Harm as part of existence : no escape in a technology-driven alternative
| dc.contributor.advisor | Du Toit, J. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Reynecke, Werner Nielen | |
| dc.contributor.researchID | 20405219 - Du Toit, Jean (Supervisor) | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-12-02T07:45:50Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2021-12-02T07:45:50Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2021 | |
| dc.description | MA (Philosophy), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | This study serves as a response to, and remediation of, utopian conceptualizations of technology-driven alternatives to human existence. Such conceptualizations often present harm-mitigation as a central criterion for the validity of their approaches, an assumption that this study will question. I firstly investigate the nature of harm as identified in Benatar's concept of anti-natalism, particularly the notion that we have different measurement criteria for assessing a life's worth depending on whether it is a life to be started (before birth - future-life) or a life to be continued (when it is already underway - present-life). I also reflect on humanity's positive view of life and its pleasures due to overly optimistic psychological states and their underlying biasedness. The study then traces a line from such harm, as experienced existentially in everyday life, to the hypothetical alternatives to everyday existence made possible by technology. The measurement tool of the Relative Asymmetric Principle (RAP), introduced by Benatar, is analyzed to show it applicability in assessing alternative forms of existence. Consequently, it is used to assess an existence's worth when it takes on alternative forms (i.e. technologydriven forms). I then illustrate that an alternative existence through technological alternatives may overcome (or reduce) some of the aspects of harm, whilst other aspects of harm remain inherent to existence (whether biological or technological). Reviewing the shortcomings of technology with the RAP, I conclude that we should be implored not to seek salvation in technology. We should instead abandon our quasi-teleological relationship with technology and instead see it for what it us: a powerful and often dangerous tool. In this study I employ a philosophical critical method based on close reading and critical analysis. I consider the incidences of harm when allowing for an anti-natalist policy of existence as postulated by Benatar and evaluate its possibilities in accordance with technology-driven alternative existences through the application of the standards set out by Benatar to determine a life's worth. | en_US |
| dc.description.thesistype | Masters | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2883-9046 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10394/38082 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
| dc.publisher | North-West University (South Africa) | en_US |
| dc.subject | Benatar | en_US |
| dc.subject | Anti-natalism | en_US |
| dc.subject | Harm | en_US |
| dc.subject | Philosophy of technology | en_US |
| dc.subject | Relational asymmetric principle | en_US |
| dc.title | Harm as part of existence : no escape in a technology-driven alternative | en_US |
| dc.type | Thesis | en_US |
