Assessment of Aerodynamic Separation Process and regulation by Nuclear Supplier Group

Abstract

Nuclear Suppliers Group recognises that in many cases, plants, equipment, and technology for uranium isotope separation have a tight relationship to plants, equipment, and technology for isotope separation of "other elements". These controls on facilities and equipment for "other element" isotope separation are in addition to controls on plants and equipment specifically constructed or equipped for the processing, use, or production of special fissionable material covered by the Trigger List. Due to the close and complementary relationship, controls of Trigger List items are employed during the regulation of plants, equipment, and technology for isotope separation of "other elements". However, these isotope separation plants, equipment, and technology of "other elements" do not meet the Especially Designed or Prepared applicable to the Trigger List. Furthermore, although the Trigger List item would trigger safeguards, the regulation of some of these plants, equipment, and technology for isotope separation of "other elements" can only be covered under the Section 2(b) of the Additional Protocol, which unlike the IAEA Safeguards, is not condition of supply. Currently, South Africa hosts a company, which uses Aerodynamic Separation Process (ASP) to separate lighter elements such as Si-28 and O-18, however, it has not been proven to separate fissile elements. Such has been the difficulty regulating the technology in South Africa, that the export and import of this company's plants, equipment and technology are controlled via the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, No. 87 of 1993 whilst the safeguards implementation is through the Nuclear Energy Act, No. 46 of 1999. However, the preceding aerodynamic technologies, i.e. the Becker process and the UCOR process, were only used for the separation of Uranium, which made them to be regarded as trigger list items. The purpose of this study was to understand the similarities and differences between the current ASP technology and UCOR process and assess the control thereof domestically in South Africa and by the NSG. It has been found out that despite the difference in the layout of the front end of the ASP plant for separation of other elements, compared to the architect of the preceding aerodynamic technologies, such as autoclave, or the lack of carrier gas in the case of natural gas separation, the controls are still the same. This means that ASP plant for separation of other elements and natural gas is still subjected to the same controls despite that fact that either it cannot be efficient for fissile material in the case of other elements, or it is not applicable in the case of natural gas. It has also been found that both the Nuclear Energy Act, No. 46 of 1999, and its Government Notice 207 of 3 February 2009 would need to be amended to standardize the control of this technology with the NSG prescripts. Similarly, the Government Notice No. 493 of 29 March 2019 would need to be repealed to ensure alignment with the NSG. The survey conducted showed lack of understanding of the non-proliferation controls by academic researchers and some officials in the nuclear safety regulation. Therefore, there is a need to increase outreach and consolidation of the non- proliferation regulatory framework to be at a single body. NSG's regulation of plants, equipment, and technology for isotope separation of "other elements" is correct, based on the responses of the technical expert industry, as they are closely related to regulation of plants, equipment, and technology for isotope separation of fissile materials, but exempted for natural gas is necessary.