CONTINENTAL PEACE AND SECURITY: ASSESSING THE ROLE OF SOUTH AFRICA IN RESTORING PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC) CONFLICT FROM 2000 – 2013

BY

MATSHEPE ELIZABETH MOLEMANE

16208838


SUPERVISORS: PROFS. BERNARD MBENGA & PROF LERE AMUSAN

2015
DECLARATION

I declare that this mini-dissertation is my own unaided work. All citations, references and borrowed ideas have been appropriately acknowledged. The dissertation is being submitted for the Masters of Arts Degree in International Relations Faculty of Human and Social Sciences, in the Department of History, Politics and International Relations of the North West University: Mafikeng Campus, South Africa. No part of the present work has been submitted previously for any degree or examination in any other University.

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ME Molemane  Profs. B Mbenga & L Amusan

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Date  Date
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My mentors Daniel Taye Medoye and Dr Kesolofetse Lefeny-Motshegare, thank you very much.
DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to the Almighty God who gave me strength when I needed it. I did all this through Christ who gave me strength.

To my loving husband Abraham Morei for the support he gave me throughout my studies, who always encouraged me even when I was discouraged. I almost gave up on my programme when the going got tough. His encouraging words and love made me to press forward. Thank you so much and may the almighty God bless you and keep you.

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Finally to all the contingent who was deployed in the peace mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2001, and all came back alive from their first operation, I salute you.
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<td>AIDS</td>
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<td>AMP</td>
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<td>MONUA</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
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<td>RCD</td>
<td>CONGOLESE RALLY FOR DEMOCRACY</td>
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ABSTRACT

The dissertation seeks to explore the intervention of South Africa in the Democratic Republic of Congo conflict from 2000 to 2013. The study was motivated by the fact that the people of the Democratic have suffered cruelly throughout the past 20th century from particularly brutal experience during the colonial rule and following independence in 1960, external interference by the foreign powers, under Mobutu’s rule. There was a periodic warfare, which even now continues in the east of the country. Hence, the quest for South Africa to mediate in order to promote peace and security in the SADC region.

After a series of meetings the Southern African Developed Countries decided to intervene. South Africa demonstrated action by sending South African National Defence Force troops to restore peace and security and the South Africa’s first contingents was sent in 2001 to try and bring stability. There are still some troops in that country. The Department of International Relations and the Minister of the South African National Defence are always in talks with the different stakeholders. Although the war is far from ending, they are still working hard to achieve their goal of restoring peace.

The study has investigated the practical issues and the root causes of the crisis and what South Africa as a leading role player in the intervention has done to alleviate the crisis. The research has revealed challenges and shortcomings which are at the core of the crisis.

- War broke out over minerals. This resulted in extreme suffering and a breakdown of infrastructure, which in turn led to other problems like shortage of water, and the collapse of the infrastructure which led to poverty and sicknesses such as Malaria, HIV and Aids and others.
CHAPTER 1

1.1 Introduction

In assessing the role of South Africa in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) conflict, it might be necessary to contextualise the conflict by undertaking a historical sojourn into the nature of the turmoil to be able to explain the rationale of South Africa’s mediatory involvement in the crisis. The generally held view is that the DRC has been in turmoil since its independence from Belgian rule in 1960. However, what seems to be of concern is the seeming impossibility of charting out a nationally acceptable political structure to create a new DRC with a relatively sustainable peace. The DRC, like every other African country, has its experience of colonial heritage, which amongst other things, involves the fusion of different ethnic/tribal groups for the self-centred interest of the colonists, and ultimately at the expense of its people (Congo/roots, 2010:1).

The war in the DRC had, no doubt, caused serious negative impact on both the lives of its people and the region, and had produced a high number of refugees in neighbouring countries, including forcing them to seek asylum in South Africa. This development on its own could be advanced to have partly motivated South Africa to mediate in the crisis, in order to curtail the influx of refugees. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) the crisis in the DRC has displaces an estimated 1.7million Congolese. Other regions of the DRC have also been affected by sporadic violence, in which the UNHCR was expected to spend $12.4 million in support of internally displaced persons (IDPs) (Ferris E and Winthrop R, 2010:2).

In what looked like an attempt to bring about a lasting solution into the DRC crisis, the 2009 peace deal between the Congolese and the Rwandan governments, led to the integration of some of the armed groups in eastern Congo in the national government. The two governments agreed to launch a joint military offensive against the National Congress for the Defence of the Congolese People (CNDP), and Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). They also agreed to restore full diplomatic relations and to activate economic
cooperation. In the same year Rwandese forces pulled out of the Congo as part of an agreement reached with Congo (IDPs) (Ferris E and Winthrop R, 2010:2).

Prior to this peace deal, South Africa has been involved in the DRC conflict for over a decade. An example of this intervention was South Africa emerging as the principal broker in Inter-Congolese Dialogue ending with the Global and All-Inclusive Peace Accord being signed in Pretoria in 2002 under the leadership of former South African President, Thabo Mbeki. However, the intervention of South Africa in the DRC turmoil has attracted mixed reactions, not only among its nationals, but also scholars and commentators, thus provoking the need for a critical analysis for the purposes of arriving at an objective interpretation of events (Firsing, 2013).

This study opines that South Africa’s mediatory role in the DRC crisis requires further elucidation, even if it is for the purpose of adding to existing body of knowledge from which more critical studies can evolve. The next section highlights the historical background of the DRC crisis.

1.2 Background

The seemingly intractable political crisis in the DRC owed, in large measure among other issues, to the country’s socio-political disparate structure, resulting from the legacies of colonialism. This much can be appreciated in the context of the historical interrogation of the country’s era of colonial and post-colonial experience. The French policy of assimilation as a way of administration and governance imposed on the DRC served as the basis of the disunity that the DRC, had to contend with the element of the policy was characterised by an obsession to create a favoured class of Africans, imbued with French culture and civilisation and later designed to enhance their status to be full French-man (Nkrumah,1963).

The Congo Free State, as it was known under King Leopold II in the 1880s, manifested this much, as it was characterised with brutal exploitation and the mass deaths that
resulted. There were virtually no laws or restrictions protecting the native Congolese and their lands. People were forced to work as potters, miners, rubber-tappers, wood cutters and railway builders for European interest because there was a little oversight and no form of organized government control. Europeans were free to adopt brutal policies of kidnapping, mutilation, robbery and murder to extract desired labour and resources from the local population. People who refused to be slaves were punished severely, their hands were cut off in public or killed in front of others. In identifying the causes of the seemingly interminable conflict in the DRC, writers contends that the availability of minerals and other forms of natural wealth such as copper, gold, diamond and others, in the country has been one reason for the continued instability and particularly, in the eastern region which borders the trio of Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi (Kasaija, 2010:189).

Upon ascension to power in 1965 through a coup d’etat, Mobutu Sese Seko, who had been Congolese army’s Chief of Staff, began a tyrannical rule and his government was characterised by corruption, personal enrichment and ethnic favouritism. Mobutu misruled Zaire for thirty-three years, engaging in divide-and-rule, warlord politics with enormous state resources and backing from the West and apartheid South Africa. He entrenched himself in power until the 90s, and perpetrated human rights violations, economic dislocation, tribalism and nepotism at home and exported political instability to the contiguous states in a strategy to retain his hold on to power (Reno, 1998).

The turmoil in the DRC has been fuelled by external forces. This manifested in the military collaboration between the Alliance of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo, who were the Kabila’s armed forces and the Rwandese National Congress for Defense who were the refugees who fled from the genocide in Rwanda, and found refuge in Eastern Congo, the People in the eastern region of the DRC bordered by both Rwanda and Burundi which is rich in mineral resources and tends to attract the attention of the two countries by getting involved in the crisis in the Congo (Dagne, 2011). However, the end of the cold war in the global system and the collapse of apartheid in South Africa in 1989, affected Mobutu’s strategy adversely. Mobutu initially, supressed
social formations, particularly ethnic groups, and demanded inclusion in government and this brought about political uprising against him. Mobutu renamed Congo as Zaire in 1971, and left it in an impoverished population and a country indebted to the level of over 200 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP)(Reno, 1998). It has been estimated that Mobutu and close friends pillaged between US $4 billion and US $10 billion of the country’s wealth, siphoning off up to 20% of its capital budget. Zaire's formal economy had shrunk by more than 40% between 1988 and 1995, and its foreign debt in 1997 was around US $14 billion (Friesecke, 1997).

In a clear sense, the DRC crisis was rooted in predation and corruption, and the external dimension of the aftermath of the 1994 genocide in neighbouring Rwanda. It must be noted that the genocide that erupted consequent upon the ethnic clash between the Hutus and the Tutsies in Rwanda had a snowballing effect on the DRC. When the Rwandese flee the genocide the closest place was DRC and they crossed the border into the DRC and became refugees in that area, and the crisis based on their historical links, which revealed that the Tutsi (Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda) who were at the centre of the on-going crisis originally had their roots from the neighbouring countries of Rwanda and Burundi (Reno, 1998).

The Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge were migrant labourers in Tanzania, the Congo and Uganda, who sought refuge in Eastern DRC to escape from Belgian draconian laws during the colonial era. Based in the Eastern Zaire for decades, they were regarded as aliens or stateless people by the Mobutu government and they were treated badly and like slaves (Akinrinade & Sesay: 1998). In September and October 1996 a massive rebellion of Banyamulenge Tutsies occurred in Eastern Zaire, in Ituri Province who found themselves on the other side of the border, threatened by the very existence of the ruling regime in Zaire. Soon after the onset of the rebellion, the autocratic Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko accused Burundi and Rwanda of provoking the conflict. Mobutu's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence claimed to possess evidence that Burundi and Rwanda had trained and armed the Banyamulenge. Mobutu was later overthrown by the Alliance for Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo under the
leadership of Laurent Kabila (Owoeye and Amusan, 2000:172).

The crisis in the DRC is no doubt in succession, beginning with the reign of Mobutu, through Joseph Kabila with no end in sight. Over the subsequent years its capita gross domestic product was 65% lower than its 1958 pre-independence level. While there was little disagreement about how bad the past was, there were few willing to place bets on its future. Following the demise of Mobutu in 1997, Kabila’s rebels took the capital, Kinshasa, and Kabila proclaimed himself president in of the country and renamed it, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Few foreign observers were not sure if he would be a saviour or a successor to Mobutu’s dictatorial ways (Friesecke, 1997).

Within one year, tensions between President Laurent Kabila and his Rwandan and Ugandan allies began to mount. Kabila changed his mind about the Hutus, he tuned against them immediately and wanted to force them back into Rwanda, the Rwandans and Ugandans abruptly switched sides and began to support rebels seeking to overthrow Kabila. He received support from Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe and later Chad, all of whom wanted the vast nation of Congo for its own purposes. Angola wanted to fight the rebels from its own civil war who were sheltered in Congo, and Zimbabwe was hoping to get rich off the mineral rights Kabila signed over in to Zimbabwe in 1997 (Kasaija, 2010:187).

In August 1998, an open conflict erupted between Kabila and Congolese forces supported by Rwanda, Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe who joined the fight in support of Kabila. In July 1999, a peace agreement (Cease-Fire Agreement) at a summit in Lusaka, Zambia, was signed by Uganda, Rwanda, Congo Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola, the agreement provided for, amongst others, a ceasefire, disarmament of all the non-governmental forces, the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the DRC territory and the holding of inter-Congolese Dialogue to find a new political dispensation for the country. It also called for political dialogue among Congolese political and armed groups to settle their differences peacefully and to map out new political chapter for Congo, which Kabila never lived to witness, because he was assassinated by one of his
bodyguards, in January 2001. The former President of Botswana, Sir Ketumile Masire was appointed to facilitate the talks between the rebels and Kabila. Few weeks later his son Joseph was sworn in as the President (Kasaija, 2010:188).

The peace negotiations were re-launched again in 2002, after Joseph Kabila took power and in December all the Congolese belligerents, civil society groups and unarmed opposition movements signed a Cease Fire Agreement in South Africa. The agreement stated that by the end of 2002 all the troops from Angola, Zimbabwe, Rwanda and Uganda will be fully withdrawn from Congo. The rapid progress was made on paper, but the situation for civilians on the ground, especially women, and children remained difficult through hunger, malaria and malnutrition. Although open fighting between the government and rebels became rare, both sides continued to control, and in some cases ethnically cleanse targeted populations (UN Report, 2010:4).

In April 2002, the DRC government agreed to a power-sharing arrangement with Ugandan supported rebels and signed a peace accord that Uganda should remove its troops in DRC, which did not happen. In July 2003, the Congo’s new power-sharing government was inaugurated, but the fighting and killings continued and in April 2004 hundreds of civilians were massacred in the Eastern Province in an ethnic conflict by the rebels.

The 2004 insurgency in Bukavu erupted due to protesters in several Congolese who took to the streets in the demonstration against the UN for failing to prevent Bukavu from falling to Rwandan-backed Rally for Congolese Democracy Forces (RCD) led by General Nkunda. It was found by Rwanda during the outbreak of the rebellion. Congo became restive and Rwanda continued to support rebel groups fighting the DRC government to support Nkunda (Global Witness, 2013).

In April 2012, violence began to escalate, centred on a new rebellion in the eastern highlands led by the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23). This movement was formed in May 2009 by the Armée nationale congolaise, the former military troops of the CNDP. The
M23 thus derived its name from the Peace Agreement signed between the DRC government and Congres National pour la Defense du Peuple (CNDP) between 2006 and 2009 in the city of Goma (Koko, 2013:60). A rebellion against what it considered the failure of the DRC government to address the poor working conditions in the army, and the government’s unwillingness to implement a 2009 peace deal. They were a group of about 300 soldiers, made up primarily of the Tutsi, who had defected from the army following the threat by the DRC government to redepoly them away from their preferred operational base for security concerns. In an assessment of the impact of rebel groups in the DRC crisis, a (UNHCR Global Report, 2013), revealed that there were 2.6 million people displaced in Congo and over 30 different armed groups. There were thousands of killings and rapes each year. The UN had deployed one of its largest peacekeeping missions there, and half a dozen peace process and agreements such Lusaka Cease-Fire and others failed to bring an end to the fighting.

According to a Newspaper article in the International Spectator, (1999:45-54), the situation in the DRC was misleading, that there was stability then, while it was not the case. However it is necessary to diagnose the root of the conflict and the cause. The root cause of the conflict is mainly about the minerals which some of the Congolese did not even know exists. People occupied the eastern part of the country where minerals are found. Although the Western media have often taken shortcuts in focusing on the scourge of sexual violence and conflict on minerals, a close reading suggested that it was not local warlords and mining companies that were behind these. Some were interested in the minerals which the Congo has such as diamond, gold, copper and other minerals that can enrich that country.

Due to the Congo’s weakness and instability, the ruling party in Rwanda (Rwanda Patriotic Front) took it upon themselves to back up armed groups (the RCD and AFDL) in the eastern Kivu region of Congo which it considered to be its backyard. The conflict continued not because of these local protagonists but also due to the failures of the foreign diplomats and activists, who were looking after their own interests such as the United States of America, who had not grappled with the underlying dynamics. The
United Nations Security Council’s tenuous authority in Africa, has been further threatened by an explosive new report from a UN Group of Experts showing wide-ranging violations of the arms embargo on Congo-Kinshasa by both Western and African states. The expert panel reported that many killer militias in Eastern Congo had been receiving military orders from leaders based in Germany and France and getting finance from two Spanish based charities linked to the Roman Catholic Church in clear breach of UN sanctions regime. The report also accused the governments of Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania and Congo Kinshasa of allowing serious breaches of sanctions and the illegal export of mineral wealth. This has produced a piecemeal response guided more by the interest of outside powers USA, and France and those of aid bureaucracies than by a strategy for solving the conflict. Throughout the crisis donors, mostly the USA and a handful of European countries have supplied over 40% of the budgets of Congo and Rwanda, but they have rarely displayed the commensurate political and diplomatic muscle necessary to leverage this aid towards a sustainable solution (Manso, 2012; UNHCR Global Report, 2012).

Other African governments have stayed on the side lines because they respected the Congo’s state’s sovereignty. These diplomatic failings have been particularly striking during the past seven years when the last serious peace process was concluded, donors had adopted a post-conflict or stabilization strategy, epitomised by a mandate that focused on supporting the government in Kinshasa. At the same time, the UN peacekeeping mission had been stripped of any role in negotiating between the Congolese government and the rebels (Stearns, 2013:3).

1.3 Statement of the Problem

The study has put into context the intervention by South Africa in its efforts of addressing the DRC crisis. The issue of peace is high on South Africa’s agenda, and South Africa has played a pivotal role to help resolve the DRC conflict in the past. The global and All-inclusive Peace Accord between DRC and main rebel groups was signed in Pretoria on 17 December 2002. South African National Defence Force (SANDF) has been
sending troops to the DRC as part of South African Development Community (SADC)’s Standby Force, so as to promote peace and security in the region. Despite its contribution of over 1 000 soldiers to United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), there was a general consensus by the world that more needs to be done (“Roots of the Crisis” Article, 2015:2).

The role of SA’s government in the DRC conflict still remains blurred today, amidst the peace agreements that have been entered into and the deployment of peace troops into the DRC.

1.4 Objectives of the study

The study aims to assess the role of South Africa in restoring peace and security in the DRC focusing on the period 2000 – 2013.

- To identify the key role players in that conflict;
- To identify key peace agreements that was signed in order to curb the prevalence of that conflict;
- To determine or establish the role that SA played in an attempt to resolve the conflict;
- To identify the shortcomings within the intervention strategies; and also why key agreements failed to take root especially South Africa;
- To make recommendations on how future conflicts in the region can be resolved.
- The study shall provide an in-depth knowledge of how internal armed conflicts can be best resolved, especially where there are external forces, mediators and external intervention strategies. Given the nature of the conflict in DRC, if there were no external parties and factors to the factors to the conflict, the conflict could have been easily resolved.
1.5 Research Questions

- What are the root causes of the DRC crisis and why was South Africa attracted to get involved in a mediatory capacity?
- To what extent has South Africa supported the peace process from 2000 to 2013?
- What is the human security, and economic interest nexus in the context of what attracted South Africa into the DRC crisis?
- What are the implications of external interference on the DRC crisis?
- What policy suggestions can be offered in determining South Africa’s mediatory intervention in the internal crisis of any African country?

1.6. Significance of the study

The significance of this study lies in the fact that at the conclusion of the investigations on the role South Africa played in restoring peace and security in the DRC, the scholar will come up with suggestion on how to deal with this crisis.

1.7. Hypothesis

The study argues that South Africa’s involvement in the DRC crisis was a justifiable diplomatic decision since its aim was to restore peace and order in the Eastern region. Also if other neighbouring countries or the SADC region assisted in resolving this conflict, the conflict could have been resolved at an early stage.

1.8 Limitations of the study

This study focuses only on the conflict in the DRC from 2000 to 2013?
1.9. Organization of the study

The study comprises of six chapters which are divided into two sections. In this respect chapter 1-3 introduces the issues of the topic, reviews literature in this field and discusses research methodology while another three chapters provide the findings, oral interviews and conclusion.

1.10. Research Methodology

In pursuit of this exercise, the researcher employs qualitative research methods. Qualitative research is designed to reveal a target audience’s range of behaviour and perceptions that drove it with reference to specific topics or issues. It is a method that uses in-depth studies of small groups of people to guide and support the construction of hypotheses. The results of qualitative research are descriptive rather than predictive (QRCA, 2015:1). According to (Nieuwenhuis & Maree, 2007:78). The qualitative research model is based on a naturalistic approach that seeks to understand “phenomena in context (or real-world setting) and, in general the researcher does not attempt to manipulate the phenomenon of interest. In other words, research is carried out in real-life situations and not in an experimental (test-retest) situation”. Further still, it is his view that qualitative research methodology is concerned with understanding the processes, social and cultural contexts which underlie various behavioral patterns and is mostly concerned with exploring the “why” questions of research. With particular reference to this study, a qualitative design approach will be used to address the “Why” questions relating to the DRC crisis.

Related to the foregoing on the focus of qualitative research method is the view of (Creswell, 2009:145), that qualitative research is a means for exploring and understanding the meaning, individuals or groups attribute to a human problem whereby a role of research involves emerging questions and procedures, data typically collected in the participants setting, data analysis inductively building from particulars to general themes, and the researcher making interpretations of the meaning of the data.
In general terms, what distinguishes qualitative research method from other methods is that its collectable data and mostly expressed using words. It can also be described as interpretive and humanistic as it seeks to discover the internal meaning from the respondents or interviewees by exploring issues under study beyond the standard responses such as yes or no, especially in the case of questionnaire.

The need for the use of questionnaire for this study has arisen in view of the fact that some of the potential respondents may feel reluctant to discuss issues.

It is relevant to restate that this study has assessed the role of South Africa in pursuit of peace in the DRC. It will be recalled, as noted in the preceding sections of this study, that the conflict in DRC, especially in the eastern region, had been raging since the 90’s and resulted in the deaths of millions of Congolese nationals and potential foreigner-victims such as the people who were fleeing the genocide in Rwanda, Ugandans, Burundians, and other refugees from neighbouring countries. The researcher will also use literature sources written by other scholars, internet sources, policy documents, United Nations and African Union reports, etc.

1.11. Data Collection methods

Qualitative data has been collected through interviews with army officials who were deployed to the Eastern DRC, the very first contingency who served as peacekeepers in 2001. Descriptive information such as gender, age and nationality has been asked from each participant to confirm the knowledge of what their experience was, interview from the Democratic of Republic of Congo High Commission; Institute of Security Studies, an interview guide was used to encourage participants to tell their story about the DRC war and if there have been any changes in the country and in people’s lives since the mediation by South Africa.
1.12 Data analysis method

Scholars state that data analysis is the application of logic to understand and interpret the data that has been collected about a subject. As a result, data collected has been clustered according to each approach used in order to develop theory of common roles utilized to influence effectiveness of re-integration.

Audio taped interviews will be used to clearly articulate the information provided by the participants. In order to validate the data and strengthen findings from the study, the system of triangulation will be used. Triangulation uses multiple methods to ensure that each phenomenon is thoroughly examined from different perspective (Kerr, 2002).

1.13. Secondary Sources

This includes special publications, periodicals, journals, newspaper articles and interviews from researchers at the Institute of Security studies; internet sources. Additionally, this study will seek comments from scholars of the War College in SANDF who originates from DRC and the staff from DRC High Commission based in Pretoria.

1.14. Ethical Consideration

In this study, the researcher is mindful of the need to protect the identities of potential participants that will be contacted for information which this study required for analysis. Hence, the researcher has ensured that they will not be hurt or harmed in any way as results of information supplied. In other words, the study will strictly operate within ethical guidelines to protect the integrity of every identifiable respondent who will be informed that their participation is voluntary and that they can withdraw at any stage.
1.15. Conclusion

The last chapter of this research consists of the researcher’s findings, conclusions and recommendations. The study will conclude by summarising the major issues arising from the findings as well as suggesting necessary recommendations for future studies. The chapter presented a background of the study, the problem statement, research questions and objectives of the study. Thereafter the chapter also outlined the qualitative method or exploration and the data collection techniques, outline of the chapters and finally the summary. The following is to be expected in the next chapter, and the literature review.
Figure 1: *below shows the map of DRC and its neighbouring countries.*
CHAPTER 2

2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW

In this section, the author criticises a selected number of prominent scholars’ works and one by one and comes up with the strengths and weaknesses of their works on the DRC conflict. The author comes up with what can be taken as a solution to end violence or come up with a new perspective that will ease the conflict in the DRC. It may be that states’ preference with regard to humanitarian intervention in the Eastern DRC was selfish in practice. Theoretical considerations have on the questions of which actions should sanction intervention and which actors should intervene. Finally it will be demonstrated that it is possible to reconceptualise the debate, through combining the principle of sovereignty with human rights, to form a theorizing humanitarian intervention. In order to understand the concept of humanitarian intervention, it is important to analyse the concept of humanitarian intervention independently (Ayoob, 2002; Baer, 2011; Bellamy, 2003; Gomes, 2010; Roberts, 2000).

Scholars who believe that morality justifies intervention in the pursuit of preventing human rights violations, and those who defend the political morality of authority, with the sovereign state as a supreme moral authority, the state has the responsibility to protect its own subjects. Much of the debate concerning morality stems from the works of Kant and Rosseau who, according to Gomes, concludes that it is unjust to stand idly while massive human rights violations occurs, when it is clearly possible to stop the atrocity through intervention (Devetak, 2007 :1); (Steinkraus WE, 2010: 22).

The DRC’s challenges are regarded as the microcosm of problems faced by Africa and the masses of its people. It is maintained that it constitutes the strategic heart of the socio-political, economic and financial trade, human resources development, military and technological transformation of Africa. It has been posing challenges to the African continent in terms of Africa’s response to its conflict and contribution to its resolution. Developed countries in advancing their strategic interests in the DRC and using the country for their own interests, particularly in central and southern Africa, added this
challenge to Africa. It is in the interest of the transformation that African countries should play an active role in paving a way for the transformation of the DRC. Africa has a socio-political and economic obligation to actively contribute towards the transformation of the DRC. The country’s centrality, size and enormous natural resources make this an investment not only in the DRC and its people, but also in the future of the African continent and its people (Sehlare, 2011:150).

The fact that developed countries have been maintaining in practice that any government that any government in the DRC must serve their strategic interests and that these interests are opposed to those of the people of the country, and the continent is such that they cannot be expected to pave the way for the transformation of the DRC. The problems of the DRC are African problems to be solved by Africans themselves, and not the West. If African countries do not coordinate their policies in support of the Congolese people, developed countries will continue to use the DRC for their own strategic interests against the transformation of the continent (Batina, 2007).

There were some mistakes made in the past that leaded to war, like housing the Rwandan refugees during the 1994 genocide. It is clear that because Ugandans, Namibians, Angolans who were also miners in that country turned against the Congo government and became the worst enemies, those were stateless people rescued from war in their countries. The overcrowding and misunderstandings were caused mostly by refugees in the eastern Congo.

The former General Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in his report Prevention of Armed Conflict, called upon countries to move from a culture of reaction, to a culture of prevention. There is no doubt that a change of this kind was desperately needed in Great Lakes region as elsewhere. Promotion of democracy in the Great Lakes could bring peace because liberal democracy culture may make the leaders get accustomed to negotiation and compromise. Another is that belief in human rights may make people in democracies reluctant to go to war, especially against another democracy (Weart, 1998:4);(Miller & Wolf, 2004:17). South Africa and the responsibility to protect states
Sovereignty and regime and as a major player in the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU). The country is certainly one of Africa’s nascent but strong democracies with avowed soft-power aspirations in Africa as well within the international community. South Africa’s foreign policy advocates principles revolving around a commitment to the promotion of human rights, democracy, justice and international law in the conduct of international relations (Aboagye, 2012 : 29).

2.1.1 Soft Power

The concept of soft power was introduced in the late 190s by Joseph Nye, who described it as the ability to influence the behaviour of others to the outcomes one wants. There are several ways in which it can be achieved like one can coerce them with threats; you can induce them with payments; or one can attract and co-opt them to want what one wants. This soft power getting others to want the outcomes you want co-opts people rather than coerces them. It can also be contrasted with hard power, which is the use of coercion and payment. Soft power can be wielded not just by states but also by all actors in international politics, such as NGOs or international institutions, it is also considered the second face of power that indirectly allows you to obtain the outcomes you want. A country’s soft power, according to Nye rests on three resources:

• Culture – In places where it is attractive to others
• Political values – When it lives up to them at home and abroad
• Foreign Policies – When others see them as legitimate and having moral authority

Nye further quoted that “A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries – admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness – wants to follow it. In this sense, it is also important to set the agenda and attract others in world politics, and not only force them to change by threatening military force or economic sanctions. This soft power getting others to want the outcomes that you want, co-opts people rather than coerces them. Soft power resources are the assets that produce attraction which often leads to acquiescence,” that
“Seduction is always more effective than coercion, and many values like democracy, human rights and individual opportunities are deeply seductive.”

Codevilla observed that an often overlooked essential aspect of soft power is that different parts of populations are attracted or repelled by different things, ideas, images, or prospects. Soft power according to Codevilla soft power is hampered when policies, culture, values repel others instead of attracting them.

Although Niall Ferguson, neorealist and other rationalist and neorationalist authors dismisses soft power out of hand as they assert that actors in international relations respond to only two types of incentives:

• Economic incentives and
• Force

Soft power then represents the third behavioural way of getting the outcomes you want. It is contrasted with hard power, which has historically been the predominant realist measure of national power, through quantitative metrics such as population size, concrete military assets or a nation’s gross domestic product. But having such resources does not always produce the desired outcomes, as the United States discovered in the Vietnam War. Soft power is more than influence can also rest on the hard power of threats of payments. And soft power is more than just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument, though that is an important part of it. It is also the ability to attract, and attraction often leads to acquiescence. In international relations, soft power is generated only in part by what the government does through its policies and public diplomacy.

2.1.1.1. South Africa and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

While South Africa participated in the regarding discourse earlier, the foregoing analysis will be relied upon as the basis to justify South Africa’s involvement in the efforts to
resolve the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo. South Africa was a major player in the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU), which was formally launched in Durban in 2003.

The country is certainly one of Africa’s nascent but strong democracies with avowed soft-power aspirations in Africa as well within the international community. South Africa’s foreign policy advocates principles revolving around a commitment to the promotion of human rights, democracy, justice and international law in the conduct of international relations.

These principles include, among others, a commitment to international peace and agreed international mechanisms for conflict resolution as well as enhancing Africa’s position in world affairs. (Aboagye, 2012: 29). These principles, together with South Africa’s unprecedented double non-permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 2007/8 and 2011/12, has helped to place the country at the centre of the Responsibility to protect R2P discourse and practice but have also posed serious challenges to South Africa’s foreign policy choices

2.1.1.2 Responsibility to Protect

The notion of sovereignty as responsibility had entered the protection discourse in the early 1990s. Thus in 2001, the International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) produced its seminal report on what is now called the Responsibility to protect (R2P). The report prominently underlined the idea of sovereignty as responsibility, drawing a connection between international humanitarian interventions and the limits of the principle of non-interference in circumstances in which a state cannot or does not want to protect its population from genocide, war and crime against humanity or ethnic cleansing (Malte, 2012:2).
2.2. According to the ICISS, the report R2P encompasses three pillars namely:

(a) **The responsibility to prevent:** The responsibility to address both the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises putting population at risk.

(b) **The responsibility to react:** The responsibility to respond to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and extreme, cases military intervention, and

(c) **The responsibility to rebuild:** The responsibility to provide, particularly after a military intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert. Furthermore, the ICISS developed so-called ‘precautionary principles’ which aim at curtailing potential misuse of military interventions, foreseeing the politically highly contested content of R2P.

2.2.1 There are precautionary principles:

(a) **Right Intention:** The primary purpose of the intervention, whatever other motives intervening states may have, must be to halt or avert human suffering. Right intention is better assured which multilateral operations, clearly supported by regional opinion and the victims concerned.

(b) **Last Resort:** Military intervention can only be justified when every non-military option for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing lesser measures would not have succeeded.
South Africa became a democratic nation in 1994 and as a result assumed full-fledged membership of the international community regional and multilateral organizations such as the African Union, Common Wealth of nations and the United Nation (UN) since then, South Africa has been involved in the resolution of conflicts and promotion of peace and stability on the wider African continent. (Sidiropoulus, 2007:2) argues that South Africa’s engagement with Africa rest on three pillars viz. Strengthening Africa regional South Africa Customs Union (SACU) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Continental African Union (AU) institutions by enhancing South Africa’s proactive participation in the bodies aimed at promoting integration and development. Supporting the implementation of Africa’s socio-economic development program, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and of the SADC’s Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), the regional expression of NEPAD. Strengthening bilateral relations through structures for dialogue and co-operation. This includes support for peace, security, stability and post-conflict reconstruction initiatives and South Africa’s participation in the implementation of Africa’s peace and Security agenda and the management of peace missions. Implicit in these perspectives is the fact South Africa cannot be indifferent to developments especially within the African Continent which would unavoidably pose challenges to it, politically, economically, militarily (security concerns) among other related issues of human activity.

Besides, South Africa’s involvement in the effort to bring about peace in the (DRC) it would appear to be predicated on the joint communiqué signed by both South Africa and DRC on the platform of Bi-national Commission (BNC) on Friday 29th April 2005 in Pretoria. In specific terms the two countries signed agreements covering the following areas of co-operation, Political and diplomatic consultation; Governance and administration; Defence and Security; Economy, Finance and infrastructure. During the occasion, the two countries expressed satisfaction with the outcome of the BNC and their determination to reinforce the positive dynamic in their bilateral relations. Following this situation, South Africa expressed its firm commitment to support the government of the DRC and its people in their efforts towards the sustainable peace and reconstruction and encouraged the government of the DRC to continue its plans to hold
elections in line with the Global all-inclusive agreement.

In pursuit of what can be regarded as South Africa’s agenda in the African continent, is the fact that since its independence in 1994, South Africa has worked assiduously in the report to African conflicts, which have continuity constituted a challenge to development in Africa since for example; it is on record that on 24th February 2013. South Africa joined ten other African Countries as well as the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), the International Conference in the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and the South African Development Community (SADC), in signing the Peace, Security and Co-operation Framework for the DRC and the region. In fact, this event was regarded as the most commendable and acceptable international mechanism to resolve the challenge of the recurring conflicts in the DRC. The framework set out a national government for the DRC, for the countries of the region as well as for the international community. In this regard, South Africa is designated a member of the group to execute regional oversight with the responsibility to ensure that the countries of the region adhere to their commitments (Aboagye, 2012:29).

A significant outcome of the consultations by the stakeholders earlier mentioned in the study was the proposal that a dedicated intervention brigade be established within the UN mission in the DRC (MUNOSCO). This was immediately followed with the adoption by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2098 which among other things, extended the mandate of MONUSCO in the DRC until March 2014, and the establishment of the Intervention Brigade under direct command of the MONUSCO Force Commander, charged with the responsibility of neutralizing armed groups, thus working for a return to stability that was an essential pre-condition for finding lasting political solution.

It can be argued that the overriding content of South Africa’s bilateral relations, with the DRC was aimed at assisting the country to develop the capacity to effectively manage its programs within the framework of its own part of the conflict reconstruction and Development Program, like to rehabilitate the victims and place the misplaced victims by
supplying them with houses as they have lost all what they had during the war. Additionally, it can be argued that South Africa’s involvement in the peace mission constituted an inseparable commitment of its emerging foreign policy focus that there shall be peace and harmony (Aboagye, 2012: 29).

Furthermore, it will be necessary to mention that research focused on South Africa’s involvement in the resolution of the DRC crisis has been scanty, and where there is a semblance of scholarly work, it is only obtainable from journal articles or classified documents from South Africa’s governmental departments or archives.

However, this study adopted an eclectic approach by examining the few available but related scholarly works done in the efforts to resolve the DRC crisis by countries in southern Africa with the view to determining likely areas of inadequacy on such research studies. In doing this, emphasis will be placed on assessing the role of South Africa to engender peace in the endemic crises in the DRC. Additionally, it is relevant to mention that owing to the fact that the DRC crises is in transition, scholarly works for review are mainly accessible as papers presented at conferences and academic fora, which in part have either be assembled for publication or published in reputable journals. On South Africa and peace keeping operations Nhlapo opines that the genocide in Rwanda emerged as the maiden attempt in peace keeping exercise by South Africa shortly after its emergence as a new democracy (Nhlapo, 1999:127).

Specifically, South Africa was called upon to work together with the United Nations, African Union and other international bodies charged with responsibility to prevent a continuation of the horror in Rwanda, and to try and assist that afflicted country on the part of rehabilitation. Expectedly, South Africa was not in a position to make an immediate contribution towards peace keeping activities owing to its inadequacies in the area of structural, administrative and practical capacity like being immediately ready to contribute meaningfully to any multinational ventures such as Rwanda genocide, regardless of its heartfelt desire to start playing its rightful role as a responsible member of the international society (Nhlapo, 1999:127-128).
Nhlapo is of the opinion that South Africa operates on a guiding philosophy regarding peacekeeping. This results from absence of direct experience of peacekeeping on the part of South Africa. The philosophy is reflected in the benefit of the very dynamic international debates that were brought about by the genocide in Rwanda, the UN experience in Somalia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)'s experience in Bosnia. In the opinion of Nhlapo for an effective peacekeeping effort on the part of South Africa, it has to be acknowledged that no conflict can be solved only by addressing the symptoms while immediate relief of the symptoms may be a short-term priority. For South Africa, the inclination was to investigate thoroughly the causes of conflicts generally in order to avoid an escalation or a resurgence of the violence in the Eastern DRC.

In other words, South Africa's involvement in peacekeeping activity will always be informed by its assessment of the possible outcome of any peace mission. This way, it is believed that early action based on proper analysis of early warning signals would yield better outcomes. While Nhlapo recognizes the need for South Africa to mobilize adequate funding to enable it to participate effectively in peacekeeping engagements, South Africa was always ready to participate in peace missions in Africa.

At the level of analysis Nhlapo's assessment of the role of South Africa in peace mission is commendable. However, his analysis is manifestly probabilistic and futuristic. This is evident in the fact that South Africa may not be adequately positioned to creditably partake in executing joint peacekeeping operation, given its experience. The study provided a clearer position on what South Africa would do or how effectively it would respond to peacekeeping invitations in the Great Lakes. In view of Mashimbye, overriding content of South Africa's current bilateral relations with the DRC is aimed at assisting the country to develop. This has been reflected on the general co-operation agreement signed by South Africa and the DRC in February 2004. Since the dawn of its own democracy in 1994 SA has been involved in resolution of conflicts and promotion of peace and stability on the wider African continent. In the DRC, South Africa’s involvement was encouraged by its vision to see the end of human suffering and the
emancipation of the DRC people following the intra-and-inter-state wars of the late 90s. South Africa played in role in bringing an end to the war by being directly involved in a number of mediation talks, which led to the DRC’s first democratic election in 2006, which is believed will strengthen bilateral political, economic and technical co-operation and made provision for the establishment of a Bi-national Commission (BNC) as an annual forum for exchange and dialogue.

In the realm of military/defence forces, Mashimbye argues that South Africa supports the DRC government in its approach to issues related to the integration of the army, demobilization and reinsertion into normal civilian life especially in rural areas, the promotion of small scale development project that would assist local communities to facilitate the reintegration of the demobilized soldiers, the issue of women and children in armed groups and the integration of disabled soldiers.

At the level of politics, South Africa is noted to have rendered significant financial and logistical support enabling the DRC to host credible elections. In 2006, South Africa provided significant assistance to ensure that the Presidential and Parliamentary elections were held in DRC. In practical terms, the South African National Defense Force (SANDF) assisted to move tons of ballot papers and other electoral materials from South Africa to distribution hubs in the DRC. In financial terms, the South African Government provided funding approximating 126 million rand to ensure that the elections took place with the view to ensure that democracy was consolidated in the DRC.

In addition, the South African Government Department of Home Affairs provided capacity-building training on population and immigration matters. The training of facilitators, and identification of relevant equipment and infrastructure usage which were supplied by the Home Affairs of the South African Government and the development of operating procedures. In assessing the foregoing categories of assistance by South Africa to the DRC as highlighted by Mashimbye, it is fair to describe these forms of assistance as commendable. However, he did not attempt to highlight what South
Africa stands to benefit in the spirit of reciprocity. In specific terms, the nature of bilateral relationship between South Africa and the DRC would appear to be one-sided in favour of the DRC. A likely consequence of this scenario is the possibility of the negative perception of the public in South Africa being against the home government.

The role of outsiders in attempting to resolve conflicts has been a long tradition of the third party mediation in the context of international relations. This is evidently documented since the time of the Greek City States and the Roman Empire in the west and later evolved into a recognizable pattern of interstate diplomacy in the early modern period. According to the below three authors, the leading role was played in a somewhat ad hoc fashion by neighbouring states and foreign powers mainly in their own interest in Goma, Bunya and Bukavu. Following the devastating experience of the II World War the United Nations under chapter VI of its Charter made provision for a set of techniques which it can use in order to secure the peaceful settlement of disputes including fact finding, good offices, conciliation and mediation and negotiation (Miall; Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse, 2004: 35),

Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council (SC) was vested with powers to use coercion and armed force is necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. While it is fair to remark that Miall and others provided useful information on the developments of efforts by countries to mediate in the crisis within member countries, the scholars did not attempt to reflect on why South Africa got involved in the DRC crisis which is the focus of this study.

South Africa has worked assiduously, on the helping to resolve African conflict. This perhaps, has been made possible by the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) which came into effect as its first summit in Durban in 2002. The Act is regarded as the most ambitious continental document that Africa has created since decolonization and came into being to condemn and reject unconstitutional changes of government and commits members to respecting democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law, and good governance among other issues of concern.
The constitutive Act has as one of its provisions, the non-interference in the internal affairs of a member state.

This notwithstanding, the Act also provides for the union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances which include among others, war crimes, genocide and crime against humanity. South Africa, alongside Nigeria, Algeria, Mozambique and Senegal were vociferous for the inclusion in the Constitutive Act of the right to intervene in the affairs of member states in grave circumstances. In the light of this, it can be argued that the formal launch of the peace and Security Council of the African Union is 2004 is part of institution backup to execute the mandate of the AU in respect of peace and security crisis on the continent. Upon the inauguration of Security Council of AU, South Africa was elected to serve for an initial three year term (Sidiropoulous, 2007:3-4).

This role is to be further complemented as a key financial contributor to many of the Peace and Security Council (PSA) commitments. It is equally argued that under President Mbeki, South Africa was deeply involved in both elements of the continental peace and security agenda. This was not the reflection of Mbeki’s own African and Pan-Africanist leanings but also of South Africa’s growing confidence in engaging with the continent given the experience of the apartheid regime and the role of the former South African Defense Force in the Southern African region. In this instance, South Africa has made prominent contribution to the evolution of a more effective continental institutional framework with regional peace and security apparatus. Additionally, South Africa has taken a leading role in negotiating settlements of key conflicts such as the Great Lakes and has consequently deployed peace keeping troops under United Nations or African Union mandates.

At the level of analysis, Sidiropoulous’ exploration of the role of South Africa in areas of commitment to the resolution of crisis in Africa is commendable and laudable. This is evident from its activities engaged in DRC, alongside other African countries in the efforts at ensuring peace in Africa as highlighted in the foregoing. However, it is clearly
notable from Sidiropoulous’ analysis, the absence of any instance where South Africa has unilaterally spearheaded a peacekeeping arrangement encompassing logistics, funding and restoration of order in a given crisis-ridden DRC. Besides, Sidiropoulous’ analysis also suffers the weakness of not highlighting the peculiar challenges confronting South Africa in its declared intention to bring about peace in war-torn states in Africa. This study, had comprehensively addressed this weakness by proposing relevant recommendations for use by stakeholders in the DRC crisis (Sidiropoulous, 2007:3-4).
CHAPTER 3

3.1 Data presentation and analysis

3.1.1. The origin of the DRC conflict

On August 1998, barely fourteen months after the conclusion of the war initiated by the anti-Mobutu coalition, the emergence of a new armed movement heralded the beginning of a second war of liberation in the DRC, this time against the regime of Laurent Kabila. The conflict arose out of differences between the founder members of the Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-Zaire Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (ADFL), the coalition that installed Kabila as the head of Congo in May 1997. Military victory against Mobutu’s army offered only temporary healing to the dissension that plagued the movement from its inception. Kabila’s decision in July 1998 to dismiss the Rwandan contingent of the Forces Armees Congolaises Congolese Armed Forces (FAC) thus served as a catalyst to a crisis that was already underway. The anti-Kabila rebellion was largely the creation of Ugandan and Rwandan governments whose hostility towards Kabila was fuelled by a dubious notion of national interest. But the emergence of the rebel opposition was also a function of the failure of the ADFL regime to construct a broad domestic constituency by opening the political space to civil society groups and NGO’s (Afoaku, 2010:109).

Not only did Laurent Kabila impose autocratic rule on Congo, but his government also failed to take a principled stance on the Bayamulenge nationality question, as well as on the security concerns of his principal allies. Essentially, Kabila pursued a contentious foreign policy without the benefits of a supportive domestic political base. Not surprisingly, his fledgling regime was ill-equipped to handle pressures from overbearing allies (and their Western patrons) that had an important stake in a friendly and stable Congo. Significantly, more than two years after the rebels embarked on what turned out to be “Africa’s first world war”, they were unable to achieve their stated objectives of replacing the Kabila dictatorship with a transitional government of national unity,
restoring popular confidence in the Congolese state, and jump-starting the process of national reconciliation and state reconstruction.

The research argues that not only were there serious discrepancies among stated motivations (Ofoaku, 2002:110) by examining the rebels' motivations and strategies. The argument is that not only were there serious discrepancies among the stated motivations of the various anti-Kabila rebel groups, but they lacked the politically cost-effective strategy needed to attain their objectives. Specifically, the rebels committed a serious political blunder by entering into an alliance with Rwanda and Uganda because the Rwandans and Ugandans first went to seek refuge and some were used by Kabila and they capitalised in his weaknesses. Kabila’s erstwhile allies who were deeply resented by many Congolese for exerting undue influence on their national affairs.

This relationship made it difficult because they were mixed multitudes of refugees who turned to be used by Kabila for his personal agenda to separate the rebels’ so called “emancipatory” agenda from the economic and security interests of their allies because of their personal interest in minerals produced by Congo such as diamonds and others. Further, Kabila’s opponents relied heavily on an ill-conceived strategy of the refugees who were on his side were used to overthrow the government through lightning military defeat of the FAC (or what was left of the latter after significant desertions by disloyal soldiers (Afoaku, 2002:111).

Unfortunately, following the decision by Angola and Zimbabwe to come to Kabila’s rescue and the resulting shift in the balance of power, Congo became the theatre of a protracted and intensely brutal conflict. The rebels ignored Kabila’s proven capacity for rallying domestic support by exploiting the growing anti-Rwanda sentiment in the country.

Similarly, by equating Kabila with Mobutu they could not foresee the government’s success in manipulating the ambiguous notions of state sovereignty and territorial
integrity to its advantage. As evidenced by the non-violent stance of the civil opposition, the rebels grossly underestimated the people’s intolerance for the use of force to resolve political differences.

Finally, not only was the anti-Kabila movement fragmented from its inception because they didn’t share the same political ideologies, but rebel forces further alienated the Congolese masses by engaging in human rights violations, financial corruption, destruction, looting and similar practices that made them look like an army of occupation.

Apparently, there was a consensus among Congo rebels about the deficits of the Kabila regime, and the rebellion was intended to correct and forestall the recurrence of those deficits. Since the rebels were important actors in the events that led up to Congo’s second war. What follows is a preliminary effort to shed light on their motivations and strategies by determining the extent to which they made a systematic attempt to apply the critical lessons offered by Kabila’s misrule.

Unlike Etienne Tshisekedi and the other opposition leaders, whose credibility was tainted as a result of their involvement in the Mobutu system, Kabila initially enjoyed the political advantage of being perceived as a faithful disciple of Patrice Lumumba, Congo’s slain nationalist and first premier, and unwavering opponent of Mobutu. Given its own socio-economic challenges of unparalleled inequities between blacks and whites, grotesque levels of poverty, and sluggish economic growth on the home front, it was the policy position of Pretoria that South Africa needed a stable environment in Southern and central Africa (Afoaku, 2002:111 - 113).

The policy holds that such a stable regional terrain was essential in order to facilitate trade on the continent. South Africa further wanted to contain, and more ideally prevent, a spill over of such conflicts into its own territory. Specifically, South Africa would like to avoid refugee flows, as pockets among all races in the country’s population are already highly xenophobic. Thus, any assessment of the rationales behind South Africa’s policy towards the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) should
focus not so much on exclusive, bilateral relations but on Pretoria’s broader geo-regional policy and strategies. For South Africa the conflicts in central and Southern Africa are inextricably intertwined, forming as they do an “arc of conflict”. Thus Pretoria’s policy position and options towards the late Laurent Kabila’s embattled DRC must be located within the framework of South Africa’s overall Africa policy (Afoaku, 2002: 114).

The context of the “Renaissance Africa” was also helpful in probing its stance vis-à-vis the Congo war. This context included South African economic interests as well. For if South Africa’s economic relations with the rest of the continent are to drive Africa’s renewal, the South African corporate sector, especially its mining-industrial core, was expected to buy into the renaissance project. Anglo/De Beers has historically had a major stake in the Southern African mining industry, reaching north into the Congo. Other South African private sector conglomerates included SASOL, ESKOM and GENCOR. Hence the African National Congress (ANC) governments’ politico-diplomatic interests in the stabilization and post-conflict reconstruction of the DRC could not be divorced from such interests. In fact, many captains of such industries came out in favour of former President Mbeki’s African Renaissance idea, and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), since a success in this regard would open market opportunities for them (Afoaku; 2010:112).

Pretoria has, since 1994, regarded peace in any regional country in conflict, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Lesotho, Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo as conducive to stability for the broader sub-region and as beneficial to South Africa’s national interest.

Often South Africa even pursued a deliberate linkage strategy that seeks to link peace initiatives in two or more countries, as for example, in Angola and the DRC.

According to (Afoaku, 2010:113) just as Pretoria’s regional strategy at times seemed both opportune and prudent for conflict resolution, so regional contradictions and dilemmas pursued and faced by Pretoria, as well as contradictions in its regional policy, served to undermine stability. Indeed, South Africa’s policy stance has been strongly
influenced by regional dynamics of controlling the flow of refugees. Therefore, while South Africa has frequently pursued policies of (thankless) peace-making and diplomacy, its pursuit of these strategies has allowed its neutrality and sincerity as peacemaker to be questioned why it has decided to pursue peace by some of the belligerents whether peace will finally be restored in Eastern DRC.

Furthermore, the SA government has persistently faced two major predicaments in its diplomatic efforts. It was at one stage trying to mediate between two or more sides of the conflict and, at the same time, experiencing tensions between itself and (one of) those two camps. Between 1998 and 2000, Laurent Kabila and his allies, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, accused South Africa of siding with Congo’s anti-government rebels, because South Africa was negotiating peace talks so that war can come to an end. These states have questioned the SA’s governments’ alleged even-handedness. Indeed, the Congo’s allies Zimbabwe, Angola and Tanzania have also criticized what they suspected as SA’s indulgence of their enemies. What was in their minds was not peace, they thought that SA government was taking sides. But it was not the case as South Africa only wanted peace and stability. Whether true or false, such charges have brought into sharp relief South Africa’s ostensible leverage in the DRC conflict in particular, and Africa in general (Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2015:1).

Although South Africa’s neutrality and credibility have often been questioned, it has proved itself to be a wary, ambivalent peacemaker. These dilemmas faced by South Africa had exacerbated divisions within the Southern African Development Community (SADC). When President Nelson Mandela left office in June 1999, SADC had become a highly balkanized organization with deep splits and cleavages (UN Article, 2015: 2).

The main cause of the divisions were the stand-offs between South Africa and the three SADC member states who decided to intervene in the DRC on behalf of Laurent Kabila’s government. For example, fallout over the conflict in the DRC and divisions in SADC was linked to differences between South Africa and Zimbabwe over the status of SADC on Politics, Defence and Security, because South Africa after its independence
they concentrated on reconciliation not on revenge about the apartheid, so other countries did not understand why? These differences have been symptomatic of more deeply felt economic tensions between South Africa and its neighbours, especially Zimbabwe when a suggestion was made that president Mugabe should recognize opposition parties and recognise trade unions (Stearns, 2013:1).

Thus the question of South Africa’s policy towards the DRC concerns more than simply the DRC itself. It also involved South Africa’s policy towards its regional neighbours and SADC as well. The first remedy that came to mind was peace-keeping, even peace enforcement. South Africa was thought to be the ideal candidate for participation because it was a new African democracy. Offers from many well-meaning non-African countries to assist Africa in enhancing its peace keeping capacity started pouring in, from Botswana, Lesotho and Zambia and from the UN. What everybody seemed to overlook was that South Africa itself had just begun to pick up the pieces after three hundred years of a different, but equally horrific past of apartheid (Stearns, 2013:1-3).

Politically, South Africa might have been a good candidate for peace-keeping, because its mandate was to protect human and people’s right and restore peace in the Great Lakes. But it lacked the structural, administrative and practical capacity to contribute meaningfully to any such multinational ventures, regardless of the heartfelt desire to start playing the rightful role as a responsible member of the international community. South Africa could not just go without the support of the United Nations, with its structures alone and all equipments it had, it needed a backup from UN (Stearns, 2013:3).

Apart from having to integrate nine different armies and six departments of foreign affairs, South Africa was faced with the problem that no policies for international action with respect to peacekeeping existed immediately after they have got their freedom at the time. Mandela further said that although South Africa was not in a position to make an immediate contribution towards peacekeeping activities, it did launch an investigation into how they could remedy their absence from such operations. The outcome of the investigation was that a lot need to be done in restoring peace and security in the DRC,
What was needed was a good policy and firm commitment at the political and functional level to fulfil their international obligations in that regard, capacity building to implement the policy and commitment, and putting in place of the necessary structures to drive the implementation process (Stearns, 2013:3).

On the 21 October 1998, Cabinet approved the White Paper on South Africa’s Participation in International Peace Missions, and it was confident that the Parliament will put its blessing on it during its next session starting June 1999. At the level of capacity building, some 6 000 military personnel and about 15 Foreign Affairs officials had undergone training in peacekeeping, conflict resolution and civil military relations in the last three years from 1999 to 2001. That included training both in South Africa and at international training facilities in Africa and abroad. Six police officers had their training in civilian policing skills for peacekeeping (Kasaija, 2010:183 - 184).

A number of humanitarian peacekeepers had also received training from the UN, from 19 to 26 April 1999, some 2 000 South Africans, ranging from a large contingent of troops to police officers and civilians, participated in the biggest ever peacekeeping exercise in Southern Africa when they were deployed to Eastern DRC. Exercise Blue Crane brought together 14 SADC, 10 non-SADC African countries and about 15 non-African Partner countries to practice their skills in an exercise which tested our individual and collective capacity for peacekeeping in a most integrated and holistic manner. What few people seemed not to know was that South Africa has indeed already participated in peace missions. The South African government had already had four observers in Bosnia for two periods of six months; nine engineering experts took part in the MONUA operations in Angola until December 1998. Other requests for participation were being considered. Furthermore, South Africa was recognized as centre of excellence for the training of civilians in peacekeeping. Courses were been arranged by the Institute for Security Studies and ACCORD in Pretoria (Kasaija, 2010: 183-184).
A great number of southern African military and civilian personnel had also completed the courses in civil-military relations being offered by the Graduate School of Public and Development Management at the University of Witwatersrand. Regarding the putting in place of the appropriate structures to manage South Africa’s peacekeeping participation internationally, the instruction from cabinet was to establish a National Office for the Co-ordination of Peace Missions (NOCMP) within the Department of Foreign Affairs. The progress went well, and that office was up and running. In order to ensure proper co-ordination it was decided to staff that office with personnel who had foreign affairs, military and policing experience. Naturally personnel would also interact closely with those institutions in civil society who could assist them in co-ordination and capacity building tasks. It is important, however, to dwell little on South Africa’s philosophy regarding peace-keeping. It is true that South Africa had to develop a philosophy in the absence of direct experience of peace-keeping (Kasaija, 2010:184).

Africa is considered to be the richest continent in the world in terms of natural resources. The enormous amount of minerals in the continent include among others copper, platinum, chrome, asbestos, gold, diamond, chromium iron core, and petroleum, while agricultural resources constitute most of the continent’s economy with crops such as tobacco, coffee, tea, cocoa, corn, wheat. Despite this wealth Africa remains the poorest, marginalized and grossly underdeveloped continent. There is an emerging consensus among scholars, researchers and development practitioners that the primary cause of Africa’s underdevelopment is poor governance. Poor governance has been due to personalized rule and corruption in some African countries (Ake, 1996:31).

The problem of some leaders according to Ake was self-enrichment and by any means, to retain power, points out that the high premium of power in Africa was exceptionally higher than the concern for development. There is evidence that this type of rule has extreme consequences for development in Africa. The elite in power have merely concentrated on consuming resources needed for development. Political megalomaniacs like Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire, Samuel Doe in Liberia, and Siad Barre in Somalia created for themselves political freedom in their countries.
They accumulated the national wealth, devalued the lives of the people and destroyed the fabric of society (Ake, 1996:32).

Mobutu’s case in Zaire was a classic example. Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is one of the largest and richly endowed countries in Africa, yet it is a country that lies bare in ruins. Mobutu received aid from the donor nations and put it in his private coffers instead of developing the country. It has been stated that he was a very rich man at the time of his death. His legacy to his own country was a civil war. Apart from politics, the living standards in Zaire under him stooped below that of pre-independence era. Mobutu was closely followed by Sani Abacha of Nigeria, who took only five years and died in office and made off with between two and five billion dollars (Transparency International Article). There was ample evidence that his type of rule had dire consequences for development in Africa/Nigeria (Ntalaja-Nzongola, 1995); (Sandbook, 1993).

According to (Catan and Chaffin, 2003:3), corruption is the single greatest obstacle to economic and social development in Africa. They argued that corruption decreases public revenue and increases public spending, inequalities, whilst distorting markets, resource allocations and incentives. These latter resulted in a loss of productive infrastructure investment as funds are diverted to corruption support activities. It creates monopolies that make goods and services more expensive and may put off foreign investors.

According to (Ologbenla, 2007:10), he wrote that corruption is a symptom of poor governance which in turn impedes poverty reduction and sustainable development. Corruption takes scares resources from the development process, has negative effect on investment, economic growth and development in general. The most damaging effect of corruption on sustainable development if unchecked is that it grows, intensifies and become normalized and spreads like cancer to vital departments of government with powerful influences on the public. The most important issue is human rights, which was a factor of poor governance in the Great Lakes. Though the motive for the war was
mostly for personal gain, women and children suffer and ended up running away from rape and torture.

When Pierre Pemba the rebel leader, went into war after the South African government and the UN sent forces to restore peace, he went on to fight for reason known to him because the DRC was at the verge of peace and he fought against the government in power (Harris, 2000:14).

In early 2002 South Africa’s Department of Foreign Affairs stated “The current most important issues with regard to the Central African Region were conflict resolution, promotion of peace and stability, good governance, economic reconstruction and development”. In this regard, the specific challenges facing South Africa was to assist in the resolution of the conflict in the DRC through the comprehensive implementation of the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement (Harris, 2000:15).

The Department of Foreign Affairs further asserted that other challenges in the DRC included the promotion of the values of democracy and good governance and the implementation of sound stable economic policies. SA was upfront in recognizing that “the other main priorities for it were the expansion of its trade and economic ratios with the countries of the region”. When considering retrospective of South Africa’s policy in the Congo war over the past half-decade or so, the policy pronouncements of the Department of Foreign Affairs clearly highlighted that southern and central Africa form post-apartheid South Africa’s sphere of influence and areas of economic comparative advantage in African and international affairs (Cilliers,2010:1).

The violent conflict that engulfed parts of the DRC principally the East, for much of the last decade, during which some 3.3 million people died, making it the world’s most deadly conflict since the World War II. With the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, the Sun City Accord, and the subsequent attempt to the establishment of a Transitional Government, there was optimism for the future. But areas such as North and South Kivu Provinces and Ituri, territory remained volatile, as it was during June 2004,
when opposing army factions battled in Bukavu, in July 2004, when new clashes broke out between militia groups near Bunia (Vlassenroot & Huggins, 2004:1).

Even the Transitional Government itself in the DRC came under serious threat in August 2004, after one of its members suspended its participation, Rwanda and Burundi sent a new warning to Kinshasa that it had to deal with Burundian and Rwandan militias operating on Congolese soil. The interplay between local, national and regional dynamics in the DRC conflict has attracted much attention and has been illustrated in numerous reports. One of the key issues in this analysis is the competition for natural resources, which is presented as competition for Congolese resources prolonged the war and has shaped the warfare in the DRC (Vlassenroot & Huggins, 2004:2).

It was argued that international competition for Congolese resources has prolonged the war and shaped the power strategies pursued by the different belligerents. While most of these analyses tend to focus mainly on how ‘greed’ has become the dominant military strategy, they also tend to limit their scope to the macro-level structures and patterns of economic control and exploitation. One element that is often missing from the debate about the links between economic resources and violence was the role control over agricultural and pastoral land. Despite a relative lack of analytical attention, competition for land has played a dominant role in local disputes and can be pointed at as one the root causes of violence and conflict in Ituri and Kivu-provinces. Even more, since the start of the Congolese war, local disputes over land were linked to the regional struggle for economic control and politico-military power (Vlassenroot & Huggins, 1999:2).
CHAPTER 4

4.1 FINDINGS

This research is intended to examine the involvement of South Africa in the efforts to bring about the lasting peace in the DRC. In previous chapters of this study, the volatile situation in the DRC has been stressed. In order to undertake a genuine and scientific research enquiry on why South Africa got involved in the instability of the DRC, this study employed the qualitative research model to properly situate the issues involved in proper perspective. This method is considered appropriate for this enquiry, in view of its relevance to the objectives of the study.

4.2 Making peace on the back of War

Congo represents a cautionary tale for outsiders; it is worth understanding the international community’s past failings there, especially those of the 1999-2006 peace process, which succeeded at unifying the country after years of war but at the cost of creating new conflicts. The Congo war began in earnest in 1996, prompted primarily by the collapse of the Congolese state and the 1994 genocide in neighbouring Rwanda. After years of misrule, President Mobutu Sese Seko had become a liability to the entire region. His poorly governed territory had become a rear base for armed groups from at least four neighbouring countries, including the defeated Rwanda army and affiliated militias, which had massacred 800,000 people in 1994 before fleeing across border (Stearns, 2013: 2).

The Rwandan government received support from Angola, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Uganda took the lead in creating and backing a Congolese rebellion to break up the refugee camps where its enemies were based and to eventually topple Mobutu from power. But the Rwandans soon fell out with Laurent Kabila, because he turned against them after they assisted him to topple Mobutu, the man they had put in power in Kinshasa, and so they launched another rebellion in eastern Congo aimed at ensuring their continued influence there. Eventually, the country was divided into at least five
different parts, each one run by an armed group with a foreign backer, like the group which was under the Rwandan refugees. Peace talks began in Zambia and culminated in a comprehensive deal in South Africa. The agreement was that there must be negotiation for peace and security. The magic that these talks had to accomplish was to make each belligerent believe that it would benefit from putting down its arms and joining a transitional government, even though the transition, which ended in elections in 2006, would by its very nature produce losers as well as winners (Stearns, 2013 : 2 & 3).

The DRC came out of the war which lasted for almost a decade and there are some parts that were still volatile, hence there was a huge social and economic challenge.

4.3 Unemployment

Due to war, the Congolese spent most of their time running for their safety. As a result, in my opinion, skilled people are very few and since the United Nations is trying to bring peace, employment is something that will happen very late in future.
CHAPTER 5

5.1 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Democratic Republic of Congo is still facing challenges of refugees pouring over its borders who are fleeing from the Seleka rebels in the CAR, women, children and elderly are now in search of safe places to sleep even if it means finding refuge under a few tree branches on the banks of a riverbed. For thousands of CAR refugees, this is exactly the situation they now find themselves in. Settling on the sandbanks of the Ubangi River in North-Western DRC, they are living in makeshift shelters with little access to clean water or sanitation facilities. These refugees are living in a very difficult and precautious situation, exposed to all forms of adversity, especially those living on the sandbanks, the households were overcrowded and there were no foodstuffs (International Federation of Red Cross And Red Crescent Societies, 2013).

This situation has resulted in major challenges for the refugees in all key aspects of health and nutrition, water, hygiene, sanitation and shelter. The region is common destination for refugees as the Ubangi River provides opportunities for fishing, which allows people in camps to supplement the support they received from UNHCR. However, people were also using the river to bath and wash, also as latrines, as well as for drinking, which poses a serious health risk. Humanitarian organizations have launched programmes to promote hygiene and sanitation in affected areas. To date, 18 chlorination stations were been installed along the river in Lembo, Kambo and Mobayi-Mbongo by the Red Cross to help provide clean water from the river. These sustainable projects were managed by the refugees themselves who were trained in the safe use of chlorine and aqua tabs. Awareness campaigns on the importance of latrines were also launched, but their availability varies. In areas where temporary shelters were erected, latrines were available including six built by volunteers with the Red Cross of the DRC, but in the riverbanks they were hard to find (International Federation of Red Cross And Red Crescent Societies, 2013).
The IFRC launched an emergency appeal of 1, million US dollars to support 15 000 refugees over six months. Ensuring that people remain healthy was a key component of the Red Cross work. Despite the challenges of accessing this extremely remote area, volunteers with the local Red Cross have already helped construct 47 latrines and 30 showers and distributed aqua tabs to help purify water. There was need for democratic reforms in the DRC and its neighbouring states. Democracy could be deterrence and detente against DRC’s political instability for democracy leads to peace. South African companies such as ESKOM is busy installing infrastructure so that there can be electricity, the Department of Water Affairs in conjunction with Mr Khulubuse Zuma are also installing water infrastructure in the eastern region where the area was affected more than other areas in the DRC (International Federation of Red Cross And Red Crescent Societies, 2013).

In her speech in November 12, 2013 Minister of Defence Ms Maphisa-Nqakula said “The South African National Defence Force is committed to restore peace in the DRC and as a result South Africa is going to send more troops to protect the citizens of the DRC and if need be to make all the rebel groups to agree to negotiations in both DRC and CAR” (SA Soldier, 2013)

5.2 Has South Africa’s intervention been successful?

In the researcher’s opinion, even to date the South African Government is still committed in restoring peace in the DRC, She is trying hard to try to maintain the peace but the more she tries new attacks comes up from time to time.
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APPENDIX

QUESTIONNAIRE

ORAL QUESTIONS
WITHIN SOUTH AFRICA

THE FACTORS THAT MOTIVATED THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO SEND TROOPS TO EASTERN DRC

South Africa as a peacemaker in the African continent focusing in particular on its role in restoring peace and security in the DRC, its efforts in the realm of Peace and Security has played and is still playing an important role in conflict resolution. South Africa is not operating on its own it is supported by SADC, and AU, many of South Africa’s peacemaking efforts for instance in relation to the DRC are undertaken under the auspices of the UN. The country’s status as an emerging power, known to be a strong country after surviving the apartheid and going through the truth and reconciliation it became a role model to other countries hence it was tasked with restoring peace and security in the Great Lakes. Its relatively strong economy, its technology and know-how its peaceful transition from apartheid to democracy and the high esteem in which South Africa is held by other countries are all characteristics that equip South Africa to play the role of a continental peace maker.

Unlike the apartheid regime. South Africa’s new and democratically elected government affirms the close links and mutual responsibilities between itself and other African countries.

South Africa’s own experience, both during the peaceful resolution of intraceable conflicts, is exactly what compels the country to engage in peace missions to alleviate the plight of other peoples who are trapped in similar conflicts (FA Article, 1998 : 1).
**WHAT WERE THE LOGISTICAL ARRANGEMENTS OF GATHERING TOGETHER THE SOLDIERS WITHIN SA?**

After the agreement between UN, AU and SA government and United Nations was finalized in 2001, a written signal message from Chief of the SANDF was dispatched to special units across the country as a general call to those who were interested to deploy to Eastern DRC. That is why the mission was called SANDFSPECC (South African National Defense Force Specialist Contingent). Soldiers were gathered in Pretoria Mobilization Centre. Nobody was forced to deploy but only the interested specialists agreed to do so. Soldiers were chosen in accordance with the requirements of the UN, the staff who specialized in the field of HR, Medical (military nurses & Doctors), Engineers, Finance, Communications, Air cargo Handling and Fire Fighting etc.

**ON WHAT BASIS WERE THEY CHOSEN, WHAT SKILLS AND QUALIFICATIONS WERE THEY REQUIRED TO HAVE?**

Any Soldier who was to be deployed under the auspices of UN he or she must undergo CHA (Concurrent Health Assessment). Meaning that the member must be G1K1 Green free from HIV, Hepatitis, High Blood Pressure, good eyesight, Heart disease free, no hearing problem. Psychological problems as well as outstanding civilian court cases, serious offences committed in SANDF or outside the Defense Force.

**EVEN FROM THE FIELDS OF HR, AIR CARGO HANDLING, COMMUNICATIONS, MEDICAL SPECIALISTS, ETC, OBVIOUSLY NOT EVERYBODY LEFT FOR DRC. ONLY SOME PERSONNEL LEFT. THEREFORE, THOSE WHO WENT: ON WHAT BASIS WERE THEY CHOSEN? DID THEY VOLUNTEER, OR DID THEY HAVE NO CHOICE?**

Soldiers voluntarily chose to deploy and no force or pressure was put on anyone.
WHAT ABOUT COMBAT TROOPS: WERE THERE ANY WHO WERE CHOSEN TO GO? WHY NOT?

UN and all the troops contributing countries agreed that Chapter 6 of the United Nations Charter be applied, which had nothing to do with Chapter 7 which is Peace Enforcement, no weapons were carried on that mission because the aim was to go and restore peace not war. Chapter 6 means no shooting unless a life is threatened. The Combat troops were not needed by the time of deployment so they could not deploy, they were always on standby within the borders of RSA in case they were called to intervene.

WERE ANY PARTICULAR KINDS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL PREFERRED MORE THAN THE OTHERS? IF SO WHY? DID FEMALE SOLDIERS ALSO GO?

RSA Contingent Structure was solely designed or required by UN. No military personnel were preferred more than the others. Female soldiers were present though not in large numbers like male soldiers. Females were mostly from Medical fields, HR and Cargo Handlers.

WHAT PARTS OF SA DID THE TROOPS COME FROM WHICH MILITARY FORMATIONS?

Soldiers were coming from three compartments or Services and Divisions of the Defense Force i.e. from the SA Army, Air Force and SAMHS (SA Medical Health Services).

WHAT SPECIAL TRAINING (E.G. LECTURES, ETC) DID THEY HAVE TO UNDERGO IN PREPARATIONS BEFORE THE DEPARTURE FOR THE DRC?

Some personnel were given training on Security, intelligence, Finance staff, Psychologists were conducting counseling for all members in preparation for the unknown in the DRC. Counseling was done in all sickbays were troops who to deploy were based.
EXACTLY WHERE IN SA DID THE TROOPS LEAVE? IN HOW MANY PLANES WERE USED AND WHAT KIND OF PLANE (S)?

The RSA troops left from Pretoria through Waterkloof Airport belonging to the SA Air Force. C130 plane was used for personnel and personal materials and equipments. Illusion plane was used to carry large equipments or consignments. Two of the planes were used but in different days and times. C130 plane landed first in DRC and Illusion plane followed the next day.

WHEN WERE THE VERY FIRST TROOPS DEPLOYED FROM SA, AND HOW MANY?

RSA Contingent was supposed to have deployed in the year 2000 but due to political disagreement between RSA government and DRC the movement was postponed to 2001. RSA Soldiers were only 86 in number including reserves that were paid by the RSA government.

THEREAFTER, HOW MANY MORE WENT NEXT? OR DID THEY AFTERWARDS LEAVE IN GROUPS? GROUPS OF HOW MANY, EACH TIME?

The RSA Contingent was deployed for a period of six months, and thereafter the same number of troops would go and relieve the initial deployed troops. The whole 86 personnel return home together as a group and the same number of troops would go from RSA as a group.

WHAT MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT DID THESE TROOPS CARRY WITH THEM IN THE PLANE(S)?

RSA soldiers were not allowed to carry with them any weapons in accordance with UN requirements. Soldiers were carrying their personal and official materials to DRC and equipments. The other necessary staff like stationery, green trunks with documents, duffel bags with uniform and civilian clothes, computers, Photostat machines, telephones equipment, printers etc.
IN THE DRC

WHERE IN THE DRC DID THE TROOPS LAND?

From Waterkloof Airport in Pretoria to DRC, port of entry, troops landed at N’jili Airport in Kinshasa.

WHO WAS THERE TO RECEIVE THEM?  WHO WAS THEIR COMMANDER IN THE DRC – WAS HE SA OR UN OR BOTH?

RSA Soldiers were received by the RSA Ambassador to DRC and UN officials based in DRC, wearing the blue berets and flags ready to receive them. The troops were commanded by the South African Commander accompanied by his South African Second in Command.

FROM THE AIRPORT THEY LANDED AT, WHERE WERE THEY TRANSPORTED TO?  WHERE WAS THE BASE COMMANDER?  WAS THAT THEIR FINAL DESTINATION?

From the airport soldiers were transported by Iveco Busses and Trucks of the Company rented by UN. The base was commanded by RSA Commander and his RSA 2IC. That's where the RSA Contingent headquarter was established. The final destination was at a war-torn region were some were distributed around DRC.

DID ALL OF THE SA TROOPS GO ONLY TO THE EASTERN PART OF THE DRC – OR DID SOME GO TO OTHER PARTS OF THE COUNTRY?

The RSA Contingent only went to the eastern part of the DRC. The RSA soldiers were stationed in the Eastern DRC Kinshasa. It was only after three to four months when some of RSA soldiers were posted to Kisangani, Kalemi, Kananga and Mbandaka to continue with their usual services.
WHAT ABOUT THE CHALLENGE(S) OF LANGUAGE, THE DRC BEING FRENCH-SPEAKING? HOW DID THE SOUTH AFRICAN SOLDIERS DEAL WITH IT? HOW DID THE LOCALS DEAL WITH IT? GIVE A DETAILED ANSWER.

RSA soldiers struggled to communicate with the DRC locals in French and it was a blow to RSA soldiers as well as locals until RSA soldiers resorted to speaking their DRC local language called Lingala. Lingala took the troops not all though three weeks to learn. English was mostly spoken by RSA and DRC locals; though locals were struggling to speak English fluently soldiers could understand them here and there. Especially when it comes to cargo handling there was a lot of misunderstanding during packing, loading and offloading of cargo. The Contingent Commander decided to invite a French teacher for his soldiers, but only few attended the classes for two weeks and after that nobody attended because it was not easy to learn because Lingala was spoken even amongst soldiers. Most of Lingala words are similar to Setswana, Venda, Zulu and Xhosa so it was easy to understand and speak the language.

WHAT ACTIVITIES (E.G.LECTURES) WERE CONDUCTED IN ORDER TO ADJUST THEM TO THEIR NEW DUTIES AND PLACE OF DWELLING? WHO CONDUCTED SUCH ACTIVITIES?

Lectures concerning the soldier’s duties to handle cargo at the airports, help with medical aid, scraping of gravel roads, water purification and firefighting, and the place of barracks where soldiers were advised not to drink tap water and always use hot iron for their clothes in order kill small insects. Always move in a pair of two whether in town or village so that it will be easy to notice when some are missing, no movements in the nights, was conducted by UN Officials.

WHAT ETHNIC GROUP(S) INHABITED THE AREA OF OPERATIONS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS

Most of the ethnic groups were found in Kinshasa because of its capital city status in the DRC. Ethnic groups found in Kananga and Mbandaka are called Baluba, Batetela and Bangala. Those found in Kisangani are called Bakongo and in Kalemi, they are Bamongo.
HOW LONG DID IT TAKE BEFORE THEIR VERY FIRST ASSIGNMENT(S), AND WHAT KIND OF ASSIGNMENT(S) WERE THEY GIVEN, AND DID THEY ALL HAPPEN IN ONE PLACE? WHERE? DID THESE TASKS BECOME THEIR DAILY HOW LONG?

They offloaded their belongings from trucks coming from the airport, they had to erect and clean weather havens to sleep in, and prepare for the next day. The third day they were invited by SA Ambassador for a welcoming party in the SA Embassy Headquarters Hall. After a week the soldiers started with their first assignment of cargo handling with trucks at the airport and install them at their camp, firefighting equipments deployed at the airports as well for emergency services, and other services were on standby. All these activities took place at N'jili airport before some soldiers were dispatched to different regions. Such assignments were given by the UN and they never changed for the whole of six months.

DESCRIBE A TYPICAL DAY IN THE LIFE OF SA SOLDIERS IN TWO OR THREE DIFFERENT TYPES OF TASKS. HERE WE ASSUME THAT NOT EVERY SINGLE SA SOLDIER DID EXACTLY THE SAME KIND OF WORK EVERYDAY. YOUR DESCRIPTION MUST BE ABOUT TYPICAL DAY, FROM MORNING TO NIGHTFALL. YOU SHOULD NOTE HERE THAT THIS IS THE CORE OF YOUR STUDY AND TO WHICH YOU MUST PAY PARTICULAR DETAILED ATTENTION. THE DAILY WORK OF THE SA TROOPS IN THE AREAS THEY LIVED AND WORKED IN IS THE CRITICAL PART OF YOUR STUDY.

The Air cargo handlers were the most hardworking team. They used to work daily from 08:00 very late in the night, loading and offloading equipment as well as delivering the cargo to different places in Kinshasa for other SA troops. Medical officers supported the soldiers as well as foreign soldiers around Kinshasa with medical assistance, like attending to minor sicknesses like flu, etc. Fire fighters were always on the alert at the airport to help on cases of fire. Engineers were repairing potholes as well as leveling gravel roads and also helping local community with water purification.

HR and Finance officers were mostly handling movements of troops in and around
eastern DRC where some were based, and also liaising between families in South Africa if there was a need.

They were also preparing allowances from SA as well as food allowance from UN. Communication officers were installing telephone lines so that calls can be received from South Africa. They were also doing the fixing of copiers and printers when they were broken.