77
 e ‘Lost’ South African Tribe
 e ‘Lost’ South African tribe – Rebirth of the Koranna1 in 
the Free State
 P Erasmus
 Department of Anthropology
 University of the Free State
 Abstract: 
e Khoisan is the original inhabitants of southern Africa. e Koranna were one of the 
tribes that already lived in the vicinity of Cape Town before the arrival of the rst white 
settlers (1652). ey had an own culture, language, identity and racial basis. However, 
by 1932 the Koranna no longer existed. Colonisation had threatened their nomadic 
existence of cattle-farming and hunting, while two destructive wars (1868-69 and 1878-
 79) against colonial oppressors had left them leaderless. Intermarriage, evangelisation, 
capitalisation (the discovery of diamonds in 1869-71 created a need for cheap labour at 
the diggings) and apartheid destroyed the tribal structures, cohesion and identity of the 
Koranna.
 According to the Population Registration Act of 1950, all South Africans who were not 
Whites or Blacks were regarded as “Coloureds” - the umbrella concept for the “residue” 
- those who did not t in anywhere else. e Khoisan were stigmatised as “Coloureds” 
and were politically, socially and economically constrained to renounce their origins. 
e Department of Coloured Education, for example, prohibited the use of Khoisan 
languages amongst schoolchildren, while the Khoisan origins and culture were portrayed 
as “backward”.
 Constitutional accommodation and recognition are accorded to the Khoisan by the 
current government. A revival of traditional leadership and identity is evident everywhere. 
National and regional organisations are campaigning for political recognition and for 
linguistic and cultural regeneration. e Koranna, who were regarded as extinct, have 
also put in an appearance. After almost a century, there are virtually no more structures, 
knowledge, customs, or oral histories in existence, while political opportunism, nepotism 
and division are seriously hampering revival. In this contribution, the focus is on the 
Koranna in the Free State; on the regeneration of their structures and identity; as well as 
on the factors that are having a negative eect in this regard. 
1 e Koranna peoples’ spelling of their name is used in this contribution, i.e. ‘Koranna’ as opposed to the more 
generally used form ‘Korana’.
78
 New Contree, No. 50 (November 2005)
 Introduction
 ere is uncertainty surrounding the origins in place and time, as well as 
the migration (reasons for this and routes that were taken) of the Khoikhoin/
 Khoekhoen. For various reasons dierent tribes/clans were formed with the 
passing of time; one of which were the Koranna (Gorachouqua). As with 
the Khoekhoen, the origins of the Koranna are also uncertain, making it 
impossible to come to any solid deductions on the matter.
 In comparing the Koranna with other Khoekhoen groups, one starts to doubt 
whether a unique Koranna culture, as postulated by authors , ever existed.2 
Tobias, however, refers to what he terms a ‘racial basis of the modern Korana’.3 
An own Koranna dialect (!Ora/Goragowap), distinct from other Khoekhoen 
dialects such as Xirigowap/Gri (Griqua) and Khoekhoegoawab (Nama), have 
existed.4 It is alleged, however, that !Ora disappeared over time.5
 Various (sub)groups with their own identities are found amongst the Koranna. 
According to Tobias, there were already 17 dierent subgroups in existence 
by approximately 1850.6 Buys7 and Engelbrecht8 refer to the following groups 
of the Koranna, during the period 1820-30, as the most important of these: 
Cloetses, Linkse, Regshande, Katse, Springbokke, Skerpioene, Pampiere, 
Karosdraers, Afrikander, Towenaars, Slaparms, Bitterboschse, Taaiboschse, 
etc. 
By 1932, Maingard maintains that none of the Koranna or any of the above-
 mentioned subgroups were still extant.9 A range of factors contributed to 
what Marks has called ‘the ultimate disappearance of the Khoi-San as an 
ethnic entity’. In all probability, colonialisation is the greatest reason for the 
2 JA Engelbrecht, e Koranna. An account of their customs and their history with texts (Cape Town, Maskew Miller, 
1936), pp. 83-194; K Schoeman, Die huis van die armes: die Berlynse Sendinggenootskap in die O.V.S., 1834-1869: 
’n bloemlesing/geredigeer en vertaal deur Karel Schoeman (Kaapstad, Maskew Miller, 1985), pp. 25-26.
 3 PV Tobias, “Taaibosch Korannas of Ottosdal”, South African Journal of Science, 51(9), 1955, p. 263.
 4 JA Engelbrecht, e Koranna, pp. 197-231. LF Maingard, “Koranna names of animals and plants”, Bantu 
Studies, 6(4), 1932, pp. 309-322; T. Strauss, War along the Orange. e Koranna and the Northern border wars of 
1868-9 and 1878-9 (Cape Town, 1979), p. ii; A. Trail, South African Khoisan Languages (Johannesburg, sa), p. 
23. 
5 According to Trail (Khoisan Languages, p. 25), Ben Kraalshoek was one of South Africa’s last Ora speakers. In 
an interview with Mr. HC Taaibosch (19 February 2004), he has claimed that there are still a number of people 
living in Heidedal (Bloemfontein) and Boshof who speak the language uently. Mrs. Susan van Wyk from 
Heidedal conrmed this in an interview (1 July 2004), stating that she still speaks the language.
 6 PV Tobias, “Taaibosch Korannas of Ottosdal”,e South African Journal of Science, 51(9), 1955, p.  263.
 7  JJ Buys, Die oorsprong en migrasiebewegings van die Koranna en hul rol in die Transgariep tot 1870 (Universiteit 
van die Vrystaat, Bloemfontein,1989), p. 33.
 8 JA Engelbrecht, e Koranna, p.  55.
 9  LF Maingard, “Studies in Koranna history, customs and language”, Bantu Studies, 6(2), 1932, p.  103.
79
 e ‘Lost’ South African Tribe
 disintegration and ‘disappearance’ of the Koranna. Initial Dutch occupation 
of the Cape (1652) drove the Koranna from their original place of habitation 
to the north, thus rendering them the rst ‘frontier’ community in South 
Africa. When the British extended the northernmost colonial boundary from 
the Buels to the Orange Rivers (1847), the Koranna were once again placed 
under the colonial yoke. As nomadic cattle herders and hunters, the Koranna 
were no longer able to practice their traditional mode of existence, and two 
destructive wars (1868-69 and 1878-79) with the colonial authorities left the 
Koranna beside the Orange River without a leader. Under the false pretence 
that the colonial spokesmen wanted to enter into peace negotiations, the 
Koranna leadership agreed to a meeting. Virtually all of the Koranna were 
captured by the colonial authorities and were banished to Robben Island.
 Marks states that another reason for Koranna extinction was their tendency 
towards acculturation. She claims that the Koranna ‘literally acculturated 
themselves out of existence’, ascribing this to the fact that the social 
organisation of the Koranna had not formed a close and integrated unit.10 
Various publications make noteworthy references to the mutual interactions 
between the Koranna, the Griqua, the Tswana, the Sotho and whites in the 
Transgariep.11 ese were mostly interactions of trade, war or intermarriage. 
As a matter of fact, intermingling with other groups seems to have been 
such a common occurrence, that Beach states it impossible ‘to nd a pure 
representation’ of the Koranna.12 Schapera13 and Kies14 are of the same 
opinion.
 Schoeman illustrates the role that missionaries and westernisation have 
played in the destruction of the Koranna’s tribal cohesion and identity.15 
He refers to the incomprehension, impatience, disapproval and agrant 
antagonism of the missionaries towards the Koranna, as well as the way in 
which their haughtiness, insensitivity and intolerance detracted from their 
10 S Marks, “Khoisan resistance to the Dutch in the seventeeth and eighteen centuries”, Journal of African 
History,13(1), 1972, p.  77.
 11 MC Legassick, e Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana, and the missionaries, 1780 – 1840: e politics of a fronteer zone 
(University of California, Los Angeles, 1970); WF Lye, e Sotho wars in the interior of South Africa, 1822 – 
1837 (University of California, Los Angeles, 1970), WF Lye, WF & C Murray, Transformations on the highveld: 
e Tswana and the Southern Sotho (Cape Town, David Philip,1980). 
12 Beach (1937), as quoted by JJ Buys, Die oorsprong en migrasiebewegings..., p.55.
 13 I Schapera, e Khoisan Peoples of South Africa (London, 1965), p. 47.
 14 CW Kies, Die Kleurlinge van Noord-Kaapland, noord van die Oranjerivier (Universiteit van Pretoria, 
Pretoria,1972), pp. 34-36.
 15 K Schoeman, e Griqua captaincy of Philippolis, 1826-1861 (Pretoria, 2002), p. 100.
80
 New Contree, No. 50 (November 2005)
 good intentions.16 e discovery of diamonds (1869-71) was an important 
catalyst in the process of westernisation. Apart from the labour that the 
Koranna supplied in the diamond diggings, they themselves came to a quick 
realisation of the economic value of diamonds and involved themselves in 
the diamond trade.17 According to Shillington, the Koranna, Griqua and 
Tlhaping found the largest share of diamonds next to the Orange River in 
the early years.18 
In spite of the general view that the Koranna had become extinct, two 
factions identifying themselves as the Taaibosch Koranna made appointments 
with the researcher on the same day (without being aware that the other group 
had done the same). ey both requested that research be conducted on the 
history and genealogy of the Taaibosch family of the Free State.
 According to Marks19 and Strauss20, the history of the Koranna has mostly 
been written by whites. On this subject, Strauss feels that ‘their ethnocentric 
and “anti-Hottentot” bias is evident. ey looked upon the Korana as an 
uncivilized, morally degenerate and lazy people with an innate desire to steal 
cattle’. Coertze21 endorses this view, while contributions by dierent other 
authors conrm the negative characterisation of the Koranna.22
 Given the negative historical characterisation of the Koranna, a decision 
was made, on accepting the request of the Taaibosch Koranna, to adopt an 
inclusive approach to the study in question. An agreement was made with 
the involved persons that they would share partnership in the research and 
writing process, and would accept mutual responsibility for the nal product. 
e structure and objectives of the research report were negotiated and a 
decision was made to focus the research on the involvement of the Koranna 
in the early history of the Free State, as well as recent developments, identity 
issues and the genealogy of the Koranna. e researcher has undertaken to 
remain unbiased, and to avoid verifying or falsifying individual suppositions 
16 K Schoeman, Die huis van die armes, pp. 77 & p. 88.
 17 JJ Buys, Die oorsprong en migrasiebewegings..., pp. 101-102; W van der Merwe, “Bethanie in die Oranje-Vrystaat 
– ‘n terugblik na 150 jaar”, Lantern, Julie 1984, p.57.
 18 K Shillington, e colonization of the Southern Tswana 1870-1900 (Pretoria, 1985), pp. 35-44.
 19 S Marks, “Khoisan resistance”, Journal of African History, 13(1), 1972, p.55.
 20 T Strauss, War along the Orange..., p.v
 21 PJ Coertze & RD Coertzee, Die Afrikanervolk en die Kleurlinge (Pretoria, Coertze & Coertze, 1983) p.  111.
 22 JJ Buys, Die oorsprong en migrasiebewegings..., p. 65; PJ Coertze & RD Coertze, Verklarende vakwoordeboek vir 
Antropologie en Argeologie, p. 157;  CW Kies, Die Kleurlinge, 1968, p. 32;. JS Marais, e Cape Coloured people 
1652-1937 (Johannesburg, 1968), p.94; R de V Pretorius, Die geskiedenis van die “Vrystaatse” Griekwa 1825-
 1862 (Universiteit van die Vrystaat, Bloemfontein, 1963), p.  36.
81
 e ‘Lost’ South African Tribe
 or conicting interpretations and deductions. It was at any rate not possible 
to verify the ‘truth’ in all cases.
 Involvement in events in the Free State
 During the 16th to 17th centuries the Koranna were established in a region 
more or less west of the present-day Stellenbosch. Kora (Gora/Chora) was 
the chief (Khoeseb) of the Koranna at the time of Jan van Riebeeck (1652). 
He was succeeded by his son Eikomo, who, together with his followers, left 
the Cape area for good between approximately 1661-86.23 eir exit route 
from the Cape extended in a northerly direction and out of Namaqualand. 
ey had reached the southern banks of the Orange River by approximately 
1750. ey moved along the Orange River in an easterly direction until they 
reached Prieska, where the Taaibosch and Links families (these were two half 
brothers) established themselves. Under Klaas Lukas, the Kats Koranna were 
diverted to the regions of Upington and Keimoes.24
 e Koranna were at the forefront of the northerly migration, with white 
‘trekboere’ and ‘Basters’ following at a later stage. e available resources 
came under pressure, resulting in clashes and conict. e Koranna were 
systematically forced to move even further north and east. In the Taungs 
region, the Koranna made contact with the Tlhaping. e two groups 
intermarried freely and extensive trade relations were established. When the 
Rolong created conict by invading the laping region under the command 
of Tau, the Koranna hastened to the side of the Tlhaping, driving out the 
Rolong.25 At the end of the 18th century conicting trade interests, however, 
destroyed the peaceful relations between the Tlhaping and the Koranna. e 
Koranna drove the Tlhaping out to Kuruman.26 Between 1813 and 1820 
the Koranna relocated to the Mamusa region (Schweizer Reinecke).27 It was 
here that the Links and Taaibosch families went their separate ways. e 
leader of the Taaibosch family, Hanto Taaibosch, moved to Platberg, south 
23 LF Maingard, Studies in Koranna, pp.108-112; S Marks, Khoisan resistance, pp. 64-65; Schapera, e Khoisan, 
p.  47.
 24 JS Marais, e Cape Coloured, pp. 92-93; JA Engelbrecht, e Koranna, p.  31; WF Lye, e Sotho wars, p.  113; 
Kies, Die Kleurlinge, p.  31.
 25 WF Lye & Murray, Transformations on the highveld..., pp.41-42. Lye, e Sotho wars, p.114, 141.
 26 WF Lye & Murray, Transformations on the highveld..., p.  42.
 27 LF Maingard, Studies in Koranna, p.  121.
82
 New Contree, No. 50 (November 2005)
 of Ladybrand via Boshof during 1833. From here he moved to Umpukani28, 
between Clocolan and Marquard in the following year (1834).29 Hanto was 
killed by a lion in 1839 and the son who was to be his successor was a minor 
at the time, and was being schooled at Farmereld, Albany. As a result of 
this, Gert Taaibosch, Hanto’s brother, assumed chieftainship of the Taaibosch 
family.30 He later became a well-known gure in the Transgariep and much of 
this contribution is focussed on Gert and his descendants.
 Maingard describes the Taaibosch family as the ‘largest and most important’ 
of the various Koranna families and they are thus known as the Kei (Big) 
Koranna, or the ‘Bolanders’.31 Jan Taaibosch (I) was the ancestor of the 
Taaibosch family and the oldest son of Kora and his rst wife (Ktanghy). 
He had four sons, namely Jan Taaibosch (II) (also known as Hanto or Jan 
Kaptein), Gert Taaibosch, Johannes and Jacob. It was during their stay at 
Prieska that Jan Taaibosch (I) was murdered by the San and succeeded by his 
son Hanto.32 
According to Kriel33 and Lye & Murray34, the Koranna in the aba ‘Nchu 
and aba Bosiu regions had launched a number of marauding expeditions 
against Moshweshwe and his followers by 1836. is obligated Moshweshwe 
to react violently against the marauders, driving them out into dierent 
regions. e Koranna ed, attacking the Tlokwa of Sekonyela in the process. 
According to what has been reported, Sekonyela was very impressed with the 
military capabilities of the Koranna (they possessed horses and ries), and 
immediately saw the possibility of using their skills to outdo Moshweshwe. As 
a result of this, Sekonyela invited the Koranna to teach his people to horseride 
28 is mission station was established for Hanto and his descendants by omas Jenkins during 1833. According 
to Dreyer, missionaries made attempts to relocate e Koranna from Umpukani to Merumetsu (between 
Marquard and Winburg) during 1836 and 1837. Both of the aforementioned mission stations were attacked by 
Moletsane during 1850, after which the stations were abandoned. J. Dreyer, “omas Arbousset and Francois 
Daumas in the Free State: tracing the exploratory tour of 1836”,  South African Humanities, 13 (2001), p.96.
 29 JA Engelbrecht, e Koranna, p.  35; JD Kriel, “Die lotgevalle van die Batlokwa ba okotleng vanaf die aanvang 
van die Difaqane tot 1853”, Suid-Afrikaanse Tydskrif vir Etnologie, 5(2) 1982), p. 27; JJ Buys, Die oorsprong en 
migrasiebewegings..., p. 17.
 30 RC Germond, Chronicles of Basutoland, p.165; Backhouse, 1844, p. 393. JJ Buys, Die oorsprong en 
migrasiebewegings..., p. 51.
 31 LF Maingard, Studies in Koranna, p.  120.  According to JJ Buys, Die oorsprong en migrasiebewegings..., p. 23, e 
Koranna referred to the main group as the ‘Big’ Koranna, and to those that later broke away from them as the 
‘Small’ Koranna. is term is used to refer to those who rst reached the Orange River, while the ‘Ondervelders’ 
were those who arrived later (WF Lye, e Sotho wars, p. 113. WF Lye & Murray, Transformations on the 
highveld..., p. 40).
 32 LF Maingard, Studies in Koranna, p.120.
 33 JD Kriel, “Die lotgevalle van die Batlokwa”, Suid-Afrikaanse Tydskrif vir Etnologie, 5(2), 1982, p.  27.
 34 WF Lye & Murray, Transformations on the highveld..., p.  48.
83
 e ‘Lost’ South African Tribe
 and shoot; an invitation gladly accepted by them. Quarrels broke out between 
Sekonyela and the Koranna, who relocated to the Korannaberg (at Excelsior 
and Marquard) in the meantime. e Koranna succeeded in driving Sekonyela 
across the Caledon River and virtually all of his cattle were carried o. A year 
later there was another clash between the two groups and the Koranna drove 
Sekonyela deep into the Maluti mountains, once again stealing his cattle away 
from him.
 According to the treaty signed between Sir George Napier and Moshweshwe 
on 13 December 1843, the region between the Caledon and the Orange Rivers 
was to reside under the authority of Moshweshwe. According to Barnard, 
Moshweshwe was greatly advantaged by this treaty.35 However, Gert Taaibosch 
and the Griqua chief, Pieter Davids, laid claim to areas in the same region, 
and the treaty could not be implemented.36 With the Maitland treaty three 
years later (1846), Gert Taaibosch’s land claims were ocially acknowledged.37 
In all likelihood, a variety of reasons contributed towards this. According to 
Germond38 and Buys39, there was a good mutual understanding between Gert 
Taaibosch and Major Warden. In fact, Gert Taaibosch assisted Warden against 
Moshweshwe, the BaTaung of Moletsane, and the Koranna chief Gert Links 
during the Battle of ‘Viervoet’ (30 June 1851). Gert Taaibosch also had good 
relations with the white farmers. He assisted the ‘voortrekker’ leaders Potgieter 
and Maritz against the Ndebele of Mzilikazi during December 1838, and 
never attacked any whites on their farms.40
 Gert Taaibosch and Sekonyela were reconciled during May 184941, and 
Taaibosch became actively involved in the struggle between Moshweshwe 
and Sekonyela.42 Gert Taaibosch and Sekonyela launched various attacks on 
Moshweshwe and Moletsane. Moletsane, who was also an ally and friend 
35 BJ Barnard, “‘n Lewensbeskrywing van majoor Henry Douglas Warden”, Argieaarboek vir Suid-Afrikaanse 
geskiedenis, 11(1), 1965, p.  369.
 36 RC Germond, Chronicles of Basutoland (Morija, Morija Sesotho Book Depot, 1967), pp. 167-170; GD Kriel, 
“Die lotgevalle van die Batlokwa...”, p.  29.
 37 JJ Buys, Die oorsprong en migrasiebewegings..., p.  64.
 38 RC Germond, Chronicles of Basutoland, pp.187-192.
 39 JJ Buys, Die oorsprong en migrasiebewegings..., p. 83.
 40 JJ Buys, Die oorsprong en migrasiebewegings..., p. 64
 41 BJ Barnard, “‘n Lewensbeskrywing van majoor Henry Douglas Warden”, Argieaarboek vir Suid-Afrikaanse 
geskiedenis, 11(1), 1965, p.  414.
 42 According to Attree, Gert Taaibosch was deeply oended by Moshweshwe’s invasion of his territory by 1847, 
and by the number of cattle posts he had established there. In all likelihood, the aforementioned chain of 
events inuenced Gert Taaibosch’s decision to join forces with Sekonyela. See EM Attree, “e closer union 
movements between the Orange Free State, South African Republic and Cape Colony (1838-1863)”, Archives 
Year Book for South African History, 12(2), 1949, p. 41.
84
 New Contree, No. 50 (November 2005)
 of Gert Links, had some of Gert’s cattle in his possession and these were 
unknowingly plundered by Gert Taaibosch. e Links group took their 
revenge by raiding the cattle of Gert Taaibosch.
 After the attack on the Basotho living near the Phuthiatsana River during 
July 1849, Warden intervened and tried to bring about a peaceful agreement. 
A meeting was arranged in Bloemfontein for 27 August 1849. e most 
prominent roleplayers, namely Moshweshwe, Sekonyela and Gert Taaibosch 
did not turn up for the meeting, while Sekonyela and Taaibosch launched an 
attack on the Basotho on the same day. On 1 September 1850, Warden received 
permission to take military action against Sekonyela so as to put an end to his 
ongoing attacks on the Basotho and the BaTaung. However, Gert Taaibosch 
and chief Moroka of aba ‘Nchu mediated discussions between Warden and 
Sekonyela. Sekonyela voiced his remorse over the attacks and agreed to pay 
a ne of 300 cattle. Sekonyela and Taaibosch, who in the meantime came 
to learn that Warden was planning military action against Moletsane, also 
oered to assist Warden; an oer gladly accepted by the latter.43
 After the battle of Berea (20 December 1852), Gert Taaibosch and 
Sekonyela attacked the BaTaung of Tulu (in the Winburg region) and the 
Kgolokwe under Wetsi in the Harrysmith region. Moshweshwe saw this as an 
opportunity to unite the conicting chiefs of the Orange River Sovereignty 
under his authority, and decided to take action against them. In the ensuing 
struggle during November 1853, Gert Taaibosch was killed at Dawidsberg.44 
He was succeeded by his son Jacob Taaibosch, who moved nearer to aba 
‘Nchu.45
 e Republic of the Orange Free State was established in 1854, at the time 
of the Bloemfontein convention. e second article of the Bloemfontein 
convention determined the government’s internal policy with respect to the 
regulation of the relations between the various population groups. One of the 
matters for which the Volksraad took responsibility was the discontinuation, 
as they saw it, of the migration of indigenous population groups. By means 
43 BJ Barnard, “‘n Lewensbeskrywing van majoor Henry Douglas Warden”, Argieaarboek vir Suid-Afrikaanse 
geskiedenis, 11(1), 1965, p.  425; Attree, “e closer union movements between the Orange Free State, South 
African Republic and Cape Colony (1838-1863)”, Archives Year Book for South African History, 12(2), 1949, p. 
230.
 44 RC Germond, Chronicles of Basutoland, pp. 217-221; JJ Buys, Die oorsprong en migrasiebewegings..., p.82. 
Dawidsberg (also known as Yoalaboholo) was the home of Sekonyela’s mother, Mantatise. It is situated at 
Marabeng, Sekonyela’s hill fortress near Ficksburg. Dreyer, omas Arbousset, p. 89.
 45 JJ Buys, Die oorsprong en migrasiebewegings..., p. 100.
85
 e ‘Lost’ South African Tribe
 of this the freedom of movement necessary for the indigenous Khoi-San to 
practice their economies of existence was nally destroyed, causing the issue 
of land ownership to grow in importance. At a time when their downfall 
was inevitable, the Koranna no longer had a place in the rapidly changing 
landscape of the Transgariep.
 Further information on the history of the Taaibosch family could not be 
found in documents. Interviews with informants also did not provide much 
information, and thus it seems that for a period of more than 100 years there 
is virtually no information on these people.
 Recent developments: leadership and identity
 e identity of the Khoi-San was undervalued under the apartheid regime, 
thus furthering the disintegration of the Koranna. According to the Population 
Registration Act (No. 30 of 1950), all people not typied as whites or blacks, 
were classied as ‘coloureds’. e term ‘coloured’ was an umbrella concept 
for the ‘rabble’ of society – those who did not belong anywhere else. As the 
number of population groups grew, subgroups such as the Cape Coloureds, 
Malays, Griqua, the Chinese, and the Indians were later identied. No 
mention, however, is made of the Koranna; a clear indication that their 
existence remained unacknowledged by the apartheid government.
 Khoi-San identity was contaminated. Informants tell of the ways in which 
they were forced – politically, socially and economically – to renounce their 
descent. For instance, the Department of Coloured Education prohibited the 
use of Khoi-San languages by the children on the school grounds (a practice 
of the early mission schools), and the Khoi-San descent and culture were 
ridiculed (the ‘Jolly Hotnot’ image of comical rowdiness). In many cases 
parents felt ashamed to speak their mother tongue in front of their children 
for fear of being thought ‘backward’.
 e present government grants constitutional accommodation and 
recognition to traditional communities and their leadership, including the 
Khoi-San (see Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Amendment 
Act, 2003 [No. 41 of 2003]). Together with the government’s land reform 
policy, these developments have been a powerful stimulus in the revival 
of traditional Khoi-San leadership and identity. National and regional 
organisations geared towards gaining political recognition and linguistic or 
86
 New Contree, No. 50 (November 2005)
 cultural revival have come into being all over the country. is is also true for 
the Koranna, who were thought to be extinct.
 During 1998-99, Jaftha Davids, a self-confessed successful building contractor 
at the time, developed an awareness of the Koranna case and joined the Free 
State Koranna Community Committee (FSKCC), led by Mr. Raymond 
Beddy. Although they convened on a regular basis, Davids felt that nothing 
constructive came out of these meetings. Together with a colleague, Willem 
de Wee, Davids started to register Koranna people as members, although this 
was not met by a great deal of enthusiasm by members of management. In 
fact, a committee member felt it necessary to warn Davids that he was being 
overly hasty in promoting awareness of the Khoi-San identity, in that it would 
take the government a long time to address the issue.
 According to Davids, the leaders of various Khoi-San groups in the Free 
State did not see eye to eye. e poor understanding, for example, between 
Mr. Johannes Kraalshoek of the Free State Griqua Council and Beddy of the 
FSKCC disadvantaged the unity of the Khoi-San. For this reason, he has 
decided to take up an invitation from Prof. Jattie Bredenkamp (University 
of the Western Cape) to represent the Free State Koranna at a Khoi-San 
conference in Oudtshoorn. Together with delegates from the Free State 
Griqua Council, Davids, Mathews and de Wee attended the conference from 
29 March to 1 April 2001. e National Khoi-San Consultative Conference 
of South Africa (NKOC) was established during the conference. 
Back in Bloemfontein, Davids, Mathews and de Wee got to work, and family 
members recognised Jaftha Taaibos-Davids as chief of the Koranna in the Free 
State on the basis of his supposed genealogical seniority.46 is position was 
recognised by the chairman of the Khoi-San Council (Khoeseb Joseph Little) 
and the Koranna House, North Cape (Khoeseb Josiah Katz) on 29 October 
2001. Subsequently, 46 family members gave their written support of this 
move on 17 December 2001.
 Taaibos-Davids bases his claim to leadership on matrilineal descent. He is 
the eighth child of Marie (Toebaai) and Jacob Davids and has the support of 
his older, living brother and two sisters. Marie, in turn, was the oldest child 
46 At this stage, Davids decided to change his surname to Taaibos-Davids, and applied for a new identity document. 
He was convinced that the family surname was to be written as ‘Taaibos’ and not ‘Taaibosch’, basing this view 
on the fact that his mother’s (Mary Magdalena) surname is indicated as Taaibos (not Taaibosch) on her birth 
certicate and identity document (Identity No. 1409280060015).
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 e ‘Lost’ South African Tribe
 of Isaac and Ellen Taaibosch. Taaibos-Davids makes use of a reference from 
Engelbrecht’s publication to justify his allegation that Marie is Isaac Taaibosch’s 
rightful heir. e relevant reference reads: ‘Male children had preference over 
female in the sense that if the family consisted of several daughters and but 
one son the latter, even if he was the youngest child, would still succeed his 
father as head and also be his chief heir’.47 Taaibos-Davids argues that there 
was not only one, but two sons in the case of his mother, and thus Marie is 
the rightful heir.
 Taaibos-Davids registered the Free State Koranna Culture & Heritage 
Council Trust (IT 803/02) on 14 May 2002. According to this the Free State 
Koranna Culture and Heritage Council (FSKCHC) has the highest authority, 
and provision is made for a Traditional Council. On request, the FSKCHC 
attended the meetings of the National House of Traditional Leaders, taking part 
in discussions on the accommodation of traditional leaders. As a result of these 
discussions, consultations with communities in the Free State were initiated, 
and the FSKCHC decided to found the Taaibos-Davids Koranna House 
(TDKH). On 2 August 2003, the TDKH was established in Bloemfontein 
with the acceptance of a constitution. e TDKH’s constitution makes 
provision for an elected council (Council of the Elderly) with an executive 
committee comprising a chairman, vice-chairman, secretary, treasurer, and 
two additional members. Furthermore, there is a ‘Women’s Association’, 
‘Youth League’, and a ‘Language and Cultural Association’. 
Taaibos-Davids called the Taaibosch family members together to ask them to 
work together to promote the interests, culture and identity of the Koranna. 
However, his leadership was not undisputed and led to much discord and 
disunity. Despite a number of attempts to resolve the ongoing family dispute, 
the dispute persists to the present day (2005). 
Verication of ndings 
Firstly, research has made evident that the section which Taaibos-Davids 
quotes from Engelbrecht to conrm his claim of leadership, deals with the 
inheritance of property and the estate of a deceased, and not with the succession 
of chieftainship. Regarding the succession of chieftainship, Schapera declares 
47 JA Engelbrecht, e Koranna, pp. 191-192.
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 New Contree, No. 50 (November 2005)
 that it was never transferred to a daughter48, while Engelbrecht states that in 
the event of a chief passing away without a son, the chieftainship is transferred 
to his brother and the brother’s son.49 is information was presented to 
the relevant parties and Taaibos-Davids admitted to being misguided, thus 
abandoning the claim he had wrongly based on Engelbrecht.
 Secondly, according to the genealogical data compiled in consultation with 
the two relevant parties, not one of Gert Taaibosch’s sons remained in the Free 
State, and thus he could not be succeeded. e leadership was thus transferred 
to the lineage of Gert’s younger brother, Johannes (married to Griet). Taaibos-
 Davids succeeded in obtaining a democratic mandate from the genealogically 
most senior Taaibosch descendant in the lineage of Johannes to assume the 
position of leader.
 In the third place, the section of the Taaibosch family that rejected the 
leadership of Taaibos-Davids, also rejected his view of the manner in which 
they are to be described in writing. e researcher took a closer look at this 
matter and discussed it with Taaibos-Davids. He was informed that no 
substantial proof was found to support his insistence that the typical Afrikaans 
spelling of ‘Taaibos’ must be recognised. All of the historical sources that were 
consulted make use of the original Dutch form, i.e. ‘Taaibosch’. It is unlikely 
that the Dutch authorities in the Cape at that time would have written the 
surname in Afrikaans as the language did not yet exist at the time. For the 
aforementioned reasons it was decided to continue using the original Dutch 
form (for purposes of this report), and Taaibos-Davids decided to change his 
surname again, this time to Taaibosch-Davids.
 Fourthly, it became evident from the research that Taaibosch-Davids was 
related to the Griqua Chief Pieter Davids on his father’s side.50 Pieter Davids 
was married to the Griqua Chief, Barend Barendse’s daughter, and they 
lived together at Danielskuil.51 After Barendse was murdered, Pieter Davids 
assumed chieftainship52 and, together with his followers, moved out into 
48 I Schapera, e Khoisan, p.  328.
 49 JA Engelbrecht, e Koranna, pp. 90.
 50 According to BJ Barnard, “‘n Lewensbeskrywing van majoor Henry Douglas Warden”, Argieaarboek vir Suid-
 Afrikaanse geskiedenis, 11(1), 1965, p. 338; Campbell has wrongly typied Barend Barendse and Pieter Davids 
as Griqua. In fact they are of Koranna descent.
 51 BJ Barnard, “‘n Lewensbeskrywing van majoor Henry Douglas Warden”, Argieaarboek vir Suid-Afrikaanse 
geskiedenis, 11(1), 1965, p. 338.
 52 RC Germond, Chronicles of Basutoland, pp. 165-187.
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 e ‘Lost’ South African Tribe
 Lishuane53 – a Wesleyan mission station near Ladybrand.54 He was the son 
of Hendrik Davids (married to Sanna Jacobs), who, in turn, was the son of 
Samuel Davids (married to Rina Maarman). Samuel Davids’s second son was 
Daniël Davids (married to Mita Peterson), the father of Jacob Davids, the 
father of Jaftha Taaibosch-Davids. Taaibosch-Davids’s claim to genealogical 
seniority can thus be based on both his paternal and maternal descent.
 Discussion
 In this contribution the focus has rstly been on the history of the Taaibosch 
Koranna in the Free State. Apart from the negative characterisation of the 
Koranna, the scarcity of information is worth noting and causes one to 
question whether the Taaibosch Koranna were suciently important to 
justify the accurate keeping of records. Not surprisingly then, references which 
indicate that the ‘disappearance’ of the Koranna constitutes a cultural, ethnic 
and linguistic loss to South Africa cannot be found. Figuratively speaking, no 
single tear has been shed for the loss of the Koranna.
 Secondly, this contribution has dealt with the revival of Koranna identity 
and leadership. Although various authors have alleged that the post-apartheid 
disposition is generally disinclined towards the identity issue55, the current 
government’s constitutional accommodation and recognition of traditional 
communities and leadership, as well as the land reform policy have stimulated 
the revival of Koranna issues pertaining to identity and leadership. Apart 
from the aforementioned (national) factors leading up to the revival of these 
issues of Koranna identity, various authors also hold that the contemporary 
international climate is favourable for the recognition of and debate about 
indigenous linguistic, cultural and identity rights.56 irdly, a closer look 
has been taken at the role of specic individuals. Accusations of own gain, 
enrichment and power hunger have passed between the opposing factions. 
Whatever the reasons for the involvement of certain individuals in the case of 
the Koranna, their involvement has been instrumental in the revival of Koranna 
53 BJ Barnard, “‘n Lewensbeskrywing van majoor Henry Douglas Warden”, Argieaarboek vir Suid-Afrikaanse 
geskiedenis, 11(1), 1965, p. 338.
 54 J Dreyer, omas Arbousset, p. 85.
 55 S Bekker, Ethnicity in focus. e South African case (Pietermaritzburg, 1993), pp.24-28; FC de Beer, “Ethnicity 
in nation-states with reference to South Africa”, Suid-Afrikaanse Tydskrif vir Etnologie, 21(1), 1998, p. 38. 
56 R Darnell, Comments on ER Wolf. “Perilous ideas; race, culture, people” , Current Anthropology, 35(1), 1994, 
p. 7; A Kuper, “Culture, identity and the project of a cosmopolitan anthropology”, Man, e Journal of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute, 29(3), 1994 p. 537.
90
 New Contree, No. 50 (November 2005)
 identity. Regarding the value of the individual in the construction of cultural 
patterns, groups and identities, it is important to note the following: Although 
social pressure can be overwhelming, it is the voluntary relationships which 
determine the singularity of the person, his/her relationships with others, and 
with groups. When the initial pattern of relationships between individuals 
changes for some or other reason, the individual’s connectedness with a 
specic group is bound to change. As a result of this, group membership and 
the extent to which the individual conforms to group culture is adaptable.57 
Dierent authors have reported that ethnic identity is in a constant state of 
ux due to the fact that individuals full complementary roles determined 
to a large extent by the essence of what the group does for survival.58 Seen in 
this light, the denition of ethnic boundaries varies according to the context, 
and individuals make conscious or subconscious choices between alternative 
sources of identity in order to manipulate social and economic situations.
 e individual is confronted with innumerable situations where a decision has 
to be made on whether he/she identies with a certain group or not. Logically 
speaking it is the individual who conceptualises the meaning that is attached to 
the notion of ‘identity’. Regardless of the implications of the individual’s decision 
(choosing to accept or reject groups; preparedness for active or passive participation 
in symbolic systems, etc.), authors feel that identication is a personal aair 
representing the result of an exercised choice.59 Furthermore, multiple identities 
exist not only because the individual may alter his identication during the 
course of his life, but because he is able to relate dierent identities and reconcile 
contradictions between identities.
 In keeping with the above, ethnic groups and boundaries are similarly not 
permanent xtures. In this regard, authors focus our attention on the fact 
that the origin, creation, maintenance and disbanding of ethnic groups is 
similar to the origin, creation, maintenance and disbanding of any other type 
of group, and thus may be explained in the same terms.60 us, the Koranna 
57 M Banton, “Modelling ethnic and national relations”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 17(1), 1994, p. 2; S Bekker, 
Ethnicity in focus..., pp.12-13. 
58 D Bates & A Rassam, Peoples and cultures of the Middle East (Englewood Clis, Prentice Hall, 1983), p.  86; J 
Sharp, “Ethnic group and nation: e apartheid vision in South Africa”, South African Keywords. e uses and 
abuses of political concepts (Cape Town, David Philip,1988), p.  80.
 59 D Bates & A Rassam, Peoples and cultures..., pp.85-86; S Bekker, Ethnicity in focus..., p.12; DC Martin, “e 
choices of identity”, Social Identities, 1(1), 1995, p. 14.
 60 F Barth, Ethnic groups and boundaries: e social organization of cultural dierence (London, 1969). Bates & 
Rassam, Peoples and cultures, pp. 87-88; M Banton, “Modelling ethnic and national relations”, Ethnic and 
Racial Studies, 17(1), 1994, p. 2; DC Martin, e choices of identity, p. 5; J Peoples & G. Bailey, Humanity. 
An introduction to Cultural Anthropology (New York, West Publishing Company, 2000), pp. 307-309; J Sharp, 
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 e ‘Lost’ South African Tribe
 have ‘disappeared’ (disbanded) because the connectedness of individuals has 
weakened. Stated dierently, the Koranna are experiencing a revival because 
individuals are prepared to make the eort to promote their case.
 In revival scenarios, and this is the fourth point of this discussion, Martin 
states that dierent identity narratives are generated and oered to the 
individual exercising his/her choice.61 Certain values are proclaimed within 
these narratives, and attempts are made to convince the individual to identify 
with these values. In this regard, undisputed truths, promises, feelings, 
emotions, fears and anxieties are combined. e research requested by the 
various Taaibosch factions may be seen as an attempt to create an identity 
narrative; ‘something’ which may be upheld as proof of the ‘truth’, or as 
a justication of the allegations, but which may also provide the basis for 
identifying with the case of the Free State Koranna.
 “Ethnic group and nation: e apartheid vision in South Africa”, South African Keywords. e uses and abuses of 
political concepts (Cape Town, David Philip,1988), p.  80.
 61  DC Martin, “e choices of identity”, Social Identities, 1(1), 1995, p. 15.