Jan K. Coetzre and Geoffrey T. W<KKl.
 Rhodes University
 IntrOOoction
 1.
 The tnlderpinning epistemological assumptioo of this article
 is that of the micro f~datioo of social reality. The most
 diroct empirical r~ty in the coostitution of the social wocld
 is the individual. This empirical r~ty reveals itself as an
 experience within a specific time span, at a specific place.
 Individual experiences must, however, re sreo against the
 OOckgr~d of a totality of experiences and are closely
 Ix>und to it AS sucll they cootribute colloctively to that
 coherent whole of human experiences whicll ~ to re a
 tmity in itself. We can tnlderstand the colloctive, all-
 enampassing ~ty by viewing it through the cootributing
 parts.
 As an Wlpra:aJentOO wave of resistance to the socio-
 political status quo, the 1980s mass inSWToctiOO repr~tOO
 a watershoo in South African politics, and provoo that
 mincrity role was Wltenable. Much of the existing wa-k 00
 the subja;t bas tended to focus 00 the realm of tx-ood
 political ecoocmy CK 00 the chrooological train of events. In
 a sense, the missing g~t bas ~ the exJX'1'iences of
 individual political activists. The WIn of this article has
 ~ to explCKe the events SWTounding the resistance in a
 small town in the Eastern Cape, through the aro:xmts of five
 such activists. This study fams part of a tx-ooder CKal
 histCl'y r~ch projeA:t. In aU. the stcries of eleven
 activists were collected. and all were used as source material
 in the soctioo relow General Patterm In the
 GrabaImtown R~. The five individual stcries
 discussal rest encapsulate the general themes that emerged
 The five life histaies usa! in this article therefoce cootri1xJte
 to oor understanding of the way in whicl1 a signifi~t part
 of tile ~u1atioo experienced the peri<xl of political nnmoil
 in the Eastern Cape (and in other parts of the OOUDtry)
 during the 1980s. This micro approocl1 roincides with the
 view expressed by mologist Ge<X"g Simmel and histocian
 Walter Benjamin, nanlely that histocy is only ~ible under
 <XXlditioos of selection, emphasis and synthesis. It is D<X.
 ~ible to devel~ a full understanding of the totality of
 histocy. Social analysis and histaical recooslructioo are
 therefoce of ne:cessity selective and largely represent designs
 to suit a particular programme3.
 Methooology
 2
 This article, 00sal 00 the life histcri~ method, sreks to
 exploce the "r~ess motioo" of the liv~ of ocdinary ~le
 in an extraocdinary time. This study ~ 0« h~ to
 provide a definitive histay of the regioo in the 198Os, rot
 ratho- sreks to rtXXl'd and exploce the aa:oonts and
 fe'reptioos of the activists themselv~ towards these
 a"ow<bI years.
 What is b1Jly social, aro:rding to Simmel4, is the
 individual's passage thrOOgh life and her/his interactioos
 with others. This ~itioo tmdeclies Simmers "fragmentary
 methcx1ology" whidl assumes that localised social
 determinatioos are intO"wOven, and that all other
 determining foc~ in society spring frcm this sourre5. This
 coocept of "fragmentary methcx1ology" regarding
 sociological analyses WdS ed1<m by Walter Benjamin, who
 argued that the p<:I1ioos of social reality could ooly re
 piered together thrOOgh a process of recoostructioo. Only
 throogh detailed micro ~dl was a ~ tmderstanding
 of social processes ~ble6. Benjamin's meth<xl sreks to
 n... weave a falxic oot of fragments of material that have
 In the traditioo of the w<rks of Mi.cl1el Foo~t. it is not
 SOOght toattcnpt to speak f<T, <T name the discooten~ oot
 ratho- to draw attentioo to the nanlre of their struggles, and
 the iss~ arcxmd whim they ~e mOOilizedI. Unless the
 respooses ofth~ individual activists are acooI.mted f<T, any
 analysis of the resistance will re ovo-ly state cenU"ed, with
 the failal system playing the doolinant role2. In (XXl~
 this study represents an attcnpt to clear a space in which the
 activists can speak f<T themselves.
 The authm are grateful to Canon Ezra Tisani, Makh~dile Tisani, MzWdkbe Ndlela and the eleven activists who told us
 their staies, f(X" their axluibution in making this project possible. The financial assistance of the Joint Researcll C<Jnmittre
 (Rh<xJes University) is hereby acknowloogoo. Opinions expressed and axlclusions aITivoo at. are th~ of the authm.
 9CONTREE 38/1995
~ uansf<Xmoo by the process of emph~s and
 <mission"7.
 The method emplo.)lrA:1 in this article is ~ 00 the
 assumptioos mentioooo aoove. This method relies 00 the
 re(;(l"ding of the detail of individual experienre and
 thereafter constructing a moorage, an overall frameW(X'k f<r
 social analysis. In this article the individual' aro:>unts are
 also inteJ"pretOO in the light oflx'ooder issues. DooJmenmry
 analysis is used to provide linkages retween diffe1'ing social
 happenings, in order to obtain as CXXDprehensive a visioo as
 pQ')sible. Through roording the unique experiences of a
 numrer of political activists it is pQ')sible to capture aspects
 of the nature of the political struggle of a large propaotioo of
 the ~u1atioo, as well as the issues around whicll they were
 mobilized
 StXXXldly, the protests ~tOO not ooly axltlict ~
 the cx:mmunity and ootside authcrity, but also revealed
 deep-seatOO divisioos within the cx:mmunity, ~ older
 axlservabve elements and the youth. Thirdly, the ~
 ~ partially a-ushed by means of mass detentioos, a
 similar medlanism to what ~ employed in the mid-1980s.
 Fmally, the oo}'COtt energised the student leadership and it
 ~tOO the logical extensioo of the activism of 1976.
 In the 1982.1983 period, the government ~ a num~ of
 ~s to change the influx axltrol system and set in
 motioo the pr~ towards implementing the trl-cameral
 System13. The "K<XJ'nhof Bills" ~ to incrrase the
 axltrols placed 00 black migrants, whilst the Black Local
 Auth<rities Act greatly increased the powers of the generally
 un~ular and cmupt black C<Xnmunity Cooncils into
 town oc village oouncils, ~tensibly similar to those
 ~ting in white areas14. The black C<Xnmunity Cooncils
 had been established in 1977, with intentioo of "~ting a
 sectioo of the urmn ~ulatioo as agents of the state at local
 level"IS. The Cooncils ~ focced to increase servi~
 charges owing to the OOllapse of the moo~ly on beer sales,
 an incapacity of the Bantu Administratioo Boards to "match
 iname with expenditure in the 1980s" and losses incurred
 in the provisioo of hoosing and servi~16. These
 devel~ments provided the impetus roc the launch of the
 UDF in August 1983, an umocella ocganizatioo of civi~
 groupings, trade unioos and student ocganizatioos.
 3.
 Historical background
 3.1 
Origim of the R~istaoce
 Betwren 1983 and 1987, South Africa was rackoo by
 internal turmoil of a type unprectXlented in the country's
 histay. Essentially, the intr<xiuction of the Black Local
 Auth<Xities system and of the Tn-Cameral Constitution
 unleashoo a wave of resistance that was only br<*.en by two
 suc:cessive States of Emergency, thousands of detentions
 and the militarization of white South African society.
 These OOsic facts mask the full <Xmplexity of the nature of
 the resistance, regional dynamics and of the myriad of
 ocganizations that ar~ to represent the interests of black
 South Africans. The revolt was initially oonfinoo to the
 Vaal Triangle townships. However, it spread oountrywide
 through a <Xmbination of activism, the increasing influence
 of txxJies such as civic associations that had sprung up in
 most South African centres, and the alienating nature of the
 state's initial attempts to curb the resistance.
 The first signs of the 1980s insurrectioo reachoo
 Grahamstown in Septemm- 1984. This first majcxincident
 of "uilrest" (XXlcernoo neither the Tri-Cameral Coostitutioo
 ncx the Black Local Authcrities, although these issues
 (XXltributOO to the reality of the everyday life of the subjects
 of this research. Scholars 1x>~ school in memcry of
 the death in detentioo of black (XXlsciousness leader, Steve
 Biko, seven ~ previously. Five hundred scholars
 marchoo fr<m Joza to Fmgo Villagel7. At the <XX'Der of
 Victcria and Albert Rood'), they were dispersed by polire
 using shotguns and sjamtxics. When the pupils regrouped,
 ~gas was Used18. This march was to represent a fcxmative
 political experienre fcx many of the activists who told their
 stcrles.
 It should re noted that whilst the ~ ins~oo of the
 1980s only regan in the Vaal Triangle in 1983, in the Cape
 the mUle lines had already ~ drawn by the 1980 schools
 ooyootts, the attendant violent resistanre sharing many of
 the cllaracteristi~ of the la~ revolt During 1979, the
 Grahamstown polire had ~stOO in the establishment of a
 vigilante grouping, the Peacemakers, to ~st them in their
 tasks8. This grouping ~e intimately involvoo in the
 1980 schools ooycott in Grahamstown. In July 1980, over
 thirty school pupils were arrested, following a wave of arson
 and stollings dirocted against school property, and the
 businesses and homes of memrers of the Peacemakers9.
 This violenre oontinuoo into 0ct<M, when pupils attackoo
 memrers of the vigilante grouping en route to a meeting
 with parents and teacllers to discuss mecllanisms foc ending
 the OOycottlO. At the time there seems to have ~
 oonsiderable tensioo retween parents and students as to the
 utility of the OOycottll.
 3.2 General Patterm in the Grahanl§town Re§1stance
 A numrer of general patterns are apparent with regard to
 the insurroction in Grahamstown in the 1980s whicll may
 re of value in histcrically locating the life stcries. Firstly, it
 is evident that mucll of the ~ular anger was ~
 against representatives of the authcrities within the
 townships, most notably black town councillm19. The
 highly-focu~ attacks succeeA:Jed in mnging the local
 authcrities system to its knees, although it never totally
 COlIap~.
 Seoondly, the resistance followed coherent patterns, with the
 a~ce of authocity being replaceAi by alternative structures,
 the street committees. These street committees. themselves
 reporting to area committees. 00sed themselves 00 the
 principal of retaining the anooymity of street level leaders,
 The 1980 schools boycott shares a num~ of characteristics
 with the mass insurroction of the mid-1980s. Firstly,
 criginally peaceful protests soon escaIatOO into violence12.
 10 CONTREE38/1995
.vith detained activists being rapidly replaced, and roo::x:ds
 being kept of detainees and of th~ who had vanished2o,
 Mcre famal ocganization was provided by the umtJ'ella
 Grahamstown Civic, Association (Graca) which had
 criginally been fclmed to encourage ~le not to vote in
 town rouncil elections, but had now become involved in
 political education21, The life stocies revealed some tensions
 retwoon this ocganization and the street oomminre activists,
 Thirdly, the role of the security focces deserves some
 CXIlsideration, The police had a strongly militaristic
 ocganizational culture, a phencmenon not unique to South
 Africa22, The army's role sooms to have been limited, and
 of a lower profile than the police23, Nonetheless, its
 presence in the townships greatly politicised its role and
 challenged the CXIlventional mould of civil-military
 relations, By 1985, up to 35 (XX) South African Defence
 Focce (SADF) ttoops were deployeti internally to coun~ the
 diSturbances24, Meanwhile, up to three-quarters of
 policemen were also oommitted to these tasks2s,
 and SOOIn to have learnt little fr<m the tacti~ employed by
 E~ police fa'ces26. SAP riot CXXltrol ~niques
 remained framed by perceptions of unfavourable terrain,
 climatic CXXlditions and the size and aggression of ~posing
 mom27. PCXX' strategy and inappropriate ~uipment
 (shotguns, sjamtxics and teargas versus specialised riot
 protection gear and other ~uipment) ensured a higher
 degree of casualties on both sides. In addition, ~g and
 inexperienced policemen were often placed in situations
 where demands were placed on them be)OOd their
 emotional capabilities and training. This led to inaeasingly
 severe respooses by the police when faced with h~tile
 mom28. In the case of GrahamstoWD, this resulted in the
 inaeased use of firearms by the police and, CXXl~uently,
 higher casualties. In additioo, these respooses deepened the
 cleavages be~ established authcrity and its ~pooents.
 Fourthly, the impact of the resistance 00 white
 Grahamstown n~ mentiooing. One of the m~t visible
 manifestatioos of the diSCXX1tent was in the endemic
 stooings of vehicles 00 Raglan Road, which then fooned
 part of the N2 highwaf9. These incidents reOocted the
 mae intense. hidden struggles in the township between
 The role of the South African Police (SAP) was even mae
 oontentious than that of the SADF in the 1980s. SAP riot
 oontrol te(:hniques have tendOO to re very heavy-handOO
 CONTREE 38/1995
th~ C()-(1)tOO into existing structures of authocity and th~
 seeking their demise. However, these incidents also
 refle(:ted the faceless side of the rerellioo and the bitter
 harvest of entrenched racial segregatioo. In rebn"n, they
 often triggered dispr~ooate respooses by white
 civilians30.
 4.1 Shared Experte~ and Cormmn TheRB
 Although each of the five activists have their own ln1ique
 stay, certain ccmmoo b"ends and themes are identifiable.
 FtrStly, there is the process of political ~Jlliz~tioo.
 Against a 00ckdr~ of the reemergence of political
 crganizatioos, each of the individuals ~e involved in
 localised sU'Uggles. Generally, this Wlscientizing process
 took. place in the late 1970s and early 198Os, a period when
 a num~ of majoc schools boycotts took. place in the regioo.
 After a period of inactivity, a plethcra of ccmmln1ity
 crganizatioos had emerged in the Eastern Cape.
 On 21 July 1985, the FIrSt State of Emergency was declared,
 a:nfiiled ooly to certain regioos, including A11m1y (the
 regioo within which Grahamstown falls). In the first five
 days after the declaratioo, at least thirteen Grabamstown
 residents were detained31, with over 441 OOing detained
 romtr}Wide32. By ~rer 1985, 1(XX) ~le had
 already died in the past 18 mooths' "unrest" countr}Wide, as
 a result of 1xJth police actioo and a:ntlict within
 axnmtmities33. SADF mmrers were given wide-ranging
 powers of arrest, with every soldier effectively gaining the
 powers of a policeman34.
 Although Cl'ganizatioos such as the South African Allioo
 WCI'kers Unioo (SAAWU) and the United Democratic
 Froot (UDF) had criginated outside the district, a legacy of
 political and WCI'kplace acti\/ism had preceded their arrival
 in Grahamstown. In this sense, it seems apparent that a
 dualistic relatiooship existed 00twren individual and
 l~ activism, and political structures. On one hand, it
 appears that
 During March 1986, the first State of Emes:gency was
 ccmp1ete1y 1iftro3s. Resistance nevertheless <XX1Unuai in
 Grahamstown throughout that year, notwithstanding the
 declaralioo of a natioowide ~d State of Emergency 00
 12 J1D1e 1986. The m~t <XX1spicuous evidence to the
 outside wcx1d was the stooing of vcllic1es, petro1-1xmbing of
 houses and ne:ck1acings36. However, the Emergency was to
 re applied with "1D1precedented harshness", which
 ultimately ocoke the 00ck1x:lle of the resistance37. By
 Novemm- 1987, the UDFs cxganizatioo had ~ severely
 damaged in the Eastern Cape regioo, with many youth
 cxganizatioos COl1apsing38.
 "... scme of the civic crganizatioos ooly came
 after the UDF. They had ~ thes:e, oot wes:e
 not structured cr C(iles:ent in any way. So when
 the UDF came into reing, it assisted in the
 f<Xmatioo of othes: civic crganizatioos."
 On the other, it is evident, that grassroots ocganizatioos
 such as the street canmittees in Grahamstown emergoo
 independently of the rise of the UDF. Whilst natiooallevel
 ocganizatioos were to give a certain coherence and
 idoological dira:tioo to l~ struggles, it was mass
 participatioo in the latter, that would enable the fames: to
 mount an 1D1precedented challenge to the StablS quo.
 The mass insurrectioo of the 1980s thus saw unpr~tOO
 levels of resistance, the partial destructioo of government
 authmty in parts of the townships, and in coosequence, the
 ina-eased militarization of mety and 1Dlpr~ted levels
 of repression. These 1xood devel~ents cooceal the real
 hmnan drama -the stcries of those actually involved in the
 resistance and its effect 00 their social relationships and
 pe!"SOI1a1 outlooks. It is h~ that these stcries fr(m
 Grahamstown, will reveal S(XDet1)ing of the real face of the
 rerellioo.
 In axttrast to Subject A and Subject B, Subject C's political
 involvement ~e thrOOgh NGOs and the trade tmioo
 movement However, a similar process of jux~tioo
 retween the spootaneous emergence of grass roots structures
 and the rise of natiooallevel ocganizatioos, such as the UDF
 oc individual trade W1ioos, is apparent Thus, whilst Ix>th
 trends were related, the relatiooship retween local activism
 and national ocganization was two-way, whereby Ix>th
 chauga! and were changa! by the other.
 4. The stories
 There are a nmnrer of different manners in whicll ocal
 histay researcll may 00 presented, apart fr<m simply
 reprooucing interview transaips. Foc a usable researcll
 rep<x't oc article, however, there are two alternatives -to
 weave the stcries into a single narrative, oc present a
 nmnrer of distinct individual stcries in tm'n. The latter has
 the advantage in that the ricllnesS of the individual
 experience may 00 preserved, yet ~ not preclude the
 ~bility of identifying general trends oc tendencies. This
 approo.ch was selected as the most appropriate foc this
 article. It provides a range of differing perspectives 00 the
 experience of a community, yet allows ooe to gain an overall-perspective 
thereof. Whilst, in all, eleven stcries were
 collected, five were selected foc the purposes of this article.
 An additiooal dimensioo is the spatial ooe. Apartheid space
 had txJth local and regiooal manifestatioos. On the regiooal
 level, the hcmeland policy, and the 1981 independence of
 Ciskei, unleashed a range of new pressures. On the ooe
 hand, the mobilizatioo against Ciskeian independence had a
 ripple effect in neigh1x>ln'ing South African centres such as
 Grahamsto\\11. On the other, the wave of repressioo
 unleashed in that territorl9, created a bleak precedent foc
 future repressive actioo. On the local level, whilst the
 resistance centred around Grahamstown's densely-~ulated
 to\\11ships, it spilled over into the neigh1x>uring white area
 in the focm of coosumer ooycotts, stayaways, periOOic
 stooings 00 the natiooal r~ and suikes, all of which
 drew 00 the mass political mobilizatioo. An additiooal
 CONTREE38/1995
spatial dimensioo CXX\cems the activis~ themselves, their
 movement ~ the regioo, and the extended netwc:rks of
 SUPP<I't that sustained them, in times of 1x>th CXX\flict andpeace.
 pi~ together all i~ amplexities.
 Related to this is the issue of state repressioo. Of particularimP<Xfanre 
here is the state's choire and deployment of
 "n<mlalising technologies" fa' dealing with the newdissidents. 
Strategies ranged fr<Xn the simple disappearanreof 
individuals, to the seloctive use of t<lture as an
 insU'ument of policy. The ultimate objoctive of the latter
 ~s to have ~ to ftxce detain~ into ~ing
 ~ent citizens, to ~e oolla~t(J'8, in additioo to
 <XX1trolling and disciplining them41.
 Furth~CI'e. there is the telnpcnt aspect. In many respeas
 the resistanoo representW a cumulative affair, t)le later
 ootmeaks of protest being fram~ by earli~ experienoos and
 the subj~ve interpretatioos theroof. Even if earli~
 struggles V¥'ere, in objective temls, unsu~, they may
 have, in S(Xlle cases, ~ inteI'pretM as advances, and the
 basis fa future ooll~ve acUoo. In this mann~, a ridl
 aJItureofresistanoo~ Also of imP<X't8Dre remainoo the relatiooships between
 individual representatives of the status quo and the activists.
 A <Xmmoo thread through the 1980s resistanre in
 Grahamstown w«e ongoing attacks on persoos perceived tobe 
oo1la~tas42. Howe~. such oo1la~tas represented
 the product of the same <x:mmunities and often were old
 a(XIuaintanres of the activis~ It was inevitable that the
 A key ampooent of the struggle of the 1980s was the
 hidden v.u-ld which the activists built fa themsel~ a
 v.u-ld of disguised fares and structures, and of cc:xJes. Of all
 the ~ of the 1980s resistance, this is prot8bly the least~ed. 
Only through <ral a~ts is it ~ble to
 ure 
th
 IS 
in\
 rassro(reef
 'During that time we were
 vere set up in all the streel
 set up mmitte
 ~
 13CONTREE 38/1995
1980s resistance representfd not only an attack on the
 apartheid state, but also a struggle retween a:mpeting
 interests within the oommunity. A final issue is the effects
 the resistance bad on the activists' lives into this decade and
 their retrospective assessments of the value of their
 (XXltributions.
 place. As a result of his involvement in the ooycott. Subjoct
 A was focced to flee the Ciskeian authocities, and return to
 Grahamstown .
 Subjoct A played an active role in most of the schools
 ooycotts of the 198Os, and still relieves troay that they
 yielded impressive gains in terms of rOO)8nition fCl" SRC's
 and retter school facilities. He was never able to realise his
 objectives of ~g a teacher, but places the blame on
 the Bantu Education system and the discouraging attitudes
 of his teachers. Although it seems evident that schools
 ooycotts yielded very mixoo results43, any cost-benefit
 analysis of their effects is na:essarily subjective.
 Subject A: Student activist to employee In organized
 student atTalrs
 Whilst at school in Grahamstown in the late 1970s, Subject
 A bad joined the Congress of South African Students
 (CaSAS). He remains ambivalent al:x)ut that (l'ganization,
 rocalling 1x>th CaSAS's ability to weather repeated waves of
 detentions, and the tendency f(l' th~ in leadership
 ~tions to fail to coosult with mem~ip and 00 "too
 independent". However, it was only in 1980, in the
 aftermath of the schools boycotts, and following the death of
 a friend at the bands of the police that Subject A was
 actively drawn into resistance politics.
 During the 1980 school ooycott, a right wing group of
 vigilantes, the "P~cem~:kers", founded by the police in 1979
 "to assist them in their tasks", had intervenoo 00 the side of
 the authocities44. The Peacemakers actively SUpp<:l1ed the
 C(lnInunity council system, violently attacking s~
 ~ents thereof. Nooetheless, the c<mmunity counci1l(X's,
 widely despised following the increases in OOsic service
 charges4s, were fCl'cOO to seek refuge in a fCl'tifioo enclave.
 However, the cooservative groupings still scmetimes took
 the offensive. Following Subjoct A's return to Grahamstown
 in 1985, he was hunted by the fcxmer Pe~~-8--1c:e1"
 vigilantes, and his h<me looted.
 At the friend's funeral, a numrer of mourners, including
 Subject A, were detainoo. Whilst the circumst&1~
 surroonding his detentioo were scmewhat arbitrary, his
 experien~ in police custOOy refleA::ted a c.ertain coosistency:
 "In the evenings, the police would fetch you fr<m
 the cell where }OO were staying with others and
 take }OO away foc interrogatioo. Police would
 s<metimes not take you back to your original cell
 after intetTogatioo. They would s<metimes tell
 the others that they had released you because you
 had ~ted. Of course they were lying."
 In cootrast to COSAS, Subj~ A relieved that the UDF
 emerged spont&1eously in Grahamstov.1l, representing a
 1x"ood coo.1ition of well-established )OOth and civic
 ocganizatioos. Indeed, the UDFs natiooal policy and
 relatiooship v..ith the charterist movement initially was
 unclear to many in Grahamstov.1l. Unlike COSAS, Subj~
 A relieved that decision-making v..ithin the UDF was fully
 democratic. His involvement in the UDF stemmed fr<m his
 memOOrship of a )OOth ocganizatioo. It was relied that the
 UDF "... ensured all ocganizatioos had a role to play in what
 was happening".
 As is apparent from the other activists' stroes, it seems
 evident that the detention process had a num~ of distinct
 hallmarks. These includOO isolation from society, attempts
 to divide activists, and the scientific use of ta"ttlre.
 Detention was not only intendOO as a deterrent to others, but
 to gain assert power over, and, it was hoped, to focce him or
 her to recant of carlier beliefs. In this process, the objective
 of gaining infoonation from detainees seems only to have
 been accocdOO secondary status.
 Despite the demro'atic nature of the UDF and its apparent
 independence of the ANC, activists painstakingly regan to
 eroct a hidden wocld in whicll to pursue their political aims.
 Meetings were p~fully kept shCX't. with individuals
 only being notified a1x>ut them at the last possible mcment
 Certain individuals were entrusted with the task of
 clandestinely infooning selected activists a1x>ut sea-et get-
 togethers.
 AfteJ: his perioo in detention, Subject A's school refused to
 readmit him as a pupil. This, and his financial
 independence 00 his 1x"other in King William's Town,
 focced him to continue his schooling in that centre. Subject
 A went to live in Zwelitsba, ooe of King William's Town's
 black townships, which were inCC!"pOCated into the Ciskei.
 However, he maintained contact with events in
 Grahamstown, revealing S(XDething of the nature of
 extended netwocks of suppoct and contact. Resolving to
 })ec(me better infCl'1Ded, Subject A and his friends regularly
 met to discuss political issues. At this stage, Subject A's
 primary sources of infocmatioo 00 national level deootes
 included not ooly daily newspapers. but also Radio
 Fr~, and periOOic supplies of OOnned literature.
 Following the 1985 murder of Cradock a:mmunity leader
 Matthew Goniwe, a particularly large school boycott took
 As part of the wave of detentions following the declaration
 of a second State of Emergency on 12 JW1e 1986. Subject A
 was detained W1der section 50 of the Emergency
 regulations. He was to re incarcerated foc almost three
 ~. ills experiences in detention were scmewhat less
 severe than in 1980.
 "The COO1fades who had ~ in detentioo in
 1985 had fought f<X' an improvement of
 cooditioos in detentioo."
 CONTREE 38/199514
It seems that this was m~t1y adlievoo by means of h1D1ger
 strikes. However, Subj~ A's ~tioo starttXl with a spell
 in solitary coofinement, where the f<Xxi was es~y 00d
 and washing facilities very limitOO. AlthOOgh he regularly
 faced hoor-loog interrogatioos, he was not t(l"turOO -a moce
 subtle level of "noonaiising tecllnologies" was applied,
 involving less use of physical violence, and a grearr-r use of
 moce indir~ methods to humiliate oc 1x"eak down the
 individual, such as the regular denial of nocmal washing
 facilities and the frequent use of solitary coofinement
 Following his release, Subj~ A felt that he "... was in
 another wocld, a different wocld", and experien~
 coosiderable difficulties with nocmal social interactioo.
 Subject B was taken to a house in white Grahamstown,
 wh~ he was repeatedly assaulroo and then releaseA:I:
 "As long as there was trooble in the location ...
 getting pickOO up was a high ~bility. And
 the person pickOO up would pay the price roc
 what they term trooble in the location,"
 Bearing the marks of a seVel'e 1X'.ating, Subja:t B was askOO
 to address a political rally, and tell the audience what had
 happened He was "... still a bit )OODg", thooght "...
 addressing a big aowd was scary", and "... was shivmng
 refoce (he) g<x 00 the platfocm". Whilst Subja:t B relievOO
 Subja:t A relievoo he persooally renefitted ft<m his
 involvement in the struggle, through realising that: "... it was Wlsafe to be involved, it was D<X. ~
 retreating."
 n... nothing is static. I also reali~ that if ~le
 fooght or struggled their situatioo would cllange.
 If they are hooest in their struggle, they will
 triwnph."
 It was in the area of street politics that Subject B was to
 ~e m~t involved The civic movement in
 Grahamstown was divided, with two rivalleacbs ~ "...
 feeling they owned individual groops of ~le:~ When
 <XIlftooiOO With a divided civic movement ~gly
 imp(1o;ed frcm aOOve, a group of activists, including Su~
 B, decided to ocganize street and area CI:Dmi~. He
 en~ a seaet wocld, a wocld that involved <XIlstandy
 moVing address, wocking to establish new stroot
 CI:Dmi~ and ocganizing the ~oo of individuals
 ooto structures to replace th~ who bad most ~dy ~
 detained Ead1 street had a Cl:Dmittre of ten, el~g an
 exOOltive foc five streets. C<mmunicatioo ~
 CI:Dmi~ was by wocd of mooth, <XIlsi~ly hampered
 by the amplexity of structures, and the fact that two entire
 street CI:Dmi~ of "Y" and ItN" streets WO'e arrestOO. At
 this stage, Subj~ B oogan to address political meetings in
 disguise.
 In the end, when presseAi a)x)ut the m~t effa:tive fam of
 resistance, Subjoct A argues that "... MK played a ~
 impcx"tat1t role." Whilst theI'e is little doubt that Umkhooto
 we Sizwe (MK) activity had a:Ilsiderable symoolic
 impcx"tat1ce, "... it remains difficult to separate rlletcric fr<m
 reality, in effocts to apprroate the size and nature theI'eofl46.
 Pr<mbly, activists such as Subjoct A bad a greater impact.
 oot theI'e is little doubt that the ~bility of assistance fr<m
 a powerful focce fr<m outside a:Ilsiderably ~ted their
 mocale.
 During his 1980 bout in detentioo, SubjtX:t A's mother died.
 "... the ooe who wcrrled m~t a}x)ut me." He was never able
 to <Xmplete his educatioo, and at the time of the interview
 wocked as a messenger in the offices of a university's SRC.
 However, he feels that his peri<xi as an activist resulted in: Although lxJth the Grahamstown Civic Associatioo
 (GRACA) and Grahamstown Youth Coogress (GRA YCO)
 made r~tOO attempts to bring the street ccmmi~ lDl(b'
 their cootrol, SubjOC't B and othes: street a:mmittre activists
 re~ preferring to retain &me f<Xm of autm<my.
 Incmi, in defiance of the civi~ the Grahamstown street
 ccmmi~ ocganized a COOSWDes: ooyoott, revealing
 &mething of the discootinuity retwm1 individual actioos
 and established organizatiooal structures. Howeves:, (XIl~
 was retained with activists fr<m othes: rentres involved in
 the ocganizatioo of street a:mmiures. sucl1 as Malgas and
 Gooiwe (prioc to his assassinatioo). Subject B believed that
 their cootriootioo f<Xmed part of a larges: political cootext
 "The ~le in my <x:mInWlity see my role and
 have a certain way of looking at me. They
 respect me. They approoch me when thrze are
 things they do not Wlderstand".
 Subject B: Street Commi~ Organizer aOO Activist.
 In the early 198Os, Subj~ B was a scholar at Nombulelo
 High School. He did not sre himself as politically active
 tmtil his mer detentioo by police at a (XD1nlemocatioo
 service foc Steve Biko, in 1984. Indeed, foc the duratioo of
 the 1976 Soweto uprising, Subj~ B'S parents had sent him
 to school at the moce peaceful farming hamlet of Patersoo,
 wha-e mem~ of his extended family lived. As was the
 caSJ:, with Subj~ A, it was an arbitrary arrest that was to
 prove a focmative experience politically. Subj~ B had ~
 following a crowd of tori-toying youths at a distance when
 he was arrested. At that period:
 Prioc to the fClmatioo of the stroot ccmmiures, a Inaja:
 focus of violence had ~ ~ the ~~~k~
 vigilantes and political activists. OrganizOO vigilante
 activity had doclinoo in the early 198Os, following the death
 of their leader, Mr Blaai (see relow). Howeves:, by the mid-
 198Os, tensioos rapidly incr~ ~ black policemen
 and othes: residents of the townships. At this stage, there
 ~e a spate of attacks 00 individual policemen's houses47."... one could easily re taken up and ~ten up
 and not even taken to a police statioo".
 15CONTREE 38/1995
During the July 1985 to March 1986 State of Emergency,
 Subject B was detained again. His reputation had preceded
 him, and the policemen arresting him were suq)rised by his
 relative youth:
 Subject C: Working to Change the Field
 Unlike Subjoct B and Subjoct A, Subjoct C was already
 working during 1983. His political involvement regan in
 1977, when he left school in standard eight Subjoct C was
 employed as a reporter for a student group, oollecting
 information on consumer ooycotts, strikes and politicalcampaigns. 
Thereafter, he worked as a fieldworker with the
 Surplus P~le's Projoct.
 "The picture they had was of this huge guy, and
 they were not thinking in terms of this. small
 roy."
 Shc.'tly after his detention, Subjocr B's father died. After
 initial promises to release him, the ~ty police infonned
 him that he would only re permitted to attend the fimeral if
 he ro-<¥fated with them in future. This offer was repeated
 on several occasions. As was the case with Subjocr A, then,
 the pr~ of detention involved sustained efforts to "turn"
 the activist
 "I would say that was the one thing that gave me
 insight ~ it mean going to th~ ~
 threatened with removal. Trying to discover how
 people felt as they were threatened with removal,
 and whether they knew alx>ut the place they were
 moving to... I could sre that people were really,
 really suffering in the true sense. When people
 were faced with the dilemma perhaps: when ooe
 had R5 and ooe had the choice retween using the
 R5 to travel to town to seek wock or using the R5
 to buy something to eat foc the family."
 As a result of Subject B's refusal to ~ate, he was
 transferred to police ceUs at Kentoo-oo-Sea (a nearby
 seaside res<x1). Here he was placed in solitary confinement
 and repetitively tJ:xtured. the objective sremingly reing to
 1x"eak his m<rale and ~ate in future, rather than
 extract infmnation per se. Detainees were regularly made
 to:
 After leaving the Project. Subject C obtainoo wock at St
 Andrew's College, an exclusive and predcminantly whiteprivate 
school. At alxJut this stage, he had beccBne involvoo
 in ocganizing a local wockers movement, "Yoong ChristianWca-kers". 
They would
 "... ride a helicopter, you have a brocmstick, they
 handcuff you ...".
 Again, the technologies of detentioo were intended as
 "namalising", with the objective of making the internee;
 "willing to work" with the existing order. Seemingly as an
 experiment, he Wa,s briefly released in both 1986 and 1988.
 When the authorities discovered there "was no change" in
 his political reliefs and actioos, he was redetained.
 Released in 1989, he was placOO under heavy restrictioos
 until the De Klerk reforms.
 "... start off with small situations to mobifu;e the
 wockers refoce we went on to attack the larger
 ones".
 After a perioo of mobilizatioo at Sl Andrew's, me WCl"kersasked 
permissioo to fOOD a workers committre.
 "It would only re fooned up by dle workers and
 address worker issues widlin St Andrew's. But
 we as workers knew dlat I would re reporting
 00ck to my group in dle l<ntion after work."
 Subject B relieves the political resistance cootributtXl toP.w. 
Botha's 1<& of political power and the negotiatioo
 process:
 However, individual committee memoo-s proved extremely
 vulnerable to management pressure, and a decisioo was
 made to link up with the South African Allied Wockers
 Union (SAA WU). Against the OOckdr~ of rising political
 resistance in the townships, the small group of unionists at
 St Andrew's began to mobilize wockers in surrounding
 factories and at the University. Subject C believed that
 "Those things made him (p. W. Botha) find that
 the country is getting out of hand and he was
 focced to declare a State of Emergency. After
 that the (struggle) continued. with ~le
 making a lot of sacrifices, to such an extent that
 he was to suffer a sb'oke and give up oompletely.
 The new person (De Klerk) realised he could not
 take the same b'end..."
 "... 
radical changes nealOO to be made within the
 sb"ucture that would accommodate the plight (of
 the po<X")."A deeply religious person, Subject B has retained his
 involvement in C<mmunity affairs, and at the time of the
 interview worked as a fieldworker for the AlOODY Council ofChurdles. 
Like Subject A, Subject B regrets the opportunity
 to not have studied further, yet ~lieves that
 During the wave of repression during the mid 198Os,
 Subject C's house was ransacked by police while he was at
 wock.
 It... through this type of experience, one has
 learnt and contributed, and saaificed."
 "They didn't actually find anything, but it gave
 me an indication that one day my time would
 come. "
 CONTREE38/1995
H1s time came in July 1986. On his way to W<X'k, he was
 detainoo by two policemen. one of them a black policemen
 known to him. Subjoct C was detainoo roc over a year.
 although he was never infc.moo as to under which legal
 provision he was being held He was given no access to his
 family during his time in detention. Although he was never
 ta'tured, he was on one occasion assaulted by a y~g white
 policeman roc smiling at an in~e m<ment. On
 numerous occasions, he was foc~ to write a statement.
 which was then tocn up when it failoo to reveal any
 involvement in a conspiracy to stir up the )OOth.
 The school Subjed. D was at, Ntsika Scllool had S(:Inething
 of a reputatioo as a centre of activism, reing "very
 notcrious". The activists rebind many of the initiatives at
 the time were Ntsika students. Thus, organizatioo remained
 a covert business, with no OOcking fr<m an established
 ocganizatioo. Rather, it was 00 the 00sis of activism by a
 group of individuals at a single school that later, moce
 fClmal ocganizatioos were built
 Subj~ D was personally involved in a num~ of clashes
 with the ri<x squad. which was perceived as tt... m~ vicioos
 and lx"utal" in <XX1trast to the SADF and nCi"1Dal police.
 Subj~ D descritx:s the <XX1frootatioos as tt... stooes against
 a 1xillet". Again, the heavy handed respooses of the
 authocities hardened attibldes and coofirmed his militancy.
 Subj~ D was ooetly detained by police, but was S(Ol
 released 00 accoont of his age. DIning thiS perioo a
 personal friend of his was sh<x whilst attending a fw1eral in
 Pcrt Elizareth.
 Subja:tC's emplo~ ~tinued to pay his salary whilst he
 was in detentioo. His apparent wealth and a ~ality
 cIa')b with a fellow-detainre, an older, ex-~ Islander,
 led to accusations that he was an infocmer. He began to fear
 his release, ~ of a ~ble adverse ra::eptioo in his
 C(XD1nunity. Fmally, Subja:t C could no looger ~.
 Coovinced that he was mad, the authooties placed him
 under medical C;:dre foc the last two mooths of his detentioo.
 Following his release, he ~f~
 In <XX1trast, in DurOOfi there "... were no stroog
 ocganizatioo", hpite the emeJ'genre of a vig(;J.]rQUS trade
 unioo movement in that centre. The ooly overt political
 activity Subject D came into <XX1tact with during his stay in
 that centre was a <XX1frootatioo ~ polire and youth
 fr<m the Kwa-Mashu and Lamootville townships and a
 single strike at a school. HoweveJ', awxding to Subject D,
 theJ'e weJ'e covert "armed structures" all oVeJ' Natal,
 although he had little <XX1tact with these groupings. His
 movements shed s<me light 00 the nature of regiooal
 variatioos in political aIlture. In Grahamstown, a series of
 schools OOycotts took: place in the late 1970s and early
 1980s, 00rked up by a vigOW'OUS inf~ ocganizatioo.
 The situatioo in Natal was partially framed by deeply-
 entrenclled notioos of ethnicity. TheJ'e was less overt
 political resistance, although even here theJ'e were signs of
 discootent, 1x>th in the emeJ'genre of the independent
 unioos, and the shadowy "armed structures" that had
 emeJ'ged.
 "I could not bear seeing ~le next to my hcme.
 BeA::ause every time I saw ~le standing next
 to my hcme, I had this feeling that these ~le
 had perhaps crme to kill me, ~ they had
 heard this infc.'tnatioo frcm prisoo and they had
 now crme to act ulXXl it This was a very
 difficult perioo foc me."
 Ova- the following )'ear, Subja:t C managed to clear his
 name, whilst wocking foc two different NGO's. He has no
 regrets a1xJut his daisioo to ~e involvoo in wocm
 ocganizatioo, despite the trauma of his detentioo.
 Subject D: Youth Congr~ Activist and Street Warrior
 Subj~ D <Xmpleted his primary schooling in
 Grahamstown, <Xmpleting one year of his ~dary
 OOucation at Peddie, in the neighbouring Ciskei hcmeland
 He then, on the ftXlUest of his sister, who was maITied to a
 Zulu in DurOOn, <Xmpleted his ~dary OOucation in that
 centre. Subj~ D fO\Uld the DurOOn environment scmewhat
 diffa-ent to the Eastern Cape one:
 After matriculating in DurOOn and then wocking foc ooe
 year in his 1:rothes:-in-Iaw's business, Subject D retumoo to
 Grahamstown in 1984. He autanatically joinoo the
 Grahamstown Youth Coogress, whidl had ~t1y
 eInes:goo. He differs fr<m many of the other activists in that
 he slottOO into already existing ocganizatiooal stru~ a
 move made ~ble by his earlier political activities.
 Subject D relieves that the Grahamstown Youth Coogress
 was establishoo to mobilise th~ of the ")OOth II who had
 ampletOO their focmal educatioo, and thus could no looger
 re memrers of CaSAS. The Youth Coogress was to
 ~e involvoo 00 a d(XI'-to-dcxr ~paign infocming
 ~le a}x)ut the focmatioo and rise of the UDF. Subject D
 soc.l txx:ame a leading activist, whidl coo1ributOO to him
 reing unable to find employment:
 "They (the Zulus) are m<X'e attached to their
 CUSt{In and they regard themselves as the trire ...
 )oW might find yow-self in a difficult ~ition.
 They offend the otbex trires"
 Subja:t D's politiall involvement began when he was still in
 junioc school in Grahamstown when he participated in a
 1977 schools boycott. This was during the ~t-Soweto
 wave of repression, necessitating underground mretings, not
 only within Grahamstown, but with individUals from other
 centres. These meetings:
 "It was terrible ~use it was n<x easy to get a
 job at that time. We were all 00 the run. Fa-
 inStmlce, at this time we were n<x sl~ing at oor
 ".,' gave us dira:tioo, and r~g material and
 also to deOOte scme of the p<>litical issues ...I
 ~e politically aware since then,"
 17CONTREE 38/1995
places. It would have ~ an lRlstrategic thing
 to do at that time ~use )00 had to futd your
 own place to sleep."
 mixai results, as many black sh~keepers t£X>k advantage of
 the situatioo to raise prices, despite pressures frcm the
 ronmtmity. However, these sh~keepel"s never ~e
 identifiai with a conservative grouping. The earlies:
 Peacemaker vigilantes had, in fact. disintegrated following
 the exOOltion of their leader, Mr. Blaai. by students in late
 1980. Ironically, Subj~ D's own fathes: was a policeman.
 He felt that his father had no problems in the ronmtmity:
 Although unemployed, he also did voluntary WCl'k foc the
 UDF-$lffili$ltoo South African Allied Wockers' Union
 (SAAWU). On 25th May 1985, his parents' house was
 fire1xmbed, at a time when he was at their house. The
 1xmb was a relatively ~histicated one and Subjoct D has
 little doubt it was the WCl'k of the police. He was injuroo
 during the 1xmQing, whilst his female companion was burnt
 to death. Subjoct D and his parents were constantly
 harassed by the police following the attack. His
 involvement in SAA WU was abruptly ended when that
 union's offices were fire1x:mbed, severely disrupting union
 ocganization. He pla)W a limited role in the rebuilding of
 SAA WU's activities in Grahamstown. Thus, with the
 exception of his involvement in 1977, Subjoct D's stay is
 S(Inewhat different to th~ of many of other activists who
 told their stocies, in that he joined ocganizational structures
 that were already in existence, as adverse to king involvoo
 in their fcxmation.
 'We were D<X against individuals".
 Even then there was:
 "... a shift in the OOIanre of focres (in the polire)
 taking place ...we cann~ blame sane ofthem... 
who were foc~ by the axlditioos to wock
 foc the polire."
 AlthOOgh, by 1985, all mem~ of the police, SubjtX:t D
 ootOO, had ~e widely disliked in the a:xnmunity.
 After the firclxmbing of his parent's house, Subj~ D
 retreattXl into deep hiding. Nooetheless, the auth<X'ities
 were able to track his movements through a ~histicated
 netw<rk of infClmel"S, wh~ task it was to re{)(Xt 00 the
 movements of known activists 00twren defined areas in the
 township. Subj~ D was able to disoover scmething of this
 netw<rk fr<m infc.ma-s the activists themselves had within
 the seamty establishment He refused to divulge additiOOal
 inf<Xmatioo, as "even now" it was unwise. Despite this
 knowledge, during 1985 "... the ~le (including Subj~
 D) were taken straight to gaol". Subj~ D was charged with
 arsoo and attempttXl murder. He managed to escape during
 his first rourt ~ce, but was, however, recaptured
 scme mooths Iatel'. Found not guilty, he was then detained
 and moved to police cells in Kentoo-On-Sea and then prisoo
 in PM Elizareth.
 Furthermoce, Subjoct D's stocy introouced an additiooal
 spatial dimensioo. This coocernoo the attempt to establish
 "no go" areas to the authcrities in Grahamstown.
 "The p~ of that thing was to cultivate oc to
 create a:.lducive a:.lditions roc the MK
 mem~, Ba:ause, if roc instance, we manage to
 create 'no go' areas that area would re safe,
 There must definitely re no infocmers therefoce
 MK cadres might use that place as a free zone,"
 This strategy was never totally successful owing to the lack
 of "~ slmn areas", Subja:t D argued. However, the area
 arOWld "I" Street ~e famous foc "troubles<me
 activities". In~ seva-al armed OOttles took place with the
 police in this area. M~dy, the activists used R4 and R5
 assault rifles stolen fr<m members of the secln"ity focces,
 and, in particular, fr<m the notcriously {XXXly-trained
 "kitskoostarels" (police auxiliaries).
 Subja;t D's four mooths in Kentoo were in solitary
 a:xtfinement
 "I should say after that detentioo, when I was
 ~g, I was stammering a little bit
 SOO:Indly, during the coorse of the night I was
 sweating and I was experiencing scme
 nightmares. I did lffidergo sucll things. Anxiety.
 ~g frightened over scmething )00 doo't
 know."
 Again, there are indications of the resistance reing a
 cmnulative affair. Police lxutaIities fuelloo militancy, whilst
 the increasro organizational activity empoweroo individuals
 with grmter confidence -confidence "... not to fear, to shout
 the name of the African National Congress". Street
 ccmmittee structures mushr<XmOO. Although the UDF
 SUPPCI1ed this initiative, it is evident fr<m Subja:t D's stocy
 that they were in fact a semi-spontaneous grass-roots
 initiative. He argues that the UDF was only a front "to rally
 ~le" and wak foc the UDmnning of the ANC. State
 legislative measures such as the hated "K<XX'I1hof Bills"
 assisted in the process of conscientising individuals to the
 process of injustice, and grmtly facilitated the mobilizatioo
 of ~le around su~uent issues and campaigns.
 He fOWld <mditioos in gaol in Pm Elizareth "appalling".
 5000 after his arrival there were a numm- of violent clashes
 retween white and coloured (of mixed racial (rigin)
 warders, and black detainees. Over time, however, the
 detainees managed to overcome S<me of the warders'
 misb"ust In additioo, there was little tocture,
 "", ~ it was very difficult foc them to do it
 ~use there was lots of pressure",
 Subject D was intimately involvoo in the organizatioo of the
 Grahamstown coosumer ooycott. This ooyoott bad rather
 CONTREE38/1995
~t in the Ciskei. HoweVel:, after a~, he was fcrceAl ro
 flee that hcmeland 00 aro:>mlt of his involvement in
 attempts to uniooise Ciskei tead1ers.
 It should re n<xoo that tho:e bad ~ earlio: public
 revelatioos of tnistreaunent of detainees in the relevant
 prism.
 In 1986, he trietly enroloo at Vista Univmity in PCI1
 Elizareth, rot SOCIl had to leave again as a result of)U
 another strike. His experiences of these ditIermt
 univmities and his foccal movements ~ them
 representai a fClmative political experience. By the time of
 his return to Grahamstown, Subja:t E was a ~oo
 political activist, ready to assume a cenb"al ~tioo in the
 struggle in that centre.
 s~ D relieves that his political involvement sharpenOO
 his thinking. Although S(Ine of his relatives ~ his
 invdvement
 n... they were able to adapt (The ~stanre
 ooabled) ...all to taste the democratic process:'
 Subject E: ~ Migrant to Activist
 Fcr ~cmic reasoo, Subj~ E was sent to relatives in
 Cape Town fcr m~t of his sdlool~. Althoogb
 tOOmicallyan "illegal" in temlS of the influx cootrol system,
 he managoo to <nain a(bnissioo to a school in Langa. lf1s
 first ex~ to JX}litical resistanre came in Cape Town
 dw'ing 1976:
 By 1986, Grahamstown bad aIr~y 1xxxme a maja' ~tre
 of resistance. Subjoct E was struck by the unwillingness of
 ~dents to accept the authmty of the ammunity
 oouncil1<Ys, as well as the street canmittre system.
 AlthOOgh the street canmittees were designed to ~er
 repressioo, Subject E was of the opinioo that:
 "... we had th~ running OOttles with the police
 in the street. Thes:e was scmething novel a}x)ut
 that. reing part of the ~le throwing stooes,
 running, battles and so 00. I woold say that also
 had scme influence 00 me, rot. as I said, my
 thOOgbts \\U"e n<x ocganized in any way. It was
 just spootaneoos."
 "~le ~ n~ aware the regime was a}x)ut to
 clamp down 00 them. It was ooly when the
 strret oonmittee was alTestOO and taken to gaol
 that ~le 1n:ame ~ed. "
 Following the decIaratioo of the Se(X:.1d State ofEm~gency,
 m~ of the street ronmittre l~ WO"e arrested
 However, by this stage the coosumer boycott had ~
 instiwted, a boycott which Subject E pla.)W a cen1J'al role in
 (X"ganizing. The authocities peri<XlicaI1y issueA:I false
 pamphlets, claiming the boycott had ~ calloo off.
 However, Subject E and a numM of fellow activists WO"e
 able to issue mmtO'-pamphlets, m~ of which ~e
 illegally duplicarro at sd1ools. Unpraroentro levels of
 repressioo f(X"~ him and his fellows dreper into the hidden
 W<X"ld (there WO"e alxJut twenty key activists in
 Grahamstown who had managoo to elude arrest).
 Returning to Grahamstown, Subja:t E cxmpletro his matric
 in 1978. In 1980, he enroloo at the University of F<rt Hare.
 ~ to leave as the result of a strike, he W<X'kOO foca ~
 prlOC to emoling at the University of ZAJIuland He was
 expelled in 1984 foc tnxming involvoo in a strike at that
 Uni~ty.
 What happened was
 "... a very diffiaJIt situatioo, a very traumatic
 situatioo. whim, I think, also ~ by political
 thinking."
 It... it ~e quite risky even to attend th~
 clan~tine meetings. Hence we devisal a way.
 If we were going to a meeting we would bave a
 checkpoint We would Dtt say we Wt2"e meeting
 in so-and-so's boose. We would sjmply say so-
 and-so's boose would re a check point and
 ~le would go and check the1"e. They would
 then re told where to go ...even in that meeting
 sinJatioo we would always re sme that the1"e was
 S(Ine1xxly outside l<Xicing, watdling roc the
 police, sa;urity, infocmerslt.
 Su~ E bad ~e a memm of AZASO, initially a
 ~ <XXlscioosness ocganizatioo, which bad gradually
 sbiftOO to a charterist ~tioo.. AZASO was t«hnically D<X.
 allowed 00 campus. Howevel', a groop of students had
 00gun to establish a 1x'ancll 00 campus, as well as ~g
 fa" a danoc:catically-ela:tOO SRC. Subject E ~e
 involved in the establishment of a rugby club. Memlus D<X.
 ooiy pla~ rugby with ~ fr<m othez: universities, but
 also made use of the ~ity to hold political
 discussioos after matdles. Subja::t E o<x ooly fearOO arrest by dle audl<Xities. S<me 9f
 dle }OOdl had OOgml to take unacceptably violent measures
 against dl~ who wo-e caught lx"eaking dle OOycott.
 Subja::t E and his canmittre had to remoosttate widl dlese
 }OOdls:
 DIning late 1984,1nkatha had regun organizing a rally. As
 ~vious Inkatha gathmngs had ~ markOO by violence
 diftx,1OO against noo-TnkSlthSi mtm1us, attempts wo-e made
 to .~ the rally throogh a oourt CIder. However, these
 atttmpts provoo lUlsuccessful. In~ the meeting was
 markOO by violent attacks 00 those who did ntt suppcrt
 TnkathSi. This resulroo in fin"ther (XXltlict and a ooycou.
 foccing him to leave. Subj~ E then movoo to a teaChing
 "It was really getting out of hand. We had no
 ~tioo but to call all th~ ~th into a meeting
 and address them. It was quite a risky situatioo
 lX'-Cause they w~ quite dangerous as well. They
 19CONTREE 38/1995
would ign<re us ampletely !x:(;ause they were
 also armed .. It was only in Decemrer 1986 that Subject E was detainoo
 by the authcrities. On the day prioc to his arrest. a nmnrer
 of comrades had ~ arrested. At 5 a.m. the following
 mocning, he found the house he was staying in was
 surroundOO by the police and the army. Subject E was then
 taken to the Kentoo-oo-Sea (a nearby seaside feS(X1) police
 station. He would spend four months in solitary
 confinement in police cells.
 Although he had on one occasion been picked up in a police
 s~, he was not identified and was thus released. At this
 stage, only a few le.aders had managed to evade arrest In
 addition to n<xmat work of political mobilization1 they were
 called on to mediate in disputes, as well as assist in the
 organization of the funerals of victims of police action:
 "There were no cleJirly definoo ar~ of wock that
 show a persoo is aCbJally doing scmething. So
 ooe had to respond to everything that was
 aming up ...scmetimes even things they
 regardOO as personal things. If a neigh1x>ur
 fights another neigh1x>ur, ~le would ame to
 us and ask us to resolve it, things that I really
 think coold re resolvoo at that level... at that
 stage ~le 1001<:00 at us foc guidance. If there
 was scmetxxly who was shot and killoo they
 knew we would ame in and we would
 immediately mobilise funds to support them ...
 and aCbJally run everything."
 During this perioo he was regularly interrogated:
 "So you Iivoo in constant fear -you did not know
 when they would come. They could come in the
 evening, they could come in the mocning, they
 could come anytime. And you knew that scme
 of the ~le who were detainoo refoce you were
 also assauitro iil trying to extract infoonation,
 So you Iivoo in constant fear -of not knowing
 when they are going to come foc you,"
 He was then transferroo to St AlOOn's ~ in Pm
 ElizaOOth. He would remain there until April 1988. He
 20 CONTREE38/1995
vividly rememm-s the a:owded nature of the cells, and the
 pcx:r sIreping oonditioos. Prisooers wo-e given mats to
 sIrep 00, 00 a oona:ete flocr. They were not issuoo with
 sb~ but a numrer of filthy blankets.
 The r~ce in the 1980s did D<X ooly involve (XXlflict
 with the authcritie.s, rot also within <x:mmunitie.s, ~
 the activists and moce (XXlSel"vative elements. Initially, the
 moot pr<JDinent representative of the ~ wo-e the
 Peacemaker vigilante grooping. However, ~ular anger
 S(XXl f<X:UsOO 00 <x:mmunity <XXJDcill<X's, policemen and
 suspectOO rollal:xxatas. The <x:mmunity <XXJDcillm bOO
 1x:come particularly disliked following the in~ in
 service charge.s, growing adminisb'ative inefficiency, the
 rollapse of the ~ moo~ly and l~ inattrOO in the
 provisioo of housing and services48. 1ndetXi, a map focus
 of violent resistance involved attacks 00 the houses of
 aInmunity <XXJDcillm and policemen. Ultimately, many
 wo-e foccal to leave the aInmunities they wo-e drawn fr<m.
 Equally under threat were infooners and rolla1xx'atas.
 Even an activist with impeccable a'edentials, sud1 as
 Subjoct C, had to fear foc his ~al safety, following the
 merest suspicioo ofC()-q>eJ'a bOO with the authcrities.
 SubjtX::t E resolved to complete his studies. and emoled at a
 axTespoodence university, UNISA He would o:mplete his
 degree through that 1xxly. In addition, political discussions
 were held in prison. A numrer of detainees had earlier been
 prisoners on R~ Island. where they "... got thet:retical
 mentation ", OOing taught by ~ers such as Harry Gwala.
 In addition, "... very sharp" deOOtes were held retween
 those who relieved "... strongly in nationalism and were
 ~ to ccmmunism" and those who were C(mInittf:d
 ccmmunists. Sevel'al children, s<me as young as eight. were
 detained in neighbJuring cells.
 "They were not as maturOO as us and could not
 take detentioo."
 By the mid-198Os, the state increasingly made use of loog-
 ~ detentioos as a means of re-im~g S(x;ial antrol.
 All five acti~sts were to suffes: loog ~<xls of
 imprisonment Whilst ex~ences varied. all fa£XX1 anstant
 pressure to r~t their political reliefs and to fully ro-
 ~ with the authocities in future. It seems that ta'ture
 was regularly used as an instrument of policy, intended ntt
 so mucll as to extract inftxmarloo, but as punishment and to
 ensure sucll oo-q:Ieratioo.
 Following his release, Subj~ E olxaineAJ employment as a
 tuta at SACHED, an NGO primarily focusing on the
 provision of mdging education. At the time of the ~ch
 he was still wocking as a fieldwocker foc that 1xxly. Subj~
 E relieves that his spell in detention strengtheneAJ him as a
 peJ'Son:
 "I doo't know of a single persoo that a:me oot of
 prison disappointal or despondent It is true it is
 D<X a place where )')U can say )')U were 00
 holiday. On the other hand, there is another
 dimensioo: that of political growth and
 inteUa:tual growth that ~le experience there.
 Y 00 feel that it ex~ yoo to different ~le,
 how ~le interpret things. Actually, prisoos
 and places of detentioo have ~ usal to enrich
 ~le politically... and I know it has happenoo
 that way to many other ~le ...the struggle has
 made me a much moce disciplinoo persoo, much
 moce respoosible than I was refoce."
 The lives of all five activists ~e irrevocably dlangoo by
 their decisioos to actively engage in the pr~ of
 mobilizatioo and protest Nooe of the activists have any
 regrets alx>ut their involvement in the mass resistance of the
 198Os, although in all ~ a heavy price was paid,
 financially, OOucatiooally, and emmooally, in coping with
 loog ~00s of jmprisooment and ~1ioo foc their
 reliefs. Ultimately, as ooe of the activists remarkOO:
 "The way ~le and ocganizatioos have
 dOOicated themselves to the struggle ...gives me
 h~ that we will re able to enjoy our fr~s."
 5.
 Conclttilon
 ENDNOTES
 Invol~ in a nmnoo- of diffttent ocganizations, the stcries
 of the five activists reveal many facets of the resistance in
 the 1980s. These include the relationship retween
 grassroots initiatives, and regional and national
 ocganizations, the social effects of a decade of resistance and
 repression, and the practical implications of shifting state
 strategies. Whilst regional and national groupings served as
 im~t agents foc mobilization and change, it is evident
 that much of the drive foc change came frcm relow, in the
 fCI'JD of semi-autoocmous initiatives such as Subject B's
 Sb'ret ccmmittees and Subject C's Y OlUlg Christian
 Wockers. Although they may have at times clashed as well
 as ~ted with mcre focmal structures, such initiatives
 provided the OOsis foc much of the sustained resistance
 through the 1980s.
 1.
 2.3.
 4.
 6.
 7.
 M. ~ter, Foucault, Marxism and History (Oxfocd,
 1984), p.147.
 Ibid.
 Simme1, quoted in S. Crook, Modernist Radicalism
 and its Aftermath (Loodoo, 1991), p.59.
 P. Lawrence, Georg Simmel : $ociologist and
 European (SWlbury-on- Tham~ 1976), pp. 65-69.
 Ibid
 F. Jameson, Late Marxism (Loodoo, 1992), p.51.
 M. Jay, Ado11W (Cam1:ridge, 1984), p.59.
 8. 
Argus, 27/10/1980.9. 
Argus, Iln/1980.
 10. Argus, 27/10/1980.
 11. Ibid.
 CONTREE 38/1995
 21
12. Argus, 16/5/1981.
 13. W. C~tt et al. "A Critical Analysis of the South
 African State's Reform Strategies in the 1980s" in
 Frankel, P., Pines, N. and Swilling, M. (eds.), State,
 Resistance and Change in South Africa
 (Johannesburg, 1988), pp. 19-51.
 14. T. L<xIge and W. Nasson, All, Here and Now:Black
 Politics in South Africa in the 1980s (Cape Town,
 1991), p.34.
 15. J. Grest "The Crisis of Local Government in South
 Africa" in Frankel, P., Pines, N. and Swilling, M.
 (eds.), State, Resistance and Change in South Africa
 (Johannesburg, 1988), pp.94-95.
 16. Ibid.
 17. Cape Times, 13/9/1984.
 18. Ibid.
 19. Cape Times, 12/6/1986, 21n/1986, 22/9/1986.
 20. Sunday Times, 2/3/1986.
 21. Ibid.
 22. G. Northam, Shooting in the Dark: Riot Police in
 Britain (London, 1989), pp.29-43.
 23. Cape Times, 12/11/1984.
 24. S. Baynham and G. W<XXl. "Securing Protection and
 ~fence" in Clrete, F., Schlemmer, L. and Van
 Vuuren, D., Policy Options for a New South Africa
 (Pretoria. 1991), p. 226.
 25. Ibid, p.230.
 26. Ibid, p.233.
 27. Ibid, p.234.
 28. see Business Day, 12/12/1985.
 29. Cape Times, 5/9/1985,17/4/1986.
 30. Cape Times, 12/5/1986.
 31. Cape Times, 21n/1985, 24n/1985.
 32. Cape Times, 27n/1985.
 33. Business Day, 12/12/1985.
 34. Cape Times, 21/12/1985.
 35. Cape Times, 8/3/1986.
 36. see Cape Times, 12/6/1986, 21n/1986, 22/9/1986.
 37. l.(xlge and Nasson, All, Here and Now, p.87.
 38. Ibid, p.99.
 39. see G. Mills and G. Wood, "A Handful of Armies",
 South African Defence Review, 5, 1992, p.3.
 40. Cape Times, 12/11/1984, 2On/1985.
 41. see M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish
 (Harmondsworth, 1979), pp.l-l0.
 42. see Cape Times, 7/12/1985,13/12/1985,22/9/1986.
 43. see l.(xlge & Nasson, All, Here and Now, p.l0l.
 44. Argus, 27/10/1980.
 45. Grest, "The Crisis of Local Government in South
 Africa", pp.94-95.
 46. G. Mills and G. Wood, "Ethnicity, Integration and the
 South African Armed Forces" in South African
 Defence Review, 12, 1993,p.28.
 47. Cape Times, 24/10/1985.
 48. Grest, "The Crisis of Local Government in South
 Africa", pp.94-95.
 22 CONTREE 38/1995