Examining the Oversight Role of the Republic of Botswana’s Parliament

Abstract

The study attempted to examine the oversight role and function of the Republic of Botswana Parliament. Concern regarding the role and function of Parliament in ensuring accountable Executive authority required scholarly examination. Such an examination was necessary to maintain key public administration principles of realising effective and efficient public service. The ineffective execution of the principle of separation of powers, has resulted in structural, administrative, and operational limitations that hinder the effectiveness of Botswana’s Parliament to hold the Executive accountable. Therefore, this study sought to develop a framework necessary to enhance guiding of the oversight role and function of Parliament as well as to foster the separation of powers between Parliament and the Executive branches of government in Botswana. This enhancing of the oversight role of Parliament is necessary to attain an independent, strong, efficient and effective Parliament which is able to hold the Executive meaningfully accountable. To achieve its purpose, the study used qualitative research methodologies. The first were semi-structured interviews, employed as the empirical component of the study, and allowing predetermined questions with respondents to guide the discussions. The second used a desktop review data collection approach which is highlighted throughout the study. This approach is summarised to provide a discourse and understanding of the applicable oversight framework for the Parliament of Botswana that fosters the principle of separation of powers. Participants were drawn from stakeholders relevant to this study, such as current and former members of Parliament (MPs), current and former members of the Executive, the Clerk and Speaker of the National Assembly, representatives of civil society organisations in Botswana and academic experts from the University of Botswana. Key findings of the study are that Botswana’s Parliament is limited and often ineffective in exercising its oversight responsibilities. This finding is observed owing to a number of reasons, including Parliament’s lack of independence from the Executive, the dominance and control of Parliament by the Executive, the extensive executive powers of the president, a single dominant ruling party, weak opposition parties, weak civil society organisations, insufficient support staff for MPs, the nature of the political party caucus system, lack of question time for the president, the manner in which the motion of no confidence item is structured by the Constitution of the Republic of Botswana of 1966, and undeveloped Parliamentary committee structures. The study concludes, recommending that, in order to optimise the oversight function of Parliament, and to eliminate the dominance and control of the Executive, Parliament needs to be separated from the Executive in accordance with the classical principles of the theory of separation of powers, as highlighted in the proposed oversight framework of the study. It is considered that, once Parliament is separated from Executive control, then reforms pertaining to the operational and administrative oversight challenges may be better implemented. The study recommends an overarching and comprehensive oversight framework necessary to guide the role and function of Parliament in Botswana. It is within this framework that solutions to the aforementioned administrative and operational problems identified are provided.