| dc.description.abstract | Entrenching the best corporate practices in Zimbabwe’s state-owned enterprises has been on
the governmental agenda for decades. Despite pockets of progress, transforming the fortunes
of SOEs has remained obstructed by an unconducive political arena. In the advent of political
and economic adversities, state-owned enterprises became entangled in the web of
unaccountable and non-transparent governance that characterised most, if not all, of the
country’s major public sector institutions. Consequently, a vicious circle of a strangled and
poor-performing state enterprise sector dependent on and bailed out by the government
emerged. Using Grain Marketing Board (GMB) as a case study, the research develops an
integrated corporate governance model to redress corporate governance deficiencies within the
country’s State-owned enterprises. The research is precipitated by the search for a more
sustainable model to insulate the state-owned enterprises in Zimbabwe from political and
economic catastrophes.
Based on an interpretive and qualitative exploration of the GMB case, the research examined
the corporate governance approaches and challenges of the country’s state enterprises. The
research was grounded on the principle-agent and contingency theories to illuminate the angle
adopted by the enquiry in reviewing the corporate governance phenomenon. The research
further reflected on international best practices on corporate governance and the country’s
experiences to establish the fundamental principles of good corporate governance. This
provided a benchmark for assessing state enterprise governance practices in Zimbabwe. The
model development strategy employed by the study entailed reviewing the data obtained from
both academic and grey literature and then integrating the data with findings from fieldwork.
The data mined from the field was based on the views of different corporate governance experts
as well as key informants from GMB headquarters, and the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture,
Mechanisation and Irrigation. All participants in the study were purposively chosen. Data were
analysed using content and thematic analysis techniques.
The major research findings revealed that the current decentralised governance model in
Zimbabwe’s state-owned enterprises was no longer fit for purpose. The model created multiplebut
inefficient controls and accorded the Minister excessive powers. The existence of multiple
and conflicting institutional actors accompanied by a political incursion from the Minister has
birthed assorted types of corruption at state-owned enterprises and diminished the entities’
operational efficiency. The study also unearthed the indelible effects of the politico-economic
ecology on state-owned enterprise governance and performance in Zimbabwe. Interestingly,
the findings of the study coincided with the problem that necessitated the study, that, most
state-owned enterprises are not abiding by the generally accepted standards of good corporate
governance and have lost operational viability. This situation has caused the SOEs to depend
heavily on the national fiscus.
Cognisant of the ecological idiosyncrasies of state enterprise governance in Zimbabwe and the
current governance challenges at the GMB, the research proposed an integrated corporate
governance model that annihilates corruption and depoliticise the countries’ state-owned
enterprises. The centralised model of governance entrusts the state enterprise ownership/
regulatory function to a specialised, Centralised Ownership Agency, independent from the
government. The study proposed that the specialised agency work together with the parliament
to cushion the state owned enterprises from politics and restore their commercial function.
Other key features of the model proposed include professionalised SOEs boards, marketisation
of state-owned enterprises, outcome-based performance, monitoring and evaluation
framework, high transparency and disclosure standards, better remuneration schemes and
incentives, and empowerment of the Auditor General. The model deals with the principle agent
problem by reducing SOEs agency costs and increasing their performance as expounded by the
principle agent theory. At the same time, the model is context-specific in line with the
assumptions of the contingency theory that there is no one-size-fits-all corporate governance
model. | en_US |
