| dc.description.abstract | The meaning of human dignity has been elusive since its recognition by the Stoics in 128 B.C. as an attribute that distinguishes man from the rest of nature because of his ability to reason and to decide over his own fate. The Stoics were the first to adduce a universal meaning to the concept of human dignity. However, the legal protection of human dignity followed only two thousand years or so later, when dignity was shaped to mean that each person has inherent dignity in equal quantum, which cannot be violated and which has to be respected and protected by fellow human beings and the state alike.
The first part of the study unravels dignity's evolution through the history of ideas. The meaning of dignity in current law is reflected through its development in anthropology, religion, philosophy and the law. Dignitas humana originated in Antiquity, evolved through Christianity and the Enlightenment, and culminated in Modernity, as claims to justify man's dominion in the cosmos; to explain the norms of fitting behaviour in terms of the analogy between dignity and imago Dei and to justify its position as a universal source of equal rights. These three interrelated ideas, associated with the protection of human worth, allow for a moral reading of law that disallows systematic violations of dignity. As a legal concept, human dignity functions not only as a moral value but also as a universal right that guarantees in principle the respect and protection of humanity per se.
In the aftermath of World War II human dignity was incorporated in the Universal Declaration of Rights (1948) as a relatively vague concept to unite people of different ideologies and cultural backgrounds. The use of dignity in democratic constitutions increased dramatically from the 1990's in which contexts it is employed as a value or a right, or both. The dual functionality of dignity in domestic constitutions relates to the justification
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for the derivation of human rights and guidelines for constitutional interpretation as well as to the status of dignity as an independent right. This duality raises questions about dignity's real meaning, the establishment of which might serve to limit inconsistent and conflicting interpretations. Otherwise, the application of dignity as a constitutional right may lead to a too broad interpretation of dignity as a pre-eminent right, without clear limits to its application. It follows that the value of and the right to dignity can overlap, which would cause interpretational problems in terms of the limitation of rights principles. Values cannot be limited in terms of proportionality analysis, whereas rights can be limited when conflicting interests are being adjudicated. In dignatarian terms, this would mean that the right to dignity and the value of dignity may overlap but cannot be absolute and limited at the same time.
Consequently, the main purpose of this thesis is to conceptualise the idea of dignity in order to establish and distinguish the contents of both the value and the right to dignity.
In the second part of the thesis, three essential and universal elements of the concept of dignity are identified, which emanate from Kant's moral ethics. The first element is the inherent dignity paradigm; which holds that everybody has inalienable dignity that cannot be limited. Recognition and respect for inherent dignity comprises the second element and the third element requires that the state must realise dignity in the context of sosio-economic rights in appropriate circumstances. In the process of conceptualising dignity its evolution needs to be researched to contribute towards an understanding of what dignity means in current law. Any attempt to conceptualise dignity in South African law must be undertaken within the framework of dignity's application in German law, because dignity is the central value of the Basic Law, where it functions as an absolute and inviolable constitutional right, whereas dignity functions as one of a triad of values in the Constitution and as a relative right.
Furthermore, the dignity clauses in these two constitutions are similar in many respects. To contribute to an understanding of the meaning of dignity in German and South African law, the historical process of enacting the dignity clauses in the Basic Law and the Constitution are traced and recorded. The application of dignity in these two jurisdictions is contrasted against the usage of dignity as a second order rule in US law, without a fixed content as in German and South African law.
Finally, a further purpose of this thesis is to apply dignity's three essential elements as referred to above, to the distinction of constitutional norms as rules and principles, as advocated by Dworkin and Alexy. The three elements play an indispensable role in proportionality analysis and when judges refer to foreign law and cite foreign judgments, because they indicate which element constitutes a rule or a principle and consequently which element can be limited. Applying these elements within the framework of rules and principles in instances when dignity competes with conflicting rights would provide guidelines in proportionality analysis to assess whether dignity has been infringed upon or not. It is therefore necessary to establish whether dignity functions as a rule or as a principle, or both, in South African law, in order to illustrate instances in which dignity projects inviolability as a rule or assumes the role of a right that can be limited as a principle in terms of Alexy's theory of constitutional rights.
Die betekenis van menswaardigheid as 'n begrip bly die mensdom ontwyk sedert die Stoïsyne in 128 V.C. aangetoon het dat die mens oor menswaardigheid beskik juis vanweë sy vermoëns om te redeneer en om oor sy eie lot te kan beskik, welke vermoëns hom uitsonder van en verhewe stel bo die res van die natuur. Die Stoïsyne het heel eerste 'n universele betekenis aan die idee van menswaardigheid toegedig. Geregtelike beskerming van menswaardigheid het egter eers ongeveer twee duisend jaar later gevolg, toe die begrip geslyp is tot 'n betekenis van gelyke hoeveelheid menswaardigheid vir elkeen, wat nie geskend mag word nie en wat gerespekteer en beskerm moet word deur beide die staat en die mensdom.
In die eerste gedeelte van hierdie studie word die ontwikkeling van die menswaardigheid-begrip deur die eeue heen nagevors. In die huidige regsposisie reflekteer menswaardigheid se betekenis as 'n manifestasie van sy vroeëre ontwikkeling in antropologie, godsdiens, die filosofie en die reg. Dignitas humana het in die Oudheid ontstaan, ontvou in die Christendom en die Verligting, en 'n hoogtepunt bereik in die Moderne Era, as aansprake om die mens se heerskappy in die natuur te verantwoord; om die norme van respekvolle optrede in terme van die analogie tussen menswaardigheid en die imago Dei-begrip te verduidelik en om menswaardigheid as bron van menseregte te regverdig. Laasgenoemde onderling verbonde begrippe word geassosieer met die beskerming van menswaardigheid en lei tot die slotsom dat die heersende reg beskou word as a morele agent wat sistemiese inbreukmakings verbied. Gevolglik funksioneer menswaardigheid nie net as 'n morele waarde nie, maar ook as 'n universele reg wat respek en beskerming van die mensdom per se en in beginsel waarborg.
Menswaardigheid is na die afloop van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog as 'n relatiewe vae begrip in die Universele Verklaring van Menseregte (1948) geïnkorporeer, as spesifieke oogmerk om mense met verskillende ideologiese en kulturele agtergronde te verenig. Die gebruik van menswaardigheid in demokratiese grondwette het sedert die 1990's dramaties verhoog, waarin dit aangewend word as 'n waarde of as 'n reg, of as beide. In plaaslike jurisdiksies is menswaardigheid se tweesydige funksionaliteit begrond op die regverdiging van die begrip as basis vir menseregte, as voorskrif vir grondwetlike interpretasie en dra dit ook by tot die status van menswaardigheid as 'n selfstandige reg. Hierdie dualiteit in funksionaliteit laat die vraag ontstaan na die begrip se ware regsbetekenis, aangesien toepassing van menswaardigheid inkonsekwente en teenstrydige interpretasies mag veroorsaak indien die betekenis daarvan arbitrêr vasgestel word. Verder kan die verhoogde voorkeur aan menswaardigheid as 'n primêre grondwetlike reg ly tot 'n te wye en uitgebreide interpretasie, sonder dat duidelike grense vir die aanwending van hierdie reg neergelê word. Die waarde van en reg tot menswaardigheid kan in een feitestel oorvleuel en tot interpretasie probleme ly wanneer beperkings op grondwetlike regte geplaas word. Waardes kan nie beperk word nie, terwyl regte wel beperk kan word in terme van proportionaliteits-analise. Menswaardigheid as 'n waarde kan nie absoluut geld en terselfdertyd ingeperk word as 'n reg nie.
Die hoofoogmerk van hierdie proefskrif is gevolglik om vas te stel welke inhoud aan menswaardigheid as 'n reg en as 'n waarde toegedig kan word en tot watter mate hierdie inhoud 'n rol speel tydens proportionaliteits-analise, wanneer regte teen mekaar opgeweeg word en meer gewig aan een reg toegeken word as aan 'n botsende reg.
In die tweede gedeelte van hierdie proefskrif word drie kern elemente van menswaardigheid geïdentifiseer, wat voortvloei uit die moreel-etiese filosofieë van Kant. Die eerste element bepaal dat elke mens ingebore en onvervreembare menswaardigheid het, wat op generwyse ingeperk kan word nie. Elke mens se reg op erkenning en respek van sy menswaardigheid funksioneer as tweede element. Die derde element behels dat die staat menswaardigheid moet in bepaalde omstandighede moet realiseer in the konteks van sosio-ekonomiese regte. Om die betekenis van menswaardigheid te bepaal word die ontwikkeling daarvan deur die eeue heen nagevors, ten einde 'n idee te vorm van wat die begrip in die huidige reg behels. Enige poging om 'n vaste betekenis aan menswaardigheid in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg te heg moet onderneem word binne die raamwerk van die Duitse reg, omdat menswaardigheid as die sentrale waarde van die Basic Law geld en fungeer as 'n absolute en onbeperkte reg, terwyl menswaardigheid as een van die drietal waardes en as 'n relatiewe reg in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg funksioneer. Verder toon die onderskeie menswaardigheidsklousules in die Basic Law en die Grondwet verskeie ooreenkomste. Om 'n begrip van menswaardigheid in die Duitse en Suid-Afrikaanse reg te vorm, is dit sinvol om die historiese aanloop tot die verordening van die menswaardigheidsklousules in beide grondwette na te vors. Die toepasing van menswaardigheid in die Basic Law en die Grondwet word gevolglik gekontrasteer met die toepassing daarvan in die Amerikaanse reg, waar daar nie 'n vaste betekenins aan menswaardigheid toegedig word nie en dit nie funksioneer as 'n primêre aksiegrond nie.
Die drie kern elemente van menswaardigheid word in die finale instansie beoordeel binne die raamwerk van Dworkin en Alexy se verdeling van grondwetlike norme in reëls en beginsels. Hierdie elemente speel 'n onontbeerlike rol wanneer proportionaliteits-analise toegepas word en wanneer regters verwys na buitelandse reg en regspraak aanhaal. Die onderskeiding van watter van drie elemente as 'n reël of as 'n beginsel funksioneer is aanduidend van welke element beperk kan word in terme van proportionaliteits-analise. Dit is dus noodsaaklik om vas te stel of menswaardigheid as 'n reël of as 'n beginsel, of as beide in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg funksioneer, ten einde te illustreer wanneer menswaardigheid 'n element van absoluutheid as 'n reël projekteer, of wanneer dit die rol inneem van 'n beginsel wat slegs relatiewe gelding het, in terme van Alexy se teorie van grondwetlike regte.
Sleutelwoorde: menswaardigheid, menseregte, grondwetlike regte, grondwetlike waardes, kategoriese bevel, reëls en beginsels, proportionaliteits analise, beperkings van grondwetlike regte | en_US |
