Reifying things or relations: substantialism versus functionalism

Abstract

Our awareness of a diversity of things as well as a multiplicity of relationships took shape in the history of philosophy and the various academic disciplines, embodied in a constant struggle between allegedly independent substances or encompassing relations. Viewing entities as independent (self-sufficient) substances dominated Greek and Medieval philosophy. Since the Renaissance, a definite shift towards the primacy of relations has taken place. Kant claims that our knowledge about matter is limited to knowledge about relationships. Entities are not independent substances, because through the universal modal aspects in which they function they are related, as embodied in the wave-particle duality.

Ons besef van ’n ryke verskeidenheid dinge asook ’n menigvuldigheid relasies het vorm aangeneem in verskeie akademiese dissiplines en dit is beliggaam in die stryd tussen vermeende onafhanklike substansies of omvattende relasies. Die siening van entiteite as onafhanklike (selfgenoegsame) substansies het die Grieks-Middeleeuse era gedomineer. Sedert die Renaissance vind ’n besliste verskuiwing na die primaat van relasies plaas. Kant beweer selfs dat al wat ons van materie kan ken relasies is. Entiteite is nie onafhanklike substansies nie, want kragtens die wiekslag van universele modale aspekte bestaan hulle in ’n samehangsverband, soos beliggaam in die golf-deeltjie dualiteit