Participatory Budgeting in rural councils: The case of Mangwe District Council, Zimbabwe

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DECLARATION

I, Tambudzai Ndlovu (Student number 36996793), declare that the thesis titled "*Participatory Budgeting in rural councils: The case of Mangwe District Council, Zimbabwe"* submitted for the award of the Doctor of Philosophy in Public Management and Governance at the North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, is solely the outcome of my own scholarly efforts. This work has not been previously presented by me to any other academic institution. All references to external sources within this thesis have been appropriately cited, providing full and accurate attributions.

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T. Ndlovu

Date: October 2023

DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my two grandmothers, Selina Ndlovu Baloyi and the now departed Josephine Ndlovu, who steadfastly supported my educational journey from a young age and served as my pillars of strength.

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The path I have travelled has been arduous, and even now, I find myself overwhelmed with emotions and disbelief as I stand at the finish line of this journey.

I offer praise and honour to the Almighty Lord for granting me the courage, strength, and resilience to persevere when surrendering felt like the easier path.

I am profoundly grateful for the unwavering support of my husband, Sambulo Gegana Ndlovu, whose invaluable assistance has meant the world to me. I cannot underestimate the invaluable support of my niece, Sibusisiwe Nsingo, throughout this academic pursuit. I extend my heartfelt appreciation to my wonderful children, Zothile Zayne Gegana and Zongile Zayden Gegana, for granting me the space I needed to focus on my studies.

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ABSTRACT

Participatory Budgeting (PB) lies at the core of the New Public Management reforms, which seek to reform public finances through increased citizen participation. Participatory Budgeting is fundamental for democratic governance and for empowering communities to play an active role in shaping local fiscal decisions. The adoption of PB in Zimbabwe was motivated by the need to enhance citizen participation, service delivery, transparency and accountability, and responsiveness to the needs of the citizens. This study investigated the intricate dynamics of PB's implementation, and its diverse outcomes within the unique context of Mangwe Rural District Council (RDC) in Zimbabwe.

This research is underpinned by a qualitative approach using semi-structured key informant interviews. Extensive fieldwork within the local context provided in-depth understanding of the intricate dynamics at play. These qualitative insights are supplemented by meticulous document analysis which further enriches the empirical fabric of the study.

The findings are in sync with the problem which necessitated this study, which is that despite adopting PB, Zimbabwean local councils are failing to attain positive PB outcomes. The research findings yielded an array of PB outcomes ranging from the lack of empowerment of citizens through limited engagement in the PB process, to grappling with accountability and transparency challenges, and navigating constraints in service delivery. In response to these findings, the fifth objective of this study sought to develop a participatory financial model for use in Mangwe RDC, and in other similar environments.

Grounded in a robust theoretical foundation, this study seamlessly amalgamates empirical insights garnered from extensive fieldwork with well-established public management paradigms, theoretical frameworks, and globally recognized best practices. Informed by this comprehensive understanding, the study crafts a

comprehensive financial model akin to a strategic blueprint. This is done with the aim of strengthening PB within rural local governments.

The proposed model underscores the significance of the theoretical frameworks that advocate citizen participation and bottom-up engagement approaches. Moreover, the model recognizes the need to address the dynamics in the political, technological, economic and legislative environments in-order to ensure the efficacy of PB in Mangwe RDC.

Going beyond the realms of theoretical discourse, the financial model provides a proactive strategy to overcome barriers to effective implementation of PB in rural local governments. Through fostering synergy between stakeholders, judicious resource allocation, capacity building and empowerment, affording citizens an oversight role, and fostering the evaluation and feedback loop, the model emerges as a citizen-oriented approach, which upholds the ideals of PB. In essence, this study aspires to contribute substantially to the ongoing discourse surrounding PB implementation, underscoring its pivotal role in enhancing local governance and steering community development across the distinct landscape of Zimbabwe.

KEY WORDS:

Budget, participatory budgeting, rural council, decentralisation, Mangwe District Council, traditional leaders, Ward Development Committee, Village Development Committee, outcomes, Zimbabwe.

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LIST OF ACRONYMNS/ABBREVIATIONS

AG	Auditor General
CA	Capability Approach
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CSOs	Civic Society Organisations
DA	District Administrator
MDA	Mangwe District Administrator
MLRUD	Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development
MRDC	Mangwe Rural District Council
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NPM	New Public Management
ILO	International Labour Organisation
LACEP	Local Authorities Capacity Enhancement Project
LGC	Local Government Code
MLGPWNH	Ministry of Local Government Public Works and National Housing
PA	Provincial Administrator
PB	Participatory Budgeting
PC	Provincial Council
PDCOs	Provincial Development Committees
PG	Provincial Government
PDC	Provincial Development Committee
PDDC	?
PM	Prime Minister
PMDD	Prime Minister's Directives on Decentralisation
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
PSED	Public Sector Equality Duty
PT	Participatory Theory
PPGDD	Presidential Policy Guidelines on Devolution and Decentralisation
RDC	Rural District Council
RDDC	Rural District Development Committee
RERC	Research Ethics Regulatory Committee
ToC	Theory of Change

OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
VIDCO	Village Development Committee
VA	Village Assembly
VH	Village Head
WA	Ward Assembly
WADCO	Ward Development Committee
WB	World Bank
USA	United States of America

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1ORIENTATION

The local government system in Zimbabwe during the colonial era was characterised by a dual structure that was discriminatory and based on racial segregation. In the initial years following independence, consistent attempts were undertaken to revise this dual system (Chatiza 2010; Jonga 2014; Kurebwa2015). Government policies and laws were formulated and enacted to rectify the injustices of colonialism (Kurebwa 2015:). According to Mutizwa-Mangiza (1985) and Makumbe (1998), the directives on decentralization issued in 1984 and 1985 by the Prime Minister brought about grassroots involvement, through the establishment of local authorities as provided for by the Urban and Rural District Councils Acts of 1985. The establishment of these councils marked the beginning of a decentralized and more participatory governance approach in Zimbabwe. Local government councils emerged as a prominent instrument embraced by the government to act as a catalyst for improving citizens' lives through enabling their engagement in the governance process. This paved the way for the decentralization of specific authorities and responsibilities from the central government to local government units, which were anticipated to swiftly address citizens' demands (Coutinho 2010; Rural District Councils Act [Chapter 29:13], Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:15]).

The concept of Participatory Budgeting (PB) is a central element within the New Public Management (NPM) reforms aimed at restructuring public sector finances. Participatory Budgeting is defined by Municipal Development Partnership for Eastern and Southern Africa (MDP-ESA) (2007:10) as a “cyclical process by which citizens and sub-national governments widen mechanisms for promoting civic engagement in identifying local needs, deciding preferences as well as the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the budget taking into account expenditure requirements and the available income resources”. In light of this definition, and according to scholars such as Rondinelli and Cheema (1983), Wekwete and De Valk (1990), Mamdani (1996),

and Matovu and Mumvuma (2000), citizen participation enables the breakdown and customization of development strategies and initiatives to match the requirements of the populace. Additionally, the inclusion of citizens in the budgeting procedure enhances their influence, augments resource efficiency, promotes fairness, and enhances both participation and government's responsiveness to citizens.

Participatory Budgeting (PB) was initially put into practice in Brazil during the late 1990s, with the aim of redistributing economic resources (Rumbul *et al.,* 2018). The World Bank (WB) has played a pivotal role in ensuring that almost all developing countries adopt PB as a catalyst for financial reforms. PB was primarily advocated by the WB because conventional budgeting was viewed as a contributor to social exclusion among third world countries' citizens. Proponents of PB argue that generally, it enables citizens to address the priority concerns of their communities through being actively involved in fiscal decision making (Social Development Team 2006; Sterling, Grunfelder & Borges 2006). Similarly, MDP-ESA (2007) argues that the adoption of PB practices usually results in reduced corruption, increased public ownership of projects, deepened local democracy, empowered citizens, improved service delivery and increased transparency and accountability.

In representative democracies, citizens vote for their representatives, who in turn, hold the state accountable on behalf of the citizens. However, the emergence of the NPM paradigm has seen an agitation by citizens to directly participate and hold governments accountable. Zinyama (2014) notes that the need to bring local governments close to the citizens was underscored by the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, where the Local Agenda 21 called for every citizen to actively engage in shaping development choices. Buela *et al.* (2020note that the concepts of citizen participation and governance are currently co-joined as they seek to increase efficiency, effectiveness and transparency in public management. The UNDP (2000:8) underscores the significance of citizens' involvement in governance in the following manner: "Good governance ensures political, social and economic priorities are based on consensus in society and the voices of the poorest and the most vulnerable are heard in decision-making over the allocation of development resources".

There are several strategies to directly involve citizens in governance, and PB is one such strategy. Chikerema (2013) outlines activities which promote citizen participation and highlights PB as one key strategy for bringing citizens into the governance of their affairs. The concept of PB has attracted significant global interest, with global examples illustrating continuous efforts to enhance citizen participation in governance over time (Cabannes 2019:; O'Hagan *et al.* 2020). PB is a concept that was designed to provide citizens with an opportunity to be directly involved in, and to influence government financial decisions.

Current literature suggests that, as of 2019, more than six thousand PB cases had been recorded in at least 40 countries worldwide (Cabannes 2019:). Empirical evidence (Sintomer *et al.* 2013:; Zhuang 2014; Cabannes 2019) points to the widespread adoption of PB, demonstrated by the growing global prevalence of PB practices in countries within the Commonwealth. Moreover, significant PB experience has been gained in various regions such as Asia (for instance, India, Sri Lanka, and Malaysia) and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) nations. Sintomer *et al.* (2013) and Cabannes (2019) observe that PB has also facilitated better governance in countries such as Porto Alergre and Cameroon. As a result, corruption has almost been completely eradicated, and enhanced cooperation between administrators and citizens was reported. Similarly, PB in Australia, Canada and the Philippines has played a significant role in giving "a voice to the voiceless" and increasing citizen participation (Cabannes, 2019). In sharing China's experience on PB, Zhuang (2014:) note that in Chengdu the villages have direct entitlement of their budgets. Giving villages control over the budget has increased transparency and accountability over public funds and efficiency in responding to the needs of the village.

Cabannes (2019) reports that in the southwestern region of Nigeria, the state of Ekiti implemented Participatory Budgeting (PB) as an experiment in 2012. It resulted in more transparent relations between the citizens and local government officials. This experiment also caused citizens to gain popular control of 177 local construction projects which were completed successfully in 170 communities. Transparency and accountability were further improved through allowing citizens to choose the contractors and directly purchase the building material from the suppliers. Another

study conducted in Penang established that PB promoted social equality by empowering the community and improving basic services provision (Cabannes, 2014).

Drawing from the above experiences, PB can thus, be viewed as an inclusive process of reform that empowers citizens to play a direct role in the planning and allocation of municipal resources. PB thus, enhances participation of local communities in local government affairs by influencing decisions regarding the identification and prioritization of service delivery projects (Blore *et al.,* 2004

Citizenship theory resonates well with the concept of PB, as it stipulates that all citizens should exercise their rights by participating in all government affairs (Holcombe, 1995:). The theory suggests that the public administrator, in addition to being a citizen, has the responsibility of serving fellow citizens. The other citizens who are not public administrators have a responsibility to ensure that there is fiscal prudence in the utilization of public resources (Bailey 1999:). This responsibility of citizens and their participation shows that the theory is positioned on citizen participation and accountability. As stated by Holcombe (1995), it is imperative that all individuals participate in development decisions, their implementation, and enjoy their consequent advantages. This theory encourages the integration of local communities into the decision-making process concerning development, without being subjected to dominance by the local government, as highlighted by Rahim (1994). Moreover, the theory suggests that local communities should be drivers and subjects of their own development process as they define their priorities. The theory is geared towards a people-centred approach at a normative level. The citizenship theory, together with the systems theory which advocates for a continual process of communication between the citizens and government officials, were adopted for the purposes of this study, as they illuminate the issues underlying PB.

1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT

Although Zimbabwe adopted the Rural and Urban Councils Act that attempts to promote citizen participation, it was not until the year 2000 that local governments adopted a budget process that was participatory in nature (Chebundo 2007). The re-engineered budget process provided for consultative meetings whereby all

stakeholders were allowed to present their priority areas to local governments. The Rural District Councils Act, Chapter 29:13, requires rural local governments, like urban local governments, to create their local budgets in compliance with the prescribed procedures. In their budget formulation, rural local governments are directed to afford citizens an opportunity to participate and make decisions pertaining to the effective use of local resources thus, introducing PB in local governments.

Several studies carried out in Zimbabwe (Urban and Rural Development Portfolio Committee, 2011; Zinyama, 2014; World Bank, 2017; Marango et al., 2018; Anti-Corruption Trust of Southern Africa, 2019) posit that mostly negative PB outcomes have been realised. Findings from the studies reveal that there is generally lack of transparency and accountability, poor citizen participation in budget public hearings, and ineffective service delivery (Marangoet al.,2018). These experiences are incongruent with the expectations and experiences in other countries adopting PB praxis. When reflecting on the situation in Zimbabwe, Zinyama (2012) notes that the realization of positive PB outcomes could be a result of "pseudo-democracy", which only provides for legislation that calls for consultation instead of participation. This is contrary to what happens in other countries discussed earlier, whose legislation advocates active participation of citizens in local government fiscal activities (Sintomer *et al.* 2013).

The adoption of PB in local governments worldwide, Zimbabwe included, is underscored by the need to enhance citizen engagement, transparency, accountability, effective service provision, and attentiveness to citizen needs (Sterling*et al.* 2006; MDP-ESA 2007). The adoption of PB raises the following expectations: enhanced service delivery, efficient and effective operating local government institutions, increased citizen participation, transparency, and accountability (Rahaman and Lawrence, 2004; Sterling, Grunfelder & Borges, 2006; MDP-ESA, 2007). Although the concept of citizen participation has received much attention, Ebdon & Franklin (2004:210) posits that in Zimbabwe there is "…persistent evidence that citizen participation occurs infrequently and has little influence on decision-making". While the implementation of PB should yield positive results in local governance, current literature indicates otherwise in the case of Zimbabwe. Reports by the World Bank (2017) and the Anti-Corruption Trust of Southern Africa (2019:), for

example, reflect that local governments and the localities they govern in Zimbabwe are characterized by corruption, deteriorating service delivery, minimal citizen participation and disempowered citizens. Zinyama (2014:2) notes that, despite having adopted PB, the Harare city council is experiencing serious; “poor service delivery, financial mismanagement, decline in infrastructure, dictatorial tendencies during budget making process and residents priorities not considered in the budget”. After the adoption of PB, the development trends indicate a paradox of expectations as reality is the opposite of intended outcomes of PB. This paradox creates a problem in the implementation of PB in the Zimbabwean context. Such problems could be associated with the lack of PB implementation capacity and competency in Zimbabwe. For instance, the Parliament of Zimbabwe Report (2010) indicates that the residents of Norton and Chitungwiza were not consulted nor participated in the budget formulation process. It also emerges from the Portfolio Committee’s report that citizen consultations are not taken seriously, and when they are done, they are just a formality and residents’ views are often ignored. Lack of stakeholder participation in the budget process results in poor service delivery and lack of community ownership of projects as established by Mulaudzi (2014) in his study of the Beitbridge Town council. These Machiavellian experiences resonate with Arnstein’s (1969:216) observation that “there is a critical difference between going through the empty ritual of participation and having the real power needed to affect the outcome of the process”. It is a possibility that the failure in Zimbabwean local authorities is linked to lack of serious implementation of PB.

Local governments in rural Africa continue to experience problems after PB. In his study of rural councils in Uganda, Mulindwa (2013) found that, despite embracing PB, political accountability was still lacking. The lack resulted in withholding information from citizens on expenditures incurred and the purpose they were incurred. He further notes that the information was not withheld from citizens only but from Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), some of which funded development projects through the local authorities. Moreover, Mulindwa (2013) noted, from evidence collected, that there was delay in making budget information available to sector committees during meetings. Budget documents would not be available during meetings or they would only be availed at the end of the meeting. Such acts derailed attempts at ensuring that there was transparency in the process and practice of PB. This hindered active citizen

participation and their right to be able to hold officials accountable. It also opens possibilities of chicanery by local authorities to subvert the opinions of the people in PB.

Rural Africa has examples of local authorities subverting citizen priorities (Babirye 2009). In a study in Uganda the district of Wamala Babirye (2009:8) observed that “it is only priority projects of the district and central government that are actually implemented”. Babirye’s findings in Wamala are reinforced by findings made by Mulindwa (2013) that citizen participation does not influence budget decisions. An example given by Mulindwa (2013 concerns district funds being utilized to further the president’s campaigns at the expense of priority community projects. This shows how PB is violated to prioritize politicians at the expense of the citizens, resulting in it failing to meet the expected outcomes of empowering citizens and being accountable to them. In fact, Babirye (2009) argues that political pressures dictate the priorities of local government, not citizens. The rights and responsibilities of citizens are made ineffective and PB becomes rhetoric. Local authorities in Africa appear to be directed by, and accountable to politicians rather than citizens.

Apart from the few examples from Uganda, there is scant literature interrogating PB strategies and outcomes in rural Africa. Scholarly literature has directed its attention toward municipalities in urban areas across both developed and developing nations (Rubin 1990; Ebdon & Franklin,2004:). Tom and Munemo (2015:) note that current literature does not focus on the meanings and experiences of rural communities, rather, it is more focused on urban dwellers. Suffice to note that urban local governments and rural local governments are different in terms of their social and economic set ups. To this end, it is crucial to assess the process of PB in rural areas and evaluate its implementation and outcomes commensurate with rural environments and priorities. Given the inconsistences in urban councils and some rural councils elsewhere, it is important to evaluate PB in rural authorities in Zimbabwe; and Mangwe district in Zimbabwe was a case in point.

The locus of this study was Mangwe District Council, a rural authority that is in the process of pursuing PB as an alternative budgeting process. The map below (figure 1.1) illustrates the location of the case study. Mangwe district is located in

Matabeleland South Province in the greater Plumtree area. Plumtree is divided into four districts, namely, Bulilima West, Bulilima East, Mangwe District, and Plumtree Urban. The divisions among these districts called for the separation of local councils, leading to the establishment of four councils (Government of Zimbabwe,2016).

Figure 1.1:Mangwe District



Source: Dube (2015:2)

As stated, Mangwe District Council is a rural authority that is in the process of pursuing PB as an alternative budgeting process. Despite having adopted PB, the Zimbabwean experiences discussed earlier indicate that the country is lagging in terms of achieving positive PB outcomes. While Zimbabwean cases in literature relate to the experiences of urban dwellers, what is clear is that they reflect PB experiences in Zimbabwe inclusive of rural councils such as Mangwe rural district council. Assumptions on Mangwe district were built on these experiences that equally apply within a Zimbabwean context. Moreover, the study drew inferences from the Ugandan study which is rural to inform the assumptions on Mangwe PB outcomes. The study, therefore, investigated these assumptions in Mangwe and ascertained their extent. To this end, the study is relevant as it sought to understand the concept of participatory budgeting in Mangwe, assess its contribution, and proffer recommendations on how to address challenges such as lack of citizen participation, lack of accountability and

transparency being faced in its practice. To address the challenges, lessons were drawn from other areas and regions where participatory budgeting has been a success.

The problem under investigation was that, despite having adopted PB, Zimbabwean councils are not meeting the expected outcomes of PB, and there is evidence of continued decline in service delivery. PB has been implemented elsewhere with positive administrative and developmental results, yet the opposite appears true from literature on Zimbabwe. The study and evaluation of PB in Mangwe sought to identify the gaps and develop better strategies for PB in rural Zimbabwe and Africa in general.

1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The main objective of the study was to identify challenges encountered in the realization of positive participatory budgeting outcomes such as increased citizen participation, transparency, accountability, and improved service delivery in Mangwe rural district council in Zimbabwe and formulate measures which can be adopted to ensure effective and efficient implementation of PB.

The secondary objectives were to:

- analyse the meta-theoretical and theoretical underpinning of community participation and participatory budgeting in rural local government;
- assess the statutory, regulatory, and institutional frameworks that govern participatory budgeting in rural local governments in Zimbabwe;
- explore international best practice regarding participative budgeting processes in local governments;
- solicit the perceptions of key stakeholders regarding key challenges faced in the execution of PB in rural Mangwe;
- recommend financial model refinements in PB implementation in rural Zimbabwe;

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- What are the meta-theoretical and theoretical underpinning of community participation and participatory budgeting in local government?
- What are the statutory, regulatory and institutional frameworks that govern participatory budgeting in local governments in Zimbabwe?
- What is the international best practice regarding local government participatory budgeting praxis?
- What are the perceptions of key stakeholders regarding key challenges faced in the execution of participatory budgeting in rural Mangwe?
- What should be incorporated in an adjusted financial model to improve participatory budgeting implementation in Mangwe?

1.4 CENTRAL THEORETICAL STATEMENTS

The theoretical underpinnings for this study were premised on the argument that, if citizens are actively involved in their local government budgetary process, progress and development in society will be achievable. This is because the process of participation creates an environment where local government officials can be held accountable and are likely to be transparent in using public funds. It fosters community ownership of development sense of ownership of projects.

The study was premised on the citizen theory in line with participatory budgeting, which argues that citizens should be given an important status of being directly or indirectly involved in the decisions which they have an interest in (Quick and Bryston 2016). Moreover, the theory suggests that citizen participation is key in that it allows necessary development to take place since the beneficiaries are the ones at the forefront of defining and driving their own development. This theory can also be explained in the light of the Eastonian Systems Model of 1953 as illustrated in figure 1.2. The model views the political process of governance as being participatory in nature and affording citizens an opportunity to make demands, suggestions and hold the government accountable for decisions made and not made. The systems theory provides a macro theoretical perspective to illustrate the interaction between councils

and stakeholders. Within this macro theory, the micro participation theory was utilised to analyse the nature and potential contributions of PB.

Figure1.2: Systems Model



Source: Easton (1981)

The Systems Theory elucidates that the political system functions within an encompassing environment that gives rise to various societal demands (Easton, 1981). These demands span a range of areas, including requests for employment reservations for specific groups, improvements in working conditions or minimum wages, enhanced transportation facilities, and better healthcare provisions, among others. The generation of these demands (inputs) can be termed citizen participation, as citizens will be involved in their governance by making demands, suggestions and decisions pertaining to their community interests and priorities. During the process of conversion, decision makers transform the inputs into 'outputs,' which manifest as policies, decisions, regulations, rules, and laws.

The 'outputs' circulate back into the environment via a 'feedback' mechanism, leading to the emergence of new 'demands' (Easton, 1981). Thus, this process operates in a cyclical manner. Clearly, the model advocates an open communication between the citizens and the government. It gives citizens power to question the decisions made by the government and to make objections on policies or programmes which would have been adopted by governments which are not in sync with the needs and priorities of the community. These theoretical frameworks were utilised in the study as they

related to the concept of PB which advocates citizen participation in local fiscal decisions in the Mangwe district.

The Theory of Change (ToC) that focuses on how change comes by, and why it is important to change the status quo, was deployed in this study. The ToC comprehensively describes and explains the reason for change and the expected outcomes of a change intervention (Stein & Valters, 2012). The intervention was examined in terms of how it leads to the expected outcomes and the conditions necessary for the attainment of the outcomes identified. The study focused on a change intervention that was adopted to ensure citizen participation in Mangwe district and its outcomes examined. The theory held relevance in the study by providing a guiding framework that could be utilized to assess the change intervention. The study ultimately unearthed the benefits and failures of changing from the traditional budget process to participatory budgeting hence the relevance of the theory of change. It was triangulated with Participation Theory and Easton's systems theory, which were the focus of the study in question.

1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

1.5.1 Literature review

Extensive review of existing literature on traditional budgeting and participatory budgeting in Zimbabwe and Mangwe was carried out. This was done in order to have a background of the subject and comprehend current models and paradigms relating to participatory budgeting. Moreover, literature review enables one to make comparison of the study in question and other studies which have been undertaken. It was also utilised to draw lessons from experiences of other countries on participatory budgeting. Data for this research was solicited from texts on participatory budgeting, books, journals, media, and internet sources.

1.5.2 Empirical study

The study makes use of qualitative research. Field and desk research was utilized for this study. The research needed to benefit from previous research on participatory

budgeting hence, the use of desk research. Field research helped to get raw data on participatory budgeting for analysis and comparison. Data for the study was collected from the field as primary data and secondary sources also guided the study. The majority of the qualitative information for this research was derived from a case study approach, which involved participation observation, interviews with key informants, a secondary analysis of policies and legislation, as well as a review of archival records. The research was guided by an interpretivist research paradigm. As described by Maree (2007:59), the fundamental objective of interpretivist research is to provide an angle on a particular situation and to comprehensively analyse the situation being investigated.

1.5.3 Sampling

The participants for this research were selected through non-probability sampling, a method where researchers exercise their discretion in choosing individuals for the study based on their understanding of the phenomenon. Nieuwenhuis (2007:79) defines sampling as a procedure employed to pick a subset of the population for investigation. Burns and Grove (2003:31) see sampling as the act of selecting a cohort of individuals, events, or behaviors for the purpose of conducting a study. With non-probability sampling, researchers have the flexibility to use their own judgment to decide which subjects to include in the study, relying on their familiarity with the subject matter. There is no assurance that each element has an equal chance of being chosen (Parahoo 1997:223). This method allows researchers to pinpoint individuals who are known to possess the necessary knowledge about the study.

Non-probability sampling was used to select individuals responsible for budgeting and financial oversight which are: the chief financial officer, two (2) officials from the senior financial management, two (2) officials from the junior financial management, and two (2) budget committee members. The Mangwe District Administrator (MDA) was also interviewed because the office has administrative oversight in development programmes and services in Mangwe district. All seventeen (17) Mangwe wards were sampled, and in each ward, one (1) headman, one (1) councillor and one (1) committee will be interviewed. The total sample was made up of fifty-nine (59) respondents. Ward councillors and headmen were interviewed because they

supersede local government structures and play a crucial role in community leadership. Community committee members were interviewed because they are participants in the participatory budget process, and recipients of the development process. For the sample to be inclusive, gender equity was sought, where the views of both males and females were solicited.

1.5.4 Instrumentation

Field research was carried out using face-to-face semi-structured interviews. Key informants, individuals or groups closely connected to, or knowledgeable about, the studied community, played a pivotal role. These interviews were held with various figures, including council members, administrative officers, village leaders, and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). These participants were chosen due to their presumed distinct viewpoints on the subject in question (http://srdc.masstate.edu). Their input held significance as they held authority beyond local government structures. Cresswell *et al.* (2002:186) note that interviews are valuable for capturing historical context, attaining a broad and deep understanding of issues, and offering flexibility. Through these interviews, the researcher had the flexibility to delve deeper and seek further clarification from the interviewees regarding their perspectives on participatory budgeting in the Mangwe area.

1.5.5 Data collection and analysis

Qualitative research is considered crucial in that it allows one to study and observe things in their natural setting or as they happen (Mertens, 2010). Of utmost importance is being allowed to carry out the research in Mangwe district. Relevant documents were sourced from the North-West University and permission sought from the various leadership structures, such as the provincial or district administrators, chiefs and headmen who have jurisdiction over Mangwe district.

The researcher was the primary data collector. The researcher took comprehensive field notes and carried out repeated observations to validate findings. An interview

guide was prepared for interviews, and in the event that the respondent could not have a face-to-face interview, telephone interviews were utilized instead. Digital recording of all interview proceedings was done to ensure that the researcher does not lose any valuable data.

The researcher employed a variety of techniques for analyzing the collected data. Qualitative data was analyzed using Nvivo software, where data was organized into categories using codes. Additionally, the researcher employed thematic analysis, which allowed for the identification, analysis, and reporting of patterns (themes) within the data related to the subject of study. The data was recorded, transcribed, and categorized accordingly.

Content analysis was also used in the data analysis process. This involved reviewing guidelines and provisions related to participatory budgeting. This approach enriched the study by providing a comprehensive understanding of participatory budgeting.

To enhance the reader's comprehension, the information was presented in various formats. Data was condensed into narrative descriptions, tables, figures, and pie charts. Narrative descriptions were employed to clarify specific scenarios and relationships. Tables were used to succinctly present numerical data, facilitating easier understanding. Graphs and charts were used, not only to condense data, but also to provide a visual representation for comparison purposes.

1.6 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The study obtained ethical clearance from both the Research Ethics Regulatory Committee (RERC) at North-West University and the Mangwe Rural District Council. In addition, the researcher prepared an introductory letter and a consent form for all respondents and participants involved in the study. This process guaranteed that participation from the respondents was entirely voluntary, emphasizing that no coercion or unethical tactics would be employed to elicit their involvement in the study. The researcher adhered to confidentiality, and identities of interviewees and discussants were not revealed. Furthermore, the researcher respected intellectual

property through strict acknowledgement of the sources from which the data has been gathered from.

In this research, permission was sought from the Mangwe district administrator, ward councillors and headmen.

1.7 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

In addressing the governance components, the study was feeding into the ongoing debate on administrative reforms in the country, and aiding in proffering solutions to the effective and efficient management of the local purse. The study also benefits various stakeholders, policy makers, academia, and institutions interested in financial reforms in Zimbabwe and elsewhere in the globe. To encourage rural development, it is imperative to have a study that focuses on the experiences of the local rural people, which this study sought to achieve. The research advances knowledge in public administration by bringing in an evaluative analysis on participatory budgeting in arid rural communities. The findings from this study can be used to inform future government policies and programmes.

1.8 CHAPTER LAYOUT

Chapter 1: Introduction

This chapter served as an introduction to the study, offering an overview of its orientation and the statement of the problem. It presented the core theoretical concept, highlighted the study's importance, outlined its research questions and objectives, and provided an overview of the research methodology employed in the study.

Chapter 2: An analysis of the meta-theoretical and theoretical underpinning of community participation and participatory budgeting in local government

The chapter gives a detailed presentation of the meta-theoretical and theoretical underpinnings of community participation and PB in local government. Participatory theory and theory of change were utilised as theoretical frameworks in the study in question.

Chapter 3: Examining global best practice regarding local government participatory budgeting praxis

Review of global trends in PB implementation and linking them to African and ultimately Zimbabwean policy implementation experiences was the focus of this chapter.

Chapter 4: An assessment of the statutory, regulatory, and institutional frameworks that govern PB in Zimbabwe

This chapter focuses on the statutory, regulatory, and institutional frameworks that govern PB in Zimbabwe.

Chapter 5: Participatory budgeting in Mangwe District Council: Empirical findings

The fifth chapter outlines the approach and techniques employed for both data collection and analysis. This section details the rationale behind the chosen methods, their effectiveness, limitations, and difficulties encountered during their implementation. The collected data underwent analysis, leading to the identification, presentation and discussion of key outcomes derived from the empirical investigation.

Chapter 6: Conclusion and Recommendations: A participatory budget model for rural councils

In this chapter, the primary challenges identified in the fifth chapter are consolidated and examined. This process facilitates contemplation of the essential aspects pertaining to research objectives and questions, culminating in drawing conclusions,

presenting suggestions, and indicating potential avenues for additional research. Proposals were put forth to tackle the core research issue through the development of a financial model aimed at enhancing the execution of participatory budgeting in rural Zimbabwe.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AND PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING

2.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter explores the meta-theoretical and theoretical underpinnings that inform the key constructs of this study, namely, community participation and participatory budgeting (PB). The chapter is split into three parts. The initial part centres on exploring participation and community participation and accountability, and how these are intertwined with the concept of local democracy. Typologies of community participation propounded by Arnstein (1969), the United Nations (1981), Moser (1983) and Oakley (1986-1989) are analyzed in detail. According to these typologies, community participation ranges from low to high participation depending on the type of governing authority. Notions of community participation are pivotal for this study that provides a framework for understanding how participatory budgeting can be implemented within the setting of local governance. Secondly, focus is on examining the meta-theoretical and philosophical dimensions of community participation. This is done by factoring in both macro level (national) and micro level (local) democratic perspectives. Systems theory serves as a grand macro theoretical framework within which the theories of participation, citizenship, and theory of change are analyzed. Thirdly, the contextual application perspectives of PB will be isolated.

As far as the contextual application perspectives of participatory budgeting (PB) are concerned, authors such as Mulindwa (2013 and Frenkiel and Lama-Rewal (2009) note that the origins of PB can be traced to Brazil. The reviewed literature shows that PB was utilized in Porto Alegre, Brazil, as a mechanism for redistributing wealth, addressing social inequalities, curbing corruption, and giving the voice to the voiceless in the community, through being involved in making financial decisions. Since its emergence in Brazil, PB has gained prominence in both developed and developing countries (Cabannes, 2019).

2.1 COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION: TOWARDS A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Community participation as a guiding concept in the research is conceptualized in this section. The conceptualization process occurs through examining the key constructs of community and participation separately to get a clear and detailed understanding of these constructs. Having conceptualized these constructs separately, a synthesis of these two will be done to aid in the conceptualization of the concept of community participation. The concept of community participation forms the basis of the research.

2.1.1 Community as construct

Bell and Newby (1971) and Johnston (2000) argue that the construct of community is elusive and multifaceted. Evidently, the construct is characterized by various dimensions and issues which include, geographical location, values, norms, beliefs, modernity, and many others that make it a complex concept. Numerous definitions (Cohen, 1985; Mattessich & Monsey, 2004; Samah & Aref, 2011; Bettez & Hytten 2013; Capece & Costa, 2013) have been penned given in an attempt to examine notions of community.

When discussing the construct of community, Capece and Costa (2013) perceive it as encompassing a specific geographical area, where a collection of individuals is connected through economic, political, social, and psychological bonds. In a similar manner, Mattessich and Monsey (2004:56) describe the idea of community as “people who live within a geographically defined area and who have social and psychological ties with each other and with the place where they live”. There are three aspects emanating from these definitions, namely, people who form part of the community, certain relationships or ties binding them, and a particular geographical location. Pradeep and Sathyamurthi (2017) note that these three aspects locate community into both geographical and social dimensions. The geographical location dimension relates to the physical space in which people are located and have certain ties binding them. The social dimension relates to the sociological perspective that views the community as a social construct (Cohen, 1985). In furthering the perspective of community being a social construct, Cohen (1985:118) contends that, “people construct community symbolically, making it a resource and repository of meaning, and a referent of their

identity". Emanating from this perspective is the crucial role played by people in creating a community.

The above definitions emphasize the aspects of geographical location, people and the ties that bind them as the core dimensions of a community. To these core dimensions, Vogl (2009) and Bettez and Hytten (2013) add interdependence and sharing or belonging as dimensions to community, by pointing out that the shared interests, culture, skills, experiences foster unity and develops a sense of belonging and interdependence among group members. The sense of belonging is also captured by Cohen (1985) and Crow and Allen (1994). Possessing a shared set of norms, values, and beliefs creates an emotional connection that nurtures a feeling of being part of a group, thereby facilitating the development of a community among individuals who mutually embrace this feeling of belonging. Such observations feed into the social dimension of community as it is constructed by the people with shared values and practices. In furthering this thought, Hardcastle *Powers and Wenocur.* (2011) point out that a community offers people a platform to interact and learn to be interdependent social agents. In addition, Durkheim (1964) and Popple and Quinney (2002) maintain that notions of community should also be conceptualized within the realm of possessed skills, interests or interest groups, meaning people experiencing the same conditions or having similar experiences. This implies that people sharing similar conditions, for instance, the disabled, those suffering from similar diseases and conditions, those who share similar interests (business, social, political), can be regarded as a community despite the non-existence of a particular geographical location.

The permeability of geographical boundaries has been furthered by the concepts of social networks, which has provided an alternative way of defining and understanding the concept of community. Lee and Newby (1983) note that people can be geographically located in the same place, but not bound by similar interests and values, while other people could be physically distant but bound together though social networks. The concept of community is therefore, premised on individual networks instead of geographically located groups. The online domain of the internet gives the impression of communities being 'distant, loosely connected, thinly woven, and fragmented' (Pradeep and Sathyamurthi, 2017:60). Instead of being members of the

same groups, social networks allow individuals to have multiple personal communities without having to be physical part of groups (Wellman, 2001). However, Glynn (1981) argues that the changing nature of community, which seems to displace the emphasis on physical space creates a modern society which is characterized by a dwindling sense of belonging which is crucial in shaping a functional community. In a similar manner, Capece and Costa (2013) observe that virtual networks have a potential of displacing physical communities and eliminating the sense of belonging, which is very crucial in a community.

Despite the concerns on the potential downside of virtual networks on the community, Wellman (2001) maintains that virtual communities have their place, which is beneficial to citizens. Evidence suggests that virtual networks have created significant interactions and created powerful communities, which have a critical significance in the modern society (Park *et al.*, 2009). Pradeep and Sathyamurthi (2017) argue that the geographical and virtual dimensions of community are different ways of understanding and examining communities. It is therefore, not about the superiority of one dimension over the other, but the relevance to the kind of community under discussion. Emphasizing the importance of physical space in community, Wellman (2001) argues that the benefits of spatial community, where people meet face to face cannot be downplayed, although due to communication technologies and social media, the significance of such physical spaces have dwindled. There are people located in rural areas who still maintain the use of physical space in communicating in their localities. In rural areas, there are village and ward committees which facilitate such communication among its members, and the existence of traditional leadership facilitates physical communication. In advancing the need for physical space, Pradeep and Sathyamurthi (2017) note that access to the internet is limited to those who can afford yet the majority of rural located dwellers are poor and continue to rely on physical discourses.

In their view of community, Burns *et al.* (1994) reason that it can be regarded as a broad concept which houses divergent interests that are, at times, at odds with each other. Similar sentiments are echoed by Van der Waldt (2019) that a community is made up of individuals who have different dispositions, interests, culture, social standing in terms of income and wealth. Such perceptions of community denote the

presence of conflict because achieving a harmonious equilibrium between the preferences of diverse community members proves to be challenging. This therefore, accentuates the complexity of the concept of community.

Warren (1978) in Pradeep and Sathyamurthi (2017:61) say that a community can also be regarded as “a system of interrelated subsystems that perform important functions for their members”. This view denotes an interactive system where social units and subsystems converge in carrying out their activities to benefit the people. These activities enable local people to access to local resources required for their wellbeing and sustenance. What emanates from Warren’s perception of community is the existence of a locality although there is no stringent application of geographical location. To justify this locality, Warren (1978) in Pradeep and Sathyamurthi (2017:61) identifies five social functions which are locality relevant. These are: “(a) production-distribution consumption, (b) socialization, (c) social control, (d) social participation, and (e) mutual support”. These social roles play a crucial role in the everyday operation of both the community and its individual members. These roles are executed through the operations of various institutions and groups within the community, which can either be formal or informal (Hardcastle *et al.* 2011).

Warren’s (1978) in Pradeep and Sathyamurthi’s (2017:61) perception of community is the guiding view the study takes because it is a perception that fosters the interaction of various sub-systems within a system. Thus, community for the purpose of this research is perceived as a social construct which houses divergent yet converging subsystems whose interactions are pivotal for the survival of the social unit and its members. The interactions can either be physical or virtual depending on the environment and existing conditions. It is a perception which denotes participation of various sub-units where various activities are executed.

2.1.2 Participation as social construct

Holcombe (1995) reports that the genesis of participation as a construct emanated mainly from the socio-economic development arena, driven by the observation that marginalized groups in society are typically being excluded from developmental decisions. This observation led to the recognition that there was need to involve

individuals in developmental decisions. It also exposed the weaknesses in the more conventional top-down decision-making approaches, which Agrawal and Gibson (1999) criticized on the basis of benefiting a few elites in society. Expanding on the roots of participation, Midgley *et al.* (1986) and Lane (1995) argue that the idea of participation is shaped by the principles of community development. This approach aims to enable communities to express their needs and effectively address them. Such observations made scholars such as Chambers (1993), Mompati and Prinsen (2000) and Kelly (2001) to place more emphasis on people-centred approaches that promote participation. People-centred approaches that foster public participation have also been advocated on the grounds of creating more responsive, efficient, accountable institutions which can address the needs of the marginalized in society (Putman, 1993. The construct 'participation' can thus, be regarded as an attempt to desist from using top-down approaches that exclude marginalized groups from decisions influencing them.

According to Bryson *et al.* (2013), participation is critical to advancing the democratization process because it encourages residents to actively participate in making decisions about the public affairs in their communities. (White, 1981; Eyben & Ladbury, 1995). The democratization process and participation seek to address issues of equity and recognition, where the voiceless are being given a voice (Puri, 2004). Democratic ideals promote citizen engagement and participation in public life either directly or indirectly. Participation can also be nominal or broad. In addressing the various forms of participation, Agarwal (2001) argues that 'narrow' participation refers to nominal or passive means of engagement and 'broad' types of participation are more active and inclusive in its approach. It is thus, more valuable to include the most vulnerable groups in society.

Oakely and Marsden (1984:19) take the side of "low" participation when defining participation as "... a voluntary contribution by the people to one or another of the public programs supposed to contribute to national development but the people are not expected to take part in shaping the program or criticizing its content". The definition denotes passive participation where citizens who are affected by decisions and programmes are not given adequate opportunity to participate and influence those decisions and programmes. Passive participation results in a top-down approach

where decisions and programs are handed straight from the top without much participation from the citizens (Moser, 1989). Such an approach has been objected to by various scholars as they advocated a more people-centred bottom-up approach.

Devas and Grant (2003) view participation in the light of citizens having control over decisions that affect them. Having control like Agarwal (2001) highlighted, depends on the range of participation adopted. Price and Mylius (1991) concur with the sentiments of Devas and Grant (2003) but further indicate that, for citizens to be able to have control over decisions, they should be involved in the entire process which include, planning, execution, and ongoing sustenance of the developmental initiative.

Price and Mylius's (1991) definition of participation is the study's grand definition as it advocates the involvement of beneficiaries in all the stages of an intervention. If beneficiaries take part and make decisions from the onset of the intervention, it gives them power to control the direction of the intervention and to make decisions which advances their interests and priorities. This also results in the inclusion and empowerment of everyone including the vulnerable (World Bank, 2001. Participation and empowerment are intricately intertwined in that the former presents a platform of involvement, where the latter can occur through sharing control and power, and being able to influence decisions (White, 1981; Holcombe, 1995). An empowered citizen is one who can hold the governing authority accountable, and influence financial decisions in their locality. The concept of empowerment and participation borrows from Sen's capabilities approach, which is described further in this chapter.

2.1.3 Community participation conceptualized

According to Midgley *et al.* (1986:23), there is a close and intricate connection between the concepts of popular participation and community participation. Popular participation is a broad concept which furthers the inclusion and engagement of citizens in the governance process of a nation, whereas community participation is micro in nature as its locus is specific to local affairs. Hansen *et al.* (2003) state that community participation seeks to empower and enhance social development and welfare for everyone in the communities, especially the vulnerable.

According to Samah and Aref (2011), community participation can be viewed as a procedure that involves citizens actively participating in the decision-making processes of their local area. Sheng (1990) views community participation as a right which every citizen should exercise to improve their livelihoods. In a similar manner, Oakley and Marsden (1984), Paul (1987), and Putman (1993) insist that community participation can be regarded as a process which entails citizen involvement in the activities that occur in their locality, and that enhances societal well-being and growth. This is a democratic bottom-up, decision-making approach which ensures that initiatives are sustained and the process itself promotes the formulation and implementation of new endeavours. This perspective on participation is consistent with Sen's (1995) capability approach, which claims that what matters most is that individuals have the choice (capabilities) to choose the lives they want to live and the identities they want to adopt. The capability approach is discussed later in the chapter.

When exploring rural development, Chifamba (2013:4) posits that “community participation involves an active process whereby beneficiaries influence the direction and the execution of development projects rather than merely receive a share of project benefits.” Beneficiaries of the developments process become the drivers of their development process and play a pivotal role in influencing policies and programmes that contribute to their welfare and livelihoods. Community participation is a tool which stakeholders utilise to control and direct development and enables communities to hold local governments accountable for the utilization of resources and service delivery. Community empowerment is at the centre of community participation as it quips citizens with education and knowledge on their rights and responsibilities. In this manner, citizens are empowered to be drivers of their development process, be self-reliant, influence policies, and demand for transparency and accountability from public institutions (Arnstein, 1969).

Sheng (1990) and Dutu and Diaconu (2017) stipulate that community participation entails a collaboration between the government and citizens, without which it is difficult to achieve participatory objectives. Both stakeholders have activities and responsibilities which should be valued if positive outcomes are to be achieved. The notion of community participation ought to be perceived as a collaborative endeavor, involving both the government and the community. This collaboration propels the

community's development by jointly identifying their necessities and preferences. Thus, community participation becomes a community-driven process.

The cooperative engagement of citizens with their local government yields benefits for both parties. The benefits which are derived from the participatory process motivate community members and government to meaningfully contribute to the procedure (Waweru, 2015; Jaafar, 2020). The community should be motivated to collaborate with the government in the participatory approach because it perceives that the process will yield positive outcomes for the good of the community. In a similar manner, local government should be invested in the participatory approach because it yields substantive outcomes which relate to its legal obligation of ensuring that goods and services are delivered to the citizens. Moreover, motivation is cultivated by the realization that local government agents are committed to the participatory approach through esteeming community views and incorporating them into the final local government developmental plan.

Motivation without properly organized community leadership structures will not achieve positive participatory outcomes. These community leadership structures are responsible for organizing participatory approaches and they ensure that the community is ready to embrace any positive changes. Bell and Evert (1997) underscore the importance of community leadership in motivating community members to be part of participatory approaches. This role is enhanced by the fact that community leaders and members have common community challenges and shared interests, which brings them to agree on the significance of civic engagement. Therefore, the role of community leaders in promoting community participation should ultimately result in the attainment of positive outcomes that include developing the community and empowering the citizens.

In another view, community participation can be perceived as a management instrument which aims to provide the community power to drive the development process since the community is the one faced with diverging societal ills that the development process, through government agencies, seek to address (Diduck and Mitchell, 2003). Such a management tool is a driver for the achievement of more positive outcomes because developmental interventions address the real needs and

priorities of communities. In cementing this thought, Dutu and Diaconu (2017:5) posit that community participation "provides public managers with the possibility to set a sustainable public agenda and makes decisions that impact favourably upon community, making public administration accountable". If the government and various agents are informed on the real needs of the community, resources will be used efficiently since they will be directed towards the actual problems instead of implementing programs which do not address the needs of communities. Community participation, therefore, is a foundational conceptual pillar of the study since it resonates with the concept of PB which is being investigated at the local community level.

2.2 THE EMERGENCE OF COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNANCE SETTINGS

Community participation has found place in various disciplines including sociology, public policy, planning, and development (Moser, 1989; Croft & Beresford, 1992; Abbot, 1995). In these various disciplines, community participation has been viewed as a tool for enhancing effective democracy. Democracy is founded on the concept of democratic participation which gives citizens a voice through making decisions which impact their wellbeing (Rothschild & Russel, 1986; Warren, 2009 Westheimer & Kahne, 2004; Withanachchi, 2011). Democracy is a term which originates from the Grecians, established in the 5th century and viewed as a type which informs the notion of modern democracy (Janda *et al.*, 1995). It is derived from the term "demokratia". Broken down, the term, "demos" means "common people" and "kratia" means "rule". The term Democracy is taken from the Greek word, "*demokratia*", i.e., "*demos*" meaning "common people" and "*kratia*" meaning "rule" (Joyce, 2006:16).

What is clear from the above definition is that democracy is a system of governance which gives pre-eminence to the citizens through giving them power to control the government. This concept has spread throughout the world, except in some few monarchist groups and some political ideologies which include some form of support of democracy (Diamond, 2008). Various mechanisms have been devised to enable citizens to exert control over governments.

Mandaza and Sachikonye (1991) regard democracy as an essential component for driving and promoting citizen participation in national and local government activities. Democracy is primarily premised on the conception of mutual respect, upholding of human rights, and personal freedoms. This implies that those whose lives would be affected by certain government decisions and programs should participate in the formulation and implementation thereof. It provides a platform for citizens to participate equitably, whether through direct or indirect means, in the formulation of policies that govern them. Such a platform should be cognisant of the social, economic, and cultural conditions that promote social equity and equality. Joyce (2006) states that democracy is a concept which gives political power to the people who reside within a given place. In other words, the people are sovereign, and are in control.

Democracy has manifested in various theoretical and practical forms, differing in their degree of representation and citizen freedoms. Representative democracy, prevalent in both developed and developing nations, empowers elected officials to make decisions on behalf of the public (OECD, 2001; Gaventa, 2004). It involves having citizens select political appointees who will represent them in the governance process. Representative democracy facilitates citizen participation through electing government officials who make decisions on behalf of the public. These elected officials have a mandate to ensure that they represent the interests and priorities of the citizenry, though they possess the liberty to employ their judgment in advancing these interests (Turner *et al.*, 1996; Janda *et al.*, 2006).

Representative democracy has various forms of participation which include, parliamentary system, presidential system and constitutional democracy. Parliamentary system works through having representatives appoint the government, unlike the presidential system which entails the president being the head of state and government chosen through an electoral process by the citizens (Joyce, 2006). Constitutional democracy subjects the elected official's authority to be constrained by the rule of law, which serves as a safeguard against the unjust exercise of power by those in the public office.

The model of representative democracy has been advocated on the ground that citizens are usually not acquainted with the subject of discussion, are occupied with

other things, and are usually uninterested in being directly engaged in governance issues (Pierce *et al.*, 1992; Overdevest, 2000). Embedded in this argument is that, due to citizens' insufficient expertise, knowledge, comprehension of various complex issues, and time they need to have expert and willing representatives to represent their interests (Pierce *et al.*, 1992) is paramount. This type of representation entails having interest groups with expertise on given disciplines to represent the citizens.

Debate rages over the legitimacy and representativeness of representative democracy (Ribbot, 2002a Bollens, 2000; Gaventa, 2004). Bollens (2000) argues that, if taken to extremes, the concept of citizen consultation and engagement distorts the notion of representative democracy because accountability is only applicable in representative democracy not participatory democracy. These arguments have been critiqued on the basis that, if representative democracy included more active citizen participation, better decisions and service delivery will be achieved.

Envisaged in the above is that more citizen participation will improve the decisions made by representatives, thus, adding value to the locality and even enable representatives to gain more support for re-election. Therefore, active citizen participation and engagement are necessary components of democracy, taking note of the realization that elected representatives will not always have the same perspectives with the electorate, hence, the necessity of systematic citizen participation. Moreover, Gaventa (2004) notes that participation is essential in that it promotes local democracy and instils a sense of trust in local institutions.

Active citizen participation can also be termed direct democracy. Direct democracy is a political arrangement which empowers citizens to directly engage in the process of making decisions, instead of depending on elected officials to make decisions on their behalf. In this type of democracy, each citizen has the right to attend district meetings and make contributions. The referendum is a system used under direct democracy, which gives the public an opportunity to vote on specific issues. The process gives the public a chance to make contributions on proposed public policy, to approve or disapprove the proposed course of action (Turner *et al.*, 1996; Joyce, 2012).

Some critique against representative democracy but their views have been challenged by scholars such as Cabbanes (2004) who argue that both types of participatory democracy, be it direct or indirect, have a touch of representative democracy. This is because the local government budget is often approved by the municipal or council authorities although it would have been prepared in a participatory manner. Therefore, both representative and direct democracy are important aspects of modern democracy.

The need to further the concept of democracy was reiterated by the United States of America President Harry S. Truman during his 1949 inauguration. Truman (1949 in Cornwall, 2006) accentuated the need for community participation as a strategy of fostering democracy and empowering the citizens. Evidently, the Western notion of democracy cannot be separated from the concept of community participation as it seeks to bring forth equity, inclusion and empowerment of the citizens in giving a voice to the voiceless. Although Truman (1949) has outlined the Western vision on democracy and participation, it was only after the amendment of the 1966 Act which provided for the involvement of beneficiaries of projects in the formulation and implementation stages (Pateman, 1970; Cornwall, 2006). The World Employment Conference Community participation of 1976 and the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of 1969 and 1975 both reiterated the importance and need for governments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to include and promote popular citizen participation in the forecasting, formulation, and execution of pubc schemes (Cornwall, 2006). Cornwall (2006) avered that the resolutions of the UN ECOSOC of 1969 laid a foundation for the 1970s views on participation as it alluded to the realization that voluntary democratic involvement of citizens is crucial for the achievement of effective participation. Voluntary democratic involvement of citizens relates to role they play in the project cycle of projects, which they are meant to benefit from (Midgley *et al.*, 1986). The International Labour Organisation (ILO) paper of 1978 (Cornwall, 2006) underscored the importance of participation. During this period, concepts such as ‘community participation’, ‘citizen participation’, ‘stakeholder participation’, and ‘popular participation’ stirred intense scholarly debate (Cornwall, 2006).

The notion of community engagement in the African context holds a long-standing history which emanates from the concept of *uBuntu*. In their attempt to describe what *Ubuntu* is, various authors note that it refers to the recognition of the humanness of others in society. Khoza (2005:269) views *Ubuntu* as "an African value system that means humanness or being human, a worldview characterised by such values as caring, sharing, compassion, communalism, communocracy and related predispositions". This definition of *uBuntu* places the concept of *uBuntu* in the realm of the human centred approach that places value in the individuals in the society.

In conceptualizing *uBuntu*, Samkange and Samkange (1980) in Mugumbate and Nyanguru (2013) notes that '*uBuntu'* refers to the establishment of mutual relationships built on respect, preservation of life and the realisation of the supremacy of the will of the people in the community. These characteristics of *uBuntu* reinforce the notion of democracy as they perceive the community as the key decision maker in community issues. It is a web of interconnected human relations which gives meaning and purpose to the African way of life, characterized by participation and aimed at the general good of the community.

Letseka (2000) and Diop (1990) view *uBuntu* as a philosophy which directs the African way of life and is historical and embedded in their experiences. Letseka (2000) further notes that the concept of *uBuntu* is about the historical African humanness of communalism, and the interdependence of people and communities. In a similar manner Mabovula (2011) points that *uBuntu* is deeply rooted in the African collectivism which furthers a kinship type of social order. In other words, *uBuntu* is a concept which cements communal relations and African systems, values humanity, and places importance on an individual's welfare as intricately intertwined with the community's welfare. This explains the common utterance "I am because we are". These definitions of *uBuntu* point to the importance of community in the African life. Reiterating the above sentiments, Mabovula (2011) avers that it is the duty of every individual in the community to ensure the welfare of others. As such, their actions should be directed towards achieving the common community good. The *uBuntu* philosophy upholds a human centred approach which incorporates participation, cooperation and interconnectedness of various stakeholders in the community. It is a concept

embedded in democracy, which values humanity through opening channels for citizen participation in the governance process.

In investigating the link between *uBuntu* and democracy, Samkange and Samkange (1980) posit *uBuntu* as a deeply rooted practice in the African political philosophy, which places the community at a position of power over the King because the King's status is owed to the will of the people. Such a proposition illustrates the connectedness of democracy and community participation.

Further impetus to the scholarly discourse came in the early 1990s when the World Bank (WB) rigorously championed the need to incorporate popular citizen participation globally. The WB argued that the disadvantaged in society should be given an opportunity to voice their concerns and be part of their governance processes (McGee, 2000 in Cornwall, 2006). In its various studies, the WB drew the conclusion that community-driven projects that make provision for participation during the planning, formulation, implementation, and evaluative processes, are likely to succeed. Communities should take ownership of such projects and regard them as legitimate government initiatives. It is for these and other reasons that the enthusiasm for participation has been redefined in contemporary governance systems (Dongier *et al.*, 2004).

As far as the chronological development of notions of community participation is concerned, Table 2.1 summarises the main drivers.

Table2.1: Development of participatory processes in government

Era	Trends in participatory processes
1950's and 60s: industrialization	The period of rapid industrialization and the increasing impact of technological proficiency, alongside the dominance of scientific understanding. Chambers (1992) suggests that during this time, the prevailing model for the adoption of new practices in agriculture was diffusion. In this context, extension agents primarily engaged in educating farmers and facilitating the dissemination of technological advancements.
1970s: Discontentment of externally imposed driven models, need for substitutes	The need to provide representation to the marginalized especially the impoverished populations (Friere, 1972). Growing emphasis on education, principles of adult education and the expansion of group interactions. Initial emergence of participatory methods in developmental initiatives. Discontent arose due to the lack of success of externally imposed and 'expert'-driven models (Chambers, 1992). The concept of Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) evolved from the foundation of Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA).
1980s: Participation drive	A shift from top-down approaches to bottom-up approaches, embracing the significance of traditionally and locally available knowledge. This period witnessed an influx of civic organizations which sought to find alternative strategies to replace top-down approaches. The focus revolved around engaging rural communities through participatory assessment and analysis. This led to a surge in various participatory techniques, encompassing Participatory Action Research (PAR), along with tools like rich pictures and Venn diagrams.
1990s: The participation overdrive	The participation drive was taken along even in the 1990s where participation signalled sustainable development (Guijt and Shah, 1998:4). As highlighted by Green (1998:71), there is a risk associated with the widespread adoption of participation, as it can sometimes lead to a superficial treatment of complex issues. Funding organizations started to require the implementation of participatory approaches as a prerequisite for receiving funding. This drive for participation led to an abundance of instructional materials and training programs on the subject. Moreover, there

	has been an increasing interest in monitoring and evaluating natural resources, which has prompted communities to engage in these endeavors.
2000s Empowerment, democratic governance, approaches cantered on human rights, and accountability mechanisms.	Current trends of participation places emphasis on empowering individuals and communities, promoting democratic governance, employing rights-based strategies, and establishing accountability measures focuses on empowerment, democratic governance, rights-based approaches, and accountability. Such a focus adds a dimension which seeks to question and perhaps find solutions to the underlying causes of poverty and inefficiency. Democratic governance and rights-based approaches are notions which have gained prominence and seek to enable individuals to gain empowerment, thereby equipping them with the capacity to hold their governments responsible for their conduct (Cornwall, 2006).

Source: Adapted from Kelly (2001) cited in Claridge (2004:17) and Cornwall (2006).

In the 1970s and 80s, the main concern was on giving the poor a voice and that is when the Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) grew, and the top-down approaches were criticized in favour of bottom-up approaches. In the wake of the 1990s, funding institutions began to demand the adoption and implementation of participatory processes, and this became a condition for funding. It is during the 90s that participation became synonymous with good and sustainable governance (Guijt & Shah, 1998). The new millennium ushered in the empowerment, democratic governance, rights-based approach, and accountability dimensions which sought to unravel the underlying causes of poverty and inefficiency in service delivery, and to proffer recommendations to curb these.

2.2.1 Typologies of citizen participation

Typologies and models of citizen participation have been postulated by various authors (Moser, 1989) and these typologies illustrate the level of control and influence citizens have on community activities and projects. Arnstein's participation typology is viewed by the Creative Commons (2012) as a definitive and influential participatory theory, which argues that citizen participation cannot exist in the absence of citizen

power. Of importance to note is that other participation typologies in table 2.2 build on Arnstein's ladder of participation illustrated in figure 2.1.

Figure2.1: Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation



Source: Adapted from Arnstein (1969)

According to this ladder, participation can be "high" or "low" depending on the willingness of a governing authority to engage citizens and to accommodate their views. In most democracies, participation is considered high since democracy advocates the involvement of all citizens in the governing process, whereas in most autocracies, participation is nominal or non-existent.

Table2.2: Typologies of Participation: A continuum

Level of Participation	**Typologies of Participation**			
	Koneya (1978)	Oakley (1986-1989)	U.Nation (1981)	Moser (1983)

HIGH	Problem formulation led by citizens and the action to be taken to address the problem.	Spontaneous participation	Spontaneous participation	Participation as an end
C **O** **N** **T** **I** **N** **U** **U** **M**	Officials formulate the problem and set the limitations but it is the prerogative of the citizens to decide on the action to be taken. Officials formulate the problem, solicit citizen input, then have the final decision. Officials propose a course of action, consult citizens, then make the final decision.	Induced participation (co-optive and manipulative of an activity	Induced Participation	**C** **O** **N** **T** **I** **N** **U** **U** **M**
Low	Announce decision, permit questions "sell" decision to citizen decide, and announces decision through bulletin	Compulsory participation	Coerced participation	Participation as a means

Source: Adapted from Samah and Aref (2011).

The participation typologies in Table 2.2 above generally identify the level of participation by the stages along a continuum from low levels to higher levels of participation. The lowest level denotes lack of participation on the part of the citizens since the government has a tight control over decision-making and the establishment and execution of programs. Insufficient participation to some authors is signalled by mandatory participation (Oakely, 1989), coerced participation (United Nations 1981) and participation as a means (Mosser, 1983). Samah and Aref (2011) note that at the lowest level participation is non-existent, even if citizens are consulted it does not denote power and control over decisions made and programs implemented. In essence, this is a top-down approach in which those in power impose decisions on the populace.

Despite consulting and giving room for questions from the citizens, Goulet (1989) argues that it represents inadequate participation. It is at the highest level of the continuum where citizens gain power and control of their governance and development process. At this level, citizens in liaison with their authorities, define their problems, identify their priorities and interests, and decide on the action to be taken to meet the demands and address and interests of the community. To achieve effective participation and empowerment it is imperative to have cooperation between the citizens and the authorities (Arnstein, 1969; Oakley and Marsden, 1984; Moser, 1989).

Arnstein's (1969 ladder of participation, together with the other participation typologies alluded to in the preceding section, identify various levels of participation which a government uses, informed by the kind of regime. The utmost degree of participation in the continuum gives citizens power and control of their local resources, and the ability to influence financial decisions. Such an outcome illustrates how adopting high level of participation empowers citizens to direct their governance process. The level of participation adopted also directly influences citizens' capacity to demand responsibility from their governments regarding their actions and allocation of resources. Consequently, accountability is strengthened through enhanced citizen participation, which adopts high level of participation on the continuum in the participation typologies.

2.2.2 Accountability

Crook and Sverrisson (2002) highlight that accountability plays a crucial role in enhancing the ability of local government to address the needs of the impoverished population, and in promoting development processes that prioritize the well-being of the poor. If citizens are given power and control of their governance process, they are able to hold those in government accountable. The OECD (2001) posits that citizen participation that allows citizens an opportunity to have access to government financial statements results in accountability. Those in government who act on behalf of the citizens are expected to cater for the welfare of the electorate, and be answerable and responsible for their actions. The importance of accountability lies in that it is key in enhancing the responsiveness of local governments, ensuring that development is pro poor, guaranteeing equitable allocation of resources, and having financial probity in local governments (Crook and Sverrisson, 2002).

Figure2.2: Timeline of accountability



Source: Roberts (2015:44)

Commenting on the above timeline of accountability, Lindberg (2009), figure 2.2 illustrates a contractual relationship between the citizens who happen to be the Principals (P), and the local governments who are the Agents (A), in which case A has been given power and authority to execute a specific mandate as indicated in the first stage of figure 2.2. The second stage of the figure positions 'A' in a state of action and activity where the mandate given to it is being fulfilled. 'A' is expected to be accountable to 'P' for the decisions, actions, and utilisation of resources as illustrated

in the third stage of the figure. ‘P’ requests information from ‘A’ because the nature of local governments and public officials locates them as custodians of public resources who are supposed to ensure the prudent utilization of public resources, and be accountable. However, Lindberg (2009) argues that it is not always true that those who are affected by decisions are always the ones with the right to hold the government accountable. Rather at times, it is the government, in the form of ministers, holding bureaucrats accountable.

The fourth stage in the timeline of accountability places ‘A’ in the position of adhering to the information request made by ‘P’ or not. The failure of ‘A’ to justify their actions and provide the requested information results in ‘P’ sanctioning ‘A’ as illustrated in the fifth stage. However, in their analysis of accountability, Smulovitz and Peruzzoti (2000) do not include the authority of ‘P’ to impose sanctions on ‘A’. In response to this exclusion of the right to sanction ‘A’, Lindberg (2009) argues that this leaves the government at liberty to do as they please since they are not deterred by anything to explain and justify their actions. In a similar manner, Ayee (2005) notes that the absence of a deterrent against negative actions of ‘A’ results in the reversal of roles, resulting in citizens ending up serving the state which is supposed to serve and further their interests. Zvoushe (2019) notes that this situation aligns with the principles of public choice theory, which depicts state officials as individuals who engage in rent-seeking behavior. They prioritize their own interests over the public good. Furthermore, this exclusion of sanctions waters down the concept of accountability because government officials are left to determine the extent to which they feel comfortable to hold each other accountable.

In further analysing the right to sanction, Lindberg (2009) seems to be stresses that the authority to sanction is restricted to the failure to avail the required information and justify action, not necessarily to the effects of their actions and decisions. The sanctioning ‘A’ for the contents of their decisions and actions is not at the core of accountability, though it would add more value to the concept of accountability if it had been strictly incorporated. To illustrate this, an example can be drawn from the Auditor General’s office (AG) in Zimbabwe. The AG acts on behalf of the public to ensure that accountability is upheld through auditing all government institutions. The AG becomes the principal in his or her relationship with the rest of the government institutions under

her jurisdiction in terms of auditing. The AG office in Zimbabwe has been described as a 'toothless bulldog' because the office does not have sanctioning powers (Zhou, 2012). The role of the AG is limited to only exposing the wrongs to the public. Although parliament is vested with some sanctioning powers, most of the times, these are only on paper as the offenders are not taken to book and corruption is perpetuated.

Several criticisms have been labelled against the agent principal theory. It has been argued that the principal has the power to replace the agent if unhappy about the service provided, whereas the agent does not have such power (Perrow, 1986). However, this argument's practicality is questionable because, as highlighted above the state can utilize state machinery to coerce citizens to support them and retain power. It is therefore, not entirely true to say the citizens have the power to remove the public officials whenever they are dissatisfied with their conduct and service provision. Sobol (2016) notes that, at times, principals make unattainable demands and expectations on the agents. At times citizens' demands are unattainable, especially in developing countries where their revenue bases are dwindling due to high rates of unemployment, tax evasion, tax avoidance, and smuggling. Such revenue leakages place a burden on the shoulders of the agent, and result in failure to achieve the goals and demands of the principals.

2.3 THEORETICAL AND META-THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES TO COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

Accountability, as has been indicated earlier, cannot be separated from the concept of democracy since it is democracy which gives citizens the power to hold local governments accountable. Therefore, the concept of democracy is premised on active engagement of citizens in the governance process, a principle which has gained prominence in both developed and developing countries (Mandaza & Sachikonye, 1991; Schweizer, 1995; Withanachchi, 2011). This concept is closely knit with the concept of community participation. Participation of the community at a grassroots level strengthens the efficacy of local democracy, by involving residents directly in making decisions and formulating plans within their localites. It calls for collaboration and cooperation between these institutions (citizens and local government institutions) which are visible at the local level. Local democracy facilitates citizen participation in

their local governance process, which includes making financial decisions pertaining to their local interests and priorities. Uphoff (2000:215-220) postulates that citizen engagement in the governance process could be approached through “decision-making, implementation, benefit and evaluation”. What this means is that citizens are engaged in making decisions and ensuring the execution of programs which pertain to their locality, and they expect to reap benefits from these programs. Issues of accountability are also envisaged here, as citizens will then hold the local officials accountable through the evaluation process.

Having highlighted the interconnection between democracy and community participation, it is crucial to explore the theories and the philosophical dimensions of community participation. Theories are attempts, not only to predict or describe reality, but also to interpret and explain why things happen in the manner in which they occur (Botha, 1990; Bhattacherjee, 2012). Van der Waldt (2010) underscores the importance of theories in scholarly inquiries and notes that in their absence, it is impossible to examine and understand given paradigms and phenomena. Moreover, Van der Waldt (2010) upholds the sentiments of Glaser and Strauss (1967), who see theory as guiding research, explaining, and even predicting behavior. Therefore, theories are crucial in enabling researchers to gain a deeper understanding of reality.

Theories also guide researchers to centre on relevant aspects and provide reasonable explanations for the research findings (Bourne & Russo, 1998). Having led the researcher to focus on relevant factors, theories should ensure that the relevant questions to be answered by the study are asked and become the mirror through which research findings will be analyzed. In essence, theories are important in that they enable the researcher to concentrate on pertinent issues and questions, and to make testable predictions about observable behaviour.

2.3.1 Systems Theory

The systems theory provides a macro theoretical perspective to illustrate the interaction between councils and stakeholders. The systems theory was chosen to be the macro theory guiding this research. Van der Waldt (2010) notes that, in local democracy, it fosters a relationship between the stakeholders concerned and the

environment. In this relationship, values, priorities, interests are shared and communicated by the members of the system concerned. The systems theory is the guiding theory in the study because it fosters and promotes interaction and engagement between the citizens and the local council. Participatory theory, citizenship theory and theory of change is deployed in this study on a micro theoretical perspective within the macro systems theory. These theories resonate with the systems theory's overarching theme of participation and relationships between stakeholder and councils. These theories will be discussed in detail in this section and their relationship with the systems theory depicted.

Applications of systems theory in social sciences can be traced back to David Easton, who sought to understand and explain public management from the perspective of systems (Anyebe, 2018). Vaughan-Game (1987) notes that systems theory is premised on the understanding that, political systems are open and adaptive in nature, and the analysis' locus is on inputs, outputs, and feedback. What is evident from the above is that this theory is premised on the perspective that political systems are participatory and adaptive as they interact with their environment.

Figure2.3: Systems Theory



Source: Easton (1981)

According to the systems model as indicated in figure 2.4, open political systems are interactive and receive inputs from their environments. The environment constitutes the entire community, the economic, social and biological phenomena. The environment, in essence, denotes all other components of society which are not the

political system (Easton 1965). As illustrated in figure 2.4 above, the political structure receives inputs from the citizens in the form of support and demands, which are processed and converted into outputs in the form of decisions and policies. Inputs from the environment are the values, priorities, needs and interests of the society, which they demand from the political system, whereas outputs are policy outcomes actioned upon the inputs from the environment. These may be in the form of policies and authoritative decisions that allocate resources to further the values, priorities and needs of the society.

The ‘outputs’ are reintroduced to the environment through a ‘feedback’ mechanism, leading to new ‘inputs.’ As such, it constitutes a cyclic process. The systems theory promotes open dialogue between citizens and the government, empowering citizens to question government decisions and voice objections to policies or programs that do not align with community needs and priorities. It enables a pathway for transformative change, allowing environmental factors to trigger demands for the implementation of specific projects and policies, leading to a transformation of the current status quo. As a result, the systems theory is intricately woven into the study’s theory of change. The study leverages the systems theory as a broader theoretical foundation, connecting it to the idea of participatory budgeting (PB), which emphasizes a symbiotic relationship between citizens and local governments in their respective communities.

According to Anyebe (2018) the theory has, however, been criticised for being general and abstract in nature Moreover, the theory is limited in that it does not give clarity on the procedures and processes which take place in the black box where authoritative decisions are made (Anyebe, 2018). Despite these shortcomings that have been labelled, the theory maintains its significance in the context of the study as it aids in comprehending how the inputs from the environment affect and influence the policy outcomes (Anderson, 1997). The researcher will get to understand how the policy outcomes affect the environment. In the context of the study in question, the theory enables the researcher to understand how citizen participation in PB influences PB policy outcomes, and how these outcomes alter the lives of the citizens.

Within the macro systems theory, is the micro participation theory that was utilized to analyze the nature and potential contributions of PB in local budgetary decisions in the

Mangwe district. According to Holcombe (1995), the importance of participation is deeply rooted in the realization that the world's poor have been excluded in formulating and implementing development decisions that are supposed to benefit them. Participatory Theory (PT) therefore, permits the involvement of people at the grassroots in formulating decisions with regards to the development process without being dominated by the government (Rahim, 1994). Moreover, the theory suggests that local communities should be drivers and subjects to their development process as they are allowed to define their priorities. The theory follows a people centred approach at a normative level and is the driving hypothesis in PB.

Figure2.4: Generic logic of participation

Source: Adapted from Jones *et al.* (2013)

Figure 2.4 above demonstrates the envisaged arguments for adopting a participatory approach in governance. Allowing citizens to participate in their governance as shown above has been applauded as a means to foster programme ownership, efficiency, effectiveness of public programmes, improved quality and quantity of service provision, among other supposed positive outcomes. Participatory theory is used in the study to determine whether there is a causal relationship between achieving or failure to achieve positive PB outcomes, and the level of community participation.

The notion of participation is principal to the idea of citizenship. According to the UK 's Department for International Development , DFID (2010), a citizen is an individual who has rights and responsibilities, and as such, is entitled to exercising their rights through participating in the socio-economic and political domains of life. In

participating, a citizen has the right to hold public servants accountable (Jones and Gaventa, 2002) and expect efficiency in service provision. Citizenship theory thus, holds value since it empowers citizens to hold public officials accountable, thereby promoting efficiency and effectiveness in the operations of the local government.

2.3.2 Citizenship Theory

The theory of citizenship dates to Marshall 1950, and has been modified by various authors like Mann, Hegel, Zamudio and Turner (Turner, 1990). According to Marshall (1950), citizenship denotes a complete inclusion in a community and comprising of civil, political and societal rights. Having acknowledged the work of Marshall (1950), Zamudio (2004) adds three dimensions which are, status, exercise, and conscience. Status refers to the rights and responsibilities of individuals and states, whereas citizenship exercise is concerned with the presence of appropriate conditions to achieve citizenship rights. The persuasion and acknowledgement of being a citizen is referred to as citizenship conscience. To get to the conscience dimension, it is the duty of the government to make sure that both the entitlements or rights and the prerequisites for exercising those rights are provided and established. Heywood (1994) underscores the importance of a mutual relationship between the state and citizens, noting that “citizenship represents a relationship between the individual and the state, in which the two are bound together by reciprocal rights and obligations” (Heywood, 1994:155).

Citizenship theory is premised on the realization that it is the right of every citizen to participate in all spheres of life, and to hold the governments accountable. Exercising the rights alluded earlier enhances accountability in the utilization of public resources by governments (Forester, 1999). The role of the public servants, in this case, is a very important one of serving citizens who, through taxes, pay for those services. Mann (1987) notes that citizenship can be viewed in two categories which are: active citizenship and passive citizenship. Active citizenship relates to the bottom-up approach of governance, whereas passive approach relates to the top-down approach. However, the type of citizenship which allows citizens to exercise their rights is the active one.

The importance of holding governments accountable has been discussed above, but this can only be done by citizens who have been educated in that regard. Zamudio (2004) and Karatzimas (2020) note that the state should execute its mandate of educating citizens about their rights for them to be able to actively participate in the governance process and develop citizenship conscience. If citizens are not treated as citizens by state agents and authorities, it becomes impossible for them to develop a citizenship conscience and to exercise their rights in making demands (inputs) to the state. Figure 2.5 below depicts the relationship between educating citizens on their rights and effective citizenship. Educating citizens on their duties and rights is an empowerment tool that reduces inequality in the community and gives the powerless and poor skills and knowledge of effective citizenship. Of importance is the existence of the political from the local government to provide appropriate conditions for education to occur. If there are appropriate conditions, education on citizen rights will take place and result in effective citizenship.

Figure2.5: Local government's education of citizens and its link on effective citizenship



Source: Researcher's own

The advent of the New Public Management (NPM) paradigm has seen an agitation by citizens to directly participate and hold governments accountable (Hughes, 2003)). Roberts (2015) posits that active citizen participation would lead to fiscal transparency and accountability and limit corruption and inefficiency. The concept of citizenship is central in local governance and decentralization, as it seeks to afford citizens an

opportunity to hold their governments accountable through being actively involved in fiscal decision making and scrutinizing their decisions and actions (Shafir, 1998).

Public servants, who are also citizens, are very key in the making of fiscal decisions, hence, the need to scrutinize their decisions. According to Stivers (1998), public servants should consider the views and desires of the populace. Due to the realization that these public servants influence fiscal decisions, it is crucial to evaluate the degree to which they facilitate the occurrence of citizen participation or hinder it. Citizenship theory is relevant and key in examining the role played by public servants in enhancing the citizenship status of the other citizens.

Citizen participation has been viewed by MDP-ESA (2007) as a process which influences the attainment of positive PB outcomes. Citizenship theory is key to providing an understanding of the relationship between citizen participation and the attainment of positive PB outcomes. Moreover, the theory gives insights on the attitudes and behaviors of public servants in the conduct of public affairs. The theory helps to answer questions relating to the extent to which public servants promote citizen participation and are accountable in the utilization of public resources (Stivers, 1998). Mulindwa (2013) used citizenship theory in a case study of Uganda where the process and outcomes of PB were interrogated in a decentralised local government. This study uses what has been deployed by others to understand issues related to the study in question.

2.3.3 Theory of Change

Stein and Valters (2012) state that the Theory of Change (ToC) originated in the 1990s within the United States America as a tool to evaluate community initiatives. Since the 1990s, ToC has expanded its scope to focus on how change comes by, and why it is important to change the status quo. ToC comprehensively describes and explains the reason for change and the expected outcomes of a change intervention (Stein & Valters, 2012). Implied here is that ToC is concerned with the activities which occur during the change process and the outcomes of the change process. In essence, ToC operates within the realm of the logic model which utilizes the ‘if’ statements which refer to the cause-and-effect relationship (Rogers, 2014). The ToC theory is relevant

to this study because PB is a change intervention strategy aimed at achieving specific outcomes. ToC, as illustrated in Figure 2.6, resonates with the systems theory in that, for the change process to occur, there should be some interaction of different systems, which brings inputs to the process and results in the evaluation of the process through outcomes and impact.

Figure 2.6: Theory of change presented in a results chain



Source: Adapted from Rodgers (2014:110)

The study focuses on a change intervention where PB was adopted in place of traditional budgeting to ensure citizen participation in Mangwe district. The theory's pertinence to the study lies in that it offers a guideline and a framework which can be followed in evaluating the change intervention. The study can unearth the benefits and failures of changing from the traditional budget process to participatory budgeting, hence the relevance of the theory of change. It is triangulated with Easton's systems theory and citizenship theory which are the anchors of the study in question.

2.4 CONCEPTUALISING AND CONTEXTUALISING PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING

The theoretical perspectives discussed in the preceding section illustrate the importance of community participation as it drives the interaction between the community, council, and other stakeholders on financial matters. Unlike in traditional budgeting which excluded the community from influencing the budget, PB favours the involvement of the community in making financial decisions. Community participation in financial matters, specifically the budget, has been discussed by various authors (Miller & Evers, 2002; Herian, 2011). All the authors who have examined this concur that citizen participation in the budget process brings benefits (Stivers, 1990). What has been of interest among the scholars is to determine the extent to which citizen participation enhances local government service delivery to the satisfaction of citizens. It has been argued that the involvement of citizens should, not only be limited to

enhancing service delivery, but also viewed as a means of educating citizens on their civil rights (Stivers, 1990) and responsibilities, so that their capabilities, that Sen (1995) advocates, are enhanced.

The Porto Alegre PB experiences made Anderson (1995) and Mulindwa (2013) observe that democracy, stakeholder participation, accountability and transparency are the building blocks of the concept of PB. PB's emergence can be traced back to Porto Alegre in Brazil, when it was a means of redistributing wealth, addressing social inequalities and corruption, and giving the voice to the voiceless in the community through being involved in the formulation, implementation, and monitoring of financial decisions (Frenkiel & MDP-ESA, 2007; Masiya, 2009; Rumbul *et al.*, 2018; Lama-Rewal, 2019). This democratic budgetary innovation spread globally as witnessed by its adoption in the Latin America, Europe, Asia, and also Africa (Masiya, 2009; Sintomer, Herzberg and Allegretti, 2013). The leading role played by the World Bank (WB) in ensuring that almost all developing countries adopt PB as a catalyst for financial reforms, has been pivotal. PB was primarily advocated by the WB because conventional budgeting was viewed as a contributor to social exclusion among third world citizens (Frienkel & MDP-ESA, 2007). Proponents of PB argue that it generally enables citizens to address the priority concerns of their communities through being actively involved in fiscal decision making (Social Development Team, 2006, Sterling, Grunfelder & Borges, 2006). In a similar manner, MDP-ESA (2007) argues that the adoption of PB practices usually results in reduced corruption, increased public ownership of projects, deepened local democracy, empowered citizens, improved service delivery, and increased transparency and accountability.

PB is a process which incorporate all stakeholders in the budget process concerned in the development, gaining approval for, execution and assessment of the budget (Shah, 2007). What this means is that PB is not an event, but an open continuous process with various stages citizens plays a crucial role in, leading to their development process. The PB process has been conceptualized by MDP-ESA (2008) in Table 2.3.

Table 2.3: The characteristics of the PB process

• the discussion of financial or budgetary issues are at the centre of the process, explicitly dealing with the allocation of limited resources.
• a continuous process accompanied by meetings on the mobilization and allocation of resources.
• the inclusion of all citizens directly or indirectly in the formulation and implementation of the annual budget.
• the prioritization of demands in a manner that supports the poor, including the needs of the socially marginalized groups; that is, to facilitate a fairer distribution of resources.
• defining and developing a shared understanding of the rules that apply to participatory budgeting.
• the participatory process is often based on territorial and thematic divisions, and requires solid communication and information mechanisms to ensure transparent decision-making and outputs

Source: MDP-ESA (2008:3)

The above conceptualization of the PB process distinguishes it from traditional budgeting which is dominated by the council led by the finance director, whereas in PB citizens participate in the identification of their needs, implementation, and evaluation process (MDP-ESA, 2008; Masiya, 2009). There is collaboration between the citizens, local government officials, civil society, and the private sector, which enhances transparency, accountability, and equitable financial policies (MSP-ESA, 2008). 8

The history of PB worldwide has resulted in extensive empirical evidence of the benefits related to it. Cabannes (2004) notes that PB has led to lower episodes of tax evasion and increased tax compliance among citizens. When citizens perceive that their interests and priorities are being addressed and they are aware of how resources are being spent, they are more likely to be tax compliant and avoid evasion. Empirical evidence also shows how PB increases efficiency in the day-to-day operations of local governments as the allocation of resources will be service and goods-specific, thereby increasing fiscal discipline while reducing corruption (Schneider and Goldfrank, 2002;

Zamboni, 2007). The quality of goods and services are improved and investments that cater for the needs of the poor adopted (Baiocchi*/.*, 2005; World Bank, 2008; Cabannes, 2015). PB has also resulted in the transformation of local government institutions, which are now responsive to the needs of the citizenry creating citizen trust of the local institutions (Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Keele, 2007; Tampubolon, 2010; Larson, 2018) that in turn, results in the smooth implementation road of budget decisions (Cabannes, 2004).

These findings illustrate the positive benefits of implementing PB in local governments and give reasons as to why the world at large has been rallying behind it. Gudic (2016) posits that PB excites different people for different reasons. To substantiate Gudic's claims, Wampler (2007) argues that, for a politician, when implementing PB, what is more important is winning the next election. PB can be used to reach the most excluded citizens in society, thereby enabling the politician to gain support for re-election. However, for the policy maker, what is more important is to achieve a smarter and effective way of allocating resources and achieving the intended policy goals and objectives efficiently. Gudic (2016) notes that citizens' reasons for participating in PB vary with individuals but can be generalized. To some, participating in PB is the first opportunity they have been given to speak publicly and influence government decisions resulting in tangible change. Ordinary citizens benefit from PB since they get to learn and understand the domain of public policy formulation and also get to have access to public information which in the past has always been the preserve of the few elites.

Unlike traditional budgeting, where the ruling class made decisions for the citizens, proponents of PB argue that PB generally enables citizens to address the priority concerns of their communities through active involvement in fiscal decision making (Social Development Team, 2006; Sterling, Grunfelder & Borges, 2006). It is for this reason that PB has been referred to as the school of citizenship because it upholds the rights of citizens, enables citizens to learn and understand their civil rights, and fosters their participation in fiscal decision making (Shah, 2007; Masiya, 2009). The ability of citizens to participate in the political processes encourages them to be more confident and open to challenge the status quo and to effect change. This also enhances their ability to hold their local governments accountable. Figure 2.7 below

illustrates the relationship between the citizens and the local government in the budgetary process, and how this enables the citizens to hold the local government accountable.

Figure 2.7 illustrates how citizen participation in the budgetary process strengthens the relationship between the agent and the principal, which ultimately leads to being able to define their preferences. Closing the gap between the agent and the principal is crucial as it enables the two to emerge with a powerful coalition (Stansbury, 2004) that enables the locality to be productive and grow. Having citizens driving the budgetary process and being able to monitor and control the local government as illustrated in figure 2.2, promotes an effective, efficient, and responsive local government answerable to its citizens (Mikesell, 2007). Corruption and misuse of resources is curtailed because beneficiaries of the development intervention are involved in both the planning and control phases of the budgetary process.

Figure 2.7: Conceptual framework for Participatory Budgeting



Source: Adapted from Kim and Schachter (2013:466)

In most instances when discussing the principal agent theory, public officials and other stakeholders hold the badge of being agents. When dealing with government budgeting, citizens take pre-eminence and the principal and government officials become agents as illustrated in figure 2.7 (Kim and Schachter, 2013). The introduction of PB seems to have been hailed as a tool of giving citizens a mechanism for monitoring and controlling their agents, and for holding them accountable on the

utilization of public resources. The adoption of PB in many countries has enabled the agents to perform in accordance with the interests of the principal who is now at the forefront of addressing her preferences. This has narrowed the gap between the citizens and the government officials as citizens are now able to have access to financial information on their local government, and also to define their preferences and interests (Callahan, 2002; Ebdon, 2002; Irvin & Stansbury, 2004).

Since the agent-principal relationship is established through a contractual arrangement, it is essential to define the responsibilities and rights of agents. This serves as a framework that directs agent behaviour in alignment with the goals of the principal (Ayee, 2005; Gauld, 2007). The principal-agent theory illustrates a dynamic where an agent represents the interests of a principal in a specific realm of decision-making (Ross, 1973). This concept operates on the presumption that a formal contract empowers the agent to make choices and take actions on behalf of the principal (Kassim & Menon, 2003; Gauld, 2007). It is vital to emphasize that the theory proposes that all actions undertaken by the agent are intended for the principal's advantage and well-being.

Gauld (2007) argues that, prior to entering a contractual arrangement with agents, it is essential for the principal to carefully choose the most suitable candidate for the position. However, it is not feasible to gain a deeper knowledge and understanding of candidates at such a short time (Aye, 2005). It therefore, means that there is possibility of selecting someone who will not be able to effectively pursue the objectives and goals of the principal. In the political sphere, this could be taken to refer to the voting process where the citizens select the candidates whom they perceive will pursue their interests. This is difficult to achieve because the campaign period is very short and the use of propaganda clouds the judgements of the citizens. In most instances, instead of promoting the interests of the electorate, the voted individual pursues the achievement of his or her goals. Furthermore, the theory views agents in a negative light as they are perceived as “opportunistic and disloyal” (Sobol, 2016:335) individuals who prioritize their personal gains while disregarding the interests of the principal. It is for this reason that the theory suggests that the principal should have mechanisms to monitor the agent’s behaviour and performance.

Zvoushe (2019) notes that it is, not only the agent who is driven by selfish interests, but also the principal as well and as such conflict is inevitable. Such conflict emanates from having agents pursuing their self-interests instead of the furthering the interests of the principal. In the government sector, this has led to the misrepresentation and swindling of funds from the intended use to further the interests of the agent, resulting in an inability to achieve desired policy aims and objectives (Howlett *et al.*, 2009; Ayee, 2005). This scenario has resulted in the adoption of various mechanisms and institutional reforms to curtail the negative behavior of the agents and promote the achievement of the given policy goals (Sobol, 2016).

2.4.1 Integrated Framework for Participatory Budgeting

The integrated framework shown in figure 2.8 was adapted from Mulindwa (2013). Mulindwa developed this framework in his study as he triangulated the institutional and citizenship theories.

Figure 2.8: Integrated theoretical framework for participation



Source: Adapted from Mulindwa (2013:67)

As indicated earlier, the study utilizes the systems theory which captures participatory theory, citizenship theory, and theory of change. These theories are triangulated in order to have a holistic understanding of the PB process. From a macro perspective the framework illustrates how environmental pressures emanating from the civil society and donor countries have influenced the adoption of the NPM reforms (Mulindwa, 2013). Embedded in the NPM reforms is the decentralization policy which Zimbabwe, like other developing and developed countries, has embraced. The decentralization policy in Zimbabwe ushered in the PB method of budgeting which seeks to enhance democracy, accountability, transparency, and efficient and effective service delivery at a local level. All these reforms reflect a change in the status quo and the adoption of new concepts and methodologies expected to produce positive outcomes. In the same framework, the notion of community participation is illustrated

though the interactions of the council and stakeholders, as well as the environment. Furthermore, the framework broadens the concept of participation through citizenship. Citizenship presents citizens with a responsibility of exercising their social, civil, and political rights. Exercising these rights entails participation in the various spheres of governance, including financial matters and having the capacity to ensure that public officials are answerable for how they use public resources.

The framework emphasizes that, for citizens to engage in the process of Participatory Budgeting (PB), it is the responsibility of the government to establish a favourable setting and implement suitable mechanisms that enable citizens to take part in the PB process. PB outcomes are measured against the level of participation of citizens and their ability to influence budget decisions and accountability.

2.5 THEORETICAL AND META-THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES TO PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING

The participatory discourse as illustrated in table 2.1came to influence the decision-making processes in various policy arenas. Bherer (2016:225) maintains that the participatory discourse came into light due to the “strong critiques of representative and liberal democracy”. These participatory processes were advocated as a tool of fostering citizen involvement in various processes which entail making decisions including the political arena and thus, hold the public officials accountable for their decisions and actions. Moreover, participatory processes were adopted as tools for empowering citizens (Fung & Wright, 2003) and promoting good governance (Tendler, 1998) through having responsive and transparent government in public financial matters (Bherer, 2016).

Bherer and Breux (2012) in Bherer (2016) hold that participatory budgeting over the years has marked the genesis of many participatory related practices. These participatory practices are related to the bottom-up approach which gave birth to practices such as ‘participatory planning, public consultation, neighbourhood councils, citizen councils and PB’ (Bherer 2016:225). Scientific inquiry regarding PB involves effectively locating it within a theoretical custom whose origins can be traced back. The rationale for the implementation of PB has been discussed above, and the

theoretical assumptions which paved way for its adoption are discussed here. Public choice theory, deliberative democracy, and capability approach are analyzed in the following sections.

2.5.1 Public Choice Theory

Black (1948), Buchanan (1949) and Arrow (1950) have their names linked to the genesis of public choice theory. Assumed in the public choice theory is that government officials, like the private sector, are rational beings who seek to maximize their self-interests (Zvoushe, 2019). Such an assumption is in sync with the perception of the principal-agent theory that the agents as self-seeking needing to be monitored by the principal.

The government's intervention in the economy has been justified on the grounds to correct market failures since the market is unable to allocate resources equitably due to its self-seeking interests. However, from the public choice theory's perspective, the government is also affected by the same rent seeking interests which are rampant in the private sector. Public choice theorists perceive voters, public officials, private sector, and leaders as self-seeking people who are motivated by selfish interests at the expense of the general public (Downs, 1967; Niskanen, 1973).

According to Zvoushe (2019), these political leaders, more often, pursue their interests in the policy making arena, with the aim of amassing as much wealth as possible as well as gaining political power and votes for the next election. Such a view is divorced from the notion of public interests and societal welfare, as political leaders are only interested in personal gain and development. In examining the behaviour of public office bearers, Walsh (1995) is of the view that they are driven by the need to win the next election rather than long term societal benefits. Moreover, competition for national resources is the driving force behind the rent seeking behaviour of public leaders. The urge to benefit more from the national resources results in the formation of clusters based on the interests of the rent seeking individuals. Turner and Hulme (1997) and Ayee (2005) argue that clusters formed wage competition with other groups over public resources, power to control and determine the allocation of these resources, with the aim of attaining more benefits for themselves instead of the public good.

The political economic theorists also concur with the assumptions of the public choice theorists as they argue that state fiscal policies, budgets, taxes, borrowings are not always motivated by public interest. The budgetary allocations are not always fair allocations and may reflect interests of the dominant classes. Such observations call for a citizen-oriented approach, which would allow citizens to be directly involved in fiscal decision-making process so that these decisions reflect their interests.

The arguments by the public choice theorists question the government's ability to make collective decisions that will solve community problems. Buchanan (1949) notes that, due to the rent seeking behaviour that happens during the legislative process, it is difficult for government to be able to really curb societal problems. In a similar manner, Riker (1982) notes that the collective approach of addressing societal problems is likely to be dictatorial in nature hence, downplaying democracy. If arbitrary collective decisions are made for the citizens, citizen preferences will be undermined thereby undermining democracy. However, the theory has been criticized for generalizing and confining human behavior to self-seeking rather than acknowledging the influence and role institutions play in shaping human behavior (Howlett *et al.*, 2009). Institutions play a crucial role in political socialization and influencing political culture, which individuals eventually adopt.

Having realized that individuals and groups are self-seeking and concerned about their personal gain, public choice theorists' postulate that there is need to place restraining mechanisms to prevent self-seeking behavior and enhance the attainment of social good and interests (Howlett *et al.*, 2009). In a similar manner, Buchanan (1975) notes that public choice theorists also advocate for citizen engagement in the identification of their preferences, on the taxes to be paid for their preferences and even voting on the one preference which they deem of high priority. Moreover, Buchanan (1975) notes that there should be stringent rules to restrain public officials from undermining citizens from accessing equitable public goods. These assumptions are relevant to this study since PB is a mechanism adopted to curtail the prevalence of rent seeking behavior and increase the voice of the public in the allocation of resources and enhance public good and interests.

2.5.2 Deliberative Theory

PB is located within deliberative democracy (Dryzek, 2000; Cavalier, 2011; Ganuza & Francés, 2012. Deliberative democracy is premised on the notion that participation and political deliberation are crucial in attaining democracy. It is an inclusive discourse which provides space for citizens to deliberate on community issues affecting them, identifying their needs, thereby finding sustainable solutions to societal problems (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Cavalier, 2011; Thomas, 2014).

Deliberative democracy grew out of the dissatisfaction of citizens who argued that there was a disconnection between the policy makers, implementers and the beneficiaries (Smith 2003). This was an attack on Western liberal democracy, which usually has a few elites influencing government policies at the expense of the general public (Smith, 2003). Deliberative democracy resulted in excluding the majority of citizens who were affected by the policies from the governance process (Cherniak, 2012). What it means is that the role of citizens was reduced to being voters and did not go beyond the voting process. In other words, the government was only accountable to the few elites who influenced the policy process, and not the majority citizens.

The genesis of deliberative democracy was a means for addressing the issues raised above. Deliberative democracy furthers the idea of participative democracy as it initiates a continuous discourse between political authorities and public opinion (Bohman, 1998). Implied here is that deliberative democracy is not an event but a continuous process that promotes publicity and creates a link between the governed and the governors. It is for the lack of citizen participation that the government, according to the public choice theorists and Nabatchi (2004), fail to address societal problems. About deliberative democracy, Nabatchi (2012) in Gudic (2016:4) notes that it "…is a potential remedy for the philosophical and practical shortcomings of current governmental practices, including the limitations of voting, the deteriorating ties among citizens and between citizens and government, and the apparent inability of government to address systemic policy problems".

Nabatchi's (2012) sentiments place emphasis on the ability of deliberative democracy to address societal problems since it is a process which brings citizens to the forefront of development as they engage in public discussions on matters that affect them. These public discussions and the consensus reached, according to Johnson (2009), protects and upholds the interests of everyone in the community. Every citizen who is likely to be affected by the policy deliberations is supposedly involved in the policy deliberations, and collectively protects their values and interests, thus, exercising their civil rights (Chambers, 1996; Freeman, 2000). Smith (2003), in Cherniak (2012: 11), underscores the importance of impartiality in the deliberative process in noting that deliberative democracy

> "…relates to both presence and voice: in principle, all citizens are entitled to participate in the process of political dialogue and have an equal right to introduce and question claims, to put forward reasons, to express and challenged needs, values and interests. Voices should not be excluded from the political process; citizens have an equal right to be".

Smith's (2003) sentiments are shared by Freeman (2000) and Valadez (2001), who stipulate that, to achieve procedural fairness and equality, all participants should be exposed to the same and equal opportunities to information, technology, and material crucial for effective deliberations. Lack of information compromises citizens' ability to effectively contribute to, and make informed decisions during, the deliberative process. Decisions emanating from the deliberative process should reflect collectivism, which is aimed at achieving the greater community good. The deliberative process should uphold morality, even in cases where participants have differing perspective on issues being discussed (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). Respect for each other and their views enhances democracy and participation in that every view is accommodated for the greater collective good. Johnson (2009:683) says deliberative democratic theory can be summarized in by these defining characteristics:

- inclusiveness and representativeness;
- procedural and informational equality;
- public reason; and

- agreement on a common good.

If fully adopted and implemented, the above components of deliberative democracy result in the attainment of deliberative empowerment (Johnson, 2009). Deliberative empowerment occurs both at individual and collective levels. Defining deliberative empowerment, Johnson (2009:680) notes that it "is a general reference to the capacities, capabilities, and opportunities of citizens directly to influence public policies". This definition refers to citizens' ability to effect a change in the governance process through increased agency, autonomy, political literacy and skills and social capital. Moreover, the process of democratic empowerment can be attained though creating more opportunities for citizen engagement, inclusivity, transparency, equity and prioritising the interests of the community (Johnson, 2009:680). This process transforms the status of citizens from being passive recipients of development to being active empowered citizens able to make effective decisions in their governance process.

PB borrows heavily from deliberative democracy as it promotes citizen engagement through a continuous deliberative budgetary process. The process is deliberative and conflict ridden as it entails the allocation and distribution of scarce resources. Because the process is conflict ridden, it is therefore, important to be tolerant and respect each other's views to finally reach a consensus for the good of the community. PB identifies with what was advocated for by Johnson (2009), as it involves citizens identifying their preferences and arranging them in their priority order, to allocate resources according to community priority and interests. Sen's (1987) capability approach refers to the ability of citizens to identify their preferences and the freedom to determine the kind of life they desire to lead.

2.5.3 Capability Approach

The Capability Approach (CA) has some features which can be traced back to the classical writers such as Aristotle and Adam Smith, while the current capability approach is associated with the writings of Sen (Robeyns, 2005) and has been further modified by Nussbaum (2000). Of importance to note is that the CA cannot be a standalone theory but needs to be used in conjunction with other theories since it only

helps to conceptualize phenomena. It is for this reason that the theory is used in liaison with the other theories which have been outlined above. Sen's (1987) capability approach has two major constituents, which are "functionings" and "capabilities". A functioning is regarded as an achievement, whereas a capability is the ability to achieve. Functionings are, in a sense, more directly related to living conditions, since they are different aspects of living conditions. Capabilities, by contrast, are notions of freedom, in the positive sense: "what real opportunities you have regarding the life you may lead" (Sen, 1987:36).

The above definition by Sen (1987) views capabilities as freedoms which people have been given to make decisions and choices pertaining the kind of life they deem satisfactory to them. These freedoms relate to freedoms to be involved in political and socio-economic processes of making decisions where they prioritize their interests and needs. Functionings refer to the realized achievements that enable one to exercise their freedoms. For example, if one has an educated mind, it follows that they are aware of their freedoms and mechanisms to exercise them. The CA enables citizens to take part in activities which impact their every sphere of life, and by doing so, enhances their well-being and development.

As illustrated in figure 2.9 below, goods and services play a pivotal role in enabling functionings to occur because of certain characteristics which they possess. Robeyns (2005:98) notes that the ability to achieve these functionings using goods is influences by "conversion factors which are personal, social and environmental". These conversion factors impact an individual's capacity to attain these functionings. To illustrate this influence, Robeyns (2005:98) avers that "…if a person is disabled, or in a bad physical condition, or has never learned to cycle, then the bicycle will be of limited help to enable the functioning of mobility".

Transformation can be in the form of social factors such as "public policies, social norms, discriminating practices, gender roles, societal hierarchies, power relations" (Robeyns 2005:98). These affect the ability of individuals to achieve their functionings. There are various discriminating and stereotyping practices in the society which will exclude other groups of people from participating in public gatherings such as women,

children and the disabled. Such societal norms and discriminating practices become a hindrance for the attainment of functionings.

Figure 2.9: A stylized non-dynamic representation of a person's capability set and his/her social and personal context



Source: Adapted from Robeyns (2005:68)

Figure 2.9 illustrates the existence of means to achieve capabilities that pertain to social institutions, capability sets, social, economic, and political circumstances that influence people's choices. What needs to be established is the context within which individuals interact with these various economic, political and social circumstances, and to assess the degree to which these provide enabling and equitable opportunities for achieving functionings and ultimately, capabilities (Sen, 1999a; Nussbaum, 2000).

PB seeks to empower citizens to have the freedoms to decide on their spending priorities, which resonates with the CA's assumptions. Functionings and capabilities are what PB seeks to achieve through active citizen engagement in their local financial decision making. Giving citizens the opportunity to deliberate on their local financial matters enables them to align development and social welfare programs to their needs. In so doing, their functionings are achieved and they have the freedom to exercise their capabilities. In other words, PB falls within the broader concept of CA as it facilitates the realization of functionings and capabilities. Moreover, for PB to

achieve these functionings and capabilities, the conversion factors should be favorable. For instance, social institutions should ensure that conditions for the success of PB are in place. This resonates with what was illustrated in figure 2.5 under citizenship theory, where government is supposed to ensure that suitable and favorable conditions exist for effective PB processes.

Another important feature of CA that is in sync with PB is the democratic principle which emanates from the concept of 'freedoms'. In furthering the concept of democracy in CA, Nussbaum advocates constitutions which guarantee the political principles and rights of citizens (Robeyn, 2005). This gives CA a legislated democratic approach that offers citizens an opportunity to participate in the governance process and includes the allocation of scarce resources through PB. This participation of citizens, as Nussbaum (2000) argues, should be facilitated by the government through guaranteeing these rights in the constitution.

2.6 CONCLUSION

This chapter explored the conceptual and theoretical frameworks that explain the concepts of participation, community participation, and PB. It was established that democracy, as a concept, lays the foundation for participation, local government, and even PB. The theories which inform the concept of community of participation and participation, which are the grand systems theory, participatory theory, citizenship theory, and the theory of change were examined. Systems theory, citizenship theory and ToC were triangulated into an integrated approach to give the study a holistic approach to understanding all the variables involved in the PB process. The chapter proceeded to analyze the theories which influence the PB discourse and these are; public choice theory, deliberative democratic theory, and the capability approach. These illuminated the understanding of the study's key concepts of community participation and PB.

In the next chapter, an examination of global best practices regarding local government participatory budgeting praxis is carried out through a review of literature on the experiences of PB in both developed and developing countries. A review of global trends in PB implementation locates the study within the context of PB

experiences and develops a link with the Zimbabwean PB implementation experiences which is the focus of this study.

CHAPTER 3

GLOBAL BEST PRACTICE REGARDING LOCAL GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING

3.0 INTRODUCTION

Scholars such as Sekaran (1992) and Kumar (2005) observe that a literature review of international best practice is highly significant to place a particular study in perspective. A literature review should gather relevant information to contextualize and guide the study and illuminate the phenomenon under scholarly investigation. This chapter's main focus is reviewing literature relevant to PB by exploring global best practices informing the study.

The chapter delineates notions of budgeting and accentuates the peculiarities of PB as a specific budgeting type and arrangement. Furthermore, the origins of PB are traced and located in the Porto Algre experience in Brazil (Zamboni, 2007; Mulindwa, 2013). Since the emergence of the Brazilian PB experience, PB has been embraced and implemented worldwide in both developed and developing countries (Cabbanes, 2019). The chapter also reviews extant literature on PB experiences from both developed and developing countries, to ascertain particular challenges experienced. It extracts best practices and lessons from selected cases to inform a participatory budget model for rural councils. That is the main contribution of this study. In addition, the chapter locates and analyzes various dimensions and principles of PB developed by eminent scholars such as Ebdon and Franklin (2006), Wampler (2012), and Escober and Harkins (2015). These dimensions have a direct bearing on the achievement of positive PB outcomes. PB outcomes and processes are at the centre of the study, and the reviewed literature positions the research in the context of other studies conducted.

3.1 BUDGETING: A CONCEPTUAL AND CONTEXTUAL ORIENTATION

The financial decentralization policy adopted by many countries, including Zimbabwe, facilitated the creation of local governments. Constitutions and legal frameworks have been formulated to give the local governments the basis for its existence. Madhekeni and Zhou (2012) locate local governments within the decentralization framework, which fosters citizen participation in their governance and development processes. In Zimbabwe, the mandate of local governments is provided for in the Constitution and in the Urban and Rural District Act. The general mandate of local governments is the provision of services in their localities aimed at realizing economic prosperity and social development.

Mawhood (1993) defends the existence of local governments on the basis of furthering the democratization process and enhancing public participation in the governance process. Local governments are vital governance units which foster democracy and citizen participation in decision making. Furthermore, Seabright (1996), Gold (2010), and Murimoga and Musingafi (2014) justify the existence of local governments on the grounds of their close proximity to the people and the ability to gather information about the community's needs and priorities. Having access to information about community needs enables the local government to be responsive to those needs. In a similar manner, Fjeldstad *et al.* (2014) note that fiscal decentralization, which promotes own local revenue collection, fosters accountability and improves service delivery. Similar sentiments are reiterated by Gold (2010:12), who note that local governments' proximity to communities favourably positions them "to derive the most from public resources at their disposal and are more likely to seek innovative means of doing so".

Commenting on the ability of local governments to execute their mandate, Gold (2010:12) observes that "there must be sufficient autonomous local government powers and resources…and adequate incentives (electoral and beyond) for local governments to be held accountable to their constituents and to behave in a fiscally responsible manner". Emanating from the above observation is the relationship between the local government's ability to mobilize and generate own revenue and to be held accountable. It is only when the local government utilizes financial resources from citizens (taxes and rates) to execute their mandate, that citizens can justifiably

demand for accountability. The ability to mobilize own local resources is crucial, not only for accountability, but also for the pursuance of public sector policy goals.

Local governments in Zimbabwe, and elsewhere, get their mandate to mobilize local revenue from the Constitution and enabling legislation. In this respect, Machingura (2010) states that, in Zimbabwe, the Urban and Rural District Councils Act (13 of 2002) empowers local governments to raise revenue locally though various means, which include user charges, taxes, and income generating projects. The bulk of local government revenue for most countries is made up of taxes and user charges, although central government transfers are also a source. This places local governments at the forefront of being custodians of public resources expected to utilize public resources prudently. Basri and Nabihab (2014) say financial accountability and transparency are concepts that should be upheld in public institutions because of the nature of public resources. In a similar manner, Shah (1998) and Smoke (2013) state that local government financial mobilisation does uphold accountability and empowers citizens as they are able to demand for explanation on the utilization of mobilized resources.

Figure 3.1 illustrates the expected responsibilities of local governments and citizens in the governance process. Citizens are expected to finance local government expenditure through paying taxes and rates to ensure effective and efficient service delivery on the part of local governments. The cause-and-effect relationship between the local government and citizens either inhibits the local development process or enhances it. This is because the ability of the local government to pursue policy objectives is largely dependent on the will and ability of citizens to finance government expenditure. More so, the will of citizens to finance government expenditure can possibly be affected by the extent to which local governments are transparent and accountable.

Figure 3.1 : Expected responsibilities of local government and citizens



Source: Researcher's own

Accountability of financial resources is concerned with the performance of the local government. Having paid taxes and user charges, citizens' expectation is high quality service delivery from the local government (Holzer & Rabin, 1995; Smoke, 2013). Marango *et al.* (2018:170) state that "local authorities … are the primary nerve centres for rural development. This being the case resilient, vibrant, accountable, and transparent systems within councils are an important prerequisite". Such observations reinforce the importance of accountability in the utilization of resources in local governments to achieve policy goals and enhance development. If there is prudent utilization of resources in local governments, citizens will be compliant in the paying of rates and taxes needed by the local governments to render services. Beck *et al.* (1987) note that there is a relationship between local government performance and the willingness of citizens to pay for the services rendered. Evidence from Zimbabwe suggests that citizens who reside in certain localities resisted paying developmental levy citing that the amount of money paid and the development on the ground were disproportionate (Wekwete, 1987). Public servants should be able to give reason for their failure to provide the expected services the citizens would have paid for. Glaser and Hildreth (1999) posit that the performance of the local government also has a direct bearing on economic and social development of a community.

Local government policy objectives are executed through an adopted budget statement, which Zinyama (2014) views as the epicentre of local government activities. Local government budgets are crucial because they are ways in which public projects are funded and are used to render accountability of resources. It is through the budget that the community is informed of the performance of the local government for the previous year, and the citizens get to hold the local governments accountable for their

performance. Because budgets are tools for allocating public resources, transparency and democratic participation in the budget process should be upheld (Zinyama, 2014).

Budgeting can be regarded as a quantitative process of allocating financial resources of an organization to its varied units for different activities to be achieved within a stipulated timeframe (Awio & Northcott, 2001; Ndiwalana, 2002; Shah, 2007). Lucy (1996) adds that a budget is made up of two components; the expenditure (which is the spending side) and the revenue side (which refers to the income flowing into the purse). The allocation of resources towards different activities of the organization is meant to achieve organizational goals and priorities. Such a process enhances the financial well-being of an entity. Budgets are also a process of communicating the financial performance of the organization over the past one year and to avail the financial programmes and policies the organization seeks to pursue in the given year (Drury, 1992; Lin, 2007). This makes budgets both planning and coordination tools since they help in the preparation of annual plans for the organization. Such planning gives direction to the activities and operations of the organization which in turn, translate to the achievement of organizational goals. Moreover, budgets play a crucial role of control, which facilitates the comparison of the actual performance and the expected outcome, for remedial action (Lin, 2007).

It is evident that the budget process is case sensitive. This means that private and public sector institutions generally apply different conventions. However, there are generic stages applicable to budgeting. According to Lega and Vendramini (2008), these generic stages confirm that the budget process is both a management and financial control instrument. Otley (1978) observes that the management and financial control are intricately intertwined in that the financial control dimensions ensure that the resources are used purposefully, whereas the management dimensions' focus is to ensure that activities are well coordinated to achieve the objectives of the organisation. Similarly, Uddin (2005) notes that, in both the private and public sector, budgets foster management control that is crucial for overall organizational performance. In the public sector, budgeting is subject to political dynamics and characterized by shifting and often conflicting priorities, as well as the general scarcity of resources. In this regard, Schultz (2002:10) notes that "public budgets are more than a collection of numbers; they are a declaration of a community's priorities".

Introduced in this definition is the concept of furthering the priorities of the community. The allocation of resources in the public sector is done with the aim of achieving the priorities of the community. However, such a definition is rather reductionist in nature owing to the arguments by public choice theorists that public officials tend to further their own interests instead of the community's (Down, 1967; Niskanen, 1973; Zvoushe, 2019). There are, thus, strong arguments to make public budgets more community oriented and participatory in nature.

According to the Budget Analysis Manual (2011:19), "the budget cycle comprises the major events involved in making decisions about the budget, and implementing and assessing those decisions". Similarly, Norton and Elson (2002:7) conceptualize the budget cycle as "one which outlines the bureaucratic tasks associated with the functional stages of formulation, enactment/approval, execution and audit/evaluation". Emanating from the above definitions of a budget cycle is the realization that there are processes and stakeholders involved in the budget process. These processes are pivotal for the translation of budget decisions into substantive programs and projects. Figure 3.2 illustrates the typical conventional budget cycle in public institutions. This budget cycle is vital because it lays the foundation upon which PB builds. Of importance to note from this cycle, as confirmed by MDPESA (2008), is the exclusion of citizens from participating in the budget process. The budget processes within the cycle were rather a technocratic exercise executed by government officials in compliance with policy guidelines from central government.

Figure 0.1: The conventional budget cycle



Source: Adapted from MDPESA (2008:24)

The need to deepen democracy and empower citizens led to the adoption of PB as a community engagement practice in the budget cycle (Wampler & Touchton, 2017) as will be outlined in the next section.

3.2 PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING IN FOCUS

Community participation has always been embraced by western countries such as the United Kingdom, United States of America, and Germany, where citizens have been consulted and involved in public decision-making (Dienel *et al.*, 1993; Burns *et al.,* 1998; Cornwall, 2006). Active community participation is not a new concept in the European and American contexts, in as much it is not a new concept to the African continent. In the African context, the discourse on community participation has been associated with the concept of Ubuntu which upholds humanness, unity, and collective community deliberations for furthering community interests. The need to further the concept of community participation has resulted in the adoption of more participatory processes, including PB (Zamboni, 2007).

At a national level in developing and developed countries, budgeting has sought to be participative as evidenced by consultative meetings with stakeholders during the budget process and the role of Parliament and the Auditor General during the entire budget process underscored (Zhou, 2012However, Machinjike and Bango (2021) note that, despite the supposed participative nature of national budgets, in reality, “in developing countries, the budget is produced in a closed-door process and is dominated by the executive branch and the legislative approval occurs with little opportunity for debate for amendment”. The legislature, which represents the citizens in such matters, is complacent and rubber stamps the budget which may not be people-oriented, but serves the interests of the few in society. Such observations justify the need to adopt PB at a local level where citizens are afforded an opportunity to identify and prioritize their needs and direct the local government budget in a community-oriented manner.

Reforms which dispelled authoritarianism in Brazil and ushered in multipartyism were implemented (Avrtzer, 2009 in Ebdon, Krane & Franklin, 2012). These reforms paved the way for participatory approaches like PB at a local level. The democratisation process which had begun and the political culture which supported citizen participation facilitated the adoption of these participatory processes. After its election into the Porto Alegre municipality in 1989, the Workers Party facilitated the introduction of PB and the first PB experiment in Brazil was implemented in Port Alegre (Avrtzer, 2009 in Ebdon, Krane & Franklin, 2012). Porto Alegre’s PB application is broad in nature as it incorporates the consultative dimension and the deliberative discourse. This broad perspective relates to both direct and representative democracies, which empower citizens to direct and influence budget decisions. Moreover, in the lens of Porto Alegre, PB is redistributive in nature as it seeks to empower the poor and promote equity and self-governance where the community determines how resources are allocated and to what priority areas.

Evidently, positive PB outcomes like redistribution of wealth, increased participation of the poor in the governance process, reduced corruption, and enhanced service delivery were experienced from the Porto Alegre PB trial (Wampler & Avritzer, 2004 in Mulindwa 2013; World Bank, 2017). Commenting on the participation of the vulnerable in society, Souza (2001) confirms that PB has been observed as a governance tool

which is inclusive as evidenced by the ability of the poor and vulnerable to participate and influence financial decisions. It was for these positive PB outcomes that PB was recognized as one of the best participatory and governance practices during the UN Habitat Conference in Turkey (Zamboni, 2007).

The Porto Alegre experience was the guiding force behind the move by donors to promote the adoption of PB in both developing and developed countries (Mulindwa, 2013). In examining the spread of PB, Cabbanes (2019) notes that PB's spread was marked by few phases. These phases began with the initial Porto Alegre experimentation phase that ignited the adoption of PB throughout Brazil and recorded 130 councils that had adopted PB between 1989 and 1997 (Cabbanes, 2003 in Cabbanes, 2019). The post Brazilian phase evidenced the spread of PB in Latin America and Europe with the African continent also adopting it. The global spread of PB ultimately included "Asia, Russia, Arab, North America and Pacific cities to the adoption of PB" (Cabbanes, 2019:3).

According to Cabbanes (2019), the recorded 6000 experiences from 40 countries that had adopted PB by 2019 illustrate a positive uptake of PB globally. This could be attributed to the initial outcomes of PB which were recorded in Port Alegre, and the support PB received from international institutions. Clearly, evidence pointing to the spread of PB globally indicate that it is a practice that has gained popularity and will continue to expand since it is being viewed as a practice which enhances good governance (Verite Research, 2017), reduces corruption, increases accountability and efficiency, and ensures effectiveness of local governments (Zamboni, 2007). Experiences from different regions (e.g., Russia, Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean and Pacific Islands) have been mixed perhaps, due to differences in economies, social and political landscapes (Cabbanes, 2019).

According to Anderson (1997, PB is an innovation which fosters the concept of local democracy through affording citizens an opportunity to influence financial decisions. In the same vein, MDP-ESA (2007), Wampler (2007) and Shah (2007) describe PB as a deliberative discourse where citizens are involved in the entire budget process. Furthermore, according to MDPSEA (2008), PB facilitates the inclusion of the civil society resulting in increased citizen participation, reduced corruption, improved

service delivery, enhanced equity, and many other positive outcomes. In this regard, PB is a participative governance tool that empowers citizens to determine their priorities and enhance accountability and transparency of local governments.

The PB cycle is not different from the traditional budgeting cycle. The only difference lies in the deliberative and participative nature of PB. The PB cycle, as indicated in figure 3.3 below, is participative and deliberative, as citizens are mobilized to direct the process through identifying their needs and deciding on the spending priorities of their community. Although the PB cycle is participative, the local government officials play a crucial role in driving the entire budget process. They set the pace for deliberative discourses to occur.

The PB preparatory and formulation stages, as indicated in figure 3.3, are synonymous with what Mulindwa (2013) terms ‘the planning phase’, while the implementation and monitoring and evaluation stages are termed ‘the control phase’. The planning phase of the budget cycle is focused on mobilizing stakeholders to identify and prioritize their needs for funding. The control phase is concerned with the implementation of the agreed projects and assessing the extent to which the actual performance tallies or deviates from the intended plan. The feedback loop from the control phase allows for corrective measures to be effected to achieve the desired outcomes or facilitate a redirection of the budget to focus on practical and feasible goals (Mulindwa, 2013). Shah (2007), in underscoring the importance of these two phases, emphasises the need of timeous and active involvement of stakeholders in the entire budget process to have the budget process reflect their needs and create accountable and transparent local governments. Wampler (2007) indicates that these stakeholders include the council officials, citizens, politicians, as well as business people. The diversity of these stakeholders indicates that their motive for participating in the budget process is also different (Wampler, 2007), thus, posing a challenge to the prioritization of the identified needs and objectives in the budget process.

Figure 3.3: The Participatory Budget cycle



Source: Adapted from MDPESA (2008:34)

Despite the positive outcomes, PB challenges are inevitable (Aber, 2000). Aber (2000) observes that the elite and those in power usually favour the status quo because it advantages them. They then resist any change that is proposed. Inequality usually prevents other groups from being part of the deliberative discourses, and some manipulative governments hinder effective PB through controlling information and resources to the extent of manipulating the participatory mechanisms. Such a scenario hinders effective participation as it deviates from the ultimate aim of enhancing participation, resulting in an empowered citizenry, especially the vulnerable and excluded in society (MDPESA, 2008; Cabbanes, 2019).

3.3 PB APPLICATIONS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT: EXPERIENCES IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

PB's importance as a tool for good governance was underscored during the UN Habitat Conference in Turkey (Zamboni, 2007) which promoted the adoption of the concept in many developed countries. The Italian and Spanish PB adaptations

according to Ganuza (2007), closely reflect the original Porto Alegre experience. Other experiences differ and are modified to suit the country in which it is adopted. Various studies have been carried out in Scotland (O' Hagan *et al.* 2019), United States of America and China (Ebdon, Krane & Franklin, 2012). The studies concluded that the level of citizen participation is determined by factors such as, the political culture, the level of education of the citizens, the size of the locality which the local government has jurisdiction over, and the type of government in place. These factors inhibit or enhance the level of citizen participation. For instance, Ebdon and Franklin (2006) observe that, where citizens are highly educated, the level of participation in local activities, including budgeting, is high.

3.3.1 PB applications in the United States of America

Since its genesis in Brazil, PB has taken various forms depending on the different contexts and environments in which it has been implemented. In the United States of America (USA), the budgeting system is highly decentralized, giving each local government independence to adopt and implement the budgets they deem necessary for their locality (Ebdon, Krane & Franklin, 2012). The budgetary system in the USA entails the publication of the budget information to the public, holding budget public hearings, and in the case of increasing taxes and borrowing, a referendum is usually held where citizens decide on the way forward. The cities of Chicago and New York experience similar practices to those of Brazil with regards to PB. In reviewing these experiences, Ebdon, Krane and Franklin (2012) applaud the efforts made by Chicago and New York in enhancing citizen participation and formulating strategies to address societal problems. Lerner (2012) in Sintomer *et al.* (2013) highlight that despite the New York and Chicago local governments' PB processes having been dominated by the white population and the elite, inclusion strategies which sought to accommodate the poor and vulnerable in society were devised.

Civic engagement is significant in fostering accountability of local governments (Ebdon, Krane & Franklin, 2012). It is for this reason that civic society organizations in the USA like the Participatory Budgeting Project (PBP) have been championing and supporting the PB process (Sintomer *et al.*, 2013). The purpose of the PBP was to promote participative democracy in the budget making process and empower citizens

to make meaningful informed financial decisions on the locality's revenue and expenditure. Ebdon, Krane and Franklin (2012) point out that more strategies to promote accountability and include more participatory activities in the PB process in the USA have been embraced in Kirkland, California, and Brooklyn. The resulting outcome of these efforts is an empowered citizenry and an efficient performing local government (Gomez *et al.,* 2016). These sentiments are further shared by Ebdon, Krane and Frankling (2012) who observe that, in most local authorities in the USA, only a few individuals deliberate on a small amount of the budget money. Emanating from this is the lack of representativeness of the entire community (i.e. county) which results in only a few individual's priorities reflecting in the final budget. Moreover, Ebdon, Krane and Franklin (2012) argue that effective participation is usually hindered by citizens' lack of understanding of the budget jargon. Participation therefore, remains the preserve of a few elites who can interpret budget presentation formats, and have an understanding of typical budget jargon.

3.3.2 PB applications in Scotland

In Scotland, the development of PB has been an ongoing process in tandem with the ongoing public service reform The Scottish government has taken a leading role in the championing of the PB process through legislation which supports the process and providing funding for the small-scale pilot projects on PB (O' Hagan *et al.*, 2019). The role played by the government in the PB process makes the Scottish experience unique in that, in other countries, PB has been advocated by civic organizations and community-based organizations. Harkins, Moore and Escobar (2016) hold that the government drive for PB attracted support from various civic organizations.

The Scottish government passed the Community Empowerment Act of 2015 as a basis for supporting participatory processes. The Act gave citizens a citizenship status through extending their rights to include being part of the participative and deliberative discourses of the policy and decision-making processes (Harkins & Escobar, 2015; Harkins, Moore & Escobar, 2016). In this regard, O'Hagan *et al.* (2019) note that the right to participate in the PB process was not explicitly outlined in the Act, but it was indirectly provided for as the Act sought to extend the rights of citizens to participate and deliberate on local decisions which could be extended to include financial matters.

The Scottish Equality Act of 2010 is a piece of legislation that contains the Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED) and calls upon public servants to utilize participatory approaches like the budget processes, to curb inequalities that exist within communities (O'Hagan *et al.,* 2019). Due to its push for the adoption of participative processes to tackle inequality, PSED has been viewed as a platform which has driven PB adoption and implementation.

In Scotland, PB has resulted in the formation of community groups which facilitate community participation and influence decision making (O'Hagan *et al.*, 2020). Furthermore, O'Hagan *et al.* (2020) state that the role of these groups has resulted in increased citizen participation, with citizens able to hold local governments accountable for their decisions and actions. Citizens have been empowered and their ability to influence financial decisions in their localities enhanced. Such a status bolsters citizen and local government relationship and enhances proper utilization of resources. O'Hagan *et al.* (2020) reason that the Scottish PB experience is characterized by exclusion from participation as evidenced by little or no participation of ethnic minority groups and individuals. This scenario illustrates an experience marred by inequality and exclusion and in need of urgent redress.

Cultural resistance is another factor which has been cited by O'Hagan *et al.* (2019) and O'Hagan *et al.* (2020) as an impediment to participation in the PB process. Culturally, men have been viewed as superior to women, and as such, it pushes females away from the participative processes. O'Hagan *et al.* (2019:49) argue that the "ideology of superiority" amongst the local government officials is a hindrance to effective participation. Local government officials also generally undermine the views of ordinary citizens as they esteem themselves more knowledgeable to articulate the needs of the community than citizens themselves Such a perception is contrary to the PB process, which underscores the importance of citizen participation in identifying their needs and participating in the entire PB process.

Evidently, PB is still in its infancy in Scotland and issues emanating from the experiences are supposed to inform future PB projects to achieve more positive outcomes. Harkins, Moore, and Escobar (2016) question the practicality of comparing PB experiences in Scotland and those in Brazil due to differing political and social

environments which existed in both countries when PB was adopted. The political landscape in Brazil prior to the adoption of PB was characterized by a dictatorial political regime and PB became a relevant and necessary strategy for ushering in democracy. Socially, Brazil was characterized by high levels of poverty.

3.3.3 PB applications in China

Vast reforms targeting the budgeting processes have been effe cted in China (Ebdon, Krane & Franklin, 2012). Prior to the adoption of these reforms, the state exerted total control of the economy and all other processes in the country. Sintomer *et al.* (2013) record that the budgetary processes were highly centralized, and the state made the final decision on the spending priorities of sub national governments. It was in 1978 when the country liberated the economy through adopting a market driven approach to the economy and facilitating fiscal decentralization which sought to increase local autonomy and increase the number of stakeholders participating at the local level (Sintomer *et al.,* 2013). Mechanisms were also put in place which availed financial local government information to the public thus promoting accountability and transparency.

Commenting on the reforms of the budgetary process in China, Ma and Niu (2006) observe that the process sought to ultimately democratize the budget process and ensure prudent use of resources. These reforms scaled up citizen participation pilot projects, although these were not supported by Law. Evidence shows that in Xinhe town, citizens could attend budget review meetings without any invitation from the local council (Niu, 2011). This could have been due to the adoption of the market driven economy which relies on taxation. It gave citizens an opportunity to participate in local government financial decisions, which in turn, gave them power to hold local government officials accountable for the use of public resources.

It was not until 2005 that China began experiments on PB in various provinces which included Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Heilongjiang and Shangai (Niu, 2011). Since the inception of these experiments, PB has spread countrywide offering citizens an opportunity to deliberate on budget decisions and influencing them to reflect the needs and priorities of their communities. Evidently, PB experiences in Chengdu (Frenkiel & Rewal, 2019)

and Wuxi show that citizens participate in the budget process and identify and prioritize community needs (Wu & Wand, 2011 in Frenkiel & Rewal, 2019). In illustrating the power of community participation, Wu and Wand (2011 in Frenkiel & Rewal, 2019) record that the Xinhe 2006 budget was significantly amended due to the influence of citizens. Similary, in the Zeguo local government it was the community which influenced the selection of priority projects that ultimately received funding (Wu & Wand, 2011 in Frenkiel & Rewal, 2019). The ability of the communities to identify and rank their priorities is of paramount importance since it directs development to the priority needs of the community instead of directing scarce resources to projects that do not address the concerns of the community.

Despite the PB successes recorded in China, its experience is marred with challenges which, according to Ma (2009), He (2011) and Niu (2011), emanate from the fact that China is a one-party state. Yuan (2012) notes that the party and government's push to maintain power and have control affects the spread of PB to other local governments. Commenting on these challenges, Niu (2011) points to the positive benefits of PB, which entail bringing the local government and the citizens together to effect development to the locality. He (2011) is optimistic about PB in China and points to the positive outcomes which have been recorded as a basis for the optimism that PB will spread throughout China and deliver more positive outcomes.

3.3.4 Synopsis of PB experiences in developed countries

Experiences from the above countries capture important components which facilitate successful PB implementation. Local democracy is a crucial element which enhances effective citizen participation as evidenced in the USA, Brazil, China and Scotland. The constrained spread of PB and effective citizen participation has been attributed to the lack of substantive local democracy. Admittedly, in both countries PB has facilitated the redistribution of wealth from the more affluent to the most vulnerable sections of society in order to address issues of inequality. Evidently the PB process is not a rubber-stamping process but citizens are capable to, and do influence the budget. They also have their priorities, interests and needs reflected in the final budget. PB experiences from USA, Brazil, China, and Scotland are summarized in Table 3.1 below.

Table 4.1: Citizen participation experiences in Brazil, USA, Scotland and China

	Brazil	USA	Scotland	China
Legal	Constitutional changes, reinstatement of local elections	States typically mandate disclosure and public hearings	Legislative framework which reinforces citizen participation	Budgets were secret until recently, little legal role for citizens
Social	Large socio-economic disparity, active (and growing) number of civil society organizations, call for "a right to rights."	Large numbers of neighbourhood groups, unions, and non-profit organizations	Large and active civic organisations	Recent growth in civic associations
Political	Multi-party system, contested democratic elections, mix of patron-client networks, mass politics/populist appeals, and Civil society organizations	Two major parties, competitive elections, local often non-partisan	Multi-party system, competitive elections	One party, mostly non-competitive elections; mostly used in small communities
Scope of decisions or input	Prioritisation of new public infrastructure investments, between 5-50% of the budget	Varies (operating, capital, specific funding allocations)	To make decisions and prioritise projects in the budget	Primarily prioritisation of pre-selected capital projects
Participant selection	Multi-tiered plenary assemblies open to all residents; budget and policy theme tracks	Varies widely, often self-selected	Open to all citizens to participate	Typically selected by government officials, some random sampling
Number of participants	2 to 3 delegates per 1000 population; nearly half are	Typically small	Relatively large although there is still cultural	Typically small

	female; nearly half are working class or poor		resistance which gives men dominance and the exclusion of the minority and disabled	
Timing	Year-long starting with budget deliberation, including implementation monitoring	Varies (budget preparation, during legislative review)	Starting with the preparation since there is the 1% for PB projects	Usually during budget preparation
Mechanisms	Assemblies, councils, neighbourhood meetings; polling; district tours; criteria used to select priorities	Varies (workshops, focus groups, simulations, surveys, hearings)	Varies (public hearings, neighbourhood meetings, deliberative polling)	Varies (one-two day workshops, deliberative polling)
Goals	Re-democratization; socio-economic inclusiveness; attain group and neighbourhood interests; political gain by officials and political parties	Education, gain support, build trust, community, input to make difficult budget – balancing decisions	Intended to bring local communities together for local and small-scale decision making, strengthen local democracy	Transition to market economy with taxation; administrative reforms
Outcomes	Participation and venues are growing over time Increased investment in poorer neighbourhoods; increased influence of marginalized citizens on city plans and budgets	Effect on budget often unclear; useful for education and possibly trust; lack of institutionalization	Participation growing over time with citizens given the 1% of the budget to decide on	Decisions are limited but are used in budgets; little diffusion/ institutionalization but PB is recent

Source: Researcher's own based on the classification of Ebdon, Krane and Franklin (2012:20)

Table above captures various aspects of PB in the different countries and show how their different experiences impact PB outcomes. Outlined above is the importance of a clear legislative and constitutional framework which provides for the rights of citizens to participation. Without such provisions, participation remains a fallacy. These frameworks are not limited to supporting citizen rights, but further empower local governments to execute their mandates independent of the central government and provide clear procedures pertaining to the budget process. Evidently, without the existence of a vibrant civic society which replaces a parochial and subject political culture with an active culture, citizen participation will continue to lag behind. It is important to have a civic society which lobbies and mobilizes citizens to be involved in the budget process.

3.4 PB EXPERIENCES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Rahaman and Lawrence (2004), Sterling, Grunfelder and Borges (2006), and Maynihan (2007) say citizen participation is an effective antidote to typical local governance problems such as corruption, budget deficits, misappropriation of funds, and deteriorating service delivery. The need to adopt participatory approaches has been underscored as a means to tackle governance issues, on the grounds that it promotes accountability and transparency, and empowers the vulnerable and poor in society (Maynihan, 2007). The failure of most developing countries to uphold transparency in the governance process has greatly contributed to the economic woes ravaging these countries hence, an urgent need to embrace participatory approaches in the budget process, where citizens are actively involved in the allocation and utilization of public resources (Maynihan, 2007; MDP-ESA, 2007). The drive by citizens enables local governments to improve service delivery because they can be held accountable for their performance and utilization of resources.

The Brazilian PB experiences and the influence of the international organizations resulted in developing countries experimenting with PB. Evidence is recorded by Cabbanes (2019) who notes that PB has spread in all parts of the world, including in developing countries. Several PB experiences from developing countries have been documented in various studies (Koelble & Siddle, 2014; Aceron, 2019; Buele *et al.*,

2020) identifying both successes and challenges. Experiences from Ecuador and Philippines are discussed below, and their experiences compared and contrasted.

3.4.1 PB applications in Ecuador

Ecuador is a South American country which is characterized by rural poverty, inter-culture and various disabilities in its population (Buele *et al.,* 2020). The “Council of Participation and Social Control” was among the many mechanisms adopted by the Corea government to enhance citizen participation (Balderich, 2015:131). The Rafael Correa Citizen Revolution made political changes in Ecuador that sought to enhance democracy and citizen participation through adopting participatory approaches including PB. Similar to some developing countries, Ecuador adopted PB as a governance tool that seeks to promote citizen participation.

Citizen participation is vital because it gives citizens a citizenship status and empowers them to prioritize their needs and hold the government accountable in the utilization of public resources. The institutionalization of the PB process was facilitated by the provisions made in the 2008 Constitution and the Organic law of citizen participation of 2010, which extended the rights of citizens to participate in the budget process (Buele, Vidueira & Guevara, 2020). These legislative frameworks formed the basis for the practice of PB in Ecuador. Cameron (2009) and Buele *et al.* (2020) note the limitation of the law in failing to give a detailed procedure on the implementation of PB, leaving local governments to use their own criteria.

Cameron (2009) and Buele, Vidueira and Guevara (2020) view the PB process in Ecuador as an interactive process that is inclusive of citizens in the budget process where community needs are identified. However, evidence from Ecuador, as highlighted by Buele *et al.* (2020) and Buele, Vidueira and Guevara (2020), point to the lack of interest and understanding of citizens of the PB process. Instead of participating in the PB process, most citizens prefer to focus on their livelihood activities deemed of greater importance compared to the PB process. Lack of understanding of the significance of the PB process could be the reason for such citizen attitude towards the participative process. Buele, Viduera and Guevara (2020) allude to the lack of commitment and political will by the local government officials to

the participative process as a hindrance to effective citizen participation. This is further evidenced by lack of educative programs and trainings focused on equipping citizens with understanding and knowledge on the importance of the participative process and on how to participate. Buela *et al.* (2020) argue that lack of participative education for citizens, continuity or political will render the whole PB process futile because these aspects play a significant role in fostering local democracy and good governance. Participative education ultimately gives citizens power and confidence to demand more transparency and accountability from the local government on the utilization of resources.

The perceptions of Ecuadorian citizens as recorded by Buela *et al.* (2020) illustrate their dissatisfaction with PB outcomes as they argue that they have not realised many positive PB outcomes related to improved quality of life and provision of basic needs. Furthermore, the demise of the Rafael Correa Citizen Revolution marked a reversal in the gains made with regards to citizen participation. Buela *et al.* (2020) note that, with the rise in power of the new government, citizen participation slowed down. Clearly, the type of regime in power either promotes or derails citizen participation.

The Ecuadorian PB experience reflects a quest for a better governance tool that seeks to achieve participatory democracy, empowered citizenry, efficient functional local governments, and improved provision of basic needs. It is evident that political will, citizen participation, enabling legislative frameworks, are crucial for the successful implementation of PB.

3.4.2 PB applications in the Philippines

The end of the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos in 1986 ushered in a new chapter in Philippines, which was characterized by reforms which sought to deepen and expand democracy nationwide (Aceron, 2019). Cristobal (1997) observes that the decentralization policy adopted in Philippines became a driving force of the democratization process, since it established local government units that facilitated local democracy through citizen participation. The reforms were institutionalized through the constitution and various other pieces of legislation like the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, which sought to direct and guide the

democratisation process through providing mechanisms to be followed (Aceron, 2019; Franklin & Ebdon, 2020).

PB was introduced in Philippines in 2011 under the broad decentralization policy as a mechanism for increasing citizen participation and local government viability (Aceron, 2019). Abad (2012) notes that PB became a part of the reform process that sought to redirect the budgeting system from the centre to the grassroots level to increase citizen participation, curb corruption, and enhance transparency in the utilization of public resources. These reforms, according to Aceron (2019), gained recognition from various international organizations, and earned the Aquino administration the Gold open government award for grassroot PB in 2014.

The central government, in liaison with the civic society organizations played a leading role in the rolling out of PB in Philippines due to perceived elitist tendencies dominating the local governments (Aceron, 2019). Placing the CSO at the same level with the local government as Cayadong *et al.* (2018) record, enabled PB to achieve more in terms of increased citizen participation since the decentralization policy was introduced.

Aceron (2019) holds that PB in the Philippines increased the presence of the civic society in the budget process and facilitated the formulation and implementation of a society-oriented budget. The Philippines experience resonates with the Porto Alegre experience where wealth was redistributed to the vulnerable and poor in society in order to achieve equality and poverty reduction (Manasan, Adaro & Tolin, 2017). Despite the positive outcomes achieved, Aceron (2019) and Franklin and Ebdon (2020) hold that challenges were inevitable in the Philippines PB experience and identifies challenges encountered during the process. Challenges identified include strife between the CSOs and government, corruption, delay in completion of projects and the lack of continuity. Lack of continuity was evidenced in the demise of the Aquino administration, which marked the end of PB in Philippines, although arguments have been brought forward justifying the new project which was adopted as PB in another name (Aceron, 2019).

The side-lining of the local government from championing the PB process resulted in a centralized PB process which was against the primary purpose of PB. Such a strategy perpetuated the top-down approach which hindered effective citizen participation in the budgetary process. Aceron (2019) notes that the process did include the local civil society but neglected the existing mechanism for citizen participation in the budget process, hence failing to transform the budgetary process to be inclusive and participatory. Moreover, bureaucracy became an impediment to the timely completion of PB projects, and the system was characterized by inherent inefficiencies.

3.4.3 Synopsis of PB experiences in developing countries

Both Ecuador and Philippines have constitutions and other pieces of legislation which provide for the inclusion of citizens in financial decision making in their various localities. Such legislative frameworks are not limited to the above-mentioned countries but exist in several developing countries (Dodoo, 1998; Hope & Chikulo, 2000). Experiences from the reviewed countries indicate several challenges which are encountered in the implementation and adoption of PB. These challenges range from, lack of capacity by local government councillors and citizens, citizens' ignorance of their rights to participate, low levels of literacy among citizens, lack of political will, and lack of appropriate legislative framework (Olowu, 2002; Moore, 2007; Shall, 2007). When discussing participation in developing countries, Painter (2002) argues that the attitude of government determines the success or failure of PB. In a similar manner Heimans (2002) holds that most governments in developing countries do not outrightly oppose PB but seemingly embrace it and formulate legislations in support of it because it is deemed advantageous. However, on the ground, participation is suppressed directly or indirectly**.** Shall (2007) proposes several strategies to address the challenges which hinder effective PB implementation in developing countries. These strategies include, but are not limited to, garnering political will, capacity building of involved stakeholders, continuous education of the public of their rights, and commitment to the democratization process.

3.5 AFRICAN PB EXPERIENCES

Africa as a continent is characterized by rampant corruption, misappropriation of funds, partisan politics, deteriorating service provision and a culture of authoritarianism, although the culture of democracy has been embraced by many (Maynihan, 2007; Sintomer *et al.,* 2013). Such a landscape makes Maynihan (2007) argue that participation is an urgent need which can rescue Africa from the challenges it faces. Participation has been viewed as a mechanism which dispels the problems highlighted above and results in enhanced accountability, reduced corruption, efficient service provision, and empowerment of citizens (Rahaman & Lawrence, 2004; Sterling, Grunfelder & Borges, 2006; MDP-ESA, 2007). Most developing countries' governments have failed to govern in a transparent manner which Maynihan (2007) argues, is reason for most economic woes. Therefore, there is an urgent need for fiscal decentralization that promotes local democracy, where citizens are at the forefront of resource allocation and utilization to further local needs and priorities (Sintomer *et al.*, 2013).

Decentralization policies adopted by various African countries paved way for participatory approaches in the local governments. Decentralization sought to bring government closer to the people and create an environment open for citizen participation. These attempts later included inclusion of citizens in the budget process which originated from Brazil and came to be known as PB. PB was endorsed in Namibia in 2000 as a key instrument which the continent could utilize to foster good governance which is an urgent need in Africa (Sintomer *et al.,* 2013). The Africities forum, established in 2004, has since played a pivotal role in promoting and soliciting for support for the project from various international institutions (Sintomer *et al.,* 2013). Several African experiences have since been examined and shared by various authors (Sintomer *et al.,* 2013; Mulindwa, 2013) and mixed reactions have been received as is highlighted in this section.

3.5.1 PB applications in South Africa

Emerging from the apartheid rule, South Africa became an economic and democratisation giant in Africa (Langa & Jerome, 2004). The 1994 election where the majority participated in the election process for the first time marked the genesis of the democratization process. The democratization policy as Koelble and Siddle (2014) note, was further extended through the adoption of the decentralization policy which facilitated the establishment of local government units. The creation of local governments in South Africa became an important aspect of the democratization process since it played a crucial role in promoting local democracy.

In South Africa, the local sphere of government is governed by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 and several other legislative frameworks which upholds the concepts of citizen and community participation (Langa & Jerome, 2004). The creation of local governments was underscored by the need to address the needs of the community and ensure development occurs at a local level. The Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998, the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 and the Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003, are crucial pieces of legislation which foster participatory democracy in the planning process, budget process, and many other local governance related affairs in South Africa (Shall, 2007; Sintomer *et al.,* 2013; Koelble & Saddle, 2014). Langa and Jerome (2004) hold that, in an attempt to conform to the dictates of the constitution and the law, South African local governments have adopted strategies for expanding participation. These include holding public hearings of budgets, consultations, and the use of media.

Sintomer *et al.* (2013) point to the determination of the new government to address the inequalities and imbalances which existed in the apartheid government through reprioritizing and redistributing wealth, taking from the affluent to the vulnerable and poor. In order to achieve this redistribution of wealth, the government had to reform the budgetary system. Shall (2007) notes that the new South African constitution facilitated the budgetary reform because it made provision for the adoption of such reform to increase citizen participation in the financial decisions of their locality. The budgetary reform cascaded to become a nationwide program existing in all local

governments in South Africa, although the commitment to its success varies from local government to local government (Langa & Jerome, 2004).

The South African PB experience has been viewed by some in a positive light, where local governments have been applauded for transparency (Shall, 2007). In a similar manner, Sintomer *et al.* (2013) record that PB has resulted in empowered citizens who have the power to demand accountability and are able to influence budget decisions. The redistribution of wealth has been perceived as a pro-poor project that seeks to empower the vulnerable in society through availing free basic services. Despite attaining these positive PB outcomes, the South African PB experience is marred by numerous impediments which include, among many; citizens' lack of knowledge with regards to their right to participate, councillors' and citizens' lack of capacity and expertise to meaningfully contribute to the PB process, and socio-cultural differences which exist in many local governments that render the communication ineffective (Shall, 2007). Such challenges thwart the efforts at effective community participation and impedes achieving substantive PB outcomes and continuity of the process.

3.5.2 PB applications in Uganda

Contrary to the South African post-apartheid government's commitment to the democratization process, the Ugandan's post-independence experience was characterized by a military dictatorship and civil unrest until 1986 (Mulindwa, 2013). The Ugandan political landscape took a different direction in 1986 when the new government implemented reforms which also sought to change the local government system (Mulindwa, 2013). Mushemeza (2019:12) note that "the Local Governments (Resistance Councils) Statute, 1993 provided the law for decentralisation and empowerment of the popularly elected local leaders to make own decisions, budget, plan and monitor own programme". Decentralization became an imperative which facilitated citizen participation in their governance process through local government units which were created. The 1995 Ugandan Constitution and the Local Government Act of 1997 or the Local Government Act Cap 243 are the guiding frameworks which underpin decentralization policy and the operations of local governments (Mulindwa, 2013; Mushemeza, 2019).

The decentralization policy further provides for the participation of citizens in the budget formulation, implementation and evaluation thus empowering citizens to hold local governments accountable for the utilization of public resources. The legal frameworks mentioned above provide the basis for the implementation of PB in Uganda and they empower citizens to participate in their governance process and create a favourable environment for citizen participation in the budget process. Citizen participation in the budget process in Uganda is facilitated through village councils which are mandated to gather the needs and priorities of the community at a village level, and these are submitted during the budget conference which is hosted annually (Mulindwa, 2013). Such strategies seek to achieve one of the core objectives of decentralization which seek to enable citizens to identify their needs and order them according to priority. Issues of accountability are very crucial in PB in Uganda in the district of Wamplala to enhance accountability. Mulindwa (2013) states that the local government runs a weekly radio program where accountability is rendered.

In a study carried out by Mulindwa (2013), it was noted that the well formulated legal frameworks lacked implementation. Rather, they were fund raising frameworks used by government. Furthermore, evidence gathered indicate that participation in budget conferences is discriminatory as it is based on partisan support, hence; only a few loyalists are allowed to attend. Citizens' contributions in the form of village plans are often not included in the final budget, making the budget elitist in nature, since it will not reflect the needs and priorities of citizens. Thus, Mulindwa (2013) hold that the PB process in Uganda is symbolic and a tool for securing more funding. The inability of citizens to participate in the process stalls the accountability process and promotes corruption and misappropriation of funds.

Locally mobilised resources are inadequate to cater for the PB process therefore it emerged from Mulindwa (2013) that most local governments in Uganda rely on government transfers and donor funding for the PB process to be effected. In the event that these funds are not availed on time the, PB process would be undermined as the ability of communities to determine their spending priorities will be thwarted. If PB is to be successful and the benefits gained the local governments should expand its revenue base to have sustainable resources for the continuation of the PB process. This experience is synonymous to that of most African countries (Sintomer *et al.,*

2013). Challenges experienced in the Ugandan PB process characterize most African experiences, and as such, there is need to address them to benefit from the PB process.

3.5.3 Synopsis of PB experiences in Africa

Legislative frameworks which underpin PB in both South Africa and Uganda are adequate to facilitate and support effective PB in local government settings (Mulindwa, 2013; Leduka, 2009). South African and Ugandan experiences are generally synonymous with most African experiences where excellent policies are formulated but lack implementation. Legislative frameworks in both countries are exceptionally good, but lack implementation. This lack is exemplified by the exclusion of citizens from the participation process in Uganda and how the budget process is dominated by technocrats and politicians.

These experiences are contrary to the sentiments shared by Gret and Sintomer (2005:100 in Leduka, 2009:40), that “PB cannot be a self-managed civic process rather it should be joint effort between local government change agents and citizens, with citizens voice regarded as core to the process”. The voice of the citizens is core and Souza (2000:177 in Leduka 2009) posits that the poor and vulnerable in society “…make constructive contributions in decision making and that they utilise their rights and have access to basic services…”. Citizens have meaningful contributions to the budget process. Therefore, legislative frameworks should be implemented in order to ensure their participation. Failure to uphold the legislative frameworks results in a local government system void of transparency and accountability, and an educational structure which empowers stakeholders of their right to participate and how to do so (Shall, 2007; Mulindwa, 2013).

Shall (2007) and Leduka (2009) propose that training and educational forums be established and capacitated so that citizens are equipped with budget skills for them to meaningfully contribute to the budget process. Moreover, citizens should be involved in the budget process from the onset until the end of the cycle, and not be excluded in some phases of the budget process (Shall, 2007; Leduka, 2009). Political

will and commitment to the democratization process are essential components to the achievement of positive PB outcomes.

3.6 DIMENSIONS OF PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING

The purpose of this section is to detect dimensions or modalities as key success factors necessary for the achievement of PB outcomes. These dimensions play a pivotal role in shaping PB outcomes as they enhance or hinder citizen participation in the budgetary process. These dimensions are used in conjunction with Wampler's (2012) and Harkins and Escobar's (2015) principles to identify challenges encountered in the realization of positive PB outcomes in Mangwe district. The government environment dimension, process design dimension and mechanism dimension as illustrated in figure 3.4 are explored in detail below because they influence the type of outcomes attained in the PB process. Moreover, Wampler (2012) and Harkins and Escobar's (2015) principles of PB are examined.

Figure 3.4: Participatory Budgeting dimensions



Source: Adapted from Ebdon and Franklin (2006:438)

3.5.1 Government environment dimension

The significance of the government environment in the PB process is underscored by Ebdon and Franklin (2006) who observe that both positive and negative PB outcomes are influenced by the government environment. To contribute towards achieving positive PB outcomes, the government environment should play a pivotal role in facilitating legislative frameworks which support PB and citizen participation. It is difficult for PB to achieve positive outcomes in an environment where the government

is not committed to empowering citizens, where there is too much interference from the centre, characterized by party politics. Ebdon, Krane and Franklin (2012) argue that, for effective PB to occur it is important that the local governments be immune from central government interferences which usually overrides local government decisions.

Furthermore, Ebdon and Franklin (2006) hold that, in order to achieve positive PB outcomes, it is imperative to have a government environment with established local government structures which promotes citizen participation and engagement of civil society organizations. Civil society organizations play a crucial role in fostering citizen participation in governance processes, including the budgetary process. Such a role is important because it curtails government dominance in the budgetary process and ensures that the needs and interests of citizens are upheld in the local budget statement. Without the established local government structures which facilitates citizen participation and an active civil society, the needs and preferences of citizens would be overshadowed by the dominant government priorities thus, undermining the objectives of PB (Ebdon & Franklin, 2006; Ebdon, Krane & Franklin, 2012).

3.5.2 The Process dimension

Ebdon, Krane and Franklin (2012:21) allude to the importance of the following questions: “What is being allocated, who participates and the timing of participation in the budget cycle” to the success of the PB process. Emanating from these questions is the realization that the process dimension is concerned with the process adopted for citizens to play an active or inactive role in the allocation of resources. To be meaningful, the process should ensure that participants are representative of the entire community, such that the community’s interests and priorities are captured in the final budget document, which is further translated into community projects and programmes. The timing at which participants are involved in the budget process impacts on the ability of citizens to influence budget decisions. Figure 3.2 accentuates the need to have stakeholders involved in all the phases of the budget process (Mulindwa, 2013). Being involved on time in the budget process enables participants to meaningfully steer the budget in the direction that is beneficial to the community.

3.5.3 The Mechanisms dimension

The mechanisms dimension relates to the strategies developed to enhance citizen participation in the PB process. These strategies are determined by the availability of resources like time (Ebdon & Franklin, 2006). In both developing and developed countries, there are several participatory mechanisms utilized in the budget process. These include focus group discussions, public hearings, consultative meetings, village and ward meetings and e-platforms. In Zimbabwe, the establishment of grassroots committees was a means to facilitate participation at a grassroots level (Mutizwa-Mangiza & Conyers 1996). In the USA, public hearings are some of the mechanisms used to facilitate citizen participation in the budget process (Ebdon *et. al.* 2012). These mechanisms empower citizens to meaningfully contribute to the PB process which results in the attainment of positive PB outcomes. However, it is important to note that the availability of these mechanisms does not always result in the ability of citizens to participate. The Ugandan experience (Mulindwa, 2013) illustrate how the availability of participation mechanisms does not always enhance generic citizen participation. Such a scenario results in failure to attain expected positive PB outcomes.

3.5.4 The Goals and Outcomes dimension

The government environment, process design, and mechanism dimensions have a direct bearing on the outcome dimension. The activities occurring in the other dimensions influence the final result of the PB process either positively or negatively. Expected positive PB outcomes include, deepened democracy, enhanced accountability and transparency, empowered citizenry, efficient service delivery, and redistribution of wealth to the vulnerable and poor in society (Navarro, 1998; World Bank, 2017). The Porto Alegre experience resulted in PB being viewed as the best governance tool, which facilitated its adoption in both developed and developing countries (Heimans, 2002 in Mulindwa, 2013).

The proponents of PB hold that citizen participation, coupled with other elements, plays a crucial role in achieving positive PB outcomes (Navarro, 1998; World Bank,

2017; Heiman, 2002 in Mulindwa, 2013). Sharing similar sentiments, Avrtzer (2009 in Ebdon *et. al.* 2012) indicate that the Port Alegre PB experience recorded positive outcomes due to a favourable government environment that enabled citizen participation and was committed to supporting citizen participation. The positive outcomes recorded in Porto Alegre included the redistribution of wealth to cater for the poor in society, reduced corruption, and enhanced service delivery (World Bank , 2017; Wampler & Avritzer, 2004 in Mulindwa, 2013). Zamboni (2007) points out that the process design of formulated strategies for citizen participation in the budget process as well as a favourable government environment, resulted in PB being recognized as one of the best participatory and governance practices.

3.5.5 Principles of PB

Wampler (2012) and Harkins and Escobar (2015 in O' Hagan *et al.,* 2019) posits principles of PB (Table 3.2) which are synonymous with Ebdon, Krane&Franklin's (2012) PB dimensions. These principles as stipulated by Wampler (2012) and Harkins and Escobar (2015) should underpin successful PB implementation.

Table 3.2 : Principles of Participatyory Budgeting

PB Unit	Wampler's Principles (2012)	Harkins and Escobar Principles (2015)
Accessibility		PB is a long-term endeavor.
Local ownership	Voice	PB requires strong leadership, time and resource
Shared responsibility		
Deliberation	Vote	PB should be independently facilitated.
Transparency		
Support representative democracy	Oversight	PB enables an authentic representation of community interest
Mainstream involvement	Social Justice	PB should be a new and distinct approach.
		PB must utilize existing community groups

		PB must be clear what form of democracy it will take.
		PB recognises the challenges in engaging socially excluded citizens.
		PB has realistic expectations of community representation.
		PB allocates reasonable funding to a limited number of projects

Source: Adapted from O'Hagan *et al.* (2019:82)

The extent of the application of these principles in the PB process determines the outcomes of the process (Cabannes & Lipietz, 2018). Deliberative democracy, transparency, leadership, resources, and duration considerations are some of the key aspects of PB, which if taken into consideration in the implementation of PB, will yield positive PB outcomes. These principles can be used in a similar manner with Ebdon and Frankiln's (2006) dimensions to assess the impact of the PB process. In the quest to identify key challenges which hinder the realization of positive PB outcomes, the study utilized Ebdon and Franklin's (2006) dimensions in conjunction with Wampler (2012) and Harkins and Escobar's (2015) principles as outlined in O' Hagan *et al.* (2019).

The active participation of citizens in the PB process enables them to identify their needs and prioritize them in order to direct the allocation and redistribution processes of resources. Of importance to ascertain is the extent to which the final budget document incorporates the needs of the community as prioritized by citizens through the deliberative process. Ebdon and Franklin's dimensions and Wampler (2012) and Harkins and Escobar's (2015) principles are utilized to ascertain this, and further interrogate the extent of citizen participation in the PB process. The argument is that active participation of various stakeholders in the budget process results in enhanced transparency and accountability which in turn results in effective and efficient service delivery. The inclusion of citizens in the PB process gives them a sense of ownership of projects, trust in the government will be restored and be encouraged to participate in the PB process continuously hence achieving sustainability of the process. Figure

3.5 below summarizes the PB process and its processes, and how these have a relationship with the outcomes.

Figure 3.5: Participatory Budgeting framework



Source: Adapted from Mulindwa (2013)

Figure reflects a PB framework with three boxes which have interrelated elements that facilitate the attainment of positive PB outcomes. Depicted in the first box is the budget cycle with various phases which citizens should be involved in. The second box contains the variables which influence the budget cycle since the PB process is influenced by the environment within which it operates, and the type of mechanisms adopted by government for participation. Activities occurring in the first box and the second box influence the resulting outcomes of the PB process as outlined in Figure.In the absence of the PB process and the process capabilities, it is impossible to achieve positive PB outcomes because these are intricately interwoven.

3.6 CONCLUSION

Addressed in this chapter is the objective which sought to explore international best practice regarding participative budgeting processes in local governments. PB experiences in developing, developed and African countries were analyzed, and lessons drawn from the varying experiences. Challenges which impede the attainment of positive PB outcomes, effective participation and factors which enhance positive PB outcomes identified from these experiences. Lessons which can be drawn from this chapter relate to the inter-connectedness of the PB process with the government environment, process design, mechanism, and the outcomes. The government environment, process design, and the mechanisms influence PB outcomes. The

dimensions and principles of PB aided in giving a clear picture of the relationship between the PB process, capability process, and the outcome. These dimensions and principles of PB, together with the reviewed PB experiences where challenges and factors to enhance positive PB outcomes were identified, enabled the researcher to develop a participatory budget model for rural councils.

In the next chapter the statutory, regulatory, and institutional frameworks that govern participatory budgeting in rural local governments in Zimbabwe are examined. Assessing these frameworks within the context of Zimbabwe is imperative as it contextualizes the study and places it into perspective.

CHAPTER 4

ZIMBABWEAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM AND BUDGETING PROCESSES

4.0 INTRODUCTION

In the preceding chapter, extant literature on PB experiences from both developed and developing countries was reviewed, and particular challenges and best practices extracted from these experiences. Tracing the origins of PB from a global scale facilitates the need to analyze and trace PB within the Zimbabwean perspective from which the study is located. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze issues pertaining to Zimbabwe's governmental structure focusing specifically on local governance and budgeting processes. Tracing the changing dynamics of the local government landscape since the 1980s entails detailing the decentralization policy of 1984 and 1985, and how this redefined the local government system. Such changes in the local government system were facilitated through the formulation and adoption of a comprehensive legislative framework, which among other provisions, provided for the engagement of citizens in local government budgeting processes. This was further cemented by the 2013 Constitution founded on the principles and values of decentralization of authority and devolution of power. Having this chapter focus on these issues seeks to examine how the local government and budgeting system has evolved over time, as well as to determine how the legislative and institutional frameworks direct this system.

The first section of this chapter contextualizes Zimbabwe's system of government, with emphasis on constitutional reforms since 1980. These changes range from the absence of local government legal recognition to the adoption of the 2013 Constitution which provided for devolution as guiding principle. Decentralization of authority to local government was adopted to enhance the engagement of citizens in decision-making processes inclusive of budgeting. It is thus, essential to trace the contours of decentralisation and devolution to analyze the respective participation mechanisms in the budget cycle. Finally, the latter part of the chapter accentuates the case study of

this research, namely Mangwe Rural District Council (MRDC). The profile and particular budgeting arrangements in this case are evaluated to operationalize the research objectives.

4.1 ZIMBABWE'S SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT

The Zimbabwe system of government has undergone major governance reforms since 1980. At the national level, the country moved from being a parliamentary democracy to a presidential democracy, which bequeathed the president with significant authority to interfere in all spheres of government, and in local government affairs in particular. Such interventions materialized through various means including the domination of traditional leadership structures, and interference in decision making at the local government level through the Office of the Minister of Local Government, the Provincial Administrator, the Minister of State, and the Office of the District Administrator (Chatiza, 2010; Chigwata 2010; Makunde et al., 2018).

In response to the imbalances of power which existed in the colonial times, after independence the Government introduced local government reforms through the Prime Minister's Decentralisation Directives of 1984 and 1985, which aimed at redefining the position and responsibilities of local governments in Zimbabwe (Chatiza, 2010). The decentralization policy marked the genesis of a more people-oriented and community-centred local governance system, which sought to address the imbalances which originated during the colonial era.

From the first decade of independence up to 2013 local governments, Zimbabwe did not have legal recognition which made scholars such as Chatiza (2010), Chigwata (2010), and Makumbe (2010) argue that they were mere extensions of the central governments. They thus, simply exercised delegated powers from the centre. However, the 2013 Constitution dramatically altered this state of affairs by introducing a governance structure composed of three tiers; the national government, provincial government, and local government spheres (Constitution, 2013). The three-tier governance system is based on a devolved structure which recognizes the need for flexibility and inclusion of citizens in their governance system (Constitution, 2013?). Thus, the 2013 Constitution was established based on the ideals and concepts of

devolution which strongly suggest a shift from centralized power to a more inclusive, people-oriented governance system characterized by citizen engagement, consultation and participation (Makunde et al., 2018). The second republic which took over from the late Zimbabwean President, Robert Mugabe, has expressed its commitment towards the implementation of devolution and the adoption of the Presidential Guidelines on Devolution and Decentralisation (Chatiza and Zivhave, 2020). However, despite the commitments made towards the decentralization policy in Zimbabwe, there is ample evidence that the Government has been failing to deliver on their obligations and pledges. Reasons for this include several factors which range from lack of political will to lack of resources (Chigwata, 2019; Makunde, 2018).

The respective tiers of government and the significance it holds for local government decision-making powers and authority are outlined below.

4.1.1 National Government

The national government structure consists of the Legislature, Judiciary and Executive authorities which govern and direct national activities (Chakunda, 2015). The Legislature leads in the formulation of laws which govern public institutions and agencies including the lower tiers of government. Chakunda (2015) avers that the enabling legislations which govern the local government structure in Zimbabwe is formulated by the Legislature and it gives the lower tiers of governments power to execute the various mandates stipulated in national legislation. Legislation is also key in the establishment of major institutional frameworks which govern local governments in Zimbabwe.

The Executive authority plays a key role in the appointment of central actors in the local government structure (Zhou, 2013). As stipulated in the 2013 Constitution (Section 104: 1), it is the mandate of the President to appoint the Minister of Local Government, the Minister of State in Provincial Affairs, the Provincial Administrator, as well as the District Administrator. All these positions are highly significant for the powers, authority, and responsibilities of local governments in Zimbabwe.

The highest level within the framework of local governance is the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development (MLRUD) mandated by law to "perform co-coordinative, consultative, and political functions, seen as essential for the speedy and co-ordinated development of districts and provinces" (Chatiza, 2010:15). Chigwata (2010) points to the significance of the duties of the MLRUD in fostering the process of development as it ensures that local governments adhere to national development guidelines in executing their mandates. Kurebwa (2015:31) observes that the MLRUD and the Ministry's Secretary have "far-reaching decision-making powers affecting rural communities". The role of the MLRUD signifies the influence of central government on local affairs since the Minister is a political appointee with representatives at both Provincial and District level through the persons of Provincial and District Administrators. Commenting on the role of the minister, Mushamba (2010) notes that having visibility from national level to local level enables the MLRUD to effectively coordinate national and local affairs. However, such "visibility" often manifests in interference in local affairs and can be regarded as an indication of a limited degree of decentralization. Mushamba (2010:72) confirms this assertion by stating that provisions in the legislations which empower the minister more than local governments seems to suggest that the structure of local government in Zimbabwe is based on a "delegate and delegator relationship". Mushamba (2010:73) further notes that there are more than 250 instances (stipulations) in the Rural District Councils (RDC) Act of 2017 that make it possible for the Minister to intervene in the operations of local governments in Zimbabwe, thus "recentralizing" the whole local government system.

4.1.2 Provincial Government

Zimbabwe comprises ten provinces previously governed by the Provincial Governor. The Provincial Governor system has since been replaced by the Minister of State for Provincial Affairs as provided for by the 2013 Constitution. The Provincial Councils and Administration Act of 1985 has been the primary legislation that guides the activities and operations of Provincial Governments (PGs) in Zimbabwe.

At the apex of the provincial level is the position of the minister of State for Provincial Affairs who is appointed by the President. This ministry is obliged by law to lead the

development processes of the provinces. The minister chairs the Provincial Council (PC) that comprises the following delegates:

- provincial members of the Senate,
- members of Parliament,
- political party leaders within the province,
- the RDC chairperson,
- representative of traditional leadership, and
- three technical experts (Kurebwa, 2014).

The PC is an integral decision-making body at the provincial level, and its creation is provided for in the 2013 Constitution (Section 281:1). PCs are to operate through the Provincial Development Committee (PDCOs) which facilitate planning and coordinated development in the province (Chigwata, 2010; Jonga, 2014). They are mandated to formulate provincial development plans congruent with the country's developmental blueprint development strategy or vision.

The Office of the Provincial Administrator (PA) is synonymous with what was called "Provincial Commissioner" during the colonial times (Chigwata, 2010). The PA's functions can be regarded as a continuation of the central government functions at a provincial scale. Their influence is through chairing the PDCs to ensure coordinated development and compliance of local governments to the policy guidelines of the central government. The PA is also mandated "to perform such duties in relation to the Provincial Councils as the Minister may from time to time direct" (Provincial Councils and Administration Act, 1985). Chigwata and Marumahoko (2017) hold that the mandate of provincial government is that of consolidating and prioritizing district plans plan. Thus, the provincial government plays a crucial role in the decentralization process as it facilitates the inclusion of citizens in the development process through including local priorities in the provincial development plans and then forwarding them to the national developmental agenda.

Despite having a participatory and developmental mandate, Chigwata (2010) argues that provincial governments are inadequate in terms of owning and displaying a

devolved character, which is an emblem of a decentralized entity. Provincial governments in Zimbabwe lack the attributes of a devolved entity which are “own budget, separate legal status, authority to allocate substantial resources, a range of different functions and a system whereby decisions are made by representatives of the local people” (Mawhood, 1993:9). However, the PG in Zimbabwe, as Chakaipa (2010) states, has powers to allocate resources and relies on the central government for resources to execute their mandate. Commenting on the lack of powers to allocate resources, Stewart *et al.* (1994) opine that deconcentration is a type of decentralization which has been adopted at the PG level instead of the supposed devolution. Where deconcentration is being used, the lower governing units owes their accountability to the central government and the central government determines their operating boundaries and activities.

According to Chigwata (2019), under section 12 of the Provincial Councils and Administration Act, the PG has a legal existence but there is no substantive evidence which validates the ability of PGs to exercise this existence. Moreover, it is exceedingly challenging for PGs to derive any value from their legitimate existence when they are devoid of substantial roles and responsibilities (Chigwata, 2019). Such inadequacies render the PGs as ineffective governing units that act more as central government extensions instead of furthering the ideals of decentralization. Furthermore, it can be argued that the appointments of the former Provincial Governors, who are now known as the Ministers of States, compromise the objectives of decentralization. The decentralization policy sought to uphold the interests, needs and priorities of the local people. However, Chigwata (2019) maintains that the centralized appointment of the Ministers in charge of the Provinces and the Provincial Administrator makes it virtually impossible for these officials to be held accountable by local communities since their appointments direct them to be accountable only to central government. In this regard, Chigwata (2010:50) insists that “this has resulted in the implementation of pro-central government policies which contains little or no reflection on local needs, preferences and priorities”.

4.1.3 Local Government

The structure of local government is premised on the devolution principles as outlined in the 2013 Constitution (Chapter 14) and subsequent enabling legislation including the Rural Districts Councils Act (1996) and the Urban Councils Act (1996). These primary Acts are used in conjunction with the Provincial Towns and Structures Act (1985) and the Traditional Leaders Act (2000) which outline the procedures and powers of local governments. These Acts serve as overarching institutional and legal frameworks that govern the structure of local governments in Zimbabwe.

The Urban Councils and Rural District Councils are established local government units which Jonga (2014:79) identifies as "lower sub-national structures compared to the Provincial Councils". They are mandated to facilitate development in their areas of jurisdiction through adopting various participative approaches. Councils are subdivided into wards which are sub-national units whose representative is an elected councillor. Councils are composed of political and technical officials whose duties though different enhance the functioning of the institution (Jonga, 2014). Political officials in the form of elected councillors play a leading role in policy making, bylaws passing and budget formulation, whereas the technical arm facilitates the day-to-day functioning of the council and implement policies formulated by the elected officials. Tolmay and Morna (2010) underscore the need for independence of the political and technical arms of governance in the execution of their distinct functions.

The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the District Administrator play a significant role in the administration of the council (Jonga, 2014; Kurebwa, 2015). Kurebwa (2015:35) furthers the thought that the office of the DA is an extension of the central government since it is evident that the office "… wield enormous powers and have been described as acting on behalf of the Ministry of Local Government" in administrative issues, monitoring and ensuring that local governments adhere to central government policy guidelines. Such a role suggests that the central government interferes in local government affairs through the office of the DA, which somehow supresses the ideals of devolution as provided for in the 2013 Constitution.

Chigwata and Marumahoko (2017) note that local governments are expected to facilitate development in the areas of their jurisdiction through adopting a participative budgetary process. However, the composition of the RDDC as observed by Kurebwa (2014:37) is “almost exclusively restricted to bureaucrats and technocrats at the expense of ‘popular’ representatives of grassroots structures in the district’s supreme planning body”. Similar sentiments are shared by Chakaipa (2010) who stipulates that such a composition upholds the top-down approach instead of facilitating the bottom-up approach which includes communities in crucial decision making which affects them. Plans and decisions made by Ward Development Committees (WADCOs) and Village Development Committees (VIDCOs) are purportedly incorporated into the final RDC plan which is further forwarded to the PDDC for incorporation into the broader national development plan. Having a RDDC excluding the community implies that decisions and plans forwarded by the WADCOs and VIDCOs are “largely ignored and sub-national planning becomes the reserve of the few elites” (Kurebwa, 2015:38). Thus, local government planning and decision making reflects the needs and interests of a few politically connected individuals. Excluding or under-representing the communities in decision making, especially budget decisions, hinders development since the needs and interests of the community will not be incorporated in the final budget. Instead of involving communities in the decision-making process, councils legitimize their already authored plans through what Kurebwa (2015:38) terms “shallow, hurried, dubious and cosmetic consultation processes”.

4.1.3.1 The role of traditional leadership in the local system of governance

Traditional leaders’, form the bedrock of rural local governance system, whose existence is recognised by law through the previous and the current Constitution of Zimbabwe and the Traditional Leadership Act of 1998 (Kurebwa, 2015). The role of traditional leadership has been recognised during the pre- and post-independence period in Zimbabwe and has played a crucial role in fostering grassroots participation in the governance process (Chatiza, 2008; Makumbe, 2010). Traditional leadership has been instrumental in mobilizing communities to be active recipients of the development process through participating in their governance process.

Local administrative and judicial roles were the reserve of the traditional leaders in Zimbabwean communities during the colonial era. Such a position placed them at a pedestal where their rights to allocate communal land were increased, and their mandate was expanded to tax collection within their areas of jurisdiction. Traditional leaders, according to the Zimbabwe Institute (2005), became a representative of both the local people and the colonial masters who even bolstered their position through paying them salaries. The post-colonial government introduced governmental reforms which tremendously altered the position of traditional, as most of their administrative and judicial roles were reduced from their portfolio. The newly introduced district councils assumed the administrative roles formerly performed by the traditional leaders, and most judicial matters were transferred to the established community courts (Zimbabwe Institute, 2005).

As articulated in the 2013 Constitution, traditional leaders in Zimbabwe have power over communal lands which fall within their jurisdiction. However, the Centre for Conflict Management and Transformation (CCMT) (2014) states that this right is limited to the provisions of the enabling legislation which extends this right to the RDC. Being regarded as the custodians of communal lands, traditional leaders in rural areas retain the powers to allocate residential and agricultural land to the local people. Any land which is located within business centres or meant for commercial farming falls within the portfolio of the RDC (CCMT, 2014; Makumbe, 2010). Observing these land allocation roles for both traditional leaders and the local authorities, Makumbe (2010) notes that traditional leaders have been given limited responsibilities compared to their local government counterparts. The constrained duties and responsibilities of traditional leaders are further illustrated in the RDC Act (1998), which allows Chiefs to sit in the RDC meetings as ex-officio whose rights are only limited to participating but are excluded from the voting process. This has led to soured relations between the traditional leaders and RDC officials, with traditional leaders blaming the RDC for the limited powers and responsibilities which they seemingly now have.

Evidently the land allocation question has created a controversial relationship between traditional leaders and the DC. The controversy emanates from double land allocation where the two structures operate parallel to each other and allocate the same land to different recipients. A case was recorded in Chirumanzu where Chief Nhema allocated

formerly commercial farmland to over 300 families without liaising with the relevant RDC authorities who had already allocated the same land and provided offer letters to more than 300 farmers (CCMT, 2014). Similarly, CCMT (2014) attests to the potential conflicting relationship between the RDC and the traditional leaders due to the land allocation meant to facilitate the extension of growth points. The land for this purpose is usually apportioned from the surrounding rural land which exists outside the growth point. This has caused bad blood between the traditional leaders and the RDC as they view this act as diminishing their power and territory, since they would not have a hold over land taken for growth and development.

The introduction of the Traditional Leaders Act (1998) ushered in more changes to the dynamics between the traditional leaders and Village Development Committee (VIDCO) (Zimbabwe Institute, 2005). Under this Act, traditional leaders are given authority to preside over land and livestock disputes, and to enforce judicious management of natural resources. The Village Head's (VH) authority over the VIDCO chairperson was also upheld under the Traditional Leaders Act (1998). The village head was given authority to preside over village matters and the Village Assembly (VA) to supersede all VIDCO structures in the village. The fact that the VIDCO and VA are both chaired by the VH is an indication that the VIDCO has become a shadow of the VA, with no powers to make any meaningful contribution towards community development. Chiefs supersede traditional structures as indicated by the powers given to them by the Traditional Leaders Act (1998). These powers range from administrative, traditional, cultural to policy making, and these can be delegated to the headman who can act on behalf of the chief. The Headman has a mandate of chairing the Ward Assembly (WA) where ward related issues are deliberated.

According to the Zimbabwe Institute (2005), the changes which have been made to the roles of traditional leaders, council officials, and elected officials has resulted in conflicted relationships. Straining the relationships are issues related to the community customs and traditions, especially on land allocation and natural resources. Rural councils are the hardest hit with these conflicting relations since they operate within the vicinity of traditional leadership. Traditional leaders feel undermined by local government officials as they seek to execute their duties (CCMT, 2014; Makumbe, 2010). In a similar manner, local government officials often view traditional leaders as

a setback to revenue collection since village heads, tasked with this mandate, often fail to be successful.

Traditional leaders and elected officials (councillors) often have conflicting relations which result in a state of underdevelopment in rural areas. According to CCMT (2014), traditional leaders and councillors have divergent views as to who supersedes the other in terms of their responsibilities and roles. Traditional leaders believe that they have been assigned by the ancestors to hold the highest position as representatives of the people. In contrast, elected officials claim their legitimacy as official representatives due to the mandate obtained via elections. Such conflicting power perspectives and dynamics have resulted often in failure of these two structures to have a coordinated work relationship conducive for development (CCMT, 2014).

Despite being an important channel used to mobilize community participation, traditional leadership has been accused of failing to adhere to the provision of the law, which calls upon the institution to be apolitical and be a haven for everyone in society despite their political affiliations (Zimbabwe Election Support Network [ZESN], 2008). Kurebwa (2015) alludes to several incidences where traditional leaders have been at the forefront of political campaigns on behalf of their preferred political party, at the same time victimising community members known to be affiliated to another political party. This has largely been influenced by the realization of politicians that the influence of traditional leadership could be utilized for their own political benefits (Kurebwa, 2015).

Notwithstanding challenges associated with traditional leadership, it remains significant in mobilising local communities to be actively involved in local government affairs, thus contributing to the ideals of the policy of decentralization.

4.2 LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE: LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS

As noted in the previous section, the structure of local government in Zimbabwe is fashioned after the decentralization policy which was first outlined in the Primer Minister's (PM's) directives of 1984 and 1985 (Chigwata, 2010). Following the PM's

directives, subsequent legislative frameworks were enacted which defined the operational methods of the local government structure. These Acts, as outlined by Kurebwa (2015:28), include the following:

(a) “Regional Town and Country Planning Act (1976),
(b) Provincial Councils and Administration Act (1985),
(c) The Urban Councils Act (1993),
(d) The Rural District Councils Act (1988, 1996),
(e) The Traditional Leaders Act (1998), and
(f) Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013)”.

These Acts form the bedrock of local government management in Zimbabwe (Zinyama, 2014; Jonga, 2014; Mapuva, 2019). The 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe is in sync with the ideals of NPM reforms, as it gives eminence to citizen participation in the local government system, including PB processes, and underscores the need for local governments to “...ensure good governance by being effective, transparent, accountable and institutionally coherent” (Section 265:1a). Similarly, Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development (ZIMCODD) (2019:28) observes that “the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment 20 provides frameworks for public participation in budgeting”. Emanating from these constitutional provisions is the need to empower citizens to be drivers of their development process through participating in their governance process. Involving citizens in the budget process seeks to reduce the dominance of bureaucrats and allow the beneficiaries of the process lead in the prioritisation of their needs (Machingauta, 2010).

These Acts play a crucial role in defining the relationships between various actors, stipulating the mandate of local governments and laying out procedures to be followed in various processes including PB process. The constitution provides for enabling legislations to guide local government systems, including the budget process (Zinyama, 2014). Zinyama (2014) argues that the concept of PB is located within these Acts through the stipulations made with reference to budgeting. Participation in the budget process in rural areas is directed by the RDC Act of 1988 and the Traditional Leadership Act of 1998, which provide for the establishment of Ward Development Committees (WADCOs) and Village Development Committees (VIDCOs). These

promote community development through being platforms for citizen participation (Marango *et al.*, 2018). Thus, local government budgeting is mandated by law to foster development and be citizen oriented. All information pertaining to the budget should be availed to citizens in-order to ensure that they make meaningful contributions towards the budget process.

The legislative frameworks are vital for articulating the roles of institutions involved in local government management, defining the relationships between various actors, stipulating the mandate of local governments, and laying out procedures to be followed in various local government processes (Machingauta, 2010). Rural local government institutions include, the Ministry of Local Government, Provincial Administration and Councils, Rural District Councils (RDCs), WADCOs and VIDCOs.

4.2.1 Tracing the chronicles of the changing local government landscape since 1980

The early phase of independence marked a series of endeavours aimed at reforming the previously prevalent two-tiered local governance structure from the colonial period (Chatiza, 2010; Jonga, 2014; Kurebwa, 2015). Government policies and legislations which sought to redress the ills of colonialism were formulated and enacted (Kurebwa, 2015). Mutizwa-Mangiza (1985) and Makumbe (1998) note that the 1984 and 1985 Prime Minister's directives on decentralization transformed the local government landscape and promoted grassroots participation through instituting local authorities through the enactment of the Urban and Rural District Councils Acts of 1985. The PM's directives which were issued as policy interventions and sought to enhance citizen participation, were later translated into law to become the Provincial Councils and Administration Act of 1985 which enabled the creation of inclusive frameworks at the village, ward, district, and provincial levels. These decentralization reforms facilitated the integration of rural and district councils, along with tribal land under Rural District councils. The restructuring aimed to eradicate the racial inequities inherited from the colonial period. Similarly, in urban areas emphasis was placed on a one city concept which sought to address developmental imbalances characteristic of the colonial era. In a bid to bolster the status of both the urban and rural councils, the government

launched capacity building projects which sought to enable these councils to execute their functions effectively.

The PM's directives of 1984 and 1985 became a major policy instrument which defined the rural governance landscape in Zimbabwe. It articulated the structures of governance which sought to facilitate grassroots participation (Kurebwa, 2014). A body of representative committees comprising village, ward, district, and provincial committees was established and provided for by the PM's directive. Jonga (2014:80) underscores the significance of the committees to "enhance governance through providing democratic platforms at local levels where issues of a local nature are deliberated and policy decisions and development plans or options are voluntary agreed". These establishments marked the genesis of a decentralized and more participatory approach to governance in Zimbabwe. Local government councils were a major strategy the government adopted as a catalyst to transforming the lives of citizens, by providing them with a chance to engage in their own governance procedures. This enabled the delegation of specific powers and responsibilities from the central government to local governing bodies. These bodies were anticipated to swiftly address the needs of the populace (Coutinho 2010; Rural District Councils Act [Chapter 29:13], Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:15]).

When examining the decentralisation framework adopted in Zimbabwe in the 1980s, Chigwata (2019) stipulates that the Lancaster House Constitution, which was in existence since 1980 till 2013, did not provide for the constitutional recognition of local governments. Rather, the previous constitution established a unified state structure that did not acknowledge provincial and local governments within its constitutional framework. Local governments' existence was based on a delegated relationship with the central government, where they only exercised the powers delegated to them through the enabling legislation. However, such a landscape made local governments mere agents of central governments, with little autonomy if at all, to execute their mandates. The unitary type of government was highly criticised nationwide for "over centralisation and personalisation of power" (Chigwata, 2019). Furthermore, Chigwata (2019) notes that there was consensus that the problems which crippled Zimbabwe since the 1990s were due to over-centralization of power and lack of a devolved local

government system, which could have been a vehicle for improving service delivery, local driven development, and democracy.

4.2.2 The 2013 Constitution and the system of local governance

As outlined in the previous section, the previous Constitution (1980-2013) over-centralized power instead of giving the local governments constitutional recognition. The 2013 Constitution review process sought to address these concerns through ensuring that the devolution debate was given priority. It was believed that devolution was the only solution to empowering local governments and reducing over-centralization of power to the centre. Chigwata (2019:73) alludes to the controversy which surrounded the constitutional review process due to the devolution mantra where “those with power and control over resources wanting to maintain the status quo, whereas those who lacked power and resources sought to have more power and influence and a greater share of resources”. Despite having diverse ideologies from different stakeholders, devolution was finally adopted into the new 2013 Zimbabwean Constitution.

The devolution principles adopted in the 2013 Constitution enhanced the status of provincial and local governments as they attained recognition as tiers of government. When examining the meaning of “level of administration” which local governments were previously known as, and “tier of administration”, Chigwata (2019) expresses that a “level of administration” is not empowered by law to formulate policies, but instead, only implements what has been formulated by the higher office. Thus, introducing the three tiers of government consisting of the national, provincial and local government, has been applauded as a significant move towards ensuring good governance. As per the 2013 Constitution, the provincial level of governance has been subdivided into ten entities consisting of eight provincial councils and two metropolitan councils. The local government tier is divided into two parts, namely, urban councils and rural district councils.

Despite having a strong constitutional framework which has devolution as its founding pillars, Chigwata (2019) asserts that devolution lacked implementation by the former government, with lack of resources being cited as the main hindrance. Moreover, it

has been argued that devolution was viewed as ideologically and politically undesirable, especially for the ruling party, hence the lack of full implementation.

4.3 TOWARDS A DECENTRALIZED SYSTEM FOR LOCAL GOVERNANCE

The Government which took over from former President Mugabe pledged full support for the effective implementation of devolution. Chigwata (2019) is of the view that President Mnangagwa's government is more concerned about devolution of an economic nature which will enable the provinces to achieve economic growth within their provinces. Despite the Constitution recognizing the provincial councils, it falls short in detailing what their powers are, and how are they expected to drive socio-economic development and their relationship with the local government. Also having Provincial Ministers as political appointees is feared to be a setback to devolution.

It is still unclear as to what devolution will entail since the Devolution Act has not yet been enacted and the Urban and Rural Councils Acts have not been modified to cater for this (UCAZ 2020). The provisions of the 2013 Constitution suggest that local governments in Zimbabwe are more than extensions of central governments since they are a tier of government. This suggests that they have the power to make laws and policies, and implement them. This is somewhat true of Zimbabwe's local governments as they are mandated by law to raise their revenue using sources outlined in legislation and other legal income generating projects within their jurisdiction. Moreover, local governments are empowered by the enabling legislations to formulate by-laws and policies which govern their areas of jurisdiction, and to craft budgets in a participatory manner, for which approval is sought from the national government through the person of the Minister of Local Government (Rural District Councils Act, 1996; Urban Councils Act, 1996).

The 2019 Presidential Policy Guidelines on Devolution and Decentralization (PGDD) is a significant policy instrument which seeks to address the inadequacies of the Constitution on devolution and decentralization. The PGDD seeks to strengthen the functions and roles of the lower tiers of government and enhance cooperative governance and development. Of importance, and what the policy seeks to address is:

i) “intergovernmental fiscal transfers,
ii) citizen participation, and
iii) intergovernmental relations (functions and structures)” (UCAZ, 2020:13).

Considerable efforts have been made by the Second Republic in Zimbabwe to operationalize devolution. Such efforts have been manifested in the emphasis on devolution in the subsequent blueprints adopted. These include the Transitional Stabilization Programme and Reforms Agenda adopted in October 2018 (Chigwata, 2019) These blueprints underscore the importance of upholding devolution through ensuring that resources are availed to the local governments through their provinces. Chigwata (2019) states that such resources have been committed by Government since 2019. All local governments in Zimbabwe have been receiving five percent of the devolution funds aimed at socio-economic development. However, the need for approval of such funds by the cabinet questions the reality of devolution, since it gives the central government eminence over local government affairs. Such issues pose a challenge and raise questions about the type of devolution which the government seeks to implement.

Despite having shown commitment to the devolution agenda, the reform of the law governing provincial and local governments has been on the agenda for long without being finalised and operationalised. It has been observed that the existing legislations have not been aligned to the 2013 Constitution, and this has suppressed effective local government service delivery and enhanced central government’s hold on power and functions which should have been devolved to local governments (Chigwata, 2019; UCAZ, 2020). Moreover, the legislative reforms should give clarity on the roles of provincial and metropolitan councils and how they are to cooperate with local governments. Furthermore, parameters and clarity on issues of fiscal autonomy, revenue sharing, the extent of local government supervision and local government autonomy should be provided for.

Despite having expressed and shown commitment towards operationalizing devolution in Zimbabwe, Chigwata (2019) argues that effective execution of devolution hinges on the political will of those in power, and the willingness of the technical arm

in implementing it. Thus, for devolution to be effectively adopted and implemented in the Zimbabwean context, there is need for those at the realm of power to cede the hold of control and authority to the subordinate levels of government.

Chatiza (2010) and Jonga (2014) opine that the local government structure that existed during the colonial period local government was characterized by a dual system of governance which was segregational and racial in nature. Chigwata (2010: 24) sees this dual system of governance in terms of "separate development" which mostly benefitted the white population while subjecting the black majority to poor services and excluding them from being involved in the governance process. The colonial authorities ensured the deliberate underdevelopment of the African rural economy, maintaining its function as a labour reservoir for the benefit of the colonial rulers (Machingauta 2010; Jonga 2014). To perpetuate this, the local governments lacked autonomy, denied the right to pursue their local interests and identify their priorities and lacked resources for the execution of their mandate. Thus, the local government system in place subjugated African local interests and denied Africans an opportunity to participate in their local governance process. Machingauta (2010) states that the colonial government exercised a top-down approach when dealing with African local governments, as policies were imposed on them without allowing them to lead the governance process.

Jonga (2014) explicates that despite being discriminatory and segregational in nature, the colonial local government system which was inherited by Zimbabwe was already decentralized and devolved. The post-colonial government, through the Prime Minister's Directives on Decentralisation (PMDD's) of 1984 and 1985, sought to redefine the decentralization system through addressing racial injustices and imbalances which characterized the colonial local government system. The redefinition of the decentralization policy aimed at improving service delivery, and enhancing the democratization process through affording citizens an opportunity to direct their governance and development process (Machingauta, 2010).

Makara (2018) views decentralization as a process of transferring powers from the centre to the periphery, with the intention of increasing the citizen's voice in the governance process. In a similar manner, Conyers (2007) observes that

decentralization entails expanding and strengthening democracy and citizen participation in the governance process. Implicit in the definitions is that decentralization entails the central authority transferring its authority to the outer regions, with the intention of involving the governed population in the process of governance. Crook and Manor (1998:27) observe that “democracy is not necessarily part of the definition of decentralisation, but it has considerable influence on the concept and practice of decentralisation”. Democracy entails popular participation by citizens in the governance process, for example, participation in local elections, policy making, and development planning, constitutional making process among others. To this end, decentralization has been appreciated as a tenet of democracy due to the participatory approach it offers to the localities, and the accountability of local authorities to the grassroots.

According to Ozmen (2014:415) “decentralisation seeks to create relationships of accountability among citizens, service providers, and subnational governments and between the local and central governments”. Similarly, Tommasi & Weinschelbaum (2007) applauds decentralization on the grounds of increased accountability of local government to the grassroots. These sentiments reinforce the importance of decentralization in enhancing accountability and fostering citizen inclusion and participation in the development process, which ultimately positively imparts on their wellbeing.

Bustamante (2010) and Cheema and Rondinelli (2007) regard decentralization as a concept which allows for flexibility and tailoring programs to the needs of the local citizens. The argument is that local governments are strategically located to understand and know what the citizens’ needs and priorities are, and to quickly act on these without wasting scarce resources on programs that are not of an urgent nature to the people. Mamdani’s (1996) emphasis is on the citizenship status which decentralization affords to citizens where they have rights to deliberate on issues which affect them locally. These sentiments are further cemented by Chigwata (2010:19) who states that allowing citizens to direct their development process “has a great potential to promote national development by creating a conducive environment for policy formulation and implementation which is a prerequisite for economic development”. Other proponents of decentralization, such as Agrawal and Ribbot

(1999), justify it on the grounds of creating more efficient local governments and fostering citizen participation in their governance process. Similar sentiments are echoed by Wekwete and de Valk (1990: 261), who note that decentralization "increases speed and flexibility and more efficient use of existing resources". These views underscore the significant contributions attributed to the practice of decentralization.

Makara (2018:23) identifies the following four characteristics of decentralization:

(i) "democratic and participatory decision making,
(ii) freedom of civil society to play an active role in society,
(iii) engendering effective accountability, and
(iv) reforming the state for development in Africa".

These characteristics of decentralization seek to transform governments from centralized regimes to ones that uphold participatory governance approaches such as freedom and rights of civil society. It also promotes good governance where government can be answerable to the people for their actions and inactions, and having government entities which provide efficient and effective services.

While decentralization is commended for enhancing the engagement of citizens, in numerous Latin American and Asian nations, only a privileged few have significant involvement in the process, rather than the majority who remain economically disadvantaged. In Zimbabwe, as observed by Makumbe (1998:28), the intention behind establishing Village Development Committees (VIDCOs) and Ward Development Committees (WADCOs) was to encourage local-level grassroots participation in the decision-making processes for development planning and implementation within their respective communities. However, these committees were unable to fulfil their designated roles due to various hindrances, including factors such as "lack of authority to raise resources, the central government dictating the *modus operandi* of these committees" and "impositions from the central government on how these committees should operate" (Makumbe, 1998:29).

Decentralization makes it difficult to coordinate and implement national policies hence downplaying the concept of national uniformity. In addition, decentralization, as noted by Conyers quoted in Wekwete and de Valk (1990:18), “can also lead to the increase in demand of resources and make it more difficult for the centre to control resource use”. Chigwata (2010) argues that decentralization cannot be an all-encompassing remedy for governance challenges in developing countries, but its success is largely dependent on its design and existing socio-economic and political landscape of a given state. Despite the challenges that have been highlighted in the implementation of decentralization, Chigwata (2010) maintains that these are due to ill formulated decentralization policies and lack of political will to ensure their success.

Figure 4.1 below captures Zimbabwe’s rural local government’s three tier structure discussed above. Indicative in this figure are various actors involved in local government management consisting of the traditional leadership, elected officials, political appointees and the RDC public officials.

Figure 4.1: Zimbabwe's local government structures



Source: Adapted from Kurebwa (2015:43).

4.4 LOCAL GOVERNMENT BUDGETING SYSTEMS AND PARTICIPATION MECHANISMS

As outlined above, local governments in Zimbabwe have become the nerve centre of the decentralization policy. The need to enhance citizen participation was evidenced through the establishment of committees at grassroots level, which sought to facilitate a bottom–up approach to development. Scholars like Mamdani (1996), Matovu and Mumvuma (2000), Rondinelli and Cheema (1983), and Wekwete and De Valk (1990) highlight that citizen participation enables the customization and adaptation of development plans and initiatives to align with specific requirements of the populace. The idea of citizen participation, as conceived within the framework of New Public Management (NPM) reforms, aimed to strengthen governance structures. A pivotal component of NPM-driven overhauls in public sector financial arrangements is the notion of Participatory Budgeting (PB).

Zinyama (2014) notes that the concept of PB is a participatory mechanism which local governments in Zimbabwe have adopted to enhance citizen participation in their governance process. The realization that finance is the fuel of administration makes it difficult for local government to operate without a budget. It is for this reason that Section 121 of the RDC Act 29:13 mandates RDC to formulate budgets in accordance with the stated procedure, which involves involving citizens in the budget process. Transparency and participation are key concepts of good governance which should be upheld in the budget process (Marango *et al.*, 2018; Zinyama, 2014). Citizen participation is key in the budget process, as it allows for the budget to reflect the interests of those which it is formulated for.

According to Mulaudzi (2014) and *We Pay You Deliver* Consortium (2018), ministerial Guidelines through Local Government Circulars, that are availed annually, are important policy guidelines for providing a framework for the facilitation of the practice of PB. These guidelines offer a prescription of the course which local government budgeting should follow. These guidelines are the first stage of the budget cycle as indicated in figure 4.2 below. According to *We Pay You Deliver* Consortium (2018), the general local government process in Zimbabwe as outlined in the various

Ministerial Guidelines seeks to ensure that the budget process is transparent and the local governments are accountable through providing all the information relating to the budget process. Outlined in these guidelines is the need for the budget process to be inclusive and give all citizens an opportunity to influence budget decisions.

Section 288 of the RDC Act 29:13 provide a participatory and transparent environment for budget formulation that seeks to enhance accountability and effective service delivery. Upon drafting the local government income and expenditure estimates, consultations and hearings through community outreach programmes are carried out with the aim of soliciting citizens' inputs of programs to be funded through the budget (World Bank, 2017). The prioritization of citizen engagement in the budget formulation process, as outlined in the RDC Act, was initially established within the directives of the Prime Minister Directives of 1984 and 1985, focused on enhancing grassroots participation in their governance process.

At the grassroots level, broad citizen participation in the budget process is spearheaded by WADCOs and VIDCOs. The Traditional Leadership Act of 1998 (sections 18 and 20) and the RDC Act (section 56) provide for the establishment of the Ward Assembly (WA) and the WADCOs. WADCOS and VIDCOS facilitate PB through meetings where citizens prioritize projects which they deem necessary for their locality. The Village Assembly is the bridge between the governed and the governors (Makumbe, 2010). The VA operates through the VIDCO that is mandated to identify community needs and interests and prioritise them through village plans forwarded to the WADCO for incorporation in the district plan. It is in these platforms where communities are to articulate their needs and influence budget decisions to reflect these priorities. According to the PMFC Act of 1999, the views gathered from the citizens are consolidated into the budget statement approved by council and signed by the responsible authority, then made public for inspection by the citizens. The inspection process empowers citizens to raise any objections before the budget is adopted as the final draft and forwarded to the Minister of local government for endorsement as illustrated in figure 4.2 below (World Bank, 2017).

Section 22 of the Traditional Leaders Act of 1998 underscores the need for VIDCOs and WADCOs to be platforms of facilitating citizen participation on community needs

and priorities. Commenting on the roles of these grassroots committees, Makumbe (1998) states that their inclusivity and participatory nature is in theory, because in practice, grassroots decision making is almost entirely the reserve of the traditional leadership under the influence of the central government. Thus, local government is viewed by Makumbe (1998) as a sub-unit of the central government which seeks to further its interests at the expense of the common community good. Similarly, Katerere and Mohamed (1996) hold that grassroot committees fail to render accountability to their communities. Rather, they are upwardly accountable.

The World Bank (2017) justifies the powers given to the minister of local government to endorse or disapprove local government budgets on several grounds, chief among them being to verify if the budget process was inclusive of the citizens and the participatory procedures. Under these circumstances, the minister of local government assumes the role of watchdog and guardian of the interests of the grassroots. Despite these justifications, it is imperative to note that such power possessed by the minister of local government seemingly points to sentiments made by Kurebwa (2015) of local governments as extensions of the central government due to their interference through the minister of local government. Once all objections have been rectified, the budget is then adopted by the council and sent to the minister of local government for endorsement. Once the budget receives an approval status from the ministry concerned, it is implemented, monitored, and evaluated. Marango *et al.* (2018) notes that, throughout the entire budget cycle, citizens' involvement should be visible and meaningful.

Despite the emphasis on a bottom-up approach in local government budgeting, Bland (2010) maintains that local government budgeting, just like provincial budgeting, is dominated by the central government through its technical expertise. In a similar manner, Mushamba (2010) observes the dominance of the central government in local government activities as undermining the bottom-up approach which facilitates effective citizen participation. Bland (2010) further argues that such a composition falls short of attaining the decentralization objective of being inclusive of grassroots in the governance process. Decentralization is effective if the governed are adequately incorporated into making decisions which affect them through participatory mechanisms like PB. Moreover, Mushamba (2010) indicates that consultation is more

pronounced in the local government process rather than participation. Various instruments of public consultations have been viewed by Mushamba (2010) as elitist in nature, since not all citizens are literate enough to understand how they operate.

Figure 4.2: Local government budget cycle in Zimbabwe

Source: Adapted from ZIMCODD (2019:23)

The budget cycle illustrated in

Figure 4.2 reflects all the stages which local government budget has to go through before the budget is approved and becomes operational. The Ministry of Local

Government, Public Works and National Housing (MLGPWNH) kick starts the budget cycle by providing local governments with budget guidelines to guide their budgets for the year. Once the guiding policy from the ministry has been received, various council departments formulate their departmental budgets, which are further consolidated into a draft budget assessed by the finance committee before being presented to the council for discussions. Stages F and G are participatory stages where stakeholders and citizens at large are given an opportunity to discuss the proposed draft budget, raise objections, and further their proposals and approvals. Having considered the discussions from the citizenry, the budget is modified to capture the views of the people and is presented to the full council for adoption. After the adopted budget has been approved by the minister, it is then executed by the relevant council.

The budget cycle, as discussed, fulfils the legal requirements outlined in the Constitution, Public Finance Management Act, and other enabling legislation. According to the Zimbabwean Constitution of 2013: 141b, the public has a right to be consulted on key national matters. In a similar manner, the PFM Act: 28[5] stipulates that public hearings should be carried out on the budget to ensure public participation in matters relating to their governance (ZIMCODD, 2020). It is important to note that the budget cycle, as illustrated in

Figure 4.2, offers a consultative instead of participatory approach to citizens (Zinyama, 2014). Citizens are only consulted after the draft budget has been formulated. If Makumbe's (2010) analysis of grassroots committees as institutions which form the bedrock of grassroots participation in the budget is to be adopted as fact, then grassroot committees' visibility in the budget cycle should be enforced from the onset of the formulation of the draft budget. Capturing these committees would reflect a true participatory nature of the budget process.

4.5 MANGWE RURAL DISTRICT COUNCIL AS CASE STUDY

Provided in this section is the background information of Mangwe Rural District Council, the locus of this study. The general profile of the case is outlined as well as its structure and organizational arrangements.

Mangwe is situated in the western part of Matebeleland South province. It is bordered by Bulilima to the north, Matobo towards the east, and the main Zimbabwe-Botswana boundary towards the west and south. Mangwe Rural District Council (MRDC) is a rural authority in the process of pursuing PB as alternative budgeting process (https://mangwerdc.co.za). The map below (Figure) illustrates the location of the case.

Figure 4.3: Map showing the location of Mangwe District



Source: Dube (2015:2)

4.5.1 Structure and organisational arrangements of Mangwe RDC

Having been defined by the various policy pronouncements and legislations, local government structure in Zimbabwe is uniform across the country. The MRDC consists of committees which include the RDDC, WADCO and VIDCO, whose responsibility is to foster community inclusion in local government decision making. The MRDC is structured into divisions of wards and villages which are represented by elected councillors. Traditional leadership significantly influences the operations of the wards and villages. Several wards fall under a single chief, and villages are divided into sub-units which are headed by the headman and village head (Matiza, 2010). Rural local governments in Zimbabwe are uniform thus, Mangwe RDC is characterized by the same structure outlined in the previous section and as illustrated in Figure 4.4 below.

Figure 4.4: The structure of Mangwe RDC



Source: Adapted from Dube (2015), Kurebwa (2015) and Makumbe (2010)

Emanating from the discussion pertaining to the structure of local government in Zimbabwe is that it consists of the political and technical aspects. The technical arm's role, as stipulated by Mulindwa (2013:108), is "to give technical advice and guidance to the political wing and implement all lawful policies approved by the political wing". The political arm facilitates the formulation and implementation of policies in a participatory and inclusive manner that incorporates the views of the citizens. There is need for balanced coordination among these functions since they interact and complement each other in important ways. Lack of complementarity of the political and technical arm may cause dislocations in the operation of the local government council.

Figure 4.5: Organizational structure



Source: Adopted from Mulindwa (2013:09).

4.6 CONCLUSION

The intention of this chapter was to discuss the Zimbabwean system of government, with particular reference to local governance and budgeting processes. It was established that the policy of decentralization and the principles of devolution of powers, as articulated in Zimbabwe after gaining independence through the prime minister's directives of 1984 and 1985 paved way for local governments which sought to bridge the gap between the government and the governed. The Constitution of Zimbabwe and various other pieces of legislation empower citizens to engage in their governance process including the budget process. Various participatory mechanisms have been adopted across the country to ensure citizen participation in the budget process. Among these are the WADCOs and VIDCOs through which citizens have an opportunity to be actively involved in deciding the spending priorities of the communities. The chapter also expounded on the case of this research, namely the Mangwe Rural District Council (MRDC). It was found that MRDC is a rural authority

that is in the process of pursuing PB as an alternative budgeting process. The MRDC consists of committees which include the RDDC, WADCO and VIDCO whose responsibility is to foster community inclusion in local government decision making including the budget process.

The following chapter discusses the research methodology utilized in carrying out the study and presents and discusses the findings of the study.

CHAPTER 5

PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING IN MANGWE RDC: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

5.0 INTRODUCTION

The second chapter of this study explored the meta-theoretical and theoretical underpinnings that inform the key constructs of this study which are community participation and participatory budgeting (PB). The third chapter delineated notions of budgeting and accentuated the peculiarities of PB as a specific budgeting type and arrangement. Furthermore, the origins of PB were traced and located in the Porto Algre experience in Brazil. The chapter also reviewed extant literature on PB experiences from both developed and developing countries, challenges identified, lessons drawn, and recommendations noted. Dimensions and principles of PB developed by Edbon and Franklin (2006), Wampler (2012) and Escober and Harkins (2015), were also discussed. The fourth chapter of the study investigated issues pertaining to the Zimbabwean system of government, with particular reference to local government and budgeting processes. These literature review chapters form the bedrock of secondary data collection adopted for this study. This chapter focuses on the procedures and instruments adopted in carrying out the empirical survey and presenting the study's findings. These findings are crucial in that they are utilized to operationalize the objectives of the study, especially the primary one which seeks to develop a financial model for PB implementation in Zimbabwe's local governments.

Semi-structured interviews on purposively sampled key participants, and extensive content analysis were adopted for gathering data presented in this chapter. Codes and themes were utilized in data presentation and analysis as they enabled the researcher to identify, analyze and report patterns (themes) with data regarding the subject under study. To make the information more meaningful to the reader, data was reduced to figures and tables.

5.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CASE STUDY: MANGWE RURAL DISTRICT COUNCIL

Mangwe district is located in Matabeleland South Province in the greater Plumtree area. Plumtree is divided into four districts, namely; Bulilima West, Bulilima East, Mangwe District, and Plumtree Urban, in what was previously known as Bulilima-mangwe district. The divisions among these districts called for the separation of local councils, leading to the establishment of four councils (Government of Zimbabwe 2016). Mangwe district has a population of 65 562 (National Statistics Agency , 2022), covering a geographical area of about 545,937 hectares (https://mangwerdc.co.zw/). The map below (figure 5.1) illustrates the location of Mangwe and its seventeen wards.

Mangwe Rural District Council (RDC) is headed by a political and administrative structure which consist of the elected officials and civil servants. The political arm consists of seventeen elected councillors who represent members from the seventeen wards Mangwe has (https://mangwerdc.co.zw/). Traditional leadership plays an administrative role at both ward and village levels as stipulated by the Traditional Leaders Act of 1998.

The executive arm of the RDC consist of the Chief Executive Officer at the helm, and various officials who hold various positions to ensure the smooth functioning of the RDC. Mangwe RDC functions through a committee system headed by a council chairperson and a chairperson for each committee.

Figure 5.1: Mangwe District



Source: Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), (2008)

The existence and functionality of Mangwe RDC is guided by the 2013 Constitution and the Rural Councils Act of 1996. Furthermore, Mangwe RDC is subject to the Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing, which plays a supervisory and oversight role to the RDC. Mangwe RDC is mandated by law to:

- facilitate infrastructure development,
- monitor and evaluate development programmes,
- provide social services,
- promote investment and local economic development,
- facilitate corporate and local governance,
- promote environmental management and conservation, and
- levy rates and taxes.

The RDC has been faced by financial challenges which curtail its ability to effectively execute their mandate. Despite these challenges, the RDC's vision is to be "a centre

of excellence in inclusive local governance and economic development by 2030" (https://mangwerdc.co.zw/).

5.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

According to Cresswell (2014), research comprises two basic approaches; quantitative and qualitative. The quantitative approach is based on the logic-positivist approach confined to the use of scientific methods to explain the social world, assuming that the social world is stable and can be explained objectively (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010; Saunders r& Rojan, 2014). Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2012) have argued against the relevance of the positivist approach to the analysis of the social worldview. However, the approach finds meaning and relevance in the natural sciences. Contrary to the quantitative approach, the qualitative approach is located within the interpretivist approach, premised on studying and understanding the phenomenon within its context. Furthermore, the approach seeks to understand the perceptions, attitudes, and behaviour of participants within the context of their environment (Cresswell, 2014). In a similar manner, Holloway (2005) justifies the use of qualitative approach on the grounds that human experience cannot be subjected to measurements and statistics but is characterized by an analysis of perceptions and experiences of participants.

This study sought to examine PB praxis in Mangwe RDC as experienced by citizens and RDC officials. Hence, it required to understand the participant's perceptions and opinions about the phenomenon. To gather this kind of data on a social phenomenon, perceptions and attitudes of those who have experienced the phenomenon should be solicited. Thus, the study is based on the qualitative interpretivist approach since it seeks to interrogate and understand the perceptions of participants on PB since its implementation.

5.2.1 Research design

Qualitative research entails a wide spectrum of approaches which include, content analysis, case study, phenomenology, ethnography, and grounded theory (Creswell, 2014). This study utilized a single case study design that adopted a variety of data collection methods such as interviews, observations, and document analysis (McMillan & Schumacher, 2001; Yin, 2009). Such multiplicity of data collection methods aided in data triangulation to benefit from both interviews and document analysis from more detailed data. A case study design seeks to gather and interpret information about human experiences in their social setting which is the thrust of this study as illustrated in research objective 4:

- To solicit the perceptions of key stakeholders regarding key challenges faced in the execution of PB in rural Mangwe.

Yin (2009) underscores the need to utilize case studies on contemporary issues such as PB. This study sought to understand the impact of PB in Mangwe, and to design a financial model to improve participatory budgeting implementation in rural Zimbabwe, hence the relevance of a case study approach. Mangwe RDC, as a single unit of analysis, was selected for this research. Case studies focus on getting a deeper understanding of a phenomenon of a single unit, which possibly could be generalized to other similar entities with similar conditions (Kothari, 2004). Thus, the resultant financial model could be used to influence positive PB outcomes in all RDCs in Zimbabwe.

5.2.2 Data collection methods

The qualitative approach adopted for this study influenced the use of qualitative research methods for data collection. Data collection, according to Burns and Grove (2003), is a methodical process which seeks to gather data relevant to the research questions posed. According to Marshall and Rossman (2006:97), qualitative research methods include the use of “(a) participating in the setting, (b) observing directly, (c) interviewing in depth, and (d) analysing documents and material culture”.

This study made use of semi-structured interviews and content analysis, where relevant documents were examined. Semi-structured interviews were used because they entailed the organization of interview questions beforehand, through an interview schedule which guided the interview process soliciting precise questioning and responses. Moreover, semi-structured interviews allowed for further probing on responses given by participants. This enables the researcher to explore the responses given. An interview schedule for each category of participants (i.e., cohort) was designed to guide the interviewing process. All the interview questions were translated to Ndebele, one of the local languages in Mangwe, besides Kalanga and Tswana. There were three interview schedules for three groups of participants, which were (a) traditional leaders, councillors and village heads, (b) local government officials, and (c) community committee members. These three groups represented key informants' perceptions. Their contribution was significant because they superseded local government and community structures. The interviews gave the researcher freedom to probe and get further clarification from the interviewee on participatory budgeting perspectives in Mangwe. Pre-testing (piloting) of the interview schedule was done with a small number of participants to ascertain whether the questions were understood and relevant to obtain thick descriptions and rich data.

Document analysis is a research instrument for data collection that entails a review of policies, legislation, archival records, news and journals with the intention of gathering relevant research data (Deess, 2003). Complementing the interviews used, document analysis in the form of budget minutes, annual reports, local budget documents were used to collect data. Furthermore, the researcher used a field notebook to document the experiences and perceptions gathered during the data collection process.

5.2.3 Sampling

According to Nieuwenhuis (2007:79), sampling is a process which selects a part of a greater population for a study. Burns and Grove (2003:31) view sampling as a process where a cluster or portion of people or behaviours is chosen for a specific study. Randomization is used in probability sampling, and offers every element an opportunity to be included in the study. However, non-probability sampling does not give every element an equal chance to be included in the sample as researchers use

their judgement to choose the elements to be included in the sample based on their relevance and expertise on the subject under research (Parahoo, 1997:223). Since the case study approach is guided by the principles of qualitative research, this study adopted the purposive sampling technique to select participants who are knowledgeable and have experienced the phenomenon under study (Creswell and Clark, 2011).

Purposive sampling entails intentionally selecting participants who possess the required characteristics for the study (Babbie, 2010; De Vos *et al.*, 2011). This type of sampling enables the researcher to make judgements pertaining to the participants suitable for the study, who will enable them to gather data relevant to the study. Purposive sampling was used to select those responsible for budgeting and financial oversight. These were: the Chief Financial Officer, two (2) officials from the senior financial management, two (2) officials from the junior financial management, and two (2) budget committee members. The Mangwe District Administrator (MDA) was interviewed because the office has an administrative oversight in development programmes and services in Mangwe district. All seventeen (17) Mangwe wards were sampled and in each ward one (1) headman, one (1) councillor and one (1) committee were interviewed. Ward councillors and headmen were interviewed because they superseded local government structures and played a crucial role in community leadership. Community committee members were interviewed because their contributions were significant as they were participants in the participatory budget process and recipients of development programs. For the sample to be inclusive, gender equity was sought, where the views of both males and females were recorded. The total sample was made up of fifty-nine (*n*=59) participants.

Table 5.1: Groups of participants

Stakeholder group	Intended Sample size	Actual Sample size	Reference code
Mangwe RDC Officials	7	6	CO1, CO2, CO3, CO4, CO5 CO6
Mangwe Office of the District Administrator	1	1	MD1

Mangwe Ward Councillors	17	14	CL1, CL2, CL3, CL4, CL5, CL6, CL7, CL8, CL9, CL10, CL11 CL12, CL13, CL14
Mangwe Ward and Village Committee Members	17	14	CM1, CM2, CM3, CM4, CM5, CM6, CM7, CM8, CM9, CM10, CM11, CM12, CM13, CM14
Mangwe District Traditional Leaders	17	14	TL1, TL2, TL3, TL4, TL5, TL6, TL7, TL8, TL9, TL10, TL11, TL12, TL13, TL14
Total	**59**	**49**	

Source: Researcher's own

As illustrated in Table 5.1: Groups of participants, the intended sample was 59 but the eventual number of interviewed participants was 49. This was due to unavailability of officials and inaccessible road networks.

5.2.4 Data collection and analysis

Scholars such as Burns and Grove (2003), Cresswell (2013, 1994) and Yin (1994), opine that data analysis can be regarded as a process which entails organizing the collected data, coding and interpreting it. It is a process where data is formatted to bring about the research findings. These findings could be presented in a pictorial sequence, tables, or themes, which ultimately tell a story about the phenomenon under study. The researcher utilized thematic analysis which enabled the researcher to identify, analyze and report patterns (themes) regarding the subject under study. Carey (2013) notes that themes emerge from the data and not imposed by the researcher. By making use of thematic analysis, patterns are identified (themes). Similarly, Leedy and Ormrod (2010 state that thematic analysis allows the researcher to check, organize data in terms of frequent themes, and draw meaning for analysis. Figure 5.2 illustrates this study's data analysis process.

Content analysis was adopted for data analysis, as guidelines and provisions on participatory budgeting were reviewed. The study benefited from content analysis in that it provided in-depth understanding of the participatory budgeting. Furthermore,

data was presented diagrammatically to make it more appealing and easier to comprehend.

Figure 5.2: Data analysis process



Source: Researcher's fieldwork

The first step in data analysis, as illustrated in figure 5.1, entails organizing field transcripts for data analysis and familiarization with data as captured in Box A. Data familiarization before the analysis is underscored by Braun and Clarke (2006) and Eisenhardt and Sonenshein (2016), who argue that it is paramount for the researcher to be familiar with the data in order to have an in-depth understanding of the contents in preparation for the initial analysis. Nvivo, as indicated in Box B, was used to analyse qualitative data, and codes were used to organize data into a segment which represents a category. The Nvivo software assisted the researcher in managing, shaping, and making sense of unstructured data (Baronov, 2021; Saldana, 2011). A Word Cloud comprising key words was extracted from the Nvivo system as illustrated in figure 5.3.

Figure 5.3: Word Cloud

Source: Author's field work

NVivo software provided the researcher with adequate time to analyse data and identify themes as illustrated in Box C, where themes are named, defined and reviewed. This enabled the researcher to gain insight and develop meaningful conclusions about the study under investigation. Hence, after defining and reviewing themes, the researcher presented and analysed the findings.

5.3 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Ethical approval for the study was acquired from the Research Ethics Regulatory Committee (RERC) of North-West University (Ethics Ref.: NWU-01102-21-A7) and the Mangwe Rural District Council. Introductory and consent letters were presented to the participants to sign to ensure voluntary participation in the study. Confidentiality was upheld by the researcher as the identities of participants were protected using pseudo names. All data sources used by the researcher were acknowledged, thus, upholding the value of intellectual property.

Verbal permission for interviews was also obtained from the Mangwe district administrator, ward councillors and village headmen.

5.4 RESEARCH CHALLENGES

First and foremost, permission was sought from gatekeepers and appointments with key participants done. However, due to the socio-economic conditions in Zimbabwe, it was difficult to locate most participants since they would be up and about attending to their various livelihood activities. The researcher had to wait until the participants were done with their activities to interview them. Moreover, councillors were difficult to locate due to the spatiality in the geography of their villages and the requirement to attend meetings at the RDC offices, which for some, was more than 200 km. In such instances, the researcher had to reschedule the appointment for another day or return to the RDC offices to interview the councillors as they were leaving their meetings. In some instances, the rural folk thought that the researcher was a donor who was seeking to register people for food and financial aid. However, after a detailed introduction and explanation of what the research was about, participants cooperated and opened up to be interviewed.

Particular challenges encountered during the research included:

- participants being sceptical about participating in the interview because they thought it was a politically motivated meeting. However, after explaining to them and showing them the supporting documents, they opened up to be interviewed.
- participants being unavailable due to the nature of their work, for example councillors. Some councillors had gone to attend their political party business or meetings in difficult to access villages and the researcher had to reschedule the appointment for another time when they were available.
- participants being unavailable due to the socio-economic conditions of the country which forced them to be engaged in many livelihood activities for survival.
- some wards being difficult to access due to poor road networks.

5.5 RESEARCH RESULTS AND FINDINGS

The interview schedule had two sections. The first section focused on the biographical details of participants and the second section contained open- and close-ended questions.

5.5.1 Biographical profile of participants

Table5.2: **Participant Profile** shows the age, gender, years of experience, and highest qualifications of participants. This information was necessary to compare and contrast responses and to make certain deductions.

Table5.2: Participant Profile

No.	Participant codes	Age (years)	Gender	Experience (years)	Qualification
1	CL1	72	M	10	Diploma
2	CL2	72	M	20	Primary level
3	CL3	60	M	8	Primary level
4	CL4	51	M	8	Primary Level
5	CL5	50	F	4	Primary Level
6	CL6	48	M	4	Ordinary level
7	CL7	43	F	21	Undergraduate degree
8	CL8	48	F	4	Ordinary level
9	CL9	49	M	8	Ordinary level
10	CL10	43	F	4	Ordinary level
11	CL11	52	M	4	Ordinary level
12	CL12	62	M	9	Primary level
13	CL13	60	M	9	Primary level
14	CL14	50	F	4	Ordinary level
15	TL1	66	M	9	Primary level
16	TL2	82	M	20	Primary level
17	TL3	90	M	2	Primary level

No.	Participant codes	Age (years)	Gender	Experience (years)	Qualification
18	TL4	78	M	15	Primary level
19	TL5	66	M	8	Primary Level
20	TL6	85	M	10	Primary level
21	TL7	65	M	30	Primary level
22	TL8	69	M	9	Primary level
23	TL9	78	M	5	Primary level
24	TL10	62	M	7	Ordinary level
25	TL11	78	M	15	Primary level
26	TL12	66	M	9	Primary level
27	TL13	82	M	15	Primary level
28	TL14	90	M	2	Primary level
29	CM1	52	M	5	Primary
30	CM2	48	M	10	Ordinary level
31	CM3	30	F	3	Ordinary level
32	CM4	48	F	4	Ordinary level
33	CM5	56	F	9	Ordinary level
34	CM6	54	F	10	Primary level
35	CM7	48	F	8	Ordinary level
36	CM8	50	F	5	Ordinary level
37	CM9	58	M	15	Ordinary level
38	CM10	46	F	6	Ordinary level
39	CM11	55	F	15	Primary level
40	CM12	45	M	4	Ordinary level
41	CM13	50	F	8	Primary level
42	CM14	52	F	10	Primary level
43	CO1	52	M	15	Undergraduate degree
44	CO2	58	M	5	Diploma
45	CO3	38	F	2	Undergraduate degree
46	CO4	36	F	1	Undergraduate degree
47	CO5	36	F	2	Undergraduate degree
48	CO6	38	F	8	Diploma

No.	Participant codes	Age (years)	Gender	Experience (years)	Qualification
49	MD1	36	F	5	Undergraduate degree

Source: Author's fieldwork

The above table details 49 profiles of research participants who took part in this study. All the participants met the study's inclusion criteria and were willing to participate in this study.

The profiles of research participants are summarized in terms of age, gender work experience and educational qualifications. These participants work directly with issues related to PB and have special insight into its operational challenges and how it has impacted the Mangwe district. Experiences (in years) of the participants in their respective positions (reflected in column 4 of table 5.2) ranged between 1 and 30 years. The participants were also representative in terms of gender, as twenty-nine were males and twenty females. Nine participants had tertiary educational qualifications, sixteen had completed ordinary level, and twenty-four had basic primary level education (figure 5.4).

Figure 5.4: Level of education of participants



Source: Researcher's fieldwork

The next section reflects the results obtained from participants regarding key dimensions of PB. The first dimension is labelled ‘government’ dimensions.

5.5.2 Government dimensions of PB

The government dimension, as espoused by Ebdon and Franklin (2006), entails the policy and operational aspects of PB. Legislative frameworks are significant in establishing a favourable environment for PB to achieve positive outcomes and ensure the continuity and stability of the process. Emerging themes and sub-themes relating to the research findings are presented in the following sub-sections.

5.5.2.1 Legislative frameworks

The first question which was posed was: “What legal frameworks are in place that provide for Participatory Budgeting?” This question sought to gather information about the specific legal frameworks that exist to support and facilitate the implementation of PB in Mangwe RDC. Some responses were captured verbatim, while others were grouped together and presented on the basis of popular views expressed. Content analysis further substantiated field data collected from Mangwe RDC.

Only twenty-two percent (22%) of the participants had sufficient knowledge of the policies and legislative frameworks governing PB. These participants were educated, with their educational attainment ranging from Ordinary level to degree. Participant CO2 noted that:

“When discussing the legislative frameworks governing PB, we can be doing injustice if we fail to refer back to the PM’s Directives of 1984 and 1985 on decentralization. These ushered in a participatory approach to governance which sought to include everyone in the governance process.”

In a similar manner, CL7 indicated that:

"The constitution of 2013 is the basis of a participatory approach in local governments as it provides for citizen participation in all spheres of life including the formulation of the budget".

Other legislation outlined by twenty-two percent (22%) of the participants included the Rural District Councils Act, the Public Finance Management Act, and the Traditional Leaders Act. These Acts form the bedrock of local government management in Zimbabwe (Zinyama, 2014; Jonga, 2015; Mapuva, 2019).

It is important to note that 68% of the participants lacked adequate knowledge of the policies and national legislation governing PB. The lack of knowledge of legislative frameworks governing PB highlights a potential significant barrier to effective implementation and participation in PB processes. With only 22% of participants demonstrating awareness of the legal frameworks, it indicates a low level of understanding among the general population. This lack of knowledge can hinder the ability of citizens to fully engage in the PB process, make informed decisions, and hold local governments accountable. Similar findings are recorded in South Africa where Shall (2007) notes that the South African PB experience is marred by citizens' lack of knowledge with regards to their right to participate, which translated to their lack of knowledge of the legislative frameworks governing PB. Such ignorance thwart the efforts of achieving effective community participation and impedes achieving substantive PB outcomes and continuity of the process.

The correlation between education and knowledge of legislative frameworks is noteworthy. It suggests that education plays a crucial role in equipping individuals with the necessary information and awareness of legal structures. The fact that educated individuals comprise the majority of those with knowledge indicates that formal education provides better access to information about PB and related legislation. However, the finding also raises concerns about equity and inclusivity within the PB process. If only educated individuals possess the knowledge of legislative frameworks, it may exclude a significant portion of the population from meaningful participation. This knowledge gap could contribute to the marginalization of certain groups, as education levels are often associated with socio-economic status.

All of the participants who acknowledged their knowledge of the legislations governing PB viewed these legislations as important for laying the foundation for citizen participation. Participant CM1 pointed out that:

"The laws governing PB are very important because they give guidance on how the process is supposed to be carried out. As articulated by law, citizens have a right to participate in the budget process and as such this seeks to empower the citizens to be in control of their development process".

Similarly, participant CO5 hailed the legislations, noting that:

"The RDC Act of 1996 promote citizen participation in the budget process since it details procedures to be followed in order to include the populace in the budget formulation process. More so, the 2013 constitution enhances citizen participation in the budget process as it articulates that citizen have a right to engage in government activities which include the budget".

The Traditional Leadership Act was also emphasized by participants. According to TL10, this Act was crucial as:

"You need to understand that the Traditional leadership Act is not only limited to articulating the mandate of the traditional leaders, but it is a significant piece of legislation which provide for the establishment of grassroot committees which seek to foster grassroot participation. These committees are the Village Development Committees and the Ward Development Committees".

TL10 sentiments were supported by Marango *et al.* (2018) who note the significance of the Traditional Leadership Act of 1998 that provides for the establishment of Ward Development Committees (WADCOs) and Village Development Committees (VIDCOs) to promote community development through being platforms for citizen participation (Marango *et al.*, 2018).

These research findings highlight the significance of PB legislation in shaping the foundation for citizen participation in the budgeting process. The fact that all 22% of

the participants were knowledgeable about these legislations and acknowledged their importance, indicates a widespread recognition of the role these legal frameworks play in promoting participatory decision-making. PB legislations and policies provide the legal basis for citizens to actively participate in the budgeting process. Similarly, ZIMCODD (2019:28) observes that “the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment 20 provides frameworks for public participation in budgeting”. Emanating from these constitutional provisions is the need to empower citizens to be drivers of their development process through participating in their governance process. Involving citizens in the budget process seeks to reduce the dominance of bureaucrats and allow the beneficiaries of the process to lead in the prioritization of their needs (Machingauta, 2010).

These findings are in line with the South African context where the local sphere of government is governed by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 and several other legislative frameworks which uphold the concepts of citizen and community participation (Langa & Jerome, 2004). Legislation outlines the mechanisms, procedures, and rights that enable citizens to voice their opinions, influence budget allocations, and contribute to decision-making. By recognizing the importance of citizen input, legislation empowers communities to shape the allocation of public resources according to their needs and priorities. It also makes provision for the establishment of guidelines for disclosing budget information, conducting public consultations, and ensuring the proper utilization of funds. By formalizing these requirements, PB legislation fosters a culture of openness and accountability, enabling citizens to hold governments and officials accountable for their budgetary decisions.

However, despite acknowledging the importance of these legislations, the findings also reveal certain shortcomings and challenges associated with PB legislations, particularly in relation to central government interference. The RDC Act, for example, was mentioned as a legislation that grants excessive powers to the minister of local government, which can impede effective functioning of local government and undermine local priorities. The unanimous agreement among the twenty-two percent (22%) who are knowledgeable about PB legislation regarding the interference of the central government, further emphasizes the extent of this issue. The uniform perspective suggests a systemic problem that needs to be addressed to foster more

meaningful local governance and citizen participation in budgetary decisions. In this regard participant CO6 indicated that:

"You see, the RDC Act exposes us by giving the Minister of Local government so much powers to interfere in our day to day activities. This hinders effective functioning of the local government and derails efforts of prioritising local needs".

Similar sentiments were shared by participant CO2 who noted that:

"It is very difficult to ensure the wholistic implementation of PB when you are being governed by a legislation which gives the Minister of Local government powers which include the power to authorise or reject the budget without regarding that the budget holds the views of the people."

These findings regarding the inadequacy of legislation governing PB shed light on the challenges faced in achieving genuine participatory budgeting processes in Zimbabwe. The Rural District Councils Act of 1996, which governs local government activities, grants the Ministry of Local Government substantial power to interfere in local government affairs, including budget drafting. This interference from the centre can undermine the autonomy and decision-making authority of local governments, hindering their ability to effectively engage citizens in the budget process. Furthermore, participant CL1 was of the view that:

"*The inadequacies of legislation expose local government to the pursuance of the interests and projects of the political elites instead of pursuing citizen driven projects".*

Emanating from this view is that the driving force behind central government interference can be political interests and patronage networks. Political elites may exert influence over local governments to prioritize projects or allocate resources based on political considerations rather than citizen priorities identified through participatory budgeting. These views are synonymous to the evidence gathered by Mulindwa (2013) in Uganda, where citizens' contributions in the form of village plans were often not included in the final budget making the budget elitist in nature since it will not reflect the needs and priorities of citizens. Furthermore, the RDC Act offers a

scope of limited fiscal decentralization to rural local governments. Participant CO3 stated that, due to legislation, local governments have limited authority over their own financial resources. This constraint restricts the ability of local governments to implement participatory budgeting autonomously and make decisions that align with local needs and preferences.

Despite underscoring the need for the visibility of the Minister of Local Government from national to local level for coordination, Mushamba (2010) argues that such "visibility" often manifests in interference in local affairs and can be regarded as an indication of a limited degree of decentralisation. Participant CO6's and CO2's sentiments are substantiated by Mushamba (2010:72) who confirms that provisions in the legislations which give the minister much power over local governments suggests that the local government system in Zimbabwe is based on a "delegate and delegator relationship". Mushamba (2010:73) further reasons that there are more than 250 instances (stipulations) in the Rural District Councils (RDC) Act of 2017 that make it possible for the Minister to intervene in the operations of local governments in Zimbabwe, thus "recentralising" the whole local government system.

Another aspect highlighted from the findings is that the current legislation focuses more on consultation rather than active citizen participation. While consultation is an essential element of participatory processes, it falls short of empowering citizens to actively shape and influence budget decisions. Genuine participatory budgeting involves citizens, not only in providing input, but also in co-creating, deliberating, and making decisions together with local government officials. The lack of emphasis on active citizen participation in the legislation limits the potential for true democratic engagement in the budgeting process.

5.5.2.2 The role of the traditional leadership and the Mangwe RDC in the implementation of PB

When questioned about the roles of traditional leaders and the Mangwe RDC in ensuring that the provisions of legislation pertaining to PB are successfully implemented, the traditional leaders indicated that their role was mainly information sharing in nature. They typically organized meetings on behalf of the RDC or

Councillor to share information with the village or ward. Participant TL8 indicated that their roles were articulated in the Traditional Leaders Act and included the collection of household taxes from citizens.

Most participants from the community committee members' group were in agreement with the sentiments shared by the traditional leaders concerning the dissemination of information. However, some of the community members indicated that traditional leaders were yet to appreciate the legislation governing PB and could not be expected to ensure that its provisions are followed. In this respect, participant CM5 expressed the following:

" Traditional leaders are clueless about PB legislations and PB itself. They don't even know what they are supposed to do".

Based on the responses obtained, it is evident that traditional leaders played some role in ensuring that the provisions of PB are made known to communities. As such, they created awareness among the community and empowered them to participate.

The interviews carried out with the RDC officials indicated that the RDC facilitated budget consultative meetings although, in recent times, the Ward Councillors had been facilitating the meetings in the absence of the RDC officials. These sentiments were supported by Councillors, with CL12 acknowledging the role he played in leading in the budget consultative meetings. Moreover, CO1 indicated the role the RDC played in ensuring that all wards had existing WADCO and VIDCO structures. These structures were discussed by Makumbe (2010) and Marango *et al.* (2018) as crucial grassroot structures that promote community engagement. However, CO1 pointed out that, in as much as the RDC has tried to ensure that the provisions of the legislations are implemented, much should be done in terms of enhancing citizen engagement. Interviews carried out with the community committee members were in agreement with CO1's sentiments as they also viewed the council as a failure in terms to ensuring that active citizen engagement in Mangwe District.

Emanating from the interviews conducted with RDC officials and community members, the role of the Rural District Council (RDC) in ensuring the fulfilment of the provisions

of Participatory Budgeting (PB) has been mixed. According to the RDC officials, they had facilitated budget consultative meetings in the past. However, in recent times, the responsibility for facilitating these meetings had been taken up by the Ward Councillor in the absence of RDC officials. This suggests a potential gap or lack of consistent involvement by the RDC in the PB process.

The sentiments expressed by the Councillors support the notion that they played a role in leading budget consultative meetings. This indicates that individual Councillors have taken the initiative to actively engage with the community and facilitate PB discussions. Furthermore, it is mentioned that the RDC has made efforts to ensure that all wards have existing Ward Development Committee (WADCO) and Village Development Committee (VIDCO) structures. These structures are recognized as crucial grassroots platforms for promoting community engagement. The presence of WADCO and VIDCO structures aligns with the principles of PB, as these committees provide opportunities for citizens to participate in decision-making processes. However, it is noted that there is a general sentiment among RDC officials, including CO1, that more needs to be done to enhance citizen engagement in the PB process. The RDC acknowledges trying to implement the provisions of PB legislation, but there is still room for improvement in terms of actively involving and engaging citizens. The community members interviewed also shared the view that the RDC had not effectively fulfilled its role in promoting and facilitating meaningful citizen participation through the implementation of legislations governing PB. Similar sentiments are consistent with Mulindwa's (2013) observation that local government legislations in Uganda are well formulated but lack implementation as evidenced by the discriminatory nature of PB consultative meetings. Legislations provide for inclusivity in participation but practice a process which is elitist, and only allows a few loyalists to participate.

5.5.3 Process dimensions of PB

According to Edbon, Krane and Franklin (2012), the process dimension relates to the processes adopted for citizens to play an active or inactive part in the budget process. It is important to note that this dimension focuses on understanding the budget process and how conducive it is for citizen participation to influence budget decisions. The

purpose of this subsection is to establish the current budget process in Mangwe and how it impacts on citizen participation.

5.5.3.1 Current system of local government budgeting in Zimbabwe

To ascertain the status of the current system of budgeting in local government, the following question was posed to the participants: “How would you describe the current system of local government budgeting in Zimbabwe?” In this regard, participant CO6 responded as follows:

"For the past few years, we have been doing PB in local governments in Zimbabwe. We have been implored to work with our communities as it facilitates active participation of the community".

In a similar manner, participant CO4 noted that:

"The current system of budgeting in local governments seeks to ensure inclusivity. It's a forum to empower the previously marginalised in the community e.g. women, disabled, and the youth".

The Ward Councillors generally also concurred with the opinions of RDC officials in that the current budgeting system in Zimbabwe is one which seeks to involve the citizens in decision making. Participant CL2 noted that:

“The current budget system affords the citizens an opportunity to react to the proposed budget”.

Based on the information provided by participants above, the current system of local government budgeting in Zimbabwe incorporated PB principles and aimed to ensure inclusivity and active community participation. According to participant CO6, PB has been implemented in the local government budgeting system for the past few years. This indicates a recent shift towards involving communities in the decision-making process regarding budget allocation and project selection.

The findings are in sync with the New Public Management (NPM) paradigm which has seen an agitation by citizens to directly participate and hold governments accountable. Roberts (2015) active citizen participation leads to fiscal transparency and accountability and limits corruption and inefficiency. The emphasis on working with communities suggests a move towards greater participation and engagement of citizens in shaping the budget priorities. This experience is similar to experiences in developing and developed countries, where mechanisms and strategies have been adopted to enhance democracy and citizen participation through adopting participatory approaches including PB (Ebdon, Krane & Franklin, 2012; Balderich, 2015).

Participant CO4 highlighted that the current system of budgeting in local governments seeks to ensure inclusivity. This implies that efforts are being made to address the needs and interests of previously marginalized groups, such as women, disabled individuals, and youth. The budgeting process is viewed as a platform for empowering marginalized sections of society and giving them a voice in determining resource allocation. The need to adopt participatory approaches is viewed by Maynihan (2007) as a means to tackle governance issues as it promotes accountability, transparency and empower the vulnerable and poor in society.

Overall, the current system of local government budgeting in Zimbabwe is evolving towards a more participatory and inclusive approach, with the introduction of PB and a focus on active community participation. This shift indicates a recognition of the importance of engaging citizens and empowering marginalized groups in the decision-making process regarding budget priorities.

5.6.3.2 Differences between the current and previous local budgeting system

Data gathered from the interviews with the RDC officials indicate that unlike in the traditional budgeting which excluded the community from influencing the budget, PB favours the involvement of the community in making financial decisions. A change of system from a centralized one to one which places a greater emphasis on active community participation in the budgeting process. PB is characterized by engaging citizens, seeking their input, and involving them in decision-making regarding resource

allocation and project selection. This marks a shift from a more top-down approach where decisions were made by a limited group of government officials.

Commenting on the budgeting paradigm shift, CO1 confirms that:

"The current system seeks to address the needs and interests of previously marginalized groups, such as women, disabled individuals, and youth. By focusing on inclusivity, the current budgeting system aims to ensure that the voices of these marginalized sections of society are heard and considered in the budget allocation process. This inclusivity aspect was lacking in the previous budgeting processes".

Similarly, most Councillors, Traditional leaders and Committee members interviewed were of the view that the current system of budgeting is a forum for empowering previously marginalized groups. It aims to give these groups a sense of agency and influence in shaping the budget priorities. The current system's focus on inclusivity and empowerment of marginalized groups can provide them with a platform to voice their concerns, influence decisions, and advocate for their specific needs. This can lead to greater social equity and help address historical disadvantages faced by marginalized communities. In contrast, the previous system had limited mechanisms for actively involving marginalized communities and empowering them in decision-making processes. The above sentiments are also shared by Sterling, Grunfelder and Borges (2006) who argue that, unlike traditional budgeting where the ruling class made decisions for the citizens, PB generally enables citizens to address the priority concerns of their communities through being actively involved in fiscal decision making.

Having illustrated how the budget system has changed from the previous system, the Traditional leaders, Community Committee members and the RDC officials had some views which indicated that the current budget still has some characteristics of the previous system. Participant TL6 furthered the thought that most of the times the consultative process was symbolic, with citizens expected to just accept the blueprint drafted by the RDC. Such a view is supported by Kurebwa (2015) who argues that the consultative process is somewhat a façade and a symbolic process which does not result in active citizen engagement. Furthermore, CO5 argued that the change in the

system of budgeting fails to entirely embrace the bottom-up approach since the legislation empowers the ministry of local government so much power to interfere in the local government affairs. These sentiments are echoed by Bland (2010), who argues that, despite the emphasis of a bottom-up approach in local government budgeting, local government budgeting, like provincial budgeting, is dominated by the central government through the latter's technical expertise. Commenting on a similar issue, Mushamba (2010) notes that the dominance of the central government in local government activities undermines the bottom-up approach that facilitate effective citizen participation.

5.5.4 The budgeting process in Mangwe RDC

The research findings point to varying responses emerging from the interviews. According to the RDC Officials, the budgeting process begins with the guidelines from the ministry of local government outlining the economic climate and the procedures to follow for that particular year. Participant CO5 noted that ward plans are forwarded to the RDC where they are directed to a specific relevant committee. Departments then come up with estimates which are then presented to the relevant committees, and then taken to the Finance committee, and thereafter, discussed in a full council.

There is consensus among RDC officials that, once the budget has been discussed in a full council, consultative meetings begin with the community. The community is divided into various segments and the consultations are done in categories, such as business owners, farmers, miners and traditional leaders. Once these discussions are concluded, a general consultation process is carried out with the general public. According to CO7, outputs from consultations are taken back to the RDC for budget modification because, in some instances, people can disagree with the budget.

After the consolidation of the draft budget is done, it is then adopted in a full council meeting and submitted to the ministry for approval. Upon receiving approval, the budget is then executed. The budget cycle as articulated by the RDC participants is illustrated in figure 5.5.

Figure 5.5: The budget cycle in Mangwe RDC



Source: Aurthor's fieldwork

The interviews with the traditional leaders, community committee members and councillors indicate a slightly different direction of the budget process from the one given by the RDC officials. This is encapsulated by participant CL5 as follows:

"We go to the RDC to draft the budget together with the RDC officials then bring the proposed budget to the people for discussion. If there are any alterations or modifications, the budget is taken back to the RDC for those".

CM5 shared similar observations with CL5, noting that:

"The RDC drafts the budget and brings the proposed budget document to the community for discussion. After discussions, the draft is taken back to the RDC for consolidation".

Similarly, TL6 attest to the fact that budget formulation is a preserve of the RDC, which then brings the draft document to the people for consultations.

In contrast, traditional leaders, community committee members, and some councillors indicated that the RDC drafts the budget and brings the proposed budget document to the community for discussion and potential modifications. This cycle is supported in literature by ZIMCODD (2019:23) as illustrated diagrammatically in figure 4.2 (chapter 4). Clearly, from both literature and field research, the budget process only engages the grassroots at a later stage, which is stage F and G. These findings suggest that community consultations occur after the budget has been drafted, raising concerns about the timing of community involvement in the budgeting process. This is contrary to the sentiments shared by Marango *et al.* (2018) who hold that, throughout the entire budget cycle, citizens' involvement should be visible and meaningful. Engaging citizens at a later stage in the budget process perpetuates a top-down approach which hinders effective citizen participation in the budgetary process. This view is supported by Aceron (2019), who notes that in the Philippines, the existing mechanisms for citizen participation in the budget process were neglected leading to failure to transform the budgetary process to be inclusive and participatory.

Marango *et al.* (2018) suggest that early engagement of community members in the budgeting process results in more meaningful and effective participation. Similarly, Shah (2007), in underscoring the importance of citizen participation, emphasizes the need of timeous and active involvement of stakeholders in the entire budget process in order to have the budget process reflect their needs, and to create accountable and transparent local governments. This early involvement allows for community priorities and needs to shape the budget formulation and decision-making, leading to a greater sense of ownership and legitimacy.

However, participants CO2 and CO3 defended the first view made by the RDC officials. The RDC officials mentioned that the second stage of the budget process entails receiving the ward plans which will be used to draft the budget. However, the traditional leaders, committee members and some councillors disputed this view. According to participants CO2 and CO3 the budget process starts silently which is a problem because the communities will not be aware of what will be happening. CO2 opined that:

" Communities formulate village and ward plans then have them submitted to the RDC through their Councillor, but they are not aware that it is the budgeting process which they are engaged in".

According to CO2, communities lack expertise to cost, thus, the RDC does the costing using the district programme then committees discuss the estimates then a resolution is made in the full council. It is after the resolution of the full council that the budget consultations with the citizens are effected. Participant CO2 opined that:

"Because the budget process from the onset was silent, we are bound to face resistance from the community because they will feel that they were never included in the budget process".

According to CO2 and CO3, there is a problem with the budget process starting silently, as communities are not aware that they are engaged in the budgeting process when they formulate village and ward plans. Lack of awareness can hinder meaningful community participation and lead to resistance when the budget is presented to them. CO2 suggests that the budget process should involve communities from the onset to address this issue. This resonates with Shall's (2007) research findings in South Africa, where citizen's lack of awareness with regards to their right to participate in the budget process is an impediment to effective citizen participation. Such experiences are contrary to the citizenship theory which underscores the need to ensure that citizens are aware of their rights and obligations in the budget process (Marshall, 1950; Turner, 1990). This highlights the importance of effective communication, transparency, and awareness campaigns to ensure that all stakeholders, including community members and local leaders, have a clear understanding of their roles, the process, and the significance of their participation.

5.5.4.1 Factors affecting citizen participation in the budget process

This theme sought to establish the views of participants on factors affecting citizen participation in the budget process in Mangwe. Participants were asked to rank these factors in terms of the highest to the lowest effect they have on citizen participation. The study established from the majority of the participants that the general turnout of

the community to budget meetings was very low and this was a cause for concern. TL8 noted that very few people attended the meeting and those who attended the meetings *"…do not effectively participate in the proceedings, people are not open in those discussions".* When asked about the reasons for such a situation, various responses emerged, and these included limited education, lack of knowledge, poverty, politics, lack of faith in the RDC, and short notice of the meetings. These factors are ranked as per frequency response made by the participants (figure 5.6).

Figure 5.6: Factors affecting citizen participation



Source: Author's fieldwork

The respective factors are briefly outlined below.

a. Limited education

Emanating from the research was that low educational levels hampered effective citizen participation in the budget process. Participant CM6 pointed to this fact as follows:

"Limited education among citizens is a hindrance to their participation because they do not even understand what the budget is".

Moreover, the RDC officials agreed that most citizens' education was limited, therefore, it was difficult for them to participate without the financial literacy to understand the budget. If one lacks knowledge and understanding of the budget process, participation in the meetings becomes difficult. However, out of participants from the 14 wards, one participant (CL8) pointed out that:

"Our ward is very educated. Most of the citizens are pensioners who were once civil servants. Therefore, failure to attend is nothing to do with education but could be attributed to long distances. When in attendance, most of them effectively participate since they have an understanding of the budget process".

CL8's views indicate the importance of education in enhancing effective citizen participation in the PB processes. The findings underscore the significance of education in enhancing effective citizen participation in budget process. Citizens who lack education may not understand the purpose and intricacies of the budget, making it difficult for them to actively engage and contribute to discussions. Buela *et al.* (2020) argue that lack of participative education for citizens renders the whole PB process futile because participation plays a significance role in fostering local democracy and good governance. Similarly, Ebdon and Franklin (2006) observe that, where citizens are highly educated, the level of participation in local activities, including budgeting, is high. Participative education ultimately empowers citizens to hold the local government accountable for the use of resources, thus, enhancing transparency.

b. Lack of knowledge, capacity, and expertise of the PB process

The research established that most citizens had limited knowledge, capacity and expertise of the PB process. Participant CL9 stated that:

"Attendance is very low and participation is very low. People do not understand what the budget is".

In a similar manner, CL6 noted that:

"*Not only do the general citizens lack the know-how of the budget processes, but the majority of Traditional Leaders are not knowledgeable about the budget".*

If traditional leaders are not knowledgeable about the budget yet they are expected to foster community participation in the budget process, how then do they succeed in encouraging citizens to participate in something which themselves they do not understand? The study also revealed that limited understanding of financial concepts, difficulty in cost estimation, and challenges in analysing budget documents was common in Mangwe District, thus, hindering effective participation in the budget process.

Findings indicate that the majority of citizens in Mangwe had limited knowledge of participatory budgeting. This lack of understanding hampered their ability to actively engage in the budgeting process and voice their opinions. Noteworthy, is the realization that these experiences are not unique to Mangwe but have been experienced in South Africa where Shall (2007) established that citizens and councillors lacked capacity and expertise to meaningfully contribute to the PB process. In a similar manner, Ebdon, Krane and Franklin (2012) argue that effective participation is usually hindered by citizen's lack of understanding of the budget jargon. Participation therefore, remains the domain of a few elites who can interpret budget presentation formats and have an understanding of typical budget jargon. To address these challenges, it is evident that capacity-building efforts should be made to raise awareness about PB, its benefits, and how citizens can participate meaningfully. Initiatives, including financial literacy programs and training workshops, should be recommended to empower community members and enhance their meaningful engagement in budget processes.

c. Poverty concerns

Zimbabwe has been going through some serious economic turmoil, and Mangwe has not been spared. Interviews carried out indicated that citizens wished to attend meetings, but they were economically challenged hence, their priorities were on their livelihoods than attending consultative meetings which would not solve their immediate problems. Participant CO3 indicated that:

"The poor of the poor do not attend consultative meetings because they are busy trying to concentrate on their small livelihoods in order to feed their families. As a result, the more elite are the ones who attend, and their decisions affect the poor in the community. The poor who decide to attend end up being silenced by the elite".

Moreover, participant TL7 noted that, due to the economic situation which exacerbated poverty, most people left the community and crossed to Botswana and South Africa, leaving their homes under the care of workers who would ordinarily not attend these meetings.

Economic challenges and poverty prevent some community members from attending budget meetings. Their focus is primarily on meeting their basic needs, leaving little time and resources for engagement in the budgeting process. Similar experiences are recorded in Equador where, instead of participating in the PB process, most citizens prefer to focus on their livelihood activities which seem to be of importance to them as compared to the PB process (Buela *et al.*, 2020). Addressing poverty and creating economic opportunities can alleviate this barrier and increase participation.

d. Mistrust in the Mangwe RDC

Expressing own views on the low turnout of citizens, TL 4 noted that:

"My child, people used to attend the meetings but now the turnout is very low because their needs are not met hence, they abandon these meetings".

Sentiments expressed by TL4 were also expressed by CM9 who echoed that there is some degree of burn out among the people:

"…you need to understand that people are tired of empty promises. Due to these empty promises from the council, they end up not participating in these consultative meetings. The principle which should be followed is: Promise and deliver- people will definitely attend and be participative in all the meetings".

Some participants noted that citizens do not attend these meetings because they think that the RDC is imposing things on them. Unanimously, the participants indicated that, in most wards, the relationship between the RDC and the citizens was strained and characterized by mistrust.

Some community members had lost trust in the RDC due to unmet promises and perceived impositions. This lack of faith discouraged citizens from participating in the budget process, as they felt that their inputs were not taken into account. O'Hagan (2019) shares similar experiences from Scotland where local government officials generally undermine the views of ordinary citizens as they esteem themselves better knowledgeable to articulate the needs of the community than citizens themselves. In a similar manner, Kurebwa (2014:38) argues that citizens often lose trust of their local councils because, instead of involving them in the decision-making process, councils legitimize their pre-authored plans, through what Kurebwa (2014:38) terms "shallow, hurried, dubious and cosmetic consultation processes". This has had dire effects on citizen participation in the budget process as citizens tend to lose trust in the council. Therefore, rebuilding trust through transparency, accountability, and delivering on commitments is crucial to fostering citizen engagement.

e. Political factors

According to Kurebwa (2014), in environments like Zimbabwe that are characterized by a lack of political openness, limited civic freedoms, or high levels of political polarization, citizens may face obstacles to freely express their opinions and engage in decision-making processes. This is true of the data gathered in Mangwe where participant TL1 noted that:

"The turnout at these consultative meetings is very low because people are disgruntled due to the way help is given to people. People feel discriminated politically".

Similarly, participant CM3 pointed out that:

"People attend but a few participate, people fear to contribute for fear of political victimization".

Kurebwa (2014) alludes to several incidences where traditional leaders have been at the forefront of political campaigns on behalf of their preferred political party at the same time victimising community members known to be affiliated to another political party.

Political factors, such as political polarization, limited civic freedoms, and fear of political victimization hinder citizen participation in the budgeting process. In politically charged environments, citizens may be reluctant to express their opinions openly or participate due to concerns about repercussions. This resonates with experiences in Uganda where Mulindwa (2013) found that participation in budget conferences was discriminatory as it was based on partisan support, and only a few loyalists were allowed to attend. Creating a non-partisan and inclusive environment that respects freedom of expression is essential for meaningful citizen engagement.

f. Short notice of meetings

The interviews established that most of the times citizens were not given adequate time to prepare and plan for the meetings since they were only given a short notice of the meeting. Participant CM12 observed that:

"… short notice of the meeting hinders effective participation since most people would end up not attending the meeting".

Another participant TL8 noted that:

"*At times, you are told today to call for a meeting the following day. This is very problematic because people need to plan ahead and ensure that, as they attend the meetings, their livelihoods are also taken care of. So, if a meeting is given such a short notice, it means people would not attend since they can leave their livelihoods unattended".*

Established from the findings is that inadequate notice and planning time for budget meetings can impede citizen participation. Community members need sufficient time

to prepare, prioritize their commitments, and ensure their livelihoods are not compromised. Providing advance notice and scheduling meetings in a way that accommodates community members' needs can help mitigate this issue.

5.5.4.2 Perceptions of the current Mangwe RDC budgeting process

This theme sought to establish the perceptions of the RDC on the current Mangwe RDC budgeting process. The question which they were asked to respond to was: What are your perceptions of the current Mangwe RDC budgeting process? The highly dominant view which emerged from the interviews with the RDC officials is that there was lack of effective citizen engagement in the process. Participant CO6 had this to share:

"You see, as a council we are trying to follow the legal side of budgeting by ensuring that mechanisms for participation are in place, but the problem is with citizens who do not attend the meetings. As a result, we have a process which is failing to adequately function due to lack of citizen engagement in the process".

Another perception of the budgeting process in Mangwe was one related to the silent budget process. Participant CO2 pointed to the fact that the silence in the budget process had negative implications on effective citizen engagement. Furthermore, a few participants were of the view that the reason for low citizen engagement is that councillors were not in touch with their communities. Commenting on this, participant CO3 noted that:

"If you have a good relationship with the citizens, it would be easy to have them participate in community matters".

However, participant CO1 came to the rescue of Councillors by noting that these people failed to adequately engage with the citizens due to lack of adequate training on PB.

Based on the findings and statements provided above, there were concerns about the current budgeting process in Mangwe RDC. The dominant perception expressed by

the RDC in Mangwe was lack of citizen engagement in the budgeting process. This is a common challenge faced in participatory budgeting initiatives. Studies have shown that low citizen participation can be attributed to various factors such as lack of awareness, limited understanding of the budget process, insufficient communication, and inadequate mechanisms for citizen involvement (Olowu, 2002; Moore, 2007; Shall, 2007; Mulindwa, 2013; Buela *et al*., 2020). These findings suggests that Mangwe RDC needs to explore strategies to increase citizen awareness, improve communication, and create meaningful opportunities for engagement, to address this issue.

The perception of a silent budget process raised concerns about transparency and citizen engagement. This finding reflects the importance of transparent and inclusive budgeting processes, where information about the budget is widely shared, and citizens have the opportunity to provide input and feedback. Shall (2007) emphasizes the need for clear communication channels, publicizing budget information, and engaging citizens in budget discussions to enhance transparency and foster trust.

Some key informants attributed low citizen engagement to councillors not being in touch with their communities. This finding highlights the significance of strong relationships between elected representatives and their constituencies. These findings corroborate with the systems theory, which was the guiding theory in the study, because it fosters and promotes interaction, participation, and communication between the citizens and the local council (Van der Waldt, 2010). Emphasis has been placed on the role of councillors in facilitating citizen participation, acting as intermediaries between communities and the RDC, and bridging the gap in understanding and communication. Thus, strengthening the connection between councillors and communities through regular interactions and meaningful engagement can contribute to improved citizen participation.

The mention of councillors lacking training on participatory budgeting aligns with the need for capacity building highlighted by Shall (2007). Effective implementation of participatory budgeting requires knowledge and skills in financial management, citizen engagement techniques, and facilitation. Training programs can empower councillors to lead budget consultations effectively, enhance their understanding of financial

matters, and improve their ability to engage citizens. This finding underscores the importance of investing in training and capacity building for elected representatives.

5.5.5 Mechanisms dimension in PB

The mechanisms dimension relates to the strategies which have been developed to enhance citizen participation in the PB process (Ebdon & Franklin, 2006). These mechanisms empower citizens to meaningfully contribute to the PB process, which results in the attainment of positive PB outcomes although the existence of these mechanisms does not guarantee meaningful participation as noted in the Ugandan experience (Mulindwa, 2013).

The participants were divided into 4 groups and each group was expected to share their experiences with regards to participation and the mechanisms used to participate in the PB process. The councillors, traditional leaders and committee members have the same set of questions which they were asked to respond to. This made comparisons possible. The RDC officials had a similar but slightly different question which sought to establish the role of the RDC in enhancing participation of the councillors, traditional leaders and committee members.

5.5.5.1 Induction and education on PB

The question asked to the councillors, traditional leaders and committee members was: “Where you inducted into your office and the practice of PB explained to you?” This question sought to establish the mechanisms used for each group to induct them into their office and provide education on PB.

a. Councillors

All fourteen participants concurred that a Workshop for councillors by Local Authorities Capacity Enhancement Project (LACEP), in collaboration with the RDC, for capacity building in revenue collection, enabled them to appreciate their roles and gave PB related education. Despite having had this one workshop, councillors strongly felt that

more workshops on financial issues should be carried out to enhance knowledge and understanding of PB. Participant CL2 noted that:

"We had asked for another workshop so that we enhance our understanding of financial matters".

Questioned about their roles in the PB process, councillors unanimously agreed that they were the link between the citizens and the RDC. Moreover, participant CL14, beaming with pride, had this to say:

"Our role as councillors have been to lead in the budget consultative process with the assistance of the RDC or without their assistance if you are capable to do it on your own".

Despite leading in the consultative meetings, most participants noted with concern that there is generally a low turnout of the citizens in the consultative meetings. However, few participants noted that in their wards the turnout was good due to the fact that their constituencies were characterized by educated people who were able to interpret financial jargon.

Emanating from the interviews with councillors was that the councillors in Mangwe RDC had received some form of induction and education on PB. The workshops organized by LACEP, in collaboration with the RDC, were aimed at capacity building for revenue collection, which included aspects of PB. The councillors expressed the need for further workshops to enhance their understanding of financial matters related to PB. In a similar manner, interviews carried out with the RDC officials indicated that most councillors lacked training and education on the PB processes, which rendered their efforts in trying to engage with the citizens fruitless. Such a scenario is not unique to Mangwe but have been highlighted in South African where Shall (2007) recorded that councillors generally lacked capacity and expertise to meaningfully contribute to the PB process, thus impeding achievement of substantive PB outcomes.

It is important for councillors to continue advocating more education and training opportunities to enhance their understanding of PB and financial matters. This is

supported by Shall (2007) and Leduka (2009), who propose that training and educational forums be established and capacitated so that citizens are equipped with budget skills for them to meaningfully contribute to the budget process. This can help them effectively lead the budget consultative process and engage with the community in a meaningful way. Additional workshops and training sessions, specifically focused on PB, can contribute to building their capacity and addressing their concerns.

The role of councillors in the PB process, as mentioned by CL14, is to lead in the budget consultative process, either with or without the assistance of the RDC. They play a crucial role in engaging with the community, facilitating discussions, and ensuring that the voices of the citizens are heard in the budgeting process. However, the lack of education and the low turnout in the meetings were identified as challenges that could impact on the effectiveness of their role. Continuous education, training, and capacity building for councillors, specifically in the context of PB, can play a significant role in enhancing their understanding and skills.

b. Traditional Leaders

Unanimously, the traditional leaders agreed that no trainings had been conducted for them on PB. When asked about how they had received education on PB, participant TL noted that:

"We haven't received any education on PB. What we know is that the RDC or the Councillor brings the budget for consultation, and we facilitate the meetings".

Established from the interviews is that traditional leaders in Mangwe RDC had not received any formal training or education specifically focused on participatory budgeting (PB). They mentioned that their scant understanding of the budgetary process was based on the RDC or the councillor bringing the budget for consultation and their role being to facilitate the meetings. Such a state of affairs, according to Ebdon, Krane and Franklin (2012), hinders effective participation in the budget process due to lack of knowledge, expertise and capacity to understand the budget process.

It is important to recognize the role of traditional leaders in fostering community participation and engagement in the budgeting process. Providing targeted training and education on PB to traditional leaders can enhance their understanding and skills in effectively involving their communities in decision-making and budget consultations. Engaging with traditional leaders through workshops, seminars, or training sessions can promote their active participation and contribute to more inclusive and informed budgeting processes.

c. Ward and Village Community Members

According to the Ward and Village Community Committee Members (WADCOs and VIDCOs) no induction or training on PB was done to them. What they know about PB is what they had heard perhaps, from the knowledgeable ones in the community. The research also established that the majority of the members were yet to appreciate their roles. This finding suggests that Ward and Village Community Committee Members (WADCOs and VIDCOs) in Mangwe RDC had not received any formal induction or training specifically focused on participatory budgeting (PB). Their knowledge about PB was primarily based on what they have heard from more knowledgeable individuals within the community. This indicates lack of empowerment and capacity-building among WADCOs and VIDCOs in relation to their roles in the budgeting process. This scenario is lamentable because, according to Marango *et al.* (2018), these committees are viewed as platforms for grassroots participation.

Section 22 of the Traditional Leaders Act of 1998 underscores the need for VIDCOs and WADCOs to be platforms for facilitating citizen participation on community needs and priorities. However, research findings reveal that the majority of WADCO and VIDCO members have not fully appreciated their roles in the PB process. This lack of understanding can potentially hinder their active participation and effective engagement in budget consultations. Commenting on the roles of these grassroots committees, Makumbe (1998) states that their inclusivity and participatory nature is in theory because in practice these committees failed to execute their mandate and grassroots decision making is almost entirely the reserve of the traditional leadership under the influence of the central government. Similarly, Katerere and Mohamed

(1996) hold that grassroots committees fail to render accountability to their communities.

5.5.5.2 The role of the Mangwe RDC in educating the Councillors, Traditional Leaders and Committee Members on PB

This theme sought to have the Mangwe RDC responding to the question: “What role does Mangwe RDC play in ensuring citizen, traditional leadership and elected councillors’ education on budgeting activities”. The researcher was soliciting from participants data on the mechanisms which the RDC employed to educate the stakeholders on the budgeting process.

When responding to this question, the RDC officials concurred on the role played by LACEP in providing a training program for the councillors. This training sought to capacitate the councillors on financial issues including PB. The research established that, after this workshop, most councillors were able to lead in the consultative meetings on their own without the RDC officials. Despite having been able to conduct consultative meetings after this training, CO1 calls for conceited efforts to facilitate more trainings for councillors since they still lack capacity and understanding of PB. This is because they are supposed to be the glue between the citizens and the RDC. However, for traditional leaders and committee members, the RDC concurred with the views shared by these stakeholders that nothing had been done to facilitate for their training and education on PB, which is a hindrance to effective citizen participation. It is concerning that no specific mechanisms or initiatives was mentioned to educate the traditional leaders and committee members on PB. This lack of education generally hindered their ability to effectively engage in and promote citizen participation in the budgeting process.

Educating community members on their duties and rights is an empowerment tool which reduces inequality in the community, as it gives the powerless and poor skills and knowledge on effective citizenship. Of importance is the existence of adequate political will of the local government to provide appropriate conditions for education. If there are conducive conditions, education on citizen rights will take place and result in effective citizenship.

The role of Mangwe RDC in ensuring education on budgeting activities for citizens, traditional leadership, and elected councillors was limited based on the information provided. While the RDC collaborated with LACEP to provide training programs for councillors, there was need for more concerted efforts to enhance their understanding of participatory budgeting (PB) and financial issues. Zamudio (2004) and Karatzimas (2020) substantiate these findings by noting that, for citizens to actively participate in the governance process, exercise their rights, and develop a citizenship conscience, it is the responsibility of the state to educate them in that direction. To ensure more inclusive and participatory budgeting, it is important for the RDC to recognize the significance of educating and involving traditional leaders. It is imperative for the RDC to facilitate participative education of PB to all the interested stakeholders.

5.5.5.3 Mechanisms for disseminating budget documents

The interviews with the councillors, traditional leaders and committee members sought to establish the form in which they received budget documents. In a similar manner the RDC officials were asked the question: “Which mechanisms do you use to disseminate budget documents to citizens, traditional leadership and councillors?”

According to the majority of participants, budget documents in Mangwe RDC were received in hard copy format during the consultative forums. While a few individuals mentioned receiving them through WhatsApp, this method was not widely used. In recent times, it is primarily the councillor in most wards who leads the consultative meetings and is responsible for explaining the contents of the budget documents. However, there are three wards where the RDC officials had to assist the councillor in this task. According to Ebdon, Krane and Franklin (2012), the mechanisms adopted in the USA entail the publication of the budget information to the public online and on hard copies, holding public hearings, and holding a referendum. In some cases, these resonate with mechanisms adopted in Mangwe RDC to share budget information. According to CO6, budget documents were advertised in the newspaper, published for inspection, and communicated via WhatsApp chatboard platform through the help of LACEP (Local Authorities Capacity Enhancement Project). All stakeholders were registered so that they could have access to the chatboard anytime. However,

according to some participants, these mechanisms were too elite for some Mangwe rural folks since they could not access, let alone understand them. These instruments of public consultations have been viewed by Mushamba (2010) as elitist and exclusive in nature since not all citizens are literate enough to be able to understand how they operate.

5.5.5.4 The implications of the language used for budget documents

As part of the mechanisms and modalities used for disseminating budget documents, a further follow-up question was asked to ascertain the implications of the language used for budget documents to the people. Unanimously, the participants confirmed that the documents were always in English, and during consultative meetings, the RDC officials or the Councillor leading the meeting interpreted the documents to the local language.

Relying solely on the councillor to interpret and explain the budget can be problematic, especially when both the councillor and the community members have limited education. There is also the risk of distorted information being communicated, which may hinder the community's understanding and meaningful engagement in the budgeting process, as expressed by participant TL13. Ebdon, Krane and Franklin (2012) argue that effective participation is usually hindered by citizens' lack of understanding of the budget jargon. Participation therefore, remains the domain of a few elites who can interpret budget presentation formats and have an understanding of typical budget jargon.

Out of the fourteen wards, only two had individuals with exceptional skills who can effectively translate and explain the budget in local languages. For example, participant CL4 mentioned translating the budget from English to Ndebele and Kalanga, and copies of the translated documents were made available to those who can read them. Similarly, CL11 mentioned using young undergraduate students who are native to Mangwe to interpret and explain the budget contents to the community, aiming to encourage youth participation in community governance.

In terms of availability, participant CM7 noted that the budget documents were only provided once a year when the draft budget is shown to the community. However, CM9 pointed out that there was a problem with accessing the documents, as they were often only given on the day of the meetings instead of being provided in advance. Such a scenario is against the ideals and principles of PB, which seeks to ensure that accessing of the documents is made easy for the stakeholders (Shah, 2007). This hampers people's ability to review and comprehend the budget, thereby affecting their participation in the meetings.

5.6.5.5 Participation strategies in the PB process

The thrust of this theme was to examine ways in which councillors, traditional leaders and committee members participated in the PB process. Data in this section is presented in categories of the cohorts interviewed.

a. Councillors

The study revealed that the majority of councillors participated in the budget process through leading the budget consultative meetings with the assistance of the RDC officials, as mentioned earlier. They played a crucial role in facilitating discussions, explaining the budget contents to the community, and collecting feedback. The mechanisms used to enhance their participation included training programs provided by organisations such as LACEP, to build their capacity in financial matters and participatory budgeting. This is in line the observations made by Karatzimas (2020) that, for effective participation to occur, the state has the responsibility to educate and train the stakeholders with regards to their rights and responsibilities.

While it seems that the training programs have been helpful to some extent, there is still need for additional training to enhance councillors' understanding and capacity in participatory budgeting. This will enable them to effectively fulfil their role as intermediaries between the RDC and the citizens. To improve the effectiveness of their participation, it is necessary to provide ongoing training and support for councillors, ensuring they have a comprehensive understanding of the budget process and the skills to facilitate meaningful citizen engagement.

b. Traditional Leaders

According to the information gathered from the interviews with both the traditional leaders and the RDC officials, it is evident that they had not received any specific education or training on PB. Participant TL6 stipulated that their participation in the budget process primarily involved facilitating the consultative meetings by informing the community on when the meeting will be held and where they provide support and guidance based on their traditional roles and influence. However, the lack of education on participatory budgeting hinders their effectiveness in this process. Collaborative efforts between the RDC and traditional leadership institutions can be established to facilitate such training programs.

c. WADCOs and VIDCOs

According to most participants, Ward and Village Community Committee Members (WADCOs and VIDCOs) are expected to participate in the budget process by attending the budget consultative meetings and providing input and feedback from their respective communities. Makumbe (2010) shares similar sentiments and notes that WADCOS and VIDCOS facilitate PB through the holding of meetings where citizens prioritize projects which they deem necessary for their locality. The same sentiments are established in the Traditional Leadership Act of 1998 section (18 and 20) and the RDC Act section 56, which provide for the establishment of the Ward Assembly (WA) and the WADCOs as grassroot committees which are supposed to be a bridge between the government and the governed. Thus, evidence underscores the significance of these committees in facilitating grassroot participation in the governance process. However, the majority of participants opine that their participation in the budget process is limited due to lack of education and expertise. Participant CM7 alluded to the fact that:

“We do not have adequate skills and expertise to participate in the budget process. In instances where the community hold meetings and discuss projects, we even fail to cost those projects”.

In a similar vein participant CM10 shared that:

"My child, it is very difficult to execute our mandate because we don't have the power to do anything without the buy in of the traditional leaders. As a result, whatever we do, or we don't do is what the traditional leaders want even though it may not be in the best interests of the community".

Emanating from the above sentiments is the inability of grassroots committees to effectively participate in the budgetary process due to issues like the dominance of the traditional leaders in the community. These sentiments are cemented by the Zimbabwe Institute's (2005) argument that the enactment of the Traditional Leadership Act (1998) ushered in changes to the relationship between the WADCO and the VIDCO. Under this Act, the Village Head (VH) and the Headman who are both traditional leaders, are given authority to preside over the Village Assembly, thus, superseding all VIDCO structures. In a similar manner the Headman has authority to preside over the Ward Assembly, an assembly where all ward related issues are discussed. The Act gives the traditional leaders power over both the VIDCO and WADCO chairpersons, rendering them a shadow of the village and ward assemblies with no powers to make any meaningful contribution towards community fiscal matters.

Makumbe (1998) questions the inclusivity and participatory nature of grassroot committees since they are dominated by the traditional leaders who are usually under the influence of the central government. It is evident from the interviews and literature that these committees fail to execute their mandate due to factors like lack of education and expertise, lack of power to influence community decisions, "lack of authority to raise resources, the central government dictating the modus operandi of these committees" (Makumbe, 1998:29).

5.5.5.6 Suggestions to improve the effectiveness of participation mechanisms

To improve the effectiveness of the mechanisms used to enhance participation in the budget process, the following actions were suggested by the participants:

a. Comprehensive and ongoing training

Unanimously, participants agreed to the need to provide comprehensive and ongoing training programs for councillors, traditional leaders, and committee members. These programs should cover, not only financial matters, but also the principles and practices of participatory budgeting. Training should be tailored to the specific needs and capacities of each group, considering their educational backgrounds and language skills.

b. Clear and accessible communication

It also emerged from the interviews that, of paramount importance is to improve the communication channels for disseminating budget documents and information. It is essential that budget documents are provided well in advance for consultative meetings, allowing participants enough time to review and understand the content. Explore various communication methods, such as translated documents, audio-visual materials, and simplified summaries, to make the information more accessible to a wider range of stakeholders.

c. Engage local interpreters

The participants concurred that the use of English only was a barrier for effective participation. They therefore, suggested that local interpreters who can effectively translate the budget documents and discussions into native languages should be engaged. These interpreters should have a good understanding of financial terminology and be able to convey the information accurately to ensure that participants fully comprehend the budget process.

d. Promote community outreach

The research established that community outreach should be promoted. Community outreach programs should be conducted to raise awareness about the budget process and encourage active participation. These can include public meetings, workshops, and information campaigns targeted at citizens, traditional leaders, and committee

members. They also suggested that local media channels, such as radio and community newspapers, should be used to disseminate information and educate the wider community about the budget process. The use of such channels was evidenced in Uganda, where Mulindwa (2013) documents that a local community radio was used to raise awareness about the budget process and it impacted positively.

e. Strengthen collaboration

Participants further recommended that stronger collaboration between the RDC, councillors, traditional leaders, and committee members should be fostered. Regular dialogue and information sharing should be promoted to ensure that all stakeholders are well-informed and actively engaged in the budget process. In addition, platforms for joint decision-making and problem-solving to enhance transparency and accountability, should be established.

5.5.6 Outcomes dimension of PB

Ebdon, Krane and Franklin (2012) pointed out that a combination of the government environment, process design, and the mechanism dimension have a direct bearing on the outcome dimension of PB. Zamboni (2007) holds similar sentiments in noting that the process design and the government environment influence the outcome dimension to be either negative or positive.

It is the focus of this section to examine the direction the process design, mechanism, and government environments have influenced the outcomes in this study. The findings in this section seeks to answer the following questions:

- “How often are community inputs incorporated into the final local government budget?”; and
- What have been the main outcomes of PB in Mangwe RDC?”

Furthermore, responses to questions relating to the challenges encountered in the PB process and recommendations to be adopted to improve PB outcomes, are addressed.

5.5.6.1 Incorporation of community inputs in the budget process

This question was asked to all the participants and the majority opined that the views from the people were not adequately incorporated into the final government budget. In this regard, participant CM9 shared that:

"Our views and priorities are often not considered in the final budget. As the community we blame our ward councillor for the failure of the needs to be incorporated in the budget since he is the one who brings the budget to us and pretend to be noting our views".

Another participant (CL5) pointed to the fact that the council failed to prioritize the needs and views of all the seventeen wards, and only a few wards were catered for, especially those with good road networks and close proximity to the RDC. However, some participants, especially the RDC officials, were of the opinion that the views of the participants were captured to some extent in the final budget though to a limited extent due to financial constraints. Participant CO1 expressed this as follows:

"We do try to capture the views of the community, but we have to prioritise what is critical in these wards. I will also point out to you that it is difficult to get all the projects from the wards sail through. Everyone wants their programmes to be implemented in all the wards, but the resources are inadequate. What magic can the council perform in such a situation?"

The findings highlight a common sentiment that citizens' inputs are not adequately incorporated into the final local government budget. This lack of inclusion can lead to frustration and a perception of neglect among community members. Several factors contribute to this situation. For example, participants CM9 and CL5 suggested that there was general dissatisfaction and a sense of disconnect between the community and its representative, as well as disparities in infrastructural development and public

services. This imbalance resulted in perceptions of favouritism or neglect among community members. These findings are congruent with evidence gathered by Mulindwa (2013) in Uganda, where it is recorded that citizens' views and proposed projects were often excluded in the final budget, making the budget elitist in nature since it would not reflect the needs and priorities of citizens. Evidence from China presents the ideal PB experience where citizens' inputs are incorporated into the budget. Wu and Wand, 2011 in Frenkiel and Rewal (2019) indicate that, in the Zuguo local governments the citizens' inputs and influence resulted in the selection of priority projects which ultimately received funding. Thus, the ability of communities to have their input incorporated into the budget is crucial in directing development to the priority needs of the community and giving citizens the sense of ownership of the projects. This ultimately results in the attainment of positive PB outcomes.

The RDC officials, like participant CO1, however, argued that the views of the community were taken into account, albeit to a limited extent, due to financial constraints. They emphasized the difficulty of allocating resources to address the needs of all wards and the necessity of prioritizing critical projects. The officials acknowledged the challenges of balancing the desires and expectations of the community with the realities of limited resources. Similar sentiments were shared by Mulindwa (2013), noting that in Uganda, local governments are faced with financial constraints which undermines the ability of the local government to prioritise community's needs and projects in the budget.

5.5.6.2 The relationship between citizens and the RDC

This theme sought to examine how the relationship between the citizens and the RDC had been altered since the inputs of the citizens in the budgets were largely not incorporated into the final budget. Largely, participants believed that their views were often not captured in the final document, and as a result, the blame was directed to the RDC. Participant CM9 noted that the relationship between the RDC and citizens was sour, and shared that:

"*People are disgruntled with the way the RDC operates. They call us to their meetings, they ask for our views which we give them and after that they just disregard our views*

and implement their blue print. So why call us for a meeting in the first place? This has really created a bad relationship between the people and the RDC".

In a similar manner, participant TL8 shared that:

“Because the RDC does not consider the people's views in the budget this has created a sour relationship with the people. They seem not to care about our welfare at all. Nowadays, they don’t even attend the consultative meetings instead they send the councillors to do it on their behalf. This further creates a distance between the people and the RDC, we want to see them and be able to talk to them, we have a lot of questions for them".

The RDC officials also attested to such a sour relationship with the citizens. They noted that balancing the divergent needs from different wards with limited resources was problematic since other wards would feel neglected and their needs not met. This then resulted in the citizens blaming the RDC for imposing things on them.

The lack of citizen input in the local government budget significantly affected the relations between citizens and local government officials. The findings suggest that there was a sense of frustration, disappointment, and distrust among the citizens towards the RDC and its officials. According to participant CM9 and TL8, citizens felt disgruntled and perceived the RDC as disregarding their views and implementing their own agenda. This created a perception that the RDC does not value or respect the input provided by the community during consultations. As a result, citizens questioned the purpose of attending meetings if their views were not taken into consideration. This lack of responsiveness led to a deterioration of trust and a strained relationship between citizens and the RDC. The absence of RDC officials at consultative meetings further deepens the divide and leaves citizens feeling unheard and disconnected. The desire to have direct access to RDC officials and the need for open dialogue indicate a breakdown in communication and a growing frustration among citizens. Even RDC officials themselves acknowledged the strain in their relationship with citizens. They recognized the challenge of balancing diverse needs with limited resources, which can lead to some wards feeling neglected. Citizens blamed the RDC for imposing decisions on them and not adequately addressing their needs.

These findings were in line with the findings from Uganda. Commenting on the Ugandan experience, Mulindwa (2013) argues that due to failure of the local government to incorporate the input of the citizens in the final budget, it resulted in a strained relationship with the local government. In a similar manner O'Hagan *et al.* (2019) argue that, in Scotland, the views of the citizens have often been undermined by local government officials who esteemed themselves better equipped to articulate the needs of the citizens than the citizens. Such an observation is contrary to the PB process which emphasizes the importance of citizen participation in identifying their needs and having those needs prioritised in the budget.

It is crucial for the RDC to address these issues and work towards rebuilding trust and fostering a more collaborative and inclusive relationship with citizens. By actively involving citizens, valuing their input, and working towards addressing their needs, the RDC can rebuild trust, enhance transparency, and foster a more positive and productive relationship with the community.

5.5.6.3 The role of traditional leadership to ensure that citizens' inputs are considered in the budget process

The research established that, in a limited way the traditional leadership tried to ensure that the views of the people were incorporated in the budget. However, participant CL7 noted that traditional leaders thought that their role was more to do with collecting taxes from the people than working towards ensuring that the community needs are captured in the budget. Commenting on their role, participant TL13 shared that:

"Even if we seek to influence the RDC to incorporate the views of the people our hands are tied because in the RDCC meetings we can only attend as ex-officio members. We will only be watching what is happening not participating".

This finding suggests that the traditional leadership plays a limited role in ensuring that citizen and community inputs are considered in the local government budget. While they may advocate the inclusion of people's views, their ability to influence the process is often constrained. Participant CL7 noted that traditional leaders primarily perceived

their role as that collecting taxes from the people, indicating a more administrative function rather than actively participating in budgetary decision-making. This perspective contributed to lack of proactive engagement by traditional leaders in championing citizen engagement. Additionally, participant TL13 highlighted a limitation in the participation of traditional leaders in the RDC meetings. As *ex-officio* members, they attend these meetings but are unable to actively participate and have a significant impact on the decision-making process. This lack of participation hampered their ability to effectively advocate the incorporation of community views into the final budget. The limited powers and responsibilities of traditional leaders is further illustrated in the RDC Act (1998), which allows traditional leaders to sit in the RDC meetings as *ex-officio members,* whose rights are only limited to participating but not the voting process. Furthermore, Makumbe (2010) notes that traditional leaders have been given limited responsibilities compared to their local government counterparts. Given these constraints, it is evident that traditional leadership's role in ensuring citizen inputs is considered in the budget is currently limited.

5.5.6.4 PB Outcomes in Mangwe RDC

This theme sought to evaluate the PB outcomes recorded in Mangwe since the implementation of PB. The participants were asked the question: **"**What have been the main outcomes of PB in Mangwe RDC?" In response to this question, both positive and negative outcomes were identified.

Despite being dominated by negative outcomes, it is important to note that there are some positive outcomes. These positive outcomes are briefly outlined below.

a. Citizen engagement

The interviews established that consultative meetings were a major part of PB in Mangwe District. All the participants alluded to the fact that annually, budget consultative meetings were carried out. The document analysis similarly revealed the existence of grassroots committees in Mangwe, aimed at enhancing citizen participation in the PB process, although in practice their visibility is questioned.

In support of the above findings, Ebdon, Krane and Franklin (2012), Mutizwa-Mangiza and Conyers (1996) and Mulindwa (2013) note that, in both developing and developed countries, participatory mechanisms that include consultative meetings have been adopted as a means of enhancing citizen participation in the PB process. The research findings and literature underscore the significance of consultative meetings as a means for providing a platform for citizen engagement in the PB process. While the level of participation may be limited, the existence of these meetings demonstrates an effort to involve citizens in decision-making. These meetings can be utilized as opportunities to gather valuable input and feedback from citizens.

b. Enhanced transparency

As confirmed by Ebdon, Krane and Franklin (2012), PB initiatives tend to promote transparency by making budget information accessible to citizens. Data gathered from the participants indicate that various mechanisms have been used to make the budget documents accessible to the citizens. The RDC officials noted that hard copy budget documents, a WhatsApp chatboard, and the publication of the budget in local newspapers were key mechanisms Mangwe RDC use to make budget information accessible to citizens. The existence of these mechanisms shows a commitment to transparency and providing information to the public. Although some of these mechanisms were viewed as elitist in nature, their existence reflects an attempt to improve transparency.

c. Service delivery improvement

A few participants hailed the RDC for the provision of services to the people in Mangwe District. Participant CL8 and TL11 indicated that, in their ward, the RDC in collaboration with the local and diaspora citizens, had managed to construct a clinic and secure a solar system and one-kilometer-long pipes so that there is piped water. In another ward, a similar solar project was effected with the assistance of the non-governmental organisation known as OXFAM. These positive outcomes demonstrate the potential for improved service delivery through partnerships and community involvement. This partnership is underscored by MSP-ESA (2008) who argues that PB brings in a collaboration between citizens, local government officials, civil society

and the private sector which enhances transparency and efficient service delivery. These findings are further substantiated by evidence documented by Futman (1993), Scheinder and Goldfrank (2002) and Zamboni (2007) that show how PB increases efficiency in the operations of local governments which results in the provision of services and goods.

d. Citizen empowerment

Some participants hailed the fact that the consultative meetings were open to everyone, including the previously marginalized groups, indicative of the empowering nature which PB brings to the citizens. Participant CO5 noted that:

"The consultative meetings provide a platform for citizens to hold the local government accountable on the use of resources. If citizens are able to hold the local government officials, it means they are empowered as they are able to demand for answers and get them".

The inclusive nature of the consultative meetings, open to all citizens including marginalised groups, was seen as empowering by some participants. The ability to hold local government officials accountable for resource usage was seen as a positive aspect of PB, enabling citizens to demand answers and participate in decision-making processes. Despite concerns that the consultative meetings were rather discriminatory, the fact that they are inclusive of everyone brings in empowerment.

The following less-favourable outcomes were also recorded:

a. Limited citizen engagement

The majority of participants acknowledged that, despite Mangwe RDC having mechanisms for participation in place, citizen engagement in the budget process was limited. Ebdon, Krane and Franklin (2012) argue that effective participation is usually hindered by citizen's lack of understanding of the budget jargon. Participation therefore, remained in the domain of a few elites who can interpret budget presentation formats and have an understanding of typical budget jargon. This is true of Mangwe

as it was established from the interviews that factors contributing to limited participation included limited education and knowledge of PB as well as the failure of the RDC to incorporate citizen views in the final budget.

It was also established that most citizens did not attend consultative meetings, and for those who did, they seldom participated in the budget process, contrary to the ideals of PB. The Ugandan experience (Mulindwa, 2013) illustrate how the availability of participation mechanisms does not always enhance generic citizen participation. Such a scenario results in the failure to attain expected positive PB outcomes. Mulindwa (2013) hold that the PB process in Uganda is symbolic and a tool for securing more funding. Such a scenario hinders effective participation as it deviates from the ultimate aim of enhancing participation that results in an empowered citizenry, especially the vulnerable and excluded in society (MDPESA, 2008; Cabanes, 2019).

These findings were in contrast with the deliberative theory which grew out the citizens' dissatisfaction with the limited participation of citizens in governance issues affecting them (Smith 2003). The deliberative theory furthers the idea of participative democracy as it initiates a continuous discourse between political authorities and public opinion (Bohman, 1998). The argument is that it is for the lack of citizen participation that the government fail to address societal problems (Nabatchi, 2004). Deliberative theory furthers the thought that effective citizen participation in the PB process would result in an empowered citizenry who can influence fiscal decisions. This was evidenced in China where Wu and Wand (2011) in Frenkiel and Rewal (2019) illustrate the power of community participation noting that the Xinhe 2006 budget was significantly amended due to the influence of citizens.

Figure5.7: Generic logic of participation

Source: Adapted from Jones *et al.* (2013:6)

Figure5.7: Generic logic of participation captures the arguments forwarded by the deliberative theory and the participative theories which both guided this study. The arguments relate to the significance of citizen participation in achieving positive PB outcomes.

b. Lack of accountability and transparency

Emerging from the interviews carried out with the participants was the lack of accountability and transparency. Commenting on this issue, participant TL10 demanded that:

"The RDC should come and address us on the budget and how the finances are being used. We demand for accountability and transparency in the use of resources. How do you expect us to continue paying taxes without knowing how our monies are being used".

There is a perceived lack of accountability and transparency in the use of resources by the RDC. Citizens expressed a desire for more information on budget allocation and expenditure, and the need for the RDC to address these concerns to build trust and confidence among the community. Such a scenario differs from the South African PB experience, viewed by some in a positive light, where local government has been applauded for transparency (Shall, 2007).

Basri and Nabihab (2014) underscored the need to uphold the concepts of accountability and transparency due to the nature of public resources. Basri and Nabihab's (2014) sentiments are in accordance with the citizenship theory, which acknowledges that every citizen has the right to participate and hold governments accountable. Forester (1999) further notes that exercising the rights enhances accountability in the utilization of public resources by governments. Thus, the call by Mangwe citizens to get information from the local government on the utilization of resources is supported by theory and practice.

c. Limited service delivery

Interviews with the participants and evidence from document analysis concur on the mandate of the RDC. They both indicate that the RDC is mandated by the RDC Act of 1996, to provide services to the people which are not limited to water provision, rehabilitation of roads, provision of health and educational facilities. However, evidence emerging from the field indicate that the RDC was failing to execute this mandate as illustrated by a shortage of schools, health facilities, and water sources. The majority of participants indicated that the citizens have to travel very long distances to access services. This is problematic as this results in school children dropping out of school, and people facing serious health complications due to inaccessible health facilities. Participant CM9 shared that:

"When we continuously talk about our need for health facilities, we are not taken serious but this is really critical. Last year, we nearly lost my niece who was bitten by a scorpion. We had to push her in a wheelbarrow for more than two hours to get to the clinic. Perhaps we need to die before they can take us seriously".

Unanimously, the participants acknowledged the despicable state of the road which covered the Mangwe District. Participant TL13 noted that:

"Our roads are in a sorry state my sister! I am sure you saw them as you were coming to this place. In our ward we have a nutritional garden and we had secured a contract with Willsgroove that we supply them with our vegetables but due to the poor road network the contract was terminated. This contact was our ticket out of poverty, but

the road decided that we remain in this state. It is really crucial that this time the RDC looks into this road issue with all the seriousness it deserves."

Despite the mandate of the RDC to provide services such as water, road rehabilitation, and health and educational facilities; evidence suggests that there are significant gaps in service delivery. Citizens often have to travel long distances to access basic services, leading to negative consequences such as school dropouts and health complications. Similar sentiments are shared by Buela *et al.* (2020) who recorded the dissatisfaction of the Ecuador citizens with PB that did not have much positive PB outcomes with regards to improved quality of life and the basic needs. It is therefore, crucial for Mangwe RDC to allocate resources effectively to address these service gaps and improve the well-being of the community.

d. Lack of priority on community needs

PB is designed to prioritize community needs and address the most pressing issues. Zeguo local government in China is an example of a local government which ensured the prioritization of community needs as evidenced by funding community priority projects (Wu & Wand, 2011 in Frenkiel & Rewal, 2019). The ability of the local government to direct development to the priority needs of the community as ranked and identified by the community is key in PB. This ensures that scarce resources are only directed to projects which address the concerns of the community.

However, evidence gathered in the field suggest that Mangwe RDC had not been prioritizing the allocation of resources to projects that have a direct impact on the community's well-being. This was discussed in the previous section, where it was established that the needs of the community were not prioritized and the RDC officials indicated that this was due to lack of adequate resources. The research indicates that the prioritization of resources towards projects that directly impact the well-being of the community was lacking. Resource allocation decisions may not align with the most pressing needs of the community, potentially exacerbating existing challenges and hindering development. Furthermore, some participants noted that this led to lack of social cohesion in the district.

e. Financial constraints

The interviews established that the RDC failed to prioritize community projects due to financial constraints. Participant CO4 pointed out that:

"The RDC is struggling financially, locally raised resources are inadequate. Yes, we receive grants from the central government, but the funds are still inadequate. Business owners do try to pay for their licences, but the problem is with household tax, people do not pay tax. They can go for five years without paying this tax. In such a case even when budgeting and prioritising community needs, how do we finance projects when there is no money".

When commenting on the issue of non-payment of household tax, TL14 and CM10 argued that this was due to the lack of the developmental component in the district. Participant TL14 shared that:

"People used to pay their taxes but we realized that we were not benefiting anything since our projects were never financed, for example look at the state of our roads. When we realised that we then decided that paying was of no use. You see people just want to benefit from their money".

Financial constraints faced by the RDC have been identified as a factor impacting their ability to fulfil their mandate. Non-payment of household taxes by citizens exacerbates the financial challenges faced by the RDC, making it difficult to finance projects and deliver services effectively. The sentiments shared by participants CO4 and TL14 are cemented by Wekwete (1987) who suggest that there is a causal relationship between the local governments' performance, accountability and transparency and the willingness of citizens to pay taxes.

Wekwete (1987) documented experiences in Zimbabwe where local governments of certain localities faced resistance to pay developmental levy from residents, because residents argued that the development on the ground was disproportionate to the money they paid. Commenting on instances of tax compliance and evasion, Cabannes (2004) held that, when citizens are satisfied that their interests are being catered for,

episodes of tax evasion are lowered and compliance is increased. Wekwete (1987) and Cabanes (2004) explain the Mangwe situation and provide a solution to it.

5.6 Participatory budgeting challenges

PB challenges have been inevitable, and this section highlights the challenges and complexities involved in its implementation. While PB has the potential to enhance citizen participation and promote transparency and accountability, it is important to acknowledge and address its limitations. Based on the understanding and experience of the participants, there are several major drawbacks or challenges associated with PB. These challenges range from lack of capacity by local government councillors and citizens, citizens' ignorance of their rights to participate, low levels of literacy among citizens, lack of political will, and lack of an appropriate legislative framework (Olowu, 2002; Moore, 2007; Shall, 2007).

a. Limited participation

Most participants stipulated that one of the main drawbacks of PB was that it often struggled to attract a broad and diverse range of participants. Certain groups such as those with limited resources or education, were less likely to participate actively in the process. This resulted in the underrepresentation of certain voices and perspectives, limiting the inclusivity and effectiveness of the process.

These findings are in contrast with the deliberative theory which grew out the citizens' dissatisfaction with the limited participation of citizens in governance issues affecting them (Smith 2003). The deliberative theory furthers the idea of participative democracy as it initiates a continuous discourse between political authorities and public opinion (Bohman, 1998). The argument is that it is for the lack of citizen participation that the government fail to address societal problems (Nabatchi, 2004). Deliberative theory furthers the thought that effective citizen participation in the PB process would result in an empowered citizenry who can influence fiscal decisions. This was evidenced in China, where Wu and Wand (2011) in Frenkiel and Rewal (2019) illustrate the power of community participation in recording that the Xinhe 2006 budget was significantly amended due to the influence of citizens.

b. Time and resource intensive

From the interview data, it was revealed that the PB process is time and resource intensive. The RDC officials noted that PB requires significant time, effort and resources to implement successfully. Participant CO1 maintains that:

"PB involves extensive planning, organizing, and facilitating participatory meetings, training sessions and deliberation processes. The financial and human resources required for the process is very substantive and a rural council- like which is already struggling financially it is difficult to sustain the process".

In a similar manner CL14 points to the fact that:

"The RDC is crippled by inadequate finances. Yes, they do collect licence fees from the shop owners, but the struggle is more with the collection of household taxes. Most people think that they went to war so that they will be free from paying tax, which is a wrong mentality".

Both the traditional leaders and the committee members agreed with the observation that household taxes were not paid by the citizens due to varying reasons, not limited to harsh economic conditions, resistance to the RDC, and lack of understanding why they should pay tax. The participants noted that, despite being given devolution funds by the central government, the disbursement of funds was made very late, resulting in it being eroded by inflation. Participants MD1 and CO5 refer to the fact that Zimbabwe is currently operating in a very volatile economic environment that has resulted in high inflation rates, and therefore, devolution funds do not make much of a difference in terms of enhancing the PB process.

Particularly for rural councils with limited resources, sustaining the PB process can be difficult. This issue is compounded by the non-payment of household taxes, which reduces the available funds for community projects. Similar sentiments are shared by Mulindwa (2013) who points to the inadequacy of financial resources in most local governments in Uganda as a hindrance to effective PB implementation. Just like in

Mangwe, in Uganda local governments locally mobilized resources are inadequate and therefore, the reliance shifts to central government transfers which are usually disbursed late, thus, making it difficult for the local government to fund community prioritized projects. Finding ways to streamline the process and secure adequate resources is crucial to ensuring the long-term viability of PB.

c. Complex decision-making

The RDC officials attest to the realisation that PB often involves complex decision-making processes, especially when it comes to prioritizing and allocating limited resources among competing community needs. Participant CO3 commented that:

"Balancing different perspectives, addressing conflicts, and reaching consensus can be challenging and time-consuming. This complexity can sometimes lead to delays in decision-making or even gridlock".

According to some participants, this complex decision-making process often results in some wards' needs and priorities ignored. Balancing competing needs and reaching consensus among diverse perspectives can be time-consuming and challenging. This complexity may lead to delays or even gridlock in decision-making. Wampler (2007) underscores the views emerging form the interviews, that the diversity of these stakeholders indicates that their motive for participating in the budget process is also different (Wampler, 2007). This poses a challenge in the prioritization of the identified needs and objectives in the budget process. Efforts should be made to simplify the decision-making process and provide clear guidelines for prioritization to ensure efficient and effective allocation of resources.

d. Limited technical expertise and information gaps

Engaging citizens in budgetary decisions requires providing them with relevant information about the budget, financial constraints, and project feasibility. However, many citizens as alluded to by the majority of participants, lack the technical expertise or access to detailed information needed to make informed decisions. Bridging the information gap and ensuring that citizens have the necessary knowledge and

capacity to participate effectively can be a significant challenge. This resonates with experiences recorded by Shall (2007) in South Africa, where citizen participation in the PB process was stalled due to lack of technical expertise and information about the PB process. Similarly, Buele *et al.* (2020) lamented the lack of participative education as a challenge to achieving positive PB outcomes, since only the interests of the few elites were captured in the budget instead of that of the general public. Yet providing accessible and comprehensive information about budgets and projects is essential for informed decision-making. Bridging the information gap and building citizens' capacity to understand and analyze budgetary information should be a priority to empower them to participate meaningfully.

e. Political influence and manipulation

PB processes can be susceptible to political influence and manipulation as highlighted by some of the participants. According to participant CM9, some politicians attempt to sway the decision-making process to serve their own agendas, undermining the principle of citizen empowerment and the equitable allocation of resources. Such influence and manipulation have been recorded in this chapter as among the reasons there is a general low turnout and participation during the consultative budget meetings.

Abers (2000) observes that the elite and some manipulative governments hinder effective PB through controlling information and resources to the extent of manipulating the participatory mechanisms. According to MDPESA (2008) and Cabanes (2019), such a state hinders effective participation as it deviates from the ultimate aim of enhancing participation, which results in the exclusion of most citizens from the PB process which supposed to empower them. Political agendas undermine the integrity and equity of the process, compromising the empowerment of citizens and fair resource allocation. Establishing safeguards, such as independent oversight mechanisms and transparency measures, can help maintain the integrity of PB and protect it from undue political influence.

f. Unrealistic expectations

RDC officials and some councillors argue that PB can generate high expectations among citizens regarding the outcomes and impact of their participation. Participant CO2 noted that limitations in budgetary resources, competing priorities, and administrative constraints may prevent the full realization of all citizen suggestions or demands. Managing and communicating realistic expectations to avoid disillusionment and mistrust is an ongoing challenge. Having realized the challenge of unrealistic expectations in the PB process, Harkins and Escorbar (2015) formulated the PB principles which amongst many they emphasised the need for PB to have realistic expectations.

g. Sustainability and long-term impact

Research has established that some participants are of the opinion that sustaining citizen engagement and the impact of PB beyond a few cycles can be challenging. Without continued support and institutionalization, PB initiatives may fade away or lose effectiveness over time. Maintaining momentum, building trust, and ensuring the long-term impact of citizen participation requires ongoing commitment and investment.

According to Mulindwa (2013), commitment from all stakeholders, including the government, local authorities, and communities, is necessary to maintain momentum, build trust, and ensure the enduring impact of citizen participation. Moreover, as stipulated in Wampler (2007) and Harkins and Escobar (2015), the inclusion of citizens in the PB process gives them a sense of ownership of projects, and trust in the government. It encourages them to participate in the PB process continuously, achieving sustainability of the process. It is important to note that these drawbacks should not discount the potential benefits of PB, but rather highlight areas that need attention and careful management to maximise its effectiveness and impact.

5.7 Recommendations for the attainment of positive PB outcomes

The question “What do you think can be done to improve the outcomes of PB?”, was posed to all participants to elicit ideas for the attainment of positive PB outcomes. Recommendations made by participants are thematically outlined below.

a. Enhance participation

According to participants CO1, CO5 and CO6, strategies should be implemented which increase citizen awareness and understanding of the budgeting process. This include conducting public awareness campaigns, organising community meetings and workshops, and utilising local media channels to disseminate budget information. These mechanisms have been adopted and used in Uganda, United States of America (USA) and China resulting in enhanced citizen engagement in the budget process (Ebdon, Krane & Franklin 2012; Mulindwa, 2013; Frenkiel & Rewal, 2019). Furthermore, participant CL3 iterated that:

"Special attention should be given to addressing barriers such as language barriers, limited resources, or lack of education that may hinder participation".

Participant CM6 argued that:

“The RDC should ensure that our views are incorporated into the budget. That way, it will encourage others to attend because they will realise that our views matter in the eyes of the RDC”.

The proponents of PB hold that citizen participation, coupled with other elements, plays a crucial role in achieving positive PB outcomes (Navarro, 1998; World Bank, 2007; Heiman, 2002 in Mulindwa, 2013). In this light, Ebdon, Krane and Franklin (2012) point out that many strategies to promote accountability and include more participatory activities in the PB process in the USA were used in Kirkland, California and Brooklyn. The resulting outcome of these efforts is an empowered citizenry and an efficient performing local government (Gomez *et al.*, 2016). Moreover, as participant CM6 stipulated, it is important to have the RDC incorporating the views of

the people in the final budget, as this will give them a sense of ownership of the project and shared responsibility (Wampler, 2012). Enhancing participation is a crucial step in improving the outcomes of PB.

By reaching out to marginalized groups and addressing barriers to participation, such as language barriers or limited resources, a more inclusive and diverse range of voices can be included in the decision-making process. However, it is important to recognize that, simply increasing participation does not guarantee better outcomes. Efforts should be made to ensure that all participants are well-informed and have an equal opportunity to contribute meaningfully.

b. Capacity building and information dissemination

Of importance is the need for targeted training and capacity-building initiatives to equip WADCOs and VIDCOs with the necessary knowledge and skills to effectively contribute to the budgeting process. The majority of participants noted that providing citizens with the necessary skills and knowledge to understand budgets and participate effectively is crucial. Therefore, they called for the organization of capacity-building programs, workshops, and training sessions to educate citizens about the budgetary process, financial management, and project evaluation. Providing induction programs and training sessions for WADCOs, VIDCOs, traditional leaders and councillors can enhance their understanding of PB, their roles and responsibilities, and the overall budgeting process. Shall (2007) and Leduka (2009) propose that training and educational forums be established and capacitated so that citizens are equipped with budget skills for them to meaningfully contribute to the budget process. Such initiatives can empower them to actively participate in budget consultations, advocate the needs and priorities of their communities, and contribute to more inclusive and transparent decision-making processes. By investing in the capacity-building of these stakeholders, the RDC can promote greater community engagement and strengthen the effectiveness of participatory budgeting in Mangwe.

Participant CM5 suggested that efforts should be made to disseminate budget information in clear and accessible formats, utilizing various channels such as community meetings and even local media using the local language in order for the

budget process to be inclusive. Efforts should be made to ensure that all segments of society have equal opportunities to participate and contribute to the budgeting process.

These findings resonate with the integrated theoretical framework for participation adapted by Mulindwa (2013). The framework broadens the concept of participation through citizenship. Citizenship presents citizens with a responsibility of exercising their social, civil and political rights. The government however, has the responsibility of ensuring that there is a conducive environment for citizens to exercise their rights. In accordance with Mulindwa's (2013) framework, Zamudio (2004) and Karatzimas (2020) note that for citizens to actively participate in their governance process and exercise their rights and develop a citizenship conscience, it is the responsibility of the state to educate them in that direction.

Capacity building and information dissemination are important factors in empowering citizens to participate effectively. By providing training and workshops on budgetary processes and financial management, local governments will be allowing citizens to develop the necessary skills to understand and evaluate budgets. Disseminating budget information in accessible formats is also essential.

c. Strengthen transparency and accountability

PB in Scotland has resulted in the formation of community groups which facilitate community participation and influence decision making (O'Hagan *et al.*, 2020). Furthermore, O'Hagan *et al.*, (2020) state that the role of these groups has resulted in increased citizen participation, with citizens being able to hold local governments accountable for their decisions and actions. Similarly, Sintomer *et al.* (2013) note that in South Africa, mechanisms were also put in place which facilitated availing financial local government information to the public, thus promoting accountability and transparency. These sentiments were also shared by participants from Mangwe who pointed to the need to strengthen transparency and accountability mechanisms, to build trust and confidence in the PB process. According to Participants TL10 and CL11, this can be achieved through regular and timely reporting on budget allocations, expenditure, and project implementation. Open data initiatives can be utilized to make

budget information easily accessible to the public. Independent oversight bodies or citizen-led monitoring groups can be established to ensure transparency and hold authorities accountable for budgetary decisions.

Practical experiences from China, as alluded to by Sintomer *et al.* (2013), support these sentiments as mechanisms were put in place availing financial local government information to the public thus, promoting accountability and transparency. Commenting on these reforms of the budgetary process in China, Wu and Wand (2011 in Frenkiel & Rewal, 2019) record that the Xinhe 2006 budget was significantly amended due to the influence of citizens through the use of multiple communication channels to access the budget.

Strengthening transparency and accountability is a key aspect of improving the outcomes of PB. Regular reporting on budget allocations and project implementation can enhance trust and ensure that decisions are made in a transparent manner. Transparent communication, active engagement, and inclusive dialogue should be promoted to ensure that all voices are heard and respected. Efforts should be made to bridge the gap between traditional leaders, local authorities, and citizens, fostering collaboration and mutual understanding. However, the effectiveness of transparency measures depends on the willingness of authorities to provide accurate and timely information. Additionally, independent oversight bodies or citizen-led monitoring groups can help hold authorities accountable, but their effectiveness may vary depending on the level of independence and authority granted to them.

d. Streamline decision-making processes

Emanating from the interviews is the need to simplify and streamline the decision-making processes within PB in order to overcome complexities and improve efficiency. Participant CL 14 called for:

"Clear guidelines and criteria for project selection and prioritization to be established, taking into account the needs and preferences of the community. Mechanisms for resolving conflicts or disagreements should also be in place to facilitate decision-

making and avoid gridlock. This will remove the stalemate which exist between the citizens and the RDC".

The sentiments shared by participant CL14 resonates with MDP-ESA's (2008:3) observation that:

"The participatory process is often based on territorial and thematic divisions and requires solid communication and information mechanisms to ensure transparent decision-making and outputs".

Evidently, streamlining decision-making processes is important for improving efficiency and avoiding gridlock. Clear guidelines and criteria for project selection and prioritization can provide a framework for decision-making. However, it is essential to strike a balance between streamlined processes and ensuring meaningful participation. Overly rigid guidelines may limit creativity and innovation in project proposals, while too much flexibility may lead to inconsistency and bias in decision-making.

e. Address resource constraints

Adequate resources are essential for the successful implementation of PB. The participants noted that, because finance is the fuel of administration, efforts should be made to secure sufficient funding for community projects. In this regard, participant CL1 noted that:

"*Collaborations with external partners, NGOs, or development agencies can be explored to supplement local resources. Governments should also allocate a reasonable portion of their budgets to PB initiatives and consider increasing the share of devolution funds to empower local authorities and ensure that there is timely disbursements of funds".*

Participant CO3 added that, in order to address the financial constraints, the collection of household tax should be removed from the traditional leaders' portfolio since they

have failed to do so in the past, and are part of the larger community who resist paying. Participant CO6 concurs with these sentiments stating that:

"Most traditional leaders are aged and illiterate therefore they lack the know-how of revenue collection. They were given receipt books, but they failed to use them. Also, they take too long to remit the money to the RDC. Removing them from the revenue collection process perhaps would improve revenue collection".

These sentiments are supported by literature as Makumbe (2010) and CCMT (2014) observe that local government officials often view traditional leaders as a setback to revenue collection since village heads, tasked with this mandate, often fail to be successful.

The councillors and the RDC officials agree that imposing penalties on those who default to pay tax would perhaps, go a long way in enhancing tax compliance. However, participant CL12 questioned the feasibility of imposing penalties to tax defaulters, noting that issues of politics would come into question and render the efforts of imposing taxes futile.

Such findings are not unique to Mangwe, but have been experienced elsewhere in Africa including Uganda. Thus, Mulindwa (2013) proposed that local governments in Uganda expand their revenue source for the sustainability of the PB process. Securing adequate funding for community projects is essential, and collaboration with external partners or increased government allocation of funds can help address resource limitations. However, it is important to ensure that the allocation of resources is equitable and aligned to community needs, rather than being influenced by political or vested interests.

f. Strengthen councillor-community relationships

Participants CO1 and CO6 posited that, to enhance effective community engagements, it is vital to foster stronger connections between councillors and their communities by promoting regular and meaningful interactions. Participant CO6 advised that:

“Councillors are supposed to be the bridging gap between the RDC and the citizens therefore it is paramount to encourage councillors to actively engage with their constituents, attend community events and meetings, and establish feedback mechanisms to gather community input on budget priorities”.

In this regard, O’Hagan *et al.* (2020) state that, in the Scottish experience, a thriving relationship between the citizens and the elected citizen representatives has resulted in increased citizen participation, with citizens being able to hold local governments accountable for their decisions and actions. Citizens have been empowered and their ability to influence financial decisions in their localities enhanced. Such a status bolsters citizens and local government relationship and enhances proper utilisation of resources. Evidently, this can help build trust, improve communication, and ensure that councillors are more attuned to the needs and aspirations of the communities they represent.

g. Evaluate and adapt mechanisms

Some of the participants suggested that it is important to continuously evaluate the effectiveness of existing mechanisms for citizen participation, and adjust them as needed. Participants CO1, CO3 and CO5 underscored the need to seek for feedback from citizens, councillors, traditional leaders, and committee members to identify areas for improvement and address any concerns or barriers to participation. Such views were also shared by Mulindwa (2013) who furthered the thought of constant monitoring and evaluation of the process in order to adapt the process to ensure inclusivity. Thus, there should be regular assessments of the accessibility, inclusivity, and impact of the mechanisms used and make necessary adjustments to ensure greater effectiveness.

According to the participants, by implementing these measures, the outcomes of PB can be improved, leading to greater citizen engagement, a culture of participatory decision making, increased transparency and accountability, more effective resource allocation, and ultimately, improved governance and service delivery for communities.

5.8 CONCLUSION

This chapter outlined the methods utilized in the data collection process and presented and analyzed the study's findings. The findings were scrutinized in conjunction with the literature reviews conducted in the theoretical chapters. Based on the responses from participants about PB in Mangwe RDC, it emerged that PB can be regarded as a noble cause which is supported by legislation and has potential to transform the lives people if several challenges are addressed. It was established that, despite having been adopted, PB has not yet produced expected positive outcomes. The Mangwe PB experience is characterized by mistrust of the RDC, poverty, politicization of the process, inadequate legislation, limited education and knowledge of the PB process by both the councillors, traditional leaders, committee members and the citizens at large. Such factors are regarded as stumbling blocks to effective citizen participation.

Compelling evidence from the study indicated that PB outcomes are largely negative, hence the call to implement several measures which have been suggested by participants to achieve positive PB outcomes. These measures are aimed at enhancing citizen participation, capacity building, and information dissemination, strengthening transparency and accountability, and streamlining decision-making processes.

Utilizing data presented and discussed in this chapter, the next chapter presents the major conclusions of the study and proffer recommendations to be adopted in order to achieve positive PB outcomes. A financial model for PB in rural local governments is developed and examined in the next chapter to address the fifth objective of this study.

CHAPTER 6

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.0 INTRODUCTION

The study explored the experiences of Mangwe RDC in the implementation of PB. The primary objective of the study was to identify challenges encountered in the realization of positive participatory budgeting outcomes such as increased citizen participation, transparency, accountability and improved service delivery in Mangwe rural district council in Zimbabwe, and to formulate measures which can be adopted to ensure effective and efficient implementation of PB. The main findings of this study indicated that PB experiences in Mangwe RDC are characterized by limited citizen engagement, lack of transparency and accountability, limited-service delivery, financial constraints and lack of priority on community needs. These negative PB outcomes are largely caused by limited education and knowledge of PB, limited citizen engagement in the PB process, politicization of the PB process, and economic meltdown. Thus, in line with the objective to recommend financial model refinements in PB implementation in rural Zimbabwe, this chapter presents the model which is guided by the theoretical underpinnings and the global best practices from both developing and developed countries. Furthermore, lived experiences from Mangwe district are synchronized with the above to develop an empirical wholistic model which addresses the challenges faced by rural local governments in similar settings.

6.1 STUDY SUMMARY: RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS

As articulated in chapter 1, section 3, the primary objective of this study was to identify challenges encountered in the realisation of positive participatory budgeting outcomes in Mangwe rural district council in Zimbabwe, and to formulate measures which can be adopted to ensure effective and efficient implementation of PB. In light of this primary objective, the following secondary objectives were formulated:

6.1.1 Research Objectives

Research Objective 1. To analyze the meta-theoretical and theoretical underpinning of community participation and participatory budgeting in rural local government.
Research objective 2. To assess the statutory, regulatory and institutional frameworks that govern participatory budgeting in rural local governments in Zimbabwe.
Research objective 3. To explore international best practice regarding participative budgeting processes in local governments.
Research objective 4. To solicit the perceptions of key stakeholders regarding key challenges faced in the execution of PB in rural Mangwe.
Research objective 5. To recommend financial model refinements in PB implementation in rural Zimbabwe.

These research objectives resulted in the formulation of research questions the study sought to answer. These research questions are outlined below.

6.1.2 Research questions

Research question 1. What are the meta-theoretical and theoretical underpinning of community participation and participatory budgeting in local government?
Research question 2. What are the statutory, regulatory, and institutional frameworks that govern participatory budgeting in local governments in Zimbabwe?
Research question 3. What are the international best practices regarding local government participatory budgeting praxis?
Research question 4. What are the perceptions of key stakeholders regarding key challenges faced in the execution of participatory budgeting in rural Mangwe?
Research question 5. What should be incorporated in an adjusted financial model to improve participatory budgeting implementation in Mangwe?

Table 6.1 below illustrates the alignment between the research objectives and questions with the respective chapters in this study.

Table6.1: Alignment of the research objectives and questions to the chapters

Research Objectives (RO)	Research Questions (RQ)	Chapters
RO1. To analyze the meta-theoretical and theoretical underpinning of community participation and participatory budgeting in rural local government	**RQ1.** What are the meta-theoretical and theoretical underpinning of community participation and participatory budgeting in local government?	**Chapter 2**
RO2. To assess the statutory, regulatory, and institutional frameworks that govern participatory budgeting in rural local governments in Zimbabwe.	**RQ2.** What are the statutory, regulatory, and institutional frameworks that govern participatory budgeting in local governments in Zimbabwe?	**Chapter 4**
RO3. To explore international best practice regarding participative budgeting processes in local governments.	**RQ3.** What are the international best practices regarding local government participatory budgeting praxis?	**Chapter 3**
RO4. To solicit the perceptions of key stakeholders regarding key challenges faced in the execution of PB in rural Mangwe.	**RQ4.** What are the perceptions of key stakeholders regarding key challenges faced in the execution of participatory budgeting in rural Mangwe?	**Chapter 5**
RO5. To recommend financial model refinements in PB implementation in rural Zimbabwe.	**RQ5.** What should be incorporated in an adjusted financial model to improve participatory budgeting implementation in Mangwe?	**Chapter 6**

Source: Researcher's own

6.2 SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS

Chapter 1 provided an introduction to the study, highlighting the background and context of the research. It emphasized the significance of Participatory Budgeting (PB) within the framework of New Public Management (NPM) reforms in public sector financial restructuring. PB is defined as a cyclical process that involves citizens and sub-national governments in identifying local needs, making budget decisions, and

monitoring implementation. The chapter further traced the origins and implementation of PB in Brazil in the late 1990s as a means of wealth redistribution, and how the World Bank has played a crucial role in promoting its adoption in developing countries to address social exclusion. Despite the adoption of PB in Zimbabwean councils, there is a problem of not achieving the expected outcomes and a decline in service delivery. The chapter outlines the research objectives, research questions, central theoretical statements, methodology overview, significance of the study, ethical considerations, and provides a structural preview of the subsequent chapters.

Chapter 2 explored the conceptual and theoretical frameworks that elucidate the concepts of participation, community participation, and PB. The first section examined the concepts of participation, community participation, and accountability within the framework of local democracy. Various typologies of community participation, as proposed by Arnstein (1969), the United Nations (1981), Moser (1983), and Oakley (1986-1989), were thoroughly analyzed. Secondly, the chapter established the foundational role of democracy and examined the systems theory as a comprehensive macro theoretical framework that encompasses theories of participation, citizenship, and theory of change. The chapter further analysed theories that influence the discourse on PB, including public choice theory, deliberative democratic theory, and the capability approach. These theories contribute a comprehensive understanding of the study's key concepts of community participation and PB.

In **chapter 3,** notions of budgeting were delineated, emphasizing the distinct characteristics of Participatory Budgeting (PB) as a specific type of budgeting arrangement. The origins of PB were traced back to the Porto Alegre experience in Brazil (Zamboni, 2007; Mulindwa, 2013). Following its emergence in Brazil, PB gained global recognition and was implemented in both developed and developing countries (Cabanes, 2019).

The chapter reviewed existing literature on PB experiences across developed and developing countries to identify specific challenges encountered. Best practices were identified, and lessons were drawn from selected cases to inform the development of a participatory budget model for rural councils, which serves as the main contribution of this study. Furthermore, the chapter focused on locating and analyzing various

dimensions and principles of PB developed by prominent scholars such as Ebdon and Franklin (2006), Wampler (2012), and Escober and Harkins (2015). These dimensions play a crucial role in achieving positive PB outcomes. The study centred on PB outcomes and processes, positioning the research within the context of other conducted studies.

Chapter 4 provided a historical overview of Zimbabwe's government system, tracing the constitutional reforms and the introduction of decentralization and devolution. It emphasized the need to analyze the participation mechanisms in the budget cycle within this context. Moreover, the case study of MRDC was profiled in this chapter, focusing on the dynamics surrounding the budgeting processes and procedures. These procedures were further examined in the fifth chapter, where empirical evidence was presented and discussed.

Chapter 5 outlines the methods and tools utilized in conducting the study in question. Furthermore, the chapter presents and discusses the findings of the study. These findings are significant in that they operationalize the study's objectives, specifically the objective which seeks to develop a participatory financial model for rural councils in Zimbabwe.

Chapter 6 focuses on drawing main conclusions and proffering practical recommendations which are meant to facilitate effective PB implementation and the attainment of positive PB outcomes. Moreover, the chapter presents a proposed participatory financial model which is developed for implementation in rural local government settings. The model operationalizes the study's fifth objective, which sought to develop a model for PB in the rural context.

6.3 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS: KEY CHALLENGES

The study findings revealed several significant drawbacks and challenges associated with Participatory Budgeting (PB) implementation in Zimbabwe's local governments. These findings shed light on key areas that require attention and careful management to maximize the effectiveness and impact of PB initiatives. The major conclusions drawn from the study, based on the identified challenges, are as follows:

a. Limited Participation

One of the main drawbacks of PB is the struggle to attract a broad and diverse range of participants. The findings highlighted that certain groups, particularly those with limited resources or education, were less likely to actively participate in the PB process. This underrepresentation of voices and perspectives led to limited inclusivity and effectiveness of the process. This finding was contrary to the deliberative theory, which advocates for participative democracy and continuous discourse between political authorities and public opinion. The theory posits that effective citizen participation in PB can empower citizens to influence fiscal decisions positively.

b. Time and Resource Intensive

The study participants expressed that the PB process is time- and resource-intensive. Extensive planning, organizing, and facilitating participatory meetings and deliberation processes require substantial financial and human resources. Rural councils, already facing financial challenges, found it difficult to sustain the PB process. Additionally, the non-payment of household taxes further reduced available funds for community projects. The reliance on central government transfers, which are often disbursed late, compounded the financial constraints. Similar experiences in Uganda also highlighted the inadequacy of financial resources in local governments, hindering effective PB implementation. Finding ways to streamline the process and secure adequate resources is crucial for the long-term viability of PB.

c. Complex Decision-Making

PB often involves complex decision-making processes, especially when it comes to prioritizing and allocating limited resources among competing community needs. Balancing different perspectives, addressing conflicts, and reaching consensus can be challenging and time-consuming, leading to delays or gridlock in decision-making. This complexity may result in some wards' needs and priorities being ignored. Simplifying the decision-making process and providing clear guidelines for prioritization are essential to ensure efficient and effective resource allocation.

d. Limited Technical Expertise and Information Gaps

Engaging citizens in budgetary decisions requires providing them with relevant information about the budget, financial constraints, and project feasibility. However, many citizens lack the technical expertise or access to detailed information needed to make informed decisions. Bridging the information gap and building citizens' capacity to understand and analyse budgetary information is crucial for empowering them to participate meaningfully**.**

e. Political Influence and Manipulation

PB processes can be susceptible to political influence and manipulation. Some politicians may attempt to sway the decision-making process to serve their own agendas, undermining citizen empowerment and equitable resource allocation. Such influence can lead to low turnout and participation during consultative budget meetings, reducing the process' integrity and equity. Implementing safeguards, such as independent oversight mechanisms and transparency measures, is essential to protect PB from undue political interference.

f. Unrealistic Expectations

PB can generate high expectations among citizens regarding the outcomes and impact of their participation. However, limitations in budgetary resources, competing priorities, and administrative constraints may prevent the full realization of all citizen suggestions or demands. Managing and communicating realistic expectations to avoid disillusionment and mistrust is an ongoing challenge.

g. Sustainability and Long-Term Impact

The study revealed that sustaining citizen engagement and the impact of PB beyond a few cycles can be challenging. Without continued support and institutionalization, PB initiatives may lose effectiveness over time. Maintaining momentum, building trust, and ensuring the long-term impact of citizen participation require ongoing commitment

and investment from all stakeholders, including the government, local authorities, and communities.

Figure 6.1: Challenges of PB and the resultant outcomes



Source: Researcher's own

The diagram above provides a concise overview of the challenges that have emerged during the implementation of Participatory Budgeting (PB) in Mangwe. These challenges, as depicted in the diagram, have subsequently led to adverse outcomes within the PB process. Considering these challenges, the study proffers several recommendations, chief among them being the financial model which is discussed in the following section. These recommendations seek to address the identified challenges and improve PB outcomes in Zimbabwe's rural local governments.

6.4 RECOMMENDATIONS: A PARTICIPATORY BUDGET MODEL FOR RURAL COUNCILS

This section aims to address the issues identified in Chapter 1 by proposing improved implementation processes of Participatory Budgeting (PB) in rural local government. This financial model is built upon empirical findings from Chapter 5, as well as insights from public management paradigms, theoretical frameworks, and global best practices

explored in Chapters 2 and 3. The study confirmed the existence of challenges hindering positive PB outcomes and identified implementation gaps. The proposal centres on the development of a comprehensive financial model, which acts as a practical tool to effectively manage resources and encourage citizen involvement in the budgeting process. Thus, the participatory budget model was developed to tackle the problems and challenges associated with PB outcomes and implementation in rural local governments in Zimbabwe.

At the macro level (A), the proposed participatory budget model illustrated in figure 6.2 is influenced by the public administration paradigms and theories (A.3) discussed in chapter 2. Citizen participation is a critical aspect of the New Public Management (NPM) paradigm (A.1), and has been a central focus in efforts to improve public sector governance and service delivery. The NPM paradigm recognizes the importance of involving citizens in decision-making processes, especially in shaping public policies and service delivery strategies.

The environmental factors identified in the study that hinder the effectiveness of Participatory Budgeting (PB) in Mangwe RDC include the organizational structure (B.1), stakeholders' involvement (B.2), economic conditions (A.5), political landscape (A.7), technological aspects (A.6), and legislative framework (A.8). Each of these factors are analysed in detail below.

Figure 6.2: A proposed participatory financial model for application by Mangwe RDC



Source: Researcher's own

The participatory financial model as illustrated in figure 6.2, integrates citizenship theory, systems theory, and deliberative theory (A.3) into the model. These theories are vital theories in the study as they guide the direction of the research as articulated in the second chapter of this study. Meaningful citizen participation is at the core of these theories, as it is viewed as a catalyst for good governance, democracy and guided policy formulation. Moreover, deliberative discussions and processes are an integral part of effective participation as they afford citizens an opportunity to collaborate and make informed decisions about their governance process. Embedded in citizenship, deliberative and systems theories is the practice of participation which fosters inclusivity, citizen empowerment and democratic decision making. Bryson *et al.* (2013) share in these observations, underscoring the role of participation in the promotion of the democratisation process. The proposed model therefore, builds on these theories that champion participation and deliberative democracy, to guide effective PB implementation.

The integration of global best practices (A.2) significantly contributes to shaping the model, as it draws upon the lessons and hurdles encountered in various countries. These international experiences were thoroughly examined in the study's third chapter and have played a pivotal role in formulating the model under consideration.

The model is further enriched by incorporating Ebdon and Franklin's (2006) dimensions of Participatory Budgeting (PB). These dimensions hold a pivotal role in shaping the outcomes of PB, either fostering or hindering citizen engagement in the budgetary process. These dimensions encompass the government dimension (A4), process dimension (B.4), mechanism dimension (B.3), and outcome dimension (C). The government dimension's significance, as depicted in the model and underscored by Ebdon and Franklin (2006), is paramount in the PB process. It influences both positive and negative outcomes, reflecting the governmental environment's impact. To contribute to favourable PB outcomes, the government dimension within the model assumes a central role in facilitating legislative frameworks that support PB implementation and citizen participation. Moreover, the government's responsibility extends to policies that stabilize the economy, a critical factor for achieving positive PB outcomes. Similarly, the political environment must be conducive to PB's success

as PB struggles to thrive where citizen empowerment is not a governmental priority and excessive central interference prevails due to party politics. Shielding local governments from central government overreach becomes imperative, affirming the government's duty to ensure their autonomy.

Technological access is another facet of the government dimension that Ebdon and Franklin (2006) highlight for achieving positive PB outcomes. Government's proactive role in extending technology to rural areas, providing electricity, ensuring mobile and internet networks, and offering technology literacy programs, becomes essential. This facilitates citizens' use of online platforms for participation, elevating their engagement in the PB process.

The **microenvironment (B)** encompasses internal elements within the RDC, including the organizational culture (B.1), stakeholders (B.2), mechanism dimension (B.3), process dimension (B.4) and the outcome dimension (C).

The element of organization culture (B.1) as espoused in figure 6.2 is also embedded in the systems theory which is the overarching theory in this study. The systems theory is grounded on the assumption that political systems are open and participatory, which enhances the status of citizens in the governance process. Evidently, a positive organizational culture that promotes transparency, collaboration, and open communication can foster an environment conducive to participatory budgeting. Conversely, a culture of hierarchy, secrecy, or resistance to change might hinder citizen engagement and open dialogue. Based on empirical findings, the organizational culture observed is characterized by lack of transparency in the budget process, accompanied by insufficient communication about the initiation of this process. This situation acts as a barrier to meaningful citizen engagement in the budgeting procedure. Consequently, participants voiced the need for a transformation in the organizational culture of the Rural District Council (RDC). This transformation should prioritize values of transparency, effective communication, and collaborative efforts to foster a more inclusive and participatory budgeting process.

The second element within the micro dimension revolves around stakeholders (B.2). Stakeholders encompass individuals, groups, or entities with vested interests in the

activities of the Rural District Council (RDC), which include the budgeting process. These stakeholders span from local communities and traditional leaders to elected officials, civil society organizations, and business entities. Hence, the focal point of Participatory Budgeting (PB) initiatives lie in bolstering stakeholder engagement within this process.

According to the generic logic of participation, as articulated in existing literature by Jones (2013), robust stakeholder involvement enhances revenue collection and yields positive outputs, outcomes, and impacts PB initiatives. Additionally, these principles align harmoniously with citizenship theory, which underscores the rights and responsibilities of each stakeholder. For instance, the RDC is accountable for service provision, while community members bear the responsibility of paying taxes. The RDC's ability to deliver services is either advanced or hindered by citizens fulfilling or failing to fulfil their tax obligations. The study findings discussed in the research's fifth chapter underscore a deficiency in stakeholder engagement within the budget process, a discrepancy that contradicts the essence of PB. Consequently, this model draws insights from experiences in other countries where increased citizen participation yielded positive PB outcomes. It places significant emphasis on effective stakeholder engagement as a pivotal tool for the prosperity of participatory budgeting. Involving stakeholders throughout various stages of the budgeting process ensures the incorporation of diverse viewpoints, and bolsters the legitimacy of budgetary decisions.

The third facet within the micro level of the model is encapsulated within the mechanism dimension (B.3). This dimension endeavors to propose a pathway for addressing the challenges unearthed in the fifth chapter of the study, and for enhancing the outcomes of Participatory Budgeting (PB). As delineated in the model, element A.2, which is the global best practices and challenges, provided the bedrock for informing the mechanisms prescribed within the model. Driven by the challenges confronted during the PB implementation in rural Mangwe, empirical evidence favour the adoption of strategic interventions meticulously tailored to bolster the PB process, as depicted in Figure 6.2: A proposed participatory financial model for application by Mangwe RDC

Similarly, the guiding principles of PB by Harkins and Escobar (2015) furnished a compass for successful PB execution, thus, significantly contributing to the formulation of these mechanisms. The overarching objective remains the establishment of a dynamic and inclusive process that aptly mirrors the community's requisites and aspirations. To rectify the issues identified in the research, the model proffers precise actions to transform the PB process into a more potent and participatory endeavor. These specific actions were thoroughly deliberated in section 6.4.1 of this study.

Through the integration of these mechanisms, the model establishes a process dimension (B.4) that elevates citizen engagement within PB. This dimension encompasses the modus operandi of the budget process itself, the temporal aspects of citizen involvement, and the comprehensiveness of the participation process. Both empirical evidence and scholarly literature converge in revealing certain flaws in the existing budget process. Notably, stakeholder engagement tends to occur at a later stage, while effective citizen participation remains lacking. To counter these shortcomings, the model's mechanism dimension addresses these concerns through the strategic deployment of targeted approaches. These include stakeholder consultations, public awareness campaigns, improved communication platforms, and capacity-building initiatives. The overarching aim is to surmount the challenges identified in Chapter five. Collectively, these mechanisms contribute to cultivating a culture defined by transparency, inclusivity, and responsiveness within the PB process.

The model envisions a transformed PB process where citizens are actively engaged, traditional leaders assume a pivotal role, elected officials become effective intermediaries, and the Rural District Council (RDC) proactively establishes the required infrastructure and mechanisms to facilitate meaningful participation. In essence, the proposed mechanisms bridge the gap between challenges and positive outcomes, enabling the evolution of the PB process into a potent instrument for democratic decision-making and community development.

The interplay of macro and micro elements assumes a crucial role in shaping the outcome dimension (C), which constitutes the final component of the model. The literature examined in chapters 2 and 3 of this study underscores the rationale for PB

through the lens of the Alegre experience, characterized by favourable outcomes. However, insights from both developed and developing nations as discussed in the third chapter of this study illuminate that PB outcomes exhibit variations due to diverse government, mechanism, and process dimensions operational within specific contexts. Hence, it is paramount to ensure that the government, process, and mechanism dimensions harmonize effectively to establish the requisite framework for attaining positive PB outcomes. Literature analysis and empirical discoveries unequivocally advocate comprehensive implementation of all suggested strategies to ensure the realization of positive PB outcomes.

The proposed model offers a systematic and multifaceted approach to address the challenges and discrepancies identified in the context of participatory budgeting (PB) implementation within rural African local governments. By advocating legislative reforms that empower local authorities and align with PB principles, the model tackles the issue of central government interference and lack of local autonomy. Transparent communication and accessible budget information, as emphasized by the model, counteract the observed lack of transparency and accountability. Through the integration of technology and alternative energy sources, the model bridges the digital divide, enabling virtual discussions, access to budget information, and broader citizen engagement. Furthermore, the model prioritizes capacity-building initiatives and community awareness campaigns to enhance citizen participation, addressing barriers like language and education. Robust enforcement mechanisms within the model ensure adherence to transparency and participation requirements, thus holding local authorities accountable. By streamlining decision-making processes, the model provides clarity and efficiency, while striving to counter political pressures that may sway local priorities. In essence, the model holistically addresses the multifaceted PB problems highlighted in the first and fifth chapters of this study, by offering a comprehensive strategy to foster positive PB outcomes within rural African local governments.

6.4.1 Operationalizing the PB financial model

This section outlines the actionable strategies employed to effectively implement the proposed model, as illustrated in figure 6.2. The model operates at both macro and

micro levels, encompassing key dimensions that are integral to the successful implementation of PB in rural local governments across Zimbabwe. The macro level's focus is on the government dimension crucial in providing a favourable environment for PB implementation. The government environment comprises the political, legislative, economic, and technological aspects. In order for PB implementation to be strengthened, it is important to address these key aspects of the government environment.

The micro level's focus is on the case study, which is Mangwe RDC, and the specific aspects, which are; mechanism dimension, process dimension, and the outcome dimension. These dimensions are crucial in the implementation of PB and the attainment of positive PB outcomes. It is thus, the intent of this section to operationalize the proposed model through outlining the mechanisms which will be adopted to ensure the relevance and effectiveness of the model within rural contexts. Addressing the macro and macro dimensions will ensure the establishment of a favourable environment for citizen engagement in participatory processes and empowerment.

6.4.1.1 Operationalization PB at a macro level

Effective PB implementation calls for a holistic approach that addresses the key aspects of the government context. These dimensions include the economic, technological, political, and legislative environments, each playing a significant role in shaping the success of PB in rural local governments across Zimbabwe.

Figure 6.3: Identified strategies at a macro level



Source: Researcher’s own

a. A.7 Political Environment

Political will serves as a foundational catalyst for the effective implementation of PB. It encompasses the dedication and backing of government officials and leaders to prioritize and advocate the adoption of the participatory budgeting process. Strengthening political will entails engaging political figures in conversations that highlight the advantages of PB, alongside showcasing successful case studies that underscore PB’s positive influence on community advancement. The transposition of these discussions and the dissemination of awareness regarding PB should be a collaborative effort involving civil society, community groups, and NGOs. These entities can amplify the citizens' voices and champion the merits of involving them in decision-making processes.

By fostering such collaborative efforts, PB can become deep-rooted in local government policies and strategic blueprints, effectively becoming a core component of the governance framework. This sentiment is evident in the Scottish context, explored in Chapter 3 of this study, where numerous instances of fruitful PB have materialized. These accomplishments can be largely attributed to governmental initiatives, underscoring the profound influence of political will in yielding positive outcomes within PB. This aptly demonstrates how political commitment can pave the way for the realization of advantageous PB experiences**.**

b. A.8 Legislative Environment

Legislative frameworks play a pivotal role in shaping the outcomes of PB, acting as guiding principles that steer the practice of PB. To ensure the alignment of existing laws with the fundamental principles and objectives of PB, legislative reforms are crucial. Such reforms empower local governments to effectively implement PB, thereby integrating citizens' voices into the decision-making processes related to budget allocation. Drawing insights from both empirical evidence and scholarly literature, which accentuate challenges like limited citizen participation, insufficient local government autonomy, restricted power, and a lack of fiscal decentralization in

Zimbabwe, this study combines field responses and academic insights to advocate local government empowerment.

There is a critical need to strengthen local governments through legislative amendments that bestow on them greater decision-making authority. A pivotal aspect of these amendments involves reducing the extent of central government interference in local affairs, often channelled through the ministry of local government. Field insights from RDC officials, combined with scholarly observations, underline the necessity to amend current legislation to enhance fiscal decentralization. Such reforms would empower local governments with heightened control over their financial resources and decision-making prerogatives. These revisions would, in turn, foster more substantive and effective implementation of participatory budgeting initiatives at the grassroots level. Furthermore, adhering to the principles of citizenship and deliberative theories, citizen participation emerges as a cornerstone of effective governance, including PB processes. Thus, legislative reforms must include citizen participation mandates that obligate local governments to actively engage communities in the decision-making arena. This ensures that the perspectives and needs of citizens are, not only acknowledged, but also thoroughly integrated into the budgetary decision-making processes. Moreover, transparency laws, integrated within legislative reforms are of paramount importance for effective PB. Emerging from empirical evidence is the inaccessibility of budget documents to most citizens as they are presented in English and contain complex jargon which cannot be understood by many. It was, therefore, recommended by the research participants that laws which mandate that budget-related information is made available to citizens in formats that are accessible and comprehensible be formulated. By providing clear and detailed budgetary information, citizens can be empowered to engage more meaningfully in the decision-making process. This transparency not only cultivates trust between local governments and citizens, but also strengthens the accountability of authorities for their financial decisions. The significance of transparency in PB is underscored in literature by Anderson (1995) and Mulindwa (2013). To ensure that legislative provisions related to PB are effectively enforced, the research recommends that robust mechanisms for enforcement should be adopted. These mechanisms serve as safeguards to guarantee that local governments adhere to transparency and citizen engagement requirements. They hold local authorities accountable for their

commitment to open budget processes and citizen participation as articulated by the macro systems theory in the second chapter of this research. By establishing clear consequences for non-compliance, enforcement mechanisms provide a strong incentive for local governments to uphold the principles of PB and engage citizens in a genuine manner.

c. A.5 Economic Environment

The research findings articulated how the macroeconomic environment significantly affects the feasibility and success of participatory budgeting (PB) initiatives in rural local governments. To effectively address this dimension, empirical evidence suggests the need to introduce economic stabilization policies and ensure adequate resource allocation for PB. Most RDC participants lamented the challenge of inflation and how it erodes their resources which affects the efforts of the RDC to deliver services. It is therefore, recommended that government adopts measures to curb inflation and stabilize prices to ensure that PB projects are implemented successfully without financial constraints. In-order to ensure continuity and stability of the PB process, empirical evidence suggests that government should allocate a predetermined percentage of the budget of PB and engage in public-private partnerships.

By addressing these components within the broader macroeconomic landscape, rural local governments can establish a robust and resource-abundant basis for the effective implementation of PB. The introduction of economic stabilization policies, the allocation of sufficient resource, and the cultivation of public-private partnerships collectively contribute to a favourable economic environment. Such an environment is conducive to supporting participatory, meaningful, and enduring budgeting processes. These actions align harmoniously with the principles of PB outlined by Harkins and Escobar (2015) in Chapter 3. These principles emphasize the essential requirement of resources for the success of PB. Thus, these strategies are strategically aimed at augmenting the resources available for the realization of a successful PB framework.

d. A.6 Technological environment

The technological landscape holds a pivotal influence over the efficacy of participatory budgeting (PB) endeavors within rural local governments. Derived from research findings is the prevailing issue of limited digital accessibility in rural areas, rendering platforms like chat boards, designed for sharing budget documents online, accessible only to a limited portion of the community. Empirical evidence strongly advocates governmental investment in digital infrastructure, to establish dependable internet connectivity in rural regions.

It is crucial to emphasize the imperative need for increased investment in rural electrification and alternative energy sources, which are pivotal for harnessing technology's potential in participatory budgeting (PB) initiatives within rural local governments. Alongside efforts for electrification, the incorporation of alternative energy sources, notably solar fields, emerges as a pivotal driver in advancing technological empowerment within PB endeavours. In tandem with these strategies, the establishment of solar-powered smart community hubs is strongly recommended. These hubs seamlessly amalgamate solar energy, electricity, reliable internet connectivity, and digital tools. This amalgamation acts as a catalyst, enabling the hosting of virtual discussions and the provision of accessible budgetary information. Through the assurance of consistent and dependable energy access, local authorities can seamlessly integrate digital tools and sophisticated data management systems. This integration, in turn, enriches citizen engagement, nurtures transparency, and significantly heightens the overall effectiveness of PB initiatives.

6.4.1.2 Operationalization at micro level

Figure 6.4 below serves as an operational blueprint at a micro level, for translating the conceptual model into actionable steps. This figure outlines the sequential stages that should be undertaken during the implementation of the mechanisms proposed within the model. These stages offer a structured approach to ensuring the effective execution of the recommended strategies, ultimately leading to an enhanced PB process.

Each stage in figure 6.4 corresponds to a specific mechanism identified in the model. These stages detail the process of how each mechanism is put into action, guiding practitioners, policymakers, and stakeholders in navigating the complexities of implementing participatory budgeting improvements. By providing a clear roadmap, figure 6.4 facilitates the practical application of the model's recommendations within the real-world context of Mangwe.

The operationalization illustrated in figure 6.3 underscores the importance of a systematic approach to realizing positive outcomes in PB. It emphasizes the need for coordinated efforts, active engagement of stakeholders, appropriate timing, and proper resource allocation at each stage. This operational framework assists in overcoming potential challenges and streamlining the implementation process, thereby enhancing the likelihood of successful results.

In essence, figure 6.3 transforms the theoretical model into a practical guide, offering a step-by-step direction to ensure that the proposed mechanisms are effectively integrated into the PB process. It serves as a valuable tool for translating ideas into action, fostering citizen engagement, and ultimately contributing to the improvement of local governance and community development in Mangwe.

Figure 6.4: Stages to follow in PB implementation in Mangwe



Source: Researcher's own

The delineated stages depicted in Figure 6.4 serve as a comprehensive roadmap for the successful implementation of participatory budgeting (PB) initiatives within rural local governments. Each stage in this process plays a pivotal role in ensuring the effectiveness, inclusivity, and transparency of PB practices. Here, an in-depth explanation of each stage, along with pertinent details highlighting their significance in Table 6.2, is provided.

Table 6.2: Stages, activity and strategy for PB implementation

Stages	Activity	Strategy
1 Establish a Participatory Budgeting Committee	• Form a committee comprising representatives from the RDC, civil society organizations, traditional leaders, WADCOs, VIDCOs and other stakeholders. • The committee will oversee the PB process, ensure transparency, and promote citizen engagement.	• Composition of the committee • Terms of reference • Leadership and facilitation • Capacity building • Communication channels • Engagement strategies and resource allocation.
2 Conduct a Comprehensive Needs Assessment	• Engage with the community through surveys, town hall meetings, and focus groups to identify the most pressing needs and priorities. • Categorize the identified needs (e.g., education, healthcare, infrastructure) for better allocation and decision-making.	• Identifying pressing needs categorization of needs • Alignment with community priorities • Enhancing transparency and ownership
3 Allocate the Participatory Budget	• Determine the portion of the overall budget to be allocated for participatory budgeting. • Communicate the allocated budget to the community to foster transparency and awareness	• Determine the portion of the budget • Communicate the allocated budget to the community • Explain how the allocated budget aligns with the local government's overall financial plan.

Stages	Activity	Strategy
4 Design the Proposal Submission Process	• Develop a clear and accessible project proposal template for citizens, community organizations, other stakeholders to submit their project ideas. • Specify the criteria for project evaluation, such as impact, feasibility, sustainability, and alignment with community needs.	• Develop a clear and accessible project proposal template • Specify criteria for project evaluation
5 Organise PB Meetings	• Hold annual or periodic PB meetings that are open to all citizens. • Present the identified needs and project proposals to the community during these meetings	• Hold annual or periodic PB meetings • Present identified needs and project proposals
6 Vote and Prioritise Projects	• Allow citizens to vote on the proposed projects to prioritise them based on community preferences. • Ensure that voting is fair and inclusive, taking into account the voices of all community members expand	• Voting process on proposed projects Fairness and inclusivity in voting
7 Evaluate and Select Funded Projects	• The PB Committee, with inputs from technical experts if needed, should evaluate the proposals based on the established criteria. • Select projects with the highest impact and feasibility for funding, up to the allocated PB budget.	• Participatory Budgeting Committee evaluation • Incorporating technical expertise • Selecting projects within the allocated budget • Balancing community priorities and technical feasibility
8 Implement Funded Projects	• Work with selected project proponents and community members to implement the funded projects.	• Collaborative implementation • Project management Engagement of local workforce • Transparency and communication

Stages	Activity	Strategy
	• Establish project monitoring committees comprising citizens and stakeholders to oversee the implementation process	
9 Monitor Progress and Provide Regular Updates	• Regularly monitor the progress of funded projects and provide updates to the community. • Encourage citizens to actively engage in the monitoring process and report any issues or concerns.	• Regular progress monitoring • Timely issue identification and resolution • Open communication with the community • Encouraging community involvement • Reporting issues and concerns
10 Conduct Impact Assessments	• Conduct periodic impact assessments to evaluate the effectiveness of funded projects in addressing community needs. • Use the assessment results to improve future PB cycles and project selection	• Periodic impact assessments • Design evaluation metrics
11 Capacity building and Empowerment	• Invest in capacity-building programs to empower citizens and community organizations in project management and financial literacy. • Provide training and support to enhance their engagement in the PB process.	• Investing in capacity building • Empowering citizens and organisations
12 Foster Collaboration and Resource Mobilisation	• Collaborate with NGOs, development agencies, and local businesses to supplement the PB budget with additional funding. • Foster public-private partnerships to maximise resources for community development	• Engage NGOs and development agencies • Leverage local businesses • Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) • Grant applications • Crowdfunding and fundraising • Resource mapping • Communication and networking

Stages	Activity	Strategy
		• Transparency and accountability
13 Continuously Improve the PB Process	• Seek feedback from citizens and stakeholders on the PB process and make necessary improvements based on their suggestions. • Maintain open communication channels to ensure transparency and accountability in the PB financial model	• Feedback mechanisms • Data analysis • Adaptive management • Regular reviews • Learning from failures • Community engagement • Innovation • Public reporting

Source: Researcher's own

6.4.2 Contribution to the body of knowledge in the realm of Public Administration

This study makes a substantial contribution to the corpus of knowledge in the field of Public Administration by shedding light on various critical aspects of PB implementation within the context of rural local governments in Zimbabwe. The study contributes a comprehensive exploration of PB within rural local governments, offering valuable insights and practical strategies for effective implementation. It digs into the intricacies of PB, shedding light on challenges related to citizen engagement, traditional leadership roles, and the responsibilities of elected councillors. Notably, the study examines the impact of the legislative environment on PB, illustrating how legal provisions and transparency laws can shape the success of citizen participation. It emphasizes the pivotal role of political will and advocacy in driving PB outcomes, urging awareness campaigns to garner support among various stakeholders.

Central to the study's contributions is its emphasis on continuous improvement in the PB process, in line with the principles of New Public Management. Stakeholder feedback and transparent communication are vital in PB, as they provide inputs and mechanisms that can be adopted to refine PB initiatives and ensure their sustainability. Importantly, the contextual insights offered by the study, drawn from rural local

governments in Zimbabwe, resonate with developing countries facing similar challenges. This enriches the understanding of PB's dynamics in diverse settings.

The study's proposed practical strategies offer a tangible roadmap for those engaged in PB implementation, including local authorities, policymakers, and practitioners. These strategies are grounded in empirical findings and align with modern administrative approaches.

6.5 SUGGESTED AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The findings of this study have illuminated various crucial facets of participatory budgeting (PB) implementation in rural local governments. However, to deepen the understanding of this process and advance its effectiveness, a range of recommendations for further research is proffered. Comparative studies spanning multiple rural local governments in Zimbabwe or similar contexts could study challenges, divergent practices, and contextual factors that shape PB implementation. Longitudinal studies are proposed to track the trajectory of PB initiatives over extended periods, allowing the assessment of strategy impact and citizen engagement evolution. Evaluating the efficacy of capacity-building programs for officials, traditional leaders, and community members could enhance PB comprehension and participation. Additionally, exploring digital inclusion levels and technological literacy within rural communities may uncover barriers hindering citizens' interaction with digital PB platforms. Investigating strategies employed by local governments to involve stakeholders such as NGOs, development agencies, and businesses could reveal their impact on resource mobilisation and community development. Gender-focused analyses are suggested to assess women's participation in PB initiatives and address gender-specific challenges.

Comprehensive impact evaluations of PB initiatives on community development, infrastructure improvement, and citizen empowerment offer valuable insights into tangible outcomes. Drawing lessons from successful PB case studies in analogous contexts can inform Zimbabwean rural local governments' strategies. The creation of policy recommendations based on research findings could guide government agencies, NGOs, stakeholders in local governance, and PB efforts.

Through the pursuit of these research avenues, a holistic understanding of PB in rural local governments can be attained. Insights derived from such studies can contribute to refining strategies, policies, and practices, ultimately enriching citizen engagement, transparency, and community development through effective PB implementation.

6.6 CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this research considered the complexities and dynamics of participatory budgeting (PB) implementation within the context of rural local governments in Zimbabwe, using the case study of Mangwe Rural District Council. The aim of the study was to provide deeper stakeholder insights about the challenges, opportunities, and perceptions on PB and proffer practical recommendations on fostering effective PB processes in Mangwe RDC. Empirical evidence was gathered through key informant interviews with RDC officials, traditional leaders, ward councillors and community committee members. Empirical evidence pointed to the existence of challenges ranging from limited citizen engagement, inadequate comprehension of the PB processes and inadequate training on the PB processes. This state of affairs has been exacerbated by factors such as limited education, hostile economic conditions, and lack of trust in the local government system.

Underscored by the study is the significance of addressing the dimensional aspects which include the legislative, political, economic, technological environments, as well as the collaboration of relevant stakeholders. Evidently, addressing these aspects contributes to an environment effective for PB implementation, and ultimately, attainment of positive PB outcomes.

The strategies formulated for the operationalization of the proposed model offer an integrated approach for fostering transparency, accountability, citizen engagement and empowerment and community development through PB initiatives. Despite the limitations posed by a single case study, the study remains significant and relevant to policy makers, local governments, and relevant stakeholders as it enhances the practice of PB. The study concludes that PB is the potential vehicle for rural local government transformation, empowerment of citizens, and community development.

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APPENDIX A

Interview Guide/ Isiqondiso esijulileyo sengxoxo

Ward Community Members/ Amalunga ekomithi yewadi

Position……

Age (in years)……..……

Sex…….

Number of years in Office……

My name is Ms Tambudzai Rashirayi (Std. nr. 36996793) a registered PhD candidate at North-West University. My study title is: "**Participatory Budgeting in rural councils: The case of Mangwe District Council, Zimbabwe**". The primary objective of the study is to identify challenges encountered in the realisation of positive Participatory Budgeting (PB) outcomes such as increased citizen participation, transparency, accountability and improved service delivery in Mangwe Rural District Council in Zimbabwe and to formulate measures which can be adopted to ensure effective and efficient implementation of PB. I hope that the responses I am going to get from you will help me in illuminating your perceptions on participatory budgeting in Zimbabwe. Participation in this interview is voluntary and confidential. In the event that you feel uncomfortable to withdraw from participating in the interview you are free to do so and there are no consequences for doing so. The interview will take between 30- 45 minutes of your time.

Ibizo lami nginguTambudzai Rashirai, ngenza izifundo zobudokotela bezincwadi kuUnivesithi yaseNorth West kweleSouth Africa, inombolo yami yesikolo yile (Std. nr. 36996793). Ngicubungula; "**Ngokuphatheka komphakathi kubhajethi zamakhansili emaphandleni: Sikhangele ikhansili yeMangwe kweleZimbabwe**". Injongo emqoka yocwaningo lolu yikudinga inhlupho eziphazamisa imiphumela emihle yokuphatheka kukazulu kuzinhlelo zemali efana lokuphatheka kwenengi, ukuthembeka kanye lentuthuko ekhansilini le. Ucwaningo lolu lujonge njalo ukuphuma lezixazululo zenhlupho lezi. Ngithemba impendulo engizazithola kuwe zizanginceda ukuthola imibono yakho ngokuphatheka komphakathi ekuhleleni imali zikazulu. Ukuphatheka kungxoxo le akuphoqwa njalo kuyimfihlo, nxa ingxoxo ingasakuphathi

kuhle ukhululekile ukuyivala, lokhu akusicala. Ingxoxo izathatha imizuzu engaba ngu30 kusiya ku45.

I would like to extend my gratitude to you for agreeing to take part in this interview and allowing to have this conversation recorded. Can you please go through the consent form and sign it before we start the interview so that it is clear that you were not coerced to participate but it was voluntary and you consented to do so. /
Ngithanda ukukubonga ngokuvuma ukuphatheka kungxoxo lokuthi siyirekhode. Usungabala ifomu lesivumelwano sengxoxo ulisayine singakaqali ingxoxo ukuqinisa ukuthi kawuphoqwanga ukuxoxa.

	Section A: Government Dimension	
Question 1	**What policies and legal frameworks are in place that provide for participatory Budgeting? Yiphi imithetho lezimiso okukhuthaza ukuphatheka komphakathi kubhajethi?** *Probes* ▪ *What is the significance of these policies and legal frameworks? Izimiso lemithetho le kuqakatheke ngani?* ▪ *What role has the traditional leadership played to ensure that these provisions are followed? Ubuholi bomdabu sobenzeni ukuze izimiso lezi zilandelwe?*	
	Section B: Process dimension	
Question 2	**Are there any noticeable changes to the budgetary process in Mangwe RDC since it was established? Kambe kulenguquko ekhanyayo kungqubo yebhajethi yeMangwe RDC lokhe yabayiyo?** *Probes* ▪ *Who participates in the budgetary process? Ngubani ophathekayo kungqubo yebhajethi?*	

	▪ *Are there specific selection criteria for participants? Kukhethwa abantu abanjani ukuthi baphatheke?* ▪ *At what stage of the budget do citizens participate? Izakhamizi ziphatheka kusigaba siphi sebhajethi?*	
Question 3	**Do environmental factors (such as politics, financial standing, level of education) have a bearing on citizen participation in the budget process? Kambe izinto ezithi ipolitiki, inotho, lemfundo zilendonsela ekukhethweni kwezakhamuzi eziphatheka kubhajethi?** *Probes* ▪ *If yes, how do these affect citizen participation in the budget process? Nxa zilendonsela, lokhu kulendonsela bani kuzakhamuzi na?* ▪ *In your perception, of the above listed factors which one has the highest effect on citizen participation? Ngokubona kwakho yikuphi okuqakathekiswayo nxa kunxuswa uzulu kubhajethi?* ▪ *What measures can be put in place to curb the negative effects these factors have on citizen participation? Kuyini okungenziwa ukuze izinto lezi zingaphazamisi ukuphatheka kwezakhamizi kubhajethi?*	
	Section C: Mechanism Dimension	
Question 4	**Were you inducted into your office and the practice of PB explained to you? Wafundiswa ngomsebenzi wakho njalo ukuphatheka kukazulu ekuhleleni izimali wakuchazelwa?**	

	Probes ▪ *If yes, who was responsible for your induction? Nxa wafundiswa, wafundiswa ngubani?* ▪ *If no, how have you received education on participatory budgeting? Nxa ungafundiswanga, ulwazi ngokuphatheka kukazulu ekuhleleni izimali zekhansili waluthola kanjani?* ▪ *Have you been satisfied with the PB education process? Uyaneliseka ngohlelo lokufundisa ngokuphatheka kukazulu ekuhleleni ngemali?*	
Question 5	**In what form do you receive budget documents? Incwadi zebhajethi uziphiwa ziyisimakanjani?** *Probes* ▪ *Is the language used in the budget documents understandable? Ulimi olusetshenziswa encwadini zebhajethi luyezwakala na?* ▪ *Do Mangwe RDC officials explain the contents of the budget documents? Iziphathamandla zekhansili yeMangwe RDC ziyachasisa okumunyethwe zincwadi zebhajethi na?* ▪ *How often are these budget documents availed to you? Uziphiwa kangaki incwadi zebhajethi lezi?*	
Question 6	**How do you participate in the budget process? Uphatheka njani kungqubo yebhajethi?** ▪ *What mechanisms are used to enhance your participation in the budget process? Yiziphi izimiso ezikukhuthaza ukuphatheka kungqubo yebhajethi?*	

	▪ *Are these mechanisms effective? Izimiso lezi ziyasebenza na?* ▪ *What can be done to improve their effectiveness? Zingalolongwa njani ukuze zisebenze ngcono?* ▪ *What is your role in the PB process?Udlala ndima bani ekuphathekeni komphakathi kubhajethi?*	
	Section D: Outcomes Dimension	
Question 7	**How often are citizens/community inputs incorporated into the final local government budget? Imibono yezakhamizi ibayingxenye yebhajethi okukangakanani?** *Probes* ▪ *How has this affected relations between the citizens and local government officials? Lokhu sokubelendonsela bani ebudlelwaneni bezakhamizi leziphathamandla zekhansili?* ▪ *What role has the traditional leadership played to ensure that citizen/community inputs are considered? Abaholi bomdabu sebenzeni ukuze izifiso zikazulu zifakwe kubhajethi?*	
Question 8	**What have been the main outcomes of PB in Mangwe RDC? Yiphi imiphumela emqoka yokuphatheka komphakathi kubhajethi yeMangwe RDC?** ▪ *Has the community benefited from PB? Umphakathi usubelanzuzo bani ngokuphatheka kubhajethi?* *If yes, how have the poor benefitted? If no, Why? Nxa kulenzuzo emphakathini,*	

	abampofu bona batholani? Kanti njalo nxa kungela nzuzo, kungani? ▪ *From your experience, what can you say are the major drawbacks of PB? Ngenkambo yakho, kuyini okubisela ukuphatheka komphakathi kubhajethi emuva?* ▪ *What do you think can be done to improve the outcomes of PB? Ngokubona kwakho, kuyini okungenziwa ukthuthukisa imiphumela yokuphatheka komphakathi kubhajethi?*	
	Conclusion	
	The respondent will be given an opportunity to ask questions and comment on the interview. The researcher will thank the respondent for participating in the interview. Umxoxi uzanikwa ithuba lokubuza lokuphawula ngengxoxo. Umcwaningi uzabonga umxoxi ngokuphatheka kungxoxo.	

APPENDIX B

Interview Guide

Traditional leaders / Umholi womdabu

Position……..……
Age (in years)……
Sex…….
Number of years in Office……

My name is Ms Tambudzai Rashirayi (Std. nr. 36996793) a registered PhD candidate at North-West University. The title of my study is: "**Participatory Budgeting in rural councils: The case of Mangwe District Council, Zimbabwe**". The primary objective of the study is to identify challenges encountered in the realisation of positive Participatory Budgeting (PB) outcomes such as increased citizen participation, transparency, accountability, and improved service delivery in Mangwe Rural District Council in Zimbabwe and to formulate measures which can be adopted to ensure effective and efficient implementation of PB. I hope that the responses I am going to get from you will help me in illuminating your perceptions on participatory budgeting in Zimbabwe. Participation in this interview is voluntary and confidential. In the event that you feel uncomfortable to withdraw from participating in the interview you are free to do so and there are no consequences for doing so. The interview will take between 30- 45 minutes of your time.

Ibizo lami nginguTambudzai Rashirai, ngenza izifundo zobudokotela bezincwadi kuUnivesithi yaseNorth West kweleSouth Africa, inombolo yami yesikolo yile (Std. nr. 36996793). Ngicubungula; "**Ngokuphatheka komphakathi kubhajethi zamakhansili emaphandleni: Sikhangele ikhansili yeMangwe kweleZimbabwe**". Injongo emqoka yocwaningo lolu yikudinga inhlupho eziphazamisa imiphumela emihle yokuphatheka kukazulu kuzinhlelo zemali efana lokuphatheka kwenengi, ukuthembeka kanye lentuthuko ekhansilini le. Ucwaningo lolu lujonge njalo ukuphuma lezixazululo zenhlupho lezi. Ngithemba impendulo engizazithola kuwe zizanginceda

ukuthola imibono yakho ngokuphatheka komphakathi ekuhleleni imali zikazulu. Ukuphatheka kungxoxo le akuphoqwa njalo kuyimfihlo, nxa ingxoxo ingasakuphathi kuhle ukhululekile ukuyivala, lokhu akusicala. Ingxoxo izathatha imizuzu engaba ngu30 kusiya ku45.

I would like to extend my gratitude to you for agreeing to take part in this interview and allowing to have this conversation recorded. Can you please go through the consent form and sign it before we start the interview so that it is clear that you were not coerced to participate but it was voluntary and you consented to do so.
Ngithanda ukukubonga ngokuvuma ukuphatheka kungxoxo lokuthi siyirekhode. Usungabala ifomu lesivumelwano sengxoxo ulisayine singakaqali ingxoxo ukuqinisa ukuthi kawuphoqwanga ukuxoxa.

	Section A: Government Dimension
Question 1	**What policies and legal frameworks are in place that provide for participatory Budgeting? Yiphi imithetho lezimiso okukhuthaza ukuphatheka komphakathi kubhajethi?** *Probes* ▪ *What is the significance of these policies and legal frameworks? Izimiso lemithetho le kuqakatheke ngani?* ▪ *Who benefits from these policies and legal frameworks? Izimiso lemithetho le kwenzelwe bani?* ▪ *What role has the traditional leadership played to ensure that these provisions are followed?Ubuholi bomdabu sobenzeni ukuze izimiso lezi zilandelwe?*
	Section B: Process dimension
Question 2	**Are there any noticeable changes to the budgetary process in Mangwe RDC since it was established? Kambe kulenguquko ekhanyayo kungqubo yebhajethi yeMangwe RDC lokhe yabayiyo?** *Probes* ▪ *Which changes are these***? Nguquko bani?** ▪ *Who participates in the budgetary process?Ngubani ophathekayo kungqubo yebhajethi?*

	▪ *Is there a specific selection criterionfor participants?Kukhethwa abantu abanjani ukuthi baphatheke?* ▪ *How does this criterion work? Bakhethwa njani?* ▪ *At what stage of the budget do citizens participate?Izakhamizi ziphatheka kusigaba siphi sebhajethi?*
Question 3	**Do environmental factors such as (politics, financial standing, level of education have a bearing on citizen participation in the budget process? Kambe izinto ezithi ipolitiki, inotho, lemfundo zilendonsela ekukhethweni kwezakhamuzi eziphatheka kubhajethi?** *Probes* ▪ *If yes, how do these affect citizen participation in the budget process?Nxa zilendonsela, lokhu kulendonsela bani kuzakhamuzi na?* ▪ *In your perception, of the above listed factors which one has the highest effect on citizen participation?Ngokubona kwakho yikuphi okuqakathekiswayo nxa kunxuswa uzulu kubhajethi?* ▪ *What measures can be put in place to curb the negative effects these factors have on citizen participation?Kuyini okungenziwa ukuze izinto lezi zingaphazamisi ukuphatheka kwezakhamizi kubhajethi?*
	Section C: Mechanism Dimension
Question 4	**Has the Mangwe RDC used any mechanisms to educate the traditional leadership on the budgetary process? IMangwe RDC isithethe manyathelo bani ukufundisa abaholi bomdabu ngengqubo yebhajethi?** *Probes* ▪ *If no, how have you received education on participatory budgeting?Nxa bengafundiswa, ukufunde njani ukuphatheka komphakathi kubhajethi?* ▪ *If yes, name these mechanisms?Nxa befundisa, qamba inhlelo zemfundiso le?* ▪ *What outcomes have been achieved due to these mechanisms?Inhlelo lezi sezibelamphumela bani?* ▪ *Have you been satisfied with the education process?Uyasuthiseka ngemfundiso le na?*

Question 5	**In what form do you receive budget documents? Incwadi zebhajethi uziphiwa ziyisimakanjani?** *Probes* ▪ *Is the language used in the budget documents understandable?Ulimi olusetshenziswa encwadini zebhajethi luyezwakala na?* ▪ *Do Mangwe RDC officials explain the contents of the budget documents?Iziphathamandla zekhansili yeMangwe RDC ziyachasisa okumunyethwe zincwadi zebhajethi na?* ▪ *How often are these budget documents availed to you?Uziphiwa kangaki incwadi zebhajethi lezi?*
Question 6	**How do you participate in the budget process? Uphatheka njani kungqubo yebhajethi?** *Probes* ▪ *What mechanisms are used to enhance your participation in the budget process?Yiziphi izimiso ezikukhuthaza ukuphatheka kungqubo yebhajethi?* ▪ *Are these mechanisms effective?Izimiso lezi ziyasebenza na?* ▪ *What can be done to improve their effectiveness?Zingalolongwa njani ukuze zisebenze ngcono?* ▪ *Do you understand why you participate in the budget process?Uyazwisisa ukuthi kungani uphatheka kungqubo yebhajethi?*
	Section D: Outcomes Dimension
Question 7	**How often are citizens/community inputs incorporated into the final local government budget?Imibono yezakhamizi ibayingxenye yebhajethi okukangakanani?** *Probes* ▪ *How has this affected relations between the citizens and local government officials? Lokhu sokubelendonsela bani ebudlelwaneni bezakhamizi leziphathamandla zekhansili?* ▪ *What role has the traditional leadership played to ensure that citizen/community inputs are considered? Abaholi bomdabu sebenzeni ukuze izifiso zikazulu zifakwe kubhajethi?*

Question 8	**What have been the main outcomes of PB in Mangwe RDC? Yiphi imiphumela emqoka yokuphatheka komphakathi kubhajethi yeMangwe RDC?** ▪ *Has the community benefited from PB? Umphakathi usubelanzuzo bani ngokuphatheka kubhajethi?* *If yes, how have the poor benefitted? If no, Why? Nxa kulenzuzo emphakathini, abampofu bona batholani? Kanti njalo nxa kungela nzuzo, kungani?* ▪ *From your experience, what can you say are the major drawbacks of PB? Ngenkambo yakho, kuyini okubisela ukuphatheka komphakathi kubhajethi emuva?* ▪ *What do you think can be done to improve the outcomes of PB? Ngokubona kwakho, kuyini okungenziwa ukthuthukisa imiphumela yokuphatheka komphakathi kubhajethi?*
	Conclusion
	The respondent will be given an opportunity to ask questions and comment on the interview. The researcher will thank the respondent for participating in the interview. Umxoxi uzanikwa ithuba lokubuza lokuphawula ngengxoxo. Umcwaningi uzabonga umxoxi ngokuphatheka kungxoxo.

APPENDIX C

Interview Guide

Mangwe Rural District Council Officials

Ministry/Department……
Age (in years)……
Sex……
Number of years in Office……

My name is Ms Tambudzai Rashirayi (Std. nr. 36996793) a registered PhD candidate at North-West University. The title of my study is: "**Participatory Budgeting in rural councils: The case of Mangwe District Council, Zimbabwe**". The primary objective of the study is to identify challenges encountered in the realisation of positive Participatory Budgeting (PB) outcomes such as increased citizen participation, transparency, accountability and improved service delivery in Mangwe Rural District Council in Zimbabwe and to formulate measures which can be adopted to ensure effective and efficient implementation of PB. I hope that the responses I am going to get from you will help me in illuminating your perceptions on participatory budgeting in Zimbabwe. Participation in this interview is voluntary and confidential. In the event that you feel uncomfortable to withdraw from participating in the interview you are free to do so and there are no consequences for doing so. The interview will take between 30- 45 minutes of your time. Ibizo lami nginguTambudzai Rashirai, ngenza izifundo zobudokotela bezincwadi kuUnivesithi yaseNorth West kweleSouth Africa, inombolo yami yesikolo yile (Std. nr. 36996793). Ngicubungula; "**Ngokuphatheka komphakathi kubhajethi zamakhansili emaphandleni: Sikhangele ikhansili yeMangwe kweleZimbabwe**". Injongo emqoka yocwaningo lolu yikudinga inhlupho eziphazamisa imiphumela emihle yokuphatheka kukazulu kuzinhlelo zemali efana lokuphatheka kwenengi, ukuthembeka kanye lentuthuko ekhansilini le. Ucwaningo lolu lujonge njalo ukuphuma lezixazululo zenhlupho lezi. Ngithemba impendulo engizazithola kuwe zizanginceda ukuthola imibono yakho ngokuphatheka komphakathi ekuhleleni imali zikazulu. Ukuphatheka kungxoxo le akuphoqwa njalo

kuyimfihlo, nxa ingxoxo ingasakuphathi kuhle ukhululekile ukuyivala, lokhu akusicala. Ingxoxo izathatha imizuzu engaba ngu30 kusiya ku45.

I would like to extend my gratitude to you for agreeing to take part in this interview and allowing to have this conversation recorded. Can you please go through the consent form and sign it before we start the interview so that it is clear that you were not coerced to participate but it was voluntary and you consented to do so. Ngithanda ukukubonga ngokuvuma ukuphatheka kungxoxo lokuthi siyirekhode. Usungabala ifomu lesivumelwano sengxoxo ulisayine singakaqali ingxoxo ukuqinisa ukuthi kawuphoqwanga ukuxoxa.

	Section A: Environmental Dimension
Question 1	**What policies and legal frameworks are in place that provide for participatory Budgeting? Yiphi imithetho lezimiso okukhuthaza ukuphatheka komphakathi kubhajethi?** Probes ▪ *What is the significance of these policies and legal frameworks? Izimiso lemithetho le kuqakatheke ngani?* ▪ *To what extent do you make use of these provisions*? Uzisebenzisa kangakanani lezizimiso lemithetho?
Question 2	**How would you describe the current system of local government budgeting in Zimbabwe? Ungakuchaza kanjani ukubhajethwa okwenziwa ngamakhansili eZimbabwe lamhlanje?** *Probes* ▪ *In what ways is it different from the previous budgeting system? Kwehluke njani kungqubo zebhajethi ezedlule?* ▪ *How beneficial is the current local budgeting system?* Ilobungcono bani ingqubo yebhajethi eliyisebenzisayo?
	Section B: Process dimension
Question 3	**How is the budgeting process carried out in Mangwe RDC?Ingqubo yebhajethi yenziwa njani eMangwe RDC?** *Probes*

	▪ *At what stage are citizens involved in the budgetary process? Umphakathi ungena kusiphi isigaba kungqubo yebhajethi yenu?* ▪ *Who participates in the budgetary process? Ngubani ophatheka kungqubo yebhajethi?* ▪ *Is there a specific selection criterion for participants?Kulendlela elandelwa nxa kukhethwa abazaphatheka na?* ▪ *How does this criteria work? Indlela isebenza njani?*
Question 4	**What are your perceptions of the current Mangwe RDC budgeting process?Yiphi imibono olayo ngengqubo yebhajethi eMangwe RDC namhlanje?** *Probes* ▪ *How would you justify your (dis)like of these perceptions?kuyini okwenza uthande kumbe ungathandi imibono yakho le?* ▪ *What do you think may alter these perceptions?Ubona engani imibono yakho le ingaguqulwa yini?*
	Section C: Mechanism Dimension
Question 5	What role does Mangwe RDC play in ensuring citizen, traditional leadership and elected councillors' education on budgeting activities? iMangwe RDC yenzani ukuze umphakathi, abaholi bomdabu, lamakhansila bafunde ngengqubo yebhajethi? *Probes* ▪ *What outcomes have been achieved due to this role?Imizamo le isibelemiphumela bani?* ▪ *Which mechanisms do you use to disseminate budget documents to citizens, traditional leadership and councillors?Lisebenzisa Ndlela bani ukufikisa incwadi zebhajethi emphakathini, kubaholi bomdabu kanye lamakhansila?* ▪ *Do ordinary citizens understand the diction used in these budget documents?izakhamizi ziyazwisisa ulimi lwencwadi lezi na?*
	Section D: Outcomes Dimension

Question 6	**How often are citizen inputs incorporated in the final local government budget? Imibono yezakhamizi iyabayingxenye yebhajethi yekhansili na?** *Probes* ▪ *How has this affected relations between citizens and local government officials? Lokhu sokubelendonsela bani ebudlelwaneni bezakhamizi leziphathamandla zekhansili?* ▪ How are conflicting interests of citizens dealt with?Liziphatha njani izifiso zezakhamizi eziphambene lezenu kumbe lezezinye izakhamizi?
Question 7	**7. What have been your experiences with regards to Participatory budgeting in Mangwe RDC? Yiphi inkambo osubelayo ngokuphatheka komphakathi kubhajethi yeMangwe RDC?** *Probes* ▪ *What have you learned from these unique experiences?Usufundeni kulezinkambo?* ▪ *What have been the role of Mangwe RDC in the maintenance of these experiences?Ndima bani edlalwe yiMangwe RDC kunkambo zakho lezi?* ▪ *What have been the role of traditional leaders in the maintenance of these experiences?Ndima bani edlalwe ngabaholi bomdabu kunkambo zakho lezi?* ▪ *What have been the role of councillors in the maintenance of these experiences? Ndima bani edlalwe ngamakhansila kunkambo zakho lezi?* ▪ *What have been the role of ward community commitees in the maintenance of these experiences? Ndima bani edlalwe zikomidi zamawadi kunkambo zakho lezi?*
Question 8	**What have been the main outcomes of PB in Mangwe RDC?Yiphi imiphumela emqoka yokuphatheka komphakathi kubhajethi yeMangwe RDC?** ▪ *Has the community benefited from PB?Umphakathi usubelanzuzo bani ngokuphatheka kubhajethi?*

	If yes, how have the poor benefitted? If no, Why?Nxa kulenzuzo emphakathini, abampofu bona batholani? Kanti njalo nxa kungela nzuzo, kungani? ▪ *From your experience, what can you say are the major drawbacks of PB?Ngenkambo yakho, kuyini okubisela ukuphatheka komphakathi kubhajethi emuva?* ▪ *What do you think can be done to improve the outcomes of PB?Ngokubona kwakho, kuyini okungenziwa ukthuthukisa imiphumela yokuphatheka komphakathi kubhajethi?*
	Conclusion
	The respondent will be given an opportunity to ask questions and comment on the interview. The researcher will thank the respondent for participating in the interview. Umxoxi uzanikwa ithuba lokubuza lokuphawula ngengxoxo. Umcwaningi uzabonga umxoxi ngokuphatheka kungxoxo.

APPENDIX D

Interview Guide/ ingxoxo lamakhansila

Councillors /Okhansila

Isikhundla Position……
Iminyaka Age (in years)……
Ubulili Sex…….
Number of years in Officeiminyaka usesikhundleni……

My name is Ms Tambudzai Rashirayi (Std. nr. 36996793) a registered PhD candidate at North-West University. The title of my study is: "**Participatory Budgeting in rural councils: The case of Mangwe District Council, Zimbabwe**". The primary objective of the study is to identify challenges encountered in the realisation of positive Participatory Budgeting (PB) outcomes such as increased citizen participation, transparency, accountability and improved service delivery in Mangwe Rural District Council in Zimbabwe and to formulate measures which can be adopted to ensure effective and efficient implementation of PB. I hope that the responses I am going to get from you will help me in illuminating your perceptions on participatory budgeting in Zimbabwe. Participation in this interview is voluntary and confidential. In the event that you feel uncomfortable to withdraw from participating in the interview you are free to do so and there are no consequences for doing so. The interview will take between 30- 45 minutes of your time. Ibizo lami nginguTambudzai Rashirai, ngenza izifundo zobudokotela bezincwadi kuUnivesithi yaseNorth West kweleSouth Africa, inombolo yami yesikolo yile (Std. nr. 36996793). Ngicubungula; "**Ngokuphatheka komphakathi kubhajethi zamakhansili emaphandleni: Sikhangele ikhansili yeMangwe kweleZimbabwe**". Injongo emqoka yocwaningo lolu yikudinga inhlupho eziphazamisa imiphumela emihle yokuphatheka kukazulu kuzinhlelo zemali efana lokuphatheka kwenengi, ukuthembeka kanye lentuthuko ekhansilini le. Ucwaningo lolu lujonge njalo ukuphuma lezixazululo zenhlupho lezi. Ngithemba impendulo engizazithola kuwe zizanginceda ukuthola imibono yakho ngokuphatheka komphakathi ekuhleleni imali zikazulu. Ukuphatheka kungxoxo le akuphoqwa njalo

kuyimfihlo, nxa ingxoxo ingasakuphathi kuhle ukhululekile ukuyivala, lokhu akusicala. Ingxoxo izathatha imizuzu engaba ngu30 kusiya ku45.

I would like to extend my gratitude to you for agreeing to take part in this interview and allowing to have this conversation recorded. Can you please go through the consent form and sign it before we start the interview so that it is clear that you were not coerced to participate but it was voluntary and you consented to do so. Ngithanda ukukubonga ngokuvuma ukuphatheka kungxoxo lokuthi siyirekhode. Usungabala ifomu lesivumelwano sengxoxo ulisayine singakaqali ingxoxo ukuqinisa ukuthi kawuphoqwanga ukuxoxa.

	Section A: Environmental Dimension
Question 1 umbuzo 1	**What policies and legal frameworks are in place that provide for participatory Budgeting? Yiziphi izibopho lemithetho okulawula ukuphatheka komphakathi ekuhleleni imali kazulu?** *Probes* ▪ *What is the significance of these policies and legal frameworks? Izibopho lemithetho le kuqakatheke njani?* ▪ *To what extent are these provisions followed? Izibopho lezi zilandelwa kangakanani?* ▪ *What role has the traditional leadership played to ensure that these provisions are followed? Abaholi bomdabu balendima bani ekufezeni lezizibopho?*
	Section B: Process dimension Isigaba B: ihlandla lokuhlela
Question 2	**Are there any noticeable changes to the budgetary process in Mangwe RDC since it was established? Kulenguquko ekhanyayo ekuhleleni ngezimali eMangwe RDC lokhe yaba yiyo?** *Probes* ▪ *Who participates in the budgetary process?Ngubani ophatheka ekuhleleni imali zekhansili?* ▪ *Is there a specific selection criterion for participants? Kulengqubo yokukhetha abaphathekayo na?*

	▪ *How does this criterion work?Ingqubo le isebenza njani?* ▪ *At what stage of the budget do citizens participate? Uzulu uphatheka kuhlandla liphi ekuhleleni?*
Question 3	**Do environmental factors such as (politics, financial standing, level of education have a bearing on citizen participation in the budget process? Izinto ezibalisa ipolitiki, inotho kanye lokufunda komuntu zilendonsela na ekuphathekeni kwabo kunhlelo zemali ekhansilini?** *Probes* ▪ *If yes, how do these affect citizen participation in the budget process?Nxa kuliqiniso, izinto lezi zilendonsela bani ekuphathekeni komphakathi ekuhleleni?* ▪ *In your view, of the above listed factors which one has the highest effect on citizen participation? Ngokubona kwakho yikuphi kuzinto eziphawulwe phezulu okulendonsela enkulu ekuphathekeni komphakathi?* ▪ *What measures can be put in place to curb the negative effects these factors have on citizen participation?Kungenziwani ukuze izinto lezi zingabiseli emuva uhlelo lokuphatheka kukazulu ekuhleleni imali yekhansili?*
	Section C: Mechanism Dimension Isigaba C:
Question 4	**Where you inducted into your office and the practice of PB explained to you? Wafundiswa ngomsebenzi wakho njalo ukuphatheka kukazulu ekuhleleni izimali wakuchazelwa?** *Probes* ▪ *If yes, who was responsible for your induction?Nxa wafundiswa, wafundiswa ngubani?* ▪ *If no, how have you received education on participatory budgeting?Nxa ungafundiswanga, ulwazi ngokuphatheka kukazulu ekuhleleni izimali zekhansili waluthola kanjani?*

	▪ *Have you been satisfied with the PB education process? Uyaneliseka ngohlelo lokufundisa ngokuphatheka kukazulu ekuhleleni ngemali?* ▪ *What is your role in the PB process?ulandima bani kuhlelo lokuphatheka kukazulu ekuhleleni?*
Question 5	**In what form do you receive budget documents? Amaphepha ebhajethi liwathola njani?** *Probes* ▪ *Is the language used in the budget documents understandable? Ulimi olusetshenziswa kuncwadi zebhajethi luyazwisiseka na?* ▪ *Do Mangwe RDC officials explain the contents of the budget documents? Abaphathi beMangwe RDC bayachasisa okumunyethwe zincwadi zebhajethi na?* ▪ *How often are these budget documents availed to you? Incwadi zebhajethi lezi lizithola kangaki?*
Question 6	**How do you participate in the budget process? Uphatheka njani kuhlelo lwebhajethi?** ▪ *What mechanisms are used to enhance your participation in the budget process? Yiziphi izibopho ezenza uphatheke ngcono kubhajethi?* ▪ *Are these mechanisms effective?Izibopho lezi ziyasebenza na?* ▪ *What can be done to improve their effectiveness? Zingathuthukiswa njani?* ▪ *What is your role in the PB process? Yiwuphi umsebenzi wakho ekuphathekeni komphakathi kubhajethi?*
	Section D: Outcomes Dimension
Question 7	**How often are citizens/community inputs incorporated into the final local government budget? Kukangaki lapho imibono yomphakathi isibayingxenye yebhajethi yekhansili?** *Probes* ▪ *How has this affected relations between the citizens and local government officials? Lokhu sokube lendonsela bani kubudlelwano bukazulu labaphathi bekhansili?*

	▪ *What role has the traditional leadership played to ensure that citizen/community inputs are considered?Ubukhokheli bomdabu sobenzeni ukuze izifiso zomphakathi zizwakale?*
Question 8	10. **What have been your experiences with regards to Participatory budgeting in Mangwe RDC? Yiphi inkambo yakho lokuphatheka kukazulu kubhajethi yeMangwe RDC?** *Probes* ▪ *What have you learned from these unique experiences?Ufundeni kunkambo lezi?* ▪ *What have been the role of Mangwe RDC in the maintenance of these experiences?IMangwe RDC yenzani ukuze kubelenkambo lezi?* ▪ *What have been the role of traditional leaders in the maintenance of these experiences?Abaholi bomdabu balendima bani kunkambo lezi?* ▪ *What have been the role of councillors in the maintenance of these experiences? Amakhansila alendima bani kunkambo lezi?* ▪ *What have been the role of ward community committees in the maintenance of these experiences? Amakhomithi amawadi alendimabani kunkambo lezi?*
Question 8	**What have been the main outcomes of PB in Mangwe RDC? Yiphi impumela emqoka yokuphatheka kukazulu kubhajethi yeMangwe RDC?** ▪ *Has the community benefited from PB?Umphakathi usutholeni ngokuphatheka kubhajethi?* *If yes, how have the poor benefitted? If no, Why? Nxa uthola, abampofu bona bazuzani, nxa ungatholilutho, kungani?* ▪ *From your experience, what can you say are the major drawbacks of PB? Ngokwazi lokubona kwakho, yiziphi izinto ezibuyisela ukuphatheka kukazulu kubhajethi emuva?*

	▪ *What do you think can be done to improve the outcomes of PB?Kuyini okungenziwa ukuthuthukisa imphumela yokuphatheka kukazulu kubhajethi?*
	Conclusion
	The respondent will be given an opportunity to ask questions and comment on the interview. The researcher will thank the respondent for participating in the interview. Umxoxi uzanikwa ithuba lokubuza lokuphawula ngengxoxo. Umcwaningi uzabonga umxoxi ngokuphatheka kungxoxo.

APPENDIX E

Informed Consent Form/ Isivumelwano sengxoxo

My name is Tambudzai Rashirayi (Std. nr. 36996793) a registered PhD candidate at North-West University with the title: "**Participatory Budgeting in rural councils: The case of Mangwe District Council, Zimbabwe**". The primary objective of the study is to identify challenges encountered in the realisation of positive Participatory Budgeting (PB) outcomes such as increased citizen participation, transparency, accountability and improved service delivery in Mangwe Rural District Council in Zimbabwe and to formulate measures which can be adopted to ensure effective and efficient implementation of PB. Your consent to participate in the interview which will be held at your convenient location is therefore requested. The interview's focus will be on your understanding, experiences and perceptions of PB in Mangwe RDC. You are requested to participate in this interview because of your exposure and experience to local government and community activities, therefore you will be able to share your experiences and perceptions towards the uptake of PB in Mangwe RDC.

Ibizo lami nginguTambudzai Rashirai, ngenza izifundo zobudokotela bezincwadi kuUnivesithi yaseNorth West kweleSouth Africa, inombolo yami yesikolo yile (Std. nr. 36996793). Ngicubungula; "**Ngokuphatheka komphakathi kubhajethi zamakhansili emaphandleni: Sikhangele ikhansili yeMangwe kweleZimbabwe**". Injongo emqoka yocwaningo lolu yikudinga inhlupho eziphazamisa imiphumela emihle yokuphatheka kukazulu kuzinhlelo zemali efana lokuphatheka kwenengi, ukuthembeka kanye lentuthuko ekhansilini le. Ucwaningo lolu lujonge njalo ukuphuma lezixazululo zenhlupho lezi. Ngicela imvumo yokuxoxa lawe ngalokhu njalo ingxoxo izenzelwa endaweni lapho ofuna khona. Ingxoxo le izagxila ekuzwisiseni, kunkambo kanye lemibono yakho ngokuphatheka kukazulu ekuhleleni ngemali kukhansili yeMangwe. Ukhethwe ukungena kule ingxoxo ngenxa yokuphatheka lolwazi lwakho ngezinhlelo zomphakathi. Ukhangelelwe ukwaba inkambo lolwazi lwakho ngokuhlelwa kwezimali yikhansili yeMangwe.

Participation in this study is voluntary and it is up to you to choose to be involved or not. The researcher upholds confidentiality and to that effect anonymity is assured.

Informed Consent Form/ Isivumelwano sengxoxo

Pseudonyms will be used in order to protect your real identity during and after the research. The information which is being collected from you is only going to be used for academic purposes and not any other purposes not mentioned here. The findings of the study are going to be publicly disseminated but without your identity being linked to the findings. Data collected will only be accessible to the researcher and the academic supervisor and kept in a secure place where it will not be shared with anyone without your consent. Soft copies of data will be kept in a password protected external hard drive and laptop for backup. The collected data will be kept safe for five years before being destroyed for ethical reasons.

Kawuphoqwa ukuba yingxenye yalolucwaningo uyazikhethela. Amagama abazaphatheka azabayimfihlo yomcubunguli. Abaphathekayo bazaphiwa amagama amatsha ukuze bangavezwa ngawabo ocwaningweni. Imibono yakho izasetshenziswa kumsebenzi wesikolo lo kuphela hatshi kwezinye indawo ezingaphawulwanga lapha. Impumela yocwaningo lolu izabekwa ebandla kodwa amabizo abaxoxi engekho. Isiphala sengxoxo lezi sizafinyelelwa ngumqeqeshi lalowo omqeqeshayo kuphela, ngeke luphiwe omunye umuntu ungatshelwanga. Lamakhompiyutha azagcina ingxoxo lezi azaqatsheliswa ngumqeqeshi, njalo ingxoxo lezi zizagcinwa okweminyaka emihlanu besezitshabalaliswa.

Despite having agreed to participate in the interview but during the start or during the course of the interview you decide to discontinue the interview, you will not be obliged to continue against your will. You are at liberty to terminate the interview at any given time. There are no benefits or risks attached to participating in the interview. The interview will take between 30-45 minutes and during the course of the interview an audio recorder will be utilised in order to capture the issues we are going to be discussing. If you voluntarily agree to participate in the study, can you please sign the consent form in the space provided below.

Lanxa uvumile ukuphatheka kungxoxo, ulakho ukunqaba laloba ingxoxo isiphakathi. Kukuwe ukumisa ingxoxo laloba yinini ofisa khona. Akulamvuzo kumbe ingozi okukhona ngokuphatheka kungxoxo. Ingxoxo izathatha imizuzu engaba ngu30 kusiya

ku45 njalo izarekhodwa ngerediyo. Nxa uzifunela ukuphatheka kucwaningo lolu, sayina isivumelwano lesi kuzikhala ezibekiweyo.

Formal acknowledgement of consent

minal ……..……on this day of ngalolusuku …….20.., agree to participate in the interview for a PhD research project on: "**Participatory Budgeting in rural councils: The case of Mangwe District Council, Zimbabwe**"**.** I understand that I will be asked to share my experiences and perceptions on PB uptake in Mangwe RDC and asked to suggest ways of tackling challenges faced in the implementation of PB. I acknowledge that I have not been coerced to participate in this study but have voluntarily agreed to participate. I also agree to the use of audio recording of the interview.

Ngiyavuma ukuphatheka kungxoxo zocwaningo lwePhD ecubungula: "**Ngokuphatheka komphakathi kuzinqumo zemali kukhansili yeMangwe kweleZimbabwe**". Ngiyazwisisa ukuthi ngizacelwa ukupha inkambo lemibono yami ngokwenziwa kokuphatheka komphakathi kwezemali yeMangwe RDC njalo ngizacelwa ukupha imibono ngezixazululo zenhlupho esengizibonile. Ngiyafakaza ukuthi angiphoqwanga kodwa ngizifunele ukubayingxenye yocwaningo lolu. Njalo, ngiyavuma ukuthi ingxoxo ezirekhodiweyo zisetshenziswe ngumcubunguli.

Signature of participant…… Date……

Signature of researcher…… Date……

APPENDIX F

Stand 222/3 Station Road
P.Bag 5912
PLUMTREE
ZIMBABWE

TEL: (0219) 6388/6272 /6194/5383/5773
E –Mail: mangwerdc@gmail.com

All correspondence to be addressed to the Chief Executi

8 June 2021

Tambudzai Rashirai

Dear Madam,

RE: PERMISSION TO CARRY OUT RESEARCH WITH MANGWE RDC

The above matter refers.

Your request to carry out research with Mangwe Rural District Council on 'Participatory budgeting in rural Councils' has been accepted.

We sincerely request a copy of the findings of your research after completion.

Wishing you the best in your studies.

Kind regards

For and on behalf of Mangwe Rural District Council

J.Sibanda
Human Resources and Administration Officer

MANGWE RURAL DISTRICT COUNCIL
0 8 JUN 2021
ADMIN. AND HUMAN RESOURCES
P. BAG 5912
PLUMTREE