

Understanding Shame and Guilt as a Key to Cross-Cultural Christian Ministry

An Elenctical Study

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this thesis is to help missionaries and those who train them better understand the differences of conscience orientations between peoples and cultures, and the implications of these differences for cross-cultural Christian ministry.

After an introduction, an interdisciplinary literature survey in the second chapter presents material from Scripture, theology, philosophy, psychology, cultural anthropology and missiology, in order to arrive at a working definition of the conscience and an appreciation of the importance of shame and guilt in the functioning of the conscience. In a third chapter on Scripture, shame and guilt are investigated through selected word and concept studies, and through exegetical studies. The fourth and fifth chapters deal with the theoretical and practical implications of conscience orientation for cross-cultural Christian ministry. The sixth chapter evaluates the importance of understanding shame and guilt for cross-cultural Christian ministry and indicates areas of further research.

In view of the fallen state of man, the author proposes a soteriological definition of the conscience. The research shows that every definition of conscience must include shame and guilt. Even if the term „conscience“ does not appear, the conscience is engaged when shame or guilt are present. In the first psychoanalytic model, the differential definition of shame and guilt is either a shortcoming in relation to an ideal or a transgression of a standard. According to the second cognitive model, it is either a global or a specific attribution of failure. These two models are helpful, but have their limitations. The interdisciplinary approach to the conscience has proved fruitful.

The study of Scripture has shown that the Bible is not only a guilt-oriented message. God's goal in his redemptive history with man is a balanced shame and guilt-oriented conscience. Shame before God is as appropriate and as frequent as guilt before God. One of the major messages of the Bible is that God is and has to be our significant other.

Further research shows that conscience orientation influences both personality and culture. Hypothetical extremes of shame and guilt-oriented personalities and cultures are presented. It is shown that personalities and cultures are always a mixture of both shame and guilt orientation. Theology as a part of culture is also a function of conscience orientation. This concerns all the disciplines: systematic and practical theology, ethics, and exegesis. The conscience orientations of missionary and target people influence all domains of cross-cultural

Christian ministry, that is, communication and contextualization, evangelism, church planting and counseling.

The proposed soteriological model is simple enough to be applied by any missionary in his everyday situations. Conscience states can be attributed to the shame-honour or the guilt-justice axis. Practical situations are however always a mixture of both. The everyday use of the model can simplify, enrich and promote cross-cultural Christian ministry.

PREFACE

The author has worked since 1984 as a missionary in Guinea, West Africa. Questions concerning shame and guilt retained his attention particularly. During his studies at Columbia International University, missiologist Dr. Klaus W. Müller and anthropologist Prof. Lothar Käser helped him better understand many aspects of these phenomena. For this reason, he wrote a manual for missionaries in Guinea, dealing with the main aspects of a shame-oriented, animistic and folk-Islamic culture and their missiological implications. After finishing this manual, the desire to dig deeper and to attempt a synopsis on the phenomena of shame and guilt was born. A meeting with Prof. Bennie van der Walt during the General Assembly of the Association of Evangelicals of Africa in Johannesburg opened the way to realize this dream in the form of a doctoral thesis at Potchefstroom University, South Africa.

This thesis can be read in different ways. The missionary practitioner might want to limit his reading in chapter 2 to the conclusion sections of the particular disciplines, or even only to the summary in section 2.7. In chapter 3, he might skip section 3.1. Thus, he can directly read the exegetical parts of chapter 3 and come then to the theoretical and practical implications in chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 5 is even more practical than chapter 4. Of course, the academic reader will prefer a complete reading of chapters 2 and 3.

I am very much indebted to Prof. Koos Vorster who facilitated the administrative matters with Potchefstroom University and to Prof. Faan Denkema who led my doctoral studies diligently and generously. To Prof. Lothar Käser and PD Dr. Rüdiger Reinhardt go my thanks for their valuable comments on the first draft. To Prof. Harold Kallemeyn I am thankful for his proof reading of the finalised English text. I am also grateful to the Swiss Alliance Mission, especially to its president Silvano Perotti and its director Martin Voegelin, for the possibility they granted me to write this thesis while being a missionary. My wife Claire-Lise and my children Simone, Christine, Mirjam and Rahel, renounced many leisure hours and my help in the household during reading and writing of the thesis. Finally, I am thankful to my heavenly Father who has led the way to my doctoral studies and has permitted to bring them to an end.

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TABLE OF TRANSLITERATION

Hebrew		Greek	
א	'	α	a
ב ב	b b̄	β	b
ג ג	g ḡ	γ	g
ד ד	d d̄	δ	d
ה	h	ε	e
ו	w	ζ	z
ז	z	η	ē
ח	ḥ	θ	th
ט	ṭ	ι	i
י	y	κ	k
כ כ	k k̄	λ	l
ל	l	μ	m
מ	m	ν	n
נ	n	ξ	x
ס	s	ο	o
ע	'	π	p
פ פ	p p̄	ρ	r
צ	ṣ	σ	s
ק	q	ς	s
ר	r	τ	t
ש	ś	υ	y
שׁ	š	φ	ph
ת ת	t t̄	χ	ch
		ψ	ps
		ω	ō
		·	h
	(ה) ṭ â (h)		
	· ā		
	· a		
	· a		
	· ê		
	· ē		
	· e		
	· e		
	· ê		
	· i		
	· ô		
	· ō		
	· o		
	· o		
	· û		
	· u		

ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations Old Testament

Gen	Genesis	Ezr	Ezra	Dan	Daniel
Ex	Exodus	Neh	Nehemiah	Hos	Hosea
Lev	Leviticus	Est	Esther	Joel	Joel
Num	Numbers	Job	Job	Amos	Amos
Dt	Deuteronomy	Ps	Psalms	Obad	Obadiah
Jos	Joshua	Prov	Proverbs	Jon	Jonah
Jdg	Judges	Eccl	Ecclesiastes	Mic	Micah
Ruth	Ruth	Cant	Song of Solomon (Canticles)	Nah	Nahum
1Sam	1 Samuel			Hab	Habakkuk
2Sam	2 Samuel	Isa	Isaiah	Zeph	Zephaniah
1Ki	1 Kings	Jer	Jeremiah	Hag	Haggai
2Ki	2 Kings	Lam	Lamentations of Jeremiah	Zech	Zechariah
1Chr	1 Chronicles			Mal	Maleachi
2Chr	2 Chronicles	Ezek	Ezekiel		

Abbreviations New Testament

Mt	Matthew	Eph	Ephesians	Hebr	Hebrews
Mk	Mark	Phil	Philippians	Jas	James
Lk	Luke	Col	Colossians	1Pet	1 Peter
Jn	John	1Thess	1 Thessalonians	2Pet	2 Peter
Acts	Acts of the Apostles	2Thess	2 Thessalonians	1Jn	1 John
Rom	Romans	1Tim	1 Timothy	2Jn	2 John
1Cor	1 Corinthians	2Tim	2 Timothy	3Jn	3 John
2Cor	2 Corinthians	Tit	Titus	Jude	Jude
Gal	Galatians	Phlm	Philemon	Rev	Revelation

Reference Works and Journals

ASV	American Standard Version
BFC	French Bible Version: Français courant
BKAT	Biblischer Kommentar Altes Testament, Hg. M. Noth, S. Herrmann, H.W. Wolff, I-XXI, 1973-2000.
EKL	Evangelisches Kirchenlexikon, Hg. Erwin Fahlbusch et al. 3., Aufl. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986.
em	Evangelikale Missiologie
EMQ	Evangelical Missions Quarterly
GBL	Grosses Bibellexikon, Hg. Helmut Burckhardt, Fritz Grünzweig, Fritz Laubach, Gerhard Maier, I-III, 1987-1989.
GW	Gesammelte Werke (Germ.), collected works by Sigmund Freud. 18 vol., Frankfurt: Fischer, 1940-1968.
HfA	German modern Bible version: Hoffnung für alle
HThG	Handbuch Theologischer Grundbegriffe, I-III, 1962.
IBMR	International Bulletin of Missionary Research
KJV	King James Version
LThK	Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, Hg. J. Höfer, K. Rahner, 2. völlig neu bearb. Aufl., Freiburg: Herder, 1957-1968.
NASB	New American Standard Bible
NIDNTT	New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology, ed. Colin Brown, I-IV, rev. ed., 1992 (1 st Engl. ed. 1976, 1 st Germ. ed. [TBLNT] 1971-1975).
NIDOTTE	New International Dictionary of Old Testament Theology and Exegesis, ed. Willem A. VanGemeren, I-V, 1996.
NIV	New International Version
NTD	Das Neue Testament Deutsch, Hg. Paul Althaus, I-XI.
PG	<i>Corpus Christianorum: Clavis Patrum Graecorum</i> . 15 Bde. Rom: Brepols Turnholti und Leuven: University Press, 1977-1983.
PL	<i>Corpus Christianorum: Series Latina</i> . 75 Bde. Rom: Turnholti Typographici Brepols, 1954-1997.
RGG	Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart: Handwörterbuch für Theologie und Religionswissenschaft, Hg. K. Galling et al., I-VII, 3. Aufl. 1957-1965.
RSV	Revised Standard Version
SEM	French modern Bible Version: Semeur
ST	Summa theologiae by Thomas Aquinas
TBLNT	Theologisches Begriffslexikon zum Neuen Testament, Hg. Lothar Coenen, Erich Beyreuther, Hans Bietenhard, I-II, 8. Aufl., 1990. (1. Aufl. 1971-1975).
THAT	Theologisches Handwörterbuch zum Alten Testament, Hg. E. Jenni und C. Westermann, I-II, 5. Aufl., 1994-1995 (1. Aufl. 1971, 1975).
ThWAT	Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Alten Testament, Hg. G.J. Botterweck, H.-J. Fabry, H. Ringgren, I-X, 1973-2000.
ThWNT	Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, Hg. G. Kittel und G. Friedrich, I-X, 1933-1974.
TRE	Theologische Realenzyklopädie, Hg. Gerhard Müller, I-XXVII, 1977-1997.
Ver	De Veritate by Thomas Aquinas
VT	Vetus Testamentum
WA	Weimarer Ausgabe (Germ.), Weimar edition of Martin Luther's complete works
WBC	Word Biblical Commentary, eds. D. Hubbard, G. Barker, I-LII, 1987-1999.

General Abbreviations

ahd.	althochdeutsch (Germ.), old German
Bd.	Band (Germ.), volume
Bde.	Bände (Germ.), volumes
cf.	confer (Lat.), compare
CIU	Columbia International University
contra	against
cp.	compare (Lat.), compare
ed.	editor
eds.	editors
e.g.	exemplii gratia (Lat.), for example
Engl.	English
Ep	Epistulae morales by Senecas
esp.	especially
ET	English translation
et al.	et alii (Lat.), and other persons
EVZ	Evangelischer Verlag Zürich
f.	and following verse or page
ff.	and following verses or pages
fem.	feminine
FHM	Freie Hochschule für Mission, Korntal
FS	Festschrift (Germ.)
Habil.	Habilitationsschrift (Germ.)
Hebr.	Hebrew
Hg.	Herausgeber (Germ.), editor
Germ.	German
GT	German translation
ibid.	ibidem (Lat.), in the same work/page
idem	the same
Inst.	Institutio Christianae Religionis by John Calvin
Lat.	Latin
LXX	Septuagint
mhd.	mittelhochdeutsch (Germ.), medieval German
n.	note
neutr.	neutral
NT	New Testament
o.J.	ohne Jahr (Germ.), without year
op.cit.	opere citato (Lat.), in the work quoted
OT	Old Testament
par	parallel(s) in the Synoptics (Mt, Mk, Lk)
trans.	translated
UMI	University Microfilms International
V&R	Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht
VKW	Verlag für Kultur und Wissenschaft
VLM	Verlag der Liebenzeller Mission
WCL	William Carey Library
übers.	übersetzt (Germ.), translated
w.y.	without year

Unless otherwise noted
all Biblical quotations are from
The New International Version
International Bible Society
1973, 1978, 1984, 1990

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

The author has worked since 1984 as a missionary in Guinea, West Africa. Many questions related to cross-cultural Christian ministry arose during this period and some remained unanswered. In particular, questions concerning shame and guilt retained the author's attention as they seemed to concern almost all spheres of life and ministry. During his studies at Columbia International University, missiologist Müller (1988; 1996a) and anthropologist Käser (1997) helped him better understand many aspects of these phenomena. For this reason, he wrote a manual for missionaries in Guinea, dealing with the main aspects of a shame-oriented, animistic and folk-Islamic culture and their missiological implications (Wiher 1998).

1.2 Problem Statement

Many Western missionaries coming from societies characterized by a predominantly guilt-oriented conscience present the Gospel in predominantly shame-oriented cultures. Often these missionaries are not aware of the differences in conscience orientation and their implications for personality, culture and theology. Different personality traits, as for example time or event orientation, goal or person orientation, efficacy or status orientation, can lead to completely different decisions or reactions in every day life (Lingenfelter/Mayers 1986). An animistic worldview holds a set of very different values and patterns of life as compared to a secular worldview (Käser 1997:226f.). From a theological point of view, predominantly shame-oriented people who respond to the person-oriented concept of reconciliation may have difficulty understanding a Gospel presented in guilt-related terms which include justification and reparation (Noble 1975:80). For these reasons, missionaries frequently encounter miscommunication and frustration. Some leave the mission field completely discouraged (Foyle 1989:100f.; O'Donnell 1988:421-445; Klement 1997). This regrettable situation has prompted the author to undertake this thesis project. The following questions will be addressed:

1. What is the conscience and how does it function? What is the role of shame and guilt in the conscience?
2. What does Scripture teach us about shame and guilt?
3. What theoretical implications do different conscience orientations have for cross-cultural Christian ministry?

4. What practical implications do different conscience orientations have for cross-cultural Christian ministry?

1.3 Aim and Objectives

The aim of this thesis is to help missionaries and those who train them better understand different conscience orientations in persons and in cultures, and the implications of these differences for cross-cultural Christian ministry.

The objectives of this thesis are the following:

1. To come to a working definition of the conscience and an appreciation of the importance of shame and guilt in the functioning of conscience.
2. To investigate shame and guilt in Scripture.
3. To investigate the theoretical implications of shame and guilt-oriented conscience for cross-cultural Christian ministry.
4. To investigate the practical implications of shame and guilt-oriented conscience for cross-cultural Christian ministry.

1.4 Hypothesis

A better understanding of the role of shame and guilt in the functioning of the conscience will promote effective cross-cultural Christian ministry.

1.5 John's Story

The scope of the problem may best be understood through an example. John,¹ one of our local drivers, is travelling with our Guinean agricultural specialist to buy some material in the capital. Because there is much space left on the platform of the pickup, he takes passengers with him and makes them pay. This he does against the rules and regulations of the mission and against the explicit protest of the agricultural specialist. Unfortunately, in a curve he drives off the road. The pickup turns over. One of the passengers is killed. John is charged with negligent driving and imprisoned temporarily in the closest town because of a suspicion of culpable negligence.

When our expatriate agricultural specialist arrives there, he finds the pickup badly crushed. The left front tire is slit open, apparently with a knife. Together with the director of

¹ The names given in the examples of this thesis are fictitious.

the Bible institute, he goes to the family of the passenger who has passed away in order to present condolences with the ten cola nuts. The family expresses their desire to sue the driver before court, after they have heard that the car belongs to white people. They want to make a lot of money in this affair. The pastor of the town informs the mission. Subsequently, the family decides to no longer press charges with the mission, but to settle with the insurance company.

The pastor follows the negotiations with police and justice. In the police report, the fact that the driver has been drunk and that too many passengers have been in and on the pickup are not mentioned nor that the slit open left front tire does not fit the picture of the suspected cause of the accident. The police give a fine because of excessive speed and present a bill for the proceedings that seems excessively high. Should this bill be paid, even if it is clear that it is excessive? If so, isn't it the responsibility of the guilty party to pay it? The missionary team is against paying the bill. The negotiations with the insurance change considerably when the director of the insurance discovers that the pickup was on the way to the Bible institute, where he has a close friend. The affair ends without further discussions.

Back home, the driver's family asks the mission for forgiveness. She is dependent on the fact that John does not lose his job. John himself has never confessed the smallest detail of his act. He only acknowledges as much of the truth as the missionaries force him to. Pastor James, who has recommended John to the mission for this job, has to accompany him in order to ask for forgiveness and for cancellation of his contribution to the costs of the accident. Pastor Josef, after whom John's first child is named, accompanies John to plea for his reengagement as driver.

The missionaries decide to dismiss John immediately, as he never has shown any real contrition nor has he confessed honestly. His participation to the costs of the accident can never be recovered. On the other hand, his family never understands the mission's refusal to reengage John after all their interventions.

1.6 Method and Research

What happened really in the consciences of the two parties? In order to get a better understanding of the events in this story, it is important to first understand the functioning of the conscience. Research has sufficiently shown that this is an interdisciplinary endeavour (Blüh-dorn 1976:4-11; 1984:191; Zecha 1987:iv-xii). Therefore, in a second chapter the author will present material from Scripture, the history of theology and philosophy, psychology, cultural

anthropology and missiology, in order to arrive at a working definition of the conscience and an appreciation of the importance of shame and guilt in the functioning of the conscience. The introductory story will be analysed. The conclusion of the first chapter leads to the formulation of our working hypothesis.

In the third chapter, the hypothesis should be confirmed or invalidated based on the evidence in Scripture. Biblical research will first concentrate on selected word and concept studies concerning shame and guilt and their soteriological implications. Secondly, through an exegetical study, we will explore examples in the Old and the New Testament presenting shame and/or guilt situations. Thirdly, we will attempt to see God's redemptive history from the perspective of both shame and guilt. The chapter will conclude by clarifying the importance of shame and guilt in Scripture.

The fourth and fifth chapters will deal with the theoretical and practical implications of shame and guilt-oriented conscience for cross-cultural Christian ministry. The method of research will include tools from the social sciences as well as those from theology and exegesis. A sixth chapter will conclude this study with an evaluation of the hypothesis, the search for a better solution of John's story, and propositions for further research.

2 WHAT IS THE CONSCIENCE ?

TOWARD A WORKING DEFINITION

2.1 Introduction

The question: „What is the conscience?“ is necessarily raised within a specific historical context and specific anthropological concepts. Through history these concepts have changed considerably (Kittsteiner 1991:289). Therefore, it is necessary to situate the discussion of the conscience in its respective historical context and its anthropological concepts (Wolf 1958:1556; cp. Weyer 1984:230; Maurer 1966:902 n.21, 905). Theologically speaking, conscience must also be understood in the context of soteriology, man being a fallen creature needing salvation.

Through history, the phenomenon of conscience has been examined by many different disciplines: philosophy, jurisprudence, theology, psychology, sociology, cultural anthropology and missiology. In our selective historical literature survey with the specific interest point in cross-cultural Christian ministry, we will start with the Bible, our reference, continuing with theology, philosophy, psychology, cultural anthropology, and missiology. In the study of all these disciplines, we will put a special accent on describing the anthropological and soteriological background concept of the period or author, as well as noting the appearance of shame and guilt in the concept of conscience. This means that we have to keep in mind the different worldviews with their respective anthropological concepts (Hiebert 1994:36-38). They are schematically presented in figure 2.1. (adapted from Hiebert 1993a:158 and Musk 1989:176f.; cp. Hopp 1993:8; Dierks 1986:76-90). Most of them are anthropocentric. The Hebrew worldview alone is theocentric.

In studying the disciplines, we will try to combine diachronic and synchronic approaches. Diachronic approaches are historical (historical science and Biblical theology), whereas synchronic approaches are ahistorical (natural and social sciences). Diachronic approaches look at specific events, which can confer meaning, whereas synchronic approaches look at universal, structural and functional theories (Hiebert 1994:44f.).¹ The diachronic, historical literature survey will be summarized by synchronic, systematic conclusions.

¹ Cp. the larger discussion in section 2.5.9. Paul Hiebert: From Epistemology to Metatheology.

Figure 2.1: Worldviews and Anthropological Concepts

Animistic Worldview	Hebrew Worldview	Greek Worldview	Secular Worldview
	God	gods Angels Spirits	„Excluded Middle“ ²
Supreme Being Spirits Ancestors	Angels Spirits		
Humans Animals Plants Matter	Humans Animals Plants Matter	Humans Animals Plants Matter	Humans Animals Plants Matter

This procedure implies also a combined synthetic and analytic approach. Synthetic approaches are based on intimate knowledge without subject-object distance. They tend to be holistic and lead to synthetic, often broad and diffuse concepts (Wolff 1990:22f.). On the other hand, analytic approaches imply a subject-object distance. They lead to systematic and clear-cut, but fragmentary concepts. As will be shown later in greater depth, the former corresponds to a shame-oriented epistemology exemplified in the relationship between God and man in the OT (cp. Ps 139). The latter is a guilt-oriented approach developed through modern science.³ It is obvious that one can only study conscience from one's own conscience orientation. This inevitable dilemma, which can also be termed a hermeneutical circle, should not prevent us from further investigation despite the fact that our conclusion will have their limitations.

In part because of this epistemological problem, the conscience remains part of the mystery of man and his soul. For the same reason, the definitions and semantic domains of the terms for conscience in the different languages and disciplines are often ambiguous (Blüh-dorn 1976:4f.; Eckstein 1983:4f.). Stelzenberger names it a „Babylonian confusion of tongues“ (1962:519). Similarly, for Vetter speaking of conscience, the core of personality is

² Hiebert speaks of the excluded middle, which leads to a partial understanding of the world and consequently to a partial preaching of the Gospel (1982:40,45f.; 1994:199ff.).

³ Cp. the discussion of the two concepts in section 3.1.10. Knowledge and Wisdom as Covenant Characteristics, and in relation to conscience orientation and personality, in section 4.1.5. Analytic or Synthetic Thinking.

an „incognito“ (1966:123). Due to this fact, we adopt a combined historical approach to the phenomenon of conscience rather than a purely structural and systematic approach. In our discussions of the different historical periods, we will attempt to clarify the differences of definition. The fact that we deal with a human entity makes the discussion of the conscience an interdisciplinary endeavour (Blühdorn 1976:4-11; 1984:191; Zecha 1987:iv-xii; Hiebert 1985:26; 1994:10,13,15). This fact does not lighten the problem of different and fuzzy definitions. By approaching the „mystery“ from different historical viewpoints and from different disciplines, our goal is to arrive at a practical definition that is helpful for the cross-cultural missionary in his everyday decisions.

How do we approach the different presuppositions of the disciplines?⁴ Most of the authors of mental and social sciences would not agree with the basic assumptions of the Bible. Theology's epistemology is revelational, while mental and social sciences' epistemology is speculative or empirical. In theology, the locus of explanation is generally historical and socio-cultural, while in the social sciences it is descriptive. The level of explanation is meta-physical in theology, and empirical in social sciences (Carter/Narramore 1979:52f.; Hiebert 1994:38-42). Our literature survey will necessarily include revelational, speculative and empirical data. However, the fact that „God is the creator of all things ... establishes a basic unity of all truth, whether found in scriptural revelation or scientific experimentation. Given this unity of truth, it is possible to integrate truth discovered from different sources and with different methodologies“ (Carter/Narramore 1979:13; cp. Gaebelin 1968; Holmes 1977). When doing this, we will be careful to maintain a critical realist epistemology in theology and a theistic view in the sciences (Hiebert 1985:19-27; 1994:40-45; 1999:68ff.).⁵ In order to show possible unity and discrepancy of findings of theology and other disciplines, Carter and Narramore create a matrix of orientation, which is presented in table 2.1. (adapted from Carter/Narramore 1979:22).

If we believe that God is the source of all truth, we assume that there is no inherent conflict between the *facts* of science and the *data* of Scripture. All conflicts between theology and science must, therefore, be conflicts between either the *facts* of Scripture and the *theories* of science, the *facts* of science and our (mis)interpretation of

⁴ For a discussion of the different points of view see Larkin (1992:129-136) and Hiebert (1994:23,40).

⁵ Critical realism differentiates between theology and biblical revelation, ascribing final and full authority to the Bible as the inspired record of God in human history. At the same time, it takes history and culture seriously. It admits that knowledge is partial (1Cor 13:12) and that there are different complementary views of reality. Firstly, it implies a complementarity between synchronic and diachronic systems of knowledge, secondly a complementarity between a realist theology and theistic science (Hiebert 1994:40-47; 1999:103-106). Cp. the larger discussion in section 2.5.10. Paul Hiebert: From Epistemology to Metatheology.

Scripture, or between the *theories* of science and our (mis)*interpretations* of Scripture (Carter/Narramore 1979:22 italics in original).⁶

Table 2.1: Unity and Discrepancy between Theology and Other Disciplines

	Data of Theology (Scripture)	Interpretations of Theology
Data (Facts) of Science	No Conflict	Possible Conflict
Theories of Science	Possible Conflict	Possible Conflict

Keeping Scripture as our reference, we will be careful to differentiate Scripture from theological interpretation and not to discard or accept scientific evidence without thorough evaluation. Consequently, an interdisciplinary approach to the phenomenon of conscience should be fruitful.⁷

2.2 The Bible and its Context

In the following discussion of the concept of conscience in the Bible and its context, we will not specifically consider the concepts of shame and guilt for methodological reasons, as we will take up these concepts more systematically in chapter three. First, we will look at the concept of conscience in the OT, then in the Hellenistic context, and finally in the NT.

2.2.1 The Hebrew Concept of Conscience

In the OT, an animistic worldview is being transformed systematically into a theistic worldview, the Hebrew worldview. Man lives in communication with the self-revealing God. God questions him, searches him and calls him to new things (Wolff 1990:17). Man comes to understand himself out of the presence of the all-knowing, ever-present, almighty, redeeming and leading God, as shown in Ps 139 (cp. Maurer 1966:906; Werblowsky 1976:31).⁸ This Creator-and-Redeemer-God is at the same time close to him and far away. God is close through the intimate knowledge, which he has of man, and his redeeming intervention in history (Ex 7-14; Dt 30:14; Ps 139:1-6). He is far away as the completely other, the Creator as

⁶ Carter and Narramore speak only of the relationship between theology and psychology, whereas we speak of science in general. In the quotation, psychology has therefore been replaced by science.

⁷ Others have undertaken similar interdisciplinary literature surveys with a theological or missiological perspective: the surveys of Augsburg (1986:111-143), Wunderli (1990:9-41), and Kurani (2001:24-62) are more concise, the one of Nyeste (2001:6-127) more extensive.

⁸ About the relational character of OT anthropology see Jacob (1973:628). Consider also the relational meaning of intimate knowledge of the Hebrew verb *yd'* (cp. section 3.1.10. Knowledge and Wisdom as Covenant Characteristics).

compared to the creature (Isa 29:16). The I-You relationship between God and man is based on the fact that man is created in the image of God (Gen 1:26f.) and on the covenants between them (Gen 1:28; 9:15f.; 12:1f.; 17:9-11; Ex 19:5f.; 2Sam 7:14-16; cp. Rom 9:4).

The OT does not give a systematic anthropology (Wolff 1990:16). In describing man, it uses stereometry, that is to say, a part stands for the whole (Ps 6:3-5; 84:3; Prov 2:10f.; 18:15), as well as the synthetic use of terms, which means that terms are broad and interchangeable (Jdg 7:2; Isa 52:7; cp. Werblowsky 1976:28). Wolff calls this the „synthetic-stereometric“ thinking of the Hebrews (Wolff 1990:22f.). In this sense, terms like heart, soul, spirit, flesh, and also ear, mouth, hand and foot can be exchangeable or represent a whole person (Isa 26:9).

In this perspective, „flesh“⁹ means the weak man, who was built from dust in frailty (Wolff 1990:49ff.; cp. Gerleemann 1995:376-379; Dyrness 1979:87ff.). „Soul“¹⁰ stands for the needy man. Starting from the basic meaning of throat, the term describes man as vital, emotional, needy and covetous self, a being in search for life and therefore for God (Wolff 1990:25ff.). Hasenfratz sees it as life force, the vehicle of which is the blood (Gen 9:4; Lev 17:14; Hasenfratz 1986a:76f.; cp. Westermann 1995:77f.; Dyrness 1979:85; Eichrodt 1967:134ff.). „Heart“¹¹ describes the centre of consciously living man. The term is the most frequent anthropological term of the OT and encompasses the physical, emotional, intellectual and volitional domains (Wolff 1990:68ff.,90; Werblowsky 1976:28; cp. Dyrness 1979:89; Eichrodt 1967:142f.). The term includes all the dimensions of human existence. It can be used for man as a whole (Stolz 1995:863). The heart is the seat of the spirit (Hasenfratz 1986a:79). „Spirit“¹² describes man gifted and empowered by God with the force of life (Wolff 1990:57ff.). The spirit gives man his determination, because he is in touch with God. It is not always possible to differentiate man's spirit from God's spirit (Hasenfratz 1986a:77; cp. Dyrness 1979:86; Eichrodt 1967:131f.).¹³ The term can also be used for the different moods (Jdg 8:3; Jos 2:11) and approaches the use of heart (Ps 51:12; Albertz/Westermann 1995:738,741; Hasenfratz 1986a:78). When we discuss these different terms, let us not forget

⁹ Hebr. בָּשָׂר (*bāsār*).

¹⁰ Hebr. נֶפֶשׁ (*nepeš*).

¹¹ Hebr. לֵב (*lēb*).

¹² Hebr. רוּחַ (*rûah*).

¹³ Hasenfratz says that this difficulty to distinguish man's from God's spirit is specific for Israel (1986a:77). Cp. the conscience as „organ“ of the relationship with God in section 2.7. Proposal for a Working Definition of the Conscience.

that man is a unity for the Hebrews, that he has not a soul, but is soul, that he has not a heart, but is heart. Man is also a member of a group (family, clan, tribe and people) (Wolff 1990:309ff.). Robinson speaks of this group orientation as corporate personality (Dt 26:5-10; Jos 24:15; Jer 31:29f.; Robinson 1946:70).

The OT does not know a Hebrew term for conscience (cp. Maurer 1966:906; Werblowsky 1976: 21; Kettling 1985:71; Oser 1976:58; Thiele 1971:75; Wolter 1984:214). This does not mean that the Hebrew had no such anthropological perception of the conscience (Seel 1953:298,319; Eckstein 1983:106f.,111).¹⁴ Two approaches to the phenomenon are possible: The question of the place of the conscience and the ontological question. In relation to the former, the conscience belongs to inner man, which is described by different terms. The space of inner man is commonly called the „inward parts“¹⁵ (Wolff 1990:102). The „bones“¹⁶ are another possibility of expressing the inner life (Ps 139:15; cp. Eichrodt 1967:146; Hasenfratz 1986a:79f.). The most important terms however are the „kidneys“¹⁷ and the „heart“¹⁸ (1Sam 25:37; Ps 7:10; 16:7; 26:2; 33:13-15; 73:21; Prov 14:33; Jer 12:2; 17:10; 20:12). Five times heart is combined with kidneys. Together they are largely identified with the conscience (Wolff 1990:105). David's heart beats (1Sam 24:6; 2Sam 24:10) or it staggers and stumbles (1Sam 25:31) to show the conscience in motion. For God examines the heart (Prov 21:2). On this ground, David can ask for purification and renewal of the heart (Ps 51:12; cp. 73:1) and God can promise a new heart, that is, a pure conscience (Jer 31:31-34; Ezek 36:26).¹⁹ David can also say: „Even at night the kidneys instruct me“ (Ps 16:7).²⁰ This voice does not come *from* the interior, but it goes *to* the interior. It is God's voice (Werblowsky 1976:28). Soul and spirit become vehicles of moral personality and continue life after death (Ps 88:11ff.; Hasenfratz 1986a:81). In Prov 20:27 the „breath“²¹ of man is the knowing and discerning presence of God in man's innermost (Werblowsky 1976:33). In conclusion, knowledge (of God), the conscience, must be part of inner man (Eccl 10:20; Werblowsky 1976:29).²²

¹⁴ See section 2.2.2. Hellenism's Concept of Conscience for possible explanations.

¹⁵ Hebr. **חֵרֶב** (*hereb*).

¹⁶ Hebr. **עֲצָם** (*'ešem*).

¹⁷ Hebr. **כִּלְיֹת** (*k'läyōt*).

¹⁸ 1Sam 25:37; Ps 7:10; 16:7; 26:2; 33:13-15; 73:21; Prov 14:33; Jer 12:2; 17:10; 20:12.

¹⁹ This leads later in the NT to the concept of the good conscience (Maurer 1966:907).

²⁰ Consider the synonymous parallelism in this verse, where „instruct“ is complemented with „counsel.“

²¹ Hebr. **נְשָׁמָה** (*nf'sāmāh*).

²² See also the discussion of knowledge **דַּעַת** (*da'at*) in section 3.1.10.

This brings us to the ontological question. Man created in the image of God is meant to live in communion with God. He is given responsibility over creation, including himself (Gen 1:28). He does not know to distinguish between good and evil by himself (Gen 2:17). The intimate knowledge about himself comes from God (Ps 139). Through this he is in direct relationship to God occupying a „central“ position in creation. As God has spoken his Word (Gen 2:16f.), man is obliged to obey or refuse. The problem of disobeying God brings him out of this direct relationship, in an „excentric“ position, in opposition to God. From now on, man knows to distinguish between good and evil, but he does not know „in“ God, but „with“ God (Plessner 1928:291 cited by Werblowsky 1976:24f.) and against God (Bonhoeffer 1988:20). The problem of being responsible of his actions is for man not so much a problem he has with himself, but much more a matter with God, of obeying or disobeying his commandments (Ps 16:7f.; 40:9; 119:11; Maurer 1966:906f.; Wolff 1990:234f.; Werblowsky 1976:26-28; Hahn 1986:348f.; Bonhoeffer 1988:20f.).²³

2.2.2 Hellenism's Concept of Conscience

The Hellenist worldview develops out of an animistic worldview (Dihle 1973:604f.). Erin-yes²⁴ and penitent figures in Hades represent outwardly projected actions of the conscience. Socrates speaks of the *daimonion*, the voice of the oracle of Delphi, which judges his decisions (Eckstein 1983:67-71; Adkins 1960:261; Maurer 1966:903; Kähler 1967:144; Oser 1976:52f.).

During the enlightenment of the 5th century B.C., the order of the supernatural world of the gods is broken and man becomes the measure of all things (Maurer 1966:903). Greek philosophy develops a generally dualistic, anthropocentric worldview (Lohse 1973:631,634; Dihle 1973:657f.; see figure 2.1). It is in this setting that for the first time in history specific terms for conscience are developed (see appendix 1 for a synthesis). Firstly, we will look at Hellenism in Greek, secondly in Latin expression, and last at Jewish Hellenism.

From the 5th century B.C. on, the non-reflexive form σύννοιδά τι νί τι (*synoida tini ti*) „knowing something with somebody“ is used in the sense of being a witness of something. This „knowing with“ can be neutral or positive in the sense of bringing honour and recognition or negative in the meaning of complicity (Eckstein 1983:35f.; Maurer 1966:897). At the

²³ For a larger discussion see section 2.3.8. Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Analysis of the Fall.

²⁴ Greek goddesses of revenge. Cp. their role in Orest's myth written down by Aischylos and discussed by Petersmann (1997:197).

same time, the reflexive form σύννοιδά ἑμαυτῷ (*synoida emauto*) „knowing with oneself“ appears in the sense of being conscious of something. This again can be a neutral knowledge or a moral consciousness of shame, of a bad character or act (Eckstein 1983:37f.,47; Maurer 1966:898f.; Pierce 1955:21f.). The verb receives a new accent in philosophy starting with Socrates, later Platon and Aristotle, giving it a purposely negative value as condemnation (Maurer 1966:898; Pierce 1955:46ff.,132-137).

Rarely from the 3rd and more frequently from the 1st century B.C. on, verbal derived nouns appear: ἡ συνείδησις (*syneidēsis*), a verbal noun from ionic origin, and τὸ συνειδός (*syneidos*), a substantivized neutral participle from attic origin. Both terms have the same meaning as either neutral knowledge, understanding and consciousness, or as moral consciousness of a bad act in the past, a „bad conscience“ (Eckstein 1983:50,63f.; Maurer 1966:900f.).²⁵ It can also have the meaning of harmony with oneself and the others (Hadot 1991:177-181; Hübsch 1995:237). The terms were not used consistently by the different writers and do not express a major concern of Hellenism (Maurer 1966:905; Blühdorn 1984:196). They were not used exclusively in Stoic philosophy. They were popular in Hellenistic language, from where the NT writers drew them (Eckstein 1983:66; Kähler 1967:29f.,191; Pierce 1955:16; contra Stelzenberger 1933:200ff.). As opposed to theocentric Hebrew culture, self-consciousness developed in the anthropocentric Greek culture where the gods of mythology did not concern themselves with problems of every day life.

Just as in the Greek sphere the term *syneidēsis* becomes common in the 1st century B.C., a parallel Latin term *conscientia* appears at the same time in Latin literature. Kähler contends that it is not derived from *syneidēsis*, but develops independently from common usage (1967:53,73). Its literal meaning is equally „knowing with.“ Similarly to the Greek term, the meaning can either be neutral in the sense of understanding and consciousness, positive as recognition or involvedness, and negative as consciousness of a bad character, bad behaviour, or association with evil. Cicero and Seneca use it very frequently, far more than the equivalent Greek term in its respective sphere. Like the Greek term, it can include the meaning of self-consciousness, insofar as the Biblical Partner-God is absent in Latin philosophy. This is especially the case in conjunction with the genitive, for example, *conscientia virtutis et vitiorum* „the knowledge of virtues and vices“ and *conscientia animi* and *mentis* „self-consciousness“

²⁵ Classified as *conscientia consequens* („following“ conscience, that is conscience about a past act) as opposed to *consequentia antecedens* (foreseeing conscience). See discussion in section 2.3.2. Thomas Aquinas' Synteresis and Conscientia, and appendix 1.

or „conscience.“ Here, the moral aspect becomes predominant and consciousness becomes conscience. The same is true in conjunction with a qualifying adjective, *conscientia bona et mala*, „good and bad conscience“ (Eckstein 1983:72-78; Maurer 1966:905f.).

Seneca (4 B.C. - 65 A.D.), a Stoic philosopher, calls to self-examination every evening (*examen conscientiae*) and pretends that one's proper *conscientia* is of greater value than the opinion of others (Seneca Ep 81,20; Ep 20,4: *de vita beata*, cited by Blühdorn 1984:201). In this way, philosophy, as the search for wisdom, becomes the search for a good conscience, a way of life. The ideal philosopher is a man with a good conscience, a wise man (Hübsch 1995:235). Thinking of the world directing reason (*logos*), Seneca writes of the *conscientia*: „God is proper to you; he belongs to you; God is in you.“²⁶ The paradigm shift to conscience as moral authority is developed (Maurer 1966:906; Kähler 1967:53-67,160ff.; Blühdorn 1984:200).²⁷

Interesting for the further development of the concept of conscience is Jewish Hellenism. In this section, we will look at the Greek translation of the OT, the Septuagint (LXX), which was probably translated in the 3rd century B.C. in Alexandria, and the Jewish philosopher Philo from Alexandria, who lived from around 25 B.C. to after 40 A.D.

In the LXX, the verb *synoida* appears only once in Job 27:6 and the noun *syneidēsis* only three times, once with the meaning of conscience. In line with Hebrew usage, the concept of conscience is expressed mainly in terms of *kardia* „heart.“ Even in later rabbinic literature, there is no word for conscience (Maurer 1966:908; Strack/Billerbeck 1985:3,92-96; 4,466-483). The substantivized participle of Attican origin *syneidos*, which is largely used by Josephus and Philo, does neither appear in the LXX nor later in the NT. This suggests that Philo does not exercise a direct influence on the NT writers (Eckstein 1983:112-116; Pierce 1955:55f.).

For the first time in recorded history, Philo develops a theologically consistent theory of the conscience by trying to combine OT and Hellenistic concepts. The importance of the subject is reflected by the fact that *syneidos* appears thirty-one times and *syneidēsis* three times in his work. However, concerning his theory of the conscience the Stoic influence is less determinant than the influence of the OT (Stelzenberger 1933:205). The task of the *syneidos*

²⁶ *Prope est a te deus, tecum est, intus est* (Seneca Ep 41,2 cited in Stelzenberger 1963:22 n.31).

²⁷ For Seneca, this authority of conscience is autonomous. As he identifies it with God, he loses the Creator-God who wants to be our accompanying partner. Stendahl warns to presuppose such an introspective conscience for the authors of the NT (1963:199).

„conscience“ is to cause the conversion of man, that is ἐλέγχειν (*elengchein*). This includes, according to Philo, all the functions of accusing and judging. This corresponds to the Hebrew root **יָכַח** (*ykh*) „judge, convict,“ which has an important place in Hebrew wisdom literature. *Elengchein* is complemented with *paideuein* „instruct, educate,“ *epistrephein* „convert,“ *nouthetein* „exhort,“ in the task of the Godly wisdom to conduct man to God. Thus Philo, as a representative of later Judaism, attributes to the conscience a judicial function in the service of God. God is the accuser and judge. The conscience is a means in the hand of God to lead man to conversion (Kähler 1967:172f.,184f.; Maurer 1966:910f.; Eckstein 1983:130). However, in the general Greek context *elengcho* means „put to shame, rebuke, refute“ (Büchsel 1935:470; Adkins 1960:33,45-49,157-159). Thus, Philo changes a shame-oriented concept into one that is guilt-oriented.

For the purpose of this study it is interesting to note that Dodds, Adkins, Finley, Cairns and Williams, based on the study of Homer and the Greek tragedies, classify Greek society as an honour and shame culture (Dodds 1951:17f. n.106; Adkins 1960:48f.; Finley 1962; Cairns 1993; Williams 1993:5,91). Adkins and Knoche show that honour and shame continue to play a prominent role into 5th century Greek society and Hellenistic Greek and Roman societies (Adkins 1960:154f.,167,312f. n.5; Knoche 1983:420-445).²⁸ Finally, Peristiany (1966; 1992) compiles sufficient evidence that the emphasis on honour and shame continues to prevail in Mediterranean societies until today. A Portuguese proverb says: „Nothing is so costly as that which costs shame“ (Augsburger 1992:81).

2.2.3 The NT Concept of Conscience

Because all but one of the NT writers are of Jewish origin, the NT concept of anthropology is greatly influenced by the OT concept. It is theocentric: man is God's partner and vice versa. Slight changes are observable in the sense of an influence of Greek dualism. The same is basically true for the concept of the conscience. Conscience is expressed according to the OT concepts in the corresponding Greek terms with slightly changed semantic domains.

The concept of flesh, in Hebrew **בָּשָׂר** (*bāsār*), is rendered in Greek by **σάρξ** (*sarx*) and **σῶμα** (*soma*) „body.“ *Soma* describes man more as a person, whereas *sarx* more as a creature

²⁸ Actually, shame is opposed to virtue (*aretē*) which is in this case a synonym to honour (*timē*) (Adkins 1960:31-40,154-168,332-335; Schneider 1977:19): „... the most powerful terms of value were *agathos* (*aretē*) and *kakos*, used of men, and *elencheiē* and *aischron*, used of their actions“ (Adkins 1960:156). Cp. the opposition of *in-dog* „virtue“ to loss of *ui-sin* or *che-mion* „honour, prestige,“ that is to shame, in Korea (Sung-Won 1987; cp. Hofstede 1997:232f. for China).

in its covetous and sinful nature.²⁹ In the OT, *bāsār* is the aspect of man, which suffers illness and death, but not covetousness, which is rendered much more by *nepeš* (Seebass 1990:343). Soul, נֶפֶשׁ (*nepeš*) becomes ψυχή (*psychē*), and spirit רֹּחַ (*rūah*) becomes πνεῦμα (*pneuma*). Their semantic domains in OT and NT correspond largely. In the NT, the conflict between the flesh and the spirit becomes more accentuated than in the OT.³⁰ Heart, in Hebrew לֵב (*lēb*), is together with the kidneys the central term for conscience in the OT. It is rendered in Greek by two terms: καρδία (*kardia*) „heart“ and νοῦς (*nous*): God examines the heart (Prov 21:2; 1Thess 2:4). For *nous* there is really no equivalent in English, but it can be translated by „understanding“ (Ridderbos 1992:117). It represents together with *kardia* the basis for *syneidēsis*, the necessary, underlying consciousness of norms and values (Rom 1:20,21,28). It is the γνῶσις (*gnosis*) „knowledge“ finally, which gives the informational basis for the norms to the *nous* (1Cor 8:7; Eckstein 1983:314f.).

It is important to remember that man is a unity for the Hebrews, that he does not *have* a soul, but *is* soul, that he does not *have* a heart, but *is* heart. Terms as monism,³¹ dichotomy³² and trichotomy,³³ which come from Greek anthropology, are based on analytic thinking. Therefore, they are in opposition to the wholistic Hebrew view with its synthetic thinking (Boman 1952:11-17; Hiebert 1992:26). Summing up the Hebrew view, Erickson speaks of a conditional unity of man (Erickson 1985:536-538).³⁴

In the NT, different authors, especially Paul, add the currently used popular philosophic term *syneidēsis* to the terms describing the concept of conscience. The Synoptics and the Johannic writings do not mention the new term, which suggests that they are written in the OT tradition (Maurer 1966:912). *Synoida* is used two times (Acts 5:2; 1Cor 4:4), and the ionic noun *syneidēsis* thirty or thirty-one times, depending on the inclusion of Jn 8:9.³⁵ The attic form *syneidos* is completely absent from the NT (Maurer 1966:912). Paul uses *syneidēsis* twenty times.³⁶ The Pauline part of Acts uses it twice (Acts 23:1; 24:16), and Hebrews five

²⁹ For a discussion of the differential meanings of *sarx* and *soma* see Ridderbos 1992:64ff., 115-117, 126ff.; Seebass 1990:342-347; Wibbing/Hahn 1990:867-875.

³⁰ Cp. Rom 7 as an example of a consensual conflict (Ridderbos 1992:126-130).

³¹ View that man is indivisible.

³² View that man is composed of two parts, one material and one immaterial.

³³ View that man consists of three components: body, soul and spirit.

³⁴ For a larger discussion of these concepts of man, see Erickson 1985:520-527; Ebert 1996:3-5. For a discussion of analytic and synthetic thinking as a function of conscience orientation see section 4.1.5.

³⁵ Questionable is *syneidēsis* in the *lectio varia* in Jn 8:9, which is absent from all *majusculae* and appears only from the 8th century A.D. on (Stelzenberger 1963:35).

³⁶ Rom 2:15; 9:1; 13:5; 1Cor 4:4; 8:7,10,12; 10:25,27,28,29; 2Cor 1:12; 4:2; 5:11; 1Tim 1:5,19; 3:9; 4:2; 2Tim 1:3; Tit 1:15.

times (Hebr 9:9,14; 10:2,22; 13:18). In the first letter of Peter, it appears three times (1Pet 2:19; 3:16,21; Stelzenberger 1963:35; Pierce 1955:62; Maurer 1966:912). In the former Pauline letters, *syneidēsis* appears more as an absolute. In his later letters as with the other Biblical authors, it is more frequent with a qualifying genitive or adjective (Eckstein 1983:302,311). *Syneidēsis* is one of few Greek terms in the NT, which were not taken from the LXX, but from the popular philosophic context (Pierce 1955:60,64f.; Maurer 1966:912; Kähler 1967:278f.).

The question is raised: is this term taken into the NT with its current popular meaning or is it transformed to a new concept? Paul describes *syneidēsis* as a neutral and objective anthropological authority which evaluates our behaviour according to given norms in a positive or negative way (Eckstein 1983:311f.; Maurer 1966:913,916). However, it can fail (1Cor 8+10; Brown 1992a:352). With this usage, he abandons the original meanings of „knowing with,“ „self-consciousness“ and „moral bad conscience.“³⁷ This authority controls Paul's (Rom 9:1; 2Cor 1:12) and the others' behaviour (2Cor 4:2; 5:11). It is also active in non-Jews so that they have a sense of the precepts of the Law (Rom 2:15). Man's relationship to it is one of responsibility so that the formula *dia tēn syneidēsin* takes the meaning of „in responsibility, for responsibility's sake“ (1Cor 10:25ff.; Rom 13:5). Through Christ's work on the cross, it is renewed together with *nous* and *kardia* in a way which changes the norms according to which it evaluates (Rom 12:1f.; Eckstein 1983:314f.). Through the authority of *syneidēsis*, man is reminded of the reality of God, and draws him into responsibility before God. Because of man's responsibility before God, the anthropological concept of *syneidēsis* receives a theological dimension (Eckstein 1983:317).

In the later letters, Paul and the other authors often use *syneidēsis* with a qualifying genitive or adjective, as is the common use by the Church Fathers. It can be a good (*agathē kalē*), a pure (*kathara*), a perfect (*aproskopos*) (1Tim 1:5,19; 3:9; 2Tim 1:3; Hebr 13:18; 1Pet 3:16,21), or a bad (*ponēra*) conscience (Hebr 10:22). The fact that emphasis is on the good and not on the bad conscience, testifies of the new creation through faith and is a specificity of the NT as opposed to Hellenism (Maurer 1966:918). Baptism as a pledge to God for a good *syneidēsis* in 1Pet 3:21 and the Hebrews passages speak of *syneidēsis* in the sense of the inner man, which has to be purified and renewed (cp. Ps 51:12). A special case is *syneidēsis tou*

³⁷ See the discussion in section 2.2.2. Hellenism's Concept of Conscience.

theou in 1Pet 2:19 with the meaning „consciousness of God“ (Eckstein 1983:303-308).³⁸ We can conclude that the NT does not present us with a systematic theory of *syneidēsis*, but nonetheless greatly enriches NT anthropology, influenced itself by the OT concept.

2.2.4 Conclusion

In studying the concept of conscience through the Bible and its surrounding context, we have noticed the absence of an abstract term for conscience in OT Hebrew and classical Greek (Eckstein 1983:105). Essential for the understanding of conscience in the OT is the theocentric view of man. Man is seen as image and covenant partner of God. He belongs to God, his creator.³⁹ Several anthropological terms and situations express the concept of conscience, preferentially heart and kidneys, rather than one specialized term. Conscience is developed within the solidarity of the covenant society, which determines normative relationships between God and man and between fellow men.

During the 1st century B.C., we find a late development of specific, abstract terms for consciousness, self-consciousness and the conscience in Greek and Latin: *syneidēsis* and *conscientia* and cognates. Their basic meaning is „knowing with“ in the sense of witness. A second meaning relates to consciousness or self-consciousness. A third meaning has a moral connotation, positive or negative, in the sense of conscience, as summarized in appendix 1. This development, which does not reflect Hebrew language and culture, is too late to influence the Greek translation of the OT in a major way. Therefore, we do not find the Greek terms in the Aramaic or Hebrew speaking Jewish-Christian community producing the Gospels. Paul and some other authors of the NT take up the specialized term *syneidēsis* from the Hellenistic context of popular philosophy and use it among other anthropological terms, especially *kardia* and *nous*, reflecting OT concepts, to describe the conscience. Generally, they give the term the meaning of an anthropological, neutral and objective authority reacting to one's behaviour according to given norms. This relates the term to human imperfection, as is shown in the discussion in 1Cor 8+10. However, *syneidēsis* has the authority of God, the prescriber of norms, behind it (Rom 2:15f.; 13:5; 2Cor 4:2). As John indicates in OT terms: „God is greater than the heart,“ that is to say, the conscience (1Jn 3:20f.).

³⁸ For a detailed exegesis of each verse see Eckstein 1983:137-300; Kähler 1967:225-293; Stelzenberger 1963:36-42; Maurer 1966:912-918. For a synthesis see the table in Pierce 1955:62 and appendix 1.

³⁹ *Ge-wissen wird Ge-hören* Germ. „consciousness becomes belonging“ (Maurer 1966:907).

The Hellenistic world of Greek and Latin tongue maintains the different meanings of the terms without major observable developments (Blühdorn 1984:198f.,201; Kähler 1967:67). Seneca's concept of conscience differs largely from the NT through its autonomistic view of *conscientia* identifying it with God within man, as *vox Dei*. Therefore, man has to listen to his *conscientia* more than to fellow man.⁴⁰ Apparently, he does not know the Biblical Partner-God outside and opposite to man.

The difference between Jewish Hellenist Philo's concept of *syneidēsis* and the NT lies in the fact that for Philo conscience refers to divine perfection, a means for God, the accuser and judge, to lead man back to God (*elengchein*). Note that Philo, a representative of late Judaism, takes the shame-oriented popular term *elengcho* to introduce it into his guilt-oriented concept of conscience as means of God's judgement. In the NT, *syneidēsis* is an anthropological instance permitting to evaluate one's behaviour. As a human feature it is imperfect and can mislead. However, it can be developed in relation to the authority of God. It is a human and a suprahuman instance at the same time (Rom 2:15; 13:5; Egelkraut 1996). It is the „organ“ linking man to God.

In Greek Hellenist literature, the bad conscience is predominant, whereas in Latin Hellenist writings, the good conscience is attainable by the autonomous *conscientia* (Pierce 1955:118; Eckstein 1983:88). In the NT, a good and pure conscience becomes the gift and the goal for the Christian (Acts 24:16; 1Tim 1:5). A good conscience becomes possible through the forgiving grace of Jesus Christ (Hebr 9:14; 10:22). This fact makes faith become a key term for understanding the conscience in the NT.⁴¹ Therefore, baptism can be a pledge to God for a good conscience (1Pet 3:21). This implies that during conversion conscience is changed: it becomes theonomous⁴² (2Tim 1:3; Kähler 1967:309; Hahn 1990:559). However, this does not exempt the believer from a long process of reorientation through Word and Spirit (Hebr 13:18).

The originality of the usage of *syneidēsis* in the NT does not consist in giving a new meaning to the term taken from the popular philosophical context nor in founding a consistent theory of conscience, but in taking the term in one of its current meanings and integrating it into NT anthropology and soteriology in continuity with the OT (Eckstein 1983:319). As we

⁴⁰ Interesting for our later discussion of shame and guilt-oriented conscience.

⁴¹ Note the replacement of conscience (1Cor 8:7) by faith (Rom 14:1) in the same context. See also the discussion of faith in Scripture in section 3.1.9. Faithfulness, Faith and Truth as Covenant Behaviour.

⁴² Theonomous means „directed toward God,“ lit. „directed by God's law.“

will see in section 2.3, and later in chapter 3, the phenomena of shame and guilt are expressions of the fallen state of man.

2.3 Theology and Philosophy

In this section, we will follow the historical development of the concept of conscience in theology and philosophy. From every major period, we will take one representative who influences the change of the concept significantly. We will start with Jerome who influences scholasticism by his translation and gloss. Even though Augustine deals much with conscience in his *Confessions* in a phenomenological way, he does not create a new theory of the conscience (Stelzenberger 1959:146f.; Oser 1973:69). Some centuries later, „the prince of scholasticism,“ Thomas Aquinas, systematizes the *synteresis* concept (Stelzenberger 1963:90). The reformer Martin Luther reacts to scholasticism and brings about a completely new understanding of conscience. For the Enlightenment secular theory, we will study Kant’s autonomous moral system. We will also discuss Nietzsche with his nihilism in order to observe the possible effects of „crisis“ of the conscience. Next, we will examine the writings of the Russian philosopher Solowjow who links shame to conscience. Finally, we will study two theologians of the 20th century: Emil Brunner who reacts to the Enlightenment paradigm, and Dietrich Bonhoeffer who relates conscience to the Fall. Generally speaking, the theologians start from a partly Hebrew and partly Greek worldview, the Enlightenment philosophers from a secular worldview.

Paul does not develop a systematic theory of the conscience. Nor do the Greek speaking Church Fathers. Rather, they narrow the meaning of *syneidēsis* to the moral sense. For the further development of the concept of the conscience, it is of great importance that Origen in his commentary to Romans identifies *syneidēsis* with the indwelling Holy Spirit (1Cor 2:11-12). Origen presents the Spirit (*syneidēsis*) as educator and leader of the *psychē*. Writing about the vision in Ezekiel 1, he interprets the eagle’s face as this leading force of the *psychē* (PG 13,681b; 14,893b quoted by Krüger 1984:219).

2.3.1 Jerome’s Translation and Gloss

When Jerome (c. 347-419) translates the NT into Latin, the term *conscientia* is used for *syneidēsis*. „With this translation he perhaps more than any other Latin patristic writer lays the foundation for the medieval idea of conscience“ (Baylor 1977:24). As mentioned earlier, the Latin concept of *conscientia* is much wider than the Greek concept of *syneidēsis*. The Latin

translation of the Bible, the *Vulgate*, becomes the standard Bible of the Roman Catholic Church for the next 1500 years. This widening and fuzzying of the concept of conscience exercises an enormous influence on Christian thought, fatally, as Pierce says (Pierce 1955:118). The Latin term *conscientia* in its double meaning of consciousness and conscience becomes thus the basis of the Romanic and English concepts. It is important to note that in the Germanic languages there is no term for conscience prior to the introduction of the derivatives of *conscientia*.⁴³ In modern English, conscience can mean „inward knowledge, consciousness, inmost thought, mind“ and „consciousness of right and wrong, moral sense.“⁴⁴

Jerome contributes in a second crucially important way to the idea of conscience in medieval theology through his commentary on the OT (Baylor 1977:25). Adopting the platonic, dichotomic view of man and following Origen in his commentary on the vision in Ezekiel 1, he interprets the first three elements of the vision in terms of Plato's threefold division of the human soul: the man represents the rational soul, the lion the irascible emotions, and the ox the concupiscent desires. With the eagle, Jerome identifies a fourth element in man: the *synteresis* (PL 25,22 cited in Baylor 1977:25f.; Stelzenberger 1933:189f.; 1963:83). In the gloss, Jerome describes *synteresis* as the spark of the conscience (*scintilla conscientiae*), which was not quenched even in the heart of Cain when he was driven from paradise (PL 25,22b). The *synteresis* is superior to the other three elements of the soul in the sense that it corrects the others. It makes us aware of our sinfulness (Baylor 1977:26). It can do this because it constitutes the rest of the *psychē*, which was not corrupted by the Fall (Krüger 1984:219). By his translation and his gloss, Jerome prepares the way for the scholastic theory of *synteresis* and *conscientia*.

2.3.2 Thomas Aquinas' Synteresis and Conscientia

Medieval theology follows Jerome and develops his thought through its speculation. NT influence decreases. The Bible is interpreted allegorically. A speculative, analytical school of thought develops influenced by Aristotle. Aristotle sees the individual human being in a dichotomistic, hylomorphic⁴⁵ framework as a single substance composed of body (the material

⁴³ Cp. the absence of a specific term for conscience in Hebrew. Hasenfratz 1986a:88-92 and 1986b:28-31 gives another example of how Germanic concepts of soul were transformed by Christianity.

⁴⁴ *The Oxford English Dictionary* 1989b:754f. Equally in French *la conscience* is used in the sense of *sentiment de soi-même* as well as of *jugement de l'âme, sentiment des fautes commises* (*Dictionnaire de la langue française* 1991:1111f.).

⁴⁵ Hylomorphism relates, according to Aristotle's theory, to the unity of matter and form. This theory is further developed by scholasticism.

element) and soul (the formal element). Aquinas himself follows this view (ST Ia,76,1 quoted by Baylor 1977:31). Aristotle's division of the soul in *potentia* „force,“ *actus* „act“ and *habitus* „disposition“ is integrated, and both *synteresis* and *conscientia* evaluated in relation to them.⁴⁶ Scholasticism asks whether the intellectual (*genus cognitionis*) or the emotional (*genus affectionis*), an innate (*innatus*) or an acquired (*acquisitus*) part of the soul is involved. Finally, the question of free choice is raised, whether the conscience is a matter of will or knowledge (Stelzenberger 1963:84f.; Krüger 1984:220).⁴⁷

Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) systematizes these thoughts in the first coherent theory of the conscience after Philo.⁴⁸ For him, *synteresis* is an innate disposition (*habitus*), not a force,⁴⁹ which is directed through the principles of natural law. The *synteresis* is the original consciousness and theoretical knowledge of the moral norms. According to Rom 2:15, it is the innate remains of the divine sense of moral values that has not been corrupted by the Fall. It is God-given and seeks the good (Aquinas ST Ia IIae 94,2; Baylor 1977:49). The *conscientia*,⁵⁰ on the other hand, is an act (*actus*) and not a force. It makes the practical application of the moral consciousness to the actual case. It is directed by reason.⁵¹ In the practical decision, *synteresis*, as an ontological disposition (*habitus*), is transformed into an act (*actus*) of the *conscientia*.⁵² The application is done in three forms: The *conscientia* witnesses or testifies whether something is done or not. Secondly, it decides whether something has to be done or not, and thirdly, whether something done is good or evil (Aquinas ST Ia,79,13 quoted by Baylor 1977:41). The judgement and the conclusions are taken on the basis of the principles of the natural law laid into the *synteresis* (Aquinas ST II,90,1f. quoted by Krüger 1984:220).⁵³ However, the *conscientia* as an act of practical reason can be in error.⁵⁴ If man cannot avoid

⁴⁶ For Thomas Aquinas, the 2x2 matrix structure of the human soul is in its horizontal division rational and non-rational, and in its vertical division theoretical (apprehension) and practical (desire) (ST I,79,6 quoted by Potts 1980:49).

⁴⁷ According to Thomas Aquinas, free choice (*arbitrium*) is a pure potentiality. Therefore, *synteresis* is also pure potentiality (Ver 17,5 quoted by Potts 1980:123).

⁴⁸ See the excellent exposition in Baylor 1977:29-70, the short synthesis in Stelzenberger 1963:90f. and its discussion from a logical, philosophical point of view in Weingartner 1987:201-216.

⁴⁹ *Synteresis non est potentia sed habitus* (Aquinas ST I,79,12c cited in Krüger 1984:220).

⁵⁰ Aquinas believes that the etymological origin of *conscientia* was *cum alio scientia* in the meaning of „knowledge applied to an individual case“ (ST Ia,79,13 cited by Baylor 1977:30).

⁵¹ Aquinas speaks of the direction by reason as a dictate (*dictamen rationis*) (Ver 16,2f.), as opposed to Bonaventure, who thinks *synteresis* as a force and disposition (*potentia habitualis*) directed by will (Krüger 1984:220; Baylor 1977:32).

⁵² It is therefore a matter of practical reason. Cp. Kant in section 2.3.4.

⁵³ Aquinas defines „natural law“ as „the sharing in eternal law by creatures of reason“ (ST Ia IIae,2.91,2). „The precepts of the natural law are for the practical reason, ... what the axioms of science are for the speculative reason.“ (ST Ia IIae14,3 quoted by Baylor 1977:45f.).

⁵⁴ As opposed to *synteresis* (Potts 1980:48,52). See the interesting deductions in Weingartner 1987:211f.

his ignorance by consulting his *synteresis*, which is theoretically infallible, he is bound to his *conscientia* and is excused.⁵⁵ This is not a cause for an autonomous conscience, because the *conscientia* is always bound to the God-given natural law, that is God's commands. In summary, for Thomas Aquinas „the conscience remained in the framework of practical reason: it is an act of judgement in which we apply our knowledge of moral principles to the specific situations in which we must act“ (Baylor 1977:69).

In spite of its dubious exegetical origins, the scholastic distinction between *synteresis* and *conscientia* leads to important results. The modern English term „conscience“ embraces of course both *synteresis* and *conscientia* (Potts 1980:51). Positively, *synteresis* could be called the „place“ of the image of God, its ontological presence in man. In scholasticism, it becomes the infallible voice of God inside man (*vox Dei*). Another exegetical exercise concerning the Mosaic Law in Rom 2:14f. leads to the theory of man's knowledge of natural law, the object of *synteresis*. Aquinas' relationship of *synteresis* to *conscientia* is similar to the Augustinian distinction between higher and lower reason (Potts 1980:64). *Conscientia* is a matter of practical reason, as discussed by Kant. Another weak point of Aquinas' system is the absence of emotions. Only Bonaventure integrates the aspect of emotions into his concept of conscience, a fact, which will later become very important for Puritanism and psychology (Potts 1980:66). The drifting away from Scripture induces the error to omit sin and guilt from the discussion of conscience. This omission leads Aquinas to speak of it as sadness (ST II-1,39,2 quoted by Potts 1980:66). As a reaction to that, the Reformers will speak of the total depravity of fallen human nature (Potts 1980:69). Aquinas also influences the Puritan theologian William Perkins (1558-1602) who formulates his theology of conscience in terms of the dichotomy of the voice of God and of practical reason, *synteresis* and *conscientia* (van Til 1992:18f.). Shame (*pudor*), for Aquinas who follows in the steps of Aristotle, is derived from bashfulness (*pudicitia*), which as a virtue tries to avoid shame. Bashfulness, and therefore shame, has its setting exclusively in the sexual field (ST I-II 41,2; 42,3; 76,4; 77,7; cp. Riksen 1999:78,80).

2.3.3 Martin Luther's Reform

Among the Reformers, Martin Luther (1483-1546) has treated the problem of conscience most extensively. Young catholic Luther's main question is: „How can God become gracious to

⁵⁵ „The erroning *conscientia* is invincible“ (*conscientia erronea invincibilis*) (Aquinas ST I,II 19,5f. quoted by Potts 1980:55-59; cp. Krüger 1984:221; Stelzenberger 1963:105).

me?“⁵⁶ (Thiele 1991:88). In his early lectures he still uses the scholastic schemes of thought, especially Ockham's (Baylor 1977:119-208, esp. 165). The more he engages in Bible studies, the more superfluous and suspect the whole apparatus of scholastic anthropology becomes for him. For him, the soul is no more a *forma corporis* and man a *compositum materiae et formae*, but man as totality comes under the claim of the law and the promise of the Gospel (Ebeling 1975:324f.). Man exists only in relationship to God. Man stands before God and his fellow men (*coram Deo et hominibus*) (Bornkamm 1932:88f.). Inside of this new anthropological context, the conscience becomes for Luther the fundamental concept of man and relates to all the central themes of his theology (Lohse 1981:5-7). As Holl puts it, Luther's religion becomes a „religion of conscience“⁵⁷ (Holl 1927:35).

For Luther, the conscience is not only an act of the *synteresis* as for Thomas Aquinas, but the centre of the person living before God.⁵⁸ Even the smallest remains of a natural disposition for the good situated in the conscience (*synteresis*) is extinguished. With the organ of the conscience man hears God in His word spoken as a totality in the judging law and the comforting Gospel. „The law presses the conscience by the sins, but the Gospel liberates it and gives it peace through faith in Christ“ (*Römerbrief-Vorlesung* 1515/16, WA 56,424,16f.). Thus, for Luther conscience and faith live in a close relationship: „Faith in conscience and conscience in faith“ (*1. Psalmenvorlesung* 1513-1515, WA 3,603,11). By joining together with faith, the conscience becomes a transmoral entity, an entity beyond the moral norms (Wolf 1958:1553).⁵⁹ The foundations for ethics and morals are the personal relationship with God.

Luther defines conscience as a judging authority. Its function is to accuse or to acquit before the court⁶⁰ of God. This conscience is not autonomous, but „the conscience belongs to a Lord who directs it“ (Hirsch 1954:161). For Luther, a bad conscience does not lead to God, as in tradition, but rather God manifests himself through it. A good conscience is neither caused by the congruence of man's will with God's, but by the experience of the saving act of God (Krüger 1984:223). Thus, the conscience has been freed through Christ: Christ is the

⁵⁶ Germ. *Wie bekomme ich einen gnädigen Gott?* Lit.: How do I get a gracious God?

⁵⁷ Germ. *Gewissensreligion*.

⁵⁸ Thus, Baylor can choose the title of his treatise on the comparison between Aquinas and Luther „action or person“ (1977).

⁵⁹ A term coined first 1945 by Paul Tillich (1945:289-300), which has however a different meaning for him in the sense of an ability to act, which transcends casuistic legalism, a liberation from the moral conscience through its transmoral foundation, so to say, a good conscience despite of a bad conscience (Freund 1994:66-73, def. 181). For us „transmoral“ means simply „beyond the moral norms,“ that is „conditions and foundations of ethics and morals“ (Blühdorn 1984:211), for Luther, on the basis of a personal relationship with God.

⁶⁰ Germ. *Forum*.

„Redeemer of the consciences“ (Luther *Kirchenpostille* 1522, WA 10 I/1,606,30-32). The freedom of the conscience is according to the Reformers' view nothing else than the description of the trusting relationship of faith to God (Krüger 1984:224). Therefore, the conscience of the Christian becomes the meeting place with God (Wolf 1958:1553; Stelzenberger 1963:94; Kittsteiner 1991:173).

As Luther, Calvin sees in the conscience a concept that describes the relationship of God and man (Inst IV,10,3). Man lives before God (*coram Deo*). Therefore the conscience can only refer to God (Inst IV,10,4). Freedom of conscience is only possible by faith in God's free grace (Inst III,13,5). For the other Reformers, the conscience does not take as central a place as for Luther. However, they agree with Luther to localize the justification event in the conscience and therefore to identify conscience and faith (Krüger 1984:224). By this, they take the conscience out of the purely ethical context of Aristotelian and scholasticism's practical reason and back into a Biblical anthropological and soteriological context (Baylor 1977:271). As a by-product of the Reform and in a similar way as the Latin translation of the Bible, the German translation of the Bible by Luther becomes a marking stone in the development of a German term and concept for conscience separated from the Romanic development.⁶¹

2.3.4 Immanuel Kant's Categorical Imperative

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) stands in the stream of the Enlightenment, particularly that of German idealism. The model of conscience, which he develops, can be considered as the climax in the history of philosophic conscience theory. Until today, this model is considered as the philosophical concept of the conscience par excellence (Hübsch 1995:92). Another aspect of Kant's importance lies in the fact that his model leads through its adaptation by Fichte and Schelling to the psychoanalytic theory of conscience (Hübsch 1995:94).

Kant is fully aware of the scholastic attribution of the *conscientia* to practical reason and of the point of view of the school around Wolff, which holds to the rational character of ethics

⁶¹ The etymological development starts from *ahd. gawizzani* to *mhd. gewizzen* (fem. and neutr.) as enforced form of a substantivized infinitive with the meaning of „knowing about something.“ The prefix *ga-* or *ge-* has probably a sociative meaning like *syn-* in Greek and *con-* in Latin. Luther takes the term from judicial language to give the neutral noun a religious meaning (Wolf 1958:1549f.; Blühdorn 1984:197). Luther renders with *nhd. Gewissen* not only Latin *conscientia*, but also terms like *cogitatio*, *iudicium*, *iudicare* (Frey 1977:5; Grimm/Grimm 1911:6219f.,6233-6237). The latter terms show again his guilt orientation. In contrast to the English and French term conscience, the German term *Gewissen* does not include the meaning of consciousness, which in German is rendered separately: *Bewusstsein* (Frey 1977:193 n.4). It becomes clear that conscience has always been conceived of as a conscious phenomenon. Freud will be the first to introduce the unconscious aspect. Cp. section 2.4.1. Sigmund Freud's Structural Model.

and morals, and therefore also of conscience. This view is based in turn on John Locke's empirical thesis that morals can be treated and proven just like mathematics (Locke 2000:91). One title of his books, where he treats conscience, reveals his programme: „Religion within the limits of pure reason“ (Kittsteiner 1991:267). In this work, we are confronted with a secular worldview. Kant combines it with a dualistic view of man as nature and spirit, as drive or emotion and reason. This dualism creates tension in man when the conscience becomes active (Riksen 1999:54f.). However, man is originally good, a fact which is drawn from creation and the scholastic view of the divine spark (*scintilla conscientiae*) and the divine voice (*vox Dei*) in man (Kant 1990:28; Riksen 1999:144).

Kant's original contribution is the discovery of a new moral principle, the categorical imperative. The moral practical law replaces the traditional understanding of conscience in traditional understanding by a law of reason governing the will. As in scholasticism, conscience is a matter of practical reason. It includes practical-legislative reason, which defines the rules and duties, and practical-judging reason, which determines condemnation or absolution. This process occurs before a court (*coram iudicio* or *foro*).⁶² Conscience is therefore a consciousness of an inner court in man, before which the thoughts accuse or excuse each other (Kant 1983:572f.). Conscience is not acquired. Every man, as a moral being, has it originally in himself as a relationship to himself. „Conscience is a consciousness, which is a duty for itself“ (Kant 1983:859). „Conscience is a duty of practical reason to acquit or condemn in every case of law“ (Kant 1983:531f.). The reason, not the conscience, has to decide, whether an act is right or wrong. But the conscience is asked to decide, whether an action, which I want to do, is right.⁶³ Therefore the conscience, and consequently reason, is „a moral, self-judging force“ (Kant 1983:860).

Conscience, as an application of the acts to the law, is complementary to the categorical imperative, which applies the law to the acts. The categorical imperative is immanent to the action of the conscience, when the categorical imperative demands that „the maxim of the will be valid at any time as a principle of a general law“ (Kant 1983:698-701; Hübsch 1995:105f.).⁶⁴ The categorical imperative becomes more than a hypothetical imperative, it

⁶² Germ. *Gerichtshof*.

⁶³ Kant's conscience is therefore not a conscience, which looks at past acts, but mainly a foreseeing conscience (*conscientia antecedens*) (Kittsteiner 1991:285).

⁶⁴ The Ten Commandments, the Rule of the Talion and the Golden Rule are such maxims. Hegel criticizes Kant's rigorous moralism as „Mosaism“ (Thiele 1991:117).

becomes an absolute (Oser 1976:77).⁶⁵ It determines the general compulsory nature of the action (Kittsteiner 1991:275f.).⁶⁶ Thus, we must speak of the autonomy of the will when we speak of Kant's autonomous conscience (Hübsch 1995:106). The true value of man lies in the domination of the spirit over his drives and affections, therefore also over shame (a term which does not appear in his writings). As Kant's categorical imperative includes a universal, rational system, man in his individuality and identity, which would have to include shame, does not appear in his philosophy (Riksen 1999:57-62,123,141f.).

Kant's new critical and autonomous foundation of ethics makes him also ask the question of the relationship between God and the human conscience. According to Kant, the conscience is thought of as a subjective principle of responsibility before God. God should be thought of as an ideal person,⁶⁷ which reason creates for itself: a preacher to the heart,⁶⁸ an all-binding and moral being, which has power over everything. This is an idea, to which conscience leads man inevitably, a subjective-practical principle given through reason, which sees it as a duty to act adequately (Kant 1983:574). Religion is only a principle used to consider duties as godly precepts (1983:575). All the operations of the conscience, which were traditionally oriented from man to God, are now reoriented in a reflexive manner back to man (Kittsteiner 1991:277).

According to Kant, the new dignity of man, and thus the end of his immaturity, is the autonomy of his conscience, whereas for Luther the dignity of man is the conscience liberated through Christ, which remains directed to God (Kittsteiner 1991:283f.; Thiele 1991:114). Hegel structures and systematizes Kant's concept of autonomous conscience in his concept of the universalist, absolute spirit (*Geist*), to which Nietzsche reacts (Hübsch 1995:113,215; Riksen 1999:153,161).

2.3.5 Friedrich Nietzsche's Nihilism

After German idealism, the decline of the theory of conscience takes place. An important impulse is given by Schelling's naturalistic interpretation of Fichte's approach, which opens the way for Nietzsche and Freud to reconstruct the conscience as a psychological phenomenon

⁶⁵ Cp. Kant's categorical imperative with the inner, moral imperative of the super-ego in section 2.4.2. Sigmund Freud's Structural Model, and Zulliger 1989:133.

⁶⁶ Schlatter mentions that a categorical imperative should not be surprising for Christians who know God's commandments and the character of „duty,“ which they produce for the believer (Schlatter 1981:143).

⁶⁷ Germ. *idealische Person*.

⁶⁸ Germ. *Herzenskündiger*.

based on genetics. Nietzsche sees the genesis of the soul as taking place through the „instinct of cruelty, which turns inward, after which it cannot discharge towards the outside anymore.“ This causes the internalisation of man (*Verinnerlichung des Menschen*) (Nietzsche 1967e:350). For him, conscience is the realisation that man is what he makes himself to be (Hübsch 1995:215). Nietzsche and Heidegger contribute largely to the destruction of the traditional concept of conscience (Hübsch 1995:195f.).

The position of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) is that of a general critic of the conscience from the point of view of „moral of insight, which has transcended all the illusionary motives of morals, and which has understood that humanity does not dare to have other permanent motives“ (Nietzsche 1967a:211).⁶⁹ The conscience is criticized as „faith in authorities“ (1967a:214). The conscience represents subjective feeling of values. It „repeats what others have said, it does not create new values“ (1967g:255). It is „a sort of formal conscience“ (1967d:121), a „holy lie“ (1967g:229). The conscience as feeling of duty belongs to the „masked manners of the will for power“ (1967f:283).

The causes of a bad conscience, that is a guilty conscience, are enmity, cruelty, and lust for persecution. Man, who persecutes and mistreats himself, „driven into a corner by the tightness of customs, ... this desperate prisoner discovers a bad conscience“ (1967d:339). The instinct of freedom is repressed, imprisoned in the inner man. This is the genesis of a bad conscience as self-violation (1967d:341). „The analysis of the bad conscience and its origin reveals the fact that man looks at his natural drives with an ,evil eye““ (1967d:351).

Salvation is possible through the Antichrist who can save man from the curse which the Christian ideals have put on humanity (1967d:352f.). This requires a „knowledge about conscience“ from the viewpoint „behind the conscience,“ from an „intellectual conscience“ (1967b:225,241). Most people however lack this „intellectual conscience“ (1967b:47). This viewpoint is negatively extramoral, beyond good and evil, and positively, according to Nietzsche, represents a free spirit (1967d:47).

Nietzsche draws the conclusion that a guilty conscience is inevitable and insupportable. In this conclusion, he agrees with Luther. However his solution is different. The utopian state of guiltlessness, which he proposes, is designed as a state beyond good and evil, that is, an empty conscience. Luther's state beyond good and evil is life in justification, life with a purified conscience. Nietzsche's life ends in resignation and suicide.

⁶⁹ This presentation of Nietzsche's thought follows largely the exposition in Blühdorn 1984:209f.

Despite his guilt-oriented language in relation to the conscience, Nietzsche knows shame as a central anthropological phenomenon (Riksen 1999:81,175f.). However, he does not associate shame with conscience. He is aware of the fact that shame makes man hide his personal centre. He says: „Everything which is deep likes the mask ... Every deep spirit needs a mask ... He hides his deepest thoughts and decisions“ (Nietzsche 1967d:57f.). However it is a bad phenomenon that the animal „man“ learns to feel shame about all his instincts (1967d:302). The goal is that he becomes a child without shame. Man should forget⁷⁰ shame (1967c:189). That is why the „ugliest man“ has to kill God. He says: „ ... he had to die; he saw with eyes, which saw everything - he saw the deepness of man, all his hidden shame and ugliness ... Man does not tolerate that such a witness exists“ (1967c:328). Erich Heller comments on Nietzsche's ugliest man: „He would have to kill not God, but shame, in order to forget what it is like to feel ashamed. Shame is ‚another;‘ he sees himself through the eyes of God and despises himself“ (Heller 1974:30; Riksen 1999:134). Nietzsche's utopia foresees a man without guilt and shame, a man without conscience. After him National Socialism achieves this state with all its cruelty and horror and draws further what philosopher Ernst Bloch terms the German line of disaster (*die deutsche Unheilslinie*) (Kettling 1985:33; Huntemann 1995:258).

2.3.6 Wladimir Solowjow: Conscience and Shame

In a completely other line of thought is Nietzsche's contemporary Wladimir Sergejewitsch Solowjow (1853-1900), a Russian moral philosopher and Dostojewsky's friend. He is the first thinker in history to establish a relationship between shame and the conscience.⁷¹ In his writings, he deals mainly with the unity of the universe, predetermined by Godly wisdom, through the unification of God and world. Man has the role of mediator in this process.

Solowjow begins his reflections with the human experience of the Fall when God asks Adam:

Where are you? Where is your moral value? Man, ruler of nature and image of God, do you still exist? And the answer comes quickly ... Discovering my low nature I have become afraid: I am ashamed, therefore I exist. I exist not only physically, but also morally - I am ashamed of my animal nature, therefore I exist as human being (Solowjow 1976:77).

⁷⁰ Germ. *verlernen*.

⁷¹ I have discovered Solowjow thanks to Riksen 1999.

drives Solowjow sees it as the basis of personal dignity (Riksen 1999:31). With the perception of his personal difference in relationship to God, Adam discovers a spiritual principle: „Who is ashamed separates himself in this psychical act of shame from what he is ashamed of“ (Solowjow 1976:76). Shame is therefore at the origin of a consciousness of distance and relationship. Leading over to the relationship with the conscience, Solowjow writes:

This knowledge of good and evil in man is given not only immediately in the feeling of shame, which is specific for him, but this knowledge of good and evil develops from its foundation, enlarges itself progressively, refines its concrete sensual character and extends finally in the form of the conscience to the whole field of ethics ... When the moral self-evaluation extends to another field of relationships ... towards the next and to God ... this moral self-evaluation cannot keep the simple form of a concrete sensation, but it passes inevitably through the medium of the abstract consciousness from where it emerges in the form of the conscience. But the inner essence of both manifestations is undoubtedly the same. Shame and conscience speak at different occasions and a different language, but the sense of what they say is one and the same: This is not good, this is not what should be, this is unworthy ... The conscience adds an analytical explanation: Because you have done the forbidden thing ... you have become guilty of something bad, a sin, a transgression. Only the voice of the conscience, which determines our relationships to our next and to God as good or evil, gives them a moral meaning, which they would not have without it. Because the conscience is a further development of shame, the whole moral life of man grows in this way in all its three spheres just as out of one root, out of a purely human root, which is foreign to the animal world in its essence (1976:88).

On the lower level of development, where the sensual sphere predominates, ... the feeling of shame is originally linked with just this side of life. But with the further development of moral feelings and relationships, man begins to become more diverse. He does not only feel ashamed of his concessions to the lower material nature, but also of all violations in relationship to men and to duty ... Here the unconscious instinct of shame gets transformed into the clear voice of conscience, which reproaches man not only fleshly sins, but also any unjust or merciless feelings or acts. At the same time, the special feeling of the awe of God develops that holds us away from any collision with the holiness of God. When the relationship from man to God rises up to an absolute consciousness, then also the feeling, which protects human wholeness, rises up to a new and final level. On this level the negative voice of shame, of conscience and of the awe of God in man becomes ... the consciousness that God is in him (1976:274).

Solowjow establishes the connection between conscience, shame and the relationship to fellow men and to God. Conscience analyses in more precise way what shame senses in its spontaneity. The shame-conscience-axis is extended to a shame-conscience-God-axis. Solowjow's concept of conscience is theonomous and heteronomous at the same time (Riksen 1999:122,234). Other thinkers who also wrote about shame beyond the mere sexual concept, but without a clear connection to conscience, are Kierkegaard, Sartre, and Dostojewsky (Riksen 1999:63ff.,211ff.,225ff.).

2.3.7 Emil Brunner's Man in Conflict

In the 20th century, the discussion becomes so diversified that a common language and denominator is absent (Blühndorn 1984:4f.). We have to mention the different re-interpreters of Luther (Holl, Gogarten, Hirsch, Jacob, Wolf), Pannenberg's approach to identity, Althaus' conscience as hearing,⁷² Bonhoeffer's self-justification, Ebeling's equation „man is conscience,“ Tillich's transmoral conscience, Barth's eschatological knowing with God, Bultmann's existential approach, Jasper's challenge, Hengstenberg's search for a sense in life, and many others (Freund 1994; Blühndorn 1984:210f.). We have chosen two theologians from „neo-orthodoxy,“ who think about fallen man and try to give an answer to the developments of theology and philosophy since the 18th century.

Emil Brunner (1889-1966) situates the locus of conscience only provisionally in the field of ethics (Brunner 1939:136 n.1). Actually, he sets it in the field of dogmatics, and there in the doctrine of the consequences of sin, which places his anthropology in soteriological perspective (Brunner 1972:137ff.). Brunner sees man essentially as God's creature made in God's image (*imago Dei*) (1972:67-69,86-92). Nevertheless, man as a sinner is in a never ending conflict and in contradiction with God (1972:102ff.). Brunner describes man's basic conflict especially in his book *Man in Conflict* (1941).⁷³ Conscience is for Brunner the indicator of man in conflict.

Ethics poses the problem of the conscience, when it asks: „Who acts?“ Conscience is the knowledge of man about himself that carries the conflict and induces the contradiction. In this knowledge, man experiences himself in his centre of existence as troubled, as concerned by the conflict. He senses here his „person-wound.“⁷⁴ Conscience is like the enflamed sword, which is between God and us, and which hides God from us (1939:140f.). Conscience relates to the core of the person (1939:57f.), it has a total knowledge⁷⁵ of the person (1939:142). This knowledge is above all knowledge of conflict (1941:201f.; 1972:140). Natural man has a „consciousness of guilt, sin and lostness“ (1932:517). Conscience is „experience of the wrath of God, life under the curse of the law as reality of the soul“ (1941:203). But in this conflict and contradiction, the knowledge of conscience is always also lack of knowledge, self-

⁷² Germ. *Ge-wissen als Ge-hör*.

⁷³ Esp. in the 7th chapter: The Conflict of Origin and Contradiction: The Real Man (Brunner 1941:201ff.).

⁷⁴ Germ. *Person-Wunde*.

⁷⁵ Germ. *Totalitätserkenntnis*.

understanding is always self-misunderstanding (1932:523; 1939:100). Only faith will be able to accept this lack of knowledge as God's work (Freund 1994:129).

Conscience is furthermore a „consciousness of responsibility,“⁷⁶ through which man responds to God's word (Brunner 1941:202). The law finds its confirmation in the despair of the bad conscience. It brings the negative self-experience to maturity. When God's word encounters the mature conscience, the bad conscience is silenced by forgiveness (1932:510f.). Through faith, the troubled conscience can be acknowledged as God's work. Conscience is not merely annihilated, but corrected through faith. It is newly equipped as an essential human function (1939:143). Therefore, preaching misses the heart, if it does not establish a link with conscience. And preaching is not the Gospel, if it does not relieve the conscience (1932:517). In this sense, Freund can speak of „Brunner's dialectics of the conscience“ (Freund 1994:129). One of Brunner's merits is that he rediscovered the perspective of soteriology in the discussion of the concept of conscience, whereas its traditional place was only in ethics and anthropology.

2.3.8 Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Analysis of the Fall

Through an analysis of the Fall and its consequences, Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906-1945) arrives at the same perspective of man in conflict. In his book *Ethics* (1949/88), he starts from the general statement that „the knowledge of good and evil seems to be the goal of every ethical reflection“ (1988:19). But the first task of Christian ethics is, on the contrary, to abolish this knowledge. Therefore, Christian ethics is a critique of any other ethics. Already in the possibility of the knowledge of good and evil, Christian ethics recognizes the separation from man's original state. Man at the origin knows only one thing: God. After the Fall, man knows about himself and fellow man outside of God. He does not really know God anymore, for he can only know God when he knows him alone. Knowledge of good and evil indicates the separation from the original state (Gen 3:22) and means the complete inversion of knowledge. Man as image of God lives out of God, his origin. Man, who has become „like God“ through sin, lives out of his own origin. The original life in the image of God has changed into a form of Godlikeness, because man has to choose himself between good and evil, outside of God, against God. Man destroys himself with this secret that he has stolen from God. His life becomes separation from God, from fellow men, from things, and from himself (1988:20f.).

⁷⁶ Germ. *Bewusstsein der Verantwortlichkeit*.

Instead of seeing God, man sees now himself (Gen 3:7). Man recognizes himself in separation from God and fellow men. He feels exposed (Gen 3:10). Consequently, shame originates (opposed to Gen 2:25). „[Shame] is man’s ineffaceable recollection of his estrangement from the origin; it is grief for this estrangement, and the powerless longing to return to unity with the origin. Man feels ashamed because he has lost something that belongs to his original being, to his totality; he feels ashamed of his exposure“ (1988:22). Shame is not the same as repentance. „Man repents because he has transgressed, he feels ashamed because he lacks something“ (ibid.).

As a consequence of shame, man hides (Gen 3:10) and God makes him garments of skin (Gen 3:21). „Shame seeks coverage as remedy to the separation“ (1988:23). Consequently, man puts on a mask. This mask is a necessary sign of the separation. But under the mask, the desire for the restoration of the lost unity continues to live. This desire manifests itself in sexuality (Gen 2:24) and in man’s relentless search for God. „Because shame contains the Yes and the No of the separation, man lives between coverage and exposure, between hiding and revealing himself, between loneliness and fellowship“ (1988:24). The dialectics of coverage and exposure are signs of shame. The only solution to shame is the restoration of the original unity. „There is only resolution of shame by shaming through forgiveness of sin, that is restoration of the fellowship with God, and before fellow men“ (1988:26).⁷⁷ This is shown in Ezekiel 16:63, where God says: „Then, when I make atonement for you ..., you will remember and be ashamed ...“ (cp. Ezek 36:62). About the relationship of shame and conscience, Bonhoeffer states:

While man is reminded through shame of his separation from God and fellow men, the conscience is the sign of man’s division within himself. The conscience is farther away from the origin than shame; it implies the separation between God and man and signals the division within man who is separated from the origin. It is the voice of the fallen life (1988:26).

For Bonhoeffer, the call of conscience has the exclusive character of interdiction: „You shall not ...“ Before the conscience the life is divided in allowed and forbidden things. Therefore „the conscience does not include the whole life like shame, but reacts only to certain acts“ (1988:27).⁷⁸

Thus, the conscience is not concerned with man’s relationship with God and fellow men, but with man’s relationship with himself. A relationship of man with himself,

⁷⁷ Germ. „Überwindung der Scham gibt es nur in der Beschämung durch die Vergebung der Sünde, d.h. durch die Wiederherstellung der Gemeinschaft mit Gott und vor den anderen Menschen“ (1988:26).

⁷⁸ Cp. Lewis’ view of shame as global and of guilt as specific attribution in section 2.4.8.

which is independent from man's relationship with God and fellow men, is only possible through man's Godlikeness in the separation. The conscience inverts this relationship. It makes the relationship with God and fellow men come out of man's relationship with himself. The conscience appears as God's voice⁷⁹ and as the norm for the relationship with fellow men (1988:27).

Through conscience man has become the origin of good and evil. Thus he has also become judge over God and fellow men, and judge over himself. „His life is now his understanding of himself as it was in the origin knowing God“ (1988:28). Now to know means to relate to himself. The point of decision of the specific ethical event is always conflict.

Thus, for man separated from God everything is dialectical: to be and to ought, life and law, knowing and doing, idea and reality, reason and drive, duty and compulsion, morals and utility, the necessary and the voluntary, the general and the concrete, the individual and the collective, but also truth, justice, beauty, love go against each other (1988:28).

In the NT, this world of separation, of conflict and of ethical problems becomes resolved. „Only the man who is accepted by Jesus Christ is a real man, only the man touched by the cross is a judged man, and only the man participating in resurrection is a renewed man“ (1988:117). The opposite to man in the image of Jesus Christ is man as his own creator, his own judge and his own restorer. Guilt comes not from transgression of an abstract law, but the separation from Christ, from the person who wants to become man in us and wants to lead us back to our original image.

Through the analysis of the Fall, Bonhoeffer arrives at a very fundamental understanding of man in conflict and of shame. However, he limits conscience to the *conscientia consequens* and sees it in his guilt-oriented, narrowed concept as judge. Thus, he fails to make the link between shame and conscience despite a deep understanding of the Biblical view on shame.

2.3.9 Conclusion

In this highly selective overview of the history of the concept of conscience in theology and philosophy, we can note some significant marks. The Hebrew language renders the concept of conscience with a rich vocabulary, but has no specific term for it. The NT concept of conscience, which is largely influenced by Hebrew anthropology, also has many terms describing it, one among them *syneidēsis*. *syneidēsis* stands for an anthropological instance of authority that is liable to and controlled by God (Rom 13:5; 1Jn 3:20). Through the integration into the Greek and Latin Hellenistic world in the primitive church, and especially through Jerome's

⁷⁹ Lat. *vox Dei*.

translation, the concept is adapted to a Greek dualistic worldview. *syneidēsis* becomes synonymous to the Holy Spirit (*pneuma*). By this it becomes a theological entity. Through Jerome's gloss, scholasticism's term *synteresis* is coined for this spark of God in man (*scintilla*), this inclination to virtue and the good (see the synoptic table in appendix 1). It is God's voice (*vox Dei*), with essentially a moral character, as opposed to the original NT concept of *syneidēsis* (Krüger 1984:221). The practical, everyday part of conscience is ascribed to the *conscientia*, which is an act, an application of the godly knowledge of *synteresis* to practical problems (Baylor 1977:37). This dual system of conscience is placed within the context of a classical Greek view of the soul. *Conscientia* is part of practical reason. However, the problem of conscience has not found as much interest in scholasticism as other theological problems. Apparently, too many questions remained unsolved (Krüger 1984:221). Until today, a certain unease about this problem remains. We find it again in the theology of the 20th century and in the philosophical orientations of psychology. Its source lies in the fact that the conscience is on the cutting edge between man and God, between man's „soul/spirit“ and the Holy Spirit. Conscience is the „organ“ or the „place“ of the relationship between man and God.

As opposed to the dual system of conscience influenced by Greek philosophy, Luther returns to the OT view of man as sinner in opposition to God. Man is before God (*coram Deo*) as a whole man. „Man is conscience“ (Ebeling 1967:348). Whereas scholasticism stresses the partial godlikeness of man through the *synteresis* concept, Luther insists on man as a sinner who has to be justified by God's grace. Only through Christ's work at the cross, can man regain his existence in God's image: he is at the same time Godlike and a sinner (*simul justus et peccator*). The conscience induced by the law leads man back to God (*usus elenchticus legis*). It is God's forgiveness, which renews and liberates the conscience.

The coming centuries build on this foundation of Lutheran orthodoxy, or react to it, as during the Enlightenment. German idealism, with its outstanding representative Kant, tries to construct an autonomous conscience without needing the imperative of God's moral presence. It needs a categorical imperative of the will compelled by the duty to do the good. This represents the *synteresis* function of the conscience (Kittsteiner 1991:271). „We have to become better men, therefore we must be able to do it“ (Kant 1990:55).

In his analysis of humankind, Nietzsche, as a critic of idealism, comes to the same conclusion as Luther: Mankind is lost through its cruelty, which, turned inward, creates a bad conscience, a guilty conscience. But Nietzsche's proposed solution is different. He foresees a utopia beyond good and evil, without conscience or with an empty conscience. The redemp-

tion of conscience happens through its abolition (see Kettling's synoptic table in appendix 2, and Rüdiger's synopsis in appendix 3).

In the 20th century, theologians take up the insights and misunderstandings of the past two thousand years. The discussion of conscience diversifies. We have studied Brunner who revives Luther's concept of conscience in conflict, while balancing better the aspect of man as sinner and man as the image of God. Through an analysis of the Fall, Bonhoeffer comes to a fundamental understanding of shame related to fallen man. From this event on, man hides behind a mask, because he is ashamed before God, his fellow men and himself. Shame can only be abolished through the reversal of the Fall by Christ's grace. However, Bonhoeffer fails to connect shame to the conscience, which he considers guilt-oriented. Conscience as self-consciousness becomes a judge of good and evil outside of God.

Other theologians try to integrate insights from the social sciences and refine or reinterpret Lutheran concepts. To summarize them, we can use three terms introduced by Joest in order to describe the categories of being a person in Lutheran thought: excentricity, responsibility, and eschatology (Joest 1967:232-353; Freund 1994:88). Excentricity means man in his hamartiological-soteriological position outside of God, but in search of God and his identity. Conscience is part of this self-consciousness (Pannenberg 1983:292). It means that man has an ontological openness to God, which Althaus names „hearing“⁸⁰ (Althaus 1949:326; 1953:34). This openness is not only to God, but also to oneself, to the you, and to all creatures (1953:27f.). This „knowing with“ defines identity and non-identity, which is fixed in the conscience and in the community, and which is necessarily broken through sin (Pannenberg 1983:287-295). It transcends heteronomy and autonomy in theonomy (Althaus 1953:20).

Man's excentricity implies his responsibility. This responsibility includes the fact that he must respond to God's initiatives and that he is responsible for his answers, acts and omissions (Freund 1994:109). Conscience before God is finally an eschatological quality. Its decisions have eternal consequences (Joest 1967:335f.).

As categories of the person, excentricity, responsibility and eschatology also describe the conscience. Speaking with Ebeling (we could say in OT terms), „man is conscience“ in that he is in his totality before God (1967:348). Conscience is „the place of man.“ It describes fundamentally the relationship of man to God (Ebeling 1967:404; Freund 1994:176f.).

⁸⁰ Germ. *Gewissen als Gehör*.

The 20th century situation in the field of philosophy is no less chaotic than in the field of theology. Hübsch speaks of controversies of a non-conciliatory nature (1995:220). Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) draws from both German idealism and its critique, when he speaks of a conscience that is given to man as such, but is also formed by man. He also takes up scholasticism's differentiation of ideal and empiric conscience, which has a notion of God, but can also err. With his „philosophy of compromise“ of the autonomous conscience, he introduces the philosophical view of modernity (Hübsch 1995:176-202,219f.). We will mention three newer philosophical theories of the conscience that represent all the others. Firstly, Luhmann's functionalistic theory is based on systems theory. It speaks of conscience in its social setting (Hübsch 1995:47ff.).⁸¹ Lenk's constructivistic theory asks for a construct beyond conscience for the complex technical problems of the 20th century. It assumes that conscience is no longer able to cope with the complexity of these problems (Hübsch 1995:54ff.). Thirdly, Kittsteiner's cultural-historical theory states that every cultural and historical period has to work out its own concept of conscience (Kittsteiner 1991:289; Hübsch 1995:60ff.).

In the field of philosophy, Catholic moral philosophy has worked on conscience more than anyone else, especially on the question of the place of conscience. With his structural model, Vetter presents a large consensus of Catholic moral philosophy (see appendix 4). Stating that conscience remains a mystery and an „incognito,“ he places it at the core of personality in relationship to the transcendent. The conscience is the cognitive and volitional counterpart to, and in „dual unity“ with the *Gemüt*, the „affective centre“ of man. Based partly on the Biblical concept and partly on Greek dualism, he names this centre „emotional, cardiac middle“ (*emotional-kardiale Mitte*) (Vetter 1966:159; S. Müller 1984:58; cp. Auer 1976; Rüdiger 1976:468). While the Biblical concept of the heart as the centre of personality includes cognitive, affective and volitional elements, the Greek dualistic concept opposes the heart as the affective centre to the head being the cognitive and volitional centre of man. With regard to this structural model of Catholic moral philosophy, we agree that conscience is situated at the junction of the transcendent with the human. However, for us the conscience comprises not only cognitive and volitional, but also affective elements without differentiation from an emotional counterpart.

⁸¹ Luhmann's systems theory of meaning will be discussed in section 2.4.10.

According to Hübsch, despite its crisis of identity in modernity, since antiquity philosophy has always been the place to investigate the conscience (1995:4,233f.).⁸² Possibly for that reason, philosophy may have coined the term initially. For us however, conscience remains an interdisciplinary topic. Even though theology and philosophy have made fundamental contributions to the discussion of conscience, they have not been able to overcome the limitations inherent in the speculative methodology of their discipline.

In the interest of this thesis, we mention that the theological language of conscience from late scholasticism on, and especially since Luther, is predominantly guilt-oriented. A bad conscience is a guilty conscience. This fact is also true for most of the philosophers of the Enlightenment down to theologians and philosophers of the 20th century. For most modern theologians and philosophers, guilt becomes a mere guilt feeling, „the subjective moment in fault as sin is its ontological moment“ (Ricoeur 1967:101). Guilt is not any more the ontological state of sinfulness. In the same line, shame is a feeling almost exclusively related to the sexual sphere. There are few theologians, philosophers and writers, as Kierkegaard, Dostojewsky, Bonhoeffer and Sartre, who treat shame as a basic anthropological phenomenon. Only the Russian moral philosopher Solowjow and theologians Delitzsch and Bonhoeffer see shame primarily as the expression of an ontological state after the Fall. However, only Solowjow integrates shame and conscience and relates the topic to the questions of identity, distance, and relationship to fellow man and to God.⁸³ For him, conscience is both an autonomous, heteronomous and theonomous entity.

2.4 Psychology

Psychology, as its name indicates, is the discipline *par excellence* which wrestles with the phenomenon of the inner life, and consequently with that of the conscience. Its anthropology, however, is generally based on a secular and deterministic worldview. Psychology can be divided into two main strands: the hermeneutic or speculative approach of psychodynamic theories and the empirical approach of behaviouristic, cognitive and systems theories. Psycho-

⁸² Hübsch is right in the sense that philosophy as „love of wisdom“ always implies conscience in the ethical and soteriological questions of life. However, philosophy as a speculative science, how it presents itself today, can only illuminate one aspect of the interdisciplinary anthropological phenomenon that conscience is.

⁸³ According to anthropologist Käser, the Russians are a predominantly shame-oriented people (personal communication Jan. 4, 2001). Interestingly, Greek and Russian Orthodox Churches have a shame-oriented theology until today as opposed to Catholic and Protestant theology (Galitis et al. 1994; Clendenin 1994; 1995).

analysis has developed a host of speculative conscience theories, some of which will be presented in this section. Empirical psychology sees the phenomenon of soul and conscience as a blackbox of unknown nature with inputs (stimuli of the social context) and outputs (behaviour) (Watzlawick 1969:45; Glanville 1988:100f.). Hypotheses about the blackbox are to be evaluated in experimental situations. Consequently, conscience is not a topic for behaviouristic theory. Cognitive theorists see conscience as an acquired, hypothetical construct controlling moral development. The development of a theory of conscience in psychology goes from the more speculative approach of psychoanalysis to the rather sober cognitive and systems approach of empirical psychology.

We will start our discussion with some psychodynamic theories. Freud is the first to think about the unconscious side of conscience. He comes up with a „structural model“ of personality. His colleague Adler formulates an alternative theory named „individual psychology.“ Erikson refines Freud’s developmental theory and introduces shame and guilt systematically. Piers and Potter-Efron further develop the differentiation of shame and guilt. Due to space limitations, the contributions of psychoanalysts Helen B. Lewis (1971), Wurmser (1981b; 1987), Broucek (1982; 1991), Nathanson (1987), and Morrison (1989) cannot be studied. However, Kaufman (1989), Lewis (1992), and Hilgers (1996) integrate a large amount of their contributions into their work.

The discussion of empirical psychology starts with Kaufman who develops a „psychology of shame“ based on affect theory. Then, we give a short overview of Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s contributions to cognitive theory. Lewis’ concept of self-conscious emotions is a combination of cognitive theory and affect theory. Hilgers formulates a theory of shame that combines psychoanalysis, affect and cognitive theory. We will take then a brief look at systems theory. In conclusion, we will study some attempts at integration: first some philosophical orientations of psychology, then some attempts of a synthesis of psychology and theology, and finally, conclusions for Christian education.

2.4.1 Sigmund Freud’s Structural Model

Through the history of the term and concept of conscience it becomes clear that conscience has always been conceived of as a conscious phenomenon. Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) is the first thinker and also the first psychologist to direct his research on the unconscious by analysing dreams and misbehaviours (*Fehlleistungen*). He is originally a physiologist and derives his structural model largely from biology, physiology and physics (Hoffmann 1988:579). He takes

a deterministic approach to the psychical phenomena on the grounds of Darwin's genetic model and Nietzsche's nihilism (Nowak 1978:26). For him, man is *homo natura* (Krische 1984:62; Binswanger 1947:164).

In 1900, Freud creates the „rainbow model,“ a topographical model including the „unconscious,“ the „pre-conscious“ and the „consciousness.“ This model includes a „censure“ by repression through „motivated forgetting“ of contents of the psyche which are not acceptable to the „consciousness“ (Freud GW II/III:543; Hoffmann 1988:581).

Later on, he differentiates the „structural model“⁸⁴ in hypothesizing an „id,“ a „super-ego“ and an „ego.“ The id contains everything that is inherited and constitutional, and before all the drives. A drive is the psychic representative of a continuously flowing intrasomatic source of stimuli (GW V:67). The two basic drives are *eros* „love-drive“ and *thanatos* „death-drive.“ The love-drive is constructive, whereas the death-drive is destructive (GW XIII:268-270).⁸⁵ The love-drive is also called „libido,“ can however also represent „psychic energy“ in general (GW II/III:337; V:118; XI:323; XIII:99).⁸⁶ The id is unconscious and functions according to the principle of desire and satisfaction (*Lustprinzip*) (GW XV:99).

The ego is originally a part of the id. It is the structure that entertains the contact with the outside world. Therefore, it has to function according to the principle of reality (*Realitätsprinzip*) and is thus in opposition to the id (GW XV:88). It has also a mediating position between the lustful tendencies of the id and the moral inhibition of the super-ego. The ego is partly conscious and partly unconscious (GW X:300; XIII:251).

The third structure of personality, the super-ego, is a differentiation of the ego and comes out of the oedipal development (GW XIII:256). It has the three functions of self-observation, of the judicial activities of conscience and of the ideal-functions, which develop out of the ideals and models of parental and other authorities. A substructure of the super-ego is the „ego-ideal“ (GW XV:71). Even if the super-ego is largely unconscious, the value and ideal representations as well as the guilt feelings are partly conscious (GW XIII:264).⁸⁷

In the development of the child, Freud distinguishes the oral stage (1st year), the anal stage (2nd and 3rd year), and the phallic stage (4th year), which all together can be named

⁸⁴ Term coined in 1969 by Nagera (1987:357).

⁸⁵ In relation to this dualism of drives, Frey speaks of the speculative level of Freud's theory (Frey 1977:130). Even Freud himself speaks of speculation (GW XIII:64f., 66 n.1).

⁸⁶ On this ground, Freud's opponents have accused him to reduce love and the general energy of man to the sexual aspect only (Bally 1961:7).

⁸⁷ In relation to the super-ego, Frey speaks of the metapsychological level of Freud's theory touching the discipline of philosophy (Frey 1977:119).

„pre-oedipal stages.“ During this time, the child is completely dependent on the authority of the parents. They determine what is good and evil. According to Freud, the child's relationship with the parent of the other sex is positive and ambivalent, rivalizing or even aggressive with the parent of the same sex. In allusion to Greek mythology, he calls this situation the „oedipal complex.“⁸⁸ During the next stage (5th to 6th year), which is called „oedipal stage,“ the oedipal complex is overcome by the „introjection“ of the parents' norms and values. Through this process the super-ego is created (GW XIII:260-262). The oedipal complex is therefore a transitory stage in child development. If this development is normal, the oedipal complex disappears. This means that the child has to relinquish its claim on the parents. As a result the super-ego appears (GW XV:62). According to Freud, anxiety of punishment, ambivalent parent relationships and repression play an important role in the development of the super-ego (Krische 1984:65).⁸⁹ In the normal further development, the child starts to compare the parent „imago“ of the super-ego with the actual parents and starts to criticize them, a development that finds its culmination during puberty (Zulliger 1989:54).

The discussion above has demonstrated that Freud has a predominantly guilt-oriented view: The super-ego is a judicial authority and feels guilt in its conscious part (GW XIII:256,264).⁹⁰ For Freud, shame is related to the sexual domain and has a negative, inhibitory function (Piers 1971:18). According to Freud, small children are essentially „shameless“ and have great pleasure to show the genitals to others and play with them. He speaks of an „exhibiting-drive“ (*Schautrieb*) (GW V:92f. quoted by Köhler 1995:75). Later in the „latent stage“ (6th to 12th year), the sexual energies („libido“) are diverted upon non-sexual goals („sublimation“). It is during this time that „the psychic powers are constructed, which later inhibit the sexual drive and narrow its direction like dams (disgust, shame, the esthetic and moral, ideal demands)“ (GW V:78 quoted by Köhler 1995:90). Freud and psychoanalysis speak rarely about shame (Lewis 1992:86). According to Kaufman, „Freud's blindness to shame is partially the result of his drive theory, and partially the result of the general failure of

⁸⁸ Zulliger holds that the relationship to both parents is ambivalent (1989:54). He mentions that Oedip's myth moved many poets to write about it: in the Greek period it was Aischylos, Sophocles, and Euripides. During medieval times it was connected to Judas' motive. De Voragine introduced it into his Golden Legend. Corneille, Voltaire, André Gide and Hofmannsthal worked it into dramas; Strawinskij into an oratorium. Schiller used the motive in his Tell, and Shakespeare in his Hamlet. „Scientists say that sagas are collective literature,“ which means that their content may describe fundamental anthropological phenomena (Zulliger 1989:53). In relation to the oedipal complex, Frey speaks of the onto- and phylogenetical level of Freud's theory (Frey 1977:106).

⁸⁹ Ricoeur speaks of the super-ego as „return of the repressed“ (Ricoeur 1969:449; Frey 1977:140).

⁹⁰ Cp. Luther's and Kant's judicial forum.

language to partition affect“ (Kaufman 1989:8). Helen B. Lewis concludes that Freud’s male bias and his lack of understanding of female psychology hinders him in the examination of shame: „Freud describes men’s super-ego in terms of Kant’s categorical imperative of guilt ... while women’s super-ego took the lower form of shame“ (H.B. Lewis 1987:31).

Freud’s structural model may seem quite speculative (Frey 1977:141). But until today, it is widely used by the different psychoanalytical schools.⁹¹ Freud has had a lasting effect on the psychology of the 20th century. Its brilliant character is undeniable, even if Freud’s presuppositions are not ours and not those of many later psychoanalysts. However, his deterministic concept of the super-ego excludes an appeal of conscience to the innermost part of man as well as the possibility of a good conscience, but leaves man at the mercy of a cruel super-ego (Frey 1977:141). According to Nowak, the conscience has become the greatest problem for Freud (1978:29).

2.4.2 Alfred Adler’s Search for Harmony, Honour and Power

Since 1902, Alfred Adler (1870-1937) is a participant in Freud’s psychoanalytic study group in Vienna, but leaves him 1911 because of dissent over Freud’s sexual theory. In 1912, he founds the school of „individual psychology“ as a basis for a new form of psychotherapy. In antithesis to Freud’s sexual theory, Alfred Adler sees man as an indivisible, free and goal-centred individual, who is responsible for his acts. The common characteristic of neurotic man, as a common denominator of all social mis-adaptations, is „self-centredness“ (*Ichhaftigkeit*). Normal man is however group and perfection centred (*Wirhaftigkeit und Vollkommenheitsstreben*) (Metzger 1991:21f.). In opposition to the associations that the term „individual psychology“ awakens, Adler’s theory pays special attention to the social context in which man develops. In this sense, „individual psychology“ would have to be rendered rather by „holistic psychology“ (Antoch 1988:310).

⁹¹ Schematically, the development of psychoanalytical schools is the following (Wyss 1972; Nowak 1978:12 n.5):

a) S. Freud’s school: K. Abraham, S. Freneczi, O. Fenichel; the british group: E. Glover, E. Jones, A. Freud, M. Klein; the USA group: H. Hartmann, E. Kris, R. Loewenstein, R. Spitz, Ph. Greenacre, E.H. Erikson, Th. Reich, W. Reik, P. Federn, F. Alexander.

b) A. Adler’s school of individual psychology: K. Horney, E. Fromm, H.St. Sullivan, H. Schultz-Hencke, T. French, S. Rado, A. Kardiner, J. Pearce, S. Newton, E.G. Schachtel.

c) Philosophically orientated, psychoanalytic theories: C.G. Jung, O. Rank; Personal analysis: K. Jaspers, K. Schneider; the new Vienna school: V.E. Frankl, W. Daim; Personalistic analysis: I.A. Caruso; *Dasein* analysis: V. Gebattel, E. Straus; partnership and transference: M. Buber, M. Scheler, K. Löwith, E. Michel, P. Christian, V. von Weizsäcker, H. Ey.

Adler's main concern is not the unconscious, but the confrontation of the individual with his social context. In opposition to Freud, Adler knows only of one drive, the „drive“ for honour and power (*Geltungs- und Machtstreben*). For Freud the id is the problem, for Adler it is more a question of the ego. Freud wants to make man more rational. His formula is: „Where id was, ego has to come“ (GW XVI:24). „The core of Adler's personality theory is a unified, creative individual who lives in a positive, constructive, ethical relationship with his fellow men“ (Nowak 1978:29f.). Adler says: „When I know the goal of a person, I know what will come ... We are incapable of thinking, feeling, willing, acting without having a goal“ (Adler 1974:20f.).⁹² Whereas Freud's theory is well structured, Adler leaves no systematic theory. He dislikes rules and systems, but stresses „artistic nuances“ and „artistic empathy“ (Nowak 1978:28f.; Krips 1976:211). „It is Adler's great merit that he has replaced the causal thinking in psychoanalysis with a goal-oriented concept ... and therefore has given a greater importance, homogeneity and responsibility to the ego“ (Nowak 1978:34). According to Adler, it is the task of psychotherapy „to direct a person towards the real sense of life“ (Rattner 1963:36). This statement shows the extent of Adler's completely different anthropology.⁹³

After having contrasted Adler with Freud, we will discuss some of Adler's core concepts with their semantic domains. The term that describes best the wholeness of personality is *Lebensstil* „style of life“ (Antoch 1988:311). It can mean „goal of life“ in the sense of the movement of a person towards an unconscious goal, „tasks of life“, „creativity“ or else „I“, „individuality“ or „character“ (Krips 1976:189). The tasks of life are essentially partnership, profession and participation in the communal life. They require communication and cooperation with the social context (Antoch 1988:312).

The individual lives in a fundamental tension between *Gemeinschaftsgefühl* „sense of community“ and *Minderwertigkeitsgefühl* „feeling of inferiority“ (Antoch 1988:31; Handlbauer 1984:241-247). Besides being a simple feeling of togetherness and of belonging, *Gemeinschaftsgefühl* can mean „empathy“ and „identification.“ It can also stand for the connection between man and his context, fellow men and the tasks of life. It describes an evolutionary force, capacity and goal. In this latter sense it is an ideal. It is the fundamental „logic of human cohabitation“ as coercion to fellowship, to cooperation and to love and marriage.⁹⁴ Basically, it is a worldview, the worldview of „common sense“ (Krips 1976:97-102; Jacoby

⁹² Cp. the similar ideas in *Gestalt* psychology.

⁹³ For a larger discussion of the differences between Freud and Adler see Köppe (1977).

⁹⁴ Cp. the semantic domains of the Hebrew term *šalom* in section 3.1.2. The Sin - Salvation Axis.

1983:48f.). It is the fundamental and central concept of Adler's theory for whom the community is the source of the creative personality (Rattner 1963:15,28).

Being confronted with the tasks in life, the demands of nature, and the goal of perfection, man can be subject to a *Minderwertigkeitsgefühl* „feeling of inferiority.“ This means a lack of confidence in oneself in the sense of a negative self-evaluation, a feeling of being less valuable than others, or a feeling of incapability, smallness, insecurity or imperfection (Krips 1976:174-176).⁹⁵ The result of continuous discouragement due to others' insensitivity or to a defective constitution is a complex of inferiority. It is in this situation that the search for honour and power becomes predominant.⁹⁶ The task of psychotherapy is encouragement and the development of life goals (Antoch 1988:312f.).

Even though the term conscience rarely appears in the vocabulary of individual psychology, the concept exists (Nowak 1978:29,33). A bad conscience is for Adler a symptom among others, which indicates that a person has failed to become a „being in community“ (*Gemeinschaftswesen*) (Adler 1929:134f.). The conscience builds up under the pressure of the need for protection and becomes an authority (1929:159,162). It is the feeling that confirms the person in the pursuit of his life plan (*Lebensstil*) (1929:163). In addition, it is a means of orientation in the insecurity of life and a capacity to doubt (Nowak 1978:34). The oedipal complex, which plays a very important role in Freud's theory of the super-ego, is for Adler the consequence of a spoiling attitude of the parents towards the children, and not an event that comes generally and automatically out of the development of the libido (Krips 1976:203; Nowak 1978:33).

Shame does not appear in the indexes of Adler's works. Guilt does not play a big role either. Prestige is seen in connection with the feeling or complex of inferiority, especially when neurosis makes a person self-centred and eager for honour and power (Adler 1974:28,48f.,196,329). Adler's concept of *Gemeinschaftsgefühl* („common sense“) fits well with the Hebrew concept of *šalom* with the meaning of wholeness and harmony.⁹⁷ The failure

⁹⁵ Cp. the description of feelings of inferiority in the Chinese shame-oriented society by Sun 1990:244f.

⁹⁶ On superficial grounds, Adler's theory has been called a „psychology of the drive for power.“ Search for honour and power are not drives, but secondary phenomena in the context of a complex of inferiority. They are in tension with the *Gemeinschaftsgefühl* „sense of community,“ which is the central concept in Adler's theory. In his later writings, the will for power is seen as a mislead search for perfection (Rattner 1963:25,28). Sperber speaks of this search of prestige as „psychology of appearance“ (Germ. *Psychologie des „als ob“*) (1970:73).

⁹⁷ Interestingly, Adler, of Jewish origin, declares before his death: „The priests of all religions will be the first to diffuse my teachings in the whole world as soon as they will discover the inherent values“ (Novak 1978:29 n.37). In fact his theory has many similarities with the Hebrew concept of harmony and restoring harmony. Nevertheless, it is a secular, evolutionist view with a more positive and holistic anthropology.

of harmony leads to a *Minderwertigkeitsgefühl*, a feeling of shame, with a resulting search for honour and prestige. Adler's individual analysis makes it clear for us that the opposite polar values to shame are multiple: harmony, honour and power. Adler's theory is basically a shame-oriented concept. His contrasting theory to Freud, who is predominantly guilt-oriented, is therefore highly interesting for the field of education and for our thesis.⁹⁸ Kaufman concludes: „His concept of inferiority represents one of the first attempts to accord shame a central role in the development of personality“ (Kaufman 1989:6).

2.4.3 Erik Erikson's Developmental Stages

In his book *Childhood and Society* (1950), Erik H. Erikson (1902-1994) combines the insights of clinical psychoanalysis and cultural anthropology based on findings with North American Indians. Being a disciple of Freud, he develops a theory of child development beyond Freud's. In the chapter „The Growth of the Ego,“ he comes up with eight stages of personality development. Two of the stages deal with shame and guilt, which gives Erikson's book a particular interest for this thesis. Erikson is the first psychologist to think systematically about shame and guilt.

The first or „oral-sensory stage“ is the one of „basic trust versus basic mistrust.“ The child's trust originates from the oneness with its mother and manifests itself in the depth of its sleep, the relaxation of the bowels and its general ease. It relies on the continuity of familiar providers and on the capacity of one's organs to cope with urges. The testing of this trust is linked to inside and outside pains, for example that of teething. Through introjection and projection, pleasure and pain are internalized and externalized and cause trust or mistrust to prevail. Parental religious faith can support the trust emerging in the newborn (1950:247-250,272f.).

Erikson sees in the second „muscular-anal stage“ the problem of „autonomy versus shame and doubt.“ In this stage, muscular maturation permits holding on and letting go, both possible in a positive or negative mood. Outer control at this stage must be firmly reassuring. Shame, Erikson says, „is an emotion insufficiently studied, because in our civilization it is so early and easily absorbed by guilt. Shame supposes that one is completely exposed and conscious of being looked at: in one word, self-conscious. One is visible and not ready to be visible“ (1950:252). Shame is expressed by burying one's face or to sink to the ground, which „is essentially rage turned against the self ... Visual shame precedes auditory guilt, which is a

⁹⁸ For Adler's influence on education see Rüedi (1988:264-314).

sense of badness ... when nobody watches and when everything is quiet - except the voice of the super-ego“ (1950:253). „Doubt is the brother of shame. Where shame is dependent on the consciousness of being upright and exposed, doubt ... has much to do with a consciousness of having a front and a back - and especially a ‚behind‘.“ The „behind“ is an area that can be dominated by those who would attack one's power of autonomy. This stage becomes decisive for the ratio of love and hate. „From a sense of self-control without loss of self-esteem comes a lasting sense of good will and pride; from a sense of loss of self-control and of foreign over-control comes a lasting propensity for doubt and shame.“ The sense of autonomy fostered in the child serves to preserve a sense of justice (1950:254).

The third or „locomotor-genital stage“ is preoccupied by „initiative versus guilt.“ The child's miracle of unfolding is demonstrated in initiatives taken. The child has a sense of „making,“ of „being on the make.“ „The danger of this stage is a sense of guilt over the goals contemplated and the acts initiated in one's exuberant enjoyment of new locomotor and mental power.“ Infantile rivalry comes to a climax in the contest for a favoured position with the mother. „The usual failure leads to resignation, guilt and anxiety.“ This then is the stage of the „castration complex“ (1950:256). „Infantile sexuality and incest taboo, castration complex and super-ego all unite to bring about that specifically human crisis during which the child must turn from an exclusive, pregenital attachment to his parents to the slow process of becoming a parent.“ The super-ego that develops is uncompromising. „One of the deepest conflicts in life is the hate for a parent who served as the model and the executer of the super-ego, but who ... was found trying to get away with the very transgressions which the child can no longer tolerate in himself.“ The resulting self-righteousness as reward for goodness can turn against others „so that the prohibition rather than the guidance of initiative becomes the dominant endeavour“ (1950:257). „The ‚oedipal‘ stage results not only in the oppressive establishment of a moral sense restricting the horizon of the permissible; it also sets the direction toward the possible and the tangible which permits the dreams of early childhood to be attached to the goals of an active adult life.“ Social institutions offer children of this stage an economic ethos in the form of ideal adults (1950:258).

Erikson goes on with the fourth or „latency stage“ which is characterized by „industry versus inferiority.“ In this stage the child learns through „school life“ to win recognition by producing things. The child's danger, at this stage, lies in a sense of inadequacy and inferiority, if he despairs of his tools and skills or of his status (1950:260). The fifth or „puberty stage“ deals with „identity versus role confusion.“

For Erikson, shame and doubt are caused by the child's incapability to control his bodily functions and belong therefore to the anal phase. Guilt is caused by the child's failure in his initiatives (Lewis 1993:89). Erikson's message, which influences most of the West for personality-and-culture theory, is that shame is a lower stage than guilt and is replaced by it in higher development. This theory is falsified by cultural anthropology through the works of Benedict (1946) and Singer (1953), who show that shame and guilt-oriented cultures appear in equally developed peoples (cp. Hultberg 1988:114; Lienhard 1998:33f.). Erikson's concepts of shame and guilt are clarified and refined by Piers. Interesting to note is the concept of inferiority in the fourth stage that appears in Adler's theory and again in Chinese culture, which both are shame-oriented. Kaufman notes that after the stage of shame „each subsequent stage represents a linguistic transformation of shame. The negative pole of each crisis is actually an elaboration of shame, given new or wider meaning. Each subsequent crisis involves, at least in part, a reworking of shame“ (Kaufman 1989:10).⁹⁹

2.4.4 Gerhart Piers' Differentiation of Shame and Guilt

In their classical monograph *Shame and Guilt: A Psychoanalytical and a Cultural Study* (1953/71) Piers and Singer develop an attractive and widely recognized concept for distinguishing between shame and guilt. In this section, we will limit our discussion to Piers' psychoanalytical study.¹⁰⁰ Its main concept is found in the distinction between super-ego and ego-ideal. Defining guilt, Piers says:

The sense of guilt remains as such unconscious, although the concomitant anxiety becomes conscious. The sense of guilt is generated by the super-ego. Without the formation of such an internal authority, psychological „guilt“ does not occur ... Guilt must not be confounded with apprehension ... the „fear of being caught,“ nor ... the fear of impending punishment. Guilt, then, is the painful internal tension generated whenever the ... barrier erected by the super-ego is being touched or transgressed. The transgressors ... are id impulses ... The irrational punishment ... is governed by the Law of Talion (Piers 1971:15f.).¹⁰¹

The anxiety contingent to the feeling of guilt is the „castration anxiety,“ a fear of being annihilated. The super-ego, Piers says, originates exclusively from internalisation (introjection) of the punishing, restrictive parental image.

⁹⁹ The different stages of the life cycle according to Erikson are: Basic trust vs. basic mistrust, autonomy vs. shame and doubt, initiative vs. guilt, industry vs. inferiority, identity vs. role confusion, intimacy vs. isolation, generativity vs. stagnation, ego integrity vs. despair (Erikson 1950).

¹⁰⁰ Singer's cultural study is discussed in section 2.5.2.

¹⁰¹ For brevity's sake Piers uses „guilt“ instead of „guilt feelings“ or „sense of guilt“ (1971:16).

It has been shown that the projection of primitive destructive impulses and possibly fantasies into the parental images plays a large part in the formation of the super-ego. Since at an early stage the primary narcissistic „belief“ in the omnipotence of thought and wish prevail, the super-ego is automatically endowed with similar power (1971:17).

However, Piers takes distance from the Freudian theory of the formation of the super-ego through his concept of the „passing of the oedipal complex:“

The development of an internalised conscience with its executive arm of guilt feeling occurs prior to and in large portions independent of the oedipal situation. E.g., the importance of oral aggressiveness and the role of the mother as punitive agent have been amply demonstrated in this connection (1971:17).

Different from Mead's (1937/1961:493f.) and Benedict's (1946/1974:323) findings, Piers defines shame as completely internalised tension between ego and ego-ideal:¹⁰²

- 1) Shame arises out of a[n internalised] tension between the ego and the ego-ideal, not between ego and super-ego as in guilt.
- 2) Whereas guilt is generated whenever a boundary (set by the super-ego) is touched or transgressed, shame occurs when a goal (presented by the ego-ideal) is not being reached. It thus indicates a real „shortcoming.“ Guilt anxiety accompanies transgression; shame, failure.
- 3) The unconscious, irrational threat implied in shame anxiety is abandonment, and not mutilation (castration) as in guilt (Piers 1971:23f.).

According to Piers, shame is different from „feelings of inferiority“ in that the latter implies comparison with external figures, whereas the former expresses a completely internalised tension between ego and ego-ideal. „The two terms stand in somewhat similar relationship to each other as „guilt feelings“ and „fear of punishment“ (1971:28). Behind the feeling of shame stands the fear of contempt and abandonment and emotional starvation. Piers says that such „withdrawal of love can be a threat only from positive images. It is as if the loved parental images or the projected power and life sustaining sources of one's own omnipotence threaten to abandon the weakling who fails to reach them.“ Following Fenichel, he concludes that shame is not the fear of the „evil eye“ but the fear of „God's eye“ which reveals all shortcomings of mankind (1971:29f.).

¹⁰² According to Piers, the ego-ideal consists of four aspects. First, it contains a core of *narcissistic omnipotence* that seems to be necessary to establish such functions as self-confidence, hope, and trust. Second, it represents the sum of the *positive identifications* with the loving as well as narcissistically expecting parental images. Third, the ego-ideal contains layers of later identifications, e.g. the „social role“ that an individual assumes in any given situation. Pointing to the significance of the peer group, Piers recognizes a continuous interchange between the individual ego-ideal and its projection in the form of collective ideals. Fourth, the ego-ideal remains in dynamic interfunction with the conscious and unconscious awareness of the ego's potentialities. This part contains the goals of self-realization, what Piers terms „maturation drive“ (1971:26f.).

To speak of people exclusively driven by shame or guilt is an abstraction. „Both shame and guilt are highly important mechanisms to insure socialization of the individual ... Social conformity achieved through guilt will be essentially one of *submission* ... Social conformity achieved through shame will be essentially one of *identification*“ (1971:53 italics in original).

In a very brilliant way, Piers succeeds in drawing a clear picture for both guilt and shame and their interrelationship. Shame and guilt are reactions to different control structures of the psyche: shame to the ego-ideal and guilt to the super-ego. Shame indicates failure to reach an ideal, and guilt the transgression of a standard. Anxiety in shame is fear of abandonment or refusal, in guilt an expectation of punishment or destruction. Piers' findings have had a large influence on psychologists Helen M. Lynd (1958) and Helen B. Lewis (1971), anthropologists Spiro (1958; 1961a) and Käser (1997), and missiologists Müller (1988) and Lienhard (1998; 2001a). On the other hand, Piers' theory was also widely criticized by Yap (1965:84-112; cp. Hesselgrave 1983:464f.; 1984:206f.), Robert White (1960:125f.), John Rawls (1971:440-446), Ernest Kurtz (1981:1,6,9), Leon Wurmser (1981:29,49,62), and John Deigh (1983:225f.,236,243).¹⁰³

2.4.5 Ronald Potter-Efron's Insights with Alcoholics

In his book *Shame, Guilt and Alcoholism: Treatment Issues in Clinical Practice* (1989), Ronald T. Potter-Efron, a clinical psychotherapist, differentiates shame and guilt as follows: „Shame is ‚a painful state of awareness of one's basic defectiveness as a human being,‘ while guilt is ‚a painful state of awareness that accompanies actual or contemplated violation of societal values and rules“ (1989:1f.). He states that shame and guilt are frequently confused by clients and therapists, because „an individual may feel both emotions simultaneously ... Nevertheless, certain individuals are prone more to shame or to guilt; it is important to be able to speak both languages fluently. The same behavior can trigger shame with one person, guilt with another, and both feelings with a third“ (1989:3). Potter-Efron situates shame in a shame/pride continuum and guilt in a guilt/moral pride continuum (1989:18,145f.). „Shame issues involve the client's identity, his whole self. In contrast, guilt refers to specific actual or contemplated behaviors of that individual. The shamed individual laments, ‚How could I have

¹⁰³ For a discussion of the different points of view see Wunderli (1990:28-35). For the discussion of the Symposium on Transcultural Psychiatry (1965) see section 2.5.11, the conclusion to the section of cultural anthropology, and section 2.6.2. David Hesselgrave: From Persuasion to Elenctics.

done that?’ while the guilty person asks, ‚How could I have done *that?*’“ (1989:2 italics in original).

A number of terms in the literature demonstrate the ambiguity between shame and guilt. „Existential guilt“ (Buber 1971; Morris 1971; Sternig 1984; Carroll 1985) refers to guilt that is vague. It is a spiritual condition that forces the individual to appraise its entire life rather than particular actions. „Irrational guilt“ (Ellis 1975) is used to refer to guilt that has no specific cause. „Moral shame“ (Miller 1985) describes a feeling of shame that accompanies an ethical transgression. „Obviously, guilt and shame overlap tremendously“ (Potter-Efron 1989:4).

Shame and guilt share their origin in the intimate interactions between self and society that characterize a child’s early development. Shame is most frequently associated with early episodes when the child recognizes that he is a separate individual who needs and could easily lose parental acceptance (Broucek 1982; Stipek 1983). Guilt develops as the child begins to realize that he has societal obligations and so must curtail selfish aggressive or sexual urges. Overlap of these two developmental issues seems inevitable. For example, when the child exposes his aggressive urges he is likely to be punished for them both through parental shaming statements („Look at you now, you ought to be ashamed of yourself“) and through guilt-producing statements („You shouldn’t hit your sister, that’s against our rules“). The simple and direct critical message - „No, bad!“ - can be interpreted both as shaming in that the child is fundamentally defective and as guilt-inducing if a specific behavior is attacked (1989:4).

Potter-Efron cites several other shame generating behaviours: deficiency messages like „You are not good,“ „You are not good enough,“ or „You are not lovable,“ emphasis on family image, abandonment themes, physical or sexual abuse (violations of autonomy), or emphasis on being perfect (1989:56,76).

It is possible to distinguish different therapeutic directions for shame and guilt, particularly if we separate the two by contrasting shame with „rational guilt,“ defined as guilt, which might occur when somebody has indeed broken a significant rule and feels bad in direct proportion to his transgressions. The therapist treats shame best at the affective level, helping the client expose his hidden defects in a safe relationship. In contrast, rational guilt is best confronted at the behavioral and cognitive levels; clients are encouraged to examine their value systems and to act consistently with those values (1989:5).

Other guidelines for the treatment of guilt concerns include helping the client to distinguish between irrational and rational guilt and to trace irrational guilt messages to their source in the family of origin, linking irrational guilt with the underlying fear of punishment, encouraging them to use guilt as a signal to examine their choices in living and to challenge

defences, and turning confessions into plans of action (1989:218). A summary of the differences of shame and guilt is presented in table 2.2. (adapted from Potter-Efron 1989:2f.).

Table 2.2: Differentiation of Shame and Guilt according to Potter-Efron

Central Trait	Shame	Guilt
Failure	Of being; falling short of goals; of whole self	Of doing; violation of values
Primary Feelings	Inadequate, deficient, worthless, exposed, disgusting, disgraced	Bad, wicked, evil, remorseful
Precipitating Event	Unexpected, possibly trivial	Actual or contemplated transgression
Primary Response	Physiological: eyes down, etc. affective: strong emotional response	Cognitive: being responsible behavioural: focus on actions mixture of affect and thought
Involvement of Self	Total self image involved: „How could <i>I</i> have done that?“	Partial (moral) self-image: „How could I have done <i>that</i> ?“
Central Fear	Abandonment, not belonging	Punishment, ostracism
Origins	Identification with idealized parent (ego-ideal)	Need to control aggressive impulse (super-ego)
Primary Defences	Denial, withdrawal, perfectionism, arrogance, exhibitionism, rage	Rationalization, intellectualisation, selflessness, paranoid thinking, obsessive/compulsive pattern, seeking excessive punishment
Positive Functions	Sense of humanity, of humility, of autonomy, of competence	Reparation (making amends), moral behaviour, initiative
Treatment	Affective: helping the client expose his hidden defects in a safe relationship	Cognitive and behavioural: distinguish between irrational and rational guilt, examine value systems, turn confessions into plans of action

2.4.6 Gershen Kaufman's Psychology of Shame

At this point, we change from the discussion of speculative psychodynamic theories to empirical psychology. In his book *The Psychology of Shame* (1989), Gershen Kaufman, a clinical psychotherapist, develops a theory of shame based on affect theory. He notes that shame has been neglected because of „shame about shame,“ because it is both easier and safer to explore „guilty“ impulses rather than a „shameful“ self, and because scientific language fails to describe inner experience adequately (1989:4). However, recent evidence shows that

shame plays a central role in addictive, abusive and eating disorders, as in the development of conscience and identity. „The optimal development of conscience depends on adequate and appropriate graded doses of shame. Conscience will misfire because of too little or too much shame.“ Shame alerts us to any affront to human dignity. It has always been associated with honour and pride. Shame is acutely disturbing to the self. It is the source of low self-esteem, poor self-concept or body image, self-doubt and insecurity, diminished self-confidence and feelings of inferiority (1989:5).

According to Kaufman, it is a mistaken assumption that shame requires the presence of another person. Shame can be an entirely internal experience.

The assumption that we feel guilty about deeds but feel shame about self is equally in error. The target of shame can be either the self or the self's actions, just as one can feel guilty about deeds or else feel essentially guilt-ridden as a person. From the perspective of affect theory, one can feel shameful about deeds as well as guilty about self (1989:6).

Other misconceptions are that shame is a more „primitive“ state than guilt, or that shame is inherently crippling whereas guilt is „healthier.“ Shame is not necessarily crippling, but amplifies our experience. It is the experiential ground from which conscience and identity spring. „Shame is a universal dynamic in child rearing, education, interpersonal relations, psychotherapy, ethnic group relations, national culture and politics, and international relations“ (1989:7).

Kaufman bases his psychology of shame on Silvan Tomkins' affect theory (1962; 1963; 1982). It considers „affect or feeling as the primary innate biological motivating mechanism“ (Tomkins 1987:137; Kaufman 1989:12). Every human being seeks „maximizing positive affect, minimizing negative affect, minimizing affect inhibition, and maximizing power to accomplish the other three strategies“ (Kaufman 1989:13). „Affect is primarily facial behavior ... Only secondarily is it bodily behavior, outer skeletal and inner visceral behavior“ (Tomkins 1962:205; Kaufman 1989:12). There are three positive primary affects (interest, enjoyment, surprise), three negative primary affects (distress, fear, anger), one affect auxiliary (shame), and two drive auxiliaries (disgust, disgust). Everyone of them is defined by a specific facial expression, shame by eyes down, head down, reddening, etc., with the goal of immediately reducing facial visibility, inducing „loss of face“ (1989:12f.,20). „Shame is an affect auxiliary to two primary affects, interest and enjoyment, by inhibiting them after they have been activated“ (Tomkins 1963:123; Kaufman 1989:14). Shame is the affect of exposure, of indignation, of defeat, of alienation, and of self-consciousness (1989:17f.).

The affect of shame is multidimensional. It operates facially, affectively, cognitively and interpersonally (1989:178). Based on Tomkins (1987:143), Kaufman distinguishes the following affective signs of shame: discouragement is shame about temporary defeat. Self-consciousness is the self exposed in shame, the self scrutinizing self. Embarrassment is shame before any type of audience. Shyness is shame in the presence of a stranger. Shame is loss of face, honour or dignity, a sense of failure. Guilt is „the ethical judgement of immorality.“ It is not a different innate affect. Guilt is shame about moral transgression, „immorality shame“ (1989:22f.). „Guilt“ refers to a broad spectrum of affective states: shame, self-disgust, anger, distress, or fear about moral matters (Kaufman 1989:26). Cognitive signs of shame affect are the impostor syndrome, low self-esteem, diminished self-concept, and deficient body image. Rage, contempt, and power scripts are readily observable interpersonal signs of shame. Perfection, transfer of blame, and withdrawal scripts are more subtle interpersonal signs (1989:180f.).

In the early years of life, shame is predominantly a wordless experience when the interpersonal need is not satisfied, when the „interpersonal bridge“ to the face of the mother or the stranger is broken and love is withdrawn (1989:19,32,36f.). Primary interpersonal needs are: need for relationship, need for touching/holding, need for identification, need for differentiation, need to nurture, need for affirmation, and need for power (1989:66-84). Later, shame experiences become transformed by language through expressions like „Shame on you!“ or „You are embarrassing me,“ belittling or transfers of blame. Performance expectations comprise a further source of shame. Shame increasingly becomes a partially cognitive, self-evaluative experience (1989:38f.). During every developmental epoch, especially adolescence, shame can be further amplified, for example by powerlessness, what Tomkins calls affect magnification (1989:43f.,48,57,88ff.). As affect magnification, shame is radically increased as in chronic shyness or enduring inferiority (1989:178f.). Secondly, shame experiences relating to affect, drive, interpersonal needs or competence become internalised through images or scenes combined with voices. Affect-shame binds, drive-shame binds and interpersonal need-shame binds develop and produce shame scripts and shame profiles (1989:60-64).

Kaufman shows how physical and sexual abuse syndromes, eating disorders, addictive, phobic, borderline, sociopathic, depressive, schizoid and paranoid syndromes as well as sexual dysfunction syndromes can be shame-based (1989:113ff.,247ff.). The role of psychotherapy is to restore the interpersonal bridge through the client-therapist relationship, to return internalised shame to its interpersonal origins in the original family, to regrow identity by

healing shame, and to develop equal power in current relationships and the family of origin (1989:157ff.).

Kaufman shows in an impressive manner the role of shame in human psychology and psychopathology. Based on affect theory, he creates a model much closer to shame phenomenology than the structural model of psychoanalysis. For Kaufman, guilt is not a separate affect, but is integrated into the psychology of shame as immorality shame, distinguishing different affects related to „ethical immorality.“ According to Lewis, Tomkins and Kaufman’s model of shame, as incomplete reduction of interest affect, is very mechanistic and does not take sufficiently into account cognitive, self-conscious attributions or processes. Neither does this model view shame and guilt from the point of view of the violation of standards (Lewis 1992:49f.). Kaufman’s model is very useful to study shame and its implications, but it does not give an integrated view of affective, cognitive and volitional aspects of both guilt and shame.

2.4.7 Jean Piaget’s and Lawrence Kohlberg’s Cognitive Development Theories

The two main contributions to cognitive development theory are those of Piaget and Kohlberg. In his book *The Moral Judgement of the Child* (1932), Jean Piaget (1896-1980) describes cognitive development as a process of increasing integration and differentiation that leads to the emergence of new capabilities and increasing understanding. Beginning with simple motor and sensory patterns that are formed and then integrated into more comprehensive cognitive structures, an enduring symbolic representation of the external world emerges. The child no longer exists primarily in a flood of emotions and bewildering confrontations. Later, as the child grows in his or her ability to understand the way the world works, there are important developments in thinking and reasoning. The child moves from thinking that is concrete, animistic, egocentric, or legalistic, to thinking that is truly logical, scientific, abstract, and relational. According to Piaget, cognitive development is the main business of education (cp. Oser 1976:317-336; Frey 1977:74-82).

Lawrence Kohlberg (1927-1987) presents his main findings in the two volumes of *Essays on Moral Development* (1982). He believes that conscience is organized around the dominant moral principle on which a person bases her or his moral reasoning. He postulates that conscience goes through developmental stages. The first and most elementary stage of conscience is organized around the principle of obedience out of fear of punishment. The second reasons on the basis of self-interest, while the third is most concerned with getting praise and

approval. The fourth is based on law and order, while the fifth thinks in terms of a mutually beneficial social contract. The sixth and final stage reasons on the basis of a commitment to universal ethical principles. Tests of moral reasoning have been used by Kohlberg to identify which type of conscience a person has. Attempts have been made to move people up the scale by teaching these principles and their application.

After studying cognitive development, some have concluded that the young child, lacking the ability to understand fully and reason logically, is not capable of acting ethically and must be treated differently until all the necessary cognitive processes are fully developed. In reality, this has been shown not to be true. Children already behave ethically, because the actions of conscience are not altogether dependent on cognitive development. Belonging and bonding, beyond logical ability or intellectual knowledge, enable moral development (cp. Coles 1997). Since conscience is built on the affective experience of I-You relationships, approaches that attempt to create conscience through teaching beliefs or moral principles, and approaches that stress training in logical reasoning or that use values clarification, are basically ineffective (Snyder et al. 1980:77f.). With his concept of cognitive attribution, Michael Lewis attempts a way out of this dilemma.

2.4.8 Michael Lewis' Self-Conscious Emotions

In his book *Shame: The Exposed Self* (1992), Michael Lewis, a pediatric psychiatrist, presents a new cognitive model of conscience development and of shame/guilt differentiation. In his concept of self-conscious emotions, based primarily on systematic observations of children, he combines cognitive and affect theory. He integrates the findings of psychoanalysts Piers and Singer (1953), Helen B. Lewis (1971), Wurmser (1981), Broucek (1982), Nathanson (1987), and Morrison (1989). His main point, which separates him from Tomkins' affect theory, is that shame, like guilt and pride, is not a primary affect, but a secondary emotion. These secondary emotions imply self-consciousness, a splitting of self with a cognitive attribution of the emotion to self. Therefore, Lewis calls them self-conscious emotions. One cannot feel shame without comparing one's acts with one's norms and convictions. Furthermore, Lewis holds that „shame can be distinguished from guilt: a *total* failure of self vis-à-vis a standard produces shame, while a *specific* failure of self results in guilt“ (1992:9 italics in original). Lewis' model of cognitive attribution of self is presented in figure 2.2 (1992:65).

Figure 2.2: Model of Cognitive Attribution of Self according to Lewis

A. Standards, Rules and Goals

B. Evaluation

Success	Failure	C. Attribution of Self
Hybris	Shame	
Pride	Guilt / Regret	specific

The three categories A, B and C stand for cognitive processes that serve as stimuli for these cognitive emotions. A same act can be a success or a failure for different individuals depending on the norm or goal. Apparently, North American males have the tendency to attribute success to themselves and failure to others, whereas females tend to attribute success to others and failure to themselves (1992:69,102,106). Concerning attribution of self, Lewis holds that:

Shame is elicited when the self orients toward the self as a whole and involves an evaluation of the total self [global attribution of self], whereas in guilt it is orientation of the self toward the actions of the self, either in terms of the actions of the self alone or in terms of the actions as they have affected another [specific attribution of self] (1992:71).

In shame situations with a global attribution of self, the focus of self lies on the self, which is subject and object at the same time. The self is in conflict with self. On the basis of this inward focus, the individual is unable to act and wants to hide and disappear (1992:72). In guilt situations, the focus lies on specific actions of self in interaction with objects or persons and its effect on other selves. The person wants to repair the situation. Global versus specific focus of the self may be a personality style. Depressed persons are likely to make stable global attributions. North American women and younger children are more likely to make global attributions of failure than men and older children (1992:73).

Shame is the result of the evaluation of acts in relation to standards, rules and goals and of the global evaluation of self. Phenomenologically, shame has four characteristics: (1) the desire to hide or to disappear: reddening, lowering or turning away of eyes and head, collapse of the body, etc., (2) an intense pain, discomfort, and anger; these symptoms distinguish shame from embarrassment and shyness, (3) the feeling that one is of little value, inadequate,


and unworthy; this is a global statement by the self in relation to the self, (4) the fusion of subject and object; we become subject and object of shame. The self is in conflict with itself and focuses completely on itself, which results in confusion and a complete incapability to act. This fourth phenomenological feature enables Lewis to differentiate shame from guilt. „Shame is the complete closure of the self-object-circle.“ In guilt, the self is the subject. The object is external to the self. The self focuses upon the behaviour that violates the standard and upon the object which suffers from that failure. Many researchers „have used terms like concern or regret as synonyms of guilt suggesting a focus on something external to the self rather than on the self itself.“ Guilt and shame have the function to interrupt an action. The command in guilt is: „Stop. What you do violates a standard. Focus on what you did, change your behaviour and repair the situation.“ In shame the command is: „Stop. You are no good“ (1992:34f.). The command in guilt does not lead to confusion and inability to act, but to a corrective action in order to repair the failure. The different postures in shame and guilt are also very helpful to differentiate the two emotions: in shame the body collapses, freezes or turns away. There is lowering or turning away of eyes and head, and reddening of face. In guilt we observe active, corrective behaviour. If there is no corrective action, either in thought, feeling or deed, it is possible that a guilt experience has been converted into one of shame. „Here, then, is another difference between shame and guilt. We can be ashamed of a guilty action, but we cannot feel guilty about being ashamed“ (except when shame is bypassed) (1992:76f.,121,123).

The resulting emotions of a successful evaluation are hybris and pride, hybris being the global, successful evaluation, counterpart of shame, and pride being the specific, successful evaluation, counterpart of guilt. Hybris as „global pride“ (1992:234 n.29) is associated with pridefulness, grandiosity and narcissism. Hybris is therefore a transitory, addicting emotion that necessitates progressive adaptation of goals and evaluation standards. It harms human relationships. Pride is the result of a positively evaluated act and is therefore reproducible without adapting goals and standards. It is therefore a more sound emotion (1992:78f.). Contrary to Kaufman, Lewis sees shyness not as an affective sign of shame, but rather as a biological disposition which appears much earlier than shame in childhood and has nothing to do with an evaluation of self (1992:80f.).

Lewis sees in the story of the Fall in Genesis 3 the proof for the importance of shame, the representation of the ontogenetic development of shame in the child, and the description of the process of shame development in the adult. Curiosity leads to knowledge. This knowledge of

standards, rules and goals, and the evaluation of behaviour in relation to these standards and to self becomes then the cause for self-conscious emotions, that is, shame (1992:85). The learning of standards and the development of the objective self¹⁰⁴ in the second year of life lead to self-conscious emotions toward the end of the third year (1992:48,66,94). Lewis' scheme for the development of self-conscious emotions is presented in figure 2.3 (1992:87).

Figure 2.3: Genesis of Self-Conscious Emotions according to Lewis



Exposed emotions can transform into evaluating emotions: „embarrassment becomes the material for shame, and empathy becomes the material for guilt“ (1992:97). Embarrassment as exposed emotion is an embarrassment with a lesser intensity than the evaluative „shame-embarrassment“ (1992:80).

Trauma in childhood can induce a global attribution style. Parents with difficulties (alcoholism, drug addiction, constant quarrels, depression) induce in their children a continual feeling of failure in coping with the problem of their parents. Children will attribute these problems to themselves. Furthermore the attribution style is learned from the parents' and teachers' education style. „You are not intelligent“ induces a global attribution, whereas „You have done this well“ a specific attribution. North American fathers give more specific attributions than mothers, and more to sons than to daughters, while mothers give more global

¹⁰⁴ Lewis calls „objective self“ the reflection of the self about self (looking at self as object), and „subjective self“ the reflection of self about objects. In man, the self is exposed to itself. Shame is the exposed self (cp. the title of his book) (1992:36,42,45).

In concordance with Lewis' observations, late Freud situates the development of the super-ego and of identification at age three. Klein and Erikson connect the appearance of the self-conscious emotions, especially shame, with the anal phase at the end of the second year (Klein 1937/1975; Erikson 1950:253f.; Lewis 1992:93).

attributions (1993:105). Disgust, contempt, humiliation and love withdrawal produce a global attribution and lead to shame, while power and arguments produce a specific attribution and lead to guilt (1992:115). According to Lewis, withdrawal of love is a prototypical and universal producer of shame (1992:117).

Repressed or bypassed shame can be expressed through other emotions, as for example guilt, and through laughter, confession or forgetting (loss of memory or „loss of self;“ H.B. Lewis 1971:243). In laughter and confession, a person puts himself in the position of the observer of self. The self detaches itself from the shamed self. The pathological form of this dissociation is multiple personality disorders. In North America this is mostly caused by sexual abuse (Lewis 1992:123,172). Continually bypassed shame can lead to depression and rage. North American females tend to the former and males to the latter. Shame-rage-spirals can be at the origin of child abuse, crime and suicide. Humiliation and punishment escalate the shame-rage-spiral. Only forgiveness and comprehension reduce shame (1992:140,153, 161f.).

Forgetting, laughter, and confession are also means to deal with felt shame. After confession, forgiveness and love reduce shame. When confession is made to the offended person, this person can be obliged to forgive without being able to express her shame or rage. This can lead to conflicts in a relationship. Repeated confession of shaming acts tends to induce a global attribution style, because it focuses on the total self. Nevertheless, Lewis considers confession an important means to reduce shame in a society. Its diminished use can lead to an increase in narcissistic disorders. „In all the cases the shame is owned first and then reduced“ (Lewis 1992:127,136f.).

Summing up differences between sexes in North America, „men are more likely to experience guilt than shame, and when they do experience shame, are more likely to transform shame to anger, while women are more likely to experience shame than guilt, and tend to transform shame into depression. Men, probably because they are more guilt than shame-prone, have, throughout history, focused far more on guilt (and morality) than on shame“ (1992:176). Important shame eliciting situations for men are school and sports performance, money earning activities and sexual potency, for women physical attractiveness and interpersonal relationships (1992:178). „On the one hand, women are globally oriented, but, on the other hand, they are more other-oriented and empathic, a specific attribution orientation. This suggests that women may be more prone than men to both shame and guilt.“ The origin of these differences lies, according to Lewis, most likely in socialization differences (1993:180).

Lewis concludes that many conflicts in couples can be reduced to miscommunication due to different attribution styles. He calls this the „two worlds hypothesis.“ The same could be true for parent-child relationships, which might be at the origin of what Freud calls the „oedipal conflict“ (1992:183,189). Men’s dominant position in society would then rather be due to women’s proneness to shame than to the aggressiveness of men (1992:186).

On cross-cultural differences of self, Lewis follows Geertz, Rosaldo and Shweder (1984). Geertz holds that the concept of personality exists in all social groups. He defines the Western concept of personality as „a distinguishable whole, which is separated from other ‚wholes‘ and from the social and natural context.“ This entity is independent from other entities (Geertz 1984:126). Outside of Western tradition, the concept of multiple personalities is frequent. The Javanese have a twofold concept of self (1984:128). The Balinese see themselves not as individuals, but as part and representation of a general type, defined through a network of roles. Moroccans define themselves through their relationship to others and the belonging to a group (1984:133). Rosaldo finds the concept of multiple personalities also in the Ilongot of the Philippines and the Gahuku-Gawa of New Guinea. They have a changing identity depending on changing roles. Mutual obligations and emotional interdependence define the self (Rosaldo 1984:148; Shweder/Bourne 1984). Lewis calls these identities, which depend on the social context, *we-selves* as opposed to the independent *I-self* (Lewis 1992:200).

In Japan this mutual interdependence is called *amae* (cp. Doi 1982:118). The behaviour, which maintains harmonious relationships, is encouraged by subtle, non-verbal expressions. „Overt praise is to be avoided: praise is not only immodest, but it fosters a focus on the *I-self*.“ Shaming tends to increase the interdependence, if it leads to forgiveness rather than to anger. „Since within-group anger is not allowed in Japanese culture, and therefore the substitution of anger for shame rarely occurs, shame is likely to be owned and therefore dissipated through forgiveness.“ Shame is therefore an essential element of cohesiveness. Japanese culture shows that the cohesion of society can best be assured through shame and the repression of anger combined with forgiveness (Lewis 1992:202). In Japanese culture, the difference between in-group and out-group behaviour is surprising for the Westerner. While in-group behaviour is governed by *amae*-rules, where anger is suppressed, out-group behaviour is aggressive based on shame-anger (formerly offensive wars, nowadays economic competition) (1992:203f.).

Concerning religious differences, Lewis classifies the Jewish religion and mainstream Protestantism as guilt-oriented because of the importance of laws and reparative action.

Catholicism and the fundamentalist Christian religions are classified as shame-oriented because of the global attribution of sin and forgiveness (1993:206,235 n.2).

Lewis observes that the anti-authoritarian education style with argumentation and inductive techniques often accompanied by a facial expression indicating shame, disgust and humiliation, the frequency of withdrawal of love and overt praise have induced a global attribution. Consequently, shame-related problems like narcissistic disorders (with rage reactions: child abuse and crime) and multiple personality disorders escalate. Western culture is driven more by shame since the turn to personal freedom. Simultaneously, many have freed themselves from the religious institutions that were able to absorb shame. Therefore, many lack the mechanisms providing forgiveness (1992:176f.).

Lewis' theory of cognitive attribution appears to provide an excellent model to understand the cognitive and affective aspects of shame and guilt and their implications for psychology and psychopathology, personality and culture. It gives additional insights beyond psychoanalytic theories. Conscience is not situated in the super-ego anymore, but in the objective self. Depending on the attribution style, a person will be more shame or guilt-oriented. Lewis' cross-cultural analyses show that shame and guilt are universal, while attributions, which depend on norms, are cultural. His religious analyses are less useful. They indicate the limitations of his theory. His co-researcher Tangney develops his theory further and validates it in the cross-cultural setting.¹⁰⁵

2.4.9 Micha Hilgers' Theory of Shame

In his book *Scham: Gesichter eines Affekts* „Shame: Faces of an Affect“ (1996), Micha Hilgers, a German psychotherapist, tries to develop a theory of shame by drawing on all theories and all his predecessors, interestingly except Lewis (1992). He explains the absence of a theory of shame in the field of psychology by the fact that after Freud all affects were understood as psychological correlates of objective libidinal processes. After the rupture with Adler, who emphasizes the importance of feelings of inferiority and therefore questions the libido theory, shame is taboo in guilt-oriented Freudian psychoanalysis. Beyond this historical fact, shame, as a feeling, which confers the desire to hide or disappear, is often repressed and banned from consciousness (1996:23f.).

¹⁰⁵ See section 2.5.5. The Functionalist Approach to Self-Conscious Emotions.

Hilgers sees progressive forms of shame experiences in child development (cp. Nathanson 1987a; Kaufman 1989). In the first months of life, anxiety from strangers and mismatch with parents can cause feelings of displeasure, which can be interpreted as precursors of shame. On the other hand, experiences of success can be at the origin of feelings, which can be seen as precursors of pride. Further consolidation of self-limits and experiences of competence in interaction with the outside world allow affective components of competence and pride to develop. When self and intimacy limits are menaced, feelings of embarrassment and shame develop. Later on, a comparative perspective enlarges the experience of shame. Then, it indicates a violation of an image of self, for example in mirror reactions to a disfigured face. When self objectivation develops, reactions of shame, which are based on complicated cognitive comparisons of self with internalised representations, goals and ideals are aroused (cp. Lewis' theory of cognitive self attribution 1992:65). Finally, differentiated shame-guilt-conflicts related to the need of belonging, loyalty and conformity towards significant groups and to the desire of autonomy and loyalty towards self and its ideals become possible (cp. Erikson 1950:252f.). Infraction against one's norms can generate shame feelings towards self as well as shame and guilt feelings towards significant groups. Colliding norms can finally lead to unsolvable shame-guilt-dilemmas (1996:196f.).

One is ashamed of a failure or defect, which leads to a tension between ego and ego-ideal, while one feels guilty about a transgression of a norm, which leads to a tension between ego and super-ego. Guilt feelings relate to a violation of the other, while shame feelings concern the self (Wurmser 1981a:15; Hilgers 1996:14). In many aspects, pride is the opposite feeling of shame (cp. Stipek 1983; Nathanson 1987b; 1992; Lewis 1992). Both are intimately connected to the senses of the face (1996:16). Members of different cultures feel shame in very different situations, while the causes of guilt feelings seem to be less diverse: „That which is forbidden is less contested than that which causes shame“ (1996:20). Because of the great diversity of sources and the subsequent feelings of shame, Hilgers proposes to speak of a *group* of shame feelings instead of simply shame feelings. Shame feelings can originate from the following situations (adapted from Hilgers 1996:19):

- Failures of competence (competence shame)
- Violation of self and identity limits (intimacy shame)
- Humiliation from outside
- Sudden or unexpected exposure of parts of body or self
- Discrepancy of self and ideal (cp. Piers 1971:23f.)

- Dependence from others (dependence shame)
- A sudden end of desired relationships
- Guilty acts (combined with guilt feelings)

Hilgers stresses the importance of shaming situations in the aging process when progressive loss of control causes competence and dependence shame. It is astonishing for Hilgers that psychoanalytical research has not studied the diminution of the control of body functions when their increasing control in child development has enriched insights in such a great measure (1996:120ff.). He also observes the almost complete lack of guilt feelings in criminals, while shame feelings predominate. They are caused by constant humiliation and violation of self-limits in child development and in the rehabilitation process (1996:140f.). Psychoanalytic treatment of shame syndromes provides a measured exposure to shame experiences revealing discrepancies between ideals, values, self-concepts and reality (1996:63f.). Hilgers sums up: „Shame – in digestible fractions – is the guardian of self and of self limits; it is the feeling without which there is no personal development and no successful psychotherapy, no identity and no healthy search for autonomy. But it is also the feeling, which causes regression, isolation, destruction and violence, once out of control“ (1996:24).

2.4.10 Niklas Luhmann's Systems Theory of Meaning

Systems theory is usually not associated with the problem of conscience. It sees personality within a social system, which, as we have seen with Freud, Adler and Erikson, and especially with Piers, influences the development of the conscience. Systems theory or therapy, which does not differentiate between exploration and intervention, refers to approaches that focus more on relational processes than intrapsychic patterns, particularly to family therapy (Minuchin 1967). Strategic systems theory focuses more on regulative mechanisms of interactional processes and uses the language of communication theory (Watzlawick 1967). Structural systems theory is more concerned with structures and roles (Weber 1988:768). Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1956) has developed its theoretical basis, which is cybernetics. It is interdisciplinary in nature and therefore its classification in the discipline of psychology somewhat arbitrary (Bertalanffy 1956:127; Kneer 1993:19f.; Hohm 2000:16). As processes in a cybernetic system do not follow linear causality, systems theory has developed the concept of the blackbox. It implies that the nature of the researched object is unknown, despite observable inputs (stimuli of the social context) and observable outputs (behaviour) (Watzlawick 1969:45; Glanville 1988:100f.; Kneer 1993:22). For our discussion of the conscience,

Luhmann's „theory of meaning“ is of interest. As we will see, it is in itself already a combination of systems theory and philosophy.¹⁰⁶

Niklas Luhmann (born 1927) is lawyer and from 1968, professor of sociology specializing in interdisciplinary research. In his structural-functional approach, he follows essentially Parsons. For Parsons, systems have four functions (AGIL): Adaptation, Goal attainment, Integration and Latent structure maintenance (Parsons 1976:168). In his book *Soziale Systeme: Grundriss einer allgemeinen Theorie* „Social Systems: Outline of a General Theory“ (1984), Luhmann's basic ideas are summarized in the following way:

Social systems are not only a construct or a model of the ... observer in the sense of analytical unities, but already existent in the social reality and delimit themselves against their specific context on the basis of communication constituted of meaning (Luhmann 1984:30; Hohm 2000:17).

Each social system produces its identity through a difference, respectively delimitation from the context. Because this delimitation is too complex as an infinite horizon of attributions of meaning in order to be used in all its possible associations for the communicative construction of social systems, it is linked with a gradient of context complexity and of system-specific possible own complexity. This is produced especially by the reduction and selectivity of theoretically possible attributions of meaning of the context. In this process the mutual expectations have a special function for the structural stability of the communicative autopoiesis of social systems (Luhmann 1984:411f.; Hohm 2000:18).

On the one hand, they increase the social order of social systems by security of expectations. On the other hand, their immanent risk and their susceptibility to deception increases in the measure that their latent protection by the communicative thematization of other possibilities, as the context prepares them, is lost (Luhmann 1972:31; Hohm 2000:18).

Luhmann defines his concept of meaning with five fundamental concepts of system theory: reduction of complexity, difference between system and context, self-reference, autopoiesis and operational closure (Krieger 1996:63). Basically, Luhmann says that social systems are goal-oriented and therefore have meaning. However, they are so complex that the conscience cannot handle the complexity of possibilities to decide meaningfully. Therefore, it reduces the possible range of views and actions in order to assure the congruence of cultural convictions, a necessary condition for maintaining the social system (Luhmann 1970:76,116). „Meaning is therefore a form of handling complexity. Meaning renders possible the reduction and maintenance of complexity ... The flexibility of the event of meaning is ... autopoiesis par excellence“ (Luhmann 1984:101; Kneer 1993:75-77).

¹⁰⁶ Krieger mentions that Luhmann decides to start from a phenomenological analysis of meaning, which is based on Husserl's philosophy of consciousness (Luhmann 1984:93,105; Krieger 1996:62 n.8). Hübsch discusses

Systems theory has a great influence on the „personality-and-culture“ branch of psychology and later „psychological anthropology.“ In our study, we will be able to observe the influence on Spiro's „Three Schemes and Motivation Theory“ (1961a; Lienhard 1998:8; 2001a:16-34). Luhmann's theory shows the different influences of the social system on the individual and relativizes meaning, attempting to reduce complexity to a measure digestible for the individual and its culture. This latter fact shows the relativity of cultures. As an empirical, secular theory it cannot hold to the belief that there is a fixed point of meaning in the God of Scripture.

2.4.11 Philosophical Orientations of Psychology

Whereas Freud, as a materialist, shows the drive-energetic aspect of conscience and the bio-psychological determinants of man, Adler focuses on the socio-psychological aspects. Some psychoanalysts in accordance with Adler have put their focus on the goal orientation of man, and therefore on values and meaning. We will discuss them under the heading of philosophical orientations of psychology in the following order: C.G. Jung's analytical psychology, Binswanger's *Dasein* analysis, Frankl's existential analysis, Caruso's personal analysis, and Frey's anthropological approach.¹⁰⁷

Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961) distances himself from Freud in 1912, to focus primarily on people in the second half of their lives, when the search for meaning is predominant. His theory, which he calls first analytical psychology and later complex psychology, puts forward the teleological-synthetic aspect of man (Nowak 1978:37). For Jung, libido represents the psychic energy (Jung 1960:490). The psychic apparatus is composed of the consciousness, in the centre of which is the ego,¹⁰⁸ the collective unconscious, the instincts and archetypes (1960:596,629). Through the „individuation process,“ the personality, that is the „self,“ develops. „The self is an absolute paradox in that it represents at the same time thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis“ (1952:36). The self expresses the unity and the wholeness of the personality. „Psychologically, the self can be named an archetype of the *Imago Dei*“ (1952:23).

Jung sees the conscience on two „levels.“ There is the „moral“ foundation, which corresponds to Freud's super-ego. It is situated in the confrontation between the autonomous „collective unconscious“ and a system of norms. The second level is the „ethical“ form of

Luhmann's theory as one of the contemporary philosophical theories of conscience (Hübsch 1995:47ff.).

¹⁰⁷ In this section I follow essentially Nowak (1978:36-51) except for Frey's discussion.

¹⁰⁸ The *persona* is an attitude of the ego towards the outside world (Jung 1928:64).

conscience, which is a function of the self. The self calls man, who is confronted with certain archetypal constellations, to take position in free decision and thus realize his individuation. Concerning the ethical form of conscience, we can speak of an archetype of conscience, a „call to the self“ (1966:38; Bock 1970:123f.). Jung has big problems defining conscience, particularly „right“ and „false“ conscience. Guilt is in Jung’s psychology not necessarily negative as for Freud, but an event on the way to the self, and therefore a necessary element in the process of individuation (Nowak 1978:40; cp. Oser 1976:277-302; Krische 1984:75-82). We deal here with a dualism of conscience as Jung’s attempt to solve the problem of man as *imago Dei* and as fallen man. Jung idealizes guilt as a necessary element in finding meaning in life. His dualist approach to conscience is reminiscent of scholasticism’s *synteresis* and *conscientia*.

Heidegger’s existentialist philosophy exercises a great influence on psychology and psychiatry. For him „to be“ is not a „must,“ but a „could“ and a „should.“¹⁰⁹ On these grounds, Ludwig Binswanger (1881-1966) formulates the *Dasein* analysis.¹¹⁰ He understands the question of the „self“ and of man’s freedom not psychologically as Jung, but ontologically in the philosophical sense. Freedom, love and friendship are key terms for *Dasein* analysis. Concerning conscience, Binswanger says that his research is anthropological, beyond „good and evil“ (1962:311). The call of conscience is only possible in the context of love (1962:93). In friendship, „you are my conscience and I am your conscience“ (1962:241). A moral behaviour of man is only possible on the grounds of what ethics call conscience. For Binswanger, God is a possibility: „the solution for the problem of man has to be looked for ,by transcending’“ (1962:404).¹¹¹

Whereas the *Dasein* analysis avoids the „body-soul-spirit“ problem, Viktor E. Frankl’s „existential analysis“ makes it its theme. Man is only whole man in body, soul and spirit (Frankl 1959a:100). Frankl (born 1905) sees in the spirit the root of conscience and the „unconscious God“ (1974:20). Man as a spiritual being has a will to meaning. Man’s essentials are spirituality, freedom and responsibility. The authority before which man is responsible is the conscience. But the last authority is God. „Behind the super-ego of man is not an ego of a super-man, but the You of God; the conscience could never be a word of power

¹⁰⁹ Germ. *Seinmüssen, Seinkönnen und Seindürfen*.

¹¹⁰ Possible translation: „analysis of being.“ Other psychiatrists of this stream are: M. Boss, V.E. Frankl.

¹¹¹ Germ. *im Transzendieren*, as opposed to „in the transcendence.“ Binswanger deals with anthropology, not theology or theological anthropology (Binswanger 1955:82; Nowak 1978:43 n.107).

in immanence, if it were not the You-word of transcendence“ (1974:52). The conscience can apply the „eternal“ general moral law to the specific situation of man. It cannot be reduced to Freud’s super-ego, but it is a specific human phenomenon. Frankl defines the conscience „as the intuitive capacity to sense the unique meaning which is hidden in each situation. In one word, the conscience is an organ of meaning“ (1966:56).¹¹² Whereas Binswanger takes refuge behind the concept of „openness to God“ which is „antitheological“ on purpose, Frankl’s synthesis of philosophy and psychology shows his Jewish background. However, the soteriological aspect of conscience is absent from his writings.

Another attempt to revise Freud’s anthropology on the subject of a person’s wholeness is Igor A. Caruso’s personal analysis. His theory is based on a dialectic personalism. It can be called dialectic because it is „necessarily and consciously a praxis based on the insight that consciousness changes the context and vice versa“ (Caruso 1962:11). In Caruso’s dialectic method, the Freudian super-ego becomes a symbol of the conscience. Each person must overcome the „transitional moral“ of the super-ego in his progressive personalization; otherwise the fixed super-ego will become an obstacle for the development of the true conscience. The super-ego is necessary on a certain level of development, but the personal conscience has to take its place. The heteronomous morality must be transformed into the autonomous morality (1959:731f.). The conscience is therefore not the heir of the super-ego. It is, on the contrary, a congenital triggering mechanism that develops in several stages like the capacity to speak. It is specifically human like consciousness. Consciousness and conscience are inseparable as the Romanic languages show through their unique term *conscientia* and cognates (Caruso 1967; Nowak 1978:51). A normal personal development is characterized by the fact that the „personal conscience“ replaces progressively the super-ego, which has been passively formed during childhood.

In his doctoral dissertation *Das Gewissen als Gegenstand psychologischer Untersuchung* „The Conscience as Object of Psychological Analysis“ (1977), Eberhard Frey (born 1943) criticizes as insufficient the qualitative, quantitative and perception-theoretic concepts of conscience in philosophy. He proposes therefore an interdisciplinary approach with findings from psychology. As a qualitative concept, he classifies it as structural, actual genetic, ontogenetic, and phylogenetic approaches. The structural approach sees conscience in a „dual unity“ with

¹¹² Frankl calls his existential analysis logotherapy, a „psychotherapy of meaning“ (Frankl 1959b).

the *Gemüt*,¹¹³ the centre of integration (1977:36ff.). The actual genetic approach sees the conscience as an instance of regulation functioning according to mechanisms of *Gestalt* perception theory, seeking the *Gestalt* (meaning) of personality (1977:43ff.; cp. Rüdiger 1976:472-476). The ontogenetic approach stresses the importance of love and interhuman understanding as basis of the functioning of conscience (1977:53ff.; cp. Rüdiger 1976:476-485). Finally, the phylogenetic approach sees conscience as a specifically human phenomenon (1977:59ff.). As quantitative concepts of conscience, Frey classifies the conscience as moral judgement (1977:66ff.) and the consciousness of guilt and repentance (1977:83ff.). The perception theoretic concept of conscience differentiates „outer“ and „inner“ stages in a spiral process of finding *Gestalt* (meaning), which includes emotional stages with predominantly outside influences, and volitional-intentional stages with predominantly inner influences (1977:29ff.).¹¹⁴

As a more adequate solution to the human phenomenon of conscience, Frey proposes a philosophical, anthropological approach based on Keller (Keller 1948:237; Frey 1977:138). This approach goes beyond speculative theories and experimental observation to an *a priori* understanding in relation to psychology. It is based on the phenomenological human experience, and attempts to identify the essence of the conscience, which is hidden to psychology according to Frey. Excluding transcendence in the theological sense, it remains transcendental philosophy in the ontological sense (1977:143f.). Frey's approach includes the understanding of conscience as a process of dual nature: a good conscience filled with meaning alternates with a bad conscience characterized by guilt, emptiness and vanity (1977:142ff.). The process of conscience is a manner of understanding oneself: an experience, a selective procedure, and a search for value that is lived in polarity of meaning and vanity, of peace and guilt. Based on Scheler, Frey says that the way to meaning and life leads through guilt and repentance (1977:190f.; Scheler 1954:126). Frey's value lies in his return from the experimental and speculative level of psychology and philosophy to a more anthropological phenomenon of conscience.

¹¹³ Germ. *zweieinig mit dem Gemüt*. *Gemüt* renders the affective part of the soul in opposition to the cognitive and volitional part. See Vetter's structural model in appendix 4 (Vetter 1966:159; S. Müller 1984:58). Cp. the parallel analysis of Rüdiger (1976:468) in section 2.4.14.

¹¹⁴ Rüdiger includes this „spiral model“ in the ontogenetic aspect (1976:476f.); see section 2.4.14.

2.4.12 Attempts of a Synthesis of Psychology and Theology

For the Christian, the conscience is an anthropological phenomenon in relation to God. A synthesis of psychology, philosophy and theology is necessary. According to Carter and Narramore, integration is the relating of Christian and secular concepts, but additionally a way of thinking (humility and awareness of finite limitations) and a way of functioning (a balanced expression of intellect and emotions) (Carter/Narramore 1979:117-119). In the discussion of this integration, we will study some selected examples. We will start with Mowrer, a secular psychiatrist who reflects on the need of integration of forgiveness in psychotherapy. We will then proceed with Tournier, an evangelical medical doctor who starts psychotherapy in his home. Finally, we will study the contributions of a Catholic psychologist Nowak, of youth psychotherapist Meves, and of Green and Lawrenz's strategic pastoral counseling.

In his books *The Crisis in Psychiatry and Religion* (1961) and *The New Group Therapy* (1964), Orval Hobart Mowrer (born 1907), a secular psychiatrist, emphasizes the need for integration of the concept of forgiveness into psychiatry. He influences the anthropologist Loewen and many Christian counselors such as Jay Adams' „nouthetic counselling.“ He states „ ... that the so-called psycho-neuroses and functional psychoses can be understood only (sola!) in terms of palpable misconduct which has neither been confessed nor expiated“ (1964:20). For him neurosis is „a euphemism for a state of sin“ (1964:6).¹¹⁵ About confession, Mowrer says:

What good does it to confess your past errors to someone who is going to be as secretive about them as you have been? This private confession is not the way for a person to achieve social redefinition of personality and true redemption. Just as the offense has been against society, that is, against the laws of humankind and God, so, one might argue, that confession and forgiveness must be as broad as the sin itself (1989:81).

Mowrer calls confession limited only to God a „cheap grace“ (1961:82). He says that confession should be public and periodical (1961:216; 1964:97). „If confession is not made artificially easy, I am persuaded it has not only this redemptive function but also a strongly prophylactic one as well“ (1961:215). Just as mere confession of a legal crime does not absolve one from all further responsibility of punishment, confession has to be accompanied by restitution (1989:82). „The person whose life is open to social interaction and influence has the benefit of social support and sanctions ... I am increasingly persuaded that will power or

¹¹⁵ However, Mowrer's concept of sin „is not the Judeo-Christian view of an offense against God; he also rejects the concept of vicarious atonement“ (Carter/Narramore 1979:134).

self-control is not nearly so much an individual matter as we sometimes think. Instead, is it not basically a social phenomenon?“ (1961:215). „The most radically redemptive enterprises which we today know, notably the Salvation Army and Alcoholics Anonymous, are lay movements with ‚leaders‘ coming ... from the ranks of their own converted and transformed personnel. Here the priesthood of All Believers is more than a high sounding Reformation slogan; it is a living reality“ (1964:109). Mowrer says that sin always impairs „the ease and the zest“ with which man participates in social institutions, and it undermines interpersonal „confidence and security.“ For this reason, repayment in the sense of sacrifice, suffering, and restitution has long been widely recognized as the basic expression of human justice and the means of again making oneself acceptable after having violated some established code of conduct (1964:91-94).

Mowrer has the merit of reminding the Christians of their heritage in forgiveness. Building on Mowrer's insights, Loewen integrates the aspect of forgiveness into cultural anthropology. However, Hesselgrave cautions: „We err to read Christian meaning into the language of O.H. Mowrer when he speaks of the need for open confession, repentance, restitution and service. Mowrer is not even a theist. He makes it clear that he has no interest in man's ‚eternal salvation,‘ but only in his ‚salvation‘ here and now“ (Hesselgrave 1983:481 commenting on Mowrer 1964:19).

Paul Tournier, an evangelical medical doctor, starts psychotherapy in his home. In his most conceptual book *Guilt and Grace* (1962), he discusses various aspects of guilt: its subtle manifestations, its destructiveness, true and false guilt, and the relation of the atonement and unconditional love to guilt feelings (Carter 1979:133). He says about guilt and confession:

It is abundantly clear that no man lives free of guilt. Guilt is universal. But according as it is repressed or recognized, so it sets in motion one of two contradictory processes: repressed, it leads to anger, rebellion, fear and anxiety, a deadening of conscience, an increasing inability to recognize one's faults, and a growing dominance of aggressive tendencies. But consciously recognized, it leads to repentance, to the peace and security of divine pardon, and in that way to a progressive refinement of conscience and a steady weakening of aggressive impulses (Tournier 1962:152).

Tournier stresses the importance of confession. He says that where people work together, there will always be differences of opinion, conflicts, jealousy and bitterness. But in a religious circle, we are less willing to bring these out into the open. „Aggressiveness is repressed taking the form of anxiety“ (1957:38).

I speak of my own experience as a doctor ... Many functional disturbances, and, in the long run, many organic lesions as well, are the direct consequence of unresolved remorse. That this is so is shown by the fact of their abrupt disappearance or reduction after confession. One has seen, for instance, cases where long-standing insomnia, palpitations, headaches, disorders of the digestive organs or of the liver have disappeared overnight after the confession of a lie or of an illicit love-affair (1954:209).

When a patient is painfully making his way towards a complete confession, absorbed in his inner dialogue, the voice of conscience says to him: „You have sinned;“ but the voice of God adds: „Confess it.“ One is negative, the other positive; one crushes, the other is a call to deliverance and to life (1957:174).

Talking about true and false guilt, Tournier points out that true guilt is estrangement from God and therefore also from fellow men, while false guilt is the feeling of condemnation which arises out of violation of cultural norms (1962:67; 1965:129). False guilt feelings are those of „illegitimate“ children (1962:18). Talking predominantly about guilt, Tournier is also conscious of his search for honour.

I wanted to play a successful role - for the good of my patient, certainly, but also in order to come up to the expectations I supposed my colleague to have of me. We are touching here on a most difficult problem, that of our desire to appear in a favorable light. Our personage is fashioned not only by our instincts, our egoism and our vanities, but also by our legitimate ambitions, even those, which seem most desinterested (1957:36).

In his habilitation thesis *Gewissen und Gewissensbildung heute in tiefenpsychologischer und theologischer Sicht* „Conscience and Development of Conscience Today in Psychoanalytical and Theological Perspective“ (1978), Antoni J. Nowak (born 1935), a Catholic priest, attempts an integrated view of conscience. He says that Jesus Christ, not a law, is the moral norm for the Christian (1978:108f.). Based on Caruso, he identifies as Christian the „personal conscience“ when it makes conscious decisions to approach and follow Christ (1978:115).

It is essential that it [moral theology] understands man not as a closed in monad and not only in his relationship to transcendence, but always in relationship to redemptive history ... As the conscience is a hermeneutical principle of Biblical ethics, thus redemptive history is a hermeneutical principle for the conscience of modern man. Therefore, the Christian personal conscience is not confronted with a value system, but with a person, Christ. It acts in responsibility; in Christ it has a critical instance for the evaluation of its correspondence with the will of God (1978:117).

Nowak sees the psychogenesis of the conscience in five stages as presented in table 2.3. In Christian education, these developmental stages of the conscience should be considered when speaking about sin and guilt (1978:52-79,136).

Table 2.3: Developmental Stages of the Conscience according to Nowak

Developmental Stage	Developmental Stage of the Conscience
Principle of desire and reality	„Conscience“ of the dual union
Pre-oedipal stage	With-„Conscience“
Oedipal stage	Authority-„Conscience“
Super-Ego	Symbol of the Conscience
Overcoming of the Super-Ego	Personal Conscience

The development of the conscience should also consider the different persons and relationships involved in the *ecclesiola*, the „church.“ These are listed in table 2.4. (Nowak 1978:137).

Table 2.4: Relationships Involved in the Development of Conscience

I	The authenticity of the personal character to which conscience belongs
You	The conscience receives a concrete structure through the dialogue with the You. Psychologically speaking, this is the pre-oedipal and oedipal stage.
We	The community that builds the super-ego-„conscience.“
God	Faith in God who revealed himself in Jesus Christ.

In the Catholic Church, education of the conscience means essentially education into the sacrament of penance explained by Nowak in table 2.5. (1978:131).

Table 2.5: Heteronomous, Autonomous and Theonomous Conscience

Conscience	heteronomous	autonomous	theonomous
Guilt	To violate a norm	Act against my conscience	Both
Penance	To restore order	I have to regain order	Put my relationship to God and church in order
Sacrament	Belongs to rel. life	Here I find religious force	Here we meet God

Whereas Christian theology remains essentially guilt-oriented not only in vocabulary but also in content, Christa Meves, a youth psychotherapist, states in her book *Plädoyer für das Schamgefühl* „Pledge for the Feeling of Shame“ (1985) that shame is first a physiological, human reaction. It comprises reddening, lowering or turning of the face, lowering or covering

the eyes, covering the head or the whole body with the hands, to curb the body, turn it, run away or hide. It is produced by the secretion of epinephrine in the adrenal glands. It is caused by an experience of exposure, of inadequacy or shortcoming (1985:10f.). It is a normal human reaction, which only animals, schizophrenics and mental deficient persons do not have. At the latest from the third year on, educators know the hiding and shaming reactions of children in situations of exposure and deficiency (1985:13). The feeling of shame correlates with the development of ego and personality and serves its protection, especially during its fragile early stages (1985:15). Relating to the loss of the initial unity of the personality in the Fall, she differentiates three stages: the consciousness of good and evil, secondly the understanding of one's fault and evil state, and thirdly, the reaction of shame with the need for protecting one's dignity. Shame is a general human phenomenon, despite the fact that failure for which one feels shame is dependent on time and society. Even in zones of complete loss of taboo, the feeling of shame persists in a situation of failure (1985:18f.).

The sexual feeling of shame is a specific, especially intensive feeling, as a special case of the general, social feeling of shame. The attempt to do away with sexual shame in the West has led to a loss of control of sexuality, which has led to an increase of rape, divorce, hysteria, disorders of potency and neurotic homosexuality. The result of the „great experiment“ shows why in all the cultures sexuality is especially protected through an intensified shame feeling and taboos. Its lack is dangerous for humanity (1985:22,24). Shame serves as a protection for the centre of personality, for the dignity of man, in order to give weak or deficient parts of personality the possibility to develop (1985:24f.). Interestingly, in marriage there is no shame anymore because love covers the exposure of body or character deficiencies (1985:27). „The attempt to put away with shame leads to diminished discernment of good and evil, to demoralization and perversion. Therefore, it becomes evident that shame functions as part of conscience. It helps to oppose the surrender to the vital drives: egoism, sexuality, property, power, gluttony. It stimulates the perfection of the person through the measured use of the drives“ (1985:28). In the younger generation, Meves observes a loss of values through non-concern for the development of conscience in anti-authoritarian education (2001).

Green and Lawrenz present a substantial contribution to a synthesis of theology and psychology in their book *Encountering Shame and Guilt* (1994). They build basically on Tomkins' affect theory (1962; 1963), Kaufman's psychology of shame (1989), and Benner's strategic pastoral counseling (1992). Based on Kaufman's refusal to differentiate shame and guilt on the grounds of attributing the former to self and the latter to acts, Green and Lawrenz

decide to use shame „as the overarching term for the affective experience“ and guilt „as the objective status of being in the wrong“ (1994:38). Consequently, they define guilt as „the fact of wrongdoing, being in the wrong.“ Shame is „the subjective, personal, and painful emotional experience that occurs when one feels disconnected. It is a painful awareness of feeling inadequate, unworthy, and exposed“ (1994:169). Within the comprehensive affect of shame including discouragement, embarrassment, and shyness, Green and Lawrenz differentiate moral shame as „regret or remorse for having done wrong,“ imposed shame as „disgrace or devaluation inflicted by another,“ and natural shame as „a sense of limitation, fallibility, and humility“ (1994:43,169f.).

Shame is resolved when broken interpersonal bridges are reconnected. „The type of shame can be identified by the following question: Who is responsible for the disconnection?“ (1994:170). When I am responsible for the disconnection, then I am feeling moral shame. The resolution of moral shame implies the following six steps: (1) identification and (2) acceptance of responsibility, (3) ownership of the resulting feelings, (4) confession of the wrongdoing, (5) acceptance of forgiveness from the other, God, and self, and (6) restitution or correction. If another person is responsible for the disconnection, then it is imposed shame (1994:56,170f.). Resolving imposed shame involves the following eight steps: (1) reattribution of responsibility for the disconnection (hold self responsible when appropriate, hold other person responsible for his or her part), (2) identification, ownership and resolution of all emotional reactions, (3) use of anger to re-establish ego-boundaries, (4) acceptance of love from another person, (5) application of love to oneself, (6) confrontation of the imposer (in person or symbolically) and confession of personal responsibility, (7) acceptance of forgiveness from God, the other person, and oneself, and (8) rebuilding the relationship in truth and grace (1994:67,171). „If no specific transgression has occurred and my humanness is responsible for the disconnection, then the experience is natural shame. Natural shame is resolved through acceptance of God’s reconnection with us through Jesus Christ and our acceptance of redemption and grace“ (1994:75,171).

The pastoral counselor can assist ... individuals in their pursuit of knowing God by aiding in the resolution of the imposed shame. The realistic attribution of responsibility for the experienced disconnection and any associated guilt is the beginning of clarifying the transference.¹¹⁶ Feelings and attitudes toward parents and others that

¹¹⁶ „Psychologists use the term ‚transference‘ to refer to the unconscious assignment or transfer of the attitudes and feelings originally associated with one person, who has been personally significant, to another person“ (Green/Lawrenz 1994:116).

have been too hard to acknowledge influence a person's capacity to give and receive love. The expression of such feelings and attitudes begins the process of being realistic in accepting and loving self and others. Anger or fear that is related to a parent can be attributed to the source of the emotional reaction and then resolved ... God can then be known for who he is and not as a reflection of the parents or other people (1994:117).

Green and Lawrenz's choice of shame as „overarching term for the affective experience“ and guilt „as the objective status of being in the wrong“ does not seem adequate. According to their definition, „moral shame“ can correspond to shame about a transgression or to „guilt feelings.“ Their merit is to define guilt as an objective state of culpability beyond the psychological limitation to feelings. They do not manage to do the same for shame, limiting its definition to an affect only. In contrast to their position, we hold that shame and guilt both are „subjective“ emotions and „objective“ states. Green and Lawrenz's original contribution is their therapeutic approach to the different forms of shame by attribution of responsibility. The healing process is followed step by step through ownership of emotions, acceptance of love, confrontation and confession to forgiveness from God, the other person, and oneself. The final step is restitution and reconciliation respectively. We will discuss the relative application of confrontation and confession in the different conscience orientations in later chapters.¹¹⁷

2.4.13 Consequences for Christian Education

Stephan E. Müller (born 1950) formulates in the introduction to his doctoral thesis the role of conscience in the personal development like this:

The success of the personal-social process of maturation in the life of man is dependent on the conscience. This personal disposition shows man, under the precondition of a good development of the conscience, what he owes to the You and We, the Self and God. Without understanding these duties man lives inadequately, fails in the human relationships and misses the meaning of his life. Thus, the conscience acts as personal instance, which starts the process of maturation of man, maintains it and helps that living together in community and society can succeed (S. Müller 1984:11).

The first Christian pedagogue to write about conscience is Johann H. Pestalozzi (1746-1827). He says that conscience is like a germ in every child. To develop this germ is the task of every education (Pestalozzi 1960:63). „Obedience and love, thanksgiving and confidence united unfold the first germ of the conscience“ (1963a:392).

¹¹⁷ See sections 5.4.7. Initiation and Confrontation with Shame and Guilt-oriented People, 5.4.8. Confession with Shame and Guilt-oriented People, and 5.4.10. Methods and Models of Counseling in Shame and Guilt-Oriented Contexts.

She [the mother] gives the child's exercise in the moral feeling, speaking and acting, through which she elevates it to independence, a living model in her own moral feeling, speaking and acting. Her presence, the whole impression of her being, generates in the child the moral consciousness ... Her supervision under which it is in her absence, the demand to act according to it as if she were present, creates in it the habit and capability to live under her eyes. Its conscience wakes up ... The image of its mother, which accompanies it everywhere, becomes its conscience (1963b:202f.).

However, the child is for Pestalozzi not a *tabula rasa* in which the conscience is set from outside. The mother's example and education serve the exercise of a function, which is already present in the child and which seeks to unfold and develop itself.

As a product of nature I have therefore an animalistic, as a product of society a social and as a product of myself a moral view of truth and rights ... My conscience makes me a product of myself ... Through the work of myself I am moral force and virtue ... As a product of myself I seek perfection“ (1963a:175f.).

Like the reformers, Pestalozzi sees the conscience through its expressions. Like most theologians he sees in it the voice of God. Having taken up ideas from Kant and Fichte, his observations describe phenomena taken up later by Freud and Jung (Krische 1984:54).

Hans Zulliger (1893-1965), a pedagogue and psychotherapist, sees the conscience as a disposition developed and influenced by human context. In the first weeks of life the child is determined by its drives. Zulliger sees the first reactions of conscience when the child learns to renounce certain things because of love for the mother. The child has confidence that the mother will care for its needs, because it knows that she loves it and it loves her. „Without love no conscience can develop. The conscience is a ‚heir‘ of love“ (1970:24).

The development of the conscience depends essentially on the fact that the small child has the opportunity to have deeper relationships, to learn to love, and to „bind“ itself to a You. The natural object of love is first the mother (or another significant other), later the father; only a lot later, when the young person has become more mature, the objects of love are abstract ideals and God (1989:10; cp. 1970:38).

The voice of the conscience is first the voice of the mother, the father, the grand parents, or the teacher. Later, the child identifies itself with the demands of the conscience so that the voice becomes its own. Finally, the voice of the conscience becomes the representative of a super-personal power, the voice of God (1989:33). „The absolute speaks through our conscience; but not everything which comes from our conscience is caused by the absolute. Otherwise, inadequate reactions of the conscience would be impossible“ (1989:131f.).

Zulliger knows also about an unconscious part of the conscience. Unacceptable demands of the context are not only perceived, but absorbed in the soul, however as a foreign body. Consequently, the division of the conscience takes place. This unconscious part manifests

itself in the coercion to confess and in the need for punishment. The conscience can betray the crime and provoke auto-punishment (1989:61,88f.). For the maturing conscience of the older child and the adult, confession progressively takes the place of the need of punishment, a confession generated not from fear of punishment or deprivation of love, but from repentance. The greater the liberty of punishment and anxiety in which a child grows up, the earlier the conscience reacts in a healthy way. Guilt is confessed directly, the punishment is endured, the feeling of isolation is finished, and the conscience is durably relieved (1989:87; cp. Krische 1984:61).

In his doctoral thesis *Das Gewissen lernen* „Intentional Learning of the Conscience“ (1976), Fritz Oser (born 1937), a Catholic pedagogue, defines conscience based on Huijts (1969) as an inter-subjective relationship, as perspective-cognitive and affective-motivational self-evaluation, as development of personality, and as self-realization in shared responsibility (1976:496-499). He says that only pedagogical and applied psychological models can make a contribution for understanding the conscience. A descriptive theory of the conscience does not promote (a) moral decision processes, (b) emotional binding to norms and values, and (c) guidelines for in-class situations (1976:406f.). For the intentional learning, he stresses the importance of emotional learning over cognitive learning. Emotional learning is promoted by confidence, harmony, bonding, and love. It is hindered by mistrust, disharmony, anxiety and lack of bonding (1976:155ff.). In order to teach the conscience, it must be integrated in the regulative learning process in the way that norms are given, guilt is produced, sanctions are emitted and relief of the conscience is thus induced (1976:391-395,405).

As we have seen, confession is a very important component in Roman Catholic education. Traditionally, instruction for confession was given in the 4th or 6th primary grade. In answering the question, when the first confession should take place, Oser says: „As long as the development of the conscience lasts“ (1973:115). In the learning process of the conscience, which is most intense in the first two years of life with decreasing intensity up to age twelve, but lasting the whole life, confession should be presented at every age in a way which is adequate and understandable for the child. Besides the priest, it includes parents, peers, teachers and the catechisers, and takes place in different locations and in different forms. To be valid it must include sincere repentance and relief of conscience through reparation and reinsertion into the community (1973:116f.). Confession should be promoted by a gracious authority such as provided by the family, which guarantees freedom of punishment (1973:119). The child needs to confess to the person, against whom it has committed the

offence and with whom it has a relationship. Only the adult can confess his guilt in an abstract way to a „third person“ (1973:120).¹¹⁸

Generally, Christian educators stress the importance of love as catalyser of the development of conscience. They have an exclusively guilt-oriented vocabulary even though emotional learning with bonding and love as its basis imply a person-oriented and therefore shame-oriented approach. For Oser forgiveness includes the three Rs (repentance, reparation and reconciliation) and therefore includes a combined guilt and shame-oriented view.¹¹⁹ Only Rüedi, who draws the conclusions for education from Adler's individual psychology, has a socio-psychological emphasis on holistic and goal-oriented education for cooperation, *Gemeinschaftsgefühl*, *Lebensstil* and „meaning of life“ which represents a shame-oriented approach (Rüedi 1988:264-314).¹²⁰

2.4.14 Conclusion

Freud is the first to have shown that conscience is a mainly unconscious phenomenon. He identifies the conscience with the impersonal super-ego originating from the overcoming of the oedipal complex. In Adler's conception, the conscience is an instrument of securing the life, a feeling, which confirms man in the pursuit of his life plan and life style. Nevertheless, the conscience remains a „fictive instance“ for him. The representatives of the philosophical orientations of psychology attempt to overcome Freud's deterministic model. For C.G. Jung, the conscience, as the call of the self, is an archetype originating from the collective unconscious, which is given for every human existence. It exists in a „moral“ and an „ethical“ form, which reminds us of scholasticism's dual system. For Jung, the conscience lacks the personal dimension, the relationship to the You. For him, God is not a partner, but only a *factum psychologicum* (Nowak 1978:50,134). In Caruso's personal analysis, the Freudian super-ego is only a symbol of the conscience. Conscience itself is a congenital disposition open to the world, which develops across different stages to the personal autonomous conscience. However, Caruso's personal analysis cannot solve the problem of values, which is beyond psychology (Nowak 1978:135f.). Finally, Frey proposes a philosophical-anthropological

¹¹⁸ Cp. Mowrer's propositions to confess in the circle of the concerned, valuable also for adults, in section 2.4.12. Attempts of a Synthesis of Psychology and Theology. S. Müller shows the role of all the members of the family (mother, father, brother, and sister) in supporting the development of the conscience (1984:214-271).

¹¹⁹ For the conscience orientation of the three Rs see sections 2.7.4. A Soteriological Model of Conscience in Relation to Shame and Guilt, and 4.3.4. The Biblical Models of Forgiveness.

¹²⁰ For an ample explanation of *Gemeinschaftsgefühl* and *Lebensstil* see section 2.4.2. Alfred Adler's Search for Harmony, Honour and Power.

approach beyond psychology. But his approach lacks the You of God behind the conscience. Only Frankl speaks of conscience as the „organ of meaning“ responsible to God.

Theology gives the answer to the question of the responsibility of conscience, which psychology and philosophy cannot answer satisfactorily. Man is confronted with the You of God. In his covenant relationship with God, conscience is liable to Him through Jesus Christ (Nowak 1978:137). In Christian education, then, Jesus Christ has to be presented adequately to every age (Oser 1973:115). Where psychology sees sin as a result of emotional disturbance (not a cause), theologians speak of depravity, condemnation, alienation and guilt as the result of sin (Carter/Narramore 1979:58). The answer of theology to the problem of conscience is forgiveness. Secular psychologist Mowrer, evangelical Tournier and Catholics Nowak and Oser stress the importance of the inclusion of confession into Christian education, psychotherapy and counseling. The psychogenesis of the conscience in a Christian perspective is shown schematically in table 2.6. (adapted from Nowak 1978:76). The conscience develops from a heteronomous super-ego structure through the stage of an autonomous conscience during youth to a theonomous conscience.

Table 2.6: Psychogenesis of Conscience in a Christian Perspective

	Childhood	Youth	Maturity
Conscience development:	The dominion of the super-ego	Attempt to overcome the super-ego	Overcoming of the super-ego (mature personality)
Source of authority:	Bio-psychical authority of the significant others	Internalisation of the significant others	Acceptance of norms & values with responsibility
The conscience as:	Super-ego, heteronomous morality	Attempt to take position in regards to norms & values, autonomous morality	Moral norms, personal conscience, theonomous morality

While Freud perceives shame as a product of repression, and Erikson as a „primitive“ stage, Piers defines it as the expression of the tension between ego and ego-ideal concerning a shortcoming in relation to goals or values. On the other hand, guilt is the expression of a transgression of a norm set by the super-ego. Piers' psychoanalytical model seems to be very helpful. Anthropologists Spiro and Käser, and missiologist Müller build on it.

Kaufman and Lewis start from empirical psychology. For Kaufman, who bases his psychology on Tomkins' deterministic affect theory, shame is an affect auxiliary, and guilt

„moral shame.“ According to Kaufman, the cognitive aspect of shame comes only later in child development. In Kaufman’s theory, guilt is reduced to the „immorality“ component of several affects. For Lewis, the conscience is situated in the objective self. Shame and guilt are secondary, so-called self-conscious emotions, depending on cognitive attributions. While shame results from a global attribution, guilt results from a specific attribution of self. This is another helpful model for differentiating shame and guilt. It seems to better explain shame and guilt phenomenology than speculative psychoanalytic models. It explains affective and cognitive aspects of both shame and guilt. Tested in the cross-cultural setting, shame and guilt seem to be human universals, whereas norms and attributions are culture-specific. However, Lewis’ model does not include the „objective“ aspect of shame and guilt, of which the Bible speaks. These two aspects are presented in table 2.7.

Table 2.7: Subjective and Objective Aspects of Shame and Guilt

	Shame	Guilt
Subjective emotion	Emotion of falling short, of failure, of being exposed	Remorse, regret about wrongdoing
Objective state	Fallibility, incompleteness	Fact of transgression & wrongdoing

Systems theory changes radically the approach to conscience from a former intrapsychic pattern to a regulative system, which is communicating with the social system. It makes it part of the blackbox, of which only inputs and outputs are observable. Hence, it takes into account the „incognito“ aspect of conscience. Luhmann’s attempt to integrate it into a theory of meaning, makes conscience the organ which reduces the complexity of the system to a meaningful concept. It is a combined empirical-philosophical approach with a relativization of meaning, which ultimately can only be given by God.

Finally, Meves stresses the importance of shame as a physiological human phenomenon related to the concept of face. Both shame and guilt are expressions of the fallen state of man. She warns the West of the attempt to neglect the importance of shame. In his attempt to suppress shame, Western man suppresses the conscience as a whole, and its ability to protect the personality. The end result is moral decadence.

In summary, shame and guilt include affective, cognitive, behavioural and existential elements. Both are considered subjective emotions and objective states. While shame implies a failure, guilt indicates a transgression in relation to standards. Shame implies a global

attribution, while guilt results from a specific attribution. Table 2.8. summarizes the contributions of different psychologists to conscience theory in relation to shame and guilt.

Table 2.8: Differential Definitions of Shame and Guilt in Psychology

Author	Shame	Guilt	Underlying Theory
Piers (1953)	Tension between ego and ego-ideal	Tension between ego and super-ego	Psychoanalysis
Potter-Efron (1989)	Failure of being, implying the whole self; treatment mainly affective	Failure of doing, implying violation of values; treatment mainly cognitive, behavioural	Psychoanalysis
Tomkins (1962; 1963) Kaufman (1989)	Failure, exposure of self, loss of face	Immorality shame	Affect theory
Lewis (1992)	Self-conscious emotion; global failure	Self-conscious emotion; specific failure	Cognitive theory
Hilgers (1996)	Failure, defect or exposure with violation of self, which leads to a tension between ego and ego-ideal (competence, intimacy & dependence shame)	Transgression of a norm with violation of the other, which leads to a tension between ego and super-ego	Combination of psychoanalysis, affect and cognitive theory
Meves (1985)	A physiological, human phenomenon, connected with face	A human state of fallenness	Physiology and Scripture
Green/Lawrenz (1994)	Painful experience of disconnection natural: fallibility imposed: someone else causes the disconnection	State of being responsible for a wrongdoing or transgression	Affect theory, cognitive behavioural theory & Scripture

Each of the contributions illuminates one aspect of the phenomenon, but no one can entirely explain it. They are complementary theories. With its psychodynamic and empirical approaches, psychology has given a substantial contribution to conscience theory, which theology and philosophy with their speculative approach could not produce. Psychology, in

particular, has shown that the greater part of the conscience is unconscious. On the other hand, psychology's empirical approach has shortcomings, which theology and philosophy can overcome.

In his attempt to sum up the contribution of psychology to the theory of the conscience, Rüdiger gives four complementary aspects of psychological theories of conscience: (1) The conscience is an acquired specification of a general disposition to the self-realization of the personality. (2) The structural aspect: The conscience is the structural core of human soul, in dual unity with the *Gemüt* (the emotional element of the soul as counterpart to the cognitive and volitional element of the conscience). (3) The actual genetic aspect: The conscience is an instance of regulation, which functions according to the mechanisms of *Gestalt* perception theory, which means that it aims for a meaningful goal. (4) The ontogenetic aspect: love and inter-human understanding are two preeminent dimensions of the psychogenesis of the conscience (Rüdiger 1976:461ff.). Rüdiger's position is a combination of Catholic moral philosophy and psychology. From a theistic perspective, we believe that it is primarily God who supervises the realization of personality. Furthermore, it is embedded into the whole cultural setting of the social system, not only the self. Concerning the structural model, we have already seen that Vetter's structural model is based more on a dualistic Greek view than on a Biblical, holistic view (see appendix 4). The conscience has affective, cognitive, volitional and existential elements. However, we agree that conscience is the core of human personality. The actual genetic aspect expressed in terms of *Gestalt* perception theory is a convenient summary of the Biblical view as well as Adler's, Frankl's, and probably also Luhmann's perspective of meaning. The ontogenetic aspect places the genesis of the conscience within a loving covenant relationship.

2.5 Cultural Anthropology

The introduction of cultural anthropology into the discussion of conscience adds the cross-cultural dimension to the concept. This additional perspective gives another view on shame and guilt in the function of the conscience. The approach of cultural anthropology builds on psychology's findings and follows its secular worldview.

We will start the study with Benedict and Mead, who are the first to differentiate tentatively between guilt and shame cultures. This view is refined by Singer and developed into a coherent developmental and motivational theory of conscience orientation by Spiro. Spiro's findings inspires Käser and Müller, who systematize it further. Lewis' concept of self-

conscious emotions is validated cross-culturally and developed further by a group of cross-cultural psychologists around Tangney. At this point in our study, we interject a description of Chinese society as one example of a shame-oriented culture. We will not be able to discuss other shame-oriented cultures such as Japanese culture (Doi 1982; Wiegand-Kanzaki/Minamioji 1986), Mediterranean cultures (Peristiany 1966; Peristiany/Pitt-Rivers 1992), Arabic culture (Patai 1983), and West African culture (Parrinder 1961). Finally, we present four approaches to an integration of cultural anthropology with psychology and theology by evangelical anthropologists Loewen, Noble, Priest, and Hiebert.

2.5.1 Benedict and Mead's Differentiation of Cultures

The two pioneer anthropologists who differentiate first between shame and guilt cultures are two collaborators of Franz Boas at Columbia University: Ruth Benedict (1887-1948) and Margaret Mead (1901-1978). Mead studies psychology prior to engaging in anthropological research (Zanolli 1990:299). Both of them approach culture as a functional whole, a view, which they inherit from Boas (Benedict 1989:51f.; Mead 1961:1-3; Zanolli 1990:314).

In her book *Patterns of Culture* (1934/89), Benedict makes a first attempt to categorize cultures. She uses the labels of Nietzschean and psychiatric distinction between *Dionysian* and *Apollonian* behaviour for explaining the differences between Pueblo and other North American Indians. *Dionysian* cultures would be cultures of ecstasy and frenzy, where people would believe that „the path of excess leads to the palace of wisdom.“ They would use self-glorification, fear of ridicule and shaming as positive and negative sanctions (Benedict 1989:79,214f.). *Apollonian* cultures would prefer the law in the Hellenic sense, „the middle of the road,“ formality and sobriety (1989:79,129).¹²¹

Three years later, in 1937, Mead edits a comparative cultural study about the North American norms of competitiveness and individualism with the title *Cooperation and Competition among Primitive Peoples* (1937/61). As the main conclusion she states:

There is a correspondence between: a major emphasis upon competition, a social structure which depends upon the initiative of the individual, a valuation of property for individual ends, a single scale of success, and a strong development of the ego.

[Secondly] there is a correspondence between: a major emphasis upon cooperation, a social structure which does not depend upon individual initiative or the

¹²¹ The Pueblo *Apollonian* culture is described in Benedict 1989:117-129, the Kwakiutl *Dionysian* culture in 1989:175-212. Note the affinity of *Dionysian* culture to shame-oriented culture and *Apollonian* to guilt-oriented culture.

exercise of power over persons, a faith in an ordered universe, weak emphasis upon rising in status, and a high degree of security for the individual (1961:511).¹²²

As a by-product¹²³ of this study Mead observes that the use of public shame as a principal sanction is not a function of either competitive or cooperative emphases in the specific culture nor yet of the development of the ego, but specifically of the studied North American Indian culture area (1961:511). She comes to this conclusion in the study of internal and external sanctions, which she describes in the following way:

The devout Catholic who alone on a desert island would still abstain from meat on Friday may be said to be responding to an *internal* sanction, which we customary call conscience; whereas the businessman from a middlewestern city who regards a visit to New York as a suitable occasion for a debauch in which he would never indulge at home conducts his exemplary home behavior in response to an *external* sanction¹²⁴ ...

Guilt [as an internal control] differs from fear in that it represents a disordered state within the psyche, which can be righted only by atonement. Guilt is a response to a past threat; for the Arapesh to the threat of loss of love if aggression has been manifested, for the Manus to the threat of loss of support if the emotions have not been controlled and socially directed. This early threat seems to be internalized in the character ...

The use of shame as a principal external sanction is ... characteristic of all the North American Indian cultures in the sample whether they are individualistic, competitive, or cooperative. The development ... of an enormous sensitivity to the opinion of others seems to be fundamental ... Among the cultures with a strong development of the ego, the exercise of the sanction may result in suicide. Shame may also, when it is very strongly developed, become a relatively internal sanction (1961:493f. *italics in original*).

As early as 1937, Mead arrives by minute observations at a significantly differentiated view of guilt and shame. About shame in Samoa, which she finds less intensely present as in the American Indian form, she observes:

Shame in Samoa, which is a potent force for control of individuals in the interests of conformity, is not connected with the bodily functions, nor with sex, but with social relationships, and comes from calling attention to oneself unsuitably, from speaking out of turn, from presumption, and also from awkwardness, fumbling for words, lack of skill, if these ineptitudes are specifically commented on by others. The greatest shame is aroused by the accusation *tautala laititi*, „talking above your age,“ a shame in which the parents share (1961:307).

¹²² Note the similarities of the first with a guilt-oriented culture and of the second with a shame-oriented culture. There are however differences, as the weak emphasis on rising in status, which are surprising for a prestige and shame-oriented culture.

¹²³ Guilt is absent from the index, shame is mentioned once only.

¹²⁴ Note that the internal sanction is related by Mead to conscience, but the external sanction not.

Towards the end of the Second World War, Benedict receives the assignment to study Japanese culture, the USA's main enemy at that time. The result of this study is published in 1946 with the title *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (Benedict 1946/74). Drawing on the common insights with Mead, Benedict categorizes the Japanese culture as a shame culture and the American culture as a guilt culture. According to Hesselgrave, this distinction has been most significant in cultural studies (Hesselgrave 1979:428).

In Benedict's description, a guilt culture „inculcates absolute standards of morality and relies on men's developing a conscience ... A man in such a society may ... suffer in addition from shame when he accuses himself of gaucheries ... He may be exceedingly chagrined about not dressing appropriately,“ but in no way does he view this as sin (1974:222).

In a culture where shame is a major sanction people are chagrined about acts which we expect people to feel guilty about. This chagrin can be very intense and it cannot be relieved, as guilt can be, by confession and atonement ... Where shame is the major sanction, a man does not experience relief when he makes his fault public even to a confessor. So long as his bad behavior does not „get out into the world“ he need not be troubled and confession appears to him merely a way of courting trouble. Shame cultures therefore do not provide for confessions, even to the gods. They have ceremonies for good luck rather than for expiation.

True shame cultures rely on external sanctions for good behavior, not, as true guilt cultures do, on an internalized conviction of sin. Shame is a reaction to other people's criticism. A man is shamed either by being openly ridiculed and rejected or by fantasizing to himself that he has been made ridiculous. In either case it is a potent sanction. But it requires an audience or at least a man's fantasy of an audience. Guilt does not (1974:223).

Describing Japan's culture, Benedict explains that Japanese view shame as the root of virtue. „A man who knows shame“ is regarded as a „virtuous man“ or a „man of honour.“ Honour means living up to the picture of oneself, which is congruent with following the explicit signposts of good behaviour, such as meeting expectations or foreseeing contingencies. A failure to do so is shame (*haji*). As Benedict says, such shame has the same place of authority in Japanese ethics as „a clear conscience“ and „being right with God“ have in Western ethics. Therefore, a Japanese does not have to be punished in afterlife (1974:224).

Both Benedict and Mead already observe that North America experiences a shift in moral emphasis from parental guidelines to „age-grade standards,“ in which the disciplinary force shifts from guilt to the shame of peer group disapproval (Benedict 1974:225; Mead 1961:307; cp. Keesing 1958:305; Johnson 1972:182; Hesselgrave 1983:464; Müller 1996a:110).¹²⁵

¹²⁵ Cp. section 5.1.13. The Generation X and Shame-Oriented.

In summary, Benedict and Mead differentiate shame and guilt cultures on the basis of the mechanisms of social control in a given culture: external social control for shame cultures and internal social control for guilt cultures. Piers (1953/71:60f.) insists that both conscience orientations have internalised the norms. As we will see with Spiro (1958:409), the difference is that significant others are not introjected in shame orientation, while they are introjected in guilt orientation.

2.5.2 Milton Singer's Cultural Studies

In his conjoint study with Gerhart Piers *Shame and Guilt* (1953/71), Milton B. Singer refines Benedict and Mead's newly introduced differentiation of shame and guilt cultures. Comparing the anthropological data of five American Indian Tribes classified as „shame cultures“ with Western „guilt culture,“ Singer confirms Piers' findings on shame and guilt and proposes the following conclusions (Piers/Singer 1971:96-100):

- 1) There are sufficient reasons for doubting the prevailing assumption that most cultures of the world are shame cultures, and that Western culture is one of the rare guilt cultures ...
- 2) Neither the distinction between internal and external sanctions, nor the additional criteria of reference to an audience and internalized past threat,¹²⁶ suffice to differentiate shame from guilt ... Piers' conception of shame as the anxiety aroused by failure to live up to internalized parental ideals under the unconscious threat of abandonment and of guilt as the anxiety aroused by transgression of internalized parental prohibitions under the unconscious threat of mutilation, offers a very promising criterion for distinguishing „unconscious“ shame from „unconscious“ guilt within the individual ...
- 3) The comparative psychometric data of the Indian Education Study do not support the generalization that American Indian cultures rely principally on shame as an external sanction ... they tend to indicate a significant role for guilt among some of them...
- 4) ... The comparison [of Freud's and a cultural theory of the role of guilt in cultural evolution] suggests that the kind of moral and technical progress that is characteristic of the development of civilization in general and Western civilization in particular does not depend, as Freud thought, on repression and an increase in the unconscious sense of guilt, but it is associated with the delimitation and specialization of the sense of moral responsibility. It further suggests that this emergence of an individual-centered moral order is itself the product of such civilizing processes as the growth of knowledge and the contact of diverse cultures. So far as the „burden of unconscious guilt“ is concerned, there is no evidence to indicate that it is any greater for civilized peoples than it was for pre-civilized peoples.
- 5) ... We cannot find sufficient evidence to justify the theory that most cultures of the world are shame cultures and that they are morally and technically „backward“ because they are not dominated by a sense of guilt ... The sense of guilt and the sense

¹²⁶ With reference to Benedict and Mead's hypotheses (Mead 1961:307,493f.; Benedict 1974:223).

of shame are found in most cultures, and the quantitative distribution of these sanctions has little to do with the „progressive“ or „backward“ character of a culture. 6) Psychological characterizations and comparisons of cultures - whether they are made in terms of shame and guilt, or in terms of personality types and „national characters“ - are of low validity because they seek to isolate „pure“ psychological categories. Their validity and fruitfulness will increase as they abandon this „psychologism“ and develop instead characterizing constructs in which the emotional emphases of a culture are integrally related to cultural values, worldview, overt behavior, and features of social organization (1971:96-100).

The interdisciplinary psychoanalytical and anthropological approach of Piers and Singer is very valuable to avoid stereotyped oversimplifications and generalizations in the new discovery of the importance of shame and guilt. Singer's last recommendation of applying the concepts of shame and guilt not to whole cultures, but to cultural value systems, behaviour and organizations is taken up by Melford Spiro in a very fruitful way.

2.5.3 Melford Spiro's Developmental and Motivational Model

In his book *Children in the Kibbutz* (1958), anthropologist Melford E. Spiro researches the relationship between child training and personality development in an Israeli kibbutz. His observations on cultural conformity lead to new insights to better distinguish conscience orientations.

Cultural conformity among adults may be, according to Spiro, a function of a number of motives: The performance of a cultural pattern can be intrinsically rewarding. If it is not rewarding, extrinsic motives are necessary. These can be alter-ego sanctions like esteem or shame from peers, super-ego sanctions as esteem or anxiety from self, or super-alter sanctions such as esteem or fear of authority. Spiro assumes that all three techniques are found in all societies, but that they are of different relative importance in a given society (1958:399).

Spiro sees the desire for approval and esteem as universal ego drives. Such approval is perceived as a sign of love. Due to the non-competitive training techniques employed by the nurses, the children of a kibbutz do not experience much recognition, even less in form of reward than in the form of punishment.¹²⁷ Through the frequent change of nurses, they suffer additionally of a high discontinuity of nurturance. As a result of the fact that kibbutz children must compete with their peers for the love of their nurses, they have a strong desire for approval and esteem. This desire is also found among adults in their concern for status or prestige (*emdah*). They say: „Everyone is interested in status. It's obvious - I don't want others

¹²⁷ Spiro speaks of a skewed punishment-reward ratio in childhood (1958:400).

to laugh at me.“ Approval and status can be gained by behaving in accordance with the cultural norms. Inadequacy and discovery of wrongdoing are important sources of shame (1958:401-403).

Like Piers and Singer, Spiro rejects Benedict and Mead's distinction of guilt and shame cultures, particularly the idea that members of shame cultures have no „conscience“ in the Euro-American sense, because they have not internalised the cultural values. He says: „If the values were not internalised, parents would have none to transmit to their children ... Further if no one has internalised the values, who would do the shaming?“ (1958:406).

Spiro holds that in any society most people have internalised their cultural values and evaluate their own acts in accordance with them. Should they desire to violate them, they experience „moral anxiety,“ which is the same as „expectation of punishment.“ Such moral anxiety informs the individual that the anticipated act is wrong and that its performance will lead to punishment.¹²⁸ Therefore, it serves as a motive for conformity. According to Spiro, this moral anxiety develops out of reward and punishment employed as training methods by agents of socialization. „Agents of socialization are more than trainers; they are also nurturers, satisfying the child's most important need - the need for love“ (1958:407). The child is motivated to comply with the demands of these „significant others“ in order to preclude withdrawal of their love. He models his behaviour in accordance with their values and learns to accept their judgements as his own. As a result, a super-ego develops.

Having denied the validity of the distinction between shame and guilt cultures, Spiro suggests:

Two types of super-ego, based on the agent of anticipated punishment, can be distinguished. This agent may be outside the individual or within him. It is our hypothesis that societies in which the child is trained by only a few agents of socialization, who themselves administer punishments, produce individuals who not only internalize the values of the socializing agent but who „introject“ the agent as well. The introject, then, is the significant other for such individuals; it is withdrawal of the introject's love that constitutes the anticipated punishment. Since this punishment, when it comes - and it comes after the transgression - is experienced as guilt („pangs of conscience“), we may refer to this type of super-ego as „guilt-oriented.“

We also hypothesize that societies in which the child is trained by a number of socializing agents, or in which the trainers discipline the child by claiming that other agents will punish him, do not produce individuals with „guilt-oriented“ super-egos. For, though these individuals internalize the values of the socializing agents, they do not introject the agents themselves. Since the significant others continue to remain external, it is withdrawal of the love of others that constitutes the anticipated

¹²⁸ Cp. the *conscientia antecedens* of scholasticism.

punishment. Because this punishment, when it comes, is experienced as shame, we may refer to this type of super-ego as „shame-oriented“ (1958:408; 1961a:120).

Of course, these two types of super-ego represent the polar extremes, conceived as ideal types, of a super-ego continuum. Most super-egos would represent admixtures of the two, weighted toward one or the other end of the continuum (1961a:120).

It must be emphasized that a shame no less than a guilt-oriented super-ego constitutes a conscience. By producing anxiety concerning anticipated punishment, both of them inform the individual that his anticipated act is wrong, and motivate him to refrain from transgression. Both serve to deter nonconformity whether others are present or not. Nevertheless, they function differently after a transgression has occurred. A person with a guilt-oriented super-ego suffers guilt when he transgresses, even if no one perceives his transgression, because the agent of punishment (the introject) is always with him. However, a person with a shame-oriented super-ego does not suffer shame when he transgresses unless others witness his transgression, for no agent of punishment (the external others) is present. Instead of experiencing *actual* punishment (shame), he continues to experience *anticipated* punishment (anxiety) (1958:409; 1961a:120 italics in original).

This anxiety may be so painful that it may lead some persons who live in societies with so-called shame-cultures to commit suicide ... the Japanese would be said to have shame-oriented super-egos; they experience anxiety when they anticipate performing a forbidden act or not performing a prescribed act. After committing the transgression, they continue to anticipate punishment, anxiety mounts, and suicide represents the last desperate attempt to remove the anxiety (1958:409 n.11; 1961a:120f.).

Spiro's observation that members of the kibbutz are highly sensitive to public opinion indicates that their conformity to cultural patterns is motivated by „fear of external punishment.“ However, they also have internalised their cultural values and conform to them even in the absence of external punishment. Therefore „moral anxiety“ must be another powerful motive in order to behave in accordance with cultural patterns. In this shame-oriented population of the kibbutz the anticipated agent of punishment is an external group rather than an introjected image, in Spiro's initial nomenclature, an alter-ego rather than a super-ego. Such shame-oriented super-ego nevertheless constitutes a functioning conscience that produces moral anxiety for anticipated wrong acts.

Social conformity¹²⁹ however has a larger aspect than internalised cultural motivation through the super-ego. Spiro elaborates further on culture and personality in his articles *Social Systems, Personality, Functional Analysis* (1961a) and *An Overview and a Suggested*

¹²⁹ Spiro differentiates between cultural and social conformity: „Social conformity is motivated by the desire to conform to the behavior of others; cultural conformity, by the desire to conform to cultural norms. Cultural conformity ... is a requisite for the functioning of human social systems, whereas social conformity is not“ (1961a:123 n.1).

Reorientation (1961b).¹³⁰ His basic idea is that social systems have vital functions for the survival of the group. In order to fulfil these functions the social systems make demands on the individuals and expect them to comply to these demands. At the same time the individual has basic needs which the social system must provide for. If the two can be brought together, a member will usually conform to the social system's demands and the individual's and the society's needs are met. According to Spiro's thesis, this conformity is achieved not principally by sanctions, but by internal motivation (1961a:98f.; 1961b:490). „If social systems can function only if their constituent roles are performed, then, in motivating the performance of roles, personality not only serves its own functions but it becomes a crucial variable in the functioning of social systems as well“ (1961a:100). These motivations are threefold:

In the first place, although society provides sanctions as a means for achieving social control, these sanctions are effectively only if the members of society have drives which can be reduced by the attainment of these goals. If this is the case these sanctions are cathected,¹³¹ and thereby become personality needs, which motivate role performance [extrinsic social control by alter-ego and super-alter needs]. Second, if the cultural norms, which prescribe the performance of the role, are internalized by the members of society, non-conformity induces anxiety. Since this anxiety can be reduced by the performance of the role, conformity with these norms becomes a need, which motivates role performance [internalized social control by super-ego needs]. Finally, the prescribed goals which are attained by role performance are, themselves, cathected and, hence, serve as personality needs to motivate the performance of roles [intrinsic social control by id and ego needs].¹³²

These three types of control have been termed, extrinsic, internalized, and intrinsic, respectively. We may summarize their differences and similarities, as follows: (a) In extrinsic control which is based on positive social sanctions, and (b) in intrinsic control which is based on manifest personal functions, the performance of roles is motivated by the desire to obtain a rewarding goal - either the cathected social sanction or the cathected goal of the role. (c) In extrinsic control which is based on negative social sanctions, (d) in internalized control, and (e) in intrinsic control which is based on latent [unconscious] personal functions,¹³³ the performance of roles is motivated by the desire to avoid pain - in the form of physical or social punishment, moral anxiety, or unrelieved needs, respectively (1961a:122)

In internalized, as well as in intrinsic, cultural motivation the members of society have acquired „the kind of character which makes them *want* to act in the way they have to act ...“ (Fromm 1944:381 quoted by Spiro 1961a:121; italics in Spiro's and Fromm's originals).

¹³⁰ Ruth Lienhard has drawn my attention to these articles.

¹³¹ Cathexis means in psychology „holding, retention.“ It is intended as a rendering of Germ. *Libidobesetzung* (Freud). It is the concentration or accumulation of mental energy in a particular channel (*The Oxford English Dictionary* 1989a:987).

¹³² Brackets have been added to clarify the motivation discussed and cross-connect with the explications of Spiro 1961a:117.

¹³³ Explained largely in Spiro 1961a:108ff.

Robert LeVine calls Spiro's approach the „Two Systems View“ (1973:58; Lienhard 1998:8), and Lienhard the „Three Schemes and Motivation Theory“ (Lienhard 2000b:8; 2001a:16-34). Table 2.9. is an attempt to represent Spiro's view schematically (cp. Lienhard 1998:8; 2001a:17).

Table 2.9: Spiro's Motivational Model in the Two Systems View

Motivation	Social System	Individual	Psycho-social Structure
Intrinsic motivation	Rewards individual needs and drives	Fills the roles of the social system	Id and ego needs
Internalised motivation	Prescribes values and norms	Learns and internalises values and norms	Super-ego and ego-ideal needs
Extrinsic motivation	Uses positive and negative sanctions (reward and punishment)	Conforms to receive positive and avoid negative sanctions	Alter-ego and super-alter needs

But there is a limit to Spiro's motivational model. „Conformity with cultural norms - alas - does not always gratify needs. Conformity often leads to the frustration of needs ... It is one of the tasks of culture-and-personality [theory] to discover how this intrapersonal conflict is resolved ...“ (1961b:491). Despite this limitation of the motivational model, Spiro enlarges our view in two ways: in the clarification and differentiation of the development of conscience orientation and in the grounding of the conscience in the social system as one of its motivational sources.

2.5.4 Lothar Käser's Concept of the Soul and the Functions of the Super-Ego

From 1969 to 1974, Lothar Käser (born 1938) spends five years on the Truk Islands in Micronesia conducting anthropological studies on the concept of body and soul of the Truk people. Together with missionary and missiologist Klaus Müller and on the basis of Spiro's findings, he develops a model for conscience, which from 1975 on has become a basis for understanding missions for many students of Columbia International University, Korntal, myself included. I am indebted to their many insights in the function of the conscience and its implications for missions. Hereafter, we will discuss first the concept of conscience of the Truk people and secondly parts of the model of Käser and Müller.¹³⁴

¹³⁴ Another part of the model will be discussed in the section 2.6.4. Klaus Müller's Dynamics.

For the Truk people, conscience is situated in the place, where non-bodily sensations of the *psyche*¹³⁵ are perceived. It is located in the upper part of the abdomen. It is not an organ and is not associated to an organ like heart, liver or stomach. It is called *neenuuk*, *neetip* or *tipey*. It is the seat of emotions like anger, fear or joy, as well as of intellectual functions, intentions, and expressions of will and character. The prefix *nee-* is an indication for space. *nuuk* stands for the abdomen, which makes *neenuuk* the space of the abdomen as the place of *psyche*. *neetip* means the *psyche* as seat of all those psycho-intellectual-volitional manifestations, which figure under the general term „psychical disposition“ (*tiip*).¹³⁶ *tipey* describes the more volitional functions of *psyche*. These three terms stand for everything, which we would classify under heart, emotion, personality, character, ego, self, attitude, intention, will, intellect, thought and also conscience (Käser 1977:31–47). As a matter of interest, the term „body“ (*inis*) is also used quite frequently for the ego or self of man (1989:81). One expresses the idea of „myself“ through the phrase: „Coming from my body“ (2001). In essence however, conscience is situated at the seat of *psyche*.

The psychical disposition is very often expressed in metaphors. Having a bad conscience means „the *psyche* is unpleasant“ (1977:42). The *psyche* can be going in a wrong direction (*rikirik*) like a boat. It can be off the way (*ttók*). The *psyche* can err (*mwánechenó*) (1977:62f.). If somebody rebukes a person, the *psyche* gets a contusion (*en*). The *psyche* can be strained (*finngaw*) and it needs massage as treatment. It can be hurt (*kinas*) or it aches (*metek*). When a person discovers that his transgression of a norm is publicly known, or he simply becomes conscious of it, his *psyche* is bitten (*óóch aa kkúúw neetip*). Feelings like remorse, contrition or reproach can arise in consequence. When these feelings have passed, the *psyche* is scarred (*mómmó*). A Truk proverb says: „An outer wound can scar, but not an inner one.“ If someone wishes to profoundly influence someone else, one plants it in his *psyche* (*fótuki nón*) (1977:65f.).

Conscience can also figure in the realm of „movements of the *psyche*“ (*meefi*), which include all the sensations connected to changes of the state of body or soul (1977:33,50). These *meefi* can refer to a feeling of reconciliation (*chá*), of consolation (*chip*), or of peace (*kinammwe*), that constitutes a good conscience (1977:78). *weyires* is the general term for unpleasant psychical dispositions and can mean discomfort, affliction, distress and also guilt

¹³⁵ Käser avoids the term „soul“ as it induces associations, which are not adequate for the concept of Truk people and proposes the term *psyche* (Käser 1977:37).

¹³⁶ Cp. the table on the structure of the terminology for „psychical disposition“ (*tiip*) in Käser 1977:48a.

feeling. The feeling of sitting on hot coals, an inner unrest, is *cchopwa* (1977:82f.). A stab of conscience or guilt feeling is *mengiringir*, the remorse and reproach, which comes out of it *niyamaam*. The feeling of being publicly shamed and loosing face is *mitinngaw* (1977:90). Pangs of conscience can also be expressed metaphorically: „A thorn has picked me“ or „My heart (or liver) gets cold“ (Käser 2001).

Even though the term conscience is non-existent in the Truk culture, a multitude of expressions dealing with the concept of conscience exist in their language. Käser found about 600 terms describing „psychical dispositions“ (*tiip*), of which the „psychical movements“ (*meefi*) are well structured and therefore important for the culture. 63% are unpleasant „psychical movements“ (1977:98f.). From this, we can conclude tentatively that a bad conscience is a prominent problem in Truk culture as was observed for Hellenistic culture.

In the Truk worldview, these „psychical dispositions“ are caused by spiritual beings who are either close to the person, touch it or even penetrate it, also the spiritual double. Are they good they can induce intellectual efficiency and behaviour according to the norms (*miriit*). Are they bad, abnormal behaviour or illness can be the consequence (1977:103f.,133). The same effect is attributed to medicinal substances (*sáfey*) (1977:105). It is needless to say that the concept of conscience becomes very complex in such a culture.

In his book *Fremde Kulturen* „Foreign Cultures“ (1997), Käser presents his model of the super-ego.¹³⁷ At birth, the individual receives a capability to learn a culture and a language and to evaluate his behaviour according to certain standards. This predisposition is called conscience or super-ego. It learns these standards like all the other things during the phase of enculturation through experiences in thousands of particular situations. The preconditions for this learning process are twofold: The child needs at least one person (significant other) to whom it has a close relationship, and it needs a desire for a harmonious relationship with the significant other, with which a normal child is born (1997:140f.)

At the end of this learning process, the individual disposes of a complex and detailed set of rules for the ethical-moral evaluation of its own acts and those of others. It disposes therefore of a strategy with the help of which it can adapt to others ... The conscience and the standards, which regulate the behaviour of the individual, are almost completely dependent on the culture, which surrounds the individual during its development and which it absorbs (1997:130).

¹³⁷ It was discovered together with Klaus Müller on the basis of Spiro's *Children in the Kibbutz*, chapter 15. Käser developed it in an anthropological perspective and Müller in a missiological perspective.

Käser holds that it is an error to think that the conscience is an „organ which develops by itself in a ‚natural‘ way“ as the „voice of God“¹³⁸ independently of fellow men and the socio-cultural context. According to him, conscience is also the „voice of God,“ but he fears that this view narrows our perspective and can therefore hinder to recognize other conscience orientations (1997:130). „True understanding of foreign behaviour is only possible, if we first consider structure and function of the conscience in purely anthropological perspective and only then evaluate what the Bible says about it“ (1997:132).

We have to keep in mind that conscience is not only a religious entity, but that it regulates primarily social behaviour by giving man the criteria for evaluating what are socially „right“ and „wrong“ acts. Conscience has a horizontal, social and a vertical, religious dimension (1997:133).

According to Käser, the conscience has three functions (1997:136):

1. It evaluates intended or executed acts,¹³⁹ whether they correspond with the norms of a certain society, group, etc. ...
2. It signals correspondence with these norms through a feeling to act or have acted rightly, ... which is called popularly a „good conscience.“ ... It signals also non-correspondence with these norms through a feeling of acting or having acted wrongly ... This feeling is called popularly a „bad conscience,“ and it is perceived as punishment.
3. It controls the individual through the feeling of the bad conscience and prevents (as a rule) transgressions of these norms through the expectation of punishment.

A good conscience is experienced as something normal and peaceful, and is often unconscious, whereas a bad conscience is experienced as abnormal, heavy, dramatic and blocking. The bad conscience expresses itself through two different manifestations. It prevents and punishes violations of norms by guilt and shame feelings. In everyday reality usually both feelings are simultaneously present, one being more predominant than the other. It is by this that individuals can be integrated into a social system. Individuals „without conscience,“ who feel neither guilt nor shame, cannot exist on a long-term basis in any society (1997:137f.)

Käser builds on Spiro's findings that few significant others lead normally to a guilt-oriented conscience and many significant others to a shame-oriented conscience (Spiro 1958:408). Shame-orientation means in a certain sense also group orientation, which can explain why a high status and prestige are important elements for such individuals. Käser speaks therefore of „prestige and shame orientation“ (Käser 1997:147). Shame orientation

¹³⁸ Cp. the *vox Dei* of scholasticism and German idealism.

¹³⁹ Cp. *conscientia antecedens* and *consequens* of scholasticism.

leads also to group ethics, which privilege members of the group as compared to outsiders (in-group behaviour). This behaviour appears to a guilt-oriented conscience as tribalism and corruption (1997:151). Another consequence of shame-orientation is a greater anxiety of making mistakes than persons with guilt orientation usually feel. In these societies it is a great impertinence to criticize a person in front of others. It would discredit him, and make him lose face and prestige (1997:158). A typical phenomenon caused by shame orientation is the institution of a mediator to solve a shaming problem in the sense of reconciliation. With this procedure too much shame for the malefactor is avoided. Actually it would count as shamelessness for the malefactor to regularize the problem himself (1997:162).

It would be wrong to pretend that shame orientation is less valuable as compared to the guilt orientation of the West. Each culture depends on the context, in which its individuals live, and on a whole series of historical factors. If this context requires a certain culture as strategy to cope with the necessities of life and excludes others, then it can be that the so formed culture admits only one or the other conscience orientation as strategy (1997:157).¹⁴⁰

This last statement stands in contradiction to Singer's view that conscience orientation should not be generalized to a whole culture (Piers/Singer 1971:100). Käser ends his reflections on guilt and shame with the remark that statistical evidence in the Bible shows the double prevalence for terms related to shame as compared to terms related to guilt and invites principally guilt-oriented theologians and missiologists to look at the Bible also from a shame perspective (1997:166).

2.5.5 The Functionalist Approach to Self-Conscious Emotions

A group around June Price Tangney develops Lewis' concept of self-conscious emotions (1992) further and validates it cross-culturally. They publish their results in *Self-Conscious Emotions: The Psychology of Shame, Guilt, Embarrassment, and Pride* (1995). They integrate Lewis' cognitive attribution theory and the goal-centred concept of *Gestalt* perception theory. From a *Gestalt* perspective, shame and guilt fulfil elementary functions in society. Self-conscious emotions are „functional organizers of human action and thought“ (Fischer/Tangney 1995:5). They model our relationships in a significant way (Tangney 1995:114). They are „adaptive patterns of behavior arising from a person's appraised relation to ongoing events“ (Mascolo/Fischer 1995:65). Thus, they help the individual to react adequately to his environment and to adapt to it. Depending on its specific task, every emotion

¹⁴⁰ Cp. section 4.2. Culture: Animism as a Natural Worldview for a Shame-Oriented Society.

has its own patterns: „A useful way of depicting the organization of emotions is through ‚prototypical social scripts’ – patterned sequences of events and reactions that portray the prototype, gestalt, or best instance of an emotion, including antecedents and many components“ (Tangney/Fischer 1995:9). This script concept approaches Käser’s functionalist definition of culture as „strategy to cope with everyday problems“ (1997:37). The scripts are thus learned during socialization and internalized in such a way that they are completely unconscious and automatic (Fischer/Tangney 1995:7).

Self-conscious emotions are „self-monitoring processes“ (Mascolo/Fischer 1995:65). They „monitor if the relationship to the social context is in order or not“ (Lindsay-Hartz et al. 1995:178). Scripts can therefore be adaptive or maladaptive, depending on whether they help the adaptation of the individual or not. This evaluation depends very much on the standards used, which can differ remarkably from culture to culture. While for North-American Tangney guilt appears to be a more adaptive emotion than the paralysing shame (1995:115), for North American Lindsay-Hartz et al. „feeling ashamed can be adaptive if the functional values supported are adaptive“ (1995:297). The Japanese-American team around Kitayama evaluates the values of independence (a dominant value in the USA) versus interdependence (a dominant value in Japan). They classify emotions into „engaging emotions,“ which enhance interdependence, and „disengaging emotions,“ which enhance independence. For them, shame and guilt are engaging emotions as they modulate relationships to the social context. Anger and pride are classified as disengaging emotions. Depending on the culturally predominant values, engaging or disengaging emotions are seen as negative: „For the interdependent self, the cultural nightmare is to be excluded; for the independent self, it is ... to be so engaged that one is merely a cog in a giant wheel“ (Kitayama et al. 1995:452). Independent Americans will tend to see engaging emotions like shame negatively, while Japanese will see disengaging emotions as anger and pride negatively. The latter will see shame as a highly positive emotion promoting interdependence (cp. the Japanese *amae* concept; Doi 1982; Braithwaite 1989:85-89). Probably unconsciously, they define guilt in a shame-oriented way as failure in social obligations. However, if guilt orientation is seen as individualistic standard-centredness, it would rather seem to be a disengaging emotion. This example demonstrates well the culture-dependent definition and evaluation of shame and guilt.

In differing cultural contexts, self-conscious emotions are not only evaluated differently, but also experienced differently. Wallbott and Scherer have found that shame and guilt resemble each other in countries like USA, but differ largely in countries like Japan.

It seems that „typical“ shame experiences (as characterized by short duration, high ergotrophic arousal, unexpectedness, etc.) are typical of collectivistic, high-power-distance, and high-uncertainty-avoidance cultures, whereas shame experiences in individualistic, low-power-distance, and low-uncertainty-avoidance cultures resemble the „typical“ guilt pattern to a larger degree (Wallbott/Scherer 1995:481).

They call the individualistic shame experience „guilt-shame,“ which is not very different from guilt. It describes the reaction to a failure related to a transgression of a norm (cp. Lindsay-Hartz et al. 1995:295). In shame-oriented cultures, shame as global failure or violation of self contrasts with „guilt“ as specific failure in social obligations. Consequently, there exist different sorts of shame in different persons and in different cultural contexts. Thus, one should differentiate between Chinese, Japanese, Arabic, African and North American shame. When self-conscious emotions are learned during socialization, it is not surprising to discover an infinite variety of shame and guilt and of shame-oriented and guilt-oriented persons and cultures.

2.5.6 Chinese Society and the Shame-Oriented Conscience

Several descriptions of Chinese society give insights into its conscience orientation. In this section, only a few of them will be discussed. Sun Longji (born 1945) is a Chinese having lived in exile a good part of his life. He holds a doctorate in Chinese history. His book *Das ummauerte Ich* „The Closed-in Ego“ (1994) is not a systematic anthropological analysis of Chinese society, but a product of personal observations, which is very useful for the purpose of this study.¹⁴¹

In Chinese anthropology, „man is defined through his social relationships, which are based on reciprocity.“ The limits between I and You are dissolved. The Chinese sign for „humaneness“ (*ren*) is composed of the sign for „man“ and the sign for „two.“ In old China, the five important relationships (*wu lun*) for man were the relationship between king and vassal, father and son, husband and wife, older and younger brother and between friends. Humaneness (*ren*) describes an emotional contact of sympathy between two persons, in other words „an exchange of hearts“ (1994:11f.). If the others are friendly to me, I have to „give my heart“ (*jiao xin*), otherwise I would have „no conscience“ (*mei you liangxin*). The heart comprises feelings, thoughts and will (1994:25). Good behaviour includes the obligations of

¹⁴¹ Lothar Käser has indicated this book to me. A similar descriptive study could be undertaken for Japanese society, but space does not permit. We recommend the following literature: Benedict (1946); Haring (1956); Doi (1982); Wiegand-Kanzaki/Minamioji (1986); Kawai (1986); Minamoto (1986); Sakuta (1986).

humaneness (*ren qing*), which makes it almost impossible to decline a friend's request. An individual, who is outside of these „five relationships,“ is unthinkable. A person who fulfils all these „five relationships,“ for example a father of a family, is a „complete man“ (*chengren*) (1994:11f.).

In the *taiji* diagram the body corresponds to the static, accepting, dark and female principle *yin*, and the heart to the dynamic, light, male principle *yang*. Humaneness is a function of the heart, which is in neo-Confucianism (under Buddhistic influence) identical with the heavenly principle. The Confucian maxim demands to respect the heavenly principle and to extinguish the human drives by integration into social relationships (1994:15f.).

The body (*benshen* = my body) means the self, one's person. A personal insult means in Chinese „attack on the body“ (*renshen gongji*). The Chinese goal for life is „to find a home for the body“ (*anshen liming*) (1994:22f.). From this, Sun concludes that China is an orally and materially oriented culture (1994:34,82f.). The one who knows how to provide for the body of others can „win their heart“ (*de renxin*). „The direct way to the heart leads through the body“ (1994:25). Therefore, the ultimate goal for the Chinese is to find „a home for the body and the heart,“ that is the security for the self in harmonious relationships (1994:45).

The conscience has its seat in the heart. It is influenced by „humanly feelings,“ that is by others. The Chinese culture defines man as a being controlled by its own heart and by other hearts (1994:30). The Chinese conscience is therefore heteronomous. The heavenly maxim asks the heart to keep measure and harmony and not to succumb to drives, to be a „moral true heart“ (*dao xin*) (1994:28,63,166). It reminds us of Kant's categorical imperative. The philosopher Zhu Xi (1130-1200) defined conscience as the sensitive heart, the heart, which feels shame, the modestly renouncing heart and the heart that differentiates between right and wrong. These four qualities of the heart are at the same time feelings and virtues (1994:157). Both shame and rightness (guilt) are present in Zhu Xi's definition of the conscience.

Relationships are tied (*la*) by a mediator. The sign for *la* originally means „to draw near.“ To mediate (*ji*) has the old sign for „tie.“ Relationship has a sign for man (*ren*) and a sign for silk (*si*). They are therefore tied like silk. In addition, relationships are usually initiated by meals, which should be normally well cooked. Men who have passed through this tying of relationships are „cooked“ or „inner“ (*ziji*) men. They belong to the inner circle, which is ruled by mutual obligations. The others are „crude“ or „outer“ (*wai*) people (1994:50f.). Inside this circle, „pardon“ is formulated by „I have really no heart“ (*wo shi wu xin de*). Outside the

circle, it is not necessary to behave as a man with a heart. „Pardon“ means here: „I cannot measure myself with you,“ as a formal relationship is absent (1994:59).

Inside the circle, the relationships are marked with a „mutual indebtedness“ (*ren-qingzhai*), which means that one cares for the other. Sun speaks of an atmosphere of humane-ness, but also of obligations of humaneness (1994:134). This interdependence is close to the Japanese *amae* concept (1994:203f.; cp. Doi 1982). It follows the rule: *Do ut des* (I give you in order that you give me back) and becomes a harmonious interdependence. A consequence of this is a deep sense of community and a corporate identity going beyond the limits of generation (1994:148f.,181). The ultimate goal is a general ontological harmony as *yin* penetrates *yang* in the *taiji* diagram. This dualism is however completely different from the dualism of good and evil. Evil becomes merely an imbalance between *yin* and *yang*. Equilibrium is the goal. Motion leads easily to chaos. Finally, harmony must be restored through the harmonization of the contrasts. The ideal is stability (1994:140f.; cp. Hofstede 1997:241).

Harmony in mutual relationships is expressed by „acting with a heart“ and by „giving face“ (*gei mianzi*). The wishes of the other are read from his face. The one who „tears down the face“ (*saxia mianzi*) shows that he has no heart. Not to show the face, that is not to visit regularly, alienates from the other. The inability to maintain face means to lose it (1994:161f.). The fear not to live up to the expectations of the other or one's obligations towards the other expresses itself as shame. The Chinese sign for shame (*chi*) is composed of the sign for „ear“ and the sign for „heart,“ which means: I hear with my ears and I feel in my heart what the others speak about me. In the word for character (*renpin*), the second sign consists of three mouths. Face, mouth and eyes control the other's behaviour. The one who does not submit to this control is said to „have a thick face without shame.“ The one who does not comply to traffic rules is said to be shameless. Consequently, the Chinese conscience is predominantly shame-oriented (1994:162-168). Sun sums it up like this:

As the Chinese culture knows no hereafter and the heavenly principle is the only transcendental element, which derives itself as an idealized heart from the this-worldly social conventions, the part of shame in the structure of Chinese conscience is by far larger than the part of guilt. However, also in China one can hear the phrase: „In my heart I feel guilt.“ In most cases this means that one has not helped somebody whom one should have helped. After all, as a feeling of inner turmoil, which originates in one's heart without outside critic, it is sort of a guilt feeling, which is oriented towards humaneness (1994:163).

In his book *China von innen gesehen* „China Seen from Inside“ (1982/1989), Wickert observes that the Chinese use the term of shame (*chi*) very little „as if shame was for them

such a common feature that one need not lose a word on it“ (1989:328). Richard Wilhelm, a missionary, translated *chi* with conscience. *Chi* was sensed when *li*, that is propriety, custom, and cosmic order, was violated. Confucius says: „If one wants to lead the people by laws and keep order by punishment, then the people will try to avoid the punishment without feeling shame. If one leads it by virtue and keeps order by the commandments of propriety, it will feel shame.“ Laws can only determine the outward behaviour of man. However the causes for his behaviour lie inside. Educated man avoids crime not because of fear of punishment, but because of shame (1989:327). As shame can hurt so deeply, educated man does not make another person lose face. He does not criticize someone in front of others. Shameless man loses his face and loses his good name, but only when the violation of the norm becomes known. Interestingly enough, the criminal code of the Qing dynasty, which was in use until the beginning of the 20th century, defined forty blows as punishment for „shameless behaviour.“ Shame cannot be lessened by penance, but can only be forgotten with time based on good behaviour (1989:328f.). Therefore, suicide is often the easiest way out of a deep shaming situation (1989:333f.).

Consequently, honour is an important concept in Chinese society. *mien-tzu* is honour and reputation achieved by success through clever manoeuvring and personal effort. It is self-recognition that depends on external factors. *lien* is respect and honour of the community for a person who has a good reputation, a person who fulfils all obligations regardless of the hardships. It is the confidence of the community in the integrity of a person's moral character. The loss of *lien* makes it impossible for the person to function in his community (Hu 1956:147). The need for *lien* functions both as an internal pressure sanctioning the individual's behaviour and as an external, public pressure. *tiu-lien* is to lose honour and respect and to be shamed. It entails the condemnation of the individual's socially unacceptable behaviour, which has come to public notice in the community. This condemnation is a blemish on a person, an inadequacy exposed, a shameful loss of dignity and a violation of pride (Hu 1956:148).

The concept of sin is expressed in the Chinese language basically by two words: *zui* translates in the Union Version of the Chinese Bible the Greek words for sin *hamartia* and *anomia*. But to a Chinese person *zui* implies „violation of the country's laws“ and has no relation to a god. It is a humanistic, guilt-oriented concept. Consequently, it is very difficult to convince an average law-abiding Chinese person that he is a sinner. The second word describing sin is *guo*, or *guo fan*, which means „to miss the mark,“ precisely the meaning of Greek *hamartia*. *guo* implies a sense of personal responsibility: a failure in obligations toward other

persons. If you ask a Chinese, whether he has *guo*, he will readily admit it. The problem of *guo* is that it is entirely humanistic, lacking any sense of accountability to deity (Ramstad 2000:172). However, the concept of filial piety *xiao jing* in the father-son relationship can express satisfactorily the Biblical concept of sin: falling short of *xiao jing* implies falling short to our heavenly father's standards (cp. Mt 5:48; Rom 3:23): „Therefore, in the same way that lacking *xiao jing* toward one's earthly father is sinful and brings shame to his name, lacking honor (*zun jing*) toward one's Creator Father is also sinful and brings shame to his name (Isa 59:2)“ (Ramstad 2000:174). The concepts of both *guo* and *xiao jing* (implying *zun jing*) are shame-oriented concepts and therefore well understood by Chinese.

Francis L.K. Hsu (born 1909), a Chinese-born, Western trained anthropologist, who specializes in psychological anthropology (culture-and-personality), confirms in his book *Americans and Chinese* (1953/81) the characteristics of Chinese society as prestige and community-oriented in search for harmony. As weaknesses he mentions corruption (1981:187,209, 372). In his article on the Chinese concept of *jen*, he suggests a revised approach to the study of personality: „Personality is a western concept rooted in individualism ... What is missing is the central ingredient in the human mode of existence: man's relationship with his fellow men“ (Hsu 1971:23). Hsu describes a „psycho-sociogram“ of man. There are eight layers: (7) the unconscious, (6) the pre-conscious, (5) the unexpressed conscious, (4) the expressed conscious, (3) the intimate society and culture (*jen* = personage), (2) the operative society and culture, (1) the wide society and culture, (0) the outer world. Layers 6 and 5 are „not communicated to his fellow human beings because ... he is ashamed to do so ...“ (1971:24-26). *jen* could be called the „in-group“ and corresponds to Lienhard's concept of the social group (2001a:236f.).¹⁴² „Hsu allows for an inner psychic core to the human personality, but he insists that the Chinese concept of *jen*, which puts the primary emphasis on interpersonal relationships, is crucial for a balanced perspective of man“ (Noble 1975:21).

In China, we encounter a holistic, animistic worldview influenced by a secular enlightenment component through Confucianism. The conscience situated in the heart is heteronomous and shame-oriented. However, it also has traits of an autonomous conscience with a moral imperative, which differs from Kant's guilt-oriented concept in that it is predominantly shame-oriented. A Chinese proverb says: „A murder may be forgiven, an affront never.“

¹⁴² Cp. section 2.6.7. Ruth Lienhard's Search for Harmony.

2.5.7 Jacob Loewen's Concern for Forgiveness

Jacob A. Loewen (born 1922) is a linguist and anthropologist who recognizes the need of attempting a synthesis between anthropology, psychology and theology. One of his major concerns is how to fit the soteriological aspect of forgiveness into the anthropological insights. In his article *Four Kinds of Forgiveness* (1970b), he differentiates between supernatural, religious, social and self-forgiveness stating that they are all necessary for a full experience of forgiveness. In order to achieve supernatural forgiveness, men invoke anonymous supernatural spirits like the Eskimo (1969a:63-65; 1970a), or one unique God like the Hebrews, Christians and Muslims. This approach is supported by penance, expiation or sacrifice, exemplified by the ritual of the great Day of Atonement described in Lev 16 (1970b:157). Loewen calls religious forgiveness a supernatural forgiveness which includes a social dimension like reconciliation (1970b:158f.). This is exemplified by John the Baptist's and Jesus' call to confession and repentance (Mk 1:4) combined with the call to mutual responsibility of face-to-face soul nurture (Matt 18:15-20) and „binding and loosening“ of erring members of the church (Matt 16:18f.; Jn 20:19-23). James calls for believers to confess their sins to one another and to pray for each other (Jas 5:13-29), an example of a true priesthood of believers (1Pet 2:9). Loewen calls confession which is directed to God alone „cheap grace“ citing Mowrer and Bonhoeffer (1970b:160; Mowrer 1961:82; Bonhoeffer 1988:29). Purely social forgiveness is relatively rare according to Loewen. However, the social dimension is very important within „the fellowship that forgives and heals, the community that considers the sinner worth saving, and the social context that provides the penitent with the necessary support for learning new behavior ...“ (1970b:163). On the subject of self-forgiveness, Loewen stresses the fact that „for a person to receive full forgiveness, he must be able to ‚own‘ his sin and to ‚forgive‘ himself.“ However, it is all too common to „rise above“ one's sins rather than admit such failures and accept ourselves (1970b:165). „But the moment he accepts his guilt, the possibility of radical reformation opens up and the person may legitimately pass from pervasive self-rejection and self-torture to a new freedom of forgiveness and self-respect“ (1970b:165; Mowrer 1961:54). As favourable factors of „secular forgiveness,“ Loewen cites „the Protestant emphasis on dealing personally and only with God“ and „the general retreat of the church from the priesthood of all believers and its soul-healing functions“ (1970b:167). By excluding the transcendent dimension, secular therapy denies „the penitent one of the essential aspects of adequate forgiveness“ (1970b:168). Loewen is

basically saying that forgiveness involves all the covenant persons involved, God, You and I (1970b:156).¹⁴³

In his article *The Social Context of Guilt and Forgiveness* (1970a), Loewen defines guilt as „a universal phenomenon because men everywhere fail to live up to their moral ideals or else in selfishness infringe upon the rights of their fellows“ (1970a:81). This definition of guilt includes the notion of shortcoming, which is an element of shame. After having talked about true and false guilt, Loewen discusses shame under the heading of guilt. Citing Mead, he defines it as „response to disapproval by one’s own peers“ (1961:307,342). Citing Mead again, he affirms that „face-to-face societies generally depend on gossip-triggered shame sanction to enforce obedience to socially accepted norms“ (Mead 1961:206,342) and that guilt is „increased by public knowledge“ (Loewen 1970a:82). In fact, gossip often triggers confession (1969b:124). Loewen continues that „one frequently finds that even in face-to-face societies these norms have been internalized to such a degree that many adult individuals experience independent guilt“ (1970a:82). We conclude that Loewen’s concept of guilt is not clear, a view that is rather typical for his period. He tends to confuse shame with guilt, for example in flight reactions after discovery of an act (1970a:84).¹⁴⁴

Loewen proposes three steps in the process of forgiveness: confession, expiation and release (1970a:81,87). To underline the importance of these steps, he cites Mowrer who says „that the so-called psycho-neuroses and functional psychoses can be understood only (sola!) in terms of palpable misconduct which has neither been confessed nor expiated“ (Mowrer 1964:20; Loewen 1970a:84). Confession „while by no means universal, has been found to have important cathartic and healing functions in many of the world’s cultures“ (Loewen 1969a:65). Confession must be honest, open, specific, complete, public and periodical (1970a:88; Tournier 1954:10; Mowrer 1961:216; 1964:97). A premise to confession „is genuine repentance and the intent to abandon the evil“ (Loewen 1970a:89).

There is no question that the members of the indigenous church need the benefits of confession, not only in the general sense that all believers must confess their wrongs and shortcomings, but also because they have some unique (or at least accentuated) problems. These special tensions result from (1) the influence of their pre-Christian socialization, (2) the conflicts precipitated by the encounter of their culture with the gospel, and (3) the imbalances produced by the cycle of change resulting from contact with other cultures and or conversion (1969b:115).

¹⁴³ Cp. the system theory’s view of the individual inside a system and several subsystems.

¹⁴⁴ Cp. also the discussion of the different conception of guilt by a shame-oriented conscience in sections 2.4.14. Conclusion, in 2.5.5. The Functionalist Approach to Self-Conscious Emotions, and in 2.5.6. Chinese Society and Shame Orientation.

The next step of forgiveness is expiation. According to Loewen, „expiation is a voluntary or at least an expected cost which actually or ritually atones for the transgression“ (1970a:90). There are five kinds: (1) restitution as repayment, (2) expiatory payments, (3) sacrifice, (4) penance, (5) social sanction as the „sinner’s robe“ and the pillory, down to exile (1970a:90-94). We note that the first four forms of expiation are guilt sanctions and only one of them, the last, is a shame sanction.

The last step „release“ has a supernatural and a social dimension. Sin produces estrangement, and confession and expiation reestablish fellowship with God or the spirits and fellow men (1970a:94f.). „Personal release restores the inner equilibrium and peace and thereby sets in motion the process of physical and psychic healing“ (1970a:95). But it also „involves the assurance [usually by a mediator] that the culprit will no longer be subject to supernatural retribution“ (1970a:94).¹⁴⁵ Speaking of reconciliation under the heading of release, Loewen takes unmistakably a shame-oriented stand.

In this process of forgiveness, Loewen stresses the importance of the „healing community:“ „The fellowship that forgives and heals, the community that considers the sinner worth saving, and the social context that provides the penitent with the necessary support for learning new behavior represent the true priesthood of believers“ (1970b:163). If the guilty person

can find at least one member of the human race who will listen to him sympathetically and who, while knowing the worst, will still love and respect him, the culprit finds that his own self-respect can be restored (1970a:88).

Man needs a social context in which he can openly admit how far he is falling short of his ideals, but in which he will be accepted and loved in spite of his shortcomings, and in which he will be supported in every genuine effort to develop the kind of group approved behavior he really desires (1970b:162).¹⁴⁶

In the last two sections, Loewen adopts a shame-oriented view of the counseling situation despite of his bias toward guilt-orientation. His merit is that of introducing the concept of forgiveness and with it the soteriological aspect in cultural anthropology.

2.5.8 Lowell Noble’s Attempt at a Synthesis

Lowell L. Noble, who calls himself an „armchair anthropologist,“ wrote a seminal book entitled *Naked and not Ashamed: An Anthropological, Biblical and Psychological Study on Shame* (1975). He elaborates his study around three questions: „How does a person preach a guilt-oriented gospel to a shame-oriented culture? Is the gospel of Jesus as guilt-oriented as

¹⁴⁵ Bracket added by Lienhard 1998:46.

¹⁴⁶ See also Loewen’s article „Confession in the indigenous Church“ (1969b).

the Westerners tend to think it is? ... Could one replace the traditional Western ‚sin-guilt-Savior’ with a ‚sin-shame-Savior’ evangelistic message?“ (1975:viii). Starting from the experience of Fall in Genesis 3, he states that „shame is loss of honor.“ It results from failure. „The state of shame is one of covering.“ Attempts to hide and to mask characterize it. „The experience of shame is one of exposure“ whenever the mask is removed temporarily (1975:2,5,27ff.). „The loss of honor is disgraceful, shameful. Therefore, a person attempts to cover up, to hide, so as to avoid painful exposure“ (1975:7). Noble believes „that the avoidance of eye contact is a simple but profound demonstration of the significance of the shame dynamic. We avoid the exposure of the inner self at all costs. Eye contact is so personal that it seems to reveal the inner self. Only where love and trust exist between persons is eye contact positive. In such situations, exposure of the self is desired and safe“ (1975:2). „The prime concern [in Thailand] is for individual dignity in the immediate face-to-face situation. It is much better for either or both parties to suffer from neglect or a bad decision, than for embarrassment or conflict to occur in a face-to-face relationship“ (1975:60). „Shame is both profoundly personal and significantly social“ (1975:21). Noble describes different varieties of shame, which are summarized in table 2.10. (1975:4-6; cp. Augsburg 1986:117; Hilgers 1996:19).

Table 2.10: Varieties of Shame according to Noble

Variety of Shame	Description
Innocent shame	Shame felt when one’s character is slandered without justification
Social shame	Embarrassment felt when one makes a social blunder or error
Familial shame	Disgrace from the behaviour of another family member
Handicap shame	Embarrassment over some bodily defect or physical imperfection
Discrimination shame	Downgrading of persons treated as socially, racially, ethically, religiously, or vocationally inferior
Modesty shame	Shame related to sexual, social, or dress norms and proscribed behaviour
Inadequacy shame	Feelings of inadequacy and inferiority from passivity, repeated failure, or abuse
Public shame	Open ridicule in the community as punishment or group pathology
Anticipated shame	The fear of exposure for any planned or desired behaviour
Guilty shame	Shame felt before others when one violates an ethical norm

Noble affirms that terms related to shame are far more frequently used in both the Old and New Testaments than terms related to guilt (1975:30,33). In his practical section, Noble gives many hints in order to avoid deculturalization in evangelism and unnecessary shame situations in conversion (1975:78-84). He gives sermon suggestions for guilt and shame situations with the following themes: from confusion of face to righteousness of God, rebellion and reconciliation, the glory and shame of the cross, the person versus the work of Christ (1975:86-94). He speaks of the church as living fellowship and stresses the importance of the small group and the voluntary self-exposure as catalyser of revival (1975:96-112). Further, he promotes relational theology as more adequate to shame orientation than dogmatic theology (1975:119ff.). Talking about love, he cites Schaeffer who says: „Genuine love, in the last analysis, means a willingness to be entirely exposed to the person“ (Schaeffer 1968:120; Noble 1975:113). On this background, Noble's statement that „the greatest weakness of Christian missionaries in Africa is their ‚failure to love‘“ (1975:98) means that missionaries have not learned to open themselves in a way and in a measure adequate for the African context (cp. Lienhard 1998:80).

Noble's approach is not systematic and analytical, but interdisciplinary and very practical. His study gives many suggestions for evangelism, church life and counseling. I am indebted to him for many ideas in chapters 4 and 5.

2.5.9 Robert Priest's Continuity and Discontinuity of Consciences

Robert J. Priest is an anthropologist having grown up as missionary child in Bolivia. In his article *Missionary Elenctics: Conscience and Culture* (1994), he states that „the gospel“ is „a message which includes a mix of ‚theology‘ and ‚anthropology‘“ (1994:291). He draws the attention to the fact that consciences of missionaries and indigenous people may be very different from each other, neither being necessarily congruent with what is revealed in Scripture. Missionaries, he says, are „likely to express bewilderment, confusion and dismay at the total lack of conscience, guilt and sense of sin which they find“ (Priest 1994:292). On the other hand, „the missionary who understands and works with native conscience finds conscience to be God's great and good gift, an ally which works to support repentance and faith, the sanctification of the believer, and personal conviction and independent initiative amongst leadership of a vigorous indigenous church“ (1994:315). „Conscience is not perfect, but it is God-given and fulfils crucial functions. Conscience contributes to an awareness of spiritual need for God and for salvation. It contributes to repentance and faith“ (1994:314). It

„functions as internal witness which ratifies the Biblical message that we are sinners in need of salvation“ (1994:291). On the other hand, it „is a natural faculty and is thus capable of being studied, analysed, and understood through empirical methods. The content of conscience is fallible and variable ... and directly dependent on learned cultural meanings, norms, ideals, and values“ (1994:294f.). „Conscience on its own is not sufficient to unerringly guide us into sanctified moral understandings“ (1994:299).

„In an intercultural situation, there will be both significant overlap and marked discontinuity between the consciences of interactants. But it is not the overlap, which interactants will tend to notice. Rather it is in the area of discontinuity - specifically where one's own conscience speaks and the other's does not.“ In these areas interactants „tend to condemn the other morally for behavior about which the other has no [bad] conscience“ (1994:296). Figure 2.4. illustrates this reality (adapted from Priest 1994:296-299).

Figure 2.4: Continuity and Discontinuity of Consciences according to Priest

		Biblical Norm	
		Congruity of A & Bible	A Indigenous Conscience
Discontinuity with the Bible	Area where M has scruples & A has none	Discontinuity of M & Bible	Area where A has scruples & M has none
Missionary's Conscience	M	Congruity of M & Bible	

„With conversion, the content of conscience is not instantly changed. But under the tutelage of a new authority - the Word of God - the conscience of the believer who is growing in sanctification will be gradually changed in certain needed areas toward greater conformity with the written Word“ (1994:311). Nevertheless, there will remain significant areas of discontinuity between the conscience shaped by culture and what is revealed in Scripture. We can call these areas the „blind spots,“ where our conscience has no scruples and is therefore silent. On the other hand „believers also may be bothered by a conscience which condemns behavior God himself does not condemn. That is, conscience is a natural faculty not necessarily dependent on the special action of the Holy Spirit.“ Priest warns against equating the

conscience with the work of the Holy Spirit. Where this has been done it had detrimental effects on missionary and church practice (1994:294).¹⁴⁷

2.5.10 Paul Hiebert: From Epistemology to Metatheology

Paul G. Hiebert's (born 1932) approaches to epistemology¹⁴⁸ and metatheology have a great importance for our subject.¹⁴⁹ Hiebert develops his thought in *Anthropological Insights for Missionaries* (1985), *Anthropological Reflections on Missiological Issues* (1994), and *Missiological Implications of Epistemological Shifts* (1999).

In his reflection, Hiebert speaks of an interdisciplinary dialogue between theology, anthropology and missions, as well as between philosophical, historical and empirical approaches. The precondition for this integration is the study of the presuppositions of the different disciplines, which is defined by their worldviews¹⁵⁰ (1985:26; 1994:10f.,15). This leads Hiebert to the study of epistemologies. He finds that traditionally most theologians hold a naïve idealist or naïve realist epistemological position, which assumes one uniform system of reason for all humans based on exact, objective, certain and potentially exhaustive knowledge. An idealist epistemology faces problems with the findings of different systems of logic used in different societies as revealed by cultural anthropology. It has difficulty in accounting for the problems of communication, particularly disagreements between different theologies. It also undervalues the importance of history. Of course, it is impossible to integrate an idealist theology and a realist science, as the past hundred years clearly show (1994:23,28f.).

After the collapse of naïve idealist and naïve realist epistemology in recent years, Hiebert proposes a critical realist epistemology for the integration of theology and theistic science based on a Biblical worldview. Critical realism differentiates between theology and Biblical revelation, ascribing final and full authority to the Bible as the inspired record of God in human history. Theology is the interpretation of the Scriptures. Hiebert proposes to „speak of *theologies*, for each theology is an understanding of divine revelation within a particular historical and cultural context ... This assumes that all theologies are partial and culturally

¹⁴⁷ Cp. the Church Fathers' identification of *syneidēsis* with the Holy Spirit and its long-term effect on scholasticism and the Catholic Church.

¹⁴⁸ Epistemology is the theory of knowledge, which asks the question: „How can I know?“

¹⁴⁹ In fact, this thesis as an interdisciplinary endeavour uses Hiebert's conclusions and sees itself as a contribution to the formulation of metatheology.

¹⁵⁰ Worldviews „are the most fundamental and encompassing views of reality shared by a people in a culture.“ At the next upper level „belief systems make explicit the implicit assumptions of the worldview.“ At the highest level are the theories „which reduce experiential data to concepts“ and „provide answers to questions raised by belief systems“ (Hiebert 1994:36f.).

biased.“ It is the „hermeneutical community“ which „determines the actual enculturated meaning of Scripture“ (1994:30; 1999:99-102 italics in original; cp. Kraus 1979:71). Does this lead us into a theological relativism? Hiebert answers: „No. Historical and experiential facts remain the same in all times and cultures“ (1994:31; 1999:103). We speak of *the Truth* with reference to Scripture and reality, of *a truth* with reference to our partial understandings of the Truth and reality. In order to limit error „theologizing must begin with Scripture ... must be led by the Holy Spirit ... [and] must be done in the community“ (1994:71).

Critical realist epistemology implies a theory of complementarity: Firstly, a complementarity between synchronic and diachronic systems of knowledge, most sciences and systematic theology being synchronic and only historical disciplines diachronic. Hiebert shows this schematically in a matrix, which we present in table 2.11. (adapted from Hiebert 1994:45; 1999:105).

Table 2.11: Diachronic and Synchronic Disciplines according to Hiebert

	Diachronic Models	Synchronic Models
Theology	Biblical and Narrative Theology	Systematic Theology
Science	Historical Sciences	Natural and Social Sciences

Hiebert points out that „synchronic models show us the universal order of things,“ not looking at specific events. „Consequently, exceptional cases and miracles are out of focus. Diachronic models, on the other hand, look at unique events ... and help us to understand how things operate ... Meaning ultimately rests in diachronic models ... When joined, the interplay of diachronic and synchronic belief systems in science and theology provide a better understanding of reality“ (1994:44; 1999:104).

Secondly, critical realist epistemology implies a complementarity between a realist theology and theistic science, realizing that knowledge of each discipline is partial (1Cor 13:12) and gives us not a photograph, but only models of reality, which in interrelationship may describe reality better (1994:23,44). For Hiebert, „theology ... is the master blueprint on which all other blueprints are mapped“ (1994:68). For missions, this means that theologies be critically contextualized through self-theologizing by the indigenous churches, using the *emic* (inside) and *etic* (outside) analyses in interplay between the churches. „This ‚inside-outside‘ perspective enables us to translate from one to the other“ (1985:188,194f.; 1988:387; 1994:46,88,96). This metacultural grid will lead us to formulate a „metatheology“ or

„supracultural theology,“ which according to Hiebert is a process by which different theologies, each a partial understanding of the truth in a certain context, arrive to better „understand the unchanging nature of the Gospel“ and at „a growing consensus on theological absolutes“ (1988:391-394; 1994:101-103; 1999:113f.).

In this thesis, and especially in this literature survey, we consciously attempt to integrate critical realist theology and theistic science on one hand and diachronic and synchronic approaches on the other hand. We are careful to study the underlying worldviews of the authors and attempt, through the historical study of the different disciplines, to arrive at a maximum number of complementary theories of the conscience.

2.5.11 Conclusion

Cultural anthropology's contribution of the cross-cultural perspective to the discussion of conscience has proved fruitful. After the tentative introduction of the distinction of guilt and shame cultures by Benedict and Mead, the concept is refined and further differentiated by Singer. He cautions against gross generalizations having identified shame and guilt-oriented peoples among North American Indians, and even having found both traits in the same people.

Building on Piers and Singer's findings, Spiro brings a solution to the problem of generalization by the discovery of the conscience orientation and the refinement of its different expressions. It is important to note that these two conscience orientations are for Spiro ideal types of a whole spectrum of mixtures, a model that contributes to a better understanding of this complex reality:

Of course, these two types of super-ego represent the polar extremes, conceived as ideal types, of a super-ego continuum. Most super-egos would represent admixtures of the two, weighted toward one or the other end of the continuum (1961a:120).¹⁵¹

But shame in a shame-oriented conscience is not the equivalent of guilt in a guilt-oriented conscience. A shame-oriented conscience reacts in the absence of a significant observer differently from a guilt-oriented conscience: it does not produce shame but anxiety, whereas the guilt-oriented conscience reacts directly with guilt. This is a difference, which is very important in practice as we shall see in chapter 5. Spiro's observation that the orientation of conscience depends on the number of significant others during conscience development in childhood is very helpful. This hypothesis could be enlarged in such a way that the presentation of inconsistent norms by multiple or few significant others prevent the child from intro-

¹⁵¹ Cp. Müller's model in appendix 5, and its discussion in section 2.6.4. Klaus Müller's Dynamics.

jecting the significant others. The complete activity of the conscience is then dependent on the presence of the significant other. This could explain the shame orientation induced by an education without a coherent set of norms by few significant persons, for example anti-authoritarian education in modern Western culture. Spiro embeds the conscience also in the general social system as one of three motivational forces. Here he draws from system theory.

Käser (and Müller) develop their model of conscience starting from the findings of Piers, Singer and Spiro. They build on practical observations of missionary practice and take the model out of theoretical, anthropological ground. Käser's definition of the functions of the conscience resembles scholasticism's and Enlightenment's categories of *conscientia consequens* and *antecedens* as well as of conscience as consciousness and judicial authority, but defines it more clearly and in a practically relevant way. Käser's topography of conscience in Truk culture and Sun's description of the Chinese concept show that despite the lack of a specific term for conscience there can exist a colourful descriptive language of conscience in a culture. Chinese like Korean and classical Greek society view virtue and honour as opposite to shame. Based on his findings in Chinese culture, Hsu proposes to view man as a social being defined by his relationships. This leads us back to the Hebrew shame-oriented concept of corporate personality. In contradiction to Singer's warning to name a culture a shame or guilt culture, Käser comes to the conclusion that in a given culture the strategy to solve everyday problems may cause one conscience orientation to prevail. This correlation of personality and culture is called „psychologically satisfying conformity“ by Spiro (1961a), and „functional congruence“ by Inkeles and Levinson (1954). This is exemplified for shame orientation with the analysis of Chinese society.¹⁵²

The functionalist embedment of self-conscious emotions helps to apply Lewis' concept to cross-cultural contexts. If self-conscious emotions are learned during socialization, it becomes clear that they must differ infinitely from one person to the other and from one culture to the other. Not only do the evaluation of self-conscious emotions differ, but also their experience. Shame does not equal shame, and guilt does not equal guilt in different contexts. Shame-oriented consciences conceive of shame and guilt differently than guilt-oriented consciences. Additionally, shame and guilt are more different in a shame-oriented context than in a guilt-oriented culture. Table 2.12. presents a schematic overview.

¹⁵² Cp. sections 4.1. and 4.2. which describe personality and culture as a function of conscience orientation.

Table 2.12: Concepts of Shame and Guilt in the Two Conscience Orientations

	Shame	Guilt
Shame-oriented Conscience	Failure or exposure of self connected with a global attribution	Failure in social expectations and obligations connected with a specific attribution (Germ. <i>Schuldigkeit</i>)
Guilt-oriented Conscience	Failure connected with transgression or wrongdoing „guilt-based shame“ or „moral shame“	Fact of transgressing a norm, of wrongdoing, responsibility for wrongdoing (Germ. <i>Schuld</i>)

Finally, we have studied attempts of integration of theology, psychology and anthropology. Loewen introduces the soteriological aspect in the anthropological discussion of conscience. He shows that forgiveness has a covenant character in that it includes all persons involved: God, We, You and I. Noble shows many practical implications of shame-orientation for evangelism, church life and counseling. Sermon topics that are meaningful to shame-oriented consciences are different from those speaking to guilt-oriented consciences. Church for a shame-oriented conscience has to be a fellowship. For shame-oriented contexts, Noble promotes relational theology as opposed to dogmatic theology. Priest makes practical the differences between consciences across cultures, compares them to the Bible, and before and after conversion. He shows that conscience can have blind spots where it should react. Conscience may also react where it should not. This shows the cross-cultural relativity of conscience.

Hiebert finally lays the foundations for an interdisciplinary view of an anthropological phenomenon like conscience. Critical realist epistemology seems to be a Biblical view and permits complementarity of theories. When Hiebert opens the perspective of theologies beyond contextualization, which he calls metatheology, the question is raised: „How will absolutes be considered in the light of guilt and shame-oriented consciences?“

2.6 Missiology

Despite the fact that missiology is directly concerned with conscience and its orientations, relatively few missiologists have approached the problem of conscience systematically. We will begin our discussion with Bavinck who defines the term *elenctics*, and Hesselgrave who pursues it. Then, we will present Freitag's contribution to the change in conscience during

conversion. The most substantial contributions to the discussion of conscience are made by Müller, who (together with Käser) brings up a cross-cultural theory of the conscience, and Lienhard, who studies the implications of a shame-oriented conscience for cross-cultural Christian ministry. Both of them are building on Spiro, and both build their argument on the findings of the social sciences. Few theologians have attempted a synthesis of theology with the recent findings of psychology and cultural anthropology. Even though they are not missiologists in the stricter sense, their findings are of practical importance for missiology. Here we will discuss Kraus' Christology of shame and guilt from the perspective of systematic theology, and Neyrey's models for shame-oriented NT exegesis. Exum and Moore (1998) and Deist (2000) have published corresponding studies on the Biblical culture of the OT. Several other theologians have contributed to shame-oriented exegesis of particular books of Scripture: Stansell (1989/1996), DeSilva (1995), Bergant (1996), Hanson (1996), Overholt (1996), Simkins (1996), Campbell (1998), Laniak (1998), and Kurani (2001). Their discussion will be integrated into the study of the respective Biblical books in chapter 3. The contributions to conscience theory of Gustav Warneck (1897:213-218), Johannes Warneck (1913:354), Bruno Gutmann (1925:154ff.; 1941:30-35; 1966:201f.), Christian Keysser (1926:149; 1929:16ff., 249), Georg Vicedom (1951:230-235; 1962), Alan R. Tippett (1971:151), and Hans Kasdorf (1980:111-115) will not be discussed due to space limitations.¹⁵³

2.6.1 Johan Bavinck's Elenctics

In his book *An Introduction to the Science of Missions* (1960), Johan Herman Bavinck (1895-1964) takes up the term *elenctics* from Abraham Kuyper (1894) following the line of thought of Gispertus Voetius (1589-1676). In the second and middle part of his introduction, he defines the term, develops the concept and proposes to introduce the new discipline into missiology.

The term „elenctic“ is derived from the Greek verb *elengchein*. In Homer the verb has the meaning of „to bring to shame.“ It is connected with the word *elengchos* that signifies shame. In later Attic Greek the significance of the term underwent a certain change so that the emphasis fell more upon the conviction of guilt, the demonstration of guilt. It is this latter significance that it has in the New Testament.¹⁵⁴ Its meaning is entirely ethical and religious.

¹⁵³ References are given partly in Bavinck (1960:223ff.) and Müller (1988:422-425).

¹⁵⁴ Bavinck gives the reference of Büchsel's article in *ThWNT* (1935:471). According to Büchsel, the NT speaks more of sin than of guilt, which is an important nuance for our thesis, interpreted by Bavinck on his unconscious presuppositions. It is interesting to note that late Judaism, early Christianity, as well as Epictetus think of the disciplining and educating of man by God as „to shame by exposure“ (Büchsel 1935:473).

In the New Testament the verb *elengchein* appears in various places. It is used together with various subjects.

a. The Lord in his final judgement. Thus, in Jude (vss. 14,15), „Behold, the Lord cometh with ten thousands of his saints, to execute judgement upon all and to convince all that are ungodly among them ...“

b. The Lord in his daily care for the congregation. Thus in Revelation 3:19 where we read: „As many as I love, I rebuke (*elengcho*) and chasten.“

c. The Holy Spirit. Thus, in John 16:8 „and when he is come he will reprove (*elengchei*) the world of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgement.“

d. An elder in relation to those who err in the congregation. This occurs in I Timothy 5:20, which states: „Them that sin rebuke (*elengche*) before all.“

e. One brother trespassing against another brother. Thus, in Matthew 18:15, Jesus says, „Moreover if thy brother shall trespass against thee, go and tell him his fault (*elengchon*) between thee and him alone.“

From these texts it is clear that the word in the New Testament is regularly translated as rebuking, but then in the sense that it includes the conviction of sin and a call to repentance.

When we speak of *elenctics* we do well to understand it in the sense that it has in John 16:8. The Holy Spirit will convince the world of sin. The Holy Spirit is actually the only conceivable subject of this verb, for the conviction of sin exceeds all human ability. Only the Holy Spirit can do this, even though he can and will use us as instruments in his hand. Taken in this sense, *elenctics* is the science, which is concerned with the conviction of sin. In a special sense then it is the science, which unmasks to heathendom all false religions as sin against God, and it calls heathendom to a knowledge of the only true God. To be able to do this well and truthfully it is necessary to have a responsible knowledge of false religions, but one must also be able to lay bare the deepest motifs, which are therein expressed. This can actually occur only if one recognizes and unmasks these same undercurrents within himself. *Elenctics* is possible only on the basis of a veritable self-knowledge, which is kindled in our hearts by the Holy Spirit (Bavinck 1960:221f.).

Bavinck inquires „whether reason can be of service as a basis for *elenctics*.“ The apologists of the first centuries were convinced that it could. „They made grateful use of what the Greek and Roman philosophers had said.“ Connecting the *logos* of Socrates, Plato, and later Greek philosophers with the *Logos* of the apostle John, they were confident that reason could lead from one to the other. The climax of this development was Thomas Aquinas. In his *Summa contra Gentiles* he „says that it is possible to convince the heathen simply by appealing to reason, that there is and can be only one God, that there is justice, and a life after death ... If we proceed in this manner, one can thus say that reason is necessarily the original standpoint or basis of *elenctics*“ (1960:224f.).

„The Reformation has in principle broken with this finely constructed conception“ (1960:225). And yet their churches are still strongly influenced by Roman Catholic concepts. However „*elengchein* does not in the first place refer to arguments which show the absurdity

of heathendom. Its primary meaning refers to the conviction and unmasking of sin, and to the call to responsibility“ (1960:226). It can only be understood when it is placed in the religious and moral spheres. „Coming to the light“ (John 3:19-21) is not yielding to philosophical argument, but „it is rather becoming convinced of the sin hidden behind unbelief, the sin of fleeing from God“ (ibid.). Bavinck elucidates several considerations that ought to direct the elenctic argument (1960:227-231):

1. Each person is „within the reach of God’s common grace. God has not left him without a witness.“ Deep in the heart, there is „a vague awareness that man plays a game with God and that man is always secretly busy escaping from him“ (1960:227f.).

2. „We must be very cautious if we would speak about moments of truth in non-Christian religions.“ Superficial similarities mask great dissimilarities.

3. Bavinck emphasizes that:

The subject of elenctics is in the deepest sense the Holy Spirit. He alone can call to repentance and we are only means in his hand ... The Holy Spirit himself ... creates a basis. He awakens in man that deeply hidden awareness of guilt. He convinces man of sin ... The Holy Spirit uses the word of the preacher and touches the heart of the hearer ... The Holy Spirit demands of us a true and complete surrender to the task he has assigned to us, and it is only after we have so yielded that he will use us as his instruments (1960:229).

4. The person of the preacher itself offers a starting point: the sin both have committed, and the grace which saves both. There arises „a common human heart ... the same *sensus divinitatis* ... the sole difference is the grace which has been given to you“ (1960:230; cp. Kraemer 1963:137ff.; Kuyper 1909:449ff.).

5. „If we use philosophical reasoning to drive a pagan from his superstition to faith in the one God,“ we may move this person in a vacuum. His „God“ will be an idea, „not a living God, not a redeemer“ (1960:230).

Bavinck concludes that „the foundation or basis of our elenctics cannot be anything else than God’s revelation in Jesus Christ ... The Holy Spirit ... alone is empowered to *elengchein*“ (1960:231). Even though elenctics is „innerly bound“ with dogmatics, it is strongly controlled by the missionary motive. Therefore, Bavinck prefers to see its place in the department of missions (1960:232). As such it is informed by the history, science, psychology, phenomenology and philosophy of religion (1960:234-240). „Elenctics, as the science of *elengchein*, the conviction of sin, can ... be exercised only in living contact with the adherents of other religions.“ Different subdisciplines of theology as exegesis, dogmatics, church history and the history of dogma can profit richly from elenctics. „The doctrine of justification by God shines

all the brighter, if we compare it with the doctrine of the Karma.“ By elenctics the church is reminded of its missionary calling (1960:245f.). „Bavinck is concerned about a kind of rationalism in missiology, about an over-dependence upon a philosophical approach ... and about an under-dependence upon the Word and the Holy Spirit“ (Hesselgrave 1983:478).

2.6.2 David Hesselgrave: From Persuasion to Elenctics

In his book *Communicating Christ Cross-Culturally* (1978) and in his article *Missionary Elenctics and Guilt and Shame* (1983), David J. Hesselgrave takes up Bavinck's thoughts on elenctics in his discussion on guilt and shame.

In the ninth and last part of his book on Christian communication under the title „From Persuasion to Elenctics,“ Hesselgrave reflects on the motivational sources of decision. Starting from Greek rhetoric, he asks whether we have the right to persuade a person. Using Weaver's summary of Plato's position he answers: „Rhetoric moves the soul with a movement which cannot finally be justified logically ... When the rhetorician encounters some soul ,sinking beneath the double load of forgetfulness and vice' he seeks to reanimate it by ... leading to the ultimate Good“ (Weaver 1953:23; Hesselgrave 1978:414f.). Hesselgrave comments: „Plato was right. Rhetoric has no inherent absolutes. Nor does it have the power to make men good. Truth and goodness transcend man himself. They *are* in the *logos*, but - and here Plato was wrong - they are not in the *logos* of the philosopher but in the *Logos* of God, the Christ of the Bible“ (1978:416 italics in original). He continues that even „good men need to be converted.“ On the grounds of Lk 1:16 and Acts 26:18, he concludes that conversion is an activity involving both God and man and is therefore more than mere persuasion: it is elenctics. Here Hesselgrave joins Bavinck: „The *Holy Spirit* must convict (*elengchein*) (John 16:8)! The *Word* must be heard (Romans 10:17)!“ (1978:421 italics in original). Speaking with Packer: „There is only *one agent* of evangelism: namely, the Lord Jesus Christ ... through His Holy Spirit ... There is only *one method* of evangelism: namely, the faithful explanation of the gospel message“ (Packer 1961:85f. quoted by Hesselgrave 1978:421 italics in original). Hesselgrave concludes:

A rational presentation of truth is important. A persuasive appeal to forsake unbelief and idolatry, and to receive Christ as Redeemer and Lord, is enjoined in Scripture. But the essential ministry is that of the Holy Spirit ... First, the Triune God is sovereignly active in the task of missionizing ... He convicts men of sin and causes them to turn (return) to Himself ... Second, the missionary is the servant of God ... Third, though men are sinners, they still bear the marks of the *imago Dei* in their reason, conscience, aspirations, inclinations, strivings, hopes, feelings, fears, values, and

desires. (Our inclusive term for these concepts in this context is „motive“ which Gordon Allport has defined as „any internal condition in the person that induces action or thought“) (Allport 1961:196; Hesselgrave 1978:422 italics in original).

While he [Bavinck] provides numerous cautions concerning the use of philosophical argument, he says comparatively little with respect to psychological suasions. He has written much about religions, less about culture. He does not emphasize ethos, worldview, values, and ethical agendas to the degree that we might like him to do ... Were he to re-write his *Introduction to the Science of Missions* after a significant exposure to contemporary (especially North American) social science and missiology, he would undoubtedly include some newer emphases. In a sense however, all of this is beside the point. As far as Bavinck's conclusions are concerned, the question comes down to this: Is his understanding of elenctics in accord with Scripture? ... Does his view square with such crucial passages as John 3:19-21; John 16:5-11 and Romans 1:18-32? ... I believe that we must answer these questions in the affirmative. And if that is so, the implications for missiology are as far-reaching as they are obvious (1983:478f.).

In his article *Missionary Elenctics and Guilt and Shame* (1983), Hesselgrave looks at the distinction of guilt and shame. He starts the discussion with the Freudian guilt concept and Benedict and Mead's over-generalizing distinction of national characters into „guilt“ and „shame“ cultures. Without mentioning the contributions of Piers, Singer and Spiro, he proceeds with a discussion of the symposium on transcultural psychiatry in 1965. There P.M. Yap insists that:

The opposition of „shame“ to „guilt“ is intellectualistic, arbitrary and without empirical justification. He held that it is more helpful to distinguish between unconscious guilt feelings on the one hand, and conscious guilt feelings and conscious moral shame feelings „generated by the anticipation of discovery of wrong conduct by others“ on the other ... He agreed with DeVos that Japanese guilt feelings based on moral obligations to ancestors and Emperor showed a development analogous to that inherent in Weber's Protestant ethic. (Yap 1965:100f.; Hesselgrave 1983:464).¹⁵⁵

Tsung-Yi Lin disagreed with Yap. He said that when the definitions of sin and guilt are widened so that failure to fulfil obligations to ancestors and parents are included, guilt complexes are apparent among Chinese depressives (Yap 1965:111f.; Hesselgrave 1983:465).

Hesselgrave comments that guilt feelings are an important factor in transcultural psychiatry and counseling. „Second, if semantic confusion can be cleared away, the guilt-shame differentiation has validity“ (Hesselgrave 1983:466). After having discussed Bavinck's elenctics, Hesselgrave concludes on guilt and shame:

¹⁵⁵ Cp. Doi's statement on the Western and Japanese concepts of guilt as transgression of a norm and failure in obligations respectively: „In Western eyes, the Japanese sense of guilt appears to be rather sluggish ... Where the Westerner tends to think of the sense of guilt as an inner problem for the individual, the Japanese has no such

First, the guilt-shame distinction made by Benedict and others would seem to have validity. The distinction is not one that is generally recognized and utilized in the literature of psychiatry, psychology and counseling. Nor can the anthropological distinction which differentiates between cultures on this basis be said to have biblical support. But whether we be analyzing personality problems, the biblical record or cultural characteristics, the difference between anxiety or discomfort occasioned by a failure to live up to a standard, even in the absence of the „standard-imposer,“ and that produced only or primarily by failing to meet the expectation of „one’s immediate others,“ is very real. We would argue that anxiety of the former type is appropriately labeled „guilt;“ that it is most compatible with, if not derived from, the Judeo-Christian view of a holy and omniscient God as the Author of both the revealed Law and the human conscience; that conscious guilt of a biblical sort is a consequence, not only of man’s conscience, but also of the ministry of the Holy Spirit; and that the only completely ameliorative antidote of guilt is the forgiveness provided by God in Jesus Christ. Shame and the spector of shame, on the other hand, are frequently inimical to faith in Christ, because, when a sense of shame supplants an awareness of guilt, the respondent is often so preoccupied with the approval or disapproval of others that he cannot consider the requirements of God (1983:479f.).

Second, we should not confuse „conviction of guilt“ with „points of guilt“ and priorities in the „ethical agendas“ of a given culture. The notion that missionaries should direct their communication to items high on the priority agendas of their respondents - guilt in „guilt cultures,“ shame in „shame cultures,“ fear in „fear cultures“ - is not without merit ... However, to suggest that guilt before the true and holy God, shame before departed ancestors and present contemporaries, and fear before spirits and ghosts are somehow equal and interchangeable as motivations for conversion is to err. Insofar as biblical elenctics might involve shame, the shame must be that shame which Adam and Eve experienced - shame before a holy God. Insofar as biblical elenctics involve fear, it must be the fear of a just God. Primarily, however, *elengchein* refers to conviction of *guilt*. This is not so much cultural as it is transcultural and spiritual. Sin and guilt, atonement and forgiveness - these are not culturally derived accidents which are seized upon by God. They are supercultural and spiritual realities insisted upon by him ... (1983:480 italics in original).

Third, great care must be exercised in the interpretation of the theories, and in the employment of techniques, of secular therapists and counselors ...

Fourth, missionary communicators and counselors should be prepared to deal with the issue of guilt, whatever the culture of the counselee and irrespective of the presence or absence of (or conscious or unconscious nature of) guilt. This is not to say that every human problem is hamartigenic in its origin ... Still in another sense, all human maladies are occasioned by sin. And sin has its forensic side. Ultimately, no malady can be cured, no wrong righted, and no problem solved, until payment is made (1983:481f.).

Hesselgrave rightly diagnoses the „semantic confusion“ over guilt and shame in the symposium on transcultural psychiatry. However, he is not as clear in his own definitions as Piers and Spiro, whom he does not mention. We will be very careful to differentiate between

idea ... What is characteristic about the Japanese sense of guilt, though, is that it shows itself most sharply when the individual suspects that his action will result in betraying the group to which he belongs“ (Doi 1982:59).

the concept of guilt as failure in the expectations and/or obligations towards oneself or others in a shame-oriented conscience and guilt as transgression of a norm in a guilt-oriented conscience.¹⁵⁶ Hesselgrave rightly cautions to consider only guilt and shame before God as valuable motives in conversion and Christian life. Guilt and shame before fellow men however play an important role for our spiritual life, especially for forgiveness, as Mowrer and Loewen have shown. Hesselgrave does not appear to recognize that the concepts of sin, guilt, shame and forgiveness are as much cultural as transcultural and spiritual concepts. Of course, the death of Jesus-Christ at the cross of Golgotha and his resurrection are transcultural facts. However, *elengchein* refers not only to conviction of guilt, but also to conviction of shame before God, as the etymology of the term shows (Büchsel 1935:470). It will be our task in the chapter on Scripture to show the Biblical point of view on guilt and shame.

2.6.3 Walter Freytag's Clock

In one of his lectures, Walter Freytag (1899-1959), professor of missiology in Hamburg, compares the conscience with a clock. Peter Beyerhaus reports this in an article in the honour of his teacher (1961). Later on, Klaus Müller discusses and enlarges Freytag's concept in his article *Elenktik: Gewissen im Kontext* „Elenctics: Conscience in Context“ (1988).

„When two men have a correctly set clock, it is not said that both clocks show the same hour. It depends from which degree of longitude they receive their normal time“ (Beyerhaus 1961:147). Conscience, according to Freytag, is „the human organ which responds to God's message.“ As the task and goal of missions is „to call people from among all the Gentiles to the obedience which comes from faith (Rom 1:5; 16:26), this obedience of faith is the answer of man to the word of God which witnesses in his conscience ... The answer of faith is only genuine when it is the expression of his own conscience“ (ibid.). Therefore, conscience must be a general and uniquely human phenomenon. Animals do not have a conscience. The conscience is not a legislative authority, but has only a judicial function: it makes categorical decisions before an intended or after an executed action. It is „not the last instance, but is itself bound to a higher authority. This authority is not the same for every conscience.“ Among the thousands of possible authorities it is only the God of Biblical revelation who has absolute authority over the human conscience. However, the conscience is already oriented towards an

¹⁵⁶ The Portuguese and Japanese languages express the shame-orientation of the concept of guilt in their term for „excuse me“ or „I am indebted to you“ when they say „I am obliged to you“ (Portuguese: *obrigado*, Japanese: *sumanai* / *sumimasen*; cp. Doi 1982:60-64,67).

authority, but not towards God. When a person comes to Christ, his ego divides: it has two sets of standards, those of his worldview and of his community and also the new one of Christ. The former set of norms may match in several points with God's standards (Rom 2:14f.). Only when the new obedient ego wins over the old and Christ has taken his place as Lord of the human conscience, this conflict is overcome. The person has converted to Christ; his conscience has changed. This process may last many years; only rarely does it happen suddenly and radically. „It depends again and again on those breakthroughs of the Spirit ... The new specific character of the Christian conscience is based on the fact that the merciful God speaks in it and that he is ready to heal a hurt conscience“ (1961:148). True missionary leadership seeks only one thing: „to bind the conscience to the Word“ (Freytag 1938:253).

Beyerhaus then compares his observations as a missionary among the Bantu of South Africa with Freytag's concept of the conscience as a clock. The term for conscience among the Sesotho (*letswalo*) and the Zulu (*uvalo*) means „the terrified beating of the heart confronted with danger.“ It is, as Gutmann describes it among the Wachagga of Tanzania, „the organ of balance of the soul“ (*Gleichgewichtsorgan*) which has the function of maintaining the harmony of life in the community (Gutmann 1926:726). It reacts only when the act is discovered. It is predominantly a bad conscience, which is controlled by the ancestors and the medicine men (Beyerhaus 1961:150).

Beyerhaus then asks why the African Christian conscience can be weaker than the former pre-Christian conscience and why the conscience of the second generation can be weaker than that of the first generation? 1) Freytag speaks of the „pagan embracing of the Christian message“¹⁵⁷ when the Gospel is not yet completely understood. Beyerhaus asks if there cannot be a division of the conscience when the new knowledge is there, but the old pagan authority does not leave the person out of its grip. The person lives „in two worlds“ (1961:154). 2) Beyerhaus goes on by asking whether it could be a „degeneration of conscience“ in the sense of Ole Hallesby (1977), based on the old person's egoism and search for prestige. 3) Considering the prevalent „fear-conscience“ which responds to sanctions, would the Christian conscience need also sanctions as motivation? Luther spoke of fearing, loving and trusting God in the context of the Decalogue, and Paul wanted to uphold the law (Rom 3:31). Do we have to preach the wrath of God as Hallesby says? (Hallesby 1977:32ff.; Beyerhaus 1961:155). 4) Can the conscience stay healthy without care in counseling, without a possibi-

¹⁵⁷ Germ. *heidnische Verklammerung der christlichen Botschaft*.

lity for confession? 5) Even though there is no collective conscience, is there no common action based on the common decision of conscience by the members of the church? Freytag holds that „genuine independence is nothing else than the church’s proper conscience which is bound to the Word“ (Freytag 1938:256; Beyerhaus 1961:155). 6) Does not the Bantu church, which Beyerhaus describes, need a revival of the conscience? During revivals sins are recognized, confessed without shame before fellow men and overcome (Warren 1954:59; Beyerhaus 1961:156).

Beyerhaus’ questions are most relevant. Several of them are answered by the understanding of the shame-oriented conscience, especially Spiro’s motivational theory with the different structures controlling conformity by sanction and motivation. Some of them will be discussed in chapters 4 and 5 where we reflect the theoretical and practical implications of our findings in Scripture and the social sciences.

Freytag’s model of the clock is refined and enlarged by Klaus W. Müller (1988:441-448). Everybody can read an analogue clock with two hands and a fix point in a fraction of a second. However, few think of the mechanics or electronics behind the clock-face. At the same time, we assume that they are there and get used with time and must be renewed. The hands mean guilt and shame, their short ends corresponding to righteousness and prestige/honour. For persons, who have been educated in a nuclear family, the big hand, which reacts quickly, represents the feeling of guilt. For persons having been educated in an extended family, the big hand represents the feeling of shame. The quick second hand means the scan of conscience by senses, reason and emotions. The minute and hour hand do not turn systematically in the same direction, but show the status of conscience with the field between them. If the angle between the hands is more than 180 degrees, the conscience is in a status of alarm; it is a bad conscience. In the six thousand plus cultures in the world the clock-faces are differently oriented, formed and divided. The division of the clock-face seems „normal“ in every culture; it has its logic. „Reading conscience in another culture needs a total change of thought, another logic“ (1988:443).

Through conversion the clock-face receives a new orientation, form and division. The new orientation is toward the Triune God. This fixed orientation changes the conscience towards guilt orientation, which means that the length of the hands changes. The Christian changes the context (the form of the clock) and the culture (division of the clock-face). If the divisions are not substituted, a cultural vacuum develops and syncretism with it. The ten commands represent the rough division, the Sermon on the Mount the fine division of the

clock-face. The empty space between the divisions poses problems for Christian ethics. It is the realm of a contextualized interpretation of the Bible guided by the Holy Spirit. The motor of the Christian clock is the Holy Spirit.

Besides Freytag, Beyerhaus and Müller, also Nowak talks about conscience as a clock: „Paul asks to relate the conscience always to God. It is therefore theonomous. It represents a norm which has to seek always God’s holy will, just like a clock has to be set always according to normal time“ (Nowak 1978:108).

2.6.4 Klaus Müller’s Dynamics

In numerous writings, Klaus W. Müller (born 1945) makes a substantial contribution to the theory of conscience. As my teacher at Columbia International University, Korntal, I owe him my basic insights into the functioning of the conscience, the role of guilt and shame in it, and some of their implications for cross-cultural Christian ministry. I am indebted to him for the insights I gained through his teachings. It will be impossible to review all his writings on the subject. In this section, I will concentrate on two of the five models for conscience, which he presents in his article *Elenktik: Gewissen im Kontext* „Elenctics: Conscience in Context“ (1988), and some of his remarks concerning guilt and shame in the Bible and Christian life.

Like Bavinck and Hesselgrave, Müller is convinced of the importance of elenctics. „There is no enduring change in man, if there is no change of conscience“ (1988:427). Müller would like to see elenctics as an independent branch within missiology. For him, it is necessarily an interdisciplinary discipline. Through the integration with social sciences, elenctics leave theory and become practical (1988:426f.,451). Müller develops his theory based on Piers, Singer, Spiro, Noble, and his missionary colleague Käser.

The first model describes the structure of the shame and guilt-oriented conscience (1988:427-431). It is presented in appendix 5. „Within the cognitive frame of the culture, the religion, and the sociological and psychological situation of a person, his conscience moves on two parallels with two opposite poles, which Alan Tippett calls ‚axes.‘ The elements to the right represent cross-cultural, human needs. The elements to the left represent the threat to their fulfilment: shame – prestige and guilt – righteousness“ (1988:427). „Sigmund Freud would probably call *libido* the forces of the soul, which get moving the conscience on these axes“ (1988:429). According to Müller, however, „this spiritual force, which wants to bring the conscience back into the status of peace and to maintain it there, is the real motor of the conscience, which every man has from birth on; the conscience is a witness to the creation in

the image of God“ (1988:430). It is not to be equated with instinct; it is learned. It starts to be in motion through the „bringing-into-service“ of the elements of the cultural and sociological context and reacts based on the learned norms.

The form of the conscience is represented by small ovals. „The education, the context, the intellectual training, the personal will, conscious and unconscious cognitive processes determine it. The centre of the oval is positioned on the line between sin and obedience“ (1988:429). Based on Wayne (1976), Müller defines sin as „transgression of a norm,“ (*Norm-übertretung*) and obedience as conformity to the norm. If the „middle line“ of the oval lies closer to the shame-prestige axis, the conscience is more sensitive to this element, and it is called a more shame-oriented conscience, and vice versa. „Herewith it is clear that there is no such thing as pure shame or guilt orientation“ (1988:429).

If the conscience is close to the left pole, shame, guilt or anxiety appears. It is under the pressure of society's norms: it is a bad conscience. In order to come back to peace, that is, to a good conscience, it needs a relief mechanism (*Entlastungsmechanismus*), a „punishment,“ which differs from culture to culture. „According to the Bible, the relief mechanisms are repentance and forgiveness based on the redemption and reconciliation through Christ. Sociologically speaking, they mean reparation and reinsertion“ (1988:430). In this way, the person gains back the prestige¹⁵⁸ and the righteousness that he lost by the transgression of the norm. Depending on the orientation, the conscience will go the „shorter“ way to relief: for shame by prestige, and for guilt by righteousness. Either will be the preferred goal. The conscience is then at peace. Man's soul is in equilibrium; he does not feel his conscience (1988:431). The conscience of a person, who is normally integrated in society, attempts to go from the left to the right, to avoid the „Fall“ by defence mechanisms (*Abwehrmechanismus*) (1988:430). If one of the poles is suppressed systematically, not only the conscience of the individual is destroyed, but also the cohesion and responsibility of society, which authorizes the norms through the poles. The collective conscience degenerates (1988:431).

The fourth model presents the differential functioning of a shame and guilt-oriented conscience. Müller's graphic, which is based on Piers, Singer, Spiro, Noble and his own observations, is presented in appendix 6. Müller shows clearly how the conscience functions in either orientation. The main difference is that the shame-oriented conscience produces only

¹⁵⁸ For Müller, prestige is the product of the status, which the person has in society, and the role that he plays (Müller 1985).

anxiety, as expectation of punishment after the violation of a norm, whereas the guilt-oriented conscience produces directly guilt. Shame is produced only when a significant other discovers the violation. This difference is of great practical importance as the shame-oriented conscience functions properly only in the presence of a significant other, who reinforces the internalised norms. If the violation is not known at all, or known by persons who are not significant others, shame is not produced. Table 2.13, which is based on Käser,¹⁵⁹ attempts to show this difference more schematically. The two orientations of conscience are again isolated from each other. In reality, there is always a mixture of the two (Müller 1988:439f.).

Table 2.13: Differential Functioning of Conscience according to Käser and Müller

Conscience	Guilt-Oriented	Shame-Oriented
Origin of orientation	Small number of „significant others,“ well defined: parents (nuclear family)	Big number of „significant others“ (extended family), inexactly defined: parents, relatives, strangers, and spirits
Structure	Norms of „significant others“ are internalised, conscience is formed	Norms of „significant others“ are internalised, conscience is formed
Manifestation	One's own conscience is norm control	Other persons or spirits are authorities for norm control
Reaction to planned violation of a norm	Signal of the conscience that the imaginary act is false, defence mechanism is activated	Signal of the conscience that the imaginary act is false, defence mechanism is activated
Reaction to actual violation of a norm	Disturbance of the equilibrium is caused from inside suddenly, always felt as guilt which is seen as punishment relief mechanism is activated	Disturbance of the equilibrium is caused from outside, but only when the act is known by others suddenly, always felt as shame which is seen as punishment defence mechanism is activated relief mechanism is activated
Result	A functional conscience (super-ego) leads to peace	A functional conscience (super-ego) leads to peace

There are two refinements that are necessary for this model: anxiety can be due not only to expectation of punishment, but also to expectation of abandonment or refusal (Piers 1971:24). Secondly, reparation should only be attributed to the guilt-oriented conscience, while reconciliation is a function of the shame-oriented conscience.

¹⁵⁹ Müller mentions that Käser presented a similar comparative table in 1971.

I will now touch on some of Müller's comments on sin, forgiveness, conversion, the Bible, and elenctics in general. „For a shame-oriented conscience, it is more important to save face, to defend the prestige, and to maintain the relationship than to be right ... What is sin is defined by one according to the standards of righteousness, by the other according to the standards of prestige“ (1996a:100). Concerning forgiveness of sin and conversion, Müller agrees with George W. Peters, his teacher: „Forgiveness of sin is based on a consciousness of guilt before God, not on a feeling of shame“ (1988:416; cp. 1996a:109).

The feeling of shame is superficial. The search for prestige, acceptance by others, and the values that lead there, are the motive for a decision. This leads to a sort of „rice Christians“ ... Syncretistic elements are the consequence, if the guilt feeling does not grow ... Shame is however not only an obstacle on the way. It has to be directed towards God like in the OT, on his omnipotence, omnipresence and incorruptibility ... Furthermore, shame is an inhibition to sin for the Christian, an active defence mechanism, not only in the sexual realm (1988:448).

„If a shame-oriented conscience accepts the Holy Spirit as his authority, it internalises the ‚significant other‘ and experiences a change to guilt orientation“ (1988:447; 1996a:109). „But also extremely guilt-oriented persons are sensitized by the Word of God concerning their relationship with other persons; they learn to react on their ‚relationship-axis‘“ (1996a:109).

Concerning the Bible, Müller holds that „The Word of God is guilt-oriented, that means its goal is that man becomes just before God. The relief mechanism leads by right and righteousness and only in second line by prestige and honour. The spiritual charging mechanism [*Belastungsmechanismus*]¹⁶⁰ reacts to the norms of the Bible, for example the ten commandments or the Sermon on the Mount, and it indicates guilt“ (1996a:109). Müller concludes with a general remark on elenctics:

Some missiological textbooks indicate the problem [of conscience], but do not treat these complicated interconnections in the unconscious of man. A practical proposal, how to deal with it, is usually not given. The components of the conscience are not recognized in the structure presented here. Probably, there is no other topic where people think and judge so much from their own cultural standpoint. Even theology is influenced by it, especially when teachers of dogmatics have no sensibility for other cultures (1996a:109f.).

With Müller's (and Käser's) coherent theory of conscience, the study of elenctics has taken a big step. Müller's great merit is to have defined conscience on the basis of soteriological models based on the fundamental importance of shame and guilt. Based on their models,

¹⁶⁰ „Charging mechanism“ (Germ. *Belastungsmechanismus*) in Müller's terminology means to be „weighed down“ by guilt or shame. See appendix 6.

every missionary can analyse his daily situations easily. This way, elenctics become practical and essential for cross-cultural Christian ministry. Additionally, Müller's models, especially the 4th model, show clearly that anxiety, as expectation of punishment or abandonment, is involved in both conscience orientations after the violation of a norm and does probably not constitute a 3rd constitutive element in the same rank as shame and guilt, as Hesselgrave, Augsburg and Muller hold (see appendix 5 and 6). Beside „shame“ and „guilt“ cultures, they speak of „fear“ cultures (Hesselgrave 1983:480; Augsburg 1986:122-125; Muller 2000:19f.,40). In shame-oriented consciences, anxiety as fear of punishment or abandonment persists until the violation comes to light. Therefore, anxiety can last a long time; it may never be appeased. In this case, a shame-oriented conscience may appear as a fear-oriented conscience.

It is no lessening of Müller's merit that some refinements have to be made. Lienhard questions Müller's statement that the Bible is guilt-oriented (Lienhard 1998:79). It will be our task in the chapter on Scripture to evaluate whether the Biblical charging mechanism indicates always guilt and whether the Bible is generally guilt-oriented. Scripture will also be called upon to determine whether shame before God is possible and whether or not it can be a basis for forgiveness, in an answer to Hesselgrave's, Peters' and Müller's statements. Müller considers righteousness as opposite to guilt. It will be important to check the semantic domains of this term in Scripture and in its common theological and secular use in Europe and North America. We will attribute the Biblical term „righteousness“ to the semantic domain of salvation and introduce innocence, rightness and law as polar opposites of guilt.¹⁶¹ Müller defines sin as transgression of a norm, which is a guilt-oriented definition. For us, sin is a neutral term meaning disturbance of harmony and salvation. „Violation of a norm“ would seem to be a more neutral definition. Again Scripture will orient us in the definition of the term. For Müller, the opposite of sin is obedience. This again shows Müller's guilt-oriented approach to Scripture. We will use salvation as the primary opposite of sin. For Müller, the 2nd axis is made up of shame and prestige/honour. As we have already seen, the polar value opposite to shame can be manifold as virtue, honour, glory, power, and harmony. Müller indicates that a person, who becomes a Christian, will become more guilt-oriented as God's norms are internalised. The person will however also become more shame-oriented as the relationship to God intensifies. The conscience becomes more sensitised to sin in form of shame

¹⁶¹ Cp. section 3.1.12. A Revised Model.

and guilt. Thus, the person will normally develop in the direction of a more balanced conscience. This balance will depend largely on how Scripture is preached and taught.

2.6.5 Jerome Neyrey's Model for Shame-Oriented NT Exegesis

On the basis of the findings of anthropologists as Peristiany (1966; 1992) and Gilmore (1987), who analysed the values of contemporary Mediterranean cultures, and on the basis of the studies of ancient Greek culture (e.g. Adkins 1960; Cairns 1993), Bruce J. Malina, a Catholic NT scholar, develops several anthropological models for NT exegesis. He presents these models in his book *The New Testament World: Insights from Cultural Anthropology* (1983). Together with Neyrey (1991; 1998; Malina/Neyrey 1996), Moxnes (1991), Pilch (1993), and Rohrbaugh (1996; Malina/Rohrbaugh 1992), he refines the models and develops them further. As an example, we will discuss in this section the coherent model for shame-oriented NT exegesis, which Jerome H. Neyrey (born 1940) presents in his book *Honor and Shame in the Gospel of Matthew* (1998).

Neyrey considers his model of „honour and shame“ to be a culturally adequate model for NT exegesis. It results from the synthesis of the findings of many researchers in cultural anthropology, ancient Greek studies and theology. „From Xenophon to Augustine, Greco-Roman historians supply ample evidence that their world was characterized by a ‚love of honour‘ (*philotimia*)“ (1998:17). According to Neyrey, honour was the basic value in ancient Mediterranean society. Based on Malina (1983:30-33) and Pitt-Rivers (1977:1), he defines honour as comprising worth, value, prestige, and reputation. It is claimed by an individual and acknowledged by the public. Consequently, it refers also to esteem (1998:15). He differentiates between ascribed and achieved honour. The former depends on family and geographical origins. The beginning of the Gospel of Matthew shows by its genealogies and OT citations that Jesus Christ is born in the royal city of Bethlehem into the royal family of king David (Mt 1:1-16; 2:6; Mic 5:2). God's witness acknowledges him as Son of God (Ps 110:1; Isa 7:14; 42:1-4; Mt 1:23; 3:17). The father-son relationship is paralleled by a patron-client relationship, in which Jesus takes the function of mediator and „broker“ for the kingdom of God (1998:39).

Neyrey observes that the ancient societies are „agonistic,“ meaning competitive. Everything is conceived of existing in limited supply (cp. Foster 1965:296). „Any advantage achieved by an individual or family is seen as a loss to others, and the person who makes what the Western world lauds as ‚progress‘ is viewed as a threat to the stability of the entire

community“ (1998:18). Therefore, everything has to be fought for. Also honour is seen as a limited good. Consequently, the „love of honour,“ which characterizes all ancient Mediterranean societies, produces competition, aggression and envy. Love of honour produces also love of victory (*philonikia*) and love of glory (*philodoxia*). Therefore, all of society's life is a public game of „challenge and riposte“ (1998:20). By entering this game, men can achieve honour. Jesus' way to achieve honour is by being a mediator and broker of divine benefaction through wise teaching, healing, exorcisms and forgiveness of sin (1998:43). His way of answering questions has to be seen as part of the challenge and riposte game. Its rhetoric form corresponds to the „responsive chreia,“ a way to assert honour (e.g. Mt 9:1-17; 1998:50).

Symbols of honour are family „blood“ and name. People are introduced through their name (Mt 3:1; 10:3) and their family lineage describing their origin (*eugeneia*) and birth (*genesis*) (Mt 1:20; 4:21; 9:27; 16:17). Jesus' names and titles as Jesus, Lord, Son of God, Son of Abraham, and Son of David are names of honour (1998:21f.,53-56). Honour is displayed by physical appearance, clothing and wealth. Head, face and eyes, the right arm and hand are honourable parts of the body. The penis and testicles are shameful parts. To expose them, particularly involuntarily, is humiliating and shaming. Stripping of clothing is used to shame captives and criminals. Jesus' clothing with a royal garment, the thorn crown, and his nudity at the cross are humiliating and shaming acts. On the other hand, status and role in religious and social life are expressed by clothes: „Clothes make man.“ Similarly, wealth symbolizes one's status and translates into power. „The association of the naked with the sick, the hungry and thirsty, the stranger, and the prisoner ... describe the bottom of social ladder in antiquity“ (1998:25f.,60-65).

Neyrey goes on to describe the narrative of Matthew as rhetoric of praise. Consequently, he defines Matthew's description of Jesus' origins, birth, education, accomplishments and death as „encomium,“ a document of praise, written according to the rules of Greek rhetoric. He reads the Sermon on the Mount as an inversion of the cultural values, an honouring of the dishonoured. Jesus, says Neyrey, „calls off the honor game“ (1998:190).

Man of antiquity is, according to Neyrey, a group-oriented person with a corporate identity. He lives in a face-to-face society. „He is born for fellowship“ (1998:27). Undoubtedly, Neyrey is describing a shame-oriented personality and culture. Subsuming worth, value, prestige and reputation under honour, he can talk of an honour society. In his analysis, he omits harmony, power and virtue, which are other central concepts of ancient Mediterranean society. We prefer to keep multiple opposite values to shame. Additionally, Neyrey blends out

the guilt-oriented component of NT culture, especially visible among the Pharisees. Nevertheless, Neyrey presents a convincing model for shame-oriented NT exegesis.

2.6.6 Norman Kraus' Christology of Shame and Guilt

In a missionary experience in Japan, C. Norman Kraus (born 1924), a systematic theologian, is dissatisfied with the traditional theological concepts that he brings from the United States. He finds that:

Traditional resolutions based upon the legal metaphor have proved inadequate to the profound nature of the problem. It is not a matter of „paying a debt to justice“ as defined in the law of talion, i.e., „an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.“ The shame and guilt of sin are antecedent to legal evaluation and penalties and cannot be equated with them. Legal metaphors only bear witness to a more primal reality of personal relationships. They do not define the essence (1990:206).

Therefore, he proposes in his book *Jesus Christ Our Lord: Christology from a Disciple's Perspective* (1987/90) a Christology of shame and guilt.¹⁶² Building on Piers and Singer (1953), Helen Lynd (1958), Noble (1975) and Augsburg (1986), Kraus recalls that „shame has not been used as an analytical category in Western theology“ (1990:205). However, he finds large evidence of shame in the Bible.

The cultural expression of shame is much more evident in the world of the Bible than most modern Western readers are aware. It is not only a question of how often the word shame is used, although there are significant instances. The concepts of ritual purity and uncleanness, rules for the segregation of social classes and foreigners, attitudes toward women and sexual relationships, views of disease and death, exile as a form of punishment – all point toward a shame rather than a guilt orientation. Thus to a greater extent than is often recognized, the problem of sin in Israel was the problem of purifying the nation of its pollution without permanently expelling the unclean person. The problem was resolved by a common confession of shame before God (Isa 6:5) and a careful definition of the degrees of sinfulness and the manner in which it might be cleansed. (See, for example, the rules of Leviticus.) For most transgressions ritual offerings could cover the offensive, dishonorable behavior. But the extreme case required execution of the offender whose continued presence would compromise the people and pollute the land (e.g. Jos 7:13,16-26).

To suggest that New Testament writers, including Paul, also were thinking in these terms far more than post-Reformation biblical interpreters and theologians realized is not unreasonable. A guilty conscience was Luther's problem, not Saint Paul's (Stendahl 1963:202ff.). In the first-century world the moral impact of sin was experienced to a great extent as shame, and this is clearly reflected in the New Testament. The ultimate revulsion to sin can be expressed as glorying in what is contemptible to God, or vice versa, falling short of and shaming the glory of God (Rom 3:23; 1:22-25; 1Cor 1:26-31; Phil 3:19) (1990:214).

¹⁶² Cp. the title of Kraus' article (1987): „The Cross of Christ - Dealing with Shame and Guilt.“

„Shame is related to the fact that we have fallen short of the image of God ... Or, to put it in current secular vocabulary, shame is related to the dehumanization both of ourselves and others. We have disappointed and dishonored God in that we have fallen short of the covenant goals which would have fulfilled the divine image“ (1990:215). However, the Christian view goes beyond psychological concepts.

In the Christian view shame and guilt are more than subjective feelings conditioned by a relative cultural situation. They must be defined in terms of an ultimate authority, which defines the true nature of human existence and relationship. The biblical concept that humans are created „in the image of God“ means that their true nature and responsibility must be defined in a relation to God. This gives both shame and guilt an objective moral status that must be taken seriously in the act of moral pardon. Acts against the very nature and ground of existence cannot be resolved by escape from one set of cultural mores to a society with different patterns and definitions. Sin is a universal objective moral offence, and pardon must be morally justified. Both its objective (social-moral) and subjective (individual-psychological) aspects must be dealt with (1990:206).

„Shame is associated with concepts of sin as defilement or uncleanness and it is experienced as a sense of embarrassment of unworthiness in another's presence (Isa 6:1-5; Lk 5:8; 7:6). ... Objectively it is suffered as social disgrace, exclusion, or ridicule which the group projects onto the ‚defiled‘ individual“ (1990:206). Guilt is experienced as a burden of responsibility that one must bear for what has been done. Such responsibility is objectified in formulas of restitution or legally prescribed penalties. Kraus differentiates between false and true shame and guilt. False shame and guilt are expressed in the taboos, mores, and laws of society. „In theological terms we can say that the expressions of shame are negative indicators of a society's concept of the *imago dei*“ (1990:220). Examples for true shame and guilt are evil intentions, selfish desires, deceit, pride, dishonouring parents, fornication, theft, adultery, and coveting (cp. Mk 7:21-23).

Jesus did not shift the categories from defilement and shame to transgression and guilt but gave to shame an authentic moral content and internalized norm, namely, exposure to the eyes of the all-seeing, righteous, loving God. Indeed, he described the judgement of God as making public the shameful things that we have imagined were hidden from sight (Lk 12:1-3). This transfer from an external social standard to an internalized theological standard is important for Christian formation in societies, which continue to depend upon the shame of public exposure as a primary sanction against undesirable conduct. If it is not accomplished, the conscience remains bound to relative authorities such as tradition and local social approval (1990:221).

This means that Jesus turned false into true shame and guilt.

The Christian doctrine of forgiveness and reconciliation, then, must deal with the social disgrace and exclusion (objective shame) as well as the subjective feelings of

failure and unworthiness. Further, it must deal with the intrinsic consequences of guilt – both its internal and external consequences ... The shamed person must find new identity and personal worth. And the guilty person must find expiation (1990:207).

Caution must be taken in understanding the function of confession within „shame cultures.“ „Confession becomes a form of self-shaming ... The most effective way to break relationships is to shame another person; when one has been shamed, there is little chance for reconciliation ... Thus it is far easier to overlook, excuse, or forget than to confess and forgive“ (1990:212f.).

The cross of Christ implies identification with both shame and guilt. Christ took the punishment appropriate for guilt, and he experienced the moral shame of humanity. When he accepted the ridicule, derision, and rejection that crucifixion represented, he lived through „the most shameful execution imaginable“ (Kraus 1990:216; cp. Green/Lawrenz 1994:101). For Kraus, the cross does not necessarily demonstrate God’s need for justice, a payment so God could be satisfied. Rather, the cross shows his love, a love that led Jesus to „despise the shame“ and to identify with us to the very end, to the depth of shame and guilt, to complete isolation and to death (2Cor 5:21) (1990:218).

The cross involved no equivalent compensation of payment of penalty demanded by God’s anger. God is justified in forgiving us on the basis of his own holy love and not on the basis of an equivalent penal satisfaction, which has been paid to him through the death of Jesus. The cross itself as an act of solidarity with us is the divine ethical justification for forgiveness, and the resurrection of Jesus demonstrates the effectiveness of God’s love in Christ to forgive and cleanse us from sin (1990:225).

Stressing God’s love in identifying with us in our alienation as a reason for the cross appeals to shame-oriented people. Kraus adds rightly that the Biblical models for forgiveness, that is justification and reconciliation, have to be interpreted in the context of the covenant concept (1990:178f.). However, he does not elaborate on the application of conscience orientation in different contexts.¹⁶³

Kraus’ great merit is to have made a most substantial contribution to the formulation of a shame and guilt-oriented theology. However, having based his ideas mainly on relatively old sources,¹⁶⁴ his models of differentiation between the two conscience orientations are not

¹⁶³ Cp. sections 4.3.4. The Biblical Models of Forgiveness, and 4.3.8. Forgiveness for Both Shame and Guilt-Oriented People.

¹⁶⁴ Kraus bases his ideas about shame and guilt on Piers and Singer (1953), Helen Lynd (1958), Noble (1975) and Augsburg (1986) (Kraus 1990:205).

completely thought through, as table 2.14. shows. Despite of his intention to balance shame and guilt-oriented theology, Kraus goes so far as to belittle the guilt aspect (e.g. of the cross 1990:225). Taking a stand against guilt-oriented, traditional, evangelical theology, Kraus postulates that shame orientation is more fundamental and more important than guilt orientation. Table 2.14. summarizes Kraus' basic ideas (1990:204).

Table 2.14: Basic Concepts of Kraus' Theology of Shame and Guilt

	Shame	Guilt
Focus	Focus on Self	Focus on Act
Nature of Fault	Failure to meet self-expectations	Offence against legal expectations
Internal Reaction	Embarrassment/disgrace Self-depreciation Fear of abandonment Resentment Self-isolation („rage“) Alienation	Condemnation/remorse Self-accusation Fear of punishment Anger Self-justification Hostility
Social Reaction	Ridicule & exclusion	Demand revenge or penalty
Remedy	Identification and communication Love banishes shame	Propitiation through restitution or penalty Justification banishes guilt
Interpretation of the Cross	An instrument of shame God's ultimate identification with us in our sinful shame Expresses God's love Resurrection – new hope	An instrument of penalty God's ultimate substitute for our sinful guilt Expresses God's justice Resurrection – new chance

2.6.7 Ruth Lienhard's Search for Harmony

In her doctoral thesis on *Restoring Relationships: Theological Reflections on Shame and Honor among the Daba and Bana of Cameroon* (2001a), Ruth Lienhard (born 1946), a linguist and anthropologist, reflects on restoring harmony in shame-oriented consciences. Through her thesis, she makes four contributions to the research on the conscience (2001a:235-238). The first contribution is the emphasis on honour and justice-oriented cultures as opposed to shame and guilt-oriented:

As I started my research, I soon realized that the basic difference between my reactions and that of the D/B [Daba and Bana] was not guilt and shame, as anthropologists have advanced, but justice and honor. I have therefore made a point in this

dissertation that we should speak of honor versus justice-oriented cultures instead of shame and guilt cultures. In the one culture type, honor is essential for group cohesion and daily life relations; in the other, rules are the indispensable basis for interactions between individuals.

When there is transgression of norms or values, individuals from both orientations experience a bad conscience. But this bad conscience is experienced differently according to the orientation of the individual. In a justice orientation, it is marked by feelings of guilt and the need for confession and restitution. In an honor orientation, the initial reaction to transgression is denial because of shame anxiety, and when wrong is finally admitted, it results in embarrassment and shame for all concerned. The offender experiences isolation, which is magnified through shame, and only restoration of relationships and honor, will put conscience at peace (2001a:236).

Because in Western culture the guilt-justice axis is stronger, it is difficult for Western missionaries to understand people from cultures, where the shame-honour axis prevails, as Landrø says:

Westerners tend to conclude that tribal people feel no guilt for the actual wrong they have done, since it is only as it gets known that they feel ashamed. Shame then becomes (to the Westerner) a superficial shallow experience that presumably does not go as deep as guilt does. This is, in my opinion, a typical Western, individualistic interpretation. Guilt among the Nguni, as I see it, must not be seen as opposed to shame, but as part of shame. Shame can, in a sense, be seen as magnified guilt (Landrø 1987:141f.; Lienhard 1998:33).

Lienhard's second insight is the importance of the social group:

With the help of Spiro's three schemes theory ... I found that the social group is the prevalent scheme among these three [the social system, the social group and the individual] ... I think the importance of the social group in the functioning of society has not been stressed enough in literature. In anthropology, culture as a system and the individual within it are in focus, and the role of the group is neglected. In psychology, the individual and the therapist are at the center, and the social group of the individual is again rarely mentioned (2001a:236f.).

Lienhard's third insight is the importance of humility for honour-oriented people:

As I studied disharmony in the biblical stories, I was amazed at the importance of humility. In my justice orientation, I never understood why the Bible stresses humility so strongly. As I now realize the power of honor, I suggest that the role of humility cannot be overstressed. In fact, without humility, honor can be a curse. Since everyone needs honor so badly for self and for the group, the quest for it can finally destroy unity instead of enhancing it if it is not paired with humility. Also in reconciliation, humility is essential both on the side of the offended and the offender (2001a:237).

Fourthly, Lienhard stresses the importance of rules that fulfil needs and therefore motivate, as opposed to negative sanctions:

Spiro's theory also stresses the need for motivation. People usually conform because following norms brings rewards and fills needs ... The church must be a group that

attracts people by providing for their needs ... Jesus took this seriously. He emphasized the need for norms, which his followers must live up to, but at the same time he did not hesitate to bypass rules that kept people from being part of the group (2001a: 237).

After that, Lienhard makes three recommendations (2001a:238-241). She says that coping with these differences in conscience orientations is a worldwide problem and therefore that teaching on it must be included in cross-cultural training.

Many had not realized that in one culture honoring the individual and the group is a basic value, whereas in the other telling the truth and being correct is indispensable ... This difference in orientation is not only pertinent in daily interactions, it is also an issue after transgression. An honor-oriented person will try to hide their failure to avoid shame, and needs to be coached to admit wrong in a loving and caring atmosphere. This person will give reasons why he or she acted the way they did in order to make confession less painful. In contrast, a justice-oriented person expects to confess because conscience will not be at peace otherwise. Reasoning why the act was done is seen as self-defence, and as such negative (2001a:238f.).

Lienhard's second recommendation concerns confession:

As seen above, in an honor orientation, an offender finds it impossible to confess wrong done and denies it as long as possible. Yet without confession, reconciliation is impossible. In these cultures, the social group must therefore learn to take their responsibility for the individuals seriously and confront offenders ... If they are not willing to confront, sin will continue and relationships will never be restored ... At one occasion, a Chadian commented: „We just let the ‚big people‘ in church live in sin without ever confronting them. This is not good“ ... I suggest that confrontation through the social group is an essential step toward restoration in an honor orientation. At the same time, any confrontation must be accompanied by a willingness to help the offender in confession, in change of life-style, and in restitution (2001a:239).

The third recommendation stresses the importance of reconciliation and reinsertion:

This research showed that restoration of relationships is the central requirement. Also, reconciliation must be open and visible to all. The offenders must be reintegrated into the group; they must be able to play a role in society ... In addition, I propose that in church, communion be stressed as the sign for sins forgiven as well as for reconciliation with God. God made a new covenant! Reconciliation must also be the central message in evangelism and in conversion ... In fact, where culture brings shame and disharmony, God brings honor and harmony (2001a:240f.).

Lienhard suggests two areas of further research: the „three schemes theory“ and honour orientation in the Bible. She finds that:

Spiro's three schemes theory is a helpful grid to analyze relationships and emotions. It keeps the group, the individual and the rules of the social system apart, and at the same time provides a means to show the interactions between the three. It also aids in identifying the roles of each scheme. Therefore, I suggest that this theory be used for other research when relationships are a concern ... Further Bible research on

honor and shame as well as justice and guilt is also essential. I concentrated only on a few stories, and I realize that the Psalms, the Proverbs, the Prophets, and Paul speak extensively to the topic. In addition, I have concentrated on narrative texts. Comparing ... the narratives with expository and hortatory teaching will be interesting (2001a:241).

Lienhard makes a substantial contribution to the understanding of restoring harmony in honour and shame-oriented consciences. She does not present a theory of an honour-oriented conscience but gives many practical suggestions for Christian community life. We agree with her on the suggestion that the concepts of honour and justice are more important in directing daily life than shame and guilt that manifest only the failure of the system, that is a bad conscience. We feel that a complete description of the concepts would also include as well as honour harmony, virtue, glory, and power, and as well as justice law and rightness. However, it would sound cumbersome to continually refer to the full range of terms implied. For this reason, we will maintain the habitual simpler terminology of shame and guilt-oriented consciences by keeping the honour and justice orientation in mind. As Lienhard has rightly mentioned, humility represents a challenge for an honour-oriented conscience, probably a bigger one than for a guilt-oriented conscience.

We further agree with Lienhard that the social group becomes eminently important, especially when talking about the shame-oriented conscience with its development depending directly on the social group and its functioning depending indirectly on that same group. Lienhard's emphasis on the social group corresponds to the shame-oriented in-group concept exemplified in the Chinese concept of *jen* (Hsu 1971:24-26). What Lienhard calls „Three Schemes Theory“ is actually more her own contribution than Spiro's. In his article (1961a), Spiro presents what LeVine calls rightly a „Two Systems View“ (1973:58), namely personality and the social system. Lienhard however correctly stresses the three schemes including the individual, the social group and the social system. What was the intrinsic motivation through id and ego needs in Spiro's model becomes the social system in Lienhard's model, and what was the extrinsic motivation through alter-ego needs becomes the social group. Lienhard's synthesis of Spiro's model, which differs slightly from my analysis, is presented in table 2.15. (Lienhard 2001a:17). At this point in the discussion, Beyerhaus would ask: Are not sanctions and fear of sanctions also necessary? Concerning the importance of motivation as opposed to sanction, we can say that a positive as well as a negative sanction can become a motivation.

Table 2.15: Lienhard's Three Schemes and Motivation Theory¹⁶⁵

	Society	Individual
Intrinsic motivation (Social System)	Rewards needs and drives of the individual	Fills the roles of the social systems
Internalized motivation (Conscience)	Prescribes values and norms	Internalizes values and norms in the form of conscience
Extrinsic motivation (Social group)	Uses positive and negative sanctions	Conforms to receive positive and avoids negative sanctions by the social group

2.6.8 Conclusion

The discipline of missiology makes a substantial contribution to our research. It attempts a synthesis between psychology, cultural anthropology and theology. First, Bavinck defines elenctics as the science of the conviction of „guilt“ (which we would rather term sin). It is itself a part of the discipline of missiology. Hesselgrave considers elenctics, as convicting work of the Holy Spirit, in contrast to purely human persuasion. In this sense, mission is the work of God, *missio Dei*, and the missionary is God's servant and tool. Freytag uses the image of the clock to show the relativity of conscience with its different normal time sets depending on the cultural context. During conversion, its normal time is set on the Triune God: it becomes theonomous. But the process of „tuning in“ continues during one's whole life, since the conscience remains split for many situations and periods (Brunner 1941). In his discussion of Freytag's image, Beyerhaus asks many pertinent questions in relation to shame orientation, which we will address more fully in the conclusion of our study. Prestige orientation is a characteristic of shame orientation, even after conversion. The shame-oriented conscience is dependent on clear moral standards reinforced by significant others. In the absence of significant others, the shame-oriented conscience does not react with shame, but only with anxiety. Therefore, it does not function fully until the violation is made public. The shame-oriented conscience, with its socially defined norms, should become theonomous after conversion. This means that the person should become ashamed primarily before God. Beyerhaus stresses the need for confession and counseling as well as the need for contextualization so that the Gospel can be properly understood and integrated into the conscience.

¹⁶⁵ Cp. my resuming table in section 2.5.4. Melford Spiro's Developmental and Motivational Model.

Hesselgrave speaks of a semantic confusion in relation to the differentiation of guilt and shame. This cross-cultural dispute between Chinese, Japanese and Western psychiatrists, psychologists and anthropologists (e.g. Yap 1965:84-112¹⁶⁶) is largely due to the fact that shame and guilt-oriented consciences have a different perception of shame and guilt (cp. Hesselgrave 1983:464f.; 1984:206f.). While for a guilt-oriented conscience guilt is transgression of a norm, for a shame-oriented conscience guilt is failure in social obligations. The German language makes this difference with the nuance between *Schuld* and *Schuldigkeit*. Shame for a guilt-oriented conscience is a failure related to a transgression. Therefore, there is a greater difference between shame and guilt in a shame-oriented conscience than in a guilt-oriented conscience (cp. Wallbott/Scherer 1995:481; Lindsay-Hartz et al. 1995:295). This is summarized schematically in table 2.16.

Table 2.16: Concepts of Shame and Guilt in the Two Conscience Orientations

	Shame	Guilt
Shame-oriented Conscience	Failure or exposure of self or significant other connected with a global attribution	Failure in social expectations and obligations connected with a specific attribution (Germ. <i>Schuldigkeit</i>)
Guilt-oriented Conscience	Failure related to a transgression of a standard connected „guilt-based, moral shame“	Transgression of a standard, responsibility for wrongdoing (Germ. <i>Schuld</i>)

Based on the findings of Piers, Singer, Spiro and Käser, Müller presents a new theory of conscience, which is very helpful for analysing everyday situations (see appendices 5 and 6). He bases his theory on a soteriological definition of conscience. For man as a being in need of salvation, a soteriological rather than an anthropological definition of conscience is most appropriate. Man's conscience functions along two axes: a guilt-justice axis and a shame-honour axis (we have seen that the positive polar values are actually multiple). The graphic in appendix 5 makes it clear that each conscience includes the two orientations, which are quantitatively and qualitatively different in every individual and culture. The synopsis in appendix 6 shows that shame is not simply guilt in shame-oriented consciences. The two consciences function differently, especially in the case of the violation of a norm that is not known to a significant other. The guilt-oriented conscience feels guilt as the significant other is

¹⁶⁶ See other references at the end of section 2.4.4. Gerhart Piers' Differentiation of Shame and Guilt.

introjected, whereas the shame-oriented conscience feels anxiety as expectation of abandonment, and shame only after the discovery of the violation.

Beyerhaus, Hesselgrave and Müller leave us with the two questions: „Can shame be a starting point for the process of salvation or is guilt a necessary precondition?“ and „Is the Bible guilt-oriented?“ Whereas Hesselgrave and Müller see the Bible as guilt-oriented, Neyrey and Kraus stress its shame orientation. Based on the findings of modern anthropology and on ancient Greek studies, Neyrey puts forth a convincing model of shame-oriented society. It can help us understand NT society more accurately. However, Neyrey completely neglects the guilt-oriented component of NT culture. It will be our task in chapter 3 to evaluate Neyrey’s conclusion and to show in detail the guilt-oriented components of NT culture and of Jesus’ teachings. It is our hypothesis that the Bible presents a balanced view of conscience orientation and that God aims for a balanced conscience orientation in man. Stating this, we want to specify that „balanced,“ in this thesis, does not imply strict equilibrium, but means a combined shame and guilt-oriented conscience with a tendency towards equilibrium.

Kraus holds that the relational aspect in Scripture is deeper and more basic than the legal aspect. For Kraus, shame explores deeper layers of human personality than guilt. In opposition to psychology and modern liberal theology, he stresses the fact that shame and guilt are not only subjective emotions, but also objective states. Forgiveness should be understood in relationship to all of them: shame and guilt, subjective emotions and objective state. This happens for shame through identification, reinsertion, reconciliation and love, for guilt through propitiation and justification. At the cross, Christ has not only born our penalty and suffered our punishment, but he has identified himself with us and has experienced fully our shame in the derision and ridicule of the cross. Table 2.17. summarizes Kraus’ ideas on forgiveness and the cross.

Table 2.17: Kraus’ Concepts of Forgiveness and Cross in Relation to Shame and Guilt

	Shame	Guilt
Resolution	Identification and communication Love banishes shame	Propitiation through restitution or penalty Justification banishes guilt
Interpretation of the Cross	An instrument of shame God’s ultimate identification with us in our sinful shame Expresses God’s love	An instrument of penalty God’s ultimate substitute for our sinful guilt Expresses God’s justice

Kraus draws our attention to what Tournier calls true and false guilt feelings (Tournier 1962:18; 1965:129). He defines true shame and guilt as shame and guilt before God. They are both theological and existential. False shame and guilt are cultural or imposed, „someone else’s“ responsibility, as indicate Green and Lawrenz (Kraus 1990:20; cp. Augsburg 1986:137; Green/Lawrenz 1994:43,169f.). As sin and shame are socially and culturally defined in shame-oriented contexts, social shame can remain more important for shame-oriented converts than shame before God. Jesus does not turn our shame into guilt, but he turns cultural shame into theological shame, shame before God (Kraus 1990:220). It is important to reinforce shame and guilt before God through preaching, teaching and counseling (cp. Hesselgrave 1983:480), and clarify the sources of false shame and guilt (see table 2.18).

Table 2.18: True and False Shame and Guilt

	Shame	Guilt
True	My shame before God (theological, existential, „natural“ shame)	My guilt before God (theological, existential guilt)
False	Someone else’s shame (cultural & imposed shame)	Someone else’s guilt (cultural & imposed guilt)

Lienhard, finally, makes a thorough study on the honour and shame-oriented conscience in relation to restoring harmony. She stresses the importance of the social group, the significant others. She embeds this social group into the motivational system of the three schemes based on Spiro’s two systems’ view. Additionally, she stresses the importance of the positive motivational sanctions in the sense of harmony, honour and prestige given to the conforming individual by the social group and the social system. In the Christian context of restoring harmony, Lienhard talks about humility as a spiritual counterbalance to the search for honour. The social group, that is the church, has the important function of initiating the process of reconciliation and reinsertion by confronting the offender like Jesus did, in order to lead to confession.

2.7 Proposal for a Working Definition of the Conscience

2.7.1 Elencitics: The Study of Conscience

On the basis of his cultural-historical theory of the conscience, Kittsteiner sums up the quintessence of our historical overview:

The diachronic history of a term [here conscience] pretends a continuity, which dissolves in that instant, when we ask for the cultural contexts of the term. Then we see that solutions for problems of society were always thought into the conceptions of conscience. This is valuable both for the moral-theological as well as the moral-philosophical discourse. The semantics of these discourses describe an inner committing authority in man, the norms and committing force of which change with every new worldview that a society constructs. We do not have a sure knowledge of conscience once for all. Rather the conscience in its bipolar basic structure has to be thought through and determined in every discourse generation. The term „conscience“ is only the quintessence of all experiences that have been made with it (Kittsteiner 1991:289).

As mentioned earlier, in the 20th century a deep resignation about the unfathomable mystery of conscience has been registered (Stoker 1925:114; Stelzenberger 1963:190f.; Blüh-dorn 1976:4f.). In the realm of theological, philosophical and psychological theories of conscience, Tillich differentiates between ethical conscience theories and transmoral theories. While the former deal with ethical questions, the latter look at the preconditions and foundations of ethics and morals (Tillich 1945; 1950). Ethical theories of the conscience in the 20th century present themselves as descriptive, normative, cognitivistic, naturalistic, subjectivistic, objectivistic, teleological, deontological, intentionalistic, monistic or pluralistic theories, that is, in most part as motivational theories of ethics (Von Kutschera 1982:39-225). Among the transmoral theories of conscience, examples are theological approaches as Luther's, philosophical theories as Heidegger's and depth psychological approaches as Freud's and Erikson's (Blüh-dorn 1984:211f.).

This research raises two fundamental questions. The first question is structural in nature: the „place“ of conscience or conscience as an „organ.“ This question can be approached in the metaphysical-ontological way: „What is the origin of conscience?“ or in the perspective of the genesis of conscience and personality: „How does it develop?“ Closely related is the second question of the conscience as moral self-consciousness (Blüh-dorn 1984:210).

The ontological genesis of the conscience is described in the story of the Fall (Delitzsch 1887; Bonhoeffer 1949). By disobeying God, man has separated himself from the intimate, unconscious union with God. From the Fall onwards, he is conscious of himself and of God, and of his separation from God: he „knows with“ God and against God. His sinful state is expressed through shame and guilt.

The „place“ of conscience is generally seen in the centre of personality (Stoker 1925:105; Auer 1976:84; Ott 1977:202). Also Freud's structural model places the super-ego in the centre of the *psyche* between id and ego. Catholic moral philosophers Wellek, Vetter, and Lersch,

and Catholic moral psychologist Rüdiger place it in a dual unity with the affective part of the soul (*Gemüt*) (Wellek 1965:319f.; Vetter 1960:139; Lersch 1970:498f.; Rüdiger 1976:468; see appendix 4).

The concept of conscience as an „organ“ is widely held by Catholic moral philosophers in line with Thomas Aquinas, who differentiates between *synteresis* as *vox Dei*, witness of the image of God, and *conscientia* as fallible conscience influenced by evil. Taking up the scholastic conception and attempting to go beyond Freud's deterministic super-ego unto an autonomous conscience, most of the philosophical orientations of psychological theories have a dualistic conception of conscience (e.g. Caruso 1959:731f.). On the Protestant side, Luther reacts to this Greek dualism. He holds with the Hebrew conception that man is before God as a whole. In the words of Ebeling „man is conscience.“ However, for Luther, man is at the same time image of God and sinner, *iustus et peccator*. In the same perspective, Stoker defines conscience as „the real inner personal manifestation of evil“ (Stoker 1925:98,133).

The actual consensus tends to see conscience as an „acquired specification of a general disposition“ (Rüdiger 1976:462). At birth the child has a God-given potential for conscience that reacts to the context. The dualism present is not that of a deterministic, fallible super-ego and a God-like conscience, but between the disposition, which corresponds to the creation of man in the image of God, and the development of conscience in dialogue with its cultural context, which is both good and evil. In this view and in an anthropological perspective, Müller defines conscience as „the organ of the human faculty for culture, society and religion“ (Müller 1996a:101). With this definition, Müller gives the conscience a very basic role in man's existence. It is the means for man's relationship with the supernatural, with fellow men, and with himself. In this sense, it is the basis for his personality and identity. It is also the means for the building up of culture, which is according to Käser's functional definition „the set of strategies to find solutions for everyday problems“ (Käser 1997:130).

Conscience as moral self-consciousness is defined in very different ways by theologians, philosophers and psychologists. Reviewing past theories of conscience, some authors have attempted a synopsis. Eckstein reviews the development from *syneidēsis* to *conscientia* and conscience (see appendix 1). He differentiates the non-reflexive use of *synoida*, a „knowing with,“ from the reflexive use, which he subdivides in non-moral self-consciousness and moral self-consciousness or conscience. Moral self-consciousness is further divided into *conscientia consequens* as the controlling and judging of one's past behaviour, and the *conscientia antecedens* as prescribing behaviour directing to duty and responsibility, the *lex naturalis* or *vox*

Dei. Conscientia consequens can be seen as rational consciousness, as emotional pain or as an objectivizing instance. Eckstein divides *conscientia antecedens*, as does scholasticism, into *synteresis* and *conscientia*, the former being the essential knowledge of good and evil, the latter the moral instance deciding and reinforcing concrete behaviour (Eckstein 1983:12). *Conscientia consequens* and *antecedens* are most often involved together in the processes of conscience. It is therefore not useful to separate them (Käser 1997:136).

Rüdiger sees conscience, that is the „person,“ as a figure in the form of a cross describing different anthropological presuppositions of past conscience theories (see appendix 3). There is the *vox Dei* conscience, which represents the Christian-religious aspect of man as a being in need of salvation. Secondly, there is the rational conscience, which understands man as a responsible, rational being directed by responsibility. Thirdly, Rüdiger mentions the guilt conscience that sees man as a being in an emotional conflict between drive and norm. Lastly, there is the norm conscience, which views man as an externally determined being from the point of view of situational ethics. No one of these extreme positions is defended in pure form, but they view man in four aspects of his existence (Rüdiger 1976:463).

In his synopsis, Kettling builds largely on Rüdiger's synopsis (see appendix 2). The perspective „from deep below“ sees conscience as „a rapacious beast“ represented by the Greek tragedies. In the biological perspective „from below,“ Friedrich Nietzsche names conscience „the most terrible disease“ of man. Real freedom is liberation from conscience, an existence beyond good and evil. For Spencer and Durkheim's sociological perspective, the conscience is the „collecting basin of the norms of the context.“ Conscience is therefore relative and can be trained and even manipulated. The depth psychological perspective „from inside“ views conscience as „internalised norm of society,“ the super-ego, which is the eternal war ground between *eros* and *thanatos*. Finally, the religious-idealistic perspective „from above“ sees conscience as the voice of God in man, an autonomous God-like authority (Kettling 1985:67).

A theological theory of conscience cannot be formulated independently from Biblical anthropology and soteriology. The anthropological precondition of a permanent relationship of man with the eternal and transcendent God and the theory that this relationship is possible through conscience gives great importance to the conscience. It becomes the „central organ“ of man (Weyer 1984:230). The century-long debate between catholic and evangelical theologians about whether conscience is God-like and infallible or affected by Fall is resolved in the model of conscience as „organ for the relationship with God,“ which develops in reacting

through its creational elements within a cultural fallible context (Rüdiger 1976:462; Potts 1980:64-66).

The natural conscience as conscience without Christ serves human self-justification. It is a prisoner of sin. When it accepts Christ as its Lord and authority for life, the conscience is completely renewed. Its goal is not human self-justification anymore, but the love of God. This transformation from an imprisoned to a free conscience is enacted in faith through Christ. „It is not primarily a moral instance, but as a transmoral conscience ascertainment of faith in the sight of Christ“ (Weyer 1984:231). In view of justification by grace, without a human effort, conscience is „the place where faith has to fight its battle against the ethical as an attempt to bring the relationship with God under human order“ (Gogarten 1965:295). When theology maintains the soteriological perspective, the conscience keeps its primordial importance (Ebeling 1967:429). Then, conscience is „the condition of the possibility to understand what the word ‚God‘ means“ (1967:441). „Only where God is a question of the conscience, there man and the world can be understood as a question of the conscience“ (1967:434). In the fundamental concept of conscience „the connection of dogmatics and ethics have to be thought through“ (1967:437). We will opt for a soteriological definition of conscience in relation to shame and guilt.

Table 2.19. is an attempt to summarize the contribution of the different disciplines to conscience theory, its shortcomings and the main perspective of conscience. It is necessarily incomplete and biased when taking into consideration the multifaceted discussion through the centuries, and especially in the 20th century.

In conclusion, the conscience gives man contact with God and orientation in society. It enables him to internalise norms, values and goals of society and religion and avoid their violation. It is given to every man as an innate disposition in form of potential elements and is developed and formed by the social context. Formed and adapted through culture, it directs decisions and behaviour. This process of modulation is a life-long process, which in Christian life is directed by the Holy Spirit. The conscience relates to largely unconscious, cognitive, emotional, volitional and spiritual processes, which induce an internalised moral control of behaviour (cp. Aronfreed 1968; Trachsler 1991:768). This definition avoids the century-long debate about the rationality or emotionality of conscience.¹⁶⁷ It is however not operational in

¹⁶⁷ Cp. the dispute between Aquinas (rationality of conscience) and Bonaventure (emotionality of conscience), the exclusive rationality of Kant's theory and the exclusive emotionality of some psychological theories

everyday life. Therefore, we will try to formulate a definition of conscience in relation to shame and guilt.

Table 2.19: Contribution of the Sciences to Conscience Theory

	Contribution to Definition	Shortcoming	Perspective
Scripture	Anthropological-soteriological, objective & neutral authority of „knowing with“ God & responsible to God	Characteristic of fallen man, therefore corrupted and fallible	Theonomous
Theology	Transmoral, anthropological-soteriological entity: man is conscience, the renewed, Christian conscience is based on grace and faith	Conscience as „knowing with“ is excentric, responsible and eschatological, not knowing God, but knowing against God	Theonomous
Philosophy	Autonomous, conscious entity of practical reason in dual unity with <i>Gemüt</i>	Dualism of infallible <i>vox Dei</i> and fallible <i>conscientia</i>	Autonomous
Psychology	Mainly unconscious entity, super-ego and ego-ideal, objective self	Often limited to affect	Heteronomous autonomous
Systems Theory	Reduction of complexity in pursuit of meaning	Relativity of meaning	Heteronomous, autonomous
Cultural Anthropology	Cross-cultural relativity of conscience	Blind spots versus unnecessary activation	Heteronomous
Missiology	„Normal time“ is culturally dependent Conversion sets „normal time“ to God	Conscience becomes theonomous with conversion, but needs life-long fine-tuning	Heteronomous, autonomous, theonomous

2.7.2 The Role of Shame and Guilt in the Functioning of the Conscience

„In Western writing ... the constructive and instructive powers of both emotions [shame and guilt] are largely overlooked. In cross-cultural work, such evasion of these central human emotions becomes impossible“ (Augsburger 1986:114). However, already in the oldest times, a consciousness about the existential human phenomena of both shame and guilt existed. Right at the beginning of the Bible, we find the story of the Fall when man starts to feel shame

(e.g. Freud's psychoanalysis and affect theory). Lewis' concept of self-conscious emotions combines affective and cognitive elements.

before God, fellow men, and himself. As a consequence, he hides and puts on clothes (Gen 3:7-11). In Platon's dialogue *Protagoras*, shame and guilt are part of the myth of the origin of culture:

Zeus, who is worried for humankind that it might not perish, sends Hermes to bring men „shame and rightness“ in order that these two become order and link for the cities, mediators of affection. Hermes asks Zeus, how he would have to distribute rightness and shame to men ... „Should I distribute rightness and shame among some [as the arts] or should I distribute them among all?“ „Among all,“ says Zeus, „all should have them; for no states could exist, if only a few had them like the arts. And give also a law that one kills the man as a bad harm to the state who is incapable to acquire them“ (Plato 1990:119; Riksen 1999:31f.)

Talking about Nietzsche's ugliest man, Erich Heller describes man's situation like this: „Not God but shame he would have to kill in order to forget what it is like to feel ashamed. Shame is ‚another;‘ it is himself who sees himself through the eyes of God and despises himself“ (Heller 1974:30; Riksen 1999:134). However, in the language of European and North-American theology and philosophy since late medieval times, shame has practically disappeared. The theories of conscience have been built on reason and guilt with a few exceptions. This has led to a misconception of conscience and of man, to which Freud has rightly reacted with his theory of the super-ego, while still misinterpreting the phenomenon of conscience and shame. While guilt is readily related to conscience, shame is seen as a phenomenon related to sexuality. The first to have seen the connection between conscience, shame and identity is the Russian moral philosopher Solowjow. However, it is only in the mid 20th century that the importance of shame in the function of the conscience has been rediscovered. Riksen sums up his thesis about the place of shame in the conscience in the following way:

Without the impulse of shame the conscience loses its proximity to the other person and its moral commitment. As the emotional central component of the conscience, shame forms the sensitive platform through which the acts, the individual failure or the omissions are handed over to the authority of the conscience apparatus. In the moral shame there exists an openness for the other ... A heteronomy, which does not have its centre in the individual subjectivity, is compatible with this conception ... If the concept of conscience is linked exclusively to reason, as in philosophy of modernity, an ontology is affirmed, which diminishes the ethical dimension (Riksen 1999:123).

In conclusion, when we deal with shame and/or guilt, we are dealing with conscience.

2.7.3 Understanding Shame and Guilt

What conclusions can we draw from our interdisciplinary study on shame and guilt? Shame and guilt are human universals. Seen in a corporate perspective, they are linked with the fallen

state of man. Man is separated from God. Man is condemned to differentiate „good and evil.“ He realizes his fallibility, shortcomings, and transgressions, and therefore feels shame and guilt. Seen in an individual ontogenetic perspective, the child realizes his separation from his mother and his context. It realizes its failures through the objective self as shame in case of a global attribution, and as guilt in case of a specific attribution (Lewis 1992:65). If the child is brought up by a great number of significant persons or by persons without a consistent set of standards, these persons and their standards cannot be introjected. The same result is produced by an education pointing to the others: „What will the others think?“ This enlarged circle of significant persons overseeing the child’s behaviour will induce a shame orientation (Miyake/Yamazaki 1995:493; Käser 1997:145). The child wants to stay in harmony with these significant persons. It stays dependent on the reinforcement of the standards by his significant others. In case of violation of harmony and failure in relation to goals and values, it feels shame before his educators. If the child is brought up by a small number of significant persons, it introjects them and their standards. In case of violation, it will feel guilty (Spiro 1958:408; Augsburger 1986:126-131). Both shame and guilt are self-conscious emotions, which means that the objective self attributes them cognitively to self. They are acquired during socialization. Consequently, there exists an infinite number of variations and mixtures of the two conscience orientations in personalities and cultures.

Table 2.20: Varieties of Shame according to Noble

Variety of Shame	Description
Innocent shame	Shame felt when one’s character is slandered without justification
Social shame	Embarrassment felt when one makes a social blunder or error
Familial shame	Disgrace from the behaviour of another family member
Handicap shame	Embarrassment over some bodily defect or physical imperfection
Discrimination shame	Downgrading of persons treated as socially, racially, ethically, religiously, or vocationally inferior
Modesty shame	Shame related to sexual, social, or dress norms and proscribed behaviour
Inadequacy shame	Feelings of inadequacy and inferiority from passivity, repeated failure, or abuse
Public shame	Open ridicule in the community as punishment or group pathology
Anticipated shame	The fear of exposure for any planned or desired behaviour
Guilty shame	Shame felt before others when one violates an ethical norm

„Shame is bipolar; it both separates and presses for reunion; it is an impulse to conceal and a yearning to be accepted; shame is responsibility to others and personal recognition of a need to respond in more acceptable ways ... [It] is a communally oriented, socially responsive concern for relationship, a caring for harmony“ (Augsburger 1986:115,118). The physiological reaction of shame is connected to face: one avoids eye contact, wears a mask and hides. Face is „one’s ability to play one’s social role; ... maintaining of face is the maintaining of worth, dignity, and social esteem; ... losing face results from falling short of the expectations set for one’s role“ (Augsburger 1986:132f.). Table 2.20. presents the varieties of shame (Noble 1975:4-6; Augsburger 1986:117), and table 2.21. positive and negative aspects of shame (adapted from Schneider 1977:19-26; Augsburger 1986:116).

Table 2.21: Positive and Negative Aspects of Shame according to Schneider

Shame as Discretion (Positive Aspects)	Shame as Disgrace (Negative Aspects)
Discretion shame is a complex of emotional, volitional, and dispositional factors.	Disgrace shame is the painful experience of disruption, disorientation, disgust, and the disintegration of one’s world.
As an emotion, it can produce a blush in contemplation of a dishonouring choice.	As an emotion, it is a feeling of being exposed, humiliated, despised, totally rejected, and dishonoured.
As a motivation, it can evoke choices that have moral character, ethical direction, and recognition of obligation.	As a situation, it is being in a position of loss of face, loss of respect, and loss of inclusion by significant others.
As a disposition, it becomes a virtue, a settled habitual tendency to act according to certain principles.	As fragmentation, it is being suddenly confronted with painful self-consciousness; the self is disclosed to the self; the shame is not just for the act done, but for what the self is. Thus it is a total emotion, a rejection of the whole self.
Shamelessness, in almost all cultures, is seen as a negative quality. A lack of a proper sense of shame is a moral deficiency; the possession of a proper sense of shame is a moral obligation.	Shame has the potential of being a totally negative experience of alienation from the self and from others. But shame is intrinsically both positive and negative, essentially ambivalent. The alienation experienced is from a relationship deeply desired. The underlying dynamic is acceptance, affection, and positive valuation deeply needed from other persons and the society.

Consequently, Hilgers speaks of a group of shame producing situations (1996:19):

- Failures of competence (competence shame)
- Violation of self and identity limits (intimacy shame)
- Humiliation from outside
- Sudden or unexpected exposure of parts of body or self
- Discrepancy of self and ideal (cp. Piers 1971:23f.)
- Dependence from others (dependence shame)
- A sudden end of desired relationships
- Guilty acts (combined with guilt feelings)

While shame orientation implies a relational personality type, guilt orientation implies a standard-centred personality type. The former searches harmony and honour, the latter wants to be right in relation to society's standards. These two personality types and conscience orientations represent the polar extremes, conceived as ideal types, of a conscience continuum. All consciences represent mixtures of the two ideal types, weighted toward one or the other end of the continuum (Spiro 1961a:120). Shame and guilt are closely interrelated (Piers 1971:44). Hesselgrave, Augsburger, Muller and others add anxiety as a third human universal besides shame and guilt, and speak of „fear cultures“ (Hesselgrave 1983:480; Augsburger 1986:122-125; Muller 2000:19f.,41). However, Piers', Spiro's and Müller's models show clearly that anxiety is an integral part of the functioning of both shame and guilt-oriented consciences, and therefore anxiety does not have to be seen necessarily as a third universal. In shame-oriented consciences, anxiety is fear of punishment or abandonment. It persists until the violation comes to light. Therefore, anxiety can last a long time; it may never be appeased. In this case, a shame-oriented conscience may appear as a fear-oriented conscience. When we consider this anxiety in relation to punishment or abandonment, together with the global or total attribution of self and the paralysing effect of shame, we can conclude that shame-oriented persons probably suffer more than guilt-oriented persons, who make only a specific attribution and seek actively the resolution of guilt through confession and reparation (cp. Käser 1997:163; Kurani 2001:129).

There is also a large discussion on the polar values as opposite of shame and guilt (e.g. Wikan 1984). From our study, we conclude that shame has not only honour as a polar opposite, but many other positive values such as harmony, honour, prestige, glory, power, virtue, and pride. It is in this inclusive way that most modern authors use the technical label „honour and shame.“ For them, honour includes worth, value, prestige, status, respect, and reputation

(cp. Malina 1983:30-33; Neyrey 1998:15). In the same sense, prestige is used as a synonym of honour in this thesis. Lewis and Hilgers propose pride as opposite to shame (Lewis 1992:65; Hilgers 1996:63f.). Honour, however, is the opposite value that is most frequently mentioned by inhabitants of shame-oriented societies. When used in an inclusive and synthetic way, there is a certain justification in taking „honour and shame“ as a technical label. Similarly, the opposite values of guilt are multiple: innocence, rightness, justice, and law. As Lienhard rightly observes, these positive opposite values are more powerful motivators than shame and guilt. Therefore, Lienhard speaks of honour and justice cultures. However, to select one of these positive values as a technical label, as for example honour and justice, is often imprecise and does not promote a good understanding of conscience. Therefore, in this thesis, we will maintain the traditional terminology of shame and guilt-oriented consciences, personalities and cultures. However, when talking to an uninformed public about shame and guilt-oriented personalities, we propose to use the descriptive terms „relational“ and „standard-centred“ instead, remembering that these concepts are models at a high level of abstraction and therefore oversimplifications. „Models by their nature serve to reduce complex sets of data into manageable blocks“ (Neyrey 1998:14).

As we have seen, shame in shame-oriented consciences is not simply the equivalent of guilt in guilt-oriented consciences. In a shame-oriented conscience, a failure produces shame after a global attribution and guilt after a specific attribution. In a guilt-oriented conscience a transgression of a norm produces guilt, while a failure connected with it produces shame, „guilt-based shame“ or „moral shame“ (cp. Green/Lawrenz 1994:51-56,169; Hilger 1996:19; Laniak 1998:8f.). In guilt-oriented consciences, shame can be restricted to the sexual sphere, its central domain. These differences are schematically presented in table 2.22.

Table 2.22: Concepts of Shame and Guilt in the Two Conscience Orientations

	Shame	Guilt
Shame-oriented Conscience	Failure or exposure of self connected with a global attribution	Failure in social expectations and obligations connected with a specific attribution (Germ. <i>Schuldigkeit</i>)
Guilt-oriented Conscience	Failure connected with transgression or wrongdoing „guilt-based shame“ or „moral shame“	Fact of transgressing a norm, of wrongdoing, responsibility for wrongdoing (Germ. <i>Schuld</i>)

Shame and guilt can be a subjective emotion and an objective state (see table 2.23).

Table 2.23: Subjective and Objective Aspects of Shame and Guilt

	Shame	Guilt
Subjective emotion	Emotion of falling short, of failure, of being exposed Germ. <i>Scham</i>	Remorse, regret about wrongdoing
Objective state	Fallibility, incompleteness Germ. <i>Schmach, Schande</i>	Transgression, wrongdoing

Tournier, Augsburgers and Kraus speak of true and false shame, and true and false guilt respectively (Tournier 1962:18; 1965:129; Augsburgers 1986:137; Kraus 1990:220). Other authors speak of unhealthy or toxic shame and guilt (e.g. Potter-Efron 1989; Green/Lawrenz 1994). While true shame and guilt are oriented towards God, false shame and guilt are socially determined or imposed. The difference is presented schematically in table 2.24. In table 2.25, we give a synopsis of phenomena related to shame and guilt.

Table 2.24: True and False Shame and Guilt

	Shame	Guilt
True	My shame before God (theological, existential, „natural“ shame)	My guilt before God (theological, existential guilt)
False	Someone else's shame (cultural & imposed shame)	Someone else's guilt (cultural & imposed guilt)

Table 2.25: Synopsis of Phenomena Related to Shame and Guilt

Central Trait	Shame	Guilt
Description	• Failure before one's ideal or exposure before an inner or external audience • Loss of face before significant persons • Embarrassment before social demands • Total emotion: fearing rejection as a person, exclusion from community, or withdrawal of love	• Condemnation before an inner parent or judge • Loss of integrity before one's own conscience • Pain under moral demands • Specific emotion: fearing judgement of behaviour, correction of acts, or withdrawal of trust

	Humiliating exposure, dishonour, self-negation; the impulse is to hide, to cover, to deny	Humbling disclosure, discomfort, regretted acts; the impulse is to justify, rationalize, excuse
Origin	Identification with idealized parent (ego-ideal)	Submission to idealized parent (super-ego)
Precipitating Event	Unexpected, possibly trivial event	Actual or contemplated transgression
Character	Failure of being; falling short of goals; of whole self	Violation of values and norms, of other
Primary Feelings	Inadequate, deficient, worthless, exposed, disgusting, disgraced	Bad, wicked, evil, remorseful
Primary Response	Physiological: eyes down, etc. behavioural: paralysis affective: strong emotion	Cognitive: being responsible behavioural: focus on actions affective: weak emotion
Involvement of Self	Total self image involved: „How could <i>I</i> have done that?“	Partial (moral) self image: „How could I have done <i>that</i> ?“
Primary Focus	Focus on Self	Focus on Act
Central Fear	Abandonment, not belonging	Punishment, ostracism
Mechanism	Feels anxiety when violation premeditated or enacted Feels shame when violation discovered	Feels guilty when violation premeditated or enacted Feels guilty when violation discovered
Primary Defences	Denial, withdrawal, perfectionism, arrogance, exhibitionism, rage	Rationalization, intellectualization, selflessness, paranoid thinking, obsessive/compulsive pattern, seeking excessive punishment
Positive Functions	Sense of humanity, of relationships, of reconciliation,	Reparation (making amends), moral behaviour, initiative
Social Reaction	Ridicule & exclusion	Demand revenge or penalty
Interpretation of the Cross	An instrument of shame God's ultimate identification with us in our sinful shame Expresses God's love	An instrument of penalty God's ultimate substitute for our sinful guilt Expresses God's justice
Resolution	Identification and communication Reintegration and reconciliation banish shame	Propitiation through restitution or penalty Justification and reparation banish guilt

Treatment	Affective: help the client expose his hidden defects in a safe relationship Cognitive: allocate responsibility Behavioural: overcome affect-shame binds	Cognitive: allocate responsibility Behavioural: turn confessions into plans of action Affective: discern between true and false guilt emotions

Different authors have tried to define and explain shame and guilt with complementary theories. Table 2.26. gives a synopsis of the most useful models.

Table 2.26: Useful Models for the Differentiation of Shame and Guilt

Author	Shame	Guilt	Underlying Theory
Piers/Singer (1953)	Tension between ego and ego-ideal, anxiety as expectation of abandonment	Tension between ego and super-ego, anxiety as expectation of punishment	Psychoanalysis
Lynd (1958)	Direct link with identity	No direct link with identity	Psychoanalysis
Spiro (1961)	Great number of significant others, no introjection	Small number of significant others, introjection	Psychoanalysis
H.B. Lewis (1971)	Main focus on self	Main focus on act	Psychoanalysis
Lewis (1992)	Self-conscious emotion; global failure	Self-conscious emotion; specific failure	Cognitive theory
Hilgers (1996)	Failure, defect or exposure with violation of self, which leads to a tension between ego and ego-ideal (competence, intimacy & dependence shame)	Transgression of a norm with violation of the other, which leads to a tension between ego and super-ego	Combination of psychoanalysis, affect & cognitive theory
Meves (1985)	A physiological, human phenomenon connected with face	A human state of fallenness	Physiology and Scripture
Green/Lawrenz (1994)	Painful experience of disconnection natural: fallibility imposed: someone else causes the disconnection	Being responsible for a wrongdoing or transgression	Affect theory, cognitive behavioural theory & Scripture

In conclusion, we try to summarize the main similarities and differences of shame and guilt. The main similarities are:

1. Both are self-conscious emotions (with an affective, a cognitive and a behavioural component) (Lewis 1992:65)
2. Both are emotions and objective states (Scripture such as Gen 3; Rom 3:23; 6:21-23)
3. Both are internalised mechanisms of social control (Piers 1971:60f.; Spiro 1958:409)
4. Both are connected to anxiety (Piers/Singer 1971:23f.,97; Spiro 1958:409; Müller 1988:440)

The main differences are shown through basically two models, the first psychoanalytical, and the second cognitive:


1. Psychoanalytical Model: A tension between ego and ego-ideal produces shame, while a tension between ego and super-ego produces guilt (Piers/Singer 1971:23f.). The practical consequence is that shame corresponds to a failure and shortcoming in relation to a standard, goal or value, and guilt to a transgression of a standard.
2. A small number of significant persons in child education produce a guilt-oriented conscience. Significant others are introjected. A great number of significant others or an inconsistent set of standards produces a shame-oriented conscience. In the second case, significant others cannot be introjected (Spiro 1958:409). The practical consequence is that the shame-oriented conscience does not react fully in the absence of significant persons: it expresses anxiety as expectation of abandonment. Shame is expressed only after the violation has been discovered. A second consequence is that the predominantly shame-oriented person is group-oriented, while the guilt-oriented person is standard-centred.
3. Cognitive Model: Shame corresponds to a global attribution of failure involving the whole self, while guilt corresponds to a specific attribution of failure involving only parts of self (Lewis 1992:65). The practical consequence is a complete paralysis in the shame-oriented person, while the guilt-oriented person attempts reparation. A second consequence is that shame is directly related to personality and identity, while guilt is not.
4. While shame is not necessarily moral, guilt is directly related to a moral causality and responsibility (Lindsay-Hartz et al. 1995:278,290). The practical consequence is that guilt-oriented people judge shame-oriented people often as immoral, having no conscience, while shame-oriented people feel that guilt-oriented people do not respect the others' personality and identity.

In most cases of personalities and cultures, one of the two conscience orientations is predominant: either a strong guilt orientation combined with a weak shame orientation or a strong shame orientation with a weak guilt orientation. Looking more in detail at the different values, the mixture can be very complex. There are also persons with little developed consciences on both axes: the conscience is tendentially shameless and guiltless.¹⁶⁸ With conversion conscience is normally sensitised: shame and guilt orientation can develop further. Beside the healthy conscience with true shame and guilt, conscience can also be unhealthy with false (or toxic) shame and guilt. The phenomena of conscience, shame and guilt are very complex and mostly subconscious. Therefore, we need a simplified model, which we can apply to everyday situations of cross-cultural Christian ministry.

2.7.4 A Soteriological Model of Conscience in Relation to Shame and Guilt

Before presenting our model, we have to reiterate the initially mentioned caution that studying conscience involves an epistemological dilemma, which could be named a hermeneutical circle, because conscience reflects on conscience. The problem is that shame-oriented and guilt-oriented epistemologies lead to different concepts of conscience and conscience orientation. As mentioned earlier, we choose a soteriological definition of conscience, because of its ability to be practically operational in everyday problems. Adapting from Müller's soteriological bipolar model of conscience on two axes, we present in figure 2.5. a threefold scheme as a hypothesis for a working definition of conscience which integrates the elements of shame and guilt.

Figure 2.5: A Soteriological Model of Conscience in Relation to Shame and Guilt



¹⁶⁸ Cp. sections 3.2.7. Judges, and 5.1.13. The Generation X and Shame Orientation.

The movement of the conscience is from bottom to top, from a bad to a good conscience, from sin to salvation (vertical arrows). The horizontal arrows indicate the inter-relation of the three axes. At the left hand side, we find the shame-oriented terms, in the middle the neutral terms, and at the right hand side the guilt-oriented terms. As discussed above, in English the positive polar values are multiple as opposed to the single negative values. This model will be tested against Scripture in the following chapter.¹⁶⁹

2.7.5 Understanding John's Story

Equipped with this model, we go back to John's story from section 1.5. and try to understand what has happened. On the Guinean side, we can observe the attempt to restore John's honour and harmony in the relationships through a mediator. The expression of forgiveness by the missionaries does not solve John's problem. In order to set his conscience at peace, he would need to be reaccepted into the status of a driver of the mission. As the missionaries do not accept this, John leaves the town in order to avoid the shame of the asking glances of his surrounding: „Why are you not a driver of the mission anymore?“

While for a guilt-oriented conscience the problem is solved when guilt is confessed and reparation done, a shame-oriented person has to be taken out of his isolation and reinserted into the group. Harmony must be restored in the relationships through reconciliation. John is not isolated from his family or the church. These show solidarity with him: from the pastor at the place of accident, the Bible school director, the family which asks forgiveness for him, down to the pastors who accompany him to the missionaries as mediators. Only the mission does not accept him, even after several attempts.

The missionaries reproach John not to have confessed his fault himself, but to have only given excuses through other persons instead. For a shame-oriented person, it is very difficult to lose face by exposing oneself before other persons. This is much more difficult for him than for a guilt-oriented person. Excuses are given to diminish shame for everybody, including third parties. However, a guilt-oriented person interprets this avoidance of a public confession as cowardice, and the excuses as lack of repentance. For a shame-oriented person, the „courage to confess“ would rather be another shamelessness, another infraction to the norms. As we cannot see into John's heart, we cannot say if John feels real repentance or not. The big risk

¹⁶⁹ The French equivalents are: *Honte - réconciliation - harmonie, honneur / péché - pardon - salut, culpabilité - réparation, justification - droit*. The German equivalents are: *Scham, Schande - Versöhnung - Harmonie, Ehre, Prestige / Sünde - Vergebung - Heil / Schuld - Wiedergutmachung/Rechtfertigung - Recht*.

for guilt-oriented people is to draw conclusions from certain behaviours of shame-oriented people as to their motives, without understanding the functioning of their conscience.

As the shame-oriented person feels ashamed to confess a fault, and because confession could be considered a form of shamelessness, a mediator is necessary for the confession. An important member of the family or of society is chosen to confess and to ask for forgiveness. In the case of John, this is done by different pastors, the director of the Bible school, and the family, but is interpreted by the missionaries as cowardice and lack of repentance.

Corruption is the collective term for a series of phenomena, which appear as violation of a norm to a member of a guilt-oriented society. However, what is a violation of a norm for a guilt-oriented person can still be within the norm for a shame-oriented person. As the group fixes the norm, it is possible that in this group the act is still within the norms. The needs of the enterprise or of the families of these officials can be more important than the respect of charges. It can be possible that an overtarification is considered too high for an indigenous, but adequate for a rich stranger. In the case of John, the bill could have been much higher, had the official not considered the mediating contacts and the philanthropic character of the mission.

However, it is also possible that in the respective group of officials the bill does not correspond to the norms, but that one official wants to keep the additional charge for himself. In this case, the fact is important that a shame-oriented person only feels shame after a violation of a norm, when his fault is discovered. Before the discovery he only feels anxiety in expectation of punishment. If prices are not fixed clearly, the chance is small that the client is informed about them, even more if he is a foreigner. Additionally, he is in a difficult situation with the police so that he cannot ask too many questions. Therefore, the risk is small that the overtarification will be discovered. All these phenomena appear as corruption and induce discomfort in guilt-oriented persons, even when they are interpreted differently in a shame-oriented context.

For a guilt-oriented person, forgiveness means punishment and reparation of guilt. In a shame-oriented society, restoration of prestige and honour are important. Reparation is not a major issue. In Guinea, after confession of the fault by the culprit or his family, forgiveness is complete. This is based on a mutual consensus between the two families. This consensus can include the understanding that reparation is not necessary except for sacrifices. Christians in a shame-oriented culture interpret this in the way that after the ceremony of forgiveness no claims can be made, reparation is not necessary anymore. In our case, John never thinks of

paying his contribution to the costs of the accident. This seems all the more justified from his point of view since the mission is many times richer than him and that he no longer has a salary. According to him, it would be inhuman to insist on repayments.

For John and his family, forgiveness means to reinstate him as driver of the mission. The missionaries' affirmation to have forgiven and at the same time the refusal to keep John as driver is for them a discrepancy, which they interpret as refusal to forgive. Acts speak more than words. In their eyes, the missionaries are hypocrites. For the missionaries, the fact that John has violated several times the interdiction to take passengers is a sufficient reason to fire him. For some missionaries, another reason is the fact that John has never confessed his fault and has never showed real repentance. They want to forgive him and accept him as a human being. For them, the two are separated aspects: a continuing state of guilt on one side and forgiveness towards John as human being on the other. John and his family however cannot separate these two aspects. The two perspectives described can hardly be reconciled. Consequently, misunderstandings and frustrations between shame and guilt-oriented persons are to be expected.

2.7.6 Conclusion

Having studied John's story, we realize the importance of understanding conscience orientations in cross-cultural Christian ministry. The three R's in the instruction of Christian forgiveness have a special significance. Repentance, as we have seen, manifests itself differently according to conscience orientation. Whereas the readiness for confession in a guilt-oriented person will promote manifested repentance, in a shame-oriented person one will have to look for a whole set of behaviours, including the mediation of significant others. Confession by mediators and excuses by the culprit do not necessarily mean cowardice and lack of repentance. Reconciliation through mediation and reinsertion into the group correspond to the need of shame orientation. Reparation of the fault corresponds to the need of guilt orientation.

We can ask which orientation is more important or better? Before we study Scripture in the next chapter, we can only give a provisional answer. We see that shame orientation is necessary for our relationship with other persons, God and ourselves, as well as for our identity. Guilt orientation is necessary to maintain fixed moral standards in society. Our hypothesis is the following: God wants a „balanced“ shame and guilt orientation in man.¹⁷⁰ Both depend

¹⁷⁰ „Balanced,“ in this thesis, does not imply strict equilibrium, but means a combined shame and guilt-oriented conscience with a tendency towards equilibrium.

on an internalisation of norms by the conscience. If no norms are proposed to a conscience during childhood it will not be able to develop correctly. In this case, we are confronted with an underdeveloped, in the extreme a shameless and guiltless conscience.

3 SHAME AND GUILT IN SCRIPTURE

In this chapter we will study shame and guilt in Scripture. It will include an evaluation of the soteriological model developed in chapter 2. First, we will study some key terms and concepts related to our topic. As a conclusion of this first part, we will revise our soteriological model, as necessary. In the second part, we will draw examples of shame and guilt orientation from specific books of Scripture. Finally, we will attempt to give an overview of redemptive history in the perspective of shame and guilt.

The questions raised by our interdisciplinary model go beyond traditional historical and literary analysis. They imply an interdisciplinary exegetical approach. And because Scripture texts are so distant in time, space, and culture we will include culturally sensitive tools as those of cross-cultural psychology and cultural anthropology. As Overholt states: „The key point is that the social reality assumed by the text is likely to be more complex than it appears on the surface, and the process by which we seek to grasp it will require the use of a variety of tools – historical, sociological, anthropological, and literary“ (1996:21). However, „the choice between literary, anthropological, and other methods is both/and, not either/or“ (Overholt 1996:19). Nevertheless, a word of caution about anthropological methods has to be added. „We turn to anthropology because of the paucity of our information, but that very paucity makes the use of anthropology problematic“ (Overholt 1996:22; cp. Osborne 1991:139-144).

Which hermeneutic is appropriate for the study of conscience orientation in Scripture? While Thiselton speaks of the fusion of two horizons in a monocultural setting (1980; cp. Osborne 1991:386), Hesselgrave and Carson introduce three horizons for the cross-cultural setting. Hesselgrave calls this „the cultural triangle.“ It includes the missionary’s culture, the Biblical culture and the target culture (Hesselgrave 1978:73; Carson 1984:17; Hesselgrave/Rommen 1990:200).¹ Consequently, a culturally adequate hermeneutical process is cross-cultural and includes three horizons: the interpreter’s culture, the Biblical culture and the target culture. Since culture is a function of conscience orientation,² exegesis in the perspective of conscience orientation should also include these three horizons. It includes four steps: (1) to understand one’s own conscience orientation, (2) to understand the conscience

¹ Cp. section 5.1.7. The Cultural Triangle.

² For the discussion of culture as a function of conscience orientation see section 4.2.

orientation of the target culture, (3) to understand the conscience orientation of the Biblical section, (4) to exegete the text keeping in mind the conscience orientation of the Biblical text and the target culture (cp. Kurani 2001:17-22). Hebrew and Greek cultures have been shown to be predominantly shame-oriented (Pedersen 1926; Funaki 1957; Adkins 1960; Finley 1962; Huber 1983; Malina 1983; 1986; Bechtel 1991; Cairns 1993; Williams 1993; Neyrey 1991; 1998; Bergant 1996; Simkins 1996; Stansell 1996; Hanson 1996; Laniak 1998; Kurani 2001). If this is confirmed in our study, exegesis would have to be predominantly shame-oriented. However, as mentioned above, our hypothesis is that Scripture is balanced in conscience orientation. This has to be evaluated in the following sections.

3.1 Key Terms and Concepts

3.1.1 Introduction

There are different approaches to the study of terms and concepts, all of which are based on semantic domains.³ Nida (1975) uses an analysis of referential meaning of Biblical terms based on componential analysis. In componential analysis, meaning components of words in the same semantic domain are compared up to the point at which all of them can be shown to be distinct. Louw and Nida (1989) use also a semantic domain analysis approach. Another analytic approach is taxonomy. It identifies a semantic field, classifies subsets and shows how these are related to the whole. Starting from taxonomy, Goerling (1995) has developed prototype theory. It uses polythetic categorization in which classifications are not based on rigid distinctions, but rather on the concept of family resemblances, bundles, clusters, and multi-dimensional relations (1995:46). As we will see later, prototype theory is a synthetic adaptation of the analytic method of taxonomy.⁴

The problem inherent in all term and concept studies is that the meaning of words is contextual. Therefore, lexical meaning tends to be multiple, vague and fuzzy (cp. Osborne 1991:64-92; Giddens 1987:62f.; Overholt 1996:20). Additionally, the Hebrew use of words is synthetic rather than analytic (Wolff 1990:22f.). Our approach is a combination of the different approaches mentioned above. It will emphasize synonymity, antonymity and componential analysis (Osborne 1991:89f.). Consequently, it is a combined synthetic and analytic approach.

³ In this section, I will essentially follow Lienhard 2001a:56-79.

⁴ See sections 3.1.10. Knowledge and Wisdom as Covenant Characteristics, and 4.1.5. Analytic or Synthetic Thinking.

Lexicographical information for the word and concept studies is taken from Brown/Driver/Briggs (1907), Kittel/Friedrich (1933-1974), Koehler/Baumgartner (1953), Baumgartner (1967), Jenni/Westermann (1971/94), Coenen/Beyreuther/Bietenhard (1971/90), Botterweck/Fabry/Ringgren (1973-2000), Brown (1992a), and VanGemeren (1996). In our lexicographical studies, we will put special emphasis on the concepts of sin, shame and guilt and their polar opposites. We hypothesize that they are covenant concepts. Consequently, our study will include the most important covenant behaviours and characteristics. As the covenant concept comprises both shame and guilt orientation, it is of great importance for exegesis in the perspective of conscience orientation.

3.1.2 The Sin - Salvation Axis

The Biblical concept of salvation starts from fallen man who left the fellowship with God and violated his standard out of the desire to be like God (Gen 3:6). Since then, the intervention of a mediator is necessary to restore this fellowship and liberate man from his fallen state (Gen 3:15; Isa 53; Jn 3:16). Hence, from the Fall onwards, a broken relationship and a violation of standards play a role between God and man. Thus, the Hebrew terms for sin all imply a shame-oriented and a guilt-oriented aspect in varying degrees.

In all Hebrew terms for sin, „the unifying conception [is an] action contrary to the norm“ (Eichrodt 1967:381). God sets the standard for normative behaviour in the covenant relationship. The nature of sin is clearly characterized by the various terms used to denote it. The most frequent term **חטא** *ḥṭʾ* (593 occurrences) means „miss, fail, sin, sinful state, punishment for sin, sin offering.“ Its literal meaning „to miss, fail“ is drawn from an object, which is thrown and misses the target (Jdg 20:16; Job 5:24; Prov 8:36; 19:2). Religiously, it means God’s target in the covenant relationship (Knierim 1994:541; Luc 1996:88). In its basic meaning, it is therefore a predominantly shame-oriented concept. A second, less frequent term **עוון** *ʿwōn* (231 times) means „iniquity, transgression, guilt, punishment of sin.“ Its original meaning comes from „bend, veer, go astray from the right way“ (Knierim 1995:244f.; Eichrodt 1967:380). Its original proper use is a religious and ethical one: turning away from the covenant and its standards (Gen 4:6; 15:16). Its basic meaning implies a deviation from a goal and a transgression of standards. It is thus a shame and guilt-oriented concept. In its plural form, it can represent the other two terms (e.g. Lev 16:2f.). The third term **פשע** *pešaʿ* (136 times) originated from the political sphere to mean „rebellion“ (2Ki 1:1). In its religious meaning, it implies „offence, rebellion, transgression.“ It depicts overstepping the boundaries set by the

commandments of the covenant (e.g. Num 14:41; 1Sam 15:24). It is thus a predominantly guilt-oriented concept. All three terms can be used together to show the totality of sin (13x, e.g. Ex 34:7,9; Ps 103:10,12). When all three terms are mentioned, *āwōn* is usually at the first place (Knierim 1995:489; Luc 1996a:88; 1996b:351).

Parallel terms in the semantic domain of „error, mistake, wrong“ are *šgg* „commit error, sin advertently“ (Lev 5:18; Num 15:28), and *šgh* „stray, err, go/do wrong, mislead“ (Dt 27:18; Prov 19:27). In the semantic domain of „guilt, evil, unrighteousness,“ we find *šm* „become guilty“ (e.g. Lev 4:27), and *ršc* „act wickedly, unrighteously, to be guilty“ (e.g. Isa 48:22) among others (Luc 1996:92). In the study of synonyms, we observe a close relationship of the concepts of sin and guilt. This is due to the principle of causality and retribution, which relates a sin directly to its consequence (cp. Ex 34:7; Knierim 1995a:245; Koch 1991:2; 1995:517).⁵ However, due to the guilt orientation of most theological thoughts, the consequence of sin is seen principally as guilt and far less as shame. The concept of sin is also related to death, another consequence (Gen 2:17; Rom 6:23; Luc 1996:89,92).

In conclusion, sin is a breach in the covenant relationship with God as well as disobedience towards his covenant standards. Härle formulates it like this:

The most important common feature of the three OT terms for sin consists in a *communal relationship* (particularly between God and man) – be it as a *fact* or as a *goal* – which man violates through sin. If righteousness has to be understood in the OT as behaviour which corresponds to the standards of the community, then sin is the opposite: behaviour which is against these standards. This element is more important than the transgression of a given norm or a commandment, also than guiltiness (Härle 1995:459 italics in original).

We do not attempt to give more value to the relational, shame-oriented aspect than to the legal, guilt-oriented aspect. However, it is important to see the concept of sin within the covenant relationship. Herein, the individual sin cannot be separated from the corporate sin of the people (Günther/Bauder 1995:1195). According to the principle of causality and retribution, all Hebrew terms can mean the sin, its consequence and its punishment (Eichrodt 1967:402). In late Judaism, the concept of sin is transformed into a law-dependent concept, and becomes therefore predominantly guilt-oriented. The non-Jews do not know God's commandments and are therefore all sinners. Idolatry, adultery and bloodshed are seen as unforgivable sins. The possibility of atonement for sins committed unintentionally is provided by sacrifice, purifica-

⁵ Germ. *Tun-Ergehen-Zusammenhang und schicksalsträchtige Tatsphäre* (Koch 1991:2; 1995:517; Kreuzer 1995:220f.).

tion rites, good works, suffering and martyrdom (Günther/Bauder 1995:1196). Today we find a similar concept of great and small sins in Muslim societies.

Following the predominant use in LXX of ἁμαρτία *hamartia* as rendering for sin, this term becomes the main term for sin in the NT. Its basic meaning is still „missing the mark“ with a predominantly shame-oriented connotation. All other terms are influenced by this original Hebrew meaning: *adikia* as polar opposite to *dikaioσynē* meaning „unrighteousness“ (Jas 3:6), *anomia* „lawlessness,“ and *parabasis* and *paraptoma* „overstepping, transgression“ (Rom 2:23ff.; 4:15; Hebr 9:15; Jas 2:9-11) (Günther/Bauder 1995:1192,1199,1201). However, the latter three terms have a predominant guilt orientation.

Jesus' teaching goes beyond the Jewish concept. He radicalizes the law in the Sermon of the Mount and sets his own person as a new standard (Mt 7:11 par; 12:31ff.). The righteous and unrighteous become sinners (Mt 1:21; Lk 1:77; 5:8). At the place of ritual means of expiation, Jesus puts the sacrifice of his life. Hence, baptism and forgiveness of sins take on a new meaning (Günther/Bauder 1995:1197).

Paul's main statements on sin are to be found in Rom 1-8. Jews and non-Jews are missing God's standard of righteousness. They are in a state of godlessness (*asebeia*) and unrighteousness (*adikia*) (Rom 1:18). The law produces knowledge of sin (Rom 3:20; 5:20; 7:7ff.; Gal 3:22). It serves as a disciplining agent (*paidagōgos*) to lead men to faith in Christ (Gal 3:24). Without Christ, man is condemned to the law-sin-death road. Sin becomes „missing the mark“ (*hamartia*). The man that struggles against the spirit of God is imprisoned in his flesh (*sarx*), which as God's enemy produces sin and consequently death. „Spirit“ (*pneuma*) and „flesh“ (*sarx*) fight against each other in man under the law (Rom 7:13-25; Gal 5:16-26). Sin is thus seen as having an almost personal power (Rom 5:12,21; 6:6,17). The same is true for flesh and death (Gal 5:19,24; Rom 6:9b). These statements of Paul lead later to the church's formulation of the doctrine of original sin (Günther/Bauder 1995:1197).

In the OT, the concept of salvation is expressed essentially by two terms: שָׁלוֹם *šālôm* „peace, friendship, happiness, well-being, prosperity, health, luck, kindness, salvation“ is derived from the verb *šlm* „Qal be finished, to have satisfaction; Piel repay, reward, fulfill a vow, recompense, retribute, to make complete; Hiphil make peace, fulfill.“ The fundamental meaning of *šālôm* is „totality,“ which includes everything that is necessary for harmonious living in the material, social and religious sphere. *šālôm* describes a state and a relationship including unity, solidarity, harmonious community, the exercise of mutual responsibility and confidence, a fulfilling of obligations and a participation in the covenant community (Gerle-

mann 1995:922; Nel 1996b:130f.). Davies formulates it like this: „Shalom is a social happening, an event in interpersonal relations. It can therefore never be reduced to a simple [legal] formula; it has to be found and worked out in actual situations within which the holy is to be encountered“ (Davies 1973:67). According to the principle of causality, also the fundamental idea of retribution is included, which means positively „satisfaction“ (Gerlemann 1995:927,932f.).⁶ *šālôm* includes the concept of harmony and describes the fulfillment of covenant obligations, expectations and standards. It is thus a shame and guilt-oriented concept.

The term *יְשׁוּעָה* *yēšû‘â* „help, salvation, deliverance“ implies the notion that salvation presupposes God’s act of deliverance. The English term „salvation“ is not able to render this nuance. The Hebrew term is largely used in narrative and legal sections, wisdom literature, psalms and prophets. Thus, it is to find in the OT’s paradigmatic salvation-event, the Exodus (14:13,30). The Song of Deliverance praises Yahweh as Israel’s salvation (Ex 15:2). It plays also an important role in the exploits of the so-called judges against foreign invasion (e.g. Jdg 3:9,15). Yahweh is the Saviour (*môšîa*) (Isa 43:3; 45:21; Hos 13:4; Jer 14:8). He is the God of my salvation (Isa 17:10; Mic 7:7; Hab 3:13,18) (Hubbard 1996b). *yēšû‘â* describes the restoration of *šālôm*, of harmony and of standards. Thus, it is a shame and guilt-oriented concept.

Related terms in the semantic domain of „salvation, deliverance“ are *g’l* „redeem, deliver, ransom“ (Lev 25:25), *mlt* „get to safety, deliver“ (2Sam 4:6), *nsl* „rescue“ (Gen 32:30), and *pdh* „ransom, redeem, deliver“ (Ex 13:13; 34:20) (Hubbard 1996:562). Other terms in the semantic domain of „peace, tranquility“ are *šqt* „quietness, tranquility“ and *beṭaḥ* „confidence.“ Isa 32:17 parallels *šālôm* with these two terms: „The fruit of righteousness (*šēdāqâ*) will be peace (*šālôm*); the effect of righteousness (*šēdāqâ*) will be quietness (*šqt*) and confidence (*beṭaḥ*) forever“ (Nel 1996b:134). Isa 32:17 shows also that *šālôm* is the fruit of righteousness (*šēdāqâ*). Isa 48:18 makes it evident that salvation and righteousness flow from the observance of God’s commands and can be seen as his blessing: „If only you had paid attention to my commands, your peace (*šālôm*) would have been like a river, your righteousness (*šēdāqâ*) like the waves of the sea (Isa 48:18). This confirms the guilt-oriented element of the concept. In Ps 24:5, *b’rākâ* is parallel to *šēdāqâ* and *yēšû‘â*. „He who has clean (*nāqî*) hands and a pure (*bar*) heart ... will receive blessing (*b’rākâ*) and vindication (*šēdāqâ*) from God his Saviour (*yešā’*)“ (lit. the God of his salvation) (cp. Isa 56:1; Ps 26:1; 40:10). The

⁶ Cp. section 4.3.5. Anselm of Canterbury’s Satisfaction Theory.

God-given conformity to community behaviour (righteousness) and God's blessing produce together salvation. Ps 85:10 says that God promises peace to his people, and righteousness (*šedeq*) and *šālôm* will kiss each other (Nel 1996b:132f.). Thus, *š'dāqâ* „righteousness“ and *b'rākâ* „blessing“ are synonyms to *šālôm* and *y'sū'â* with both shame and guilt-oriented aspects.

Another related term to *šālôm* is *ḥāyîm* „life.“ The relation becomes evident in the formula „covenant of life (*ḥāyîm*) and peace (*šālôm*)“ (Mal 2:5). Yahweh is the God of truth (*'emet*) and life (*ḥāyîm*) (Jer 10:10). Respecting God's covenant means life (Isa 55:3). „He who pursues righteousness (*š'dāqâ*) and love (*ḥesed*) finds life (*ḥāyîm*), prosperity (*š'dāqâ*) and honour (*kābôd*)“ (Prov 21:21). *šālôm* includes all that is God-given in all spheres of life (von Rad/Foerster 1935:406). Equally, light (*'ôr*) is linked with salvation (Ps 27:1) and life (Ps 56:14), and associated with covenant behaviours: righteousness (*šedeq*), justice (*mišpāt*) (Ps 37:6), and truth (*'emet*) (Ps 43:3). God and the Messiah are the sources of light (Isa 9:1; 42:6).

In LXX and NT, the two main OT terms are rendered by *eirēnē* and *sotēria*. Their content is determined by the OT concepts. If the origin of the concepts is not taken into account and the meaning of *eirēnē* is narrowed to „peace,“ we consider only a small part of the semantic domain covered. *eirēnē* as coming from God approaches the meaning of *sotēria*. It is a sign of God's beginning new creation. In its consummation, God will have the full glory, honour and power. The precondition of *eirēnē* is the salvation-act of God in Jesus Christ. Only through his expiatory sacrifice at the cross, man has access to salvation. (Beck 1994:389f.). In relation to *šālôm*, *eirēnē* thus experiences a theocentric narrowing of the concept of salvation. Additionally, it is subject to the eschatological tension between the „already“ and the „not yet“ of God's kingdom, the present and future salvation. Thirdly, it reflects the tension between the material and the spiritual, the this-worldly and the other-worldly aspect of salvation (Beyerhaus 1996:484,497). The clearly holistic and synthetic (thus shame-oriented) concept of *šālôm* becomes in the NT a complex concept, which is difficult to grasp (cp. Dierks 1986:167-180). Nevertheless, sin and salvation maintain their covenantal dimension throughout the Bible, sin being lack of respect of the covenant relationship and violation of its standards, and salvation being the covenant's fulfillment in relational and legal terms. The terms for sin and salvation include therefore both conscience orientations in a varying degree.

The NT confirms and accentuates the relationship between salvation and life, especially in John's writings. Jesus himself is the life (Jn 1:4; 6:35; 11:25; 14:6) and he gives abundant life (Jn 8:12; 10:11). Thus, the Gospel is the word of life (Jn 5:24; 6:68; cp. Phil 2:16).

Respecting his eternal covenant standards (that is love, faith and obedience) means eternal life: God gave his Son that whoever believes in Him shall have eternal life (Jn 3:15f.,36). Eternal life occurs 36 times in John and 13 times in 1John (e.g. Jn 4:14; 12:50; cp. Mt 19:16f.). Consequently, life itself is a shame and guilt-oriented concept, just as the covenant concept is combined. Again, the concept of light is linked with salvation and life (Jn 1:4; 3:16-21; 8:12). God is light (1Jn 1:5-7), and the Messiah Jesus is the light of the world (Jn 1:5-9; 8:12; 9:5). Consequently, the children of God also become light (Eph 5:8).

3.1.3 The Guilt - Justice Axis

Guilt is connected to sin through the principle of causality and retribution. Consequently, the Hebrew does not tend to differentiate sin from its consequence and its punishment. Guilt-oriented Western theologians have underlined this repeatedly (Koch 1991:2; 1995:517; Knierim 1995a:245; Kreuzer 1995). Linguistically therefore, guilt, as the objective result of sin, is most often rendered with one of the terms for sin. The most frequent term for guilt is **אָוֹן** *‘āwōn* „iniquity, transgression, guilt, punishment of sin“ (231 occurrences). Its original meaning comes from „bend, veer, go astray from the right way“ and describes for the religious sphere a turning away from the covenant and its standards (Gen 15:16) (Knierim 1995:244; Eichrodt 1967:380). Thus, its basic meaning includes thus shame and guilt-oriented concepts. The former implies failure in covenantal expectations, a shame-oriented perspective of guilt. The latter implies a transgression of covenantal standards, a guilt-oriented perspective of guilt.⁷ A close connection of sin and guilt is visible in Ps 32:5: „Then I acknowledged my sin (**חַטָּאתִי** *ḥāṭṭāʾtī*) to you and did not cover up my iniquity (*‘āwōn*). I said, „I will confess my transgressions (*pešaʿ*) to the Lord“- and you forgave the guilt of my sin (*‘āwōn ḥāṭṭāʾtī*).“ The three terms can be in parallel (e.g. Ex 34:7; Isa 59:12f.) or *‘āwōn* can represent the others (Lev 16:21f.).

The second term **אָשָׁם** *ʾāšām* „become guilty, incur guilt, bear guilt, guilt offering“ has 103 occurrences as a verb, half of them in Lev and Num. It can refer to a responsibility or culpability that a person must bear for some offence, the guilt or reparation offering, and for the punishment or penalty incurred through wrongdoing. Hence, it is an almost completely guilt-oriented concept. This is confirmed by the passage of Isa 53:10, where the Servant of the Lord becomes an *ʾāšām* (Carpenter/Grisanti 1996; Averbeck 1996a). A related term of the

⁷ Cp. section 2.7.3. Understanding Shame and Guilt.

semantic domain of „guilt, unrighteousness“ is *rsʿ* „act wickedly, unrighteously, be guilty“ (e.g. Ps 1:4). The fact that it can be used for the designation of the guilt offering points back to the judicial element in Israel’s covenant relationship with God (Eichrodt 1967:381; Knierim 1994:255; Leuwen 1995).

The primary polar opposite of guilt is *nqh* „be innocent, free, exempt from guilt or responsibility“ (Ex 20:7; Num 5:31; Dt 25:1; Jer 2:35). The root *nqh* conveys the notion of freedom in a forensic sense: on the one hand, the exemption from obligations and duties that have been imposed; on the other hand, it describes the acquittal of guilt incurred and punishment deserved (Olivier 1996a:152). Hence, it has a predominantly, but not exclusively, guilt-oriented connotation.

A second polar opposite of guilt is *mišpāt* „judgement (case, trial, verdict, sentence), justice, rights, law“ which is derived from the verb *špt* „judge, govern.“ It occurs 425 times, especially in the prophetic writings and the Pentateuch. The laws given to the Israelites through Moses in Ex 21-23 are introduced as *hammišpātīm* (Ex 21:1). *mišpāt* is often found in close proximity to other terms such as *dīn*, *hōq*, *tôrâ*, *šedeq* and *sedāqâ* (Gen 18:19; Dt 32:36a; Ps 33:5; 89:15; Prov 21:3; Isa 9:6; 10:1f.; 11:4; Jer 23:5-6; Hos 2:21,19; Zeph 2:3). Ps 119 gives many other parallel terms (e.g. *mišwâ*, *piqqûdīm*). *mišpāt* implies the due decision in the judicial arbitration by the *šōpēṭ*, the judge, who distinguishes between the innocent and the guilty. It is „the moral attribute which belongs both to God by his nature, and to the man who obediently conforms to his will“ (Funaki 1957:51; Enns 1996:1142; Schultz 1996a; 1996b:214). In the meaning of law and legal action, *mišpāt* is a definitively guilt-oriented concept. However, the process of judgement including the *šōpēṭ* as mediator in a conflict implies a strong relational and consequently shame-oriented element. In the technical term „*mišpāt wûsedāqâ*,“ *mišpāt* represents the guilt-oriented aspect (e.g. Jer 23:5f.). Contrary to *mišpāt* „justice,“ *šedeq* / *sedāqâ* „righteousness“ is a combined shame and guilt-oriented term.⁸ The modern English language is not able to differentiate the two. For this reason, the model in section 2.7.4. does not make this differentiation and should be corrected. In our thesis, „righteousness“ will be used for the combined shame and guilt-oriented concept, and „justice“ for the purely guilt-oriented concept.

⁸ Cp. section 3.1.7. Righteousness as Covenant Behaviour.

A related term to *mišpāt* is ׀ׁׂ *yāšār* „straight, level, right, just, righteous“ (200 occurrences). In its most dominant figurative sense, it describes „the correct human conduct in regard to ethical norms and religious values“ (H. Olivier 1996:565). Related terms in the semantic domain of „integrity, loyalty, uprightness“ are *tmm* „be sound, whole“ (Gen 17:1), and *kēn* „right, sound, honest“ (1Sam 23:17). God is just (*šaddîq*) and upright (*yāšār*) (Dt 32:4). *yāšār* qualifies the ways (Hos 14:9), works (Ps 111:8), word (Ps 33:4), ordinances (Ps 19:9), and laws (Ps 119:137; Neh 9:13) of Yahweh, who himself is characterized as good and upright (Ps 92:15). It occurs also as a technical term in a fixed idiomatic expression „to do what is upright in the eyes of the Lord“ (Dt 6:18; 12:28; 13:18; 1Ki 11:38; 14:8; 15:11; 22:43; 2Ki 12:2). In Job, Psalms, and Proverbs, *yāšār* serves as a technical term for those who are morally and practically right, who keep loyal to Yahweh and associate themselves with the God-fearing, the righteous (*šāddîqîm*), the innocent (*nāqî*), and the blameless (*tāmîm*) (Job 1:1,8; 2:3; 4:7; Ps 64:10) (Liedke 1994:793; H. Olivier 1996:566-568). The term has a strong guilt-oriented aspect insofar as it qualifies the behaviour in relation to the law, but also a shame-oriented component insofar as it characterizes the behaviour in relation to the person of Yahweh.

In LXX and NT, guilt is rendered by a multiplicity of terms, which all are close to the semantic field of „missing the mark“ *hamartia*. However, *hamartia* stays the main term for sin and guilt in the NT. This confirms the close connection of the two concepts through the principle of causality and retribution in the NT. While sin has a more active character, guilt is rather a passive state and an acceptance of a superior instance of a legal court of human or divine nature. Guilt is therefore a judicial term. This is most apparent for the technical legal term ἑνοχος *enochos*, which describes the guiltiness of an accused person before a court. Other terms are αἰτία *aitia*, which in LXX partly renders the Hebrew term *‘āwōn* and figures, for example, on the inscription on the cross (Mt 27:37 par). ἐλέγχω *elengchō* „convict“ goes beyond the judicial sphere (Thiele/Link 1995:1092f.,1096; Büchsel 1935). A related concept is the word-group ὀφείλω *opheilō* „owe, be indebted to.“ It renders the shame-oriented aspect of guilt: the failure in social and covenantal expectations (cp. *‘āwōn*). Jesus uses the term in the Lord’s Prayer (Mt 6:12) in parallel to *paraptoma* „transgression,“ a guilt-oriented concept, and in Lk 13:4 parallel to *hamartolos* (Tiedtke/Link/Brown 1992:666f.).

Polar opposites of guilt in LXX and NT are *anaitios* „guiltless,“ *amemptos* „irreproachable“ and *anengklētos* „blameless.“ They render the concept of *nqh* „innocence.“ The root *krinō* „judge“ and derivatives (*kata-*, *syn-*, *krima*, *katakrima*, *krisis*, *kritēs*) render the root *špt*.

The most common renderings of *mišpāt* are *krima* „decision,“ *krisis* „judgement,“ and *dikaïoma* „regulation“ (Enns 1996a:1144; Schneider 1990). They are all predominantly guilt-oriented concepts, with the exception that a judge is a mediator in a conflict and introduces therefore relational elements into the concept.

A parallel concept to *dikaïoma*, which has to be added, is *nomos* „law.“ It is the rendering of Hebrew *tōrāh* „direction, instruction, law“ which has undergone in late Judaism a transformation from a covenantal, combined shame and guilt-oriented concept into an independent, predominantly guilt-oriented concept of „law“ (Guthbrod 1942:1037-1050; Esser 1990a:522f.; Enns 1996b:898f.). However, in the formulation „law of God“ (Rom 7:22-25) and „law of Christ“ (Gal 6:2), law is a combined shame and guilt-oriented concept close to the covenant concept. As Christ is the end (*telos*) of the law (Rom 10:4), love is the fulfilment (*plēroma*) of the law (Rom 13:8,10). The fulfilment of the new law is faith and love, both covenant concepts (Rom 3:31).

3.1.4 The Shame - Honour Axis

The primary Hebrew shame words are the following:⁹ 1) בּוֹשׁ *bōš* „to be ashamed, feel shame, be disconcerted, disappointed, confounded“ in the Qal (e.g. Jer 48:39) or „to put to shame“ in the Hiphil (e.g. Ps 44:8) or „to be ashamed before one another“ in the Hithpolel (*yṭbōšāšū* Gen 2:25) or to „delay until shameful“ in the Polel (*‘ad-bōš* Ex 32:1; Jdg 3:25; 5:28; 2Ki 2:17), and the related *bošnā* or *bōšet* or *būšā* „shame“ (e.g. Hos 10:6; Mic 7:10; Job 8:22) or *m^ebūšim* „private parts or pudenda that excite shame“ (Dt 25:3); 2) כָּלַם *klm* „to be humiliated, ashamed, put to shame, dishonoured, confounded, emotionally wounded, rebuked with insulting words“ in the Niphal and Hophal (e.g. 1Sam 25:15; 2Sam 10:5) and „to humiliate or cause shame“ in the Hiphil (e.g. Jer 16:5), and the related *k^elimmā* or *k^elimmūt* „insult done by words or deeds, reproach, ignominy“ (e.g. Isa 45:16; Jer 23:40); 3) קָלָה *qālā* II „to be dishonoured or disgraced“ in the Niphal (e.g. Isa 16:14) and „to treat with contempt, dishonour, or hatefulness, to lightly esteem“ in the Hiphil (e.g. Dt 27:16), and the related *qālôn* „ignominy, disgrace, dishonour“ (e.g. Hos 4:7); 4) חָפַר *ḥpr* II „to be shamed, feel abased, act shamefully“ in the Qal (e.g. Jer 50:12) or „to cause shyness or bashfulness or cause shame to be displayed or to put to shame“ in the Hiphil (e.g. Isa 33:9);¹⁰ 5) חָרַף *ḥrp* II „to say sharp

⁹ In this section, I follow largely Huber (1983:46-53) and Klopfenstein (1972).

¹⁰ Cp. Klopfenstein (1972) up to here.

things, taunt, reproach, scorn“ in the Qal and Piel (e.g. Ps 119:42; Isa 37:23), and the related *ḥerpâ* „reproach, disgrace, shame, scorn, slander“ (e.g. Ps 71:13). This word appears to refer to „verbal shaming“ and in several instances is used as parallel to *bôš* and *klm* (Ps 69:8,20; 71:13; Jer 23:40; 51:51; Ezek 36:15). Linguistically, it is interesting to note that Hebrew has a whole wealth of terms denoting shame, whereas English has only one.¹¹

There are several expressions associated with shame: *bôšet pānîm/pānîm būšâ* „shame of face“ (2Sam 19:6; 2Chr 32:21; Ezr 9:7; Ps 44:16; Jer 7:19; Dan 9:7) or *mallē' p'nehem qālôn* „fill their faces with shame“ (Ps 83:17) or *p'nehem 'al-yḥparû* „their faces shall not be shamed“ (Ps 34:6) express the idea of public disgrace or shame that is manifest physically through a bodily reaction, which can suggest blushing. They demonstrate a close link between the concepts of shame and face (see below). In addition, the phrases *y'ṭksh ḥerpâ/būšâ/k'limmâ* „covered with shame“ (e.g. Ps 71:13; 89:46; Jer 3:25; Obad 10; Mic 7:10) also suggest both the outward manifestation of shame and the fact that the shame affects the whole self. The expression *lbš-bôšet/k'limmâ* „clothed in shame“ (Job 8:22; Ps 35:26; 109:29) expresses the same idea. One expression, which has given scholars difficulty, is *'ad-bôš* „until shame“ (Jdg 3:25; 2Ki 2:17; 8:11). Something is done to the point that a person begins to feel shame (cp. Hazael and Elisha in 2Ki 8:11, and Ezra in Ezr 8:22). We believe with Huber that this indicates self-consciousness (1983:45).

There are a number of other words, which in some instances are parallel or associated with shame. In Ps 40:14 such a parallel construction is shown:

May all who seek to take my life
Be put to shame (*bôš*) and confusion (*ḥpr*);
May all who desire my ruin
Be turned back (*sûg*) in disgrace (*klm*) (Ps 40:14).

Here *sûg* and *klm* are parallel to *bôš* and *ḥpr*, and *sûg* is parallel to *klm*. In this following section, an exemplary, non-exhaustive list of parallel and associated words is given (cp. Huber 1983:48f.): *pesel* or *gillûl* or *'ašab* „idols“ (Ps 97:7; 98:7; Isa 42:17; 44:9,11; 45:16f.; 48:13; Jer 10:14; 50:2; 51:17,47; Hos 4:19; 9:10; 10:6); *ba'al* „Baal“ (Hos 9:10); *šûb* or *šûg 'ahôr* or *nûs* „turning back in cowardice, fleeing“ (2Sam 19:4; Ps 6:11; 35:4; 40:15; 129:5; Isa 42:17; Jer 48:1,39); *ḥtt* „to sin, dismay“ (1Ki 19:26; 2Ki 19:26; Ps 83:17; Isa 20:5; 37:27; Jer

¹¹ „Indo-European languages commonly have two or more [words for shame] (Greek and Latin each have five; German and French, two). Oriental languages are also more rich (Japanese, Chinese, Thai, Malay, Javanese, Tamil, and Hindi all have more than one word for this complex emotion)“ (Augsburger 1986:115; cp. Nyeste 2001:34).

3:25; 8:9; 17:18; 48:1,38f.); *bzh* „ruin“ (Neh 3:36; Ps 22:7; 119:22; Prov 18:3; Dan 12:2); *šdd* „ruin“ (Jer 9:18; 48:1,20; Joel 1:10-12); *kšl* „stumble“ (Jer 46:12; Ezek 36:6,15); *qll* „curse, humble, abate, lightly esteem“ (Jer 42:18; 44:8; 49:13); *qls* „derision“ (Ps 44:14; 79:4; Jer 20:8); *nbl* „fool“ (Prov 3:35; 18:13; „shame of a fool“ Ps 39:9); *znh* „harlotry“ (Jer 3:3; Hos 2:7; 4:18; „adultery“ Prov 6:33); *šmm* „desolation“ (Jer 42:18; 49:13; Ezek 5:15); *yrq* or *rqq* „spitting“ (Num 12:14; Isa 50:6f.); *qšh* or *krt* „cutting off“ (Jer 44:8; Hab 2:10); *nʔš* „revile“ (Ps 74:10,18); *lʔg* „scorn“ (Ps 44:14; 79:4); *šrq* „hissing“ (Lam 2:15f.; Mic 6:16); *znḥ* „casting off“ (Ps 44:10); *lkd* „taken, captured, defeated“ (Jer 8:9); *rūš* „poverty“ (Prov 13:18); *gdp* „revile“ (Ps 44:17); *šsh* „despoil“ (Ps 89:42); *bhl* „sorely troubled“ (Ps 6:11); and *qml* „decay“ (Ps 33:9).

Shame can also be expressed, though less often and less directly, by words whose primary meaning may not be related to shame, but which under certain circumstances carry a definite shame connotation. We call these secondary Hebrew shame words. The first word that we place in this category is עֶרְוָה *ʿerwā* „nakedness, pudenda, the exposed undefended parts of the country or person, shameful exposure.“ Even though this word is sometimes translated „shame,“ it is of course not really a synonym of *bōšet* etc. However, in several passages nakedness (*ʿerwā*) is labelled as shameful or is parallel to shame (Isa 20:2,4; 47:3; Mic 1:11; Nah 3:5). In other passages, it is not labelled but implied (Jer 13:26; Lam 1:8; Ezek 23:10). Nakedness is shameful because of exposure, not only of the sexual parts, but of self. At times, *bōš* can be a euphemism for the genitals (Ex 28:42; Lev 18:6,10; Isa 47:3). Nakedness exposes a person’s vulnerability and makes her feel defenseless (e.g. Gen 42:9; Ps 141:8). A person’s clothes form a protective covering, which, once removed, leave the person feeling psychologically vulnerable. Therefore, in shame-oriented contexts, captives in ancient times, and criminals in modern times, are publicly exposed naked (Isa 20:1-6; Nah 3:5-7) (cp. Funaki 1957:67f.; Huber 1983:70f.; Kurani 2001:116).

Another example is פֶּסֶל (*pesel*) „idol.“ „Every goldsmith is shamed (*bōš*) by his idols (*psl*)“ (Jer 10:14b). Idols cause the goldsmith to be shamed and thus *psl* is associated with *bōš*. Evidence for this is sustained by the fact that *bōšet* is substituted as a name for Baal (e.g. Jer 3:24; 11:13). In the same order, the names of the sons of Saul and Jonathan are transmuted from Ishbaal and Meribbaal to Ishbosheth and Mephibosheth (2Sam 2:8; 4:4; 9:6; 19:25; cp. 1Chr 8:33f.) (cp. Eichrodt 1961:202; Huber 1983:57 n.4; Nel 1996a:626).

A further group of terms related to shame includes **טמא** *tm'* „unclean, defiled, impure, polluted“ (cp. Lev 11-15; Isa 6:5). Related terms in the semantic domain of „uncleanness, defilement, pollution“ are *g'l* „be defiled, desecrate“ (e.g. Num 31:19) and *hnp* „be defiled, godless“ (e.g. Num 35:33). Mocking and gnashing teeth are shaming behaviours. Ps 35:16 says: „Like the ungodly [profane] (*hānēp*) they maliciously mocked (*l'g*); they gnashed their teeth at me (*hrq*)“ (Koch 1991:168; Neyrey 1988b; Auerbeck 1996:375). Other synonyms of *hnp* „ungodly“ are *hll* „profane, defiled, polluted“ (e.g. Lev 18:21; 20:3) and *nbl* „fool“ (Prov 3:35; 18:13; „shame of a fool“ Ps 39:9). Ungodliness is a folly, and folly is a shame (1Sam 20:30; Prov 14:35; 17:2; Isa 1:29). Therefore, ungodliness is a shame (Prov 10-11; Seebass 1970:52; von Rad 1966:142; Huber 1983:30f.). Consequently, to be defiled, naked, sick, poor, accursed, or ignorant is a shame (cp. Muller 2000:58-66).

The shame of military defeat is seen in passages, where *bōš* is linked with the consequences of defeat: in Ezek 7:15-18 with sword, pestilence, famine, feeble, sackcloth, horror, or in Ezr 9:7 with captivity and plundering. There is also an association of false confidence *mibteham* with shame (e.g. Jer 48:13) and, in reverse, confidence in God's help with no shame *lō' nīklāmū* (e.g. Isa 50:7).

We especially want to underline that *bōš* is linked with sin *h't*, as for example in the following passage: „Let us lie down in our shame (*bōšet*), and let our disgrace (*k'limmā*) cover us, for we have sinned (*h't*) against the Lord our God“ (Jer 3:25). Shame is shown to be the result of sin (cp. Prov 14:34). Shame is also parallel to fear:

Do not be afraid (*yr*); you will not suffer shame (*bōš*).

Do not fear disgrace (*klm*); you will not be humiliated (*hpr*) (Isa 54:4).

As sin, shame and fear are all expressions of the state of a bad conscience, it is not surprising that they are linked in synonymous parallelisms in Hebrew poetry.

Another group of words associated with shame suggest a movement downward: *špl* „to make low or humble, abase, humiliate“ (e.g. Isa 2:9) and the related *šipālā* „a low, humiliated state“ (e.g. Isa 32:19); *kn'* „to be humbled or subdued, bowed down, humiliated“ (e.g. 1Ki 21:29); and *mkk* „to sink in decay, bow one's head, be brought low, diminished, humiliated“ (e.g. Ps 106:43 Qal; Job 24:24 Hophal). People hang their heads because of their shame (Ezr 9:6) or lie down on the ground in shame and loss of honour (*klm* Jer 3:25; *bōš* Jer 48:18-20).

The downward movement of head and eyes, or even of the whole body, implies the face (*pānīm*). As the heart *lēb* (conscience) is the inner representation of the *nepeš* (self), the face is its outer representation (Funaki 1953:11f.; Eichrodt 1967:35f.). *bōšet pānīm/pānīm būšā*

„shame of face“ (2Sam 19:6; 2Chr 32:21; Ezr 9:7; Ps 44:16; Jer 7:19; Dan 9:7) is then the shaming of the whole self, a loss of face and honour (Funaki 1953:13f.). Because of the Fall, man has lost his own face and God's face. He hides and then has to leave the garden of Eden. God asks Cain why his face is downcast (Gen 4:5f.). After his offering has not been accepted, Cain has „lost face.“ God's face (*pānîm*) and eyes turned (*pnh*) toward us mean blessing (Num 6:25; cp. Ex 33:13,20,23; 34:6,8; 1Ki 8:29a) and absence of shame (Ps 34:6). God's face and eyes turning away from us mean misfortune and shame. Therefore, David is afraid to be taken away from God's face (Ps 51:13). On the other hand, our turning back to God (*šûb*) results in God's face turning to us again (*pnh*) (2Chr 30:9).

There are also a number of words that describe an action that seems primarily intended to shame others. Some of them have already been mentioned: *qls* „to deride, distain, mock, jeer at, scoff“ (e.g. Ezek 16:31); *lîš/lôš* „to mock, scorn, reprove“ (e.g. Prov 9:12 Qal; Ps 109:51 Hiphil; Hos 7:6 Polel; Isa 28:22 Hithpolel); *l'g* „to mock, stutter in a person's face, mimic, deride“ (e.g. 2Ki 19:21 Qal; Isa 33:19 Niphal; Neh 3:33 Hiphil); *gdp/g' dūpā* „to taunt“ (e.g. Ps 44:17 Piel); *nû'ā rōš* „wag the head“ (e.g. Ps 22:8; 109:25); *spq* „clap hands“ (Lam 2:15); *šrq* „hiss“ (Lam 2:15; Mic 6:16); *ḥarēq 'alāi w šinnāi w* „gnash teeth“ (Ps 37:12; Lam 2:16); *yēqr' šû-'aîn* „wink“ (Ps 35:19); *yarḥîbû 'alaî pîhem 'āmrû he'āḥ he'āḥ* „make mouths, saying aha, aha“ (Lam 2:16; Ps 35:21); *pṭr b'šapā* „shoot out the lip“ (Ps 22:8); *s'hōq* „laughingstock“ (Job 12:4); *p'r* „gape“ (Job 16:10); and *ḥerpā hikkû f'hāi'āi* „slap on the cheek shamefully“ (Job 16:10; Lam 3:30).

In his philological study of *bôš*, *klm*, *ḥpr* and *qālā* (1972), Klopfenstein concludes from the comparison with the Akkadian that *bôš* has a „subjective“ and an „objective“ meaning. The subjective meaning is „to be or feel ashamed“ and the objective meaning „to be put to shame, go to ruin.“¹² It implies consequently an emotion and a state. *Qālā* „lowliness of social position“ has only an objective meaning (1972:206f.). For Klopfenstein, *bôš* denotes the inappropriate, „the disturbance of a relationship of loyalty based on trust“ (2Sam 19:6). *bôš* can also express a deception about an unfulfilled promise or expectation and a feeling of inferiority. Klopfenstein infers that shame (*bôš*, *klm*) is a manifestation of guilt and has to be situated in the legal context of a process (Jer 2:26a; Ps 127:5). According to him, shame expresses humiliation before a legal authority (1972:48f.). It is interesting to note that in Jer 2:26a the thief feels only shame at the moment when he is caught, a typical characteristic of shame

¹² Germ. subjective *sich schämen*, objective *zuschanden werden*.

orientation. Even though shame can be linked with guilt (cp. guilt-based shame), in most of the instances a legal context cannot be inferred into the passages. With Huber (1983:29,36), we do not find guilt inherent in the meaning of Hebrew shame words.

In his cultural study of Biblical Israel, Pedersen (1926) concludes that in Biblical thought shame reacts on a person's „soul“ (*nepeš*). Based on Wolff, we would rather say that it reacts on „the self“ (Wolff 1990:41f.). Starting from *qālā*, shame is a condition of the self decreasing or emptying *nepeš*. On the other hand, honour is increasing or filling it. For Pedersen, when the self is filled with blessing, praise, prosperity, and strength, it becomes „heavy.“ Thus, honour is called both *קָבוֹד* *kābôd* „heaviness, abundance, honour, glory, power“ because of the weight it gives the self, and *גָּאֹן* *gāʾôn* „highness, pride, majesty, exaltation,“ because of the value it contributes. Conversely, defeat, misfortune, weakness, and reproach atrophy the self with shame, emptying it and making it lowly and inferior (Pedersen 1926:213,235).

Other words, which are in the semantic domain of „glory, honour, majesty,“ together with *kābôd* are *ʾdr* „be magnificent, majestic, splendid“ (e.g. Ex 15:6); *hḏr* „swell, honour, adorn“ (Ps 90:16); *hōd* „splendour, majesty“ (e.g. Isa 30:30); *yeqār* „honour, riches, respect, price, splendour“ *nēšaḥ* „luster, glory, lastingness, successful“ (e.g. 1Sam 15:29); *pʾr* „beautify, glorify“ and the related *tifʾeret* „beauty, dignity“ (e.g. Ex 28:2,40); and *šbī* „ornament, glory“ (e.g. Dan 11:16). In the group of *gāʾôn*, other cognates are *gʾh* „rise up, be exalted,“ *gēʾā* *gaʾwā* and *gēʾūt* „pride.“ Other words in the semantic domain of „arrogance, pride, height“ are *sll* „lift up, exalt“ (e.g. Prov 16:17); *rwm* „be high, exalted, proud“ (Dan 11:36 Hitpolel); *šahaš* „pride“ (e.g. Job 41:34); *nsʾ* „lift, raise high, exalt“ (e.g. Gen 40:20; Num 6:26); *rhb* „be proud“ (e.g. Ps 38:3); and *ʾhillā* „glory“ (e.g. Ps 78:4; Jer 48:1) (cp. Collins 1996:686; Smith/Hamilton 1996:788). Different passages show the different cognates of pride and glory as opposites of shame and fear (Lev 26:19; Dt 28:23; Ps 10:2-4; 78:4; Prov 8:13; Isa 16:6; 23:9; 25:11; Jer 48:1,29f.). One example, which may stand for all, is David's doxology in 1Chr 29:11: „To you, O Lord, belongs greatness (*gʾdullā*) and power (*gʾbūrā*) and glory (*tifʾeret*) and majesty (*nēšaḥ*) and splendour (*hōd*).“ We find a whole wealth of terms in the category of opposites to shame.

In his study on the book of Esther, Laniak organizes the various meanings of *kābôd* under four categories: substance, status, splendour, and self (Laniak 1998:17-23; cp. Kurani 2000:97-100). Substance is the material nuance of the literal meaning „weight, heaviness“ (e.g. Gen 12:10; Ex 12:38). The material emphasis is extended to various forms of power and strength (Isa 8:7; 10:16; 17:4), and to wealth including money, clothing, livestock, and an

extended family (Num 22:12; 24:11). Status is the kind of honour associated with the symbols of authority, prestige and rank (2Sam 23:19,23). It is linked to titles, hierarchies and formal gestures (Jos 7:19; Mal 1:6). Splendour is the conceptual sphere most closely associated with sacrality: God's radiant presence (Lev 10:3; Isa 6:3). *kābēd* being a nominal term for liver, the most significant organ for the ancient's perception, it is often a euphemism for the person, its „name“ and reputation (Prov 22:1). Honour-as-reputation follows wisdom (Prov 3:35; 8:18; 12:8), humility (Prov 15:33; 18:12), and the fear of the Lord (Prov 22:4). The OT differentiates between the moral quality of honour and pride. „Pride (*gā'ôn*) goes before destruction, a haughty (*gbh*) spirit before a fall“ (Prov 16:18). And „when pride (*zādôn*) comes, then comes disgrace (*qālôn*)“ (Prov 11:2). Therefore, it is a special challenge for a shame-oriented person, who is in search for honour, to avoid pride and be humble.¹³

In comparison with our model in section 2.7.4, the discussed Hebrew terms cover honour, prestige, glory, and pride. The Hebrew word *ōz* „strength, power“ is not properly a synonym of *kābôd*, but a closely related amplificatory term (e.g. Isa 25:3) (cp. Collins 1996:584). Related terms to *ōz* are *zerôa* „power“ and *gebûrâ* „might“ (Ps 71:18). As we have seen, the semantic domain of harmony has to be attributed to *šālôm*. For virtue there is no word in Hebrew. The term belongs to the autonomous Stoic philosophy and has therefore no place in theonomous Hebrew anthropology. Only a few times, the LXX translates *ῥhillâ* and *hōd* with the Greek term *aretē* (Link/Ringwald 1990:1239).

In LXX and NT, the Hebrew concepts are roughly maintained with minor adaptations to the Greek semantic domains. The dominant Greek expression to render the Hebrew concept of shame is *αἰσχύνομαι aischynomai* and derivatives (Lk 14:9; Rom 1:16; 2Cor 4:2; Phil 3:19). The other terms *ἐντρέπομαι entrepomai*, *αἰδός aidos*, *ἀτιμάζω atimazō* „dishonour“ and *ὀνειδίζω oneidizō* being much less important (Rom 1:26; 1Cor 6:5; 11:14; 15:34; 2Cor 6:8). As becomes apparent, the wealth of vocabulary is less developed. While *aischynē* describes more the interpersonal shame (1Pet 2:26), *aidos* means rather the fear of God. It is thus parallel to piety (1Tim 2:9) (Bultmann 1933a; 1933b; Schneider 1954; Link/Tiedtke 1990:1064f.).

In LXX and NT, the main expression for *kābôd* is *δόξα doxa* „glory,“ while *gā'ôn* is mainly rendered by *ὑβρις hybris* „pride.“ *τιμή timē* „honour“ is much less frequently used, especially to render man's honour, whereas *doxa* is used mainly for God's glory (Kittel 1935; Schneider 1969; Aalen 1990). In relation to our model, honour, glory and pride are covered.

¹³ Cp. section 5.4.6. Repentance and Humility.

Power is rendered in the NT by δύναμις *dynamis* „power, might,“ ἐξουσία *exousia* „authority,“ and κράτος *kratos* „force“ (Betz/Coenen 1990). Honour, glory and power are part of many doxologies in the book of Revelation and thus seen together, even though they may seem separate from an analytic point of view (Rev 1:6; 4:11; 5:12f.; 7:12; 12:10). Virtue *aretē* is a very rare word in the NT (Phil 4:8; 2Pet 1:3,5). It is rather a term for an autonomous, rational ethics than the concept of a spirit-enacted ethical liberty as presented in Paul's letters (Link/Ringwald 1990:1240). In a Biblical version of our model, virtue would therefore have to be taken away from the scheme.

Even though there are minor changes in the semantics, NT concepts of shame and honour change considerably. According to the principle of causality and retribution, misfortune, misery and deception in the OT imply shame and are associated with sin (Job 4:7-9). The fate of the servant of the Lord is therefore interpreted initially as the consequence of sin (Isa 53:3). The revolutionary new perspective of Isa 53 and of the book of Job is that this shame does not indicate sin, but the righteousness of the servant of the Lord (Isa 53:11f.; Job 42:10). Jesus Christ as a righteous experienced the greatest shame at the cross, which was accounted to him as honour (Hebr 12:2; Phil 2:5-11). The disciples of Jesus Christ follow their master in this reversal of shame and honour. The small, poor, weak, naked, sad and outcast will be great in the kingdom of God (Mt 5:3-12 par; 23:12 par). The last will be first, and the first last (Mt 19:30 par). For Paul, all men have sinned and fall short of the glory of God (Rom 3:23). However, the one, who believes in Christ and remains in him, will not be put to shame at his second coming (Rom 9:33 quoted from Isa 28:16; 1Jn 2:28). At the end of history, God will have all the glory, honour and power (Rev 1:6; 4:11; 5:12f.; 7:12).

3.1.5 Fear

The reason to include „fear“ in these term and concept studies is to determine, whether fear has to figure as a third universal at the side of shame and guilt in its own right or whether it has to be included into the mechanisms of shame and guilt-oriented conscience.

The most frequent Hebrew term is יָרָא *yṛʾ* „Qal: fear, be afraid, Niphal: be feared, revered, held in honour, Piel: overawe, alarm“ with 435 occurrences. Related terms in the semantic domain of „fear, terror“ are פָּחַד *pḥd* „tremble, be in dread“ (Isa 44:11), דָּגַח *dʿg* „be anxious, concerned, fear, dread,“ בָּהַל *bhl* „be dismayed, terrified“ and גָּוַר *gwr* „be afraid, dread“ among others (van Pelt/Kaiser 1996:533). The basic meaning of *yṛʾ* can be divided into two main categories: 1) „fear associated with terror“ as expression of a shortcoming or failure, of a bad conscience

or of a danger (e.g. Gen 19:3; 26:7; Ex 2:14); 2) „fear associated with respect and worship“ as expression of reverence to Yahweh, the „fear of the Lord“ (e.g. Dt 10:12f.; 13:5) (van Pelt/Kaiser 1996:528f.). Also the latter includes a consciousness of smallness, of failure or shortcoming, this time in relation to the holy and perfect God. That is why Hebrew can use the same term for the reverence to God. However, while the former is the expression of a violation of the covenant, that is, of a bad conscience, the fear of the Lord is a covenant behaviour. In both meanings fear is related to shame and to guilt. Pride, on the other hand, is opposite to the „fear of the Lord“ (Lev 26:19; Dt 28:23; Ps 10:2-4; Prov 8:13; Isa 16:6; 23:9; 25:11; Jer 48:29f.). In this section, we are interested particularly in the first category of meaning.

In a number of instances, fear is associated with shame. In the first occurrence of *yrʾ*, it is said that Adam and Eve were afraid of God because they were naked; so they hid (Gen 3:10). Here fear is associated with a typical shame behaviour. In Isa 44:11 the makers of idols shall fear and be covered with shame: „All his fellows shall be ashamed (*bôš*): and the workmen, they are of men: let them all be gathered together, let them stand up; yet they shall fear (*phd*), and they shall be ashamed (*bôš*) together (KJV Isa 44:11).“ Let us remember that fear prevails in a shame-oriented conscience as long as the failure is not detected by the significant other. In Biblical terms, this means that fear can remain until the last judgement, until „the day of the Lord,“ when shame will take over (cp. Isa 45:16). However, in the future glorious Zion, the barren woman will not fear and will not be ashamed: „Do not be afraid (*yrʾ*); you will not suffer shame (*bôš*). Do not fear disgrace (*klm*); you will not be humiliated (*hpr*). You will forget the shame (*bôšet*) of your youth and remember no more the reproach (*herpâ*) of your widowhood“ (Isa 54:4). Again *yrʾ* occurs in a context of shame related terms.

In other instances fear is not associated with any of the two terms: Jacob is afraid of Laban after having cheated him (Gen 31:31). He is also afraid to meet Esau again after having stolen his right of the firstborn (Gen 32:7,11). Saul is afraid of David (1Sam 18:12), and Ishbosheth, Saul's son, of Abner (2Sam 3:11). David is afraid of being chased away from God's face and lose God's Holy Spirit (Ps 51:11). In all these instances, fear is the expression of a bad conscience without being linguistically associated with shame or guilt. However, the context of inadequate past behaviour implies shame or guilt. In these instances, fear expresses expectation of punishment by the significant other who might know my failures and transgressions. It is typical for the covenant relationship between the Israelites and God that man can only come to God in fear or love, because He is great, mighty and awesome (Dt 10:17f.; 1Chr

16:25). God turns himself toward man in a loving attitude. Therefore, he says again and again: „Do not fear!“ (e.g. Gen 15:1; Jdg 6:23; Isa 44:2).

This becomes entirely evident in the NT. The main Greek terms for fear are φοβέομαι *phobeomai* and cognates, and less frequently δειλιάω *deiliaō* and cognates (e.g. Jn 14:27). Also here fear is in close connection with the expectation of the judgement (2Cor 5:11; 1Pet 1:17). However, those who put their trust in Christ do not have to fear (Mk 5:36; Lk 5:10; Mt 17:7; 28:5,10; Rev 1:17); they are saved from slavery (Hebr 2:15). They will never be put to shame (Rom 9:33; 10:11). John says in 1Jn 4:18: „There is no fear (*phobos*) in love (*agapē*). But perfect love drives out fear because fear has to do with punishment. The one who fears (*phobeomai*) is not made perfect in love.“ God is love (1Jn 4:16), and therefore the covenant behaviour is love (Lev 11:4f.; 19:11; Dt 6:5; Mt 22:37-39). Fear comes when the covenant is violated (cp. Mundle 1990:416f.).

We conclude that fear is often associated with shame. We do not find a linguistic association with guilt. This is not utterly surprising as anxiety lasts much longer in shame orientation than in guilt orientation due to its different mechanism.¹⁴ Linguistically, fear occurs most often independently. The context is however always one of inadequacy or a bad conscience. Our preliminary conclusion of section 2.7. that fear is an integral part of the shame and guilt mechanism, is entirely compatible with Biblical data. This is the most probable solution, which will be adopted for this thesis. However, we can neither prove nor exclude that fear is a third universal besides shame and guilt.

3.1.6 The Covenant Concept

In his *Theology of the Old Testament* (1961), Walther Eichrodt chooses the covenant concept as the controlling idea and the centre of all OT theology (1961:13-15,36-69). While the search for a „centre“ is problematical (cp. Hasel 1972:117-143; McConville 1996:752), the idea of the covenant is indeed filled out by certain important collocations and helpful for our study.

The main Hebrew term for covenant is בְּרִית *brît* with almost 300 occurrences. It implies a continuous relationship between two partners, typically a suzerain and a vassal, a patron and a client, with a mutual commitment to covenant obligations. The OT presents a number of consecutive covenants between God and his people: the Noahic covenant (Gen 9:8-17), the Abrahamic covenant (Gen 12:1-3; 15:18; 17:2), the Mosaic covenant (Ex 19-24), and the

¹⁴ Cp. sections 2.6.4. Klaus Müller's Dynamics, and 2.7.3. Understanding Shame and Guilt.

Davidic covenant (2Sam 7:8-17). It is best visible in the Mosaic covenant where the relational covenant obligations in the faithful covenant relationship are accompanied by a legal code. Thus, the covenant concept includes both a relational (shame-oriented) and a judicial (guilt-oriented) aspect. This fact is very important for Christian ministry with both conscience orientations.

The dual pattern of mutual love and obedience to the covenant stipulations is repeated again and again. Yahweh's steadfast love (*ḥesed*) abides with those who love (*ʿhb*) him and keep his commandments (*mišwâ*) (Ex 20:6). The book of Deuteronomy refers to it several times: „Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your strength. These commandments (*dābār*) that I give you today are to be upon your hearts“ (Dt 6:5f.). There are not only the covenant obligations on the side of the people of Israel, but also on God's side: „Know therefore that the Lord your God is God; he is the faithful (*ʾmn*) God, keeping his covenant of love (*ḥesed*) to a thousand generations of those who love him (*ʿhb*) and keep his commands (*mišwâ*)“ (Dt 7:9). The same formula comes over and over again (Dt 11:1,13; 30:16; Jos 22:5; 23:6,8; 24:25). When God renews the Davidic covenant after the dedication of the temple, he admonishes king Solomon to keep a sincere heart and respect his commandments (*ḥôq mišpāt*) (1Ki 9:4; cp. 2Ki 23:2f.). Even the prophets repeat the same double formula: in his prayer, Daniel recalls that: „God ... keeps his covenant of love (*ḥesed*) with all who love him (*ʿhb*) and obey his commands (*mišwâ*)“ (Dan 9:4; cp. Neh 1:5). And God says to Ezekiel: „I will give you a new heart and put a new spirit in you ... and move you to follow my decrees (*ḥôq*) and be careful to keep my laws (*mišpāt*)“ (Ezek 36:26f.).

The same double formula continues in the NT. Jesus says to his disciples: „If you love (*agapaō*) me, you will obey (*tēreō*) my commands (*entolē*)“ (Jn 14:15,23f.), and vice versa: „Whoever has my commands and obeys them, he is the one who loves me“ (Jn 14:21; 15:10). And „those who obey his commands live in him, and he in them“ (1Jn 3:23f.). This double formula witnesses to the fact that the covenant concept is a combined relational (shame-oriented) and judicial (guilt-oriented) concept.

The matter is however complicated by the way *bʿrît* was translated into Greek. Instead of using the term συνθήκη *synthēkē* „agreement,“ LXX and NT introduce the term διαθήκη *diathēkē*. *synthēkē* implies that two partners engaged in a common activity accept reciprocal relational and legal obligations (cp. the meaning of *bʿrît*). It is a combined shame and guilt-oriented concept. On the other hand, *diathēkē*, which is derived from the mid. *diatithemai* „dispose of by will,“ means „a private legal action.“ It denotes therefore an irrevocable legal

decision. A prerequisite of its effectiveness before the law is the death of the disposer (Behm 1935:130f.; Gurth 1990:157ff.).¹⁵ Consequently, the concept has been transformed from a combined shame and guilt-oriented concept to a purely legal concept, hence also the Latin translation *testamentum*. This transformation is not surprising when we keep in mind the shift to predominantly guilt-oriented concepts in late Judaism. In the same order, we have already observed the transformation of the combined concept of *tōrāh* to the guilt-oriented concept *nomos* (Guthbrod 1942:1037-1050; Esser 1990a:522f.; Enns 1996b:898f.). The covenant concept appears to be linguistically less present in the NT. As compared to almost 300 occurrences of *bʿrīt* in the OT, *diathēkē* occurs only 35 times in the NT. Hence, we raise the following question: Is it possible that the mostly guilt-oriented covenant concept was not favoured by the Hebrew authors of the NT?

Several relational images of the covenant relationship between God and his people indicate a shame orientation of the concept. The book of Hosea and many other passages in the OT use the husband-wife relationship to describe the covenant relationship saying that Israel has gone astray like a prostitute (Isa 1:21; Ezek 16:35; Hos 2:7; 4:13; 5:3; Amos 7:17). Revelation speaks of the church as a bride (Rev 19:7; 21:2,9; 22:17) and of the representation of humanity as a prostitute (Rev 17:1,15f.). The covenant relationship is also described as a father-son relationship. When talking about the covenant, several OT passages speak of God as Father (Dt 32:6; 2Sam 7:14; Ps 68:6; 89:27; Isa 9:5; 63:16; Jer 31:9; Mal 1:6) and of Israel as his son (Jer 31:9,20; Mal 3:17). This gives a special status to God's people and leads to an in-group behaviour. The NT takes up the father-son relationship in the Beatitudes (Mt 5:3 par), in the Our-Father prayer (Mt 6:9), and in the parable of the lost son (Lk 15:11-32). It speaks of those who believe in Christ as God's children (Jn 1:12; 1Jn 3:1). They call God *Abba* Father (Rom 8:15; Gal 4:6). This image of the covenant relationship is well fitted to cultures like China, which emphasize the father-son relationship (cp. Sun 1994:11f.; Ramstad 2000:174).

Another element, which indicates a shame orientation of the covenant concept, is the fact that the covenant was thought of needing a mediator. While the old covenant had Moses as mediator, a new covenant is announced mediated by the servant of the Lord who is called *gōʾēl* (Isa 59:20). This „closest parent,“ the redeemer of the new covenant, is clearly Jesus

¹⁵ Interestingly, Philo uses the shame-oriented *synthēkē* to render „covenant“ (Behm 1935:131).

Christ. In the letter to the Hebrews, he is compared to the other mediators as the angels, Moses, and Melchizedek, and found superior (Hebr 8:6; 9:15; 12:24).

Several passages of the Bible describe the covenant behaviours. When describing God's attributes, Ps 145 names *š'dāqā* „righteousness“, *ḥnn* „grace“, *rḥm* „mercy“, and *ḥesed* „steadfast love“ (Ps 145:7-9,13-20; cp. Ex 34:6; Ps 112:4). Ps 33 presents God's attributes: *ʾemûnâ* „faithfulness“, *š'dāqā*, *mišpāt*, and *ḥesed* (Ps 33:4f.). God's *š'dāqā*, *ʾemûnâ*, *t'šû'â*, *ḥesed*, and *ʾemet* „faithfulness, truth“ are glorified (Ps 40:10f.). The covenant behaviour that God asks from man is presented in Micah: „He has showed you, O man, what is good. And what does the Lord require of you? To act justly (*mišpāt*) and to love mercy (*ḥesed*) and to walk humbly (*šnʿ*) with your God“ (Mic 6:8). The Proverbs promise a glorious result of covenant behaviour: „He who pursues righteousness (*š'dāqā*) and love (*ḥesed*) finds life (*ḥāyîm*), prosperity (*š'dāqā*) and honour (*kābôd*)“ (Prov 21:21; cp. Jer 4:2). The four main covenant behaviours are summarized in Hos 2, a passage that speaks of the covenant relationship in the image of the betrothal between husband and bride: „I will betroth you to me forever; I will betroth you in righteousness (*šedeq*) and justice (*mišpāt*), in love (*ḥesed*) and compassion (*rḥm*). I will betroth you in faithfulness (*ʾemûnâ*), and you will acknowledge (*ydʿ*) the Lord“ (Hos 2:19f.). God gives salvation as a dowry including the ability to perform covenant behaviours. The knowledge of God seems to be the result of the others.

Jesus confirms these covenant behaviours, when he admonishes the scribes and Pharisees: „Woe to you, teachers of the law and Pharisees, you hypocrites! You give a tenth of your spices – mint, dill and cummin. But you have neglected the more important matters of the law (*nomos* cp. *tōrāh*) – justice (*krisis* „judgement, rights“ cp. *mišpāt*), mercy (*eleos* cp. *ḥesed*), and faithfulness (*pistis* cp. *ʾemûnâ* / *ʾemet*). You should have practiced the latter, without neglecting the former“ (Mt 23:23). As we will see, this is a combined shame and guilt-oriented command. Paul presents salvation and the covenant behaviours as the fruit of light: „... for the fruit of light consists in all goodness (*agathosynē* cp. *ḥesed*), righteousness (*dikaïosynē* cp. *š'dāqā*) and truth (*alētheia* cp. *ʾemet*)“ (Eph 5:9). Keeping his commands and performing covenant behaviours means actually to know God. Knowledge of God is the result and culmination of covenant behaviour (1Jn 2:3). In the following sections, we will study some of these positive covenant behaviours in relation to their conscience orientation. As we have already seen, sin, shame, guilt and fear are consequences of covenant violation.

3.1.7 Righteousness as Covenant Behaviour

For a long time, Protestant scholars have seen *šedeq* / *š' dāqā* as a legal term describing norm conform behaviour (cp. Quell/Schrenk 1935:177). Only in the 20th century, some theologians start to see *šedeq* / *š' dāqā* as a relational term describing conformity to community behaviour (Cremer 1899; von Rad 1957:368-381; Eichrodt 1961:240; Koch 1976:265; 1995:511-515; Reimer 1996:747).¹⁶ *šedeq* / *š' dāqā* as an adequate behaviour in the covenant community must actually include a relational and a legal component (cp. Eichrodt 1961:240). It also implies a response from man (Schmid 1976:405). Based on an Isaiah-Targum, Koch sees three aspects in the Hebrew term *šedeq* / *š' dāqā*: first, righteousness means a godly transmission of a moral potency to the Israelites, which secondly is to be practiced in the community, in order that thirdly salvation and life develop according to the principle of retribution with renewed godly assistance (Koch 1976:265). When according to the principle of causality and retribution, „righteousness“ leads to a state of health, well-being and salvation, it becomes a saving power (*iustitia salutifera*) (Eichrodt 1961:241; Koch 1995:516). In the eschatological perspective, righteousness thus becomes a synonym of salvation (*šālôm*) and a characteristic of the Messianic time (Quell/Schrenk 1935:188). The true righteous is the servant of the Lord, who suffers death as an innocent substitute for the unrighteous (Isa 53).

For late Judaism, righteousness becomes fulfilment of the law out of obedience through deeds of merit: providing food to the hungry, clothes to the naked, consoling the sad, visiting the sick and the prisoners (cp. Mt 25:35f.). The motivation for these deeds of mercy becomes entirely legalistic. In the same order, Pharisaic and Rabbinic thought emphasizes God's eschatological judgement of the unrighteous: righteousness becomes retributive justice (*iustitia retributiva*) (Seebass 1990:503). Righteousness has become justice, a uniquely legal or guilt-oriented concept.

The NT uses the concept of righteousness much less frequently than the OT (226 vs. 523 occurrences for the word group found especially in Mt, Rom, Gal). The coming of God's kingdom through Jesus Christ has brought about the eschatological righteousness. Those who hunger and thirst after God's righteousness or are persecuted because of it are declared blessed (Mt 5:6,10 par). Jesus asks his disciples to seek first his kingdom and his righteousness (Mt 6:33). By demanding a better righteousness than that of the Pharisees (Mt 5:20), Jesus takes up the OT tradition of a combined concept of righteousness. He criticizes them for

¹⁶ For a larger discussion of righteousness in the perspective of shame and guilt see Wiher (1997:3-8).

paying the tithe of the spices, while neglecting the more important matters of the law: righteousness, mercy and faithfulness (Mt 23:23). In concordance with late Judaism, the Pharisees have developed a guilt-oriented approach to righteousness. Jesus wants to bring them back to a combined shame and guilt-oriented stand, as we will see in the next sections.

Paul uses the word-group of righteousness in the most extensive and differentiated way. The only way to righteousness is faith in Jesus Christ (Rom 1:16f.; 3:26,28; 5:1; Gal 2:16). In the letter to the Romans, he makes of the concept of „God’s righteousness“ in Jesus Christ the central content of the missionary Gospel (Stuhlmacher 1981:105). In church history, this genitive construction has been interpreted antithetically. Luther interprets it as *genetivus objectivus* with the meaning „righteousness that man possesses before God“ (Rom 4:3,5; cp. Phil 3:9). This concept of righteousness by grace and by faith, which originates in the context of Catholic indulgences, becomes the cornerstone of Reformation belief. It emphasizes righteousness as a state of individual innocence in the judicial process representing a guilt-oriented view. Schlatter (1935) introduces the interpretation as *genetivus subjectivus* in the meaning of „God’s own righteousness as salvific power“ (cp. Rom 1:17; 3:5,21f.; 10:3; 2Cor 5:21). With this interpretation he emphasizes God as driving force in redemptive history with man. With this definition, he shows the christological-theological importance and the cosmological-eschatological breadth of the term (Käsemann 1964:182f.). This corresponds to a relational, shame-oriented concept. Käsemann and Stuhlmacher plead then for a combination of the two genitives in the sense of God’s righteousness as power (Schlatter) and gift (Luther). Fahlgren (1932) speaks of a „synthetic breadth of meaning“ of the term (Käsemann 1964:186,192; Stuhlmacher 1981:107; 1997:335). „Because righteousness has to be attributed to God in his function as sustainer of the world, it is his righteousness, which he gives to the one who acts righteously“ (Schmid 1976:407). With this balanced view, the concept of righteousness comes back to the shame and guilt-oriented OT concept as covenant behaviour (Eichrodt 1961:241; Koch 1995:516).¹⁷

Righteousness as covenant behaviour is closely related to the concept of salvation. Its parallels and polar opposites demonstrate this clearly:

I have been blameless (*tmm*) before him
and have kept myself from sin (*‘āwōn*).
The Lord has awarded me according to my righteousness (*ṣedeq*),
according to the cleanness (*brr*) of my hands in his sight (Ps 18:23f.).

¹⁷ Cp. section 4.3.6. Martin Luther’s Justification by Grace.

While *ṣedeq* is parallel to integrity (*tmm*) and cleanness (*brr*), both shame-oriented concepts, it is opposed to *‘āwōn* which is a shame and guilt-oriented concept. In Dan 9:7f., *ṣḏāqā* is even opposed to shame (*bōšet hapānīm*) implying a shame orientation of the concept. Also in the NT, righteousness is opposed to sin: Jesus comes to save the sinners (*hamartolos* cp. *ḥāṭā’āwōn*) not the righteous (*dikaioi* cp. *ṣāddīq*) (Lk 5:32). According to 1Pet 2:24, we die to sins and live for righteousness (cp. 2Cor 5:21). „God is faithful and just (*dikaioi*) and will forgive us our sins (*hamartia*) and purify us from all unrighteousness (*adikia*)“ (1Jn 1:9).

Another feature, which does not prove but imply shame orientation, is the combination of justice and righteousness in the technical term *mišpāt wūṣedāqā* (Gen 18:19; Ps 33:5; 89:14; Prov 21:3; Isa 9:7; 11:4; 28:17; Jer 23:6; Hos 2:19; Am 5:24). The Lord loves righteousness and justice (Ps 33:5). The Messiah is announced to establish and uphold his government with justice and righteousness (Isa 9:7; Jer 23:6). While several constructions use the two terms simply in poetic parallelism (Isa 11:4; 28:17; Am 5:24), other passages speak specifically of righteousness and justice as two aspects of covenant behaviour (Gen 18:19; Ps 33:5; 89:14; Prov 21:3; Isa 9:7; Hos 2:19). *ṣedāqā* represents the relational aspect of covenant behaviour, the conformity to community behaviour, while *mišpāt* stands for the legal aspect, the conformity to legal standards. If this is correct, the formula represents a combined shame and guilt-oriented covenant behaviour.

The concept of righteousness is also linked with the other covenant behaviours, which will be discussed in the next sections. This witnesses again to the synthetic breadth of the concept. In LXX, the term *hesed* „covenant love“ can be translated with *dikaioynē* „righteousness“ (e.g. Gen 19:19; 20:13; 21:23; 24:27; 32:10). Righteousness as covenant conform behaviour can also be understood as covenant faithfulness (*pistis* / *‘emûnâ* and *‘emet*) (e.g. Rom 3:3-5:25; 9:6; 10:3; 15:8) (cp. Dunn 1988:41; LaSor et al. 1992:135).

In conclusion, righteousness is a concept closely related to the concept of salvation and, as such, often stands in opposition to sin. However, it can also stand in opposition to shame-oriented concepts. When combined with *mišpāt* „justice,“ it represents the shame-oriented aspect of covenant behaviour. It must be clearly differentiated from the guilt-oriented concept of justice. Generally speaking, righteousness as covenant behaviour implies a shame and a guilt-oriented aspect. This finding is contrary to Müller’s use of righteousness as a guilt-oriented term on the guilt-justice axis (Müller 1983a:3; 1988:428; 1996a:103)

3.1.8 Love and Grace as Covenant Behaviour

Wherever *ḥrît* (covenant) governs relations between human beings, the kind of normative behaviour expected by those associated together is clearly recognized as *ḥesed* (Eichrodt 1961:232). *ḥesed*, with 246 occurrences, is a very frequent term in the OT. Over half of the occurrences are in the Psalms. It has been a very difficult term to translate with an especially broad synthetic meaning. *NIDOTTE* renders it: „loyalty, faithfulness, goodness“ (Baer/Gordon 1996:211). A historical overview of the translation of the term in Ps 136 gives an appreciation of the theological search to understand it. KJV (1611/1769) renders it mercy, ASV (1901) lovingkindness (cf. Eichrodt 1961:232), RSV (1952) steadfast love, and the NIV (1984) with love. A similar development from mercy to love takes place in French translations: LSG (Louis Segond 1910) renders it *miséricorde* „mercy,“ SEM (Semeur 1992) and BFC (Français courant 1997) renders it *amour* „love.“ Luther translates *ḥesed* with *Güte* „goodness“ or *Gnade* „grace.“ This development shows clearly that *ḥesed* implies love, loyalty, mercy and grace, even though these words represent different concepts in modern English. It witnesses to a „synthetic breadth“ of the concept.

All scholars agree that the term has a strongly relational aspect. It implies a mutual commitment in a covenant (contra *ḥmn*) and describes a beneficent action. It means essentially loyalty in the covenant relationship (1Sam 20:8,14; 2Sam 9:3). Divine *ḥesed* saves people from disaster or oppressors (Ps 31:7,21; 32:10; 57:3; 143:12) and sustains life (Ps 6:4f.). Divine *ḥesed* counteracts God's wrath (Isa 54:8; Mic 7:18). Divine *ḥesed* is enduring, persistent, even eternal (Isa 54:10; Hos 6:4; Ps 89:2,28,33; 103:17; 136). Divine *ḥesed* guides back to God (Ex 15:3) and is hope in difficulty (Ps 13:5; 17:7; 33:18; 143:8). Divine *ḥesed* is abundant (Ps 33:5; 119:64) (Baer/Gordon 1996:212-217). It becomes clear that *ḥesed* is a shame-oriented concept embedded in the covenant relationship.

Related terms in the semantic domain of „faithfulness“ are *ʾmn* „support, faithfulness, belief, trust“ (see next section) and *ḏbq* „stick, cling, cleave“ (e.g. Gen 2:14). Related terms in the semantic domain of „love, loyalty“ are *ʾhb* „love“ (e.g. Num 6:25; 2Sam 24:14) and *rḥm* „love, compassion“ (e.g. Neh 1:11) (Baer/Gordon 1996:218). Other related terms in the semantic domain of „grace, favour“ are *ḥnn* „favour, grace“ (e.g. Ps 112:4) and *ršh* I „be pleased with, treat favourably“ (Dt 33:11,16; Isa 60:10; 61:2). An important difference between *ḥesed* and *ḥnn* is that the former implies mutuality of the relationship and characterizes mostly God's action, while the latter describes a unilateral gracious act and speaks of God in a minority of cases (Fretheim 1996:206; Baer/Gordon 1996:212; Esser 1990:591). Several

passages combine the major terms when describing Yahweh's attributes in a synthetic and liturgical way: „the Lord, the compassionate (*rḥm*) and gracious (*ḥnn*) God, slow to anger, abounding in love (*ḥesed*) and faithfulness (*ʿemet*)“ (Ex 34:6; cp. Ps 86:15; 103:8; 145:8; Neh 9:17; Joel 2:13; Jon 4:2). A recurring formula is God's *ḥesed wʿemet*: „It is good ... to proclaim your love in the morning and your faithfulness at night“ (Ps 92:1f.), and „I do not conceal your love and your truth from the assembly“ (Ps 40:11; cp. Gen 24:27; 2Sam 2:6; 15:20; Ps 25:10; 57:4; 85:11; 89:15; 138:2). In the formula *ḥesed wʿemet*, the root *ʿmn* can change in later passages from a shame-oriented, relational meaning „support, faithfulness, belief, trust“ to the guilt-oriented meaning „truth.“ In this way, the formula receives a combined shame and guilt-oriented meaning comparable to the formula *mišpāt wūṣedāqā* „justice and righteousness.“

The regular LXX rendering of *ḥesed* and *rḥm* is *eleos* „mercy,“ and the rendering of *ḥnn* and *rḥh* is *charis* „grace.“ In the NT, *ḥesed* is rendered by *eleos* „love/mercy“ or *charis* „grace“ (Esser 1990:590). In the translation by the two terms, the synthetic breadth of the semantic domains of *ḥesed* is maintained. This is exemplified in Hebr 4:16: „Let us then approach the throne of grace with confidence, so that we may receive mercy (*eleos*) and grace (*charis*).“ Mt 9:13, which is a citation of Hos 6:6, renders *ḥesed* with *eleos*: „I desire mercy, not sacrifice.“ On the other hand, Jn 1:14, which renders the formula *ḥesed wʿemet*, translates *ḥesed* with *charis*: „We have seen his glory ... full of grace (*charis*) and truth (*alēheia*)“ (Beasley-Murray 1987:14). Based on the breadth of the concept of *ḥesed* and the combination of its meanings „love“ and „grace“ (e.g. Jn 3:16; 1Jn 3:16; Eph 2:4), we propose to sum up the concept in a synthetic way with „love and grace.“

Love is a covenant behaviour on the side of the believer (Dt 6:5; Jn 13:34f.; 14:21,23; 17:21-23) as well as on God's side (Dt 33:3a; Jn 3:16; 1Jn 3:16; 4:10; Rev 1:5). It is the polar opposite of fear: „There is no fear in love. But perfect love drives out fear“ (1Jn 4:18). Love is particularly a shame-oriented concept. The concept of grace undergoes however a transformation in late Judaism: a legalistic guilt-oriented aspect is developed. This becomes apparent in the parables of the NT, which try to explain the concept of grace. While the parable of the lost son images the shame-oriented aspect (Lk 15:11-32), the parable of the unmerciful servant is based on a guilt-oriented model of grace (Mt 18:21-35). The same is true for the passage of the two men who had debts (Lk 7:41f.) and the parable of the shrewd manager (Lk 16:1-15).

In conclusion, the concept of „love and grace“ in the OT is an entirely shame-oriented covenant concept. It describes the mutual obligation to a beneficent covenant behaviour. On

the divine plane, it describes God's saving acts. Love remains an entirely relational concept. Grace develops in late Judaism a guilt-oriented aspect beside the relational, shame-oriented component.

3.1.9 Faithfulness, Faith and Truth as Covenant Behaviour

„The language of faith/belief (*pistis* / *pisteuō*), which is of central importance in the NT, does not hold a position of similar importance in the OT. The difference, however, is perhaps more one of terminology than of basic outlook“ (Moberly 1996:427). The three basic roots that are used are *bṭḥ* „trust“ (e.g. Isa 30:15), *yʾrʾ* „fear“ (e.g. Gen 22:12; Dt 5:29; Job 28:28), and *ʾmn* „support, be faithful, believe, put trust in.“ The most widely used root is *ʾmn*, which occurs in various forms. The verbal meanings are Qal: „support,“ Niphal *neʾemān*: „be reliable, faithful,“ and Hiphil *heʾemîn*: „believe, put trust in.“ *heʾemîn* is the equivalent word in Hebrew to Greek *pisteuō*. The nominal forms are *ʾemûnâ* with the meaning „steadiness, reliability, honesty, duty“ and *ʾemet* „reliability, security, fidelity, truth.“ The semantic fields of the two nouns are almost identical with the basic meaning of „faithfulness, belief, trust.“ They represent shame-oriented covenant behaviours. Yahweh's faithfulness is praised in Ps 89, where *ʾemûnâ* occurs seven times (Ps 89:1,2,5,8,24,34,49) and *ʾemet* once (Ps 89:14). The two terms are generally interchangeable. The only difference is that *ʾemet* can additionally mean „truth“ (Wildberger 1994:204; Moberly 1996:428f.). This is the case especially in combination with the other covenant behaviours *ḥesed*, *ṣedeq* / *ṣḏāqâ* and *mišpāṭ* (Ps 15:2; 85:10; Isa 48:1; 59:14; Jer 4:2). In these combinations, together with *mišpāṭ* it represents the guilt-oriented component. Truth can be seen as the result of constant faithfulness, the guilt-oriented consequence of a continuous shame-oriented covenant behaviour. In this order, Buber differentiates two types of faith: first a faith of relationship, and second a faith based on objective data, that is, truth (Buber 1951:7).

Interesting is the fact that the LXX translates *ʾemûnâ* and *ʾemet* in the 3rd century B.C. often with *alētheia* „truth,“ *ʾemûnâ* in almost half the cases and *ʾemet* in 100 of 127 cases (Wildberger 1994:202). This witnesses to a trend toward guilt orientation in late Judaism, which we have observed several times already. Some aspects of this trend continue in the NT, where the concept of truth (*alētheia*) prevails over faithfulness, which is largely rendered with *pistis* „faith“ in the NT. This is shown, for example, by John's formula grace (*charis* cp. *ḥesed*) and truth (*alētheia* cp. *ʾemet*) (Jn 1:14,17). Faithfulness remains the contextual meaning of *pistis* in only a few passages (Mt 23:23 par Lk 11:42; Tit 2:10). Faithfulness in Hab 2:4

becomes faith in its citation in Rom 1:17 (see below). Consequently, the semantic domains of „faithfulness, faith and truth“ (*ʿemûnâ* / *ʿemet*) include a shame and a guilt-oriented component in a varying degree through history.

Several OT passages with the root *ʿmn* have become of preeminent importance for the NT authors. Two passages become later the basis for Paul’s and Luther’s concept of justification by faith. Gen 15:6 (cit. Rom 4:3; Gal 3:6) speaks of Abraham’s faith: „Abraham believed (*heʿemîn* / *pisteuō*) the Lord, and he credited it to him as righteousness.“ Another important passage is Hab 2:4b (cit. Rom 1:17): „but the righteous will live by his faith (*ʿemûnâ* / *pistis*)“ (note in Hab 2:4b NIV: „or faithfulness“). Isa 28:16 (cit. Rom 9:33; 10:11) formulates it in slightly other words: „the one who trusts (*heʿemîn* / *pisteuō*) will never be dismayed (*hûš* / *kataischynomai*).“ Isa 7:9 stresses the importance of trust in God in a word play between Hiphil and Niphal forms of *ʿmn*: „If you do not stand firm in your faith (*heʿemîn*), you will not stand at all (*neʿemān*).“ The above passages make it clear that faith becomes a central concept of covenant behaviour in late Judaism and in the NT. Eichrodt comments this development: „The attitude of faith had to emerge as of decisive significance for the God-Man relationship“ (1967:277).

In the NT, the centrality of the concept of faith is best shown in John’s Gospel (98 occurrences of *pistis* / *pisteuō*) and Paul’s letters (196 occurrences). Faith is a gift of God: it is a „coming“ faith (Jn 6:44,65; 18:37; Gal 3:23-25). The three characteristics of the covenant behaviour „faith in God“ are obedience (Jn 5:24; 6:68f.; Rom 1:5; 15:18; 16:26), knowledge of God (Jn 6:69; 14:9f.; 17:8) and hope (Rom 8:22-25; Gal 5:5; Phil 3:20f.) (Stuhlmacher 1997:344-346; 1999:252f.). „According to Paul, *pistis* is lived in love to God and to fellow men; its life dimension is the Holy Spirit and its fruit the *ergon pisteos* [work of faith], which is executed in the power of the Spirit“ (Stuhlmacher 1997:347).

In conclusion, faithfulness and faith go together with love for God and fellow men, and are considered righteousness by God. All three are covenant behaviours. The one who puts his trust in God and is faithful and truthful to God, will not be put to shame, because he remains in the covenant. Mt 23:23 sums it up nicely: „Woe to you, teachers of the law and Pharisees, ... you have neglected the more important matters of the law – justice (*krisis* cp. *mišpāt*), mercy (*eleos* cp. *ḥesed*) and faithfulness (*pistis* cp. *ʿemûnâ* / *ʿemet*)“ (cp. Mic 6:8; Hagner 1995:670).

3.1.10 Knowledge and Wisdom as Covenant Characteristics

The meanings of *yd'* range from „sensory perception“ over „intellectual process“ to „practical skills,“ „careful attention,“ „close relationship,“ and „physical intimacy.“ In the broadest sense, *yd'* means „to take various aspects of one’s experience into the self.“ The heart/mind (*lēb*) is the seat of the knowing (Dt 8:5; 1Ki 2:44). The term has a fundamentally relational character and can refer to intimacy in sexual intercourse (Gen 4:1,17,25). The noun *da‘at* is used to describe God’s intimate relationship with Israel, his people (Amos 3:2), and with individual leaders: Abraham (Gen 18:19), Moses (Ex 33:12; Dt 34:10 [face-to-face]), David (2Sam 7:20), Jeremiah (Jer 1:5). Equally, to know God is to be in a relationship with him, which is characterized by love (*hesed*), trust (*‘emet*), and open communication (Hos 2:20; 4:1,6; 6:6) (Fretheim 1996b:410f.).

The intimate marriage and the parent-child relationship are taken as metaphors of the God-Israel relationship (Hos 5:4; Isa 1:2f.; Jer 4:22). This intimate relationship is exemplified in Ps 139:1-4,23 and contrasted with the hiatus between the knowledge of the psalmist and God’s knowledge (v.6). A complementary notion of the intimate relational knowledge is thus the objective knowledge from a distance. While the former is the shame-oriented aspect, the latter is a guilt-oriented conception of knowing. We are thus confronted with two epistemologies: a synthetic, holistic and an analytic, fragmentary one. The first is shame-oriented describing relational intimacy between subject and object. The second is guilt-oriented describing knowledge from a subject-object distance, which represents the Western method of science. The former speaks of an intimate knowledge of God. To the latter belongs a more specific content of the knowledge of God, the knowledge of the Torah and of its precepts (Ps 119:79; Jer 8:7) (cp. Carew 2000:253ff.).

While Proverbs speaks positively of knowledge, Ecclesiastes tends to be pessimistic. Knowledge conveys no benefit (Eccl 1:16-18) and is only of relative advantage in comparison to folly and riches (Eccl 2:21; 7:11f.). *da‘at* is what characterizes the wise (Prov 10:14), the righteous (Prov 11:9), the prudent (Prov 13:16), and those with understanding (Prov 14:6). *da‘at* and *hokmā* „wisdom“ come from God (Prov 2:6,10). The fear of the Lord is the beginning of *da‘at* and *hokmā* (Prov 1:7; 2:5f.; 9:10). *hokmā* is personified in Prov 8:12-31 as mediator of God’s revelation. It goes along with righteousness (*šēdāqā*) and justice (*mišpāt*) (Prov 8:20). It is present in the Law (Ps 19:7; 119:98) (Sæbø 1994:566f.). It is recommended to seek and acquire wisdom (Prov 9:12; 13:20; 21:11; 27:11). Beyond knowledge, *hokmā* „wisdom“ is a *savoir faire*, an application of knowledge to specific situations (Eichrodt

1967:81). It seeks the harmony between knowledge, will and action (Goetzmann/Weigelt 1990:1373). *ḥokmâ* is a shame-oriented covenant behaviour.

In Proverbs, *daʿat* is used interchangeably with *ḥokmâ* and *bînâ* „understand, discern“ (Dt 4:6; Job 28:12,20; Dan 1:20) and *tebûnâ* (Prov 2:6), synonyms from the semantic domain of „knowledge, discernment, shrewd, wisdom.“ „The Spirit of the Lord is ... the spirit of wisdom (*ḥokmâ*) and of understanding (*bînâ*), the spirit of counsel (*ʿēṣâ*) and of power, the Spirit of knowledge (*daʿat*) and of the fear of the Lord“ (Isa 11:2). The polar opposites of the shame-oriented term *ḥokmâ* are logically in the semantic domain of „folly, madness, shameless:“ *nbl* „stupid“ (Dt 32:6), *ksl* „foolish“ (Prov 10:1; Eccl 6:8), *skl* „fool“ (Eccl 2:19) (Wilson 1996:133f.).

In LXX and NT, the terms are rendered with *gnosis* „knowledge“ and *sophia* „wisdom.“ *moros* „foolishness, folly“ and *aphrosynē* „lack of sense, folly“ are the antonyms. The NT concepts correspond largely to the OT use (Schmitz/Schütz/Coenen 1990:247). Wisdom is not only knowledge, but a covenant behaviour (Goetzmann/Weigelt 1990:1376). In the doxologies of Revelation, it is combined with other shame-oriented attributes of God: honour, glory, power and wisdom (Rev 4:11; 5:12; 7:12). Knowledge is mainly a relational concept. Knowledge of God and his Son means fellowship with him, i.e. eternal life (Jn 17:3). Knowledge of God goes together with faith: „We believe and know ...“ (Jn 6:69). However, „being known by God precedes human knowledge of God (Gal 4:9; 1Cor 13:12)“ (Stuhlmacher 1997:253). Knowing God means also to keep his commandments (1Jn 2:3). It goes beyond mere understanding toward covenant behaviour and becomes thus a synonym to wisdom. Paul praises the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God when looking at redemptive history (Rom 11:33). In Christ are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge (Col 2:3).

There is, however, a fundamental difference between OT and NT concepts of wisdom, which Paul develops in 1Cor 1-3. Through Christ's foolish and shameful death at the cross, God has made foolishness the wisdom of the world (1Cor 3:19). Hence, when somebody „thinks he is wise according to the standards of this world, he should become a ,fool' so that he may become wise“ (1Cor 3:18). Paul speaks in shame-oriented terminology of the paradox of Christ's death at the cross. Even though it may seem that Christ's death is the consequence of shame and foolishness, i.e. violation of covenant behaviour, it signifies actually conformity to covenant behaviour (cp. Isa 53:4). „God chose the foolish things (*mōra*) of the world to shame (*kataischynomai*) the wise (*sophos*); God chose the weak things (*asthenos*) of the world to shame (*kataischynomai*) the strong“ (1Cor 1:27) (cp. Goetzmann/Weigelt 1990:1377).

In conclusion, knowledge and wisdom are basically relational terms that describe a shame-oriented covenant behaviour. The concept of knowledge also has a guilt-oriented aspect when it is a question of distanced, objective knowledge as opposed to relational, intimate knowledge. The latter is the shame-oriented aspect. This complementarity opens up two epistemological perspectives. Right knowledge is knowledge of God (Jer 9:22f.). It goes together with other covenant behaviours like love (1Jn 4:8) and faith (Jn 6:69).

3.1.11 Forgiveness as Covenant Concept

Man who has fallen out of the fellowship with God needs forgiveness for the restitution of the troubled covenant relationship (Gen 3:15; Isa 2; Ps 2). In the OT, forgiveness is signified primarily through the cultic atonement sacrifice, the sin offering *ḥāṭṭā't* and the guilt offering *ʿāšām* (Lev 4-6). The classical term for forgiveness is *slh* „forgive, pardon“ (e.g. Lev 4:20,26,31,35; 5:10,13,16,18), but it is sparingly used, and only in cultic contexts with God as subject (Olivier 1996b:260). Other more frequent terms are *ns'* „lift, raise high, pardon“ (e.g. Isa 53:4) and *kpr* „Qal: cover, paint, smear; mainly Piel *kipper* (92 occurrences): atone, appease; Pual, Hitpael and Nitpael: be atoned“ (especially Ex, Lev, Num: e.g. Lev 17:13). *kipper* becomes the main technical term for cultic sacrificial forgiveness in the OT (Eichrodt 1967:444; Thiele 1990:995; Stamm 1995:151; Stolz 1995:110; Maass 1994:843). The English term for *kipper* „atonement“ is interesting insofar as it is a combination of „at“ plus Middle English „one(ment),“ meaning to be or make at one. The German language expresses the closeness between atonement and reconciliation through the two terms *Versöhnung* „atonement“ and *Versöhnung* „reconciliation.“ This reconciliation passes through the payment of a sacrifice. In the same sense, English dictionaries tend to define atonement as a term for reconciliation and reparation. Such a definition also calls attention to the relationship between God and man within the Israelite cultic sacrificial system. It reinserts the sinner into the covenant relationship (reconciliation) and repairs his fault (Averbeck 1996b:690). Saying this, it becomes clear that *kipper* describes a combined shame and guilt-oriented forgiveness typical for the covenant concept.

In Israel, the sacrifices do not represent a human merit. God has instituted them. They stand for the fact that man cannot choose freely his way back to God and are therefore an expression of the recognition of God's reign (Egelkraut 1996b). Only Yahweh can halt the chain of sin and disaster, insofar as he diverts the evil effect of a misdeed from the doer to a beast, which dies in his place, the classic example being the ritual of the scapegoat given to

Azazel on the Day of Atonement (Lev 16:20ff.). As blood is the carrier of life, so blood serves as the means of atonement, the way to life (Lev 17:11). Therefore, the cover of the ark (*kappōret*) is sprinkled with blood on the Day of Atonement (Lev 16). In this act of atonement, the subject who brings about the atonement is Yahweh. Through the translation of *kipper* by *hilaskomai* „propitiate, expiate,“ and especially of *kappōret* by *hilastērion* „atonement seat, mercy-seat, means of propitiation,“ the LXX has prevented the animist misunderstanding that atonement is a way from man to God, a reconciliation from below to above. The NT maintains *hilaskomai* when speaking of forgiveness in a cultic language (e.g. Lk 18:13; Rom 3:25; 1Jn 4:10) (Link/Vorländer 1990:1305; Brown 1992b:154-156; Auerbeck 1996b:699).

OT sacrifice is accompanied by prayer, confession of sin and by an attitude of humble renunciation, that is repentance (Lev 5:5; 16:21; Num 5:7; 1Sam 7:5f.). The essence of this attitude is summed up by the term *šûb* „return, repent“ (e.g. Zech 1:3). It is embedded in the community of the triangular relationship of sinner-priest-God, which adds a significant shame-oriented component to the basically guilt-oriented sin and guilt offerings. Two effects of man's personal relation with God may be seen in the Israelite sacrificial atonement: „The first is that atonement is made to the wrath of God by self-humiliation and reparation; the second that the sinner is transferred from a state of defilement to one of purity“ (Eichrodt 1961:160). Reconciliation and purification are shame-oriented concepts while reparation is a guilt-oriented concept.

Later on in Biblical history, it becomes evident that animal sacrifices are limited and cannot „cover“ all sins: the guilt of the house of Eli, Saul's, Israel's and Judah's guilt cannot be atoned for by sacrifices (1Sam 2:34; Isa 1:11-15). The ultimate means of atonement is the vicarious suffering of the servant of the Lord, of the righteous for the many, as guilt offering (Isa 53). It „results in the accomplishment of that ‚blessed exchange‘ of *mūsār* and *šālôm*, punishment and salvation, by which the sinners become righteous“ (Martin Luther cited by Eichrodt 1967:452). God himself is the one who forgives (Ps 25:11; 51:18f.; 65:4; Isa 6:7). Forgiveness is the essence of his character. His name indicates it: „The Lord, the compassionate (*ṛḥm*) and gracious (*ḥnn*) God, slow to anger, abounding in love (*ḥesed*) and faithfulness (*ʿemet*), maintaining love (*ḥesed*) to thousands, and forgiving (*nsʿ*) wickedness (*ʿāwōn*), rebellion (*pešaʿ*) and sin (*ḥāṭṭāʾ*)“ (Ex 34:6f.; cp. Ps 116:5).

Another OT term for forgiveness is *gʾl* „redeem, deliver, ransom.“ It occurs in cultic instructions (Lev 25; 27; Num 35; Dt 19) and in non-cultic contexts (Jos 20; Ruth 4; Jer 32).

Lev 25 instructs Israel concerning the redemption of family property (vv. 25-28), houses (vv. 29-34) and relatives in difficulty (vv. 47-49) during the Year of Jubilee. If an Israelite sells some property to survive financially, his nearest relative (*gō'ēl haqqārōb*) must redeem it during the Year of Jubilee (Lev 25:25). This action includes the reinsertion into the community of free Israelites and the payment of the *g'ullā* „the price of redemption“ (Lev 25:50-52). It is consequently a combined shame and guilt-oriented concept. In the book of Ruth, Naomi identifies Boaz as *gō'ēl* or „kinsman redeemer“ (Ruth 2:20), i.e. a close relative under obligation to help the widows. The union cannot occur until Boaz gets another *gō'ēl* to cede his prior „redemption right“ (*g'ullā*) to Boaz (Ruth 3:12f.; 4:1,3,4,6). Yahweh is the closest relative, the *gō'ēl* par excellence, when he redeems Israel from slavery in Egypt (Ex 6:6; 15:3; cp. Isa 43:16-21) and when he becomes Israel's future redeemer in the Servant of the Lord (Isa 41:14; 43:14; 48:20; 52:9b; 54:5; 59:20; 60:16). In Exodus and Isaiah 40-66, *g'l* is used in conjunction with related terms of the semantic domain „salvation, deliverance, ransom, rescue“ as *yšc* „save, help“ (Isa 49:26; 60:16), *nsl* „rescue“ (Isa Ex 6:6), *ʿzr* „help“ (Isa 41:14), and *pdh* „ransom, redeem“ (Isa 51:10f.). The LXX renders *g'l* principally with *lytroomai* or *ryomai*. When Rom 11:26 quotes Isa 59:20f., Paul speaks of Christ as the future deliverer (*ryomenos*), „the closest relative“ with the right and the obligation for the redemption of his covenant partners (Stamm 1994; Hubbard 1996a).

In the NT, forgiveness as renewal of the troubled covenant relationship between God and man becomes a central theme in the proclamation of the Gospel. The forgiveness of sin in the Christ event (Eph 1:7; Col 1:14) becomes relevant in preaching (Lk 24:47; Acts 10:42f.; 13:8), in counselling, baptism (Acts 2:38) and communion (Mt 26:28). Forgiveness includes cancellation of sin (Mk 2:5 par) and also integration of the sinner into God's community (Lk 15:20). The sinner receives a new life (Lk 13:43). Repentance and confession precede or follow forgiveness (Mk 2:1-12) (Vorländer 1990:506f.).

Paul specifies and differentiates the central theological concept of forgiveness (*aphesis*) into different terms of which the following are most important: redemption (*apolytrois*), justification (*dikaiosis*) and reconciliation (*katallagē*). Redemption (*apolytrois*) illuminates the aspect of man's liberation from the power of sin through the payment of the price of redemption (*lytron*) (Mundle/Schneider/Coenen 1990:260). It takes up the combined shame and guilt-oriented concept of *g'l*, focusing it to the guilt-oriented aspect of the liberation of a slave through the payment of a ransom. Hence, it is related to the guilt-oriented term *exagorazō* „redeem, lit. pay back“ (Gal 4:5). Even though justification (*dikaiosis*) follows the concept of

שְׂדָּאָה, which is originally a combined shame and guilt-oriented concept and means reinsertion into the covenant community and realignment with the covenant standards, the concept is narrowed by Western Protestant theology to the legal aspect of the payment of a debt (e.g. Barth 1960:573). Righteousness (*diakaiosynē*) as recovery from a state of sinfulness and defilement through the substitutive death of the righteous at the cross, through which the holy and righteous God can be „satisfied,“ is a predominantly shame-oriented concept. Man can only be justified through faith in Jesus Christ, again a relational concept (Rom 3:26,28) (Seebass 1990:506f.). Reconciliation (*katallagē*) emphasizes the restitution of the fellowship between man and God. It is a shame-oriented concept. The entirely different notion to the non-Christian, religious world, which sees deity only as the object of a reconciliatory act, is that God himself is the reconciling mediator (Rom 5:10f.; 1Cor 5:18-20). Reconciliation is the expression of the end of enmity between man and God (Rom 5:12). As a unilateral act of God through Christ, it is a gift to men (Link/Vorländer 1990:1308). Gift means grace (*charis*), the essence of which is God's gift of himself in the expiatory, sacrificial death of Jesus Christ (Jn 3:16; Rom 3:24f.) (Esser 1990:593).

In conclusion, the two main OT terms for forgiveness *kipper* and *g'l* transmit a combined shame and guilt-oriented concept. In the NT, we find a multiplicity of models for forgiveness. The different models illuminate aspects of the concept, which are either shame or guilt-oriented or both. Rom 3:24-26 links OT and NT models (*kipper* / *hilaskomai*, *g'l* / *lytroomai*, *sdq* / *dikaioō*) in that it compares the sprinkling of the cover of the ark (*hilastērion*) at the Day of Atonement with the expiatory sacrifice of Jesus Christ at the cross. Generally speaking, forgiveness is God's means to reintegrate man into the covenant community and conform him to its standards.¹⁸

3.1.12 A Revised Model

After having discussed the different terms and concepts of covenant behaviour related to shame and guilt, we have to evaluate the soteriological model, which we have presented in section 2.7.4. (figure 2.5.) as the result of an interdisciplinary analysis of prior research on shame and guilt. In figures 3.1. to 3.3, the revised model is presented in Hebrew, Greek and English terms. At the left are the shame-oriented terms, in the middle the neutral terms and at the right the guilt-oriented terms.

¹⁸ For a larger discussion of these models and their use in cross-cultural Christian ministry see sections 4.3.4. The Biblical Models of Forgiveness, and 4.3.8. Forgiveness for Both Shame and Guilt-Oriented People.

Figure 3.1: Revised Soteriological Model in Hebrew Terms






Figure 3.2: Revised Soteriological Model in Greek Terms



Scriptural evidence confirms the model with some minor modifications. On the side of the negative polar values, Hebrew has a whole wealth of terms for sin, shame and guilt, whereas English has only one term and Greek generally two. Hebrew has also an overwhelming wealth of concepts related to positive and negative shame values. The covenant concept *g'l* includes both shame and guilt-oriented aspects. Because it concerns the closest relative, it is a more shame-oriented concept and is therefore positioned on the shame-honour axis in the graphic. On the other hand, Hebrew terms like *ʿāwôn*, *šdq* and *špt*, which have also both shame and guilt-oriented components, are positioned on the guilt-justice axis in the graphic, because they are closer to the legal sphere. As it becomes clear from the neutral position of

ṣḍāqā, *ṣdq* could also be positioned on the middle axis. In this sense, the graphic cannot render justice to our findings.

Figure 3.3: Revised Soteriological Model in English Terms



The multiplicity of terms for the positive polar values has been confirmed. A difference with the original English model is that the Hebrew term righteousness is a combined shame and guilt-oriented covenant concept and belongs to the semantic domain of salvation, while the English term justice covers mainly guilt-oriented connotations and does not belong to the concept of salvation. Due to the history of the terms, in English the difference between righteousness and justice is unclear. Based on scriptural evidence, the concept of blessing has to be added to the semantic domain of salvation. On the shame-honour axis, virtue as positive polar value does not have its place in Biblical worldview, but remains valuable in some cultures that have gone through an enlightenment period as classical Greek, Confucian Chinese, Korean and European cultures. Therefore, we will keep the term in the model. The concept of harmony, which is in the original model part of the shame-honour axis and part of the concept of salvation, is integrated into the Hebrew concept of salvation.

The multiplicity of Hebrew and Greek terms for positive and negative polar values indicates synthetic concepts in the semantic domains. By maintaining the multiple terms for each conscience orientation, our model represents the synthetic breadth and the relationship of the concepts to each other. Reducing the polar pairs to the two couples of honour and shame and of guilt and justice respectively, is an analytic approach, which is adopted by the majority of Western authors.

3.1.13 Statistical Evidence

Even though concept studies are not measurable with word statistics, we will present the frequencies of the most important terms for the shame and guilt concepts. These statistics will be somewhat arbitrary as they depend heavily on the selection of the terms counted. Nevertheless, the figures give a general idea of the comparative prevalence of the concepts. The statistical figures are based on Jenni/Westermann (1971/94), Klopfenstein (1972), and VanGemeeren (1996) for the OT terms, and Morgenthaller (1958) and Brown (1992a) for the NT terms.

In the shame concept, *bôš* occurs 129 times as a verb (Qal 95, Hithpolel 1, Hiphil I [*hebîš*] 11, Hiphil II [*hōbîš*] 22) and 36 times as a noun (*bōšet* 30, *bûšâ* 4, *bošnâ* 1, *m^e bûšîm* 1). It does not occur in the Pentateuch with one exception (Gen 2:25), is very rare in prose and little used in wisdom texts (Prov 6 times). It is frequent in the prophets (Jer 36 times) and in the psalms (34 times). *klm* occurs 26 times, and *hpr* 12 times, both frequent in the prophets and the psalms. *qālâ* II occurs 6 times as a verb (Niphal 5, Hiphil 1) and 16 times as a noun (*qālôn* and *qîqālôn*). This gives a total of 225 occurrences of the major shame words in the OT.

In the NT, the verb *aischynomai* (and derivatives *kat-*, *ep-*) occurs 29 times and the noun *aischynē* 6 times. *aischros* and derivatives occurs 9 times. *aidos* occurs only once in 1Tim 2:9 with the meaning of „decency“ (and in a variant of Hebr 12:28). The verb *entrepō* is counted 10 times and its noun *entropē* 2 times. The verb *atimazō* „dishonour“ occurs 7 times, its noun *atimia* also 7 times and its adjective *atimos* once. *oneidizō* „diffame, slander“ occurs 9 times as a verb and 6 times as a noun (*oneidismos* and *oneidos*). This gives a total of 87 occurrences of major shame words in the NT, and 312 occurrences in the whole Bible.

The main polar opposite to shame in the OT is *kābôd*. It occurs 114 times as a verb (Qal 23, Niphal 30, Piel 38, Pual 3, Hithpael 3, Hiphil 17), and 262 times as a noun (*kābôd* 200, *kābēd* 54 and others 8). In the NT, *doxa* occurs as a verb 61 times and as a noun 165 times. *timē* appears 41 times as a noun and 13 times as an adjective. NT terms for honour total 280 occurrences. This gives a total of 656 for the terms designating honour in the whole Bible.

In the guilt concept, *ʿāwōn* occurs 17 times as a verb (Qal 2 times, Niphal 4 times, Piel 2 times, Hiphil 9 times) and 231 times as a noun. It occurs especially in Lev and Num and in the prophets. The related *ʿāwel* occurs 21 times. The second root *ʾāšām* occurs 35 times as a verb (Qal 33, Niphal 1, Hiphil 1), 65 times as a noun (*ʾāšām* 46, *ʾāšmā* 19) and 3 times as an adjective. This totals together 372 occurrences for guilt terms in the OT. In the NT, *aitia* and derivatives (*aitēma*, *aition*, *aitioma*, *aitios*) occurs 29 times. *enochos* appears 10 times as a

noun and 2 times as a verb. Together this gives 41 appearances in the NT, and 413 in the Bible.

The polar opposites for guilt in the OT are the following: *nqh* „innocent“ 44 times as a verb (Qal 1, Niphal 25, Piel 18), 43 times as an adjective, and 5 times as a noun. *špṭ* appears 144 times as a verb (Qal 126, Niphal 17, Polel 1) and 498 times as a noun (*mišpāṭ* 422, *šōpēṭ* 58, and others 18). This gives a total of 734 occurrences in the OT. In the NT, *anaitios* 3 times, *amemptos* 7 times, and *anengklētos* 4 times render the concept of „innocence.“ *krinō* and derivatives (*kata-*, *syn-*) figure 130 times as a verb, and 59 times as a noun (*krima*, *kata-krima*, *kritēs*). As a NT total we count 203 occurrences of polar opposites of guilt, which gives a Bible total of 937 references.

The following synoptic table shows the frequencies of terms in the shame-honour and in the guilt-justice axis. It is interesting to note that positive polar values have more or less the double frequency of the negative polar values shame and guilt. This fact corresponds to Lienhard's observation that positive polar values are more determinant in everyday life (2001a:236).

Table 3.1: Statistical Evidence of Shame and Guilt in Scripture

Label	OT	NT	Total	Gr. Total
Major terms for shame	225	87	312	968
Major terms for honour	376	280	656	
Major terms for guilt	372	41	413	1350
Major terms for justice	734	203	937	

As mentioned above, these figures do not indicate the actual prevalence of the concepts. We have only looked at the statistical frequency of the terms. We have seen that there are an overwhelming wealth of related terms and concepts on the shame-honour axis, probably more than on the guilt-justice axis. However, it is difficult to draw conclusions from these statistics. It is also problematic that *ʿāwōn* as a shame and guilt-oriented term has only been counted on the guilt-oriented side. Equally, the combined shame and guilt-oriented terms *šēdāqâ* / *dikaio-synē* have not been considered at all in these statistics. Nevertheless, the figures give a general idea of the more or less balanced frequency of terms belonging to the shame-honour and the guilt-justice axes.

In a complementary attempt to give a synopsis, we present an overview of the major terms in the semantic domains of disharmony (shame and guilt) and restoring harmony (repentance and forgiveness). In the appendices 7 and 8, this is done in taxonomical form, in appendices 9 and 10 in a prototype view (adapted from Lienhard 2001a:246,248,251f.).

3.1.14 Conclusion

Scriptural evidence confirms the validity of our soteriological model. We have learned to understand sin, shame and guilt as expressions of a violation of covenant relationships and standards. Shame represents failure in relation to covenant standards, whereas guilt refers to transgression. The covenant concept helps us to understand shame and guilt as relational respectively legal aspects of covenant violation. The major covenant behaviours such as righteousness, love and grace, faithfulness and truth, knowledge and wisdom, and forgiveness, all have shame and guilt-oriented components in a varying degree. Understanding the conscience orientation of covenant behaviours helps to better understand Scripture in the light of our own and others' conscience orientation (sections 3.2 and 3.3) and helps reflect on appropriate approaches in cross-cultural Christian ministry (chapters 4 and 5).

3.2 Examples from the Old Testament

In sections 3.2. and 3.3, we will go through the major books of the Bible and consider them in the perspective of shame and guilt. Hereby, we will not only look for the terms, but consider the concepts of shame and guilt and their covenant context. Because of its particular importance, the book of Genesis will be discussed in greater detail than other books.

Many Western authors of exegetical commentaries and theological works have emphasized the legal aspect of Biblical texts, especially in the OT (cp. Kraus 1990:205f.; Bechtel 1991:76). Because most readers of this thesis are familiar with this guilt-oriented legal aspect, in the following discussion of Biblical books we will emphasize the shame-oriented aspects of texts. With Laniak (1998:16), we will identify a „socio-literary pattern“ in many books that show a clear concern for harmony, honour and status. Stories that begin with shepherds, slaves and exiles end with prime ministers, kings and queens. The overall movement goes from low to higher to lower-than-before to higher-than-before. The acquisition of honour following a state of shame seems to be an organizing element of the pattern. This is particularly true for the biographies of Abraham, Jacob, Joseph, Moses, Ruth, David, Daniel, Nehemiah, Esther and Mordecai. Even the biography of Job corresponds to this pattern when one

considers Job's final restitution. Table 3.2. presents the pattern for some of the above mentioned personalities (adapted from Laniak 1998:12).

Table 3.2: Socio-Literary Pattern of Honour in Scripture

Honour	Granted		Challenged		Vindicated	Enhanced
	Divine Choice	Object of Favour	Threat	Descent Lament	Reversal & Vindication	Harmony & Prosperity
Job	1:8; 2:3	1:2-3	1:13-19 2:7	1:20-21 2:8,11-13	38:1-41:9	42:10-17
Joseph (Gen)	37:5-9 39:2	37:3 39:2-6,21f.	37:18-24 39:7-18	37:4		
Moses (Ex)	2:1-2	2:5-10	2:11-15a	2:15b	12:29-36 14:19-31	12:24-27
David (1Sam)	16:12-13	16:18-23 18:2-3	18:8-11	22:1ff.	1Sam 31- 2Sam 4	2Sam 7-8
Daniel	1:9,17	1:9ff. 6:3	3:12-15 6:6-9	3:21-23 6:16	3:24-27 6:24	3:29-30 6:25-28
Nehemiah		2:8,18	1:3 (2:19; 4:1-14; 6:1-14)	1:4	6:15-16	8:10-12 (chps. 10-13)
Esther / Mordecai	2:5-7	2:9,15-18	3:1-15	4:1-17	6:1-12; 7:10; 9:1ff.	10:1-3

3.2.1 Genesis

Gen 1:1-2:3:¹⁹ In the first creation narrative, it is interesting to note that man is created last as the culmination point of the creation process indicating a special honour and status. The character of his creation and the responsibility attributed to him denote this special status of man. God says: „Let us make man in our image (*šelem*), in our likeness (*ḏmūt*), and let them rule (*rdh*) over ... all the creatures“ (Gen 1:26). The fact that man is created in the image of God attributes to him a status completely different from the status of animals. The term *šelem* is doubled in v.27 to underline the importance of this fact. The formula is repeated in Gen 5:3 to signify that the likeness of God and man is similar to the likeness of father and son. In Gen 9:6, the fact that man is created in God's image is taken as argument that human blood should

¹⁹ In the discussion of Genesis, I follow Kurani for the creation and the Fall narrative (2001:107-143), and Lienhard for the following sections (2001:267-275).

not be shed. An attack on man is thus an attack on God. Just as man is the *šelem* of God, the statue of an idol is the *šelem* of another god (Num 33:52; 2Ki 11:18; 2Chr 23:17; Isa 44:19; Ezek 7:20; 16:17; 23:14; Amos 5:26). Consequently, man finds his identity and dignity from God. Man is called to rule (*rdh*) over all the creatures (Gen 1:26,28). Thus, he receives the status and honour of a ruler (cp. Ps 8:6f.). This fundamental difference to the animals makes it logical that man does not eat the same food as these animals over which he rules (Gen 1:29f.).

Gen 2:4-24: In the second creation narrative, the intimate proximity between God and man is described in other terms. Here, God creates man not as the last being, but as the first, and builds, so to speak, the whole creation around him. God forms (*yšr*) man like a potter (Gen 2:7,19; cp. Isa 64:7; Jer 18:6). In a face-to-face intimacy, which would not normally be possible between two unequal beings, God breathes the breath of life into man's nostrils as through a kiss (Gen 2:8) (cp. Kidner 1967:60f.). Man becomes a living being like God. God entrusts his creation to man as his representative not only to rule over it, but to serve it (*bd*) and care for it (*šmr*) (Gen 2:5,15). Nevertheless, God tells man to name (*qr*) the animals (Gen 2:19), usually God's attribute alone (cp. Isa 40:26; 43:1). It is interesting to note the marked status difference between man and the animal world and the small status difference between man and woman. She is created as a helper (*ēzer*), a term that is mainly used to describe God (Ex 18:4; Dt 33:7,26,29; Ps 10:14; 30:11; 63:8; Hos 13:9). Thus, it does not indicate a status difference. The preposition *neḡed*, lit. „opposite,“ speaks rather of equality than of status difference. That is why the woman has the same name (*yš / yšā*) (Gen 1:23b). Nevertheless, the fact that man has been created first accounts for a difference in function (cp. 1Tim 2:13). Man is the beginning (*rēšît*) and therefore the head (*rôš*) of the wife (cp. Eph 5:23). From the second creation narrative, the Orthodox Church draws the conclusion that creation is an ongoing process, which it calls *theosis*. Man has to develop more toward God and become more like God (Lossky 1974; 1976:126).

Gen 2:25: The creation narrative finishes with the statement: „The man and his wife were both naked (*ārôm*), and they felt no shame (*bôš* Hitpaël)“ (Gen 2:25). As shown above, nakedness is a shame related concept.²⁰ The lack of clothes is an involuntary exposure of self and signals in OT times poverty, captivity or adultery (cp. Dt 28:48). It does not necessarily have a sexual connotation, but indicates a lack of honour. Positively speaking, clothes are an

²⁰ See section 3.1.4. The Shame – Honour Axis.

expression of honour (Pedersen 1926:227; Kurani 2001:117; Jenni 1994b:868f.; SeEVERS 1996a:528f.; 1996b:532). Therefore, Wenham proposes to render „no shame“ by „unabashed“ or „not disconcerted.“ He goes on to say that „they were like young children“ (1987:71). Already Delitzsch incurs that they were without sin, as „shame is the correlate of sin and guilt“ (1887:96). In relation to conscience, this corresponds to an ontogenetic stage prior to the development of the objective self and consequently self-consciousness (Lewis 1992:48,85). It is the lack of a discrepancy to an ideal state in relation to clothing. The message of Gen 2:25 is that nakedness is here not the sign of a state of shame, that is a bad conscience, as the ancient shame-oriented reader would think, but is normal and belongs to the paradise state of a good conscience (Seebass 1973:571).

Gen 3: „You must not eat from the tree of knowledge of good and evil.“ In Gen 2:17, God sets a standard, which is an obligatory precondition for a functioning conscience. The temptation approaches man through the „crafty“ (*‘ārûm*) serpent (Gen 3:1). *‘ārûm* is part of a wordplay with nakedness (Gen 2:25 *‘ārôm*; 3:7,10f. *‘ērôm*). We have to note that the serpent is one of the creatures, over which man should rule and for which he should care, implying lower status. Secondly, it is a creeping animal in contact with dust, which symbolizes even lower status. It is a paradox that the serpent, which is the lowest in the hierarchy, gives a subversive idea first to Eve and through her to Adam. After they have violated God’s standard, „the eyes of both of them opened, and they realized that they were naked“ (v.7). Self-consciousness is activated and they feel shame. Let us note that the emphasis is placed not so much on guilt as shame is felt before God and not primarily before fellow men (cp. Burton 1988; contra Hesselgrave 1983:480; Müller 1988:416; 1996a:109). Anxiety as expectation of abandonment or punishment arises (v.10). Typical shame behaviours like covering up and hiding follow (v.7f.) This fact confirms the shame orientation. Then God initiates the worst thing, which can happen to a shame-oriented person: God confronts them and makes them lose face (vv.9,11,13). Blaming the others is the consequence (v.12f.). The effects of sin are that the serpent loses its honour and has to crawl on the belly and eat dust (v.14; cp. Mic 7:16f. and the captives in Ps 72:9; Isa 49:23). Disconnection and disharmony follow between God and man, between fellow men, between people and themselves, and between man and his environment (vv. 14-19) (cp. Green/Lawrenz 1994:49). By clothing them, God gives them back a certain honour and responds to their need to cover their shame (v.21). When driven out of the Garden (v.23), man loses his face and the face of God, and with it his divine glory (v.26-28; cp. Ps 8:5f.; Rom 3:23). This lost harmony and honour has consequences for the

corporate identity of the whole mankind. The salvation-life axis is replaced by the sin-death axis (Rom 3:23; 5:12,21; 6,21,23). The search for a higher status with more honour has resulted in the Fall into a state of exclusion and shame. Wolf and Kurani observe that the concepts of original sin and substitution are only valuable in a shame-oriented perspective of corporate personality (Isa 53; Rom 5:12-21). They do not find it in the guilt-oriented Pelagian perspective of the Qur'an (Wolf 1993:561; Kurani 2001:90f.,131). In conclusion, the Fall narrative describes the failure of man toward God, his covenant partner, and toward fellow man: the wife is no helper, and man is no protector from temptation. The serpent as creeping animal has paradoxically superiority over its ruler. The new position of man „as gods“ is a shameful, naked state in banishment.

Gen 4: In the story of Cain and Abel, Abel is honoured and Cain is shamed (v.4-5). Anger results and Cain's face is downcast (v.5-6). This is linked to lack of appropriate covenant behaviour. If Cain's behaviour were conform to the covenant, he would be able to lift his face again (v.7). A shame-rage spiral follows at the end of which Abel is killed (v.8). Harmony is destroyed. Now Cain fears punishment. God confronts him (v.9). Cain's punishment is separation and exclusion from God's face, a shaming sanction (v.14,16). Later on, Cain gains back some honour through his family (v.17). That his shame remains an issue is seen through the fact that Lamech promises revenge (v.24).

Gen 5: The genealogies or „family histories“ (*tôf dōt*) show the importance of corporate identity: „I am what my father and mother [and my ancestors] are“ (cp. 2:4; 6:9; 10:1; 11:10,27; etc.) (Wenham 1987:121-126). This is a clearly shame-oriented perspective.

Gen 9:18-28: Canaan is shamed (cursed) because of having seen the nakedness of his father Noah. He will be permanently dishonoured: he will be the slave of his brothers (vv.25-27). On the other hand, Shem and Japheth are blessed for having covered their father's shame (v.26).

Gen 12-25: The story of Abraham: Abraham is honoured by God's promise and blessing (12:2f.). Then Abraham honours Melchizedek by giving the tithe, and Melchizedek honours God through the presentation of bread and wine and his blessing (14:19f.). Abraham's childlessness and Sarah's barrenness are shameful (15:2; 16:1; cp. Rachel's 30:23). God's promise of a numerous succession covers this shame (15:4f.). This promise is expressed in a new name (17:5). Yes, God credits Abraham's faithfulness (*he'emîn*) as righteousness (15:6) and honours him by a covenant (15:18). Hagar experiences God as the one who sees everything: El-Roi (16:13; cp. 28:16; Jn 1:48). The ever-present God, El-Shaddai, asks Abraham to walk

before his face (17:1; cp. Isaac 24:40; 48:15) and to be whole (*tmm*) (cp. 6:9; Wenham 1987:170). God wants Abraham to live completely unto him and to belong to him. Actually, God calls him to a life of sacrifice and obedience in order to make him great (17:5-7). When Abraham realizes God's presence, he falls down on his face and hides it (17:3; cp. Ex 3:6; Isa 6:3). Despite all honour that Abraham receives through the covenant with God, we realize that Abraham is only in harmony when Isaac is born (21:2).

Gen 25-50: The story of Jacob: Isaac confers honour on Jacob by blessing him (27:27-30). Esau is caught in a shame-anger-rage spiral (27:41). Rebekah and Jacob fear his reaction (27:42f.). Jacob attempts to hide from God by fleeing. But he realizes at Bethel that God is also there and sees all his shortcomings (28:16; cp. Piers/Singer 1971:30; Kurani 2001:127 n.64). There, Jacob is honoured by God's promises (28:13-15). He finds home, family and prosperity in Laban's house (29). Having six sons is an honour for Leah, but barrenness is a shame for Rachel (30). Jacob's honour is complete, when God blesses him at the Yabbok river. Jacob sees God's face (Peniel) and still lives. Harmony with God is restored, but Jacob is limping from now on, a reason for shame and a cause for humility (32:30-32). Subsequently, harmony is also restored with Esau (33). But Dinah's rape is a shame for Jacob's family. Simeon and Levi revenge it (34). The culmination of Jacob's honour is his burial in the family tomb in the presence of many Egyptian dignitaries, Canaanites and all of Jacob's sons (Gen 49:29-50:14). Not to be buried in the family tomb would be very shameful (Funaki 1957:71).

Gen 37-50: The story of Joseph: Joseph is the favourite son of his father and receives as a visible sign for this preference a richly ornamented robe (37:3). Jacob and his sons are extremely humiliated by Joseph's dreams (37:10). A shame-rage spiral on behalf of Jacob's sons leads to Joseph's exile in Egypt (37:28). The text does not refer to shame in regard to Joseph's brothers, since no one knows of their deed. In Egypt, Joseph goes through great humiliation in slavery and captivity (39-40). But God initiates restoration. After his correct interpretation of Pharaoh's dreams, Joseph ascends to great honour and is married into an important Egyptian family (41:41-52; 45:13). When Joseph's brothers come to Egypt, he makes them suffer and shames them repeatedly (42-44). However, he honours them also through a common meal (cp. 2Sam 9:10; 2Ki 25:29; Mt 22:1-14; Lk 19:1-10). Benjamin, Joseph's brother, is especially honoured through a bigger portion of food. Purity rules keep Joseph from eating from the same plate (43:31-34). At Joseph's disclosure, the brothers are terrified at his presence. They expect a severe punishment (45:3). In a symbol-laden gesture of

reconciliation, Joseph gives new clothing to his brothers, and money and extra clothing to Benjamin (45:22). The remaining doubts about Joseph's sincerity reactivate after Jacob's death. Joseph's brothers fear revenge. Their shame pushes them to ask for forgiveness and to offer themselves as his slaves (50:16-18).

The whole book of Genesis exemplifies the functioning of the shame-oriented conscience, even though shame-oriented terms are not frequent. Also guilt-oriented terms appear rarely. *ʿāwōn* occurs four times comprising the different meanings of sin, guilt, and punishment in the perspective of the principle of causality and retribution when talking about Cain, the Amorites, Sodom, and Joseph's brothers (4:13; 15:16; 19:15; 44:16). *ʾāšām* appears two times, when Abimelech speaks of the possibility of sexual intercourse with Rebekah as guilt (26:10), and when Joseph's brothers speak of their guilt toward him (42:21). This fact shows that the Bible sees guilt as consequence of sin, even if guilt terms were not used in the original account.

3.2.2 Exodus

Ex 1: The book begins by describing the shameful state of slavery of which Israel suffered in Egypt (vv.11-14). However, the fact that Israel is strong and numerous, and that Israelite women are more vigorous than Egyptian women attributes honour to the people of Israel.

Ex 2-18: The story of Moses: Moses starts out as one of the Israelite slave baby boys condemned to death. Through a miracle, he survives and becomes the adoptive son of Pharaoh's daughter, a very honourable position at the royal court in Egypt (2:10,23). Pushed by a feeling of justice, Moses commits a capital crime. He starts to feel anxiety. When Moses has to assume that the Pharaoh knows about it, a shame-oriented behaviour follows: he flees in the desert, hides and becomes a simple shepherd (2:14). But God remembers his covenant with Abraham (2:24) and initiates the liberation of his people. When God appears to Moses in the burning bush, Moses hides his face. Thinking of what he has done, he is ashamed and afraid to look at God (3:6). God is the one who is with him, wherever he is. He is the one who was with his forefathers, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, wherever they were (3:14). He is the significant other. He chooses Moses as the mediator between him and the people in order to communicate indirectly with it (3:10). On Moses' demand, he additionally declares Aaron to be the mediator between Moses and the people, an even more indirect communication (3:14-17; 7:1f.). The ten plagues and the exodus are an honour for God and Moses, and a shame for Pharaoh (7-11). The Song of Moses and Miriam summarizes this in a doxology (15). In the

same order, the celebration of the Passover sacrifice is a communal commemoration of this liberation and of God's superiority over the other gods (Gen 12:1-30; cp. Num 9:1-5; Jos 5:10; 2Ki 23:21-23; 2Chr 30:1-27; Ezr 6:19-22; Lk 2:41-43; Jn 11:55-12:1). God is with the people to guide it day and night as a pillar of cloud or fire (13:21f.; 14:19). A next element of honour for God and his people is the victory over the Amalekites (17). Jethro, Moses' father-in-law, gives advice in judging the people. Even though judging is a guilt-oriented action, it includes shame-oriented elements, because the judge functions as the mediator between two conflicting parties (18).

Ex 19-20:21: In the Mosaic covenant at Mount Sinai, God adopts his people as the „people of his possession“ (19:5). This conveys a very special status, a big honour, a feeling of belonging and of significance to the people (Huber 1983:208). The condition is obedience to God and his covenant standards. The people has to prepare himself by ritual purification (19:10-15). The new element is that this covenant, as opposed to the Noahic and Abrahamic covenant, is accompanied by a legal corpus starting with the Ten Commandments (20-23). With this move, God introduces a strong guilt-oriented element into the redemptive history with his people. This means that this covenant has a relational aspect of loving God and also a legal aspect of keeping his commands. In the positive case, God will show love (*hesed*) to his people. In the negative case, he will punish the sins (*ʿāwōn*) down to the third and fourth generation (20:5f.). The almost completely shame-oriented history of God with his people becomes explicitly shame and guilt-oriented.

The basis of the covenant is God's loving deliverance of the people (20:2). The making and following of an idol is not only a shame for God and the people, but becomes a transgression of a covenant standard (20:3f.). Pronouncing (*ns*) the name of the Lord in vain or misusing it (NIV) is not only disrespectful and shameful, but from now on also a guilty act, the opposite to innocence (*nqh* Piel) (20:7). The first four commandments regulate the covenant relationship between God and his people, the following six the covenant relationship among fellow men: honour of the parents, defense of murder, adultery, theft, lie, and coveting (20:12-17). It is interesting to note that similar standards are adopted in many cultures around the world (cp. Rom 2:14f.). The Israelites are afraid of God's direct communication, because they feel shame anxiety. They prefer God's indirect communication through the mediator Moses. But God wants to make sure that the people is conscious of his presence (20:18-21; cp. 24:1f.).

Ex 20:22-31: The Book of the Covenant (20:22-23:33) contains civic and religious laws that reinforce the guilt-oriented aspect of the covenant. It insists on forgiveness as reparation. Stolen property has to be paid back one- to fivefold (22:1-15; cp. Lk 19:8). It prescribes undergarments for the priest to prevent exposure of nakedness in the Tent of Meeting, which would be a shame for them and for God, and which incurs now also guilt (20:26; 28:43). It speaks however also of the obligation of mutual assistance (22:21-24; 23:4f.). This is a definitely shame-oriented aspect of the law (Huber 1983:102). When the people abides with the commandments, God will give blessing and longevity, and take away sickness and barrenness, both shameful states (23:25). For greater crimes, capital punishment insures physical elimination of the defiled and hence shameful part of the community (e.g. 21:15-17). Yahweh's instructions for the media of worship (25-31) include atonement money as a ransom for each Israelite's life as a definitely guilt-oriented ordinance (30:11-16), and the purification of the priests, a shame-oriented prescription (30:17-33).

Ex 32-34: In Israel's disobedience with the Golden Calf, Moses again plays the role of the mediator in the indirect communication between God and Israel (32:7-14,30-35; 33:12-23). One of Moses' arguments in the negotiation with God is that God could incur a shameful reputation when destroying the people (32:11f.; cp. Huber 1983:169). To get reassurance, Moses searches God's face and eyes (33:13,15,20,23). God speaks face-to-face only with Moses (33:11) and lets him finally see his glory (33:18,21). In his revelation, God gives his full name: „the Lord, the compassionate (*rḥm*) and gracious (*ḥnn*) God, slow to anger, abounding in love (*ḥesed*) and faithfulness (*ʿemet*)“ (Ex 34:6; cp. Ps 86:15; 103:8). After this reconciliation with the people through Moses' mediation, God is ready to contract the covenant (34:10).

3.2.3 Leviticus

Lev 1-7: In the regulations for sacrifices, which would seem an entirely guilt-oriented matter, there are many shame-oriented elements. The „whole burnt offering“ (*ʿōlā*) is to be without defect (*tmm* „entire, complete“) and has to be presented to God by a mediator, the priest (1:5-9). It is acceptable (*ršh*) (1:3) and a pleasing aroma (1:9,13,17) to the Lord, when the layman lays his hands on the head. It is a plea for fellowship with God. Then it will „make at-one-ment“ (*kpr*) for him (1:4) and reconcile him with God (Hartley 1992:18f.). The priests as mediators present also the „grain offering“ (*minḥâ*) (2:2,8,16). In non-cultic texts, the term means „gift“ presented by one obligated to another (Gen 32:14; 43:11; 1Sam 10:27; Hartley

1992:29). It is therefore a shame-oriented concept. The same is true for the „peace offering“ (ASV, RSV), „fellowship offering“ (NIV), „shared-offering“ (NEB), „communion sacrifice“ (JB), or „offering of well-being“ (Hartley 1992:37) (*zeḇaḥ šelāmîm*) (3:1). A primary aim of this offering is for the Israelite and his family, including invited guests, to eat the meat returned to them by the priests in a festive, communal meal. All who partake of the meal are to be ritually pure (7:20). Since it was proper to offer an offering of well-being at any time, it was the most frequently offered sacrifice, at least in the earliest times (Hartley 1992:38). Traditionally, the term *ḥāṭṭāʾt* has been rendered as „sin offering“ (NIV: 4:3). But on the basis that it is built on the Piel of *ḥṭʾ*, which carries the opposite meaning „de-sin, purify,“ Milgrom (1971:237) and Hartley (1992:55) propose the rendering „purification offering“ (cp. 8:14f.; 14:49,52). It includes the purification of offences committed inadvertently, out of negligence or because of weak will (4:27; 5:25). Above, purity has been identified as a shame-oriented concept. However, the sin (*ḥāṭṭāʾt*), which the offering of purification expiates, is clearly identified as guilt (*ʾāšām*) (4:3,13,22,27). In the meaning of „guilt, reparation offering,“ the same term describes the „obligation that one must bear for wrongdoing“ (Knierim 1994a:254; Hartley 1992:77). A shame-oriented person experiences such an obligation as guilt (Gen 26:10). Usually, the person has to restore that which has been damaged (5:16; Num 5:6-8). Even though *ʾāšām* is a clearly guilt-oriented term, there is a shame-oriented element of the concept just as for the synonymous term *ʿāwōn*.

Lev 11-15: Purity Laws: Ritual purity is a vital dimension of daily life in ancient Israel. Decrees regarding ritual purity are found throughout the priestly legislation of the Pentateuch, but the core legislation comes in Lev 11-15. In these chapters, cleanness and uncleanness are regulated with regard to meats (11), births (12), skin diseases, growths in garments and on walls of a house (13-14), and bodily emissions (15). While cleanness is non-communicable, uncleanness is readily transmitted (cp. Hag 2:12-14). The standard of ritual purity in the OT is built on the view of God's holiness (11:44f.; 19:2; 20:26). God's holiness is paralleled to God's honour in 10:3 (cp. 22:32a; Laniak 1998:19). The key verse in the cultic legislation tells the priests: „You must distinguish between the holy (*qḏš*) and the common (*ḥōl*), between the unclean (*tmʾ*) and the clean (*thr*)“ (10:10). This hierarchical structure of the ancient world belongs clearly to a shame-oriented worldview. A particular example of the shame orientation in these laws is the legal sanction of lepers through public shaming by the means of torn clothes, unkempt hair, covered face and the cry „Unclean!“ (13:45; Funaki 1957:70).

Lev 16: The Day of Atonement: The culmination of consecration and purification procedures is performed on the Day of Atonement, when the purified high priest presents sin/purification offerings and whole burnt offerings to the Lord. These offerings are presented for the high priest himself and for the whole people. The basis for this ceremonial of substitution is a corporate identity and personality, which is a shame-oriented element. However, the ordinance itself carries a strong guilt-oriented connotation.

Lev 17-26: Laws on Holy Living: As stated above, holy living is built on the hierarchical shame-oriented worldview of the holy/profane and clean/unclean polarities (cp. Neyrey 1988b). Shameful nakedness and sexual relationships lead to dishonour (18:7), uncleanness, profanity and defilement (18:19-28). Capital punishment cuts off (*krt*) the shameful element from the community (18:29). In the same order, the pilgrimage festivals are naturally communal events with different types of offerings (23). The Year of the Jubilee (25) includes in its concept of redemption (*gʾl*) shame-oriented elements with the reintegration of the impoverished Israelite as a free member of the community, and guilt-oriented aspects in the cancellation of the debts. An interesting feature of the Jubilee is the fact that different regulations are emitted for countrymen and foreigners. The right of redemption (*gʾullâ*) through a close relative (*gōʾēl*) is retained for countrymen, but not for foreigners. *gʾl* is thus an in-group covenant concept. Despite the numerous ordinances in favour of foreigners (e.g. Ex 23:9; Dt 1:16; 10:18), which are egalitarian guilt-oriented commands, we find in this section a marked difference between in-group and out-group behaviour, which is a typical feature of shame-oriented communities.

3.2.4 Numbers

The book of Numbers continues with the concern for the purity of priests, levites and the unclean (5:1-4; 8:5-26; 19:1-22). It demonstrates several corporate punishments after transgression of commandments and insubordination (16:46-50; 21:4-9). As observed above, this is often capital punishment and leads to the exclusion of the unclean and therefore shameful members from the community. Miriam's leprosy as punishment of her „foolish“ (*yʾl*) insubordination toward Moses is an example of a non-capital shaming sanction (12:10f.). God's response to Moses' mediation for Miriam refers to „spitting in the face“ and exclusion from the community as public shaming sanctions. This is surely a great disgrace (*klm*) for Miriam (12:14; cp. Dt 25:9; Isa 50:6; Job 30:10; Huber 1983:18; Budd 1984:137). The people's rebel behaviour and its lack of respect for God brings not only shame to the people, but leads to

God's shameful reputation among the neighbours of Israel (14:15f.; cp. Dt 9:28; Huber 1983:169f.).

Num 6:24-26: The Priestly Blessing deserves some special consideration: „The Lord bless (*brk*) you and keep you; the LORD make his face (*pānîm*) shine upon you and be gracious (*hnn*) to you; the Lord turn (*ns'*) his face (*pānîm*) toward you and give you peace (*šālôm*).“ The priestly benediction is the obvious conclusion to the sanctification of the community (5:1-6:21). It conveys honour to those blessed and is related to the *'ašrē*, *makarios* and *eulogēmenos* formula (Ps 1:1; 2:12; Dt 28:2f.; Mt 5:3-10 par; 21:9 par; Lk 24:50). *šālôm* describes the state of harmony and wholeness that is conferred through grace (*hnn*). The shining face of the Lord is a figure of speech for God's presence, benevolence and favour (cp. Ps 4:7; 31:17; 44:4; Dan 9:17). On the other hand, the hiding of his face is a picture of divine disfavour and withdrawal of support (Dt 31:18; Ps 30:8; 44:25; 104:29; Budd 1984:76).

3.2.5 Deuteronomy

If Deuteronomy is the „second law,“ we expect it to be a predominantly guilt-oriented book. Indeed, the repetition of the ten commandments (5:6-21), reinforces this guilt-oriented element. However, the legal codex of Deuteronomy foresees many shaming sanctions and the book includes frequently shame elements as pointed out by Daube (1969).

Dt 6:4-7:11: Shema Israel: In the Shema, God's command to love him wholly and obey his commandments is a combined shame and guilt-oriented command (cp. 10:12f.; 11:1,13; 30:16; Jos 22:5; 23:6,8; 24:25). If Israel obeys God's commands and decrees, he will bless and honour it and it will prosper. If Israel disobeys, it will perish. This is a matter of life and death, of salvation and perdition (cp. 7:12-8:20; 11:26; 27-28; 30:15).

Again concerns for purity are expressed (14:1-21; 23:9-14). Uncleanliness is a shameful thing. Equally, there is a general concern for reputation, for „what others think,“ for avoiding shameful appearances in the eyes of others (17:2; 21:1; 22:5,22; 23:13-15), for not being unduly shamed (25:1-3), for not shaming one's parents (21:18-21), and in reverse (5:16). Shameful or indecent things are called folly (*nē bālā*) (22:21) or „the nakedness of a thing“ (*'erwāt dābār*) (23:13-15). This concern for appearance is reflected in the formulaic expression *kî yimmāšē* „if there be found“ (17:2; 21:22; 24:7) and in the warning against „hiding oneself“ (22:1-4). Through the concept of face, to be ashamed involves unwillingness to see and unwillingness to be seen.

Another shame-oriented expression, which most would consider guilt-oriented, is *lō' tūkal* „You should not ...“ (12:17; 16:5; 17:15; 21:16; 22:3,19; 24:4). Rather than being a „You shall not“ command referring to a codified civic or religious law, which can be transgressed, it refers to the „shoulds“ or ideal expectations of society. The best example is when Dinah's brothers tell Shechem and Hamor: „We should not do (*lō' nūkal*) such a thing; we can't give our sister to a man who is not circumcised. That would be a disgrace (*herpā*) to us“ (Gen 34:14; Daube 1969:41-50; Huber 1983:19-22). Equally, failure to perform the duty of mutual assistance is shameful (22:1-4).

Dt 25:5-10: Levirate Regulations.²¹ Sanctions for shameful and thus „foolish“ things are public shaming events. The husband's brother's refusal to follow the levirate regulations is an invitation to the widow to „go up to him in the presence of the elders, take off one of his sandals and spit in his face ... That man's line shall be known in Israel as The Family of the Unsandalled“ (25:9; cp. Gen 38). Removing one's own sandal legalized an action in Israel (cp. Ruth 4:7f.). Taking off a sandal from another person indicates his failure of complying with the law. Spitting in another's face ensues up to seven days of impurity (cp. Lev 15:8; Num 12:14). The spitting of a woman into a man's face is in itself shameful. Consequently, the passage describes a powerful shaming event with lasting effects. The extreme shaming sanction is public stoning and exclusion from the community (22:13-21; 23:1-7). The sanctions put shame not only on the offenders, but on their whole family. In this way, they have a deterring effect in a shame-oriented community (Daube 1969:35; Huber 1983:96,102; Phillips 1986:13; Bechtel 1991:56-59).

Dt 27-30: Blessings and curses: If Israel obeys the Lord and carefully follows his commands, „God will set it high above all the nations on earth“ (28:1). God's blessings mean honour. Israel will be „the head (*rōš*), not the tail“ (28:13). Practically, it means that the land will receive rain and be fertile (28:4f.,11f.; cp. Isa 51:19; Jer 14:13-18; Amos 4:6). On the other hand, if Israel disobeys, it will be cursed and dishonoured (27:15-26; 28:18,23f.,38). „The alien who lives among you will rise above you higher and higher, but you will sink lower and lower ... He will be the head (*rōš*), but you will be the tail“ (28:43f.). Sickness will result from the curse (28:58-61). The principle of causality and retribution is thus a combined, but more shame-oriented concept. In the best of cases, the principle of retribution leads to

²¹ Levirate describes the custom that a man inherits the wife of his deceased brother (Dt 25:5-19; cp. de Vaux 1964:72f.; Mbiti 1974:182).

wholeness and harmony (*šālôm*). In order to achieve this, God's commands are not far from the people. „No, the word is ... in your mouth and in your heart“ (30:15). In other words, the law is in the conscience (cp. Jer 31:33).

Dt 32-34: At the end of his life, Moses contrasts in his song God and his people:

He is the Rock, his works are perfect (*tmm*), and all his ways are just (*mišpāṭ*). A faithful God (*ēl emûnâ*) who does no wrong (*‘āwen*), upright (*yāšār*) and just (*šāddīq*) is he.

They have acted corruptly (*šḥt*) toward him; to their shame (*mûm*) they are no longer his children, but a warped (*ptl*) and crooked (*‘qš*) generation.

Is this the way you repay the Lord, O foolish (*nābāl*) and unwise (*lō’ ḥākām*) people?
Is he not your Father, your Creator, who made you and formed you? (32:4-6).

Covenant characteristics as attributes of God contrast with terms imaging the shameful state of the people. Nevertheless, Moses blesses his people (33). The one who blesses is even more honoured than the one who is blessed. This honour is also expressed through his old age, by God burying him personally, and by the fact that God „knew“ (*yḏ*) Moses face-to-face (34:5-12). All these items speak of an intimate relationship between God and Moses.

3.2.6 Joshua

Jos 7: Achan's Sin: After the defeat at Ai, Joshua and the whole people are full of fear and shame with their faces down (7:9f.). The covenant has been violated. The sin is a disgrace (lit. folly *nē ḥālâ*) for Israel (7:15). Then the Lord shows Joshua that Achan alone caused the defeat at Ai (7:18). Achan and his whole family including their possessions are publicly stoned and burnt (7:25f.). The fact that Achan's whole family was exterminated is often regarded as cruel. However, an understanding of shame orientation helps us better understand it.

Achan's transgression, so serious at this crucial moment of national crisis, became the cause of the deepest feelings of shame on the part of the whole people. Achan himself must have been ashamed of his sin ... The often forgotten key to the account is that his family probably were as much ashamed as he was ... Achan's family, it is clear, must have lost their face completely; and it was apparent for them that there was no possibility of restoring their honor so they would continue to live as members of their society. Their total loss of face at this point was nothing less than a death sentence, psychologically speaking ... If such were actually the case, extermination of all members of the family was not really cruel, but natural and in a sense, from a purely Israelite viewpoint, an act of mercy (Funaki 1957:78f.).

The basis for the shame of the whole people and for the extermination of Achan's family is the concept of corporate personality and corporate identity, a shame-oriented perspective (cp. Pedersen 1926:217). Extermination or exclusion can be seen here as a merciful way out of a shameful state. A slightly different case is the extermination of the Canaanites by the

people Israel. It is caused by their wickedness and their sinfulness, which is shameful for the Lord (Dt 9:4f.). If the people of Israel fall in an equally sinful state by disobeying the covenant standards and not loving the Lord, the same will happen to them (23:6-13).

Jos 10: The Five Amorite Kings: When Joshua captures the five Amorite kings, he calls all the warriors of Israel to watch, and commands his officers: „Come here and put your feet on the necks of these kings“ (Jos 10:24). The action described indicates the total humiliation of the conquered enemy kings. This ancient practice of placing the foot on the neck or the head of a subdued enemy is part of their public humiliation. The practice is visually represented in the art and reliefs of the ancient Near East, especially Assyria and Babylon. A person of a lower status than the king places his foot, the lowest part of the body, on the head/neck, the highest part of the body, of the king, a person of the highest status. This degrading gesture has the effect of strengthening the self-confidence, courage, and feelings of superiority of the Israelite warriors. As the kings are „put down,“ the warriors of Israel are „raised up.“ This practice, which is called „the foot of arrogance“ by archeologists, is also referred to in Ps 110:1: „Sit at my right hand until I make your enemies a footstool for your feet“ (Huber 1983:78f.).

Again we find the double command of loving God and obey his commandments several times in the book of Joshua (22:5; 23:6,11; 24:25 cp. Dt 6:5f; 11:1,13; 30:16). It represents a combined shame and guilt-oriented covenant behaviour.

3.2.7 Judges

In the book of Judges, the following refrain recurs several times: „In those days there was no king in Israel, but every man did that which was right in his own eyes“ (KJV: 17:6; 18:1; 19:1; 21:25). In this society, there were no fixed standards, because the significant other was not there. We have to conclude for the consciences that they were not formed properly and could not function properly. In consequence, the Israelites were to a certain degree shameless and guiltless.²²

Jdg 1: Israel Fights the Remaining Canaanites: The first Canaanite king that the Israelites attack and defeat, is Adoni-Bezek, the king of Bezek. When they catch him, they cut off his thumbs and big toes. Adoni-Bezek has formerly done so to seventy other kings whom he had subdued. These were also obliged to pick up scraps from under Adoni-Bezek's table (1:6f.).

²² Cp. the section 5.1.13. The Generation X and Shame Orientation.

Both measures are powerful and lasting public shaming sanctions for captives. The mutilation disables the captives for running and fighting, and possibly disqualifies them for reigning. Everybody will recognize them at their limping gate. To oblige somebody to pick up scraps under the table in a prostrate position is a continuous humiliation (Huber 1983:81).

Jdg 7-8: Gideon Defeats the Midianites: Discontent to have been put aside by Gideon, the Ephraimites ask him: „Why have you treated us like this? Why didn't you call us when you went to fight Midian?“ (8:1; cp. 12:1). The Ephraimites used to have the first position among the tribes of Israel. It was necessary to maintain this place of honour. When Gideon succeeds in his battle without the Ephraimitic forces, the honour goes not to them, but to Gideon and his family. Following this, the inhabitants of Succoth and Peniel taunt (*hnp*) Gideon (8:6,8,15; Pedersen 1926:218f.; Funaki 1957:34).

When the Midianite kings Zebah and Zalmunna fall into the hands of Gideon, he demands more than a death penalty, for they have killed his brothers (8:19). They have made the Israelites lose face. Gideon knows how much honour he and his people have lost through the Midianites. So Gideon causes the two Midianites to lose face by killing them through the hands of Jether his firstborn son. To have been slain by a great judge would be a blow to their honour, but to be slain by a mere boy is far worse. This is a great insult to them. Even in their death, they plead to preserve their dignity and ask Gideon to slay them himself (8:21; Funaki 1957:29).

Jdg 15-16: Samson's Honour: When Samson finds that his father-in-law has given his wife to another man, he becomes very angry because he has lost face and honour (15:1f.). He says: „This time I have a right (*nqh*) to get even with the Philistines; I will really harm them“ (15:3). When he burns their corn and shocks, the Philistines retaliate by burning his wife and father-in-law (15:6). Samson then kills many of them. When the Israelites ask him, why he has done that, he says: „I merely did to them as they did to me“ (15:11). We observe here a shame-rage spiral on both sides. The extent of revenge is not determined by the objective offense, but by the loss of face inflicted (Funaki 1957:27f.). Shame-rage spirals lead to continuous blood-vengeance in the sense of *vendetta*. This technical term from Spain witnesses to the shame-oriented culture of these Mediterranean countries (cp. Baroja 1992; Di Bella 1992; Jamous 1992). When the Philistines succeed to capture him through the means of Delilah, they gouge out his eyes and set him to grinding in the prison, a continuously humiliating and shaming situation (16:21). Samson's only thought is to die in honour, that is, to take revenge (16:28). He succeeds in that when he tears down the two central pillars of Dagon's temple in

Gaza and kills many Philistines along with himself (Pedersen 1926:222f.). It is interesting to note that Samson is mentioned among the heroes of faith who lived a faithful life (Hebr 11:32-38).

3.2.8 Ruth

Because of a famine, Naomi and her family move to Moab, where the husband and the sons die (1:1). This is a discouragement and shame for Naomi, for widows have no status and prestige. She decides to return home. Ruth her daughter-in-law wants to stay with her and honours her through this (1:16). At arrival in her hometown Bethlehem, Naomi feels great shame and proposes therefore to name herself *Mara* „bitterness“ (1:20). In the midst of this shame, Naomi sees the hand of God at work for her: Boaz gives Ruth the possibility to glean in his field (2:8-18). Boaz is one of her kinsman-redeemers (*gōʿēl*). This reassures her and gives her back some honour (2:20). According to the levirate regulations (Lev 25:25-55; Dt 25:5-10), the closest relative (*gōʿēl haqqārōb*), that is usually the brother-in-law, has to redeem (*gʾl*) the widow. This includes integration into his family through marriage and the payment of the price of redemption (*gʾullā*). Through a shameful manoeuvre with her potential *gōʿēl* at the threshing-floor (3:7-15; cp. 4:12; Tamar Gen 38), Ruth forces Boaz to become her redeemer. Preventing malicious gossip and securing his reputation (3:14), Boaz actively pushes redemption by announcing that Naomi wants to sell her land (4:3). The closest relative renounces on his redemption right (*gʾullā*), when he learns that it includes marriage of the widow (4:5). Boaz having organized the meeting at the gate without Naomi, nobody is there to shame the closest relative by removing his sandal and spitting in his face (4:7f.; cp. Dt 25:5-10). So Boaz becomes elegantly the kinsman-redeemer and avoids shame. Naomi and Ruth have left the honourless state of widows. Their harmony and honour are restored (Phillips 1986:15f.).

Through the combined shame and guilt-oriented concept of redemption (*gʾl*), the book of Ruth becomes an exemplary model of forgiveness by God, our closest redeemer (*gōʿēl*) (3:9,12f; 4:8; cp. Isa 41:14; 54:5; 63:16). This is a possible reason why the book of Ruth is read during Jewish worship on the second day of every Pentecost festival.

3.2.9 1 & 2 Samuel

1Sam 1-2: Hannah's Shame: The first chapter of 1 Samuel starts out describing the shameful state of Hannah's barrenness (cp. Sarah: Gen 16; Rachel's disgrace (*herpā*): Gen 30:23;

Michal 1Sam 16:33; Elisabeth's Lk 1:25). Her co-wife puts her down, even though Hannah as Elkanah's first wife would deserve being honoured by Peninnah. Hannah comes weeping and mourning to the Lord (1:10-12). When she gives birth to Samuel, her harmony and honour are restored. She praises the Lord: „He raises the poor from the dust and lifts the needy from the ash heap; he seats them with princes and has them inherit a throne of honour“ (1Sam 2:8). The subject of barrenness implies a definitely shame-oriented language (cp. Funaki 1957:74).

1Sam 4-6: Capture and Spoliation of Foreign Gods: The Philistines capture the ark of God, which means shame (*ʾyī-kābôd*) for Israel (4:21f.). But the statue of Dagon falls on its face before the ark, and the head and the hands break off (5:3). This is a shameful position and a big humiliation for the Philistines. Head and hand as the symbols of power are broken. Plagues break out like in Egypt. Finally, they send back the ark with a guilt offering (*ʾāšām*) of gold in order to atone for the sin against Yahweh (6:3f.). Interestingly, a guilt offering rectifies shame (Huber 1983:187f.).

1Sam 8 – 2Sam 1: Saul's Story: The fact that the people Israel wants a king like the other nations causes disharmony between God and Israel (8; cp. 12:19). But finally, God chooses in the person of Saul a king for them (9-10). Harmony is restored. The Ammonites threaten the people of Jabesh and menace to „gouge out the right eye of every one of them and bring disgrace (*herpâ*) on all Israel“ (11:2). Saul delivers the people of Jabesh and is confirmed as king of Israel, a great honour for him (11:15). Then, the Philistines threaten Israel (13:5). Before launching the attack on them, Samuel is supposed to make an offering to the Lord. As Samuel is late and in order to please the soldiers, Saul makes the burnt offering even though this is defended to non-Levites (13:9). This is a shame-oriented behaviour. When Samuel confronts him, Saul feels shame and blames others (13:11f.). „You acted foolishly (*skl*)“, says Samuel, „you have not kept the command the Lord gave you“ (13:13). The transgression of God's commands (guilt-oriented) is a folly (shame-oriented). The fact to lose the kingdom is a great shame for Saul. Following this, Saul seeks honour. When he is successful against the Amalekites, he builds a „monument in his own honour“ (15:12). And again he violates God's commands by not destroying everything from the plunder (15:9). When confronted, he argues and blames others (15:20). Again, he has given in to the people, a shame-oriented behaviour (15:24). Shame follows when God rejects him (15:23). Saul repents and asks for forgiveness, but Samuel rejects. Before he leaves, Saul asks him to honour him in front of the people, which Samuel accepts to do in order to lessen pain due to loss of face (15:30). Saul's jealousy is awakened, because the women's song honours David more than Saul (18:7). This loss of

face is never forgotten and leads to Saul's pursuit of David (19-31). Saul loses more honour when he kills the priests and confronts daughter and son for being friends with David (22). When David spares Saul's life and confronts him, Saul's shame becomes even bigger (24; 26). His shame increases more when the witch of Endor learns from Samuel that the inquiring man is king Saul (28). Saul's shame overflows when he sees his sons killed and defeat approaching: he commits suicide (31:4). This becomes sometimes the easiest way out of shame. The exposition of the bodies of Saul and his sons by the Philistines is a public shaming sanction (1Sam 31:10; Funaki 1957:60,72) But finally, the burial by the people of Jabesh (31:13) and David's praise (2Sam 1) restore some of Saul's honour (Lienhard 2001a:273-275).

1Sam 16 – 1Ki 2: David's Story:²³ The first half of David's story describes a rapid rise from an insignificant, unknown position to one of great status: David's secret anointing by Samuel (16:1-13), David's appointment as court musician and arm bearer (16:14-23), and David's heroic triumph over Goliath (17). Goliath's mocking and despising (*bzh*) is a disgrace (*herpâ*) for Israel and its God (17:26,42). After David's stone has hit him, he falls on his face, a humiliating position (17:49). Saul wants to know whose son David is (17:55). Identity and status are determined by family descent. In the same order, David says to Saul, when he proposes his daughter to David: „Who am I, and what is my family or my father's clan in Israel, that I should become the king's son-in-law?“ (18:18). „Do you think it is a small matter (*qll*) to become the king's son-in-law? I'm only a poor man (*râš*) and little known (lit. have no honour: *qlh*)“ (18:23). Saul's jealousy arouses when the women compare Saul's successes with David's (18:7). David's position of honour and his friendship with the king's son lead to the shaming of Jonathan. Saul says to him: „Don't I know that you have sided with the son of Jesse to your own shame (*bōšet*) and to the shame (*bōšet*) of your mother's nakedness (*erwâ*)?“ (20:30 my translation). In consequence, Jonathan is ashamed (*klm*) of Saul's behaviour toward David and him (20:34). Nabal's story exemplifies the behaviour of a fool (*nbl*) (25). Even though David and his troop does not shame (*klm*) Nabal, he lacks to give David the due honour (25:7). David wants to revenge his loss of honour. But Abigail's wise behaviour saves him from a folly. At the end, David can praise God that he has „upheld the case of his shame (*herpâ*)“ from the hand of Nabal (25:39).

²³ For David's story, I follow partly Stansell (1994).

When Asahel, Joab's brother, is pursuing Abner, a much stronger man than him, Abner pleads: „Stop chasing me! Why should I strike you down? How could I look your brother Joab in the face?“ (2Sam 2:22). He fears for his reputation when killing a younger and weaker man. On the other hand, the murder of Ishbosheth by Recab and Baanah is an example of absolute shamelessness and is consequently punished by the sentence of death (4; Funaki 1957:54). Then, David's delegation to the Ammonite king Hanun is greatly dishonoured (*klm*) when they cut them half of the beards and expose the buttocks (10:5). The Ammonites have thus become a stench (*bʿš*) or a shame (LXX: *kataischynomai*) (10:6; cp. Isa 50:6). That the beard is a symbol of seniority and rank is shown by the closeness of *zāqān* „beard“ and *zāqēn* „elder“ (Bechtel 1991:68). Talking about the beard as symbol of honour, Stolz and Huber speak of a head-shame-beard link (Stolz 1971:232; Huber 1983:61).

The restoration of Michal to David may appear a surprising cruelty of David. The motif for it is not love for Michal, but it is an absolute necessity for the restoration of David's face and honour (3:12-15; Funaki 1957:26). When David dances in front of the ark entering Jerusalem, it is apparently not a shame for him. His God-centredness extinguishes shame feelings before his fellow men. But this is not the case for Michal. She despises (*bzh*) him in her heart (6:16) and exclaims cynically: „How the king of Israel has distinguished (*kbd*) himself today, disrobing in the sight of the slave girls of his servants as any vulgar fellow would! ... I will become even more undignified (*qll*) than this, and I will be humiliated (*šāpāl*) in my own eyes. But by these slave girls you spoke of, I will be held in honour (*kbd*)“ (6:20,22). Michal's punishment is barrenness, a great shame in ancient Israel (cp. Gen 30:23; Hos 9:11; Funaki 1957:35-38,75).

David is greatly honoured by God's covenant with him (7:12-14). But he falls deeply in shame after the adultery with Bathsheba (11). He has despised (*bzh*) God and the covenant (12:9f.). Nathan confronts him privately (12:7). After David's repentance and confession, God forgives (12:13). But consequences as equivalent of guilt and shame remain. Because of the shame (*nʿš*) involved for God and his people, shame is put on David: his son dies (12:14,18), there is war, rape and incest (12:11f.). When Amnon rapes Tamar, she pleads: „Don't humiliate me (*ʿnh*). Such a thing should not be done in Israel! Don't commit such a folly (*nebālā*)“ (13:12 my translation; cp. Funaki 1957:53). Then Absalom kills Amnon for having shamed Tamar and his family (2Sam 13:23ff.; Funaki 1957:29). David's flight is shameful (15; Funaki 1957:79f.). Shimei's curses are a deep humiliation for David (2Sam 16:5-13). As David's honour and face are never restored, this shame is actually not forgotten and never forgiven.

Solomon must not consider him innocent (*nqh*) (1Ki 2:9). The penalty for this wrongdoing (*rāʿā*) is death (cp. 2:36-45; Funaki 1957:29). On the other hand, those faithful to David are to be honoured (2:7). In fact, after David's adultery with Bathsheba, harmony is never restored.

3.2.10 1 & 2 Kings

In the two books of the kings of Judah and Israel, there is a refrain that comes back again and again: „He did evil (*raʿ*) in the eyes of the Lord“ (1Ki 14:22; 15:26,34; 16:25,30; 21:25; 22:52; 2Ki 8:18,27; 13:11; 14:24; 15:9,18,28; etc.), or „He committed all the sins his father had done before him“ (1Ki 15:3; 2Ki 15:24). The opposite formula is: „He did what was right (*yāšār*) in the eyes of the Lord“ (1Ki 15:11; 22:43; 2Ki 13:2; 14:3; 15:3; 18:3; etc.). These two formula are evaluations of the kings' life in relation to the covenant and its standards. The term *yāšār*, as a guilt-oriented term, directs towards the covenant commands rather than the relational component of the covenant. But the formula „in the eyes of the Lord“ places the evaluation clearly in the covenant relationship from person to person. After David, God makes a covenant of love (*hesed*) with Solomon (1Ki 8:21,23). God asks Solomon to „walk before him in integrity (*tmm*) of heart and uprightness (*yōšer*) and [to] do all he commands and [to] observe his decrees and laws“ (1Ki 9:4). Integrity and uprightness are a shame and guilt-oriented pair. But Solomon does not keep the „covenant and its decrees“ (1Ki 11:11). Equally, Elijah mourns that Israel has rejected God's covenant (1Ki 19:10,14). On the other hand, the king Hezekiah does not cease „to follow the Lord; he kept the commands the Lord had given Moses“ (2Ki 18:6). After him, king Josiah renews the covenant with the Lord: „to follow the Lord and keep his commands, regulations and decrees with all his heart and all his soul“ (2Ki 23:3). This double formula confirms that the covenant concept is combined. Violation of the covenant incurs shame and guilt. In fact, the book confirms that Israel is exiled because of her sin (*ḥāṭṭāʾt*). Israel will become a byword and an object of ridicule among all peoples (1Ki 9:7,9; 2Ki 17:7).

1Ki 17 – 2Ki 8: Elijah's and Elisha's Story: Overholt observes that both are men of power. Power has been identified above as a shame-oriented concept. Apart from Exodus and Numbers, the Elijah and Elisha narratives contain nearly all the accounts of miracles in the Hebrew Bible (Overholt 1996:24). In the great contest for superiority between the priests of Baal and the prophet of Yahweh, Elijah starts shaming and taunting (*htl*) Baal through ridicule: „Shout louder! ... Surely he is a god! Perhaps he is deep in thought, or busy, or traveling. Maybe he is sleeping and must be awakened“ (18:27). This ridiculing should

certainly shame Baal into action. But it has no effect. Baal neither responds to being shamed and ridiculed by God through Elijah nor to the mutilation and raving of his prophets. When Elijah starts to call God, he responds immediately with fire consuming the wet offering, wood, stones, dust, and water in the trench (18:38f.). The contest is decisive. Baal acts submissively toward Yahweh and abandons his prophets in silence before the superior God (Huber 1983:178).

After having made a treaty with Ben-Hadad king of Aram, Ahab king of Samaria comes back home (20:34). Ahab, who is constantly suffering from his complex of inferiority before his wife Jezebel, is proud of his magnanimity by exercising mercy upon Ben-Hadad. On his way home, a prophet confronts and condemns him for letting go Ben-Hadad (20:42). In this confrontation, Ahab loses face before God and men. The narrative says that he returns „sullen and angry“ to his palace in Samaria (20:43) (Funaki 1957:38). Ahab's weak ego is hurt again, when Naboth refuses him his vineyard (21:3). Jezebel's tactic to get the vineyard is public shaming of Naboth (21:9f.). God's punishment is again public shaming: dogs will lick Ahab's blood and devour Jezebel (21:19,23). Ahab's repentance causes the punishment to be delayed to „the days of his son“ (21:29). This fact reinforces the concept of corporate personality of the family in Israel (Funaki 1957:58).

An episode of Elisha's life poses a problem to the modern reader. Elisha is ridiculed by youths: „Go on up, you baldhead!“ (2Ki 2:23). Right away he turns around to curse the youths and sends a bear to devour forty-two of them. This story seems childish and even ungodly. Elisha can easily be accused of abuse of the divine name and petty appeal to divine miracle for unworthy personal motives. The story is only explainable when we realize that Elisha has lost face completely. These children are not so much mocking Elisha, but God himself in the person of his representative. To preserve God's dignity, Elisha is obliged to revenge the ridicule suffered (Funaki 1957:33). This is another example of corporate personality.

Two narratives illustrate the shame of leprosy. According to the regulations of the Mosaic Law, lepers are removed from the normal fellowship of society. A leper must wear torn clothes, let his hair be unkempt, cover the lower part of his face and cry out: „Unclean! Unclean!“ (Lev 13:45). As physical sickness is commonly thought of as judgement sent by God, leprosy represents a real punishment, more through its psychological than its physical effect. The story of Naaman, commander-in-chief of the army of the king of Aram, has to be understood before this background. Even though he has attained one of the highest positions in secular society, he is an outcast of society through his leprosy (2Ki 5:1). When he comes to

Elisha, this one does not even welcome the high guest himself, but sends only a servant, which is a great humiliation for the sensitive outcast. Additionally, the cure prescribed is so ridiculously simple that Naaman goes away angry (5:10f.). Naaman has lost his face. When Gehazi accepts the presents from the healed Naaman against Elisha's orders, he is struck with leprosy instead of Naaman (5:27). Leprosy can be a punishment upon idolatry, blasphemy, adultery, theft, slander, false witness, and false judgement. A good example is Uzziah, a successful and strong king. In his pride, he strives to secure all power, political or religious, in his hand. When he brings an offering of incense in the temple, he is struck with leprosy (15:5; 2Chr 26:19-21; cp. Miriam: Num 12:10). What punishment could have been more severe for this man of power? At the highest peak of human glory, he is brought down to the lowest, to a state of impurity and disgrace (Funaki 1957:71f.).

2Ki 18-20 = Isa 36-39: Hezekiah's Story: Public insulting, mocking and taunting of the defeated enemies is also Assyrian king Sennacherib's strategy (18:19-25). To diminish the loss of face and preserve a little bit of dignity, Hezekiah's delegates plead the Assyrians to advance the insults in Aramaic, not in Hebrew, so that the people could not understand it (18:26) (Funaki 1957:31). The boasting of Sennacherib has not only taunted (*hrp*) king Hezekiah, but also God (2Ki 19:16 par 2Chr 32:17). „Who is it you have insulted [shamed] (*hrp*) and blasphemed (*gdp*)? Against whom have you raised your voice and lifted your eyes in pride? Against the Holy One of Israel!“ (2Ki 19:22f. = Isa 37:23f.; cp. Ps 74:10f.; 79:2). God's concern in the taunting of his Israelite king expresses a corporate personality between covenant partners (Huber 1983:167f.).

3.2.11 Ezra, Nehemiah

Ezr 9: Ezra's Prayer: Ezra starts his prayer by confessing the people's shame and sins:

O my God, I am too ashamed (*bōš*) and disgraced (*klm*) to lift up my face to you, my God, because our sins (*ʿāwōn*) are higher than our heads, and our guilt (*ʾāšām*) has reached to the heavens. From the days of our forefathers until now, our guilt (*ʾāšām*) has been great. Because of our sins (*ʿāwōn*), we and our kings and our priests have been subjected to the sword and captivity, to pillage and humiliation (*bōšet pānīm*) at the hand of foreign kings, as it is today (Ezr 9:6f.).

Ezra expresses his shame through the lowering of face, „shame of face,“ and through the mention of terms related to defeat in warfare like „sword,“ „captivity“ and „pillage.“ It is shame before God, not before fellow men, showing that this is possible (contra Hesselgrave 1983:480; Müller 1988:416; 1996a:109). His shame is based on sin (*ʿāwōn*) and guilt (*ʾāšām*), producing a surprising mixture of shame and guilt-oriented concepts (cp. Ezr 9:13,15). His

confession is pronounced in an inclusive first person of plural expressing corporate personality (cp. Neh 1:6f.), and is followed by the people's confession (Ezr 10:1-4). Ezra mourns the impurity of the land (Ezr 9:11f.). The shame is a shame of the exile and is due to disobedience toward the covenant (Ezr 9:7,10,13f.; 10:2f.; cp. Laniak 1998:172). At the end of the book, those who are guilty of intermarriage are named (Ezr 10:18ff.). One could feel that this would be a surprising thing to do in a shame-oriented context. On the other hand, a detailed list of those guilty, at the same time those who have made a new covenant with the Lord, will help those shame-oriented persons keep their engagement (cp. Neh 10:1ff.).

Just as Ezra, Nehemiah prays to the Lord „who keeps his covenant of love (*ḥesed*) with those who love him and obey his commands“ (Neh 1:5; cp. 9:32). „You are a forgiving (*slh*) God, gracious (*ḥnn*) and compassionate (*rḥm*), slow to anger and abounding in love (*ḥesed*) (9:17; cp. Ex 34:6). Nehemiah opposes God's faithfulness and righteousness with the people's unfaithfulness (*mʾ*) and sin (Neh 1:8; 9:33; cp. Ezr 10:6). Again we observe the techniques of verbal shaming and social taunting. This is Sanballat's and Tobiah's reaction to Nehemiah's menace, their psychological warfare.

[Sanballat] ridiculed (*Iʿg*) the Jews, and in the presence of his associates and the army of Samaria, he said, „What are those feeble Jews doing? Will they restore their wall? Will they offer sacrifices? Will they finish in a day? Can they bring the stones back to life from those heaps of rubble - burned as they are?“ (Neh 4:1f.).

The taunting is most effective before a laughing audience. And Nehemiah answers the taunting in prayer:

Hear us, O our God, for we are despised (*bûzâ*). Turn their insults (*ḥerpâ*) back on their own heads. Give them over as plunder in a land of captivity. Do not cover up their guilt (*ʿāwōn*) or blot out their sins (*ḥāṭṭāʾt*) from your sight (*pānīm*), for they have thrown insults in the face of the builders (Neh 4:5f.).

The transgression of the covenant decrees is again expressed in guilt-oriented terms and embedded into a shame-oriented context.

3.2.12 Esther

The book of Esther starts out to describe the loss of face of King Xerxes. At the climax of his splendid feast, he wants to present queen Vashti to the guests. But she refuses to come (1:12).²⁴ She is relegated and a decree of the king released (1:19-21). Her fall becomes the occasion of Esther's sudden rise to great honour. Again the king gives a great banquet worthy

²⁴ In the discussion of the book of Esther, I follow partly Laniak (1998).

of his honour and distributes gifts with royal liberality (2:17f.). Equally, Haman is elevated to honour by King Xerxes (3:1). Haman boasts about his vast wealth, his many sons, and all the ways the king has elevated him above the other nobles (5:11). But one thing stings in his heart: Mordecai and the other Jews would not bow down before him and pay him honour. A shame-rage spiral follows (3:5; 5:9; Laniak 1998:83). Haman decides to kill not only Mordecai, but all the Jews (3:6). Corporate personality means also representative responsibility (Laniak 1998:75). A decree of the king is issued (3:12-14). When King Xerxes finds out about Mordecai's discovery of the plot in the chronicles, Haman is allowed to propose the honours for the man the king delights to honour. What a shame for Haman to guide Mordecai in the royal robe and on a royal horse through the city! Clothing is definitely an important symbol of honour (6:6-9). Ironically, Mordecai, Haman's greatest enemy, is honoured (6:11). The king increases his own honour by granting honour (Laniak 1998:104). Haman's immense hybris ends in great shame: he is hanged (7:10; cp. Prov 11:2). The book ends with the triumph of the Jews. Mordecai's power increases. The king's administrators fear him and all the peoples fear the Jews (9:4). The Jews avenge (*nqm*) themselves (8:13; 9:16). Their shame is reversed to honour. Just vengeance is however retribution and vindication, restitution of honour and rights (Isa 61:2; 63:4). The Jews are restored in their rights too. This is attested by the king's decree (8:8-11; cp. 3:12-14) (Laniak 1998:141f.). The special importance of the law of Persia and Media contrasts with the language of honour and shame in Esther.

3.2.13 Job

The book of Job reveals life values of ancient Israelite society.²⁵ When Job enjoys a harmonious relationship with God, he is prosperous and honoured.

When I went to the gate of the city and took my seat in the public square,
The young men saw me and stepped aside and the old men rose to their feet;
The chief men refrained from speaking and covered their mouths with their hands;
The voices of the nobles were hushed, and their tongues stuck to the roof of their mouths.

Whoever heard me spoke well of me, and those who saw me commended me,
Because I rescued the poor who cried for help, and the fatherless who had none to assist him.

The man who was dying blessed me; I made the widow's heart sing.

I put on righteousness (*ṣedeq*) as my clothing; justice (*mišpāt*) was my robe and my turban.

I was eyes to the blind and feet to the lame.

²⁵ In the discussion of the book of Job, I follow partly Pedersen (1926:213-215) and Huber (1983:13-14, 110-115). Cp. also Bechtel (1991:72f.).

I was a father to the needy; I took up the case of the stranger.
I broke the fangs of the wicked (*‘āwel*) and snatched the victims from their teeth
(29:7-17).

Job is a man living in harmony with God and his community, a harmony in which he is dominant and superior, but also one in which he receives and gives back in return. When blessing and prosperity depart, harmony crumbles. Job remarks: „[God] has stripped me of my honour (*kābôd*) and removed the crown of my head“ (19:9). Job is shamed, made sport of by the younger men, becomes a byword, is detested, and spat at:

But now they mock me (*shq*), men younger than I, whose fathers I would have disdained (*m’s*) to put with my sheep dogs ...
A base and nameless brood [lit. foolish sons] (*nbl*), they were driven out of the land.
And now their sons mock me in song (*n^egînâ*); I have become a byword (*millâ*) among them.
They detest (*t^b*) me and keep their distance; they do not hesitate to spit in my face
(30:1,8-10).

His friends, who interpret Job’s misfortune as a sign of sin and disapproval of God, mock, taunt and shame him with the good intention to correct him (12:4; 17:6; 30:9). However, they are the ones who should be pitying (19:2), comforting (16:2), and supporting him. They are bad mediators who fall short of their ministry of mediation. Job asks them:

How long will you torment me and crush me with words?
Ten times now you have reproached me (*klm*); shamelessly (*bōš*) you attack me.
If it is true that I have gone astray, my error remains my concern alone.
If indeed you would exalt (*gd*) yourselves above me and use my humiliation (*herpâ*) against me,
Then know that God has wronged me (*wt*) and drawn his net around me ...
He has alienated my brothers from me; my acquaintances are completely estranged from me.
My kinsmen have gone away; my friends have forgotten me.
My guests and my maidservants count me a stranger; they look upon me as an alien.
I summon my servant, but he does not answer, though I beg him with my own mouth.
My breath is offensive to my wife; I am loathsome to my own brothers.
Even the little boys scorn me (*m’s*); when I appear, they ridicule me.
All my intimate friends detest me (*t^b*); those I love have turned against me (19:2-6,13-19).

Job is tormented, reproached, humiliated, ignored by slaves, shown contempt by young boys who have formerly hidden their faces from his strength. He is left friendless and unsupported, and derided by the rabble. Job feels that God and everybody is against him:

God assails me and tears me in his anger and gnashes his teeth at me; my opponent fastens on me his piercing eyes.

Men open their mouths to jeer at me; they strike my cheek in scorn and unite together against me (16:9-10).

The adversaries not only gnash their teeth at Job, but stare at him, making him self-conscious, and gape at him with their mouths open in derision. Previously, we have seen these same gestures used for shaming. The one new gesture is slapping a person on the cheek as insult and humiliation (cp. Ps 3:8; Lam 3:30; Mic 4:14).

All these shaming sanctions are based on the assumption that the principle of causality and retribution is valid. However, the new message of the book of Job is that misfortune does not necessarily mean sin. God says before the misfortune starts: „[Job] is blameless (*tmm*) and upright (*yāšār*), a man who fears (*yrʾ*) God and shuns evil (*raʾ*)“ (1:8). Even after the misfortune started, Job does not speak up against God as his foolish (*nbl*) wife suggests (2:8). Even then, he stays without sin: „In all this, Job did not sin (*ḥāṭāʾ*) nor charge God foolishly (*tiplāʾ*)“ (KJV 1:22; 2:10). On the other hand, God names the shaming actions of Job’s friends a folly (*nʿ bālāʾ*) and asks them to make a burnt offering for atonement (42:8). To certify this new message in the still shame-oriented context, God restores Job’s honour and prosperity and gives him twice as much as he had before (42:10). But through his sufferings, Job realizes that God is sovereign and far greater than we think (11:7-9). „He looks down on all that are haughty (*gābōah*); he is king over all that are proud (*šāḥas*)“ (41:34). Job realizes that in relation to God we fall short of what we should be. Therefore, he says: „My ears had heard of you, but now my eyes have seen you. Therefore I despise myself (*mʾs*) and repent (*nḥm*) in dust and ashes“ (42:5f.).

3.2.14 Psalms

Psalms of Lamentation: Many psalms talk about shame (25:2f.,20; 26:8; 32:3-5; 40:16f.). But psalms of lamentation speak particularly of shame. Their refrain is: „How long will you abandon me?“ (13:1-3; 74:10; 79:5f.; 89:47-49; 106:40-42; Huber 1983:150f.; Bechtel 1991:70f.).

A good example of an individual psalm of lamentation is Ps 22:

My God, my God, why have you forsaken me? ...

I am a worm and not a man, scorned (*ḥerpāʾ*) by men and despised (*bzh*) by the people.

All who see me mock me (*lʿg*); they hurl insults (*pṭr*), shaking their heads ...

Roaring lions tearing their prey open their mouths wide against me (22:1,6-7,13).

Calling oneself a worm or a „nothing“ reflects feelings of lowliness, inferiority, and humiliation. A worm crawls on its belly on the ground in ultimate lowliness and might even be trampled under foot. Scorning and despising, mocking and insulting, and roaring and open-

ing the mouth are all parallel and commonly associated with shaming. Ps 35 gives more shaming techniques and expresses the wish that God shame the enemies:

Like the ungodly they maliciously mocked (*l'g*); they gnashed their teeth at me ...
 Let not those gloat (*smh*) over me who are my enemies without cause; let not those who hate me without reason maliciously wink the eye ...
 They gape at me (*rhb*) and say, „Aha! Aha! With our own eyes we have seen it“ ...
 May all who gloat (*smh*) over my distress be put to shame (*bōš*) and confusion (*hpr*); may all who exalt (*gdl*) themselves over me be clothed with shame (*bōšet*) and disgrace (*k'limmā*) (35:16,19,21,26).

Most of these psalms of lamentation express concern about the incongruity between God's promises and the present shameful condition (cp. Ps 22; 44; 69; 77; 89; 102; Huber 1983:172,199 n.49). The psalmist feels abandoned (cp. Ps 89:39-49). He appeals for God's attention (Ps 69:3-8,20f.) and his respect for his covenant obligation to protect Israel from shaming (89:4f.,21-25,27-35,51f.; 119:22f.,38f.,77-80,116,158,161; Huber 1983:154). God should rather cover the enemies with shame (35:4-6; 40:15; 70:4; 71:13). The shamed faithful pleads for God's face-saving vengeance (6:10; 31:18f.; 35:26f.; 40:15; 53:5; 57:3; 70:2; 71:13,24; 78:66; 83:16f.; 109:28f.; Huber 1983:158f.). As the psalmist's honour is attacked, God's honour is attacked equally, and vice versa (cp. 74:10-12). When the corporate identity and personality between covenant partners is understood, then the imprecatory psalms become less enigmatic (cp. 109). Man's covenant obligation, on the other hand, is to honour and praise God (Ps 61:8; 66:2; 96:7; 145:5; Huber 1983:166f.).

Psalms 85, another psalm of lamentation, exhibits in the first four verses parallel terms of forgiveness and in the second half several covenant features:

You showed favor (*rsh*) to your land, O Lord; you restored (*šûb*) the fortunes of Jacob.
 You forgave (*ns*) the iniquity (*'āwōn*) of your people and covered (*ksh*) all their sins (*hātā*) ...
 Restore (*šûb*) us again, O God our Savior, and put away (*pr*) your displeasure (*ka'as*) toward us ...
 Show us your unfailing love (*hesed*), O Lord, and grant us your salvation (*yeša*).
 I will listen to what God the Lord will say; he promises peace (*šālôm*) to his people, his saints, but let them not return to folly (*kislā*).
 Surely his salvation (*yeša*) is near those who fear (*yr*) him, that his glory (*kābôd*) may dwell in our land.
 Love (*hesed*) and faithfulness (*'emet*) meet together; righteousness (*sedeq*) and peace (*šālôm*) kiss each other.
 Faithfulness (*'emet*) springs forth from the earth, and righteousness (*sedeq*) looks down from heaven (85:1-2,4,7-11).

Folly is set in an antithetical construction opposite to salvation (*šālôm*). This shows that folly is not only a shame-oriented, but a combined shame and guilt-oriented concept. Salvation is for those who feel themselves inferior to the powerful God (*yꜣꜥ yꜣꜣꜣꜣ*), whose honour and glory witnesses to his superiority. Love, faithfulness and righteousness, the main covenant behaviours, are set up in parallel constructions. Love (*ḥesed*) and faithfulness (*ʿemet*) give a combined shame and guilt-oriented pair. Righteousness is set in parallel with salvation. The two are therefore, as seen above, combined shame and guilt-oriented concepts.

Psalm 51, a psalm of confession, exemplifies in the first strophe the concepts of confession, conscience and forgiveness, and defines righteousness in the last strophe:

Have mercy (*ḥnn*) on me, O God, according to your unfailing love (*ḥesed*); according to your great compassion (*ṛḥm*) blot out my transgressions (*pešaʿ*).

Wash (*kbs*) away all my iniquity (*ʿāwōn*) and cleanse (*thr*) me from my sin (*ḥāṭṭāʾ*). For I know (*yꜣꜥ*) my transgressions (*pešaʿ*), and my sin (*ḥāṭṭāʾ*) is always before me. Against you, you only, have I sinned (*ḥāṭāʾ*) and done what is evil (*raʿ*) in your sight, so that you are proved right (*šdq*) when you speak and justified (lit. pure *zkh*) when you judge (*špt*).

Surely I was sinful (*ʿāwōn*) at birth, sinful (*ḥēṭ*) from the time my mother conceived me.

Surely you desire truth (*ʿemet*) in the inner parts (*tūḥōt*); you teach (*yꜣꜥ* hi.) me wisdom (*ḥokmā*) in the inmost place (*stm*) (51:1-6).

In the semantic domain of sin and forgiveness, conscience orientations are difficult to attribute in this psalm. Men's sin is opposed to the righteousness and purity of God (v.4). It is God who illuminates our innermost (conscience) with truth and wisdom, a guilt and shame-oriented pair (v.6). The greatest punishment for the psalmist would be to be taken away from the intimate presence of God. He knows that he needs a pure (*thr*) heart (conscience) for that (v.10f.). God wants righteous (*šedeq*) sacrifices, that is, a broken (*šbr*) and contrite (*dkr*) heart, in other words repentance (v.17,19).

Sapiential Psalms: In a typical manner for wisdom psalms, Ps 1 opposes the righteous (*šaddiq*) and the wicked (*rešaʿ*). The righteous is blessed (*ʿašrē*) and honoured (cp. Num 6:24; Mt 5:3-10). He keeps away from the impurity of the sinners (v.1) and is not ashamed in the assembly at the gate (v.5). He delights in the law (*tôrā*) of the Lord (guilt-oriented). He resembles a powerful tree and prospers (shame-oriented). The Lord knows (*yꜣꜥ*) him intimately, stays with him and makes him last into eternal life (v.6). Not so the wicked: He is a „nothing“ blown away like chaff (v.4; cp. Lk 3:17). He will be ashamed and even excluded from the assembly of the righteous (cp. Mt 21:43; Jn 15:6). He will be condemned in the judgement (*mišpāt*) (v.5) and will shamefully disappear (v.6).

Psalm 119, another sapiential psalm, blesses and honours those:

Whose ways are blameless (*tmm*), who walk according to the law (*tôrâ*) of the Lord.
Blessed are they who keep his statutes (*‘ēdā*) and seek him with all their heart ...
Then I would not be put to shame (*bōš*) when I consider all your commands (*mišwâ*).
I will praise you with an upright (*yōšer*) heart as I learn your righteous (*šedeq*) laws
(*mišpāt*) (119:1-2,6-7).

Honoured is the one who abides with the law (v.1-2): This is a shame-oriented recompense for a guilt-oriented behaviour. In other words, the one who abides with the law will not be put to shame (v.6). Keeping God's commands protects from shaming (cp. vv.22,31,39,78-80,116,158,161; Huber 1983:154). Actually, the one is blessed who keeps God's statutes and loves him with all his heart, the habitual combined double formula (v.2; cp. v.10). God's laws are upright (guilt-oriented) and righteous (combined) (v.7; cp. 137f.). This theme is repeated in more than a hundred variations.

3.2.15 Proverbs

The book of Proverbs is written „for attaining wisdom (*ḥokmâ*) and discipline (*mûsâr*), for understanding (*bin*) words of insight (*bînâ*), for acquiring a disciplined (*mûsâr*) and prudent (*škl*) life, doing what is right (*šedeq*) and just (*mišpāt*) and fair (*mēšārîm* cp. *yāšār*)“ (1:2f.). *ḥokmâ* and *mûsâr*, and *šedeq* and *mišpāt* / *yāšār* are shame and guilt-oriented pairs. Being covenant behaviours, wisdom and knowledge come from God (8:22-31): „The fear (*yŕ*) of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge (*da‘at*), but fools (*‘ewîl*) despise (*bûz*) wisdom (*ḥokmâ*) and discipline (*mûsâr*)“ (1:7; cp. 15:33; Ps 111:10), and „the Lord gives wisdom, and from his mouth come knowledge and understanding“ (2:6; cp. Col 2:3). Where the Lord is not, there is no wisdom and knowledge, no norms and no limits: „Where there is no revelation, the people cast off restraint; but blessed is he who keeps the law“ (29:18; cp. Hos 4:6). In the same order, wisdom is associated with righteousness, another covenant behaviour. This becomes particularly evident in the passage on the wise and the foolish son (10:2,3,6,7,16,20,21,24,28,30,31,32; 11:5,6,8,9,10,19,23,28).

Honour and shame are linked to wisdom and knowledge in the way that covenant behaviours bring honour, while the violation of the covenant causes shame. „The wise inherit honour (*kābôd*), but fools (*ksl*) he [God] holds up in shame (*qālôn*)“ (3:35). In this verse, the two are opposed in an antithetic parallelism and a chiasm. Honour follows wisdom (3:35; 8:18; 12:8), humility (15:33; 18:12), and the fear of the Lord (22:4). Honour accompanies the patient (20:3; 25:9f.) and the generous (Ps 112:9). The good name of a family or patron

depends on the good behaviour of all the subjects (28:7; 30:9; 31:23). Adulterers, the proud, and those who avoid discipline deserve disgrace (*qālôn*) (6:32; 11:2; 13:18); the wicked bring shame (*bôš*) (13:5) and contempt (*bûz*) (18:3); sin is shameful (14:34); and the foolish are disgraceful (14:35; 17:2) (cp. Laniak 1998:20f.; Kurani 2001:99f.).

This implies the principle of causality and retribution: whereas covenant behaviour brings prosperity, its violation causes poverty. „He who ignores discipline comes to poverty and shame, but whoever heeds correction is honoured“ (13:18). And „with me [wisdom] are riches and honour, enduring wealth and prosperity“ (8:18). „Blessed are those who keep my [wisdom’s] ways“ (8:33; cp. 10:3,27; 13:25; 14:26, etc.). Terms belonging to the semantic domain of prosperity have been identified above as shame-oriented. Consequently, the principle of retribution could easily lead to pride. But wisdom coming from the fear of the Lord does not correspond to arrogance, but to humility: „Humility (*‘ānāwâ*) and the fear of the Lord bring wealth, honour and life“ (22:4). Contrarily, „when pride (*zādôn*) comes, then comes disgrace (*qālôn*), but with humility (*šn*) comes wisdom“ (11:2; cp. 16:8; 29:23; Phil 2:3). Wisdom hates pride (*gē’â*) and arrogance (*gā’ôn*) (8:13).

3.2.16 Isaiah

When we start the study of the prophets, we have to realize that they function as mediators in the reconciliation between God and his people, a shame-oriented function. Eichrodt speaks of them as „the conscience of Israel“ because they call the people back into the presence of their covenant partner, that is, before his face (1961:387). The prophets are those who are conscious of the shameful and guilty state of Israel. The prophets’ communication is direct (guilt-oriented) and indirect (shame-oriented) according to the particular situation. Nathan confronts king David first indirectly with a parable (2Sam 12:1-4) and then directly (12:7). The answer of the prophetess Huldah to king Josiah’s delegation is direct (2Ki 22:11-20). Ezekiel has to speak to Israel’s leaders directly (Ezek 11:7-12) and indirectly through symbolic acts (12:3-6).

Isa 6: Isaiah’s Commission: When Isaiah has the vision of the Lord, he observes that the seraphs cover their faces with two of their wings (6:2). Even they feel shame before the Lord Almighty who is three times holy. Isaiah is ashamed of the fact that he and his people have unclean lips (6:5). This is a shameful confession as observes Kraus (1990:206,214). The seraphs’ shame and Isaiah’s impurity is contrasted with the sanctity and glory (*kābôd*) of the Lord (6:3). The term *kābôd yhwh* occurs 37 times in the book of Isaiah. Together with the

concern for purity, it illustrates a strong shame-oriented element. Isaiah is not only concerned about his own impurity, but also of his people's pollution, a corporate identity and personality. But God can purify this defilement. When the seraph touches his lips with the coal, he says to Isaiah: „Your guilt (*‘āwōn*) is taken away (*sûr*) and your sin (*ḥāṭṭāʾ*) is atoned for (*kpr*)“ (6:7). Shame is not labeled, but implied as needing purification.

The Shame of Captivity: In the prophecies against the nations, the Lord is designed as victor shaming Israel's enemies. The Egyptian captives will be lead away stripped, barefoot, and with buttocks bared, to Egypt's shame (*‘erwā*) (20:4; cp. 47:3; Ex 28:42; Lev 18:6; 2Sam 10:5; Mic 1:11). Huber observes: „The naked warrior has been stripped of his ability to defend himself or his nation, he is without protection. His nakedness is symbolic of his vulnerability and demonstrative of his failure“ (1983:73). The Assyrian captives will be treated like animals (37:29 = 2Ki 19:28; cp. Ezek 19:4; 38:4). In the procession before the victors, the captives will „bow down before you [Israel]; they will lick the dust at your feet“ (49:23; cp. Ps 72:9; Col 2:15). Equally, the Babylonian gods will be shamed (41:21-29; 43:8-13; 44:1-11; 45:20-25; 46:1-7). These shaming sanctions of captives are not intended to be sadistic, but serve to restore the honour of the formerly shamed people of Israel (cp. 1Sam 17:54-57; Mk 6:14-29). Unless honour is restored, conscience will not be at peace (Huber 1983:69-83; Bechtel 1991:63; Hanson 1994:83).

The Shame of Exile: Isa 40 is a comfort to the people, because his shame is completed (40:2). The Hebrew term *šbāʾā* „KJV: warfare, NIV: hard service“ is rendered by LXX with *tapeinosis* „humiliation.“ The shame of exile is completed, the sin (*‘āwōn*) has been paid for (lit. propitiated, satisfied *ršh*), and she has received double for her sins (*ḥāṭṭāʾ*) (40:2bc). Shame and guilt-oriented concepts are mixed in the account of forgiveness. The result is that the Lord's glory (*kābôd yhwē*) will be revealed (40:5).

The Messiah: The fact that the Messiah is called Immanuel „God with us“ (7:14) expresses that „the Lord is in our midst“ (*ʾlōhîm bʿqirbā*) (Ps 46:5; cp. Zech 8:23b; Mt 1:23; Acts 9:31). He is our ever-present partner, the one who sees and knows everything, our „con-science.“ He deploys covenant behaviours. He reigns on David's throne establishing justice (*mišpāṭ*) and righteousness (*šdāqā*) (9:7). His spirit is a spirit of wisdom (*ḥokmā*) and of understanding (*bînā*), of counsel (*ēšā*) and of power (*gʾbūrā*), of knowledge (*daʿat*) and of the fear (*yrr*) of the Lord (11:2). In faithfulness (*ʾemē*), he brings justice (*mišpāṭ*) to the nations and establishes a covenant with them (42:1,3f.,6). He brings salvation (*yʾšûʿā*) to the ends of the earth (49:6). But in his glorious ministry, paradoxically he has to suffer shame:

I offered my back to those who beat me, my cheeks to those who pulled out my beard; I did not hide my face from mocking (*k'limmâ*) and spitting.
Because the Sovereign Lord helps me, I will not be disgraced (*klm*). Therefore have I set my face like flint, and I know I will not be put to shame (*bōš*) (50:6f.).

Beating, pulling out the beard, mocking and spitting are shaming sanctions. However, this shame does not imply disgrace in this case. The reason why he has to be shamed becomes clear only in the last of the Servant Songs. Men despise and reject him, they hide their faces out of shame before him and do not esteem him, because they think he is „stricken by God“ because of his sins (53:4). But actually:

He took up our infirmities and carried our sorrows, ...
He was pierced for our transgressions (*peša*), crushed for our iniquities (*'āwōn*);
The punishment (*mûsar*) that brought us peace (*šālôm*) was upon him, and by his wounds we are healed, ...
The Lord has laid on him the iniquity (*'āwōn*) of us all (53:4-6).

The Servant's disgrace indicates this time the guilt of the shamers (Klopfenstein 1972:209; Huber 1983:29). The language is guilt-oriented. The Lord makes the Servant's life a guilt offering (*'āšām*) for us (53:10). As shown above, substitution is a concept that is understood only in shame-oriented contexts with corporate personality and identity. Apparently, the Qur'an does neither include corporate sin in the Fall account, nor substitution in the Messiah's death because of its guilt-oriented Pelagian outlook (Wolf 1993:561; Kurani 2001:91 n.47). For a shame-oriented person, it is very surprising to hear that this severe shaming of the Servant is the Lord's will (53:10a). But this becomes clear when the Servant prospers and is elevated and honoured (52:13; 53:10-12). By his knowledge (*da'at*), the righteous (*šāddîq*) Servant justifies (*šdq*) many (53:11). The language is balanced again. Here it becomes also clear that knowledge is an active covenant behaviour and not only a passive state of knowing. This wonderful work of substitutive punishment is motivated by God's unfailing love for his people (*hesed*) and his covenant of peace (*šālôm*) with him (54:10; cp. Mal 2:4f.).

3.2.17 Jeremiah

Jeremiah lives at the threshold of the exile. Israel is in a state of sin and shame. Consequently, the book is full of references to shame (e.g. 2:26,36; 3:25; 6:15; 8:9; 9:19; 15:15; 23:40; 51:51; Huber 1983:115). There are relatively fewer occurrences of guilt-oriented terms. *'āwōn* has 24 occurrences, mostly in a parallelism with *ḥāṭṭā'* in the meaning of sin. We find *'āšām* only two times as a verb, when Jeremiah talks about the enemies of Israel who devour it and nevertheless do not feel guilty because it has sinned against the Lord (2:3; 50:7).

Like the other prophets, Jeremiah does not exempt himself from the people's shame, but identifies with it in the spirit of corporate personality. He exclaims:

Let us lie down in our shame (*bōšet*),
 And let our disgrace (*k'limmâ*) cover us.
 We have sinned (*ḥāṭā'*) against the Lord our God, both we and our fathers;
 From our youth till this day we have not obeyed the Lord our God (3:25).

Covenant images in the sense of the husband-wife and father-son relationship are used to describe the shame. God criticizes Israel: „You have the brazen look of a prostitute; you refuse to blush with shame (*klm*). Have you not just called to me: My Father?“ (3:3f.; cp. 3:19; 13:27). In the form of a rhetorical question, God speaks even of the shameless conscience: „Are they ashamed (*bōš*) of their loathsome conduct? No, they have no shame (*bōš*) at all; they do not even know how to blush (*klm*). Therefore they shall fall among those who fall“ (6:15 = 8:12; cp. Phil 3:19). Shamelessness is unrighteous and foolish. The shameless person must be punished for his sin and his shamelessness about the sin (Funaki 1957:50; Lawson 2000:36). God will ruin the pride (*gā'ôn*) of Judah and Jerusalem (13:9). He will not only shame Israel but also her false gods (10:11).

On the other hand, God is the one who exercises kindness (*ḥesed*), justice (*mišpāt*) and righteousness (*š'dāqā*) (9:24). He is faithful to the covenant and he will bless (*brk*) and glory (*hll*) those who keep the covenant in a truthful (*ʿemet*), just (*mišpāt*) and righteous (*š'dāqā*) way (4:2). He begs Israel to keep the covenant: „For the sake of your name do not despise us (*nʿš*); do not dishonour (lit. fool *nbl*) your glorious (*kābôd*) throne. Remember your covenant with us and do not break it“ (14:21). As somebody who holds to the covenant with the Lord, Jeremiah is consistently shamed (e.g. 20:7-8,18). Recurring to covenant loyalty, he begs the Lord: „Let my persecutors be put to shame (*bōš*), but keep me from shame (*bōš*) (17:18; cp. 20:11). In the midst of the bankruptcy of the covenant, God offers a new covenant:

„The time is coming,“ declares the Lord, „when I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel and with the house of Judah.

It will not be like the covenant I made with their forefathers when I took them by the hand to lead them out of Egypt, because they broke my covenant, though I was a husband to them,“ declares the Lord.

„This is the covenant I will make with the house of Israel after that time,“ declares the Lord. „I will put my law (*tôrâ*) in their minds (*qereb*) and write it on their hearts (*lēb*). I will be their God, and they will be my people.

No longer will a man teach his neighbor, or a man his brother, saying, „Know (*yd*) the Lord,“ because they will all know (*yd*) me, from the least of them to the greatest,“ declares the Lord. „For I will forgive (*slḥ*) their wickedness (*ʿāwōn*) and will remember (*zkr*) their sins (*ḥāṭāʾt*) no more.“ (31:31-34).

God reminds the people first of the old broken covenant that united them as husband and wife. In the new covenant, God's instruction will be laid right into the deepest layers of personality, the conscience. The mutual belonging and knowledge will be very intimate. The precondition of this new covenant is of course the forgiveness of sins and the purification of the conscience (cp. Hebr 8:6-13).

3.2.18 Lamentations

In the book of Jeremiah's lamentations, we find the shame of exile and of captivity described in many variations. Jeremiah mourns: „Jerusalem has sinned (*ḥāṭāʾ*) greatly and so has become unclean (*nîdâ*). All who honoured (*kbd*) her despise (*zll*) her, for they have seen her nakedness (*ʿerwâ*); she herself groans (*ʾnh*) and turns away (*šûb*)“ (1:8). „The elders of the Daughter of Zion sit on the ground in silence; they have sprinkled dust on their heads and put on sackcloth. The young women of Jerusalem have bowed their heads to the ground“ (2:10). „All your enemies open their mouths wide against you; they scoff (*šrq*) and gnash (*ḥrq*) their teeth ...“ (2:16). „Let him bury his face in the dust ... Let him offer his cheek to one who would strike him, and let him be filled with disgrace (*ḥerpâ*)“ (3:29f.).

3.2.19 Ezekiel

The themes of the book of Ezekiel are the judgement of Jerusalem and the shame of exile (1-24), the judgement of the other nations (25-32) and the restoration of the people of God (33-48) (Allen 1990:xxiii).

In the opening vision, Ezekiel sees „the likeness (*demût*) of the glory (*kābôd*) of the Lord“ (1:28). When he sees it, he falls face down in fear and shame. The vocabulary is shame-oriented. Ezekiel is then called to judge (*špt*) Jerusalem (20:4; 22:2; 23:36), because the people rebelled (*mrh*) against the Lord and did not follow his decrees (*ḥôq*) and laws (*mišpāt*) (20:13,16). It has defiled (*tmʾ*) himself with idols (*gillûl*) (20:18). However, for the sake of his name, the Lord keeps the land from being profaned (*ḥll*) in the eyes of the nations (20:14). God has a concern for his reputation among the nations (Huber 1983:169). Judgement is a shame and guilt-oriented activity. The vocabulary is therefore mixed. The punishment is largely composed of shaming sanctions. This is demonstrated in two metaphors, a husband-wife (16) and a father-daughter analogy (23), an indirect style of communication.

In the allegory of unfaithful Jerusalem, the Lord describes his care for the upbringing of a small shameful girl: „On the day you were born you were despised (*gʾ*)“ (16:5). When she

grew up, she became beautiful, but was still naked (*‘êrôm*) and bare (*‘eryâ*) (16:7). Then he covered her nakedness (*‘erwâ*) with his garment and entered into a covenant with her. She became his (16:8). He clothed her with fine linen, covered her with costly garments and jewelry and put a beautiful crown on her head (16:9-14). But she flaunted her beauty, became a prostitute with the Egyptians, Assyrians, Babylonians and Philistines, and made male idols from the gold of her jewellery (16:15-17,26-29). Because she has exposed her nakedness (*‘erwâ*), he will strip her in front of her lovers, and they will see all her nakedness (*‘erwâ*) (16:36-39). „You are a true daughter of your [Hittite] mother, who despised (*gʿ*) her husband and her children; and you are a true sister of your sisters [Sodom and Samaria], who despised (*gʿ*) their husbands and their children“ (16:45). God will restore Sodom and Samaria „so that you may bear your disgrace (*kʿlimmâ*) and be ashamed (*klm*) of all you have done“ (16:54). But the Lord will restore the covenant with her (16:60-62). „Then, when I make atonement (*kpr*) for you for all you have done, you will remember and be ashamed (*bōš*) and never again open your mouth because of your humiliation (*kʿlimmâ*), declares the Sovereign Lord“ (16:63). The forgiveness of her sins will be a great shame, the real shame, for her (cp. Bonhoeffer 1988:26; Odell 1992).

The metaphor of the two adulterous daughters Oholah (Samaria) and Oholiba (Jerusalem) speaks again of prostitution with the Assyrians and Egyptians (23:3-5). The Lord hands Oholah over to the Assyrians who „stripped her naked (*glh ʿerwâ*) ... She became a byword (*šēm*) among women, and punishment (*špôt*) was inflicted on her“ (23:9). When Oholibah exposed her nakedness (*glh ʿerwâ*), the Lord turned away in disgust (23:18). The final punishment will be that „they will leave you naked (*‘êrôm*) and bare (*‘eryâ*), and the shame (*‘erwâ*) of your prostitution will be exposed (*glh*)“ (23:29).

But the shame of the exile will not be God’s last word. God will make an everlasting covenant of peace (*šālôm*) with Jerusalem (37:26). He will cleanse (*thr*) her from all impurities (*tūmʿâ*) and idols (*gillûl*) (36:25). „I will give you a new heart and put a new spirit in you; I will remove from you your heart of stone and give you a heart of flesh. And I will put my Spirit in you and move you to follow my decrees (*hōq*) and be careful to keep my laws (*mišpāt*)“ (36:27). Through the forgiveness of sins, the conscience will be renewed in order that it will be able to comply to covenant standards. The new covenant means not only harmony, but also justice. „You will be my people and I will be your God“ (36:28; 37:27). The intimate covenant fellowship will be restored. Then the Lord will be concerned about the reputation of his covenant partner. He will not permit former misfortune to shame Israel:

„You will no longer suffer disgrace (*ḥerpâ*) among the nations because of famine“ (36:30; cp. 34:29; Huber 1983:126). But God’s forgiveness will nevertheless mean shame for Jerusalem: „Be ashamed (*bōš*) and disgraced (*klm*) for your conduct!“ (36:32; cp. 16:63). She will be ashamed of God’s grace.

3.2.20 Daniel

In his prayer, Daniel calls to the Lord „who keeps his covenant of love (*ḥesed*) with all who love him and obey his commands“ (9:4). We find the combined double formula again. The Lord is merciful (*rḥm*) and forgiving (*slh*) even though Israel has rebelled (*mrd*) against him (9:9). Daniel goes on to confess his and his people’s sins in a first person plural inclusive prayer expressing the solidarity of corporate identity and personality:

We have sinned (*ḥāṭāʾ*) and done wrong (*ʿwh*). We have been wicked (*ršʿ*) and have rebelled (*mrd*); we have turned away (*sûr*) from your commands (*mišwâ*) and laws (*mišpāt*) ...

„Lord, you are righteous (*šʿdāqâ*), but this day we are covered with shame (*bōšet hapānîm*) ... in all the countries where you have scattered us because of our unfaithfulness (*maʿal*) to you.

O Lord, we and our kings, our princes and our fathers are covered with shame (*bōšet hapānîm*) because we have sinned (*ḥāṭāʾ*) against you“ (9:5,7-8).

God’s righteousness is opposed to Israel’s sin, wrongdoing, wickedness, rebellion and shame, which confirms the breadth of the concepts of righteousness and sin in their shame and guilt orientation. But the cause of the exile is clearly seen as guilt-oriented transgression: „All Israel has transgressed (*ʿbr*) your law (*tôrâ*) and turned away (*sûr*), refusing to obey you. Therefore the curses and sworn judgements written in the Law of Moses, the servant of God, have been poured out on us, because we have sinned (*ḥāṭāʾ*) against you“ (9:11). In the following intercessory prayer, Daniel appeals to God’s righteousness and his faithfulness to the covenant to take away the sins (*ḥāṭāʾ*) and iniquities (*ʿāwōn*) of the fathers and the present shame (*ḥerpâ*) (9:16,19).

3.2.21 Hosea

The Lord chooses to illustrate, through Hosea’s life, Israel’s violation of the covenant with God. In opposition to the faithful husband-God, Israel is an adulterous prostitute (cp. Ezek 16). This is a shame-oriented relational image. God tells Hosea to marry the prostitute Gomer and to adopt the „children of unfaithfulness“ with her (1:2). Gomer’s two children Lo-Ruhamah and Lo-Ammi signify the rupture of the covenant from God’s side (1:6,8). Israel is not God’s wife nor God her husband anymore (2:2). „Let her remove the adulterous look

from her face and the unfaithfulness (*nʿp*) from between her breasts. Otherwise I will strip her naked (*ʿārôm*) and make her as bare as on the day she was born“ (2:2f.). „I will take back my wool and my linen, intended to cover her nakedness (*ʿerwâ*). So now I will expose her lewdness (lit. folly *nablût*) before the eyes of her lovers“ (2:9f.). God not only punishes Israel and brings shame onto her, but he restores the covenant with her: „I will betroth you to me forever; I will betroth you in righteousness (*ṣedeq*) and justice (*mišpāt*), in love (*ḥesed*) and compassion (*ṛḥm*). I will betroth you in faithfulness (*emûnâ*), and you will acknowledge (*ydʿ*) the Lord“ (2:19f.). Through the image of betrothal, a strong shame-oriented accent is laid for the covenant concept. But *mišpāt* is included in the list as guilt-oriented component. All four main covenant behaviours are mentioned together: *ṣedeq*, *ḥesed*, *emûnâ*, and *ydʿ*. Three of them (*ḥesed*, *emet*, and *daʿat*) are repeated in God’s lamentation about Israel violating the covenant (4:1). The knowledge of the Lord seems to be the result of the other three covenant behaviours. Knowledge of God describes an intimate fellowship between God and his covenant partner. The relational component of the covenant is emphasized over against the guilt-oriented legal aspect: „For I desire mercy (*ḥesed*), not sacrifice, and acknowledgment (*daʿat*) of God rather than burnt offerings“ (6:6). But knowledge of God cannot go without knowledge of his covenant law. Lack of knowledge of the Lord and his law destroys the people (4:6). Thus, knowledge has a relational shame-oriented and a legal guilt-oriented component that cannot be separated (cp. Carew 2000:253ff.).

3.2.22 Jonah

Jonah receives the call from the Lord to preach repentance to the Ninevites because their „wickedness (*rāʿâ*) has come before me“ (1:2). But Jonah thinks based on his in-group orientation that this venture would become surely a failure. Thus, he feels ashamed before the Lord and runs away (1:3). He hides in the boat (1:5). When the storm becomes rougher and rougher, Jonah realizes that he cannot escape God. When the lot falls on him, he is obliged to tell the sailors that he is running away from God. The easiest way out of this shame is death. So he proposes the sailors to throw him into the sea (1:12). Inside the great fish, Jonah feels banished from the sight of the Lord and excluded from the covenant. He repents (2:4). Forced by God a second time to go to Nineveh, Jonah accepts. He delivers the message of judgement. When the Ninevites repent and God desists from destroying the city, Jonah loses face: „Jonah was greatly displeased and became angry“ (4:1). He experiences the failure that he foresaw when still at home. „I knew that you are a gracious (*ḥnn*) and compassionate (*ṛḥm*) God, slow

to anger and abounding in love (*hesed*), a God who relents (*nĥm*) from sending calamity (*rā'ā*)“ (4:2; cp. Ex 34:6; Neh 9:17). Shame becomes so great that Jonah wants to die (4:3). When the vine plant withers and Jonah experiences another failure, he is ashamed again and wants again to die (4:8). Jonah feels that he has the right to be angry after having experienced shame (4:9). Jonah’s behaviour illustrates a shame-anger spiral. Even though shame terminology is not significantly represented in the book of Jonah, his behaviour is clearly shame-oriented.

3.3 Examples from the New Testament

After the OT, we will now study shame and guilt in the NT within their covenant context. In the study of NT books, the discussion of the Synoptics will be longer than the other books because of their particular importance for our study.

3.3.1 Synoptics

In the light of the ancient Greek „rhetoric of praise and blame,“ Neyrey classifies the Gospels as „encomium.“ The author of an encomium „draws praise for a person by considering the various stages of his life“ (1998:11). In the language of honour and excellence, origin and birth, education, great deeds and fortune, and the noble death are presented. The miracle accounts and Jesus’ brilliant answers to the challenges of the Pharisees are part of this ancient rhetoric of praise. Additionally, the Gospel narratives turn shame into praise. This is especially the case for Jesus’ death at the cross, which is the ultimate shame a human being can suffer (1Cor 1:23; Hebr 12:2). Also in his instructions, particularly in the Beatitudes (Mt 5:3-12), the Antitheses (Mt 5:21-48), and in the Instructions on Piety of the Sermon on the Mount (Mt 6:1-18), Jesus honours what others have shamed. Even though Neyrey does not wish to reduce the genre gospel to a mere encomium, it becomes clear that the Gospel narratives follow the structural elements of the encomium (1998:70-163; cp. 1991). We find again Laniak’s „socio-literary pattern,“ which designs a personality’s way from shame to honour, or from honour to shame and honour again (cp. Phil 2:5-11; Laniak 1998:16).

Mt 1:1-17; Lk 3:23-38: The Genealogy of Jesus.²⁶ The start of Matthew’s Gospel with the genealogy of Jesus shows the importance of proving attributed honour through descent. Jesus Christ is the son of Abraham and the son of king David (Mt 1:1). The inclusion of

²⁶ For some Gospel narratives I follow Lienhard (2001a:276-285).

women like Tamar, Rahab and Ruth is a sign that an apparently shameful lineage can become honourable in God's plan (Mt 1:3,5).

Mt 1:18-25; Lk 1:26-56: Mary's Pregnancy and Joseph: It is a great honour for Mary to be visited by the angel Gabriel (Lk 1:26). But the pregnancy, which follows, risks to expose her and Joseph to public disgrace (*deigmatizō*). It must not have been easy to tell Joseph and her family. Maybe, it is for this reason that she hides for three months at Elizabeth's, her relative's, house (Lk 1:56). While Mary is apt to shame because of her pregnancy, Elizabeth's pregnancy takes away the shame of her barrenness (Lk 1:25). As Joseph is a righteous (*dikaios*) man and wants to avoid public shaming, he thinks to divorce Mary quietly (Mt 1:19).

Lk 2:1-40: The Poverty of Jesus' Parents: Mary and Joseph do not have enough money to pay a room in the inn. The very special child is born where animals are fed (Lk 2:7). The shepherds' and the Magi's visit, and the benedictions in the Temple are an honour for the parents and the baby (Mt 2:11; Lk 2:34). But the parents can only offer the sacrifice of the poor (Lk 2:24). It is to be assumed that the contrast between the great prophesies and honours received and the shame of everyday poverty was a great tension for Jesus' parents.

Mt 5:3-12; Mk 3:13; Lk 6:12-13,20: The Beatitudes: Hanson proposes that the Greek term *makarios* and the Hebrew term *āšrē*, which are normally rendered by „blessed“ (KJV, NASB, NIV), should be rendered by „How honourable!“ Hanson contends that makarisms in a general third person formula indicate that certain values are held as ideal. Inversely, the reproaches with the Greek term *ouai* and the Hebrew term *hōi* are spoken in a direct second person formula and impute shame (cp. Mt 23:13-36). Consequently, it should be rendered with „How shameful!“ (Hanson 1994). Jesus' makarisms describing God's kingdom imply a new world order, which puts the old upside down and ascribes honour to the shameful. It reverses therefore the honour game of the actual world (Neyrey 1998:187f.).

Mt 5:17-20: The Fulfillment of the Law: When observing Jesus' behaviour towards the Pharisees with their law orientation, one could have the impression that Jesus is against the law (*nomos*). However, he confirms that he has not come to abolish, but to fulfill it (5:17). The Law will not disappear until everything is accomplished. The one who breaks the least of these commandments will be called the least in the kingdom of heaven (5:18f.). God seems to be sure why he has introduced the guilt-oriented element at Mount Sinai in the march with his covenant people. He is not ready to renounce to it. But Jesus admonishes his disciples that they will not enter the kingdom of heaven unless their righteousness (*dikaiosynē*) surpasses that of the Pharisees (5:20). While the Pharisees' righteousness concentrates only on the

meticulous respect of the Law, that is the guilt-oriented aspect, the disciples' righteousness has to include both the relational element (conformity to covenant and community behaviour) and the legal aspect of the covenant (Mt 23:1-34 esp. 3). In the context of the woes, Jesus says to the Pharisees: „You give a tenth of your spices—mint, dill and cumin. But you have neglected the more important matters of the law - justice (*krisis* cp. *mišpāt*), mercy (*eleos* cp. *hesed*), and faithfulness (*pistis* cp. *ʿemûnâ* / *ʿemet*)“ (Mt 23:23 par Lk 11:42; Hagner 1995: 670).

Mt 5:21-48 par: The Law of Jesus: Jesus calls off the honour game also through his new law (Neyrey 1998:190-211). He prohibits all aggressive behaviour tolerating the shame of not seeking revenge (5:21-26). He prohibits all sexual aggression (5:27-32) and all false and vain speech (5:33). Jesus prohibits also all defense of honour (5:38-42) and prescribes love to one's enemies (5:44). In the perspective of the contemporary world of Jesus, these prescriptions raise the question of a shameless God. Nevertheless, honour is gained through the imitation of our heavenly Father. The sons, who are shamed by their families for disloyalty to their social traditions, are honoured by adoption into a new and better family, that is to be „sons of your Father who is in heaven“ (5:45; Neyrey 1998:209).

Mt 6:5-18: Piety in Secret: Neyrey observes that custom at the time of Jesus expects males „to be in public“ and females „to be in secret“ (1998:218f.). Acts of piety (alms giving, prayer and fasting) are performed in public and honour is looked for (cp. Mt 23:5f. par; Lk 14:1-14). Jesus' order to pray, fast and give alms in secret is therefore a reversal of cultural values in regards to gender expectations and the general public honour game. The public audience is replaced by the heavenly Father „who sees what is done in secret“ and rewards it (6:18). Jesus insists on God as the ever-present partner (cp. Gen 16:13f.; Ex 3:14). It is not the „evil eye“ that sees everything, but God's eye (Neyrey 1998:223).

Mt 6:9-13; Lk 11:2-4: The Lord's Prayer: The invocation with the pronoun in the first person plural implies a concept of corporate personality, a shame-oriented concept. Individualists would rather pray: „My Father!“ In regards to our subject, the prayer about forgiveness is of special interest: „Forgive (*aphes*) us our debts (*opheilēma*), as we also have forgiven our debtors (*opheiletēs*)“ (Mt 6:12). For the shame-oriented, indebtedness is the obligation that remains in a relationship, which is not „balanced“ or „finished“ (cp. Doi 1982:60-64,67). For the guilt-oriented, indebtedness is the financial or legal debt, which can be counted and must be paid back. Jesus' prayer for forgiveness means therefore different things for shame and guilt-oriented persons.

Mt 7:12; Lk 6:31: The Golden Rule: When Jesus gives a summary of the Law and the Prophets, he presents the Golden Rule: „In everything, do to others what you would have them do to you.“ This is a relational and shame-oriented definition of the OT covenant behaviour. The summary term of the OT in the NT is often the „Law,“ in Greek *nomos*, which is a rendering of the Hebrew term *tôrâ* „instruction.“ This change in meaning has been identified above as an indication of the guilt orientation of late Judaism. Later, when Jesus gives a second summary of the Law and the Prophets, he cites Dt 6:5 in conjunction with Lev 19:18: „Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind. ... And ... Love your neighbour as yourself“ (Mt 22:37-39; Mk 12:30f.; Lk 10:25-28). This is again a shame-oriented relational definition of righteousness implying the guilt-oriented aspect, namely that the love of God will lead to obedience to his covenant standards.

Mt 9:9-17; Mk 2:13-22; Lk 5:27-39: Jesus, Levi and the Pharisees: When Jesus calls Levi, the tax collector and collaborator of the Romans, to follow him, it must have been a shameful moment for the disciples and the Pharisees (Mt 9:9). This is even more the case when Jesus accepts Levi's invitation to have dinner with him and other tax collectors considered impure by the Pharisees (Mt 9:11). Jesus responds to them with a citation from Hos 6:6: „I desire mercy (*eleos*) not sacrifice.' For I have not come to call the righteous (*dikaïos*), but the sinners (*hamartolos*)“ (Mt 9:13). The citation from Hosea puts emphasis on the shame-oriented relational aspect of the covenant, and devalues the legalistic concern for purity as well as guilt-oriented sacrifices. Jesus' answer is a direct confrontation of the Pharisees, which shames them by making them lose face.

Mt 9:20-22; Mk 5:24-34; Lk 8:40-56: Jesus and the Woman with a Hemorrhage: The woman has been an outcast for twelve years because of her impurity (Mt 9:20). Certainly, she has not found a husband or has lost him. She has suffered a lot from her shame. When she touches Jesus, she is healed. Jesus' open confrontation by his question „Who touched my clothes?“ is very embarrassing for her and arises in her great fear and shame. Filled with shame she falls to his feet. Jesus' „Go in peace!“ brings definitive resolution to disharmony (Mk 5:33f.).

Mt 15:1-20; Mk 7:1-23: Concern for Ritual Purity: The Pharisees come and ask Jesus, why his disciples do not perform the ritual ablutions before eating. Jesus answers them with the citation of Isa 29:13 indicating a disparity between formal obedience to Law and inner rebellion. His conclusion is that „what goes into a man's mouth does not make him ,unclean' (*koinoō*), but what comes out of his mouth, that is what makes him ,unclean“ (Mt 15:11). The

concern for purity has been identified above as shame-oriented (cp. Lev 11-15; Neyrey 1996). Jesus comes back on this theme in the woes pronounced against the Pharisees (Mt 23:25f.; Lk 11:41). The leprosy patients and the woman with the hemorrhage have the same concern for ritual purity (Mt 9:21; Lk 5:12; 17:12). Jesus has come to purify the needy (Mt 8:2f.; 10:8; 11:5).

Mt 18:1-5; Mk 9:33-37; Lk 9:43-45: Who is the Greatest? The disciples are concerned about this question. This is an important theme in an honour-oriented society. Jesus shows that the people who are like children are truly great: „Whoever humbles (*tapeinoō*) himself like this child is the greatest in the kingdom of heaven“ (Mt 18:4). Thus, again Jesus reverses the common honour scale. And even worse, people who cause „little ones“ to fall are in great danger (Mt 18:5). The two sons of Zebedee initiate a second discussion of this same theme (Mt 20:25-28; Mk 10:42-45; Lk 22:24-27). They think they have a right to in-group preferential treatment as Jesus' relatives and send their mother as mediator. The narrative underscores the importance of the theme for the shame-oriented disciples. With the indication of the manner worldly kings govern, Jesus says: „But you are not to be like that. Instead, the greatest among you should be like the youngest, and the one who rules like the one who serves ... I am among you as one who serves“ (Lk 22:26f.). Following this scene, Jesus washes his disciples' feet and says: „Now that you know these things, you will be blessed if you do them“ (Jn 13:17). Service seems shameful, but actually confers honour: a reversal of the current cultural order.

Mt 18:21-30: The Parable of the Unmerciful Servant: This parable exemplifies the guilt-oriented aspect of forgiveness and grace. A debt has to be paid back (*apodidomi*) (18:25). The master cancels (*aphiēmi*) the debt (*daneion*), because he takes pity (*splangchnizomai*) (18:27). But the servant does not want to cancel a debt that a fellow servant has with him. He throws him into prison until he pays the debt (*opheilomenon*) (18:30). Then the master calls the first servant and says: „I cancelled (*aphiēmi*) all that debt (*opheilē*) ... Shouldn't you have had mercy (*eleeō*) on your fellow servant?“ (18:32f.). Even though the context of the narrative is financial and therefore clearly guilt-oriented, the terminology used is shame-oriented (*opheilō*), neutral (*aphiēmi*) or guilt-oriented (*daneion*). Apparently, *opheilēma* „obligation“ can be used for the social expectation or obligation in a relationship and the financial debt. The fact that it includes a shame and guilt-oriented component confirms our evaluation of Mt 6:12. Like sin and forgiveness, the concept of grace also has a guilt-oriented aspect. In

conclusion, money affairs introduce generally a guilt-oriented component in a shame-oriented culture.

Lk 15:11-31; The Parable of the Lost Son: When the Pharisees criticize Jesus of sitting with the tax collectors and sinners and making himself unclean, Jesus tells the parable of the father and the two sons. One son asks for his inheritance and spends all the money. When it is all consumed, he becomes guardian of pigs, unclean animals, and even envies them for their food (15:16). He is stripped of all dignity, poor and hungry, a very shameful state. When he comes back home, he confesses his sin and his unworthiness to be called a son (15:21). But his father welcomes him, gives him new clothes and shoes, the heir's finger ring, and organizes a big feast for him (15:22f.). He gives status and honour back to the son. This parable illustrates the shame-oriented aspect of grace and forgiveness that is reconciliation (cp. Lawson 2000:101).

Mt 21:28-33: The Parable of the Two Sons: A father wants to give work to his two sons. The first says, he will not go, but later changes his mind and goes. The second answers, he will, but does not go (21:29f.). The first son gives a guilt-oriented confrontational answer, while the second responds in a situational shame-oriented manner. Actually, he also means no, but adapts to the situation to please his father. This way of conforming to the protocol of situations is not considered a lie in shame-oriented contexts. It serves the important function to prevent losing face (Käser 1997:162f.; Kurani 2001:59). The latter son stands for the Pharisees, who are here grouped with the shame-oriented. For everyone, it is clear that the first son did what his father wanted (21:31). Interestingly, Jesus approves here the guilt-oriented direct communication. The same happens in the Sermon on the Mount, when he advises his listeners to „let your ‚Yes‘ be ‚Yes,‘ and your ‚No,‘ ‚No‘“ (Mt 5:37).

Mt 22:1-13; Lk 14:1-24: Who Gets to Sit at God's Table? Jesus is invited to a Pharisee's house for a meal and sees people scramble for the best places. He says, those who choose first places will be lowered. Those who seek honour will be shamed. And those who choose lower places will get a better place and be thus honoured. „For everyone who exalts (*hypsoō*) himself will be humbled (*tapeinoō*), and he who humbles himself will be exalted“ (Lk 14:11). Again, Jesus reverses the current honour game. Then he tells the parable of the great banquet: Those who are invited are honoured, but they do not come. So, the man invites „the poor, the crippled, the blind and the lame“ (Lk 14:21). Those who are in shameful conditions are honoured. But one man enters without proper clothing. The master confronts him so that he loses face: „The man was speechless“ (Mt 22:12). The servants „throw him outside, where

there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth,” a shameful condition. It may be surprising for some that the criterion of entrance to the banquet is clothing, a shame-oriented criterion. In conclusion, an invitation to a banquet and clothing are honour symbols (cp. Gen 43:31-34; 2Sam 9:10; 2Ki 25:29; Est 5:12; Lk 13:29). Exclusion from a banquet or a social event is shameful.

Lk 19:1-10: Zacchaeus: Despite the shameful collaboration with the Romans, Zacchaeus, a chief tax collector, is a wealthy and respected man in the community. It is considered very shameful for such a dignitary to run and to climb a tree (19:4). To do it would act fuel to the gossip that warmed his back as he taxed the Jews on behalf of the Romans. Zacchaeus does it nevertheless, because God has become a greater preoccupation than his shame before the crowd (cp. king David 2Sam 6:14-16). When Jesus stops at the sycomore-fig tree and invites Zacchaeus to come down, all the eyes of the crowd are directed on him, a very shameful moment. But at the same time, this is a moment of great honour for a „sinner“ (*hamartolos*), which is a shameful epithet (19:7). Zacchaeus accepts gladly to welcome Jesus in his house (19:6). His exposure and the acceptance in Jesus' presence over dinner motivates him to change his way and restore what he has stolen in fulfillment of the Mosaic law (Ex 22:1; Lev 5:21-24). Salvation (*sōtēria*) has come to his house; he has been transformed from a sinner to a „son of Abraham“ (19:9). Forgiveness is not only enacted on the guilt axis through reparation, but also on the shame axis through the restitution of honour and status as a member of Jewish society (Lienhard 1998:83; Lawson 2000:100f.).

Mt 25:31-46: The Last Judgement: Matthew describes the scene of the last judgement in terms of glory and power, that is, in shame-oriented terms (25:31). The criteria of judgement are shame-oriented relational behaviours: mercy on behalf of the shameful: the thirsty, the naked, the sick, and the strangers (25:35f., 42f.). The ones on the right are blessed and honoured (*eulogeō*), the ones on the left are cursed or shamed (*kataraoimai*) (25:34, 41). The retribution is eternal punishment (*kolasis*) for the wicked, and eternal life for the righteous (*dikaioi*) (25:46). The judgement, for which we would expect guilt-oriented terms to be used, is described in neutral and shame-oriented concepts.

Mt 26-28; Mk 14-16; Lk 22-24: Jesus is Crucified, Dies and Lives Again: Despite his contrary convictions, Pilate condemns Jesus to death by crucifixion. The fact that his motivation is to please others indicates a shame-oriented behaviour, as is often the case with politicians (Lk 23:24). The Gospel authors reflect the general perception of crucifixion in the Greco-Roman world as „shame“ (cp. Hebr 12:2). At every step, crucifixion entails progressive

humiliation of the victim and loss of honour. Public trials serve as status degradation rituals. Flogging and torture, scourging from back and front, nakedness, pinioning of hands and arms, public ridiculing and mocking label the accused as shameful person. Death by crucifixion is slow and protracted. The victim suffers bodily distortions, loss of bodily control, and enlargement of the penis. Ultimately, it is deprived of life and thus the possibility of gaining satisfaction or vengeance (Hengel 1977:22-32; Neyrey 1994:113). This shameful death at the cross is changed into praise through the rending of the temple veil, the earthquake, the opening of tombs (Mt 27:51f.), praise from the executioner (Mt 27:54), the burial among the rich (Mt 27:60), Jesus' resurrection (Mt 28:6; cp. Acts 2:23f.), and his subsequent authority and position at the right hand of God (Mt 28:18; cp. Phil 2:5-11; Neyrey 1998:140-146).

3.3.2 John

Jn 1: The Word became Flesh: „The Word became flesh and made his dwelling among us. We have seen his glory (*doxa* cp. *kābôd*), the glory of the One and Only, who came from the Father, full of grace (*charis* cp. *ḥesed*) and truth (*alētheia* cp. *ʾemet*) ... Or the law (*nomos*) was given through Moses; grace and truth came through Jesus Christ“ (1:14,17). Jesus Christ, the *logos*, is presented in OT shame and guilt-oriented covenant terminology (Beasley-Murray 1987:14). In this passage, the new covenant's emphasis on grace and truth is opposed to the old covenant's emphasis on law and judgement. This indicates a shift from a guilt-oriented perception of the old covenant to a combined concept in the new covenant. „Yet to all who received him, to those who believed in his name, he gave the right (*exousia*) to become children of God“ (1:12; cp. 1Jn 3:1; Hos 2:1). In a shame-oriented language, Christ's *doxa* „glory“ is put in relationship to the *exousia* „power“ of those who believe in him. While KJV translates *exousia* rightly with power, NIV renders it in a guilt-oriented terminology as „right.“ This power is embedded in the covenant relationship. It comes from the covenant partner's *doxa*. John's formulation and the context recall the creation narrative (Gen 1:26), where God's image (*selem*) implies representation, authority, honour and power. The children acquire a new and high status. They are brought into the covenant relationship with the Father through a mediator, the Father's Son and *logos*. This *logos* is life and light, synonyms of salvation (1:4,8f.).

Jn 3: Jesus Meets Nicodemus: Nicodemus, the Pharisee and member of the Jewish ruling council, comes to Jesus at night. This is a shame-oriented behaviour in regard to his special status. He wants to know whether Jesus is really the Messiah. But he does not ask this

question directly, but chooses an indirect approach praising his teaching capacity and miraculous signs (3:2). Jesus, on the other hand, chooses a direct approach surprising him with the statement that he must be born again (3:3). Then Jesus makes Nicodemus lose face. He says in a rhetorical question: „You are Israel’s teacher and do not understand these things?“ (3:10). Nicodemus must never have forgotten this moment when Jesus talked about his superior knowledge of heavenly things and made Nicodemus feel humiliated.

Jn 3:15-17: Jesus’ sending mission is motivated by love, covenant love (*agapē* cp. *hesed*) (3:16; cp. 17:26; Ps 136). The objective of Jesus’ coming into the world is salvation or, in Johannine terminology, „eternal life“ (3:15-17; cp. 4:14; 6:33,40,63; 17:2; Mal 2:5) and „abundant life“ (10:10). Jesus’ mission is a mission of reconciliation and justification (cp. 2Cor 5:17-21). „Now this is eternal life: that they may know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom you have sent“ (17:3). Life „like God“ is a function of the intimate knowledge of God, a covenant behaviour.

Jn 4: Jesus Talks With a Samaritan Woman: When Jesus who is tired from the journey sits down at Jacob’s well at mid day, a Samaritan woman comes to draw water. Why does she go draw water in the greatest heat when everybody else is taking a nap? (4:6). She is ashamed of other people and tries to avoid them. Jesus starts a conversation about water, adopting an indirect approach. Reminding Jesus of the purity laws, the woman is astonished with Jesus’ demand (4:9). Then Jesus works his way through the water theme to the matrimonial situation and his being the Messiah, the main point of the conversation.

Jn 10: The Shepherd and His Flock: The shepherd and his flock are in an intimate relationship. The shepherd knows his sheep by name and the sheep know his voice (cp. *ydʿ*) (10:3f.). „I know my sheep and my sheep know me - just as the Father knows me and I know the Father“ (10:14; cp. v.27). The same corporate personality concept, which exists between the shepherd and his sheep, exists also between Father and Son: „The Father is in me, and I in the Father“ (10:38). The same concept of corporate personality is visible in the image of the vine and the branches (15). Jesus is the vine, the disciples the branches. „Remain in me, and I will remain in you“ (15:4). Then you will bear much fruit (15:5). Then „ask whatever you wish and it will be given you“ (15:7). This is to the Father’s glory (*doxa*) (15:8). Still the same corporate personality concept is visible in Jesus’ prayer (17). Unity exists between Father and Son: „All I have is yours, and all you have is mine“ (17:10). Jesus prays also for the unity of the disciples: „that all of them may be one, Father, just as you are in me and I am in you“ (17:21). Additionally, there is corporate personality between the Deity and the disciples: „May

they also be in us so that the world may believe that you have sent me“ (17:21). Corporate unity among the disciples and with God means glory (*doxa*) for Jesus and the disciples and is important for evangelism (17:24; cp. Ps 133:1,3). The disciples were shamefully excluded from this intimate covenant community, but now they are included into harmony and honoured.

Jn 13: Jesus Washes His Disciples' Feet: It is interesting to note that this passage is found only in John's Gospel. Could it be because of the fact that the author of the Gospel, as the youngest of the disciples, would have normally had the responsibility to wash the feet of the group? If this is true, then the scene must have been an unforgettable shame experience for John. At about the same time the dispute among the disciples who was the greatest took place (Lk 22:24). Is it because of the preoccupation with their honour that John and the others forgot to wash the feet? When Jesus starts to wash the feet, all the disciples are shamed. Only Peter's shame is mentioned indirectly (13:8). The fact that Jesus insists to perform the task that is naturally the responsibility of one of the disciples deepens the shame experience. When Peter understands Jesus' washing as ritual washing, he wants to have head, hands and feet washed (13:9). But Jesus says that the disciples are already clean (*katharos*) (13:10). The lesson is that humility (*tapeinosis*) and service (*diakonia*) are more honourable (*makarios*) than the pursuit of honour and power (13:17).

Jn 14-16: Jesus Promises the Holy Spirit: Jesus' mission has been identified as one of mediation (3:16; cp. 2Cor 5:18f.). When Jesus announces his departure (13:33), he announces the arrival of the second mediator or counselor (*paraklētos*) (14:16). The Father will send him in Jesus' name (14:26; 16:7). He will testify to Jesus (15:26) and will remind the disciples everything he has said to them (14:26). The disciples do not have to be afraid of direct exposure to the Father. They will continue to have a mediator between them (cp. Ex 20:19). This is a major concern for shame-oriented people.

Jn 15: The Covenant of Love: Jesus' mediation is an integral part of God's covenant of love (*agapē* cp. *hesed*) with his people. The covenant of love implies the covenant standards. It is therefore combined shame and guilt-oriented. „As the Father has loved me (*agapaō*), so have I loved you. Now remain (*menō*) in my love. If you obey my commands (*entolē*), you will remain in my love, just as I have obeyed my Father's commands and remain in his love“ (15:10f.). We find again the double formula of love and obedience. Keeping Jesus' law means to love him: „If you love me, you will obey what I command“ (Jn 14:15).

Jn 18-20: Jesus' Passion: Although arrest and capture are shameful events, there are elements of honour in it. When Jesus says: „I am he“ who you are looking for, the soldiers draw back and fall to the ground (18:6; cp. Ezek 1:28; 44:4; Dan 2:46; Rev 1:17). Jesus knows all that is going to happen (18:4). He is in control and suffers no shame. In the Jewish investigation with Annas and in the Roman trial with Pilate, Jesus defends himself honourably (18:23,37). But his true honour is that which God ascribes: Jesus is King and Son of God (18:33,36; 19:7). Pilate flogs Jesus, mocks him through a thorn crown and a purple robe and strikes him in the face (19:1-3). Through this shaming and humiliation, he attempts to produce pity in the Jews. But they insist on more shaming because they have been shamed at many occasions, too many to be able to forgive. They want that Jesus be shamed, that is, crucified (19:6,15). The Jews try to shame Pilate in order to compel him to cede: „If you let this man go, you are no friend of Cesar“ (19:12). Following that, Pilate shames the Jews by obliging them to acknowledge loyalty to Cesar (19:15). Jesus says that the Jews have greater „sin“ (*hamartia*) than Pilate, which NIV renders in a guilt-oriented perspective with „guilt“ (19:11). It is interesting to note that the Jews did not enter Pilate's palace to avoid becoming ritually unclean for the Passover (18:28). Despite the shame of crucifixion, some honour is maintained by his burial „among the rich“ (cp. Isa 53:9) and clearly by his resurrection and appearances (20). Ironically and surprisingly, Jesus' death accounts for his and his Father's glorification (13:31f.) (Neyrey 1994:119-132).

3.3.3 Acts

Acts 2: Pentecost: Peter explains the event of Pentecost, which was announced by Jesus in Acts 1:8, with the prophecy of Joel 2:28-32. He confronts the audience directly in a guilt-oriented way condemning them for having imposed the shame of the cross on Jesus (2:23). But God honoured him and raised him from the dead as David had prophesied in Ps 16:10. He is now seated in his glory at the right hand of God. He has shamed his enemies who have to serve him as a footstool (2:34f.; cp. Ps 110:1; 1Cor 15:25; Hebr 1:13; 5:6; 7:17,21). „God has made this Jesus, whom you crucified, both Lord and Christ“ (2:36). The shame and honour terminology about Jesus contrasts with the confrontational guilt-oriented approach. Peter deals here with relatively guilt-oriented Jews. In this same confrontational style, Peter calls to repentance (*metanoia*) (2:38; cp. 3:14f.; 4:10; 5:29; 7:51-53). This is a power encounter. In the following verses, the intimate fellowship among the disciples and with God is described, a shame-oriented concept (2:42-47).

We have to ask what happened with the consciences at Pentecost? Jer 31:33f. tells us that the Lord forgives the sins. He then puts his law in the purified minds and writes it in the renewed hearts (consciences) (cp. Ps 51:10). The standards are internalized and remain fixed, a stronger guilt orientation. The relationship with God is intensified, an increase in shame orientation. The Holy Spirit sensitizes the conscience, which means deeper shame and guilt orientation. Teachers and mediators do not have the same function anymore, because everybody knows the Lord (cp. *יד*), that is, has intimate fellowship with him. Communication becomes more direct. Through the constancy of standards, the Holy Spirit brings about a shift towards guilt orientation in shame-oriented persons (cp. Müller 1983a:6,10f.). On the other hand, through the intimate relationship with God, guilt-oriented persons become more shame-oriented.

Acts 8:9-25: Simon the Sorcerer: Simon is in search of honour and power. „He boasted that he was someone great“ (8:9). When he sees the great miracles and signs of Philip, he wants to become a Christian (8:14). Envyng the power of the Holy Spirit that is transmitted by the laying on of the hands, he offers money to Peter and John (8:18). Peter confronts him and calls him to repent (8:22). God does not want money and a heart of pride, but a broken and contrite heart filled with humility (cp. Ps 51:16f.). This might possibly be more difficult for shame-oriented people like Simon.

Acts 10: Peter, Ritual Purity and Cornelius: Peter has to learn a lesson about ritual purity, a shame-oriented concept. God tells him to touch and eat ceremonially unclean animals (10:13). Peter refuses with vehemence: „I have never eaten anything impure (*koinos*) or unclean (*akathartos*)“ (10:14). God answers: „Do not call anything impure that God has made clean“ (10:15). God is leading Peter clearly beyond ritual laws (Lev 11-15). He prepares him to meet the „unclean“ Roman centurion Cornelius who becomes one of the first non-Jewish believers (10:27f.).

Acts 15: The Council at Jerusalem: Believers from Jewish and Pharisean background demand that the new believers respect the Mosaic Law and get circumcised (15:1,5). Paul and Barnabas who have seen the Holy Spirit at work among the non-Jews plead for freedom (15:2). After his experience with Cornelius, Peter himself is convinced that „God who knows the heart [conscience], showed that he accepted them by giving the Holy Spirit to them, just as he did to us. He made no distinction between us and them, for he purified (*katharizō*) their hearts by faith (*pistis*) ... We believe (*pisteuō*) it is through the grace (*charis*) of our Lord Jesus that we are saved (*sōzō*), just as they are“ (15:8-9,11). In the question, which ritual and

cultic laws should be maintained, James supports Peter's „judgement“ (*krinō*) and proposes a compromise: They should „abstain from food polluted by idols, from sexual immorality, from the meat of strangled animals and from blood“ (15:20,29). Actually, James becomes the mediator between the two factions, and between the law and the human reality, which is the old shame and guilt-oriented function of the judges (*krinetēs* cp. *šōpēt*). However, if this compromise was the Lord's leading for the actual situation (shame-oriented), it has not lasted very long as the further development in the NT shows. In conclusion, the Law is not anymore a condition for and the way to salvation, but it remains as „Christ's law“ the revelation of God's will. Conscience has to apply it to the actual situation (cp. Schnabel 1992).

Direct and Indirect Communication in Public Speeches: While the Jews Peter and Stephen choose direct confrontational approaches to their fellow Jews (2:38; 3:14f.; 4:10; 5:29; 7:51-53), Paul uses indirect approaches to the mixed audience in Pisidian Antioch (13:17-43), to the non-Jews in Lystra (14:15-17), to the Greeks in Athens (17:22-31), and in his defense before the Roman governor Felix (24:10-21). Paul develops the chronological history of Israel and his testimony when talking to a mixed audience in the synagogue of Pisidian Antioch (13:17-43), before the crowd in the temple of Jerusalem (22:1-21), and in his defense before King Agrippa (26:1-32). He speaks of justification (*dikaiosis*) when talking to more guilt-oriented Jews: „Through him everyone who believes is justified from everything you could not be justified from by the law of Moses“ (13:39). In conclusion, we find a more guilt-oriented approach by Peter and Stephen when talking to Jews, and a more shame-oriented approach by Paul when talking to non-Jews. However, we cannot detect a change from shame to guilt orientation in Peter through the book of Acts as Müller observes (1983a:10f.).

3.3.4 Paul's Letters

Several of Paul's letters are divided into a theological section (e.g. Rom 1-11) and a paraenetic section (e.g. Rom 12-15). The theological expository parts are easy to grasp for analytic guilt-oriented thinkers and difficult for synthetic shame-oriented consciences. However, the style of a fictitious dialogue adopted by Paul facilitates the comprehension for shame-oriented synthetic thinkers.

Rom 1:16-17: The Righteousness of God: Paul is not ashamed (*epaischynomai*) of the Gospel (cp. Lk 9:26). It is the power of God (*dynamis theou*) for salvation and the righteousness of God (*dikaiosynē theou*). This is a parallel construction with a shame-oriented term in

order to show that the „righteousness of God“ is not only a gift of God (guilt-oriented objective genitive), but also his activity (shame-oriented subjective genitive). Righteousness becomes thus virtually synonymous to salvation, a combined shame and guilt-oriented concept (contra Müller 1983a:3; 1988:428; 1996a:103). Righteousness is covenant faithfulness (cp. Rom 3:3-5:25; 9:6; 10:3; 15:8) and also covenant love as the LXX renders *hesed* by *dikaiosynē* (e.g. Gen 19:19; 20:13; 21:23, etc.) (Dunn 1988:41; Moxnes 1988a:73). This righteousness is for everyone who believes (*pisteuō*), that is, for the one who is faithful to the covenant between God and man. Following OT and Jewish-apocalyptic tradition, the righteousness of God becomes the main theme of Paul's letter to the Romans (Schlatter 1935; Stuhlmacher 1989:15).

Rom 1:18-5:21: Justification by Faith: Even though non-Jews do not have the law, the requirements of the law are written on their hearts, that is, in their consciences (2:15). This is the situation after Pentecost. Righteous (*dikaios*) in God's sight are those who obey the law, not those who hear it simply (2:13). God knows men's secrets. He will judge (*krinō*) them on the last day (2:16). Therefore, righteousness from God cannot come through the law, but through faith only. „For all have sinned (*hamartanō*) and fall short (*hystereō*) of the glory (*doxa*) of God, and are justified (*dikaioō*) freely by his grace (*charis*) through the redemption (*apolytrosis*) that came by Christ Jesus“ (3:23f.). The vocabulary is neutral or shame-oriented. Sin is opposed to righteousness, which proves again the balance of the concept. The above NT models of forgiveness are then linked to the OT concept of atonement through the historical fact of Christ's death at the cross: „God presented him as a sacrifice of atonement (*hilastērion*) through faith (*pistis*) in his blood“ (3:25). He did this to demonstrate his righteousness (*dikaiosynē*) in order to be righteous (*dikaios*) and the one who justifies (*dikaioō*) those who have faith (*pistis*) in Jesus (3:26). God's covenant love and grace in the sacrifice of Jesus proves his covenant righteousness. Modern translations like NIV and HfA adopt here a guilt-oriented rendering with justice and guilt. Paul asks then the question whether justification by faith nullifies the law. „Not at all! Rather, we uphold the law (*nomos*)“ (3:31). The qualification to be given is that the law is not a condition for salvation anymore, but that it is still important as a disciplining agent (*paidagōgos*) (Gal 3:24), for both shame and guilt-oriented consciences. Faith is the condition for salvation. Even though this faith is in Christ who experienced a shameful and foolish death at the cross, „the one who trusts (*pisteuō*) in him will never be put to shame (*kataischynomai*)“ (9:33; cp. 10:11; Isa 28:16; Moxnes 1988a:72). There is thus a shift from guilt-oriented obedience to the law towards faith, that is

faithfulness towards the covenant partner and his standards. This is a combined but more shame-oriented expression of covenant behaviour.

At the end of this passage, Paul gives another model of forgiveness linked with the first: „Since we have now been justified (*dikaioō*) by his blood, how much more shall we be saved (*sōzō*) from God's wrath through him! For if, when we were God's enemies, we were reconciled (*katalassō*) to him through the death of his Son, how much more, having been reconciled, shall we be saved through his life!“ (5:9f.). While the Biblical concept of justification is combined shame and guilt-oriented, the reconciliation model is clearly shame-oriented (cp. 2Cor 5:17-20). This difference does not bother Paul to speak of both in one sentence.

Eph 6:10-17: The Armour of God: Paul exhorts the Ephesians to put on the full armour of God (6:13). These are actually the covenant behaviours and characteristics: the belt of truth (*alētheia* cp. *ʾemet*), the breastplate of righteousness (*dikaiosynē* cp. *šdāqā*), the feet fitted with peace (*eirēnē* cp. *šālôm*), the shield of faith (*pistis* cp. *emûnâ*), and the helmet of salvation (*sōtēria* cp. *yšûʿâ*).

Phil 2:1-11: Christ's Humility and Honour: Paul admonishes the Philippians to consider in humility (*tapeinophrosynē*) others higher than themselves, and to have the same attitude as Christ Jesus:

Who, being in very nature (*morphē*) God, did not consider equality with God something to be grasped,
 But made himself nothing (*kenōō*), taking the very nature (*morphē*) of a servant (*doulos*), being made in human likeness (*homoïoma* cp. *šelem*).
 And being found in appearance (*schēma*) as a man, he humbled (*tapeinoō*) himself and became obedient to death-- even death on a cross!
 Therefore God exalted (*hyperypsoō*) him to the highest place and gave him the name that is above every name,
 that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, in heaven and on earth and under the earth,
 and every tongue confess (*homologeō*) that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory (*doxa*) of God the Father (2:6-11).

The Christ-hymn of the primitive church designs Christ's way from glory and honour in his eternal preexistence „with God“ through humility to shame and again back to glory. This corresponds to Laniak's „socio-literary pattern“ discovered in several OT narratives (1998:16). It describes also the „paradoxical identity“ of the Christian that shame in the culture of this world can mean honour in the spiritual world (cp. Mt 5:3-12; Moxnes 1988a:71).

1Tim 2:5: Jesus the Only Mediator: For the old covenant, there was a mediator: „The law was put into effect through angels by a mediator“ (Gal 3:19; cp. Acts 7:38,53). This mediator of the law was Moses (cp. Hebr 1-3). It seems that the association of angels with the giving of the law came about by the LXX's translation of Dt 33:2 (Longenecker 1990:139). This association can be explained by the fact that angels are generally mediators between God and men. For a shame-oriented context, it is therefore logical that they were present when the law was given. For the new covenant, there is also a mediator: „There is one God and one mediator (*mesitēs*) between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave himself as a ransom (*anti-lytron*) for all men“ (1Tim 2:5). The fact that making a covenant is thought of in terms of a mediator is a clearly shame-oriented perspective. Being the ransom brings in a guilt-oriented element in the process of freeing slaves, which comprises giving freedom as relational element and the payment of the ransom as guilt-oriented aspect.

1Cor 10:23-11:1: Pauline Ethics: In the paraenetic sections of his letters, Paul explains Christian ethics with many practical details. He discusses ethics in covenant perspective (cp. Huntemann 1983:127). Ethics are in a particular way a matter of conscience (e.g. 1Cor 10:25-29). A guilt-oriented conscience internalises the standards and the significant others reinforces them. It can function well with general principles independent of significant others present. A shame-oriented conscience needs the presence of a significant other setting clear practical and public standards for every situation in order to function properly. If the significant other is absent, the conscience has no ethical orientation. So Paul admonishes the Corinthians: „Whatever you do, do it all for the glory (*doxa*) of God (1Cor 10:31; cp. Eph 1:12,14; Col 3:23). God and Christ are the significant others (1Cor 11:1). Despite the compromise at the Council at Jerusalem, Paul's ethics, which are practiced before God in the guidance of the Holy Spirit, are based on the freedom from the law: „Everything is permissible“ (1Cor 10:23). This applies to guilt-oriented Christians who have internalised the standards in their consciences. However, even though everything is permissible, not everything is beneficial and constructive (1Cor 6:12; 10:23). The limit of Christian freedom is „the good of others“ (1Cor 10:24), a shame-oriented check that we have already met in the Golden Rule (Mt 7:12). To the Romans, Paul says it in another way: Owe (*opheilō*) no man anything except to love (*agapaō*) one another, for he who loves his fellowman has fulfilled the law (Rom 13:8). Were it not for love, this would be a guilt-oriented command: „Owe no man anything.“ But in a shame-oriented perspective, *opheilō* can mean the „debt“ or failure in social expectations (cp. Mt 6:12). Additionally, the concept of interdependence is a shame-oriented „way of life.“ The fulfill-

ment of the law is interestingly a shame-oriented behaviour (cp. Schnabel 1992). There is another aspect to ethics in a shame-oriented context. The significant other has to set clear-cut public standards for every situation. This is the reason why Paul discusses the different questions in great detail. This detailed discussion resembles in a shame-oriented perspective „contextual“ or „situational“ ethics.

Covenantal ethics have to do with love, righteousness, faithfulness and wisdom. For the evaluation of ethical questions, a judge needs all of these, but particularly wisdom. Paul tells the Corinthians that they will judge (*krinō*) the world, and even the angels (1Cor 6:2f.). And he asks them: „Is it possible that there is nobody among you wise (*sophos*) enough to judge (*krinō*) a dispute between believers?“ Paul says this to shame (*entropē*) the Corinthians (1Cor 6:5). Wisdom is opposed to shame and to folly (cp. 2Cor 11:1,16-19), which is a confirmation that it is shame-oriented covenant behaviour.

On the basis of the analysis of Paul's behaviour and speeches in Acts and of his theological expositions and ethical discussions in his letters, we conclude that the apostle Paul, who was originally a Pharisee, seems to have a balanced shame and guilt-oriented conscience (cp. Stendahl 1963; Wiher 1997).

3.3.5 Hebrews

One of the themes of the letter to the Hebrews is mediation. The mediators of the old and of the new covenant are compared. „In the past God spoke to our forefathers through the prophets at many times and in various ways, but in these last days he has spoken to us by his Son“ (1:1-3). The prophets and the Son are seen as mediators in a process of reconciliation between God and men. God's indirect incarnational communication is shame-oriented. The Son is shown to be superior to all the mediators of the old covenant: the angels (1:4-14; cp. Dt 33:2; Acts 7:38,53; Gal 3:19f.; Longenecker 1990:139), Moses (3:1-19), and Melchizedek the priest (7). The Son is „heir of all things,“ „the radiance of God's glory and the exact representation of his being,“ and he is seated „at the right hand of the Majesty in heaven“ (1:3). God has made him temporarily „a little lower than the angels,“ but „has crowned him with glory (*doxa*) and honour (*timē*) and put everything under his feet“ (2:7-9; cp. Ps 8:6; 110:1). Having all this glory, he is not ashamed (*epaischynomai*) to call men his brothers (2:11). „He has been found worthy of greater honour than Moses“ (3:3). Jesus is greater than the great high priest Melchizedek (7:4). He „is holy, blameless, pure, set apart from sinners, exalted above the heavens“ (7:26; deSilva 1995:220). His sacrifice is „once for all“ (7:27; 9:12,26,28; 10:10; cp.

Rom 6:10; 1Pet 3:18). Jesus is the mediator of a new and better covenant (7:22; 8:6-13; 9:15; 10:29; 12:24). The old covenant of the law was „only a shadow of the good things to come.“ The realities are spiritual (10:1; cp. 1Cor 10:1-13; 2Cor 3:6). Unlike the old covenant, the blood of the new covenant cleanses (*katharizō*) our consciences (*syneidēsis*) (9:14; 10:2). Zero time is set anew. The law is now written in the hearts and minds, that is the conscience (10:16; cp. Jer 31:33).

Hebr 11-12:13: Loyalty to God through Persevering Faith: The list of the faithful in Hebr 11 is the list of those „commended for“ (NIV), those having „received attestation“ (*martyreō* passive), that is, those honoured by God (11:2; Lane 1991:313). Faithfulness and faith (*pistis*) as covenant behaviours are honourable. Faithfulness means righteousness (11:4,7). God was not ashamed (*epaischynomai*) of them, but honoured them (11:16). Faithful and honourable people like Abel, Enoch, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Joseph, Moses, Gideon, David, Samuel and the prophets are part of them. But also less equivoque persons like Rahab, Samson, Jephthah are considered honourable because of their persevering faith and suffering. Discipline (*paideia*) produces righteousness (*dikaioynē*) and peace (*eirēnē*), synonyms for salvation (12:11). Therefore, since we have this corporate identity and personality together with all these faithful, let us run with perseverance the race of faith. Let us look upon Christ, the example of faith. He renounced of his glory in heaven, scorned the shame (*aischynē*) of the death at the cross, and sits now again in glory, honour and power „at the right hand of the throne of God“ (12:1-2; deSilva 1995:168). Therefore, let us bear the same disgrace (*oneidismos*) he bore at the cross (13:13).

3.3.6 Peter's Letters

Peter addresses God's elect and chosen, honourable terms, who are at the same time strangers, normally a shameful term (1Pet 1:1f.). He wishes them „grace (*charis*) and peace (*eirēnē*) ... in abundance through the knowledge (*epignosis*) of God and of Jesus our Lord,“ knowledge implying an intimate covenant relationship and covenant behaviour (2Pet 1:2). In honour vocabulary, Peter calls them a „chosen people (*genos eklekton*), a royal priesthood (*basileion hierateuma*), a holy nation (*ethnos hagion*), a people belonging to God (*laos peripoiēsin*)“ (1Pet 2:9; cp. Ex 19:6; Rev 1:6; 5:10). God's special covenant people has been „called out of darkness into his wonderful light,“ a synonym of sin and salvation. Once they were in the shameful position of being „not a people.“ But now they are in the honourable position of being the people of the God of the universe. Once they had not received mercy (*eleeō* cp.

hesed), but now they have received mercy (1Pet 2:10). This honourable position is due to their faith in Jesus Christ: „the one who trusts (*pisteuō*) in him will never be put to shame (*kataischynō*)“ (1Pet 2:6; cp. Isa 28:16; Rom 9:33; 10:11; Campbell 1998:84). The fact that this citation from Isaiah comes back again and again in the NT shows its special importance for shame-oriented believers. The power of the Holy Spirit has brought them through a spiritual baptism from a shameful to an honourable position. In this sense, baptism is not a ritual purification, „not the removal of dirt from the body, but the pledge (*eperōtēma*) of a good conscience (*syneidēsis*) towards God“ (1Pet 3:21). The new birth purifies the conscience, sets new zero time, and empowers to a good conscience, a really honourable and upright situation implying salvation.

The apostle calls the chosen ones to humility: „All of you, clothe yourselves with humility (*tapeinophrosynē*) towards one another, because „God opposes the proud (*hyperēphanos*) but gives grace (*charis*) to the humble (*tapeinos* cp. *‘ānī*)““ (1Pet 5:5; cp. Prov 3:34). If they humble themselves now, God will lift them up (*hypsōō*) and honour them in due time (1Pet 5:6). Now they suffer „a little while“ and are thus in a shameful situation. But God calls them „to his eternal glory (*doxa*) in Christ“ (1Pet 5:10) and will give them at Christ’s return „the crown of glory (*doxēs stephanos*)“ (1Pet 5:4). The direction leads from weakness to strength, from shame to glory and power, reminding us of the familiar socio-literary pattern (Laniak 1998:16).

At Christ’s return, glory and honour for the believers are as certain as judgement and shame for the unbelievers. Judgement (*krisis*) brings just retribution: righteousness for the righteous, and punishment for the ungodly (*athesmos*), lawless (*anomos*) and unrighteous (*adikos*) (2Pet 2:4-10). Neutral and guilt-oriented terms are used. The day of the Lord will be a moment of truth: „The earth and everything in it will be laid bare (*heuriskō*)“ (2Pet 3:10; cp. 1Cor 4:5). The secret things will be exposed unexpectedly. Therefore, it will not only be a moment of guilt, but also a shameful moment. Consequently, „make every effort to be found spotless, blameless and at peace with him“ (2Pet 3:14). Be pure and seek harmony. After that, in the new earth and the new sky, righteousness (*dikaiosynē*) will dwell (*katoikeō*) (2Pet 3:13).

Peter’s predominantly neutral and shame-oriented vocabulary indicates a shame orientation of his personality. These findings contrast with Peter’s direct approach in most of his speeches in Acts. We have to keep in mind that Peter spoke to Jewish audiences who are generally speaking more guilt-oriented than non-Jewish populations. However, his letters probably have a non-Jewish audience (1Pet 1:14,18; 2:10; 2Pet 3:1; Michaels 1988:xlvf.). If

such is true, a shame-oriented vocabulary is logical. Based on the general evidence of Peter's behaviour in the Gospels, his speeches in Acts and the vocabulary in his late letters, we have to think of Peter as a balanced shame and guilt-oriented personality. It is practically impossible to assume that Peter has become more and more guilt-oriented as Müller holds (1983a:10f.).

3.3.7 John's Letters

John says in his typical vocabulary that God is light (salvation) and in him is no darkness (sin) (1Jn 1:5). If we walk in the light, that is, if we adopt covenant behaviours, we have fellowship with him and with one another. In this case, the blood of Jesus purifies (*katharizō*) us from all sin (*hamartia*) (1Jn 1:7). These are shame-oriented statements. „If we confess (*homologeō*) our sins (*hamartia*), he is faithful (*pistos*) and just (*dikaios*) and will forgive (*aphiēmi*) us our sins (*hamartia*) and purify (*katharizō*) us from all unrighteousness (*adikia*)“ (1Jn 1:9; cp. 2Pet 1:9). If we take this passage out of its shame-oriented context and put it into a strictly guilt-oriented context, it means that God forgives automatically when we confess without any consideration of repentance and change of life. Forgiveness becomes a system, a „cheap grace“ (Bonhoeffer 1989:29f.). Leaving the passage in its covenant context with God's faithfulness and righteousness as a basis, then God's love and grace (cp. *hesed*) seems a logical covenant behaviour for forgiveness and purification of sin and unrighteousness. God's covenant behaviour presupposes the believer's covenant behaviour: „walking in the light“ (1Jn 1:7). We „know (*ginoskō*) him if we obey his commands (*entolē*)“ (1Jn 2:3). The respect of Christ's law results in intimate fellowship with him. „If you know that he is righteous (*dikaios*), you know that everyone who does what is right [lit. performs righteousness (*poiei dikaiosynē*)] has been born of him“ (1Jn 2:29).

„How great is the love (*agapē*) the Father has lavished on us, that we should be called children of God“ (1Jn 3:1; cp. Jn 1:12). This is a very honourable title and a great status. But it is not all. „When [Jesus] appears, we shall be like him (cp. *selem*), for we shall see him as he is. Everyone who has this hope in him purifies (*katharizō*) himself, just as he is pure (*katharos*)“ (1Jn 3:3). So far, John has a shame-oriented terminology. But he can switch quickly to guilt-oriented vocabulary: „Everyone who sins (*poiei hamartia*) breaks the law (*poiei anomia*); in fact, sin (*hamartia*) is lawlessness (*anomia*)“ (1Jn 3:4). In a parallelism, sin is defined in guilt-oriented terms. And John switches back again: „No-one who lives (*menō*) in him keeps on sinning (*hamartanō*). No-one who continues to sin (*hamartanō*) has either

seen him or known (*ginoskō*) him“ (1Jn 3:6). Knowing Christ means continuous intimate fellowship, which is the opposite of sin. On the other hand, „he who does what is right (*poiei dikaiosynē*) is righteous (*dikaïos*), just as he is righteous (*dikaïos*)“ (1Jn 3:7). The opposite of sin are the covenant behaviours, knowledge and righteousness.

Then John develops further the concepts of love (*agapē* cp. *ḥesed*) and life (*zoē* cp. *ḥāyîm*). As covenant behaviour and synonym of salvation they are interconnected: „We have passed from death to life, because we love our brothers. Anyone who does not love remains in death“ (1Jn 3:14). Therefore, love brings about life, love is salvation. „This is love: not that we loved God, but that he loved us and sent his Son as an atoning sacrifice (*hilasmos*) for our sins (*hamartia*)“ (1Jn 4:10). This Son not only loved us, but has given us life: „God has given us eternal life, and this life is in his Son. He who has the life has the Son“ (1Jn 5:11f.). Therefore, John exhorts his readers: „Let us love one another, for love comes from God“ (1Jn 4:7). Because God has shown covenant loyalty, we should also be faithful to him and love him. But there is a second element of covenant behaviour together with love: to carry out his commands. „This is love for God: to obey his commands“ (1Jn 5:2f.). We find again the double formula, which combines the two conscience orientations in covenant behaviour.

3.3.8 Revelation

An element that strikes the reader of Revelation are its doxologies (1:6; 4:11; 5:12f.; 7:12; 12:10). The following example may stand for all of them: „Worthy is the Lamb, who was slain, to receive power (*dynamis*) and wealth (*ploutos*) and wisdom (*sophia*) and strength (*ischys*) and honor (*timē*) and glory (*doxa*) and praise (*eulogia*)“ (5:12). God and the Lamb are praised with an entirely shame-oriented vocabulary. In the first chapter, Jesus Christ is presented as the faithful (*pistos*), the firstborn from the dead, the ruler of the kings of the earth, the Alpha and the Omega, the Almighty (*pantocrator*), the Living One, the one who holds the keys of death and Hades (1:5,8,17-18). These are all honourable titles. In John's theophany, the Son of Man is equally described in very honourable terms: the throne, his appearance and clothing, and the surrounding with the hosts of angels imply great glory (1:12-16; cp. 4-5). Jesus Christ is „the one who is, and who was, and who is to come“ (1:4,8; 4:8; cp. Hebr 13:8). The formula renders the Hebrew tetragrammaton *ihwh* (Ex 3:14; cp. LXX Jer 1:6; 4:10; 14:13; 39:17; Aune 1997:30). It describes the ever-present covenant partner as significant other and is related to the title „the Almighty“ (*pantocrator* cp. *šadday*) (cp. Gen 17:1).

The Spirit warns the church in Laodicea not to think that they are honourable, while they are actually shameful. „You say, ‚I am rich (*plousios*); I have acquired wealth and do not need a thing.‘ But you do not realize that you are wretched (*talaipōros*), pitiful (*eleeinos*), poor (*ptōchos*), blind (*typhlos*) and naked (*gymnos*). I counsel you to buy from me ... white clothes to wear, so that you can cover your shameful nakedness (*aischynē gymnotēos*)“ (3:17f.). Appropriate clothing is also a symbol of honour for the 144’000 (7:14). „These are those who did not defile (*molynō*) themselves with women, for they kept themselves pure (*parthenos*)“ (14:4). Here the shame-oriented vocabulary changes in a guilt-oriented one in order to switch back as quickly again. „They were purchased (*agorazō*) from among men and offered as firstfruits to God and the Lamb. No lie was in their mouths; they are blameless (*amōmos*)“ (14:5).

Towards the end of the book of Revelation, the covenant relationship is presented in husband-wife analogies. In chapter 17, the great prostitute Babylon is shown dressed in royal purple and scarlet, and glittering with gold, precious stones and pearls (17:4; 18:16). This is the king’s wife who has been unfaithful to the covenant (cp. Ezek 16). Her fate changes from splendour to ruin, from honour and glory to shame (18:1,7,14,16). Then the true bride of the Lamb is presented. Again her clothing is important. She is clothed with „fine linen, bright (*lampros*) and clean (*katharos*) ... (Fine linen stands for the righteous acts (*dikaïoma*) of the saints)“ (19:7f.). As seen above, it is a special honour to be invited to the wedding feast: „Blessed (*makarios*) are those who are invited to the wedding supper of the Lamb!“ (19:9). Then the bridegroom is presented. His title, an important honour symbol is „King of Kings and Lord of Lords“ (19:16). He is the carrier of covenant behaviours: He „is called Faithful (*pistos* cp. *ʾemûnâ*) and True (*alēthinos* cp. *ʾemet*). With justice (*dikaïosynē*) he judges (*krinō*) and makes war“ (19:11). Not love is now in the foreground, but righteousness and truth. Books are opened. In the books is recorded what the people have done. Those whose names are not written in the book of life are thrown into the lake of fire (20:13-15). Contrary to the judgement in Mt 25:31-46, this judgement scene is described in entirely guilt-oriented legal terms.

The book of Revelation ends with consummation, a new vision of the bride in the new heaven and the new earth. Again it is important how she is dressed: „I saw the Holy City, the new Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God, prepared as a bride beautifully dressed for her husband“ (21:2). The splendour of the city is described in detail (21:9-21). There is perfect communion between God and his people: „Now the dwelling of God is with men, and

he will live with them. They will be his people, and God himself will be with them and be their God“ (21:3). God becomes the perfect Immanuel, „God with us.“ The Lord God Almighty (*kyrios theos pantokrator*) and the Lamb are the city’s temple (21:22f.; 22:3). „They will see his face (*prosōpos*) and his name will be on their fore-heads“ (22:4). The presence of God is light (21:23; 22:5) and life (21:6; 22:1f.), synonyms of salvation. There is intimate communion, perfect corporate personality in the covenant relationship. The covenant is renewed: the people become actually God’s people (cp. Ezek 37:26-28; Jer 31:33; Hos 1:9). Honour is implied: they reign forever (22:5). Even the kings of the nations bring their glory (*doxa*) and honour (*timē*) (21:24-26). But the city has to remain pure: „Nothing impure (*koinos*) will ever enter it, nor will anyone who does what is shameful (*poiein bdelygma*) or deceitful (*pseudos*), but only those whose names are written in the Lamb’s book of life“ (21:27). The vocabulary of this vision is entirely shame-oriented, except the last hint to judgement. At its end, God’s angel says to John: „These words are trustworthy (*pistos* cp. *’emûnâ*) and true (*alēthinos* cp. *’emet*)“ (22:6). This formula corresponds to the shame and guilt-oriented aspect of covenant faithfulness.

In conclusion, we find John to be balanced shame and guilt-oriented in his vocabulary. He switches quickly from one to the other, mixes both and expresses combined formulas.

3.4 God’s Redemptive History with Shame and Guilt-Oriented Man

After having studied examples of shame and guilt from the particular Biblical books, we will try to get an overview of shame and guilt in the perspective of God’s redemptive history with man. We start with creation and Fall, look at God’s redemption in the old and new covenants, and end with consummation.

3.4.1 Creation: God an Ever-Present Partner

Terrien and Osborne consider the „presence of God“ as one of the central themes of Scripture (Terrien 1978; Osborne 1991:278). God creates man in his image as his plenipotentiary representative. He authorizes man to name and reign over all of creation (Gen 1:26-28). Man is meant to be God’s covenant partner. Adam and Eve must learn that God is present in the garden and that hiding is of no use (Gen 3:8f.). Cain has to learn the same lesson (Gen 4:9). From her experience in the desert, Hagar understands that God is the one who sees her (*’el r’î*) (Gen 16:13). To Abram, God presents himself as the God Almighty (*’el šadday*): „Walk before my face and be whole (*tmm*)“ (Gen 17:1 my translation). This means that God turns towards

him and in return solicites his whole attention and covenant faithfulness. Jacob, who has run away, is surprised to find God outside of his home: „Surely the Lord is in this place and I was not aware of it“ (Gen 28:16). He names the place Bethel, God’s house. Then God presents himself to Moses as the „One who is here for you“ (Ex 3:14; Buber 1976:158).²⁷ The NT renders this name by „the One who is with you“ (Mt 28:20), „the same yesterday and today and for ever“ (Hebr 13:8) and the one „who is, and who was, and who is to come, the Almighty (*pantokrator*)“ (Rev 1:4,8). He is „the First and the Last,“ „the Living One“ (Rev 1:17f.). In fact, he is with the Israelites through the pillar of cloud and fire (Ex 13:21). Also the psalms describe God as the one who sees everything:

From heaven the Lord looks down and sees all mankind;
From his dwelling place he watches all who live on earth,
He who forms the hearts of all, who considers everything they do (Ps 33:13-15).

The Messiah is named Immanuel: „God with us“ (Isa 7:14; cp. Kraus 1990:60). Thus, Jesus sees Nathanael under the fig-tree, even when he does not realize at all that God’s eye is upon him (Jn 1:48). Paul preaches in Athens: „God is not far from each one of us“ (Acts 17:27). Also the author of the letter to the Hebrews confirms this fact: „Nothing in all creation is hidden from God’s sight. Everything is uncovered and laid bare before the eyes of him to whom we must give account“ (Hebr 4:13; cp. Jer 23:24). God knows us even better than our conscience. He knows everything (1Jn 3:20). To signify this, the exalted Messiah, the Lamb, has seven eyes (Rev 5:6; cp. Zech 3:9; 4:10). And finally, God’s dwelling is with men in the New Jerusalem (Rev 21:3).

In conclusion, God is man’s ever-present significant other. Whereas in shame-oriented consciences only the standards are internalized but not the significant others themselves, in guilt-oriented consciences both of them are internalized. For the latter, the internalization and knowledge of a code suffices to have a well functioning conscience. However, for shame-oriented consciences, the presence of a significant other is necessary for their correct functioning. In fact, the consciousness of the presence of God, that is „God’s eye,“ is indispensable for shame-oriented persons. The Orthodox Church is conscious of this fact and paints an eye on the top of the icon walls. Piers formulates it like this: „Indeed, it is not the malevolently destructive eye, but the all-seeing, all-knowing eye which is feared in the condition of shame, God’s eye which reveals all shortcomings of mankind“ (Piers/Singer 1971:30; cp. Kurani 2001:127 n.64). God and his all-seeing eye must become a bigger preoccupation for a shame-

²⁷ Germ. *Ich were dasein, als der ich dasein werde* (Buber 1976:158).

oriented person than others around him. This has become the case for Zacchaeus who, as a respected person, runs and climbs on a tree in order to see Jesus (Lk 19:1-10). Kraus describes Jesus' concern for the shame-oriented conscience in the following words:

Jesus did not shift the categories from defilement and shame to transgression and guilt but gave to shame an authentic moral content and internalized norm, namely, exposure to the eyes of the all-seeing, righteous, loving God. Indeed, he described the judgement of God as making public the shameful things that we have imagined were hidden from sight (Lk 12:1-3). This transfer from an external social standard to an internalized theological standard is important for Christian formation in societies, which continue to depend upon the shame of public exposure as a primary sanction against undesirable conduct. If it is not accomplished, the conscience remains bound to relative authorities such as tradition and local social approval (Kraus 1990:221).

3.4.2 Creation: The Honour of Man

Then God said: „Let us make man in our image (*šelem*), in our likeness (*ḏmūt*), and let them rule (*rdh*) over the fish of the sea and the birds of the air, over the livestock, over all the earth, and over all the creatures that move along the ground“ (Gen 1:26).

So God created man in his own image (*šelem*),
In the image (*šelem*) of God he created him;
Male and female he created them (Gen 1:27).

God blessed them and said to them: „Be fruitful and increase in number; fill the earth and subdue it (*kbs*). Rule (*rdh*) over the fish of the sea and the birds of the air and over every living creature that moves on the ground“ (Gen 1:28).

The creation of man in the image of God, his covenant partner, is definitely honour language. Man draws his identity and dignity from God. Hence, his honour and status are ascribed. Only ascribed honour is true honour. Man is not only created in God's image, but also designated ruler over creation, God's plenipotentiary representative (cp. Ps 8:6f.). This is why man's food has to be different from the animals' food (1:29f.). In the first creation narrative, man is God's last creation, the crown of creation (Gen 1:26). In the second creation narrative, the creation process starts with man (Gen 2:7). Even though he is formed from dust, God himself breathes life into man's nostrils, which is depicted in the extremely intimate image of a kiss. It is needless to say that this again is honour language. But man is not only put into the garden to rule (*rdh*), but also to work it (*ʿbd*) and take care (*šmr*) of it (Gen 2:15). God's position of honour implies service. The God-man relationship becomes similar to a Father-son relationship, in which the father accompanies the son in his tasks (Kraus 1990:161). In this order, the second creation narrative describes the creation of man as a process. The Orthodox Church does not consider this process completed. For her, man has to develop still more towards God. They call the process of becoming „similar“ to God *theosis*

(Lossky 1974; 1976:126). While for the shame-oriented Orthodox Church the honour of man as God's image is a very important theological concept (cp. Jn 1:12), for guilt-oriented Catholics and evangelicals the sinfulness and guiltiness of man is more emphasized (cp. Kraus 1990:190; Kurani 2001:121f.).

3.4.3 Fall: The Shame of Man

When God puts man in the Garden of Eden, he sets a standard: „You are free to eat from any tree in the garden; but you must not eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, for when you eat of it you will surely die“ (Gen 2:17). God sets a norm, which is an indispensable condition for the functioning of the conscience. Before the Fall narrative, the author concludes: „The man and his wife were both naked (*‘ārôm*), and they felt no shame (*bōš*)“ (Gen 2:25). Because of their intimate fellowship and unity with God, their conscience is at peace. They have nothing to hide. Man at the origin knows only through God. After the Fall, man knows about himself and fellow man outside of God. He does not really know God anymore, for he can only know God, when he knows him alone. Knowledge of good and evil indicates the former separation from the origin (Gen 3:22) and means the complete inversion of knowledge. Man as image of God lives out of God, the origin. Man, who has become like God, lives out of his own origin. The original life in the image of God has changed into God-likeness, because man has to choose between good and evil himself, outside of God, against God. Man destroys himself with this secret, which he has stolen from God. His life becomes separation from God, from fellow men, from things, and from himself (Bonhoeffer 1988:20f.).

Instead of seeing God, man sees now himself: he is self-conscious (Gen 3:7). Man recognizes himself in separation from God and fellow men. He feels exposed (Gen 3:10). Consequently, shame originates (contra Gen 2:25). „[Shame] is man's ineffaceable recollection of his estrangement from the origin; it is grief for this estrangement, and the powerless longing to return to unity with the origin. Man feels ashamed because he has lost something that belongs to his original being, to his totality; he feels ashamed of his exposure“ (Bonhoeffer 1988:22).

As a consequence of shame man hides (Gen 3:10) and God makes him garments of skin (Gen 3:21). Shame seeks coverage as remedy to the separation. Consequently, man puts on a mask. This mask is a necessary sign of the separation. But under the mask the desire for the restoration of the lost unity continues to live. This desire manifests through sexuality (Gen 2:24) and in man's relentless search for God. „Because shame contains the Yes and the No to

the separation, therefore man lives between coverage and exposure, between hiding and revealing himself, between loneliness and fellowship“ (Bonhoeffer 1988:24). The dialectics of coverage and exposure are signs of shame. The only solution to shame is the restoration of the original unity. There is only resolution of shame by shaming through forgiveness of sin, that is, restoration of the fellowship with God and fellow men. This is exemplified in Ezekiel’s allegory of the unfaithful Jerusalem where God says: „Then, when I make atonement (*kpr*) for you, ... you will remember and be ashamed (*bōš*)...” (Ezek 16:63; cp. 36:62; Odell 1992). God’s punishment is exclusion from the intimate covenant fellowship. He banishes man from the Garden of Eden, a shame sanction (Gen 3:23f.). From an honourable position, man falls into a shameful state, far from God (Kurani 2001:128).

An important question that we have to ask is why the Fall narrative does not mention guilt. Theoretically, Adam and Eve’s transgression of God’s commandment could cause guilt. But as a matter of fact it causes shame. This means that the violation of God’s standard is interpreted by Adam and Eve’s consciences as a failure in covenantal obligations, not as a guilty transgression of a norm. Thus, after creation and the Fall, God deals basically with shame-oriented consciences despite the fact that shame-oriented terms are rare. Also guilt-oriented terms occur only a few times in retrospective summaries or commentaries, even though original narratives may not have used them (*‘āwōn*: Gen 4:13; 15:16; 19:15; 44:16; *’āšām*: Gen 26:10; 42:21). They express the unity of sin, consequence (guilt or shame) and punishment, in other words the principle of causality and retribution. In a shame-oriented context, guilt can be understood as the result of failure in social or covenantal obligations and expectations.

3.4.4 God’s Redemption: Shame and Guilt in the Old Covenant

Through the Mosaic Law, God brings in a completely new element into redemptive history: a legal codex prescribes limits of behaviour and fixes reparation for each sin. God must have intentionally introduced the law in order that the guilt-oriented axis of conscience begins to function. The activation of the guilt-justice axis will gradually transform the shame-oriented consciences of some Israelites. This transformation is observable through history. After some centuries, it leads to the fact that groups of the people of Israel like priests and scribes, who are in daily contact with the law, function more on the guilt axis and neglect the relational shame-oriented component of the covenant (cp. Eichrodt 1961:392-435). This seems to be the case already at Saul’s (1Sam 15:22) and David’s epoch (Ps 40:6f.; 51:16f.). The prophets are

preaching against mere legalism (Isa 1:11; 43:23; Jer 6:20; 7:22; Hos 6:6; Amos 5:22-25). Late Judaism reinterprets shame-oriented or neutral terms into guilt-oriented concepts: instruction (*tôrâ*) becomes law (*nomos*); righteousness (*š dāqâ*) as conformity to covenant and community behaviour is transformed into the legal concept of merciful acts like alms-giving; the combined covenant concept (*b'rît*) becomes a legal testament (*diathēkē, testamentum*). Some of these changes have been observed in the LXX, others in Jewish literature and with the Pharisees of the NT (see next section; Esser 1990a:522f.; Guhrt 1990:157). However, the majority of the Israelites, who have no direct daily contact with the law, stay predominantly shame-oriented (1Ki 21:4; 2Ki 2:23-25; Isa 6:5; Jon 1:3; 4:1). Besides the prevalent shame vocabulary of the prophets, one indication for this is the indirect communication of the prophets through stories, proverbs, metaphors and symbolic acts. Another indication is the frequent use of the relational parent-child metaphor (Dt 32:6; 2Sam 7:14; Ps 68:6; Isa 63:16; Jer 3:19; 31:9) and the husband-wife analogy (Jer 31:32; Ezek 16; Hos) (cp. Kraus 1990:161; Kurani 2001:59).

Two cautions have to be forwarded. The Mosaic Law, which is expected to be guilt-oriented, has many shame-oriented components and includes shaming sanctions. It is transmitted to the Israelites by a mediator in the person of Moses, and reinforced by the prophets (Samuel, Nathan, etc.). In the execution of the sacrifices (Lev 1-7), priests are mediating elements in the process of forgiveness. The fellowship offering includes communal elements in a very particularly way (Lev 7:11-21). Furthermore, the regulations about the Jubilee include shame and guilt-oriented elements: liberation of slaves and reintegration into society as well as cancellation of their debts (Lev 25). The second caution is that God does not want to produce guilt-oriented individuals, because he would consider this a higher state as compared to shame orientation. No, God's goal for man is balanced shame and guilt orientation. This is indicated by the fact that God commands the Israelites to love him and obey his commands (Dt 6:5f; 11:1,13; 30:16; Jos 22:5; 23:6,8; 24:25; 1Ki 9:4; 2Ki 23:2f.). Also the prophets repeat the same double formula (Dan 9:4; Neh 1:5; Ezek 36:26f.).

3.4.5 God's Redemption: Shame and Guilt in the New Covenant

Like the old covenant, the new covenant is introduced by a mediator: Jesus Christ. He is a superior mediator than the mediators of the old covenant: the angels, Moses and Melchizedek (Hebr 1-8). Mediators are necessary for the resolution of conflicts in shame-oriented contexts (Augsburger 1992; Lingenfelter/Mayers 1996:112f.; Käser 1997:162f.). Jesus Christ brings

about our reconciliation with God (2Cor 5:18f.). He makes use of a direct communication style toward more guilt-oriented Pharisees (Mt 5:21-48 par; 23 par; Jn 3) and of indirect communication toward the shame-oriented people (e.g. Jn 4). He uses largely stories, parables, proverbs, and symbolic acts (Mt 13 par; Jn 13; cp. Kurani 2001:59). Toward the more guilt-oriented Pharisees, Jesus emphasizes the relational shame-oriented side of covenant behaviour (Mt 15:5f. par; 23:23 par). As mentioned above, the Pharisees present the strongest guilt orientation among the Jews (e.g. Mt 23:23). However, they also show strong shame behaviours being thus shame and guilt-oriented (Mt 23:5-10; Lk 14:7; Jn 3:2). Certainly, some of the Pharisees are more shame and other more guilt-oriented. The apostle Paul as a Pharisee has been identified as shame and guilt-oriented.

Jesus does not abolish the Law, but fulfils it in its shame and guilt-oriented aspects (Mt 5:17-20). Christ's law is shame and guilt-oriented (Mt 7:12; 22:37-39) and gives a better righteousness than the Pharisees' guilt-oriented perception of the Law (Mt 5:20-48). As Moses and the prophets, Jesus uses the double formula: Love me and obey my commands (Jn 14:15,21,23f.; 15:10). With him, the real Jubilee has come. This is the real liberation of slaves and the reparation of their debts, a shame and guilt-oriented mission (Lk 4:18f.). Those who believe in him, have the new status of children of God (Jn 1:12; 1Jn 3:1; cp. Hos 2:1). God is their Father (Mt 6:9; 23:9 par; Rom 8:15; Gal 4:6). In God's kingdom, the this-worldly honour game is however reversed: the shameful become honourable (Mt 5:3-10 par), and the honourable shameful (Mt 19:30 par; 23:12 par).

When Jesus is ready to ascend to heaven, he announces a second mediator: the Holy Spirit (Jn 14:16,26; 16:7). This announcement is fulfilled at Pentecost (Acts 2). One mediator is still, so to say, in heaven, the other on earth. But the Spirit in the heart (conscience) of believers, „Christ in us,“ changes the situation slightly (Rom 8:10; Gal 4:19; Eph 3:17; Col 1:27). Despite the two mediators, communication with God becomes more direct. Parallel to this direct communication, which normally signifies guilt orientation, the relationship between God and the believer becomes more intense which means an increase in shame orientation. The conscience is sensitized on the two axes, a process that has also been observed during conversion.

The Law is written in the believers' hearts (consciences). Nobody has to teach his brother anymore, because all the believers know God now (Jer 31:33f.; Hebr 8:8-12; 10:15-17). Nevertheless, the conscience does not equal God: „For God is greater than our hearts, and he knows everything“ (1Jn 3:20). The conscience does not know everything. It is a fallible

product of our upbringing and context. In a certain sense, the conscience is also a mediator between God and the believer. However, it cannot measure itself with the divine mediators in that it is limited and corrupt.

✿ After Pentecost, the question of the relationship between the law and the life in the Spirit arises. Between the shame-oriented non-Jewish Christians and the more guilt-oriented Jewish Christians, conflicts are programmed (Acts 6). God shows Peter in an impressive experience that the old covenant's ritual laws are invalid in the new covenant (Acts 10; cp. Lev 11). Based on Peter's experience, the council at Jerusalem proposes a compromise between non-Jewish and Jewish Christians (Acts 15:20,29 cp. Ex 34:15f; Lev 17:10-16; 18:6-23). However, this compromise does not hold very long. Paul, the apostle to the non-Jews, gives the conscience in new covenant ethics a place of primordial importance. As the law is written on the hearts of the non-Jews (Rom 2:14f.; cp. Jer 31:33), it is not anymore a means for salvation, but only a disciplining agent (*paidagōgos*) (Gal 3:24). Paul shows in the paraenetical sections of his letters clearly that the real work of ethical leadership has to be accomplished by the conscience (e.g. Rom 12-15; 1Cor 5-11). The Holy Spirit gives the „law“ through conscience. Therefore, there is great freedom for the Christian. Everything is permissible, but not everything is beneficial and constructive. „Nobody should seek his own good, but the good of others“ (1Cor 6:12; 10:23f.; cp. Eph 5:21; Mt 7:12; 22:39). The real objective of every Christian endeavour is God's glory (Eph 1:6,12,14; Phil 1:11) and the harmony among brothers (Rom 12:18). The real honour is gained by the one who humiliates himself as Christ did (Phil 2:3-11).

3.4.6 Consummation: Harmony, Honour, and Justice for God and Man

In the new covenant, there is still an eschatological tension between the „already“ and the „not yet“ of the kingdom's glory as well as in the reversal of the world's honour game (saying that the shameful are honourable and the honourable shameful). In consummation, this tension is resolved. God's glory is complete (Rev 1:6; 4:11; 5:12f.; 7:12; 12:10; 19:1-6). The Christians are integrated into this glory (Rev 7:9-17; 14:1-5; 19:7-10; 20:1-6; 21; cp. 1Pet 5:10f.). Harmony between God and man, between fellow men and with creation is restored (Rev 21:1-4,22-27; cp. Ezek 37:27). This harmony is described in entirely shame-oriented terms.

But before the final harmony, glory, and honour can be restored, judgement as guilt-oriented element is necessary. First, the great prostitute Babylon is judged (Rev 18), then before the thousand years the beast and his false prophet (Rev 19:20), and Satan after the

thousand years (Rev 20:10). Then the dead are judged. Books, that is, legal codes are opened. Everyone is judged according to what he has done and whether his name is written in the book of life. At the end, death and Hades are thrown in the lake of fire (Rev 20:11-14). The multitudes shout: „Salvation (*sōtēria*) and glory (*doxa*) and power (*dynamis*) belong to our God, for true (*alēthinos*) and just (*dikaios*) are his judgements (*krisis*)“ (Rev 19:2; cp. 15:3; 16:5). Righteousness and truth have to be restored before the new heaven and the new earth can come (Rev 16:4; 19:2; cp. 2Pet 3:13). Thus, until consummation can be complete, not only glory and honour, but also justice and truth have to be restored. Only then is harmony perfect.

3.5 The Importance of Shame and Guilt in Scripture

Our analysis of shame and guilt in Scripture has confirmed our basic hypothesis that the Bible is balanced shame and guilt-oriented (cp. Bechtel 1991:48). It has also shown that not only guilt can be sensed directly before God, but that also shame can be a self-conscious emotion or a state in relation to God directly. Shame is not necessarily an emotion in relation to fellow men only. Generally speaking, we have found that populations in the OT and NT are predominantly shame-oriented (cp. Bechtel 1991:55). Nevertheless, in the OT there are particular persons with a daily exposure to the Law who are balanced shame and guilt-oriented or more guilt-oriented. The general trend toward guilt orientation is increasing in time until late Judaism. The Pharisees and scribes in the NT are thus more guilt-oriented than the rest of the population, but still combined shame and guilt-oriented.

Hesselgrave is right when he insists on the fact that guilt has to be felt before God. We agree that guilt before God is not equal to shame before fellow men or ancestors. But we hold that the two cannot be compared. Hesselgrave does not acknowledge that shame before God can be as valuable as guilt before God (1983:480). Our findings go also against Peters' and Müller's assumption that „forgiveness of sin is only effective on the basis of a guilt consciousness, not on the basis of a shame feeling“ (Peters cited in Müller 1988:416; cp. Müller 1996a:109). Müller holds that „the Word of God is ‚guilt-oriented,‘ that means, its objective is that man becomes just before God“ (1996a:109). He concludes: „If the terms guilt and justice are so important for man's salvation and if the OT culture is more shame-oriented, then the conscience of the persons exposed to Jesus' person and message has to show an observable shift toward guilt orientation“ (1988:449). For Müller, the analysis of Peter's conversion process confirms this shift from shame to guilt orientation. Peter's messages in Acts are for Müller clearly guilt-oriented (1983a; cp. 1988:450). In our analysis, we could not find that the

Bible is basically guilt-oriented (cp. Lienhard 2001a:203). We agree with Müller that Peter's messages are very direct and thus guilt-oriented. We find however a shame-oriented and neutral vocabulary in late Peter's letters. This fact directs us to assume a balanced shame and guilt-oriented person with a direct or indirect approach according to the audience. We also find Jesus' message either shame or guilt-oriented according to the audience. His objective is a balanced shame and guilt-oriented conscience. Conversion leads the conscience to intensified exposure not only to fixed norms, and renders it thus more guilt-oriented, but also to the person of God, and makes it thus more shame-oriented (contra Müller 1988:450). Actually, conversion sensitizes the conscience on both axes. In the process of balancing the conscience, guilt-oriented persons become more shame-oriented, and shame-oriented persons more guilt-oriented (cp. Müller 1996a:109). Müller's point of view has thus changed somewhat between 1988 and 1996.

In his attempt to go against the traditional, guilt-oriented appraisal of the Bible, Kraus emphasizes the shame-oriented aspect of Biblical concepts (1990:214). Actually, he becomes unbalanced towards the other side and puts too much emphasis on the shame orientation of Biblical concepts, even though the title of one of his articles (1987) and much of his book on shame and guilt-oriented theology (1990) indicate a balance of shame and guilt. Malina, Neyrey and others tend towards a uniquely shame-oriented exegesis of the Bible, particularly the NT. Nowhere in their publications the traditional legal interpretation of the Bible is mentioned. Based on our analysis, it is our profound conviction that God intends to balance shame and guilt orientation in man.

4 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR CROSS-CULTURAL CHRISTIAN MINISTRY

In this chapter we will consider the implications of shame and guilt orientation on personality and culture, and thirdly on theology as the element of worldview which is particularly interesting for our thesis. We conceive of the relation of personality and culture as Spiro's „psychologically satisfying conformity“ (1961a) and Inkeles and Levinson's „functional congruence“ (1954) on the basis of what LeVine calls the „Two Systems“ view (1973:58f.). This two systems view implies a close interrelationship between personality and culture (cp. Geertz 1973:144f.). Later research in cross-cultural psychology criticizes this culture-and-personality school (also known as psychological anthropology) for its disregard of individual differences within societies, its conceptual linkage with psychoanalysis and its uncritical use of projective techniques. One explanation of this problem is that psychology puts more emphasis on differences within cultures, and anthropology more on similarities within cultures (Berry et al. 1992:186). The former is a more analytic or guilt-oriented view, while the latter is more synthetic and shame-oriented (cp. section 4.1.5). However, cross-cultural psychology and cultural anthropology maintain the general conception that culture and personality interrelate (Segall et al. 1990:50f.; Berry et al. 1992:183-186). In this perspective, Samuel speaks of „relatedness“ or „connectedness“ of personality and culture (Samuel 1990:12; Overholt 1996:6f.).

4.1 Personality: A Function of Conscience Orientation

Roy R. Grinker writes in his foreword to Piers and Singer's book *Shame and Guilt*: „Each [shame and guilt] is associated with a different intrapsychic pattern and probably contributes to a characterological type“ (Piers/Singer 1971:7). On the same grounds, we hypothesize that personality is a function of conscience orientation.

Based on the blackbox concept of empirical psychology, Robert LeVine defines personality as „the organization in the individual of those processes that intervene between environmental conditions and behavioural response ... These processes include perception, cognition, memory, learning, and the activation of emotional reactions as they are organized and regulated in the individual organism“ (1982:5). In his book *The Silent Language* (1973), Edward T. Hall differentiates ten canals of communication where persons can be oriented differently:

language, temporality, territoriality, exploitation, association, subsistence, bisexuality, learning, play, and defence (1973:38-59). Both LeVine's definition and Hall's communication model serve as examples of the immense complexity of personality orientations. To see personality as a function of conscience orientation implies a model of a high level of abstraction, kind of a „core personality“ similar to DuBois' concept of „modal personality“ (1944).

Talking about personality orientations in his book *Afrocentric or Eurocentric?* (1997), Bennie J. van der Walt differentiates three basic value pairs: individualism and communalism, using and enjoying time, and analytic and synthetic thought patterns. We hypothesize that the former personality traits are part of guilt orientation, while the latter are part of shame orientation. In a similar way, Sherwood G. Lingenfelter and Marvin K. Mayers present in their book *Ministering Cross-Culturally* (1986) a model for basic values, which was first developed by Mayers (1974/1987:157-161). It differentiates six pairs of contrasting personality traits which can compose a personal profile: time or event orientation, task or person orientation, dichotomistic or holistic thinking, achievement or status focus, crisis or non-crisis orientation, and willingness to expose vulnerability versus concealment of vulnerability (1986:34f.). We hypothesize that most of the former personality traits are part of guilt orientation while some of the latter traits are part of shame orientation. Our model of conscience orientation is a simplification of Mayers' model, which renders it more easily applicable in everyday life.

From a scientific point of view, it could seem desirable to correlate conscience orientation with more professionally elaborated value orientations than van der Walt's and Mayers'. Hofstede has found four basic values in sixty-six nationalities: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, and masculinity (1980; 1986). Pederson and Ivy (1993) use them as a basis for cross-cultural counseling. Based on Rokeach's thirty-six values (1973) and on their own extensive studies, Schwartz and Bilsky (1987; 1990) present seven motivational domains: achievement, enjoyment, maturity, prosocial, restrictive conformity, security, and self-direction. Both Hofstede's and Schwartz and Bilsky's values could be more scientifically adequate. However, they mix aspects in one value, which seem to us important to differentiate. For example, they use the very much culture-dependent concept of masculinity/femininity. Therefore, their values are not well adapted to our purposes. Five of Mayers' contrasting value pairs supplemented with the individualism/collectivism pair appear to give a model that best serves the needs of cross-cultural Christian ministry. A model does not represent the whole reality, but produces an oversimplification of reality that should help us better understand some aspects of reality (Lingenfelter/Mayers 1986:29). Or as Samuel puts it: „Models

are theoretical constructs for mapping the world of our experience, and each represents one of a variety of possible ways of viewing that world“ (Samuel 1990:68; quoted by Overholt 1996:12). „Good models are meant to explain, guide, reveal and aid discovery“ (Malina 1981:iv). In the following sections, we will discuss the different orientation pairs.

4.1.1 Individualism or Collectivism

In contemporary psychology, the value pair „individualism/collectivism“ is frequently used in cross-cultural studies (Hofstede 1980; Segall et al. 1990:218; Berry et al. 1992:56f.). Triandis (1983) proposes to name them „idiocentric“ and „allocentric“ instead, which would be more adapted to the conscience orientation involved. Some scholars prefer the term communalism, because it describes the importance of community better (e.g. Steyne 1989; van der Walt 1997; Turaki 1999). In this thesis, we will employ the more commonly used terms individualism and collectivism.

Table 4.1: Individualism or Collectivism

Individualism	Collectivism
A high regard for the individual	A high regard for the in-group
Exclusive attitude	Inclusive attitude
Individual independence	Dependence on the in-group, interdependence
Competition, confrontation	Cooperation, peaceful coexistence
Individual initiative is highly regarded - personal achievement is more important than attention to the community	Individual initiative is not appreciated or encouraged - good human relations are a priority
The rights of the individual are stressed	Duties towards the community are emphasized
Acquisition for personal use, materialism	Readily shares with others, generosity
Decisions are often taken individually - don't waste time through endless discussions	Decisions have to be taken with the approval of the group
Direct communication	Indirect communication
Honesty, frankness, incorruptibility, steadfastness and perseverance - all individual virtues (shame-oriented people might regard this as rude)	Modesty, compliance, pliability, willingness to compromise (guilt-oriented people see this perhaps as a sign of dishonesty)
Formality, independence, self-sufficiency are highly regarded	Friendliness, helpfulness, hospitality, patience and brotherliness are highly regarded

In research, it is an open question whether individualism and collectivism are polar opposites on a unidimensional scale or independent factors (Triandis et al. 1986). We hypothesize that individualism corresponds to guilt orientation and collectivism to shame orientation. This would imply that they are polar opposites. For individualism versus communalism, van der Walt presents a synoptic table with forty elements, which is adapted and reproduced partially in table 4.1. (van der Walt 1997:31-34; cp. Triandis 1994:167-172; Gudykunst/Ting-Toomey 1988:93,153; Hofstede 1980/1997:90).

An important difference between individualists and collectivists is their in-group and out-group behaviour. As guilt-oriented individualists have introjected standards and significant others, their conscience functions on the basis of codes and principles independently from the context. Their in-group and out-group behaviour is identical. On the other hand, shame-oriented consciences are dependent on the presence of significant others in order to function properly. In-group behaviour in presence of the significant others follows the standards. Inversely, out-group behaviour is not governed by the standards of the group. Thus, shame-oriented persons present substantial differences between in-group and out-group behaviour (Triandis 1995:74; Kurani 2001:82 n.35).

4.1.2 Time or Event Orientation

We consider time orientation as guilt (or object) orientation whereas event orientation corresponds to shame (or person) orientation. Lingenfelter and Mayers sum up the two orientations in table 4.2. (1986:42).

Table 4.2: Time or Event Orientation

Time Orientation	Event Orientation
Concern for punctuality and amount of time expended	Concern for details of the event, regardless of time required
Careful allocation of time to achieve the maximum within set limits	Exhaustive consideration of a problem until resolved
Tightly scheduled, goal-directed activities	A „let come what may“ outlook not tied to any precise schedule
Rewards offered as incentives for efficient use of time	Stress on completing the event as a reward in itself
Emphasis on dates and history	Emphasis on present experience

The issue is complicated by the fact that time itself can be viewed and experienced differently. Van der Walt contrasts the Western and African concept of time (1997:62f.). We would not call it Western and African concepts, but rather guilt and shame-oriented concepts that can mix and overlap (cp. Spiro 1993:144). Table 4.3. presents guilt and shame-oriented concepts of time (adapted from van der Walt 1997:62f.; italics in original).

Table 4.3: Guilt and Shame-Oriented Concepts of Time

Guilt-Oriented Concept of Time	Shame-Oriented Concept of Time
Static and absolute	Dynamic and relative (depends on context)
Chronological (time interval is important)	Kairological (the right moment is important)
Task/issue-determined	Relationships-centred
Time is mathematical, measured in figures	Time is events
Time is <i>filled</i> , man is the slave of time	Time is <i>made</i> , man is the master of time
Punctuality	Poor punctuality
<i>Uses</i> time	<i>Enjoys</i> time
Thorough planning	Minimal planning

Lingenfelter and Mayers' event orientation and van der Walt's African time concept meet in the shame-oriented concept of time as events (Fuglesang 1982:37). Evans-Pritchard (1940) speaks of ecological time for events in relation to nature, and structural time for events in relation to kinship groups (de Wet 1983:45). There is the time to get up, the time to carry water, the time to collect wood, the time to make fire, the time to eat, the time to sow or to harvest, the time for birth or death (cp. Eccl 3:1-8). For a shame-oriented person it is important to have time with his friends. Not to have time means: „You are not important for me.“

Another complication in the time concept arises from still another fact, which is independent from conscience orientation: the perspective. Based on an image presented by Moreau (1986), van der Walt compares the African with a person standing in a river. The water that is around him and that has flowed past him is a reality for him. He is looking downstream. The future is in his back. The Westerner resembles to a person who is wading upstream. His attention is directed more at what is to come (van der Walt 1997:65). Mbiti (1969:24ff.; 1974:18-35) and Kagame (English/Kalumba 1996:82-90) go as far as to say that the African has no notion for the future. As Kato (1981), Staples (1981:156), Nyirongo (1997:89) and van der Walt (1994:203f.; 1997:65) have shown, the difference is the direction of the main perspec-

tive, not a complete incapability to conceive future (cp. Hall/Hall 1990:17). It is interesting to note that the Hebrews also originally look towards their ancestral traditions and see the future in their back (Ps 143:5; Isa 46:10; Jer 29:11; Wolff 1990:134f.; Jenni 1994:115; Boman 1952:128,210). Due to the prophets' constant announcement of the day of Yahweh, the Israelites start to look towards the future. The time concept becomes linear (von Rad 1957b:127f.; Gese 1974:95; Cullmann 1962:62; 1967:11f.; van Zyl 1983:40; Bär 1998:53). We will call these two time concepts past-time and future-time concept (cp. Hall/Hall 1990:17). It is not surprising that a person with a future-time concept will foresee and plan ahead more than a person oriented towards present and past, especially in view of an upcoming crisis. Lingenfelter and Mayers call this crisis and non-crisis orientation and make it an additional contrasting pair of personality traits (1986:35,75). Additionally, persons with a past-time concept may have extreme difficulties with a goal-oriented approach in an organization or project. As more and more educational and developmental projects are geared to planning by objectives, people with past-time concepts are systematically underprivileged.

The differentiation between time and event orientation merits additional reflection from a Biblical perspective. The parable of the Good Samaritan (Lk 10:25-37) seems to indicate that the priest and the levite are guilt and time-oriented and the Samaritan shame and event-oriented. We agree with Lingenfelter and Mayers that most of the persons in the NT are event-oriented (Jn 1:39; 3:2; 4:4-42; 11:6) (1986:43f.). The NT *kairos* concept is definitely event or shame-oriented. We also agree entirely with them that „in God's scheme the emphases on time and event exist together in complete harmony“ (1986:50). This statement supports our hypothesis that God's goal for man is balanced shame and guilt orientation.

4.1.3 Task or Person Orientation

Mayers' next contrasting pair of task versus person orientation shows some parallel features. We see task orientation as object or guilt orientation, and person orientation as shame orientation. Table 4.4. presents the characteristics of task and person orientation (Lingenfelter/Mayers 1986:83). In Christian ministry persons with task orientation are well equipped for administration, teaching, preaching and Bible translation, whereas person-oriented members are apt for coordinating, counseling and pastoral functions in the strict sense. Since Western educational and organizational systems give rewards to task-oriented persons, shame-oriented people-persons tend to have lesser achievements (1986:85).

Table 4.4: Task or Person Orientation

Task Orientation	Person Orientation
Focuses on tasks and principles	Focuses on persons and relationships
Finds satisfaction in the achievement of goals	Finds satisfaction in the interaction with people
The achievement of tasks is more important than relationships	Relationships are more important than the achievement of tasks
Seeks friends with similar goals	Seeks friends who are group-oriented
Accepts loneliness and social deprivation for the sake of personal achievements	Deplores loneliness; sacrifices personal achievements for group interaction

The NT furnishes strong evidence that person or shame orientation is important (Mk 6:30-48; 1Thess 2:7f.). However, the passage of Luke 4-9 shows Jesus' balanced approach to tasks and persons (see table 4.5; Lingenfelter/Mayers 1986:92):

Table 4.5: Jesus' Balanced Approach to Tasks and Persons in Luke 4-9

Task or Principle	Persons
1. Declaration that no prophet is accepted in his hometown (4:24-30)	1. Healing of the sick and demon-possessed (4:31-41)
2. Declaration that he must preach in other towns (4:43)	2. The call to Simon to be a fisher of men (5:1-11)
3. Refusal to see mother and brothers (8:19-21)	3. Healing of a leper (5:12-14)
4. Settlement of the argument as to who is greatest - whoever is least (9:46-48)	4. Healing and forgiveness of a paralytic (5:17-25)
	5. Eating with sinners (5:29-32)
	6. Statement that as guests of the bridegroom the disciples need not fast (5:33-35)
	7. Picking grain on the Sabbath (6:1-5)
	8. Healing on the Sabbath (6:6-11)
	9. Healing of the centurion's servant (7:1-10)
	10. Raising of the widow's son (7:11-15)
	11. Forgiveness of the sinful woman (7:36-50)
	12. Healing of a demoniac (8:26-39)
	13. Raising of Jairus' daughter and healing of a chronically ill woman (8:40-56)
	14. Feeding of five thousand (9:10-17)
	15. Healing of a demon-possessed boy (9:37-43)
	16. Refusal to curse hostile Samaritans (9:51-56)

4.1.4 Achievement or Status Focus

Again we hold that achievement focus is guilt-oriented, because object and task-oriented, whereas status focus is shame and person-oriented. Table 4.6. presents the characteristics of achievement and status focus (Lingenfelter/Mayers 1986:100).

Table 4.6: Achievement or Status Focus

Achievement Focus	Status Focus
Prestige is attained	Prestige is ascribed
Personal identity is determined by one's achievements as knowledge and possessions	Personal identity is determined by formal credentials of age, birth, rank and title
The amount of respect one receives varies with one's accomplishments and failures; attention focuses on personal performance	The amount of respect one receives is permanently fixed; attention fixes on those with high social status in spite of any personal failings
The individual is extremely self-critical and makes sacrifices in order to accomplish ever greater deeds	The individual is expected to play his or her role and to sacrifice to attain higher rank
People associate with those of equal accomplishments regardless of background	People associate with those of equal social status
All have equal rights and chances - egalitarian society	Rights and chances according to status - hierarchical society

In the NT, we find several examples of status orientation: Matthew and Luke open their narratives with a detailed description of the family background of John the Baptist and Jesus, including a complete genealogy of Jesus (Mt 1; Lk 3). Prominent Pharisees and teachers of the law are given places of honour at weddings and religious festivals (Lk 14:7-11 par; Jas 2:2f.). That Jesus breaks the habit of associating with equals is mentioned over and over again (e.g. Lk 15:1f.; 1986:96f.). We find also examples of achievement-oriented people: Martha (Lk 10:38-42), the rich fool (Lk 12:13-21), the man who claims to have lived a good life having kept all the commandments (Lk 18:18-30; 1986:98f.). Jesus rejects both orientations as inadequate. He rebukes those who find their self-esteem in ascribed rank, public honours, and acquired wealth and power (Lk 14:11,26; Jas 2:1-9). Jesus challenges his followers to choose the path of humility, which ultimately leads to honour (Lk 14:10f. par). Likewise, the apostle Paul recommends to acknowledge our weaknesses and to go the way of humility. „For when I am weak, then I am strong“ (2Cor 12:10; 13:4; Phil 2:5-11). True self-worth comes from our identity as children of God (Lk 10:20; Jn 1:12).

4.1.5 Analytic or Synthetic Thinking

Lingenfelter and Mayers speak about dichotomistic and holistic thought patterns. According to our understanding, dichotomistic or analytic thinking corresponds to a guilt orientation, while holistic or synthetic thinking corresponds to a shame orientation. The distinction is outlined in table 4.7. (Lingenfelter/Mayers 1986:58).

Table 4.7: Analytic or Synthetic Thinking

Analytic Thinking	Synthetic Thinking
Judgements are black/white, right/wrong - specific criteria are uniformly applied and specific aspects evaluated in others	Judgements are open-ended - the whole person and all circumstances are taken into consideration
Security comes from the feeling that one is right and fits into a particular role or category in society	Security comes from multiple interactions within the whole of society - one is insecure if confined to particular roles or categories
Information and experiences are systematically organized; details are sorted and ordered to form a clear pattern	Information and experiences are seemingly disorganized; details (narratives, events, portraits) stand as independent points complete in themselves

Van der Walt makes the distinction between Western and African thought patterns with some additional elements. In general, the two thought patterns stand for guilt and shame orientation. They are presented in table 4.8. (adapted from van der Walt 1997:81).

Table 4.8: Guilt and Shame-Oriented Thought Patterns

Guilt-Oriented Thought Patterns	Shame-Oriented Thought Patterns
Scientific, truth-oriented	Prescientific, power-oriented
Reductionist, fragmented knowledge	Holistic, integral, totality knowledge
More reflective	More intuitive
Emphasis on things	Emphasis on human interaction
Abstract, removed from reality	Close to concrete reality
Either - or logic	And - and logic
Observes object of knowledge at a distance	Closely involved with object of knowledge

Both analytic and synthetic thinkers may make negative value judgements about others, but for different reasons. The analytic person may reject another person because of a particular mistake, while a synthetic thinker may say that all are flawed. There are two complementary

epistemologies involved: guilt orientation is linked to knowledge at a distance, the so-called scientific method. On the other hand, shame orientation shows a close involvement between subject and object. Lingenfelter and Mayers connect the difference between the two thought patterns with the theory of differential functioning of the two brain hemispheres. The left hemisphere is associated with verbal, rational, analytic and digital thinking, while the signal-pictorial, emotional, synthetic and analogical thinking is thought to be located in the right hemisphere (1986:58).

The OT is principally written in a synthetic manner as independent narratives, life histories and prophecies. OT prophets describe specific historical incidents or concrete pictographic visions in great detail. The Gospels witness that Jesus taught mainly in concrete analogies, concrete issues of the day, illustrations from nature, and personal case studies (Mt 5-9; 13). Paul, in contrast, argues with an abstract, often difficult logic in order to convince his readers (e.g. Rom 4-5). Paul uses the verbal, abstract, and rational thinking that was characteristic of Greek philosophy. The tradition of systematic theology grew out of the Greek philosophical perspective and is pushed to its extremes by Western schools (1986:54,60,62). Synthetic thinkers have problems with systematic theology, Pauline argumentations and Greek, while preferring OT and NT narratives and Hebrew. While most of Jesus' auditors must have been synthetic or shame-oriented thinkers, we have many clues that the Pharisees and teachers of the Law were segmental or guilt-oriented thinkers who „demand clear-cut, black-and-white issues, insist on universal applications of principle, and cannot feel secure unless their perceptions are recognized as correct“ (1986:65). Analytic thinkers „will reject the muddy ambiguity of their holist peers, accusing them of softness, lack of principle, and inconsistency. Holistic thinkers will reject the rigidity of their dichotomist peers, accusing them of legalism and callous inhumanity to others“ (1986:66). This is why Jesus Christ warns us not to judge (Mt 7:1; 1Cor 4:3). He alone, who knows our hearts, will be the judge of all men (Rom 2:16; 1Cor 4:4f.). And he wants us to use both patterns of thinking, synthetic and analytic, „the right and the left hemisphere“ (1986:67).

4.1.6 Willingness or Fear to Lose Face

According to Lingenfelter and Mayers, a further pair of contrasting personality traits is the willingness to expose vulnerability and the concealment of vulnerability. Willingness to expose vulnerability and therefore to lose face corresponds to guilt orientation. Concealment of vulnerability and fear of losing face correspond to shame orientation. Lingenfelter and

Mayers' differentiation is presented in table 4.9. (1986:107; cp. Gudykunst/Ting-Toomey 1988:159; Augsburger 1992:87f.).

Table 4.9: Willingness or Fear to Lose Face

Willingness to Lose Face	Fear of Losing Face
Relative unconcern about error and failure	Protection of self-image at all cost; avoidance of error and failure
Emphasis on completion of event	Emphasis on the quality of performance
Willingness to push beyond one's limits and enter the unknown	Reluctance to go beyond one's recognized limits or to enter the unknown
Ready admission of culpability, weakness, and shortcomings	Denial of culpability; withdrawal from activities in order to hide weakness and shortcomings
Openness to alternative views and criticism	Refusal to entertain alternative views or accept criticism
Willingness to talk freely about personal life	Vagueness regarding personal life

A careful examination of NT teaching shows that each of the orientations has both positive and negative aspects. Using examples of a man who wants to build a tower and a king who is about to go to war, Jesus recommends estimating the cost and weighing one's vulnerability (Lk 14:28-33). In their dialogues with Jesus, the Pharisees often refuse to answer in order not to lose face (Lk 14:4; 20:1-8). By indirect communication, Jesus avoids to make people lose face in public. He confronts persons in private (Jn 4:18). However, he confronts the Pharisees in public (Mt 21:43; 23:13-36 par). In a shame-oriented society, the usual way to avoid confrontation and to initiate reconciliation is choosing a mediator (Mt 8:5 par; 1Tim 2:4). God uses the same approach to reconcile men through Jesus Christ to him. This is also true in matters of church discipline (Mt 18:15f.).

It is interesting to note that shame-oriented persons do not like to expose themselves in relation to the others or to enter the unknown. They are afraid of losing face and need the protection from the group. On the other hand, guilt-oriented persons feel free to push beyond accepted limits and to adopt alternative views. This is a possible explanation for the fact that the history of discovery and scientific research is linked to the setting of Western guilt orientation. Only guilt orientation gives the individual the liberty to think and adopt new and alternative ways. Breach of taboo like the research on the human body in late medieval times led not

so directly to loss of face and social exclusion as would have been the case in shame-oriented contexts (Käser 2002).

4.1.7 Identity as a Function of Conscience Orientation

When discussing the Russian moral philosopher Solowjow (1976) and the German theologian Bonhoeffer (1949), we learned that through the experience of the Fall Adam perceives his personal difference with God and thus discovers a spiritual principle. „Who is ashamed separates himself in this psychical act of shame from what he is ashamed of“ (Solowjow 1976:76). Shame is therefore at the origin of a consciousness of distance and relationship, in other words, of identity. So is guilt in a lesser degree, as it is a self-conscious emotion with a specific attribution of conscience (Lewis 1992:65; contra Lindsay-Hartz et al. 1995:295). Thus, conscience „distances“ itself in its genesis from the other through shame or guilt and creates identity.

In the discussion of Lingenfelter and Mayers' model of basic values, we have seen that identity is defined differently according to conscience orientation and consequent basic values. In the guilt-oriented achievement focus, personal identity is determined by one's achievements, what one is doing or has done (1986:100). The guilt-oriented analytic thinking gives security through the feeling that one is right relative to a particular role or category in society (1986:58). Identity depends on the individual's internal perception of facts and norms.

On the other hand, in the shame-oriented status focus, formal credentials of age, birth, rank and title determine personal identity (1986:100). Furthermore, shame-oriented synthetic thinking gives security through multiple interactions within society (1986:58). Identity depends on the individual's context. It is defined by the honour and the role that the group and community provide. Shame-oriented identity becomes a corporate identity (Robinson 1911:8; Augsburg 1992:86f.; Nyirongo 1997:101). The Trinity can stand as an example of corporate personality, God being a balance between unity and community (Jn 5:19f.; 7:16f.; 8:26f.; 14:10; 17). Jesus and Paul give corporate unity a unique importance in testimony (Jn 17:21-23; 1Cor 6:15-20; 12:26). Evangelism becomes then an expression and extension of corporate personality, just as *djihad* in Islam is conceived. Hebrew religion, Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism are community-based religions with a corporate personality, since they exist in shame-oriented societies.

Additionally, identity in a past-time perspective depends largely on (ancestral) traditions. In a shame-oriented past-time perspective, the harmony with ancestors is important. In a guilt-

oriented past-time perspective, identity will depend on compliance to traditional rules and laws. Practical examples for the former are the African Traditional Religions and for the latter Judaism's pursuit of Law. Kwame Bediako makes an interesting reflection to this aspect in his book *Theology and Identity* (1992). He mentions that European and American theologians have studied early Christian writers largely for their contribution to Christian doctrine. Accordingly, their careers have tended to be assessed in terms of their relation to orthodoxy and heresy. This represents the guilt-oriented, analytic approach. Bediako however looks at them as persons and witnesses, as he says „from the standpoint of the Christian identity problem.“ He studies the Christian writers' response to the religious past and context in Hellenistic Graeco-Roman culture of the 2nd and 3rd century as compared to modern Africa. For Bediako, the theological identity of the Church Fathers and of modern African theologians depends on the context, especially the cultural tradition. He follows the shame and past-time-oriented approach to identity (Bediako 1992:4,7,437; 1995:256f.).

4.1.8 Conclusion

As mentioned earlier, our model of conscience orientation is surely an oversimplification in relation to Mayers' and other models of basic values. It cannot render justice to the complex composition of personalities. Personalities will never fit entirely into this scheme (cp. Spiro 1993:144). Let us not forget that every person is a mixture of shame and guilt orientation. He or she will have a general predominance of one orientation, but vary in one or the other trait toward the opposite conscience orientation. The model is not exact, but simple enough to permit a global orientation and easy analysis in everyday life. As Lingenfelter and Mayers say, „a model does not represent the whole reality, but produces an oversimplification of reality which should help us understand some aspects of reality better“ (1986:29). The advantage of this model is that it is cross-culturally applicable.

One of Mayers' six contrasting pairs, crisis or non-crisis orientation, does not fit into the shame/guilt orientation model. It has to do with the main perspective of the time concept: past, present or future perspective. It is one of Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck's value orientations beside man-nature orientation, activity orientation, relational orientation, and nature of man (1961). The collectivist or shame-oriented personality corresponds to Malina's „dyadic“ personality, the person who is oriented towards the other (Malina 1983:53-60). This personality type is, according to Malina, the one presented by the NT authors (1983:iii,47,51f.). Generally speaking, it is also the predominant personality type of the OT.

In summary, guilt and shame orientation can also be seen as object versus person orientation. The former is centred on standards and asks: „Am I right?“ The latter is a relational personality type. This vocabulary will be probably more adapted to and easier to understand for people, who have not followed the discussion in chapter 2 and in this section. Guilt or object orientation includes individualism and consequently an individual identity, time and task orientation, achievement focus, analytic thinking, and willingness to lose face. On the other hand, shame orientation includes collectivism and a corporate identity, event and person orientation, status focus, synthetic thinking, and fear of losing face. A synoptic view of shame and guilt-oriented personality traits is presented in appendix 11. In the following sections and chapters, we will frequently draw from it. It is important to mention that each person has at the same time shame and guilt-oriented personality traits. However in most cases, one conscience orientation is predominant. In order to give every person the possibility to know her profile, Mayers has worked out a questionnaire on basic values (Lingenfelter/Mayers 1986:29-35). We present its adaptation to our model in appendix 12. With this, a typology of personality based on conscience orientation is added to Hippocrates' four temperaments, Kretschmer's body typology connected to psychopathology (1921), Jung's eight functional pairs (1960), Isabel Briggs Myers' sixteen types (1976), Rokeach's thirty-six values (1973), Hofstede's four values (1980; 1986), Mayers' twelve basic values (Lingenfelter/Mayers 1986), Schwartz and Bilsky's seven motivational domains (1987; 1990), and the century-old ninefold ennea-typology (Rohr/Ebert 1989).

We can ask ourselves whether a shame or guilt-oriented personality is preferable. As should be evident by the reflections made above and by looking at the synoptic table in appendix 11, both personality styles have their positive and negative aspects. The shame-oriented personality is strong on interpersonal competences and weak on object-related competences. On the other hand, the guilt-oriented personality is strong on object-related competences and weak on interpersonal competences. Again we repeat that the specific profile of a person can be much more complex. Based on our Biblical studies, it is our hypothesis that God aims at a balanced shame and guilt-oriented personality.

4.2 Culture: Animism

as a Natural Worldview of a Shame-Oriented Society

As we have seen, culture and personality are seen in the two systems view of the culture-and-personality school in a „functional congruence“ (Inkeles and Levinson 1954) and a „psychologically satisfying conformity“ (Spiro 1961a; LeVine 1973:58f.). Also later research in cross-cultural psychology and anthropology see the two in interrelation: culture influences personality and vice versa (Samuel 1990:12; Segall et al. 1990:50; Berry et al. 1992:265-267; Käser 1997:139,157). Cross-cultural psychology puts the emphasis on differences within cultures, a guilt-oriented approach, while anthropology sees more similarities within cultures, a shame-oriented approach (cp. Berry et al. 1992:186). However, „both the particularity of specific cultures and more general patterns intelligible across cultural lines must be taken into account“ (Overholt 1996:11). Segall et al. formulate the relationship between personality and culture like this: „The notion that there are traits shared by members of a society and that these traits are compatible with the society's values is tenable. It merely expresses an expectation of finding functional relationships among elements of culture and aspects of behavior“ (1990:51).

The logical consequence of our hypothesis that personality is a function of conscience orientation is therefore that culture and personality are in many cases congruent in conscience orientation. When we hypothesize that animism is a shame-oriented worldview, it follows that the personality type found in it will most frequently be shame-oriented. Again we are conscious of the fact that this statement is a gross overgeneralization. We agree with Singer (1953/71), Wallace (1961), Shweder (1979a) and Segall et al. (1992) who criticize the tendency to conceive of societies as culturally homogeneous. However, this model of personality and culture has to be seen in a similar way as DuBois' concept of „modal personality“ (1944). Modal personality expresses the personality found in a statistically greater frequency (mode) in a society rather than a fundamental or basic uniformity of personality. It allows for variability in personality and for discrepancy and incongruity between personality and culture (cp. Berry et al. 1992:182). The model of personality and culture as a function of conscience orientation is situated at a high level of abstraction (Samuel 1990:68,109; Overholt 1996:12). It helps us understand certain cultures and religions better.

First, we will give brief definitions of culture, worldview and animism and study then the shame-oriented components of animism as an example of a predominantly shame-oriented

worldview. Then we will reflect on the conscience congruence of some folk religions. Finally, we will ask what could be a Christian worldview and sum up what stereotypical shame and guilt-oriented cultures looks like.

4.2.1 Definitions

It is impossible to define culture briefly. Therefore, there are many different definitions of culture. Here we will only give three of them and discuss the concept of culture more in depth in relation with contextualization in section 5.1.5. From an anthropological perspective, culture is „a socially acquired and linguistically transmitted worldview“ (Larkin 1992:194) or „a set of rules to cope with everyday life“ (Käser 1997:130). According to Hesselgrave, culture is composed of a grid of seven patterns. Worldview is one element of culture. The others are cognitive processes, linguistic forms, behavioural patterns, social structures, media, and motivational resources (Hesselgrave 1978:120). Worldview is the way of perceiving the world and ourselves. It is the „picture“ that members of a culture share „of the way things in sheer actuality are, their concept of nature, of self, of society“ (Geertz 1973:127 quoted by Overholt 1996:23 n.6). Redfield defines worldview in relation to culture in the following way:

The culture of a people is, then, its total equipment of ideas and institutions and conventionalized activities ... The „world view“ of a people ... is the way a people characteristically look outward upon the universe ...

But if there is an emphasized meaning in the phrase „world view,“ I think it is in the suggestion it carries of the structure of things as man is aware of them. It is in the way we see ourselves in relation to all else (Redfield 1957:85f. quoted in Hesselgrave 1978:125f.).

According to Redfield, there are seventy-five elements common to the worldviews of all cultures. Here we give only the three basic elements: all worldviews are related to the themes of man, nature, and gods or supernature (Redfield 1957:90). Hesselgrave proposes to add as fourth basic element the perspective of time, past or future (1978:128).

The term animism comes from Latin *anima* (soul) and means belief in the existence and efficacy of spiritual beings (Käser 1997:225). In Africa it is named „African Traditional Religions,“ in plural, in order to express the multiplicity of regional differences (Kato 1975:20). Animism, as any culture, is a „strategy to solve certain problems in everyday life“ (Käser 1997:37). It is therefore less a religion than a worldview with, in its centre, a characteristic concept of man (1997:227).

One of the fundamental concepts of animism, which is independent from conscience orientation but important for the understanding of the following discussion, is that there are as

many spiritual things and beings corresponding to the material things and beings in the world, and additionally an immeasurable number of spiritual beings. To each material thing and being corresponds an invisible double or „spiritual double.“ For the animist, the world consists therefore of two aspects related to each other like images of reflection: a visible, material one and an invisible, spiritual one (Käser 1997:227; Oduyoye 1983). Men consist therefore of a material, visible being and an invisible „spiritual double.“¹ This shows why animism is best understood on the basis of the concept of soul (Käser 1977:10f.).

The matter is even more complicated when we consider that man can have several „spiritual doubles,“ that is to say, several souls. In many cultures man is seen with two souls. One soul is not directly bound or closed into the body, but lives in proximity as a separate personality. Therefore, it is called „free soul,“ „dream ego“ or „spiritual double.“ The main functions of this soul are the protection of the body from bad spiritual beings and the maintenance of the bodily functions. Man can live a certain time without his spiritual double. But after prolonged absence, characteristic symptoms of diminished functionality, such as weakness, lack of motivation or depression begin. If this soul does not return to the body in time, coma and eventually death occurs (Käser 1997:229; cp. Hochegger 1965:280,285f.; Hasenfratz 1986a:108; Sundermeier 1988:18f.).

The other soul as seat of emotions is mostly named after a body organ outside of the Indo-Germanic languages. Therefore, it is called the „body soul.“ In West Africa, for example, it is rendered as heart, liver or breath (Hochegger 1965:281), in China as heart (Sun 1994:24), and in Truk as „psychical disposition“ without organ location (Käser 1977:31-47). Here the seat of intellectual functions as thinking and memory, and character traits as courage, will and moral judgement are located. Good and bad spiritual beings as well as the spiritual double and the body itself have this seat of emotions. The animistic worldview is holistic (or synthetic) and anthropocentric (Käser 1997:229f.; cp. Hasenfratz 1986a:108; Dierks 1986:71f.,116ff.; Sundermeier 1988:125ff.; Steyne 1989:35f.,178f.; Gehman 1990:50ff.; Nyirongo 1997:99).²

¹ In defining spirit or spiritual we have a problem in English. Germanic languages do not distinguish clearly between soul, spirit and ghost (Hasenfratz 1986a:82-88; 1986b:27-31). Spirit or ghost can describe a spiritual being, spirit also the seat of the intellect. Soul can mean the being that lives after death or the seat of emotions. In many languages, the two latter contents are separated. On the other hand, the seat of intellect and the seat of emotions are expressed with the same word in many languages, for example in Hebrew with the word „heart.“ Semantic domains are very diverse in different cultures.

² Cp. figure 2.1. with a synoptic graphic of the different worldviews.

4.2.2 Harmony between the Living and the Living-Dead

When man dies, only the body „passes away“ according to the animistic view. The „body soul“ can have a threefold fate: it can die, be reincarnated in the grand children or be transformed into a totem. The „free soul“ becomes an ancestor, a spiritual being that it has always been. Now it is not attributed to a body anymore. In a transitional phase it stays in the proximity of the living und surveys the funeral (*rite de passage*). Afterwards, it integrates the community of ancestors and lives at certain places. It does not go into a hereafter according to Western ideas, because this world and the other world are not separated in the animistic worldview. Therefore, Mbiti calls the ancestors the living-dead (Mbiti 1974:104ff.; Käser 1997:230; Hochegger 1965:280f.; Parrinder 1981:57ff.,134ff.; Gehman 1990:136).

Also the Supreme Being of animism lives in such a „hereafter.“ It is basically good and wise. It has created the world, but has withdrawn to heaven because of the depravity of men. It is venerated by men but the sacrifices and prayers go to the ancestors as the Supreme Being has no immediate importance for men like the ancestors do (Käser 1997:197; Mbiti 1974:38-59; Gehman 1990:189-193; Parrinder 1981:31ff.; Steyne 1989:72).

A family therefore consists of the living members of the clan, of the much more numerous ancestors and the unborn. The family is the centre of life. Through it an ancestor can be reincarnated in a descendant. Marriage and family are therefore inseparably bound to the procreation of children. A person who does not procreate children is practically extinguished from life (Mbiti 1974:167f.).

There are two sorts of animism: a) a less frequent form of animism without ancestor cult, mainly in hunter cultures. They have a concept of the dead as evil spirits. Because they fear them, they do not bury them, but rather eliminate them. They do not seek contact with them either. In these cultures, shamans are the mediators between the two worlds. They enter in contact with the spirit world through ecstasy by sending one of their souls to the „good“ spirits (not the dead) in order to get the knowledge necessary for their functions in society. b) The second more frequent sort is animism with ancestor cult. In these cultures, media are the mediators between the two worlds. Ancestor spirits visit them and transfer their knowledge to them (Käser 1997:230). In the following discussion, we will concentrate on animism with ancestor cult, especially the African forms, called African Traditional Religions, with which the author is more familiar.

A fundamental rule in an animist society is to maintain harmony between fellow men, ancestors, spirits, the Supreme Being, and animals, plants and matter. We must not forget that

nature, plants and matter, are also represented in this continuum by their spiritual doubles which we would call spirits. The means maintaining harmony in the animist micro- and macro-cosmos is to respect norms and standards given by traditions. „Breaking a taboo disturbs the harmony of the community and the peace of the spirits“ (Nyirongo 1997:62; cp. Nielsen 1991:9; Tso 1991:1). When norms are violated, rituals and sacrifices are necessary to restore harmony. Mediators like medicine men perform these reconciliation rituals (Staples 1981:159,166,193f.; Steyne 1989:62f.,147-152; Nyirongo 1997:79).

4.2.3 Honour for Men and Ancestors

It is the honour that the community gives to its member that matters, not the member's view of himself. It is the community's acceptance of the individual that gives him his identity. This identity is gained step by step, through various rites, but it is the initiation ceremony that truly incorporates the individual into the social group (Nyirongo 1997:101).

Honour depends on age, seniority of birth, roles, gender, ritual status and material possessions. The older are more important than the young because they are closer to the ancestors. They possess more personal power and wisdom (1997:103). The younger brother is expected to carry the load of the elder brother because of his status of birth. The same respect is due to the father's elder brother's son, even though he may be younger. The younger brother must not marry earlier than his elder brother. To do so is not only a sign of disrespect, but a sin against the community and the ancestors. Social roles such as father, mother, grandmother, chief or diviner are closely linked to social hierarchy. The parent is believed to have more worth, life force and wisdom and is closer to the ancestors than the child. Heads of families with numerous children and many wives are seen as filled with more life force and honoured more. The most honourable man in the community is the chief. He becomes a kind of divinity, close to the ancestors. Second to him is the witchdoctor, priest or diviner (Nyirongo 1997:104; Steyne 1989:159). Females are inferior in status than males: wives than husbands and daughters than sons (Nyirongo 1997:118f.). Rites, especially puberty rites like circumcision and excision, upgrade one's worth as a person and makes one feel superior to those not initiated. A further mark of honour and status is material wealth (Nyirongo 1997:105).

4.2.4 Corporate Personality

It was in 1911 that H. Wheeler Robinson, an OT scholar, coined the term of corporate personality describing a „psychic community“ or a „psychical unity“ between the members of the

same social group (Robinson 1911:8; Rogerson 1970:1,6). As we have seen in the discussion of identity, corporate identity is a feature of shame-oriented persons and cultures. The individual is not a person until the community has accepted him (Adeyemo 1979). Mbiti writes in his description of traditional African society:

In traditional life, the individual does not and cannot exist alone except corporatively. He owes his existence to other people, including those of the past generations, and his contemporaries ... The community must make, create or produce the individual; for the individual depends on the corporate group. Physical birth is not enough ... *I am because we are, and since we are, therefore I am*“ (Mbiti 1969:108; 1974:136 italics in original; cp. Steyne 1989:61).

This identity is gained through various rites. It is mainly the initiation ceremony, mostly during puberty, which truly incorporates the individual into the social group. „Without this transition, one remains a child, an outsider, a ‚half‘ person or a nobody. He will not fully enjoy the privileges of the community“ (Nyirongo 1997:101; cp. Staples 1981:199). Because of this view of the individual, the African community strongly emphasizes the qualities of peace-loving, friendliness, forgiving, having appreciation and respect for each other, and sharing. The outcomes are communal sharing, communal decision-making and communal ownership (van der Walt 1994:210-219).

It is important to note that also the Hebrews see man as member of the community, as *homo socialis*, integrated and bound in family, clan, tribe and people (Wolff 1990:270,309). That is why Robinson speaks in relation to this community orientation of corporate personality (Dt 26:5-10; Jos 24:15; Jer 31:29f.; Robinson 1946:70; Dyrness 1979:82). Concepts as salvation and righteousness include communal elements, in the sense of communal well-being and conformity to communal standards (Gerlemann 1995:922; Koch 1995:515). It indicates that the OT community has come out of an animistic society.

4.2.5 Salvation as Well-Being, Harmony and Power

The animistic concept of salvation is holistic and includes such elements as well-being, harmony, honour, longevity, prosperity, success and power (Sawyer 1973:129f.; Sanneh 1983:180; Mbiti 1985:135-179; van Rhee 1991:290). Gaba writes about the Anlo in Ghana:

Salvation is deliverance ... from material ills in all manifestations. Peace, on this score, can be equated with material contentment. ... [Salvation is] total well-being in life in its individual as well as its corporate dimensions and this is reflected in all spheres of human existence (Gaba 1978:390).

In the Annang culture of Nigeria, salvation means *edinyanga* and has six basic meanings:

Negatively it means:

1. The transference from the state of danger to a peril-free one.
2. Freedom from physical attack.
3. Protection from whatever would inflict a jeopardy.

Positively it signifies:

1. Increase and progress in the state that is conceived as safe, prosperous, glorious.
2. Maintenance of a peaceful relationship with the objects and persons on which and whom one's own harmony and that of the world around one depend.

These five different meanings lead into the sixth, namely actions that bring about *edinyanga*. Thus the Annang can only say that he has been saved, when the different eventualities ... have produced a successful outcome in the end (Enang 1979:107f.).

Nyirongo, following Gaba, mentions five standards in terms of which salvation is perceived: (1) incorporation into the tribe by way of initiation, (2) becoming an ancestor after death, (3) growing old and having the respect of younger people, (4) acquiring wealth, health, plenty of children and food, and (5) winning the approval of the community (1997:72f.).

All of the positive elements are in fact shame-oriented concepts filled with harmony, honour and prestige. They all witness to a life-force which is the third element in Adeyemo's definition of salvation in African traditional religions: „acceptance in the community of the living and the living-dead, deliverance from the power of the evil spirits, and a possession of life force“ (Adeyemo 1979:94; cp. Nkurunziza 1989:145f.). In the African context, salvation equals life (Dierks 1986:150; Nkurunziza 1989:165). Hauenstein comes to the same conclusion from an Asian perspective (1999:156). In summary, salvation is a state of wholeness filled with harmony, honour, glory and power.

4.2.6 Sin as Violation of Harmony

Sin is diminution of salvation and life force. In a society where the community fixes the standards, sin is mainly socially defined. As we have seen, harmony and honour are the standards in an animistic society. Therefore, to violate harmony and honour is sin (Mbiti 1989:4f.; van Rheenen 1991:278f.). In African traditional religions, the elders and the ancestors are the originators and custodians of the customs and regulations of the tribe.

Although the African believes that sin originated from man's first offence against God, in daily life, sin is not committed against God but against the community – one's family or tribe (which includes the ancestral spirits). Consequently, fear of disapproval from one's family/tribe is more valid than fear of God's wrath over sin. In fact one must even tell lies just to avoid offending one's people ...

Since it is the community that „justifies“ an individual, it is the same community that feels the pain and guilt most. One's consciousness of the shame and

disappointment experienced by one's family - especially one's elders and ancestral spirits - is more painful than fear of God's wrath (Nyirongo 1997:61).

In Korea, *in-dog*, the virtue or moral reputation, is the most important value for man. It is composed of *in-riun* „humaneness“, of *song-sil* „sincerity“, of *do-dog* „moral capacity for decision-making“, and of *chin-jol* „goodness.“ The one who loses *in-dog* „moral reputation“ is ruined for all times. There is no remedy for him. The worst is to be responsible for the loss of somebody else's *in-dog*. The second important value is *ui-sin* or *che-mion* „honour, prestige.“ Fear of destroying somebody else's prestige hinders criticism, especially in public. Therefore, the foundations of Korean morals are *in-jong* „empathy“ and *ui-sin* or *che-mion* „honour, prestige“ together (Sung-Won 1987).

When social harmony and corporate honour are the standard in a community, to destroy this harmony and honour is sin. It is not measured at the intention of the sinner, but at the outcome of the action. A special way to violate the harmony is by making somebody lose face. The following shame is a communal shame, as the honour of everybody has been touched. An action, like theft, murder or adultery, can be hidden. The shame-oriented conscience is only activated when the action is discovered. Rather than the action of stealing, the uncovering of the theft becomes the shaming act. If the person, who has been stolen, is the one who uncovers the theft (the offended person for a guilt-oriented conscience), he becomes the offender in a shame-oriented society. Landrø observes:

Among equals on the human level, however, it is not always self-evident who is to be blamed. A Westerner would of course be quick to ask, „Who *did* it?“ And the sympathy will then go out to „the poor object“ who had been wronged.

African logic does not necessarily reason the same way. I myself was often surprised when I saw that it could be the one who *found out* about the wrongdoing who was „the sinner,“ and not always the one who did it. „Did *what*?“ the African mind would ask. It is, in other words, not self-evident who is the offender (subject) and who is being offended (object) (1987:143f. italics in original).

Instead of labelling the attitudes Western and African, we propose to label them guilt and shame-oriented. Again we stress that guilt and shame-oriented can but do not necessarily equal Western and African. It is interesting to note that Dodds and Adkins characterize (animistic) Homeric and classic Greek societies as shame-oriented with (1) a social definition of sin, (2) a fear of losing face, and (3) a search for virtue (Dodds 1951:17f.; Adkins 1960:31,48f.,154).

4.2.7 Social Control through Shaming

A shame-oriented society uses shaming for social control. There are different methods of shaming. In a progressive order of seriousness, Braithwaite, Nielson and Lienhard mention teasing, joking, gossip, direct accusations, take away a job, exclusion from the group, public exposure in front of the council of elders or by the crier, cut the nose or finger off, and lastly, physical extermination (Braithwaite 1989:89; Nielsen 1991:10; Lienhard 2001a:149). Gossip is a very powerful means of social control as Lienhard shows in Daba/Bana society in North Cameroun (2001a:148). Stopping gossip, on the other hand, can be a powerful means of restoring harmony (Lienhard 2001a: 165f.,195f.).

Public exposure is mentioned in a variety of cultures. It was used in medieval times in Europe by binding people at the pillory on the market place. Kraus mentions exposure and exclusion as important measures of social control in Japan (1990:212). From China, Wickert relates situations of public exposure during the Cultural Revolution. Persons of the upper class had to walk through town with a shield on the back mentioning their wrongdoings or with funny clothes or hats on, before being led to the work camps (1989:335). Well-known are the public confessions forced on the „imperialists.“ Some preferred to commit suicide before having to suffer loss of face and shame (1989:332). In conclusion, shaming and loss of face are the most effective measures of social control in a shame-oriented society.

4.2.8 Forgiveness as Reconciliation and Reintegration Through Mediators

In shame-oriented cultures, mediators bring about forgiveness (Augsburger 1992:192-194). Mediators from the invisible world are different sorts of spirits, ancestor spirits being the practically most important ones. Mediators from the visible world include kings, chiefs, elders, prophets, priests, medicine men, witch doctors, diviners and mediums. This group is also believed to be capable of tapping the blessings from the spiritual realm and passing them on to the individuals, families or tribe. Only good spirits or people who have lived through long life to ripe age qualify as mediators. It is at the burial ceremony that the deceased is transformed from an ordinary person to a potent spirit able to bestow favours on those he leaves behind. (Staples 1981:121; Steyne 1989:147,159; Augsburger 1992: 204f.; Nyirongo 1997:52).

The mediators indicate what kind of rituals and sacrifices are indicated to attain reconciliation with the ancestors. These rites do not only include guilt-oriented reparative rites and sacrifices but also shaming situations. In the Toma people in Guinea, West Africa, the adulterer has to stand naked before the village together with his co-offender. A dog is cut in two

between them. Then he passes several times naked through the village. During these rounds, the population insults (shames) him. He can be expelled from the village for a certain time, a measure that leads to a temporary loss of (corporate) identity. Important is the fact that after these procedures the offender is reintegrated into society without further punishment. Reconciliation with the whole village is accomplished. Toma people say about reconciliation with God: „Before the advent of Christianity, we have known God, but we did not have a mediator.“

4.2.9 The Included Middle

In 1982, Paul E. Hiebert coined the term „the excluded middle,“ referring to the exclusion in the West of supernatural, this-worldly beings and forces from the spirit world (1982:43; 1985:158; 1994:193-197; 1999:89). The West excluded the middle level of reality in the course of the Greek enlightenment during the 5th century B.C. with its emerging dualistic Greek worldview, and after the Enlightenment in the 17th century, with its secular worldview (cp. figure 2.1; Musk 1989:176f.; Hopp 1993:8; Dierks 1986:76-90). This gives a two-tiered view of reality occupied by high religion and science, leaving the problems of the uncertainty of the future, and the crises of present life without solution (Hiebert 1994:196f.). While high religions deal with universal truth and science with empirical truth, the „human middle“ involves a power encounter of spiritual forces (Hiebert 1994:199; Hopp 1993:9f.).³

As we have seen in the discussion of personality traits, shame orientation goes along with a holistic approach. Animism as a shame-oriented worldview includes the middle level concerning the vital questions of human existence. It offers a holistic and synthetic worldview. All the levels, aspects, and questions of human life are included. On the highest level, it includes cosmic history in creation, redemption, purpose, and destiny of all things. On the middle level, it includes human history in the affairs of nations, peoples, clans, and individuals, healing, suffering, and death, ancestors, spirits and invisible powers. On the bottom level, it includes the natural order of things (Hiebert 1994:199). Animism offers also a holistic worldview as far as it proposes to see reality on the grounds of a visible, material world, and a corresponding invisible, spiritual world (the spiritual doubles). Interestingly, according to Paul Dirac's equation (1927), modern physics proposes to see reality analogically as a material world and an anti-material anti-world (Laukenmann 2000). It is also of interest that the world-

³ The term „power encounter“ was introduced by Alan R. Tippett (1967:100-118). It is interrelated with the animistic concept of *mana* (cp. Müller 1993:63). See section 4.3.11. Power Concepts and Power Encounter.

view of „new age“ and esoteric streams are holistic and that they become popular at the moment when Western society becomes more shame-oriented.⁴

According to Hiebert, Christian missionaries must offer a holistic, three-tiered worldview addressing cosmic, human and natural history if it wants to be appealing to animists (Hiebert et al. 1999:372). Therefore, it will be necessary to go beyond the traditional, Greek dualistic and the secular worldview. This animistic worldview represents also a special challenge to Christian theology because it continues to be the basis of high religions like Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity (Käser 1997:226; Hoppenworth 1993:89; Steyne 1989:51-56). In this function, it is called folk or low religion as opposed to formal or high religion (Hiebert 1999:77).

4.2.10 Folk Religions and Shame Orientation

As folk religions are a combination of an animistic worldview and formal religions, their worldview and culture is basically shame-oriented. Hiebert et al. name as their characteristic features corporate anthropocentrism, the spirit world, holism, particularism (as opposed to universalism), existentialism (in the sense of dealing with existential questions), power and pragmatism, orality (being highly immediate, personal and relational), transformation and transportation (being able to transform and transport themselves magically), and fear and security (1999:80-87). From our former discussion of personality and of animism, we know corporate anthropocentrism and holism to be shame-oriented views.⁵ In animism, holism includes a spirit world which is transformable and transportable and which deals with existential questions (the included middle), and thus eliminates fear and gives security. Fear has been identified as typical feature of shame-oriented societies. Security is provided by the integration into the community. Particularism and pragmatism correspond to a situational view of reality and are therefore shame-oriented concepts. Orality is closely linked to person orientation and therefore also to shame orientation. Besides being linked to the spirit world, power concepts depend on the *mana* concept, and are linked to honour, prestige and well-being, all shame-oriented concepts.⁶

Hinduism, Buddhism, Chinese religions and Islam are community-based religions with corporate personalities and many other shame-oriented concepts. We will mention some

⁴ Cp. section 5.1.13. The Generation X and Shame Orientation.

⁵ Schreier ascribes the congruence between folk religions and personalities to the fact that they fulfil needs (1985:139; cp. Spiro 1961a).

⁶ See for its discussion section 4.3.11. Power Concepts and Power Encounter.

examples of shame-oriented concepts that were formalized into the high religion. The basic concept of Hinduist worldview is the *brahman-atman* philosophy that has developed between 500 B.C. and 1000 A.D. *brahman* is the primary, cosmic reality, the highest, impersonal absolute which reigns above everything. It is the great Id, the precondition of all gods, men, and other creatures. From this primary reality the world goes through periodic rebirth. The Hindus believe that the world exists in an eternal cycle of creation, existence and death with continuous repetitions. Because the world only originates from *brahman* but is not *brahman*, it is a fictitious world, *maya*. *atman* is the self of man, the core of his personality, or also the soul of other beings. *atman* is that which possesses eternal reality in this fictitious world. It is the smallest part of *brahman*; it is of the same essence and actually identical with it. *maya*, belonging to the fictitious world, is also the power of evil. It is external to man (Hoppenworth 1993:89). The concept of *brahman-atman* is a description of corporate personality. The gods of Hinduism are personifications and reincarnations of the one impersonal, godly absolute, *brahman*, which remains one. Men are connected to *brahman* through *atman*. Therefore, man is essentially good. *maya*, the power of evil, is external to man and belongs to the fictitious world. Therefore, man cannot be a sinner in his essence. He does not need a saviour. The main purpose of life is to live in harmony with *brahman*.

In Chinese religions, cosmic harmony is also a predominant feature. Two opposite, polar cosmic principles which are represented in all beings, *yang* and *yin*, enter into a harmonious balance. *yang* represents the sunny river shore, spring and summer, that which is male, light, warm, dry and high. It is the active principle. *yin* represents the shadowy river shore, autumn and winter, all that is female, dark, cold, wet and deep, the passive principle. Analogies are found everywhere, for example, heaven and earth, warm and cold, chief and servant, good and evil. In the relation of the two principles, the basis for cosmic harmony is given which should exist between heaven, earth and men (Dammann 1978:59). With the *yang* and *yin* cosmic principles, Chinese religions formalize the animistic, synthetic worldview of harmony between all beings and things. In Buddhism, harmony with the cosmic absolute is reached in *nirvana*, the state of annihilation without any desire (Dammann 1978:46,51f.; McDowell 1986:50).

The basic ethical principles in old Chinese religion are the five duties: love between father and son, justice between chief and servant, respect of duties between husband and wife, respect of age, faithfulness toward friends (Dammann 1978:59). All five are relational and therefore shame-oriented concepts.

In Islam, the Qur'an is conceived of as containing the basic doctrines of Islamic law, the *shari'a*. But even though Islam presents itself as a guilt-oriented high religion, folk Islam includes predominantly shame-oriented features. Musk states that in folk Islam „it is not primarily law which channels and corrects human behaviour. Rather, it is the connected concepts of honour and shame“ (1995:67). Musk presents in table 4.10. differences between official and folk Islam (adapted from Musk 1989:203f.).

Table 4.10: Official and Folk Islam

Aspect	Official Islam	Folk Islam
Issues	Questions of life, death, heaven, hell, salvation, eternity, believers, non-believers From preaching of Muhammad	Questions of fear, sickness, loneliness, guilt, shame, powerlessness, longing, meaninglessness, disease, crisis From everyday life
Text	Qur'an, kept up to date by commentaries (<i>tafsir</i>)	No basic text is handed on except books of magic
Institution-alisation	Formal: • sheikh or imam, down through hierarchy; does not include women • Sunni orthodoxy; sects within the great tradition • major mosques in Mecca, Medina, Jerusalem, Damascus, Istanbul	Informal: • specialists may be imam, medicine man, witch doctor; includes women • groups built up around persons of power; sects around new persons • no central edifices, but local places of power: trees, shrines, streams
Authority	Ulema (ruling theologians) and hierarchy of religious-political officials	Lies in the <i>baraka</i> -possessed, proven power of practitioner
Morality	System provided, based on the Qur'an; legal and societal sanctions	Amoral ‚fitting-in‘ with the spirit world; appeasing <i>jinn</i> that are angered, using those whose favour is won

Folk Islam is essentially relational and person-oriented with no fixed standards whereas the official Islam is predominantly standard or guilt-oriented. Many features of folk Islam are however dependent on the concept of *baraka* that is the equivalent of *mana* in folk Islam. As an element of power, it is linked to shame orientation (Musk 1989:262-265; 1995:72f.,185f.). Function and meaning may change from official Islam to folk Islam. Musk presents in table 4.11, how the meaning of the creed and the five pillars changes (Musk 1989:222).

In the change of meaning from official to folk Islam, we see again the two elements: fixed standards or guilt orientation is transformed into shame orientation by seeing angels and prophets as mediators for reconciliation and *baraka*. On Middle Eastern society, Musk observes:

Table 4.11: Meaning in Official and Folk Islam

Intended Function	Form	Meaning in Official Islam	Meaning in Folk Islam	Reinterpreted Function
Expression of Submission to God (<i>islam</i>)	Creed: • Only God • Angels • Books • Apostles • Last Day • Predestination	• monotheistic confession of faith • servants of God at his pleasure • encoding of God's self-revelation • vehicles of God's word to man • ethical focus of man's life • ultimately all in God's hand	• magical use of the names of God • possible mediators, powerful in charms • bibliomancy and bibliolatry • possible mediators, veneration, relics • acts to gain merit for dead relatives • <i>laylat-al-qadr</i> to change destinies	To Maintain Equilibrium
Expression of Belonging to Community of Faithful (<i>umma</i>)	Pillars: • Confession • Prayer • Aims • Fasting • Pilgrimage	• proves one is a true Muslim • bodily purity for worshipping God • responsibility to fellow-Muslims • sign of communal commitment • visit epicentre of the faith	• protection in spaces inhabited by evil • removal by water of demonic pollution and sins • precaution against the evil eye • veneration of Muhammad and <i>laylat-al-qadr</i> • obtaining of <i>baraka</i> and alternative shrines	In Largely Hostile World

The Arab Muslim lives in a group-oriented context where vertical relationships are predominant. The cultural theme most valued is honour. Shame is to be avoided at all costs. Daily living becomes a question, largely, of navigating successfully through the uncharted water that lies between honour and shame (Musk 1995:85).

A major goal ... is to accumulate honour and avoid its erosion by shame. Social control, for such people, is essentially exercised by the dynamics of shaming. Such a control depends on everyone knowing everything about everyone. This is quite easily achieved in a community-oriented society. 'Gossip' is the public expression of the shaming mechanism. Saving face is all-important to such a culture. A single shame experience threatens to expose and damage the whole self (Musk 1995:73).

4.2.11 A Christian Worldview?

After the discussion of animism as a shame-oriented worldview and of folk religion as a combination of an animistic worldview with a high religion, we can ask ourselves how a Christian worldview should look like. What characteristics should it have and should it be shame or guilt-oriented?

An attempt of reflecting on Christian worldview is made by van der Walt. After having outlined the basic foundations of a Christian worldview in *The Liberating Message* (1994), he gives a summary of ten agenda points and ten weak points (-isms) for South African Christianity in *Religion and Society* (1999:3-22). He proposes a committed Christianity as opposed to nominalism, an integral, holistic worldview „to replace pietist, dualistic, other-worldly, individualistic Christianity,“ an involved Christianity versus escapism, a kingdom Christianity (seeing God’s rule larger than „the church“) versus institutionalism, an ecumenical Christianity (in the sense of interdenominational on the basis of the kingship of God and the discipleship of Christ with the universal offices of prophet, priest and king) versus denominationalism, a radical Christianity (in the sense of going to the roots, to the heart of personality and culture) as opposed to secularism, a normative Christianity versus subjectivism, an African (we could say contextualized) Christianity versus eurocentrism, a visionary Christianity with a Biblical vision of worldview as against myopism, and a socially involved Christianity with a pluralistic model for society as compared to syncretism (in the sense of borrowing uncritically from non-Biblical models like liberal individualism and socialism). In trying to find a common thread in van der Walt’s proposal, we can say by overgeneralizing that the -isms tend to be legalistic and analytical, and therefore tendentiously guilt-oriented; the agenda with its holistic view, synthetic thinking and strong relational component is predominantly shame-oriented. Presenting Christianity as normative, gives however a decisive guilt-oriented character to the Christian worldview. This leads to a balanced shame and guilt-oriented worldview in accordance with our hypothesis on Biblical grounds.

In their book *Understanding Folk Religion* (1999), Hiebert et al. present a reflection on a missionary Christian theology, a narrower approach compared to a worldview. They hold that a truly missionary Christian theology will have to offer a holistic, three-tiered worldview addressing cosmic, human and natural history if it wants to appeal to animists and folk religionists. Therefore, it will necessarily have to go beyond its traditional, Greek dualistic and secular worldview. This means to readopt the holistic Hebrew worldview (cp. figure 2.1.). It will have to include the invisible world, with the trinitarian God as creator, sustainer and

empowerer of life, the angels as God's ministers on earth, and Satan and the demons as the counterplayers. Therefore, it has necessarily to be a theology of power. A theology of the kingdom of God will stress God's rule and work in the world. However, the Biblical power concept includes the love, humility and weakness of the cross (1Cor 1:23-27). It needs to stress the church as a caring community. It will have to offer a theology of submission and worship as opposed to the self-centredness of fallen humanity and the attempts to control their world, gods, ancestors, and other beings through magical manipulations. Critical contextualization is needed, which is rooted in Scripture, related to the context, guided by the Holy Spirit, and done by the church as hermeneutical community. The evangelistic, pastoral, teaching and prophetic ministries (Eph 4:11) have to respond to popular religious beliefs and practices as transforming ministries (Hiebert et al. 1999:369-392). Trying to sum up the requirements for a missionary Christian theology as seen by Hiebert et al., we conclude that in order to respond to folk religions it will have to be predominantly shame-oriented. In relating however to a specific context, it will be either predominantly shame *or* guilt-oriented. Being rooted in Scripture, it will be balanced, shame *and* guilt-oriented.

Thinking about Christianity is necessary to construct a Christian society. However, this reflection does not encompass all aspects of Christian vocation. In a narrower missionary perspective, Hesselgrave sees worldviews as a „starting point for missionary communication“ (1978:129). This is a realistic approach, because worldviews are created and transformed only over long periods of time. This means that it will be necessary to contextualize the Christian message into a shame or guilt-oriented setting. However, it is good to know what we aim for when we want to construct a Christian worldview in cross-cultural Christian ministry. Based on our Biblical analysis, it is our hypothesis that God aims for a balanced shame and guilt-oriented worldview.

4.2.12 Conclusion

To sum up this section on culture, we will give an overview of culture in relation to conscience orientation. According to the theory of „functional congruence,“ there are similarities between a culture and the persons living in it (Inkeles and Levinson 1954; LeVine 1973:58f.). Culture influences personality and vice versa (Segall et al. 1990:50; Berry et al. 1992:265-267; Käser 1997:139,157). Therefore, culture and personality are in many cases congruent with regards to conscience orientation. When animism is a predominantly shame-oriented worldview, it follows that the predominant personality type found in it will be shame-

oriented. We would also expect that a culture with predominantly guilt-oriented elements would be composed, in majority, of guilt-oriented persons. When we say that animism is a shame-oriented worldview, it does not mean that there are no guilt-oriented elements in it. It simply indicates that the shame-oriented elements are predominant.

A stereotypic shame-oriented culture values communal harmony and honour. It goes together with a predominantly shame-oriented personality type and a corporate personality, a holistic worldview including the middle sector, salvation as well-being, harmony, success and power. Sin is considered a violation of harmony, and forgiveness as reconciliation and reintegration into the community through mediators. It is tendentially a hierarchical society. In accordance with this model, Dyrness describes the basic elements of an African worldview as harmony, human community, and the power concept (1990:43-52). Based on Steyne (1989), Turaki identifies four philosophical foundations of African worldview: holism, spiritualism, dynamism and communalism (1999:110; cp. de Visser 2000:194f.). All four have been identified as shame-oriented concepts: spiritualism in the sense of a holistic worldview, and dynamism as synonym of the power concept.⁷

A stereotypic guilt-oriented culture stresses justice, law and rights. Societal life is regulated by fixed codes and standards. It tends to be an egalitarian society. The guilt-oriented personality seeks to be right, that is, to comply with these standards. The worldview is analytic and fragmentary, as for example the dichotomistic or secular worldviews. Salvation is seen as man being right with God based on the societal standards, sin is a transgression of these standards, and forgiveness a reparation of the transgression.

4.3 Theology: God, Man, Sin and Salvation

After having discussed personality and culture as a function of conscience orientation, we now reflect on the implications of conscience orientation for theology. We will proceed from theology proper to anthropology, soteriology, ethics, and Biblical exegesis. However, it is not the aim of this section to present a comprehensive, systematic treatment of theology. The analysis will be limited to subjects relative to our topic. The following questions will be raised: what are the conscience orientations of Biblical concepts, how does the conscience

⁷ Based on Turner (1977), Bediako lists six features: (1) a sense of kinship with nature, (2) a sense that man is finite, weak and impure or sinful, (3) the conviction that man is not alone in the universe, (4) the belief that man can enter into relationship with the benevolent spirit-world, (5) a sense of the reality of afterlife, (6) no sharp dichotomy between the physical and the spiritual (Bediako 1995:93-95; cp. deVisser 2000:194f.). They are included in Turaki's four philosophical foundations.

orientation of theologians influence theology, and how can the Biblical message be adapted within a given context?

4.3.1 Theology Proper: Who is God?

The Biblical concept of God is grounded on the affirmation that God has created the universe. Therefore, he stands apart from all his creation as the completely other, as the creator (Isa 29:16; 64:8; Rev 4:11; Eichrodt 1967:96). This attribute belongs only to Yahweh. Each other deity is a created being and consequently part of creation (see figure 4.1). The other deities are „nothings“ in comparison with Yahweh (Isa 44:6; Ps 115:4). In this respect, the Biblical concept of God stands in stark contrast to the animistic concept, whose Supreme Being is a creator god and yet is also of this world. Synthetic thinkers, as shame-oriented people, tend naturally to the concept of a Supreme Being as part of the universe. The Biblical concept presents a difficulty for them and is more adapted to analytic thinkers, as guilt-oriented people are.

Figure 4.1: Hebrew and Animistic Worldview

Hebrew Worldview	Animistic Worldview
God	
	Supreme Being
Angels	Spirits
Spirits	Ancestors
Humans	Humans
Animals	Animals
Plants	Plants
Matter	Matter

Israel’s belief that God is the creator of the earth, remaining separate from it, represents a radical shift when compared to the animistic context of Israel. The world is not sacred in the sense of being confused with a deity, but the work of the power and goodness of God (Gen 1; Ps 8). It is not an object of capricious powers, but is under God’s control (Eichrodt 1956:9).

Despite unbridgeable transcendence, Yahweh reveals himself to man and becomes immanent (Gen 12; 15; 17; Ex 3; 19f.; 33). In Jesus Christ, God has revealed himself definitively and perfectly as Immanuel, „God with us“ (Isa 7:14; Jn 10:30,38; 14:9f.; Col 1:15f.;

Hebr 1:1). From an animistic-type *Deus remotus*, he becomes a God near to his people (Dyrness 1979:43; van Rooy 1995:75; Turaki 1999:163). Thus, from a more guilt-oriented concept of *Deus remotus*, the concept of God becomes more relational and shame-oriented through Jesus Christ.

God is not an impersonal object as the Supreme Being, but God is a person who desires to enter into fellowship with man (Gen 6:18; 17:1f.; Dt 6:5; Mt 22:37ff.; van Rooy 1995:47). Many Supreme Beings, such as the *modimo* of the Sotho-Tswana in South Africa, are conceived of more as impersonal force and power than as a person (Setiloane 1976:77; van Rooy 1994:263; Turaki 1999:154f.). Even though power is an outstanding feature of the deity, for a shame-oriented individual the person from which emanates the power is central (cp. Eichrodt 1961:228).

God is not a specialized tribal and territorial God as the supreme beings usually are conceived of and as the Israelites may have understood Yahweh to be (Gen 26:24; 27:20; 28:13,18; Ex 3:18; 1Sam 26:19; 1Ki 20:23). Yahweh is a universal God (Gen 1 & 2; Dt 20:16f.; Isa 45:1-4; 56:3-7; 66:17-21; Jer 27:6,8; Jonah; Rom 2:10; Loewen 2000:95-104; Scheurer 1996:308-312,355ff.; de Visser 2000:260). He is the Lord of all the peoples and of all the religions (Rev 5:9; 7:9; Scheurer 1996:413-416). He is actively present in eternity (Hebr 13:8; Rev 1:4) and becomes our ever-present *alter ego* and *significant other* (Eichrodt 1961:207; Terrien 1978). He turns to us (Hebr. *pnh*), shows us his face (*pānîm*) and not his back and blesses us (Num 6:25f.; Rev 22:3; Eichrodt 1967:35f.). God's constant presence is an important feature for shame-oriented people who need the presence of the significant other for the normal functioning of the conscience, more than for guilt-oriented people who have introjected the significant other. Knowing this, the Orthodox Church represents it with God's eye on the icon walls. In the same order, the images of ancient deities and modern state presidents are put up everywhere. This fact sheds new light on Israel's temptation to represent God visually (e.g. Ex 32) and the relevance of the second commandment (Ex 20:4).

The Biblical God guarantees the binding character of his relationship with men through a covenant (Gen 6:18; 17:2; Ex 19:5; Dt 7:9; Rom 9:4; cp. Eichrodt 1961). This fact is shown by his names: he is the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob (Ex 3:6). He is *yhwh*, the one who is, the real and powerful (Ex 3:14; Boman 1952:36f.); he is here for us and with us (Kittel 1993:68). Through Jesus Christ, the Biblical God is also the Father of believers (Jn 1:12; Rom 8:15f.; cp. Peters 1985:45f.). Through this covenant relationship, he is fundamentally different from a remote Supreme Being which does not take interest in men and their sorrows, such as

Allah who is perceived principally as impersonal fate (Hoppenworth 1993:97). Through this intimate fellowship, the Biblical God gives a „fiduciary framework“ and becomes attractive for shame-oriented people (Bosch 1991:358f.).

God is one (Dt 4:35; 6:4). However, he is one in three (Gen 1:1; Mt 3:16f. par; 2Cor 13:13). This phenomenon, which is very difficult to grasp for any mind, is expressed already by his OT name *ʾĒlōhîm*, an „abstract plural“ or „plural of intensity,“ which is followed by a verb in the singular when talking about the God of Israel (Eichrodt 1961:185). The triune God has loving relationships among themselves and forms a community (Swahili *ujamaa*, Arabic *umma*) (Jn 3:35; 5:20; Mwoleka 1976:151). This becomes visible, for example, through the fact that Jesus used to pray through entire nights (Lk 6:12; 9:18,28). The Trinity is different from the loneliness of the Supreme Being and of Allah (surah 112:1). It makes the triune God attractive for shame-oriented persons who conceive of themselves as corporate personalities. They tend to stress the community and fellowship of the triune God, whereas guilt-oriented persons tend to emphasize the oneness of God.

The Biblical God is a living God (Jos 3:10). God's covenant with man is a „covenant of life and peace“ (Mal 2:5). Life is the central concept of most societies (cp. Nkurunziza 1989:52; Hauenstein 1999:156). For a shame-oriented person, life is not thinkable without a network of relationships: „I am because we are, and because we are I am“ (Mbiti 1974:136). Therefore, the God of life is an attractive concept for shame-oriented people. The aim of God's covenant relationship with man is life (Mal 2:5; Jn 6:33,51; 10:10; 1Jn 4:6). This is expressed succinctly by the formula: „God's mission for the world's life“ (*missio Dei pro mundi vita*) (Hauenstein 1999:169). As an attractive propositional concept for Muslims, Troeger speaks of the triune God as will, word and power of life (Troeger 2001).⁸ God is the source of life (Gen 1:1ff.; 2:7; Ps 36:10; 104:29f.; Jer 2:13; 7:13; 11:25; 14:6; cp. Wolff 1990:61). Jesus Christ has given his life for the life of man (Jn 3:16; 6:51; 10:10). The one who has faith in the „God's gift for the world's life“ (*donum Dei pro mundi vita*) has attained life (Jn 5:24) and does not lose it anymore. It is eternal life (Jn 3:16-19). It becomes a life for God in the Spirit (Rom 6:11; 8:1-17; Gal 2:19).

Yahweh is the holy and righteous God (Isa 6:3; 43:15; Rom 2:5). The concept of holiness is close to that of animist taboos, when it means the entirely separated and special other withdrawn from ordinary use. Many languages express „separate, mark off:“ Hebr. *qđš* - *qđ*, Greek

⁸ Germ. *Lebenswille, Lebenswort, Lebenskraft*.

temenos - *temnein*, Lat. *sanctus* - *sancire*, Polynesian *tabu* (Eichrodt 1961:270). Holiness is also close to the concept of purity and cleanness. Therefore, it is a shame-oriented concept. Righteousness means the behaviour that corresponds to the covenant community and to the covenant standards (Koch 1995:514f.). Thus, it is a combined shame and guilt-oriented concept. Eichrodt names it *bundesgemässe Liebestreue* „covenant conforming loving faithfulness“ (1961:239 my translation; cp. 1968:155). With this term, he combines righteousness with love and grace (*hesed*). The character of love differentiates Yahweh completely from the Supreme Being of animism and from Allah (Jn 3:16; 1Jn 3:16; van Rooy 1995:125).

In opposition to the apparently silent Supreme Being (van Rooy 1995:54,75; Turaki 1999:163; de Visser 2000:239) and to Allah who speaks only through the Qur'an, the Biblical God speaks and acts in history (Wright 1973:12; Dierks 1986:121f.). The living God reveals himself directly to man, shows his face, makes a covenant with him, gives promises, blessings and curses and guides his life. In Jesus Christ, he himself breaks into human history. He not only communicates within the Trinity, but also with man. He does this in a holistic way and desires to receive from him an answer that is „whole“ (Gen 17:1b my translation). This is also a shame-oriented characteristic of the Biblical God.

4.3.2 Anthropology: What is Man and His Soul?

The Bible presents man in dialogue with God (Wolff 1990:17), a person and shame-oriented situation. Man understands himself out of the omniscient, omnipresent, omnipotent, redeeming and guiding God (Ps 139). He lets God examine, question and appoint him to new things. This creator God is at the same time close to him and far away. God is close to him through his intimate knowledge (Hebr. *yḏ'*) and his continuous attention (Hebr. *pnh*). He shows man his face (*pānîm*) (Eichrodt 1967:35). The expression and blessing of the intact covenant relationship is his shining face (Num 6:25f.; Ex 33:14; 34:33-35; 1Cor 3:18; 4:6; Rev 22:3). He is far away from him as the completely other (Hebr. *qdš*), the creator as compared to his creature (Isa 29:16). The I-You relationship between man and God is based on the fact that man is created in the image of God (Gen 1:26f.) and on the covenant between them (Ex 19:5; Rom 9:4; 1Cor 11:24f.). Having missed the aim, which is God (Hebr. *ḥṭ'*, Greek *hamartia*), and therefore having failed and broken the covenant relationship, man has left the state of harmony, honour and righteousness, became self-conscious, and is now subject to shame and guilt as global and specific attribution of his sinful state (Gen 3; Lewis 1992:84f.). He has lost his own face, and after having been chased from paradise, he has also lost God's face. „Shame

is related to the fact that we have fallen short of the image of God ... and of the covenant goals which would have fulfilled the divine image“ (Kraus 1987:215). Consequently, man is in need of redemption and in search of salvation. His conscience is in conflict (Brunner 1941).

As a guilt-oriented man, he is looking for reparation and justification. Jesus Christ has come as ransom to pay back his debt. Now man is justified; he is again right with God (Carson 1992). As a shame-oriented man, he is in search of a mediator bringing reconciliation with God, fellow men and himself, and reinsertion into the covenant relationship representing a position of honour. Through the sacrifice of Jesus Christ, man is restored in the image of God (Col 3:10) and in the position as child of God (Jn 1:12). The Orthodox Church states in a shame-oriented manner that the descent (*katabasis*) and the renouncement (*kenosis*) of the God-person Jesus Christ causes man's ascent (*anabasis*) through the Holy Spirit and his „deification“ (*theosis*), his restoration in the image of God (2Pet 1:4; cp. 2Cor 3:18; Lossky 1974:97f.; 1976:126; Clendenin 1994:117f.; cp. Kurani 2001:122 n.47). Whether „deification“ (*theosis*) in the sense of the unification with the substance of God as the Alexandrian school interpreted it, or „becoming like God“ (*homoiosis theou*) in the sense of participation with the Godly as the Antiochian school saw it, or a restoration of status as John Calvin holds, is a nuance in the restored intimate covenant fellowship between God and man (Kraus 1990:190f.; McGrath 1997:423f.). It is interesting to note that man as *simul justus et peccator* „sinner and just at the same time“ (Luther) was apparently seen in church history primarily as a sinner by guilt-oriented people and predominantly as renewed image of God by shame-oriented people. While the former is an analytic view, which stresses the difference, the latter is a synthetic view with the emphasis on fellowship and harmony.

Understanding shame and guilt as expression of a bad conscience is quite clear. But understanding the configuration of the conscience and situating it in the soul is complex. The Bible speaks of heart, soul, spirit and reason when describing man's soul. Conscience is described as heart or kidneys and situated in the context of man being created in the image of God. God by his Holy Spirit contacts man through the conscience (1Sam 24:6; 2Sam 24:10; Ps 16:7). It is therefore the basis for his capacity for community and fellowship with God (Ps 86:11) and fellow men, and consequently for culture and religion (Müller 1995a; cp. Th. Schirrmacher 1994a:337). As such, it is the foundation for the respect of the last six commandments of the Decalogue, which appear in varied form in different cultures. The conscience is however only an anthropological, fallible authority. God claims to be the last authority over conscience (Rom 13:5). This is expressed in the first three commandments.

The psychoanalytic branch of psychology presents an elaborate structure of the soul with id and ego. Super-ego and ego-ideal are the correlates of the conscience. It explains the tension between ego and ego-ideal as producing shame, while the transgression of the norms of the super-ego produces guilt. The culture-and-personality branch draws our attention to the fact that man is part of a social group and a social system, which influence in turn conscience and behaviour. The models of empirical psychology are less elaborate and hypothetical. Lewis sees attribution theory corresponding to the situation of the Fall when man developed an objective self-consciousness and made a global attribution of self (1992:84f.). Syntheses between psychology and theology attempt to pass beyond a heteronomous super-ego to an autonomous conscience. Cultural anthropology presents a multitude of concepts of the soul in different peoples. It speaks of body souls, excursion souls and reincarnation souls among others. Many languages do not have a term for conscience and nevertheless have a concept of conscience (e.g. Käser 1977; Hasenfratz 1986a; Badenberg 1999). In conclusion, conscience is a theonomous structure of the soul with heteronomous and autonomous components. Both shame and guilt are heteronomous, autonomous and theonomous.

4.3.3 Soteriology: Cultural Concepts of Sin and Salvation

The concept of sin and salvation differs from culture to culture. If the Gospel is brought to a culture, the message has to build on these concepts. The ignorance of differences in soteriological concepts has led to superficial Christianity and deculturation (Uchendu 1964:114; Noble 1975:81; Rommen 1994:40f.). The missionary is therefore obliged to learn how people understand sin and salvation in a given culture. During the process of learning he can compare these concepts with his own and those of the Bible (Dye 1976; Kasdorf 1989:123).

In animistic cultures, sin is a violation of harmony „that disrupts the cohesiveness of an ordered world and causes disharmony“ (van Rheeën 1991:279). As its moral standards are regarded in the broadest sense as taboo, sin is the state in which a person finds himself after having broken a taboo (Käser 1994:29). This ordered world contains a community of gods, men (the living, the dead, and those yet to be born) and spirits (Mbiti 1989:4). Sin destroys the harmony of life and expresses itself in illness, sterility and catastrophes. The disharmony in relationships determines this concept. It is therefore adapted to a shame-oriented culture.⁹ In guilt-oriented cultures, sin is defined according to fixed standards independent of relationships

⁹ Cp. section 4.2. Culture: Animism as a Natural Worldview of a Shame-Oriented Society, and particularly section 4.2.6. Sin as Violation of Harmony.

and group. For guilt-oriented persons, definitions of sin in shame-oriented cultures appear relative (Steyne 1989:192).

The concepts of sin and salvation are closely interdependent. Animistic cultures have social and theological definitions of salvation. As for sin, the social definitions predominate. Additionally, they are this-worldly oriented. Adeyemo writes that salvation in African traditional religions contains at least three elements: „the acceptance in the community of the living and living-dead, deliverance from the powers of the evil spirits, and a possession of life force“ (Adeyemo 1979:94 quoted in van Rhee­nen 1991:291; cp. Sawyerr 1973:129f.; Enang 1979:107; Mbiti 1986:135). If the missionary wants to formulate good news, it should correspond to these attitudes. The new believer in Christ enters into a lively community. The power of Jesus Christ redeems him from demonic powers and fills him with life (cp. Enang 1979:318-326 summed up in Mbiti 1986:153). In many contexts, salvation is synonymous to life (Dierks 1986:150; Hauenstein 1999:156). Sin is therefore diminution of salvation and life. It is not measured by the intention of the sinner, but on the result of the action.¹⁰ For guilt-oriented cultures, salvation is synonymous with being right in relation to standards combined with a high achievement level.

How does the sinner gain salvation? In animistic contexts, ancestors are sensitised and approached with sacrifices. The sacrifice has a utilitarian character and transmits the message: „I give you in order that you give me back“ (Lat. *do ut des*; cp. van Rhee­nen 1991:291). The ancestors are hence mediators of salvation (Dierks 1986:153). In combination with these sacrifices, fetishes, which are substances filled with *mana*-force, are produced. These are in a certain sense the „carriers of blessing.“

4.3.4 The Biblical Models of Forgiveness

Contrary to the cultural concepts of forgiveness, the Biblical God has come to us in Jesus Christ in order to die for us as sacrifice and to reintegrate us into the covenant community. The movement and interest are not directed from the animist to God, but from the Biblical God to man. The believer lives in a loving relationship with God, which determines his whole life including his relationships with others. Salvation is community with God and fellow men and victory over enemies. Sin is violation of this fellowship with God and men and consequently defeat against the hostile powers. It leads to a state of shame and impurity that

¹⁰ Cp. section 4.2.5. Salvation as Well-Being, Harmony and Power.

represents dishonour for God. For man, this means to miss the objective. The way to God does not lead through human manipulation, but through acceptance of our sin before God and fellow men and of his forgiveness through Jesus' sacrifice. This purifies from all shame and restores harmony. A guilt-oriented version of the way back to God shows that through Jesus' ransom the debt of guilt is paid back.

Which one of Paul's models is adapted to which conscience orientation?¹¹ The justification model is appropriate for shame and guilt-oriented individuals depending on the concept of righteousness and justice used. When righteousness means conformity to covenant and community behaviour, it is a shame-oriented concept. God reinserts man back into the covenant community and brings him into the honourable status of a covenant partner. When justice means that God pays back man's debt through Jesus' sacrifice, it is a guilt-oriented concept (cp. Kraus 1990:179). When the justification model is presented to shame-oriented people in a guilt-oriented manner, it is misunderstood (cp. Messenger 1959:100f.). Based on 1Jn 1:9, it means then that the Christian God forgives sins automatically when man confesses them. Little is said about repentance, conversion, discipleship, sins of omission, and reparation of relationships and damage (cp. 2Chr 7:14; 30:18f.). Hence, a system of „cheap grace“ is produced: transgression of norms is restored through simple confession.

Cheap grace means grace as a doctrine, as a principle, as a system ... Cheap grace means justification of sin and not ... justification of the repentant sinner, ... who abandons his sin and changes ... Cheap grace is the grace which we have with ourselves.

Cheap grace is preaching forgiveness without repentance, is baptism without discipline, is communion without confession of sins, is absolution without personal confession. Cheap grace is grace without discipleship, grace without the cross, grace without the living Christ made man (Bonhoeffer 1989:29f.).

This misunderstood and reduced justification model can reinforce the legalistic aspect of the animistic concept of sin. Because of this tendency, the justification model is applicable in shame-oriented contexts only with Bonhoeffer's supplement or when explained in a shame-oriented manner as restoration of righteousness.

The justification model becomes more comprehensible for shame-oriented persons when introduced with the help of the sacrifice model. Sacrifices as substitutive means of expiation are well known to animists and Muslims. Through the sacrifice, „the sinner is transferred from a state of defilement to one of purity“ (Eichrodt 1961:160; Bruce 1994:286). „Without the

¹¹ Cp. section 3.1.11. Forgiveness as Covenant Concept.

shedding of blood there is no forgiveness“ (Lev 17:11; Hebr 9:22), for the blood contains the God given life force (Beyerhaus 1996:498). Caution is necessary because of the general attitude towards gifts and sacrifices, which transmit the message: „I give you so that you give me“ (Thiele 1990:993). „Help God and he will help you!“ says a sign in front of a mosque construction. It expresses the shame-oriented concept of interdependence. From this animistic concept, Jesus' sacrifice has to be marked off clearly. It is an unconditioned gift of God, that is, pure grace (cp. Keita 1992). Jesus' sacrifice is a means for justification and reconciliation (Rom 3:24f.). Through this passage and the LXX term for the top of the ark *hilastērion*, Paul binds the historical fact and the OT concept of sacrifice together with the concepts of justification and reconciliation (Büchsel/Herrmann 1938:319; Kraus 1990:183 n.5; Link/Vorländer 1990:305).

The reconciliation model emphasizes the fact that sin destroys the covenant fellowship with God and men (cp. Kraus 1990:179). Hence, not only transgressions but also sins of omission are concerned. Troubled relationships are to be improved through changed behaviour. The reconciliation given through the sacrificial death of Jesus Christ makes this possible (Col 1:20). Grace means not only forgiveness of known sins, but leads to restoration of fellowship with God and men. It becomes a „precious grace“ (Bonhoeffer 1989:31). Missing the objective is the meaning of Hebrew and Greek terms for sin. With the reconciliation model, the social as well as the theological aspects of the concepts of sin and salvation are taken into account. Therefore, this model is well adapted to shame-oriented people.

The redemption model is important for people living in social and material constraints. People living in an animistic context are often threatened in their existence by many powers and forces. These are expressed in illness, shortness, isolation, enmity and catastrophes. To know that Jesus Christ is the winner over all these powers gives them the necessary security in their battle for existence (Rom 7:24f.; 1Cor 15:27; 2Cor 2:14). He is the Lord (*kyrios*), the redeemer (*sotēr*) and the king (*pantokrator*) (Rev 1:8). He is the *Victor*. All authority in heaven and on earth has been given to him (Mt 28:18), also over demonic powers and interpersonal constraints (cp. Noble 1962:221; Gaba 1978; Mbiti 1986:159-161).

The NT concept of redeeming slaves (*hilaskomai*) is interpreted by most in an essentially guilt-oriented way. However, it has its roots in the OT model of redemption by the closest relative (*gʾl*), which comprises shame and guilt-oriented aspects. The Year of the Jubilee (Lev 25) includes the guilt-oriented component of the remission of debts besides the relational

aspect of reintegration of the slaves into society. The redemptive model of the levirate¹² in the book of Ruth also incorporates both aspects: the relational aspect of parenthood and the guilt-oriented component of payment. The redeemer figure (*gōēl*) can be transposed to Jesus Christ who becomes our closest relative, our *gōēl*. Thus, the story of Ruth becomes a very powerful message for shame and guilt-oriented contexts with or without a levirate tradition. This is probably the reason why the book of Ruth is read at every feast of Passover in Jewish worship service. The incorporation of both aspects permits to use the soteriological model of the Jubilee and the redeemer (*gōēl*) with shame and guilt-oriented people.

The suitability of the different models becomes easy to understand when applying Adeyemo's definition of salvation. According to him, salvation for African traditional religions means acceptance in the community of the living and the living-dead (the ancestors). For this aspect, the reintegration into the covenant community with the Father, the reconciliation model is adapted. Secondly, salvation means deliverance from the powers of evil spirits. Jesus Christ's sacrifice gives victory over such powers. Here, the redemption model is well suited. Thirdly, for the animist salvation means a possession of life force. The believer receives the power of the Holy Spirit after the renewal of the conscience (repentance - *metanoia*) and the behavioural change that is confirmed through baptism (Acts 2:38; cp. Rom 12:2). Mbiti speaks here of a „pneumatological soteriology.“ He holds that the African sees salvation basically trinitarian, that he has a „trinitarian soteriology“ (Mbiti 1986:169; cp. Beyerhaus 1996: 506).

After having discussed the different models of forgiveness in relation to conscience orientation, we must add that the power of the Holy Spirit can overrule the anthropological mechanisms mentioned and thus, so to speak, „simplify“ forgiveness (Rom 1:16).¹³ In the following section, we will present two interpretations from church history that have a special importance until today: Anselm of Canterbury's satisfaction theory as shame-oriented interpretation and Martin Luther's justification by grace as guilt-oriented approach. Afterwards, we will give an overview over Bible and church history from the perspective of shame and guilt. After an evaluation of what forgiveness and the cross can mean for shame and guilt-oriented

¹² Levirate describes the custom that a man inherits the wife of his deceased brother (Dt 25:5-19; cp. de Vaux 1964:72f.; Mbiti 1974:182).

¹³ Cp. sections 5.2.6. Evangelism and Revival, and 5.4.11. The Holy Spirit and Shame and Guilt-Oriented Conscience.

people, we will study different christological models and finally discuss the importance of the power concept for soteriology.

4.3.5 Anselm of Canterbury's Satisfaction Theory

Dissatisfied with the patristic model of the *Christus Victor*, Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109) develops the satisfaction theory, which he presents in his work *Cur Deus homo* „Why God Has to Become Man“ (McGrath 1994:409).¹⁴ As a creature, man owes God the free submission and dedication of his will. This submission is the only and entire honour that man can give to God. In the liberty of a will that follows God, man is the honour and glory of God in creation. If man does not submit himself to God, he shames God's honour and takes away from him what belongs to him alone (*Cur Deus homo* I,11). „Nothing is more intolerable in creational order than when the creature refuses the due honour to the creator, and does not restore what it steals“ (*Cur Deus homo* I,13). The obligation towards God and the debt resulting from man's failure are so big that the smallest fault becomes a monstrosity. This situation demands therefore an immeasurable satisfaction or else eternal punishment (*satisfactio aut poena*; *Cur Deus homo* I,15).¹⁵ God's punishing justice however cannot be God's definitive answer, for God has chosen man for eternal salvation; he could not shame his most precious work for eternity. The restoration of the initial creational order calls for a saving act of God. Only freely given satisfaction of infinite value can restore God's lost honour again. Sinner-man cannot realize this satisfaction, for it would have to be bigger than the penance of all men to counterbalance the weight of sin. What man should have done, but only God could do, the God-man Jesus Christ has done (*Cur Deus homo* II,7).

It is obvious that Anselm's discourse is highly shame-oriented.¹⁶ The problem of God's honour is in the centre of his concern. How could God's lost honour be restored? Only through God's sovereign act of satisfaction in Jesus Christ. Anselm follows the Germanic code of honour and its sanctions, which was apparently shame-oriented at his time (Hödl 1978:775; Kraus 1990:155). Typically, its concern is not individual but corporate salvation. This main concern will have changed at Luther's time indicating a change in conscience

¹⁴ For the following treatment of Anselm's satisfaction theory I am indebted to Hödl (1978:774f.).

¹⁵ „The idea of satisfaction first arose out of the early church's requirement of a token of the penitent's sincerity. The satisfaction required was in proportion to the seriousness of the sin. Later, it came to mean the ‚temporal punishment‘ due to sin which must be met even though the eternal consequences had been cancelled“ (Kraus 1990:155 n.8).

¹⁶ Pruyser and Kurani interpret Anselm's satisfaction theory as guilt-oriented (Kurani 2001:71; Pruyser 1964:18f.).

orientation. In the 13th century, Thomas Aquinas develops Anselm's satisfaction theory further. Argumenting the reason for the satisfaction he says:

This one gives real satisfaction for an offence, who offers something to the offended that this one loves more than he hated the offence. Christ has offered God something greater through his suffering out of love and obedience than the compensation of all the offences of mankind demanded: Firstly, because of the great love with which he suffered. Secondly, because of the dignity of his life that he offered as satisfaction and that was the life of a God-Man. Thirdly, because of the generality of his suffering and the greatness of the accepted pain. ... The dignity of the body of Christ must not only be measured according to the nature of the body, but according to the person that has accepted it; insofar it was the body of God. From this it received an infinite dignity (ST IIIa,48,2 quoted in Mc Grath 1994:411).

During the time of Lutheran orthodoxy, the satisfaction model is integrated into classical Protestant dogmatics and finds its expression in many hymns of the 18th and 19th century (Kraus 1990:225 n.7; McGrath 1994:409). This fact shows the survival of a shame component in the guilt-oriented Protestant stream.

4.3.6 Martin Luther's Justification by Grace

In the middle of the 12th century, the Catholic Church becomes guilt-oriented. According to Brunner and Kraus, this is because jurists well versed in Roman law entered the Roman Curia (Brunner 1951:41f.; Kraus 1990:207; cp. Kurani 2001:71). As a matter of fact, since patristic times, Roman law has influenced Christian theology through jurists like Tertullian, Augustine and others. Also Luther and Calvin had legal training (Muller 2000:27-30). An alternative and more probable explanation for this shift in conscience orientation is that the Catholic practice of indulgences, which inculcates in the minds on a daily basis that man has to pay for every sin, transforms central European society into a more guilt-oriented one. As part of guilt orientation, humanism brings in the 16th century a new knowledge about human individuality. In the context of individual consciousness, a new interest in the doctrine of justification arises with the question: How can man as an individual enter into a relationship with God (McGrath 1994:447).

Martin Luther (1483-1546) has to be seen in this mainstream when he asks the question: „How can I be justified before God?“¹⁷ As he writes in 1545, in the foreword to the Latin edition of his works, in 1515 he struggled through a personal Bible study of Paul's letter to the Romans about an understanding of the term „righteousness of God“ (WA 54,185,12-186,20).

¹⁷ Germ. *Wie bekomme ich einen gerechten Gott?* Lit.: How can I get a just God? For the following treatment of Luther I am indebted to Sauter (1995:317ff.).

Reading the NT in the Greek original text „liberates“ him from the semantics of the Latin Vulgate, which translates *dikaion* with *iustificare* and gives the concept of righteousness the meaning of transformation: God makes man just (Sauter 1997:317). Luther interprets the genitive in „God’s righteousness“ as a *genetivus objectivus* meaning „the justice that man has before God“ as a gift from God (Rom 4:3,5 cp. Phil 3:9). This leads him to see justice as a forensic declaration. Justice is then an external matter, *iustitia aliena*, not an internal transformation as Augustine and the Catholic Church see it, especially after the Tridentine Council 1545-1547 (WA 56,158,9-14; cp. McGrath 1994:451). Man is at the same time sinner and justified (*simul iustus et peccator*), sinner in reality, just in hope. God is active (*iustitia distributiva*) and man is passively acknowledging God’s judgement through faith: „God’s passive righteousness through which the merciful God justifies us through faith“ (*iustitia Dei passiva qua nos Deus misericors iustificat per fidem*) (WA 54,186,7). It is not only justification through faith, but justification by grace through personal faith. Hereby, grace is not infused in man (*gratia infusa; habitus infusus*) as Augustine and Thomas Aquinas see it based on Rom 5:5, but grace is a personally appropriated gift. From there, the reformers arrive at the formula: *sola gratia, sola fide*.

The forensic interpretation becomes clearer in the later writings of Luther from 1530 on, probably under the influence of Philipp Melanchthon (McGrath 1994:454; Sauter 1997:321f.). Luther differentiates the declaration of justice (Germ. *Gerechtsprechung*) as justification (Germ. *Rechtfertigung*) from making just (Germ. *Gerechtmachung*) as sanctification. All the reformers align themselves to this differentiation in opposition to the Catholic Church, which sees them together (Sauter 1997:322f.). This makes evident the guilt-oriented approach.

It is needless to say that Lutheran guilt-oriented interpretation has influenced generations of Protestant theologians and churches until today. Lutheran orthodoxy from the 16th century on up to German theology of the 19th century calls the doctrine of justification the „central and fundamental material principle of Protestantism“ (Barth 1960:581f.; Sauter 1997:329f.). In this context, it is of interest that Karl Barth speaks about right and wrong (Germ. *Recht und Unrecht*) when talking about justification (1960:573,576). This confirms the guilt-oriented approach of Protestant theology to this topic until the middle of the 20th century. Barth however goes beyond the doctrine of justification to the person of Jesus Christ as the foundation of the church (cp. 1Cor 1:30; Col 2:3; Barth 1960:588). Also for Luther, the foundation

for ethics and morals is the personal relationship with God.¹⁸ The almost exclusive guilt orientation in relation to the doctrine of justification contrasts with relational shame-oriented elements in Luther's and Barth's theology.

The introduction of the reconciliation model in the second half of the 20th century indicates renewed interest in shame within Protestant theology (Stuhlmacher 1981; Sauter 1997:338). This development throws also new light on the interpretation of the genitive construction „God's righteousness“ (cp. Rom 1:17; 3:5,21f.; 10:3; 2Cor 5:21). Newer research from Schlatter on (1935) shows that it can be understood as *genetivus subjectivus* as well. It means then God's own righteousness as power of salvation (Käsemann, 1964:182f.; Dunn 1988:41; O'Brien 1992:70). This brings the cosmological-eschatological breadth of the term back into perspective. Following Schlatter, Käsemann and Stuhlmacher plead for a combination of *genetivus subjectivus* and *objectivus*, which comes basically to be a *genetivus auctoris*. Righteousness of God then becomes power (Schlatter) and gift (Luther) at the same time (Käsemann 1964:186; Stuhlmacher 1989:32). It combines shame and guilt orientation as the Biblical concept of righteousness does. Additionally, it means „God's righteous action for salvation and/or man's being and behaviour which conforms to this action“ (Stuhlmacher 1981:107). It aims for man's answer. „As righteousness has to be ascribed to God as sustainer of the world order, it is his righteousness which he gives to the one who practices righteousness“ (Schmid 1976:407). Schmid actually describes covenant relationship and behaviour. With this comprehensive view, Käsemann can say that in the concept of God's righteousness, Paul succeeds in combining „the presentic and futuric eschatology, ‚declare just‘ and ‚make just‘, gift and service, liberty and obedience, forensic, sacramental and ethical perspective“ (Käsemann 1994:184). In conclusion, Luther has interpreted Paul through guilt-oriented glasses. Stendahl criticizes Luther and other theologians of projecting the „introspective conscience of the West“ into Paul's letter to the Romans (1963). Apparently, Stendahl speaks of the guilt-oriented conscience (cp. Kraus 1990:214).¹⁹

4.3.7 The Bible and Church History in the Perspective of Shame and Guilt

In this section, we will try to give an overview as a hypothetical synthesis of the analysis of Scripture and church history in the perspective of shame and guilt. In an attempt to generalize, the statements tend to be stereotyping.

¹⁸ Cp. section 2.3.3. Martin Luther's Reform.

¹⁹ For a larger discussion of „righteousness of God“ in the perspective of shame and guilt see Wiher (1997).

- God creates man with the disposition of a conscience and sets a norm (Gen 2:16f.). When this norm is violated, self-consciousness comes, and Adam and Eve feel shame and hide (Gen 3:7-10). There is no sign of a guilt feeling. The conscience is shame-oriented. However, ontological guilt is present. It is expressed by the banishment from paradise.
- In response to the shame-oriented conscience, God reveals himself as the ever-present and „whole“ demanding a holistic response: to Abraham he says: „I am God Almighty; walk before me and be whole“ (Gen 17:1b; my translation). To Jacob: „The Lord is in this place and I was not aware of it“ (Gen 28:16). To Moses: „I am who I am“ (Ex 3:14) or „I am here for you“ (Buber 1976:158). In the presence of a significant other with fixed standards, the conscience becomes sensitised and thus more shame and guilt-oriented.
- God gives the Law at Sinai (Ex 20ff.). Failures in relation to goals become also transgressions of standards. Every sin has to be paid for (Lev 1-7). The conscience becomes more guilt-oriented.
- Over the centuries, the Jews become more guilt-oriented, observable especially in late Judaism (LXX, Pharisees of NT, Talmud). OT concepts become guilt-oriented: instruction (*tôrâ*) becomes law (*nomos*), covenant (*berît, diathēkē*) becomes testament, righteousness (*ṣedāqâ*) in the meaning of conformity to covenant and community becomes almsgiving (Arabic *sadaqa*).
- Jesus communicates directly with the relatively guilt-oriented Pharisees and stresses the relational component: You give the tithe of the herbal spices, but you do not honour father and mother (Mt 23:23; 15:6). With ordinary people he shows a balanced shame and guilt orientation. He asks to love God and fellow men and to keep his commands: „If you love me, you will obey my commands“ (Jn 14:15,21,23f.; 15:10,12; 1Jn 3:23f.).
- The Jewish Christians are relatively guilt-oriented, while the non-Jewish Christians are shame-oriented. Conflicts are programmed (Acts 6; 15; 21). With the influx of non-Jewish Christians, the early church becomes shame-oriented. The Orthodox Church stays shame-oriented until today.
- In the middle of the 12th century, the Catholic Church becomes guilt-oriented through the practice of indulgences: Every sin has to be paid for.
- Luther as a Catholic is guilt-oriented. His theology of justification is also guilt-oriented. Consequently, Protestant theology stays mainly guilt-oriented until today.

- Guilt-oriented Western theology is exported into mainly shame-oriented „mission-fields.“ There it is generally accepted and transmitted, but often misunderstood and reduced.

4.3.8 Forgiveness for Both Shame and Guilt-Oriented People

For a shame-oriented person, sin means loss of honour or face and disharmony in the community. It is a shameful matter. Therefore, forgiveness means restoration of honour and harmony. This can include a change of behaviour with or without a change of mind (*metanoia*). Often repentance, confession and reparation of damage are absent. For a guilt-oriented person, the feeling of guilt is in the foreground. It is appeased through reparation: the suffering of punishment and the payment of a fine. This restores justice and the person feels right again. Consequently, forgiveness for guilt-oriented individuals is more easily established than for shame-oriented persons (cp. Wiher 1995:7-11). Many authors associate forgiveness with guilt and define it consequently in a guilt-oriented way (e.g. Lynd 1958:50). Shame is often not associated with forgiveness.

When we study the concept of forgiveness in Scripture, we find that both shame and guilt-oriented aspects are present. An analysis of king David's adultery with Bathsheba and its consequences (2Sam 11-12) shows the following elements: David has committed a grave sin. He reacts only when the prophet Nathan confronts him with the truth, a shame-oriented behaviour. However, he repents of his sin against God and confesses it to Nathan, an intimate circle. God forgives him and he does not have to die (2Sam 12:13b). He also stays king. Few know of his act in the short term. Therefore, he does not have to lose face and can keep his prestige and honour. Nevertheless, the act has consequences, also after having been forgiven by God (2Sam 12:10f.,14b): the death of his son (2Sam 12:14b), Amnon's adultery with Tamar and Absalom's murder of Amnon as revenge (2Sam 13), Absalom's revolt and his adultery with David's wives (2Sam 12:11; 15-16), Absalom's persecution of David and Absalom's death (2Sam 17-18).

David can stay king. The harmony is nevertheless troubled by the death of his son. Also part of the blessing is taken back: even though the promise remains that the Messiah will come from the house of David (2Sam 7:12-16), David's children are in constant conflict so that the family is disrupted and the kingdom divided after David. Despite of forgiveness, consequences remain contrary to the shame-oriented concept. Part of the consequences trouble harmony and prestige, and are therefore important for shame-oriented persons. Others diminish the long-term blessing. Type and measure of the consequences are different from case to

case. With this example, it becomes evident that understanding Biblical concepts like sin, salvation and forgiveness in relation to conscience orientation represents a priority in cross-cultural Christian ministry and that it is very complex in its implications.

The justification model, which had a decisive role in the reform in Europe with mainly guilt-oriented persons, can lead to a „religion of cheap grace“ through unwise use among shame-oriented people. It is only one of several Biblical models for forgiveness. Because it is often misunderstood and reduced, it is not suited for evangelism of shame-oriented people. It should be used in connection with the well-known sacrifice model, which is the foundation for all other models and builds on the animistic background. The justification model has however its place in Biblical teaching. In catechism, preaching and counseling, the justification model should be taught as Gospel of „precious“ grace in order to lead to a balanced understanding of forgiveness. In this context, it is important to understand that cultures change only slowly, that is, during generations, and therefore a change from a one-sided conscience orientation to a balanced shame and guilt orientation will not happen quickly. The redemption model with its basis in the OT concept of close parenthood and the Jubilee has the advantage of incorporating both shame and guilt-oriented aspects and building on familiar traditions in many cultures.

4.3.9 The Shame and Guilt of the Cross

Western theological approaches deal almost exclusively with the relation of the cross to guilt (Kraus 1990:207). In Jesus Christ, however, God deals definitively with shame and guilt. Green and Lawrenz formulate it like this:

There is one overwhelming, compelling reason to believe that God has decisively dealt with sin and guilt, and will deal with the shameless perpetrators of human pain: God himself stood in the spot of the greatest shame ever experienced in the universe, and in so doing, began the work of unravelling the guilt and the shame that has beset the human race since Adam and Eve (Green/Lawrenz 1994:101).

The cross, then, „must deal with the social disgrace and exclusion (objective shame) as well as the subjective feeling of failure and unworthiness. Further, it must deal with the intrinsic consequences of guilt - both internal and external ...“ (Kraus 1990:207).

The guilt-oriented aspect of the cross is that Christ, our ransom, has paid the equivalent penalty to clear the debt of guilt. The intrinsic consequence of sin is death (Rom 6:23).²⁰ At

²⁰ Cp. the principle of causality and retribution (Germ. *Tun-Ergehen-Zusammenhang*; Koch 1991:2; 1995: 514; Kreuzer 1995:220f.).

the cross, propitiation has taken place through the suffering of our punishment. Christ has born our guilt through substitutive identification (Isa 53:4; Mt 8:17; 1Pet 2:21-24; Kraus 1990:226). He has become God's ultimate substitute for our sinful guilt. Here guilt is not only a legal matter, but it is ontological as sin is (Kraus 1990:224; cp. von Rad 1957; Ricoeur 1967:101; Pannenberg 1961). In the eyes of a guilt-oriented person, the cross is an instrument of penalty. It expresses God's justice (Kraus 1990:204).

The shame-oriented viewer sees Jesus Christ as self-disclosure of God (Kraus 1990:102). He has become our mediator who is not hindered by shame to present our sin (shame) before God's throne (1Tim 2:4; Hebr 9:15). Shame-oriented people say: „We have known ‚god‘ (Supreme Being), but we have not had a mediator to go for us towards him.“ Christ has come to bear man's shame and dishonour. „We must recall that the cross was designed above all to be an instrument of contempt and public ridicule. Crucifixion was the most shameful execution imaginable“ (Kraus 1990:216). Therefore, the shame-oriented viewer sees the cross as place of ultimate shame. Kraus says that Christ dealt at the cross with false and true shame. False shame is expressed in the cultural taboos, mores, and laws. The cross exposes them „as an idolatrous human self-justification“ and breaks their power (cp. Lk 7:39; Jn 7:49). In theological terms, these „expressions of shame are negative indicators of a society's concept of the *imago Dei*.“ True shamefulness of man is his intentions and selfish desires, deceit, and pride, which come from the heart (cp. Mk 7:21-23; Kraus 1990:220f.). At the cross, Christ „despised the shame (Hebr 12:2 KJV), i.e. he exposed the despicable character of our humanly devised shame“ (Kraus 1990:222). In love, Christ has identified with us in our shame, defilement, curse and alienation (Dt 21:22f.; Gal 3:13). This was true conformity to the covenant, true righteousness (Rom 1:17). Now, man is reconciled with God (2Cor 5:18f.) and newly restored in the covenant relationship (Rom 8:14-17). „Stressing God's love in identifying with us in our alienation as a reason for the cross will appeal to an honor oriented society“ (Lienhard 2001a:184).

Kraus and Clapp suggest that the resurrection also deals with shame and guilt. According to Kraus, resurrection is a new hope for shame-oriented people, and a new chance for guilt-oriented persons (1990:204).

The resurrection is deep reassurance - exactly the reassurance we need - that shame does not destroy. We have no hope in the face of shame without the resurrection. ... Our hope is not that resurrection obliterates the shame of crucifixion. Our hope is that resurrection transforms and paradoxically elevates the shame of crucifixion (Clapp 1991:38).

4.3.10 Christological Models

Many christological models have been proposed around the world (e.g. Samuel/Sugden 1983; Schreiter 1992). In Africa, these models are mainly relational, and consequently shame-oriented (Healey/Sybertz 1997:83f.). Nyamiti and Bujo see Christ in the central role of the ancestor, as mediator between God and men and as Lord over the powers that direct life (Nyamiti 1984; 1990; Bujo 1982). Gutmann says in the same sense: „Christ should replace the ancestors“ (Bammann 1990:59). As an ancestor, Christ is also head and master of our initiation. After having gone through different initiatic steps himself, Christ leads us through similar steps to perfection (Hebr 2:10; 5:9; 7:28; Sanon 1992). Kabasélé proposes a similar metaphor in the eldest brother who is the one who carries the responsibility in the extended family, makes the decisions, directs life and mediates (1992b). According to the levirate custom, which exists in the OT and many cultures, Christ becomes our closest relative, our Redeemer (*gōēl*). For Bediako, Christ resembles not so much to a blood member of the family, but to the chief or king who sits on the throne and from there controls the forces of life (Bediako 1983; cp. Kabasélé 1992a; Waruta 1992). A very creative metaphor in a culture where hospitality is valued very highly is Jesus as a guest (Healey/Sybertz 1997:168ff.). Shorter (1982) and Kolié (1992) see Christ as healer and diviner, a central feature in Jesus' ministry on earth (cp. Healey/Sybertz 1997:85). In a context of animism, poverty and suffering, Jesus as *Victor* and liberator is also a central theme (Mbiti 1968; Magesa 1992; Healey/Sybertz 1997:203ff.; de Visser 2000:269; cp. for the patristic period: McGrath 1994:409). Van Rheenen says rightly: „The animist views his religion as a way to escape from suffering - to overcome evil in the world. However, the Christian realizes that although he is in Christ, suffering continues and frequently increases because of Satan's attempts to turn him from Christ“ (1991:304).

Of course, Christ as pre-existent Word of God, member of the Trinity, as Redeemer of sin, as sender of the Holy Spirit, and as suffering Servant-King, goes largely beyond the scope of these metaphors. The former metaphors are well adapted for creative evangelism (Sawyer 1968; 1973). However, in catechism, teaching, and preaching, the concepts of Trinity, sin, salvation and suffering deserve special attention (Nyamiti 1992:15). Therefore, Pobee and Waruta propose a „royal-priestly Christology,“ and Pobee and Dickson an African theology of the cross (Pobee 1979:81-98; Waruta 1992; Dickson 1984:185-198). When teaching to shame-oriented people, the relational and covenantal aspect of these concepts should be stressed. Special care has to be taken as to the anchorage and linkage of the metaphors to the expiatory sacrifice of Jesus Christ, as Paul did in Rom 3:25f.

4.3.11 Power Concepts and Power Encounter

An important concept in animist and therefore folk religionist soteriology is power. It is related to the concept of honour and to the animist concept of the spiritual double. Therefore, it is important for understanding shame-oriented animist and folk religionist reality. One of the underlying features for power is the Melanesian concept of *mana* (Codrington 1891:119). It is closely related but not to be confused with *baraka* in folk Islam, and with what is commonly called life force (Musk 1989:262f.; Nkurunziza 1989:142ff.; Steyne 1989:90f.; van Rheenen 1991:199-214). The overriding social phenomenon is the one of power, a shame-oriented concept.

mana describes a quality of processes, things and beings which are activated by rituals and manifests themselves in unexpectedly or exceptionally effective ways. Besides power and force, *mana* can impress, depending on the context, as authority, status, luck, well-being, miracle or validity. A person who survives a plunge from a tree or is just missed by a falling object has a lot of *mana*. A lot of *mana* is also attributed to a person with a high status. The more effectively his orders are followed, the more *mana* he possesses (Käser 1997:215f.).

The one who has a special status because of his authority is taboo („saint“), that is, he merits respect. In case of non-respect to his orders, one has to count with negative consequences. Through ritual, fields can receive a taboo („spell“) for protection from theft. Fetishes²¹ are displayed as signs of the taboo. The protecting power of the fetish can be named *mana*. It originates normally through a ritual act, which can include spoken formulas, procedures or sacrifices. The *mana* of medicine, talismans or amulets originates while being made (Käser 1997:218; Steyne 1989:99f.).

Spiritual beings are endowed with especially effective *mana* depending on their status. Therefore, men approach them by sacrifices and rituals in order to make them favourable. Consequently, *mana* is closely related to magic. In magic, other men or powers are manipulated for one's own benefit or to the disadvantage or even harm of others by causing powers and other men to be at one's own service through meticulously followed rituals (formulas, sacrifices). Magic is therefore opposite to what Christian faith means, man's submission to God and identification with Christ (Käser 1997:219; Steyne 1989:40,113).

The concept of *mana* gives a worldview background that has many implications for interpretations of everyday life. In the case of Jacob and Esau, it will be held that Jacob's

²¹ Fetishes are objects that are filled with *mana* by a ritual (Käser 1997:218f.).

ultimate position as father of the twelve tribes of Israel was an immediate result of the blessing (*baraka*) he stole from Esau when Isaac communicated the „force“ to him by the laying on of hands (Gen 27). The Biblical perspective on the matter, which is quite different, is given in Rom 9:10-18 (Steyne 1989:92). Likewise, the bag that Jesus is constantly carrying in the Jesus film is seen as the reason of his healing power, because it contains his fetishes. The white rooster that ran across the football field after the world cup final match is the proof that the French are powerful medicine men and the reason why they won the final in 1998.

The animist worldview includes the middle level of spiritual forces and powers. The Western Greek, dichotomistic or secular worldview excludes the „middle“ which is vital for the animist understanding of life and everyday security (Hiebert 1982:40; 1985:158; 1994:193-197; 1999:89). Consideration of this middle level leads to power encounter in missions (Hopp 1993:5; Müller 1993:61f.). It involves what Beyerhaus calls the antagonistic dimension of missions (Beyerhaus 1993:17; 1996:557f.).²² Power encounters can be found frequently in the Bible. The exodus from Egypt was connected with several power encounters between Moses and Pharaoh (Ex 7-12; 14; Dt 7:17-21). The classical example is the encounter of Elijah with the prophets of Baal on mount Karmel (1Ki 16-18). Jesus heals many sick people and encounters demoniacs and forces of nature (Lk 3:35; 8:24,32f.). In Ephesus, the apostle Paul encounters magicians who burn their books and leave their practices (Acts 19:18f.). In his letter to the Ephesians, he states that cross-cultural Christian ministry involves a spiritual battle against powers and authorities (Eph 6:12). The kingdom of God is not a matter of words but of power (1Cor 4:20). Jesus Christ is Lord over every authority and power (Mt 28:18; Col 1:16; 2:10). God has rescued us from the dominion of darkness and brought us into the kingdom of the Son (Col 1:13) (Müller 1993:73f.). That the concept of power is related to the concept of honour is also shown by the doxologies in the Bible, especially in Revelation (1Chr 16:28; Ps 29:1; 96:7f.; 1Tim 6:15f.; Rev 4:11; 5:12f.; 7:12).

Steyne and Müller propose to include the power encounter as strategic concept into missions, beyond presenting propositional cognitive truth appealing to will only (Steyne 1989:246; Müller 1993:76). Kraft speaks of the power dimension as one of three basic dimensions of contextualization and church life: the cognitive, the relational and the power dimension (1999). Based on Acts 26:18 and Tippett (1975:847f.), Steyne and Müller propose a five-

²² Beyerhaus defends a tripolar view of other religions: Godly, human and demonic (1987:111-122). The antagonistic dimension of missions deals with the demonic aspect of other religions (1993:24).

fold method: create awareness through an eye opener, realize that there are two kingdoms, a kingdom of darkness and one of light, and then lead to making a decision with following power encounter and forgiveness. The last step is incorporation into the body of Christ (Steinne 1989:249-256; Müller 1993:67f.).

Traditionally, the Holy Spirit is perceived as closely associated with power. Consequently, Pentecostal, charismatic and independent churches are criticized because of their emphasis on power. They are accused of seeing the Holy Spirit as „impersonal and manipulable force“ (Martin 1964:161; Anderson 1991:66). Power is rather seen as a „relational reality“ by Africans (Boesak 1977:41). The Supreme Being is the source of all power (Idowu 1973:156; Nkurunziza 1989:142). Without power life cannot be what it must be. Biblically speaking, the Triune God is endued with honour, glory and power and is the source of all power (Rev 1:6; 5:12; 7:12). Mbiti promotes consequently a „trinitarian soteriology“ (1985:169).

For the animist, life's successes and defeats depend on man's effective manipulation of the powers and forces. The use of power is the means to maintain and restore harmony and remove conflict (Steinne 1989:36). *mana* is one underlying concept, life-force another. The encompassing sociological and theological feature is power, closely related to honour. In cross-cultural Christian ministry, the power encounter is not only a Biblical entity but also a necessary component within a shame-oriented, and consequently also within a power-oriented culture.

4.3.12 Relational or Dogmatic Theology

Relational theology focuses on persons in relationship. It is therefore a shame-oriented approach that frames well with Scripture as we have seen in chapter 3. Kraft (1999:7-9) holds that Biblical Christianity is primarily relational (Gen 17:1; Dt 6:5; Mt 22:37-39). The relational dimension is the second, most foundational of three dimensions of contextualization. As relational practices, which should be contextualized, he mentions baptism, the Lord's Supper, fellowship meetings, repentance and reconciliation. „Theology, then, is intended to serve relationship“ (Kraft 1999:8). Kraft derives from Jesus' example that teaching should be relational, not only informational (ibid.). In the same order, Noble concludes that Christian education is relationship and dialogue (1975:96). Noble then advises to use small groups with mutual self-disclosure as basis for counseling, social problems' ministries, and catalyst for church revival (1975:101-112). Today we would speak of house cell groups. The same is true

for missions: „It is only through open relationships that we really get to know each other“ (1975:98). This is a principle, which is applied in Alpha courses. Hesselgrave advocates a relational evangelistic approach for peoples who are relational thinkers, who are in other terms shame-oriented peoples. Interestingly, he counts among the relational thinkers the tribal (animistic) people and the Chinese (1978:223ff.). This intention is realized, for example, in the relational African christological metaphors (Schreiter 1992).

Theology pursuing and fixing dogma is the guilt-oriented, analytic approach. Dogmatic theology was primarily followed by Western theology. In this approach, theology was looked at from the viewpoint of orthodoxy and heresy. First attempts go back to the formulations of symbols by the early church.²³ Its expression in systematic theologies, a highly analytic and guilt-oriented approach, is however specifically Western. The Orthodox Church has not developed a systematic theology until today, which is one sign of her shame orientation. Apologetics, as understood in Western theology, belong mostly to dogmatic theology and are guilt-oriented.

As we have seen earlier, the covenant concept includes both conscience orientations. Covenant theology is relational theology as far as the relationships between God and man, Father and child, and between fellow men are concerned (Gen 17:4-8; Ex 19:5f.; Lev 19:18; Rom 13:10; 1Pet 2:9). Covenant theology is „dogmatic theology“ as far as codes like the Ten Commandments and Mosaic Law are concerned (Ex 20; Lev 1-7; Rom 13:9).

Kwame Bediako makes an interesting reflection in relation to our topic in his doctoral thesis *Theology and Identity* (1992). He researches the theological attitude of several theologians of the 2nd century A.D. and of modern African theologians in relation to their cultural past and present. He follows their search for identity synthesizing (Tatian, Justin, Clement, Idowu, Mbiti, Mulago) or marking off (Tertullian, Kato) their theologies as compared to their context. As an African, Bediako defines identity in a shame-oriented way as corporate identity, that is, identity in relation to the context. He remarks that early Christian writers and modern African writers „have been studied largely for their contribution ... to the development of Christian doctrine ... [and] assessed in terms of their relation to orthodoxy and heresy“ (Bediako 1992:7). Guilt-oriented Western theologians have evaluated their individual identity in terms of dogmatics, a guilt-oriented approach. What for Bediako is a contradiction between identity

²³ The symbols have also a narrative and therefore shame-oriented aspect. See the next section 4.3.13.

and doctrine, becomes for us a tension between corporate and individual identity, between a shame and a guilt-oriented approach, between relational and dogmatic theology.

4.3.13 Narrative or Expository Theology

„Narrative is the main literary type found in Scripture“ (McGrath 1991:23).²⁴ It includes books like Genesis, Exodus, Samuel, Kings, and parts of the prophets in the OT, and especially the Gospels and Acts in the NT. It was neglected since the Enlightenment in the 17th century with its accent on generally available rational truths (McGrath 1997:209f.). Osborne says that in the 1970's narrative theology „was spawned in large part by the failure of form and redaction criticism to interpret the text. The tendency to break the text into isolated units is widely perceived as counterproductive, and so scholars turned to the much more literarily aware field of narrative criticism to breach the gap“ (Osborne 1991:153). This development makes it clear that the analytic, conceptual, guilt-oriented thought patterns of the Enlightenment made the narrative disappear, and their failure made it reappear again. The development of narrative theology has to do with the rediscovery of shame orientation in theology.

Narrative theology accepts the Bible as „a story that tells of God's acts in history“ (Ladd 1974:20). It is „discourse about God in the setting of story“ (Fackre 1983:343; van Engen 1996:52). It is an approach in which form and meaning are seen as a unity, a holistic perspective of Scripture (van Engen 1996:59). It is potentially more faithful to Scripture than a more theoretical approach would be (McGrath 1991:23). It affirms the historicity of the Bible (van Engen 1996:52; McGrath 1997:211). It brings history and theology together via a „story“ format (Osborne 1991:153). As Jesus' parables show, narrative theology offers itself as a teaching method. „Stories are a particularly effective means of communicating theological truth“ (Moberly 1986:77). Fackre and Loughlin have worked out a presentation of basic Christian doctrine in narrative form (Fackre 1984; Loughlin 1996). Stories not only offer theological truth, but also make ethics practical (Hauerwas 1983; McGrath 1997:212). „Ethic is embodied in and exhibited through the story of Jesus and cannot be understood or acted out apart from that story“ (Goldberg 1982:45). The synthetic, holistic, concrete and relational features make narrative theology a shame-oriented approach.²⁵

Apart from narrative, there are also predictive, hortatory and expository discourse patterns in the Bible. Expository books of Scripture are for example Leviticus in the OT and

²⁴ For the following treatment of narrative theology I am indebted to Lienhard (2001a:93-96).

²⁵ Cp. appendix 11: Personality as a Function of Conscience Orientation.

parts of the letters in the NT. Expository theology analyses, systematizes and conceptualises the intent of the stories. As such it is the method of systematic theology that is concerned with „the final meaning of the teachings of the Bible or their relevance for today“ (Ladd 1974:20). It is a guilt-oriented approach.

Both narrative and expository literary types occur in Scripture, representing respectively shame and guilt orientation. It is God's mystery to have transmitted theological truth in different discourse patterns to us. Faithfulness to Scripture demands us to respect not only its meaning, but also its form. Craddock writes:

To have converted [a biblical doxology] ... into a syllogism, or a polemic, or an exhortation, or a defence of a proposition [is] ... a literary, hermeneutical, aesthetic, and practical violation without excuse. Let doxologies be shared doxologically, narratives narratively, polemics polemically, poems poetically, and parables parabolically. In other words, biblical preaching should be biblical (Craddock 1979:163 quoted by Kallemeyn 1996:75f.).

Consequently, we propose a Biblical approach (cp. Osborne 1991:263-286; Stuhlmacher 1997:1-39). Biblical theology expounds „the theology found in the Bible in its own historical setting, and its own terms, categories, and thought forms“ (Ladd 1974:20). The Bible is propositional and relational at the same time (Kraft 1979:214f.; Osborne 1991:321,324). Biblical books are propositional and situational even in narrative discourse (Osborne 1991:326,409). It is up to the teacher and preacher to use shame or guilt-oriented thought patterns and communication styles, narrative or expository theology, according to his audience and context.

4.3.14 Ethics: Revelational or Situational

Looking at ethics, a guilt-oriented approach would seem to be based on law and principles, whereas a shame-oriented approach would be situational based on love.²⁶ In the discussion about Christian ethics, these two opposites are involved. Fletcher says:

Christian ethics or moral theology is not a scheme of living according to a code but a continuous effort to relate to a world of relativities through a casuistry obedient to love; its constant task is to work out the strategy and tactics of love, for Christ's sake (Fletcher 1966:158 quoted by McQuilkin 1995:147).

²⁶ Based on Niebuhr (1963), Stackhouse, Darmaputera and Augsburgers differentiate three ethical orders: a deontological ethic of right and wrong focused on rules and principles and a teleological ethic of good and evil focusing on goals and ideals, which represent a guilt-oriented approach. The third is a contextual ethic of fit or unfit focusing on what is fitting in responsibility to the context and situation, which corresponds to the shame-oriented approach (Niebuhr 1963:60f.; Stackhouse 1978:328-335; Darmaputera 1982:415; Augsburgers 1986:250 [see synoptic table]).

Whereas Fletcher stresses the liberty of situational love, Huntemann insists, at first glance on the opposite end, on the binding force of God's revelation, the torah:

Christian ethics is revelational ethics. It is the ethos of the torah that was transmitted to the OT people of God by God the giver of the commandments through the mediator Moses and then through the prophets. The torah is the document of the covenant between God and the people that he chose for this covenant. In everything that a Christian does, he is responsible to the giver of these commandments within this covenant (Huntemann 1995:171).

For Huntemann, Christian ethics is not only revelational and binding through the torah, but it is covenantal (1983:127). Therefore, it is an ethics of creation (exactly a creational order) and of salvation (1983:24,38). Consequently, it is also kingdom ethics, and as kingdom ethics it is an interim ethics situated between the eschatological „already“ and the „not yet“ (1983:129). Covenantal ethics is therefore kingdom ethics.

As we have seen, the Biblical covenant concept is both shame and guilt-oriented. It is shame-oriented as a relational, person-oriented concept: „I am your God and you are my people“ or „love God from all your heart.“ It is also a law and guilt-oriented concept: „Obey my commands.“ These two aspects are often seen together in the Bible (Dt 6:5f.; 11:1,13; 30:16; Jos 22:5; 23:6,8; 24:25; 1Ki 9:4; 2Ki 23:2f.; Neh 1:5; Ps 25:10; Jer 15:16; Ezek 36:26f.; Dan 9:4). Jesus says: „If you love me, you will keep my commands“ (Jn 14:15; 15:10f.; cp. 1Jn 3:23f.). The Biblical covenant includes a binding relationship and binding laws. Both were revealed: God's intention to choose his people and be with it, as is expressed in his name Yahweh (Ex 3:14), and the law (Ex 20ff.; Lev; Dt). A sound ethics cannot be based only on prescriptions. According to Piers, social conformity based on guilt feelings results only in submission, whereas the shame feeling leads to identification (Piers/Singer 1971:53). In this order, Paul admonishes to become his imitators (1Cor 4:16; Phil 3:17), and God's and Christ's imitators (Eph 5:1; Phil 2:5). A sound basis for ethical behaviour needs therefore both aspects: a relationship and a code. It will be loveless without a relationship and lost in relativity without a code. We deduce that revelational and situational is a false dichotomy for Christian ethics. Revelational ethics is situational in its relational openness to the triune God and fellow men, its shame-oriented component. But it is preserved from complete relativity through the law that Jesus has not come to abolish (Mt 5:17) and that is written in the hearts (consciences) after Pentecost (Jer 31:33; Hebr 10:16). Revelational ethics is also situational in its contextual application of Jesus' law (Mt 5:21-48; Lk 5:29-6:11 par). Jesus' reaction to legalistic, guilt-oriented Pharisaism is to introduce and emphasize particularly the

person or shame-oriented component in his teaching. „The Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath. So the Son of Man is Lord even of the Sabbath“ (Mk 2:27f.). The Bible is both propositional and situational (Osborne 1991:326). The solution for the false dichotomy of revelational and situational ethics lies in the covenant concept, which unites shame and guilt-oriented elements.

In his dissertation *Conscience and Responsibility* (1966), Charles E. Mount comes to the same conclusion starting however from other grounds. After having discussed the ethical theories of the theologians Bonhoeffer, Ebeling, Niebuhr, Lehmann, and Häring in relation to conscience, he concludes with Niebuhr that „human existence is primarily social“ (1966:81). Following Ebeling’s linguistic theory (1966:48), he uses the term responsibility in order to understand social selfhood and relate conscience to community. Responsibility becomes the fundamental ethical category (1966:173). It is the covenant bond that defines Christian conscience and responsibility. Christian conscience is „the center of the self’s integrity and loyalty, in terms of one’s relation to the ultimate ,other’“ (1966:214; cp. Wurzbürger 1994).

Christian conscience then is a knowing with oneself or an integrity of heart [in OT terms] in which the self’s integrity or image of itself is constituted in God as he has made himself and true manhood known in Jesus Christ and as this revelation is mediated through the Christian community. The joint authorship of conscience, i.e. the self-in-the-Christian-community and the-Christian-community-in-the-self, points to and is derived from a transcendent theonomous authority (1966:212).

„This objective referent enables the avoidance of the polar pitfalls of collective, heteronomous absolutism and individual, autonomous antinomianism“ (1966:213). „God’s love, which both enables and elicits response, defines responsibility as universal, unconditional, concrete, and co-operative with his ongoing creation, judgement and redemption“ (1966:214). Because God is known in Christ as friend, his judgement is known to be gracious. In sin, by contrast, the self attempts to have its own independent conscience. „Conscience as sinful is then legalistic, libertine or idolatrous instead of covenantal or reconciled to God“ (1966:212). Mount’s development shows nicely how the social definition of conscience in relation to God, the „ultimate other,“ and to the Christian community as hermeneutical community, and its continuous relation to the revelational covenant is the solution to Christian ethics. Let us not forget that the definition of conscience through shame and guilt in relation to its significant others and to the ultimate other is a social and theological definition.

Nevertheless, we have to consider some specific problems of ethics in a shame-oriented context. As the shame-oriented conscience is group-oriented, the norms of the in-group dictate

one's behaviour. A negative expression of the obligation to group loyalty can be corruption, nepotism and ethnocentrism (Triandis 1995:77; Hofstede 1997:65; Käser 1997:151). Group loyalty is more important than obedience to codes and respect of truth. The conscience's choice is often between loyalty to the group and truth: to be „unkind and honest“ or „kind and dishonest.“ The former corresponds to the guilt-oriented choice, the latter to the shame-oriented behaviour (cp. Adeney 1995; Kurani 2001:55). Additionally, in-group behaviour can be different from out-group behaviour. The only solution to this problem is to make the loyalty to the Biblical covenant prevail over social in-group loyalty. In this case, the ultimate other takes precedence over the significant others. In this line of thought, Paul exhorts to become God's and Christ's imitators (1Cor 11:1; Eph 5:1; 1Thess 1:6). A modern example for this approach is the movement that proposes to ask in every situation: „What would Jesus do?“ (WWJD).

As we have seen in the discussion of Paul's letters,²⁷ Paul gives in his paraenesis many practical examples to support his theological propositions (cp. Schnabel 1992). Talking to shame-oriented Greeks, ethical codes are carefully formulated in order to avoid Christian freedom from being absolutized (1Cor 6:12; 10:23f.). Guilt-oriented observers have noticed that in shame-oriented contexts sermons are often moralizing. This is due to the fact that shame-oriented consciences feel the need for clear and detailed standards and imperatives. When building ethics we have to keep in mind the conscience orientation of our partners. Toward guilt-oriented consciences great freedom can be granted, because introjected significant others assure fixed standards. In shame-oriented consciences, significant others are not introjected (Spiro 1958:408). Therefore, their presence is necessary in order that the conscience can function properly. This fact makes enforced and detailed external standards very important. When teaching ethics, we have to be sure to build on covenant revelation, which includes shame and guilt-oriented elements with relational and legal aspects. Presenting moral standards without relation to the ultimate other would be detrimental for shame-oriented consciences. Ethics has best been transmitted to shame-oriented people by practical examples in contextual stories or narrative parts of Scripture (Hauerwas 1974:73-75; 1983:29; McGrath 1997:212; Lienhard 2001a:95f.).

²⁷ See section 3.3.4. Paul's Letters.

4.3.15 Shame and Guilt-Oriented Biblical Exegesis

The hermeneutical problem involved in Biblical exegesis in the perspective of conscience orientation has been discussed in the introduction to chapter 3. We have seen that it implies an interdisciplinary exegetical approach. As Scripture texts are culturally distant, we have to use culturally sensitive tools. Beyond historical and literary methods, we need psychological, sociological and anthropological approaches (Overholt 1996:19-21). On the other hand, the paucity of data available and the risk of reductionism and generalization limit the same use of social sciences' tools (Overholt 1996:22; Osborne 1991:139-144).

Thus, Biblical exegesis becomes a complex matter. It is approached best by van Engen (1996:44) based on Thiselton (1980) and Osborne (1991). In his book *Two Horizons* (1980), Thiselton adapts Gadamer's „two-horizon“ perspective in relation to history, theology, linguistics and semantic meanings. He writes: „The goal of Biblical hermeneutics is to bring about an active and meaningful engagement between the interpreter and text, in such a way that the interpreter's own horizon is reshaped and enlarged“ (Thiselton 1980:xix). Because the meaning of words is contextual and procedural, therefore the meaning of a text is multiple (Giddens 1987:62f.; Overholt 1996:20). Osborne, whose concern is to preserve the original meaning of the text (1991:369-371), summarizes Thiselton's viewpoint on the relativity of meaning:

Thiselton finds four levels at which the „illusion of textual objectivism“ becomes apparent. (1) Hermeneutically, the phenomenon of preunderstanding exerts great influence in the interpretive act ... (2) Linguistically, communication demands a point of contact between the sender and the recipient of a message ... The differing situations of the hearers remove any possibility of a purely objective interpretation. (3) These problems are magnified at the level of literary communication, where other factors such as narrative-time, plot development, characterization and dialogue enter the picture ... (4) Philosophically, meaning is never context-free but is based on a large list of unconscious assumptions between sender and receiver ... (Osborne 1991:386 quoted by van Engen 1996:44 n.1).

Osborne then adds his concept of „the hermeneutical spiral“ (1991:324f.) that goes beyond the „two-horizon“ perspective, and recognizes that „there is a dynamic, constant interaction of text, community, and context through time in relation to meaning“ (van Engen 1996:44 n.1). Talking about the cultural triangle²⁸ (Hesselgrave 1978:73; Hesselgrave/Rommen 1990:200), Carson points out that:

²⁸ Cp. section 5.1.7. The Cultural Triangle.

Any Christian who witnesses cross-culturally must concern himself not only with two horizons, but with three. He must attempt to fuse his own horizon of understanding with the horizon of understanding of the text; and having done that, he must attempt to bridge the gap between his own horizon of understanding, as it has been informed and instructed by the text, and the horizon of understanding of the person or people to whom he ministers (1984:17).

Biblical exegesis, within any ministry setting, is concerned with the interplay of these three horizons. It involves four steps: (1) to understand one's own conscience orientation, (2) to understand the conscience orientation of the target culture, (3) to understand the conscience orientation of the Biblical section, (4) to exegete the text keeping in mind the conscience orientation of the text and the target culture (cp. Kurani 2001:17-22).

As we have seen in chapter 3, several Biblical concepts have a shame and a guilt-oriented aspect. Ordinarily, in a „two-horizon“ perspective of a monocultural setting, a guilt-oriented reader interprets Scripture through his guilt-oriented glasses. The analogue is true for a shame-oriented reader. This way Scripture becomes meaningful to them. When talking about missions, the cross-cultural element is introduced, that is, a third horizon. Interpretation has to be adapted to the audience and its context (cp. Osborne 1991:355f.; Larkin 1993:346f.). But already in teaching and preaching in the church, that is, in a mono-cultural setting, exegesis has to go beyond the „two-horizon“ approach. If it is really God's objective to form in man a balanced shame and guilt-oriented conscience and if Scripture is really balanced, then it is important to teach both aspects of conscience orientation in the churches. This way we go a step further in the direction of metatheology (Hiebert 1988:391-394; 1994:101-103; 1999:113f.). Here it is interesting to note that Islam conceives of the exegesis of the Qur'an as a judicial matter. Islamic theologians are then jurists, specialists of the *shari'a*. In table 4.12, we give a provisional and simplified synthesis of shame and guilt-oriented aspects of the most important Biblical concepts.

A matter of concern in Biblical exegesis is that modern Bible translations, which have a more dynamic and less literal style, have the tendency to translate neutral terms in a guilt-oriented manner. This happens because the translators seem to be guilt-oriented theologians. They do not realize that a majority of world readers and the younger generation in Europe and North America are predominantly shame-oriented.²⁹ The following examples may stand for many others. NIV, NASB, and SEM render *tôrâ* in Isa 2:3 with law, whereas Luther and HfA

²⁹ Cp. section 5.1.13. The Generation X and Shame Orientation.

render it with instruction. NIV renders *rzh 'āwōn* „propitiate the sin“ (Isa 40:2) in a guilt-oriented way with „pay for the sin.“ HfA renders it even with „pay for the guilt.“ HfA renders the confession of the lost son with „I have become guilty before God and you“ instead of „I have sinned“ (Lk 15:18,21). Likewise, HfA renders Lk 23:31 in a paraphrased way: „If already the innocent has to suffer so much, what do the guilty have to expect?“ In Rom 3:26, NIV renders righteousness and righteous with the guilt-oriented vocabulary of justice, and HfA paraphrases „justifies“ with „liberates from guilt.“ Again, HfA renders „become the righteousness“ in 2Cor 5:21b in a paraphrased way with „God has put all our guilt on him who was without sin in order that we are free of guilt.“ And finally, SEM renders *hamartia* with guilt in Gal 3:22.

Table 4.12: Shame and Guilt-Oriented Bible Concepts

Biblical Concept	Guilt Orientation	Shame Orientation
God	Oneness Justice	Trinity Love
Jesus Christ	God's identification with our guilt	God's identification with our shame
Cross	Instrument of penalty	Instrument of shame
Sacrifice of Jesus Christ	Ransom for expiation	Mediation for shame
Sin	Violation of law	Violation of harmony in covenant community
Salvation	Justice	Harmony, honour, well-being and power
Forgiveness	Justification by equivalent penalty	Reconciliation by mediation
Covenant	Law	Community
Righteousness	Behaviour according to norms	Conformity to covenant and community behaviour
Grace	Remittance of debt	Reinsertion into community, restitution of lost honour

4.3.16 Conclusion

At the end of this section, we will try an overview on the implications of conscience orientation on theology. The main point is that nearly all theologians are one-sided as a reflection of the conscience orientation of their theology, a fact that is not utterly surprising. During the last

centuries, Western theologians used a predominantly guilt-oriented approach. Karl Barth is an example when he writes in his dogmatic in the introduction to the chapter on justification: „God’s justice [Germ. *Recht*], established in the death of Jesus Christ and proclaimed in his resurrection despite human injustice [Germ. *Unrecht*], is the foundation of a new justice of man which corresponds to God“ (1960:573 my translation).³⁰

On the other hand, theologians who recognize the deficiency of guilt-oriented approaches, use the shame-oriented concepts exclusively and rule out the guilt-oriented aspect completely. An example is C. Norman Kraus, an American Anabaptist theologian who has written a Christology for the shame-oriented Japanese (1990:16f.). He goes in the right direction when emphasizing shame-oriented models, but neglects the legal approach. The following citations serve as examples of his position:

Traditional resolutions based upon the legal metaphor have proved inadequate to the profound nature of the problem. It is not a matter of „paying a debt to justice“ as defined in the law of talion, ... The shame and guilt of sin are antecedent to legal evaluation and penalties and cannot be equated with them. Legal metaphors only bear witness to a more primal reality of personal relationships. They do not define the essence (Kraus 1990:206).

The obligations of [the] covenant are not legal and extrinsic to our good. Rather, they spell out the conditions for our human fulfilment in community. The covenant is a „covenant of life and peace“ (Mal 2:5) (1990:176).

God is not ultimately interested in judgement, which results in a perfect balance of retributive justice. Jesus said that he had come not to judge but to heal. God’s ultimate goal is reconciliation, restoration of relationships, reintegration ... (1990:168).

In no way can shame be expiated through substitutionary compensation or retaliation. As Piers observed, it does not respond to the law of talion. No payment such as a „debt of justice“ can balance accounts and thus restore lost honor. Suffering punishment for the mistake may screen feelings, but it cannot genuinely relieve the anguish of shame. Only a forgiveness, which covers the past, and a genuine restoration of relationship can banish shame (1990:211).

Rather than to promote a one-sided shame-oriented approach, it is our conviction that the Bible witnesses to a balanced shame and guilt-oriented approach. This keeps us from rejecting the traditional, Western legal theology, but complement it with important shame-oriented concepts. This balanced approach is ever more important in a globalized world where conscience orientations are more mixed as, for example, the generation X shows. To conclude this chapter we summarize some theological shame and guilt-oriented concepts (see table 4.13).

³⁰ Barth employs a definitely guilt-oriented language when using the German *Recht* and *Unrecht* instead of Luther’s more neutral *Gerechtigkeit*, which Luther fills then in a guilt-oriented way.

Table 4.13: Shame and Guilt-Oriented Theological Concepts

Theological Concept	Analytic Perspective (Guilt Orientation)	Synthetic Perspective (Shame Orientation)	Unifying Concept
Epistemology	Object-distant knowledge („scientific“): Dogmatic Theology	Object-intimate knowledge („relational“): Relational Theology	Covenant Theology
Dominant Perception	Knowledge-centred: Knowledge-Encounter (Apologetics)	Power-centred: Power-Encounter	
Genre / Type	Expository Theology	Narrative Theology	Biblical Theology
Hermeneutics	Individual interpreter	Hermeneutic community	
Ethics	Law-centred Ethics	Situational Ethics	Covenantal Ethics

Many more theological implications could be drawn from conscience orientation, adding to this first attempt to understand its effects on theology.

5 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR CROSS-CULTURAL CHRISTIAN MINISTRY

In this chapter we will consider the practical implications of shame and guilt orientation on the communication and contextualization of the Gospel. According to Gilliland, contextualization must touch three areas: first evangelism (calling to discipleship), secondly nurturing believers (developing discipleship), and thirdly witnessing (including meeting needs, moral and ethical issues) (Gilliland 1999:15). In the second part of this chapter, we will discuss the implantation and edification of churches, evangelism, community life and counseling.

5.1 Rethink Communication and Contextualization

According to Eugene Nida, identification and communication are the most important challenges for the missionary (Nida 1954:250f.; Noble 1961:185). Being aware of different conscience orientations, communication and contextualization merit reconsideration. After the elaboration of the theoretical basis of contextualization, we will look at different examples, challenges and problems of contextualization. We will start with the three selves of autonomy and the collaboration between missions and churches. Then we will reflect on indigenous theologies based on the example of the African independent churches, looking specifically at the problem of the prosperity gospel. Next, corruption and the judicial system will be studied from the conscience orientation perspective. Then, we will focus on the young generation in Europe and North America and its conscience orientation. Finally, we will have a look at the behaviour in traffic, an everyday problem.

5.1.1 Take Time

It is necessary to spend time with others in order to get to know them and their culture. Communication takes time. To have no time communicates the message: „You are not important for me.“ While for guilt-oriented persons time is chronological time, for shame-oriented persons time is „event-time“ (Fuglesang 1982:37). There is the time to get up, the time to carry water, the time to collect wood, the time to make a fire, the time to cook, the time to eat, the time to sow and to harvest, the time of birth and death (cp. Ecc 3:1-8). Practically all the personalities in OT time and most of the persons in the NT are event-oriented (Wolff 1990:127; Lingenfelter/Mayers 1986:43f.). For missionary service this means that we not only

must spend chronological time with the people we love, but participate in important events with these with whom we want to identify.

Like the Hebrews many people see their spent time, the past with its memories, in front of them (Ps 143:5; Isa 46:10). But they live in the present, which includes also the near future and the near past (Dt 5:1-3). The future lies behind them, in their back (Isa 46:10; Jer 29:11). Therefore, they cannot see it. (Wolff 1990:134; Mbiti 1969:24ff.; 1974:18f.). In section 4.1.2, we have already mentioned that this past-time perspective is independent from conscience orientation, but came about in Hebrew culture, as in many other cultures, through the orientation towards the lost paradise in the past. The prophets announcing the coming Messiah pointed to a future day and thus developed a perspective turned to the future (Wolff 1990:135f.). The past-time perspective is of practical importance because planning for a distant future is not possible. This capability, which is so familiar to people with a future-time perspective, is used and needed in many everyday activities. Especially educational and development projects include planning by objectives. Therefore, it is felt heavily when the future-planning faculty is absent. Past-time oriented people are systematically underprivileged in a future-time world. Of course, this capability can be learned over a period of time when planning activities occur in a daily routine.

5.1.2 Honour Fellow Men

The African culture, as many other non-Western cultures, is much closer to the Biblical culture, especially Hebrew culture, than the Western cultures. Similarities are found in many concepts: the sense of community, the importance of genealogy, marriage and family traditions, worship, the importance of music, the dynamic concept of the word (blessing and curse), and the concept of causality and retribution¹ (Dickson 1979:102f.; 1984:62-73; Tiénou 1980:8f.; Mafico 1986:402). Its central values are respect for the other and community traditions as partaking of necessities of life and submission to the group (cp. the values of the Lengua culture in Paraguay: Loewen 1966:252-272). These are also Biblical values: the *koinonia* concept. We have postulated that these person, family and community-oriented values, whether in the target culture or in the Bible, are based on shame orientation. Consequently, the missionary in general, but particularly the one coming from a predominantly guilt-oriented society, is not only sent to give, but first to learn and to receive.

¹ Germ. *Tun-Ergehen-Zusammenhang und schicksalwirkende Tatsphäre* (Koch 1995:517).

First, the missionary will try to understand the conscience orientation of the people he is sent to. This means practically that he must become conscious of the conscience orientation and observe its consequences on personality, reactions, decisions and behaviours of people. This will be easier for him when he understands the role which culture has played in the formation of his own conscience.

Then, he has to learn to differentiate between a „bad conscience,“ which is caused by Biblical understanding, and a „bad conscience,“ which originates from conventional, cultural violation of norms, and this for himself and others. This will help him to live an exemplary life in the eyes of the people he is sent to.

In cohabitation and cooperation with the indigenous Christians, the missionary will therefore avoid any authoritarian behaviour. His attitude will rather be humble, because he understands that as a foreigner he is in an unfavourable position to prescribe authoritatively how Biblical principles should be applied in practical situations. He will have respect of the consciences of indigenous believers, of the Bible and the Holy Spirit directing them (Priest 1994).

While dealing with shame-oriented persons, the most important thing to respect is their honour and face. The worst thing to do is to make somebody lose face. Criticizing somebody, his actions, his colleague, spouse or family publicly means to cover him with dishonour. His reaction will be to hide or flee. The relationship with him will be profoundly disturbed. Making thoughtless comments or jokes is a very risky endeavour in a shame-oriented context.

5.1.3 Speak the Same Language

The transmission of the Gospel is a process of communication. The communicator² intends to transmit Biblical truth to the receiver. He selects from the abundance of possible messages. This message has an intended content, which should result in an intended effect. The communicator influences the acceptance of the message through his credibility, attractiveness and authority (Rommen 1985:100f.).

The message can be verbal or non-verbal. According to Hesselgrave, less than 35% are verbal and more than 65% non-verbal (1978:278). Language is composed of signs and symbols. Signs are easily understood when the language is mastered. Symbols are tightly bound to a context and are easily misunderstood (Hall 1980:38f.; Engel 1989:20). Hall mentions seven dimensions of non-verbal communication, which have to be taken into account:

² Also sender, speaker, source. Communicator is the most comprehensive term.

physical characteristics, body language, touching behaviour, space, time, paralanguage (how things are said: pitch, inflection, pause, silence), artefacts and environment (Hall 1980 discussed in Hesselgrave 1978:283f.,293-316). The communicator himself is also a message. Therefore, one speaks of incarnational communication (Nida 1960:226; Dierks 1986:12,36).

The respondent³ selects from the transmitted information and interprets its content. The message is reduced selectively when passing through several filters. Several factors play a role in the selection process: the cultural background of both communicator and respondent, the attention of the respondent and the interferences during the transmission (Rommen 1985:149). The number and complexity of the information is decisive (1985:145f.). The subjective selection from the information sent can deform the message substantially (Engel 1989:19f.).

Good communication is however not only transmission of information, but also reception of feedback messages. It includes sending and receiving, speaking and hearing. The sender is also receiver and respondent. Communication becomes dialogue (Hiebert 1985:185f.).

Christian communication also has a divine dimension, that is, it necessarily includes a reference to God (Rommen 1994:160). God's communication is incarnational, which means it happens to men and through men. God's incarnational model is Jesus-Christ (Jn 1:14; Phil 2:5ff.; Hebr 1:2). Therefore, divine communication participates entirely in human communication, but transcends it at the same time (Mt 10:20; Nida 1960:226; Kato 1985:24; Dierks 1986:35f.; Hill 1993). The divine communicator is the Holy Spirit (Lk 10:21; 12:12; Jn 16:13; 2Pet 1:21f.; Beyerhaus 1996:285,509).

In summary, this means for cross-cultural Christian ministry that the missionary himself is also a message and that he has a great responsibility in selecting message and medium. He should have come to understand his target culture through a profound analysis and should have mastered its language. His message is oriented and adapted to his audience. He knows their thought categories and interpretational reflexes, that is, their conscience orientation (Kraft 1980:131-138; 1983:89-108; Hesselgrave/Rommen 1992:192). He targets the real needs of his fellow men. He starts from the felt needs, and passes by the observed needs to the real needs (Müller 1995c). Beyond this, the messenger opens himself to God and the direction of His Spirit. Rommen calls this transparency (1994:165). Abiding by all these communication rules is however not sufficient, if the Holy Spirit does not give the understanding of the

³ Other terms are hearer and recipient. Respondent includes the possibility of a feedback, being the basis of good communication as dialogue.

message (Freytag 1961a:216). He can surpass all anthropological obstacles and „simplify“ the communication process.

Special attention is to be given to differences of semantic domains. Minute comparative word and concept studies will reveal the necessary paths to effective cross-cultural Christian ministry. According to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, man's cognitive processes depend upon linguistic patterns (Whorf 1963; Hesselgrave 1978:258f.; Käser 1997:180). „The language is the most complete symbolic embodiment of a culture. It reveals its mind and heart; it is the body of the ‚culture-soul‘“ (Peters 1977:230). In seeking for a renewal of man's mind by a change of culturally conditioned thought patterns, the underlying semantics become crucial. Words must be viewed as the basic „stones,“ shaped by culture, and used in order to think and to build meaningful sentences. For educating the human mind in scriptural truth, we not only need to know the semantics of Biblical terms and concepts, but the sense of cultural idioms as well (Peters 1982:121). Only such comparative studies will show the overlap and deviation between Biblical and cultural expressions and thought patterns and will form a solid basis for the communication and contextualization process.⁴

5.1.4 Direct or Indirect Communication

When discussing personality types, we have seen that communication styles differ depending on conscience orientation. While guilt-oriented persons tend to direct communication, shame-oriented persons prefer to communicate indirectly. Shame-oriented persons perceive the direct communication of guilt-oriented persons as brutal; guilt-oriented persons feel that the indirect approach of shame-oriented persons is hypocritical (cp. Mt 21:28-32). Guilt-oriented people allow confrontation to take place, while for shame-oriented persons these situations mean that they lose face. Shame-oriented persons will hesitate to express criticism directly against a person fearing that it will make the person lose face. Contrastingly, guilt-oriented persons will freely criticize another person, even in front of others. At the same time, a guilt-oriented person will speak freely of his inner life, his emotions and intimacies, while a shame-oriented person will conceal his private life and feel securer to wear a mask. Asked to take position to an event or problem, he will think well before expressing an opinion in order to avoid hurting somebody or disturbing the harmony of the group. Out of the same concern for harmony, shame-oriented persons will try to include any newcomer in the group, while guilt-oriented

⁴ The field of science, which is based on Whorf's linguistic hypothesis, is called cognitive anthropology.

persons may exclude him systematically. Spontaneous exclamations of shame-oriented persons will be rare in fear of what others will think of them, while guilt-oriented persons will hesitate less. Indirect communication is often non-verbal communication. A Japanese proverb says: „The eyes speak more than the mouth“ (Tokuzen 1981:569).

Indirect communication includes stories, proverbs, parables, and symbolic acts. It passes through mediators (Augsburger 1992; Käser 1997:162f.; Kurani 2001:59). God and Jesus use it abundantly. God passes through Moses, the prophets and Jesus to communicate with his people, the so-called incarnational communication. Catholic priests and many evangelical pastors take up this role of mediation. The Reformation concept of universal priesthood implies a direct communication with God. It is the logical consequence of the effusion of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost. Shame-oriented persons have problems with this concept. In this same regard, the Jews speak of God indirectly. They do not pronounce his name. They speak of God's glory (Ex 34:18,21), name (1Ki 8:29a; Ps 23:5), face (Ps 27:8f.; 34:6; 51:13), and eyes (Ex 34:6,8). This indirect approach expresses reverence and respect in a shame-oriented context (cp. Eichrodt 1967:29-45). God, the prophets and Jesus however use also the direct confrontational approach (e.g. Gen 3:9; 4:9; Mal 3:8; Mt 23).

An example for both communication styles is given when Jesus meets the more guilt-oriented Pharisee Nicodemus and the shame-oriented Samaritan prostitute in John 3 & 4. Jesus tunes his communication style to his partner. Nicodemus approaches Jesus at night and with an indirect introductory phrase, which are both signs for shame orientation. Contrastingly, Jesus comes directly to the point with Nicodemus (Jn 3:3). This is a guilt-oriented communication style. Jesus uses generally the direct approach when talking to guilt-oriented Pharisees as they approach him directly also (Mk 3:22-30 par; 6:4 par; 11:17 par; Jn 8:37-59; 10:20f.). Totally different is his approach with the Samaritan woman in Jn 4 who is a shame-oriented prostitute. Very smoothly and indirectly Jesus starts with the water theme and works his way around several curves to the question about her husband (vv.16-18). With the flexibility of his communication style Jesus is an example for us: let us choose direct or indirect communication according to the conscience orientation of our partner.

5.1.5 Contextualization

Contextualization is a new term in missiology, which was coined by Shoki Coe (1972:20) in order to replace the older terms enculturation,⁵ inculturation,⁶ accomodation,⁷ and indigenisation.⁸ He writes in an article that first appeared in 1973:

Indigenization tends to be used in the sense of responding to the Gospel in terms of traditional culture. Therefore, it is in danger of being past-oriented ... So in using the word *contextualization*, we try to convey all that is implied in the familiar term *indigenization*, yet seek to press beyond for a more dynamic concept which is open to change and which is also future-oriented (Coe 1976:20f. italics in original).

Contextualization includes the process of transmitting Biblical truth in a certain culture not only based on Scripture, but also adapted to the local culture. This is based, on the one hand, on the faithfulness and truthfulness towards the godly revelation as it is transmitted in the Holy Scripture, and on the other hand, relevance toward those receiving the message in their specific culture or subculture (Tiénou 1990:76; Rommen 1994:174f.). Contextualization is verbal and non-verbal. It includes all activities of cross-cultural Christian ministry in a wider sense: from Bible translation, interpretation and application across evangelism, implan-tation and organization of churches, and teaching, to church service and missionary life style. Rommen speaks of the contextualization cycle (Hesselgrave/Rommen 1990:200). Contextu-alization includes first a thorough analysis of culture, secondly an exegesis of the Bible, thirdly an evaluation of the culture in the light of the Bible, and fourthly, where necessary, the creation of new elements. Hiebert calls this fourfold process „critical contextualization.“ It is opposed to uncritical or rejected contextualization that leads to overt or hidden syncretism and an estranged Gospel (Hiebert 1985:188; 1994:88f.). Tiénou proposes a three-dimensional method; the three steps should ideally be gone through at the same time: a multidisciplinary examination of the church, an analysis of the culture, and an exegesis of the Bible related to the two (Tiénou 1993:249f.). In this process, it is important to analyse along with Scripture, church and culture as well as the dynamics of cultural change with respect to needs, coping with life, cultural vacuum, and functional substitute (Lingenfelter 1992:19,310; Müller

⁵ Process through which a child or a missionary assimilates a culture (cp. Shorter 1988:5).

⁶ Adaptation with cultural exchange on the level of language and communication symbols (cp. Shorter 1988:11).

⁷ Adaptation with shift or loss in content and „uncritical“ takeover of elements from the receptor culture; primarily a Roman Catholic approach (Hesselgrave/Rommen 1990:125; Rommen 1994:169f.).

⁸ Process through which a church becomes indigenous in message and structure. Among other things it has its expression in the three autonomies: 1. self-support, 2. self-government, 3. self-propagation (Beyerhaus 1964; Nevius 1993; Ro 1995:15).

1998b:220). Contextualization has to be done in the vernacular language in order to get to the heart of the people (Schreiter 1985:143; Dyrness 1992:9).

Different models weigh the steps and elements of critical contextualization differently (Schreiter 1985:6-16,80-93; Gilliland 1989:313-317; Bevans 1992): The anthropological model focuses the needs and themes of culture, reads the Bible in the light of these themes and integrates culture with Scripture. Culture is the primary consideration. The praxis model starts also from the human needs relative to culture and Scripture and reflects on the outcomes and further action. The adaptation model and the translation model start from Scripture and Christian tradition (the church) and „adapt“ or „translate“ its meanings with the goal of dynamic equivalence into cultural forms. The semiotic model⁹ looks at the Christian traditions in historical perspective and at the indicators and dynamics of change (Schreiter 1985:56ff.). The transcendental model stresses the revelational character of Scripture. Therefore, the Bible must stay *norma normans* according to the Reformers' tradition of *sola scriptura* and culture stays *norma normata*. In the dialogue between Scripture and culture hermeneutics is not primarily understood as circle, but as dialysis where questions flow from context to Scripture, but also from Scripture to culture. „Towards Scripture flows a context in need of salvation and from the Word of God flows a healing vision for the context“ (Neufeld 1994:141; 1998:201). As a combination of all the former models, the synthetic model is a surely holistic model. It seems to be the ideal solution, but risks to be non-practical and universalist (Gilliland 1989:316). To summarize:

Contextualization, biblically based and Holy-Spirit-led, is a requirement for evangelical missions today. Contextualization is incarnational. The Word which became flesh dwells among us. It clarifies for each nation or people the meaning of the confession, „Jesus is Lord.“ It liberates the church in every place to hear what the Spirit is saying, Contextual theology will open up the way for communication of the gospel in ways that allow the hearer to understand and accept. It gives both freedom and facility for believers to build up one another in the faith. Contextualization clarifies what the Christian witness is in sinful society and shows what obedience to the gospel requires. These are the components of a theology for mission that meets the needs of today's world (Gilliland 1989:3).

⁹ Semiotics is the study of signs (from Greek *sēmeion*). It sees culture as a vast communication network, whereby both verbal and nonverbal messages are circulated, which, together, create the systems of meaning. The bearers of these messages are called „symbols“ or „signs.“ The bearer of the message is seen to stand for the message (Schreiter 1985:49).

5.1.6 The Concept of Culture

In the contextualization process, Bible and culture are involved. Therefore it is vital to define their relationship. Culture and language are God's creation as a gift for man, established in His order (Gen 1:28; 2:15-17,19,24). Equally, God has created man in His image and in relation to Him (Gen 1:27). In this respect, Müller observes that through conscience man is able to conceive of culture, society and religion (1995a). After the Fall, culture is not only determined by God's order, but also by sin (Gen 4). With the dispersion after the construction of the tower of Babel (Gen 11), not only the diversity of language starts, but also the diversity of cultures increases. With the call of Abraham, God creates a new culture, in which he can reveal himself (Gen 12). Culture becomes the context of God's revelation (Larkin 1992:191ff.). Israel and later the Christian community are called to create and live a model culture (Dt 4:6-8; Rom 12:1f.; 1Pet 2:9). This model culture has a partial and provisional character until God himself creates a new culture at the parousia, and definitively at the creation of a new heaven and a new earth (Rev 20:4; 21:3,24).

From an anthropological perspective, culture is a socially acquired and linguistically transmitted worldview (Larkin 1992:194) including rules to cope with everyday life (Käser 1997:130). According to the theory of „functional congruence,“ there are similarities between a culture and the persons living in it (Inkeles and Levinson 1954; LeVine 1973:58f.). In its relativity, culture cannot be the basis and source of absolute truth as some anthropologists hold: „Search the truth in context“ (that is in culture). Rather, it constitutes the context in which cues for Biblical truth can be looked for in order to render the message relevant for the audience. According to Hesselgrave, culture has seven dimensions which have to be considered when a message should become culturally relevant: a worldview, thought patterns or „logics,“ linguistic forms (the world is perceived through language), behavioural patterns, social structures, communication media, and decision models (Hesselgrave 1978:120,276,412; Hesselgrave/Rommen 1990:203f.). All the messages have to cross this cultural grid. The greater the differences of the components of two cultures, the more difficult the task of contextualization is. If this evaluation between two cultures is rejected, the message stays foreign or hidden syncretism results. In the case of uncritical acceptance of the culture, an overt syncretism arises. Hiebert calls this uncritical contextualization (1985:188; 1994:88f.). Arthur Glasser goes beyond this when he declares that there is no contextualization without syncretistic elements (Müller 1995c). These different evaluations show that contextualization is an act of balance between cultural foreignness and syncretism. What is good contextualization for

one, is syncretism for the other (Barrett 1968:96). The African independent churches are a good example for this.

5.1.7 The Cultural Triangle

In the process of contextualization, at least three cultures are involved. Based on Nida, Hesselgrave calls this „The Cultural Triangle“ (Hesselgrave 1978:73; Hesselgrave/Rommen 1990:200). It describes the fact that the Biblical message has first been given into the Hebrew and Roman-Hellenistic cultures. The missionary or evangelist who comes from another culture will interpret it with his cultural presuppositions based partially on conscience orientation. Then, he transmits his message into the target culture that again has different presuppositions and assumptions. In the communication process across three cultures, distortions of the message and misunderstandings can ensue. These are enlarged when different conscience orientations are involved in the triangle. These problems can only be diminished through the translation of the Bible into the language of the target culture and by working with and through indigenous people. In this way, the hearers of the target culture are exposed directly to the concepts and thought categories of the Biblical culture without the detour via the culture of the missionary. This task is made easier when the missionary has the same conscience orientation as the target people. Therefore, generally speaking Two-Thirds-World evangelists and missionaries diminish the problem. Wendland calls the effects of the cultural triangle „the interference factor“ in cross-cultural Christian ministry and proposes as solution the four I's: indigenisation, instruction, interaction, investigation. With interaction, Wendland means working in mixed teams of indigenous people and missionaries, and with investigation advice giving by the missionaries (1995:277f.). He omits the first step: the Bible translation. Many think that the absence of an Arabic translation of the Bible was the main reason for Muhammad's misunderstandings of Christology. The aim of the process of contextualization is an indigenous, missionary Christian community with an indigenous theology (Bediako 1989; Tiénou 1990; 1992; 1993).

After having reflected on the theoretical basis of contextualization, we will look at some examples, challenges and problems of contextualization. We will start with the study of the three selves of autonomy and the models of mission-church partnership. Then, we will reflect on indigenous theologies and the prosperity gospel, two legal phenomena, the young generation in Europe and North America, and finally an everyday problem for everybody, the traffic.

5.1.8 Autonomy and Interdependence in Missions

As early as 1792, it was William Carey's goal to train indigenous leaders for his churches (1792:76). In 1847, Karl Graul states as „the last goal of the evangelical-Lutheran Leipzig mission to render independent the gathered churches by training indigenous teachers and by leading them, in time, to suffice to their own needs“ (Handmann 1902:15; Beyerhaus 1956:45). Around 1856, Rufus Anderson of the American Board and Henry Venn of the Church Missionary Society, two close friends, coined the „three selves formula“ which views „self-governing, self-supporting and self-propagating“ churches as the ideal for the mission field (Beyerhaus 1956:46; 1964:394). In 1899, John L. Nevius' book *The Planting and Development of Missionary Churches* (1993) appears, where he speaks of „founding independent, self-reliant, and aggressive native churches“ (Gensichen 1959:1066). Nevius influences profoundly the Korean and Chinese missionary movement. Also Roland Allen stresses in his book *Missionary Methods: St. Paul's or Ours?* (1912) the importance of the self-reliance of indigenous churches. Anderson's and Venn's formula meets almost general acceptance in the beginning of the 20th century. In the course of the nationalist movement, the young churches applaud it (Beyerhaus 1964:396). This finds its clearest expression in the Chinese „Three Selves Patriotic Movement“ after the communist take over in 1949. Until today self-reliance is an issue in missions. Today it is addressed most sharply by Glenn Schwartz (e.g. 1994).

There are two questions which we must ask in connection with our study: To what extent is the three selves formula Biblical, and how does conscience orientation apply to it? In his article *The Three Selves Formula: Is It Built on Biblical Foundations?* (1964), Beyerhaus reminds that the weakness of the evangelical missionary movement consists of the fact that pietism has put little importance on church development (1964:393). The truth of the formula lies in the fact that in the NT the three selves are practiced.

The matter of self-government and self-propagation is not so much a question of church law as a spiritual problem, related to the congregation's readiness to assume the responsibilities inherent in the nature of the Church ... Self-support was never a problem in Paul's young churches. The only instance of a church apparently unable to support itself was the mother church at Jerusalem during the famine, and then help was given through the great collection that Paul organized among his mission churches ... Paul's churches were self-supporting simply because he did not introduce the principle of the full-time salaried pastor. Until the 5th century, the local ministry was in most instances entirely voluntary (Beyerhaus 1964:401f.; cp. Kritzing 2000:6).

However, „it is wrong to speak of autonomy, since a church can never be autonomous, but only christonomous“ (1964:397). The ambiguity of the three selves formula must be

sought in the prefix „self.“ Positively, it implies the affirmation of identity; negatively, it can imply isolation. The Bible calls the Christian to a „continual mortification“ and submission to Christ. The danger of human pride opposed to God inherent in the individual’s self-assertion also threatens the church.

A word that sums up the biblical view of a church fully exercising her authority and fulfilling her divine calling, that word will neither be autonomy nor independence but responsibility. For this term (1) indicates that the Church exists and acts not in her own right, but as a response of faith, love and obedience to the call of Christ; (2) implies that real duties are fulfilled, and (3) expresses the divine right by which the Church is entitled to exercise authority in the work entrusted to her (Beyerhaus 1964:404).

We have seen that responsibility is a basic concept for understanding the Biblical covenant concept. It is fundamental in Christian ethics for shame and guilt-oriented persons. It is covenantal responsibility that will show us what to do in our church and our relations with other churches and missions. „Every church in the world will be asked to be faithful to the Church’s threefold ministry of *leiturgia*, *diakonia* and *martyria*“ (Beyerhaus 1964:407). This ministry should be fulfilled in accordance with Christ’s will for His Church, that all be one (Jn 17:21).

All the images used to describe the nature of the Church in the NT stress her essential unity: the vine, the temple, the city, the flock, the new Israel, the bride, and, above all, the body of Christ [Rom 12:4f.; 1Cor 12:12-26]. The last image emphasizes not only the unity of the body and its dependence on the Head, but also the interdependence of all its members (Beyerhaus 1964:405).

In the same line of thought, Morris O. Williams in his book *Partnership in Mission* (1979) adds partnership as expression of interdependence to the three selves (cp. Braithwaite 1989:85-89; Kurani 2001:51f.). It does not counteract or annihilate the three selves, but complements them. Partnership includes love, effective communication, and definition of role (Williams 1979:160). I would add that responsibility has to be a major element in any covenant, partnerships included. It can be considered an element of love. In cross-cultural partnerships, difficulties can rise because of cultural differences as leadership style, paternalism and nepotism, emphasis on person or institution, and precedence of relationships or competence (Sookhdeo 1994:57f.). Personality differences between shame and guilt-oriented persons are relevant in partnerships and can be a cause of tensions (McKaughan 1994:77f.; Fuller 1980:159-188; Kim 1992:125-140).

What is the relation to conscience orientation? The three selves can be seen as the code of missionary church planting principles through the 19th and 20th century. Guilt-oriented

missionaries maintain it whereas shame-oriented people do not understand this emphasis. For them, interdependence is the overriding principle to follow. Partnership, or better interdependence, is important for them, even though the concept, as Westerners see it, is foreign in many cultures. It is perceived as family relationship between big and small brother or between husband and wife. In most cultures, these are not relationships between equals. This introduces an unwanted and often unexpected bias. Another cultural analogy and equally Biblical pattern is the covenant relationship that includes responsibilities on both sides. Partnership behaviour should then express conformity to covenant and community. The major elements of the covenant are righteousness and law. We do not view the three selves and interdependence as contradictory or exclusive, but as necessary, complementary elements. For God intends, such is our hypothesis, a balanced guilt and shame-oriented approach to mission-to-church, church-to-church, and mission-to-mission relationships.

5.1.9 Self Theologizing: Beyond „Form Indigeneity“

The publication of William Smalley's „Cultural Implications of an Indigenous Church“ in *Practical Anthropology* (1958) was a major breakthrough in thinking about indigeneity and contextualization. In this article, Smalley challenges the assumption that three-self indigeneity is sufficient, but observes that it represents indigeneity solely at the form level. He defines a truly indigenous church as:

A group of believers who live out their life, including their socialized Christian activity, in the patterns of the local society, and for whom any transformation of that society comes out of their felt needs under the guidance of the Holy Spirit and the Scriptures. ... An indigenous church is precisely one in which the changes which take place under the guidance of the Holy Spirit meet the needs and fulfil the meanings of that society and not of any outside group (Smalley 1958:55f.).

In the chapter „Indigenous Principles in Mission Today“ of his book *Verdict Theology in Missionary Theory* (1969/73), Alan Tippett deals with quantitative, qualitative and organic church growth and suggests that it is a quality of selfhood that we should be concerned with when discussing whether a church is truly indigenous or not:


When the indigenous people of a community think of the Lord as their own, not a foreign Christ; when they do things as unto the Lord meeting the cultural needs around them, worshipping in patterns they understand; when their congregations function in participation in a body, which is structurally indigenous; then you have an *indigenous* Church (Tippett 1973:158 italics in original).

However, indigeneity is not the most appropriate term to signify an expression of Christianity that is both culturally authentic and genuinely Christian. For there is „no such thing as an

absolutely indigenous church in any culture“ (Smalley 1959:137). Contextual church and contextual or local theologies seem to be more appropriate terms (Coe 1972; Schreiter 1985; Dyrness 1990). In his book *Verdict Theology* (1973), Tippet goes on to suggest that we look for a quality of selfhood in six areas: self-image, self-function, self-determination, self-support, self-propagation and self-giving. Self-giving is the basis of self-support and self-propagation, and self-function and self-determination is part of self-government. Self-image is built up mostly by self-theologizing, the term, which has been retained in the further theological discussion as fourth self leading beyond „form indigeneity“ (Hiebert 1985:193-197; Kraft 1997:5).

Self-theologizing leads to contextual theologies by the direct interplay of Scripture and culture. It avoids the problems of the cultural triangle. Neufeld expresses the bipolar character of the interaction between Scripture and culture with the image of dialysis (1998:201). Some prefer to call the hermeneutical process involved a spiral in order to uphold the authority of Scripture (Osborne 1991:324f.). Based on Schreiter (1985:25), Dyrness proposes an interactional model for the development of contextual theologies, which is presented in figure 5.1. (adapted from Dyrness 1990:30).

Figure 5.1: Interactional Model for the Development of Contextual Theologies



It is obvious that a parallel conscience orientation of concepts in Scripture and culture facilitates the process of contextualization, whereas opposite conscience orientation renders it more difficult. In shame-oriented societies theologians will prefer relational and narrative theology, while theologians from guilt-oriented backgrounds will practice doctrinal and expository theology. For the same reason, shame-oriented people favour shame-oriented concepts in the Bible and tend to blend out guilt-oriented concepts. Justification is a doctrine that is difficult to assimilate in a shame-oriented society, while the need for reconciliation is an everyday reality. Reparation after sin does not seem to be a theme in churches of shame-oriented people, while it is a must in guilt-oriented societies. Equally, guilt-oriented people tend to favour guilt-oriented concepts and blend out shame-oriented concepts. The codifications in the Bible, as the Ten Commandments, were welcomed and emphasized. Contrarily, the whole theme of shame was neglected in Western Christianity. For many Western Christians reconciliation seems to be a watering down of the justification concept. Consequently, it will be important to look for over-emphasis and blind spots in the process of contextualization.

The African independent churches (AIC) are an interesting example for contextualization. Between 1862 and 1968 more than 5000 new religious movements have originated from mission-founded churches. These independent churches are found in 40% of people groups south of the Sahara. Half of them are in South Africa. By its size, this is a unique phenomenon in the history of missions (Barrett 1971:93,148). The single largest denomination is the Kimbangu church¹⁰ in the Democratic Republic of Congo with more than two million members. The Baptist teacher Simon Kimbangu founded it in 1921 (Martin 1971:17; Sanneh 1983:206f.). In West Africa, the largest movement is the *aladura* movement in Nigeria with more than ten million followers (Sanneh 1983:180ff.).¹¹

Most of the independent churches have been formed around a miracle producing prophetic figure. They adapted many elements of traditional religion. Some classify them as a success in contextualization, others as sectarian healing movements (Turner 1967; Barrett 1968:96; 1971:147-159; Sanneh 1983:236-241; Dierks 1986:95-109; Beyerhaus 1964; 1996b). They try to combine the essential elements of the African traditional culture with Christianity and to give answers to the burning problems of everyday life. They emphasize the

¹⁰ In French *Eglise de Jésus-Christ sur la Terre par le Prophète Simon Kimbangu*.

¹¹ In Yoruba *aladura* means prayer. The exact name of the movement is „Church of the Lord (Aladura).“

spiritual gifts of prophecy, healing and prayer, which are also elements of African spirituality. Parallels exist especially in the role of the prophet who has access to the will of God through prayer, dreams and visions and therefore embodies his power. Prayer is therefore understood as a function of power (cp. Martin 1964:161). Power, as we have seen in section 4.3.11, is a shame-oriented concept. The independent churches take up the African elements of salvation: well-being, harmony and prosperity, all shame-oriented concepts (Enang 1979:107; Sanneh 1983:180; Van Rheeën 1991:290). African independent churches pursue salvation on four fronts: in the Lord's Supper, baptism, Holy Spirit, and healing (Mbiti 1985:136). Each one of them fills the believer with blessing and power, again neutral and shame-oriented concepts (Kruger 1983:35; Anderson 1991).

On the other hand, there are parallels to African Islam, especially in the area of prayer, rituals and dietary taboos (Sanneh 1983:225). This is not surprising as both movements represent contextualizations to African traditional culture: Islam throughout centuries, and *aladura* during a revival in the early 20th century. Both are characterized by a strong legalism as a guilt-oriented counterbalance to many shame-oriented elements, the most important of them prayer (Sundermeier 1970).

5.1.10 The Gospel of Prosperity and Shame Orientation

Many African independent churches announce a gospel of prosperity. This concept contains mainly three elements: material prosperity, divine healing and positive confession. It is based on a particular interpretation of the Bible. The theology of prosperity holds that salvation is total for man. God saves body, soul and spirit. He delivers man not only from sin, but also from poverty, sickness and depression. The Christians are children of God and not of Satan. God, their father, is almighty. He owns everything, he can do everything and does everything for his children. Jesus Christ, the Son of God, delivers men by his death from the bonds of sin. The liberation of the soul procures inner peace, abundant life and joy. The liberation of the body guarantees longevity and divine healing for the sick. God's presence represents a blessing that materializes in success, health and prosperity. The children of God must reflect their glorious position in Christ. This is especially true for the full-time servants of God. God will pay them back their service by making them prosperous. One of the spiritual laws, secret of prosperity, is the law of the hundredfold fruit (Mk 10:30). According to this law, you give five francs and receive back 500. If you give a villa, you will have a hundred villas or a castle worth a hundred. On the other hand, poverty, failure, sickness, death and fear are a punish-

ment of God and a testimony to the absence of his blessing. The only remedy in this situation is to declare mightily the victory of God over sickness, failure and poverty. This technique is called positive confession. To confess with your mouth is a spiritual principle: „If you confess with your mouth, ... you will be saved“ (Rom 10:9). The only „secret“ is therefore to know your identity and your status in Christ in order to obtain what you desire. The positive mental attitude is the source of every positive confession. Combined with the formula „in the name of Jesus“ it gives authority over every sin and misfortune (Bourdanne 1999:19-29; cp. Barron 1987).

The above description drawn mainly from African independent churches stands as an example. House churches in China could be mentioned as another example. Multiple variations of the theme are found in independent churches across the world, especially in shame-oriented contexts. The basic principle stays the same: as in the case of the African independent churches, the elements of prosperity are drawn from the animistic concept of salvation. It includes well-being, harmony, honour, longevity, health and success (Sawyer 1973:129f.; Enang 1979:107; Mbiti 1986:135; Sanneh 1983:180; Van Rheenen 1991:290). All of these are in fact shame-oriented concepts filled with honour and prestige. They all witness of the life-force which is the third element in Adeyemo's definition of salvation (Adeyemo 1979:94; cp. Nkurunziza 1989:145f.; Van Rheenen 1991:291). In many contexts, salvation equals life (Dierks 1986:150; Nkurunziza 1989:165; Hauenstein 1999:135ff.). Sin is diminution of salvation and life. It is not measured at the intention of the sinner, but at the result of the action. The prosperity churches accept uncritically the cultural concepts of sin and salvation, which leads to „uncritical contextualization,“ that is an overt syncretism (Hiebert 1985:180). The traditional concepts are clothed in Christian terminology and presented as the Gospel.

The matter is complicated by the fact that the OT concept of salvation is similar to the traditional African concept (Dt 8:18; Ps 72:7; 90:17). The principle of causality and retribution means that a sinful life ends in failure, but a godly life in success (Ps 1; Koch 1991:2; 1995:517; Kreuzer 1995:220f.). When an African Christian reads the OT, he is basically confirmed in the traditional concept. Even Jesus promises abundant life (Jn 10:10). In the OT, the principle of causality and retribution is questioned only in the book of Job and in Isaiah 53. The NT reveals a suffering Messiah who in his failure becomes the door to salvation (Jn 10:7; Rom 4:25-5:1). The NT concept of salvation stands in two tensions, which are incorrectly resolved and dispensed with by the theology of prosperity. First, it is the eschatological tension between the „already“ and the „not yet“ of the coming Kingdom of God. Secondly, it

stands in the tension between a visible, this-worldly and an invisible, other-worldly salvation (Beck 1990:390; Mundle/Schneider/Coenen 1990:265). The honour attributed to the children of God can be delayed in an other-worldly future, a fact which is difficult to conceive of for a person who is concerned with honour and has a past-time perspective. The NT concept of salvation in Jesus Christ goes definitively beyond the AT and traditional African concepts and is therefore a difficult challenge for African churches and theologians, and for churches in shame-oriented contexts in general (Dierks 1986:167-180; McGrath 1997:395-399).

5.1.11 Corruption as a Typical Problem within a Shame-Oriented Society

Corruption is a general phenomenon in today's world. It is the collective term for a series of phenomena that appear to a guilt-oriented person as violation of a norm. However, a behaviour that is a violation of a norm for a guilt-oriented individual, can still be within accepted norms for a shame-oriented person. The needs of the enterprise or of the family can be more important than the respect of given standards. It can be possible that an overtarification is considered too high for a poor and indigenous, but adequate for a rich and foreigner (Käser 1997:151; Kurani 2001:55).

It is also possible that a bill does not correspond to the norm in the group, but that one official wants to keep the additional charge personally for himself. In this case, it is important that a shame-oriented person only feels shame when the violation of a norm is discovered. Before the discovery, he only feels anxiety in expectation of punishment or abandonment. If prices are not clearly fixed, the chance is small that the client is informed about them, even more if he is a foreigner. Additionally, he is in a difficult situation with the authorities, preventing him from asking too many questions. Therefore, the risk is small that the overtarification is discovered. All these phenomena appear as corruption and induce discomfort in guilt-oriented persons. Shame-oriented persons who are person-oriented interpret them differently. The legal norms do not have the same priority for them as for guilt-oriented individuals. They are considered flexible.

An example from Japanese politics may illustrate the case. Two women criticize the corruptibility of Japanese liberal politicians who are in power since fifty years. After the elections, one woman asks the other how she has voted. She answers: „For the liberal politician.“ „Why?“ asks the woman. „Because I received a gift from the liberal politician and am therefore obliged (*sumimasen*) to vote for him.“ *Sumimasen* is the Japanese expression to indicate that an affair is not finished, and that an obligation continues to exist in a relationship. This

way, the liberal party can stay in power despite of multiple corruption scandals and even though only a small minority of the voters are in its favour.

As in Japanese society, in the Ilongot of the Philippines and the Gahuku-Gawa of New Guinea, mutual obligations and emotional interdependence define the self (Rosaldo 1984:148; Shweder/Bourne 1984). They are characteristics of a shame-oriented society. In Japan, this mutual interdependence is called *amae* (Doi 1982:118). It is a much stronger force than the codes of administration. „*Do ut des*“ or „I give you in order that you give me back again“ is the fundamental principle of a shame-oriented society. This mutual interdependence also controls animistic societies as shame-oriented structures. The gifts to ancestors and other authorities are motivated by this deep consciousness of mutual interdependence (Flückiger 2000:39). Van Rheeën writes: „Frequently sacrifices are made to compel spiritual beings to reciprocate by giving appropriate gifts: By making a gift to the gods, the gods are compelled to give back benefits to man“ (1991:294). As economic trade becomes more and more international and as former Christian guilt-oriented societies become dechristianized and more shame-oriented, these elements become more and more introduced into economics: gifts are exchanged (Kleiner 1992:24,29,59).

How can one do away with corruption? Rennstich gives an interesting note from the English revival in the 18th and 19th century (1990:90-95). He observes that corruption disappeared in English society and administration during this time. „The real breakthrough came only when the consciousness that corruption was sin gained general acceptance and was supported by the church and the education in the families. The women and the spiritual renewal in society made a decisive contribution to this fact“ (Rennstich 1990:225). What happened? The consciences, whether more shame or guilt-oriented, became focused on God and therefore more sensitive to His Word. However, we can generally assume that consciences through this orientation towards God and his fixed standards became also more guilt-oriented. Being more guilt-oriented, they accepted the standard of avoiding corruption and felt guilty to break it, whereas a shame-oriented conscience would only feel ashamed after being detected.

Where is the limit between a gift in the sense of mutual interdependence and a means of corruption? After a thorough Biblical study of the concept of corruption, Kleiner gives three criteria of differentiation: righteousness, in the sense of conformity to covenant and community, faithfulness to God and men, and truth. We find two familiar covenant behaviours with

the underlying ethical concept of responsibility.¹² Righteousness includes, according to Kleiner, legality, common well-being, transparency, and efficiency (1992:154f.,160-178). Two of the three concepts (righteousness, faithfulness, and truth) have a relational or shame-oriented aspect. It is righteousness as common well-being due to conformity to community and covenant, and faithfulness which results from continuous truth (cp. the Hebrew root *'mn*). Two of them, righteousness and truth, also have guilt-oriented components. The guilt-oriented component of righteousness is justice, including the legal aspect (legality), and the fact that a good goal should be attained by good means (transparency). For Kleiner, efficiency is part of justice. Using the two covenant behaviours and the underlying concept of responsibility with Kleiner's criteria, a theory of corruption can be formulated which is applicable for shame and guilt-oriented persons and societies. Corruption is then a behaviour that does not take into account the communal well-being (in the larger and stricter sense), righteousness and justice, mutual faithfulness and truth. In other words, it is an egoist, unjust, faithless and untruthful behaviour. Corruption is an irresponsible behaviour, which is not conform to covenant and community.

5.1.12 The Judicial System and Guilt Orientation

The discussion on corruption brings us to the question, how a shame-oriented person can keep in line with a European or American-imported judicial system, which is evidently guilt-oriented, or how shame-oriented judges can run it. When discussing the personality and culture typology,¹³ we have seen that guilt orientation emphasizes individual rights. Under the achievement focus, all have equal rights and chances, a fact that leads to an egalitarian society. Guilt orientation is also characterized by an openness to positive criticism. Judgements are black and white, innocent or guilty. Attempts for restoration stress repentance, confession, and reparation. On the other hand, shame orientation emphasizes the duties towards the group in the sense of mutual obligations. Under the status focus these duties and rights are attributed according to status, which leads to a hierarchical society. Criticism is seen as personal attack. Therefore, judgements are open-ended in order to avoid making somebody lose face. Attempts of restoration stress consensus, reconciliation and reintegration.

¹² Cp. sections 3.1.7. Righteousness as Covenant Behaviour, 3.1.9. Faithfulness, Faith and Truth as Covenant Behaviour, and 4.3.14. Ethics: Revelational or Situational.

¹³ See section 4.1. Personality as a Function of Conscience Orientation, and appendix 11.

A situation between a guilt-oriented judicial system and predominantly shame-oriented persons is already given in OT Israel. God gives the Mosaic Law as codified expression of his covenant with the people Israel. Covenant behaviour is supposed to be faithful to God and conform to the law. Whereas cultic law, which is interpreted by the priests, regulates some situations in detail, the civil law does not provide systematic regulations for all of daily life, but gives only the main lines. The law is then applied to the concrete situation by the meeting of the elders at the gate (Gen 23:3-20; Ruth 4:1-12). In this way, behaviour in conformity to the covenant law and to the community is enforced. Systematic teaching of the community (Dt 6:4-9) and God's own acts as a judge (Ex 20:5) establish it on the basis of the covenant relationship. When this relationship is troubled, it is not only a transgression of the covenant law, but a shame to the person and the people (Jer 2:26; Prov 19:26; Klopfenstein 1972:48). In the NT, Jesus admonishes the Pharisees to not only give the tithe of the herbal spices, but also to honour father and mother (Mt 15:6; 23:23). When in the NT, the non-Jews are integrated into the new covenant (Eph 2:11-22), the same covenant relationship regulates their daily behaviour (Rom 1-3; 1Cor 5:13; Eph 2:1-10). In this way, the guilt-oriented law is adapted to the shame-oriented society by the integration into a covenant relationship and its interpretation by a hermeneutical community (Hafner 1989:1270f.).

Additionally, the law which is principally guilt-oriented as such has shame-oriented elements integrated into it. On the Day of Atonement, the high priest has to make a substitutive offering for the people (Lev 16). In a similar way, the sin and guilt offerings are to be presented to God by a priest who becomes a mediator for the sinner (Lev 4-7). Beyond this, the fellowship offering is a happy community experience (Lev 3 & 7), as are the pilgrimages to Jerusalem for the three great feasts (Lev 23). The law also includes public shaming sanctions (e.g. Lev 13:45f.; Dt 22:13-31; 25:1-10). Additionally, sin in the Bible is not only a problem between God and the individual, but a communal affair as shown in Achan's case (Jos 7).

A similar situation between a guilt-oriented judicial system and a shame-oriented society exists today in many countries of the Two-Thirds-World where the judicial codex is imported from a European or American context. One of the clashes happens in the realm of human rights, which are a guilt-oriented concept of an egalitarian society. Shame-oriented societies on the other hand, are stratified according to age, sex, status, and wealth, and refer more to respect and duties towards others than to individual rights (Kalny 1998:90f.). In international

politics, the exhortation to respect human rights meets generally with deaf ears in shame-oriented countries.

Another clash occurs between the concepts of good and evil and sanctions of bad behaviour in traditional societies as compared to the judicial system. A shame-oriented culture looks at the harmony in the group as their central value (Tso 1991:1f.; van Rooy 195:129). This can „lead to interpersonal ‚offences,‘ such as adultery and assault, being considered relatively minor offences unless they caused a rift within the whole group“ (Nielsen 1991:9). Harmony is restored by informal mediation. Conformity is more important than punishment. Punishments are immediate and include exclusion from the community and public shaming situations (Nielsen 1991:10f.). Attempts to integration into a guilt-oriented judicial system are difficult (Kuppe 1986; Matsuda 1988), but seem to be most successful when accomplished through mediation by persons of authority within the traditional society (Kumado 1989; Nielsen 1991:18). This lesson could be learned from the OT, as seen above. A special case is the extended family including polygamy, a problem that is not dealt with in Western European codices (Adigun 1989:285-289; Bentzon 1994).

Shame is practically absent in the judicial codices of Europe. It is only contained implicitly as constitutional element of the person's dignity. Only theoretically is shame seen as an inner protection of the personality, which is indispensable to integrate the person into society again. It is interpreted in three ways in German and Swiss civil law: as physical integrity of the prisoner, as necessity for space and time to move daily, and as necessity for outside contacts (J. Müller/S. Müller 1985:17ff.). Daily practice in court shows that shame can keep a person from acknowledging his act. Additionally, daily life in prison is filled with humiliating situations which produce a reinforcement of the feeling of insufficiency, inferiority and dishonour, and consequently of shame orientation. The overflow of shame in shame-anger-rage spirals leads to aggressive behaviour and outbursts of rage during and after prison which represent a serious obstacle to successful reintegration into society (Geissbühler/Nafzger 1999; cp. Kaufman 1989:180f.; Lewis 1992:176f.). In Europe and North America, a consideration of shame in the penal system is needed in order to improve the chances of reintegrating criminals into society.

5.1.13 The Generation X and Shame Orientation

North American population statisticians and sociologists have started to categorize generations and to attribute specific names and characteristics to them (Pfister 2001:2). They

differentiate between the boosters (born 1927-1945), the baby boomers (born 1946-1964), and the busters (born 1965-1983) (Donovan/Myors 1997:42). The busters have also been called the generation X, standing for the unknown generation (cp. Mahedi/Bernardi 1996; Schieber/Olson 1999; Pfister 2001:18f.). These observations can be applied to Northern Europe also, as differences tend to become smaller through globalization (Pfister 2001:3).¹⁴

The boosters (born 1927-1945) are the generation that lived through the hardships of the world economic crisis and World War II. Their goal was to achieve peace and security, and improve the conditions of life. They were ready to bring great sacrifices in order to achieve their goal. Work had priority over the family. The boosters were characterized by faithfulness, loyalty and stability. They stayed with the same partner, enterprise, organization or mission for their whole life. They preferred individual over team work (Donovan/Myors 1997:42f.; Böker 1998:82; Pfister 2001:5f.). The boosters were individualists, and goal and task oriented. Consequently, according to our personality typology, they were guilt-oriented.¹⁵

The baby boomers (born 1946-1964) are the post-war generation. In Europe they are often called the 1968-generation because of the student revolts and their later political involvement. They continued the post-war reconstruction of the boosters. Therefore, they have a success and achievement focus, believe in technology and are optimistic about the future. As a fruit of their parents work, they grew up in abundance. They can therefore afford to be idealists and think about ecology, the Two-Thirds-World and world peace. They are tolerant when talking about abortion, homosexuality and religion, but intolerant about inefficiency and incompetent leadership. Authority, moral values and traditions are questioned. The boomers look for the best solution and are open for change. They value not so much loyalty and stability as efficiency and quality. This brings high mobility in family, enterprise, church or mission with increased divorce rates, the downfall of old and the creation of new institutions, and missionary attrition. Paradoxically, the family becomes more important than work and work in teams is preferred (Donovan/Myors 1997:43f.; Baker 1997:72-74; Böker 1998:83; Pfister 2001:7-10). With their achievement focus and task orientation, boomers are essentially guilt-oriented. The importance of the family and preference of team work show an increase in shame orientation as compared to the boosters (cp. Benedict 1974:225; Mead 1961:307;

¹⁴ For the discussion in this chapter I am indebted to Pfister (2001).

¹⁵ See appendix 11: Personality as a Function of Conscience Orientation.

Hesselgrave 1983:464; Müller 1996a:110). As values and authority are questioned, the conscience becomes additionally less differentiated.

The busters (born 1965-1983) seek self-realization in spare-time and creativity. They do not live to work, but work to live, and especially to have fun. Busters have been called the fun-generation. Fun is found in spare time, especially sports and big events with peers. They need love, friends and family and communicate intensively with them. They find it prestigious to be cool and wear clothes with labels. Busters are an antiauthoritarian generation raised by largely antiauthoritarian parents. They do not respect laws highly and lie if necessary. They ask for clear direction but have problems submitting to it. They are the first globally thinking, multicultural generation. This causes them to be tolerant. Hence, they are children of post-modernism valuing pluralism, relativism and tolerance. Their synthetic thinking leads them to an „and - and logic“ rejecting analytic exclusivity. The busters are the first generation, which has no hope for a better future. Optimism and pessimism are balanced at the best. Career and material well-being are no priorities for the future. Authenticity in their lives and that of friends and models are of prime importance (Gerken/Konitzer 1995:50-52; Mahey/Bernardi 1996:40,59; Pfister 2001:15ff.).

Gerken calls the generation X the generation with the highest complexity (Gerken/Konitzer 1995:53; Pfister 2001:37). This evaluation is also confirmed by the self-image of generation X-ers (Gerken/Konitzer 1995:49 quoted by Pfister 2001:19). They see themselves as curious (62%) which is a guilt-oriented trait, as enjoying contacts (59%) which corresponds to person and shame orientation, as cool (53%) which is prestige and shame-oriented, as self-confident (51%) and critical (50%) which originate from antiauthoritarian education.

It becomes apparent that the generation X is in great part shame-oriented (cp. Long 1997:83-113; Lawson 2000:10). Indicators are its group and person orientation with the intensive need for communication within the group, its status focus, its event and fun orientation, the synthetic thinking including tolerance, syncretism and rejection of analytic judgements, and the absence of an achievement focus. Direct communication, egalitarianism and individualism do not fit into this pattern. They can correspond to guilt orientation. Together with anti-authoritarianism resulting from an antiauthoritarian education, they can also indicate shamelessness.¹⁶

¹⁶ „We note that cultures regularly give shamelessness a negative connotation. The concept of shamelessness suggests that the lack of a proper sense of shame is a moral deficiency and that the possession of a sense of shame is a moral obligation“ (Schneider 1977:19).

In conclusion, the generation X has a very complex conscience: it is a predominantly shame-oriented, partly guilt-oriented, and in many cases underdeveloped, that is, shameless and/or guiltless conscience. This happens after the boomers have still been mostly guilt-oriented. The main reason for it is the antiauthoritarian education by the boomers. In the absence of clear standards, the in-group becomes the determining instance in education (cp. Davis 1993:27; Kurani 2001:67,75). It is to note that such a rapid shift in conscience orientation within roughly one generation has probably never happened in world history. It is responsible for many generation conflicts in families, groups, enterprises, organizations, churches and missions, because, seen schematically, it confronts a guilt-oriented and a shame-oriented generation.

Finally, we want to ask two questions about the relation of the generation X to missions: How can they be reached with the Gospel? A shame-oriented generation has to be reached with a Gospel adapted for shame-oriented people. It will include a narrative and relational approach and the reconciliation model. It will also pass through fun events and persons as models (cp. Long 1997:96f.,112f.).¹⁷ The second question is: Will they be good missionaries? As the majority of the world population is shame-oriented, the generation X with its group and person orientation will be better adapted to most of the peoples than the boomers and boomers. The deficits of this generation will be its direct communication style, its antiauthoritarianism, its problem with hierarchies, and its incapacity for patience, discipline and suffering (Donovan/Myors 1997:44f.,52; Böker 1998:85f.; Pfister 2001:36-39).

5.1.14 Traffic: Respect Codes or Avoid Each Other

It is a well-known fact that general behaviour patterns reveal themselves by the way we behave in traffic. As conscience influences behaviour, it is not surprising that conscience orientation also determines traffic behaviour. Because traffic behaviour is so easily observable by anybody, we conclude this section with some reflections on traffic. Traffic observation may even be the starting point in the analysis of conscience orientation of persons or a society. Klaus Müller tells the following example as a testing case for conscience orientation (1995b). You arrive at a crossroads with a red light at two-a-clock at night. There is nobody and no cars around. What do you do? If you respect the red light and wait, you are definitely guilt-oriented. If you drive through by looking right and left, you are rather shame-oriented. If you

¹⁷ Cp. sections 5.2. Evangelism, 5.3. Community Life, and 5.4. Counseling.

get mad at the policeman waiting for you after the crossroads and who gives you a fine, you are definitely shame-oriented.

Guilt-oriented people, who are educated and used to drive according to the traffic code, feel insecure while driving in a shame-oriented society. For them, this way of driving is chaotic and dangerous. However, it is a fact that this way of driving does not cause more accidents than in societies that drive according to codes. In Guinea, West Africa, people say: „We don't drive, we avoid.“ Shame-oriented driving orients itself at the other driver's behaviour, and, of course, avoids him. In Northern Europe, travelling guides for Mediterranean countries tell the same story: shame-oriented driving does not respect the code, but the fellow driver. We have to add: it respects the fellow driver according to his prestige and power. Trucks have priority over big cars, and these over small cars, and these over motorcycles, and these again over bicycles, and these over pedestrians. Cars coming from a large road have priority over those coming from a narrow road. In Northern Europe young people respect the traffic code less than older people, because they are more shame-oriented as we have seen above. This is the reason why fines have been increased substantially in the last years. While guilt-oriented consciences abide with codes without a major threat, shame-oriented consciences need a substantial deterrent to respect them. Ideally one should respect codes and fellow drivers. This corresponds to a combined shame and guilt-oriented behaviour and thus to our hypothesis that God aims for a balanced conscience.

5.2 Evangelism

After having gone through the process of rethinking communication and contextualization from the perspective of conscience orientation, we will concentrate on three practical fields of cross-cultural Christian ministry: evangelism, community life and counseling. In cross-cultural Christian ministry, evangelism plays an important role. In order to be good news, the message of evangelism must consider the conscience orientation of the target people. In shame-oriented peoples, it has to follow the shame-honour axis, while it will follow the guilt-justice axis with guilt-oriented persons.

5.2.1 Evangelism and Conscience Orientation

„All evangelists consider addressing conscience as necessary ...“ (Riecker 1974:200). Conscience is a human instance and at the same time sign of an extrahuman authority (Rom 2:1-16; 2Cor 4:2). The content of conscience however depends on cultural norms and values.

In a cross-cultural situation, there will be both significant overlap and marked discontinuity between the consciences of interactants. Additionally, the encounter with norms of the Bible always represents a cross-cultural situation. Because three cultures are involved, Hesselgrave speaks of the cultural triangle (1985:73). „It is not the overlap which interactants will tend to notice. Rather it is in the area of discontinuity - specifically where one's own conscience speaks and the other's does not.“ In these areas, interactants „tend to condemn the other morally for behavior about which the other has no [bad] conscience“ (Priest 1994:296). Figure 5.1. illustrates this reality (adapted from Priest 1994:296-299):

Figure 5.2: Continuity and Discontinuity of Consciences

		Biblical Norm	
		Congruity of A & Bible	A Indigenous Conscience
Discontinuity with the Bible	Area where M has scruples & A has none	Congruity of M & Bible	Area where A has scruples & M has none
Missionary's Conscience	M		

The content of every conscience is close enough to God's norms in order to be an initial reference point (Rom 2:1-16). In initial evangelism, the missionary should therefore speak of sin with reference to the indigenous conscience, particularly the grey zone, that aspect of their conscience that is in agreement with Scripture (Priest 1994:309). Other areas should not be approached in evangelism, but only after conversion in teaching and counseling. These are of great concern to missionaries, but are of little concern to the indigenous. Therefore, the message causes misunderstanding in the audience and represents a call to accept the culture of the missionary. People may refuse, because conversion would lead from their „familiar, successful and good“ culture to an alien, perhaps even seemingly immoral culture. Or they may choose to convert exactly because it is a conversion to another culture that seems preferable. A conversion would in this case not be based on conviction, but on opportunism. Conversion, which bypasses the indigenous conscience, may lead to superficial conformity or to compartmentalized conformity, that is, syncretism. The missionary would have to take the role of permanent policeman with the misunderstood new culture (Priest 1994:304-306).

While evangelism among persons with a guilt-oriented conscience aims for recognition of guilt in reference to the Christian moral code, for example the Ten Commandments, the Sermon on the Mount or the double commandment of love, evangelism among shame-oriented people will aim for reinsertion into the community with God and men by stressing reconciliation through the mediation of Jesus-Christ (cp. Noble 1962; Tippet 1987:328-336).

For many people with a corporate personality, a change of allegiance to the Christian faith would mean to betray their people, culture and religion and would be a great shame for them. Our message has to show therefore that becoming a Christian makes of a person a better member of the nation, tribe or family. To attack another religion or culture would mobilize shame feelings. This should be avoided as much as possible (Noble 1975:84).

Additionally, it should be stressed that the evangelist's life-style can be a help or an obstacle to his witnessing. Acts speak louder than words. The apostle Paul admonishes us not to put an obstacle in the way of our target people (1Cor 9:12; 10:32; 2Cor 6:3). For this reason, Paul aims to please all men in everything (1Cor 10:33), and to show integrity in ethical matters (Col 4:5). Peter and Paul prefer to endure wrongs patiently than to retaliate with evil for evil. Suffering for Christ's sake is not a shame for those who suffer, but for those who cause the suffering (1Cor 4:12f.; 1Pet 3:16f.; 4:16). Paul exhorts us further to be honourable citizens and to respect the laws of our land, even though we are citizens of a heavenly commonwealth (Rom 13:3), and to be gentle in our relationships with „those outside“ (Col 4:16). In this way, the Greeks of Justin the Martyr's time confused the word *chrēstos*, meaning „gentle“ or „kind,“ with the messianic title of Christ (Ewert 1998:259).

As we have seen, the style of communication is different in shame and guilt-oriented people. Shame-oriented people have an indirect communication style, while guilt-oriented persons are more direct.¹⁸ It is interesting to see how Jesus interacts with different persons. With Pharisees he adopts a rather direct approach, as for example Nicodemus in John 3. On the other hand, Jesus' approach is very smooth and gentle with the Samaritan woman in John 4. It is important for the evangelist to know which audience he has in order to adopt his communication style to conscience orientation.

As thought structures also differ according to conscience orientation it is necessary to adapt the presentation according to the public.¹⁹ Systematic and analytic presentations, as

¹⁸ Cp. section 5.1.4. Direct and Indirect Communication.

¹⁹ Cp. section 4.1.5. Analytic or Synthetic Thinking.

Paul's expositions of Christian doctrine in his letters, are appropriate for guilt-oriented persons. For shame-oriented people, a narrative approach is more adapted. The historical books of the OT (Genesis, Exodus, Joshua, Judges, Ruth, Samuel, and Kings) and of the NT (Gospels, Acts) are examples of this form of communication.

The theological concepts presented will also have to be chosen according to conscience orientation. Guilt-oriented theology will talk about God as author of the Mosaic Law, as the True One and the Judge. Sin is transgression of his standards and forgiveness reparation of the fault. God has paid our debt in Jesus Christ and has justified us in him. Shame-oriented theology is relational. God is our Father. He loves his child, is faithful and gracious. Sin is violation of the harmony with God and forgiveness reconciliation with God. Jesus-Christ has borne our shame and has become the mediator of our reconciliation with God. Covenantal theology is a unifying principle with both shame and guilt-oriented aspects. God is our covenant partner and author of the covenant code. Sin is violation of covenant community and law, and forgiveness reintegration into the covenant community and reparation through payment. Christ has become the mediator to reintegrate us into the covenant community and bear our punishment.

5.2.2 The Process of Conversion

Conversion implies a paradigm shift (Mbiti 1986:128f.). It includes a process in which several stages are crossed. Rommen differentiates five stages: the stage of realization during which a person comes to realize that another mode of life, another system of behaviours and values exists. Then the moment arrives when the person understands the practical implications of a change. After that, the stage of decision follows, when the different alternatives are weighed against each other. During the moment of meeting, a consensus with the significant others is elaborated. Finally, the stage of foundation follows with the fixing of new norms and structures (Rommen 1994:43f.). This process can be gone through individually or communally. Vicedom gives an example for the process of a mass conversion (Vicedom 1962; Müller 1994:210-230).

Engel sees the process of conversion in eight stages before and three stages after the new birth. He presents it on a scale. According to the culture, the way until the existence of a Supreme Being is accepted (the beginning of Engel's scale -8) differs in its length. From that point on the Gospel and its practical implications for the person must be made known until the moment when he considers a decision to become a Christian (scale -4). From this moment on,

a call for decision is meaningful. The decision is made at -2, followed by repentance and faith in Christ (-1) and the new creation (0). Here, follow up begins with the evaluation of the decision the following day (+1). The converted person is integrated into a community and grows in faith (+3). This is a long process, which of course cannot happen without God's intervention (Engel 1989:38f.).

During an evangelism campaign, people from the different stages are present. Information about the Holy Scriptures is necessary in all stages from -8 to +3. Additionally, each stage needs specific information. This individualization has to be offered by the counselors. The call for decision can only meaningfully challenge those who are ready for a decision, namely those who are in stages -3 to -1.

In shame-oriented cultures, decisions are made in relation to group and context. These decisions, which are bound to a certain situation, can be considered invalid the next day when the situation has changed. Independent of the motive for the decision, these persons can be integrated into a Christian group through good follow up. However, if follow up is defective, the „decision“ can be abrogated. It can also provoke immunity towards the Gospel in similar situations in the future. Therefore, contact with new Christians in the first 24 hours after their decision is very important.

Under „decision“ one should not understand conversion or even rebirth. In shame-oriented societies, a decision is a group process that can last a certain period of time. The goal is that it ends in a consensus. Therefore, it can hardly be finalized in an unprepared moment like an evangelism campaign. In the best case, the „decision“ rather marks the interest for the Gospel, but is mostly an act of solidarity with persons who are under the strong momentary impression.

When calling for a decision, situations that put people under pressure should be avoided. The presence of certain persons of authority, uncertainty with regard to expected behaviour, the need for public confession or the need to step forward can keep shame-oriented persons from taking a decision (Noble 1975:84f.). Regular personal visits in the sense of friendship evangelism should help avoid several of these obstacles.

With conversion, the conscience starts to change. Under the tutelage of a new authority, the Triune God, with the influence of the written Word of God, the conscience of the new believer will be gradually changed in certain needed areas toward greater conformity with the written Word (Priest 1994:311). The basic conscience orientation acquired in childhood will however not change suddenly. Nevertheless, a guilt-oriented conscience will become more

shame-oriented under the influence of the overwhelming relationship with the Triune God, and a shame-oriented conscience will turn more guilt-oriented under the exposition of God's fixed standards. This process tends to a more balanced conscience orientation according to our hypothesis. Additionally, the conscience will be sensitised through the exposition to the Triune God. It will acquire new layers of identification with increased maturity (Piers 1971:27).

5.2.3 Application of the Models for Forgiveness

Approaches that stress restoring harmony, including reintegration into the community with God and men and establishing honour and power, will appeal to shame-oriented persons. On the other hand, offers of a correct life with possibilities for reparation of past faults will tend to convince guilt-oriented persons. It is wonderful to know and announce that Jesus Christ has come to bear the shame of our past life and actions on the cross. He is the mediator between God and us in order to reconcile us with Him (Rom 5:10; 2Cor 5:19; 1Tim 2:5). He puts us in a position of honour and power, the status of children of God (Jn 1:12). Those who believe in Him will not be put to shame (Isa 28:16; Rom 9:33; 10:11; 1Pet 2:6). At the same time, Jesus Christ has come to pay our debt at the cross (Rom 4:5,25). He has given himself as a ransom for all men (1Tim 2:6). Now we are justified and in peace with God (Rom 5:1).

The parable of the lost son (Lk 15:11-32) shows how the second son is established by the sovereign initiative of the father into his position of a son after coming out of a shameful and isolated position. A similar setting is shown in the parable of the great banquet (Mt 22:1-10 par): socially marginal persons like the poor, the crippled, the blind and the lame are invited to the banquet. Out of a shameful isolation they are invited into the house of the king and receive there a place of honour at the table of the king. The parable of the lost sheep (Lk 15:4-7) and Jesus' speech about the good shepherd (Jn 10:1-18) illustrate the reinsertion into the community for pastoral cultures.

The aspect of power is presented in narratives of Jesus healing the sick and the obsessed. Especially useful is the narrative of the healing of the paralytic (Mk 2:1-12 par), where healing is brought in connection with forgiveness of sins. The Jesus film, in which healings, exorcisms and Jesus' power over nature are shown, appeals to those in search for liberation and power. Equally, prayers for the sick and needy respond to the need for redemption from the powers of everyday constraints.

Theological concepts as covenant, righteousness and grace are concepts found all through the Bible, which have shame and guilt-oriented aspects. The covenant is primarily a relation of two partners and therefore a relational matter. But God's covenant is codified in prescriptions corresponding to his justice. Righteousness is the behaviour that corresponds to covenant community and law. This behaviour has to take into account the covenant partners and the covenant laws, being therefore at the time relational and legal, person and object-oriented, shame and guilt-oriented. Jesus asks from his followers a better righteousness than the guilt-oriented justice of the Pharisees and scribes, because he wants them to have a relationship to the God of the covenant (Mt 5:20). God's righteousness is his solidarity and faithfulness towards his covenant partners in restoring their honour and justice by relieving their shame and guilt (Rom 3:24f.). Therefore, grace is reintegration into the covenant community and remission of the debts at the same time. The book of Hosea with the husband-wife analogy and the parable of the lost son speak primarily of the former. An example of the latter is the parable of the unmerciful servant (Mt 18:21-35). The redemptive models of the Jubilee (Lev 25) and of the closest relative (*gōēl*) (Ruth; cp. Dt 25:5-19) incorporate both aspects: the relational aspect of reintegration into society and family and the guilt-oriented component of payment. Transposed to Jesus Christ as our closest relative and Redeemer (*gōēl*), the story of Ruth becomes a very powerful message in shame and guilt-oriented contexts with a levirate tradition.²⁰

In conclusion, the soteriological theme of an evangelistic message has to be chosen carefully according to the conscience orientation of the target audience. Noble and Kemp present other possible themes for messages in shame and guilt-oriented contexts (Noble 1975:78-93; Kemp 1988:43-50).

5.2.4 Chronological Evangelism and the Messiah Concept

Each culture has its own conceptions of good and evil, of sin and salvation. For shame-oriented people, Jesus is very attractive. By accomplishing wonders and engaging himself for the poor, Jesus transmits harmony, love and power, concepts that are associated with salvation in a shame-oriented context. For him, a word and its accomplishment are one. He forgives sin and heals. This unity is important for synthetic thinkers, that is, shame-oriented people (cp. Hesselgrave 1987:157; Sauer 1995:32). But Jesus can be misunderstood as successful

²⁰ Levirate describes the custom that a man inherits the wife of his deceased brother (de Vaux 1964:72f.; Mbiti 1974:182).

medicine man and marabout when understood according to animistic concepts (cp. Wendland 1995:270).

For shame-oriented people, the concept of sin includes violation of harmony in the community, loss of honour and prestige. According to the principle of causality and retribution, it expresses itself in sickness and misfortune. When Jesus dies at the cross, could this not be God's punishment for his sin? The Qur'an negates the death at the cross probably for this reason. In animism and folk religion, sacrifices have a utilitarian character. The sacrifice transmits the message: I give you in order that you give me. This is, as we have seen, due to the concept of interdependence in shame-oriented contexts. Without a deeper understanding of the lostness of man and the Biblical solution for it, the death of Jesus at the cross is difficult to understand, for shame-oriented still more difficult than for guilt-oriented people (McIlwain 1991:34f.).

Therefore, evangelism must first lead men towards a clear understanding of God's nature and character, the position of sinful man, and his need for salvation (McIlwain 1991:6,59,78; Beyerhaus 1996:109-154). Only when people recognize their sinfulness and lostness, they can understand the Good News. For this, they need information from the Bible, especially from the OT (Freytag 1961a:193-210; Müller 1998a:132). McIlwain proposes a systematic Biblical program for the teaching of redemptive history as evangelistic method. In this way, Biblical concepts of God, man and salvation can grow slowly in the student. His program has been widely used and adapted to different contexts. Bär (1998) presents an adaptation of McIlwain's program for Thailand together with a Biblical foundation. McIlwain's program of chronological evangelism is presented schematically in table 5.1. (1991:131):

Table 5.1: McIlwain's Program of Chronological Evangelism

Old Testament	Gospels	Acts	NT Letters
Phase I: Unbelievers, Believers,			
Mixed Groups			
Phase II: New Believers		Phase III: New Believers	Phase IV: New Believers
Phase V: Maturing Believers		Phase VI: Maturing Believers	Phase VII: Maturing Believers

In Guinea, West Africa, a shame-oriented context with folk Islam, we have adapted McIlwain's program in a Messiah-centred approach as presented below:²¹

Gen 1: God is the creator. He is different from creation, „holy“ (doctrine of God). God is good. Therefore the creation was good.

Gen 1-2: Man is created as man and woman in the image of God, and for fellowship with Him (1:27; 2:15-17). Therefore, he has a free will (doctrine of man).

Gen 3: The Fall: Evil enters the world through Satan. It is not God who sends evil through fate (cp. Supreme Being, Allah). Satan is a fallen angel who has been banished from the presence of God (Isa 14; Ezek 28) (doctrine of the angels: origin, nature, fall, good and bad angels [demons]). Following the temptation by Satan, man interrupts the fellowship with God (doctrine of sin). Man is banished from the garden. Shame enters as a condition of sinful life having missed the goal and become a failure (Gen 3:7,10).

Gen 3:15: God plans restoration of fellowship: the son of the woman will crush the head of the snake (doctrine of salvation).

Gen 3:21: God provides a solution for sin by the blood of sacrifice and animal skins to cover shame.

Gen 4: God accepts the bloody sacrifice of Abel; God does not accept the good works of Cain. It is the blood that purifies from sin (doctrine of salvation).

Gen 6: God saves a rest (Noah & family) through an ark. The ark is a type of the Saviour.

Gen 11: The tower of Babel shows the definitive refusal of man to obey God's command to fill the earth (1:28).

Gen 12: Election of Abram: He becomes Abraham, father of multitudes. The son of Abraham will be a blessing for the whole earth (12:1-3): he is the Saviour.

Gen 22: Sacrifice of the son of Abraham on mount Moriya (Jerusalem). God sends a ram at his place, but will provide a lamb later (22:8,14). Isaac is the promised son, the heir of the promises of the covenant; Ismael has received a blessing, but not the heritage.

Gen 37ff.: Joseph is a type of the Saviour who will suffer and be elevated into glory.

Ex 2-3: God reveals himself to Moses as the one who „is,“ Yahweh (doctrine of God). Moses is a type of the Saviour.

Ex 19:5f.: The covenant at Sinai between God and the people Israel.

Ex 20: The chart of the covenant: the Ten Commandments.

²¹ I am indebted to Ken Blackwell, CMA missionary in Guinea, for his contributions.

Ex 25-27: The Tabernacle and his utensils: a type of the Saviour (Hebr 9).

Lev 1-7: The sacrifices: means of expiation defined by God, not by men (doctrine of salvation).

Num 21: The Bronze Snake: a type of the Saviour.

Dt 18:15: God will give a prophet like Moses, originating from the people Israel.

2Sam 7:14-16: God makes a covenant with David: the son of David will reign eternally.

1Ki 18: God sends the fire on Elijah's sacrifice as sign of acceptance.

Isa 7:14: A virgin will give birth to a son whose name is Immanuel (God with us).

Isa 11:1: A shoot from Jesse (son of David) will reign.

Isa 53: The servant of the Lord will suffer for the sins of men.

Jer 31:31-37: A new covenant: the law written into the hearts.

Ezek 37:26: A new covenant: a new heart and a new spirit.

Dan 9:24-27: After 69 „sevens“ transgression and sin will cease and a Messiah will be cut off without successor; He will confirm the covenant. As a sacrifice he will put „once for all“ an end to sacrifice in the Temple (cp. Hebr 10:2,10).

Mic 5:1-5: The king born in Bethlehem has eternal origins (divinity of the Saviour).

Mt 1:1,16: Jesus, son of Abraham, son of David, who is called the Messiah.

Lk 1:26-38: God calls the son of the woman Jesus, which means „salvation.“ God will give him the throne of his father David and he will reign forever.

Mk 8:31 par: The Messiah must suffer (cp. Ps 21:1; Mt 27:46; Lk 24:46f.).

2Cor 5:18-21: The restoration of the fellowship with God is accomplished through the mediation and reconciliation of Jesus Christ.

Rev 21: Fellowship and harmony with God and men will be perfect in heaven (21:1-5,22-27).

5.2.5 The Messiah Jesus Son of Mary

After having gone through the Messiah-centred program of chronological evangelism, the question is now how Jesus Christ can be presented specifically to Muslims. The Biblical Messiah is the central figure of the hope for redemption in late Judaism: He brings salvation and peace (Isa 11:6-9), a prophet like Moses (Dt 18:15; Ezek 20:33f.), the son of David (2Sam 7:12-16; Isa 7:12), the servant of God (Isa 42:1-4; 49:1-6; 50:4-9; 52:13-53:12), the son of the woman (Gen 3:15; Mic 5:2), and the son of man (Dan 7:13f.). He is the Christ of the NT (Jn 4:25), Lord and Saviour (Lk 2:11). He is identified with the person of Jesus (Jn 1:41). He

accomplishes the OT promises (Lk 4:18f.; 24:46f.), first in weakness, but later in glory (Mk 14:61f. par; Rev 19:11-16) (France/Betz 1988; Bruce 1972).

Muhammad's conceptions of Christ were shaped by Jewish Ebionites, Nestorians, Monophysites and adorers of Mary. These saw Jesus either only as man and prophet or only as God, and thirdly, together with God and Mary, as Holy Trinity (Yoder 1994:342). At his time, there was no Arabic Bible translation. Therefore, the Qur'an presents a very selective and deformed picture of Jesus Christ. He is called Word and Spirit of God, Messiah, envoy, servant of God, prophet of God, model and witness of God. As he is Word and Spirit of God, has accomplished great miracles and brought the *Injil*, Jesus has on the one hand a special position in the Qur'an. On the other hand, he is only one of the envoys of God. Muhammad is the last envoy and the greatest prophet. He brought the Arabic Qur'an, certified copy of the original in heaven, the mother of the book (*umm al-kitab*) (surah 42:7). „Christ [the Messiah] Jesus the son of Mary was (no more than) a Messenger of Allah and His Word, which He bestowed on Mary, and a Spirit proceeding from Him“ (surah 4:171).²²

Despite of these exceptional titles that resemble some names of Jesus in the Bible, it is unmistakable that the terms have different semantic connotations. There is a great difference in the *logos* of the Bible as the preexistent Word of God, active at creation with God and sent into the world at the fulfilled time (Jn 1:1).

Additionally, the crucifixion of Jesus is very controversial among Qur'an commentators. There are verses which speak against it (e.g. surah 4:157f.) as well as those which speak for it, like surah 19:33: „Peace is on me the day I was born, the day that I die, and the day that I shall be raised up to life (again).“ The circumstances of the death (crucifixion, natural death or recall) and the point in time (before or after the parousia) are open. Additionally, the Qur'an does not talk about the meaning of the crucifixion as act of atonement. For shame-oriented Muslims, the crucifixion signifies a great failure and shame, to which Allah cannot possibly expose a great prophet (Ch. Schirrmacher 1994b:229-241).

In the context of these problems concerning the person and divinity of Jesus Christ, one of the Qur'anic titles of Jesus is relevant for Muslim evangelism: The Messiah Jesus, Son of Mary, *al-Masih 'Issa ibn Maryam* (surah 3:45; 4:171; 19:34). First, the title of Messiah is not explained anywhere in the Qur'an. Muhammad and later Qur'an commentators used it simply

²² All Qur'an verses are cited according to *The Meaning of The Holy Qur'an*. 1989. 'Abdullah Yusuf 'Ali, ed. Beltsville, ML: amana publications.

as an honourable title (Ch. Schirmmacher 1994b:218f.). The term has the advantage of being central to the Christian message and to have little negative connotations for Muslims. Therefore, it can be invested with the Judeo-Christian meaning. Unfortunately, modern Qur'an translations render this term: „Christ,“ which is no longer neutral. Secondly, the name „Jesus“ can be explained according to its Hebrew meaning „Saviour“ with reference to the need of redemption, which is developed in the chronological program. Originally, Muslims do not feel a need of redemption because of their guilt-oriented Pelagian view of the Fall (Wolf 1993:561; Kurani 2001:90f.,131). Nevertheless, every human being, and especially the animist, existentially feels the need for redemption. Thirdly, the title „son of Mary“ is very surprising in any patriarchal society and consequently in all Islamic societies. It points to a very special happening concerning origin and birth of Jesus. Here, one can refer to the descendant of the woman in the OT (Gen 3:15) and to the announcement of the birth of Jesus (surah 19:16-36; Lk 1:31-33) (cp. Foster 1991a; Marsh 1977; Glasser 1978; Nicholls 1980).

5.2.6 Evangelism and Revival

When during revivals God's presence, power and address impresses people mightily, cultural characters, traditions and behavioural patterns can be relativized and lose their power. During these special interventions of God, men stand before the face of God in such a direct way that the group loses its importance in front of the omnipotence of God. Shame-oriented persons start to confess their sins publicly opposite to cultural customs and patterns, and anthropological insights based, for example, on conscience orientation. The two following citations from the Chinese revival 1905 stand as an example for many revivals in shame-oriented contexts:

All kinds of sins were confessed and done away with. The district judge, whose curiosity was raised through the reports, came to a meeting in civil clothes and listened to the confessions of murder, theft and crime of any sort. His surprise was without limits, because, as he said later, he would have been obliged to beat these people almost to death, if they had come to him with such confessions (Goforth w.y.:60).

Let us consider that the Chinese is extremely sensitive to the public opinion and that there were men and women here who disregarded all prejudices concerning the old traditions. They lost so to say their face by humiliating themselves in front of the public (Goforth w.y.:19).

The events during the revival in China and elsewhere show clearly that God's intervention can override the anthropological mechanisms of the conscience. Under conditions of revival, persons react very differently. Therefore, we should not forget that God's spirit can go beyond the limits, habits and difficulties of conscience orientation.

5.3 Community Life

The church should be authentically Christian and authentically indigenous. In this sense, an indigenisation, or better contextualization, of the church should be aimed at (Dierks 1986:99f.; Tiénou 1990:76).

5.3.1 Biblical Foundations of the Church

The Greek term ἐκκλησία *ekklēsia* comes from ἐκκαλέω *ekkaleō* „call out of.“ In the Greek city states, the free citizens, a minority, were called out of town to the meeting place at the door in order to deliberate political matters (cp. Acts 19:39). In LXX, the term is used to translate the Hebrew term קָהָל *qāhāl*. This term generally describes an assembly in Israel, especially the assembly of the covenant people (Ex 12:3; 35:1), and of the people of God at the pilgrimage feasts (Num 19:20; 27:17,22; cp. Acts 7:38). In the NT, the term appears 114 times, six of which with the OT meaning of assembly. It describes the community of those called out by Jesus Christ, the elect (Jn 15:16) and saints (Jn 17:19), who constitute his body (Rom 12:4ff.; 1Cor 12:12ff.; Eph 5:23,30). The unity of the church is a gift of God through Christ's work at the cross and the Spirit's work since Pentecost (Jn 11:52; Eph 2:13-22). In Mt 16:18, Jesus speaks of his church, the universal church (cp. Acts 2:47; 9:31; Hebr 12:22f.), but also, and more often, the local church (Mt 18:17). The term can also describe house churches (Rom 16:5; 1Cor 16:19). (Krimmer 1987:434f.; Ridderbos 1975:328ff.).

In the Bible, many images and figures are used to describe the church. These figures can represent the universal church and the local church, and occasionally the individual believer. Most of them are well appropriate for shame-oriented contexts. The church is an organized, human community being a partial, visible representation of the Kingdom of God (Mt 18:23-25; 22:1-14; 25:14-30). The image of the flock shows the relationship between this community and Christ (Lk 12:32; Jn 10:11,16; Mt 26:31; Hebr 13:20). The plant indicates the growth (Mt 13:24-30,31,36-43; Mk 4:26; 1Cor 3:9). The image of the vine stresses the dependency from Christ (Ps 80:9; Isa 3:14; 5; 27; Jer 2:21; Mt 20:1-16; Jn 15). The building and the temple show the aspect of construction (1Cor 3:9,16f.; 2Cor 6:16; Eph 2:20-22; 1Pet 2:5; Hebr 3:6; 1Tim 3:15). The fiancée and the bride represent the intimate, affectionate relationship with Christ (Isa 62:5; 54:4f.; Ezek 16:8; Hos 2:18-21; Cant; Jn 3:29; Mt 9:15; 2Cor 11:2; Eph 5:25f.,32; Rev 19:7f.; 21:2; 22:17). The image of the family speaks of the covenant relationship and attracts especially people of societies with an extended family system (Isa 63:16; 64:7; Jer 31:9; Mt 6:9; Rom 8:15; Gal 4:6). The figure of the body shows the different

functions in the church (Rom 12:5ff.; 1Cor 10:16f.; 12:4-27; Eph 4:1-16; 5:22f.) (cp. O'Brien 1987). It is interesting to note that the Bible (OT and NT) does not speak primarily of the individual believer, but rather of the assembly of believers. In this respect, it is definitely shame-oriented.

5.3.2 The Church as Fellowship and Family

In a shame-oriented culture, the church is measured according to the fellowship (*koinonia*) it offers (Alders 1995:108). According to Hoekendijk, fellowship is one of three ways to promote evangelism and missions, the two others being proclamation of the Gospel (witnessing), and mutual service (*koinonia*, *kerygma* [*martyria*], *diakonia*) (Hoekendijk 1964:120 quoted by Bockmühl 1974:17,47). This triad is derived from the primitive church's three offices of Christian individual and community life: witnessing, mutual service and adoration (*martyria*, *diakonia*, *leitourgia*), corresponding to the prophetic, the royal and the priestly offices (Heussi 1981:63-74; Beyerhaus 1996:594,672-674). Fellowship was already contagious in NT times (Acts 2:44ff.; 4:32; Gal 6:10; cp. Tippet 1987:40-45). In Africa, it is better practiced in independent churches than in mission churches (Martin 1971:238-240). Barrett confirms this when he mentions lack of love in the mission churches as the main reason for the secession of independent churches (1971:153). While Nthambury links Biblical *koinonia* with the African community concept with regard to independent churches (1990), Kurewa does the same for mission-related churches (1973:99ff.). Mulago speaks of „vital participation“ as the cohesive factor of (African) community (1969). In societies with extended families, the church becomes „the extended family of God“ (Healey/Sybertz 1997:104ff.). Even outside of Africa, community has a healing effect and is the centre of life, which seems to be a new discovery for the Western world (Crabb 2000). The emphasis on cell groups and Alpha courses, and the discovery of fellowship in Western churches arrive at a moment when populations in the West are becoming more shame-oriented.

Thomas has found in African independent churches six images of the church which are attractive for Africans with their concept of salvation: the church as place where the Spirit dwells, the church as Mount Zion, the church as diverse gifts but one spirit, the church as a place of power to protect and heal, the church as a community of the disciples of Jesus, and the church as the deliverer from poverty (Thomas 1995). These images translate harmony and power and address the main elements of the African concept of salvation according to Adeyemo: integration into the community, deliverance from the evil powers and possession of

the life force (Adeyemo 1979:94). They correspond largely to the images of the church, which Senior has found in the NT (Senior 1995:7; cp. Thiessen 1987:348; Peters 1985:227):

1. A „sending“ church conceived of as a community of disciples or as a pilgrim, itinerant church whose mission is to cross boundaries and to proclaim the gospel to the entire world.
2. A „witnessing“ church whose mission is to give credible witness to the world through its manifest faith and its virtue.
3. A „receptive“ church whose mission is expressed in its very being as a hospitable and inclusive community of healing, reconciliation, and unity.

Senior's three concepts are presented schematically in table 5.2. (Senior 1995:6).

Table 5.2: Images of Church and Mission

Image of Church	Image of Mission	Theology / Christology	Goal	References
Community of disciples sent into the world	Urgent itinerant proclamation of the Gospel	God is sovereign; Christ triumphant Saviour of world	To convert and save	Rom 15:14-21; Mk 13; Mt 28; Paul
Community of visible witness through faith & virtue	Personal and communal witness to persuasion, conversion	God is holy and sanctifying; Christ is prophet and teacher	To inspire; challenge; transform	1 Peter; Revelation; Acts 2-4; Jn 13-15
Community of healing and reconciliation	Proclamation of Gospel of healing and forgiveness	God / Christ as unifying, healing, saving	To build community; reconcile; unite	Mt 18; Lk 15; Jn 17; Eph 2; Lk 4; Mk 3; 6

Senior's model corresponds also roughly to Sundkler's classification based on observations in South Africa: Sundkler calls the African independent churches with their holistic approach to the needs of their members „institutions of healing,“ the Protestant churches with their emphasis on sermon and teaching „institutions of the word,“ and the Catholic church through its sacraments an „institution of grace“ (Sundkler 1964:323). A combination of the three would probably correspond to what God intended the church to be.

The Kimbanguist church in the Democratic Republic of Congo understands itself as a new people of God, as brotherhood and extended family. Each believer belongs to a cell group not only in which one prays every morning together, but through which each helps the other in every sort of need (Martin 1971:238f.; 1975:27). Common feasts with singing and dancing as well as retreats with prayer, fasting and repentance, and services of healing and intercession create and further fellowship (Martin 1971:88). Ndala-za-Fwa, a Kimbanguist pastor, writes:

Salvation ... is manifested in an intense and fruitful community life. Christ unites believers in a family where spiritual and material gifts are shared, as in the Church after the first Pentecost (Acts 2:44-46). In public confession, repentance and pardon are shared. For according to African tradition, when one member is ill, the whole family suffers (1975:170).

An interesting model was developed by Bruno Gutmann, a Leipzig missionary to the Chagga people of Tanzania in the first half of the 20th century. The Chagga called the church „God’s family,“ a comprehensive community of life (Bammann 1990:53; cp. Waliggo 1990:125; Nyamiti 1990:132-137). Gutmann refers to the three „original bonds“ in Chagga culture: the family, the neighbourhood, and companionship. His fast growing church was not only grounded in the traditional structure of the extended family, but also in neighbourhood cells for common prayer, counseling, preparation of the Lord’s Supper, and mutual service. Additionally, he organized groupings according to age in the form of associations (*Schiltschaften*) among baptismal and confirmation candidates as well as youth and women’s groups (Jaeschke 1981:63-69,111-117; Fiedler 1983:34f.,40,46f.; Bammann 1990:21-47). The confirmation camps were organized according to the example of initiation camps (Jaeschke 1981:132-142; Fiedler 1983:84-97). Women led the girls’ confirmation classes that included initiation and excision (Fiedler 1983:91f.). Each baptismal candidate was assigned godparents to look after his physical and spiritual well-being during his whole life (Jaeschke 1981:126-132; Bammann 1990:64f.). The believers were left consciously under the family authority, from which a Chagga church has originated which penetrates the whole people today (Jaeschke 1981:156f.).

The Manila Manifesto sees the church as the historical expression of the Trinity. She is a historical and eschatological entity. Evangelism is the historical task of the church between the first and the second coming of Christ. It is a natural expression of the corporate personality of the church (Marquardt/Parzany 1990:342f.,349). The model of the church as community is also represented in the community-based religions of Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and all folk religions. It corresponds to the shame orientation of the majority of the world’s population. On the contrary, in the last centuries the European and North American churches have put their main emphasis on doctrinal orthodoxy, which corresponds to a guilt-oriented approach.

5.3.3 Worship

Christian worship service is confused by non-Christian members of a society with their own familiar cultural worship patterns, for example animistic ritual worship, the ritual prayer of

Islam and the liturgical Catholic mass. Therefore, it is important that the worship service be characterized by a strong fellowship component. It can do this best through communal public events including a meal. It can then be an event enjoyed by event-oriented people and preferred to other happenings, such as sports events. In societies where time-orientation is weak, the Sunday service should be as complete as possible, that is to say, it should include adoration with songs, testimonies, lecture of the Bible, recitations, sermon, discussion, announcements, offering, intercessional prayer and healing, and a final blessing. It is to note that the generation X is quite time-oriented even though it is predominantly shame-oriented. In African independent churches, but also in Africa in general, and probably in other societies with an animistic background, ritualistic tendencies can be observed (Sundkler 1964:199f.; Dierks 1986:105-109).

At the start of worship, it is important to lead participants in an attitude of adoration towards God. A formalistic or inexperienced leadership can hinder this process. For shame-oriented people, adoration is a very important part of service. It is through prayer and singing that they can express their relationship to God. Therefore, prayer should be allocated sufficient time. Africans prefer free prayer individually or in „Korean“ style (Sundkler 1964:212; Mbiti 1986:67f.; cp. Kim 1990). It is a well-known fact that predominantly shame-oriented Pentecostal churches attribute more importance to adoration than more guilt-oriented Protestant and evangelical churches. Equally, it is no surprise that adoration becomes more important in Western churches at a time when people become more shame-oriented. Worship and adoration are the primordial features of services intended for the generation X.

Africans love to sing. In this and other parts of the service, spontaneous and planned singing should have ample space. Songs are as much teaching for illiterates as a catechism for literates. Therefore, one should maintain a balanced distribution of themes: God the creator and provider, the person and work of Jesus Christ, the Holy Spirit, the Trinity, eschatology, the Christian life, praise and adoration, the missionary call of the Gospel (Tippett 1967:287f.). Bible texts in the form of songs are especially appropriate to impress Holy Scripture into memory. Indigenous songs with local rhythm and colour should be preferred (Sundkler 1964:213-217; King 1999:54,79).

In illiterate societies, the systematic lecture of Scripture is of prime importance for the spread of Bible knowledge (Martin 1971:188). Common recitations of key texts like the Decalogue, the double commandment of love, the Beatitudes, the Lord's Prayer and confessions of

faith are helpful for Bible instruction (Freytag 1961a:202f.; Bammann 1990:54f.; Müller 1994:170).

In guilt-oriented churches, the sermon is generally speaking the centre of the service. Because of their emphasis on sermon and teaching, Sundkler calls the Protestant churches „institutions of the word“ (Sundkler 1964:323). In shame-oriented churches, the sermon tends to have a secondary importance. However, in most African independent churches it has remained the main emphasis of service (Sundkler 1964:210). In guilt-oriented churches, preaching is mainly expository and analytic with the famous „three points.“ In shame-oriented societies with synthetic and analogue thinking, the following principles, which are discussed in more depth below in the sections on teaching and preaching, are valid: inductive (from the specific example to the general application), practical (in relation to actual life), interactive (questions and answers) (Wendland 1995:271f.). In multilingual regions, there is a tension between a translation into all languages represented with a rhythm that hardly affects the conscience or the translation in only one vehicular language that does not speak to the heart. In Papua New Guinea, Vicedom initiated a discussion after the sermon that contributed to a better comprehension of its content and diminished the discussions and misunderstandings after the service (Müller 1994:171). Others, like Yonggi Cho, organize systematic discussions of the sermon in the house cells.

General and organizational announcements during the service have a different importance for illiterates and for churches without written bulletins than in literate cultures. The time allotted to announcements also serves to give reports of trips and conferences. Testimonies are also well received in Africa. Testimonies are very important for the experience of fellowship and sharing among believers. However, there is a risk that testimonies take time normally used for the sermon (Sundkler 1964:211).

The offering is public in shame-oriented cultures. In African independent churches, participants go forward with their gift. In this way, the offering becomes attractive and also compulsory. In some churches, members who give their tithe receive a special blessing from the pastor in front of the pulpit, which renders tithing very attractive for persons with an animistic background.

Of special importance in shame-oriented contexts is the opportunity to express the needs and receive healing, deliverance or words of comfort during the service. Therefore, in African independent churches, parts of the service, as well as special services, are reserved for healing and intercessional prayer (Martin 1971:191).

The final blessing has a special importance in the context of the animistic *mana* concept. This should be taken into consideration without giving it inordinate value. The blessing should be spoken by an ordained and respected person (cp. Musk 1989:209f.; Käser 1997: 214-218).

5.3.4 Prayer

Many shame-oriented societies, like the African, have a rich prayer tradition (Mbiti 1975; 1986:67-71; Sumithra 1990; Uenuma 1990; Nazir-Ali 1990). Prayer expresses the person orientation of these people. Reasons for this are found in the prayers of the African traditional religions:

1. The feeling of dependence on unseen powers ...;
2. The firm belief in active contact between the living and the dead;
3. The belief in the essential goodness of the gods and the possibility of securing their favour by right relationship with them;
4. The strong social bond existing between the members of the community ...;
5. The assumption of human sinfulness which, though unexpressed, underlies the desire for right relationship with the gods through prayer (Lucas 1971:225f. quoted by Mbiti 1986:87).

Contents of prayer include the whole of human life, health and healing, prosperity and work, salvation and deliverance from war, adversity and danger, one's life journey, dealing with spirits, offerings and sacrifices, praise and thanksgiving, confession and forgiveness, blessing and curse (Mbiti 1986:84).

The Christian churches of Africa follow the rich prayer tradition not only of Africa but also of the Bible. This is especially true for the independent churches that accuse the mission-related churches of not praying enough. The *aladura* church in Nigeria has separated from the Anglican Church for this reason among others (Turner 1967:1 quoted by Mbiti 1986:78). *aladura* is the Yoruba word for prayer. The first of the six „fixed commandments“ of the *aladura* church is therefore to pray. The other five are fasting, alms giving, practical love, preaching, and Bible reading (Turner 1967:69 quoted by Mbiti 1986:78).

„Christian praying gives opportunity for people to deal directly and squarely with the spiritual and mystical realities of the African world“ (Mbiti 1986:75). The attitude of confidence and the contents of the Christian prayer remain basically the same. The form is spontaneous and free (Mbiti 1986:69,84f.). Prayer in the name of Jesus, however, goes beyond tradition. In prayer for healing and deliverance from demons, it transmits to the outside world a

lively experience of faith (Mbiti 1986:77,146-152). Similar examples can be taken from churches in Korea and China (Kim 1990; Wang 1990).

5.3.5 Baptism and Communion

Baptism is the initiation rite of Christianity. It replaces animistic purification rites (Sundkler 1964:222f.). Like other transition rites it contains elements that represent a symbolic death and a symbolic resurrection (Käser 1997:212). For many Christians from an animistic background, baptism is the „entrance card to heaven“ and therefore has great importance. It is *the* mission sacrament (Gensichen 1962:657; cp. Sundkler 1964:229; Mbiti 1986:129).

What are the expectations of power, honour and shame-oriented people with regard to baptism? Baptism is not only an external sign of inner change, but it is God's act of salvation. The believer enters the privileged community of those blessed by God. Baptism gives him a new identity. From now on, he participates in the power of *baraka* or *mana*. With it his entrance into paradise is guaranteed. This conception resembles the Lutheran and Orthodox traditions, according to which baptism brings the Holy Spirit unto the believer and enables him to have faith. It takes distance from the Reformed tradition, according to which baptism is only the external sign of baptism in the Spirit (Gensichen 1962:657f.; cp. Ridderbos 1975:406f.; Mbiti 1986:136; Enang 1989:117f.; Bammann 1990:64f.; Albers 1995:91-102; McGrath 1997:515-521).

Baptism means a separation from the old community of life, from the old gods, that is, it implies a decision. It is, in particular, a rejection of ancestor worship. If „conversion“ can pass without notice by society, then baptism represents a clear social separation. For that reason, it often produces social discrimination and persecution. People can hesitate in front of such a decisive step, even at the last minute (Vicedom 1958:92-94; Gensichen 1962:658). It explains in part, why only a small fraction of the Sunday service attendants may be baptized. Another reason is related to the baptismal regulations followed in many churches. Only ordained pastors are authorized to baptize. As ordination takes place after a trial period of several years following graduation from Bible school, the interest of the pastors in baptism diminishes. The occasion for baptism is often limited to Christian feasts like Christmas and Easter. Additionally, many churches may be led by lay pastors who are not permitted to baptize.

Baptism gives a new identity, which should be worked at, not only before baptism in preparation classes, but also after baptism through continued teaching of believers. For this, the study of the first letter of Peter is like a „baptismal sermon“ according to Bruce

(1972:72,74). Baptism should represent the starting point of the covenant with God. The consequence should be conformity to the covenant within the covenant community, reflecting Christian ethics.

The logical follow-up ritual of baptism is the Lord's Supper, understood as a reactualization of the covenant. Christ commissions his disciples to celebrate the Lord's Supper in his memory (1Cor 11:24f.). In many animist cultures, there are meals celebrated in memory of a person or an event. In the spirit of gratitude towards the deceased, a sacrifice is offered and a communal meal celebrated. Through the meal, often eaten out of one bowl, brotherly fellowship and love is expressed (Vicedom 1958:95; Kamano 1991:4f.; Healey/Sybertz 1997: 254ff.).

The Toma people in Guinea, West Africa, have three sorts of common meals: *tisangere-mai* is a meal for old pious Toma who live a pure life. *kpelagi* is the holy meal of a covenant between two persons, families or groups. The one who takes this common meal expresses: I will never betray you. *peleghoghoi* is the family meal to be taken with reverence and openness. Everyone eats according to his status and merit. For the Toma Christians, the Lord's Supper means the following: it is for reborn Christians who are eager to live a pure life. It is also a covenant meal between the believer and God (Lk 22:19f. par; Gal 2:20). One has to eat it with awe and openness (Béavogui 1991:5; cp. Enang 1979:169f.; Mbiti 1986:140).

In the Lord's Supper, like at the cross, the two aspects of guilt and shame, of justice and honour, are present. God sent his son to give his body and to shed his blood (Lk 22:19f. par). The body is given as a sacrifice to take away the sins of the people, the blood is shed to seal the new covenant between God and the people. The first aspect is justification, taking away guilt; the second is honour, taking away the shame of alienation. The cross and the Lord's Supper imply identification with both shame and guilt. Green and Lawrenz formulate it like this:

There is one overwhelming, compelling reason to believe that God has decisively dealt with sin and guilt, and will deal with the shameless perpetrators of human pain: God himself stood in the spot of the greatest shame ever experienced in the universe, and in so doing, began the work of unraveling the guilt and the shame that has beset the human race since Adam and Eve (Green/Lawrenz 1994:101).

The Lord's Supper becomes a solemn event to reactualize the covenant with God, to experience fellowship with other believers, and to experience salvation through removal of guilt and shame. Thus, concerns of both shame and guilt-oriented people are satisfied. Whether the Lord's Supper is considered in the perspective of transubstantiation, consubstan-

tiation or as a simple memorial is a secondary question. The direction of their answer and the importance given to it will depend on the theologian's synthetic or analytic thought patterns (cp. Gensichen 1957:50; Bockmühl 1974:55; Ridderbos 1975:425ff.; Mbiti 1986:129,139-141; McGrath 1997:522-527).

5.3.6 Teaching

Children in Africa, like in many other predominantly shame-oriented societies, are used to learn in an informal manner, through personal relationships, and through praxis. They learn through play, through memorisation of riddles, proverbs, and parables, and through songs and dancing, often using antiphony (Griffith 1985:249f.). Often formal institution also refers to these methods.

Teachers must realize that people with different conscience orientations have different perceptions and consequently different learning methods. Desmond Tutu sums up the differences as follows:

It is important ... to note the differences in the African perception and that of the Westerner. ... The Westerner is largely analytical, whereas the African tends to be synthetical. ... The Westerner breaks things up and the other tends to see things as wholes. That is why Westerners can be such good scientists, but they are not so good at putting things back together. The African may be good at seeing the woods, but most often will miss the significance of the individual trees. The Westerner will tend to be cerebral, whereas the African gives great play to feelings. The former, particularly in his worship, may be cold and intellectual, while the latter might be emotional and warm, sticking loosely to intellectual content. The Westerner emphasizes the individual person, whereas the African will give an important place to the community. The one encourages initiative - the Western view - and is concerned about individual liberties, whereas the latter tends to stifle personal initiative for fear of being out of step with the herd (Tutu 1987:161 quoted by Bowen 1989:270f.).

With „Westerner“ and „African“ we realize that Tutu describes roughly guilt and shame-oriented personality types.²³ Shame-oriented students prefer a rigid structuring and leading by teachers. They like to learn in small groups, however dislike lectures. They need a clear-cut course program with well defined objectives, a course outline, graphic helps and practical learning. Achievements should be acknowledged by personal feedback, or in the form of grades (Bowen 1989:272).

While in Europe and in the USA about half of the students are field-dependent, it is about 90% in Africa. This means that they are dependent on external referents to guide them in

²³ Cp. appendix 11: Personality as a Function of Conscience Orientation.

processing information and that they perceive situations globally (Bowen 1989:272). Field dependency is not identical with shame orientation, but closely related to it. The characteristics of field dependency as compared to field independence are presented schematically in table 5.3. (adapted from Bowen 1989:273).

Table 5.3: Field Dependency and Field Independence

Field-dependent	Field-independent
Display of physical and verbal expressions of approval and warmth	Formal student-teacher relationships
Use of personalized rewards	Instructional objectives, atmosphere secondary
Teacher guides clearly	Loose guidance of students
Teacher as model	Teacher as consultant
Purpose and main principles of lesson obvious from the beginning	Development of purpose and main principles of lesson with the student
The student is measured in relation to a predefined standard; no competition	Competition between students
Cooperation and group feeling	Individual learning
Relating concepts to students' experiences	Task-oriented learning
Stress global aspects of concepts	Details, facts, principles
Personalized and humanized curriculum	Graphics, charts and formulas
Informal class discussions	Inductive learning and discovery approach
Small group tasks	Lectures
Planned questioning	Impromptu questioning
Feedback to improve performance	Not dependent on feedback
Field experiences	Structured learning

Teaching should be adapted to conscience orientation. While guilt-oriented students present analytic thinking, shame-oriented students tend to think in a synthetic and analogical manner. While the first group will have an inductive learning and discovery approach, the second group will learn by copying and learning by heart. The former will prefer to learn individually, while the latter functions better in groups. Teaching according to conscience orientation is a challenge for teachers from the other orientation. Obliging a student to function in a school system of the other conscience orientation can represent a major drawback in school

performance. A main warning for teaching in shame-oriented contexts is to avoid making a student lose face.

As often as possible, teachers should refer to the traditional learning methods: riddles, proverbs, songs, antiphonal songs, drama, Scripture memorisation, practical and experience-related learning, group learning, and teacher-disciple relationships (mentoring) (Griffith 1985:252f.). Jesus himself referred to traditional Jewish teaching methods. He used imagery, symbolism, parallelisms, stanzas, rhythms, rhymes, and chiasms as mnemotechnic aids (Riesner 1981:392-408).

For Biblical teaching, this means that parables, proverbs, psalms and narrative elements from OT and NT are often used. In doing so, it is important to draw from the whole Bible in a balanced way and to give an overview of redemptive history in the sense of chronological evangelism (McIlwain 1991).²⁴ Fundamental truths like the Decalogue, the Lord's Prayer and confessions of faith can be recited during Sunday services (cp. Bammann 1990:54f.; Müller 1994:170). The choice of an adapted catechism for baptismal preparation is also important. Nyeste presents the use of the Heidelberg Catechism relating to shame concerns (2001:148-178).

5.3.7 Preaching

The sermon should have a healing emphasis and a missionary and counseling orientation (Hilton 1965:236; Kurewa 2000:212ff.). It should be basically Biblical, that is, use Scripture and be faithful to Scripture (Kurewa 2000:89,141). What has been said above for teaching is equally true for preaching. With guilt-oriented audiences, an analytic approach with „three points“ and an expository presentation can be appropriate (e.g. Broadus 1870:133 quoted by Kallemeyn 1996:46). In shame-oriented societies with synthetic and analogical thinking, inductive, practical and interactive preaching is preferable. Inductive preaching goes from the specific example to the general application, practical preaching is in relation to the actual life, and interactive preaching will include questions and answers during the sermon (Wendland 1995:271f.). In shame-oriented contexts, preaching will contain mainly narrative and relational elements (Ellingsen 1990:70-102; Kallemeyn 1996:251f.,257-264; Healey/Sybertz 1997:20,82; Kurewa 2000:143).²⁵ While Broadus' classical concept uses methods of direct communication with a direct presentation, argumentation and adaptation of the subject,

²⁴ Cp. section 5.2.4. Chronological Evangelism and the Messiah Concept.

²⁵ Cp. section 4.3.13. Narrative or Expository Theology.

narrative and relational preaching uses an indirect, inductive approach in the form of a spiral. It starts from a tension in the narrative and works its way through a story to a resolving conclusion, which challenges the faith of the audience. The audience should be able to identify emotionally with the persons involved in the story (Kallemeyn 1996:257-264). Biblical examples of narrative preaching are Nathan's encounter with king David (2Sam 12), Jesus' parables and Steven's sermon in Acts 7 (Kallemeyn 1996:267f.). Preaching in shame and guilt-oriented contexts will take the covenant with God as a theme and will promote conformity to covenant behaviour. Christian preaching in general will respect three criteria: the exegetical criterion will evaluate the sermon in relation to the Biblical text, the theological criterion will judge whether the sermon focuses on God, the object of our faith, and the pastoral criterion will ask whether the sermon edifies the faith of the audience through its appeal for consolation, adoration and responsible Christian involvement (Kallemeyn 1996:249).

In an analysis of sermons in mission-related and independent churches in Nigeria, Turner has found that in mission churches the NT is preached four to six times more often than the OT, while in independent churches OT and NT are evenly represented (Turner 1965:14-23 quoted by Mbiti 1986:35-39; cp. Martin 1971:189). In the *aladura* church in Nigeria narrative elements with miracles from OT and NT are very popular. Preaching is often based on the life of Jesus: his temptation, his fasting, his baptism, the entry into Jerusalem and his resurrection. Little emphasis is placed on his passion. The letter of James is frequently used because of the practical presentation of religion (Turner 1965:27-35). The NT passage most often used for sermons is the image of spiritual warfare in Ephesians 6:10-20 (1965:19,39). On the theme of Christian life, the active and moral aspects prevail. Also the last judgement represents a major theme (1965:74-77).

While this analysis orientates us which themes are adapted to a shame-oriented context in an animistic background, it also manifests the imbalance in the presentation of the Bible. According to the Manila Manifesto, preaching should include the „whole Gospel“ (Marquardt/Parzany 1990:329). It can be wise to do it according to a planning through the year (Kurewa 2000:153). This should also include aspects of systematic Bible teaching (McIlwain 1991). Preaching should equally address the „whole world“ or the „whole person,“ in this case, shame and guilt-oriented members of the audience as well as shame-and guilt-oriented aspects of a person. When preaching in view of conscience orientation, it should orient shame and guilt towards God, the significant other, becoming thus true shame and guilt. This corresponds to the above mentioned theological criterion (Kallemeyn 1996:249).

Consciously choosing themes and stories for both conscience orientations can enrich our message. Jonah is an example of a person losing face repeatedly. John 3 & 4 are contrasting models of Jesus' communication. Noble and Nyeste give further examples for sermon topics related to shame and guilt (Noble 1975:86-95; Nyeste 2001:179-194).

5.3.8 Education

For the Christian educator, the development of the conscience is a priority concern (Pestalozzi 1963b:202f.; Oser 1976; S. Müller 1984:11).²⁶ The child is born with a disposition for conscience. The Christian educator's task is to develop this „germ“ (Pestalozzi 1960:63) from an „animalistic“ to a „social“ and to a „moral product“ (Pestalozzi 1963a:175f.) or from a heteronomous super-ego to an autonomous and theonomous conscience (Nowak 1978:135f.,176). The learning process of the conscience is most intense during the first two years of life with decreasing intensity up to age twelve, but lasts a whole life time (Oser 1973:116f.). In order to teach the conscience, norms must be given, guilt and shame produced, sanctions emitted and relief of the conscience induced (Oser 1976:391-395,405). According to the number of educators (significant others) and the coherence of the norms presented, the child will be able to introject the significant others or fail to do so. A small number of educators and coherence of norms leads to a guilt-oriented conscience, while a great number of educators and the incoherence of norms leads to a shame-oriented conscience (Spiro 1958:408; 1961a:120). Conscience orientation is fashioned by the reactions received by an educator. Reactions transmitting a specific attribution like „This is not well done“ further guilt orientation. On the other hand, reactions like „You're a bad girl!“ transmit a global attribution and engrave consequently shame orientation (Potter-Efron 1989:2,56,76; Lewis 1992:34f.,71). If educators purposely avoid presenting norms to the child in the pursuit of an antiauthoritarian education, the conscience will be underdeveloped, that is it will tend to be both guiltless and shameless. Parent identification will be influenced by learned gender roles (with differential conscience orientation) and their reinforcement in family and society (Lewis 1992:189-193). Educators who are aware of conscience orientation will be careful to behave in a way that will permit the child to identify with them (S. Müller 1984:93). They will aim for a balanced shame and guilt-oriented conscience.

²⁶ Cp. section 2.4.13. Consequences for Christian Education.

The normal development of the conscience depends essentially on an environment of love, bonding, confidence, and harmony (Zulliger 1970:38; 1989:10; Oser 1976:155f.). In order to promote confession, an important element in the development of the conscience, the learning process of the conscience depends on sincere repentance and relief of conscience through reparation and reintegration into the community (Oser 1973:116f.). The significant others have to represent an „instance of grace,“ which guarantees freedom of punishment (1973:119). This includes all members of the family and all significant others. However, punishment as an „encouragement“ to conscience development also has its indispensable place in education (Oser 1976:405; S. Müller 1984:113).

Christian educators must be aware of their children's perceptive, reactive and thought patterns (see appendix 11). These are dependent on conscience orientation and influence the learning process (Bowen 1989:273). Predominantly shame-oriented children need direction and reactions from their teachers, which are different from predominantly guilt-oriented children. Shame-oriented children belonging to the generation X and coming out of an anti-authoritarian education will behave completely differently in school than shame-oriented children from another context with strong authority structures. Consequently, education that is aware of conscience orientation makes education appear even more complex than it already is.

5.3.9 Motivation: Identification or Submission

Education, behaviour, and consequently ethics, is essentially a question of motivation. Piers states that „social conformity achieved through guilt will be essentially one of submission“ while „social conformity achieved through shame will be essentially one of identification“ (1971:53). According to Piers, this is the case because in a guilt-oriented person a transgression of the super-ego's norm leads to guilt and fear from punishment, a „castration anxiety“ (1971:16). On the other hand, in a shame-oriented person, shame and shame anxiety are caused by a shortcoming when a goal presented by the ego-ideal is not reached. Shame anxiety is one of abandonment, not of mutilation as in guilt-oriented persons (1971:24). The ego-ideal is a psychoanalytical term which describes the projected self, or in other words the identity, in comparison with the real self. Consequently, shame orientation goes along with identification while guilt orientation goes along with submission. Piers concludes that „one might, therefore, easily expect to find various cultures characterized and differentiated according to the prevalent use of either shame or guilt inducing sanctions to insure social integration“ (1971:53).

Spiro refines the concept of social conformity in his two systems view (1961a). He sets the social system in relation to different psycho-social structures as presented in table 5.4.²⁷

Table 5.4: Motivation and Social Conformity

Motivation	Social System	Individual	Psycho-social Structure
Intrinsic motivation	Rewards individual needs and drives	Fills the roles of the social system	Id and ego needs
Internalized motivation	Prescribes values and norms	Learns and internalizes values and norms	Super-ego and ego-ideal needs
Extrinsic motivation	Uses positive and negative sanctions (reward and punishment)	Conforms to receive positive and avoid negative sanctions	Alter-ego and super-alter needs

Intrinsic motivation refers to the basic needs of the id and the ego, such as hunger, thirst and sex that are satisfied by filling roles of the social system. Through the conscience, represented in psychoanalytic theory by the super-ego and the ego-ideal, the individual internalises values and norms and conforms to them. Additionally, the significant others (alter-ego) and authorities (super-alter-ego) of the social group influence the individual directly through extrinsic motivation or sanction. The fellowship of the social group can, for example, create an in-group feeling which helps shame-oriented people withstand temptations (Loewen 1969b:120). For this reason, Lienhard stresses the importance of the social group for motivation (2001a:236f.). When the standards of the social group are internalised, they become a matter of the conscience. Thus, the conscience and the social group play key roles in motivation of behaviour. In conclusion, motivation is based on the fact that those who comply will have their needs filled and a role in society, secondly, they will have a good conscience, and thirdly, they will belong to a social group. Fear of punishment following non-conformity can also work as motivation, but it is not the primary incitement (Spiro 1961a; Lienhard 2001a:214).

The church is also a social system. People will enter into it and participate in the rules and roles primarily by motivation. A guilt-oriented person will look for an orthodox community that complies with the rules of the Bible and/or Christian tradition. A shame-oriented person will be attracted by harmony, honour and power. Mega-churches with fellowship, worship, mighty events and members of a certain affluence and status in society will be

²⁷ For a larger discussion see section 2.5.3. Melford Spiro's Developmental and Motivational Model.

preferred (cp. Hiebert et al. 1999:250). Common rituals as public celebrations in the calendar year, baptism and communion, days or weeks of prayer and fasting, moments of confession, even events of discipline with the reinsertion of church members, can enhance fellowship and maturity (Lienhard 2001a:227f.; Singgih 1995).

What happens when motivation breaks down, that is, when needs are not fulfilled? Christian teaching of humility goes against the search for honour of natural man. Neyrey explains:

The bottom line is that Jesus' disciples, because they cannot play the honor game as usual, will lose respect, value, and worth in the eyes of kin and neighbors. They will lose what is considered vital to meaningful life among the ancients, namely respect. We cannot emphasize enough how bitter and difficult an experience this would be. Following Jesus can lead to a wretched fate according to worldly standards (Neyrey 1998:228).

Exclusion from the Lord's Supper is an effective form of discipline in a shame-oriented context, but it disturbs harmony and honour and produces shame. It can cause a member to stay definitively away from church and change denomination, village or town. Less harmony and honour-oriented persons will be less affected by such disciplinary measures. For guilt-oriented individuals, they rather provide an opportunity for reparation. But God introduces a new dimension to the anthropological mechanisms. Neyrey observes about Jesus transforming men's search for honour:

Matthew portrays Jesus, not as destroying the traditional honor game, but rather as reforming it in his own interests. Worth, respect, and praise remain the aim of disciples; and Jesus himself generously makes grants of these. But he challenges the conventional definitions of honor, the typical ways of achieving it, and the obligatory public forum for gaining it. Indeed, Jesus „honors“ those who were „shamed.“ ... The expected defence of one's honor when challenged is proscribed for the disciples. The public form for seeing and being seen is denied them. New rules, new umpires, and a new playing field are envisioned for the game of honor (Neyrey 1998:227).

Even though the social system may not be able to fulfil the needs, God through his Holy Spirit can give harmony, honour and justice. Even the shame-oriented disciples of Jesus are finally more motivated by the fact of being children of God than being first in rank (Lk 22:24-30 par; Jn 1:12f.; 13:13-16). Paul as an academic is not ashamed of the Gospel in front of the Greeks for whom it is foolishness (Rom 1:16; 1Cor 1:18,23). He is ready to humiliate himself in the steps of Jesus (1Cor 9:19-23). He identifies with Christ and wants us to identify with him (1Cor 4:16; 11:1; Eph 5:1; Phil 2:5; 3:17; 1Thess 1:6). God introduces a paradox in

man's life: whoever loses his life, will win it (Lk 9:24; 17:33 par). Green and Lawrenz put it this way:

The Christian Gospel says much about self-esteem but in a different context than our culture offers. Our call to love God fully and love ourselves as we love others is a radical departure from what surrounds us. Rather than doing, performing, or obtaining, we are to love. Rather than competing in our attempts to be good enough by being better than others, we are to find our value in relationship to God and to others (Green/Lawrenz 1994:106).

God wants us to reckon with his power beyond all anthropological mechanisms. In the transmission of ethical standards, it is important to consider motivation by identification and submission.²⁸ Concerning ethics, we have seen that the concept of covenantal ethics covers both conscience orientations: identification with God in the covenantal relationship and submission to his standards. The Hinduistic concept of *karma* as alternative ethical system is uniquely an ethics of submission. So is Islam's ethics as the meaning of the term *islam* „submission“ indicates. The apostle Paul is concerned with both aspects: he explains in his letters the new covenant with God through Jesus Christ and our new identity as children of God and disciples of Jesus Christ. After having laid the soteriological foundations, he goes on with the detailed explanation of the ethical imperative of God's commandments. Covenantal ethics is essentially an ethics of responsibility: responsibility towards God and fellow men (Lv 19:18; Dt 6:5; Mt 22:37-39; Rom 13:9f.). It lives from the identity as covenant partner and child of God, and it manifests itself in the respect of God's commandments. It responds to God's identification with our shame and guilt in Jesus Christ (Kraus 1990:204).

5.3.10 Discipline

For several reasons, discipline is a difficult theme in Christian churches worldwide (Th. Schirmacher 1994b:567). Firstly, guilt-oriented people are ready to accept criticism when it is positive and justified. On the other hand, shame-oriented people interpret criticism as a personal attack due to the global attribution (Lewis 1992:65).²⁹ Therefore, a disciplinary act is often related to a loss of face in shame-oriented contexts. Leaders will therefore be very careful with public disciplinary sanctions in order to spare their subordinates. Otherwise on a later occasion, the subordinate could in revenge make the leader lose face.

²⁸ See also section 4.3.14. Ethics: Revelational or Situational.

²⁹ See also appendix 11: Personality as a Function of Conscience Orientation.

Secondly, while guilt-oriented people have introjected moral standards, shame-oriented people are dependent on significant others being present. Guilt-oriented people feel guilt right after the violation of the norm, while shame-oriented persons usually feel shame only after discovery of the violation (Spiro 1957:408f.). Therefore, in a shame-oriented context punishment or anxiety from punishment is necessary to maintain moral order because the conscience is dependent on external significant others and authorities. In Christian churches, ordained pastors and the committees of elders have taken over the role of the supreme judge, the traditional chief. If punishment is absent out of leniency, moral order collapses (cp. G. Warneck 1897:251).

A third aspect of the problem is that the animist gods are punishing gods. A violation of a norm is punished immediately with sickness, accident or death. Protestant missionaries presented the justification model, the Gospel of grace, the message that the Christian God does not punish, but forgive, and that salvation is attained through faith alone. Many Christians from shame-oriented societies reduce this message to a system of „cheap grace,“ that sins only have to be confessed in order to be forgiven (Bonhoeffer 1989:29f.). The consequence of this is that moral order collapses, as Messenger describes it for the Anang in Nigeria (1959:100f. quoted by Trobisch 1961a:203; cp. Uchendu 1964:114; Noble 1975:81-83). The application of the reconciliation model instead can avoid such a collapse.

Trobisch mentions that 95% of disciplinary cases in Cameroon concern adultery. He ascribes this fact to the above mentioned reduction of the justification model and draws the conclusion that Africa needs urgently a positive Biblical concept of marriage (1961a:202). Adulterers are normally excluded from the Lord's Supper, which means for shame-oriented people that they are excluded from the community of the blessed and from God's power of blessing and healing (cp. the concept of *mana* and *baraka*).³⁰ In this way, the Lord's Supper becomes a procession of the just who have not committed adultery in the period before, or whose adultery has not been discovered. Thus, it receives a social function without Biblical foundation (1Cor 11:28) (Trobisch 1961a:205f.).

For all these reasons, discipline is a more complex matter in shame-oriented contexts than in guilt-oriented societies. As a consequence, discipline is either neglected or over-emphasized (Trobisch 1961a:201; Boikanyo 1968:22). Trobisch says that „church discipline means to go and to win, not to wait and to judge“ (1966:202 quoted by Schmid 1996:7).

³⁰ Cp. section 4.3.11. Power Concepts and Power Encounter.

Gilliland proposes to make of it a church event. This will lead to a church that is injured (and shamed) by the offence, realizing the seriousness of sin, and open to repentance and restoration (1983:245). In shame-oriented societies, people should be approached individually, early in the process, when shame is not yet overwhelming for the affair to be treated smoothly. For this process, initiators and mediators who are aware of upcoming problems are urgently needed in Christian churches.³¹

5.3.11 Leadership

Shame-oriented societies tend to have hierarchical systems. In the Bible, we find the judges, prophets, priests and kings. In Africa, the traditional chief system prevails. In the church within a shame-oriented context, the hierarchical system corresponds to the episcopal system. Even when there are democratic structures like committees, the whole decisional power is with the president or director. The members of the committee are the counselors, elders or wise men in the traditional system. Before a decision, the chief can consult, but it is not compulsory for him to do so. If the elders do not agree with the chief, they are limited in the expression of critique by the norms of the shame-oriented culture. If the chief does not spontaneously consult them, they have no direct means to influence him. On the other hand, shame-oriented subordinates will not express their opinion when they are not consulted, even if they are heavily dissatisfied with the leader. This goes on until open rebellion creates chaos. It is therefore advisable for a leader to consult with a group of counselors before taking decisions.

Because of sensitivity to power and honour, it is of importance, who sits on a committee. A pastor is different from a lay person because in the animist's perspective the pastor becomes a carrier of *mana* by means of his ordination. Thus, he has direct access to God's power of blessing and life. Consequently, the word or a prayer of an ordained pastor has a greater importance than that of a lay man.

Criticism of subordinates should only be communicated privately. If the leader loses control, he is dishonoured and shamed, conduct equated with sin. Control of emotions is therefore a precondition for leaders. As the working community is perceived as an extended family, the leader also has the functions of a head of the family. This means showing consideration and

³¹ See sections 5.4.5 Restoration of Harmony, Honour and Justice, and 5.4.7. Initiation and Confrontation with Shame and Guilt-Oriented People.

care in critical situations. It also means showing generosity with subordinates in material and social matters.

On the other hand, respect of the leader and his orders is the first obligation for shame-oriented subordinates. If he does not agree with an order, he is supposed to execute it and only express his opinion after that, in private. A discussion engaged directly after the order, before its execution, is seen as refusal and shames the leader (cp. Lim 1987).

Guilt-oriented societies will tend to an egalitarian system with a low key hierarchy or no hierarchy at all. The leader will be measured at his correctness, his punctuality, his competences and his efficiency. Criticism of leadership will be current and open. A pastor will not be able to hide behind his special access to God through ordination. He will rather have to prove his capacities in preaching, management and counseling.

Consequently, cross-cultural leadership has to take into account culture and personality differences according to conscience orientation. Special issues concern differences in power distance, uncertainty-avoidance, task or person orientation, and individualist or collectivist tendency (Clinton 1989:187-190). Additionally, Christian leadership takes its orientation from Trinity: it directs the Christian to be a child of God, his Father, to be a disciple of Jesus Christ and to be a temple of the Holy Spirit (1Cor 3:16) (Beyerhaus 1996:662f.). A key word for Christian leadership is servant leadership (Jn 13:13-17), a great challenge for honour and power-oriented persons as many leaders are.

5.4 Counseling

A guilt-oriented missionary newcomer may find that individual counseling is absent in a shame-oriented context and may conclude therefore that counseling is non-existent in a given church. However after a thorough study, interesting parallels between OT and modern psychotherapeutic features can be recognized. It will be important for us to reflect on the differences between counseling shame and guilt-oriented persons.

5.4.1 Biblical Foundations of Counseling

In the OT, there are two terms that translate the concern for counseling: *יָשָׁב* *yāšab* „to sit, to sit together,“ and *יָצַח* *yā‘aš* „to counsel, to reflect, to determine.“ Both are related to the counsel (*‘ēšā*) of the elders in the gate (Stähli 1995:751). Therefore, we have to think that in OT times the problems of the community were discussed and solved by the counsel of the elders at the gate. Problem solving was group-oriented (Scheunemann 1996).

In the NT, preferentially the two terms παρακαλέω *parakaleō* „to exhort, to console, to encourage, to ask“ and literally „to call at the side,“ and νουθετέω *noutheteō* „to exhort, to rebuke“ are used. Exhortation is part of community life (Acts 16:40). Exhortation and teaching belong together (Col 1:28; 3:16). Exhortation is a task of the apostles and the community leaders (1Thess 5:12) as also of the whole community mutually (Col 3:16). Paul exhorts by (*dia*) God or Christ (Rom 12:3; 15:30). He does not moralize, but sets the ethical imperative based on the soteriological indicative (Selter/Braumann 1990:275). While *noutheteō* has one main meaning of „to exhort, to rebuke,“ *parakaleō* is also translated: „to show the way, to encourage, to console“ (2Cor 1:3ff.; Hebr 6:18). Counseling is thus an integral part of community life. It is the task of both the community leaders and members. In the NT, the concept of individual counseling starts to complement the communal concept. This new perspective is based on Plutarch and Philoderm who describe *psychagōgē* (lit. „direction of the soul“) as dialogue between a client and the *psychagōgos*.

Biblical counseling is founded in God's love for man that expresses itself in the person of Jesus Christ (Jn 3:16). Man is created in God's image (Gen 1:27) and for fellowship with Him (Dt 6:5; Mt 22:37). This relationship is troubled since Fall (Gen 3; 1Cor 2:14). It cannot be restored by our works, but only through God's redemption (Eph 2:8f.). When accepting the forgiveness of sins through the person and work of Jesus Christ, man receives the Holy Spirit and becomes a new creature (2Cor 5:17). He becomes God's child and heir (Rom 8:14-17) and partaker of his gifts (Gal 5:22-25) (Hesselgrave 1984:166-174).

This Biblical concept of man stands in opposition to both the Greek and secular concepts of man, which view man as good. They are the foundation for most of our psychological methods. On the other hand, they are also in opposition to the animistic and Islamic concepts of man, which do not see man in need of redemption and at the same time seek a way to God through sacrifices and good works.

The task and goal of Biblical counseling is to lead man back to fellowship with God, and consequently into forgiveness and grace. The result is gratitude, a new force, liberation from bonds, healing from wounds, a new blessing and renewed service. Cross-cultural Biblical counseling takes place within the context of four tensions (adapted from Hesselgrave 1984:188; Augsburg 1986:372f.):

1. Man is created in God's image. But this image is falsified through sin. Therefore, man has to be redeemed and born again.

2. There are human universals across all cultures. On the other hand, every culture is unique. The access to the person has to be worked on through enculturation, the learning of the language and especially an open and understanding presence.
3. Every psychological method can contribute new insights, but is founded on a specific worldview and certain experiences. Men however are unique.
4. Methods and experiences can contribute to understand and help man. But God speaks directly to the heart (conscience) (2Thess 2:16f.).

5.4.2 Counseling and Conscience Orientation

In conversion, the content of the conscience is not immediately changed. If it is exposed to the new authority of God's Word, it is slowly adapting to the norms of Scripture. Its transformation in the process of sanctification should be a priority for the believer and the counselor (Priest 1994:302-304). The feeling of shame and the concern for honour can be of help in this stage: It is important to keep a „good name“ to God's glory and to „sanctify“ his name, that is, honour him through our behaviour (Lev 19:1; 22:32; Mt 5:48; 6:9 par). Transparency in the life of believer and counselor can promote authenticity in shame-oriented persons (Noble 1975:67f.).

In shame-oriented contexts, anxiety of punishment turns into shame when other people discover the violation of the norm. Then, shame is mostly felt in front of fellow men or ancestors. In this case, the person is more concerned to restore harmony with the social group than with God. Therefore, shame can also be an obstacle to faith in Jesus Christ. Only when guilt or shame are felt before God, then forgiveness can be found at the cross of Jesus Christ (cp. Hesselgrave 1983:483).

Repentance can be expressed differently by shame and guilt-oriented persons. Guilt-oriented people start readily to confess and repair their fault when remorse is building up. On the contrary, shame-oriented persons are blocked through their shame and will continue to deny in order to reduce shame. When the blockage loosens, they will send a mediator to the offended person to confess the failure and to seek reconciliation (Augsburger 1992; Lienhard 2001a:157ff.). Counselors of opposite conscience orientation should be careful with judgements that originate from their own conscience orientation. It is important to have an attitude of patience and humility, to work on the instruction with Scripture and to wait patiently for the action of the Holy Spirit in the conscience of the believer who has another conscience orientation (Priest 1994:296-299).

Methods of counseling vary with conscience orientation. While guilt-oriented persons usually prefer individual approaches, shame-oriented persons may feel more comfortable in group therapies. With guilt-oriented persons, direct, verbal and literal communication is used. For shame-oriented persons, indirect modes of communication are appropriate. This includes use of proverbs, songs, stories, parables, poems and sayings, as well as non-verbal and symbolic communication like dance, drama, music, and rituals including eating and drinking (Lartey 1987:125; 1991:41f.; Berinyuu 1989:93,101,117,123). The therapist treats shame best at the affective level, helping the client expose his hidden defects in manageable portions within the „safe“ therapeutic relationship (Hilgers 1996:24,63). In contrast, guilt is best confronted at the behavioural and cognitive levels; clients are encouraged to examine their value systems and to act consistently with those values (Potter-Efron 1989:5). Other guidelines for the treatment of guilt concerns are to help distinguish between irrational and rational guilt and to trace irrational guilt messages to their source in the family of origin, to link irrational guilt with the underlying fear of punishment, to encourage clients to use guilt as a signal to examine their choices in living and challenge defences, and to turn confessions into action plans (Potter-Efron 1989:218).

5.4.3 Counseling in the Context of the Extended Family

In societies with extended families, counseling happens normally within the family (Lartey 1987:121,125,182; 1991:41; Masamba ma Mpolo 1991:27; Nwachuku 1991). In this case, counseling practices differ little from the OT. They also correspond largely to modern group therapy. Group therapy is well adapted to shame-oriented contexts, because it is a corporate approach (Lartey 1987:121). In the case of family therapy, all the stages of the counseling process happen under the eyes of the significant others. Mowrer, one of the founders of modern group therapy, stresses that sins have to be confessed in front of significant others, not in front of specialists only (Mowrer 1967:106 quoted by Noble 1975:109). In traditional cultures, the elders of the family or village lead the discussion, and all who are concerned assist (cp. Hesselgrave 1986:110). The pastor can be invited to the family meeting or he invites the family in the church. Hence, he has the possibility to introduce Biblical concepts into the discussion. As the family structures are very complex, it is usually too difficult for a foreigner to practice family counseling. It is preferable to entrust an indigenous pastor or elder with the leadership of the session and as missionary to take only an advisory position.

Marriage counseling is usually little developed when spouse roles prescribe a life without intimate communication. The disciplinary approach is then the only one applied in marriage problems. Trobisch calls it the „easy way“ for the churches (Trobisch 1971:16). Trobisch, Hastings and Augsburgers have tried to develop new approaches for marriage counseling (cp. Trobisch 1967; Hastings 1973; Augsburgers 1986:175-215). Marriage seminars coupled with instructions for natural contraception have been proposed. Traditional concepts of marriage, family and women's roles, which are profoundly rooted in the worldview, must be compared and confronted with Biblical concepts, in preaching and teaching. It is important to show that marriage is not an opportunity for the husband to attain immortality, status, power, prosperity and sexual satisfaction (all underlying concepts of polygamy), but an expression of the covenant relationship of love, faithfulness and trust between God and his people. The marriage relationship is based on the equality of the partners by mutual submission and the consideration of the needs and obligations of both partners (Gen 1:27; 2:23; Eph 5:21-33). These are delicate themes that must be treated with special care in the „right“ circle of persons. One has to consider that much time is needed and that results will only be achieved with regular teaching.

In relation to polygamy, it is important not to condemn the polygamist, but to understand why he became a polygamist, to help him in his actual problems and to meet his needs. It is important to show that the monogamist and the polygamist are confronted with the same challenge, that is, to manifest love, faithfulness and trust in marriage life motivated by God's grace and forgiveness. A monogamous marriage is not good, just because it is monogamous. Only when it begins to reflect the ideal marriage established in creation, to which Jesus made reference, can it become an example (Gen 2:24; Mk 10:7f. par; Eph 5:31) (Trobisch 1971:26; Shyllon 1991).

The cultural change from the extended family to the nuclear family and from the traditional to the „modern“ family advances slowly but surely and brings new problems. Modern (or consecutive) polygamists should first be committed to the much more demanding traditional form of polygamy. To the latter belong, for example, the approval of the first wife before marrying an additional wife and the peaceful cohabitation of all wives. The respect of these two traditional norms would render modern polygamy impossible in view of the progressive emancipation of the woman (Bujo 1987:386).

In the midst of these changes, the counselor has to navigate between not condemning the different marriage forms and not downplaying the central values of the Biblical concept of

marriage (Augsburger 1986:213). Love, mutual trust and respect should be more important than the form of marriage. The counselor has to be prepared to bear this tension.

5.4.4 Fellowship and Openness

God has created man in his image in order to have intimate fellowship with him (Gen 1:27; Dt 6:5; Mt 22:37-39). Intimate love means total openness to God (Schaeffer 1970:120 quoted by Noble 1975:113). This is shown by the fact that the Hebrew word *yad'* „to know“ is used to describe sexual intercourse, a very intimate knowledge (Gen 4:1,17,25; cp. Ps 139:1-4,23f.).³² Since the Fall, man is separated from God and also from his fellow men. Consequently, men carry masks in order to hide their true identity that would be shameful to show. However, this prevents true fellowship. Therefore, God shows, in his servant Jesus Christ, the need for somebody to carry this shame (Isa 53:3; Hebr 12:2) and guilt (Isa 53:10). Only when men open up freely towards each other, can fellowship happen (Loewen 1965:50). After opening up, loneliness initially increases due to shame. Then, acceptance by the group can grow and a progress in faith can follow. Missionaries and pastors can have a function of catalysers and models in this process when they open up and speak of their own sins (Noble 1975:108; Loewen 1969a; 1969b).

Grubb speaks of openness toward God and men as an initiator and sustainer of revivals. When the Christian wins over pride and shame and confesses his sin, not only to God, but also to his fellow men, and speaks of God's victory in his life, then God uses this to expose sin in the heart of others. It is shame that drives them to such confession (Grubb 1954:15f.). Loewen insists that the theological and the social dimension of forgiveness go together (1970a; 1970b:160). Mowrer calls confession of sin only to God without the significant others a „cheap grace,“ a term coined by Bonhoeffer (Mowrer 1961:82; cp. Bonhoeffer 1989:29f.).³³ Rogers speaks of fellowship and openness as necessary elements of his encounter groups (1970:107f.). However, „intimacy requires the active and consistent resolution of our shame. As we only connect at points of vulnerability, it is necessary that we learn to be vulnerable. Vulnerability becomes safe only as shame is resolved“ (Green/Lawrenz 1994:111).

When this openness towards each other and towards God is absent, due to shame, the realization of sin becomes superficial and Christianity becomes legalistic and moralizing with

³² This is a synthetic, shame-oriented way of knowing. Cp. sections 3.1.10. Knowledge and Wisdom as Covenant Characteristics, 4.1.5. Analytic or Synthetic Thinking, and appendix 11: Personality as a Function of Conscience Orientation.


³³ See the discussion of „cheap grace“ in section 4.3.4. The Biblical Models of Forgiveness.

an emphasis on external behaviour. In order to create a healthy community, the church must set her first priority on promoting authenticity and openness. Pastors should use Scripture not only in relation to objective truth, which leads to legalism, moralism and overestimation of the value of the sermon, but in the perspective of relationships and community (Noble 1975:103). This relates to the scriptural concern for a balanced shame and guilt-oriented approach. Additionally, a balance between sermon and community must be achieved.

5.4.5 Forgiveness: Restoration of Harmony, Honour and Justice

We have seen that forgiveness is the central concept of our soteriological model of conscience (see sections 2.7.4. and 3.1.12.). It is also the crucial matter for counseling. It follows roughly the path of the three R's: repentance, reconciliation and reparation. Repentance is the first step, being followed by reconciliation on the shame-oriented side and reparation on the guilt-oriented side. We reproduce the model in figure 5.3.

Figure 5.3: Soteriological Model of Conscience



It is impossible to include all the desired nuances in a model like this. Secondly, the terms used in the Bible are not as well defined as a guilt-oriented, analytic mind would prefer. Rather it corresponds to synthetic thinking typical of shame-oriented contexts. The objective of a shame-oriented conscience is not only honour as some imply, but also harmony, glory and power. These are also divine characteristics (Rev 4:11; 5:12f.; 7:12). On the shame-honour axis, forgiveness is enacted by a mediator and passes through reconciliation to reinsertion into the group (Mt 21:33-41 par). On the neutral axis, salvation is synonymous with harmony and righteousness (Rom 14:17; Hebr 12:11). A first step to forgiveness is repentance (Mk 1:15

par). On the guilt-justice axis, rightness and law represent an expression of justice (Rom 2:26). Justification goes together with reparation (Rom 3:25; 4:5). In the following sections, we will reflect on the different elements of the process of forgiveness in relation to conscience orientation.

When a violation of honour or justice cannot be forgiven, revenge follows as expression of a shame-rage or a guilt-anger spiral (cp. Gen 4:8,24; 34:25; Jdg 16:28). Revenge serves to restore honour for a shame-oriented conscience and justice for a guilt-oriented conscience. As honour is generally more difficult to restore, revenge is a greater problem in shame-oriented contexts. Blood revenge has been a century-long tradition in the Mediterranean context, which has coined the Spanish technical term *vendetta* (cp. Baroja 1992; Di Bella 1992; Jamous 1992). In the imprecatory psalms, the psalmist renounces revenge, but pleads for God's face-saving vengeance as an expression of corporate personality (Ps 6:10; 31:18f.; 35:26f.; etc.). When God forbids to take revenge (Rom 12:19; cp. Mt 5:21-26,38-44), he implies that he wants to forgive and make revenge unnecessary.

5.4.6 Repentance and Humility

The first step towards forgiveness is repentance. The main word for it in the OT is שׁוּב *šûb* „to turn around“ (e.g. 1Ki 8:33; Ps 51:13; Joel 2:12). The fact that it is mentioned more than 800 times shows its importance. The other root נָחַם *nhm* „to repent“ is much less frequent (Lienhard 1996:76). The OT emphasizes that the offender needs to turn back to God, regretting and confessing sin and professing renewed allegiance to God. In the NT, the most common term is μετανοέω *metanoēō* „to change one's mind i.e. to repent“ (e.g. Mt 11:20f.). The LXX does not use this term, but the NT and the church fathers use it widely (Lienhard 2001a:69). Jesus begins his ministry with the call to repent and to believe in the Gospel (Mt 3:2; 4:17; Mk 1:4,15; Lk 3:3). Peter calls his audience on Pentecost to repent (Acts 2:38). The NT stresses repenting of specific deeds, changing one's attitude and life style and doing things that exemplify the new life style (Lienhard 2001a:70).

The step to acknowledge the authority of God over oneself is an act of humiliation. Therefore, repentance is closely related to humility. In the OT, the most important roots are כָּנַע *knʿ* „to humble self“ because of failure implying shame (Lev 26:41; 2Ki 22:19; Job 40:12), and הָנַח *nhh* also „to humble self“ among other meanings (e.g. Prov 22:4; Lam 1:8; Zech 9:9). Proverbs see pride as opposed to humility: „When pride (*zādôn*) comes, then comes disgrace (*qālôn*), but with humility (*śn*) comes wisdom“ (Prov 11:2; cp. 16:18; 29:23). In the OT,

pride is also opposed to shame and fear of the Lord (Lev 26:19; Dt 28:23; Ps 10:2-4; Prov 8:13; Isa 16:6; 23:9; 25:11; Jer 48:29f.). God calls Abraham to a life of sacrifice and obedience in order to become great (Gen 12:1f.; 17:5-7; cp. Lk 17:33). Humility can serve to restore harmony in broken relationships: Jacob humbles himself before Esau by bowing down and calling him his lord, and then receives honour from Esau who kisses him and accepts him back (Gen 33). Humility is named as one of three things that God requires from man: „To act justly (*mišpāt*) and to love mercy (*hesed*) and to walk humbly (*śn*) with your God“ (Mic 6:8).

In the NT, the main term for humility is ταπεινῶω *tapeinoō* „to humiliate“ (e.g. Phil 2:8). Its focus is again on contrasting humility with pride (Lienhard 2001a:74). Pride leads to dishonour and shame, like when the invited guest has to take a back seat (Lk 14:7-9; cp. Jas 2:2f.). Jesus challenges his followers to choose the path of humility, which ultimately leads to honour: „For everyone who exalts (*hypsoō*) himself will be humbled (*tapeinoō*), and he who humbles himself will be exalted“ (Lk 14:11 par). Likewise, the apostle Paul recommends us to acknowledge our weaknesses and to go the way of humility: „For when I am weak, then I am strong“ in dependence upon God (2Cor 12:10; cp. 13:4; Col 3:12; Tit 3:2) (Lingenfelter/Mayers 1986:109). The best example of humility is Jesus who humbled himself by renouncing to his glory and accepting the shame of the cross (Phil 2:5-11). Also Peter asks us to clothe ourselves with humility and humble ourselves under God’s mighty hand (1Pet 5:5f.).

Repentance and humility seem to be a bigger challenge for shame-oriented than for guilt-oriented persons. The former search honour and conceive of the world in hierarchies. The latter pursue justice and live in an egalitarian universe. Additionally, „the call to repent can increase feelings of shame. It encourages further hiding or else pseudo-repenting“ (Lawson 2000:98). In this way, shame can be an obstacle to repentance. On the other hand, shame can also lead to humbleness and dependence in relation to God and fellow men (Huber 1983:207). Humility is emphasized right across Scripture confirming that it is an important matter for a shame-oriented conscience (Prov 15:33; 18:12; Mic 6:8; Zeph 2:3; Col 3:12; Tit 3:2; 1Pet 5:5). Another challenge for a shame-oriented conscience is humiliation by others. It implies dishonour and shame like when Simei curses king David (2Sam 16:5-13). King David has apparently not digested and forgiven his humiliation. For David it would be too shameful to revenge it, but Solomon will have to do it after his death (1Ki 2:9). This episode confirms that humiliation and loss of face are difficult to forgive for shame-oriented consciences as long as honour has not been restored, even after decades.

5.4.7 Initiation and Confrontation with Shame and Guilt-Oriented People

Lienhard observes that in Biblical stories there is often an initiator in the restoration process of justice and harmony (2001a:158-160). Most often God himself is the initiator. He confronts Adam, Eve and Cain when they try to hide, and initiates dialogue (Gen 3:8f.,13; 4:9). God makes Jacob return to Palestine to deal with his relationship with Esau (Gen 33). A generation later, Pharaoh's dreams initiate Joseph's liberation (Gen 41). In the NT, God sends Joseph a dream when he wants to leave Mary who is shamefully pregnant (Lk 1 par). Jesus frequently initiates restoration. He has Peter catch fish before starting to speak with him about his being a future fisher of men (Lk 5:1-11). He tells Zacchaeus that he wants to stay with him with the result that Zacchaeus pays back the money earned through corruption (Lk 19:1-10). With the Samaritan woman, he initiates a conversation about drinking water in order to end up speaking about her marital situation (Jn 4). With Peter, Zacchaeus and the Samaritan woman, he employs an indirect approach of initiation avoiding confrontation. This is often not the case when he talks to the more guilt-oriented Pharisees. For example, with Nicodemus Jesus goes directly to the point when saying that Nicodemus has to be born again in order to see the kingdom of God (Jn 3:3). Jesus can use actions to initiate: He heals the right hand of a man in order to initiate a discussion on the Sabbath (Mk 3:1-6 par), and a paralysed man in order to discuss forgiveness of sins (Mk 2:1-12 par). Visiting a Pharisee, he does not wash his hands in order to speak in a direct confrontational way about purity of the inner man (Lk 11). Often he uses parables and proverbs to initiate consciousness of the underlying issues (Mk 2:17 par; Mt 13; 22:1-14 par). This is a softer „direct“ approach. We conclude that Jesus uses a direct or indirect approach, that is confrontational or not, depending on the conscience orientation of the partner.

Offenders themselves can initiate the process of restoration of justice and harmony through humiliation. The lost son humiliates himself and comes back home (Lk 15). Judas wants to return the money after having betrayed Jesus (Mt 27:3). The attempt fails as the high priests and elders do not agree to give Jesus back (Lienhard 2001a:160f.). However, shame can hinder the offender to initiate the process of restoration. Therefore, mediators, who are not subject to shame in a specific matter, have an important role in initiation.

Lienhard emphasizes that the social group (in-group) has a prime importance in initiating restoration of justice and harmony. She sees Jesus as a mediator representing the social group's authority. In a shame-oriented society, it would be impossible for persons of lower status to initiate the process for a person of higher status. Therefore, initiation becomes the

task of leaders. They have the role and responsibility of mediators (Augsburger 1992; Käser 1997:162f.; Lingenfelter/Mayers 1996:112f.). In the Daba and Bana culture of Cameroon that Lienhard has studied, elders invite the offender to drink beer in order to give him the possibility to confess when emotional controls are loosened and shame is lessened (Lienhard 2001a:208,239). Potter-Efron (1989) has made the same observation with alcoholics who are often predominantly shame-oriented. In the church, the pastors and elders are the mediators. They have to solve this problem without the help of alcohol, but with the help of the Holy Spirit and prayer.

5.4.8 Confession with Shame and Guilt-Oriented People

Loewen says that confession, „while by no means universal, has been found to have important cathartic and healing functions in many of the world's cultures“ (1969a:65). In the Bible, the main terms *ydh* (Jos 7:19; 1Ki 8:33; Job 40:9; Ps 107:15) and *homologeō* or *exomologeō* (Hebr 11:13; 13:15; 1Jn 1:9) have the double meaning of „to confess“ and „to praise.“ This shows the soteriological context of Biblical confession that leads to joy and praise through forgiveness. Confession is originally situated in the context of sacrifices (Lev 4:4-6; 5:14,18). It is directed towards both the priest and God (Fürst 1990:76f.; Lienhard 1996:72f.,80f.; 2001a:69f.).

In a guilt-oriented person, the emotion of guilt is a strong incentive for confession. After the confession and following reparation, the individual is greatly relieved. Little outside pressure is needed. While the Catholic Church provides for the confession of guilt and promotes it strongly during Christian education (Oser 1973), in Protestantism confession has become a private affair „to God alone.“

In a shame-oriented context, confession is very shameful and represents dishonour. „Confession becomes a sort of self-shaming“ (Kraus 1990:212). An offender will therefore deny the act and avoid confession as long as possible. This is supported by his shame anxiety. Group pressure has to build up through gossip and other shaming sanctions. When the offender is ready to confess, he chooses a mediator, who can approach the offended without shame. This mediator has to be an important personality of the family or the group. In the church, it is a pastor or elder. This mediator can present the excuses in the name of the offender in front of the group while the offender himself still feels too much shame to confess himself. Narramore describes the process like this:

The church's traditional call to repent and confess is followed with the gift of forgiveness and release from the fear of punishment, but not for the shame-oriented person: When the problem is fear of punishment or self-inflicted punishment, confession tends to lessen the need for punishment. We know we will not be punished since we have already confessed. And since we no longer fear external punishment, we feel the need to punish ourselves. But if the problem is a feeling of inadequacy, inferiority and disesteem, confession may magnify our sense of inferiority. In the light of the others' apparent strength and goodness we look even worse! This is why some Christians find that confession reinforces their feelings of inadequacy and failure rather than providing reassurance of forgiveness (Narramore 1984:28).

Nevertheless, in many churches of shame-oriented contexts, the offender has to confess personally because it is expected that he must lose his face in front of the church members. Often this remains the only act of „penance“ in order to be reintegrated into the church again. For bigger violations like adultery, exclusion from the Lord's Supper during a certain period is added. This isolation is a big shame for the offender. Reparation depends on the consensus of the families involved, but is often not an issue (cp. Mead 1961:206,307,342; Loewen 1969b:124; 1970a:82; Lienhard 2001a:39-43). An additional complication is added when the offended must accord forgiveness to the offender. According to the Lord's Prayer, this is a condition for God's forgiveness towards us (Mt 6:12).

Forgiveness becomes problematic because to say ‚I forgive‘ implies that I affirm the other person's badness, and thus forgiveness reaffirms his or her shame (Kraus 1990:212).

Consequently, confession will be more difficult to achieve in a shame-oriented society than in a guilt-oriented context.

Loewen and Mowrer emphasize the importance of public confession in front of the significant others because of the social consequences of sin on the harmony in the group. Therefore, confession must be public and periodical (Loewen 1969b:124; 1970a:82; 1970b:167; Mowrer 1961:216; 1964:97; 1989:81). Loewen is basically saying that confession involves all the covenant persons involved: God, You and I (1970b:156). Mowrer calls a confession only to God a „cheap grace“ (1961:82). „The most radically redemptive enterprises, notably the Salvation Army and Alcoholics Anonymous, know mutual confession of sins ... Here the priesthood of All Believers is more than a high sounding Reformation slogan; it is a living reality“ (1964:109). So far, Loewen and Mowrer reason on the shame axis.

Because, according to Mowrer, sin always impairs harmony in society, repayment in the sense of sacrifice, suffering and restitution should be added after confession (1964:91-94; 1989:82). Here, he argues on the guilt axis. We agree with him insofar as shame and guilt

aspects should ideally be balanced. God confirms this by introducing the Mosaic Law. Jesus does not revoke the old covenant and its standards but only qualifies it (Mt 5:17f.; Lk 16:17; cp. Lk 19:1-10). In shame-oriented contexts, reparation is a matter of consensus between the parties. The two parties may agree on renouncing reparation. Our covenant partner God has renounced reparation on our behalf because Jesus Christ has paid our debt. Grace can renounce repayment as it can renounce the isolation and shaming of the offender (Mt 18:21-35; Lk 15:11-32). Jesus Christ has carried our guilt and shame on the cross. The formula of the three R's indicates the fact that our approach to forgiveness ideally should include reconciliation/reintegration and reparation.

5.4.9 Models and Methods of Counseling

Hilgers describes the treatment of shame syndromes as exposure to shame experiences in measured dosage: „Each insight about oneself that shows new, hidden or unknown elements, must lead to shame feelings. It is ... the measure, the mode and the time of shame that determine opposition or constructive collaboration“ (1996:63). Therefore, it is advisable in psychotherapy and counseling to share insights starting from the surface and going deeper progressively (1996:66). Psychotherapy can only function where measured shame affects are a stimulus to modify self concepts and concepts about others. However, too frequent or too intense shame feelings or – in compensation as pride – narcissistic feelings are inhibitory for the self and its object relationships, because they „inundate“ and therefore traumatize the ego. „Only where the patient's ideals, values or self concepts are touched by the therapeutic interventions by manifesting ‚shameful‘ discrepancies between reality and ideal, there is inner motivation for change. Without measured shame affects there is no development“ (1996:64). A person who is incapable of being ashamed is consequently not treatable. On the other hand, „the prognosis will be best for persons who dispose of shame affects which stay controllable“ (1996:64).

Because psychoanalytic treatments are long and costly, Green and Lawrenz have developed a concept for short-term therapy following Benner's model of „strategic pastoral counseling“ (1992). It is based on affect and cognitive behavioural theory combined with Scripture. It includes five sessions in three stages, as summarized in table 5.5. (Green/ Lawrenz 1994:19,127-167). As the treatment is short, it is practicable for pastors who are not specialist counselors. It has necessarily to be embedded into the lay counseling community of the church in the sense of the universal priesthood of believers.

Table 5.5: Strategic Pastoral Counseling according to Green/Lawrenz

Stage 1	Encounter (Session 1) • Joining and boundary setting • Exploring the central concerns and relevant history • Conducting a pastoral diagnosis • Achieving a mutually agreeable focus for counseling
Stage 2	Engagement (Sessions 2, 3, 4) • Exploration of cognitive, affective, and behavioural aspects of the problem and the identification of resources for coping or change
Stage 3	Disengagement (Session 5) • Evaluation of progress and assessment of remaining concerns • Referral (if needed) • Termination of counseling

Table 5.6. schematically presents Green and Lawrenz' approach adapted to our concepts and terminology (Green/Lawrenz 1994:56,67,169-171; cp. Allender 1990:223; Enright et al. 1998:53; Lawson 2000:69). The focal point of strategic pastoral counseling is forgiveness. Green and Lawrenz' diagnostic key for therapy is the attribution of responsibility for disconnection (shame) or transgression (guilt).³⁴ Caution is however necessary as responsibility is conceived of as corporate responsibility by shame-oriented consciences.

Table 5.6: Attribution of Responsibility in Strategic Pastoral Counseling

If I am responsible	If another person is responsible
1. Identification of responsibility 2. Acceptance of responsibility 3. Ownership of resulting emotions 4. Confession of failure or wrongdoing 5. Acceptance of forgiveness from God, the other, and oneself 6. Reparation and reconciliation	1. Reattribution of responsibility for the disconnection or wrongdoing (hold self responsible when appropriate, hold other person responsible for his or her part) 2. Identification, ownership and resolution of all emotional reactions 3. Use of anger to reestablish ego-boundaries 4. Acceptance of love from another person 5. Application of love to oneself 6. Confrontation of the imposer (in person or symbolically) and confession of personal responsibility 7. Acceptance of forgiveness from God, the other person, and oneself 8. Reparation and reconciliation

³⁴ Cp. responsibility as foundational concept of ethics in section 4.3.14. Ethics: Revelational or Situational.

Green and Lawrenz' counseling model implies the fact that shame and guilt are combined which is often the case. However, the counselor's approach differs depending on the conscience orientation of the counselee. Especially initiation, confrontation and confession must be dealt with according to conscience orientation. As we have shown above, confrontation and confession are extremely sensitive points for shame-oriented people and therefore must be handled with care.

Special attention has to be given to the communication style during counseling and psychotherapy. While direct, verbal and literal communication can be well adapted to guilt-oriented persons, indirect, non-verbal and symbolic communication should be chosen with shame-oriented counselees. „An aggressively interpreting technique is a form of chronic shaming“ (Wurmser 1986:37; Hilgers 1996:66). Indirect modes of communication are rituals, proverbs, songs, stories, parables, poems and sayings (Lartey 1987:125; 1991:41f.; Berinyuu 1989:93,101). Also dance, drama, somatic exercises and music therapy find its place with shame-oriented persons (Hanna 1988; Berinyuu 1989:117,123; Hilgers 1996:97ff.).

As shown above, reparation will be no priority for predominantly shame-oriented persons, whereas it is the determinant issue when evaluating forgiveness for predominantly guilt-oriented people. Reconciliation, reinsertion into the group and restoration of harmony and honour will be of pre-eminent importance for shame-oriented persons. A balanced expression of forgiveness as intended by God is given in the Zacchaeus story (Lk 19:1-10). The counselor must pay attention to the preferred expression of forgiveness in his context and will favour a balance between reconciliation and reparation with a pedagogic intention.

5.4.10 The Holy Spirit and Shame and Guilt-Oriented Conscience

To conclude this section, we want to reflect on the relation between conscience and the Holy Spirit. In the OT, the conscience is situated in the covenant relationship and its standards. Man is seen as image and covenant partner of God. He belongs to God. Consciousness becomes belonging³⁵ when man abides in the covenant relationship (Maurer 1966:907). The conscience is activated with anxiety, shame or guilt after a violation of the covenant. In the OT, several anthropological terms (preferentially heart and kidneys) and situations express the concept of conscience. In the NT, the OT concept continues. Additionally, Paul and some other authors introduce the term *syneidēsis* and generally give it the meaning of an anthropological authority

³⁵ Germ. *Ge-wissen wird Ge-hören*.

reacting to one's behaviour according to given standards. This makes the term humanly imperfect, as is shown in the discussion in 1Cor 8 & 10. However, *syneidēsis* has the authority of God behind it (Rom 2:15f.; 13:5; 2Cor 4:2). John affirms in OT terms: „God is greater than the heart,“ that is, the conscience (1Jn 3:20f.). Conscience is at once a human and supra-human instance (Egelkraut 1996).

The Church Fathers including Origen in his commentary to Romans start to identify *syneidēsis* with the Holy Spirit, which indwells man according to 1Cor 2:11f. Origen presents the spirit, the *syneidēsis*, as educator and leader of the *psychē* (Krüger 1984:219). This conception could be promoted by Rom 9:1, which speaks of the fact that the *syneidēsis* witnesses *en pneumatī hagio* „in the Holy Spirit.“ However, 2Cor 1:22 states that the Spirit is given in our hearts (consciences) as a guarantee differentiating clearly between Spirit and conscience. And Rom 2:15 and 13:5 clearly differentiate between the conscience and God's judgement. Consequently, the conscience must be the hinge between man and God, between the human spirit and the Holy Spirit. Although the Spirit can lead through conscience, conscience cannot be equated with the Holy Spirit (Dye 1976:32; Eckstein 1983; Priest 1994:294).

During spiritual rebirth, man is washed, sanctified, and justified in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ by the Holy Spirit (1Cor 6:11). Therefore, baptism can be a pledge of a good conscience towards God (1Pet 3:21). This implies that during conversion conscience is changed: it becomes theonomous (2Tim 1:3; Kähler 1967:309; Hahn 1990:559). According to Freytag, its clock is set to normal time (Beyerhaus 1961:147). This does not exempt it from a long process of reorientation through intimate communion with God and his Word (Hebr 13:18). Under the tutelage of this new authority, the Triune God, with the influence of the written Word of God, the conscience of the new believer is gradually changed in certain needed areas toward greater conformity with the written Word (Priest 1994:311).

In Eph 3:17, Paul prays that Christ may dwell in Ephesians' hearts through faith. „The obedience of faith is the answer of man to the word of God which witnesses in his conscience ... The answer of faith is only genuine when it is the expression of his own conscience“ (Beyerhaus 1961:147). This fact makes faith become a key term for understanding the conscience in the NT. The Christian conscience is no longer enslaved to the law anymore, but through faith, directed by the Holy Spirit. Thus, „where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom“ (2Cor 3:17). Only the Lordship of Jesus Christ and his law of love limit this freedom (1Cor

3:23; 6:12; 10:23). Christian life „in Christ,“ that is life in the Spirit, permits to have a good conscience.

With conversion, the conscience becomes theonomous. This means that God has to become a bigger preoccupation than the social group (cp. 2Sam 6:14-16; Lk 19:1-10). The basic conscience orientation acquired in childhood however will hardly change. Nevertheless, a guilt-oriented conscience can become more shame-oriented under the influence of the overwhelming relationship with the Triune God, and a shame-oriented conscience can turn more guilt-oriented under the exposition to God's commandments. Additionally, the conscience will be sensitised through the exposition to the Triune God. It will add new layers of identification in the ego-ideal (Piers 1971:27). These identifications will be with God in Jesus Christ, as the apostle Paul indicates (Eph 5:1; Phil 2:5). The process of maturation aims ideally for a more balanced conscience orientation. „Conscience should never become static; it must stay dynamic“ (Müller 1988:446). The Holy Spirit continually assists in this process by giving correction and new insights.

6 A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF CONSCIENCE CAN ENRICH AND PROMOTE CROSS-CULTURAL CHRISTIAN MINISTRY

In this last chapter, we will first attempt a summary of our thesis. Then, we will reflect on a possible better solution to John's story. Thirdly, we will propose areas of further research.

6.1 Summary

At the beginning of our study, we have conducted an interdisciplinary literature survey in order to arrive at a working definition of the conscience. In view of the fallen state of man, we have proposed a soteriological definition of the conscience. We have seen that every definition of conscience has to include shame and guilt. Even when the Bible, a society, psychology or cultural anthropology does not mention the term conscience, conscience is involved when shame or guilt are present. The difference between shame and guilt, in the first psychoanalytic model presented, is that of a shortcoming in relation to an ideal as compared to a transgression of a standard. According to the second cognitive model, it is either a global or a specific attribution of failure. These two models are helpful, but have their limitations. Our interdisciplinary approach to the conscience has proved fruitful. This underlines the fact that elenctics are an interdisciplinary endeavour (cp. Müller 1988:418–426).


Then, we looked at shame and guilt in Scripture. We found that the Bible is not only guilt-oriented or has a guilt-oriented message. God's goal in redemptive history is a balanced shame and guilt-oriented conscience. Shame before God is as valuable and as frequent as guilt before God. One of the major messages of the Bible is that God is and has to be our significant other. Of course, a shame-oriented conscience will be more geared to its social context than a guilt-oriented conscience. This horizontal perspective is as important in the covenant relationship as its vertical counterpart.

In the reflection on the theoretical implications for cross-cultural Christian ministry, we have seen that conscience orientation influences both personality and culture. We have presented ideal-type extremes of shame and guilt-oriented personalities and cultures. In reality however, personalities and cultures are always a mixture of both shame and guilt orientation. Theology as a part of culture is also a function of conscience orientation in relation to systematic and practical theology, ethics, and exegesis. The conscience orientations of missionary

and target people influence all domains of cross-cultural Christian ministry, that is, communication and contextualization, evangelism, church planting and counseling.

The proposed soteriological model is simple enough to be applied by any missionary to his everyday situations. Conscience states can be attributed to the shame-honour or the guilt-justice axis. Practical situations are however always a mixture of both. The everyday use of the model can simplify, enrich and promote cross-cultural Christian ministry. In figure 6.1, the English version of the revised model is reproduced.

Figure 6.1: Soteriological Model of the Conscience



6.2 A Better Solution to John's Story

At the end of our study, we must ask ourselves whether John's story could have a better ending than the one given in the beginning of the study. John and the missionaries did not understand each other. Both of them saw the other as a bad Christian who was not ready to repent or forgive. Are shame and guilt-oriented persons doomed to misunderstand and frustrate each other?

Understanding the different functioning of the two consciences does not avoid frustrations, but permits each party to analyze the experiences and to understand them better. It also helps envisage a better compromise. A possible approach to a better solution has to take into account the shame and guilt-oriented concepts of forgiveness. John expected to be restored in his prior position as a driver of the mission without participation in the reparation. The missionaries did not want to accept this because of repeated alcohol abuse, apparent lack of repentance and unwillingness to repair at least a small part of the damage. A better solution

could have been found through compromise. The missionaries should have understood John's attempts to reconciliation through mediators as a sign of repentance, rather than an easy way out. Surely, they would have had to see a change in John's behaviour in relation to alcohol abuse. The time to make this change apparent could have been agreed upon as a time of discipline during which John could have worked for a lower salary in another job in the mission's workshop in order to permit him to pay back his part of the reparation. John would have had to understand that he could not be reengaged by the mission without a resolution of his alcohol abuse and without some participation in the car repair, as little it would be. After a time of abstinence and goodwill in reimbursement, the mission could have reengaged John. If these compromises are not perceived or do not seem possible, then there is no better solution for John's problem.

6.3 Further Research

The reader understands that this study is preliminary. It is a first attempt to gain an overview on the subject of shame and guilt. Further research is necessary to investigate the complex relationship, which exists between shame and guilt orientations in the following phenomena in individuals and in society:

1. A developed guilt orientation and an underdeveloped shame orientation
2. An underdeveloped guilt orientation and a well developed shame orientation
3. An underdevelopment of both guilt and shame orientation
4. A balanced and healthy development of both guilt and shame orientation
5. A highly developed and yet unhealthy (toxic) guilt or shame orientation

Other areas of needed research:

Elenctics: As Bavinck (1960), Hesselgrave (1978:421; 1983:478f.) and Müller (1988: 425f.) have suggested, the interdisciplinary study of elenctics should be systematically established in the discipline of missiology. We consider that the interdisciplinary approach of Müller and of this study have proved fruitful. But more in-depth research is necessary. Researchers from shame-oriented contexts should conduct further interdisciplinary studies in the field of elenctics.

Psychology: We have been able to retain two differential models of shame and guilt, one from psychoanalysis (Piers 1953) and the other from cognitive behavioural theory (Lewis 1992). Both have their limits. Other models of the differential functioning of conscience are

needed. More research is needed on personality typology, especially using a more appropriate questionnaire.

Cultural Anthropology: The two psychological models retained have been little tested in cross-cultural settings. More research in cross-cultural psychology or psychological anthropology is needed. We have hypothesized that animism is a function of shame-oriented conscience. This theory must be researched in greater depth.

Judicial System: Shame has found little attention in the judicial system. Shame-rage spirals are responsible for a great part of criminality. A reflection on the penal system in relation to shame-oriented criminals is necessary.

Politics: Politicians are normally shame-oriented personalities. What effect does this have on world politics? The possibilities and drawbacks in the resolution of conflicts and in the collaboration between predominantly shame and guilt-oriented countries should be studied.

Economics: Corruption has been identified as a characteristic of a shame-oriented society. Kleiner has made a proposal for a theory of corruption. It should be developed further in order to find possible solutions to this worldwide problem.

Exegesis: Most commentaries have been written in guilt-oriented perspective. Some newer commentaries are based on a uniquely shame-oriented perspective. Systematic Bible studies from a balanced shame and guilt-oriented perspective should be conducted. My hypothesis that the Bible implies and that God aims at a balanced conscience orientation should be further evaluated.

Theology: Guilt-oriented Western theologians or Western trained two-thirds-world theologians have written most of the existing theological textbooks. Systematical and practical theology should be systematically approached from the shame and guilt perspective.

Ethics: Conscience orientation has a great impact on the kind of ethics practiced in a given society. To my knowledge, no studies exist on ethics within shame contexts. The whole field of ethics should be systematically examined in this perspective.

The above catalogue is surely not exhaustive. Many other research topics can be thought of. The author encourages researchers from shame-oriented contexts to undertake systematic research in the field of elenctics.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Synopsis of Syneidesis, Conscientia, Conscience according to Eckstein

Source: Eckstein 1983:12.

non-reflexive	reflexive						
knowing with sb. of sth.	consciousness	moral consciousness / conscience			innermost		
under the aspect of:	non-moral	conscientia consequens		conscientia antecedens		the real „self,“ the „heart,“ the inwardness	
- witness (neutral)	rational self-reflection related to knowledge	controlling and judging one's given and accepted norms		own behaviour according to	prescribing behaviour, directing to duty and responsibility	in opposition to:	
- complicity	knowledge	as consciousness / as pain	as instance		under the application of given norms	- the superficial, recognizable from outside	
- intimacy (closing of the common knowledge)		(rational) / (emotional)	(objectivizing)		in one's own consciousness of normative capacity (<i>lex</i>)	values and one's own <i>naturalis, vox Dei</i>	- the opinion and influence of others
- recognition, agreement		related to a concrete act or as remaining consciousness as a „bad conscience“	e.g. witness, spectator		synteresis	conscientia (in the special sense)	
		as a „good conscience“ (lack of a bad conscience or consciousness of good behaviour)	accuser, convincer		essential knowledge of good and evil, moral capacity of deciding	moral instance deciding and reinforcing concrete behaviour	
			judge				


Appendix 2: Synopsis of Conscience Theories according to Kettling

Source: Kettling 1985:67.

	Perspective	Character of Conscience	Representative	Critical Evaluation	Positive Evaluation
I	<i>From deep below</i> from mystic depth	„ <i>A rapacious beast</i> “ attack of the erinyes	Greek tragedians	Only „terror“ from anonymous id-powers	The monstrosity of the pain of conscience is taken into account
II	<i>From below</i> biological from the assumed animal, genetic make-up	„ <i>The most terrible disease</i> “ the beating inside of the once lord-like predator	Friedrich Nietzsche	Real freedom is liberation from conscience? (= being without conscience)	Clairvoyance of hate: correlation between God-commandment- conscience-guilt
IIIa	<i>From the side</i> sociological	„ <i>Collecting basin of the norms of the context</i> “ standard: the practicable (good-evil) foreign-directed „norm-conscience“	Spencer, Durkheim	Conscience - <i>nothing else</i> <i>than</i> the echo of the context? only the law of majority?	The conscience can be trained, manipulated; the contents are conditioned by the context (relativity)
IIIb	<i>From inside</i> depth psychological	„Internalized norm of society“ super-ego <i>guilt conscience</i>	Sigmund Freud	a) Conscience - finally war ground between the eternally fighting antagonists <i>eros</i> and <i>thanatos</i> ? b) Only „internalized“ education?	The radical seriousness of analysis (proximity to Rom 7)
IV	<i>From above</i> religious-idealistic	„ <i>Voice of God in man</i> “ internal court of justice tendency for the absolute	<i>Variations:</i> Seneca, Kant, Fichte	The illusion of the God-like autonomy of conscience „conscience as last authority“	The relationship of the question about conscience and about God is in view

Appendix 3: Synopsis of Conscience Theories according to Rüdiger


Source: Rüdiger 1976:463.



Appendix 4: Structural Model of Conscience and Personality according to Vetter


Source: Vetter 1966:159
S. Müller 1984:58

(Emotional centre = *Gemüt*)



Appendix 5: Structural Model of Conscience according to Müller


Source: Müller 1983a:3; 1988:428; 1996a:103.




Appendix 6: The Differential Functioning of Shame and Guilt-Oriented Consciences according to Müller

Source: Müller 1988:440.

Functioning of the Shame-Oriented Conscience



Functioning of the Guilt-Oriented Conscience



Appendix 7: Taxonomy of Biblical Terms in the Semantic Domain of Disharmony

Source: adapted from Lienhard 2001a:246.

Disharmony								
Guilt			Shame					
Guilt as deviation of a standard	Guilt as legal fact	Guilt resulting in punishment	Public dishonour, humiliation			Disrespect, humillia- tion	Infer- iority	
			wrong done	relationship issue			shameful state	fear of shame
				trust	position			
ʿāwōn	ʾāšām	enochos aitia	ʿerwâ yābēš kʿlimmâ klm entrepō entropē aischron aischemosynē deigmatizō paradeigmatizō atimia atimazō	qālâ bōš bōšet aischynomai kataischynomai	aischynē anepaischyntos aischynomai epaischynomai kataischynomai	ḥpr tapeinō atimazō atimia oneidizō	ḥerpâ	yrʾ phobeomai


Appendix 8: Taxonomy of Biblical Terms in the Semantic Domain of Restoring Harmony

Source: adapted from Lienhard 2001a:248.

Restoring Harmony								
Repentance					Forgiveness			
Change of Self		Be sorry		Humility	Forgive	Make peace	Reinsert	Justify
New allegiance	Change of life	Regret sin	Confess sin					
<i>ydh</i> <i>šûb</i> <i>homologeō</i> <i>homologia</i> <i>metanoia</i>	<i>kānaʿ</i> <i>ʿānāh</i> <i>metanoia</i> <i>metanoēō</i> <i>metamelomai</i>	<i>nḥm</i> <i>ydh</i> <i>metanoēō</i> <i>homologeō</i>	<i>ḥāṭāʾ</i> <i>tōdāh</i> <i>ydh</i> <i>exhomologeō</i> <i>hēmartoō</i> <i>paradeigmatizō</i> <i>atimia</i> <i>atimazō</i>	<i>kānaʿ</i> <i>ʿānāh</i> <i>tapeinoō</i> <i>tapeinomai</i>	<i>kpr</i> <i>slḥ</i> <i>nāśāʾ</i> <i>charizomai</i> <i>aphiēmi</i> <i>aphesis</i>	<i>kpr</i> <i>špṭ</i> <i>šōpēṭ</i> <i>hilaskomai</i> <i>hilasmos</i> <i>hilastērion</i>	<i>gʾl</i> <i>kbd</i> <i>kābôd</i> <i>hādar</i> <i>ḥōd</i> <i>yqr</i> <i>timē</i> <i>timaō</i>	<i>špṭ</i> <i>šdq</i> <i>dikaioō</i> <i>dikaios</i> <i>dikaiosynē</i>

Appendix 9: Prototype View of Biblical Terms in the Semantic Domain of Disharmony

Source: adapted from Lienhard 2001a:251.



Appendix 10: Prototype View of Biblical Terms in the Semantic Domain of Restoring Harmony

Source: adapted from Lienhard 2001a:252.



Appendix 11: Personality as a Function of Conscience Orientation

Source: adapted from Lingenfelter/Mayers 1986:42,58,83,100,107;
 Gudykunst/Ting-Toomey 1988:93,158, Triandis 1994:167-172;
 Hofstede 1997:90; van der Walt 1997:31-34,81.

GUILT ORIENTATION	SHAME ORIENTATION
• The person tries to be right • Specific failure: „My act is bad“ • Feels guilt after transgression • Peace when fault is repaired	• The person searches harmony and honour • Global failure: „I am bad“ • Feels shame after discovery of failure • Peace when harmony and honour are restored
Individualism	Collectivism
• A high regard for the individual • Exclusive attitude • Individual independence • Competition, confrontation • Individual initiative is highly regarded - personal achievement is more important than attention to the community • Individual interests are more important than group interests • Changes the situation to fit the self, rather than the self to fit the situation • The rights of the individual are stressed • Acquisition for personal use, materialism • Decisions are often taken individually - don't waste time through discussions • Direct communication • Honesty, frankness, incorruptibility, steadfastness and perseverance - all individual virtues (shame-oriented people might regard this as rude) • Formality, independence, self-sufficiency are highly regarded	• A high regard for the in-group • Inclusive attitude • Dependence on the group, interdependence • Cooperation, peaceful coexistence • Individual initiative is not appreciated or encouraged - good human relations are a priority • In-Group interests are more important than individual interests • Changes self to fit the situation rather than the situation to fit the self • Duties towards the community are stressed • Readily shares with others, generosity • Decisions have to be taken with the approval of the in-group • Indirect communication • Modesty, compliance, pliability, willingness to compromise (guilt-oriented people see this perhaps as a sign of dishonesty) • Friendliness, helpfulness, hospitality, patience and brotherliness are highly regarded
Individual Identity	Corporate Identity
• Identity through individual perception • Personal identity is determined by one's achievements, what one has done • Security through the feeling that one is right relative to particular standards, rules and goals	• Identity through in-group perception • Personal identity is determined by in-group status: age, birth, title and rank • Security through multiple interactions and membership within in-group and society

Time Orientation	Event Orientation
• Concern for punctuality and amount of time expended • Careful allocation of time to achieve the maximum within set limits • Tightly scheduled, goal-directed activities, fixed program • Rewards offered as incentives for efficient use of time • Quantitative concept of time (<i>chronos</i>) • Emphasis on dates and history	• Concern for details of the event, regardless of time required • Exhaustive consideration of a problem until resolved • A „let come what may“ outlook not tied to any precise schedule • Stress on completing the event as a reward in itself • Qualitative concept of time (<i>kairos</i>) • Emphasis on present experience
Task Orientation	Person Orientation
• Focuses on tasks and principles • Finds satisfaction in the achievement of goals • The achievement of tasks is more important than relationships • Seeks friends with similar goals • Accepts loneliness and social deprivation for the sake of personal achievements	• Focuses on persons and relationships • Finds satisfaction in interaction with people • Relationships are more important than the achievement of tasks • Seeks friends who are group-oriented • Deplores loneliness; sacrifices personal achievements for in-group interaction
Achievement Focus	Status Focus
• Prestige is attained • Personal identity is determined by one's achievements as knowledge & possessions • The amount of respect one receives varies with one's accomplishments and failures - attention focuses on personal performance without respect of status • The individual is extremely self-critical and makes sacrifices in order to accomplish ever greater deeds • People associate with those of equal accomplishments regardless of background • All have equal rights and chances - egalitarian society	• Prestige is ascribed • Personal identity is determined by formal credentials of age, birth, rank & title • The amount of respect one receives is permanently fixed; attention fixes on those with high social status in spite of any personal failings • The individual is expected to play his or her role and to sacrifice in order to attain higher rank • People associate with those of equal social status • Rights and chances according to status - hierarchical society

Analytic Thinking	Synthetic Thinking
• Judgments are right/wrong, black/white • Either - or logic • Reductionist, fragmented knowledge: specific criteria are uniformly applied and specific aspects evaluated in others • Abstract, removed from reality • Conceptual • Observes object of knowledge at a distance • Emphasis on things • Information and experiences are systematically organized; details are sorted and ordered to form a clear pattern • Analytic conclusions • Learning through explanations	• Judgments are open-ended • And - and logic • Holistic, integral, totality knowledge: the whole person and all circumstances are taken into consideration • Close to concrete reality • Relational • Closely involved with object of knowledge • Emphasis on human interaction • Information and experiences are seemingly disorganized; details (narratives, events, portraits) stand as independent points • Analogue conclusions • Learning through imitation
Willingness to Lose Face	Fear of Losing Face
• Relative unconcern about one's error and failure • Willingness to push beyond one's limits and enter the unknown • Ready admission of culpability, weakness, and shortcomings • Openness to positive criticism • Willingness to talk freely about personal life • Truthfulness is more important than harmony of relationships	• Protection of self-image at all cost; avoidance of error and failure • Reluctance to go beyond one's recognized limits or to enter the unknown • Denial of culpability; withdrawal from activities in order to hide weakness • Criticism is seen as personal attack • Vagueness regarding personal life • Harmony in relationships is more important than truthfulness

Appendix 12: Questionnaire on Personality Typology

Source: adapted from Lingenfelter/Mayers 1986:29-35.

Determine to what extent each of the following statements describes your thinking and approach to life. If the statement is *not at all* descriptive of you, write the number 1 in the blank space. If it is *very* descriptive of you, write the number 7. Write the number 4 if the statement describes you only somewhat. Use the number 2 or 3 for items that are less descriptive of you, and the number 5 or 6 for those that are more descriptive. Respond to all statements with a number from 1 to 7.

1. I would not feel comfortable working for a large company because I would never see the whole picture of what I was working on.
2. I seek out friends and enjoy talking about any subject that happens to come up.
3. I avoid setting goals for fear that I might not reach them.
4. I am more concerned about what I have accomplished than I am with the position and title of my job.
5. I seldom think much about the future; I just like to get involved in things as they turn up.
6. I feel things are either right or wrong; discussion of „gray“ areas makes me uncomfortable and seems to compromise the truth.
7. When making a decision, I feel that more than one of the options can be a right choice.
8. When I set a goal, I dedicate myself to reaching that goal, even if other areas of my life suffer as a result of it.
9. I am always one of the first to try something new.
10. I tend to associate only with people of the same social status.
11. I feel strongly that time is a scarce commodity, and I value it highly.
12. When my car needs tuning, I go to the dealer rather than let my neighbour who works out of his garage do the job. With professionals I know it will be done right.
13. I like performing before an audience because it pushes me to perform better.
14. My primary criteria for buying a car are low price and a record of quality and reliability; I do not let family or friends influence me to spend more for a „name brand.“
15. My desk or work area is very organized. There is a place for everything, and everything is in its place.
16. If offered a promotion that entailed moving to another city, I would not be held back by relationships to parents and friends.
17. I find it difficult to relate to people who have a significantly higher occupational or social position than mine.
18. I always wear a watch and refer to it regularly in order not to be late for anything.
19. I feel frustrated if someone treats me like a stereotype.
20. When waiting in line, I tend to start up conversations with people I do not know.
21. I hate to arrive late; sometimes I stay away rather than walk in late.
22. I get annoyed at people who want to stop discussion and push the group to make a decision, especially when everybody has not had a chance to express their opinions.
23. I plan my daily and weekly activities. I am annoyed when my schedule or routine gets interrupted.
24. I do not take sides in a discussion until I have heard all of the arguments.
25. Completing a task is almost an obsession with me, and I cannot be content until I am finished.

26. I enjoy breaking out of my routine and doing something totally different every now and then to keep life exciting.
27. When involved in a project, I tend to work on it until completion, even if that means being late on other things.
28. Even though I know it might rain, I would attend a friend's barbecue rather than excuse myself to repair the damage a storm has done to my roof.
29. I always submit to the authority of my boss, pastor, and teachers, even if I feel they may be wrong.
30. I feel that there is a standard English grammar and that all Americans should use it.
31. To make meals more interesting, I introduce changes into the recipes I find in cookbooks.
32. I argue my point to the end, even if I know I am wrong.
33. I do not feel that anything I have done in the past matters much; I have to keep proving myself every day.
34. When starting a new job, I work especially hard to prove myself to my fellow workers.
35. When introducing important people, I usually include their occupation and title.
36. I talk with others about my problems and ask them for advice.
37. I avoid participating in games at which I am not very good.
38. Even if in a hurry while running errands, I will stop to talk with a friend.
39. I have set specific goals for what I want to accomplish in the next year and the next five years.
40. I enjoy looking at art and trying to figure out what the artist was thinking and trying to communicate.
41. I feel uncomfortable and frustrated when a discussion ends without a clear resolution of the issue; nobody wins the argument.
42. I resist a scheduled life, preferring to do things on the spur of the moment.
43. When leading a meeting, I make sure that it begins and ends on time.

Analysis

To determine your personal profile, fill in below your responses to each of the corresponding statements in the questionnaire (number of statements are in brackets). Then add the five numbers in each line and divide the total by five to obtain your average score for each trait.

No	Personality Trait						Total	Average
1.	Time orientation	(11) __	(18) __	(21) __	(23) __	(43) __	_____	_____
2.	Event orientation	(5) __	(22) __	(27) __	(28) __	(42) __	_____	_____
3.	Analytic thinking	(6) __	(10) __	(15) __	(30) __	(41) __	_____	_____
4.	Synthetic thinking	(1) __	(7) __	(19) __	(24) __	(40) __	_____	_____
5.	Task orientation	(8) __	(12) __	(16) __	(25) __	(39) __	_____	_____
6.	Person orientation	(2) __	(35) __	(20) __	(28) __	(38) __	_____	_____
7.	Achievement focus	(4) __	(14) __	(19) __	(33) __	(34) __	_____	_____
8.	Status focus	(10) __	(17) __	(29) __	(30) __	(35) __	_____	_____
9.	Willingness to lose face	(9) __	(13) __	(26) __	(31) __	(36) __	_____	_____
10.	Fear of losing face	(3) __	(21) __	(29) __	(32) __	(37) __	_____	_____

To determine your conscience orientation, fill in below your average to each of the personality traits. Then add the five numbers in each line and divide the total by five to obtain your average score for each conscience orientation.

	Conscience orientation	No	No	No	No	No	Total	Average
A.	Guilt orientation	(1) _	(3) _	(5) _	(7) _	(9) _	_____	_____
B.	Shame orientation	(2) _	(4) _	(6) _	(8) _	(10) _	_____	_____

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