



A comparative analysis of the relationship between political party preference and one-party dominance in Botswana and South Africa

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DECLARATION

I declare that this dissertation is my original work and it has not been submitted anywhere in full or partially to any university for a degree. All contributions and sources cited here have been duly acknowledged through complete references.

Obakeng Naledi Modise

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“I was lucky to have been born in a family that knew the value of education, I was very fortunate to come from a family who gave me the opportunities and skills to succeed in life. Thereafter, I have had to work hard to be lucky” Khaya Dlanga

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my mother, **Kenewang Aletta Modise**, without whom I would not have been.

ACRONYMS

ANC	African National Congress
ARAP	Accelerated Rain-fed Arable Programme
ARDP	Accelerated Rural Development Programme
AZAPO	Azania People's Organization
BAM	Botswana Alliance Movement
BAM	Botswana Alliance Movement
BCP	Botswana Congress Party
BDP	Botswana Democratic Party
BEE	Broad Based Economic Empowerment
BIP	Botswana Independence Party
BMC	Botswana Meat Commission
BN	Barisan Nasional
BNF	Botswana National Front
BPP	Botswana People's Party
BTTO	Botswana Tlhoko Tiro Organisation
BWF	Botswana Workers' Front
CCM	Chama Cha Mapinduzi
CONTRALESA	Congress of Traditional Leaders
COPE	Congress of the People
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
DA	Democratic Alliance
DP	Democratic Party
EFF	Economic Freedom Fighters
FF+	Freedom Front Plus
FP	Freedom Party
FPTP	First Past the Post
IC	Independent Candidates
IFP	Independence Freedom Party
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
MELS	Marxist-Leninist Communist Party
NDF	National Democratic Front
NDF	New Democratic Front

NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NNP	New National Party
NP	National Party
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress
PR	Proportional Representation
SABC	South African Broadcasting Corporation
SACP	African Communist Party
SADC	South African Development Community
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SWAPO	South Western People's Organization
UAP	United Action Party (Bosele)
UDC	Umbrella for Democratic Change
UDF	United Democratic Front
UDM	Umbrella for Democratic Change
USA	United States of America
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic
Front	

ABSTRACT

Through employing a comparative case study as a research design as well as the data collection technique of document analysis, this study sought to comparatively examine whether party preference led to one party dominance in Botswana and South Africa. The main sources of data for the study were the Afrobarometer surveys cycles of 2002/2003, 2005/2006, 2008/2009, and 2011/2013 as well as 2014/2015 and the National Election results of both countries between the years 2004-2014.

The study revealed amongst other things that the Batswana like South Africans were in favour of many political parties within their state. However, as compared to the Batswana, South Africans possessed higher tolerance towards opposition political parties. While at the same time in both countries, there is more trust towards incumbent governing parties. This sentiment was consistent with electoral results in which the Botswana Democratic Party enjoyed majority support, since opposition parties had fragmented support. These findings are similar to South African experience.

Despite the positive predisposition towards the governing parties in both countries; the study further provided evidence that in Botswana opposition parties enjoyed a larger share of the electoral support, which is fragmented amongst the opposition political parties; as a result, this fragmentation in conjunction with the electoral system in Botswana maintains the BDP's electoral and legislative dominance. While in South Africa, voter apathy maintains one party dominance. This is a result of failure of some of the South African electorate to take advantage of their universal suffrage right. To this end, the remaining active voters continue to maintain dominance of the ANC.

Key words: ***one party dominance, party preference, voter behaviour, electoral system, opposition parties***

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CHAPTER ONE

1. Introduction

Between the years, 1990 and 1994 several African states experienced political transitions from military dictatorships and one party states to multi-party democratic systems. These transitions from authoritarian type regimes to democracy. In scholarly and popular discourse this period known as the “third wave of democratization” which was defined by Huntington (1991:15) as:

“A group of transitions from non-democratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber the transitions in the opposite direction during that period”.

The conceptualization of the “waves of democratization” by Huntington (1991) came as a result of his evaluation 35 countries in Asian and Latin American countries which had undergone political transitions from authoritarian to democratic systems respectively. These countries transitioned from non-democratic to democratic political systems throughout the period 1970-1980. Huntington (1991) termed this period the “third wave” of democratization since the first two “waves” as discussed by London (1993), occurred during the periods 1828-1926 and 1943-1962.

The third wave of democratization began in Southern Europe in the mid-1970s and continued to other regions such as South America from the late 1970’s until the early 1980’s. By the end of the 1980’s the transitions had reached most parts of the East, South East and South Asia. Toward the end of the 1980’s the transition had reached East Europe which was a predominantly communist region. This democratic transition later found its way to Africa at the beginning of the 1990s (Diamond, 1997).

The transition to multi-party democratic political systems in Africa, followed the one party authoritarian era between 1960 and 1980. This immediate post-independence era saw a number of African states abandon multi-party democracy on the basis that it deterred efforts from economic development, nation building and reconciliation (Shillington, 2005; 441; Thompson, 2010; Matlosa, 2004).

Democracy, it was argued to be a western imposition and a foreign practice to Africa (*ibid*). As a result, the majority of newly independent African states adopted variants

of Marxist-Communist ideology in which political pluralism in the form of multi-party democracy was rejected in favour of one party presence with the exception of Botswana and Mauritius (*opcit*). However, the end of the Cold War and the demise of Apartheid in South Africa catalysed the third wave of democracy across the African continent (Matlosa, 2007). This wave of democratic transition in various African countries became hope for social transformation within the continent (Adibe, 2012).

However, the democratic transition of the 1990s left African states with similar challenges relating to the operationalizing of democracy faced by the newly independent states of the 1960's. For instance the task of democratic consolidation. Thompson (2010) succinctly details some interrelated challenges to the consolidation of democracy in Africa. These challenges included and still include; lack of a strong civil society which is unable to play watchdog role, failing economies which led and still to civil disobedience as well as ethnic divisions inspiring mobilisation along ethnic lines which ultimately undermines the quality of democracy and the meddling of the military in the political affairs of the state.

For instance, West African states have a history of military intervention into the political affairs of the state. Consequently, the *coup de tat* curse continues to haunt West Africa even in its new democratic era. This is because in the region the army is deeply entrenched in politics. In the period between 1990 till 2011, the region experienced 34 military *coup d'états* (Adibe, 2012). In addition, some of the most pressing challenges include the absence of a credible opposition as well as the inability of political ruling parties to separate state administration and party politics (*ibid*).

In most Southern Africa states, there is a growing tendency to usurp state institutions by the ruling party. This in turn, blurs the lines between state and party, leads to an uneven distribution and access to resources and a negative bias of security forces towards opposition parties (Cole, 2015; Brooks, 2004).

Furthermore, multi-party democracy requires multiple political parties. Should the electorate be unhappy with its government policies or conduct it needs an alternative party that it can elect into power. However, credible choices of other political parties are not always available which often results in one party dominating the political landscape of a country. This trend is particularly common in southern Africa. In Botswana, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia have consistently elections since

liberation yet the results of these elections have been predictable as there is yet to be a changeover of government from one political party to another (*ibid*).

Concerns about the democratic development in Africa stems from the realisation that elections are necessary but are not the only adequate measure of democracy. Thus far, elections on the continent are met with apathy because of their predictability of their outcome and are often associated with violence, which indicates that the existence of institutions alone does not guarantee democratic habituation and consolidation (Adibe, 2012).

These developments have cast a shadow of doubt over hopes for democratic consolidation in Africa. As a result these advances have birthed new academic enquiry to the value of democratisation and whether this new democratic transition is likely to succeed or not. These concerns seem to be more urgent twenty years after the transition to multi-party democracy, and are no longer interpreted as alarmist or conservative because they have proven to withstand the test of time.

The factors that are considered to be a challenge for the consolidation of democracy in Southern Africa which include the non-viable political opposition and the blurring between state and party and as such resulted in the emergence of one party dominance in the region. One party dominance is understood as a political condition whereby one party dominates the political landscape within a state and there are very little prospects of electoral defeat (Brooks, 2004). According to Matlosa and Karume (2004) states where one party dominates are often characterised by

“The existence of multiple opposition parties, with one dominant party that directs the political system. This dominant party is firmly in control of state power over a fairly long period of the time that even opposition parties make little if any dent on the political hegemony of a dominant ruling party”.

One party dominance contradicts the very assumptions of multiparty democracy (Mtimkhulu, 2006) because one party dominant states do not follow the normative model of political party competition, consequently this occurrence is considered abnormal for a democratic system (Doreenspleet and Nijzink, 2013; 2; McEldowney, 2013).

This anomaly is reflected in the dominant party's unmatched political influence and power; which translates into consistent electoral victory that gives it the power to set

and implement policy (Cole, 2015). Although a state may have multiple political parties in the legislature, the dominance of one party tends to create what Crenson and Ginsbreg (2002) cited by Maseng (2015; 189) describes as a downsized democracy. A democracy in which the participatory process is monopolised by the elite.

Dominant parties also possess a significant margin of victory, with the size of the gap between the winning party and the next closest party being substantially large (Cole, 2015). In an evaluation of party systems in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region Karume (2004) provides a snapshot of election results from different SADC countries from 1995-2001. In Tanzania the ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) enjoyed between 80.2% and 89.1% of the electoral vote, South Western People's Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia enjoyed support beyond 75% threshold.

Botswana and South Africa are the states discussed in the study. Botswana and South Africa have for several years been under the political reality of one party dominance. Since the attainment of emancipation from British colonial rule in 1966 in Botswana and the emergence of an inclusive democracy in 1994 in South Africa, neither of these countries have experienced a transfer of executive authority from one political party to another (Giliomee *et al*, 2000). Yet in both these countries the standards of procedural democracy are upheld, due to the fact that both countries have held elections consistently in accordance to their legal prescripts.

In addition, substantive democracy in the sense of a general respect for human rights as well as the supremacy of the constitution are respectively upheld. Since this is a comparative study it is significant to offer some insights on electoral politics and one party dominance in Botswana and South Africa respectively in order for the reader to understand the historical context of one party dominance in both these southern African states.

1.1 Electoral Politics vis-à-vis One Party Dominance in Botswana

The first political parties in Botswana were the Botswana People's Party (BPP) formed in 1960 and the Bechuanaland Democratic Party formed in 1962 which would later change its name to Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). The BDP was founded by Seretse Khama and Quett Masire. Unlike many of the governing parties in the

Southern African region, BDP is not a liberation movement which transformed into a governing political party. Instead, the BDP was formed to act as a buffer to the more radical nationalistic political parties that existed at the time (Maundeni *et al*, 2006). Particularly responding to the BPP's radical socialist stance, that it declare that it would abolish chieftainship, introduce a socialist economy, nationalise land owned by European settlers or absentee landlords and redistribute cattle. Their radical position alienated dominant interest and reduced their mass appeal (Tsie, 2011).

The politics of BDP were more palatable because Botswana never experienced a violent liberation transition. As a result the population held no resentment towards the Europeans and actually held them in high esteem because they had established a protectorate over Bechuanaland that exempted them from annexation by South Africa. Furthermore the close links between the Europeans and the Batswana were further entrenched by the marriage between Seretse Khama and Ruth Williams (Tsie, 2011).

Secondly the BDP adopted more pragmatic approach that reassured its followers that it would not abolish the chieftainship (Seretse Khama¹ was a paramount chief by birth), would respect private property, encourage free enterprise and strive for a multilateral approach to governance (*ibid*).

Moreover the BDP was able to attract to its side larger ethnolinguistic groups; the Bangwato, Bakgatla and Bakalanga. Finally the BDP also enjoyed support from civic organisations such as women groups, the business community and the rural people. (*ibid*)

Due to its moderate² politics the BDP enjoyed support from; the European settlers, up-and-coming business men, chiefs and overwhelming support from the poorest in the population. As a result the BDP was able to rally support from different parts of the

¹ Seretse Khama commanded legitimacy and trust because of his former position as paramount chief of the Bangoato and his charismatic leadership as a member of the out-going Legislative Council (Seabo & Molebatsi, 2017).

² Moderates in the political spectrum are individuals that are to a large extent satisfied with society. Although they acknowledge that there is room for improvement and insist that changes must be gradual and that no change so be so extreme that it will alter the structure of society. The BDP was considered to be moderates because the founding members of the BDP where members of the Colonial Legislative Council, they defended the rights of the minority settlers to participate politically and wished to continue the traditional hereditary structure of the Batswana Chiefs (Mokopakgosi & Molomo, 2000).

population that would place it firmly in control of the state machinery in 1966 (Selolwane, 2002).

The electoral success of BDP is married to Botswana's economic prosperity. At independence in 1966 Botswana was one of the poorest countries in the world with no economic, social and institutional infrastructure, there was no private sector to drive the economy. As a result the responsibility of economic development lay solely on the shoulders of the governing party (Maudeni *et al*, 2006).

In 1967 diamonds were discovered in Botswana and through wise policy choices and economic management by the BDP, the government of Botswana entered into a profitable partnership with De Beers to exploit diamonds (Tsie, 2011).

Following the discovery and centralisation of diamond mining in the 1970's the country's economy took off. This take off coincided with the global economic boom of the 1980's the country enjoyed unprecedented economic growth. Through the prudent management of the economy by the BDP government the country was able to overcome some of the challenges it faced at independence to become of the richest non-oil producing country in Africa (*ibid*).

This success completely disarmed the opposition and described them as critics who could not offer anything better than what already existed. In this regard, opposition parties in Botswana are up against a ruling party that has performed well in terms of human and infrastructure development. Initially the BDP used its cultural appeal and modest policies to attract support but sustained this appeal by making wise policy decisions that made for good governance (Tsie,2011).

The inaugural elections of 1966 became the initial point to thrust the BDP into dominance and the BPP into a minority opposition. Other than the radical³ politics of the BPP, the poor performance of the BPP can also be attributed to the leadership squabbles that saw it split into three factions. The splinter parties would form the BPP, which was eventually renamed the Botswana Independence Party (BIP). Sebodubodu and Osei-Hwedie (2010) identify this period as the beginning of factionalism and fragmentation of the opposition. In this respect, Botswana has thirteen opposition

³ All radicals demand immediate and fundamental change at the foundations of society and favour extreme methods of achieving this goals. In the case of Botswana the during the transition period to independence BPP demanded the abolition of hereditary power base that rested amongst the Batswana chiefs (Selolwane,2002).

parties which are breakaway parties from within these multiple political parties (Selolwane, 2002 ;Selolwane and Shale, 2006).

The emergence of these many political parties have resulted in small and politically weak opposition parties which are unable to or have very weak capacity to threaten the electoral hegemony of the ruling party (Khama, 2006; Nkalo,2011; Selolwane and Shale, 2006 ; Tsie, 2011; Lotshwao, 2011).

Other than the weak opposition, another contributor to the dominance of the BDP is the electoral system. Botswana employs the First Past the Post (FPTP) as its electoral system. In this system, a community or constituency is allowed one representative. The candidate who wins a simple majority in a constituency becomes an official representative of that particular constituency and as a result all the other candidates and their parties are not given a representative seat. This system links people's representatives to the constituency or ward which possibly enhances accountability by political representatives (Molomo, 2000).

The FPTP system disadvantages smaller parties because there is mismatch between the voter share and the allocation of seats, which affects the opposition negatively. In 2009 the BDP attracted 54% of the national votes and this translated in more than three quarters of parliamentary seats, BCM-BAM pact obtained 22.1% of the votes and 9% of parliamentary seats, BNF received 21.4% of votes and 11% of seats; the BPP obtained 1.4% and did not win any seat while independents received 1.4% of the votes and one seat (De Jager and Meintjies, 2013).

The electoral performance of a party is also determined by the nature of its support base. In Botswana support for the opposition is narrow and regionally drawn mainly from the minority non-Tswana ethnic groups. Secondly party membership and support is not class based but is largely gender based. The 2004 Democracy Research Project found that the BDP core support base is women, while men support BNF and BCP (Seabo, 2013).

Opposition parties in Botswana display similar weaknesses to most opposition parties across African States. These weaknesses are a result of inadequate resources, poor organization, factionalism and fragmentation and have a narrow support base. In Botswana these weaknesses are exacerbated by the lack of unity behind one

candidate, ethnic mistrust, differing ideologies and legal barriers and the demarcation of constituencies (*ibid*)

Furthermore the opposition is weakened by the demarcation of electoral constituencies which favours the governing BDP. The urban constituencies where the opposition has more support are outnumbered by the meagrely populated rural constituencies where the BDP is stronger (*ibid*). The opposition in Botswana is poorly resourced in comparison to the governing party which has access to more sources of funding including from private companies and party subscriptions (Sebudubudu, 2011). Funds and the staff available for a political party limit or enhance their capacity to mobilise support and visibility across the country (Du Toit and De Jager, 2014).

One of the major factors inhibiting effectiveness of political parties is lack of party funding. Opposition parties struggle to raise enough money to be able to carry out their election activities, while the ruling party enjoys the benefits availed by incumbency. The ruling party has been criticised for using state resources and for dominating the media during elections, making it relatively difficult for the opposition to use the media for election purposes (Tsie, 2011).

1.1.1 Voter Behaviour in Botswana

Initially commentators argued that the Botswana electorate voted largely on the basis of ethnicity (Holm, 1999). However, Botswana is a homogenous country and in these countries Mattes and Norris (2003) find that where ethno-linguistic cleavages are more homogeneous ethnicity plays an inconsequential role in determining party preference. As a result evaluative and demographic factors influence party preference in Botswana than ethnicity.

The dominant party in Botswana is the BDP. The stronghold of BDP support is the rural areas and is attributed to evaluative factors such as the first president's influence, and successful service delivery projects in the rural areas such as the provision of clean water, building of health facilities and schools and the construction of roads. The BDP has adopted positive policies and programmes aimed at rural development (Mpabanga,2000).

The ruling party's domain is the rural areas. The governing party's rural stronghold is consistent with findings by Matsheka and Botlhomilwe (2000) that the behaviour of the

electorate in Botswana from the 1980's adhere to the reward-punish model of voting which is dominant in western democracies. Despite the continued legislative dominance of the BDP their electoral share has been steadily declining reaching its lowest in the 2004 elections when it received 55% of the overall votes (Poteete, 2012).

Findings by Makomane (2000) indicate that the BDP core support constituency is men, while opposition party's main patrons are women. Furthermore the governing party also enjoys significant support from the 18-24, 50-5 and 55+ age groups while the opposition party's core support base resides amongst the 25-29, 30-34 and 40-49.

As opposed to South Africa whose election results has been focused on the racial census and ethnic voting, Botswana's limited and dated literature provides a more thorough analysis of how demographic and socio-economic factors determine voter choice.

1.2 Electoral Politics vis-à-vis One Party Dominance in South Africa

In the case of South Africa the African National Congress (ANC) has won all general elections since 1994 with the exception of the Kwa-Zulu Natal in the first ten years of the democratic dispensation and Western Cape from 2009.

In the inaugural democratic elections of 1994 the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) won control of Kwa-Zulu Natal with 50.32% of the provincial vote and forty seats in the provincial legislature. This was followed by 41.90% of the provincial vote in 1999 amounting to thirty-one seats in the legislature. It finally lost control of the province to the ANC in 2004 where the party only gained 36.82% of the vote and thirty seats in the provincial legislature (Mottiar, 2014).

The years 2004 represented the peak of the ANC dominance and 2009 showed a new decline. As the ANC gained control of KZN, it lost t in the provincial legislature. This victory was repeated in the 2014 national elections were the DA received. The 2016 LGE extended the governing prospects of the DA to three metros, who although did not get to enjoy outright majority formed a coalition government with the new kids on the political landscape the EFF. In the midst of this however, the ANC enjoyed dominance across the rest of the country.

The loss of the Western Cape to the Democratic Party (DP) in 2009 and being unseated as governing party in three key Local Municipalities (Nelson Mandela Bay, Tshwane and Johannesburg) in 2016 Local Government Elections indicates a significant decline in the support of the ANC (IEC, 2016).

However, despite its poor performance during the 2016 Local Government Elections the ANC has managed to maintain its dominance across the rest of the country and the electoral support towards the ANC has not declined below the 60% threshold (IEC, 2016; Southall and Daniel, 2009:23).

The dominance of the ANC on the political landscape of South Africa is rooted in its history as a liberation movement. Although the liberation movement was banned from 1960-1990, the ANC maintained close relationships with internal civic bodies such as the United Democratic Front (UDF), Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and The Congress of Traditional Leaders (CONTRALESA). At its unbanning the UDM was dissolved and members transferred to the umbrella of the ANC while COSATU and CONTRALESA pledged their allegiance to the party. Hence when the ANC transitioned from a liberation movement to a political party, it already had a large membership base that came from the civic organisations that had held the fort when the ANC was in exile (Mtimkhulu, 2006).

Secondly there is an agreement in literature that South African elections are a racial census (Lodge, 1995; Brookes, 2004; Southall, 1996; Welsh 1996), as 94% of African voters who cast their votes in 1994 voted for the ANC. The ANC is viewed by Africans as the guardian of their interests and aspirations. Survey evidence from Schelmer (2004) found that black South Africans were prepared to vote for the ANC despite being dissatisfied with the performance. This is because the performance of the ANC is often contrasted with the 55 years of the National Party rule (Booyesen, 2015).

Additionally the support of the ANC has an element of patronage. The main beneficiaries of the redress policies implemented by the ANC government (the provision of social grants, housing programme and affirmative action policies) are the disadvantaged, largely black masses who are also the biggest electoral supporter of the ANC (Mtimkhulu, 2006; Lodge, 2005).

The dominance of the ANC is also attributed to the weak opposition parties in South Africa. From as early as 1999 there were concerns about the state of opposition parties

in the country. Opposition parties in South Africa were characterised as fragmented, and showed stark divisions along historical, racial and ideological lines. Moreover opposition parties were considered to face an existential crisis as they did not seem to have a set plan on how to best play opposition politics (Southall, 2000) In 2004 when the ANC won its government of hope, by reaching a two thirds majority and the power to form government in all the nine provinces, the opposition parties share of the voter support had declined and fragmented significantly since 1994 (Piombo, 2004).

A key marker of the state of South African politics is the inability of opposition parties to build effective electioneering campaigns. This limitation is attributed to the limited resources (whether financial or human capital) opposition parties have access to. While the DA and ANC enjoy large corporate financial donations and access to the most experienced political strategists other political parties must contend with donations in kind from companies and stretched human resources capability. At the root of this problem is a problem of funding. Politics in South Africa is expensive because of a complex electoral market and a geographically large country. This funding problem is also reinforced by the public funding scheme, which benefits the ANC and DA most, thus raising capital for smaller parties is a problem (Collard, 2006).

Despite this persisting problem, the fortunes of the state of opposition politics in South Africa took a turn for the better at the formation of the Democratic Alliance (DA) in 2000. The DA was legally formed at the merger of the Democratic Party (DP) and the New National Party (NNP) on 26 June 2000. Since its formation the DA has recorded consistent growth in national elections (12.37% in 2004, 16.66% in 2009, 22%, and 23% in 2014). The growth in support of the DA is largely due to its track record in government (Schulz- Herzenberg, 2014) and an urban constituency which is more likely to hold government accountable. Yet despite its growth trajectory the DA has failed to appeal to the African rural constituency (Piombo,2004), and has simply solidified its existing support base by making inroads into the support of other opposition parties (Jolobe, 2009).

In 2009 South African politics were reinvigorated by the formation of the Congress of the People (COPE). COPE was the first break-away political party of the ANC. COPE breathed new life into the sphere of opposition politics. It was expected to be the first viable opposition party to challenge the hegemony of the ANC (Schulz- Herzenberg-

Hezenberg, 2014). This was because COPE appeared to have a broader appeal than most existing opposition parties as it cut across different class and racial barriers. After four months of the formal existence of COPE, the party achieved 7.4% of the national vote and came third in the national elections. It replaced the DA in five provinces as the official opposition and contributed to ensure that the ANC would not achieve a two thirds majority in Parliament (Booyesen, 2010).

The irony of the implosion of COPE is that the reason for its downfall was the reason for its formation. The leadership battle between Mbazimba Shilowa and Mosioua Lekota that included mudslinging and legal battles cost the party its moral credibility. By the 2011 local government elections the party was unable to organise itself and as a result it's lost its electorate support (Grootes, 2013; 195). At the failure of COPE South Africa once again faced an imminent vacuum of a viable opposition party.

The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) was birthed under a cloud of Julius Malema's 'tenderpreneur' scandal and Kenny Kunene's playboy persona. From the onset the credibility of the EFF was attacked. Moreover the political party was portrayed in the media as the swan song of Julius Malema and Floyd Shivambu's political careers. The EFF was never really considered as a viable political alternative to the ANC, it was often relegated to the status of an extremist, populist party that could not threaten the hegemony of the ANC. Du Preez (2013; 276) acknowledged the growth potential of the EFF due to its appeal to the poor, black young people; Grootes (2013; 198) agreed with this sentiment but argued that their appeal would be hard to translate to electoral support because the party did not have any organisational structure.

The EFF went to prove all their critics wrong after the 2014 national elections managed to become the third largest party in parliament with a 6.35% of the voter share and the official opposition party status in two provinces.

Like COPE, the EFF is a splinter party that has its political roots within the ANC, secondly it was formed months before the national elections yet managed to win a significant portion of the voter support. The difference between the EFF and COPE is that while COPE was celebrated as a viable alternative to the ANC the EFF is dismissed as a populist fascist party. Another key difference between COPE and EFF is that the EFF has solidified its position as successful grip on the political landscape

and successfully contested the Local Government Elections in 2016, thus showing a growth trajectory COPE never did.

1.2.1 Voter Behaviour in South Africa

There is a link between identities and voting behaviour in South Africa, this is rooted in South Africa's because the history of South Africa is a story of nationalism. The Great-Trek was a rebellion against British Imperial rule, and the Mfecane was the imperial quest of Zulu nationhood the apartheid government was founded on the exclusionary principles of Afrikaner nationalism these nationalistic trends have been found to have translated into voting behaviour (Ramuntsindela, 2006)

Moreover, identity in the South African context is reinforced by the apartheid legacy of the Group Registration act of which classified South Africa's population along distinct ethnic categories. As a result there is a link between identity and party support.

However, Ramuntshindela (2006) agrees with Mattes that for this claim to hold any water the first and most necessary condition is that subjects must first identify themselves along that racial category. Therefore, his study was to understand how voters identify themselves and thereby try to establish how identity informs voting patterns. Interestingly the core finding of his study the majority of the people see themselves as South Africans which then in-turn becomes problematic in explaining what informs voter choices in South Africa.

The identity discourse in voter behaviour in South Africa is closely linked to the debate around the race and ethnic influence on voter behaviour.

The race census argument holds that considering South Africa's racial polarisation it should be of no surprise that the electorate make their decisions along racial lines, with white people voting for white parties and black people voting for black parties. Giliomee and Simkins (1999) conceptualised the widely accepted thesis that *"members of the electorate conceptualise and identify themselves upon racial terms that govern their electoral behaviour."*

Despite the wide acceptance that the 1994 elections were a racial census (Guelke, 1996) Reynolds (1999; 176) argues that the racial pattern of the 1994 elections makes sense considering the historical legacy of apartheid and colonialism.

The race and ethnicity debate continued in the 1999 and 2004 elections and analysts believe that this debate will continue in the years to come because 350 years of colonial subjugation will not be erased in 20 years of democracy.

The debate of race and ethnicity is also linked to the relationship between social class and how they overlap. Detractors of this thesis argue that race cannot be treated as an independent variable outside social class (Habib and Taylor, 2001).

Mattes *et al* (1999) were the first to study voter choices in South Africa outside the demographic parameters set by Horowitz (1985) and racial census set by Giliomee and Simkins (1999). Mattes *et al* studied voter behaviour in the 1999 national elections and found that voter decisions were determined by the information available to the electorate. Their findings suggested that voter choices are based on voter evaluations that rest on the good record of accomplishment of the incumbent government and economic trends in the country. Furthermore, they found that socio-economic status had little bearing on the political behaviour of voters.

The study challenged the racial and ethnic census view and further challenged the assumption that South Africa would slide into a rigid one party state, with no “undecided middle” and bleak prospects for democratic consolidation in the country (*ibid*).

In reflecting on the twenty years of democracy in South Africa, it is evident the study referenced above was presumptuous in its ability to gauge voter satisfaction with the incumbent government. A key contribution however is the understanding that voter choices even at this early phase of democracy in the country rests on more than just race and ethnicity.

This view was further buttressed by Letsholo (2005) who found that the racial and ethnic argument in South Africa is weak when analysing the performance of ethnic based political parties. For instance, in the three elections from 1994 and 1999 national elections, political parties that had organized themselves along ethnic lines Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), Azania’s People’s Organization the Freedom Front (FF+) and Afrikaner Eenheids Beweging all recorded sharp declines in their electoral support.

In the lead up to the 2009 elections, Schulz- Hezenburg (2011) asserted that the potential exists for electoral fluidity. This conclusion was drawn from the statistical analysis of public opinion surveys Afrobarometer. The survey results indicated that there are various factors, that drive party identification, such as new information about political and economic developments are combined with assessments of party images, sociological cues and cognitive skills

Additionally, this study, which focused on voter behaviour in the first fifteen years of democracy in South Africa suggested electoral fluidity in future elections. Schulz-Herzenberg (2011), further adds economic interests and government evaluations as key determinants of voter choice.

This was mainly because of new information regarding political and economic developments in the country in conjunction with sociological cues, party images and cognitive skills (Schulz-Herzenberg; 2014, 24).

Additionally, Schulz-Herzenberg (2011) finds that voter behaviour in South Africa is determined by partisanship, campaign strategies, the fragmentation and intra-party politics of opposition parties and finally the belief that the ANC best articulates economic aspirations of the electorate (*ibid*).

While in Africa, there is agreement in literature (see; Young, 2009; Basedau, Erdman, Lay, 2011) on the relationship between ethnicity and voter choice. However, in the South African context this finding has been proven weak, which in turn also weakens the racial census perception, as “black opposition parties” have failed to appeal to the wider population. The ANC thus despite recording declining numbers at the past four elections dominates the political landscape in South Africa, and seems will continue to do so in the near future.

South African voters have been found to be rational voters who have been found that in making an electoral decision consider all political information from the economic conditions of a state, party images and party ideology and imagery.

1.3 Justification for Comparison: Overview of Botswana and South Africa

The existence of opposition parties in Botswana and South Africa has failed to threaten the political hegemony of both the BDP and ANC. These ruling political parties

continue to enjoy un-paralleled support from the Batswana and South African electorate. There is an enduring attachment from the electorate as they continue to overlook existing political parties in favour of the BDP and the ANC.

This predisposition to support the a political is termed party preference (Brader and Tucker, 2008) and is one of the strategies employed by political scientists to predict voter behaviour; that Ethridge and Handelman (2010:96) cite V.O Key Jnr (1963) who explains

“Elections are not the time in which people make decisions but it is a time for reaffirmation of long standing partisan faith”.

As a predictor of voter behaviour, party preference is the *“psychological attachment to a political party that party evaluation, policy choices and voter choice rests”* Samuels (2006). In other words party preference creates bias within individuals that inform their political participation. This bias determines voter behaviour, which reinforces electoral outcomes.

As a result, sources of party preference is of significant interest to political scientists as it is helpful in providing analytical knowledge on citizen’s involvement in politics, electoral outcomes and overall voter behaviour (Huang, 2014; Dalton, 2014). Contributions to the literature indicate that sources of party preference mainly include religion, class, income, race and ethnicity, as well as, education (Ishayama, 2006; Pereira, 2008). However, recently there is a growing concern that these factors are losing recognition as predictors to citizens’ inclination to support a political party (Huang, 2014; Dalton, 2014).

The political landscape in Botswana and South Africa are different yet both experience one party dominance. This is especially interesting to observe despite the following contrast; Except for a drawn out liberation struggle in South Africa what accounts for one party dominance in South Africa can also be found in Botswana. Moreover Botswana is a demographically homogeneous state and geographically smaller than South Africa which hosts a heterogeneous society in a much larger geographical setting. Furthermore the electoral systems also differ; Botswana adopts the use of the Westminster First Past the Post System while South Africa uses the Proportional Representative model.

One of the commonalities between the two political landscapes is the existence of weak opposition parties, who pose no threat to the ruling party (De Jager and Meintjies, 2013).

The two contrasting political experiences of Botswana and South Africa merely converge at one party dominance indicated that the study of one party dominance in the region cannot continue to be generalised. Furthermore, a comparative analysis will allow broaden our understanding of the emergence and entrenchment of one party dominance in southern Africa.

1.4 Statement of the Problem

South Africa and Botswana are considered prominent models of democracy in comparison to most African states. These two countries respectively boast successful democracies that have ran for an extended period. On the one hand Botswana has been a democratic state since independence in 1966, while South Africa only became a democratic state in 1994. In addition to their successful tenures as democratic states, these southern African countries also share a distinctive feature of one party dominance.

One party dominance in southern Africa has been under close academic scrutiny (Giliomee and Simkins, 1999; Matlosa and Karume, 2004; Southall, 2004; Mtimkhulu, 2006; Maundeni *et al*, 2006; De Jager and Du Toit, 2013; Cole, 2015). The core focus of these studies has been how dominant parties in southern Africa came into power, entrench their positions and finally how they affect democratic institutions in these emerging democracies.

Thus while many studies have provided insights into why there is continued dominance of party in southern Africa, little scholarly has been carried out to provides insights into the contribution of attitudes of the electorate towards political parties in continued dominance of ruling parties (Mattes et al, 1999; Mattes, 2005; Cole ,2015).

Furthermore South Africa has enjoyed majority representation in the comparative scholarship of dominant systems in southern Africa (Mwangi, 2002 Baregu, 2004; Bogaards, 2004; Landsberg, 2004; Kassner, 2005; Mtimkhulu, 2006; Oseni, 2012; De Jager and Meitjies, 2013) however there has been little scholarly comparison to the

experiences of one party dominance in Botswana and South Africa (Sebudubudu and De Jager, 2017).

Subsequently there is limited comparative scholarship on the experience of one party dominance in Botswana and South Africa. Studies that do exist have not yet probed the relationship between party preference and one party dominance in southern Africa. This study engages and interrogates the relationship between party preference and its possible contribution to maintenance of one party dominance in Botswana and South Africa.

1.5 Significance of the Study

This study examines the relationship between political party preference and one party dominance through a comparative case study of Botswana and South Africa. Dominant party states by nature are democratic states. They hold free and fair elections therefore there is meaningful political participation by the citizens of those states.

Studies on one party dominant states in Southern Africa focus mainly on the three aspects; firstly on how dominant parties come into power and secondly how political parties entrench their dominance (see; Giliomee and Simkins, 1999; Matlosa and Karume, 2004; Southall, 2004; Mtimkhulu, 2006; Maundeni et al, 2006; De Jager and Du Toit, 2013; Cole, 2015; De Jager and Sebudubudu, 2017). This current study therefore offer insights on whether party preference leads to one party dominance.

Very little scholarship has been placed to study the attitudes of the electorate regarding the political parties within dominant party systems (Mattes et al, 1999; Mattes, 2005; Cole 2015), the bulk of focus of these studies have been on South Africa exclusively and there is yet to be a comparative analysis on these attitudes between South Africa and Botswana. This study contributes to body of knowledge through embarking on a scholastic and comparative analysis on the attitudes of the electorate regarding the political parties within dominant party systems between South Africa and Botswana.

Furthermore, the study evaluates whether there is correlation between the political attitudes of the electorate and their voter behaviour in these two states. Literature indicates that one party dominance is a measured along electoral outcomes (Blondel,

1968; Pempel; 1990; O' Leary, 1994; Ware 1996; Bogaards, 2004), In other words, this study provides more insights about the contribution of electoral attitudes to voter outcomes and ultimately one party dominance.

In addition, this study is strengthened by its research design which is comparative case study approach. Comparative case studies are revered for its ability to help make broad generalisations, and expand our understanding of phenomena under study. Therefore, this study will expand our understanding of the implications of political attitudes to the maintenance of one party dominance in Botswana and South Africa, through comparison and by extension provide a possible hypothesis to explain existence of dominant party systems in the Southern African region.

1.6 Research Questions

The study attempts to respond to the following questions:

- What is the nature of political attitudes of the electorate regarding political parties in Botswana and South Africa?
- What are the trends in the voter behaviour of the electorate in Botswana and South Africa?
- To what extent do the trends in electoral behaviour correlate with perceptions of the Botswana and South Africa?
- Does one political party preference lead to one party dominance Botswana and South Africa?

1.7 Aim and Objectives

Through comparative analysis of Botswana and South Africa, this study seeks to examine whether party preference leads to one party dominance by specifically carrying out the following objectives:

- Examine the political attitudes of voters regarding political parties in Botswana and South Africa.
- Describe and analyse trends in electoral behaviour in Botswana and South Africa.
- Evaluate whether trends in electoral support correlate with the perceptions of the electorate in Botswana and South Africa.

- Determine whether political party preference leads to one party dominance in Botswana and South Africa.

1.8 Notes for Clarification

The following sub-sections briefly provide conceptualisation as well as relevance of this comparative study in the field of international relations.

1.8.1 Conceptualisation

The present study seeks to understand the relationship between political party preference and one party dominance through a comparative case study of Botswana and South Africa. For the purpose of this study the reader is made aware that party preference is an alternative term to partisanship and assumes the same definition which is the predisposition to support a political party (Samuel, 2006; Brader and Tucker, 2008). It also refers to a psychological attachment to a political party that acts as a reference point of all political information.

Studies of electoral behaviour find that party preference refers to a psychological attachment to a political party. This attachment acts a heuristic short cut for individuals that influences their understanding of political actions and evaluate political information by acting as a reference point (Mokomane, 2000). Party preference is a perceptual screen through which people understand politics. Party preference is a combination of political values and is a strong determinant of political participation and voter behaviour (Dalton, 2013).

Since this study compares various factors under dominant party states as stated under the objectives section, it significant for the reader to be provided with an intimation of what “dominant party” states are. Dominant party states are states that have regular and popular elections that are competitive but are dominated by one major party that enjoys prolonged periods in power (Heywood, 237: 2013). In this regard a dominant party system is one in which a political party registers four consecutive electoral victories, and as result allow the political party the ability to dominate the policy making and political landscape of a state” (Du Toit and De Jager, 2015). This study focuses on comparing Botswana and South Africa, which according to Southall (2000) can be regarded as liberal dominant party systems and not authoritarian forms of dominance

which limit political competition, alter electoral rules to benefit the incumbent and often do not accept electoral outcomes.

1.8.2 Relevance of this Study in International Relations

The relevance of conducting this comparative study is based on the essence of studying “similarities and differences between countries in terms of regime type, social structure, and history”. This comparative study is therefore carried out in order to shed some insights on how political realities of both Botswana and South Africa could be analysed by scholars and policy makers in international relations to make some empirical and theoretical contributions about common and contrasting trends in both countries with more or less similar political features. In other words this comparative study finds resonance in international relations due to fact that it could assist scholars and policy makers to explore what could be best international practices which states could adopt and/or learn from one another having demonstrated understanding of various domestic practices and experiences.

1.9 Structure of the Thesis

The thesis is organised into six chapters. Chapter One sets the tone for the research. It begins with a discussion of the journey to democracy in Africa. This is followed by a discussion of the challenges faced by democracy and introduces the concept of one party dominance. Following which the study leads to a discussion on the emergence of one party dominance in Botswana and South Africa as well as a brief overview of literature on voter behaviour in Botswana and South Africa.

Chapter Two is the review of empirical on scholarship of one party dominance and party preference. It reviews the classifications of one party dominance as well as the cited causes and sustenance of the phenomenon while similarly providing a similar exposition of the literature regarding party preference.

Chapter Three is an extension of chapter two as it presents and justifies the theoretical framework adopted for the study. The theories are justified through related literature of the case studies selected for the study.

Chapter Four provides an overview of the research methods employed for the study. It starts by revisiting the research objectives. Thereafter, the chapter details the data

collection methods and how the data was organised and analysed. The chapter ends with an examination of the challenges and constraints faced, their impact on the research, and how the limitations were mitigated.

Chapter Five is the presentation of research findings. It is divided into three sections which present the findings of each research question. The sections where necessary include a comparative presentation of findings.

Chapter Six synthesises the research findings in relation to the literature and the theory cited. It presents the conclusions of the study and discusses the implications of the findings for theory and directions for further research. The chapter concludes with a consideration of the policy implications of the research results.

1.10 Chapter Summary

Chapter One placed the study in context by presenting the democratic development in Africa from independence to the third wave of democracy in the 1990's. The chapter provides the key debates about the challenges of democratic consolidation on the continent with a special focus on the emergence of one party dominance in Botswana and South Africa.

Through a synopsis of some early empirical works; chapter one provides a clear overview for this current study. The following chapter pays attention to reviewing existing literature and providing theoretical dispossessions guiding the study.

CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON PARTY PREFERENCE AND ONE PARTY DOMINANCE

2.1 Introduction

This chapter pays attention to reviewing empirical literature on the subject under inquiry. Chapter Two is divided into three sections. The first section focuses on partisanship as party preference, the conceptual foundations of partisanship, the measures of as well as the sources of partisanship. The second section, reviews themes related to the causes of dominant party states. The themes reviewed of the empirical literature are namely; causes of dominant party systems and one party dominance. The third and final section specifically reviews empirical works of some leading exponents on issues pertaining to classifications of one party dominance.

2.2 The Relations between Partisanship and Political Party Preference

The sub-sections below pay specific attention to various scholarly works on partisanship.

2.2.1 Foundations of Partisanship

Partisanship is an essential component of political science. Political Party politics and state politics cannot be understood without interrogating their scientific relations to partisanship. This is due to the fact that, partisanship is an inherent feature of party systems across the world (Heywood, 2013: 230). In other words, partisanship is a combination of political values and is a strong determinant of political participation and voter choice. Previously, partisanship has been found to be a vital component of democratic politics. This is mainly to reasons that, partisanship sets the base from which economic and political events are interpreted. For instance, in developing democracies, partisanship is a strong indicator of democratic consolidation (Dalton, 2010). In other words, the process of democratic consolidation, is embedded on establishment of various political parties, as a result, citizens in emerging democracies develop partisanship towards different political parties and this allows room for political contestation and also enhances democratic consolidation.

From the works of amongst others, Campbell, Converse, Miller, Stokes (1960) and later on Dalton (2010) as well as Lupu (2013), the epistemological foundation to the study of partisanship determines the factors that are thought to encourage partisanship. If the studies were grounded in the psychosocial school of thought, their findings would suggest that social groups, age of the democratic system and party institutionalization, determine partisanship. Equally, if these studies were based on approaches from the revisionist school of thought; partisanship would be determined by factors such as party system fractionalization, party performance and the age of the political party. Therefore, scientific enquiry on partisanship heavily rests either on psychosocial or revisionist schools of thought. Depending on whether the scientific enquiry combines both schools of thought or only adopts either one of the two.

A closer inspection of the definitions of partisanship finds that the most comprehensive definition comes from Brader and Tucker (2008) who define partisanship as an inclination to support a political party. This predisposition to support the party acts as the basis upon which policy positions and ideals are interpreted and guides political behaviour. In essence, partisanship is an expression of preference and is rooted in the belief that a political party best represents your ideals.

For some people this predisposition becomes an extension of who they are as they begin to identify with the party. Therefore, partisanship is the foundation of party identification. Party identification can be understood as a psychological attachment to a political party (Goren, 2005). Party identity is often used to describe the expression of partisanship; and this expression frequently translates into electoral support.

Interestingly when partisanship is understood as an extension of social identity it is usually termed party identification; therefore in studies that follow this school of thought, the word partisanship is often used interchangeably with the term party identification (Goren, 2005; Brader and Tucker, 2008; Samuel, 2006, Haung, 2014; Curana, et al, 2015). In studies by amongst others Goren (2005), Brader and Tucker (2008), Samuel (2006), Haung (2014); there is no difference between party identity and partisanship and these two concepts are understood to explain the same phenomena.

The revisionist perspective challenges the sociological position that argues that partisanship is firmly rooted in the political socialization process (Lupu, 2013). This

perspective shifts the attention from the socialization process and behaviour of social groups onto the individual (Heywood, 2013: 276).

One of the first scholars to explore the impact of short-term fluctuations of partisan identities was Key (1966); the most significant finding of his study was that, political issues such as candidate personalities, party images and economic conditions within the state, played a significant role in determining voter choice. For instance, political parties that advocate for pro-poor economic policies have a propensity of attracting citizens with low socio-economic status. Fiorina (1981) built upon Key's findings and went on to redefine partisanship as a "running tally" of officeholder's performance. Thus, Fiorina (1981), suggested through the findings in the her study that, good or bad track record of a candidate or political party in government also determines citizens 'partisanship.

The two approaches to the conceptualization of partisanship reinforce the assumed bases of partisanship, thus literature on the sources partisanship can be divided into the sociological group or revisionist perspective.

Thus, understanding partisanship as well as the approaches to the conceptualization of partisanship is important to providing a scientific nexus between society and party systems across the world. However, because of the newly emerging democracy in Africa, studies of partisanship are relatively new and as a result, little scholarly attention has focused on the relationship between partisanship and the occurrence of one party dominance, specifically in Botswana and South Africa. Therefore, there is scanty scholarly enquiry, which provides a comparative analysis on the relationship between political party preference and one-party dominance in Southern African countries. In the context of partisanship, very few studies have attempted to enquire on the nexus between political party preference and partisanship as well as that of one-party dominance and partisanship in comparative analysis amongst Southern African states.

2.2.2 Measures of Partisanship

There are two known measures to the study of partisanship (Greene, 2002). The first measure is one that treats partisanship as a psychological term; an attitude, a predisposition or an abiding identification (Greene, 2002; Dalton and Weldon, 2007).

While the other investigations require some sign of behavioural commitment such as party membership or a pattern of support over time at the polls (Campbell et al, 1960; Krehbiel 2000; Mughan, 2009). The fundamental questions about the nature of partisanship and how it relates to political activity depends on whether people consider partisanship as a partisan attitude or partisanship as group belonging.

As different measures, partisanship has been used in various ways to evaluate different political factors. In other words, measures of partisanship are informed by the methodological approaches and conceptions of partisanship.

Campbell et al (1960) refer to partisanship as party identification, which is the same as religious, racial and ethnic identification. This is similar to Mughnan (2009) who asserts that the notion of party identification builds on the social psychological insight that people define themselves through their sense of attachment to a variety of secondary groups, among them political parties, religious groups and national communities. In sum, the totality of this perspective is that partisanship is a social identity.

On the other hand Krehbiel (2000) evaluates partisanship as a behavioural pattern and in so doing assess the manner in which state legislators in the USA's partisanship and party affiliations inform voting behaviour in senate which result in policy outcomes.

The other school of thought which more widely used in the study of voter behaviour treats partisanship as an attitude or predisposition to support a political party (Lupu, 2013; Brader and Tucker, 2008; Greene, 2002; Dalton and Weldon, 2007).

According to Petty and Cacioppo (1981), partisanship fits the psychological definition of attitude; which is considered to be, a general and enduring response to an object.

Green (2002) explores partisanship from a psychological perspective and in so doing attempts to provide a comprehensive examination of the social-psychological theory that underpins the concept of partisanship.

Additionally, Dalton and Weldon (2007) define partisanship as the psychological bond between citizens and a political party and use this definition as a measure of party system institutionalization from the public perspective.

As an attitude or psychological attachment, partisanship is subject to change based on voters' evaluation of candidates, economic conditions and political parties (Friona, 1981). From this perspective, partisanship is not a social identity but a heuristic shortcut that helps voters make maximum use of their vote (Lupu, 2013).

Therefore, for this study, partisanship is broadly measured as the attachment or closeness to which people feel towards a political party. As a result, partisanship shapes political attitudes and informs trends in voter behaviour. Yet, despite this existing scholarship, there is very little studies in southern Africa have attempted to establish the value of partisanship in the creation of one party dominance from a comparative perspective in southern African states.

2.2.3 Sources of Partisanship from a Global Perspective

Sources of partisanship is a rich vein of research in political science that explores the voter behaviour, partisanship and most notably sources of partisanship (Pereira, 2008).

Within this large body of literature in the West the most commonly cited variables in explaining partisanship include socio-cultural (identity and ethnicity), demographic characteristics (age, education, income, place of residence (urban/rural) and participation in Civil Society Organizations (Campbell, et al;1960; Ishayama and Fox, 2006).

Other variables that influence partisanship include cultural values (whether the person is raised in a society that stresses collectivism or individualism), political factors that include the evaluation of incumbents as well as cognitive awareness that is shaped by access to the media and political discussion (Pereira, 2008).

The study of partisanship in developing democracies is a relatively new field because many of the developing democracies returned to holding competitive elections in the late 1980's and all through the early 1990's (Pereira,2008, Shultz-Hezenberg,2008, Lupu,2013). This is recent when compared to America's 240 years of democratic tradition. It is no wonder then that studies of partisanship originated in America.

Most of what is known about partisanship from its sources, development and transitions emanates from the United States of America (Brader and Tucker, 2008).

Even studies that were conducted in Europe, Asia and Africa were usually conceptualised for studies in American public and were replicated and adapted to be used in these emerging democratic dispensations.

In Latin America, Asia and Africa, the primary aim of these studies has been to test whether the findings collected in more industrialized democracies; more specifically America could be replicated across the world. The weaknesses of these studies is that they followed similar methodological and theoretical frameworks.

Since these studies had their conceptual origins in industrialized democracies they are often a response to the original findings. This was done mainly to develop the comparative literature regarding partisanship and by extension developing partisan literature for developing democracies. Often the results presented from these studies are rooted in comparative literature where their findings are contrasted with their American counterparts.

In an examination of partisanship and its relationship with political behaviour across Latin America; using sixty-six America's Barometer survey's conducted from 2006-2012, at yearly intervals (Lupu, 2013) reports that; patterns of partisanship closely resemble those found in advanced democracies. Latin American partisans are informed and educated, those who are ideologically close to a party are more likely to form party attachments and finally individuals who are attentive to the mass media are more likely to form party attachments.

In East Asia Sheng (2007) compares partisanship across East Asian nations and concludes that partisanship is weak in the East Asia; he cites the lack of electoral experience and weak parental socialization. This study is rooted in the sociological approach, which outside its original context suggests that partisanship is weak.

On the other hand Lisi (2014) adopts the revisionist perspective when exploring the sources of mass partisanship in southern Europe, the study confirms the main hypothesis of his study that suggests that mass partisanship in Southern Europe is a result of performance evaluations and retrospective considerations stemming from voters political experiences.

What these studies have done is simply to reinforce the American conceptualization of partisanship. This despite the differences in the political context. There is standing

concern in partisan literature that the original conceptualization of partisanship cannot be studied outside America as many developing democracies have adopted the European multi-party democratic system as opposed to the American two party presidential model (Garry, 2007).

In the original conceptualization of partisanship, the question posed was whether an individual identified with one of the two American parties or independent, Garry (2007) cites Weisberg (1999) who argues that this questioning limits the usage of the concept of partisanship as it does not consider the holding of multiple party identities by individuals. This argument was supported by Van der Eijk and Niemoller (2012) who found in a multiparty setting like the Netherlands the idea that a person can hold only one party identity to be false.

Therefore, this analysis does call for a reconceptualization of partisanship that can be applied across different political contexts. In Africa the most common assumption regarding partisanship is its relationship between ethnicity and party loyalty, it rests on the assumption that ethnicity is a core determinant of voter choice. This assumption stems from Horowitz (1985: 291) argument that:

“in countries where ascribed ethnic loyalties are strong and deeply driven along a preponderant ethnic cleavage as many African and Asian countries are there is a tendency to throw up party systems that exacerbate ethnic conflict”

As a result, research on partisanship in Africa has been channelled in a similar direction that begins with ethnicity and identity as points of departure. This route is largely based on Horowitz's (1985) thesis that argues that ethnicity is a strong determinant of voter choice especially in ethnically segmented societies. In the same breath, it assumes that voter loyalty rests on social identities and that voters use socio-demographic cues as bases of party support.

This thesis is supported by the fact that multiple electoral studies in Africa engage ethnicity as a determining factor of voter choice (Young, 2009; 2012; Pereira.2008; Basedau et al, 2011; Ishiyama. 2012).

Furthermore, in the first round of Afrobarometer survey Norris and Mattes (2003) conclude that ethnicity, as determined by language group and race is a noteworthy predictor of party identification.

Interestingly there has been a concerted effort by other African scholars to refute this theory and prove that African voters are motivated by much more than their ethnic ties and that even in Africa political preferences are shaped by political institutions, and economic conditions of the state (Dendre. 2013; Perre and Masemple-Samps, 2013).

As a matter of fact finding's by Basedau et al (2011) that draws data from representative survey polls in eight Anglophone and Francophone African countries found that there is no set relationship between party preference and ethnicity.

Moreover, in the study exploration of how the ANC won the 2004 elections Letsholo (2005) concludes that the ethnicity is relatively weak in the South African. This is because context, as political parties that have aligned themselves along ethnic groupings have failed to make an inroads into the electoral support of the ANC, and actually where facing a decline in their electoral share.

What this means is that ethnicity does not act independently of other factors: including access and understanding of political information and the economic performance of the state (Samuel and Adams. 2014); and this indicates the importance ethnicity plays is only relative to the other factors available to the electorate.

In line with this argument is the relationship between patronage and ethnicity in contributing to the development of partisanship in developing countries. Thomson (2000) and Chandra (2004) find that in these societies partisanship is a result of a trade-off for public goods by the politician and political support by the electorate. They further argue that in patronage democracies there is a strong link between partisanship and ethnicity.

From a global perspective, determinants of partisanship include identity, ethnicity, and demographic characteristics. Most of what is known about partisanship from various empirical works from early development and finally to transitions emanates from the United States of America. The original intention of these studies was to create scholarly literature where studies of partisanship could have a global footprint. The focus was to create a foundation of literature for reference, which could be built upon. The focus of these studies was on the sources of partisanship, and not how partisanship could shape party systems through political attitudes and voter behaviour. As a result, there is a significant literature gaps on the relationship between the nature of party systems and partisanship.

2.3 Classifications of Dominant Party System

The number of political parties operating within a state is referred to as the party system. One party systems allow for only one political party and in these states opposition parties are often stifled. In two party systems, two strong parties compete and power is alternated between the two parties. In a multiple party system a number of political parties compete for electoral victory and the state is usually governed through a coalition (Jounnou and Coetzee, 2010).

White (2011) provides a histography of the concept of dominant party states, and traces its origins to Duverger's *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*. In this work, Duverger (1964) defines dominance as being about influence and strength. This idea is reinforced by Sartori (1979) in *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis* agrees with this conceptualisation of dominance being about strength.

However Pempel (1990) in *Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes* recognised the need to extend the understanding and operationalization of this term. And as a result, went on to identify four characteristics for a political party to be considered dominant.

According to Pempel (1990) for a political party to be considered dominant it must be dominant in legislative representation, an ability to bargain with smaller parties, duration of stay at the helm of power, and its ability to shape public discourse. Subsequent studies have had their conceptualisation of dominant party states rooted in this framework and meeting this four criterion (Shale, 1990; Greene, 2010; Reuter, 2010; Tempel, 2012; De Jager and Du Toit, 2013; Shimbe, 2014).

Dominance through the number of Seats or Votes. At the most basic dominance requires that a party attain a majority of the electoral share (Blondel, 1968; Pempel; 1990; O' Leary, 1994; Ware 1996; Bogaards, 2004). Dominance in this regard is understood to be when a party wins a large percentage of the seats or the votes. Other scholars have contend that a party is only dominant if it "*wins enough parliamentary seats to control government on its own*". In this conception dominant parties control enough seats to form government, pass legislation and the threshold of victory is

considerably large design and implement policy and finally amend the constitution (Matlosa and Karume; 2004; Reuter, 2010:35;).

Dominance through length of governance is closely related to *dominance through agenda setting power* which is indicated by a single party's consistent control of the policy setting agenda through either being the core formation of a coalition or through the control of agenda setting institutions in the state. For Duverger (1964; 308) a dominant party is more about influence as opposed to strength. A core feature of this dominant party formation is the party's regular and outsized influence in the policy making process (Greene, 2013; 25).

The ability to direct national socio-economic machinery is sustained through the third formation of dominance which is *dominance through duration in power* (Sartori, 1976; Greene 2013; 25 ;) The duration can range from a single year to a multiple consecutive elections. This form of dominance makes it clear that the party faces no threat at the polls. It challenges the basic democratic principle that expects that all incumbents at some point in future should lose an election (Templeman, 2012).

Scholars of one party dominance have thus followed this conceptualization and went on to classify dominant party regimes under different variants of the criterion. Giliomee and Simkins (1999) define dominant party systems as those that enjoy electoral victory for long time. On the other hand, De Jager and Du Toit (2013; 3) describe a dominant party as one where one party dominates the political system over a long period despite regular elections and more than one party contesting the elections. According to Cox, (1997; 238) dominant parties are those which are successively in government, either alone or as the senior partners of a coalition, for a long period of time. For Maundeni et al, (2006) longevity in power is a result of good governance.

Green (2010) describes states where one party maintains the ability to determine government policy for a minimum of twenty years. This form of dominance includes majority parliamentary representation, office of the president and as well as regional leadership. With this sort of dominance, it is impossible to form government in the absence of this party.

In the study of the emergence of a dominant party system in Russia, Reuter (2010) defines a dominant party as an organization that controls access to political office, holds sufficient power in policy making and distribution of goods and exploits its position to maintain its position in power.

In the same year Shale (1990) defined dominant parties as those that lead government for long periods uninterrupted as a result of the popular vote. Friedman (2009) defines one party dominant states as a democracy which regular elections take place, opposition parties are free to organize and civil liberties are respected. In these state the dominant parties are legitimized by elections and not through force.

While Simbine (2014) defines dominant parties as political parties who have enjoyed successive electoral victories and who govern without the likelihood of defeat in the next elections

From the criteria discussed above one party dominance in Southern Africa meets four of the criterion, dominance resulting from a weakness of opposition parties, number of seats in the legislature, margin of electoral victory, party identification and finally dominance resulting from the duration of the party in power.

African scholars who have contributed to the understanding of the manifestations of one party dominance in the region have synthesized these criterion and define one party dominance as

Moreover Matlosa and Karume (2004) define a dominant party system as a political terrain in which one political party is so dominant that it directs the political system, is firmly in control of state power, over a significant period of time and the existence of opposition parties does not threaten the hegemony of the dominant ruling party. For Suttner (2006) a dominant party state is a state where a political party has won successive elections and defeat seems unlikely in the foreseeable future.

The classifications of dominant party systems acknowledge the significance of electoral margins as signs of dominance. While the electoral outcomes may suggest a favourable disposition towards the dominant party understanding the general attitudes towards all political parties in provides for a more in-depth understanding of the electoral outcomes.

2.4 Causes of Dominant Party States

A party's ability to maintain control of government indicates that there is something more systematic at play that contributes to enduring position of power (Templeman, 2012). The following section provides an overview of the literature that is cited when discussing the reasons for the emergence of one party dominance. The justifications amongst others include the historical credentials, access to state resources, weakness of opposition parties, institutional architecture and finally patronage.

2.4.1 Legacy of Liberation Movement

A political party's historical credentials as a status liberation movement reinforce its dominance on a political landscape of a state (Baregu, 2004; Suttner 2004; Mtimkhulu, 2006 Doorenspleet and Nijzink 2011; Southall, 2013; Du Toit and De Jager, 2014; Cole, 2015; Ziegfeld and Tudor. 2015)

In southern Africa the history of the repressive settler colonialism has shaped the post-colonial states. The leading struggle organizations transitioned to be catch-all political parties supported by wide-ranging coalitions that led to large voting blocs (Cole, 2015).

According to Southall (2013) the dominance of liberation movements as political parties is rooted in party ideology. These former liberation movements in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe have monopolised the liberation struggle and believe that they hold the right to govern because of their role in their nation's history. Cole (2015) describes this strand of dominance as 'ideologically infused dominance' which suggests that the historical legacy is a brand of ideology.

As an extension of their historical legacy, current dominant parties in southern Africa have a broad church appeal, and their dominant position is based on their ability to successfully go beyond social cleavages in society and attract electoral support from various social groups (*ibid*).

Furthermore Doorenspleet and Nijzink (2011) argue that former liberation movements use their legacy of national struggle as a powerful political images and justification for their dominant position. Finally Baregu (2004) and Suttner (2004) contend that such parties are able to use their liberation credentials to retain support and further delegitimise the efforts of the opposition (Ziegfeld and Tudor. 2015).

In South Africa the ANC has declared itself the leader of the project of transformation (Brooks 2004; De Jager, 2013). The founding rhetoric of SWAPO in Namibia is that the party is the nation's guardian of democracy (Du Pisan, 2013) while in Zimbabwe ZANU-PF believes it has the right to governance because it was key in overthrowing the Ian Smith regime (Britz and Tshuma, 2013).

The existing empirical literature on the legacy of Liberation Movement generally maintains that a political party's historical credentials as a status liberation movement reinforce has a propensity to influence one party dominance on a political landscape of a state. However, this literature appears to be inadequate in illuminating how political attitudes, voter behaviour as well as one party preference lead to one party dominance. In addition, there is scantiness in the literature with regards to providing comparative analysis on how political attitudes, voter behaviour as well as one party preference lead to one party dominance in Botswana and South Africa respectively.

2.4.2 The Blurring between State and Party

A significant marker of dominant party systems is the use of state programmes and resources to promote party interests (Schlemmer, 2005). This is because the dominance of a political party on the political landscape of a state allow it access to state resources which it uses to maintain its position of power (Cole.2015). The access and use of state led programmes through state resources leads to a blurring between the party and state as it becomes more and more unclear where the party ends and the state begins. Furthermore as one party becomes monotonous with the state it creates a wider gap between opposition parties and hope for electoral victory.

Coincidentally the blurring between party and state has the likely effect of reducing the formation of an independent civil society and a growing preponderance of political power that may result in the abuse of office, arbitrary decision making that weakens the integrity of the legislature and its ability to hold the executive accountable (Brooks, 2004).

Furthermore Matlosa and Mbaya (2004) suggest that when ruling parties dominate in the legislative and executive organs of state they can spread their undue influence to the judiciary which will result in the dominant party no longer ruling according to the letter and spirit of the constitution (Mtimkhulu, 2006).

Existing empirical works on the blurring between State and Party points out that significant marker of dominant party systems lies on the use of state programmes and resources for advancement of party interests; this is more so due to the reality that dominant parties have access to state resources. Nonetheless, this existing scholarship does not succinctly provide comparative analysis on how political attitudes lead to one party dominance in Botswana and South Africa respectively. In addition, these existing contributions on the blurring between State and Party voter behaviour make note substantive efforts to illuminate how political party preference lead to one party dominance in both Botswana and South Africa.

2.4.3 Institutional Architecture (Electoral Systems)

Electoral systems holds a significant amount of influence on the party system as well as the way in which political parties function within a state (Bouceck, 1998; Adjumobi, 2000; Molomo, 2000; Spieb, 2002; Mazaffar, 2003; Kadima *et al*, 2006).

Electoral laws often have built-in biases which can reinforce dominant parties by providing bonuses to large parties and penalizing small parties. Examples of these mechanical aspects of electoral rules are seat allocation formulae, thresholds for party parliamentary representation, district magnitudes, apportionment, and the preference voting mechanism (Bouceck, 1998).

As a result, electoral systems tend to reinforce one party dominance. In a proportional electoral system the election results translate the party's electoral margin into the allocation of legislative seats, while in a disproportional electoral system seat allocation far surpasses the original vote share (Bouceck, 1998; Ziegfield and Tudor, 2015;).

Many African nations do not exclusively rely on the electoral support from their constituency but also on the electoral system Mazaffar *et al*, (2003). Since electoral competition is governed by electoral laws that inform the rules of government formation, divisions of power and distribution of office, in a government where one party enjoys majority representation, the electoral rules are open to manipulation consequently dominant parties have been known to alter the electoral procedures to maintain their grip onto power (Adejumobi, 2000).

Moreover electoral rules are often subject to change incumbent parties can concoct rule changes to improve the parliamentary prospects of ruling parties to maintain disproportionalities beneficial to themselves by resisting demands for reform aimed at rectifying “unfair” outcomes (*ibid*).

As Spieb (2002:17) argues ‘party elite share to ensure that the institutional arrangement of the polity works in the favour of the dominant party, which means that, the dominant party is in a position to play its organisational advantage and electoral dominance’ A case in point being the BDP which has ignored various calls by scholars and opposition parties alike for the change in their current electoral system (Molomo, 2000; Kadima, 2004).

Furthermore there are inherent problems in the African election management structures which are a result of the lack of independence and capability of election management bodies to deliver on their constitutional directive. The ability of an election management body to manage free and fair elections is measured in the independence of the body from any political influence and their ability to uphold their constitutional directive (Bouceck, 1998).

Predominantly scholarly contributions on electoral systems provide expositions on how electoral systems such as FPTP and PR systems regulate the way in which political parties campaign for elections, determine the threshold for parliamentary representation and seat allocation within the legislature. Therefore these aforementioned electoral systems have regulations and political realities that reinforce one party dominance. Eventually electoral outcomes tend to sustain dominant party systems.

While political parties exist to represent a particular electorate and function along the guidelines established by the electoral system, the available literature does not reveal how political attitudes lead to one party dominance in Botswana and South Africa, nor does it discuss the value of voter behaviour in determining electoral outcomes which promote one party dominance.

2.4.4 Patronage/ Clientele Relations

Prolonged dominance is maintained by the use of patronage and clientelism, which may be in the form of targeted public spending and vote buying (Scheiner, 2006; Rumboya, 2007; Mtimkhulu, 2009; Greene, 2010; Hu, 2011; Werner, 2014; Cole, 2015; Trandis, 2015; Ziegfield and Tudor.2015; Gomez, 2016).

Dominant parties in democracies, such as the LDP in Japan and KMT in Taiwan, have strengthened their dominance with patronage circulated through clientelist linkage tools (Scheiner, 2006)

Clientelism is a known strategy for the maintenance of dominant parties in Japan, Mexico, Israel, Italy, Taiwan and Russia. Interestingly a party whose victory lays on racial, confessional, ethnic or regional solidarity can exploit its new found position to strengthen the polarization in society that brought it to victory. This can be done in through the use of discriminatory legislative preferences, or superior access to social, occupational and material opportunities for the population that supported the party. This ensures that the beneficiaries of the material access do not consider supporting alternative parties in fears of losing their special advantages (Schlemmer, 2005).

Clientelism is used in two ways by dominant parties, firstly it is a tool used to curb inter-party contestation, and secondly it is used to influence the political decision making of individuals by changing the benefits they enjoy from alternative choices of political participation. As a result it becomes difficult for opposition to recruit supporters and activists (Trandis, 2015).

A party whose victory lays on demographic divisions and regional solidarity can exploit its new found position to strengthen the polarization in society that brought it to victory through the use of patronage. This can be done in through the use of discriminatory legislative preferences, or access to social, occupational and material opportunities for the population that supported the party. This ensures that the beneficiaries of the material access do not consider any other political actor to support (Ziegfield and Tudor.2015).

In evaluating the leading maintenance of one party dominance Mtimkhulu (2009) identifies patronage as a fundamental characteristic of five dominant party states;

Botswana, India, Israel, Italy and Sweden. Their commonality is the access to state resources that enabled these dominant parties to fortify their dominance.

While these states adopted a more bureaucratic approach to clientelism, the Barisan Nasional (BN) in Malaysia was more abrasive. The Malaysian dominant party BN is has a reputation for vote buying during the election period. This is usually done through a targeted campaign of cash payments amongst constituencies where they doubt their popularity, the assurance of infrastructure investment for their rural support base as well as the enactment affirmative action policies (Gomez, 2016).

In Mexico Greene (2010) discusses how the governing party manipulates access and distribution to state resources and to favour their supporters while punitively withholding them from non-supporters. This strategy undermines the opposition party's ability to gain and retain support.

While clientelism and patronage has negative connotations Rubunguya (2007) is a protagonist for an alternative understanding of clientele relations in a democratic state, by arguing that it is in fact a legitimizing strategy. He argues that the acceptance of a regime lies in its ability to meet its social contract obligations and this is achieved through the distribution of material and financial rewards to its support base.

This position is supported by Wener (2014) who further argues that patronage networks act as a catalyst for the acceptance of a regime especially in the absence of ideologically based legitimacy.

The existing scholarship on clientele relations and patronage within dominant party states posits that that prolonged dominance is preserved by the use of patronage and clientele relations through targeted public spending, vote buying and to lessen factions within the dominant party. The focus on the ability of the dominant party to utilise resources for continued public support suggests that political attitudes are in favour of the dominant party even if this may not be the case.

However due to the assumed positive predisposition towards dominant parties as a result of patronage and clientele networks, empirical studies on patronage and clientele relations in Botswana and South Africa states do not explore the political attitudes of the electorate or evaluate the voter behaviour as a contributor towards the maintenance of one party dominance in the midst of patronage and clientele politics.

2.4.5 One Party Dominance and Opposition Parties in Southern Africa

Political parties are meant to articulate and express differing interests in a society, as a result in a democratic state the immediate role of the opposition is to be vigilant, act as a watchdog in order to hold the ruling party accountable. By holding the incumbents accountable opposition parties create conditions for a diversity of political viewpoints to thrive (Nkalo, 2015)

Opposition parties are central to the consolidation of democracy. The quality of democracy rests on the effectiveness of opposition parties in challenging the incumbent. Furthermore opposition parties are meant to offer alternatives; alternative political leaders, policies, political information and manage conflict of interest in society. Finally opposition parties foster political order and stability, keep citizens involved.

The existence of multiple political parties competing for power under a constitutional framework suggests that there is an equal opportunity for victory. However in the immediate independence era in Africa opposition parties gained a reputation of being enemies of the state. This is rooted in the region's history of liberation struggle that was dominated by one organisational body. The liberation movement would later become the governing party and thereby reaffirm Pempel, 1990's assertion that "*a dominant party has to initiate a historic project that determines the national policy agenda and lays the roots for a long lasting support base*" cited in (Muandeni et al, 2006).

Furthermore extended dominance by one party shapes the way other political actors view and engage with the political system. Thus the strategy and response of opposition parties is informed by the dominant party (Jounnou and Coetzee, 2010).

In their role as an agenda setting body the governing party has also managed to shape the perceptions about opposition parties which were often labelled as an enemy of transformation and anti-revolutionary (Ferree, 2011).

Thus there has been a constant suppression of opposition politics in the continent, as a result opposition parties are often described as young, fragmented, ill organised and dominated by individuals. Moreover opposition parties appear to be more focused on

power squabbles than on their core mandate which has rendered opposition parties in the continent as weak and ineffective (Giliomee and Simkins 1999; Southall, 2013).

Therefore in southern Africa the opposition parties face a legitimacy crisis. Their role remains undefined and the lack of intraparty democracy within the opposition parties works to undermine their status among voters.

Chiroro (2006) discusses the challenges and dilemmas of opposition parties in southern Africa and argues that there is systemic neglect of opposition politics in the governance debate despite the fact that opposition parties are considered to play an integral role in the building of democratic societies.

In a dominant party state opposition parties have to overcome three obstacles; the fight for the support of the society, institutional and structural barriers, and the fight to maintain a constant flow of resources and membership since most opposition parties are not publicly funded (*ibid*). Furthermore opposition parties face challenges that includes being obscured in the governance debate by being lumped together, being neglected by donors and by voters, negative perceptions

There is an agreement in literature that the challenges opposition parties face in the region include fragmented into non-viable parties, fights for power and internal weaknesses, lack of a clear and ideological stance which increase their tendency to rely on ethnicity and personality as their party's identity, not institutionalised in society, no history or liberation credentials and finally under resourced and a lack of effective fundraising strategies (Nkalo, 2015)

Opposition parties contribute significantly to the political configuration of a state. Matlosa (2004) argues that the one party dominance in southern Africa is symptomatic of the weakness and disorganization of opposition parties while Landsberg (2004) puts forth that opposition parties in newly democratizing states are in general poorly institutionalised have poor rules of procedure and weak institutions. This reinforces the notion by Pempel (1990) that one party dominant states tend to feature highly fragmented opposition.

The challenge is that political parties especially opposition parties tend to become active only during the election period, with their presence declining between elections.

This trend affects public confidence and trust in these parties which results in declined membership and voter turnout (Kadima *et al*, 2006).

Without effective opposition parties, the region risks sliding back to authoritarian and autocratic systems, thus opposition parties are a vital component of democratic systems without which the democratic project would fail.

In the existing studies of one party dominance little scholarly attention is paid to the perceptions of the electorate towards opposition parties. Instead the focus of this existing literature is on institutional factors, the weaknesses of opposition parties, and the party fragmentation

Nevertheless the focus on the weakness of opposition parties has erased the contribution of the electorate on the maintenance of one party dominance. The assumption is opposition parties are trapped within the cycle of weakness which cannot be escaped. Thus there is little systematic studies on how the attitudes of the voters towards opposition parties and their interpretation of the political landscape may contribute to one party dominance in Botswana and South Africa.

2.5 Chapter Summary

This chapter sought to review empirical literature relating to political party preference and one party dominance. The literature review is meant to highlight the inadequacies within the existing knowledge that provide the impetus for this study.

The literature on the foundations, measures and sources of partisanship illuminates the limited scholarship in the comparative analysis in southern Africa in contrast with the rest of the world. This is because, African countries returned to competitive democracies thirty years ago. As a result, little scholarly attention has focused on the relationship between partisanship and the occurrence of one party dominance in Africa, specifically in Botswana and South Africa. The review of empirical literature further illuminates the significant literary gap in the manner in which party preference shapes party systems.

The existing empirical literature on the legacy of Liberation Movement appears to be inadequate in illuminating how political attitudes, voter behaviour as well as one party preference lead to one party dominance. In addition, there is scantiness in the

literature about providing comparative analysis on how political attitudes, voter behaviour as well as one party preference lead to one party dominance in Botswana and South Africa respectively.

The scholarly works on the blurring between State and Party does not succinctly provide comparative analysis on how political attitudes lead to one party dominance in Botswana and South Africa respectively. In addition, these existing contributions on the blurring between State and Party voter behaviour make note substantive efforts to illuminate how political party preference lead to one party dominance in both Botswana and South Africa.

Predominantly scholarly contributions on electoral systems provide expositions on how electoral systems such as FTPT and PR systems does not reveal how political attitudes lead to one party dominance in Botswana and South Africa, nor does it discuss the value of voter behavior in determining electoral outcomes which promote one party dominance.

Empirical studies on patronage and clientele relations in Botswana and South Africa states do not explore the political attitudes of the electorate or evaluate the voter behaviour as a contributor towards the maintenance of one party dominance. Furthermore, in the studies of one party dominance little scholarly attention is paid to the perceptions of the electorate towards opposition parties. Instead the focus is on institutional factors, the weaknesses of opposition parties, and the party fragmentation. It appears that there is little systematic studies on how the attitudes of the voters towards opposition parties and their interpretation of the political landscape may contribute to one party dominance in Botswana and South Africa.

It is significant that the reader notes that chapter two reviewed empirical literature related to party preference and one party dominance. Chapter three presents the theories guiding the study, which are namely, the Michigan Model of Voter Behaviour and the Rational Choice Theory. In addition, chapter three provides some empirical works which justify the applicability and usage of the aforementioned. In other words, the chapter three is a fusion of theory and literature. It is noteworthy for the reader to understand that having chapter two which reviews the literature only and three which presents theories guiding the study as well as concurrently providing some empirical

basis for employing such theories does not suggest that the theoretical framework and literature review are separable.

However, separating the two chapters is necessary to conform to technical departmental requirements of reviewing literature while presenting theories guiding the study separately. This approach is helpful to provide an in-depth review of literature as well as a clear presentation and resonance of theories to studies. Therefore, chapter three which follows presents theories guiding the current study.

CHAPTER THREE

THEORETICAL *VIS-A-VIS* EMPIRICAL DISCOURSES ON PARTY PREFERENCE AND ONE PARTY DOMINANCE

3.1 Introduction

It is significant that the reader notes that chapter two reviewed empirical literature related to party preference and one party dominance. Chapter three presents the theories guiding the study, which are namely, the Michigan Model of Voter Behaviour and the Rational Choice Theory. These two theories have been used and still are used by various scholars to predict voter behaviour, and are therefore complimentary to guide theoretical and empirical analysis for this study. The complimentary nature of these theories lies on the fact that the Rational Choice Theory is normally employed to address the weaknesses of the Michigan Theory in explaining variation of party support as will be explained later on in this chapter.

Be that as it may and as already indicated earlier, chapter three provides some empirical works which justify the applicability and usage of the aforementioned theories. Chapter three is therefore a fusion of theory and literature. The reader must in this regard understand that having chapter two which reviews the literature only and chapter three which presents theories guiding the study as well as concurrently providing some empirical basis for employing such theories does not suggest that the theoretical framework and literature review are separable. However, separating the two chapters is necessity to conform to technical departmental requirements of reviewing literature while presenting theories guiding the study separately. This approach is helpful to provide an in-depth review of literature as well a clear presentation and resonance of theories to studies. This current chapter presents the theories guiding the study as well as how they resonate with the existing empirical literature on the subject matter. Later on in chapter six, the assumptions of the two theories will be juxtaposed against the findings of the current study.

3.2 The Michigan Model of Voting Behaviour

As already stated in the introduction, the Michigan model is one of the two theories which this study subscribes to in order to elucidate and comparatively examine the relationship between political party preference and one party dominance in Botswana and South Africa respectively. The origin of Michigan model is based on studies

conducted by the Survey Research Centre at the University of Michigan during the 1948, 1952 as well as 1956 United States of America (U.S.A) presidential elections. The results of these surveys were integrated to produce a book offering the foundations of Michigan model and therefore providing empirically inspired theory to analyse voter behaviour. The Michigan model has three main assumptions which lead to the funnel of causality (these shall be discussed in course of this section after elucidation of the assumptions). The assumptions of Michigan model are elucidated and contextualised to this current study below:

- The first assumption of the Michigan model is that, social status is considered an influential factor of who the voters engage with and as a result which political party patrons will support.

In the immediate post-independent Botswana the chieftaincy has played a significant role in determining electoral outcomes. Chiefs enjoyed more respect as political figureheads as opposed to non-chiefs who had found the BPP (see: Barei, 2000). In other words, the BDP enjoyed support of the local chiefs due to the fact that it was established by these Chiefs under the leadership of Seretse Khama. As regards, the social status of chiefs in Botswana and their membership to the BDP directed and still direct the political affiliation and support towards of most Batswanas to the BDP. In other words, the close ties the BDP has with the Bangwato is because of the legacy of Seretse Khama. In the same vein, the close ties the BDP has with the chiefs of the Batswana people legitimizes the party's dominance and popular support in Botswana.

The value of social status in South Africa is embedded in the ANC role in the liberation struggle. Due to the fact that the ANC played a crucial role in establishing a democratic and inclusive South Africa, the party immediately gained political support and still enjoys considerable support from the formerly disenfranchised black majority who endured the brunt of Apartheid for a significant period of their political, economic and social life. In the eyes of the formerly disadvantaged groups the ANC is the custodian of their liberty and the bulwark of their material interests hence its social status in most parts of South African communities.

- The Michigan model also recognises that socialization plays a significant role in the formation of long term patterns of party preference. The transmission of political values influences the determination of party preference which is

ultimately expressed through the ballot. The first forms of political socialization occur at the family, thereafter through the population at large, which extends to education and the media. Once partisan patterns are established and ingrained they produce stable voter decisions (Wiese, 2013).

In respect of political socialisation, the BDP has employed the state owned and other media houses to buttress its dominance in society, this ultimately resulting in consistent electoral support for a long duration. For instance, the broadcast of both Radio and Television Botswana has been able to socialising the population into supporting the BDP during elections (Taylor, 2003). Unfortunately, opposition political parties don't have access to state resources (Doorenpleet, 1999) or control over Radio and Television Botswana. It is not surprising that Maundeni et al (2006) observe that, the limitations on visibility of opposition parties come as result of the fact that they receive no funding by government. In this regard, the lack of visibility through the media hinders any efforts by opposition political parties to socialise the Batswana for political support particularly during election period.

Political socialization within the South African context is experienced through the state owned broadcaster which is the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). The SABC as the largest broadcaster in the country and has been accused of political bias because of its selective airing of political events including election events of the ANC and not those of other political parties, while also being unwilling to air negative content regarding the ANC. This is largely due to the fact that the ANC is responsible for the appointments of the SABC board (Louw, 2007⁴; Letsholo, 2009). There are factions within the ANC who envisioned that the SABC should be in service of the party such as it had been to the National Party government (Louw, 2007).

Moreover due to its larger electioneering budget the ANC is able to print more election newspaper advertisements, enjoy more radio airplay and screen time as opposed to their opposition (Booyesen, 2015). The hyper visibility of the ANC through the SABC engrains the message of the ANC into the consciousness of South Africans which therefore reflected in the electoral support of the ANC. In other words the ANC uses state owned media to biasedly socialise South Africans towards their favour.

⁴ Louw, R. 2007. The SABC. E-mail interview by Cheryl Abboo. Johannesburg cited from Abboo, 2008

- The Michigan Model of Voting assumes that voters vote out of long standing loyalty and with a sense of identification with a particular political party (Heywood, 2002: 242). Furthermore the theory considers party preference as a stable predisposition and determinant of voting behaviour that cannot be easily changed (Franklin and Jackson, 1983: 957). Party preference has a significant bearing on the attitudes towards the political landscape, in times of indecision it acts as a decisive factor after filtering through the long-term (socio-economic, historical factors, values and attitudes) and short term factors (issues, candidates, election campaigns, government action, social influences) (Atunes, 2010).

Party Preference leads to the Funnel of Causality which entail the following three factors:

- Party identification is more stable at aggregate and individual level.
- Party loyalty is shielded from the effects of current issues and party loyalties exercise a powerful influence on voters issue positions, evaluation of party leaders and voting decisions.
- Party identification rests on social identification as opposed to the party's ideology or policy positions (Abramwitz and Saunders 2006: 175).

These factors are segmented and briefly elucidated vis-à-vis empirical evidence from both Botswana and South Africa beneath:

Party identification is more stable at aggregate and individual level

Seabo (2013) examined the relationship between party preferences within social cleavages in Botswana and found that the BDP enjoyed support from different social cleavages in society resulting to its electoral dominance. Similarly, ten years after democracy in South Africa, a study by Schulz-Herzenberg (2008) found that despite a drop in party preference during this period, the ANC enjoyed more party loyalty amongst the African demographic who also registered the highest level of attachment to any political party.

Party loyalty is shielded from the effects of current issues and party loyalties exercise a powerful influence on voters issue positions, evaluation of party leaders and voting decisions

In Botswana the BDP has faced multiple corruption scandals which have included high level BDP MP's. The corruption scandals led to housing shortages in Gaborone, self-enrichment of public officials through the Botswana Meat Commission (BMC), lack of delivery of primary school amenities which negatively impacted the effectiveness of public schools in Botswana's (see; Sebudubudu, 2003). The corruption scandals of the early 1990's had the citizens of Botswana in outrage and dented the good governance image of Botswana (Kuris, 2013). Despite the public outcry, the BDP continued to register its legislative dominance throughout the 1990's to date.

In South Africa the ANC is plagued with scandals of non-service delivery and corruption. For instance, the ANC leadership had been implicated in the arms deal scandal and yet in the 2004 elections, the party managed to register its highest electoral victory (this led to the party enjoying two third majority in parliament). Leading up to the 2009 elections was the watershed 2007 Polokwane ANC elective conference which elected Jacob Zuma at the helm of the ANC leadership. Jacob Zuma was tainted with scandal having been implicated in the arms deal corruption as well as other corruption and rape charges. While support for the ANC dropped in the 2009 general elections, the party still managed maintain support which was not below 60% (Grootes, 2013). Finally, in the lead towards the 2014 elections, under the ANC government the country experienced load shedding, the value of the rand weakened, unemployment and inequality worsened yet ANC support still remained above 60% in the 2014 elections (Booyesen, 2015).

Party identification rests on social identification as opposed to the party's ideology or policy positions

In Botswana the Batswana people identify with and are loyal to the BDP more than any other party because of the respect it has shown traditional leadership, as well as its history of service delivery which has ensured that the Batswana benefit from the diamond mines in the country. In South Africa the loyalty to the ANC is as a result of its status as a liberation movement, and the social redress policies which it has enacted once it came into power.

As already mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the Rational Choice Theory is normally employed to address the weaknesses of the Michigan Theory in explaining variation of party support. Meaning that, Michigan Theory since is unable to provide theoretical and empirical insights which explain the variation in electoral outcomes. Since its core thesis is that individual's votes are determined by their party identity, it fails to account for why these voters with their long standing party identity may vote for another party or decide not to vote at all (Atunes.2010). Against this backdrop, the following section presents the Rational Choice Theory in order to curb the weaknesses of the Michigan Theory in the context of existing empirical material as well as to address the theoretical and empirical basis for this current study.

3.3 Rational Choice Theory

Rational Choice Theory is a theory for understanding economic and social behaviour, and is one of the central theories of political science. The extension of rational choice theory into political science is based on the premise that in politics as in economics there is always competition for scarce resources. There is a resemblance between market competition and political competition to hold office.

Rational Choice Theory is the foundation upon which the economic expiation of voter behaviour is rooted. It draws parallels between the market and politics and it theorises that voters are like consumers, and political parties are companies. It further argues that if enterprises are driven by profit motives then parties aim to grow their electoral margins while voters seek to maximise the utility of their vote (Antunes, 2010).

Rational Choice Model begins with the supposition that actors know what they want and order their needs accordingly; because they know what they want they can decide which action is best suited to meet their needs subject to their availability. These rational individual actions result in larger societal outcomes. (Rochester, 1995; Ogu, 2013). Rational Choice Theory has three main assumptions which are elucidated and contextualised to this current study below:

- All decisions are rational and guided by the principle of self-interest. The main premise of rationality is that voters and political parties act directly according to their self-interest. They consider the advantages and

disadvantages of an action before taking it, and these actions result in larger societal outcomes.

Political parties including the BDP in Botswana and the ANC in South Africa have taken action that has rightly positioned them to be dominant parties. The BDP has adopted developmental projects and aligned themselves with core groups in society in order to maintain its appeal to the electorate. This goes along with the ANC strategy, which also aligned itself with core organizational groupings such as COSATU as well as the South African Communist Party (SACP). Furthermore, the ANC enacted public policy that has maintained their positive public image amongst the majority black as well as poor South Africans.

- There is an element of consistency in a democratic political system. Voters in a democratic system have limited options from which to choose, that is ordered in preference from least to most favourable. This makes easy to predict outcomes and also compare them.

In accordance with this assumption in the context of Both South Africa and Botswana, it appears that there is an element of consistency with regard to voters predominantly limiting their choices towards ruling and dominant political parties. On the one hand, South African voters have limited their voting choices towards the ANC consistently for a period of 22 years. On the other hand, the Batswana have also continuously voted for the governing BDP for over 60 years. The consistent electoral victories of the ANC and BDP therefore makes it easy for one to predict and compare election outcomes in both countries.

- The rational choice theory argues that rationality and self-interests that informs political behaviour goes hand in hand with a level of uncertainty that is brought about the pursuit of self-interest and maximum utility (Antunes.2010).

In the case of Botswana, the BDP led government's partnership with the De Beers diamond mining company provides the government with revenue which is currently and historically been used to provide social services in the country. Therefore the BDP has effectively used its partnership with De Beers to improve the lives of the Batswana and having being the only governing party since independence is known as the sole custodian of the material interests of the people of Botswana. In South Africa the ANC

enjoys a close relationship with the black majority due to its liberation credentials. While in government the ANC has been able to position itself as the representatives of the aspirations of the formerly marginalised black people while simultaneously rolling out policy that supports this perception.

3.6 Chapter Summary

The guiding principles of the Michigan and Rational Choice theories offer substantial explanatory power in explaining voter behaviour globally. Party identity is a result of social status and early socialization and is assumed to be reinforced with age. According to the Michigan theory of voter behaviour, once party loyalty is established, the individual will vote according to that party loyalty forever. However, the Michigan model fails to account for changes in voter behaviour. As a result, in order to address this weakness within the Rational Choice Theory has been adopted to complement the shortfalls of Michigan theory.

Though the propositions of the Rational Choice and Michigan Theories have been contextualized against the existing empirical material in this chapter, the reader is alerted that these propositions will be tested in chapter six against the findings of this study as obtained from the AfroBarometer. The propositions of the Michigan and Rational Choice theories will therefore guide the analysis of this study which intends to satisfy the research objectives as stated in the first chapter, which are to:

- Examine the political attitudes of voters regarding political parties in Botswana and South Africa.
- Determine the trends in electoral behaviour in Botswana and South Africa.
- Evaluate whether trends in electoral support match with the perceptions of the electorate in Botswana and South Africa.
- Determine whether political party preference leads to one party dominance in Botswana and South Africa.

The following chapter presents the research methodology as well as data collection techniques employed to source data for this study.

CHAPTER FOUR RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

4.1. Introduction

As already stated earlier, the main aim of this study is comparatively examine the relationship between party preference and one party dominance with specific reference to Botswana and South Africa, with an intention contribute to closing some of the knowledge gaps that currently exist on the subject which was under enquiry. Therefore, this chapter provides expositions on qualitative research methods which were applied in order to comparatively examine the relationship between party preference and one party dominance with specific reference to Botswana and South Africa. Through the usage of qualitative research methods and in order to achieve the stated research aim, the research questions are re-stated bellow for the reader's convenience:

- What are the political attitudes of the electorate regarding political parties in Botswana and South Africa?
- What are the trends in the voter behaviour of the electorate in Botswana and South Africa?
- To what extent do the trends in electoral behaviour correlate with perceptions of the Botswana and South Africa?
- Does one political party preference lead to one party dominance Botswana and South Africa?

It is these stated questions that were used as data collection guidelines. This chapter is categorised into eight sections that together clarify how data was sourced for this study. The first sections points out the research sites, while the sections that follow provide insights on methodological approaches and data collection techniques employed as well as all the epistemological challenges relating to the study.

4.2 Research Site

The research sites for this study are Botswana and South Africa. The two case studies were selected based on their track record as beacons of democracy in Southern Africa whilst also being dominant party systems. The two countries have been under a democratic governance for over twenty years; both allow the existence of multiple political parties, periodically hold elections and have effective institutions of accountability. Despite adhering to core tenants of democracy, the two states are yet to pass the 'two turn-over' test where there is a changeover of government from one political party to another. These are the basis for comparing political party preference in Botswana and South Africa as well as choosing both states as research sites. The reader must note however, that the researcher did not subscribe to data collection techniques that requires a research field trip to both research sites. As will be indicated later, the researcher employed only document analysis as a data collection technique, which requires a review of documents to solicit data. The reader should therefore note that, the researcher intended only to provide clarity on why Botswana and South Africa were chosen as sites of study.

4.3 Research Design

This study employed a comparative case study which entails examining in rich detail the context and features of two or more specific phenomena. The goal of comparative case study is to discover the differences, similarities or patterns across these cases. In this regard, the comparative case study was used to elucidate as well as provide differences, similarities as well as patterns of political party preferences in Botswana and South Africa. In other words, comparative case study was employed to map out differences and similarities of political party preferences in Botswana and South Africa since both these countries are descriptively one party dominant states. Therefore, it was necessary to utilise comparative case study due to the fact that both Botswana and South Africa espouse a similar pattern of one party dominant system.

4.4 Data Collection Method

Document analysis refers to the collection, review, interrogation, and analysis of various forms of text as a primary source of research data (O' Leary, 177; 2014).

Alternatively document analysis could be understood as analysis or interpretation of documents that contain information about the phenomenon we wish to study (Bailey, 1994). Document analysis was employed in this study through specifically relying on three sources of data, which are the Afrobarometer surveys, reports on elections results from the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) of South Africa as well as the IEC of Botswana.

On the one hand, the Afrobarometer survey data was sourced specifically on the surveys conducted between 2002 and 2014. While on the other hand, data on election results was sourced from the 2004, 2009, 2014 elections results of both Botswana and South Africa as published by the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) .

The data set used for the purpose of the study is the Afrobarometer survey series round 4 until round 6. These surveys were conducted between surveys cycles of 2002/2003, 2005/2006, 2008/2009 and, 2011/2013 as well as 2014/2015

Afrobarometer series is based on the Barometer survey series. It is administered by the Centre for Democratic Development in Ghana and the Institute for Democracy in South Africa and Michigan State University and therefore follows international best practices.

This survey series is the most comprehensive and scientifically sound public opinion series available in the two states. Furthermore the reliability of the survey series is its due consideration of the distinctiveness of each state.

4.4.1 Advantages of using Survey Data

Public opinion surveys such as the Afrobarometer series have a larger sample than normally studied with a panel or in-depth interview. Such large samples results are more representative and provide inference which is important when studying a nation or a society (Schulz-Hezenberg, 2010).

Survey data provides a cross-sectional and longitudinal data for a study of this nature by providing attitudinal information over a period of time from different individuals who are selected through scientific principles of sampling (ibid).

Due to the systematic nature of survey data collection it provides the researcher the ability to perform descriptive and explanatory research. Furthermore because of the periodic nature of such surveys, there is consistency between questions and it provides an opportunity to study the trends in responses over time. This creates another opportunity for comparative analysis of the same variables in different populations over time (Ingelhart, 2008).

4.4.2 Disadvantages of Survey Data

A key disadvantage of survey data such as Afrobarometer series is the fact that different people are interviewed with every round of data collection. This skews the data because while trends may appear to change over time they may not be a true reflection of the individuals that were initially interviewed and therefore does not account for a true change in the trends over time (Schulz-Hezeburg, 2010).

Furthermore survey data's inherent weakness is its limited probe to the respondent's answers thereby does not probe in-depth the answers provided. Moreover another weakness of survey data is the inability to find a truly representative sample due to uneven responses among different classes (*ibid*).

4.5 Delimitations and Limitations of the Study

This study sought to examine whether political preference lead to one party dominance in Botswana and South Africa. To achieve this objective the study employed the use of document analysis as the data collection technique due availability of data (Bowen, 2009) for both Botswana and South Africa. The data available as already observed above was from Afrobarometer surveys and the IEC elections reports from both countries. Conducting in-depth interviews could have assisted in further strengthening this study through provision of narrations from respondents, however, this technique of data collection proved to be difficult to employ in Botswana specifically. This was due to the fact that the 'guidelines for application for research permit' in the republic of Botswana state the following:

- It should be noted that not every application, however well substantiated, will necessarily meet with Government approval. We hope that prospective

researchers will understand the reasons for these precautions, and voluntarily comply with the spirit as well as the letter of these Guidelines for Research.

- Priority will be given to research by local institutions and to research which is of maximum benefit to the nation.
- It should therefore be noted that not every application, however well substantiated, will meet with Government approval. Prospective researchers should understand the reasons for these precautions, and voluntarily comply with the spirit as well as the letter of these Guidelines for Application for a Research Permit (Republic of Botswana, 2004:4).

With regards, to the interpretation and understanding of the researcher due to the above mentioned legislative guidelines, utilising document analysis became one of the viable options to conduct a comparative study of this nature. In other words, while for South Africa, in-depth interviews could have been possible since there are no restrictions for researchers; for Botswana the study could have been compromised in terms of the duration of years to be spent for this academic level as a result of awaiting the Botswana government to respond to the application of conducting research. To a very large extent, the Guidelines for Application for a Research Permit by the Republic of Botswana became one of the major limitations with regards to possibly expanding sourcing data to interviews rather than relying on document analysis only.

Another key limitation is that documents used for this study were not produced for this particular study, as such the data utilised for this study is open to interpretation, based on the researchers specific aims and objectives. As a result the data utilised for this study may have yielded different results for other studies with different objectives.

However despite these challenges, document analysis was deemed to be most appropriate as the documents selected for the study were most representative of the electorate of Botswana and South Africa.

4.6 Validity and Reliability of Data

For this study, authenticity, reliability and validity of data lies on the fact that data was sourced from Afrobarometer survey series reports which cannot be tampered with by a third party once published. Furthermore the Afrobarometer survey series are authentic, reliable as well as valid since they adhere to well-known and best international practices guided and administered by independent institutions as the

Centre of Democratic Development in Ghana, Michigan State University and the most recent non-operating Institute for Democracy in South Africa.

Afrobarometer employs the use of national probability samples. Samples are designed to create a sample that is representative of all the citizens of a voting age in any country excluding people in mental institutions, prisons, hospitals, and people in nursing homes (Afrobarometer, 2017).

The universal sample population of the Afrobarometer series is people over the age of 18. The purpose of the surveys is to provide each adult with an equal opportunity of being selected for an interview. This is achieved by using random selection at every section of sampling and sampling at every selection. Furthermore there is sampling at all stages with probability proportionate to population size and wherever possible to make sure that more populated geographic units have an even greater likelihood of being chosen into the sample (*ibid*).

Samples usually include either 1,200 or 2,400 cases. A randomly selected sample of $n=1200$ cases allows inferences to national adult populations with a margin of sampling error of no more than $\pm 2.8\%$ with a confidence level of 95 percent. With a sample size of $n=2400$, the margin of error decreases to $\pm 2.0\%$ at 95 percent confidence level (*opcit*).

The sample design is a clustered, stratified, multi-stage, area probability sample. Specifically, we first stratify the sample according to the main sub-national unit of government (state, province, region, etc.) and by urban or rural location. Area stratification reduces the likelihood that distinctive ethnic or language groups are left out of the sample. Afrobarometer occasionally purposely oversamples certain populations that are politically significant within a country to ensure that the size of the sub-sample is large enough to be analysed (Afrobarometer, 2017).

In addition, the reports on election outcomes from the electoral management institutions in Botswana and South Africa should be considered deemed authentic on the basis two facts. Firstly, in both countries opposition political parties have never contested the electoral outcomes; and secondly, to date elections in both countries have been deemed credible by election observer missions from SADC. On the same note, both states are signatories of NEPAD and during the election period Botswana and South Africa often have international election other observers in order to ensure

that the elections are inclusive, transparent in order to curb election fraud and vote rigging as well as to maintain accountability.

4.6 Method of Data Analysis

The collected data was organized and categorized systematically by arranging the material collected thematically. Thematic analysis is a systematic approach to the analysis of data that involves identifying themes or patterns of cultural meanings. In this process coding and classifying data is usually in themes and interpreting the results in thematic structures that seek commonalities, relationships and overarching patterns of theoretical constructs or explanatory principles. Thematic analysis provides a purely qualitative, detailed, and nuanced account of data (Braun and Clarke, 2006). In this regard, the researcher organised themes in accordance with the research questions and objectives. In sequence the themes are as follows:

- Political attitudes of the electorate towards political parties in Botswana and South Africa.
- Trends in the voter behaviour of in Botswana and South Africa.
- The correlation between electoral behaviour and political attitudes in Botswana and South Africa.
- Political party preference *vis-a-vis* party dominance Botswana and South Africa

Consequently, the presentation of data was arranged in accordance with the themes presented above. It is these themes that are categorised into sections or parts in the presentation and analysis chapters.

4.7 Chapter Summary.

This chapter provided expositions on qualitative research methods which were applied in order to comparatively examine the relationship between party preference and one party dominance with specific reference to Botswana and South Africa. This chapter was categorised into various sections that together clarified how data was sourced. The first sections pointed out the research sites, while the sections that followed provided insights on methodological approaches and data collection techniques employed as well as all the delimitations as well limitation surrounding the study.

Chapter four detailed the thematic manner and approach the researcher analysed the data. The forthcoming chapter pays attention specifically to presentation in light of the themes outlined in the data analysis section of this current chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE: PRESENTATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

5.1. Introduction

Chapter five presents the results of the comparative case study as described in chapter four. As previously stated the main aim of this study is to examine the contribution of party preference to the emergence of one party dominance. In order to achieve this aim, four research questions were conceptualised. To remind the reader the questions are restated below:

- What are the political attitudes of the electorate regarding political parties in Botswana and South Africa?
- What are the trends in the voter behaviour of the electorate in Botswana and South Africa?
- To what extent do the trends in electoral behaviour correlate with perceptions of the Botswana and South Africa?
- Does one political party preference lead to one party dominance Botswana and South Africa?

This chapter on presentation of findings is segmented into four parts which are thematised in accordance with the research questions and objectives of this study. Part One presents findings pertaining to research question one which examines the attitudes of the voters regarding political parties in Botswana and South Africa. Part one of the chapter, encompasses two sections, namely “Part One A” and “Part One B”. “Part One A” presents findings pertaining to research question one which examines the attitudes of the voters regarding political parties in Botswana, while “Part One B” presents findings pertaining to attitudes of the voters regarding political parties in South Africa.

Similarly, Part Two is also divided into two sections, “Part Two A” and Part Two B” which present the findings responding to the second research question that focuses on the electoral trends in Botswana and South Africa. “Part Two A” presents findings regarding electoral trends in Botswana and “Part Two B” presents findings regarding electoral trends in South Africa.

Finally, “Part Three” provides a comparative presentation of the findings detailed in “Part One” and “Part Two”. In other words, “Part Three” attempts to satisfy the main aim of the study through providing a comparative examination on whether party preference leads to one party dominance in Botswana and South Africa.

5.2 PART ONE

PART ONE A

Findings pertaining to attitudes of the voters regarding political parties in Botswana

Findings presented in here in “Part One A” pertain to the first research question of the study which is restated below:

- What are the attitudes of the voters regarding political parties in Botswana and South Africa?

As already outlined in the methodology chapter, the responses were selected from the Afrobarometer cross national surveys over three election cycles which described the underlying attitudes of the nation’s regarding political parties within their state. The findings in this section are therefore thematically presented:

- Trust in the Governing Party in Botswana.
- The Role of the Opposition Parties in Botswana.
- Presences of Opposition Parties in Botswana.
- Trust in Opposition Parties in Botswana.

5.2.1 Trust in the Governing Party in Botswana

The public attitudes towards democracy and governance as probed by Afrobarometer were meant to determine whether the respondents trust the political parties in their country. The levels of trust were measured along three indicators complete trust, partial trust and no trust.

When queried about their complete trust in the governing party in Botswana there seems to be a continuous upward trajectory in the level of complete trust of the ruling party.

In the 2002/2003 respondents who trusted the governing party completely stood at 43%. While there was a low level of trust towards the governing party in the 2002/2003


survey cycle, complete trust towards governing party in Botswana had increased in the two cycles that followed.

Trust towards the governing party in Botswana in the 2005/2006 cycle increased by 11.5%, as a result 54.5% of the respondents indicated that they trust the governing party completely. In addition, percentages of the level of complete trust peaked to 62.3% in 2008/2009 cycle recording an increase on the level of complete trust by 7.8%. This meant that, from 2002 to 2006, complete trust towards political parties by citizens in Botswana had increased by 19.3%.

Though the above mentioned cycle provides an impression that the citizens were increasing their level of complete trust towards the governing party, for the 2011/2013 cycle complete trust towards the governing party registered a decrease of 8% and levels of complete trust registered at 54.3%. In the 2014/2015 cycle, there complete trust towards the governing party increased slightly by 1.8% to 56.1%.

Respondents were also given an option to indicate whether they had partial trust in the governing party. In the year 2002/2003 the number of respondents who indicated partial trust in the governing party stood at 29.4%. This was the highest level of partial trust as in the following 2005/2006 cycle the percentage of respondents who indicated partial trust dropped by 7.6% reaching to a low of 21.8%. However in the 2008/2009 cycle the levels of partial trust recovered by 3.3% and therefore went up to 25.1%. The recovery was short lived as the levels in partial trust decreased slightly to 24.7% in 2011/2013 and 23.4% in the 2014/2015 cycle.

Still on the same questions there were respondents who indicated their lack of trust in the governing party. Respondents who did not express any trust in the governing party was in the 2002/2003 standing at 25.1%, in the following 2005/2006 cycle the number of respondents who indicated no trust in the governing party increased by 0.9% to reach 26%. However, for the 2008/2009 cycle, respondents who expressed no trust in the governing party reached an all-time low with 11.4% losing 14.6%. The responses that indicate no trust in the governing rose to 19.3% in the 2011/2013 cycle. Finally for the 2014/2015 cycle the percentage of respondents who expressed no trust increased slightly by 0.5% reaching 19.8%.



Source: <http://afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/analyse-online> Accessed on 15 October 2017


5.2.4 The Role of the Opposition Parties in Botswana

From the 2008/2009 period the survey further probed what the electorate believed the role of opposition parties was in the post-election period. The question encompassed two statements from which the respondents had to indicate which statement they agree with or whether they agree with neither.

Statement One: Opposition parties should regularly examine and criticise government policies and actions. In the 2008/2009, 17.6% of the respondents agreed with this statement. In 2011/2013 cycle, agreement to this question gained 11.1% to reach 28.7%. However, for the 2014/2015 cycle agreement with the aforementioned statement loses 12.5% decreased to 16.2%.

Statement Two: Opposition parties should concentrate on cooperating with government and helping it develop the country. In 2008/2009 cycle 80.3% agreed with this statement. The support for this statement declined by 2.1% in the following 2011/2013 cycle to reach 78.2%. For the 2014/2015 cycle, interestingly the responses in support of the above mentioned statement increased by 3.9% and climbed up to 82.1%.

The respondents were also given an option to agree with neither of the statements. For the 2008/2009 only 1.4% of the respondents did not agree with either of the statements. The responses to with no agreement to either of the statements increased by 0.2% to reach one point six percent 1.6% in 2011/2013 declined 0.5% to reach 1.1% in 2014/2015 cycle.



Source: <http://afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/analyse-online> Accessed on 15 October 2017

5.2.1 Presence of Opposition Parties in Botswana


In survey cycle of 2002/2003 conducted in the years leading up to the 2004 national elections when asked which statement is closest to their views between statement A: *Political parties create division and confusion and it is therefore unnecessary to have many political parties*; 37.2% of the respondents agreed with this statement while 59.1% of the respondents agreed with *statement B: that many political parties are needed to make sure that Botswana have real choices in who governs them.*

In survey cycle of 2005/2006 conducted after the general elections of 2004, 23.2% of the respondents agreed with the statement that *many political parties create division and confusion and it is therefore unnecessary to have many political parties* while 73.8% of the respondents favoured the existence of multiple opposition parties in Botswana.

The survey conducted in the election period of 2008/2009; only 20%, the respondents express their displeasure at the existence of opposition parties, registering a 3.2% decline, while 78.8% of the respondents still supported the existence of opposition parties.

In the post-election survey of 2011/2013, statement A; that said *political parties create division and confusion and it is therefore unnecessary to have many political parties*; continued to enjoy the least amount of support receiving only 29% of agreement as compared statement B, that said *many political parties are needed to make sure that Botswana have real choices in who governs them*. While 61.5% indicated a significant drop 17.3% it is significantly higher than the 29% agreement with statement A, which is also an increase of 9%.

In the survey cycle conducted in 2014/2015, 28.2% of the respondents supported the statement that *many opposition parties were divisive and caused conflict therefore deem it unnecessary to have many political parties in Botswana*. While 70.3% of the respondents agree that Botswana needs more political parties to ensure real choice in governance.



Source: <http://afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/analyse-online> Accessed on 15 October 2017

5.2.3 Trust in Opposition Parties in Botswana

The survey also probed to what extent the electorate trusts opposition political parties and in Botswana the results are as follows:


In the 2002/ 2003 round two survey 53.4% of the respondents said that they do not trust opposition parties at all, while 27.8% expressed a partial trust in the opposition and 14.2% expressed complete trust in the opposition parties.

In post-election survey of 2005/2006, 29.4% of the respondents expressed no trust in opposition parties, 22.8% expressed a partial trust and 38.3% described themselves as trusting of the opposition parties.

During the election period of 2008/2009 48.2% of the respondents expressed complete distrust in opposition parties while 17.2% expressed a partial trust in opposition 38.3% expressed complete trust in opposition parties.

In the post-election survey of 2011/2013, 37.3% expressed complete distrust in opposition parties, 19.5% expressed partial trust while 39.6% indicated that they trusted opposition parties.

In the election period of 2014/2015, 33.3% of respondents expressed complete distrust in opposition parties, 23.6% of those surveyed expressed partial trust and 41% expressed trust in the opposition parties.



Source: <http://afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/analyse-online> Accessed on 15 October 2017

5.2.5 PART ONE B: Findings pertaining to attitudes of the voters regarding political parties in South Africa

Findings presented in here in “Part One B” are in response to the first research question of the study which is restated below:

- What are the attitudes of the voters regarding political parties in Botswana and South Africa?

As already outlined in the methodology chapter, the responses were selected from the Afrobarometer cross national surveys over three election cycles which described the underlying attitudes of the nation’s regarding political parties within their state. Following the same thematic arrangement as Part One A, the findings in this Part One B are presented in the following manner:

- Trust in the Governing Party in South Africa.
- The Role of the Opposition Parties in South Africa.
- Presences of Opposition Parties in South Africa.
- Trust in Opposition Parties in South Africa.


The survey also probed to what extent the electorate trusts the governing party in South Africa the results are as follows:

5.2.9 Trust in the Governing Party in South Africa

Respondents were also asked regarding their trust in the incumbent government. In the 2002/2003 round those who expressed complete trust in the ruling party was 32.3% of the respondents, the number would peak in the post-election survey of 2005/2006 to 55.7%. However for the 2008/2009 cycle, trust for the governing party decreased by 9.6% to reach 46.1%. In 2011/2013 cycle, complete trust for the governing party recovered by 5.5% and support number rose 51.6%. Finally in the 2014/2015 cycle, complete trust for the governing party registered a 6.4% decrease and the number drops again to 45.2%. Despite the fluctuations, the overall trust in the governing party from the initial cycle used for this study until the last considered survey cycle increased by 12.9%.

Those who indicated partial trust in the incumbent stood at 35% in the 2002/2003 cycle, the number declined in the 2005/2006 cycle, by 7.7% going down to 27.3%. In the 2008/2009 cycle the number of respondents who expressed partial trust further decreased to 26%. In the 2011/2013 cycle numbers for partial trust picked by 5.2% in the 2011/2013 survey to register 32.5%. However in the 2014/2015 cycle the number indicated a 10.4% decline to 22.1%.

The percentage of respondents who expressed no trust in the governing party stood at 25.4% in the 2002/2003 cycle, dropping down to 13%, this is a significant 12.4% decrease in those who have no trust in the governing party. Nevertheless, respondents who expressed no trust in the governing party made significant gains of 8.1% and in the 2008/2009 cycle, the number stood at 21.1%. The fluctuations continued and for the 2011/2013 cycle the percentage of respondents expressed no trust in the governing party dropped to 14.9%. In the 2011/2013 round and peaking at thirty-one percent in the 2014/2015 round.



Source: <http://afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/analyse-online> Accessed on 15 October 2017


5.2.8 The Role of opposition parties in South Africa

Afrobarometer also enquires what the people of the country believe the role of the opposition party should be in the post-election period. The respondents are provided with two statements from the two statements they must select which statement they most agree with.

Statement One: Opposition parties should regularly examine and criticise government policies and actions. In 2008/2009, 36.4% of the respondents agreed with this statement, the percentage slightly drops by 3.7% in 2011/2013 to 32.7% and the decline continues in the 2014/2015 survey registering at 27.8%.

Statement Two: Opposition parties should accept defeat and cooperate with government to help develop the country. In 2008/2009, 58.9% of the respondents agree with this statement, a steady increase in support of this statement increasing by 4.7% to reach 63.6% in 2011/2013 and reaches a new peak in 2014/2015 cycle to reach 68.8%.

In the three survey rounds less 3% of the respondents agreed with neither; 2008/2009 the percentage stood at 2.2%, in 2011/2013 the number peaked at 2.7% and finally 2.3% in 2014/2015.



Source: <http://afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/analyse-online> Accessed on 15 October 2017

5.2.6 Presence of Opposition Parties in South Africa

When respondents were probed which statement is closest to their views between statement A and statement B, with the option to agree with neither

Statement A: Political parties create division and confusion therefore it is unnecessary to have many political parties in South Africa.


In 2005/2006, 36% of the respondents agreed with this statement, in the following survey year of 2008/2009, 29.4%, this is a decrease of 6.6% of respondents who agreed with the view that opposition parties caused conflict and were divisive.

In 2011/2013 cycle a decline was registered in the percentage of respondents who agreed with this statement from 29.4 in the previous cycle to 15.2%, this dip in support was the lowest and would recover to 26.3% in 2014/2015.

Statement B: Many political parties are needed to make sure that South Africans have real choices in who governs them.

In 2005/2006 cycle 61.4% of the respondents agreed with this statement. The number slightly rose in the 2008/2009 cycle to 63.9% of the respondents who agreed.

The upward trajectory in agreement with this statement continues and peaks in the 2011/2013 cycle to reach 70.7% of the respondents agreeing with this statement. This is a substantial 6.8 % increase. However this momentum would be lost in the 2014/2015 cycle where the first decline is registered with 69.6% of respondents agreeing with this statement, this is a marginal decrease of 1.1%.



Source: <http://afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/analyse-online> Accessed on 15 October 2017

5.2.7 Trust in Opposition Parties in South Africa


In the Afrobarometer round of 2002/2003, 44.3% of the respondents said that they did not trust opposition parties at all, 31.7% indicated a partial trust and only 12.5% expressed full trust in opposition parties.

In the survey conducted in 2005/2006, 34.3% of the respondents indicated that they did not trust opposition parties at all this is a 10% drop from the 2002/2003 cycle. Furthermore, 20%, another 11.7% decline since the previous survey cycle in the partial trust in opposition parties enjoyed and 37% trusted opposition parties, this is a substantial increase from the previous cycle, an increase of 24.5%.

In round four of the survey cycle conducted in 2008/2009, 28.6% of respondents indicated a complete distrust for opposition, 23.8% expressed partial trust in opposition parties while 38.2% of the respondents said that they trust opposition parties. Trust for opposition parties registers another increase of 1.2% although minimal.

In round five of the survey conducted in 2011/2013 the percentage of respondents who did not trust opposition parties stood at 20.6%, on the other hand those who expressed partial trust stood at 30.5% and finally those that trusted the opposition parties stood at 40.4% another marginal increase of 2.2%.

For the sixth round conducted in 2014/2015, 29.5% of the respondents said they did not trust opposition parties, while 23.9% twenty three point nine percent expressed a partial trust while the percentage of those who trusted opposition parties 43.4%. Like the previous cycle, trust for opposition parties has been increasing with every cycle, and in this particular cycle gained a 3% increase.



Source: <http://afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/analyse-online> Accessed on 15 October 2017

5.3 PART TWO

Findings Pertaining to Trends in Electoral Behaviour in Botswana and South Africa.

The second part of the chapter responds to the second question which is; “*What are the trends in the voter behaviour of the electorate in Botswana and South Africa?*”

This question is answered through the presentation of the national election results of the three national elections of 2004, 2009 and 2014 in Botswana and South Africa. These election results provide a picture on the voting patterns of the electorate in Botswana and South Africa. Furthermore they provide a reference point of analysis on whether the perceptions regarding political parties are reflected in voter choices.

Additionally this section also provides the responses of the Afrobarometer survey respondents regarding their voter behaviour and voter choice. It then compares the responses of the survey to the election results. The data presented in this section is a combination of Afrobarometer indicators that speak to voter behaviour and national election results of 2004, 2009 and 2014.

Part Two A

5.3.1 Trends Botswana Electoral Behaviour


The respondents of Botswana when asked *“If a presidential election would be held tomorrow which party’s candidate would you vote for?”*

The governing party consistently received the highest number of support from the respondents. In the 2005/2006 survey the number of respondents who said they would vote for the incumbent should an election be held the next day stood at 53%, in the 2008/2009 survey the number peaks at 68.9%, this is a 15.9% increase. The number of respondents dropped by 18.7% in the 2011/2013, decreasing to 50.2% and registering a slight increase 1.8% in the 2014/2015 round to reach 52%.

The party that got the second most support was the BNF who in 2005/2006 24.3%, dropping by almost 10% to 13% in 2008/2009 cycle, decreasing further down to 10.9% in 2011/2013. The downward trajectory reaches an all-time low to 6.3% in the 2014/2015 cycle that is an overall decline of 18% since the 2005/2006 afrobarometer survey cycle.

The third largest party was the BCP who in the 2005/2006 survey received 9.1% of envisioned support, dropping by 1.2% to reach 7.9% 2008/2009 cycle. Their first increase is registered in 2011/2013 going up to 13.1% The rise in support continues in the 2014/2015 cycle to 19.7% an increase of 10.6% since the 2005/2006 survey cycle.

In the third and fourth cycles of the Afrobarometer surveys other opposition parties in Botswana failed to reach the one percent threshold of possible support. However in the 2011/2013 round BMD surpasses the one percent threshold to register 3.6% percent in the 2011/2013. The coalition of (BCP, BPP, BNF, BMD), the UDC registered only a 4.6% envisioned support in the 2014/2015.



Source: <http://afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/analyse-online> Accessed on 15 October 2017

The envisioned support is consistent with the partisan attitudes of the Botswana people. When questioned *whether they felt close to any particular party* in 2008/2009 round 77.8% of the respondents responded yes and 21.2% said they did not feel close to any party.


When further probed about which party was that; the BDP registered the most amount of support at 54.8%, the BNF came second with 13.5% of respondents who felt close to the party. The BCP came third recording 6.8% of the respondent's attachments.

In the fifth survey cycle of 2011/2013, there is a significant decrease in the people who felt close to any political party dropping by 14.4% to reach 63.4%, on the other hand, there was an increased in those who did not harbour any attachment to a political party from 21.2% in the previous cycle to 35.2%.

Continuing the trend from the previous survey cycles, the BDP attachment was higher during this period, registering at 62%. BNF attachment ties also indicate a 1.8%

increase to 15.3%. BCP also increases to 14.7% while remaining the opposition parties failed to reach the one percent threshold.

For the election year of 2014/2015, 72.8% of the respondents felt close to a political party, and 25.9% of the respondents did not feel close to any party. When probing deeper as to what party they preferred the most the BDP once again enjoyed the most amount of support at 60.5% of the respondents citing preference to it. The BNF continued to lose support only reaching only 8.3% while the BCP continued to gain preference and peaking at 21.4% a 14.6% increase. The coalition movement of UDC only managed to incur 3.1% a decline when compared to the previous cycle outcomes.



Source: <http://afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/analyse-online> Accessed on 15 October 2017


5.3.2 Botswana National Assembly Electoral Outcomes 2004-2014

For the 30 October 2004 elections eight political parties (BDP, BNF, BCP, BAM, BPP, NDF, MELS and Independent Candidates) competed in the elections. Of the eight contenders only three political parties (BDP, BNF and BCP) gained enough support to gain a seat in the Botswana National Assembly (IEC. 2017).

In the 2009 national assembly elections another eight political parties with the exception of the NDF and the addition of Botswana Tlhoko Tiro Organization (BTTO) contested the elections. In these elections five political parties (Independent

Candidates, BAM, BCP, BNF and BDP) where able to receive enough votes to gain a seat in the national assembly. These elections indicated a rise in support for opposition political parties (*ibid*).

In the 2014 national assembly elections only four political parties compete in the national assembly elections this is due to the coalition agreement between (BNF, BCP and BMD). The three parties canvassed under the Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDM). Of the four parties that contested the elections three parties (BCP, UDM, and BDP) managed to gain sufficient electoral support to gain a seat in the national assembly (*opcit*).



Source: <https://www.eisa.org.za/wep/souresults2004.htm> Accessed 15 October 2017

Table 1: Electoral Performance of Botswana Opposition Parties

Year	Party	Electoral Outcome in Percentage	Seats in Parliament
2004	BNF	26.06	12
	BCP	16.62	1
	BAM	2.84	0
	BPP	1.91	0
	NDF	0.78	0
	MELS	0.03	0
	IC	0.03	0
Total		48.27	13
2009	BNF	21.94	6
	BCP	19.15	4
	BAM	2.27	1
	IC	1.92	1
	BPP	1.39	0
	MELS	0.05	0
	BTTO	0.01	0
Total		46.73	12
2014	UDC	30.01	17
	BCP	20.43	3
	IC	3.11	0
Total		53.55	20

PART TWO B

5. 3.3 Trends in South African Electoral Behaviour

In South Africa when respondents were asked if they felt close to a political party in the 2005/2006 survey cycle 64.3% of the respondents agreed that they felt close to a political party. In the 2008/2009 survey the percentage dropped to 60.4 and remained constant in the 2011/2013 period increasing by 0.1% to 60.5%. However the number


increased in the election period rising from 60.5% in the previous cycle to 72.7% in of 2014/2015. This is a 12.2% increase.

Those who did not feel any close to any political party in the 2005/2006 round was 25.2%, increasing to 27.7% in 2008/2009. For the 2011/2013 period the continued on the upward trajectory reaching 28.2% dropping for the first time to 22.2% twenty-two point percent one in 2014/2015, this is a drop of 6%.

When asked which party they felt closest to, the governing party enjoyed significant support standing at 52.1% in 2005/2006 dropping to 43.3%, a 8.8% decrease in the election period of 2008/2009. The governing party preference peaked at 73.4% in the 2011/2013 and declining by 28.9% in 2014/2015 election period to reach 44.5%

The IFP enjoyed 1.3% of the partisan support in 2005/2006 dropping to 1.1%. In 2008/2009 preference for the IFP dropped below 1% to 0.3% yet seemingly recovered 1.3% in the election period of 2014/2015.

However consistently a large number of South African respondents did not consider themselves close to any political party was significantly high. In 2005/2006 it was at 35.7%, increasing to 39.6%. However in 2011/2013 it decreased by 11.4% to 28.2% and registered another decline in the 2014/2015 cycle to reach 27.3%. All other political parties failed to reach the one percent threshold.




Source: <http://afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/analyse-online> Accessed on 15 October 2017

When probed who they would vote for if an election was to be held tomorrow support was skewed towards the governing party. In the post-election period of 2005/2006, 57.7% of the respondents said they would vote for the incumbent. The intended support dropped by 13.2% going down to 44.5% in the 2008/2009 survey cycle. The following 2011/2013 survey round preference for the incumbent made significant gains in to and increased to 55.3% yet dropping by 7% to 48.3% in the election period of 2014/2015.

The second most popular party is the DA with potential support standing at 6.2% in 2008/2009. Increasing to 13.1% in 2011/2013 and peaking at 17.1% in 2014/2015. That is a 10.9% increase in potential support for the DA since the 2008/2009 survey cycle.

A recurring trend is one where the respondents indicated that they would not vote at all; in the 2008/2009 round the percentage of respondents who indicated they would not vote stood at 10.1% dropping to 6.8% in 2011/2013 and dropping once more to 5.6% in the 2014/2015 survey round.



Source: <http://afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/analyse-online> Accessed on 15 October 2017


The option not to vote gathered more support amongst South Africans than many of the existing opposition parties who failed to reach the one percent threshold of “possible support”.

5.3.4 South African National Assembly Electoral Outcomes 2004-2014

In the 2004 national and provincial elections in South Africa 21 political parties contested the national assembly elections and only 12 of those parties gathered enough votes to ensure representation in the national assembly.

For the 2009 national and provincial elections 26 political parties contested the national elections, 13 of the 26 parties managed to gain representation in the national assembly.

Finally in the 2014 national elections, 29 political parties contested the elections and only 13 managed to gain sufficient electoral support that afforded them a seat in the national assembly.



Source: <https://www.eisa.org.za/wep/souresults2004.htm> Accessed 15 October 2017

Table 2: Performance of Opposition Parties in South Africa

Year	Party	Percentage of Votes	Seats in Parliament
2004	DP	12.37	50
	IFP	6.97	28
	UDM	2.28	9
	ID	1.73	7
	NNP	1.65	7
	ACDP	1.60	7
	FF+	0.89	4
	UCDP	0.75	3
	PAC	0.73	3
	MF	0.35	2
	AZAPO	0.25	1
	OTHERS ⁵	0.84	0
TOTAL		30.41	121
2009	DA	16.66	67
	COPE	7.42	30
	IFP	4.55	18
	ID	0.92	4
	UDM	0.85	4
	FF+	0.83	4
	ACDP	0.81	3
	UCDP	0.37	2
	PAC	0.27	1
	MF	0.25	1
	AZAPO	0.22	1
	APC	0.20	1

⁵ Political Parties that contested the 2004 elections but did not garner enough votes to be represented in parliament. These parties are; Christian Democratic Party (CDP), National Action, Peace and Justice Congress, Socialist Party of Azania, New Labour Party, United Front, The Employment Movement for SA, the Organisation Party and Keep it Straight and Simple (KISS)

	OTHERS ⁶	0.76	0
TOTAL		34.11	136
2014	DA	22.23	89
	EFF	6.35	25
	IFP	2.40	10
	NFP	1.57	6
	UDM	1.00	4
	FF+	0.90	4
	COPE	0.67	3
	ACDP	0.57	3
	AIC	0.53	3
	Agang SA	0.28	2
	PAC	0.21	1
	APC	0.17	1
	OTHERS ⁷	0.96	0

TOTAL		37.84	151
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Source: <https://www.eisa.org.za/wep/souresults2004.htm> Accessed 15 October 2017


⁶ Political Parties that contested the 2009 elections but did not gain sufficient support to be represented in government; Movement Democratic Party, Al Jamah-ah, CDP, National Democratic Convention, New Vision Party, United Independent Front, Great Kongress of SA, SA Democratic Congress, KISS, Pan Africanist Movement, Alliance of Free Democrats. Women Forward, A Party.

⁷ Political Parties that contested the 2014 elections but did not receive sufficient votes to be represented in government; Al Jamah-ah, MF, UCDP, AZAPO, Bushbuckridge Residents Association, Independent Civic Organization of SA, Patriotic Alliance, Workers and Socialist Party, Ubuntu Party, Kingdom Governance Movement, Front National, KISS, PAM, First National Liberation Alliance, United Congress, People's Alliance

5.4 PART THREE Comparative Presentation of Findings


5.4.1 Attitudes towards the presence of opposition parties

“Many political parties are divisive and cause confusion”



Many political parties are needed to make sure that people have real choices in who governs them.

Support for the existence of multiple political parties






Earlier surveys indicated that the Batswana were in favour of many political parties within their state yet this support seems to be waning which is a direct contrast to the South African findings which started off lower and seems to be increasing with every passing survey cycle.

As compared to the Batswana, South African respondents show more tolerance towards opposition parties. This is an indication of maturing political attitudes; as South Africa is a recent democratic state whereas Botswana has effectively been a democracy since independence in 1966.

In Botswana there was an increase in the belief that many opposition parties create confusion and are divisive, this is a result of the size of the country and the population it houses. Furthermore, opposition political parties in Botswana have a history of factionalism, public fall outs and incoherent policy options.


5.4.2 Trust in the Governing Party






At the tenth anniversary of democratic elections in South Africa the trust in the incumbent party had reached its peak and has been steadily declining ever since. There is a significant difference with regards for trust in the governing party, for Botswana begins and maintains an increase in the complete trust in the incumbent while the trust for the governing party in South Africa continues to decline.


5.4.3 Trust in the Opposition Parties



Partial Trust in Opposition Parties




No Trust in Opposition Parties




As democratic values become more entrenched so does the trust in opposition parties in South Africa. Interestingly in Botswana the trust of opposition parties is higher than in South because Botswana has enjoyed a longer democracy. This is a reflection of the state's political landscape that will be explored further in the data analysis.

5.4.4 The role of opposition parties

Opposition parties should critique and examine the incumbent.



Opposition Parties should cooperate and help develop the country



South Africans are less inclined to believe that opposition parties should critique and examine government and are more supportive of the idea that they must cooperate and help develop the country. The Botswana most favour idea that opposition parties should rather focus on helping develop the country and least support the idea that opposition should critique and examine the governing party.

5.5 Chapter Summary

This chapter presented the results of the comparative case study as described in chapter four. Chapter five presented the findings pertaining to research question one and two. The Chapter was then divided into three parts. Each part served as a response to a specific research question. Every part is then divided into a sections. The first two sections provided a presentation of the results of the individual country while the third and final part is the comparative presentation and discussion of findings that synthesizes the results of the first two questions. The following chapter provides a discussion of the research findings against the empirical literature reviewed in chapter two and theories guiding the study presented in chapter three.

CHAPTER SIX:

SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Introduction

The synthesis of findings is elucidated in chapters six and seven. Chapter six synthesizes the findings of research questions one, two and three against the empirical literature and the theoretical frameworks presented in chapter two and three respectively.

To remind the reader the research questions are stated below:

- What are the political attitudes of the electorate regarding political parties in Botswana and South Africa?
- What are the trends in the voter behaviour of the electorate in Botswana and South Africa?
- To what extent do the trends in electoral behaviour correlate with perceptions of the Botswana and South Africa?

This chapter follows a thematic arrangement that discusses the findings of the study according to the themes of the study as informed by the research objectives. The third question which is a summation of research question one and two will conclude chapter six.

6.2 Summary Key Findings

Crucial findings to the research questions are summarized below:

RQ1: What are the political attitudes of the electorate regarding political parties in Botswana and South Africa?

- Botswana where in favour of many political parties within their state yet this support seems to be declining which is a direct contrast to the South African findings which started off lower and seems to be increasing with every passing survey cycle.
- As compared to the Botswana, South African respondents show more tolerance towards opposition parties. In Botswana there is a steady increase in the belief that many opposition parties create confusion and are divisive.

- In both Botswana and South Africa, it appears that respondents surveyed by Afrobarometer had more trust towards incumbent governing parties.

RQ2: What are the trends in the voter behaviour of the electorate in Botswana and South Africa?

- In Botswana a significant number of respondents indicated that they felt close to the incumbent BDP and would vote for the BDP in the upcoming elections. This was consistent with electoral results in which the BDP enjoyed majority support. These findings are similar to South African experience in which the majority of South African respondents indicated they felt close to the ANC and would vote for the ANC in the up-coming elections. Furthermore, such as in Botswana, the South African responses correlated with the election results.
- Another significant finding is that despite the legislative and electoral dominance of the BDP, opposition parties enjoyed a larger share of the electoral support which is fragmented amongst the parties, eventually this leaves the BDP with electoral dominance. In other words, while opposition parties share 53% of the electoral results, the BDP remains with 47% therefore making it the dominant party in Botswana's electoral politics. However, in South Africa, there is a spatial difference of electoral support as compared to Botswana since opposition political parties receive little percentages of voter support leaving the ANC with a larger and dominant percentage of support. Thus while the ANC remains with beyond 60% of electoral dominance, opposition parties often share the remaining percentages of support from the electorate.
- Furthermore, in South Africa a large number of respondents did not consider themselves close to any political party, and responded that they would not vote in upcoming elections. However, this was not the case in Botswana as respondents indicated preliminary voter support and electoral participation in large numbers.

RQ3: To what extent do the trends in electoral behaviour correlate with perceptions of the Botswana and South Africa?

- In Botswana and South Africa there is correlation between voter attitudes and electoral outcomes. Respondents in Botswana, like in South Africa indicated more trust in the incumbent governing party than in the opposition parties. As a result trends electoral behaviour *vis-à-vis* political attitudes in both countries were found to be similar.


RQ4: Does one political party preference lead to one party dominance Botswana and South Africa?

- In Botswana there is fragmentation with regards to the electoral share of opposition parties. While the opposition parties in enjoy a larger electoral share, the votes are fragmented along multiple opposition parties. This is what maintains the dominance of the BDP.
- In South Africa, however, it is voter apathy that maintains one party dominance. A significant percentage of respondents indicated that they did not feel close to any political party and would not vote in the up-coming elections. This large share of the electorate that does not participate in the elections allows the remaining dominant voters to maintain the hegemony of the ANC in South Africa.

6.3. Discussion of Findings

6.3.1 Political attitudes of the electorate towards political parties in Botswana

With regards to the political attitudes towards political parties in Botswana the study found that the Batswana do not believe that many political parties are divisive and cause conflict, as a matter of fact they support the existence of multiple political parties. However despite their support for the existence of opposition parties, there is an ongoing trust for the governing party.



After forty years of democracy in the post-election Afrobarometer survey of 2005/2006 the study further found that confidence in opposition parties in Botswana was significantly lower which was in direct contrast with their trust in the incumbent which was at its highest. However as the trust in the incumbent began to decline the trust in opposition parties begin to increase.

Furthermore, the study further found that the responses to trust in political parties within their state was consistent with their party preference. When respondents were probed regarding which party they felt closest to and would vote for if an election would be held soon thereafter the governing BDP received a significant amount of support. This indicates that the Batswana trust the incumbent far more than they trust the opposition.

The findings of the study reinforce the literature regarding party images and party preference. Since the lack of unity within opposition parties in Botswana play out in the public domain they determine the confidence the parties enjoy from the electorate. Moreover party images act as indicators of whom parties stand for and the mandate they represent. The ingrained fragmentation suggests that these political leaders harbour selfish, narrow interests and therefore cannot be trusted to govern in the interest of the people.

The results of the study regarding the distrust for opposition parties in Botswana expands on the literature regarding opposition parties in dominant party states. Opposition parties in Botswana suffer from the same infirmities that plague opposition parties in southern Africa; internal weaknesses, fragmentation, disjointedness and factionalism, ideological incoherence, lack of strategy (Nkalo,2011; Selolwane and Shale, 2006 ; Tsie, 2011; Lotshwao, 2011)

Additionally Botswana's opposition politics are characterised a severe form of factionalism that often results in breakaways from amongst them (Selolwane and Shale, 2006). In 2010 Botswana had thirteen opposition parties which were splinter organisations from each other. These splits resulted in small, weak parties without the organisational strength to contest the dominance of the BDP (Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedie, 2010).

Even the main opposition party the BNF is a splinter political party which has its origins in the BPP. The BPP was the first political party formed in Botswana in 1960. The BPP called for independence from the British colonial administration and national self-determination. Yet the BPP faced internal challenges even before the general elections of 1966 which led to a fragmentation of the party. There are various contesting arguments about what triggered the split but most popular include personal differences amongst the leaders of the party compounded by ideological clashes (Selolwane, 2002). There were reconciliatory efforts and when they failed the BNF was formed (Selolwane and Shale, 2006).

The BNF carries the splinter curse. The BNF was meant to be an alliance of multiple political interests, and these competing ideals are often a source of disagreement which has threatened the unity and survival of the party. From 1989 the BNF has struggled to contain internal party conflict which has led to splinter parties such as the Botswana Workers Front (BWF), Freedom Party (FP) Independence Freedom Party (IFP), Botswana Independence Party (BIP), United Action Party (Bosele) , Botswana Alliance Movement (BAM), Botswana Congress Party (BCP) and the National Democratic Front (NDF) (Mokgopakgosi and Molomo, 2000; Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedie, 2010).

These confrontations that usually play out in the public domain diminish organisational strength, compromise their ability to organize effectively and most importantly weaken their credibility as alternative governing structures (Selolwane and Shale, 2006).

In a democracy the role of opposition parties is to hold the incumbent accountable (Venter and Landsberg. 188; 2014) the infighting amongst the opposition prevents them from focusing on operational duties which works in favour of the incumbent BDP.

The findings of the study also indicate that after forty years of democracy trust in the incumbent was significantly higher than that of the opposition parties although this trend would begin to show signs of decline during 2011/2013 survey rounds.

In light of the above mentioned findings the confidence in the governing party can be attributed to its track record in governance. The BDP has an impressive track record in government. In 1966 when Botswana gained independence it was one of the poorest nations in the world. It had no known mineral deposits, and being a landlocked state located on desert terrain it held no agricultural promise. Nonetheless the discovery of diamonds in 1967 and the partnership that would ensue between De Beers and the government of Botswana under the stewardship of the BDP transformed the fortunes of the country. Diamond revenue became the fuel to Botswana's economic growth; which has allowed it to deliver public goods and services. The BDP has made concerted efforts to fight poverty, maintain social relations and political stability (Matlosa *et al*, 2006; Oswei-Hwedie, 2010; Tsie, 2011).


Furthermore the governing party has made huge investments in education, health and sanitation. Essentially the BDP has effectively managed the economy of Botswana and the success of their social programs, infrastructure development, low levels of corruption and managed factions provide for a very clean, stable political image of the BDP (*ibid*).

In addition, Botswana's economic success made free education possible from 1988 till 2006, free access to public services including the provision and access to ARV's, access to clean water, the expansion of physical infrastructure, targeted agricultural policies such as Accelerated Rural Development Programme (ARDP) and Accelerated Rainfall Agricultural Development while urban residents have benefitted from self-help housing association (Maundeni *et al*, 2006).

The study found that, the Batswana's favour of the existence of multiple opposition parties. Moreover, the results of the study indicate that in Botswana from the initial survey cycles under study complete trust towards the governing party remains on an higher than complete trust in opposition parties

The findings of the study expands on literature regarding party images because the incumbent maintains a clean image, presents a united front and has a history of good governance, while the opposition is being suffocated under factionalism and splits, the BDP works well to maintain unity despite internal conflicts. Their track record in government makes it easier to place trust as opposed to opposition parties who are known for in-fighting.

According to the literature on dominance of the BDP in Botswana the significant focus has been the on the weakness and fragmentation of opposition parties. In line with previous works, this study also contends that despite the legislative and electoral dominance of the BDP, opposition parties enjoyed a larger share of the electoral support which is fragmented amongst the parties, eventually this leaves the BDP with electoral dominance (see table 2).



And secondly is that the electoral system in Botswana works to maintain one party dominance in the state. The literature on how dominant parties come into power emphasizes reference to the contribution of electoral systems as gatekeepers of dominance (Ziegfield and Tudor, 2015), this despite the fact that electoral systems decide how elections are earned and lost (Molomo, 2000).

The electoral system encompasses the rules and regulations as to how the electorate will exercise their right to vote and dictates how elected representatives are assigned seats in the legislature. Elections are a core characteristic of democracy as they are the apparatus electors use to determine who will govern their state. Consequently the electoral system employed by a state determines the utility of elections and as well as their results. Granting the elections are a selection of national leaders on a cyclic basis the electoral system is a technique of electing the leaders and converting votes into parliamentary representation (Matlosa, 2003).

An electoral system is meant to produce a parliament that is representative, accountable and should not undermine the efficiency of the majority party. Furthermore the electoral system must create a link between the voters and their elected representative to ensure that legislators truly protect the interest of their constituencies (Dingake, 1999).

Botswana employs the West-Minister-Parliamentary First Past the Post (FTPT) electoral system which is the simplest and the most frequently used electoral system. According to this model a country is apportioned into equal districts from which only one representative will be elected as the representative. The contenders that are competing in these districts compete in their own right and not under the banner of political party even if the candidate is recommended by their party, as a result this system permits the competition from independent candidates. The system requires a simple plurality of votes and not a majority of votes (Matlosa, 2003).

The most valuable attribute of this electoral system is its ability to produce a stable and responsive political system because the system ties a representative to a constituency which keeps legislators accountable (Matlosa, 2003; Molomo, 2004).

The key drawback of this system is the winner takes all approach that determines election outcomes on the basis of a simple majority as a result any contender that gets

a plurality of votes is essentially elected as a member of parliament and other competitors are considered losers irrespective of their electoral outcomes (Molomo, 2000). This outcome is interpreted as “wasted votes” (Matlosa, 2003) as the election results disregard the choice of 48.2% in 2004, 46.73%, in 2009 and 53.55% in 2014. The very essence of this system is that it fortifies the dominance of one party (*ibid*).


According to Molomo (2000) this system has made obsolete the will of the Batswana as the parliamentary representative does not truly reflect the will of the people. Furthermore the electoral system in Botswana has been criticized as unfair and archaic because it does not reflect the strength of contestants (Dingake, 1999).

6.3.2 Political attitudes of the electorate towards political parties in South Africa

According to the findings South Africans do not believe that many opposition parties are divisive and cause conflict. As a matter of fact they believe that multiple parties should exist in order for the people of South Africa to have a real choice in who governs them.

These findings amplify the literature regarding the identity legacy of apartheid (Ramuntsindela, 2006). The inception of the Union of South Africa in 1910 completely excluded black South Africans from the participating in political system by denying them franchise. The socio-economic exclusions of the apartheid government were built upon the political exclusions of the establishment of the union. Consequently black South Africans could not vote and the promise of democracy and liberation were propelled by the need for political agency (Mbenga; 2002; 12). Therefore the democratic foundations of South Africa are built upon political choice, which is embraced in the responses towards the presence and role of multiple political parties in the country.

The study further finds that in South Africa complete trust in the ANC fluctuated but is higher than partial trust and significantly higher than no trust in the incumbent. Yet this fluctuation also indicated a downward trend trajectory in the trust of the incumbent.



The findings of the study buttress the literature regarding the influence of political images onto party preference. To the electorate party images are suggestive of who and what a political party represent. They are the easiest of political information to interpret and require low levels of education to understand. Party images also inform the perceptions or ideas individual voters have regarding a political parties and further help interpret the actions of party's themselves (Habib and Schulz-Hezenberg, 2011; Mattes,2005).

Within this context party images are a significant unit of analysis in understanding the findings of this study. Party images act as a base for all political information and reaction and therefore the trust in political parties in South Africa can be attributed to how people know and understand a political party.

The trust in the ANC can be attributed to a number of factors, key to which is the ANC's historical credentials. From the 1950's the ANC adopted new tactics to respond to the intensified repression that the apartheid regime began rolling out. In addition to the political programmes the organisation adopted more social approaches to resistance which fortified its position in the country as the only liberation movement. As a result the organization began to represent an amalgamation of interests under one banner. From this point forward the ANC membership of the ANC was broad as it was diverse (Lodge, 2005).

Amongst those broad coalitions, the relationship between the ANC and the working class was one of its strongest. The movement had close ties with the trade union movement and during the 1960's the organization was sustained by the trade unions and while many of its leaders were in exile ANC leadership position in the country was in the hands of the trade unionists. In the post-apartheid era these close ties with the labour movement would be solidified with the formation of the tripartite alliance that included the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) (*ibid*).

The history of the ANC has shaped its actions in government. In the first ten years of democracy the ANC could count on the trade unions to mobilise support as members of the working class in the country were possibly a trade union member. Furthermore the social ties the ANC had created during the apartheid era were strengthened in the democratic dispensation with the enactment of social welfare policy that included social grants and low cost housing, access to healthcare and education, water and sanitation as well as affirmative action strategies such as the Broad Based Economic empowerment scheme (BEE) which helped stimulate the growth of a black bourgeoisie. Currently the ANC government social welfare budget makes up more than half of governments expenditure and has been increasing proportionally ever since (*ibid*).

According to the Michigan theory of voter behaviour, party preference does not change easily and therefore the allegiances created during apartheid are likely to survive short-term disappointment (Lodge, 2005). Often the performance of the ANC's government is contrasted to the NP apartheid government (Mtimkhulu, 2006).

Despite the enduring trust for the incumbent ANC; the study finds that the levels of trust for the incumbent have been steadily declining. It is important to note that the social policy infrastructure has been rolled out and ran parallel to the corruption scandals that plague the party, including as cases of maladministration, rising unemployment, inflation, poverty and the scourge of HIV/AIDS (Mattes, 2005).

The 2004 national and provincial elections provided for a milestone victory for the ANC for two reasons. Firstly it was during these elections that the ANC attained its two-third victory and secondly because it is after these elections that disgruntlement with the ANC began to intensify. The people of South Africa began to be more vocal in their expression with their dissatisfaction with the state of governance. This was fuelled by

the belief that the ANC had had more than enough time to govern and the people wanted to see results (Grootes, 2013).

Currently South Africa is one of the most unequal societies in the world with high levels of unemployment and poverty. Consequently the ANC's core constituency is black people who are formerly disenfranchised and suffer from the structural inequalities resulting from apartheid policy (Mtimkhulu, 2006).

As such, the support of the ANC hinges upon the incumbent's promise to deliver public goods, because a government's legitimacy is a result of its ability to deliver on the social goods and services. Yet the ANC has a problematic record in governance; that includes limited reach of government socio-economic transformation policies, increase in black poverty and the rise in inequality amongst the rich and poor (Brooks, 2004).

This is mainly because South Africa the governing party is constrained by the lack of control over the economy and its liberal approach to economic development which has compromised its ability to deliver (Kaume, 2004).

Moreover the ANC has a reputation of being corrupt, incompetent and lacking the political will to effect real change to the lives of South Africans (Twala, 2012). This complacency is mainly blamed on the governing party's policy of cadre deployment. Cadre deployment has created a patronage network where ANC members are rewarded with strategic positions in public service which allow them access to state resources (Du Toit, 2015).

The effect of cadre deployment has also created a tendency of complacency most visible at local municipality levels which most impacts the electorate (*ibid*) Johannou and Coetzee (2010) document the Auditor General report of 2005/2006 on provincial service delivery in the Free State Province which produced evidence of under-expenditure, misallocation of houses and lack of sewage, corruption within the tendering process, non-existent employees, large amounts of debt and wastage and delays in the completion of infrastructure projects.

In the run up to the 2009 elections the ANC felt a mammoth of pressures coming from the electorate. Firstly service delivery protests were on the rise which signalled a new political resistance to local patronage and corruption. Dissatisfaction amongst the poor in South Africa was growing due to the inconsistent service delivery especially at local

municipality level. In the year 2005 a year after the 2004 national and provincial elections and a year before the 2006 local government elections there were a recorded 881 service protests in South Africa (Butler, 2009).

Secondly the country experience power shortages in 2008 which resulted in supply interruptions (dubbed load shedding) which had negative consequences for the domestic economy. It deterred investors and shot up electricity prices. Thirdly the great recession further impacted on investment opportunities which in a country with pervasive poverty and unemployment proved to be most negative. The failure of the Mbeki government to properly address the HIV/AIDS epidemic widened the rift between the poor who were hardest hit and government (*ibid*).

The 2014 national elections were a culmination of all the issues that had enthralled the South African public for twenty years. There were also key events that ensured continued haemorrhaging of ANC trust. Most notably the Marikana Massacre of 2012, the upgrade of presidents home Nkadla's homestead and Waterkloof saga which made the name Gupta synonymous with ANC patronage and corruption. What these scandals have also done is entrenched in the memories of South Africans an idea of an ANC that is corrupt and anti-poor, which is essentially anti-black (Grootes, 2013; Brookes, 2014).

Yet despite this disappointing performance in government, opposition parties in South Africa have failed to capitalise on the failures of the ANC. Brooks (2004) posits that in the absence of a credible opposition South Africans will continue to vote along racial lines.

However, during the 2014 national elections it was established that the middle and working class were now willing to vote against the ANC (Booyesen, 2014). In 2009 a bulk of COPE's support came from urban and metropolitan citizens and indicated that South Africans were seeking an alternative party in the face of ANC dissatisfaction (Booyesen, 2010).

Nevertheless in terms of trust the study illuminates that opposition parties fare worse than the governing party. This finding expands on the failure of the race census theory in South Africa can be largely attributed to the literature based on the types of opposition parties found in South Africa. For the first ten years of democracy in South Africa the racial census was put forward to explain the election outcomes (Gillomee,

1999). The race census theory suggest that people in South Africa vote along their racial and ethnic make-up. The history of apartheid in the country made this thesis plausible especially because of the electoral margins between the ANC and the NNP and DP (Naidu, 2000).

When the weaknesses of this theory failed to account for the decline and eventual ousting of smaller ethnic based parties from the South African political system became apparent a new focus had to be cast on why opposition parties failed to appeal to South Africa voters.


Like the incumbent ANC, opposition parties also have a historical legacy rooted in the apartheid era. While the ANC was a liberation movement, a number of these political parties where in governance in the homelands. Thus opposition parties in the country are also disadvantaged by their historical legacy which they tried to exploit in the post-democratic dispensation by appealing to race and ethnic sentiments. This was the case with the UCDP and IFP (Habib and Naidu, 2006).

The NNP have a history of serving white Afrikaner and English speaking whites and in the immediate post-apartheid dispensation developed electoral strategies that aimed at white, coloured and Indian people. For the 1999 elections the DA/DP focused on negative anti-ANC campaign that invoked threats of blacks oppressing white people and further exploited the insecurities of the demographic minorities by emphasizing the ideas of political as well as social exclusion (Naidu, 2000). It is therefore the election strategies adopted by opposition parties in South Africa that have essentially alienated them from the South African electorate.

Party images explain perceptions held regarding political parties within the state. These perceptions inform party identity which according to Michigan School of voter behaviour inform voter behaviour. The second section of this study aims to test the validity of this assumption by contrasting responses related to party identity and electoral outcomes.

In the case of South Africa it finds that when respondents were probed about which party they felt closet to the incumbent ANC received a greater portion of the support with a similar trend emerging when questioned on the subject of vote choice should there be elections in the near future. The patterns that emerge from this line of

questioning is consistent with earlier responses regarding the perceptions the electorate held about political parties.



However a significant finding of this study relates to the large portion of the respondents did not identify with any political party and also declared that they would not go to the polls should there be an election held.

In South Africa there exists at any given time a considerable number of people who do not feel close to nor do they identify with any political party (Mattes, 2005). South Africa's largest voting bloc is the non-voters (De Jager; 2015, 161). When they are unhappy with the performance of the ANC they choose to abstain from voting as opposed to voting for opposition parties (*ibid*). Whereas voter theories suggest that when the electorate is unhappy they seek out other potential representatives, Kotze (2006) suggests that South African voters use their votes as an ANC accountability mechanism and use non-voting as means to punish the ANC.

Consequently non-voting is an expression of the disappointment in the ANC government and even though South Africa is a multiparty democracy the electorate has not indicated do not sufficient trust other political parties to articulate their concerns. Therefore frustration with the performance and non-delivery of the ANC due to unmet expectations has resulted in voter apathy in the country (De Jager, 2015; 161).

This contrary to and rational choice theory which speaks of maximum utility of votes. According to Rational Choice Theory voters seek to maximise their vote by voting for a political party that best articulates their concerns and seeking to address them. This theory explains the change in the voter behaviour suggests that voter behaviour is continuously informed by the performance of the incumbent and voters respond either positively by voting for the incumbent when they perform well and deliver public goods and services and voting them out of power when they feel dissatisfied with their performance.

The findings of the study reveal a shortfall of Rational Choice Theory. This theory emphasise the role of choice, rationality and utility of votes they do not adequately explain why individuals may choose to instead abandon their franchise, especially in a country with the political history such as that of South Africa. In essence theories of voter behaviour do not adequately explain voter apathy.

Secondly that in South Africa voter apathy has resulted in one party dominance. This large voting bloc that disenfranchises itself and does not go to the polls to express their unhappiness with the incumbent ANC, and vote for other political parties other than the ANC, help project images of a successful ANC, one that governs at the pleasure of the majority of South Africans and one that holds the popular mandate. This despite empirical evidence such as the findings of this study that the majority of South Africans are generally unhappy with the ANC government.

Table 3 : South African Voter turnout in relation to Voting Age Population 2004-2014

	2004	2009	2014
Estimated Voter Age Population (VAP)	27 436 926	30 096 466	31 434 035
Percentage of VAP that voted	57	59	59
Percentage of VAP that did not vote	43	41	41
Percentage of VAP that voted ANC	39.7	38.7	36.4

Source: *South African Politics: An Introduction. Page 162*

6.3.4 The correlation between electoral behaviour and political attitudes in Botswana and South Africa.

This section answers the third research question; *to what extent do the trends in electoral behaviour correlate with the perceptions of the Botswana and South African electorate?*

This section is a summative reflection of the two research questions and thus encompasses findings from research questions one and two as it aims to gauge the relationship between electorate perceptions and their voter behaviour in Botswana and South Africa.

The response to the third question is approached in the following way; it is a comparative presentation of the perceptions of the electorate and electoral outcomes.

6.4.1 Electoral Behaviour and Political Attitudes Botswana

According to the Afrobarometer findings presented in section one of the study the Botswana indicate a high tolerance towards the existence of multiple political parties within their state and do not believe that they are divisive and cause confusion. Furthermore, the respondents indicated an increasing trust in opposition parties yet despite the favourable perceptions towards opposition party preference is skewed towards the governing party and at face value the seat allocation in the legislature further reinforce this.

However a closer glance at the electoral performance of opposition parties as indicated in table one present a different narrative. The Botswana are consistently voting for opposition parties, as indicated by the significant voter margins of combined opposition parties which are disproportionate to the seat allocation in the legislature (see table 2).

Literature on the performance of Botswana's opposition parties focus on the structural weaknesses of the party's and fault them for the lack of democratic consolidation in Botswana while consistently praising the incumbent for its successful economic management and overall governance for their continued stay in power. By this account the BDP strengthens its incumbency through good administration, while opposition parties will stay out of the seat of power for so long as they are fragmented.

The study also finds that while the people of Botswana display intolerance towards opposition parties they show a higher level of party preference towards the incumbent. This indicates the strong ties to society the BDP has. By having been in power for over fifty years through a generational change the Botswana also experience early socialisation of the BDP as the only governing party. This is consistent with the Michigan model of Voter Behaviour that assumes that party preference is instilled through family socialisation and strengthens over time.

6.4.2 Electoral Behaviour and Political Attitudes South Africa

The findings of the study indicate that South Africans displayed significant distrust towards the governing party the ANC. Furthermore as the trust levels as the incumbent seemed to be declining over time, the findings indicate that the feelings of trust towards opposition parties began to increase and is gaining momentum over time.

The study reveals a correlation between electoral outcomes and voter attitudes in South Africa. While the ANC's electoral share remains high, the findings further indicate a decline while opposition party's electoral share in South Africa is increasing with every election. There is a considerable growth in the electoral margins of overall opposition parties and this negatively impacts the performance of the ANC.

In South Africa when asked "*if a presidential election would be held tomorrow which presidential candidate would they vote for?*" A significant amount of respondents indicated that they would not vote. This is a key revelation from the study as it garnered more support than most opposition parties that failed to reach the one percent threshold.

The findings of the study also show that ANC support reached its peak in 2004 attaining 69.8% of electoral support, this peak coincided with an emerging trend of a decline in voter turn-out. In 2004 a mere 40% of all eligible voters voting for the ANC and 42% of all voters staying home. Analysts concluded that it is a consequence of democratic entrenchment within the state however this perspective is contrary to international trends of states with similar electoral systems and age of democracy but similar to countries that experience one party dominance. In these states that portray

low levels of competition people lose interest in all political processes and are even less inclined to go vote (Mattes, 2005).

The findings regarding voter apathy expand the literature that speaks of low voter turnout in South Africa. Dissatisfied ANC supporters are more likely to refrain from voting rather than vote for the opposition (Booyesen, 2014). Additionally Brookes (2004) contends that people who do not participate in the electoral process are those that feel alienated by the dominance of the governing party. Also Lodge (2014) finds that the working class in the Gauteng province of South Africa would rather not vote thus reduced levels of voter-turnout is a form of non-voting to the extent they can be differentiated from apathy or a total rejection of the system. Furthermore the 2014 election documented a sixteen percent drop in voter turnout. Of the twenty-million registered voters, ten million eligible voters did not bother to register to vote and of those that did register a quarter did not go to the polls (Booyesen, 2014).

The study also reveals consistency in voter behaviour and party preference In South Africa. When South Africans where asked which party do they feel closest to and who would most likely gain their vote if an election would be held tomorrow, the governing ANC enjoyed a bulk of the support. These results prove the assumptions of the acclaimed political scientist V.O Key Jnr. that elections are not a time for decision making but a time for reaffirming partisan faith.

For the first ten years of democracy in South Africa the ANC was able to rely on its liberation credentials to rally support. It entrenched its presence through an expanded social welfare infrastructure and tolerance towards non-payment of local rates as well as door to door campaigns (president Mbeki for the 2004 elections and president Zuma for the 2009 and 2014 elections) further reinforce the ANC's image as a caring party (Chiroro, 2006; Brooks, 2004). However, with growing disgruntlement and the euphoria of democracy wearing off the ANC has had to work harder to convince the electorate to keep them in government (Brooks, 2004).

Election results in South Africa have mimicked the racial patterns of the country and thus a racial census has been used to describe election outcomes. The race census theory suggests that voting patterns in South Africa reflect the racial nuances of the state where blacks vote for black parties and whites vote for white parties.

Nevertheless there is considerable empirical data that challenges this assumption. Letsholo (2004) makes a credible case by analysing the performance of political parties that are rooted in their race and ethnic ties and instead finds a decline amongst the most ethnically inclined political parties.

Additionally Habib and Naidu (2006) recognised that the focus on the racial census which had been used to describe election results in South Africa was narrow in its analysis. They argued that for the 2004 elections the South African electorate had begun to show signs of rationality and had made their choices to reflect the information they had available to them which in turn helped them decide which party best articulated their material interests.

Class interest, it seems are a significant driver of voter behaviour in South Africa. The working class and poor support political parties on the left of the political spectrum while the middle class and richer support parties on the right. Coincidentally class in South Africa is a reflection of the black and white racial divide with the white being significantly well off than their black counterpart (Hirsch, 2005). Consequently in South Africa, class more than race is a significant driver of voter behaviour, and social class is organised along racial lines.

Essentially this means that South African voters are rational voters as their class and material interests are stronger determinants of voter choice. Rational theory of voting assumes that voters seek maximum utility for their votes and weigh up the advantages and disadvantages of what political parties offer. Thus despite the perceived failures of the ANC it is the only political party that has positioned itself as a non-racial party interested in the socio-economic advancement of its constituency.

The findings of the study also revealed that the trust levels in the incumbent seem to be declining over time and as the feelings of trust towards opposition parties began to increase and is gaining momentum over time.

There is a correlation between electoral outcomes and voter perceptions. While the ANC's electoral share remains high, they also indicate a decline, while opposition party's electoral share in South Africa is increasing with every election. There is a considerable growth in the electoral margins of overall opposition parties and this negatively impacts the performance of the ANC.

However the ANC enjoys party preference amongst South Africans and this is reflected in the voter behaviour. Thus despite the ANC's questionable performance in government, and the worsening lived experience of the poor in the country, the ANC enjoys considerable support amongst most South Africans.

The study further finds that voter patterns in South Africa are relatively stable and can be understood through the Michigan Model of Voter Behavior. The central thesis of this theory is party identification that assumes that through the funnel of causality therefore party identity is the decisive factor in any political landscape. It filters through socio-economic factors, influences personal values and attitudes, government action, and election campaigns to make the decision whether or not to vote for a party.

South Africa is a maturing democracy and political values are changing as indicated by voter perceptions and behaviour. These changes are incremental and with the inconsistency of opposition parties in South Africa in terms of their staying power, the changes in political attitudes may not threaten the hegemony of the ANC from the ballot as voters in South Africa will have no alternative party to vote for.

6.5 Does Political Party Preference in Botswana and South Africa Lead to One Party Dominance

The final section of this chapter aims to respond to the final research question; *does political party preference lead to one party dominance*. Similar to research question three; the final research question is a summation of research question one, two and three.

When examining the attitudes of the electorate regarding political parties in Botswana and South Africa, the findings of the study indicate that the electorate of Botswana and South Africa have similar attitudes as they do not believe that many political parties are divisive and cause conflict.

In the case of Botswana which has a longer history of democracy these attitudes are a reflection of a healthy democracy and indicate that the democracy in Botswana is not under any danger of regression. In South Africa the support for a multi-party democracy is rooted in the nation's history of segregation which had excluded the black majority from meaningful political participation and denied them franchise.

However despite the support for the existence of multiple political parties, the respondents in both countries indicated that they supported cooperation after the election period and not critique.

While the initial responses it indicates a healthy predisposition towards the existence of opposition parties and by extension a multi-party democracy these attitudes may not be an accurate indicator of democratic acceptance. The role of healthy opposition parties is to critique the incumbent as a measure to hold them accountable. It is therefore necessary to probe deeper as to why the existence of multiple political parties is acceptable to the electorate and not the critique of the governing party. For future research, studies must focus on clarifying as why cooperation is preferred over critique needs further engagement as it distorts the understanding.

The findings further indicate that the Batswana trust the governing party more than they trust opposition parties. This study attributes these responses to the track record BDP as the governing party and the fragmented opposition in Botswana. This is in contrast to the South African findings where there is a noticeable decline in the trust of the governing party and an increase in the trust opposition parties. This is due to the wearing off of the liberation euphoria and compounded by the corruption scandals that plague the ANC which alienate the electorate.

The responses of the Batswana regarding the trust in opposition parties is consistent with their partisan responses. When respondents were probed about which party they felt closest to, and which party they would most likely vote for the BDP enjoyed greater support than the closest BNF and far ahead of the BCP. However electoral results showed a disconnect between voter patterns and party preference. While the respondents in Botswana consistently indicated support for the BDP they voted for the opposition parties, unfortunately due to the fragmentation of votes, the opposition parties are unable to threaten the hegemony of the BDP, this is further exacerbated by the electoral system. The results indicate that BDP is kept in power by the electoral system in Botswana.

Similarly the ANC enjoyed more party preference. South Africans felt closest to the ANC and further indicated that they would vote for the ANC if an election would be held the next day.

However while a significant number of respondents indicated that they did not feel close to any political party and would not vote if an election would be held the next day. This is noteworthy because the number of respondents who indicated that they would not vote, neither do they identify with any political party was higher than those that identified with the next closest party being the DA.

It is within this context therefore, that this study argues that in South Africa it is voter apathy that sustains one party dominance by the ANC, as indeed there is a large number of South Africans who have between the years 2004-2014 elected not to participate in the electoral process as they do not identify with any other political party but the ANC, however due to the under-performance and corruption since in power they exclude themselves from the electoral process.

6.6 Appraisal of Theories

As already indicated in chapter three, this study employed the Michigan Model of Voter Behaviour and Rational Choice Theories. These theories are appraised in the context of this study below:

6.6.1 Michigan Model of Voter Behaviour

The study found that the Michigan Model was relevant for the study as it was able to explain the long term loyalty and support for the dominant political parties in South Africa and Botswana. Furthermore, the Michigan Model was able to predict accurately the correlation between voter attitudes and voter behaviour in Botswana and South Africa.

The Michigan Model assumes that the electorate votes out of long standing political party preference that is established by social status and early socialization. The findings of the study buttress this assumption which indicate that despite the favour for a multi-party democratic system in Botswana and South Africa, voters still feel strongly and support the governing parties.

Nonetheless this theory is not explicit in explaining the voter choice in Botswana. As the study found, despite verbal support for the ruling party, there is an inconsistency between the levels of voter attitudes in support of the governing and electoral

outcomes. The larger share in terms of percentages of support in Botswana is fragmented amongst opposition parties and not directed to the governing BDP.

The Michigan Model of Voter Behaviour is unable to explain the decision of the South African electorate not to participate in the elections due to its focus on long standing political party preference while failing to account for variation in voter behaviour. In order to address this weakness, the study employed Rational Choice Theory as well.

6.6.2 Rational Choice

Rational Choice Theory states that voters seek maximum benefit from their vote. As such, the vote acts as a tool through which the electorate express their feelings of support towards political parties in the country.

However, this study revealed that in South Africa a large number of respondents expressed that they felt no attachment to any political party neither would they vote in the upcoming elections. These political attitudes were consistent with electoral behaviour in South Africa as there is a continuous decline in voter turn-out. The voter apathy is a complete disengagement from the political system whereas Rational Choice Theory assumes that voters would instead vote for a different political party instead of not voting at all.

6.7 Conclusion and Ideas for Further Research

This study concludes that, in Botswana there is fragmentation with regards to the electoral share of opposition parties. While the opposition parties enjoy a larger electoral share, the votes are fragmented along multiple opposition parties. This is what maintains the dominance of the BDP. However, in South Africa, voter apathy maintains one party dominance since a significant percentage of respondents surveyed by Afrobarometer indicated that they did not feel close to any political party and would not vote in the up-coming elections. This large share of the electorate that does not participate in the elections allows the remaining dominant voters to maintain the hegemony of the ANC in South Africa.

Since the study has found that amongst other things that, in South Africa voters turned to indicate that they have no intentions of voting in the upcoming elections, hence a continuous decline in voter turn-out. The researcher therefore intends to conduct

further research at Doctoral level to explore various factors relating to why do most South Africans opt to abandon their universal suffrage right this resulting in low voter turnout as well why do some poses lack of attachment to any political party in the midst of existence of multiple political parties in the country.

6.8 Recommendations

Based on the findings of the study the following recommendations are proposed:

- In Botswana and South Africa, opposition political parties should maintain visibility in the post- election through community based initiatives and redirect their human resources towards voter education in order to create general political awareness for the electorate.
- In South Africa opposition parties need to employ more strategies to appeal to the electorate, especially disinterested voters. These strategies may include setting up branches in communities, and adopting youth focused initiatives to appeal to first time voters.
- Opposition political parties in Botswana and South Africa should establish and maintain a high presence on social media so as to engage with the electorate in order to provide knowledge on indicators and prerequisites of party preference.
- In Botswana opposition political parties enjoy a larger share of electoral outcomes and should for this reason consider fortifying their relations and form a coalition in order to challenge the dominance of the BDP and also maintain the call for electoral system reform as well possibly institutionalizing competitive two party system.

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