



**M060072564**

**ETHNIC POLITICS AS A HINDRANCE TO GOOD GOVERNANCE: THE CASE  
OF SOMALIA**

**B. L. PELOMPE**

**21518297**

**A MINI-DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF HUMAN AND  
SOCIAL SCIENCE IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF  
MASTERS OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AT NORTHWEST  
UNIVERSITY (MAFIKENG CAMPUS)**

**SUPERVISORS: DR OLA ABEGUNDE**

**PROFESSOR NDORO VERA**

**DATE**

**2013**

DECLARATION

I, Bonolo Lovedelia Pelompe declare that this mini-dissertation titled "Ethnic politics as a hindrance to good governance: the case of Somalia" is my own work and has therefore, never been previously submitted by me or any other person in any institution(s) of learning. Each source of information from other people's work is fully acknowledged.


Bonolo Lovedelia Pelompe



Signature

20/09/2013

date



## DEDICATION

The study is dedicated to my late father, Mpotsang Ishmael Pelompe, who made it a point that I become a better person by putting my needs ahead of everything and everyone else. Thank you for your sacrifices, daddy you are dearly missed.

The dedication also includes to all the parties that took part in the struggle for a just cause (restoring law and order) in the Somali state; including all the victims of the insecurity that characterised the country.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The researcher wishes to thank most sincerely various individuals who assisted in different ways to make this study a reality;

First, I would like to thank my excellent supervisors Dr Ola and Prof Vera for guiding the development of this study. I am very much thankful for your encouragements, for believing in me and for instilling confidence in me. Your useful comments, edits and insights are highly appreciated. I also wish to thank the both of you for always having time for me. I would also like to acknowledge Prof Lere for overseeing my corrections.

Second, I wish to thank my mother, Neo Mildred Pelompe, for her love, motivations, prayers, and for giving me the opportunity to further my studies. Mama you remain the light that brightens my life, you are my hero!

Third, I would like to acknowledge my boyfriend, Onkokame Moremi, for his forever blossoming love and support. I also thank him for accommodating me when I was struggling with getting accommodation in school. Baby you are the pillar of my strength.

Forth, I would like to recognise and appreciate my classmates, especially the class of 2012 (Mpho Tseladimitloa, Quencillia Ngwanang, Katlego Molokwane, Nelsile Ginindza, Orapeleng Matshidiso and Frank Lekaba) for their encouragements and motivations. Guys I learned so much from being just around you; because of you I am a better person.

Lastly and most importantly, I thank the Lord Almighty for his love, wisdom and protection. May his blessings continue to shine in our lives!!!

## ABSTRACT

The thesis investigates ethnic politics as a hindrance to good governance in Somalia. The study is predicated on the hypothesis that the politicization of ethnicity in Somalia has been an impediment to the practise and provision of good governance which has led to the political problems experienced in the country. The study employs the qualitative research design which utilises secondary data as source of information and thus uses the content analysis approach to unpack and interpret the data.

The role of the colonial powers and the past regimes in Somalia remains dominant and detrimental to the stability of the country. These parties sowed hatred and resentment along tribal lines and thus resulted in divisions in the country. The country currently consists of three different regions (South-Central Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland). These regions operate independently from one another. Somaliland and Puntland, however, do not form part of this study. By Somalia the thesis only refers to the South-Central region.

Somalia has been declared as a failed state. After 1991 the security situation deteriorated over the years, leading the country into total collapse. The country existed without a central government for almost two decades. Poor governance, corruption, piracy, violent conflicts and other illicit activities became widespread with warlords and clan militias fighting for the control of the state. All efforts to resuscitate the country failed as they were not supported by the majority of the Somali people. For stability and peaceful co-existence in the country, national reconciliation and the practice of good governance should be the first priorities in solving the Somali problems. These two could be crucial aspects in combating the clan rivalries and tensions and thus address fragmentations that have come to define the Somali state.

Key words: clans, ethnicity, politics, instability, central government, violent conflict, militia, warlords, insurgency, democracy and good governance.

## LIST OF ACRONYMS

AIAI	Al-Ittihal Al-Islamiyya
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union
DFID	Department for International Development
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EU	European Union
FDLR	Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
G8	Group of Eight
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HDM	Hisbia Digil Marifle
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
M.O.D	Mareehaan, Ogaden and Dulbahante
RDC	Rally for Congolese Democracy
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SNM	Somali National Movement
SYL	Somali Youth League
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TNG	Transitional National Government
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme



UNITAF	United Nations Task Force in Somalia
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
US	United States
USC	United Somali Congress
USP	United Somali Party
WB	World Bank

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Declaration.....	I
Dedications.....	II
Acknowledgements.....	III
Abstract.....	IV
List of Acronyms.....	V
<b>Chapter one: introduction.....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1. Background.....	1
1.2. Statement of the Problem.....	3
1.3. Significance of the Study.....	4
1.4. Aim of the Study.....	5
1.5. Research Objectives.....	5
1.6. Research Questions.....	5
1.7. Hypothesis.....	5
1.8. Definition of Terms.....	6
1.9. Methodology.....	7
1.9.1. Research Design.....	7
1.9.2. Methods of Data Collection.....	7
1.9.3. Methods of Data Analysis.....	7
1.10. Scope of the study.....	8
1.11. Limitation of the Study.....	8
1.12. Organization of the Study.....	9
<b>Chapter two: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework.....</b>	<b>10</b>

- 2.1. Literature Review.....10
- 2.2. Theoretical Framework.....25
  - 2.2.1. Ethnic Conflict Theory..... 26
  - 2.2.2 Game Theory.....27
- Chapter three: Somalia Post 1991.....30**
  - 3.1. The Aftermath of the Somali Crisis.....30
    - 3.1.1. Implications of the Absence of an Effective Central Government.....31
    - 3.1.2. Attempts at Establishing a Functioning and Efficient Central Government.....33
    - 3.1.3. Actors at Play.....34
    - 3.1.4. Security Situation.....36
    - 3.1.5. Political Progress.....37
    - 3.1.6. Economic Growth and Development.....38
    - 3.1.7. Poverty.....41
    - 3.1.8. Crime and Corruption.....42
    - 3.1.9. Humanitarian Situation.....44
    - 3.1.10. Intervention.....45
- Chapter Four: Findings, Conclusion and Recommendations.....47**
  - 4.1. Findings of the Study.....47
    - 4.1.1. Discussions of the Study.....50
  - 4.2. Conclusion.....51
  - 4.3. Recommendations.....52
- References.....54

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1. Background of the Study

Somalia is a country located on the East Coast of Africa in the region called the Horn of Africa. It is bordered by Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti (Nyambura, 2011: 183). Like many other African countries, colonization has had devastating effects on Somalia. The country was colonized by the European powers, France, Britain and Italy, who divided it into five protectorates (Ansems, 2007: 97). Somalia is a homogenous society; most of its citizens share a common language, religion and culture. However, the country has never been able to sustain a lasting stability (Hansch et al 1994; 1). The political landscape of Somalia is dominated by a primitive system of kinships. The Somali kinship structure is based on a patrilineal lineage type known as clan. One's sense of belonging is determined by the ancestors from whom they stem. In order to implement any meaningful political reforms the constitution of Somalia should be understood in this context as it serves as a social contract (Gundel, November 2006, p. iii). The International Crisis Group (23/12/2008: 3) notes that the country has many clans, which are families consisting of sub-clans and sub-sub-clans; the biggest ones include the Hawiye, Darood, Rahanweyn and Dir.

Ahmed and Green (1999) point out that the Somali people have the utmost respect for their culture and they have lived peacefully embracing their tradition as a unified nation until the arrival of the colonizers. The European colonial powers divided the Somali people according to their own economic needs resulting in separate colonies of British Somaliland and Italian Somalia. According to Besteman (1999) the colonial powers practiced different economic policies. The Italian colony emerged as the most developed resulting in "lasting disparities in wealth and infrastructure". Under these circumstances the clans served as political identities to access economic gains. Clan rivalry came to the fore as each group strived for survival. The two former colonies, however, merged and became the independent United Republic of Somalia in 1960. Notwithstanding, the Somali people's differences were already highlighted and the divisions deepened. Inequalities stemming from the economic underdevelopment of one colony pitted the Somali clans against each other in a fight to maximize their power, influence and capabilities. Somali politics became dominated by ethnic identity and many opportunists emerged in attempts to gain power. Political participation along ethnic lines became prevalent as alliances and coalitions were formed. The outcome has been that the

politics of Somalia have been characterised by power struggles and thus the country became disturbingly unstable (Besteman, 1999).

Xaragaga Online (28/11/2010) reports that after independence political relations have been defined along tribal lines. Political decisions were made but not in the interests of the Somali people. Clan members in the executive promoted their family members. Marginalization and exclusion dominated the political stratum. As a result, bad governance, corruption, nepotism, collapsed economy, rampant unemployment, lack of meaningful social services and deep mistrust among the Somali population became widespread. Hence, the political, social, economic and security situation in the country remained seriously volatile and far from stable.

The country's first president was President Aden Abdullah Osman. Osman led the country from 1 July 1960 to June 1967 and lost power in the democratic elections to his former Prime Minister Abdirashid Ali Shermarke (Sachs, 1988: 290). During his first few years Shermarke's government was seen as democratic and stable. However, according to many journalistic writings his governance was characterised by corruption and political patronage and this undermined its efficiency. As the time went by Shermarke's government became more favourable to his clan as political and government positions, wealth and power were dominated and controlled by them. Clan-based politics came to the fore and thus became prevalent. This created space for contestation of power which was headed by General Siad Barre; in October 1969 the President was assassinated during a military coup (Ansems, 2007: 97).

Metz (2009) submits that the Somali power struggle was heightened further by the regime of Major General Siad Barre who became the president of Somalia in 1969 after the assassination of President Sharmarke. Initially Barre tried to practise inclusive politics and promised to alleviate clan-based politics; however this did not last for long. Barre became a dictator; he enriched and promoted members of his clan-family. His government was critically called Mareehaan, Ogaden and Dulbahante (M.O.D), a codename used for the clans that benefited from it. All the public services were controlled by the members of the M.O.D. In Barre's regime repressive tactics were utilised against all those who wished to challenge him. Throughout his reign thousands of Somali people were killed, tortured, arrested, and others fled the country. During Barre's regime "tribalism, nepotism, corruption and misrule" became widespread and intensified, swiftly sowing deeper divisions among Somali clans

(Metz, 2009). Menkhaus (2007) added that Barre used a divide-and-rule tactic and as a result hatred and distrust among the Somali people was exacerbated, making national building and unity illusive.

Different clans established their own political parties. The parties enjoyed support along tribal lines as a way to preserve the clan's strength and existence. Somali Youth League (SYL), for instance, enjoyed support mainly from Marjeerteen clan of the Daarood clan family, Hisbia Digil Marifle (HDM) enjoyed Italian support, Somali National League (SNL) was supported by Isaaq clan and the United Somali Party (USP) enjoyed Dir and Daarood's support. (Polity IV Country Report, 2010: 2).

At the height of the power struggle new relations were formed and others became ruined; splinter groups emerged who in turn also launched their own political parties resulting in the formation of many parties. It was reported that "there were over 30 rival clans competing for political control of Somalia" (Polity IV Country report, 2010: 2).

In 1989 the United Somali Congress (USC) was formed in Rome by a group of Somali exiles from Hawiye clan. The USC was very instrumental in challenging Barre's regime. Barre responded by attacking the Isaaq and Hawiye clan-families inside the country. The fighting went on indefinitely and ultimately on the 27th January 1991, Barre was defeated and fled the country (Metz, 2009). After the collapse of the central government the rival clan-parties fought among themselves and this resulted in a bloody civil war that ended with the escalation of intensified divisions, violent conflicts and the emergence of Islamist Insurgency (Polity IV Country report, 2010: 2).

## **1.2. Statement of the Problem**

Ethnic diversity has frequently been identified as a potential impediment to good governance. A large and influential body of scholars has demonstrated that ethnically diverse societies are less likely to provide high-quality public goods or to implement development-enhancing public policies (McClendon, January 2012: 2).

Instead of embarking on cohesive efforts to rebuild and develop their country, groups strive for their own personal gain. This has a negative impact on the stability of the country. The

political and socio-economic rights of other groups are compromised. Policy efficiency is sacrificed for narrow ethnic gains and thus political stability becomes elusive.

Political participation along ethnic lines polarises politics and the results have a detrimental impact on the stability of the country as well as the type of governance executed. As noted by Gundel (15/05/2009: 5) “Somalia remains in a condition of internal conflict, fragmentation, and complex political humanitarian emergency”. Luling (1997) painted the picture in these terms:

In Somalia, artificial state and clan-based society, are unable to work together healthily, instead they have set up a poisonous interaction which produced corruption in the state and distortion of the clan-tie. Clans had always competed for resources such as land, grazing and water, but now that control of all these resources and much more was vested in the state, competition between clans, which before had been only one aspect of their existence, became its permanent condition. The state is both the arena within which they fought and the prize for which they contended. So the state, which had been intended to unify the Somali people, actually became the mechanism of their disintegration (Luling, 1997: 290).

The inclusion of ethnicity in Somali national politics have resulted in polarization and fragmentation, leading to heavy fighting and instability. Politicization of ethnicity has a negative effect on Somali politics and remains a major threat to a lasting stability. This paper argues that the political problems experienced in Somalia lies in the complicated nature of its clan-based politics.



### **1.3. Significance of the Study**

The significance of this study is that it intends to explore the impact of political participation along ethnic lines on the consequent failure to provide good and effective governance. The interest of the researcher is to suggest policy changes so that the country can return to normalcy through the practice of democratic principles that will promote inclusivity and transparency. The importance of this study is that it will offer answers to the dilemmas that marred the country's developmental performance. Findings will provide new solutions to problems facing the country. This will be useful for policymakers, Somali government, civil society, non-governmental institutions and other developmental agencies involved in Somalia.

#### **1.4. Aim of the Study**

The study aims to identify the role of ethnicity in Somali politics and explore the correlation between politicization of ethnicity and lack of good and effective governance in Somalia. It will also develop ways in which this relation can produce constructive and fruitful results in order to unite the Somali people rebuild the country and achieve lasting peace.

#### **1.5. Research Objectives**

The objectives of the study include:

- To investigate the root causes of ethnic politics in Somalia.
- To establish how politics of identity affected Somalia and its governance.
- To examine the challenges of the absence of an effective central government in Somalia.
- To suggest solutions to the challenges of ethnic politics in Somalia.

#### **1.6. Research Questions**

- What are the root causes of ethnic politics in Somalia?
- How has the politics of identity affected Somalia and its governance?
- What are the implications of the absence of an effective central government in Somalia?
- What can be done to achieve stability in Somalia?

#### **1.7. Hypothesis**

Politicization of ethnicity in Somalia has been an impediment to the practice and provisions of good governance, and therefore the country is experiencing political problems.

## 1.8. Definition of Terms

Clan	is a tribe or collection of families, united under a chieftain, regarded as having the same common ancestor and bearing the same surname (Webster Online Dictionary).
Ethnicity	is a community solidarity based on shared ideas of origin, ancestry, tradition and culture (Thompson, 2010: 61).
Federal republic	is a state in which the powers of the central government are restricted and in which the component parts (states, colonies, or provinces) retain a degree of self-government; ultimate sovereign power rests with the voters who chose their governmental representatives (CIA,19/02/2013).
Governance	is how the country is controlled. It is comprised of necessary processes and institutions, through which citizens and organised civil groups can express their interests, practice their constitutional rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences (United Nations Development Programme, 1994: 797).
Good governance	is ensuring respect for human rights and the rule of law; strengthening democracy; promoting transparency and capacity in public administration (Annan, 1994: 797).
Human Security	is the guaranteeing of the protection and promotion of people's rights, safety and life (Japanese Foreign Ministry, 2000).
Instability	is a situation of lawlessness, disorder, violence and hostility.
Terrorism	is the use of violence by sub-state groups to inspire fear, by attacking civilians and/or symbolic targets, for purposes such as drawing widespread attention to a grievance, provoking a severe response or wearing down their opponent's moral response, to effect political change (Kiras, 2008: 374).

## **1.9. Methodology**

### **1.9.1. Research Design**

The researcher will employ a qualitative design, which according to Holetzyky (2007) is a kind of research design that seeks a wide understanding of the entire situation as it produces more in-depth and comprehensive information. The qualitative method of research examines how people learn about themselves and their surroundings in order to make sense of their daily lives. It provides a descriptive survey which captures people's beliefs, views, attitudes or perceptions (Hox and Boeije, 2005). Secondary sources of data will be used for this study because the crisis in Somalia is still on-going; hence the researcher will not be able to travel to Somalia for an on-the-spot assessment of the crisis.

### **1.9.2. Methods of Data Collection**

The method of data collection that is adapted for this study is an examination of materials on the on-going conflict in Somalia. This includes books, journals, conference articles and research publications, government releases, newspaper articles and relevant internet materials.

### **1.9.3. Method of Data Analysis**

The paper utilises a qualitative data analysis technique which includes the use of content analysis. According to Welman et al (2005: 39) content analysis is used for the analysis and interpretation of the data obtained from previous studies, reports, documents and other documentaries (audio or visual). The researcher will rely on previous studies carried out on the topic such as; the data recorded from various authors understandings, views, opinions and experiments. Thereafter, the researcher will be able to articulate and draw conclusions regarding the problem the thesis seeks to examine. The results thus obtained then provide feedback on whether the hypothesis is validated or invalidated. However, the analyzed data presentation will be descriptive and historical in a way that it will be chronologically presented for easy understanding.

#### 1.10. **Scope of the study**

The study is based on the influence of ethnicity on the politics of Somalia and how it affects the institutionalisation of good governance.

#### 1.11. **Limitation of the Study**

The researcher encountered some constraints in the process of carrying out the research. The main constraint is the fact that the problem in Somalia is still on-going; firstly this will enable the researcher to go and conduct interviews in the affected areas because of safety and security; secondly, conducting interviews with the Somali immigrants in South Africa might result in subjective and bias information because of the unbalanced representation of ethnic groups. Given that the thesis will utilise only secondary data the other limitation will be that by 2012, which was the year that the mandate of the government expired, the government had not released any report, statement or press release on the on-going situation in the country. Despite the aforementioned limitations, the researcher made use of the available secondary data to achieve the aim and objectives of the study.

## 1.12. Organization of the Study

The paper is structured as follows:

- Chapter one:** dwells on introduction of the study. This include background, problem statement, significance, aim of the study, research questions, research objectives, hypothesis, methodology, scope of the study, limitations and organization of the study.
- Chapter two:** focuses on literature review and theoretical framework which is on the effects of the involvement of ethnicity in Somali politics
- Chapter three:** examines the implications of the absence of central government in Somalia
- Chapter four:** contains findings, conclusion and recommendations

## CHAPTER TWO

### LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

#### 2.1. Literature Review



Literature review is an effective evaluation of selected documents on a research topic. It involves a critical synthesis of previous researches. The researcher will use literature review to distinguish what has already been done from what needs to be done, synthesize and gain new perspectives and rationalize the significance of the problem (Hart, 2008). This will be vital in assisting to discover important variables relevant to the topic. In order to achieve this, the researcher will rely on previous studies to be able to elucidate and address the gap that exists in the literature evaluated.

In contemporary Africa there are different views and opinions on the role of ethnicity. Many studies, realisations and conclusions have been undertaken and made respectively by various scholars in different parts of the world. Therefore, most of them agree that ethnicity is neither good nor bad. It is alleged that it all depends on a country's inhabitants as to how they choose to interpret and utilise their ethnic differences. Ethnicity has been manipulated by various actors, however. Many studies find that these actors only utilise ethnicity when it suits or benefits them for their personal or group gains. In many instances atrocious acts have been committed using ethnicity as the motivation. Ethnicity has become increasingly talked about since the 19<sup>th</sup> century; in the 21<sup>st</sup> century many violent conflicts, civil wars and political and economic instability have been associated with it. In Africa ethnicity has come to be regarded as the major threat to sustainable peace, security and development. This chapter looks at some various writers' view on the role of ethnicity in African politics, particularly focusing on Somalia as a case study. The researcher will start off by examining the role of ethnicity in the African continent and thereafter evaluate its effect in Somalia.

Osinubi<sup>1</sup> and Osinubi<sup>2</sup> (2006: 101) state that "most developing countries are ethnically diverse". Mostly, in such countries the stages of development are still in progress; modernization and democratization are still in their infancy and therefore easily manipulated. Ethnic groups employ different tactics to loot or attempt to loot state resources for their own benefit and at the expense of other groups. Here ethnic divisions, tension and rivalries are prevalent as ethnicity is used to divide the people so as to determine who is included or

excluded in decision-making processes. In this instance ethnicity becomes detrimental as it enhances the notion of 'us' against 'them' resulting in a suitable atmosphere for conflict.

According to Ong'ayo (19/09/2008: 1-2) Africa is prone to violent conflicts. The continent has experienced more intractable and turbulent conflicts than any other continent in the world. As such it has had difficulties in maintaining peace, security and development. Many factors have been outlined as contributing factors, many solutions have been developed and different measures have been taken in order to find a lasting solution. In all these conflicts the problems of leadership and ethnicity has been the most evident. Greed and power have caused Africa to witness freedom fighters turning into mercenaries and dictators, natural resources and wealth become a curse for Africans. As such politics of exclusion and deprivation as well as violent counter measures of attempting to balance power continues to dominate the public sphere.

Ong'ayo has outlined Africa's problems as well as highlighting their causes, however he has failed to present a lasting solution that could see Africa being completely liberated from violent conflicts and political instabilities.

Nhlapo (2001: 11), building on the ethnic thesis, submits that Africa is an ethnically heterogeneous continent. It is made up of many ethnic groups with different and sometimes conflicting cultures and traditions. In the post-cold-war era Africa witnessed an increased political significance of ethnicity exacerbated by its manipulation by politicians for mass mobilisation. African politics were transformed from the "politics of ideology to politics of identity". In addition, Lange (2001: 9) in a related view asserts that "ethnicity continues to shape the dynamics in areas related to governance". Moreover, Lange argues that in societies where ethnicity is used for political gains it plays a vital role in determining who is included and who is not in decision-making processes. Furthermore ethnicity is used as a base for determining to whom and how services are delivered, health care is provided and political affiliation is conducted.

Both authors agree that ethnicity influences African political systems; however, they did not specify whether the influence is positive or negative or if it is desirable or sustainable.

Steward (2009) finds that identity politics has been one of the major causes of instability in many African countries, either as the main cause or as an underlying factor. Many Africans have been using their differences as a base for conflict. This has become one of the major

impediments to sustainable human development. As a result many African countries have experienced conflict since gaining their independence.

Similar to Steward (2009), Osinubi<sup>1</sup> and Osinubi<sup>2</sup> (2006: 101) also point out that the manipulation of ethnicity has resulted in instability, political chaos, dwindling economies and massive loss of life. There are several examples that can be identified including Kenya, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Sudan among others.

In Sudan, for example, politicization of ethnicity resulted in a civil war that pitted the Arab-Muslim North against the non-Arab Christian and animist South. The conflict lasted for decades. Reportedly, there have been about one million deaths. In Kenya, ethnic tensions hijacked multiparty elections in the late 1991 and 1993. The death toll was estimated to be about 1,500. Again during the elections of 1997 violence erupted and continued until January 1998 (Osinubi<sup>1</sup> and Osinubi<sup>2</sup>, 2006: 101).

The authors only outlined the negative aspect of ethnicity and as such regarded it as one of the major causes of conflict and for this reason one of the main hindrances to African development; however it is also worth noting and highlighting the aspect that ethnicity has also played a positive role in African societies. For instance ethnicity has provided peace, cohesion and unity among Africans especially during the colonization era and in the fight for liberalization. However, as Africans attained power they started manipulating their own people by using their differences against each other and this became a major challenge for African stability.

The introduction of identity politics is fuelled by the principle of nationalism. Nationalist policies result in an intensified politicization of ethnicity with many Africans believing that “the ethnic likes should rule over ethnic likes”. However, in the modern era the nationalist approach is expressed in different contexts ranging from conflict over access to state power between leaders of competing ethnic communities (Brass, 1991), secession from existing states in order to establish a new state ruled in the name of a particular ethnic group (Hechter, 2001) or to join another state controlled by ethnic kin (Weiner, 1971) and competition between new states over mixed territories inhabited by members of their respective ethnic core groups (Brubaker, 1996).

Similar to the previous authors, Brass only discussed the negative aspect of ethnicity as opposed to alluding to its positive aspects, however he introduced a new phenomenon to the

discussion; that nationalism has exacerbated political mobilization along ethnic lines and thus leaving Africans divided and perceiving each other in terms of 'us' and 'them' and for this reason they end up fighting over the state resources for their survival. Brass, Hetchter, Weiner and Brubaker point out the fact that Africans are at war with their own future. They are causing their problems themselves by looking down on and thus destroying each other on the basis of ethnic differences.

In addition Cederman et al (1/1 2010: 28) support the previous submissions and thus argue that relations are dominated by power inequality which is most often comprised of exclusion and competition along ethnic lines. Cederman et al also mention that this practice has been regarded as the most evident cause of many civil wars in Africa. In Ivory Coast, for example, the ethnic factor pitted the people living in the north and south against each other because of the unequal treatment practised. This translated into a civil war that saw a country being permanently divided. Since then the country has been experiencing the challenges of instability and its elections have been marred by boycotts, violence, and allegations of fraud with disgruntled groups disputing the results (Ruiters, 2008).

Mamdani (20/1/2011) adding to the nationalist discourse, provides a Congolese example which was one of the African countries dominated by the politics of identity characterised by the discrimination between the indigenous people and 'non-indigenous'. In Congo however, the problem emanated from the colonial institutions that introduced and supported the use of ethnic identity. After the attainment of independence this practice escalated and thus translated into an ethnic conflict. It is reported that the indigenous people had access to certain privileges such as the right to tribal homeland while the non-indigenous were suffocated; they faced hardships such as intimidation and different tactics were employed as measures to drive them out of the country.

Mamdani introduces a new phenomenon to identity politics. He points out that ethnic tensions in Congo emanated during the colonial era as it was instigated as a strategic tactic to divide and rule. The practice thus caused hatred and mistrust among African people leading to long lasting divisions that resulted in ethnic conflict. Generally in Africa, this led to instabilities in heterogeneous societies as ethnicity became a base for political mobilisations. After independence, most governments opted for practices that guaranteed and secured their stay in power. As such dominations and institutionalised discriminations continue to plague African politics.

According to Stearns (3/2/2011) Mamdani is right to point out that “the persistence of a discourse of ‘nativism’ or ‘indigeneity’ is a serious problem for contemporary Congolese society which the peace process has never properly confronted”. However, he has neglected crucial aspects of the region’s recent politics by insisting on the legacy of the native authority. Between 1998 and 2003, the eastern Kivu region was a battleground fought over by the Rwandan army and its local Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) allies on one side, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)-Rwandan rebels, Mai-Mai militia and Kabila’s government on the other. The violence was not fuelled only by a discourse of indigeneity, but also by geopolitical considerations: the continuation of the Rwandan civil war on Congolese territory and struggles by local and regional elites over resources and power.

Stearns notes that Mamdani’s discourse raises more questions than it provides answers. He argues that if it is true that the problem lies with the native authority, Mamdani failed to address how it should be reformed.

In his book, *When Victims Becomes Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda*, Mamdani (2001) explained the genocide in Rwanda by exploring different approach to other authors. He particularly focused on political explanation that includes identity politics and further broadened the historical and geographical context. Mamdani argue that political identities, which has been polarised through historical processes, are at the root of the racialization of the two main groups in Rwanda, the Hutu and the Tutsi. This racialization was a main contributor to the emergence of the genocide.

In both submissions Mamdani attribute the politics of identity as a phenomenon that is inherited from colonial practices. In both countries the conflict emerged as a result of underlying historical changes. Politicisation of ethnicity hampered the stability in that identity became the main point of focus that determined ones belonging. In this instance history, race and ethnicity became political.

Collier and Hoefler (2004) assert that in situations where ethnicity plays a pivotal role in politics the state becomes “too weak, corrupt and mismanaged”. Distribution of state resources is usually dominated by inequalities and the leadership finds it difficult to suppress rebellions. Warlords and militias capitalize on these conditions to loot for their self-gain. These factors further escalate the instability as they divide the nation, with groups either fighting to challenge the status quo, or defending it when it favours them.

Collier and Hoefler find that the ethnic factor weakens the security of the state. It results in lawlessness and disorder and therefore the state becomes more vulnerable to instability. Similar to Cederman et al, they also submit that power struggles intensify as different groups want to control the state; however, the authors fail to provide suggestions as to how this problem could be addressed or explain whether it is possible to live peacefully under such conditions.

Cederman et al (1/1/2010: 1) emphasize that the emergence of ethnic conflict can be triggered by the exclusion and unbalanced representation of groups in the state. They argue that once one ethnic group dominates the representation, the more it threatens the existence of the others. This leads to attempts by the other groups to balance the representation and most of the time this translates into the use of force. Most leaders take advantage of these social cleavages. Elite members hold a monopoly of power in the executive to the exclusion of members of other ethnic groups.

Cederman et al unanimously state clearly that unfair representation of ethnic groups is a major problem, however they are not clear on how the representation should be, who should be excluded or included and based on what criteria. It is best to present both a problem and a suggested answer so as to provide a way forward.

In addition, Ohlson and Soderberg (2003: 6) note that in weak states the ability of government to extend its control and legitimacy is weakened as it is vulnerable to domestic challenges and rebellion. They further observe that such government is usually characterised by internal divisions and these circumstances derail its ability to carry out its mandate of serving and protecting its citizens (Ohlson and Soderberg, 2003: 6). As such the prospect of shifting towards and maintaining democracy becomes minimised. Bratton (2005: 14) notes for example, that “a fully-fledged functioning democracy has never emerged in any of Africa’s weaker states, rather most African states seem capable of nurturing only ‘partly free’ or ‘un-free’ political regimes, which are easily destabilised by mass uprisings, military coups, terrorism, crime and disease”.

Ohlson and Soderberg highlight that the health and strength of the state affects the capacity and the effectiveness of the government. This therefore implies that if the state is weak it impacts on the ability of government to function effectively. Bratton complement the view by pointing out that Africans have not yet been able to achieve a full democracy. The gap that exists in all these submissions, however, is to suggest ways in which African countries can be

able to fully embrace and practice democratic principles so as to avoid rebellion, inequality and instability. However, many Pan Africanists (incumbent president like Mugabe, Mbeki to mention a few) have always argued that it is not a fair conclusion to suggest that democracy is the only way to prevent and manage African problems. They argue that African problems should be solved by African solutions. This means that what democracy means in the Western world might actually be completely different from what it means for Africans.

In an African experience what has been noted is that where there is no law and order terrorism has always emerged. Its emergence can be attributed to the failure of government to control and regulate the state and protect its people. Nationally, terror tactics are used by opponents to challenge the status quo that they perceive as oppressive to them. Violence is seen as the only option that could draw attention to their plights. Terrorists mobilize the marginalised groups and provide them with an ideological doctrine that will both satisfy and channel their frustrations. This becomes advantageous for terrorists to lobby support and show their prestige (Kiras, 2008: 372 &373).

Kiras argues that terrorism emerges as the repercussion of the failure by government to ensure state and human security as disgruntled groups strive for inclusion and recognition. UNDP (1994) supports Kiras's claim and argues that once terrorism becomes prevalent human security is compromised. According to UNDP human security encapsulates that "all people are assured basic income, have both physical and economic access to basic food, guaranteed health care, protected from short and long term ravages of nature, physical violence and loss of traditional relations, and enjoy their human rights". However, due to massive ethnic exclusion and marginalisation the continent has experienced, many of its states are unable to provide the afore mentioned necessities.

Both Kiras and UNDP acknowledge the impact of terrorism by highlighting its effects on the state and its people; however the gap that they both failed to address is how the state and the people as the victims can work together to combat this phenomenon and whether it can be addressed. Kiras and UNDP further highlight the inefficiencies of a state that is characterised by ethnic divisions.

Most authors and scholars attribute African predicaments to lack of firm and decisive leadership. They argue that had African leaders adopted sound policies in the interest of their people the situation would be better and the conditions would be different. The people trusted their leaders enough to put them in power with the view that they will improve their lives;

however, in many instances this has not been realised (Mills, 2010: 1). In his direct words he argues that “bad choices have been made because better choices in the broad public interest were, in very many cases, not in the leader’s personal and often financial self-interests” (Mills, 2010: 13).

The literature suggests that the role of African leaders has been minimal in addressing the ethnic challenges facing their countries. It argues that they did not have the interests of their people at heart and sold them out for their personal gain. The literature attributes the crisis to the policies made by these leaders; however, Mills applies the umbrella approach and as such fails to identify and acknowledge the leaders who have done all they can to ensure security, peace and stability in their countries and in the continent at large. Furthermore, the paper suggests that it should be the people’s task to ensure that their leaders implement correct policies that favour the betterment of their lives. The gap that exists in the author’s submission is how the people can utilise their power to make their voices heard and what powers they have.



The literature points out that the use of ethnicity in the African context is like a poisonous disease, a cancer that spreads across and destroys all useful aspects of the nation including stability, health care, public safety, economic, social and political growth and development. In simpler terms the literature highlights that if ethnicity is used in a negative way it bears negative results and in this instance destroys the health and strength of the nation because of the rivalries and divisions that emanate.

In addition, Tutu (2004: 4) observes that many African governments are poor, weak and corrupt. For many of these leaders it has not been easy to provide a just, equal and free social order to all their citizens, hence the problems Africa is currently experiencing.

Likewise, Ong’ayo (19/09/2008: 9) submits that Africa’s political and economic stability is constantly under threat due to internal factors such as unequal development, poverty, disease, violence and manipulative tendencies of the local elite. On the contrary Lange (2001: 8) mentions that due to the democratic transition embraced in the 1990’s the continent has shown some readiness and capability to solve its own challenges. However, it must be noted that despite some registered positive achievements from some countries there are those which are still lagging behind.

Tutu and Ong'ayo discuss internal factors that contribute to African problems. They highlight the role of domestic factors and also point out that it is not only foreign actors who are responsible as is commonly argued. Lange, however, presents a more positive view by mentioning that the introduction of democracy has liberated Africa from some of its challenges. The gap that exists in these submissions is assessing whether democracy is fully capable of addressing African problems and if the people are ready for it; if not, how can they be prepared for it.

According to Rok (1997) the dimension of corruption and ethnicity or nepotism in state institutions came to the fore as ruling elites looted the public domain for their own survival. Furthermore Rok asserts that the pressure mounted by external forces and internal government maladministration are serious problems in Africa which contributes to political instability. These tendencies exacerbate conflict over resources, ethnic rivalry, and more recently, the emergence of electoral violence as a characteristic of multi-party elections in Africa.

Hunting (1991) states that after the attainment of political independence by many African states, internal power struggles among different interest groups reared its ugly head, consequently threatening the existence of these new states. Ong'ayo (19/9/2008: 7) supports the view and added that more often than not such violence is state sponsored, to the benefit of the elite. In response, the marginalised also employ violence in most cases in the form of rebels or violent gangs. He explains that in the mist of all this violence it is the ordinary men and women who are grossly affected through loss of lives and destruction of their properties. Sadly the wrestling for political power is not to the benefit or improvement of ordinary civilian's lives but rather it is for access to state resources which are often looted.

The Somali state epitomises the above mentioned circumstances. Ethnicity has been used for furthering the interests of the few and the result has been that the country was left in total chaos for decades. Ethnicity was exploited negatively for power and has therefore proved to be detrimental to the stability of Somalia.

As World Bank (2005, 15) puts it *"nearly all armed conflicts in contemporary Somalia break out along clan lines. Clan identities are malleable and can be shaped by leaders to pursue control of resources and power. Clans are not the basis of conflict; rather, their deliberate manipulation creates and exacerbates divisions. Clan groups can serve as destructive or constructive forces as well as traditional conflict moderators"*.

In Somalia social and political relationships are formed based on clan interests. This means that relations are not predictable and static. They are mostly not designed for the long term as they are determined by the perceived goals each wants to achieve at that time. This circumstance makes it easier for clans to take advantage of and deceive each other. Politically this unstable practice is uncalled for as it affects many lives as well as the ability of government to carry out its duties to the nation (Lewis, 1961: 15).

Clan leaders are the most powerful people in Somali society. They have more power and influence. Their members take directions from them and follow them to the letter. It was revealed that the Somali people respect their clan leaders more than their political leaders. Clannism is an institution higher than the political office. In Somalia, clan laws, customs and regulations (traditional) are adhered to more than democratic principles. As the result there exists a contradiction between culture and democracy. For instance, what is allowed traditionally and perceived as a norm might actually be regarded as a taboo democratically. There are freedoms and rights provided by democracy that traditional leaders are not ready to fully embrace. Therefore, the state has to collaborate closely with these leaders in order to make any meaningful and respectable decisions (World Bank, 2005: 16).

Clan members pledge their allegiance and loyalty to their leaders in exchange for support and protection in difficult times like during war, drought etc. In times of war only the strong survive and clan-families work very hard to ensure that they win every battle to protect their clan identity. The use of clannism has affected Somali politics negatively in that political relations became dominated by vicious conflicting interests. In this case the end justified the means. The end in this instance is the benefits that come with being a strong and powerful clan. As a result the politics of Somalia has been characterised by violent counter measures by weak clans who are trying to balance the forces of power, and are fighting for their recognition (World Bank, 2005: 16).

According to World Bank (2005: 15) the promotion of clan interests has compromised the stability of the Somali state. However, World Bank notes clearly that clans can also be a source of cooperation if managed properly. Clannism is what the Somali people have in common; it is their identity. The task is just to ensure that their needs and interests become one and do not threaten the existence of another. What the World Bank failed to address is what measures should be used to create the necessary conducive environment where all clans can live happily and on an equal basis.

Nyambura (2011: 181) finds that the emergence of political instability is mainly attributed to clannism which is a crucial aspect of the Somali societal make-up. Clan identity and clan pride took precedence over the needs of the ordinary people, national unity and development. Clan rivalry made it impossible for Somali people to practice accommodation, compromise and cooperation towards each other. For instance, World Bank (2005: 9) states that much of Somali's instability that took place since 1991 was perpetuated and escalated by those who fought in the interests of the clan, most of whom were "political leaders manipulating clannism for their own goals".

The literature points out that what Somali people regard as a norm, "clannism", is actually the major threat to their political growth and development. Clannism affects all sectors of the Somali state. The "protection" of clan interest results in security compromises that in turn affect the stability, governance efficiency, law and order as well as development of the state. The literature reveals that clans are considered to be more important than any other thing. Lives can be compromised for the interest and existence of the clan. The benefits are the vital aspects and thus outweigh the costs.

On a brighter note, Nyambura (2011: 190) mentions that in the early days clans played a more positive role in a society by keeping order and maintaining peace. Tensions were there but they were minimal, and highly regulated by the use of the *xeer* (traditional law). However, after the attainment of independence the manipulation of clans to achieve political objectives became evident resulting in vicious conflicting interests among Somali clan-families. As such clannism has been regarded as the root cause of the practice of the politics of identity. Moreover, Ansems (2007; 98) points out that competition for power and resources has resulted in the erosion of clan relationships. For this reason, the control of key areas and foreign aid became highly contested and further escalated the political crisis that lasted for over two decades.

Nyambura reveals that the involvement of ethnicity in politics led to the practice of clan-based politics. As a result ethnicity became politicised and ethnic differences were thus used to garner support for political gains. The problem seems to have manifested in the post-independence era. This therefore means that the Somali political crisis emanated from the exploitation of clannism. In addition, Ansems supports Nyambura's view. Both authors agree that clannism and clan cleavages became destructive forces for both Somali politics and society. The two played a significant role in dividing the Somali people and exacerbating the

conflict as they were used as the basis for mobilisation. However, the authors after identifying the problem did not specify a way forward.

Ethnicity has become a major factor in Somali politics and serves as a base for political representation and was thus made official. The Transitional National Government (TNG) came up with a system that encompasses all the clans in Somali politics. TNG introduced the “4.5 formula” (Gundel, 15/5/2006: 11 and Miti, June, 2010:2). The formula allocates an equal number of seats in parliament to each of the four major clan-families and half that number to the remaining minority groups (International Crisis Group Report, 23/12/2008: 3). In the formula as unpacked by Hoehne (2010: 35) and Miti (June, 2010: 2), out of 245 parliamentary seats 49 were assigned to each of the four biggest clan-families, 29 seats were allocated to minority groups and 20 seats reserved for women.

According to Baadiyow (3/4/2012) “the purpose of the 4.5 system was to manage conflict and achieve stability with the objective of creating a structure leading to a democratic system”. However, this proportional representative system which is meant to provide for fair political representation for all existing clans does not always produce the desired results. The formula has been highly controversial, with some unsatisfied groups arguing that it is unfair and does not represent the Somali people equally (Gundel, 15/5/2009: 11) and (Baadiyow, 3/4/2012). Menkhaus (2007: 361) also pointed out that the TNG itself did not put the 4.5 formula into practice and only managed to place power in the hands of its president’s cronies and allies.

Menkhaus (2004a: 10) points out that the legacy left by the former regimes, particularly that of Barre, contributed enormously to the exploitation of clans, thus fuelling the political instability. The “oppressive and exploitative nature of the state created conditions for some leaders ‘to dominate others, monopolise state resources and appropriate valuable land and other assets’”. The result has been that the chances of reconciliation became very complicated as ‘distrust and zero-sum mentality’ came to play. In addition, World Bank (2005, 10) argues that clan leaders played a crucial role in politicising ethnicity. They were only concerned with the short term goals of attaining power and overlooked their implication for the future. These actions, however, sowed seeds for ethnic divisions, tensions and rivalries and thus resulted in political chaos.

Menkhaus highlights the legacy of the past regimes as a contributor to the crisis. He suggests that the problems are inherited from the past mistakes. This implies that the Somali people

still have scars from the past regimes that mistreated them. As a result it becomes very difficult to be able to trust one another as history has exposed them to the worst of what dominance can do. The central issue here is that clan-families fear the repetition of inequalities that characterised the Barre regime. Their past has left them in constant defence mode, which is the only way they know how to protect themselves and guarantee their survival. World Bank also adds that the traditional leadership is to blame for the crisis. They manipulated and distorted culture and their people.

According to Menkhaus (2003a:18) the Somali people do not trust the state. In the past the state was used as an institution to intimidate, suppress and exploit the people. It was considered to be the fastest way to enrich oneself and this was done to the disadvantage of the poor and the vulnerable. Those who were in power used their positions to make life difficult for those who were not. Being in the executive was a powerful position to which each clan wanted to ascend leading to the vicious fight for control of the state by all clans.

The use of clan for political gain has resulted in a violent conflict that lasted for almost two decades. The manifestations of clan divisions made a way for violence as major clan families wrestled for political power and the control of state resources. The World Bank (2005: 16) explains the situation in these terms:

In recent years, conflict increasingly has devolved to subclan and even sub-subclan levels. The collapse of the central state led to fragmentation and an economy of plunder that brought leaders into conflict with other leaders, sometimes from the same clan, vying for control of the same local area and resources. It was this struggle for territorial control, political power, and economic control of a region that prompted lowering the level of clan identities so as to mobilize support from the subclans.

Furthermore World Bank (2005: 16) argues that the conflict was most prominent only at the political level. At the social level, clans continue to work together; inter-clan marriages still take place. There are “cross-clan associations in the form of civil society organizations (CSOs), cross-clan businesses, and social interactions among clans. In fact, cross-clan CSOs and business partnerships are on the rise, and they are playing an important role in increasing the potential for peace and weakening the destructive aspects of clans. They operate across clan and geographic boundaries and are instilling vibrancy and hope in Somali society”.

Baadiyow (3/4/2012) states that the central issue was about representation and power distribution resulting in clan nepotism and political anarchy which spread across the country.

The literature finds that the Somali political crisis was primarily about making ends meet for political objectives. The clan families went against each other in order to maximize their influence and capabilities so as to survive and prevent dominance from other families as had been prevalent in the past. The use of violence was considered most suitable at the time to protect oneself, eliminate competition and weaken opponents. However, at the social front clan-families promote peaceful relations. There are activities and opportunities that link them together, force them to cooperate and thus reduce the hostilities. Clans only attack each other if they feel that their interests or power are threatened. If they have common goals they are willing to put their differences aside and work together peacefully.

Al Arabiya News (19/02/2012) reports that the Somali leaders and other important role players in Somali politics met to discuss a way forward to address the political crisis. The leaders proposed a system of governance that could be accepted and respected by all provided that it promotes inclusiveness. It was agreed that the political system governing the Somali state be a federal parliamentary republic.

According to United Nations (31/01/2013) the federal government was established on the 20 August 2012. On that day the new speaker and the members of parliament were selected by the 135 traditional leaders. The president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, was then selected. UN reports that the process of selecting the president was transparent and representative however, it was alleged that there were reported cases of intimidation and attempts to influence the outcome.

The literature reveals that there have been many arguments regarding the choice of the country's political system. Many argue that it further marginalised the weak and promoted the interests of the powerful. Most of its critics call it "clan-federalism". The central theme has been to unite the Somali people; as such many feel that this kind of political structure would not work very well for Somalia. Many authors have suggested that the most suitable system of government that could liberate the country from constant violence, conflict and instability is the one that would unify the Somali people and achieve national solidarity. They argue that what Somalia needs is a system that could ensure that the central government is the only body that has absolute power over all Somali inhabitants irrespective of their clan-origin.

Uluso (05/02/2012) point out that federalism is not a new phenomenon in Somalia. It is reported that the Hizbia Dighil and Mirifle (HDM) Party composed of the Dighil and Mirifle clans have proposed such a system in 1947; however it was rejected. The establishment of Puntland in 1998 was based on it. The author argues that as much as federalism allows for some degree of self-government it is not a necessary structure suitable for uniting the Somali people. In Uluso's words "Rather than solving the problems of bad governance, clan federalism expands the state's flaws, frustrates national reconciliation, and annuls citizenship rights and obligations". In short, Uluso argues that clan federalism only expands the problems of bad governance.

Fatah (2002) maintains that the Somali people must embrace their culture, by doing what used to be done before centrally controlled government was introduced to them. He argues that the clan-based structure worked perfectly well for the Somalis before the arrival of the colonizers. According to him the current system is not working and the country is in chaos because the utopian model of governance was imposed on the Somali people. He maintains that the system is not working not because of the country's inhabitants but because the conditions do not allow. Finally he suggests that the Somali people must not be confused and intimidated, and follow what they know works for them.



The literature finds that the use of ethnicity as a base for political participation has remained a challenge for Somali political stability. There exists a fear of domination and mistrust among clans. The outcome has been that internal politics came to be characterised by petty personal and clan rivalries. The politics became unstable as groups manoeuvred to gain the most political influence for their clan-families. Tribalism, nepotism and corruption still dominate Somali politics and "the country became a byword for anarchy" (Luling, 1997: 2).

Despite many challenges that existed in 2012 Somalia has registered some positive changes, including an attempt at establishing a stable government. First, on the 20<sup>th</sup> of August 2012 the mandate of the TFG came to an end (Aljazeera, 20/08/12). On the same day the new parliament was sworn in (Times Live, 21/08/2012). It must be noted however that the processes that are being used are still clan-based. There were 135 tribal leaders charged with selecting members of parliament (Sabahi, 09/08/2012). As Tay (17/08/2012) puts it "the process is more of selection than election". This means that the members of parliament were appointed rather than being elected.

Second, Somalia's National Constituent Assembly has approved the new constitution. It has been reported that the decision garnered 96% of the votes. However, it is worth noting that during the meeting that endorsed the constitution the security guards shot and killed two suicide bombers who intended to cause chaos and disrupt the meeting (Aljazeera, 01/08/2012). The constitution declares Islamist law as the legal foundation (Aljazeera, 03/08/2012). Even though things are not yet entirely normal, the conflict over the control of the state has come to an end and the violence subsided considerably.

However, most scholars argue that the involvement of ethnicity in politics has been destructive rather than constructive. They also point out that it has the potential to be beneficial as it could foster cooperation. Their stance is that the practice of politicised ethnicity is the main contributor to the social, economic and political turmoil that characterise Somalia today. This thesis is concerned with examining lack of good governance as a consequence of the practice of clan-based politics. For this reason, the vacuum that exists is the extent to which politicization of ethnicity has affected the execution and implementation of good governance. The researcher further seeks to identify what can be done in order to achieve good governance in Somalia. This gap is what this paper intends to address.

## **2.2. Theoretical Framework**

The theoretical framework or conceptual framework in a social science research is like a foundation upon which a building is erected. Hence, this thesis will be guided by two theories; the ethnic conflict theory and game theory. The theories explain the factors that contributed to the emergence of the practice of politicised ethnicity in Somalia. They each offer their own unique approach to understanding the Somali predicament. Ethnic conflict theory focuses more on describing the formations of ethnic groups and their interactions while game theory examines political mobilization along ethnic lines and the reasons for it. As such these theories complement each other and will best explain the sources of Somali conflict and their consequences.

### 2.2.1. Ethnic Conflict Theory

Eriten and Romine (2008: 1) argue that in order to give an understanding of the consequences arising from ethnic diversity the ethnic conflict theory explains how and why different ethnic groups emerge and the reasons for ethnic conflict. Ethnic conflict theory is comprised of three schools of thought; the primordialist, instrumentalist and constructivist.

- Primordialist

The primordialist view puts more emphasis on the importance of identity and origin. It submits that one's identity is formed on the basis of kinship. The primordialist view holds that biological features such as skin colour and other physical traits are the crucial element of social interactions. One's origin plays a vital role in determining one's standing in a society. It argues that ethnic groups are bound together by the same tradition, way of life and belief system (Horowitz, 2000: 90-95). Horowitz (1985) argues that this kinship "makes it possible for ethnic groups to think in terms of family resemblances". In this manner it makes it easier for member groups involved to act selfishly towards others in order to secure the interests of their respective groups.

- Instrumentalist

The instrumentalist view brings a structural explanation for the sources of ethnic conflict. It explains the main sources of ethnic conflict as "modernization, economic factors and elite ambitions" (Eriten and Romine, 2008: 2). It assumes that ethnicity is used as a means to access the state and its resources. Political participation along ethnic lines is considered as the most effective tool to acquire power. Instrumentalists charges that ethnic conflict is as a result of the actions taken by community leaders (ruling elites) for their selfish gains. It also argues that leaders rely and capitalize on social cleavages to mobilize political support. This results in instability as it increases conflicting interests within a society; for this reason, it also impacts on the type of governance executed (Smith, 2001: 54-55).

For the elite, ethnicity is exploited as a means to a particular end. As noted by Cornell and Hartman (1998: 59) "ethnicity in this context is first and foremost a resource in the hands of leaders to mobilise and organize followers in the pursuit of other interests, such as physical security, economic gain or political power".

- **Constructivist**

The constructivist view focuses on the way in which ethnic groups are constructed in a society. Constructivists argued that their nature, history and origin form the basis for a conflict. They charge that composition of different ethnic groups further divides the society and escalate conflicting interests. This results in what is termed “imagined communities” within a society and the groups acts selfishly to secure their perceived goals and interests. This was the case in Rwanda, in the early 1990’s as the Hutus and Tutsis tried to eliminate one another and this translated into the civil war that culminated in the world’s deadliest conflict (Mamdani, 2001). This is also the case in Somalia where clan families strive to maximize their own existence at the expense and disadvantage of another. Each group wants to acquire political power and take over control of the country.

In ethnic conflict theory the schools of thought that will best capture the problem that this study seeks to address are the primordialist and the instrumentalist. The primordialists argue that the person’s biological traits form a basis for ethnic conflict through ethnic cleansing. Essentially, the primordialist concept of conflict can be linked to the Somali problems. The country is characterised by inter-clan rivalries and tensions. Each clan family wants control of the state and works tirelessly to maximise their existence and dominance which results in political instability.

The instrumentalists cite the most important contributing factors to ethnic conflict as the socio-economic and political aspect. They argue that the disputing group’s main interest is the benefit associated with the outcome of conflict, be it the control of the state or unlimited access to state resources. They assert that competition over socio-economic and political factors culminates in violence and terrorism via ethnic conflict. They also state clearly that fighting is considered as a just cause and is thus pursued at all costs.

### **2.2.2 Game Theory**

Game theory is defined as a “formal study of decision-making where several players must make choices that potentially affect the interests of the other players”. Game is defined as “an interactive situation” (Turocy and von Strengel, 8/10/2001: 2 &6).

Game theory elucidates motives and causes of conflict. It gives more insight into the actor's mindset and behaviour. The theory provides an understanding of how and what informs human decision-making. It provides the answers as to "why" human beings behave the way they do. The theory explains the calculated measures applied by conflicting actors by examining their strategies and tactics used, as well as the motivating factors, to arrive at a particular conflict stage or a decision. The theory is used to "describe, predict and explain human behaviour". It gives a description of how humans behave under different circumstances especially when they feel that their interests are threatened (Myerson, 1991: 1).

Its main assumption is that "players are rational". The theory asserts that the players are calculative and strategic in their approach and always go for what they believe in irrespective of what their opponents do. The perceived goal is regarded as worth fighting and dying for and is thus pursued at all costs (Turocy and von Strengel, 8/10/2001: 7).

The theory argues that the players are motivated by the value they seek to win. It argues that before engaging in confrontational acts people calculate the benefits and the costs of their actions and only act when the chances of winning are high. The actors are of the view that their actions are in a good cause and beneficial to the society at large. For instance, the Islamist insurgency in Somalia seeks to defend Islam, which the majority of the population follow (Nyatepe-Coo, 2004).

The theory argues that actors in a conflict perceive their situation as a "zero-sum game" where the winner takes all, and those who lost suffer. The perceived goal is seen as attainable to only one group. In this instance sharing and compromise are not considered as beneficial, strategic or well-calculated options (Myerson, 1991: 1).

The theory argues that a power struggle is characterised by countermeasures. Everyone wants to dominate, have an outright majority in decision-making and ultimately take control. As such, all actors act to maximize their chances of winning, and strive to protect their perceived interests at all costs. Extreme measures are employed in order to weaken the opponents, lobby support or gain prestige (Turocy and von Strengel, 8/10/2001: 8).

The relevance of game theory to the study is that it complements the primordialist and instrumentalist views in examining the Somali problems. The game theory is best for analysing the problem the research seeks to address in the area of power struggle, in that it

explains why people act the way they do. It provides answers as to what propels people to take the decisions they take and what are they going to gain. The theory asserts that parties to conflict utilise calculative measures to achieve their objectives resulting in instability. These theories will give the utmost description of the situation and explain the causes of instability in the country and will also contribute to mapping a way forward.

## CHAPTER THREE

### SOMALIA POST 1991

#### 3.1. The Aftermath of the Somali Crisis

The Somali crisis badly affected the way the country is governed. The result has been that bad governance characterised the political spectrum as the control of the state became a central issue. The practice of democracy, which includes inclusivity, was compromised and this affected the ability of government (TNG/TFG) to make and implement sound policies. The capacity and influence of government became limited as many clans maintained some kind of self-governance/autonomy apart from the national government. As such the government post-1991 was never able to provide good governance.

On that note, Nyambura (2011: 181) observes that since 1991 it has been very difficult to restore and maintain law and order. He argues that “the emergence of warlords and other interest groups who are thirsty for power; the destruction of major institutions like courts of justice, and social disconnection are the factors that escalated and prolonged the crisis”.

According to UNDP (1994) good governance encapsulates the following principles inter-alia; transparency, accountability, participation as well as effectiveness and equity. It makes certain that key functions such as social, political and economic priorities include the aspirations and interests of all people based on consensus.

On the political front, good governance makes provision for a democratic political system which will provide for much-needed balance. Balance entails a fair and inclusive government. It prevents and avoids a totalitarian system which often results in poor governance. This balance is responsible for the provision of many rights and freedoms such as freedom of speech, civil rights and a free press, among others. Such provisions preserve a democratic system, protect and uphold democratic rights enshrined in a democratic constitution and thus make it very stable (Graham et al, 2003: 3-5).

In societies dominated by ethnic rivalries fair and inclusive government is essential; Thompson (2010: 66) argues that if there is unfair representation of ethnic groups in the state the disgruntled groups are more likely to rebel and challenge the regime. Under such circumstances the role of the state is usually reduced and will thus inevitably have to collaborate closely with ethnic groups concerned for stability. Rothchild (2010: 66) termed



this state-ethnic relationship as “hegemonial exchange”. Hegemonial exchange simply implies that the state does not have absolute powers over its citizens as they are under the jurisdiction of their group leaders. In order for the state to legitimise its authority over these distinct ethnic groups and enable it as an authoritative figure, it utilises resources as incentives to mobilise these groups. In turn, the ethnic groups relinquish and delegate some challenges to the state as an authoritative figure to resolve, and further anticipate benefiting from the state through resource injection to their regions (Thompson, 2010: 66).

In such societies, however, there are three major potential problems; (1) there will always be some difficulties (skill and will) in maintaining the balanced representation of ethnic groups, (2) another problem relates to the massive inefficiencies that pervade such societies and (3) finally the reality that this basis of government only provides a limited degree of representation for those in civil society (Thompson, 2010: 66).

Somalia became a country that is characterised by all of the above mentioned problems. Ethnicity plays a vital role in the society and is very influential in mobilising political support. The Somali society became completely fragmented. The Somali society witnessed a fierce contestation of state power, with power shifting from one group to another. The society was divided into districts and sub-districts in order to accommodate many groups that existed (Miti, 2010: 2). The outcome has been that Somalia became the most dangerous, corrupt and poor state as the situation deteriorated into “one of the world’s worst humanitarian and security crises”. Political stability was never achieved and politics and ethnicity became a quick way of accessing state resources (International Crisis Group Africa Report, 23/12/2008: 1).

### **3.1.1. The Implications of the Absence of an Effective Central Government in Somalia**

After the defeat of Barre in 1991 the country existed without a central government. The lack of central government meant that the country was left as a completely lawless zone; insecurity, inter-clan fighting and violence were prominent. It was a country where everybody did what they wanted and did not have to account to anyone. Since 1991 the country has been insecure because large parts of it are often entrenched in armed conflicts. There was no law and order. Everyone was a leader in their own right.

Somalia has since been declared a failed state. A well governed state is seen as a necessary prerequisite for peace, stability and security (Haldén, 11/2008: 10), however, the country has blatantly failed in this regard. Somalia has failed to protect its citizens and to secure lasting peace and security. The country has been caught up in many unfortunate circumstances since central government was toppled. Since then, the country has been experiencing inter-clan fighting which has come to characterise the Somali societal make-up as well as its politics. The New York Times (17/5/2012) reports that Somalia is ranked as the “world’s most poor, corrupt and violent country dominated by warring militias, bandits, warlords and pirates”. In 2012, tens of thousands in Somalia have died from famine, with countless others cut down in relentless combat.

Dave-Odigie (28/02/2011: 63) submits that after the collapse of government which was caused by opposing clan armed groups, consensus was not reached regarding by whom and how the country was to be governed. In these circumstances, the country was left in total chaos mainly because of the leadership vacuum.

Clan endeavours to gain control of the state resulted in a bloody civil war. The country lost so much due to the conflict; thousands of people were killed, others fled the country while millions were left homeless and poor. The standard of living became very low as businesses, schools, health care facilities and government buildings were shut down by the warring militias. Everything that used to be free such as education and health care had to be paid for. The militias used these unfortunate circumstances to make money for themselves. For instance, it was reported that the militias made checkpoints at roadblocks and ports to charge those who wished to use the road. They also kidnapped people to get ransom. Due to the poverty and hunger that plagued the country many different illegal money-making schemes were established. Allegedly passports, identity document, citizenship, small arms and other weapons were sold in the streets at a very low price (Winter, 18/11/2004).

The situation was better described by the International Crisis Group (03/12/2009) “Somalia was in a grave new security, political and humanitarian crisis. Thousands of civilians have died in the violence that has engulfed the country. The UN says that over one million have been displaced and up to 3.2 million need humanitarian assistance”.

### 3.1.2. Attempts at Establishing a Functioning and Efficient Government

After 1991 all the efforts that were made to promote peace and normalcy failed as they were met by fierce rejection from warlords and clan militias. The opponent's resisted expansion of central government control, which would have come with centralized authority, which they feared would threaten their interests and weaken the clan's prestige in national leadership. Without central authority the warlords enjoyed unlimited control and access to state resources (Haldén, 2008; 389). As a result both Transitional National Government (TNG), established in 2000 in Arta, and Transitional Federal Government (TFG), established in 2004 in Kenya, faced strong opposition from various groups in the country and operated under difficult and challenging conditions (Menkhaus, 2007; 359 & 363). Menkhaus also mentions that there have been 14 failed attempts to resuscitate the troubled state.

The first attempt to establish a central government was with TNG. The TNG was a product of the Arte peace talks held in Djibouti. Its president was Abdiqassim Salad Hassan. Its intended mission was to last for 3 years within which time a permanent government would have been erected through national elections. It was reported that the TNG did not enjoy sufficient support (financially and morally) required for its success. It was also alleged that the financial support it received was looted for private usage and as such it was never able to reach its set aims and objectives. It is reported that the TNG and Ethiopia had a poor relationship and therefore, Ethiopia started to finance the anti-TNG groups. Menkhaus observes that the TNG has failed to resuscitate the country, bring the Somali people together and create an environment necessary for stability. Two years after its inception, the TNG was severely divided, did not achieve any of its stated goals and was perceived to be aligned to the Hawiye sub-clan and thus being biased towards them (Menkhaus, 2003: 11).

Menkhaus further explains that the TNG was clan-based and dominated by groups associated with its president's clans. As such it failed to encapsulate and represent the interests of all Somali people and subsequently this led to its failure. The main opposition to TNG was the group called Somalia Reconciliation and Rehabilitation Council (SRRC) made up of a coalition of clans, factions and warlords. As the time went by the group was divided into two groups and this intensified the instability and divisions as the former members supported factions opposing each other which ultimately resulted in endemic political instability.

The second attempt was the establishment of TFG. Its president was Mr Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. TFG had a good relationship with Ethiopia. This relationship alienated it from most

of the Somali inhabitants. The result was that within the country its leadership and legitimacy was not taken seriously. Its leadership was repeatedly accused of corruption. Like the TNG, TFG was also characterised by divisive leadership. It was reported that the TFG was more reliant on foreign assistance. For instance, in 2010 its survival was dependent on the troops provided by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the international community and this angered the opposition groups which intensified the feud. Unlike TNG though, the TFG was allegedly not allowing much space for other political entities; it sought to take total control of the state ruthlessly and this further provoked the insurgents who then responded fiercely. This added to its flaws and failure (International Crisis Group, 21/02/2011: i).

### 3.1.3. Actors at Play:

- Domestic actors

The **Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC)** was an organization launched by Somali political groups and leaders. The council was established in 2001. Menkhaus asserts that the council was mainly made up of those who were not included in the TNG. “It mainly comprised clan-based factions and regional administrations”. This coalition was formed to create an alternative and powerful opposition to the TNG. It was closely linked to Ethiopia, although it was argued that Ethiopia did not directly influence their policies. The SRRC started off with the largest momentum and assumed 24 seats in the Leaders Committee. This placed it as a crucial player in influencing the peace talks (Menkhaus, 2003:12).

The **Group of Eight (G8)** was also established. The group was made up of political or militias leaders mainly from Hawiye clan family. The G8 was operated autonomously, with no links to either the TNG or Ethiopia. It was reported that the leaders had varying individual interests; however their common goal was to create sufficient support so as to reject any government arrangements that did not favour them (Menkhau, 2003:12).

**Islamist Groups;** as of September 2001 Islamism and terrorism have been carefully observed as the two were associated with each other. The Islamists groups are generally known for pursuing radical politics and for this reason they received scrutinized analysis. The most influential Islamist group was the Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiyya (AIAI) commonly known as the

Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The group was known for its strict Wahabist interpretation of Islam. Its main aim was to create an Islamic government. The AIAI was in intense conflict with Ethiopia. The two were at each other's throats. AIAI members were huge supporters of the TNG and this led Ethiopia to accuse TNG of being biased to AIAI (International Crisis Group, 2002: 13). Several other Islamist groups started to emerge. Al-Islah was one of the new groups. It was funded by the Gulf States to "build and operate Islamic schools, hospitals and other social services in Somalia". Its objective was to secure the Islamic culture by indoctrinating the youth at an early stage. It was different from the AIAI in that it was not as radical and did not take any interest in the state politics (Tedesse, 2002: 13). Al Shabab was established in 2006. It became the most powerful insurgent. The group reported that it was a member of the international terrorist cell, Al-Qaeda and thus claimed responsibility for many deaths and violent attacks in the country (Botha, 2010: 15).

As of 2006 the main actors in the Somali conflict were the Islamist extremist militias comprised of Al-Shaabab, Hizb Al-Islam, Ahlu Sunna Waljamaca, clan militias mainly from the major Hawiye sub-clan, and the TFG leaders and supporters. The Shabaab and Hizb Al-Islam were in a joint operation and their main goal was to turn Somalia into an Islamist state governed by Sharia and to overthrow the TFG (Reuters, 29/05/2009). The TFG and Ahlu Sunna Waljamaca worked together and their main objective was to preserve the government.

**Business Community;** these actors are considered to be the most powerful in that they influence decisions. The business community pour funding into their preferred candidates and their decisions. The problem with business is that their owners have varying interests. What makes them happy at that point in time is what is actually decided on. Since mid-1990s they have been actively involved in Somali politics as "real power brokers". The financial constraints enabled the politicians to think autonomously and implement the decisions that they see fit to address the Somali political crisis, but they have to consult with their funders. If the decision threatens the interests of the business they were scrapped. It is also alleged that the TNG enjoyed support of several businessmen (Marchal, 1996: 14).

**External actors;** due to the prolonged armed conflict and humanitarian crisis that characterised the country after 1991, Somalia has seen a number of external actors intervening in its problems. While some were regarded as interference in the internal affairs of the state, some played a crucial role in the reduction and partial eradication of the crisis.

Menkhaus (2002: 15) reminds us that the Somali catastrophe was also influenced by the regional realities as well as the internal factors of the neighbouring states. These factors include the rivalries between Somalia and Ethiopia; Eritrea and Somalia; Egypt and the Arab states. Different actors had different interests and this affected the outcome of their engagements in the Somali conflict.

### 3.1.4. Security Situation

- Local conflicts



The country is severely divided and currently consists of three regions; namely Somaliland, Puntland and South-Central Somalia. Somaliland and Puntland declared themselves autonomous in 1991 and 1998 respectively. Even though they have not been internationally recognised, they have shown some relative achievements in the areas of peace, security and development, and clans play a minimal role in governance (Gundel, 15/05/2009; 5). South-Central Somalia was overrun by chronic violent conflicts and the widespread insecurity made life unpleasant and unpredictable.

The situation was completely out of hand as the region is clan-based. It is dominated by intense clan rivalry and clan politics (Miti, June 2010; 2). The security situation is volatile, dire and unpredictable (Gundel, 15/05/2009; 5). Warlords, clan militias and Islamist insurgents play a pivotal role in making the establishment of a stable government impossible. The Shabaab controls much of the southern and central parts. Both Al-shabaab and Hizb Al-Islam view President Sharif Ahmed as a puppet of foreign interests; therefore, they undermine and reject his authority. This has resulted in an enormous contestation of power between the internationally recognized national government (TFG) and the Islamist insurgents. These insurgents have taken over the responsibility of the government in most of the territories. This intensifies power struggles, and the repercussion is that corruption, piracy, humanitarian and security crises have been growing at an alarming rate (Polity IV Country Report, 2010; 4).

According to Nyambura (2011: 190) Somalia's economy is mainly based on the agricultural sector. Competition for land dominates inter-clan disputes as each strives to secure its own survival. In the light of the scarce and limited resources piracy has become popular as an alternative means for survival. For many poor Somali citizens piracy has been considered the

most effective tool to guarantee survival. It has also been considered as the main contributor to instability and has spread across the region.

Somali society became completely fragmented. Over the years several groups, alliances and factions were formed. Somali society witnessed fierce contestation of state power with power shifting from one group to the other. Society was divided into districts and sub districts in order to accommodate the many groups that existed (Miti, 2010: 2).

- Violence

The collapse of government led to a radical increase in violent conflicts. There were “localised communal clashes over resources, political clashes over control of the state and its resources, regional involvement (sometimes through proxies) and violence fuelled by global ideologies”. Localised rivalries remained constant as each had set goals and interests that could not be compromised. The conflict completely destroyed the Somali state (both its physical and economic structure); it was reported that 1.36 million people are internally displaced and 45% of the population are living in poverty, and that the living standards are also very poor (UNDP, 2001). World Bank (1990) reported that the employment rate is 60%. Woman and children remained the most affected. This group was the most vulnerable as rates of rape, slavery and gender based violence were high. The humanitarian crisis had reached its apex and the main contributors were the effects of floods, drought and conflict that plagued the country for years.

The security situation in the Mogadishu area was a worrying phenomenon. It was unpredictable in the sense that nobody knew what tomorrow would bring. One day the violence subsides; the other day it escalates tremendously. Mogadishu was hell on earth. People’s suffering became normal. The country was in a total state of collapse (Menkhaus, 2003: ii).

### **3.1.5. Political Progress**

The effectiveness of the central government (TFG) has always been a subject of discussion. Many observers found that its institutions and mode of governance were not adequate to deal with the situations that characterised the country at the time. It was alleged that the leaders

within the TFG did not see eye-to-eye on many things as they failed to have coherent policies. Lack of sufficient resources also added to the problem as it became an obstacle to the effective functioning of the government. Transparency, accountability and equity were non-existent in all Somali governments, hence the continuing rebellion. Many argue that the governments lacked the ability to deliver on their aims and objectives; they were all talk and no action (International Expert Group, 2008:11).

Political participation along ethnic lines has proved to be the main obstacle in achieving integration and political stability. Political struggle, therefore, came to define Somali politics. The government in place (TFG) was forced to defend its authority and legitimacy prior to carrying out its mandate of serving the people. This undermined its existence as well as its effectiveness as the vanguard of the interests of the general populace (International Crisis Group, 23/12/2008; 7). Moreover, in contrast to the mandate to promote social cohesion and stability TFG has failed to “create a broad-based government and became non-functional, existing only in name”. TGF has shown a failure to challenge the power base of warlords and the Islamic insurgents. It has never been able to control areas other than Mogadishu (Menkhaus, 2007; 375).

New York Times (17/5/2012) reports that in August 2011 the Shabab left several areas they have been occupying unattended. This gave the government (TFG) a great opportunity to reclaim these areas and exercise their legitimacy as a national government; however, the government failed in this regard. New York Times cites that the government was “too weak, corrupt, divided and disorganised to mount a claim beyond Mogadishu, the capital”. This opportunity was then utilised by the warlords, Islamist and proxy forces armed by foreign governments who later gained control of these areas.

### **3.1.6. Economic Growth and Development**

In the academic spectrum the Somali predicaments have aroused various opinions. Theorists presented varying assumptions. In the unusual circumstance of a country lacking a government many people cracked their brains trying to predict the future as well as the implication of state collapse for the already poor Somali people and their fragmented state. According to Powell et al (30/11/2006: 1) theorists such as Hobbes (1951) and Buchanan (1975) present that “without a government society would plunge into war of all against all,

the result of which would be life that is nasty, brutish and short". They suggest that in the absence of central authority people will mistreat, kill, fight, deceive, torture and harass each other. According to these theorists it would be an undesirable society to live in, characterised by anarchy. Others (Rothbard 1973 and Friedman 1989) however, argue that "a stateless anarcho-capitalist society could provide essential public goods and maintain a high standard of living". These schools of thought presents that a stateless society can function very well and efficiently address the needs of the people.

Powell et al (30/11.2006: 1) maintain that the situation in Somalia did not emulate any of the predicted circumstances. They argue that initially there were minimal disruptive tendencies, followed by relative peace. According to them things changed for the better; the standard of living improved, there was unexpected economic growth. Pre-1991 was characterised by a dwindling economy with poor economic policies and increased debt. For example "in 1989 the consolidated non-financial public sector deficit was 37% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP); by 1990 the total outstanding foreign debt was 277 % of GDP (Mubarak 1997: 1). The population received few benefits from this spending. About 90% of spending was on defence and administration while spending on social services fell to less than 1 % of GDP during 1988-1989" (Mubarak 1997: 1).

Mubarak (1997: 6) submits that the inability of government to provide goods and services created space for the informal black market to take an active part in the control and running of the economy. The informal market assumed the national government's responsibility of creating jobs, and funding public services such as providing schools and health care. In the presence of the "highly" oppressive, politicised and exclusive government of Barre the informal sector was already stronger and more efficient. Many people including the private sector were already relying on it for survival. In addition the agricultural sector also contributed to the running of the economy. The pastoralists created jobs and many opportunities for the mainly rural Somali people and thus contributed massively to the GDP. This allowed people to be self-reliant and independent from the national government.

Mubarak (1997: 8) admits that the collapse of government has badly affected the economy and as such impacted negatively on the standard of living. On that note he finds that the economy improved enormously as relative peace was achieved. Moreover, Mubarak submits that the economy was more hurt by the civil war and drought than the collapse of state institutions. His analysis shows that the economic welfare was more prosperous in the

stateless society than in “repressive institutions and improper policies of Barre’s government”.

In the table below Leeson (2006; 16) provides a comparison of the Somali living standards with other Sub-Saharan countries that had national government at the time. In his analysis it shows that in most cases the country was performing better than its counterparts which were considered safe and stable. He further argue that Somalia’s conditions and performances might not be acceptable by Western standards, however it was way better than other African countries.

Somali living standards		Rank among 42 Sub-Saharan countries		
year	2005	2005	1990	1985
Death rate (per 1000)	17	17	37	30
Infant mortality (per 1000)	33	38	32 <sup>b</sup>	32
Life expectancy	47	18	37	34
Child mortality (% of children underweight)	26	20 <sup>a</sup>	-	-
Telephone-main lines per 1000 people	25	8	29 <sup>b</sup>	33
Mobile cellular phones per 1000 people	63	16	-	-
Internet users per 1000 people	25	11	-	-
Households with television (TV) (% households)	8	27 <sup>c</sup>	-	-
Immunization, DPT (% children 12-23 months)	30	41	38 <sup>d</sup>	21 <sup>e</sup>
Immunization, measles (% children 12-23 months)	40	42	38 <sup>d</sup>	19 <sup>f</sup>

Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access)	26	24	-	-
Improved water source (% of population with access)	26	41	-	-
Tuberculosis (per 100,000 people)	411	31	40	-

The alphabets indicate a tie for the given rank with at least one other country

- a. Ranking out of 36
- b. Ranking out of 41
- c. Ranking out of 40
- d. Ranking out of 39
- e. Ranking out of 37
- f. Ranking out of 36

According to the Western standards, the Somali life expectancy levels dropped significantly. Since 1991 the UNDP Global Human Development Index list did not include the Somali state due to persistent and uncontrollable irregularities. When the country finally got listed in 1996 it was ranked as 172 out of 174 least developed countries globally. As such the UNDP classified it as a highly indebted poor country, least developed country and low income country under stress; with 73.4% living in general poverty and 43.2% in extreme poverty (DFID, 2011: 7(60)).

Also, Somalia's key indicators of human development including life expectancy, per capita income, malnutrition and infant mortality ranked as the poorest. The lives of the Somali people were in danger due to the living standards post-1991. The simple way to define the state of Somalia was that it was in a condition of lawlessness or political disorder brought about by the absence of governmental authority. South Central Somalia was anarchic in all senses of the word (UNDP, 2003 and UNDP 2001: 1).

### 3.1.7. Poverty

Poverty was regular and existed among all aspects of life and thus it became very difficult to get rid of in the country. Factors that escalated the poverty rate included severe lack of resources, information, opportunities and access to facilities that would allow citizens to better their lives. There was no government to provide basic services and this also served as a major setback in efforts to eradicate poverty. The basic needs of the people were not attended

to. Parents had no options as they were forced to watch their children suffering, getting sick and dying because of hunger, poor sanitation and rampant violence. Mortality rate increased due to uncontrollable malnutrition (Forum Syd, 2008: 7(60)).

Survival became the central issue. With no other options, criminality became the main source of income. Many people started to join the armies in order to get medical attention, food and protection. The military was the only resort they had to guarantee regular meals and medical care. In the height of increased instability many people lost their homes, businesses, land, and properties and this further multiplied the poverty phenomenon. Millions fled the country in search of greener pastures while thousands who remained in the country were left stranded and in extremely difficult conditions (Forum Syd, 2008: 7(60)).

Somalia remained highly dependent on foreign aid. Citizens could not fend for themselves. Many people, especially children were badly affected by the unbearable living conditions they were exposed to. Many died from hunger. Aid organizations, particularly UN-agencies took pity on them. They provided citizens with basic needs such as health care, water, food, education, sanitation and other necessary means for survival (Forum Syd, 2008: 7(61)).

The security situation served as a hindrance for aid agencies to reach the needy. The aid personnel were threatened by the armed militias. It became very difficult to carry out their prescribed job. Menkhaus argues that the country “remained a dangerous, difficult, and generally non-permissive environment for international aid agencies”. However, as the violence subsided in the mid-2003 the agencies were able to work in a safe environment in a number of areas (Menkhaus, 2003: ii). Menkhaus (2003: 1) observes that the humanitarian relief dispatched to Somalia was one of the biggest to ever operate in any country in the post-cold-war era. However, rampant instability, armed conflict and disorder that dominated the Somali state drove it away. The UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) operated in Somalia from 1993 until 1995. Reportedly, the operation became caught up in the conflict and thus the donors saw it fit to disengage. As the result after 1995 intervention in Somalia was minimal and it was mainly characterised by diplomacy which also was faced with many challenges.

### **3.1.8. Crime and Corruption**

- War Crimes

Prolonged violence resulted in massive human rights violations as many atrocious acts were committed in order to secure clan interests. Somalia was ranked as having one of the worst human rights abuses in the world in post-cold war era. By the early 1990's this phenomenon was at its highest point. Thousands of Somalis died in horrifying incidents of clashes between factions and militias. The Isma'il Jimale Human Rights Centre, for example, "documented 530 civilian deaths in armed conflicts between July 2002 and June 2003" (UN Integrated Regional Information Network, 2003: 31). Likewise, intra-factional fighting in Baidoa in mid-2002 claimed the lives of over 100 people, wounding 200 more (UN Commission on Human Rights, 2003: 31).

- Destruction of Property

Ethnic cleansing was used as a tool to eliminate opposition. This was done in the sense that any means necessary was applied to drive the rivals away. Factions intentionally destroyed their enemies' properties and expropriated their land. It was reported that properties were often burned or demolished. The businesses were looted and this was a way to demoralise the owners. The greatest property destruction occurred during the clash between Aulihan and Bartirre clans in 2003 where the entire villages were burned. These incidents contributed greatly to insecurity and malnutrition as people were left in hideous conditions; this constituted intentional displacement (Menkhaus, 2003: 32).

- Human Trafficking and Smuggling and Arms Trade (SALW)

The borders were not regulated. There was free unprecedented movement of goods and services. Women and children were trafficked and sold to work as slaves or sex workers. Getting things and people in and out of Somalia was very easy. Warlords and clan militias saw this as an opportunity to make money. Weapons, drugs, money, people were smuggled into the country without government's consent. This contributed immensely to the state of disturbance, confusion and uncertainty. It is for this reason that Somalia was considered to be an epicentre of terrorism, particularly accused of accommodating Al-Qaeda. The Somali security situation became a nightmare for neighbouring countries, the African continent and the international community (UNDP, 2008: 21-22).

- Illegal Occupation.

Somalia was turned into an anarchic state whose citizens divided and shared it among themselves like a pie. Important sectors of the state were illegally occupied and controlled by

militias and warlords. It was reported that they were using this occupation to oppress other citizens; ordinary citizens were forced to work for the militias for a very low wage (Menkhaus, 2003: 32).

- Child Soldiering

According to Human Rights Watch (30/01/2003) boys from the age of 12 were recruited to join the armies by armed militias. However, it was also noted that the UN Security Council passed a resolution in an endeavour to halt this exposure of children to horrific and traumatising incidents.

- Impunity

The actors who harassed and violated the rights of other citizens were never punished. They seemed above the law and everything they did was considered as justifiable by their commanders and local authorities, who had vested interests in the situation (US Department of State, 31/03/2003).

- Piracy



In post-1991 piracy has become a major issue in Somalia. It is regarded as one of the major organized crimes threatening the security of the state as well as the region. The pirates became known for holding people hostage and demanding absurd sums of money as ransom. International society has also fallen victims. The numbers of the perpetrators have been increasing yearly. The operations have become more systematic. It has been reported that piracy has affected business badly as it hindered trade exports and this also caused disruptions in neighbouring countries. It has also affected the humanitarian relief because many necessities were transported by sea. In all this the disturbing feature has been that TFG leaders were accused of being the primary beneficiaries of piracy (International Expect Group, 2008: 14, 29-31).

### 3.1.9. Humanitarian Situation

Frequent attacks on the civilian population remained a constant disturbing aspect of the instability in Somalia. The offences were characterised by arbitrary arrests, detention of human rights defenders, killings of journalists and aid personnel, and gender-based violence.

Rapes and kidnappings dominated the social spectrum. It was reported that the intense fighting between the TFG and the insurgent groups has resulted in serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law (International Expert Group, 2008: 10).

### 3.1.10. **Intervention**

The United States (US) led the intervention programmes in Somalia by providing a peacekeeping force in December 1992. The US played a significant role in initiating efforts to bring peace and security to Somalia. In December 1992, under the Bush administration, the US provided a peacekeeping force which was tasked with protecting the aid personnel who took care of the famine victims (Menkhaus and Ortmyer, 1995: 5). The UN joined with the United Nations Task Force on Somalia (UNITAF) which was its first peacekeeping attempt. The operation consisted of 30,000 peacekeeping troops. It was reported that the forces succeeded in addressing the famine. In May 1993 the UN launched the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). The operation was different from UNITAF in that its scope of operation was much broader and with bigger responsibilities. Its mandate included to “promote reconciliation and the rebuilding of a central government” (Bensahel, 2003: 5).

The mandate of the UNOSOM placed it as a threat to the power of the warlords. The efforts to rebuild the country were considered a massive hindrance to the interests of these warlords and their sub-clans. As such they did not trust or approve the UN’s intervention. One of the warlords, General Aideed began to campaign against the UN operation. The UN also started to target him and his militias. The violent confrontation between the two took place and left “24 Pakistani soldiers dead and over 60 injured”. The gloves were off between the UN and General Aideed. As the rift grew, the General’s clan-family got involved and the violence escalated. On 3 October 1993 the rivalry reached its apex and “17 US army rangers and hundreds of Somalis were killed”. The UN retracted the operation until March 1995 and when it finally started to operate it had already lost control on the ground. As a result of that the UN vacated the country and its mission was never realised (Menkhaus, 2003: 5).

Other external actors such as Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, African Union (AU) and Intergovernmental Development (IGAD) also took part in attempts to help Somali people find a common ground; however, their initiatives have not produced the desired outcomes. Miti (2010; 3) argues that their endeavours have aggravated the situation as some actors had

vested interests in the outcome. The United States, for example, has classified Somalia as one of the African countries associated with Al-Qaeda. It therefore went there as part of its programme of war-on-terror. It mobilized neighbouring countries against Somalia in the fight to eliminate terrorism, authorised the use of force and offered incentives to Somali warlords to hunt suspected terrorists. Other Islamist militias have interpreted the US war on terror as a war against Islam and the outcome has been intensified violence and suffering. Opponents to external actors regard their involvement as interference in internal matters of the state and fiercely reject it (Miti, 2010; 3-4).

## CHAPTER FOUR

### FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 4.1. Findings of the Study

This chapter highlights and interprets the findings drawn from previous chapters. It represents what the researcher has gathered while analysing the information regarding the problems in Somalia. The findings are as follows:

The underlying reason for the lack of central government in Somalia is ethnicity. The manipulation of ethnicity became the major issue that threatened the security of the Somali state. Ethnicity was exploited through the use of clans for political objectives. Somali leaders became opportunists and utilised their ethnic differences to cling onto political power and to access state resources. Due to the practice of identity politics there was unequal treatment among clan-families and this polarised Somali politics. This inevitably caused conflict among the Somali people and led the state into a complete collapse.

On the surface the conflict appeared to be a squabble between the national government (TNG/TFG) and the Islamic insurgents. The government sought to represent the interests of the poor by trying to restore law and order. Insurgents were said to be saving Somalia from external dominance and control and also to protect the Islamic religion. However, in reality the crisis was about the attainment of power. Everyone wanted to ascend to a powerful position and take control of the state.

The Somali conflict has been characterised by clannism, warlordism and piracy over the years. However, the conflict has evolved to include elements of terrorism, with Islamist insurgents such as Al-Shabaab declaring their allegiance to Al-Qaeda (Hikum, 2011).

The root cause of the Somali crisis was conceived during the colonization era where the colonizers partitioned Somalia into five protectorates. Each protectorate was controlled by different colonial powers with varying tactics and objectives. Colonization had a detrimental impact on Somalia in that it sowed division among the country's inhabitants and its effects still characterise the country today. As the result the country is characterised by the manifestation of deep divisions resulting in fragmentation of Somali society along geographical lines.

The regimes that took over from the colonial reign capitalized on these social cleavages for their own benefit and this further marginalised the people from the national government. The politics of exclusion dominated the Somali political landscape. Power struggles became the dominant feature among the Somali people.

Somalia is a clan-based state. The involvement of the clan in Somali politics was formally introduced by the TNG with the 4.5 formulas. The formula set out to allocate an equal number of parliamentary seats to different clans and minority groups in the country.

Since the introduction of centrally controlled government there has been political intolerance in Somalia, especially among clan families. Each wanted control of the state and it did not matter at what cost it came. The politics of Somalia were marred by vicious and atrocious power struggles and resulted in instability in the country. The cost of this instability included massive loss of lives, human rights abuses, destruction of properties and a dwindling economy.

Different strategies and tactics have been employed to bring peace in the country. It is reported that there have been 14 attempts, however all of them failed. There are two reasons why these endeavours did not produce the desired outcomes; (1) most of them were planned outside the country and mostly led by external parties and (2) not all the parties to the conflict wanted peace as some were benefiting from the crisis-ridden situation.

In addition both national governments (TNG/TFG) were met with massive opposition. The insurgents questioned their loyalties and thus challenged their legitimacy. This undermined their effectiveness as well as their ability to carry out their duties. Both the TFG and the TNG did not receive sufficient support especially from the Somali people. This served as one of the many factors that consequently led to their failures and rejection.

Like many other post independence governments the TFG and TNG had their own shortcomings. First, both of them were marred by internal divisions within their leadership. Second, they lacked the will and capacity to challenge and eliminate rebellion on their own. Third, their leaders were implicated in corrupt activities and this cost them support and loyalty from the general populace. Lastly, they were very weak in implementing policies.

The TNG was mainly supported by the business community, who mostly cared only about their own interests. This means that decisions were made, not in the interests of the public but of business in order to maximize profit. The TNG came to be associated with its president's

clan-family; they controlled key government positions. As such it was not considered as an impartial arbiter and thus alienated other clan-families.

The TFG was mainly supported by the international community, IGAD, US and Ethiopia. Most of the opposition perceived its leaders to be the puppets of foreign actors. They therefore saw and treated it as a form of neo-colonialism, which they strongly opposed. For the insurgents TFG was seen as a way for the international community to penetrate into Somalia to undermine its sovereignty and their religion. They wanted to defend their territorial integrity and to protect Islamic values hence the establishment of many Islamic groups.

Ethiopia takes quite an interest in the internal matters of the Somali state. It was the first African country to intervene by providing troops to strengthen and secure the legitimacy of the TFG. It took it upon itself to fight the insurgents, a stance supported and financed by the US. However, the relationship and intervention is a worrying phenomenon because Ethiopia has vested interest in what goes on in Somalia. For instance, when the TNG did not see eye-to-eye with it, Ethiopia financed the anti-TNG groups to destabilize the country.

Good governance was compromised for narrow selfish gains. Transparency and inclusivity have always been an issue in Somali politics, and as such, the people fail to trust and identify with the government

Even though the collapse of government initially had a devastating impact on the economy of the country, the economy gradually started to perform much well than when the central government was in place. There was a huge improvement when compared to the situation pre-1991. The informal market played a vital role in maintaining the development of the economy.

Although the security situation in Somalia was considered to be an African nightmare, its living standards were much better than other Sub-Saharan countries that were stable and had central governments. However, the country's living standards were very poor and unacceptable.

The crime rate was at its highest. Everyone was focused on what they could do to survive.

Somalia is enormously reliant on external parties. For example, the life and survival of the TFG was mainly in the hands of the AMISOM. The TFG on its own failed to secure peace

and to establish itself outside Mogadishu. Since 1991 the Somali people failed to find common ground on how to govern their country. Warlords and clan militias played a crucial role in derailing peace processes. They even undermined efforts by fighting the foreign intervention.

As violence escalated the external parties had difficulties maintaining their impartiality and neutrality in the conflict. After a series of violent interactions between themselves and the insurgents they were forced to disengage from the country, without achieving their missions. The poor and the vulnerable were left to fend for themselves in the midst of poverty, hunger, violence and volatile security that characterised the country.

Ethiopia was given an ultimatum from the insurgents to stop the fighting. The UN left the country because it had lost control on the ground after taking a short break. The US was forced out because the insurgents were specifically targeting their personnel because they saw the US intervention as a fight against Islam. The intervention was therefore regarded as interference in the internal matters of the state.

#### **4.1.2. Discussion of the Findings**

The Somali problems are inherited from the country's political history. They continue to persist in everyday life. The ethnic factor characterised Somali society even before independence and became worse post-1960 as it led to violent conflict. The Somali people regard themselves as members of their respective clans first and then as Somali people. This means that clan identity is more important than nationality. This has become a vexed question and serves as a major obstacle to achieve the national solidarity.

Clan interest pitted Somali people against each other. Society became severely divided and resulted in three different regions existing within the country (South Central Somali, Puntland and Somaliland). Criminality, corruption, cronyism and inequality became very common.

The international community took an interest in the crisis and their endeavours did not succeed because they were not impartial arbiters to the conflict. In many attempts to establish a central government and to resuscitate the country it was found that the external actors assumed a more pro-active role than the Somali people. This enabled the Somali people to solve their problems themselves and as such made them dependent on foreign intervention,

which many opposed. This prolonged the crisis, deepened the divisions and thus escalated the conflict.

#### 4.2. Conclusion



In the 21<sup>st</sup> century it is still quite clear that ethnicity continues to be the major obstacle to the attainment of sustainable peace and development. Many African countries are suffering from deep rooted divisions that are manifesting themselves along ethnic lines. This therefore threatens the ability of governments and subsequently leads to maladministration and poor governance.

Even after the achievement of independence many African countries are still entrenched in protracted conflicts. Intra-state conflicts remain constant and disturbing features of the post cold war era and thus weaken and undermine the economic growth and development, which has devastating effects on the stability of these countries.

What transpired in Somalia is not in part or forms any different from what actually took place in other African countries like Sudan and Rwanda among others. The varying feature is that Somalia officially embraced the involvement of ethnicity in national politics through practising clan-based politics. Clannism is a phenomenon with which every Somali is involved. The problem is that the ethnic differences were defined in negative terms and this resulted in anarchy.

Different submissions and findings advanced in this study are indeed a true reflection of the problem statement and the hypotheses. Thus the hypothesis is validated because it has been proven to be true that; first, politicization of ethnicity in Somalia has been an impediment to the practice and provision of good governance and second, the political problems experienced in Somalia lie in the complicated nature of its clan-based politics.

All the research objectives were achieved. The objectives were tackled one at the time and divided among the chapters of the study. Chapter one investigated the root causes of ethnic politics in Somalia. Chapter two explored the role of ethnicity in the politics of Somalia and its effect in the state governance. Chapter three examined the challenges of the absence of an effective central government. Finally the last chapter (4) addressed the last objective which is to suggest solutions to the challenges of ethnic politics in Somalia. The objectives of the

study proven that indeed there is a connection between clan politics and instability, in that the relation led to maladministration, divisions, violence and other practices of undemocratic principles. The practice of clan politics was a hindrance to good governance.

#### **4.3. Recommendations**

The study recommends the following:

- Somalia is a clan based state. Clannism is what Somali people have in common; therefore it must be taken as advantage and form a basis for nation building and peaceful co-existence.
- National rebuilding should be everyone's concern. The Somali people have so much in common; they share a common religion, language and all believe in clannism. They must come up with ways to accommodate each other's needs and wants and prioritise the restoration of law and order in order to resuscitate the country.
- The importance of patriotism must be emphasized. Somali people must first regard themselves as Somalis before members of a particular clan family. This will assist in creating a sense of solidarity and one common identity. It will thus result in much needed unity, respect and trust among the Somali people and bring the sense of nationhood.
- There should be the introduction of separation of powers between traditional leaders and political leaders. Somali people must be taught to trust and believe in political leaders as much as they believe in their clan leaders. The allegiance must not be bought but rather earned through practising equal treatment in all spheres of society, including equal distribution of resources. Therefore it would not matter who becomes a president or which clan is powerful because people would know that there would not be any suppression or exclusion.
- Employment, especially in government positions must be done based on merit (level of education, experience, capacity and skill) rather than one's origin. This will curb the government's bias to a particular clan-family and it will also promote transparency and inclusiveness thus resulting in good governance. It could also serve as a remedy for corruption and nepotism.
- A commission of inquiry must be established. This will enable the Somali people to move on with their lives. There would not be any way forward if people are still angry

or do not know the truth of what really transpired and who to blame. This will also address the issue of vengeance.

- The government should work closely with the opposition parties. This would enable the government to advance and represent all the Somali people irrespective of their clan families. It should also consult with them from time to time on major decisions to strengthen democracy and their confidence in government.
- The Somali people should be given space to deal with their problems and differences the best way they know how and not impose solutions on them. They are the cause of the problem and should be left to fix things in the manner that will satisfy all parties. Also this could lessen the dependency syndrome the country is suffering from.
- Finally and most importantly national reconciliation should be the number one priority in solving the Somali problems. Reconciliation could be a key ingredient in combating the clan rivalries and tensions and thus addressing the fragmentation that has come to define the Somali state.

## REFERENCES

### Books

Besteman, C. 1993. **Public History in Private Knowledge: on Disputed History of Southern Somalia**. Duke University North California: Press Autumn.

Besteman, C. 1999. **Unrevealing Somalia: race, Violence and Legacy of Slavery** cited in Centre for Justice and Accountability. 2012. <http://www.cja.org/index.php> [Accessed 19/9/2012].

Cornell, S and Hartman, D. 1998. **Ethnicity and Race: Making Identities in a Changing World**. Pine Forge: Thousands Oaks.

Eriten, N. D. And Romine, J. 2008. **Instrumental and Symbolic Sources of Ethnic Conflict: Application to the Kurdish Conflict in Turkey**. Urban Champaigns: University of Illinois.

Hart, C. 1998. **Doing a Literature Review**. London: Sage.

Hoehne, M.V. 2010. **Political Representation in Somalia: Citizenship, Clannism and Territoriality**. Cited in Brudbury , M and Hearly, S (eds). **Whose Peace is it Anyway? Connecting Somali and International Peacemaking**. London: Conciliation Resources.

Horowitz, D. L. 2000. **Ethnic Groups in Conflict**. Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Horowitz, D. L. 1985. **Ethnic groups in Conflict**. Berkely: University of California press.

Kiras, J. D. 2008. **Terrorism and Globalization** cited in Baylis, J; Smith, S and Owens, P. (eds) **The Globalization of World Politics**. New York: Oxford University Press.

Laqueur, W. 19997. In Marjike, K. November 2002. **Towards a Theory of Terrorism**. Ireland: University of Limerick.

Lewis, I. M. 1961. **A Pastoral Democracy**. United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

MacCledon, G. January 2012. **Co-ethnicity and Democratic Governance: an Experiment With South African Politicians**. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Mamdani, M. 2001. **When Victims Becomes Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda**. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Metz, H. C. (eds) 1992. **Somalia: a Country Study** cited in Centre for Justice and Accountability. 2012. <http://www.cja.org/index.php> [Accessed 19/9/2012].

Nyatepe-Coo, A. 2004. **Economic Implications of Terroorism**. In Nyatepe-Coo, A and Zeisie-Vralsted, D (eds). **Understanding Terrorism**. Prentice Hall: Upper Saddle River, NJ.

Khan, A. A. 1987. In Marjike, K. November 2002. **Towards a Theory of Terrorism**. Ireland: University of Limerick.

Mills, G. 2010. **Why is Africa Poor and What Africans Can Do About it**. South Africa: Penguin Books.

Rothchild, D 2010. **State-ethnic Relations in Middle Africa** cited in Thompson, A. 2010. **An Introduction to African Politics**. New York: Routledge.

Smith, A. 2001. **Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History**. Cambridge: Polity.

Takasu, Y. 19/06/2000. **Towards Effective Cross-Sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalised World** Cited in Acharya, A. **Human Security** Cited in Baylis, J; Smith, S and Owens, P. **The Globalization of World Politics**. 2011. Oxford University Press: New York.

Thompson, A. 2010. **An Introduction to African Politics**. New York: Routledge.

Welman, C; Kruger, F and Michell, B. 2005. **Research Methodology**. Southern Africa: Oxford University Press.

Wolff, S. 2006. **Ethnic Conflict: a Global Perspective**. United Kingdom: Oxford University Press

## **Journals**

Bras, P. 1991. **Ethnicity and Nationalism**. Cited in Cederman, L. E ; Wimmer, A and Min, B. 1/1/2010. **Why do Ethnic groups rebel?** *World Politics* Vol 62, No.1

Brubaker, R. 1996. **Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe**. Cited in Cederman, L. E ; Wimmer, A and Min, B. 1/1/2010. **Why do Ethnic groups rebel?** *World Politics* Vol 62, No.1

Cederman, L. E; Wimmer, A and Min, B. 1/1/2010. **Why do Ethnic groups rebel?** *World Politics* Vol 62, No.1

Dave-odigie, C. P. 28/02/2011. **Somali Conflict: An African Indigenous Approach Towards a Peaceful Resolution**. *Journal of Law and Conflict Resolution*. Vol 3.No 4

Grindle, M.S. 2007. **Good Enough Government Revisited**. *Development Policy Review*. Vol 25. No 5.

Grindle, M. S. 2004. **Good Enough Government: Poverty Reduction and Reform in Developing Countries**. In Grindle, M.S. 2007. **Good enough Government Revisited**. *Development Policy Review*. Vol 25. No 5.

Graham, J; Amos, B and Plumptre, T. 2003. **Principles of Good Governance in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century**. *Institute on Governance*. Policy Brief no 15.

Hansen, S. J. 2003. **Warlords and Peace Strategies: the Case of Somalia**. *The Journal of Conflict Studies*. VolXXIII. No.2 .

Hechter, M. 2001. **Containing Nationalism**. Cited in Cederman, L. E ; Wimmer, A and Min, B. 1/1/2010. **Why do Ethnic groups rebel?** *World Politics* 62, No.1

Huntington, S. P. 1991. **The Third Wave: Democratization in the late Twentieth Century**. Cited in Ong'ayo. A.O. March 2008. **Power Sharing and the Implications for State Restructuring in Kenya**. *Third World Resurgence*. Issue no 211

Luling, V. 1997. **Come Back Somalia? Questioning a Collapsed State**. *Third World Quarterly*. Vol 18. No 2.

Mamdani, M. 20/1/2011. **The Intervention of the Indigène**. *London Review of Books*. Vol 33. No 2 pg 31-33. [hptt//www.LRB.com](http://www.LRB.com) [Accessed 5/7/1013].

Menkhaus, K. 2007. **The Crisis in Somalia: Tragedy in Five Acts**. *African Affairs*. Vol 106, No 204.

Mohamed, A. A. 1995. **Some Reflections on Current Somali State** cited in Luling, V. 1997. **Come Back Somalia? Questioning a Collapsed State.** *Third World Quarterly*. Vol 18. No 2

Nyambura, C. W. 2011. **The multifarious Interlinked Causes of Conflict in Somalia and The Way Forward.** *Journal of Language, Technology and Entrepreneurship in Africa*. Vol 3 No.1

Ong'ayo. A.O. March 2008. **Power Sharing and the Implications for State Restructuring in Kenya.** *Third World Resurgence*. Issue no 211

Osinubi, T. S and Osinubi, O. S. 2006. **Ethnic Conflict in Contemporary Africa: The Nigerian Experience.** *Journal of Social Sciences*. Vol112. No. 2

Southall, R. 1998. **Moi's Flawed Mandate: the Crisis Continue in Kenya.** Cited in Ong'ayo. A.O. March 2008. **Power Sharing and the Implications for State Restructuring in Kenya.** *Third World Resurgence*. Issue No 211

Spilker, D. 2008. **Somalia on the Horn of Africa.** In Stifun, H. B. **Somalia: Current Conflicts and New Chances for State Building.** *Heinrich Böll Fondation*. Vol 6.

Stearns, J. 3/2/2011. Cited in *London Review Books*. Vol 33. No 3. <http://www.LRB.com> [Accessed 5/7/2013].

Tutu, O. O. 2004. **Traditional Systems of Government and Modern State.** Cited in Ong'ayo. A.O. March 2008. **Power Sharing and the Implications for State Restructuring in Kenya.** *Third World Resurgence*. Issue no 211

UNDP. 1994. **Governance Foe Sustainable Development.** Cited in Weiss, T. G. 2000. **Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance: Conceptual and Actual Challenges.** *Third world Quarterly*. Vol 21. No 3.



#### **Official Reports, Research and Presentations, Papers and Magazine articles**

Ahmed, I. I and Green, R. H. 1999. **The Heritage of war and State collapse in Somalia and Somaliland: Local Level Effects, External Intervention and Reconstruction.** Cited in Centre for Justice and Accountability. 2012. <http://www.cja.org/index.php> [Accessed 19/9/2012].

Ansems, A. 2007. **Somalia: Starting from Scratch on the Long and Winding Road to Peace and Democracy.** South Africa: Stellenbosch University. (unpublished).

Bensahel, N. 2003. Humanitarian Relief and Nation Building in Somalia in Menkhaus, K. August 2003. **Somalia: A Situation Analysis and Trend Assessment.** A Written Report Commissioned for Refugees, Protect Information Section (PIS/DIP).

Botha, A. 2010. Who's Who in the Somali Quagmire? Cited in The African.Org Issue 9

Bratton, M. 2005. **Building Democracies's Weak States.** Cited in Ansems, A. 2007. **Somalia: Starting from Scratch on the Long and Winding Road to Peace and Democracy.** South Africa: Stellenbosch University. (unpublished).

DFID. June 2012. **Somalia Operation Plan 2011-2015**

[https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/67414/somalia-2011.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67414/somalia-2011.pdf) [Accessed 03/03/2013].

Forum Syd. January 2008. **Somalia: Country Analysis.**

[http://www.forumsyd.org/upload/Delade\\_dokument/Omv%C3%A4rldsanalyser/somalia\\_land\\_analys\\_080206.pdf](http://www.forumsyd.org/upload/Delade_dokument/Omv%C3%A4rldsanalyser/somalia_land_analys_080206.pdf) [Accessed 6/2/2013].

Gundel, J. 15/5/2009. **Clans in Somalia. Australian.** Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation(ACCORD).

Gundel, J. November 2006. **The Predicament of the 'Oday', the Role of Traditional Structures in Security, Rights, Laws and Development in Somalia** cited in Gundel, J. 15/5/2009. **Clans in Somalia.** ACCORD.

Handén, P. November 2008. **Somalia: Failed State or Nascent States System?** FOI Somalia paper: Report 1. Swedish Defence Research Agency.

Hansch, S et al. August 1994. **Excess Mortality and the Impact of Health Interventions in the Somalia Humanitarian Emergency** cited in Menkhaus, K. November 2000. **Somalia: a Situation Analysis.** Centre for Documentation and Research, UNHCR. paper no 07/2000.

Hikam, A. M. January 2011. **An Exploratory Study on the Somali Immigrant's Involvement in the Informal Economy of Nelson Mandela Bay.** MA in Development Studies: Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University. (unpublished)

Human Rights Watch. 30/01/2002. **UN Spotlights Child Soldiers** in Menkhaus, K. August 2003. **Somalia: A Situation Analysis and Trend Assessment**. A Written Report Commissioned for Refugees, Protect Information Section (PIS/DIP).

International Crisis Group. 2002. **Somalia: Countering Terrorism** in Menkhaus, K. August 2003. **Somalia: A Situation Analysis and Trend Assessment**. A Written Report Commissioned for Refugees, Protect Information Section (PIS/DIP).

International Crisis Group. 21/02/2011. **Somalia: The Transitional Government on Life Support**. *Africa Report* No. 170

International Expert Group. 2008. **Piracy of the Somali Coast**. Workshop Commissioned by the Special Representative of General Secretariat of the UN to Somalia. Nairobi 10-21 November.

Kauffmann, D and Kraay, A. (accessed 20/3/2012). **Governance Indicators; Where Are We, Where We Should be Going?** The World Bank: Washington DC. Policy Research Working Paper No 4370.

Landau, L.B and Gindrey, V. 27/10/2008. **Gauteng 2055 Trend Paper: population and Migration**. University of the Witwatersrand. <http://migration.org.za> [Accessed 18/08/2012].

Lange, M. 2001. Welcoming remarks in Politics of Identity and Exclusion in Africa: From Direct Confrontation to Peaceful Cooperation. Presented in 25-26 July 2001, Senate hall: University of Pretoria

Lewis, I. M. 1961. **A Pastoral Democracy: a Study of Pastoralism and Politics Among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa** cited in Gundel, J. November 2006. **Clans in Somalia**. ACCORD.

Leeson, P. 2006. **Better Off Stateless: Somalia Before and After Government Collapse** in Powell, B; Ford, R and Nowrasten, A. 30/11/2006. **Somalia After State Collapse: Chaos or Improvements?** *The Independent Institute*. Working Paper no 64

Marchal, R. 1996. **The Post Civil War Somali Business Class** in Menkhaus, K. August 2003. **Somalia: A Situation Analysis and Trend Assessment**. A Written Report Commissioned for Refugees, Protect Information Section (PIS/DIP).

Menkhaus, K. 2003a. **Protracted State Collapse: A Rediagnosis, Review of African Political Economy**. Cited in World Bank. Jan 2005. **Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics**.

<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOMALIA/Resources/conflictinsomalia.pdf>

[Accessed 04/03.2013].

Menkaus, K. 2004a. **Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of terrorism**. Cited in World Bank. Jan 2005. **Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics**.

<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOMALIA/Resources/conflictinsomalia.pdf>

[Accessed 04/03.2013].

Menskhaus, K. November 2000. **Somalia: a Situation Analysis**. Centre for Documentation and Research, UNHCR paper no 07/2000.

Menkhaus, K. 2007. **The Crisis in Somalia: Tragedy in Five Acts**. *African Affairs*. Vol 106, No 204.

Menkhaus, K. August 2003. **Somalia: A Situation Analysis and Trend Assessment**. A Written Report Commissioned for Refugees, Protect Information Section (PIS/DIP).

Menkhaus, K and Ortmayer, L. 1995. **Key Decisions in the Intervention** in Menkhaus, K. August 2003. **Somalia: A Situation Analysis and Trend Assessment**. A Written Report Commissioned for Refugees, Protect Information Section (PIS/DIP).

Mubarak, J. 1997. **The “Hidden Hand” Behind the Resilience of the Stateless Economy of Somalia** in Powell, B; Ford, R and Nowrasten, A. 30/11/2006. **Somalia After State Collapse: chaos or Improvements?** *The Independent Institute*. Working Paper no 64.

Ohlson, T. & Soderberg, M. 2003. **Friom the Intra-State to Democratic Peace in Weak States**. Cited in Ansems, A. 2007. **Somalia: Starting from Scratch on the Long and Winding Road to Peace and Democracy**. South Africa: Stellenbosch University. (Unpublished)

Ong’ayo. A.O. March 2008. **Power Sharing and the Implications for State Restructuring in Kenya**. *Third World Resurgence*. Issue no 211

Ong'ayo, A. O. 19/09/2008. Political Instability. Cited in Africa: Where the Problem Lies and Alternative Perspectives. Paper Presented at the Symposium 2008: "Africa: Een Continent op Drift". African Diaspora Policy Centre.

International Africa Crisis Group. 23/13/2008. **Somalia to Move Beyond the Failed State**. Africa Report no 147.

Nhlapo, W. 2001. Welcoming Address in Politics of Identity and Exclusion in Africa: From Direct Confrontation to Peaceful Cooperation. Presented in 25-26 July 2001. Senate hall: University of Pretoria

Miti, K. June 2010. **Somalia: The Endless Search for Peace**. AISA Policy Briefing No.25

Polity IV Country Report 2010: **Somalia**.

<http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Somalia2010.pdf> [accessed 03/05/2012].

Powell, B; Ford, R and Nowrasten, A. 30/11/2006. **Somalia After State Collapse: Chaos or Improvements?** *The Independent Institute Working Paper no 64*

Refugee Policy Group. 1994. **Hope Restored? Humanitarian Aid in Somalia 1990-1994** cited in Menskahus, K. November 2000. **Somalia: a Situation Analysis**. Centre for Documentantation and Research, UNHCR paper no 07/2000.

Rok. A. 1997. **Kenya's 1992 Election and its Implications for Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa** in Ansems, A. 2007. **Somalia: Starting from Scratch on the Long and Winding Road to Peace and Democracy**. South Africa: Stellenbosch University (Unpublished).

Ruiters, M. 2008. **Contested politics in Africa: the state, identity and resource**. IGD: Pretoria. Issue 77.

Sachs, M. 1988. **Worldmark Encyclopaedia of Nations**. Vol. 2 Pg 290.

Steward, F. 2009. **Religion versus ethnicity as a source of mobilization: are there differences?** MICRONON, Brighton. MICROCON Research Working Paper no. 18.

Tedesse, M. 2002. **Al-Ittihad: Political Islam and Black economy in Somalia** in Menkhaus, K. August 2003. **Somalia: A Situation Analysis and Trend Assessment**. A Written Report Commissioned for Refugees, Protect Information Section (PIS/DIP).

Uloso, M. M. 06/02/2012. **Clan Federalism Tears Somalia Apart**. Issue 615.

<http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/86132> [Accessed 20/02/2013].

US Department of State. 31/03/2003. **Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2002** in Menkhaus, K. August 2003. **Somalia: A Situation Analysis and Trend Assessment**. A Written Report Commissioned for Refugees, Protect Information Section (PIS/DIP).

UN Commission on Human Rights (n.d). Report of the Independent Expert; Mr Ghanim Alnajjar. *para* 16 in Menkhaus, K. August 2003. **Somalia: A Situation Analysis and Trend Assessment**. A Written Report Commissioned for Refugees, Protect Information Section (PIS/DIP).

United Nations Development Programme. 2003. **Human Development Report** in Menkhaus, K. August 2003. **Somalia: A Situation Analysis and Trend Assessment**. A Written Report Commissioned for Refugees, Protect Information Section (PIS/DIP).

UNDP. March 2008. **Project Proposal on Strengthening Protection and Security in South Central Somalia**. Cited in International Expert Group. 2008. **Piracy of the Somali Coast**. Workshop Commissioned by the Special Representative of General Secretariat of the UN to Somalia. Nairobi 10-21 November

UNDP. 2001. **Somali Human Development Report** in Menkhaus, K. August 2003. **Somalia: A Situation Analysis and Trend Assessment**. A Written Report Commissioned for Refugees, Protect Information Section (PIS/DIP).

UN Integrated Regional Information Network. July 2003. **Rights Group Reports Increase in Abuses** in Menkhaus, K. August 2003. **Somalia: A Situation Analysis and Trend Assessment**. A Written Report Commissioned for Refugees, Protect Information Section (PIS/DIP).

UN Somali Report. 31/01/2013: S/2013/69 <http://taleex.net/2013/02/12/un-somalia-report-31january-2013-s201369> [Accessed 04/03.2013].

World Bank. Jan 2005. **Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics**.

<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOMALIA/Resources/conflictinsomalia.pdf>  
[Accessed 04/03.2013].



World Bank. 1990. **World Development Report** in Powell, B; Ford, R and Nowrasten, A. 30/11/2006. **Somalia After State Collapse: Chaos or Improvements?** *The Independent Institute Working Paper no 64*

### **Internet Materials**

Al Arabiya News. 19/02/2012. **Somali Leaders Sign Deal for New Government Structure to Replace Transitional Body.** <http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/02/19/195584.html> [Accessed 20/02/2013].

Aljazeera. 03/08/2012. **Is Somalia Ready for Democracy?** <http://Aljazeera.com/programs/insidestory/2012/08/2012836825437207.html> [Accessed 19/08/2012].

Aljazeera. 01/08/2012. **Somali Assembly Endorses Draft Constitution.** <http://Ajazeera.com/news/africa/2012/08/201281101033529886.html> [Accessed 19/08/2012].

Baadiyow, O.A. 3/4/2012. **Traditional Power Sharing In Somalia: Implications and Future Prospects.** Hiiraan Online. [http://www.hiiraan.com/op4/2012/apr/23473/traditional\\_power\\_sharing\\_in\\_somalia\\_implications\\_and\\_future\\_prospects.aspx](http://www.hiiraan.com/op4/2012/apr/23473/traditional_power_sharing_in_somalia_implications_and_future_prospects.aspx) [Accessed 04/5/2012].

CIA. Accessed 19/02/2013. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html> [Accessed 20/02/2013].

Fatah, A. A. March 2002. **Somalia's Traditional Clan-Based System Holds Key to the Country's Future Stability.** Washington report on Middle East Affairs. Pg 59 <http://www.wrmea.org/wrmea-archives/237-washington-report-archives-2000-2005/march-2002/4054-somalias-traditional-clan-based-system-holds-key-to-the-countrys-future-stability.html> [Accessed 20/02/2013].

New York Times. 17/5/2012. **Amid Somalia's Suffering: Signs of Hope** <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/somalia/index.html> [Accessed 26/30/2012].

Reuters. 29/05/2009. **Fact Box-Main Actors in Somali Conflict** <http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/05/29/idUSLT226533> [Accessed 18/07/2012].

News African. 26/01/2009. **The Breton Woods Institutions and Africa**

<http://newsafricanghana.blogspot.com/2009/01/bretton-woods-institutions-and-africa.html>

[Accessed 15/07/2012]

Sahabi. 09/08/2012. **Somali Technical Selection Committee Extends Parliament Selection Deadline**

<http://sabahionline.com/en/GB/articles/hoa/articles/newsbriefs/2012/08/09/newsbrief-01>

[Accessed 27/08/2012].

Tay, N. 17/08/2012. **A Shot at Stability**. Mail and Guardian.

Times Live. **Somali Parliament Sworn in Despite Presidential Election Delay**

<http://www.timeslive.co.za/africa/2012/08/21/somali-parliament-sworn-in-despite-presidential-election-delay> [Accessed 27/08/2012].

Webster Online Dictionary. <http://Webster-dictionary.net/definition/family> [Accessed 30/07/20102].

Winter, J. 18/11/2004. **Living in Somalia's Anarchy**. BBC News

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4017147.stm> [Accessed 6/2/2013].

Xaragaga Online. 28/11/2012. **A New Dawn of Somali Political System Arrangement**.

<http://www.xargaga.net/index.php?name=News&file=article&sid=4716> [Accessed 20/02/2013].