



The value of Paul Ricoeur's philosophy for mining induced displacement and resettlement

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Mini dissertation accepted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree *Magister Philosophiae*
in Philosophy at the North-West University

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Graduation: April 2024

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Abstract:

The mining industry is frequently associated with decisions and activities that have enormous social and environmental consequences. One of the most negative effects of mining today, especially in South Africa but also globally, is the forcing of thousands of people to abandon their current places of residence to make space for mining activities. Resettlement is a change process where people are involuntarily relocated from one place to another. In most cases, it causes drastic environmental, social, political and economic changes. In the mining industry this activity is known as Mining Induced Displacement and Resettlement (MIDR). To forcefully remove people from their place of living, for example as was done during Apartheid for racist reasons, is something that has tremendous effect on people's dignity, social cohesion, livelihood, identity, and socio-economic circumstances. Much has been written on this topic, also in philosophy, but there is not much literature on MIDR, and also not from a philosophical perspective. This study aims to fill that lacuna by exploring and indicating the value of the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur for developing and practising a more just MIDR.

Keywords:

Mining induced displacement and resettlement, philosophical anthropology, negotiations, fragility of human beings, Paul Ricoeur, ethics.

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Introduction & Problem Statement

1 Background

Mining induced displacement and resettlement (MIDR) refers to specific mining activities (new or extensions of existing) that necessitate the 'displacement and resettlement' of people that are occupying the land where mining is planned. MIDR differs from Development-Induced Displacement and Resettlement (DIDR), which entails any type of development (roads, suburbs, dams, factories) that requires people to be moved. Terminski (2012) therefore considers mining-induced displacement and resettlement (MIDR) as a sub-category of development-induced displacement and resettlement (DIDR). With MIDR the reason for the displacement and resettlement of people is specifically mining activities and this has its unique characteristics and challenges. For example, it is normally a mining company that is involved, it is a long-term project, there are huge environmental consequences, and mining companies may change ownership, which can complicate relations with the displaced people, etc. (John R, and Owen, 2015) In 2016, the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) commissioned a detailed report titled *National Hearing on the Underlying Socio-economic Challenges of Mining-affected Communities in South Africa*. (SAHRC; 2016). The paper recounts the terrible stories and lived experiences of mine-affected communities, as well as how they deal with the issue of repeated displacements by mining firms, among other severe socioeconomic effects of the sector on their livelihoods.

Contemporary literature on DIDR (Cernea, De Wet, McDowell, Penz, Chakrabarti & Dhar) focuses mostly on the consequences of dam construction, irrigation projects, and even some artificial reservoirs. The literature on (MIDR) is rather limited compared to the umbrella DIDR cases. However, in both fields the deleterious effect of the resettlement *process* has not been adequately emphasised. The complexity of the negotiations in MIDR, with so many factors that play a role (e.g., culture, customs, language, religion, education, social embeddedness), is for example often not considered by mining companies (or deliberately ignored) to get the best financial deal as quickly as possible. In the end this has serious effects on the resettled people.

There are many other problems associated with the process and activity of MIDR, such as:

- The complexity of the negotiation process is ignored by the mining companies.
- There is not always sufficient participation from the communities that are displaced.

- Participants from the communities do not always understand the complex negotiations. They are often less educated while the mine company's lawyers put complex documents on the table; and language is also a problem.
- Negotiations is not taking place on a level playground, with hidden agendas by negotiators that outsmart local communities in the end.
- The humanity and dignity of local communities are not respected, and they are treated as financial means (or obstacles) only.

There are other problems associated with the process and activity of MIDR as well, as will be discussed later this study. These problems are related to mining activities as the human endeavour to access the natural resources, in general. The South African theologian, Thomas Resane (2015:1), said in this regard that while mining activities is described as the extraction of minerals that are the natural resources from the earth,

... it can have a negative impact on the various populations. A natural resource is not a human invention, as it is already divinely deposited in the earth. Developmental studies state that the universal debates regarding the natural resources revolve around the threatening depletion and exportation driven by first world economies at the expense of producing countries. On a wider scale, the private sector, which is often foreign, amasses the profit, which does not always improve the quality of life for the indigenous populations affected.

In literature on DIDR it is for example widely acknowledged that physical displacement, relocation, and resettlement are posing enormous risks to these project-affected peoples. For over four decades, scholars, campaigners and project affected people have sought to highlight the negative effects of DIDR. It is clear from this literature that new thinking about DIDR and MIDR is needed to ensure a more just process within the negotiation phase, and a more ethical practice and implementation of MIDR. It is on this point where this study will argue that we need to think from a different starting point about MIDR, namely a philosophical ethical point, and not from the traditional 'developmental' or 'economical' points.

It is important, though, to keep the difference between MIDR and DIDR in mind here. As mentioned above, DIDR is a well-established area of inquiry. Some of the best known DIDR scholarship includes the work of Scudder (1993, 2005), Cernea (1991, 1995, 1999, 2009), Mathur (2008 (with Cernea); 2013) and Theodore Downing (2002). They provided the foundations for the continued evolution and refinement of international standards and safeguards of DIDR, and subsequently MIDR as a branch of DIRD. However, the dominance of DIDR as a singular frame of reference limits the extent to

which the particularities of MIDR can be understood and accounted for. This limitation has pronounced and detrimental effects on contemporary resettlement practice in the global mining industry. Unless an industry-specific debate emerges, knowledge building on MIDR will remain generalised, diluted, and unfocused.

The current deficit in MIDR knowledge is two-fold. The first issue stems from what can be characterised as a 'disconnection' between DIDR literature and MIDR practice. DIDR scholars have undoubtedly proven displacement to be one of the most disruptive and perplexing of development dilemmas. Theodore Downing was the first to observe that the "rich vein of knowledge" from this established literature has barely been tapped by the mining industry. In his now two-decade old report, *Avoiding New Poverty: Mining Induced Displacement and Resettlement* (Downing, 2002:6), he aptly characterised drivers for the increased significance of MIDR rich mineral deposits being found in areas with relatively low land acquisition costs in areas of high population with poor definitions of land tenure and politically weak and powerless populations. According to Downing (2002:8), "no global survey has assessed the scale of MIDR", despite evidence suggesting significant numbers of mine displaced persons globally. The persistence of these knowledge gaps is a major barrier to improvements in MIDR policy and practice. Many problems associated with MIDR can be discerned. Some of the substantial listed problems "are 1. landlessness; 2. joblessness; 3. homelessness; 4. marginalisation; 5. increased morbidity and mortality; 6. educational losses; 7. food security issues; 8. loss of common property, and 9. social disarticulation and community breakdowns" (Cernea 2009:61).

It is, however, not only the 1) disconnection between DIDR literature and MIDR practice, and 2) the lack of global information on the scale of MIDR which are problematic, but also the trend that the process of MIDR is normally discussed within an

Economic Science framework (Mackenzie, *et al*, 2007:59) and not a philosophical or ethical one. The process of negotiations in the resettlement programme for example needs a better philosophical understanding to make it more just, equal, and inclusive. So, although DIDR resettlement questions would normally reside within Economic Sciences, there are many central issues involved that require a philosophical evaluation. For example, a philosophical approach may provide a much needed 'outside perspective' from the Economic Sciences, and thereby uniquely contribute to the deliberations therein. Put differently, the interpretation of life experience is a necessary complement to the clarification of concepts within MIDR, which philosophy can address best. Without interpretation, without taste and experience (of injustice with resettlement) can neither be our best

teacher nor our ever-seductive mistress. On this understanding of philosophy, the MIDR question and associated local participation becomes an appropriate subject matter of philosophy (Ramose, 2006).

To think differently, more ethically, and more justly about MIDR, I propose in this study that Paul Ricoeur's philosophy should be explored and engaged with. There are of course many other philosophers to consider in this regard, to name a few; Levinas and Adorno but in this study the focus will be on Ricoeur's philosophy. Furthermore, it is specifically Ricoeur's philosophical anthropology, his work on hermeneutics, and his ethics that I will argue can be of huge value for the practice of MIDR. These work of Ricoeur emphasised that human beings are capable beings who can act, speak, narrate, and be morally responsible. If this is considered, for example during the negotiations with MIDR, a more human interaction might take place with a more just outcome. In brief: Ricoeur's work helps one to understand the complexity of being human, that we cannot be reduced to financial 'objects' and that the mystery and dignity of humans should be respected (Schaafsma, 2014). This has all huge implications for MIDR in general, and for creating a more just MIDR process specifically.

2 Problem statement

In view of the preceding consideration, the research question to be investigated in this study is: *How can Paul Ricoeur's philosophy be of value in the process of Mining-Induced Displacement and Resettlement?* This 'value' is specifically not stipulated, because it can entail more than what is anticipated with the conceptualisation of this study. It also depends on where in the *process* of MIDR Ricoeur's philosophy is applied. For example, Ricoeur's work on hermeneutics would be valuable in the entire negotiation process; and his ethics would be valuable in the implementation phase. The hypothesis of this study is that Ricoeur's work will be of value for MIDR by making MIDR more just, more inclusive, more ethical, and more humane. The importance of this value of Ricoeur's work for MIDR will be emphasised as part of the conclusion of this study.

3 Research questions

To investigate the above-mentioned question, the study will try to answer the following question: How can Paul Ricoeur's philosophy be of value in the process of Mining-Induced Displacement and Resettlement? This question can be broken down into three sub-questions (and consequently three chapters), namely:

What is MIDR and why is it problematic?

What are the main and relevant aspects of Paul Ricoeur's philosophy that might be of value to MIDR?

How can Paul Ricoeur's philosophy positively contribute to the process and implementation of MIDR?

These research sub-questions imply, amongst others, the following sub-questions:

- What are the problems in the broader MIDR process in general and specifically for negotiations?
- What are the implications of adopting a more complex approach that coincide with the challenges that mark inclusivity?

These questions will also be discussed from a more personal perspective, because of my experience for working for mines in South Africa.

4 Research approach.

This mini-dissertation takes the form of qualitative research consisting solely of a desktop study, and thus involves no participants. A literature study will be conducted on MIDR and the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur. The method used in this study mainly consists of the reading of several literature sources relevant of the topic at hand (i.e., a literature study), and retrieved electronically or from the Ferdinand Postma Library. The databases used to conduct this research include, among others, *The Philosopher's Index* and *The International Philosophical Bibliography*.

5 Limitations & significance of the study

This study only examines the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur regarding philosophical anthropology, hermeneutics, and ethics. This is done to demarcate the study to a workable focus on this level (mini-dissertation) and it also helps to get cohesion and coherence between these three aspects. The limitation is, however, that many other important philosophers on these three themes will not be discussed in this study.

The significance of this study is that it intentionally thinks about MIDR from a philosophical perspective and not from a business or economic perspective, as is usually the case. It furthermore contributes to studies of Ricoeur by applying his work to MIDR. Lastly it aims to contribute to

literature and further development of MIDR by making specific proposals of how to create a more just, ethical, and inclusive MIDR process and practice. To that end, the specific practical and ethical problems associated with MIDR should first be explained.

Chapter One: MIDR and its associated problems

MIDR and some of its associated problems have been discussed in the introduction, but in this chapter the focus will be on the specific practical, philosophical and ethical issues of MIDR as encountered not only in the literature on MIDR, but also in my own experience in working for different mines in different capacities.

The practical and ethical problems of MIDR

It is generally accepted that the problem with MIDR orbits around mainly four aspects: cultural erosion, weakened social structures, endemic poverty and social problems of the affected people. (Cernea 2009). Cernea further enumerates the following risks associated with involuntary displacement: landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalisation, food insecurity, increased morbidity and mortality, loss of access to common property resources, and social disarticulation. Affected peoples (APS) are those who stand to lose all or part of their physical and non-physical assets as a result of the project, such as their homes, communities, productive lands, resources such as forests, rangelands, fishing areas, or important cultural sites, commercial properties, tenancy, income-generating opportunities, and social and cultural networks and activities (ADB 2003:1). APS may also include “host communities” when a large population is displaced onto the land of a smaller existing (host) population (Downing, T.E.,2002). *Rehabilitation* refers in this context to restoring the incomes, livelihoods, and social systems of the displaced people to at least the level of their pre-project status.

My interest in discussing MIDR is not merely on an academic level. The need for a practical and just implementation of MIDR is discussed from my personal experience as working for a mine, as a Mine Stakeholder Engagement Manager, since 2019. After I received a legal qualification, I joined a trade union as an official in the retail sector. Dealing with pickets, strikes, bargaining councils and the CCMA (where I represented employees), I became aware of much conflict in the labour sector, and through on the job-training I developed some negotiation skills. I later joined the multinational petroleum company as the labour relation officer and later as the Human Resource manager respectfully. My main responsibility as the HR manager in the petrochemical industry was to deal with misconduct cases, mostly misappropriation of company properties (theft) of the company’s petroleum product by employees. During these internal disciplinary processes and at the bargaining council meetings, some dismissed employees made threats of violence if the company kept on

winning cases against them. They argued that they needed to steal these products because their children need to eat. If they were dismissed from their work, they asked: What do you think our children should eat now?

I joined the mining sector in 2017 as the Head of Employee Relations, where my main responsibility was to build a working relationship between the unions and management. I was hardly a year in this position when the mine ownership changed. The new employer introduced new policies and culture, and required certain capabilities from the workforce. Later it was discovered that there was a need for staff rationalisation. I led the process from beginning to end under extreme difficulties, having to see some of the colleagues departing the place of work for no fault of their own. Re-employability was a challenge to some due to the lack of requisite qualifications, which were required by the new employer and certain contractors. However, I was happy to see some of the retrenched colleagues converting their businesses from fulltime employees to active directorship of BEE companies that would do business with the mines. This sudden change of ownership of a mine company, along with its devastating consequences for so many employees and sub-contractors, gives an indication of the environment in which MIDR is often negotiated and implemented. There are often no guarantees for the APS and no lasting relationship from a specific mine with these communities to ensure that they are treated fairly in the long term.

A specific project that gave me insight into the practical and ethical challenges of MIDR, was to negotiate the relocation of 28 homesteads as part of an MIDR at the mine where I worked in Mpumalanga province. The affected families lived in dilapidated mud houses and part of the urgency of moving these people was that during the rainy seasons, the mud houses could not resist the blasting that was to be executed by the mine within a 500-meter radius. The negotiations for relocation commenced in August 2019, and the process was time-bound because the mine wanted to continue with the blasting when the raining season started. The first step was to elect a relocation committee of ten people from the communities. However, after about four months the relocation committee had to be reinforced because some members were no longer available for various reasons. This had a negative effect on the committee's functioning.

Among the main issues to be addressed by this committee were the design of the of the new houses to be erected and the site of relocation. These two issues took almost 8 to 14 months to be finalised because key role players from the community kept on changing, and goals also kept on changing. The expectations of the community increased as the negotiations progressed, and protest marches were organised to raise the community concerns. Many of these concerns were not even related to

the planned relocation, however, but rather to other socio-economic issues or other issues with the mining company. For example, among the new items to be negotiated between the mine and the affected community, were employment and procurement opportunities that they wanted at the mine.

These new requests by the community indicated the disjuncture between labour relations processes and broader stakeholder management functions. The former is internal and process-intensive and managed by the mine company, while the latter is external and often politically driven, with political parties getting involved to make gains for themselves and not necessarily for the communities. The external stakeholders were many and varied, with different and divergent interests. After a relocation agreement was eventually signed in June 2021, the construction process commenced in September 2021. New matters arose from the construction stage, however. The direct beneficiaries of the relocation process and the people living in the nearby township were competing for procurement. Eventually the first eight houses were built by certain contractors, whilst the other nineteen were built later by other contractors. One beneficiary opted for cash to assist with her already-built house, instead of a new house.

These experiences of negotiating and implementing an MIDR made me realise how complex and ethically difficult it is to manage resettlement and that the problem is more than a management one, but also a philosophical and ethical one. This example of an MIDR highlights some of the problems that are found in academic literature (and again from my own experience as working for the mine) about MIDR as well. I will discuss nine of these issues to answer the first research question, namely: *What is MIDR and why is it problematic?* These nine issues are not the only problems, but they suffice to give a good indication of the complexity of the problem.

1. Place attachment

Place attachment conveniently refers to the positive relationship between people and the place where they live. MIDR literature is broadly unanimous in agreeing that the concept *place attachment* is multi-layered, and the concept has indeed been used in sociology, geography, planning and architecture (Milligan, 1998). Place attachment of people creates a sense of belonging and stability, which is needed for people to achieve their long-term goals. An MIDR project manager, mine management and technical experts should at least have a working knowledge of the concept *place attachment*, because, as Relph (1976:43) asserts, “there is for nearly everyone a deep association with and consciousness of the places where we were born and grew up, where we now live, or where we have had particularly moving experiences.” This association appears to be an important source of both

individual and cultural identity and security. Place attachment is an emotional bond between people and places and is a major concept in environmental psychology.

Place attachment is greatly influenced by individuals' personal experiences. A large amount of research is for example dedicated to defining what makes a place 'meaningful enough' for place attachment. Schroeder primarily emphasises the distinction between "meaning" and "preference", describing meaning as "thoughts, feelings, memories, and interpretations evoked by landscapes"; whereas preferences are described as "the degree of liking for one landscape compared to another" (Schroeder, 1991:231). Environmental psychologists agree that affect plays a crucial role in person-place bonding. Most of their descriptions depict place attachment in affective terms, such as an emotional investment in a place. But it also relates to the concepts of 'community attachment', 'sense of community', 'place identity' or 'sense of place' (Dlamini & Tesfamichael, 2021). Place attachment has for example been defined as "a cultural value shared by the community, a collective understanding about social identity intertwined with place meaning" (Harner 2004:660) and, more simply, as the "bonding between individuals and their important places" (Scannell & Gifford 2010:1). There is some agreement that place attachment is often an attachment to the social relations associated with the place in question, and not just to its environmental characteristics (Scannell & Gifford, 2010). Place attachment is thus much more than just an 'attachment' to a certain 'place'. It provides identity and it is an emotional, historical, communal, personal and meaningful concept, among others.

Place attachment is multifaceted, and it cannot be explained just through a cause-and-effect relationship. Rather, it is determined by the reciprocal interaction between behaviour and experience. Many factors come into play when people need to be removed from the places they are attached to; and many of these factors cannot be determined because of the complexity of land attachment. When people are detached from their places, the problems that occur in the displaced community are not only loss of a place and land, but other major problems often occur as well, which indicates the bigger sense of loss within these communities. These problems might include criminality, drug and alcohol abuse, mental health problems, and marriage breakups, and are consistently related with mine development. Other problems usually include low levels of local employment, homelessness, and increasing poverty. The place attachment problem relates strongly to the problem of social disruption, which is discussed below (Scannell, L. and Gifford, R., 2010).

2 Social disruption

The problem of social disruption has significant meaning here because it deals with people who experience dramatic changes in aspects of their social life due to being moved to a different place, as a whole community. 'Social disruption theory' tries to describe and understand such social disruption, and it has been applied in the context of rural communities and the boomtown concept, for example. Social disruption theory has also been used to explain the impacts of mining development on mining towns. Initial research on mining developments in remote and small towns in the United States adopted the perspective of the social disruption thesis (Gillmore & Duff, 1975). Social disruption theory suggests that resource booms have negative implications for the local population, and that such booms erode local culture, structures and place attachment (Smith *et al.*, 2001; Ennis *et al.*, 2014). Specific issues concerning social disruption include (as with place attachment) homelessness, increased poverty among the local inhabitants, crime, high levels of drug and alcohol abuse, marital breakdown, mental problems, lack of community harmony, and low levels of local employment (Bowes-Lyon *et al.*, 2009; Argent, 2014; Ennis *et al.*, 2014).

The social disruption theory has permeated the mining industry literature. However, the dominance of social disruption theory has begun to be questioned within in mining town areas (Wilkinson *et al.*, 1982). The research points to the fact that, over time, social disruption is replaced by stability, however. MIDR implies, though, the sudden loss of physical and non-physical assets, including homes, communities, productive land, income-earning assets and sources, subsistence, resources, cultural sites, social structures, networks and ties, cultural identity, and mutual help mechanisms. It is not only about the loss of land, but also of subsistence, networks and ties, cultural identity and social bonds. The disruptive nature of MIDR should thus be understood as a social phenomenon as well, and not only as pertaining to property or land (Kemp & Owen, 2013).

With MIDR negotiations and implementation, there should thus be an awareness beforehand, among the affected community and the mine management, that disruption will take place. To move people is always stressful and socially disruptive, and it will always be a difficult and challenging task. The problem is that the social structures and harmony in the community will be disrupted and mostly lost, and therefore this move should be managed with sensitivity. What makes this problem worse, is the fact that communities might be moved again in future – it all depends on the ongoing mine activities, and it often happens that communities have to be relocated twice. This is not only due to bad planning by the mines but also to change of ownership by the mines. The MIDR remains a temporary arrangement and it brings psychological stress, anxiousness, and loss of security to the

affected community. The option to relocate people to an adjacent municipal town is not always available, because affected communities are often not as educated as the people in the towns, and they are often looked down upon and are seen as outsiders. Affected communities thus often prefer not to be moved to an existing town or to an established township with developed services and they rather stay on the farm.

3 Political distortions

A huge problem with MIDR, especially in the South African context, is that competing parties (e.g., mine management, community leaders, political parties, and others) promise the affected people different things. For example, some political parties would (for the sake of political gain and not necessarily for the sake of the community) say that if they had been in charge of the negotiations, and not the community, and they promise the community that they are better suited to negotiate better deal with the mines . With limited levels of literacy, the affected people are often misled by all the competing parties and their promises to these communities. This makes negotiations extremely difficult on the part of the mine management and on the part of the affected people.

This context of negotiations of MIDR has similarities with negotiation processes where one experiences ‘archipelagos’ of domination (where many islands are found in a specific water area). Archipelagos of domination arise in a society when more than one social group – and more than one political party – may gain political and social dominance over geographically separate areas. Archipelagos of domination can be said to exist in a polity when more than one social group – and more than one political party – are able to achieve political and social domination of geographically distinct areas. While the ruling party dominates some areas, as dominant parties are said to do, in others it will be dominated. Unfortunately, as a mine representative, one is involved in these dynamics and consumed by the political games different groups play at the negotiations.

MIDR implies that geographic spaces are contended for, and competing groups fight vigorously for public support. Where politics are so competitive, it is largely an expression of the imbalance of power in the area. Ironically, one can say, as Von Holdt *et al.* (2011:85) do: “[D]emocracy has delivered freedom to areas where the ruling party is marginalized, but not to those where it enjoys overwhelming support. It is precisely during these negotiations that one realises how realises it is debatable whether the ANC is the source of local elites’ power or the vehicle through which they exert it.” Many participants reject the involvement of the dominant political party at the negotiation table, but this then enables opposition parties to be opportunistic in their involvement and promises.

In the end these 'political distortions' are just creating more problems and they do not help to negotiate and implement MIDR in a fair and just way. They would often lead to long postponements of the MIDR process, which creates further uncertainty and instability for the affected communities.

4 Patronage network complexes

The notion of a 'patronage network complex' refers to the fact that during negotiations, the affected group becomes bigger and bigger due to more people who want to benefit from the MIDR process. During MIDR and its negotiations, huge resources are normally unlocked by the mine, and this attracts a lot of people's attention who also want to benefit from it. This includes the extended families of the affected people, formation of elite or wealthy groups in the area, and political patronage. As discussed under the above point of 'political distortion', a number of people from different political persuasions suddenly emerge at the doors of the affected people – either as uninvited participants, or as actors and even advisors. Von Holdt (2011 et al) explains that the political parties know that to “get into power and to remain in power, you need supporters, allies and networks of patronage. Having access to wealth and resources that can be distributed at all these levels is a way to build political capital. Conversely, to be successful as an entrepreneur, you need political connections. In this way, wealth and politics are closely bound up with each other.” It is these networks which struggle for power and access to resources that are problematic. These networks and factions form, compete and reform (Von Holdt 2011:24 *et al*).

Power struggles assume an increasingly violent character as different factions and rivals try to immobilise each other. The problem is that everyone wants to benefit from the possible compensation of the mine when MIDR must take place. As the affected group gets bigger, the expectation for compensation also increases, which again stalls the MIDR process instead of helping to resolve it in a fair way. New factions emerge during the negotiation process, and new patronage network complexes are formed. This not only complicates the matter, but even perpetuates corruption in the procurement process. The negotiations of MIDR and its fair implementation, especially regarding compensation, is thus something highly controversial and contested from the beginning, and the uninvited new role players – the patronage network – in my experience makes a just process and implementation very elusive to achieve.

5 Perpetuation of the mining town

A 'mining town' is a resource town, owned by the mine, in which mineral extraction, primary mineral processing, and related activities dominate the town's economic base. In South Africa, most mining towns were already normalised by the early 1990s, but some are still under the management of mines, where basic municipal services are provided by the mines. With MIDR, the relocated communities prefer that the mining companies (and not the local municipality) will continue to provide municipal services to them. The expectation is that the mine would provide these services for free or cheaply, and the communities do not trust their local municipalities to reliably provide some of these basic services.

With the MIDR negotiations, the expectations are therefore that the mine should not only build and maintain houses for the affected community, but that the mine should keep on providing basic municipal and engineering services. The problem with such an arrangement, however, is that the mine will then dominate local decision making in the long term because of the power it will have (Obeng-odoom, 2014:447). So, while communities prefer that the mine provide all these services, and continue to maintain a 'mining town', the communities are not prepared to lose their say or power about the town or new settlement. This is one of the incessant and economic problems that the resettled people encounter years after the resettlement action plans (RAPs) has been reached and the MIDR has been completed. RAPs are generally the most comprehensive documents in the MIDR process. However, they are not the panacea for the relocation problems, because when they are prepared by specialists to align with international standards, RAPs contain summary details of the project history, socio-economic conditions, expected scope and severity of impact, along with proposed measures and resources to mitigate the effects of displacement. The document should reflect the company's efforts to accurately characterise the social impacts associated with the development, together with an articulation of how the project will respond to these impacts. Given its focus on the management and mitigation of resettlement risks, RAPs provide important information on individual resettlement events, but do not describe all the impacting factors on the community due to MIDR.

6 Corporate social responsibility (CSR)

The CSR concept has been defined variously by many scholars, and Kotler and Nancy (2005) relate this concept of corporate social responsibility with concepts such as corporate citizenship, philanthropy, corporate giving, corporate community involvement, community relations, community

affairs, community development, corporate responsibility, global citizenship, and corporate societal marketing (Carroll, 1979) also describes CSR: “The social responsibility of business encompasses the economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary expectations that society has of organizations at a given point in time corporate”. Ofori and Hinson, (2007:179) stated that “the belief that profit maximisation is management’s only legitimate goal is seen as one end of a continuum, while at the other end is the argument that businesses are trustees of societal property that should be managed for the public good”. Some scholars also believe that in making corporate decisions, management must maintain both economic and social variables (Cyert & March 1963). The problem is, however, that CSR creates some expectations among the affected communities (of more resources from the mine’s side) while management only sees CSR as something to comply with (within a limited budget).

Literature on CSR is unanimous in confirming that a business is accountable to its primary stakeholders. These include profit to the owners, achievement of goals, efficacy of the organisation, productivity, promotion of the organisation’s image and public relations, quality of service rendered, as well as environmental management and control. These aspects are referred to as the internal dimension of CSR (Jones *et al.*, 2005). The external dimension (Jones *et al.*, 2005) or secondary stakeholders to whom a company is held accountable, are the community and the country. Organisations can thus demonstrate corporate social responsibility in local communities through community development, low-cost housing, support of health and medical services, training and development, donations to churches and religious institutions and sponsorships for schools and sporting bodies. These activities remain a secondary dimension of CSR, however, but this is what communities are most aware of and this is what creates expectations.

The potential benefits of CSR are improved financial performance and profitability, reduced operating costs, long-term sustainability for companies and their employees, good relations with government and communities, accountable risk and crisis management, enhanced reputation and brand value, and forging closer links with customers, and fostering greater awareness of their needs. In this regard there is widespread agreement that CSR is the correct thing to do (Jones *et al.*, 2005) but the expectations of the mine and the resettled communities are different when it comes to CSR. To the mine, CSR is an obligatory activity, whereafter they may continue with their business as usual. They typically focus on making a CSR budget for the year as required and spend a percentage of that budget on the host or surrounding community. It is pertinent to note that the 2018 Mining Charter requires new mining rights to have 30% Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) shareholding which includes a 5% equity equivalent benefit for host communities (Mining Charter: 2018).

However, for the resettled communities (after MIDR has been completed) CSR is understood as a further form of compensation for their resettlement. They expect the mine to keep on contributing to their needs, and they expect that they should get priority (and not, for example, other communities in the vicinity of the mine). These deep and powerful conflicts and contradictions about CSR resist straightforward solutions and approaches and complicates MIDR. Friedman (1970:122-126) furthermore argues in this regard that corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a “fundamentally subversive doctrine” because in a “free” society, businesses must engage in activities whose sole goal is to exploit resources for profit maximisation, as long as business is conducted within the bounds of applicable laws and regulations. Mines can thus easily use CSR to argue that they fulfilled their responsibility towards the community, while affected communities can feel deeply unsatisfied with the way CSR is rolled out by the mine.

7 Compensation

Compensation for resettled communities is a given. It is their constitutional right to be compensated through different means, like new houses, land, or monetary payouts. In October 2018, the principle of compensation for mining-affected communities in South Africa was unambiguously affirmed in the case between *Maledu and Others vs Itereleng Bakgatla Mineral Resources (Pty) Limited and Another* (Concourt, 2018). The Constitutional Court Justice AJ Petse opened his unanimous judgment of this case by quoting a passage from Frantz Fanon’s *The Wretched of the Earth*, who wrote, “for a colonised people the most essential value, because the most concrete, is first and foremost the land: the land which will bring them bread and, above all, dignity” (Fanon, 1961:9). The judgment held that owners and lawful occupiers of land affected by mining are entitled to compensation prior to the commencement of mining development in terms of Section 54 of *the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act* (MPRDA).

Yet, it remains unclear what fair compensation for loss or damage, as laid out in the Act, looks like. The Supreme Court of Appeal explained the importance and calculation of compensation for dispossession of land in *Haakdoornbult Boerdery CC and Others vs Mphela and Others* (SAFLI, 2007). They said that the purpose of giving fair compensation is to put the dispossessed, insofar as money can do it, in the same position as if the land had not been taken. Fair compensation is not always the same as the market value of the property taken and it is but one of the items which must be considered when determining what would be fair compensation. There are important structural and politico-cultural reasons why indigenous people suffer disproportionately when displaced. These can include religious and spiritual value they attach to the land. Western concepts of expropriation and

compensation are therefore not always suitable when dealing with community held tribal land and calculating compensation. In this process a wider range of socially relevant factors should consequently be considered, such as resettlement costs and, in appropriate circumstances, solace for emotional distress, social disruption, etc.

It is important to note here that although compensation remains a constitutional right for the resettled communities, the Act does not prescribe that some negotiations should take place in this regard, but only consultation. This undermines in effect the judgement of the Constitutional Court because it leaves the door open for the mining companies to only consult about the compensation and not to fairly negotiate it.

8 False needs

The problem of false needs links back to the problems of political distortion and patronage network complexes, as discussed above. The notion of false needs refers to the difference (in following Marcuse's philosophy) between actual, or real, needs one may have in comparison to needs superficially created in various ways. In his book, *One Dimensional Man*, Marcuse (1964) argues that advanced capitalist societies dominate through the production of false needs (Marcuse, 1964:4-5). He defines false needs as those which are enforced and promoted by societal structures, such as political and economic procedures, policies and social convention (Marcuse, 1964:12-14). Marcuse considers false needs to be "superimposed upon the individual by particular social interests in his repression" (Marcuse, 1964:5). False needs, as superimposed needs, create and perpetuate "toil, aggressiveness, misery and injustice" (Marcuse, 1964:5).

False needs are not things one thinks one needs, but they are things or needs imposed on one by the society in which one lives. These false needs do not lead to one's flourishing upon their satisfaction. For Marcuse, false needs are not wants masquerading as needs; but rather actual needs (created for example by society) that produce harmful side-effects upon their satisfaction. The problem is not that individuals make poor choices as much as it is that our society is designed to make even our good choices result in continued domination and misery. This paradoxical phenomenon of fulfilled needs that lead to harm, stands as evidence supporting Marcuse's claim that advanced industrial society is "irrational as a whole" (Marcuse, 1964:5).

Marcuse's concept of false needs highlights the manipulative nature of a capitalist consumerist society that keeps people occupied with pursuing these false needs in exchange for surplus labour. Heilbroner (2008:1071) stated:

Capitalism is a unique historical formation with core institutions and distinct movements. It involves the rise of a mercantile class, the separation of production from the state, and a mentality of rational calculation. Its characteristic logic revolving around the accumulation of capital reflects the omnipresence of competition. It displays broad tendencies to unprecedented wealth creation, skewed size distributions of enterprise, large public sectors, and cycles of activity.

A person's capabilities might be enhanced because they have more opportunities to better their socio-economic circumstances by consuming and pursuing more false needs, but their well-being suffers significantly under the psychological, physical and mental stress of surplus labour with extremely limited meaningful engagement with their work. Marcuse therefore bemoans total domination of technological rationality in an "advanced industrial society", which creates a one-dimensional society. For Marcuse, a one-dimensional society is a notion that defines a condition of affairs that lacks critical thinking, "alternatives", and potentialities that go beyond the existing technological civilization. Marcuse (1964:4-5) elaborates on his understanding of false needs and provides the following expanded definition:

... those which are superimposed upon the individual by particular social interests in his repression; the needs which perpetuate toil, aggressiveness, misery and injustice. Their satisfaction might be most gratifying to the individual, but his happiness is not a condition which has to be maintained and protected if it serves to arrest the development of the ability (his own and others) to recognize unhappiness. Most of the prevailing needs to relax, to have fun, to behave and consume in accordance with the advertisements, to love and hate what others love and hate, belong to this category of false needs.

According to Marcuse's definition of false needs, I identified some characteristics of false needs in the context of MIDR that emphasise the destructive effects of false needs. Firstly, false needs are "superimposed" to promote "a particular social interest", and the satisfaction of those needs has a negative effect on a person's well-being. This could happen if politicians added needs such as new shops to be built, but this can create unnecessary expenditure. Secondly, false needs are "most gratifying", but the happiness which a person gains from satisfying those needs is fleeting and only distracts a person from their long-term unhappiness. The compensation as monetary payout is an example of such a possible fleeting gratification. Lastly, the satisfaction of false needs leads to mass false consciousness that is encouraged and perpetuated within materially affluent societies. People

may thus feel happier with a bigger house, but it might have been more important to secure a bathroom inside the house and not outside.

The resettlement agenda of MIDR falls squarely in Marcuse's description of false needs, where one-dimensional thought is characterised by the "repression of all values, aspirations, and ideas which cannot be defined in terms of the operations and attitudes validated by the prevailing forms of rationality" (1964:xii). The result is the loss of genuinely critical thought and a willing submission of the individual to an established system that serves dominant interests – those of politicians and other stakeholders and not of the affected community, for example.

9 Negotiation

As mentioned above, compensation is a constitutional right of resettled communities, but to negotiate fairly for such compensation is problematic, because only consultation is required by law, and not negotiations. Normally negotiations take place with MIDR, but even in these cases, it is often deceitful or flawed. Negotiations are often inflexible, univocal or hierarchical and blocked into an asymmetrical power game without the possibility to escape it. In MIDR, the participants find *fait accompli* decisions. Understood in this way, it is oxymoronic to speak of negotiation and 'participation' in mining-induced relocation, since the move is inherently involuntary. We know from experience that successful resettlement depends in very large part on an active participation and negotiation of those who are forced to move.

It is only after resettlement that communities are really able to see what they have lost and what they have been compensated for. From my experience, they will for example say: "Now that the mines have resettled us, now we have the experience to negotiate." It is difficult for many of these communities to make the calculations of compensation beforehand. They cannot negotiate as equals because of the intellectual and power advantage of the mine. Furthermore, they are often objectified in these negotiations where their lives and social relationships, culture, and place attachment are all commodified. In the negotiations they must take a step back and evaluate their present life and formulate priorities regarding what they would like to save and change; and what they identify as good and bad traditions and assets. They furthermore must verbalise matters that they have taken for granted in their cultural and natural landscape of heritage, and they must come to terms with feelings of loss and confusion. In theory, in these negotiations, three-time dimensions coexist, namely past, present, and future (Aronsson, 2003; Downing, 2002).

The power asymmetry in these negotiations has to do with the disproportionate power wielded by disparate mining-industry stakeholders and amongst local community members – in other words, how power is wielded by different actors, their motivations, and the factors that allow, reinforce or fail to mitigate these power differentials. It is crucial to understand the amount of power wielded by, and the level of participation of, mining stakeholders in company-funded development projects, and the extent to which these dynamics have influenced community development. Parties at the negotiation table are not empowered. Empowerment in this context means that local participation is nevertheless based on the perception that the local people are aware, or made aware, that their own choices and socio-economic, political, and cultural priorities may have weaknesses in the context of displacement, resettlement, and compensation. They must be critical of their own thinking and understand that their choices will have real consequences.

The complex problem can further be expounded by the proverb 'It is gold and silver by which war and the other things ... thrive' (Ramose, 2010:164–165), which may be construed as an ironic prophecy of Judas Iscariot's betrayal of Jesus just for 30 pieces of silver. The betrayal is hurtful, morally sensitive, and ethically untenable. The hurt is so deep that for the Gospel writer Mark (Mark 14:12-21), it would have been much better for the betrayer not to have been born at all than to have been born and commit the act of betrayal (Ramose, 2010:294).

One of the objectives with local participation is to comprehend, intellectually and emotionally, another person's life world and then facilitate and convert this knowledge together with the affected people (not necessarily as a communicator) into efficient compensations. This would resonate even more with the lived experiences of mine communities that are often having to grapple with the collateral socio-economic hardships and impoverishment effects. Matters can get even worse when the State has weak legal and institutional frameworks to regulate the use and possession of such highly contested lands.

There is another difficulty with negotiations: What are the chances of community representatives expressing their cultural dilemmas during mining-induced development and resettlement negotiations? Cultural identities are the distinct identities of people or groups in cultural or subcultural categories and social groups. Categories that make up cultural identities, include sexuality, gender, religion, ethnicity, social class, and region. In multi-cultural negotiations there are many cultural characteristics that can remain unformulated and misunderstood. For example, many people in developing countries attach strong emotional, spiritual, and cultural significance to ancestors, long-held heritage, and ancient places of living. Understood in this way, it seems given

that to relocate people from any cultural and spiritually important areas, as such, will obviously create problems for their psychosocial well-being (Akpanudoedehe, 2010). Relocation causes a disjuncture between the living and the living dead; and the mine's negotiators (again in my experience) normally do not assert the right of the community to be consistent with the African epistemological paradigm. This is unfortunate because Africans have the right to adopt and use indigenous concepts that congruently capture and represent their ways of knowing and doing particular when issues affect them directly.

The role of the Nyanga (traditional healer) is a prominent example of the problem of African indigenous knowledge and epistemology that can be problematic in negotiations. The Nyanga is the link between two interrelated ontologies constituting a oneness, namely the invisible life force of goodness and the visible community of the living here and now. This latter is the first dimension of community, according to indigenous African ontology (Baloyi & Ramose, 2016). Africans are aware that the living actually die at a certain point, but upon death the departed become members of the community of the living-dead, otherwise known as *badimo*, *vhadzimu*, or *abaphansi* (Ramose, 2006:16). It is precisely important for the *badimo* to be spoken to during these times before a huge decision (like MIDR) is taken. They also become vital intermediaries between the life force of goodness and their family or clan.

While *badimo* forms the second dimension of the concept of community in African ontology, the third arm of community is formed by the yet-to-be-born. These are the responsibility of the living, and whatever they do, should not curse the yet-to-be-born. This means that having children in African culture is understood as a duty. The fulfilment of this duty could ultimately permit polygamy, for example, in the case of the "barrenness of one of the partners" (Bujo, 1998:101). The three-dimensional understanding of community in African ontology reveals the centrality of *moya*, which is understood as the life force of goodness. Understanding this is the gateway to comprehending African ontology, ethics and spirituality (religion). In traditional African religions – taken from the point of view of 'family resemblances' – god is the subject of religion, but not the object of theology: "At the same time, god is a necessary element in the African understanding of community" (Bujo, 1998:16).

To know if the *badimo* were pleased or displeased with something one had done (for example decisions regarding MIDR), one turns to the *nyanga* to use *moya* to speak to the living dead. It is this body of knowledge the community representatives fear to express during negotiations with the mines. This then creates cultural dilemmas and therefore might leave the entire community unhappy

(if the Nyanga cannot be consulted), because the mine representative will be seen to have suppressed the cultural practices of the local people. In this regard, mine representatives will be seen to be disrespectful to the cultural values of the community. Buttressing the point, we argue that the continuing exclusion of indigenous languages, cultural practices, and experiences from MIDR negotiations and practice is ethically unjustifiable and pedagogically unsustainable (Baloyi & Ramose, 2016. 30).

It will, however, be difficult for the affected community's participants to air their cultural preferences because of extroversion. Extroversion involves not being able to appreciate one's beliefs, values, and potentialities; thus, leading to "an adoption *tout court* of foreign ideas and values which prove to be sterile in the African milieu" (Ajei, 2007:6). This spirit of extroversion is often explained in terms of the colonial legacy and domination which robbed Africans of their self-confidence and self-appreciation (Wiredu 2002). The human self-transcendence requires that Africans move beyond those accidents of history which they tend to make an important part of their ontological make-up. This should in other words form part of the negotiations to make it fairer and more inclusive.

In search of an answer to these problems

This chapter discussed nine problems associated with MIDR and indicated why a more philosophical approach is needed to address some of the fundamental problems of MIDR. It is especially because of philosophy's non-reductionist approach in thinking about human beings, justice, and ethics which is needed in this context.

In chapter two, different aspects of Ricoeur's philosophy will be discussed to indicate the potential relevance and value of his philosophy for the process and problems of MIDR. The first will be Ricoeur's philosophical anthropology; and the second his hermeneutics and ethics. In the last chapter these aspects of the philosophy of Ricoeur, as discussed in chapter two, will be applied to MIDR to indicate the value and relevance of it to make MIDR a more ethical, just, and inclusive practice.

The first question has already been answered in the preceding chapter. The questions to be asked in the second and third chapters are thus focused on the search for an answer to the nine problems indicated in this chapter. The main questions and sub-questions for the next chapters will be as follows:

2. *What are the main and relevant aspects of Paul Ricoeur's philosophy that might be of value to MIDR?*

- Can Ricoeur's philosophical anthropology help us formulate a more ethical framework which will foster local participation in resettlement negotiation?
- What role will a hermeneutics of suspicion play with negotiations in MIDR?

3. *How can Paul Ricoeur's philosophy positively contribute to the process and implementation of MIDR?*

- What is the possible contribution of Ricoeur's notion of attestation in dealing with the dilemmas of negotiator positionality as reflected in the question: "Negotiator, from where do you speak?"
- To what extent can Ricoeur's anthropology, hermeneutics and ethics assist negotiations, for example, in order that they are not viewed as inflexible, univocal, and hierarchical between parties?

Conclusion

This chapter unfolds the problem of displacement (MIDR). The questions posed are: Can MIDR be executed in an ethical manner, given all the common problems that have been identified in the discussion of the nine problems that are part of the MIDR process, such as cultural erosion, weakened social structures, endemic poverty, and various social problems. There are many other problems which can be added to this list, but it is sufficient to indicate that a more holistic approach is needed to MIDR to ensure it is not only greed and disrespect – from the side of the mines or the communities – that determine the process and negotiations and implementations.

Philosophical thinking should attempt in this context to allow for a better understanding of another human being and our ethical behaviour towards each other. The nine problems indicated that the current relocation praxis of MIDR is both morally and ethically untenable. Next, I deal with the question of whether Paul Ricoeur's philosophy can be of value to the MIDR project to make the process ethical and just.

Chapter 2: The main aspects of Paul Ricoeur's philosophy that might be of value to MIDR

Introduction

In chapter one the ethical, social, and cultural problems of displacement as induced by the mining sector, were introduced. Such displacement normally encompasses two meanings. Firstly, it includes a literal or physical meaning. It is about how populations are evicted from the places they live and moved to a different area. Secondly, it includes a more figurative or metaphorical meaning, namely how the minds, memories and historical connectedness of people are removed from one physical space and social context, to where they are supposed to be integrated into the new physical spaces, but also the new way of thinking and living. This often includes a radical shift from a more traditional, tribal, rural way of living to a more urban, state-governed, capitalist environment and society.

The pertinent philosophical issue in this context is whether MIDR can be executed in such an ethical manner that the humaneness of the people that are removed, is respected and treated fairly. In other words, the question is not only if people are compensated materially in a fair manner for the property they lose, but if their loss as humans – their psychological, historical, cultural, religious, spiritual, societal and lifestyle connection to the physical space (the loss of space detachment with the associated social disruption) – is respected in the negotiations with the mining companies and in the resettlement that is offered.

To answer this question, one needs to ask the fundamental question of what it means to be human. This is of course an age-old philosophical and contentious question, and this study does not aim to answer it, but in what follows, the intention is to give an indication of an answer to this question from the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur. Ricoeur's philosophy will in this regard be examined to highlight the aspects thereof that are of value for thinking and for developing a more ethical way of MIDR for vulnerable communities.

The discussion in chapter one focused on the MIDR problem that has affected most farm or rural dwellers around the mine operations. These are normally poor and vulnerable people with little resources and not much formal education. This can create opportunities for powerful mining companies to execute resettlements in an unjust manner by only treating the people as a problem to be solved – to be removed to a different land in order to continue with mining practices – and by ignoring their humanness in the process. The aim of mining companies is to make profit, but this

cannot be to the detriment of humans. The Sesotho proverb *feta kgomo o tshware motho*, which translates literally as “go past the cow and catch the human being” is also found in other African languages, and it means that given a choice, you should always prefer to defend human life over protecting your possessions (the cow). This proverb emphasises that it is wrong to preserve and increase riches at the price of human life. To put it another way, whenever we are given this option to choose between riches (cows) and preserving human life, the latter is the wise decision. This proverb anchors and supports the notion (from an African philosophical perspective) that it is unethical for wealth creation and preservation to take place at the expense of human life (Ramose, 2006:15).

The argument of this study is consequently that it is the humanness of all other people that should be considered to make MIDR more morally acceptable and just, especially in the South African political and socio-economy context. In other words, MIDR is and should not be only a legal compliance matter, but an ethical and humane matter. To grasp what the humanness is that needs to be considered in MIDR, however, this chapter turns to Ricoeur’s philosophy, and specifically his philosophical anthropology.

Before proceeding with a discussion of Ricoeur’s philosophy, it is imperative to motivate why Ricoeur was chosen. Firstly, Ricoeur’s emphasis on the notion of respect is highly relevant for the focus of this study, but it is also something that I am attracted to on a personal level, and from an African philosophical point of view. Respect is for Ricoeur a fundamental part of being human and it plays a crucial role in his philosophical anthropology. Respect is for him the way we reconcile or mediate between one’s own (finite) selfish wish for happiness of one’s character, and the (infinite) happiness of all other people. It is in respect that the dialectic tension between happiness (for all) and character (one’s own happiness), between the infinite and the finite, is kept alive and where we ‘become humans’. Ricoeur (1986:25) emphasises humankind’s ability to achieve an intentional synthesis of finite and infinite, meaning and presence. He said: “I ought to respect the person ‘in’ the other and ‘in’ myself” (Ricoeur 1986:30). This resonates strongly with Ubuntu as part of African philosophy.

Another reason why Ricoeur was chosen for this study is because of his highly influential and seminal philosophical anthropology that was published in his book, *Fallible Man* (1960). As stated above, his exploration of what it means to be a human being, is something that resonates with the African notion of what “*motho*” (Tswana word for person) is. Due to the limited scope of this study, however, it is not possible to delve deeper into African philosophy on this point, but the potential that lies in

Ricoeur's work, and its affinity to African philosophy are quite apparent and important in the South African context. The focus on Ricoeur is thus motivated by his philosophical anthropology, his emphasis on respect, and the fact that this resonates with African Philosophy, although this last aspect is still an unexplored theme.

Ricoeur provides an entry-point into this discussion, and many other philosophers can of course be added to this discussion, but to delineate this study to a workable project, only Ricoeur is discussed here. Furthermore, this study will be limited to Ricoeur's philosophical anthropology (as found in *Fallible Man*) and hermeneutics, and will not go into detail in other aspects of his philosophy.

Who is Paul Ricoeur?

Paul Ricoeur is perhaps one of the most challenging and enduring thinkers of the twentieth century. He was born in 1913 at Valence, south of Lyons, in France (Regan 1996: 4), and he first became interested in philosophy in his final year of high school in 1929-30 (Ricoeur 1995a: 3). Ricoeur then spent two years (1931-3) at the unfashionable provincial University of Rennes, studying for the entrance examination to the prestigious *École Normale Supérieure* in Paris.

His MA dissertation was on 'The Problem of God', and early in his career Ricoeur developed the interest which has informed his work to his death, namely that of the relationship 'between philosophy and biblical faith'. In 1934-5 Ricoeur spent a year at the Sorbonne, where he met his intellectual hero, the Christian philosopher Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973), celebrated for having coined the term 'existentialism'. In 1935 Ricoeur came second out of three hundred candidates in the *agrégation*, an examination entitling the best students in any particular year to teach, and consequently he was appointed to several provincial teaching posts from 1935. In 1950 Ricoeur was awarded his PhD for his translation of Husserl's *Ideas*, and in recognition of the first part of Ricoeur's own Philosophy of the Will, *The Voluntary and the Involuntary*. In 1956 he was appointed Chair of General Philosophy at the Sorbonne. In 1960 the second part of his Philosophy of the Will was published, itself in two parts, *Fallible Man* and *The Symbolism of Evil*. Ricoeur died on 20 May 2005.

Ricoeur published over thirty major works, ranging from existentialism and phenomenology to psychoanalysis, politics, religion, and the theory of language. Ricoeur became known as a brilliant intellectual negotiator between competing schools of thought through his dialectical philosophical method. In this method he keeps tensions intact, while constantly creating new mediations among these opposing positions. This allowed him to become the philosopher for all dialogues. REF?

Ricoeur's philosophy is described as simultaneously a philosophy of life and a philosophy of reading. It is generally agreed that his philosophy is universally applicable: Whatever field we are in – whether history, psychoanalysis, literary criticism, or any other field – that discipline is built through texts, and those texts each disguise their true meaning in different ways, which hermeneutics reveals. The relevance of Ricoeur's work to address the ethical difficulties posed by mining-induced displacement and resettlement will become apparent in this chapter.

Ricoeur's philosophical anthropology

This chapter aims to highlight the complexity of what it means to be human, by exploring Ricoeur's thought in this regard. This notion is discussed in Ricoeur's philosophical anthropology, namely *Fallible Man*. This book is part of Ricoeur's three-book series on the philosophy of the will. The first book in this series is *Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary* (1950, Eng. tr. 1966). The original title of this first independent book of Ricoeur is *Le volontaire et l'involontaire* (1950), and this book is concerned with the human functioning of the will. The will as voluntary is contrasted with the involuntary. The voluntary and the involuntary cannot be understood independently, according to Ricoeur; and neither can the one be understood as a derivative of the other. Both need to be in tension with each other as part of our being human.

The second book in Ricoeur's series on the will is the two-part volume entitled *Finitude and Culpability*, with the first part *Fallible Man* (1960, Eng. tr. 1967) and the second part, *The Symbolism of Evil* (1960, Eng. tr. 1970). Ricoeur wrote about many other aspects of being human, for example *History and Truth* (1955, Eng. Tr. 1965) and *Freud and Philosophy* (1965), but *Fallible Man* remains the best summary of his philosophical anthropology. In *Fallible Man*, Ricoeur develops his earliest insights into vulnerability and capability using a phenomenological approach, which permits the description of humanity's essential structures of the will – the voluntary and the involuntary – leaving out of consideration its empirical effects. The voluntary and the involuntary are inextricably linked: the voluntary, that is our free will, is linked to the involuntary of the body as a source of reasons, organ of activity, and location of necessity.

The main theme and focus of *Fallible Man* are the tensions we experience in being human – in human life (our thinking and emotions) and in human activities (all our actions and living). Ricoeur uses the concept 'pathétique of misery' to describe this fundamental disproportion or tension we find ourselves in as human beings. It is a tension between our finite abilities and context, and the infinite possibilities of our aspirations, actions and knowledge. As finite human beings, we have for example

infinite imagination and dreams, but as human beings we remain finite and limited in our bodily perspective. This creates a fundamental 'disproportion' that is part of being human, as Ricoeur argues. He then identifies three disproportions that link to what he describes as the three 'levels' of aspects of being human. These three disproportions are found in the theoretical, practical, and affective aspects of being human, and in each one of them there is a 'fragility' for Ricoeur. In short, the human according to Ricoeur is someone who is 1) knowing; 2) doing; 3) and has feelings. These three aspects need to be explained in more detail to understand Ricoeur's philosophical anthropology.

1. To be human is to know, and to create knowledge

To be human according to Ricoeur is to know things, and to formulate it as knowledge. This is something that takes place within the fundamental disproportion or tension of being human, because on the one hand we all have a finite perspective (one's own limited point of view), and we have the infinite possibilities of formulating what we perceive as knowledge in different ways. This infinite possibility of language is described by Ricoeur as the 'infinite verb'. In other words, to be human is to know, but this takes place through a limited and finite perspective or mind, and through the infinite and unlimited way language allows us to formulate this knowledge. To be human is to find ourselves within these two poles of the finite perspective and the infinite verb in our effort to create knowledge.

This may be explained in a different way: According to Ricoeur, our relationship to the things we know, is one of finite perceiving and limitless naming, as giving meaning to the object as knowledge. So, knowledge is created when we name something we perceive from our finite and limited perspective. According to Ricoeur, for us to comprehend, we must first perceive, and then name something, but to bring these two together, we require imagination. To put it differently, to bring the pole of the finite perspective and the pole of the infinite verb together, asks for a transcendental synthesis, something that happens in our minds, and in Ricoeur's view this happens through our imagination. It is in the imagination where the transcendental synthesis of the two poles takes place, but this remains a fragile synthesis where the two poles remain in tension for Ricoeur.

This synthesis of the imagination is for Ricoeur the first moment or indication of man's fragility (Ricoeur 1986:37) because it emphasises the underlying tensions of being human. Thus, to comprehend one's life (or anything else), one always adopts a limited or finite perspective or point of view. From this perspective, which is for example socio-economically and culturally influenced, one makes certain statements (in the infinite possibilities of language) about what one comprehends,

even about our life itself. It is within one's imagination that the production of knowledge takes place, but the productive imagination is a fragile place to base our knowledge creations. To know something, even our own human being, is not merely to let it appear somehow, but to determine it intellectually, through our imagination and to express it in language. This is an open process with certainties (formulations) that remain open for reinterpretation and formulation, but this is at the same time part of the wonder of being human: to have the capability to create knowledge in this way.

This brings one back to the notion of the 'pathétique of misery' which Ricoeur argues, in the beginning of *Fallible Man*, is underlying our ability as human beings to know, to act and to feel. The pathétique of misery is to be understood in the Greek sense of *pathos*: the sadness which comes out of a tragic situation. It is a sadness here, regarding creating knowledge, because of this tension between the finite (perspective) and the infinite (verb) that is always synthesised through the imagination in a fragile way. The pathétique of misery indicates for Ricoeur the 'pre-comprehended' notion of what it means to be human. That is to say, it is a condition of human's being before all thought or consciousness, or before the alleged self-consciousness of the cogito. This is fundamentally part of being human to be within this 'sad' tension of the finite and infinite on all the levels of our existence.

It is a pathétique of misery because human beings are finite. Ricoeur explains that this does not only mean that humans only live for a limited period of time, but also that the time they experience in consciousness is less than their total time on earth: "my birth is an event for others, not for myself", says Ricoeur (1986:36). Ricoeur (1986:37) also argues: "My life is comprised, if I am conscious, of a series of 'heres': 'I am here now', I might say, and then remember this instance of the 'here' in the future. But 'my place of birth does not appear among the 'heres' of my life and cannot therefore be their source." So, to comprehend my life, I must adopt a perspective or point of view where I view my birth not from a past perception of a 'here', but by in some sense stepping outside myself, and seeing myself as others would see me. In doing this I am already going some way towards 'transgressing' the finitude of my life, and I perform a similar transgression to realise that my life is finite, and then to discourse upon that finitude. It is by means of imagination one arrives at this possibility: "In imagining another state of affairs or another kingdom, I perceive the possible, and in the possible, the essential" (Ricoeur, 1986:37).

Imagination is thus vital for the opening of the new horizons of our being in the world and for the creative rethinking of the traditional oppositions: between reason and body, faith and atheism, word and touch, philosophy and literature, high and popular culture, cosmopolitanism and nationalism,

and more. In Ricoeur's anthropological scheme imaginations fulfil one of these vital roles, namely the synthesis of the finite perspective and infinite verb to enable us to create knowledge. The Ricoeur scholar, Richard Kearney (2004) emphasises that imagination hereby crucially forms part of the phenomenological and hermeneutic tradition of creating knowledge. It is in this regard that Kearny further defines imagination as the challenge of narrative coherence and identity, and warns that radical postmodernism, for example, risks "abandoning the emancipatory practice of imagining alternative horizons of existence" (Kearney, 2004:16). He furthermore argues for bringing postmodern critique and humanist ideals into a genuine conversation, but that requires us to envision a notion of imagination that incorporates postmodern thinking and discloses that the imagining subject is not self-sufficient and egocentric, but open to and oriented toward the other. This is important on an ethical and practical level – it is the second important aspect of what it means to be human according to Ricoeur.

2. To be human is to act, to live in this world

The second aspect of being human is for Ricoeur our ability to act and to live practically in this world. This aspect is not so much about our theoretical knowledge, but the practical part, the living as humans, and what that entails, which is uniquely human. Ricoeur positions this aspect of being human, the practical living, also within the *pathétique* of misery, where there is a fundamental disproportion and tension at play in our acting in the world.

With any acting of human beings, there is on the one hand the finite pole of our existence, which influences why, and how, we act. Ricoeur calls this finite pole our character, but this does not refer only to our personalities or habits, but to our entire limited existence that includes our embodiment, our dreams, desires, personal wishes for happiness, and vision. Following Aristotle, Ricoeur argues that our character is aimed at our personal happiness, or the good life in the sense of *eudaimonia*. In this sense it remains limited, because it only includes my own perspective (as with knowledge), my own bodily needs and desires, and my own personal wishes for happiness. This is what drives us as human beings to act, but this finite character's acting is always in the context of and in tension with all other people's wish for happiness. This combined aim or totality of everyone's happiness is for Ricoeur the infinite pole that remains in tension with our finite character, and it is within this tension, or dialectic, where some synthesis needs to take place for human beings to act.

The question about human acting is about how we reconcile or mediate our finite character with the infinite happiness of all. This type of acting, this unique synthesis between the poles of finite character

and infinite happiness – as part of our fundamental pathétique of misery – is for Ricoeur what distinguishes us from mere acting, as animals for example do. Ricoeur says that character is “unalterable or immutable” in the sense that it is not subjected to the will as what for example ‘I can choose’ to have. Rather, it is for Ricoeur “the radically non-origin of all my choices” (1986:95). We cannot escape or ignore our character in our human acting. Character is constant, it is my limitedness, and although I might change my point of view (e.g., with knowledge), I shall always have the same character (as the finite facticity of my existence). As something inescapable, my character is part of my finitude.

If one cannot escape one’s finite character within his or her acting, how can there then be a practical synthesis with the infinite pole of happiness of all? Such synthesis is needed to not act only in one’s self-interest (as animals will do) as determined by one’s finite character, but also not to sacrifice one’s one ability to act in fear that it might hinder the infinite happiness of others. We are acting and living as human beings, but what makes our acting a ‘project of the person’, as Ricoeur describes it, is the fact that we act through the fragile synthesis of character and happiness through the notion of respect. Respect means the acknowledgment of the infinite happiness of all other people, which influences my own wishes and acting for happiness. Respect is the crucial mode of synthesis in acting as human beings, where we recognise the human quality in each individual person. If we lose respect, we lose something that makes us uniquely human, Ricoeur argues here.

Being human involves synthesising finite character with infinite happiness by recognising the humanness of others, and this recognition is called ‘respect’. Ricoeur calls respect a ‘moral feeling’ and follows the eighteenth-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) in his emphasis and understanding of respect. There is a striking resemblance between the position of respect in Kant’s practical philosophy (with respect as the categorical imperative) and that of practical synthesis between one’s own wish for happiness and those of others. While imagination was something transcendental in the theoretical synthesis of creating knowledge, the practical synthesis through respect is something that becomes visible in our ethical acting and living. One can say that the body, the ‘flesh of desire’, does not manifest itself as a closed figure but as a practical mediation, in other words, as a projecting body in this practical synthesis of respect in our acting as human beings.

3. To be human is to be affective, to live with feelings

The third crucial aspect of being human that Ricoeur discusses in his philosophical anthropology, is the fact that to be human is to be affective, to live with feelings. Again, his anthropology is

characterised by finite and infinite poles regarding the affective, and how this tension should be mediated through a fragile synthesis as part of being human. On the one hand there is the finite pole of our own passions and feelings, part of our bodily desires and existence, which Ricoeur describes as the finite *bios* pole on the affective level of our existence. On the other hand, there is the infinite pole of our desires and passions on an intellectual and spiritual level, the infinite *logos* pole, or as complete happiness – pure joy, the sublime – that is much higher than only our own passions and affections.

Ricoeur argues that to be human is not only to have bodily desires, passions, and affectivity on a personal and finite level, but that these passions are constantly in tension with the completion of happiness in the Sublime, the Beatitude, the spiritual and intellectual desires of our existence. To be able to live within these tensions, makes us human, because to live with only our bodily desires and passions, our finite *bios*, would again not distinguish us from animals; but to live only with the infinite passions of the spiritual and intellectual, the *logos*, is impossible because we remain embodied human beings. To mediate between these passions, we need to allow the *thumos*, our heart, to synthesise our affective existence. This also is for Ricoeur not an easy or peaceful mediation or synthesis that takes place through the *thumos*, but a restless one where we constantly need to learn to love both our finite bodily passions and our intellectual and spiritual passions.¹ This love that appreciates both and allows both to play a role in one's life as a human being, is called *eros* by Ricoeur. It is thus within the fragile synthesis of the *thumos*, through *eros*, that the tension is kept open and productive between the finite *bios* and infinite *logos* on our affective level as human beings. This is important because the affective can become so powerful in one's life that it can allow certain passions to dominate and eventually destroy one's life. They can become so destructive that it can destroy the lives of others as well, and in that sense, they become something evil.

It is on this point where Ricoeur moves to the notion of the 'fallibility' of being human, which is reflected in the title of his book *Fallible Man*. Ricoeur explains that with all three mediations that

¹ The influence of Plato on Ricoeur's thinking here is clear. In *The Phaedrus*, Plato (c. 370 BC) postulates that the soul has three component parts, which he explicates by way of Socrates's allegory of the chariot. In the allegory, a chariot (representing the soul) is pulled by a rebellious dark horse, which symbolises man's appetites or desires, and a high-spirited white horse, which symbolises *thumos*. The charioteer is Reason. Reason's challenge is to harness the energy of both horses, getting the divergent steeds – that 'pull it (the chariot or the soul) violently in different directions' (§ 248a) – into sync to be able to successfully pilot the chariot into the heavens where he can behold Truth and become like the gods. The soul's fate is therefore dependent upon the establishment of a symbiotic cooperative relationship between the appetites and desires, on the one hand, and *thumos*, on the other. In the *Phaedrus*, the noble white horse is described as 'a lover of honour and modesty and self-control; companion to true glory' while no explicit mention is made of *thumos* as in *The Republic* of Plato.

takes place as part of us being human – on the level of knowing, acting, and feeling – we are constantly torn in two. Our existence is, in other words, not stable, but ‘fallible’ in the sense that we can easily ‘fall’ and allow some of these tensions to dominate. If we for example allow the bios to dominate, we might end up becoming destructive and ‘evil’ and lose something fundamental of being human. Ricoeur explains this in three classical examples which are important in terms of the theme of this study.

These classical examples are the three Kantian passions or human desires, namely the desires for possessions (*Habsucht* – the longing to have things), the desires for power and domination (*Herrschaft* – extreme form of bossiness), which usually manifests itself in the political space, and finally honour and worth (*Ehrensucht* – also translated as ambition), which shows up in the social realm. Ricoeur discusses these passions as examples of what should be synthesised in the *thumos*. In other words, he does not dismiss these passions as bad per se, but cautions that any of these passions could be misused and become destructive for us and others. Such instances are demonstrated in our day and age by the vices of avarice, corruption, despotism, and vanity. There is, however, a positive way to deal with these passions, so that our human being is affirmed and recognised by it.

To be human is to be fallible

According to Ricoeur, to be human is to experience a disproportion in relation to oneself. There is something about human beings that causes us to be in tension, to be ‘inconsistent’, to be in a ‘sad state of disproportion’ as a *pathétique* of misery. This experience does not come from something outside us but is fundamentally what it means to be a human being. To negotiate between these disproportions and tensions on the three levels of our existence, as Ricoeur described it, is something challenging. It is something we struggle with and something that can go wrong, and therefore we are in principle fallible. On the level of cognition or knowledge, the imagination functions as the transcendental synthesis between the finite perspective of perception and the infinite intention of the verb. On the level of volition and acting, respect is needed as the fragile synthesis between the finite character and the infinite happiness of others. On the level of affection, the *thumos* or heart needs to mediate and synthesise the finite *bios* passions and the infinite *logos* passions in a way that both can be life-giving and creative in one’s life, and not destructive. In all these cases the syntheses are not resolving the tensions, but it brings the tensions of the finite and the infinite of our existence into a productive conversation. This dialectic between these finite and infinite poles of our existence is crucial for Ricoeur in what it means to be human.

This dialectic or synthesis is for Ricoeur always a fragile one. This fragility is not related to human finitude, but to the typically human mediation between finitude and infinitude. In this mediation lies human possibility, but also human fallibility. Ricoeur summarises this by stating that human beings are always marked by a disproportion where finitude and infinitude are not well-balanced but in a restless tension. Sometimes they tend to lapse into finitude, another time into infinitude. The balanced state is never permanent, although it is the human task to strive for it. Thus, human beings are characterised by the mediation between both poles of infinitude and finitude and not by a natural emphasis on, or dominance of, one of them.

In this restlessness of these mediations, Ricoeur finds the most complete insight into the disproportion that makes human beings fallible. He calls the human being as characterised by this disproportion, 'fragile'. This fragility is again to be understood as a primordial one, and in that sense a neutral one. This fragility is fundamental to human beings, but as such not yet good or evil. Human beings simply cannot be thought of without this fragility. It characterises human beings but does not fix them as good or evil. It rather leaves the possibility open to be both, and therefore we are described as fallible.

Ricoeur's analysis of the disproportion becomes very clear in the three classical examples of human passions as described by Kant, namely the passions for possession, power, and honour. In each of them Ricoeur discovers a pure form of the passion as distinct from the perverted forms thereof, and therefore he does not reject these passions. They are needed for us to be human, but they need to be mediated within the *thumos*. Characteristic of these passions (as classical human passions) is that they will never be satisfied. The search for these passions has its moments of fulfilment, or completion, but these are not lasting. There are moments of temporary pleasure, but Ricoeur emphasise that they remain finite. The horizon of happiness as completion, as the infinite logos passions, is always more encompassing than our own limited and finite passions. As a result, human beings, who are both finite and infinite in their passions, are restless. They have their moments of pleasure, but at the same time keep longing for the totality of complete happiness. The three examples Ricoeur discussed, are illuminated below.

First, the passion for having, which underlies our passion for possessions, can be understood in an innocent, primordial sense as the 'I' that grounds itself on a 'mine'. By calling something 'mine', human beings therefore relate to objects around them, which incites all kinds of feelings in them. Although this way of relating to objects may pervert into greed, avarice, and envy, human beings cannot be imagined without this quest for having, without the 'anchorage' in the mine. We need for

example to be able to say 'my body is mine', and also that some possessions are mine – at least for taking ownership of our own bodies and to nurture it. In its innocent form, this passion for possessions is imagined in the myth of paradise, where human beings 'possess only what they cultivate, have only what they create'. It is, however, a passion that can quickly become so dominant that it destroys us as human beings, and eventually other human beings as well.

Secondly, human beings live in relations of power. These are guaranteed by the political authority of institutions or in families. Again, authority and control should not be understood solely from their perverted forms. Some kind of institution – and thus of power over others – is necessary to live in a community. Political power is always related to evil, but that does not undo the possibility of differentiating between power and violence. It is possible to imagine a power without violence, as in a 'Kingdom of God, a City of God, an empire of minds or a kingdom of end' and not one where power is abused.

Thirdly, the passion for honour of glory is also reckoned as a primordial one. It is in an innocent and healthy way the passion to have a sense of self-worth, or a healthy self-esteem. This is needed to function as a human being, especially to be able to recognise others as human beings and their self-worth. This passion can, however, become corrupt and dominant and transform into the destructive power where everything is focused and manipulated to enhance one's own worth. In this sense it can become something evil, like the two passions that were discussed above.

For Ricoeur, the ability to carry out an evil act is therefore a fundamental continuation of the possibility of human existence within these fragile mediations. We are not 'fallen', or condemned to be evil, in Ricoeur's anthropology, but we are fallible in the sense that we seem to be free to decide to commit evil. Ricoeur states that "man can be evil only in accordance with the lines of force and weakness of his functions and his destination" (1986:143). So, for Ricoeur human evil is not necessitated by our existence. Evil rather results from free choice, and from some passions being allowed to dominate; and it is not from an unavoidable consequence of our being. This means that we as human beings have ethical agency and responsibility and that we should act this way.

Ricoeur's understanding of human happiness

Ricoeur's philosophical anthropology leads to the development of a distinctive understanding of human happiness which should be kept in mind in developing a more just understanding and implementation of MIDR, especially in relation to the problem of false needs, as discussed in chapter

one. In response to the existentialists of his era, Ricoeur builds his philosophical anthropology on the ideas of Aristotle and Kant, as discussed above. In this process, he created his own version of human happiness, which can be directional in thinking about ethical decisions – especially if the forceful removal of other people is considered (Savage, 2020).

Three things best describe Ricoeur's perspective on happiness. The first is, in following Aristotle, that happiness is something that all people inherently crave and need. The dialectical or mediating synthesis of human beings at the different levels of their existence makes this desire for happiness visible. Happiness (at the level of actions and emotions) furthermore reflects the crucial infinite pole in the human imbalance of finitude and infiniteness. Happiness (of everyone) is the infinite pole in relation to the finite pole of one's own character and happiness on the level of acting. Happiness is also the infinite pole of the *logos*, the completions of the intellectual and spiritual passion in relation to the finite passions of the *bios*.

Ricoeur argues in his philosophical anthropology that this infinite happiness is transcendental in nature. It is something infinite that functions as a horizon. This insistence on transcendence (as being part of the nature of happiness) makes Ricoeur an important interlocutor between philosophy and theology, and for further thinking about ethics (Verhoef, 2014a). Although Ricoeur did not write a book specifically focused on happiness, his philosophical anthropology focused on it, and in 1994 he wrote a philosophical essay devoted completely to the topic of happiness, namely "Le Bonheur Hors Lieu" (Happiness is out of place).

Ricoeur asks in this article where happiness is to be found, and he concludes that happiness is "out of bounds", or "off-site", but not "sans lieu" (without place). Happiness is part of the individual human being's desire for a complete and fulfilled life (*Fallible Man*), and that happiness always involves others: friends or people close by, and people further away ("to live well with and for others in just institutions", as in *Oneself as Another*, 1992). This links strongly to Ricoeur's ethical project, and he argues that we cannot find happiness on our own. We need to live with others and respect their happiness as well – as he already highlighted in *Fallible Man*. Secondly, happiness cannot just be dependent on others. Of course, loving and caring relationships with others are important for our happiness, but we need to create the possibilities for this to be more just and more lasting. It is therefore important to develop just institutions than can allow for the happiness of all people. This is a comprehensive happiness and not merely one of satisfying one's needs or creating feelings of joy (Verhoef, 2014b). Such happiness coincides with an ethical way of living, as Aristotle argued for example.

Ricoeur's hermeneutics

An aspect of Ricoeur's philosophy which might be of huge importance for the negotiations that is part of MIDR, is his understanding of hermeneutics. Hermeneutics is the study of interpretation and understanding. It is a crucial method for determining how mine companies and affected communities should and could understand each other during negotiations. The scope of this dissertation does not make it possible to present a full discussion of Ricoeur's work, but some main points regarding his hermeneutics will be highlighted.

Ricoeur coined the phrase *hermeneutics of suspicion* to refer to the method of interpreting texts counterintuitively to reveal their suppressed or concealed meanings. Ricoeur named Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud as the key figures (masters of suspicion) in this method. Despite their many differences, Ricoeur (1970:32) argues, these thinkers share a common commitment to reducing the illusions and lies of consciousness. For Freud, our sexual desires influenced our interpretations; for Nietzsche it was our will to power; and for Marx our longing for economic equality. Ricoeur thereby makes the point that with hermeneutics one should know that appearances are deceptive and that texts do not gracefully relinquish their meanings, but that manifest content shrouds darker, more unpalatable truths. Hermeneutics of suspicion is thus a mode of interpretation that adopts a distrustful attitude toward texts, to draw out meanings or implications that are not intended and that remain inaccessible to their authors as well as to ordinary readers. In his argument, Ricoeur (1970:9) develops a key distinction between a hermeneutics of trust, which is driven by a sense of reverence and goes deeper into the text in search of revelation, and a hermeneutics of suspicion, which adopts an adversarial sensibility to probe for concealed, repressed, or disavowed meanings. The difference between these approaches, we might say, is the difference between unveiling and unmasking. In the context of negotiations one can say it is the difference between suspicion and trust about what the other party says, and the challenge of how to interpret it correctly.

The task of hermeneutics is for Ricoeur to discover meaning – to understand what the other person is saying. As in most of philosophy, 'meaning' here means the meaning of life or, at least, meaning in life. But hermeneutics is based on a view of the world that sees language as the medium through which not only meanings (plural) are conveyed, but also Meaning in this grander, philosophical sense. However, hermeneutics is not really concerned with language in the same way that linguistics is, or even in the way that philosophy of language is. Broadly speaking, linguistics seeks to describe language; and philosophy of language seeks to explain the conditions under which language can operate, have meaning and be truthful. Rather, the hermeneuticist sees the world related to the

individual through the mediation of texts. One understands the world not directly, but through texts (through language) – and this means through texts seen as wholes, and not as individual linguistic units combined. This does not mean that pre-literate cultures, or illiterate people, cannot or do not understand the world – as a method, hermeneutics is just as capable of being applied to the myths of oral cultures as it is to the documents of written cultures.

The task of hermeneutics is then to seek in the text or communication itself, on the one hand, the internal dynamic that governs the structuring of the work; and, on the other hand, the power that the work possesses to project itself outside itself and to give birth to a world that would truly be the ‘thing’ referred to by the text or communication. It is the task of hermeneutics to reconstruct this twofold work (Ricoeur, 1992:17-18). As I noted earlier, Ricoeur distinguishes between a hermeneutics of suspicion and a hermeneutics of trust; between a reading which tears off masks and one which seeks to restore and recollect meaning. Perhaps, in this light we can get a better handle on suspicious interpretation by treating it with a degree of generosity, bestowing upon it a measure of the sympathy it withholds from others. In this light we can ask: When can we generally say that we understand something? How do we get to that point where we understand? What must we do – what method should we follow – to get a clear understanding?

All these questions emphasise the need for an understanding of the process of understanding or interpretation. As I mentioned before, hermeneutics – as the theory and methodology of interpretation – is not only applicable to texts, but also to events, institutions, and personages. Verhoef and Rathbone (2015) argues that Ricoeur’s hermeneutics continues Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s notion that understanding is fundamentally part of our existence; it is ontological, and part of our being-in-the-world. Ricoeur also accepts the apriority (it comes first) of language as part of hermeneutics. Most of his work is therefore on the analyses of language within the hermeneutical circle between life (reader) and events (texts).

Ricoeur agrees with Gadamer’s notion of effective-historical consciousness (tradition), which is our entry point to the hermeneutical circle, but he differs from Gadamer in that he emphasises the need to be more critical of our own tradition or self-understanding. Ricoeur argues for a ‘distanciation’ (a critical distance to or critique of) regarding one’s tradition (prejudices) to maintain a critical moment within hermeneutics. The possibility is there, as Ricoeur argues throughout his work, that we may have a false self-interpretation, a false self-consciousness, and a false ‘effective-historical consciousness’ (tradition); and therefore, it needs to be scrutinised through a process of ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’. This means we should be suspicious about the way we interpret

ourselves, because there are unconscious and unforeseen influences that shape our self-interpretation and that eventually shape others and events. An awareness of these influences may help us to better interpret ourselves and others, and the world we live in. This might also help us to better understand the different parties that are involved with negotiations with MIDR.

In terms of Ricoeur's 'hermeneutics of suspicion', Ricoeur insisted that it would be a mistake to view the three masters of suspicion (Freud, Nietzsche, Marx) as masters of *scepticism*. While it is true, they are involved with destroying established ideas, "All three clear the horizon for a more authentic word, for a new reign of Truth, not only by means of a 'destructive' critique, but by the invention of an art of interpreting" (Ricoeur, 1986:33). In other words, each of the masters has, in their own way, unmasked a false consciousness, a false understanding of the "text" (society) by systematically applying a critique of suspicion, with the result that the true understanding, one that more faithfully tracks and correlates with the real situation, now becomes unmasked and revealed.

The challenge in hermeneutics, according to Ricoeur, is thus to always trust and be suspicious about not only what others say, but also about what you say yourself. The question (and suspicion) should always be: "From where do you speak?" In other words, what determines the way you understand and formulate your view of the world, and how can you be more sceptical about it – about your own standpoint, but also about that of others. Such an attitude, or understanding of understanding, can have a constructive bearing on any negotiations, as I will argue in the last chapter.

Conclusion

The first chapter of this study focused on the problems of MIDR – especially the ethical and practical problems that require a more holistic and philosophical approach to answer them. In this second chapter the focus was on the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur to investigate which aspects of his philosophy might be of value in making the negotiations and implementation of MIDR more ethical and just. It was argued that it is the humanness of others (all other people) that should be considered to make MIDR more morally acceptable and just, especially in the South African political and socio-economical context. In other words, MIDR is and should not be only a legal compliance matter, but an ethical and humane matter.

To know what the humanness is that needs to be considered within MIDR, however, this chapter identified in Ricoeur's philosophy, and specifically his philosophical anthropology, the notions of human beings that can uniquely create knowledge (name things through language), act ethically (with

respect), and have passions (*bios* and *logos*) that position them in this world in relation to all others and things. Humans are fallible, but not fallen. They have the capability to respect each other and to keep their passions in a fragile synthesis. They have the ability to be happy in a much fuller sense than just the experience of pleasure, and they are always part of this complex world they live in.

Ricoeur's philosophy further indicated the need for a hermeneutics that allows for trust and suspicion of one's own point of view and that of others. These philosophical insights need to be applied to the problems of MIDR as discussed in chapter one, to understand the real value of Ricoeur's philosophy in this context. This will be the focus of the last chapter.

Chapter 3: The possible value of Ricoeur's philosophy for the process and implementation of MIDR

Introduction

In the first chapter, nine problems were discussed regarding MIDR. It was indicated that the current relocation praxis of MIDR is both morally and ethically untenable. In the second chapter the question was whether Paul Ricoeur's philosophy can be of value to the MIDR project, to make the process ethical and just. Ricoeur's philosophy, or at least some relevant aspects of it, was also discussed. In this third chapter the aim is to apply these principles or philosophical insights from Ricoeur's work to the ethical and practical challenges of MIDR.

An aspect of Ricoeur's philosophy that stood out in chapter 2 was his understanding of the human being as a complex being. Human beings cannot be reduced to only some aspects of their being, like the economical; and in Ricoeur's view one's humanity is part of this holistic understanding of being human. This is important in terms of the ethical challenges of MIDR. Furthermore, Ricoeur understands ethics in a holistic way, where the good life is not only about one's own ethical living but living with others and in just institutions (as he argued in his book *Oneself as Another*). Ethics are thus important on a personal level, in relationships with others, and in the establishment of just institutions.

An important aspect of ethics in this regard is for Ricoeur that human beings remain capable beings (*homo capax*). In other words, human beings can and must take responsibility for their actions. In his philosophical anthropology, *Fallible Man*, Ricoeur made his case for *homo capax* (the capable human being) as the acting human being who is also always recognised as a suffering human being. He keeps this dialectical thinking intact and argued that this suffering human being is never only considered a victim, but also recognised as a person capable of developing actions.

To look through the lens of Ricoeur's philosophy to MIDR is a challenge, because MIDR is such a complex and problematic issue. This have been discussed in chapter 1, but two further aspects should be highlighted here as well, namely the other relevant legislation and the challenge of Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BB-BEE) in South Africa.

MIDR should be understood within the context and provisions of the *Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002* (MPRDA) of South Africa because both focus on mining activities. The

MPRDA intends to make provision for equitable access to and sustainable development of the nation's mineral and petroleum resources; and to provide for matters connected with it. The critical and most important objective of the MPRDA is to expand opportunities substantially and meaningfully for historically disadvantaged persons, including women and communities, to enter into and actively participate in the mineral and petroleum industries and to benefit from exploitation of the nation's mineral and petroleum resources. When MIDR takes place, the expectation is that these historically disadvantaged persons will also be benefitting from the process. Most communities that need to be relocated, are historically excluded from the mining sector, and the question is how the mine will provide opportunities for them. The relocation and resettlement process itself (e.g., building of new houses) are furthermore subjected to BB-BEE regulations.

When the African National Congress assumed power in South Africa, it decided to implement an economic restructuring program "aimed at empowering the historically marginalized people in order to tackle the socio-economic problems of the past" (Hirsch, 2005:69). One of the most visible initiatives by South Africa's government was the implementation of BB-BEE. The term *Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment*, or BB-BEE, is defined as a broad-based process aimed at "the economic empowerment of black people, including women, workers, youth, people with disabilities and living in rural areas through diverse but integrated socio-economic strategies" (Tiwari, *et al* 2022:321). A few legislative requirements have been implemented for the inclusion and development of the previously disadvantaged black people. Black people as defined in the statute to refer to "Africans, Coloureds and Indians" (Pooe, 2013:635). The BB-BEE strategies have also been included in sector-wise charters and notes which makes it mandatory for different commercial sectors to aid in the fulfilment of the core principles of BB-BEE. This often creates problems for the mines if they need to contract companies to build houses and help with the relocation of the communities for various reasons. Black entrepreneurs insist that it is 'their time to eat'. What makes this matter worse, is the fact that the mining industry in South Africa is one of the most unpredictable and dynamic environments to operate in.

The potential value of Ricoeur's philosophy for the problems of MIDR

In the above context, the question of this study remains how to ensure a more fair and ethical way of implementing MIDR. Significantly, literature is unanimous that MIDR is associated with four aspects: cultural erosion, weakened social structures, endemic poverty and social problems of the affected people. In chapter 1, further problems of MIDR were listed by me as a practitioner in this field. I will return to these nine challenges here to see how Ricoeur's philosophy may be of value to

create a more just MIDR process and implementation. To avoid repetition, I will only briefly indicate the potential value of Ricoeur's philosophy for some of these nine problems, whereas longer discussion will follow for others.

1 Place attachment

Place attachment refers to the positive relationship between people and the place where they live. If people are removed from their familiar place, they do not only lose the place itself, but also their emotional and historical connectedness to their environment. Their loss includes the connection to the place where they grew up, and to the land and place that provided them with security and identity. It is a loss that is multi-layered and involves emotional aspects (an affective connectedness with a place), cognitive aspects (the unique meaning of a place), cultural aspects (where rituals and traditions were celebrated) and of aspects of identity (with the unique history of land and space).

The problem of place attachment regarding MIDR is that the mines do not consider what the communities really lose when they are moved from one place to another. The calculation of place is often only done in terms of the financial value of the place or land, and not in terms of the multi-layered value it has for a community. Mines may argue that this is not relevant, but it is on this point where Ricoeur's philosophy becomes important. Ricoeur will argue that we should not reduce people to their financial needs and losses. People are complex human beings with unique knowledge and memories, with the ability to respect each other and act in that way towards each other, and with emotions and passions. If the humanness of people is recognised by the mines (as for example described by Ricoeur), the value they attach to space and land will also be recognised. This will bring a sensitivity to the process of MIDR, which is often lacking when the loss is only understood in terms of the financial value of the land. This will for example affect the compensation that the mines offer to the displaced communities.

As mentioned in chapter 2, the question is not only if people are compensated materially in a fair manner for the property they lose, but if their loss as humans – their psychological, historical, cultural, religious, spiritual, societal and lifestyle connection to the physical space (the loss of space detachment with the associated social disruption, which is to be discussed next) – is respected in the negotiations with the mining companies and in the resettlement that is offered.

2 Social disruption

If a whole community must be moved, social disruption takes place because of the social structures, networks and ties that are lost. People are not related physically to each other after the resettlement, and it takes a long time before stability in social networks is created again. Cultural sites and cultural identity are lost, and new ones need to be found. The same applies for harmony in the community, and that is why social disruption leads to problems like homelessness, increased poverty, crime, high levels of drug and alcohol abuse, marital breakdown, and mental problems. The loss of the community is thus much greater than the mere place they lost, because of MIDR (as explained in the point above). The same aspects of Ricoeur's philosophy are applicable here to ensure a more just MIDR negotiation, compensation, and implementation.

Another aspect that could also be mentioned here, is the role of imagination in being human. Ricoeur's discussion of the imagination as the transcendental requirement to create knowledge is not only of academic interest but can help to understand the problem of social disruption caused by MIDR. To be human is to create knowledge, and this is needed to create relationships. Imagination is also needed to create narratives of coherence and identity, and with social disruption, this is often destroyed. It takes courage and freedom, as Ricoeur explained and as Kearney emphasised in chapter 2, to imagine alternative horizons of existence if your own horizons are destroyed. Not only the knowledge we have of others (as created through imagination) seems to be disrupted by MIDR, but also the framework or horizon in which we create such knowledge. The lack of coherent narratives of us and others is a huge challenge to overcome, and that might partly explain the associated problems of social disruption such as high levels of drug and alcohol abuse. The complexity of the social disruption caused by MIDR is highlighted by Ricoeur as something that affects our humanity. It should therefore be a priority for the mines to create ethical alternatives in the MIDR process.

Practically it might mean that the mines should be willing to provide wellness programmes and support after the resettlement, to help communities restore their narrative coherence regarding their identity. Communal spaces – like community halls, sport grounds, schools, etcetera – should also be provided to ensure that new social relations are built.

3 Political distortions

The problem of political distortion occurs when competing parties, often political in nature, promise the affected community different things just to make political gain out of the situation. As mentioned

before, the affected community is often not well educated, and they are often misled by these opportunistic parties. In the end, political games are played at the MIDR negotiations, to the detriment of the affected community because the community is marginalised in these negotiations and more uncertainty and instability are created in the process.

Various aspects of Ricoeur's philosophy can come into play with the problem of political distortion. A prominent aspect is Ricoeur's understanding of happiness. If it is really the happiness of the affected community that is at stake, they cannot and should not be misled and used for political gain. They should be protected in a way that false expectations are not created through different role players. Here Ricoeur's understanding of happiness as part of our *bios* and *logos* is important. *Bios* refers to our bodily needs and *logos* to our rational and spiritual needs. These should be in balance for us to be happy, according to Ricoeur; and to find this balance is always an ethical process. It is an ethical process where one's own happiness, but also those around one, and the need for just institutions come into play. It is a comprehensive happiness that also admits the fact that it is always part of a dynamic process and not something static to be achieved.

What this practically means for a more just MIDR negotiation and implementation, is that the affected communities should be assisted by people who really have their interest at heart. For example, the mine could offer to hire a social welfare worker (of the community's choice) to guide them from a more professional starting point in these negotiations. The *bios* and *logos* need of the community itself, and not of other opportunistic parties, should be identified. Furthermore, it should be possible to have a more flexible approach to ensure that it remains a dynamic process and not one that is closed as if all needs are satisfied. This will require patience from the mine, and willingness on the part of the community to exclude certain role players that are misleading them in their expectations. The affected community can for example decide that no political parties may be involved in the MIDR process.

4 Patronage network complexes

The problem of patronage network complexes relates to the problem of political distortion in the sense that other parties get involved and complicate matters. In this case the problem is that the affected community gets bigger because more people want to benefit from the potential resources of the mine. Extended families are for example suddenly included as part of the affected community, and the issue of compensation gets bigger and bigger. This problem can stall negotiations and the actual MIDR, which causes more stress and uncertainty for the original affected community.

Ricoeur's understanding of humans that are fallible is of importance here. Humans are fragile, according to Ricoeur, in the sense that our passions can easily become so dominant that it can become something destructive and evil. For example, the passion for possessions is something that is needed, and it can have innocent forms according to Ricoeur, like the positive acceptance of my body as *my* body. To possess can, however, become so dominant that it can destroy our humanity, because we allow this passion to sacrifice other people for the sake of possessions. Our own humanity is then lacking.

Regarding the problem of patronage network complexes there are two things to consider if we keep our fallibility as human beings in mind. The first is that the mine will always try to possess as much as possible, because of its nature as a business that exist to make profit. Mine management should be aware of this danger and guard against this possible inhuman approach to possessions and profits. The same applies to the affected community, who should not approach the MIDR negotiations and process with a mindset that they want to gain as much as possible for as many as possible people. In such a mindset they will allow the desire for possessions to dominate the negotiations and will not pursue a possible outcome where their humanity is respected. Such possible greediness may compromise their fair claims for compensation for the loss of place and for the social disruption caused by MIDR. Again, Ricoeur's ethical motto of fairness to myself, others, and the creation of just institutions is applicable here. If the community expects the mines to be fair in their approach and compensation, they should be fair in who they include as the potential beneficiaries.

5 Mining town syndrome

The mining town syndrome refers to the fact that relocated communities prefer that the mining companies (and not the local municipality) continue to provide municipal services to them. They expect the mines to not only build and maintain houses but to provide water and electricity and other municipal services for free or cheaply. When this expectation of the affected community is indeed met by the mines, the communities often lose their independence and autonomy. Communities only realise this after the MIDR, which leaves them unhappy afterwards.

One way of dealing with this problem is to make sure the resettlement action plan includes as many as possible of the factors impacting on the affected community. Ricoeur emphasised in his understanding of hermeneutics that we should aim to reconstruct in our communication a world that would 'truly' be the 'thing' so that we can honestly engage with each other. This requires that all factors impacting on the affected community should be communicated even (or especially) if the

community does not know these things in advance. This will help to create an honest relationship and build trust, which is crucial for fair negotiations.

In Ricoeur's hermeneutics, trust is the basis for understanding, although he is aware of other factors that influence understanding. His hermeneutics of suspicion is not a rejection of the possibility of understanding, but rather part of the hermeneutical circle. In other words, he allows for understanding to be critical of where one starts, and of where and how one's own self-understanding and tradition influence one's initial understanding. For example, the community should be aware of their need for sustainable and subsidised basic services to be provided by the mine, but within the hermeneutical circle they should be able to re-evaluate the value they contribute to it. Further discussions in the hermeneutical circle leads to a better understanding of one's own initial starting point, and it develops it further for the next round of discussions and understanding. The process of understanding thus remains open and dynamic, and it requires that one will be self-critical of one's own views. Practically it means that affected communities might want to change their views and negotiate for some other arrangement regarding the provision of basic services by the mine.

6 Corporate social responsibility

As mentioned in chapter one, corporate social responsibility (CSR) creates some expectations among the affected communities in the context of MIDR. Mine management often just comply with the minimum requirements of CSR, while affected communities see this as a further means to be compensated for the MIDR. Affected communities also have expectations that they will get opportunities for employment by the mine after MIDR, as part of the CSR of the mine. These different perspectives of CSR in the context of MIDR can potentially lead to conflict between the parties.

What makes this situation more complex, is the fact that the mining industry has become unpredictable due to the volatility of the market. In this context mining companies are responding furthermore to increasing pressure to conduct their operations responsibly. The implementation of CSR projects in their host communities is therefore of huge importance and the expectations are already high – even if MIDR is not part of the picture. Unsurprisingly, these CSR projects do not always satisfy the host community. Critique against these CSR projects are, among others, that they are mere public relation exercises by the mines, while the poverty levels of the host communities remain high. What makes this situation worse for the mines, is that coal mines in particular depend on the liquidity of Eskom, on the political temperature of the host communities and on the state of ownership at a given time. All three these aspects are often highly volatile.

At a practical level, the key demand of critics of CSR is that for CSR to be anything other than greenwash, it must guarantee that companies are accountable for the direct and indirect impacts of their activities. It is apparent that in any such assessment, the scale of analysis is an important factor. MIDR activities might then become part of such an analysis. Furthermore, in South Africa, the sheer magnitude of socio-economic problems, from malnutrition and HIV to illiteracy and homelessness, inspires a turn toward all available sources of aid, most notably corporations. Especially when those problems are juxtaposed to the wealth-creation capabilities of firms or to the ills that firms may have helped to create, firms become an understandable target of appeals. On the other hand, a sturdy and persistent theoretical argument in economics suggests that such corporate involvement is misguided. It “may be neither permissible nor prudent to devote corporate resources to redress social misery” (Friedman, 1970:17).

To look at Ricoeur for answers to these many questions regarding CSR and MIDR might initially appear futile, but there are some valuable points in Ricoeur’s philosophy to repeat, and to apply to some extent, in the context of these problems. The first of these relates to the previous point of the mining town syndrome, where the emphasis was on the disclosure of all relevant information and factors that may impact MIDR to make it fairer. In the case of CSR it would entail that the mines should communicate clearly, at all stages of the MIDR negotiations and implementation, what the role of CSR is, what the aim of it is, what their budget is, etcetera. Of course, mines should rethink how CSR can benefit the affected communities of MIDR, but in most cases it has a different purpose. Affected communities should be informed about realistic expectations in this regard.

Furthermore, it will require both the mines and the affected communities to rethink their stance on resources and how greed can become a problem, or even something evil, as Ricoeur argued. Mine companies cannot just think about CSR as a compliance exercise or as a mere public relations exercise, while they are not willing to sometimes provide more than what is required by law. Then CSR will always fail to address the challenges in the host communities. The affected communities, on the other hand, should know that there can only be so many expectations from the mines. Other communities also have expectations and there are limited resources to share. Both parties should be cautious of greed – this point will be discussed in more detail below in the context of the problem of compensation with MIDR.

7 Compensation

It has already been stated that compensation is a constitutional right for the affected communities of MIDR. This compensation can be a combination of land, houses and monetary payouts. What exactly is fair compensation, is problematic, however. The market value of the property, for example, is not the only thing the affected community will lose with MIDR, but also the social, spiritual and cultural attachment to the land and its spaces. How to compensate communities for these losses remains a complex issue, and if mines only think about the monetary value of the land in a Western framework, the affected communities will never be compensated enough. Thus, according to Ricoeur's explanation of the hermeneutical circle, mine management should be willing to rethink their initial understanding (of land) that is based on their tradition (monetary value) to be criticised and rethought within their understanding of land as something more spiritual, for example. More possibilities of thinking about land (e.g., a different ontology of land) are needed to ensure fair compensation in the end.

To formulate this in a different way (and to get better insight in Ricoeur's philosophical value on this point), the seminal article of Verhoef and Rathbone (2015) is helpful. They argue that economic justice is not a simple concept or task. It involves a complex interaction between people and goods – an interaction which must secure the sustainable livelihood and dignity of people and responsible engagement with the environment. They argue that this system should be fair and open, and although this might sound idealistic, it indicates the complexity of economic justice. What is needed, according to them, is a more encompassing ontology of land that is inclusive of the diversity of ontological dimensions of land to address injustices. Thus, the ontology of land should be broadened to include different traditions' understanding of land. It should be an ontology of land that moves beyond the reductionist constraints of modernism. It may also create a constructive point of departure to discover other ontologies of the African context.

Ricoeur's philosophy and views on narrative and imagination are helpful on this point, as a theoretical lens to engage the full complexity of the ontology of land. Ricoeur argues for the inclusion of alternative stories in the search for justice that invites other discourses to be part of a normative and more inclusive ontology of land. This is needed, because Ricoeur argues that communities are formed by their stories. These stories are subject to hermeneutical critique and suspicion, and in this hermeneutical process a need for an alternative memory arises for a community to become more empathetic and ethical. As part of this alternative memory of a community, a social imagination develops, which creates new social realities (by implication of land then). So, in a community's

narrative understanding, a creative reinterpretation of its past (or tradition) must take place wherein its myths must be exposed, but not rejected.

This means that mine management cannot merely reject affected communities understanding of land as of much more value for them regarding their history, identity, spirituality and culture. A price tag cannot be given to these things and mine managers should at least realise this with the negotiations and especially the compensation of MIDR affected communities. There is something priceless that needs to be compensated for by the mines and that should be respected, in Ricoeur's explication of the need to include others' stories as part of their identities, by the mine management.

There is another conundrum when it comes to compensation: both parties may see each other as greedy. However, to view humans as "desiring machines" is to emphasise the reductionism of people which is taking place in our consumerist culture (Kearney, 2004:108). People are manipulated through the media to desire more things and certain things to be fulfilled or happy (as also discussed under the problem of false needs). Land would be a typical example of something which is desired, but in this context, it can be only to gain more possessions through compensation when it is lost. Again, the question of fair compensation is complicated by external factors (as with political distortion and the patronage network complex), and in this case Ricoeur's understanding of greed is important. As explained before, greed (as the desire for more possessions) can quickly become something obsessive for us as human beings; and that can be destructive and even evil for our humanness. Both parties – the mine and the affected community – should be wary of this in the calculation and negotiation of fair compensation.

8 False needs

False needs are created by the societies and economic structures we live in as discussed by Marcuse (as highlighted in chapter one). These false needs are used to manipulate people to do things, and it can be destructive to be caught up in this endless spiral of false needs. As mentioned in chapter one, the result of false needs is the loss of genuinely critical thought and a willing submission of the individual to an established system that serves dominant interests – those of politicians and other stakeholders and not of the affected community, for example.

Such false needs are not only affecting poor communities (like most affected MIDR communities) but also middle class and rich people. In South Africa the post-1994 Black middle class (BMC) has for example significantly expanded alongside millions of the working class, the poor and unemployed. Despite its numeric insignificance, the social, economic, and political role of the Black

middle class, its “wealth, patterns of consumption, style of life, and moderating or revolutionary tendencies” has long held the interest of the academic community (Kuper, 1965:10). How this new middle class spends their income gives a good indication of what they consider as needs, for example. Affordability in this context means the ability to meet the expenses of the “basic” necessities of life, but it can also be described as the “trappings of middle-class life”, such as a house, car, food, private education for their children, a holiday and credit. These things give an indication what people aspire to, and will probably also be on the list of needs of the affected communities of MIDR .

With his hermeneutics of suspicion, Ricoeur can at least give some pointers for distinguishing real needs and to avoid false needs dominating the negotiations and implementation of MIDR. To understand one’s own desires and interpretations, one should be critical about the underlying and often invisible forces at play. Ricoeur listed the sexual forces in our subconsciousness (Freud), the will to power (Nietzsche) and our economic needs (Marx) as three major forces that influence our understanding not only of ourselves, but of our entire world. With false needs we are in the domain of the economic, and although it will always be present, we can at least become more critical of it and distance ourselves from it if we are more aware of these influences. This will be the challenge for mine companies as well as affected MIDR communities when they think about their needs when it comes to compensation.

9 Negotiations in the MIDR process

Many problems with negotiations in the MIDR process have been highlighted in chapter one. These include the differences in education of the parties; the fact that affected communities only realise retrospectively what they should have negotiated for; the power asymmetry within the negotiations; cultural protocols; and communities’ need to consult the Nyanga in certain instances. The negotiation processes are furthermore often not inclusive, and unfair time constraints put pressure on both parties.

Two further aspects that complicate the negotiation process of MIDR should be highlighted here. The first is discussed by Croll and Parkin,(1992) namely the fact that the affected community and the mine management are guided in the negotiations by decidedly different points of departure. The mine management is always negotiating as a unit, while the affected community struggles with social stratification originating in the access to resources, which in turn is deeply embedded in the history of the place. Families literally fall apart due to the negotiations, because of complicated webs of

socioeconomic relations and structures, whereas concurrently the land that always had been a “moral and spiritual entity” (Croll & Parkin, 1992:18), now becomes despiritualised before their eyes. These aspects have been mentioned as part of the problem of place attachment, but with the negotiations it creates huge tensions within the affected communities.

Another pertinent point in negotiations is the question of participation and of agenda. A carefully prepared agenda is essential for the affected community’s ability to participate and meet the demands at the negotiation table. Croll and Parkin argue that an agenda is the foundation for a well-functioning participation; but the reverse is also true, as informed participation is the basis for a well-prepared agenda. Developing an agenda is difficult for the local community because they have no experience with MIDR projects. Negotiations in MIDR projects can be protracted, complicated and confusing. The parties get exhausted, meetings escalate in number and can take on almost ritualised forms, whereby the ‘actors’ take on their respective roles and fulfil their obligations towards their audiences. This is true for both the mine management and the affected communities’ representatives. The front stage is where all members are gathered, but there is also often a backstage where negotiations take place with a few selected members.

There are thus practical and more fundamental problems and challenges with the negotiations of MIDR, and it is truly challenging to find fair and practical solutions in this context. Ricoeur’s philosophy can be of great value here, because he thinks in a very positive sense about understanding each other (which is a fundamental principle of negotiations). Although he is known for his hermeneutics of suspicion, he is not trapped in a scepticism and will always emphasise that trust is fundamentally what makes communication possible. One should be critical about your own position and from where you speak, but one should also allow for the hermeneutical possibilities to create a constructive understanding. Precisely because we can communicate, the differences among us are never absolute. Though each of us has an individual identity, our identities show that we are bound up to others: “Man is this plural and collective unity in which the unity of destination and the differences of destinies are to be understood through each other” (*Fallible Man*, 138). This humanness that we share, should then be the basis of negotiation that is about dialogue between equal partners.

For Ricoeur, the kind of unity that binds people to one another despite their differences, is found in their desire for esteem and recognition. This desire seeks genuine mutuality that expresses esteem for the worth that each of us has by reason of both our common humanity and our individual uniqueness. This esteem positively values the disproportion constitutive of every person. This theme of mutual recognition is developed more fully in Ricoeur’s final book, *The Course of Recognition*, where

he argues that it goes beyond mere reciprocal recognition, like that found in commercial or other transactions reducible to an exchange of goods with no regard for who the other relevant party might be. This recognition of others' humanity allows for negotiations to be potentially more inclusive and respectful.

With regard to the unequal power relationships between the mine management and the affected community, it should be kept in mind that the mine management have extensive human, technical, economic and political resources; whereas the affected people in the local community have less extensive resources of all kinds, and also less experience. Furthermore, the affected community is doing this kind of negotiations for the first time, while the mines might have extensive experience of the process. The empowerment of the affected communities is thus crucial to ensure fair negotiations, and the affected communities should for example be made aware of the potential consequences of their choices on a socio-economic, political, and cultural level.

Conclusion

The aim of the third chapter was to investigate to what extent Ricoeur's philosophy can be applied to and be of value for the different problems of MIDR as identified in the first chapter. The principles and philosophical insights from Ricoeur's work (as discussed in chapter 2) were considered in terms of the ethical and practical challenges of MIDR.

At the heart of Ricoeur's philosophy is respect for others. His philosophical anthropology in particular advocates a more encompassing view of human beings that is centred on respect for others. This principle was applied in this chapter to the nine challenges of MIDR, while some other aspects?? of Ricoeur's work, such as his hermeneutics and his concept of happiness, were also used to address some of the ethical issues around MIDR. Various aspects have been highlighted in the discussion of how Ricoeur's philosophy can be of value for a more just implementation and negotiation of MIDR. These aspects need to be further developed and discussed, with the inclusion of various other philosophers and with experts in the field of MIDR, to make the process more meticulous and practical. Nevertheless, a number of good initial insights are found in Ricoeur's philosophy to aid and improve this process.

Conclusion

The main research question of this study was: *How can Paul Ricoeur's philosophy be of value in the process of Mining-Induced Displacement and Resettlement?* This question was broken down into three sub-questions (and consequently three chapters), namely:

What is MIDR and why is it problematic?

What are the main and relevant aspects of Paul Ricoeur's philosophy that might be of value to MIDR?

How can Paul Ricoeur's philosophy positively contribute to the process and implementation of MIDR?

These questions have been discussed in the chapters as planned, and in conclusion this study has indicated that Ricoeur's philosophy can be of value in many ways in the process of MIDR, to ensure that the process is fairer and more just in its negotiations and in its implementation. Respect remains one of the main features of Ricoeur's work, and that should be the basis for a fairer MIDR. Not surprising, a lack of respect was cited by the mineworkers as a core factor in one of the most devastating massacres experienced during post-1994, namely the Marikana massacre (Alexander, 2013).

The complexity of MIDR in South Africa, with all the socio-economic, cultural, and political challenges, makes this study of huge importance. We should respect each other, on all levels of society in South Africa; much more than we may realise. When sensitive issues like MIDR takes place, this respect should be pivotal. The philosophy of Ricoeur was valuable to show how MIDR can be conducted more justly, but the complexity of MIDR is of such a nature that much more research needs to be done to ensure that it will become a more just process. This study attempted to contribute meaningfully to such a quest.

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