CHAPTER 5

5. THE CRISIS OF THE SCHOOL IN THE 20TH CENTURY (ctd.): LEFT RADICAL
   CRITICISM OF THE SCHOOL

5.1 INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter the left liberals' criticism of the school and
their reforming ideas within the school system were discussed. Since the
left liberals put a strong emphasis on individuality and on individual
freedom of the child, they express their dissatisfaction with the existing
public schools which are in their view inhumane, repressive, and hostile
to human freedom and dignity. Thus, they have suggest(ed) various reforming
ideas to make the school a fitter place for free autonomous human beings.

With this movement of reform there has emerged a more fundamental and ra=
dical criticism of the modern society in general and of the school as a
social institution in particular. These so-called radical critics all
start with some or other kind of radical criticism of the modern society
which is to their mind an incurably sick society. Consequently, they are
not quite content with the liberal's efforts at reforming the school.

In the opinion of the radicals, the school as it currently exists in modern
society is not only beyond hope but also even dangerous to children. Thus,
they began to query the very right of existence of the school itself as
educational institution and have called for the de-establishment of the
existing system of schooling as a first step toward a positive solution to
the crisis of the modern school. The revolt is no longer against out-dated
curricula or ineffectual teaching methods, but against the essence and foun=
dation of the school as a social institution itself.

This chapter will be concerned with an examination of these left radical
criticisms of the school and of their alternative strategy to the present
school system. It is again not the purpose of this chapter to discuss all
their points of criticism and their suggested alternatives to the present

school system in detail. Only the general crisis line of the modern school
will be traced with respect to the left radicals' school ideas.

5.2 THE MEANING OF THE TERM "RADICAL"[1]

The term "radical" is derived from the Latin word "radix" which means
"root" or "origin". Radical, thus, usually means "going or penetrating
to the root" of the matter, posing fundamental problems, and advocating
an extreme and sweeping change from existing, usual, or traditional views,
habits, conditions, or methods. In this sense, the term "radical" has both
a negative and a positive meaning. In the negative sense, it implies a
threat to all aspects of ongoing life, and in the positive sense, it implies
a projection of a completely new version of human life and enterprise
(Bittner, 1968:294).

Radical thought and practice, in fact, cover a wide range of social life.
In politics, radical means revolutionary. In social relations, radical
means libertarian. In a school situation, it indicates unorthodox ways
of promoting learning that fall outside the scope of conventional, or even
innovative, school practice (Gross & Gross, 1971:14). At the centre of
all the radical thought and practice, however, there exists a strong con=
viction of the innate potentiality and freedom of man.

The original cause with which modern radicalism is associated has been the
attack on the traditionally inherited corporate structure of power. The
foremost object of the attack was, among other things, the belief that
only a select few, that is, an élite, had the wisdom, right, freedom, and
power to govern. This belief was never seriously challenged in previous
ages of Western civilization. However, the modern radicals have challenged
this belief and formulated in its place a doctrine that has proclaimed
every man the patron of his own life. They established the sovereign right
of all the people to order their common affairs (Bittner, 1968:296).

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1. The meaning of the term "left" is already defined in the previous
    chapter (cf. paragraph 4.2.1).

This shows that the modern radicals have put the ideal of human potentiality and freedom at the centre of their thought and practice. They are strong in their conviction that man is not something to be manipulated; he is always an autonomous, free and sovereign being.

For the radicals, thus, the problem is not man, but an evil system that forces men to do evil deeds (Gish, 1970:26). Like the liberals, the radi= cals also see modern society as being in deep trouble. But in the eyes of the radicals, all existing conditions and customs are so corrupt that they must be completely changed. They see little hope for reforming the existing social system. It must be overthrown and replaced by a new and rational order. This is, according to Gish (1970:30), probably the funda= mental difference between liberalism and radicalism.

Whereas the liberals accept the assumptions and needs of the establishment to be legitimate and thus choose to work within the system to bring about the changes they see as necessary, the radicals reject the very legitimacy of the establishment and doubt that meaningful change can be brought about through the existing structures. The radicals maintain that meaningful change must mean a change of the whole system. Basically they feel it is naive to think that one can bring about meaningful change from within the system. Therefore, they are talking about revolution and not reform. They are not interested in doing patchwork on the present system. They seek a new society organized on completely new lines (Gish, 1970:40).

Consequently, where the crisis of the modern school is concerned, there exists, for the radicals, actually no possibility to reform the school. They want to abolish the school as a social institution to the root. They no longer think in terms of reforming the school within the school system, but they think of the destruction of the school. The school is condemned to death by the radicals.

5.3 GENERAL OVERVIEW OF A LEFT RADICAL ALTERNATIVE
STRATEGY TO THE PRESENT SCHOOL SYSTEM

5.3.1 Orientation

Although we have differentiated, in this study, between two groups of
modern school critics, namely, left liberals and left radicals, it should
always be remembered that no clear-cut demarcation can be made between
the two groups. They have much in common: both stand on the left in the
sense that they do not accept Scripture as a norm in their life-concept;
both are highly dissatisfied with what is happening in schools at present;
both stand for the individual as against that which is taken to be the
oppressive and dehumanizing forces of institutions in contemporary society;
both make a passionate plea for an increase in personal freedom; both
have a deep-rooted faith in the individual and his potentiality for self-
realization; both believe in the need to transform education and the school
to meet individual and social needs in the modern world (Hargreaves, 1976:
186 - 187; cf. Ravitch, 1978:29).

The distinction between these two groups is made in this study mainly on
the basis of their ways of approach to the crisis of the modern school.
As has already been indicated in the previous chapter, those critics who
want to reform from within the school system are regarded as left liberals
and those who want to abolish the school as an institution are described
as left radicals (cf. paragraph 4.3.1). On the basis of this distinction,
Reimer, Goodman, Holt, Freire, and Illich were classified into the left
radical camp.

In the following paragraphs, the school idea of four left radical critics,
namely, that of Reimer, Goodman, Holt, and Freire, will be broadly outlined
in order to trace the general line of the school crisis with respect to
the left radical idea of the school. After that much more attention will
be given to Illich's school idea.[2]

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2. On the motivation for the specific choice of Illich, see paragraph 5.4.1.

5.3.2 Criticism of the school from the left radicals

5.3.2.1 Everett Reimer

Reimer's criticism of the school is based on his functional analysis of
what schools do. Reimer observes that different schools do different things,
but in common they perform four distinct social functions. These main
functions, according to Reimer (1971:23; cf. 1968(a):9/7),[3] are custodial
care, social-role selection, social indoctrination, and the education/
learning function. In performing the first three functions schools negate
any hope for the education and learning function.

First of all, schools are expected to provide a safe, healthy environment
and to be responsible for students during school hours. Reimer claims that
concern for custodial care, besides being expensive, is wholly inappropri=
ate since it extends childhood beyond its natural term.

> Money, however, is the least of the costs of providing
> custodial care in schools. The really important con=
> sequence of packaging custody with the other function
> of the school is the extension of childhood ... This,
> in turn, is only one aspect of the division of modern
> life into school, work and retirement (Reimer,1971:24).

Reimer (1971:25) believes that the custodial function puts the school well
on the way to its joining armies, prisons and insane asylums as one of
society's total institutions. By means of this custodial function, Reimer,
contends, schools pervade the lives and personalities of their students
in powerful and insidious ways and have become the dominant institution
in the lives of modern men during their most formative years.

Another major function of the school system is the sorting and certifica=
tion function, that is, to screen and certify future applicants for employ=
ment and other social roles. According to Reimer (1971:26), the major part
of job selection is not a matter of personal choice at all, but a matter

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3. Chapter 9, p. 7: each chapter starts numbering anew.

of survival in the school system. Age at dropout determines whether someone will be paid for his hands, body, or brain, and also how much he will be paid. Furthermore, in a schooled society, opportunities, that is to say, where one can live, with whom one can associate, and the rest of one's style of life, are to a large extent determined by this school achievement level.

The use of the school to sort the young for different kinds of jobs and social roles Reimer (1971:25) regards as wasteful and often disastrous in its results. Moreover, Reimer sees that by this sorting or social-role selection function schools hold out false hopes for the underprivileged and thus greatly further their frustrations. "... school is a handicap race in which the slower must cover a greater distance bearing the growing burden of repeated failure, while the quicker are continually spurred by success. Nevertheless, the finish line is the same for all and the first to get there win the prizes" (Reimer, 1971:28). In addition, the school punishes children for failing to learn what society is trying to teach them.

However, Reimer sees these as lesser evils and points to a greater evil, namely, that the school necessarily sorts its students into a caste-like hierarchy of privilege or social classes. Reimer sees nothing wrong with hierarchy itself nor with privilege, nor even with hierarchies of privilege, so long as these are plural and relatively independent of each other. But he sees everything wrong with a dominant hierarchy of privilege to which all others must conform. For instance, castes, property, and guilds have been the major mechanisms of social inheritance by which such a do= minant hierarchy can be maintained. In the modern technological world, Reimer (1971:29) contends, all of these means either depend upon or are replaced by the school. "No single system of education can have any other result nor can a dominant hierarchy of privilege be maintained in a tech= nological world by any means except a unified system of education" (Reimer, 1971:29).

In this way, says Reimer (1971:26 - 27), the school system has become the major mechanism for conserving social structure and has begun to monopolize education.

The third function of schooling which Reimer criticizes is that of social indoctrination. All schools, according to Reimer (1971:30), teach the value of childhood, the value of competing for the life prizes offered in school and the value of being taught what is good and what is true. In other words, all schools, for Reimer, indoctrinate and manipulate the child in effective ways. Reimer (1971:30) explains this indoctrinating function of the school in the following way:

> By the time they go to school, children have learned how to use their bodies, how to use language and how to control their emotions. They have learned to de= pend upon themselves and have been rewarded for initia= tive in learning. In school these values are reversed. The what, when, where and how of learning are decided by others, and children learn that it is good to depend upon others for their learning. They learn that what is worthwhile is what is taught and, conversely, that if something is important someone must teach it to them.

The indoctrinating function of the school is closely connected with the hidden curriculum, since the word 'indoctrination' is used loosely to imply the covert and perhaps quite unconscious forming of attitudes and beliefs (Barrow, 1978:131). In this sense, for Reimer, the indoctrination, social control or manipulation exercised by the schools, and the hidden curriculum are to some degree one and the same.

The hidden curriculum is implicit in the procedures and organization of the school and propagates the social myths. For Reimer, schooling is identical with social ritual which bridges the gap between social myth or ideology and social reality or practice. There is, for instance, equal opportunity, according to social ideology, which makes everyone's advance= ment depend solely upon his own personal qualities. In reality, Reimer does not believe that there is equal opportunity. Here, the school system, according to Reimer, perpetuates and validates what is in fact inequality by calling it equality and institutionalising it.[4] In the same way,

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4. On this point, Reimer points to the similarity between schools and churches. He (Reimer, 1971:19) explains that the school has become the universal church of a technological society, incorporating and transmitting its ideology, shaping men's minds to accept this ideology, and conferring social status in proportion to its acceptance.

Reimer views the reality of freedom as a social myth. Reimer also con=
tends that people are seduced by the rituals of democratic process, in
school and society, in accepting the discrepancy between the assumption
of freedom and the facts of domination and suppression. Likewise, pro=
gress and efficiency are also social ideologies or social myths which
are perpetuated by the hidden curriculum or the indoctrinating function
of the school (Reimer, 1971:45 - 53). Furthermore, this function of the
school, according to Reimer, produces habits of passivity and social con=
formity, an unthinking consumerism and a stifling of man's essential in=
dividuality and humanity.

Reimer also criticizes the educational and teaching function of the
school, since he (Reimer, 1971:37) objects that schools treat learning
as if it were the product of teaching. According to Reimer (1971:31),
cognitive learning, although it is declared to be the principal pur=
pose of schools, occurs only in so far as resources remain after the
custodial care, social-role selection, and value-teaching functions
are performed. Thus, when he considers rising costs and an increasing
population, Reimer does not believe that the present system of schools
will ever supply in the educational and teaching needs of the world's
people.

Reimer, therefore, argues that schools cannot hope to succeed in pro=
moting learning and education. "No country in the world," says Reimer
(1971:16), "can afford the education its people want in the form of
schools". Moreover, for Reimer, who is convinced that learning should
not be separated from other work and the rest of life, today's schools
seem to be totally designed to keep children from learning what real=
ly intrigues them in order to teach them what they ought to know.
As a result, says Reimer (1971:92), "children learn to read and do not
read, learn their numbers and hate mathematics, shut themselves off
in classrooms and do their learning in cloakrooms, hangouts and on
the road".

Accepting Coleman's view that home background, including the education
of parents, explains much more of the difference in student achieve=
ment than the quality of schools attended by these students, Reimer

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(cf. 1968(a):9/12) is of the opinion that language and mathematical
skills as well as science and the arts on which schools rest much of
their claim, in fact, can be learned more effectively outside the
school. "Even in a fully schooled society," says Reimer (1971:32),
"few children learn to read easily and well, although almost all learn
to speak easily and well, a skill learned outside of school".

5.3.2.2 Paul Goodman

Goodman's criticism of the school is closely linked with his criticism
of the over and wrongly technologized contemporary society. Goodman
(1971(a):25) realizes that schooling is simply a mirror of our society,
therefore he is not interested first and foremost in schooling.
Most of the abuses in the present school system, according to Goodman,
derive from abuses of the technological society. In his recent work
entitled New Reformation (1971) Goodman discusses the current society
where he thinks science and technology have become the mass faith or
superstition(cf. Goodman, 1971(b):3 - 63), and attacks the society
of our time as being in conflict with human nature. He claims that
the contemporary technological society has become destructively compe=
titive, over-centralized, over-bureaucratized and dehumanized, thus
it offers little outlet for human dignity, autonomy, freedom, and the
development of the full range of human potentialities. These condi=
tions of contemporary life, says Goodman (1971(b):49), "have certainly
deprived people, and especially young people, of a world meaningful
for them in which they can act and realize themselves".

Goodman sees the school in all of industrialized and technologized
societies as locked into that large society in supporting the system
and shaping itself after the patterns of the component of the system.
In Compulsory Miseducation, he (Goodman, 1971(a):23) accuses the schools
of not representing any human values, but fostering an adjustment to
a mechanical system. The main thrust of Goodman's thought points up
the functions that schools perform as an agent of society and serve
the system. Goodman (1962:125) says:

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> From the elementary grades, the schools as a
> whole are civilized society's chief instrument
> for the planned socializing of its young. This
> means that they must deal, generation by gene=
> ration, with persons who are growing, inde=
> terminate, and therefore somewhat unpredictably
> free.

If this so-called socialization function is a primary function of the
school, as Goodman maintains, then the goals of society are of necessity
the goals of education and schooling. In contemporary society he feels
that the goals that society asks those engaged in education and schooling
to pursue are the following: to fit the young for a useful life by
teaching them acceptable attitudes and skills that have a marketable value;
to perpetuate civilized society by manning society's fundamental pro=
fessions, religion, and government. Among the goals are the preparation
of the young for some form of immediate service, such as winning a war,
working for the corporations or working for the State. Above all, those
engaged in education should affirm with their authority the social
ideology, whatever it happens to be (Holderied, 1975:145). In this way,
according to Goodman, schools perform an insidious function of indoc=
trination into an ideology that supports and perpetuates the institution
of schooling itself.

Goodman (1971(b):49) also claims that the schools in contemporary techno=
logical society, like big industries, have become overcentralized and ad=
ministered on a top-down bureaucratic model. Like government and civil
service, they have become strongholds of regimentation, and they are or=
ganized along the lines of plant efficiency. Consequently, as in corpo=
rations, people in the school cannot pursue their own interests, use
their powers, exercise initiative, but must play the roles assigned them
in order to keep the system running. This over-centralized and over-
bureaucratized school system for Goodman, who wants to minimize the force
of institutions in society and to keep the individual as free as possible,
tends to obliterate the individuality of the students for the smooth ope=
ration of the system. The schools do not provide the necessary opportu=
nities for human growth, but rather thwart that growth through oppression
and mindless insistence on conformity. "... the crowding and scheduling

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in school allow little chance or time for personal contact. ... One
must be 'deviant' to be attended to as a human being" (Goodman, 1971(a):
60).

In all technologically advanced countries, the school systems are also
the chief cause of alienation of the young, and this alienation has con=
tributed greatly to the movement of the counter culture, Goodman contends
(cf. paragraph 3.7.1.2). According to Goodman (1971(b):68 - 69), in all
societies, until quite recently, most education of most children has oc=
cured incidentally, not in schools set aside for the purpose. Adults
did their economic work and other social tasks; children were not exclu=
ded, were paid attention to, and learned to be included. The children
were not formally taught. It is only in the last century in industrialized
countries, emphasizes Goodman, that the majority of children have got
much formal teaching at all, and it is only in the past few decades that
the school system has been massively extended into adolescence and furt=
her. Yet now, says Goodman, formal schooling has taken over very much
of the more natural incidental education of most other social institu=
tions. The other social institutions, and the adults in them, are no
longer in touch with youth, and the young do not know the adults in their
chief activities:

> Like the jails and insane asylums, schools isolate
> society from its problems, whether preventing crime,
> curing mental disease, or bringing up the young.
> And conversely, to a remarkable degree, vital func=
> tions of growing up have become hermetically rede=
> fined in school terms: being a good citizen is doing
> homework; apprenticeship is passing tests for jobs
> in the distant future; sexual initiations is high
> school dating; rites of passage are getting diplomas.
> Crime is breaking school windows, and rebellion is
> sitting in on the dean. In the absence of adult cul=
> ture, there develops a youth subculture (Goodman,
> 1971(b):70).

For Goodman, the most crucial element in education is providing the child=
ren with a worthwhile adult world in which to grow up. This means aban=
doning the direct forms of instruction in the school in favour of crea=
ting a total social environment worthy of children. Goodman (cf. 1971(a):

51, 61; 1970:181), thus, objects to the compulsory schooling system. Compulsory schooling is, for him, coercive and conformist, as well as generally inept. It is also a device to protect the society from the unemployed by putting them into concentration camps called schools. Furthermore, while compulsory schooling is supposed to ensure all children a certain equality of opportunity in an open expanding indus= trial society, in reality the schools have become stupefying and often like jails. The whole process of formal public education is, in Good= man's view, little more than a brainwashing enterprise and a universal trap. Thus, says Goodman (1971(a):43):

> The advance-guard problem is that the compulsory
> school system, like the whole of our economy, politics
> and standard of living, has become a lockstep. It
> is no longer designed for the maximum growth and
> future practical utility of the children into a
> changing world, but is inept social engineering for
> extrinsic goals, pitifully short-ranged. Even when
> it is benevolent, it is in the bureaucratic death
> grip of a uniformity of conception, from the univer=
> sities down, that cannot possibly suit the multitude
> dispositions and conditions.

5.3.2.3 John Holt

Holt's criticism of the school is based on his continuing observation of schools and children as a school teacher, and also on his functional analysis of the school.

First of all, through his careful observation of schools and children Holt comes to believe that schools create an environment within which the fear of failure and disapproval is the most influential motivating force affecting children. In the Foreword to How Children Fail, Holt (1969(a):xv) asserts that most children in the school fail to develop more than a tiny part of the tremendous capacity for learning, understanding, and creating with which they were born and of which they made full use during the first two or three years of their lives. The reason why children fail in the school, according to Holt (1969(a):xv),

is that they are afraid, bored, and confused. They are afraid of
failing, of disappointing or displeasing the many anxious adults around
them, whose limitless hopes and expectations for them hang over their
heads like a cloud.

The fear of failure and disapproval, for Holt, is directly related to
conformity. Holt (1969(a):3) classifies students into two groups, that
is, "producers" and "thinkers". Producers are those students who are
only interested in getting the right answers, and who behave well, that
is, in concert with the expectations of the school, while thinkers try
to think about the meaning, the reality, of what it is they are working
on. Holt's view is that schools reward the producer and judge him to
be a success, while disapproving of the thinker and judging him as a
failure. The examination and testing activities carried on at all le=
vels in the school provide substantial evidence that producing right
answers is the certain mark of success. Failure is never acceptable
or approved in school, in either a personal or an educative sense. The
creation of fear of failure and disapproval in children is thus a means
of controlling the behaviour of children and keeping them in line in the
school.

Children respond to such a school system by adjusting to its expectations
in several ways. After some experience, most children learn to seek
the right answers for their own sake and to avoid as carefully as possi=
ble the risks of independent or unconventional solutions to problems.
They do so, however, at the expense of their innate abilities for real
learning. Thus, Holt (1972:53; cf. 1969(a):167) says that "the schooling
of most children destroys their curiosity, confidence, trust, and there=
fore their intelligence".

Some children develop, according to Holt (1969(a):48 - 49), tremendously
ingenious strategies. The strategies are self-limiting and self-de=
feating, aimed at avoiding trouble, embarrassment, punishment, disappro=
val, or loss of status. Children withdraw their most intelligent and
creative capacities from the school scene and sometimes deliberately
"go stupid" to withstand the pressures. "To a very great degree," says
Holt (1969(a):157), "school is a place where children learn to be stupid."

This is, for Holt, the real failure that takes place in the school.

For these reasons, Holt maintains that the school's notion that its duty
is to teach children to think, is total nonsense. "We like to say,"
Holt says (1968:vii), "that we send children to school to teach them to
think. What we do, all too often, is to teach them to think badly, to
give up a natural and powerful way of thinking in favour of a method
that does not work well for them and that we rarely use ourselves."

Through his extensive observation of learning in infants and young child=
ren, Holt has come to the belief that man is by nature a learning animal.
"Birds fly, fish swim; man thinks and learns," says Holt (1968:189).
Based on this faith, Holt maintains that schools do not need to motivate
children into learning, by wheedling, bribing, or bullying. All what
the schools need to do is bring as much of the world as they can into
the school and the classroom and give children as much freedom and help
as they need and ask for.

However, Holt finds that most schools depend on the means of compulsion
or coercion which is in his view reprehensible and futile for real learning.
In this way, schools, according to Holt, destroy the identity, sense
of being, dignity, competence, and worth in children. Thus, Holt com=
pares the school to the jail or to the Army. "What is most shocking and
horrifying about public education today," says Holt (1969(b):134), "is
that in almost all schools the children are treated, most of the time,
like convicts in jail." In another incident, Holt compared a welcoming
pamphlet put out for new students by a junior high school with one that
the Army put out for recruits. "From the two pamphlets, the Army seemed
about a hundred times more friendly, welcoming, and pleasant than the
XYZ Junior High School" (Holt, 1969(b):137). Holt contends that the
Army is probably less destructive psychologically than the schools.

Holt's view of schools is thus somewhat uncompromising:

> Schools seem to me amongst the most anti-democratic,
> most authoritarian, most destructive and most dan=
> gerous institutions of modern society. No other
> institution does more harm or more lasting harm to
> more people or destroys so much of their curiosity,
> independence, trust, dignity, and sense of identity
> and worth (Holt, 1975:188).

Holt also criticizes the school based upon his functional analysis of what schools do. Like Reimer, Holt (1976(b):242 - 255) observes that schools perform various social functions. They are the custodial or jail (or corral, in Holt's word) function, social role selection or channelling (or grading and labelling) function, indoctrination function, and educative function.

Holt (1976(b):242) insists that society demands of schools that they be a place where for many hours of the day, many days of the year, children or young people can be shut up and so got out of everyone else's way. This so-called custodial or jail function, according to Holt, is an expres= sion of the adult's general dislike and distrust of the young. Holt's view is that at any time some students feel that they are in school, not because they want to be but only because a superior force has compelled them to be there, thus they are not very likely to learn anything. The result of this compulsory school attendance, Holt (1976(b):244) points out, makes humane involvement in learning impossible for learners and teachers alike, so that neither the teacher nor the school can get any kind of feedback to discover what learning experiences students would choose and persist in. In this sense, Holt argues that this custodial or jail func= tion is quite obviously in conflict with the humane function of true edu= cation, of encouraging and helping human growth.

Social role selection or channelling is another social function or task. This function which might also be described as the grading and labelling function, according to Holt (1976(b):247), is the business of turning people into commodities, and deciding who goes where in our society and who gets what kinds of jobs and roles in society. Holt acknowledges that all so= cieties have methods for accomplishing selection of vocational and social roles, but he strongly objects to their being in schools. Holt's point is that this channelling is not a task schools do or can do well. "Almost

nothing in experience," argues Holt (1976(b):247), "supports the widely held idea that by looking at what a person has done in school we can tell what he will be able to do outside of school." Furthermore, if schools perform this kind of "cream separator" function, we are going to have many more losers than winners. The separation of children into losers and winners, according to Holt, must result in incalculable harm to both alike. Therefore, he (Holt, 1976(b):250) argues that schools cannot perform the truly educative function and at the same time the grading and labelling function.

Another important function of the schools is indoctrination, getting the children to think whatever the adults, or at least politically powerful adults, think, or want the children to think. As in most if not all societies, says Holt (1976(b):250), the schools explicitly indoctrinate children and young people with the conventional ideas about patriotism, which inevitably conveys a sense of common interest and a sense of assumed superiority. This kind of indoctrination Holt finds simple and direct enough and less objectionable than the training in consumer attitudes, which are often very strong and all the more damaging because they are accepted by all persons involved without much consciousness or analysis of their long-term consequences. Schools also indoctrinate people in such a manner that a few winners and a great many losers emerge. Schools se= parate and label children, and they must be convinced that there must al= ways be a few winners and many losers, that no other human arrangement is possible, and that no matter whether they become winners or losers they deserve whatever comes to them (Holt, 1976(b):250 - 254).

All above-mentioned social functions are, according to Holt (1976(b):242), not the primary or legitimate function of the schools. Today's schools have acquired these functions slowly, over many years, even if not having been deliberately planned. Holt maintains that the prime, legitimate, humane mission or function of the schools is the educative mission, that is, to promote the growth of the children in them. The problem or crisis of the modern school, for Holt, lies in the fact that the schools do not perform the educative function fully and properly. Schools, according to Holt (1976(b):242), fail to develop innate human qualities to the fullest extent:

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...in among other things awareness, responsiveness,
curiosity, courage, confidence, imagination, re=
sourcefulness, patience, generosity, sympathy, skill,
competence, and understanding; in the ability to see
a wide range of choices, to choose wisely among them,
and to recognize and change choices that prove to be
unwise; in a strong sense of his own freedom, dig=
nity, and worth, and of those same qualities in oth=
ers.

5.3.2.4 Paulo Freire

Freire does not pay much attention to the specific problem of the school
itself. He did his work especially among the poor and illiterate peasants
of Latin America, and his attention was mainly on the issues immediately
surrounding adult literacy training. He, thus, simply ignored formal
schooling or the school system itself in his educational works (Van der
Walt, 1982(b):1902). However, we can draw some implicit conclusions
regarding his criticism of the school from his discussion of the so-cal=
led humanizing pedagogy which he believes can help the poor and illite=
rate to break out of their oppression.

Although his family was middle class, its economic underpinnings were
swept away by the pervasive pressures of the Great Depression. Young
Freire experienced a life of hunger and despair and came to share the
listlessness and lethargy of the poor. This sharing of the life of the
poor also led him to the discovery of what he describes as the "culture
of silence" of the dispossessed.

In the culture of silence, says Freire (1970(a):213), the masses are
"mute" when prohibited from creatively taking part in the transformations
of their society and therefore prohibited from being. Freire believes
that society's entrenched institutions, which are in the control of the
upper classes or the oppressors, have propagated a system of myths. This
system of myths supports the status quo and discourages any real questio=
ning of the Establishment (Conti, 1979:39). Manipulated by a system of
myths, the oppressed, according to Freire (1973:11), were merely kept
submerged in a situation in which critical awareness and response were

practically impossible. The were never encouraged and equipped to know and respond to the concrete realities of their world.

The culture of silence can be a product either of simple ignorance or of domesticating and dehumanizing education itself (Spring, 1977:63). By being kept in a state of simple ignorance, the oppressed can be locked in this culture of silence. On the other hand, domesticating or dehuma= nizing education contributes also its powerful forces to the production of the culture of silence. Because domesticating or dehumanizing educa= tion is bound to divide the consciousness from the world, and to consider the consciousness as an empty space within man which is to be filled with contents, this separation negates the power of reflection of the consciousness.

Education or schooling, for Freire (1974:18), cannot be neutral in the sense that it is always in the service either of the domestication and dehumanization of men or of their liberation and humanization. In other words, it is either an instrument to facilitate conformity to the present system or a process for helping people to deal critically with the realities of their world. The proclaimed neutrality of schooling in it= self means, for Freire, nothing less than a mystification, a convenient ideology that hides the political function of schooling (Giroux, 1981:129).

From this perspective, Freire argues that the content of knowledge trans= mitted in the school has nothing to do with the wretched peoples' real concrete situations. Consequently, by means of schooling the people are alienated from themselves and their own problems. Moreover, they are in= doctrinated or manipulated by schooling to accept the values of the existing system uncritically. "Education as the exercise of domination," says Freire (1973:65), "stimulates the credulity of students, with the ideological intent (often not perceived by educators) of indoctrinating them to adapt to the world of oppression." This implies that the function of cultural preservation of the school, indeed, perpetuates the values of the dominating classes who organize school education and determine its aim. When schooling is oriented toward this preservation, it is obvious to Freire that the main task of the school becomes to adapt new genera= tions to the existing social system.

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Freire's criticism of the so-called banking concept of education (cf. Freire, 1973:57 - 62), implies that the school system in present society functions as one of the major instruments for the maintenance of the culture of silence. In the banking concept of education, knowledge is misconstrued as a gift to be bestowed by those who consider themselves knowledgeable upon those whom they consider to know nothing. In a school setting, this pattern assumes that the teacher is the source and reposi= tory of knowledge and that the student is an object into which knowledge is placed. The student is never regarded as a subject in the learning process:

(1) the teacher teaches and the students are taught;
(2) the teacher knows everything and the students know nothing;
(3) the teacher thinks and the students are thought about;
(4) the teacher talks and the students listen - meekly;
(5) the teacher disciplines and the students are dis= ciplined;
(6) the teacher chooses and enforces his choice, and the students comply;
(7) the teacher acts and the students have the illu= sion of acting through the action of the teacher;
(8) the teacher chooses the program content, and the students (who were not consulted) adapt to it;
(9) the teacher confuses the authority of knowledge with his own professional authority, which he sets in opposition to the freedom of the students;
(10) the teacher is the Subject of the learning pro= cess, while the pupils are mere objects (Freire, 1973:59).

According to Freire (1973:60), this banking method of education and school= ing regards the learner as an adaptable and manageable repository. More= over, the fact that the banking theory turns the learner into an object reflects the assumption that the fundamental problem is not with society but with the individual. The goals of schooling, then, is to change the behaviour of the learner so that it conforms to the needs of the society (Spring, 1977:69). In this manner, the banking approach undermines or annuls the learner's critical consciousness and eventually strengthens his credulity - and therefore ultimately serves the interests of the op= pressors. Thus, Freire believes that the more students work at storing the deposits entrusted to them, the less they develop a critical conscious=

ness.

In other words, if they learn well and progress in the school, they are all the more alienated from their own miserable situations and even ab= sorbed in the structure of the ruling and affluent class in society. Therefore, Freire (1973:63) defines the educated man as follows:

> The educated man is the adapted man, because he is better 'fit' for the world. Translated into prac= tice, this concept is well suited to the purpose of the oppressors, whose tranquility rests on how well men fit the world the oppressors have created, and how little they question it.

In short, it is obvious from the above discussion that Freire's criticism of the school is mainly focused on the dehumanizing or manipulating function of the school. This can be explained in view of his philosophy which is heavily influenced by Latin America's historical social-class rift.

5.3.3 Alternative strategy suggested by left radicals

5.3.3.1 Reimer: democratic institutions

In seeking alternatives to the present school system, Reimer first propo= ses some premises or assumptions for alternative strategy in order to avoid the pitfalls of schooling. In the first place, alternatives to schools, according to Reimer (1971:89; cf. 1970:8/3), should be more eco= nomical as well as more effective than schools so that everyone can share in them. Secondly, alternatives must be plural so that monopoly may be avoided. Thirdly, alternatives should not manipulate individuals but should prepare individuals to direct and recreate institutions. Fourthly, alternatives should not separate learning from other activities of life, but pursue them as an activity in itself. Fifthly, alternatives should allow everyone the opportunity to learn what he needs to know in order to act intelligently in his own interests.

On these premisses, Reimer proposes a strategy for establishing a demo=
cratic institution, that is to say, a national system of resource cen=
tres. Reimer admits that it seems somewhat strange to use the very no=
tion of democratic institutions because institutions are so identified
with hierarchy, control, domination, privilege and exclusion. However,
democratic institutions, says Reimer (1971:83), offer a service, satisfy
a need, without conferring on some an advantage over others or conveying
the sense of dependence that institutions such as welfare agencies do.
Public utilities, for instance, would be such democratic institutions
since they are truly public and provide something useful. They are very
economic and effective since the bigger they get and the more of the popu=
lation they serve the more useful they are for everyone. Access to them
is at the discretion and initiative of the user, who may also leave the
service when he wishes. Use is not obligatory, and thus they are never
manipulative.

As opposed to the school system, democratic institutions, according to
Reimer, take the form of networks rather than production systems. Reimer
(1971:107 - 124) thinks of two kinds of networks. One is a network of
things and the other one is a network of people. Networks of things are
collections of educational things, particularly recording and filing sys=
tems such as books, tapes, discs, films, papers, punch cards, and computer
memories, so that it is always possible for the individual to find out
where to look for further information. Computers, which to some extent
take the place of books, are seen as the gateway to knowledge. Access
to these networks should be directly available to all with the minimum of
fuss and bother. Here, the quality of education depends only upon the
quality and completeness of the records which are available. Networks of
people include skill-exchangers, arrangements for peer-matching and access
to educators. Skill-exchangers are centres that provide access to skill-
models, which is to say individuals proficient in a particular skill.
Peers are equals deriving mutual benefit from their relationship. They
contribute more or less equally to each other's objectives. Peer relation=
ships are freely chosen and freely kept.

If schools are replaced by networks of educational objects, skill models and peers, contends Reimer (1971:121), the demand for educators will in= crease. These educators, however, perform different functions from those now performed in the school. The role of the educators is to facilitate the use of the more essential learning resources.

Behind Reimer's deschooling strategy, there lies his strong conviction or philosophy which puts a high premium on individuality and on the ideal of human freedom. Reimer takes seriously the belief that every individual has the right of maximum freedom from human constraint, so that the right of any man to impose either truth or virtue upon another can be denied. People who are free and can choose freely as individuals and in voluntary groups, according to Reimer (1971:39), can best make de= cisions for themselves when they have many alternatives to choose from. Freedom of choice is the characteristic of the ideal or good society for Reimer.

The implications of this philosophy of freedom, for Reimer, include denial of the right to monopolize anything which other men need, because such monopoly is and always has been used to violate their freedom. The mono= poly of institutions, which Reimer finds most apparent in the school sys= tem, is the obstacle to the freedom necessary for man's vital choices. The main reason why Reimer suggests alternatives to schools is that he thinks the schools close the door to humanity's escape from this monopoly. Therefore, Reimer is quite convinced that the answer to meeting the true educational needs of people include the de-establishment of the present monopoly of the schools. He sees no hope within the framework of the ideas of educational or school reform within the existing school systems (cf. Reimer, 1968(b):5/12; 1968(a):9/10, 11). Rather, he (Reimer, 1971:33) considers them as detrimental to both the privileged and the underprivileged. Reimer's objection is that A.S. Neill's Summerhill and schools patterned after it still teach dependence on the school (Lister, 1974:3).

Since Reimer (1971:10) thinks that people, in general, are unconscious of their habits, particularly their institutional habits,   he advocates a peaceful revolutionary movement among the people. For this purpose, he insists on abolishing or overthrowing the school system by law and building a democratic institution. Along with this legislative prohibition of an

established school, Reimer further suggests that what is needed is an ex=
tension of anti-discrimination laws to include schooling. Further, Rei=
mer holds that educational opportunity should also be equalized by dis=
tributing educational resources in an inverse ratio to present privilege
(Reimer, 1971:144 - 145).

According to Reimer, these three laws would effectively disestablish the
present school system as an educational monopoly. Although Reimer does
not see this alternative strategy of democratic institution as solving
all the problems, he does see it as an indispensable step toward a solu=
tion of the problems of the school.

5.3.3.2 Goodman: a diversified educational framework

Goodman's fundamental premise in seeking alternatives to the present
school system is that the whole community or society should be struc=
tured to facilitate the inevitable process of growth of the child, and
the schools only play a part in the over-all process. Goodman believes
that in a humane society the economic, political, and social institutions
could and should participate in the education of youth by providing them
with real and engaging experiences and the frequent company of adults
at work. "In my opinion," says Goodman (1971(a):106), "... a much more
reasonable overall pattern is to structure all of society and the whole
environment as educative, with the schools playing the much more parti=
cular and traditional role of giving intensive training when it is needed
and sought, or of being havens for those scholarly by disposition".

Goodman, however, blames the contemporary society for not being educative
in the sense of reflecting and transmitting a worthwhile culture to them.
The present society, for Goodman, has become over-centralized, over-bureau=
cratized and so dehumanized that it cannot meet the educational needs
of human individuals any longer. This, when coupled with his distrust
of the formal schooling system because of its damaging effects on the
development of children, leads him philosophically to the advocacy of a

social revolution. If incidental education is the only worthwhile edu=
cation and if the society at present cannot yield good incidental edu=
cation because its institutions are corrupt, then these social institu=
tions must be radically altered so as to create a humane and worthwhile
educative arena. This institutional revolution would, according to Good=
man, be achieved through radical decentralization of the institutions and
a return to participatory democracy. Only under these conditions are the
social institutions educative in a positive way (Berg, 1972:66). For this
reason, words like "decentralize", "dismantle", and "deinstitutionalize"
are the key words to Goodman's vision of an alternative strategy to the
present school system.

On this premise, Goodman first wishes to abolish the compulsory school
system and to dispense with teaching. As the schools are strongholds of
regimentation and mechanization, no growth to freedom occurs at all in the
existing school setting. In this situation, compulsory schooling is de=
structive not only of genuine learning and academic quality, but also of
personal dignity. It serves only the goals of an unhealthy social order
and not the human purpose toward which education is presumably directed.

In a word, the compulsory school system in this society is, for Goodman,
a human injustice. Goodman's bias is that teaching is largely a delu=
sion; people learn by practice, and not much by academic exercises in an
academic setting (Goodman, 1971(b):72 - 73).

Goodman also believes that no single mode of interaction between young
people and adults can account for the various individual needs and pro=
pensities that the schools purport to accommodate, that subjecting every=
one to the same kind of training necessarily does a great deal of harm.
Therefore, the present monolithic school system should be abolished and
the educational opportunities must be various and variously administered.

> Our aim should be to multiply the paths of growing
> up, instead of narrowing the one existing school
> path. There must be opportunity to start again
> after false starts, to cross over, take a morato=
> rium, travel, work on one's own. To insure free=
> dom of option, so that the young can maintain and
> express their critical attitude, all adolescents

should be guaranteed a living (Goodman, 1971(b):
87).

In practice, this means that the society provides the young with a di=
versified set of voluntary opportunities ranging from apprentice trade
programmes to high quality boarding schools for rich and poor students.
The chief use of schools in modern society, for Goodman, is their func=
tioning as a community because he believes that it is the community which
educates the young.

These are some of the general directions that Goodman believes alterna=
tive strategy to present schooling should take. In Compulsory Miseduca=
tion, Goodman (1971(a):32 - 33) also offers six possible proposals for
alternative ways of being educated:

> 1. Have 'no school at all' for a few classes ...
> 2. Dispense with the school building for a few clas=
>   ses; provide teachers and use the city itself as
>   the school - its streets, cafeterias, stores,
>   movies, museums, parks and factories ...
> 3. ... Use appropriate unlicensed adults of the com=
>   munity - the druggist, the storekeeper, the me=
>   chanic - as the proper educators of the young
>   into the grown-up world ...
> 4. Make class attendance not compulsory, in the man=
>   ner of A.S. Neill's Summerhill ...
> 5. Decentralize an urban school ... into small units,
>   twenty to fifty, in available store-fronts or
>   clubhouses ...
> 6. Use a pro rata part of the school money to send
>   children to economically marginal forms for a cou=
>   ple of months of the year ...

The above proposals reflect Goodman's radical thinking on education and
the school. In his proposals, Goodman seeks to change the basic insti=
tutional structure of schooling. Goodman's alternative strategy that
most schools should be eliminated and a diversified educational frame=
work, which would provide a variety of ways of growing up, should be pro=
vided for the young bears a similarity to Reimer's advocacy of establish=
ing democratic institutions. He (Goodman, 1971(b):86) shows plainly his
radical colours when he writes: "We must drastically cut back formal
schooling because the present extended tutelage is against nature and
arrest growth".

5.3.3.3 Holt: learning networks

In his early stage of thought, Holt was doubtlessly on the side of the left liberal or reformist camp. When he wrote How Children Fail (1964) and How Children Learn (1967) his main concern was with better teaching and better school environments. Since he has observed and be= lieved that children's intellectual and creative capacity was destroyed by adults who make children afraid of not doing what other people want them to do, of making mistakes, of not pleasing others, and of being wrong, Holt has maintained that giving children complete freedom in their own learning experience is most important. He, thus, defines the pro= blem of educational or school reform as the problem of somehow getting much more freedom into the schools. If we could find a way to do this, Holt believes (cf. 1969(b):138; 1968:viii), we can have a good education and school for all children. Therefore, he places emphasis on the idea of individual freedom.

By 1969, when Holt published The Underachieving School (1969), Holt however was moving away from the concept of schools. He was more pes= simistic, more angry, and generally more dogmatic than he had been in How Children Fail and How Children Learn (Hootman 1976:52). And with Freedom and Beyond (1972), Holt rejected schools and accepted the de= schoolers' idea, like Reimer, Goodman, Freire and above all else, Illich (cf. Holt, 1974:42). In this book, Holt shows how deeply he has been influenced by the deschoolers.

Holt's move away from the concept of the school as it is traditionally known and accepted comes from his rediscovery of the interplay of school and society. Through his continual analysis of the school and school problems he has realized that most serious problems or faults of schools, in fact, are inherent in the large society of which the schools are a part. In a "free school news-letter" that Holt contributed to in 1971, he said, "I do not believe that any movement for educational reform that addresses itself exclusively or even primarily to the problems or needs of children can progress very far ... I do not think we can treat as se= parate the quality of education in a society and the quality of life in

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general ... I am saying that truly good education in a bad society is a contradiction in terms" (Hootman, 1976:21).

Holt (1976(b):152 - 153) argues that schools can not do anything to render fairer the distribution of good jobs. Schools do not determine and cannot change the shape of the job pyramid. Here, Holt reasons that it is false and misleading to claim that schooling can benefit the poor, since the problem is not one of lack of credentials on their part, but one of the economic condition of society.

Holt (1976(b):216) refers to what he considers the needs of poor people. They need better, cheaper, more widely available, more effective arrange= ments and resources for learning. This learning refers to all the things they want and need to know from writing and reading to practical medi= cine, economics and law. They need a much freer, less restricted, and less expensive access to what learning opportunities there are in so= ciety. They also need a society in which there are many more opportuni= ties. This would mean a society committed to doing away with poverty and to making available and possible an active, interesting, and useful life to its members. These things are political needs and goals and none of these can be provided by schools and schooling.

When the problems of schools are seen in their many relationships to the problems of the larger society, then reforming efforts of the schools begin to seem increasingly a futile enterprise. Therefore, in Freedom and Beyond, Holt raises questions about the role of schools and eventually the premises of schools as institutions. Holt (1976(b):14) no longer thinks that any imaginable sum of school reforms would be enough to pro= vide good education for everyone, or even for all children. His point is that people, even children, are educated much more by the whole society arround them and the quality of life in it than they are by what happens in schools.

Holt looks beyond the question of reforming schools and at the larger question of schools and schooling itself. And he (Holt, 1976(b):14) raises the following questions: "Can they (schools) do all the things

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we ask them to do?" "Are they (schools) the best means of doing it?"
"What might be other or better ways?" To these questions about the
school, Holt's answer is eventually that the schools as they are cannot
possibly do what they are asked to do. The prime, legitimate, and humane
mission or function of schools, namely, their educative mission, is in
conflict with a number of other missions they have become engaged in.
The consequences of the school's exclusive involvement in performing
the other missions make Holt necessarily conclude that the schools as
they are can not be reformed. It follows that what is needed, especial=
ly for the poor and for minority groups, is the deschooled society.
Holt's (1976(b):236) radical statement is as follows:

> And even in the here and now it seems to me foolish
> to put all our hopes for a truly educative society or
> enlightened way of rearing children into the bas=
> ket of school reform. To ask or expect the schools,
> given their present functions, given our present un=
> derstanding of education, to be innovative and ima=
> ginative as a whole, consistently, and in the long
> run seems to me to be asking for the impossible.

In his latest book Instead of Education (1976(a):3 - 4), Holt adds:

> People still spend a great deal of time - as for
> years I did myself - talking about how to make
> "education" more effective and efficient, or how
> to do it or give it to more people, or how to re=
> form or humanize it. But to make it more effective
> and efficient will only be to make it worse, and
> to help it do even more harm. It cannot be re=
> formed, cannot be carried out wisely or humanely,
> because its purpose is neither wise nor humane.

As a left radical critic (or a deschooler), Holt's proposals for an al=
ternative strategy to the present school system are almost the same as
those of other deschoolers like Reimer, Goodman, Freire and Illich.
First of all, Holt (cf. 1969(b):28, 53 - 70; 1976(b):244 - 245) calls
for an end to compulsory school attendance. Testing, grading and label=
ling, the present graded curriculum (a sort of ladder of learning, in
Holt's phrase), ability grouping, credential requirement, and anything,
else that divorces learning from living should be totally abolished.
Instead, the notion of apprenticeships should be extended to a great

many fields. The advocacy of an increase in the apprentice system is
in line with Holt's thought that children should spend more time in the
actual world they shall be living in and learning from it.

These conditions of learning, for Holt, necessarily lead to a deschooled
society. By a deschooled society Holt does not mean a society without
any arrangements and resources for learning. He doesn't even mean a
society without any schools. By a deschooled society Holt (1976(b):
190) means a society in which everyone shall have the widest and freest
possible choice to learn whatever he wants to learn, whether in school
or in some altogether different way.

As an example of what he means, Holt (1976(b):217 - 235) suggests a way
or method of teaching reading without schooling. He assumes that his
alternatives to conventional reading instruction would be offered as
options to learners to use or not to use as they see fit. For this
purpose, he endeavours to find ways to make resources more available
than they are now. He suggests a reading guide switchboard where volun=
teers would answer questions about word meaning and spelling, a variety
of reading machines equipped with simple controls and visual and audio
components, signs naming all common objects along streets, storefront
libraries, and book-mobiles, all of these things being an aspect of public
service and not a part of the schools. In this manner, the alternative
strategy suggested by Holt is almost the same as Reimer's idea of demo=
cratic institutions and with Goodman's idea of a diversified educational
framework (cf. paragraphs 5.3.3.1 & 5.3.3.2). They all are essentially
speaking of educational or learning networks.

5.3.3.4 Freire: "conscientization"

As has been discussed in the previous paragraph (5.3.2.4), education or
schooling, for Freire, cannot be neutral; it is either an instrument to
facilitate conformity to the present system or a process for helping
people to deal critically with the realities of their world. To Freire,
it is purely myth to think that education, schooling, and politics are
separate; the fact is that they never have been separate, and are not

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separate now.

What Freire does is, thus, to ask educators and teachers to face up to this reality and to institute a politics of liberation in the place of the oppression now practised in schools.

Education and schooling, for Freire, are primarily concerned with humanization, with helping people to become critically conscious of the structure of oppression, of personal and social reality, and enabling them to act upon their consciousness. Conscientization is, therefore, the key concept in Freire's educational theory and practice.

Crucial to an understanding of Freire's concept of conscientization is his theory of the various levels of consciousness. Freire (1974:17 - 20; 1970(a):457 - 467) classifies several levels of man's consciousness. The lowest level of consciousness he calls intransitive consciousness. People at this level are preoccupied with meeting their most elementary needs. They lack a sense of life on a more historical plane. They are almost impermeable to challenges beyond the sphere of biological neces=sity.

The second level of consciousness is semi-intransitivity. This type of consciousness is typical of closed structures. People at this level take the facts of their sociological situations as "given". This form of consciousness is characterized by a fatalistic mentality, which views all of life as being related to destiny or fortune, forces beyond the control of man. Self-depreciation is a most common attribute of this level of consciousness, for the people have internalized the negative values that the dominant culture ascribes to them. This level of con=sciousness is also characterized by a strongly emotional style and by the practice of polemics rather than dialogue.

The third level of consciousness is naive transitive consciousness. Silence is not the characteristic of this level. A serious questioning of the situation begins, but at a naive and primitive level. This con=sciousness is more likely to see the cultural situation as being deter=

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mined by men. Populism is the characteristic at this level of conscious=
ness. People begin to sense that they have some control over their lives;
but the danger of manipulative populist leadership is very great at this
level.

The highest level of consciousness for Freire is critical consciousness.
This level is characterized by depth in the interpretation of problems,
self-confidence in discussions, receptiveness, a refusal to transfer re=
sponsibilities. The quality of discourse here is dialogical rather than
polemical. At this level the person scrutinizes his own thoughts; he
sees the proper casual and circumstantial correlations. This level is
achieved through the process of conscientization (Elias, 1976:53).

The process of conscientization, according to Freire, requires an active,
dialogical educational programme concerned with social and political
responsibility. Accordingly, Freire strongly rejects the banking con=
cept of education. He (Freire, 1973:66 - 74) proposes, instead, the
problem-posing education to help the oppressed identify and reflect upon
the injustices of their society. The method of problem-posing relies
on dialogue between the teachers and students to stimulate critical
thinking, creativity, and reflection upon reality. By means of dialogue,
the oppressed "name" their world, and the students and teachers exchange
viewpoints.

Freire began his work with illiterate peasants by entering into a dialogue
with them about the reality of their lives. As centres of sensitivity
were touched upon and words of real feeling mentioned - "poor", "rich",
"hungry", "water", and so on - they learned these more quickly and with
more perception than "cat", "hat", "dog", "Dick", or "Jane". Rather than
memorizing neutral or insignificant words, they were learning to read
and write significant words linked to an exciting theme. In this way
people were not only becoming literate; they were beginning to ask what
they could do about being poor, sick, hungry, and landless (cf. Freire,
1970(b):207 - 209; Brigham, 1977:5; Van der Walt, 1980(d):2; 1982(b):
1905).

To summarize, conscientization is the key concept in Freire's educational theory and practice. It means, for Freire, a courageous endeavour to demythologize reality, a process through which men who had previously been submerged in reality begin to emerge in order to re-insert them= selves into it with a critical awareness. In other words, it represents the development of the awakening of critical awareness.

5.4 RADICAL PROPOSALS CONCERNING EDUCATION BY ONE SELECTED
    LEFT RADICAL: IVAN ILLICH

5.4.1 Orientation

If A.S. Neill is counted as the most representative figure among the left liberals, Ivan Illich may be regarded as the best representative figure among the left radicals. Although a number of writers have favoured either total or partial deschooling, Illich has been most precise in his definition of terms, most radical and detailed in his alternative proposals, and most consistent in his advocacy of both deschooling society and completely non-directed learning (Goldberg,1976:560). More= over, Illich is the person who first publicised the term "deschooling" (Lister, 1974:2) in his book Deschooling Society (1971).

Illich's criticism of the school and his alternative proposals to the present school system are so radical and comprehensive that it would be no exaggeration at all to say that everything that could be said against schools has probably been said by Ivan Illich.

He has also exerted a tremendous influence on the so-called deschooling movement. The various designations for Ivan Illich, for instance, "the guru of the deschooling movement" (Barrow, 1978:127), "a modern-day Jeremiah" (Pratte, 1973:108), "a latter day Samson" (Clarke, 1983:16), "a man of the year in education" (Piveteau, 1974:393), "The prophet" (Vogel, 1980:135; Havighurst, 1972:404), and even "a madman, a mystic, and a male-factor" (cf. Piveteau, 1974:394), clearly show Illich's impact

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and his influence on the scene of education and schooling in contemporary times. In this sense, Piveteau (1974:393), a professor of education at the Institut Catholique in Paris and at the University of Louvain in Belgium, described Illich as the man who "has burst upon the world with the energy of a volcano or an earthquake". For these reasons, Ivan Illich has been selected for closer scrutiny. Special attention will be given to his school idea in the following paragraphs.

5.4.2 Biographical sketch of Ivan Illich[5]

Illich was born in Vienna, Austria, in 1926. His education includes the study of Crystallography at the University of Florence, a doctorate in history from Salzburg University, and degrees in Philosophy and Theology from the Gregorian University in Rome. Illich was ordained as a Roman Catholic priest in Rome.

After emigrating to the United States, he served as an assistant pastor in an Irish-Puerto Rican parish in New York City until 1956. In 1957 he was assigned as Vice Rector of the Catholic University of Puerto Rico, a position he held until 1960. While in Puerto Rico he founded the In= stitute of Intercultural Communication and was a member of the Common= wealth Board of Higher Education.

In 1961, Illich went to Mexico to assist in the training of missionaries for Latin America. He quickly became aware that his students were not reaching the mass of Latin Americans. In fact, he found that they were actually strengthening the power of a privileged minority by operating school systems that would never reach the masses. Thus, he founded the Centro Intercultural Documentacion (CIDOC) in Cuernavaca, Mexico, for the development of effective leadership in Latin America. Contrary views between Illich and church authorities on the nature of missionary acti=

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5. Cf. also Havighurst, 1972:404, Spring, 1973:139, Holderied, 1975: iii, Ornstein, 1977:147, McGurrin, 1978:4, Illich, 1980:1.

vities in Latin American resulted in his severance of denominational
ties with CIDOC in 1968.

Illich's sharp insights on the critical relationship between man's mode
of existence and the contemporary society which supports him are deeply
rooted in his personal experiences and relationships with the Catholic
Church and its hierarchy in particular. Illich's critical views on the
institutions of society are seen as an extension of his censure of the
Church as an institution.

Illich's philosophical views on the nature of man and society would be
strongly influenced by his religious and theological background. Lots
of religious metaphors in Illich's writings, for instance, "schooling
as a pseudo-religion", "school as a new world religion", "school as a
sacred cow", "schooling as a ritual", "demythologizing of schooling",
the metaphor like "It is easier for a camel to pass through the needle's
eye than for a man who treasures education to see the world through the
eyes of the poor" (Illich, 1971(b):1464), become clearer when one under=
stands Illich's biographical background. Illich's radical proposals for
deschooling society should also be understood within the historical and
political context in which he has worked.

5.4.3 Illich's criticism of the modern school

5.4.3.1 Illich's view of modern society

Since Illich (1974(b):142) sees the crisis of the modern school as sympto=
matic of a deeper crisis of industrial society, his criticism of the
school and his alternative proposals to the present school system are
closely interrelated with his criticism of the modern society and his
ideas of how it needs to be changed. Therefore, a discussion of Illich's
criticism of the school and his alternative proposals to it must be pre=
faced by a brief review of his critique of modern society itself.

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In Celebration of Awareness (1980) and Deschooling Society (1974) Illich
maintains a consistent, sweeping attack upon modern technological society.
He decries the exesses of contemporary technology perpetuated by and upon
man. In this highly technologized society, contends Illich (1974(a):1),
everything is specialized and even non-material needs are transformed
into demands for commodities. For Illich, technology contrives to per=
petuate consumer addiction for unnecessary products and goods and thus
creates a highly materialistic society. This modern consumer-oriented
society, then, requires a type of character which is dependent on the
advice or service of experts for every action. In this way, man comes
to confuse process with substance and accept service in place of value.
Illich (1974(a):1) says:

> Medical treatment is mistaken for health care,
> social work for the improvement of community
> life, police protection for safety, military
> poise for national security, the rat race for
> productive work.

Illich's critique of the modern technological society is further developed
and explicated in terms of four myths of institutionalized values that
are said to characterize modern society: the myth of unending consump=
tion, the myth of value measurement, the myth of packaging values, and
the myth of self-perpetuating progress (Illich, 1974(a):38 - 43).

It is beyond doubt that Illich's criticism of modern society is premised
upon his positive conception of man and of his becoming. Illich, indeed,
puts a high premium on man's potentiality, perfectibility, autonomy and
on human freedom and dignity (cf. Illich, 1980:17 - 19). A highly tech=
nological, consumer-oriented society to Illich, however, is a dehumani=
zing force. It creates a form of alienation which destroys man's ability
to act. It also denies man's perfectibility and has the adverse effect
of diminishing one's individual autonomy to act. This society, then,
leads inevitably to physical pollution, social polarization, an⁻ psycho=
logical impotence. This is the major reason why Illich proposes to "de=
school" even the total ethos of the whole society. Everything that
violates or contradicts the basic nature of man is condemned by Illich
as evil.

However, Illich is not totally anti-technology and anti-materialistic. This is not entirely the case. "It is a mistake," says Illich (1975:37), "to believe that all large tools and all centralized production would have to be excluded from convivial society." (Illich, 1975:37) continues:

> What is fundamental to a convivial society is not the total absence of manipulative institutions and addictive goods and services, but the balance between those tools which create the specific de= mands ... and those complementary, enabling tools which foster self-realization.

It is clear from the above quotation that Illich is concerned about how mankind can control technology without sacrificing its personality and freedom ideal. The above quotation also clearly reveals how Illich has got entangled in a tension between two poles of the modern humanistic religious ground motif, namely, the freedom ideal and the science ideal.

Illich tries to keep a balance between two poles of the modern humanistic religious motif by means of bringing about the "deschooling of society".[6] Furthermore, Illich believes that schooling is a very major part of so= cio-economic, production-consumption structure of modern society, in= asmuch as its primary function is to socialize, to imbue members of so= ciety with patterns of thinking and behaving which fit them into exis= ting society (Götz, 1974:93). Therefore, to change the schooling process is, for Illich, to engage in total social reconstruction. For these reasons, Illich takes the school as the paradigm for his analysis of contemporary society. Accordingly, it must be remembered that Illich's analysis of the school and the school system applies to other service and product institutions of modern society as well.

5.4.3.2 A "Phenomenological" description of the school

Illich bases his school criticism upon his phenomenological description of the school, which he thinks reveals the general characteristics that

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6. Note that Illich falls into another dualistic tension, i.e. between contingency and firmness, when he tries to maintain a balance between the freedom ideal and the science ideal (cf. paragraph 5.4.3.6).

schools have, be they in Latin America or in the United States. It is also very important for Illich to define or describe the school first in order to search for alternatives in education.

He (Illich, 1974(a):25 - 26) defines the school as "the age specific, teacher-related process requiring full-time attendance at an obligatory curriculum".[7] By this he means that schools are those places where people are grouped according to age; where they are re-defined as pupils, a notion that is meaningful only in relation to teachers; places de= manding a near total dedication of time and energy; and, finally, places where pupils are made to face both an outwardly respectable and codified curriculum, and a hidden curriculum.

The age grouping, according to Illich (1974(a):26), rests on three pre= mises, thus far unquestioned: children belong, learn, and can only be taught in schools. The result is the mass production of "childhood" or the "Age of Schooling", which was in Illich's view unknown to most his= torical periods. The demand for the milieu of childhood, then, creates an unlimited market for accredited teachers. Yet, most learning, argues Illich (1974(a):29), occurs casually and pupils have never credited teachers for most of their learning. "We have all learned," says Illich (1974(a):28), "most of what we know outside school. Pupils do most of their learning without, and often despite, their teachers." Nevertheless, schools make a demand for full-time attendance on pupils and determine what they must learn, how they must learn, and when they must learn. What is worse, schools, according to Illich, necessarily have a hidden curri= culum and pupils are nakedly exposed to this hidden curriculum.

Illich assumes that his criticism of the school is confined to the above-mentioned schooling or school system which he described phenomenologi= cally. Thus, he is said to be not the enemy of the school, but of the school system (Piveteau, 1974:402). It should be pointed out here, how= ever, that Illich's criticism, in fact, goes beyond the school system or school as an institution, and even extends itself to the "idea" or "law"

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7. Reimer (1971:35) also defines schools as "institutions which require full-time attendance of specific age groups in teacher-supervised classrooms for the study of graded curricula".

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underlying the school.[8]   This point will become clear in the course
of discussing his school criticism and especially his alternative pro=
posals to the present school system (cf. paragraph 5.4.4).

5.4.3.3 The school and the "evil" hidden curriculum

The crux of the Illich's argument against the school lies in his convic=
tion that the school or schooling teaches its members a hidden curriculum
which is always the same regardless of school or place. It constitutes
the unalterable framework of the schooling system, within which all
changes in the curriculum are made. Moreover, it is taught much more
effectively than the formal curriculum.

What is then the content of this hidden curriculum and why does Illich
think it is "evil" and inimical to pupils? Illich presents numerous
details of the hidden curriculum which are communicated by means of
schooling itself. However, it would be enough for the purpose of this
paragraph to summarize only some of these details.

In the first place, it is, according to Illich (1974(a):1, 1970:56, cf.
Manners, 1975:639), the hidden curriculum of the school that teaches
children to confuse process with product, thus teaching with learning,
grade advancement with education, a diploma with competence, and fluency
with the ability to say something new. Illich, however, sees that learn=
ing is the human activity which least needs manipulation by others. Most
learning, according to Illich (1974(a):39), is not the result of instruc=
tion; it rather happens casually, and is the result of unhampered parti=
cipation in a meaningful setting.

In the second place, Illich contends that people are conditioned by the
hidden curriculum of the school to believe that schooling is inevitably
necessary. According to Illich (1971(a):45), the hidden curriculum con=

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8.   The "school-idea" will be discussed in more detail in chapter six
     (paragraphs 6.2.2 & 6.2.4).

veys indelibly the message that only through schooling can an individual prepare himself for adulthood in society, that what is not taught in school is of little value, and that what is learned outside of school is not worth knowing. In short, children come to accept uncritically the illusion of "extra scholam nulla salus", that is to say, "outside this school, no salvation" (Illich, 1971(b):1465).

In this way, once children have learned to need schools, all their acti= vities tend to take the shape of client relationships to other speciali= zed institutions. Hence the general reluctance to question the necessity of existing institutions. They become insatiable consumers of institu= tional services and products instead of being self-reliant individuals. On this point, Illich (1974(a):39) says as follows:

> Once a man or woman has accepted the need for
> school, he or she is easy prey for other insti=
> tutions. Once young people have allowed their
> imaginations to be formed by curricular instruc=
> tion, they are conditioned to institutional plan=
> ning of every sort .... This transfer of respon=
> sibility from self to institution guarantees
> social regression, especially once it has been
> accepted as an obligation.

In the third place, the hidden curriculum conveys the message that schooling is the most effective means for social mobility. The masses, especially the poor, are lured into believing that schooling is the golden key to "secular salvation". In other words, the hidden curriculum of the school teaches its members that schooling is a major condition or a form of compulsory insurance for entry into society. The compulsory schooling system was thus contrived to help equalize educational opportunity (Illich, 1976:48, 1973:9, cf. Van der Walt, 1980(b):32).

However, the reality, according to Illich, is that the school system legitimizes inequality instead of being an equalizer. The standards of the school are such that it is nearly impossible for a child from a poor environment, with a poor socio-economical background, to achieve success in the school and he then becomes a "drop-out". Illich (1971(b):1465) says:

> For generations we have tried to make the world
> a better place by providing more and more schooling.
> So far this endeavor has failed. Instead, we have
> found out that forcing all children to climb an
> open-ended ladder cannot foster equality but in=
> evitably favors the individual who starts out ear=
> lier, healthier or better prepared.

Illich, therefore, believes that schools are discriminatory. Instead of
ensuring equality of opportunity, they have only asserted their hegemony
over the distribution of such equal chance. Consequently, Illich thinks
that schooling, in fact, creates a new class structure or a caste system
for society within which those who received the so-called professional
services of schooling enjoy special privileges, a high income, and access
to the more powerful tools of production.

The fourth aspect of the hidden curriculum, according to Illich (1974(a):
46, 1973:11), involves alienation (in the Marxist sense). Alienation,
in the traditional scheme, was a direct consequence of work's becoming
wage-labour which deprived man of the opportunity to create and be re=
created.

For Illich, schools as they are in current society, function like a market-
place where teachers sell packages of knowledge, namely, curriculum -- a
bundle of goods made according to the same process and having the same
structure as other merchandise. Consumer-pupils are taught to make their
desires conform to marketable values. Thus they are made to feel guilty
if they do not behave according to predictions of consumer research by
getting the grades and certificates that will place them in the job cate=
gory they have been led to expect.

In this process of schooling, the "virtues" like silence, obedience, con=
formity, and a conditioned reliance upon institutions are highly valued.
Thus, children have come to be overly-dependent upon such institutiona=
lized treatment, and anything which is accomplished independently of such
institutions as schools becomes suspect in their minds. Schooling, then,
has become mainly concerned with administrative minutiae, attendance keeping,
prerequisite courses, developing sequential curricula, placating communi=

ties, and establishing criteria for promotion, graduation, and certifica=
tion.

One's eventual position in society is thus from very early on pre-or=
dained and is contingent upon the judgment of someone else as to one's
fitness and competence in tasks which may have no relevance for him or
her. This means that the pupil becomes a being made for another, for a
teacher, for business and industry. In this way, Illich argues, schools
make alienation preparatory to life, depriving education of reality and
work of creativity. In these schools, children are pre-alienated from
their process of self-realization and from their real world.

The above claims that Illich makes regarding the hidden curriculum are his
empirical claims. Illich is claiming that schools are always associated
with this hidden curriculum. Whether or not the school intends it, as
far as there exists school, there is a hidden curriculum within its walls,
and students learn it even though teachers may not teach it. "Even the
best of teachers," says Illich (1974(a):32), "cannot entirely protect his
pupils from it (the hidden curriculum)."

Now, granting Illich's (empirical) conviction that the hidden curriculum
is necessarily connected with the school and schooling, why is such a
curriculum "evil"? This transition of Illich's argument from his empirical
statements to the evaluative judgment, as Götz (1974:96) puts it, will be
discussed in paragraph 5.4.3.6 in a discussion of Illich's philosophical
premise of man's nature.

5.4.3.4 The school as a manipulative institution

Illich also criticizes the school because of its manipulative character.
He (Illich, 1974(a):53) makes a distinction between institutions which
are manipulative and those which are convivial or democratic in Reimer's
sense of the term (cf. paragraph 5.3.3.1). If one were to consider them
in linear terms, the manipulative institutions would be to the extreme
right and the convivial institutions to the extreme left. Positions

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along the line would vary depending on whether the institutions tend to be more manipulative or more convivial.

Manipulative institutions, according to Illich (1974(a):54), support a culture and a life-style that is characterized by production and consump= tion. They produce dependency by generating the need for their "products" and by controlling in one way or the other the way their products are used. These institutions are concerned with convincing consumers that they cannot live without the product or the treatment offered by the institution. Illich includes mental hospitals, nursing homes, orphan asylums, prisons, and schools in this category because they are obliga= tory and coercive by forced commitment or by selective service.

Convivial institutions, on the other hand, satisfy the individual's needs and interests without creating a dependency. They allow creativity and serve all individuals without generating increasing needs. They can serve a diversity of individual purposes, thus increasing rather than controlling the options or opportunities available to people. They are, thus, iden= tified by how well they serve the needs of the individual citizen rather than how they manipulate them.

Hence, sewage systems, drinking water, telephone link-ups, subway lines, mail routes, public markets and exchanges etc. are convivial by nature. These institutions do not require hard or soft sells to induce their clients to use them. They tend to be networks which facilitate client-initiated communication or co-operation (Illich, 1974(a):54 - 55).

Furthermore, Illich (1974(a):55 - 56) asserts that the manipulative insti= tutions rely upon subterfuge and manipulative artifices and eventually be= come either socially or psychologically addictive. They are socially addictive in the sense that the consumer comes to desire more and more of the commodity and psychologically addictive because the client comes to desire more and more of the service. The manipulative institutions usually invite compulsively repetitive use and frustrate alternative ways of achieving similar results. On the other hand, institutions to the left tend to be self-limiting and serve a purpose beyond their own repeated use.

In his institutional spectrum, Illich speaks of false public utilities and public utilities which are not false. Telephone, postal, and all-purpose public roads are not false public utilities. People are free to use them or not. However, the highway system is a public service to the owners of vehicles, particularly high speed vehicles.

Highways, then, like other institutions of the right, exist for the sake of a product and are false public utilities. Schools fall into this category. "Of all false utilities," says Illich (1974(a):60), "school is the most insidious." He (Illich, 1974(a):60) adds:

> Schools are not only to the right of highways
> and cars; they belong near the extreme of the
> institutional spectrum occupied by total asy=
> lums ... By making men abdicate the responsi=
> bility for their own growth, school leads many
> to a kind of spiritual suicide.

Now, Illich's argument is that if pupils are discouraged and become un= able to take control of their own growth and learning, they are easily manipulated by schooling to accept the value of the dominant minority of the society. According to Illich (1968:75), the school, in fact, indoctrinates very effectively its clients into compliance with the so= ciety's political system, despite the claim that teaching is non-politi= cal. In this society, the school functions as the key instrument for the preservation of an existing social hierarchy. In Illich's view, the school system is an integral part of the rottenness of modern so= ciety, a key mechanism in the perpetuation of that rottenness.

5.4.3.5 The school as a monopolistic instrument

The manipulating power of the school, which is discussed in the previous paragraph (5.4.3.4), is increased excessively because of school's radi= cal monopoly on education and learning. By radical monopoly Illich (1975:66) means the dominance of one type of product rather than the dominance of one brand. It means, for instance, that one industrial production process exercises an exclusive control over the satisfaction of a pressing need, and excludes non-industrial activities from compe= tition.

Applying this idea to the school, Illich sees the school as a monopolis=
tic instrument which tries to extend a radical monopoly on learning by
redefining it as education. As has already been discussed in the previous
paragraph (5.4.3.3), Illich argues that pupils in the school are indoc=
trinated by the hidden curriculum to believe that skills are valuable
and reliable only if they are the result of formal schooling; once a
person has become used to the ideas, education outside of the school
gives the impression of something spurious, illegitimate and certainly
unaccredited (Illich, 1980:95). Moreover, learning in the school be=
comes transformed into a commodity to be purchased and consumed. Conse=
quently, the schools have a radical monopoly on access to educational
and learning opportunities in society, and also control how the commodity
will be packaged, in what units and sequences.

One reason why schools can exercise this radical monopoly, according to
Illich (1974(a):8), is that they appropriate the money, men, and goodwill
which would be available for education and in addition discourage other
institutions from assuming educational tasks. In this way work, leisure,
politics, city living, and even family life depend on schools for the
habits and knowledge they presuppose, instead of becoming themselves
the means of education.

Illich raises a serious objection to the monopoly of the school on edu=
cation and learning. He believes that it is dangerous and harmful to
institutionalize education and learning in a single institution like
the school with prescribed methods, curricula and syllabuses. He con=
tends that the school may not have a monopoly on education and learning.
According to his judgement other persons and institutions in the society
also ought to have a share in education by virtue of free bases of compe=
tition.

The basic reason why Illich objects vehemently against the school's mono=
poly on education is without doubt based on his philosophical premise
of man's nature. The following paragraph, thus, will deal with Illich's
view of man's nature.

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5.4.3.6 Illich's philosophical premise of man's nature

Illich (cf. 1980:17 - 19) sees man as a free and autonomous being who is imbued with rationality and capabilities. He seems to be the supreme optimist in his belief that man is inherently free, inquisitive, crea= tive, and capable of perfection. He especially believes in learner so= vereignty. He thus places great emphasis on man's basic values of indi= vidual freedom, dignity, autonomy, self-realization and perfectibility. On this basis he contends that learning is a personal activity which best occurs casually, spontaneously, and without external coercion or manipulation; that is, others may enhance one's learning, but they do not have the right to dictate how, when, and what another individual is to learn (Illich, 1974(a):56). Everything which contradicts or violates this basic nature of man considers Illich as bad and evil.

The transition of Illich's argument from his empirical statements to the valuational judgment that the hidden curriculum is evil, is effec= ted via his view of the nature of man. Götz (1974:96) transforms this point into dialectical terms: schooling is antithetical, and therefore must be transcended (negated), because of a conception of man as a being who constantly seeks to actualize in further syntheses all the thetical potentialities of his 'essence. In other words, Illich's argument runs like this: the hidden curriculum of the school is evil because it con= tradicts and impedes the perfectibility of man's essence. But since it is impossible for schools to exist without communicating this hidden curriculum, schools must be banished from the society.

Likewise, his strong objection to schools as manipulative and monopolis= tic institutions rests on his contention that, in being manipulative and monopolistic institutions, schools deny the further and fuller blossoming of human potential and perfectibility.

According to Illich (1975:68), people have a native capacity for learning, healing, consoling, moving, building their houses, and burying their dead. Each of these capacities meets a need. The means for the satisfaction of these needs are abundant so long as they depend primarily on what people can do for themselves, with only marginal dependence on commodities.

Schools as manipulative and monopolistic institutions, however, rule out man's innate freedom and his natural competence. They only impose compulsory consumption and thereby restrict personal freedom and auto= nomy.

In view of this, Erich Fromm, in his preface to Illich's little book Celebration of Awareness (1980:10), refers to Illich as a humanistic radical who questions every institution from the standpoint of whether it helps or hinders the capacity for growth and full development of man. Illich's argument for deschooling society, indeed, rests on this huma= nist radicalism. The crisis of the modern school is thus, for Illich, a humanistic crisis.

It should now be clear that the ideal of man's perfectibility or the pro= cess of man's self-realization, for Illich, can never be thought of as being completed as long as there are in him potentialities capable of being actualized, or of being actualized more fully. Whether individually or socially, a human being in the process of realizing himself is en= gaged in a continuous becoming. This means that the process of self-realization requires the transcendence of every stage, every achievement, so that every potentiality may become actualized. It obliges one to a higher fulfilment. In order to be all that a man can be, he must deny or negate every stage of his achievement for the sake of further achieve= ments (Götz, 1974:96 - 97).

The notion of man's perfectibility demands that everything along the way, institutions, achievements, jobs, loves, retain a provisional character. However, the hidden curriculum of the school, according to Illich (cf. paragraph 5.4.3.3), teaches the pupils that the school as an institution is an inviolable holy cow, thus cannot be transcended. This is, for Illich, precisely the reason why the school as an institution must be abolished. Schools must be negated because although they do represent a form of achievement of man, such achievement must give way concretely to the fulness that may come to be, so that man's full self-realization may continue to draw near (Götz, 1974:97). Illich is convinced himself that his radical alternative to the present school system, that is, de= schooling society, will guarantee the means to the higher fulfilment

of man's perfectibility.

It should now also be clear from the above discussion that Illich falls
into another dualistic tension between what Duvenage (1981:181; cf.
Duvenage, 1971:65 - 68) calls contingency and firmness when he tries to
keep a balance between the freedom ideal and the science ideal. Illich
(1980:19) argues that we must necessarily challenge existing values
and systems in order to control technology for mankind and to celebrate
man's humanity. This means for Illich that we must bury the myth of in=
stitutionalized values and build a de-schooling society. In this society,
man is, essentially, on the way to the ideal of self-realization or
perfectibility. In other words, the man who finds himself in a contin=
gent situation is always trying to reach out to the ideal of firmness,
namely, the ideal of self-realization. But he can never reach this ideal
because every stage or achievement obliges him to a higher fulfilment.
This clearly shows that even though Illich himself was an ordained Roman
Catholic priest he never based his view of schools and schooling on the
sound Scriptural religious ground motif of creation, fall into sin, and
redemption in Christ.

5.4.4 Illich's radical proposals for alternatives to the
       present school system

5.4.4.1 Deschooling society

In the previous paragraphs the discussion centred on Illich's basic objec=
tions against the school as an institution. He contended that the school
teaches children by its hidden curriculum in order to confuse teaching
with learning, to accept the need for school, to believe the schools's
function for social mobility, and to consume packaged knowledge. In
addition, the school is, for Illich, an extremely manipulative and mono=
polistic institution which violates man's basic nature of self-actuali=
zation. The school inevitably communicates its hidden curriculum and func=
tions as a manipulative and monopolistic instrument in society.

Illich, therefore, rejects any idea or effort to reform the school. In his view, reforming the school is like adding another lane to a freeway. This may ease the traffic problem for a short time but another jam will inevitably occur (Spring, 1973:144). Even the free school movement, Illich (1974(a):65) points out, "entices unconventional educators, but ultimately does so in support of the conventional ideology of schooling". He (Illich, 1974(a):148 - 149) makes the point as follows:

> Most of the changes have some good effects ...
> Yet all these alternatives operate within
> predictable limits, <u>because they leave the</u> hid=
> <u>den structure of school intact.</u> Free schools
> which lead to further free schools in an un=
> broken chain of attendance produce the mirage
> of freedom. Attendance as the result of seduc=
> tion inculcates the need for specialized
> treatment more persuasively than reluctant
> attendance enforced by truant officers (empha=
> sis - SSK).

Illich, thus, comes to the conclusion that schools must be abolished from the society. The elimination of the school as an institution would be the first step, for Illich, in creating a de-institutionalized social order. Lister (1974:3) explains the origins of the term "de= schooling" as having occurred when Illich misheard the answer given by someone in an audience when he asked them what they felt schools did. The person said: "Schools screw you", but Illich heard "Schools school you" and afterwards he began to talk of deschooling. What this implies is that the deschooling idea gets rid of all the conventions and ills of the present schooling. It actually refers to the disestablishment of the public school system and the abolition of compulsory schooling which will ultimately lead to a de-institutionalized society and to what Illich calls a convivial society.

The term conviviality means for Illich (1975:24) the opposite of indus= trial productivity; it means autonomous and creative intercourse among persons, and the intercourse of persons with their environment, in con= trast with the conditioned response of persons to the demands made upon them by others, and by a man-made environment. Conviviality is the indi=

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vidual freedom which becomes actualized in personal interdependence and
is, as such, an intrinsic ethical value. The convivial society would
permit the evolution of a new life-style and of a political system giving
priority to the protection, the maximum use, and the enjoyment of one
resource that is almost equally distributed among all people, namely,
personal energy under personal control.

Deschooling thus involves for Illich a negative proposal, that is, the
dis-establishment, and a positive plan for providing people with the con=
vivial tools. To accomplish this, Illich envisions four specific lear=
ning networks or opportunity webs.

5.4.4.2 Learning networks, webs, or opportunities

A good educational system, says Illich (1974(a):75 - 76), needs three
things: firstly, it should provide available resources to all who want
to learn at any time in their lives; secondly, it should make possible
the contact and relationship of those who want to teach something with
those who want to learn it from them; thirdly, it should provide an open
opportunity for people to present their ideas to the public.

As a means of fulfilling these needs, Illich (1974(a):77 - 104) recom=
mends four convivial learning webs or networks.

The first network is a reference service to educational objects. The
purpose of this network is to provide individuals with the educational
objects or things they need for learning. Illich broadly defines these
educational objects to mean such things as libraries, tool shops, print
shops, art galleries, and, in fact, any collection of objects or tools
that have learning possibilities in them. People could use these re=
sources whenever they wished, rather than waiting until reaching the
"proper" grade in school or the hours put aside for these materials in
the school curriculum. Learners are given the right to choose the acti=
vities in their environment that they regard as necessary and relevant
for their purposes.

The second network is a skill exchange wherein people who wished to mas=
ter a skill could contact a model who would demonstrate it for the learner.
Illich believes that a wide range of skills, from speaking foreign
languages to performing surgery can be learned simply by watching some=
one who already has those skills and receiving some instruction from
them. Consequently, he recommends establishing networks through which
people who have a skill they are willing to teach and others who wish to
learn that skill are put into contact with each other. Various skill
centers and banks could be set up in present school buildings. People
could also be given vouchers to pay business and industry to teach them
desired skills. Illich is opposed to certifying certain people as teachers
and believes that the right to teach skills should come under the protec=
tion of freedom of speech. According to Illich, certification only
creates an artificial shortage of both teachers and skilled practitioners.

The third network is the peer matching service. This network would in=
volve people who were interested in meeting others with similar skills
and interests so they could share these with one another. Illich argues
that schools artificially restrict those with whom we come into contact
and therefore violate our rights to free assembly. Illich recommends
registering people in large computer banks that would then match them
with each other when peers were desired.

Illich's fourth and the last learning network is a reference service to
professional educators. This network would include those persons who
have educational competency as administrators, pedagogues, and educa=
tional initiators or masters. The administrators are to create and ope=
rate educational exchanges or networks. The pedagogues serve as advi=
sers to parents and to students in that they provide assistance in using
the networks. For instance, they might suggest what books would be most
helpful to a student desiring to learn a particular skill or tell him
how he could make use of the skill exchange network. The educational
initiator or master acts as a leader who points the way to advanced learn=
ign and insights.

It goes without saying that Illich proposes the alternatives of learning networks on the basis of his radically humanistic view of man. Since Illich believes that man is a free, autonomous, and sovereign being as has already been discussed in paragraph 5.4.3.6 he strongly objects to the existing educational system which makes, in his view, the individual subservient to the institutional process and leaves little or no room for the inherent value and worth of the freedom, autonomy and sovereig= nity of the individual child. He is of the opinion that only if the child can be liberated from institutional impositions then his natural endowments will develop and emerge to the fullest degree. Illich en= visages that true education and humanity could be realized without re= ference to categories such as school or teacher. He seems to hope that the whole community or society can and should become the context for education and every member should become, potentially, a teacher.

In this view, Illich (1976:35) is convinced himself that the crisis of the modern school can be solved only if the present schools are replaced by the learning networks which are more like libraries and matching services and which empower the learner to find access to the tools and the encounters which he needs to learn to fit his own choices.

5.4.4.3 Toward Epimethean Man

The dis-establishment of schools, asserts Illich (1974(a):102; 1971(a):44), has become inevitable and attempts to maintain them are futile. It is now less a question of fighting against the system than it is one of the system's crumbling from within. It is already swaying and will topple of itself, with perhaps a slight push from the young. And this is being done now.

> We are witnessing the end of the age of school=
> ing. School has lost the power, which reigned
> supreme during the first half of this century,
> to blind its participants to the divergence
> between the egalitarian myth which its rhetoric
> serves and the rationalization of a stratified

society which its certificates produce (Illich, 1974(b):142).

However, this dis-establishement of schools, according to Illich (1974(a): 103), could take two diametrically opposed directions. It is not at all certain that the direction which a deschooled society will take will entail any more dangers or problems than we have now in our so-called schooled society. Therefore, the remaining task is, according to Illich, to try to orient the deschooled society in a hopeful direction.

Here, Illich (1974(a):105 - 116) dresses his argument in terms of the Greek myths of Prometheus and Epimetheus. According to one version of the myth, Prometheus stole the power of the gods, attempting to control the world in order to reduce the effects of Pandora's evil gifts.[9] Epime= theus, the brother of Prometheus, had married Pandora and found that she also brought humanity desirable gifts, of which the chief one was hope.

To Illich, Prometheus symbolizes the folly of man. The history of modern man, says Illich (1974(a):105), is the history of the Promethean endea= vour to forge institutions in order to corral each of the rampant ills. As a result, modern man is trapped in the boxes he makes to contain the ills Pandora allowed to escape. 'In other words, modern man has wound up in iron chains, namely, the chains of manipulative institutions.

Illich suggests that we forgo the Promethean ethos and adopt a new sense of the finiteness of the Earth and a new nostalgia now can open man's eyes to the choice of his brother Epimetheus to wed the Earth with Pandora. He believes that only Epimethean man can restructure society so as to be more expressive of the good gifts, cooperating with the earth and one another rather than controlling, co-opting, and coercing. Illich's essential point is, thus, that it is man who can and must choose between the Promethean or the Epimethean society. He (Illich, 1980:17) implores:

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9. According to the Greek myth, Pandora opened the amphora which Zeus had given her, and thus allowed all manner of evils to escape. But she closed the lid before hope, too, could escape.

All of us are crippled - some physically,
some mentally, some emotionally. We must
therefore strive cooperatively to create
the new world. There is no time left for
destruction, for hatred, for anger. We
must build, in hope and joy and celebra=
tion. Let us meet the new era of abun=
dance with self-chosen work and freedom to
follow the drum of one's own heart. Let
us recognize.that a striving for self-
realization, for poetry and play, is basic
to man ... that we will choose those
areas of activity which will contribute
to our own development and will be meaning=
ful to our society.

5.5 CRITICAL EVALUATION OF LEFT RADICAL CRITICISM OF THE

     SCHOOL (WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO IVAN ILLICH'S

     CRITICISM OF THE SCHOOL)

5.5.1 In the first place, the left radical's school ideas are also, as
       in the case of the left liberal, radically humanistic. They to=
       tally reject the Scripture and the perspective which it offers
       in their school ideas.

5.5.2 In the second place, the authority of the teacher in the teaching
       and learning setting is not legitimately acknowledged by the
       left radicals. Illich even objects to teaching itself as a ne=
       cessary aspect of the process of learning. From the Christian
       standpoint, however, the teacher is an indispensable element in
       the process of teaching and learning (Taljaard, 1976:245 - 246).
       Teachers are people professionally trained for the task of trans=
       mitting knowledge and skills, cognitive and psychomotoric skills,
       to the children. Since they are professionally trained institu=
       tors of the teaching-learning situation, they alone have authority
       in the aspects of the teaching which have to do with their pro=
       fessional competence, for instance, in the area of curriculum
       planning, the choice of learning contents, the methods which they

use, the ways of discipline, and so on (Van der Walt, 1983(a):
27 - 29 ; cf. Fowler, 1980:35). Illich, however, ignores the
authority of the teacher in the classroom which is delegated to
the teacher by God by virtue of his being a professional teacher
(cf. also paragraph 4.5.10).

5.5.3   In the third place, Illich ignores the position and the authority
        of the parents in his school ideas. Consequently, he never mentions
        the spirit and direction of his new educational system. In view
        of the Christian standpoint, the parents or the people who desire
        teaching (Taljaard, 1976:245 - 246) are also an indispensable
        element in making school a school. Moreover, the parental home
        has a certain character, a certain spirit and direction for the
        education and teaching of their children. This spirit and direc=
        tion of the parental home should be reflected in the school which
        is established by the parents. The authority of the parents is
        thus exercised directly over the spirit and direction of the
        school (Van der Walt, 1983:25, 28). But Illich completely over=
        looks the position and the authority of the parents in his alter=
        native proposals to the present school system. In this sense,
        Illich is anti-normative (according to Christian norms) or does
        not see the ontic law for the school (cf. paragraph 5.4.4.2).

5.5.4   In the fourth place, Illich is mistaken in considering the in=
        terests of the child as the only significant factor in learning.
        Although it is true that in the teaching and learning situation
        much careful attention should be paid to the interests and de=
        sires of the child, it is totally wrong and anti-normative (ac=
        cording to Christian norms) to make sinful human nature the deter=
        mining factor or norm in the process of education and schooling.

5.5.5   In the fifth place, learning means, for Illich, merely exposing
        the child to a significant setting and allowing him to learn an
        arbitrary curriculum with a minimum of structure and supervision.
        Thus, the alternative that Illich proposes, is to rely on self-
        motivated learning. The fallacy here, however, is that Illich

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assumes that everyone, if given the opportunity to act autono=
mously with a minimum of prescription, will aspire to learn spon=
taneously. This assumption is, however, highly optimistic, ab=
surd and unwarranted. Especially, in terms of present day so=
ciety, it is very likely that many people would simply not be
self-motivated enough to use the various facilities available.

Furthermore, some skills may be best learned in youth or in an
orderly sequence. In particular, habits of discipline and study
may be critical to later success, but people do not usually
appreciate them until adulthood, when acquiring them may be diffi=
cult or even impossible. Indeed, many of the critics of Illich's
deschooling philosophy highlight some of the deficiencies and the
potential hazards of substituting the sovereignity, readiness, and
self-motivation of the learner for obligatory schooling (cf. Hook,
1973:70; Stanley, 1973:76; Wicker, 1972:29; McGurrin, 1978:40;
Berman, 1975:66).

5.5.6 In the sixth place, whether one learns anything worthwhile is,
in Illich's view, purely a matter of chance (cf. Illich, 1974(a):
12). It is true that young children do learn a large amount on
their own outside the school, but this does not mean that schools
are therefore unnecessary. Learning is never acquired in a com=
plete vacuum, and there is a point when the intervention of those
with more expertise and experience is necessary. Having an ex=
perience is not _ipso facto_ educational. Schooling can make a
difference to what we bring to an experience to make it education=
ally significant (Hook, 1973:72).

Moreover, the educational and teaching task, which was delegated
to parents by God, is too important to be left to chance. The
knowledge and skills that equip covenant children for their calling
on earth are not likely to be attained haphazardly in the absence
of a planned educational and teaching program.

5.5.7   In the seventh place, Illich, in his idea of learning networks, has set up a radical dichotomy between teaching/instruction and learning. To Illich, teaching is seen as forcing the consumer to accept certain goods, whereas learning is seen as a situation in which the consumer qua learner makes the decisive choice of when, where, and how much he will buy. In this way, there is, for Illich, always a basic incongruity between teaching and learning; the former is bad and the latter is good. Thus the concept of teaching/instruction is totally eliminated from his idea of the learning networks. Teaching and learning, however, are not to be understood as elements of a dichotomy. They are rather two sides of the same coin. The dichotomy he creates between teaching and learning is a result of his misconception of man. Since he sees man as a free and autonomus being, he rejects every form of coercion, thus even the teaching activity.

5.5.8   In the eighth place, Illich's proposal for learning networks is conceived in terms which are sociologically naive. It can not be held, for instance, that everyone who knows something, even when he knows it well, can teach it, not to mention teaching it effectively, and that everyone who is able to teach is willing or in a position to do so (Hook, 1973:71). Illich's confidence in the miraculous ability of his educators-at-large is as little justified as is his condemnation of professional teaching staff.

5.5.9   In the ninth place, Illich's opposition to the certification of teachers is highly problematic and unrealistic. Illich's open society may bring about, as Hook (1973:73) points out, an open society for educational quacks without any safeguards for their victims that intellectual scepticism, the by-product of effective teaching, can produce.

5.5.10 In the tenth place, Illich tends to see only the negative side of the compulsory schooling system on the basis of his misconcep= tion of the human being, and wants to abolish it. However, his view of man is totally unacceptable to the Christian educationalist (cf. paragraph 5.4.3.6). Furthermore, it should always be ack= nowledged that compulsory schooling also provides for some measure

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of protection for the young against the indiscriminate whims of parents or adults who would exploit the labour potential of their children rather than encourage them to attend school. The system of compulsory schooling shows the responsibility of a society to all its children, especially in cases where parental responsibility is absent.

5.5.11   In the eleventh place, it is conceivable that the learning net= works would have the effect of favouring the haves over the have- nots, contrary to Illich's claim that they would provide avail= able resources to all regardless of their socio-economical posi= tions in the society (cf. Havighurst, 1972:405). One of Illich's most serious objections to the present school system is that under the present school system the children of the rich with an en= riched environment always win, and the children of the poor are always betrayed (cf. paragraph 5.4.3.3). Therefore, Illich pro= poses the radical alternative of the learning networks. However, Illich overlooks the fact that the learning networks also would tend to give the group with the greatest resources the opportu= nity to employ tutors for their children and teach their children informally in the family. The poor are in fact least likely to profit from learning networks.

5.5.12   In the twelfth place, Illich's radical and anarchistic approach to education and schooling is, to a large extent, romantic, uto= pian, unrealistic and hypothetical. It is, first of all, based upon his highly optimistic view of man. In addition, there is a tremendous economic and cultural investment in the existing school system. Illich's proposals also seem to be incompatible with the socio-economic realities of modern society. Furthermore, there is no real guarantee that a deschooled society would be any less problematic and bureaucratic than the existing educational system.

In view of these facts, it is almost inconceivable that the de=
schooling philosophy would be implemented in a reasonable and
feasible fashion in modern society. Berman (1975:88), who has
undertaken a critical analysis of the concept of deschooling as
a possible solution to the crisis of the modern school, has con=
cluded that the deschooling concept, as far as its relevance is
concerned, both theoretical and practical, is unlikely to become
a social reality in the near or even distant future in spite
of Illich's optimism.

5.5.13 In the thirteenth place, the existing system of education has been
fairly functional and highly valued also in terms of <u>performing</u>
<u>its basic function</u> of teaching children, whereas Illich's deschool=
ing philosophy is extremely utopian and hypothetical. The brief
historical review of the school in chapter 2 has revealed that
the school has so far succeeded in performing its basic function
(cf. also Van der Walt, 1982(a):108). In modern society the parents,
poor ones as well as those of the middle class, commit their chil=
dren to schools and teachers in the expectation that they will
learn what they can't learn at home or in the street.

In addition, schools have provided a functional environment in
which children may interact with peers, form friendships, ex=
press their individuality, and demonstrate their creativity,
ability, and talents in a variety of educational and recreational
activities. There are at present few other institutions in modern
society to which most children would have access, which allow
even an opportunity for such educational, creative, and social
involvement (Berman, 1975:64).

5.5.14 In the fourteenth place, the credibility of Illich's deschooling
philosophy is diminished by the fact that Illich himself actually
directed a school in Cuernavaca, Mexico, where traditional educa=
tional methodology and classroom structure are used in teaching
various courses to students from affluent American suburbs (Ber=
man, 1975:87; cf. also Fields, 1971:108). Fields (1971) and Ozmon

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(1973), who have visited Illich's Centre for Intercultural Docu=
mentation (CIDOC) in Cuernavaca, Mexico, also said that they
were struck by the contrast between Illich's philosophical con=
cepts on deschooling and the manner in which his Spanish language
school is organized and conducted along traditional and conven=
tional lines. Fields (1971:108) referred to it as a Prussianized
Spanish programme. In Ozmon's (1973:178) words:

> The language program, for example, is highly
> structured, with students attending set clas=
> ses, repeating drills, memorizing dialogues,
> and changing teachers at the sound of a bell ...
> Not only within the language courses but
> throughout the school in general there is an
> aura of strictness and control.

5.5.15 In the fifteenth place, there is little justification for Illich's
generalization of his criticism and analysis of the school in the
Third World to that of a highly developed society like for example
America. Illich fails to distinguish the different levels of
development and concomitant problems in Latin American, European,
and American education and schools. Thus he has essentially the
same analysis and prescription for all. The vast differences
and greatly divergent educational needs of the Third World and
the economically developed societies are glossed over in his ana=
lysis of educational functions and roles (Rich, 1974:165; cf.
Pratte, 1973:115).

5.5.16 In the sixteenth place, the left radical critics of the school
are not interested in the ontic law for the school. The left
radicals' opposition to the authority of the teacher and of the
parents in the process of teaching and learning reveals an in=
clination to deny the fact that God instituted an ontic law for
the school in Creation. Because they don't know or the don't want to
know the ontic law for the school, they think they can even destroy
the school as a social institution totally (cf. chapter 6; also Van der
Walt, 1980(b):36). They do not acknowledge the fact that the school
has its own particular function and structure.

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This is so because they have always tried to analyse the function and structure of the school from their ideological and political frame of reference and not from the radical Scriptural standpoint.

5.5.17 In the seventeenth place, the left radical critics have also cri= ticized the school and developed their alternative ideas to the present school system on the basis of irrationalistic philosophy (cf. paragraph 3.3.7 & 3.3.8). For the left radical school critics, the self-determining, free man in his contingent situation is the autonomous law-giver, the creator of all norms and principles which are valid for himself. In this way, the personality or free= dom ideal of the humanistic religious ground motif is extreme= ly over-rampant or absolutized in all the left radicals' alter= native ideas to the present school system.

5.5.18 In the eighteenth place, it should be pointed out that, although the deschooling philosophy does not represent a realistic solution to the educational and school crisis, it calls our attention to the rigidities and shortcomings of the existing school system. The strength of Illich lies in his treatment of existing organi= zational forms in modern society, for he demonstrates the weak= nesses of all the social institutions in general and the short= comings of the school as a social institution in particular, and their resistance to change. From the Scriptural standpoint, the structure of the school should always be reformed according to the structure for the school (cf. chapter 6).

5.6 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, the problems or crisis in the left radical context were outlined. For this purpose, the school ideas of four radical cri= tics, namely Reimer, Goodman, Holt, and Freire were broadly overviewed, and the deschooling philosophy of Ivan Illich was discussed in more de= tail.

In viewing the crisis of the school, the left radicals no longer think of the school in terms of reforming, changing or improving it, but they think of the total destruction of the school. The school as it current= ly exists, according to the left radical critics, generates ill-will, hypocrisy, monopoly, and manipulation to such a degree that it is be= yond all hope. School reform, whether radical or moderate, is, accor= ding to them, a futile enterprise. Therefore, they have suggested that the very idea of a school system must be rejected in favour of finding a more effective, humane, personal, self-directed choice of means for learning. The concept of deschooling society has been, therefore, sug= gested by the left radical critics as a solution to the educational crisis in general and the school crisis in particular.

Deschooling philosophers believe that inasmuch as the schools limit rather than enhance the individual's free, autonomous, and self-sufficient growth and development, they should be discontinued as the primary agen= cy of education in society. This clearly demonstrates the workings of the ideal of the free human personality (freedom ideal) of the modern hu= manistic religious ground motif which is at the bottom of all left ra= dical philosophy of the school.

In the following chapter, the fundamental problems of the school which have been raised inter alia by the left radical critics will be evalu= ated from a Scriptural perspective.