

**BOPHUTHATSWANA AND ITS IMPACT ON THE
NORTH WEST PROVINCE, 1974-1998**

MOLOKOE B.K.M.

**BOPHUTHATSWANA AND ITS IMPACT ON THE NORTH WEST
PROVINCE, 1974-1998**

by

BENJAMIN KENALEMANG MATSHIDISO MOLOKOE

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in the

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

in the

FACULTY OF HUMAN AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

at the

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH WEST

SUPERVISOR : Prof. A. H. Manson

DECEMBER 2000

DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis for the degree Doctor of Philosophy at the University of North West hereby submitted, has not been submitted by me for a degree at this or any other University, that it is my own work in design and execution and that all material contained herein has been duly acknowledged.

.....

.....

—

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My very sincere gratitude is due to the many kind people who have given so much help and support. Special thanks go to:

- Professor A.H. Manson, for his scholarly advice, exceptionally prompt and insightful responses to written submissions, warm encouragement and delightful sense of humour. His constructive criticisms have enriched this research.
- The staff of History Department of the University of North West for their support.
- The staff of the Africa Institute of South Africa for their assistance in the production of the News Paper reports relevant to my research.
- Mrs Dikeledi Gaebee, the Secretary for the Dean of the Faculty of Agriculture, Science and Technology of the University of the North West for her patience and dedication while typing this work.
- Mr de Klerk of Geography Department at the University of the North West for the drawing of Maps.
- The co-operation obtained from former Bophuthatswana Government officials and the North West Provincial Government officials is highly appreciated.
- My wife, Rosina and my sons, Goitseone, Gaositwe and Thato for their patience and tolerance when this research forced me to be away from home, denying them my presence.
- The National Research Foundation (formerly HSRC) for its financial assistance to carry out this research. NRF is however, not responsible for any opinion or views expressed in this work.

**NWU
LIBRARY**

ABSTRACT

This thesis is about the history of Bophuthatswana from 1974 and its impact on the North West Province. Bophuthatswana was one of the homelands created by the Nationalist Government for different ethnic groups of black South Africans and it became an independent 'state' (in the South African context) in 1977 under kgosi L.M. Mangope as its president. This was done within the Grand Apartheid plan as an attempt to prevent the growth of African Nationalism and a Black united political front against White domination. The Nationalist Government thought that this could assist in the preservation of White Supremacy. Independent homeland 'states' remained integral parts of South Africa, their policies were monitored and they were also funded by South Africa. This type of relationship degenerated into a Neo-Colonial relationship, or what has been termed internal colonialism.

Despite a lack of legitimacy for homeland independence, in the eyes of South African government, Bophuthatswana became a shining example of the homeland states. It introduced tangible changes, moving away from the Apartheid system by creating a non-racial society, introducing a totally new constitutional model which contained a Bill of Rights, instituting a Multi-Cultural Education system which theoretically provided equal opportunities to all, and attempting to establish an independent economy. Though it continued like all other homelands to receive funding from South Africa, Bophuthatswana was considered to have organised a sounder economy than all South Africa's homelands. On the political field Bophuthatswana's quest for international recognition became an illusive exercise as the international community rejected homelands and perceived them as creations of Apartheid. Moreover as Bophuthatswana came under mounting political pressure from within South Africa and internationally, it resorted to increasingly oppressive rule.

With the dawn of new democratic South Africa in 1994, Bophuthatswana disappeared dramatically from the political scene. The events leading up to the fall of Bophuthatswana, the actual collapse of the homeland and the interim administration which followed are discussed fully in this thesis. It was incorporated into the North West Province, forming almost half of the Province and also providing the largest sector in terms of infrastructure, human and economic resources. This legacy was however not fully utilised by the new government for political motives and in cases the infrastructure was left to collapse in disuse. The failure of the North West Provincial Government to build on foundations of earlier strides taken by Bophuthatswana especially in the fields of Education and Economy became a major constraint in service delivery. The artificiality of the original Bophuthatswana state meant that it was often neither rational nor economic for the NWPG to follow the Bophuthatswana model. On a political level the North-West Provincial government obviously had to distance itself from the Bophuthatswana past.

ABBREVIATIONS

AGRICOR	Agricultural Development Corporation
ANC	African National Congress
APLA	African People's Liberation Army
ARMSCOR	Armaments Supply Corporation
AVU	Afrikaner Vryheid Unie
AWB	Afrikaner Weerstand Beweging
AZAPO	Azanian People's Organization
BBC	Bophuthatswana Broadcasting Corporation
BCM	Black Consciousness Movement
BDF	Bophuthatswana Defence Force
BDP	Bophuthatswana Democratic Party
BENBO	Bureau for Economic Research re Bantu Development
BLA	Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly
BNP	Bophuthatswana National Party
BNDC	Bophuthatswana National Development Corporation
BNPF	Bophuthatswana National Provident Fund
BNSU	Bophuthatswana National Security Unit
BOMIFRA	Bophuthatswana Ministers Fraternity
BOPSOL	Bophuthatswana Professional Soccer League
BPC	Black People's Convention
BPF	Bophuthatswana Police Force
BUF	Black United Front
CAD	Central Archival Depository
CCB	Consumer Council of Bophuthatswana
CDP	Christian Democratic Party
CED	Cape Education Department
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CLO	Community Liaison Officer
CODESA	Convention for Democratic South Africa
COSAG	Concerned South African Group
COSAS	Congress of South African Students
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions

CP	Conservative Party
CPA	Cape Provincial Administration
DDG	Deputy Director General
DET	Department of Education and Training
DOE	Department of Education
DP	Democratic Party
EXCO	Executive Council
FA	Freedom Alliance
FNB	First National Bank
GNU	Government of National Unity
GST	General Sales Tax
INSET	Inservice Training
KGB	Committee for State Security (Russia)
MD	Managing Director
MEC	Member of the Executive Council
MEUP	Middle School Education Upgrading Programme
MK	Mkhonto Wesizwe
MP	Member of Parliament
NAD	National Archival Depository
NEHAWU	National Education and Health Allied Workers Union
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NIEC	National Inservice Education Centre
NP	National Party
NSP	National Seoposengwe Party
NUM	National Union of Mineworkers
NWDC	North West Development Corporation
NWED	North West Education Department
NWPG	North West Provincial Government
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OBE	Outcomes Based Education
PP	Progressive Party
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress
PEUP	Primary Education Upgrading Programme

PPP	People Progressive Party
PSC	Public Service Commission
SA	South Africa
SABRA	South African Bureau of Racial Affairs
SACC	South African Council of Churches
SACP	South African Communist Party
SADF	South African Defence Force
SADTU	South African Democratic Teachers Union
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SASCO	South African Students Congress
SASO	South African Student Organization
SATSWA	South Africa - Bophuthatswana Steering Committee
SBD	Small Business Division
SEBO	Sefalana Employees Benefit Organisation
SMT	Senior Management Team
SRC	Students Representative Council
STANBO	Standard Bank of Bophuthatswana
TBVC	Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei
TEC	Transitional Executive Council
TED	Transvaal Education Department
TPA	Transvaal Provincial Administration
TLA	Tswana Legislative Assembly
TNP	Tswana National Party
TTA	Tswana Territorial Authority
UCDP	United Christian Democratic Party
UDF	United Democratic Front
UIF	Unemployment Insurance Fund
UN	United Nations
UNIBO	University of Bophuthatswana
UNIWEST	University of North West
VSP	Voluntary Severance Package
WCF	Workmen's Compensation Fund

GLOSSARY

Bafaladi	Foreigners/Aliens
Bana ba ya ntlo	children born out of a relation of a man and his late brother's wife
Bogosi	traditional leadership
Bogwera	male initiation rites
Bojale	female initiation rites
Diboka	totems
Dikinane	tales
Dinaane	Folklores
Kgosana	Headman
Kgosi (dikgosi)	Batswana traditional leader (s), equivalent to king
Lefatshe la bo rra rona	Land of our fathers (father land)
Letsema	ploughing activity(voluntary work group)
Maleta Motse	village guard
Mmemogolo	mother's elder sister
Mmutla	Hare (rabbit)
Mophato	Age regiment
Rakgadi	Father's sister (aunt)
Rangwane	Father's younger brother
Re ka kgona	We can (BDP motto)
Rremogolo	Father's elder brother
Temisano	co-operative crop-farming
Tshwene	baboon

TABLE OF CONTENTS	PAGES
Declaration	i
Acknowledgements	ii
Abstract	iii
Abbreviations	iv
Glossary	iv-vi
Maps	2-3
Introduction	1
Scope and approach	1-22
Sources	22-25

Chapter One

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE POLITICAL “INDEPENDENCE” OF BOPHUTHATSWANA

1.	Introduction	26
2.	The Origin of the Batswana	26-28
3.	Times of troubles and land dispossession	28-37
4.	The political and constitutional development of Bophuthatswana.....	38
4.1	Tswana Territorial Authority	38-40
4.2	The legislative assembly (TLA/B.L.A)	40-42
4.3	Preparations for the 1972 elections and formation of political parties.....	42
4.4	Seoposengwe Party (SP)	43-44
4.5	Bophuthatswana National Party (B.N.P)	44-45
4.6	Tswana National Party (T.N.P)	45-46
4.7	The Progressive Party (P.P)	46
4.8	The 1972 elections and the Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly	46-48
4.9	Opposition to Mangope and the formation of Bophuthatswana Democratic Party (B.D.P)	48-50
4.10	The attainment of Political Independence, 6 December 1977	50-56
5.	The early Political Career of Kgosi L.M. Mangope	56-62

6.	Conclusion	62
----	------------------	----

Chapter Two

THE ADMINISTRATION AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK OF BOPHUTHATSWANA

1.	Introduction	63
2.	An Overview of the Bophuthatswana constitution	63-68
3.	The organisation of government	68-76
3.1	Legislature	68
3.2	Executive Power	69-70
3.3	Judiciary	70
4.	Funding of Bophuthatswana Government	71
4.1	Own Sources	71-72
4.2	Other Sources	72-76
4.	Security	76
5.1	Bophuthatswana Defence Force	76-80
5.2	Bophuthatswana Police Force (BPF)	81-82
6.	Education as Part of Social Development	82
6.1	Historical Development of Education among the Batswana up to 1977..	83-84
6.2	Developments : Challenges, Successes and criticisms	85-88
7.	Economic Development	88
7.1	Agricultural Development	88-89
7.1.1	The Role of Agricor	89
7.1.1.1	Agricultural Co-operatives	89-92
7.1.1.2	Rural Service Centres	92-94
7.1.1.3	Agri-Industries	94-95
7.1.1.4	Agribank as agricultural financier	95-96
7.1.1.5	Other contributions by Agricor	96-98
7.2	The Industrial Sector	98-102
7.3	The Mining Sector	102-104

7.4	Tourism	104
7.4.1	Hotel Industry	104-105
7.4.2	Game Reserve Nature Conservation	106-108
8	Conclusion	108-109

Chapter Three

AN ANALYSIS OF THE STATE OF POLITICS,1977-1994

1.	Introduction	110
2.	Bophuthatswana : Democratic or undemocratic	110-130
3.	Alleged financial mismanagement and corruption	130-132
4.	The 10 February 1988 Coup Attempt	132-146
5.	Attempts to gain International Recognition	147-151
6.	Mangope's responses to Political Developments of the 1990's ..	151-156
7.	Conclusion	156

Chapter Four

THE FALL OF BOPHUTHATSWANA

1.	Introduction	157
2.	The Immediate Causes	157-163
3.	The Last Crucial Days in the Bophuthatswana Story	164-172
4.	Responses to the Fall of Bophuthatswana	172-181
5.	Short-term Political Consequences	181-185
6.	Conclusion	185

Chapter Five

THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION

1.	Introduction	186
2.	The Appointment of the Joint Administrators	186-189
3.	Challenges Confronting the Interim Administrators	189-217

4. Conclusion	217-218
---------------------	---------

Chapter Six

THE LEGACY FOR THE NORTH WEST PROVINCE

1. Introduction	219
2. Administration and Political Developments	220-235
3. Education	236-252
4. Economy	252-265
5. Conclusion	265-267

Conclusion	268-275
-------------------------	---------

Bibliography	276-305
---------------------------	---------

INTRODUCTION


SCOPE AND APPROACH


A major aspect of the South African government's Apartheid policy was Separate Development which aimed at separate development in geographical, social, political and economic terms. This led to the creation of homelands for different ethnic groups of black South Africans. Among them was the Bophuthatswana homeland, which became an independent 'state' (in the South African context) in 1977 under kgosi L.M. Mangope as its founding and only president. Bophuthatswana was therefore an important structure of the Separate Development (Apartheid) policy, with money pumped into the homeland 'state' to project it as a shining model of the homeland system. It lasted for seventeen years and indeed affected the lives of many people in different ways. With the dawn of democratic South Africa in 1994, Bophuthatswana virtually disappeared from the political scene. A number of earlier works have described Bophuthatswana's establishment, but no coherent and systematic analysis exists explaining the general context in which the homeland developed (socially, economically, and politically) during its 'independence'. Nor do we have a full account of how its downfall came about and what its impact on its successor, the North West Province was. This thesis is therefore an attempt to document its past in relation to the present scenario in the North West Province.

**NWU
LIBRARY**

The democratisation process in South Africa resulted in the division of the country into nine provinces, cutting across the boundaries of old provinces of South Africa(Transvaal, Orange Free State, Cape and Natal), Black homelands and Black "independent" states. These were agreed upon after protracted negotiations,

reducing the ANC's initial proposed ten regions. The regions of Border/Kei and Eastern Cape were integrated into one, becoming the Eastern Cape Province, thereby avoiding the division of the Xhosa-speaking people into two regions. This angered the Bophuthatswana government which regarded this step as an attempt by the Xhosa dominated ANC to ensure that resources would be utilised to develop the Xhosa speaking people as a united nation while on the other hand Bophuthatswana was denied the right to retain all its regions. (see a map below).





One of the nine newly created provinces was the North West province, which incorporated part of Western Transvaal (areas such as Potchefstroom, Ventersdorp, Klerksdorp and Rustenburg), part of Northern Cape (areas such as Vryburg) and almost all of Bophuthatswana, except Thaba Nchu region and a small portion of the Moretele region, which were incorporated into Free State and Mpumalanga respectively. This is much evident from the above map. Bophuthatswana is therefore associated almost wholly and exclusively with the North West Province.

This thesis therefore is about the history of Bophuthatswana from 1974, the events surrounding its demise and its later impact on the history of the North West Province . As a point of departure in examining the history of Bophuthatswana, or any other South African homeland, a general understanding of Separate Development, in so far as it related to homelands and their people, becomes an indispensable preliminary or theoretical basis for any in-depth study.

It would appear that there is no definite meaning of Separate Development (Apartheid) other than defining what it implied in practice. Apartheid and Separate Development are synonyms. This work does not seek to construct a definitive meaning of Apartheid but rather seeks to examine the approaches of different writers to Separate Development in order to make it easier to understand the implementation of the policy in political and economic terms.

The advocates of Apartheid had their own propagandist interpretation of Separate Development. According to O'Meara,

“the National Party presented Apartheid as an ethical policy which granted to other groups what the Afrikaners demanded for themselves, namely the development of the personal and national ideals of every ethnic group within its own national community. This separateness formed the philosophical basis of Apartheid. To the National Party, it was the only way to avoid racial conflict in South Africa's multi-ethnic situation as it provided for the survival of Afrikaners (and other whites) while theoretically it facilitated the development of other ethnic groups.”¹

¹. D.O'Meara, **Forty Lost Years : The Apartheid State and the Politics of the National Party, 1948 - 1994** (1996), p.66.

As many historians have argued the real intentions of Separate Development contradict the above - mentioned propaganda. To begin with, all black South Africans were to lose their citizenship.² This was taken further by Karel Boshoff (Verwoerd's son in law and chairperson of South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA)) that homeland leaders who might refuse the proffered "independence" would simply have to accept continued white domination³. It was pre-planned that black homelands would be given "sham independence" to supposedly accommodate black political aspirations.

The Marxist critique on homeland independence has been developed to a greater extent than others. Marxist historians such as Wolpe saw Separate Development as:

"a political development conditioned by economic imperatives or needs. There was a strong inter-relationship and co-existence between political domination and economic exploitation, political domination being a condition for the maintenance of exploitative relations. Politics and the state were merely the means to economic ends."⁴

White supremacy rested on the cornerstone of capitalism, whose entrenchment served to further secure white interests.

². D.O'Meara, **Forty Lost Years**, p.420.

³. D.O'Meara, **Forty Lost Years**, p.198.

⁴. H.Wolpe, **Race, Class and the Apartheid State** (1988), pp.15-17.

From Wolpe's argument it is noted that the South African economy in the 1960s was to be directed towards the attainment of a political goal, to fit the imperatives of a racialised political system. The capitalist economy subordinated the racialised political system and transformed it to serve the needs of the economic market⁵, creating interchangeable relations in the roles of politics and economy, to complement each other in pursuit of white supremacy and the growth of capitalism.

However, in Wolpe's view, this racialised system created certain class antagonisms among Whites. Merchants and traders who saw opportunities in massive expansion of the manufacturing sector, saw Separate Development or Apartheid as an obstacle to their further expansion⁶. Indeed international outcry against, or rejection of the Apartheid policy impacted negatively on their trade in international markets. Contrary to this, the white farming community saw the policy as a means to protect them against competition from black farmers and as a form of assurance of cheap black labour. The Nationalist government relied on the support of the Afrikaners (white farmers) for its continued governance and sustenance of its power base. It was therefore bent on satisfying them and avoiding alienating them at all costs. White farmers therefore played a very crucial role in policy making and were able to influence the government in significant ways. They and certain other capitalist interests, influenced the government to enforce territorial segregation through Separate Development (manifested by various forms of legislation), by forcing Black South Africans (including Namibians) to economically non - viable areas, thus creating pools of cheap labour needed for

⁵. H. Wolpe, **Race, Class and the Apartheid State**, p.28.

⁶. H. Wolpe, **Race, Class and the Apartheid State**, p.28.

white owned farms, mines and in various construction projects in the White economic sector. All economically viable land became the monopoly of the whites⁷.

These Revisionist historians subjected South Africa's economy to Marxist analysis to show that white security and prosperity were interrelated.⁸ Johnstone states that:

“Apartheid was a set of policies rationally conceived to restrict black advancement by preventing Blacks from acquiring education, accumulating capital or using their industrial bargaining power.”⁹

He elaborated on the compatability of white supremacy and economic growth, the relationship between capitalist development, Apartheid policies and the core structures of white supremacy which were essentially collaborative. Apartheid provided white employers with the cheapest possible labour (black labour) and arranged the production and regulation of that labour. Racial oppression boosted economic growth, and the more prosperity the whites enjoyed the more secure was white supremacy.¹⁰

⁷. United Nations (UN) Institute for Namibia, **Namibia : Perspective for National Reconstruction and Development** (1986), p.39.

⁸. T.R.H. Davenport, **South Africa : A Modern History** (1977), p.574.

⁹. J.Londsdale, **South Africa in Question** (1988), p. 20.

¹⁰. J. Londsdale, **South Africa in Question**, pp. 20-21.

Another interesting aspect to the Marxist position was the relationship between 'white' South Africa and the homelands, which assumed both a colonial and neo-colonial nature. According to Wolpe, when South Africa became a union in 1910 in terms of the South African Act passed by the British Parliament in 1909, Britain withdrew as the colonising metropole. Unfortunately national sovereignty was vested in a white state and a racially exclusive political system. The capitalist economy of South Africa was already in the hands of both the British and White South African capitalists. A system of internal colonialism, which entrenched and enforced the political subjugation of the Black majority and provided the conditions for the capitalist exploitation of the Black people by both foreign and white owned national capital, was set in place. African areas became colonies of 'white' South Africa. "The indigenous population was subjected to extreme national oppression, poverty and exploitation, lack of democratic rights and political domination."¹¹ This was achieved through the institutions, laws and practices of Apartheid which were basically extra-economic devices, established to secure the process of capital accumulation through the maintenance of the Black majority as an easily exploitable source of cheap labour power. The system was designed to subordinate the Black population as a whole to the white population as a whole. Capitalism and white domination which owed their origins to the colonial period, continued to be reproduced even after 1948.¹²

Both Cleary and Southall also follow Wolpe in believing that the granting of independence to homelands was an attempt by the South African government to impose a neo-colonial solution on Blacks, to maintain its position of power and

¹¹. H. Wolpe, **Race, Class and the Apartheid State**, pp. 29-30.

¹². H. Wolpe, **Race, Class and the Apartheid State**, p. 60.

privilege.¹³ Black South Africans were taught to conceive themselves as Xhosas, Zulus, Batswana, Vendas, Sotho, Swazi and Tsonga and were encouraged to compete among themselves along ethnic lines for a share of the scarce resources allocated by the South African government for the ‘development’ of their reserved areas. This prevented or reduced the prospect of a united black front. On the other hand the Nationalist government manipulated Black politicians and elite groups willing to co-operate in the system¹⁴.

Although there have been critical responses to the theory advanced by Wolpe, and expanded upon by others¹⁵, the relationship between South Africa and independent homeland states was characterised by features of neo-colonialism. The homeland states, for example, relied for a large portion of their budgets on South African grants, with only a small percentage of their revenue generated internally¹⁶. This economic relation, as argued by Southall, exposed the polarisation between a metropolitan centre country and its peripheral satellites. South Africa’s capital accumulation at the centre has underdeveloped the satellite states (homelands). He notes that:

“Whether or not, the homelands were granted formal constitutional sovereignty, they have historically developed (or underdeveloped) as integral parts of the South African political economy, and continued to perform their essential function of serving as labour reservoirs

¹³. S. Cleary, **The Homelands Policy : A Neo-Colonial Solution to SA’s future** (1980), pp. 1-2; R.J. Southall, **South Africa’s Transkei**, p.7.

¹⁴. S. Cleary, **The Homelands Policy**, pp. 1-2.

¹⁵. S. Van der Merwe as quoted in S. Cleary, **The Homelands Policy**, p.34.

¹⁶. S. Cleary, **The Homelands Policy**, pp. 6-7.

whose primary purpose was to serve the labour needs of the white economy.”¹⁷

Politically, homeland leaders did not derive their authority to govern from the expressed will of their people, but from the goodwill and support of the South African government. In return they served as agents of South African policy implementation. They even assisted South Africa in stemming or containing guerilla activities of liberation movements, to the extent of arresting freedom fighters (guerillas) and handing them over to the South African Security Police¹⁸. This is why despite proof of lack of popular support (as indicated by low polls), South Africa continued to support them to maintain their positions.

Liberal historians such as Maylam saw Apartheid

“as a rigid racial policy devised and implemented by the National Party. It did not represent a radical departure from the segregation which preceded it. It amounted to a more systematic, more monolithic set of policies and was more rigidly and ruthlessly enforced than segregation.”¹⁹

¹⁷. R.J. Southall, **South Africa's Transkei**, p.10.

¹⁸. S. Cleary, **The Homelands Policy**, pp. 13; 29.

¹⁹. P. Maylam, “Apartheid”, in C.C. Saunders(ed), **An Illustrated Dictionary of South African History**, p.17.

Another liberal historian, Giliomee, interpreted Apartheid as a radical rejection (alternative) of liberal demands which developed in the postwar years to justify white supremacy. It was not a clean break from the past but rather an elaboration or intensification of the policy of segregation.²⁰

On the other hand, a paternalistic view assumed that there was correlation between racial identity and mental capacity claiming that Europeans were superior to Africans. This is based on Social Darwinist theories and claimed that Europeans had to act as guardians of the Blacks as Blacks were inferior and needed guidance to attain “civilisation”. This cultivated a belief that Africans were naturally rural people whose social order and stability could be maintained in rural life of the countryside. For Blacks urbanisation was viewed as a negative process leading to social degeneration and moral disintegration.²¹ This influenced policies such as Influx control, which was aimed at restricting Blacks to rural areas (homelands), by preventing their migration to towns and cities.

Two writers, Meer and Letsoalo, from the African Nationalist school, interpreted Apartheid from a black perspective. In this perspective the issue of race is uppermost. In Fatima Meer’s words:

“Apartheid was a comprehensive system of grouping and segregating people by race, evolved by White South Africans. It was unique as a form of discrimination as it was sanctioned by law and sanctified

²⁰. H. Giliomee, “Apartheid, Verligheid and Liberalism”, in J. Butler, et al (eds), **Democratic Liberalism in South Africa : Its History & Prospects** (1987), p. 363.

²¹. C. Saunders, (ed), **An Illustrated Dictionary of South African History**, pp. 212-213.

by the ideological commitment of its Afrikaner practitioners. It implemented territorial, political and social separation”.²²

While historians differ as to the causes of Apartheid, there is more general agreement that its result was to implement racial segregation in social, political, economic and geographical (territorial) terms. It had to ensure White racial purity and supremacy.

With the emergence of the doctrine of Apartheid, legislation increasingly began to divide Blacks according to “tribal” affinity. They were allocated separate areas which became known as Bantu reserves. These areas were designated as Bantustans and later Black homelands.²³ As argued by Letsoalo, the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 was the crux of the Apartheid system in terms of the creation of the homelands and disenfranchisement of the black population. This act was supplemented by the both the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 and Homelands Constitution Act of 1971 which strengthened the power of traditional chiefs by modernising the old “tribal” institutions and providing for the tribal bodies to form regional and territorial authorities. Nine territorial authorities (later homelands) for each of the eight ethnic groups of South African were established. By the passage of the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970 the government reinforced its intention of overcoming pressure to end racism by

**NWU
LIBRARY**

²². F. Meer, “Domination through Separation : A Resume of the Major Laws Emanating and Preserving Racial Segregation” in D.M. Smith (ed), **Separation in South Africa : People and Policies, Occasional Papers**, no.6, p.17.

²³. E.M. Letsoalo, **Land Reform in South Africa : A Black Perspective** (1987), p.44.

making Blacks in South Africa citizens of one or the other homeland thus declaring them foreigners in the country of their birth. In terms of the Apartheid doctrine each of the homelands was to be given political 'independence'.²⁴ Bophuthatswana became politically 'independent' as a result of this doctrine.

African areas were divided into separate homelands based on ethnic lines to develop separately to self-governing status and eventually into black independent states. A plan was developed in such a way that these unviable fragmentations would remain perpetually dependent on South Africa. The creation of independent homelands with separate citizenships was an attempt or strategy by the South African government to prevent the emergence of united black nationalism in South Africa which would challenge South Africa's oppressive rule²⁵. The homelands had to go through an evolutionary process or stages until they became independent. However this is fully discussed ahead.

Southall in his examination of the Transkei homeland argues that there was serious opposition to homeland independence. Movements such as South African Students Organisation (SASO), Black Peoples' Convention (BPC) and Black United Front (BUF) opposed the partitioning of South Africa into independent homelands. This urban based resistance became evident during the 1976 Soweto Uprisings and applied also to Bophuthatswana. The Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly buildings were razed to the ground, while Transkei, which was about to become independent, experienced serious acts of violence. Some white parties such as the United Party and the Progressive Reform Party argued that the newly

²⁴. E.M. Letsoalo, **Land Reform in South Africa**, p.44.

²⁵. UN Institute for Namibia, **Namibia**, pp. 39-40.

created states would be economically unviable²⁶. Despite this opposition, South Africa went ahead with its predetermined plan and granted Transkei independence on the 26 October 1976, which became the first independent black homeland. Transkei was followed by Bophuthatswana (1977), Venda (1979) and Ciskei (1980). Other homelands such as Kwazulu under the leadership of Mangosuthu Buthezi rejected homeland independence, seeing it as the balkanization of South Africa.

By granting independence to Black homelands the South African government attempted to buy time for white domination in South Africa. Preservation of white domination was the major object of Separate Development. South Africa had conceived the use of homelands as a mechanism to avoid racial conflict, but it further fueled the conflict as a majority of Blacks especially in urban areas did not accept the homeland system and in fact strongly opposed it²⁷. Political conflict in Bophuthatswana as detailed in chapter four exposes the failure of the homeland system to contain black aspirations. The limited economic and industrial developments carried out in these homelands were monitored in such a way that they did not alter their roles as suppliers of cheap labour, but only served to provide a superficial credibility to the notion of being independent states. As a number of historians have shown, African areas were therefore transformed historically from a subsistence, pastoral, pre-capitalist economy into reservoirs of cheap labour for the white economy. They further became dumping areas for the

²⁶. R.J. Southall, **South Africa's Transkei : The Political Economy of an "Independent" Homeland** (1983), pp.2-3.

²⁷. J. Butler, R.I. Rotberg & J Adams, **The Black Homelands of South Africa : The Political and Economic Development of Bophuthatswana and Kwazulu** (1977), pp. 219-220; 230.

unproductive and surplus Africans²⁸. Many people were forcibly removed from “white” areas and were resettled in areas within homelands.

At the international level, there was a total rejection of homeland independence. Homelands were perceived as creations of Apartheid and attempts to grant independence to them was seen by the international community as an act of justifying its racial policies and of imposing structures of political domination (through the willing co-operation of black ‘sell outs’ or stooges headed by Matanzima, president of Transkei) upon the unwilling mass of Black South Africans. The exercise was considered essentially fraudulent, and specifically designed to entrench white rule at the expense of the black masses. Both the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and United Nations (UN) refused to admit the South African independent homelands to their ranks. To avoid offending the Afro-Asian bloc, Western powers also refused to recognise these homeland states, claiming that they did not meet the criteria for nation statehood²⁹. None of the four South African independent homeland states received international recognition.

It is hoped that this historical overview of Separate Development will provide a broad theoretical framework for the in-depth study of the history of Bophuthatswana and its impact on the North West Province. However, one of the concerns raised in this thesis is the contradiction between the theoretical basis of the homelands, which indicates their fundamental illegitimacy, and the support which Bophuthatswana and its former President still appear to enjoy. What did

²⁸. R.J. Southall, *South Africa's Transkei*, pp. 16; 44; 60.

²⁹. R.J. Southall, *South Africa's Transkei*, pp. 3-6.

Bophuthatswana do which makes people remember it, and what did it leave behind for the North West Province?

Literature on Bophuthatswana can be divided into two broad types of literature; the earlier propagandist works and later critical studies. The earlier works such as those produced by Bureau for Economic Research re Bantu Development (BENBO)³⁰ served to justify the existence of Bophuthatswana and/or explained how it arose. The later critical studies, mostly from within Bophuthatswana, are works predominantly, but not only, by scholars at the University of Bophuthatswana (UNIBO) (later the University of the North West (UNW)). These include works by de Clercq, Roodt, Lawrence and Manson, Seiler, Drummond, Ndaki, Woolfrey and Manda and Drummond and Manson³¹. De Clercq examined educational developments in Bophuthatswana. Roodt's focus was on economic development, especially state farming projects and their viability as agro-business.

³⁰. BENBO, **Bophuthatswana at Independence** (1978); BENBO, **Bophuthatswana : Economic Revue, 1975** (1975).

³¹. F. De Clercq, "Education and Development in Bophuthatswana : Political and Limitation (An Educational Monograph 3, Institute of Education, UNIBO, Mmabatho, 1991); M.J. Roodt, "Bophuthatswana's state farming Projects : An Aggro-Business?", **Indicator SA**, vol.3, no.1, Winter 1985; M. Lawrence and A. Manson, "The Dog of the Boers : The Rise and Fall of Mangope in Bophuthatswana", **Journal of Southern African studies**, vol. 20, no.3, September 1994; J. Seiler, "Transforming Mangope's Bophuthatswana : Towards Democracy in the North West Province" (unpublished Manuscript, Mail and Guardian Website); B.F. Ndaki, "A Bill of Rights : The Bophuthatswana Experience", **De Rebus**, September 1983; D. Wolfrey and P. Manda, "A Bill of Rights. Lesson from Bophuthatswana", **The Comparative and International Law Journal of South Africa**, vol. 16, no.3, January 1992; J.H. Drummond, "Rural Land Use and Agricultural Production in Dinokana Village, Bophuthatswana", **Geo-Journal**, vol.22, no.3, November 1990; J.H. Drummond and A.H. Manson, "The Evolution and Contemporary Significance of the Bophuthatswana-Botswana Border Landscape", in Rumley, D. and Minghi, J.V., **The Geography of Border Landscapes**, (1991).

Lawrence and Manson examined different tactics employed by Mangope to strengthen and protect his political position, and his attempt to forge alliances with other small groupings which were also threatened by the new political developments which started in 1989. Drummond investigated the viability of rural development projects, using Dinokana project as an example. Both Ndaki and Woolfrey and Manda investigated the Bill of Rights as contained in the Bophuthatswana constitution and its application. Drummond and Manson examined the importance of the Bophuthatswana-Botswana border and its impact on the lives of the people on both sides of the border. Seiler's work provides a coverage of the transitional period from Bophuthatswana to the North West Provincial Government (NWPG), covering the legacy left by Bophuthatswana for the North West Province and how the latter struggled to deal with that inheritance. Though his work shows lack of objectivity as he tries to create a villain out of Bophuthatswana, blaming it for all the problems and failures of the North West Province, it remains the only work which attempts to examine Bophuthatswana - North West Province in transition. It provides important perspectives on the transitional period and Bophuthatswana's legacy, thus enriching this study, particularly chapter five which deals with the legacy of Bophuthatswana for the North West Province.

From the few published secondary sources available on Bophuthatswana, it was the work by Richards³² which was used fairly extensively. Richards investigates Bophuthatswana as a developing country on its march to world recognition, pursuing every avenue politically, socially and economically in its efforts to achieve international status. Written from the perspective of the Bophuthatswana government, which needs to be treated with caution, it describes Bophuthatswana

³². R. Richards, **A Nation on the March** (1987).

as a country which moulded its society to live up to its projected ideals of freedom and upliftment. Though a one sided and biased work it remains one of the few works which investigated the developments in Bophuthatswana in-depth, thus contributing to this thesis. The book presented important aspects of Bophuthatswana's history and provided much basic information and ideas for the researcher.

This study is the first to synthesise the ideas of these scholars and others and consults new sources which emerged since the fall of Bophuthatswana, to produce a holistic picture of the history of Bophuthatswana. Oral sources were used as people are now free and willing to talk. This oral information provided an important aspect of the thesis.

The study focuses on the period 1977 to 1998. The year 1977 is an important date because it marked the independence of the homeland from South Africa and the beginning of a process of development to "improve the lives of the people". A historical survey of events and factors (evolutionary process) that led to the rise and independence of Bophuthatswana from 1950 forms a significant background to this study. The major aspects examined in the thesis cover developments in the arena of politics and administration, economic development and certain social aspects, particularly education. The attempts made to try and gain international recognition for the Bophuthatswana homeland, regarded by its architects as a "sovereign state," are highlighted in the study. The events leading to the well-known political crisis in this homeland and its downfall also received attention. Though the homeland state disappeared from the political arena in 1994, the study then looks at the period from 1994 to 1998 in order to cover the legacy of the homeland state for the North West Province.

In examining the history of Bophuthatswana and its impact on the history of the North West Province, this study complements the work of Southall, Charton and Butler and others³³ who have written on the homelands. Butler, Rotberg and Adams examined general conditions of the South African homelands, especially in the arena of politics and economy and used Bophuthatswana and Kwazulu as examples. Though Southall's focus is on Transkei, he gives a general overview of the conditions in homelands and a critical analysis of the relationships between the homelands and South Africa. Charton examines the political economy of Ciskei. While these writers focus mainly on the Apartheid era, this study goes beyond into the post Apartheid era (the new democratic dispensation). The study also benefits from works such as by Wolpe and Cleary on Separate Development. These works comprised a body of writing dealing broadly with issues around Separate Development .

This study, which covers a wide scope of the history of the region of the former Bophuthatswana and its successor, the North West Province, deals with the same field researched by John Seiler³⁴, and by Anthea Jeffery³⁵. Seiler's work covered the transitional period in the North West Province, thus covering a similar field as the second and major part of this thesis. Seiler's work provides an invaluable basis for an analysis of the transitional period, and he captures the dramatic nature of the fall of Bophuthatswana and the kinds of problems faced by those who had to step into the administrative breach. He offers also some important, if trenchant,

³³ . R.J. Southall, **South Africa's Transkei**; C. Charton (ed), **Ciskei: Economics and Politics of Dependence in a South African Homeland** (1980); J. Butler, R.I. Rotberg & J. Adams, **The Black Homelands of South Africa**.

³⁴ . J. Seiler, "Transforming Mangope's Bophuthatswana: Towards Democracy in the North West Province", (<http://www.mg.co.za/mg/projects/bop/index.html>).

³⁵ . A.J. Jeffery, **Conflict at the Crossroads in Bophuthatswana**(1993).

comment on the successes and failures of the incoming administration. Seiler has relied heavily on personal information, some official reports and information from the press.

This study has benefitted from the publication of a body of information either not available to Seiler at the time or not consulted by him, and a much wider range of commission and departmental reports than those to which he has had access. A wide range of personalities involved in the dramatic events between 1994 and 1998 have also been interviewed. Seiler's work is also the product of a more immediate and polemical response to the fall of Bophuthatswana premised on the ideal that the legacy of Bophuthatswana was avowedly "bad", and the intentions and political position of the new ANC government indisputably better than its predecessor, although he recognises the many difficulties facing the new Provincial government in making governance effective. This thesis tries to provide a more balanced and objective treatment of this period and has the advantage of viewing the transition from a deeper time perspective. Seiler's analysis on the period from 1996-1999, though insightful, is by no means a complete picture of the unfolding events. This thesis attempts to analyse what did happen from 1994 onwards from the perspective of those who were both aggrieved with the new government and those who were partisan to it.

Jeffery's work, written from a liberal perspective, covers events in Bophuthatswana up to 1992, dealing with the same field covered in the first part of this thesis. Like Seiler's work, it has enriched this thesis, especially the chapter on political developments in Bophuthatswana. It exposes the intolerant attitude of Mangope towards his political opponents particularly non-Tswanas.

Furthermore, it gives an analysis of the views of the opposition regarding Bophuthatswana's independence.

Jeffery further describes the conditions in Bophuthatswana as more stable than in other parts of South Africa, stating that conflict in the area was relatively low as compared to areas such as Kwazulu and the rest of South Africa. Indeed at the time she wrote this work, violence in Bophuthatswana had not escalated as it had in the areas she mentioned and the death toll was very low. She saw Bophuthatswana as “an island of stability” and was critical of ANC tactics to make it ungovernable. Any deconstruction of Bophuthatswana, she argued, should be done within legal national parameters. The argument sets to extenuate the Bophuthatswana situation that things were not as bad as elsewhere in South Africa, that there was less violence, less intimidation, less escalation of unrest, a relatively low death toll and no “necklacing” of political opponents, could not be substantiated after the demise of Bophuthatswana. Her argument cannot be sustained for the period after her book was published in 1993. Events in Bophuthatswana changed dramatically, becoming worse than in the rest of South Africa, and Bophuthatswana became the only homeland where force became necessary to reincorporate it into South Africa. Her work therefore becomes one piece of work in the broader history of the region under research. It has however provided much basic information and ideas for this thesis. This thesis unlike Jeffery's work has the opportunity of investigating the events which unfolded since 1993, consulting sources which were not available to Jeffery at time of writing.

The research on the history of Bophuthatswana and its impact on the history of the North West Province which integrates many aspects of the history of the homeland

state, add to our understanding of a broader policy of Separate Development, the homeland system, how homelands developed and how their history fits into the current political and economic dispensation.

The study consists of six chapters excluding the introduction and conclusion. In chapter one, events and factors which led to the independence of Bophuthatswana are examined. This is followed in chapter two with the examination of the administration of the homeland state, an interesting feature being the constitutional model which in theory was a total break from Apartheid discourse. It also covers the social and economic developments in the homeland. In particular some of the interesting changes in education receive attention. Economically it is argued that, while some important steps were taken to try to build an economic framework for Bophuthatswana, the economy relied substantially on South African support. In chapter three, the political situation is investigated. The chapter focuses on political activity in Bophuthatswana, opposition and the emergence of political repression. The chapter four investigates events which led to political crisis and the fall of the homeland state. Chapter five investigates and analyses the Interim Administration, its challenges and successes. The final chapter (chapter six) examines the legacy of the homeland state for its successor, the North West Provincial government.

SOURCES

Sources used in this study include archival records, oral sources, newspapers, government publications and the secondary sources which have already been alluded to. Though archival research was done at both the Mafikeng Archival depot, where Bophuthatswana government files are stored and the Central

Archival Depository (CAD) in Pretoria, it was mainly the records of the Central Archival Depository which were consulted to provide background information on the early stages of Bophuthatswana. These provided valuable information on agreements signed between Bophuthatswana and South Africa and on kgosi Mangope's early political career. Much of the material during the Bophuthatswana period has only recently been deposited in Pretoria and is not available for researchers at the current time. Reference has been made however to Parliamentary debates in Hansard.

As this study is about the recent past and overlaps into the current situation, oral sources became extremely important and have been used fairly extensively. Interviews were conducted individually with people mostly from government, parastatals, political parties and some ordinary people. Information was collected from two sets of contemporaries, those who are involved in the transitional process, having problems in getting the system working, and on the other hand, people who worked in the old system and who generally continue to criticize the new system as having been disruptive and its policies as being too abstract. Those from the NWP government were inclined to give official views which were dictated by the kind of functions they perform daily, while those outside government (and in opposition ranks) tend to exaggerate problems encountered by the new government. Though these responses are subjective and need to be treated as such they benefitted this study by supplementing the deficiencies of the written accounts. The very contrasting opinions however, make the task of achieving an objective position for the historian very difficult. They do reveal however the strong feelings Bophuthatswana engendered during its seventeen years of existence. Though attempts to interview kgosi Mangope have failed due to his tight schedule as the leader of the official opposition party and due to his

intermittent ill-health, sufficient information on Bophuthatswana and its legacy was covered from interviews with many people who were part and parcel of Bophuthatswana, including some members of the Mangope family and United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP) politicians.

Opposition to the homeland policy, developments in the homelands and the demise of the homelands, especially the fall of Bophuthatswana which was more violent than in other homelands, were widely published in the print media (press). Newspaper reports were therefore a valuable source and were obtained mainly from the Africa Institute of South Africa and were extensively used.

Another set of primary sources used are government publications especially departmental annual reports of both the Bophuthatswana and the North West Provincial governments. The shortcoming of these sources is that they reflect the interests and biases of the government officials who had to protect the images of their departments by emphasizing generally their successes. Failures were presented as future programmes or “projects in the pipeline”. These official reports need to be treated critically. Despite the weaknesses and questionable impartiality, they contributed significantly to this study.



Among theses which were consulted are works by Mompei, Matladi and Worth³⁶. These have significantly contributed to various aspects of this thesis as they

³⁶. Mompei, G M, Factors and Events which led to the Political Independence of Bophuthatswana, 1950 - 1977 (M.A. dissertation, Potchefstroom University, Potchefstroom, 1994); M.N. Matladi, “Implementation of a Curriculum Project : A case study of the Primary Education Upgrading Programme (PEUP)” (M.Ed dissertation, University of North West, Mafikeng, 1998); S.H. Worth, “The Management of Agricultural Development in Bophuthatswana since 1972” (M.A. dissertation, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1993).

researched on specific aspects such as education and economy in Bophuthatswana Mangope's own works³⁷ which were compilation of his speeches on different occasions, were very cautiously used, as they were written from both political and personal points of view, and were intended to serve a particular purpose, to promote the image of Mangope himself and that of Bophuthatswana . Though obviously self-congratulatory in tone, they provide valuable information in isolating factors which contributed to his earlier successes and his later downfall.

³⁷. L. M Mangope, **A Place of All** (1978); L.M. Mangope, **Mandatory Sanctions: Bophuthatswana and the Frontline OAU Nations** (1988).

CHAPTER ONE

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE POLITICAL “INDEPENDENCE” OF BOPHUTHATSWANA

1 INTRODUCTION

The main objective of this chapter is to examine the events and factors which led to the political ‘independence’ of the Bophuthatswana homeland in 1977. The chapter opens with a short overview of the history of the Batswana. The major issue of discussion is the process through which Bophuthatswana became independent. The chapter finally examines the early political career of kgosi Lucas Manyane Mangope, the founding and only president of Bophuthatswana in order to understand his character and policies during his rule as the president of Bophuthatswana.

2 THE ORIGIN OF THE BATSWANA

Although the exact date of the African settlement in Southern Africa cannot as yet be scientifically confirmed, archaeologists now generally agree that it was between the year AD200 and AD 450. The Bantu - speaking peoples of which the Batswana are assumed to have formed part were established as far south as modern Zimbabwe by AD 200 and were expanding through migration south wards beyond the Limpopo river.³⁸ Clearly this expansion took a long time. This is confirmed by the archeological excavation of sites in different areas of southern Africa. The

³⁸. I. Schapera, *The Bantu Speaking Tribes of South Africa*(1950), p.60.

early Iron Age sites discovered by Revil Mason at Broederstroom date as far back as AD 350. He discovered the remains of stone walled sites and iron products which are indicative of the presence of the Early Iron-Age Bantu-Speakers of whom Sotho-Batswana, the ancestors of the present Batswana people in South Africa, formed a part.³⁸ The same discoveries were made at Khunotshwane (Kaditshwene) near Zeerust, Molepolole, Serowe and Shoshong in Botswana dating between AD 350 and AD 600. The Early Iron Age People practised mixed farming, kept stock and grew crops such as millet and sorghum.³⁹ This differentiated them from both the Basarwa (hunters) and Bakgothu (stock farmers) thus indicating that the sites were inhabited by the ancestors of the Bantu speaking people who were already settled in southern Africa by AD 350.

The Hurutshe lineage indicates that most of the Batswana chiefdoms had Mohurutshe as their ancestor, the descendant of Malope, the son of Masilo⁴⁰ According to Legassick, the original chiefdom began to undergo fission (disintegration) so that within three hundred years its members were spread from the centre of the highveld near Brits to the borders of the Kgalagadi and as far as the upper Caledon river. This was probably around 1440.⁴¹ This fission led to the

³⁸. T. Tlou & A Campbell, **History of Botswana (1984)**, pp. 37-40; R. Mason, **Origins of Black People**, p. 47.

⁴⁰. G.M. Mompei "Factors and Events which led to the political independence of Bophuthatswana, 1950 - 1977," (M.A. dissertation), (1994) p.18; M. Legassick, "The Sotho - Tswana Peoples before 1800" in L.M. Thompson (ed), **The African Societies in Southern Africa** (1969), p.100; I.Schapera, **The Bantu Speaking Tribes of South Africa**, p.61. ; T. M.O.C. Maggs, **Iron Age Communities of the Southern Highveld** (1976), p .308.

⁴¹. M. Legassick, "The Sotho - Tswana Peoples before 1800", p100.

formation of various Batswana chiefdoms such as the Bahurutshe, the Bakwena, the Batlhaping, the Batlharo, the Barolong, the Bangwato, the Bangwaketse, the Bakgatla and the Bakgalagadi.⁴² These chiefdoms were located in different areas and further subdivided into sub-chiefdoms.

There were also non-Batswana chiefdoms which originated from the Batswana. The Bapedi chiefdoms of the Batshweneng (Bagananwa ba Mmalebogo) in Lebowa, for example, were an offshoot of the Bahurutshe, while the Bahlaloga originated from the Bakwena.⁴³ The Basotho originated from the Bakwena ba Mogopa.⁴⁴

3 TIMES OF TROUBLES AND LAND DISPOSSESSION

The period starting from the mid 18th century may be regarded as the times of troubles for the Batswana people. This was the period in which the Batswana experienced increased conflict due to the Difaqane wars, followed by Boer conquest and Land dispossession and British colonial rule. This section therefore seeks to establish the influence of these external threats on the history and

⁴². B.K.M. Molokoe, "A Historical study of the Bakwena ba Mogopa as Victims of Forced Removals, 1983-1994 (M.A. dissertation, 1998), p.9; M. Legassick, "The Sotho-Tswana Peoples", p.88; G.M. Mompei, "Factors and Events", p.18; I.Schapera, **The Bantu Speaking Tribes**, pp. 60-61.

⁴³. Centre for Indigenous Law (Unisa), **Indigenous Contract in Bophuthatswana** (1990), pp. 1-2; H.O. Mönning, **The Pedi** (1967), pp. 11-13.

⁴⁴. H.J. Van Aswegen, **History of South Africa to 1854** (1990), p. 62.

settlement of the Batswana in order to provide a context for more recent events, especially the separation of South Africa along ethnic lines.

The period between 1750 and 1840 was a troubled period in the history of Southern Africa, when chaos reigned among the Black peoples, the Batswana included. This was the period including Difaqane, which was characterised by turbulence, fear, tension, misery, distrust, instability and disintegration. African Communities were displaced, some totally disintegrating and losing their vital economic resources. As continual raids put communities to flight, communities were forced to abandon agriculture. They could not plough or graze their herds, and their animals were seized by intermittent raiders. This forced them to lead a semi-nomadic life and many died of starvation⁴⁵. Some African leaders responded to Difaqane by launching attacks on weaker communities. The Nguni leaders such as Shaka, Dingane and Mzilikazi became destructive and forceful agents of Difaqane. However, there were other non-Nguni leaders who contributed to the general chaos such as Mmanthatisi of the Batlokwa, Sebetwane of the Bafokeng (Makololo) and Tshwaane of the Baphuting.⁴⁶

The cause of Difaqane has always been a debatable and controversial issue. Before Cobbing challenged the exaggerated role of the Zulu kingdom in Difaqane, historians generally accorded the reason for the Difaqane on the Zulu and Shaka in particular. Cobbing on the contrary exposed the role of the expansion of a

⁴⁵. P. Maylam, **A History of the African People from the Early Iron Age to the 1970s** (1986), pp. 59-60; M. Kinsman, "Hungry Wolves : The Impact of Violence" in C. Hamilton (ed), **The Mfecane Aftermath : Reconstructive Debates in Southern African History** (1995), p. 364.

⁴⁶. J.D. Omer-Cooper, "The Mfecane Survives its Critics" in C. Hamilton (ed), **The Mfecane Aftermath : Reconstructive Debates in Southern African History** (1995), pp.283-289.

white settler capitalist economy from the Cape into the interior, the long distance ivory and slave trades between Delagoa Bay and the Cape and the insatiable appetite for cheap African labour and land grabbing by the Trek-Boers as possible causes of Difaqane. He sees the rise of the Zulu kingdom as a response to these pressures and opportunities resulting from trade and white expansionist movement. This also led to conflict between the Ndwandwe and the Zulu. It was the failure of the Ndwandwe to incorporate the Zulu which forced the Ndwandwe to the north (Mozambique) where they became involved in slave raiding as agents of the white economy. The Griquas were also armed by the Cape Colony to raid slaves for the white economy, causing disruption on the Western highveld. Omer-Cooper blames Cobbing for claiming that, "the Zulus started to raid other groups only after Shaka had moved the centre of his kingdom to the area between Thukela and Mzimkhulu in 1820 due to internal political problems"⁴⁷. Although Omer-Cooper accepts the role of slave trade in Mfecane, he accuses Cobbing of underplaying the role and initiatives of the African peoples, depicting them as having been reactive to other factors. Cobbing brought an interesting dimension to the Difaqane which historians have been forced to consider, though his ideas have been strongly criticised.

The Batswana, as the victims of Difaqane, suffered severely in the hands of the marauding Southern bands of the Baphuting under Tshwaane (later Ratsebe), Bafokeng under Sebetwane. These bands crossed the Vaal river to attack the Batswana in their areas. The main victims of the Baphuting were the Barolong, Seleka, Bakgatla, Bakwena, Bahurutshe and Bangwaketse. The other

⁴⁷. J.D. Omer-Cooper, "The Mfecane Survives its Critics", in C. Hamilton (ed), **The Mfecane Aftermath : Reconstructive Debates in Southern African History** (1995), pp.283-289.

Batswana chiefdoms such as the Barolong and Batlhaping suffered similar fate from the Bafokeng of Sebetwane, causing a lot of destruction to the areas inhabited by the Batswana.⁴⁸

In 1823 these devastations were followed by the arrival of the Matebele of Mzilikazi. He had fled from Shaka and crossed the Vaal river into the highveld forcing the Batswana westwards by launching repeated attacks on them for almost five years. The main victims were the Bakgatla and the Bakwena between Madikwe and Odi rivers.⁴⁹ Kinsman states that the Matebele then moved west and established a new capital at the headwaters of the Madikwe river.⁵⁰ According to Maylam this was in 1830 at Mosega near Zeerust after Mzilikazi had conquered the Bahurutshe without much resistance from them. It was from this capital where the Voortrekkers later drove him away. He crossed the Ngotoane river and attacked the Bangwaketse and Bakwena in the present day Botswana.⁵¹

The Batswana were affected by the Difaqane in different ways. Some were displaced from their settlements, others reduced to servitude like the Bahurutshe. Some disintegrated and were left weak and this is what led to their incapacity to resist the Boer intrusion as will be shown later on. Some of the Batswana people

⁴⁸. J.D. Omer-Cooper, "The Mfecane Survives its Critics", pp. 285-289.

⁴⁹. P. Maylam, **History of the African People**, p. 58.

⁵⁰. M. Kinsman, "Hungry Wolves, The Impact of Violence", p.386.

⁵¹. P. Maylam, **A History of the African People**, p.59.

like the young Bahurutshe men were incorporated into the Difaqane bands.⁵² The Difaqane fragmented the Batswana chiefdoms and demarcated their land by leaving open, unoccupied areas, though still laying claims to them, which were later occupied by the Voortrekkers. This resulted in an uneven settlement pattern characterised by dispersed Batswana villages.⁵³ This was evident in the later fragmented nature of Bophuthatswana, with better quality land occupied by whites lying alongside overgrazed and usually poorer quality African held land.

The Difaqane was immediately followed by the Voortrekker entry into the land of the Sotho - Tswana around 1835-6. The Voortrekkers entered the Transvaal and Orange Free State and found the Batswana living under the domination of Mzilikazi. Mzilikazi was also the enemy of the Voortrekkers having attacked Potgieter's group and captured all its livestock in 1836. This group was helped by the Barolong boo Seleka at Thaba Nchu showing the Boers great hospitality, seeing them as possible allies against Mzilikazi.⁵⁴ Mzilikazi therefore became a common enemy to both the Batswana and Voortrekkers.

**NWU
LIBRARY**

In 1837, an army comprising of the Barolong, Bahurutshe, Bangwaketse and the Voortrekkers defeated Mzilikazi and drove him out of the Transvaal across the

⁵². B.K. Mbenga, "The Bakgatla ba Kgafela in the Pilanesberg District of Western Transvaal from 1899 to 1931," (Ph.D Thesis 1996), pp. 33-36; Department of Information, **Republic of Bophuthatswana : Five Years of Independence (1983)**, p.8.

⁵³. G.M. Mompei, "Factors and Events", p.18.

⁵⁴ W.F. Lye & Murray, **Transformations on the Highveld : The Tswana and Southern Sotho** (1980), p.59.

Limpopo and Ngotoane rivers into present day Zimbabwe. After this the Voortrekkers settled in the Transvaal in areas from which the Batswana had been displaced during the Difaqane. The Voortrekkers mistakenly regarded these areas as “open lands”, hence the beginning of the myth of empty land.⁵⁵ Initially the Batswana did not resist the occupation of their land by the Voortrekkers as they thought their stay would be temporary and they saw a potential ally in the Voortrekkers against Mzilikazi should he return to the highveld. The other reason was their incapacity to effectively resist the Voortrekker intrusion in their areas.⁵⁶

To make their settlement permanent, the Voortrekkers needed to acquire the title deeds to the areas they occupied. Initially when it was expedient, they negotiated with the Batswana, entering into agreements which resulted in treaties like in the case of the Maroteng, but the Batswana chiefdoms viewed these with suspicions as they wanted to maintain their autonomy. After the defeat of Mzilikazi the Voortrekkers claimed to have won this land by right of conquest of the Ndebele. They claimed that they had liberated the Batswana from the Matebele and were justified to treat them as vassals.⁵⁷ The Batswana who were displaced from their areas and wished to return to them, had to do so on condition that they accepted and recognised Voortrekker authority.⁵⁸ Maritz claims that “some Batswana

⁵⁵. W.F. Lye & Murray, **Transformations on the Highveld**, pp. 59-60.

⁵⁶. W.F. Lye & C. Murray, **Transformations on the Highveld**, p.60; B.K. Mbenga, “The Bakgatla ba Kgafela”, pp. 33-36.

⁵⁷. P. Curtin, et. al., **African History** (1978), p.322.

⁵⁸ C.J. Maritz, “Voogbestuur en Nasievorming by die Batswana van die RSA” (Ph.D thesis, 1976), p.313.

voluntarily became Boer subjects but there were also incidents of campaigns by the Voortrekkers to impose their authority.”⁵⁹ In point of fact, the Voortrekkers imposed their rule by military strength.

To develop their farms, the Boers needed labour from the Batswana but most of them were not prepared to work for the Voortrekkers. It was very difficult for the African chiefs (*dikgosi*) to force their people to work as expected of them by the Voortrekkers. The Voortrekkers then imposed forced labour on the Batswana and started to ill-treat *dikgosi*. This ill treatment included humiliating and insulting acts such as the flogging of *dikgosi*. *Kgosi* Kgamanyane for example, was flogged by Paul Kruger at the kgotla in full view of his people and other *dikgosi* of the Pilanesberg district. This soured relations further, angering the Bakgatla to the extent that half of them left with Kgamanyane to Botswana and settled at Mochudi.⁶⁰ A similar incidence was experienced by Mmamogale of the Bakwena ba Mogopa. Like the Bakgatla, the Bakwena left their area and sought refuge in Lesotho where they remained until 1868 when they returned to their area, Matlhare (Bethanie).⁶¹

From the time of the establishment of the Boer rule on the highveld, there were land disputes. Those Batswana groups still independent from Boer rule, such as the Barolong and Batlhaping fought bitterly to defend their land against the Boers.

⁵⁹. C.J. Maritz, “Voogbestuur en Nasievorming”, p. 323.

⁶⁰. B.K. Mberiga, “Forced Labour in the Pilanesberg : The flogging of chief Kgamanyane by commandant Paul Krüger, Saulspoort, April 1870”, **Journal of Southern African Studies**, vol. 23, no.1, March 1997, p.129.

⁶¹. B.K.M. Molokoe, “A Historical Study of the Bakwena ba Mogopa”, pp. 15-16.

The disputes dragged on were compounded by further disputes which arose from the conflicting claims to the diamond rich area resulting from the discovery of diamonds in the 1860's. The disputes were referred to Sir Robert Keate, governor of Natal, to arbitrate. His arbitration became known as the Keate Award. The Award defined the Batswana land as stretching from the source of Molopo to the Harts river, from Makwassie to the Vaal river, south of Platberg to Langeberg and west of the Kgalagadi. However the award did not stop the Boers from pressing their claim to African land.⁶²

The imposed Voortrekker rule over the Batswana areas was disrupted by the annexation of the Transvaal and British rule in 1877.⁶³ The Cape government which was influenced by mining interests, particularly Cecil John Rhodes, started to show more interest in the interior as a result of the diamond discovery. The Keate Award had paved the way for British annexation and exploitation of the Batswana territories. The British intervention in the area brought them into conflict with the Transvaal and the Orange Free State and which in turn led to the Anglo-Boer War of 1881 and subsequently the South African War of 1899 - 1902.⁶⁴ The South African War resulted in power shifting from the Afrikaners to the British when the Transvaal became a British Crown Colony in 1902.

⁶². J.D. Omer-Cooper, **Histoy of Southern Africa** (1987), pp. 103-105; S.M.Molema, **Montshiwa: Barolong Chief and Patriot, 1815-1896** (1966), pp.66-67.

⁶³. C.J. Maritz, "Voogbestuur en Nasievorming", p.323.

⁶⁴. W.F. Lye & C. Murray, **Transformations on the Highveld**, p.72.

The British government had split the Batswana territory into two areas in 1885, using the Molopo river as the dividing line between the two areas. The land north of the Molopo river was proclaimed a British Protectorate. This brought the Batswana chiefdoms in that area under British rule. These included previously independent groups such as the Bangwato and Bangwaketse.⁶⁵ Although there was a claim that this was done on request from leaders such as kgosi Bathoeng of the Bakwena and kgosi Gaseitsiwe of the Bangwaketse, the reason behind this was that the expansion of the British rule into Bechunaland could be used as a springboard to open the road to the north, thus fulfilling Cecil Rhodes' ambition of the Cape to Cairo road. The area remained a British Protectorate until it became independent in 1966 as the Republic of Botswana.

The area south of the Molopo river was declared the crown colony of British Bechunaland. African leaders in this area obtained a solemn and categorical commitment from the British colonial government that their area would never be incorporated into the South African Republic (Transvaal) or the Cape colony. In gross disregard of this commitment the Southern Tswana were annexed by the Cape Colony in 1895 regardless of petitions against the annexation by kgosi Montshiwa and Mankurwane.⁶⁶ The Batswana south of the Molopo river found themselves subjected to the three different white controlled states: the Transvaal, Orange Free State and Cape Colony. In 1910 when the Union of South Africa was declared, they became part of the union without their consent and thus were

⁶⁵. A. Jeffery, **Conflict at the crossroads in Bophuthatswana**, pp. 13-14; K. Shillington, **The Colonisation of the Southern Tswana 1870 - 1900** (1985), p.172.

⁶⁶. K. Shillington, **The Colonisation of the Southern Tswana**, p.184.

subsequently treated as part of the general black population of South Africa. They remained in that position until the establishment of the “independent” Republic of Bophuthatswana in 1977 under L.M. Mangope as the president.⁶⁷

The division of the Batswana territories revealed the artificiality of the colonial creations. There were no well defined borders between the British Protectorate and British Bechunaland especially with regard to the Lehurutshe and Barolong area. The Ngotoane River was regarded as a border but it remained an informal one and served no political purpose. According to Drummond and Manson, “before Botswana independence, there was no border control and people on both sides of the river had access to water and grazing on both sides of the river.”⁶⁸ Measures of border control became operative only after Botswana independence as Botswana needed to safeguard her sovereignty and political integrity against the white minority rule in South Africa and not against their fellow Batswana south of their country.⁶⁹

⁶⁷. Benbo, **Bophuthatswana at Independence**, p.19; A. Waugh, “Time for Bophuthatswana to join the Commonwealth”, **Pioneer**, vol. 8, No.2, February 1986, p.1.

⁶⁸. J. Drummond & A.H. Manson, “The Evolution and Contemporary Significance of the Bophuthatswana - Botswana Border Landscape” in D.Rumley & J.V. Minghi, **The Geography of Border Landscapes**, pp. 223-224.

⁶⁹. J. Drummond & A.H. Manson, “The Evolution and Contemporary significance of Bophuthatswana - Botswana Border Landscape”, pp. 232-233.

4. THE POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF BOPHUTHATSWANA

This section examines both the political and constitutional developments of Bophuthatswana to political “independence”. It looks into the various stages on the road to independence, namely the Tswana Territorial Authority, the Tswana Legislative Assembly and Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly. It also examines the establishment of political parties and their participation in the elections and ultimately the attainment of political independence.

4.1 TSWANA TERRITORIAL AUTHORITY

In terms of the Bantu Authorities Act no. 68 of 1951, all the Black ethnic groups were entitled to establish their own territorial authorities which would constitute the highest level of government in each territory. This led to the establishment of the Tswana Territorial Authority on the 21 April 1961 at Potchefstroom by the representatives of eight regional authorities who were mostly *dikgosi*. An executive committee of eleven members, comprising of the following: chairman, vice chairman (both *dikgosi*), a full time secretary and one member from each regional authority was nominated. Kgosi T.R. Pilane of the Bakgatla ba ga Kgafela at Moruleng in the Pilanesberg (Mankwe) region was elected the chairman and kgosi L.M. Mangope of the Bahurutshe boo Manyane at Motswedi in the Lehurutshe region was elected the vice chairman. The Tswana Territorial Authority had very few executive powers⁷⁰.

⁷⁰. Department of Information, **Bophuthatswana at Glance**, p.3; G.M. Mompei, **Factors and Events**, pp. 61-62; Benbo, **Bophuthatswana at Independence**, p.31.

The Tswana Territorial Authority expressed the desire for self-government (independence) as is noted in kgosi Pilane's expression that "all people with self-pride want independence"⁷¹. This triggered a move for independence negotiations. On the 20 November 1965, on its own initiative, the executive council of the Tswana Territorial Authority met with Mr M.C. Botha then Minister of Bantu Administration to discuss the question of self-government, of course within the limited pre-conceived plan of the National Party. The council was further motivated by the fact that the Transkei had attained self-governing status in 1963. The council came out of that meeting assured that it would be the next to be granted self-government.⁷² As a result of these talks the Tswana Territorial Authority was given further executive powers on the 12 December 1968. It was given control over Authority Affairs and Finance, Education and Culture, Works, Justice, Agriculture and Community Affairs. It had to have a chief councillor as the head of the cabinet. On the 14 October 1968 the reconstituted Tswana Territorial Authority elected L.M. Mangope as the first chief councillor by 33 votes to 19 for T.R. Pilane.⁷³ A cabinet was announced and the following were the ministers:

Kgosi L.M. Mangope - chief councillor and responsible for Authority Affairs and Finance.

Kgosi H.T.R Maseloane - Community Affairs

Kgosi S.G. Ntuane - Agriculture.

Kgosi B.J. Toto - Justice

⁷¹. P. Alberts, **The Borders of Apartheid : A Chronicle of Alienation in South Africa with a Portfolio of Photographs on Bophuthatswana Today** (1983), p.17.

⁷². G.M. Mompei, "Factors and Events", p.64.

⁷³. J. Butler, et al, **The Black Homelands**, p.52; Benbo, **Bophuthatswana at Independence**, pp. 31-32.

Mr M. Setlogelo - Education and Culture

Mr D.P. Kgotleng - Works⁷⁴

For those who supported the system, this signalled a great stride in the political development of Bophuthatswana to "independence". It gave the people in Bophuthatswana a measure of control over their affairs but more significantly, provided those appointed as leaders with the opportunity to gain experience in administration and governance.

4.2 THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY (TLA / B.L.A)

In line with the extensive legislative powers conferred on the homelands (Territorial Authorities) by the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act of 1971, the Tswana Territorial Authority was converted into the Tswana Legislative Assembly (T.L.A). This happened on the 1 May 1971 through Proclamation R87 of the 30 April 1971.⁷⁵ The 13 regional authorities were reduced to 12 which coincided with the future 12 magisterial districts of Bophuthatswana. These authorities were subordinated to the Tswana Legislative Assembly.⁷⁶ The reorganised regions were as follows:

**NWU
LIBRARY**

⁷⁴. Benbo, **Bophuthatswana at Independence**, p.32.

⁷⁵. P. Alberts, **The Borders of Apartheid**, p.21.

⁷⁶. Benbo, **Bophuthatswana : Economic Revue**, 1975, p.14; J.H. Moolman & G.M.E. Leistner, **Bophuthatswana Hulpbronne en Ontwikkeling**, (1974), pp. 5-6.

- (a) Bafokeng
- (b) Ditsobotla
- (c) Ganyesa
- (d) Lehurutshe
- (e) Madikwe
- (f) Mankwe
- (g) Molopo
- (h) Moretele
- (I) Odi
- (j) Taung
- (k) Tlharo-Tlhaping (later Kudumane)
- (l) Thaba Nchu⁷⁷.

In 1970 Kgosi Pilane requested that negotiations be held with the government of the Republic of South Africa to request self-government in line with government policy. In the 1971 Legislative Assembly session, kgosi Mangope announced that in terms of the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act of 1971, the Batswana would be granted self-government. They had to draw a constitution and prepare for self-government. The Legislative Assembly appointed the Constitution Committee to draw up a constitution which had to be in line with the blueprint of self-government. It started its work in 1971 and tabled its report in 1972. The adopted constitution contained the new name for the territory, the flag and the national anthem. The name Bophuthatswana (where the Batswana abide) was adopted as the official name of the territory and *Lefatshe la bo rra rona* was adopted as the

⁷⁷. D.A. Kotze, **African Politics in South Africa, 1964-1974 : Parties and Issues** (1975), p.33.

national anthem.⁷⁸

In June 1972, Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa, Mr B.J. Vorster declared Bophuthatswana as self-governing territory. The new Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly (B.L.A) was to be constituted through elections. The preparations for elections to elect a 72 member Legislative Assembly were made. The 72 members comprised 24 members nominated by the 12 regional authorities (i.e. 2 each) and 48 elected from the 12 constituencies (regions), 4 from each.⁷⁹ The elections were scheduled for the 4 October 1972 and preparations for these elections led to the emergence of political parties in the territory.

4.3 PREPARATIONS FOR THE 1972 ELECTIONS AND FORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES

The preparations for the 1972 elections scheduled for 4 October 1972 saw the emergence of four political parties in Bophuthatswana. These parties are discussed individually, but it must be noted that the major parties were the Seoposengwe (unity) Party of Pilane and the Bophuthatswana National Party of Mangope. The Tswana National Party under Mr Lloyd Ndaba and the Progressive Party under Mr Tsoke were smaller parties.

⁷⁸. D.A. Kotze, **African Politics in South Africa**, p.33.

⁷⁹. G.M. Mompei, "Factors and Events", p.72.

4.4 SEOPOSENGWE PARTY (SP)

From the time of the granting of self-government to Bophuthatswana, kgosi Pilane and his supporters had criticised the limited extent of Bophuthatswana's autonomy. In reality it was limited as the Bophuthatswana Legislative Council still had to seek the approval of the South African government (Minister of Bantu Administration) on certain issues. Pilane's group demanded that autonomy should be expanded immediately. On the other hand Mangope adopted a more cautious approach and believed that self-government should be gradually extended to allow for opportunity to gain experience in governance.⁸⁰ The real differences were in the ambitions of the two leaders. Pilane was sure of his support and thought that he would win the elections if the Legislative Assembly was to be constituted. Mangope on the contrary was still building a power base especially among traditional leaders and needed more time to consolidate his power. The two leaders also differed on the question of federation with other black ethnic groups, Pilane believing in a federation of all black homelands, while Mangope feared the possible domination of the numerically superior Zulu and Xhosa over the Batswana. Mangope felt that in such a federation, the Batswana would lose their cultural identity.⁸¹ Mangope gained the favour of the South African government as he supported the objectives of Grand Apartheid while Pilane's view was opposed to Apartheid objective of separating black South Africans on ethnic lines.

⁸⁰. G.M. Mompei, "Factors and Events", p.72.

⁸¹. J. Butler, et al, **The Black Homelands**, pp. 81-83.

The Pilane faction then resolved to form a political party in order to foster their ideas in respect of the political status of Bophuthatswana.⁸² The supporters of Pilane held a consultative meeting at Garankuwa on 3 June 1972 where the final resolution to form a political party was taken. The party was formally launched as Seoposengwe Party on 29 July 1972 at Moruleng (Saulspoort), kgosi Pilane's village. Pilane was elected the leader of the party.⁸³ Seoposengwe therefore became the first party to be established in Bophuthatswana. It favoured Black unity, a view which brought a major disagreement in the Legislative Assembly to the extent that the vice-chairman of the Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly, Maseloane launched a personal attack on kgosi Pilane accusing him of being influenced by his Xhosa wife into the idea of a federation with the Xhosa and the other ethnic groups.⁸⁴ Nevertheless Seoposengwe became one of the leading role players in the early politics of Bophuthatswana.

4.5 BOPHUTHATSWANA NATIONAL PARTY (B.N.P)

Initially Mangope was opposed to the establishment of political parties seeing them as foreign to Black politics. This view was shared by some African leaders such as Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. However the surprise news about the formation of a political party by Pilane prompted him to think along similar lines. On 6 August 1972 at a meeting initiated by him in Mafikeng, the nominated

⁸². D.A. Kotze, **African Politics in South Africa**, pp. 49 -50.

⁸³. D.A. Kotze, **African Politics in South Africa**, p. 50.

⁸⁴. J. Butler, et al, **The Black Homelands**, p.52; G.M. Mompei, "Factors and Events", pp.71-72; D.A. Kotze, **African Politics in South Africa**, p.49.

members from the regional authorities established a new political party, Bophuthatswana National Party and Mangope was elected its leader.⁸⁵

While the formation of the Bophuthatswana National Party was formed in response to the formation of the Seoposengwe Party, it still managed to put forward its own programmes, manifesto and policies. The party believed in the unity of all the Batswana people resident in Bophuthatswana and the Republic of South Africa, and was committed to the furtherance of “a Tswana nationhood,” Tswana nationalism and self-government.⁸⁶ This tight ethnic approach constituted its guiding principle and brought it in conflict with the Seoposengwe policy of a broader nationalism.

4.6 TSWANA NATIONAL PARTY (T.N.P)

The Tswana National Party was initially formed/founded in Soweto as a group aiming to contest the 1968 elections of the Bantu Urban Council of Soweto. It was founded by a Zulu resident of Soweto, Mr Lloyd Ndaba, whose house served as the head office for the nationalist groupings such as Lebowa National Party, Zulu National Party and Tswana National Party. The Tswana National Party had no formal administrative apparatus, no paid up members but only a leader and few supporters. It was later joined by Mrs M.R. Modise who unsuccessfully contested

⁸⁵. A.de Crispigny & R. Schrire (eds.), **The Government and Politics of South Africa**, p.127.

⁸⁶. D.A. Kotze, **African Politics in South Africa**, p.50.

the 1972 elections.⁸⁷ After the 1972 elections the party disappeared from the political scene.

4.7 THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY (P.P)

This party existed in name only. Like the Tswana National Party it had no formal administrative apparatus.⁸⁸ Even worse, it had no followers but was a one man party formed out of emotional reaction by a disillusioned Mr Tsoke. Mr Tsoke was frustrated by his exclusion from the list of candidates of the Bophuthatswana National Party although he had supported Mangope on the nomination day. He then contested the Odi constituency and fared badly. After the 1972 elections, like Modise, he disappeared from politics.⁸⁹

4.8 THE 1972 ELECTIONS AND THE BOPHUTHATSWANA LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

Given the status of the political parties which registered to contest the 1972 elections, it becomes clear that the elections were a race between the Seoposengwe Party and the Bophuthatswana National Party. The elections went ahead as scheduled, on 4 October 1972 with 50% of the eligible voters (mainly from the

⁸⁷. A.de Crispigny & R. Schrire (eds.), **The Government and Politics of South Africa**, p.127.

⁸⁸. D.A. Kotze, **African Politics in South Africa**, p.50.

⁸⁹. Anon, **The Republic of Bophuthatswana**, p.7; Benbo, **Bophuthatswana at Independence**, p.32.

rural areas) participating. Bophuthatswana National Party received an overwhelming majority, winning all the constituencies except Odi and Mankwe which went to Seoposengwe Party. This gave Bophuthatswana National Party 20 of the 24 nominated seats. It also won 44 of the 48 elected seats thus gaining a total of 64 seats in the 72 member assembly. Seoposengwe Party won 8 seats and became the official opposition party in the B.N.P led government.⁹⁰ The fact that only a half of the eligible voters voted, raised some concerns that the move lacked popular support.

In a special session of the Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly on the 30 October 1972, Mangope was elected Chief Minister with 60 votes, against 8 for Pilane. On 1 November 1972, the new Bophuthatswana cabinet was formed as follows:

Kgosi L.M. Mangope - Chief Minister, Authority Affairs and Finance

Kgosi H.T.R Maseloane - Community Affairs (Internal Affairs)

Kgosi S.G. Ntuane - Agriculture

Kgosi V.T.R. Makapane - Justice

Kgosi B.J. Toto - Works

Mr M. Setlogelo - Education and Culture.

The number of "tribal" chiefs (dikgosi) in the executive council confirms what was stated earlier that Mangope relied on the support of the traditional leaders for his government. They formed his power base.

⁹⁰. J.H. Moolman & G.M.E. Leistner, **Bophuthatswana Hulpbrone en Out-wikkling**, p.24; Benbo, **Bophuthatswana at Independence**, pp. 31-32; G.M. Mompei, "Factors and Events", p.85.

On that day the cabinet was sworn in, and on the following day, 2 November 1972 the first session of the Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly was opened by B.J. Vorster, the Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa.⁹¹ This step constituted another milestone in the development of Bophuthatswana homeland to full political “independence,” in terms of the Separate Development policy.

4.9 OPPOSITION TO MANGOPE AND THE FORMATION OF BOPHUTHATSWANA DEMOCRATIC PARTY (B.D.P)

Although the Bophuthatswana National Party had emerged from the 1972 elections victorious and in a strong position, it was soon embroiled in internal strife over leadership. There was a struggle for leadership between Maseloane and Mangope. Maseloane had unsuccessfully attempted to oust kgosi Mangope from the party leadership and his position as chief minister while he was away in the United States of America in 1973.⁹² On 13 March 1974, Maseloane spearheaded a motion of no confidence in kgosi Mangope as the leader of Bophuthatswana National Party and chief minister. He was supported by some members of the party including Toto, the then Minister of Works. They accused Mangope of three things, namely:-

- (a) Interference in the administration of Madikwe region (Maseloane’s regional base; this might undermine his influence and support).

⁹¹. **Rand Daily Mail**, 13 March 1974.

⁹². Anon, **Bophuthatswana Democratic Party : Ten Years 1974-1984** (1984), p.4; M. Horrell & T. Hodgson, **A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa**, p.134.

- (b) The intention to establish the Bophuthatswana Development Fund of which they claimed Mangope would be the trustee.
- (c) They claimed that after the discovery of Maseloane's attempts to oust him, Mangope had requested the South African government to remove Maseloane from the cabinet.

When a count was taken, the motion was defeated by 35 to 23 votes in Mangope's favour but Maseloane did not accept the defeat.⁹³ The Bophuthatswana National Party was split into two factions: the Maseloane and the Mangope factions. Both Maseloane and Toto were expelled from the party but obtained a court interdict from the Kimberly Supreme Court instructing Mangope to reinstate them. They were reinstated on 10 November 1974. On the day after reinstatement, Mangope resigned from the Bophuthatswana National Party and formed a new party, the Bophuthatswana Democratic Party (B.D.P) with the majority of the B.N.P members.⁹⁴ The interesting aspect of Mangope's resignation from the ruling party was the fact that he retained his position as Chief Minister. This move was described as 'unusual if not unique'.⁹⁵ Maseloane remained the leader of the minority Bophuthatswana National Party. When the Bophuthatswana Democratic Party cabinet was formed Toto and Maseloane were replaced by Motsatsi and Suping respectively. They were removed in terms of proclamation 84/1975 which

⁹³. Anon, **Bophuthatswana Democratic Party**, p.7.

⁹⁴. **Rand Daily Mail**, 16 November 1974.

⁹⁵. J. Butler, et al, **The Black Homelands**, p.65; **Mafikeng Mail**, 11 April 1975.

empowered the Chief Minister to remove any minister from the cabinet for reasons acceptable to him.⁹⁶

The formation of the Bophuthatswana Democratic Party can therefore be attributed to the internal strife and competition for political leadership between Mangope and Maseloane, the latter being supported by Toto. The underlying principle of the Bophuthatswana Democratic Party was that Batswana society should be built on respect for existing traditions and authority, but with equal opportunities for all, equitable distribution of wealth and recognition of the worth of every person, while the dignity and rights of all should be respected.⁹⁷ The motto of Bophuthatswana Democratic Party was “POSSUMUS”, a Latin word for “we can” which was translated in Setswana to mean “Re ka kgona”.⁹⁸ For the B.D.P this became the driving force in what it saw as the road to full independence and the development of Bophuthatswana. This is critically evaluated later in this study.

4.10 THE ATTAINMENT OF POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE, 6 DECEMBER 1977.

The desire for independence had been expressed as far back as the period of the Tswana Territorial Authority by kgosi Pilane, as mentioned earlier in this study. The unfolding of political developments which led to self-government had raised legitimate expectations among the Batswana in Bophuthatswana for independence,

⁹⁶. J. Butler, et al, **The Black Homelands**, p.55.

⁹⁷. G.M. Mompei, “Factors and Events”, p.88.

⁹⁸. Anon, **Bophuthatswana Democratic Party**, p.9.

so negotiations were started with all role players to ensure that Bophuthatswana moved to independence. For those who wanted independence, it was perceived as a possible platform and means for the liberation from discrimination and oppression.

On 4 November 1975 at a special meeting of *dikgosi*, *dikgosana* and “tribal” councillors convened by Mangope in Mafikeng, a motion was passed by 155 to 5 votes in favour of future independence for Bophuthatswana.⁹⁹ The matter was also referred to the annual Conference of Bophuthatswana Democratic Party which on 9 November 1975 gave Mangope a mandate by a majority to lead Bophuthatswana to full political independence.¹⁰⁰ The Legislative Assembly also agreed on 19 November 1975 to start negotiating independence with the South African government.¹⁰¹ It must be stated that this was still within the parameters of the National Party government blue-print. Thus very little choice was available to them, as the Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly, than to work within the dictates of Separate Development.

In February 1976, serious negotiations were started between the Bophuthatswana cabinet and the Prime Minister of South Africa, B.J. Vorster, in Cape Town. An agreement was reached to constitute the action and constitution committees with

⁹⁹. M. Horrell & T Hodgson, **A Survey of Race Relations**, p.134; P.Alberts, **The Borders of Apartheid**, p.24.

¹⁰⁰. M.P. Vorster, et al (eds), **The Constitutions of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei**, (1985) p.83.

¹⁰¹. M. Horrell & T. Hodgson, **A Survey of Race Relations**, p.135.

representatives from both the Bophuthatswana and South African governments. The action committee was charged with the responsibility of drawing up a detailed programme for independence while the constitution committee had to draw a constitution for Bophuthatswana. The constitution committee started its work in March 1976 and tabled its draft constitution in October 1977. After a lengthy debate, the constitution was adopted with amendments on 14 October 1977.¹⁰² This was the final stage in the preparations for Bophuthatswana independence which was scheduled for 6 December 1977.

The pre-independence elections were held on 24 August 1977 to elect 96 members of the National Assembly (48 nominated from regions and 48 elected). The Bophuthatswana Democratic Party won the elections by a wide margin, winning 43 of the 48 elected seats and 47 of the 48 designated seats. In all, the B.D.P. won an overwhelming majority of 90 of the 96 seats.¹⁰³ The National Seoposengwe Party won the remaining six seats and became the official opposition party to the B.D.P. led government.¹⁰⁴

On 6 December 1977, in terms of the status of Bophuthatswana Constitution Act no. 89 of 1977 Bophuthatswana became a sovereign independent state with L.M. Mangope as its first president.¹⁰⁵ Mmabatho became the capital city. It was

¹⁰². G.M. Mompei, "Factors and Events", pp. 100-102.

¹⁰³. Benbo, **Bophuthatswana at Independence**, p.32.

¹⁰⁴. Anon, **The Republic of Bophuthatswana**, p.7.

¹⁰⁵. These developments are contained in **Court case, State v Manyane Mangope, cc 30/97** ; Benbo, **Bophuthatswana at Independence**, p.33.

clearly expressed by president Mangope that the main reason for accepting “independence” was an abhorrence of racial discrimination and he pledged to create a non-racial society in Bophuthatswana.¹⁰⁶ This issue is investigated later in this study. It can be argued however that in a sense the attainment of independence began to reverse the process of dispossession and disenfranchisement of the Batswana started by the British Colonial Administration in 1895.

It must be noted too that there was opposition to Bophuthatswana independence from within and outside Bophuthatswana. The National Seoposengwe Party which operated within the area, preferred land consolidation before independence. It was supported by the non-Tswana groups resident in areas which were to be part of Bophuthatswana like the Bataung (Sotho group) of Maboloka (Odi region) and the Ndebele of Kekana of Majaneng (Moretele region). The two groups voiced their opposition as independence would impose Bophuthatswana citizenship on them and impact negatively on their cultures and traditions¹⁰⁷, and deny them South African nationality.

Outside Bophuthatswana opposition came from the liberation movements and Africans in the Republic of South Africa. The latter can be divided into two groups, those in the urban areas and those in white rural areas (farms). For those in the white urban areas Bophuthatswana independence would automatically deprive them of their South African citizenship. This would in practice go further to threaten their rights to live and work in the white areas. Their section 10 rights

¹⁰⁶. M.P. Vorster, et al, **The Constitutions**, p.83.

¹⁰⁷. W.F. Lye & C. Murray, **Transformations on the Highveld**, p.100.

would be lost. They accused Mangope for his readiness to take independence before resolving the issues of citizenship and consolidation.¹⁰⁸ Their fear of losing South African citizenship became a reality. After Bophuthatswana independence, they lost South African citizenship and remained aliens who were formally excluded from a right to access jobs and housing in white South Africa. Citizenship was only restored to them in July 1986 when a concession was made to the TBVC citizens who were “permanent residents” of white South Africa.¹⁰⁹

Another group of the Batswana who rejected independence were those living in areas referred to as “black spots” in the white rural areas. With independence they would be forcibly removed to areas within Bophuthatswana in order to consolidate the Tswana homeland. Indeed, thousands of the Batswana like Bakwena, Barolong, Batlounge and Bakubung fell victims to this inhuman process. By March 1977, almost 17000 people had been forcibly removed from the Transvaal and Cape Province into Bophuthatswana.¹¹⁰

According to Jeffery, “the South African Council of Churches (SACC) saw Bophuthatswana independence as a sham independence which was used to prevent power - sharing by giving false political rights to Blacks.”¹¹¹ The Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) on the other hand saw Bophuthatswana

¹⁰⁸. W. F. Lye & C. Murray, **Transformations on the Highveld**, pp. 98-99.

¹⁰⁹. C. Murray, “Displaced urbanization : Rural Slums.” in W. Beinart & S. Dubow (eds), **Segregation and Apartheid in Twentieth Country South Africa** (1985), pp. 232-233.

¹¹⁰. W.F. K Lye & C. Murray, **Transformations on the Highveld**, pp. 99-100; B.K.M. Molokoe, “A Historical study of the Bakwena ba Mogopa”, p.36.

¹¹¹. A.J. Jeffery, **Conflict at the Crossroads at Bophuthatswana** (1993), p. 198.

independence as a collaboration with the apartheid system. It accused Mangope of being an opportunist playing an opportunistic game. They called upon him to stop assisting the South African government in its pursuance of the Separate Development policy.¹¹² From Motlhabi's argument it becomes clear that the Pan Africanist Congress and African National Congress rejected the idea of homelands and "separate freedoms" given to the black people. They saw this as a means of fracturing black nationalism and resistance. They saw the proposed Bophuthatswana independence as a further balkanisation of South Africa by whites. It would fragment and weaken the struggle towards emancipation, diverting true struggle for liberation to racialist and "tribalist" undertakings. Through this the South African government would succeed in keeping total liberation out of immediate sight or attention of the Blacks.¹¹³ The United Nations Organisation (UN) had also opposed the independence of Bophuthatswana. Like Transkei independence, the UN rejected Bophuthatswana independence as 'sham' declaration of independence and declared it invalid.¹¹⁴ This was a great blow for Bophuthatswana as it indicated how difficult it would be for her to get international recognition as an independent state. Despite all these attempts to oppose independence, the process went on until it was attained. It needs to be stated that failure to address the anxiety of the opposition by both the Bophuthatswana and South African authorities later proved disastrous for the

¹¹². P. Alberts, **The Borders of Apartheid**, p.24.

¹¹³. M. Motlhabi, **Black Resistance to Apartheid** (1984), p.131.

¹¹⁴. K. Waldheim, **Everyone's United Nations: A Handbook on the United Nations, Its Structure and Activities** (1978), p.100.

Bophuthatswana government as it fomented resistance to the new 'state'. This is discussed in depth later in the study.

The evolutionary process which led to the political independence of Bophuthatswana was within the parameters of the South African policy of Separate Development. The formation of political parties, debates in both the Tswana Territorial Authority and Legislative assembly, the 1972 and 1977 elections are partly evidence of political participation of the Batswana in the affairs of their territory which in 1977 became the Republic of Bophuthatswana. In many other respects it is clear that "independence" was imposed as part of the total strategy of apartheid.

5. THE EARLY POLITICAL CAREER OF KGOSI L.M. MANGOPE

This sub-section is not intended to be a biography of kgosi Mangope but to give an overview of his early political career up to 1977 when he became the president of Republic of Bophuthatswana. This is done in order to understand his character and administration during his period as the president of Bophuthatswana which dictated the lives of many people in that area. This section also examines Mangope's earlier political involvement and rise to power, from 1958 to 1977.

Mangope's interests in politics may be traced as far back during his days as a student at St. Peters where he met people like Oliver Tambo and Eskia Mphahlele. He, like other African students during those days had an interest in the African National Congress and African politics in general. They attended ANC meetings in the Bantu Men's Social Centre in Eloff Street, Johannesburg. From one of the meetings, he and a group of fellow students were nearly arrested when the police

stopped and questioned them for walking in the streets of a white suburb after nine in the evening.¹¹⁵ These are some of the experiences which hardened Mangope's will to free his people from racial discrimination. His contact with the ANC and Oliver Tambo in particular, made it possible for Mangope to meet with prominent figures of the organisation in 1960, but unlike them he opted for an alternative means of dealing with oppression.

As heir apparent to the chieftainship of the Bahurutshe Boo Manyane he was expected to be conversant with the Batswana customs, traditions and rituals. He was the leader of the Matlhatlhowa regiment (mophato). In 1946 he was sent to Botswana and apprenticed to kgosi Bathoeng II of the Bangwaketse where he learned much about the wealth of traditions and complex customs of the Batswana. He returned from this initiation with a heightened awareness as a Motswana.¹¹⁶ It must be stated that this awareness as a Motswana left an incredible impact on Mangope and instilled in him an inherent Tswana ethnic nationalism. This was immutable and when one analyses his political career and administration one finds a career which was aimed at welding a Tswana Nationalism to build Tswana Nationhood. He had wished for the reversal of the colonial creation which divided the Batswana and had constantly sought unity with the Batswana of Botswana. Whether he succeeded in this or not falls outside the scope of this sub section.

When he succeeded his father (who died in 1958) as kgosi of the Bahurutshe Boo Manyane in 1958, he was already conversant with "tribal" administration. He had

¹¹⁵. R. Richards, **A Nation on the March**, p.195.

¹¹⁶. R. Richards, **A Nation on the March**, pp. 192-194.

understudied kgosi Bathoeng and had also assisted his ailing father to administer the chiefdom. Having worked in the Department of Native Affairs (Bantu Administration and Development) from 1947 to 1948, Mangope was already conversant with the legislation and structures of the Bantu Authorities. As a kgosi he became an ex- officio member of the Lehurutshe Regional Authority.¹¹⁷ Another contributing factor to his knowledge of tribal and regional affairs was his appointment as a sworn translator on 13 October 1964 at Potchefstroom to translate from Afrikaans and English into Setswana and vice versa¹¹⁸. This also boosted his proficiency and confidence in these languages, something that placed him always above many of his colleagues and contemporaries.

As stated by Lawrence and Manson, Mangope's political career rested on support given by the South African state. This did not apply to Mangope per se but to all leaders of the homelands. However, although he worked within the system of Separate Development it did not mean he did not have capabilities. He became the vice chairman of the Tswana Territorial Authority in 1961, whose chairman was kgosi T.R. Pilane. In 1968 he became the chairman of the reconstituted Tswana Territorial Authority. He became the chief councillor of the Tswana Legislative Assembly in 1971 and the first chief minister of the self-governing territory of Bophuthatswana in 1972. He eventually led his territory to full political

¹¹⁷. R. Richards, **A Nation on the March**, pp.193-195; Nationa Archival Depository(NAD), Pretoria, Bantu Administrasie en Ontwekkelling(BAO) /1/44920 :Feite oor L.M. Mangope; NAD, Pretoria, Uitvoerende Raad van die Unie van Suid Afrika(URU) /1958/2031/2081/3831 : Installation of L.M. Mangope as kgosi of the Bahurutshe boo Manyane, 18.9.1958.

¹¹⁸. NAD, Pretoria, To / 1964/92/1381/1398 : Admission of Lucas Manyane Mangope as a sown translator.

independence on the 6 December 1977 and became its first and only president.¹¹⁹

According to Butler, Mangope was reconciliatory in nature, and a strong believer in the family of man. He did not believe that confrontation could bring any solution to South Africa's problem of racial tensions. It must be stated that his reconciliatory attitude changed as he progressed in his political career. Initially however, he believed in negotiations and appealed to White South Africans to make sacrifices no matter how painful those sacrifices were to normalise the situation. In his own political manifesto he writes that he wanted to see South Africa as a state where tolerance, freedom and human dignity would become truly real.¹²⁰

During his service as a homeland leader Mangope became very controversial, a dichotomised character. He was always critical of the Separate Development policy and claimed to be a supporter of only the positive aspects of Separate Development which laid emphasis on development only.¹²¹ He believed that Separate Development should be a means to destroy the ideological basis of Apartheid and should offer Blacks an opportunity to develop socially, politically and economically. It must offer a means of gaining concessions for Africans.¹²²

¹¹⁹. M. Lawrence & A Manson, "The Dog of the Boers", p.451; R. Richards, **A Nation on the March**, p.201.

¹²⁰. L.M. Mangope, **A Place for All**, p.95; J. Butler, et al, **The Black Homelands**, p.75.

¹²¹. L.M. Mangope, **A Place for all**, p.98.

¹²². J. Butler, et al, **The Black Homelands**, p.76.

Although he was depicted by the media (especially the Afrikaans media) as a staunch supporter of Separate Development, another side of Mangope was seen after his visit to the United States in 1973, a visit which possibly had profound influence on him. He immediately clashed with Prime Minister John Vorster for threatening to prevent White political parties from inviting homeland leaders to their congresses. He criticised the government for expecting them to help it to defend South Africa against terrorists while the homelands did not enjoy full political rights.¹²³ It was definitely difficult to protect something from which one did not derive benefit. Mangope further believed that vast sums of money which the South African Government spent on defence against possible terrorist attacks could be more profitably spent on developing the Blacks in South Africa, including the homelands, if the government was prepared to build goodwill among its citizens including the liberation movements.¹²⁴ He further believed that foreigners of European origin (the British, Italians, Belgians etc) were far more privileged in South Africa than the non-European citizens of South Africa. They had access to the same universities, restaurants, earning same salaries and employment as South African whites. South Africa treated white foreigners better than its people (Blacks, Coloureds and Indians).¹²⁵

Mangope's political interest was nurtured at St.Peters where he was educated by influential people like Trevor Huddleston. It is where he met politically inspired

¹²³. J. Butler, et al, **The Black Homelands**, p.76.

¹²⁴. J. Butler, et al, **The Black Homelands**, p.76.

¹²⁵. **The Star**, 12 July 1973.

students like Oliver Tambo and Eskia Mphahlele who influenced him. The harsh realities of racial discrimination he observed in South Africa's predominantly white cities led him to devise a solution which he believed would liberate his people. Mangope's apprenticeship under kgosi Bathoeng II, as stated earlier shaped him into a true Motswana patriot, conversant with the Setswana customs, traditions and rituals. It infused him with an inherent Tswana ethnic nationalism which he followed consistently if not slavishly. He always placed the interests of his Batswana followers before fellow Blacks. Many critics have thus depicted him as an ultra ethnic traditionalist. As stated earlier Mangope's role in Separate Development was characterised by both support for and opposition to the system. He had a serious reservation about the system which dictated his political career until 1977 even beyond. However, Mangope's stand point later changed to that of a willing supporter and agent of Separate Development. He accepted the system and legitimised it by accepting "independence" which served to divide Black South Africans. This was despite efforts by his colleagues (other homelands leaders) such as Buthelezi, who despite accepting appointments as chief ministers, refused further polarisation of South Africa by the granting of sham independence to Black homelands. Buthelezi used his position to urge the South African government to create a system which would accommodate all South Africans. He became a forceful spokesman for Africans generally¹²⁶. He openly criticised Apartheid system and insistently called for the release of Nelson Mandela. Mangope, by virtue of his political choices, was not able to adopt a similar position to that of Buthelezi. This should be understood in the contexts of the backgrounds of the two men. Mangope having been apprenticed to kgosi Bathoeng II in Botswana at a stage when Botswana was preparing for full independence, had

¹²⁶. For earlier encounters between Buthelezi and South African government, see J. Butler, et al, **The Black Homelands of South Africa** , pp. 74-84.

cherished that moment when an opportunity would present itself for him to lead his people to independence. Buthelezi on the other hand, had played a role in the ANC youth League of which he was one of the founder members.

6. CONCLUSION

From the examination of the historical background of the Batswana with regard to their origin, migration and settlement, we have noted that the Batswana had already settled in Southern Africa by AD 350. Dispossession and land loss of the Batswana at the hands of both the Afrikaners and the British continued from 1850's to 1970's. It can be argued that 'independence' of Bophuthatswana began to reverse some of these trends. As will later be seen, the history of the Batswana was variously used to either advance or contradict the homeland concept and was to shape the nature of political alliances in the early 1990's.

In addition, the process by which Bophuthatswana became 'independent' in 1977 has been also examined. The attainment of 'independence' raised certain expectations, such as the removal of racial discrimination and improvement of the conditions of life in general. Whether these were attained will be examined in the succeeding chapters.

Mangope's early political career was also examined in this chapter. As a leading figure in the creation of Bophuthatswana and throughout the Bophuthatswana era, his role and career continues to be placed under the spotlight throughout the study.

CHAPTER TWO

THE ADMINISTRATION AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK OF BOPHUTHATSWANA

1. INTRODUCTION

The main objective of this chapter is to examine firstly the administration of Bophuthatswana with regard to its organisation and functions, and secondly to review its socio-economic status. A critical overview of the Bophuthatswana constitution is given. The funding of the state and the issue of security is also be examined.

2. AN OVERVIEW OF THE BOPHUTHATSWANA CONSTITUTION

The Bophuthatswana constitution was a radical break from the pattern of the local constitutional law and it introduced some new concepts (executive president; ombudsman and bill of rights) which were foreign to African constitutionalism.

It might have been problematic for the Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly (prior to independence) to pass such a constitution as it needed the approval of the president of the Republic of South Africa. To overcome this problem the Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly reconstituted itself into a National Convention and that prevented South Africa from intervention. It was a rigid constitution which needed two-thirds majority of the members of the National Assembly present for amendment or repeal.

According to Vorster, “the Bophuthatswana constitution was designed according to the constitutional framework of the modern continental states, containing a declaration of fundamental rights.”¹²⁶ These are contained in chapter two of the constitution which deals with the Bill of Rights. The chapter bound the government (legislative, executive and judiciary) to respect the rights of citizens. Some of these rights were:

- (i) Equality before the law, no discrimination of any form.
- (ii) The right of freedom from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.
- (iii) The right to freedom.
- (iv) Respect for private and family life¹²⁷.

As rightly noted by Vorster, the declaration of rights was a combination of the European Convention of Human Rights and the Declaration of Rights contained in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany. He further states that it was both innovative and enriching, introducing continental jurisprudence in regard to constitutional law in Southern Africa.¹²⁸ The Bophuthatswana constitution indeed influenced jurisprudence and constitutional law in the sub-continent as evidenced by the adoption in 1996 of the constitution of the new democratic South Africa. It contained a chapter on the Bill of Rights (chapter two)¹²⁹. Although there is no evidence, (and is very unlikely that Bophuthatswana

¹²⁶. M.P. Vorster, et al (eds), **The Constitutions of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei**(1985), p.84.

¹²⁷. Republic of Bophuthatswana, **The Constitution**, Act no.18 of 1977, p.5.

¹²⁸. M.P. Vorster, et al(eds), **The Constitutions**, p.85.

¹²⁹. Republic of South Africa, **The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa**, Act no 108 of 1996, p. 7.

constitution was consulted), the experiences of the anti-Bophuthatswana groups which used to accuse Bophuthatswana for not respecting its bill of rights clause, played a role. Wiechers and Van Wyk believe that there was no distinction in the declaration of rights between the Bophuthatswana citizen and any other person¹³⁰. The declaration was blind in this respect and it could treat a foreigner like a local person.

The bill of rights in Bophuthatswana has been examined by Ndaki; Woolfrey and Manda. Their views and how the declaration of rights was implemented and observed are discussed in Chapter Three of this study. However it needs to be stated here that there was a limitation on individual rights. Section 18(1) of the Bophuthatswana constitution states that the rights and freedom of an individual may be restricted only by a law of parliament¹³¹. It further states that except for the circumstances provided in the declaration, a fundamental right or freedom shall not be totally abolished or in its essence be encroached upon. A similar clause is contained in the 1996 South African constitution. According to Loucaides:

“the limitation of rights was made in the interests of the democratic society for national security, public safety and economic well being of the country. It must be for the protection of rights and freedom of others, for health and prevention of disorder or crime. This must be in accordance of article 8, paragraph 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights.”¹³²

¹³⁰. M. Wiechers & D.H., Van Wyk, “The Republic of Bophuthatswana Constitution”, p.89.

¹³¹. Republic of Bophuthatswana, **The Constitution**, p.6.

¹³². L.G. Loucaides, **Essays on the Developing Law of Human Rights**, (1995), p.183; A. Cachalia, et al, **Fundamental Rights in the New Constitution**(1994), p.105.

The establishment of the office of the executive president by the Bophuthatswana constitution was an innovation in the sub-region. Chapter three of the Bophuthatswana constitution made no provision for the office of the prime minister, making the president the head of both parliament (National Assembly) and the executive council (cabinet)¹³³. As stated by Wiechers and Van Wyk , the Bophuthatswana constitution achieved a combination of a parliamentary democracy and presidential regime in a remarkable way¹³⁴. The term of office of the president was seven years and the president was elected by universal adult suffrage, a shift from the previous arrangement of being elected by the National Assembly. This theoretically enhanced the legitimacy of the constitution, as the power, prestige and independence of the president were gained through a mandate directly from the people. Conversely however, the president had absolute control over the ministers¹³⁵.

Boulle states that: “the Bophuthatswana model served as a representative example for Venda, Ciskei and South Africa. The three had followed this system of having the president combining the roles of head of state and head of government. This constituted a favourable institutional feature of a consociational government which combines the advantages of both presidentialism and parliamentarism.”¹³⁶

¹³³. Republic of Bophuthatswana, **The Constitution**, p.6.

¹³⁴. M. Wieschers & D.H Van Wyk, “The Republic of Bophuthatswana Costitution”, p.95.

¹³⁵. M.P. Vorster, et al (eds), **The Constitutions**, pp. 87-88.

¹³⁶. L.J. Boulle, **South Africa and the Consociational Option: A Constitutional Analysis** (1984), p.124.

There were lower levels of government as prescribed by the Bantu Authorities Act (tribal and regional authorities). This was the same as in the Ciskei constitution¹³⁷. The Bophuthatswana constitution attempted to create an obligatory conciliation between traditional and modern elements on vital political issues without creating a second chamber of parliament.

In 1981 provision was made for the establishment of the office of the Ombudsman. He was appointed by the president as a control commissioner, a watchdog over corruption and maladministration. His term of office was five years. He had to provide a vigilant control and authority to investigate matters of irregularities and inefficiencies. His office was established also to compliment the bill of rights¹³⁸. According to Milton (who became the first incumbent of this post), the ombudsman was to be an impartial and independent officer as he was a bridge between the bureaucracy and citizens. He had to protect human rights by helping the citizens with their complaints against the government. Milton further states that Bophuthatswana was amongst the few countries that had an ombudsman and above all, the first in the continent to have a classical ombudsman¹³⁹. This innovation had an impact on the constitution of South Africa which made provision for a similar office, the office of the Public Protector.

The Bophuthatswana constitution provided for an economy based on private and communal ownership and free enterprise. According to Vorster it was innovative

¹³⁷. M.P. Vorster et al (eds), **The Constitutions**, p.95; Cooper, et al, **Survey of Race Relations** (1983), p. 328.

¹³⁸. Cooper, et al (eds), **Survey of Race Relations**, p.328.

¹³⁹. C.C. Milton, "The Ombudsman: A bridge between Bureaucracy and Citizens", **Pioneer**, vol.8, no.3, March, 1986; Editor, "Ombudsman: The Bophuthatswana Experience", **De Rebus**, September, 1983.

and dynamic in operation. It created a framework for a non-racial society and set an example for constitutionalism, racial co-operation and sound economic development for the whole of South Africa¹⁴⁰.

3. THE ORGANISATION OF GOVERNMENT

This sub-section examines the organisation and different levels of government. It further makes an indication of the first cabinet of Bophuthatswana and the introduction of new departments and their functions during the Bophuthatswana era. The government was organised into the legislature, executive and judiciary and these are discussed individually.

3.1. LEGISLATURE

Legislative power was vested in the unicameral Parliament of the Republic of Bophuthatswana which consisted of the President and the National Assembly. The National Assembly consisted of one hundred and five (105) members of whom seventy-two (72) were elected by popular vote, twenty-four (24) were designated by the twelve Regional authorities and eight were appointed by the president on the basis of their knowledge, qualifications and expertise. The lifespan of the National Assembly was five years after which new members were to be elected.

¹⁴⁰. M.P.Vorster, et al, *The Constitutions*, p.84.

3.2. EXECUTIVE POWER

Executive power was vested in the Executive President who was the head of the executive council and commander in chief of the defence force. The council consisted of the president, the ministers and deputy ministers. The ministers were appointed by the president as political heads of various state departments. Each state department had a secretary as its administrative head.

Most of the members of the executive council were *dikgosi* and the majority of them were mostly nominated to parliament by the regional authorities. This is an indication of how the Bophuthatswana government depended on traditional leaders who had influence over their subjects. This negated the modern nature of the constitution and opened the door for a system of power based on patronage.

One interesting feature of the Bophuthatswana state was the Department of Governors which was established in 1990 in terms of Act no. 10 of 1990. Its first minister was Mr G.M. Nkai with Mr P.H.K. Ditshelelo as its first co-ordinator. The objective of this department was to serve as a link between the government and the communities in the regions. According to its 1992 annual report, this department facilitated the presence of government in all regions of Bophuthatswana. It helped the communities in the regions to discuss, interpret and implement the government policy. It was a form of decentralisation, bringing government closer to the people. It stimulated, supported, advised and encouraged grass-roots level participation in socio-economic development programmes. It ensured structured and effective channels of communication among state departments, parastatal organisations and private institutions in the regions. It was intended to serve as a link between the government and communities in the

regions¹⁴¹. Each region had its governor as its administrative head and these governors were appointed by the president.

3.3. JUDICIARY

Judicial jurisdiction was vested in the Supreme court of Bophuthatswana which had its own Appellate Division from 1982. Before 1982 the Supreme court of South Africa served as Appellate for Bophuthatswana¹⁴² but this was thought to undermine the independence of Bophuthatswana and its judiciary. It was also considered in some circles to be difficult for the South African judges who came from a racial and discriminatory society to preside over cases of violation of Human Rights in a non-racial and non-discriminatory state of Bophuthatswana. The Supreme court of Bophuthatswana comprised of the Chief Justice and Judges appointed by the President and it had jurisdiction over all Bophuthatswana citizens. The President also appointed the Attorney General. There were also 13 magisterial districts, each with its own magistrates court which served as an appeal court for appeals from “tribal” courts. Each “tribe” had its own “tribal” court which was presided by *kgosi* or *kgosana*. There were also regional courts under the senior magistrates and dealt with appeals from the magistrate courts¹⁴³. It was assumed that all courts were open and independent. Again the much vaunted independence of the judiciary is examined in the subsequent chapters.

¹⁴¹. Department of Governors, **Annual Report (1992)**, pp. (ii)-(iii); E.B. Pule, interview, 2 May 1999

¹⁴². Anon, **The Republic of Bophuthatswana**, p .38.

¹⁴³. D.H. Patrick, **Bophuthatswana: An Economic Survey and Business Guide (1980)**, pp. 6-7; Anon., **The Republic of Bophuthatswana**, p.38.

4. FUNDING OF THE BOPHUTHATSWANA GOVERNMENT

This section examines the funding of the Bophuthatswana government, its sources of revenue and the extent to which it was financially dependent on the Republic of South Africa.

4.1. OWN SOURCES.

Bophuthatswana government espoused to attain financial independence in order to be self-sufficient and also to legitimize its political independence. Prior to 1977 (independence), Bophuthatswana received development aid grant amounting to 70% of its revenue from the South African government. This aid was gradually reduced after independence, hence dropped drastically. The government took various steps to generate an internal income.¹⁴⁴ Both Richards and Applegreen state that from 1982 Bophuthatswana was able to provide 87% of its revenue from its own sources. Taxation on personal income and company profits contributed a lot in this improvement. For the 1981/1982 financial year, taxation alone, contributed 35% of the total revenue. The contribution of the mining companies operating within the Bophuthatswana borders amounted to R290 million¹⁴⁵.

Patrick states that Bophuthatswana was one of the important tourist centres in Africa. Tourism therefore contributed a lot to Bophuthatswana's revenue. Its Southern Sun hotels especially Sun City and Lost City attracted tourists all over

¹⁴⁴ Anon, **The Republic of Bophuthatswana**, p.32.

¹⁴⁵ R. Richards, **A Nation on the March**, p.55; M.G. Applegreen, **Bophuthatswana at Glance: Information in brief** (1985), p.9.

the world. Its game parks and game reserves added to tourist attraction. Its two largest game reserves, Pilanesberg Game Reserve and Madikwe Game Reserve contributed a lot to its revenue. For 1986 alone tourism contributed more than R100 million to Bophuthatswana revenue¹⁴⁶.

According Applegreen, the other source of income was from the proceeds of investments. Bophuthatswana had built up capital markets within its borders by establishing financial institutions such as Bophuthatswana National Development Corporation, Bophuthatswana Building Society and Agricultural Bank. Interest charged on loans from these institutions contributed to the income of the country¹⁴⁷. Richards points out that the Bophuthatswana National Provident Fund was unique in Africa, and also contributed to the income of the state. It provided security for the nation (pensions and retirement benefits). The money was invested on short and long term in the South African markets and greater return offer to Bophuthatswana contributed to both Bophuthatswana revenue and for individual schemes.¹⁴⁸ The 1991 Annual report of the department of Finance revealed that Bophuthatswana also obtained income from customs and excise services from the three border posts between Bophuthatswana and Botswana namely Kopfontein, Skilpadfontein and Ramatlabama. In 1991, R 76, 109.43 was raised accruing from custom goods from Zimbabwe¹⁴⁹.

¹⁴⁶. D.H. Patrick, **Bophuthatswana**, p.33.

¹⁴⁷. M.G. Applegreen, **Bophuthatswana at Glance**, p.9.

¹⁴⁸. R. Richards, **A Nation on the March**, p. 54.

¹⁴⁹. Department of Finance, **Annual Report (1991)**, p.24.

4.2. OTHER SOURCES

Bophuthatswana was a member of Southern African Customs Union which included the Republic of South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Transkei, Venda and Ciskei. The idea behind this union was to ensure economic co-operation among the neighbouring states. The members of the union shared the profits and a share of each was calculated on a formula agreed upon by the members of the union. For 1983/84 financial year Bophuthatswana received R224 million as a share from the common custom union¹⁵⁰. According Jeffery, for the 1989/90 financial year, the revenue derived by Bophuthatswana from common customs union amounted to R625 million which was almost 35% of the Bophuthatswana income for that year¹⁵¹.

According to Patrick, "Bophuthatswana had also derived income from South Africa as compensation for its services rendered. South Africa had as per standing agreements to pay Bophuthatswana for using its currency."¹⁵² This was for the rand coins and notes in circulation in Bophuthatswana. South Africa also paid Bophuthatswana for services rendered by the people educated and provided with services in Bophuthatswana. There were funds paid by South Africa to Bophuthatswana as reimbursement for the taxes levied on the Bophuthatswana nationals working in the Republic of South Africa. Although these funds were derived from sources outside Bophuthatswana it was argued by Bophuthatswana

¹⁵⁰. M.G. Applegreen, **Bophuthatswana at Glance**, p. 11; D.H. Patrick, **Bophuthatswana**, pp .10-11.

¹⁵¹. A.J. Jeffery, **Conflict at Crossroads**, p.24.

¹⁵². D.H. Patrick, **Bophuthatswana**, pp. 10-11; R. Richards, **A Nation on the March**, p .55; M.G. Applegreen, **Bophuthatswana at Glance** (1991), p.9.

officials that they were not grants nor loans but comprised what was legitimately due to Bophuthatswana.

Vorster states that:

“Bophuthatswana was more economically viable than South Africa’s three ‘independent, states (Transkei, Venda and Ciskei) due to its significant mineral resources (especially platinum) and it was also close to the economic heartland of South Africa.”¹⁵³

NWU
LIBRARY

This did not mean that it was completely economically independent. Like independent African states which continued to get their slice from their colonial powers, Bophuthatswana also continued to receive substantial grants in aid from South Africa. Generally termed neo-colonialism in Africa, this situation can be termed neo-Apartheid as far as the relation between South Africa and her surrogate states (referred to as independent states) was concerned. However, the statistics provided by Jeffery show a decrease in percentages of South Africa’s contribution to the Bophuthatswana revenue as grant. In 1978/79 financial year South Africa contributed R 98 million to Bophuthatswana’s income. From 1988 to 1992 its contribution was as follows:

¹⁵³. M.P. Vorster, et al (eds.), **The Constitutions**, p.91.

Financial year	Bop.'total revenue	S.A.'contribution	%.
1988 / 89	1,75 billion	956 million	54,6
1989 / 90	2,76 billion	526 million	19,1
1990 / 91	2,57 billion	607 million	23,6
1991 / 92	3,34 billion	724 million	21,7 ¹⁵⁴ .

These percentages show decrease of dependence on South African Government's hand-outs, as Bophuthatswana was trying to become self sufficient.

Bophuthatswana also received financial assistance from the Republic of South Africa in terms agreements between the two countries. In 1984, Bophuthatswana received as assistance R4 409 000 for drought relief and R5 million as rand for rand contribution for industrial decentralisation¹⁵⁵. It needs to be stated that this funding undermined the independence of Bophuthatswana. To the outside world it projected Bophuthatswana as part of South Africa.

Bophuthatswana also received loans for special projects from the South African Reserve Bank, the South African Industrial Development Council and the Development Bank of Southern Africa and also from European markets. In 1982 alone it received R26,5 million and R95 million from the South African and European institutions respectively¹⁵⁶. For 1992 only Bophuthatswana received development loans of R84 667 354 and R63 398 531 from the Development Bank of Southern Africa and the Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa

¹⁵⁴. A.J. Jeffery, **Conflict at Crossroads**, pp .23-24.

¹⁵⁵. C. Cooper, et al(eds.), **A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa** (1984), p .510.

¹⁵⁶. Anon, **The Republic of Bophuthatswana**, p.32.

respectively¹⁵⁷. This further reflects the magnitude of Bophuthatswana's dependence was on South Africa during Apartheid.

Although Bophuthatswana was more economically viable than the other South Africa's independent homelands, and managed to reduce its dependence on South Africa, it was by no means totally economically independent. It continued to be dependent on South Africa and continued to receive financial assistance in the form of grant aid. It must also be stated that Bophuthatswana effectively exploited its economic potential especially in mineral and tourist departments. Its attempts to create independent financial institutions is examined later in this chapter.

5. SECURITY.

This section examines the security of Bophuthatswana. This includes the Bophuthatswana Defence Force, Bophuthatswana Police Force and the Intelligence Unit. The relationship between the Bophuthatswana Defence Force and the South African Defence Force is also discussed.

5.1. BOPHUTHATSWANA DEFENCE FORCE

According to Reichardt and Cilliers the Bophuthatswana Defence Force started in 1977 as Bophuthatswana National Guard of 250 men under the Office of the President. Its officers were trained for counter insurgency by the officers of the South African Defence Force. It performed largely ceremonial duties and guarded Government officials and buildings. Brigadier van der Berg, President Mangope's

¹⁵⁷. Department of Finance, **Annual Report (1992)**, p.10.

first military advisor, became the first Commanding Officer of the Bophuthatswana National Guard¹⁵⁸. Southall and Wood contend that the Bophuthatswana National Guard was transformed into a fully fledged force of career soldiers in 1979 known as the Bophuthatswana Defence Force. Brigadier H.F. Riekert became the first Minister of Defence and Lieutenant Colonel H. Turner was appointed the Commander-in-Chief of the Bophuthatswana Defence Force. Both Riekert and Turner were from the South African Defence Force¹⁵⁹.

The Headquarters of the Bophuthatswana Defence Force were situated at the Molopo Army Base outside Mmabatho. This base was a modern base with military training school, maintenance unit and infantry battalion. Other bases were at Mogwase, Gopane and Thaba Nchu and these were some of the most modern military bases and were well resourced. Being a career soldier under these conditions was deemed a privilege.

Reichardt and Cilliers state that:

“all the TBVC states defence forces were created as trappings of power for the homelands leaders. They lacked the inherent objective of normal defence forces, that is the defence of territorial integrity.”¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁸. M..Reichardt & J. Cilliers (eds.), **About Turn : The Transformation of the South African Military and Intelligence, History of the Homeland Armies**(1985), p.69.

¹⁵⁹. R. Southall & G. Wood, “Control and Contestation: State Security in South Africa’s Homelands, A Report to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission(Rhodes,1998), pp.77-78.

¹⁶⁰. M. Reichardt & J.Cilliers(eds.), **About Turn: Transformation of South African Military and Intelligence**, p.63.

Like other African security establishments whose governments lacked popular legitimacy, the Bophuthatswana Defence Force was drawn into domestic politics as an active participant. The BDF groups such as the musical band always accompanied the ruling party to its activities to entertain the attendants who were mostly party members. However, it did not extend the same service to the opposition parties and this had to a certain extent eroded the professionalism of the Defence Force. A defence of national sovereignty was never a realistic mission for the homeland army, but it was used to impose the legitimacy of its government. As it will be seen from later developments, its involvement in the internal politics of the homeland made it to conform to the pattern which was common to the rest of the African continent which turned the army into a tool of the ruling party.

The Bophuthatswana Defence Force acquired the largest Air Force of all the homeland armies. This was due to its geographically fragmented and widespread nature. In 1982 the Air Force was a purely helicopter force, but later additional air crafts were purchased to make transport and communication easier among the separate areas of Bophuthatswana¹⁶¹.

In terms of the National Security Act no. 27 of 1981, a specialised Bophuthatswana National Security Council was set up in 1982. The special forces unit served as a reserve army and was often forced to be always ready for deployment to the outlying districts of Bophuthatswana in terms of need. The act further provided for the establishment of the Transfer Account which provided

¹⁶¹. M. Reichardt & J. Cilliers(eds.), **About Turn: Transformation of South African Military and Intelligence** , p.70.

(funded) for incidental matters. The Security Council consisted of the President (chairman), ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Law and Order¹⁶².

Reichardt and Cilliers state that the aborted coup of February 1988 led to the restructuring of the Defence Department. It led to the forced resignation of Brigadier Riekert and Mangope assumed the Defence portfolio. The Defence committee was established under Rowan Cronje to assist the chief of the Defence Force in dealing with welfare and social issues which were considered to be the most important factors in the dissatisfaction that sparked the coup. A military intelligence unit was established under Colonel Pilane. The Bophuthatswana National Stability Unit which led the coup was disbanded and a very small number of its members was allowed to join the Bophuthatswana Defence Force. Some of the senior members of the Bophuthatswana Defence Force who were implicated in the coup like Brigadier Sekame were sentenced in 1989¹⁶³. Despite the attempted coup, the defence force remained intact as Mangope remained in control. The later coup in 1994, suggests that Mangope did not have the loyalty of the Defence Force that he might have imagined.

Southall and Cilliers note that the Bophuthatswana Defence Force, like other homelands forces, was dependent on the South African Defence Force for equipment, training, leadership and funding (by Pretoria). Pretoria (SADF) monitored the activities of all the homeland armies and their development. The Bophuthatswana Defence Force worked closely with the South African Defence

¹⁶². The Republic of Bophuthatswana, **The National Security Act** no.27 of 1981.

¹⁶³. M. Reichardt & J. Cilliers(eds.), **About Turn: Transformation of South African Military and Intelligence**, pp.71-72; R. Southall & G. Wood, "Control and Contestation", p.141.

Force in its efforts to stem the ANC's Mkhonto we Sizwe (which was a military wing fighting Apartheid), from entering South Africa from Botswana.¹⁶⁴

The armies of the TBVC states were in actual fact the appendages of the Apartheid state army. The Bophuthatswana Defence Force actually constituted a unit of the South African Defence Force's North West command. For the 1993/94 financial year it received R177 700 000 towards its budget. Its relation to the South African Defence Force did not allow it to pursue defence policies hostile to those of the South African Defence Force. It could not host the Liberation armies (ANC's MK or PAC's APLA). It could also not enlist the services of Cuban or Russian (Soviet) military advisers. This was unlike the Transkeian Defence Force under Bantu Holomisa which defied Pretoria and violated the South African Defence Force's code and supplied arms to APLA and MK, something which brought it in conflict with Pretoria. Until 1994, the Bophuthatswana Defence Force remained loyal to the South African Defence Force¹⁶⁵. Although it could buy some military equipment from outside countries such as West Germany, its main supplier of weapons remained Armament Supply Corporation (ARMSCOR), possibly for monitoring purposes¹⁶⁶. This type of relationship between the Bophuthatswana Defence Force and the South African Defence Force largely undermined the independence of Bophuthatswana, particularly as an independent defence force is a major indicator of national sovereignty.

¹⁶⁴. R. Southall & G. Wood, "Control and Contestation", p.68.

¹⁶⁵. R. Southall & G. Wood, "Control and Contestation", pp.71-78.

¹⁶⁶. R. Southall & G. Wood, "Control and Contestation", p.144.

5.2. BOPHUTHATSWANA POLICE FORCE (BPF)

After gaining independence, Bophuthatswana like any independent state needed its own police force for its internal security and general maintenance of law and order. According to Richards the Bophuthatswana Police Force was established in November 1977 and took over the services which had been rendered by the South African Police. It started with 800 members commanded and trained by seconded officers from the South African Police¹⁶⁷. Until 1990 Bophuthatswana police were trained at Hammanskraal Police Training College (South African college) but from 1990 they started training at the Mmabatho Police College (formerly Tswana Territorial Authority headquarters)¹⁶⁸.

According to Southall and Wood, the Bophuthatswana Police Force was the largest of the four independent homelands. In 1990 it numbered 5 300 members as compared to Transkei's 3 300 members (second largest). Venda and Ciskei had 2000 members each. Southall and Wood further state that the Bophuthatswana Police Force was the most funded of the four homeland police forces. For the 1993/94 financial year its funding was R 343 000 000 while others were funded as follows: Transkei-R22 814 000, Venda -R68 862 000 and Ciskei-R103 327 000. Given the relationship of Bophuthatswana security forces to the South African security forces and its position along the borders, it was given a larger share in order to effectively assist in the counter attacks against South African "enemies" especially the Liberation movements¹⁶⁹. Like other TBVC states police,

¹⁶⁷. R. Richards, **A Nation on the March**, p.154.

¹⁶⁸. R. Southall & G. Wood, "Control and Contestation", p.37.

¹⁶⁹. R. Southall & G. Wood, "Control and Contestation", p.57.

Bophuthatswana police had always been part of the multi-lateral co-operation system with the South African Police to counter the infiltration of the African National Congress, Pan-Africanist Congress and Azanian Peoples' Organisation inside the country.

Southall and Wood claim that there was a general trend in the homeland police forces to be loyal to the ruling parties rather than to the constitutions and democratically elected governments and democratic principles. The police are ideally supposed to be neutral arbiters of social conflict, above manipulation by one political party or a faction of government. The Bophuthatswana Police acted increasingly as a tool of the ruling party (Christian Democratic Party) or even more pointedly to the person of Mangope¹⁷⁰. This is a common occurrence, especially where there is either a weak opposition or an increasingly authoritarian rule, such as is the case in many post-independent African states.

6. EDUCATION AS PART OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Social developments include education, health, sports and culture but for the purposes of this study only education is examined. It was in education that tangible changes were implemented and new ideas formulated and brought in which later had impact on the North West Province. The Bophuthatswana education system was different from that of South Africa thereby justifying it being singled out. Attempts are made to assess how it was developed and used as an instrument to create a non-racial society in Bophuthatswana.

¹⁷⁰. R. Southall & G. Wood, "Control and Contestation", pp.41-43.

6.1 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCATION AMONG THE BATSWANA UP TO 1977

In the pre-colonial era, Batswana were educated informally to acquire skills needed for their everyday life such as maintaining the homes, herding domestic animals and knowledge of “tribal” lore and customs. These were imparted by the family elders (*rangwane, rakgadi, rremogolo*). This informal education was a skill-based education, children received specialised training in different crafts such as herbal medicine, rainmaking, ironwork and house building. It also emphasised the value of a human being and the ability to co-exist with others in the village. Children were taught to look after the weak and the disabled. This was central to the traditional life of a Motswana.

Formal education among the Batswana was introduced by the missionaries. Their contribution to the education of the Batswana and other Africans was considerable. Robert Moffat, for example, was the pioneer of the written form of Setswana, and was responsible for standardising it. He also translated the Bible into Setswana. Missionary societies established institutions of learning such as those at Bethel, Tigerkloof and Kilnerton which produced many Batswana leaders in the academic and political fields¹⁷². Mission education attacked and criticised racial discrimination and exposed the evils of the Apartheid system. This obviously incurred the wrath of the National Party government.

¹⁷². N.D. Atkinson, **Multi-Cultural Education**, p.9; Also see, M. Lawrence & A. Manson, “The ‘Dog of the Boers’ : The Rise and Fall of Mangope in Bophuthatswana”, **JSAS**, vol.20. No.3, Sept 1994, p.452.

The introduction of the Bantu Education Act in 1953 by the South African Government, disrupted Mission Education. Mission schools were closed down and the education of Blacks was placed under state control. Through the Bantu Education Act the National Party designed an effective tool for the transformation of the educational system and institutions for Blacks to suit a particular political ideology that of White supremacy and Apartheid. Among others, Bantu education imposed compulsory teaching of both Afrikaans and English (two foreign languages) on Black children, severe restrictions on choice of textbooks, content, interpretations and teaching methods and heavy prohibition of social mixing by pupils of different ethnic groups (it imposed segregated education)¹⁷³. The type of education offered under the Bantu Education Act alienated schools from their natural and human environment especially rural areas. Work at school was too abstract and this rendered it difficult to relate to everyday experience of both the learners and communities. Black children became increasingly divorced from their traditions. It had little appeal for the future citizens of Bophuthatswana and only raised resentment and opposition. Matladi states that “from 1953 until Bophuthatswana independence (1977), education of the Batswana and Black South Africans in general suffered from neglect, from lack of resources and government insistence on keeping it racially separated.”¹⁷⁴ The foregoing discussion summarises the ills of Bantu Education whose shortcomings forced Bophuthatswana to reform its education system immediately after independence.

¹⁷³. N.D. Atkinson, **Multi-Cultural Education**, p.9.

¹⁷⁴. M.N. Matladi, “Implementation of Curriculum Project : A case study of the Primary Education Upgrading Programme (PEUP), (MED dissertation, UNIWEST, 1998), p.1.

6.2 DEVELOPMENTS: CHALLENGES, SUCCESSES AND CRITICISMS

The main challenge for the new state was to deal with the legacy of Apartheid. Bophuthatswana inherited the ills of Bantu Education such as a backlog created over 25 years, an inferior and poor education system which manifested itself in overcrowded classes, underqualified teachers, inadequate buildings and equipment, and poor academic standards and performances. The quality of African Education had deteriorated substantially under Bantu education.

To address the above-mentioned challenges, Bophuthatswana appointed a commission under Prof E.P. Lekhela (became known as the Lekhela Commission) in 1977 to investigate all aspects of education in Bophuthatswana. The commission presented its report in 1978. Atkinson states that “the commission provided a philosophic basis for educational development, the ideal of Education for Popagano,”¹⁷⁵ which produced a new non-racial liberal rhetoric showing that Bophuthatswana had broken away from Apartheid education and embarked on a new education philosophy and policy. The commission among others, recommended a more child centred approach that would promote creativity and problem solving ability of the pupils¹⁷⁶.

In pursuit of the goals of Education for Popagano,(bringing together people of different race and culture who were residing in Bophuthatswana) two experimental multi-cultural educational institutions, Mmabatho Primary (Connie Minchin) and Mmabatho High Schools were established in 1978 and 1980 respectively.

¹⁷⁵. N.D. Atkinson, **Multi- Cultural Education**, p.10.

¹⁷⁶. M.N. Matladi, “Implementation of a Curriculum Project”, p.121; F. de Clercq, **Education and Development in Bophuthatswana**, p.20; Republic of Bophuthatswana, **National Education Commission Report : Education for Popagano** (1978), p.44.

Multi-cultural education succeeded in competing favourably with world standards, producing competent students who were more privileged than their peers from other schools (rural schools). On the other hand, it polarised the Bophuthatswana education system with the prestigious schools following their own curriculum, using English as a medium of instruction throughout their school phase. Ordinary primary and middle schools followed different educational programmes (Bophuthatswana curriculum) while ordinary high schools followed South Africa's Department of Education and Training (DET) curriculum and the Afrikaans medium schools, Mafikeng Laer en Hoer Skole followed the South Africa's Transvaal Education Department (TED) curriculum. These accommodated different racial groups as separated entities, showing that Bophuthatswana failed to live up to the requirements of the ideal of Education for Popagano. Different curricula advantaged racial groups of European origin more than the local pupils. This led to the replacement of the African culture with European culture, instead of the development of new culture, which would accommodate everybody.

One of the innovations in education in Bophuthatswana was the implementation of a curriculum project, the Primary Education Upgrading Programme (PEUP). It was intended to improve the quality of education in Bophuthatswana through a totally new approach, the child centred approach. PEUP was introduced in 1979 at grade 1 (sub-standards were replaced with grades) and was phased in gradually throughout the primary school phase. PEUP was a modest success from which several lessons could be learnt for the implementation of future educational developments in South Africa. There are clearly similarities between PEUP and Outcomes Based Education (OBE) in that they both lay emphasis on child-centredness in approach and attitude.

An important achievement in Bophuthatswana was the establishment of the University of Bophuthatswana (UNIBO). Apart from providing the young state with the pride of having its own university, through the Institute of African Studies, the University assisted in research, development and preservation of the African (Tswana) heritage. On the other hand, it has been argued that it reinforced Tswana ethnicity; supporting the government's intention of creating Tswana "nationalism"¹⁷⁷.

Although Jeffery claims that "education in Bophuthatswana was elitist and beyond the means of the citizens"¹⁷⁸, Hunter on the contrary states that "education was free as parents made only nominal contributions towards school funds and hostel fees"¹⁷⁹. Jeffery might have used the level of unemployment and poverty in Bophuthatswana as a yardstick for her argument. Many parents were unemployed therefore R20 and R40 charged for primary and post - primary schools respectively were beyond the means of the unemployed parents. Hunter on the other hand took into account the level at which the government subsidised education. Jeffery states in contrast to her earlier argument that "education was highly subsidised, primary at 80%, post-primary at 85% and university through a complex formula" (not described)¹⁸⁰. Both writers agree that there was a substantial increase in school enrolment. According to Jeffery, pupil enrolment from 1976 to 1990 increased by 200 000 from 380 000 to 580 000 with a comfortable teacher - pupil ratio of 1:33

¹⁷⁷. M. Lawrence & A. Manson, "The Dog of the Boers", p.453.

¹⁷⁸. A.J. Jeffery, **Conflict at the Crossroads**, p.27.

¹⁷⁹. B. Hunter (ed), **The Statesman's Year Book : Statistical and Historical Annual of the States of the World for the year 1991-1992** (1991), p.1110.

¹⁸⁰. A.J. Jeffery, **Conflict at the Crossroads**, p.27.

at primary, 1 : 31 at middle and 1 : 30 at high schools¹⁸¹. Hunter put pupil enrolment at 568 239 and teachers at 16 058 (excluding lecturers) in 1989¹⁸². These show an average increase of 11 000 per annum. These figures show that more people gained access to education in Bophuthatswana. This was one of the tangible advantages offered to residents in Bophuthatswana.

7. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The economic situation in Bophuthatswana was characterised by both development and dependency. Many studies on the economy of Bophuthatswana have emphasized economic dependency and ignored how economic development was achieved. This section assesses the different economic sectors in Bophuthatswana and critically analyses how those sectors contributed to the whole economic development of the region. The focus is on agriculture, industry, mining and tourism which were the major economic activities in Bophuthatswana. Parastatals such as the Agricultural Development Corporation (Agricor) and Bophuthatswana National Development Corporation (BNDC) are assessed under their relevant sectors.

7.1 AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

Bophuthatswana was spread over three diverse agro-economic zones, namely mixed farming, cattle grazing and crop farming. An area with all these zones has the potential to be agriculturally self-sufficient. The main objective of this section

¹⁸¹. A.J. Jeffery, *Conflict at the Crossroads*, p.27.

¹⁸². B. Hunter (ed), *The Statesman's Year Book*, p.1110.

is to evaluate how agriculture in Bophuthatswana was developed and the extent to which it improved the quality of life for the citizens of the country. The focus is on the Agricultural Development Corporation (Agricor) which was established as a vehicle for agricultural development.

7.1.1. THE ROLE OF AGRICOR

Agricor was established as a government owned non-profit service organisation. Its mission statement was to “enable people to improve their quality of life through the optimum utilisation of the agricultural resources in a sustainable manner and which stimulates the agricultural sector to become an increasingly viable contributor to the economy”¹⁸³ To achieve its objectives, Agricor established a number of institutions such as corporations, rural service centres and credit facilities. These are discussed individually to assess their roles.

7.1.1.1. Agricultural Co-operatives

The concept of cooperatives was based on the historical and cultural concepts of the Batswana of *Letsema* and *Temisano* which referred to co-operative farming. Profit-sharing among the participants was done proportionally based on labour and effort put into the tasks. Tasks involved were planting, weeding, reaping and threshing of corn¹⁸⁴. The use of *Letsema* concept by Agricor encouraged working togetherness and helped to instil the spirit of co-operation among the Batswana

¹⁸³ Agricor, **Annual report, 1990 - 1991**, p.1.

¹⁸⁴ S.H. Worth, “The Management of Agricultural Development in Bophuthatswana”, pp. 57-59.

farmers as it was easily understood by the intended clients (participants). This was a recognition of the need for human development in the agricultural development process.

A group of ten or more farmers would register as a primary co-operative and two or more primary co-operatives would register as a senior co-operative. Farmers received production aid, in the form of fertilizers, seed, finance, mechanical and chemical services, expert advice, administrative assistance and training. These were provided through co-operatives. By 1980 there were sixty primary and two senior co-operatives.¹⁸⁵ Provision of loans and production aid through co-operatives might have undermined the objective of reaching and developing the rural communities. More resources were directed towards the development of commercial farmers to the neglect of the non-commercial farmers, and subsistence farmers comprised the bulk of the agricultural community.

Apart from the one-sided development of the co-operative movement, there were often problems surrounding the co-operative movement. According to Worth, the co-operative movement was entrusted with underqualified and inexperienced officers who could not carry out their tasks and responsibilities efficiently and effectively; besides, the registration of the co-operatives was done in a haphazard manner. The training of co-operative management committees was not well structured. These led to losses in agricultural development.¹⁸⁶ Despite these problems, Agricor, through these co-operatives was able to develop human resources as it encouraged ownership among the Batswana farmers. The farmers

¹⁸⁵ D.H. Patrick (ed), **Bophuthatswana**, p.22.

¹⁸⁶ S.H. Worth, "The Management of Agricultural Development in Bophuthatswana", pp.60-61.

were assisted to own primary co-operatives. In Ditsobotla for example, three primary co-operatives working 36926 ha of land were owned by 190 Batswana farmers.¹⁸⁷

Co-operative farmers were not left on their own but were guided through the project farms. The projects were undertaken to provide farmers with examples of modern farming techniques while encouraging the spirit of "temisano". Examples of such projects were Taung Irrigation Scheme, the Shiela Project which was the Ditsobotla Pilot Rural Development scheme involving 183 farmers, working 3500 ha of land. The other example was the construction of a Silo storage at Vryhof, (Molopo district) which had the storage capacity of 500 tons.¹⁸⁸ Undoubtedly these increased production and boosted the confidence of the participating farmers and the co-operative movement as a whole. They provided a basis on which to run their farms and co-operatives. Despite these successes, there were instances where the local farmers, participating in these large scale capital intensive agricultural projects, found themselves worse off than before. According to Roodt "the Mooifontein project, for example, was dominated by whites who enjoyed favours from the white management which virtually controlled the projects."¹⁸⁹ Although there were elected management committees which were expected to run the projects, in practice they became rubber stamps of the white management decisions. They made no contribution to the actual production process. This

¹⁸⁷ B. Hunter (ed), **The Statesman's Year Book**, p.1110.

¹⁸⁸ D.H. Patrick (ed), **Bophuthatswana**, p.22.

¹⁸⁹ M.J. Roodt, "Bophuthatswana's State Farming Projects: An Aggro-Business?", **Indicator SA**, vol.3, no.1, Winter 1985, p.8.

rendered local small scale farmers the employees of the co-operatives, thus defeating the objectives of the co-operative movement.

Taking into account that by 1980, Bophuthatswana was three years old as a "state", and Agricor was only two years old after being established in 1978, one is inclined to conclude that the co-operative movement achieved a modest success in Bophuthatswana. This is based on the fact that by that time there were sixty primary co-operatives and two senior co-operatives. Among the sixty primary co-operatives were nine livestock breeding co-operatives which were spread all over the country. These improved the quality and size of livestock and some farmers became stud breeders, something which was never within reach of Blacks before the "independence" of Bophuthatswana.

7. 1.1.2. Rural Service Centres

In pursuit of its objectives of reaching all rural communities for agricultural development, Agricor established rural service centres, for villages. In some cases the neighbouring smaller villages would share a service centre, for example Rietpan and Driefontein which are five kilometres apart had the service centre established at a strategic place to serve them equally. By 1991 there were 103 rural service centres in Bophuthatswana serving all areas of Bophuthatswana.¹⁹⁰ The service centres were offices of rural development, staffed with qualified agricultural extension and rural development officers (trained from University of Bophuthatswana and Taung college of Agriculture). These acted as a major contact

¹⁹⁰

A. Bosman (compiler), "An Evaluation of Agricor's Rural Service Centres in Bophuthatswana" (Agricor Development Research, Sept, 1991), p.12; W.T. Ratshikana, **interview**, 10 September 1999.

between Agricor and rural communities. The extension officers provided professional advice, gave demonstrations through open days and encouraged rural communities and individuals to produce their own food (by laying food gardens, fowl runs). These projects involved many rural people as the service centres were established to develop the non commercial farmers and ordinary villagers.¹⁹¹ About 125 food plots established as community projects throughout the country enabled 1500 participants to produce their own food thus attained the level of self-sufficiency. Agricor spent R545 per participant and, in this case, had achieved its objective of enabling people to feed themselves. Participants had improved the level of nutrition of their own families and some had surplus to sell, thus providing their own income.¹⁹² On the contrary, Klu contends that these centres would have done better than this if demographic and community needs were considered when locating service centres. The main constraint was landlessness as communities needed more land for farming. Ignorance of communities' articulated needs, rendered those services which were provided inappropriate.¹⁹³

Despite criticisms from people such as Klu, the introduction and establishment of the rural services centres by Agricor can be read as a partial success story. Through them Agricor was able to reach more than 50 000 ordinary people and farmers.¹⁹⁴ As offices of rural development they had provided a facilitating role to communities and individuals to identify their needs and implement their action

¹⁹¹ A. Bosman (compiler), "An Evaluation of Agricor's Rural Service Centres in Bophuthatswana", p.12.

¹⁹² Agricor, **Annual Report, 1990 - 1991**, p.5

¹⁹³ J. Klu, "Agricor and Rural Development in Bophuthatswana", in R. Levin & D. Weiner (eds), **Community Perspectives on Land and Agrarian Reform in South Africa** (1994), pp.152-153.

¹⁹⁴ Agricor, **Annual Report, 1990 - 1991**, p.6.

plans thus fulfilling the objective of enabling people to feed themselves. By and large, they served their objectives.

7.1.1.3. Agri- Industries

Agricor also introduced various industrial enterprises aimed at contributing to the country's economy, job creation and most importantly for human development. Agrichicks, a Poultry firm established as a major supplier of white meat in Bophuthatswana, was the biggest single investment in the agro-industry but it took sometimes to attain self-sufficiency. Immediately after its establishment, it experienced a drop in nett selling values almost year after year. For the 1989/1990 financial year, Agrichicks had a dramatic drop of 23% which accounted for monetary loss of three million rand. Although for 1990/1991 financial year it had a profit of R730 000, this was proved worthless because it faced an interest burden of R7 million due to an unacceptably high level of borrowed capital which had been characteristic of Agrichicks since its inception.¹⁹⁵ Notwithstanding its contribution to the creation of 35 000 job opportunities by the whole agri-industry sector, one may conclude that Agrichicks was never the success it was expected to be.

Another of Agricor's industrial projects was the Mimosa Nest Egg Production with its main unit branches situated in Garankuwa and Mafikeng. By 1991 the project had 38 400 layers in full production. In its efforts to realise Agricor's objectives of enabling people to feed themselves and develop human resources, eighteen of

¹⁹⁵ Agricor, *Annual Report, 1990-1991*, p.4.

its twenty-four laying houses were privatised.¹⁹⁶ According to Moilwe, an officer in charge of Human Resource Development in Mimosa, nine former project labourers were given the opportunity to become individual entrepreneurs, running egg production units for their own accounts.¹⁹⁷ Their success made the Mimosa Nest project a successful trainer and contributor in the human development which was the cornerstone of rural agricultural development process.

There were other small scale Agri-industrial operations carried out by ordinary people. There were industrial enterprises such as wire making, sewing/knitting, candle making, welding, brick making, wood carving, pottery, milling, butcheries and bakeries. Through Agricor, the government spent R60 million in this venture.¹⁹⁸ This sector was successful as it was able to empower or develop 2500 people to become self employed. In addition to that number, it created 35 000 job opportunities for the people of Bophuthatswana. Almost 37 500 people were able to feed themselves as a result of this sector. This was however achieved at some considerable capital investment.

7.1.1.4. Agribank as Agricultural Financier



To promote agricultural development with emphasis on human development there was a need for accessible financial aid for Agricor's target groups. This necessitated the establishment of the Agricultural Bank of Bophuthatswana (Agribank) in 1981 to promote agricultural, pastoral and agri-economic

¹⁹⁶ Agricor, **Annual Report 1990- 1991**, p.5.

¹⁹⁷ M. Moilwe, **Interview**, 22 June 1999.

¹⁹⁸ Agricor, **Annual Report 1990 - 1991**, pp.6-8.

development in Bophuthatswana.¹⁹⁹ Agribank provided loans to farmers with a low interest rate as the government subsidized the interest payable by farmers. Loans and credit were given through co-operatives and those who received such loans as individuals were the already developed commercial farmers.²⁰⁰ This practice was therefore disadvantageous to the majority of the Bophuthatswana citizens as most of them were non-commercial farmers. They only farmed to feed their families (subsistence farming). It was only from 1988 that non-commercial farmers benefited from credit and financial assistance. Although they could not apply directly to the Agribank, the bank provided funds through Agricor to extend the facilities to cover those non-commercial farmers who did not qualify for production or other loans from the commercial institutions like Agribank.²⁰¹ This helped to promote the non market sector of Agriculture without placing an unbearable debt load on smaller farmers.

7.1.1.5. Other Contributions by Agricor

In pursuit of its objective of improving the livestock industry and optimizing Bophuthatswana's vast natural grazing potential, Agricor helped "tribal" and community authorities to establish and develop their natural grazing under Merafe Ranches. Working together with communities, Agricor developed 228 000 ha of land and divided it into camps. The camps were used by non commercial farmers

¹⁹⁹ S.H. Worth, "The Management of Agricultural Development in Bophuthatswana", p.69.

²⁰⁰ S. H. Worth, "The Management of Agricultural Development in Bophuthatswana", pp.69.

²⁰¹ Anon, "Another Record year for Agribank", p.5; S.H. Worth, "Management of Agricultural Development in Bophuthatswana", p.94.

who grazed their stock on community land.²⁰² This was another attempt to develop the non market sector of agriculture and it helped to minimize the perennial problem of overgrazing especially in rural “tribal” areas.

Another contribution was Agricor’s success in transforming rural farmers into successful commercial farmers. About 3600 rural farmers became commercial farmers, some as individuals while others farmed collectively as co-operatives. Projects like the Kolontoane Breeding project in Silverkrans (Madikwe district) remain as evidence of the success story of Agricor’s rural development programme which in some areas helped to form self sustaining projects.²⁰³

To sum up the section on agricultural development in Bophuthatswana, one may conclude that there was development in the agricultural sector. Agriculture contributed to the economic growth of the country and remained the cornerstone of economic development in Bophuthatswana as it provided a means whereby the greatest portion of the population enjoyed meaningful participation in economic growth. Through Agricor, agriculture encouraged and facilitated the development of self-sustaining and progressive rural communities. It improved the quality of life and the general well being of a significant number of rural people in Bophuthatswana. It succeeded in transforming a section of rural subsistence farmers into independent commercial farmers. Whether they remained viable, independent commercial farmers free from credit restrictions, remains open to question.

²⁰² Agricor, **Annual Report**, 1990-1991, p.4.

²⁰³ Agricor, **Annual Report** 1990-1991, pp.7-8.

While acknowledging the successes of agricultural development in Bophuthatswana, one needs to accept that no system is without weaknesses whether in developed or under-developed states. Agricultural development in Bophuthatswana had weaknesses. One such weakness was that during the first years of agricultural development, too many resources were directed towards commercial farming while subsistence farming, which comprised the majority of the population, was given less support. If this was not the case, it might have resulted in the establishment of a middle class farming community. Although there was agricultural growth, it did not reach all its intended beneficiaries (rural people), and there was still poverty in most rural areas. Some pilot projects, such as the rice project at Dinokana, failed because no proper research was conducted before implementation and implementation strategies were in most cases inappropriate and ineffective. Dinokana was chosen because it had sufficient water but nothing was done to ensure that the project did not disrupt the existing irrigation (furrow) system practised by the community. The computer controlled drip irrigation system applied by the Israeli company, Agri-Carmel used too much water hence the decline in water supply through the furrows.²⁰⁴ In this case the project failed to improve the living conditions of the community and instead deprived them of their resources.

7.2. THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR

The objective of this section is to examine industrial development in Bophuthatswana and how it contributed to the general economic development in

²⁰⁴

J.H. Drummond, "Rural Land Use and Agricultural Production in Dinokana Village, Bophuthatswana", **Geo Journal**, vol.22, no.3, November 1990, pp. 337-338.

the territory. It gives an overview of investment opportunities in Bophuthatswana and attraction to the investors, attempts by the Bophuthatswana National Development Corporation (BNDC) to encourage local small industries, the free market system and conditions of workers. BNDC was an autonomous statutory organisation (i.e. a parastatal body responsible for promoting industrial development).

In its attempts to encourage industrial development among the local people, BNDC established industrial sites and factories all over Bophuthatswana. Small industrialists were encouraged to make use of the available infrastructure by providing loans for the establishment of business enterprises. BNDC actually did much to establish the proposed enterprise. It leased premises at a low rental to the entrepreneur and lent up to 100% of the necessary finance. It further provided stock, prepared a business plan and budget, trained the borrowers and gave them advice on management of business.²⁰⁵ Through these, BNDC was able to help and encourage many local people to improve their quality of life by being self-employed and helping the government in the creation of job opportunities.

BNDC further contributed in the development of rural people by establishing small industries in most of the rural areas. About 1500 rural people were trained in welding, handicraft, wire making, carpet making and pottery, and thus were able to develop towards self-sufficiency. They were further assisted to find markets and customers for their products. Through a Small Business Division, flea markets were organised from region to region annually where products from small industries were displayed. These small industries were able to provide about 250

²⁰⁵. D.H. Patrick (eds), **Bophuthatswana**, p.29.

000 rural people with a minimum income.²⁰⁶ This venture helped to alleviate rural poverty and the creation of job opportunities. Notwithstanding these attempts, Mosadi notes that more could have been achieved if there was a coherent policy for rural industrial development. There was a need for a shift in orientation of non-agricultural businesses from urban to rural areas.²⁰⁷ Co-operation between Agricor and BNDC would have played a crucial role in the development of rural small scale industries. Unfortunately the two operated independently.

For big business, BNDC established business centres, shopping centres and city centres in all regions of Bophuthatswana. It also administered an incentive scheme offered by the government which among others, exempted investors from taxes of certain bodies, expenses incurred in the production of income, interests on loans, rent paid on land and buildings. Depreciation of machinery was also deductible for tax purposes. For investors, tax was very low.²⁰⁸ Other attractions for foreign investors were good transport infrastructure (most of the separate areas of Bophuthatswana were along South Africa's major railway lines) and a controlled labour force.²⁰⁹

The free enterprise system fostered economic development as markets determined prices against cumbersome or debilitating regulations which had to regulate the

²⁰⁶. M. Legotlo, **interview**, 10 September 1999; L. Mosadi, "Village Industries and Crafts : Invisible Productivity", **Matlhasedi**, April 1994, pp.24-25.

²⁰⁷. L. Mosadi, "Village Industries and Crafts", p.27.

²⁰⁸. Anon, **Bophuthatswana : An Economic Guide** (1987), p.27.

²⁰⁹. W. Van Graan, "Investment Opportunities in Bophuthatswana", **Growth**, Summer 1985, p.18.

supply, demand of good and services.²¹⁰ Undoubtedly this gave Bophuthatswana a special appeal to businesses which found difficulty in contending with restrictions in South Africa and other homelands. This provided a welcoming environment for foreign investors. What is more important here, is how the free enterprise system was implemented and whether it benefited Bophuthatswana and its citizens. Bophuthatswana's dependence on South Africa (although not acknowledged) formed the basis of economic development in Bophuthatswana. The rhetoric of independence imposed restrictions and impediments on progressive economic development planning. The free market system therefore remained irrelevant to Bophuthatswana needs and did not exist beyond a form of state capitalism and foreign investments. It had no specific relevance to the masses who had little or no chance of accumulating capital and it therefore benefited mostly foreign and South African investors and consumers.²¹¹

The free market system was exploited by foreign businesses such as BMW, AECI to obtain maximum profits. Even smaller businesses and suppliers in industrial areas such as Babelegi, Garankuwa, Mogwase and Mmabatho made generous profits taking advantage of favourable financial and labour conditions offered by the government. They exploited the oppressed workforce and paid them very little. Workers in Bophuthatswana were not allowed to join the South African Trade Unions and therefore had no capacity to negotiate for the improvement of their conditions, especially wages. Their wages compared unfavourably with those of

²¹⁰. R. Richards, **A Nation on the March**, p.53; G. Linscott, "Bophuthatswana: Evolution vs Revolution", **Productivity SA** (1991) no. 6, p.14.

²¹¹. K. Magyar, "Planning for Economic Development in Bophuthatswana", **Indicator SA**, vol.2, no.1. March 1984, p.16; **The Star**, 31 August 1984.

their counterparts in South Africa.²¹² Industrial development in Bophuthatswana failed to change the original objective of the South African government of creating homelands as labour reservoirs for white South African economy. Instead of the number of migrant and commuting workers decreasing, it increased and still provided labour to South Africa.

7.3. THE MINING SECTOR

Taking into consideration the fact that Bophuthatswana produced one third of the world's platinum²¹³, it is evident that the mining sector was one of the main contributors in the economic development of Bophuthatswana. This section is intended to establish the role played by the mining sector in the improvement of the quality of life of the citizens of Bophuthatswana, its contribution to the economy and the creation of job opportunities.

Bophuthatswana was rich in mineral resources, which by 1980 contributed almost 70% to the national revenue. The value of minerals to the economy increased year after year, after independence, being R300 million in 1978 and between R400m to R500m in 1979. By 1991 the mineral sales in Bophuthatswana rendered R3,4 billion. Major minerals were: Platinum, Chrome, Vanadium and Manganese. Platinum, of which the world's three largest mines are in Bophuthatswana, contributes more than 30% of the total world production of platinum. There were 26 open cast mines, 11 underground and two alluvial mines worked by Impala

²¹². F. de Clercq, "Bophuthatswana : At the edge of time", **Work in Progress**, no. 74, May 1991, p.18.

²¹³. Waugh, A., "Time for Bophuthatswana to join Commonwealth", **Pioneer**, vol 8, no.2, 1986, p.2.

Platinum and Rustenburg Platinum companies. The mines were in the Bafokeng region. Other minerals were copper, gold, granite, calcite and limestone. All in all there were 46 mines in Bophuthatswana.²¹⁴

The mining sector was one of the main employers in Bophuthatswana. It was the second largest single employer after the public sector. By 1991 it employed 60 000 people. It should be noted that this number included and still includes a large percentage of non-Bophuthatswana citizens.²¹⁵ If one were to assume an average of five as dependants of each mineworker, then one may conclude that the mining sector was able to support 300 000 people.

As much as this sector contributed to the economic development, it also experienced some setbacks and labour unrest. It was always hit by the fluctuations of the platinum price and decline in demands. These led to retrenchment of some mineworkers. For example, the mineral sales dropped to R2.5 billion in 1993 as compared to R3,4 billion in 1991. The total employment number which stood at 60 000 workers in 1991 dropped to 53 000 in 1993.²¹⁶

The ownership and control of Platinum mines led to a conflict between the Bophuthatswana government and the Bafokeng under kgosi Lebone Molotlegi. The "tribe" which occupied the platinum rich area, received only R16 million per year as royalties while the government netted almost R700 million. Part of the

²¹⁴. D.H. Patrick (ed), **Bophuthatswana**, p.31; Anon., **Bophuthatswana**, p.14; B. Hunter (ed), **The Statesma's Year Book**, p.1109; B. Broadfoot (compiler), **Minerals of Bophuthatswana** (1994), p.11.

²¹⁵. B. Broadfoot (compiler), **Minerals of Bophuthatswana**, p.11.

²¹⁶. B. Broadfoot (compiler), **Minerals of Bophuthatswana**, p.1.

money was kept in a trust and President Mangope was the trustee.²¹⁷ The political consequences of this feud is examined later.

7.4. TOURISM

Tourism in Bophuthatswana was boosted by a pleasant climate, natural scenic attractions and proximity to the more densely populated areas of South Africa.²¹⁸ The focus of this section is on the hotel industry and development of Game Reserves.

7.4.1 Hotel Industry

This sector grew at a phenomenal rate in Bophuthatswana. Prior to the Bophuthatswana independence, there was one hotel in Taung (excluding those incorporated with Mafikeng in 1980) which was an ordinary hotel, almost a one star hotel. After independence ten luxurious hotels were built with Sun City as the biggest.²¹⁹ Richards states that BNDC was a shareholder and the government was able to earn an income (about R100 million per year).²²⁰ Although Patrick states that BNDC held 50% shares, it was Sun International, a foreign company led by a South African hotel magnate, Sol Kerzner, which was the major shareholder.²²¹

²¹⁷. Anon, **Grasping the Prickly Pear**, p. 23; also see B. Mbenga & A. Manson, *A History of the Bafokeng of Rustenburg District, South Africa* (forthcoming).

²¹⁸. D. H. Patrick (ed), **Bophuthatswana**, p.33.

²¹⁹. R. Richards, **A Nation on the March**, p.174.

²²⁰. R. Richards, **A Nation on the March**, p.174.

²²¹. D.H. Patrick (ed), **Bophuthatswana**, p.33; R. Richards, **A Nation on the March**, p.174 .

On the basis of Patrick's assertion it could be argued that Bophuthatswana was better placed than some of the African states such as Seychells and Gabon whose tourist industries were predominantly foreign owned.

This sector provided jobs and skills training for a large number of Bophuthatswana citizens. Many Batswana were trained in hotel industry in order to provide standard service to the tourists. Some employees and students were awarded bursaries to pursue studies in Hotel Management and Tourism. This enabled some Batswana employees to rise to management positions.²²² As employment of the local citizens is a very crucial and important aspect of tourism, general training assisted in facilitating the replacement of expatriates by the locals. The unavailability of statistics to show the percentage of expatriate workers makes it difficult to assess the situation on this issue. It is estimated that the hotel industry employed 12 000 people with Sun City alone employing 5000. This was a fair contribution to job creation.



The hotel industry unlike the agricultural and industrial sectors was not geared towards training people for self-employment. It was however able to stimulate tourist related interests such as market gardening, florist, porter services and laundries. These were owned mostly by local people who became more self-employed.²²³

²²². R. Richards, *A Nation on the March*, p.174

²²³. R. Richards, *A Nation on the March*, p.174.

7.4.2. Game Reserves and Nature Conservation

In its mission of conserving and utilising its natural resources optimally, Bophuthatswana government developed a plan to establish Game Reserves. This plan was in line with a Tswana tradition of conserving nature based on customs, tradition and totems (diboka) of various "tribes". These included certain species of animals and indigenous trees. For the Bahurutshe (Batshweneng) for example, it is a taboo to kill a baboon (tshwene) because it is their totem. They are therefore expected to protect and respect these animals.

Pilanesberg Game Reserve was the first to be established in Bophuthatswana and was partly financed by the South African Nature Foundation. The foundation sponsored a number of projects throughout Southern Africa. It was the fourth largest Game Reserve south of the Limpopo, covering 60 000 ha of land in the Mankwe region.²²⁴ From Pilanesberg, the Bophuthatswana National Parks Board which was in charge of the parks and reserves, expanded its operations to establish a number of Game Reserves. By 1993 there were five game reserves in Bophuthatswana with Madikwe Game Reserve situated along the Dwarsberg mountain and Molatedi dam, as the largest in Bophuthatswana and second largest south of the Limpopo. It measures 75 000 ha of land in the Madikwe - Lehurutshe area.²²⁵

As much as the section of tourism contributed to the income of the country from tourists, it also contributed in the creation of job opportunities. Although it

²²⁴. R. Richards. **A Nation on the March**, p.171.

²²⁵. G. Linscott, "Bophuthatswana : Evolution vs Revolution", p.18.

employed fewer people than other sectors, it also helped to establish small business ventures for the local communities around the Game Reserves. The local people were involved in providing services to tourists such as specialised tour guiding, provision of fresh produce, rural craft markets, laundry services and tourist ferrying services to and from local airstrips.²²⁶ This provided many local people with opportunities for self-employment and self-sufficiency and assisted in creating jobs for their fellow community members as they needed more manpower to render those services to tourists. It therefore helped to stimulate the local economy of the rural people whose villages were in the neighbourhood of the Game Reserves.

In an interview with Kgaboesele, an officer in the Parks Board, it became clear that Parks Board had also contributed in the economies of the rural communities. The tribal authorities were assisted to protect their wild life and hunting was organised and controlled by Parks Board. From hunting, the communities received the greatest portion of the money paid by hunters who hunted from their own “tribal” lands. These funds assisted in community development projects thus Parks Board contributed in the economic development of the rural communities.²²⁷ Notwithstanding contributions made, the establishment of Game Reserves such as the Pilanesberg Game Reserve affected some communities negatively. The Batlhako ba Leema and some Baphalane families (Kube, Molwana, Maleka and Mmolotsi), for example, lost their grazing areas (Lotlhakane and Tlapamafura). The Welgeval community was removed from their land to an area closer to

²²⁶. G. Linscott, “Bophuthatswana : Evolution vs Revolution”, p.18.

²²⁷. J. Kgaboesele, **interview**, 12 September 1999.

Moruleng.²²⁸ These communities were not sufficiently compensated for loss of land as a result of the establishment of the Game Reserve²²⁹. The Welgeval community, for example, lost more than was given as compensation. According to the Keenan Report, they received substantial land as compensation, although it was far less fertile than their original one, Welgeval. They therefore lost their livelihood as they could not farm it. They also lost their hunting grounds.²³⁰

8. CONCLUSION

The Bophuthatswana Administration in its efforts to create a non- racial society set up constitutional mechanisms which on paper served as a model for the Southern African region for constitutionalism. Its feature of a bill of rights was in theory an important political development at the time. The clause on the limitation of the Bill of Rights was a weakness which gave the President the power to override those rights. Its continued dependence on the South African government for funding and security training and legislation impacted negatively on Bophuthatswana and served to undermine its independence.

This chapter has also revealed that there was economic development in Bophuthatswana despite the fact that it was not recognised internationally as a sovereign state. It is evident that the territory achieved a steadier economic and financial performance than other homelands. This however does not imply that Bophuthatswana was economically self-sufficient. Like all other homelands, it

²²⁸. E.S. Kube, **interview**, 29 February 2000.

²²⁹. P.L. Breutz, **A history of the Batswana and origin of Bophuthatswana**, p.159.

²³⁰. J. Keenan, "The Keenan Report, date unknown ", pp.60-62.

failed to be economically viable and South Africa continued to inject millions of rands into it.

CHAPTER THREE

AN ANALYSIS OF THE STATE OF POLITICS, 1977 - 1994

1. INTRODUCTION

after attaining independence Bophuthatswana was driven by desperation for international recognition and thus channeled its energy into pursuing this expansive and illusive mission. On the other hand it kept a tight control over its people, especially the opposition, to impress upon outsiders that everything was normal in Bophuthatswana, and that there was law and order and political stability. These contradictory tendencies in turn led to widespread repression and increased resentment in the territory. The extent of repression and oppressive rule rendered democracy in Bophuthatswana questionable. These issues form the core of this chapter. The chapter also gives attention to the aborted coup of 1988 which indeed had a significant impact on the politics of the territory, and on Mangope's political manoeuvres in attempting to maintain his position and the independence of Bophuthatswana.

2. BOPHUTHATSWANA: DEMOCRATIC OR UNDEMOCRATIC?

In terms of the Bophuthatswana constitution, chapter 1 section 1, "Bophuthatswana was a sovereign independent state and a republic which accepts the principles of democracy, and an economy based on private and communal ownership and free enterprise"²³¹. The question which needs to be investigated in this section is

²³¹. Republic of Bophuthatswana, **Constitution Act no. 18 of 1977**, p.22.

whether Bophuthatswana lived up to the expectations of the democratic principles and non-racialism. Before investigating this, one needs to come to grips with what is meant by democracy. It is difficult to try to define democracy without relating it to its practice. Sono defines democracy as “an ideal form of government whereby all the people settle their affairs through free discussion and in Africa this is done within a community”,²³⁵ and he calls it pure democracy. This gives credit to the traditional method of the African societies of conducting affairs in free discussion in a single united group. This is what influenced African leaders such as Julius Nyerere to believe that one party system was more suited to the African situation and democratically superior to the multi party system. He believed that one party which would be identified with the whole nation would work better for the nation than to have two or more parties each representing a section of the nation²³⁶. There are other definitions but all converge around the notion of government by the people which then gives rise to the principle of government by people’s representatives. For these representatives to be truly representative they must be freely chosen by the people among themselves. So free elections are an essential instrument for representative democracy whereby the electorate has the right to choose its government from the contending parties. Elections should be held regularly and should be fairly conducted.

Based on the above discussion, Bophuthatswana in its early years of independence (1977 - 1985) showed signs of being a viable parliamentary democracy. There were promises for improved conditions for its citizens, and the presence of enlightened policies which depicted Bophuthatswana as a shining example for

²³⁵. T. Sono, **From Democracy to Partocracy : Why a Party System is Undemocratic** (1993), p.158.

²³⁶. Julius Nyerere quoted in T. Sono, **From Democracy to Partocracy**, p.158.

Black Homelands. It laid emphasis on opposition to Apartheid (see ahead). This was confirmed by the embodiment of a Bill of Rights in the constitution guaranteeing all forms of freedoms (see ahead). These earned Bophuthatswana praise from many observers including the media²³⁷. Bophuthatswana during that period showed aspects of a democratic state, but what is more important is whether that democracy was sustained. Despite all these features, Bophuthatswana's legitimacy was always challenged by Liberation Movements and majority of black South Africans (see ahead).

The period after 1985 showed signs of political intolerance in Bophuthatswana. For non-Batswana and opposition parties, democracy became mere rhetoric, and its practice was elusive. The 1988 aborted coup then raised the heat of politics which led to the oppression of individuals and groups and the gradual erosion of human rights. These are discussed in detail later in this chapter. The period was characterized by government antipathy towards all who did not support it and the ruling party. There were widespread claims that even within the ruling party, Christian Democratic Party (CDP) there was no free political debate²³⁸. The members of the party were expected to rubber stamp the decisions of the leadership without questions. Those who attempted to challenge the decisions of the party leadership or Mangope as a leader, invited disciplinary action in the form of suspensions or expulsions from the party, and the cabinet. *Kgosi* Ntuane, for example, clashed with Mangope and was suspended from the party because he questioned why Ian Smith, former Rhodesian Prime Minister who visited Bophuthatswana in 1984, was transported in government vehicles when he visited

²³⁷. L. Platzky & C. Walker (eds), *The Surplus People*, p.371; Anon., *Grasping the Prickly Pear: The Bophuthatswana story* (1990), p.3.

²³⁸. A.J. Jeffery, *Conflict at the Crossroads*, p.28.

Kwa Maritane, which was his personal arrangement.²³⁹ Ntuane was then the chief whip of the Bophuthatswana Democratic Party, and was the same man who founded the party with Mangope. He also fought for the reinstatement of Mangope as a party leader after having been ousted by Maseloane in 1974. Dr Mokhobo also resigned his cabinet post as Minister of Health as a result of his clash with the President when he questioned the expensive projects such as the International Airport when Bophuthatswana did not have sufficient funds²⁴⁰. These measures earned Bophuthatswana and Mangope widespread criticism. According to Jeffrey, "the African National Congress (ANC) described Bophuthatswana as illegitimate, corrupt and self-serving and labeled Mangope as a martinet who ruled Bophuthatswana as a personal fiefdom."²⁴¹ Indeed for that period, the public rhetoric of adherence to the democratic principles was seriously questionable. The absence of free political activity became prevalent in the territory.

As stated earlier, free elections are an essential instrument for representative democracy; elections should be free, fair and conducted regularly. For elections to be declared free and fair, they should be subjected to external or international monitoring. Bophuthatswana had provision for elections to be conducted every five years, but no provision was made for external monitoring. The absence of the provision for external monitoring and an independent electoral commission, made it difficult to assess whether elections would be free and fair and not rigged and this had an impact on voter registration and turnout to polls. Though elections were conducted regularly, after every five years, there was always low registration

²³⁹. B.Saul, "Because I speak my mind", **The Mail**, 22 February 1985, p.1.

²⁴⁰. C. Cooper, et al, **A Survey of Race Relations** (1985), p. 296; **The Mail**, 6 September 1985.

²⁴¹. A.J. Jeffery, **Conflict at the Crossroads**, p.28.

and voter turnout. In 1977 for example, only 375 000 people registered and only 50% of that number voted. The BDP of Lucas Mangope gained a landslide victory, winning 39 of the 43 elected seats and NSP of Tidimane Pilane winning 6 seats. In the 1982 elections the NSP failed to get a single seat in the National Assembly, it lost all the eight seats it contested. Only 200 000 people voted and returned the BDP as the only party to parliament²⁴². Opposition was nullified by the electorate through the electoral process. This disappointed President Mangope who in his opening address to the first session of the second National Assembly, stated that:

“the absence of opposition party was an anomaly and was disappointing and most embarrassing. One party parliament was undesirable as it rendered Bophuthatswana a one party state, which was against its constitution which catered for a multiparty system.”²⁴³

A responsible opposition party was of crucial importance to play a constructive watchdog role against all forms of infringement of the constitution and the rule of law, to alert the government and public of any form of bribery, corruption and nepotism. In response to Mangope's concern over lack of opposition, kgosi W.G. Motsatsi, MP for Madikwe stated that the failure of the opposition to gain a seat was an indication of strong belief of the electorate in the leadership of Mangope. If people had complaints against the government they would have supported the opposition in order to articulate their grievances in parliament. He further stated

²⁴². A.J. Jeffery, **Conflict at the Crossroads**, p.28; City Press, 1 November 1977.

²⁴³. Mangope quoted in Republic of Bophuthatswana, **Debates of the First Session of the Second National Assembly**, 3 May - 15 June 1983, vol.1., p.4; **The Star**, 3 December 1982; **The Star**, 14 March 1983.

that as long as the government was not oppressive there would be no opposition²⁴⁴. These were official articulations from the ruling party, whether they were genuine remains suspect, but given the political situation prevailing by 1982, one is inclined to credit them. The opposition during the first National Assembly was weak and did not pose any threat to the ruling party. It needs to be stated that some people might have boycotted elections as a way of showing opposition to the state.

The last contested elections were in 1987 in which 47% of the eligible voters voted. The Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) established in 1986 after the expulsion of Malebane-Metsing, a former BDP MP for Bafokeng after clashing with Mangope, won six seats and became the official opposition party²⁴⁵. The PPP which had hoped to win elections perhaps on the basis of the attendance and enthusiasm visible at its rallies, complained that the elections were rigged. It further claimed that its members were intimidated by the police during elections²⁴⁶. These were cited as reasons for the 10 February 1988 aborted coup. Indeed Malebane-Metsing had a following but most unfortunately in some areas such as Madikwe, where he had hoped for better performance, his following was dominated by young people who were not eligible to vote and the disgraced members of BDP, who had failed to make final selection as candidates for BDP parliamentary seats. These members therefore defected to PPP to try their luck. Malebane-Metsing depended on them, and he put some such as Reuben Molefe

²⁴⁴. Republic of Bophuthatswana, **Debates of the First Session of the Second National Assembly**, p.14; **The Star**, 14 March 1983.

²⁴⁵. A.J. Jeffery, **Conflict at the Crossroads**, p.28.

²⁴⁶. Republic of Bophuthatswana, **Debates of First Session of the Second National Assembly**, p.14.

and Koboyankwe Bogatsu up as candidates for Madikwe²⁴⁷. Both the NSP and PPP threatened to take court action to challenge the result of the elections because they claimed that they were not free and fair. This challenge never came to fruition as events were overtaken by the attempted coup. Whether these elections were free and fair therefore, remains difficult to accurately assess.

The 1992 elections were not contested and the Christian Democratic Party (formerly BDP) candidates were returned unopposed²⁴⁸. The failure of the opposition parties to put up nominations for candidates may be attributed to a number of reasons such as the changed political situation in South Africa and the debates on the reincorporation of the homelands including Bophuthatswana into South Africa. Considering the frequency of elections as a feature of democracy, then Bophuthatswana was democratic. It held elections regularly, all of which were contested except the last ones. Participation in elections had given the Bophuthatswana (later the North West Province) residents some acquaintance with the electoral process and its problems and it could be argued that they were more familiar with the process than many of their Black South African counterparts when they cast their votes in the first South African democratic elections in April 1994.

Another question related to democracy is whether Bophuthatswana was non-racial as was always pronounced by its officials. Bophuthatswana had set itself a goal of creating a non racial society. Bophuthatswana was committed to the principle of non-discrimination which was one of the reasons why it opted for independence.

²⁴⁷. A.J. Jeffery, **Conflict at the Crossroads**, p.47; **Weekly Mail**, 6 November - 12 November 1987; R.M. Molefe, **Interview**, 10 April 2000.

²⁴⁸. A.J. Jeffery, **Conflict at the Crossroads**, p.28.

As described by Mangope, Bophuthatswana was “A Place for All”. However those who wanted to enjoy the benefits of Bophuthatswana and book themselves for a “A Place in the Sun” had to prove their respect and loyalty to the interests and aspirations of Bophuthatswana and its people²⁴⁹. Bophuthatswana indeed created a truly non racial society. People who emigrated to Bophuthatswana and took its citizenship, had few problems with the issue of racial integration. This was due to a highly developed non- racial society in the territory. They found the county racially harmonious and non-discriminatory²⁵⁰. In Mmabatho for example, Blacks and Whites lived next to one another peacefully as neighbors. Those who emigrated to Bophuthatswana were white families from countries such as Denmark, the United States, England, Russia, France and Black families comprising former nationals of African countries such as Zimbabwe, Ghana, Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho etc. Most of them were attracted by attractive teaching posts at the university, colleges of education and multi racial schools and other jobs in Bophuthatswana. Some were disillusioned by racial discrimination and disharmony in their societies. Mrs Tuson, for example, left Rhodesia in 1978 and opted for Bophuthatswana in order to avoid racial conflict which reigned in her country²⁵¹. Bophuthatswana was viewed as a haven for racial harmony, a place for all. Many South Africans were also attracted to Bophuthatswana by the same reasons. They left South Africa for Bophuthatswana to avoid compulsory military service and mixed marriage couples to avoid the restrictions of the Immorality Act.

²⁴⁹. L. M. Mangope, **A Place for All** (1978), pp.15-17.

²⁵⁰. Reichter quoted in R. Richards, **A Nation on the March**, p.87; L.M. Mangope, **Mandatory Sanctions : Bophuthatswana and Frontline OAU Nations** (1988), p.65; A. Waugh, “Time for Bophuthatswana to join Commonwealth”, **Pioneer**, vol.8, no.2, 1992, p.2; **Cape Times**, (date unknown).

²⁵¹. **The Star**, 9 March 1984.

Some of these people took Bophuthatswana citizenship. In promoting non-racialism, Bophuthatswana offered a pleasant alternative to South Africa's racial policies, although it cannot be denied that this applied to only a handful of individuals. Nevertheless it remained for them, a "model" for non-racial society.

Non-racialism in Bophuthatswana was not without criticism. Lawrence and Manson, for example criticized Bophuthatswana for claiming to be a place for all while non-Batswana were at the time denied work permits, pensions and other social services²⁵². This is supported by Platzky and Walker who saw an irony in non racialism in Bophuthatswana. They claimed that "Black/White relations were improved while the treatment of non-Batswana was different from that the Batswana. The treatment of non-Batswana was characterised by a gross violation of human rights thus rendering democracy for them elusive."²⁵³ This indeed reflected the real situation of non-Batswana in the areas such as Winterveldt, Maboloka and Onverwachdt.

Mangope's attitude towards non-Batswana who did not show loyalty to Bophuthatswana was severe. The main targets were the Winterveldt residents who had occupied that area, 40 km north-west of Pretoria, long before Bophuthatswana independence. Winterveldt was occupied by a mixed population of about 500 000 people comprising of North and South Sotho, Shangaan /Tsonga, Ndebele, Zulu and Xhosa. From 1967 they had been under the jurisdiction of the Winterveldt Community Authority. In the 1970s they were incorporated into Bophuthatswana despite their protest. Many refused to take up Bophuthatswana citizenship and

²⁵². M. Lawrence & A Manson, "The Dog of the Boers", p.453.

²⁵³. L. Platzky & C. Walker (eds), *The Surplus People*, p.372.

declared that they did not regard themselves as the citizens of Bophuthatswana. This resulted in increasing conflict with the Bophuthatswana authorities.²⁵⁴ Bophuthatswana restricted land occupation by non citizens thus declaring them squatters, rendering them landless and rightless despite having lived in the areas for years. They became “aliens” and squatters who, in the view of government, needed to be removed through the Bophuthatswana Anti-Squatting Act. Winterveldt was declared a squatter infested area which needed to be purged. This ultimately led to the forced removal of 30 000 Ndebele to the newly created KwaNdebele homeland.²⁵⁵ The Bophuthatswana government thus collaborated with the South African government in furthering the policy of Separate Development of dividing Black South Africans into ethnic homelands. This ran counter to her public rhetoric of rejecting Apartheid and pursuance of non-racialism.

NWU
LIBRARY

The Winterveldt problems culminated in a bloody conflict when the residents clashed with the Bophuthatswana Police and soldiers on the 26 March 1986. The police under Colonel Molohe and Major Mokubiyane opened fire to disperse a crowd of between 10 000 and 15 000 who attended a mass meeting on the local soccer field in connection of the continued detention of the youth from that area. This ended up with 11 residents killed, 200 injured and 2 500 arrested.²⁵⁶ These

²⁵⁴. Anon, **Grasping the Prickly Pear**, p.13; A.J. Jeffery, **Conflict at the Crossroads**, p.5; V. Makanje, “Bophuthatswana : Bordering on No-Man’s Land”, **Indicator S.A.**, vol. 5, no. 4, Spring, 1988, p.44.

²⁵⁵. Anon, **Grasping the Prickly Pear**, p.13; A.J. Jeffery, **Conflict at the Crossroads**, p.38.

²⁵⁶. J. Bekker, “A court hears of the day people were shot at Winterveldt”, **Weekly Mail**, 6 - 12 June 1986, p.7; V. Makanje, “Bophuthatswana”, p.44; Anon, **Grasping the Prickly Pear**, pp. 13-15; A.J. Jeffery, **Conflict at the Crossroads**, p.38.

shootings did not reduce resistance from the Winterveldt residents. They continued to clash with the Bophuthatswana authorities and received the support and sympathy of the liberation movements such as ANC, PAC and AZAPO. This became evident when these movements claimed responsibility for the murder of Brigadier Molohe. Brigadier Molohe, a Bophuthatswana Police Colonel who led police during the Winterveldt massacre in March, was killed in Winterveldt three months (June 1986) after the massacre.²⁵⁷ It should be noted that it was not the Winterveldt Community alone which faced these problems and police brutalities. The 40 000 strong Basotho Community at Kroondraai in the Thaba Nchu region were repeatedly harassed by the Bophuthatswana police. They were declared illegal squatters and were forcibly removed to Onverwacht near Bloemfontein in 1979. They named their settlement "Botshabelo" (a place of refuge).²⁵⁸ This ran counter to the Bophuthatswana projected image of being a place for all. In this case it furthered the Apartheid policies of land dispossession and forced removal.

In the two cases cited above, it was a fear of losing their working and residential rights (section 10) in South Africa, which discouraged people from taking Bophuthatswana citizenship. However, it can be argued that non-Batswana who did take the Bophuthatswana citizenship and openly declared themselves citizens did reap the rewards of citizenship.

It needs to be stated that as far as Black/White relations are concerned, Bophuthatswana indeed succeeded in breaking the barriers of racial discrimination and creating non-racial society. Racial harmony which prevailed among some

²⁵⁷. **The Star**, 23 June 1986; A.J. Jeffery, **Conflict at the Crossroads**, p.59.

²⁵⁸. C. Murray, "Displaced Urbanisation", pp. 239 - 240; Anon, **Grasping the Prickly Pear**, p.6.

sections of its citizens, especially in Mmabatho, Mafikeng and suburbs such as Riviera Park, provided lessons for South Africa and paved the way for racial integration in the region, in particular the future North West Province. It is significant that it was only in areas which formerly fell outside Bophuthatswana such as Vryburg and Ventersdorp, where the new provincial government had to deal with serious racial problems.

According to Ndaki, "the enactment of a bill of rights was intended to restrain the abuse of majority political power and to secure for individuals an environment conducive to the full development of their personality and capacity."²⁵⁹ This was a reaffirmation and commitment by the state to the individual's inherent worth. On paper this was a bold and innovative endeavor. However the application of the declaration on human rights was widely criticised. There were widespread claims of violation and erosion of the Bill of Rights which were confirmed by a number of cases brought against the Bophuthatswana government²⁶⁰ and existence of laws which were definitely in conflict with the declaration of declared fundamental rights. These laws included those such as the Terrorism Act, 83 of 1967 of the Republic of South Africa (inherited at independence and later challenged), the Internal Security Act 32 of 1979 and Security Clearance Act 40 of 1985. These stifled democracy and rendered the Bill of Rights illusory; suggesting that Bophuthatswana had opted for a constitutional dispensation it did not understand. As Mr Jood, M.P. for Kudumane argued, although the constitution allowed people

²⁵⁹. B.F. Ndaki, "A Bill of Rights : the Bophuthatswana experience", *De Rebus*, September 1983, p.449.

²⁶⁰. For example, see *S v Marwane*, an appeal against judgement based on the Terrorism Act in V.G. Hiemstra, *The Bophuthatswana Law Reports 1977 - 1979*, pp.64-73.

to do as they wished under the protection of a Bill of Rights²⁶¹, there was never sufficient justification of the existence of such laws in an allegedly democratic country.

During the first years of independence (1977 to mid 1980s), there were signs that rights would be protected and declaration of fundamental rights was operational. This was suggested in the Marwane case. Marwane had appealed against a sentence and conviction in terms of the Terrorism Act (inherited from SA). He was charged for illegal possession of arms and explosives. The inherited act was in conflict with the Bophuthatswana constitution. The Appeal Court of South Africa which by then served as Appeal Court for Bophuthatswana, set the sentence and conviction aside²⁶². In this case the Bill of Rights had the effect of restraining the state from abusing power and violating individual rights. The same thing happened in the case of Segale v Government of Bophuthatswana. Segale took government to court for refusing the National Seoposengwe Party permission to hold a meeting in 1986. He successfully challenged section 31 of the Internal Security Act as it imposed a restriction on the fundamental rights of freedom of expression, assembly and association. It was found by the court that the section was indeed in conflict with the Bophuthatswana constitution and was declared null

²⁶¹. Republic of Bophuthatswana, **Debates of Special Session of the Second National Assembly**, 2 - 4 December 1985, pp. 22-23; P. Manda, **Executive Manipulation employed by virtue of Security Clearance Act of Bophuthatswana** (1993), p.2.

²⁶². D. Woolfrey, & P. Manda, "A Bill of Rights : Lessons from Bophuthatswana", **The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa**, vol. 23. no.1, March 1990, pp. 72-73; S v Marwane in Republic of South Africa, **Law Reports 1982 (3) SA 717 (A)**, pp. 717 - 718.

and void²⁶³. This section had given the minister unlimited powers and effectively encroached upon if not fully removed rights of freedom of expression and assembly.

The post-1988 period (following the attempted coup) was characterised by repression and further violations of the Bill of Rights. These were accompanied by a number of amendments to the constitution and effective application of the Security Clearance Act 40 of 1985 which gave the President unlimited powers to terminate employment of people in government, parastatals and education institutions for security reasons²⁶⁴. This was exploited and misused by Mangope to dismiss his political opponents. Among those who fell victims to this act was Dr Paul Sefularo (who later became Member of the Executive Council (MEC) for Health in the North-West Provincial Government), and was then Deputy Superintendent of the Thusong hospital. He was dismissed together with Dr Thabo Rangaka, the Superintendent of the Bophelong hospital in 1992²⁶⁵. Both men were members of the ANC Itsoseng branch and it was for that reason that they were forced to leave Bophuthatswana. These dismissals even reached the school level. Peter Monyebodi, a teacher at Opadiatla Primary School and a member of the ANC Itsoseng branch was also dismissed from his employment on the 20 August 1991. No reasons were given but on enquiry he was told that he was dismissed in terms

²⁶³. See Segale v Bophuthatswana Government in T. Stewart, **The Bophuthatswana Law Reports, 1984 - 1987**, pp. 370 - 374.

²⁶⁴. P. Manda, **Executive Manipulation employed by virtue of Security Clearance Act**, p.2; Republic of Bophuthatswana, **Security Clearance Act no 40 of 1985**.

²⁶⁵. L. Taylor (Compiler), "Problems in the Creation of a climate for Free Political Expression in Bophuthatswana" (Paper for Codesa Working Group One by Mafikeng Anti Repression Forum (MAREF), 1992), p.6.

of the Security Clearance Act²⁶⁶. For this period, Bophuthatswana was like a “prickly pear”²⁶⁷, tasty for those loyal to it and very thorny and dangerous for those who were opposed to it.

The control of media by the state stifled the freedom of expression and access to information. Powerful media such as Bophuthatswana TV, Radio Mmabatho, Radio Bophuthatswana and the Mail was used to promote the objectives of the ruling CDP, the government and the image of Mangope himself. Opposition parties and extra parliamentary groups opposed to government were not given the opportunity to present their viewpoints. The Bophuthatswana Media failed to reflect a diversity of viewpoints in order to hide views critical of the regime²⁶⁸. This was in conflict with the Bill of Rights and had a long term impact on the media as reflected in the post - Bophuthatswana era. Immediately after the fall of Bophuthatswana and before restructuring, the above mentioned media very clumsily and uncomfortably shifted its focus to the promotion of the ANC and Popo Molefe, Premier for the North West Province. Mangope was depicted as a villain and Molefe as a hero. In one of their editorials following the fall of Bophuthatswana, Nat Molomo described Mangope as “a deposed autocrat misled by wishful thinking by trying to challenge the legitimacy of the Joint Administrators (entrusted to run Bophuthatswana after Mangope’s fall) while the people who deposed him were in close co-operation with the administrators.”²⁶⁹

²⁶⁶. T.P. Monyebodi, **Interview**, 14 April 2000.

²⁶⁷. The Prickly Pear story was expressed by Mangope when he addressed the Braklaagte Community (which opposed incorporation into Bophuthatswana).

²⁶⁸. L. Taylor, “Problems in the creation of a climate for Free Political Expression in Bophuthatswana”, pp.4 -5.

²⁶⁹. N. Molomo, “Mangope Turned Down”, **The Mail**, 22 April 1994.

This attitude changed to some extent after it became clear that the pre-1994 elections promises by ANC could not be realised and that the restructuring at the Bophuthatswana Broadcasting Corporation would be accompanied by retrenchment. Thereafter the former Bop media became less sycophantic to the new government.

The period after the aborted coup also saw a gradual erosion and encroachment of human rights. The government used constitutional amendments to abolish or override fundamental rights. Arbitrary declaration became a vehicle for the destruction of the rule of law. Restriction of the right of certain persons, especially those opposed to the government, early criminal trials and visitations were viewed as serious violation of rights. Retaliation against the opposition through constitutional amendments made state commitment to constitutional rule highly questionable. There were widespread claims of repression in Bophuthatswana during that period.

The University of Bophuthatswana (UNIBO) was set up in 1979 as a liberal and progressive University which was committed to the development of students, as well as the community. It also encouraged the application of theoretical knowledge in work experience. It attracted a number of liberal staff members from all over the world. The government's initial fine sounding principles were consistently eroded as UNIBO gradually lost its autonomy and became subject to tight state control. The Vice Chancellor and most of the council members were appointed by the President and had to be loyal to their political master.²⁷⁰

²⁷⁰. Anon, **Grasping the Prickly Pear**, p.18; A. H. Manson, "South Africa's "Homeland" Universities. "Focal Points for Resistance or Illegitimate "bush" colleges", (Paper presented at a Workshop on Culture and Development in Southern Africa, Copenhagen University, April 1988), p.4.

In the late 1980s UNIBO became an appendage of the Bophuthatswana government and academic freedom became theoretical or rhetoric. The government always intervened in both staff and students grievances with repressive measures which included the use of force by police, arrest and deportation of lecturers who were non Bophuthatswana citizens, and the closing of the University. On the 9 October 1985, for example, President Mangope closed the University following the organisation of a prayer day by students in response to a call by the South African Council of Churches (SACC) which was perceived as a rival to Bophuthatswana Ministers Fraternity (BOMIFRA). The students had sought and obtained permission from the University Administration. About half an hour after the meeting had started, President Mangope and some of his cabinet members arrived at the University and held talks with the Vice Chancellor. This was followed by an announcement by the Vice Chancellor that the president had closed the University and students were instructed to leave the campus. Their evacuation was supervised by 300 riot police. Although both the students and staff association sought an interdict against Mangope, challenging the legality of the closure of the University in terms of the University Act which stated that only the University Council had the power to close the University, the University remained closed for three weeks. Judgement was given against the students.²⁷¹ This showed how public life was politicised to the extent that even the judicial system could be politically manipulated to favour the government. On 10 January 1986, ten members of staff were deported in terms of the Security Clearance Act which stated that no person would be employed in statal, para-statal, educational or training institutions in Bophuthatswana if the Minister of Law and Order, on

²⁷¹. Anon, **Grasping the Prickly Pear**, 18; A.J. Jeffery, **Conflict at the Crossroads**, p.56; A. H. Manson, "South Africa's Homeland Universities", p.7.

reasonable grounds, was satisfied that such a person endangered or constituted a threat to the public safety or national security or the maintenance of law and order. Although the President agreed to rescind the deportation on appeal, only five members appealed, four of whom were successful. This did not stop further deportations, particularly as after 1988 the political situation became more volatile. In January 1991, for example Paul Daphne, lecturer and Vice President of the University Staff Association, was deported and declared persona non grata in Bophuthatswana areas.²⁷² These deportations, as Daphne pointed out, were served during University recess to avoid any possible boycotts from both students and staff. They were therefore executed in such a way as to avoid public protest.²⁷³ It can be argued that at that time, negotiations on democratic changes including the reincorporation of TBVC states into South Africa were taking place. Academics and University students had contact with the rest of South Africa, thus they were more informed than the rest of the Bophuthatswana population. Having been the victims of the Bophuthatswana's oppressive rule, they became inspired to participate together with the anti-Bophuthatswana forces to demand free political activity in the territory.

Confrontation between students and Bophuthatswana security increased in 1988 and this resulted in a series of lecture boycotts. In September 1988 students boycotted lectures to demonstrate their dissatisfaction over restrictions placed on visitors and freedom of the movement of resident students. They demanded

²⁷². L. Taylor, "Problems in the Creation of a climate for Free Political Expression in Bophuthatswana", p.8; P. Daphne, "The Reincorporation of Bophuthatswana : Information and Analysis for CODESA and Beyond", (Regional Policy Research Project funded by Centre for Development Studies, 22 February 1992), p.31; P. Daphne, **Interview**, 23 May 2000.

²⁷³. P. Daphne, **Interview**, 23 May 2000.

revision of such rules as they saw them as an extension of the control exercised by the state. Instead of negotiating, Vice Chancellor Prof R. Malope closed the residences at two hours notice on the 28 September 1988. Police were invited to the campus to supervise the evacuation process as usual. In their confrontation with students, one student, Ocklers Keoikanyang, was shot and injured by Major Vermeulen of the Bophuthatswana police. The boycott continued through October and into the November examinations. During this period the Student Representative Council (SRC) members were repeatedly detained and interrogated. Other students were also sometimes detained in military style swoops on campus. The eventual outcome of this confrontation was the exclusion of more than 500 students from the university and this had the negative effect of a drastic decline in the morale of the institution.²⁷⁴ These events illustrated inability of the UNIBO administration to deal with students grievances and most importantly the close relationship that existed between top UNIBO management and the Bophuthatswana security police.



The problems of the University continued or persisted throughout Bophuthatswana's existence, reaching its worst in the 1990s when the political situation in Bophuthatswana became more intense. UNIBO was almost always under siege. In mid 1993, Bophuthatswana experienced the worst crisis in Education when UNIBO was closed down, and four senior management members namely, Acting Vice - Chancellor, J.E. Setshedi, Deputy Vice Chancellor (academic) M.Z. Chuenyane, Deputy Vice - Chancellor (Student Affairs) L. Gadinabokao and Registrar, J. Banda were dismissed. Their main mistake was that

²⁷⁴. Anon, *Grasping the Prickly Pear*, p.18.

they had decided to reopen the University without government permission.²⁷⁵ The students reacted with anger and decided to enter the campus without permission in defiance of the instruction that they should not enter the campus. This resulted in further confrontations with the police. Ten SRC members including their president Solly Bokaba were arrested.²⁷⁶ This was the second time in two months that these students had been arrested, the first being in April when the University closed down. Bokaba was also seriously assaulted by the police, at some stage beaten into a coma.²⁷⁷

The Education Crisis which started at UNIBO spread to all institutions of Higher Learning (Colleges of Education, Setlogelo Technicon and Manpower Centres) in Bophuthatswana, resulting in the closure of these institutions. First semester examinations were disrupted. The SRCs from these institutions together with that of UNIBO formed a Joint Students Representative Council (JSRCs) and worked together with the South African Students Congress (SASCO). They vowed to reoccupy their campuses to force all institutions to be reopened unconditionally.²⁷⁸ Although their attempts to occupy campuses forcefully failed, they did have an impact on the authorities as these institutions were later reopened and lectures resumed. The re-opening did not resolve the crisis confronting these institutions as they were tightly controlled by the state reducing their administrations to extended appendages of the government. The situation continued until early

²⁷⁵. **The Weekly Mail**, 23 - 29 July 1993.

²⁷⁶. **The Citizen**, 11 June 1993; **Business Day**, 11 June 1993.

²⁷⁷. J. Seiler, "Transforming Mangope's Bophuthatswana: Towards Democracy in the North West Province" (Unpublished Manuscript, Mail and Guardian Website, 1999).

²⁷⁸. **The Star**, 5 July 1993.

March 1994 when the whole country was embroiled in political crisis. Immediately after the fall of Bophuthatswana, these institutions ridded themselves of their respective management which were labelled as Mangope loyalists. Most of the rectors were considered not welcome in their institutions.

3. ALLEGED FINANCIAL MISMANAGEMENT AND CORRUPTION

There were widespread allegations of corruption in Bophuthatswana and as argued by Seiler they took both institutional and personal forms.²⁷⁹ In mid 1984 for example, a report was handed over to the Ombudsman detailing allegations of corruption involving R13 million. Among others it exposed the following:

- large discrepancies between the amounts recorded in government records of bus drivers wages and the actual amounts paid to the drivers.
- * Irregularities in regard to transport subsidies. Although the government subsidised workers tickets, commuters continued to pay exorbitant fares.
- * The recovery of stolen government vehicles from Botswana and Zimbabwe and sale of government tractors to white farmers.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁹ J. Seiler, "Transforming Mangope's Bophuthatswana".

²⁸⁰ Anon, *Grasping the Prickly Pear*, p.25.

Bophuthatswana therefore wasted large sums of money which could have been used for development projects to pursue other more worthy objectives. This was done despite financial problems faced by the State. In 1985, for example, it had an overdraft of R300 million but it spent R18 million on the sports stadium.²⁸¹ It also spent huge amounts of money on bringing overseas parliamentarians and business people to Bophuthatswana on costly fact finding trips (see ahead). Seiler argues that these expenditures were funded within a wider tradition of financial non-management.²⁸²

Mangope's relationship with Israeli Shabtai Kalmanovitz led to allegations of corruption. Kalmanovitz was a Russian-born Israeli businessman, who emigrated to Israel in 1971. He was a controversial person, accused by the Israeli government of passing secrets to Soviet Union and thus dubbed a KGB (Soviet Union Committee of State Security) spy. As stated by Tony Stirling, he met Mangope in 1980 and befriended him, a relationship which earned him a number of construction contracts including R 48 million contract to build the National Independence Stadium and a housing project worth some R 300 million. He was further appointed the Bophuthatswana trade representative in Israel and operated from offices built by Bophuthatswana government in Tel Aviv.²⁸³ Although Kalmanovitz operated from Tel Aviv, his Sandton City based construction company, Liat, is alleged to have won multi-million contracts in

²⁸¹. Anon, **Grasping the Prickly Pear**, p.9.

²⁸². J. Seiler, "Transforming Mangope's Bophuthatswana."

²⁸³. T. Stirling, "Bop links revealed", **The Citizen**, 12 January 1988, pp. 1-2.

Bophuthatswana.²⁸⁴ His alleged connections with the KGB aroused serious concerns within government circles and the opposition.

The distribution of state - owned resources also left much to be desired. Seiler argues that government officials benefited at the expense of the ordinary people. The Bala farms transferred to Bophuthatswana after having been bought from white farms, were shared among cabinet ministers and government officials without following proper channels. Some individuals such as Paul Stone, Managing Director of Sefalana Employee Benefit Organisation(SEBO) and Roger Colinson the Director of Parks Board are alleged to have misappropriated a lot of money from their institutions. Though commissions of inquiry were instituted against them, the reports of the these commissions were never made public.²⁸⁵ Mangope was also alleged to have misused state funds and it came as no surprise when he was sentenced to a suspended two year imprisonment in 1998 on 102 counts of theft totalling R3543 685. 98²⁸⁶ This issue is discussed in further detail in the concluding chapter.

4. THE 10 FEBRUARY 1988 COUP ATTEMPT

The attempted coup of 10 February 1988 was widely published in media and other sources and this section is not intended to rewrite what has already been written. It attempts to offer a brief overview of the impact of the event on the state of politics in Bophuthatswana particularly as it was stated in the previous section that the period preceded by this event was characterised by erosion of human rights.

²⁸⁴. **Business Day**, 14 January 1988.

²⁸⁵. J. Seiler, "Transforming Mangope's Bophuthatswana".

²⁸⁶. J. Seiler, "Transforming Mangope's Bophuthatswana".

The coup took place on the 10 February 1988 at 1 am. President Mangope and some cabinet ministers, high ranking Defence and Police officers were held captives at the Mmabatho stadium. They were heavily guarded by their captors, namely the members of the Bophuthatswana National Security Unit (BNSU) or the Guard Unit (Maleta Motse) as they were known. They were led by a non-commissioned Warrant Officer Timothy Phiri. At about 4.30 am, about 50 uniformed Members of the BNSU seized the Radio station and announced that Mangope had been overthrown in a military coup and Malebane-Metsing was the new president. At 16h15 the South African Defence Force's 34 paratroopers under General Jannie Geldenhuys rescued the captives (Mangope and his men) with no resistance from the captors. Malebane-Metsing managed to escape to Botswana. At 19h15, Mangope appeared on Bop TV and announced that he was back in power²⁸⁷.

There were a number of reasons why the Bophuthatswana government was overthrown. The reasons given by Malebane-Metsing²⁸⁸ and Timothy Phiri²⁸⁹, the two key people who masterminded the coup, can be considered as a set of basic grievances. They stated their reasons as the following:

1. The association between President Mangope and Shabiti Kalmanovitz;
2. The irregularities in and the manipulation of the Bophuthatswana general elections of the 27 October 1987;

²⁸⁷. Anon, **Grasping the Prickly Pear**, pp. 19-21; **The Star**, 10 February 1988; R. Hamid, "Trouble in the Homelands : The Bop Coup", **SAPEM**, March 1988, pp. 10-11; C. Cooper, et al, **A Survey of Race Relations 1988/1989** (1989), pp. 92-95; **The Mail**, 3 March 1989.

²⁸⁸. **The Mail**, 23 June 1989.

²⁸⁹. **Sunday Times**, 12 February 1989.

3. The confiscation of land and forced removals of people from their land, causing tremendous deprivation, poverty and dissatisfaction;
4. Financial mismanagement and corruption;
5. Winterveldt killings.

In addition to the above mentioned reasons, Malebane in his testimony given in London on the 5 June 1989, stated that he had realised that he could not vote the government out, and the only possible way was to stage a coup. He had approached some people in the Defence Force including Phiri whom he blamed for the failure of the coup. Phiri was misled by a coup in Transkei and miscalculated South Africa's behavior, believing that it would remain unconcerned as it did in the Transkei coup²⁹⁰. Why South Africa intervened in the Bophuthatswana coup and not in the Transkei remains open to question. Some of the reasons advanced, such as that there was no bloodshed in Transkei while in Bophuthatswana five people died are not sufficient to justify South Africa's behavior. Probably a more plausible reason is that Bophuthatswana was South Africa's favored homeland that promoted the best image of all homelands, and the intervention was in order to restore Bophuthatswana's image and position.

The coup had a serious impact on the political life of Bophuthatswana and indeed was one of the real challenges to the government of Mangope both locally and internationally. The South African intervention which was the sole reason for Mangope's political and personal survival put Bophuthatswana independence into serious question. This was summed up by P.W. Botha's untimely utterance: "Well, we have had these problems but we are back in full control", although he later

²⁹⁰. **The Mail**, 16 June 1989.

corrected it by saying “The President of Bophuthatswana is in full control”²⁹¹. The intervention had demonstrated that the independence of Bophuthatswana and other independent national states was a “sham” and their continued existence and political survival depended on the South African government²⁹². Their “value” was dependent on how loyal and beneficial they were to South Africa. Mangope had unlike Matanzima proved to be loyal and reliable and Bophuthatswana was both economically (its minerals base) and politically (its location along Botswana borders) important to South Africa. This intervention was nevertheless a blow to its struggle for international recognition as is shown later in this chapter.

The coup provided a pretext for Mangope to crack down on the opposition in Bophuthatswana. The PPP was banned on the 19 October 1988 and this left Bophuthatswana as a one party state. The five PPP MPs were forced to resign their seats and were also charged with treason despite their attempts to disassociate themselves from the coup. Many of their supporters (about 500) were arrested and some were later released without having been charged. Their party and its activities were declared to have been endangering national security and public order²⁹³. Many amendments effected to the constitution especially the Internal Security Act, section 12 opened the functionality of the constitution up to question. The constitution was almost suspended. People were denied the right to early trial;

²⁹¹. Anon, **Grasping the Prickly Pear**, p.21.

²⁹². Africa Institute of South Africa, “The Coups in Transkei and Bophuthatswana” **Southern African Facts Sheet**, no.107, May 1988, pp.1-2.

²⁹³. **The Star**, 20 October 1988; **The Citizen**, 20 October 1988; A.J. Jeffrey, **Conflict at the Crossroads**, pp. 47-48; R.M. Molefe, **Interview**, 10 April 2000.

suspects of the coup could be arrested without a warrant²⁹⁴. These measures prevented any political opposition from operating or functioning effectively and normally. Free political activity was effectively ended. Mangope had indicated in an interview with the Mail that his Government was going to tighten the security system²⁹⁵. Indeed security became very tight and repressive.

The coup was also followed by repression and a Stalinistic style of removing undesirable elements, in the typical manner of a purge. Mangope purged every government department and parastatal of any employee suspected to be linked in one way or the other to the coup; some were dismissed for having rejoiced during the day of the coup. Among those who were dismissed were, John Letswamotse, head of the Bop television news department, David Mothibi, the director general of the Bophuthatswana Broadcasting Corporation(BBC) and Bismark Kobheka, the secretary of the Agricultural Bank²⁹⁶. The purge reached the level of the Cabinet for in that year (1988), three cabinet ministers resigned their posts for reasons apparently linked to the coup. They were H.F. Riekert of Defence, B.L.M.I. Motsatsi of Internal Affairs and L.G. Holele of Health and Social Welfare²⁹⁷. Whether they were actually forced to resign remains unsubstantiated but given the prevailing political situation at that time, one may conclude that political pressure took its toll. Hennie Riekert, for example, could not withstand the pressures of consistent questioning regarding why the BDF did not act during

²⁹⁴. A.M. Dlamini & P.J. Manda, **The Bophuthatswana (Constitution) Bill of Rights and Security Legislation**, pp. 22-23.

²⁹⁵. **The Mail**, 19 February 1988.

²⁹⁶. **The Weekly Mail**, 17 March 1988; **The Weekly Mail**, 23 February 1989; Anon, **Grasping the Prickly Pear**, p.21.

²⁹⁷. **The Mail**, 16 December 1988; Anon, **Grasping the Prickly Pear**, p.21.

the coup. It was clear that Mangope aimed his attack both at those who supported the coup and those who failed to prevent it.

Many rural people (some as individuals, others as communities) also felt the heat of repressive politics ushered by the impact of the coup. A well known example is that of the Bafokeng under kgosi Lebone Molotlegi at Phokeng. The Bafokeng region was the stronghold of the Peoples Progressive Party and also the residential area of Malebana-Metsing. It was this region from which the six PPP MPs came. The Bafokeng were in conflict with the Bophuthatswana government and Mangope himself before the coup²⁹⁸. Molotlegi's opposition to the homeland system and Mangope administration and to a larger extent Mangope's continued control and non-accountability over the mineral earnings from Impala mines was a point of contention (see chapter three). The coup provided Mangope with an opportunity to settle old scores with the Bafokeng, their kgosi Molotlegi and people opposed to the Bophuthatswana government. They were special targets. Although there was no evidence for Molotlegi's physical involvement in the coup, repeated police raids at his home and harassment forced him to flee to Botswana where he lived in exile. Molotlegi was a son-in-law to the Khama family, one of the ruling families in Botswana²⁹⁹. His stay in that country was made easier and possible as a result of these family ties. Mohumagadi Semane Molotlegi also faced problems after the coup and the departure of her husband. She was detained for ten days at Rooigrond prison together with some members of the Bafokeng Women's Club,

²⁹⁸. For the detailed history of conflict see B. Mbenga & A Manson, "A History of the Bafokeng", (forthcoming); Supreme Court of Bophuthatswana, Chief E.P.L. Molotlegi and Cecil Tumagole (applicants) v President of Bophuthatswana and George Molotlegi (respondents), case M74/89, pp. 5-8.

²⁹⁹. Anon, **Grasping the Prickly Pear**, pp. 23-24; D.M. Ntshabele / S.B. Molotlegi, **Interview**, 22 October 1999; **Sunday Times**, 27 March 1988.

which was later declared an unlawful organisation. The club, led by Semane was perceived as a rival to Bophuthatswana Women's League led by Mohumagadi Lea Mangope. After the coup it was accused of having links with PPP, something which was dismissed by Semane as an unfounded allegation³⁰⁰. She was later deported to Botswana, her country of birth, on the pretext that she was not a citizen of Bophuthatswana. Indeed "Mmemogolo" as Semane was known was not a Bophuthatswana citizen; she was a Botswana passport holder and had entered Bophuthatswana as a wife to Molotlegi. Her passport had been endorsed several times but after the departure of her husband the authorities refused to endorse it³⁰¹, which left her vulnerable for deportation. In this sense, she appeared to have played into the hands of the Bophuthatswana government, giving it justification for its actions. The situation of the Molotlegi family strained the relation between Bophuthatswana and Botswana which as will be noted later had been tense for some time. This development helped to paint a negative picture of Bophuthatswana to the outside world.

The departure of the Molotlegi family from Phokeng gave Mangope a free hand in the "tribal" affairs of the Bafokeng. Mangope appointed George Mokgwaro Molotlegi, a younger brother to Lebone to replace him as an acting *kgosi*, overriding Lebone's own appointment of his *rrangwane*, Cecil Molotlegi Tumagole which was in line with the traditions and customs of the Bafokeng. Tumagole had on several occasions acted on behalf of Lebone when he could not attend to the affairs of the community. Mangope preferred Mokgwaro because he

³⁰⁰. S. Molotlegi, "Bophuthatswana : Instruction from Above", **Frontline**, November 1988, p.20; D.M. Ntshabele / S.B. Molotlegi, **Interview**, 22 October 1999; D.M. Ntshabele / A. Ditsele, **Interview**, 22 October 1999.

³⁰¹. D.M. Ntshabele / S.B. Molotlegi, **Interview**, 22 October 1999.

was amenable to his continued control over the Bafokeng revenues from the Impala mines.

Harassment and victimization reached almost all levels of the Bafokeng society as many ordinary people were arrested. Some of these had nothing to do with politics or the Bafokeng Women's Club³⁰². Some principals who were accused of having allowed PPP to hold meetings and rallies at their schools faced serious problems. Many of them were transferred from Phokeng to remote areas. Mrs Mokgatle, a principal of Kgale Primary School, for example, was transferred to Bonolo Primary School in the Madikwe region where she served as a deputy-principal though she retained her principalship salary.³⁰³

There were other Batswana communities who also clashed with Mangope and Bophuthatswana authorities. These communities were led by "non-compliant" *dikgosi*, who either rejected the homeland system or were opposed to the rule of Mangope. This resulted in the manipulation of *bogosi* by Bophuthatswana government in attempt to replace a non - compliant person by a co-operative person who would assist in furthering the policies and interests of government and CDP. One of the communities which faced these problems was the Batlhaping ba ga Phuduhucwana in the Taung area. The community clashed with Mangope over the deposition of Samuel Morwagaabus Mankuroane and the appointment Stephen Molale (Mankuroane) as acting *kgosi* in 1987. Sam Mankuroane had served as an assistant to his uncle, *kgosi* Scotch Mankuroane and had acted as de facto *kgosi* during Scotch's ill health. Scotch then installed Sam as an acting *kgosi*

³⁰². D.M. Ntshabele / A. Ditsele, **Interview**, 22 October 1999.

³⁰³. M. Mokgatle, **Interview**, 31 March 2000.

of the Batlhaping on behalf of his minor son, Goitseone. Sam Mankuroane was a young well educated man of 34 years and was an ANC sympathiser and had refused to take up his seat in the Bophuthatswana legislative assembly. He held a B.Com.degree obtained from the University of Natal where he was actively involved in student politics. He had earlier clashed with the Bophuthatswana authorities defending the land rights of his mother and other residents when Agricor deprived them of their land.³⁰⁴ This was during the time when he was studying in Natal. Given the background of Sam Mankuroane, it was not a surprise that Mangope rejected his appointment to the Batlhaping throne. Mankuroane was far from being pliable.

Mangope exploited a leadership dispute among the Batlhaping and installed his own choice, Stephen Molale (Mankuroane). The Batlhaping leadership (*bogosi*) was in dispute as the death of *kgosi* Scotch Mankuroane was followed by claims to the throne from three competitors, Lefatshe Mankuroane, Samuel (Sam) Morwagaabuse Mankuroane and Stephen Molale (Mankuroane). Sam Mankuroane who won the contest, was the son of Scotch's uncle and as stated earlier, he had been an assistant to Scotch and was installed by Scotch as a regent on behalf of his minor son. This meant that Sam would relinquish the post once Scotch's son came of age. Sam argues that this did not happen because Scotch did not marry according to Batlhaping custom, therefore his son did not qualify to lead the Batlhaping. This is how he (Sam) became the rightful *kgosi*. Sam Mankuroane claims that his rivals "(Lefatshe and Molale) were Scotch's illegitimate brothers,

³⁰⁴. S.M. Mankuroane, **Interview**, 8 June 2000; **The Mail**, 24 June 1988; Anon, **Grasping the Prickly Pear**, p.11; J. Seiler, "Transforming Mangope's Bophuthatswana"; M. Lawrence & A. Manson, "The Dog of the Boers", p.451.

born outside Scotch's father's marriage (*bana ba di-ya-ntlo*).³⁰⁵ Mangope used his self-proclaimed position as a patron of all *dikgosi* to depose Sam Mankuroane and install Stephen Molale, in his opinion a "co-operative person".³⁰⁶ He claimed to be guided by the Batswana laws and customs of seniority to succession. Sam was from the sixth royal family. After this, Sam Mankuroane was repeatedly harassed by the Bophuthatswana government and security police. Mankuroane ultimately fled to Johannesburg³⁰⁷ where he lived until his return after the fall of Bophuthatswana and was officially installed as a regent of the Batlhaping ba ga Phuduhutswana. Though Sam Mankuroane regarded himself as the rightful *kgosi* of the Batlhaping ba ga Phuduhutswana, the truth is that he is a regent, acting on behalf of Scotch's second son, Tshepo. Tshepo qualifies for *bogosi* as his brother, Goitseone, who is mentally unstable, is unfit for "tribal" leadership.³⁰⁸

The other rural communities which also had problems with the Bophuthatswana government after the coup were the Leeufontein and Braklaagte communities in the Lehurutshe region which faced forced incorporation into Bophuthatswana. The incorporation of the two communities was part of the South African Government plan to consolidate Bophuthatswana. It was as a result of the decision of the Commission for Co-operation and Development that all the farms in the Marico Corridor should be added to Bophuthatswana. The white farmers would be bought

³⁰⁵. S.M. Mankuroane, **Interview**, 8 June 2000.

³⁰⁶. Republic of Bophuthatswana, **Report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Batlhaping Ba Ga Phuduhutswana Ba Ga Mankuroane of Taung**, vol.1 (Mmabatho, December (1988), pp. 6-11.

³⁰⁷. S.M Mankuroane, **Interview**, 8 June 2000; **The Mail** 24 June 1988.

³⁰⁸. Republic of Bophuthatswana, **Report on Commission of Inquiry**, p.10; S. Ruthwane, **Interview** 12 June 2000.

out and land owned by Blacks would be incorporated.³⁰⁹ The farms that were earmarked for annexation to Bophuthatswana included Braklaagte and Leeufontein. The two communities had occupied the two farms since 1907, following the dispute between Keobusitse (Israel) and Pogiso over *bogosi*. Keobusitse had acted on behalf of Pogiso, Ikalafeng's son since 1893 following Ikalafeng's death. When Pogiso came of age in 1903, Keobusitse refused to hand over leadership to Pogiso and in 1907, he broke away from the "tribe" and settled at Leeufontein, a farm bought by the Bahurutshe in 1876. In August 1908, Keobusitse bought an additional farm, Braklaagte and his younger brother, Malebelele was among the first occupants of Braklaagte. Keobusitse appointed Malebelele his representative at Braklaagte on behalf of his son, Mosekaphofu. Keobusitse was officially recognised as *kgosi* of the two settlements in 1911.³¹⁰

At the time Malebelele acted as *kgosana* at Braklaagte, Keobusitse sons, Monnamere, Mosekaphofu and Maje were still minors. In 1930, Mosekaphofu became *kgosana* at Braklaagte while Monnamere had succeeded his father in 1924 following his father's death. Succession at Leeufontein was smooth. Monnamere was succeeded by his son, Seruthe who in 1959 was appointed *kgosi* at Dinokana, and thus became a senior *kgosi* of all the Bahurutshe ba ga Moiloa. While Seruthe ruled at Dinokana, his brother Moswana ruled at Leeufontein. Seruthe was succeeded by his son, Monnamere (the present *kgosi*) at Dinokana in 1984. At Braklaagte, unlike at Leeufontein, succession seems to have been surrounded by confusion. In 1939, Braklaagte under Mosekaphofu was recognised as a separate

³⁰⁹. Transvaal Rural Action Committee (TRAC), "Braklaagte", **Reality**, May 1989, p.1.

³¹⁰. A. Manson, "Changing Forms of Resistance : Braklaagte and Leeufontein in 1906 - 1991", African Studies Seminar Paper presented at Wits, 27 April 1992, pp. 1-3; TRAC, "Braklaagte", p.18.

and independent entity from both Dinokana and Leeufontein. In 1948, Mosekaphofu died while his son Moitasilo was a minor. Lekoloane Sebogodi, a son of Malebelele became acting *kgosana* while Moitasilo waited to come of age and take over.³¹¹ The confusion clouding *bogosi* at Braklaagte turned into a serious problem when the community faced forced incorporation into Bophuthatswana.

The Braklaagte and Leeufontein residents heard about the incorporation of their farms into Bophuthatswana for the first time in 1986. The two communities immediately petitioned the South African Government showing their rejection to the pending incorporation citing the following reasons as outlined by Manson:-

- * That they would permanently lose their South African citizenship and become citizens of a state not recognised internationally.
- * They would lose their right to work in South Africa.
- * Having indicated their opposition to incorporation they would be likely to face discrimination from the Bophuthatswana Authorities.
- * Social, Educational and Health services were of an inferior standard in Bophuthatswana and there was a possibility that they would be denied access to these services.³¹²

³¹¹. M.G.J. Moilola, *interview*, 20 April 1999; also see A. Manson, "Changing Forms of Resistance", p.5.

³¹². A. Manson, "Changing Forms of Resistance" p.8; *The Star*, 7 April 1989.

Despite the protest, the two farms were incorporated into Bophuthatswana on the 31 December 1988. This was followed by violence in the two areas which was accompanied by police brutality. In Braklaagte over 80 people were injured over the Easter weekend of 1989 and in July 1989, eleven people including nine policemen were killed in Leeufontein.³¹³ The situation in the two areas remained tense for some time and many people fled to the neighbouring white farms and to Ikageleng township in Zeerust. Many people were arrested during this time. Those who fled only started returning in 1991 when Bophuthatswana assured them that they would not be intimidated and essential services such as Education and Health would be restored. Others who supported incorporation and feared intimidation from resisters permanently settled at Nyetse which was created as a resettlement area.³¹⁴

Although the two communities returned to their respective areas and services were restored, Braklaagte community's problems remained unresolved. During their fight against incorporation, Lekoloane was replaced by Moitasilo as *kgosana* at Braklaagte. He was installed by both Monnamere, *kgosi* at Dinokana in his capacity as a senior *kgosi* of the Bahurutshe ba ga Moiloa and Mangope in his capacity as the President of Bophuthatswana. This was done despite protest from the majority of community members who regarded Lekoloane as a permanent *kgosana*. There was a lot of confusion surrounding this issue and it was politicised. As Manson argues it was done as a strategy to give the Minister a

³¹³. C. Murray & C.O' Regan (eds), **No Place to Rest : Forced Removals and the Law in South Africa** (1990), p.42; J. Seiler, "Transforming Mangope's Bophuthatswana"; A.J. Jeffery, **Conflict at the Crossroads**, p. 126; **The Star**, 7 April 1989; Anon, **Grasping the Prickly Pear**, p.30. —

³¹⁴. B. Majafa, **Interview**, 9 March 1998; R. Rantao, **Interview**, 15 April 1998.

motive to claim that both *kgosi* and his subjects had agreed to incorporation.³¹⁵ The real problem came when Lekoloane attempted to instal his son, Ntšwanyana (Pupsey) in his place. A dispute arose regarding the legitimacy of his claim to *bogosi*. As stated earlier Keobusitse, who bought the farm, had appointed Lekoloane's father who indeed was sent to buy Braklaagte and had acted on Keobusitse's place. Monnamere was therefore guided by these developments. The appointment remained in force until the fall of Bophuthatswana. The new Provincial government then instituted a commission, the Sebetlela commission, whose report resulted in the replacement of Moitasilo by Ntšwanyana as *kgosana* at Braklaagte.³¹⁶ This did not solve the problem of *bogosi* at Braklaagte as currently there are court cases proceeding regarding this issue.

The escape and self-imposed exile of Malebane-Metsing became a source of embarrassment to Bophuthatswana and a source of inspiration for the opponents of Bophuthatswana. He continually urged his followers to regroup and resist any repression against them. While in exile he joined ANC and gained support from its structures such as United Democratic Front (UDF) which was an active organisation in South Africa. He also gained the support of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)³¹⁷. He continually threatened Bophuthatswana with another coup, causing a lot of panic within government circles³¹⁸. He toured a number of

³¹⁵. A. Manson, "Changing Forms of Resistance", p.11.

³¹⁶. R. Rantao, **Interview**, 15 April 1998; North West Provincial Government, **Report of the Sebetlela Investigation on the Headmanship of Braklaagte : Bahurutshe ba ga Moiloa**, 1994.

³¹⁷. **The Mail**, 23 June 1989; R.M. Molefe, **Interview**, 10 April 2000.

³¹⁸. C. Cooper, et al, **A Survey of Race Relations, 1989/90**, p.478; **The Mail**, 23 June 1989; **Business News**, 29 March 1988; **The Weekly Mail**, 7 April 1988.

countries (such as Botswana, Swaziland, Zambia and Britain) influencing these states to harden their attitude towards Bophuthatswana, and closing all avenues which might have been explored by Bophuthatswana in its quest for international recognition.

The coup and the repressive rule which followed it, led to an increase in public resentment. The politics of dissent gained ground especially in the Odi, Moretele and Bafokeng areas. Trade unionism generated an increasing support especially in the Impala Platinum mines. Mineworkers joined the COSATU affiliate, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) which operated illegally and underground in Bophuthatswana. The government reacted with repressive measures including the declaration of the state of emergency on the 7 March 1990, but all these were in vain. It failed to control and suppress the growing opposition³¹⁹. These were further complicated by the changing political situation in South Africa, the release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the liberation movements (ANC, PAC, SACP and AZAPO). It became extremely difficult for Bophuthatswana to maintain its status quo. Its attempts to deny its opponents free political activity ran counter to the generally accepted political climate in South Africa which was responsible for the very existence of Bophuthatswana. This widespread political conflict continued until the fall of Bophuthatswana in 1994.

³¹⁹. F. de Clercq, "Bophuthatswana : At the edge of time" **Work in Progress**, Vol. 14, May 1991, p.18; **The Mail**, 23 June 1989; S. Zikalala, "Impala Platinum : No Easy Road to Collective Bargaining", **SA Labour Bulletin**, vol.16, no. 3, January 1992, pp. 28 - 29.

5. ATTEMPTS TO GAIN INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION

One of the challenges and priorities of the Bophuthatswana government was to gain international recognition. This was pursued at whatever the cost even though this elusive mission was followed slavishly, ignoring the realities of the Bophuthatswana situation.

Bophuthatswana and many observers had hoped that Botswana which indeed shared a common pre-colonial history, culture and language with the Batswana in Bophuthatswana, would be the first country outside South Africa to recognise Bophuthatswana as an independent state. This would have been a springboard for worldwide recognition and acceptance of Bophuthatswana. Nothing came of this assumption as all attempts to forge diplomatic links with Botswana failed as Botswana regarded Bophuthatswana as “a child of Apartheid”³²⁰. This exposed the prejudice carried by Bophuthatswana and which she could not get rid of. It was a creation of Apartheid and any recognition would be perceived as justification to the Apartheid system.

The failure of Botswana to recognise Bophuthatswana voluntarily, forced Bophuthatswana to change its attitude which formerly had been friendly and open. It resorted to pressure by taking advantage of its geographical location in Southern Africa, especially in relation to Botswana. In 1982 it restricted Botswana access to Ngotoane River by constructing the Ngotoane Dam near Lobatla thus reducing the water supply from the river to Gaborone Dam (Botswana). The Molopo river

³²⁰. **Mafikeng Mail**, 1 July 1977; J.H. Drummond & A.H. Maïtson, “The Evolution and Contemporary significance of the Bophuthatswana - Botswana Border”, p.234; M. Lawrence & A. Manson, “The Dog of the Boers”, p.55; **The Mail**, 8 April 1988.

was also dammed. These violated the previous interstate (RSA, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Mozambique) agreement that dams would not be built on the Limpopo or its headwaters without prior negotiation. Although Bophuthatswana offered Botswana the opportunity to negotiate the issue, Botswana ignored it and instead approached South Africa to mediate in the matter³²¹. In desperation for recognition in December 1986 Bophuthatswana put further pressure on Botswana by placing a visa requirement on Botswana citizens entering Bophuthatswana or passing through the territory to South Africa. This virtually closed the borders, affecting many people even from a number of frontline states (Zambia, Zimbabwe, Zaire and Malawi). This disrupted transport which affected trade severely and had a serious impact on the custom union. Botswana approached South Africa to request Bophuthatswana to lift the visa restriction, which was done on August 1987 after a meeting between Bophuthatswana and South Africa authorities³²². Although these developments did not force the opening of diplomatic relations with Botswana, they helped to moderate Botswana's attitude towards Bophuthatswana. She started to accept the existence of Bophuthatswana and negotiated issues which affected the two countries, though South Africa was always involved (possibly as a mediator). This happened on the 15 February 1987 when an agreement was reached on exchange of locomotives and crews. South African crews were to take over at the border posts³²³. Although this eased the

³²¹. J.H. Drummond & A.H. Manson, "The Evolution and Contemporary Significance of the Bophuthatswana - Botswana Border", pp 234 - 235; M. Lawrence & A. Manson, "The Dog of the Boers", p.455.

³²². J.H. Drummond & A.H. Manson, "The Evolution and Contemporary Significance of the Bophuthatswana - Botswana Border", p.237; **City Press**, 3 August 1987; **Business Daily**, 3 August 1987; L.S. Mogajane, **Interview**, 4 April 2000.

³²³. **Saturday Star**, 15 February 1987; J.H. Drummond & A.H. Manson, "The Evolution and Contemporary Significance of the Bophuthatswana/Botswana

problem of crews, there were delays and inconveniences. Another agreement involving the three countries was reached with regard to the use of water from the Molatedi dam situated in Bophuthatswana³²⁴.

Botswana's refusal to recognize Bophuthatswana was influenced among others, by the fact that Botswana was a member of the international community (United Nations (UN) and Organisation of African Unity (OAU) who were obviously opposed to the international recognition of South Africa's national states³²⁵. UN rejected the homelands and opposed their recognition because they were Apartheid creations. Their creation violated the principle of self-determination and was prejudicial to the territorial integrity of countries and the unity of their peoples. Bophuthatswana "independence" was declared invalid as it was perceived as another act of bantustanization of Africans by the South African racist regime³²⁶. Despite this stance of the UN, Mangope had the opportunity of meeting with the UN officials including the then Secretary-General, Boutros Ghali³²⁷. In July 1992, he addressed the UN General Assembly³²⁸. Although this did not imply any sense of formal international recognition, it proved that the de facto existence of Bophuthatswana was acknowledged.

Border", p.237.

³²⁴. Anon, "Co-operation and Trade : South Africa Water Agreement", **African Research Bulletin**, vol. 9, 31 October 1988, p.283.

³²⁵. **The Citizen**, 6 January 1987; **The Mail**, 23 January 1987.

³²⁶. T. Cobb (ed), **Fact Finding Mission to the Republic of Bophuthatswana** (1980), pp. 12-15; C.C. Saunders(ed) , **An Illustrated Dictionary of South African History**, (1994) p.30.

³²⁷. **The Mail**, 23 April 1993; D. Jackson, "UN Chief and Mangope meet in Rome", **Pioneer**, vol. 16, no.1, June/July 1993, pp.2 -4.

³²⁸. **The Mail**, 17 July 1992.

Although no country (except South Africa and other independent homelands) gave Bophuthatswana diplomatic recognition, Bophuthatswana had relations with conservative parties and organisations in European countries such as Bavaria, Italy, Israel, Latvia, Britain, France, Germany and United States³²⁹. The support she got from some prominent British and West German members of parliament were very encouraging to the homeland government and brought hope that they would win more friends for Bophuthatswana and aid her quest for international recognition³³⁰. In 1987, Mangope addressed the British House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee and used the opportunity to state his views about his country,³³¹ providing Britons with first hand information. This was arranged by Bophuthatswana supporters in Britain, among them the six Conservative members of Parliament who had visited Bophuthatswana during that year led by Andrew Hunter. The same MPs stated the Bophuthatswana case to the British parliament³³².

Bophuthatswana had done almost everything in its power to buy or force international recognition but in the end achieved little. She had sponsored costly trips for European MP's and business people to visit the country. What came out of those state sponsored visitations were promises, hopes and trade missions in various European countries. Bophuthatswana spent millions of rands to maintain

³²⁹. **The Citizen**, 28 September 1987; **The Mail**, 17 February 1984; **The Mail**, 22 April 1988; C. Cooper, et al, **A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa** (1989), pp. 280 - 281.

³³⁰. **The Mail**, 17 February 1987; **The Citizen**, 10 August 1987, **The Citizen**, 28 September 1987.

³³¹. J.H. Drummond & A.H. Manson, "The Evolution and Contemporary Significance of the Bophuthatswana - Botswana Border", p.238.

³³². **The Mail**, 21 November 1987.

representatives in Washington, Paris, Rome and London and trade missions in Israel, West Germany, Italy and Thailand³³³.

Apart from the prejudice of being perceived as an Apartheid creation which haunted Bophuthatswana throughout its existence, Bophuthatswana had problems which constituted further obstacles to international recognition such as the lack of geographic unity as it was fragmented into dispersed pieces of land. In addition, the idea of dual citizenship (SA-Bop) was too complex, and economic dependence on South Africa made its economic viability doubtful³³⁴.

6. MANGOPE'S RESPONSES TO POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF THE 1990s.

Lack of legitimacy for the Bophuthatswana government and Mangope's shaky position especially after the attempted coup of February 1988, prompted him to seek alternative means to legitimize his position and that of his government. In the 1980s when there was a move to changes in South Africa which showed signs of a future unitary South African state, Mangope started exploring the possibilities of a merger or closer co-operation with Botswana. Delving into the pre-colonial history of the Batswana in the two territories, citing their commonalities in language, history and culture, he coined the idea of Pan-Tswanaism, of an all encompassing Tswana Nation.³³⁵ This was an attempt to reverse the division of the

³³³. **The Star**, 24 August 1988.

³³⁴. A.A. Cooper, "Bop and the obstacles to Recognition", **The Star**, 24 August 1988; T. Cobb (ed) **Fact Finding Mission to the Republic of Bophuthatswana**, pp. 17, 28-29.

³³⁵. M. Lawrence & A. Manson, "The Dog of the Boers", p.454.

Botswana chiefdoms by the British colonial administration in 1885 (see chapter one). Despite cultural links between the people of the two territories, Botswana refused to recognise Bophuthatswana and rendered any possibility of a merger untenable. This disappointed Mangope who then resorted to coercive measures in an attempt to force Botswana to recognise Bophuthatswana. The relations between the two territories, as noted earlier, turned sour and remained tense for some time.

Reacting to the political developments at national level which included the unbanning of liberation movements, release of political prisoners (including Nelson Mandela) and the Convention for Democratic South Africa (CODESA) negotiations, Mangope initially adopted a sophisticated stance. De Clercq argues that he used the rhetoric of a reasonable national leader committed to negotiations and democracy and held inconclusive talks with the South African government, ANC and INKATHA. He continually insisted on political sovereignty and independence of Bophuthatswana. Though he lifted the state of emergency and promised to amend the Internal Security Act to allow more political activity, on the contrary political activities in Bophuthatswana were more tightly controlled and suppressed than before. Any political party or group which wanted to operate in Bophuthatswana had to register in terms of the Bophuthatswana Electoral Act and was to be confined to Bophuthatswana citizens only.³³⁶

NWU
LIBRARY

Mangope saw a possible survival strategy in a federal option rather than in a unitary form. While Bophuthatswana remained intransigent about the negotiation talks, in the meantime Mangope explored forms of regional socio-economic co-operation between Bophuthatswana, the Western and Northern Transvaal, the

³³⁶ F. de Clercq, "Bophuthatswana", p.19.

Northern Cape and the South Western Orange Free State.³³⁷ As stated by Lawrence and Manson, “the projected population of this expanded region was 6.3 million (56% being Batswana-speakers) with a Cross Geographic Product of R239 billion.”³³⁸ He commissioned various studies to look into the implications of reincorporation along regional or federal lines which would protect and preserve his administration. On the other hand, a number of White Minority parties supported the move as they saw in it a means to protect their minority interests. They also intended to use it to prevent the development of a strong black dominated centralised government.³³⁹ These developments led to a conference on regional government at Potchefstroom on the 23 - 24 March 1992 attended by 320 delegates including Bophuthatswana government officials, parastatal officials, White politicians, farmers, businessmen and mining magnates in the concerned areas. It was at this conference that a South Africa - Bophuthatswana Steering Committee which later became known as SATSWA was established. It was tasked to investigate what would be appropriate powers and functions of the proposed region as well as the composition of its government.³⁴⁰ Mangope was playing an opportunistic game trying to create a power base for himself in order to join the constitutional debate with greater bargaining power. The SATSWA initiative, had it succeeded, would have expanded Bophuthatswana into a greater region thus enhancing his status. As Lawrence and Manson argue, “his deliberate distortion of history in attempt to weld Batswana and Afrikaners together claiming that there was unity based on common shared values based on christian principles,

³³⁷. F. de Clercq, “Bophuthatswana”, p.19.

³³⁸. M. Lawrence & A. Manson, “The Dog of the Boers”, pp. 457 - 458.

³³⁹. F. de Clercq, “Bophuthatswana”, p.19.

³⁴⁰. A.J. Jeffery, **Conflict at the Crossroads**, p.172; M. Lawrence & A. Manson, “The Dog of the Boers”, p.457.

did not appeal to some of the Batswana who experienced oppression, racism and cruelties on farms, forced removals from White farms.”³⁴¹ The rhetoric of Batswana / Afrikaner unity was also in stark contrast to the problems faced by the Batswana as a result of Boer intrusions into their lands which was accompanied by land dispossession, ill-treatment, flogging incidents of *dikgosi*, and imposed labour (see chapter one).

Mangope was further brought closer to the White right wingers by common objections to the Record of Understanding of 26 September 1992, between the ANC and NP as major negotiating partners which excluded other parties (including Bophuthatswana and INKATHA). Mangope convened a meeting in Mmabatho which was attended by Brigadier Gqozo of Ciskei, Kenneth Mopeli of QwaQwa and Mangosothu Buthelezi of Kwazulu and leader of INKATHA. A joint statement was issued rejecting the Record of Understanding, essentially because of its bilateral decision making on issues affecting the interests of others. On welcoming the objections, Conservative Party leader, Dr Treunicht called upon all those opposed to ANC/SACP “tyranny” and NP “betrayal” to work together.³⁴² This was followed by the formation of the Concerned South African Group (COSAG) by Buthelezi, Mangope, Gqozo and the right wing, Conservative Party and Afrikaner Vryheid Unie (AVU) in September 1992. In 1993 COSAG was consolidated into the Freedom Alliance. As rightly noted by Cilliers, COSAG was an unlikely (unholy) Alliance as it grouped right wing Afrikaners with an ethnically based

³⁴¹. See M. Lawrence & A. Manson, “The Dog of the Boers”, p.461, A.J. Jeffery, **Conflict at the Crossroads**, pp. 177 - 178.

³⁴². A.J. Jeffery, **Conflict at the Crossroads**, p.182.

black Zulu party.³⁴³ It was further formed by disparate groupings, united more by fear of marginalisation, wishful thinking of clinging to the old order than a set of coherent principles.³⁴⁴ Mangope's relation with right wingers was crystallised and this shifted his focus from regional approach to national coalition politics as a political strategy for survival.

Mangope's association with right-wingers had some immediate implications. For Mangope it boosted his confidence in pressing for the continued independence of Bophuthatswana along federal lines. This was untimely and out of step with what was happening in the rest of the country as a decision had already been taken that all black people in the homelands would have their South African Citizenship restored on the 1 January 1994 and homelands would be absorbed into South Africa after the 27 April 1994 elections. The Bophuthatswana government was noticeably absent when the decision was taken.³⁴⁵ The development disappointed the NP government which had all along calculated that electoral prospects rested on maintaining decent relationships with Mangope. Despite this, the National Party(NP) was reluctant to turn against him as this could effectively lend support to ANC electoral interests in the homeland. The ANC, like many Bophuthatswana citizens and black South Africans, was alienated by this relationship. The actions of the right-wingers had shown that they intended to destabilise the settlement process as they demanded their own "Volkstaat". The Afrikaner Weerstandsbewiging(AWB) under Terre-Blanche had on the 25 June 1993 marched to the World Trade Centre where CODESA negotiations were held, crashed an armoured

³⁴³. J.K. Cilliers, "From Pariah to Partner: Bophuthatswana, the NPKF and the SANDF", *African Security Review*, vol.7,no.4,1988, p.33.

³⁴⁴. M. Lawrence & A. Manson, "The Dog of the Boers", p. 459.

³⁴⁵. J.K. Cilliers, "From Pariah to Partner", p.33.

car into the front hall, entered and occupied the building. They had to be removed by the army. Chris Hani, a most influential and respected political figure at CODESA, and M.K. commander was also assassinated by the extremists which conspired with the CP in April 1993. In response to this, the ANC resolved that Mangope had to be removed before the elections, and it increased mobilisation and mass actions in Bophuthatswana.³⁴⁶ This put unbearable political pressure on Bophuthatswana and political opposition and demands for the reincorporation of the territory into South Africa came from all quarters. These led to the March 1994 uprising(see ahead).

7. CONCLUSION

This chapter has indicated that on paper at least Bophuthatswana was a democratic country whose constitution contained a declaration of human rights in its constitution. But in practice, the implementation of various clauses in the Bill of Rights showed that the declaration was frequently violated. Bophuthatswana like other African states failed to sustain its democratic stance and towards its downfall it became highly autocratic. Although elections were held every five years, they remained a ritual or formality to bring Mangope back as there was no strong opposition to challenge Mangope's ruling party.

The chapter has finally discussed Mangope's attempts to consolidate his position both at regional and national levels as strategies for political survival. Whether these alliances and strategies were successful is debatable and is discussed in detail in subsequent chapters.

³⁴⁶ J. Seiler, "Transforming Mangope's Bophuthatswana".

CHAPTER FOUR

THE FALL OF BOPHUTHATSWANA

1. INTRODUCTION

The week of the 7-13 March 1994, was a turning point in the history of South Africa in general, and Bophuthatswana in particular. It was characterised by traumatic events of widespread civil unrest, anarchy and looting, which resulted in the loss of many lives in Bophuthatswana.³⁴⁷ The crisis led to the ousting of Mangope as the President of Bophuthatswana on 12 March 1994. The objective of this chapter therefore is to investigate the immediate causes and course of the fall of Bophuthatswana. The immediate responses to the event and its impact is also examined.

2. THE IMMEDIATE CAUSES

The causes for the fall of Bophuthatswana are varied, and the long-term ones were discussed in detail in the preceding chapter. In this section only issues, events and conditions which were immediate causes to the fall of Bophuthatswana are examined. These are issues such as the insistence of the Bophuthatswana government to hold on to independence, 'the sinister agitation from outside' and the alliance with the right-wingers under the Freedom Alliance.

³⁴⁷. Tebbutt Commission, The Report of the Tebbutt Commission (Website/<http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/commissions/1998/tebbutt.html>.), Part 2A, p.4.

The position of Bophuthatswana at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa at the World Trade Centre at Kempton Park, became a concern for the people of Bophuthatswana and the government. While the Bophuthatswana government participated in the negotiations, it insisted that it was independent and it would remain so, and South Africa had no right or power to withdraw its sovereignty. Bophuthatswana wanted a federal settlement in South Africa, an option that would allow it to remain independent, hold on to its assets and be in a federal relationship with the rest of South Africa. This assumption, according to Van der Walt, former Ambassador of South Africa to Bophuthatswana and later one of the Joint Administrators, paid little or no attention to the true facts and realities such as:

- although Bophuthatswana was far ahead of other homelands financially, it was still far from financial self-sufficiency as it continued to receive several grants from the South African Government;
- Bophuthatswana was a fragmented region comprising six islands not divided by a neutral sea, but by land owned by a different country(RSA), which was far more powerful than Bophuthatswana; and
- Bophuthatswana was totally dependent on the goodwill of South Africa for its international mobility.³⁴⁸

Indeed, while the Bophuthatswana Government was preventing its citizens from applying for South African identity documents, its officials continued to use South African passports to visit other countries. It was further not feasible to have Thaba Nchu included in the North West Province which caused a problem for the Bophuthatswana Government as it wanted to keep all its regions. A reasonable

³⁴⁸ . T. Van der Walt, "Lewenslesse uit die Geskiedenis: die Einde van Bophuhtatswana van Weleer"(Address to the Autumn Graduation Ceremony of the Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education, Potchefstroom, 6 May 1994), p.4.

consideration of these facts, could have influenced the Bophuthatswana Government to realise that to try to go it alone, was an impossible mission. To think otherwise would have indicated political naivety, insensibility and lack of realism.

In his evidence to the Tebbutt Commission, which was instituted to investigate factors which led to the Bophuthatswana crisis of March 1994, Mr Popo Molefe, the Premier of the North West, argues that attempts were made to convince Mangope's Government to shift from its position and accept the idea of a new South Africa, which would be a unitary state. Between January and 18 February 1994, a number of meetings were held between the ANC and the Bophuthatswana Government to resolve issues of the future of Bophuthatswana and the need for free political activity in Bophuthatswana. The last of these the meetings was on the 18 February 1994 in which the two parties became deadlocked on the demands of the Bophuthatswana Government to the ANC delegation led by Molefe requiring the ANC to recognise Bophuthatswana as an independent state or as a part of the confederal agreement with South Africa. The ANC delegation, as stated by Molefe, explained that the developments which took place in 1993, could not be undone. These developments included the agreement on the Interim Constitution, Act 200 of 1993, which recognised South Africa as a single united entity, the demarcation of South Africa into nine provinces and a decision to reincorporate all the homelands.³⁴⁹ Despite all these efforts, the Bophuthatswana Government remained opposed to reincorporation and refused the ANC free political activity in Bophuthatswana, claiming that it would have to register first as a political party in

³⁴⁹. Tebbutt Commission, The Report of the Tebbutt Commission, Part 2B, pp.4-5.

Bophuthatswana. However, for the ANC to accede to this would have been tantamount to recognizing Bophuthatswana as an independent state.

It can be argued that the attitude of Bophuthatswana forced the ANC to move away from its commitment made by Mandela to Mangope in February 1992 that “ the ANC had no intention of making his country ungovernable or of overthrowing its government by force.”³⁵⁰ Until the collapse of the negotiations between the two parties, the ANC had been reluctant to openly clash with Bophuthatswana, avoiding derailing negotiations aimed at drawing the Freedom Alliance into the Transitional process. As conceded by Mr Cyril Ramaphosa, the ANC Secretary General and its Chief Negotiator at CODESA, the negotiations between the ANC and the Bophuthatswana Government paid no dividends.³⁵¹ The ANC then, according to Seiler, resolved that Mangope had to go before the elections,³⁵² although how this was to be accomplished remained uncertain.

Though there is no evidence of open conflict against the Bophuthatswana Government from the ANC, there are indications that its agitation played an important role in mobilisation of people and mass actions, which engulfed Bophuthatswana in March 1994. In support of this view, Van der Walt states that “sinister agitators such as the ANC, driven by foreign ideologies and their own ulterior motives and allied in all kinds of plots, contributed largely towards creating a spirit, which could not be brought under control easily.”³⁵³ Indeed from

³⁵⁰. Tebbutt Commission, The Report of the Tebbutt Commission, Part 2B, p.3.

³⁵¹. **The Weekly Mail and Guardian**, 4-10 March 1994.

³⁵². J. Seiler, “Transforming Mangope’s Bophuthatswana”.

³⁵³. T. Van der Walt, “Lewelesse uit die Geskiedenis”, p.7.

the meeting of the 5 March 1994, held between the ANC and public servants from Bophuthatswana in Soshanguve, Bophuthatswana was never the same again. It was engulfed in the worst crisis in its history. Soshanguve is a township in the Republic of South Africa, 30 km north of Pretoria, an area separated from Mabopane, one of Bophuthatswana's towns by a railway line. It was at this meeting that Molefe gave a report on the developments regarding negotiations with the Bophuthatswana Government. In his report, he stated that "the ANC had done all it could to persuade Bophuthatswana to take part in the elections. The homeland rejected a "magnanimous" offer including a place in the Government of National Unity."³⁵⁴ People attending this meeting, became agitated. A resolution was taken to embark on what Carl Niehaus, an ANC official who also attended this meeting, described as "a mother of all mass actions,"³⁵⁵ which was aimed at toppling the Bophuthatswana Government. This was to be coordinated by the ANC's Provincial and Regional candidates. In his analysis of the events in Bophuthatswana at that time, the journalist, Ken Owen concurs that "Bophuthatswana civil commotion was fostered by local surrogates of the ANC."³⁵⁶ This indicates that the ANC's agitations encouraged people in Bophuthatswana to defy their government, giving them confidence and support in their struggle for their rights and effectively winning them over, though through violent means.

The agitation from outside, was not unknown to the Bophuthatswana Government. There had been increased political activity by the ANC in Bophuthatswana since

³⁵⁴. **The Weekly Mail and Guardian**, 4-10 March 1994.

³⁵⁵. **Business Day**, 8 March 1994.

³⁵⁶. K.Owen, "The Annexation of Bop and the Making of History", **Sunday Times**, 20 March 1994.

1993, although it was not registered as a political party.³⁵⁷ It was unfortunate that the Bophuthatswana Government, in its attempts to prevent agitation and disturbance, ignored or underestimated the fertile breeding-ground on which incitement was flourishing. Instead of improving its internal political situation, which had been a matter of concern and source of resentment for a long time, the Bophuthatswana government continued to rely on the police force to clamp down on the political activities of those opposed it. This unfortunately served to agitate people further.



The association of Bophuthatswana with the right-wingers became a major concern not only for the people of Bophuthatswana, but also for most South Africans, who were on the brink of a new democratic era in their lives. As stated earlier in this work, Mangope and his government were brought closer to the right-wingers by a common fear of marginalisation, especially after the signing of the Record of Understanding, which they both opposed. The Freedom Alliance, in particular Dr Ferdi Hartzenberg, the leader of the Conservative Party, had an influence on the position of Bophuthatswana regarding reincorporation and elections. This, to put it bluntly, was an act of manipulation as they saw in Bophuthatswana a "Tswana Volkstaat", whose continued existence would add meaning and credibility to their demand for the Afrikaner Volkstaat. Every time Bophuthatswana was on the verge of agreeing to the elections, Ferdi Hartzenberg, according to Van der Walt, would come into the picture, meet with Mangope and convince him otherwise.³⁵⁸ Moreover, if Bophuthatswana was non-racial, anti-racist and anti-Apartheid, this was clearly not true of its white partners in the Freedom Alliance. The alliance

³⁵⁷. Tebbutt Commission, The Report of the Tebbutt Commission, Part 2B, p.3.

³⁵⁸. T. Van der Walt, **Interview**, 23 April 2001.

therefore became an embarrassment to many people of Bophuthatswana. It only served to alienate them.

The more the Bophuthatswana Government made its position clearer that it was opposed to reincorporation and would not participate in the elections, the more public servants became more concerned with their job security and pensions. In support of this view, Van der Walt states that: "by die bree bevolking het dit begin as 'n gevoel van onsekerheid: Waar gaan ons heen? Wat will die regering met hulle onderhandelings uitstel taktiek bereik? Spoedig het dit 'n gevoel geword van: Ons bly agter en die regering gee nie om nie."³⁵⁹ This indeed became a major issue particularly for those in the civil service, members of the teaching and nursing professions, and members of the Bophuthatswana Police and Defence Forces.³⁶⁰ These people were aware that in areas such as Transkei, Ciskei, Venda, Lebowa, Gazankulu and the rest of South Africa, discussions about the new structures had already been held and the army, police and public servants knew what their future would be after the April elections. The feeling of being left behind and doubt whether the Bophuthatswana Government would be able to pay their salaries should it finally decided to go it alone, coupled with the impact of political instability, brought a change in the minds and hearts of the broader community of people of Bophuthatswana. These frustrations and a feeling of uncertainty crystallised into suppressed anger, a time bomb ready to explode.

³⁵⁹. T. Van der Walt, "Lewelesse uit die Geskeidenis", p.5.

³⁶⁰. Tebbutt Commission, The Report of the Tebbutt Commission, Part 2A, p.1.

3. THE LAST CRUCIAL DAYS IN THE BOPHUTHATSWANA HISTORY

The six days, from 7 to 12 March 1994, could be rightfully labelled as “times of troubles” in Bophuthatswana. The time bomb, which had been ready to explode, was sparked by Mangope’s announcement that Bophuthatswana would not participate in the 27 April elections.³⁶¹ Within two days after the announcement, a tidal wave swept Bophuthatswana. The people of Bophuthatswana wanted to cast their votes in a democratic election as the residents of South Africa were to do.³⁶² This section concentrates on three major events, namely the collapse of the civil service, the invasion by the right-wingers and the ousting of President Mangope.

On the 7 March 1994, the Bophuthatswana Government faced a serious crisis when civil servants downed tools and went on strike. In defiance of Bophuthatswana regulations, Crisis Committees were formed from the members of different State departments and parastatals. The Crisis Committees were given a broad mandate to negotiate the conditions of workers and the general populace of Bophuthatswana with the TEC. On the 10 March 1994, the situation deteriorated as the whole country was engulfed in unrest. This was accompanied by the looting of shopping complexes and burning down of shops. This situation became threatening when the police force was divided into two camps, half remaining loyal to the Mangope Government and the rest joining the strikes, supporting the demand for reincorporation. On the same day, a group of disenchanted policemen marched to the South African Embassy to hand over a memorandum to the Ambassador, demanding the reincorporation of Bophuthatswana into South Africa and the

³⁶¹. P. McBride, “Lucas Mangope on the Ropes”, **Financial Mail**, 11 March 1994; J.K. Cilliers, “From Pariah to Partner”, p.35.

³⁶². T. Van der Walt, **Interview**, 23 April 2001.

resignation of General Seleke.³⁶³ The position in which the police found themselves at that time was unenviable. They, together with their families, were victims of public abuse and attack, and were accused of being insensitive to the plight of the general public. They could not continue to harass and kill people in defence of an illegitimate structure, whose days were numbered. The administration of Bophuthatswana totally collapsed as unrest reached every corner of the country. Policing also ceased to exist. Even at that stage the Bophuthatswana Government remained insensitive to the demands of the majority of people, who favoured reincorporation. Government responded to the crisis by stating that parliament was scheduled to meet on the 15 March 1994 to decide on the issue of reincorporation. In the meanwhile the looting of shops and acts of arson were causing enormous damage running into many millions worth of rands and looters were being shot and killed by those police who still remained loyal to the government.

While the government had effectively taken up arms against its own citizens, "foreign armies", in the form of the Volksfront's 'Boere People's Army' of General Constand Viljoen and the AWB of Terre'blanche, invaded the territory. Though it was clear that Viljoen's Volksfront entered Bophuthatswana on invitation from Mangope, the position of the AWB remained controversial. It was only at the Tebbutt Commission hearing that it became clear that they had entered Bophuthatswana uninvited, and ignored efforts made to stop them from doing so. Their conduct during their one day unwelcome stay in Mmabatho/Mafikeng area, was a shameful picture in the history of South Africa. They were undisciplined and refused to be placed under the command of the Volksfront led by Colonel

³⁶³. **Sowetan**, 11 March 1994.

Breytenbach and Commandant Doug Steyn and to remove their AWB insignia from their clothing.³⁶⁴ They behaved, as stated by Van der Walt, in a most macabre way, as if they were on a picnic, shooting left and right at every black person they saw.³⁶⁵ This raised the anger of the black members of the Bophuthatswana Defence Force, who were never informed about the request of the assistance from the Volksfront nor the presence of the right-wingers in the territory. They threatened to take the law into their own hands and to attack the right-wingers. This forced the commanding structure into agreeing that the right-wingers be withdrawn from Bophuthatswana. They were to be escorted out of the territory by a route around the Mmabatho/Mafikeng area to avoid further contact with the general populace.³⁶⁶ The AWB refused to cooperate and took their own direction, continuing to cause panic and death among the people.

The behaviour of the AWB enraged the members of the Bophuthatswana Police and Defence Forces. Apart from shooting at random resulting in loss of lives, they refused to be escorted out of the territory using a specified route to avoid contact with the rioters. This led to open conflict between the two groups, which in turn led to public execution of the three AWB members, Nicholaas Johannes Fourie, Jacob Stephanus Uys and Alwyn Wolfaart. Although these men were wounded, helpless and submissive, out of anger they were shot and killed by a member of the Bophuthatswana Police Force,³⁶⁷ who was both angered and frustrated by events,

³⁶⁴. Tebbutt Commission, The Report of the Tebbutt Commission, Part 2A, p.3.

³⁶⁵. T. Van der Walt, *Interview*, 23 April 2001.

³⁶⁶. Tebbutt Commission, The Report of the Tebbutt Commission, Part 2A, p.4.

³⁶⁷. J. Seiler, "Transforming Mangope's Bophuthatswana", D. Forbes, *The End of Mangope regime* (1995), p.5; M. Lawrence & A. Manson, "The Dog of the Boers", p.461.

causing public outcry among certain sections of the white community. Originally, Sergeant Segoba Nare was brought to trial for the murder of the three AWB men, but it later emerged that they were shot by Constable Ontlametse Menyatswe. Menyatswe confessed in his evidence to the Tebbutt Commission that it was not Nare, but him, who shot the three men.³⁶⁸ He also applied for Amnesty for the murders to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. It should be noted that it was not the three AWB members only, who lost their lives, but the rioting, looting and fighting of that week, left 60 black people dead and 300 injured, mostly around Mmabatho/Mafikeng.³⁶⁹

These events, especially those of the 11 March 1994, forced the South African Government, ANC and Transitional Executive Council(TEC) to get seriously involved in the Bophuthatswana situation. An emergency meeting was held on the 12 March 1994 in which Ramaphosa, as Secretary General of ANC and a TEC member, flanked by leading ANC figures Mac Maharaj(also Secretary of the TEC) and Joe Slovo, announced a decision to remove Mangope. This came as a shock to Roelf Meyer(NP member) and Colin Englin(DP member), who also attended the meeting. This was actually the implementation of a decision Mandela had forced on de Klerk on the 10 March 1994 despite de Klerk's argument that Mangope like all other national states leaders, had to remain in office until the April elections. The same night, the 12 March 1994, a delegation led by the South African Foreign Minister, Pik Botha and Mac Maharaj, as the Secretary of the TEC, went to Motswedi, Mangope's residence to inform him of the decision of the TEC. Other members of the delegation were Prof. Tjaart van der Walt, Mr Fannie

³⁶⁸. Tebbutt Commission, The Report of the Tebbutt Commission, Part 4, pp.1-3.

³⁶⁹. **The Citizen**, 12 March 1994.

van der Merwe, joint secretary of the TEC, General G. Meiring, head of the South African Defence Force (SADF) and Roland Darroll, Media Liaison Officer in the Department of Foreign Affairs. The situation, as described by Darroll, was very tense as Pik Botha, a different man from the one who in 1988 rescued Mangope from the coup attempt, explained the situation to the distrustful Mangope. Mangope was kept company by his sons, Kwena and Eddie. Finally Botha informed Mangope that the South African Government had withdrawn its recognition of Bophuthatswana, it had revoked its sovereignty and he was no longer a president. Bophuthatswana was to be placed under Tjaart van der Walt as an interim administrator. In his response, Mangope stated that he has been expecting this response from the National Party-ANC alliance, and put two requests to the delegation, namely to be allowed to address his people and that the Bophuthatswana parliament be allowed to continue with its sitting as scheduled for Tuesday, the 16 March 1994. These were denied at the insistence of the ANC especially. Finally, though bitterly, and on the advice of his sons, Mangope accepted what he was told by Botha.³⁷⁰ Mangope became yet another victim in long a list of coups in Africa.

From the meeting of that fateful night, three things emerged; namely a hardening in the attitude of the ANC towards Mangope, a growing divide between Mangope and Pik Botha and lastly the extent of Mangope's political miscalculations. The ANC went to Motswedi determined to ensure that Mangope was completely removed from political arena. It was the ANC, through Maharaj, which opposed any possibility of allowing Mangope to address his parliament. It believed that

³⁷⁰ R. Darroll, "Expedition to Mmabatho to depose President Lucas Mangope", **Sunday Times**, 20 March 1994; T. Van der Walt, **Interview**, 23 April 2001.

Mangope was still a 'coherent', and wily opponent who could appeal to human sentiments, and would do everything to buy time, which could give him an opportunity to 'resurrect' himself and create resistance. Maharaj further stressed that the Broadcasting services be resumed without delay so that the public could be informed of the new developments.³⁷¹ By this he meant to spread the news of Mangope's overthrow, which would assist in suppressing any move by Mangope to contact people including his former parliamentarians. This would boost the ANC support in the area of Bophuthatswana further.

The hardened attitude of the ANC was a result of the actions taken by Mangope himself during his rule. He had denied the ANC the opportunity to operate in Bophuthatswana, even after its unbanning in 1990. He had also acted cruelly against its members. He had even refused to join the democratisation process by refusing to opt for elections although it was claimed that on the 11 March 1994, he had belatedly agreed to participate in the elections. The ANC had also done everything it could during its meetings, to bring Mangope's Government into the Transition process, as stated earlier, without success. Mangope had been adamant and preferred to work with the right-wingers to oppose the democratisation process. He had therefore paid a heavy price.

It emerged during that night that the mistrust of Botha by Mangope widened. Earlier during that week, the Bophuthatswana Government had accused the South African Government, in particular Foreign Minister Pik Botha, of attempting to fan unrest in Bophuthatswana. Botha's utterances on a radio programme that South Africa was considering withdrawing its recognition of the independence of

³⁷¹.R. Darroll, "Expedition to Mmabatho to depose President Lucas Mangope".

Bophuthatswana and would send troops into Bophuthatswana, ³⁷²gave the discontented masses assurance that any South African intervention would be in their favour unlike that of February 1988 when South Africa intervened in Mangope's favour. The NP was aware that the desire for radical change had penetrated all levels of the society and there was no way they could run counter to the tidal wave sweeping the country. Party differences between the National and Conservative Parties also played a role in changing the National Party Government's attitude towards Mangope. The two had drifted apart, the National Party being in favour of a unitary state, while the Conservative Party pursued federal options. The association of Mangope with these federal right-wingers had disappointed the National Party, which had all along seen in Bophuthatswana an ally to reduce the ANC support. It was also unreasonable for the National Party Government to try and protect the Apartheid creations such as homelands when Apartheid itself was being dismantled. Homeland leaders such as Mangope, who insisted on the existence and continuation of the homeland independence, were out of step with reality. The South African Government therefore intervened and this time not to prop up Mangope but to remove him and topple his government. It was this mistrust, according to the Tebbutt Commission, that Mangope advanced as reasons why he preferred Volksfront to the South African Government to assist him during the crisis.³⁷³ He had suspected that the NP could use the request as a justification to stage a coup to overthrow his government. His final loss of power was due to yet another desperate political miscalculation. Had he opted for South African intervention, he could have had the opportunity of being included in the

³⁷². P. MacBride, "Lucas Mangope on the Ropes", **Financial Mail**, 11 March 1994.

³⁷³. Tebbutt Commission, *The Report of the Tebbutt Commission*, Part 2A, p.5.

Government of National Unity and playing a role in shaping the future of the country.

Mangope's request to address his people and parliament, constituted an act of political miscalculation on his part. He underestimated the problem that his government had caused. Having left Mmabatho on the 10 March 1994 for his own safety, and following General Seleke's advice, indicates that he accepted that the situation was beyond his control. It can be argued that for the president to flee the capital under such circumstances, was tantamount to an abdication of power. This is confirmed by the fact that on the day he fled Mmabatho, his cabinet was already disintegrating, as some ministers indicated their opposition to the cabinet decision not to register for the elections. The Minister of Health and Social Welfare, Dr Nat Khaole, the youngest member of the cabinet, for example, resigned in protest to Mangope's insistence that he was prepared to die for the independence of Bophuthatswana. He accused Mangope of being a 71-year-old man bent on defending his position at the expense young people, who were dying at the hands of the police whilst fighting for their rights. He was later that day followed by Ministers Godfrey Mothibe of Justice and H.F.Tlou of Local Government and Housing, who also resigned their posts.³⁷⁴

The news of his departure from Mmabatho, which aggravated the situation, boosted the confidence of his opponents and those who had then taken to violence and senseless looting. Together with the ugly scenes of the 11 March 1994, these developments should have convinced Mangope that he had lost total control over Bophuthatswana and that his last hope on the Volksfront to sustain his power, had

³⁷⁴. **Business Day**, 11 May 1994; T. Van der Walt, **Interview**, 23 April 2001.

also faded. Even if he was allowed to address his parliament, it could have only caused him further humiliation. It was unlikely that parliamentarians would risk their lives to attend a most hated and disputed parliament. Mangope had been in power for too long and was surrounded by those who knew what pleased him most. Mangope had unfortunately overestimated his powers and tried to achieve more than was realistically viable, thus placed Bophuthatswana fatally at risk.

3. RESPONSES TO THE FALL OF BOPHUTHATSWANA

The fall of Bophuthatswana was received differently by various groups and individuals. Some applauded while others with condemned. The various responses and the impact of that event on the political situation in South Africa, is examined in this section. Among the issues singled out, are the debates centered around the legality of the actual removal of Mangope, the intervention of the South African Defence Force in Bophuthatswana and finally the Freedom Alliance's reaction and its disintegration.

The intervention of the South African Defence Force in the Bophuthatswana situation and 'the looting of power',³⁷⁵ as Mangope called the coup staged by the NP/ANC/SACP coalition, was criticised by some as unlawful. This critique was based on the assumption, that South Africa's intervention was not immoral, but that it could have been legitimately accomplished by other means. Scholars such as Prof. Hercules Booysen of the Constitutional and International Law Department at UNISA, political analysts Mr Donald Leysen and Prof. Willem Kleynhans,

³⁷⁵. Mangope's own description of the coup by the NP/ANC/SACP.

condemned the intervention as judicially and morally unacceptable.³⁷⁶ South Africa had, as stated by Booysen, allowed Bophuthatswana to be destabilised in order to play a political opportunistic game. It had actually played a destabilising role; Pik's utterances as stated earlier incited the people against the Bophuthatswana Government.³⁷⁷ Instead of staging a coup or becoming part a "illegal" revolution, notes Leysen, the South African Government could have followed two options available to it, namely:-

- that the President could have issued a proclamation in which the parts of the Interim Constitution, which stated that on the 27 April 1994, the TBVC states independence could be stripped be brought forward, or
- alternatively summoning parliament to pass an act stripping Bophuthatswana of its sovereignty,³⁷⁸ thus incorporating it into South Africa legally.

Bophuthatswana remained an independent state in terms of the constitution, even after the invasion of the territory. This therefore justified Kheynhans' argument that South African Government's actions constituted a fraud.³⁷⁹

In justifying the invasion of Bophuthatswana by South Africa, Owen states that it was not dissimilar to other invasions in other parts of the world, in which bigger powers swallowed smaller ones. Like the German army, which invaded Sudetenland to protect the rights and safety of the Germans in the territory, the SADF invasion was also intended to protect the rights and safety of the South

³⁷⁶. **The Citizen**, 14 March 1994.

³⁷⁷. **The Citizen**, 14 March 1994.

³⁷⁸. **The Citizen**, 14 March 1994.

³⁷⁹. **The Citizen**, 14 March 1994.

African citizens in Bophuthatswana.³⁸⁰ This comparison however ignores the fact that Nazi Germany had never recognised the independence of such states, which it targeted for reincorporation to strengthen itself into a 'super race' on its way to a super power. Apartheid South Africa on the contrary, had recognised Bophuthatswana as an independent state and according to Owen, it had to follow the constitutional process to reincorporate it.

In the court case, *Mangope v Van der Walt and another* (discussed further under the Transitional Administration), held on the 13 April 1994, Mangope challenged the invasion and his removal. It was however argued in favour of the state (South Africa) that the intervention was legitimate because it had been requested by General Turner as Head of the Bophuthatswana Defence Force on the 11 March 1994. It can be argued that although Turner acted in defiance of his president's instructions not to do so, he did so in terms of the agreements the two countries had, relating to military cooperation.³⁸¹ Turner was prompted by the chaotic conditions which continued to claim the lives of innocent people, thus he was acting in the interest of the citizens of Bophuthatswana.

Mangope challenged this "looting of power" in the Supreme Court of Bophuthatswana in a case which was heard on the 13 April 1994. It was argued during the hearing that the political intervention was illegal as it violated both the Bophuthatswana sovereignty and the non-aggression pact between the two

³⁸⁰. K. Owen, "the Annexation of Bop and the making of History", *Sunday Times*, 20 March 1994.

³⁸¹. Republic of South Africa, "Mangope v Van der Walt and Another", *Law Reports, SA* 850(3), 1994, p.862; Tebbutt Commission, The Report of the Tebbutt Commission, Part 2A, p.4.

countries.³⁸² Judgement was reserved initially but when the hearing resumed on the 18 April 1994, Judge Comry dismissed Mangope's application.³⁸³ Reasons advanced were:-

- that Mangope was accepting the fact that Bophuthatswana would be reincorporated into South Africa,
- he was no longer seeking his reinstatement or that of his government but was challenging the legality of the Administrators(discussed in detail ahead), and
- that elections were to be held soon(27/4/94) and the people of Bophuthatswana would be entitled to vote.³⁸⁴

It can be argued that the judgement was a formality as Mangope had in the interim, on the advice of his legal team, dropped the case on conditions(see ahead.) It was clear that legal action alone, especially considering the way in which the case was highly politicised, would not be sufficient to reinstate him. Perhaps his decision was also taken to avoid further humiliation. No doubt his case could not be allowed to prevent the holding of the important elections which were only nine days away.

On his political future, Mangope announced his intention to play an active political role in the North West Province, describing his party, Christian Democratic Party, as the only party which would be a true democratic alternative to the ANC/SACP alliance. His party merged with the North West Democratic Party, a predominantly

³⁸². Republic of South Africa, "Mangope v Van der Walt and Another", pp.862-863.

³⁸³. **The Star**, 19 April 1994; T. Van der Walt, **Interview**, 23 April 2001.

³⁸⁴. Republic of South Africa, " Mangope v Van der Walt and Another,"p.867.

white party, which had registered for the elections, to form the United Christian Democratic Party(UCDP). He became the leader of the new party. Mangope states that "due to intimidation of UCDP supporters by the ANC/SACP/COSATU members, UCDP could not participate in the April elections".³⁸⁵ Pre-election tensions in former Bophuthatswana were accompanied by intimidation and killings. According to Mangope, his party could not finalise its list of candidates because some candidates requested to be removed from the list due to intimidation, especially after the cruel murder of Mr Bennet Kadi.³⁸⁶ Kadi, a former Bophuthatswana Member of Parliament for Lehurutshe, was together with his brother Justice, cruelly killed by being burnt alive at their home in Moshana on the 17 March 1994,³⁸⁷ allegedly by the ANC supporters. The ANC Western Transvaal Region tried to distance itself and claimed that the two were killed by angry villagers and not members of the ANC.³⁸⁸ It was always difficult at that time to distinguish ordinary, angry people, the "Anti-Mangope mob" from ANC supporters, as ANC T-shirts, caps and flags were always used, even before the fall of Bophuthatswana, as signs of defiance and protest. Whether they were ANC supporters or not, the fact remains that the UCDP faced severe difficulty in resurrecting itself as a "new" party to contest the elections.

Although Mangope's pronouncements at that time,(particularly that his party was still intact and had the potential to attract more supporters in the newly created

³⁸⁵. **The Sowetan**, 26 March 1994.

³⁸⁶. Editorial," Intimidation keeps Mangope party out of Elections", **The Citizen**, 19 March 1994; **The Citizen**, 26 March 1994.

³⁸⁷. Tebbutt Commission, The report of the Tebbutt Commission, Part 4,p.1; **The Citizen**, 19 March 1994.

³⁸⁸. **The Citizen**, 22 March 1994.

North West Province), sounded politically naive, they were later proved to have some substance. In 1995, his party did well when it received substantial support in the Local Government elections, gaining seats in the Transitional Councils of Zeerust and Mmabatho. It also received support during the 1999 National elections when it gained three seats in the National Assembly and three seats in the North West Provincial Legislature.

In reaction to the events in Bophuthatswana, the Freedom Alliance convened a meeting in Kimberly on the 14 March 1994, two days after Mangope's removal. Mangope also attended this meeting in which Freedom Alliance condemned his overthrow as "unchristian and double-crossing betrayal of Mangope by the South African Government."³⁸⁹ Dr Ferdi Hartzenberg further described it as "a communist revolution and constitutional rape."³⁹⁰ The resolve not to trust de Klerk was strengthened. This became the last meeting of the Freedom Alliance as it later disintegrated. The events in Bophuthatswana, as is discussed later, effectively put an end to the Freedom Alliance.

Dr Mangosuthu Buthelezi, as leader of the Inkatha Freedom Party, criticised the actions of the South African Government, ANC and TEC and condemned Mangope's removal as illegal. These actions, as argued by Buthelezi, indicated how opposition to the ANC/SACP/NP's decisions and intentions would be smashed by whatever means, including inciting mob violence and anarchy. Acting in a tandem, the NP/ANC/SACP coalition had used the powers they had given

³⁸⁹. **The Citizen**, 15 March 1994; SABC, News Broadcast, 14 March 1994.

³⁹⁰. **The Citizen**, 15 March 1994.

themselves through the interim constitution and TEC, to overthrow Mangope.³⁹¹ Although the removal of an elected leader was applauded as a triumph of democracy, Buthelezi maintained that it shamed South Africa as the removal of elected or appointed leaders or officials through government or party orchestrated mob violence or even anarchy, could develop into a form of political culture in the new government. This instilled fear for any future disagreement with ANC/SACP/SA Government, as it would be ruthlessly snuffed out. The long-term consequences are dealt with in the next section.

Mr Mosibudi Mangena, the President of the Black Consciousness Movement(BCM), which in 1977 accused Mangope of playing an opportunistic game when he accepted homeland independence, welcomed the collapse of Mangope. He praised the people of Bophuthatswana, the army, police and civil servants for their heroic deed in overthrowing Mangope and expelling the right-wing army from their area. He further encouraged the black communities in other areas to take lessons and courage from the killing of the AWB men, to defend themselves against right-wing attacks.³⁹² This kind of reaction, especially the emphasis on action against right-wingers, was not surprising when considered in the context of the attitude of the Africanists, including the Pan Africanist Congress, at the time. They were opposed to any compromise, when Whites had for decades oppressed the Blacks. They had instead through their slogan of “one farmer, one bullet”, encouraged people to take arms against certain elements of the white community.

³⁹¹. **The Citizen**, 14 March 1994.

³⁹². **Sowetan**, 14 March 1994.

The ANC reacted to the fall of Mangope by congratulating the Batswana for the courageous struggle against the 'brutal regime'. It further condemned the AWB and the SADF for trying to keep Mangope in power.³⁹³ In fact there is no evidence to suggest that the SADF involvement in the affair, in a sense might have supported Mangope. The temporary co-operation between the ANC and NP over the Bophuthatswana affair quickly ended once their common problem was removed. In his address to an ANC rally at UNIBO on the 13 March 1994, a day after the coup, Popo Molefe, ANC's North West Provincial Premier elect and its head of elections campaigns, attacked the South African Government for conceding to pressure from the white communities to prosecute the policeman who killed the AWB men. He demanded that he should not be prosecuted, but instead the whole matter be investigated.³⁹⁴ Although this widened the divide between the two parties, Molefe's argument was motivated by the fact that nothing was being said about those who killed the 60 black people during the same period. This was in conflict with the spirit of reconciliation. An impression would be created that the deaths of black people did not matter, and indeed, this is what happened as it is shown later in this section.

Mrs Winnie Mandela, the chairperson of the ANC Women's League, who also attended the rally at UNIBO, used the platform to attack Mangope, calling him a 'hallucinating megalomaniac Hitler'. She further pledged to lead a march to Motswedi to ensure Mangope's complete removal from the political scene.³⁹⁵ Because of the ANC's long struggle against Bophuthatswana, starting with its

³⁹³. **The Citizen**, 14 March 1994.

³⁹⁴. **The Citizen**, 14 March 1994.

³⁹⁵. **Sunday Times**, 13 March 1994.

opposition to homeland independence, the demand for free political activity and attempts to draw the territory into the Transitional process, it was not surprising to see that kind of anger and reaction. The ANC was further supported by academics such as Seiler who championed the party's case in Bophuthatswana. For those who supported Mangope, it was a time of demoralisation and fear of possible retaliation if one's political affiliation became exposed.



In justifying its intervention in Bophuthatswana, the National Party-led Government was unconvincing on its response to the questions on the legality of its actions. The Foreign Affairs Department, which through its political head, Pik Botha, lead the delegation into Bophuthatswana, referred questions posed to it by the Institute of Race Relations, to the Constitutional Development Services. Pik Botha later admitted that what happened in Bophuthatswana lacked legal basis and called it a bloodless coup, which would have not occurred if Bophuthatswana was not rendered ungovernable and the SADF had not gone in.³⁹⁶ Thus it was admitted that the action was illegal, though necessary in the circumstances.

Finally it is also important to look at the response of the people of Bophuthatswana. There was general jubilation among the people as they hoped that their conditions would improve. At the BDF headquarters, there was a sign of relief and jubilation among the Defence Guards. As one of them claimed, "that means we can now have peace." They accused those who cooperated with the Volksfront for betraying them.³⁹⁷ For the other people it was time to unleash their anger on others, especially to level old scores. For example, in some Educational

³⁹⁶. A.J.Jeferry, " Whose Bloodless Coup", p.4.

³⁹⁷. **The Citizen**, 14 March 1994.

institutions, students expelled some teachers and lecturers in their institutions. In some cases, some teachers and lecturers connived with students to expel principals and rectors thereby disrupting many Educational institutions. This even happened in parastatals and state departments.³⁹⁸ It can be argued therefore that not all people in Bophuthatswana were immediate beneficiaries of the fall of Mangope. Uncertainty about the future and fear of further intimidation and possible discrimination and marginalisation, caused panic among them and their futures remained unclear.

4. SHORT-TERM POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES

The fall of Bophuthatswana, had some almost immediate implications for the political situation in South Africa at the time. These have been alluded to in the previous section, where various responses to the fall of Bophuthatswana were discussed. The event was disastrous to the Freedom Alliance and right-wingers, whose association with Bophuthatswana had been a worrying factor. The defeat of the 'Boere People's Army' and in particular the execution of the three AWB men in Bophuthatswana created conflict within the Volksfront and ultimately led to its disintegration. The AWB, which Viljoen blamed for the military defeat, as they were undisciplined, uncooperative and whose presence alienated the BDF and BPF, was ostracised. This divided the right-wingers. Viljoen then quit the Volksfront and formed his own party, Freedom Front(FF), splitting the Conservative Party as many of its followers including some MPs such as Corne Mulder, Piet Mulder and Pieter Groenewald, joined the Freedom Front.³⁹⁹ The

³⁹⁸. I.R.Mahuma, **Interview**, 17 May 2000.

³⁹⁹. **The Weekly Mail&Guardian**, 18-24 March 1994, J.K.Cilliers, "From Pariah to Partner". P.36.

Bophuthatswana tragedy served as a wake up call to Viljoen who then shifted his focus from the militaristic option to the democratic option. It was clear that an attempt to get a Volkstaat through the military engagement was not possible and viable, but the best option was of a negotiated settlement. A negotiated Volkstaat would remain linked to South Africa constitutionally and economically. Viljoen surprised many, including his former colleagues in the Freedom Alliance, when he beat the deadline by few hours to register his party, presenting a list of 30 candidates nationally and 168 candidates for Provincial lists, which included many CP MPs.⁴⁰⁰ This shift from civil disobedience to legal participation was an applaudable victory for the democratic process. Dr Ferdi Hartzenberg became isolated as his party was reduced to a coterie of embittered old racists. With the registration of the Freedom Front, the Afrikaner resistance became institutionalised and moderate, as it was committed to follow constitutional and democratic processes to pursue its objectives.

Although Buthelezi had earlier responded to the overthrow of Mangope, he argued that “Kwazulu is not Bophuthatswana,”⁴⁰¹ and that he would fight to the bitter end to defend his territory, but he realised that resistance to elections was impossible. Despite his insistence on International Mediation, he registered for elections, possibly to avoid a repeat of the Bophuthatswana events in Kwazulu-Natal.⁴⁰² Inkatha Freedom Party gained substantial support in the elections and Buthelezi became Minister of Home Affairs in the Government of National Unity, a position he held for two consecutive terms, serving in both Mandela and Mbeki cabinets.

⁴⁰⁰. *The Weekly Mail & Guardian*, 18-24 March 1994.

⁴⁰¹. *The Citizen*, 14 March 1994.

⁴⁰². J.K.Cilliers, “From a Patriah to Partner”, p.38.

He had even acted as State President on more than one occasion, making him one of the senior ministers.

With the disintegration of the Volkstaat and Freedom Alliance, the path to free and fair elections had been cleared of obstacles, not only in Bophuthatswana but also in other areas. The possibility of disruptions and civil war in Kwazulu-Natal was greatly reduced. Even if the Conservative Party, which remained outside the election process, might continue its defiance, they would be insignificant.

The National Party's support was undoubtedly reduced, one of the reasons being that it was blamed for what happened in Bophuthatswana. Though it cannot be blamed for the whole tragedy, it failed in its conduct, as the creator and sustainer of Bophuthatswana, to prevent the situation from occurring. Due to its indecisive behaviour towards the situation in Bophuthatswana, the National Party-led South African Government, as Schrire notes, allowed the situation to take the shape it took. At that stage the reincorporation of homelands was non-negotiable and all citizens of homelands had become South African citizens on the 1 January 1994 in terms of the Interim Constitution. The failure of the South African Government to make these things clear to Mangope, continuing to shift deadlines for registration, trying to accommodate him and the Freedom Alliance, was a political blunder on the part of the National Party Government.⁴⁰³ Indeed, South Africa had protected Mangope for too long and if it could have imposed the decision on him to allow free political activity earlier, the event of March 1994 could have been avoided. Its behaviour gave Mangope a sense of self-importance and a fantasy that he could decide otherwise and that his decision could keep the people in the area

⁴⁰³ R. Schrire, "The Penalty of Wishful Thinking," **Financial Mail**, 18 March 1994.

out of 'Greater' South Africa. This also served to sustain the morale and illusions of the Freedom Alliance that it could win against the democratic process.

From the reactions to the public execution of the three AWB men by a black Bophuthatswana policeman, emerged two interesting points. The fantasy of the Batswana/Afrikaner peaceful coexistence and shared values, which were projected during the SATSWA initiative, was refuted. Further cooperation between the two groups was dealt a blow. The demand by members of white community for the prosecution of the policeman who killed the AWB men, raised racial tensions. To many black people their killing was part of the political violence, which had engulfed the country(SA) over the years, resulting in thousands of black people dying, many in awful circumstances.⁴⁰⁴ Indeed, when their killing is compared to the senseless shooting of innocent black people by Barend Strydom in Pretoria, the assassination of Chris Hani in April 1993 and the 60 black people killed in the same crisis as these three men, it does not warrant special significance.

The fact that Sergeant Segoba Nare was brought to court, wrongfully so, to face murder charges, and no one was charged for the killing of the 60 blacks, exposes the racist content of the demand for prosecution. It was further aggravated by Terre'blanche's statement when he, showed no remorse during a TV programme(Agenda). According to him, the AWB was victorious during the killings as it lost only three members when the other camp lost 60, referring to the innocent people killed in the Mmabatho/Mafikeng area. Racial tension was highly fuelled especially in areas such as Ventersdorp, the stronghold of the AWB and the home of their leader. There were fears that the right-wingers, most of whom were farmers

⁴⁰⁴. R. Schrire, "The Penalty of Wishful Thinking," **Financial Mail**, 18 March 1994.

would unleash their anger on the farm workers to avenge the death of their members. Despite a few incidents of individual attacks on farm workers by farm owners, the situation was not as ugly as had been suspected.

5. CONCLUSION

This chapter has shown that the fall of Bophuthatswana was caused primarily by the attitude and behaviour of the Bophuthatswana Government towards the democratic processes in South Africa as a whole, which were leading to the dismantling of Apartheid and the creation of a new united South African state. The Bophuthatswana Government did not only refuse to participate in the elections, but it even attempted to make it difficult for those who wanted to vote, to do so. Mangope's attitude was motivated by the ambition to hold on to the assets Bophuthatswana had built in its 17 years of independence. He was also motivated by the manipulative conduct of the Afrikaners such as Ferdi Hartzenberg, who wanted to use him to reach their objectives of a Volkstaat. The event, though painful and at a price, became a turning point in the history of the territory, as it paved the way for free political activity and free and fair elections. Bophuthatswana was the only region in the country where force was used to ensure the path to political compromise.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION

1. INTRODUCTION

From 12 March 1994 to 31 May 1994, it was a period of Interim Administration by the Joint Administrators in Bophuthatswana. Although it was initially intended to run up to the 27 April 1994 elections, which led to the establishment of the new government, it was extended up to the end of May 1994 to give the then new administration a chance to find its feet. This chapter seeks to examine the Interim Administration, its challenges and achievements.

2. THE APPOINTMENT OF THE JOINT ADMINISTRATORS

The removal of Mangope from presidency and the dissolution of both his cabinet and parliament, created a power vacuum, which could not be left unattended even for an hour, as it could have led to lawlessness and more loss of life in the territory. To avoid this, Mr F.W. de Klerk (the South African President) appointed Prof. Tjaart van der Walt as an interim Administrator of the area until the 27 April 1994 elections. This was done on the same day Mangope was overthrown, the 12 March 1994.⁴⁰⁵ This appointment was met with a strong reaction from the ANC and other Anti-Mangope groups. As alleged by Seiler, the appointment was a unilateral decision by the South African Government, without consulting with its coup allies,

⁴⁰⁵. T. Van der Walt, *Interview*, 23 April 2001; J. Seiler, "Transforming Mangope's Bophuthatswana."

coup allies, ANC and TEC.⁴⁰⁶ This can be interpreted as an attempt to put mechanisms in place, which would ensure that the National Party got a bigger share of the contested support in the territory. It would place the National Party in a strategic position, as it controlled the army of occupation which had been in Bophuthatswana since the invasion of the 11 March 1994. It would be also in charge of the setting up of the polling stations and thus have more representation in the Independent Electoral Commission(IEC). Considering that it was at a crucial stage of preparations for elections, with the race for political supremacy hotting up, the ANC could not allow this to happen and the issue caused conflict between the two parties. ANC branches in the homeland launched a vigorous objection to this appointment, claiming that they wanted more Blacks(referring to the ANC members) to be drawn into the running of the interim administration. A regional organiser was quoted as saying, “we need to neutralise the Whites.”⁴⁰⁷ Their dissatisfaction could not be ignored as the credibility of the office of the interim Administrator would be questioned, and the situation could develop into further chaos and acts of defiance from ANC supporters and sympathisers.

The Azanian Students Convention(AZASCO) at UNIBO was also angered by the appointment, labelling van der Walt as “White, a Broederbond and Mangope’s right-hand-man.”⁴⁰⁸ To show their anger, on the 14 March 1994, about 20 AZASCO members tried to disrupt a meeting between van der Walt and the striking civil servants at the Mmabatho Civic Centre.⁴⁰⁹ They were supported by

⁴⁰⁶. J. Seiler, “Transforming Mangope’s Bophuthatswana.”

⁴⁰⁷. **The Citizen**, 15 March 1994.

⁴⁰⁸. **The Citizen**, 15 March 1994.

⁴⁰⁹. **Sowetan**, 15 March 1994.

their mother body, AZAPO, which contended that “it was unfortunate that after such a brave and gallant fight our people are still stuck with Mangope’s ally and friend, the South African ambassador(Dr Tjaart van der Walt).”⁴¹⁰ In response to these reactions and as an attempt to allay the fears of people about National Party’s influence, on the 14 March 1994, the TEC appointed Mr Job Mokgoro as a Joint Administrator. Mokgoro was working at the Development Bank of Southern Africa(DBSA), and was a leading ANC activist, who at one stage chaired the ANC Mafikeng branch. He was also a former UNIBO employee and allegedly left the post when he was sought by the Bophuthatswana police during its onslaught on the ANC members in the homeland. The appointment of Mokgoro reduced fears that van der Walt would continue Mangope’s rule in a different guise. According to Cyril Ramaphosa, after extensive consultation with the ANC branches in the homeland, the branches were satisfied with the appointment of the Joint Administrators.⁴¹¹ However these incidents indicated the amount of work the Joint Administrators would face in settling affairs in the former Bophuthatswana.

The strongest opposition came from the ousted president, Lucas Mangope, who took the Administrators to court, demanding that their appointments be declared null and void. He wanted them to be replaced by an interim council consisting of seven members as follows:

- the Chief Justice of the Republic of Bophuthatswana or a Judge of Bophuthatswana appointed by him(Chief Justice), who would act as the chairperson of the council.

⁴¹⁰. **The Citizen**, 15 March 1994.

⁴¹¹. **The Star**, 15 March 1994.

- Three members appointed by the ex-President of Bophuthatswana(Mangope himself).
- Three members appointed by the Government of South Africa.⁴¹²

On the 18 April 1994, Mangope's application was dismissed by Judge Robert Comry in the Supreme Court of Bophuthatswana, who declared that the appointment of the Joint Administrators and the suspension of the constitution of Bophuthatswana or part of it, were lawful.⁴¹³ As stated earlier, Mangope had on the advice of his legal team, on the 10 April 1994, agreed to drop the case after it was postponed on the 13 April 1994.

3. CHALLENGES CONFRONTING THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION

One of the biggest challenges facing the Joint Administrators was to find a legal basis for their appointment. Indeed, despite the wonderful explanations discussed earlier, it lacked legal basis. Another problem was their incompatibility in political terms. Seiler gave them very little chance of working together, stating that the two did not get on well during their tenure at UNIBO. Prof. Van der Walt as the Chancellor, failed to use his symbolic leverage to assist to halt the erosion of the limited Academic freedom and democracy at the University. On the other hand Mokgoro, as employee of Unibo was in the forefront in defending the autonomy of the institution.⁴¹⁴ The major task of the Joint Administrators was to enhance

⁴¹². Republic of South Africa, "Mangope v van der Walt and Another", p.852.

⁴¹³. **The Star**, 19 April 1994; Tebbutt Commission, "The Report, Annexure E," p.4; Supreme Court of Bophuthatswana, Lucas Manyane Mangope v Tjaart van der Walt and Job Mokgoro, Case no. M79/94, Judgement, 18 April 1994, p.1.

⁴¹⁴. J. Seiler, "Mangope's Bop is dead, long live new Bop," **The Star**, 24 March 1994.

good governance, ensure protection of life and property, and in particular to create the conditions for a climate for free political activity.⁴¹⁵ In execution of their duties, they acted in consultation with the State President of the Republic of South Africa and the Management Committee of the TEC.

On the 16 March 1994, the Joint Administrators passed the Administration of Bophuthatswana Decree no.1 of 1994 in order to justify their appointment and provide a legal framework for the administration of Bophuthatswana. It outlined the scope of their powers, duties and functions, the suspension of certain provisions of the Bophuthatswana constitution, the continuation of some of the existing laws, state departments and administration of laws and law-making powers of the Joint Administrators.⁴¹⁶ Through this decree, Bophuthatswana was effectively handed over to the Joint Administrators to administer on behalf of the South African Government and TEC. Their decisions would always need the blessing of the President and TEC; serious changes would first be ratified by them before implementation. However, the expected supervision was never visible. The Joint Administrators took over the responsibility of legal matters applicable to the former President, the executive council or cabinet and parliament, with powers to make laws for peace, order and good governance, and to amend, substitute or repeal certain laws. This was done through a number of decrees, derived mainly from the Administration of Bophuthatswana Decree no.1 of 1994, to deal with specific problems and specific sections of the constitution. In all they passed 13 decrees in their tenure as Joint Administrators. Administering the region through

⁴¹⁵. Joint Administrators, "Report to the North West Legislature(NWL), South African Government(SA) and the Transitional Executive Council(TEC)", June 1994; T. Van der Walt, **Interview**, 23 April 2001.

⁴¹⁶. Joint Administrators, **The Administration of Bophuthatswana Decree**, no.1 of 1994, p.2; **Business Day**, 17 March 1994.

decrees, and suspending the constitution, is tantamount to declaring a state of emergency, which under normal circumstances occurs under military threat. This, coupled with the continued occupation of the territory by the SADF, meant that the territory was placed under virtual siege. However, it did ensure that resistance to the rule of the Administrators would be easily contained and stamped out.

Derived from their broad mandate of enhancing good governance and creating a climate for free political activity, the Joint Administrators's priorities were:

- to restore normality in the area
- to restore essential services, e.g. reopening of schools and hospitals
- to ensure that civil servants return to work
- to facilitate the work of TEC, IEC and the Independent Media Commission.⁴¹⁷

These issues form the basis for an assessment of the performance of the Interim Administration.

Taking into cognisance the circumstances in the territory at that time, namely the striking civil servants who continued to voice their demands despite the fall of the Bophuthatswana Government, the threat of violence and possible rioting, the uncertainty among the general populace, and games of opportunism by political parties and some individuals, the task ahead of the Administrators seemed to be a mission impossible. As a result of the vacuum created by the ousting of the entire cabinet of the previous government, their first weeks in office were characterised by crisis management. Impelled by a sense of urgency, they established the Council for Administration to administer and co-ordinate the functions of various state

⁴¹⁷. **The Star**, 15 March 1994; R. Schrire, "Penalty of Wishful Thinking" **Financial Mail**, 18 March 1994.

departments, parastatal bodies and other functions of state. The council consisted of nine councillors responsible for various sectors. It was chaired by Mr J.W.M. van der Westhuizen from the Development Bank of Southern Africa(DBSA).⁴¹⁸

Other councillors were:

Councillor

Administrative Cluster

Mr M. Lawrence

Human Resources Development

- Education

- Manpower

- Youth Affairs

Mr J. Matlhare

Social Development

- Health & Social Welfare Services

- Population Development

Admiral Bert Bekker

Finance & Economic Affairs

- Finance

- Economic, Energy Affairs &

Mining

Dr A. M. Karodia

Resources

- Agriculture & Natural Resources

- Water Affairs

Mr J.J. Tlholoe

Communications

- Transport

- Public Works

- Posts & Telecommunications

- Civil Affairs

- Housing

⁴¹⁸. Joint Administrators, "Report to NWL,SA and the TEC,"p.3.

Mr S.L. Tire

Relational Affairs

- Internal Affairs
- Foreign Affairs

Brig. M.L. Sekame

Stability

- Justice
- Police
- Prisons
- Defence

Mr J.W.M.van der Westhuizen

Public Administration

(assisted by Mr D.C. Modungwa)

- Public Service Commission
- Public Service Training
- Traditional Authority
- Local Government.⁴¹⁹

There is no evidence of the criteria used to appoint these councillors. Even Seiler's claim that the Joint Administrators drew their staff from UNIBO and the Bophuthatswana Government departments,⁴²⁰ is incorrect. Admiral Bekker, a Councillor for Finance and Economic Affairs, for example, had never worked in any of the institutions, but was from the South African Government. The same can be said about van der Westhuizen from DBSA, a former colleague of Job Mokgoro. This creates a suspicion that the councillors were selected on the basis of their relations with the Joint Administrators or their standing in the ANC and NP and or their attitude towards Mangope.

⁴¹⁹.Joint Administrators, " Second Report to the Management Committee of the TEC, 10 April 1994,Annexure B.

⁴²⁰. J. Seiler, "Transforming Mangope's Bophuthatswana."

The establishment of the administrative council in itself was not enough to carry out the Administrators mandate, as each Councillor was in charge of a cluster of departments. The former 23 departments were grouped into nine clusters, putting an enormous load on individual Councillors. This was made even worse by the fact that the departments were operating without Secretaries following their suspension or imposed leave since the 24 April 1994 due to pressure from the Crisis Committees, which demanded their dismissal, labelling them 'Mangope loyalists'. To ensure that the state departments continued to function and provide the expected service, on the 26 March 1994, Acting Secretaries were appointed to each department.⁴²¹ The Joint Administrators, according to van der Walt, actually confirmed the acting capacity of these Acting Secretaries and transferred accountability, as the Acting Secretaries were nominated by their departments.⁴²² The appointed Acting Secretaries were as follows:

Department	Acting Secretary
Education	Mr I.K. Motsilenyane
Youth Affairs & Sports	Mr N.J. Sechele
Internal Affairs	Mr S.I. Tire
Public Service Commission	Mr M.T. Mmileng
Local Govt. & Housing	Mr M.A. Tekete
Manpower	Mr M.E. Mogwatlhe
Health & Social Services	Mr H.M. Ramongale
Justice	Mr PB Monareng
Agric. & Natural Resources	Mr R.F.G. Collinson

⁴²¹. Joint Administrators, "Second Report", pp.1-2.

⁴²². T. Van der Walt, *Interview*, 23 April 2001.

Auditor-General	Mr M. Kgori
Posts & Telecommunications	Mr A. Letlape
Finance	Mr Gopane
Transport	Mr M.J. Pelle
Public Service Training	Mr M.T. Mmileng
Water Affairs	Mr T. Hartman
State Affairs & Aviation	Mr J. Moeletsi
Population Development	Mr R.S. Morake
Public Works	Mr J.J. Tlholoe
Presidency	Mr M.D. Moseki
Economic, Energy Affairs, Mines & Planning	Mr N.M. Tlhale
Foreign Affairs	Mr S.K. Gopane
Defence	Brig. J. Jordan
Prisons	Lt.Col. K.P. Mphapele
Police	Brig. M.L. Sekame. ⁴²³

Three of these Acting Secretaries, Tlholoe, Tire and Sekame also served in the Administrative Council, thus doubling their roles. The nature of the appointment of the Acting Secretaries later became a constraint in the execution of their duties. Having been nominated by their colleagues and most importantly through the support of the self-labelled Crisis Committees, their loyalty and commitment were always divided between the Administrative Council's demand for performance and the protection of the interests of their constituencies (colleagues). Some of them, instead of doing their work, appeared to concentrate on building power bases and good relations with politicians to enhance their chances for future appointments.⁴²⁴

⁴²³. Joint Administrators, "Second Report, Annexure A".

⁴²⁴. For more details see Chapter Seven.

Dealing with administrative sections of government especially, senior officials of the Bophuthatswana Government, was a serious challenge for the Joint Administrators. Although there were many cases which they dealt with, this work only singles out three groups, namely the Security personnel, the Secretaries and the District Governors. These were key personnel in the category of public servants in Bophuthatswana and had become a “hot potato” for the Administrators to handle. To restore order or stability, the key role players were the security personnel, but unfortunately the loyalty of the Bophuthatswana security and Police Intelligence Services was doubted.

The division which developed during the crisis, aggravated by the continued occupation of the territory by the SADF and rumours that the members of the BPF had been disarmed, suggested that the members of the former Bophuthatswana Forces were dissatisfied. The situation, as stated by van der Walt, created an impression on the Transitional Government that there was a possibility of a reverse coup.⁴²⁵ When the situation was reported to the TEC, it contemplated setting up a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the relationship between Bophuthatswana Defence Force, Police Intelligence Services, Government institutions and Afrikaner Volksfront. This commission would go further to investigate whether they had any link with Mangope’s efforts to reassert his authority over the area and his attempts to undermine the authority of the Administrators.⁴²⁶ This atmosphere instilled fear among members of Bophuthatswana security forces, and alienated them, as some of them later took Voluntary Severance Packages and left the government service.

⁴²⁵. T. Van der Walt, **Interview**, 23 April 2001.

⁴²⁶. **Business Day**, 30 March 1994.

To deal with the issue internally, the Joint Administrators launched a quick restructuring of the security forces. The generals in command of both the Bophuthatswana Defence and Police Forces were placed on compulsory leave while their fate was being decided. While on leave, Seiler argues, they were removed and Defence Force was placed under the direct command of the SADF.⁴²⁷ While the SADF remained in charge in Bophuthatswana, members of the BDF were sent to De Brug training camp near Bloemfontein.⁴²⁸ Although this was explained as part of the National Peace Keeping Force(NPKF) initiative, the real motive was more likely to have been an attempt to defuse any chance of conspiracies.



The restructuring of the Police Force provided Brigadier M.L. Sekame, who was dismissed from his post as Deputy-Commissioner following the 1988 coup attempt, with an opportunity to make a comeback. He replaced his former boss, General P.J. Seleke, chief of the Bophuthatswana Police Force, as Acting Commissioner.⁴²⁹ Seleke was retired while on leave. The senior officers of the Police Intelligence were also given leave.⁴³⁰ The integration of the Bophuthatswana Police into the South African Police(SAP) was done as a matter of urgency, even before the formation of the then proposed South African Police Services(SAPS). This was a pretext to bring in the members of the South African Police into Bophuthatswana. Given the circumstances immediately before the elections, it was very important to step up security to deal with the intimidation prevailing at that time.

⁴²⁷. J. Seiler, "Transforming Mangope's Bophuthatswana".

⁴²⁸. **Business Day**, 30 March 1994.

⁴²⁹. **The Citizen**, 25 March 1994; T. Van der Walt, **Interview**, 23 April 2001.

⁴³⁰. J. Seiler, "Transforming Mangope's Bophuthatswana."

As stated earlier, the Crisis Committees had among other things demanded the sacking of the 23 departmental secretaries. This was a difficult task to solve for the Joint Administrators as Secretaries were public servants and not political appointees or elected officials. Unlike the Parliamentarians who were simply retired and given their pension funds, the Secretaries were protected by the Public Service Act and the TEC commitment that no public servant would be dismissed. Working under pressure from the Crisis Committees that Secretaries were 'Mangope loyalists' and had to go, the Joint Administrators reached an agreement with Secretaries to go on leave while other options were being explored. Indeed on the 24 March 1994, Secretaries went on indefinite leave.⁴³¹ Although the Joint Administrators wanted to keep them because of their experience, the situation at that time was violent. In order to avoid making them victims of that situation, negotiations were held with them to take early retirement.⁴³² After prolonged negotiations, the Secretaries agreed to take retirement packages and to leave public service. Although Seiler states that they were bought out at a cost of R16 million in all,⁴³³ the exact amount remains a secret as there were rumours that they were offered modest packages of R2, 5 million each. Unfortunately even van der Walt could not confirm or deny these figures. It is understandable as this process was not completed during his term of office, but was only finalised by the new Provincial Government.

⁴³¹. J. Seiler, "Transforming Mangope's Bophuthatswana"; T. Van der Walt, Interview, 23 April 2001; Joint Administrators, "Report to the NWL, SA and the TEC", p.2.

⁴³². T. Van der Walt, **Interview**, 23 April 2001.

⁴³³. J. Seiler, "Transforming Mangope's Bophuthatswana".

The next group targeted by the Crisis Committees was the District Governors. The Crisis Committees referred to them as Mangope's political appointees, essentially for political control of the districts or regions. As in the case of the Secretaries, the Joint Administrators found it difficult to dismiss Governors outrightly as they were also appointed under the Public Service Act. They also enjoyed the protection of the Act and the TEC. It was not possible to allow all the governors to enjoy this protection as some of them were appointed after resigning from the public service. This would have caused problems. To deal with this issue in a fair and transparent manner, the Administrators separated the issue of the potential utility of the office of governor from the issue of the individual governors.⁴³⁴ This gave the Transitional Administration an opportunity to assess the real concern, whether the problem was with the office or the incumbents. With regard to the office of governor, the Administrators concluded that in case of a decentralised form of governance in the Province, such an office might play an important role in service delivery. It could form a link between the Provincial Government and regions and finally the local structures of government. They therefore recommended to the North West Provincial Government to retain the system of governors and spread it throughout the Province.⁴³⁵

On the issue of the individual governors, the Administrators tried as much as possible to avoid lawsuits against the state. It therefore classified the governors (with the exception Mr R.R.Masis of Thaba Nchu) into three categories:

⁴³⁴. J. Seiler, "Transforming Mangope's Bophuthatswana"; T. Van der Walt, **Interview**, 23 April 2001.

⁴³⁵. Joint Administrators, "Report to the NWL, SA and the TEC," p.3.

- Governors who resigned from the public service before being appointed as Governors. They were seven in number and their services were terminated on the 30 April 1994. They were offered modest severance packages.
- Governors who did not resign from the public service before being appointed as Governors. They were five in number and they were absorbed into the public service. Unfortunately they were later forced into early retirement by the new Provincial Government (see chapter seven).
- Governors who qualified for retirement. Only one person opted for retirement.⁴³⁶

The assistant governors were appointed as district co-ordinators in the absence of governors. It could be argued that although these officials were regarded as public servants, their image had been tarnished by their association with Mangope and his political party. They were always in Mangope's company during the CDP rallies, even wearing its uniform. Being in such a position was difficult to distinguish between the President in his capacity as head of state and his capacity as head or president of the political party. This was not the mistake of their own making as this problem exists everywhere and has become a universal phenomenon.

The Joint Administrators had also to deal with a number of claims and complaints of unfair dismissals by the Bophuthatswana Government. Most of the claimants stated that they were dismissed because of their association with the ANC. This may have been genuine, but in some cases at least it was opportunistic, and included people who had resigned or were trying to avoid charges of misconduct

⁴³⁶. Joint Administrators, "Report to the NWL, SA and the TEC," pp.2-3; E.B. Pule, **Interview**, 19 May 2000; I.R. Mahuma, **Interview**, 17 May 2000.

or incompetence.⁴³⁷ Among the claimants were the soldiers who had been imprisoned and later dismissed for taking part in the failed 1988 coup, and were now demanding re-instatement.⁴³⁸ To ensure fairness and that a permanent solution was found for these problems, a Commission of Inquiry, headed by Adv. J.J. Chulu, was appointed to investigate the magnitude of alleged cases of unfair dismissals by the previous regime. Though by the time the term of office of the Joint Administrators expired, the Commission was still busy with its investigations, the Administrators made recommendations to the incoming Provincial Government on how best the issue could be addressed. They recommended that in cases of unfair dismissals, re-employment rather than reinstatement be considered.⁴³⁹ It is understandable that the conditions accompanying reinstatement could have been extremely costly to the Provincial Government. For example, one of these conditions was that the government was to pay the officials income and benefits lost as a result of the dismissal. In case of re-employment, there was no obligation on the state to compensate the victim and in most cases the victim took consolation in getting his or her job back. Those who wanted compensation for the lost income, might take the option of legal recourse. Many would have been discouraged to pursue this option as it would cost considerable legal fees.

The Joint Administrators were also confronted with the issue of the use of contract employees and private companies to run government programmes. One such contract was between the Belvoir Park Hotel and Restaurant Training Institute in

⁴³⁷. T. Van der Walt, *Interview*, 2001.

⁴³⁸. *Sowetan*, 6 May 1994.

⁴³⁹. Joint Administrators, "Report to the NWL,SA and the TEC," pp.7-8.

Mmabatho and a Swiss Institute for hotel management. Some contracts were those of foreign doctors such as the Latvian doctors, expatriate teachers and special advisors in state departments. To make the work of the Administrators easier, some individuals requested their contracts to be terminated at a relatively low cost.⁴⁴⁰ It is understandable that the conditions were no longer conducive for these foreign people to continue with their work in the area, especially as the government which brought them in the country, was no longer in power. With regard to other contracts, a policy guideline was drawn stating that all existing contracts were to be scrutinized and might be honoured or renewed only after it was established that there was no local expertise relevant to that job market. As Administrators could not deal with all the contracts due to the expiry of their term of office, they recommended that all contracts entered into by the previous government be systematically scrutinized, not merely from a legal and moral point of view, but also with regard to the re-evaluation of priorities of the new dispensation.⁴⁴¹ It meant that even contracts which were entered into procedurally, and had been legally sound, could be terminated at the discretion of the new government. As it emerged later, the government terminated contracts of some foreigners to make room for others from the government's preferred countries. The Latvian doctors were told to leave while the Cuban doctors were now welcomed. How this is explained, remains the prerogative of the ruling party.

The restoration of a culture of learning and teaching in the territory was one of the priorities of the Interim Administration. Although Bophuthatswana was known for its good results in education, which was attributed to its stability in educational

⁴⁴⁰. Joint Administrators, "Report to the NWL, SA and the TEC," pp.3-4.

⁴⁴¹. Joint Administrators, "Report to the NWL, SA and the TEC," p.4; T. Van der Walt, **Interview**, 23 April 2001.

institutions, the crisis had negatively affected that situation. In fact the Higher Education sector had not been stable since mid-1993 as discussed in Chapter Three. This had led to widespread intimidation of staff and some students by other students and Crisis Committees. The crisis left education in total disarray. Many school principals and college rectors were not welcomed in their institutions, leaving most institutions without top management structures, and virtually ungovernable.

The University became the priority list for educational restructuring. Given the long history of confrontation between UNIBO and the Bophuthatswana Government, and the erosion of its autonomy, as stated in Chapter Three, its problems needed urgent attention. Although lectures were resumed after the crisis, the position of the University council, especially its composition, remained a major concern. The problem was that there were at least nine government appointees on the council. The state therefore had too much control over the University, which enabled it to close it any time it pleased. Many of the government appointees resigned immediately after the fall of government, reasoning that the government which appointed them was no longer in power.⁴⁴² This prompted the Interim Administration to issue a decree to amend section 9 of the University Act (Act no 13 of 1988), especially the clause which entitled the government to have more representation on the council. In terms of Decree no.13 of 1994, the section was amended to enable the Joint Administrators to appoint an Interim Council. Accordingly, membership of all government appointees was terminated. An Interim council was appointed as an attempt to restore effective control,

⁴⁴². Joint Administrators, "Report to the NWL, SA and the TEC," p.4.

governance and executive authority of the University.⁴⁴³ This was done despite the fact that Higher Education, in terms of the new dispensation, was the responsibility of the National Government. However this was in the interest of the institution, especially as the transformation process needed to be instituted. Although there were hopes that the measures taken by the Interim Administration, would normalise the situation at the University, according to Lawrence, stability was never accomplished and standards continued to drop.⁴⁴⁴ The situation was aggravated by the fact that staff started to exploit the situation, taking advantage of the temporary nature of the Interim council and management, to make unreasonable demands. On the 5 May 1994, for example, about 400 administrative staff members marched to Garona, waving placards written “ we do not want Camrys but Benzes and lot of money”, demanding parity with white Universities.⁴⁴⁵ These issues however were subject to the restructuring of Higher Education.

The situation at the colleges of education and many schools was disheartening as it continued to be uncontrollable. The authority of school management was shaken and some teachers and students took advantage of the crisis to start pursuing their own agendas. The South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU), which had operated in South Africa from 1990, for example, launched recruitment campaigns, thus disrupting even those schools trying to return to normality. Unlike the University, which is situated in the capital, colleges and schools were scattered throughout the territory. There was nothing the Joint Administrators could do

⁴⁴³. Joint Administrators, “Report to the NWL, SA and the TEC”, pp.4-5.

⁴⁴⁴. M. Lawrence, **Interview**, 31 May 2000.

⁴⁴⁵. **Sowetan**, 6 May 1994.

except to plead with those involved to exert more effort to normalise the situation. The situation persisted even after the establishment of the new Provincial Government. One major constraint in the situation was the preparation for elections. It was difficult to return schools to normality after the March crisis, as political parties were engaged in vigorous campaigns for votes. The fact that political parties were, before the 12 March 1994, prevented to canvass the electorate in Bophuthatswana, put them under pressure to move faster and institutions such as High Schools and colleges became the targets for their votes. The politicians were not concerned with learning but were pushing their agendas at all costs, impeding learning. This situation led to the closure of schools in the territory long before the holidays declared for the purposes of elections.

With the fall of the Mangope Government emerged an immediate frantic drive by junior employees in the parastatals and statutory bodies to remove from office both the senior officials and Board of Directors. Most of the senior officers and Board members were appointed by the government and for that reason they were not welcomed. This posed a serious challenge to the Joint Administrators. There was a concern that there were too many parastatals in Bophuthatswana and according to van der Walt, they were creating expensive executives who turned into 'fat cats', costing taxpayers a fortune.⁴⁴⁶ Although privatisation is sometimes important for economic growth, it was unnecessarily exaggerated in Bophuthatswana. These raised questions of whether these parastatals had to continue to be independent of government departments or be absorbed into them.⁴⁴⁷ Sefalana Employee Benefit Organisation(SEBO), which managed the pension funds in Bophuthatswana and

⁴⁴⁶. T. Van der Walt, **Interview**, 23 April 2001.

⁴⁴⁷. J. Seiler, "Transforming Mangope's Bophuthatswana"

the Bophuthatswana National Development Corporations(BNDC), which was responsible for industrial development, were two parastatals which raised major concerns, that needed urgent attention.

One of the main causes of the Bophuthatswana crisis was concern over the pensions, as people demanded that they be paid out (their contribution and government contribution) before reincorporation. As stated earlier, public servants were aware that in homelands such as Venda, pension payouts were already made. They were not prepared to accept any explanation indicating the impossibility of paying out pensions before resignation. Apart from the pension payouts in other homelands, there were suspicions that SEBO was insolvent following the failure of the Bophuthatswana Government to make the investigation findings of the financial affairs of SEBO and that of its Managing Director, Paul Stone, public. This prompted the Joint Administrators to appoint another investigation team to investigate the financial standing of SEBO.⁴⁴⁸ With regard to management, the old management was replaced by new management. While awaiting the outcome of the investigation, the Joint Administrators issued a press statement on the 7 April 1994, informing the public about the steps taken to ensure that their benefits were safe. They assured people that there was no way they could lose benefits as they were guaranteed by Government. Even if assets had been depleted, the Government would still pay them.⁴⁴⁹ Although this assurance helped to ease tensions, the error made by the Joint Administrators was that they responded to the issue of pension payouts in the same manner as Mangope; by repeating that it was

⁴⁴⁸. J. Seiler, "Transforming Mangope,s Bophuthatswana"; T. Van der Walt, **Interview**, 23 April 2001.

⁴⁴⁹. Joint Administrators, "Press Statement: Administrators' Reassurance on Bop Pensions", 7 April 1994.

illegal and not possible to pay out pensions before a member resigned. Those who did want to resign, would only receive their contributions without the Government contribution.⁴⁵⁰ This caused a conflict between the Administrators and public servants. Although there was no option other than telling the truth, public servants felt undermined by being given the same answer they had rejected long before the fall of the Mangope Government, and it was a known fact that it was a source of conflict against the Government.

As a result of the Press statement regarding pension payouts, the civil servants threatened to boycott the elections, if their demands were not met before the 27 April 1994. Their call was supported by AZAPO, whose Central Transvaal Region encouraged people to focus on resolution of their genuine grievances rather than the incoming elections. This caused panic throughout the territory, persuading the ANC/SACP/COSATU Alliance to go all out to plead with its supporters to ignore the call to boycott the elections.⁴⁵¹ In their efforts to handle this issue, the Administrators had under-estimated the seriousness of the people's concern and the emotional stress caused by this issue. This alienated many employees of the former Bophuthatswana as they started to believe that their grievances were considered less important than elections. For instance, in one of the meetings at Odi, held to address this issue, the crowd became impatient and got out of control.⁴⁵² They were angered by the way Mokgoro treated their problems, especially his insistence that no pension pay out would be made and his continued emphasis on the importance of voting on the 27 April 1994. Mokgoro had to flee

⁴⁵⁰. Joint Administrators, "Press Statement".

⁴⁵¹. **Business Day**, 14 April 1994.

⁴⁵². **Business Day**, 14 April 1994.

the meeting under a police escort when the mob attacked him, demanding that he pay their pensions the following day (14 April 1994).⁴⁵³ It was definitely naive to believe that the people's demands would fade away with the fall of Mangope. They were concerned about their future and their assets more than the Administrators thought. It became clear that free political activity was not the only concern, but there were more material issues at stake.

The continued strikes by the office-based and general workers, who despite being not professionals, were part of the civil service, posed a challenge to the Joint Administrators. Although the assurance by the Transitional Administration, and later Mandela during his visit to Mmabatho, that pensions were safe and jobs were guaranteed, had helped to normalise the situation, workers remained divided on the exact day on which they had to return to work. Those around Mmabatho returned to work on the 17 March 1994, while those around Odi and Moretele vowed not to return to work until there was a definite day on which their pensions would be paid out. They demanded a commitment from the government to pay out their pensions before the 15 April 1994.⁴⁵⁴ After a series of meetings with different workers' representatives, even though some of these were chaotic, they managed to persuade all civil servants and employees of parastatals to return to work.⁴⁵⁵ This was indeed a remarkable achievement in the circumstances. The Joint Administrators went even beyond their mandate by initiating a process of restructuring the civil service. Indeed it was not ideal to restore the civil service to its previous status when it was left with few weeks before the integration of the

⁴⁵³. **Business Day** 14 April 1994; **The Citizen**, 14 April 1994; J. Seiler, "Transforming Mangope's Bophuthatswana".

⁴⁵⁴. **The Citizen**, 18 March 1994; **Sowetan**, 18 March 1994.

⁴⁵⁵. T. Van der Walt, **Interview**, 23 April 1994.

Transvaal Provincial Administration(TPA) and the Cape Provincial Administration (CPA), which were operating in the areas designated to be part of the North West Province. They therefore started to integrate all the different administrations into what was to be the North West Provincial public service.⁴⁵⁶

The problems of the Bophuthatswana National Development Corporation(BNDC) were even more political in nature than those surrounding SEBO. Perhaps it was because one of the Senior General Managers(SGMs) was the deposed president's son, Eddie Mangope, who was in charge of the Small Business Division(SBD). Eddie, who was also the chairperson of the Bophuthatswana Broadcasting Corporation(BBC) Board had been the main target of the BNDC rioting workers since the eruption of the crisis in Bophuthatswana. Following his release from the hostage drama at the BBC on the 10 March 1994, the Managing Director of BNDC, Mr J.A.J. Maree, advised him not to come to work, fearing for his safety.⁴⁵⁷ On the 14 March 1994, in an attempt to get their grievances addressed, the Staff Representative Committee or Crisis Committee of BNDC approached the Joint Administrators, demanding the dismissal of the senior management and the institution of a commission of enquiry into the affairs of BNDC.⁴⁵⁸ In response to this demand the Joint Administrators, did not attempt to verify the allegations made by the Staff Representative Committee. Neither did they give the said officials a hearing. On the 21 March 1994, they suspended all the Senior General

⁴⁵⁶. Joint Administrators, "Report to the NWL, SA and the TEC", p.9.

⁴⁵⁷. H.J. de Vos & L.C.J. Maree, " Submissions to the Bophuthatswana National Development Corporation LTD(BNDC) Commission of Enquiry", p.27.

⁴⁵⁸. H.J. de Vos & L.J.C. Maree, " Submissions to the BNDC Commission of Enquiry", p.28.

Managers and the Managing Director, pending an investigation into alleged corruption and mismanagement.⁴⁵⁹ This threw the corporation in total disarray.

The suspended officials threatened to challenge their suspension in court. This forced the Joint Administrators to opt for out of court settlement in an attempt to avoid costs and embarrassment. The suspension was lifted on the 25 March 1994.⁴⁶⁰ The lifting of the suspension did not solve BNDC's problems as the suspension has done serious damage. It led the staff to believe that they had the sympathy of the Administrators and could get their way on any issue. After this suspension, Eddie was never welcomed by workers at BNDC. The Joint Administrators also appointed the Khumalo Commission on the 29 March 1994, to investigate the financial and general affairs of BNDC. The commission was headed by Judge J.A.M. Khumalo.⁴⁶¹

To deal with a host of other complaints and allegations, further commissions were also instituted, the main one being the Skweyiya commission. This commission, which composed of an Attorney and auditors, was chaired by Mr Lewis Skweyiya, Senior Counsel(SC), and was tasked to investigate the alleged personal and organisational corruption of the Mangope regime.⁴⁶² Although it was appointed by the Joint Administrators, it only started with its investigations in August after the

⁴⁵⁹. **Business Day**, 30 March 1994.

⁴⁶⁰. Joint Administrators, "Report to the NWL, SA and the TEC", p. 14.

⁴⁶¹. **Business Day**, 30 March 1994; Joint Administrators, "Report to the NWL, SA and the TEC", p. 7; H.J. de Vos & L.C.J. Maree, "Submissions to the BNDC Commission of Enquiry", p.30; also see Chapter Seven for more details.

⁴⁶². J. Seiler, "Transforming Mangope's Bophuthatswana".

expiry of their term of office. It went on to unmask a lot of corruption.⁴⁶³

It was a known fact that the position of *dikgosi* was almost tied to that of Mangope, as self-imposed *kgosikgolo*(paramount) of the Batswana of Bophuthatswana. It can be argued that this position equalled him to the Governor General(before in 1961) and later the State President of the Republic of South Africa, who were imposed on African communities as their Supreme Chiefs. This situation resulted in a relationship of patronage. With the fall of Mangope, there emerged two important issues, the uncertainty among *dikgosi* about their positions and hope for restitution for those who had been deposed by the Mangope regime. On the first issue, there was nothing much that the Joint Administrators could do other than to assure *dikgosi* that their roles and positions would not be affected and that their stipends would be paid by the Interim Administration.⁴⁶⁴ The controversies surrounding *bogosi* in other communities became very sensitive. Some of *dikgosi* who were installed by Mangope were immediately challenged by sections of their communities. Some of them had to flee their villages, while in other cases, communities lodged court applications to have such appointments set aside. Some of these cases are discussed in Chapter Three. The immediate issue that confronted the Joint Administrators was that of the Bafokeng discussed below.

The problem surrounding *bogosi* of the Bafokeng started immediately after the departure of *Kgosi* Lebone Molotlegi from Phokeng to live in Botswana in self-imposed exile, following his harassment by the Bophuthatswana Government after the 1988 coup attempt. As discussed in Chapter Three, he appointed his *rangwane*,

⁴⁶³. For more details see Chapter Seven.

⁴⁶⁴.Joint Administrators, "Report to the NWL, SA and the TEC", p.11.

Cecil Molotlegi Tumagole, to act as *kgosi* in his absence. This was unfortunately rejected by Mangope who instead appointed Lebone's brother, George Mokgwaro Molotlegi as acting *kgosi* despite objections from Tumagole, who was supported by many Bafokeng, including *dikgosana*. Though this was contested in court, no change was effected and Mokgwaro ruled until the fall of the Mangope Government.⁴⁶⁵

The fall of Mangope obviously paved the way for the return of Molotlegi and other Bophuthatswana exiles. On the 4 June 1994, Bafokeng lodged a court application demanding that the appointment of Mokgwaro be set aside as the first step to prepare for the return of their rightful leader. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of Bophuthatswana and on the 1 August 1994, Judge Comry had the easiest of the tasks when he delivered judgement, as the application was unopposed. He ruled that the appointment of Mokgwaro, as acting *kgosi* of Bafokeng, be set aside.⁴⁶⁶ Considering the political developments in the country at that time, it could be argued that there was no way either the President of Bophuthatswana or Mokgwaro could oppose the application. Mokgwaro had been aware all the time that he was acting on behalf of his brother, Lebone, and therefore there were no legal impediments in handing over to the rightful *kgosi*.

It was also of vital importance for the Joint Administrators to get the people of Bophuthatswana into the election process and to create a climate for fair and free

NWU
LIBRARY

⁴⁶⁵. More details in Chapter Four.

⁴⁶⁶. Supreme Court of Bophuthatswana, Edwara Patrick Lebone Molotlegi and Cecil Molotlegi Tumagole v President of Bophuthatswana and George Mokgwaro Mollo Molotlegi, Judgement, 1 August 1994, pp. 62-63.

elections.⁴⁶⁷ This involved dealing with some claims of intimidation by some political parties, thus preventing open canvassing in the area, restraining individuals who threatened to disrupt elections, and most importantly, resolving the issue of the political prisoners believed to be filling the Bophuthatswana prisons. They also had to ensure that voter education was taking place and that the IEC was assisted to set up voting stations. Free political activity and elections became the pre-occupation of the Interim Administration.

The issue of political prisoners was to be addressed as a matter of urgency following the TEC resolution that political prisoners were to be released before the elections. The Administrators were confronted with demands from prisoners who expected to be released because they reasoned that the government under whose laws they were convicted had since collapsed. These demands did not come from political prisoners only, but even from those who were convicted for criminal offences such as murder and theft. In prisons such as Mogwase and Mafikeng, prisoners revolted demanding their immediate release. The Mafikeng prison was set alight by prisoners, in turn causing damage estimated to R100 000, forcing the authorities to transfer the prisoners to Rooigrond prison, thereby causing overcrowding.⁴⁶⁸ In the meantime prisoners at Odi formed Odi Prisoners Association to negotiate on their behalf.⁴⁶⁹ This was something new in the whole of South Africa, showing how the events in Bophuthatswana presented people with opportunities to push their own agendas. Although these issues were difficult for

⁴⁶⁷. T. Van der Walt, **Interview**, 23 April 2001.

⁴⁶⁸. **Sowetan**, 30 March 1994.

⁴⁶⁹. **Sowetan**, 30 March 1994.

the Joint Administrators to handle, they did manage to pay attention to the plight of the known political prisoners.

To address the issue of the political prisoners, the Administrators embarked on a process of releasing political prisoners on a similar basis as it was being done in the Republic of South Africa. Due to various circumstances they could not fully complete the process, they nevertheless made some progress. The first to be released was the 1988 coup attempt mastermind, Mr Timothy Phiri.⁴⁷⁰ Phiri was released on Tuesday, 16 March 1994 after having been jailed since the aborted coup of February 1988. His release was secured after the meeting between the ANC's North West Provincial Premier-elect, Popo Molefe and the Administrators on Monday, 15 March 1994. Molefe, playing a masterful political stroke, knew that the release of Phiri would create a sensation in the area, as he would be hailed as a hero who once challenged Mangope. This would in turn boost the ANC support in the province, as it relied on popular support against the NP's experience. Indeed, from the prison gate, Phiri emerged in the ANC colours to the cheers of the ANC supporters. He was immediately drawn into the electioneering campaign and was placed 14th on the ANC's provincial list.⁴⁷¹ The ANC gambled with Phiri's popularity as a coup leader. Joining his co-accused in the coup case, was Malebane-Metsing, who was used as a pawn in a political game to draw more support for the ANC in preparation for the elections. This created the impression that ANC had supported their coup attempt, something which the party had not fully been able to demonstrate. After the elections, both Phiri and Malebane-Metsing lost ANC support and slowly drifted into the political wilderness.

⁴⁷⁰. Joint Administrators, "Report to the NWL, SA and the TEC", p.13.

⁴⁷¹. *The Star*, 18 March 1994; *Sowetan*, 11 April 1994.

As already indicated, to ensure that there was free political activity and a climate for free and fair elections, the Joint Administrators had to restore law and order in the territory. Safety and security were compromised following the unprofessional behaviour displayed by some of the BPF members during and after the Bophuthatswana crisis. This reduced their authority, creating a serious concern that the public would lose faith in them. This was aggravated by widespread incidents of intimidation, robbery and murder in the territory.⁴⁷² In some rural areas such as Gopane, Moshana and Tlokweng (Silverkrans), undisciplined elements of the ANC went on a rampage, attacking people labelled as supporters of the Bophuthatswana Government and Mangope's CDP. Many people were displaced as they fled their homes. In Tlokweng, for example, Kgosi Gabonewe Motsatsi, a former chief whip of the CDP, lost both his house and businesses (restaurant and bottlestore), burnt down by these undisciplined elements. He ultimately left his home residence to buy a house in Rustenburg.⁴⁷³ These incidents posed a threat to free and fair elections, thus forcing the Joint Administrators to speed up mechanisms to step up security in the territory.

Due to a negative and distrustful perception towards the Bophuthatswana Forces, the Joint Administrators had to rely on the services of the SADF. They therefore requested for the extension of SADF's stay in Bophuthatswana. They were strengthened by some members of the SAP. In this way the situation was improved. The South African Police units were also deployed to other areas outside Mmabatho such as Moretele and Odi to maintain law and order. The Joint

⁴⁷². Joint Administrators, "Report to the NWL, SA and the TEC", p.11.

⁴⁷³. E.B. Pule, **Interview**, 19 May 2000.

Administrators kept constant contact with the commanding officer of the SADF.⁴⁷⁴ Considering that the elections were very near, there was no way intimidation could be totally rooted out. With the hotting up of the race for supremacy among the political parties contesting the election, there was an intensification of political rivalry making the situation very volatile and causing panic in the homeland. This also nearly caused conflict between the two Administrators, as they differed on the assessment of the situation. Mokgoro, basing his judgement on the behaviour of some striking members of the BPF who were demanding that their pensions be paid out, announced that Bophuthatswana was on the brink of collapse.⁴⁷⁵ This was immediately challenged by Van der Walt, who claimed that Mokgoro had misread the situation and that the situation, though volatile was under control.⁴⁷⁶ This incident cannot be used to justify Seiler's view that the two Administrators were unlikely partners who operated as a dual monarchy. There was in fact a reasonable level of co-operation between Van der Walt and Mokgoro.

To ensure that many people would vote in the 27 April elections, voter education was immediately started in Bophuthatswana. The IEC's work was made easier by the eagerness of the people to vote, a good infrastructure (due to previous elections in Bophuthatswana) and the obligation on the part of the Joint Administrators to assist the IEC to ensure free and fair elections. The Department of Internal Affairs was assigned to work with the IEC to make information available especially for the issuing of temporary voters' cards to those who did not have relevant identity documents. Within four days after the fall of Bophuthatswana, 250 000 pamphlets

⁴⁷⁴. T. Van der Walt, **Interview**, 23 April 2001.

⁴⁷⁵. **Business Day**, 15 April 1994.

⁴⁷⁶. **The Star**, 15 April 1994; **The Citizen**, 15 April 1994; T. Van der Walt, **Interview**, 23 April 2001.

on voter education had been distributed in Bophuthatswana, in most cases by helicopters. The Bophuthatswana Broadcasting Services were immediately resumed, under an interim management headed by John Letswamotse as acting Director General. Its facilities were used for voter education and information dissemination and programmes. Voting stations were set up throughout the former homeland.⁴⁷⁷

The Joint Administrators kept close contact with the office of the IEC and the Mediation Services throughout the preparations and during the elections. They were in fact responsible for logistical support, visiting a number of voting stations during the elections as well as counting stations.⁴⁷⁸ Through their unwavering support and commitment to ensure free and fair elections, the IEC registered great success in an area where past grievances and disruptions had been considered an obstacle. Credit for this is also due for the Joint Administrators.

4. CONCLUSION

This chapter has painted a successful picture of the Interim Administration headed by capable Joint Administrators. Although faced with a mammoth task, sometimes under chaotic situations, they succeeded to a large degree in fulfilling their mandate of restoring good governance, to ensure the protection of lives and property, and to enable free and fair elections. In the absence of party politics and a legislature, they were able to shape an effective transitional process from the former regimes to a new democratic dispensation, giving the North West Province

⁴⁷⁷. T. Van der Walt, *Interview*, 23 April 2001; *The Citizen*, 15 March 1994.

⁴⁷⁸. Joint Administrators, "Report to the NWL, SA and the TEC", p.13.

a kickstart in effective democratic governance. On issues they could not dispose off or deal with directly, they recommended specific actions to be taken by the new Provincial government, in some cases initiating commissions to deal with those issues even beyond their term of office. There were however issues which did not receive the attention they deserved. The issue of parity in salary and benefits with the South African civil servants, was neglected and it became a source of conflict in the new North West Provincial Government as discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER SIX

THE LEGACY FOR THE NORTH WEST PROVINCE

1. INTRODUCTION

The main objective of this chapter is to establish and analyse what the North West Province inherited from Bophuthatswana and how it dealt with that past. Although it is difficult and sometimes impossible to be non judgemental, attempts are made to refrain from giving a judgemental comparison between the two regions or governments bearing in mind the context and time in which they operated. Bophuthatswana operated under the assumption of an independent state, and its infrastructure and policies had to suit the status of an independent state while the North West Province is a regional or provincial structure, a part of a broader political dispensation. An analytical comparison based on the principle of continuity and discontinuity is given. The chapter focuses on administration, politics, education and economy. Apart from the fact that these selected aspects have been discussed in previous chapters as major components of the thesis, it was in these areas where major changes were made by the North West Provincial government which were to have a major impact on the lives of many people in the province. Issues such as attempts to remove corruption and attempts to remove the Mangope “factor” in government also receive attention.

2. ADMINISTRATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Although the North West Provincial Government (NWPG) inherited the legacy of different administrations (Cape Provincial Administration, Transvaal Provincial Administration and Bophuthatswana Administration), Seiler notes that for the NWPG, it was the recent history of Bophuthatswana which was like an “omnipresent albatross”, a constraint to its planning and policy implementation⁴⁷⁹. Although this may be an overstatement, there were indeed indications of strong fears and suspicion among new government officials that elements in government continued to cling to the old order and wanted a return of Mangope. This crystallised into a strong Anti - Mangope - Bophuthatswana campaign which became a driving force and determining factor in whatever was done by NWPG officials in their attempts to remove the Mangope influence.

In administration, there is general agreement that Bophuthatswana left a sound infrastructure for the NWPG. Both Paul Daphne, chief executive officer for the North West Parks and Tourism Board and David van Wyk, former Personal Adviser to MEC for Education and currently head of the Support Services to the Executive Council respectively and speaking from the ANC government perspective, state that NWPG inherited a good infrastructure, especially in the Provincial Central Administrative Centre (Garona) and administrative machinery⁴²⁷. Although there were claims of misuse of taxpayers money when these structures were built, they turned out to be beneficial to the NWPG. It did not start from “scratch” as was the case with provinces such as the Northern

⁴⁷⁹. J. Seiler, “Transforming Mangope’s Bophuthatswana”.

⁴²⁷. P. Daphne, *Interview*, 23 May 2000; D. Van Wyk, *Interview*, 19 May 2000.

Cape⁴²⁸. Despite this positive legacy, there was public outcry that this inherited infrastructure was not properly utilised. According to Matladi, speaking from the point of view of the opposition party, UCDP, “government offices were left to collapse due to poor maintenance, which was blamed on lack of transport, manpower and funds. Facilities such as the Airport, and the stadia were left to collapse in disuse.”⁴²⁹ It was only after South Africa had entered the bid to host the 2006 World Cup (soccer), that mention was made that there were plans to renovate the stadia and recently the Airport. The inability to utilise this infrastructure deprived the province of income, and remains a challenge to the NWPG. They have become like “white elephants”, symbols of a past ostentatious wealth that did not and cannot benefit the community.

The North West Provincial Government inherited the bulk of its personnel (civil servants) from Bophuthatswana and a very small portion from both Cape Provincial Administration (CPA) and Transvaal Provincial Administration (TPA). There were widespread claims that the public servants constituted a major constraint to effective public service and service delivery. Seiler saw them as “a perplexing problem characterised by an ethos of self-centred passivity”⁴³⁰. In support of this view, van Wyk states that the former Bophuthatswana civil servants were used to a situation where they had to operate or act on instructions from Head Office (instructions from above). There were no mechanisms to encourage risk taking and initiatives among workers⁴³¹. Seiler further states that the inherited civil

⁴²⁸. P. Daphne, **Interview**, 23 May 2000.

⁴²⁹. M.N. Matladi, **Interview**, 10 May 2000.

⁴³⁰. J. Seiler, “Transforming Mangope’s Bophuthatswana”.

⁴³¹. D. Van Wyk, **Interview**, 19 May 2000.

servants had since 1994 resisted all efforts of transformation and the trimming of privileges. He blames the failure of the North West Provincial Government to match the service delivery of the Mangope era on the recurrent demonstrations, go slows and strikes by civil servants especially during the 1994 - 1995 period⁴³².

Though these claims had their own merits, they need to be placed in the correct perspective and context. The problems of the civil servants relating to issues of pension security, wage parity and job security remained unresolved by 1995. The North West Provincial Government blamed these on the reluctance of the Government of National Unity to hand over substantial powers to provinces. It was the failure of the government to resolve the problems of the civil servants which led to strikes. The notion that the inherited public servants were opposed to transformation needs to be treated cautiously and it actually provided the Provincial Government with a pretext to blame its failures on the former Bophuthatswana government. After the resolution of these problems, as stated by van Wyk, public servants overcame uncertainties and proved to be professional, committed, positive and effective⁴³³. This indeed negates the negative impression created about the former Bophuthatswana public servants by people such as Mike Lawrence, a former Professor at UNIBO. Lawrence, for example, described them as a group providing “a mixture of ready available skills for the new administration but at the same time reactionary forms of consciousness or ideologies by those who did not accept the new order (Anti - ANC) and attempted to undermine it by varying means of “resistance” including corruption and non compliance with the

⁴³². J. Seiler, “Transforming Mangope’s Bophuthatswana”.

⁴³³. D. Van Wyk **Interview**, 31 May 2000.

ethos of the new system, tax evasion and foot dragging on delivery”⁴³⁴. These civil servants were those at delivery points, administrative staff, nurses, teachers, police and other professional personnel.

There were more problems at senior level in government than at the delivery points (or lower levels). During the March 1994 crises, self imposed structures called Crisis Committees came into being. They were comprised of politically motivated individuals who claimed that they represented all workers and the Joint Administrators had to negotiate with them on all issues affecting workers. It can be argued that these individuals were in an opportunistic game of self-gain. These committees immediately demanded the sacking of the 23 former Bophuthatswana departmental secretaries. It became a serious problem for the Joint Administrators and later the new NWPG, as secretaries were employed under the Public Service Act and could not simply be dismissed. This would also be in conflict with the Government of National Unity (GNU)’s resolution that no public servant would be dismissed. Due to pressure from the Crisis Committees, who then claimed to be ANC loyalists, the secretaries were bought out of the service with “handshakes” estimated around R2,5 million each⁴³⁵.

The dismissal of the secretaries set the stage for the Crisis Committees to manipulate and exploit the new dispensation for self enrichment. They forced the department to operate with acting officials including secretaries nominated by them from amongst their members. This created serious problems as the MECs did not trust them, doubted their political reliabilities and most importantly their

⁴³⁴. M. Lawrence, **Interview**, 31 May 2000.

⁴³⁵. M.N. Matladi, **Interview**, 10 May 2000; D. Van Wyk, **Interview**, 19 May 2000; J. Seiler, “Transforming Mangope’s Bophuthatswana”.

competencies. Acting secretaries became aware of these doubts about their competencies. Realising that they would not be permanently employed, they started dragging their feet and demanding massive pay rises⁴³⁶. Indeed these constituted a major constraint to service delivery by the new government and was also a source of conflict. They continued to label other people especially those they feared and disliked as Mangope loyalists and forced the ANC led government to dismiss them. Among the victims of this were the former District Governors. According to Pule and Mahuma, both former Bophuthatswana District Governors, the governors were depicted as the symbols of the Mangope era and were not wanted in the new dispensation. This was done despite a recommendation by the Joint Administrators to keep the office of the governors and spread them to the whole province. They saw the offices of governors as important links between government and communities. On the contrary, the incoming government introduced a new structure of district councils which were to replace regions. They used the former offices of the governors and the bulk of former administrative staff of the governors' offices. The governors were retired and given severance packages⁴³⁷.

Shortcomings in financial management hampered effective provincial governance. Seiler states that the new government inherited a debt of unsettled accounts from Bophuthatswana. This was as a result of a tradition of financial non-management, absence of departmental accounting and misuse of government funds for unauthorised projects and even personal use⁴³⁸. The tradition of financial non -

⁴³⁶. J. Seiler, "Transforming Mangope's Bophuthatswana".

⁴³⁷. E.B. Pule, **Interview**, 19 May 2000; I.R. Mahuma, **Interview**, 17 May 2000.

⁴³⁸. J. Seiler, "Transforming Mangope's Bophuthatswana."

management and lack of accountability which existed in Bophuthatswana continued to haunt the North West Provincial government. This resulted in both institutional and personal corruption. Although the provincial government attempted to improve this situation by setting up a financial management team under MEC for finance, Martin Kuscus, the limited competence of this team and corruption stifled progress in this aspect. There were a number of funds which could not be accounted for. For example, the government took R200 million from the Tribal Authorities Trust Fund, which was created under the Bophuthatswana government, to meet its budgetary shortfalls in the financial years 1994/1995 and 1995/1996 respectively. It further took R157 million from the Provincial Tax Office Funds for the same reason for the same periods. The House of Traditional Leaders was not consulted and this was a breach of trust regulations. No one wanted to account for these funds and they were never repaid. Even by July 2000, the NWPG still owed the Revenue Services and Traditional Authorities Trust Fund, R360 m.⁴³⁹

Since its inception a perception exists, reflected in sections of the media, that corruption was rife in the provincial government. According to Daphne, "corruption was evident in the Bophuthatswana period, but it was the exposure of corruption (under the new government) which has increased."⁴⁴⁰ In support of this view, Lawrence describes corruption as a universal social phenomena, it is always there and what matters is how it is dealt with. He further states that the impression that the level of corruption in the North West Province was higher than in Bophuthatswana, was because the latter had no constitutional checks and balances

⁴³⁹. **Sunday Times**, 23 July 2000.

⁴⁴⁰. P.Daphne, **Interview**, 23 May 2000.

on corruption and in some cases protected those involved, while on the other hand, the former has such balances and the will to flush out the perpetrators⁴⁴¹. Indeed the evidence suggests that the NWPG is determined to expose corrupt practices and several commissions have been set up to investigate allegations of corruption. The Heath, Motimele, Moseneke Commissions and Gobodo forensic audit are signs of this determination to root out corruption. The South African Police Services (SAPS) in the province also established commercial branches to deal with the escalating corruption. Among the cases dealt with are:

- (a) Riana de Wet, former MEC for Arts and Culture who was found to have misused public funds and a government plane to fly her family to Sun City for a Concert by Joe Cocker. She finally resigned.
- (b) Mmamokoena Gaoretelelwe, a former MEC of Education who was investigated for nepotism, ineptness and personal corruption. Her department had since 1994 been involved in a fraud of R76 million (textbook scandal). She was dismissed in December 1997, after the Premier protected her for a long time despite the outcry to punish her. It was only under pressure that the Premier acted.
- (c) The Agriculture Department under MEC Malebane-Metsing was found guilty of embezzling R17 million.
- (d) The local councils were guilty of fraud of R54 million but the Motimele Commission recommendation to recover the money, was never implemented.⁴⁴²

⁴⁴¹. M. Lawrence, **Interview**, 31 May 2000.

⁴⁴². J. Seiler, "Transforming Mangope's Bophuthatswana"

Apart from these reported cases, there are many unreported ones such as the alleged corruption in the Youth Commission and the 1995 local elections. These cases and other unreported ones undermined the efforts of the government to root out corruption. This was further aggravated by the fact that corruption was continuing unabated.

One of the greatest challenges for the new NWPG was how to deal with the political legacy of Bophuthatswana. As Lawrence states that Bophuthatswana was an imposed political structure and surrogate to the Apartheid state based on a cosmetic Bill of Rights and other forms of democratic jargon enshrined in a constitution, geared largely to act as a show piece for the Apartheid government. Its democracy was not a broad-based democracy but a type ethnic loyalty to a particular group.⁴⁴³ On the other hand post - Bophuthatswana politics were about national democratic reconstruction in a new global order, attempting to play down ethnic difference and divisions that have been so destructive in the past. While respecting ethnic differences, it was trying to avoid elevating ethnicity to a divisive level.

As argued by Daphne, and this thesis has shown, non-racialism which had prevailed in Bophuthatswana, constituted an important political legacy. Though non-racialism did not reach all levels of society especially the working class and rural areas, there were pockets of non-racialism in Mmabatho and in other urban centres of the former Bophuthatswana⁴⁴⁴. This non-racialism and racial tolerance helped to lay an important foundation for the new society based on democratic

⁴⁴³. M. Lawrence, **Interview**, 31 May 2000.

⁴⁴⁴. P. Daphne, **Interview**, 23 May 2000.

principles and non-racialism. The new North West Province government had to deal with racial problems outside the former Bophuthatswana areas only. Indeed there have been several ugly incidents of racial confrontation and political violence in areas such as Vryburg, Ventersdorp and Lichtenburg, and in most cases, created by Rightwingers. The Provincial government has done well to deal with Rightwing politics and problems. As stated by van Wyk, instead of confronting the Right wingers, it ignored them. Premier Molefe instead met sectors of the Afrikaner Community such as the Afrikaner Agricultural community and Business Community individually⁴⁴⁵. Both political violence and Right wing aggression gradually disappeared. It was not as rife as it promised to be especially during the period leading to the 1994 elections when Right wing activities threatened peace talks, elections and the newly won democracy. It could be argued that the non - racial character of Bophuthatswana helped to ease the transition to normal society in the North West Province. Certainly the problem could have been worse.

It has been argued in this thesis that there was a high level of intolerance towards political opponents in the Bophuthatswana regime. Undoubtedly the new ANC led government has been more tolerant towards opposition. However, Seiler notes incidents of intolerance shown by Premier Popo Molefe towards his political opponents, even within the party. Molefe clashed with Malebane Metsing after the latter had contested ANC provincial chairmanship against Molefe in 1995. Conflict between the two actually started before the 1994 elections when ANC head office imposed Popo Molefe on the North West as provincial Premier elect despite objection from local branches. Malebane Metsing who had significant support for Premiership, was turned down by ANC and later “seduced” with an

⁴⁴⁵. D. van Wyk, *Interview*, 23 May 2000.

Executive Council(EXCO) place as MEC for Agriculture. Molefe later sacked Malebane Metsing as the MEC and replaced him by O.J. Tselapedi⁴⁴⁶.

Another victim of political intolerance was Tselapedi who in 1999 clashed with Molefe for contesting the Provincial chairmanship. He was sacked as MEC for Agriculture and appointed the Speaker of the Provincial Legislature. Although Daphne sees this as a promotion to an influential position⁴⁴⁷, it was an effective strategy to stifle Tselapedi's outspokenness against Molefe. Selau, former Speaker of parliament, also could not escape the aggressive intentions of Premier Molefe. Thus as Seiler notes, the political situation in the North West Province was transformed from an authoritarian one (Bophuthatswana situation) to one where the Province was ruled by an ANC elite, despite its mandate. The position of the local (rural) people remained unchanged; they had no say in the running of the province except that they voted⁴⁴⁸. There were mechanisms put in place in all areas to intimidate opposition at grassroots level. This effectively discouraged any opposition from within civil society. These efforts to monopolise control of domestic governance and political life created a tendency for corruption and coercion. Having neutralised political opposition, the new NWPG thus increasingly became authoritarian. This created insecurity and fear among non - ANC members especially the civil servants who were not affiliated to SADTU and the National Education and Health Allied Workers Union(NEHAWU), (COSATU affiliates and part of the ANC alliance).

⁴⁴⁶. J. Seiler, "Transforming Mangope's Bophuthatswana".

⁴⁴⁷. P. Daphne, **Interview**, 23 May 2000.

⁴⁴⁸. J. Seiler, "Transforming Mangope's Bophuthatswana".

In Matladi's view the Skweyiya Commission which was instituted in 1994 to investigate allegations of corruption against Mangope, was no more than an attempt by the North West Provincial Government to remove Mangope from politics and to wipe out opposition⁴⁴⁹. Although Daphne justifies the investigation of the accusations of corruption which were levelled against the Bophuthatswana government, he argues that there was a political motive behind the Skweyiya Commission⁴⁵⁰. In addition to the above views, Seiler states that the investigation was an attempt by Molefe and or the ANC to destroy Mangope's political effectiveness and to force him out of politics in order to secure its own provincial hegemony⁴⁵¹.

According to the Skweyiya Commission report, Mangope had misappropriated R18 million during his seventeen years of tenure as the President of Bophuthatswana; some part of the money was spent largely on the renovation of his house (Gaetsho) at Motswedi, while some was used for funding his party (the Christian Democratic Party) and developing his farm, Alwynspoort⁴⁵². On the basis of the findings of the Skweyiya Commission, Mangope was brought to court, facing 208 counts of theft, attempted theft, fraud and contravention of Exchange Control Regulations. His trial started on 11 August 1997 in the same Supreme Court of Bophuthatswana which he built, now called High Court of South Africa,

⁴⁴⁹. M.N. Matladi, **Interview**, 10 May 2000.

⁴⁵⁰. P. Daphne, **Interview**, 23 May 2000.

⁴⁵¹. J. Seiler, "Transforming Mangope's Bophuthatswana"

⁴⁵². Skweyiya Commission of Enquiry, **Final and detailed Report of the Commission into Corrupt Practices and Irregular use of Public Funds in the Government Departments and Bodies by various Individuals or at their Instance (1997)**, pp.108; 93-108; 45-60.

Bophuthatswana Provincial Division, under a retired judge, Justice Tim Mullins⁴⁵³. The trial lasted until the 20 July 1998. During the trial Mangope was supported by mainly by his “tribe”, UCDP members and supporters and largely public servants (former Bophuthatswana public servants). As stated by Seiler, Mangope’s support did not only surface during the trial, but it became evident during the 1995 local government elections when his party gained substantial votes in Mmabatho and Zeerust⁴⁵⁴ despite the highly politically publicised Skweyiya Commission findings. There have been two contrasting views of this commission. The ANC attempted to use this report (and Commission) to discredit Mangope. Mangope was accused of misappropriating funds from his chiefdom - the Bahurutshe boo Manyane. The other view, according to people like Matladi, is that the trial was an attempt to politically discredit Mangope and make him a political sacrificial lamb.

Despite the protest from the Bahurutshe boo Manyane to save their *kgosi* from prosecution, claiming that they had never complained or asked for the prosecution, the trial continued. They even sent a memorandum signed by “tribal” members (about 517) to both Premier Popo Molefe and President Mandela in which they stressed their objection to prosecution⁴⁵⁵. This became one of the few cases if not the first, where they were no complainants and even those whom the prosecutor wanted to impose as complainants, disassociated themselves and in fact opposed prosecution. Mangope was finally found guilty on 103 counts of the original 208

⁴⁵³. High Court of South Africa (Bophuthatswana Provincial Division) High Court of S.A.), **State v Lucas Manyane Mangope, judgement, cc 30/97**, 20 July 1998, pp. 1-2.

⁴⁵⁴. J. Seiler, “Transforming Mangope’s Bophuthatswana”.

⁴⁵⁵. High Court of SA, **State v Lucas Manyane Mangope, judgement on Sentence**, 21 August 1998, p.6; M. Mkwanazi; “Tribe Members rally around Mangope”, **Sowetan**, 21 August 1998; **The Mail**, 21 August 1998.

counts. He was found guilty for misappropriation of R3 543 685 (R2 092 000 from Bahurutshe boo Manyane, not part of the original charge) of the original claim of R18 million⁴⁵⁶. On the 21 August 1998 Justice Mullins sentenced Mangope to a two year suspended sentence and a fine of R500 000.

Mangope was further ordered to repay R1 184 343, 47 to the Bahurutshe boo Manyane.⁴⁵⁷ Justice Mullins gave Mangope what was described as a lenient sentence leading to a political outcry by the ruling party (ANC) leadership and supporters who argued that he should be given an effective sentence of five years. Advocate Kgomo, who was supposed to be an impartial officer, had ironically demanded at least a two year effective imprisonment for Mangope⁴⁵⁸.

On the other hand the sentencing of Mangope was perceived by many people especially his political opponents, as the final nail in his political coffin although there was a feeling that he had escaped with a very lenient sentence. His opponents were rudely shocked however by his return to active politics when he became the leader of the official opposition party in the North West Legislature. Matladi believes that the ANC led government campaigns to destroy him, had a negative impact on him and UCDP, and affected its performance in the 1999 elections. Many had been convinced that he would be imprisoned and thus unable to register his party. The dropping of the remaining charges against him came very

⁴⁵⁶ High Court of SA, **State v Lucas Manyane Mangope, judgement on Sentence**, 21 August 1998,p.7; M. Mkwanaazi, "Tribe Members rally around Mangope", **Sowetan**, 21 August 1998; **The Mail**, 21 August 1998..

⁴⁵⁷ High Court of S.A., **State v Lucas Manyane Mangope, judgement on Sentence**, pp. 15 - 16.

⁴⁵⁸ High Court of S.A. **State v Lucas Manyane Mangope, judgement on Sentence**, p. 8.

late, and it was believed he would not find time to canvass supporters.⁴⁵⁹ Indeed he did not have sufficient time to canvass all the electorates. Despite all this, his party obtained three parliamentary seats in the North West Provincial Legislature and also three seats at the National Assembly. Mangope's choice to remain at the Provincial Legislature, instead of going to National Assembly as party leader, surprised many people. According to Matladi, the decision was taken based on Mangope's age and state of health which did not allow extensive travelling, and the belief that he would be more effective at service delivery points (provincial level).⁴⁶⁰ Thus the UCDP became a localised party, based in the North West Province. Despite its surprising electoral success, it has not however made a significant impact on local politics as it is in a distinct minority. Lawrence has argued that "it is a party based on reactive politics of criticism rather than offering pro-active and constructive options to the provincial government."⁴⁶¹ The fact that Mangope resurrected himself in the form of the UCDP, and its continued support among a significant number of people in the Province, is however a notable achievement.

It was not *kgosi* Mangope alone who suffered from the anti-Mangope campaign of the NWPG, but other family members as well. According to Seiler,

"the members of the Mangope family held important but secondary roles which they carried out with varying degrees of competence. His sons, Kwená and Eddie were Senior Staff Officer in BDF and Senior General Manager in BNDC respectively, his daughter Keabaitse was

⁴⁵⁹. M.N. Matladi, **Interview**, 10 May 2000; E.B. Pule, **Interview**, 19 May 2000.

⁴⁶⁰. M.N. Matladi, **Interview**, 10 May 2000.

⁴⁶¹. M. Lawrence, **Interview**, 31 May 2000.

a Senior Producer for Bophuthatswana Television, and his daughter-in-law, Rosemary (wife to Kwena) was the head of the Mmabana Cultural Organisation.”⁴⁶²

After the fall of Bophuthatswana, all except Kwena, lost their jobs. Kwena survived because Defence became a national competence, and he was transferred to the Defence head quarters to head the communications section. He was promoted from the rank of Major to Lieutenant Colonel and to Colonel in a short space of time.

Lea Mangope (former Bophuthatswana first lady) lamented that the new government was discriminatory, hostile and hell bent on destroying her family. She stated that her children (referring to Eddie, Keabaitse and Rosemary) were forced out of their jobs, and she was also denied old age pension for which she was entitled⁴⁶³.

Although the three lost their jobs as a result of the Anti-Mangope campaign, it was the cases of Eddie (discussed in detail under BNDC) and Rosemary which drew a lot of attention and were investigated, hence their prominence in this study. Rosemary, as stated earlier, was an effective and relatively independent head of the Mmabana Cultural Organisation that provided a wide range of subsidised programmes in Mmabatho and in other urban centres.⁴⁶⁴ After the fall of Bophuthatswana, she was forced to leave her job at Mmabana. It is argued by

⁴⁶². J. Seiler, “Transforming Mangope’s Bophuthatswana”.

⁴⁶³. L.T. Mangope, *Interview*, 26 April 1999.

⁴⁶⁴. J. Seiler, “Transforming Mangope’s Bophuthatswana”.

Mayet, former Chief Executive Officer of Mmabana, that workers at Mmabana did not want her.⁴⁶⁵ There were allegations levelled against her, that she was spending more time with the CDP, than attending to her job, especially in 1993. Another allegation was that she bought a car and changed it within three months.⁴⁶⁶ An investigation was carried out to test these allegations and other minor ones such as she undertook an overseas trip accompanied by her husband at the expenses of Mmabana. According to Mayet, Rosemary was cleared of all these allegations on the grounds that she did not contravene any regulation governing the Mmabana foundation. For example, the car was changed due to factory faults. Again in 1993 she did not spend time with CDP but formed part of the Bophuthatswana government delegation at CODESA. These were confirmed by Rosemary herself.⁴⁶⁷ According to Rosemary, after being cleared by the investigation, she had to return to work; this was delayed because the MEC for Education and Culture under which Mmabana fell, did not approve her reinstatement. It was only after a new Department of Sports and Culture was created that she was requested to return but she refused as the department had previously claimed that they could not guarantee her safety. When the department requested her to return in August 1997, it refused to commit itself to guarantee her safety. She was also not given a clear job description. Rosemary was then offered a Severance package and retired from the NWPG⁴⁶⁸.

⁴⁶⁵. G.H. Mayet, **Interview**, 14 June 2000.

⁴⁶⁶. G.H. Mayet, **Interview**, 14 June 2000.

⁴⁶⁷. G.H. Mayet, **Interview**, 14 June 2000; R.K. Mangope, **Interview**, 27 October 2000.

⁴⁶⁸. R.K. Mangope, **Interview**, 27 October 2000.

3. EDUCATION

Since 1994 and the inception of the new government, Education has been one of the major concerns for the people of the North West Province and South Africa in general. Poor Matriculation(std 10) results, lack of discipline among pupils and educators and lack of resources have created widespread dissatisfaction. This section attempts to establish what the NWPG was able to improve upon in terms of the educational legacy bequeathed to it by Bophuthatswana. It also looks into problems which the North West Education Department (NWED) had to contend with.

The new national Department of Education (DOE) inherited 15 different Apartheid Education Authorities and the North West alone inherited six, namely:

- (a) House of Assembly in Transvaal for Whites (TED)
- (b) Cape Education Department for Whites (CED)
- (c) The Department of Education and Training (DET) for Black South Africans
- (d) House of Delegates for Indians
- (e) House of Representatives for Coloureds
- (f) Bophuthatswana Education Department in the Republic of Bophuthatswana⁴⁶⁹.

Although it inherited these departments, it was the Bophuthatswana government which provided the bulk of infrastructure and manpower with others providing a

⁴⁶⁹. G.H. Mayet, "Transforming Education : From Racial Separation and Inequality to Integration and Equality", (Paper delivered at the North of England Education Conference, Sheffield, 1996), p.2; I.S. Molale, **Interview**, 5 July 2000.

modest or a small portion⁴⁷⁰. According to Mayet, by 1996 NWED had 2500 schools, 7 Teacher Colleges, 10 Technical Colleges, 500 Early Learning Centres and several Adult Centres⁴⁷¹. From these numbers, the Bophuthatswana legacy amounted to 1486 schools, 6 Teacher Colleges (this was after Marapyane and Thaba Nchu Colleges were transferred to Mpumalanga and Free State Provinces respectively), 3 Technical Colleges, 500 Early Learning Centres (it was only in Bophuthatswana that Early Childhood Education received attention and where formal state funded institutions were established), 33 special schools and 290 adult centres accommodated in existing school buildings. In addition to these, Bophuthatswana provided one National Library, 9 community libraries located in regions, many school libraries resourced by the National library, a National Inservice Education Centre (NIEC), the University and three Manpower Centres⁴⁷². According to the North West Teacher Audit, by 1996, there were 28 034 teachers in the employment of NWED.⁴⁷³ This was before the process of restructuring which offered Voluntary Severance Packages (VSP) to other teachers, thus reducing this number. Of this number, 20 480 were inherited from Bophuthatswana.⁴⁷⁴

With new norms and standards imposed by the DOE which set teacher ratio at 1:40 across the school system as opposed to the situation in former Bophuthatswana schools of 1:30 and 1:33 at Secondary and Primary Schools respectively,

⁴⁷⁰. J. Seiler, Transforming Mangope's Bophuthatswana.

⁴⁷¹. G.H. Mayet, "Transforming Education", pp. 2-3.

⁴⁷². Bophuthatswana Department of Education, **Annual Report 1993**, pp. 123; 51; 35-41.

⁴⁷³. Educare, **North West Teacher Audit**, 1997, pp. 50-53.

⁴⁷⁴. Bophuthatswana Education Department, **Annual Report 1993**, p. 125.

Bophuthatswana schools were declared to be over staffed. As rightly noted by Mayet, the success of Bophuthatswana Education System lay in the fact that they had more personnel at school level and thus an affordable and low teacher pupil ratio.⁴⁷⁵ The situation was different in the former DET schools which included farm schools whose situation was characterised by over-crowded classes, incompetence and a general context of white racism. In some cases, two standards were combined in one classroom and taught by one teacher. In farm schools there were cases where a school had only one teacher despite the fact that the school catered for a number of standards. Everything was based on the number of pupils a school had⁴⁷⁶. This led to high drop out, failure and repeating rates. The teacher provisioning model in Bophuthatswana was informed by a number of factors such as the number of standards, classrooms and the curriculum needs of the school and the principal post was always excluded from the teaching posts. This gave the principal more time to attend to management of the school, thus ensuring good performance and discipline at school level⁴⁷⁷.

In terms of Rationalisation, Restructuring and Redeployment processes, which were aimed at equitable redistribution of resources, it was in the former Bophuthatswana schools where teachers were declared in excess. This created a serious problem for the new NWED because it had to move the excess teachers to schools where there were shortages, especially in former DET schools. Teachers were reluctant to move to former DET schools and farm schools. In addition to their own personal problems such as being moved from homes which meant either

⁴⁷⁵. G.H. Mayet, **Interview**, 14 June 2000.

⁴⁷⁶. J.Seiler, "Transforming Mangope's Bophuthatswana."

⁴⁷⁷. M.N. Matladi, **Interview**, 10 May 2000; also see chapter three.

commuting daily or seeking accommodation elsewhere, the main problem was fear of venturing into the unknown as were claims of ill-discipline in former DET schools. This constituted a constraint for the NWED in its planning and implementation of policies as they needed the consent of the teachers and their unions to move their members.⁴⁷⁸ By 1999, a process which had started in 1996 was still far from completion. Currently there are still 3156 excess teachers who have not yet been placed or redeployed. They remained attached to their schools and their future is uncertain.

The NWED had also inherited a school system characterised by disparity in provision of facilities and funding from the Bophuthatswana government. There were vast differences between resources for the Model C schools and ordinary (rural) schools. As stated in chapter three, schools such as Mmabatho High and the International schools were highly funded while other schools received average funding or were underfunded. It became difficult for the NWED to redistribute these resources. There was no act to force these schools to share resources. The only thing the NWED could do was to encourage these schools to open doors for pupils of other races. The Mafikeng schools which had enjoyed autonomy under Bophuthatswana continued to use Afrikaans as a medium of instruction thus making it difficult for more black pupils to enter, or cope with schooling. It was therefore only coloured pupils who spoke Afrikaans who were admitted. Attempts were made to force these schools to introduce English medium classes in order to make them accessible to more students including black pupils.⁴⁷⁹ Although this was a justified call, it became impossible for these schools to accommodate all these

⁴⁷⁸. D. Van Wyk, **Interview**, 19 May 2000.

⁴⁷⁹. G.H. Mayet, "Transforming Education", p.4; D. Van Wyk, **Interview**, 19 May 2000.

learners. It was also unreasonable on their part as the NWED failed to meet their demands to provide them with additional teachers who would handle those classes.⁴⁸⁰ The NWED allowed the new post provisioning model imposed by the DOE to stifle its progress of integrating schools. This problem affected other Afrikaans medium schools which were formerly TED and CED schools.

In January 1997, the South Africa School Act no. 84 of 1996 (SASA) became effective and among others it provided for two types of schools in South Africa, namely public and independent schools.⁴⁸¹ Former Model C schools except the International school became public schools thus placing them under the control of NWED. The NWED used its authority to force these schools to open doors to other races or face serious sanctions in terms reduced funding. Subsidies to these schools were cut or reduced drastically and privileges previously enjoyed by their teachers were withdrawn. When this preferential treatment disappeared in schools, many teachers who were predominantly expatriates left for independent schools. Very few of the original staff remained, preferring to look for better conditions and privileges elsewhere.⁴⁸² Although standards dropped to a certain extent, it was a good move by the NWED especially that it enabled the department to operate better in a context where teachers were unionised and involved in a struggle to democratise Education and improve teaching conditions for all. The continuation of these imbalances would have antagonised other teachers and served as a source of conflict between NWED and its employees (teachers).

⁴⁸⁰. M.N. Matladi, **Interview**, 10 May 2000, I Mosala, **Interview**, 14 May 2000.

⁴⁸¹. Republic of South Africa, **South African School Act, no. 84 of 1996**, pp. 25;35.

⁴⁸². D. Van Wyk, **Interview**, 19 May 2000.

The removal of foreign allowances (privileges) from Model C schools was coupled with the issue of the expatriate teachers, who were employed by the Bophuthatswana government. They came from African countries such as Ghana, Zambia, Uganda and some from Asian countries such as Sri Lanka and India. They were recruited to teach Mathematics and Science as there was a shortage of local teachers in these subjects and many of them taught in the Science High Schools. It was later discovered that there were those who did not teach these subjects but subjects in which there were enough qualified local teachers such as English, Agriculture and History. After July 1996, NWED stopped employing new teachers and this resulted in a large number of newly qualified teachers becoming job seekers. The expatriate teachers became a target of the MEC for Education and the South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU). The MEC wanted to dismiss these teachers and used SADTU, which also claimed that it was unreasonable to employ outsiders while locals were starving, to remove these teachers from their schools. Some remained out of schools for a period of two years but continued to draw salaries from the NWED. However, the expatriate teachers took their case to court and won and were reinstated. This cost the government lot of money. Their case also benefited the position of other expatriate teachers in other provinces although they did not experience the same problems. The DOE was obliged to change South African conditions to protect all teachers irrespective of countries of origin.⁴⁸³

The NWED had also inherited pockets of Multicultural education from Bophuthatswana. In Mmabatho, there were Multi-racial schools such as

⁴⁸³. G. H Mayet, **Interview**, 14 June 2000; F. Gbenou, **Interview**, 2 March 1999; S. Ramagaga, Informal discussions at the North West Provincial Education and Labour Chamber, 21 March 1998.

Mmabatho High, the International School and Sol Plaatjie Primary school which offered multicultural education. As noted by van Wyk, a former teacher at Mmabatho High School, even though Multi-cultural education was elitist, catering mostly for children of the expatriate and wealthy families, it laid a good foundation for non-racialism in the North West Province and South Africa in general.⁴⁸⁴ These schools provided education policies which underpinned the concepts of multi-culturalism and religious tolerance. Pupils from Muslim, Christian and Hindi religious groups learnt from each other and respected the cultures of other groups. This provided a religious model from which NWED and South Africa drew some lessons. Under the Bophuthatswana government, these schools administered entry tests and this restricted the number of students gaining access. This affected mostly the local black pupils. The new government abolished the entry tests and thus more students gained access to these schools.⁴⁸⁵



In management, the NWED effected radical changes. This might be a result of revolutionary decisions taken by the Senior Management Team (SMT), which was made up primarily of critics of the Mangope regime's education policies.⁴⁸⁶ Some of these people were those who were either dismissed by the Bophuthatswana government for misconduct or those who resigned to avoid disciplinary actions. After the fall of Bophuthatswana they came back and claimed that they were dismissed by the Bophuthatswana government because of their relations with ANC. They were able to gain promotion as a form of compensation. In Matladi's view these were the people who "emotionally and radically spearheaded the

⁴⁸⁴. D.Van Wyk, **Interview**, 19 May 2000.

⁴⁸⁵. J. Seiler, "Transforming Mangope's Bophuthatswana."

⁴⁸⁶. J. Seiler, "Transforming Mangope's Bophuthatswana."

dismantling of policies and structures which were inherited from Bophuthatswana in an attempt to impress their political master”.⁴⁸⁷ As stated by both Molale and Van Wyk all policies of the inherited departments were dismantled and new policies were the result of the discussions with the national department in Pretoria.⁴⁸⁸

The Bophuthatswana education system had strictly regulated attendance of both pupils and teachers. Attendance periods were fixed at 08H00 to 13H30 for Primary pupils and 08H00 to 16H00 for both Middle and High Schools. Teachers had to remain at schools from 07H45 to 16H00. Extra-mural activities were also regulated and compulsory for all teachers. This also happened in African countries such as Zimbabwe. This enhanced performance in schools and improved pass rates throughout the school system.⁴⁸⁹ With the inception of democracy and establishment of the NWED, these policies disappeared as they were perceived as relics of the old order. Monitoring and evaluation of teaching and learning activities were also discontinued. Under Bophuthatswana, teacher performance was periodically evaluated by school departmental heads, deputy principals and principals as internal monitors. These were done by class visits and control of work given to and done by pupils. There were instances where school inspectors would conduct class visits (as external monitors). This improved teacher performances as they were guided during these visits. The disappearance of these policies ushered a school system which was lamented by Van Wyk as too lenient on teachers and pupils. They have a great a latitude of freedom in most cases

⁴⁸⁷. M.N. Matladi, **Interview**, 10 May 2000.

⁴⁸⁸. I.S. Molale, **Interview**, 15 July 2000; D. Van Wyk, **Interview**, 19 May 2000.

⁴⁸⁹. D. Van Wyk, **Interview**, 19 May 2000; M.N. Matladi, **Interview**, 10 May 2000.

coupled with lack of responsibility. Thus late coming, and habitual absenteeism, drunkenness and promiscuity appear to be more frequent.⁴⁹⁰ This had a negative impact on discipline and performance and thus constituted a constraint on delivery of quality education as promised by the NWED and government.

Another contributing factor to poor performance at school level which constituted a constraint to NWED's planning and delivery of quality education, was the dismantling of the examination and assessment policies which were applied in Bophuthatswana. In Bophuthatswana schools were classified into three phases, namely Primary, Middle and High schools and at the end of each phase there was an external examination. There were awards for best schools in Std 4 (grade 6), Std 7 (grade 9) and Std 10 (grade 12) examinations. This system improved results throughout the school system and this is one of the factors which contributed to Bophuthatswana's having the best grade 12 results. The NWED discontinued both the Std 4 and Std 7 examinations, claiming that certificates issued at those levels did not benefit the students as they could not qualify them for any job. The assessment requirements of weekly classwork and monthly tests for pupils were no longer enforced and many teachers did not assess pupils until they wrote half yearly and final examinations. Thus students were not properly prepared for examinations. This is evident in the comparable pass rates. For example, Bophuthatswana produced 69,5% pass in 1992 but for the NWED for a period 1994-1999, the highest pass percentage was 54,6 obtained in 1998. This lowering of standards has also been noted in the tertiary institutions such as the University of North West which has had a significant intake of students from Bophuthatswana for the past 20 years.

⁴⁹⁰. D. Van Wyk, *Interview*, 19 May 2000.

The dismantlement of the tendering policy and procedures on textbooks created a serious problem for the NWED. In Bophuthatswana, the policy provided for the procurement of textbooks for a three year period and this corresponded with a lifespan of the usage of a set of textbooks. The Education Department bought sufficient textbooks for pupils and extras which were kept in government stores for possible increases in pupil enrolment and for the catering of any extension of the curriculum. NWED after its inception, relied on textbooks which were bought by Bophuthatswana. Textbooks were therefore not changed after their stipulated lifespan of three years and became repetitive and boring. On the other hand, the disappearance of the tendering policy and delay in putting an alternative policy in place by NWED, gave the MEC for Education and the Directorate for Support Services a free hand or blank cheque to exploit the situation for self - enrichment. They were alleged to have awarded tenders to “ghost” suppliers using pseudonyms, thus defrauding the NWED by making payments to companies which had never supplied textbooks. This resulted in a textbook scandal involving fraud and corruption amounting to R76 million.⁴⁹¹

In order to manage the Education system, the NWED changed the Bophuthatswana structure of a small complement at Head Office where they had only a secretary, two directors, four chief education officers and circuit office. Circuit office was the second structure between the schools and Head Office and it was staffed with a Circuit Education Officers and one or two education officers per circuit office. As argued by Mayet, the Bophuthatswana structure did not cater for a strong middle management which was crucially important for the support of schools. The NWED

⁴⁹¹. E. J. Teu, **Interview**, 24 June 2000; M.N. Matladi, **Interview** 10 May 2000; G.H. Mayet, **Interview** 14 June 2000.

then introduced an enlarged structure with a Deputy Director General (DDG), a post equivalent to that of the secretary, as an administrative head and two chief directors, one for administration and finance and the other for education and training, and nine directorates namely:

- (i) Co-ordination
- (ii) Subject Advisory Service
- (iii) Professional Development
- (iv) Curriculum and Examination
- (v) Auxiliary service
- (vi) Logistics
- (vii) Support Service
- (viii) Educator Training
- (ix) Personnel Administration

In addition to the Head Office structure, the province was divided into 12 districts which were further subdivided into 76 circuits. Each district had $\pm$ six circuits and a circuit is made up of $\pm$ 50 schools.⁴⁹² This was a very attractive structure and on paper gave hope for smooth sailing and effective management towards delivery of quality education.

For staffing this structure for middle management (deputy directors, districts and circuit managers) NWED relied on officials inherited from Bophuthatswana. For example, out of 12 district managers appointed, 10 were former Bophuthatswana officials and the bulk of circuit managers came from the former Bophuthatswana. It was only in Potchefstroom and Klerksdorp where officials came from former

⁴⁹² G.H. Mayet, *Interview*, 14 June 2000; I.S. Molale, *Interview*, 5 July 2000.

TED and DET. At the Head Office, the appointment of directors created a serious problem. From the eleven appointments made as chief directors and directors, only four directors were from Bophuthatswana, namely Messrs A.M. Seakamela, P.S. Tlolane, R.A. Patel and I.K. Motsilanyane and two were from TED namely, Dr K. Myburg and Mr F. Conradie. The rest of the directors including two chief directors, were appointed on the basis of their political backgrounds as members of the African National Congress. As noted by Mayet, the former Bophuthatswana officials were more experienced, qualified and technically aware of Educational administration than their other colleagues. On the other hand those who were politically appointed tended to clash with their colleagues over issues of ideology. These became issues of confrontation and destabilisation, posing a serious constraint to policy implementation and service delivery in Education.⁴⁹³

The infighting among senior and middle management levels created serious problems. In addition, it fuelled a conflict between the DDG as administrative head and MEC as political head. Each had a group of directors on his and her side. The major cause of this was that there was no clear separation of roles of the DDG and MEC or according to Mayet (former DDG), the MEC ignored her roles and interfered with the functions of the DDG. The MEC had strong relations with SADTU, COSAS and had established her own political arm in her office, the Community Liaison Officers (CLO). She then used these forces to oust the DDG from his post. SADTU connived with COSAS to revolt against the DDG and at one stage he was held hostage at Vryburg Hoërskool and the following day he was confronted by SADTU demanding his resignation. Political intervention by

⁴⁹³. G.H. Mayet, "Transforming Education", p.4; G.H. Mayet, **Interview**, 14 June 2000; M.N. Matladi, **Interview**, 10 May 2000; E.J. Teu, **Interview**, 24 June 2000.

Premier Popo Molefe resulted in the creation of a new department, Arts and Culture, where Mayet was deployed as DDG.⁴⁹⁴ This however did not solve the problems of the NWED.

Apart from the infighting which is common in large structures, the NWED ran into financial difficulties. Many posts created as a result of this enlarged structure remained vacant and those which fell vacant were never filled. By 1998, three districts were without District Managers and $\pm$ 15 circuits without circuit managers. The Subject Advisory Service which was intended to assist schools in curriculum implementation and in-service training was also rendered ineffective by lack of resources. This directorate took over functions which in Bophuthatswana were performed by the National Inservice Education Centre (NIEC or INSET). Through this directorate, NWED intended to appoint Subject Advisors for each district in order to reach every school. Unfortunately it failed to create such posts for all districts and to fill some of the created posts. Those appointed could not perform their jobs effectively and efficiently due to transport problems. Although they were promised subsidised vehicles, many had to rely on the old Bophuthatswana pool cars.⁴⁹⁵

For effective school management, the former Bophuthatswana school system was classified into three phases namely : Primary, Middle and High schools. This system was hailed by Molale, a Director for Co-ordination in the NWED, as making school management easier. Age ranges separated small children from elder

⁴⁹⁴. G.H. Mayet, **Interview**, 14 June 2000; G.H. Mayet, "Transforming Education", p.4.

⁴⁹⁵. M.N. Matladi, **Interview**, 10 May 2000; M. Makgetha, **Interview**, 12 July 2000.

ones, thus reducing bullying in schools, and from a psychological point of view, pupils need to be grouped according to ages for effective learning. The primary school phase catered for ages 5 to 13 years, Middle school phase for 14 to 16 years and High school phase for 17 to 19 years.⁴⁹⁶ There were however, cases where over-aged pupils could be found in phases where they were not supposed to be. These were treated as special cases. Some were ultimately referred to either Adult Education Centres or special schools as might be recommended by school psychologists. On the contrary, Mayet criticises the system. He considers the middle school phase as being very expensive, and creating more expenditure as the Middle school phase also needed more management posts. He further claims that the system was adopted from Britain at the time when Britain was doing away with the Middle schools⁴⁹⁷. Though Mayet, as DDG tried to do away with this arrangement, the arrangement remained intact. Only in areas where High Schools did not exist, Middle Schools were extended to run up to grade 12. Mayet's argument was motivated by attempts to save money instead of focussing on what the NWED priority was as far as the provision of quality education was concerned.

In terms of curriculum development and implementation, the NWED found Bophuthatswana schools following a different curriculum and a different approach from other education departments of SA. This curriculum was introduced in Primary schools as the Primary Education Upgrading Programme (PEUP) in 1979 which by 1994 had been phased in at Middle schools as MEUP. This curriculum was skills based, emphasising child centred approach to learning. It encouraged

⁴⁹⁶. I.S. Molale, **Interview**, 5 July 2000.

⁴⁹⁷. G.H. Mayet, **Interview**, 14 June 2000.

active participation, creativity and problem solving among children.⁴⁹⁸ Both Matladi and Mosidi state that PEUP implementation was a modest success, one of the contributory factors behind this being that it was accompanied by extensive teacher training. A special unit was established at the Head Office and twelve organisers were appointed to ensure the successful implementation of PEUP. At the circuit level there were PEUP teams which incorporated principals and teachers and circuit teams were responsible for organising two weeks workshops per quarter in their circuits⁴⁹⁹. At the Middle School level, training was carried out by the In-service Training Centre (INSET) which contributed in the shifting of emphasis from teacher centred to learner centred teaching approaches. Teachers were empowered to use new teaching approaches and this improved the standard of Education in Schools. Emphasis on knowledge was extended to include skills.⁵⁰⁰ However the NWED failed to build on this system, and opted for the approaches laid down by the Department of Education. Accordingly PEUP and MEUP collapsed as there was no assistance in terms of resources on the part of NWED. Teachers then resorted to the traditional teaching approaches.

From 1994, the teachers and the NWED operated in a vacuum until 1997 when a new curriculum was introduced by DOE. The new curriculum 2005 was to be implemented and achieved through an Outcome Based Education (OBE) approach. Curriculum 2005 and OBE were intertwined to the extent that to many people (including teachers and officials), they meant one and the same thing. According to Manyane:

⁴⁹⁸. M.N. Matladi, "Implementation of a Curriculum Project", p.19.

⁴⁹⁹. S.M. Mosidi, *Interview*, 13 May 2000; M.N. Matladi, *Interview*, 10 May 2000.

⁵⁰⁰. M.N. Matladi, "Implementation of a curriculum", p.108.

“the National Government (DOE)’s rationale behind OBE was to guarantee the actual achievement of desirable ideals such as racial and gender balance. This was a revolutionary innovation to transform Education to close gaps in learning which traditional approaches failed to do. The old aims and objectives were replaced by critical outcomes and specific outcomes respectively.”⁵⁰¹

Unfortunately learning outcomes were presented as being so new that their possible relationship with objectives was not thought of and was actually blurred. This created confusion for teachers.

It can be argued however that, for the North West Province, the implementation of a new curriculum was faster and better than in other provinces where PEUP was never practised. This was because the majority of the teachers inherited from Bophuthatswana had been thoroughly trained for PEUP and their experience provided a good foundation for OBE. As contended by both Mosidi and Matladi, with the PEUP background, teachers’ conceptualisation of OBE became quicker and more acute, as teachers had only to adjust to new terminology. Grouping of pupils and classroom situations remained the same.⁵⁰² As argued above, the NWED failed to utilise this advantage or to rely on the experiences and expertise of their inherited personnel, instead remaining undecided and, like the rest of the Provincial Education Departments, waited for the National Department to give instructions. No further training for teachers was done and there were inadequate resources for

⁵⁰¹. R.M. Manyane, “History Teaching in South Africa within the Context of Human and Social Sciences : An Outcomes Based Approach with Reference to Anti-Racism”, (D.ED, UNISA, 1999), pp. 1,14,252.

⁵⁰². M.N. Matladi, **Interview**, 10 May 2000; S.M. Mosidi, **Interview**, 13 May 2000.

the actual implementation of the new curriculum. It is saddening to note that curriculum 2005 has been criticised and the NWED can also be similarly criticised. According to the Curriculum 2005 Review Committee report, this was mainly caused by the lack of teacher training.⁵⁰³ The responsibility of training teachers was given to Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) such as Kgatelopele Initiative. These profit making service providers did not have the expertise to do the job, and thus providing inadequate training for the capital outlay made by government. Had the NWED used former Bophuthatswana PEUP officials, encouraged circuit teams and also used INSET, it could have served as a model for the rest of the provinces. For political reasons perhaps, it had to follow other provinces and felt it could not publicly acknowledge the positive legacy from its predecessor.

4. ECONOMY

The fall of Bophuthatswana in 1994 was followed by a period of change and transformation in the economic position of the North West Province. This economic change indeed had a major impact on the lives of many people. This section is therefore intended to investigate and analyse these changes focussing mainly on industrial and agricultural developments which were a major economic concern of Bophuthatswana. Emphasis is placed on BNDC and AGRICOR as development agencies and how they were restructured to be in line with the new economic dispensation in North West. Other economic sectors which contributed to the economy of Bophuthatswana, namely tourism and mining are mentioned as part of the general discussion because not much was done by the North West

⁵⁰³. Curriculum 2005 Review Committee (C2005 Report), Report of the Review Committee on Curriculum 2005 (Pretoria, 31 May 2000), pp. 22-23.

government to change their operations except to amend legislation governing tourism and gambling in particular.

In the Bophuthatswana period, most development was concentrated in Mmabatho as the capital city. Concerted efforts were made to achieve this development, which according to Daphne, was to satisfy the middle class (public servants) who resided in the city.⁵⁰⁴ If this was a political strategy then it was successful as the capital remained relatively calm and stable throughout the existence of Bophuthatswana; it was only in 1994 when the whole of Bophuthatswana caught fire that the capital exploded. The point being made here is that under the Bophuthatswana government, the economy of Mmabatho flourished. All state departments, head offices of parastatals and many large companies were concentrated in Mmabatho and their employees benefited from the local economy. According to Daphne, after the fall of Bophuthatswana, its former 23 state departments were reduced to 10 provincial departments. Departments such as Defence and Foreign Affairs were taken over by the National government and their employees were deployed to National. Safety and Security which remained a provincial competency, and had its Police Head Quarters relocated to Potchefstroom. These measures resulted in a shrinkage in the economy of Mmabatho.⁵⁰⁵ To add to this, van Wyk states that the capital income of Mmabatho (Mafikeng) dropped by 250% largely as a result of the downsizing and the redeployment of public servants.⁵⁰⁶ Although there is no other evidence to confirm

⁵⁰⁴. P. Daphne, **Interview**, 23 May 2000.

⁵⁰⁵. P. Daphne, **Interview**, 23 May 2000.

⁵⁰⁶. D. Van Wyk, **Interview**, 19 May 2000.

van Wyk's statement, the soaring unemployment in and around Mafikeng from 1994 justifies this statement.

The other contributory factor to the shrinkage of the economy of the capital city was the distribution of resources to other North West Province's main cities namely : Rustenburg, Klerksdorp and Potchefstroom. This boosted the local economy of these towns while on the other hand Mafikeng suffered. The result that many businesses pulled out of Mmabatho and took their businesses to these towns.⁵⁰⁷ Daphne argues that even though Mmabatho and Mafikeng's buying power decreased, on the whole the North West Province buying power actually increased.⁵⁰⁸

As mentioned earlier, in Bophuthatswana, industrial development was carried out by BNDC which indeed achieved a modest success in establishing industries including small industries in rural areas, and in attracting foreign investors and creating job opportunities (see chapter two). After the fall of Bophuthatswana, BNDC faced serious problems. As stated in the Khumalo Commission of Enquiry Report, which was instituted to investigate the affairs of BNDC, its public image as a leading organisation in helping the people during the Bophuthatswana government by building factories and shopping centres in all regions, began to diminish⁵⁰⁹. The BNDC Workers' Representative Committee (Crisis Committee) led by some politically motivated individuals, forced the Joint Administrators to

⁵⁰⁷. P. Daphne, **Interview**, 23 May 2000; D. van Wyk, **Interview**, 19 May 2000.

⁵⁰⁸. P. Daphne, **Interview**, 23 May 2000.

⁵⁰⁹. Khumalo Commission, **A Report of the Khumalo Commission of Enquiry into the North West Development Corporation, formerly Known as the Bophuthatswana National Development Corporation (BNDC) (1996)**, pp. 6-8.

suspend, without the benefit of a hearing, the whole Senior Management of the corporation. These included the Managing Director, Mr L Maree, and five Senior General Managers, among them Mr Eddie Mangope, a son of the former president who was the Senior General Manager for Small Business Development (SBD).⁵¹⁰ Despite the obvious mood for change, the decision to suspend the management of BNDC by the Joint Administrators was ill-advised and ill-considered. Under the management of the suspended officials, BNDC had improved and had assets (infrastructure, land and buildings) amounting to R7 billion. Their suspension was later withdrawn when the Joint Administrators realised the error they had committed. This had already created a serious problem; Eddie's return was clouded by the Anti-Mangope (former president) campaign(see ahead). He was not welcome by the Workers' Representatives Committee. Eddie Mangope who was described by Mr Pamesky, chairman of the Board of Directors, as a task master, was reported to demand (and obtain) loyalty and service from his staff. Mangope was later forced to accept a retrenchment arrangement⁵¹¹. The amount paid was an out of court settlement, and was rumoured to be an amount of R5 million. The departure of Eddie Mangope from BNDC was a great loss for the Corporation especially the SBD division which during his tenure has performed very well. It had from 1991 to 1994 created 13 495 jobs.⁵¹²

To be in line with new economic policies of the new North West Provincial Government and the broader economic dispensation in South Africa, BNDC was

⁵¹⁰. Khumalo Commission, **A Report of the Khumalo Commission of Enquiry**, pp.14-15.

⁵¹¹. Pamesky as quoted in the Khumalo Commission Report, p.42; S.S. Malapa, **Interview**, 24 May 2000.

⁵¹². Khumalo Commission, **A Report of the Khumalo Commission of Enquiry**, p.44.

restructured and transformed. It was renamed the North West Development Corporation (NWDC). It was extended to other areas such as Potchefstroom, Klerksdorp, Brits and Vryburg. A new Board of Directors was appointed whose members were political appointees, appointed by the MEC for Finance in consultation with the Executive Council (EXCO). Mr Maree, the MD of the corporation, was immediately retired. His contract had expired and it was not renewed. He was accused of being aloof and not keen to address the grievances of the employees. He was replaced by Mr Sindane as Managing Director (then changed to Chief Executive Officer (CEO)).⁵¹³ The departure of Maree like that of Mangope created a leadership gap which reduced the effectiveness of the corporation.

NWU
LIBRARY

There are opposing views regarding the fate of the NWDC. According to Malapa, a communication officer for NWDC, the corporation which during the Bophuthatswana period was jealously guarded and well-funded as a parastatal and economic development agency, was under the new government declared a non-governmental organisation. The perception of the NWPG was that NWDC as an NGO should be self-sustaining. Malapa argues that this was a political move to destroy the corporation as government perceived it as an Apartheid and Bophuthatswana structure. Without adequate financial backing the corporation became ineffective in industrial development as it could not provide services and loans as was the case under the former government. Under these circumstances, the corporation could no longer provide incentives such as low taxes and infrastructure,⁵¹⁴ which it used to attract industrialists. These had assisted in the

⁵¹³. S.S. Malapa, **Interview**, 24 May 2000; Khumalo Commission, **A Report of the Khumalo Commission of Enquiry**, p.77.

⁵¹⁴. S.S. Malapa, **Interview**, 24 May 2000.

creation of jobs for many rural people because small industries were established all over Bophuthatswana (see chapter two). Malapa attributes the failure of the NWDC to the new NWPG for failing to fund the corporation adequately. This forced the corporation to privatise some of its investment wings such as Sunbop and cut its staff in an attempt to save money and generate some income. In 1996 alone, for example, 15 000 employees were retrenched, and another 2400 employees retrenched in 1999. Many other rural people employed in regional offices and industries also lost their jobs. NWDC was forced to retain only 400 employees which constituted less than 5% of its staff complement under the BNDC.⁵¹⁵ This in itself contributed significantly and negatively to the high rate of unemployment in the North West Province.

Daphne however blames the problems of NWDC and the North West economy on the former Bophuthatswana government. Daphne claims that Bophuthatswana industrial development was based on an artificial economy; industries were established where it was not appropriate to do so. He further states that these developments were politically motivated and not economically viable. The withdrawal of industrialists from these areas stemming from reduced incentives, can be offered as proof that this indeed was an artificial economy. They moved to where there was logic to invest; where industrial capital, available manpower and markets were readily available.⁵¹⁶

⁵¹⁵. S.S. Malapa, **Interview**, 24 May 2000.

⁵¹⁶. P.Daphne, **Interview**, 23 May 2000.

Whatever the reasons, the NWDC found itself in serious problems. Its properties including infrastructure were poorly maintained and this led to loss of tenants⁵¹⁷. According to Malapa, it also lost its tenants who had occupied their complexes, such as OK Bazaar, which was one of their core occupants. This was due to high rentals and the fact that the NWPG had changed its banking from the Standard Bank of Bophuthatswana (STANBO) to the First National Bank (FNB). Public servants were also paid through this bank, which had branches in big towns formerly in the Republic of South Africa while STANBO had branches in all former regions of Bophuthatswana. This forced people to buy where their money was invested. Many of the NWDC Complexes therefore became unused, and the corporation was forced to sell some of them such as the Taung shopping complex.⁵¹⁸

By 1998, the state of affairs at NWDC were in total disorder. The institution, which by 1993, was receiving interest of R37, 857 million and substantial profits amounting to R10, 259 million, operated at a loss of R5 million per month. Most of its staff was demotivated, and management control was virtually non - existent. Its assets totalled R781, 84 million while liabilities amounted to R680 978 759, 43⁵¹⁹. The report of the Judicial Managers further states that the corporation failed to follow up debtors on their outstanding accounts because the government always

⁵¹⁷. B. Cooper, **Report of the Co-Provisional judicial Managers of North West Development Corporation (Proprietary) Limited (Under Provisional Judicial Management) ("The Company")**, Master's Reference number M1/99, P.21.

⁵¹⁸. S.S. Malapa, **Interview**, 24 May 2000.

⁵¹⁹. B. Cooper, **Report of the Co-Provisional Judicial Managers**, pp.2, 7-8; Khumalo Commission, **A Report of the Khumalo Commission of Enquiry**, p.72.

intervened to protect debtors⁵²⁰. Malapa explains that the major problem in debt collection was the fact that most debtors were retrenched people⁵²¹. On the 9 February 1999, NWDC was placed under the Provisional Judicial Management on the recommendation of the MEC for Finance. With a debt of R700 million, the corporation faced possible liquidation⁵²².

Under agriculture, Agricor, one of the legacies of the North West Province from Bophuthatswana, which was responsible for agricultural development in Bophuthatswana, was restructured. As stated earlier, Agricor established institutions such as co-operatives and rural service centres. It has been argued elsewhere that such institutions provided facilities which ensured that the people of the region were empowered in the agricultural arena (see chapter two). Agricor was divided into two institutions, Agricultural bank (Agribank) and Agricultural Services corporation (Agriserve).⁵²³ In August 1995, Agricor closed down and its functions were taken over by Agriserve. Its employees were faced with problems of job security and this indeed impacted negatively on their performance. Some employees were absorbed into the Department of Agriculture, others remained with Agriserve. Two hundred and sixty head office staff members were retrenched together with hundreds of those who were classified as casual labourers. These problems led to disillusionment among the staff. Most of the employees were

⁵²⁰. Khumalo Commission, **A Report of the Khumalo Commission of Enquiry**, p.73.

⁵²¹. S.S. Malapa, **Interview**, 24 May 2000.

⁵²². North West Agricultural Services Corporation Limited (Agriserve), **Annual Report 1998/99**, p.3.

⁵²³. North West Agricultural Services Corporation Limited (Agriserve), **Annual Report 1998/99**, p.3.

placed under Public Service Commission (PSC) conditions of employment and lost most of the benefits which they enjoyed under Agricor, such as subsidised vehicles. Instead of addressing these problems, the NWPG insisted that these changes could not be avoided as Agriculture had to conform to provincial agricultural imperatives and had to keep up with transformation imperatives.⁵²⁴

Agriserve was divided into two directorates, Support Services and Planning and Information. Its functions remained as those of Agricor except that in addition, it emphasised the promotion of the role of women in agriculture. According to the report for the period 1994 - 1999, most of the services of the Agriserve remained unstructured and were done on an ad hoc basis. Most clients were not aware of the services. Information on agricultural industry did not reach many farmers due to poor contact between the farmers and the agricultural industry.⁵²⁵ Agriserve also assumed the functions of the Marketing Board. The Marketing Board was dismantled and became the smallest unit of the Planning and Information directorate. This stifled its operation and there was therefore virtually no marketing of agricultural products in the North West Province.

During the restructuring process, Agriserve lost most of the skilled, trained and experienced staff as they opted for Voluntary Severance Packages. Amongst them were almost all the regional veterinary surgeons who then operated privately. During that process, 2301 posts were abolished. According to the Agriserve report, it remained with a lean structure, a mere complement of 452 people located

⁵²⁴. North West Department of Agriculture, **Activity Report for the period, January 1997 to December 1997**, p.181.

⁵²⁵. W.T. Ratshikana, **Interview**, 10 September 1999; S. Motshabi, **Interview**, 15 June 2000; North West Department of Agriculture, **Activity Report, January 1997 to December 1997**, pp. 188 - 189.

at head office. Only 298 posts were filled due to a moratorium imposed on the appointment of public servants. Also at regional and district offices, many former Bophuthatswana employees, who were well trained and had managed Agricor, took the Voluntary Severance Package. This led to the collapse of finance and administration, forcing the institution to centralise functions to the Head Office. The period 1996 - 1999 there saw a serious crisis in Agriserve⁵²⁶ and a decline in service delivery.

Under Agriserve, most of the projects which were previously funded and managed by Agricor, collapsed. The Tsholofelo Citrus Project in Lehurutshe faced serious problems. The project was handed over to people who laid claim to the fields which were formerly used for the project. These fields were not used when the Bophuthatswana government took them, cleared them and utilised them for the project. According to Moletsane, a long service project officer, the fields were taken after a "tribal" resolution was taken to allocate the area to the government. Traditionally land is not owned as private property by individuals but is allocated to those who use it. Once not used, the "tribe" could reallocate it. This tradition was flouted by the new government and created problems for the project. No financial assistance was given and this led to the collapse of the project⁵²⁷. The same happened to the Temisano (Vegetable) project at Dinokana. Pula Designer Wear project also faced problems as it was seen as a burden to Agriserve. Attempts were made to privatise it and downsize its staff, but these failed.⁵²⁸

⁵²⁶. Agriserve, **Annual Report 1998 / 1999**, pp. 10-12, 29.

⁵²⁷. J. Moletsane, **Interview**, 20 June 2000; S. Motshabii, **Interview**, 15 June 2000; North West Department of Agriculture, **Activity Report, January 1997 to December 1997**, pp. 185 - 187.

⁵²⁸. W.T Ratshikana, **Interview**, 10 September 1999.

The rural developments which were previously initiated and supervised by extension officers, were placed under Kgora project. Through the Kgora Project 1838 people were trained for agricultural enterprises such as bee keeping and trench gardening. About 188 women were trained in project management and leadership. Most of these activities were centred around Mafikeng and for rural communities, Kgora programmes remained largely rhetorical and were never operational.⁵²⁹ Had Kgora programmes succeeded, they might have promoted household food security. They were unfortunately too urban based and failed to alleviate rural poverty. They could not even match attempts made by Agricor through rural service centres, extension services and rural development officers (see chapter two).

Agribank became a semi - autonomous statutory institution (parastatal) within the North West Department of Agriculture. Its services were extended beyond the former 12 districts of Bophuthatswana, but its functions remained unchanged⁵³⁰. According to Gaoraelwe the chairperson of the Agribank Board, the period of five years since 1994 was the worst for the institution. Attempts to restructure the Agribank led to loss of top management. This situation was aggravated by a moratorium declared on appointment of new personnel; many posts could not be filled thus causing stress and fears in the skeleton staff that remained.⁵³¹ This impacted negatively on service delivery.

⁵²⁹. Agriserve, **Annual Report, 1998/1999**, pp. 8-11.

⁵³⁰. North West Agricultural Bank (Agribank), **Annual Report 1998/1999**, p.1.

⁵³¹. K. Gaoraelwe, "The First Years of Post 1994 at Agricultural Bank of the North West", Agribank, **Annual Report 1998 / 1999**, pp.3-4.

Agribank also suffered as a result of the government's political attitude of seeing it as a Bophuthatswana structure. The government reduced its grant for salaries thus forcing Agribank to channel more money to its salary bill instead of reaching people it was intended for (farmers). The government responded to these problems by claiming that loans provided to farmers were creating a dependency syndrome that had been engineered by the former government. According to the government this resulted in the perpetuation of a system of patronage which negated empowerment in classical terms.⁵³² Whatever might have been the cause of these problems it led to the demise of Agribank. Faced with a debt of R200 million and unpaid loans amounting to R146 183 500, Agribank started to avoid providing loans to poor farmers and dealt with commercial farmers only, as they had the ability to repay their loans without government assistance.⁵³³ This was a shift from the original mission of assisting smaller farmers, who were always avoided by commercial banks because of their high risk potential.

Apart from the political restructuring of the government, the bank also had problems of its own making. There was a lack of accounting and financial management. It always had problems with its financial statements. For 1997, for example, financial statements were only approved on the 26 May 1999. An amount of R3,3 million could not be accounted for.⁵³⁴

NWU
LIBRARY

⁵³². Agribank, **Annual Report 1998/1999**, p.4; North West Department of Agriculture, **Activity Report for the period, January 1997 to December 1997**, p.190.

⁵³³. Agribank, **Annual Report 1998/1999**, p.6; North West Department of Agriculture, **Activity Report for the period, January 1997 to December 1997**, pp. 210 - 213.

⁵³⁴. **North West Mirror**, July 2000.

Other former Bophuthatswana parastatals were closed down. Among them were Consumer Council of Bophuthatswana (CCB) and Sefalana Employees Benefit of Organisation (SEBO). SEBO had been ranked fourth out of 14 investment managers in southern Africa in terms of pension fund investment returns. It had assets amounting to R2, 5 billion and always showed a healthy surplus. In 1992, for example, it had a surplus of R84 million.⁵³⁵ Under the new dispensation, the pension fund was controlled by the national government and its funds were transferred to South African Pension Fund which by then was depleted. The depletion of the South African Pension Fund was a result of overspending during the CODESA negotiations and pension payouts to civil servants by homelands such as Venda before their incorporation into South Africa.⁵³⁶ Instead of continuing to invest the money in the region, the Bophuthatswana fund was used to stabilise the South African Pension Fund.

The economic downswing which followed the inception of the democratic government since 1994, balanced out a general increase in tourism, so that there was little change in tourism and mining. One might have expected a revenue increase in mining, given improved labour relations and the recognition of trade unions. However the mining sector continued to face problems such as fluctuations in prices and from time to time was forced to retrench some of its employees.⁵³⁷ For the Bafokeng, the fall of Bophuthatswana paved the way for more benefit. They resolved their long outstanding problems with the Impala mines and were allocated a seat on the Board. Their royalties were increased to 22% with

⁵³⁵. SEBO, **Annual Report, 1992**, pp. 4-5.

⁵³⁶. M.N. Matladi, **Interview**, 10 May 2000; G.H. Mayet, **Interview**, 25 May 2000.

⁵³⁷. B. Motsisi, **Interview**, 12 April 2000.

effect from 1998 and they were given one million shares, worth around R250 million.⁵³⁸ On tourism, Daphne states that gambling which was one of the sources of income in the Bophuthatswana's Southern Sun hotels such as Sun City, was adversely affected by the change in legislation governing gambling and licencing of casinos. Many other hotels obtained casino licences while some former Bophuthatswana hotels lost them.⁵³⁹ Gamblers therefore had many other options rather than flocking to the North West, as had been the case with Bophuthatswana. The region was no longer South Africa's premier gambling centre. The NWPG also contributed to the decreased revenue from hotel industry by decreasing the hotel tax levy from 15% to 3%. Although Martin Kuscus, claims that this was done in an attempt to save many jobs for the local people, 250 000 people lost their jobs. The reduction of tax levy resulted in government losing a revenue of R437 million in 1999.⁵⁴⁰ According to Magodiello, the head of the Marketing Research Unit of North West Parks and Tourism Board, the number of international tourists visiting the North West Province for the period 1996 - 1998 decreased from 375 777 to 303 798, and revenue generated decreased from R1, 4 billion to R1,1 billion.⁵⁴¹

5. CONCLUSION

This chapter has shown that Bophuthatswana left a varied forms of legacy for the North West Province. This legacy to a large extent was in the form of

⁵³⁸. **Sunday Times**, 2 April 2000.

⁵³⁹. P. Daphne, **Interview**, 2 May 2000.

⁵⁴⁰. **The Mail**, 26 May 2000.

⁵⁴¹. M. Magodiello, **Interview**, 17 August 2000.

infrastructure, human resources (public servants) and economic and educational systems. It is very interesting to note how the new NWPG struggled to deal with the inherited past. In some cases the legacy constituted a constraint to planning and policy implementation for the new government. The government then embarked on a process of restructuring in an attempt to make the inherited legacy in line with the new provincial and national dispensation. Instead the process led to more problems than expected. The province lost many of trained and experienced officials.

The restructuring also led to a scaling down and even closure of some economic institutions such as parastatals, resulting in a loss of jobs. This became a source of conflict and criticism against the new provincial government.

The chapter has also indicated some areas of successes and achievements attained by the new provincial government especially in the educational field. Schools were opened to learners irrespective of race. Although racism is still rife in the province, the provincial government is doing well to overcome that problem.

This chapter, also shows is the tragedy of the Bophuthatswana story. Built on false ideological foundations, it was well resourced by the South African state, in an area where arguably fewer resources should have been directed. Once Bophuthatswana fell, the “bubble” burst and the new provincial government was unable, and in some cases unwilling, to build upon the foundations provided by the former Bophuthatswana. At worst the NWPG can be accused of a lack of imagination and crudeness in the way it dealt with its physical and human legacy. Yet, faced with economic and political realities, it had little choice. The story of Bophuthatswana and its legacy is therefore one of a “lose-lose” situation. The

empty stadia and airports, the deserted government buildings, vacant houses and struggling former parastatals in Mafikeng and other leading centres of the former Bophuthatswana are a stark reminder of this tragic episode in South African history.

CONCLUSIONS

The impact of Bophuthatswana on the history of the North West Province has been recounted from the point of view of continuity and discontinuity. This history, if succinctly summed up and properly told, is the history of internal change and continuity, transformation from one form of governance to the other in differing political contexts. The study took a multi - disciplinary approach, and investigated selected themes in the political, social, and economic development of Bophuthatswana, the legacy that Bophuthatswana passed on to the North West Province and how the North West Province dealt with that specific inheritance.

The study opens with the history and origin of the Batswana whose history as stated in chapter one, was variously used to either advance or contradict the homeland concept. The Batswana were not united as one Batswana nation but were closely linked through interrelated chiefdoms. In the early 19th Century they fell victims to various external forces or imposed systems, such as Difaqane, Boer intrusion and land dispossession, British Imperialism (colonialism) and later Apartheid (internal colonisation). These were largely disruptive and had a negative impact on the Batswana.

The study then examined the factors and processes leading to the “independence” of Bophuthatswana, indicating that it was largely imposed on the future citizens of Bophuthatswana. It is argued that ethnicity was a divisive tool used by the National Party Government to achieve its goals. Bophuthatswana became “independent” on the 6 December 1977, in accordance with the Apartheid system. From the very beginning, Bophuthatswana’s legitimacy was in serious doubt, and was not supported by many Black South Africans including a large segment of the

Batswana. The elections for the creation of this Bantustan had little support from the mass of the Batswana and were held during the time of imprisonment of those who were opposed to the idea of “separate development”. As stated by Lawrence, “Bophuthatswana became independent at a horrendous price”.⁵⁴²

NWU
LIBRARY

Bophuthatswana was therefore an imposed political structure and a surrogate of the Apartheid state. It was not about broad - based democracy but ethnic loyalty to a section of Batswana elites. These Batswana elites who later took over the government after “independence”, were handpicked by the Afrikaner-led South African Government through the characteristic “internal colonial” mechanism of “divide and rule” of the traditional leadership structures and interest groups, including the co-option of traditional leaders who slavishly supported Pretoria. One such example was the choice of Mangope by Pretoria after ignoring other legitimate claims and exile of recognised leaders (paramount chiefs) such as *kgosi* Ramotshere Moiloa who fled to Botswana. Many traditional leaders therefore boycotted talks on an “independent” homeland.⁵⁴³ This, as shown in chapter four, became a constant source of conflict between Mangope and *dikgosi* who did not accept the homeland system and the “independence” of Bophuthatswana.

Following the attainment of “independence”, Bophuthatswana set herself the goal of vigorous development in political, social and economic terms. With Mangope as the guiding force, Bophuthatswana and its capital Mmabatho visibly developed and the homeland attained a degree of success presenting itself as a model of “independence”. The South African Government of the time regarded it as a

⁵⁴². M. Lawrence, **Interview**, 31 May 2000.

⁵⁴³. M. Lawrence, **Interview**, 31 May 2000.

model state, standing out head and shoulders above all other “independent states” created by South Africa. In the economic field, Bophuthatswana made attempts to develop an independent economy through the establishment of parastatals such as BNDC, Agricor and Bop Tourism. Indeed, these provided Bophuthatswana with revenue and also provided job opportunities for the local people. Under the new NWPG, many of these parastatals were scaled down and this resulted in great losses of employment for the local people. Although the macro economic politics of the new Provincial or national government did cause unemployment, economic decline was to a large extent due to the dictates of a new global economic order. From 1996 to 1998, the unemployment rate in South Africa rose from 19,3% to 25,2%, and in terms of job opportunities, there was a decrease in jobs from 5.2 million to 4,9 million.⁵⁴⁴

One of the publicly pronounced objectives of opting for independence was to liberate the Batswana and other inhabitants of homeland from Apartheid and also to create a non - racial society. Mangope and other homeland leaders had accepted to operate within the Separate Development with the hope of modifying aspects of Apartheid, but they failed to realise how tied their hands were by the Apartheid regime. They were free to bring changes and innovations in their respective homelands, only when these changes were in line with Grand Apartheid and not in conflict with it. The Bophuthatswana constitution abolished racial discrimination and provided for the creation of a non-racial society in Bophuthatswana. The constitution also contained a Bill of Rights to protect individuals against any form of discrimination. It was a total break from the Apartheid mandate. Although this was one of the best constitutions in Southern

⁵⁴⁴. City Press, 21 May 2000.

Africa, and served as a model for other homelands, it became increasingly eroded and eventually abandoned during the heat of political tension and opposition, when powerful interest groups and political formations challenged the legitimacy of the homeland, and the oppressive rule of Mangope.

The degree of political conflict and repression which became prevalent in the homelands, including Bophuthatswana, indicated the failure of South Africa to use homelands as mechanism to avoid racial and political conflict. Instead it fuelled conflict and spread it to areas outside “white” South Africa. Homeland leaders were always accused of promoting separate development which contributed immensely to the general poverty of the Black South Africans. The attitude of homeland leaders such as Mangope towards South Africa’s banned liberation movements such as the ANC indicated the success of the South African government in the creation of the homelands as buffers against its political enemies. South Africa used Homelands to further its policies and sometimes to carry out insurgent activities, thus further alienating the very people they claimed to liberate from oppression. Homeland leaders were always under constant pressure to demonstrate that they were not selling out Africans, something which they failed to do due to South Africa’s tight control over them.

The political hostility shown by the ANC-led government towards Mangope and his party, the UCDP, indicates the extent of the divide between them. Mangope was subjected to intense physical and emotional stress during the Skweyiya Commission and the trial which followed thereafter. Although there were attempts to marginalise him, he was allowed to operate and take part in the elections. With his party gaining significant support in the 1999 elections, he returned to

parliament and had the opportunity to influence policies and increase UCDP support.

The attempt to remove the Mangope influence and erase the history of Bophuthatswana by changing names of institutions and streets which came into existence as a result of the Bophuthatswana government, though perhaps understandable, indicates the divide between the “old” and the “new”, and are seen by former Bophuthatswana supporters as evidence of the ANC’s retreat from democracy and reconciliation. The removal of Mangope’s statues, especially the one at Lehurutshe, which was erected from the money raised by the Bahurutshe of which Mangope was a member, resembles an attempt by new government to deny people their history. It was to say to the people of the erstwhile Bophuthatswana, “there is no past to speak of, there is no history to boast of, your past is blank and nothing more. What matters is the present and you don’t have control over it”.⁵⁴⁵

It is understandable that it was difficult for the victims of a particular system to continue to be reminded of that system or even to be seen to be associated with that system. But this does not exonerate victims from the blame and crime of distorting the past. What is surprising is that while the ANC led government was attempting wipe-out Bophuthatswana from history, it showed tolerance towards the icons of the former Colonial and Apartheid administrations such as Cecil Rhodes. Statues and names, whether those of Jan Van Riebeck, Hendrick Verwoerd, P.W. Botha, L.M. Mangope, K.D. Matanzima, N.R. Mandela, remain monuments for future generations, who need to know what their older (past) generations have done,

⁵⁴⁵. Sir Seretse Khama, quoted in K. Smith, **The Changing Past: Trends in South African Historical Writing** (1988), p.5.

whether positively or negatively. Those monuments therefore need to be safeguarded and preserved. History is about people and their actions, and it cannot just be wished away.

One other valuable conclusion is that the events of March 1994 in Bophuthatswana, the strikes, looting and confrontation against government, which brought about the fall of the Bophuthatswana government, had an incredible impact on the people of the region. It became a legacy of people who had been vigorously involved in protest politics, undergone extensive political education, become used to challenging authority, and in a sense, creating their own political future. This was further strengthened by a long history of resistance and protest politics against Apartheid regime, and the improved labour relations and existence of labour rights and recognised trade unionism which accompanied the new political dispensation. This impacted on the new NWPG which in its early stages was confronted with protest marches from workers who demanded improved conditions of service. The issue of salary increases has remained a major and constant source of confrontation and conflict. Some of these actions took a violent form and sometimes disrupted services and brought production to a halt. This has hampered service delivery especially in social services.

From the analysis of Mangope's political career, the study has shown that Mangope's political career was characterised by many controversies and contradictions. As a young man especially while at St Peters, he was a critic of the Apartheid system and vowed to devise a solution to liberate his people. This stand point later changed to that of a willing supporter and agent of the separate development. In accepting to work within this system and later accepting "independence" he contradicted the impression that he was opposed to Apartheid,

that he would use the opportunity to destroy the ideological basis of Apartheid, liberate his people and later Blacks in general. The early years of his rule showed some prospects of improved conditions for the Bophuthatswana people; he succeeded in creating a non - racial society. As Mangope progressed in his political career, he became more authoritarian and intolerant towards opposition. He denied people, he had promised to liberate, freedom of speech, movements and economic rights. Contrary to his earlier conviction, he failed to become a catalyst for change. He even resisted changes and processes which started in 1990 and resulted in the inception of a democratic, united South Africa. This exposed his lack of statesmanship; he failed to seize the moment and present himself as a meaningful player at national, provincial and local levels. Despite this, he later made a political come back in 1999 as a leader of the official opposition in the North West Provincial Legislature, making history by becoming the only homeland leader, who after a disgraceful fall (1994), returned to active politics and parliament, without opportunistically joining the ruling party (ANC).

In the education field, the study has shown how Bophuthatswana through Education for Popagano, took steps to break away from the Apartheid (Bantu) education. Bophuthatswana succeeded in introducing multi-cultural education which was an experiment totally outside the Apartheid discourse. Through the introduction of PEUP, it went on to produce educational products which were of benefit to the new order in terms of skilled labour. It was also in education where it can be argued that the NWPG has failed to build on foundations of earlier strides taken by Bophuthatswana government. Although there were other contributing factors to the situation, the main reason was the fact that the NWPG did not build on its inherited legacy. It preferred a total break from the old system. It is understandable that the politics of the day should inform policy formulations, but

for curriculum implementation such as OBE, should have benefitted from the PEUP experience of the former Bophuthatswana teachers. The NWED has no excuse for failing to implement OBE which had similarities with PEUP; many teachers in the province were conversant with it and this should have benefited education in the province.

The North West Province, unlike Bophuthatswana which developed over two decades and ran “a full swing,” is still in transition, and despite many problems it has to contend with, there are still prospects for improvement. The new government needs to rid itself of the attitude of downplaying the Bophuthatswana legacy, especially economic developments and infrastructure, as these developments were funded from tax payers’ money, many of whom legitimately became the citizens of the North West Province. This legacy needs to be safeguarded and utilised to benefit them. Parastatals such as Development Corporation (NWDC) could have been preserved and adequately funded, in order to improve service delivery to small industries. Although being part of the South African economic dispensation and the global economic order, the NWPG could still have protected local interests who have benefited from past policy. Local (Provincial) dynamics should always be taken into account. Although efforts were made to unite all the people of the North West Province, there is still a need to intensify these efforts, and as much as possible, avoid divisive references such as former Bophuthatswana people, former Apartheid officials and structures. This will give the people a sense of belonging and ownership of the province and thus encourage co-operation in the building the province. The scars of Bophuthatswana are still apparent and need to be fully healed in order for full reconciliation to take place.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

CONTENTS

1. Archival Sources
2. Government Publications / Official Sources
 - (a) Bophuthatswana
 - (b) North West Province
 - (c) South Africa
 - (d) Transkei
3. Court Cases
4. Newspapers
5. Published Secondary Sources
 - (a) Articles
 - (b) Books
6. Unpublished Theses and Papers
7. Oral Informants

ARCHIVAL SOURCES

NATIONAL ARCHIVAL DEPOSITORY (NAD), PRETORIA

RECORDS OF NATIVE AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, 1954-1977.

NAD,Bantu Adminstrasie en Ontwikkeling(BAO), vol. 1.4920, CV of Chief L.L.M. Mangope, Chief Minister of Bophuthatswana, Chief of the Motswedi-Bahurutshe Boo Manyane Tribe, Zeerust.

NAD,BAO/F54/1791/3, Kapteins en Hoof manner-Motchedi Loasie-Zeerust.

NAD, BAO/1/4920, Feite oor Lawrence Lucas Manyane Mangope.

NAD, TO/1964/92/1381/1398, Admission of Lucas Manyane Mangope as a Sworn Translator.

NAD,Uitvoerende Raad van die Unie van Suid Afrika(URU)/1958/2031/3831, Installation of L.L.M Mangope, 18.9.1958.

NAD/URU/1965/1532/4938, Appointment of Mangope as member of University of North West Advisory Committee.

NAD,URU/1977/2011/2037, Treaty to regulate Military Aid, Military co-operation and certain Military matters between the Governments of the Republics of South Africa and Bophuthatswana.

OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS

(a) BOPHUTHATSWANA

(i) PUBLISHED REPORTS

Agricor, **Annual Report**, 1990-1991.

Department of Education, **Annual Report**, for 1992 and 1993.

Department of Finance, **Annual Report**, for 1991 and 1992.

Department of Information, **Bophuthatswana at Glance: Information in brief**, 1991.

Department of Information, **Republic of Bophuthatswana :Five Years of Independence**, (Department of Information Mmabatho, 1983).

Department of Law and Order, **Bophuthatswana Police Commissioner's Annual Report**, 1980.

Department of Law and Order, **Bophuthatswana Police Commissioner's Annual Report**, 1992.

Department of Local Government and Housing, **Annual Report**, 1990.

Heimstra, V.G., **The Bophuthatswana Law Reports 1977-1979**, (The Government of the Republic of Bophuthatswana 1979).

Republic of Bophuthatswana, **National Education Commission : Education for Popagano, Report**, 1978.

Republic of Bophuthatswana, **Debates of the First Sessions of the First National Assembly**, 7 March - 7 April vol.1, 1978.

Republic of Bophuthatswana, **Debates of the First Session of the Second National Assembly**, 3 May - 15 June 1983, vol.1.

Republic of Bophuthatswana, **Debates of Special Session of the Second National Assembly**, 2 - 4 December 1985.

Republic of Bophuthatswana, **Report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Batlhaping Ba ga Phuduhutswana Ba ga Mankuroane of Taung**, vol.1, (Mmabatho, December, 1988).

Republic of Bophuthatswana, **The Republic of Bophuthatswana Constitution, Act no 18 of 1977**.

Sefalana Employees Benefits Organisation (SEBO), **Annual Report**, 1992.

Stewart, T., **The Bophuthatswana Law Reports, 1984-1987**, (The Government of the Republic of Bophuthatswana, 1987).

The Republic of Bophuthatswana, **The National Security Act no. 27 of 1981**.

(b) NORTH WEST PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION

(i) UNPUBLISHED REPORTS

Cooper, B.C. (Compiler), "Report of the Co-Provisional Judicial Managers of North West Development Corporation (Proprietary) Limited (Under Provisional Judicial Management) ("The Company")", Master's Reference number M1/99, 1999.

De Vos, H.J. & Maree, L.C.J., "Submissions to the Bophuthatswana National Development Corporation LTD(BNDC) Commission of Enquiry".

Joint Administrators, "Press Statement: Administrators' Reassurance on Bop. Pensions", 7 April 1994.

Joint Administrators, "Report to the North West Legislature, South African Government and the Transitional Executive Council", June 1994.

Joint Administrators, "Second Report to the Management of the Transitional Executive Council", 10 April 1994.

Keenan, J., "The Keenan Report", Date Unknown.

Khumalo Commission, "A Report of the Khumalo Commission of Enquiry into the North West Development Corporation, formerly known as the Bophuthatswana National Development Corporation (BNDC)", Mafikeng, 1996.

Skweyiya Commission of Enquiry, “Final and Detailed Report of the Commission into corrupt Practises and Irregular use of Public funds in the Government Departments and Bodies by various Individuals or at their Instances”, (presented to the Premier of the North West Province in 1997).

Tebbutt Commission, “The Report of the Tebbutt Commission” (<http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/commissions/1998/tebbutt.html>).

(ii) PUBLISHED REPORTS

Joint Administrators, **The Administration of Bophuthatswana Decree**, no.1 of 1994.

North West Agriculture Bank (Agribank), **Annual Report**, 1998/1999.

North West Agricultural Services Corporation Limited (Agriserve), **Annual Report** for 1998 / 1999.

North West Department of Agriculture, **Activity Report**, for the period, January 1997 to December 1997.

North West Provincial Government, **Report of the Sebetlela Investigation on the Headmanship of Braklaagte : Bahurutshe ba ga Moilwa**, 1994.

(c) **SOUTH AFRICA**

Curriculum 2005 Review Committee, **Report of the Review Committee on Curriculum 2005** (Presented to Minister of Education, Prof. K. Asmal in Pretoria, 31 May 2000).

Republic of South Africa, **Law Reports 1982 (3) SA 717**.

Republic of South Africa, **Law Reports, SA 850(3)**, 1994.

Republic of South Africa, **South African Schools Act, no. 84 of 1996**.

Republic of South Africa, **The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act no. 108 of 1996**.

(d) **TRANSKEI**

Transkei Development Corporation Limited, **Annual Report**, 1979.

COURT CASES

High Court of South Africa (Bophuthatswana Provincial Division), *State v Lucas Manyane Mangope*, Judgement, CC 30/97, 20 July 1998.

High Court of South Africa (Bophuthatswana Provincial Division), *State v Lucas Manyane Mangope*, Judgement on Sentence, 21 August 1998.

Supreme Court of Bophuthatswana, Chief E.P.L. Molotlegi and Cecil Tumagole (applicants) v President of Bophuthatswana and George Molotlegi (Respondents), case M74/89. 1989.

Supreme Court of Bophuthatswana, Edward Patrick Lebone Molotlegi and Cecil Molotlegi Tumagole v President of Bophuthatswana and George Mokgwaro Mollo Molotlegi, Judgement, 1 August 1994.

Supreme Court of Bophuthatswana, Lucas Manyane Mangope v Tjaart van der Walt and Job Mokgoro, Case no. M79/94, Judgement, 18 April 1994.

NWU
LIBRARY

NEWSPAPERS

Specific reference has been made to the following editions:

Business Daily, 3 August 1987.

Business Day, 11 June 1993, 8 March 1994, 17 March 1994, 30 March 1994, 14 April 1994, 15 April 1994, 11 May 1994, 14 January 1998.

Business News, 29 March 1988.

Cape Times (date unknown).

City Press, 1 November 1977, 3 August 1987.

Financial Mail, 18 March 1994.

Mafikeng Mail, 11 April 1975, 1 July 1977.

Mail and Guardian, 4-10 March 1994, 18-24 March 1994.

North West Mirror, July 2000.

Rand Daily Mail, 13 March 1974, 16 November 1974.

Saturday Star, 15 February 1987.

Sowetan, 21 August 1998, 11 March 1994, 14 March 1994, 15 March 1994, 18 March 1994, 26 March 1994, 30 March 1994, 6 May 1994.

Sunday Times, 27 March 1988, 17 February 1989, 3 March 1994, 13 March 1994, 20 March 1994, 20 March 1999, 2 April 2000.

The Citizen, 6 January 1987, 10 August 1987, 28 September 1987, 12 January 1988, 20 October 1988, 11 June 1993, 12 March 1994, 14 March 1994, 15 March 1994, 18 March 1994, 19 March 1994, 22 March 1994, 25 March 1994, 26 March 1994, 11 April 1994, 14 April 1994, 15 April 1994

The Mail (Formerly Mafikeng Mail), 17 February 1984, 22 February 1985, 6 September 1985, 23 January 1987, 17 February 1987, 19 February 1988, 8 April 1988, 22 April 1988, 24 June 1988, , 24 August 1988, 16 December 1988, 3 March 1989, 16 June 1989, 23 June 1989, 17 July 1992, 22 April 1994, 21 August 1998, 26 May 2000.

The Star, 12 July 1973, 3 December 1982, 14 March 1983, 9 March 1984, 31 August 1984, 23 June 1986, 10 February 1988, 24 August 1988, 20 October 1988, 7 April 1989, 5 July 1993, 15 March 1994, 18 March 1994, 24 March 1994, 14 April 1994, 15 April 1994, 19 April 1994.

The Weekly Mail, 6-12 June 1986, 6 - 12 November 1987, 17 March 1988, 7 April 1988, 23 February 1989, 23-29 July 1993.

Weekend Star, 19-20 March 1994.

PUBLISHED SECONDARY SOURCES

(a) ARTICLES

Africa Institute of South Africa, "The Coups in Transkei and Bophuthatswana", **Southern Africa Facts Sheet**, no.107, May 1988.

Anon, "Another Record year for Agribank : Farming Community received more than R60 million", **Spring**, 1988.

Anon, "Co-operation and Trade : South Africa Water Agreement", **Africa Research Bulletin**, vol. 9.31 October 1988.

Cilliers, J.K., "From Pariah to Partner : Bophuthatswana, the NPKF, and the SANDF", **Africa Security Review**, vol.7, no.4, 1999.

De Clercq, F., "Bophuthatswana : At the edge of the time", **Work in Progress**, no. 74, May 1991.

Drummond, J.H., "Rural Land use and Agricultural Production in Dinokana Village, Bophuthatswana", **GEO Journal**, vol. 22, no. 3, November 1990.

Editor, "Ombudsman : The Bophuthatswana Experience", **De Rebus**, September, 1983.

Hamid, R. "Trouble in the Homelands : The Bophuthatswana coup", **SAPEM**, March 1988.

Jackson, D., "UN Chief and Mangope meet in Rome", **Pioneer**, vol. 16, no.1, June/July 1993.

Jeffery, A.J., "Whose Bloodless Coup", **Fast Facts**, 4 April 1994.

Kau, M. "UNIBO and the Masephe Community", **Matlhasedi**, vol.9. nos. 1/2, 1990.

Keenan, J., "Agribusiness and the Bantustans", in SARS, **South African Review II**, Johannesburg, 1984.

Lawrence, M. and Manson, A., "The Dog of Boers : The Rise and Fall of Mangope in Bophuthatswana", **Journal of Southern African Studies**, vol.20, no.3., September 1994.

Lea, J.P., "Changing Approaches towards Tourism in Africa : Planning and Research Perspective", **Journal for Contemporary African Studies**, vol.1, no.1, October 1981.

Linscott, G., "Bophuthatswana : Evolution vs Revolution", **Productivity SA**, no.6, 1991.

Magyar, K., "Planning for Economic Development in Bophuthatswana", **Indicator SA**, vol.2, no.1, March 1984.

Makanje, V., "Bophuthatswana : Bordering on No man's Land", **Indicator SA**, vol. 5, no.4, Spring 1988.

Mbenga B.K., "Forced Labour in the Pilanesburg : The flogging of chief Kgamanyane by Commandant Paul Kruger, Saulsport April 1870", **Journal of Southern African Studies**, vol. 23, no.1, March 1997.

Milton, C.C., "The Ombudsman : A Bridge between Bureaucracy and Citizens", **Pioneer**, vol.8, no.3, March 1986.

Molotlegi, S.B., "Bophuthatswana : Instructions from above", **Frontline**, November 1988.

Mosadi, L., "Village Industries and Crafts : Invisible Productivity", **Matlhasedi**, April 1994.

Ndaki, B.F., "A Bill of Rights : the Bophuthatswana Experience", **De Rebus**, September 1983.

Roodt, M.J., "Bophuthatswana's State Farming Projects: An Agro-Business?", **Indicator SA**, vol.3, no.1, Winter 1985.

Wiechers, M. and Van Wyk, D.H., "The Republic of Bophuthatswana Constitution 1977", **South African Yearbook for International Law**, vol.3, 1977.

Woolfrey, D. and Manda, P., "A Bill of Rights : Lesson from Bophuthatswana", **The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa**, vol. 23, no.1, March 1990.

Zikalala, S., "Impala Platinum : No Easy Road to Collective Bargaining", **SA Labour Bulletin**, vol.16, no.3 , January 1992.

Transvaal Rural Action Committee (TRAC), "Braklaagte", **Reality**, May 1989.

Van Graan, W., "Investment Opportunities in Bophuthatswana", **Growth**, Summer 1985.

Waugh, A., "Time for Bophuthatswana to join commonwealth", **Pioneer**, vol.8,no.2, February, 1986.

(b) **BOOKS**

Afigbo, A.E., Ayandele, E.A, Gavin, R.J., Omer Cooper, J.D and Palmer, R., **The Making of Modern Africa, vol.1, The Nineteenth Century**, (Longman, Harlow, 1968).

Alberts, P., **The Borders of Apartheid : A Chronicle of Alienation in South Africa with Portfolio of Photographs on Bophuthatswana Today**, (The Gallery Press, Cape Town, 1983).

Anon, **Bophuthatswana Democratic Party : 10 years 1974-1984**, (Craft Press, Mmabatho, 1984).

Anon, **Grasping the Prickly Pear : The Bophuthatswana Story**, (Black Sash, Braamfontein, 1990).

Anon, **The Republic of Bophuthatswana : Supplement to Bulletin vol.27,no.8,1987**, (Africa Institute of South Africa, Pretoria, 1987).

Applegreen, M.G., **Bophuthatswana at Glance : Information in brief**, (ISOB, Mmabatho 1985).

Aswegen, H.J., **History of South Africa to 1854**, (Academia, Pretoria 1990).

Beinart, W. and Dubow, S. (ed), **Segregation and Apatheid in Twentieth Century South Africa**, (Routledge, London and New York, 1995).

Benbo, **Bophuthatswana at Independence**, (Benbo, Pretoria, 1978).

Benbo, **Bophuthatswana : Economic Revue 1975**, (Benbo, Pretoria, 1975).

Benso, **The Republic of Ciskei : A Nation in Transition**, (Benso, Pretoria, 1981).

Boulle, L.J., **South Africa and the Consociational Option : Constitutional Analysis**, (Juta & Co, Kenwyn, 1984).

Breutz, P.L., **A History of the Batswana and Origin of Bophuthatswana: A Handbook of a Survey of the Tribes of the Batswana, S. Ndebele, QwaQwa and Botswana**, (P.L. Breutz, Margate, 1989).

Broadfoot, B. (Compiler), **Minerals of Bophuthatswana**, (ISOB, Mmabatho, 1994).

Butler, J., Elphick, R. and Welsh, D. (eds), **Democratic Liberalism in South Africa : Its History and Prospects**, (David Philip, Johannesburg, 1987).

Butler, J., Rotberg, R.I. and Adams, J., **The Black Homelands of South Africa : The Political and Economic Development of Bophuthatswana and Kwazulu**, (University of California Press, London, 1977).

Cachalia, A., Cheadle, H., Davis, D., Haysom, N., Maduna, P. and Marcus, G., **Fundamental Rights in the New Constitution**, (Juta & Co, Kenwyn, 1994).

Charton, C. (ed), **Ciskei: Economics and Politics of Dependence in a South African Homeland**, (Croom Helm, London, 1980).

Cleary, S., **The Homelands Policy : A Neo-Colonial Solution to SA's Future**, (South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1980).

Centre for Indigenous Law (Unisa), **Indigenous Contract in Bophuthatswana**, (J.L. van Schaik, Pretoria, 1990).

Cobb, T. (ed), **Fact Finding Mission to the Republic of Bophuthatswana**, (Bophuthatswana International, Alabama (US), 1980).

Cooper, C., et al, **A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1983**, (South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1984).

Cooper, C., et al., **A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1984**, (South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1985).

Cooper, C., et al, **A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1988/1989**, (South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1989).

Cooper, C., et al, **A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1989/1990**, (South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1991).

Curtain, P., Feierman, S., Thompson, L.M. and Vansina, J., **African History**, (Longman, London and New York, 1984).

Davenport, T.R.H., **South Africa : A Modern History**, (Macmillan, London, 1977).

De Crispigny, A. and Schrire, R. (eds), **The Government and Politics of South Africa**, (Juta & Co, Cape Town, Wenton, Johannesburg, 1978).

Educare, **North West Teacher Audit**, (Educare, Johannesburg, 1997).

Forbes, D., **The End of Mangope's Regime**, (Department of Communications, University of Bophuthatswana, 1995).

Hamilton, C. (ed), **The Mfecane Aftermath : Reconstructive Debates in Southern African History**, (Witwatersrand University Press and Natal University Press, Johannesburg and Pietermaritzburg, 1995).

Horrel, M. and Hodgson, T, (eds), **A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1975**, (South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1976).

Hunter, B. (ed), **The Statesmen's Yearbook : Statistical and Historical Annual of States of the World for the Year 1991-1992**, (Macmillan, London, 1992),

Jeffery, A.J., **Conflict at the Crossroads in Bophuthatswana**, (South African Institute of Race Relations, Braamfontein, 1993).

Kotze, D.A., **African Politics in South Africa, 1964-1974 : Parties and Issues**, (J.L. van Schaik, Pretoria, 1975).

Letsoalo, E.M., **Land Reform in South Africa : A Black Perspective**, (Skotaville, Johannesburg, 1987).

Levin, R. and Weiner, D. (eds), **Community Perspective on Land and Agrarian Reform in South Africa**, (John, D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Chicago, Illinois, 1994).

Londsdale, J.(ed), **South Africa in Question**, (University of Cambridge African Studies Centre, Cambridge, 1988).

Loucaides, L.G., **Essays on the Developing Law of Human Rights**, (Martinus Nijhoff, London, 1995).

Louw, L. and Kendal, F., **South Africa : The Solution**, (Amagi, Bisho, 1986).

Lye, W.F. and Murray, C., **Transformations on the Highveld : The Tswana and Southern Sotho**, (David Philip, Cape Town and London, 1980).

Maggs, T.M.O.C., **Iron Age Communities of the Southern Highveld**, (Council of the Natal Museum, Pietermaritzburg, 1976).

Malan, T. and Hattingh, P.S., **Black Homelands in SA**, (Africa Institute of South Africa, Pretoria, 1976).

Mangope, L.M., **A Place for All**, (Via Afrika, Goodwood, 1978).

Mangope, L.M., **Mandatory Sanctions : Bophuthatswana and Frontline OAU Nations**, (EMMCON TWORF) Books, Lagos, 1988).

Mason, R., **Origings of Black People of Johannesburg and Southern Western Central Transvaal, AD 350 - 1880**, (Archeological Research Unit, Wits, Johannesburg, 1986).



Maylam, P., **A History of the African People of South Africa : From the Early Iron Age to the 1970s**, (David Philip, Cape Town and Johannesburg, 1986).

Molema, S.M., **Montshiwa : Barolong Chief and Patriot, 1815-1896**, (C. Struik, Cape Town, 1966).

Monnig, H.O., **The Pedi**, (J.L. van Schaik, Pretoria, 1967).

Moolman, H.M. and Leister, G.M.E., **Bophuthatswana Hulbrome en Ontwikkeling**, (Africa Institute of South Africa, Pretoria, 1974).

Murray, C, and O'Regan, C. (eds), **No Place to Rest : Forced Removals and the Law in South Africa**, (Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1990).

Omer-Cooper, J.D., **History of Southern Africa**, (David Phillip, Claremont, 1987).

O'meara, D., **Forty Lost Years : The Apartheid State and the Politics of the National Party, 1948-1994**, (Ravan Press, Randburg, 1996).

Patrick, H.D. (ed), **Bophuthatswana : An Economic Survey and Business Guide**, (Barclays Bank, Durban, 1980).

Platzky, L. and Walker, C. (eds), **The Surplus People : Forced Removals in South Africa**, (Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1985).

Reichardt, M. and Cilliers, J. (eds), **About Turn : The Transformation of the South African Military and Intelligence, History of the Homeland Armies**, (Institute for Defence Policy, Pretoria, 1995).

Richards, R., **A Nation on the March**, (Hans Strydom, Melville, 1987).

Rumley, D. and Minghi, J.V., **The Geography of Border Landscapes**, (Routledge, London and New York, 1991).

Saunders, C.C. (ed), **An Illustrated Dictionary of South African History**, (Ibis Books and Editorial Services, Sandton, 1994).

Schapera, I., **A Handbook of Tswana Law and Custom**, (Oxford University Press, London, 1938).

Schapera, I., **The Bantu Speaking Tribes of South Africa : An Ethnographical Survey**, (Maskew Miller, Cape Town, 1946).

Shillington, K., **The Colonisation of the Southern Tswana, 1870-1900**, (Ravan Press, Braamfontein, 1985).

Smith, D. (ed), **Separation in South Africa : People and Policies, Occasional Papers, no.6**, (University of London, London, 1974).

Smith, K., **The Changing Past : Trends in South African Historical Writing**, (Southern Book Publishers, Johannesburg, 1988).

Sono, T., **From Democracy to Partocracy : Why a Party System is Undemocratic**, (Via Afrika, Pretoria, 1993).

Southall, R.J., **South Africa's Transkei : The Political Economy of an "Independent" Bantustan**, (Monthly Review Press, New York, 1983).

Thompson, L.M. (ed), **The African Societies in Southern Africa**, (Heinneman, London, 1969).

Tlou, T. and Campbell, A., **History of Botswana**, (Macmillan, Gaborone, 1984).

United Nations Institute for Namibia, **Namibia : Perspectives for National Reconstruction and Development**, (UNESCO, Lusaka, 1986).

Vorster, M.P., Wiechers, M. and Van Vuuren, D.J., **The Constitutions of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei**, (Butterworth, Durban, 1985).

Waldheim, K., **Everyone's United Nations : A Handbook on the United Nations, its Structure and Activities**, (United Nations, New York, 1979).

Wolpe, H., **Race, Class and the Apartheid State**, (UNESCO, Paris, 1988).

UNPUBLISHED PAPERS

Atkinson, N.D., "Multi-Cultural Education : A case study of Education for Popagano in Bophuthatswana", (Institute of Education, University of Bophuthatswana, Mmabatho, 1984).

Bauer, G and George, A., "Multi-Cultural Education", Occasional Paper, no. 2, (Institute of Education, University of Bophuthatswana, Mmabatho, 1986).

Bosman, A. (Compiler), "An Evaluation of Agricor's Rural Services Centers in Bophuthatswana", (Agricor Development Research Unit, September 1991).

Daphne, P., "The Reincorporation of Bophuthatswana : Information and Analysis for CODESA and Beyond," (Regional Policy Research Project funded by Centre for Development Studies, 22 February 1992).

De Clercq, "Education and Development in Bophuthatswana : Potential and Limitation", (Educational Monograph, 3, Institute of Education, University of Bophuthatswana, Mmabatho, 1984).

Dlamini, A.M and Manda P.J., "The Bophuthatswana (Constitution) Bill of Rights and Security Legislation", (University of Bophuthatswana, Mmabatho, 1994).

Manda, P., "Executive Manipulation employed by virtue of Security Clearance Act of Bophuthatswana", (University of Bophuthatswana, Mmabatho, 1993).

Manson, A.H., "Changing forms of Resistance : Braklaagte and Leeufontein in 1906-1991," (African Studies Seminar Paper Presented at University of Witwatersrand, 27 April 1992).

Manson, A.H., "South Africa's 'Homeland' Universities, "Focal Points for Resistance or Illegitimate "bush" "College", (Paper presented at a Workshop on Culture and Development in Southern Africa, Copenhagen University, April 1988).

Mayet, G.H., "Transforming Education : From Racial Separation and Inequality to Integration and Equality", (Paper delivered at the North of England Education Conference, Sheffield, 1996).

Mbenga, B. and Manson, A., "A History of the Bafokeng of Rustenburg District, South Africa" (Unpublished Manuscript).

Redelinghuys, H.J., "The Acceptance of certain Agricultural Innovation in the Ditsobotla District of Bophuthatswana", (Paper to Human Sciences Research Council, Pretoria, 1981).

Seiler J. "Transforming Mangope's Bophuthatswana : Towards Democracy in the North West Province", (Unpublished Manuscript, **Mail and Guardian** Website, Johannesburg, 1999).

Southall, R. and Wood, G., "Control and Contestation : State Security in South Africa's Homelands, A Report to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission," (Rhodes University, Rhodes, 1998).

Taylor, L. (Compiler), "Problems in the Creation of a Climate for Free Political Expression in Bophuthatswana", (Paper for CODESA Working Group One by Mafikeng Anti Repression Forum (MAREF), 1999.

Van der Walt, "Lewenslesse uit die Geskiedenis: die Einde van Bophuthatswana van Weleer(Address to the Autumn Graduation Ceremony of the Potchefstroom University of Christian Higher Education, Potchefstroom, 6 May 1994).

UNPUBLISHED THESES

Manson, A.H., "The Hurutshe in the Marico District of the Transvaal, 1848-1914", (PhD. thesis, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, 1990).

Manyane, R.M., "History Teaching in South Africa within the Context of Human and Social Sciences : An Outcomes Based Approach with Reference to Anti-Racism", (PhD. thesis, University of South Africa, Pretoria, 1999).

Maritz, C.J. "Voogbestuur en Nasievorming by die Batswana van die RSA", (PhD. thesis, University of Potchefstroom, Potchefstroom, 1976).

Matladi, M.N. "Implementation of Curriculum Project : A Case Study of the Primary Education Upgrading Programme (PEUP)", (M.A. dissertation, University of North West, Mafikeng, 1998).

Mbenga, B.K., "The Bakgatla ba ga Kgafela in the Pilanesburg District of the Western Transvaal from 1899 to 1931," (PhD. thesis, University of South Africa, Pretoria, 1996).

Molokoe, B.K.M., "A Historical Study of Bakwena ba Mogopa as victims of Forced Removals, 1983-1994," (M.A. dissertation, University of Potchefstroom, Potchefstroom, 1998).

Mompei, G.M., "Factors and Events which led to the Political Independence of Bophuthatswana, 1950-1977," (M.A. dissertation, Potchefstroom University, Potchefstroom, 1994).

Worth, S.H., "The Management of Agricultural Development in Bophuthatswana since 1972," (M.A. dissertation, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1993).

ORAL INFORMANTS

Daphne, P., Mafikeng, 23 May 2000.

Ditsele, A., Phokeng, 22 October 1999.

Gebnou, F., Zeerust, 2 March 1999.

Kgaboesele, J., Madikwe, 12 September 1999.

Kube, E.S., Tlhatlhaganyane, 29 February 2000.

Lawrence, M., Mafikeng, 31 May 2000.

Legotlo, M., Lehurutshe, 10 September 1999.

Magodiello, M., Mafikeng, 17 August 2000.

Mahuma, I.R., Mabopane, 17 May 2000.

Majafa, B., Mosweu, 9 March 1998.

Makgetha, M., Mafikeng, 21 July 2000.

Malapa, S.S., Mafikeng, 24 May 2000.

Mangope, L.M., Motswedi, 15 March 1994.

Mangope, L.T., Motswedi, 26 April 1999.

Mangope, R.K., Johannesburg, 27 October 2000.

Mankuroane, S.M., Taung, 8 June 2000.

Matladi, M.N., Lehurutshe, 19 May 2000.

Mayet, G.H., Mafikeng, 14 June 2000.

Mogajane, L.S., Dinokana, 4 April 2000.

Mogajane, R.N., Dinokana, 16 May 2000.

Moilola, M.G.J., Dinokana, 20 April 1999.

Moilwe, M., Mafikeng, 22 June 1999.

Mokgatle, M., Phokeng, 31 March 2000.

Mokgatlhe, B., Dinokana, 20 January 2000.

Monyebodi, T.P., Itsoseng, 14 April 2000.

Molale, I.S., Mafikeng, 5 July 2000.

Molefe, R.M., Tamosstad, 10 April 2000.

Moletsane, J., Lobatla, 20 June 2000.

Molotlegi, S.B., Phokeng, 22 October 1999.

Mosala, I., Garankuwa, 14 May 2000.

Mosidi, S.M., Pretoria, 13 May 2000.

Motsisi, B., Impala, Phokeng, 12 April 2000.

Motshabi, S., Lehurutshe, 15 June 2000.

Pule, E.B., Lehurutshe, 19 May 2000.

Ramagaga, S., Mafikeng, 21 March 1998.

Rantao, R., Braklaagte, 15 April 1998.

Ratshikana, W.T., Lehurutshe, 10 September 1999.

Ruthwane, S., Mafikeng, 12 June 2000.

Teu, E.J., Mafikeng, 24 June 2000.

Van Wyk, D., Mafikeng, May 2000.

Van der Walt, T., Silverlakes, Pretoria, 23 April 2001.