STUDY OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTIONS: A CASE OF MARIKANA IN SOUTH AFRICA AND OGONI IN NIGERIA

ONYEBUKWA CHIJIOKE FRANCIS

Student number: 23695420

orcid.org/0000.0001-6086-0626

Thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations

Department of Politics and International Relations

Faculty of Human and Social Sciences

North-West University, Mafikeng Campus

South Africa

Promoter: Professor Victor Ojakorotu.

October 2017

Declaration

I declare that this research is my original and unpublished work. I further declare that no previous research has been done on this title. I therefore confirm that this study has not been submitted anywhere for the purposes of any higher degree or qualification. I have also duly referenced and acknowledged all materials used in this research in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, International Relations, in the Faculty of Human and Social Science, North-West University, Mafikeng Campus.

Signature.. Date 19/10/2017..............................

Onyebukwa Chijioke Francis

Supervisor's Signature.................................... Date.............................

Professor Victor Ojakorotu

Dedication

I dedicate this work to the Glory of God Almighty and to the memory of my late father Sir Victor Nwaolisa Onyebukwa who laid the foundation upon which I have built.

Acknowledgements

I owe gratitude to a huge number of persons who made numerous contributions to the actualization of this research. I am particularly indebted to my immediate elder brother, Dr Victor Onyebukwa, who gave me the opportunity to undertake this study and provided me with every fundamental support I needed for my education here in South Africa. I am equally appreciative of his wife, Laura, for making sure I never went hungry while I studied. My special thanks also go to my eldest brother, Barrister Charles Onyebukwa, and family for their untiring efforts and financial contributions towards the success of this study. My profound gratitude goes to my sisters and their families; Mrs. Vivian Nwagu, Mrs. Chinwe Uba, Lolo Njideka Njepuome, Mrs. Lilian Okubor, and Mrs. Ogechi Ngwu for their financial contributions and fervent prayers. To my amiable mother, Lady Kate Onyebukwa, I thank you for your inestimable support. You have all shown me love from home, thank you.

To the very special woman in my life, my best friend and wife, Chioma Cynthia Onyebukwa, thank you heartily. You believed in me and supported me with consistent prayers and waited for me for four long years to achieve this feat. You always found soothing words to calm me whenever this academic load weighed me down. You stood your ground in the face of adversity and held the home front in my absence. You have proved your worth and I love you even more for this.

Without the supportive contributions of my indefatigable promoter, Professor Victor Ojakorotu, this research would not have been completed. Your critical evaluation and constructive input consolidated this study. You have shown me the best part of mentorship throughout my academic sojourn at North-West University, Mafikeng campus, from 2012. I extend my sincere gratitude to my father and Head of Department Politics and International Relations, Professor Lere Amusan. Thank you for your fatherly advice. Let me also thank Mr Kebine and Mr Oshupeng Maseng for being there for me. To staff of NWU who cared for and showed me love: Mrs. Maggy Maplike, Mrs. Maggie Smith, Mr John Nchoe, Mr Dingaan Ramatshego, Miss Granny Mogotsi, Ms Kenilwe Seleke, Mr Vuyo Ngayeke, Miss Kagiso Montshioa, Mr Johannes Selebi, thank you.

To my colleagues at Academic Development Center (ADC) North-West University, Mafikeng Campus, you are wonderful people to work with. I will never forget the best of times we spent

working together. You were all fun to work with. I wish to thank my friends Mr Chris Ezirim, Pharmacist Charles Egbuna, Mr Marcel Ibeh, Nelson Agu, Paul Saah, Gabriel Kinge, and Mrs Shila: I am grateful for your concern towards me. Finally, I want to say thank you to those who were my brothers in the diaspora: Dr Joshua Chukuwuere, Elder Frank Odimegwu, Kelechi Ani, Justin Uloho, Ifeanyi Mbukanma, Emeka Ezeabiakwa and Edmond Obiajulu, Kenneth Nwanu Ohei and Nnamdi Dickson Okolo.

Abstract

The recurrence of conflict in the mining sectors of South Africa and Nigeria has raised serious concerns in different quarters. The inability of mining companies, governments, workers and host communities to come to a compromise on lasting solutions to this carnage deepens disaffection and fans the embers of conflict in the mining sectors of both countries. The enormous economic earning capacity of natural resources to the economies of South Africa and Nigeria is not in doubt. Ironically, the conflicts at Marikana in South Africa and Ogoni in Nigeria are reflections of lack of sustainable development, inequality and inequitable distribution of wealth particularly on the people directly affected by the negative consequences of mining activities. Against this backdrop, this research examines the Marikana and Ogoni conflicts with a view to understanding mining companies and government involvement and conflict management intervention approaches in these conflicts. It also examines the consequences of the application of these conflict management approaches on the workers at Marikana and people of Ogoni. Guided by the aggression-frustration and resources mobilization theories, the research applied the content analytical method to draw a comparative analysis of conflict management approaches to assess the efficacy of mining companies as well as government intervention efforts before, during and after these conflicts. The study reveals that the conflict management efforts within these conflicts were not adequate to preclude recurrence of conflict in the mining sectors of South Africa and Nigeria. Government involvement and intervention strategies towards these conflicts remain desperately inconsistent. The research recommends the creation of wage and conflict management systems. The research argues that the effective implementation of these recommendations in the mining sectors of South Africa and Nigeria should be able to preclude conflict in their mining industries. It would also be a model for other African natural resources rich countries to adopt in order to prevent repetition of the experiences of Marikana and Ogoni.

Key Words: South Africa, Nigeria,Marikana, Ogoni, Conflict, Conflict management, Lonmin Company Pty, Shell Petroleum Development Company Ltd, Platinum, Oil.

Table of Contents

List of tables

Figures

List of Acronyms

ANC	African National Congress
AUC	African Union Commission
AMCU	Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BEE	Black Economic Empowerment
BBBEE	Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment
BMR	Base Metal Refinery
BNG	Breaking New Ground
CDA	Community Development Agreement
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
COTRA	Council of Ogoni Traditional Rulers
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
CRO	Community Relations Officer
CRU	Community Residential Unit
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DMR	Department of Mineral Resources
DPR	Department of Petroleum Resources
EFCC	Economic and Financial Crimes Commission

EGASPIN	Environmental Guidelines and Standards for Petroleum Industry in Nigeria
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
EPM	Eastern Platinum Mine
EPL	Eastern Platinum Limited
FEPA	Federal Environmental Protection Agency
FOG	Fall-Of-Ground
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GLC	Greater Lonmin Communities
HDSAs	Historically Disadvantaged South Africans
HRW	Human Rights Watch
HRVIP	Human Rights Violation Investigation Panel
HYPREP	Hydrocarbon Pollution Restoration Programme
ICSMC	Integrated Contaminated Soil Management Centre
JOC	Joint Operation Center
JOCCOM	Joint Operational Coordinating Committee
LRA	Labour Relations Act
LSE	London Stock Exchange
MCI	Marikana Commission of Inquiry
MEND	Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta
MFP	Marikana Field Participant

MHDC	Marikana Housing Development Company
MNC	Multinational Companies
MNDA	Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs
MPRDA	Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act
MOO	Mineral Oils Ordinance
MOSOP	Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People
MPF	Mobile Police Force
NAF	Nigerian Armed Forces
NDA	Niger Delta Avengers
NDDB	Niger Delta Development Board
NDDU	Niger Delta Democratic Union
NDDC	Niger Delta Development Commission
NDR	Niger Delta Region
NDEF	Niger Delta Education Fund
NDRDMP	Niger Delta Region Development Master Plan
NDTC	Niger Delta Technical Committee
NDVF	Niger Delta Volunteer Force
NEITI	Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
NHRC	Nigerian Human Rights Commission
NMPF	Nigeria Mobile Police Force
NNPC	Nigeria National Petroleum Company

NPA	National Peace Accord
NUM	National Union of Mineworkers
NYCOP	National Youth Council of Ogoni People
OBR	Ogoni Bill of Rights
OPADEC	Oil Producing Areas Development Commission
OPC	Oil Production Community
OFP	Ogoni Field Participant
OSCP	Oil Spill Contingency Plan
OTF	Ogoni Trust Fund
PAP	Presidential Amnesty Programme
PGM	Platinum Group Metal
PGMs	Platinum Gold Mines
POP	Public Order Police
PRO	Public Relations Officer
QIP	Quick Impact Projects
RDOs	Rock Drill Operators
RGA	Regulation of Gathering Act
RSISTF	Rivers State Internal Security Task Force
RVSG	Rivers State Government
SAP	South African Police
SAPS	South African Police Service

SACC	South African Council of Churches
SDP	Sustainable Development Policy
SDR	Sustainable Development Report
SLP	Social and Labour Plan
SPDC	Shell Petroleum Development Company on Nigeria
TB	Tuberculosis
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
TRT	Tactical Reaction Team
UN	United Nations
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programme
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNGC	United Nations Global Compact
UNPO	Unrepresented Nations and People Organization
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Programme
USD	United States Dollar
WMSL	Western Metal Sales Limited
WPL	Western Platinum Limited
WPM	Western Platinum Mine
WPR	Western Platinum Refiner

Chapter One: Background to the study

1.1 Introduction

Africa is a major producer of most natural resources including oil, natural gas, gold, and platinum, which are marketed and consumed globally. For instance, South Africa is one of the world's largest producers of platinum, gold and diamond contributing about 40% of global Platinum, 12% of diamond global production (Schiltz 2014: 10), while Nigeria is a global leading country in natural gas and oil production accounting for 23% of total liquid fuel production in Sub Saharan Africa in 2012 (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2013: 6). However, controversies surround the distribution of the wealth generated from these resources with respect to the workforce and communities where these mining activities take place. Indeed, the above resources are not adequately transmitted either directly to the workforce or indirectly to the communities hosting foreign or domestic mining companies. The plight of the communities and people directly affected by negative consequences of mining has not been adequately addressed both by the governments of South Africa and Nigeria as well as the mining companies (Lonmin in South Africa and Shell Petroleum Development Company in Nigeria). As a consequence, Lonmin workers and Ogoni people reactions have generated recurring conflicts ravaging the mining industries of South Africa and Nigeria.

South Africa and Nigeria are endowed with immense mineral resources capable of sustaining these respective economies, especially government developmental programmes and projects set to improve living and working conditions for mining workers. These resources are equally capable of sustaining and improving living and environmental conditions of the host communities. Unfortunately, this appears not to be the case. The increasing wave of recurring conflict in Lonmin workers in South Africa and Ogoni people in Nigeria, (who are also referred to the people directly affected by the negative consequences of mining), is evident suggesting that inadequate efforts have been made by Lonmin (Pty) in Marikana South Africa and Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) in Ogoni Nigeria and the governments of both countries to ameliorate the effects of mining activities. As a consequence, these people directly affected by the negative consequences of mining express their frustration through various forms of agitation that have degenerated into civil conflicts in Marikana and Ogoni.. Almost all the mining activities in both countries (South Africa and Nigeria) come with severe direct negative consequences on the workers, the population and the environment in the host communities (Elbra 2013: 549, Ite *et al* 2013: 78, Munik 2010: 11, Pyagbara 2007: 6). The citizens who work or live in proximity to the mining environment are obviously exposed to the harmful and toxic effects of the mining activities and such exposure increases their vulnerability to negative health consequences. Platinum mining in the case of Lonmin in Marikana comes with serious air pollution that increases mine workers' vulnerability to lung-related diseases such as lung cancer, silicosis and pulmonary tuberculosis (Phillips *et al* 2014: 8). These challenges are further exacerbated by poor living conditions of both the mine works in Lonmin and the Ogoni people. The consequences of oil mining in Ogoni have resulted in environmental pollution which has initiated other rippling concerns on the people and their environment (Smallwood 2012: 106).

The Marikana conflict claimed the lives of 34 mine workers, injured 78 and saw 269 arrested, (Gumede 2015: 327, Nash 2015: 387, Wasserman 2015: 375, Rapatsa, 2014: 119, Chinguno 2013: 160, Elbra 2013: 555, Ledwaba 2013: 13, City Press, 02-09-2012, Sinwell, *et al* 2012: 17), and these incidents reflect poor working and living conditions as well as low wages. It also includes apparent disaffection between the workers and the workers' union accused of poor and ineffective representation. McKenzie (2013: 160) identified Lonmin as a mine with a high number of fatalities of its mineworkers. According to City Press of 05 August 2016 report, in 2015, a total 77 mine workers lost their lives on duty and Lonmin alone accounted for 19 of these deaths. Lonmin has also not been able to provide decent accommodation to most of its workers. This assertion is supported by Leon (2012: 8) who identifies that the majority of Lonmin workers and their families live in the informal settlement of Nkaneng whose houses are predominantly shacks, and mostly without electricity and proper sewerage. McKenzie further confirms that of the estimated 28 000 workers Lonmin employs, only less than 10% have been provided with accommodation. In an apparent displeasure at these conditions, the Lonmin rock drill operators (RDOs) from July 2012 started organizing workers to exert pressure on mine management and owners to push for their demands (Chinguno 2013: 162) for an increase in wages and improvement in their working and living conditions. Their demand was a R12500 per month minimum wage (McKenzie 2013: 9).

The situation in Nigeria is not entirely different from the scenario in South Africa. This is so because the prevalence of oil and oil extraction activities and government intervention strategies in the Niger Delta has provided a veritable platform for conflict within these areas (Nwankwo 2015: 383). Oil exploration activities have severe effects on the environment, which have led to environmental devastation. Furthermore, oil spillages devastate the environment thereby destroying aquatic habitat. This implies the destruction of the mainstay of livelihood of the people particularly in Ogoni, who are predominantly fishermen. As noted by Oboreh (2010: 27) "the effects of oil operations on the environment are not only devastating, but they have triggered a series of crises." Unfortunately, government interventionist efforts to ameliorate some of the challenges associated with adverse oil mining operations in the Niger Delta have failed to provide the desired cushioning effects on the people and their environment.

Consistent resistance such as the Issac Boro Niger Delta Volunteer Force, Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People, has sprouted in most Niger Delta Oil producing communities against government's lethargic response towards their plight. The first known overt form of this resistance was an armed conflict in 1966 in which an Ijaw man, Isaac Boro, led other Ijaw youths under the aegis of the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF) in a liberation movement known as The Twelve Days Revolution (Abegunde 2014: 31, Reje 2013: 77-80, Obi 2010: 225,). Although Issac Boro's mission failed following his arrest, trial and sentence, detention and later release, Issac Boro's Niger Delta liberation ideology remains fundamental to the Niger Delta struggle (ibid). Issac Boro's action instilled in the minds of the Niger Delta people consciousness that the region was being marginalized, exploited, victimized and dispossessed of control over their natural resources (Abegunde 2014: 32). Against this backdrop, different other violent and non-violent groups have sprouted in the region to appropriate control over the resources of the Niger Delta and buttress the success of their homeland. Apart from other militant groups such as the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND), the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) was a central body through which Ogoni people pushed their demands. MOSOP adopted a non-violent approach towards the struggle, using the media to create awareness, draw support and attract international attention to their plight. However, National Youth Council of Ogoni People (NYCOP), the active wing of MOSOP, provided foot soldiers that organized and led acts of protest and local resistance (Obi 2006: 26). Government intervention through the use of soldiers against the advocacy of this group resulted in the unfortunate killing of the leader of MOSOP, Ken Saro-Wiwa, in October 1995 in a monumental legal case that led to the hanging of The Ogoni Nine (Abegunde 2014: 32).

Many debates have raged over the sorry state of the people of Niger Delta resulting from oil activities of oil exploration (ibid).The basic tenet that flows through the resistance discourse is that oil extraction is synonymous with dispossession, marginalization, and injustice (Obi 2010: 227). For instance, Barrister Mudiaga-Odjie, the facilitator of the Niger Delta Democratic Union in a statement meant to be forwarded to the then President Yar'Adua on the need to resolve the crisis in the Niger Delta stated that the reason for agitation in the region is deprivation and poverty amidst the plenty oil and gas resources (*Punch Newspaper* 11 June 2007: 9). He went further to request the president of Nigeria to offer the people reassurance, hope, employment and empowerment programmes which would better their lives. The region, which is estimated to have produced wealth worth N10 trillion Naira in forty years, ironically sank into a condition of neglect, squalor and environmental degradation under the combined oppression of an oligarchic military class and its civilian associates in league with multinational petroleum concerns (Osha 2005: 5). Such unacceptable conditions across the Delta and Ogoni land in particular, triggered conflict that has spanned several decades within the Niger Delta region in general and Ogoni in particular (ibid).

The discipline of International Relations is inherently multi-disciplinary; thus various discourses are engaged in this study to problematise the research question. However, international reactions from global community which followed the conflict management strategies adopted by governments of South Africa and Nigeria in the Marikana and Ogoni conflicts, strongly locate this study within the discipline of international relations. For instance, Amnesty International through its Director for Southern Africa criticized South African government for the unlawful killing of the 34 mineworkers at Marikana (Amnesty International 2015: 1). The international organization went further to criticize the South African government's non-implementation of full recommendations of the Marikana Commission of Inquiry as denial of justice for the victims of the Marikana massacre and their families and a lack of accountability (ibid). Amnesty International in the report had insisted that the right of the mineworkers to live, which is an integral part of human rights, was violated by the killing of the mineworkers (ibid). Likewise, according to the CNN report on 15 August 2013, the group's deputy programme director for Africa, said: "The long-term consequences for the respect and protection of human rights in South Africa will be severe should the South African authorities fail in taking all necessary steps to achieve accountability" (CNN 15 August 2013).

Similarly international attention in the Ogoni conflict for instance led to the suspension of Nigeria from the Commonwealth (a grouping Britain of and its former colonies) in 1995 (CNN 11 November 1995). The European Union member states also imposed visa restrictions on members of Nigeria Provisional Ruling Council and the Federal Executive Council and their families, expelled all military personnel attached to the diplomatic mission of Nigeria in member states and withdrew military personnel attached to diplomatic missions of European Union members in Nigeria (Human Rights Watch 1997: 1).

More clearly, the diplomatic imbroglio between South Africa and Nigeria during the Ogoni conflict, robustly locate this study within the discipline of international relations. South Africa and Nigeria had had a strained diplomatic relationship in the wake of the Ogoni conflict because South Africa supported the call for diplomatic sanctions against Nigeria as a result of the killings in Ogoni which South Africa viewed as abuse of human rights of Ogoni people (CNN 11 November 1995). According to Human Rights Watch report 1997, diplomatic relations between South Africa and Nigeria deteriorated as a result of South Africa's diplomatic position in the killings during the Ogoni conflict particularly the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other of his kinsmen, (popularly known as the Ogoni nine), by the then military regime in Nigeria.

1.2 Statement of the problem

The recurrence of conflict in the mining sector in South Africa and Nigeria is alarming. To private individuals, corporate entities, the mining companies, governmental bodies and all stakeholders in the sector the question is whether the incidents of conflict cannot be effectively managed by mining companies and governments of South Africa and Nigeria to eliminate recursive patterns.

If the sustainability of South African and Nigerian economies is dependent on mining wealth it could imply that the negative consequences of the Marikana and Ogoni conflicts may impact adversely on the economies of these two countries. The plight of Marikana mine workers which included low wages, poor living and working conditions appears unattended to following the relapse into conflict between Lonmin and the workers and between National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the splinter Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU) which claimed the lives of 34 strike participants on 16 August 2012 (Alexander 2013: 25). The situation is similar to that of Ogoniland where Ogoni people live in abject poverty and the communities remain underdeveloped as a consequence of oil mining activities. Mining activities of SPDC have resulted in severe environmental devastation such as pollution from gas emission and ecological destruction of aquatic life in Ogoniland which served as their main source of livelihood. Irrespective of the enormous wealth generated from oil mining on their land, paradoxically Ogoniland remains underdeveloped, neglected and the Ogoni people live in abject poverty. Consequently, different forms of violent and non-violent resistance have characterized this unfortunate trend which also resulted in the death of many, including the Ogoni nine (Reje 2013: 78). While the Twelve Days Revolution of 1966 was a violent resistance at the time, MOSOP organization adopted a non-violent approach initially but later turned into a violent organization during the Ogoni conflict (Obi 2010: 226). These two resistances are good examples of such conflict in the Niger Delta region.

To ameliorate the negative impact of mining activities on both workers in South Africa and host communities in Ogoni, governments of South Africa and Nigeria, as well as Lonmin and SPDC mining companies in both countries respectively, have agreed that the latter Multinational Companies (MNCs) operating in South Africa and Nigeria should invest in some development efforts including building schools and hospitals. The recurrence of such conflict in the mining sectors of South Africa and Nigeria defies various conflict management approaches by government and mining companies discussed in Chapter Four of this research. Although there are established rules and laws guiding mining rights, mining activities and their responsibilities towards their workers and host communities in South Africa and Nigeria, and the level of government involvement, intervention and mediation in conflict management, the recurrence of conflict in the mining sectors of both countries places the effectiveness of such laws in doubt.

However, conflict management efforts in both countries are seemingly inadequate to preclude the recurrence of conflict in South Africa's and Nigeria's mining sectors bordering on burning issues. A comparative analysis into the involvement of mining companies and government in conflict management in both South Africa and Nigeria has not been adequately analysed and contextualized. Furthermore, there is no study to date that interrogates simultaneously the mining context of the two respective countries' mining areas as well as involvement of mining companies and respective governments in conflict management approaches. This research therefore comparatively looks at mining companies and government conflict management approaches in Marikana, South Africa and Ogoni in Nigeria conflicts.

1.3 Research objectives

In lieu of the above, the core research objectives of this study include the following:

1. To explore the appropriateness of government of South Africa and Nigeria involvement of the police in Marikana and the military in Ogoni as effective conflict management approaches.
2. To explore whether the conflict management approaches adopted by major actors in Marikana and Ogoni before, during and after these conflicts were adequate enough to preclude the recurrence of conflict in the mining sectors of South Africa and Nigeria.
3. To explore the implications such actions on conflicts in the mining sectors of South Africa and Nigeria.

4. To examine the similarities and differences in the conflict management approaches adopted by Lonmin and Shell, South African and Nigerian government in the Marikana and the Ogoni conflicts and identify patterns in the recurrence of conflict in South Africa's and Nigeria's mining sectors.

1.4 Research questions

This research is principally born out of the desire to provide answers to questions on the dynamics of management of conflict in mining areas before, during and after conflicts. The implications seem to have perpetrated repeated and increasing conflict situations in Africa's mining sectors in general and South Africa and Nigeria in particular. The Marikana incident is shrouded in controversies as to what actually transpired. A lot of questions have been raised about the circumstances leading to the killing of 34 strikers on 12 August 2012 by the South African Police Service. Similarly, controversies surrounding the spawning of the Ogoni struggle resulted in the murder of nine Ogoni activists by the military and this has not been satisfactorily addressed in research studies to date.

This study seeks to provide answers to the following research questions:

1. Was the involvement of police in Marikana and the military in Ogoni effective conflict management approaches by the governments of South Africa and Nigeria?

2. Were the conflict management approaches adopted by major actors before, during and after these conflicts adequate to preclude recurrence of conflict in the mining sectors of South Africa and Nigeria?
3. What implications had such actions on the outcome of conflicts in the mining sectors of South Africa and Nigeria?
4. What are the similarities and differences in the conflict management approaches adopted by mining companies and governments in Marikana and Ogoni?

1.5 Aim of the Study

The central aim of this research is to provide a comparative study of conflict management approaches adopted by mining companies and governments in Marikana and Ogoni conflicts before, during and after these conflicts to find out the reason(s) behind the recurrence of conflict in the mining sectors of South Africa and Nigeria.

1.6 Rationale of the Study

The recurrence of conflict in the mining sectors of South Africa and Nigeria is a serious challenge, which has aroused deep concerns among stakeholders on ways to contain its surge. In Marikana and Ogoni, the control measures of governments and mining companies appear not to have successfully resolved the conflicts to the satisfaction of the numerous demands of the people directly affected by the mining activities. The demand for increases in wages and better living and working conditions by mineworkers is fundamentally at the core of the dispute in virtually all strike actions in the mining sector of South Africa. Mineworkers have consistently decried their poor wages, deplorable working and living conditions over the years. The centrality of these demands indicates that mining companies and government have not done enough to respond to these demands. In a similar manner, the consistent struggle for resource control in Niger Delta, which informed the Ogoni resistance, is also an indicator that developmental efforts of mining companies and government are not enough. The conflict management approaches adopted by governments during the Marikana and Ogoni conflicts resulted in the death of 34 mineworkers who were shot by the police on 12 August 2012, and the hanging of the Ogoni nine. The effective implementation of crisis management approaches by mining companies and government in the mining sectors of South Africa and Nigeria appears deficient hence the recurrence of conflict in the sector. Thus, the inability of mining companies and government to influence effective positive resolution of these conflicts has given room for continued doubt and distrust among the people. The recurrence of conflict in the mining sectors of South Africa and Nigeria is therefore, premised on this assertion, as government intervention approaches remain questionable.

This research seeks to identify the reasons for recurrence of conflict in the mining sectors of South Africa and Nigeria. A comparative analysis of the Marikana and Ogoni conflicts provides answers to the question whether the conflict management approaches adopted by mining companies and government were adequate enough to preclude the recurrence of conflict in the mining sectors of both countries. These answers provide a better understanding of the root causes of recurrence of conflict in their mining sectors. The study also provides an analytical appraisal of the implications of these actions on the recurrence of conflict in sectors of the countries under study.

Hence, the rationale behind this study is to provide a comparative analysis of conflict management approaches adopted by Lonmin and South African government in the Marikana conflict with that used by Shell and Nigerian government in the Ogoni conflict. Findings and contributions of this study are expected to help governments South Africa and Nigeria as well as Lonmin and Shell in the formulation, implementation and operationalization of their conflict management policies. The contributions also serve as a model for other natural resources rich African countries and countries where natural resources are newly discovered, in particular, to adopt in the formulation and implementation of their conflict management systems to preclude recurrence of conflict in mining sectors. The comparative study also provides a fresh analytical perspective that strengthens the conflict management strategies not only for South Africa and Nigeria but for the entire African continent.

1.7 Scope of the study

This study focuses on providing answers to the research questions at the nexus of Marikana and Ogoni conflicts. The research investigates the conflict management approaches adopted by mining companies and governments before, during and after both conflicts. Through a comparative analysis, the research delves into whether or not those conflict management approaches prevented the recurrence of conflict in the mining sector of both countries. The research also underscores the implications of these actions on the recurrence of conflict in the mining sectors of South Africa and Nigeria.

1.8 Ethical considerations

According to (Resnik 2015: 1), ethics means "norms of conduct that distinguishes between acceptable and unacceptable behavior." It means ethics are rules separating right from wrong. By implication, conformity to ethics assists the researcher in determining the difference between acceptable and unacceptable behaviours. In research, ethics implies adhering to the norms and methods that promote the value of the research; such as knowledge, truth and avoidance of error (Fink 2000: 21). The researcher is aware of the importance of comprehensive referencing of sources of information during this study. As a result, this research adheres to the strict guide of ethical guidelines to avoid plagiarism. To further ensure that this study is guided by ethics, the researcher made sure of the following:

- Confidentiality of the respondents was observed and respected (respondents names on the materials were changed and replaced with codes and information pointing directly to an individual was also erased). The names of respondents were not mentioned in the study. This is also to ensure that integrity of the respondents is respected.
- Information and data collected were strictly used for the purposes of this research.
- Respondents participated voluntarily. Participants were reassured that there participation is purely voluntary and not under any form of duress. This was to ensure express consent of participants to carry on the interview
- Anonymity of respondents was maintained throughout the study. Except where express written or verbal permission was given, sensitive information such as names of participants and names of their organisations were not mentioned in the study

The researcher also obtained ethical clearance certificate from North West University Mafikeng campus, as an express permission, to carry out this study(see Appendix 3 and 4).

1.9 Conclusion

This chapter provided an introduction to the study. The introduction revealed that the Marikana and Ogoni conflicts are spurred by the inability of major stakeholders to sufficiently distribute the wealth from the resources to the people directly affected by the consequences of mining activities. The statement of the problem suggested a probable insufficiency in the conflict management efforts of principal mining stakeholders which resulted in the recurrence of conflict in the sector. It further offered the objectives of the study and the aim of the study on conflict management approaches adopted by mining companies and governments in the Marikana and Ogoni conflicts before, during and after these conflicts. The fundamental rationale of this study is to initiate conversations that seek to solve the recurrence of conflicts in the mining sectors of South Africa and Nigeria. Secondly, the study seeks to enhance scholarly research and literature on conflict management and the recurrence of conflict in mining industries in Africa. The research adopts the qualitative methodology as data collection strategy. This qualitative research method provided the researcher the opportunity of face-to-face in-depth interaction with the participants during field work. The researcher ensured ethical principles were followed in the course of the research. The next chapter reviews literature connected to conflict management and the politics of multinational corporations, their impact on the environment and their contributions to economic development globally, in South Africa and Nigeria and Marikana and Ogoni in particular.

Chapter Two: Literature review

2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the literature review and is divided into four sections. The first section focuses on conceptual clarifications of the research concepts used in this study. The intention is to facilitate readers understanding the meaning of some terms as they are used in this research. The second section presents a review of literature in mining sector conflict and conflict management globally. The third section focuses on literature on Marikana and Ogoni conflicts. This section also reviews various literature which reflect the arguments, analytical perspectives, views and positions of divergent authors on the Marikana and Ogoni conflicts. The part also elucidates the individual contributions of reviewed authors towards the Marikana and Ogoni conflicts. The fourth section presents the theoretical framework used in this study. Two theories: frustration-aggression and resource mobilization theories are discussed under this section. Each of the section ends with a conclusion while the entire chapter ends with the chapter summary.

2.2 Conceptual clarification

2.2.1 Conflict

Conflict in itself is a very complex phenomenon, which is a prominent characteristic of everyday life. As such, conflict appears to be an inevitable part of human existence across all strata of society (Mengesha 2016: 10). Conflict usually manifests itself once there is a variance in concerns between parties characterized by pressure, tension, disparities, sentiments or polarization, particularly, where bonds are broken or absent (Ganson 2011: 4). Therefore, when bonds are broken and this results in loss, disappointment, frustration pain and grief (real or anticipated), the direct consequence is unavoidable conflict (Kohlrieser 2007: 1-2). This is a function of emotion (ibid).

People respond to circumstances or actions of the other party and these reactions create conflict situations that sometimes escalate into wars (Bennett 2011: 396). In other words, conflict is a violent or aggressive way of expressing grievance and frustration emanating from incompatibility between parties and circumstances (Bennett 2011: 394, Ganson 2011: 3). It cuts across a wide range of complex goal-directed behavioural dispositions that demand focus to understand. Conflict therefore becomes that interactive part of everyday life manifesting the incompatibility and differences between parties (Rahim 2010: 370).

As an important element of conflict, persons or groups present subjective interpretations of reality and their reactions are determined by emotions (Jehn 1997: 532). Thus, by implication, a wide variety of different phenomena has great influence upon the definition for conflict. Depending on the focus, advancing a single globally acceptable definition of conflict remains a huge challenge to scholars (Mengesha 2016: 10). However, what appears to be acceptable is a two-model approach to the formulation of definition (Thomas 1992: 267). The first approach has a narrow focus, particularly on phenomenon associated with competitive intentions; for instance, strike action and resistance (Jehn 1997: 532). The second approach adopts a general perspective that includes post conflict events, which shape the choice of conflict management approaches (Thomas 1992: 268). Both approaches resonate with the two critical aspects of this study; namely conflict and conflict management.

Early scholars of conflict like Coser (1956) as cited in Anstey (2008: 5) define conflict as "a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponent are to neutralise, injure or eliminate their rivals." This position portrays conflict along two broad branches: struggle over values and claims to scarce status, and struggle over power and resources (ibid). The indication here suggests that conflict is a behavioural reaction or responses either to defend or sustain values and scarce status or power and resources. Achieving these is not without the antecedent intention of dissipation of rivals (ibid).

According to Thomas (1992: 265), conflict is "the process which begins when one party perceives that another party has frustrated, or is about to frustrate, some concerns of his." In a strict sense, the starting point for the conflict process is when a party identifies divergences and incompatibility in the interaction. It means that the manifestation of conflict is the product of both incompatibility and action. Hence, real or perceived incompatibility to a party's belief creates the foundation for conflict between the interacting parties.

Additionally, subsequent modern perspectives appreciate conflict as a disagreement between two or more parties who perceive that they have incompatible concerns (Bloisi, Cook, & Hunsaker 2003: 489). They argue that for conflict to exist there should be a perceived situation of either interference or complete prevention of the concerns of one party by the other party. These concerns include goals, needs or actions of the other party (ibid). In other words, conflict arises from situations of incompatibility of goals, divergent interpretation of facts, undesirable feelings, differences of values and ideas, and disagreements over shared resources (ibid).

Further, modern scholarly propositions from Wallenstein (2012: 16) present "conflict as a social situation in which a minimum of two actors (parties) strive to acquire at the same moment in time an available set of scarce resources." For him, to strive realistically translates into doing something (encompassing a wide array of activities including warfare), notwithstanding how little, to secure scarce resources. Following from these definitions, conflict depicts a competition for survival and a motivation for change, which usually precipitates a threat or loss (Kestner & Ray 2002: 23). It thus implies that the term struggle or strife portrays conflict in the light of the existence of one party to a conflict remaining a constant potential or real threat to the other party.

Furthermore, there appears to be a general semblance in the definitions. These include: interdependence between parties, perception of incompatibility among parties concerned, and existence of some form of interaction (Thomas 1992: 264). The conflict predicates the collective existence of these variables, which plays out ostensibly between interacting parties. Although these conflict variables realistically could function independently, however, some underlying inevitable factors such as the existence of interacting parties, implicitly yokes them together.

Again, the parties or actors in conflict are critical vectors. For as long the system remains unpredictable, fear exists and therefore conflict persists inevitably between parties of that system (Wallenstein 2012: 17). By implication, the consequences of unpredictability between interacting parties develop fear and increase the chances of escalation of conflict. One could argue that when a party experiences a situation of fear in any interaction, it could imply that that party has lost confidence, may have suffered loss or is entirely at complete variance with the evolving situation which the party considers a potential threat regarding such a relationship. Therefore, once a party to a conflict suffers any form of loss and experiences deep needs that may not be met, conflict is deepened because bonds are broken at this point (Kohlrieser 2007: 2). Thus, the fundamental aspect of conflict revolves around the parties in the conflict (ibid). The overt actions and reactions of one party towards the other party's behaviour or a perceived situation of loss or a potential condition of threat constitute the conflict. Whether real or anticipated, the underlying connotation remains that conflict is a product of variance between the values, positions, beliefs or interests of two or more interacting parties.

2.2.2 Types, forms and dimensions of conflict

Conflict is a serious global concern which has presented itself in varying types, forms and dimensions. Folarin (2015: 4) identifies eight types of conflict. These include intra-personal, inter-personal, intra group, and inter-group as well as intra-unit conflicts. Others are inter-ethnic, inter-state and international conflicts. This study focuses on inter and intra group types of conflicts. This is because the conflicts in Marikana and Ogoni can best be described as inter group conflict. According to Folarin (2015: 5), inter group conflict is that form of contention or feud usually between two or more interest groups, communities, ethnic groups, sectarian or religious groups. Such conflicts could sometimes be confrontational or violent.

Again the interest of this study is on the feud between interest groups as a form of conflict. The Marikana conflict was more of a contest or clash of interests between mineworkers as an interest group and Lonmin as another interest group; but in this sense, as an organization. In the Ogoni conflict, the Ogoni people under the umbrella of Movement for the Survival of Ogoni, as an interest group, were fighting against Shell Petroleum Development Company as another interest group.

However, there were manifestations of some level of intra-group conflict in both conflicts. Intra-group conflicts manifests within an interest group (Folarin 2015: 6). The mine workers' disaffection in the leadership of National Union of Mineworkers, which led to the formation of Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union, is an example of intra-group conflict in Marikana. Similarly, in the Ogoni case, the killing of four Ogoni leaders labeled as "vultures" by the MOSOP for sabotaging the efforts of the group, during a meeting on 21 May 1994 (The Nation Newspapers 13 November 2015), also indicates intra-group conflict.

2.2.3 Latent and manifest conflict

Conflict could be either latent or manifest. Both are often times discussed together. Once there is a perception of divergence of interests, values and needs in a relationship, latent conflict exists. However, decisively engaging power to further or protect individual or group interests, to eliminate, neutralise or defeat the other party in the interaction, means manifest conflict has occurred (Bezuidenhout, Garbers, & Potgieter 1998: 347). In other words, latent conflict exists once parties at any level perceive differing views even though these differences lack potential capacity to force one party to react to change the situation. Therefore, the mere possession of values which differ from the other is a potential harbinger of conflict when subjected to a trigger situation (ibid). Thus, a covert incompatibility represents latent conflict while any form of overt expression towards advancing or protecting variables creating incompatibility constitute manifest conflict.

Usually circumstances of economic, social and political inequality and unequal access to political power are root causes of latent conflict. For instance, employers and government refusal to respond to the needs of the people directly affected by the negative consequences of mining are among the root causes of the conflicts in Marikana and Ogoni respectively. It means that such irresponsiveness is a potential trigger for open confrontation or overt expression of frustration that played out in Marikana and Ogoni. It also signifies that both conflicts are manifest conflicts sprouted by long covert frustration arising from incompatibility. Hence, "social life is above all a struggle for power and status regardless of the type of structure" (Bezuidenhout, Garbers, & Potgieter 1998: 348). This suggests that latent conflict in any social setting is a product of inevitable and consistent power strife and differentiation between groups and between individuals, which is beyond the struggle for power (ibid).

2.2.4 Dimensions of conflict

Conflicts take varied dimensions depending on magnitude and manifestation (Mangesha 2016: 15). Conflict could either take direct or indirectdimensions. Direct conflict is the open or overt manifestation of easily identifiable interests. Manifestation of direct conflicts could be between individuals, groups, states, nation or countries (ibid). It could manifest in various dimensions such as physical violent confrontation and wars (ibid). Quoting Ho-Won Jeong, Mangesha (2016) explains that "direct violence, the popularly understood meaning of violence, is referred to physical injuries and the infliction of pain that is caused by specific person. Thus killing and beating, whether they happen in war or interpersonal situations represent direct violence" (Mangesha 2016: 16). The killings in Marikana and Ogoni are representations of direct violence on the mineworkers and the Ogoni people. Mangesha (2016:15) also clarifies that

> Indirect violence, which is synonymously referred to as structural violence, appears to be in a form of invisible and relatively unidentifiable societal structures. Such violence is built deep in to the social, economic and political structures. These structures deliberately prohibit every people from having

> enjoyed equal social status and equal access to economic opportunities as well as involvement in one's own political matters. It is all about discrimination and marginalization, suppression and exploitative world order. And all these in turn would result in human suffering and life misery in general as the consequence of impoverishment to overwhelmingly majority of the people.

The above expression aptly captures the situation that prevailed in Marikana and Ogoni which led to the conflict in both areas. Hence, one could posit that, for instance, that the in-built social, economic and political structures which encouraged inequality and marginalization to strive in Marikana and Ogoni precipitated the direct violence which took place in these areas.

2.3 Causes of conflict

Conflict occurs between interacting political or administrative groups because of several causes. Conflicts such as in Marikana and Ogoni have been linked to certain underlying fundamental variables like stress and threat, which have the tendency of increasing emotional responses and negative arousal (Jehn, 1997: 532). Depending on the interest that a party intends to advance and how, conflict in international relations, politics and organisations, for example, appears to occur around some rudimentary causes, which include scarcity, identity, structural imbalance, ambiguity, conflicting information, differing goals, coordination, and interpersonal relations (Anstey 2008: 12; Bezuidenhout, Garbers, & Potgieter 1998: 347). In general terms, this plethora of variables engenders the stimulus to sprout conflicts across the globe. In essence, apart from fundamental root causes (socio-political and administrative) at the nexus of the Marikana and Ogoni conflicts these variables exerted some level of influence. Intentionally discussing these variables in general terms in this study was meant to capture the wider spectrum of causes of conflict. The explication enhances an understanding of the linkages between these general variables and the specific causes of the conflicts in Marikana and Ogoni. Chapter three of this study submits exhaustive discussions on the root causes of the conflicts under study.

2.3.1 Scarcity

Scarcity arises from insufficiency of resources, which essentially subject the administrative and political system to immense pressure.It develops from the social contract between the government and its people (Stewart, Holdstock & Jarquin 2002: 342). According to Huff

&Mehta (2015: 3), scarcity "refers to frugality and parsimony, an insufficiency of supply in proportion to the demand and finally an insufficiency of supply in a community or the necessities or life connoting a time-bound dearth." The broad modern conception of scarcity is conceived as the mismatch between unlimited human desires and limited means to fulfill them (Fine 2010:) However, in relation to natural resources, scarcity is regularly understood as a miscarriage to manage limited resources in the face of global population growth, and consequent overexploitation (Huff & Mehta 2015: 4). For instance, citizens accept and follow the government for as long as it provides them with basic services and provides reasonable economic and political conditions suitable for human existence. In other words, once the government fails to provide such anticipated services, as the case appears in Marikana and Ogoni, services not provided become scarce and thus tend to create tension and resistance that could degenerate into war. It would mean that the scarcity of employment opportunities, which creates and deepens poverty explicitly, cause economic decline and stagnation that resulted in the conflict in Marikana and Ogoni.

Again, some of the variables discussed in detail in chapter four which gave rise to the conflicts in Marikana and Ogoni are reflective of severe failure by the authorities (in this case government and mining companies) to provide essential services that could have enhanced the socioeconomic expectations of their subjects. In this, Lonmin and SPDC represent entities in the social contract with their workforce that are obliged to ensure befitting working and living conditions for the workers.

2.3.2 Identity

The distinction in ways of life creates group identification. Identification is the recognized ways a group of people identify themselves (Brubaker & Cooper 2000: 5). Hence, cultural, religious and ideological distinctions become frequent means for group internal identification and the development of social bonds for instance language, race, class, religion, circles, territory, and kinship (Van Aarde 2003: 228, Anstey 2008: 16). Specifically, workers' unions such as NUM and AMCU and MOSOP were putative groups through which Lonmin mine works and Ogoni people identified themselves to advance their demands from Lonmin during the strike at Marikana and from Shell during the conflict in Ogoni respectively. As a result, intergroup conflict and diversity seem to increase when ideologies advanced through these putative groups appear threatened by the actions or inactions of other groups.

2.3.3 Structural imbalance

Within any society, the social contract and structural imbalance gain prominence once there is perceived inequality of ownership, control and distribution of resources (Anstey 2008: 17-18). Once there is a perception of any form of structural imbalance, for instance where a dominant party uses their capability to establish a position of power, conflict is most likely to occur (ibid). Stewart, Holdstock & Jarquin (2002: 343) argue that economic group inequality breads conflict, especially when it is substantial, becomes consistent and increases over a long period. Again, in Marikana and Ogoni, economic inequality played a vital role in initiating the conflict. In Marikana for instance, workers complained of low salaries when compared to their colleagues at Implats according to the Marikana Commission of Inquiry (MCI) report released on 25 June 2015. They also complained of salary discrepancies among the workers. In addition, workers perceived a situation of inequality in their NUM representatives who they claimed collaborated with mine managers and in return, their rewards reflected in their life of opulence, enhanced living conditions and ownership of expensive cars to the dismay of the general workers they represented. Mkentane & Rantlha (2012) reported in *New Age Newspaper* of 29 August 2012 that the product of the allegation was mineworkers' appointment of representatives to negotiate their salary directly with mine management instead of through union representation.

In Ogoni, the situation of underdevelopment and poverty of the area amidst plenty, when compared to the rate of development in other parts of the country, reflected a state of structural inequality in the minds of Ogoni people. Secondly, allegations attached to the sudden wealth of some Ogoni leaders and representatives linked them to deviant practices that compromised the values of their people. According to Human Rights Watch Report (2012), Ogoni people maintained that some of their leaders received financial gratification from SPDC to renege upon their demand and consequently betrayed the people. They attributed the killing of some Ogoni elders in 1993 to this claim. The inference therefore stems from a standpoint that when economic inequality creates structural imbalance at the expense of some, often the majority in a group, conflict becomes inevitable.

2.3.4 Ambiguity

The process of social change faces the challenge posed by uncertainty of emerging behavioural standards (Van Aarde 2003: 228). Although preceding modes of interaction may have become unsuitable over time, the main cause of conflict during social change is the inability of society to draw an acceptable margin for the emerging societal modes (Van Aarde 2003: 229, Anstey 2008: 20). This creates obscurity on structural alternatives and exerts pressure on people who may no longer be prepared to respond to the old modes. The tendency produces intense struggle within the social system between the old and new social modes (Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse 2004: 78).

Drawing from the conflicts under study, the people directly involved in these conflicts were no longer compatible with the old social order hence their insistence on change. Mr. Nxenye, a RDO at Lonmin, clearly stated during an interview with *New Age Newspaper* reporters, Mkentane and Rantlha, on 29 August 2012: "we elected a group of men to negotiate directly with the management that we want R 12 500...But we don't want to be represented by NUM... They are failing us." One could argue from this point of view that 'failing us' in essence implied the inability of union leadership to present effective representation capable of unveiling the ambiguity surrounding their concerns. The workers could not understand why they could not be paid a better salary considering the wealth generated for the mine owners and the country and the level of tedious work they engage in to assure production. Secondly, 'failing us' implies that the workers were tired of the leadership who hitherto had failed to live up to their expectations, particularly with regard to improving their working and living conditions. Thus, it became an old order that precipitated grounds for resistance and the calls for a new order.

In Ogoni, the fury is a result of the deplorable conditions of the area. The Ogonis could not understand the 'puzzle' behind the underdevelopment of the area. Since it is obvious that they produce the oil, the wealth that literally sustains the Nigerian State and her economy, then why not their own immediate environment? To them, it was a state of confusion shrouded in so much ambiguity, elusiveness and vagueness, laden with high levels of frustration that culminated in the violent resistance experienced in the area today.

2.3.5 Information

Information remains vital in any social relationship (Rahim 2002: 217). It is a significant source of power in inter-group relations, particularly when it comes to competitiveness (Anstey 2008: 28). Compromising legitimate dissemination of information of a strategic nature to trade unions, for instance, only precipitates the inherent power struggle and also bloats the levels of mistrust in the relationship (Rahim 2002: 218, Anstey 2008: 27). In this light, it reduces the ability of the parties to understand each other and rather increases the urgency to fight based on misinformation, speculation and assumption. In other words, once information is hidden from people or when information is not properly disseminated to people, rumours and speculation tend to take over. This causes tension and invariably leads to conflict.

In Marikana for instance, the mine workers and people of Ogoni a breach of information between the workers and leadership of the unions on the workers effective representation was evident. This situation increased tensions that led to AMCU breaking away from NUM (Rodny-Gumede 2015: 260). Secondly, the refusal of mine managers to address the striking workers escalated the crisis that led to the violence (Duncan 2013: 65,)

2.3.6 Differing goals

The tendency for parties in a relationship to pursue different goals is palpable. In two ways, pursuing differing goals constitutes conflict aggravation in relationships: when there is a scarce resource, which forms the basis for the competition, and when there is interdependence (Anstey 2008: 27; Wallenstein 2012: 5). In furtherance, both ways could also play balancing roles in relationships. While the scarce resource fans competition in relations, interdependence ensures that neither of the parties achieves its goals without some form of cooperation from the other group (ibid).

The demand for a wage increase by Lonmin workers, for instance, reflects a situation of scarcity in terms of insufficient wages. At this stage, their principal goal was to ensure that their wages were increased. However, the workers advanced a channel of negotiation, which was incompatible to Lonmin and was thus rejected. The workers' position was to secure a direct audience with Lonmin management to initiate their salary negotiations while Lonmin insisted on dealing directly with the union leadership (Wallenstein 2012: 6).Clearly, it implies that while the workers were desirous of direct interaction with mine managers, the mine managers opted for due process toward responding to their concerns. This illustration may not represent the fundamental essence of differing goals in full sense but it captures a situation of incompatibility between groups that aggravated the crisis at Lonmin. However, in retrospect, both parties shared divergent views regarding who to deal with in the process of negotiation. Msindiseni Kwenene, one of the workers delegation representatives at an all parties wage negotiation that took place on 31 August 2012, as reported in the New Age Newspaper of same day, corroborated this claim. He said; "we were willing to negotiate since 9 August before the violence erupted, which could have prevented loss of life."

Figure 2.1: Outline of Conflict sources, Aggravators Mediation and Behaviour



Source: Anstey 2008: 12.

Figure 2.1, indicates that the sources of conflict so far discussed have several aggravators which trigger certain conflict behaviours among people in an interactive relationship. In the case of Marikana for instance, sources of conflict such as structural imbalance, differing goals and scarcity were aggravated by history of relationship (of wages, living and working conditions related conflict), threat (to lives of mineworkers at Lonmin), and the size of the grievance. These resulted in the conflict behaviours associated by disruption, coercion and violence in the f violent strike action exhibited by the mineworkers at Marikana. Similarly, the conflict in Ogoni was also a product of similar sources of conflict, aggravated by similar aggravating factors and resulted in similar conflict behaviours as in the case of Marikana.

2.4 Conflict management

Conflict is a prevalent and almost an inevitable part of every social interaction, which may regularly be observed between individuals, groups, organizations, states and even nations. Every social interaction exists within the liminal spaces of covert potential conflict environment with the propensity of degeneration or escalation once triggered. Overall, conflict management is concerned with reducing the dangers that could possibly lead to crisis, generate some confidence, and lower the possible suffering of the aggrieved party (Wallenstein 2012: 5). It also means that potential dangers could be managed through three levels:

(a) generate some confidence in the aggrieved party,

(b) lower possible suffering, and

(c) reduce definite suffering, representing the pre-conflict, on the conflict, and post conflict levels respectively (ibid).

The first level represents a pre-conflict management approach and it is advanced towards attempts to preclude potential conflict and the consequences on the aggrieved party. The second level concerns itself with the reduction of the consequences of conflict on the aggrieved party while the final level represents the post-conflict consequences on the aggrieved party. By implication therefore, conflict management represents a veritable mode not for the potential pre-conflict preclusion alone, but also a mode applicable during the conflict as well as post conflict management.

Once there is conflict the definite consequences are either negative or positive (Del Lucchese 2009: 72). Conflict tends to escalate particularly where there is prevalence of unresolved grievances on a number of issues. Moreover, once the aggravating factors responsible for escalation of conflict are controlled, the chances of minimizing conflict increase. Restricting unsettled issues and grievances is sure to de-escalate conflict. When it does arise, conflict management takes several approaches applicable either individually or collectively. Depending on the scholar and the conflict situation, an approach is regarded suitable provided using it would result in effective formulation and solution/s to a problem (Rahim 2002: 218).

Based on the above submission by Rahim, this study examines Rubin and Thomas' conflict management design to explain and measure conflict management approaches used in Marikana and Ogoni conflicts. The reason is that Rubin's conflict management design explains the conflict management approaches used in Marikana and Ogoni conflicts. According to Rubin (1994: 33), conflict is best managed using physical or psychological means, capitulation, inaction, withdrawal, negotiation and the intervention of a third party. However, Thomas (1992: 266) considers other approaches, which include competing, collaborating, compromising, avoiding and accommodating. These variables are discussed below. Thomas goes further to classify these into two underlying dimensions of assertiveness and cooperativeness as illustrated in Figure 2.2.

This is a "Dual Concern Model", which indicates that choosing a conflict management style is a function of two independent variables: concern about one's own outcome and concern about the other party's outcome (ibid). Put in another way, whereas assertiveness sometimes means concern about selfish outcomes, the concern for the outcome for other people's concerns encourages cooperation also known as empathy. Similarly, problem-solving or collaboration is encouraged by a high concern for outcomes of both selfish and other party's interests, while avoidance and inaction are encouraged by weak concerns for both outcomes (Bercovitch & Jackson 2001: 63). These concepts are further explained below.

Figure 2. 2:Two dimensional conflict management approaches/models



Source: Thomas 1992: 266.

2.4.1 Compromise

Kabanoff (1989: 29) defines compromise as an intermediate mode of dealing with conflict in terms of cooperativeness and assertiveness. When both parties such as mineworkers at Lonmin and Lonmin Pty, Ogoni people and Shell involved in interactive relationship give up some self or personal interests or concerns to arrive at mutually acceptable decision, compromising or capitulating has taken place. To compromise entails a moderate level of assertiveness and cooperation. Compromising is when both parties in a social interaction involve in a give-and-take situation to reach a consensus (Abas 2010: 19). It entails a give-and-take action in concern for self and others. Compromising represents a lose-lose scenario where both parties are unrealistic about achieving their concerns. That is to say, the process does not necessarily resolve the conflict; rather it shares the gains through bargaining (Limbare 2012: 173). Compromise becomes useful when the concerns of the incompatible parties are joint prerogatives that is to say, when the incompatible interests or concerns of both parties in an interactive relationship are important in resolving the conflict, certain aspect of these interests are given up by the conflicting parties to resolve the conflict. Secondly, it is used once negotiation between equally powerful parties reaches a deadlock e.g. labour and management. Therefore, this method serves the purposes of reaching a temporary solution to a complex problem for instance, in avoiding protracted conflict, once it becomes impossible for the parties to reach consensus (Rahim 2002: 220-221). Compromising is used when temporary solutions to complex issues are necessary steps from the employer (Lonmin) and employee (mineworkers) to end a conflict situation.

2.4.2 Avoiding and Inaction

Some scholars (Kassim & Ibrahim 2014: 46, Abas 2010: 19, Rahim 2002: 221, Van Aarde 1999: 232, Beer *et al* 1999: 286) associate this approach with the withdrawal, inaction or sidestepping approach. Avoiding places emphasis on the passive nature of a party towards his or her needs of the other party in an attempt to avoid a conflict situation. When an employer refuses to co-operate with his employer physically to end a conflict (Beer *et al* 2014: 20) In other words, the approach does not pursue the goals or concerns of the avoiding or inactive party in the conflict. Avoiding during conflict means the inability of the party to satisfy both his or her needs as well as those of the other party. Depending on the dimension of the conflict, this method has proved to be an effective conflict management approach particularly when the potential dysfunctional effects of challenging the other party dwarf the benefits of the resolution of the conflict (ibid). It is also efficient when a cooling-off period is a requisite before effectively dealing with a complex problem, and in dealing with trivial issues. However, avoiding may not be appropriately applicable under certain situations, including when the avoiding party possesses direct capacity to make decisions, when the parties are reluctant to hold on, and most significantly, when the issues are vital to the parties (Rahim 2002: 220).

2.4.3 Obliging /Collaborating

Obliging/Collaborating is "identified with one party attempting to minimize the differences and emphasize shared aims for the other party approval" (Abas 2010: 19). Obliging/Collaborating as a conflict management strategy places the concerns of the aggrieved party high above personal concerns. In other words, they place the concerns of the aggrieved party higher than personal and selfish concerns. It means that the strategy tends to downplay self and ensures common ground to satisfy the concerns of the differing party (Rahim 1985: 48). Obliging/Collaborating plays a vital role in circumstances where one relinquishes certain less important concerns either to gain something immediately or do so in future (Abas 2010: 20, Rahim 1985: 48). Implicitly, there is an element of sacrifice inherent in this style of conflict management. It can also be used when one party believes their action/position on a concern is wrong or when it feels the concern is more vital to the other party (ibid).

2.4.4 Integrating/Accommodating

Integrating/Accommodating is a conflict management strategy that "engages both parties to examine differences, exchange information and create openness to reach an effective satisfactory solution" (Abas 2010: 19). It places emphasis on high cooperation on the other party's concerns while placing a low value on self (Van Aarde 1999: 232). The emphatic preoccupation of this approach dwells on satisfying the concern of the other and neglecting selfish concerns. It also encourages and promotes self-giving even when the other party appears not interested in what is given or when it thinks that what is given may not comprehensively address its concerns or even when the other party is not eager to give in (ibid). Therefore, the approach requires both parties to be open, disseminate information judiciously and critically examine their differences to reach agreements acceptable to both parties (Rahim 2010: 371-372). It remains the most appropriate method, essentially engaged when a party realizes he is wrong and needs to restore confidence in the other party for future relationship.

2.4.5 Dominating/Competing

Dominating/Competing is a conflict management strategy that in which dominating employee always sticks to his arguments that he is correct and always tries to win (Kassim & Ibrahim 2014: 46). This is the win-lose approach (Rahim 2010: 372). A party acts in a very assertive way to achieve his or her own goals without seeking to cooperate with other or aggrieved differing party, and it may be at the expense of the concerns of the third party (Van Aarde 1999: 233). Dominating/Competing method involves high concern for self and low concern for the other party involved in the conflict (Kassim & Ibrahim 2014: 46). It would translate that power is asserted authoritatively (by an employer) to win a situation without taking the concerns of the other party (the employee) into consideration. This approach may be appropriate for emergencies particularly when time is of the essence. It is essential when a swift decisive action becomes unavoidable in emergencies (ibid).

2.4.6 Negotiation and Meditation

Negotiation is a process. Negotiation is that process which brings together warring parties to a discussion table where decisions regarding the ending of incompatibilities are decided (Beer *et al* 1999: 286). Citing Pruitt in Anstey (2008: 103) "Negotiation is a form of decision-making in which two or more parties talk with one another in an effort to resolve their opposing interests… a process by which a joint decision is made by two or more parties." Morley & Stephenson (2005: 120) define negotiation as "… any form of verbal communication, direct or indirect, whereby parties to a conflict of interest discuss, without recourse to arbitration or other judicial processes, the form of any joint action which they might take to manage a dispute between them (ibid)". Furthermore, Fisher & Ury (Anstey 2008: 104) posit, "negotiation is a basic means of getting what you want from others. It is a back and forth communication design to reach an agreement when you and the other side have some interests that are shared and others are opposed" (Anstey 2008: 105).

2.5 Comparative method

In every facet of human endeavour, comparison appears to play fundamental role. Making daily life choices, one could argue, involves a combination of natural political instincts and the influence of comparison. Academically, comparative analysis is a methodological scientific approach which assists a researcher to compare phenomenon, political nature and processes between events, incidents and nations (Almond 2008: 28). Through comparative analysis, the researcher tests theories and advances justifications that provide an understanding of reasons for phenomena occurrence and comparing them with a similar applicable situation elsewhere. Furthermore, comparative analysis is that scientific approach which enables a research study to establish the how and why embedded in the phenomenon (Kasselman, Krieger, & Joseph 2012: 10).

2.6 Summary

This section discussed the various causes of conflict within a social interactive group. The causes of conflict discussed under this section focused on the general causes of conflict in a social interactive setting. Some of the general causes of conflict such as scarcity, differing goals and structural imbalance, discussed also contributed to the causes of conflicts in Marikana and Ogoni. The section also discussed the various forms of general conflict management methods used in work place environment and social interactive group. The following part focuses on review of literature on global mining sector conflicts.

2.7 Global perspectives on mining sector conflicts

Globally, the recurrent conflicts in mining sectors have generated scholarly investigations. From different perceptions, varied perspectives, opinions and positions have positioned scholars in different sites in their investigative quest to unearth the reasons for the recurrence of conflict in global mining industries. Global stakeholders, political leaders of nations and officials of governments of mining industrial countries have not been exonerated from this unrelenting investigation into the prevalence of conflict in the sector.

The Australian economy subsists on revenue from the country's mining sector (Garnett 2015: 1). Garnett 2015 disclosed in her research that GDP contributions of Australia's mining sector currently stands at around 8.5% (total output), and also employs approximately 220, 000 people or 2% of the Australian workforce (Mason *et al* 2014: 2, Garnett 2015: 1). However, environmental pollution associated with mining continues to pose a challenge across Australia in general and the local host communities in particular. To this end, Mason argues that the inability of local mining industries in Australia to completely implement the contents of social licence to operate, the negative consequences of mining on Australian and its environment continues (Mason *et al* 2014: 5). According to Guardian Environment Network, 09 August 2010, the people of Wongatha aboriginal descent in Western Australia fought against the Uranium mining in the area citing the environmental pollution it brings as the reason for their refusal. Also farmers in the hunter valley in the Southeastern Australia, South of Sydney, protested against the air pollution generated from blasting in a local coal mine located in the area (Margolis 2011: 1). According to Margolis, the farmers indicated that the dust from the blast covered the pastures so thickly that it prevented their cows from feeding for days. Marson's *et al* (2014: 4) participants want government to ensure proper implementation of the content of the social licence by mining companies in order to improve environmental conditions in mining communities in particular, create employment and maintain generally acceptable international standards within the mining industries while carrying out their mining activities as conflict management strategies.

In China, similar environmental pollution from mining industries, as in the case of Australia, also exists. To this end, Shi (2013: 599) indicates serious environmental damage, deadly accidents at coal mines, illegal mining and resource waste were often overlooked at Small Coal Mining level. This level of coal mining dominates the local mining sector of China which they are usually owned by individuals. Such characteristics, Shi further argues, are similar to the larger State owned coal mining industries also operating in China. Shi (2013: 598) indicates that Small Coal Mining sector has contradictory characteristics when it comes to classifying them according to their level of pollution and income generation for China. Shi explains that apart from the fact that huge financial contributions for the development of China come from the sector, they are still regarded in the country as Small Coal Mines. Shi argues that for Small Coal Mines to produce up to 450,000 (Shi 2013: 599) tonnes of coal annually for the Chinese economy, it is a contradiction to classify such mining sector as small. He also argues that it is equally a contradiction to classify the SCM as small considering the important role the sector plays in providing energy, employment and revenue for the local governments in China. However, Shi (2013: 600) indicates that it is more contradictory considering the level negative consequences of mining coal at that level. Holistically, the Chinese mining sector contributed 48.6% of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2008 amounting to CYN 1672.2 (Ge &Lei 2013: 278).

However, even though the contradiction between Small Coal Mines and State owned mines exists amid increased poverty, the Chinese government ensures that funds generated from Chinese mining sector are channeled towards poverty alleviation and reduction within the country as one of the conflict management strategies (Ge & Lei 2013: 278). Furthermore, they highlighted that Chinese government ensures that their mining sector output contributes to household income and alleviation of poverty. Ge & Lei (2013: 602) agree with Shi (2013: 601) that coal mining is synonymous with environmental damage even though they contend that Chinese mining sector is one of the largest employers of labour with an approximately 6,52 million people (4.3 % in national total in urban units) employment rate in 2010 (Ge & lei 2013: 279). Through the mining sector, huge employment capacity is available to employ workers, who are paid and poverty is alleviated. Ge & Lei suggest that such significant contributions from the mining sector make it one of the foundations of Chinese national economy and conflict management strategy (ibid).

In some Latin American countries such as Chile and Peru, mining related conflicts have been experienced. In Chile, for instance, locals from the Pascua-Lama area violently protested against a gold mining project in the area (Urkidi 2010: 219). Urkidi highlighted in his study that the local protest was in defence of mountain glaciers endangered by mining activities from the gold mine operating in that area, thus making it one of the most renowned Chilean environmental conflicts in the last five years (ibid). As Garnett (2015), Marson *et al* (2014) and Shi (2013) have demonstrated in their various studies on mining sector, environmental pollution in Australia and China respectively roused protests. Chile similarly experienced such environmental conflict. Furthermore, some parts of Chile, especially in areas located in the arid and semi-arid north of the country where copper is mined, water scarcity is high, severe conflicts over access to water resources have led to social unrest particularly between the agricultural and mining sector (Amezaga *et al* 2011: 23-24). As a conflict management strategy, the democratic Chilean government in 1990 adopted strict environmental laws which compel mining companies to conduct environmental impact assessment to ensure environmental sustainability before they could commence operation (ibid). However, the lack of proper implementation of these environmental laws by mining companies imply that sustainability efforts have failed thereby increasing water scarcity and aggravating mining related conflict in Chile (ibid).

Similarly, most of social conflicts in Peru are water related to the impact of mining in the country (Amazaga *et al* 2011: 24). As one of the world's leading producers of silver, and a major producer of copper and zinc, environmental pollution as a consequence of mining is high in Peru. To guard against severe impact of mining, the Peruvian government developed a comprehensive frame-work for mining, water and the environment which regulate usage of renewable resources as well control level of mining pollution (Amazaga *et al* 2011: 25-26) as conflict management approaches. However, despite having one of the most comprehensive regulatory system in Latin America, Peru still faces the huge challenge of successful enforcement and effective implementation of these laws by the mining companies accordingly, mining related environmental damage persist across the country (ibid). It thus confirms the argument Yakovleva &Vazquez-Brust (2011: 195) that in most Latin America countries, "companies often operate in circumstances of resource limitations, inadequate regulation, and enforcement that result in environmental degradation and social problems, further jeopardising economic development" of these countries.

The failure of this conflict management strategy, Peru in 2007 adopted a multi-stakeholder dialogue organised by Peruvian nongovernmental organization and EU-funded Catchment management and Mining Impacts in Arid and Semi-Arid South America (CAMINAR) (Amazaga *et al* 2011: 27). The dialogue brought together mining companies, governmental agencies, NGO's, groups and citizens which dialogued and established the current effective mining operations framework in Peru (ibid).

Across Central Africa, countries such as Angola, Congo Brazzaville have fought mining related wars and the war in Democratic Republic of Congo is ongoing. From a general perspective Kolk & Lenfant (2009: 242) drew a correlation between conflict in Central Africa (CA), Multinational Companies (MNCs) and Cooperate Social Responsibility (CSR). To this end, Kolk & Lenfant argue in their analysis that CSR reporting by MNC are mostly generic thus the contents do not bear the level of influence regarding the activities of their CSR (ibid). They argue that this is because MNCs in Africa pay less attention in performing their CSR specific roles. Kolk &

Lenfant (2009: 247) further contend that conflicts in Central Africa countries they studied were partly the result of low implementation of CSR by MNCs. The reason is that these central African countries are conflict-prone hence there is vacuum government in some of them (Republic of Congo), and therefore explaining the absence of regulatory pressure on the mining companies to perform their CSR (ibid). It would imply therefore that the absence of government urged conflict in Central Africa because there was governmental pressure on MNCs to effectively implement their CSR.

As a result, the root causes of underdevelopment in these countries (poverty, negative environmental and social impacts of mining), were addressed philanthropically rather than as specific context matters of CRS (Hamann and Kapelus, 2004; De Jongh & Prinsloo, 2005: 117, Newell & Frynas, 2007: 670). The views of author discussed here were more on the causes of the conflict in Angola, Congo Brazzaville and Democratic Republic of Congo. Their views identify the connection between MNCs, non-implementation their CRS and lack of regulatory pressure at the root causes of conflict in the countries. The insinuation remains that effective implementation of CSR by MNCs in these countries were conflict management strategies put in place by their governments to preclude mining related conflicts in their countries. The strategy failed because of lack of effective implementation which led to conflict.

In Botswana, Marobela (2014 1-6) undertook an analytical perspective of one of the most popular strike actions in Botswana Diamond mining industry in 2004. He indicated that despite being the largest global producer of diamond in value and volume workers welfare remains relegated to the background (Marobela 2014: 2). Despite huge resources generated by diamonds for Botswana's economic development, poverty, inequality, and unemployment remain major (Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2008). The Botswana government adopted a policy which limits its commitment towards the welfare of workers thereby repressing full transformation of diamond wealth to the mineworkers (Bench Mark Foundation 2008, Marobela 2009).

According to Wan (2013: 40) in a study he conducted in three communities of Obuasi in Ghana, gold mining activities by Ashanti Goldfield Corporation (AGC) resulted in the pollution of water and environment in this area. Wan noted that mining profits from the area failed to benefit the local economy and could not create employment for the local people (ibid). Conflict ensued when farms along the Nyame River were destroyed because of water pollution from AGC mining activities (Wan 2013: 43). Wan's findings demonstrated the compensation which the Ghanaian government adopted as a conflict management approach failed because of two reasons:

a) Ashanti Goldfield Corporation could not effectively implement the policy.

b) Lack of serious regulatory pressure on the company to perform effectively (Wan 2013: 44).

There have also been conflicts between artisanal and small scale groups and multinational gold mining companies also in Obuasi area of Ghana (Okoh 2014: 52-54). Okoh further stated that land unavailability for farming as a consequence of land lease between the mining companies and Ghanaian government, increased poverty among local farmers and forced them into encroaching on these lands leading to conflict between the locals farmers and mining companies (Okoh 2014: 55). He indicated that the government of Ghana adopted the Structural Adjustment Programme as a conflict management strategy to alleviate poverty and increase development which failed to address the conflict (ibid).

2.8 Summary

This section reviewed literature on mining conflict from a global perspective. Different views on mining related conflicts in Australia, China, Chile, Peru, Angola, Congo Brazzaville, Democratic Republic of Congo, Botswana and Ghana were reviewed. Most of the views of the authors centered mostly on the causes of mining conflict in the country they studied, what conflict management strategy government and the mining companies adopted to end the conflict and the failure or success of these strategies. The next section reviews literature on the Marikana conflict.

2.9 Review of literature on Marikana conflict

From different angles, scholars have written a lot on the Marikana Lonmin incident that claimed the lives of 34 mineworkers and had so many others injured. Scholars have engaged in assessments and different questions that have been asked yielded several answers as to what transpired at Marikana.The ideas of Ledwaba (2013: 5-7) illustrate the pre-massacre characteristics that set the stage that influenced the Marikana massacre. Ledwaba relied on both his personal eyewitness account and the testimonies given at the Marikana commission to develop his story. His focus presents a narrative historical chronology of events preceding the day of the shooting. Critically, Ledwaba observes that killings linked to the strike did not start on the day of the shooting but rather affirmed that there were incidents of killing that actually commenced four days before, precisely on Sunday 12 August 2012. He also indicates that the trail of blood began on the 10 August night clashes at the Wonderkop mine hostel between rival union members of NUM and AMCU, which left two people seriously injured.

2.9.1 Events of 11 August 2012

Ledwaba (2013) narrates that the Sunday 12 August killings were the aftermath of about 20 members of NUM who refused to heed the advice of two mine security guards to vacate the union office before the advent of striking miners because their lives were in danger. Subsequently, ensuing confrontations between NUM officials and striking members of AMCU deteriorated into the shooting of two striking miners. However, before this time, Ledwaba further indicates that apart from the killings during the rival union clashes, other killing incidents also took place. The consequence inflamed and aggravated the already tense situation in Marikana. Because of these deaths, Ledwaba highlights that other RDOs residing in Nkaneng informal settlements near Wonderklop joined their colleagues in sympathy and an assemblage of approximately 3000 RDOs settled on top of the kopje for five days until the day of the massacre.

Of particular importance is the purported ritual undergone by the striking miners on the night of 11 August preceding the day of their second march to the NUM union office. In this regard, Ledwaba provides a confirmatory narrative account regarding the allegations bordering on the said ritual. He emphasizes that the miners underwent a ritualistic process conjuring a semblance to those prepared for warriors in pre-colonial South Africa. This type of ritual performs double functions of making the warrior-miners invincible as well as prevents bullets from penetrating their bodies in the event they were shot at. This is what the medicine man indicated to the miners. The first stage of the ritual saw the striking men stripping themselves naked and remaining so for as long as the ritual lasted. Following a series of incantations, the strikers roasted and ate two live black and white sheep. Subsequently, they got incisions on their ears, cheeks, backs, thighs and feet from the medicine man's razor blade. Thereafter, a mixture of some herbs and ashes made from the fire were rubbed into their incision wounds, thus completing the ritual.

The final part of Ledwaba's story presents an account to establish the effectiveness of the charm. He explains that some shots fired by a fireman produced from amongst the striking men, at a box smeared with the same concoctions they were 'fortified' with, surprisingly did not penetrate the box smeared with the concoctions. This experiment thus became for the mineworkers a confirmation of the indisputable effectiveness of the charm. Ironically later, this erroneous confirmation proved fatal though initially it had spurred their belief in its effectiveness. Paradoxically, the charm was not able to protect them from the bullets of the SAPS on the 16 of August.

2.9.2 Events of 12 August 2012

The events of 12 August precipitated another horror linked to the reasons for the strike action. The volatile attacks unleashed by the striking workers led to the gruesome murder of two Lonmin guards who were called up from their leave to provide back-up for their colleagues to fortify security at the National Union Mineworkers office. Ledwaba states that the killing of these two guards incited the first failed attempt by the National Union of Mineworkers Union president, at inviting the South African Police Service for police reinforcement. The fury continued, intensified and degenerated through the night. Two people were killed at Lonmin's K-4 shaft and nine vehicles were also set alight that same night when the protesters attempted to stop operations at the shaft to garner more support and boost the effectiveness of their strike action (Ledwaba 2013).

2.9.3 Events of 13 August 2012

In the response to the aftermath of the dangerous night activities of the striking workers, the SAPS was prompted into establishing what it termed a "Joint Operation Center " (JOC) and Joint Operational Coordinating Committee (JOCCOM) at Lonmin in the morning to return Marikana back to public peace and order. The aim of this tactic was to diffuse the already tense situation and prevent it from degenerating into irrepressible violence. The SAPS engaged a strategy of interacting and discussing with the striking men to see reason to drop the strike and their weapons for round table negotiations that could advance concessions and agreements which addressed the demands of the striking workers.

Unfortunately, these discussions could not douse the persistent demand of the striking men to meet with the management. What ensued forced the SAPS to fire teargas canisters and stun grenades to disperse the crowd. In the confusion that followed, three Warrant officers were seized, their weapons taken from them and then they were stabbed. Two of these men who sustained serious skull injuries later died from the injuries according to post-mortem results (Ledwaba 2013). Ledwaba further confirms that the seized weapons were used to fire at the SAPS who returned the fire that killed three people and injured five other strikers.

2.9.4 Events of 14 August 2012

The Joint Operational Coordinating Committee took a new decision to get the situation under control (Bruce 2016: 27). It adopted a six-stage strategy to disperse and disarm the strikers. They based this strategy on a SAPS mission statement:

> ...combined SAPS force will restore stability to Lonmin Mine area in Marikana from 14 August 2012 by deploying proactively with a visible show of force, isolating the transgressing groups, and ensuring an orderly processing of gatherers to extract weapons and identify suspects involved in the unrest (Ledwaba 2013: 54).

The first stage entailed Public Order Police negotiation plan targeted at securing resolutions for peaceful disarmament and possible dispersion while stationing a Tactical Reaction Team response 100 meters behind the negotiating group. The second stage would see the Tactical Response Team sent to the front line while negotiations continued. Other measures at this level included the introduction of six armoured vehicles and deployment of barbed wire fences. The intention of the third stage was to cover an address of the protesters, an attempt to disperse them into smaller groups and thereafter encircling and disarming them. This operation would require the use of teargas, stun grenades and water cannons. It was an option that would be operationalised only when negotiations failed. At the fourth stage, the arrest of suspects commenced. The arrested workers would be processed at the scene and moved to the nearest holding cells by the police. The fifth and sixth stages comprised "intelligent-driven follow-up operations to arrest protesters at their places of residence" and "cordoning off and searching hostels for dangerous weapons" (ibid).

Away from this scene, Ledwaba further reports the discovery of another victim of the day's incident, who was a supervisor at Lonmin and a National Union of Mineworkers shop steward on the Southwestern side of the kopje. He explained that though Twala had joined the strike at the time, he was killed on the suspicion that he was a NUM spy when he could not satisfactorily answer questions he was asked by the protesters. Ledwaba concludes by stating that a final attempt made by the SAPS failed to secure cooperation from the protesters on not bringing any weapon to the site the next day, Wednesday 15 August.

2.9.5 Events of 15 August 2012

Bala (2013: 30-31) narrates a comprehensive account of the leadership role of Mgcineni 'Mambush' Noki who led the striking protesters. He, among others, was the victim of the 16 August shooting (ibid). Prior to his death, his stern leadership qualities doused volatile situations of 15 August even though he had rejected negotiation offers earlier in the morning from the police and the president of NUM, Senzeni Zokwana. He had insisted that the strikers could only negotiate with the mine owners. However, he allowed Xolani, one of the leaders, to speak with him through the window of the Nyala armoured vehicle that brought him. His message was a plea for the strikers to return to work to allow for negotiations that would eventually address their grievances. Again, this message was unacceptable as the workers stood their ground of refusing to negotiate with anybody except the mine owners or remain on the kopje. To this end, they spent yet another night on the kopje.

2.9.6 Events of 16 August 2012

2.9.6.1 Pre-shooting events

Bala (2013: 34) reported that two frantic attempts made by AMCU leader, Joseph Mathunjwa and the president of South African Council of Churches (SACC), Bishop Jo Seoka at getting the striking workers back to work failed that morning. While addressing them on his knees, Mathunjwa revealed startling life-threatening information that fell on deaf ears. He declared to them that "A decision has been made about you. You are going to be killed here. ... We don't want more bloodshed!. We want your problems to be resolved and your hopes to be realized!" (Ledwaba 2013: 55, Jadoo 2012: 1). Even the pleas from Bishop Seoka could not get the workers to back down. The striking protesters who fervently clung to their demand to negotiate only with the management rejected his pleas and offers of food.

Three separate statements made by the provincial police commissioner at three different occasions on 16 August regarding the SAPS intention to end the strike on the so called 'D-day' appears to be confirmed by the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union president's earlier information to the protesters. As recounted by Ledwaba (2013:56-57), Mbombo specifically confirmed to journalists at a media briefing at about 10h00 at a Lonmin boardroom that "we are ending this today. Don't ask me how, but today we are ending this." She went ahead to declare in her response to a question on what the police intended to do if per adventure the protesters refused to disperse: "I don't want to explain to you if they don't, what then... What I told you is, today is the day we are ending this matter." Secondly, at an interview with eNews soon after the media briefing, she repeated herself: "If they resist, like I said, today is the day we intend to end this violence." Finally, she reaffirmed the intended stance of ending the strike that same day to the AMCU president; "this thing must end today because it is costing the state a lot of money."

From this point on, a series of brief meetings were held between stakeholders on the best decision and on the way forward. The outcomes and decisions taken at these meetings could not bring the management to succumb to the protesters' demand to negotiate with them. Management even reneged on an agreement made between them and AMCU president Mathunjwa the previous night to address the protesters by 09h00 of the D-day morning. Sadly, they jettisoned this arrangement for no clear reasons. However, Mathunjwa returned to the kopje to relay the message to the strikers. Ledwaba reported several fruitless frantic efforts of Mathunjwa to get the management to speak to the protesters to avert the degeneration of the already tense situation to a stage where it would warrant the shedding of blood. Unfortunately, unknown to Mathunjwa while he was still at the kopje, the SAPS held a brief meeting and took a decision to disperse and disarm the protesters.

2.9.6.2 The shooting incident

At this point, the police commissioner instructed SAPS representative to proceed with stage three of their operation strategy. Ledwaba indicated that at about 16h00 "there was a sudden flurry of activity" which prompted the police to unsling their shot guns and brandish their assault rifles. Thereafter, they introduced teargas and engaged the stun grenades and rubber bullets but this would not disperse the protesters. Rather, they continued to march in close formation from one direction to another in the kraal trying to avoid the effects of teargas.

However, as the men surged towards a large formation of the members of SAPS in a semi-circle formation, stage three was beginning to get out of hand. Ledwaba (2013) recounts that there was a sudden eruption of gunshots that lasted approximately eight minutes. At the end of this epoch-making incident, the worst had happened. Ledwaba indicates that the police had fired 284 shots at the protesters within these minutes. The lifeless and wounded bodies of several protesters littered the environment. At the end, 34 protesters had died at the scene and more than 70 were injured.

2.9.7 Other research assessment on the Marikana conflict

Ledwaba's views constitute a historical narrative of events that led to the massacre at Marikana. It is a narrative that focuses on the causes and reasons, which escalated the conflict leading to the massacre. However, this view contrasts the focus of Alexander (2013) whose ideas reflect on the reasons why mineworkers continued working despite the perilous conditions. From his perspective, Alexander (2013: 25-26) states that the mineworkers were forced by poverty to work in the mines and therefore they had to endure "the most arduous and dangerous working conditions imaginable" because of the fear of losing their jobs. His view conjures an ugly picture of indirect forced labour because of the high level of unemployment in the country and the fear of losing jobs. It is an apparent indictment of exploitation and extortionist conditions under which mineworkers laboured. As a pointer at the nexus of the cause of the Marikana conflict, the bitter response of a mineworker to an interview question in the book *A view from the Mountain* (Lekgowa, *et al (*2013) clearly supports this claim. He states that mine workers endure bad working conditions because of lack of other jobs. The focus of his reflection was on finding out the root causes of the Marikana conflict.

Although this postulation formed part of the principal variables that informed the Marikana conflict, Chinguno (2013: 161-167) had his focus on other fundamental sources. His view is apparently on union fragmentation and wage dissatisfaction. Following from this, Chinguno outlines the reasons for workers' disaffection with the union and its leaders due to ineffective leadership, which degenerated into the fragmentation of the workers' union. He extracts his information from the interviews he conducted with some workers after the Marikana conflict. The workers insisted that the union they used to recognize, the NUM, had divorced itself from pursing "their daily reality and experience" and replaced it with selfish aggrandizement. Botiveau (2014: 13) argues that the affluent lifestyle of most NUM union representatives suggested corruption, which created suspicions that these representatives were conniving with the management. Therefore, striking workers denounced NUM and its leadership, labeling them corrupt and ineffective (ibid). The article went further to confirm that the rivalry between NUM and AMCU contributed to the crisis that plagued the mining industry. It pointed out clearly that NUM's omnipotence was as a result of its assumed alignment with the African National Congress (ANC), the ruling party in South Africa then, which portrays the leaders in the light of working for the government and against their members (Botiveau 2015: 132).

Accordingly, NUM's influence started to dwindle. NUM lost its members to the splitter smaller group, AMCU, which the workers perceived as doing more for them (Soifer 2012: 36). As McKenzie (2013: 9) puts it, "the union [AMCU] appears to be more in touch with the rank and file [of the mine workers] on the ground" and deserve their allegiance. Giving further different analogical perspective, McKenzie (2013) stressed that the inter-union rivalry and fragmentation between NUM and AMCU and other smaller units created an avenue for the easy success of the divide and rule game of managers and mine owners who played against mineworkers. The reduction in the unifying strength of mineworkers makes it more difficult for mineworkers to pursue union agreements on a common front against their employers. McKenzie quoted Trevor Manuel to establish this assertion, "the divide among the workers was one of the reasons that gave rise to the events at Marikana in August last year [2012], and I have the sense that the bifurcation will remain in the sector for some time. Some of this may also spill over to other industries", and took this debate further by describing the existing rivalries in Lonmin as extreme. In furtherance, he explained that such union division was also a contributing factor to the Marikana conflict.

Botiveau (2014: 136-137) states what he calls "The political dimensions of labour crisis", which had weakened NUM following the increasing wave of mineworkers' strikes. To this end, Botiveau's central disposition is that schism and disaffection arose over the failure of economic policy to effect transformation of the mining industry. He conveyed the need for urgent economic policy reform in the sector. To buttress this position, Botiveau quotes Gavin Hartford:

> "the 2012 strike wave and the Marikana massacre not only altered the balance of forces on the ground against the NUM, but also generated division within COSATU between those who decided to remain deaf to the workers' call for change and those who had already started to realize that a decisive turn in economic policy was needed to avoid a social and political crisis" (Botiveau 2014: 136)

Still on the root causes of conflict but from varied opinion from those of Chingonu, Botiveau, McKenzie and Soifer, Leon's views emphasized poor living conditions and improper care of the workers. From this point, Leon (2012: 8-9) recognises the poor living conditions of mineworkers and their families and affirmed that lack of reflection of the mineral wealth on those who are directly affected by mining - "those South Africans whose physical and social space is affected by the arrival and, importantly, the departure of mining companies." His views clearly support that the "fundamental priority should be to ensure that mine communities are fairly included in the benefits that mining clearly brings to the economy."

However, he was quick to point out that this is not the sole responsibility of the mining companies but also that of the government. Far from this, Leon went further to advocate for a "new deal" for mineworkers and host communities that will provide strength for "firm foundation for equitable and sustainable growth in the mining sector." He was emphatic that the provisions of Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, 2002, which requires a mining right applicant to submit SLP, which will detail comprehensive labour and social management and development plan, is ineffective.

These plans were not followed nor were they implemented because the law did not provide a clear bite against non-compliance in the Act. In comparison to Nigeria, while relying on the report from a jointly conducted research on Africa's mineral regimes by African Union Commission (AUC) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) in 2011, he stated that it was discovered that South Africa's SLP framework;

> "Is static and does not provide mechanism to address emerging challenges as mining operations progress". [Whereas], "by contrast the report describes the position in Nigeria, where the community development agreement ("CDA") that will ensure the transfer of social and economic benefits to the community... such an agreement must address any matters relevant to the community and must provide for community participation in the planning, implementation, management Mineral and Mining Act, 2007, requires an applicant for mining right to conclude a community and monitoring of activities carried out under that agreement" (Leon, 2012:10)

In his work, McKenzie (2013: 9-15) reflects on the rising condition of inequality in South Africa's mining sectors as a causal factor. His study identified the state of very poor living conditions for the Lonmin workers, drawing inference from apartheid, which was designed to create a wide gap in the pay and living conditions of black and white mineworkers. He insisted that what happened in Marikana 2012 was similar if not a repetition of 1946 demand for a pay rise to bridge the gap wages of black and white in the mines. Using the statements of two striking mineworkers from apartheid and post-apartheid eras to establish this position, he equated it to the situation in Marikana. In the first statement of 1946, a migrant worker says

> "When I think of how we left our homes in the reserves, our children naked and starving, we have nothing more to say. Every man must agree to strike on 12 August. It is better to die than to go back with empty hands."

In the second statement, the past was re-echoed in the present. The worker stated bitterly, "It's better to die than to work for that shit...I am not going to stop striking. We are going to protest until we get what we want. They have said nothing to us. Police can try and kill us but we won't move" (McKenzie 2013: 13).

McKenzie decried the deficiency of equity and fairness as lying at the heart of the problem of Marikana. Such deficiencies were identified in the result of a study he cited done by Bench Marks Foundation in 2012 on Platinum mines in North West, "Lonmin was identified with high number of fatalities, very poor living conditions for workers and unfulfilled community demands for employment." Extending this line of reasoning further, McKenzie decried the inability of

Lonmin to provide accommodation to its workers. Lonmin providing accommodation to only about 10% of its workers depicts unfairness. It only puts pressure on the small living-out allowances given to mineworkers which is barely enough to pay the rent for an informal settlement while the relative returns to the small number of mine owners and managers stand in stark contrast, he argues.

The Marikana tragedy was pertinent to him in three aspects. First, "it emerged that the company had failed, in accordance with the mining charter, to provide their migrant labourers with adequate and proper accommodation. The specific responsibility fell to its mineral resource department which failed to enforce the implementation of the housing and living conditions standards developed in 2009." Secondly, "the nature of relationship between the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU) the role of the various leaders in the events that led to the slayings" and finally, "the role of indebtedness and the values of the unsecured lending in promoting the conditions that led to the scar that is Marikana."

From a different angle, Bradshaw and Haines' (2014: 1-16) analytical suppositions emphasized that Marikana was the result of the confluence of ultimate and proximate causes. Borrowing this idea from the conflict theory and central to their explanatory argument, they confirmed that the ultimate causes of Marikana incident represent key fundamentals and ultimately long-term conditions [like those demanded by Marikana mineworkers] that could give rise to overt conflict. While proximity causes arose from those specific incidental issues [like the intimidation and pre-August 16 violence that resulted in ten deaths] that gave spark for the Marikana conflict. Based on the above assertion, they argued that the eventful strike at Marikana is predictable as a direct outflow of frustration by mineworkers in lieu of the visible structural defects and other attitudinal factors that were inherent in Lonmin preceding the massacre. Similar to the views Botiveau, Soifer and Chinguno earlier highlighted, Bradshaw and Haines also agrees that mine workers deepened disaffection with NUM on accusation of its alleged unholy alliance with Lonmin management, shocking working conditions and poor salaries still prevailed the pre massacre in Lonmin. The situation they argued is a true representation of a degenerating society and supported with a quote by Frankel:

'The irony, of course, is that Marikana is more than just an unfortunate event, the result of a process of a degenerative civil society in the North West and other provinces that date back to 1994.'

Taking a divergent view to explain the foundational issues plaguing conflict in South Africa, which formed part of the causes of Marikana conflict, their judgmental reflection was based on the absence of coordinated and institutionalized strategy for conflict resolution during the historic end of apartheid. The argument here is that the development of constitutional negotiation process was an ad hoc and uncoordinated process. Even though the National Peace Accord (NPA) was a creation facilitated by the church to produce guidelines for political engagement and established conflict management system, the dissolution of the accord and its structures by the new government, inadvertently re-introduced the long-term aspects of South African conflict.

Fortunately, the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was a rescue step in the right direction. However, they emphasized government failure to move this process to its logical conclusion, denied South Africa of a permanent solution to fundamental causes of conflict in the country. According to them, these were the major shortcomings in the transition process which threatens foundation of peaceful coexistence, and providing support to the principles of inequality among South Africans until date. In the final analysis, they were emphatic on the need for the institutionalization of a proper and comprehensive conflict management process. This would fundamentally address inequality at all levels of South African society in a manner that addresses human basic needs equally. Conflicts such as the Marikana one and its attendant consequences may unfortunately continue to plague the dynamic arrangements in South Africa, they concluded.

Like Adelman, Muswaka (2014: 63-66) agrees with the view that the Marikana strike was indeed a covert reaction to accumulated frustration suffered by mine workers over time which assumed overt dimensions of a wage strike. She accentuated the unfortunate failure of contemporary post-apartheid era government to overhaul the ills of apartheid at the mines with particular attention to wage disparity, working and living conditions of the mineworkers.

Going beyond this harsh reality, the research further reflected on the negative environmental implications of mining activities on the host communities. This part remains a salient area in which documented research evidence proves to exist but regrettably lacks any serious attention from the government. To this end, the paper quoted examples from the research findings of Bench Mark Foundation, a non-governmental organization based in South Africa, that the sources of water of most of the host communities and their surrounding towns remain heavily polluted owing to the persistence of mining activities around these areas. This is in addition to visible informal settlements which dot these areas constituting evidence of poor living standards of mine workers and indigenous settlers who the article described as 'stakeholders' (Muswaka 2014: 64).

Following from this, Muswaka acknowledged the minute developmental contributions of mining companies towards the communities through corporate social responsibility but disparaged the quality of these projects describing them to be of 'appalling standards' (ibid). Farcically, these inferior and poorly constructed projects remain executed outside the pressing needs of the host communities and did not receive the consent but are forced on them. These swipes were intended by the author to bring to the fore the absolute lack of the true reflection of mine resource wealth either on the workers (in terms of upping miners wages at least to globally accepted wage level), or the host communities which by extension also serve as living areas for most mine workers. Further stressed focus was on the paradox of employers [mine owners] getting richer out of huge profits from mine wealth while the employee [mine workers] who fortunately are fundamental architects of this wealth, unfortunately, wallow in deep poverty, penury and dehumanizing destitution (ibid).

Muswaka's conclusion was a suggestive reflection that argues that just like shareholders who contribute financial capital to the corporation; employees be accorded similar, if not same recognition as stakeholders considering the vital contributions of their skills and efforts underground. In this way, decisions regarding employees and their sustainable development concerns would have gone through a process that would be all inclusive.

The inference from these views premised on the root causes of the Marikana conflict. The authors revealed divergent variables that precipitated the conflict at Marikana. The arguments further divulge the suffering of the people directly affected by the consequences of mining activities both at individual mineworker and as groups at the community level. Furthermore, they painted a gory picture which symbolizes apparent disconnect between the resource wealth and those negatively affected by its extractive consequences.

Away from these, Adelman in his views faulted the method of Marikana policing and the subsequent commission set up by government after the incident. Along this trajectory, Adelman (2015: 243-262) developed an analytical perspective of the Marikana massacre from the two angles: the context in which the Massacre occurred and the manner in which it was policed. His analysis depicted that the malicious massacre of 34 striking mineworkers on 16 August 2012 was an unacceptable form of police impunity, which comprehensively undermined the rule of law. However, Bradshaw and Haines (2014: 13) perceive this as poor management of the conflict by police. Their arguments posit that effective policing of conflict should have minimized rather than maximize level of fatality and injury among mineworkers. His views from a legal perspective asserted that both the wanton killings, the arrest of 270 miners after the massacre, and further charging them with murder and police violence under common purpose doctrine created during the apartheid rule, was a visible violation of their human rights. This regrettably is notwithstanding the fact that the law in part allowed mineworkers to protect themselves against what he termed 'hyper-exploitation' associated with era of apartheid South Africa. He argues that the demand for a wage increase for adequate subsistence of families of miners, improvement in both working and living conditions, fall under the constitutional umbrella and was a distillation of grievance against persistent socio-economic inequality, shortage of adequate housing, lack of electricity and proper sanitation. Therefore, the duty of police to play impartial in the line of duty and to protect citizens, stand sullied following the killing of the miners.

Secondly, he argues that the order to shoot issued by the National Police Commissioner, General Riah Phiyega was in flagrant disobedience of order given in an internal memorandum on 20 December 2011 by the Police Minister withholding the use of short guns and rubber bullets without his express permission. Following from this, is the affirmation of the "shoot to kill in safety and worry about the consequences later" policy advocated by one time Police Commissioner Bheki Cele. In essence, what happened in Marikana according to him was the paradoxical display of maximum force as against clearly constitutionally defined grounds for justifiable homicide. Regrettably, he sustains that it denotes an ostensible subservience of South Africa's law and constitution particularly, Section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act.

Going further in his analyses, Adelman condemns the legislation that set up the Marikana Commission of Inquiry (MCI) with limited powers only to make recommendations that may not be acceptable. To this end, Section 84(2) (f) vested the MCI with only the mandate to investigate matters of public, national and international concerns in the Marikana Incident. His argument is that the fundamental pillars; transparency and accountability, upon which the rule of law rests remain threatened because the findings of the commission, which revealed the defective extent of SAPS misconduct at Marikana, may only end as a mere report statement.

However, in a sharp contrast, he harangued painfully the falsehood in the 'truth' of the commission's report that "exonerated almost everybody- including the police who perjured themselves before the commission" and its vacillation regarding the role of government in the incident. On this premise, he maintains that this report stands in contrasts to the fundamental tenets of the pillars of the rule of law in South Africa.

His conclusion presages that the Marikana massacre was a political and psychological message, which denotes that the constitutional compromise of 1994 was factually a process of national liberation lacking in socio-economic revolution. In addition, stressed that persistence of inequality and injustice in the country would no doubt make the law and the courts permanent sites of struggle in advancement for the efficacy of the rule of law, justice and equality in South Africa.

Rapatsa (2014: 114-126) took an analytical perspective on the constitutionality of the Marikana strike and its attendant consequence, massacre of strikers. His angle of argument questions the legality or not of the strike. For a better understanding and clarity of his argument in this regard, he distinguished between two constitutionally recognized forms of strike; protected and unprotected strike. According to his elucidations, protected strike as the name implies, is a constitutionally protected or recognized form of strike action, while the other clearly is the opposite. His further clarification indicates that only two types of labour disputes accord recognition within the constitutional ambits of South Africa: the dispute of interest and dispute of right. Again, he explained further that whereas disputes of interest include among other things, the failure to reach agreement on issues [for instance, wage increase in the case of Marikana], is a typical example of dispute of interest. The dispute of right on the other hand specifically arises from workers displeasures regarding the enjoyment, protection and exercise of their constitutional rights.

Although the constitution of South Africa under Bill of Rights bestowed the right to strike on everyone including employees, his argument is that the same law recognizes other legislations, which provide further regulatory support towards the exhibition these rights. For instance, the Labour Relations Act 55 of 1996 recognizes the right to strike but under set out procedure thereto, and the Regulation of Gathering Act 205 of 1993, which provides regulatory guidelines with respect to the conducts, actions and activities of employees during strike gatherings.

To this end, he highlighted procedural limitations according to Section 64 of the Labour Relations Act on the constitutional right to strike, which include *inter alia:*

a) "The dispute must be referred for conciliation before a strike will be permitted;

b) The Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration or Bargaining Council must attempt to resolve the dispute by conciliation;

c) A certificate stating that the dispute remains unresolved must have been issued."

The glowing emphasis from Rapatsa's argument affirms that the Marikana strike was clearly an unprotected strike conducted outside the regulatory provisions of the LRA. However, he extended his line of argument to what he termed "*delictual* liability" in the face of illegal strike. To this end, he argues that since Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union and National Union of Mineworkers, could not provide leadership and consequently failed to call their members to order during the Marikana strike, the onus of '*delictual* liability' lies on them. The unions failed in their fundamental duty to repudiate the strike in writing to both the striking workers and their employers as soon as practicable following the commencement of the strike. It means in other words that the unions essentially failed in their duties at ensuring a peaceful strike in compliance to the law. Nevertheless, because they were not direct instigators of the strike, they unfortunately remain absolved of any liability.

He reiterated the unlawful killing of the mineworkers irrespective of whether the strike action was in accordance with the law or not but wondered who the responsibility of the killing and damage suffered therefrom would be on. In conformity with the views of Adelman and Muswaka that the Marikana strike was a response of numerous unresolved labour issues bordering mostly on wage discrepancy which Rapatsa unequivocally warned that if left unresolved, would assume the status of what he termed 'a time bomb' plaguing the nation in no distance time.

Bur (2013: 85) supported this view berating the present spate of inequality within South African mines as one of those discrepant time bombs. In line with this confirmation, he argues that the event of Marikana is suggestive that the acclaimed change of 1994 was drastically ineffective regardless of the then political arrangement to incorporate fully the black elites in particular into the socioeconomic system, which the whites have controlled for over 140 years. He believes that the present political dispensation in the country shockingly represent a paradox in beneficiation of the few against and at the detriment of the rest poor. Stressing the enormous importance and the strategic contributions of the mines to the sustainable subsistence of South Africa's economy, the lowly reflection of wealth accruing from these natural resources to him is a clear indication to the fact of failure of social justice and fair payment. He cited that the evidence of miners living in shacks lacking in access to clean drinking water, electricity and proper drainage system, buttresses this claim. This is against the backdrop which set South Africa [with Lonmin as the largest producer of platinum in the country amongst others], as the world's largest producer of platinum (ibid).

From a general perspective, Bur (2013: 86-92) equally agrees on the annotations of most authors on Marikana, that the Marikana conflict was the result of unresolved wage, living and working condition issues. However, in an analytical comparison, he equated the massacre of mineworkers at Marikana to the well-known regrettable historical slaughter of black South Africans at Sharpeville on 21 March 1960. In a similar disposition with Adelman, Bur condemns a semblance what he called the 'remilitarization of South African Police Service (ASPS)' as was the case during the apartheid era. This ugly experience he confirms further, had left in so many a reflection of the concept of 'asymmetric war' which engages high intensity of police forces in very violent conflicts usually against an array of non-state actors ranging from terrorism to public insurgent, like the striking mine workers. Bur like Rapatsa (2014: 115) was of the viewpoint that the political inferences of the Marikana massacre vis-à-vis the image of the ruling party, ANC, labour unions leadership, the business circles, and the police, are unfortunate resilient reflection and definitive demonstration of complete lack of leadership across these boards.

2.9.8 Conclusion

This section began with review of literature on what led to the conflict at Marikana. It presented a brief historical background of pre-Marikana conflict. This was followed by the review of other literature on the Marikana conflict. Most of the literatures reviewed discussed the Marikana conflict from the root causes perspective while the rest focused on the abuse and violation of human rights of the mine workers. These authors argued from a legal perspective that the killing of the mine workers was illegal and therefore amount to a violation of their right to life. The discussion in the following session reviews literature on Ogoni conflict.

2.10 Review of Ogoni literatures

2.10.1 Shell and oil exploration in Nigeria's Niger Delta

Although the exact year of commencement of the search for oil in Nigeria remains contentious, the earliest documented attempt dates back to 1908 (Nwapi 2010: 185). It was in 1908 that the historical sighting of oil seepages at Araromi inspired the first exploration for hydrocarbons in the area by a German company, Bitumen Corporation (ibid). The Araroni area lies between Ijebu Ode in present day Ondo state and Okitipupa, also in present day Ondo state of Nigeria (Ingelson & Nwapi 2014: 37). However, this foremost exploration was abruptly terminated owing to the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 though further principal exploration efforts were embarked upon by Anglo-Dutch consortium known then as Shell D'Arcy, now Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC) (Udensi, Etok & George 2009: 36). Following the award of sole concession rights in the whole of Nigeria, the company commenced exploration activities in Nigeria in 1937 (Igelson & Nwapi 2014: 35). However, the Second World War disrupted the company's exploration activities and exploration could not continue until 1947 (Uodsen, Etok & George 2009: 37). Nevertheless, in 1956 crude oil was discovered in the Niger Delta at Oloibiri, in present day Bayelsa State, after many years of exploratory searches (Obore 2010: 16).

Full oil production and exportation by SPDC commenced in Oloibiri in 1958 at a daily production rate of 5,100 barrels (Ihezue 2016: 28). This production doubled in 1959 and reached an all-time peak of 2.44 million barrels per day in 1979 (Obore 2010: 17). However, before this time, the sole concession rights granted to SPDC were revised (Igelson & Nwapi 2014: 37). The right, thereafter, was extended to companies from other countries to increase the pace of production and to reduce over reliance on one company (ibid). This extension ended the oil exploration monopoly held by Shell Petroleum Development Company in the country (ibid). Consequently, by 1961 increased oil exploration companies from other countries for instance Mobil, Gulf, Agip, Safrap (now Elf), Tenneco, and Amoseas (now Texaco/Chevron) had joined the oil exploration sector in Nigeria (Uodsen, Etok & George 2009: 38), exhibiting clear interest for both onshore and offshore oil exploration throughout the Niger Delta. Nigeria's oil production capacity experienced rapid increase as a consequence. Although completely owned by Shell, Shell Petroleum Development Company operates as a joint venture with a conglomerate comprising a Nigerian oil company and other oil exploration companies. Each of these companies owns a percentage share value of the entire conglomerate. The Nigeria National Petroleum Company owns 55 percent shares, Shell 30 percent, Elf 10 percent, and Agip 5 percent (Frynas 1998: 462 Obi 1997: 141, Shell.com.ng). Consequently, the conglomerate SPDC has become the largest oil producing ventures in Nigeria fundamentally carrying out oil operations on behalf of Shell.

According to SPDC, its operations are concentrated in the Niger Delta region. It also operates contiguous shallow offshore oil mining lease areas of about 31 000km^2. The company owns pipelines and flow lines that traverse more than 6 000km of the region. It also has approximately 87 flow stations, 8 gas plants and over 1000 oil producing wells. Shell Petroleum Development Company further has an employment capacity of more than 4 500 direct employees out of which 95 per cent are Nigerians and 5 per cent are foreign expatriates, and 66 per cent are from the region. This number of employees places Shell Petroleum Development Company on a minimum daily production capacity of 1000 barrels of crude oil on average. The company additionally has another 20 000-capacity workforce employed indirectly through the network of suppliers and service provider companies (Shell.com.ng).

2.10.2 Other research in this area

Most of the writers on the Ogoni in Niger Delta have expressed general views on the root causes of conflict in the area. The general views that are at the nexus of the dynamics of crisis in the

Delta stem from the oil and the consequences of the activities of oil exploration. Following from this fact, Oboreh (2010: 17-27), Ojakorotu & Morake (2010: 121), Agbonifo (2004: 5), Ejibunu (2007: 12), agree that environmental devastation, including the destruction of biodiversity, wildlife and aquatic ecosystem, caused by oil spillages are some of the root causes of conflict in the Niger Delta and Ogoniland in particular. They highlight other causes of the conflict to comprise pollution of air and water; political and economic marginalisation, corruption and bad governance. The contributions of Obi (1997: 139) appraised the root causes of conflict in Ogoni as the result of the interaction between Shell and the Ogoni environment. Obi argues that the negative consequences of this relationship have spawned alienation which aggravated the two decade long protest and general resistance in Ogoniland. The extractive activities of Shell in Ogoniland expropriated land, polluted the ecosystem, and therefore destroyed the peasant Ogoni people's source of livelihood. However, Obi reiterates that Shell's affiliation with the Ogoni people was premised on the social relationship of production as globally determined: it effectively alienated the Ogoni people from the wealth of the oil proceeds. In this regard, Osha (2004: 10) went further to assert that "the Ogonis are waging a struggle against political and structural marginalization of natural resources, environmental pollution and decay and cultural emasculation."

However, away from the aforementioned common assertions, there are further divergent views expressed by these authors in their literature on the Ogoni conflict. Agbonifo (2004: 7) for instance explores what gave the conflict its initial bloat, which he argues was that the Nigerian government betrayed the Ogonis by destroying the national values of true federation, social equality and justice, and consistent distortion of revenue allocation formula based on the principles of derivation. The result, according to him, was a widespread perception of heightened threat of insecurity among the Ogonis. Frustrated by this government policy, "they decided to fight for their own salvation" and this saw the sprouting of protagonists in the form of insurgency to enthrone social justice for all citizens. To him, "the vacuous conditions of hopelessness provided fertile grounds for this... and the [birth of] the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) [insurgence]." "The insurgents' appeal lay in the existence of injustice and logically bred a movement for the universalization of social justice, and the operation of true national values for the benefit of all, poor or rich" (ibid; 5). MOSOP thus became an avenue through which the mass of Ogoni could mobilize strategic and formidable resistance against their appalling conditions.

Osha (2004: 10-15) in an analytical contrast, expressed the systematic distortion of the national revenue allocation formula by the successive military administrations in a manner that easily depicted what he termed '*internal colonialism*' against the people of Ogoni. He described internal colonialism as a "manifestation of brutalization and alienation caused by a fundamental condition of double temporality and also by an adoption of Hobbesian ethic by the political elite and the often brutalised citizenry." Following from this, he averred that the distortion of the constant revenue allocation formula started in 1975 when General Yakubu Gowon made the revenue allocation formula 20 per cent for state and 70 per cent for federal seat. Shehu Shagari slashed the allocation to states to 2 per cent.

Nonetheless, when General Ibrahim Babangida increased this to 3 per cent, the perception of the truism of Nigerian federalism had already been doubted by the people of Ogoni who consequently mobilized vociferous opposition in response. Sitting out in prominence at the nexus of their demands were the granting of autonomous status to Ogoni and the right of resource control (Obi 2006: 26). Obi reflected on the usefulness of National Youth Council of Ogoni People (NYCOP), the activist wing and foot soldiers of MASOP, in the struggle. As foot soldiers of the struggle, their contributions were mostly in the form of protests and other forms of local resistance. He went ahead to emphasize the close collaboration among NYCOP which was a veritable tool for easy mobilization of the Ogoni people along the lines of a popular emancipation agenda and provided a platform to check the elders' excesses (ibid: 26-27). To Obi, the role of radicalised youth involvement was a generational dimension particularly critical to the popularization of the Ogoni movement in the 1990s.

Ibeanu's research (nd) efforts highlighted the various forms of government brutality against the genuine demands of the Ogoni people and the various strategies of Ogoni resistance. The research further outlined four major forms of state violence against Ogoni people. The first was the harassment of Ogoni leaders who faced arrest, detention and sometimes, undue surveillance. Secondly, violence between the Ogoni and her neighbours became a tool of repression against the Ogoni struggle. Thirdly, Ogonis were set against each other to ensure internal destruction of the struggle. Lastly, government instigated the division in MOSOP that led to the death of four important sons of Ogoni thus giving the military good opportunity to address the problem in Ogoni conclusively. In response, the Ogoni developed local and international fronts of strategic resistance. At the local front were violent and non-violent demonstrations and the sensitising of neighbouring communities and ethnic groups suffering similar conditions to widen the terrain of the conflict. The international community got involved because of international publicity given to the struggle, which was effectively facilitated the leader of MOSOP, Ken Saro-Wiwa (ibid: 15-16).

Obi's (2006) analytical approach provides a complementary view to Ibeanu's (nd), but his approach reflected the dynamics of resistance in the Niger Delta. It provided a vivid account of different forms of strategic dispositions adopted towards sustainable resistance against the taunt of dispossession, marginalization and injustice synonymous with oil exploration particularly in Ogoniland. The mobilization of ethnic minority and communal militia without any political trace or attachment used local, traditional and international media to popularise the local cause. His discourse argues that the Ogoni Bill of Rights embedded most comprehensively the cause of their campaign, including "the right to the control and use of a fair proportion of Ogoni economic resources for Ogoni development" (Obi 2010: 227-228).

Further, Agbonifo (2004: 8-10) maintains that the pattern of development as compensation was inadequate and therefore dashed the hopes of locals. The reason, he insisted, was that the multinational companies "conspired with the federal government to facilitate the exploration of communal and familial lands, often without adequate compensation." This supports the views of Oboreh (2010: 17-19 who held that failed efforts of federal government and oil companies to develop the area were deliberate because such efforts lacked seriousness and reasonable commitment. Evidence of such deliberate neglect was obvious because of the apparent lack of or complete absence of developmental infrastructure like adequate and well-equipped hospitals, pipe borne water, schools, electricity, good roads in Ogoni. Even when the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) was set up for the speedy development of Niger Delta for instance, Oboreh (2010) expressed that the commission was a fundamentally colossal failure because it was only an avenue for siphoning oil wealth for the benefit of friends, relations, cronies and loyalists of those people in power.

To this end, Oboreh (2010) identified two major negative effects of oil exploration and the behavior of various Nigerian governments in the area. Firstly was the endemic environmental pollution of the area, which destroyed territorial, atmospheric and marine environments. Secondly, the proceeds generated from oil were channeled for the development of other parts of the country to the abysmal neglect of the oil producing areas (despite the strategic importance of oil producing capacity of the area in Nigeria). Osha (2004: 6) decries that the chronic underdevelopment, jostling sense of neglect that engulfed the place and the general misery and violence that govern the lives of most of its inhabitants. He summarises the harsh living conditions in the area as grossly "threatened by deteriorating economic conditions that are not being [adequately] addressed by present policies and actions." Osha's view casts a grim picture of the detrimental underdevelopment of the region despite huge amounts of oil wealth generated from the area.

Ojakorotu & Morake (2010: 125) argues that irrespective of the fact that Nigeria is the sixth largest producer of crude oil in the world, which accrues billions of dollars to the state yearly, and which constitutes about 80% of Nigerian economy, regrettably this does not translate into meaningful physical development of the oil producing communities in the Niger Delta. These scholars explain that the local people of the host communities are completely denied access to oil wealth generated from their communities. The area has been neglected and has remained underdeveloped for so long. To this end, the region has experienced over four decades of unsuccessful violent resistance to change this anomalous trend.

However, the same scholars opine that the insensitivity of the government and oil multinational corporations operating in this area are instrumental to Ogoniland underdevelopment. On the part of the government, they argued that there is a disconnect between government policies towards the development of the region and its implementation. As a federal entity, the lopsided development in the country is associated with the lack of operationalisation of principles of true federalism, which would have ensured even development across the country. Practicing true federalism would guarantee the demise of lopsidedness, the challenges of overarching power at the center and the establishment of local government autonomy.

Secondly, the barrage of military administrations between the mid-60s and late-90s, which dominated a substantial part of the Niger Delta struggle, played a predominant role in antagonizing the Ogoni cause. Along this trajectory, the Ojakurotu (2013) opines that the military depended on decrees that concentrated absolute authority in them to formulate and implement policies of contradiction that were capable of promoting the surge of crises. Such contradictions paved way for and encouraged their flagrant violation and abuse of human rights in the wake of these military regimes. In the light of this, they emphasized that the tyrannical nature of the military administrations of General Sani Abacha and General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida resulted in the series of human rights abuses and violation, including the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni leaders and the Umuechem debacle. These Ogoni leaders lost their lives because of their agitation against the clampdown of rebellion touching on the mismanagement and squandering mania of oil wealth that characterized successive military administrations in the country. It was also a depiction of the fact that these military governments were prepared to repress any form of agitation emanating from the Niger Delta region at the time.

2.10.3 Development commissions and conflict in the Niger Delta

Totally agreeing that the agitations from the indigenes and host communities of the Niger Delta led to the establishment of some development commissions to ensure the rapid development of this region, the scholars aver that the proper implementation of the developmental policies of these bodies remain partly shrouded in unending controversy. To date, these organizations have failed to address the problems of the Niger Delta reasonably. Omotola (2012: 100) indicated that government interventionist approaches [the various developmental commissions] in the region were near futile. His argument was that the NDTC, for instance, as with other such commissions, was an insincere government policy aimed at destabilizing the Niger Delta to enhance government continued exploitation of the region. Following from this, he argues that the establishment of OMPADEC, a parallel commission with a semblance of NDTC operating concurrently, depicted lack of seriousness and sincerity on the part of the government. He went ahead to argue that vesting similar duties on both commissions simultaneously would amount to a clash of interests, which would destabilise the region and course confusion.

Ojakorotu & Morake (2010: 125) support this view but argue that these commissions were part of government 'political tricks' to make believe integration of the Niger Delta struggle into the national question and consciousness. They state further that this government's deceitful strategy, which portrayed the integration and accommodation of the rights of Niger Delta as part government policies for prompt attention, was indeed fallacious and deceptive. By implication therefore, these government efforts at developing the Niger Delta region were mere government political lip service and a ploy to distract the people and therefore aimed to sustain uninterrupted oil exploration in the region.

The views of Umukoro (2010: 56-57) support this claim. However, he asserts that the developmental efforts of the Niger Delta were unsuccessful because government politicized the process. To this end, he argues that the political dynamics surrounding the strategic development of the region within government circles ensured its perpetual underdevelopment. Although his views represent a generalised perspective on issues regarding the entire Niger Delta region, it is pertinent to affirm that Ogoniland is an integral part of this region. Thus, the views advanced by Umukoro (2010) also pertain to it as well.

2.10.4 The politics of development and underdevelopment in the Niger Delta region

Reiterating inadequate government fairness and seriousness on the development of the region, Umukoro (2010) clearly identified the effects of what he termed 'conspiracy of the political class' at the nexus of the underdevelopment of the Niger Delta region. His arguments took varying analytical dimensions of political sabotaging in the under-development of the region. Within this context, the current research identifies the existence of conspiracy that plays out in activities of Nigeria's political class that inclines the disconnection of society from its tradition and societal value, which is the pursuit and accumulation of wealth. Along this trajectory, Umukoro (2010) affirms that an inordinate quest for power among the political class fostered the relegation of relative societal interaction thus, the implicit enthronement of a condition of societal and economic inequality across the country. He suggests that this postulation inadvertently describes the situation in the Niger Delta, which undoubtedly subsists under the pangs of abject penury and the worst form of destitution.

Furthermore, Umukoro avers that parochial rather than national interests of the political class abetted the problem of underdevelopment in the Niger Delta since political independence. He identifies this as the political dimension of the conspiracy. It is a gory political and deceitful approach adopted by the political class to increase the pauperisation of the people in the name of representation. He confirms that political exploiters exist among the political class and they shamelessly usurp their political status to benefit selfish parochial interests and aggrandizement against the general good of the people they represent. To him, this political deceitfulness is a disturbing component, aggravating deplorable conditions in the Delta. To achieve this manipulative deceit, indigenous political gladiators tend to collaborate with alien political exploiters to foment adverse poverty and deplorable human living conditions within the region.

In summary, Umukoro points out the negative influence of numerical strength on the development of the Niger Delta. The minority and majority reality (Obi 2008: 3, Okonta 2008: 33, Okonta & Oronto 2001: 6) was a consequence of sense of numerical superiority felt by other cultural groups within Nigeria. Unfortunately, the Niger Delta falls among the minority judging by the numerical strength of the three major cultural groups of Igbo, Hausa and Yoruba in Nigeria. In this circumstance, those who benefit from this disparity have mobilised all forms of political, ethnic and economic maneuvers to ensure the underdevelopment of the minority, in this case the Niger Delta, which ironically remain the goose that lays the golden egg of the nation. To this end, the minority suffer as they are consistently denied political access to state power, effective political representation, and by extension inadequate provision of basic social services, making it impossible for government to meet the basic needs of the people of Niger Delta.

He pointed out that this has generated increased agitation for the creation of minority ethnic states. The first government response to these agitations was the establishment of the 1958 commission, which recommended, *inter alia,* the setting up of special development commission that was charged with the development of the region, to assuage the fears of the people. Regrettably, the array of such development bodies established over the years has failed to curb the barrage of political glitches challenging the development of Ogoniland in particular and the Niger Delta in general.

The contributions of Obi (1997: 140-141) appraised the root causes of conflict in Ogoni as the result of the interaction between Shell and the Ogoni environment. Obi argues that the negative consequences of this relationship have spawned alienation which aggravated the long protest and general resistance in Ogoniland. The extractive activities of Shell in Ogoniland expropriated its land, polluted the ecosystem, and therefore destroyed the peasant Ogoni people's source of livelihood. However, Obi reiterated that Shell's affiliation with the Ogoni people was premised on the social relationship of production as globally determined which has consequently alienated the Ogoni people from oil proceeds.

2.11 Summary

This section reviewed literature on Ogoni conflict. The section started with discussion which focused on the causes of Ogoni conflict. Most of the authors whose works were reviewed indicated that the Ogoni conflict was a result of frustration which the people had suffered as a result of oil exploration activities in the area. Other views expressed by the author regarding the causes of the conflict was the failure of the government of Nigeria and the oil company, Shell to address the negative effects and challenges of oil exploration in the area. Other authors expressed concern on the underdevelopment of the area despite huge resources Nigerian government generates from there. This section ends with further discussed the causes of Ogoni conflict. However, the authors reviewed expressed the view that the development and underdevelopment of Niger Delta region and Ogoni in particular is shrouded in politics of number and numerical strength.

2.12 Gaps in the literature

Apparently, about four inferences could be derived from the above review. These inferences provided the gaps that necessitated the research this study intends to close. First, the views of the authors center more on the causes of the conflict in Marikana and Ogoni. Each author has views focused and directed distinctively on the conflicts they intend to evaluate and study. Though there were other few divergent perspectives to these conflicts, the cores of most views were on the causes of the conflict. Secondly, the perceptions of the authors did not go the way of a comparative analysis of the root causes of both conflicts save for Peter Leon (2013) who did a brief comparative study on Mining Laws in South Africa and Nigeria. Thirdly, their views did not reflect on government involvement in the conflict and when this happens, it was not a comparative approach. Lastly, the consequences of these actions on recurrence of conflicts were not the clear focus of any of the studies in the literature reviewed in the current study.

2.13 Theoretical framework

The essence of a theoretical framework is to provide a theory that supports an intended research work. A surface assessment of the Marikana and Ogoni conflicts suggests the use of some psychological theoretical approaches as an analytical framework. Theories like frustration-aggression and resource mobilization theories immediately show their relevance in this study. However, the preference of resource mobilization theory over others stems from the focus of its approaches, which provides a comprehensive framework capable of analysing the Marikana and Ogoni conflicts.

2.13.1 Frustration-aggression theory

The focus of aggression-frustration theory was more on individual reaction than group action. Its basic propositions were advanced primarily to explain the origins and consequences of human aggression. Proponents based their assumption on the observation that "aggression is always a consequence of frustration." According to the views of the original proposers of this theory, Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mower, and Sears (1939) as cited in Berkowitz (1989: 58), frustration, which is defined as "the state that emerges when circumstances interfere with a goal response," often leads to aggression. This implies that every form of frustration always leads to some form of aggression particularly if the frustration could be eliminated through aggressive behavior. According to Berkowitz (1989: 60), this means that (a) "the occurrence of aggressive behaviour always presupposes the existence of frustration and (b) the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression." As originally identified by Dollard et al (1939) and cited by Berkowitz (1989: 60), the frustration-aggression theory identified three major aspects of thwarting that presumably influence the strength of aggression as;

(a) the strength of the drive whose gratification was blocked,

(b) the degree of interference with this drive satisfaction, and

(c) the number of frustrated response sequences (ibid: 61).

Berkowitz (1989: 61) provided a threefold analysis to the aspects of thwarting that presumably affect the strength of aggression. In a threefold hypothetically response to the above propositions, Berkowitz (1989) explained that:

> (a) "the greater the satisfaction anticipated in attaining their objective, the more aggressively inclined people become when kept from reaching their goals

(b) the strength of the resulting instigation to aggression is reduced by whatever partial gratification is obtained; and

(c) the frustration-generated aggressive inclinations will summate over repeated instances of unsatisfied expectations" (ibid: 61).

Aggression in social sciences is defined by Connor (2002: 50) as "a response by an individual that delivers something unpleasant to another person." According to Suris *et al* (2004: 166) aggression is any "harmful behavior which violates social conventions and which may include deliberate intent to harm or injure another person or object." Also, Allen, Anderson & Sturmey (2015: 3) and Anderson and Bushman (2002: 28), defined human aggression as "any behavior directed toward another individual that is carried out with the proximate intent to cause harm [and] in addition, the perpetrator must believe that the behavior will harm the target and that the target is encouraged to avoid the behavior".

Aggression, according to Connor (2002: 52), is divided into covert and overt aggression. Connor explains that while a covert aggression as the name suggests is hidden such as stealing and arson, overt aggression is open or outward expression such as physical confrontation and violence. One could argue that the conflicts at Marikana and Ogoni are covert forms of aggression because they were open expression of frustration resulting from unpleasant experiences. According to Parul & Mastnath (2016: 418), aggression can also be classified into direct or indirect aggression. They explained further that "while direct aggression is characterized by physical or verbal behaviour intended to cause harm to someone, indirect aggression is characterized by a behaviour intended to harm social relations of an individual or a group" (Parul & Mastnath: 2016: 419). Again one could also argue in relation to the conflicts at Marikana and Ogoni that the conflicts were examples of overt and direct aggression.

The relevance of this theory to this study is clear at this point considering the analytical explanations so far provided. It could be argued that the outbreak of aggression [conflict] in Marikana and Ogoni were the result of frustration. However, critics have pointed out some lapses in the theory that diminish its relevance to this study. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Jr (2001: 269) aptly pointed out that all frustrating situations do not always produce overt aggression because aggression may be inhibited if such aggressive acts could lead to punishment.

Secondly, the frustration-aggression theory presupposes that only those frustrations seen by the afflicted individual as a personal attack or threat to their personalities (Berkowitz 1989: 62) lead to aggression. In other words, the focus of the theory is more on individual aggression than group aggression. It means that it would be incompatible to use this theory to analyse group actions in Marikana and Ogoni. Further research conducted by John Dollard (1939) and his colleagues at Yale University improved on this assertion.

Nevertheless, while the frustration aggression theory is used to analyse the individual overt expression of frustration exhibited by mineworkers at the strike at Marikana, and the Ogoni people, the Resource mobilization theory is used to analyse the conflicts from group action perspective.

2.13.2 Resource mobilization theory

The principal focus of resource mobilization theory is on how groups mobilize resources and manage them in pursuit of their goal (Canel 1997: 4). According to Edwards and McCarthy (2004: 641-641) the availability or non-availability of resources remains a central determinant of the emergence, success or failure of Social Movement Organizations. The resource mobilization theory places emphasis on mobilization of resources and social capital necessary in the development and maintenance of social movements. Resources and social capital could be material and non-material (Canel 1997: 4) which may include moral, cultural, social-organisational, human and material resources (Abdullahi, Adekeye, and Balogun 2014: 87). They define a resource or social capital as "something that can be potentially used by a movement to further its goals." Often the specific aim of group resources mobilization is for the explicit purpose of pursuing the interests of the group, usually through collective actions. In Marikana and Ogoni, material and non-material resources were mobilized by AMCU and MOSOP to pursue their goals. For instance, in Marikana and Ogoni, the mineworkers and Ogoni people invested time while participating in the conflict. Time [which is a non-material resource], as indicated by Oliver & Marwell (1999: 257) is the ultimate resource for collective action. According to them, by participating in a collective action, [such as the Marikana and Ogoni conflicts], participants [such as the mineworkers and Ogoni people] had to spend time to participate (ibid).

Canel (1997:2) argues that RMT emphasises that "grievances and inequalities [which were conditions experienced at Marikana and Ogoni], could only be considered a precondition for occurrence of social movements [and] that the passage from condition to action was contingent upon the availability of resources and changes in the opportunity for collective action." This point elucidates the potential efficacy of the theory in understanding conflict in Marikana and Ogoni where grievances and inequalities formed the precondition for social movements resulting in conflict. An analytical inquiry into Marikana and Ogoni to provide such an understanding eventually leads to answers to the research questions.

2.14 Summary

This section discussed the theoretical framework for this study. Two theories, frustration-aggression and resource mobilization, were used for this study. This section started with discussions on frustration-aggression theory. It discussed the propositions of the theory which emphasizes that aggression is a result of frustration. It also discussed the criticisms of the theory and highlighted some of it short comings and the need for inclusion of another theory to make up for these shortcomings. In this light, this study also adopted the resources mobilization theory as a second theory to complement the shortcomings of frustration-aggression theory. In a similar manner, the theory was discussed and its propositions, weaknesses and relevance to this study were highlighted.

2.15 Conclusion

This chapter presented the review of various literatures in Marikana and Ogoni conflicts. It also provided conceptual elucidations on the concept of conflict. It further discussed the forms and causes of conflict. The chapter likewise reveals the different approaches to conflict management. It also argued for the theoretical framework, which advanced discussions on the relevant theory for this study.

Chapter Three: Research methodology

3.1 Introduction

Two mining host communities, Marikana in South Africa and Ogoni in Nigeria where schisms have occurred, have been selected for this study. The research provides analysis of management of these conflicts. It analyses the various conflict management procedures and processes engaged by both the mining companies and the governments of South Africa and Nigeria to ensure proper management,before, during and after the Marikana and Ogoni conflicts.

3.2 Qualitative research method

The choice of a particular methodology provides access to data to assure proper investigation. This study adopted the qualitative research method to answer the research questions. In social sciences, qualitative research design is engaged to seek answers to research questions (Denzin, & Lincoln 2000: 15). By using qualitative research, one arrives at findings not attained by statistical techniques. Qualitative research seeks arrive at findings and produce results from the primary environment where the phenomenon of investigation occurs naturally (Al-Busaidi 2008: 13). The methodological approach taps upon the experiences and perceptions of the population directly involved and affected by phenomenon of interest in order to understand fully a particular research topic and research problem. Therefore, qualitative research method seeks to extract information from the "meanings people attribute to their experiences, circumstances, and situations, as well as the meanings people embed into texts and other objects" (Hesse-Biber & Leavy 2011: 4). In specific terms, this method is an investigative process which produces results not determined in advance but through defined processes for data collection to answer research questions. This method therefore becomes an effective process for a researcher to extract information relating the social perspectives, values and behaviours of a specific group of persons about a particular phenomenon selected for investigation (ibid). Thus, at the nexus of every qualitative research method is the "extraction of meanings from data", which has its focus primarily on words and texts. By implication therefore, qualitative research method is largely an interpretive study of texts (Bernard 2013: 393), which produces empirical findings suitable for the formulation of theories.

The choice of this research method is to ensure the extraction of correct first-hand information from source to guarantee high quality answers to the questions that the research investigates. The methodology undertaken to explore a particular phenomenon is the function of existing social states. In other words, the social situation of a particular phenomenon is an influential variable in the choice of methodological approaches of investigation. Tracy (2013: 25-28) presented a three-fold characteristic of qualitative approach: the Gestalt, Bricolage and Funnel metaphor and sensitizing concepts. Tracy (2013) described Bricolage as a historical holistic approach that seeks the integration, examining and parsing of cultural elements. Explicitly, this implies that the best understanding of any culture is embed in relation and interdependent upon interaction with others. In other words, the proper investigation of a phenomenon subsists in understanding the cultural elements that informed the integration of a cultural setting. Therefore, research study as the one undertaken here explores the fundamental constellation of factors that influenced conflicts in the sociocultural settings under study.

Secondly, citing Denzin & Lincoln (2005: 4) Tracy described Bricolage as "piecing together a set of representations that is fitted to the specifics of a complex situation." The inference here is that the researcher engages in extracting views and using several perceptions to explain a specific phenomenon. It means that qualitative research is a process of making synthesis using a plethora of varying data. For this study, different aggregated views of research participants provided relevant clues that were probed in order to unravel the covert variables surrounding the phenomena under study and to answer the stated research questions.

Thirdly, appraising the structural semblance of a funnel, Tracy (2013) describes qualitative method as an approach that usually begins with a broader spectrum or perspective of the research question before narrowing it down to the distinctive focus. Stating broadly, it is an indication that researchers allow themselves opportunities to further scout the research field, collection of more data and eventually narrowing their focus. Finally, the sensitizing concepts are those contextual philosophies which provide a structural mirror, through which a researcher visualizes, systematizes and familiarizes with the research problem. According to Tracy, they "are theories or interpretative devices that serve as jumping-off points or lenses for qualitative study" (Tracy 2013: 28). Implicitly, qualitative method represents a scientific research method, which enables a researcher investigative access to phenomenon from the general to the specific.

It is imperative to note that there is a purpose for every research endeavor. Depending on the research, the drive for most research studies is a function of three purposes. Babbie (2010: 19) outlined three purposes for social research as exploratory, descriptive and explanatory. Babbie further explained that the explorative method aims to investigate developing and persistent phenomena in a bid to understand the reason why such a phenomenon occurred. Clearly, the fundamental reason influencing this study is elucidated by this position. The descriptive method concerns the observation of phenomenon and events. Thus, through proper observation, description becomes easy and facilitates accurate research findings and results (Corbin & Strauss 2008: 14, Babbie 2010: 94).

According to Hesse-Biber & Leavy (2011: 10-11) explanatory research seeks to explore under investigated aspects of communal existence. They explain that this method is vital to a researcher for three principal reasons: to search for existing literature, to enter into conversations with professionals in the field and formal focus group interview. In other words, reaching a successful explanation of a research phenomenon remains the function of the effective combination of these three principal reasons by a researcher. It means that conducting research is a process fundamentally predicated on these reasons to achieve results through any of the purposes outlined by Babbie (2010). Thus for this study, both the descriptive and explanatory methods were used to answer the research questions. The reason is that the research questions are formulated in in such a way that they are appropriately answered in descriptive and explanatory manner.

Furthermore, given the fact that the focus of the study represents a situation of persistence and recurrence, qualitative research method is apparently useful to this study. Using the qualitative method made it easy therefore, to thoroughly explore the conflict management approaches used in the Marikana and Ogoni conflicts since Babbie advocated that investigating persistent occurrence requires the use of a robust explorative research methodology such as qualitative method. It also makes it possible to evaluate the reasons framing the recurrence of conflict in the mining sectors of the countries under study and their conflict management strategies.

Similarly, Corbin & Strauss (2008: 12-13), stated that the reasons for qualitative research stems from three fronts. First, that research questions informs or determines the methodology engaged in the conduct of the research. Second, it allows the researchers access to the covert experiences of their participants, to determine the interaction between culture and the means derivable from a particular phenomenon. Thirdly, it allows the researcher to discover new variable instead of testing existing once. Explicitly, the inference here is that qualitative research method uses a methodology that seeks the explorative process to investigate and produce findings relevant to understanding a phenomenon. In this sense, the researcher links the answers to the questions why a phenomenon persistently occurs with the causative variables.

Therefore, the decision to use qualitative research method for this study stems from the following reasons:

1. Qualitative method is flexible in nature and as such allows the researcher delve into a vigorous exploration to liquefy a phenomenon (Corbin & Strauss 2008: 13). It is a very essential method used for studies in new research areas like this study, which often led to new insights for further research topics (Babbie 2010: 93) and new social science theories.

2. Qualitative research method allows the researcher flexibility of data collection approaches during data collection. Qualitative research engages true-to-life approach, which explains phenomena within this context (Babbie 2010:92). In this sense, the real world situation prevails on the researcher and prevents the adulteration of the phenomenon under study (Corbin & Strauss 2008: 14).

3. The method allows the researcher opportunity to explore complexities of real world situations and make sense from the designs for effective findings (Mason 2007: 1). It also provides a platform for the researcher to properly investigate and explain the dynamics of the study.

4. The qualitative method of data collection intends to achieve deeper of understanding of phenomenon while the quantitative method intend to achieve breath understanding of phenomenon (Palinkas *et al* 2016: 535).

3.3 Data collection

Qualitative research method as a paradigm requires the use primary and secondary sources of data collection. These are the two basic method of data collection in any social science research (Kumar 2005: 118). Explicitly therefore, the choice of the approach offers deeper prospects of obtaining and accessing information hidden from the researcher that are fundamental to the study. Interviews and observation are examples of methods to collect primary data while the extraction of information required from an already available data, is an example of secondary method of data collection (ibid). Through in-depth interviews process, which this study used, for instance, the researcher is able to have a personal appraisal with various stakeholders and persons directly involved in a particular phenomenon under study. Also, it offers the researcher that opportunity of appraising the root causes and principal reasons for its persistence and, proffer strategic platforms for lasting peace.

However, the choice of either of the two basic methods of data collection depends on the intention of the study, the resources available and skills of the researcher (Kumar 1999: 105). In this thesis, both primary and secondary data collection methods are used.This method is also known as triangulation or dual methodology. The reason for the extraction of data both from the primary and secondary sources is that both sources complement the importance of each other in research. While the primary sources provide the researcher with first-hand information or information in its original form, the secondary sources provided other important information for review. Such secondary information could also be compared with the primary information to test reliability and thrust worthiness of primary information.

Further elucidations of the primary and secondary sources of data collection are given below.

3.3.1 Primary sources

When a researcher collects data from the original source especially for the purpose in mind, such data is known as primary data (Van Teijlingen 2014: 18). Thus, primary sources are information documented at the time of study which, serves as the original source of data for the research. Primary sources are in the form of recordings, manuscript, autobiography, diary, or any other data generated during a particular study such as this one. The significance of primary sources is that data collected through it are original and not altered; thus their reliability is trusted in research.

This method provides the researcher the opportunity of gathering data from the original source where the phenomenal occurs. It entails sourcing data from a real-life social environment. The primary source of data collection ensures that the researcher gets first hand access to information. To achieve this objective, this research used semi-structured interview method for its data collection. The semi-structured interview method allows every respondent the opportunity of getting the same key questions asked to avoid biased information (Van Teijlingen

2014: 20). Semi-structured interview method also makes it easier to explore the views of an individual towards an occurrence (ibid)

3.3.2 Population and sample size

The conduct of the interview was across a number of respondents in South Africa and Nigeria selected from the target group. To select the sample, the purposeful sampling strategy, which allows the researcher to select individual and sites for the study to inform the research problem in the study (Creswell 2007: 125), was adopted. The population of various interviewees is selected from government officials in the mineral resources departments and finance departments of both countries, the police in Marikana and military personnel in Ogoni, journalists, academics, civil society actors, mineworkers, and community leaders. Others are representatives of AMCU, NUM, COSATU, MOSOP, mine managers or their representatives and the church representatives. The general criteria for the selection of all respondents, was that the respondents must have knowledge of the Marikana and Ogoni conflicts. Other specific attributes of the respondents are outlined in Tables 3.1 for Marikana and 3.2 for Ogoni, respectively.

Table 3.1: Number of respondents interviewed for Marikana and their attributes

S/N	Target Groups	Selection Attributes of Respondents	Respondent Status	Number of Respondents Interviewed	Data Collection Method used	Interview Location
1.	Mine workers	Must be Lonmin mineworkers or their representatives	Mineworkers representatives	2	Interpreter aided face-to-face recorded interview	Nkaneng informal settlement
2.	Community Leaders	Must be Marikana community leader or representative	Marikana Community Representative	1	Recorded face-to-face Interview	Marikana
3.	Civil Society Organisation	Must be Representative of Bench mark Foundation	Representative of Benchmark Foundation	1	Recorded Telephonic interview	Mafikeng
4.	Association of Mine workers and Construction Union (AMCU)	Member/ Representative of AMCU	Member of AMCU	2	Recorded Telephonic interview	Mafikeng
5.	National Union of Mine workers (NUM)	Member/ Representative of NUM	Member of NUM	2	Recorded Telephonic interview	Mafikeng
6.	Journalists	Must be Journalists of national newspaper who was part of the covering team in Marikana conflict	New Age Newspaper Journalists	2	Email	Mafikeng
7.	Academia	Must be lecturer in a higher institution in North West	Lecturers	2	Face-to-face interview.	North West University (Mafikeng Campus)
8	Department of Mineral Resources	Must be a representative or a senior civil servant in the department	Senior civil servant in the department	1	Email	Mafikeng
Total number of respondents interviewed				13		

Table 3.2: Number of respondents interviewed for Ogoni and their attributes

S/N	Target Group	Selection Attributes Of Respondents	Respondent Status	Number of Respondents Interviewed	Data Collection Method	Interview Location
1.	Ogoni Community leaders	Must be leaders from Bori and Bodo Communities or their Representatives	Community leaders of Bori Bodo, Kahna and Gokana Communities	4: (1 community leader from each community)	Recorded face-to-face interview	Kpor Town Hall
2.	Ogoni Youth Leaders	Must be Youth leaders from Khana and Gokana communities or their representatives	Youth leaders of Khana, Bodo Gokana and Bori Communities	4: (1 Youth leader from each community)	Recorded face-to-face Interview	Kpor Town Hall
3.	Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP)	Must be Representative/s of MOSOP	Representative of MOSOP	1	Recorded Face-to-face Interview	Port Harcourt
4.	Military	Must be leader or member of the military team deployed to Ogoni during the conflict	Member of military team deployed to Ogoni during the conflict	1	Recorded telephonic interview	Port Harcourt
5.	Journalists	Must be Journalists of national newspaper who was part of the covering team in Ogoni	1 Retired Daily Times Newspaper Journalist and 1 Vanguard Newspaper Journalist	2	Face-to-face and Telephonic Interviews respectively	Port Harcourt
6.	Academia	Lecturer in a higher institutions in Rivers State	Lecturers	2	2 Face-to-face interviews	University of Port Harcourt
7.	Government Officials	Must be senior officer in Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC)	Senior Officers at NDDC Port Harcourt	2	Hard copy Administered Interview	Port Harcourt
Total number of respondents interviewed				16		

3.3.3 Interviews

Open-ended interview is essential in every qualitative research used in this study. It is one of the most familiar and effective tool for qualitative data collection, which presents the researcher that opportunity of accessing phenomenal realities from people's perceptions, description of situations and interpretation of meanings to realities. Citing Jones (1985) in Punch (1988: 175) argues that for you to understand the views of another person regarding a particular reality:

> "We would do well to ask them…and to ask them in such a way that they can tell us in their terms (how they are primarily affected) and in a depth, which addresses the rich context that is substance of their meaning" (Punch 1988: 175).

The statement represents a laconic reflection on the vitality of 'asking' meaning interview to any research exploration (Braun & Clark 2013: 79, Marshall & Rossman 2011: 144). Along this trajectory in furtherance, (Braun & Clark 2013: 81), posited appropriately that interview is essential "for exploring understanding and perceptions and constructions of things that participants have some kind of personal stake in..." It catches succinctly one of the significance of interview, which is the subjective stakes of each participant. If a participant nurtures principal stakes, such a participant is a likely enthusiast for swift release information to a researcher. Therefore, such a participant becomes a potential instrument for faster generation of research data. By extension, Marshall & Rossman (2011: 145) argues correctly that interview is a fundamental method, which guarantees quick generation of quality data.

Therefore, the study used a set of open-ended interview question method. The aim in this method is to assist the researcher retrieve in-depth information that would assure reliability and trustworthiness of data collected (Creswell 2007: 109). In addition, this method presents the respondents with flexibility that allows them to develop personal ideas and comprehensively present their own views. This is so because open-ended questions do not subject the respondent to providing yes or no answers; rather the method allows respondents to express their view feely. This also inspires respondents to provide in-depth, comprehensive and thorough responses, and to provide personal vital information in their own words (Creswell 2014: 4, Braun & Clark 2013: 79). It also allows the extraction of incisive responses from the interviewees. By so doing, the researcher achieves gainful insight into the phenomenon and gets more facts that are revealing from participants' responses.

The administration of interview questions was done through the various means of interviewing respondent and participants during a research. These include the most common and historic type of interview: the face-to-face contact method. Other methods are self-administered hard copy questionnaires, mailed and telephonically conducted interviews, particularly where it was the only available direct interaction access to the participant. (Braun & Clark 2013: 79) argues that face-to-face contact between respondent and researcher remain one of the best ideal method to extract interview data during fieldwork. Marshall & Rossman (2011: 145) were right when they posited that this method initiates a form of familiarity, which enable both the researcher and the participant free, conducive and better comportment to discuss extensively.

Hence, for the purpose of the method used for data collection was the face-to-face interview method. However, where access to the respondent was impossible at the time of collection of data, other means of administering interview such as telephone and email were used. The face-to-face interviews were recorded using tape recorder, while the telephonic interviews were recorded in the phone memories.These responses were transcribed and used in the study. Emailed responses were also downloaded and printed out in hard copies.

A total number of twenty-nine participants were interviewed from both countries during the study, thirteen respondents from South Africa and sixteen respondents from Nigeria. The interview questions were divided into two sets of ten questions for each case study. One set of ten questions was for the South Africa participants, while the other set was for the Nigerian participants respectively (see appendix 1 and 2). Each of these questions was framed in such a way that they provided answers to the research questions. This indication is supported Marshall & Rossman (2011: 146) who argues that basic idea at the back of every researcher's mind when formulating interview questions would be to ensure that research questions are answered through them.

3.3.4 Pilot study

Pilot study is a process through which a researcher pre-tests or tries-out his research instruments before the actual research is conducted (Polit 2001: 20). Research instruments such as interview question and questionnaires are pre-tested through pilot test to assess their reliability during the actual research (ibid). According to Chenail (2011: 255) a pilot study is "a usual procedure for testing the quality of an interview protocol and for identifying potential researcher biases". "It is also an investigative process through researchers try-out their proposed methods to see if the planned procedures perform as envisioned by them" (ibid). Thus, it implies that a pilot study is that feasibility process that ensures that research instruments are tested to avert unnecessary complications while conducting the actual research. However, a pilot study does not guarantee success during the actual research study (Chenail 2011: 256, Polit 2001: 21).

For this research, the interview questions for Nigeria were subjected to a pilot study between 01 August and 30 September 2014 in Port Harcourt, Rivers State, Nigeria. Within this period, the researcher interviewed selected informants from within the target groups to test the reliability and trust worthiness of the interview questions in answering the research questions of this study. The researcher also conducted similar pilot test in North West Province of South Africa between 10 January and 10 March 2015. Some of the informants proffered useful suggestions and information that the rephrasing of some of the interview questions to ensure that can significantly answer the research questions. This information necessitated the rephrasing of some of the interview and research questions. These processes produced the final interview and research questions used in this research.

3.3.5. Secondary sources

The secondary data were extracted from information from existing records of historical information and this included include books, articles, magazines, journals and periodicals in this filed.

3.4 Data analysis

This research adopted the content analysis method to identify, analyse and summarise message contents from books, documents, journals and interview reports. In the words of Kaplan as quoted by Franzosi (2006: 548) "The technique known as content analysis... attempts to characterize the meaning in a given body of discourse in a systematic and qualitative fashion.". It further refers to "the objective, systematic, and qualitative description of any symbolic behavior" (ibid: 548). The content method of data analysis therefore assisted the researcher make meaning and interpret phenomenon by expressing feelings, attitude, values, perceptions, knowledge, and experiences [from interviews, books and existing literatures] to approximate their formulation of the phenomenon (Maree, 2010: 83).

3.5 Limitations to the study

Considering the tense conditions of the Marikana environment following the death of some mineworkers in the heat of the crisis, targeted number of intended mine workers for interview was not achievable. However, efforts were made to ensure success. Secondly, language barrier was another big challenge towards the effective conclusion of this work. This is because majority of the mineworkers involved were not formally schooled, and as a result, some of them preferred to express themselves in local languages such as Tswana and Xhosa languages. Nonetheless, in such situations, the researcher overcame this challenge through the assistance of an interpreter.

In Ogoni, the situation was similar. However, in this case, a generally acceptable and commonly spoken form of vernacular popularly known as Pidgin English was used by the researcher to extract information during the interview. Also, the intended number of respondents was not realized because some of them refused to grant such interview. In South Africa, the Congress of South African Trade Union (COSATU), Lonmin, Department of Mineral Resources and finance department refused to grant interview. Similarly, in Nigeria, Shell, department of mineral resources, and finance department also refused to grant interviews. This was part of the complexities of collecting data on the ground. However, the researcher managed this situation by making use of available data from the departments and existing literatures.

3.6 Summary

Chapter three discussed research methodology used in this research. The chapter started by discussing primary and secondary methods of data collection which it used for the research. Under the primary data collection method, the researcher discussed methods and processes used in the collection primary data. The chapter also presented the processes of pilot study conducted by the researcher in South Africa for Marikana and in Nigeria for Ogoni. The chapter ends with discussion on method of data analysis used in the research.

Chapter four: Historical background to two Case Studies (Shell Petroleum Development Company in Ogoni, Nigeria and Lonmin Pty Company in Marikana, South Africa)

4.1 Introduction

Chapter three presented theresearch methodology. The chapter discused in details various types of data collection, data collection process, data analysis mathod used in this research. Chapter four draws a historical analogy of Lonmin mining activities in South Africa and Shell Petroleum Development Company oil exploration activities in Ogoni Nigeria. The chapter is presented in two parts. The first part discusses the conflict management strategies adopted by Shell Petrolleum Development Company and the Nigerian government before, during and after the Ogini conflict. The second part discusses conflict management strategies of Lonmin and South African government in a smilar manner. Both parts provide reflection on historical background of Ogoni and Marikana. The section begins with discusions on the history of Shell oil exploiration in Nigeria. Similar discussions are presented for Marikana. Furthermore, the chapter will discuse the causes of the conflicts in Ogoni and Marikana. Each section ends with a summary while the chapter terminates with a chapter conclusion that sums up the discussions on both conflcits.

4.1.1 Background to Case Study 1: Shell Petroleum Development Company and oil Exploration in Ogoni Rivers State, Niger Delta of Nigeria

Figure 4. 1: Map showing Niger Delta States of Nigeria in colour

Source: Aniefiok et al (2013: 79), see also Science and education publishing website available at http://pubs.sciepub.com/env/1/4/2/figure/1.

The Nigerian federation, consisting of 36 states plus the federal capital territory of Abuja has a population of over 170 million people constituting approximately 250 ethnic groups (Ingelson & Nwapi 2014: 38). Within the entity lies the oil rich region referred to as the Niger Delta. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2006) definition of Niger Delta captures the region as inclusive of "all the oil-producing areas and others considered relevant for reasons of administrative convenience, political expedience and developmental objectives" (UNDP 2006: 19). Following from this, the area known as Niger Delta in Nigeria today falls under this description.

The region is a naturally massive sedimentary accumulation over time which dates as far back as 40-50 million years before the Eocene epoch (Watts 2004: 57-58). The Niger Delta is thus a region located in the South-South part of Nigeria and constitutes nine administrative littoral states in the federation, including Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross-River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers (Umukoro 2010: 50). These states put together cover over 75,000 kilometers of land mass and it also consists of a total of 185 local government areas (Anugwom 2011: 4). With a population of 27 million people, and an estimated 7.5 per cent practically living in rural areas, the region makes up nearly 7.5 per cent of Nigeria's total landmass (Niger Delta Development Commission 2004). Its oil and gas reserves is put at approximately 25 billion barrels and 130 trillion cubic feet and this accounts for up to 90% of Nigeria's crude oil (Obore 2010: 17). However, the latest Oil and Gas Journal updates (Kadafa, Zakaria, & Othman, 2012: 24), puts the established oil reserve of the region at about 36.2 billion barrels and gas reserves at 185 trillion cubic feet as of January 2010. Reports in the Guardian Newspapers (13 June 2006:16) divulges that eleven oil companies operate one hundred and fifty-nine (159) oil fields and one thousand four hundred and eighty-one (1,481) wells within the Niger Delta region.

The Niger Delta is covered by a natural delta of the Niger River to the East and West spanning a landscape of about 70,000km^2 which makes it the third largest delta in the world (Obore 2010: 17, Courson 2009: 8, UNDP 2006:19). About 25,000 km^{2}of this landscape are covered by four ecologically identifiable zones of mangrove forests, fresh water swamps, coastal ridge barriers and lowland rain forests (Onosode 2003: 63). It has a coastline extending to 500 kilometers, which covers approximately two-thirds of Nigeria's coastline (Idemudia 2007:3).

However, outside this formation, Roberts (2005: 96-97) identifies the 'riverine' and the 'upland' as the two ecological attributes that typify the Niger Delta. It generally consists of small and unstructured ethnic minority littoral clusters lacking any centralized traditional political system with the Izon (Ijaw) as the largest group. Other relatively large groups within the minority in the region are Itsekiri, Urhobo, Isoko, Andoni, Ibibio, Kwale and Ogoni among twenty other ethnic groups existing within the region (Abegunde 2014: 32, Obi 2006: 14).

4.1.2 Oil and the Nigerian economy

In Nigeria, the centrality of oil as a resource wealth to its economy is enormous (Baghebo & Atima 2013: 104). For instance, the buoyancy or not of Nigeria's economy depends on its oil wealth. Nigeria has the Niger Delta region as the heart of her oil production in the country (Nwankwo 2015: 387). In this respect, Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers States alone account for 75 percent of oil production in the Niger Delta region (Mukoro 2010: 79). Following from this, oil wealth has contributed about US$350 billion to the economy of Nigeria in 35 years from the period since its initial discovery at Oloibiri in 1958 to 1995 (ibid). Oboreh (2006: 26), whose work shows that oil wealth accounted for more than 70% of government revenue and about 90% of foreign exchange earnings respectively, supports this view. The justification for this assertion derives from the fact that most of oil mineral commodities are exported into the international market, especially industrialized economies (USA and Europe), emerging economies (China and Russia) and even to some African countries like South Africa. This means that Nigeria's economic sustainability and development depend on income generated from the crude oil exploration hence oil exportation remains the major source of foreign currency earnings for the country (Osha: 2005: 12.

4.1.3 Historical Ogoniland

Figure 4.2: Map showing four Local Governments of Ogoniland.



Source: http://www.unep.org/disastersandconflicts/CountryOperations/Nigeria/tabid/54124/Default.aspx. 17-03-2016

Ogoni nationality is one of the many ethnic nationalities inhabiting the present day Rivers State of Nigeria. It is situated in the oil producing area within the Niger Delta region. The Ogoni territory lies across a span land of about 404 square miles with a population approximately pegged at 832,000 people, as shown in Table 3.1, making it one of the most densely populated areas on the African continent (Osha 2005: 11, UNEP 2006: 32). The Ogoni people trace their origins to two historical theoretical perspectives. One school of thought claims that the Ogonis were originally migrants from across the Imo River in present day Cross River State who were the first settlers of Khana community before spreading to other areas like Tai and Gokana to Eleme (UNEP 2006: 33). Derivative from this theory, two Ogoni villages, Utetuk and Warife still exist in Cross River State (ibid). It also claims that Utetuk has adopted both the Annang language and traditional lifestyle of the current state while Warife still speaks Kahna language and practice some Ogoni traditions to date (Saro-Wiwa 1968: 3).

Table 4. 1: Number of inhabitants by Local Government Areas (LGA) according to 2006 Nigeria census figure

Name of Local Government Area	Number of inhabitants
Eleme	190,884
Gokana	228,828
Khana	294,217
Tai	117,797
Total	**831,726**

Source: UNEP Assessment of Ogoni report 2011: 32

The second school of thought claims that the Ogonis were originally business migrants who came in trading ships and settled in Bonny (Saro-Wiwa 1968: 3). As new arrivals, they were referred to as 'Igoni', which means 'stranger.' It is alleged that the name Ogoni is an adapted form of the word 'Igoni.' However, as their number increased, context necessitated the need for them to migrate towards the mainland areas of Khana, Gokana and Eleme (ibid).

Traditionally, Ogoniland consists of six kingdoms namely Tai, Babbe, Ken-Khara, Nyo Khana, Gokana and Eleme who are said to have settled in the area well before the fifteenth century (Osha 2005: 12). These kingdoms, put together, consist of 124 villages and some of the main towns are Bori (the divisional headquarters of Ogoni), Bodo, Dere, and Bomu in Gokana, Nowa in Tai, Nchia in Eleme, Tabang, Okwali and Beeri in Northern Khana and Bane, Baen, Kono, and Kpean in Southern Khana (Saro-Wiwa 1992: 2). According to Nigeria's administrative design, as expressed in Osha (2005) Ogoniland is divided into four local governments in Rivers State namely Eleme, Tai, Gokana and Khana.

The Ogoni people are predominantly farmers and fishermen, hence, their main source of income is the sale of agricultural produce for instance Garri made from cassava, palm oil, coconuts, fish and other fish products (Saro-Wiwa 1968: 3). A majority of the Ogoni are worshipers of a traditional deity known as Bari or Obari in Eleme, which means the creator of Heaven and Earth (ibid). These areas play host to a high concentration of plants and industrial installations, including six oil fields belonging to Shell, several oil reticulation pipes connecting various oil installations crossing overland, two refineries, a petrochemical plant, a huge fertilizer plant, and an ocean port (Obi, 1997: 143, Obi 2002: 27-28). Shell had operated 96 oil wells between 1958 and 1990 but had ironically invested only about 0.000007% of its oil revenues from Ogoniland in the area itself at that time (Frynas 1998: 463). Within the same period, Shell was producing approximately 28,000 barrels of daily crude oil production from Ogoniland alone (shell.com.ng). Within the Niger Delta, Shell produces over 50% of Nigeria's crude from over 1000 fields (Kadafa, A. A., Zakaria, M. P., & Othman, F. 2012: 23).

4.1.4 The Ogoni quest

Documented evidence, reports and research findings have shown that the story of the Ogoni people in the Niger Delta region is that of neglect by successive Nigerian government and SPDC (Ume 2012: 15). The Ogoni people claimed that the consequences of oil production on their land brought them inestimable hardship while the oil company responsible for this showed no serious commitment either in controlling the problem or alleviating the hardship the Ogonis suffer as a result of their mining activites (ibid). For instance, between 1976-1991, millions of barrels of crude oil have spilled across Ogoniland (Vanguard Newspapers 23 April 2016: 2). Within these 15 years of Shell Petroleum Development Company oil exploration, a recorded report of about 2,976 oil spills of more than 2.1 million barrels of crude oil accounting for approximately 40 per cent of total oil spills recorded by Shell worldwide had already occurred in Ogoniland (Ogoni News 2014: 5). Clearly, this magnitude of oil spill on Ogoniland would have fundamental consequences on their land, water and environment. Regrettably, both the government and SPDC have shown a lethargic approach towards its implementation hence the people have had continuous exposure to the dangers associated with oil spills (ibid).

In 2011, when the UNEP conducted an on-the-spot assessment of the level of pollution in Ogoniland the report's findings discovered high levels of hydro-carbon pollution in these areas and thus, recommended the immediate comprehensive clean-up of Ogoniland of all oil pollution, restore the polluted environment and put an end to any form of contamination in Ogoni (shell.com.ng, UNEP 2011). Five years after, the recommendations of the UNEP report of 2011 have not been implemented because of the delay and lack of seriousness on the part of Nigerian government despite the urgency it deserves. This inference comes from statements made by the President of Nigeria, Muhammadu Buhari, while on a short visit to the United Nations (UN) office in Nairobi Kenya (Daily Post 28 January 2016). There, he assured the Ogoni people of his steadfast commitment to the earliest implementation of the recommendations of the UNEP report by his administration particularly the cleaning of Ogoniland (Daily Post 28 January 2016). Only in 2016 has the government launched the take-off of Ogoni clean up according to UNEP recommendations (ibid). Despite this, the situation has not received further visible nor significant progress.

As a pivotal minority oil producing community in the Niger Delta region, the Ogoni people for many years have watched the oil resources on their lands being extracted by Shell without much benefit trickling down to their respective areas (Oboreh 2010: 26). In the meanwhile, their lands have become increasingly more polluted and less productive (Fig 2004: 1-2). Oboreh (2010: 25) argues that while oil companies make massive profits, and the Nigerian state continues to amass wealth, the Niger Delta paradoxically undergoes continued exploitation, experiencing underdevelopment and neglect.

4.1.5 Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) and the Ogoni struggle

Following from this, it is clear that the Ogoni conflict stems from a condition of unacceptable environmental, economic, political and social consequences of oil industries and their activities within the communities. Accordingly, there was a wave of different forms of stiff resistance from across the host communities in Niger Delta and in Ogoni in particular against this injustice.The Ogoni Bill of Rights (OBR) was a documented summary of the demands of Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People addressed to the Nigerian government published in 1990 (Elowyn 2011). Central to the demands of the Bill among others, was that the Ogoni people should be granted political autonomy to participate in the affairs of the republic as a distinct and separate entity (Obi 2006: 26).The reason behind this demand was to ensure their quest for the control and utilization of the oil wealth for the development of Ogoni remain protected.

To further fortify, strengthen and broaden the front of the struggle, MOSOP was also formed in 1990 (Shell.com.ng). It started its mandate as a non-violent, non-governmental and non-political organisation. In line with the tenets of the struggle, Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People had a greater part of its campaign mandate focus on: 'promotion of democratic awareness; protection of the Ogoni environment and people; seeking social, cultural rights and practices of the Ogoni people; and seeking appropriate rights of self-determination for the Ogoni people' (mosop.org 2015). Saddled with such an enormous task, MOSOP ultimately had its campaign focus on larger control over oil and oil resources revenue for the achievement of environmental, socio-economic, cultural and political development of Ogoniland and its people (shell.com.ng).

4.1.6 Root causes of Ogoni conflict

Within the Niger Delta and Ogoniland in particular, different types of intense mining activities such as oil drilling and exploration take place daily. These mining activities take different forms, dimensions and magnitude, and are performed using different technological devices for the extraction of natural mineral resources, in most cases, buried underground (Ume 2012: 15). This is so because these resources are present in different formations in their natural forms, including air, liquid and solid (Ume 2012: 18, Manby 2000: 4). Unfortunately, these mining activities are not without dire deleterious consequences which could easily trigger resistance from the people directly affected. Just as in many other rich natural resource states, the wealth of oil in Nigeria has proved to be a curse rather than a blessing. For instance, Nigeria's oil wealth has enriched a minority of people, particularly those in political power, while the vast majority remains progressively penurious. Instead of oil wealth transforming Nigeria into one of the most prosperous and developed countries on the African continent, the oil-producing region has remained one of poorest and underdeveloped countries in the world (Manby 2000: 3). Astonishingly, even the oil producing Niger Delta region and its community's parade stalled development and poverty. Thus, the Niger Delta region remains overwhelmed by intense violent conflict. Consequently, across the region, intense hatred, confusion and boiling fury has persisted predominantly between Niger Delta communities on one hand (as host communities) and oil companies and host communities and the Nigerian government on the other (ibid).

Across the Delta, the impacts of oil exploration activities are closely interrelated. Hence, the root causes of violent conflict are fairly similar across Niger Delta. Some of these factors are summarily discussed below.

4.1.6.1 Exploitation by colonial masters

The genesis of the Niger Delta conflict dates back to the colonial days before the discovery of oil when the area was rich in palm oil and palm kernel production which made useful raw material for industrial development (Ume 2012: 14). Because these areas were the major producers of palm oil at the time, this gave the area the name Oil River (http://nigerdelta.gov.ng/index.php). Umeh further stresses that during this era, the kings and indigenous palm oil merchants were forced by colonial masters into accepting treaties that subjected them to harsh treatment, intimidation and suppression while their British counterparts were doing as they pleased (ibid). Some of paramount kings across the Delta who challenged, refused or agitated against this subjugation were either dethroned or exiled or killed (Egwemi 2010: 136). According to Egwemi (2010: 137), the King of Bonny kingdom, King William Dappa Pepple was dethroned and exiled by the colonial leadership in the area at that time to Fernado Po in 1854. Even the prominent king of Opobo, King Jaja, also faced dethronement and exile. In addition, an Irsekiri prince, Nana, was equally stripped of his paraphernalia before being exiled to Ghana in 1894. Furthermore, the Oba of Benin, dethroned in 1897, was exiled to the city of Calabar where he later died in 1913 (ibid).

Again, in 1895 when the then Royal Niger Company banned the Nembe people from trade in palm oil and its products around the depot in Akassa, it resulted in a massive economic crash, which led to an attack on the depot (ibid). The ban was to allow the British sole trade access with the international palm oil trade merchants who at the time thronged around the oil rich island (Ume 2012: 17).

4.1.6.2 Adaptation and violation of the revenue sharing formula by the Government

Oil revenue sharing which started in 1945 as indicated in table 4.2 has remained not only a very sensitive policy to enact and implement but also a critically contentious issue between the Nigerian government and host communities since oil exploration commenced in the Delta (Akujuru 2015: 25). Although there was an initial revenue sharing formula used auspiciously during the early stages of oil exportation in the 1950s, successive Nigerian governments subjected it to a continuous fluctuating review (ibid). During the early stages of oil exportation in 1958, the revenue formula then allowed for half of the oil revenue to be given to the oil producing region; then the Eastern Region structure was implemented (Umeh 2012: 16). Under this fiscal arrangement, all oil-producing communities in the Niger Delta were part of and under the administrative jurisdiction of Eastern Region government who were receiving oil revenue on their behalf at that time, based on the principle of derivation (ibid).

The recommendations of some of these committees resulted in a sharp dwindle in the revenue allocation to the local governments of host communities. Particularly in the 1990s, the allocation percentage to the oil producing states was reduced to between 20-10 percent while allocation to other non-oil producing majority and the federal government grew (Boele, Fabig and Wheeler 2001: 76) as indicated in Table 4.2. Consequently, local oil producing communities like the Ogonis, perceived that notwithstanding the little level of industrialization oil companies brought to the host communities, they insisted that such industrialization was merely for oil exploration purposes that did not represent true development compared to other parts of the country (MOSOP Canada 1998, Hammer, 1998: 6, Naanen 1995: 70).

Table 4. 2: Various revenue allocation commissions and their recommendations

Commission	**Recommended Criteria**	**Other basic features of recommendations**
Phillipson, 1946	i) Derivation. ii) Even progress	Balance after meeting central Government's budgetary need allocated to regions
Hicks- Phillipson, 1951	i) Derivation. ii) Fiscal autonomy iii) Needs, and iv) National interest	Proportion of specified duties and taxes allocated to regions on the basis of derivation, special grant capitalization, education and police
Chick, 1951	i) Derivation ii) Fiscal autonomy	Bulk of revenues from import duties and excise to the regions on the basis of consumption and derivation.
Raisman, 1958	i) Derivation ii) Fiscal autonomy iii) Balance development iv) Need	Proportion of specified revenues distributed on the basis of derivation. Creation of Distributable Pool Account (DPA) with fixed regional proportional shares: North 40%, West 31%, East 24%, and Southern Cameroun 5%.
Binns, 1964	Same as above plus financial comparability	Composition of DPA relative share slightly altered, North 42%. East 30%, West 20% and Mid-West 8%
Diana 1968	i) Even development ii) Derivation iii) Need iv) Minimum responsibility of government	Special grant account introduced, recommended the establishment of a planning and fiscal commission. Recommendation rejected.
Decree No. 13 of 1970	i) Population 50% ii) Equality of states 50%	Export duties states reduced from 100% to 60%.
Decree No. 9 of 1971	Same as above	Transferred rents and royalties of offshore petroleum mines from the states to the federal government
Decree No. 6 of 1975	Same as above	Onshore mining rents and royalties to states reduced from 45% to 20%. Remaining 80% to the DPA. Import duties on motor spirit and tobacco to be paid 100% into the DPA. 50 0f excise duties to be retained by the federal Government, 100% to DPA.
Decree No. 15 of 1976	Same as above	Regional proportion share of DPA split among the 12 new states, 6 Northern states receive 7% each, East and Western states share in accordance with relative population
Aboyade, 1977	i) Equality of access 25%. ii) National minimum standard 22% ii) Absorption Capacity 20% iv) Independent revenue 18% v) Fiscal efficiency 15%	Replaced DPA with federation account. Fixed proportional share out of this account between the federal 57%, states 30%, Local Government joint account created.
1981 Act	Same as above	Federation account to be shared: federal Government 55%. State

		Government 30.5%, Local Government 10%, special fund 4.5%
Decree No. 49 of 1989	Same as above	Federation account to be shared: federal Government 55%, State Government 32.5%, Local Government 10%, special fund 2.5%
Danjuma Commission 1989	Same as above	Equality of states 40%. Population 30%. Social development effort 10%. Tax effort 10%. Land mass%.
Decree No. 49 of 1989	i) Equality of states 40%. ii) Population 30% iii) Internal revenue effort iv) Land mass v) Social Development factor 10%	Federation account to be shared: federal Government 47%, State Government 10%, Local Government 15%, special fund 8%
Decree No. 3 of January 1992	Same as above	Federation account to be shared: federal Government 50%, State Government 25%, Local Government 20%, special fund 7%
2009	Same as above	Federation account to be shared: federal Government 48.5%, State Government 24%, Local Government 20%, special fund 7%

Source: Akujuru 2015: 23-24.

Nigeria had had 7 successive military administrations between January 1966 when the first military coup took place and 29 May 1999 when the second republic democratically elected government was sworn into office (Ogbeidi 2012: 6). Although between 1979 and 1983, Nigeria had a short history of democracy regarded as the first republic administration, three military coup ad already taken place before this time (Ogbeidi 2012: 7). Before this, the colonial administration in Nigeria had commenced revenue sharing in 1946 as indicated in table 4.2. The revenue sharing formula since that time has witnessed continued adaptation by several commissions set up by different administrative regimes in Nigeria as indicated in table 2.4. After Nigeria's independence in 1960, the adaptation of the revenue sharing formula continued.

The illustrations of Table 4.2 depicted the inconsistency on the part of successive Nigerian government to adapt the revenue sharing formula. During the colonial era 1946-1958, the formula was adjusted four times by the ruling military administration in Nigeria at that time. From 1968-1992, successive military administrations showed inconsistent adaptation of the revenue sharing formula eleven times. In 1971, decree No. 9 completely transferred the control of rents and royalties of all offshore petroleum mines from the states to the federal government. By implication therefore, all the states and local governments in the federation are dependant and their economies rely on the federal government oil revenue generated from Niger Delta. As such determining the sharing formula has been the prerogative of the federal government. Although there was a brief democratic administration by Mallam Shehu Shagari between 1 October 1979 and 31 December 1983, it did not adjust the recommended sharing criteria. However, it only adjusted other basic features of the formula. The table indicates that the 1991 Act prescribed that the federation account be shared: federal Government 55 per cent, State Government 30 per cent, Local Government 10 per cent, and special fund 4.5 per cent.

Table 4.3: Vertical formulae for federal revenue sharing in Nigeria today

Level of Government	Percentage revenue allocation
Federal	48.5
State	24.0
Local	20.0
Special fund	7.5
Total fund	100

Total 100 per cent (Source: Akujuru, 2015: 23).

4.1.6.3 Federal Government decrees

The fact that oil and the revenue oil generates sustain Nigeria's economy, the quest for control over oil resources by the Nigerian government continues to intensify. It has been a key concern for any Nigerian government (Ikein, 1990: 30, Khan, 1994: 42) and shall remain so for many years to come. Thus, in order to assure this control, successive Nigerian government's promulgated obnoxious decrees and laws, thus providing her with platform to continuously strengthen her control over the land and its natural resources. From the British colonial administration, ownership of all mineral resources was vested in the British Royal Crown represented by colonial administration in Nigeria at that time (Boele1, Fabig and Wheeler, 2001: 75). From 1907, the Mineral Oils Ordinance promulgated by the colonial administrative government, monopolised and vested the control of the oil sector in the hands of British.

Apart from this, the law also stripped Niger Delta indigenes of ownership of their native land and all natural resources therein and transferred it to the government (ibid). Implicitly, the Mineral Oils Ordinance abrogated the natural right to land ownership while replacing it with full government control thus laying the foundation upon which successive Nigerian governments model similar laws.

Subsequently, in 1969, the Yakubu Gowon led administration promulgated the Mineral/petroleum decree, which transferred the bulk of oil income to the Federal Government (Umeh 2012: 17). Thereafter, successive Nigerian governments further intensified the promulgation of oil related decrees and laws in like manner (ibid). For instance, the land Use

Decree of 1979 vested the control of all land in the State and later the Petroleum Act, which also gave the Federal Government the power to seize any land needed for oil exploitation (Frynas, 2000: 28). In other words, the decree bequeathed upon government the power and authority to give out communal lands and forests to oil companies for oil exploration and exploitation activities without first consulting with host communities. Osuak (2007: 2) observes that State's intrusion in land expropriation for oil activities has created scarcity of productive land, which culminated into social dislocation and the attendant communal violence across the Delta particularly, in Ogoni.

It translates unfortunately to the fact that government possesses the right to not only seize indigenous lands, but also give them out to any designated oil company without the consent of the people. Within the same period, government further increased its control over the petroleum industry via two indigenization decrees, which virtually nationalized the oil industry and paved the way for establishing the current joint ventures (Boele, Fabig, and Wheeler 2001: 76). These decrees are the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulation of 1973 and the Petroleum refining Regulation of 1974 (Kadafa, Zakaria, and Othman 2012: 24).

Although these decrees intended to provide a regulatory framework for oil exploration and oil exploration pollutants from petroleum industries, they paradoxically dispossessed the indigenous Ogonis of their familial lands, which to them remains a vital means of livelihood. These laws generated a disconnection between the indigenous people and their natural inheritance and sources of livelihood to their detriment. Thus, among the people, anxiety builds, frustration increases, aggression deepens and agitations (violent and non-violent) escalate over time.

4.1.6.4 Shell's non-cooperative attitude

In over 43 years of Shell's oil exploration in Ogoniland, the company's clumsy approach to dealing with issues bordering Ogoni community precipitated the tragic event of November 1995 [when Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other of his kinsmen were executed after being found guilty of complicity in murder] (Wheeler *et al* 2002: 301). Initially, the commencement of oil exploration in Bomu, Ogoni in 1958 was a welcome development anticipated to add value to their lives at the time (ibid).

However, it dawned on Ogoni people that this was not to be when Shell Petroleum Development Company failed to build new hospitals, schools, construct new roads, provide electricity and clean pipeline drinking water, as well as providing the much needed jobs and other amenities anticipated from them (Factsheet on Ogoni struggle 2015: 1). Shell Petroleum Development Company allegedly refused not only to employ Ogonis but also refused to employ them into high profile offices. For instance, one of the issues highlighted in the OBR clearly specified that Shell does not employ Ogoni people into any meaningful post or level in defiance of the Federal Government's regulation on employment (Ogoni Bill of Rights 1990: 4). This aggravated and intensified the agitations, which gradually tended towards violent aggression targeted at Shell's oil facilities in Ogoni and across the Delta.

Secondly, Shell Petroleum Development Company denied accepting the rising environmental consequences of their exploration activities until after 1995 (Spickett 1995: 273). As indicated in a Shell Petroleum Development Company document, "Allegations of environmental devastation in Ogoni, and elsewhere in our operating area, are simply not true. We do have environmental problems, but these do not add up to anything like devastation" (Edoigiawerie & Spickett 1995: 271, Saro-Wiwa 1992: 20). SDPC made this statement in 1970 after seven Ogoni chiefs sent a memorandum to the then military governor of Rivers State and Shell Petroleum Development Company complaining of environmental damage because of Shell Petroleum Development Company activities in Ogoniland (Saro-Wiwa 1992: 21). This obnoxious situation has substantively represented itself as a facilitating ground for the conflict in the area. The implication here is that Shell refused to acknowledge that even the little spill does not add up to devastation that requires immediate attention to stop the situation from escalating into devastation itself (ibid). Such deceitful statements by SPDC depict the level of recklessness and the carefree attitude the company has towards their host communities.

Shell Petroleum Development Company had on different occasions refused to accept responsibility for the consequences of their activities in Ogoni resulting to multiple lawsuits instituted against it. Shell in 2008 refused to pay compensation to Bodo community in Ogoni for an oil spill that had occurred in the community (Keates 2015: 1, BBC News 11 August 2011). However, when Shell eventually accepted to pay the compensation, it offered to pay a paltry 6000USD. Angered by this development, the community instituted legal action against Shell.

This forced the company to increase the amount to 83USD million and accepting to an out of court settlement arrangement (Keates 2015). Prior to this time, however, Shell had suspended operations and withdrew its services from Ogoni in 1993 following an increase in violent attacks on its installations and threat to its staff (shell.com.ng). The most worrisome aspect is that Keates' report further indicated that the spill was a resultant effect of equipment failure. Considering this situation, fast tracking the process of cleaning up and land recovery was not only necessary but also the payment of adequate compensation to community (BBC News 11 August 2011). Regrettably, Shell accepted responsibility only for the spill but denied guilt even when the cause of the spill was clear. Shell only agreed to pay some compensation in an out of court settlement agreement with the community. Similarly, another lawsuit instituted against Shell in 1996 by relations of the slain Ogoni nine forced the company to agree on paying an out of court $15.5USD (Keates 2015). Regrettably, the company maintained that the payment was part of their humanitarian gesture to assist these families and not in any way an admission of guilt (ibid). Clearly, responsive actions undertaken by the company were generated by compulsion and not the company's willful gestures. It depicts the level of non-cooperation and unwillingness by SPDC to react, respond or attend to the deplorable conditions of the people caused by their activities.

Furthermore, also in the case of Bodo spill, SPDC denied the real cause of the spill. Shell had initially attributed the cause of the spill to sabotage. The sinister intelligence behind this idea connects directly to the Nigeria's constitution. A part of the Nigerian constitution disallows oil companies to pay compensation for spills resulting from sabotage (Manby 2000: 6). This does not translate in any way into an order for the flagrant disobedience of lawfully ascertained compensation payments by Shell or any other oil company operating in Nigeria for that matter. But, Shell, in defiance of a local court order in 1997 to pay compensation for an oil spill that occurred in 1987, for instance, flouted this order and refused to pay the lawfully certified sum to the four affected Ogoni communities (Johnasen 2010: 5-6). Arrogantly, Shell claimed that such payments would "encourage other legitimate compensation demands" from the area (ibid). Unfortunately, the determination of the real cause/s of oil spills remains largely in the hands of the oil companies and increases the chances of oil companies adulterating the result, hence, the information they disseminate to the public (ibid).

4.1.6.5 Effects of oil exploration

From 1956 when oil was first extracted in Oloibiri community in Bayelsa State (Idemudia 2010: 142), exploration activities generated many environmental polluting substances, which are emitted both into the atmosphere and the environment. These environmental impacts include most predominantly, adverse effects on air, land and water quality resulting from greenhouse gas emissions, oil spills/leakages and waste discharges (Ingelson & Nwapi 2014: 39-40).The effects of these could be seen across the region. During exploration for instance, seismic lines have significantly disrupted amounts of vegetation and during production as well, substantial amounts of dredging and filling of waterways caused acidification of the water bodies, erosion and spills in Ogoni (Ingelson & Nwapi 2014: 39).

Consequently, the Ogoni community realized that outside environmental pollution, oil exploration also aggravates already heavy pressure on land in Ogoni. Shell Petroleum Development Company claims its engagement covers only 3 percent of the entire Niger Delta therefore its operations could not have significantly exaggerated land pressure (Boele, Fabig and Wheeler 2001: 77). Inferring from this, it becomes pertinent to intimate here that oil spill is not restricted to the 3 percent of oil exploration land mass alone but spreads and affects other adjourning land space along its route and therefore the argument that it escalates pressure on land stands.

Table 4.4 shows the quantity of oil spilled in the whole of Niger Delta between 1979 and 2009. According to the table, by 2009, approximately 1 700 000 barrels of oil had been spilled across the region. Arguably, this quantity of oil may not have been spilled within the 3 percent exploration radius. For instance, judging from the previous example, the Bodo oil spill alone covered more than two thousand hectares of land and swamp. Certainly, this massive span of area represents a substantial space, which logically is close to the 3 percent radius. Looking directly on Bodo community, oil spill covering such magnitude of area definitely subjects their land to extensive pressure (Ingelson & Nwapi 2014: 42).

Table 4. 4: Summary of some oil spills in the Niger Delta, 1979-2005

Episode	**Year**	**State**	**Quantity spilt in Barrels**
Forcados terminal oil spills	1979	Delta	570,000
Funiwa No.5 well blow out	1980	Rivers	400,000
Oyekama oil spillage	1980	Rivers	10,000
System 2c Warri-Kaduna	1982	Edo	18,000
Pipeline rupture at Abudu Sohika oil spill	1983	Rivers	10,000
Idoho oil spill	1983	Akwa-Ibom	40,000
Jones creeks oil spill	1998	Delta	21,000
Jesse oil spill	1998	Delta	10,000
Etiama oil spill	2000	Bayelsa	11,000
Ughelli oil spill	2005	Delta	10,000
Bodo	2008/9	Rivers	600,000
TOTAL			1,700,000

Source: Adapted from Omotola, 2010: 102, Opukri & Ibaba 2008: 181

Oil spillage remains one of the major devastating environmental glitches of oil exploration. Umeh (2012: 27), classified oil spillage into minor, medium, major and disaster categories and went further to explain that a minor oil spill occurs when there is less than 25 barrels of inland oil spill or less than 250 barrels on land offshore or coastal waters that does not have any threat of danger to the public health. At a spillage of 250 barrels or less in the inland waters or 2500 barrels on land, offshore and coastal waters, a medium oil spill has occurred. Thirdly, when the level of spillage in the inland waters is well above 2500 barrels on land, offshore and coastal waters, a major spill would have occurred. Finally, the disaster stage denotes any state of uncontrolled well blowout, pipeline rupture or storage tank failure that subjects public health to serious danger. Unfortunately, the Bodo spill belongs to this level. This level precipitated the loss of mangrove trees and biodiversity most visible across communities in Ogoniland, including Bodo (ibid).

A greenhouse report (Keates 2015) on Bodo in Ogoniland oil spill indicated that the spill lasted for almost a year before it was stopped. The report reveals that the spill started in 2008 and continued into 2009 causing unprecedented environmental damage to the entire Ogoniland. An Aljazeera report on 14 November 2014 puts the figure at 600,000 barrels of oil spillage in the community as indicated in Figure 3.3, making it one of the worst cases of oil spill in the whole of Niger Delta. Judging from this information, the oil spill in Bodo classifies the community in in the disaster category according to Umeh's analytical classifications stated above.

Another BBC news report on 11 August 2011 not only confirmed but also revealed that the Bodo spill could be more disastrous when compared to the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster in which about 10 million gallons of oil spill destroyed the remote coastline in Alaska, which experts adjudged the world's worst oil spill. The report further ascertained that this is one of the world's worse oil disasters, which ironically have gone almost unnoticed. It revealed an estimated destruction on the marine environment in Bodo at 2000 hectares of mangroves and creeks. Without doubt, this ugly situation has supported the aggravation of violent resistance in Ogoni in particular and Niger Delta in general. The devastating effects of the spill produced significant damage to the Bodo environment and impacted heavily on the livelihood of the predominantly farming community. Poverty has deepened within the community consequently. Martin Day, lawyer to the Bodo people said in an interview with BBC reiterated, "The Bodo people are a fishing community surrounded by water. What was the source of their livelihood now cannot sustain even the smallest of fish. The spills have caused severe poverty amongst the community" (BBC News 11 August 2011).

The Nigeria Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) report of 2007, states that an estimated 10 per cent of Niger Delta oil fields live with gas stacks that flare gas at very high temperatures 24 hours a day. Gas flaring and venting as a significant contributor to global warming constitute principal environmental challenges of oil exploration activities in Ogoni (Umeh 2012: 26, Omotola 2010: 102). As at 2009, there were about 123 gas flaring points across the Niger delta (Eregha & Irughe 2009: 167) and this has discharged more than 45.8 billion kilowatts of heat from 1.8 cubic feet of gas daily into the Niger Delta atmosphere (Aron 2006: 12). The immediate result of this is the emission of more than 30-50 million tons of carbon dioxide and nearly 12 million tons per year of methane, which is hazardous to the environment (Roberts 2000: 34).

Further studies have also indicated serious climatic changes over the years because of oil mining activities in the region (Nzeadibe *et al* 2011: 9, UNEP report 2011).

Table 4.5: Ranking of major environmental problems in the Niger Delta

Problem type	Problem subset	Priority Ranking
Natural Environment	Coastal/River bank erosion	Moderate
	Flooding	High
	Sedimentation/Silt	Moderate
	Substance	Low
	Exotic (Water hyacinth)	Low
Development Related	Land degradation/soil fertility loss	High
	Agricultural decline/shortened fallow	High
	Delta forest loss (Mangrove)	High
	Biodiversity depletion	High
	Fishery decline	High
	Oil spillage	High
	Gas flaring	Moderate
	Sewage and waste water	High
	Other Chemicals	Moderate

Source: Eregha & Ireghe 2009: 165.

Indications as reflected in Table 3.5 reveal the level of environmental problems created by oil exploration and exploitation in Niger Delta. As the majority of indigenes of the region are predominantly farmers, the negative effects of climate change exposes their livelihood to serious risks, especially the fluctuation in its annual rainfall leading to decline in agricultural production and loss of its natural biodiversity (Nzeadibe *et al* 2011: 8). According to Table 3.5, consequences of mining destroy the environment quality, which subjects farming activities on land and water to undue pressure and decline output.

Ogoniland and its environment have been named the world's most severely petroleum-impacted ecosystem by a team of independent experts from Nigeria, United Kingdom and United states of America (Ingelson, Nwapi 2014: 40). In an apt summary, Ibeanu (nd) clearly established that sever environmental and ecological devastation [resulting from oil mining activities] has left Ogoniland in particular and the entire region in general poor, desolate, and uninhabitable (Ibeanu nd: 1). The UNEP assessment of Ogoni report unequivocally buttresses and confirmed this assertion. It further indicated that apart from gulping a 30 million USD, the cleaning up of Ogoniland would stretch beyond 30 years.

From the researcher's point of view, The Land Use Decree of 1979 effectively created and clearly supported direct and indirect dispossession of Ogoniland from the Ogonis. Directly, the decree automatically transferred ownership, control and use of all lands and its inherent resources to the current Nigerian governments. On the other hand, when the negative consequences of oil exploration activities, which had already destroyed Ogoniland, air and water, and inhibit farming, such a situation obviously depicts indirect dispossession. The multiplier effects would most likely include hunger, poverty, sickness, frustration, anger and either or both covert and overt aggression.

4.1.6.6 Failure of government to develop the region

Oil revenue contributes immensely to the development and sustainability of Nigeria's economy as indicated in Table 36. Despite this fact, successive government administrations in Nigeria from the colonial era up to post-colonial of military autocratic regimes down to the present democratic dispensation, no serious development is visible across the Niger Delta. It means that the Nigerian governments have essentially failed to equate reflect the level development in the region to the quantity of oil and oil naturally available underground, the quntity already exploited and the revenue it has generated for the nation.Table 4.6 shows clearly again that the Nigeria's economy has been dependanton oil wealth for many decades.

Table 4. 6: Contributions of oil revenue to Nigeria Government between 1970-2003

Amount(million Naira)			**Amount (Million Naira)**		
Year	**Oil revenue**	**Percentage**	**Oil revenue**	**Percentage**	**Total**
1970	11111166.6	26.3	1111467.4	73.7	1111.6
1971	11111510.1	43.6	1111658.7	56.4	111168.8
1972	11111764.3	54.4	1111640.8	45.4	111405.1
1973	1110163.0	59.9	1111679.3	40.1	116695.3
1974	113724.0	82.1	1111813.4	17.9	114537.4
1975	114271.5	77.5	111243.2	22.5	115514.7
1976	115365.2	79.3	111400.0	20.7	116865.9
1977	116080.6	75.6	111961.8	24.4	118042.4
1978	114555.1	61.8	112815.2	38.2	117371.0
1979	118880.1	81.4	112031.6	18.6	110912.4
1980	112353.0	81.1	112880.2	18.9	115233.5
1981	118564.0	64.4	114726.1	35.6	113290.5
1982	117814.1	68.3	13618.8	31.7	11433.7
1983	1117253.0	691	113255.7	311	110508.5
1984	118269.0	73.5	112984.1	26.5	111253.3
1985	110923.1	72.6	114126.7	27.4	115050.4
1986	118107.0	64.4	114488.1	35.6	112595.8
1987	119027.0	751	116353.6	251	125380.6
1988	119831.1	71.9	117765.0	28.1	127596.7
1989	139130.1	72.6	114739.9	27.4	153870.4
1990	171887.0	73.3	126215.3	26.7	198102.4
1991	182666.0	81.9	118325.2	18.1	100991.6
1992	164078.0	86.2	126375.1	13.8	190453.2
1993	162102.0	84.1	130667.0	15.9	1192769.4
1994	118325.2	79.3	141718.4	20.7	201910.8
1995	324547.1	70.6	135439.1	20.7	459987.3
1996	369190.0	711	151000.0	291	520190.0
1997	141681.1	71.5	1166000.0	28.5	1582811.1
1998	1289532.3	62.5	1174076.5	37.5	1463608.8
1999	1724422.5	76.3	1224765.4	23.1	1949187.9
2000	1591675.8	83.5	1314483.9	16.5	1906159.0
2001	1707562.8	76.5	1523970.1	23.5	2231532.9
2002	1230851.2	71.1	1500986.3	28.9	1731837.5
2003	2074280.6	80.5	1500815.3	19.5	2575895.9

Source: Mukoro 2010: 85-86.

After 2003, Nigerian crude oil sector experinced challenges which dropped crude oil production and the economy of the country also dwindled following global fall in price of crude oil (Nwankwo 2015: 386). However, with the beginning of civil unrest in the Niger Delta in early 1990s, (Nwankwo 2015: 384) as well as the 2007 post-election violence, Oil production crisis for Nigeria statrted subsequently dropping crude oil production from a peak of 918.96 million barrels in 2005 to 768.7 million barrels in 2008 (http://yourbudgit.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/An-Analysis-of-Nigerias-Economy-and-Vulnerability-to-Oil.pdf). The consequences on the Treasury were further exacerbated when Brent Crude prices dropped from $147 to $43 per barrel in 2009 (ibid).

However, regardless of these enormous monetary contributions to the Nigerian economy, the development of the region that lays this 'golden egg' (oil) continues to stagger and lag behind unabated. A good example would be that untill 2013, the NDDC were only able to construct a paltry number of roads in the whole of Niger Delta. In fact, according to them, the commission was only able to construct about 40 roads in the region as at the end of 2013. (www.nddconline.org/Projects/rebuilding.shtml). Table 4.7 further itemises some other projects undertaken by NDDC in the region.

Table 4. 7: Summary of NDDC projects executed in Niger Delta as at 2013

Projects	**Units Executed**
Roads	40 Roads
Water	90 boreholes
Electricity	129 Communities
Total	**259**

Adapted from Ojakorotu & Morake 2010: 127

It is no longer in contention the fact that persistent penury and underdevelopment is still associated with this area despite the huge revenue this area generates. Ogoniland generates substantial amount of wealth yet it remains under unimaginable backwardness. As stated elsewhere, oil from the Niger Delta contributes 90 per cent of Nigeria's export and 80 per cent of its revenue. Untill sustained violent agitations forced Shell to suspend and withdraw its operations in Ogoniland in 1993, it is estimated that a total of 634 million barrels of oil valued at an amount exceding USD5.2 billion was produced from the area (Boele,Fabig& Wheeler 2001: 76). Sadly, the situation in Ogoniland when compeared to the quantum of wealth it has generated for the country is at best despicable. Paradoxically, mention was not made of the number of schools and hospitals built witin this time throughout the region, Ogoni inclusive. One could assert without contradiction that no new schools and hospitals were built in the region within the period.

Table 4. 8: Oil revenue precentage to producing states

Years	Producing State %	Percentage sharing of federal government
1960-67	50	50
1967-69	50	50
1969-71	45	55
1971-75	45 plus offshore proceedings	55 plus offshore proceedings
1975-79	20 minus offshore proceedings	80 plus offshore proceedings
1979-81	-	100
1982-92	1.5	98.5
1992-99	3	97
1999-09	13	87

Source: Mukoro 2010: 84

For cleariy purposes, the list of oil proudcing states is provided. The idea is to assist the reader understand who are the oil producing States. As indicated eraleir the oil producing states are nine which include Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelas, Cross-River, Delta, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers States. Thses states each get the producing state percentage allocation indicated in table 4.8 from the federal government of Nigeria. The oil producing states are Table 4.8 shows that between 1960 and 1969, oil revenue was shared equally between the state and the federal government. The situation at that time provided an opportunity for faster and better development of the region contrary to the situation after 1975. However, between 1979 and 1981, the oil producing states were not receiving any revenue from the federal government because 100% of crude oil revenue was going directly to the federal government of Nigeria account at that time as indicated in table 4.8. The implication for the Niger Delta was slowed development and consistent underdevelopment.

4.1.6.7 Corruption

One of the greatest challenges facing Nigeria as a country over the years is corruption (Uzochukwu 2015: 1, Laden-Baki 2014: 2). The effects of curruption could virtually be felt across every public sectors and government departments because it has found its way into them. No doubt, the practice of this ugly trend across the various fascets of government have resulted in very devastating consequences across the country.It would mean that government efforts at developing the Niger Delta region is not spired. Such efforts have suffered terrible setbacks on the premise of corruption over the years. One significant contibuting factors is the elistic struggle to access the profits of oil wealth. This particular reason Babalola (2014: 123) argues sustained successive military administration in Nigeria for almost 40 years untill in May 1999. The fact remins that during the military era, power and the wealth of the nation was increasingly concentrated in the hands of fewer people and this systematically allowed organised corruption to florish unabated. These few turn power into an instrument of wealth acumulation from the oil industry through large commisions and percentage cut contracts (Uzochukwu 2015: 3, Laden-Baki 2014: 4, Manby 2000: 4). This has the capcity of increasing the cost of administraion which will in turn make the government unecessary expensive.

Moreover, research findings conducted along this trajectory, has shown that several billions of US dollars wich would have been chanelled for the development of the region have either been misused, misappropirated or summarily embazzeled (Manby 2000: 5). The former governor of Delta State for instance, in 2017 served out his prison term in the UK on account of money laundering and treasury looting when he was the governor of the state. He was accused of lundering and trafficking money amounting to more than $29,000 million (Isidiho &Sabran 2015:38). In another publication, by National Geographic Journals (2007: 1-7) the then governor of Bayelsa state was indicted for stealing hundreds of millions of the state's dollars which were either stashed away in different foreign banks or used to buy expensive mansions in the United States and to send his children to private schools in London. Clearly, these are cases of corrupt and dysfunctional government.

For instance, the then head of Nigerian Anti-Corruption Agency, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) was quoted to have said that in 2003 alone; over 70 per cent of oil revenues which was more than $14 billion were stolen or wasted (Brisibe 2001: 1).Babalola (2014: 125) emphasised that the level corruption that took place during the tenures of three former governors of Rivers Delta, and Bayelsa states respectively, was enogh to render these states bankrupt. The words of the former UN Secretary General Mr Ban Ki-moon in his statement on the day of International Anti-Corruption in 2009 on the costs of curruption, clearly captures the picture of corruption in Niger Delta. He observed that:

"When public money is stolen for private gain, it means fewer resources to build schools, hospitals, roads and water treatment facilities. When foreign aid is diverted into private bank accounts, major infrastructure projects come to a halt...The vulnerable suffer first and worst" **Source:**http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/democraticgovernance/focus_areas/focus_anti-corruption.html. Accessed 15/11/2015.

This staement was confirmed by Welch (1995: 636) who sadly indicated that the diasppearance of billions of US dollars of oil wealth into private hands without perceptible benefits to the people, is an unforgivable attrocity. The spate of corruption described to have occurred in Niger Delta aptly explains why in some communities in Ogoni till date pupils are still seen learning while seated on the floors and under treess. The apparent reality remain that existing facilities in these schools are completely delapidated due to lack of maintainance and therefore in a state of disrepair (Ajodo-Adebanjoko & Ojua, 2013: 181).

Table 4. 9:Nigeria curruption perception index (CPI) 1998-2012

Year	No. of Countries Surveyed	Nigeria Rank	CPI Score (out of 10)
1998	85	81	1.9
1999	**99**	**98**	**1.6**
2000	**90**	**90**	**1.2**
2001	**91**	**90**	**1.0**
2002	**102**	**101**	**1.6**
2003	**133**	**132**	**1.4**
2004	**145**	**144**	**1.6**
2005	**158**	**152**	**1.9**
2006	**163**	**142**	**2.2**
2007	179	147	2.2
2008	180	121	2.7
2009	180	130	2.4
2010	178	134	2.5
2011	183	143	2.4
2012	176	139	2.7

Source: Babalola 2014: 124, Akor 2014: 41

Table 3.9 clearly illustrates that Nigeria ranks above so many other countries evaluated alongside it from 1998-2012. In fact between 1999 and 2006 during the leadership of the mentioned governors, Nigeria only ranks above one country in the assessment. By implication, the assessment places Nigeria as one of the most corrupt country in the world (in top 10 most corrupt countries as demonstrated in table 4.9).

4.1.6.8 Unemployment

This factor was intentionally placed as the final conflict causative variable in Ogoni in particular and Niger Delta in general. The conception of this idea stem from the backdrop that other variables previously discussed appears to be prerequisite preludes to situation of unemployment which is the worst phenomenal condition bedevilling this region until date. It means in other words that the effects of these variables prepare a veritable environment capable of breeding, deepening and sustaining unemployment.Their chain of influence worsens the conditions that support unemployment in Ogoniland and across the entire region (Francis & Sardesai 2014:10). As mentioned in one of the previous sections, support to the livelihood of majority of the Ogoni population depends on their natural environment including land, water and other biodiversity. Therefore, the deleterious consequences of oil exploration activities deplete as well as destroyed these thereby creating and rapidly escalating, to an unimaginable level, the socio-political causes of unemployment, which increase poverty in Ogoniland.

Although it is difficult to grasp reliable unemployment figures and statistic in Nigeria, however Francis & Sardesai (2014:17) for instance, illustrated that approximately 40 per cent of the youth in the Niger Delta between the ages of fifteen and twenty four are unemployed. This figure as at 2006 stands at 24 per cent which is higher than the unemployment levels in any other part or region of Nigeria (Francis, LaPin, & Rossiasco 2011: 30). This statistics is alarmingly high for an area which has one of the highest revenue contributions toward sustainability of Nigeria's economy. Because of this, it was not difficult to recruit youths into new and existing armed militant clusters operating within the region. It unfortunately increased the level of volatility, instability and worsened the fragile security situation in the region. With particular emphasis on Ogoni, the incidence of poverty is further aggravated by the structural unemployment also suffered by the youths of entire Ogoniland.

The conflict in Niger Delta, by extension Ogoniland revolves mostly around above discussed areas. As observed by Ojakorotu (2010: 5-6), the recurrence of conflict in these community centers around the occurrence of oil, its extraction by multinational company, the anti-social state policies and decisively, the endemic poverty and deficient socio-economic development in spite of immense resource wealth of the region. Nevertheless, Ibeanu as cited in Idemudia (2010: 137) emphasized that benefits from oil wealth to the producing communities, however insufficient, have come from these institutions and oil companies. So this research investigates the reasons why conflict management approaches undertaken by Shell Petroleum Development Company and the Nigerian government in Ogoni has not precluded the recurrence of conflict in the area.

4.1.7 Summary

This section presented discussions on the historical background of Ogoni as a people. The discussion narrated how the Ogoni people originated and how oil was discovered in the area. The section also discussed the root causes of Ogoni conflict. It was argued that at the nexus of the conflict are the numerous effects of oil exploration. It was demonstrated in the section that oil exploration has hazardous consequences on the environment and the people, which has significantly aggravated poverty and adversely increased the possibilities of conflict escalation in the area. The section traced the origin of the conflicts to the colonial days when the people were oppressed by the colonial trade merchants. It further argues that the continuous adaptation of the revenue sharing formula constituted a shocking distortion, which created disaffection between the oil producing communities, Shell and government and drastically enhanced resistance leading to conflict. The section further illustrated that despite huge revenue generated from oil, there have not been visible concerted efforts by both the government and Shell to develop the region and by extension, Ogoniland.

The next section will focus on the historical background of Lonmin Company Pty in Marikana and the causes of Marikana conflict.

4.2 Background to Case study 2: The Lonmin mining company in South Africa

Figure 4. 3: Map of South Africa showing all the provinces in the country



Source:http://www.kellyworld.com/SAfrica/SouthAfrica.html (19/04/2016)

South Africa is a country consisting of nine provinces and has its capital at Pretoria. according to World Bank report, has a population of about 55.01 million people, an annual GDP of $314.6 billion and an GDP growth of 1.3% in 2015 as well as an inflation rate of 6.3% in 2016 (http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southafrica). The country is known for is vast solid natural resources including Gold, Uranium, Coal, Platinum, Diamonds, Iron ore, Chrome, and Manganese (Statistics South Africa 2017: 7). The South African mining sector according to Statistics South Africa report on 23 March 2017 is the highest employer of labour in the country employing 490 146 people in 2015. South Africa also relies on revenue generated from the mining sector to sustain her economy. In 2015 alone, South African industry generated a total annual income of R419,5 billion to the country's economy (http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-20-01-02/Report-20-01-022015.pdf).

The discovery of natural solid minerals resources and commencement of mining activities in South Africa dates back to so many decades ago. Diamond was first discovered in South Africa in 1867 and by 1876 full exploration and exploitation had begun in Northern Cape (Sorensen 2011: 625, Harrington, McGlashan, and Chelkowska 2004: 65-66). According to information available at the South African Chamber of Mines (SACM) website, gold and platinum were also discovered around the same time in the 19th and 20th centuries (http://www.chamberofmines.org.za).

North West mining history dates back to 1853 when Pieter Jacob Marias discovered alluvial gold in his first official gold prospect in Transvaal and by 1887 (Durand 2012: 25). Following the discovery of gold in commercial quantities in 1896, extensive mining activities sparked off in the Transvaal (Molate, de Klerk, and Ferreira 2014: 311). Further reports from the chamber of mines indicate that gold deposits along the Witwatersrand Basin particularly in towns with large deposits like Carletonville and Klerksdorp remain the world's largest gold resource.

Platinum nuggets were first discovered in the North West province as far back as 1924 according to the SACM (http://www.chamberofmines.org.za). Later in the same year, a geologist named Hans Merensky discovered two large deposits of platinum each covering a length of distance put approximately 100 kilometres in area which became known as the Bushveld Igneous Complex. The complex is the world's largest layered intrusion formed over two million years ago, and has mines which have for many years produced more than 7.5 per cent of the world's output. This discovery led Merensky to securing 23 claims which enabled him to locate further occurrence in Maandagshoek later named Merensky reef (http://www.chamberofmines.org.za/sa-mining/platinum).

4.2.1 Mining and South African economy

Since the commencement of mining activities in South Africa, the sector has continued to play extremely vital role in the sustenance of the county's economy. Since the 19th century, mining has been the driving force behind the industrialization of South Africa (Sorensen 2011: 642). In other words, the growth, development and sustainability of South Africa's economy revolve largely around the revenue from the mining industry. Activities of the sector in general has equally shaped and influenced the political and sociocultural circles of South Africa. The sector has made continuous significant contributions to South Africa's GDP, fixed capital formation and export earnings.

It is estimated that the mining industry generated about R330 billion yearly which is approximated to exceed 30 million Euro and employed more than 500, 000 workers. This accounted for about 7.8 per cent of total private sector employment in agriculture and 6 per cent of formal employment also in agricultural (Bur 2013: 85-86). As such, the sector stands as the largest employer of labour and a major foreign income earner of the country (Rapatsa and Matloga 2014: 114). As indicated in table 4.10 huge mining sector monetary contributions to South Africa Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from 2011-2013.

Table 4.10: The South African mining sector contributions to investment and GDP 2007-2014

Year	Contributions to GDP Billion Rand	Contribution to GDP %
2011	99.4	8.8
2012	267.2	8.6
2013	279.7	8.3

Data sourced from South African Chamber of Mines website on facts and figures 2007-2014. http://www.chamberofmines.org.za (02/04/2016).

South Africa's Platinum industry became the largest in the world in 2011 with total revenues of $ 13.3 billion (McKenzie 2013: 13). Lonmin itself, particularly the Marikana mine were the bulk of its tonnage comes from, is the largest producers of platinum in the world with recorded revenues of $1.9 billion in 2011 (ibid). The figures in table 4.11 shows that platinum is one of the largest locally and internationally sold commodities thus, making it one of South Africa's biggest local and foreign earners between 2011 and 2014. It is also one of the largest natural conservation of natural resources of the country. The former Minister of Mineral Resources Susan Shabangu in her budget speech on May 24, 2012 noted that the mineral sector has "a current conservative in value estimated at US$2.5 trillion (about R20-trillion) with an economically exploitable life span of 150 years" (New Age September 13, 2012).

Table 4.11: Summary of some South Africa's core minerals for 2011-2014

Commodity	Local sales R 1000	Total sales R 1000	Total export R 1000	% Export Total sales
January-December 2011				
Gold	3 633 111	68 891 413	65 258 302	94. 7
Platinum Group Metal (PGM)	10 619 219	83 853 266	73 234 047	87.3
Silver	80 110	611 933	531 932	86.9
Sub total	**14332 332**	**153 356 612**	**139 024 281**	
January-December 2012				
Gold	4 627 4 8	76 824 504	71 961 575	93.7
PGM	8 285 235	69 204 174	60 918 939	88.0
Silver	49 591	582 824	533 232	91.5
Sub total	**13 194 574**	**146 611 502**	**133 413 928**	**91.0**
January-December 2013/2014				
Gold	3 312 818	57 158 710	53 845 893	94.2
PGM	8 886 103	84 234 637	75 348 535	89.8
Diamond	7 543 783	12 335 974	4 792 191	38.8
Silver	43 179	452 851	409 672	90.5
Sub total	**19 785 882**	**154 182 172**	**134 396**	

Adapted from South African Chamber of Mines facts and figures 2011-2014. http://www.chamberofmines.org.za (05/05/2016).

4.2.2 Marikana in North West Province of South Africa

Figure 4.4: Map of North West Province showing Marikana

Source: https://joeland7.blogspot.co.za/2012/08/jacob-zumas-south-african-police-kill.html (10/03/2016)

The area known as Marikana was originally laid out in 1870 as a farming settlement called Rooikoppes (meaning 'red hills' in Afrikaans) and covering approximately 17.54km^2 landmass. From then on, it remained a renowned lucrative tobacco, maize, chillies, paprika, soya and cattle farming community until the advent of mining. It then grew to become the main industrial activity in the area in the 1970s (*Wikipedia*). Consequently, Marikana remained a mining town (within the platinum belt region) of North West province of South Africa conspicuously situated within 24km East of Rustenburg and approximately 100km from Johannesburg (McKenzie 2013: 10). It is a tribal land belonging to the Bapho Ba Mogale tribal community which also plays host to Lonmin mining company which leases land for its mining activities (Chinguno 2013: 7). Lonmin Pty pays royalty to the traditional authorities who are the custodians of the land. The community which is made up of 7000 households and about 40000 members, owns almost all the platinum rich areas on the province (New Age Newspapers 12 June 2015: 1). An approximated 1000 people out of this number live along the Lonmin-held mine licensed areas which include parts of villages adjoining the mines, in hostels, informal settlements and low density suburbs (Chinguno 2013: 8).

4.2.3 Lonmin Platinum Pty in the North West Province

As already indicated in this study, Lonmin is the third largest producer of platinum in the world today (Lonmin Platinum 2003: 33; 2006 and 2007). Apart from being a UK registered company with its operating headquarters located in Johannesburg, South Africa, Lonmin is also listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) (New Age Newspapers 12 November 2015: 16). It commenced its business activities in this area in 1909 and at inception, Lonmin was known as London and Rhodesia Mining Company (Lonrho) (ibid). The Lonrho business enterprise thrived very rapidly over the years from early 1960s, and it became a big conglomerate with expansive mining operations in present day Zimbabwe and South Africa. However, in the 1990s the conglomerate split into two companies; Lonrho plc. and Lonrho Africa, which later became Lonmin Pty. During its peak days, Lonmin controlled about 900 subsidiary companies operating across Europe, Asia North America and Africa and had an remarkably huge employee capacity exceeding 250 000 (New Age Newspapers 12 November 2015: 16).

Today, Lonmin is a conglomerate of three companies, which include the Western Platinum Limited (WPL), the Eastern Platinum Limited (EPL) and the Western Metal Sales Limited (WMSL). The WPL operates the Western Platinum Mine (WPM), Karee mine, the smelter and Base Metal Refinery (BMR), and the Western Platinum Refinery (WPR), the EPL operates only the Eastern Platinum Mine (EPM),while the WMSL serves as the Platinum Gold Mines (PGMs) marketing outfit both for WPL and EPL (Holtzhausen and Fourie 2011: 160). It is also currently a British producer of platinum group metals operating two multi-shaft operations in Marikana and Limpopo regions of the Bushveld complex of South Africa (Lonmin 2007). Although the Marikana business unit plays host to the mines and BMR smelter, mining activities are equally conducted at the remaining two Lonmin business units (ibid).

The production level of Lonmin Marikana is estimated at an output capacity put at 1.758kilo tonnes, representing 95% of the total production of the group in 2015. Out of this, 80% of the group production in the same year came from the newer shafts of K3, 4B, Rowland, and Saffy which are all located in Marikana (Lonmin 2016). As at 2011, the total number of Lonmin workers was put at approximately 20,000 (Holtzhausen and Fourie 2011: 160), with about 28.94% being foreign nationals from neighboring countries such as Lesotho, Mozambique and Swaziland (Holtzhausen 2008:158-159, Holtzhausen and Fourie 2011: 161).

4.2.4 Root causes of Lonmin Pty conflict at Marikana

The recurrence of agitations in the mining industries of South Africa has its roots traceable to the apartheid era. During this period, access to mining activities was attached to ownership of land which resulted in dispossession of black people whose land was usurped once mineral deposits had been identified and this perpetuated huge inequality (O'Meara 1975: 153). This has continued unabated because the fall of apartheid, which established a democratic South Africa, appears to have failed to dismantle this crucial socio-economic challenge.

South Africa's mining sector has witnessed a series of agitations from mineworkers, particularly on wage increase and improved working and living conditions. The genesis of labour agitations in the history of the mining sector of South Africa was first registered on 12 August 1946 when over 60, 000 black mineworkers at the Witwatersrand Gold mines stopped work, demanding a wage increase and improvement in their working and living conditions (O'Meara 1975: 146-171). They wanted the Chamber of Mines to bridge the gap between the wages of blacks and white in the mines (McKenzie 2013: 9).

Thereafter, successive agitations by mineworkers for wage increases and better working and living conditions have continued unabated. The root causes of the Marikana strike and massacre is complex. Nevertheless, the causative underpinnings of the Marikana conflict could be analysed under four broad categories: social issues, labour matters, economic issues and government incompetence.

4.2.4.1 Social issues

Over the years, miners have decried the persistence of poor working and living conditions in the mining sector. The dynamics of the Marikana conflict which claimed the lives of 34 mine workers, injured 78 and saw 269 arrested, (see City Press, 02-09-2012, Rapatsa, 2014: 119, Sinwell, *et al* 2012: 17, Ledwaba 2013: 13, Chinguno 2013: 160), are largely centered on these phenomenal variables. Lekgowa *et al* (2013: 129) recorded a Marikana mineworker's bitter complaint thus:

> ... The working conditions here are very bad; I didn't even think I will last five years working here, but because I have no choice, I need the money I have to work. But the conditions we work under are not right at all... First, the place we live in are not right, the pay is not right, the work place is also not right, the salary we're getting is an insult compared to the hard work we do every single day, we weren't supposed to be getting R4, 000 but because we [are] having nothing else on the hand we have to work otherwise we would not even be here.

Although this singular speech is not enough to represent the views of thousands of all Marikana mineworkers, it depicts a gory situation, which has remained one of the triggers to recurring conflict in the South African mining sector.

McKenzie (2013: 160) identified Lonmin Pty as a mine with a high number of fatalities of its mineworkers. A research report conducted by Bench Mark Foundations on the socioeconomic effects of mining on communities in Platinum minefields (2012: 72-73) indicates that the rate of fatality in Lonmin doubled in the same year as the Marikana incident. The research further considered this situation as an indisputable sign of poor safety conditions in the mine and stressed that such conditions are unacceptable. These unsafe conditions have consistently increased the level vulnerability of mineworkers to dangerous health and even life-threatening conditions underground. For example, mineworkers are vulnerable to lung disease like silicosis and tuberculosis (TB) because of their long exposure to dusty and hazardous environments associated with their type of work. Consequently, according to the report, South Africa's mines have the highest recorded rates of TB globally (Cairncross *et al* 2013: 4). The Bench Mark Foundations 2012 research further recorded an outrageous increase in the prevalence of TB in gold mines from 806 per 100 000 workers in 1991 to 3821 workers per 100 000 workers in 2004. Another example was the unfortunate death of two mineworkers Albino Moises Cuna and Thobisani David Didi. Lonmin reported them as some of the fatalities of 2012 in their annual report (Lonmin Annual Report 2012). Although Lonmin Pty acknowledged the safety steps outline of Lonmin to end or at least reduce worker fatality at the mine, Bench Mark Foundations (2012) specifically cited the unfortunate non-implementation of these measures.

Apart from this, the 2012 Bench Mark Foundations research also condemns the living conditions of Lonmin mineworkers, which it described as 'appalling' lacking in electricity water and proper drainage system. Leon's research (2012: 8) buttresses this view. He recognizes that the majority of Lonmin workers and their families live in the informal settlement of Nkaneng whose houses are predominantly shacks, and mostly without electricity and proper sewerage. McKenzie (2013: 161) and Chinguno (2013: 10) further confirm that of the estimated 28, 000 workers Lonmin employed, only less than 10% have been provided with reasonably decent accommodation.

This deplorable inadequacy in accommodation reconfirms itself in the Marikana commission of inquiry report. The report clearly indicates that Lonmin does not have accommodation for 87.5 per cent of its workers (MCI report 2016: 526-527). Lonmin failed in its SLP to provide decent housing for its employees. In the report, Lonmin confirms its failure to meet with its SLP obligations. Lonmin stated that:

> "With regard to WPL and EPL Lonmin defaulted consistently in the performance of their SLP obligations in relation to hostel conversion and house construction. By the end of the 2009 financial year they had built only 3 of the 3200 houses it had undertaken to build in the first three years of the SLP, and were 41 hostels behind their target for the conversion of 70 hostels over this three year period" (MCI Annual report 2016: 534).

This statement represents clear evidence of the company's repudiation and breach of its housing responsibility. This unpleasant situation has a lingering history which has eventually killed trust and destroyed confidence between the workers and their employers.

In an apparent displeasure of these conditions, the Lonmin rock drill operators from July 2012, started organizing workers to exert pressure on mine managers and owners and push for their demands (Chinguno 2013: 162) for an increase in wages of the mine workers and improvement in their working and living conditions. Their demand was a R12, 500 per month minimum wage (McKenzie 2013: 9). Chinguno (2013: 13) identified about five forms of settlements provided to mine workers by Lonmin. These include family units, hostels, low-density housing, mortgage housing schemes and skoomplaas (ibid). It further highlighted that not less than eight Lonmin workers share a room at the Wonderkop hostel (ibid). This presents a picture of terrible living conditions which ultimately endanger the workers at their various settlements in Lonmin.

Nevertheless, Lonmin highlighted some of its achievements towards addressing inadequate housing challenge in its Sustainable Development Report for 2012 (11-12). In a bid to address the critical shortage of affordable housing for its workers in Marikana, Lonmin in 2012 converted 19 hostel blocks into 407 bachelor units and 64 family units at R350 (US$43) per month. This was in response to their SLP commitment to convert all hostels to bachelor or family units by 2014. It also introduced a living-out allowance to encourage employees to take up responsibility for their accommodation. The report went further to highlight that Lonmin's financial assistance to the Marikana Housing Development Company which was set up in 1998 aided its completion of about 1, 149 homes out of which 242 units have been sold. Ironically, Lonmin in its 2013 Sustainable Development Report stated that it had only been able to convert 107 hostel blocks which has provided accommodation to only 2, 439 of its employees. This result is not encouraging and lays credence to workers' consistent demand for better living conditions considering that 28, 000 workers at the company do not have decent accommodation (McKenzie, 2013:13).

Furthermore, there is also the inability of the mining companies to actively involve and contribute towards the socio-economic development of their host communities. Although this is not the individual duty of the mining companies alone, it is expected as a part of their CSR to do so within their immediate environment to maintain good community relations, and to maintain their license to operate. Moreover, under the Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act, 2002, ("the MPRDA"), issuing a mining right may only be possible if the applicant submits a compliant social and labour plan (SLP) to the Department of Mineral Resources (DMR) as well as subsequently complying with its obligations. The aim of this regulation is to ensure compliance by holders of mining rights on the issue thus providing a mechanism to address community developmental. These are the conditions enshrined in the Act and mining corporations are expected to comply.

Hitherto, the effective enforcement at ensuring compliance to this rule has remained in doubt and largely, a mirage. Several projects undertaken by Lonmin as part of its CSR are either abandoned uncompleted or are shabbily done. Examples of these include the abandoned and failed multi million rand hydroponics project and the asbestos refurbished schools, all in Marikana (Bench Mark Foundations 2012: 75). That means that Marikana community lacks infrastructure befitting of an economically robust mineral producing area: one as a failure of Lonmin to live up to their CSR, and two, the complete lack of government pressure to ensure the Lonmin complies with the tenets of efficient implementation of their CSR. By implication, both Lonmin and government have failed in their duties to provide adequate service delivery to the people.

4.2.4.2. Labour matters

For some time now, South Africa has been faced with a number of labour related disputes and challenges that culminated in agitations for strike actions that sometimes are violent (Tenza 2015: 211). In the case of Marikana, labour related concerns were also a pivotal aspect to the unprotected strike action undertaken by mineworkers (McKenzie 2013: 12). Before the strike, wars of supremacy raged between the two fundamental unions within the mining sector of South Africa. The miners appeared mired in controversies regarding which union leadership could give them comprehensive representation. This development prompted the scenario that disconnected the workers from their leadership as well as the mine owners and management (ibid).

Because mineworkers accused the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) of poor representation with respect to their grievances to the management, this stance led to the split in the mining union. Consequently, the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU) was formed in1999 (Ngcukatobi 2013: 338). While the latter is the splinter unit of mineworkers in Lonmin alone, the former is the mother union of all the mineworkers in South Africa. NUM has been accused of becoming a behemoth of a bureaucracy (McKenzie 2013: 14) having too close a relationship with both the South Africa's ruling African National Congress (ANC) and Lonmin (Abegunde 2014: 33). Accordingly, mineworkers further accused NUM of failed representation. This point is further stressed by a Lonmin mineworker's comment when he was interviewed:

> "Although NUM union exists, there is nothing that it has ever succeeded in addressing [not even one or] any of the workers' issues that have occurred, it goes

to speak to the employers but never reports anything concrete to the workers, so it is useless" (Lekgowa, *et al* 2012: 129)."

These two major fronts of disaffection gave the union fragmentation between NUM and AMCU a foundation that leveraged the strike. Consequently, NUM lost the loyalty of many mineworkers who then joined the newly formed AMCU (Abagunde 2014: 34).

Similarly, the infighting within the COSATU leadership vis-à-vis their support for 'unfavourable' government policies, is symptomatic of the depth of conflict it created (Dhliwayo 2012). Stressing the needlessness of this fragmentation within COSATU, the then General Secretary of COSATU Zwelinzima Vavi speaking at the South African Medical Association conference on 25th August 2012 insisted that this "splinter [is] inherently harmful ... because they divide the loyalties of the workers and undermine their unity" (Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis Daily Briefings 28 August 2012).

Furthermore, a report in the New Age newspaper on Thursday, 13 September 2012, highlighted that a Toronto-based Fraser Institute publication ranked South African mining jurisdictions 54th out of 93 mining jurisdictions across the globe below countries like Philippines, India and Bolivia for labour regulations, employment agreements and labour militancy or labour disruptions. It went further to highlight the government lack of concern to address particularly mining related labour disputes because of government's failure to revive the "ineffectual" labour dispute management mechanisms like the Labour Courts [which has not been able to effectively address and manage the upsurge of labour issues in recent times in the country]. The implication from the foregoing translates into a vivid scenario of ineptitude and lack of government interest over the plight of mining workers in South Africa considering the centrality of their importance to the national economy. As long as the mining sector remains the backbone of South Africa's economy, it is proper for the government to express deep concern and commitment towards labour-related issues and disputes to ensure adequate conflict management. Unfortunately, this is lacking.

4.2.4.3. Economic issues

Despite the fact that South Africa was one of the most economically polarized societies in the globe because of its history of apartheid, the contemporary post-apartheid democratic government transformation has not succeeded in dismantling discrepancies across the country (Mohautse 2014: 690). In the light of this, inequality continues to reverberate as a core concern across South African workers protests demand to date. It has remained a serious issue of debate within and outside the government and across major stakeholders in the country.

The post-apartheid South African mining industry itself is not devoid of this situation (McKenzie 2013: 15). Complaints of unequal remuneration or wage disparity have been persistently touted as major miners' demand and reason for strikes (ibid). The wage discrepancy in the remuneration structure between workers at the mine helped fuel the conflict. For instance, in a circumstances where Chief Executive Officers (CEO's) and mine owners earn hundreds of thousands of rand more than an entry-level miners, the anomalies provided a tinder box that fueled the conflict (Hartford 2012: 165). This inadvertently supported the unfortunate paradox of the employers and mine owners getting richer while the employees and mine workers sweat underground for daily deaths and increased poverty (Twala 2012: 64). It further depicts the level of economic inequality that exists in post-apartheid South Africa particularly within the mining sector. It also shows that the lucrative proceeds and profits of platinum in particular and the mining industry in general do not adequately trickle down to the average South African miner.

Secondly, the reports of the Marikana Commission of Inquiry (MCI) indicated that workers wage increase at Implats, a neighboring mine to Lonmin, heightened the wage disaffection of the RDOs at Lonmin who instigated their demands also for a wage increase (Marikana Commission of Inquiry 2016: 50). The report highlighted that the unprotected wage strike embarked on by RDOs at Implats in January 2012 resulted in their wage increase in April of the same year. This is irrespective of the fact that prior to this date, Implats management in October 2011 had entered into a wage agreement that was to expire in 2013 with the NUM when salary increment was expected. It clearly shows that the RDOs at Implats had a double wage increase within six months: in October 2011 and April 2012. Succumbing to their wage-demand level, Implats management increased their wages to between R6 540 and R9 991 depending on each worker's category (http://www.implats.co.za/implats/downloads/2014/24-June%202014-Wage-negotiation-settlement-(SENS).pdf).

In the light this development, the report hinted that RDOs at Lonmin were lagging behind wage wise when compared with their colleagues at Implats in particular, and other surrounding mines in general. Regardless of the substantive wage agreement between Lonmin and NUM (at that time) which would expire in 2013, the situation at Implats necessitated wage review also at Lonmin (Marikana Commission of Inquiry 2016: 45). However, this was not to be. The impact of the wage increases at Implats affected Lonmin RDOs in two ways: "first it prompted the possibility of some Lonmin workers crossing over to Impala; and, second, the possibility of workers achieving substantial wage increase through the same route of unprotected strike" (ibid: 49). By inference Lonmin workers chose the second option, which precipitated the strike.

4.2.5 Summary

Similarly, this section presented a historical background of Lonmin Pty mining activities in Marikana, North West Province of South Africa. It equally provided a discussion on the root causes of the conflict along three continuums: social, labour and economic. The section showed that Lonmin and government were unable to respond effectively to the demands of the mineworkers and the host communities and this led to the strike and the shooting of the miners. The section further identified that union rivalry between NUM and AMCU and war of supremacy escalated workers disaffection which killed their trust in the union thus, distorting and jeopardizing proper avenues for peaceful negotiation.

4.3 Case Study 2: Conflict management strategies in Lonmin Pty and South African Government

4.3.1 Introduction

Conflict prevention, conflict management and post conflict re-building are some of the very serious challenges faced by Multinational Companies (MNCs) as these affect their operations across borders. MNCs in this study are Lonmin (Pty) South Africa and SPDC Nigeria. Studies (Bennett 2002: 397, Nelson 2000: 45) have argued that for MNCs to preclude conflict within its workforce and its host communities, the strategy is possible through three-core business strategies: "social investment programmes, engagement in policy dialogue and civic institution building". Nelson (2000: 46) further states that effective management of conflict situation entails "preventive diplomacy, fact finding and mediation mission", which address the three fundamental causes of conflict: social inequality, corruption and poverty (Bennett 2002: 398). This section presents an overview of strategies adopted by Lonmin and government conflict management teams before, during and after the Marikana massacre. Along this trajectory, the section presents a distinctive illustration of conflict management strategies adopted by Lonmin and South African Government. The aim of this illustration is to highlight the effects of some of these Lonmin and South African Government conflict management efforts before, during and after the Marikana conflict.

4.3.2 Lonmin Mining Company Pty conflict prevention efforts before Marikana conflict

Following the violent strike incident at Marikana that led to the death of 34 mineworkers sort by the South African Police, consistent criticisms have been directed against Lonmin for its lack of effective conflict management systems (Pesmatzoglou et al 2014: 192). Among various strike demands are the conditions of poor wages and living standards of the workers. Mineworkers' demands for improvements in working and living conditions as well as wage increment usually heighten against the backdrop of fatalities at the mines as a consequence of poor working conditions. Thus, some complaints from mineworkers against these conditions point to the MNC Lonmin and its inability to address the inadequacies identified. These concerns have unfortunately led to some workers' strike actions that relapsed into conflict.

As stated earlier, conflict prevention is aimed to preclude conflict situation. Therefore, preventing conflict entails addressing all pre-conflict causative variables already discussed. In this regard, Lonmin has demonstrated its willingness to address the pre-conflict causative variables blamable for recurrence of conflicts in the company. Along this trajectory, Lonmin adopted the Safety and Sustainable Development Policy (Lonmin 2010: 2). The company addresses its sustainable development responsibilities through this SSDP medium. Lonmin has developed a number of mitigation plans and programmes, which it integrated into this strategy. For instance, it created the stakeholders' engagement forum and the risk management process, to explicitly address some of the critical concerns of its workforce as indicated in Table 4.12. As an obligatory responsibility, most of these programmes are fashioned in line with the requirements and as part of its Corporate Social Responsibility.

To every mining industry like Lonmin, CSR is a very complex but highly influential concept in the decision-making process of the company. Considering the damaging effects of mining on ecological environment, the CSR is a way of giving back to the society (Pesmatzoglou et al 2014: 190). Therefore, multinational companies such as Lonmin bequeath the economic benefits to the people directly affected by the consequences of mining. This encourages minimum disruption of the social cohesion of people and protection of communities living g within the mining environment (Jenkins & Yakovleva 2006: 272). By inference. Lonmin's engagement with its CSR is an avenue for the justification of its existence and for the assessment of the progress made in this direction.

The CSR fundamentally projects the corporate image of Lonmin and therefore the seriousness attached to the complete involvement and implementation of its social obligations. In this regard, Lonmin identified some sustainable development risk areas that demand high priority including fatalities, serious injuries and unsafe behavior, housing of employees, HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, local economic development and stakeholder engagement (Lonmin 2009: 21) among others. To achieve this, Lonmin outlined a number of CSR programmes to cushion the consequences of its activities to the people directly affected. Consequently, Lonmin earmarked a huge amount of money amounting into millions of rand as well as massive financial commitment towards realization of lasting success in these areas. In its 2008 Sustainable Development Report (SDR) for instance, Lonmin expressed its commitment towards "improving the quality of life of the present and future generations through the integration of economic generation, social development and environmental protection" (Lonmin 2008: 3). The report further indicated that

Lonmin's financial commitments up to the tune of 41 per cent of its SLP annual allocation were set aside for the development of local economic community projects. In addition, the company converted 29 hostels from hostel accommodations into family and bachelor accommodation out of the 114 target mark by 2011 (ibid: 13).

The stakeholders' engagement forums and risk management teams are platforms intended to assure continued engagement with various stakeholders including the workers to discuss their concerns. These interventionist approaches are core conflict management strategies the company adopted to preclude the incidents of conflict. It is an engagement forum which, according to Lonmin's 2009 SDR seeks to ensure that:

> "They engage with those who are directly affected by our operation through the nature of our business or through proximity to our location; and with those stakeholders who demonstrated an interest in our business. We engage with our stakeholders in order to improve relations; understand their perspective and expectations; and communicate our plans and vision. We respond to our stakeholders' concerns and requests for information...We also take into consideration the interests and expectations from arrange of stakeholders obtained from various stakeholders' engagement initiatives" (Lonmin 2009: 16-17).

The interpretation thereof is that these forums avail Lonmin and its stakeholders opportunity to access, attend to and possibly address potential conflict situations from within (its workforce) or from its immediate environment (the communities). The critical aspect of Lonmin stakeholders' engagement forums is that it affords them the opportunity to report sustainable development concerns to the company who provides them with various forms of feedback to address these concerns (Lonmin 2008: 1).

Table 4.12 shows the 2008 stakeholders' engagements that indicates who are the various stakeholders, and their methods of engagement, the frequency at which these engagements occur and a summary of the issues that are material.

Table 4.12: Part of 2008 Lonmin stakeholders' engagements

Stakeholder	Method of engagement	Frequency	Summary of issues that are material
Employees	Lonmin internet; containing a library of Lonmin information for all employees.	Ongoing	Safety in workplace; Market related remuneration; Organisational change.
	Platinum Conversation, an employee newsletter distributed in three languages providing general information to employees on safety, performance and other operational aspects.	Monthly	
	CEO's newsletter translated into four languages; providing general information to the employees on safety, performance and strategic matters.	Monthly	
	Annual employee climate survey to gauge employee perceptions and experiences whilst working for the company.	Annually	
	Sample employee focus group to determine issues that are material to them as employees.	Annually	
Traditional Authorities	We engage with Traditional Authorities in the regions we operate. These authorities include Bapo Ba Mogale, Mapela, Mphalele, Ledwaba, and Zebediela Ndebele	Quarterly meetings (monthly in the case of Zedediela Ndebele)	Equity and shareholding; Employment equity; Preferential procurement
Greater Lonmin Communities (GLC)	Lentswe meetings held with the traditional communities where we operate as a platform to raise concerns and to discuss general matters pertaining to the community and the company.	Bi-annually	Equity and shareholding; Employment; Employment; local procurement opportunities; Informal settlements and insufficient housing; HIV/AIDS and pulmonary TB in the community; Community engagement on community projects.
	GLC area meeting with area representatives during which community development and engagement are discussed and projects tracked with regards performance.	Quarterly	
	GLC development forum meeting with community area representatives during which community developments are discussed and performance tracked	Quarterly	
	Site specific projects through social and environmental impact assessments	As required	
	GLC view, a community newsletter providing general information to communities on aspects relating to the company and to the GLC	Quarterly	
	Perspective survey within the GLC to obtain insight into the communities' perception in terms of engagement and development initiatives	Annually	
	Sample perception survey to obtain feedback on perceived company performance and aspects that are material to them as stakeholders.	Annually	

Adapted from 2008 Lonmin sustainable development report: 23-24.

Once these concerns were identified at the stakeholders' engagements level, they were articulated into categories in order of priority by the company for possible attention through its risk management system as indicated in Table 4.12. The Lonmin workforce is a central stakeholder of the company. Hence, their concerns particularly with regard to miners working and living environments remain of fundamental interest to the company. Therefore, through the risk management system for instance, Lonmin is able to identify, assess and address the causes of operational fatalities during its operations (Lonmin 2008: 25). To reduce the level of operational fatalities and serious injuries among its workforce, the company adopted a zero tolerance approach to harm during production implemented through the company's risk management processes as indicated in Table 4.12. To this end, Lonmin was able to maintain same level of the number of operational fatalities recorded between 2008 and 2010 as indicated in Figure 4.5. Apparently, the stability recorded over the years represents the effective and positive influence of this approach as indicated in Figure 4.5.

Though the company presented an uneven record of fatalities in 2011, Lonmin engaged in safety summit in 2011 where it adopted 63-target projects aimed at safety improvement (Lonmin 2012). The fatality rate of the company stood at a record high of six in 2011. However, the final fatality report in the 2012 SDR indicated only two fatal incidents. Lonmin credited the 2012 fatality success story to the effective implementation of the 2011 safety project initiative after recording its highest number of fatalities in three years. Furthermore, this was an impressive downward result when compared to the 2008-2010 figures with a record rate of three fatalities per year.

Figure 4. 5: Lonmin Fatality chart 2008-2012



Source: Lonmin 2012 SDR

Lonmin further reported that this campaign assisted it attain the lowest fall-of-ground (FOG) fatality in 2012. In this regard, Lonmin indicated that in July it recorded 5 million FOGs fatality-free at K3 Shaft; 5 million fatality-free shifts at Karee Mine in August; 7 million FOG fatality-free shifts at 4B Shaft in July and 13 million FOG fatality-free shifts at Rowland Shaft in August 2012 (Lonmin 2012). The implication is that the conglomerate has clearly stable but continuous improvement plan with regards the working conditions of mineworkers at Lonmin.

In a similar disposition, the company has also been able to identify risks attributed to poor living conditions as it affects employees' security and efficiency. Hence, providing adequate and affordable housing for its employees took center stage as a core policy, particularly on Lonmin's SLP. (Lonmin 2009: 18). Consequently, the Marikana Housing Development Company (MHDC) established in 1998, was to build houses in the area of Marikana Extension 1. The intention was to provide decent accommodation that either will be for outright sale or rented to both the employees and members of the community. Hence, through the MHDC, more than 369 houses had already been completed at Karee and another 280 at Wonderkop Renamile for its employees as at 30 September 2012 (Lonmin 2012).

Table 4. 13:Some of Lonmin's risk management processes for 2008

Issue/ Risk	Why the management of this risk is important to Lonmin	How Lonmin is managing this risk
Eliminating fatalities and serious injuries	Zero harm to employees and contractors is the core value of our business. Our employees' and contractors' wellbeing is the formation to the success of our business. Poor system performance has direct cost implications, reputational impact and may affect our licence to operate.	Group management is underlined by our safety and Sustainable Development Policy (SDP) and supported by group target, standards and guidelines; Associated risks are identified, managed and monitored through our company risk management framework; We have a zero tolerance approach to any risky behavior; We are improving our safety management systems; All injuries and near-miss incidents are thoroughly investigated;
Respecting and valuing fundamental human rights	The principles of human rights are fundamental to the success of the company and integral to our company value. Poor performance has direct implication on company reputation, on shareholders' value and reduce profitability	We do not tolerate any behaviour that may compromise the principles of human rights within our sphere of influence; Our human capital and sustainable policies are aligned with human rights principles, particularly in terms of employment, working conditions and grievance procedure; Human rights are integral to our company risk management framework; We have targets and management plans in place to reduce risk associated with human rights;
Availability and affordability of housing for our employees	The regions in which we operate are characterized by an estimated 50 per cent of the population living in informal dwellings. The shortage of housing is critical issue on both a national and regional scale and a concern that needs to be addressed. The magnitude of this challenge for the company is underlined by the statistics indicating that more than two thousand of our employees reside in those informal settlements. The well-being of our employees is fundamental to our success.	Associated risks are identified, and monitored through our company risk management framework; Our approach to housing is centered around the delivery of affordable housing which impact positively on our employees with their families. enhance security and experience sustainable community living; We are committed to the construction of 5 500 houses within the GLC by 2011 and the conversion of our 114 hostels into family and bachelor accommodation by 2011. Phase one, the conversion of 29 hostel complex was completed in 2008; We realized that it is in the best interest of our employees to own their own homes and it is our intention to promote the ownership of these houses by the occupants;

Adapted from 2008 Lonmin Risk Management Report: 26-34

In this respect, Lonmin in its 2010 annual report specified that as one of its achievements for the year ended, it had spent approximately $2 million in converting five hostel blocks into bachelor and family accommodation. Lonmin, in addition, indicated its intention to convert 26 more hostel blocks into family and bachelor residences in 2011 at a cost of $10.9 million and the upgrading of 252 houses in Marikana operations (Lonmin 2010: 06-09). With regards wage related issues, the company highlighted further success on wage agreement it had with NUM that placed workers' wages above Consumer Price Index but indicated that negotiations were still ongoing with the union for further review (ibid 33). To guarantee sustainable wage levels for its workers, Lonmin engaged a consistent wage increase strategy that permits negotiations and agreements with relevant stakeholders (workers' representatives). According to the Department of Labour 2011 industrial report, the strategy informed Lonmin's signing of wage agreements with NUM. The agreement which became effective in July 2011 had a wage increase between 8.5 and 10 per cent for its underground workers (Department of Labour 2011: 28). This remains one of the greatest success stories of this strategy.

The company's 2012 sustainable development report highlighted that Lonmin had successfully provided decent accommodation to 8 per cent of approximately 4000 of its total workforce. This was possible after the conversion of 19 hostel blocks into 407 single units and 64 family units that represented 71.43 per cent of family units and 47.07 of single units. Lonmin further indicated that it spent R89 million or USD$ 11 million on the conversion of the hostel blocks (Lonmin 2012).

4.3.3 Lonmin conflict management strategy during the conflict

4.3.3.1. Refusal to Negotiate

This part of the study relies on the findings of the Marikana Commission of Inquiry 2016 report since the document provides vital information not readily available in other texts. Ostensibly, according to the reports recorded by the MCI, pre-Marikana massacre negotiations commenced a week before, precisely on Thursday 9 August 2012 (Marikana Commission of Inquiry 2016: 53). On August 10, according to the MCI report, Lonmin top management organized two emergency meetings to discuss the developing situation at the mine. In one those meetings, they took a decision not to accept the memorandum from the striking workers because it was outside Lonmin's "established bargaining structures." They also took a decision not to speak, address nor negotiate with the strikers and went ahead to call for police assistance to re-enforce security at the mine (ibid 54). Lonmin also called two of its security back to work from their leave to beef up the company's reinforcement (Ledwaba 2013: 18).

4.3.3.2. Threat of Disciplinary Action

Furthermore, the company issued an internal memo threatening disciplinary actions against the strikers and stated that their dismissal was imminent in the event that they refused to get back to work. The report highlighted that this aggravated the crisis and increased tension within the mine until late in the night. Consequently, the situation degenerated and prompted the use of rubber bullets by the Lonmin security to disperse the crowd. Lonmin had stressed during the commission seating that this security action was in line with its counter industrial action procedure and therefore was necessary in the situation at the time. The company also noted that the shots were fired after warnings to the crowd to disperse peacefully from its security personnel failed and it was becoming increasingly dangerous to control the crowd (MCI: 60). Thus, the choice to fire some shots was intended to prevent the situation from worsening.

On the 12 of August, the report indicates that Lonmin security staff prevented the arson attempt by striking mineworkers on NUM office located within the Lonmin premises. To achieve this feat, the most senior security officer on ground Mr. Mabelane, instructed the use of rubber bullets and shotguns on the strikers to disperse them and to prevent them from destroying Lonmin properties (ibid: 119).

4.3.4 South African government and its conflict prevention strategies

South Africa has a poor history of apartheid rule that was based on racial discrimination (Van Der Berg 2010: 3). The system prevented any form of black majority economic involvement but allowed blacks only to aspire for menial jobs while vested economic power and control remained in the hands of the white minority (Patel & Graham 2012: 194). This inhuman history contributed to serious inequality in the country, thus generated reasons for dimensional resistance from the disadvantaged groups, which included the Indians, Chinese, Coloureds, and Blacks (ibid). These groups of people are also known as the Historically Disadvantaged South Africans (HDSAs). The unwavering need to remedy the situation came with the end of apartheid. Thus, immediately after the fall of apartheid rule in 1994, the newly established democratic South African government advanced several measures to redress the inequalities of apartheid against previously disadvantaged groups. Some of these measures were in constitutional reforms, Acts, and the establishment of new black oriented government departments.

4.3.4.1 South Africa Mining Regulatory legislations

South Africa founded her constitution on the following values: (a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedom. (b) Non-racialism and non-sexism. (c) Supremacy of the constitution and rule of law. Chapter 2, Section 9 of the 1996 constitution specifically gave every South African the right to equality before the law and against any form of discrimination. This law was intended to eliminate the human racial and economic imbalances and unemployment created by apartheid. Thereafter, other facets of South African society started receiving similar legislative attention to correspond with the aspirations of the new era of a non-racial, non-sexist society and equality founded democratic society.

Some of these legislations constrain companies operating in South Africa to take the interests of certain stakeholders seriously. It therefore becomes apposite to reiterate here that racial discrimination was the bedrock of agitations against apartheid; hence adopting these legislations apparently was to preclude the repeat of the characteristics of apartheid and its conflicts. In other words, these mining legislatures were avenues through which government sought the redistribution of South Africa's mineral wealth to include those formerly intentionally and selectively secluded by virtue of their ethnicity (Sorensen 2012: 22, Sorensen 2011a: 171). These are government legislative conflict management strategies created to regulate the activities of mining companies to avert situations that encourage conflict as was the case during apartheid.

The South African Department of Mineral Resources is perhaps one of the oldest government departments following its establishment on 24 April 1891 under the name "Department van Mijnwezen" (Department of Mining) of the Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek (South African Republic – former Transvaal Province) (DMR 2011). It is a body set up to regulate mining transformation to ensure sustainable beneficiation of every South African from the country's mineral wealth (ibid). However, this was not the original intention of this ministry at inception; the new democratic era premised this as one of its cardinal objectives. As a regulatory body, ensuring the implementation of mining legislations by mining companies across South Africa becomes one of the fundamental functions of the department. In this regard, the department undertakes inspection of all SLP projects undertaken by mining companies to ensure their compliance on delivering of their legal commitments as enshrined in the Mining Charter (ibid). The department further explains that undertaking these inspections represent mitigation against mining development continuing with the exclusion of South African communities in general and mining host communities in particular. Additionally, DMR indicated that the Mining Charter was principally for "transforming the mining industry to redress historical imbalances engendered by apartheid so that the industry is consistent with the changes in South Africa's overall transformation of its social, political and economic landscape" (ibid).

Again, the government promulgated the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act No 28 of 2002 (MPRDA) to reform and regulate the mining sector and most importantly to, *inter alia,* return all mining rights to the state and to transfer ownership of mining companies to the previously highly disadvantaged majority across South Africa (Sorensen 2011a: 627). To achieve the former, the new government repealed some part of the old mining rights and replaced them with new mining rights, which paved way for the effective realization of its objectives, namely, equitable access to the nation's mineral and petroleum resources (ibid).

One of the central objectives of the Charter is clearly highlighted in Section 2. It emphasized an ownership policy that would enable 26 per cent BEE ownership of all companies operating in South Africa within ten years from the date the Charter took effect. It requires that a considerable fraction of mining companies' procurement come from the BEE entities (Smith 2014: 1). By this arrangement, 15 per cent of ownership transfer to HDSAs under the new order would have been achieved within five years (Sorensen 2011b: 175).

The Charter therefore has to accomplish the following tasks:

i, Redressing past discrimination based on race, gender or disability in the mineral and petroleum industries and in the value chain of these industries;

ii, Transform such industries in the matter of:

Ownership participation;

Participation in management;

Development of management, scientific and engineering skills for HDSAs;

Involvement in the procurement chains for such activities (Linkages);

Socio-economic development of the host communities (Sorensen 2011b: 176).

To further the interests of the South African mining workforce, government promulgated the Mine Health and Safety Act of 1996 to address the health and conditions of work challenges inherent in the mining industries across the republic. Essentially, the aim of the Act is to provide for protection of the health and safety of employees and other persons at mines and, for that purpose-

- "to promote a culture of health and safety;
- to provide for the enforcement of health and safety measures;
- to provide for appropriate systems of employee, employer and State participation in health and safety matters;
- to establish representative tripartite institutions to review legislation, promote health and enhance properly targeted research;
- to provide for effective monitoring systems and inspections, investigations and inquiries to improve health and safety;
- to promote training and human resources development;
- to regulate employers' and employees' duties to identify hazards and eliminate, control and minimise the risk to health and safety;
- to entrench the right to refuse to work in dangerous conditions; and
- to give effect to the public international law obligations of the Republic relating to mining health and safety; and
- to provide for matters connected therewith. Mine, Health, and Safety Act 1996 (Act No. 29 of 1996).

The act has the following objectives-

a) to protect the health and safety of persons at mines;
b) to require employers and employees to identify hazards and eliminate , control and minimise the risks relating to health and safety at mines;
c) to give effect to the public international law obligation of the republic that concerns health and safety at mine;
d) to provide employee participation in matters of health and safety through health and safety representatives and the health and safety committees at mines;
e) to provide for effective monitoring of health and safety conditions at mines;

f) to provide enforcement of health and safety measures at mines;

g) to provide for investigation and inquiries to improve health and safety at mines ; and

h) to promote-

   i. A culture of health and safety in the mining industry;

   ii. Training in health and safety in the mining industry; and

   iii. Co-operation and consultation on health and safety between the State, employers, employees and their representatives.Mine, Health and Safety Act 1996 (Act No. 29 of 1996).

Apart from these, government created other Acts and legislations to stem the economic legacy of apartheid and precluding conflict. It is also aimed to increase economic participation, especially of those previously denied access or completely excluded (Krüger 2011: 207, Mbeki 2009: 25, Ramphele 2008: 15). Some of these policies are jointly implemented between government and various business stakeholders across the country. Examples of these policies are the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), and the MHDC. The BEE is a racially selective government policy introduced in 2003 to redress the inequalities of apartheid. The Black Economic Empowerment Act 2003 was enacted to establish this policy and give it a legal backing.

> "The Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment strategy is a necessary government intervention to address the systematic exclusion of the majority of South Africans from full participation in the economy. The defining feature of Apartheid was the use of race to restrict and severely control access to the economy by black persons. The accumulation process was one of restricted wealth creation and imposed underdevelopment on black communities to ensure that they were, in the main, suppliers of cheap labour" (Esser & Dekker 2008:162).

However, the policy was amended in 2013 through the Broad-Based Back Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) Act No. 46 of 2013, culminating into the change of its name to reflect it. Although the name places race as an overriding factor of the policy, other priority measures like employment preference, skills development, ownership, management, socio-economic development, and preferential procurement, are also part of the programme. The term black was also a generic term used to include Black Africans, Indians and coloured or HDSAs.

The official meaning of BBBEE according to the Act is "the economic empowerment of all black people including women, workers, youth, people with disabilities and people living in rural areas through diverse but integrated socio-economic strategies". The objectives of the Act to include-

a) Promoting economic transformation in order to enable participation of blacks in the economy;
b) Achieving a substantial change in the racial composition of ownership and management structures and in the skilled occupation of existing and new enterprise;
c) Increasing the extent to which communities, workers, cooperatives and other collective enterprises own and manage existing and new enterprises and increasing their access to economic, infrastructure and skills training;
d) Increasing the extent to which women own and manage existing and new enterprises and increasing their access to economic activities, infrastructure and skills training;
e) Promoting investment programmes that lead to broad-based and meaningful participation in the economy by black people in order to achieve sustainable development and general prosperity;
f) Empowering rural and local communities by enabling access to economic activities, land, infrastructure, ownership and skills; and
g) Promoting access to finance for black economic empowerment.

Source: Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003, (2016)

4.3.4.2 The South African Police Services and Tactical Response Team option in Marikana

Historically, the South African Police is trained to provide security to the public (McMichael 2014: 6). Implicitly, their duties include ensuring public peace and order particularly in situations where conditions threaten or breach public peace (Zondi & Ukpere 2014). Apart from these, they also provide other fundamental services, which include community policing, crime stop and prevention (Van Graan & Ukpere 2012: 10449). Strike actions or protests affect public safety therefore the police performs the function of ensuring public safety in such circumstances. As such, the police remains that law enforcement organization in place to safeguard public interests and by extension provide principal security services to the general public (McMichael 2014: 6).

Apparently, the strike in Marikana was a threat to public peace and order (Faull 2013: 15). Thus, the presence of SAP was necessary at that point judging from their constitutional duties. The South Africa government involved the South African Police intentionally to restore peace and order to the volatile. Marikana. In other words, it is a government obligatory response to misconduct (Faull 2013: 19). As stated elsewhere, Lonmin intentionally called in SAP for two particular reasons: to protect its facilities from damage and to provide protection to its workers who were working and were not part of the strike.

Upon arrival at the scene, the South African Police adopted some strategic measures to dowse tension and dispel the crowd of striking workers. These strategic steps precipitated the JOC and JOCCOM. Further strategies also included interactive interventions strategy aimed at talking the strikers into dropping their demands and dispersing peacefully (Ledwaba 2013: 5-20). It also included the adoption of a six-stage strategy to end the strike. During the implementation of some of these strategies there were severe challenges that eventually resulted in the engagement of water cannons, stun grenades and firing of rubber bullets. These strategies culminated in the shooting on the 16 August 2012 (ibid). The central idea informing these forms of reactions from the South African Police was to return Marikana back to peace and orderliness. The intervention strategy turned violent and the subsequent shooting of 34 lives.

4.3.5 Lonmin and South African Government post Marikana mitigation efforts

After the Marikana incident, both government and Lonmin intensified efforts to address the concerns of the people directly affected by its operations. What actually ended the workers strike was the increase in salary borne out of an agreement between Lonmin and the workers. After the conflict and the shooting, the strike ended. The negotiation between the company and leaders of the strike resulted in 22 per cent wage increase for RDOs including a R2000 return to work bonus (Åstrand, & Birgersson 2014: 8). This move was a very strong strategy, which eventually ended the protracted strike and saw the workers return to work.

In 2013, the company rolled out a five-step initiative to rebuild its business and through it, attempt to address its operational, social and community issues (Lonmin SDR 2014). The five steps included: employee relations, empowering employees and communities, migrant and local labour, use of invested capital and infrastructure and housing and accommodation. In summary, the report indicates that the employee relations are avenues for the renegotiation of unions' agreements and recognition. Under empowering employees and communities, Lonmin indicated that the needs of these groups should effectively be addressed through the Employment Value Proposition (EVP) and Community Value Proposition (CVP). The housing and accommodation initiative not only sustains a renewed vigor in the conversion of hostels but also increases the number of hostels converted. It also assures continuous construction of housing projects to address the living conditions of its workforce.

4.3.5.1 Lonmin Sustainable Development Projects

Regarding its obligation to the GLC, Lonmin outlined a number of sustainable development projects it carried out within its operational areas. According to an article in the Daily Maverick news report on 18 August 2015, Lonmin have "identified their needs accurately, prioritized these through a collaborative process", and made serious efforts to meet them. The article highlighted some of the housing achievements made by Lonmin through this programme in the company's bid to douse the tension roused by poor living conditions within its community of operation to preclude the recurrence of conflict. Along this trajectory, Lonmin has donated more than 180 hectares of land for the construction of over 2 890 houses for both housing and rental units for its workforce at the cost of over R500 million within the GLC. The report reiterated Lonmin's plan to construct an additional 4 000 housing units at a cost of R500 million within the next five years. Furthermore, Lonmin says it has spent approximately R17 million on tarring community roads at Wonderkop and another R7.2 Million on improving water supply, availability and accessibility. The reports revealed that yet another R2.5 Million was spent to improve the sewer network at both Wonderkop and Nkaneng community settlements. Lonmin reiterated through its spokesperson, Memory Johnson, in a report in the New Age Newspapers of 18 July 2015 that:

> "Lonmin had worked hard over the past two and half years to build a more open, transparent and mutually trustworthy environment, and in the process make the company a safe, better place to work. Emphasis has also been placed on the living conditions of employees and indebtedness; two burning issues that the company believes will make a profound impact on the wellbeing of employees. Since the tragic events of Marikana and following the unprecedented five-month strike in the platinum industry, Lonmin has focused its energy on rebuilding relationship with employees and their representative trade unions. The company has and

continues to reach out to employees through meetings and structured workshops aimed at ensuring that any issue can be dealt with swiftly and without recourse to industrial action" (Mafisa, 2015: 4).

The statement above unequivocally illustrates Lonmin's renewed promise at rebuilding and reclaiming trust in its workforce and developing Marikana to heal the wounds of the August 16 tragedy. It also indicates the company's particular interest and commitment at improving the living conditions of it workers, which was one of the fundamental variables at the nexus of the conflict.

In furtherance, Lonmin employed some members of the families of those killed in the tragedy as compensation (Mafisa 2015: 4). Among these people were the widows of those killed and other members of the family (Mafisa 2015: 4, Mhlana 2015: 2). The company also established the 1608 Education Trust to guarantee the education of the children of those killed in the tragedy in particular (Mafisa 2015: 4). The Trust provides every school going age child of the Marikana tragedy victims with funds to cover their education.

Apart from these laudable achievements by Lonmin, Lonmin and government have also engaged in some joint development projects not only to develop Marikana but also to improve the living conditions of the people and to heal the wounds of the tragedy. The Local Government and Human Settlements spokesperson, Ben Bole, reiterated government commitment at improving the living conditions of mining communities in Marikana: "Marikana housing is part of the government's initiative to revitalize old mining towns by developing integrated and sustainable human settlements to address huge housing backlogs. The project is situated on 50 hectares of land donated by Lonmin" (Torerai 2015: 10). Lonmin, according to Torerai in the New Age Newspapers on 17 August 2012, donated the land to the North West provincial government for the construction of hundreds of Breaking New Ground (BNG) and Community Residential Units (CRU) houses in the Marikana extension two projects. The report indicated that this project was intended to provide 2 600 housing units to the Marikana community through the Department of human Settlements. Expectations are that the project is completed 292 BNG and 252 CRU structures in the area by the end of 2015.

As scheduled, the project was completed and on 7 January 2016, completed structures at a cost of over R700 Million stood at 544 and these were handed over to the beneficiaries (SAnews.gov.za). According to a report by the Platinum weekly on 04 December 2015, the houses accommodate more than 550 families (http://www.platinumweekly.co.za). The Human Settlements MEC Collen Maine indicated that this project is in line and part of "The revitalization of distressed mining communities following the Social Accord, which was signed [by President Jacob Zuma] in October 2012 to upgrade human settlements in mining towns" (Torerai 2015: 1) and to improve social facilities across mining towns in South Africa (SAnews.gov.za).

Furthermore, in compliance with the BEE requirements, Lonmin made progress at attaining its co-ownership obligations. In fact, by December 2014, Lonmin achieved the minimum 26 per cent ownership by Housing Department of South Africa. Lonmin Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Mr. Ben Magara clearly indicated in the New Age Newspapers on 5 December 2014 that: "We are delighted that Lonmin has successfully achieved 26 per cent ownership by HDSA's and that the ownership involves the participation of so many of their local communities and employees" (Radebe 2014: 24). Explicitly, this effort has substantially paid off the intentions of BEE and HDSA. Implicitly, this move has not only opened a new partnership between Lonmin and its host communities, but also has further deepened and increased the relationship between both parties. Lonmin says; "This is a milestone that has been a long time in the making and the celebration today effectively heralds the start of a new partnership between Lonmin and its host communities" (ibid).

Strategically, by this partnership, communities automatically become financial stakeholders in the company. One of the intentions behind this approach was to reduce the host communities from getting involved in violent conflicts and to increase their stake in the company through the partnership. Secondly, it integrates members of host communities into the business environment of the company. Thirdly, through the co-ownership, host communities attain reasonable levels of exposure to the operational challenges the company faces particularly those militating against the effective resolution of their concerns. In so doing, better awareness created between both parties enhances increased understanding and improved relationship. To buttress this position, Mr. Magara stated that "All of these partnership will lead to stronger bonds and a better understanding between all stakeholders, as we now all have a vested interest in the success of our company" (ibid).

4.3.5.2 Marikana Commission of Inquiry (Farlam Commission)

Establishing the Farlam commission was one of the fundamental reactions of the government after the disturbing incident at Marikana. The South African government set up a panel of inquiry known as the Marikana Commission of Inquiry to ascertain what transpired in Marikana. Part of the main duties of the commission was to:

> "Examine matters of public, national and international concern arising out of the tragic incidents at Lonmin Mine in Marikana in the North West Province from Saturday 11th August to Thursday 16 August 2001, which led to the deaths of approximately 44 people, more than 70 persons being injured, approximately 250 people being arrested and damage and destruction of property".

Through this process, the circumstances surrounding and leading to the death of miners would be unraveled. By implication, the commission became a prism through which the hitherto covert causal variables of the Marikana tragedy would become visible. Its duties provide the commission with a substantially wide platform, which enhances its comprehensive and effective investigation.

It has the following terms of reference:

> "The Commission shall inquire into, make findings, report on and make recommendations concerning the following, taking into consideration the Constitution and other relevant legislation, policies and guidelines: the conduct of Lonmin in particular ....., The conduct of the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU), their members and officials and in particular......." [Others are] "the conduct of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), its members and officials and in particular ....., The role played by the Department of Mineral Resources or any other government department or agency in relation to the incidents and whether this was appropriate in the circumstances, and consistent with their duties and obligations according to law. The conduct of individuals and loose groupings in fermenting and/or otherwise promoting a

situation of conflict and confrontation, which may have given rise to the tragic incident, whether directly or indirectly".

4.3.5.3 Findings and recommendations of the Farlam Commission

The commission advanced several recommendations as to what transpired in Marikana. However, the concern of this research is on conflict management approaches and strategies espoused in the Marikana conflict by Lonmin and government. Therefore, the study concerns itself with those recommendations made by the commission in this respect. Hence, the focus shall mostly be on sections 89, 90, 91, and 92, which specifically address Lonmin's shortcomings concerning the incident at Marikana. The researcher summarises recommendations proffered in these sections to highlight the point intended therefrom. Section 90 fully discussed the failure of Lonmin to provide adequate security to its staff. The section likewise faulted the company's decision to instruct its workers to report for duty under the volatile and capricious situation at the time. Section 91 attributed one of the principal causes of the strike to Lonmin's failure to fulfill its responsibilities under the SLP, which the workers were trying to address. Section 92 insisted that Lonmin is to blame for not raising workers' wages, as did Implats in the wake of the crisis.

Furthermore, the commission recommended a full investigation to ascertain the level of criminal liability on the part of all SAP involved in the operations particularly at scenes 1 and 2 under direction of the Director of Public Prosecutor. It also recommended that an inquiry be set up with the intention of ascertaining Major General Mbombo (retired) and General Phiyega's fitness to hold office following their complicity in the Marikana incident.

4.3.6 Summary

The section discussed various conflict management efforts of South African Government and Lonmin with the aim of prevent and managing conflict situations at Marikana in particular and across the country in general. The section argues that certain government and Lonmin regulations and policies were formulated either to preclude conflict situation, to effectively manage conflict situation from reneging or to manage post conflict situation to preclude recurrence. It highlighted some of the achievements of the policies on the people directly affected by mining activities but the section argues that these were grossly inadequate. The chapter further stressed some strategic efforts and maneuvers engaged by the SAP to suppress the tensed situation at the Marikana incident. The section ends with a brief insight into the Marikana Commission of Inquiry. The next section outlines the conflict resolution strategies in the Shell Petroleum Development Company and Nigerian government in Ogoni Rivers State in the Niger Delta of Nigeria.

4.4 Case Study 1: Shell and Government conflict management strategies

4.4.1 Introduction

The discussions of the previous section focused on numerous conflict management efforts of Lonmin Pty and South African Government engaged to preclude conflict, to prevent conflict from degenerating and to ensure that conflict did not recur. Similarly, this section will discuss Shell and Nigerian Government conflict management efforts before, during and after the Ogoni conflict. It will discuss these conflict management efforts and what impacts they have made in respect to meeting the expectations of the Ogoni and Niger Delta region.

4.4.2 Shell conflict prevention strategy in the Niger Delta and Ogoni

Shell operations in the Niger Delta of Nigeria have never been functional on a smooth sail because of persistent conflict that has engulfed the area over the years (Ojakorotu 2006: 239). From the inception of its operations, Shell Petroleum Development Company has faced multifaceted security challenges, which have had consequences on the smooth running of its business in the area. In fact, the history of anti-oil agitations dates back to the colonial era (ibid). Since the emergence of serious and active anti-oil protests in the early 1990s (Agbonifo 2004: 4), there was a surge in the security challenges faced by Shell (Ojakorotu 2006: 241). The most manifest of these resistances among others was the MOSOP in Ogoniland led by the late Ken Saro-Wiwa (Obi 1997: 137). No doubt, the increase in the anti-oil resistance stemmed from two broad fronts premised on Shell Community perspective, namely, the frustration of the host communities and Shell's policy failing to address the demands of their host communities. In recognition of these challenging situations, Shell reviewed most of its already existing policies and adopted several other strategies to contain the rising dysfunctional situation within their operating region in Nigeria. It increased its commitment towards stakeholder engagement particularly as it concerns environment and social responsibility performance (Ojakorotu 2006:237, Boele1 & Wheeler 2001: 74) and increased its community assistance efforts (Ganiyu & Okogbule 2013: 22).

To this end, SPDC adopted a new strategy aimed at increasing its community engagement and expanded as well as improved CSR. The aim was to build a deeper and stronger partnership with its host community to preclude the recurrence of conflict and to strengthen its security (Groves 2009: 1). As stated by SPDC in its 2014 annual sustainability report, "Community engagement is fundamental to our approach to sustainability. It helps us to find better solutions, build people's trust and is the basis for operating responsibly" (SPDC annual sustainability report 2014: 18). However, prior to the surge in the Niger Delta ant-oil exploration activities, Shell had *ab-initio* adopted a tripartite sustainable development policy that regulates its operations *vis-à-vis* their beneficiation to host communities. To Shell, running a safe, efficient responsible and profitable business, sharing wider benefits where they operate and helping to shape a more sustainable energy future, represent sustainability (Shell.com 2016).

For Shell Petroleum Development Company, the first strategy is a foundational approach that entails engaging global principles to manage safety and environment as well as community involvement. This way, Shell aims at consistent improvement of its methods of operation to preclude "incidence and identify, avoid where possible and minimise adverse environmental and social impacts across [its] projects and facilities" (ibid). Shell's second strategy aims to integrate the company into and becoming part of the host community they operate. Shell elucidated that by so doing, local economies are aided to development, thus creating jobs and boosting sourcing from local suppliers. It also affords the company opportunity of paying taxes, royalties to the appropriate quarters and lastly providing the company with the opportunity of supporting community projects based on the needs of local communities (ibid). Thirdly, the strategy seeks to reduce growing environmental pressures around their operating environment through the introduction of low-carbon energy solutions and other advanced technologies that reduce emission and increases energy efficiency (ibid).

SPDC initiated and sponsored the Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI) to promote its business transparency, which would assist in enhancing the confidence between it and its host communities (shell.com.ng 2014). Through this initiative, SPDC openly publishes payments it made to the federal government on a regular basis. It also discloses the allocation of revenue to the states by the federal government. It translates that the essence of the policy is to fight corruption in the management of extractive industries revenue, particularly in private-public partnership (Sander 2016: 83, Eccleston& Stubbs 2016: 7, Aaronson 2011: 50) situations like the SPDC. It created a loop between the government and the governed and its records thereby offer the governed awareness of the role the partnership plays in inspiring socio-economic development of the communities (shell.com.ng 2014).

4.4.3 Shell post-conflict management strategy

After abandoning exploration activities in Ogoniland, the challenge of restoring the company's social responsibility image became a serious challenge to the company. In lieu of this, Shell intensified its clean-up operation in most of its remaining 51 oil spill sites out of 74 remediated within the region as at October 2011 (Shell.com.ng 2015). A joint representative team of community, the SPDC and government undertakes the inspection, approval and certification of these completed projects (ibid). Some of the remediation took place in spill sites located within some Ogoni communities (Ekanem, Nwachukwu & Etuk 2014: 9). For the successful achievement of this aim, the company initiated a chemical strategy where organic nutrients that stimulate natural microbes are added to the soil and these feed on the oil and break it down (ibid). Several local community youths gained employment on paid contract in the remediation exercise. Because of the precarious security situation in the region, Shell reported their inability to access some spill sites. However, the company engaged the services of Community Relations Officers (CRO) to ensure unfettered access to these sites.

The oil companies established agricultural projects like poultry farms, aquaculture and agro processing mills for the communities in a bid to cushion the effect of deprived primary occupations arising from spills and massive land takes (Ekanem, Nwachukwu & Etuk 2014: 11). These projects have the sole objective of achieving set outcomes one of which is promoting and sustaining wealth creation activities at micro, small and medium enterprise levels. As asserted by Nwachukwu (2008), the goal of every development project is to make impact on the communities in terms of human empowerment and infrastructural development.

4.4.4 Nigerian government conflict management strategy in Ogoni/Niger Delta

As the spate of agitations spread and became more intense across Niger Delta in general and Ogoni in particular, the Nigerian government introduced certain measures to douse the perilous situation in the region. The first ever-recorded incident of oil resistance and agitation took place in Ogoniland in 1958 and this historic event precipitated the establishment of the Willink

Commission of Inquiry in response (Saro-Wiwa 1968: 8). From that time on, series of various forms of agitations and resistance have been recorded in the region. The agitations took various dimensions including violence, particularly where peaceful means were impossible or failed and because of government repression at the time (Omotola 2006: 80). From the time the situation deteriorated and transformed from host communities fighting oil companies to militants engaging the State in combat, government increased her response towards the demands of the region (Emenaku 2006: 34). Government has made several efforts to develop the region. Some of these efforts were in of legislations and development commissions, which government introduced to regulate the activities of oil exploitation and exploration in the region and to improve the life oil producing communities respectively. Government also inaugurated several other commissions and panels of inquiries as mitigation strategies in the Ogoni and Niger Delta. In terms of legislatures, the newly independent Nigeria from 1963 commenced the creation of legal frameworks to regulate and mitigate pollution emanating from the oil producing industry.Some of these legislations are:

The Mineral Oil Safety Regulation 1963, The Oil in Navigable waters Regulation 1968, The Oil in Navigable Act No 34 of 1968, The Petroleum Regulation 1967, The Petroleum Decree 1969, Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulation 1969, Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulation 1973, Petroleum Refining Regulation 1974, Federal Environmental Protection Agency Act 1988, Mineral Oils (Safety) Regulations 1997(www.dprnigeria.com).

Over time, the amendment of some of these regulations became necessary in view of the circumstances necessitating the amendment. The amendment are: a) Petroleum (Drilling and Production) (Amendment) Regulations 1990 ii) Petroleum (Amendment) Decree 1996 iii) Petroleum (Amendment) Decree No.23, 1998 iv) Petroleum (Drilling and Production) (Amendment) Regulation 1996 (www.dprnigeria.com).

The supervision of activities of all oil companies operating within the country under these regulations is chiefly the function of the Federal Ministry of Mineral Resources. It is also the constitutional duty of this ministry to issue operating licenses to oil exploration companies, all drilling companies, all refining and storage companies (Ukoli 2005: 15). Apart from these, the government entered into some international agreement to make sure that oil companies operate within international standards. In this regard, government became signatory to:

i. International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971;
ii. Convention on the Prevention of Marine pollution Damage, 1972;
iii. African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, 1968;
iv. International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for the Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971;
v. Oil Pollution Act (OPC) 1990;
vi. Environmental Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum Industry in Nigeria issued by the Ministry of Petroleum Resources 1991;
vii. National Environmental Protection Management of Solid and Hazardous Waste Regulation 1991 (FEPA);
viii. Establishment of the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) Decree No 58 of 1988 and Amended in Decree No 59 of 1992 National Policy of the Environment 1999 (FEPA Revised Edition); and
ix. The Elevation of FEPA to a Ministry in 1999 (Ukoli 2005: 18).

There were also other relevant National and International Agreements entered into by the government such as the Federal Environmental Protection Agency Act Cap 131 LFN 1990, Harmful Waste Cap 165 LFN 1990 and the Endangered Species Decree cap 108 LFN 1990 (Ukoli 2001: 5).

Part of the Federal government response to the clamour of the Niger Delta also included the establishment of the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) in 1963, the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 1992, which transformed into NDDC in 2000 during the then President Obasanjo democratic administration (Idemudia 2010: 136, Obi 2006: 40, Ite 2004: 3,). Also in 1999, the federal government revenue allocation to the oil producing communities was increased from 3 per cent in 1992 to 13 per cent in 2000 (Ganiyu & Okogbule 2013: 22, Ite 2005: 5). The Niger Delta Technical Committee (NDTC) was also established in 2008 (Omotola 2007: 75).

The OMPADEC and the NDDC were the most visible government official response to the Niger Delta concerns. Decree 23 of 1992 under the Babangida led administration established OMPADE (Omotola 2007: 79). The OMPADEC was to act as a mediator between the host communities and oil companies in their particular areas (Okonta 2003: 20). Through it, the government sought to speed up the development of Niger Delta and double the revenue accruing to the region from 1.5 to 3 per cent, worth over N13.6 billion at the time (ibid). This was in line with the major task of OMPADE, which is to coordinate rapid development of the oil producing area. Apart from this, the OMPADEC has the following key functions:

i. To receive and administer the monthly sums from the allocation of federal account in accordance with confirmed oil production ratio in each State
   a. for rehabilitation and developing oil mineral producing areas;
   b. for tackling ecological problems that have arisen from the exploration of oil minerals;

ii. To determine and identify, through the commission and the oil mineral producing states, the actual oil mineral producing areas and to foster the development of projects agreed upon with local communities in the oil mineral producing areas (Omotola 2007: 80, Salisu (Ed) 2005: 20).

It is imperative to mention that through OMPADEC, government engaged in some developmental programmes and projects in the region. The commission was able to provide pipe borne water and electricity to some communities (Ojakorotu 2006: 237). However, it failed to live up to the expectations of the people. The situation became worse because corruption was endemic in the commission and most of the funds allocated to it were mismanaged, squandered, or systematically embezzled (ibid). The two sole administrators of the commission lost their jobs in September 1998 for their inability to account for N6.7 billion, (then $80 million) and these were Professor Eric Opia and Mr. Albert K Horsfall (Omotola 2007: 81).Ironically, the commission was complaining of lacking in funds adequate to execute projects at the time (Salisu (Ed) 2005: 22).

Many other writers (Fryans 2001: 38, Okonta & Oro 2006: 18, Omotola 2007: 82), at the time condemned the ineptitude and failure of OMPADEC, which they linked to massive corruption to the extent that they described it as "a contact [to enrich some people] rather than a development outfit" The prevalence of corruption, poor planning, limited capacity, poor governmental funding, bottleneck bureaucracy, and limited community involvement have led many commentators to describe these governmental agencies as total failures (Idemudia 2010:136).

At the dawn of the new democratic government in 1999 after decades of military rule, government's efforts at addressing deplorable situation in the Niger Delta became the pre-occupation of the new government. The region's financial contributions to the national treasury prompted the new democratic government's concerted efforts at developing the area (Otega & Salleh (2015: 42). Mähler (2015: 391) categorized these developmental efforts into three broad spectrums: the creation of the Ministry of Niger Delta, establishment of the NDDC and the upward review of the existing revenue allocation formula. Clearly, the creation of the NDDC was particularly fundamental for the human improvement, technological advancement and infrastructural development of the region. It was also for the remediation of the Niger Delta environment, stabilize it, provide it with immediate and imperative community needs, and thereby reduce violence and end conflict (Otega & Salleh 2015: 41).

The NDDC Act 1999 established the NDDC under the leadership of then President Olusegun Obasanjo in 2000. Part 2 of the NDDC Act contains the functions. The Act reads that the Commission shall:

1. a. "formulate policies and guidelines for the development of the Niger Delta, area;

   b. conceive, plan and implement, in accordance with the set rules and regulations, projects and programmes for the sustainable development of the Niger Delta area in the field of transportation including roads, jetties and waterways, health, education, employment, industralisation, agriculture and fisheries, housing and urban development, water supply, electricity and telecommunications;

   c. cause the Niger Delta area to be surveyed in order to ascertain measures which are necessary to promote in physical and socioeconomic development;

   d. prepare master plan and schemes designed to promote the physical development of the Niger Delta area and the estimates of the costs of implementing such mater plans and schemes;

   e. implement all measures approved by the development of the Niger Delta area by the Federal Government and the member States of the Commission;

f identify factors inhibiting the development of the Niger Delta area and assist the member States in the formulation and implementation of policies to ensure sound and efficient management of resources of the Niger Delta area;

g. assess and report on any project funded or carried out in the Niger Delta area by oil and gas producing companies and other company including non-governmental organisations and ensure that funds released for such projects are properly utilized;

h tackle ecological and environmental problems that arise from exploration of oil mineral in the Niger Delta area and advise the Federal Government and the member States on the prevention and control of oil spillages, gas flaring and environmental pollution;

i. liaise with the various oil mineral and gas prospecting and producing companies on all matters of pollution prevention and control;

j. execute such other works and perform such other functions which, in the opinion of the Commission, are required for the sustainable development of the Niger Delta area and its peoples; and

2. In exercising its functions and powers under this section, the Commission shall have regard to the varied and specific contributions of each member state of the Commission to the total national production of oil and gas. (http://www.nddc.gov.ng/the%20NDDC%20ACT.pdf).

The NDDC also has the following principal aims:

> "Our aim is to establish in the Niger Delta Region (NDR) a strong and progressive society in which no one will have any anxiety about basic means of life and work; where poverty and illiteracy no longer exist and diseases are brought under control; and where our educational facilities provide all the children of NDR with best possible opportunities for the development of their potentials". (http://www.nddc.gov.ng/projectsandprograms.html).

It was also the constitutional responsibility of the commission to come up with a master plan for the region. This plan would be a collective integration of all developmental strategies from various stakeholders including representatives of communities, the oil companies, all levels of government, and the non-governmental Organizations (Mähler 2015: 397). The master plan, known as Niger Delta Region Development Master Plan (NDRDMP) took effect in 2007 (ibid). It is a three stage short, medium and long-term strategy, which was fashioned in line with the principles of global sustainable development (Okumagba, & Okereica 2012: 281). The long-term plan was further segmented into three stages with each stage lasting five years and spanning fifteen years commencing in 2006 and terminating in 2020 (ibid).

By virtue of the law establishing NDDC, the commission is a direct agency of the federal government hence it receives direct funding from it. However, there are other sources of revenue to the commission where approximately 78 per cent of its allocations between 2001 and 2004 were direct revenues from the federal government (Omeje 2006: 30, UNDP 2006). Other avenues through which the commission could access funds include "3 percent contribution from the oil and gas companies, 50 percent of ecological fund allocation to the Niger Delta member States, proceeds from other NDDC assets, and miscellaneous sources" (Okolo 2014: 42).

On this premise and under the guidance of its master plan, the NDDC commenced operations within the area. Through the agency, government had effected some reasonable level of development in the region irrespective of consistent criticism against its performance (Ogbodo, Egbunike & Okoye-Nebo 2015: 127). Within four years of its inception, the commission was able to execute several projects across various oil communities of the region. For instance, from 2001 t0 2005, the commission initiated and successfully completed twenty-two rural electrification projects, twenty-one vital community access roads, sixty-two housing projects, and forty-two borehole water projects.

Table 4.14: NDDC completed projects in Niger Delta 2001-2005

Name of Project	**Number Completed**
Rural electrification in communities	20 communities
Residential Buildings Houses	62 houses
Bore hole	40
Constructed jetties	18
Opened canals	4
Rural access roads	21
Total	**165**

Source: Researchers compilation from data in existing literatures

Other completed projects by NDDC in Niger Delta are the construction of about eighteen jetties to access communities located within the creeks through the waters, and opening of four canals (Dokpesi & Ibiezugbe 2012: 70). Table 4.14 clearly illustrates these achievements. These were initial projects undertaken by NDDC under its Quick Impact Projects (QIP), which were meant to first, complete the abandoned projects of the moribund OMPADEC and second, to address the most demanding community needs and challenges at the time (Okumagba, & Okereica 2012: 279). As at 2012, the infrastructural and other developmental efforts of the commission span over 2000 projects throughout the area (Okumagba, & Okereica 2012: 281). These included the 165 projects it executed in the area from 2001-2005.

On several occasions, people from the region have commended the laudable strides of NDDC. For instance, a notable chief stated at the commissioning of one the NDDC project:

> "I am happy the dream has come true... Today what I started a long time ago has come to stay. I think the NDDC is wonderful. What I have seen today really is greater than what I expected. NDDC has worked very hard and they in addition have shown that they are good in rallying people. I think we will need their services for a long time to come" (Ojukwu-Ogba 2009: 144).

Despite statements of this nature, the NDDC to date has continued to face the challenge of building confidence in the people and convincing them through its projects that the development of the area is a sincere, genuine and continuous process.

4.4.4.1 The Federal Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs

The creation of this ministry was yet another government effort to develop and, return the Niger Delta to peace. On 10 September 2008, the administration of the late President Yar'Adua created the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA) with a mandate to formulate, coordinate and execute policies for the development of the region (http://nigerdelta.gov.ng). As highlighted on its official website, the MNDA has the following mandate:

> "The mandate of the Ministry is to formulate and execute plans, programmes and other initiatives aimed at fast-tracking the development of the Niger Delta Region. In addition, the Ministry is supposed to be coordinating the activities of Government Agencies, Communities in the Area, International Development

> Partners (through the National Planning Commission), Donor Agencies and other relevant stakeholders involved in the development of the Region" (http://nigerdelta.gov.ng/index.php/the-ministry/history-of-mnda).

As the name implies, the sole aim and objective of the ministry was to see to the development of the region. Indeed, it is therefore another official government move in response to the concerns of the region. As highlighted in the history page of the ministry's website:

> "The establishment of a Ministry to handle the development of the Niger Delta Region is another attempt by the Government to solve the development issues and challenges, including the perceived sense of exclusion, environmental degradation, poverty, and unemployment in the Region" (http://nigerdelta.gov.ng/index.php/the-ministry/history-of-mnda).

Within the period of its existence, the ministry has executed several laudable developmental projects targeted to improve the deplorable state of the region. A report in its website indicates that the ministry has completed 16 Consultancy Capital Projects and 6 Construction Capital Projects across the entire region.

Table 4.15: Table of MNDA completed consultancy capital projects in Niger Delta 2009-2015

Project Location	State	Project Description
Okoritp Ibeno LGA	Akwa Ibom	Shoreline Protection Land Reclamation
Okoroette/Okoro Mbokho/Okoroitti Eastern Oobolo LGA	Akwa Ibom	Land Reclamation Shoreline Protection
Anyama, Ogbia LGA	Bayelsa	Land Reclamation Shoreline Protection
Famgbe-Atissa, Yenagoa LGA	Bayelsa	Shore Protection Land Reclamation
Town Brass, Brass LGA	Bayelsa	Shore Protection Land Reclamation
Torugbene Community	Bayelsa	Shore Protection Land Reclamation
Ekeremo Town	Bayelsa	Shore Protection
Ogbudugbudu-Tsekelewe Opuama, Warri.	Delta	Canalization
Akugbene community Bomade LGA	Delta	Shore Protection Phase 1
Ogbennama Town	Delta	Community Shore Protection Phase 1
Ozoro Isoko LGA	Delta	Flood Control Land Reclamation
Orasi River Odua, Abua Odua	Imo	Canalization
Arigbo Town	Ondo	Land Reclamation Shoreline Protection
Ode-Ugbo, Ilaje LGA	Ondo	Adagbakuja Sand Filling Phase 2
Ukparama New city Ese LGA	Ondo	Flood Control Land Reclamation
Sime, Tai LGA	Rivers	Shore Protection

Source: Researcher's compilation data adapted from http://nigerdelta.gov.ng/index.php/projects.

Tai is one of the five LGAs that make up Ogoniland and Sime is one of the communities in that LGA. As indicated in Table 4.15, MNDA completed only one consultancy capital project in Ogoniland and by extension, in Rivers State to date. By inference, citing the only project from the ministry to the state in Ogoniland denotes the centrality of developing the area to the government.

Despite these developmental efforts, the situation on the ground still shows poverty, underdevelopment and devastated environment representing a further pointer to the failure of the efforts to produce desired development of the region. In an interview with TELL Magazine of 18 February 2008, the former minister of State for energy (Petroleum) – Odein Ajumogobia suggested, "The Niger Delta people are facing double jeopardy – they are affected directly by the process by which oil is extracted and then the revenues that are derived from that are not re-employed even to restore the environment" (Tell Magazine 18 February 2008). It also lays credence to the fact that despite huge revenues generated from oil exploration activities and its subsequent negative impact, government failed to show seriousness in its efforts towards restoring or at least ameliorating the impact of these activities on the people and their environment. It further translates the inadequate government response and superficial involvement towards these issues, which exacerbate crisis concerns in the region.

4.4.4.2 The Military strategy and option in the Ogoni conflict

The autocratic military regime of the late head of state, General Sani Abacha, in the 1990s was at the heart of the resistance against Shell in Ogoni. The situation across the Delta was tense and volatile. It was a situation of conflict. The federal government drafted the military into Ogoni to quell the situation, which resulted in spates highly pervasive abuses of human rights (Manby 2012: 6, Odemene 2012: 335, Ukala 2010: 201). In this regard, the military government issued the ''Operation Order No. 4/94–Restoration of Law and Order in Ogoniland'' (Odoemene 2012: 336) on 21 April 1994 and as the name implies, it was a military order to return volatile Ogoniland back to peace (Odoemene2012: 237, Olowu, 2010: 86, Ukala 2010: 110).

The military incursion was supported from two fronts namely, the federal and state fronts. While the federal government sent troops directly into Ogoniland, the Rivers State government introduced troops through the Rivers State Internal Security Task Force (RSISTF) in support of the federal government (Ukala 2010: 119). The RSISTF created in 1994 documented reports of incessant harassment, arrests, detention and vicious extra-judicial of hanging particularly of MOSOP leaders [also known as the Ogoni nine, which included Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight of his kinsmen] and carried out series of retributive attacks in the community (Manby 2012: 5). They also instigated, promoted as well as aggravated in connivance with Shell, inter-communal violence between the Ogoni community and its neighbors (ibid).

According to Human Rights Watch (1995), the military government engaged in a clampdown on any form of opposition across the country. However, the report averred that "Shell's reliance on military protection" initiated the introduction of military in the conflict. Shell had enjoyed the protection of the state military governments in the 90s who are, by extension, also protecting her interest. The period in the 90s, which was at the heart of the agitation, was an inexorable spate of government military violent crushing of the hapless helpless and non-violent people of Ogoni and the Niger Delta (Aron 2005: 114).

Consequently, the Ogoni communities suffered unimaginable level of clampdown, suppression and varying degrees of human right abuses from the troops. So many Ogoni people lost their lives while others suffered various forms of abuses including rape, assault, intimidation, unlawful arrests and detention (Human rights watch 1995) in fragrant disobedience of the rule of law and respect for human rights (Ukala 2010: 110). For instance, human rights watch and the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO) (UNPO 2012, Human Rights Watch 1995) specifically reported the killing of Mr Anamakiri Tambari and Mr Wogobo Joseph, on their way to the farm. These were among several dozen perceptibly battered physically and structurally by the military at the time. Olowu (2010: 85) agrees that these atrocities were the visible "consequences of the patrimonial alliance between the State and Shell."

Often times, the most vulnerable species in the face of such violent and atrocious situation are the women and their children. Thus, research findings support this argument. For instance, research findings conducted by Odoemene (2012: 236) on the level of human rights abuses committed during military occupation of Ogoniland, indicted state violence as the greatest culprits of violence on women:

> "... out of 2,356 ''hits,'' that is the total number of times all the acts of violence were identified by our respondents, the security forces scored 1,112 or 47% ... Clearly, security forces were the villains in the Ogoni crisis. Fifty percent or more of respondents identified them as having committed 16 of the 19 acts of violence. Sixty percent or more identified them in 15 forms of violence against Ogoni

women, while 70% or more identified them in half of the cases. These are systematic rape (71%), killings (92%), sexual slavery (73%), beating (91%), and harassment (90%), destruction of property (89%), forced pregnancy (70%) and imprisonment (82%)."

He maintains that the worst scenario of women violation ever documented in Ogoniland was committed under the military operation led by federal troops and Rivers State apparatus, the RSISTF (ibid). Odoemene contended further that Ogoni women forcefully became victims of various dehumanising sexual abuses including rape. Others were flagrantly subjected to all manner of sexual harassment, sexually related intimidations, sex servitude and even forced prostitution (Ukala 2010: 110). Following from this, approximately 2 000 Ogoni men, women and children lost their lives, while more than 37 Ogoni villages suffered substantial damage, mostly of arson, which resulted to the internal displacement of over 300 000 Ogoni people (Johansen 2010: 4, Gedicks, 2001, 47).

Apart from these, there were several other reported cases of killing and deliberate abuses in other oil producing communities in the region by human rights watch. For instance, in Umuechem in Etche, for instance, more than 80 people lost their lives, massacred in cold blood and 495 houses destroyed by members of the Nigerian Mobile Police Force (NMPF) at the wake of the conflict (Cayford 1996: 189). The dexterity at which government demonstrate its poverty and bereft of proper conflict management strategy to the Niger Delta led to the deployment of military to Odi [another oil producing community in Bayelsa State] by the Obasanjo led administration on 20 November 1999 (Duru & Ogbonnaya 2012: 167-168). Again as expected, several lives of men, women and children of the predominantly Ijaw population, came to an abrupt end following indiscriminate shooting by the military (Duru 2010: 35). The massive use of military response to the Ogoni conflict in particular and the Niger Delta in general, was for a singular purpose of intimidation, suppression and repression of dissent emanating from the struggle in the area.

Government military response to the conflict unfortunately only strengthened and aggravated the growth of agitations, violent protests and armed conflict in the area (Okumagba & Okereica 2012: 280). Explicitly, the strategy paradoxically failed to serve the purpose for its engagement to the disappointment of the federal government. However, better-organized civil groups and well-coordinated armed militant agitation groups, which included MOSOP in Ogoni, sprouted in quick succession across the region against government anticipated forceful extinguish of the agitations (Olowu 2010: 82). Until date unfortunately, various forms of agitations in the Delta subsists irrespective of relative peace brought by the amnesty programme of the Yar'Adua administration. Regrettably, on the other hand, military incursion remained unabated in Ogoniland and the Delta until date.

In fact sometime in February 2016, Ogoni saw yet another military invasion. This time, under a democratic government, which circumstantially are putatively obligated to uphold, protect and advance the tents of human rights and guard against its abuse. According to a This Day Newspapers report of 25 May 2016 by Chinwo, the invasion left at least 20 people dead and scores injured. A UNPO publication places the figure at 15 persons (http://unpo.org/article/19105). According to Nwachukwu (2016: 1) 18 person actually lost their lives during the operation (Daily Post 03 March 2016). Ironically among the dead according to (Okocha 2016: 1), was an eight month old pregnant woman Mrs. Lesi Meyakau who lost her life by a stray bullet during the operation (https://www.today.ng/news/national/108702/reps-probe-alleged-military-offensive-ogoni-communities).

Although there were, conflicting reports on the number of lives lost in the operation, which the military repeatedly denied, the underpinning factor remain that lives were lost in the February military operation in Yeghe and Bori communities of Ogoni. This contemporary operation, the military clarifies, was in search of an ex militant leader, Solomon Ndigbara, alleged by the military to be hiding in either of the two Ogoni communities (ibid). As expected, series of condemnation has trailed this dastardly military act locally and internationally. From the local scene, the Chairman of Council of Ogoni Traditional Rulers (COTRA) condemned the operation in string terms "We accuse the army of dubious intentions and alert the Nigerian people and the international community of clear genocidal intentions against the Ogoni people and particularly the Yeghe people" (Chinwo 2016: 1).

4.4.5 Government mediation efforts

Apart from military engagement in Ogoni and across of Niger Delta, government have also adopted, introduced and facilitated several other conflict management strategies aimed at amicable resolution of the conflict in Ogoni in particular and the region in general. Some of which included the appointment of the Oputa panel, Reverend Father Mathew Hassan Kuka led reconciliation process, establishment of the Presidential Amnesty Programme (PAP) (Egwemi 2010: 136). Although the Amnesty programme and the Oputa panel were not specifically directed to Ogoni conflict per say, but they however are connected by the broader spectrum of their operations. The Amnesty programme for instance ostensibly concerns with the general disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of militant groups operating in the whole of Niger Delta. Overtly, by extension, militants within the Ogoni communities or operating in this area became part of this programme. A similar trend cuts across the remaining two mediation strategies.

4.4.5.1 The Oputa Panel

In 1999, the newly elected democratic government of Olusegun Obasanjo established the Human Rights Violation Investigation Panel, popularly known as the Oputa panel coined after the name of its leader, late Justice Chukwudifu Oputa (Odoemene 2012: 226). Apart from Oputa, six other members of the seven member panel are T. D. Ayelade as secretary, Reverend Father Mathew Kukah (now Bishop of Sokoto Diocese and hereafter addressed as such), Alhaji Ali Kura Michika, Mrs. Margaret Pam, Mallam Maman Daura (later replaced by Alhaji Adamu Lawal Bamalli), Madupe Areda and Tunji Abayomi (Aka 2013: 218). The Oputa panel was fashioned after the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, inaugurated to reconcile the brutality of human rights abuses perpetrated by the military before the dawn of democracy in 1999 (Aron 2005: 112).

The panel has a mandate to determine the nature and causes of abuses particularly of mysterious deaths and assassinations and attempted assassinations; (between 1966 and 1999) identify organisations or individuals who perpetrated those abuses; determine whether the abuses were a product of state policy; and recommend measures designed to redress these past injustices and prevent/forestall future violation (Aka 2013: 219). Therefore, the panel was a government instrument to address various degrees of human rights violation perpetrated in the country since the inception of the military in January 1966 to promote forgiveness, improve reconciliation and restore peace. Arguably, this approach was in contrast to the military strategy of repression and suppression.

Most of the worse human rights violation (Dokpesi & Ibiezugbe 2012: 89), perpetrated in Ogoni occurred under the military regimes in Nigeria. Hence, the membership of the panel deemed it necessary to invite former living military heads of state to testify as well as narrate their side of the story as it played under their various administrations. In this light, the panel subpoenaed Generals Muhamadu Buhari (who was military head of state from 1983-85 and the present day Nigerian democratically elected President whose administration commenced on 29 May 2015), Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida 1985-93 and Abdulsalami Abubakar 1998-99 to appear before the commission (ibid). Unfortunately, none of these past leaders honored these summons. The only living past military leader who appeared before this panel was General Olusegun Obasanjo.

The Ogonis were actively participatory, particularly when the opportunity to address the panel came there way. From Ogoni alone, the panel received nearly 10 000 petitions through Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People. During its hearing setting in Rivers State, the Ogoni people clearly highlighted its concerns particularly in relation to Shell and the effects of oil exploration. Issues of consistent and unlawful military repression, which culminated into unprecedented human rights abuses during the military occupation of the area also formed part there petition.

Along this trajectory, according to factsheet reports on Ogoni (2015: 1), MOSOP requested the Nigerian military to accept responsibility and consequently apologize for every human right abuse perpetrated by them from 1994-1998 when their occupation of Ogoniland was most intense. However, senior military officers representing Nigerian military at the panel denied any wrongdoing in the operations in Ogoniland during this period, the reports concludes. Regrettably, these substantiations by the military were nothing less than a comprehensive discomfiture to the entire fundamental principles of behind the establishment of the panel, which was to bring justice to numerous victims of military human rights abuses.

MOSOP disputed Shell's claim of proper and sufficient response to environmental issues in Ogoni. It also refuted the company's claim of adequate payment of compensation benefits to families of victims of oil spill and pipeline explosion accidents (Egwemi 2010: 135). Unfortunately, because of the defensive and unrepentant position assumed by Shell, desired conciliation became impossible at the time (Wheeler & Boele 2002: 302). The Ogonis maintained that the evidence produced by Shell were largely false, therefore remain bereft of sincere reconciliatory effort from the company (ibid). Even when the panel report sustained that several human rights abuses in Nigeria were the result of military incursion into politics (Hassan

& Olugbuo 2015: 131). However, because of these irregularities, this reconciliatory effort failed below expectations and ended in futility. In practical terms, the panel failed to yield any anticipated outcome. The open, transparent and practical process the panel adopted, failed to drive it to the conclusion of justice for the oppressed anticipated by majority of Nigerians. Even its recommendations have been neither published nor has any part of it been implemented by government until date. To this end, the Nigerian government cited the Supreme Court judgment in the case between Fawehinmi and Babangida as the impediment against the official release of the report (ibid).

There was also the government Arm-Buy-Back Program policy of 2004, which was intended to mop up illicit in arms circulation within Nigeria from the militia at the cost of N250,000 per gun (Davidheiser & Nyiayaana 2011: 46). Ironically, Davidheiser & Nyiayaana (2011: 45) argues that the pay-off cash aggravated the nefarious activities of the militants because it provided them an opportunity to access enough funds to acquire new and better weapons to perpetuate in their nefarious activities.

4.4.5.2 The Bishop Mathew Hassan Kuka reconciliation process

Following the dawn of democracy in Nigeria in 1999, government commenced the process of restructuring the system. Part of this process included introducing new legislation to increase revenue allocation to the oil producing regions. Unfortunately, it was difficult for the Ogoni people to equitably benefit from this gesture because oil production has remained suspended hence, precipitating oilfields in the area to lay dormant until date. This situation informed government's establishment of a reconciliation process to broker peace between the Ogoni people and Shell. It was in the light this according to This Day Newspaper report of 1 June 2005, that the federal government appointed Bishop Mathew Hassan Kukahon 31 May 2005 to facilitate this process (Osamgbi 2005: 3). One of the fundamental aspects of the process was the appointment of an impartial international agency to undertake an assessment and supervise the clean-up of the areas devastated by oil exploration across Ogoniland (UNEP 2011: 26).

4.4.6 Other Nigerian government conflict management strategies in Ogoni

Among other initiatives of the process were the commencement of Ogoni/UNEP dialogue and introduction of memorandum of understanding (MoU) to be signed between Ogoni people, Shell, UNEP and the Federal Government of Nigeria (Osamgbi 2005: 2, Ganago 2007: 1).

Unfortunately, this arrangement was not supported by MOSOP. Firstly, they insisted that the dialogue platform deprived them opportunity to ask questions, make reasonable contributions and comprehensively express themselves (Ganago 2007: 1). This forms part of complains spelt out in chapter five of the 2 November 2006 by the MOSOP: "Whither Ogoni-Shell Reconciliation". The then leader of MOSOP Mr. Ledum Mitee in an interview with Vanguard News Papers of 6 March 2007 further confirmed it in his statement when he said "We think that most times that you hear about dialogue, it is actually not dialogue. It is that someone wants to talk to you. And so, he calls you and says what he wants. He does not think that you have a say about what to do". It means that the process is bereft of proper and comprehensive community participation.

Secondly, MOSOP claimed that the key ingredients of an effective MoU was lacking in the MoU document prepared and presented to them by Bishop Hukah ((MOSOP 2006: 29). MOSOP insisted that if Bishop Kukah in a statement had said "the parties would be drawing up a memorandum of understanding, which would hold the Federal Government of Nigeria, Rivers state government, Ogoni people, Shell and UN legally bound to the fulfillment of the terms of agreement on the matter", it would be wrong for him to prepare the document without necessary consultations with the community. The MoU was intended to among other things facilitate Shell's return to operation in Ogoni (MOSOP 2008: 13). In addition, MOSOP in a press release on 27 February 2007 averred that MOSOP had never accepted nor discussed the return of Shell to Ogoni with Bishop Kukah hence; his statement in that direction was "insensitive, unfortunate and a huge joke". This goes further to illustrate an aspect of controversies shrouding the process.

Thirdly, MOSOP flawed what it termed the controversial clean up exercise undertaken by Shell prior to the signing of the proposed MoU. To this end, MOSOP argues that such unilateral action by Shell was in contrast to the process and tantamount to a move by the company to cover up its mess before the advent of UNEP (ibid). To them, the failure of the membership of the process and government in particular to stop Shell from this unholy exercise was indicative of their support to try to cover up their shame before the international community wades into the matter. MOSOP along this trajectory flawed the process as dubious and insisted that it lacked credibility and transparency. Therefore, under the prevailing circumstance at the time, MOSOP declined renounced and withdrew its participation in the process.

While the reconciliation process lasted towards the end of that year, it however ended in deadlock. Like most of previous government peace efforts, the inability of both parties to forge a common platform for reconciliation marred the process. Ogoni people represented by MOSOP believed that the process was in variance to their ideas of such process and hence not a proper reflection of a dialogue or discussion forum but rather a government instructive platform.

The process was however not a complete failure in essence. It recorded some reasonable level of success on certain issues it tried to resolve between the parties. One of these significantly fundamental successes was the initiation of the Ogoni clean up by UNEP (MOSOP 2006: 25). Ironically, certain irreconcilable issues briefly discussed above, asphyxiated the immediate commencement of Ogoni clean up.

4.4.6.1 The Federal Government's Niger Delta Amnesty Programme

In further search of lasting solutions and enduring peace to the Niger Delta conflict, the federal government under the leadership of the late President Umar Musa Yar'Adua created the Presidential Amnesty Programme (PAP) for the region. It was yet another government shot at enthroning peace in the Niger Delta following the failure of her other numerous efforts. For instance, the restricting and redesigning of the NDDC master plan and the creation of MNDA could not meet the aspirations of the people (Egwemi 2010: 138).

Interestingly, the fundamental motive behind amnesty is to reinstate peace and lay a firm foundation for prosperity. Therefore, it provides the bases for security and indeed reduces the incentives for the renewal of rebellious act. In general terms, amnesty is process, which a state grants pardon to persons or group of persons or individuals who appear to have committed certain offences against the state. It also reinstates such category of people to assume innocent status. Thus, PAP preceded the granting of amnesty to all groups or individuals who have been involved in any form of militancy in the region on 29 June 2009 (Davidheiser & Nyiayaana 2011: 45). These groups of people had a two-month grace period within which to renounce militancy, surrender their arms to escape prosecution, in exchange for their freedom, and to embrace the offer made by the federal government (ibid).

Amnesty does not only strive to pardon, it disarms, demobilizes, reintegrates, reconciles and reinstates the belligerent groups. Government structured the programme policy framework to sit on this tripod that would disarm, demobilize and effectively reintegrate militants into the system.

This system is also referred to as the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) policy fashioned in line with global practice (Obi 2016: 250, Davidheiser & Nyiayaana 2011: 46). Apart from representing an official presidential offer of unconditional pardon to these groups, the policy was also to remove them from disruption of oil production and to create access to the development of the region (Obi 2016: 250). Obi argues that the programme is a government political strategy to peaceful resolution and end to the lingering conflict in the region. The PAP was a move in line with part of the 7-point agenda of the Yar'Adua administration, which was to restore peace to the Niger Delta and an obvious response to international pressure and domestic elastic oil politics (Obi 2016: 251, Egwemi 2010: 137). In other words, it was an overt political reflection of the administration's campaign vouch as well as a government official administrative policy and programme.

Those who accepted the amnesty were placed under a daily stipend of about $13 provided by the federal government (Yang 2010: 6) or $255 per month (The Guardian Newspaper 6 August 2009: 5). With a population of about 30,000 enlisted ex-militants comprising of 26, 358 under President Umaru Musa Ya'Adua in 2009 and an additional 3, 642 under President Goodluck Jonathan in 2012, the government of Nigeria within this period have spent well over N243 billion as at 2014 on implementation of the programme (Vanguard Newspapers 18 February 2014: 2, This Day Newspapers 16 April 2016: 1). Out of this number, more than 7, 556 of beneficiaries are expected to graduate by the end of 2016 (This Day Newspapers 16 April 2016: 4). The good news is that 80 beneficiaries of this programme graduated in automobile engineering from a local automobile company known as Innoson KIARA academy located in Anambra State; one of the Niger Delta states (Premium Times 20 August 2016: 2).

Though these processes tend to be complex and tasking, experiences over the years have shown that it helps societies to transit from a confrontational condition to a more peaceful and progressive state. From a general perspective, PAP was a success story. If not for any other thing, it ostensibly restored palpable peace in the region in the past six years from its inception. This is part of the reasons PAP until date remains highly rated as the world's most successful demobilization programme ever conducted around the globe (Obi 2016: 252, the Guardian Newspapers 2 October 2011: 59-61). Secondly, as intended, PAP succeeded in removing and stopping the militants from disruption of oil production. Ithalted active conflict in the Niger

Delta from 2009 until the sprout of current militant group, Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) sometime in 2016 (Nnorom & Odigbo 2015: 210).Within this period, Nigeria's oil production increased significantly. With the successful takeoff of the programme in 2009 for instance, oil production rose from 800,000 to about 2.3 million barrels daily until recent disruptions by NDA (ibid). It has also provided thousands of ex-militant with special skills including among others piloting, ship building marine welding, automobile engineering and marine engineering (Nyulaku 2016: 7).

However, critics of the programme maintain that there is no physical evidence, which as yet have altered the status quo in the region to suggest it was a success. Yang (2010: 5) argues that irrespective of the fact that violence has been reduced in the area, the disarmament process failed to comprehensively disarm the region. He stated further that an estimated 15, 000 militant are yet to surrender their arms years after the disarmament. Unfortunately, the predictions of Yang regarding the disintegration of the PAP based on this fact is manifest in the current insurgent group terrorising the region under the name; NDA. In fact, most of the members of this militant group are dissatisfied with the terms of PAP.

Yet, it still appears that government seems not to have done enough in the areas of poverty reduction. Secondly and perhaps more importantly is to assert that amnesty programme in Nigeria seems not to have eliminated several dreadful conditions that necessitated its adoption. For instance, pockets of threat by former militants still point to the fact that the crisis is not yet over. This is important especially when put into consideration that cessation of hostilities and the end of vocalized or overt violence does not mean the achievement of peace (Nnorom & Odigbo 2015: 210). Nyulaku (2016: 3) argues that because the structuring of PAP was short sighted, it has only been able to provide training to the ex-militants in various disciplines around the globe but it has remained largely unable to neither create nor provide viable jobs for them after their training. Such unpleasant situation returns the ex-militants back to square one, which he predicts possess the potential of returning the region to lawlessness if nothing urgent is done to address the trend.

4.4.6.2 The United Nations Environmental Protection assessment

On the request of the federal government therefore, it became the responsibility of UNEP to conduct a comprehensive scientific environmental assessment of the whole land of Ogoni. The assessment would ascertain the level of environmental devastations decades of consistent oil spill had on ecological system (land, air, water, agriculture, vegetation, fisheries), of the area as well as to identify its impacts directly and indirectly on human health (Sholarin, and Awange 2015: 388, Alabi 2012: 164, Thiergärtner, & Holtzmann 2012: 26). As expected, the assessment made some astounding discoveries. Among these is the discovery of a terrifying level of hydrocarbon pollution in the Community. According a research findings in all the 49 land research sites tested, the depth of hydrocarbon was at five meters deep, and level of benzene concentration found in drinking water stands at a staggering 900 times higher than the recommended levels set by the World health Organisation (WHO) Gilberth (2013: 54, UNEP 2011: 187). This odious report simply implies that apart from the obviously polluted surface water, the underground water is highly polluted. Therefore, the idea of getting fresh drinking water from locally dug wells and mechanically drilled boreholes in Ogoni is in definite terms, inexistent.

The hazardous environmental condition faced by the Ogonis from the commencement of exploration in the community in 1958 until date and one of the principal reasons for their agitations. It also means that they people live with this life threatening condition every day of their lives, 365 days a year. The report identified three categories of people whose health and safety are mostly impacted by extreme exposure to crude oil to include: "those exposed to hydrocarbon pollution in their drinking water, including one community where benzene concentrations are extremely elevated, those living on oil pipeline rights of way, and those involved in bunkering and artisanal refining" (ibid: 214). Consequently, life expectance in the area is less the 50 years in average (ibid: 204).

Obviously, the UNEP assessment has clarified the inconceivable environmental conditions bedeviling one of the largest oil producing communities, Ogoniland, in the Niger Delta. The report not only identified but also highlighted the life threatening consequences of the hazardous environmentally polluted Ogoniland on its people. The report did not stop at this it further drafted some recommendations towards the quickest remediation, recovery and restoration of Ogoniland. Some of these recommendations are summarily discussed below.

4.4.6.3 UNEP recommendations

The UNEP result was presented to the federal government on the 4th of August 2011 and consequently the government constituted a response body namely Hydrocarbon Pollution

Restoration Programme (HYPREP) in the same year to effect the full recommendations of the report (Sholarin, and Awange 2015: 389). The fundamental recommendations of the report have its nexus around the remediation, clean up, restoration of Ogoniland. One of the most essential aspects of the UNEP report is the urgency of the clean-up and insistence on speedy implementation of its recommendations, which it emphasized a $1 billion first five year start-up fund for the sole purpose of environmental remediation. UNEP outlined these recommendations under six broad categories: Operational recommendations, technical recommendations, recommendations for follow-up monitoring, recommendations for public health, recommendations for changes to regulatory framework and recommendations for follow-up. At the operational level, the report recommended among others, the maintenance of oil field facilities, which it clearly indicated that Shell should undertake urgently to preclude further oil spills in the area. It also recommended Oil Spill Contingency Plan (OSCP) for a timeous response to oil spill whenever it occurs and insisted that Shell discontinue its remediation by enhance natural attention (RENA) programme.

Its technical recommendations include the cleanup of contaminated soil and sediment. To this end, UNEP recommended combination approach to achieve this fit owing to the "diverse nature of hydrocarbon pollution". In this regard, recommendations for the establishment of an Integrated Contaminated Soil Management Centre (ICSMC) took priority. The center should comprise of such facilities as incinerator, thermal desorption, soil washing, contaminated water treatment, Waste oil treatment, and contaminated cell units. The most interesting aspect of this recommendation is that the ICSCM is in form of a modern industry, which once established according to the report, would create jobs for hundreds of Ogoni indigenes outside its fundamental purpose of serving as contaminated soil treatment center. It also recommended the rehabilitation of all decapitated mangroves in Ogoni.

Furthermore, the report advanced some follow up monitoring strategies, which would encompass three objectives that will: "monitor ongoing pollution in all environmental segments, track the impacts on the health of communities exposed to hydrocarbon pollution, especially those exposed over many years, and track the progress of all clean-up projects and provide documentation to support their effectiveness" (UNEP 2011: 215). The aim of this recommendation is to ensure prompt access and reportage of oil spills whenever it occurs. It was also for early identification of potential spill threatening conditions on oil facilities and from imminent damage threat.

Again, the report identified weak institutional framework as one of the impeding factors negatively influencing the cleaning up Ogoni. In this regard, UNEP advanced specific recommendations that will strengthen existing legislative institutions insofar as effective implementation remains sacrosanct. It postulated that transferring the oversight regulatory functions of Environmental Guidelines and Standards for Petroleum Industry in Nigeria (EGASPIN) to the Federal Ministry of Environment would be a step in the right direction in providing the ministry with enough bite when dealing with oil companies and environmental pollution, degradation and devastation. Further recommendation seeks changes in the operation of the regulation:

i, "Make the provision for social and health impact assessment an integral part of the overall environmental impact assessment (EIA) process for all new oil and gas facilities and upgrades to existing facilities, in line with international best practice;

ii, clarify the approach to be taken for clean-up of oil spills and other contaminated land, giving clear guidance on remediation criteria and realistic timeframes within which remediation has to be achieved;

iii, clarify the present inconsistency between 'intervention value' and 'target value' should such an approach continue to be adopted;

iv, include guidance on decommissioning and the environmental due diligence assessment to be undertaken while completing the decommissioning process;

v, Add new guidance on: (a) surface water quality management; (b) ambient air quality; and (c) mangroves and coastal vegetation Ensure all provisions of the regulation are internally consistent with one another" (UNEP 2011: 218).

The aim of this summary elucidation was to highlight the salient but very critical aspects of the recommendations of the UNEP report. This becomes necessary for this study because it will buttress analytical arguments in chapter six regarding government efforts at implementing the recommendations of the report. It will also facilitate an understanding to what extent government has gone in implementing the recommendations of the report. This will further assist in presenting a more vivid account of how government has fared. The step therefore becomes pivotal since the report discovered and equally clarified that the "responsibility for the pollution, and the failure to properly clean up the area..., rest with the Government of Nigeria and the oil company, Shell" (Amnesty International 2014).

4.4.6.4 Shell and UNEP recommendations implementation efforts

Unlike the federal government of Nigeria, Shell as at April 2014 had indicated in one its briefs released on its website (shell.org.ng) that it has undertaken leadership role ahead of the Nigerian government on a variety of issues directly addressed to it by the report and succeeded in remediation of all contaminated sites identified:

> "SPDC has taken action on all the UNEP recommendations directed specifically to it. All of the 15 sites identified in the report have been remediated and certified by regulators where further remediation was required, although there has been re-contamination from pipeline sabotage and oil theft in some cases. SPDC has completed an inventory and physical verification of assets in Ogoniland for decommissioning purposes. SPDC has shown leadership by undertaking a range of activities related to the UNEP report in advance of the government, where it was able to do so. This included increasing community access to potable water in Ogoniland. In partnership with the Rivers State Government (RVSG) SPDC immediately began work to provide 250,000 liters a day of potable water to those communities whose water was found to be contaminated. These supplies started two weeks after the report was published. SPDC and RVSG also embarked on a project to construct permanent piped water distribution facilities. The Elemi Regional Water Supply Project is a 450,000-liter [or 115, 851. 56 gallons] capacity facility with potential to serve an estimated 30,000 people a day (see picture), was completed and commissioned in August 2013" (Shell in Nigeria the UNEP report 2014).

4.4.6.5 Nigerian Government and UNEP report implementation efforts

The UNEP assessment was yet another strategic effort of the federal government to rebuild its fast dwindling image in terms of its numerous failed promises and attempts to develop and clean up Ogoniland to preclude the recurrence of conflict in the area. The federal government obviously is looking for an avenue to reinstate in Ogoni people the confidence that government possesses the capacity, capability, willingness and sincerity to bring lasting solution to their concerns. Thus, implementing the ground breaking and generally accepted UNEP report became new-fangled opportunity exploited by federal government to demonstrate its renewed interest in enthroning lasting peace, a healthy environment for the Ogoni people. It also becomes a new channel to explore discussions on possible recommencement of oil exploration in the community (Alabi 2012: 163) after years of failure.

Five years after the release and formal presentation of the UNEP report to the federal government of Nigeria, the current President Muhamadu Buhari launched the takeoff of the clean-up of Ogoniland on 2 June 2016 (The Nation Newspapers 05 August 2016). During the inauguration of board members of the Ogoni Trust Fund in Abuja on 04 August 2016, President Buhari reiterated on this time: "Five years on, the project is yet to properly take off. It would appear to have experienced a series of false starts, while the local communities continue to suffer from the problem, which has existed long before the report. This all adds to the picture described in the UNEP Report as 'a landscape characterised by a lack of trust, paralysis and blame" (ibid).

This was a welcome development across the globe and a credit to the incumbent Buhari administration, which is making concerted effort to fulfill its campaign promises to implement the recommendations of the UNEP report and clean-up Ogoni. The Vice President of Nigeria re-reaffirmed during the launch that "the Nigerian government is now delivering on what was one of President Buhari's key election promises" (UNEP news center 2016).

To UNEP who had criticized Nigerian government ineptitude towards the implementation of its recommendations, the development was long overdue and deserving historic step to improve Ogoni. At the occasion, UNEP Executive Director Mr. Steiner said,

> "The people of Ogoniland have paid a high price for the success of Nigeria's oil industry, enduring a toxic and polluted environment for decades. Today marks a historic step toward improving the situation of the Ogoni people, who have paid this high price for too long. A clean-up and restoration effort like this cannot happen overnight, but I am hopeful that the cooperation between the Government

of Nigeria, oil companies and communities will result in an environmental restoration that benefits both ecosystems and the Ogoni people of the Niger Delta. UNEP has provided the scientific basis for this work, and will continue to offer its technical expertise as needed to help ensure a positive result for all involved." (UNEP News center 2016).

However, the delay before the launch of the clean-up exercise increased the doubts on government claim of seriousness and sincerity speedy implementation of the report. In 2014, Amnesty International through its website had expressed dismay on the delay on the part of Nigerian government and oil company Shell to implement the UNEP report recommendations (Amnesty International 2014). The immediate past administration of former President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan between 2009 and 2015 did little or nothing towards the implementation of the UNEP report. After officially receiving the report in August 2012, the only notable move made by the administration was the establishment and appointment of the members of HYPREP (Senewo 2015: 668). Undoubtedly, the Jonathan administration lacked any show of pragmatism towards the implementation of UNEP report. In fact, the issue of UNEP implementation under this administration was a matter highly politically touted paradoxically, without overt matching action. According to a report by Nwachukwu published in the Daily Post Newspapers on Friday 8 July 2016, a group known as the Concerned Niger Delta Elders, (CNDE) led by Chief Ekayama Loyibo reiterated the support of the people of Niger Delta to the achievements of Buhari administration within a short time compared to the Jonathan regime. Chief Loyibo stated that:

"Our position is that Buhari means well for the Niger Delta region going by the steps he has so far taken. From what he has so far done, it is clear to us and other well-meaning Niger Delta people that Buhari is genuinely interested in the development of the area and should be encouraged by all to achieve his set agenda for the region. If you compare what Buhari has done for the Niger Delta region with what our son and brother, Goodluck Jonathan, did for six and a half years, you will agree that Buhari has done better in one year" (Nwachukwu 2016).

Also in furtherance of its commitment to clean up Ogoniland, the Buhari Administration on the 04 August 2016 inaugurated Ogoni Trust Fund (OTF) as an organ of HYPREP that will drive the clean-up. The OTF is a Board of Trustees (BoT) body trusted with ensuring efficient, effective and transparent use of the clean-up funds. A former minister of finance in Lagos State Mr. Wale Odun heads the BoT. According to Ehikioya's report on the nations Newspaper 05 August 2016, President Buhari made the following statements during the inauguration in Abuja:

> "Today marks another milestone in the commitment that this administration has made in ensuring the implementation of the UNEP Report in Ogoniland and other impacted sites. This is a very important endeavour that has direct impact on the lives and livelihood of our brothers and sisters whose environments have been severely degraded by years of unchecked pollution from oil exploration activities. It is exactly five years today, on the 4th of August 2011, the UNEP submitted an extensive report on its environmental assessment of Ogoniland. That report, which was commissioned by the administration of former President Olusegun Obasanjo did not only document the problems that existed, but also contained recommendations on how they can be addressed, both in the short and long terms.Five years on, the project is yet to properly take off. It would appear to have experienced a series of false starts, while the local communities continue to suffer from the problem, which has existed long before the report. This all adds to the picture described in the UNEP Report as 'a landscape characterised by a lack of trust, paralysis and blame."

4.4.7 Summary

This section discussed Shell Petroleum development Company and Nigerian government conflict management as well as mediation strategies to address the concerns of the Ogoni people and across the Niger Delta region. The section argues that both Shell and Nigerian government have not done enough to address issues leading to conflict, issues militating against proper management of conflict and issues disrupting effective management of post conflict situations to preclude recurrence. It was also demonstrated that the ineffectiveness of OMPADEC, NDDC and MND contributed to the persistence and recurrence of conflict in the region. Furthermore, the section equally showed that further mediation efforts such as the Oputa panel and Bishop Kuka reconciliation process failed to return Ogoniland to peace. Although, the NAP made some serious inroads to restore peace, there is glaring incapacity and lack of a comprehensive erasure of conflict in Ogoni. The section also emphasized that government's ineptitude and sluggish response towards implementing UNEP recommendations, reactivated conflict palpably doused by NAP in Ogoniland. This section finally highlighted the commencement of the Ogoni clean up by the current democratic government.

4.4.8 Conclusion

This chapter presented a full discussion on the 2 Case studies: Lonmin Company Pty in Marikana, South Africa and Shell Petroleum Development Company Ltd, in Nigeria. The chapter, in sections, presented discussions which covered the historical backgrounds of both case studies, their conflict management efforts before, during and after the Marikana and Ogoni conflicts, individually. The chapter also presented a similar discussion on conflict management efforts of governments of South Africa and Nigeria in the Marikana and Ogoni conflicts respectively. Each of the sections ended with a section summary and the chapter ended with a chapter conclusion. The next chapter will be data presentation.

Chapter Five: Comparative data presentation and analysis

5.1 Introduction

This chapter will focus on comparative data analysis. Data collected from both Marikana and Ogoni respondents will be presented and comparatively analysed. The chapter will begin with a brief overview which will be a discussion demonstrating the connections between discussion of previous chapters with the data and comparative analysis. Thereafter, data presentation and comparative analysis from the 2 Case Study will be done at three levels; before, during and after the Marikana and Ogoni conflicts respectively. The chapter will end with a conclusion.

5.2 Brief overview

Arguably, the Marikana and Ogoni conflicts resulted from the desire of the people directly affected by the negative consequences of mining activities to try to compel principal stakeholders to address their demands adequately (Botiveau 2014, Muawaka 2014, Rapatsa 2014, Alexander 2013, Bur 2013, Ledwaba 2013, McKenzie 2013, Leon 2012, Umeh 2012, Obi, 1997, Oboreh 2010, Ojakorotu 2010, Omotola 2010, Ejibunu 2007). The literature review shows that in both situations, scholars such Adelman 2015, Bradshaw & Haines 2014, Soifer 2012, differ in their views about the Marikana conflict while scholars such as Umeh 2012, Umukoro 2010, Agbonifor 2004 also differed in their perspectives about the Ogoni conflict. Ranging from the causes of the conflicts, the responses of the principal stakeholders, to the conflict management approaches, scholars have displayed an array of opinions. Depending on the scope of this study which is on the Marikana and Ogoni conflicts, the views of each researcher will be analytically used to comparatively affirm the position of the researchers. The analysis will link the views from literatures (secondary data) and views of respondents (primary data) with the views of the research in a comparative analysis presented hereunder. Since the aim of this study is to investigate and compare conflict management approaches adopted in both conflicts, understanding the broader perspective to these approaches requires a broader interrogation beyond the literature reviewed.

The researcher undertook to interview various groups of participants outlined in table 3.1 and 3.2. The essence of these interviews was to probe deeper with an intention to extract the views and experiences of those affected by the Marikana and Ogoni conflicts. The participants were ready consequently they voluntarily expressed their views during the interview sections. The interview was both illuminating and educative because the participants presented divergent views in their responses to the interview questions. Some of the responses were very revealing and exposed certain factual accounts unknown to the researcher but very relevant to the study. Some of these dynamics shed more light on what informed the conflicts and the conflict management approaches adopted in both conflicts.

These views drawn from participant in both cases under study were presented distinctively in two parts; the first part presents the Marikana case study while the second part focuses on the Ogoni case study. Thereafter, the comparative analysis of conflict management approaches of both conflicts follows. Grouping of experiences did not follow the same pattern explained above. However, the experiences from these perspectives are aggregated and discussed under the following themes:

- Perspectives on conflict (Marikana and Ogoni)
- Perspectives on triggers of conflicts (Marikana and Ogoni)
- Reasons and reliability on police intervention strategy in the Marikana conflict
- Reasons and reliability on military intervention strategy in the Ogoni conflict
- Effectiveness and efficiency of other conflict management approaches in the conflict
- Similarities and differences in conflict management approaches (Marikana and Ogoni)

These themes were formed based on the scope of this research on Marikana and Ogoni conflicts. The themes covered various areas already discussed in previous chapters of this research and most especially preceding discussions in this chapter. By inference, the analysis of this study revolves around these themes, which are in line with the research questions. The transcribed version of participants' responses also reflects in the discussions under various themes. Furthermore, certain responses remain as quoted by the participants, thus, such are clearly indented. In addition, paraphrasing of some quotes became necessary for clarity in other to extract their meanings.

To protect the identity of the participants, the researcher used two codes to represent participants of both case studies. Each code represents each case study. While these codes replace names of the participants, the number after the code represent serial number of the participant. The numbers on the codes are therefore further identifications for each participant. For instance, the Marikana site general code is MFP. Hence, for easy identification of each of the participants, a serial number follows the code hence the code will read thus, MFP 1, MFP 2, MFP 3 to MFP 12. The Ogoni site follows similar trend, however, its general code is OFP. For further clarification, the researcher formulated the general codes against the names of both sites. Consequently, MFP means Marikana field participant, while OFP represent Ogoni field participants.

5.3 Views from Marikana: South Africa

5.3.1 Perspectives on conflict

The participants from Marikana displayed a good understanding of the concept of conflict. The word 'disagreement' featured prominently in the answers from the respondents presented hereunder about conflict. The general connotation is that conflict is a form of disagreement between two or more people. MFP 4 describes conflict with the following words:

> "Depending from which point of view, you would like to take it from, but ordinarily we describe conflict as a situation where we have two or more parties that are in disagreement. May be contest over resources, may be contest over identity issues. It varies from the point, which the disagreement actually arose. Nevertheless, generally one can be defined as conflict as disagreement between two parties over a certain aspect of their lives" (MFP 4: 2016).

For participant MFP 10 "conflict means there is disharmony, disagreement, a clash of ideas or actions and may manifest itself openly, like a war or it could be covert and subtle." MFP 5 says conflict is "lack of agreement between two that resulting hatred, killings and fight parties..." Implicitly, the causative variables to conflict centered on disagreement. In other words, disagreement situation between parties possesses potentials capable of conflict.

5.3.2 Perspectives on triggers of conflict: The root causes of Marikana conflict

The views of our participants highlight the general disdain that revolves around wage concerns existing in South Africa mining industry and at Lonmin in particular. MFP 10 said that the causes of the Marikana conflict have its roots in wage disparity existing in the mines across the Republic. His perspective was that the:

"Conflict was a clash between mine labourers who continue to receive measly wages when mining bosses gets rewarded with handsome pay checks in an economic environment that has taken a turn for the worse and mineworkers wanted their voices hear. The police on the other hand, seemed trigger happy and ill-equipped to deal with conflict situations" (MFP 10 2016).

One clarification made in this statement is that wage disparity has a history of long existence at Lonmin Pty. It reveals that the issue has not received adequate attention it deserves from the company. In a similar manner, MFP 13 reacted thus: "It was not an overnight problem. The mining industry itself is a ticking time bomb. Unfair labour practices and low pay are the main issues. The dishonesty of unions and greed by mining companies also contributed." (MFP 13). Similarly, further reaction from MFP 6 underscores the centrality of wage disparity to the conflict. However, MFP 6 notes that the fact of profit maximization, which is central to multinational companies globally, beclouded Lonmin judgmental ability to perceive the seriousness of existing wage disparity in the company. Hence, MFP 6 argues that it contributed to their inability to accord the issue adequate attention to address it, which by extension leads to undue exploitation of the mineworkers. MFP 2 affirms and describes this scenario as "capitalism at high degree."

5.3.3 Reasons and reliability of police intervention strategy in the Marikana conflict

Reponses from participants MFP 7, 8, 9, 12, 13 and 10 unearthed what appears as covert reasons behind government choice of intervention in the Marikana conflict. Accordingly, participant MFP 7 refers to this reasons as the 'behind the scene factors'. He stated as follows:

"What informed the introduction of the police in Marikana was the function of a mixture of variables. The most important of all being what I call behind the scene factors. These are factors not visible to us the masses, but they are highly influential factors in terms of government policies. The fact is that those in government are shareholders in Lonmin therefore; positions them as people who have a stake to defend to stay afloat. So, they used what they have; the police, to do so without minding what will be the consequences on the people. Of course, our people lost their lives; 44 of them just because they voiced out their problems for the world to see the treatment they are getting for working at the mine.

Unfortunately, that option was wrong because the mineworkers did no posse any threat to public peace when the shooting occurred. How would you kill people just like that without any serious reason? So like I said, the behind the scene factor that pushed them into using the SAPS to kill the mineworkers is the defence of their personal or selfish interest in Lonmin" (MFP 10 2016).

The above statement illustrates that government used police as a cynical way to defend and protect selfish interests of those in power who have serious business acquaintances with Lonmin. To bolster this claim further, MFP 4 argued that while it remained the responsibility of government to maintain public law and order, the case of Marikana was a government action informed by selfish interests of those in power and those who have stakes in the company. He emphasized that:

"It is the responsibility of the state to maintain public law and order but at the same time, the government involvement might have been influenced by an individual who is currently the Deputy President of South Africa. This is because if you take into cognizance the relationship between public policy and government action, you will notice that most government action are not influenced by those occupying official positions in government but those that have the means of production in terms of capital. They also have huge stake in influencing government activities and actions. This has been more of personal interest as opposed to state interest. So, it was a government action influenced by personal interest of certain individuals specifically, those that are executives within the mining industry" (MFP 4 2016).

Participants MFP 7 and 4 expose different but important information that unearthed the conundrum behind government choice of such strategic option at Marikana. Their responses demonstrate the unholy connection between certain government policies and actions and selfish interests as opposed to public interest and concerns. It also shows that the police option in the Marikana conflict was wrong hence, it was a tactical failure towards addressing the situation on ground at Marikana at that moment. Furthermore, the reposes reveal that the strategy had no connection with issues raised by mineworkers nor was it a palliative measure to those concerns. MFP 5 reinforces this point thus: "The timing was wrong. Yes, there were casualties but that did not warrant the use of force at that time. Miners who had assembled at the Kopjes looked peaceful and posed no threat at that time. The police intervention lacked crowd management plan". MFP 8, 9 and 12 agrees to these perspectives. On a further confirmatory note but outlining the reason why the option failed, MFP 13 said that:

> "The deployment of the Tactical Response Team was a strategic mistake because they are not trained to disperse crowd but are trained for armed response. However, the when they started killing people, the situation turned from strike scene to crime scene. Therefore, it still is the responsibility of the police not Tactical Response Team to ensure peace and order. Remember, in any mass action, police have to be present" (MFP 13: 2016).

However, MFP 10 attaches government intervention strategy to the *cliché* that government wanted to prove to investor; "that South Africa is safe for businesses" (MFP 10). He explained that; "it looks like government wanted to show investors that South Africa was a safe destination for their monies and that it had the requisite capacity to maintain law and order" (MFP 10).

5.3.4 Effectiveness and efficiency of other conflict management approaches in the conflict

From the responses of our participants other Lonmin and government efforts equally failed to be effective approaches to address the numerous essential demands of the mineworkers. MFP 13 asserts emphatically that government management efforts were comprehensive representations of "good intentions, bad decisions". He insisted that:

> "Government policies sound beautiful to the ears but when it comes to implementation, unfortunately, wrong people are chosen. Hence, this hampers effective service delivery to the people. On the part of Lonmin, I would say that they too failed. Lonmin neglected advances for negotiation by the mineworker and this would have prevented the loss of lives. In addition, the company did not do well in terms of providing good accommodation for its workforce. The workers live in shacks and dilapidated buildings as homes with their families. Even the hostels Lonmin provided are inhabitable and the company and government has failed to provide these workers and other mineworkers in the country with decent accommodations despite huge amount of money the mining

industry generates for the country on [a] daily basis. How will they [miners] be happy?" (MFP 13: 2016).

Inferring from this respondent, Lonmin inability to grab negotiation overtures from the striking workers showed their ineptitude concerns of the workers and a complete lack of proper conflict management techniques in the company. Secondly, Lonmin's inability to provide its workers with decent accommodations exemplifies the level of seriousness the company attached to satisfactory performance of its Social Labour Plan statutory obligations towards the workers and the host community. The implication is that government and Lonmin failed to enforce successfully the strategic tenets of Social Labour Plan, which is to preclude recurrence of conflict traceable to the issues the Social Labour Plan stands to address. Again, this point of view connects with the discussions in chapter four where the research demonstrated that Lonmin failed in its Social Labour Plan to provide decent housing for its employees (Marikana Commission of Inquiry 2016, McKenzie 2013:161,) Land clearly, buttresses the point of this research made therein.

MFP 5 hinted that other Lonmin and government efforts also fell below expectations and thus, explained they were:

> "Very poor because they lack in integrity, neutrality, credibility and honesty. I say this because Lonmin until today has not showed nor provided any serious approach towards addressing these problems raised by their workforce during the strike and this will lead to another strike very soon if they continue like this. The workers still don't have good living homes, proper wage packages and better working conditions underground. People are still dying underground until today. Lonmin claimed it has converted enough hostels to bachelor homes to accommodate its workers but this is not true. If you provide comfortable homes, if I should that word, provide accommodation to less than 10 per cent of your total workforce, would that translate to providing decent accommodation to your workers in a strict sense. The answer is no and that is what you find in Lonmin until today. It means that Lonmin is neglecting its responsibility in terms of Social Labour Plan. Even the government has been biased from the beginning they have failed to compel Lonmin to perform its obligatory duties. Therefore, I would say

> that their approaches are complete a waste of time and are deceitful" (MFP 5 2016).

Respondent MFP 5, just like MFP 13, emphasized the woeful failure of Lonmin and government management efforts after the conflict at Marikana. However, while the views of MFP 13 was more on providing housing for the workers, MFP 5 focused on the challenges of poor working conditions faced by the workers. To this end, the participant insisted that the management approach adopted by the company could not be credible because the implementation lacks neutrality, which questions the integrity and honesty behind it.

MFP 15 believed that the failure of conflict management efforts of government and Lonmin arose from the combined effects of non-availability of variables that accentuate on means of subsistence and the consequences of capitalism:

> "Unfair distribution of resources such as salaries, living and working conditions, which typifies oppression originating from capitalism. Capitalism is an avenue for workers exploitation and oppression hence, the sole of capitalism is profit maximization. Government, who are supposed to intervene to stop this exploitation unfortunate are shareholders of the company and this incapacitates them from performing its duties as government. Apart from this, you should remember that platinum is one of the largest foreign income earners of the country of which Lonmin is the largest producer. Therefore, government tends to indulge them to continue production. Hence, I say that government treat Lonmin's SLP with laxity at the expense of the workers and the host communities. This is corruption. Until such a time these issues are properly addressed. both stakeholders will continue to fail to preclude conflict in the sector" (MFP 11 2016).

Drawing further inference from this analogical argument, MFP 11 clarifies failure from two perspectives. For Lonmin, MFP11 emphasized that the negative influence of capitalism prevented the company from advancing reasonable and acceptable pay packages for its workers. MFP 11 calls this as workers exploitation. From the government perspective, MFP 11stressed that the unfortunate business connections between government and the company remain an impediment preventing government from performing its constitutional duties particularly as it concerns the company. However, MFP 11 posits that adequately addressing this misnomer; will pave a new and better way forward towards precluding conflict recurrence in South African mining sector.

However, MFP 10 comes from a perspective detailing government and Lonmin approaches as lowly, poor and ineffective. MFP 10 iterated that the government and Lonmin approaches were:

> "Very poor, lowly and not effective. Firstly, there was no sustained effort to engage the protesting mineworkers and it looks like the attack on the mineworkers was unprovoked. Secondly, government failed to respect the fact that the mineworkers were demanding for their rights, which has been trivialised by Lonmin over the years. The company also failed in its SLP responsibility. One, Lonmin could not provide adequate and comfortable housing for the mineworkers. Two, Lonmin refused to make their working environment underground safe. These people work under terrible conditions down there yet the company did nothing. Three, despite the hard work, the terrible environment they work in underground and the amount of money they generate for this country, they are paid peanuts. Why? Yet, government supported them by killing the workers. So, in terms of these points of view, government and Lonmin could not be said to have managed the situation very well. Before the strike it was this story, after the strike, it is still the same story. Nothing has significantly changed and this is four years now. When will the situation change?" (MFP 10 2016).

The inferences from this point of view again portray government and Lonmin management efforts in the light of incompetence and ineffectiveness. He affirms that Lonmin failed to improve working and living conditions as well as increasing the pay packages of its works, and these by implication translates into unsuccessful management effort by the company.

5.4 Views from Ogoni: Nigeria

5.4.1 Perspectives on conflict

The information gathered during the Ogoni respondents revealed divers opinions regarding their understanding of the word conflict. These views are reflected in the data presented below. All the participants OFP 1 to OFP 15, possessed reasonable knowledge of the concept of conflict as explained to them. Their perspective of conflict is that it is a situation of disagreement and argument particularly between two or more parties. For instance, in the words of the journalist OFP 1:

> "Conflict is serious disagreement and argument about something important and have not yet reached agreement" (OFP 1 2015).
>
> "From my perspective, I see it, as some issues of disagreement between two parties, two communities on particular issues that border on their interest they are unable to have a common position on" (OFP 11 2015).
>
> "Clash of interests. It is a disagreement based on interest" (OFP 8 2015).
>
> "Conflict is disagreement, struggle, clash or contest between people with opposing needs, beliefs, ideas, opinions and principles" (OFP 10 2015).

A lecturer at University of Port Harcourt, (UNIPORT) Rivers State, participant OFP 3, described conflict:

> "As a disagreement between two or more persons/parties where there is incompatibility in interests and goals between the parties" (OFP 3 2015).

Emphatically, these elucidations reflect characteristics similar to those enunciated in the definition of conflict presented in Chapter 2. The chapter gave various definitions of conflict according to Wallenstein 2012: 16, Anstey 2008: 5 and Thomas 1992: 265. The similarity indexes are very close. Thus, based on the views of these authors discussed in chapter two, the central arguments of the participants are that conflicts are consequences of unresolved disagreement over particular issues. Furthermore, that conflicts squares between persons or groups. Finally, those conflicts are reactions from consequences of covert and overt actions that threaten economic, sociocultural and political interests of the other party to a relationship. In contrast, it also implies that conflicts cannot present themselves in the absence of the causative variables particularly, of those outlined above.

5.4.2 Perspectives on triggers of conflict

Similarly, discussions on the causes of Ogoni conflict were in Chapter 4 (see pp. 84-103). When the participants were asked the question: 'In your personal opinion, what do you think are the root causes of Ogoni conflict'? The responses were clear, succinct and straight to the point. The reasons were simple. They participants exhibited cognitive experiences of what really transpired. By virtue of the fact that some of the participants are indigenes of Ogoni, responding to this question became simple. Secondly, responses from some of the participants who were not of Ogoni origin but worked in various government establishments and were cognitive of the Ogoni situation, were equally phenomenal. Their views buttressed literary claims on some of the causes of the Ogoni conflict discussed in chapter four.

Along this trajectory, participant OFP 13 responded thus:

> "I believe that the cause of the conflict in Ogoniland is Shell Petroleum Development Company. Because we believe that Shell is not doing what they are supposed to do for us that is why we are having conflict in the land" (OFP 13 2015).

A community leader, participant OFP 12 declared that:

> "The root cause is that we are not given what is due to us. How can a man enter into another person farm harvest and repeatedly sell the farm produces from there without balancing account or giving the owner of that farm something. The owner must feel cheated. That was how we felt and it resulted in the protest" (OFP 12 2015).

The elucidation of an evangelist and church representative who is our participant OFP 14 buttresses this point thus:

> "The root causes of Ogoni conflict generated from natural resources, which they have been tapping from the land without paying due compensation to the Ogoni people" (OFP 14 2015).

The inferences from these participants are clear. Their views portray a picture of neglected community and people. It brings out the bitterness that comes with decades of neglect from an oil company, which failed in its obligatory duties to the host community. Another illustration is that Ogoni conflict is a result of decades of endured frustration originating from the consequences of oil exploration.

Participant OFP 3 indicated that the causes of Ogoni conflict are, "Loss of livelihood and poor corporate social responsibility by the oil company". It implies that since income of majority of Ogoni people is subsistent on farming, environmental degradation because of oil exploration destroys these sources and by extension, their means of livelihood. It also illustrates that Shell is lethargic in its corporate social responsibility toward ameliorating the effects of their activities on the people as well as the development of the community. The research argues that this assertion has a link to one of the company's non-cooperative manner regarding the concerns of their host community. Evidence of this assertion could be found in Osha 2005: 11Obi 2002: 28, Frynas 1998: 463.

However, participant OFP 5 who is an environmental activist revealed an aspect of the cause of the conflict not discussed in chapter three. He said that Shell adopted malicious propaganda as a deception and blackmailing tool to divide the people. In his words, 'divide and rule system'. He expresses further that the Ogoni conflict escalated when Shell wrongly informed the federal government about the Ogoni conflict and this led to the introduction of the military into the situation. Participant OFP 14 buttressed this assertion further: "....Since they came into the land in 1958, they have not been taking care of the people how it is supposed to be. Shell has been cheating on Ogoni people. They have been using on group of people or persons or chiefs or group of chiefs against their subjects in a divide and rule manner". This assertion represented itself in the responses of participants OFP 1 and OFP 2.

Furthermore, the MOSOP public relations officer (PRO), our participant OFP 11, summarises that the causes of the conflict principally originated from three broad thwarting areas, which he termed the 'three pillars' to the conflict. To this end, OFP 11 said that the three pillars are "Economic strangulation, environmental degradation and political strangulation". Intertwining the environmental and economic angles, the respondent elucidates that environmental consequences of oil exploration, destroyed the means of livelihood of Ogoni people and therefore intensified poverty in the land, increased frustration in the people and led to agitations and conflicts. OFP 11further indicated that the marginalization and neglect suffered by the Ogoni people extended to politics and this has left them politically unrepresented. In fact, his angle of argument shows that the three pillars formed the thwarting foundations that gave sprout to the Ogoni conflict.

Hence, along this line, this research found out that some of the most conspicuous sources of the Ogoni conflict arguably, revolves around the fundamental pillars of economic strangulation, environmental degradation and political strangulation. Although another lecturer at UNIPORT, participant OFP 8, agrees that, the Ogoni conflict originated from this tripod but he added underdevelopment as a relatively more fundamental variable to the conflict. He summed up thus: "lack of development, oil pollution and marginalisation by state and national political class". However, Chapter 4 independently discussed some of these causes amongst other causes. Also see Ingalson & Nwapi 2014: 39, Omotola 2010: 102, Boele, Fabig & Wheeler 2001: 77.

5.4.3 Reasons and reliability of military intervention strategy in the Ogoni conflict

The Ogoni conflict witnessed series of attacks from the Nigerian Armed Forces (NAF). Chapter 5 discussed the military option in Ogoni as a conflict management strategy. It was an analytical perspective the dwelt more on the consequences of the option. However, the discussions under this heading focus on what informed government military option in the conflict. The researcher's field experience exposed to some of the salient but real reasons for involvement of military in the conflict. The views expressed by the participants' were broadly divergent and cut across a wide continuum of issues. There was no overt concession among the participants on what actually influenced government military option in the Ogoni conflict.

In the views of participant OFP 5, a combination of reasons forced government to involve the military into the conflict. To him, desperation and administrative ignorance pushed government into the use of military force against the people of Ogoni. He stated that:

> "Desperation and administrative ignorance influenced the use of military intervention in the struggle. Government was in a desperate bid to ensure oil production goes on without hindrance. This was a clear demonstration of administration ignorance. Why not? A positive response to at least one of the demands as contained in the Ogoni Bill of Rights would have done the magic. Ironically, rather than ensuring oil production in Ogoni, the conflict escalated and

> oil production in Ogoni has since been halted resulting in huge economic loss to government and the operators of the industry" (OFP 5 2015).

To OFP 3, government involved the military in an attempt to defence and protect her stake in Shell. He emphatically stressed that because government has a stake in Shell it was unlikely for her "to go against what it is part of". As discussions in Chapter 3 highlighted, the Nigerian government through the NNPC, owns 50 per cent of Shell, which offers Nigeria a joint venture business status and a serious stakeholder with the company. Obviously, to the Nigerian government, defending and protecting this in the face of challenges such as that of Ogoni within its capacity, was therefore necessary. OFP 8 stated that government "desire for uninterrupted flow of oil" apparently in defence of its stake in the company, influenced government military strategy in Ogoni. Our further discussions in chapter 4 emphasised the important of oil wealth to the Nigerian economic sustainability (Oboreh 2006: 26, Osha 2005: 11, Frynas 1998: 462, Obi 1997: 141).

From the perspective of respondent OFP 5, the argument that government engaged that military in Ogoni in defence and protection of its stake in the community, becomes stronger. To reinforcement this point additionally, the MOSOP PRO, OFP 11 on a very sad note opined:

> As I have said before, the major issue is oil. It has to do with oil. Oil is a serious business in Nigeria. As I said, Nigeria has a mono economy and that economy is driven by oil. If you look at it from the onset, before oil, we had cocoa, we had palm produce and we had groundnuts. These were the three economic pillars of the economy we had in the nation. As soon as oil was discovered, and they began exporting it at macro level, Nigeria lost their sense of agriculture. Nigeria lost their sense of economic diversification. Nigeria lost their sense of industralisation. Nigeria now became lazy to that and lazy to anything that relates to that. At one point in Nigeria, one time military Head of State said, oh, we have so much money, we do not know what to do with it. Because the issue of oil was there, that attracted the sort of response government adopted. Those who have been benefiting from the oil are not Ogonis. They are not even Igbos [and] they are not Ijaws, [either]... Both those in government and those outside government that had those benefits, connived to influence government to commit human right abuses

in Ogoni by involving military that came to inflict violence on the people rather than simple conflict resolution methods because they were protecting their interest. As I said, government felt that if we allow this to happen... First, Babangida who was in power as at the time the Ogoni struggle started, enacted decree 26 or so that makes these sort of protest treasonable. They now followed it up with violent military occupation of Ogoniland under that name Rivers State Security Task Force (RSSTF)... So, that was how government responded to our situation" (OFP 5 2015).

First, the above expression draws an analytical postulation linking the defence of individual and government stakes in Shell to the military intervention in Ogoni. Second, it showed that government adopted a legal strategy, which illegalises the most important tool of the struggle, namely, the protest, to suppress the Ogoni people.

OFP 14 maintains that government military intervention was the function of interest. To him, government wanted to protect the royalty Shell pays it, which supports the economy. Therefore, in other not to forfeit this, government moved to defend against the threatening situation at "all cost including killing the Ogoni people" (OFP 14). OFP 10 from Niger Delta Development Commission agrees that government used the treason decree to suppress the struggle and to ensure uninterrupted oil production in the area. She however argues that because government originally failed to live up to the expectations of the Ogoni people to develop the area, resistance and conflict was inevitable.

For OFP 9 stated that government intervened because "there was a breakdown of law and order in Ogoniland. The government representatives among the Ogonis invited them for their selfish interests". Again, this view adds credence to the claim that government involvement of the military was no for the protection of government stakes in the company but also for selfish interests. Furthermore, it demonstrated that the situation in Ogoni at the time was that of lawlessness, which deserves urgent attention. The question was the military option realistically suitable for such situation in Ogoni during the conflict. OFP 7 agree with OFP 9 insisted that the military intervened because of breakdown of law and order. In his word, the military intervened "when the situation was getting out of hand". However, OFP 1 assumed a different position. His response was more on the reason why the military intervened rather than what informed it. To him "government was forced to respond to the Ogoni conflict because of the embarrassment generated as a result of the agitation of the people and the response of the international community".

The views of the participants were indeed quite divergent on this point however, they were all pointer to the fact that government military intervention strategy was for particular reasons attached to oil. Therefore, it was an option to defend government stake in oil and the company, to suppress the struggle and to protect selfish interests.

Regarding to effectiveness of military option, OFP 7 was very blunt in his response. He simply stated that; "The use of the military only escalated the conflict situation". Respondent OFP 1 responded thus: "The involvement of military in Ogoni conflict caused more harm than good in Ogoniland as this led to the killing of the Ogoni 9 and subsequent stoppage of Shell Petroleum Development Company activities in Ogoniland". OFP 8 said, "It was not reconciliatory. The military aggravated the conflict". For OFP 9, "the result of this was escalation of the situation from crisis to real conflict. The military option was a total government failure. The use of military might was a deception".

In the words of OFP 12:

> "You see, because we protested, now the government decided to use force on us. We will protest again until they pay us what is due us. So, our protest stopped Shell from working and because of this government used force, which is the military on us and so many people were killed" (OFP 12 2015)

In addition, OFP 10 expresses his personal opinion with the following words:

> "In my opinion, government use of military in Ogoni conflict was brutal, violent and full of injustice. It has left an indelible mark that cannot be forgotten or erased in Ogoniland. They killed Saro-Wiwa and over 3 000 persons, razing some villages and detained so many. This would have been resolved peacefully" (OFP 10 2015).

The views of OFP 11 revealed that the military option was a government blunder. It reflects administrative ineffectiveness of the Nigerian government towards the conflict. To this end, OFP 11 averred thus:

> "One, I think it was a blunder. It also showed how much fear they had and it showed that they hadn't the reasoning and lacked proper response to the Ogoni situation. Ogoni people only passed a message stating; this is the situation we find ourselves. We want you to think of how to resolve this problem. Instead of looking at it and asking themselves; what they are talking about, is it real, is it correct? What do we do? They instead involved violence into it. The aim was to intimidate us and protect oil production in the area because survives on oil... the military occupation in Ogoni killed over 3 000 Ogonis including both sons and daughters especially the Ogoni leaders. Ken Saro-Wiwa was killed, Chief Kobane was killed, Sammuel Radi, A. B. Dadie, Dr Chobi, John Kpoene, who could I mention? That was the government response to the agitations of the Ogoni people, which in other countries they would have called for negotiations. That would have been peaceful approach to resolving the conflict. Unfortunately, our mentality, our military orientation, which appears to survive till today, favours militarization rather than simple conflict resolution methods" (OFP 11 2015).

From these views, the failure of the military option as a reliable intervention approach to suppress the Ogoni conflict clearly illuminates. The responses divulged that the military option failed from three serious negative points of view. First, it escalated an already tensed situation into a more serious state of conflict. Second, it forced Shell to stop oil production in Ogoniland. Third, many people lost their lives. Government was unable to defend and protect its stake in the conflict through this option. Obviously, oil revenue dwindled when the company suspended oil production in the area in 1973. On the other hand, the views further favours dialog in place of military option. It implies that that government disregarded negotiation or dialog as reliable and effective conflict management approach at the time. By extension therefore, negotiation was lacking as a fragment of the conflict management strategies government adopted for the Ogoni conflict.

OFP 15 expressed that the military option in Ogoni was important because the situation at the time necessitated it. However, he was quick renounce the option as wrong. He attributed the sprout of armed militancy in the Ogoni and across the Niger Delta to what he described as one simple mistake. It would equally translate that the option heightened the conflict in Ogoni. To the retired army officer:

> "It was a tensed situation in Ogoni at the time; therefore, government had to do the needful. Remember that the country was under the military leadership then, so many variables influenced the military intervention.. Firstly, it was easier for government to draft the military straight into Ogoni to quell the situation. Secondly, government felt it has to defend its stake in the area. Thirdly, government felt the situation had superseded capability of the police to control. You see, that information was a very wrong. However, in frank words, that option was not only wrong but also it failed to produce anticipated results to the government. In fact, the situation consequently grew worse. It led to armed militancy we are still experiencing in the area until today. Yes. Because after the military intervention, youths of the area started acquiring arms to fight, defend and push their demands further. They started moving into the creeks and operating from there. It became more difficult to with the situation because of what I call one simple mistake. Honestly, it took the struggle to the next level; a level government never envisaged. Other reconciliatory options including negotiations; were not exhaustively engaged and proven to have failed before the introduction of the military into the conflict. I was in the army then so I know what I am talking about" (OFP 15 2015).

5.4.4 Effectiveness and efficiency of other conflict management approaches in the conflict

The views of OFP 5 highlighted the ineffectiveness of other conflict management efforts in Ogoni with the following words: "It was more of a confirmation that would exist in a country ruled by an alien colonial master... In essence, government approach was to make name and write history with human blood as fountain ink devoid of the rule of conscience... For Shell, they acted as catalyst in the Ogoni conflict. Shell's actions were mischievous, styled to cover its reckless conduct of fragrant disregard to environmental guidelines on standards for oil operator in Nigeria. Shell destroyed Ogoniland with impunity. Shell has no respect for human health. Shell provides deception and misleading information regarding its operations" (OFP 5 2015). The underlying connotations are suggestive of the inordinate level of recklessness surrounding Shell's response to the consequences of its activities in Ogoni. It shows that the company was insensitive to the fact that the decimation of their operating environment was the consequence of low and ineffective environmental policy. As enunciated in chapter four (see Kaetes 2015, Umeh 20012: 27, Omotola 2010: 102, Opukri 2008: 181. See also table 4.4: Summary of oil spills in the Niger Delta), the consequences left Ogoniland as one of the most polluted environments in the world. Therefore, it exposes the Ogoni people to the worst health unfriendly environment, which requires urgent remediation.

According to OFP 11; "Government wanted to intimidate us out of the whole struggle. Unfortunately, they saw a different position. The Ogoni people were determined and they kept on until today. Even with the killing of these generations of Ogoni leaders, the struggle did not stop and it is their till today and it will continue until the ultimate is achieved." Again, the emphasis in this statement further highlighted the lack of efficacy in the use of the military in the conflict. His further argument is that since the military training was not for civil conflicts such as the Ogoni conflict, but for full combat situations, involving them in the conflict would no doubt reflect their training. Hence, it occasioned the killing of many people in the conflict. His substantiations further accuse government of lacking in reasonable alternative conflict resolution method, which would have been more effective at the time. On this note, OFP 11 stated thus:

> "Zero complete zero. You saw what I had explained. If government has any reasonable approach, it wouldn't have been a military intervention. It would have been simple conflict resolution methods. First, they must attempt to call the people and talk to them to say; what is the problem and how do we solve it. Unfortunately, they did not do this... For the company it was also zero because Shell even paid allowances to the military personnel that occupied Ogoni to continue the occupation of the land under the guise of protecting their oil facilities. When they lied about it, we presented the evidence at the Oputa panel. The Oputa panel was another opportunity, which also failed because Shell refused to apologize... The Oputa panel insisted that Shell was responsible for all that has

happened in Ogoni. They are responsible for the death of our people. They are responsible for the destruction of our environment, which remain until today. They are responsible for what happens in our community... The Methodist church in the UK and Nigeria brokered a kind of peace some time. It was Shell too that made it to fail. Bishop Kuka reconciliation opportunity failed because of Shell. How many will I mention?" (OFP 11 2015)

However, OFP 2 agrees with the previous respondent on the irrelevance of the military in the conflict but emphasized that further conflict management efforts by government and Shell in the region were ineffective. To him, the little development the company brought into the community was the result of selfish interest. OFP 2 insisted that Shell conflict management approach in Ogoni was:

"Unethical and unprofessional, tilting only towards their interest. Most of the roads you see in Ogoniland today were constructed because they lead to Shell facilities located across the land. They were not constructed because they wanted it to benefit the people." Again, developmental efforts such as OMPADEC, NDDC, MNDA and even the amnesty equally failed to contain the conflict because government was not serious with them so they were all corruptly managed. Although the amnesty brought peace, it did not last because of corruption. Even the avengers you see today are products of ineptitude of Shell and government conflict management approaches in the conflict. (OFP 2 2015)"

In addition, OFP 6 accentuates that government and Shell refused to react sincerely to the cleanup of Ogoniland as recommended in UNEP report. In furtherance, OFP 2 agrees with this view and retorted in this manner:

"Their conflict management approach is slow. It has delayed the development of the region. For example, there is delay in the implementation of policies, non-implementation of the 2011 UNEP report. Non- fulfillment of the social responsibility obligation by the oil companies to their host communities, are some of the reasons conflict in the area has persisted because government and Shell has refused to listen to the people and to develop the place" (OFP 2).

Deducing from the views of the respondents, it the view of the researcher that the conflict management approaches adopted by government and Shell in Ogoni were inappropriate, slow, ineffective and inadequate (see also Okoh 2005: 5). Consequently, the situation for which the people are agitating against persisted until date. Their emphases further show that the Ogoni people continued to suffer exploitation, underdevelopment, marginalization and suppression irrespective of numerous unserious effort to better the situation from both stakeholders in the conflict until date (Ojokorotu 2010: 8: Manby 2000: 3).

5.5 Similarities and dissimilarities of the two case studies

This part of the section looks at the similarities in the conflict management approached adopted by government of South Africa in Marikana and Nigeria in Ogoni conflicts respectively. These similarities are evaluated under three sub-heading: a) before the conflicts, b) during the conflicts and, c) after the conflicts. This analysis galvanizes its arguments through participants' opinions, views of other authors. However, it will be pertinent to reiterate that the fundamental reasons linking both Marikana and Ogoni conflicts centers on the people demanding for an enhancement on the principal factors are militating against their survival as a direct consequence of mining activities.

5.5.1 Before the conflicts

Before the conflicts in Ogoni and Marikana, the scenarios posed serious threats to the existence of those people directly impacted by the negative implications of mining activities. Thus, the reactions to these situations by the principal actors to it assumed similar dimensions. These include the use of force (police in Marikana and the Army in Ogoni conflicts) to suppress the conflicts. Findings from the respondents also demonstrated that both South Africa and Nigerian government intervened in the conflicts to protect government or state interests. It is thus quite revealing that governments of South Africa and Nigeria adopted legislations, laws, statutes, decrees and Acts to preclude conflict that may arise from mining activities. These legislatures were intended to regulate mining activities in both countries to cushion the negative consequences of mining on the people and environment. The land Acts in both countries disposed indigenes of their land while replacing this authority with that of the state. These laws therefore transferred land ownership and the control of its mineral resources to the state. Unequivocally, this marked the beginning of dispossession and oppression suffered by indigenes of host communities and citizens of both countries until date. This trajectory depicts a government bureaucratic strategy to suppress and overthrow natural laws of land ownership with obnoxious land laws.

However, the mining laws of South Africa and Nigeria provided certain clear legislative guide, which regulate operations of mining companies. There were provisions in which compel mining companies to perform certain corporate social responsibility duties through which they give back to their host communities. These include progressive construction of essential projects within their operating environments to develop it. They further required them to ensure proper management of their waste products or the effects therefrom to guarantee healthy and safe living and working environments both for the members of their host communities and their workers. For instance, the environmental laws in Nigeria ensure the proper management of the consequences of mining to both the workers and the host communities as mentioned in chapter five. Apart from these, both countries entered into national and international agreements to ensure that performing mining activities within any environment in both countries meet globally acceptable standards.

In addition, it becomes an obligatory responsibility of these companies, in accordance with the provisions of some of these laws, to pay certain specified amount of monies as royalties or oil renters or taxes from their proceeds to the government. As mentioned in chapter five, government income increases through these and it thereafter engages these monies for developmental purposes across the country particularly within the mineral producing communities. The MHC in South African and the NDDC in Nigeria for instance derive their government subventions from part of such monies to develop mining host communities.

Apart from legislations, governments of both countries had also adopted some palliative measures towards ameliorating the consequences of mining, which by extension preclude conflict. In the case of Marikana for instance, the South African government established the Black Economic Empowerment in 1996 to fight against economic inequality in the country (see also Patel & Graham 2012: 194). Similarly, in Ogoni, the Nigerian government NDDC to ensure the development of the area (see also Odoemene 2012: 226, Egwemi 2010: 136, Omotola 2007: 81, Okonta & Oro 2001: 18) Through relevant government institutions, governments of South Africa and Nigeria made several bureaucratic attempts to control the issues associated with this industry. Full discussions on these are in chapters four and five. For instance, in South Africa, government performs a supervisory oversight function through the DMR to ensure completion of CSR projects undertaken by Lonmin and other companies operating throughout the country. In Nigeria, the onus lies on the FMMR to perform such parallel functions.

Furthermore, the post conflicts management efforts engaged by governments of South Africa were to redress subsisting inequality existing in the countries. While both countries brawl the inequality from the apartheid, Nigeria had a history of colonial regime. This research avers that the basic postulation here is these efforts continued toward addressing a trend, which has its roots on disparity among the group directly affected by the effects of mining. For South Africa as elucidated in chapter four, the local government department of human settlement became a tool for the provision of decent housing for both the mineworkers and indigenes of host community. However, the government of Nigeria performs these functions through established agencies such as the Oil Mineral Producing Agency and Niger Delta Development Commission in the development of the oil producing areas, which included Ogoni.

Because South Africa has a bad history of inequality, government adopted the BBBEE strategy to redress this trend. The Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment became a veritable platform through which South African government tried to tackle the disparity that plagues ownership of the mining industry. Our discussions in chapter four reveal that the Housing Development of South Africa were completely isolated from the business particularly of ownership and control of mines in the country (see Patel & Graham 2012: 194-195, Kruger 2011: 207, Mbeki 2009: 25, Ramphele 2008: 15). As such, their exclusion created the situation, which prompted the policy to effect its reversal. Discussions of chapter four demonstrated that similar situation also exist in the wide wage discrepancy between the wages of mineworkers and that of their bosses. This constituted a principal factor that gave sprout to the Marikana conflict. To this end, government of South Africa tackles this challenge through the government affirmative action policy adopted in 1998.

The situation of the Ogoni conflict is different. However, the disparity existed outside the confines of mine ownership and wages but in their deplorable environment and living conditions of the Ogoni people (see Nzeadibe et al 2011: 8, Roberts 2006: 12). Just like in South Africa, the disparity in Ogoni is also a legacy of decades of alien leadership and foreign imposed domination, though this situation in South Africa is dire. Nevertheless, the Nigerian government, like her South African counterpart, sought for a conflict prevention approach, which could exert serious positive influence to address this anomaly and at the same time not contending individual part ownership of the mining industry. In this sense, the country after independence in 1960 sought for and adopted a co-ownership approach, which transferred 50 per cent ownership of Shell to the Nigerian government through NNPC as discussed in chapter three.

Discussions of this study in chapter five and previously in this chapter illustrated Lonmin ineffective response to it SLP and CSR (see MFP 10). In fact, sections 90 and 92 of the recommendations of Marikana inquiry report validated this claim. These sections discussed the inadequacies of the company towards it SLP (see McKenzie 2013: 161). The report indicted Lonmin on this and specified that Lonmin was unable to provide adequate and comfortable accommodation for its workforce, the Marikana community until the day of the shooting (see Ledwaba 2013). It implies that the company failed in its strategy to preclude conflict because of the recurrence of conflict in Lonmin, which may arise from living inequalities. In Ogoni, the impacts of Shell's development efforts were not visible nor felt by the people. Of course, this was one of the variables discussed as principal triggers of the Ogoni conflict.

5.5.2 During the conflicts

One of the most remarkable government actions in Marikana and Ogoni conflicts was the use of force (for instance, the Police in Marikana and Military in Ogoni), respectively to suppress the conflicts. They were desperate conflict management strategic options adopted by these governments at the wake of both conflicts. While the South African government used the Tactical Response Team in Marikana, the Nigerian government engaged members of the Mobile Police Force and Nigerian Armed Forces. The consequences of both government policies were the brutal and resulted in the killing of some individuals who participated in the conflicts. Others that did not die suffered various levels of abuses and violations. In Marikana for instance, the arbitrary arrest of 270 (Saba 2015: 1) mineworkers during the conflict was despicable display of gross violation and abuse of their human rights. A report according to Amnesty International on 30 March 2015, further buttressed this claim. In the report, the regional director Southern Africa made a disquieting statement that:

The decision taken by senior police officials on the night of 15 August

> The decision taken by senior police officials on the night of 15 August 2012 to disarm, disperse and arrest the protesters, which did not arise from any escalation of threat to life. The decision was taken despite the anticipation of possible loss of life and injury. It led to the deployment of tactical units armed with live ammunition and semi-automatic rifles. Police fired more than 600 live rounds during the operation, which state and independent pathologists found resulted in the deaths of 34 protesters as a result of gunshot wounds – in most cases to the head or upper body. [This represented] violations of the right to life under both international and domestic law. The decision was reckless and driven by improper political motives (Amnesty International 30 March 2015).

Analysing this statement from primary and secondary data connecting fronts, it is apparent that firstly, the government decision to deploy the TRT to the scene of the conflict was tactically inappropriate (see MFP 13). This is so considering the fact that using the Tactical Response Team in Marikana conflict could lead to possible loss of lives and injuries. In this sense, this research argues that among the intensions for bringing 600 live rounds of ammunition and semi-automatic rifles into the scene of the conflict is also to kill the mineworkers in South Africa, which translates to a clear situation of premeditated murder (see Amnesty International 30 March 2015, Ledwaba 2013,). In fact, one of our participants, MFP 10, stated clearly the needlessness of the TRT in Marikana. He stated in rhetoric "what was the TRT doing at a strike scene when in actual fact; they were supposed to be at robbery or other crimes scene and not at Marikana. No. What crime committed at Marikana at the time amounted or fell under their jurisdiction? They have no business in Marikana".

A similar situation played out in Ogoni where the government drafted members of the Nigerian Armed Forces from two fronts, federal and state Rivers State Internal Security Task Force, to 'return Ogoni to order'. As previously argued, maintaining public order remain the duty of the police and not the military (Peterside 2014: 1302, Azinge 2013: 4). It implies therefore that military engagement in Ogoni by government was also inappropriate (see OFP 11). Going by these arguments, it becomes clear that the TRT in Marikana and military in Ogoni were government tactical or strategic option to subjugate, repress and suppress the conflict. Therefore, the veracity remains that governments of both countries hid under the umbrella of performing its duty as per maintenance of public order to confront its worst enemy: public resistance, through the wrong conflict management option. Unfortunately, would be culpable individuals escaped indictments and convictions regarding this gruesome killings at both scenes in the countries until date. By insinuation, governments of South Africa and Nigeria have persistently but blatantly refused to exhibit any seriousness to bring justice to the families of victims of their gruesome murder.

Secondly, that the decision was the product of political and selfish influence. Our earlier discussions in this chaptershowed that government of both countries acted and reacted in complementary to protect and defend selfish and government interests in the conflicts (see MFP 7, MFP 4 OFP 10, OFP 12, OFP 15,). It was also apparent that the choice of the conflict management approaches had both political and selfish undertone. Ostensibly, the selfish interests of certain high-ranking individuals and government political benefits precipitated the conflict management approaches, which fought against and destroyed the values, constitutional principles, human rights and lives of the people living in the countries they should be defending. By extension, government adopted the wrong conflict management strategy based on some cheap personal reasons as against the burning interests and concerns of their citizens that required urgent government attention and response.

Thirdly, the shooting of the mineworkers was unnecessary display of excessive force and consequently amounted to gross violation of their right to life. In the case of Ogoniland, the people were equally killed arbitrarily bases on similar reasons. The argument here is that the governments of South African and Nigerian resorted to intimidation, unlawful arrests, detention and killings as tools to end these conflicts forcefully. In this sense, governments of both countries ended up violating and abusing the rights of its citizens while engaging the wrong conflict management approach to the conflicts at Marikana and Ogoni. Thus, if Mr Deprose Mucena affirms in his statement earlier in this chapter that shooting the mineworkers amounted to abuses of their right to life, this study argues here that this statement relatively fits in unequivocally to explain the situation at the Ogoni conflict as delineated in chapter five. Hence, the situation at Marikana symbolized a true replication of a trend that plagued the people of Ogoni society over a long period.

Apart from the killings, the option of engaging force in both clashes escalated, aggravated and strengthened the conflicts, which in broad expressions, stood counter-productive. In both countries, the option resulted in the loss of lives, different forms of abuses and they were unable to neither end the conflict successfully nor preclude its recurrence. Although the strategy succeeded in dispersing the protesting crowd permanently in the case of in Marikana, it however did not stop the strike. After the 16 of August 2012 shooting for instance, the strike continued until both parties reached and signed an agreement, which returned the workers to work on 20 September 2016 (Patel 2012: 1). Similarly, Platinum mineworkers including Lonmin workers, embarked on what has been confirmed as the longest labour strike in the history of South Africa from 23 January to 23 June 2014 when a deal was signed by differing parties to end it (Nicolson 2014: 1, Simelane, Lekgowa &Nicolson 2014: 1). Unfortunately, similar variables that roused the Marikana strike formed the platform for the strike. On the other hand, the Ogoni situation saw a more resurgence of regular protesting crowd over a period regardless of heavy military presence in the area. Inferring from these postulations, it means that the TRT and military and indeed other conflict management efforts by the government options in both conflicts failed to preclude recurrence of conflict in the mining sectors of both countries.

In furtherance, negotiations efforts equally failed to stop or preclude conflict during the conflicts. With respect to our discussions in chapter two and four, both parties, namely, the striking workers and Lonmin ownership failed to agree on a common terms for negotiations during the Marikana conflict. It was clear from those discussions that while the striking workers requested direct negotiations with management consequent upon their loss of confidence in the unions, Lonmin management on the other hand insisted on talking to them only through the unions, which they claimed was the only proper and constitutional channel. The implication was among other variables that led to the killings.

Again, this shows a lack of professionalism in conflict management on the part of Lonmin. Lonmin failed to apply reason to an already tensed and capricious situation. Refusing to accept to talk to the striking workers this study argues, means directly and indirectly telling the strikers that they do not care about their welfare. Although there are recommendations at the end of this study in this regard, it is however important to mention here that Lonmin's decision at that moment was not only wrong but also increased the disenchantment between both parties to the conflict. In fact, as indicated in chapter two, Lonmin rejected frantic efforts made by the AMCU leader Mr. Joseph Mathunjwa to arrange discussions between management and the strikers. It further illustrated that Lonmin even reneged to honor a pre-shooting day agreement it had with Mr. Mathunjwa to talk with the striking workers in the morning of the shooting day. That would have doused the tension and possibly may have prevented the unnecessary loss of lives preceding this decision. Expectedly, when the news got to the strikers, the study discussions in chapter two reveal that it heightened the existing tension on ground at that moment.

The SAPS made similar negotiation attempts prior to the shooting. This study stated in chapter two that part of the SAPS plan on arrival at Marikana was to try to lure the striking workers into discussions and perhaps reach an agreement that would douse the situation, dispel the crowd peacefully and possibly end the strike. Although the strategy flopped, it depicted to some extent, the reasonableness in public policing of the SAPS before the unnecessary introduction of the TRT. On the contrary, what played out in Ogoni military operation was that of suppression and wanton destruction of life. The military never gave the Ogoni people such opportunity for negotiation before they were shot and killed. Earlier discussions in this chapter revealed that most of the people were shot during peaceful demonstrations in Bori, which is the headquarters of Ogoni located within the own community. Therefore, this study argues that while the conflict management strategy in Marikana was more of initial carrot approach, which later turned sore resulting from poor professionalism, the Ogoni conflict experienced a stick situation from the onset of the military hostility.

5.5.3 After the conflicts

After the conflicts, the underlying variables that ignited both conflicts situations are yet to receive adequate attention from these governments consequently, they have lost the confidence the people reposed on them. Thus, the post conflict management approaches adopted by the government of South Africa and Nigeria was more of image laundering efforts to regain the confidence of the people rather than sincere enhancement of their demands on perilous conditions militating against their survival.

After the killings at Marikana, negotiations between conflicting actors intensified and the process of reconciliation began. While government set up the MCI about the incident, Lonmin increased negotiation with union delegates particularly from the wage front. As expected, the strategy eventually ended the strike barely a month, on 20 September 2012 (Patel 2012: 1) after Lonmin and the workers reached an agreement. Notwithstanding the positive effects of this effort, this study argues that the multiplier effects and the delay in arriving at and executing this strategy outweigh its success. For this study, it was justice delayed and thus, denied. It depicts a scenario of receiving empathy when the head is already off. The question is why the delay and dilly-dally for wage increase when it was possible to do so without bloodshed. If this window of wage increase could open when it did in September, to end the strike, it implies that such a window was already open prior to the strike and the killings. Therefore, at the point of crisis aggravation, Lonmin refused to make effective use of this card and play it when the opportunity presented itself in the strikers call for direct negotiations with them during the strike. Hence, this argument rubbishes the whole essence of wage increase by Lonmin after the killings as an aimless walk in the right direction.

The Platinum strike of 2014 reinforces the failure of this strategy because the issue of wage resonated afresh as the cause of the strike. It demonstrated that issues surrounding wages in the sector has defiled management efforts proffered by the mining companies. Furthermore, it illustrated that the strategy targets to achieve temporary success to douse tension on prevailing circumstances. In order words, the company lacks established wage management system in place to address such issues whenever the need arises. This forms part of the recommendations of this study.

In Ogoni, it was a different scenario however, the semblance stems from the point of view of what characteristics that linked the management efforts applied in the conflicts. In this sense, Shell equally adopted half measure approaches towards addressing the fundamental reasons of Ogoni conflict. The research outlined the level of progressive inconsistencies the company has exhibited towards cleaning and remediating Ogoni environment. As noted elsewhere in the study, it took Shell and Nigerian government four to act on the urgent principal recommendation of UNEP investigation. Indisputably, the cleanup of Ogoni has just commenced a few months ago however like in Marikana, the question remains, why did it delay. It would have possible at the wake of the conflict in the early 90s but because Shell denied the level of oil spill at that time as disastrous, it stifled adequate attention to the issue. It was only after years of killings and international pressure that Shell and the Nigerian government yielded.

Thus, drawing further inference from both analogy, what stands paramount is the fact that the interests of those directly affected by the consequences of mining assumes a less-than-dead position amongst the post-conflict management priorities of Lonmin and Shell and the selfish interests of the governments of both countries. Arguably, the output of such system becomes vulnerable to overwhelms of plethora of issues including failures, lies, deceptions, corruption, inadequacies, inefficiencies, ineffectiveness and fruitless. This is so because these approaches have proved to lack in the needed capacity and potentials to preclude recurrence of conflict in the mining sectors of both countries.

Slightly away from this scenario, windows of negotiation equally opened after the Ogoni shooting including the Bishop Mathew Kuka reconciliation effort. However, the difference from the Marikana perspective was that this effort failed to reconcile the Ogoni people and their concerns with the cushioning process tendered by conveners. Thus, it turned out another botched management effort return the community and indeed the whole Niger Delta back to peace. Along this trajectory, it means that the successes of the wage negotiation in Marikana stood in contrast to the reconciliatory negotiations in Ogoni, which failed.

Furthermore, along the strategy of reconciliation, governments of both countries established commissions to decipher what transpired during the conflicts and possibly extract their differences and reconcile parties to the conflict. In Marikana, it was the MCI while it was the Oputa panel in Nigeria. Though both scenarios differ in scope, their objectives were very similar. The scope of the MCI was strictly on the Marikana incident while the Oputa panel assumed wider latitude covering the entire Nigeria, which included Niger Delta and Ogoniland. However, the failure of these conflict management approaches reflected in the doubts and contests that preceded their outcomes. Just like in Marikana, the people of Ogoni the reconciliation bodies produced results that fell below the expectations of the people. This study discussed these points in chapter five.

Dishonestly, governments of South Africa and Nigeria have shown negligible, slow and lethargic concern in their efforts to curd recurring conflict in their mining sectors. Some of the palliative policies projects undertaken by both governments along this line were either inconclusively handled or completely abandoned. In this case, this study advances that adequate, efficient and effective provision of services to these groups of people remain elusive. Instances of corruption as a hindrance to these efforts particularly in Nigeria as cited in the discussions of chapter four, illustrated the negative influences it has on sustainable development in Niger Delta. Table 3.8 highlighted Nigeria's corruption status between 1998 and 2012 in comparison with other countries globally. Similarly, in South Africa allegation of corruption has continued to shroud certain government decisions with regard to the development of Marikana. Furthermore, this situation translates to a case of ineptitude on the part of both governments towards this challenge.

In South Africa for instance, our discussions in chapter four brought to fore the fact South African government in collaboration with Lonmin, have not been able to deliver sufficient decent and comfortable accommodations to the workers and the Marikana community four years after the killings at Marikana. It implies that no serious change has taken place in this area. It clearly depicts the paradox of lacking in the midst of plenty. Acknowledging the fact as mentioned in chapter five, that Lonmin donated a large expanse of land to the government for the construction of houses for the workers and the Marikana community, the positive impacts of the small number of houses completed in contemporary terms, remain elusive to these people.

The semblance of living conditions of mineworkers before the incident, have not changed. It is disturbing to note in news a report that Lonmin failed in its promise to build and deliver decent accommodations in accordance with its SLP for its workers a day before the fourth anniversary of the massacre (Nicolaides 2016: 1). To further, state the fact, according to Amnesty International (2016), the company's post-2012 SLP is incapable of providing additional houses to the mineworkers. It is more petrifying the fact revealed in the report that Lonmin current operating SLP covering 2014 to 2018 comprises of only two new initiatives directed towards addressing the Marikana housing challenges.

The simply implication from this report exposes the covert but astounding fact that the company may not be able to deliver decent and adequate accommodations for its workers even after 2018. In the words of MFP 11, "...You can see where I am living. We don't have water, electricity. I don't even have toilets. Sometimes water and electricity will go off and you will not see it in days. It is terrible living in this condition. I work hard underground my brother and I deserve better than this. Unfortunately, Lonmin is not doing anything about this..." MFP 9 reemphasized this situation with the following bitter laden words: "...You can see for yourself, nothing has changed. Four years after killing us for demanding our rights, nothing has changed.

You read about new houses they built for us on the papers, where are they. You can see. No, water no electricity. Just nothing…" Again, these buttress the argument of this study that, four years after the massacre, the company has demonstrated failure of approaches to housing issue, which is potentially continuous considering the contents of their current operating SLP.

It is also very vital to state that irrespective of the challenges facing these conflict management efforts, some of them have recorded reasonable levels of successes. As indicated in chapter four, Lonmin for instance recorded 26 per cent BBBEE ownership by December 2014. Figure 4.1 also highlighted the reduction in operational deaths due to improved working conditions underground. The NDDC have equally completed several development projects in the Niger delta region as illustrated in table 5.1. Lonmin as well as Shell has supported education by providing scholarships, building school and hospitals, providing electricity and water to their host communities as elucidated in chapter four and five. It will be improper to jettison completely successes such as these in this study. However, the underlying argument remains that the successes of these policies are not adequate and effective enough to preclude the recurrence of conflict in the mining sectors of South Africa and Nigeria.

5.6 Summary

This chapter dwelt on data presentation and analysis. It started with data presentation for data collected from Marikana and Ogoni case studies. The chapter presented analytical discussions on the views of our participants before delving into discussions on similarities and difference of the approaches. The discussions formed part of the extractions from the interviews of our participants with regard to the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of these conflict management options on the conflicts. This study went further to compare these conflict management approaches from three fronts of before, during and after the Marikana and Ogoni conflicts, which informed the research questions of this study. The first front provided a comparative discussions on the conflict management approached government of South Africa and Nigeria adopted to preclude conflict in their mining sector. It also compares such approaches from the Lonmin and Shell perspective. It went further to provide such discussion on approaches during and after the conflicts. However, the consequences of these actions, which formed the final part of this research questions were addressed during these comparative discussions.

Ostensibly, the study drew certain inferences that inform the summary outline provided hereunder.

Summary of findings drawn from Marikana conflict management discussions:

a) Government and Lonmin development and conflict management efforts before and after the conflict were inadequate and not effective enough to preclude conflict in the South African mining sector. For instance, South African mining industry suffered the longest strike action by mineworkers in 2014, two years after the Marikana incident (BBC News 24 June 2014, news24 24 June 2014, Mail & Guardian 23 April 2014). Lonmin mineworkers were also involved in the strike action.

b) Corruption is one of the factors influencing and sometimes informing government policy choices and hindering effective implementation of conflict management decisions (see MFP 11).

c) Government and Lonmin responses to the plights and demands of those directly affected by the consequences of mining activities in South Africa remain poor and very slow (MFP 5, MFP 13, see also Sections 89-92 of the Marikana Commission of Inquiry report 2015, SAnews 05 December 2016, Daily Maverick 13 December 2016). All these reports demonstrated that Lonmin was yet to provide decent housing for its works four years after the Marikana conflict. The reports indicated that many of the housing embarked on by Lonmin were still ongoing at the time of the reports.

d) Involving the TRT in the Marikana conflict was not only a tactical error but also ill timed, counterproductive and unnecessary (MFP 7, MFP 3, Section 92 of the Marikana Commission of Inquiry report 2015, Daily Maverick 26 June 2015).

e) The choice of the options was partly a function of individual selfish interests as opposed to government purpose of ensuring and maintaining public law and order (MFP 13, MFP 4).

f) The option ended in the fatality of some of the protesters (see MFP 4, MFP 9, MFP 12, MFP 13).

g) Reconciliation efforts from both stakeholders were weak and not effective enough to preclude conflict in the mines (MFP 5, BBC News 24 June 2014, news24 24 June 2014, Mail & Guardian 23 April 2014).

Summary of findings drawn from Ogoni conflict management discussions:

a) Government and Shell Petroleum Development Company developmental efforts not only failed to develop the area, but also were inadequate to preclude recurrence of conflict in Ogoniland (MFP 12, OFP 9, Ejimodu 2014: 2, Benedict 2011: 212-213).

b) The responses of both Nigerian government and Shell Petroleum Development Company to the plight of the Ogoni people are slow and grossly inadequate (OFP 2, OFP 15, Ugo & Ukpere 2010: 1166).

c) Corruption is one of the principal factors, which have influenced and sometimes inform government policy choices and hinder effective implementation of conflict management decisions (OFP 2, OFP 3, Isidiho & Sarbran 2015: 39, Babalola 2014: 123, Brisibe 2001: 1, Welch 1995: 636).

d) The military option in Ogoni conflict escalated the conflict. Hence the move was counterproductive. It claimed the lives of many Ogoni people and left many others abused and violated (OFP 5, OFP 7, OFP 8, OFP 9, OFP 11, Usoro *et al* 2014: 138).

e) The choice of the military option in Ogoni was in defence and protection of government and individual selfish interests in the company (OFP 11, OFP 14, OFP 9).

f) The option resulted in the death of some of the protesters (OFP 7, OFP 10, OFP 12, Usoro 2014: 145, UNPO 2012, Human Rights watch 1995,).

g) Reconciliatory efforts from the government equally failed to end hostilities in the land (OFP 11, MOSOP 2006: 13,Hassan & Olugbuo 2015: 135, Odoemene 2012: 226).

h) Government and Shell delayed to implement the recommendations of UNEP report on Ogoni (OFP 2, OFP 6, Osamgbi 2005: 4, MOSOP 2006: 15, Amnesty International 2014).

i) The choice of Military option in Ogoni was partly a function of individual selfish interests as opposed to government purpose the purposes of maintenance of public peace and order (OFP 11, OFP 15, Boele *et al* 2001: 78).

5.7 Research questions and how they were answered in this research

Research question 1: Was the involvement of police in Marikana and the military in Ogoni effective conflict management approaches by the governments of South Africa and Nigeria?

How the research question was answered:

a. Marikana Case study: The answer to this question is linked to the interview question 5; what is your personal opinion about government use of police in Marikana. The responses from demonstrated that the use of force in Marikana was inappropriate (see respondents MFP 7, MFP 3 for instance). Furthermore, available literature have also shown that the involvement of the Tactical Response Team of the South African Police Services was not effective (see Section 92 of the Marikana Commission of Inquiry report 2015, Daily Maverick 26 June 2015) . In fact, one of the recommendations of the Marikana Commission of Inquiry was an investigation into the fitness of the police commissioner to hold the position. The commission was not satisfied with the use of Tactical Response Team in Marikana and questioned who ordered their involvement hence the reason for the inquiry into the fitness of the commissioner of police.

b. Ogoni Case Study: The answer to this question came from interview question 5 for Ogoni case study: What is your personal opinion about government use of military in Ogoni conflict? Again, primary data from respondents OFP 5, OFP 7, OFP 8, OFP 9, OFP 11, as well as views from literatures such as Usoro *et al* 2014: 138 gave fundamental information that answered the research question 1.

Research question 2: Were the conflict management approaches adopted by major actors before, during and after these conflicts adequate to preclude recurrence of conflict in the mining sectors of South Africa and Nigeria?

How the research question was answered:

a. Marikana Case Study: The for this question was the reason behind interview questions; 7): How would you rate government conflict management approaches towards the Marikana conflict? Please give reasons for your assessment, 8): How would you rate Lonmin conflict management approaches in Marikana conflict? Again, primary data information form MFP 5 and MFP 13 responses to this question answered provided information that answered the question.

Furthermore secondary data sources and literature such as Sections 89-92 of the Marikana Commission of Inquiry report 2015, SAnews 05 December 2016, Daily Maverick 13 December 2016, equally had useful information the answered this question.

b. Ogoni Case Study: In a similar way, primary data from responses from Ogoni participants MFP 14, OFP 9 and secondary data from literatures (Ejimodu 2014: 2, Benedict 2011: 212-213), provided important information that answered this question.

Research question 3: What implications had such actions on the outcome of conflicts in the mining sectors of South Africa and Nigeria?

How the research question was answered:

a. Marikana Case Study: The responses from respondents MFP 4, MFP 9, MFP 12, MFP 13 to questions 7 and 8 also provided answer to this research question. Literature such as Gumade 2015: 327, Nash 2015: 387, Wasserman 2015: 375, Rapatsa 2014: 119, Chinguno 2013: 555, Ledwaba, 2013: 13, Mckenzie 2013: 161, Sinwell *et al* 2012: 17, stated that 34 lives were lost as a result of the use of police as a conflict management response strategy of the government.

b. Ogoni Case Study: Respondents OFP 7, OFP 10, OFP 12 confirmed that the involvement of military in the Ogoni conflict resulted in the loss of lives of some Ogoni people. Also Usoro 2014: 145 indicated in his work that many Ogoni people lost their lives as a consequence of military shooting that took place Ogoni. Non-governmental organisations such UNPO 2012, Human Rights watch 1995 equally confirmed the killing of some Ogoni people by the military during the Ogoni conflict. However, there was conflicting views on the actual number of people killed nonetheless, they affirmed that some Ogoni people lost their live when they were shoot at by the military during the Ogoni conflict.

Research question 4: What are the similarities and differences in the conflict management approaches adopted by mining companies and governments in Marikana and Ogoni?

How the research question was answered

Case Study of Marikana and Ogoni combined: Participants responses to interview questions 4 and 9 enabled the researcher in making comparison between the root causes of both conflicts as well as the reasons for their recurrence. The reason why there was no specific question on similarities and differences between both conflicts in the interview question was that it was discovered during the pilot study that significant number of people from Nigeria does not know about Marikana conflict and vice versa. Thus, to avoid repetition of this situation, questions 4 and 9 were designed to assist the researcher address this question. To achieve this, the researcher compered these responses with views of other authors in literatures under section 6.8 (Similarities and dissimilarities of the two case studies). The triangulation between the primary, secondary data and researcher's opinion in this section provided significant information and analysis that answered the research question.

5.8 New findings

During the interview at Ogoni, respondent OFP 5 revealed an aspect of the conflict that was not known to the researcher. OFP 5 participant said that one of the root causes of the Ogoni conflict was that Shell Petroleum Development Company adopted a malicious propaganda as a deception and blackmailing tool to divide the people and cause unnecessary disaffection among Ogoni people. OFP 5 further said that the move was also to induce quarrel which may result to possible conflict among Ogoni communities. OFP 5 finally said it was a divide and rule strategy from Shell Petroleum Development Company to continue oil exploration from Ogoni whiles the Ogoni people are busy fighting each other.

5.9 Conclusion

This chapter offered presentation and analysis of data from the two cases of Marikana and Ogoni. The chapter started with presentation of data from Marikana. This section not only presented and analysed primary data from Marikana bur also back up findings from the case study with available literature. This was followed by similar presentation and analysis from the Ogoni case study. The chapter also presented a discussion on the similarity and dissimilarity of conflict management approached adopted by the governments of South African and Lonmin Pty on one hand and Nigerian government and Shell Petroleum Development Company in Ogoni on the other hand. This analysis was presented under three sub-headings; before, during and after the conflicts. Under this section the researcher used primary data from respondents and secondary data from existing literature to extract the similarities and differences in the conflict management strategies used in both conflicts. The chapter also presented a summary of the research findings from both case studies as well as how the research questions were answered. The chapter ended with a chapter conclusion

Chapter Six: Summary, Recommendations and Conclusion

6.1 Summary

Chapter five was the presentation and analysis of data. The chapter through a comparative analysis discussed the conflict management approaches adopted by governments of South Africa and Nigeria in the Marikana and Ogoni conflicts respectively. It also compared the conflict management approaches adopted by Lonmin and Shell in both conflicts. The discussion analysed these conflict management approaches from three fronts, namely before, during and after the conflicts of Marikana and Ogoni using information both primary and secondary data to present the discussion. This chapter offers conclusions reached in this study. It also proffers some recommendations and prospective areas for further research.

For many decades, the mining sectors of South Africa and Nigeria have witnessed consistent conflicts. This study presented a historical background, which linked the origin of the current array of conflict causative variables in Marikana and Ogoni partly to the legacy of colonialism. It further demonstrated that the system created inequality resulting from unfair distribution of wealth and by extension wealth disparities that plague citizens of both countries. In addition, the study outlined and discussed other causes of conflict in both countries. It also demonstrated that some of these variables are consequences of selfish interests, which consistently have overridden the common good of the people. As a result, those who felt and saw themselves as unfairly disadvantaged, particularly within the scope of this study, resisted the situation. Such resistance developed into serious conflicts that attracted certain control measures that destroyed many lives.

The aftermaths of the conflicts were examined in what this study identified and discussed from the perspectives of conflict prevention, management and post-conflict management approaches of the major actors in the conflicts. The study presented a comprehensive discussion of these various stages of conflict management approaches advanced by governments and mining companies of South Africa and Nigeria in chapter four, five and six of this study. In these discussions, it was demonstrated that these efforts were inadequate and hence, were unable to preclude recurrence of conflict in the mining sectors of both countries. The study therefore argued that the influence of selfish interests jeopardized the sincerity behind these efforts thus distorting and re-directing the outcomes toward selfish interests to the detriment of the people directly affected by the consequences of mining. In some sections of these chapters, the study advanced critical examples to understand these claims. Some of these examples also revealed short shrift in the service delivered to these groups of people. The discussions equally illuminated existing conditions of inequality within the mining sectors and the lethargic reactions of the government and mining companies of both countries toward these issues.

In the preceding chapter, the study provided a comparative analysis of primary and secondary data of conflict management approaches adopted by mining companies and governments of South Africa and Nigeria. Discussion within this context revealed a semblance in the variables such as inequality, unemployment, poverty for Ogoni and social economic and labour issues for Marikana, that ignited the conflicts, the variables that influenced and informed the choice of certain conflict management options used particularly, during the conflicts, the consequences of these actions as well as whether they were effective to preclude conflict recurrence within the mining sectors of South Africa and Nigeria. In consideration of the outcomes of discussions along these trajectories, MFP 5, MFP 13, Sections 89-92 of the Marikana Commission of Inquiry report 2015, SAnews 05 December 2016, Daily Maverick 13 December 2016, OFP 14, OFP 9, Ejimodu 2014: 2, Benedict 2011: 212-213, the researcher concluded that these conflict management approaches failed to preclude the recurrence of conflict in the mining sectors of South Africa and Nigeria.

Hence, there is need for improvement, reinforcement and restructuring of conflict management systems in both countries. In this sense, the study presents recommendations that could help to actualize these. The research advances new measures that the governments of both countries and their mining companies should adopt to strengthen existing conflict resolution and negotiation. The recommendations are from respondents, existing literature and the researcher's opinion.

6.2 Recommendations for South Africa and Nigeria

The recommendations of this research will be triangulate the views of the participants, Literature and that of the researcher. In this way, the contributions from primary and secondary data as well as views of the researcher will be distinguished. The general discussions of this study had demonstrated that existing conflict management efforts could not preclude recurrence of conflicts in Marikana and Ogoni. The views of MFP 10 who said that the Lonmin and South African Government conflict management approaches were "very poor and not effective". This claim was supported by MFP 13 who emphasized the failure of Lonmin and South Africa in the management of Marikana conflict, Sections 89-92 of the Marikana Commission of Inquiry report 2015 further demonstrated the failure of Lonmin in its Social Labour Plan. In addition, reports in SAnews 05 December 2016 and Daily Maverick 13 December 2016, also recorded the longest mining sector in the history of South Africa after Marikana. This information demonstrated that conflict management strategies adopted by Lonmin and South African Government have failed to preclude conflict in the mining sector of South Africa after Marikana. Similarly in Nigeria, OFP 14 pointed out the Shell and Nigerian government conflict management of Ogoni conflict failed because it is biased. This view was also supported by OFP 9. Other authors such as Ejimodu 2014: 2, Benedict 2011: 212-213 also indicated the failure of their conflict management in Ogoni conflict in their research work. The failure of these conflict management efforts centers on dishonesty, deceitfulness, exploitation and corruption. Ostensibly, from these negative qualities emerge other debilitating variables against proper operationalisation of the existing processes of conflict preclusion in both countries. Unfortunately, one of the serious shortfalls remains the lack of government seriousness to arrest the monster of corruption. Eliminating corruption is strategic to peace if mining companies and governments of both countries want to be sincere with the people. Mining companies and government should restrain from telling lies to the people. Their inactions include abandoned projects and uncompleted assignments. Their inactions include also exhibiting no seriousness towards addressing the concerns of the people.

Thus, this study argues that corruption has hindered the suppression of conflict recurrence in the mining sectors of South Africa and Nigeria. The study therefore advances that mining companies and governments of both countries should increase their efforts towards eradicating corruption, and that there ought to be resolute commitments to eradicate conflict in their mining industries. They should establish a system devoid of selfish political influence, manipulation and interference in government policy decisions and actions, which played out in the conflict management options of both conflicts. In this sense, purging the system of corrupt elements must remain the prerogative if the mining sectors and government sincerely desire a conflict-free mining sector.

In addition, maintenance of public order in the strict sense is the function of the police. However, public disorder manifest differently such that the disorder assumes varying and challenging dimensions. Each dimension requires appropriate and often divergent strategies to deal with in a bid to reduce casualties. It will translate that the effective management of conflict situation demands expertise from the entire police management, planning and enforcement teams. It has been demonstrated in this study that the SAPS conflict management strategy was erroneous according to the MCI report, meaning that the SAPS lacked both the professional training and the ideological capacity to manage Marikana. Hence, this study recommends a more direct and professional training and re-training process for the members of SAPS and the NPF. This could prevent a repeat of what happened at Marikana in South Africa and prevent such situation from recurring in Nigeria and other African countries should they adopt this strategy. Also, recommendations of MFP 4 suggested that South Africa should have effective conflict management practices or conflict resolution systems as well as effective conflict monitoring strategies that could arrest conflict before its manifestation.

In addition, this study also recommends the establishment of a distinctive arm of SAPS that would be saddled with the responsibility of management of public violence such as the Marikana incident. A similar arm known as the MPF exists within the NPF. Within the SAPS, such a response team would play the role the TRT wrongly played at Marikana. Members of this SAPS arm would receive special training in public disorder management apart from their normal police training. To keep members of this arm abreast with new developments, intermittent retraining programmes should form part of their rules of engagement. They would, in addition, be equipped with relevant public disorder management and control gadgets to enable them function optimally when performing their duties.

This study also recommends an overhaul of the leadership of SAPS to strengthen its efficiency and improve effective public policing. In addition, training of the entire leadership of the SAPS is necessary to acquaint them with contemporary public policing tactics and new strategies. Furthermore, appointment of the minster of police affairs and police commissioner should be from the top echelon of qualified members of the SAPS. Such persons should be in possession of impeccable records of accomplishment and proven integrity. If one of the reasons for the strategic error at Marikana centers on the capacity of Riah Phiyega to hold the office of the police commissioner at the time, according to the reports of Marikana Commission of Inquiry, it becomes imperative that government take seriously the issue of appointing suitably qualified and credible persons into this position to avoid a repeat of Marikana. Adopting this measure would go a long way to restore the already battered image of the SAPS. It would also reinstate the confidence of the disappointed public back in the SAPS.

In furtherance, sustainable development means "meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (Nweke 2014: 96). This implies that sustainable development is "progress in human well-being that can be extended or prolonged over many generations rather than just a few years. To be truly enduring, the benefits of sustainable development must be available to all human beings rather than to just the members of a privileged group" (Conningham *et al* 2003: 29). This study thus submits that the answer to the recurrence of conflicts in the mining sectors of both countries lies in the impasse in sustainable development. The corporate and public enterprises are devoid of equitable and fair distribution of resources. Both entities foment systems that benefit some few privileged groups of people at the detriment of the less privileged but larger groups. To this end, MFP 10 suggested that addressing inequality issues in South African mines would to prevent conflict from reoccurring in the sector.

Ensuring sustainable development of the mining communities translates to fair and even distribution of the wealth generated from natural resources. It also means a continuous all-encompassing development process, which addresses the general pressing needs of the system evenly. By extension, it means prioritizing the demands and concerns of the people and adequately addressing them. To be able to tow this line effectively, government must advance policies and execute projects that speed up the process of sustainable development. Achieving sustainable development means enjoying the benefits of this system. If mining companies and governments of both countries should follow strictly the principles of sustainable development, they would be able to enhance, improve and advance human well-being and by extension, reduce or completely preclude conflict recurrence in their mining sectors. Since sustainable development include making progress in the well-being of people (Conningham *et al* 2003: 29), MFP 2 suggested that "fair distribution of resources between companies (company owners) and worker (mineworkers)" at the South African mines would help preclude conflict in the industry.

Arguably, there are existing regulatory bodies and legislations at the disposal of the mining operations in both countries to manage the consequences of their mining activities. However, because the people directly affected by the effects of mining have not received adequate benefits from these bodies and legislations, this study recommends a review in this direction. As mining companies increase, mining activities intensify hence, the intensity of environmental pollution increases. It means that legislations promulgated ten years ago to regulate this area may not effectively be engaged to address issues of present day circumstances. Therefore, it is imperative for periodic review of legislations with regards mining concessions and enterprises to improve efficiency. Similarly, conducting an intermittent restructuring of existing regulatory bodies in both countries is important to check non-performance and redundancy. This study argues that because such negative connotations as mentioned in chapter three and four, informed the replacement of OMPADE with NDDC in Nigeria, it is important to subject the current NDDC and the MHC to immediate restructuring following their non-performance. Restructured MHC and NDDC would increase their performance by tackling conflict triggers and fast tracking the process of development of the areas.

In addition, government must move beyond the SLP prepared by mining companies in the case of South Africa or signing CSR agreement with government to develop host communities in Nigeria. This strategy has not functioned effectively in both case studies. To this end MFP 5 said that "Social Labour Plan are not implemented in the mining host communities" in South Africa. It has failed in both countries to ameliorate the impact of their activities on the people hence the series of agitations. This is so because some of the school projects undertaken by Lonmin at Marikana as mentioned in chapter five for instance were shabbily executed or abandoned when the media spotlight shifted its gaze elsewhere after the protracted conflicts. Apparently, this situation does not represent sustainability or sustainable practice. In fact the Deputy President of South Africa and a director of Lonmin, Cyril Ramaphosa, identified this flaw when he said in the *Daily Maverick* 27 August 2012:

> "We need to think beyond the social and labour plans that mining companies develop. We must measure success not merely by regulatory compliance, but by the tangible differences we make in the lives of people in mining communities. I believe that with the right tools to measure and act on risks before they occur, the financial markets can play a powerful role in supporting sustainable practices. South Africa's yardstick for success cannot be measured in financial and GDP growth alone. We need more inclusive measures" (Pichulik 2012: 1).

Therefore, if unsustainable practices stifle and reduce development efforts of mining companies, it implies the system has failed and as such, prompts the need for restructuring of that system.

Based on the views of respondents and literature, the researcher therefore recommends that the responsibility of deciding on sustainable development projects and drawing the SLP be transferred to a common consensus platform. This idea was supported by MFP 2 who said undertaking such decision should be "an all-inclusive affair." This consensus would be a larger all inclusive platform engaging all stakeholders, including representatives of those directly affected by the consequences of mining, the government, the mine owners and all other relevant government departments where such actions and decisions shall be determined. OFP 10 also supporting this position also suggested that establishing a routine interactive all inclusive forum of all parties in the conflict where the needs of the Ogoni people will be identified and solved will preclude conflict in the area.

Considering the level of risk and vulnerability mineworkers face daily underground, it is imperative, that they are deservedly motivated through certain incentives. Increasing the workers incentives is an important motivation because it carries the potentiality of improving workers performance and increasing company's output. Similarly, Shell should pay adequate compensation to communities and individuals directly affected by oil spills. Because of the fact that existing legislation in Nigeria does not allow Shell to pay compensation for oil spills due to bunkering activities for instance, paying such monies suffer delay or denial. Strengthening these legislations to mandate mining companies in both countries, to pay adequate compensation in instances of operational death, or oil spill, will go a long way in curbing conflict in the mining sectors of both case studies. In strict sense, such compensation will douse frustration, anguish and tension from the effects loss suffered by the people. It also enhances a cordial working relationship between the mining companies and the people directly affected by the negative consequences of their exploration activities.

In addition, while Lonmin's education scheme, the 1608 Education Trust for the children of the fallen Marikana workers is commendable, the researcher recommends that such incentive should be extended to accommodate the children of all mineworkers across South Africa. This would guarantee education for the children of mineworkers particularly for those who cannot afford it. It would also speed up the process of closing the educational inequality persisting in the country.

In a similar manner, providing free and adequate health care for the mineworkers and their families is important. This research recommends Lonmin build a standard clinic in Marikana and across other mining communities and operational environments within the country. The aim is to ensure easy access to adequate health care services whenever the need arises for the miners to do so. The treatment of work-related lung diseases such as silicosis and TB should be free for all mineworkers who have contracted these infections as a consequence of them working in mining environments. In addition, the mining companies should pay commensurate compensation to the mineworkers should their impairment situation become permanent.

Since most of these workers become poor a few months after their disengagement or retirement, it becomes difficult for them to take care of their health needs. The researcher suggests the restructuring of existing national insurance to take care of this period while they enjoy the free health care services provided by mining companies during their active service days. This is important because the national health insurance comprises part of their savings while working. Because they enjoy health insurance with their families while in active service, the funds get quickly depleted and are exhausted within a short period after their disengagement thereby increasing their vulnerability to health challenges.

6.2.1 Further recommendations for Nigeria

In Nigeria, establishing such educational foundations for all school-going age children within the Niger Delta region would secure their future. Since education is an important aspect of development, government should ensure that Shell establishes a functional education funding system to sponsor the education of the children and youth of the Niger Delta. In this direction OFP 7 recommended that the development of the Ogoni will create employment as well as improve the lives of the rural poor people of Ogoni and by extension prevent conflict in the area. Assuring consistency along this trajectory requires legislative backing. In this sense, government should enact such laws that would compel mining companies across the country to establish such education funding systems to guarantee education of the children and youth of the Niger Delta. The long-term effect of this strategy is that it would assist in closing the educational gap and disparity existing in the region when compared to other parts of Nigeria. It would also reduce unemployment and by extension poverty ravaging the area to date. Apart from oil mining companies, the Nigerian government should map out an education funding strategy to help tackle illiteracy in oil producing communities of Niger Delta. In line with this, the researcher recommends that government establish an education fund known as Niger Delta Education Fund (NDEF). Government would be constitutionally obligated to set aside funds for this scheme to secure the education future of the Niger Delta people.

In view of the distortions and controversies surrounding revenue allocation formulae in the county, the study recommends the conception of a realistic and generally acceptable revenue allocation formula. This study advocates the inclusion of representatives of the Niger Delta region as part of revenue allocation decision-making body. Exclusion of these people from this process has created disaffection and distrust between them and government and their policies. It has also aggravated agitations from the region. To this end, OFP 3 said that "involving oil bearing communities in all processes of decision making that affects them" would help solve the problem recurrence of conflict in the Ogoni in particular and Niger Delta in general.

To worsen issues, whatever revenue allocation formula has been adopted by the Nigerian government has not represented any visible transformation of the region. It implies that this conflict preclusion approach has failed. Integrating representatives of this region in the revenue allocation process would restore their confidence in the government. In this respect, OFP 5 suggested that the "prudent management and distribution of resources accruing from the oil industry" should be an important measure to curd conflict. It would also reignite their trust in Shell and the Nigerian government sincerity and seriousness in addressing their concerns.

Since it is clear that the Ogoni conflict originated mostly from consequences of environmental pollution, the most credible option to the end conflict is the implementation of UNEP recommendations and cleaning up the area. To this end, OFP 1 said "The [Nigerian] government and Shell Petroleum Development Company should be more sincere about the real concerns of the people." While according to OFP 8 suggested the speedy clean-up of Ogoniland and creation of employment for the youths, OFP 10 suggested the government should be quick and transparent in the process of implementing the recommendation of UNEP at cleaning up Ogoniland as strategy to preclude conflict in Ogoni. Although the initial stages of the clean-up exercise has commenced in Ogoni, it remains in doubt that this exercise is ever going to be completed. The estimated period of completion of this exercise is thirty years. It means that the completion period covers the eight years of the administrative span of the present Buhari government and that of almost two administrations after him. The question is whether or not successive governments after the Buhari administration are going to continue this project to its logical conclusion. The answer to this question is another prospective area of research.

However, the UNEP recommendations lack the backing of any legislation, which compels Shell and the Nigerian government to complete the exercise. Therefore, the possibility of abandoning the project by successive administrations after Buhari is high. Along this trajectory, this study recommends the provision of a legal backing binding on and compelling Shell and the Nigerian government to complete the reclamation of Ogoniland. The provisions of this legislation would make the complete remediation of Ogoniland, in accordance with the UNEP report, an obligatory responsibility for Shell and the Nigerian government. This in essence would guarantee continuity from successive governments and assure completion of the project.

6.3 The research contributions to knowledge

6.3.1 Creation of wage management system

Negotiation is one of the processes of reconciliation in conflicts. As such, negotiation readily applies during conflicts to secure agreements that could eventually restore peace to the conflicting parties. Findings in this thesis illustrated instances that portrayed negotiation in this sense. In this case, notable negotiation efforts surfaced during and after the conflicts under study. In essence, the issue of wages has persistently represented itself in most mine strikes across mining sector of South Africa as well as in Lonmin (SAnews 05 December 2016, Daily Maverick 13 December 2016). It therefore depicts negotiation as a temporary measure to douse challenges in the conflict situations when these surface. It also means that negotiation dies after achieving such temporary success. To avoid this situation, the researcher suggests the creation of a wage management system through which wage issues receive effective and adequate attention.

Membership of the proposed wage management system would comprise mine owners, their managers, union members, and selected ex-officio mineworkers as members. It would also include government representatives from the Department of Mineral Resources of South Africa, department of labour, and representatives of the chapter nine institutions. The members of the wage management system would decide on the number of representatives from each of these groups into the system. The objective of these people would be to draw a central wage management plan based on the following:

a) Determine the minimum central wage package for all mineworkers considering the risk of mining. Assessment of wages of workers under this platform would be in accordance with what they determine and agree as minimum wage. Other factors to consider would include educational qualification, the type of work and the number of years worked. This would enhance fast eradication of wage discrepancies, which were touted prominently in Marikana conflict. It would also increase production and reduce unnecessary losses during strikes.
b) Regulate the percentage rate of wage increments. The percentage increment shall progress at a fixed ratio or rate, which however would be subject to amendments when serious prevailing economic conditions necessitate it. However, such a situation shall be defined and determined by two thirds of membership of this process. In this way, no party to the process feels cheated or left out of the decision table.
c) Define at what frequency wages are to be increased. This section would specifically outline the duration that would elapse before another increment takes place. If similar economic circumstances inform amendments under this section, in the same as in above, the members of the system would equally decide the direction of the amendments.

6.3.2 Establishment of a conflict management system

Conflict management is a very crucial aspect of every business venture. In fact, it features prominently during business meetings and discussions across the globe. One of the focus areas of several conferences involving multilateral bodies such as the World Economic Forum, is to establish and define the part of businesses in conflict prevention, conflict management and post-conflict rebuilding (Bennett 2002: 394). It means that conflict management has assumed center stage as a serious concern of the global business community. Therefore, it becomes important for businesses investigate and identify what role every business venture plays in conflict prevention.

Apparently, the failure or inability of the conflict prevention methods in Lonmin attests to the inefficiency of the approach. Hence, the researcher suggests that the Governments of South Africa and Nigeria should establishment of conflict management system for their mining industry. This system would be a creation of its members drawn from the areas including; DMR, department of Labour, and representatives of the chapter nine institutions, mine owners or their representatives, union representatives, mine managers, selected mineworkers as ex-officio members and community representatives, for South Africa. For Nigeria, the scenarios is slightly different however, it would comprise of membership from DPR, MNDA, FEPA, department of Labour, Shell owners or their representatives, community representatives and representatives of Nigeria Human Rights Commission (NHRC). These bodies would decide on the number of representatives they would provide.

The objective of this body will be to draw a conflict management system, which deals with conflicts emanating from the mining sectors of South Africa and Nigeria.

It would therefore be the duty of this body to:

- Provide legislation that would guide the enforcement of the system
- Draw a framework through which causes of conflicts are identified
- Design an early conflict warning dictation strategy
- Outline the process and pattern of response or reaction to identified cause
- Define the duties, functions and obligations of each party in the system
- Design post-conflict rebuilding processes
- Provide legislations for reprimands
- Outlining processes of amendments
- Determine selection methods for membership of the department of conflict management

Inferring from the above, the scope of this system shoots from three fundamental broad areas, which would assist mining companies and governments of both countries in understanding the issues bordering on the following:

a) Identify and understand the connection between business of mining industries, government and conflict.

b) Evaluate the ways through which the companies and government can proactively preclude conflict or its recurrence.

c) Evaluate and identify proper or better ways of post-conflict rebuilding.

Identifying and understanding the linkages between business and conflict is that it would assist companies in ascertaining the root causes of conflict. This level would avail mining companies and government the opportunity to analyse the origins of conflict, its stages, the actors and their location. It would also help them to identify conflict-prone situations, and how they would respond to these and in what way. It also means acknowledgement of the other parties concerns. In this sense, the system becomes an instrument of identification of initial conflict warning signs or conflict prone situation. Thus, it makes it easier for mining companies to nip conflict on the bud. In other word, such system enhances the analytical understanding of mining companies and government in dictating early conflict warning signs and addressing them. It implies therefore that identifying and understanding conflict triggers and promptly addressing these is an important key to conflict prevention.

Furthermore, this system would also outline its own various ways and laws that shall guide the process and ways of response the companies adopt to address an identified cause or conflict prone situation. Furthermore, the system should have legislations, which would enforce compliance, outline penalties for defaulters and sanctions where necessary. The legislations would also compel companies to sign an undertaking, which would lead to the revocation of their operating licenses when they default at a certain level they shall determine. The essence of this part is to ensure and assure credible and effective response to conflict triggers to preclude its escalation. In addition, the system should outline suitable strategies to contain full conflicts from escalating. However, the system through effective use of its monitoring systems would preclude such situation from arising.

After a conflict, rebuilding the system becomes a challenge to the stakeholders. In situation of Marikana and Ogoni, rebuilding to heal the wound of the conflict remains an enormous task to the mining companies and the governments of South Africa and Nigeria. This system would outline its own ways and methods of addressing this challenge. In essence, government and mining companies should respond more proactively to conflict rebuilding process.

Apart from drawing the plan, implementation would the constitutional duties of department of conflict management, which would be established and located within the mining companies. The department would function as an independent entity within the mines. It would serve as a middle man between the mining companies and the people as well as between the government and the people. In other words, the department becomes the line connecting the demands of the people with the responses of mining companies and governments of both countries together in a concentric circle. This idea would reduce the incidence the domination of one party in the conflict over the other. Secondly, it would dissipate agitations arising from non-inclusiveness particularly of these groups of people. It would also enhance peaceful working relations between the companies and their host communities. This would increase production and by extension reduce unnecessary down times and loss of money.

Their functions shall include:

a) Ensuring early identification of conflict signs and reporting same to for subsequent response or reaction toward addressing it
b) Evaluating the magnitude of the conflict prone situation
c) Ensuring that the response to the situation is timeous, appropriate and adequate
d) Ensuring that the response served its purpose
e) Making that adequate compensations are paid where necessary
f) Ensuring that companies comply with the rules guiding their actions
g) Ensure proper enforcement of the rules of the system.

The researcher argues that if governments of the two case studies and Lonmin Pty and Shell Petroleum Development Company lost large amounts of money during conflicts, they would be willing to accept a condition or system that would preclude the recurrence of conflicts. Nevertheless, the onus lies on the governments of South Africa and Nigeria to figure out means to its effect its implementation. The study therefore recommends both strategies to other natural resources rich countries as part of the panacea of precluding conflict in their mining sectors.

6.4 Prospective areas for further research

The scope of this research covered conflict management in two internationally known conflicts that took place in two developing/emerging economies in African continent, namely South Africa and Nigeria. The study took comparative views of conflict management approaches adopted before, during and after these conflicts. However, in the course of this research, the researcher found certain prospective areas outside the scope of this study for further research. Little work has been done on these areas.

- Negotiation is one of the conflict management strategies prominently engaged by stakeholders to arrest conflict situations. However, this strategy has failed to preclude the recurrence of conflict in the mining sector of South Africa. Therefore, more research needs to be conducted in this area to find out why it has failed to preclude conflict in the mining industry of South Africa.

  Suggested research topic: The paradox of negotiations: The case of South African mining industry.

- The conflicts at Marikana and Ogoni had some economic implications on the economy of South Africa and Nigeria. In this sense, other researchers could look at the economic implications of the conflicts on their economies as this study was only interested in management of conflict.

  Suggested research topic: An assessment of economic implications of Marikana and Ogoni conflicts.

- Furthermore, not enough research has been conducted on comparative health implications of mining activities on the people of Marikana and Ogoni. Researchers could focus on comparative analysis of health challenges faced by the Marikana and Ogoni people. The research would assess the similarities and differences as well as health vulnerability probability of Marikana and Ogoni people resulting from mining activities.

  Suggested research topic: Mining and health challenges: Vulnerability of Marikana and Ogoni communities.

- In addition, further research could be done in the area of the environmental implications of mining in South Africa and Nigeria. The focus could be between Marikana and Ogoni or it could be broadened to encompass entire mining sectors of both countries.

Suggested research topics: The environmental implications of mining in Marikana and Ogoni, or in the broader sense, Environmental implications of mining activities in South Africa and Nigeria.

Bibliography

Journals

Aaron, K. (2005). Truth without Reconciliation: The Niger Delta and the Continuing Challenge of National Reconciliation. *The Crisis of the State and Regionalism in West Africa: Identity, Citizenship and Conflict. Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA)*. pp. 112-135.

Abas, N. A. H. (2010). Emotional intelligence and conflict management styles. *Unpublished research paper: Master of Science Degree in Applied Psychology, The Graduate School, University of Wisconsin-Stout, Menomonie, Wisconsin: United States of America.*

Abdullahi, A. A., Adekeye, D. S., and Balogun, O. S. (2014). A 'nation' in wilderness: Youth and insurgency in Nigeria. *South Africa Review of Sociology.* Vol. 45, Issue 2, pp. 78-96.

Abegunde, O. (2014). Causal Factors and the Dynamics of Resources Conflict in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Niger Delta and Marikana. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention.* Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 27-36.

Aigbokhan, B. E. (2008). Reconstruction of economic governance in the Niger Delta region in Nigeria: The case of the Niger Delta Development Commission. *Reconstructing economic governance after conflict in resource-rich African countries. Learning from country experiences.* Universität Bremen, pp. 241-280.

Adelman, S. (2015). The Marikana Massacre, the Rule of Law and South Africa's Violent Democracy. *Hague J Rule Law.* Vol. 7, pp. 243-262.

Agbonifo, J. (2014). Beyond Greed and Grievance: Negotiating Political Settlement and Peace in Africa. *Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development*, Issue 4.

Ajodo-Adebanjoko *et al.* (2013). An Assessment of the Niger-Delta Crisis and Nigeria's External Relations - From 1992-2008. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science.* Vol. 3 Number 8, pp. 197-192.

Aka, P. C. (2003). Nigeria since May 1999: Understanding the paradox of civil rule and human rights violations under President Olusegun Obasanjo. *San Diego Int'l LJ.* Vol. 4, pp. 209-276.

Akor. L, (2014). The Transparency International and Nigeria's Corruption Perception Index: Implications for Sustainable Transformation. *Global Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences*, Vol. 3, No. 5, pp. 37-43

Akujuru, C. A (2015). Revenue Allocation in Nigeria and the Dependency on Oil Revenue: The Need for Alternative Solutions. *Global Journal of Arts Humanities and Social Sciences.* Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 19-36.

Al-Busaidi, Z, Q. (2008). A Qualitative Research and its uses in Health Care. *Sultan Qaboos University Medical Journal*, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 11-19.

Allen, J. J., Anderson, C., & Sturmey, P. (2015). Aggression and violence: Definitions and distinctions. *The Wiley Handbook of Violence and Aggression.* UK: John Wiley & Sons.

Alabi, S. A. (2012). Recent Developments in the Niger Delta of Nigeria. *Recent Developments in the Niger Delta of Nigeria.* Vol. 1, pp. 162-169.

Amezaga, J. M., Ro□tting, T. S., Younger, P. L., Nairn, R. W., Noles, A. J., Oyarzún, R., & Quintanilla, J. (2011). A rich vein? Mining and the pursuit of sustainability. *Journal of Environmental Science Technology*, Vol. 45, pp. 21–26

Ite, A. E., Ibok, U. J., Ite, M. U., & Petters, S. W. (2013). Petroleum Exploration and Production: Past and Present Environmental Issues in the Nigeria's Niger Delta. *American Journal of Environmental Protection.* Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 78-90.

Anugwom, A. (2011). Something Mightier: Marginalization, Occult Imaginations and the Youth Conflict in the Oil-Rich Niger Delta. *Africa Spectrum.* Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 3-26.

Aron, K. K. (2006). Human Rights Violation and Environmental Degradation in the Niger-Delta in Elizabeth Porter and Baden Offord (Eds.), *Activating Human Rights.* Pp. 11-19.

Åstrand, C., and Birgersson, L. (2014). "We should be a lot angrier": A case study of the Marikana shootings.

Babalola, D. (2014). The Underdevelopment of Nigeria's Niger Delta Region: Who is to Blame? *Journal of Sustainable Development*. Vol. 7, No. 3; pp. 118–128.

Baghebo, M and Atim, T. O. (2013).The impact of petroleum on economic growth in Nigeria. *Global Business and Economics Research Journal,* Vol. 2, No. 5 pp. 102 - 115

Beer, M., D'inverno, M., Luck, M., Jennings, N., Preist, C., & Schroeder, M. (1999). Negotiation in multi-agent systems. *The Knowledge Engineering Review*, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 285 -289

Benedict, A. O. (2011). Breaking Barriers to Transformation of the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: A Human Development Paradigm. *Journal of Sustainable Development,* Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 210-222

Bennett, J. (2002). Multinational Corporations, Social Responsibility and Conflict. *Journal of International Affairs*. Vol. 55, No 2, pp. 393-410.

Berkowitz, L. (1989). Frustration, Aggression, Examination and Reformation. *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. 106, No.1, pp. 59-73

Boelel, R., Fabig, H., and Wheeler, D. (2001). Shell, Nigeria and the Ogoni: A Study in Unsustainable Development. The story of Shell, Nigeria and the Ogoni People, Environment, Economy, Relationships: Conflict and Prospects for Resolution. *Sustainable Development 9*, pp. 74–86

Botiveau, R. (2014). The Politics of Marikana and South Africa's Changing Labour Relations. *African Affairs*. Vol. 113, No. 450, pp. 128-137.

Bur, G. (2013). Marikana Shootings: Pay Dispute or Crisis of South African Democracy? In *Scientific Periodical of the Military National Security Service.Trade Craft Review,* Special Issue No. 1, pp. 82-92.

Bradshaw, G. and Haines, R. (2014). After Marikana: Rethinking Conflict Resolution in Africa: The South African Case. *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development*. Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 1-16.

Bruce, D. (2016) Commissioners and commanders: Police leadership and Marikana Massacre. *Institute of Security Studies Monograph Series 194*

Cairncross, E., Kisting, S., Liefferink, M., & van Wyk, D. (2013). Case study on Extractive Industries prepared for the Lancet Commission on Global Governance South Africa.

Cairncross, E., Kinting, S. (2016). Platinum and Gold Mining in South Africa: The Context of the Marikana Massacre. *Journal of Environmental and Occupational Health policy.* Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 513-534.

Chenail, R. J. (2011). Interviewing the investigator: Strategies for addressing instrumentation and researcher bias concerns in qualitative research. *The Qualitative Report*, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 255.

Chinguno, C. (2013). Global Issues: Marikana Massacre and Strike Violence Post-Apartheid. *Global Labour Journal*. Vol. 4, Issue 2, pp. 160-166.

Connor, D. F. (2002). *Aggression and antisocial behavior in children and adolescents: Research and treatment.* New York: Guilford Press.

Del Lucchese, F. (2009). *Conflict, power, and multitude in Machiavelli and Spinoza: Tumult and indignation.* Bloomsbury Publishing.

De Jongh, D. and P. Prinsloo: 2005, 'Why Teach Corporate Citizenship Differently? *Journal of Corporate Citizenship*, Vol. 18, pp. 113–122.

Denzin, N. K., and Lincoln. Y. S. (2000). *Hand Book of Qualitative Research(2nd edition).* Thousand Oaks, CA.

Davidheiser, M., & Nyiayaana, K. (2011). Demobilization or Remobilization? The Amnesty Program and the Search for Peace in the Niger Delta. *African Security*. Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 44-64.

Dokpesi, A. O., and Ibiezugbe, M. I. (2012). Assessing the Human Development Efforts of the Niger Delta Development Commission. *Natural Resources, Conflict, and Sustainable Development: Lessons from the Niger Delta. New York: Routledge*. pp. 60-78.

Duncan, J. (2013). South African journalism and the Marikana massacre: A case study of an editorial failure. *The Political Economy of Communication,* Vol 1, No. 2, pp. 65–88

Durand, J. F. (2012). The Impact of gold mining on the Witwatersrand on the river and karst system of Gauteng and North West Province South Africa. *Journal of African Earth Sciences.* Vol. 68, pp. 24-43.

Duru, E. J., and Ogbonnaya, U. M. (2012). The Poverty of Crisis Management Strategies in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: a Focus on the Amnesty Programme. *African Research Review.* Vol. 6, No.2, pp.162-170.

Eccleston, R., and Stubbs, R. (2016). Public Sector Participation and Compliance across National and Global Transparency Regimes. *International Journal of Public Administration.* pp. 1-13.

Edoigiawerie, C., and Spickett, J. (1995). The Impact of Petroleum on the Environment. *African Journal of Health Sciences.* Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 269-276.

Egwemi, V. (2010). From Militancy to Amnesty: Some Thoughts on President Yar'Adua Approach to the Niger Delta Crisis. *Current Research Journal of Economic Theory.* Vol. 2,No. 3, pp. 136-141.

Ejimodu, K. B. O. (2014). Youth Restiveness in the Niger Delta: A Critical Discourse. *SAGE Journal*, pp. 1-12

Ekanem, J. T., Nwachukwu, I., & Etuk, U. R. (2014). Impact of Shell's Sustainable Community Development Approach on the Livelihood Activities of Community Beneficiaries in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. *Journal of Sustainable Society.* Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 7-14.

Elbra, A. D. (2013). The Forgotten Resource Curse: South Africa's Poor Experience with Mineral Extraction. *Resources Policy.* Vol. *38*, Issue 4, pp. 549-557.

Esser, I. M., and Dekker, A. (2008). The Dynamics of Corporate Governance in South Africa: Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment and the Enhancement of Good Corporate Governance Principles. *Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology.* Vol. 3, Issue 3, pp. 157-169.

Eregha, P. B., and Irughe, I. R. (2009). Oil Induced Environmental Degradation in Nigeria's Niger Delta: The Multiplier Effects.*Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa.* Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 160-175.

Fine, B. (2010). Economics and scarcity: with Amartya Seen as point of departure. In L. Mehta (Ed.). *The Limits to Scarcity: Contesting the Politics of Allocation*, Vol. 73-92, pp. 73 -91. London: Earthscan.

Fink, A. S., (2000). The Role of the Researcher in the Qualitative Research Process. A Potential Barrier to Archiving Qualitative Data. Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research, Vol. 1, No. 3, Art. 4, pp.1 69

Frynas, J. G. (2001). Corporate and State Responses to Anti-Oil Protests in the Niger Delta. *African Affairs*. Vol. 100, No. 398, pp. 27-54.

Frynas, J. G. (1998). Political instability and business: focus on Shell in Nigeria. *Third World Quarterly*. Vol. 19, No 3, pp. 457-478.

Faull, A. (2013). Towards a 'New Professionalism' for the South African Police Service. *South African Review of Sociology*. Vol. 44, No. 2, pp. 18-35.

Ganiyu, A., and Okogbule, E. E. (2013). Relationship between Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) and her Host Communities in the Promotion of Community Development in Rivers State, Nigeria. *International Education Research*. Vol. 1, Issue 2, pp. 21-33.

Ganson, B. (2011). Business and Conflict Prevention: Towards a Framework for Action. *Geneva Peace-building Platform, Switzerland*.

Garnett, A. (2015). Australia's 'five pillar economy': mining. The Conversation.

Ge, J., & Lei, Y. (2013). Mining development, income growth and poverty alleviation: A multiplier decomposition technique applied to China. *Resourees Policy*, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 278-287.

Gilbert, L. D. (2013). Revisiting Ethno-Nationalism in the Niger Delta of Nigeria: An Interrogation of its Achievements and Prospects. *International Affairs and Global Strategy*. Vol. 16, pp. 50-56.

Gumede, W. (2015). Marikana: a Crisis of Legitimacy in the Institutions that Form the Foundations of South Africa's 1994 Post-Apartheid Political Settlement. *Social Dynamics*. Vol. 41, Issue 2, pp. 327-343.

Hamann, R. (2004). Corporate Social Responsibility, partnership, and institutional change: the case of mining companies in South Africa. *Natural Resources Forum,* pp. 278-290.

Harrington, J. S., McGlashan, N. D., and Chelkowska, E. Z. (2004). A Century of migrant labour in the gold mines of South Africa. *Journal of the South African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy*, pp. 65-71.

Hassan, I., & Olugbuo, B. (2015). The Justice versus Reconciliation Dichotomy in the Struggle against Gross Human Rights Violations: The Nigerian Experience. *Africa Development*. Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 123-142.

Haymen, J. (2015). Marikana: Analysing Miners' Subjectivity and the Cross of Representation. *Journal of Asian and African Studies,* pp. 127-137.

Holtzhausen, L., and Fourie, L. (2011). Employer–Employee Relationships at Lonmin Platinum: A developing South African Perspective. *Communicatio.* Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 155–172.

Huff and Mehta, L. (2015). The new politics of scarcity: A review of political positioning, current trends and their socioeconomic implications. Institute of Development Studies, UK Conference Paper *(Resource Politics)* 9-12 September 2015

Idemudia, U. (2010). Corporate Social Responsibility and the Rentier Nigerian State: Rethinking the Role of Government and the Possibility of Corporate Social Development in the Niger Delta. *Canadian Journal of Development Studies*. Vol. 30, Nos. 1-2, pp. 131-151.

Ingelson, A., Nwapi, C. (2014). Environmental Impact Assessment Process for Oil, Gas and Mining Projects in Nigeria: A Critical Analysis. *Law, Environment and Development Journal.* Vol. 10, Issue 1, pp. 35-61.

Isidiho, A. O. and Sabran, M. S. B. (2015). Challenges Facing Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) Projects in Imo State and Niger Delta Region in Nigeria. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*. Vol. 5, No. 6, pp. 37-48.

Ite, A. E., Ibok, U. J., Ite, M. U., and Petters, S. W. (2013). Petroleum Exploration and Production: Past and Present Environmental Issues in the Nigeria's Niger Delta. *American Journal of Environmental Protection*, Vol. 1, Issue 4, pp. 78-90

Ite, U. E. (2004). Multi-nationals and Corporate Social Responsibility in Developing Countries: A Case Study of Nigeria. *Journal of Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management.* Vol. 2 No.1, pp. 1-11.

Jadoo, Y. (2012). Mathunjwa "knew miners were going to be killed". Publication in *The Citizen* Newspapers 29-11-2012.

Jenkins, H. and Yakovleva, N. (2006). Corporate social responsibility in the mining industry: Exploring trends in social and environmental disclosure. *Journal of Cleaner Production.* Vol. 14, Issue 3, pp. 271-284.

Kabanoff, B. (1989). Conflict Management Styles: Why is Compromise so Favourably Viewed? *Australian journal of management*, *14*(1), 29-48.

Kadafa, A. A., Zakaria, M. P., Othman, F. (2012). Oil Spillage and Pollution in Nigeria: Organizational Management and Institutional Framework. *Journal of Environment and Earth Science.* Vol. 2, No. 422, pp. 22-30.

Krüger, L. P. (2011). The Impact of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) on South African Business: Focusing on Ten Dimensions of Business Performance. *Southern African Business Review.* Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 207-233.

Kassim, M. A. M., Ibrahim, H. I. (2014). Conflict management styles and organizational commitment: A study among bank employees in Penang. *International Journal of Business, Economics and Law*, Vol. 4, Issue 1, pp. 45-53

Kolk, A., & Lenfant, F. (2010). MNC reporting on CSR and conflict in Central Africa. *Journal of Business Ethics,* Vol. 93, pp. 241-255.

Ladan-Baki, A. S. (2014). Corruption and security challenges in developing countries. *International Journal of Politics and Good Governance.* Vol. 5, No. 5.2 Quarter II, pp. 1-19

Leithwood, K., Jantzi, D. (2006). Transformational school leadership for large-scale reform: Effects on students, teachers, and their classroom practice. School effectiveness and school improvement, *Ontario Institute for Studies in Education*. Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 201-227.

Manby, B. (2000). Shell in Nigeria: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Ogoni Crisis. *New York: Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs*, Vol. 8 pp., 1-15.

Mähler, A. (2012). An Inescapable Curse? Resource Management, Violent Conflict, and Peacebuilding in the Niger Delta. *High-Value Natural Resources and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, pp. 391-412

Marobela, M. N. (2014). Industrial relations in Botswana- workplace conflict: behind the Diamond sparkle. *Emerald Emerging Markets Case Studies*, Vol. 4, Is. 2, pp. 1 - 16

Marobela, M. (2009), "*Labour relations in Botswana's small business-real employment of disguised unemployment*", in Gupta, M.S. (Ed.), Labour and Sustainable Development, Serials Publications, New Delhi.

Margolis, J. (2011). Miners vs. Farmers in Australia. PRI The World Post 05-10-2011. Available at https://www.pri.org/stories/2011-10-05/miners-vs-farmers-australia. Accessed 12/05/2017

Mason, C. M., Paxton, G., Parsons, R., Parr, J. M., & Moffat, K. (2014). "For the benefit of Australians": Exploring national expectations of the mining industry. *Resources Policy*, Vol. 41, pp. 1-8.

Mengesha, D. A. (2016). The Role of Sidama Indigenous Institutions in Conflict Resolution: In the case of Dalle Woreda Southern Ethiopia. *American Journal of Sociological Research*, Vol. 6, No 1, pp. 10-26.

Mohautse, M. S. (2014). The Economic and Political Ramifications of Inequality in Post-Apartheid South Africa. *Journal of Economics and Behavioural Studies*. Vol. 6,No. 9, pp. 690-699.

McMichael, C. (2014). Police wars and state repression in South Africa. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*. Vol.5, Issue 1, pp. 3-16.

Molate, M. C., de Klerk. M., and Ferreira, P. (2014). Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosures by South African Mining Companies: The Marikana Massacre. *Corporate Ownership & Control.* Vol. 11, Issue 4, pp. 311-321.

Munik, V. (2010). The Social and Environmental Consequences of Coal Mining in South Africa: A Case Study. Environmental Monitoring Group, Amsterdam Netherlands.

Muswaka, L. (2014). Thematic Lessons from the Marikana Miners' Strike in South Africa: A Corporate Governance Perspective. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences.* Vol. 5, No 2, pp. 63-67.

Naanen, B. (1995). Oil Producing Minorities and the Restructuring of Nigerian Federalism: The Case of the Ogoni People. *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics.* Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 45–78.

Nash, A. (2015). Marikana's path. *Social Dynamics*, Vol. *41*, No. 2, pp. 387-391.

Newell, P. and J. G. Frynas: 2007, 'Beyond CSR? Business, Poverty and Social Justice: An Introduction', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 669–681

Ngcebetsha, T., and Nomazizi, J. (2015). Revisiting Ubuntu in the Midst of a Violent Conflict: Reflections on the Marikana Tragedy in South Africa. *Journal of International Relations and Diplomacy.* Vol. 3, No. 8, pp. 520-546.

Ngcukatobi, T. (2013). Strike Law, Structural Violence and Inequality in the Platinum Hills of Marikana. *Industrial Law Journal*, Issue 1, pp. 836-858.

Nnorom, K. and Odigbo, J. (2015). Amnesty Programme and the Challenge of Poverty and Insecurity in the Niger- Delta of Nigeria. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 207-216.

Nwankwo, B. O. (2015). The Politics of Conflict over Oil in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: A Review of the Corporate Social Responsibility Strategies of the Oil Companies. American Journal of Educational Research, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 383-392.

Nwapi, C. (2010). A legislative proposal for public participation in oil and gas decision-making in Nigeria. Journal of African Law, Vol.54, No. 02, pp. 184-211

Nweke, K. (2014). The Politics of sustainable development in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria: An appraisal of the role of the state and multinational corporations. 1993-2008. *OIDA International Journal of Sustainable Development.* Vol. 7, No.12, pp. 95-110.

Obi, C. (2014). Oil and the Post-Amnesty Programme (PAP): What Prospects for Sustainable Development and Peace in the Niger Delta? *Review of African Political Economy.* Vol. 41. No. 140, pp. 249-263.

Obi, C. (2010). Oil extraction, Dispossession, Resistance, and Conflict in Nigeria's Oil-Rich Niger Delta. *Canadian Journal of Development Studies.* Vol. 30, Nos. 1-2, pp. 219-236.

Obi, C. (1997). Globalisation and Local Resistance: The Case of the Ogoni versus Shell. *New Political Economy.* Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 137-148.

Ogbeidi, M. (2012). Political Leadership and Corruption in Nigeria Since 1960: A Socio -economic Analysis. *Journal of Nigeria Studies,* Vol.1, No. 2, pp. 1-25

Ogbodo, C. Y., Egbunike, F. C., and Okoye-Nebo, C. (2015).The Complementary Role of NDDC and NDE in Achieving Sustainable Economic Growth for Nigeria. *Developing Country Studies.* Vol.5, No.11, pp. 117-130.

Ojakorotu, V. (2006). Youth Militancy and Development Efforts in African Multiethnic Society. *Instituto Galego de Estudos de Segurança Internacional e da Paz.* Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 229-242.

Ojukwu-Ogba, N. E. (2009). Legislating Development in Nigeria's Oil-Producing Region: The NDDC Act Seven Years On. *African Journal of International & Comparative Law.* Vol. 17, pp. 136-158.

Okoh, G. A. (2014). Grievance and conflict in Ghana's gold mining industry: The case of Obuasi. *Futures,* Vol. 62, pp. 51-57

Okolo, P. O. (2014). NDDC, Conflict, Peace–Building and Community Development in the Niger Delta Region. *Global Journal of Political Science and Administration.* Vol. 1, pp. 36-51.

Oliver, E. P and Marwell, G. (1992). Mobilizing technologies for collective action in Frontiers in social movement theory, Morris and Muller (Eds). Yale University Press, London.

Okumagba, P. O., and Okereica, O. P. (2012). The Politics of Oil and the Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan: Its Workability and the Option of Political Goodwill. *AFR REV IJAH: An International Journal of Arts and Humanities*. Vol. 1, No.1, pp. 277-287.

Olowu, D. (2010). From Defiance to Engagement: An Evaluation of Shell's Approach to Conflict Resolution in the Niger Delta. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 10, No.3, pp. 75-100.

O'Meara, D. (1975). The 1946 African Mine Workers' Strike and the Political Economy of South Africa. *Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*. Issue 13. Vol. 2, pp. 146-173.

Omotola, J. S. (2007). From the OMPADEC to the NDDC: An Assessment of State Responses to Environmental Insecurity in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. *Africa Today*. Vol. 54, No.1, pp. 73-89.

Opukri, C. O., and Ibaba, S. I. (2008). Oil Induced Environmental Degradation and Internal Population Displacement in the Nigeria's Niger Delta. *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa*. Vol. 9, Issue 4, pp. 173-193.

Otega, O. and Salleh, D. (2015). Nigeria Niger Delta: Innovation for Sustainable Development. *Asia Pacific Journal of Education, Arts and Sciences*. Vol. 2 No. 4, pp. 41-55.

Palinkas, L. A., Horwitz, S. M., Carla A. Green, C. A., Wisdom, J. P., Duan, N., Hoagwood, K. (2016) Purposeful sampling for qualitative data collection and analysis in mixed method implementation research. *Adm Policy Ment Health, Vol* 42, No. 5, pp. 533–544

Patel, L. and Graham, L. (2012). How Broad-Based is Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment? *Development Southern Africa*. Vol. 29 No. 2, pp. 193-207.

Pesmatzoglou, D., Nikolaou, I. E., Evangelinos, K. I., and Allan, S. (2014). Extractive multinationals and corporate social responsibility: A commitment towards achieving the goals of sustainable development or only a management strategy? *Journal of International Development*. Vol. 26 No. 2, pp. 187-206.

Phillips, J. I., Nelson, G., Vorajee, N., Murray, J., Ndlovu, N. and Davies, J. C. A. (2014). Marikana autopsies highlights occupational diseases among platinum mine workers. *Occupational Health South Africa*, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 6-12.

Polit, D.F., Beck, C.T. and Hungler, B.P. (2001), Essentials of Nursing Research: Methods, Appraisal and Utilization. 5th Ed., Philadelphia: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins

Pyagbara, L. S. (2007). The Adverse Impacts of Oil Pollution on the Environment and Wellbeing of a Local Indigenous Community: The Experience of the Ogoni People of Nigeria. Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP). International Expert Group Meeting on Indigenous Peoples and Protection of the Environment Khabarovsk, Russian Federation August 27.-29, 2007

Rapatsa, M. J and Matloga, N. S (2014). The Practice of Strikes in South Africa: Lessons from the Marikana Quagmire. *Journal of Business Management & Social Sciences Research* Vol. 3, No. 5, pp. 112-126.

Rahim, M. A. (1985). A strategy for managing conflict in complex organizations. *Human Relations*. Vol. *38,* No.1, pp. 81-89.

Resnik, D. B. (2011). What is ethics in research & why is it important. *The National Institute of Health, USA*

Rodny-Gumede, Y. (2015). Coverage of Marikana: war and conflict and the case for Peace Journalism. *Journal of African Studies*. Vol. 41, Issue 2. Pp. 359-374.

Sander, M. (2016). The rise of governments in global oil governance: Historical dynamics, transaction cost economics, and contemporary implications. *Energy Research & Social Science*. Vol. 17, pp. 82-93.

Satgar, V. (2014). Beyond Marikana: The Post-Apartheid South African State. *African Spectrum*. Vol. 47, Issue 2-3, pp. 33-62.

Senewo, I. D. (2015). The Ogoni Bill of Rights (OBR) Extent of actualization 25 years later. *The Extractive Industries and Society*. Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 664-670.

Shi, X. (2013). China's small coal mine policy in the 2000s: a case study of trusteeship and consolidation. Resources Policy, Vol. 38 No. 4, pp. 598-604

Sinwell, L. (2015). Autonomous Workers Committee in Marikana, South Africa: *Journal of the Monitor.* Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 190-206.

Sorensen, P. (2012). Sustainable Development in Mining Companies in South Africa. *International Journal of Environmental Studies.* Vol. 69 No. 1, pp. 21-40.

Sorensen, P. (2011a). Legislative Transformation of South African Mining since 1994: What Progress? *International Journal of Environmental Studies.* Vol. 68, No. 2, pp. 171-190.

Sorensen, P. (2011b). Mining in South Africa: A Mature Industry? *International Journal of Environmental Studies.* Vol. 68, No. 5, pp. 625-649.

Stewart, F., Holdstock, D., and Jarquin, A. (2002). Root Causes of Violent Conflict in Developing Countries: A Commentary. *British Medical Journal*, Vol. 324, Issue 7333, pp. 342-345.

Suris, A., Lind, L., Emmett, G., Borman, P. D., Kashner, M., & Barratt, E. S. (2004). Measures of aggressive behavior: Overview of clinical and research instruments. *Aggression and Violent Behaviour*, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 165-227.

Tenza, M. (2015). An investigation into the causes of violent strikes in South Africa: Some lessons from foreign law and possible solutions. *Law, Democracy & Development,* Vol. 15, pp. 211-231

Themnér, L., and Wallenstein, P. (2014). Armed Conflicts, 1946–2013. *Journal of Peace Research.* Vol. 5, Issue 4, pp. 541-554.

Thomas, K. W. (1992). Conflict and Conflict Management: Reflections and Update. *Journal of Organizational Behavior.* Vol. 13, pp. 265-274.

Twala, C. (2012). The Marikana Massacre: A Historical Overview of the Labour Unrest in the Mining Sector in South Africa. *Southern Africa Peace and Security Studies.* Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 61-67.

Udosen, C., Etok, A. S., and George, I. N. (2009). Fifty Years of Oil Exploration in Nigeria: The Paradox of Plenty. *Global Journal of Social Sciences* Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 37-47.

Ugo, C, S and Ukpere, (2010). W. I. Oil politics and the Niger Delta developmental conundrum. *African Journal of Business Management,* Vol. 4, No. 6, pp. 1166-1174

Ukala, E. (2010). Gas Flaring in Nigeria's Niger Delta: Failed Promises and Reviving Community Voices. *Washington Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment.* Vol. 2, Issue 2, pp. 97-126.

Urkidi, L. (2010). A glocal environmental movement against gold mining: Pascua–Lama in Chile. *Ecological Economics,* Vol. 70, No. 2, pp. 219-227.

Usoro, A. A., Ekpenyong, E. O., Efiong, C. (2014). Conflict Management: The Nigerian Government's Strategies and the Question of Enduring Peace. *Journal of Business and· Management Research,* Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 138-149

Van Graan J and Ukpere W. I. (2012). The role of Impact Evaluation on Service Delivery within the Public Sector Organizations. *African Journal of Business Management.* Vol. 6, No. 39, pp.10445-10457.

Yang, C. (2010). Less Blood for Oil: Nigeria's Fragile Amnesty. *Harvard International Review.* Vol. 31 No. 4, pp. 6-10.

Wan, P. M. J. (2014). Environmental justices and injustices of large-scale gold mining in Ghana: A study of three communities near Obuasi. *The Extractive Industries and Society*, Vol.1, No. 1, pp. 38-47

Wasserman, H. (2015). Marikana and the Media: Acts of Citizenship and a Faith in Democracy-to-Come. *Social Dynamics*. Vol. 41, Issue 2, pp. 375-386.

Watts, M. (2004). Resource Curse? Governmentality, Oil and Power in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. *Geopolitics,* Vol. 9, Issue 1, pp. 50-80.

Wheeler, D., Fabig, H., and Boele, R. (2002). Paradox and Dilemmas for Stakeholder Responsive Firms in the Extractive Sector: Lessons from the Case of Shell in the Ogoni. *Journal of Business Ethics.* Vol. 39, pp. 297–318.

Zondi, Z. V., and Ukpere, W. I. (2014). Police brutality in post-apartheid South Africa reviewed. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences.* Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 574-579.

Books

Alexander, P. (2013). The massacre: A narrative account based on workers' testimonies. In *Marikana: A View from the Mountain and a Case to Answer*. Jacana Media (Pty) Ltd.

Anstey, M. (2008). *Managing Change-Negotiating Conflict*. Juta and Company Ltd.

Bernard, H. R. (2013). *Social Research Methods Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*. SAGE publishers, London.

Braun, V., and Clarke, V. (2013). *Successful Qualitative Research: A Practical Guide for Beginners*. SAGE Publishers, London.

Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996.

Creswell, J. W. (2014). *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*. (Fourth Edition). SAGE publishers, London.

Creswell, J. W. (2007). *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches*. SAGE Publications, London. Second Edition.

Cunningham, W. P., Cunningham, M.A., & Saigo, B.W. (2003). *Environmental Science: A global concern* (Seventh edition). New York: McGraw Hill.

Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (2005). Introduction: The Discipline and Practice of Qualitative Research. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (eds.), *Handbook of Qualitative Research* (3rd edition). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Dougherty, J.E. and R.L Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (2001). *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comparative Survey*. New York: Longman.

Duru, E. S. C. (2010). *Oil Multinationals and the Niger Delta Crisis: Issues and Perspectives*. Abuja: Thumbprints International Company.

Franzosi. R.P. (2006). *Tools for Qualitative Data Analysis, in Handbook of data analysis*.

Hardy and Bryman (Ed), SAGE Publications London.

Gedicks, A. (2001). *Resource rebels: Native challenges to mining and oil corporations.* South End Press.

Hartford, G. (2013). The Mining Industry Strikes: Causes- and Solutions? In *We are going to kill each other today: The Marikana Story.* Tafelberg Publishers South Africa.

Hesse-Biber, S. N. and Leavy, P. (2011). *The practice of Qualitative research.* (Second edition). SAGE Publishers, London.

Ike, O., and Oronto, D. (2001). *Where Vultures Feast: Shell, Human Rights, and Oil in the Niger Delta.* New York: Series Club Books.

Ikein, A. A. (1990). *The Impact of Oil on a Developing Country: the Case of Nigeria.* Praeger New York.

Khan, S. A. (1994). *Nigeria: The Political Economy of Oil.* Oxford Institute for Energy Studies Oxford University Press: Oxford.

Kestner, P. B., and Ray, L. (2002). *The Conflict Resolution Training Program.* Jossy-Bass Publishers USA.

Kumar, R. (2005). *Research Methodology: A Step-By-Step Guide for Beginners.* SAGE Publishers, London.

Lekgowa, T., Botsang, M., Luke, S and Bongani, X.(2013). Interview with mine worker. In *Marikana: A view from the mountain and a case to answer.* Jacana Media (Pty) Ltd.

Ledwaba, L. (2013). *Guns and Spears: Setting the Stage.* In *We are going to kill each other today: The Marikana Story.* Tafelberg Publishers South Africa.

Ledwaba, L. (2013). We are ending this today. In *We are going to kill each other today: The Marikana Story*, Tafelberg Publishers South Africa.

Maree, K. (2010). *First Steps in Research.* Van Schaik Publishers, Pretoria.

Marshall, C., and Rossman, G. B. (2011). *Designing Qualitative Research.* (Fifth Edition). SAGE Publishers, London.

Mbeki, M, (2009). *Architects of Poverty.* Pan MacMillan, South Africa.

Miall, H., Ramsbotham, O., and Woodhouse, T. (2004). *Contemporary Conflict Resolution.* Polity Press, UK.

Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), (2008). *UNEP-Ogoni Engagements: The Failures, the Opportunities.* MOSOP Publications.

Mukoro, A. (2010). *Governance failure, civil societies and the Niger Delta* in *Anatomy of the Niger Delta Crisis: Causes, Consequences and Opportunities for Peace* Ojakorotu, V. (Ed), African Politics Volume 3, Transaction Publishers, London.

Nwachukwu, I. (2008). *Planning and Evaluation of Agricultural and Rural Development Projects.* Umuahia, Lamb House Publishers, Nigeria.

Obi, C. (2006). *Youths and the Generational Dimensions to Struggles for Resource Control in the Niger Delta: Prospects for the Nation-State Project in Nigeria.* Monograph Series CODESRIA. Imprimerie Saint Paul, Dakar, Senegal.

Oboreh, J. S. (2010). The Origin and the Causes of Crises in the Niger Delta: The Way Forward. In *Anatomy of the Niger Delta Crises: Causes, Consequences and Opportunities for Peace* Ojakorotu, V. (Ed), African Politics Volume 3, Transaction Publishers, London.

Ojakorotu, V., and Morake N. L. (2010). Nigerian Leaders in the 1990s and Politics of Oil in the Niger Delta. In *Anatomy of the Niger Delta Crises; Causes, Consequences and Opportunities for Peace".* African Politics Vol. 3, Transaction Publishers, London.

Ojakorotu, V. (Ed) (2010). Introduction in "*Anatomy of the Niger Delta Crises; Causes, Consequences and Opportunities for Peace".* African Politics Vol. 3, Transaction Publishers, London.

Okonta, I. (2008). *When citizens revolt: Nigerian elites, big oil, and the Ogoni struggle for self-determination.* Africa World Press.

Okonta, I., & Douglas, O. (2003). *Where vultures feast: Shell, human rights, and oil in the Niger Delta.* Verso.

Omeje, K. C. (2006). *High stakes and stakeholders: Oil conflict and security in Nigeria.* Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.

Punch, F K (1988). *Introduction to Social Research: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*. SAGE Publishers London.

Rahim, M. A. (2010). *Managing conflict in organizations*. Transaction Publishers.

Ramphele, M. (2008). *Laying ghosts to rest: Dilemmas of the transformation in South Africa*. Nb Pub Limited.

Raymond, M. Lee and Fielding. N.G. (2006). Tools for Qualitative Data Analysis, in *Handbook of data analysis*. Hardy and Bryman (Ed), SAGE Publications London.

Reje, A. (2013). *Niger Delta Conflict and the Way Forward: An Option for Non-Violent Approaches*. Chalfont Publishers Nigeria.

Roberts, N. F. (2000). *The State, Accumulation and Violence: The Politics of Environmental Security in Nigeria's Oil Producing Areas*. Nigerian Institute of Social Economic Research (NISER), Monograph Series 17.

Saba, A. (2013). The Man in Green Blanket, in *We are going to kill each other today: The Marikana Story*. Tafelberg Publishers South Africa.

Saliu, H. A. (Ed.). (2005). *Nigeria under Democratic Rule, 1999-2003* (Vol. 2). University Press PLC.

Saro-Wiwa, K. (1992). *Genocide in Nigeria: The Ogoni Tragedy*. Port Harcourt, Nigeria.

Sholarin, E. A., and Awange, J. L. (2015). Case Study of Environmental Projects in Developing Countries. In *Environmental Project Management* (pp. 387-392). Springer International Publishing.

Tracy, S. J. (2013). *Qualitative Research Methods*. UK: Wiley-Blackwell.

Umeh, S. R. (2012). *Oil Politics in Nigeria and the Niger Delta Crisis*. Solar Publisher Nigeria

Umukoro, F. G. (2010). Politicisation and Underdevelopment of the Niger Delta Region. In *Anatomy of the Niger Delta Crisis: Causes, Consequences and Opportunities for Peace* Ojakorotu (Ed), Africa Politics Volume 3, Transaction Publishers, London

Sinwell, L. *et al.* (2012). Introduction: Encounters in Marikana. In *"Marikana: A view from the mountain and a case to answer.* Jacana Media (Pty) Ltd.

Wallenstein, P. (2012). *Understanding Conflict Resolution:* (3rd Edition). SAGE Publishers.

Van Aarde, M. C. (1999). Conflict Management in the Management of Employment Relations: Organisational Level Perspectives. LexisNexis Butterworths Publishers Durban, South Africa.

Dissertations and Seminar papers

Bench Marks Foundation (2009), Corporate Social Responsibility in the Diamond Mining Industry in Botswana, De Beers, Botswana and the Control of the Country, Bench Marks Foundation, Johannesburg.

Burkhardt, P. (2014). Platinum talks seek to end longest South African mine strike. A Mail & Guardian Newspaper publication 23 April 2014.

Courson, E.(2009). Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND): Political Marginalization, Repression and Petro-Insurgency in the Niger Delta. Discussion Paper 47, Nordiska Afrikanstitutet, Uppsala.

Enemaku, S. O. (2006). Community Relations and Oil-Related Conflicts in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. Paper presented at a seminar on "Norway, Nigeria and Oil", Organized by the Norwegian Council for Africa, Oslo.

Ihezue, C. O. (2016). The Applicability of Societal Marketing Concept By Multinational Oil Companies (A Study of Shell and Chevron in Niger Delta Region) (Doctoral dissertation).

Obi, C. (2006). *Youths and the Generational Dimensions to Struggles for Resource Control in the Niger Delta: Prospects for the Nation-State Project in Nigeria.* Monograph Series CODESRIA. Imprimerie Saint Paul, Dakar, Senegal.

Smallwood, J. J. (2012). Health, Safety and Environmental Implications in Nigeria's Oil and Gas Industry (Doctoral dissertation, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University Port Elizabeth South Africa).

Newspapers and Magazines

Atumah, S. (2016). Justice, Ogoniland Remediation Et Al. A Vanguard Newspaper Publication 23 April 2016.

Chinwo, E. (2016). Ogoni Traditional Rulers Kick as Army Arrests Yeghe Leader, Gbaranee. This Day Newspapers on 25 May 2016.

City Press, 2 September 2012.

Comrie. S. (2016). Mines of death. Citi Press Newspapers 05-08-2016.

Daily Post 28 January 2016.

Daniel, S. (2014). FG spent N243bn on Amnesty in 5yrs-Kuku. Vanguard Newspapers 18 February 2014.

Dube, D. (2012). Locals, Lonmin Fight. New Age Newspapers 12 June 2015, pp. 1.

Evans, S. (2015) Remembering Marikana: Three Years On. The Mail & Guardian Newspapers 12 August 2015, pp. 5.

Fine, B. and Ashman, S. (2012). South Africa: The meaning of Marikana. *Think Africa Press.*

Hammer, J. (1996). Nigeria crude. Harper's Magazine 15 June 1996, pp. 6.

Mafisa, I. (2015). Changes since Marikana. The New Age Newspapers 18 July 2015.

Mhlanga, Z. (2015). Widows Want Compensation. New Age Newspaper 09 August 2015.

Mkentane, L., and Rantlha, T. (2012). Lonmin Workers Dump Unions in Talks with Mine. The New Age Newspapers 29 August 2012, pp. 1.

Mosomane, P. (2012). Mining question: How Responsible is the Sector?" The New Age Newspaper 13 September 2012, pp. 4.

Ndubuisi, F. (2016). 7,556 Beneficiaries to Exit Amnesty Programme in 2016. This Day Newspapers 16 April 2016, pp. 1.

Niger Delta amnesty programme has transformed ex-agitators-Boro. Premium Times 20 August 2016, pp. 5.

Nwachukwu, O. J. (2016a). Ogoni: MOSOP petitions Buhari, NASS over military attack. Daily Post Newspapers 03 March 2016.

Nwachukwu, O. J. (2016b). Buhari has done more in one year for us than Jonathan did in eight years. Daily Post Newspapers 08 September 2016, pp. 2.

Osamgbi, I. (2005). Nigeria: Kuka Appointed to Reconcile Ogoni, Shell. This Day News Papers 01 June 2005.

Radebe, S. (2014). Tension Builds over Lonmin BEE Deal. New Age Newspaper on 05/12/2014.

Rantlha, T. (2012). Tension as Lonmin Wage Talks Remain deadlock. New Age Newspaper on 31 August 2012, pp. 2.

Rice, X. (2009). Nigeria begins amnesty for Niger Delta militants. The Guardian Newspaper 6 August 2009, pp. 6.

The Punch Newspapers, June 11, 2007, pp. 9.

The Guardian Newspaper, (2006). Oil 50 years on. Tuesday 13 June 2006, pp.16.

Thiergärtner, H. and Holtzmann, K. (2012). Mathematically Aided Risk Assessment of Crude Oil Contamination in Ogoni, Nigeria. Oil and Gas European Magazine.

Tcrerai, E. (2015). Houses for Marikana. New Age Newspapers 17 August 2015. Vanguard News Papers of 06 March 2007

Uzochukwu, M (2015). What Are the Problems Facing Nigeria Today? An Observer Newspaper publication 09 May 2015

Van Der Berg, S. (2010). Current poverty and income distribution in the context of South African history. Stellenbosch Economic Working Papers: 22/10.

Van Teijlingen, E. (2014). Semi-structured interviews, Bournemouth University Press.

Wetland & Riparian Habitat Delineation and Assessment, Lonmin Marikana Mine, North West. Wetland Consulting Services (Pty) Ltd. December 2013.

Unpublished Materials

Chinguno, C. (2013). Marikana and the post-apartheid workplace order. Society, Work and Development Institute (SWOP), Working Paper, (1).

Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis Daily Briefings of 28 August 2012.

Ejibunu, T. (2007). Nigeria's Niger Delta Crisis: Root causes of Peacelessness. EPU Research Papers, Issue 07/07.

Francis, P., LaPin, D., & Rossiasco, P. (2011). Securing Development and Peace in the Niger Delta: A Social and Conflict Analysis for Change. Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars Africa Programme, Washington DC.

Francis, P., and Sardesai, S. (2008). Republic of Nigeria: Niger Delta Social and Conflict Analysis. World Bank, pp. 1-82.

Frynas, J. G. (2000). Oil in Nigeria: Conflict and Litigation between Oil Companies and Village Communities. LIT: Muenster.

Holtzhausen, L. (2008). Employee Perceptions of Symbolic Corporate Identity Elements and Employer Employee Relationships at Lonmin Platinum. PhD thesis, North-West University.

Ibeanu, O.O. (nd). Insurgent Civil Society and Democracy in Nigeria: Ogoni Encounters with the State, 1990-1998. Research Report for ICSAG Programme of the Centre for Research and Development (CRD), Kano.

Idemudia, U. (2007). Corporate Partnerships and Community Development in the Nigerian Oil Industry Strengths and Limitations. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) Programme Paper.

Leon, P. (2012). Marikana, Mangaung and the South African Mining Industries. Address to the South African Institute of International Affairs in Cape Town on 30 August 2012.

McKenzie, A. R. (2013). Financialization and Labor: What Does Marikana Tell Us About Inequality in South Africa? No. 1305.

Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). (2004). Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan: Draft 3. Directorate of Planning, NDDC, Port Harcourt.

Obi, C. (2008). Nigerians and Niger Delta: Understanding the Complex Drivers of Conflict. Lecture Series on African Security hosted by The Nordic Africa Institute and the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI).

Obi, C. (2002). Ropes of Oil: Ethnic Minority Agitation and the Spectre of National Disintegration in Nigeria. Paper presented at Flawn Academic Center, University of Texas, pp. 29-31.

Ogoni Bill of Rights (November, 1990).

Osha. S, (2004). Birth of the Ogoni Protest Movement. Center for Civil Society Research.

Report No. 33, Centre for Civil Society University of KwaZulu-Natal.

Osuaka, A. I. (2007). Oil and Gas Revenues and Development Challenges for the Niger Delta and Nigeria. Paper presented at the Expert Group Meeting on the Use of Non-Renewable Resource Revenues for Sustainable Local Development Organised by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs on 21 September 2007, UN Headquarters, New York.

Regulation 42 of the Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Regulations, 2004, published in Government Gazette 26275, 23 April 2004.

Saro-Wiwa, K. B. (1968). The Ogoni Nationality Today and Tomorrow. A Publication of the Ogoni Divisional Union, Lagos. 20 April 1968.

Ukoli, M. K. (2001). Environmental factors in the management of the oil and gas industry in Nigeria. Theme: Resource endowment, growth and macroeconomic management in Nigeria: proceedings of the 10th Annual Conference of Zonal Research Units, at Imo Concorde Hotel, Owerri, Imo State 4th - 8th June, 2001.

Warries, T. (2004). South Africa: tension among the unions on the road to Mangaung. A weekly brief of the South African Institute of Security Studies on Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis (CPRA) - Pretoria. Tuesday, 28 August 2012, Week 33, p. 1. The author compiled the report of the briefing as a member of the research team 2004, published in Government Gazette 26275, (23 April 2004).

Internet Sources

Aaronson, S. A. (2011). Limited Partnership: Business, Government, Civil Society and the Public in the Extractive Industries Transparency initiative. Public Administrative Development. Vol. 31, pp. 50-63. Available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/3947795/susanpaad.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAJ56TQJRTWSMTNPEA&Expires=1467118691&Signature=jSFUGObVfEKdZWs70wS%2FVaL009M%3D&response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DLimited_Partnership_Business_government.pdf Accessed 13/01/2016.

About Us: Department of Mineral Resources. Available at http://www.dmr.gov.za/about-us.html. Accessed 16/10/2015.

Amnesty International (2015). South Africa: President Zuma must urgently make Marikana findings public. 30 March 2015. Available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/03/south-africa-president-zuma-marikana-findings/. Accessed 20/06/2016

Amnesty International (2016). South Africa: Four years after Marikana killings, Lonmin fails to improve 'appalling' housing for thousands of workers.15 August 2016. Available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/08/south-africa-four-years-after-marikana-killings-lonmin-fails-to-improve-appalling-housing-for-thousands-of-workers/. Accessed 27/08/2016.

Building Bridges. Lonmin 2014 Annual Sustainable development Report. Available at http://sd-report.lonmin.com/2014/lonmin-in-context/evolution-of-the-strategy/. Accesses 12/05/2016.

Bruce, D. (2015). 'Mthethwa set the scene at Marikana.' Mail& Guardian 10 July 2015. http://mg.co.za/article/2015-07-11-mthethwa-set-the-scene-at-marikana. Accessed 11-01-2016.

Canel, E. (1997) New Social Movement Theory and Resource Mobilization Theory: The Need for Integration. Available at http://www.inp.uw.edu.plE. Accessed 20/03/2015.

Chinguno, C. (2013). Global Issues: Marikana Massacre and Strike Violence Post-Apartheid. Available at file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/useer/My%20Documents/Downloads/1138-1394-1-PB.pdf. Accessed 07-03-2015.

Communities in the Platinum Belt Minefields. A Review of Platinum Mining in the Bojanala District of the North West Province: A participatory Action Research Approach (PRA). A policy publication by the Bench Mark Foundations 2012. Available at http://www.benchmarks.org.za/research/rustenburg_review_policy_gap_final_aug_2012.Pdf. Accessed 10/02/2016.

Corruption in High Places. A speech made by Ken Saro-Wiwa during his trial in 1995. http://www.unitedijawstates.com. Accessed 20-03-2015.

Department of Labour 2011 annual industrial action report. Available at http://www.labour.gov.za/DOL/downloads/documents/annual-reports/industrial-action-annual-report/2011/industrialreport2012_part3.pdf. Accessed 25/12/2016.

Dhliwayo, R. (2012). The Rise and Fall of Trade Unions in South Africa: The Marikana Incident. An online article publication by In On Africa (IOA) on 12 October 2012. Available at http://www.polity.org.za/article/the-rise-or-fall-of-trade-unions-in-south-africa-the-marikana-incident-2012-10-11. Accessed 02/07/2015.

DPR 2007 report. Available at http://www.oandoplc.com/wp-content/uploads/2007-Annual-Report-IFRS.pdf. Accessed 25/05/2016.

Elowyn, C. (2011) Ogoni People Struggle with Shell Oil, Nigeria, 1990-1995. Available at https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/ogoni-peole-struggle-shell-oil-nigeria-1990-1995. Accessed 19/04/2016.

Factsheet in Ogoni. (2015). An online article published by Days of Action for Development Justice. Available at http://peoplesgoals.org/devjustice/campaigns/ogoni-struggle/factsheet-on-ogoni/. Accessed 20/05/2016.

Farlam recommendations being implemented. An SAnews report on 05 December 2016. Available at http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/farlam-recommendations-being-implemented. Accessed 20/04/2017

Ganago, L (2007). Mathew Kuka and the Next Ogoni Holocaust. An Online Article Published by Nigeriaworld. Available at http://nigeriaworld.com/feature/publication/ganago/051607.html. Accessed 20/07/2016.

Groves, A. (2009). Shell and society: securing the Niger Delta. Available at http://www.e-ir.info/2009/06/10/shell-and-society-securing-the-niger-delta/. Accessed 20/12/2015.

Harvey, R. (2015). Marikana report exposes Labour Relations Act's flaws. Rand Daily Mail 07 July 2015. http://www.rdm.co.za/politics/2015/07/07/marikana-report-exposes-labour-relations-act-s-flaws. Accessed 1-01-2016.

Houses for Marikana (2016). South African Government News Agency Publication on 07 January 2016. Available at http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/houses-marikana. Accesses 18/07/2016

Impala Platinum Holdings Limited (2014). Wage settlement reached at the Impala Rustenburg operation. Available at http://www.implats.co.za/implats/downloads/2014/24-June%202014-Wage-negotiation-settlement-(SENS).pdf. Accessed 15 May 2017

Johansen, B. E. (2010). Nigeria: The Ogoni: Oil, Blood, and the Death of a Homeland. Available at https://ratical.org/ratville/IPEIE/Ogoni.pdf. Accessed 20/07/2016.

Keates, A. (2015) After Decades of Death and Destruction, Shell Pays Just $83 Million for Recent Oil Spills. Available at http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/shell-oil-settlement-ogoniland/. Accessed 07/05/2016.

---------2016. Our Business, Marikana. Available at https://www.lonmin.com/ourbusiness/where-we-operate/marikana. Accessed 06/05/2016.

Lonmin Annual Report 2012. Available at https://www.lonmin.com/investors/reports-and-presentations. Accessed 17/01/2016.

Lonmin Annual Report 2009 Available at https://www.lonmin.com/investors/reports-and-presentations. Accessed 17/01/2016.

Lonmin Annual Report 2008 Available at https://www.lonmin.com/investors/reports-and-presentations. Accessed 17/01/2016.

--------2007. Building Value: Interim Report. London: Lonmin Plc. Available at http://www.lonmin.com/assets/pdf/Lonmin%20Interim%20Report.2007.pdf. Accessed 07/08/2015.

---------2006. Building Value: Sustainable Development Report. London: Lonmin Plc. Available at http://www.lonmin.com/assets/pdf/reports/SDR_2006.pdf. Accessed 19/08/2015.

Lonmin Platinum. 2003. Ensuring tomorrow today: Corporate accountability report. London: Lonmin Plc.

Mabuse, N. (2013). Marikana massacre: An unresolved dispute. A CNN News report on 15 August 2013. Available at http://edition.cnn.com/2013/08/15/world/africa/mabuse-marikana-noki/. Accessed 19/04/2017

Marinovich, G. (2012). The murder fields of Marikana. The cold murder fields of Marikana Daily Maverick 08 August 2012. Available at http://dailymaverick.co.za/article/2012-08-30-the-murder-fields-of-marikana-the- cold- murder-fields-of-marikana

McKenzie. A. R, (2013). Financialization and Labor: What Does Marikana Tell Us About Inequality in South Africa. The new School for Social Research. http://www.economicpolicyresearch.org/econ/2013/NSSR_WP_052013.pdf. Accessed 07/03/2015.

Mine Health and Safety Act, 1996 (Act No. 29 0f 1996). Available at http://www.acts.co.za/mine-health-and-safety-act-1996/1_objects_of_act. Accessed 10/03/2016.

MOSOP Canada. (1998). The role of Shell in Ogoni People (MOSOP). Available at http://www.mosopcanada.org/text/shell.html. Accessed 16/01/2016.

MOSOP and Ogoni News and resources. Available at mosop.org. Accessed 19/04/2016.

NDDC. "NDDC wins International Award". Available at www.nddconline.org/Projects/rebuilding.shtml. Accessed 02/05/2015.

NDDC Act 1999. Available at http://www.nddc.gov.ng/the%20NDDC%20ACT.pdf. Accessed 20/03/2016.

NDDC Projects and Programs. Making a Difference. Available at http://www.nddc.gov.ng/projectsandprograms.html. Accessed 20/03/2016.

Nelson, J. (2000). The business of peace. In The Private Sector as a Partner in Conflict Prevention and Resolution, London: International Alert, Council on Economic Priorities, The Prince of Wales Business Leaders Forum. Available at http://www.internationalalert.org/sites/default/files/publications/The%20Business%20of%20Peace.pdf. Accessed 15/01/2016.

Nicolaise, G. (2016). Marikana massacre: Four years on and no changes for community. Eye Witness News 16/08/2016. Available at http://ewn.co.za/2016/08/16/Today-marks-4-years-since-Marikana-massacre. Accessed 20/09/2016.

Nicolson, G. (2014). Platinum strike: The negotiation table's depressing emptiness. Daily Maverick 06 March 2014. Available at http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2014-03-06-platinum-strike-the-negotiation-tables-depressing-emptiness/#.V8VcYFt97IU. Accessed 20/07/2016.

Nicolson, G. (2015a) Marikana: I don't see any difference in living conditions. An article published in Daily Maverick on 18 September 2015. Available at http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-08-18-marikana-i-dont-see-any-difference-in-living-conditions/#.V2EGz8nLvGE. Accessed 10/11/2015.

Nicolson, G. (2015b) Marikana report: Key findings and recommendations. Daily Maverick 26 June 2015 http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-06-26-marikana-report-key-findings-and-recommendations/#.VpTIMpfS3cc. Accessed 12-01-2016.

Nigeria Launches $1 Billion Ogoniland Clean-up and Restoration Programme. An article on UNEP News Center website. Available at http://www.unep.org/newscentre/default.aspx?DocumentID=27076&ArticleID=36199. Accessed 20/06/2016.

Nigeria suspended from Commonwealth: Local populace stunned by dissident executions. A CNN repot on 11 November 1995. Available at http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9511/nigeria/11-11/. Accessed 25/04/2017.

Nigeria, the Ogoni Crisis: A Case Study of Military Repression in Southeastern Nigeria. A Human Rights Watch publication. Vol. 7, No. 5. Available at https://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/Nigeria.htm. Accessed 25/11/2015.

No Progress: An Evaluation of the Implementation of UNEP's Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland, three years on. An Amnesty International article on the Implementation of the UNEP report Available at https://www.amnesty.org.uk/sites/default/files/unep_briefing_2014_niger_delta.pdf. Accessed 19/10/2015.

Nzeadibe. T.C. et al (2011). Climate Change awareness and adoption in Niger Delta Region of Nigeria. African Technology Policy Studies Network, Nairobi https://www.researchgate

.net/profile/Chidi_Nzeadibe/publication/272490454_Climate_change_awareness_and_adaptation_in_the_Niger_Delta_Region_of_Nigeria/links/54eb27b10cf27a6de1173de5.pdf. Accessed 20-03-2015.

Ogoni: Following Violent Military Invasion, Community Calls the Nigerian Army to Leave Community. A UNPO publication on 19 April 2016. Available at http://unpo.org/article/19105. Accessed on 17/06/16.

Ogoni: Individual Testimonies Highlight Human-Rights Abuses. A publication of Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) 28 September 2012. Available at unpo.org/article/14922. Accessed 19/04/2016.

Ogoniland Oil Spills: Shell Admits Nigeria Liability. A BBC report on the oil spill in Bodo on 03 August 2011. Available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14391015. Accessed 07/05/2016.

Okocha, L. (2016). Reps Probe Alleged Military Offensive in Ogoni Communities. A Today Newspaper publication 19 April 2016. Available at https://www.today.ng/news/national/108702/reps-probe-alleged-military-offensive-ogoni-communities. Accessed 18/06/2016.

Oil and Natural gas in Sub Sahara Africa (2013). U.S Energy Information Administration August 2013. Available at https://www.eia.gov/pressroom/presentations/howard_08012013.pdf. Accessed 05/04/2017.

O'Neill, T. (2007). Curse of the Black Gold. Hope and Betrayal of Niger Delta, *National Geographic*, 07 02 2007. Available at http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2007/02/nigerian-oil/oneill-text. Accessed 20/10/2015.

Patel, K. (2012). Marikana: The strike ends - now what? Daily Maverick 19 September 2012. Available at http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2012-09-19-marikana-the-strike-ends-now-what/#.V8VQult97IU. Accessed 20/05/2016.

Pichulik, M. (2012). The irony of Lonmin - an award-winning sustainable investment. Daily Maverick 27 August 2012. Available at http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2012-08-27-the-irony-of-lonmin-an-award-winning-sustainable-investment/#.V81sp1t97IU. Accessed 15/06/2016.

R159m Marikana Housing Project Gets the Thumbs Up. Available at http://www.platinumweekly.co.za/articleA1757.html. Accessed 20/02/2016.

Remediation Issues in Niger Delta (2012). Available at http://www.shell.com.ng/environment-society/environment-tpkg/remediation.html. Accessed 3/09/2015

Saba, A. (2015). Marikana miners face arrest. City Press Newspapers 05 July 2015. Available at http://city-press.news24.com/News/Marikana-miners-face-arrest-20150705. Accessed 27/06/2016.

Schiltz, M. (2014). Mining in Africa - Focus on Southern Africa. Flanders Investment and Trade Johannesburg, South Africa. Available at http://www.flandersinvestmentandtrade.com/export/sites/trade/files/market_studies/815140819105939/815140819105939_1.pdf. Accessed 05/04/2017.

Shell admits to misjudging Nigeria oil spill. An Aljazeera news report on 14 November 2014. Available at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2014/11/shell-nigeria-oil-spill 20141114025592004 78.html. Accessed 07/05/2016.

Shell in Nigeria, the UNEP report. Available at https://s02.staticshell.com/content/dam/shellnew/local/country/nga/downloads/pdf/2014bnotes/unep.pdf. Accessed 4/2/2016.

Simelane, B.C., Lekgowa, T. and Nicolson, G. (2014). Platinum strike no more: After losing R10.6 Billion in wages, miners claim victory. Daily Maverick 23 June 2014. Available at http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2014-06-23-platinum-strike-no-more-after-losing-r10.6-billion-in-wages-miners-claim-victory/#.V87UQlt97IU. Accessed 03/06/2016

Smit, S. (2014). For South Africa's mining suppliers, HDSA ownership is critical. An online article available at http://www.miningweekly.com/article/for-south-africas-mining-suppliers-hdsa-ownership-is-critical-2014-07-15/rep_id:3650. Accessed 20/12/2015.

Soifer. I, 2012 "The "Marikana Massacre" and the Reactions of South Africans." Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection. Paper 1409. http://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection/1409. Accessed 07/03/2015

South African miners agree wage deal to end strike. A BBC report on 24 June 2014. Available at http://www.bbc.com/news/business-27996445. Accessed 20/04/2017

South Africa: Suspend those behind the Marikana killings and subsequent cover-up. An Amnesty International report on 15 August 2015. Available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/08/south-africa-suspend-those-behind-the-marikana-killings-and-subsequent-cover-up/. Accessed 20/04/ 2017

SPDC, Nigeria Brief: The Ogoni Issue (Lagos: SPDC, January 1995). Available at shell.com.ng. Accessed 20/02/2016.

Statistics South Africa 29 March 2017. Mining Industry http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-20-01-02/Report-20-01-022015.pdf. Accessed 16 May 2017

Telling The Ogoni Story in Poetry. (2014) Available at http://www.ogoninews.com/ogoni/472-telling-the-ogoni-story-in-poetry. Accessed 16-04-2016.

The Great Platinum Mine Strike is Over! An article published by news24 on 24 June 2014. Available at http://www.news24.com/MyNews24/The-Great-Platinum-Mine-Strike-is-Over-20140624. Accessed 19/04/2017

The Issue of Ogoni. Available at shell.com.ng/environment-society/ogoni.html. Accessed 19/04/2016.

The Ogoni Crisis: A Case Study of Military Repression in Southern Nigeria. Human Rights Watch Vol 7, No 5, 1995. Available at www.hrw.org/reports/1995/nigeria.htm. Accessed 19/04/2016.

The role of international community. An article published by Human Rights watch 1997. Available at https://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/nigeria/Nigeria-10.htm. Accessed 15/05/2017

The UNEP Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland: Our Response. Available at www.shell.com.ng. Accessed 19/04/2016.

Ukoli, M. K. (2005). Environmental factors in the management of the oil and gas industry in Nigeria. Available at http://www.warmofloor.co.uk/pages/environmentalpdf. Accessed 15/10/2015.

UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) (2006). Niger Delta Human Development Report. Abuja, Nigeria. Available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-report. Accessed 30/03/2016.

Welcome: Ministry of Niger Delta. Available at http://nigerdelta.gov.ng/index.php. Accessed 20/07/2016.

What Sustainability Means at Shell (2016). Available at http://www.shell.com/sustainability/our-approach/sustainability-at-shell.html. Accessed 27/06/2016.

Appendix 1: Marikana interview questions

Dear Respondent,

I am conducting a doctoral research on **A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT APPROACHES IN MARIKANA, SOUTH AFRICA AND OGONI, NIGERIA** at North-West University, Mafikeng, South Africa. The main aim of the research is to provide a comparative study of conflict management approaches adopted by mining companies and governments in Marikana and Ogoni conflicts while proffering sustainable conflict management strategies in the mining sectors of both countries. Your response to the questions that follow will be highly appreciated. **Please be informed that all your answers will be used only for academic purposes.**

At all times, the socio-economic, political views and religious leanings and views of the respondents will be respected. Respondents' participation in the interview and subsequent provision of information will be treated as voluntary. On no account will the respondent be required to commit an act which might diminish self-respect or cause him/her to experience shame, embarrassment or regret in the process. This data collection should not involve any act of deception or abusive language. The autonomy of the respondents will at all times be respected and their responses will be treated in a confidential manner. Also, anonymity is guaranteed through the use of coded no names of respondents and their institutions will be disclosed. Thank you.

Name of Researcher: Onyebukwa, Chijioke Francis

Researcher's Programme: PhD in International Relations

Researcher's Contact Details: + 27632478484, +234 706 819 8078, chiokee10@yahoo.com and chiokee1010@gmail.com

Name of Research Supervisor: Professor Ojakorotu Victor

Research Supervisor's Contact Details: +271 838 92000 and Victor.ojakorotu@nwu.ac.za

Name of Respondent..

Respondent's Profession..

Respondent's Contact Details (optional)...

....

Date of Interview...

Place of Interview (Address)..

....

Note that the respondent's details as stated above are necessary but not compulsory. Respondent is at liberty to remain anonymous or go by a disguised name, while maintaining the originality of his or her arguments. You are free to document your response on an additional piece of paper.

1) What do you understand by conflict?

....
....
....

2) Are you familiar with the conflict in Marikana?

....
....
....

3) What is your view about the Marikana conflict?

....
....
....
....
....

4) In your personal opinion, what do you think are the root causes of Marikana conflict?

....
....
....
....
....

5) What is your opinion about the government use of police in the Marikana conflict?

....
....
....
....
....

6) What do you think influenced government intervention in Marikana conflict?

....
....=

....
....
....
....

7) How would you rate government conflict management approaches towards the Marikana conflict? Please, give reason(s) for your assessment.

....
....
....
....
....

8) How would you rate Lonmin conflict management approach towards the Marikana conflict?

....
....
....
....
....

9) What do you think are the main reasons for the recurrence of conflict in the South African mining sector?

....
....
....
....
....

10) What do you think should be done to prevent this situation?

Appendix 2: Ogoni interview questions

Dear Respondent,

I am conducting a doctoral research on **A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT APPROACHES IN MARIKANA, SOUTH AFRICA AND OGONI, NIGERIA** at North West University, Mafikeng, South Africa. The main aim of the research is to provide a comparative study of conflict management approaches adopted by mining companies and government in Marikana and Ogoni conflicts while proffering sustainable conflict management strategies in the mining sectors of both countries. Your response to the questions that follow will be highly appreciated. **Please be informed that all your answers will be used only for academic purposes.**

At all times, the socio-economic, political views and religious leanings and views of the respondents will be respected. Respondents' participation in the interview and subsequent provision of information will be treated as voluntary. On no account will the respondent be required to commit an act which might diminish self-respect or cause him/her to experience shame, embarrassment or regret in the process. This data collection should not involve any act of deception or abusive language. The autonomy of the respondents will at all times be respected and their responses will be treated in a confidential manner. Also, anonymity is guaranteed through the use of coded names of respondents and their institutions shall not be divulged. Thank you.

Name of Researcher: Onyebukwa, Chijioke Francis

Researcher's Programme: PhD in International Relations

Researcher's Contact Details: + 27632478484, +234 706 819 8078, chiokee10@yahoo.com and chiokee1010@gmail.com

Name of Research Supervisor: Professor Ojakorotu Victor

Research Supervisor's Contact Details: +271 838 92000 and Victor.ojakorotu@nwu.ac.za

Name of Respondent..

Respondent's Profession..

Respondent's Contact Details (optional)..

....

Date of Interview..

Place of Interview (Address)...

....

Note that the respondent's details as stated above are necessary but not compulsory. Respondent is at liberty to remain anonymous while maintaining the originality of his or her arguments. You are free to document your response on an additional piece of paper.

1) What do you understand by conflict?

....
....
....

2) Are you familiar with the Ogoni conflict?

....
....
....

3) What is your view about the Ogoni conflict?

....
....
....
....
....

4) In your personal opinion, what do you think are the root causes of Ogoni conflict?

....
....
....
....
....

5) What is your opinion about the government use of military in the Ogoni conflict?

....
....
....
....
....

6) What do you think influenced government intervention in the Ogoni conflict?

....
....
....
....
....

7) How would you rate government conflict management approaches towards the Ogoni conflict? Please, give reason(s) for your assessment.

....
....
....
....
....

8) How would you rate Shell conflict management approach towards the Ogoni conflict?

....
....
....
....
....

9) What do you think are the main reasons for the recurrence of conflict in the Nigerian mining sector?

....
....
....
....
....

10) What do you think should be done to prevent this situation?

....
....