Language, identity and radicalisation: A case study of white Afrikaans speakers (1652-2020s)

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My personal feeling is that the Afrikaner nation is confronted with a most difficult task, and at the same time most important, spiritual task, which it is bound to undertake, without having any choice of refusing. It seems to me that, in South Africa, you are faced already with a situation that is going very soon to be the common situation of the whole world as a result of the "annihilation of distance" through the progress of our Western technology … There will never be room in the world for the different fractions of mankind to retire into isolation from one another again … Now, in South Africa, the accident of history has put the native, coloured and white people of the country into this difficult situation at an early date: History – or God – has given you the honourable mission of being the spiritual pioneers in trying to find the solution of a spiritual problem that is soon going to face the rest of the human race as well.

Arnold Toynbee, historian
1951

Abstract

Keywords: Minority-language rights; Social Identity Theory; ethnicity; social cohesion; pluralism; white Afrikaans speakers; nationalism; majoritarianism; Social Categorisation Theory; Afrikaner identity; Social Identity Approach.

Thirty years after the dawn of the 'New South Africa', concerns are mounting that the project is failing. Amidst state decay and the anglicisation of the public sphere (and schools and universities in particular), many white Afrikaans speakers have emigrated, and those who remain are, by all accounts, increasing their levels of ethnic identification and mobilisation, threatening, in the process, sociopolitical stability and social cohesion. Or so it seems. In his Minority-Language Rights (MLR) framework, Stephen May (2012) stresses the importance of respecting minority-language speakers' educational-language rights, and re-imagining the nation-state in more pluralist ways, specifically in order to stave off separatist and secessionist sentiment among minority-language groups. Emphasising the pejorative views of minority ethnicity that permeate academic and political discourse, and the unequal power dynamics which give rise to language shift and loss, May makes a convincing argument in favour of power-sharing of the state apparatus. Supplementing May's MLR framework with the Social Identity Approach (SIA), this study offers a comprehensive analysis of the individual and group identity formation and mobilisation of white Afrikaans speakers. Arguing that such an analysis should take into account both the historic and present context in which it occurs, this study identifies the intergroup process of reciprocal radicalisation, highlighting identity and other threats which give rise to the increased salience of Afrikaner ethnic identity. Through identity entrepreneurship and the use of symbolic reminders of identity, this is readily converted into ethnic mobilisation. Considering their lack of territorial concentration which makes the creation of a *volkstaat*, or ethnostate, virtually impossible, as well as their relative economic strength, this study identifies the re-birth of the "organisation Afrikaner" as the most dominant form of contemporary Afrikaner mobilisation. Consisting of growing privatisation over cultural matters, as well as the fulfilment of some duties usually done by the state, this signifies a novel way for frustrated minority-language groups to deal with their perceived marginalisation. Instead of establishing their own state, they are legally creating a cultural 'state' within a political state, the latter already in a process of decentralisation due to the failures of the ruling party. Whether this form of Afrikaner mobilisation signifies a destabilising radicalisation, or the pursuit of pluralism, largely depends on white Afrikaans speakers' avoidance of essentialism and continuing commitment to the rest of South Africa, as well as the ruling party's willingness to include white Afrikaans speakers in the South African nation-state.

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Abbreviations

ACVV:	*Afrikaanse Christelike Vrouevereniging* (Afrikaans Christian Women's Association)
AHI:	*Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut* (Afrikaans Trade Institute)
ANB:	*Afrikaanse Nasionale Bond* (Afrikaans National League)
ANC:	African National Congress
APK:	*Afrikaanse Protestantse Kerk* (Afrikaans Protestant Church)
APO:	African Political Organisation
ATKV:	*Afrikaanse Taal- en Kultuurvereniging* (Afrikaans Language and Culture Association)
ATR:	*Afrikaanse Taalraad* (Afrikaans Language Council)
AU:	African Union
AVF:	*Afrikaner Volksfront* (Afrikaner People's Front)
AWB:	*Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging* (Afrikaner Resistance Movement)
BBV:	*Zuid-Afrikaansche Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging* (South African Farmers' Protection Association)
BCM:	Black Consciousness Movement
BEE:	Black Economic Empowerment
BELA:	Basic Education Laws Amendment
BLF:	Black First Land First
BSA:	British South African Company
CIC:	Social Categorisation – Social Identity – Social Competition
CIIM:	Common Ingroup Identity Model
CMA:	Concordance Model of Acculturation
CNE:	Christian National Education
COSATU:	Congress of South African Trade Unions
CP:	Conservative Party
CRL Rights Commission:	Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities
CWUR:	Centre for World University Rankings

DA:	Democratic Alliance
DHET:	Department of Higher Education and Training
DRC:	Dutch Reformed Church (NGK in Afrikaans)
DST:	Dialogical Self Theory
ECHR:	European Convention on Human Rights
ECRML:	European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages
EFF:	Economic Freedom Fighters
ELR:	Educational-Language Rights
ESCOM:	Electricity Supply Commission (now Eskom)
EWC:	Expropriation Without Compensation
FAK:	*Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigingе* (Federation of Afrikaans Cultural Associations)
FF+:	Freedom Front Plus
FVB:	*Federale Volksbeleggings* (Federal People's Investments)
GKSA:	*Gereformeerde Kerke in Suid-Afrika* ("Doppers")
GNP:	Purified National Party
GNU:	Government of National Unity
GRA:	*Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners* (Society of True Afrikaners)
HAU:	Historically Afrikaans University
HNP:	*Herenigde Nasionale Party* (Reunited National Party)
HNP:	*Herstigte Nasionale Party* (Re-established National Party)
IAM:	Interactive Acculturation Model
ICCPR:	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICJ:	International Court of Justice
IEC:	Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa
IET:	Intergroup Emotions Theory
IFP:	Inkatha Freedom Party
IPT:	Identity Process Theory
ISCOR:	Iron and Steel Corporation
ITR:	Identity Threat Responses

ITT:	Intergroup Threat Theory (formerly Integrated Threat Theory)
KKNK:	*Klein Karoo Nasionale Kunstefees* (Klein Karoo National Arts Festival)
KWV:	*Ko-operatiewe Wijnbouwers Vereeniging* (Co-operative Wine Growers Association)
KZN:	Kwa-Zulu Natal
LE:	Linguistic Ecology
LHR:	Linguistic-Human Rights
LMS:	London Missionary Society
LMT:	Language Management Theory
LPP:	Language Policy and Planning
MIDM:	Mutual Intergroup Differentiation Model
MK:	*Umkhonto we Sizwe* (Spear of the Nation)
MK Party:	*Umkhonto we Sizwe* party
MLR:	Minority-Language Rights
MMC:	Member of the Mayoral Committee
MoI:	Medium of instruction
MT:	Mother tongue
MTE:	Mother-tongue education
MWU:	Mine Workers' Union (now Solidarity)
Naspers:	*De Nationale Pers*
NDR:	National Democratic Revolution
NEET:	Not in Employment, Education or Training
NGK:	*Nederduitsch Gereformeerde Kerk* (DRC in English)
NHI:	National Health Insurance
NHK:	*Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk*
NNP:	New National Party
NP:	National Party
NUM:	National Union of Mineworkers
NUMSA:	National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa

NWU:	North-West University
NZAT:	*Het Nederduitsch Zuid-Afrikaansch Tydschrift* (The Dutch South African Magazine)
OB:	*Ossewabrandwag (*literal translation is Ox wagon fire guard)
OFS:	Orange Free State
OGOD:	*Organisasie vir Godsdienste-Onderrig en Demokrasie* (Organisation for Religious Education and Democracy)
OUTA:	Organisation Undoing Tax Abuse
PA:	Patriotic Alliance
PanSALB:	Pan South African Language Board
PRP:	Progressive Reform Party
PTSD:	Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
RAU:	Rand Afrikaans University (precursor to UJ)
RCT:	Realistic Conflict Theory
RDT:	Relative Deprivation Theory
RIM:	Rejection-Identification Model
SAAWK:	*Suid-Afrikaans Akademie vir Wetenskap en Kuns* (South African Academy for Science and Arts)
SABC:	South African Broadcasting Corporation
SADC:	Southern African Development Community
SAHRC:	South African Human Rights Commission
Sanlam:	*Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Lewens Assuransie Maatskappy* (South African National Life Insurance Company)
Santam:	*Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Trust en Assuransie Maatskappy* (South African National Trust and Insurance Company)
SAP:	South African Party
SASL:	South African Sign Language
SASSA:	South African Social Security Agency
SCT:	Self-Categorisation Theory
SDO:	Social Dominance Orientation
SIA:	Social Identity Approach

SIMCA:	Social Identity Model of Collective Action
SIT:	Social Identity Theory
SRI:	Solidarity Research Institute
SRT:	Social Representation Theory
Stats SA:	Statistics South Africa
SU:	Stellenbosch University
TEFL:	Teaching English as a Foreign Language
TIM:	Threat-Identification Model
TRC:	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UCT:	University of Cape Town
UFS:	University of the Free State
UIT:	Uncertainty-Identity Theory
UJ:	University of Johannesburg
UK:	United Kingdom
UN:	United Nations
UNESCO:	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UP:	University of Pretoria
UP:	United Party
US:	United States
VOC:	*Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie* (Dutch East India Company)
WC:	Western Cape
WMC:	White Monopoly Capital
ZAR:	*Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek* (South African Republic)

Glossary

Agterryers:	Auxiliaries, tasked with tending horses and preparing food.
Biltong:	Cured meat.
Bittereinders:	Bitter-enders; referring to those who refused to surrender to the English during the Anglo-Boer War and vowed to keep fighting to the 'bitter end'.
Boeren:	Farmers at the Dutch Colony.
Braai:	(also braaivleis) Barbecue.
Burghers:	(also vrijburghers, or free burghers) Full-time farmers for the VOC. The Dutch word translates to citizen or resident.
Bywoners:	Tenant farmers.
Drostdy:	The seat of local government.
Gelykstelling:	Social or racial levelling.
Heemraden:	Councillors.
Knechten:	Foremen; farm workers.
Landdrost:	Chief government official; magistrate.
Sestigers:	Generation of the Sixties; referring to anti-Apartheid Afrikaans writers and poets.
Staatsvolk:	Ethnic group that is culturally and politically dominant, and determines the national identity of nation-state, despite presence of other groups.
Swart gevaar:	Black danger.
Trekboers:	Migrant farmers (individual burghers or single families) who crossed the frontier in search of pasture.
Uitlanders:	Outlander or alien; referring to migrant workers in the ZAR.
Verkramptes:	Constricted reactionaries; referring to conservatives who resisted reform to Apartheid.
Verligtes:	Enlightened ones; referring to those in favour of reforming Apartheid.
Volk:	People; nation; folk.
Volkskapitaal:	People's capital.
Volkskapitalisme:	Capitalism of the people.
Volksmoeder:	Mother of the nation.
Volksraad:	Council of people's representatives.

Volkstaal: People's language.

Volkstaat: Ethnostate.

Voortrekkers: Parties of burgher families who moved out of the Cape Colony from 1835-1845 and formed the Boer Republics.

INTRODUCTION

Contextualisation and Problem Statement

In 1994, South Africa's democratic settlement and interim Constitution was widely celebrated as embracing diversity and fostering inclusion, and paving the way towards lasting sociopolitical stability and social cohesion. Three decades after the birth of the 'Rainbow Nation', or the 'New South Africa', disappointment with the ruling party's governance and the retreat of Afrikaans from the public sphere, is at an all-time high among many white Afrikaans speakers. Continued Afrikaans language activism has failed to halt the loss of higher functions of Afrikaans, and thus the perception that the South African state does not wish to accommodate the (white) Afrikaans-speaking community. Together with grievances regarding race-based employment policies, crime, and racially polarising rhetoric from many prominent politicians, this had led to an acute sense of persecution among a significant segment of the white Afrikaans-speaking population. While many white Afrikaans speakers have emigrated, those who remain follow a variety of strategies to try to mitigate the situation.

One of these strategies, involving the re-birth of the "organisation Afrikaner", denoting a return to ethnic-based collective action, directly challenges the hegemony of the *African National Congress* (ANC) and the status quo. Faced with accusations of racial exclusivity and ethnonationalism, it has become clear that intervention is necessary in order to ensure continued peace and stability in South Africa. Considering that Afrikaans is regarded as the most important aspect of group identity among white Afrikaans speakers, and a significant part of this community's perception of marginalisation stems from the removal of Afrikaans from educational institutions, keeping white Afrikaans speakers positively engaged in the public life of South Africa largely relies on respecting their minority-language rights, and educational-language rights in particular.

Dunbar (2001:120) points out that even though minority-language groups may insist on their language rights, they are still dependent on their government to respect, protect and grant these rights. Skutnabb-Kangas (2001:204) suggests that if minority groups' language rights, including their educational-language rights, are not supported by the state, it could lead to ethnic conflict and demands for secession. As a direct result of the growing anglicisation of the education system, and the public sphere in general, the concern is rising that white Afrikaans speakers are retreating and once more separating themselves from the rest of the country. May

(2012:19) contends that advancing minority-language rights is imperative for staving off nationalist and separatist movements:

> [T]he accommodation of minority language rights may become a political necessity, given the growing discontent with existing nation-state structures evident among minorities today. And this highlights a more general point. If the increasing demands of minority groups for greater cultural and linguistic representation are not met, they may lead, in turn, to secessionist pressures and the potential fragmentation of nation-states. Given the likely consequences of such fragmentation, and the hardening of ethnic and national boundaries that normally ensues, we should avoid this wherever we can.

This study broadly refers to the shifts in minority sentiment as described above by May as *radicalisation*. This term alludes both to an increase in ethnic identification, especially essentialist conceptualisations of identity, as well as an increase in ethnic mobilisation to sociocultural or political ends, in particular those which threaten the nation-state itself. Radicalisation is not to be confused with its often narrow application in Western contexts, where it is incorrectly used interchangeably with terms like 'extremism' and 'terrorism' (Bötticher, 2017:76). While the potential radicalisation of white Afrikaans speakers could be detrimental to sociopolitical stability and social cohesion in South Africa, the term radicalisation in this study is used to signify severe intergroup polarisation and non-violent collective action.

Schmid (2013:5) explains that there is no universally accepted definition of radicalisation in academia or government. He argues that the term has become politicised and has been used "in the political game of labelling and blame attribution" (2013:18). Schmid (2013:19) proposes reconceptualising radicalisation as follows:

> [A]n individual or collective (group) process whereby, usually in a situation of political polarisation, normal practices of dialogue, compromise and tolerance between political actors and groups with diverging interests are abandoned by one or both sides in a conflict dyad in favour of a growing commitment to engage in confrontational tactics of conflict-waging. […] The process is, on the side of rebel factions, generally accompanied by an ideological socialization away from mainstream or status quo-oriented positions towards more radical or extremist positions involving a dichotomous world view and the acceptance of an alternative focal point of political mobilization outside the dominant political order as the existing system is no longer recognized as appropriate or legitimate.

In the South African context, specifically with regards to the so-called language debate, heightened polarisation between interest groups may be leading to radicalisation on both ends of the argument. According to Schmid (2013:60), radicalisation is a normal occurrence

whenever political systems become "blocked on some burning public issue", and usually remains non-violent. Schmid (2013:20) further comments on the misapprehensions of radicalisation:

> Unfortunately the concept of radicalisation, as used in many government-linked quarters, suffers from politicisation, is fuzzy, applied one-sidedly (only non-state actors are assumed to radicalise, not governments), often lacks a clear benchmark (e.g. adherence to democratic principles and the rule of law, abstaining from the use of violence for political ends), and is linked too readily with terrorism (broadly defined) as outcome. Its broader application to political activism of individuals and movements in societies where social development is blocked by non-democratic extremist regimes is problematical.

May (2012:7-8; 17) insists that minority-language rights are sociologically and politically "defensible" and elaborates on the growing discontent among many linguistic minorities worldwide, stating that minority groups are either trying to increase their representation in their current political systems, or to exit them completely and form their own, new systems:

> From below, minority groups are increasingly exerting the right either to form their own nation-states – as seen in various secessionist and irredentist movements around the world – or for greater representation within *existing* nation-state structures. It is this last development, and its implications for the social, cultural and political organisation of nation-states, which is most pertinent to the issue of minority language loss and displacement. In effect, minority groups are increasingly beginning to question and contest principles and effects of nation-state congruence, not least because of the long historical proscription of minority languages and cultures that has usually attended it. In the process, national identity, its parameters and its constituent elements have been opened up for debate – particularly, with respect to questions of public bilingualism and multiculturalism.

Covering themes such as globalisation and the spread of English, mother-tongue education, the re-emergence of ethnic identities, and ethnolinguistic conflict, the field of language rights offers policymakers valuable insights into managing linguistic diversity in a wide range of contexts. In his interdisciplinary book titled *Language and Minority Rights: Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Politics of Language* (2012), Stephen May offers an impressive synthesis of key issues and theories in linguistics, sociology and political theory respectively. His minority-language rights (MLR) framework focuses on modern nation-states, minority ethnicity and nationalism, and makes a compelling case for re-imagining the nation-state in more pluralist ways.

In the midst of the current language debate about Afrikaans' continued use in the public sphere in South Africa, it is not only the concept of national identity that is being opened up for debate.

Afrikaner and Afrikaans identity are also being re-evaluated, especially through attempts to unite white and coloured Afrikaans speakers in their language activism efforts. Davies (2009:1-2) notes the importance of the realignment of "Afrikaner identity" in post-Apartheid South Africa. She states that research indicates both an increase and a decline in ethnic affiliations, and claims that there exists a wide range of identification among Afrikaans speakers (2009:3). This modification of Afrikaner and Afrikaans identity, she argues, has given rise to a new kind of Afrikaans politics, which aims to safeguard Afrikaans language and culture, without including race and/or ethnicity as a dominant factor.

While May's (2012) MLR framework offers a comprehensive integration of disparate theories on linguistic minorities, including a substantial discussion on ethnic and national identities, I believe his framework can be further enhanced by including insights from social psychology, in particular Social Identity Theory (SIT) and Social Categorisation Theory (SCT). While this combined Social Identity Approach (SIA) has been extensively applied to linguistic minorities, this research too is largely conducted in disciplinary isolation, and can also benefit from integration with May's (2012) MLR framework, in particular with his focus on national politics.

Aims of the Study

My main research goal is to provide an in-depth case study of white Afrikaans speakers in South Africa, focusing on both historical and contemporary social identity formation and collective action. I further aim to augment May's (2012) Minority-Language Rights (MLR) framework with the Social Identity Approach (SIA), in order to offer a comprehensive discussion on group identities and intergroup behaviour in this context.

My research questions include:

(1) What does a historical analysis of white Afrikaans speakers reveal about the relationship between language, identity and radicalisation? How and to what degree is radicalisation linked to marginalisation?

(2) If one applies the updated MLR and SIA framework that links language, identity and radicalisation to the case of white Afrikaans speakers, taking into account their linguistic and radicalisation history, what predictions can be made about the potential radicalisation of contemporary white Afrikaans speakers?

(3) What does a critical review of the literature on language rights, May's MLR framework and the Social Identity Approach reveal about the relationship between language, identity and radicalisation? What elements would be included in an updated framework for the study of language and radicalisation, based on the above-mentioned literature that is reviewed?

Hypothesis

The central theoretical statement of this study is that white Afrikaans speakers have undergone several rounds of radicalisation in the past that have 'hardened' their language-identity link, and that, due to current policies and politics in South Africa, they are undergoing another round of radicalisation.

I also hypothesise that May's (2012) approach to interdisciplinary debates in the fields of sociology, linguistics, politics, law and education, and more specifically, his synthesis of themes such as ethnicity, nationalism, language, culture, identity and minority-language rights, is a valuable framework which, when augmented by the Social Identity Approach, can successfully be utilised to critically analyse minority-language groups and be of predictive value to policymakers.

Methodology

In order to answer my research questions and achieve my research aims, a qualitative study employing the case study method was conducted, involving a critical review and analysis of relevant literature. This type of research is well-suited to my goal of increasing understanding of white Afrikaans speakers and especially broad political trends not easily quantified. By making use of historical, literary and other analytical tools common in social scientific studies, I was able to offer a comprehensive analysis of this group.

The theoretical basis of this study was established by reviewing the MLR framework developed by May (2012), specifically as it pertains to ethnicity, language, nationalism and politics, and then supplementing it with the various theories comprising the Social Identity Approach. Once this field was covered, a case study of white Afrikaans speakers was conducted, which tested the updated framework and illustrated its application to the study of minority-language groups.

Seeing as May is particularly concerned with the negative consequences of not accommodating minority-language groups – or more specifically, how certain minority groups are prone to

react to marginalisation – the focus of this study is solely on white Afrikaans speakers, as I believe this group is currently increasingly reacting to their marginalisation; and have done so in the past. While similar research on the coloured Afrikaans speech community would be equally valuable and interesting, I believe the scope of a PhD study might be too small to responsibly approach and complete a comprehensive study of both these groups in such a complex context.

In addition to this, I also investigate recent trends in Afrikaner political movements, to further colour my discussion on language conflict and politics in South Africa. In order to accurately describe the current sociological, language and political situation of the white Afrikaans-speaking group, and to offer meaningful insights into what the future might hold for this speech community, I provide a qualitative content analysis of a collection of texts selected from the public domain. I rely on information from prominent figures, thought leaders and organisational bodies, obtained through websites, opinion pieces and other publicly available sources.

Chapter Division

This thesis is divided into five chapters. The first three chapters are theoretical literature reviews, whereas the latter two are reserved for the case study of white Afrikaans speakers. Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the field of language rights, including a brief discussion of language policy, planning and management; an exploration of various types of language rights, and arguments and criticisms against such rights; as well as a consideration of the phenomenon of language conflict, amidst nation-building, monolingualism and majoritarianism.

Chapter 2 unpacks May's (2012) MLR framework, starting with a comprehensive discussion on ethnic and national identities, and the negative contrasts drawn between minority identities vis-à-vis majority identities within modern nation-states. This chapter also includes discussions on multiculturalism, language shift and loss, and finally, May's own recommendations for accommodating minority-language groups. Chapter 3 first traces the origins of Social Identity Theory, and then explores the key insights offered by this theory, criticisms of the theory, as well as supplemental theories comprising the Social Identity Approach. I then discuss so-called identity threats at length and conclude with a discussion on the SIA's application to minority groups and social cohesion.

Chapter 4 commences the case study of white Afrikaans speakers, starting in 1652 with the arrival of the Dutch at the Cape, moving through Dutch settlement, English colonialism, Afrikaner nationalism and Apartheid, and ending with the first democratic elections in 1994. In this chapter, I weave the theoretical content of the first three chapters into the historical account of white Afrikaans speakers, with the goal of establishing a firm grasp on both the theories and the history of this particular group, to aid in the understanding of the contemporary analysis which follows.

In Chapter 5, the post-1994 reality in South Africa is investigated, whereafter I briefly list the main outlets of contemporary Afrikaner mobilisation. I then conduct an in-depth analysis of contemporary Afrikaner social identity, including, among others, a discussion on the unification of white and coloured Afrikaans speakers. In the final section of this chapter, I critically analyse the most dominant form of contemporary Afrikaner mobilisation, firstly in an attempt to assess the risk to South Africa, and secondly to provide recommendations for maintaining sociopolitical stability and social cohesion in the country. I briefly summarise my main findings in a final conclusion.

Sources

Due to the nature of my discussion in Chapter 2 of May's MLR framework, in which he synthesises the work of many other researchers, a fair number of secondary citations are present. The intent here is not to engage uncritically with May's work, but to first give an accurate account of his main arguments.

In Chapter 4, I rely almost exclusively on the work of pre-eminent Afrikaner historian Hermann Giliomee, in particular his 2009 book *The Afrikaners: Biography of a People*. He is a highly respected and well-cited author, whose work almost always crops up in research on Afrikaner nationalism. He offers a largely detached account of Afrikaner history, which I consider to be essential considering the controversial nature of this study. Some of his writing is also included in Chapter 5.

I also include, to a significant degree, the work of Rebecca Davies on contemporary identity formation among white Afrikaans speakers in Chapter 5, specifically her 2009 book *Afrikaners in the New South Africa: Identity Politics in a Globalised Economy*. While this work is not as well-known, it represents arguably the most comprehensive investigation into post-Apartheid Afrikaner and Afrikaans identity and mobilisation to date.

Terms

This thesis frequently uses the term *Afrikaner*, which some might find objectionable. As the discussions in Chapter 4 and 5 will illustrate, the meaning of this term has changed throughout history, and the current meaning and group borders of this identity remain highly contested. However, within the confines of this study, which specifically researches social categorisation, this term is used not to essentialise or fix the identity or to assume a cohesive community, but rather, to denote a social category which most (even unwittingly) still understand to mean white and Afrikaans-speaking. Also, read together with May's (2012) critique of the negative views of minority ethnicity, and considering current attempts to reformulate and destigmatise Afrikaner identity in the post-Apartheid era, I believe its use within this context is justified.

In Chapter 4, there are limited instances of the racially derogatory *k*-word, which I only include in the context of direct quotations, or in explaining the origin of the term, specifically for the purpose of illustrating the history of racial polarisation and subjugation in South Africa. For the international reader, the use of the term *coloured* in the South African context is not considered derogatory or offensive, and refers to a specific ethnic group which originated at the Cape through mixing between settlers, slaves and first peoples. In the South African context, the term *African* is largely synonymous with black people (to the exclusion of white people and other non-white groups alike), and this thesis uses the term in the same manner.

This study includes a substantial amount of Dutch and Afrikaans words, due to the nature of the topic. To assist the reader, I provide an English translation in brackets following non-English terms (which I italicise). Some of these words are used multiple times throughout the thesis, where I continue with the Dutch or Afrikaans word (no longer italicised). These words and their English translations can be found in the glossary at the beginning of the thesis.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction to the Field of Language Rights

Introduction

In the 1960s, the field of language policy and planning (LPP) was born when the significance of language policy in national development was recognised. For the first time, language policies were linked to broader social, political and economic issues. After a decline in research, the field witnessed a revival in the 1990s. This wave of research is characterised by the realisation that a relationship exists between language policies and the establishment and maintenance of socio-economic inequality (Blommaert, 1996:403-404; Tollefson, 2002a: ix).

According to Ricento (2000:499), LPP research today is characterised by a concern with phenomena such as mass migration, the re-emergence of national ethnic identities and languages, the competition between local and supranational languages and cultural globalisation. Heller and Duchêne (2007:4) add that LPP research has given rise to the emergence of discourses of language endangerment. They argue that these discourses are, in fact, about a broader sense of endangerment, or a "threat from outside" or "from some Other". In other words, language became a proxy for other conflicts between various ethnolinguistic groups. De Varennes (1994:185) states that language issues are among the most serious points of interethnic conflict in many parts of the world. These developments have resulted in a renewed focus on language rights.

The aim of this chapter is to establish a solid theoretical understanding of the field of language rights. This will inform the rest of this thesis and, more specifically, will allow for a rigorous analysis of the behaviour of – and the rights claims made by – the white Afrikaans-speaking language group in South Africa. This chapter is divided into four sections which cover the field of language policy and planning, the interrelated frameworks of language ecology (LE), linguistic-human rights (LHR), and minority-language rights (MLR), the various types of language rights available, as well as the appearance of language conflict. In the first section, I will provide an overview of the processes involved in LPP and language management. In the second section, I will discuss the application of different language rights frameworks to deal with issues of multilingualism. The third section will unpack the specific language rights speakers may have. In the final section, I will discuss the propensity for interethnic conflict in multilingual countries.

1.1. Language Policy, Planning and Management

While language policy is often narrowly defined as a set of laws and regulations regarding language use, and the distribution of linguistic resources by a governmental or political organisation, Orman (2008:39-40) believes Spolsky (2004) offers a more comprehensive and accurate definition. According to Spolsky (2004:5), a language policy consists of three elements: (i) the language practices of the speech community; (ii) the language beliefs and ideologies of the speech community; and (iii) the efforts to modify or influence the speech communities' language practices through language intervention, planning, or management.

Orman (2008:40) argues that language policy and language planning are frequently and incorrectly used interchangeably, and suggests viewing language policy instead as the combination of linguistic culture (elements i and ii) and language planning (element iii). Language planning is thus a constituent part of language policy and can be conceptualised as the "action-oriented" aspect of language policy. Orman (2008:41) states that language planning is, however, not a necessary part of language policy. Whereas every society has a language policy (overt or covert), language planning measures are not present in every society.

Spolsky (2004:60) identifies three types of national language policies a country may have, namely: (i) *monolingual*, where one language is associated with the national identity and others are marginalised; (ii) *bi- or trilingual*, where two or three languages are associated with the national identity and others are marginalised; and (iii) *multilingual*, where no one language is seen as representing the national identity. Schmidt (cited in Tollefson, 2002b:180-181) expands on this framework and offers four different types of national language policies, namely:

- C*entralist policy*: A dominant language is employed for national unity and the dominant ethnolinguistic group excludes other languages from public spheres (especially educational), in order to sustain its political and economic control. These policies are usually based on a standard language ideology and a discourse of nationalism and national unity.
- *Assimilationist policy*: Minority groups are encouraged to adopt the language of the dominant ethnolinguistic group as their own. These policies are generally based on a discourse of national unity and the need for equality between various language groups.
- *Pluralist policy*: Linguistic diversity is promoted and there is tolerance for different languages and ethnolinguistic groups. These policies are mostly associated with a discourse of equality and to a lesser extent with a discourse of national unity.

- *Linguistic nationalist policy*: Linguistic nationalism normally entails, though is not limited to, state legitimation of numerous languages in their separate geographical regions. These policies are often implemented in the framework of a confederation.

When discussing language policies, a distinction should be made between language usage in the private and public spheres. McRae (1975:267) suggests subdividing language usage into five domains, namely: (i) *education*, both public and private sector; (ii) *mass media*, including book publishing; (iii) *politics and government*, for example courts and national, provincial, and local administration; (iv) *the working world*, such as advertising and workplace communication; and (v) *culture and leisure*, including churches, entertainment, and sports.

According to Jernudd and Das Gupta (1971:150; 157), the first step of language planning is to identify the parts of society that require planned action in terms of linguistic resources – a process which should be informed by the principles of national development. If marked economic inequality exists between two ethnolinguistic groups, they explain, language planning should be done for the benefit of the marginalised group (1971:157). Five different types of language planning have been identified (Sallabank, 2012:119; Turner & Wildsmith-Cromarty, 2014:297; Webb, 2002:259-277), namely:

- *Status planning*: The amelioration of a language's status by increasing its functions in the public domain (such as in higher education), or by increasing the status of the speakers (which raises the economic value of their language).
- *Corpus planning*: The development and expansion of a language which involves activities such as standardisation, codification and technicalisation (or broadening the lexicon).
- *Acquisition planning*, also called *language-in-education planning* (Liddicoat, 2013:2): The improvement of mother-tongue proficiency and literacy, as well as increasing the learning of the language as a second or foreign language.
- *Usage planning*: Extending the use of a language into new domains.
- *Prestige planning*: The cultivation of positive language attitudes.

Jernudd and Das Gupta (1971:158) argue that the overarching goals of language planning are to achieve a higher standard of living among citizens, to achieve equality between language groups, and to develop national unity. They caution that while some decisions can seemingly realise these goals in the short-term, they can at the same time run counter to the ultimate goals of language planning in the long-term (1971:160). They state that usually politicians have the

highest authority vis-à-vis language planning, and that language planning is an investment by the government (1971:150). Dunbar (2001:117) argues it is crucial that minority-language communities are involved in the design and implementation of policies that affect them and their language community. Jernudd and Das Gupta (1971:151) envision language planning as a collaborative effort by the community and various language experts and governmental institutions, in order to affect positive societal change.

Spolsky (2004:110) lists four factors that are fundamental in determining the language policy of a country, namely: (i) the sociolinguistic situation; (ii) the national ideology; (iii) the existence of English as a world language; and (iv) the notion of language rights. He suggests that policymakers, who seek to balance these four considerations, have to contend with conflicting demands from stakeholders. He states that views on language can range from the nationalistic mobilisation of a language for national identity purposes, to calls for cultural and linguistic pluralism, and argues that language policy often requires a choice to be made between monolingualism and multilingualism (2004:187; 217-218). Weinstock (2014:317) concurs that language policy formulation is inherently conflictual, and elaborates as follows:

> The language policy of a liberal democratic state must be formulated in a context of multiple, often conflicting sets of interests and of normative constraints that limit the means by which the liberal state can manage these interests. The interests at stake are, first, those of the individual, for whom language is viewed both instrumentally, and as a matter of identity. The state has an interest in homogenising the linguistic repertoires of its members to a degree sufficient to achieve the functions that states must by their very nature serve. To the extent that it views itself as just, it must also respond to the demands for linguistic diversity that emerge, for example, in federal and in postcolonial contexts. Finally, there may be an interest shared by all humans in preserving linguistic diversity. These sets of interests predictably generate conflicts, which a broadly liberal state must manage while respecting the normative constraints of state neutrality, and of individual rights.

As a result of these conflicting interests, and the difficulty faced in dealing with them, language policies are often merely wish lists, with no bearing on the actual language practices of a speech community. Spolsky (2004:222) believes that the "real" language policy of a community is often not in attempts at language management or in the explicit policy written in the constitution of a state, but rather in the language practices and beliefs of groups of people. He states that there is often disparity between the present language situation in practice and the idealised language situation in policy. Orman (2008:104) agrees that when there is insufficient political will to implement the official language policy, the de jure and de facto language policies may be completely different from one another.

Not only can official language policies be hyper-idealistic, but they may even directly contradict the covert language policies that govern a speech community. De Varennes and Kuzborska (2016:295) argue that despite achieving official status, minority languages can continue to be excluded from use in the public sphere by the government, who may restrict access to services, education and employment in the minority languages, regardless of the official language policy, or even the language practices and beliefs of the speech community. De Varennes and Kuzborska (2016:294) provide South Africa as an example of such a situation, and state that despite eleven official languages enjoying constitutional protections, the government is increasingly adopting an English-only de facto policy and excluding all other languages from the public sphere (more on this in Chapter 5). Orman (2008:41) agrees with this assessment:

> Locating language policy is also often rendered problematical by the existence of what may be termed an unharmonised language policy situation, which may be defined as the existence of some discrepancy or, indeed, outright contradiction between *de jure* and *de facto* language policies that operate within a polity. Examples abound in which overt, official language policies are undermined and often rendered essentially meaningless by the existence of covert policies. Post-apartheid South Africa, for example, represents a clear case of an unharmonised language policy situation.

Peled (2014:302) argues that language policy is, fundamentally, "an act of *prioritisation*", entailing the relative ranking of languages – as well as language practices, language attitudes, ideologies, and power relations – in terms of their respective importance under criteria such as "efficiency" and "symbolic value". He maintains that when the praxis of language policy is defined in this way, then LPP can be defined as the academic field "that aims to make a systematic inquiry on this prioritisation process, its structure, patterns and the dynamics that govern it". Peled (2014:302-303) cautions, however, against referring to LPP as a field, as there is no overarching theory of language policy and planning.

> Despite its historical roots in the field of sociolinguistics, language policy is increasingly perceived today as an intrinsically interdisciplinary domain, incorporating theories, concepts, frameworks and methods from a broad range of fields such as economics, law and political science. In addition to the intellectual enriching of the work in the field, this disciplinary expansion has gradually provided this emerging field a useful path for moving beyond the strong *descriptive* ethos of sociolinguistics research into *normative* theorising. Many researchers in the field are therefore presently and increasingly engaged not only with the question of *how* (and why) language is interrelated to social structures, institutions and processes, but also – and increasingly so – how it *ought* to.

LPP research has further generated theories concerning language management. Spolsky (2004:186; 2009:1; 4) differentiates between language planning and language management, suggesting that the former denotes centralised planning aimed at "correcting social problems", while the latter involves "the explicit and observable effort by someone or some group that has or claims authority over the participants in the domain to modify their practices or beliefs", or to control their language choices. He notes that the restriction of language choices occurs in all domains including the home, private and public institutions and the state (2009:3). Each domain is said to have its own policy, which are both managed internally and influenced by external forces.

Jernudd (2010:83), who coined the term language management in 1987, describes Spolsky's conceptualisation of language management as "confused" for failing to clearly delineate the notion from either language policy or planning. Nekvapil and Sherman (2015:4-5) also criticise Spolsky's (2009) approach to language management for this reason, arguing that his book's concluding questions "Can language be managed? And if it can, should it be managed?" illustrate a fundamental failure to understand the concept, since language management theory (LMT) "posits that people essentially cannot *not* manage their language".

Instead, Nekvapil and Sherman (2015:6) define language management as "any sort of activity aimed at language or communication, in other words, at language as a system as well as at language use (or, put simply, 'behaviour toward language' or 'metalinguistic behaviour')". Language management can be undertaken by both institutions (such as mandatory foreign languages in public schools), as well as by individuals (for example when code-switching to aid understanding). They refer to the former as organised management, and the latter as simple management, and argue that the recognition of the interplay between these "macro" and "micro" forms of language management sets LMT apart from other LPP approaches (2015:7-8). LMT research thus investigates both top-down and bottom-up language management or, put differently, recognises that "even ordinary speakers in everyday interactions (or based on them) contribute to these changes in language(s) and their use" (Nekvapil & Sherman, 2015:1; 9).

1.2. Language Rights: Theories and Criticisms

1.2.1. Language ecology, linguistic-human rights and minority-language rights

Hymes (1967:98) believes that linguistic diversity can, in the eyes of some, lead to problems in education, national development, and transcultural communication. Nearly six decades ago,

he lamented that those seeking to address these problems are often disappointed to find that a body of systematic knowledge and theory does not exist, as practical concern outpaced scientific competence. The field of Language Policy and Planning (LPP) has since expanded massively, and now envelops another academic field of inquiry, namely language rights.

According to May (2018:164), the main focus of the field of language rights is on the rights of minority-language speakers vis-à-vis majority-language speakers. He states that the distinction between minority and majority languages is not only based on the numerical dominance of speakers, but also on differences in status, power, influence and entitlement. Majority languages are highly valued, May (2018:164-165) continues, are supported by longstanding language policies which allow for their use in the public sphere, and are associated with wider communication and social mobility. Contrastively, minority languages are viewed as being less useful and valuable, and consequently, many minority-language speakers shift to using majority languages, disposing of minority languages in the process.

May (2018:165) suggests that language shift and loss are often related to histories of "colonialism, conquest or confederation" which marginalised minority-language speakers in the first place, and are a direct result of political nationalism and nation-states' preoccupation with linguistic homogeneity. The field of language rights, May (2018) posits, is a direct response to the processes that hierarchise languages and their speakers. De Varennes (1994:163) believes that the importance of language rights is rooted in the vital role that language plays in "human existence, development and dignity".

May (2018:165) states that while the field of language rights emanated from the disciplines of sociolinguistics and the sociology of language, it has since been extended to political theory and international law. Due to the interdisciplinary nature of LPP and language rights, and the resultant diverging theories and frameworks proposed, there are still many questions and contradictions within the vast body of research that has been produced.

Spolsky (2004:113-114), for example, argues that there are several problems regarding the notion of language rights, for example: (i) the terms *language rights*, *linguistic rights*, and *linguistic-human rights* have not been clearly differentiated; (ii) there is disagreement about whether or not language rights are distinct from other human rights; (iii) there is disagreement about the distinction to be made between the rights of an individual to choose the language to be used in his community, and the collective rights of a language community to use and

preserve its language; and (iv) there is disagreement as to whether the speakers or the government should be responsible for language maintenance.

According to Dunbar (2001:93), with the rising interest in language rights, a debate has developed regarding the nature and theoretical foundations of these rights as human rights, as well as the rights of ethnic and cultural minorities more broadly. He argues that two main approaches to the theoretical basis of minority-language rights have emerged. The first approach views language as a "fundamental constitutive element of personal identity", and considers the presence of a supportive cultural and linguistic environment as beneficial to an individual's personal development. Dunbar (2001) notes that members of cultural and linguistic majorities are more likely to enjoy such an environment than members of minorities. The second approach values linguistic diversity (similar to biodiversity) in and of itself, and can be defined as an "ecological" approach.

May (2005:319) states that the concept of language rights has developed to such an extent that it has become well-articulated in the disciplines of sociolinguistics, the sociology of language, and LPP, and has grown into three distinct yet interrelated academic movements, namely: (i) the Language Ecology (LE) movement; (ii) the linguistic-human rights (LHR) movement; and (iii) the minority-language rights (MLR) movement. Herath (2015:246-247) also identifies the latter two movements, and states that both LHR and MLR are an attempt to recognise and accept the linguistic rights of minority-language speakers.

According to May (2005:319; 2018:165), the LE movement, which emerged in the 1990s, sought to connect linguistics and ecology, and situates the exponential loss of languages in the world, the processes of language shift that underpin it, as well as the consequences of this language death, within a wider ecological framework. LE scholars believe that while language shift and loss is not a new phenomenon, it is currently occurring at an unprecedented and exponential rate, endangering some 90% of the world's languages (Krauss, 1992). Simons and Lewis (2013:17) provide an evaluation of this estimate, and found that 37% of languages in use in 1950 were, at the time of writing, either extinct or endangered, although with very high data variability across regions of the world. Simons (2019:10-11) found that the rate of language shift and language loss is increasing and is driven, in part, by rapid urbanisation in sub-Saharan Africa.

The LE movement, May (2018:166) continues, links language directly to ethnic and cultural identity and focuses on the relationship between specific languages and "cultural forms of

knowledge". It considers linguistic and biological diversity to be causatively linked – meaning the higher the linguistic diversity, the higher the biological diversity, and vice versa – and emphasises the importance of maintaining linguistic diversity alongside wider biodiversity. Skutnabb-Kangas and Harmon (2018:5) explain this "correlational and causal relationship between the extinction of species and languages" by claiming that "knowledge of how to maintain biodiversity is encoded in the small languages of Indigenous and local people(s), and it disappears when the languages disappear".

Herath (2015:247) states that the LHR movement views the right to language as a basic human right. At an individual level, linguistic-human rights enable all human beings to positively identify with their mother tongue (and have that affiliation respected by others), to receive basic education in their mother tongue, to learn at least one of their country's official languages, and to use their mother tongue in both the private and public spheres. At a collective level, linguistic-human rights allow minority groups to use and develop their own languages, to establish educational institutions where they may control the curricula and the teaching of their language, and to have political representation and autonomy to administer matters such as culture and education.

According to Herath (2015:247), LHR scholars believe that only speakers of official languages "enjoy all human rights", and that it is thus the government's responsibility to safeguard minority-language speakers. As noted above, de facto and de jure language policies often contradict one another, meaning the official status of a minority language alone is an insufficient measure of LHR protections. In LHR circles, Herath (2015) continues, it is thought that minorities cannot "take" rights for themselves by asserting them, but instead have to have them validated by the state. As a result of the view among governments and majority-language groups that monolingualism is preferable for economic development, and that minorities are a threat to the nation-state, validation of LHR seldom happens.

The MLR movement is focused on language shift, Herath (2015:248) notes, and believes that various functions or elements of majority languages – understood to mean languages with more speakers, or greater sociopolitical or economic power – end up replacing the functions or elements of minority languages. In this process of language shift, acquiring the majority language may be seen by minority-language speakers as being equal to socio-economic mobility (see Chapter 3 for discussion on social mobility). Both the LHR and MLR approaches contend that language loss is caused by wider sociopolitical factors.

May (2005:319) argues that the LHR movement often relies on LE arguments to advocate for greater institutional protection and support of minority languages and their speakers, in both national and supranational contexts. He explains that while these arguments are also present in the MLR movement, the latter has a greater focus on the specific implementation of minority-language rights in national and international law. Although the LE, LHR and MLR movements share many similarities and often overlap, MLR proponents tend to take a more critical approach to conceptions of minority identity as well as national (and supranational) political and linguistic regimes. According to Herath (2015:248), prominent MLR scholars such as Stephen May argue that the creation of nation-states, and the official language regime it inevitably gave rise to, poses the greatest threat to minority languages. As a direct response, minority groups tend to demand greater representation within their existing nation-states, or to exert power to establish their own, separate nation-state or territory.

Furthermore, proponents of LE and LHR, May (2005:327) suggests, often make themselves guilty of essentialising the languages and groups involved, i.e., assuming "an almost ineluctable connection between language and (ethnic) identity", a belief which is then used to justify collective language rights claims. May (2005) contrasts this with the dominant view in social and political theory, sociolinguistics and critical applied linguistics (and among language rights critics), which is that language is an unimportant, and thus discardable, feature of identity. He argues, quoting Kymlicka (1995), that advocates of MLR seek to find a balance between these divergent views, and instead of seeking to preserve an "authentic" culture, they seek the right "to maintain one's membership in a distinct culture, and to continue developing that culture in the same (impure) way that the members of majority cultures are able to develop theirs" (2005:332). May (2005) elaborates:

> Cultural change, adaptation and interaction are entirely consistent with such a position. The crucial difference, however, is that members of the minority are themselves able to retain a significant degree of control over the process – something which until now has largely been the preserve of majority group members. The key issue for minority language speakers thus becomes one of cultural and linguistic *autonomy* rather than one of retrenchment, isolationism, or stasis.

According to May (2005:337), instead of promoting "a singular, exclusive and oppositional notion of linguistic identity", which contrasts the minority and majority languages and identities, MLR offers "a far more pluralistic, open-ended interpretation of language and identity" wherein "multiple, complementary, cultural and linguistic identities at both individual

and collective levels" may be maintained. In Chapter 2, I will discuss the MLR approach to language, identity and nation-states in greater detail, specifically as argued for by May.

1.2.2. Arguments against language rights

Despite the progress made in developing and systematising the field of language rights, increasing criticisms are being levelled against it. May (2005:320) lists six common critiques and suggests classifying them into two broad categories, namely a questioning of the intellectual underpinnings of the language rights movement, and a critique of the limits to its practical application in real language contexts.[1] These criticisms are as follows:

- Criticisms of intellectual underpinnings
    - *The problem of historical inevitability*: critics believe that it is futile to resist linguistic modernisation.
    - *The problem of essentialism*: critics question why language and ethnic identity are necessarily linked.
    - *The problem of mobility and use*: critics believe that the mobility of minority-language speakers is limited when policymakers insist that they continue to speak a language of limited use and value.
- Criticisms of practical application
    - *The implications for social and political stability*: critics argue that language rights unnecessarily destabilise social and political contexts, by accentuating differences and endorsing differential rights-based group claims.
    - *The disconnect between pro-MLR legal arguments, and the actual language policies of many nation-states*: critics believe that while moral claims for

[1] Working from Makoni and Pennycook's (2005, 2007) argument that the notion of 'a language' is a product of nationalism and colonialism, one examiner of this study highlighted a potential criticism of the ideological underpinnings of minority-language rights. When viewing language as a colonial construct, related concepts such as multilingualism, mother-tongue education and, vitally, minority-language rights become suspect. Stroud's (2001) notion of linguistic citizenship was offered as a potential decolonial alternative to an MLR approach to language shift/loss, although its specific application to, in the words of the examiner, "privileged and […] powerful" white Afrikaans speakers is not immediately clear to me. While this critique of MLR is entirely valid, it is, in my estimation, an ideological matter that is unlikely to be settled between language activists and their critics. Although I am largely sympathetic to the understanding of language as outlined above, as my discussion in the following chapters will elucidate, language conflicts often, if not always, involve competing nationalisms. One should thus question the ideological motivations of both language activists and the policymakers (or other stakeholders) towards whom their advocacy is aimed.

language rights (especially within international law) may be just, they can only narrowly influence, let alone change, existing national language policies.

- *The disconnect between macro language rights claims and micro language practices*: critics argue that macro language rights claims require the codification and homogenisation of minority languages and language groups, which does not account for the complex and conflicting micro language practices of individuals within a language group.

There are several other common criticisms against the field of language rights. Firstly, the conceptualisation of language rights as offered by LE is accused of overstating the causative relationship between linguistic and biological diversity such as argued by, among others, Skutnabb-Kangas and Harmon (2018). Secondly, LE is accused of underemphasising, or even ignoring, the role of human agency in language shift and language loss (May, 2018:166). Third, LE is critiqued for grounding language rights not in the speaker, but in the language itself. This approach is said to contemplate something to be protected which is removed from, and may even be at odds with, the interests of minority-language speakers themselves (Dunbar, 2001:94-95).

Another set of criticisms of language rights, which involves both the intellectual underpinnings and the practical implementation of language rights, relates to the quest for monolingualism and the status of English as global lingua franca. Thus, a fourth critique presupposes that the majority language is more instrumentally valuable, and therefore that socio-economic mobility and national development stand to benefit all citizens if they were to use the majority language exclusively. Fifth, a common national language will integrate all citizens into a polity, and unite different language groups on the basis of a common identity, i.e., a common language will lead to nation-building and greater social cohesion between groups. Sixth, it is argued that a common national language will enable governmental and other institutions to run more efficiently and cost-effectively (May, 2003:159; Patten, 2009:104-106; Spolsky, 2004:131).

These arguments regarding the utility of a common national language are common in highly linguistically diverse countries with a colonial language at their 'centre', such as South Africa, and are especially deployed when discussing matters related to education. They are often predicated on the notion of *subtractive* bilingualism, which prioritises the acquisition of the common national language, as opposed to *additive* bilingualism which prioritises the acquisition of the mother tongue (Stoop, 2017:18). May (2003:160) states that arguments

which view the majority language as the most, or even the only, instrumentally useful language, remain prevalent and are difficult to refute (in academia and among the populace alike). He insists that because of these persistent language attitudes in society, the "social justice arguments" underlying MLR are ignored and the central tenet of MLR – mother-tongue education – is undermined (2003:160-161). I will explore educational rights in the next section, and discuss the ability of a majority language to unite minority-language groups in section 1.4.

A seventh critique of language rights relates to the shift of their application away from individuals towards entire minority groups and migrant communities. In other words, language rights are conferred not only on an individual basis, but also on a collective basis (see subsection 1.3.4). This broadening of language rights could have far-reaching implications for governmental and other institutions. Spolsky (2004:119-120) voices this concern as follows:

> Most linguistic rights, Varennes (2001) argues, are derivable from general individual human rights, namely the principles of non-discrimination and freedom of expression. These are straightforward enough when applied to the individual citizen. What adds complexity has been the recent extension of these rights to minority groups and, even more controversially, to the increasingly large migrant communities appearing in so many countries. The problem arises when one moves from the rights of an individual to use his or her own language to the requirement that the state both use and support the use of the minority language.

Spolsky (2004:130) argues that although the right to use one's own language is easy to derive from human rights, advocates of language rights go further and impose the responsibility to maintain minority languages on the government. And herein lies the final critique of the intellectual underpinnings of language rights: whether the government has any responsibility to protect minority languages, or whether that is up to the minority-language groups and/or speakers themselves. In order to answer who should accept responsibility for minority-language preservation, it is critical to understand what, or indeed, 'who', is responsible for language loss. Language rights scholars are also not in agreement on this matter.

Skutnabb-Kangas (2006:189-190) describes the process of language death as linguistic genocide, arguing that external factors are to blame for language loss, and not minority-language speakers. She identifies the "direct agents in language murder" as the educational system and media, and argues that behind them lie "the real culprits", namely the global economic, military and political systems (2001:201). Spolsky (2004:216), on the other hand, insists that language death "results less from linguistic genocide than from linguistic suicide".

He maintains that language activists have failed to convince governments that maintaining linguistic diversity is their responsibility.

Other scholars recognise the effect of external factors on language loss, but also believe minority groups share some responsibility. Sridhar (1994:630) argues that there are two forces involved in the preservation or loss of a minority language, namely sociopolitical and economic factors – which he believes are, collectively, the strongest force – as well as the minority group's commitment to the preservation of its ethnocultural identity and values. Perhaps the most nuanced 'take' on the interface between minority-language speakers' preservation efforts and external factors beyond their control, comes from Patten (2009:120-121):

> Language choices do not take place in a social vacuum. They are profoundly influenced by the incentives and opportunities provided by social practices and institutions. These practices and institutions help to raise or lower the various costs and benefits associated with acquiring and using particular languages. If, for example, much of a community's economic activity and popular culture are conducted in the majority language, then parents have less reason to choose to pass on their minority language to their children and children may be less keen to learn it. Or, if the public schools use a particular language as a medium of instruction, then the cost to parents of passing that language on to their children is much lower than it would be if instruction were only available privately. Many social practices and institutions themselves emerge and are reproduced as a result of individual choices and to this extent their impact on linguistic outcomes still may not give rise to any special demand for state involvement. But, as the example of the public schools illustrates, some of the most crucial institutions affecting language use are public ones, or are structured and regulated by the state. These institutions are not established and maintained by individual choices in civil society, but by public policy. Government decisions about language norms in the public sector, in the delivery of public services, in the courts, legislatures, and military, in the selection and naturalisation of immigrants, and so on, all profoundly influence the incentives people face in making choices about language use. They raise the symbolic and practical value of learning and using some languages and lower the value of others. Focusing on these facts, some theorists argue that decisions by government which privilege the majority language for use in public contexts are unfair to those minority speakers who value their language and want to use it in public and to see it survive and flourish.

This interplay between public language policies and minority-language activism is very evident in South Africa. Here language loss, specifically of Afrikaans, is viewed not as a result of individual language choices, but as a potential, or rather inevitable, outcome of (preventable) state action. I discuss this dynamic throughout Chapters 4 and 5.

1.3. Types of Language Rights

1.3.1. Introduction

Minority-language speakers may benefit from a wide variety of language rights, ranging from protection against discrimination, to promotion of their languages and advancement of multilingualism. According to Paulston (1997:81), since language rights differ from country to country, there exists no generally accepted standard legal definition of the term 'language rights'. It must also be noted that, as a consequence of the discrepancy between de jure and de facto language policies, conferred language rights might not necessarily be adhered to in practice. Skutnabb-Kangas (2006:194) identifies the following dichotomous pairs of language rights:

- *Negative* versus *positive rights*
- *Tolerance-oriented* versus *promotion-oriented rights*
- *Individual* versus *collective rights*
- *Territorial* versus *personal rights*
- *Rights in "hard law"* versus *"soft law"*

Elsewhere, Skutnabb-Kangas (2001:204) also identifies *educational-language rights* (ELR). Kymlicka (1995:6-7; 105) proposes several minority groups rights that have a bearing on language, namely *context-of-choice rights* (as termed by Patten, 2009), as well as *group-differentiated rights* (a category which consists of *self-government rights*, *polyethnic rights*, and *special representation rights*). Patten (2009:103) in turn, identifies *accommodation rights*, and additionally proposes *end-state rights* and *fairness rights*. I discuss these rights in the subsections below.

1.3.2. Educational-language rights (ELR)

Discussions in LPP and the field of language rights often focus on language-in-education policies and so-called mother-tongue education (MTE). Of McRae's (1975) five domains of language use listed in the first section, demands for language rights affect the domain of public education more than any other domain. According to Dunbar (2001:108), minority-language activists and linguists believe that minority-language education is essential to language maintenance. Skutnabb-Kangas (2001:204) suggests that educational-language rights (ELR), which include the right to learn one's mother tongue fully, and to learn fully in one's mother tongue, are among the most important rights that minority-language speakers seem to want.

According to Thomas (2009:83), research shows that minority-language children progress faster in both their mother tongue (MT) and the majority language, when they first receive education in their MT and other languages are gradually introduced. Brock-Utne (2001:125-126) also claims that the best basis for learning the majority language is "the best possible command" of the MT, indicating that it should be used as medium of instruction (MoI) up to a relatively high level of education. She suggests further that when a second or foreign language is the MoI, the language will often become a barrier to knowledge throughout education (2001:126). In its 1953 report titled *The Use of Vernacular Languages in Education*, UNESCO (cited in Fasold, 1984:2) argued that there are psychological, sociological and educational benefits to mother-tongue education:

> It is axiomatic that the best medium for teaching a child is his mother tongue. Psychologically, it is the system of meaningful signs that in his mind works automatically for expression and understanding. Sociologically, it is a means of identification among the members of the community to which he belongs. Educationally, he learns more quickly through it than through an unfamiliar linguistic medium.

Skutnabb-Kangas (2001:206) claims that in *assimilationist submersion education,* where the majority language is exclusively used as MoI, mental harm is caused to minority-language speakers. She refers to this as *subtractive education*, which teaches children the majority language at the cost of their mother tongue and, instead, advocates for *additive education* in which the majority language is taught (and used as MoI) in addition to the mother tongue. May (2014a:230) argues that "late-exit" *bilingual education*, where the MT is retained until a late stage, is the most effective option for minority-language speakers. Thomas (2009:83) notes that MTE is often misunderstood to mean mother-tongue-only education. The call for MTE though rarely means the exclusion of other languages, but rather the inclusion of the mother tongue into existing (often) monolingual language policies. She states that policymakers (and parents) often wrongly believe that mother-tongue education will mean that children will never be proficient in the majority language.

In African countries, the former colonial language usually becomes the dominant majority language, and English, in particular, is widely used as MoI (Brock-Utne, 2001:115; Mazrui, 2002:269). Mazrui (2002:275-276) has argued that African academics are linguistically, intellectually and scientifically dependent on the West, and Stroud (2001:116) has argued that African countries are not only economically, but also culturally dependent on their former colonisers.

Ricento (2000:499) states that some believe cultural globalisation – the centralised control over worldwide cultural dissemination – poses a bigger threat to independence than colonialism did. While many would surely disagree with such a strong statement, it does highlight the overlap between discourses on language issues and continued minority-group existence. Consider also, for instance, Skutnabb-Kangas (2001:204), who views MTE as "one of the most important elements in the right not only to exist with a separate identity, but, most importantly, to reproduce this identity". This theme will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

According to Paulston (1997:84), language-in-education policies mostly represent the interests of those in power and serve to maintain their socio-economic status. She adds that, under such circumstances, individuals often do not have freedom of language choice, especially in education. McGroarty (2002:31) believes that in order to promote MTE, minority-language groups have to develop a strong electoral presence and mobilise around language-in-education issues, while professional educators, researchers, and policymakers should advocate MTE to the public. McGroarty (2002:31) stresses that minority-language speakers should preferably attain some degree of political power in order to affect change in language-in-education policies. As Chapters 4 and 5 will illustrate, in the absence of political power among a numerically weak minority group, civil society may also be successfully mobilised in the promotion of a minority language and the pursuit of language rights.

In addition to MTE, educational-language rights also include the right of minority groups to establish and control their own educational systems and institutions that provide MTE (May, 2014b:225). Such a right goes beyond the reach of purely educational considerations of individuals, and rather aims to give minority groups some form of self-determination, be it in the form of cultural or (regional) political autonomy (Skutnabb-Kangas, 2001:204). These concessions relate to self-governing rights, which are discussed later in this section.

1.3.3. Negative, positive, promotion, toleration, and accommodation rights

Negative and positive rights, and promotion, toleration and accommodation rights are an overlapping set of language rights which determine the **degree** to which minority languages and speakers should be protected and/or promoted, and specifically concern the responsibility for action or inaction of the state. These rights may be situated on an axis, with negative and toleration rights on the one end, promotion and positive rights on the other, and accommodation rights somewhere in the middle.

Skutnabb-Kangas (2006:194) states that negative rights protect individuals from discrimination based on language and ensure that linguistic minorities enjoy the same human rights that speakers of majority languages do. In other words, negative rights do not award any 'extra' rights to minority-language speakers, but simply confirm that they should not lose any existing human rights and legal protections on the basis of their minority status. Positive rights, on the other hand, actively enable individuals to use their language and maintain and develop their group identity. These rights imply a responsibility on the part of the state to support minorities with the maintenance and development of their language and/or identity, and not merely that it should not interfere with such activities.

According to Pool (1987:44), toleration rights allow linguistic minorities to cultivate their own languages, whereas promotion rights require public institutions to use and cultivate minority languages. Kymlicka and Patten (2003:137) define toleration rights as the rights that individuals have against government interference in terms of their private language choices, which permit them to speak their preferred languages in their homes, in the workplace and in the private sphere. They define promotion rights as the rights that individuals have to use a particular language in public institutions such as in the courts, the legislature, public schools, and in relation to the delivery of public services.

Heinz Kloss, referred to by Pool (1987:44) as the leading historian and theorist of language law, developed a scale of language rights which can be used to rate national language policies in terms of their support of linguistic minorities. Kloss divides pro-minority-language policies into those that confer toleration rights and those that confer promotion rights, which Pool (1987:45) converts into a seven-value scale of language rights, where (7) is the most pro-minority policy:

(1) Allowing linguistic minorities fundamental political rights.
(2) Allowing the use of minority languages.
(3) Allowing minorities to establish institutions in which they use their language.
(4) Allowing minorities to establish private schools in which they cultivate their language.
(5) Allowing foreign countries to help minorities carry out activities (3) and (4).
(6) Allowing state institutions to use minority languages when communicating with minorities.
(7) Either allowing minorities to organise public institutions of self-government in which they use their language, or using minority languages in all state communications.

According to May (2014b:387), an example of promotion rights would include state-funded education in the minority language. He states, however, that minority-language speakers are usually only conferred toleration rights. Patten (2009:107) claims that many language rights disputes concern promotion rights, i.e., whether the state should designate several languages as media of instruction in public schools, depending on the preferences of minority-language speakers, and whether it should also offer public services in minority languages. He is sceptical about the justification of promotion rights, but believes that when states do "aggressively pursue" official monolingualism, they often also attempt to curtail the use of minority languages in the private sphere. This restriction or regulation of language use in the economy, civil society and the private home, Patten (2009:107-108) posits, denies speakers their easily justifiable toleration rights:

> Toleration rights are fairly easy to justify, because they piggy-back on the protection of other important values and rights. If citizens have a morally weighty complaint when they do not enjoy these other values and rights, then they have the same complaint when they do not enjoy toleration rights. Although there are disagreements at the margins about the value and proper scope of freedom of expression, most people would regard it as a key principle to be defended in any free and democratic society. And it is difficult to see how it could be consistent with such a principle for the state to restrict or meaningfully regulate the languages in which people choose to express themselves.

As Patten (2009:108) considers Kloss' distinction of toleration and promotion rights "too crude", he suggests another type of language right, namely accommodation rights. As an example of such rights, Patten (2009:108-109) offers the case of a citizen who lacks proficiency in the language of the court, being provided with a court-appointed interpreter. Due to the required action on the part of the state, such a concession cannot be described as a toleration right. It can, however, also not be described as a promotion right either, as this right is made conditional on an inability to understand the majority language, and neither the aim nor the outcome is the promotion of the minority language.

Patten (2009:109) refers to this approach to the treatment of minority-language speakers in the public sphere as the "norm-and-accommodation" model, which involves the dominance of the majority language in official functions, with special accommodations made for people who are not proficient in that language. The goal of this approach is to establish communication so that those with limited proficiency in the majority language can exercise their rights and access the benefits to which they are entitled as citizens. Patten (2009:109) states that similar to toleration rights, accommodation rights "piggy-back" off other human rights – in the case above, the right to a fair trial – and are therefore easily justifiable.

In contrast the promotion rights approach, Patten (2009:109) explains, aims to promote the minority language, and does not make rights contingent on a lack of proficiency in the majority language. In other words, a minority-language speaker may enjoy promotion rights despite being fluent in the majority language. Kymlicka and Patten (2003:138) stress that this approach strives to promote "a further identity or intrinsic value". In other words, the protection of a minority language is pursued because of the recognition of its personal value to its speakers' identity, and/or it may be based on the belief of the (ecological) value of linguistic diversity.

Negative and positive rights are largely interchangeable with toleration and promotion rights. However, one may argue that the scope of negative rights is larger and may even cover accommodation rights as well, due to the concerns of both with protecting the basic human rights of citizens, instead of their languages. According to Patten (2009:110), although minority-language activists often demand language rights that are not restricted to the private sphere, and are not conditional on insufficient proficiency in the majority language, i.e., promotion rights, these rights are not as easily justifiable.

1.3.4. Context-of-choice, end-state, and fairness rights

Patten (2009:111) believes that among political philosophers, Will Kymlicka (1995) presents the best-known attempt to justify minority rights by grounding them in principles widely accepted in liberal political theory, and in particular, the principle of autonomy. Kymlicka argues that in order to protect the personal autonomy of minority-culture members, cultural rights may be required.[2] Liberals, Patten explains, believe that not only do people have a 'morally weighty complaint' when they lose autonomy under some institutional arrangement, but also when they lose the conditions necessary for autonomy. Kymlicka suggests that one of these conditions is a secure "context of choice". Patten (2009:111) explains as follows:

> To be autonomous, a person needs access to an adequate range of options and alternatives from which to make choices. Since people are different, and they frequently revise their ends, there needs to be a variety of options and opportunities if all individuals are to flourish. This context of choice is supplied by a person's culture and, in particular, by what Kymlicka calls a "societal culture." A societal culture, in Kymlicka's jargon, is closely connected with what others have termed a "national culture": it refers to a set of institutions and practices that define an adequate range of options across the full range of different areas of life. From this claim about the conditions of autonomy Kymlicka infers that individuals have a morally weighty

[2] Kymlicka (1995) promotes the notion that culture represents a "social primary good", referring to the social goods that every rational person is presumed to want for the pursuit of the good life – rights, liberties, powers, opportunities, income, wealth, etc. (Oakes, 2017:367).

> interest in the security of the societal culture to which they belong. If a societal culture is overrun by some more powerful national or global culture, or if it is threatened with decay or decline in some way, then the autonomy of its members is in jeopardy. The upshot, he suggests, is that members of minority cultures have a set of cultural rights—including language rights—that are designed to protect their societal cultures.

Patten (2009:113) believes that due to several substantive criticisms of Kymlicka's argument, which are beyond the scope of this thesis, context-of-choice rights might only justifiably apply to "vulnerable societal cultures" – cultures which currently offer members a range of options required for autonomy, but which are on the brink of deterioration. He further argues that in some instances, promoting context-of-choice rights might actually suggest minority-language speakers learn and use the majority language, as doing so will afford them more options and opportunities needed to support autonomy than their own language does (2009:114).

While Patten (2009) identifies shortcomings in Kymlicka's attempts to base language rights in liberal democratic theory, he proposes two additional categories of rights, namely end-state and fairness rights. Schmidt (2014:399) states that, ultimately, Patten finds end-state rights (explained below) too flawed, but he does find "sufficiently firm grounding" for fairness rights, leading him to believe that considerations regarding fairness might lead to a strong justification for awarding minority-language groups promotion rights.

End-state rights are a set of protective language rights awarded to minority-language speakers, on the basis that a particular linguistic community to which speakers are strongly attached, is currently failing to flourish, or is expected to disappear in the future (Patten, 2009:115-116). In contrast to context-of-choice rights, end-state rights are not conditional on speakers losing an adequate range of options, or autonomy, when their language declines. Instead, it only requires that speakers lose a particular option that is valuable to them, namely the opportunity to use their own language, and have others in their community also continue to use it. Fairness rights, on the other hand, do not protect minority languages from certain fates, but rather, protect minority-language speakers from unfair processes which eliminate their options and lead to the loss of their language and linguistic community (Patten, 2009:116).

Patten (2009:117) argues that end-state rights impose unreasonable demands on others, and do not take into account the zero-sum structure of language, where the official use of one language necessarily means another language is being excluded. In other words, he seems to suggest that the protection of minority-language speakers' end-state rights, in the form of minority-language promotion in the public sphere, would be an impossibly onerous undertaking on the

part of the state, and might even violate the rights of the majority. Patten (2009:119) insists that in a fair context – which means that a lack of options was not caused by unfairness – citizens should bear the costs of their own commitments and attachments to their language.[3] Weinstock (2014:328) elaborates on this fairness justification for minority-language rights as follows:

> What would a liberal language policy, one that was respectful of the individual rights of citizens, and that also eschewed grounding policy on controversial conceptions of the good, look like? One answer, which has been quite popular among liberal political philosophers who have turned their attention to issues of linguistic justice, has been the following: given fair background conditions, whatever linguistic states of affairs results from the linguistic choices people make are, in virtue of having been arrived at in such circumstances, just. State action aiming to somehow correct for these choices in virtue of some ideal that is independent of people's choices is thus unjust (Blake 2003).

Put differently, Weinstock's (2014) conception of fairness would thus suggest that if minority-language speakers indicate the desire to maintain their language (and cultural identity), and the language is not at risk of language shift or language loss because of the speakers' choices, it would be unjust of the state to impede the promotion of their language in the public sphere.

Patten (2009:121) insists that despite their identity interests in their language, minority-language groups are not entitled to *linguistic survival*, because it imposes unreasonable duties on the rest of society. He believes that there might be justification of a right to *linguistic security* though, which, despite it also being an end-state concept, "is not a right to the present flourishing of one's language but to protection against 'unfair or coercive pressures' that threaten to compromise the flourishing of the language". The distinction is not between survival and security, Patten argues, but between a right to a specific end-state of a language and a right to fair treatment in the processes that determine linguistic end-states.

Fairness rights are thus violated, according to Patten (2009:121-122), when the government prohibits the use of a minority language in certain contexts or when it fails to make it possible for minority-language speakers to use their language in public institutions. Oakes (2017:367) believes that governments promote a particular culture in the public sphere, and that this is especially evident in national language policies which determine official languages. He states

[3] Patten's (2009) views on state funding versus private funding by minority groups may be questioned (at least to an extent), considering that the latter presumably do contribute to the state's resources through taxation, and the state does have a duty to act in the interest of all of its citizens, regardless of minority status. The contention here seems to be based on different evaluations regarding what is of interest to minority-language speakers.

that in order to counteract this bias, Kymlicka (1995) proposes the concept of group-differentiated rights, which are conferred on the basis of cultural membership.

1.3.5. Territorial, personal, individual, collective, and group-differentiated rights

Territorial and personal, and individual, collective and group-differentiated rights are, similar to the rights discussed in subsection 1.3.3, an interrelated set of language rights which determine the **basis** on which language rights should be accorded.

Kloss (1971:14), refers to territoriality as the speech-area principle and explains that the principle requires that in every speech area of multinational states, only one language (that of the indigenous group) enjoys official status and is allowed in the public schools, the regional and local administration, and the courts. The conferral of language rights based on territoriality is impractical in plural societies like India and South Africa, where various minority groups are geographically dispersed, unlike in other multilingual countries such as Canada and Belgium. According to McRae (1975:258), territorial rights entail that the language rules to be applied in a specific situation are entirely dependent on the territory in question, whereas personal rights entail that the rules will depend solely on the language of the speaker or speakers concerned.

In other words, when citizens have territorial rights, they have the right to the public use of their language, as long as they are in the specific territory where the use of that language has been designated. In contrast, when citizens have personal rights, they may insist on the public use of their language anywhere in their country. Personal rights thus 'follow' a speaker wherever they choose to live. Webb (2002:158) argues that the application of territorial rights means that human rights are handled on the basis of region and a federal system of government is in operation. Van Parijs (2012:2) elaborates on territorial rights as follows:

> By definition and in contrast to an accommodating regime, a territorially differentiated coercive linguistic regime (or, for short, a territorial regime) is a set of rules that constrains the choice of the language to be used in public communication and public education within a given territory.

Individual rights protect the minority-language speaker, whereas collective rights protect the minority-language group (Skutnabb-Kangas, 2006:195). The distinction between these two kinds of language rights is the right a person has to use their language, and the right a group has to cultivate their language. According to Kymlicka (1995:7), many liberals mistakenly

believe that collective rights are inherently in conflict with individual rights. He suggests that two different meanings of collective rights have to be distinguished:

> Collective rights could refer to the right of a group to limit the liberty of its own individual members in the name of group solidarity or cultural purity ('internal restrictions'); or it could refer to the right of a group to limit the economic or political power exercised by the larger society over the group, to ensure that the resources and institutions on which the minority depends are not vulnerable to majority decisions ('external protections').

According to May (2014b:386), external protections concern intergroup relations, and are intended to ensure that minority-group *members* are able to protect their distinct identity and maintain their way of life, should they *choose* to do so, by limiting the impact of the decisions of the larger society (members of the majority group). The issue of protecting minority interests in a majoritarian democracy is particularly relevant to the case study of white Afrikaans speakers, and will be returned to throughout this thesis. Kymlicka (1995:6-8) argues that a liberalism which is grounded in principles of freedom of choice and personal autonomy, necessitates a certain concern with cultural membership, leading him to propose three types of group-differentiated rights, namely:

- *Self-government rights*: The distribution of powers to national minorities, often through some form of federalism.
- *Polyethnic rights*: Financial support and legal protection for certain practices associated with particular ethnic or religious groups.
- *Special representation rights*: Guaranteed seats for ethnic or national groups within the central institutions of the larger state.

May (2014b:387) suggests that self-government rights typically involve federalism, which entails the devolution of power to minority-group members, who are usually located in a particular territory. He also argues that self-government rights acknowledge that the nation-state "is not the sole preserve" of the majority group, but that minority groups have the right to equal inclusion and representation in the public sphere.

Polyethnic rights, on the other hand, enable ethnic-minority groups (immigrants and refugees) to continue to express their cultural and linguistic identity, mainly in the private sphere, without it hindering their success in the dominant national society. Both self-government rights and polyethnic rights seek to protect cultural and linguistic identities; however, the ultimate goal

of polyethnic rights is to promote integration into the larger society, rather than to promote the self-governing status of the group (May, 2014a:387).

According to Oakes (2017:368), special representation rights, which guarantee places for minorities in national institutions, are usually conferred on a temporary basis as a transitionary measure. He argues that whereas collective rights are concerned with groups, the ethical justification for group-differentiated rights are that they are intended to meet the needs of individuals.

Kymlicka (1995:45) maintains that group-differentiated rights can be conferred to individual members of a group, to the whole group, or to a federal state or province where the group forms a majority (thus territorial group-differentiated rights), which means they are distinct from collective rights (May, 2014a:386; Oakes, 2017:368). Although critical of Kymlicka's group-differentiated rights, Pârvu (2007:415) concedes that external protections "do not necessarily come into conflict with individual rights". In other words, within a framework of liberal democracy with its emphasis on individual freedom, there is a case to be made for the protection of the (individual) members of a minority group from majoritarianism.

1.3.6. International Law

According to Skutnabb-Kangas (2006:194-195), hard-law rights are the binding rights included in charters and constitutions, while soft-law rights are rights included in declarations, recommendations, and so forth. The distinction here is therefore the degree of **overtness** of language rights. Whereas domestic legal systems are rife with legal provisions and protections for minority-language groups, in international law, and especially in international human rights law, much less attention is paid to minority-language rights (Dunbar, 2001:90).

According to Paz (2013:170), despite there being no international treaty dedicated to language rights, many international and regional legal documents address the linguistic interests of minorities. She claims that such documents follow three principles, namely: (i) that the best approach to regulate minorities' language claims is through a human-rights vocabulary; (ii) that the legal protection of minority languages and their speakers should be based on the cultural importance of language; and (iii) that the preservation of language is part of a larger policy of promoting cultural diversity.

Paz (2013:171) states that while minorities treaties, which were based on the belief that minority-group members should enjoy protection from assimilationist pressures, were popular

after World War I, they fell out of favour after World War II. Instead, it was believed that minorities could best be protected through "universal, minority-specific human rights, combined with the prohibition of discrimination". She suggests that this new viewpoint is visible in the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (1948), and constituted a shift to individual human rights. Almost immediately afterwards, Paz argues, opinions shifted back and the idea that membership of a minority group entails distinct human rights became dominant. This shift, Paz (2013:171-172) believes, is visible in Article 27 of the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (ICCPR, 1966), which confers to minority-language speakers the right to enjoy their own culture and use their own language:

> [T]he Article is the first and perhaps most notable expression in a binding universal instrument of minorities' direct right to their culture and language that goes beyond a guarantee of non-discrimination and the protection of individual rights.

Dunbar (2001:119) argues that while international law and international human rights law do provide for a variety of language rights, which in specific circumstances may be of great value to minority-language speakers, "the present provision falls well short of a comprehensive and coherent package". He suggests that while major human rights treaties such as the ICCPR and the *European Convention on Human Rights* (ECHR, 1953) are based on liberal civil and political rights – and therefore confer negative language rights that prohibit discrimination based on language – they do not acknowledge that minority languages face more subtle pressures today, some of which are caused by non-state actions and processes. Paz (2013:172) concurs that while statesmen and legal scholars agreed on the need to recognise the legal status of a collective group that is different from its individual members, and which is conferred rights beyond the scope of equality and non-discrimination for its individual members, the final formulation of Article 27 of the ICCPR was flawed.

Dunbar (2001:119-120) believes that although international instruments have been developed since 1990 which attempt to address the need for positive state measures – such as the *European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages* (ECRML, 1992) – language rights have still not been given the status of fundamental rights under international law.

> First, there is the rather patchwork nature of the support provided. Many of the most useful measures of positive support have not attained the status of binding international legal principles. Second, there is the limited nature of the rights themselves. In many cases, particularly with respect to fundamental services such as education, the rights provided are subject to a range of conditions, such as sufficient levels of demand, demonstrated "real need", and the administrative and financial convenience of States themselves, all of which tend to significantly weaken these rights. Indeed, the Minority

> Languages Charter takes pains to insist that it confers no individual or collective rights at all. Not all languages are protected; generally, only those which are spoken by a "minority" or a "national minority" qualify. Third, almost all of the positive rights and State obligations are essentially unenforceable, either because, once again, the instrument is not legally binding under international law, or because the instrument creates no real means of enforcement such as a right of individual petition or complaint to an international body; indeed, only Article 27, together with the other rights in the ICCPR and ECHR, are capable of being litigated before such bodies. Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, even the positive rights are provided in such a way that a one-sided reliance on government is created, with limited community control and input into the process of language planning and policy design and implementation. The narrow focus on government obligations obscures extremely important questions about the manner in which minority language services are conceived and developed. There needs to be greater focus on process rather than outcome.

According to Kymlicka (1995:4), it has become abundantly clear that minority rights cannot be incorporated under (individual) human rights, as the latter are unable to resolve some of the most pressing questions concerning cultural minorities – such as which languages should be used by the state, whether minority groups should have state-funded MTE, whether internal boundaries should attempt to form regions where minorities form a majority, whether power should be devolved to minority groups, and what responsibilities fall to minorities. Kymlicka (1995) believes that these questions have been left to majoritarian decision-making, rendering minority groups vulnerable to significant injustice at the hands of the majority, often exacerbating ethnocultural conflict.

I turn to this incompatibility between majoritarianism and minority-language rights in the next section, touching on the outcomes of monolingual nation-building efforts in plural societies, and highlighting the inherent political nature of language conflict, i.e., as competition between language groups over certain resources.

1.4. Language Conflict

1.4.1. Nation-building and monolingualism

According to Kelman (1971:177), language *can* be a unifying force in monolingual countries and a divisive force in multilingual countries. Many authors critique the view of linguistic diversity as inherently problematic, questioning the notion of one-state-one-language (see Coetzee-Van Rooy, 2016; Fardon & Furniss, 1994), a topic which I discuss at length in the next chapter and beyond. That being said, there are countless examples of multilingual countries plagued by language conflict. De Varennes (1994:164) also notes the ability of

language to unite and divide, and emphasises the contributing role of national language policies in language conflicts:

> Language, like race and religion, is one of the passions of our time – at once a powerful focus for uniting people who share a common language, and a potential source of fission and discord in the community at large. While differences of race and religion can be put aside in an attempt to be neutral, it is impossible for a state to remain language neutral in its communication activities or in its contacts with the public. Historically, many states have sought to integrate and even homogenise linguistically different populations.

Peled (2014:301-302) suggests that the practice of language policy emerges from the inescapable tension between linguistic diversity and societal (e.g., political, economic, environmental) interdependence. Kibbee (2008:90) states that protecting minority-language groups is a balancing act between the requirements of national unity and the need for the cultural protection of minority groups, a view which suggests that public multilingualism and social cohesion are at odds with one another. He explains that cultural protection is achieved by guaranteeing minority groups access to mass media, legal and administrative functions of government, and education in (or at least, of) their language, which provide them the opportunity to reproduce themselves, that is, to maintain the existence of their community. As there are financial and political considerations in making these concessions, the matter is never settled conclusively.

According to Kibbee (2008:92), minority groups and the state are constantly renegotiating, through political processes, how to preserve minority languages and cultures. Ethnolinguistic diversity, Tollefson (2002c:335) suggests, can be dealt with by state authorities in one of two ways: they can either extend democratic pluralism, or they can repress ethnolinguistic differences by creating two categories of citizens – those who enjoy full rights and privileges and those who do not. Tollefson (2002d:5) insists that language policies which seek to reduce linguistic diversity are usually very unrealistic.

Kibbee (2008:92) posits that the maintenance of minority languages and related cultures can either promote a sense of fairness and thereby reduce the risk of interethnic conflict, or it can also encourage a sense of difference that may lead to conflict. Kelman (1971:166) believes that while the development of a national language can lead to the establishment of a national identity in nation-states, the deliberate use of language for this purpose in multinational states may inadvertently cause disunity between groups. This means that both the promotion of

minority languages, and the establishment of a national language (and thus official monolingualism), can either create language conflict or prevent it.

According to Davis (1994:9), language problems often arise in traditional multilingual countries during sociopolitical or economic transitions. She posits that since language traditions are widely perceived as central to social cohesion and national unity, the changes in language use demanded by these transitions become difficult to realise. Davis (1994) claims that in order to address the need for change and to recognise traditional values, governments usually establish language policies which stress both "ethnic authenticity" and "modern efficiency". It is important to note here the juxtaposition of (minority) ethnicity and modernity, a position May (2012) is critical of, and which will be discussed at length in Chapter 2.

Patten (2009:106) argues that a scheme of minority-language rights could possibly do a better job than state monolingualism at promoting a common political identity. He suggests that the acknowledgement of difference could be a feature that attracts popular allegiance to the political community. Patten (2009) further states that the recognition of certain language rights is not mutually exclusive with ensuring that minority-language speakers are proficient in the majority language in order to participate in the national economy and political community, considering the fact that high levels of individual bilingualism are commonplace among minority-language speakers. He also posits that a common language may do little to improve the economic opportunities and political participation of minorities, as these are determined by deeper issues such as socio-economic status which are "only marginally affected by changes in language policy".

Kelman (1971:177) states that although a common language is not a prerequisite for a united country, there are countless examples of multilingual countries in which there have been, or still is, language conflict. Thus, while linguistically and culturally homogeneous nation-states can rely on a shared language to unite all citizens, linguistically and culturally heterogeneous multinational states have to find other ways to unite a diverse population through their national language policies. The appearance of conflict in (mainly) monolingual countries, on the basis of religion and/or political ideology – such as in Ireland and the United States – would suggest that a common language alone cannot unite indefinitely disparate groups.

Despite pretensions to ethnocultural neutrality, majority groups in liberal democracies all engage in nation-building – that is, the adoption of policies aimed at integrating all citizens into a societal culture based on a national language, culture and identity (Kymlicka and Patten,

2003:141; Patten, 2009:122). While nation-building serves some important goals, the designation of the majority language as the national language puts minorities at a disadvantage and puts pressure on them to assimilate. Whereas Kymlicka insists that such a disadvantage would be unfair unless minority groups were given the same opportunity to engage in nation-building, Patten (2009:124) believes this line of argument leads either to territorial rights, and in fact minority territories, or to the right against certain forms of nation-building, although he does not specify which ones.

In an attempt to find an ethnically neutral language, Spolsky (2004:131) explains, many African countries elect a colonial language as official language. He notes that in these highly pluralistic settings, multilingualism is seen as working against national unity, whereas the election of a particular minority language as national and/or official language is seen as causing further inequality between the various minority-language groups. Not only does the election of a colonial language (often English) exacerbate many existing inequalities between various minority groups, but it also does not eliminate the possibility of language conflict.

According to Patten (2009:104), many states have a dominant ethnolinguistic group that shapes and directs the nation-building process. This involves them privileging their own language in order to consolidate their grip on the state, and in doing so, advantaging their own members in the competition for economic resources and opportunities. The rationale for state monolingualism, Patten argues, is therefore less about "the common good" and more about the specific interests of the majority group.

1.4.2. Majoritarianism and the competition for resources and power

Henrard (2001:79) explains that while there is no generally accepted definition of what constitutes a minority, there are certain key elements that clarify the concept. Possible aspects of minority status include the possession of ethnic, religious or linguistic features which are not shared by the rest of the population, being numerically weaker (that is, comprising less than 50% of the total population), and the fulfilment of the "non-dominance" requirement (which means the minority group should not have a dominant position over the rest of the population). She asserts that aside from the minority-group members in question, "the rest of the population" is not necessarily a monolithic bloc, but may consist of several other minority groups, as is the case in South Africa.

According to Henrard (2001:79), the non-dominance requirement does not mean that the minority group in question has to be subordinate or oppressed, but simply that they must not

be dominant. This understanding of the non-dominance requirement denies the qualification "minority" to numerical minority groups that rule the state, as they are not in need of special protections, as was the case of the Afrikaner minority during Apartheid. Kibbee (2008:85) argues that even though some minority groups can be dominant because of their relative economic advantage, political power and social attitudes might still lead to discrimination against these economically privileged minority-language groups (as was the case for the Jewish minority in Weimar Germany).

Galston (cited in McGroarty, 2002:26) maintains that a very controversial matter in contemporary social theory is the extent to which liberal democracies that are dependent on majority-rule can accommodate pluralism. Tollefson (2002c:336) believes that democratic pluralism has to be accepted by dominant groups to a certain extent. He argues, however, that this is unlikely, since it requires dominant groups to forfeit their advantage, given that such pluralism often implies wealth redistribution and/or political power shifts. According to Kibbee (2008:89), majority rule, the fundamental principle of the widely embraced political value of democracy, makes the oppression of minorities possible. He asserts that this is a common occurrence, which means that for minorities, democracy does not necessarily mean freedom.

Kelman (1971:177) states that the language policy of a country frequently leads to dissatisfaction among minority-language groups. Minority-language speakers are prone to feel that their rights are not being granted and that they are being denied opportunities because of their language. Language conflict may also arise when the majority group is socio-economically disadvantaged relative to a minority group, if the majority group's language is less powerful than one of the minority languages in the country, and when the majority group believes that minority languages are being accommodated too much.

According to Kelman (1971:177), different languages commonly correspond with ethnic, religious and socio-economic differences between groups – all factors that can lead to serious conflict. Grin (2003:512) argues that linguistic diversity has a "conflictual" nature, since different language groups are often in competition for access to the same resources. Skutnabb-Kangas (2001:204) also claims that ethnic conflicts commonly occur when linguistic and ethnically defined groups differ in terms of relative economic or political power. In other words, language conflicts should be viewed as a proxy for greater conflicts between groups. Tollefson (2002d:5) maintains that since language conflict usually sprouts from the competition for political power and economic resources between different language groups, it

is important to examine the underlying socio-economic and political struggles that language conflict represents, in order to gain a deeper understanding of specific language debates. I attempt to do so throughout the case study in Chapter 5.

Kelman (1971:178) posits that language conflicts are exacerbated by the presence of sentimental and instrumental attachments to language. He explains that during language-related conflicts, the minority group will often sense a threat at the sentimental level, believing that its "language is being derogated, its cultural self-development and literary expression inhibited, and its educational efforts undermined". Since minority-group members believe that their language is not being recognised, they will also experience discrimination at the instrumental level, i.e., they are denied equal opportunities and full participation in the system, and their socio-economic mobility is hindered. I discuss different types of threat experienced by minority-group members in Chapter 3. Kelman (1971:178-179) stresses that sentimental attachments to language add to the ferocity of language conflicts:

> Assuming that the primary impetus for major linguistic conflicts is an instrumentally based grievance – a response by the weaker language group to discrimination, to exclusion, and to denial of its rightful share of power and resources – the conflict readily becomes intensified by sentimental elaborations. Since language is so closely tied to group identity, language-based discrimination against a group is perceived as a threat to its very existence as a recognisable entity and as an attack on its sacred objects and symbols. The issue is no longer merely a redistribution of power and resources, but it is self-preservation of the group and defence against genocide. The conflict becomes highly charged with emotion and increasingly unmanageable.

According to Kibbee (2008:79), achieving harmony and peace among different cultural and linguistic groups depend on making people feel that they are a part of a certain political entity, and that their (cultural and literal) existence is not threatened. He claims that a failure to do this has directly contributed to World War I and II, and numerous other local conflicts.

Orman (2008:77) suggests that those who formulate language policies inevitably have political and philosophical agendas. Hodge and Kress (cited in Tollefson, 2002d:6) believe that language is not only a tool for communication, but also of control. They claim that when language policy is viewed as ideology, its role in manipulation becomes clear. Leibowitz (1974:221-223) also proposes viewing language as a means of control, instead of just a means of communication or social interaction. He suggests that doing so allows problems faced by multilingual countries to be analysed in the same way that political scientists study federalism and empire – that is, in terms of the distribution of power between the government and society. Spolsky (2004:40) explains that states are "an obvious locus of power" wherein governments

have a constitutionally established authority over its citizens, visible in the drafting and implementation of national language policies. Noam Chomsky (cited in Herath, 2015:259) also maintains that ‘‘questions of language are basically questions of power’’.

Weinstein (1990:349) insists that governments use language for political goals and not for linguistic or communicative goals (although minority groups are able to use language in this way too). He believes that governments shape the identity of the political system and society, as well as influence the patterns of participation. Webb (2002:208) has suggested that governments use language for manipulation, discrimination, exploitation, dividing and controlling the population, and limiting access to the country's rights and privileges. Leibowitz (1974:223) maintains that governments use language to control society and limit access to economic and political life – which greatly affects the use of minority languages and the status of minority-language speakers.

Tollefson (2002d:5) contends that governments and/or ethnolinguistic groups can see language conflict as beneficial to their own political agendas and may use language policies to not only resolve conflict, but also to create and sustain it. He cautions that critical linguists and advocates of progressive language policies should remain cognisant of the fact that ethnolinguistic conflict is often created (in order to gain or retain political power) and is therefore, contrary to widespread belief, not inevitable (2002d:337). However, considering that language conflict is often a proxy for very real political and economic conflicts between groups, the failure to resolve these issues would be predictive of more language conflict.

CHAPTER 2

May's (2012) Minority-Language Rights Framework: Ethnicity, Nationalism and the dominance of the Nation-State

Introduction

In the introduction to this thesis, I stated that Stephen May's interdisciplinary book titled *Language and Minority Rights: Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Politics of Language* (2012) is a ground-breaking synthesis of key issues and theories in linguistics, sociology and political theory respectively. This seminal work, first published in 2001, offers an essential analysis of the questions concerning minority-language rights in modern nation-states. While many authors since May have examined these themes, none have offered quite such a wide-ranging discussion.

For this reason, Chapter 2 – which seeks to establish a comprehensive conceptual basis of the junction between identity, essentialism, radicalisation and language conflict – will systematically set out May's (2012) main arguments that pertain to the analysis of minority-language groups. Considering that his work already includes vast critical debates on each topic from within various disciplines, I shall not be including other views here. The aim of this chapter is not to repeat the meticulous work that May has done, but simply to summarise it, in order to provide a theoretical framework within which my own research will be situated, and upon which I can build.

This chapter aims to build on the theoretical basis established in Chapter 1, by refocusing the MLR discussion around key themes including ethnicity, nation-states, pluralism and nationalism. In doing so, I hope to construct a comprehensive theoretical perspective in terms of which I will analyse Afrikaners (and Afrikaans) throughout the centuries. Chapter 2 is divided into five sections. The first section will offer an in-depth discussion of the notion of ethnicity, and common misconceptions related to it. The second section will do much the same for the notion of national identity, paying particular attention to the concept of nationalism. In the third section, I will outline May's criticisms of liberalism and pluralism, and his support for multiculturalism. The fourth section will explore the link between language and identity, while also detailing the problematic phenomenon of language shift. In the final section, I will attempt to synthesise May's concerns and recommendations regarding minority-language rights.

2.1. Ethnicity

2.1.1. Introduction

According to May (2012:11), academic and political discourse is rife with a pejorative perception of ethnicity, and subsequently, of ethnic minority groups and their languages. He credits this to the unflattering juxtaposition of ethnicity with the nation-state, wherein the former is associated with primitivism and particularism, and the latter with modernity and universalism. Although ethnicity is generally viewed negatively in the literature, academic debates on ethnicity are polarised and can be broadly categorised under *primordial* and *situational* perspectives.

> The former ascribes to ethnicity an enduring, intrinsic character that is associated with, and determined by, particular objective cultural characteristics – the 'cultural stuff' of ethnicity such as language, ancestry and history. The latter rejects this position as essentialist and argues instead for the social and political constructedness of ethnicity, its fluidity and malleability, and its instrumental mobilisation to particular political ends. A situational account of ethnicity also specifically rejects any significant or even any particular link between ethnicity and language.

In May's (2012:11-12) view, language is a contingent marker of ethnic identity, and to argue otherwise would be to adopt an essentialised view of the language-identity link. Despite this, he believes that a situational perspective – or what may also be referred to as a *constructionist* account of ethnicity – fails to acknowledge "the collective purchase of ethnicity", the prevalence of ties between ethnicity and historically associated languages, or the prominent role that language often plays in the identity claims and political mobilisation of minority movements worldwide. For this reason, May argues that the primordial-situational dichotomy of ethnicity is insufficient, and that a thorough account of ethnicity should include aspects of both – that is, ethnicity should be regarded as constructed/contingent, as well as a social, political and cultural form of life.[4]

2.1.2. Negative views of ethnicity

May (2012:20) believes that the widespread contempt towards minority languages has less to do with the languages themselves, and more to do with the ethnicities (or minority groups) with which they are historically associated. He argues that criticisms of minority languages are usually part of a broader critique of the ethnic affiliations of their speakers. He adds to Grillo's

[4] Alexander (2003:5) cites May's 'third way' approach to ethnicity and adopts this position in his own analysis of the South African context.

(1989) argument that subordinated languages are despised languages, by deducing that the same must hold true for the people who speak them.

In May's (2012:20) opinion, the negative view of ethnicity within academic and popular discussions stems from its persistently unfavourable juxtaposition with national identity and, lately, global identity (as a result of the decline of nation-states in the face of globalisation). Ethnicity is commonly believed to be socially and politically constructed, that is, a fundamentally "anti-modern and regressive phenomenon" that is mobilised by certain groups for political ends, and consequently, the "cultural stuff" of ethnicity to which groups often lay claim (ancestry, culture, religion, and/or language) is dismissed as fictitious.

> Indeed, many academic commentators view ethnicity as simply a convenient construction of an ethnic group's *supposed* distinctiveness that is employed *retrospectively* to engender 'ethnic solidarity' as a basis for social and political action.

May (2012:21) believes that this has been the dominant view of ethnicity in social anthropology since Barth's (1969) influential work on ethnic group boundaries – a perspective further honed by Sandall's (2001) concepts of "culture cults" and "designer tribalism". In sociology too, there is consensus on the arbitrary constructedness of ethnic identity – termed "groupism" by Brubaker (2002) – and a related dismissal of its fixity. This was influenced by the postmodernist notion of multiple, fluid identity formation, as advanced by, among others, Bhabha (1994) and Gilroy (2000). May (2012) states that in political theory, cosmopolitan identities are promoted – for example by Nussbaum (1997) – as "the 'new' form of global citizenship, replacing ethnic, racial and even national identities".

According to May (2012:21), a negative view of ethnicity also dominates popular commentary. Ethnicity (and ethnic mobilisation) is fingered as the main cause for many of the social and political problems in the world – such as in Rwanda, Sri Lanka, and Northern Ireland. These ethnic conflicts lead to "ethnonational movements"[5] – movements which are based on ethnic affiliation, attempt to form their own nation-states, and often, but not always, resort to violence. May states, however, that some minority groups do not demand a separate state, but simply seek greater recognition, representation and autonomy within the nation-state they inhabit (such as the indigenous peoples groups in New Zealand, Australia and North America). May (2012:21-22) argues that despite the wide-ranging examples of ethnic affiliation and

[5] May (2012:21) lists the ETA movement in the Basque Country, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka and the IRA movement in Ireland as examples.

mobilisation, and the cases where groups are considered to have legitimate and justifiable claims, these movements are all considered to be "negative phenomena". May (2012:22) summarises his opinion on the widespread denunciation of ethnicity as follows:

> Over the last few centuries, the widespread dismissal of the legitimacy and value of ethnicity as a form of social and political identification has been juxtaposed historically against the valorisation of *national* identity and the modern nation-state from which it springs. Itself a direct product of the era of nationalism, the nation-state in this view is something to which we can legitimately give our allegiance but ethnic groups are not. Nation-states are embracing and cohesive whereas ethnic groups are exclusive and divisive. Nation-states represent modernity while ethnic groups simply represent a harping, misinformed and misguided nostalgia.

According to May (2012:23), many modern liberals believe that a homogeneous national identity mirroring the culture and language of the dominant national group, should supplant the various other minority identities within a nation-state. Instead of basing their argument on the supposed merits and hierarchical position of the dominant group's language and culture, emphasis is placed on two widely held liberal democratic principles, namely universal political citizenship and the recognition of individual rights (as opposed to group rights). These two principles are considered superior to ethnic groups' claims for greater social, cultural and linguistic recognition and representation in the public sphere of the nation-state.

Even in early Marxist accounts of ethnicity, May (2012:23-24) suggests, there is a distinct intolerance toward "non-historic nations" – that is, ethnic minorities (or more disparagingly, "ethnic trash", as Engels termed it in 1849). Hobsbawm, the renowned Marxist historian, later contrasted positive, unifying nationalisms with negative, divisive ethnonationalisms, clearly demonstrating the uneven approach to dominant groups versus minority groups. In May's (2012:24-25) view, Marxist analyses of ethnicity – with its focus on capitalism – absorb ethnic and national relations into class relations, and therefore struggle to properly account for the "specificity of ethnic form and meaning in the circumstances of their mobilisation", or for the fact that ethnic identity, and not class, is often the catalyst of mobilisation. In other words, it is problematic to analyse minority-language groups purely through the lens of class and socio-economic (and even political) status.

May (2012:25) states, furthermore, that according to postmodernists, globalisation has significantly undermined previous forms of identification and political mobilisation. Modern nation-states are struggling to impose a national identity in the face of increasing flows of people, information and ideas. A decentred and hybridised politics of identities is emerging,

and local ethnic and gender identities have emerged as alternative identities for mobilisation. Consequently, there is a rise in both new global and local identities, and the proliferation of supra- and subnational identities. May (2012:25) argues that although postmodernist analyses do account for the re-emergence of ethnicity as a valid social and political form of identification and mobilisation, it inaccurately supposes that the "fragmented, dispersed and decentred" individual may choose from a "bewildering" number of identity styles and forms of political mobilisation, of which ethnicity is only one option.

May (2012:25) claims that while postmodernists advocate for freedom of identity choice, there is still a preference for the new global over the old local identities. He believes that this perspective ignores the ongoing role that ethnicity has in the processes of identity formation and social and political mobilisation, and that it underestimates the salience and resilience of national identities. May (2012:26) insists that ethnicity has persisted and prospered in the postmodern world:

> Many contemporary liberals are confounded and dismayed by the resilience of ethnic ties, and the increasing advocacy of ethnic minority rights, within contemporary nation-states. Marxist commentators are similarly bemused by the emergent and ongoing claims of ethnonational movements in post-industrialist societies; a feature which the achievements of modernisation (and class-based politics) should have rendered obsolete. Likewise, postmodernists, while they rightly highlight the contingent and multiple aspects of identity formation, cannot explain adequately why ethnicity (and nationality) should so often 'trump' the competition.

May (2012:26) believes that even though the salience of ethnicity varies depending on the context, and that its interrelationship with nationalism, national identity and other forms of social identity is complex, overlapping and even contradictory, ethnicity cannot be easily discounted. He also maintains that the rejection of ethnicity as a valid form of social and political action is problematic:

> If ethnicity has survived and prospered – despite, it seems, insuperable odds – this suggests that it has at least *some* basis in social reality. This accords with Steve Fenton's succinct conclusion that ethnic groups 'are both actual and constructed' (2003: 6; see also Cornell and Hartmann, 2007; R. Jenkins, 2007). Ethnicity cannot *simply* be a convenient and largely fictive construction, although such elements are clearly apparent within it. The 'cultural stuff' of ethnicity – ancestry, culture and (for our purposes) language – *does matter* to a significant number of people. Likewise, ethnicity has meaning not only at the level of social and political *mobilisation* but also as a principal form of individual and collective social *identity*.

May (2012:27) identifies a contradiction within academic discussions on ethnicity, which suggests that ethnic groups are both a modernist creation, and yet essentially anti-modern. He

states that on the one hand, ethnic groups are contrasted with the modernity of the nation-state, and viewed as "atavistic and regressive", while, on the other hand, as a construction of modernity.

> Thus, while these ethnic minority groups may argue that their apparently distinct ethnicity pre-dates their (incomplete) incorporation within the modern nation-state, ethnicity is generally viewed here as a *construction* of modernity – a by-product, in effect, of the political, cultural and ideational processes of nation-state formation – rather than an antecedent to it. Yet, at the same time, ethnic claims for social and political recognition are rejected on the basis that they fail to reach or reflect appropriate standards of modernity!

According to May (2012:28), the collocation of 'ethnic' and 'minority' highlight the assumption that majority groups are not 'ethnic', but that they represent modernity. Discussions on ethnicity in the social sciences tended to favour the view of ethnicity as the 'cultural stuff' – that is, ancestry, culture and language. More recently, a view of ethnicity as subjective and situational has appeared – a position May believes has much to do with Barth's (1969) elaboration of ethnic boundaries, and is characterised by Eriksen's (2010) description of ethnicity as an aspect of social relationship, as opposed to a property of a group. May points to Weber (1922) as an author who synthesised these various aspects of ethnicity, when he defined ethnic groups as "groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or of both, or because of memories of colonisation and migration".

May (2012:28) argues that this definition illustrates how ancestral, cultural and even racialised traits are commonly associated with certain ethnic groups, by both members of the group and others, while still recognising the subjective nature of ethnic group membership. In Weber's mind, May continues, objective characteristics such as language and cultural practices do not constitute an ethnic group, but facilitate the formation of that group (see Chapter 3, section 3.2, for discussion on various aspects of group formation and categorisation). The political community is said to bring about sentiments of likeness or similarity, and the resultant ethnic bonds contribute to the solidarity of the group. May (2012:28-29) summarises:

> In other words, Weber seems to be suggesting that belief in ancestry and shared culture and language is a consequence rather than a cause of collective political action, acting in turn as a means of defining group membership, eligibility and access (Jenkins, 2007). As Richard Jenkins concludes of Weber's formulation, ethnic groups are, in the end what people (both within and beyond the group) believe or think them to be.

This is the crux of my thesis: minority group radicalisation – i.e., salience of ethnic identity markers and ethnic-based mobilisation – is not (only) the cause of political turmoil, but (also) the result thereof. If the nation-state enacts legislation that specifically impacts individuals of the same race, and/or those who share the same language, cultural practices or common ancestry, what other identities besides ethnic are available to members to join together in political action? I will elaborate on this argument in Chapter 5.

According to May (2012:29), debate within sociology and anthropology tends to follow a dichotomous approach, viewing ethnic identity as either based on objective cultural and linguistic characteristics, or more commonly, as the product of a "malleable, fluid and at times fictive" identity formation process. Analyses, May argues, have been framed within the following polarities:

- premodern or modern
- primordial or situational
- intrinsic or instrumental
- content or boundaries
- objective or subjective
- category or group
- involuntary or voluntary
- individual or collective
- material or symbolic
- minority or majority

2.1.3. Ethnicity as primordial or constructed

According to May (2012:30), *primordialism* is one perspective on ethnicity which aims to explain its enduring existence in the modern world. On the extreme end of this view – a position held by the German Romantics Herder, Humboldt and Fichte during the linguistic nationalism of the late 18th and early 19th century – ethnic and national identity were viewed as natural and immutable. Individuals were seen as naturally belonging to fixed ethnic groups that were based on "language, blood and soil". Another form of primordialism was offered by Van den Berghe (1979), who believed ethnic groups to be natural because they are extensions of biological kin groups, selected on the grounds of genetic evolution. A third form of primordialism developed by Geertz (1963), argues that the political actions of ethnic groups

are often attributable to primordial attachments – a basis for collective action rooted in our earliest socialisation and kinship. Geertz (1973; cited in May, 2012:31) elaborates:

> By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the 'givens' of existence, or more precisely … the *assumed* givens of social existence: immediate contiguity and live connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular … community, speaking a particular language … and following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves. One is bound to one's kinsman, one's neighbour … as the result not merely of personal affection, tactical necessity, common interest or incurred moral obligation, but at least in great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself.

Geertz's belief, May (2012:31) explains, is that social interaction between "co-ethnics" sprout from prior categorical distinctions, and not the other way around. He states that Geertz is not actually arguing that ethnic ties or affiliations are indeed primordial, but rather that people perceive them as such, and therefore as pre-eminent over other ties or affiliations. May also argues that Geertz's conception of ethnicity allows for the possibility that ethnic groups are not fixed and static. Despite this, much of sociology and anthropology has derided Geertz's work as justifying the influence that notions of ancestry and culture have on ethnic identification.

According to May (2012:32), *constructionists*, on the other hand, believe that cultural attributes do not constitute an adequate explanation for ethnicity, and that a focus on them cannot explain why some cultural attributes (such as language) are salient markers of ethnic identity in some instances but not in others. In some regards, a constructionist view offers a more accurate account of ethnicity than a primordialist view, which understates the range of social groups available for *individuals to choose* from. A constructionist account of ethnicity, May argues, also more adequately provides for a historical examination of cultural forms and other aspects of ethnic group formation.

> By situating the search for ethnicity within 'the assumed givens of social existence', which is, even in Geertz's account, usually stated rather than examined, the primordialist position conveniently explains both everything and nothing. It lacks, in effect, explanatory power and predictive value and is, at best, an ex post facto argument.

Constructionists emphasise, in contrast, the *situational* or *circumstantial* characteristics of ethnicity, which is now the dominant view in sociology and anthropology. According to May (2012:33), Barth (1969) argues that ethnic groups should not be defined by their differing cultural traits, but should rather be situationally defined in relationship to their social interactions with other groups, and the resultant boundaries created and maintained between

them. May explains that any one of a host of cultural attributes can be selected as the main trait of an ethnic group – a fact which can be seen in the differing identity markers used by ethnic groups worldwide to distinguish themselves from others. He states that it is the "perceived usefulness" of these traits in maintaining ethnic boundaries that is important:

> Cultural attributes only become significant as markers of ethnic identity when a group deems them to be *necessary*, or socially effective, for such purposes. Thus, particular cultural attributes (such as a group's language) may vary in salience, may be constructed or reconstructed, and may even be discarded by an ethnic group, depending on the particular sociohistorical circumstances of their interactions with other groups, and the need to maintain effectively the boundaries between them. It is these ethnic boundaries which determine in the end who is and who is not a member of a particular ethnic group, as well as designating which ethnic categories are available for individual identification at any given time and place (Nagel, 1994). Shared culture in this model is thus best understood as generated in and by the processes of ethnic boundary maintenance rather than the other way around.

According to May (2012:33), Barth (1969) believes that ethnic identity formation is shaped by the group itself, is in response to those on the other side of the ethnic boundary and to changing circumstance, and that its success depends greatly on the willingness of others to accept the distinctions involved. May (2012:34) states, however, that Barth largely views ethnicity as a product of *intra*group processes of negotiation, as opposed to the result of outside forces, meaning an ethnic group is defined by its own members. As will become clear throughout Chapter 3 (see social categorisation), ethnic identity formation and group boundaries are both internally and externally determined, and are strongly influenced by *inter*group dynamics.

May (2012:34) refers to Barth's position as *subjectivist*, a view which regards individuals, and not social structure, as responsible for ethnic identity formation. This view has been criticised for disregarding the constraints individuals face in their ethnic choices, and for trivialising *ethnogenesis*, or the creation of new ethnicities. May believes that the truth lies somewhere in the middle – that ethnic groups are both internally and externally defined. He utilises Smith's (1991) differentiation between ethnic *categories* and ethnic *communities* to illustrate his point: the former are named, categorised and delineated by others, whereas the latter are defined by members themselves.

May (2012:35-36) insists that it is crucial to distinguish between ethnicity and race. While some examples of ethnic categorisation consist of essentialised notions of racial and/or cultural difference, and therefore suggest a hierarchy of group difference, many do not. Racism can therefore be viewed as a subset of ethnic categorisation. May believes that ethnic relations are

not necessarily hierarchical, exploitative and conflictual as are race relations. In fact, he reminds the reader that racism has repeatedly overridden non-hierarchised ethnic categories in the past.

May (2012:36) also argues that groups that are negatively identified by others, may seek to identify themselves in positive racial terms – such as in cases of black nationalism. He insists that racial and ethnic ascriptions are similar processes of social and cultural construction. May (2012:37) believes that by viewing ethnicity as constructed, it becomes possible to investigate the various forms it takes depending on the sociopolitical environment, as well as the way in which it is purposefully employed in the pursuit of specific goals. The mobilisation of ethnicity is "the process by which a group organises along ethnic lines in pursuit of collective political ends" (Stack, 1986; cited in May, 2012:37).

Despite the merits of constructionism, May (2012:37) argues that a situational or circumstantial view of ethnicity – which considers ethnic identity to be constructed and a social and political resource – mistakenly compares ethnic groups with other specific interest groups which might mobilise on the basis of, for example, social class or trade unionism. May states that this is seemingly the consensus of commentators on ethnicity for the past four decades. This *instrumentalist* position often considers cases of ethnic mobilisation to be "self-interested, even cynical, attempts at social and political aggrandisement, most often promoted and led by an elite substrate within the minority ethnic group".

According to May (2012:37-38), the fluidity or malleability of ethnicity gives rise to different kinds of ethnic identities ranging from *symbolic ethnicity* – common among established immigrant families who feel a general sense of pride in their home country and traditions, without maintaining firm ethnic borders – to ethnicity which forms the main part of social identity and political organisation. In the latter case the sociopolitical context is *saturated* by ethnicity, which becomes the dominant factor in the framing, legitimation and exercise of political power, such as in Nazi Germany and Apartheid South Africa.

May (2012:38) states that an instrumentalist view holds that ethnic histories and ascriptions can be both adopted and adapted by individuals or groups, depending on their specific sociopolitical goals, meaning there is a fictive element to the construction of ethnic identity. Consequently, he argues, minority-group identities are met with scepticism and rejected as *designer ethnicities*, despite a similarly fictive construction of majority identities, which majority-group members just as readily mobilise to instrumental ends (2012:39).

May (2012:39) notes that due to the variety of identities available for mobilisation, ethnic groups (both minority and majority) may produce patterns of *ethnic layering*, which is when individuals switch between tribal, subtribal, regional and pan- identities (such as the pan-Indian identity found among Native Americans, or the pan-Māori identity found among the various indigenous tribes in New Zealand). Other examples of ethnic layering can be found among White, African and Hispanic Americans, British Asians and African Caribbean/Black British, and as I will argue in Chapter 5, white Afrikaans speakers.

> As Joane Nagel observes, a 'chosen ethnic identity is determined by the individual's perception of its meaning to different audiences, its salience in different social contexts, and its utility in different settings' (1994: 155). Relatedly, these various identities may overlap with, or crosscut other social identities. For example, one may be a woman, a Muslim, a Bangladeshi, a Bengali speaker, an Asian, working class, a Londoner, English, an English speaker and British, all at the same time. However, which of these identities predominate in any given circumstance, and how they interact with each other, will depend on the context, the audience, and the ongoing balance between the internal definition and external ascription of social identities […]

May (2012:40) adds that the intersection between ethnicity, language, class, religion and gender means individuals have a full repertoire of social identifications, which will in turn lead to *intraethnic* differences. For this reason, he emphasises that ethnic, linguistic, class, religious and gender groups are not solidary groups involving a high degree of commonality, but instead, each contain their own internal divisions. Brass (1985), as cited in May, highlights that ethnic identity formation has a dual dimension: interaction or competition with external groups, and an internal struggle for control of the group. In Chapter 3, subsection 3.3.2, I elaborate on this intragroup conflict (see entrepreneurs of identity), and in Chapter 5, sections 5.3 and 5.4, I highlight this aspect of Afrikaner identity. In order to analyse these internal conflicts and external relations, May suggests Bourdieu's (1990) analytical categories of habitus and field and Smith's (1991) concept of ethnie (see subsection 2.1.4).

According to May (2012:40), the postmodernist conception of ethnicity (and other identities) advanced by theorists such as Hall (1992), Bhabha (1994) and Gilroy (1993), is termed *hybridity*. Hybridity is said to subvert categorical oppositions and essentialist ideological movements – especially ethnicity and nationalism – by rejecting "ethnic absolutism", the idea of "rooted identities" based on ethnicity, nationality or language, and any notion of ethnic, cultural or linguistic "historical continuity" (May, 2012:41). *If* hybridity is correct, May (2012:41) posits, the argument for maintaining particular ethnic affiliations, not to mention linguistic ones, becomes very weak. However, May (2012:41-42) believes that situational

commentators (who view ethnicity as a modern construction), instrumentalists (who deem it fluid, malleable and readily mobilised), and hybridity theorists are not entirely correct.

> For all its persuasiveness, there is an obvious degree of overstatement in social constructionist accounts of ethnicity. For a start, accepting that culture is contingent to identity – the situational aspect of ethnic identity – does not necessarily entail the assumed corollary that ethnic groups are thus merely self-interested, rational, actors, often controlled by minority elites for political ends – the instrumental dimension. And yet, most constructionist commentators on ethnicity over the years have simply elided these two positions, in the process collapsing important distinctions between ethnic identity formation and ethnic mobilisation. As Francisco Gil-White argues, such commentators 'often confuse explaining ethnic groups as such with the related problem of explaining ethnic mobilisation, arguing as though ethnic groups regularly sprang suddenly into being, where none existed, in order to address the political interests of their members' (1999: 804; see also Bayar, 2009).

May (2012:42) underscores an additional problem, namely the constructionist and postmodern emphasis on the "voluntaristic nature of identity choices", a viewpoint embodied by *rational choice theory*. This theory holds that groups are subject to continuous change, since members respond to changing circumstances by making "rational choices about their ethnic alignment(s) solely on the basis of the social and material gain it will bring them". May argues that due to the narrow premise that rationality equals self-interest (one may act in the interest of another person or group), and the failure to adequately address the external constraints on individual ethnic choices, rational choice theory offers a "socially and economically reductive account of ethnicity".

Although ethnicity might be a social construct, May (2012:42) notes that even social constructionists like Roosens (1989:156) concede that ethnicity is, while malleable, not arbitrary, and that "there is always a minimum of incontestable and noninterpretable facts necessary" for the social legitimation of ethnic identities. Eriksen (2010; cited in May, 2012:42-43) concurs:

> If the agents themselves hold that a certain description of their culture is obviously false, it cannot provide them with a powerful ethnic identity. If a group's version of its cultural history is seriously contested by other groups … it may also be problematic to maintain the identity postulated by that account of history. So we cannot conclude that anything goes and that everything about ethnicity is deception and make-believe … rather, [ethnic] identities are ambiguous, and … this ambiguity is connected with a negotiable history and a negotiable cultural content.

Nagel (1994; cited in May, 2012:43) also believes that "the extent to which ethnicity can be freely constructed by individuals or groups is quite narrow when compulsory ethnic categories

are imposed by others". In other words, ethnic identity may be as much a choice of identification by an individual and/or group, as it is a label imposed by the wider society. Ethnic mobilisation may very well then be the result of, at least in part, ethnic categorisation and marginalisation from the 'outside'.

According to May (2012:43), the varying ethnic choices available to majority and minority-group members are the result of unequal power relations in the wider society – in particular the different positions of groups within the nation-state. May argues that an instrumentalist view of ethnicity does not sufficiently address these power differentials, nor does it explain why, if ethnic groups are merely one among many interest groups, ethnicity is often chosen as a means of mobilisation instead of other identifications (especially class-based identities), even in instances when doing so elicits direct political persecution. I would add that this also reveals a flaw with rational choice theory, at least in the way that self-interest is conceptualised. Instead, May (2012:44) suggests that ethnic identity be viewed not only as a vehicle for attaining resources, but also for providing a crucial sense of meaning and belonging to members:

> [E]thnic groups will continue to reproduce their ethnicity *even when* it reduces their chances of attaining prosperity and political power (Eriksen, 2010). Why is this? The reasons lie principally in the 'ineffable' cultural and symbolic attributes of ethnicity largely dismissed in instrumental accounts. Ethnic groups differ from other interest groups precisely in their particular concern with cultural attributes and symbols, language, kinship and historical memory. These features are predicated principally on 'belonging' rather than 'accomplishment' (Kymlicka, 1995a; Margalit and Raz, 1995; Calhoun, 2003, 2007) and provide the basis not only for political action but also, crucially, for identity and meaning (Melucci, 1989; Guibernau, 1996; see also Chapters 3 and 4). They may well be socially constructed (or reconstructed) but their enduring influence cannot be explained on the basis of functionality alone. Ignoring the cultural matters that are important to ethnic groups is thus an analytical error since these are central to their distinction from other interest groups.

Hybridity theory, May (2012:44) insists, does not sufficiently explain the lasting influence of cultural affiliations. For one, cultural mixture and adaptation are not specific to the postmodern world, but have been features of all societies throughout history. Second, in juxtaposing hybrid, heterogeneous or mixed identities, with pure, authentic, homogeneous ones, hybridity theory ironically essentialises conceptions of culture. Third, May (2012:45) argues, while there is an increasing amount of fractured and fracturing identities in the world today, these identities are not usually hybrid. He maintains that "nation-states are facing a plethora of ethnic, regional and other social and cultural minority demands, many of which are couched in singular,

collectivist terms". He adds that the return to (ethnic) rootedness and boundary maintenance is in response to the fragmentation occurring within and between nation-states in a global era.

May (2012:46) notes the peculiarity of hybridity and constructionist theorists proclaiming that ethnicity is "invented" and setting out to "decentre" it, amidst news of ethnic cleansing and genocide around the world. He quotes Smith's (2009) pointed remark that "people do not lay down their lives for a discursive construction". May believes that it is crucial to explain more adequately why ethnicity "does seem to continue to mean something to so many people", and "why, when ethnicity matters, it can *really* matter". For this purpose, May suggests jettisoning the dichotomous approach to ethnicity adopted by much of the primordialist/constructionist debate. He argues that primordial and constructionist views of ethnicity are not mutually exclusive, but rather each is a partial representation of the underlying social and cultural movements they aim to describe. Ethnicity should therefore be conceptualised as both a "cultural creation" and a "primary or first-order dimension of human experience".

2.1.4. Habitus, field and ethnie

In May's (2012:46-47) view, acknowledging the primordial aspect of ethnicity does not necessarily entail abandoning the social constructionist consensus on ethnicity, nor naturalising ethnicity as a sociobiological phenomenon. Likewise, acknowledging the constructedness of ethnicity does not necessarily exclude the possibility that the "cultural stuff" of ethnicity – including a historically associated language – may still have lasting and significant influence and importance. Ethnicity should therefore be viewed as socially constructed and fluid, within certain limits. This dual conceptualisation, May suggests, offers a broader and more useful explanation of the mobilisation of ethnicity by individuals and groups "in the social and political domain, and within specific temporal and historical contexts", than a constructionist conceptualisation is able to provide.

May (2012:47) offers sociologist Pierre Bourdieu's (1990) related concepts of *habitus* and *field* as a way to effectively incorporate and express these dualisms, the first in relation to ethnic identity formation, and the second in relation to ethnic mobilisation. While Bourdieu's analysis of habitus is mainly concerned with social class, May believes it is equally applicable to ethnicity and ethnic identity formation. Habitus consists of all the social and cultural experiences that shape an individual. May isolates four key aspects of habitus that are relevant to the discussion on language and ethnic identity, namely: (i) embodiment; (ii) agency; (iii) the

interplay between past and present; and (iv) the interrelationship between individual and collective trajectories.

According to May (2012:47), *embodiment* supposes that habitus is not about ideology, attitude or perception, and instead is a "material form of life, which is embodied and turned into second nature". Through the notion of habitus, Bourdieu discusses how members of a social group acquire a set of embodied dispositions (ways of viewing and living in the world) through their socialisation. These dispositions usually operate at a subconscious level, and might involve language use, dress, diet and customary practices in the case of ethnicity. May (2012:48) explains that habitus is both shaped by and shapes the objective social and cultural conditions which surround it. Ethnic attitudes and practices (including language use) may therefore be lived out implicitly as a result of historical and customary practice, and as such, provide the parameters of social action for many, and through those actions take on a life of their own.

The concept of habitus also highlights the interrelationship between *agency* and structure, May (2012:48) continues. Instead of determining individual behaviour, habitus presents individuals with a range of choices or strategic practices – which orient (rather than strictly determine) action. May explains that while choice is at the heart of habitus, not all choices are possible – as limits are set by the "historically and socially situated conditions of the habitus's production". May (2012:49) notes that practices viewed as antithetical to the mores of a particular group are rejected as unthinkable – a process termed "constrained change" or "path dependency". The range of possible practices may, however, change over time in relation to changing circumstances. Therefore, May argues, individuals and groups operate strategically within the constraints of a particular habitus, in order to establish and/or maintain ethnic boundaries, while also reacting to changing external conditions, such as economic, technological and political ones. Habitus, as conceived of by Bourdieu, is thus both a product of early socialisation, and is continually modified by an individual's experience of the world.

This *interplay between past and present* means habitus reflects the social and cultural context in which it was constructed, while also being able to transform in current situations. May (2012:49) argues, however, that the possibilities of action will tend to reproduce the limits of possibility demarcated by the social group, rather than change them. He explains that habitus, being a product of history, ensures the active presence of past experiences, which, in turn, normalises certain cultural and linguistic practices and their constancy over time. The

reproduction of group mores and practices does not, however, completely prevent the potential for change.

The *interrelationship between individual action and group mores* echoes this tension. Although individual practices often conform to those of the group, and members' practices are more harmonised than they realise, May (2012:49) emphasises that there is potential for divergence between individual and collective trajectories. Habitus within groups, and between groups, thus differs to the extent that individuals' trajectories diverge from one another. In Chapter 3, subsection 3.2.3.6, the divergence between individual and group behaviour will be discussed, and throughout Chapter 5, sections 5.2 and 5.3, I examine such divergencies among white Afrikaans speakers.

May (2012:49) believes that if Bourdieu's notion of habitus is employed as social method rather than social theory, i.e., as a way of thinking *and* of asking questions, it can be usefully applied to discussions of ethnicity. He contends that habitus allows for the recognition of ethnicity as both socially constructed and as a material form of life, which avoids the mistake of assuming a realist definition of ethnicity (the primordialist flaw), but does not minimise the significance of ethnicity and the related processes of identification (the constructionist flaw) (2012:50). May also believes that habitus, in conjunction with Bourdieu's notion of field, allows for the recognition of both the "ineffable" nature as well as the "instrumental" use of ethnicity.

Field is defined as a specific site of economic, cultural and/or intellectual reproduction, with its own "logic of practice" – central to which are the types of capital (economic, cultural, linguistic, etc.) that are valued and rewarded within it (May, 2012:50). May (2012:50-51) explains that fields are *structured* and *structuring* spaces that shape individual and collective choices, and are fundamentally *relational*, as any individual or collective action taken in the field will impact all others within that field. He states that fields are also inherently *competitive* spaces or "arenas of struggle", which continuously reflect changing positions of relative dominance and/or subordination in deciding what counts as capital in a particular field (2012:51).

According to May (2012:51), Bourdieu's concepts of habitus and field help to explain the practices of ethnic identity formation and maintenance, and the related processes of ethnic mobilisation. As opposed to the instrumentalist notion of calculated self-interest, these practices are a combination of the interrelationship between the structure of the relevant field

(which May identifies as the nation-state), and the ethnic habitus of those involved. It might also be possible to identify certain 'sub-fields' within the nation-state, as increasing localisation leads to diverging regional politics, and thus, potentially, differences in habitus and ethnic mobilisation (see Chapter 5, section 5.2).

May (2012:51) argues that this conceptualisation of ethnicity illustrates what is at stake for ethnic groups: the definition and distribution of capital, and the related power differences especially between dominant and subordinate groups. He states that the individual and collective habitus of dominant ethnic groups are constituted as *cultural capital*, i.e., recognised as socially valuable, while the habitus of subordinate ethnic groups are not. May believes that this is evident in the frequently expressed negative views of ethnic minority cultures and practices (including the use of minority languages) as regressive and premodern – views most often expressed by members of dominant ethnic groups.[6] May (2012:52) states that the habitus of ethnic minorities tend to be marginalised and devalued, both as an illegitimate means of identity, and for their lack of relevance to the modern world.

While Bourdieu's notions of habitus and field provide a methodological framework for exploring ethnicity, May (2012:52) believes that sociologist Anthony Smith's (1991) concept of *ethnie* offers an explanation of how "the actual *particularities* of ethnicity and ethnic identity are *enacted* by individuals and groups". Smith argues that in order to avoid the flawed primordialist/constructionist dichotomy, a realistic account of ethnicity and ethnogenesis must "reconstitute the notion of collective cultural identity itself in historical, subjective and symbolic terms". Smith (1991; cited in May, 2012:52) believes that:

> [Ethnic identity] refers not to a *uniformity of elements* over generations but to a *sense of continuity* on the part of successive generations of a given cultural unit of population, to shared memories … and to notions entertained by each generation about the collective destiny of that unit and its culture.

According to May (2012:52), social networks are formed on the basis of believed or actual ethnic connectedness, and are maintained by a collective sense of continuity rooted in cultural elements (symbol, myth, memory, value, ritual and tradition), which are, in turn, reinforced by a "distinctive symbolic repertoire" (such as language, religion, customs, and institutions). May

[6] This process has been described as "ascriptive humiliation" by Lukes (1996; cited in May, 2012:51). Minority-group members do, however, frequently express these views themselves, a product of the process of negative internalisation. According to Bourdieu (cited in May, 2012:51), the latter is achieved by "méconnaissance" or misrecognition, which constitutes "symbolic violence" (see subsection 2.4.4).

states that in Smith's view, ethnic groups change at a slower pace than is often thought by constructionists, and may express deeply held group values and meanings.

Despite this, May (2012:53) highlights, ethnic groups may still rise or fall, depending on "the vicissitudes of history". For this reason, Smith argues that these groups are "doubly historical", as they not only rely on historical memories for their survival, but are also subject to historical forces, change and dissolution. Smith's notion of *ethnie*, or ethnic community – the antecedent to modern *nations* – aims to convey these processes,[7] and consists of the following elements:

- a collective proper name
- a myth of common ancestry
- shared historical memories
- one or more differentiating elements of common culture
- an association with a specific homeland
- a sense of solidarity

May (2012:53) points out that most of these features exhibit a significant (and objective) cultural and historical aspect, as well as a substantial subjective component. Ethnies, despite their premodern origins, are therefore not incompatible with a constructionist view of ethnicity, since Smith (as cited in May) argues for example, that it is the *myths* of common ancestry that are important, as opposed to any *fact* of ancestry (which is typically difficult to determine). May suggests that even the more objective characteristics of a common culture (such as language, religion and kinship), only become salient to ethnic identity when value is ascribed to them. The characteristics of ethnies are also thought to be malleable and fluid – varying in their salience in relation to one another, between historical periods, and among individual group members. May notes that one such example is the languages associated over time with specific ethnies.

Smith's notion of ethnie, May (2012:53) believes, enables ethnic identification to be seen as a "*dynamic* quality of group relation", and offers a useful concept that captures both the malleability *and* the durability of ethnicity. He also argues that the notion of ethnie allows for

[7] Smith (1993:130) explains that a nation is a subvariety and development of an ethnie, although this progression is neither "necessary [n]or irreversible", and that the former "shifts the emphasis of community away from kinship and cultural dimensions to territorial, educational and legal aspects, while retaining links with older cultural myths and memories of the *ethnie*". Further distinction between nation and ethnie follows below.

an effective exploration of the close interrelationship between ethnic and national identities (2012:54), a discussion continued in the next section.

2.2. Nationality

2.2.1. Introduction

According to May (2012:12), similar to discussions on ethnicity, those on nationalism have tended to polarise into primordial and modernist perspectives. The former position is often held by nationalists themselves, who view nations as "perennial" and even as specific ethnocultural communities with fixed cultural attributes (such as a common language). The latter position, widely adopted by academic writers on nationalism, views nation-states as a product of 18th and 19th century nationalism and the associated processes of industrialisation and modernisation. Modernists refute the claim that nationhood is based on pre-existing ethnic ties, instead emphasising the contingent nature of national identities.

While May broadly agrees with modernist accounts of nationalism, he believes that they struggle to explain the continuing influence of ethnicity and nationalism in the modern world. He suggests that if modernism has been achieved – culminating in the formation of the nation-state – ethnic and national movements should have "atrophied" (2012:13). He once again proposes a middle position, one that acknowledges both the *legal-political* dimensions of nationalism and the *cultural-historical*, which avoids the modernist mistake of perceiving the nation-state – the end-product of nationalism – as solely a political community, instead of also an ethnocultural community.

Despite the similar primordial/constructed dichotomy, May (2012:55) notes that discussions on ethnicity and nationalism have mostly been conducted separately. He ascribes this to both the "well-known solidity of academic boundaries", as well as the prevailing view among modernist theorists of nationalism that ethnicity and nationalism are separate phenomena – a position held (for example by Hobsbawm, 1992) in an attempt to refute the main assertion of nationalist movements that the right to nationhood is based on pre-existing ties of ethnicity. May (2012:56) also notes that similar to the debates on ethnicity, common orthodoxy among theorists of nationalism is to reject the primordial perspective as essentialist, in favour of a more subjective, situational and socially constructed account of nationalism and nationhood.

May's (2012:56) contention is that the perennial/modernist dichotomy has, similar to discussion on ethnicity, resulted in a limited and insufficient account of the phenomena of

nationalism and nationhood – and requires a 'third way'. This alternative approach, described as "ethno-symbolic", and pioneered by Smith (1986; 1991; 2010), allows for the exploration of the interrelationship between ethnicity, and nationalism and national identity, while avoiding "the trap of essentialism".

> It is my view here that the historical denigration of ethnic minority language(s) and culture(s) within modern nation-states, and their related exclusion from the public or civic realm, are fundamentally misguided. Moreover, for those groups that can claim to be national minorities (ethnies) in their own historic territory, such an approach can actually be said to be illegitimate (Guibernau, 1996, 1999; Kymlicka, 1995a, 2001).

According to May (2012:56), the denigration and exclusion faced by minority groups stem from the pejorative views of ethnicity in political and social science commentary – which, in turn, can be traced historically to an overemphasis on political nationalism and its manifestation in the modern nation-state, and the related valorisation of *civic* over *ethnic* ties (often invoked in support of liberal democracy). May notes that majority ethnic groups (or dominant ethnies) benefit from this situation, as it results in the representation of *their* ethnic affiliations (in particular their language and cultural traditions) as those of the nation-state. May explains (2012:56-57):

> In effect, the *ethnic* interests of the majority group are legitimated and naturalised as *civic* ones, which, in turn, are equated directly with modernity. By this, the legitimate claims of minorities for similar recognition and inclusion in the public or civic realm are ignored, discounted and/or suppressed on the basis that they are merely 'ethnic'. At best, minority group members may be able to continue to maintain their ethnic habitus in private,[8] although the pressure to assimilate to the civic language and culture may remain intense. At worst, minority language(s) and culture(s) may be actively suppressed – a practice which remains an all too common feature of modern nation-state policy.

2.2.2. Nations and their states

May (2012:57) believes that in discussing ethnicity and nationalism, it is vital to distinguish between the terms *nation*, *nationalism*, *state* and *nation-state*. Based on Guibernau (1996), May defines a *nation* as a group of people who are aware of forming a distinct community and who share the following:

- a historic territory, or homeland
- common historical memories

[8] Minority-group members often face scrutiny for the maintenance of their ethnic habitus, even in private life (see Chapter 5, subsection 5.3.2.4).

- a common culture
- a common (political) destiny and, relatedly
- a desire for at least some degree of social and/or political self-determination

May (2012:57) notes that a nation therefore has five dimensions, namely psychological (in that they are conscious of forming a group), territorial, historical, cultural and political. For the purposes of his own argument, he treats the concepts of nation and ethnie as comparable, or at least complementary – but highlights that, as per Smith's conceptualisation, they are separate entities since not all ethnies become nations (see footnote 7). Based on Breuilly (1993) and Smith (1994), May (2012:58) summarises the ideology of *nationalism* as follows:

- The world is divided into nations, each with its own identity and destiny.
- The nation is the sole source of political power, and the interests and values of the nation take priority over all other interests and values – loyalty to the nation is pre-eminent.
- Everyone must belong to a nation, if everyone is to be truly free.
- To realise themselves, nations must be as politically independent as possible – political autonomy, or at least some degree of self-determination, is a central tenet of nationalism.
- To maintain peace and justice in the world, nations must be both sufficiently free and sufficiently secure to pursue their own (national) interests.

Western social science theory, according to May (2012:58), defines *state* as an entity with (i) political sovereignty over a clearly designated territorial area, (ii) monopoly control of legitimate force, and (iii) loyal citizens. He defines *nation-state* as the confluence of the nation and the state – and calls it the raison d'être of many historical and current nationalisms. Nationalism, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent, and deems the nation-state to be the "natural political unit", flows from the belief that all nations should aspire to representation in and by their own state. In other words, Smith's ethnies become nations through nationalism in the pursuit of a nation-state, although as noted above, the distinction between ethnies and nations will not be continued here, and 'nations' henceforth should be understood to refer to either/both. May (2012:58) argues that once nation-state congruence has been achieved, the principal aim of the nation-state is "to create (or *re*create) and maintain a particular conception of nationhood and/or national identity". He explains nation-states further as follows (2012:59):

> [T]he nation-state conflates the historical-cultural and the legal-political dimensions of nationhood in order to create a homogeneous national culture with which its members can identify and to which they will be committed. This is achieved principally through the establishment and promotion of a common language and civic culture, and via the agencies of the state – most notably, education.

According to May (2012:59), the nation-state is a product of the nationalism of the last two to three centuries and is therefore a relatively modern phenomenon (see subsection 2.2.4 for full discussion). However, despite its "historical recency", the nation-state and the political principles on which it is founded have become so ubiquitous and unquestioned in the modern world, that it is often considered synonymous with both society and modernity. May notes that this naturalisation of the nation-state as the normative societal model in much of social science commentary has been described as "methodological nationalism".[9]

May (2012:60) suggests that when discussing the pejorative distinction drawn between ethnicity and the modern nation-state, the concept of *national minorities*, or nations that are not represented by a corresponding state, should be included. National minorities have also been referred to as "smaller nations", "nations without states" and "stateless nations".

2.2.3. Linguistic nationalism

According to May (2012:60), many nationalists believe that nations are *perennial* (that they have always existed in some form), and, similar to a primordialist conception of ethnicity, that their enduring influence is explained by pre-existing kinship or ethnic ties. The nation is then "objectified" through a range of "national" characteristics (such as language, history and cultural practices). May notes that nationalists invoke both primordial ties and history in their claims of and for nationhood, and rely on a strong sense of kinship in mobilising members for nationalist causes. While this essentialist position is mostly held by nationalists themselves, it is also closely associated with the so-called German Romantics of the late 18th and early 19th century – Herder, Humboldt and Fichte.

These philosophers identified "language, blood and soil" as constitutive elements of the *Volk*, or nation, and advocated a nationalism where culture, and language in particular, was deemed central to the *Volksgeist* – the essence or character of the nation. May (2012:61) states that from

[9] May cites McCrone (1992:5) who points to early British sociology as having treated 'society' as interchangeable with the highly centralised British state dominated by England. Where sociology existed in the 'periphery' (in Wales, Ireland and Scotland), it was concerned with analysing the "traditional, pre-capitalist way[s] of life" and charting "its decline and ultimate incorporation into the 'modern' society".

this perspective, language became the single most important distinguishing characteristic of nationhood. Without its own language, the continued existence of a nation was inconceivable – Herder went as far as to describe a nation without a language as an *Unding* (absurdity). Following from Herder's principle of the centrality of language to nationhood, Fichte argued that if German was superior to all other languages, then the German nation was superior to all others. Kedourie (1960; cited in May, 2012:61), states that the German Romantics believed that "a group speaking the same language is known as a nation, and a nation ought to constitute a state".

May (2012:62) rejects these views as clearly *essentialist* and *determinist*, while still maintaining that language *can* be viewed as a significant marker of ethnic and national identity – a position I agree with and which will be demonstrated throughout Chapters 4 and 5. He adds that most commentators on nationalism dismiss the German Romantics' perspective, in favour of a *modernist* one, which deems nations and nationalism to be a recent historical phenomenon grounded in modernity. Such a view relies on two key principles according to May: (i) a *subjectivist* account of nationhood, in which no clearly definable set of national criteria (such as language) exists; and (ii) a clear differentiation between modern nations and their historical antecedents without the presupposition of a continuous link between the two (i.e., the link between ethnies and nations).

May (2012:62-63) cites Ernest Renan as a notable early proponent of a subjectivist account of nationhood – the French scholar who claimed that "[l]anguage may invite us to unite but it does not compel us to do so". Instead, Renan favoured a view of nationhood that is not linked to any specific objective markers, but rather, one which relies on (i) the possession of a rich shared history, and (ii) present-day consent – the desire to continue to live together and perpetuate the value of that common heritage. According to May (2012:63), the will to nationhood both unifies historical memory (which requires forgetting and/or ameliorating contradictory histories), and secures present-day consent (involving a perpetual renegotiation of the boundaries of consent) – which suggests active participation in the *construction* of nationhood.

May (2012:63) cites Max Weber as another proponent of the constructed nature of nationhood. Weber rejected ethnic solidarity and solidarity among people speaking the same language as sufficient conditions for nationhood, but conceded that nations include "notions of common descent and of an essential, *though frequently indefinite*, homogeneity" (Kohn, 1961; cited in May). According to May (2012:64), since the will to nationhood is both a conscious choice and

a specific construction of history, nations cannot be directly equated with pre-existing ethnic, cultural or linguistic communities.[10] May insists that "no single distinguishing feature fits all national contexts".

> The strident claims of linguistic nationalism can thus be safely dismissed since language, it seems, is only one of many characteristics, which may (or may not) be salient at any given time and place. Where national symbols do achieve significance in particular national contexts, and/or in particular historical periods, it is principally because of their role in differentiating 'us' from 'them'. As Armstrong (1982) observes, objectified national characteristics act in this way as symbolic 'border guards'. These border guards are closely linked to specific cultural codes and function to identify people as members or non-members of the specific national collectivity. This is not too dissimilar a position to a situational account of ethnicity with its emphasis on ethnic boundaries (cf. Barth, 1969a, b).

2.2.4. Modern nation-states

As stated above, in addition to a subjectivist account of nationhood, modernists also view nations as modern, and therefore distinct from previous forms of collective organisation. According to May (2012:65), modernists believe that nations (and nation-states) are the product of the age of nationalism, which emerged from the historical and social developments of modernisation, industrialisation, political democracy and universal literacy in 18th and 19th century Europe. Modernists suppose that the preceding feudal, dynastic and agrarian societies had little notion of the national sentiment that characterises the modern nation. In other words, modernists believe nations and nationalism to be the preserve of the modern world.

May (2012:65) states that modernists emphasise three differences between premodern and modern nations. First, modern nations are often equated with their administrative and political representation in the nation-state. They are considered to be "mass nations", based on the concept of universal enfranchisement, with the goal of representation in the form of the nation-state. Modern nations, May argues, are therefore a product of post-Enlightenment political rationalism and the ideology of nationalism which arose in the 18th century.[11]

Second, modern nations denote both *people* living within a nation-state, and the nation-*state* itself, with precedence given to the latter legal-political community over the former historical

[10] May (2012:64) cites the highly contentious issue of Modern Greeks' (Hellenic or Slavic) origins as an example of why ethnicity is "inadequate as a predictor" of nationhood and nationalism. He also claims that language and religion are "problematic as national indicators", citing the varying focus on language and religion in nationalist movements in Scotland, Wales, Ireland, Belgium and Canada.

[11] May (2012:65) notes that this is evident from the fact that most of the nation-states comprising the United Nations did not exist in name or as an administrative unit more than two centuries ago.

culture-community. May (2012:66) believes that these two dimensions, elements of the institutionalised nation-state, are also products of the ideology of political nationalism. He insists that nationalism seeks to legitimate the construction of a specific national identity for historical culture-communities that inhabit their own nation-state, by means of *internal* political and legal jurisdiction over its citizens and the construction of a homogeneous national culture in which political and ethnic boundaries are congruent (see nation-building in Chapter 1, subsection 1.4.1). Political nationalism, May continues, also holds that nations should possess their own state. For established nation-states, this is enforced by *external* rights to sovereignty and self-government within the current inter-state system, and the defence of those rights (even by war). So-called stateless nations may attempt to realise this goal through secessionist and irredentist nationalist movements.

The third distinction according to May (2012:66), is that modern nations are predicated on further modernisation – the development of a bureaucratic state organisation, a capitalist economy, a literate and scientific culture (usually based on a single language) – whereas pre-modern nations are conceptualised as usually localised, largely illiterate, and culturally and linguistically heterogenous. May (2012:66) states that modernists take the position that modern nations (and the nation-states that represent them) constitute the primary social community in the modern era, and are a direct result of modernisation and the consequent rise of the state and the ideology of nationalism.

Since modernists believe nations (and nation-states) to be a recent development, made possible through modernisation, they argue that nations are constructed. May (2012:66-67) emphasises, however, that modernist commentators on nationalism vary greatly in their support of constructionism, and their rejection of a possible link between nationhood and a pre-existing ethnicity. Despite these wide-ranging views among modernists, May claims that they are all in agreement that nationhood is a product of political modernisation (manifested through nationalism and nation-state construction), and not of pre-existing ethnicity.

According to May (2012:67), while modernist writers on nationalism have produced numerous theories on the origins of nationalism (and the resultant nation-state), they are all in agreement that it is a historically recent phenomenon, which developed rapidly and became widespread by the beginning of the 19th century. He examines the positions of two prominent theorists, Ernest Gellner (1983) and Benedict Anderson (1991), both of whom highlight the relationship between nationalism, language and education.

May (2012:68) explains that *Gellner's theory of industrialisation* holds that the rise of nationalism is rooted in industrialisation, and the material changes it affected in Europe from the late 18th century. Before these processes, traditional agrarian societies had neither widespread literacy nor centralised political control,[12] languages and cultures were largely localised, and political organisation did not require clearly demarcated territorial boundaries or the promotion of internal integration and homogeneity (or a *uniform state culture*). In contrast, modern industrialised societies required cultural and linguistic homogeneity.

May (2012:68) explains that industrialised societies require a literate, mobile and occupationally specialised workforce, which is made possible through cultural and linguistic *standardisation* – involving the development of a "standardised, context-free and unitary language", and the resultant development of a *common* culture. In a process termed *exo-socialisation*, state-sponsored mass education provided "the literacy and 'technological competence' necessary for producing 'full' or 'effective' citizens in modern industrial societies". May (2012:69) notes that the principle of "one state, one culture" meant the state became increasingly identified with a specific language and culture.

> The result was the emergence of the nation-state in which cultural and political boundaries were seen to conveniently converge. In Gellner's view, the rise of nationalism is thus inextricably linked to the *prior* development of a strong state culture *from which* a homogeneous nation could be shaped.

According to May (2012:69-70), *Anderson's 'imagined communities'* posits that national communities are imagined, considering the fact that members will never know most of their fellow members, and that the idea of a collective national community has to be "specifically and consciously cultivated". While both Anderson and Gellner trace nationalism's origins back to industrialisation, Anderson specifies the origin as the convergence of industrial capitalism and print technology in 15th and 16th century Europe, which saw previously localised languages increasingly in print, and later, their promotion to languages of political administration (at a time when Latin dominated Europe).

May (2012:70) explains that through standardised language use in print, speakers of different dialects could begin to comprehend one another, and began cultivating a sense of belonging to a specific language and cultural group. Modernisation and centralisation of state control then

[12] May (2012:68) argues that feudal elites, while they controlled large swathes of territory, did not exercise centralised control, and empires, while demanding political loyalty, made virtually no demands for linguistic and cultural homogeneity.

led to a growing sense of national consciousness, which resulted in the emergence of a shared sense of a particular nation's history and its language and cultural symbols. In order for this process to unfold, according to Anderson's theory, people had to feel as though they lived parallel lives to other members of their group – an indirect relationship between individuals joined in a common historical narrative. May suggests that nationhood provides people with a *collective* sense of history by (i) linking them to past and future generations; (ii) by situating them in the global context as a member of one nation among many; and (iii) by providing them with recognition as one member among many of a specific nation.

May (2012:71) argues that modernists would consider the construction of collective histories as largely, or even entirely, fictive – and cites Hobsbawm (1990) as holding such an *inventionist* position. May states, however, that instead of offering a moral judgement on nationalism, as many political and social scientists do, Anderson makes the argument that *all* modern nations are imagined in this way – similar to earlier commentators (such as Kedourie, 1960) who viewed nations, despite their fictive elements, as *real* communities of culture and power. Both Gellner and Anderson, according to May (2012:71), maintain that the rise of nationalism has resulted in the construction of the modern nation in its nation-state form, that is, "an anonymous, socially differentiated and large-scale collectivity with its basis in the categorical relationship of equivalent individuals". He insists "nationalism has produced nations (as nation-states) and national identity, not the other way around".

While May (2012:71-72) agrees with modernist accounts of nationalism in terms of the historical recency of nations and in terms of their scepticism of primordial/perennial accounts of nationhood, he argues that in correctly situating nation-states in the modern era, the irrelevance of pre-existing ethnicity to nation-state formation has been overstated. He explains that by claiming that nationalism creates nations and nation-states ex nihilo, the role that cultural and linguistic antecedents play in national identity formation is ignored – similar to the denial of their role in ethnic identity formation in constructionist accounts of ethnicity.

May (2012:72) further argues that modernists fail to account for the enduring presence of both ethnicity and nationalism in the modern world, specifically where political modernisation has already been attained. He states that according to modernist logic, the modernisation process leads to nationalism supplanting ethnicity, and nationalism subsequently being supplanted by internationalism. May claims, however, that neither has happened, and instead, increasing

internationalisation appears alongside nationalism, and ethnicity is still a prominent feature in nationalism, evidenced by the many *ethnonationalisms* in the modern world.

May explains this inability to predict the continued salience of ethnicity and nationalism by making recourse to Smith's (1995) observation that modernist commentators on nationalism have confused individual and collective levels of ethnicity by rejecting primordial accounts completely. May argues that whereas individuals enjoy a great amount of latitude in their choice of and attachment to specific social and political identities, on a collective level, ethnicity remains an enduring and powerful force (see differentiation between ethnic communities and ethnic categories in section 2.1).

May (2012:73) cites the "economic core-periphery" explanation of the continued presence of ethnonationalism offered by some modernists, most notably Hechter's (1975) *internal colonialist* thesis, which states that ethnonationalism persists because of unequal modernisation within a nation-state, which leads to disadvantaged groups seeking independence. May states that this view has been widely contested, and offers the "relatively prosperous" Catalan nationalist movement as a counter-example of a minority that – while having been culturally oppressed in the past – was historically the strongest economic group in Spain. This example might suggest that minority groups are equally threatened by cultural oppression (threats to their identity) as by economic and political oppression. I discuss identity threats more extensively in Chapter 3, section 3.4, and those specific to white Afrikaans speakers in Chapter 5, subsection 5.3.2.2.

Although economic factors feature prominently in *some* ethnonationalist movements, May (2012:73) argues that they are an insufficient explanation for their ongoing prominence. He maintains that a modernist account fails to account why ethnicity (and not religion, regionalism or class) is so frequently the principal focus of nationalist mobilisation, or what I refer to in the title of this thesis as radicalisation, involving the strengthening of the language-identity link (or essentialism of ethnic identity more broadly) and political mobilisation. May also contends that modernists fail to explain the presence of ethnonational claims, "even when such claims may entrench, rather than ameliorate socioeconomic and/or political disadvantage".

2.2.5. An ethno-symbolic account of nationalism

May (2012:74) believes that an *ethno-symbolic analysis of nationalism* – a position most prominently advocated by Anthony Smith and John Hutchinson – is able to provide a strong account for the links between ethnicity and nationalism. He states that while ethno-symbolic

approaches are in agreement with modernists on the recency of nationalism and the oftentimes constructed nature of national identity, they address three main weaknesses of the modernist approach, namely: (i) its historicity; (ii) its conflation of nation and nation-state; and (iii) its separation of political and ethnic nationalism.

Firstly, proponents of an ethno-symbolic approach argue that the process of nation formation should be examined through the lens of a "longer and more cyclical account of history". In order to do this, they distinguish national sentiment (feelings of collective belonging to a nation) from the ideology and movement of nationalism per se, contending that the one can occur without the other and, in fact, that national sentiment emerged centuries before the development of nationalism (May, 2012:74). May (2012:74-75) notes that this diachronic approach does not necessarily involve a perennial view of nations, but instead aims to situate nationalism within a broader theory of ethnic formation and to highlight similarities and differences between the premodern and modern eras.

Following from Smith, May (2012:75) claims that the emergence of nationalism and the nation-state has been shaped by premodern ethnic identities (ethnies), and can therefore be situated in "a larger cycle of ethnic resurgence and decline in history". Accordingly, he believes that modern nations comprise key characteristics of pre-existing ethnies – several extant memories, myths and symbols are incorporated, and new ones created if required. May explains that these cultural elements aid the establishment of a common national consciousness and a corresponding symbolic repertoire (such as language, religion, customs and institutions), which provides a sense of historical continuity for national groups. Although there are fictive elements within modern national cultures, May believes that they are not entirely invented, emphasising that cultural and/or linguistic *continuity* is not the same as cultural *fixity*.

He states that this view allows for the theory of nation formation to be applied to *nations without a corresponding state*.[13] May (2012:76) argues that the difference between ethnies and modern nations thus becomes "a question of degree rather than kind". He does note, however, that this approach does not presume a causal relationship between prior ethnies and subsequent nations. He adds that a modernist position (such as Gellner's) can therefore be criticised for "its teleological overtones" in identifying industrialisation as the source of nationalisation,

[13] May (2012:75) cites the Breton nationalist movement as one such example, arguing that it relies heavily on Breton traditions, myths, memories and symbols (such as language) which have survived despite French domination since 1532.

when in fact, nationalism predates industrialisation in many contexts (such as in Serbia, Ireland, Mexico and Japan).

According to May (2012:76), an ethno-symbolic approach therefore views nationalism as a means to achieve modernity (as modernists do), but also as a means of "(re)creating a sense of distinctive collective identity and autonomy" (see positive distinctiveness in Chapter 3). This approach views nations as both *political* communities represented by the nation-state, as well as *ethnocultural* communities which may or may not have nation-state representation, and which continue to be shaped by shared myths of origins and a sense of shared history and ways of life. May believes that it is this latter dimension – "the 'inner world' of ethnicity and nationalism" – which provides people with a sense of identity and purpose. He argues that modernists fail to provide an adequate explanation for the motive force of nationalism, or its "emotional reach and pull", among the wider population. He adds that nationalism and national identity can be understood in relation to Bourdieu's concepts of habitus and field, as well as the associated limits regarding the constructedness of ethnic identities.

May (2012:76-77) paraphrases Parekh's (1995) argument, stating that national identity is "a process of self-creation that does not occur in a historical vacuum". He believes that this position shifts the focus away from debates regarding the historical and political legitimacy of nationalism, in favour of the approach advocated by Joshua Fishman (1989), which May (2012:77) paraphrases as follows: "We must not ask if [nationalism] is 'good', if it is 'justified', if it is based on 'valid arguments'. Rather, we must ask 'why does it occur, and when, and how can its obvious power be most productively channelled'?" An ethno-symbolic approach, May argues, is able to answer these questions by determining and explaining the link between ethnicity and modern-day nationalism, that is by exploring the "popular base" and cultural framework of nationalism. He emphasises that nations are not primarily based on chronological or factual history, but rather on "*sentient* or *felt* history".

The second advantage of an ethno-symbolic approach (as opposed to a modernist approach) is that it enables the *separation of the historical-cultural and the legal-political dimensions of nationhood* – a confluence that exists because of political nationalism's key ideal, namely nation-state congruence. According to May (2012:77), nation-state congruence holds that citizens of a state should preferably be members of the same nation, and the goal of nationalism is therefore to establish an ethnically exclusive and culturally homogeneous nation-state (such as through claims for self-determination). May (2012:78) argues that nationalism did not

originally conflate the nation and the state, but by the 19th century it had come to hold that every nation deserved a state, and that each state should represent (only) one nation.

In May's (2012:78) view, modernists such as Wallerstein (1991) argue that nationalism is a *consequence* of the modern state system, and that the nation-state legitimates and institutionalises nationhood. Agencies of the state, most notably education and media, advance a sense of national sentiment, which serves to maintain the nation-state's internal cohesion and counter external threats. May explains that, on this view, the state therefore plays a vital role in attaining the three goals of nationalism, namely national identity, national unity and national autonomy.

May (2012:79) argues, however, that this conceptualisation of the functioning of nationalism within nation-states is unable to recognise the legitimate claims of stateless nations (or national minorities). On a theoretical level, he believes that this analysis incorrectly reduces the nation and the state to one another, as "citizenship does not always equate directly with nationality". On a practical level, he claims that the term nation-state is a misnomer, considering the fact that demographic and political realities contradict its ethnoculturally homogeneous construction. In other words, in equating the nation with the state, modernists conceal the true heterogeneity present in most countries and thus fail to consider the position of other present nations as well as intergroup dynamics between various nations within the same state.

Considering that the majority of states are multinational (consisting of several national minorities) and/or polyethnic (consisting of immigrant groups), May (2012:79-80) insists that the nation and the nation-state should be viewed as separate ideological and political constructs.[14] Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992), as cited in May (2012:80), maintain that the fact that nation-state congruence continues to be such a powerful concept illustrates the "naturalising effect of the hegemony of one collectivity and its access to ideological apparatuses of both state and civil society [which] constructs minorities into assumed deviants from the 'normal', and excludes them from important power resources".

The third weakness of the modernist account of nationalism, which an ethno-symbolic account addresses, is *the dominance of statist (or political) nationalism over cultural nationalisms*. May

[14] May (2012:79-80) illustrates this by pointing to the British *state*, and citing Connor (1993) who claims that while there exists such a thing as English, Scottish or Welsh nationalism, it would be more apt to speak of British *patriotism*, instead of British *nationalism*. Connor notes how rare actual nation-states are, noting that 40% of states have five or more statistically or politically significant ethnic groups, while 31% of states do not even have a national group that is in the majority, as is the case in much of post-colonial Africa, including South Africa.

(2012:81) posits that because of their denial of the role of ethnicity in nation formation, modernists overemphasise the political and civic elements of nationalism and neglect its cultural dimensions. This, he argues, legitimates the *Staatsnation* over the *Kulturnation* - the latter being relegated to an ethnic concern, as opposed to a national one.

May (2012:81) believes that nationalism is not (as modernists would have it) solely concerned with civic and political legitimation, which involves (internally) the establishment of national citizenship and (externally) self-determination within the inter-state system i.e., statehood. Instead, nationalist movements may also pursue smaller political goals with respect to greater autonomy within existing nation-states. He argues that matters of statehood (state formation and secession) might not even be the central issue of nationalist sentiments. Both the political and cultural dimensions of (ethnic) nationalism is of import to the Afrikaner case study, the latter especially to contemporary Afrikaner radicalisation (see Chapter 5, subsection 5.4.1.3).

Cultural nationalisms, which May (2012:82) argues is a recurring force in the modern world, including in Western nations with settled state power and boundaries, is mainly concerned with "what constitutes national identity, and with the moral regeneration of the national community, or 'way of life'", instead of state secession. According to May (2012:82), by reconstructing tradition (historical, cultural or linguistic), cultural nationalisms attempt to "meet more adequately the demands of modernity". He argues that this focus on "modernisation from within" contradicts the frequent accusation that these movements are simply traditionalist and reactionary. May (2012:82) further distinguishes between cultural and political nationalism as follows:

> Cultural nationalisms can thus be seen as contrapuntal to political nationalisms. They are often present when the aims of political secessionist nationalisms have been exhausted, or are simply no longer feasible or relevant – hence the prominence of cultural nationalisms in established Western nation-states.[15] Cultural nationalisms accordingly differ from political nationalisms in the nature and extent of their political organisation, comprising largely small-scale 'grassroots' movements which have as their principal foci specific historical, linguistic and educational concerns (Hutchinson, 1994, 2005). That said, cultural nationalisms will always incorporate some political aims and, as such, may themselves develop into political nationalisms with their

[15] May (2012:82-83) provides Wales as an example of cultural nationalism which, because of its considerable degree of political and economic incorporation into the British state, seeks its legitimacy (national distinctiveness) through cultural continuity and collective memory - especially its focus on the Welsh language. This stands in stark opposition to the nationalist movement in Scotland (which is significantly less incorporated into the British state), with secession clearly at its core, and attempts at cultural and/or linguistic revival very much of secondary concern.

> attendant claims to independent statehood – as seen, for example, in Belgium and Quebec in recent times.

May (2012:83) concludes that modernists mistakenly view cultural and political nationalisms as completely separate phenomena, instead of variants of the same phenomenon. Cultural nationalisms are relegated to "the realm of 'mere ethnicity'", and only statist or political nationalisms, which are tied to the modernising state, are believed to be true nationalism and hence justifiable. As a result of the reigning pejorative view of ethnicity, and the centrality of the latter in cultural nationalisms, attempts by national minorities to cultivate a sense of distinctive collective identity and autonomy, are often met with suspicion and even derision.

2.2.6. Dominant Ethnies and sociological minorities

May (2012:84) argues that the dominance of the legal-political dimension of nationhood over the cultural-historical one has not created a problem for majority ethnic groups (or *dominant ethnies*), because the latter dimension (their ethnic habitus) coincides with the former – meaning their ethnic ties are merged with, and normalised and legitimated as, civic ones in the (field of the) nation-state. The ethnic habitus of minority groups, on the other hand, are in opposition with the legal-political interests of the nation-state, and their claims for a higher degree of autonomy and/or civic representation within the nation-state, are viewed as "inherently parochial and destabilising". May (2012:80) notes the oddity of this situation:

> If […] the ethnically exclusive and culturally homogeneous 'nation-state' is a misnomer, how has it come to so dominate conceptions of nationalism and nationhood? This, in turn, leads us to another question. Even if we acknowledge the primacy of multinational and polyethnic states – and it is hard not to – why does the majority ethnic group, or dominant ethnie, in these states so often continue to perceive the state as the political expression of *their* particular ethnic group (and, usually, theirs alone)?

According to May (2012:84), the fundamentally different treatment of majority and minority ethnic groups within the nation-state, illustrates Billig's (1995) argument that nationalism is projected onto others, while one's own is naturalised. This naturalisation of certain ethnic ties – or *banal nationalism* as Billig termed it – means that dominant ethnie nationalism "not only ceases to be nationalism … it ceases to be a problem for investigation". May argues that as a consequence, the hegemonic construction of the nation-state is disregarded or at least viewed as unproblematic. Billig (as cited in May) suggests that "the battle for nationhood" thus involves the triumph of one nationalism and the defeat of others.

Connor (1993; cited in May, 2012:84), uses the term *Staatsvolk* to denote an ethnic group that is culturally and politically dominant and that determines the "national essence" of the nation-state, despite the presence of other substantial groups. The language and culture of the dominant group is considered the *national* culture and language, and minority groups are not only excluded from national recognition, but are "encouraged and/or coerced by the dominant ethnie to assimilate to 'national' (i.e. dominant ethnie) norms". May (2012:85) asserts that if minority groups resist these pressures and attempt to maintain their distinct identity, they are labelled as a "parochial and anti-national form of communalism", even though the dominant ethnie's support of a *universalistic* national unity is "simply a majoritarian version of the same process". He adds that even if minority groups acquiesce and assimilate, they are still not guaranteed the full benefits of the national (dominant ethnie) identity.

In this ethnic hegemony, May (2012:85) contends that members of the Staatsvolk control knowledge/power, and through their socio-economic dominance and control over state institutions, create the sociocultural reality – a process many members need not even be cognisant of.[16] He claims that most modernists (including Gellner) accept this process of ethnic hegemony as the "necessary price of modernisation". As discussed in Chapter 1, subsection 1.4.1, many post-colonial African countries elect the colonial language, supposedly an 'ethnically neutral language', as the national language, both for 'modern efficiency' and to avoid ethnolinguistic conflict between a host of minority ethnic groups.

Accusations of the exclusion of (some) national minorities from the state, or of their ethnic habitus from public life, may thus be refuted based on the defence that no one group's ethnic habitus is naturalised as the national identity. However, as will become clear throughout Chapters 4 and 5, the colonial language is not free of ethnic connotations (and thus does not avoid ethnolinguistic conflict), nor does its national use prevent the state from restricting (certain) national minorities' autonomy and/or civic representation within the nation-state vis-à-vis a dominant majority. Furthermore, in African contexts, the dominant majority, i.e., those in favour of the state's national language regime and in control of the state apparatus, might comprise more than one ethnic group, instead of a single Staatsvolk per se. May's focus on Western examples means he does not observe these different particulars of the dynamic between majority and minority ethnies in African contexts.

[16] May (2012:85) offers the dominance of England within Britain as an example, claiming that *English* and *British* are often used interchangeably by English people, even though one refers to national affiliation, and the other to state affiliation.

According to May (2012:86), cultural (and linguistic) homogeneity is propagated on the basis of the need for *national unity*, which means that other forms of ethnic and cultural identification are viewed as not only oppositional to this idea of national culture, but also as undermining *social cohesion*. This view is especially prevalent in post-colonial African countries comprising many different ethnic groups with histories of conflict between them. May adds that because modernists view nation-states as the end point of the transition from tradition to modernity, alternative ethnic and cultural identifications are therefore viewed as regressive and premodern. He insists that the nation-state is considered "a new form of group life at odds with that of separate ethnic groups".

May (2012:86) posits that as a result of nation-state congruence, minority ethnies struggle to have their "historical, cultural and linguistic concerns recognised by and expressed within appropriate state hierarchies". He states that *modern national* and *premodern ethnic* identities are juxtaposed, and so too are *dominant ethnies* and *sociological minorities*. May (2012:87) notes that this distinction draws attention to two often unnoticed features of national life: its heterogeneity, which is taken for granted at the individual level but ignored at the level of the polity; and secondly, that in the construction of the nation-state, "sentiments of solidarity" subsume others on the basis of "a differential apportionment of status and value".

Consequently, May (2012:87) continues, sociological minorities may be defined both as groups that are a *numerical minority* in the nation-state, and groups that are *politically non-dominant*. May believes that the while the term minority emphasises the numerical size of a group, its more important implication is groups with fewer rights and privileges. He cautions that majority/minority relationships are not fixed and may differ depending on the context, adding that sociological minorities are, however, *usually* characterised by "a history of social, economic and political marginalisation and/or exploitation by dominant ethnies within given nation-states".

May (2012:87) offers a categorisation of sociological minorities based on Eriksen's (2010) typology, which he advises should be used as a useful heuristic device, instead of as a definitive and/or exhaustive categorisation. He also acknowledges that minority ethnies "are no more homogeneous than any other grouping" and will therefore demonstrate intragroup and intergroup differences, as well as significant overlap. May distinguishes between the following sociological minorities: (i) indigenous peoples; (ii) proto-nations; (iii) modern (urban) migrants; and (iv) ethnies in plural societies.

May (2012:88) defines (i) *indigenous peoples* as aboriginal groups that are politically non-dominant, and who are not (or only partially) integrated into the nation-state, such as Native Americans in the United States, Inuit in Canada and Greenland, and Māori in New Zealand. They are historically associated with "a non-industrial mode of production and a stateless political system". These groups are severely disadvantaged in modern nation-states as a consequence of colonisation and marginalisation within their own historic territories. They have faced the expropriation of their land and the destruction of their languages and traditional practices. Indigenous groups are concerned with political and cultural recognition within the nation-state, and political and economic reparations for past injustices.

May argues that this category excludes groups such as the Welsh, Catalans and Basques, who could claim indigenous status but fail to meet all of the requirements as set out in international law. May (2012:88-89) cites Churchill's (1986) distinction between *indigenous* and *established minorities*, explaining that the latter group is characterised by a lifestyle that is more similar to the rest of the national society, and is therefore more able to claim the rights needed to conserve their identity. May notes that there is overlap between established minorities and proto-nations.

May (2012:89) defines (ii) *proto-nations* as historical culture-communities that are territorially based but do not possess their own nation-state. These groups are usually no more or less modern than other national groups and are "fully differentiated along class and education lines". May states that proto-nations are most often associated with the secessionist and irredentist nationalisms of the world, and include Kurds inhabiting an area which includes parts of Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Iran and Armenia, Palestinians residing in Israeli-occupied Palestine and Israel, Tibetans in China and the Quebecois in Canada. Proto-nations engaged in ethnonational movements attempt to (re)claim statehood and be recognised by the global inter-state system. While these concerns signify political nationalism, there exists within these movements a continuum from overt separatism to a more culturalist focus.

May (2012:89) states that whereas the abovementioned groups can be classified as *national minority ethnies* – meaning they were previously self-governing and have a historic claim to a particular territory – (iii) *modern (urban) migrants* comprise those who have emigrated to a new country, usually concentrating in urban areas. According to May (2012:90), they retain elements of their culture, language and traditions, although their aim is generally to integrate into their new society and be accepted as full members. Such *ethnic minorities* differ from national minority ethnies in that their ethnic and cultural distinctiveness is mainly manifested

in the private sphere. May notes that they too may assert their rights to express their ethnic identity, although they normally do not seek self-governing status within the nation-state. Instead, they advocate for a more plural and inclusive conception of national identity and culture, opening up the boundaries of what constitutes nationhood.

Ethnic minorities may gradually become national minorities, May (2012:90) suggests, "if they settle together and acquire self-governing power in the interim". He argues that this is the case in "ex-colonial societies such as the USA, Canada, Australia and Aotearoa/New Zealand where white settler groups have subsequently come to constitute the dominant ethnie(s) in the modern nation-state".

There are, however, exceptions to this national/immigrant split within categories (i), (ii) and (iii). May (2012:90) provides Fenton's (1999) *post-slavery minorities* category, which includes the unique case of African Americans who do not, like indigenous peoples and proto-nations, have a historical territorial claim (as do the Native Americans), but who can hardly be considered voluntary immigrants, similar to other modern (urban) migrants, due to their subjection through slavery.

He similarly notes Ogbu's (1987) distinction between *voluntary* (immigrant) and *involuntary* (caste-like) minorities (2012:91). Both types of minority groups are said to face discrimination and cultural and language "discontinuities" in terms of their uneven integration in the nation-state. However, whereas voluntary groups view these discontinuities as primary cultural/linguistic differences (existing prior to their immigration and constituting barriers to be overcome), and are more likely to assimilate to the "cultural model" of the majority group, involuntary minorities (such as African Americans) develop a secondary cultural system wherein differences are viewed in the light of a history of oppression *within* a nation-state, and opposition to the majority group. In the latter case, May (2012:91) believes that cultural and language differences therefore serve a boundary-maintenance function. Differences are viewed as symbols of identity which should be maintained, instead of barriers which should be overcome. May states that such sentiments may develop into oppositional cultural (and political) nationalism movements.

The final category, (iv) *Ethnies in plural societies*, refers to ex-colonial societies with "self-consciously" culturally heterogeneous populations. According to May (2012:91), ethnies in plural societies are divided internally by class and are easily identifiable through ethnic and cultural differences. These groups are required to participate in a uniform political and ethnic

system, wherein one particular group will usually dominate. May (2012:92) states that ethnic relations in these plural societies are characterised by intergroup competition, but secessionism is not an option considering that none of the groups have an external nation-state to which they realistically relate, as is the case in South Africa. He argues that plural societies are not the exception, but rather the norm since most modern states are *polyethnic* (2012:92).

> In short, contemporary 'nation-states' increasingly comprise a variety of ethnic groups which are in competition for the resources of the state […] To complicate matters further, polyethnic states are often *multinational* ones as well. In other words, indigenous and national minority groups are also present in many of the same states […] However, what has tended to happen up until now is that both these types of minority group have been treated *in the same way* by the dominant ethnie. As a result, indigenous peoples and other national minorities have been denied their historical rights as ethnies and have been treated as merely one of a number of competing 'ethnic minorities' laying claim to the nation-state's (invariably) limited social, economic and political resources.

This situation, May (2012:92) believes, is caused by the omission of ethnicity from the realms of nationalism, based on the principle of nation-state congruence and the separation of political and cultural nationalism. He argues that as a result ethnonationalism is spreading in the modern world:

> The voices of dissenting national minorities are increasingly questioning the pejorative distinction drawn between the (modern) 'national' identity of the dominant ethnie and their own supposedly (premodern) 'ethnic' identities. Not only this, they are also increasingly dissatisfied with the concomitant rejection by the former of their claims for greater civic recognition and inclusion within the nation-state.

May (2012:92-93) argues that while "minority disenchantment" is not a new phenomenon, there is an increasing number of indigenous and established national minorities (thus excluding recent immigrants) who are challenging the hegemonic construction of 'national' culture within nation-states. He adds that while these groups are less concerned with attaining statehood, this might inevitably become their goal. May (2012:93) cites Williams' (1994) argument that due to increasing multiethnicity within societies, national congruence will have to be redefined. May notes that this rethinking of the nation-state has particular implications to matters of language and education.

2.3. The Pluralist Dilemma

2.3.1. The philosophical matrix of the nation-state

May (2012:94) reiterates that the construction and marginalisation of ethnic and national minorities are as a result of what Churchill (1996) refers to as *the philosophical matrix of the nation-state* – philosophical matrix meaning "a combination of ideas, not easy to separate or define, that embodies the expectations of society as to how it should function" (MacLachlan, 1988:x-xi, as cited in May). According to May (2012:94), the philosophical matrix of the nation-state has also been described by Kymlicka (2001) as the *nation-building* model of modern state formation. Rooted in the political nationalism of the 18th and 19th centuries, the philosophical matrix of the nation-state is based on the confluence of nation and state, and on "the establishment (often retrospectively) of a common civic or 'national' language and culture".

May points to Fichte as having been the first to link nation, state and language "into an indissoluble whole", by incorporating Herder's views on language and culture within a statist account of nationalism. This resulted in the *one language, one nation, one state* principle of linguistic nationalism – a view which has since been rejected as essentialist. Political nationalism, on the other hand, held that the state predated and caused the rise of the nation – hence *one state, one nation, one language*. May argues that this latter principle embodies not only common modernist orthodoxy in discussions of nationalism, but even the development of nation-states themselves. May (2012:95) suggests that political nationalism and the modern nation-state commit many of the same transgressions as did linguistic nationalism:

> The nation-state, as it has come to be constructed, *creates* sociological minorities by establishing a civic language and culture that is largely limited to, and representative of the dominant ethnie or Staatsvolk. Minorities are, in turn, denied legitimate rights to their *existing* language and cultural traditions where these differ from those of the dominant ethnie. Political nationalism may thus have prided itself on the reversal of the linguistic nationalists' language–nation–state connection but it has left the *linearity* of the principle untouched. As such, what results is still ethnic and linguistic hegemony, albeit from the opposite direction. Moreover, the hegemonic construction of the nation-state is far less readily apparent than more 'overt' ethnonationalisms. Cloaked as it is in the apparently neutral representation of a modern 'national' language and culture, the legitimation and valorisation of the dominant ethnie's habitus often escapes notice or critical comment.

May (2012:95) posits that this banal nationalism is the reason majority groups rarely define themselves or their languages as ethnic. He argues that the uncritical failure to notice the ethnic

ties of majority groups may be further explained by key liberal democratic principles, namely universal political citizenship, and the precedence of individual over collective rights. According to May (2012:95), these principles are often invoked by liberal commentators in their rejection of ethnicity as a "valid form of collective social and political organisation and identity", and in support of the current political organisation of the nation-state.

May believes that the orthodox liberal defence of the nation-state is framed within, and therefore constrained by, the concept of nation-state congruence (which is based in political nationalism). Should this concept be discarded, he speculates that it will become possible to recognise a more pluralist conception of the nation-state, based at least partly on group-differentiated rights. May (2012:95-96) believes that national minorities (which comprise indigenous and established minorities) have rights to greater inclusion in the civic realm of the nation-state, and that these rights are different from those of other ethnic minorities. I discussed these group-differentiated rights in Chapter 1, subsection 1.3.5, and do so again later in this section.

2.3.2. Liberalism

According to May (2012:96), a main concern in contemporary debates on modern nation-states, involves what Bullivant (1981; italics in original) referred to as *the pluralist dilemma*, that is, "the problem of reconciling the diverse political claims of constituent groups and individuals in a pluralist society *with the claims of the nation-state as a whole*". May states that this phrase highlights the difficulty of reconciling social cohesion with the recognition and incorporation of ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity within the nation-state. I also noted this problem in the previous Chapter in subsection 1.4.1.

May (2012:96) identifies two distinct approaches from within political theory that attempt to resolve the pluralist dilemma, namely *liberal pluralism* and *corporate pluralism*. Liberal pluralism holds that ethnic, religious or national minority groups should not have separate standing before the law or government (non-discrimination). May (2012:97) states that this is rooted in the French Revolution and Rousseau's theory that the modern polity consists of three inseparable features, namely freedom (non-domination), the absence of differentiated roles and a common purpose. May notes that this conceptualisation leaves little room for recognising difference within the modern nation-state.

Corporate pluralism – commonly referred to as *multiculturalism* – is characterised by the recognition of minority groups as "legally constituted entities, on the basis of which, and

depending on their size and influence, economic, social and political awards are allocated". May (2012:97) argues that the majority of liberal commentators advocate for liberal pluralism, instead of the multiculturalist (or group-rights) approach.

> In effect, the answer to the pluralist dilemma has been consistently to favour civism over pluralism. On this basis, the 'claims of the nation-state as a whole' – emphasising the apparently inextricable interconnections between social cohesion and national homogeneity – have invariably won the day over more pluralist conceptions of the nation-state where ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences *between different groups* are accorded some degree of formal recognition.

May is unsurprised by this, since the former is situated within the philosophical matrix of the nation-state, and because liberal pluralism reinforces the "pejorative distinction between citizenship and ethnicity". While he focuses mostly on the political organisation of liberal democracies, he claims that Marxists agree with liberal commentators on the position of ethnic and national minorities within nation-states, and socialist states have similar stances on minorities to liberal-democratic ones.

This broad consensus, May (2012:97-98) explains, has led to the construction of a range of interrelated and overlapping dichotomies within contemporary orthodox liberalism, wherein the one feature is positively associated with liberal pluralism, and the other negatively associated with corporate pluralism or multiculturalism. The dichotomies are as follows:

- universal or particularist
- individual or collective
- autonomy or identity
- private or public
- informal or formal
- fluid or bounded
- dialogic or ghettoised
- changing or static
- modernity or tradition
- commonality or difference
- cohesion or fragmentation

May (2012:98) asserts that according to orthodox liberal accounts, ethnic affiliations should be restricted to the private sphere, since the formal recognition of collective (ethnic) identity (in the form of minority rights) is seen as a threat to personal and political autonomy, and promotes

social and political fragmentation. He remarks: "Any deviation from the strict principles of universal political citizenship and individual rights is seen as the first step down the road to apartheid". Liberal accounts also consider the recognition and accommodation of group-related differences (that is, group rights) as understating "the fluid and dialogic nature of inter- and intragroup relations".

May (2012:99) points to John Porter, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. and Brian Barry as espousing this "de-ethnicised" view of liberal democracy (i.e. liberal as opposed to corporate pluralism). In *The Vertical Mosaic* (1975), Porter (cited in May, 2012:99) argued that the maintenance of collective ethnicity leads to ethnic stratification (or a vertical mosaic that represents a social hierarchy) which decreases the socio-economic mobility of individuals. He consequently considered individuals to have a choice between maintaining ethnic diversity and facing this stratification, or enjoying greater mobility by reducing ethnicity within "modern society". May (2012:100) contends that Porter argued for the assimilation of ethnic minorities into the homogeneous civic culture of the nation-state, as he deemed minority cultures to be irrelevant to post-industrial society.

In *The Disuniting of America* (1992), Schlesinger (cited in May, 2012:100-101), argued that the "cult of ethnicity" jeopardizes the idea of the melting pot, and leads to an America not composed of individuals, but rather of groups. Instead of assimilation and integration, the "multi-ethnic dogma" leads to fragmentation and separatism.[17] He also took particular exception to the increasing "Afrocentric" view of American and world history, and its advancement in education under the name of multiculturalism – trends he dismissed as nationalist mythmaking, essentialist, and as attempts to "vindicate their own identity". This perspective illustrates that the banishment of minority ethnicity from the public realm is not purely for reasons of modern efficiency and social cohesion, as is often claimed, but reflects a broader rejection of minority ethnic groups themselves. Schlesinger insisted that self-esteem results from personal achievement, rather than ethnic pride (see positive social identity in Chapter 3). He similarly lambasted bilingualism as fostering self-ghettoisation, segregation, and racial antagonism, and believed a common language to be central to national cohesion (May, 2012:102-103).

[17] Considering the marked political polarisation in the United States today, it is evident that fragmentation and separation may have other causes than minority ethnicity.

In the widely influential *Culture and Equality* (2001), Barry (cited in May, 2012:103) argues that multiculturalism undermines egalitarianism, and advocates for *egalitarian liberalism*. According to May (2012:104), Barry believes that the institutionalisation of cultural diversity through the politics of multiculturalism exaggerates the importance of cultural identity, at the expense of equality and freedom. Barry argues that these latter principles are vital to the attainment of the egalitarian principle of universal justice, and are only achievable by a "difference blind" approach rooted in individual autonomy. He also believes that multiculturalism promotes cultural relativism and cultural essentialism.

May (2012:104) notes that Barry, similar to Schlesinger, believes that bilingual education prioritises language maintenance (a cultural imperative for minority groups) at the expense of socio-economic mobility (thought to only be gained via English), and promotes segregation by creating separate schools for minority children and children being taught in the national language. May (2012:105) states that Barry offers a common national identity as the solution to the pluralist dilemma, which requires commitment and sacrifices to the larger society, although it is minority-group members who have to make a disproportionate number of sacrifices.

May (2012:106) criticises these liberalist accounts for viewing a person "*only* as a political being with rights and duties attached to their status as *citizens*", while ignoring their private identity, including their communal membership. He critiques the assumption of ethnic neutrality on the part of the state, as well as the myth of a homogeneous common culture (2012:108-109). May (2012:109) further notes that none of these authors question the historical recency or supposed homogeneity of the nation-state. They are also criticised for ignoring the wider issues of exclusion and social, economic and/or political disadvantage that usually accompany minority-rights claims. May (2012:112) lastly critiques orthodox liberal accounts for offering minority groups a binary choice between accepting the national identity, or maintaining other group identities:

> This zero-sum game requires minorities to accept a prior, inviolate, *majoritarian-determined* national identity that trumps all others (Calhoun, 1993a, 1997). This position specifically forecloses the possibility of a more dynamic and multifarious conception of nationhood, arising, in turn, from the more democratic, reciprocal discussion of what might constitute such national identities, discussed earlier. Requiring minorities to choose between various levels of identity is a consequence of the unquestioned acceptance of nation-state congruence, not a necessary condition of liberal democracy, as orthodox liberals aver. Such a position also fails to reflect adequately the possibilities of holding dual or multiple identities, except oppositionally.

> And yet it is clear that many of us can and do hold multiple and complementary identities – social, political and linguistic – at one and the same time, albeit not always easily (see Chapter 1). Certainly, one can hold both a regional and a national identity without these necessarily being conflictual. Why then should this not also be the case for ethnic and national identities (Stepan, 1998; Taylor, 1998)? Likewise, the juggling of different linguistic identities is an everyday activity for many minority language speakers, not least because they invariably have to operate in a majority language as well (see Chapter 4). It is surely a delicious irony then that orthodox liberals end up endorsing a form of communitarianism not that dissimilar from the ethnic essentialism that apparently so invokes their ire. The only difference, it seems, is that theirs is a majoritarian form of 'ethnic cheerleading', reasserting the dominant ethnie's unbridled role in determining the scope (and limits) of national identity.

2.3.3. Cosmopolitanism

In addition to the narrow conception of national identity offered by orthodox liberals, May (2012:112) notes the *cosmopolitan alternative* offered by cosmopolitan theorists, who, similar to hybridity theorists, believe national identities to be "increasingly passé in a globalised world" wherein a variety of identity choices are available. He points to Martha Nussbaum (1997) as a proponent of "a new politics of belonging" and the concept of *citizen of the world*, that is, "a global form of citizenship that is no longer rooted in, or confined to, local, ethnic or national identities, but specifically transcends them" (2012:113). He notes the core values involved in this position:

> Again, the underlying principles are of individual transformation and the related movement away from the 'confines' of localised identities toward more broad-based identities.

May (2012:113) also identifies Waldron (1995) as an ardent supporter of cosmopolitanism, who argued that people pick and choose "cultural fragments" from many ethnocultural sources, without a sense of allegiance to them. May explains that this "freewheeling identity" has no deeply held affiliations, except as "an acknowledged interdependent participant in the wider global community". He suggests that both orthodox liberal commentators and cosmopolitans view ethnicity as "a fantasy world, essentialist, isolationist, antediluvian, and thus intrinsically delimited (and delimiting), not to mention, irremediably passé" (2012:114).

May (2012:114) accuses cosmopolitanism of failing to recognise "the class-based, privileged, nature of so-called cosmopolitans – the 'frequent flyers' of the contemporary world". He refers to Calhoun (2007) who argues that formulating cosmopolitanism in individualistic terms privileges those who are most able to pursue their interests through individual action (see social mobility in Chapter 3, subsection 3.2.3.2), and that viewing ethnicity as "*essentially* (rather

than partially) a choice of identifications", cosmopolitan accounts fail to acknowledge the "omnipresence of ascription and discrimination as determinations of social identities". May (2012:114) further contends that despite common misconceptions, the recognition of group-based identities (and related group rights), does not necessarily involve an essentialist view of group identity, but instead can "accommodate a view of ethnic and cultural groups as dynamic and fluid while still retaining some sense of distinct cultural identity". He finally insists that the recognition of group identities and allocation of minority rights on the one hand, and liberal democracy and individual rights, autonomy and mobility on the other hand, are not mutually exclusive (2012:114-115).

2.3.4. Multicultural alternatives

In defence of this argument, May (2012:115) lists two political theorists who have offered alternative approaches to the orthodox liberal position on minority rights (and the philosophical matrix of the nation-state on which it is based), namely Iris Marion Young and Will Kymlicka. He believes that their insights have wide applicability to the field of minority-language rights. According to May (2012:116), Young (1989) argued that the treatment of people as "abstract individuals, undifferentiated by ethnicity, sex or class, actually reinforces the norms of the dominant group(s) within the nation-state at the expense of a wide variety of marginalised and/or oppressed groups". She proposed *differentiated citizenship*, where marginalised and oppressed groups are afforded group-representation rights on the basis of their systemic disadvantage. May (2012:116-117) explains this view as follows:

> Various social, cultural and ethnic minority groups have the right in her view to a differentiated place in the civic realm. This right, in turn, is based on the *mutual* recognition and valuing of their specificity and worth in the public domain.

May (2012:117) explains that Young was concerned with both the recognition of oppressed groups through political and institutional means, and the recognition of cultural differences as a fundamental principle of justice and equality. He states that her advocacy for the recognition of group-based rights does not reify or essentialise groups though – she rejected both assimilation and separatism (what May identifies as the two common answers to the pluralist dilemma) for doing so:

> Assimilation, she suggests, rightly champions individual freedom, equality and self-development. However, it wrongly assumes that *any* assertion of group identity and difference is, by definition, essentialist. Separatism may help establish cultural autonomy and political solidarity for oppressed groups and does challenge the hegemonic construction of the nation-state. However, it tends also to understate the

> historical *interrelations* between different groups – particularly, in modern mass, urban societies – and to simplify and freeze its own group identity in ways that fail to acknowledge intragroup differences. […] For Young, both assimilation and separatism end up reinforcing the notion of difference as 'Otherness'. In this view, each group has its own nature and shares no attributes with those defined as Other.

May (2012:119) lists several convincing arguments against Young's approach, however. These include her "too wide-ranging" list of marginalised and oppressed groups, which could easily include the majority of citizens, conflating minority groups with other broad social groups (such as poor people) – in the process obscuring "the *particular* demands of these national minorities for greater self-determination within the nation-state" – and, the implication of *temporary* representation (until disadvantage is redressed) which cannot adequately address minority groups' long-term demands for recognition and representation in the civic realm. May (2012:120) also argues that Young, similar to Porter, Schlesinger and Barry, "fails to differentiate the claims of national minorities from those of other ethnic minority groups".

May (2012:120) thus turns to Kymlicka (1995) who, in *Multicultural Citizenship*, clearly distinguishes between the rights of national minorities (including indigenous peoples) and other ethnic, cultural and social groups (including immigrants). I also discussed Kymlicka's notion of *group-differentiated rights* in the previous Chapter, subsections 1.3.4 and 1.3.5. Kymlicka describes national minorities as "distinct and *potentially self-governing* societies incorporated into a larger state", and who, "at the time of their incorporation, constituted an ongoing 'societal culture'" that provided members with "meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities … [and] encompassing both public and private spheres". This is in contrast to ethnic minority groups who entered a new society, and although possibly wanting to maintain elements of their cultural identities within their host nation-state, do not necessarily wish to recreate their own separate societal culture (May, 2012:120-121).

May (2012:122-123) argues that *self-government rights*, which include the right to autonomy and self-determination within the nation-state (and could be expanded to include secession), is not inconsistent with international law. Its application to national minorities usually sees some form of devolution of political power in the form of multinational and/or multilingual federalism. May (2012:123) describes *polyethnic rights*, on the other hand, as those that protect cultural and linguistic differences, while promoting integration into the nation-state, instead of self-governing status. He defines *special representation rights* as those that aim to redress disadvantage in the political process but only on a temporary basis. May (2012:123) suggests

that “an economically successful ethnic minority group may seek polyethnic rights but would have no claim to special representation or self-governing rights”.

As to the legitimacy of such minority rights in liberal democracies, May (2012:123-124) argues that Kymlicka bases his defence of minority rights in liberal theory, and not in communitarianism, as some liberal commentators allege. This allows Kymlicka to “uphold the importance of individual citizenship rights while, at the same time, developing an understanding of the importance of cultural membership to such rights”. As noted in Chapter 1, subsection 1.3.5, and also highlighted by May (2012:124), group-differentiated rights are not necessarily “‘collective’ rights which, ipso facto, stand in opposition to ‘individual’ rights”, as they may also be conferred to individual members of a group, such as in the case of a Quebecois enjoying the individual right to use French in court. For Kymlicka (cited in May, 2012:130), the main value of cultural membership is that it “allows for meaningful individual choices”, thus emphasising that freedom of choice is no less important than community ties.

May (2012:125-126) states that Kymlicka believes there is historical precedent in liberal theory and political practice for the recognition of the importance of cultural membership, and claims that “the rigid separation of individual *autonomy* from individual and collective *identity*” in liberal theory and practice only occurred after World War II, during which Hitler feigned “concern for the rights of German minorities elsewhere in Europe as a catalyst for the war”.[18] Prior to this, the League of Nations, established after World War I, endorsed a range of bilateral treaties collectively known as the Minority Protection scheme, which was concerned with the cultural protection of minorities (see Chapter 1, subsection 1.3.6, for similar discussion). During this time, many liberal commentators did not believe that the state should treat cultural membership as a strictly private matter, and in 1928, one even argued that failure to confer minority rights increases the likelihood of secession and the break-up of the nation-state.

However, after Hitler’s abuse of the Minority Protection scheme, there was a shift to “generic human rights, irrespective of group membership”, through supranational bodies such as the United Nations (UN). May (2012:127) suggests that after the assumption that minority-group members need not be afforded any additional rights, “a widespread conviction began to emerge among liberals that minority group rights were somehow incompatible with national and international peace and stability”. He believes that lately, supranational bodies have once again

[18] Putin has used this same justification for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

begun to realise that the absence of minority-specific rights have left minority groups "subject to the majoritarian decision-making processes of the nation-state".

In addition to these concerns regarding individual rights and social cohesion, feminist critics have also expressed concern with group-differentiated rights on the basis that they may aid the perpetuation of patriarchal practices within minority groups. To this point, May (2012:124-125) states, Kymlicka distinguishes between *internal restrictions* and *external protections*, which I also noted in Chapter 1, subsection 1.3.5. The former involves *intra*group relations in which the "minority group seeks to restrict the individual liberty of its members on the basis of maintaining group solidarity, creating in the process 'internal minorities'", whereas the latter relates to *inter*group relations in which a "minority group seeks to protect its distinct identity by limiting the impact of the decisions of the larger society". Kymlicka, May continues, believes that liberals may support external protections (where they promote *fairness* between groups) while still opposing internal restrictions "which unduly limit the individual rights of members to question, revise or reject traditional authorities and practices".

Minority groups usually demand external protections, and where internal restrictions are present, they are normally viewed as "unavoidable by-products of external protections rather than as desirable ends in themselves" (May, 2012:125). For example, as indicated in subsection 2.3.2, both Barry and Schlesinger have argued that minority-language maintenance, especially through bilingual education, "is a potentially illiberal imposition on children". In other words, group-differentiated rights may be accused of limiting the social mobility of individual members, due to the perceived low instrumental value of minority languages, or of placing a burden on children to learn more than one language. While I tend to disagree with such views, throughout the following three chapters, I will argue that there are some valid concerns over internal restrictions imposed on minority-group members, both in terms of fixing a rigid and essentialised conception of their ethnic identity (and their social identity more broadly), and also in terms of taking action on their behalf, without their consent and potentially against their interests and/or beliefs.

However, if Kymlicka and May are to be believed, intragroup processes are able to deal with these matters and thus minimise the threat of internal restrictions to minority-group members. In criticising Waldron's cosmopolitan alternative – as well as related arguments as to the situational nature of ethnic identities, and concerns regarding "notions of cultural 'purity' and 'authenticity'" – Kymlicka (cited in May, 2012:127-129) insists that "the assertion of national

minority rights does not preclude the possibilities of cultural adaptation, change and interchange". Citing Kymlicka, May (2012:129) summarises:

> Indeed, the desire of national minorities to survive as a culturally distinct society is most often *not* based on some simplistic desire for cultural 'purity'. Defenders of minority rights (including minority language rights) are rarely seeking to preserve their 'authentic' culture if that means returning to cultural practices long past. If it were, it would soon meet widespread opposition from individual members. Rather, it is the right 'to maintain one's membership in a distinct culture, and to continue developing that culture in the same (impure) way that the members of majority cultures are able to develop theirs' (1995a:105).

May (2012:130-131) concludes that in spite of valid criticisms countered against them, Kymlicka's minority rights framework, which questions the philosophical matrix of the nation-state, combined with Young's nuanced conceptualisation of the fluidity of groups, offers a "powerful explanatory model for a legitimate defence of national minority rights within liberal theory". May (2012:131) laments though that minority rights advocates within political theory rarely address how group-differentiated rights might be applied specifically to minority languages and speakers. In Chapter 5, I discuss the novel ways in which white Afrikaans speakers are seizing minority-language rights and even group-differentiated rights from below (whether justifiable or not), and its effect on pluralism in the South African state.

2.4. The Language-Identity Link

2.4.1. Language, ethnicity and nationality

According to May (2012:132), debates on the pluralist dilemma are dominated by issues relating to language and education, which is unsurprising considering their centrality in the formation and maintenance of modern nation-states:

> In effect, the battle for nationhood is most often a battle for linguistic and cultural hegemony. Consequently, education – and, crucially, the language(s) legitimated in and through education – plays a key role in establishing and maintaining the subsequent cultural and linguistic shape of the nation-state.

May (2012:132) argues that what is surprising is the tendency among political theorists who oppose multiculturalism not to refer to existing and relevant literature from sociolinguistic and educational research, and consequently incorrectly assume the preclusion or reduction of effective learning of English in bilingual education (see subtractive and additive education in Chapter 1, subsection 1.3.2). Even political theorists who support multiculturalism, such as Kymlicka, largely ignore the extensive literature on issues of language and identity and their

link to cultural pluralism – leaving the latter's work constrained by disciplinary boundaries, May (2012:133-134) believes.

Although a particular language may be an important cultural marker of a specific group, May (2012:134) contends that there is no inevitable connection between language and ethnicity. He notes that ethnic-group membership does not necessarily involve association with a specific language, and more than one ethnic group may speak the same language, while still being able to maintain separate ethnic (and national) identities. Even in cases where language is viewed as central to ethnic identity, May suggests, it is the *diacritical significance* attached to language that is important, and not the language itself. He also reminds us that languages and other cultural attributes "vary in their salience to ethnicity both within and between historical periods". While May (2012:134-135) rejects the primordialist view of nations as both natural and linguistically determined, he insists that, on the other hand, modernist and postmodernist commentators are incorrect in their assumption that language has little meaning or bearing on ethnic and national identity, and for three reasons:

> First, there is considerable evidence that while language may not be a *determining* feature of ethnic and national identity, it remains nonetheless a *significant* one in many instances. To say that language is not an inevitable feature of identity is not the same as saying it is unimportant. Yet many commentators in (rightly) assuming the former position have also (wrongly) assumed the latter.

May (2012:135) believes that because of the "strong and felt association" of language with ethnic and national identity, it cannot be consigned to the level of a secondary characteristic of ethnicity. He also suggests that by recognising the *cultural* significance of language to ethnic and national identity, its *political* prominence in many ethnonationalist movements might be better explained. This, he notes, has relevance to the awarding of official status to languages – which he describes as an arbitrary process involving political and social power. May (2012:135-136) further argues that the significance of language to ethnic and national identity should not be underestimated, because despite the arbitrary construction and reconstruction of language, it still has affective and political importance for speakers.

> In short, the legitimacy, or otherwise, of a language's provenance does not much matter. If a particular language comes to serve important cultural and/or political functions in the formation and maintenance of a particular ethnic or national identity, it is important.

May (2012:136) cites Anderson (1991) who, instead of treating language as an *emblem* of ethnic or national identity, identified its most important aspect as "its capacity for generating imagined communities, building in effect *particular solidarities*". May (2012:136-137) also

identifies Heller (1987) – who similarly notes language's centrality to the formation of group boundaries – and explains this boundary-marking function as follows:

> [B]eing unable to speak a particular language places immediate restrictions on one's ability to communicate – and, by extension, identify – with those who speak that language and any ethnic and/or national identities with which it is associated. This process of demarcation may be more salient for minority groups, since such groups are likely to be more conscious of the need for clear linguistic boundaries in relation to a surrounding dominant language and culture.[19] The usefulness of linguistic demarcation may also thus help to explain why language often has a heightened sense of saliency in relation to identity when its role as only one of a number of cultural markers might suggest otherwise. Moreover, to the extent that language boundaries are employed as a demarcating feature of identity, then a decreasing emphasis on, or a blurring of, these boundaries would be regarded as a threat to a group's existence.[20]

In contexts where language is viewed as central to identity, May (2012:137) posits that "the *sharing* of that language may engender particular solidarities". He states that ethnic and nationalist movements regularly employ language as "a rallying point for the alternative histories, and associated cultural and political rights, that they wish to promote" (see Afrikaans language movements in Chapters 4 and 5). May summarises that language's cultural dimensions are evidenced by the fact that individual and social identities are inevitably mediated in and through language. Its political dimensions, he states, are important to the extent that language becomes associated, both formally and informally, with specific ethnic and national identities (2012:138). He insists that a "'detached' scientific" explanation of the link between language and identity does not adequately acknowledge the importance of language to those who speak it, or the role it plays in social organisation and mobilisation.

2.4.2. Language and culture

May (2012:138) argues that while it is clear that language is a communally shared good as it requires dialogue, it is more difficult to establish whether or not "one's *own* language is a good". He ponders that *if* a specific language is not necessarily important to cultural identity, and *any* language would therefore suffice, the case for minority-language rights becomes very weak. Even if the opposite viewpoint is accepted, May believes that the "historical, social and political construction of the language and identity link and its clear variability, both at the inter-

[19] The need to use a second (or other) language when speaking to (often monolingual) dominant-language speakers, will also increase the awareness of language borders among minority-language speakers. Similarly, the use of the dominant language as lingua franca between members of different minority-language groups will also heighten the cognisance of group boundaries.

[20] See the discussion on distinctiveness threat in Chapter 3, subsection 3.4.1, and its relevance to white Afrikaans speakers in Chapter 5, subsection 5.3.2.2.

and intragroup level" would still need to be accounted for. He considers the work of Joshua Fishman (1991) to be helpful in this regard.

According to May (2012:138), Fishman argued that language and ethnocultural identity are linked in three ways, namely: (i) indexically; (ii) symbolically; and (iii) in a part-whole fashion. The *indexical link* between language and culture denotes the ability of a language associated with a certain culture to best name that culture's artifacts, and express its interests, values and worldviews. May explains that this does not mean there is a "perfect isomorphic match" between a particular language and culture, or that a language cannot be replaced in the longer term, but simply that a "traditionally associated language reflects and conveys its culture more felicitously and succinctly than other languages, while that language-in-culture link remains generally intact".

May (2012:138-139) states that this position echoes what is known in linguistics as the *Sapir-Whorf hypothesis*, or, the principle of linguistic relativity, a theory that each language represents and encapsulates a different culture and/or worldview. May (2012:139) notes that this theory quickly fell out of favour and is often dismissed as linguistically determinist, based on what he views as a misrepresentation of the complexity of the theory. He argues that this results in "the instant and fatuous dismissal of *any* meaningful interconnections between language, culture and thought". May supports a weak version of this theory which highlights "the *influence* of language in shaping our *customary* ways of thinking". He claims that "Neo-Whorfian" research in cognitive science and the philosophy of language supports the validity of this position. May lastly points to Bourdieu's (1991) *linguistic habitus* as evidence of the indexical link between language and culture, explaining that it "is a subset of the dispositions which comprise the habitus: it is that set of dispositions acquired in the course of learning to speak in particular social and cultural contexts".

The *symbolic link* between language and culture refers to a language's symbolic representation of a particular ethnic or national group. May (2012:140) suggest that consequently, "the fortunes of language are inexorably bound up with those of their speakers", meaning that languages ultimately become a symbol not only of an ethnic or national group, but of that group's status and/or success. Thus, the replacement of a minority language in the public sphere with a dominant language, demonstrates that minority groups' declining standing in the nation-state, and vice versa.

> Languages do not rise or fall simply on their own linguistic merits – indeed, it has long been accepted that all languages are potentially equivalent in linguistic terms. Rather, the social and political circumstances of those who speak a particular language will have a significant impact on the subsequent symbolic and communicative status attached to that language. This fact often escapes speakers of dominant national languages, and particularly speakers of English as the current world language, who take the 'natural' ascendency of these languages for granted. In contrast, the current international currency of a language like English has much more to do with the sociopolitical dominance of those nation-states, notably the USA, for which English is the accepted language of public discourse. (Pennycook, 1994; Phillipson, 1992, 1998; Macedo et al., 2003; see Chapter 6). Likewise, national languages reflect the greater sociopolitical status of their speakers in relation to minority languages and cultures within the nation-state.

The *part-whole link* between language and culture denotes the partial identity between a particular language and culture. May (2012:140) explains that considering that so much of culture is verbally constituted (songs and prayers, laws and proverbs, history, philosophy and teachings), there are aspects of every culture which are "expressed, implemented and realised via the language with which that culture is most closely associated". In other words, some aspects of a particular culture exist solely in the language with which it is historically associated.

May (2012:140) insists that although Fishman underlines the cultural significance of language for identity, this does not imply the reification or fixity of identity nor the inevitable link between certain languages and identities. Instead, he explains, language is regarded as a "significant *resource* to one's ethnic identity, both at the level of societal integration and social identification".

2.4.3. Language loss: trivial or traumatic?

The link between language and identity, May (2012:141) argues, should not be explored in isolation from other factors of identity or from its particular political context, as it is *contingent* on subjective factors and political circumstances. He maintains that "the language we speak is crucial to our identity *to the degree to which we define ourselves by it*". He states that this can vary considerably across individuals, within groups and between groups, and that some individuals and groups may thus view the language they speak as a "largely superficial marker of their identities" and will therefore not experience a "great sense of loss in abandoning it".

May refers to Eastman's (1984) theory that *language use* is merely a surface feature of identity, meaning that immigrant groups, for example, may adopt another language and retain their original language only as an *associated* language – that is, a language that does not necessarily

have to be used, or even known, anymore, but that continues to be a part of one's heritage – without causing injury to ethnic identity. Gellner (1964) as cited in May, argues that "changing one's language is not the heart-breaking or soul-destroying business which it is claimed to be in romantic nationalist literature". May (2012:142) states that Ireland, and the replacement of Irish by English as ethnic (and national) language, is often given as an example of such sentiments.[21]

In order to explain this (non-devastating) language shift in Ireland, May (2012:142) cites Smolicz's (1979) theory of *core cultural values*, which for contemporary Irish identity is not the Irish language but rather the Catholic religion, or perhaps lately, a cultural Catholicism.[22] Smolicz suggested that after the loss of their language, it was through Catholicism that the Irish people could maintain their distinct identity from "the conquering British Protestants". After criticism that his theory does not allow for intragroup differences, May (2012:143) states that Smolicz developed a more nuanced approach:

> While still holding that some cultures are more language-centred than others, Smolicz and Secombe (1988), for example, differentiate four broad approaches to minority languages that are evident among and within ethnic minority groups. These comprise: *negative evaluation* of the language; *indifference* – seeing no purpose in language maintenance and showing no interest in it; *general positive evaluation* – regarding the language as a vital element of ethnicity but not being prepared personally to learn it; *personal positive evaluation* – regarding the language as a core cultural value and putting this language commitment into practice (see also Clyne, 1990).

May (2012:143), however, insists that a better explanation of language shift in Ireland should involve the social and political processes that have led to the rise of English as the language of Ireland and elsewhere, and that have linked English with modernisation, and provided it with symbolic and communicative value. While discussing the language shift (and possible death) of Irish is beyond the scope of this thesis, I believe the Irish example and the concept of core cultural values may prove useful to the study of the Afrikaners. Although language shift and loss are, at least for now, much less of a reality for Afrikaans and Afrikaans speakers, the

[21] According to May (2012:142), less than 3% of the population uses Irish regularly, and there is little interest in its restoration, pessimism about its continued maintenance, and hostility towards its compulsory learning. Despite this, the Irish language is still *symbolically* valued and forms part of the Irish ethnic and national identity. May cites Ussher's (1949) pointed remark: "[T]he Irish of course like their Irish, but they like it *dead*".

[22] The boundary-marker of an Irish accent of English should also not be understated.

language does face many of the same pressures as other minority languages, such as Irish Gaelic, which are being, or have been, displaced.[23]

According to May (2012:147), sceptics of minority-language rights often adopt a position of "resigned language realism" which argues that language revitalisation and/or retention is doomed to fail. He states that "[w]hen faced with the 'Realpolitik' of the often-exponential shift and loss of their historically associated language(s), such as Irish, minority-language groups must, it seems, simply acquiesce to the 'march of progress'" (2012:148). He argues, however, that this supposed realism (or linguistic Darwinism) on the part of MLR opponents is anything but. Instead, he claims that "*all* commentators on minority languages, and associated rights and representation, bring their own political agenda to the table". May believes that attempts at sanitising anti-MLR positions by invoking Realpolitik, while dismissing proponents of MLR as idealists and activists, should be considered "a discursive, highly partial, *move* in the politics of language rights, not some impartial, disinterested stance".

May (2012:149) notes that a key insight to be taken from the Irish example is that education cannot on its own effect language revival, but that, as Fishman (1991) argues, the continued survival of any minority language hinges on intergenerational family transmission. Following from May (2012:150), it could be argued, in addition, that a language that is not central to an ethnic or national group's identity (thus not a core cultural value), for whatever reason, cannot be adequately adopted as a unifying feature of nationalism, and is at greater risk of language shift and death. May (2012:151) also argues that the Irish example shows that language shift is a gradual process that may even take centuries, similar to the slow process of change related to habitus and culture – thus highlighting again the significance of language to ethnic identity:

> Language shift does clearly occur – it would be foolish to suggest otherwise. However, it is more problematic and traumatic than is often assumed, particularly for those ethnies for whom a certain language represented, at least at one time, an important feature of the collective identity (Taylor, 1994, 1998; Margalit and Raz, 1995; Valadez, 2007).

This *trauma* related to language shift is relevant to social identity threat, which I discuss in Chapter 3, section 3.4. May (2012:151) cites Fishman (1991) who asserts that "language shift generally and basically involves cultural change as well indeed, initially, quite devastating and profound cultural change". May (2012:152-153) suggests that sceptics of MLR (such as

[23] Crowley (2007:156) suggests that Irish language shift may be attributed to the use of discourses of endangerment by Irish language activists after independence, which served to alienate regular speakers from the movement due to its association with 'conservative' politics.

Eastman) view the consequence of language shift – aside from whether or not this process is traumatising to minority-language speakers – as greater modernity. In other words, the end justifies the means. Not only that, but they also deem this end to be inevitable.

May (2012:152) observes that similar to pejorative views on ethnicity, minority languages are often seen as "impediment[s] to modernisation and social progress", whereas proponents of minority rights are dismissed as "self-interested and unrepresentative elites, intent on maintaining such languages solely for nostalgic and/or nationalistic reasons", which is not in the interest of the speakers. According to May (2012:152-153), a popular view, especially in the African context, is that language loss is a necessary part of modernisation and development, "even if, in the process, it risks the 'destruction' of cultures". Minority languages then are not only obstacles to collective modernisation, but also to individual social mobility. May (2012:154) adds:

> [T]hose who advocate majority languages (however, disinterestedly they present themselves) generally pose as, and consider themselves to be, both humanitarians and realists, with nothing but the 'best interests' of minority language speakers at heart (Fishman, 1991).

2.4.4. Language shift and the hegemonic nation-state

According to May (2012:1; 154), language shift and language loss is a feature of the modern world, and sees the majority language increasingly subsume the minority language's functions. The process of language shift very often takes three generations, by which time bilingualism makes way for monolingualism in the majority language. He suggests that this is as a result of minority-language speakers *electing* to express themselves through, and raise their children in, the majority language, which they view as the language of power, prestige, influence and communicative reach. May (2012:1-2) identifies three main stages of language shift:

- Stage 1: Minority-language speakers face increasing pressure to speak the majority language in formal language domains in particular, a situation called *diglossia*, which is usually precipitated by the introduction of education in the majority language. This eventually leads to a decline in minority-language functions, as it comes to be replaced by the majority language in the public sphere.
- Stage 2: A period of bilingualism, during which both the minority and the majority language continue to be spoken. The number of minority-language speakers is usually

in decline at this point, as is the number of fluent speakers, as the minority language is used more infrequently, and in fewer domains.

- Stage 3: The majority language replaces the minority language completely, a process which may occur over the course of two or three generations. The minority language may be 'remembered' by a small group of speakers, but it is no longer a language of wider communication.

May (2012:155) suggests that language shift is not solely the result of coercion or linguistic genocide, nor is it solely the result of voluntary shift or linguistic suicide. Instead, he believes that "[b]oth internal pull and external push factors are involved", claiming, however, that it is often the latter that 'direct' the former (see fairness rights and the right to linguistic security in Chapter 1, subsection 1.3.4). As will become evident throughout Chapter 5, the risk of Afrikaans language shift and loss is much less attributable to voluntary language choices than to outside forces.

In an attempt to understand the relationship between language, ethnicity and intergroup relations, Giles *et al*. (1977:308-309) pioneered the theory of *ethnolinguistic vitality*, in which they offer a taxonomy of the structural variables affecting ethnolinguistic groups. In this framework, an ethnolinguistic minority group is considered to have more vitality when it is more likely to survive and thrive as a distinctive collective entity in intergroup situations. Ethnolinguistic groups with higher *status*, favourable *demography*, and sufficient *institutional support*, have more vitality, and their group survival is thus more likely. Below is the full taxonomy, highlighting the various factors impacting the (cultural) survival of ethnolinguistic minority groups:



Figure 1: Giles et al.'s (1977) taxonomy of the structural variables affecting ethnolinguistic vitality

When predicting the likelihood of a specific language's survival, May (2012:155) argues that it is not so much *how* many speakers there are that is important, but rather *who* speaks it and *why*. He cites Nelde *et al.* (1996), who found that the status of a minority group and their related marginalisation, and the degree to which minority languages are recognised by the state and supported in civil society (processes termed legitimation and institutionalisation), are more determinant than the demographic size of a language group. May (2012:4) argues:

> Language loss is not only, perhaps not even primarily, a linguistic issue – it has much more to do with power, prejudice, (unequal) competition and, in many cases, overt discrimination and subordination. As Noam Chomsky asserts: 'Questions of language are basically questions of power' (1979:191). […] The loss of a minority language almost always forms part of a wider process of social, cultural and political displacement.

May thus emphasises the underlying power relations present in minority language shift, stating that it is often ignored or downplayed by proponents (or tacit accepters) of language shift. He states that even when these power dynamics are recognised, majority languages are endorsed under the guise of "linguistic modernisation" (2012:156):

> Edwards (1985), for example, is quite willing to acknowledge that language loss has little to do with linguistic merit and almost everything to do with the (unequal) exercise of social and political power. Yet, at the same time, he is prepared to endorse the arrogation of a majority language on the basis of its greater 'communicative currency'. In other words, the notions of 'communicative currency' or 'languages of wider communication' come to serve as linguistic proxies for the legitimation of the greater sociopolitical status of the majority language group.

Yet again, minority-language maintenance is incorrectly juxtaposed with competence in the dominant language. Opponents of MLR wrongly base their arguments on the assumption that minority-language speakers have to choose between the use of their ('instrumentally low-value') language, or the use of the dominant language which will afford them modernisation and social mobility, ignoring the fact that minority-language speakers are rarely monolingual. May (2012:156-157) continues:

> Thus, while establishing a symbolic/communicative distinction to language may well help to explain the detachability of language from ethnic identity, the implicit assumption that the latter should atrophy and die is inherently a *political* not a *linguistic* judgement. Relatedly, if the loss of a particular language is the result largely of political processes, then apologists of such language shift demonstrate little credibility in their own decrial and/or dismissal of minority language promotion as 'politically motivated'.

According to May (2012:157), another criticism often lodged by critics of MLR is that ethnolinguistic continuity leads to cultural and linguistic stasis. He counters that such views leave minority-language speakers with "very little room for agency – except of a prescribed kind, the *renunciation* of one's historically associated language(s)". May (2012:158) insists that maintaining minority languages does not prevent cultural and linguistic change, adaptation and interaction:

> Indeed, it can be argued that those who wish to maintain their historically associated language, usually alongside that of another more dominant language, actually exhibit a *greater* ability to manage multiple cultural and linguistic identities.

May (2012:6) believes that nation-states, and the ideology of nationalism in which they are rooted, are central to the prevalence of language loss. A host of language varieties spoken within the borders of the nation-state are gradually replaced with one common national language,[24] by *legitimation* (formal recognition of "official" status by the nation-state) and *institutionalisation* (the widening use in public and private spheres) of the latter. The national language becomes associated with modernity and progress, while the remaining minority languages are increasingly associated with tradition and obsolescence. The establishment of a common national language accomplishes the central requirement of a nation-state,[25] namely cultural and linguistic homogeneity in the public sphere.

[24] The distinction between languages and language varieties is important here, as (non-standard) dialects are also rooted out.

[25] May (2012:6) argues that the requirement to speak a common language is unique to nation-states, and that it is a relatively recent historical phenomenon. He provides the Greek and Roman Empires, Inca and Aztec Empires,

This necessity for cultural and linguistic homogeneity, May (2012:7) posits, is based on the concept of *nation-state congruence*, which holds that the boundaries of political and national identity should coincide (and as already dealt with in section 2.2). Citizens of a nation-state should, therefore, preferably also be members of the same national collectivity. May argues that most nation-states and nationalist movements aspire to this model, regardless of the much more complex multilingual and multi-ethnic reality (see Chapter 5, subsection 5.1.1.2, for the South African example):

> The inevitable consequence of this political imperative is the establishment of an ethnically exclusive and culturally and linguistically homogeneous nation-state – a realm from which minority languages and cultures are effectively banished.

May (2012:159) suggests that the politics of language is "a contest for linguistic control (and, by extension, social and cultural control) of the nation-state". 'National' languages, he continues, are so called as a result of their legitimation by the state and their institutionalisation within civil society to the exclusion of other languages. He adds that they become an "an arm of the state".

He notes that while legitimation is an important step "in the political creation of a 'national' language", it is not sufficient to "ensure a central role for that language variety within the nation-state" (2012:160). In order to impact its actual use, institutionalisation of that language within civil society is required. Institutionalisation, May (2012:161) explains, leads to a language becoming accepted or "taken for granted" in a wide range of social, cultural and linguistic domains, both formal and informal. A language's status, and the status of its speakers, is significantly impacted by the degree of institutionalisation.

May (2012:161) states that these processes result in the privileging of one language over others, and the normalisation of that language's privilege. Dominant-language speakers are better able to access and benefit from the civic culture of the nation-state, he claims, since the dominant-language group usually has authority in administration, politics, education and the economy, and gives preference to other dominant-language speakers. Where language conflict arises, May argues, it is at least partly caused by the disparate societal status and preferential treatment of the majority language by the state and within civil society, and the stigmatisation of minority

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and more recently, the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, as examples of previous forms of political organisation that did not demand such a high degree of linguistic uniformity.

languages. He notes, importantly, that language conflict occurs when minority languages are not recognised:

> Indeed, the dynamics of ethnic tension involving language, leading in some cases to political conflict, occur most often *not* when language compromises are made or language rights recognised, but where they have been historically avoided, suppressed or ignored […] Such linguistic and political tensions are exacerbated by the continued assumption that the civic culture of the nation-state is somehow neutral and, relatedly, that the adoption of a national language depoliticises that particular language variety. Yet, as I have argued, the establishment of a state endowed or 'national' language must be regarded as an inherently deliberate (and deliberative) political act; an act, moreover, that advantages some individuals and groups at the expense of others.

May (2012:162) argues that just as the dominant ethnie's cultural and linguistic hegemony within the nation-state is maintained through legitimation and institutionalisation, minority languages require these same processes to ensure their survival in a world that, despite globalisation, remains dominated by nation-states:

> Given the spread of standardised education, the associated literacy demands of the labour force and the inevitable and widespread interaction required in dealing with state agencies, any language that is not widely used in the public realm becomes so marginalised as to be inconsequential.

According to May (2012:164), Bourdieu (1991) introduces several concepts relevant to the process of language domination and legitimation, including: linguistic capital, linguistic markets, misrecognition and symbolic violence. *Linguistic capital* denotes the value assigned to one's linguistic habitus in specific *linguistic markets* (such as the civic culture of the nation-state). The distribution of linguistic capital corresponds with the distribution of other forms of capital (such as economic or cultural), and different speakers will have different amounts of linguistic capital. Those with more linguistic capital are "able to secure an advantage, or 'profit of distinction'". Those with less linguistic capital (meaning their habitus is valued less by the market) "come to *accept* this diminution as legitimate".

This process, termed by Bourdieu as *symbolic violence*, occurs when a specific linguistic habitus and the hierarchical power relations in which it is embedded, is *misrecognised* as legitimate and "tacitly accepted – *even by those who do not have access to it* – as a 'natural' rather than a socially and politically constructed phenomenon" (May, 2012:164-165). May 2012:165) points out that symbolic violence requires "active complicity, or implicit consent" by minority-language speakers, who, according to Bourdieu, ultimately come to "collaborate in the destruction of their [own] instruments of expression".

Despite "their constructedness, evolution and change, both national *and* minority language varieties remain, for many of their speakers, important indicators of individual and collective identity". May (2012:173) believes that minority languages should (also) be legitimated and institutionalised, processes which would provide national minority ethnies with the necessary cultural and linguistic capital "to embark on their own process of linguistic modernisation; a modernisation initiated and shaped *from within* rather than from without", and which would have the potential to prevent language shift:

> Only if language change is separated from the current hegemonic imperatives of the nation-state can the prospect of more representational multinational and multilingual states be secured. The politics of language need not always remain subsumed by the language of politics.

As I will argue in Chapter 5, the pursuit of nation-state congruence in South Africa, involving the removal of Afrikaans from public sphere institutions, does not pose an immediate risk to Afrikaans in terms of language shift and loss. The average white Afrikaans speaker demonstrates a high degree of willingness to maintain their language, and symbolic violence and misrecognition is not common among this population. Rather, if Afrikaans is not allowed a space in the public sphere, the risk is to social cohesion and the political stability of the nation-state itself, as Afrikaans speakers grow agitated with a state acting against its interests and ignoring its pleas for wider recognition. Kelman (1971:180-181) similarly argues:

> [W]hen we focus on the effort to create a nation-state, not merely out of a population that is largely tied to local communities and not at all oriented towards a national centre, but out of a population that is divided into separate ethnic groups, each engendering strong sentimental attachments and often with a history of intense conflict among them. In such a situation, deliberate attempts to create a common national identity are likely to face particularly great obstacles and may well increase the disintegration rather than the unity of the society. […] This threat to ethnic identity is likely to arouse sentimental attachments to the group in their fullest emotional intensity and to create tremendous resistance to the policies designed to promote national identity.

Kelman (1971:181) maintains that if states want to formulate policies that do not enflame group identities and lead to ethnolinguistic conflict, they have to avoid direct manipulation of the national identity and protect group identities. He believes that central governments should grant minority groups the right to develop their own cultural institutions, maintain their own schools, and preserve their own language, which will increase their instrumental attachment to the central system because it services their sentimental attachment to their group identity.

2.5. May's MLR Recommendations

2.5.1. ELR in a pluralist nation-state

While education alone cannot stem societal change and stop or reverse language shift, May (2012:175) believes it is vital to the process of minority-language maintenance since it is the key institution in the apparatus of the modern nation-state. Although education is not a central theme in this thesis, it is an important component to understanding Afrikaans language activism (see Chapter 5, subsection 5.2.1), and thus the radicalisation of white Afrikaans speakers. I will therefore discuss education here briefly.

May (2012:175) cites Durkheim (1956), who argued that a society can only survive if its citizens are sufficiently homogeneous, and that homogeneity is achieved by inculcating children with "*the essential similarities* that collective life demands" through education. The nationalist goal of one "one state, one culture", which sees the state increasingly associated with the culture of the dominant ethnie, is made possible in large part through the education system. May (2012:176) adds that an "educationally sanctioned and unified linguistic culture was seen as a prerequisite for modernity, a basis of political legitimacy and a means of shared cultural identity". He notes the resistance to using education for MLR purposes:

> If education is used so effectively to these assimilationist ends, its significance as an alternative vehicle for minority language aspirations should not therefore be underestimated. Those who dismiss the significance of education in this latter regard usually do so on the basis that education cannot be reasonably expected to cater for the language and identity needs of all pupils (see J. Edwards, 1985: 130‑1).

May (2012:176) insists, however, that a common or 'core' curriculum *can* coexist with a wider recognition of minority habitus as cultural and linguistic capital in educational institutions. He highlights two main areas of concern which MLR advocates have focused on: the lower social and educational (and I would add, eventually economic) outcomes of minorities, and the requirement that minorities discard their ethnic, linguistic and/or cultural identities (suggesting uneven political relations between various groups in the nation-state) (2012:177). May notes that even if minorities stand to benefit socially and educationally from the latter (i.e. assimilation) – which he argues they usually do not – "the individual and collective costs of such cultural and linguistic evisceration are increasingly regarded by minority groups as too high a price to pay".

According to May (2012:189), official multilingualism based on the territoriality principle provides a clear alternative to the dominant monolingual nation-state model. The Switzerland example demonstrates that although regional linguistic rights may not protect smaller languages, it does address and redress the subsumption of languages in the public domain. He argues that the Belgium example illustrates that while political federalism and related territorial language rights are not panaceas for political stability, they do provide the basis for such stability. As I have argued elsewhere, due to the fact that all ethnolinguistic groups in South Africa are, in fact, numerical minority groups, and considering the geographical dispersion of these groups, territorial monolingualism (based on the South African provinces) fails to accommodate nearly half of the total South African population (Erasmus, 2019:166-169).

May (2012:190) argues that language rights based on the personality principle provide another alternative to the homogeneous nation-state model, with the goal of establishing formal language equality. He cites the India example as being illustrative of this approach to MLR, where local linguistic communities have control over their educational institutions, and regional languages are used as media of instruction, and MTE is a constitutional right at elementary school level.

May (2012:190) notes that the potential to follow the India model was initially evident in post-Apartheid South Africa. However, the wide-ranging multilingual educational approach has made way for a focus on English literacy, instead of broader multilingual aims. This is partly the result of misrecognition on the part of Bantu language speakers, suspicion of MTE advocacy, and a preference for English-medium education as a direct consequence of Apartheid-era language-in-education policies (see Chapter 4, subsection 4.3.3.3). As schools and universities are a valuable resource, there is increasing pressure on Afrikaans-medium educational institutions to anglicise in order to broaden 'access' to non-Afrikaans speakers, despite the language advocacy of Afrikaans speakers (see Chapter 5, subsection 5.2.1). May (2012:191) concludes:

> Thus, even in overtly multilingual environments, and within a political context at least ostensibly supportive of such multilingualism, the challenge of effectively implementing more plural language education policies still remains formidable.

Working from Churchill's (1986) typology of the six stages of policy responses to minority language and education,[26] May (2012:177-178; 195) suggests a group-differentiated approach

[26] In *Stage 1 (Learning Deficit)*, the educational disadvantages faced by minority groups are negatively associated with the use of the minority language, and a transition to assimilationist submersive education is encouraged. In

to educational rights. He argues that nation-states should ideally provide a Stage 5 (Private Use Language Maintenance) minority education policy approach for *all minority groups* – which allows for the maintenance and development of languages and cultures in the private domain, and which involves maintenance bilingual education programmes which utilises MTE throughout schooling. He believes, however, that *only national minorities* are reasonably entitled to a Stage 6 (Language Equality) policy approach – which entails separate language provision in public institutions, including educational institutions, and the widespread recognition and use of the language throughout private and public domains.

May (2012:191-192; 195) also adapts Churchill's (1986) typology for his own categorisation of four levels of minority-group responses to minority-language education policy.[27] He similarly argues that all minorities might reasonably mobilise to Level 3 (Consolidation and Adaptation Phase) – which is concerned with improving the quality of minority-language programmes, the social and economic integration of minorities within the nation-state; and with employing the minority culture, in addition to the minority language, in instruction. According to May, only national minorities can legitimately claim a right to Level 4 (Multilingual Coexistence Phase) – where minority-educational rights are both legally and practically enshrined, and minority groups have autonomy over minority-language education.

In discussing the fierce resistance to tolerance- and, particularly, promotion-oriented language rights, May (2012:196-197) points to antipathy toward minority-group rights in the post-World War II era, (perhaps because both World Wars were marked by ethnonationalist sentiment) and

Stage 2 (Socially Linked Learning Deficit), the minority group's educational disadvantage is associated with family status, and "adjustment" to the majority society is promoted. In *Stage 3 (Learning Deficit from Social/Cultural Differences)*, minority educational disadvantage is linked to a negative view of the minority culture in society, and multicultural education (normally without adequate recognition of the minority language) is pursued. In *Stage 4 (Learning Deficit from Mother Tongue Deprivation)*, the need for support of the minority language is accepted, and transitional bilingual education is advanced. In *Stage 5 (Private Use Language Maintenance)*, the right of national and ethnic minorities to maintain and develop their languages and cultures in the private domain is recognised to avoid language shift and loss, and maintenance bilingual education is supported. In *Stage 6 (Language Equality)*, the minority language is awarded official status, enabling separate language provision in public institutions in the minority language. It is vital to point out here that the concern with Afrikaans MLR is not educational (or economic) disadvantage, but rather identity maintenance (which necessitates political power within the nation-state), and that Afrikaans does enjoy national official status.

[27] In *Level 1 (the recognition phase)*, minority groups seek initial recognition of their distinct educational needs and often of their existence as a distinct group. In *Level 2 (the start-up and extension phase)*, minority language groups pursue the establishment or expansion of minority-language educational services. In *Level 3 (the consolidation and adaptation phase)*, minority groups aim to improve the quality of these programmes. In *Level 4 (the multilingual coexistence phase)*, MLR are legally and practically enshrined on the basis of Fishman's (1995) *ethnolinguistic democracy*, although inequality and ethnolinguistic conflict may still persist.

a reluctance to include language as a basic human right as explanation. He cites sociolinguist Joshua Fishman (1991) who summarises this position as follows:

> Unlike 'human rights' which strike Western and Westernised intellectuals as fostering wider participation in general societal benefits and interactions, 'language rights' still are widely interpreted as 'regressive' since they would, most probably, prolong the existence of ethnolinguistic differences. The value of such differences and the right to value such differences have not yet generally been recognised by the modern Western sense of justice …

Despite positive developments in international law, May (2012:204) notes that there exist no "watertight legal guarantees for the recognition and funding of minority language and education rights". He believes that claims for educational-language rights by national minorities are based on their historical rights as ethnies. He also suggests that nation-states are under increasing pressure to address these claims by minority groups, and that ignoring their claims are much more likely to escalate than quell demands.

May (2012:205) cautions, however, that since the recognition of minority-language rights challenges the hegemonic construction of the nation-state and with it, the (political) position of the dominant ethnie, it will often be faced with significant opposition. He maintains that minority-language education is particularly contentious because it necessitates changes to the power relations between the majority and minority groups and their languages. May reiterates that the conceptualisation of the nation-state has to be radically reimagined in order to deal with these developments.

May (2012:15) argues that since education often plays a vital role in facilitating and/or enforcing the shift to the majority language, it should also be able to effectively promote a minority language. May believes that all groups should be granted tolerance-oriented language rights at a minimum, but that national minority groups should also enjoy promotion-oriented language rights, for example through the representation of their language in the public sphere and/or state-funded minority-language education. Skutnabb-Kangas (2001:204) warns that if minority groups' language rights, including their educational-language rights, are not supported by the state, ethnic conflict and demands for secession are often the result. May (2012:19) similarly cautions that advancing minority-language rights is imperative in staving off nationalist and separatist movements:

> [T]he accommodation of minority language rights may become a political necessity, given the growing discontent with existing nation-state structures evident among minorities today. And this highlights a more general point. If the increasing demands

> of minority groups for greater cultural and linguistic representation are not met, they may lead, in turn, to secessionist pressures and the potential fragmentation of nation-states. Given the likely consequences of such fragmentation, and the hardening of ethnic and national boundaries that normally ensues, we should avoid this wherever we can.

2.5.2. The problem with English monolingualism

Globalisation has aided the unprecedented spread of English as global lingua franca and, as May (2012:16) notes, impacts the debate on MLR by raising questions as to the relationship between language choice and social and economic mobility, and the value of minority languages relative to English. May (2012) provides a comprehensive critique of the advocacy for English as global language, and language of instruction, and unpacks the underlying assumptions in many commentaries, paying specific attention to the English-only movement in the United States (US). Though not entirely within the scope of this thesis, similar to educational-language rights, the supremacy of English is key in understanding the Afrikaner minority group. For this reason, I provide a brief discussion.

May (2012:206) states that plurilingual education programmes – which promote societal bilingualism and challenge language hierarchies, and with it, the status of the state-sanctioned language – are often fiercely opposed by members of the majority linguistic group. Central to this opposition is the debate in academic and popular discourse, regarding not only the language of the nation-state, but of the world, and which deems English as key to achieving both globalisation and cosmopolitanism or global citizenship. This stated goal of the spread of English implies both greater social mobility for speakers of languages other than English, as well as the end of (minority) ethnic identification, deemed to be an obstacle to economic development and sociopolitical stability.

Similar to national and global identity, May (2012:208) argues that English has become associated with modernity and modernisation as a result of its global pre-eminence, and in developing countries in particular, with the (supposed) benefits that fluency holds for speakers.[28] He cites Kay (1993), Archibugi (2005) and De Swaan (2001) as proponents of this instrumentalist view of languages within political theory debates on cosmopolitanism (2012:210). Albeit not advocating for English monolingualism outright, these authors'

[28] I say 'supposed' here, considering rampant poverty and unemployment throughout much of Africa, including South Africa, despite increased English proficiency and literacy. While I certainly do not mean to argue that minority-language speakers should *not* be encouraged (and supported) to learn English, I am simply pointing out that language policy alone is clearly not able to solve entrenched and historical socio-economic inequalities.

proposals would amount to diglossia which they acknowledge could be detrimental to the retention of minority languages. Other proponents of English go one step further, identifying English monolingualism as the aspirational norm.[29] May (2012:211) lists the following arguments on which they rely:

- English is of higher instrumental value than all other languages and is the key to social mobility and progress.
- English proficiency provides individuals with social and economic mobility in a globalised world dominated by English.
- The retention of other languages, while possibly important for cultural reasons, limits the individual's mobility, and could even lead to ghettoisation.
- The sensible choice for minority-language speakers is, therefore, to opt for mobility and modernity via English.
- The choice between opting for English and/or minority languages is viewed as oppositional, or even mutually exclusive.

May (2012:212) insists that the view of English as a "neutral, beneficial, and freely chosen language" is synchronic and ahistorical. He enlists Pennycook (1994), who notes that this view does not address the broader economic, political and ideological forces that restrict language choice on the individual and collective levels. He continues that viewing English as neutral relies on a structuralist and positivist view of language that wilfully ignores the factors that gave rise to English dominance, a position also critiqued by Bourdieu (1991). Viewing English as beneficial, May believes, naively assumes that people and nation-states deal with each other on an equal footing. He suggests that advocates of the benefits of English therefore fail to address the relationship between English and wider unequal distributions and flows of wealth, resources, culture and knowledge in an increasingly globalised world (2012:213):

> One obvious example of this can be found in the strong evidence that suggests that the adoption of English as an official language by nation-states has little influence on subsequent economic development. The poorest countries in Africa are for the most part those that have chosen English (or French) as an official language. Meanwhile, the majority of the Asian 'tiger economies' have opted instead for a local language, albeit usually in conjunction with English. In short, there is no necessary correlation between the adoption of English and greater economic wellbeing (Pennycook, 1994; Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas, 1994; Macedo et al., 2003).

[29] This view is especially prominent in the US among the English-only movement supporters.

While globalisation certainly aided in the proliferation of English as world language, May (2012:213-214) reminds us of the centuries of British Empire expansionism, during which English was established as a language of global trade, as well as of the unparalleled dominance of the United States not only politically and socio-economically, but in the media as well. He also argues that the fall of the former Soviet Union has also led to the exponential growth of English throughout Central and Eastern Europe. The introduction and spread of English in South Africa through British imperialism, and the history of intergroup conflict resulting from this era of colonisation (see Chapter 4, subsection 4.2), also renders the view of English as neutral rather questionable.

> In short, the English language, and the ideology of modernisation it conveys, is far from neutral. Indeed, it is simply disingenuous to present English as some kind of tabula rasa, available at no cost and for the benefit of all.

May (2012:218) argues that a key trope of cosmopolitans (such as Archibugi and De Swaan) is viewing English only in relation to its communicative (instrumentalist) functions. He states that in an instrumental language ideology, language policies attempt to realise non-identity goals such as communication, efficiency, equality of opportunity, mobility and social cohesion; and assume that language is largely independent of identity. These goals aim to achieve linguistic homogenisation and reflect the ideology of the monolingual nation-state model. From this instrumental perspective, linguistic diversity is an obstacle to communication:

> [M]inority languages are constructed as possibly having some identity but no instrumental value, while English is construed as primarily instrumental with little or no identity value. However, this is simply wrong (and wrongheaded), since it is clear that *all* language(s) embody and accomplish both identity and instrumental functions for those who speak them.

According to May (2012:219), the degree to which a particular language can accomplish these instrumental and sentimental functions is dependent on the social and political constraints in which it operates. The instrumental use of minority languages, he argues, is often constrained by social and political processes that lead to the privileging of other languages in the public sphere. In other words, a minority language loses its instrumental value when the *state* decides not to use it in public institutions. At the same time, the identity characteristics of the majority language often becomes incorporated in and normalised by the instrumental functions it fulfils, which May argues is especially visible among monolingual speakers of English.

> After all, if English is the instrumental norm or benchmark against which all other languages are judged, it is hardly surprising that its monolingual speakers seldom, if

> ever, think of their language in identity terms. Much like discussions of ethnicity and whiteness (cf. Chapter 1), English simply constitutes the unmarked (linguistic) category.

May (2012:220) argues that while minority languages are often disparaged as "essentially anti-instrumental, as merely 'carriers' of 'identity'", these languages ironically face much opposition when they *do* fulfil instrumental functions in the public sphere (as is the case with Afrikaans; see Chapter 5, subsection 5.2.1).[30] He states that the promotion of minority-language rights usually means the possibility of public bilingualism or multilingualism, not monolingualism in a new language (2012:221). Therefore, as he points out, majority-language speakers are not penalised for the use of their language, but are merely asked to "*accommodate* the ongoing presence of a minority language and to recognise its status as an additional language of the state". Although, as has been suggested throughout Chapters 1 and 2, this accommodation of minority groups and their languages requires a degree of power-sharing of the state apparatus, a political shift the need of which it is often difficult to convince a dominant majority.

May (2012:221) considers these identity/instrumental distinctions often made between majority and minority languages to be based on "a singular, exclusive and oppositional notion of linguistic identity". He argues for a more nuanced conceptualisation of the complex relationship between language and identity that recognises the ability to hold multiple, complementary cultural and linguistic identities at individual and collective levels. Maintaining a minority language thus "avoids 'freezing' the development of particular languages in the roles they have historically, or perhaps still currently, occupy". May (2012:222) elaborates on this notion of multiple linguistic identities as follows:

> Linguistic identities – and social and cultural identities more broadly – need not be constructed as irredeemably oppositional. Narrower identities do not necessarily need to be traded in for broader ones. One can clearly remain, for example, both Spanish-speaking and American, Catalan-speaking and Spanish, or Welsh-speaking and British. The same process applies to national and international language identities, where these differ. To insist otherwise reveals both a reductionist and an essentialist approach to language and identity.

[30] To this point, May (2012:220) highlights Barry's (2001) hypocritical objection to knowledge of Welsh as (increasingly) a condition of employment by local authorities, deeming it an unfair advantage of bilingual Welsh/English speakers over monolingual English speakers. The unfairness of the Welsh (and indeed all minority-language speakers) having to learn English for inclusion to the economy goes unscrutinised by Barry, a monolingual Englishman.

In addition to instrumentalist arguments, May (2012:242) also notes the English-only movement in the US, which argues that "multilingualism and minority-language rights are inherently destabilising to the nation-state", adding that this view is common among liberal and conservative commentators and the wider public.[31] He claims that "[o]ther assertions are even more apocalyptic", and warn of impending separatism and civil strife as seen in other prominent conflicts around the world. However, May reiterates that, historically, the main cause of language conflict is usually the *denial* of MLR, rather than their recognition (see Chapter 4, sections 4.2 and 4.3, as well as Chapter 5, section 5.2, for three Afrikaans examples). May (2012:243) insists, based on the examples of Canada, Belgium and Sri Lanka, that attempting to enforce linguistic homogeneity is "far more likely to foster disunity than to ameliorate it". He cites Marshall and Gonzalez (1990), who conclude that "it is not multilingualism itself that is disruptive, but denying a group that speaks a different language from participating in greater social mobility".

2.5.3. Re-imagining the nation-state: regionalism vs separatism

Despite increasing globalisation, May (2012:246) asserts that "the impending demise of nation-states is overstated". As will become evident throughout Chapter 5, there is at the same time also a trend towards various kinds of *localisation* (both in terms of political governance and identity, contrary to predictions by cosmopolitan commentators). In other words, in the face of a globalisation that blurs national boundaries, local interests once again become important, often even superseding national ones. May suggests that *regionalism* might constitute one way of reimagining the nation-state, without encouraging separatism. He identifies the Catalan example as a successful implementation of regionalism (although see below) (2012:262). May states that separatist groups enjoy little support in Catalonia, and the Catalans self-identify as equally Catalan and Spanish, "seeing no necessary contradiction between the two forms of identity", and remaining "largely sceptical of independence as a feasible or necessary political option for Catalonia". This, he suggests, was achieved through linguistic normalisation in Catalonia, which included the institutionalisation of Catalan in all key public domains.

According to May (2012:267), opponents of language laws in Catalonia have persistently argued that MLR protections "specifically 'disenfranchise' Spanish-speaking in-migrants to

[31] For reasons that will become clear throughout Chapters 4 and 5, Afrikaner minority rights and Afrikaans language rights more broadly are particularly contentious issues, and proponents of either are (perhaps justifiably) necessitated to continuously declare their loyalty to South Africa and fellow South Africans, in a way that is not expected of other groups.

the region by delimiting access to Spanish as the wider language of the state". He highlights that this contention is linked to both class and linguistic discrimination, considering the fact that the majority of migrants are working-class, while the majority of Catalan speakers are "middle-class and economically prosperous". In spite of these socio-economic disparities, May insists that this argument is "almost entirely invalid", seeing as "Spanish is specifically enshrined as the *only* official language of the *whole* Spanish state, while Catalan only has co-official rights within the autonomous region of Catalonia". This means that Spanish speakers in Catalonia continue to enjoy the right to use their own language (as opposed to, for example, English speakers in Québec), whereas Catalan speakers only enjoy this right in Catalonia.

Since the publication of May's (2012) seminal work, however, Catalonian regionalism has appeared to be less successful than he estimated. The 2017 Catalonia independence referendum, which caused great political turmoil in Spain *despite* the implementation of regionalism, was (at least partly) prompted by the perception that the richer region was paying more to Madrid than it was receiving back in services, as well as other accusations of injustice and corruption on the part of the state (BBC, 2023; Elias & Franco-Guillén, 2022). This perceived and/or real dereliction of duty by the central government is vital to understanding contemporary Afrikaner mobilisation as well (see Chapter 5, subsection 5.1.1.4).

The fact that separatist sentiment is on the rise in Catalonia, in spite of strong MLR protections, demonstrates that language laws are not the only variable impacting the political stability and social cohesion between various ethnolinguistic groups in the same nation-state. Based on the Catalonian example, we might deduce that when there is a perception of disadvantage or injustice of some kind within the nation-state (especially as a result of differential political power between the minority group and the state), and even if a high degree of cultural autonomy has been achieved, minority groups will continue to pursue a larger degree of political autonomy through decentralisation and separatism, *if* their geographical distribution allows for the latter (an important caveat in the Afrikaner case study).

The relationship between political and cultural regionalism can also be seen in Wales. May (2012:269-271) notes that as opposed to Scotland, which has enjoyed a high degree of political autonomy from England, Wales has historically had a much higher degree of incorporation into the British state. The Welsh elite was assimilated into the English class and political system, and adopted its language, while Welsh came to be seen as a backwater and of little value. The Welsh nationalist movement of the 19th century eventually led to greater institutional

autonomy in Wales throughout the mid-20th century, including a renewed focus on the Welsh language and education policies, although falling short of "regional government in the wider European sense" (May, 2012:272). Over the past couple of decades, Wales has continued to obtain more political autonomy, including the establishment of the Welsh Assembly Government with authority over devolved responsibilities similar to the Scottish Parliament. So too, Welsh language revitalisation has been very successful (more so than similar efforts in Scotland and Ireland). Of the link between growing political and cultural regionalism in Wales, May (2012:274) states:

> Thus, the long history of Wales's incorporation within Britain may finally be coming to an end – or, at least, has been put into reverse – as Wales (re)gains a significant degree of institutional autonomy within the British state for the first time since the sixteenth century. But this four-century history of incorporation has not always been disadvantageous to Wales. Indeed, it can be argued that its *political* incorporation has actually facilitated the *cultural* distinctiveness of the Welsh – principally, through the maintenance of their language and cultural traditions. Richard Jenkins (1991) argues, for example, that Welsh incorporation within the British state may have actually *created* the social and economic space within which the Welsh language and culture could survive. The Welsh language may have been formally proscribed from the civic realm from the time of the (1536) Act of Union, and may have been regarded, along with its culture, as antediluvian. However, it was not viewed as a threat to the state. In contrast, the far more problematic and contested political incorporation of Scotland and Ireland – and the close association of Gaelic language and culture in these areas with Catholicism – contributed, most likely, to the more rapid and widespread decline of the latter within the (Protestant) British state.

While May proposes that a lack of political autonomy was beneficial to a continued Welsh identity,[32] in my view the link between political and cultural nationalism in Wales is obvious. It is noteworthy that Wales today has a more distinct (minority ethnic) identity than does Scotland, despite the latter's historically greater political separation from England.[33] This peculiar example might suggest that in cases where minority groups enjoy sufficient political autonomy from the majority, there is less motivation for cultural differentiation. Put differently, when a minority group does not have an adequate degree of political autonomy, as was the case in Wales, there exists a desire not only for greater political separation, but also cultural separation.

[32] May (2012:276) convincingly supports this hypothesis, pointing to the 1563 Welsh translation of the Bible, at the behest of Elizabeth I, and aimed at integrating and assimilating the Welsh into Britain, which had the consequence of standardising Welsh and enabling its use in higher domains.

[33] There is also much greater territorial separation between Scotland and England, the distance between their capitals being significantly more than between Cardiff and London.

Central to this dynamic is the notion of core cultural values (see subsection 2.4.3), and the use of a characteristic feature of ethnic identity in order to achieve a distinct minority identity and mobilise members on this basis (see positive distinctiveness in Chapter 3, subsection 3.2.2). This is not to say that the instrumental use of ethnicity solely should be credited for Welsh revitalisation. External attempts to erase the Welsh identity and negative perceptions towards this identification (see identity threats in Chapter 3, section 3.4), which provides members with a sense of meaning and belonging, certainly contributed to the determination to achieve positive social identity and thus ameliorate the status of Welsh.

Crucially, the Welsh example also demonstrates that even if 'modernity' and full incorporation into the nation-state has been achieved, possibly involving minority-language loss, ethnic identity might *still* not be eliminated by national identity. The lack of broad-based support of Welsh independence relative to such support for Scottish independence, further suggests that increased political and cultural autonomy, including a revival of minority ethnic identity, does not necessarily lead to separatist sentiment and threaten the sociopolitical stability of the nation-state, nor does it preclude continued national identification by minority-group members.[34]

Finally, in contexts of growing (minority) autonomy, instead of linguistic and cultural stasis, we might also anticipate the active reformulation of ethnic identity. May (2012:284) highlights that recent developments in Wales have enabled the "reconstruction of a Welsh national identity that once again includes the Welsh language as an important (but not necessarily pre-eminent) component". The re-imagining of the nation-state thus goes hand in hand with a re-imagining of ethnic and national identities. These processes of social identity and group formation, and the intergroup dynamics that underpin them, form the basis of the theoretical discussion in the following chapter. Concerning the need for and process of revitalising ethnic identity, May cites Miller (1995) who comments as follows:

> [A] national identity helps to locate us in the world; it must tell us who we are, where we have come from, what we have done […] [This] must then involve an essentially historical understanding in which the present generation are seen as heirs to a tradition which they then pass on to their successors. Of course the story is continually being rewritten; each generation revises the past as it comes to terms with the problems of the present: present identities are built out of materials that are handed down, not started from scratch.

[34] The number of residents in Wales identifying as *both* Welsh and British is actually increasing, albeit from a low starting base (ONS, 2022).

Parekh (1995; cited in May, 2012:284) similarly observes:

> A community's identity is subject to constant change … Every community must wrestle with it as best it can, and find ways of reconstituting its identity in a manner that is both deeply sensitive to its history and traditions and fully alive to its present and future needs.

In conclusion to this chapter, May (2012) offers a convincing account of ethnicity, nationalism, and the position of minority groups within states pursuing nation-state congruence, and also makes a persuasive case for extending pluralism in order to accommodate minority groups within a nation-state, especially through ELR. However, I find his suggestion regarding regionalism to be somewhat less compelling. Though it is certainly a feasible option in many countries plagued by ethnolinguistic conflict, May's Western focus means he does not adequately account for those minority groups without sufficient territorial concentration, such as in much of Africa and India.[35] For such groups, due to demographics and practical considerations, regionalism is simply not an option, meaning political power-sharing with the dominant majority, as well as cultural autonomy, have to be obtained in some other way not explicitly conceptualised by May. Although such an endeavour is beyond the scope of this thesis, in Chapter 5 I will unpack some of the novel ways in which white Afrikaans speakers are attempting to achieve power-sharing and cultural autonomy *within* the nation-state, as well as its effect on social identity within this community.

[35] May (2012:294) does argue in favour of 'internal' self-determination rights for indigenous groups, which would afford them greater autonomy within the nation-state by emphasising negotiated power-sharing, although these groups too are usually territorially concentrated, making the conferral of such rights more (obviously) practicable. In the South African context, regionalism is further hamstrung by its association with Apartheid (see Chapter 4, subsection 4.3.3.4).

CHAPTER 3
The Social Identity Approach

Introduction

Drawing on the relevant sub-fields of linguistics, Chapter 1 reviewed the main theoretical approaches to minority-language rights, paying particular attention to the policies and problems surrounding multilingualism as well as the occurrence of language conflict. In Chapter 2, I added to this theoretical overview by reviewing May's (2012) interdisciplinary work on language, identity and conflict, which synthesised key ideas from linguistics, sociology and political theory. In Chapter 3, I will continue to broaden this framework, by discussing relevant insights from social psychology, particularly Social Identity Theory (SIT), in order to develop a comprehensive perspective on matters related to minority-language groups.

Social Identity Theory and its sister theory, Self-Categorisation Theory (SCT), have jointly become known as the Social Identity Approach (SIA) – a framework which aims to understand the relationship(s) between and within social groups and the related functions of group membership and categorisation. Although the SIA is commonly applied in linguistics to conduct research on ethnolinguistic minority groups, the theoretical links between the field of minority-language rights (MLR) and the SIA have not been made fully explicit, especially as they relate to identity threats, minority mobilisation and solutions to intergroup conflict. Thus, many of the concepts from sociology and political theory discussed in the previous chapter have not been integrated with the SIA.

Chapter 3 is divided into five sections. The first section will provide a brief overview of the origins and basic tenets of SIT. The second section will investigate various forms of intergroup behaviour and phenomena and discuss the processes and motivations underlying them. In the third section, I will recount some of the criticisms of SIT and briefly discuss a couple of descendant theories, including SCT. The fourth section will offer an exploration of identity threats and responses, and the final section will discuss minority group mobilisation, and review potential solutions to negative intergroup behaviour and conflict.

3.1. The Origins of Social Identity Theory (SIT)

3.1.1. Henri Tajfel – Jewish, Polish, French, British social psychologist

Social Identity Theory (SIT) was originally formulated at Bristol University in the UK in the 1970s by social psychologist Henri Tajfel, a Polish Jew who lost his entire family to the Holocaust. A student at the Sorbonne in Paris at the outbreak of World War II in 1939, he enlisted in the French army and was later captured by German troops. As a prisoner-of-war, instead of being categorised as Jewish and sent to a concentration camp and certain death, he survived the war because he was incorrectly categorised as French. Hogg (2016:3) emphasises that social categorisation and its consequences thus had "an existential personal significance" to Tajfel. Instead of ascribing Nazism (and prejudice, discrimination and intergroup aggression in general) to a collective response to frustrated nationalism, or to collective pathology and dysfunctional personality, social identity theorists identified the centrality of group membership and categorisation in these negative phenomena (Hogg, 2016:2-4).

3.1.2. Realistic conflict theory (RCT)

Tajfel *et al*. (1971:151) argued that competition is not a necessary condition for the creation of discriminatory behaviour between ingroups and outgroups. They held that Coser's (1956) two-fold classification of intergroup relations into *rational* conflicts (based on "objective" factors of competition) and *irrational* conflicts (those that serve a "psychological" function), failed to take into account another aspect of intergroup relations, namely the *omnipresence* of intergroup categorisations in the social environment (1971:153).

> An important cognitive consequence of this pervasiveness is that the articulation of an individual's social world in terms of its categorisation into groups becomes a guide for his conduct in situations to which some criteria of intergroup division can be meaningfully applied. ('Meaningful' need not be 'rational'.) An undifferentiated social environment makes very little sense and provides no guidelines for action. Whenever alternative guidelines for action are lacking, unclear or confusing, and some form of intergroup categorisation can be used, it will give order and coherence to the social situation while at the same time enabling the individual to act in a way which has been sanctioned as 'appropriate' in many other situations. This is an aspect of intergroup conduct which is not reducible to either of the two large classes of intergroup conflict just mentioned; but it is present in all intergroup situations.

According to Tajfel and Turner (1986:276), research on the social psychology of intergroup relations tended to focus on "patterns of individual prejudices and discrimination and on the motivational sequences of interpersonal interaction". They argue that the common thread through much of this earlier work is the emphasis on "the intraindividual or interpersonal

psychological processes leading to prejudiced attitudes or discriminatory behaviour". They suggest rather paying closer attention to the "complex interweaving of individual or interpersonal behaviour with the contextual social processes of intergroup conflict and their psychological effects". In other words, while it may be possible to act on an individual basis in interpersonal situations, paying no attention to pre-existing social categories (and possibly, histories of intergroup conflict), it is more likely that these (group-related) factors will influence the behaviour of all individuals in any given interpersonal situation, even in the absence of current resource competition. They provide Muzafer Sherif's (1967) *Realistic Conflict Theory* (RCT),[36] coined by Campbell (1965), as an example of work which offered an alternative to the earlier approaches.

> Its point of departure for the explanation of intergroup behaviour is in what Sherif (1967) has called functional relations between social groups. Its central hypothesis – "real conflict of group interests causes intergroup conflict" – is deceptively simple, intuitively convincing, and has received strong empirical support (including Avigdor, 1953; Bass & Dunteman, 1963; Blake & Mouton, 1961, 1962; Diab, 1970; Harvey, 1956; Johnson, 1967; Sherif et al., 1961; Sherif & Sherif, 1953).

Tajfel and Turner (1986:276-277) explain RCT further as follows:

> RCT was pioneered in social psychology by the Sherifs, who provided both an aetiology of intergroup hostility and a theory of competition as realistic and instrumental in character, motivated by rewards which, in principle, are extrinsic to the intergroup situation (see Deutsch, 1949; Julian, 1968). Opposed group interests in obtaining scarce resources promote competition, and positively interdependent (superordinate) goals facilitate cooperation. Conflicting interests develop, through competition, into overt social conflict. It appears, too, that intergroup competition enhances intragroup morale, cohesiveness, and cooperation (Fiedler, 1967; Kalin & Marlowe, 1968; Vinacke, 1964). Thus, real conflicts of group interest not only create antagonistic intergroup relations but also heighten identification with, and positive attachment to, the ingroup.

Tajfel and Turner (1986:277) argue, however, that RCT paid little attention to this *identification with the ingroup* as a theoretical problem in its own right. They contend that RCT views the development of ingroup identifications as "an epiphenomenon of intergroup conflict" (much like Weber, 1922 does; see Chapter 2, section 2.1). Based on May's (2012) careful treatment of the development of ethnic and national identities, we can clearly appreciate that

[36] According to Hogg (2016:5), RCT was the dominant social psychological theory of intergroup conflict in the 1950s and 1960s.

group identification is a separate phenomenon to, and not merely a by-product of, intergroup conflict. In other words, individuals do not self-identify with a specific group, merely as a strategic tool to compete with other groups. Instead, they derive real meaning and a sense of belonging from group identifications, based on both historical facts and subjective beliefs regarding shared ancestry, culture and language (in the case of ethnic and national identities). That being said, and as I noted in the previous chapter, the salience of group identification increases in situations of intergroup competition, which in turn may lead to increased collective political action (i.e., radicalisation).

As discussed in Chapter 2, subsection 2.1.3, a situational view of (ethnic and/or national) identity, views identity as constructed and a social and political resource (see May, 2012:37). While May acknowledges the constructed nature of identity, he does argue convincingly that it is only one component of identity. May (2012:43) points out that, contrary to such an instrumentalist view of identity, not all mobilisation based on identity is self-interested, and it may, in fact, elicit persecution. He argues that identity should be viewed as not only a tool for attaining resources (i.e., intergroup competition), but also for offering a vital sense of meaning and belonging to members (2012:44). It is this second sense which Tajfel and Turner (1986) argue is missing from RCT and earlier approaches to intergroup conflict, and thus turn their focus to.

According to Tajfel and Turner (1986:277), RCT associates group identification with specific patterns of intergroup relations, but does not focus on the development and maintenance of group identity,[37] or on the "possibly autonomous effects upon the ingroup and intergroup behaviour of these 'subjective' aspects of group membership". They contend that this oversight leads to inconsistencies between the theory in its classical sense and the empirical data. Arguing that understanding the psychological aspects of social change requires an analysis of the social psychology of social conflict, Tajfel and Turner (1986:277) propose Social Identity Theory (SIT) as a theoretical supplementation, rather than replacement, of RCT, in order to offer a more comprehensive theory of the social psychology of intergroup conflict.

3.1.3. A sociopsychological approach to intergroup behaviour

Ehrlich (1973: vii; cited in Tajfel, 1982:2) argued that in order to explain ethnic group relations, one requires a sociological theory of intergroup behaviour which utilises mainly historical

[37] In Chapter 2, subsection 2.1.4, May (2012) dealt with this very issue through the employment of Bourdieu's (1990) notions of habitus and field.

materials as evidence, as well as a social psychological theory that is concerned with cognitive factors and their link to the interpersonal behaviour of individuals. Working from Sherif's (1966:62) view that any study of intergroup matters must take into account both "the properties of the groups themselves and the consequences of membership for individuals", Tajfel (1982:3), advocated an approach to intergroup behaviour which comprises both sociological and social psychological theoretical lenses.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Tajfel, together with colleagues and students, carried out a series of experiments which sought to explain the role of social categorisation processes in intergroup behaviour. Tajfel *et al*. (1971:150-151) argued that whereas previous studies recognised that intergroup behaviour (such as conflict and competition) is dependent on the existence of categories of people (ingroups and outgroups), none had asked whether "the very act of social categorisation [… can] lead […] to intergroup behaviour which discriminates against the outgroup and favours the ingroup".

> The process of categorisation into groups is taken for granted from the outset as the defining criterion of everything that follows. It is, however, possible that certain societies create, or contribute to, what might be called a 'generic' outgroup attitude (Tajfel, 1970); in other words, that norms, values and expectations present in their modes of socialisation and education foster or reinforce a tendency to behave differentially towards outgroups and ingroups even when such behaviour has no 'utilitarian' value to the individual or to his group, and even when a particular categorisation has very little meaning in terms of the emotional investment that it represents and in terms of differences between groups on which it is based.

Thus, in addition to the instrumental and sentimental motivations already identified, SIT proposes a third factor in intergroup conflict – the abovementioned "generic", or perhaps inherent, outgroup attitude. According to Billig and Tajfel (1973:27-28), the mere act of categorising one's social world into distinct social groups can be a "sufficient condition" for the creation of ingroup favouritism and discrimination against the outgroup. In fact, they found that social categorisation was a bigger determinant of ingroup favouritism than similarity between individuals (1973:47-48).[38] Billig and Tajfel (1973:48) believed that a purely sociological analysis of these findings would highlight the competitive nature of western societies, widespread ethnocentrism, and normative values for favouring "one's own kind".

[38] In their experiments, Billig and Tajfel (1973) defined social categorisation as the *explicit* division of test subjects into *groups*. They found that "the mere mention of 'groups' by the experimenters was sufficient to produce strong intergroup discrimination", more so than when subjects were *implicitly* grouped along similarity (1973:48). This would suggest that people display more ingroup favouritism toward explicit group members, than toward similar individuals.

Such an analysis, they maintained, overlooks the sociopsychological processes taking place on an individual level (1973:49).

Billig and Tajfel (1973:49) argued that describing the individual sociopsychological processes should commence from "the *problems* that intergroup situations pose for an individual and the analysis of the *functions* that are served by the solutions that he finds to these problems". They believed that the fundamental problem individuals face in any intergroup setting is "that of defining one's social identity, of placing oneself in relation to others". That is to say that intergroup behaviour should not be thought of as simply the result of the existence of groups, but of the complex individual cognitive processes present during the act of social categorisation.

> Social categorisation provides the framework which enables this search [for social identity] to proceed. The only direction which it can take is through comparisons of one's own group with other groups – no social group or social category can be conceptualised outside of their relation to other groups or categories.

Billig and Tajfel (1973:49) thus contended that a group can contribute to the positive self-image of an individual, if he or she can positively differentiate it from other groups. If positive differentiation cannot be achieved, a group may cause internal conflict for the individual. Therefore, *social identification* and *intergroup social comparison*, lead to the establishment of psychological *distinctiveness* from other groups (see subsection 3.2.2 for full discussion). Experiments by Billig and Tajfel (1973:49-50) suggested that the search for identity strongly correlates with efforts to establish group distinctiveness.

> Social categorisation into groups based explicitly on a criterion of randomness led to behaviour which differentiated more clearly the ingroup from the outgroup than was the case for a categorisation based on non-random interindividual similarity. Our subjects were provided with one channel through which they could establish this distinctiveness – the distribution of money – and they used this channel. There were no 'utilitarian' grounds why they should do so since their own individual interest was not engaged; and no 'rational' grounds since other, 'better', strategies for their choices were available to them. In this manner, some forms of intergroup behaviour and experience can be seen as following from the individual's need to define and place himself in his social world. From these premises it should be possible to construct a social and cognitive theory of intergroup behaviour which will have, as its point of departure, the development of ingroup affiliations rather than using for its basis the phenomena of outgroup hostility or some crude 'additivity' of individual frustrations followed, unaccountably, by large-scale social aggression.

A defining feature of SIT, according to Brown (2020:6), is that it attempted to integrate "*subjective* aspects of group membership (identification) with *objective* features of the social

environment (the nature of intergroup status relationships in society)". He states that SIT emphasises "the preconditions for subordinate groups to seek a change in the current intergroup hierarchical arrangements, and the manner in which they might do so" (2020:6). Martiny and Rubin (2016:19) believe that SIT is less concerned with how individuals operate within social groups (or groups within society, I would add), and more with how social groups operate within the minds of individuals. Therefore, while SIT does include many aspects of sociology, it is largely a theory within social psychology, and thus offers many insights into intergroup conflict not observed by May (2012).

3.1.4. SIT: theory or framework?

In the first decade of the development of Social Identity Theory, there was a "sustained effort to test hypotheses which were either explicitly stated in SIT or which could be derived from its core propositions", many of which were unambiguously supported (Brown, 2020:6-7). Researchers since the early development of SIT have however not focused on deriving and testing specific hypotheses, but instead have used the theory generally in a wide array of fields and applications. Over several decades, SIT broadened beyond its original scope and came to be known as the *Social Identity Approach* (Brown, 2020:5).[39]

Huddy (2001:132) explains that there are two distinct branches of the social identity approach: SIT as developed by Tajfel (as well as his student Turner and other colleagues), and Self-Categorisation Theory (SCT) developed by Turner and colleagues. She states that both theories acknowledge the origins of social identity in cognitive and motivational factors, however, whereas SIT emphasises the psychological motivations that lead to a group member identifying with or exiting a group, SCT focuses more on the cognitive underpinnings of social identity and attempts to explain how individuals come to identify and act as a group on the basis of these cognitive factors. These distinctions are, however, not of particular import to this thesis, as we are interested in all these facets of social identity and group membership.

Brown (2020:8) argues that SIT lacks "the kind of specificity to make it a properly testable theory" and that "it is so elastic that it may not deserve the label 'theory' at all". (A more

[39] Reicher, Spears and Haslam (2010; cited in Brown, 2020:5) were the first to use the phrase "social identity approach" to denote a combination of SIT and SCT (see below). This terminology is now commonplace, but Brown (2020:5) argues that SCT is a theory in its own right and should not be conflated with SIT. He instead uses the phrase to point to the development of SIT from a testable theory to more of a broad theoretical framework or perspective. I will not, as a rule, use the phrase in this chapter, and will thus endeavour to clearly differentiate between the various theories and hypotheses that speak to intergroup behaviour and group identity.

complete critique of SIT by Brown is offered in subsection 3.3.1.) He states that SCT is a much more precisely formulated theory: "SIT's generality is, indeed, one of its major strengths but, at the same time, also its Achilles' heel". Sedikides (cited in Brown, 2020:9) similarly argues that SIT is no longer "a coherent set of propositions from which it is possible to derive testable hypotheses" and that he is unsure whether SIT "is falsifiable, … it has evolved into a framework".

Maass (2018, cited in Brown, 2020:8-9), suggests that "breadth and predictive power are inversely related", but that SIT, despite its lack of predictive power, still affected a paradigm shift by pointing out the centrality of social identity in human behaviour. In other words, it might not have predictive power, but it does have explanatory power. Brown (2020:7) believes that the popularity of SIT is due to it offering a general theory of intergroup conflict, its account of social identity processes in intergroup contexts, and its attempts to provide a new theory of prejudice and discrimination.

Tajfel (1982:1) acknowledges that due to the enormous scope and complexity of intergroup behaviour, studies in social psychology and other fields are mostly guided by "approaches or perspectives" instead of rigid theories. He states elsewhere that intergroup relations is "an area of research which contains an enormous range and scope of problems and has always defied attempts at neat and tidy integration" (1982:30). The perspective of this chapter (and indeed, this thesis) is that SIT is a valuable framework which may offer many insights into the dynamics of minority-language groups – even if it cannot offer predictions.

3.2. Intergroup Behaviour

3.2.1. Social categorisation

3.2.1.1. Group membership

Before I discuss the core tenets and findings of Social Identity Theory (SIT) in this section, a couple of definitions are required. Tajfel (1982:1-2) adopts the following definition of *intergroup behaviour* by Sherif (1966:12) throughout his research: "Whenever individuals belonging to one group interact, collectively or individually, with another group or its members *in terms of their group identification*, we have an instance of intergroup behaviour". Elsewhere, Tajfel and Turner (1986:283) define intergroup behaviour as follows:

> [A]ny behaviour displayed by one or more actors toward one or more others that is based on the actors' identification of themselves and the others as belonging to different social categories.

According to Tajfel (1982:2), a *group* may be defined as such on the basis of either external criteria – that is, "outside designations" such as trade union member or bank clerk – or internal criteria, which is "group identification". In Chapter 2, I noted Smith's (1991; cited in May, 2012) similar differentiation between ethnic *categories* and ethnic *communities*. Hogg (2016:8) states that human groups are categories that people mentally represent as *prototypes*, or "fuzzy sets of interrelated attributes (attitudes, behaviours, customs, dress, and so forth) that capture overall similarities within groups and overall differences between groups". Elsewhere, Tajfel and Turner (1986:283) define group as follows:

> [A] collection of individuals who perceive themselves to be members of the same social category, share some emotional involvement in this common definition of themselves, and achieve some degree of social consensus about the evaluation of their group and of their membership in it.

In order to achieve group identification, Tajfel (1982:2) explains, two components are required, namely a cognitive one (awareness of membership) and an evaluative one (that this awareness is related to some value connotations). A third component that is often associated with the first two is the emotional investment in such awareness and evaluations.

Tajfel (1982:2) states that while these *internal* criteria are a necessary condition for the existence of a group, it is not a sufficient condition for the emergence of intergroup behaviour, as the latter requires "outside consensus" that the group exists. Perhaps then it is ethnic categories, and not ethnic communities per se, which may lead to negative intergroup behaviour. However, Tajfel continues, the external designation of a group does not mean that members have an awareness of their group membership, or the value connotations associated with it. Therefore, group identification requires the two (or three) internal components mentioned above, while the designation of group (and thus intergroup behaviour) requires a combination of both external and internal criteria. The external designation of groups involve *social categorisations*, which Tajfel and Turner (1986:283) define as follows:

> [C]ognitive tools that segment, classify, and order the social environment, and thus enable the individual to undertake many forms of social action. But they do not merely systematise the social world; they also provide a system of orientation for *self-reference*: they create and define the individual's place in society. Social groups, understood in this sense, provide their members with an identification of themselves in social terms. These identifications are to a very large extent relational and comparative: they define the individual as similar to or different from, as "better" or "worse" than, members of other groups.

3.2.1.2. Stereotypes

According to Tajfel (1982:3), some research within SIT on intergroup behaviour has attempted to describe the role of *cognitive processes* in determining an individual's 'ideas' about ingroups and outgroups – work that overlaps with cognitive theory's (another branch within psychology) understanding of *stereotypes*. Research in SIT on the formation and functioning of social stereotypes focused on individuals or events "singled out for attention", that is, on the origin or reinforcement of stereotypes based on salient information.[40] Tajfel (1982:6) explains that "stereotypes accumulate as a result of focusing attention on unusual people or events". He notes that the salience of certain items of information have marked generalising effects; in other words, inferences are made about groups based on characteristics of specific members of a group (1982:4).

This phenomenon relates to the idea of *category prototypes* developed by Rosch (1977; 1978; cited in Tajfel, 1982), and identified by Hogg (2016:8) in the previous subsection. It is also possible to link stereotypes and category prototypes with the notion of core cultural values (see Chapter 2, subsection 2.4.3), where the "personal positive evaluation" of a stereotypical trait such as language is used to positively differentiate the ingroup from the outgroup.

Rothbart (1978; cited in Tajfel, 1982:4) found that "the assumed typicality of certain distinctive instances tends to be retrospectively overestimated". Tajfel (1982:4-5), however, states that while some studies identified selective memory retrieval of information for the formation of negative stereotypes, others found that "when a division into ingroups and outgroups is used as one of the independent variables, the stage of the assimilation of information ('input accentuation') has a stronger effect on selectivity than is subsequent retrieval ('output accentuation')". In other words, inferences made during social categorisation are more determinant of negative stereotypes that recalling certain information after the fact. Tajfel (1982:6) summarises:

> The studies showed that when certain actions were attributed to members of two groups in a design in which more information was provided about one of the groups, and the ratio of desirable and undesirable behaviours was varied, the subjects "grossly overestimated the extent to which the infrequent group … performed the 'uncommon'

[40] Tajfel (1982:5) refers to studies (Kanter, 1977; Novarra, 1980; Wolman & Frank, 1975) which showed that one woman in a group of men – an instance of so-called *solo-status situations* – will be stereotyped more than when in more evenly mixed situations. Tajfel explains this phenomenon as follows: those in a solo-status situation will make a bigger impression; evaluations of that person will be more *polarised*, meaning both negative and positive evaluations will be more extreme.

> type of behaviour" (D. Hamilton 1979, p. 63) whether the behaviour was desirable or undesirable.

Tajfel (1982:7) notes that social stereotypes are not limited to situations in which members of an outgroup are unfamiliar to individuals. While stereotypes can be created based on limited contact with outgroup members, he believes that it is unlikely that widespread intergroup stereotypes originate from "the social summing up of the cognitive effects of 'rarity' or 'unfamiliarity' or 'singling out' of isolated individuals".

> The behaviour of certain individuals often becomes relevant to the stereotype of their group because they are representatives of a category which has a pre-existing social significance enmeshed with pre-existing value connotations. Attention-focusing becomes important for stereotyping mainly when it happens in the context of these pre-existing social differentiations and when it is determined by them.

According to Tajfel (1982:7-8), ethnocentrism is not universal as Sumner (1906) believed it to be. He summarises research that demonstrates that attachment to the ingroup does not directly correlate with attitudes towards outgroups and intergroup differentiations. He explains that value connotations of stereotypes about outgroups are not systematically altered by explicit intergroup conflict, nor is such conflict directly related to measures to socially distance from the outgroup. So too, ingroup favouritism is relatively independent of attitudes towards outgroups. Tajfel (1982:8) cites Brewer's (1981:350) summary as follows:

> Which differences are emphasised under what circumstances appears to be flexible and context dependent; this flexibility permits individuals to mobilise different group identities for different purposes.

These findings are relevant to understanding contemporary Afrikaner identity formation and mobilisation (see Chapter 5, subsection 5.3.1). Additionally, Jaspars and Warnaen (1982; cited in Tajfel, 1982:9) found that "groups do not necessarily evaluate outgroups more negatively than their own group. They do, however, in general have a more positive view of themselves than other groups have of them". An exception to this is the finding that lower-status ethnic groups may demonstrate outgroup favouritism, self-stereotyping and ingroup devaluation (see negative internalisation and misrecognition in Chapter 2) (Tajfel, 1982:10-11).[41] Tajfel (1982:11) elaborates on the positive and negative views of the ingroup as follows:

[41] Milner (1973; cited in Tajfel, 1982:11) found that immigrant Asian children, although displaying outgroup preference toward the white minority in Britain, do so less than immigrant West Indian children. He suggested that this was because Asian immigrant communities maintain a stronger cultural, familial, linguistic and religious identity than West Indian immigrant communities do, which provides Asian children with "more protection of

> Social comparisons made by an individual may focus toward the ingroup or the outgroup. In the former case, the ingroup may provide a basis for the building up of a positive self-image, if it managed to preserve a system of positive evaluations about its "folkways", mode of life, social and cultural characteristics. When the group suffers at the same time from low status in the society at large, the strength drawn by its members from its internal and positive social identity may come into conflict with the negative evaluations from the "outside" whenever comparisons with the higher status groups become salient […]

Tajfel (1982:31) believes that an emphasis on cognitive processes, while vital for understanding the formation and functioning of social stereotypes, cannot provide generalisations regarding intergroup behaviour characterised by conflicts and value-laden social differentiations. He insists that the study of intergroup behaviour necessitates a focus on the "socially determined value connotations of divisions between human groups", and insight into "the conditions in which relations between groups strongly determine the reciprocal behaviour of the individuals involved". In other words, research on intergroup behaviour needs to take into account group membership. Tajfel (1982:31) explains "there can be no intergroup behaviour without categorisation into groups, i.e., 'social categorisation'".

3.2.1.3. Social accentuation

Tajfel (1982:20) offers a review of research on the effects of social categorisation on intergroup behaviour. Whereas much cognitive research had focused on the transition from individual to group impressions in the formation and functioning of stereotypes, as discussed above, it has also suggested that the selection, accentuation and interpretation of the information obtained from the social environment has to be conceptualised as "a special instance of the functioning of the process of categorisation" and thus understood at the level of the individual. An example of the latter focus offered by Tajfel is Campbell's (1956) work on the enhancement of similarities within, and differences between, items which are placed in either the same or different categories.

According to Tajfel (1982:21), the application of this accentuation of intracategory similarities and intercategory differences to the study of stereotypes was based on hypotheses regarding two functions of *social accentuation*, namely: (i) the *cognitive* function, that is, the utilisation of the category membership of individual items for ordering, systematising and simplifying the complex network of social groups that individuals face in their social environment; and (ii) the

their self-image". Thus, even in a potentially lower status situation, certain cultures might be (more) 'immune' to misrecognition.

value function, which serves to protect, maintain and/or enhance the value systems applying to distinctions between social groups. Both functions result in the accentuation of similarities and differences, although the latter more so when differences and similarities become associated with subjective value differentials related to social categories.

Thus Tajfel (1982:21) confirms that research found that the categorisation process leads to intragroup differences being minimised, and intergroup differences being exaggerated. Hensley and Duval (1976; cited in Tajfel, 1982), for instance, found that participants accentuated the supposed similarities in beliefs among them and other members of the ingroup, and conversely accentuated the supposed differences in beliefs between them and members of the outgroup. The accentuation of intracategory similarities is, however, a comparatively asymmetrical phenomenon as it applies to ingroups as opposed to outgroups. With regard to the latter, Tajfel (1982:21) reminds one of the process of depersonalisation of the members of the outgroup, resulting in participants assuming more homogeneity of beliefs and attitudes among members of the outgroup, than among members of the ingroup (see subsection 3.2.3.3).

Tajfel (1982:22) argues that although research into the cognitive and value functions of social accentuation has aided in understanding the structure and direction of biases in intergroup attitudes and stereotypes, such studies have to be supplemented by a *theory of the contents of stereotypes*, especially considering that there is a limited variety of *patterns* or *types* of intergroup stereotypes. I do not include such theories in this chapter, however, as stereotypes are tangential to my research topic.

According to Tajfel (1982:22), conceptions of outgroups are created in their social and historical contexts, and are then adopted via transmission by individual members of ingroups and dispersed through various channels of social influence. He identifies three social functions of these conceptions, namely: (i) the *justification* of actions planned or committed against outgroups; (ii) the perception of social *causality*, particularly as it relates to large-scale distressing events such as unemployment or a lost war, the complexity of which has to be simplified;[42] and (iii) the positive *differentiation* of a social group from relevant outgroups (which I discuss in subsection 3.2.2). Hewstone and Jaspars (1982; cited in Tajfel) emphasise

[42] Tajfel (1982:22) cites as evidence of this function, work done by Billig (1978) and Guillaumin (1972) regarding the "'conspiracy theories' of social causation in which the evil intentions and actions of selected target groups become the assumed 'cause' of the ills befalling society at large".

that "in an intergroup context, attributions are made as a function of the social group membership of both the actor and observer. Thus, *social categorisation* is the key variable".

3.2.1.4. Minimal social category

While it has been established that explicit intergroup conflicts and competition lead to intergroup discrimination (ingroup favouritism and outgroup bias), Tajfel (1982:23) states that there is also evidence of the development of competitive ingroup-outgroup attitudes and ingroup bias even in the absence of competition, and indeed in the presence of intergroup co-operation. Attempting to identify the *minimal conditions* necessary for intergroup discrimination, Billig and Tajfel (1973; cited in Tajfel, 1982) conducted experiments wherein the random toss of a coin determined division into groups. There was no intergroup or intragroup social interaction in these experiments, no instrumental links between the participants' responses and their self-interest,[43] no prior hostility between the groups, and group membership was anonymous. These experiments showed "clear and consistent evidence of bias in favour of the ingroup" and that intergroup discrimination can be caused by a *minimal social categorisation*.

In other words, very little is needed to create not only the subjective sense of shared group membership, but also subsequent ingroup-favouring behaviour. These findings also support May's (2012) criticism of an instrumentalist account of ethnic identity. Tajfel and Turner (1986:277) insist that "the institutionalisation, explicitness, and objectivity" of an intergroup conflict,[44] while often proving to be *sufficient* conditions for eliciting group behaviour on the extreme end of the continuum, are not *necessary* conditions. They note that intergroup discrimination may exist even in conditions of minimal ingroup affiliation, anonymity of group membership, absence of conflicts of interest, and absence of previous hostility between groups (1986:278).

Thus Tajfel and Turner (1986:281) confirm that a number of experimental studies show that the mere perception of belonging to two distinct groups, or put differently, the mere awareness of the presence of an outgroup, is sufficient to trigger intergroup discrimination favouring the

[43] Each participant was asked to distribute "points worth money" between two other anonymous participants who were either both from the ingroup, both from the outgroup, or one from the ingroup and one from the outgroup. The distribution of said points had no bearing on the group of the member to which it had been awarded (in the sense of "winning" a competition), or on the distributor themself.

[44] *Institutionalised* conflict means researchers officially arranged it in an experiment; *explicit* conflict means it dominated the life of the groups; *objective* conflict refers to the fact that in terms of the intergroup competition set up in an experiment, one of the groups will be the winner and the other group the loser.

ingroup. They explain that in situations where there is no conflict of interests or prior hostility between groups, no social interaction between members, and no link between economic self-interest and the strategy of ingroup favouritism – so-called "minimal" groups – the "trivial, ad hoc" intergroup categorisation results in ingroup favouritism and outgroup discrimination (1986:282). They elaborate on findings from these studies as follows:

> Fairness is also an influential strategy. There is also a good deal of evidence that, within the pattern of responding in terms of ingroup favouritism, maximum difference (MD) is more important to the subjects than maximum ingroup profit (MIP). Thus, they seem to be competing with the outgroup, rather than following a strategy of simple economic gain for members of the ingroup. Other data from several experiments also show that the subjects' decisions were significantly nearer to the maximum joint payoff (MJP) point when these decisions applied to the division of money between two anonymous members of the ingroup than when they applied to two members of the outgroup; that is, relatively less was given to the outgroup, even when giving more would not have affected the amounts for the ingroup.

Tajfel and Turner (1986:282) also cite vast amounts of research which show that *explicitly random categorisation* into groups is more determining of discrimination than perceived interpersonal similarities (without group classification). According to Hogg (2016:6), SIT crystalised around the attempt to explain such minimal group findings, and integrated Tajfel's research on categorisation and social perception, and his concern with prejudice, discrimination and conflict in society. He states that over half a century, hundreds of minimal group experiments have been conducted in different settings and have conclusively found that the mere act of being categorised as a group member elicits ethnocentrism and competitive intergroup behaviour.[45]

3.2.2. Social identity and intergroup comparison

According to Brown (2000:746), Tajfel and Turner (1986) distinguish between a *personal identity* and a *social identity*, which they believed underpinned the difference between interpersonal situations and group situations (largely determined by category-based processes) respectively. SIT is concerned with the latter and, as Brown (2000:747) explains, starts from the assumption that social identity is mainly derived from group membership(s). Tajfel and Turner (1986:283) define social identity as follows:

[45] Tajfel and Turner (1986:281) state: "The laboratory analogue of real-world ethnocentrism is ingroup bias – that is, the tendency to favour the ingroup over the outgroup in evaluations and behaviour".

> [T]hose aspects of an individual's self-image that derive from the social categories to which he perceives himself as belonging.

Elsewhere, Tajfel (1981; cited in Tajfel, 1982:24) defines social identity as:

> [T]hat *part* of the individual's self-concept which derives from their knowledge of their membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance of that membership […]

People are thought to seek to achieve or maintain a *positive social identity*, which boosts their self-esteem, and thus attempt to make favourable comparisons between the ingroup and relevant outgroups. Should comparisons lead to an 'unsatisfactory' identity, they may adopt any number of strategies to leave their group or find other ways of achieving *positive distinctiveness* (Brown; 2000:747). Tajfel (1982:24) expands as follows:

> In conditions in which social interactions are determined to a large extent by the individuals' reciprocal group memberships, positive social identity can be achieved, in a vast majority of cases, only through appropriate inter*group* social comparisons. Thus, the positive or negative conceptions of a social group are seen as being primarily *relational* in nature. […] A direct inference from these views is that a "minimal" social categorisation exerts its discriminatory intergroup effects because it provides a way to enhance "positive ingroup distinctiveness".

Differentiating between the ingroup and outgroup is thus not only done for the purpose of advancing the (perceived) shared interests of the ingroup. Thus, as already discussed above, Tajfel (1982:24) confirms that even when there is no explicit or institutionalised conflict or competition between groups, ingroup favouring behaviour *still* occurs; and this as a result of the need to achieve or maintain a positive group distinctiveness, which itself serves to improve, maintain or achieve a positive social identity for members of the group. Tajfel and Turner (1986:283-284) list the following assumptions on which they base their argument:

- Individuals strive to maintain or improve their self-esteem, i.e. they seek a positive self-concept.
- Social groups or categories and membership to them are associated with positive or negative value connotations. This means that social identity may be positive or negative according to the evaluations (which are usually socially consensual within and across groups) of those groups that contribute to an individual's social identity.
- The evaluation of one's own group is determined relative to specific other groups through social comparisons in terms of value-laden attributes and characteristics. Positively discrepant comparisons between ingroup and outgroup produce high

prestige, whereas negatively discrepant comparisons between ingroup and outgroup result in low prestige.

Based on these assumptions, Tajfel and Turner (1986:284) formulate the following theoretical principles:

- Individuals strive to achieve or maintain positive social identity.
- Positive social identity is largely based on favourable comparisons that can be made between the ingroup and some relevant outgroups: the ingroup must be perceived as positively differentiated or distinct from the relevant outgroups.
- When social identity is unsatisfactory, individuals will strive either to leave their existing group and join a more positively distinct group and/or to make their existing group more positively distinct.

Tajfel and Turner's (1986:284) hypothesis is that "pressures to evaluate one's own group positively through ingroup/outgroup comparisons lead social groups to attempt to differentiate themselves from each other". They argue that there are at least three classes of variables that should influence intergroup differentiation in real-life social situations.

First, *individuals must have internalised their group membership as an aspect of their self-concept*. In other words, it is not sufficient for others (either ingroup or outgroup members) to define them as a member of a certain group; they have to subjectively identify with the relevant ingroup. Tajfel and Turner (1986:284) note, however, that "consensual definitions by others" regarding group boundaries, can become "one of the most powerful causal factors determining a group's self-definition". The distinction between ethnic categories and ethnic communities also supposes that groups are delineated and defined both from outside and from within the group. Groups are thus externally and internally (both collectively and individually) defined and demarcated. The influence of external definitions of (the characteristics and boundaries of) a specific group may have negative psychological effects on its members (see identity threats in section 3.4), and also complicates efforts by members to redefine their group identity in more positive terms, and indeed, to avoid cultural stasis (see Chapter 5, section 5.3).

Second, *the social situation must allow for intergroup comparisons that enable the selection and evaluation of the relevant relational attributes*. According to Tajfel and Turner (1986:284), not all intergroup differences have "evaluative significance", and those that do have such significance vary from one group to another. They point to skin colour, which is a more salient

attribute in the US than in Hong Kong, as opposed to language, which is "an especially salient dimension of separate identity" in Canada, Wales and Belgium. This notion of context-specific evaluative attributes for intergroup comparison relates to the theory of core cultural values discussed in Chapter 2, where I briefly noted that in Irish identity, the core cultural value changed to Catholicism (after the loss of the Irish language) as a means to maintain a distinct identity from British Protestants.

Third, *ingroups do not compare themselves with every cognitively available outgroup, but only those perceived as relevant*. Tajfel and Turner (1986:284) state that similarity, proximity, and situational salience are some of the factors that increase outgroup comparability which, in turn, increase pressure toward ingroup distinctiveness. They argue that in many social situations, comparability transcends mere similarity between groups.

Giles and Johnson (1981; cited in Louw-Potgieter, 1988:11-12) applied SIT to ethnolinguistic groups, finding that language often functions as a "criterial attribute" to group membership, and enables members to achieve a positive social identity through *linguistic differentiation*, which includes the accentuation of *ethnic speech markers* and social competition on linguistic dimensions. They also identified several factors which lead members to seek to achieve positive linguistic distinctiveness. These include: (i) strong identification with ingroup in which language is important; (ii) the perception of high ethnolinguistic vitality; (iii) the perception of impermeability of ingroup boundaries; and (iv) few other meaningful social category memberships.

3.2.3. Social competition and intergroup conflict

3.2.3.1. The self-esteem hypothesis

A similar line of research on intergroup comparisons and positive distinctiveness focuses specifically on negative intergroup behaviour and intergroup conflict. Martiny and Rubin (2016:20) explain that ingroup-favouring bias and outgroup discrimination can increase the social status of the ingroup relative to the outgroup, thereby increasing the positivity of the associated social identity (see social change in the next subsection). People are therefore motivated to engage in intergroup behaviour in order to improve the social status of their ingroup and achieve a positive social identity. This phenomenon is termed the *self-esteem hypothesis*.

According to Martiny and Rubin (2016:23), studies have shown that when in a situation of identity threat (meaning positive social identity is threatened), individuals with high

(collective) self-esteem demonstrate the strongest ingroup bias and outgroup derogation. Huddy (2001:135) also states that a number of studies suggest that "it is people with high, not low, self-esteem who are most likely to derogate an outgroup in order to protect group standing". Due to various caveats and qualifications borne from experimental research, Martiny and Rubin (2016:25-26) propose reformulating the self-esteem hypothesis as follows:

- *The self-esteem motive*: Among people who identify with their ingroup and who are sufficiently confident to engage in direct group behaviour, the need for (collective) self-esteem encourages socially competitive behaviour for ingroup status. Depending on specific social norms, this behaviour may take the form of intergroup discrimination, and it is likely to be more common among group members who had initially high collective self-esteem and have suffered an identity threat.
- *The self-esteem effect*: Intergroup behaviour that leads to an improvement in ingroup status will elevate the collective self-esteem of ingroup members who identify with their group.

This reformulated hypothesis suggests that all group members stand to benefit in terms of self-esteem from the intergroup behaviour of only a few of them. This dynamic is also observable in intergroup conflict over other social, economic and political resources, including MLR, where the entire minority-language group gain from the advocacy of some of its members.

3.2.3.2. Interpersonal-intergroup continuum

According to Tajfel (1982:13), approaches to intergroup conflict and competition are situated on a continuum between two hypothetical extremes, namely: *the interpersonal extreme*, in which interaction between two or more individuals is viewed as largely determined by their individual characteristics and the nature of the personal relations between them, and *the intergroup extreme*, where interactions are viewed as largely determined by the group memberships of the individuals.

In this same vein, Tajfel and Turner (1986:277) distinguish between two types of social behaviour, namely *interpersonal* and *intergroup* behaviour. At one extreme is the interaction between individuals that is not affected by any social groups or categories to which they might belong, but is rather strictly determined by their personal characteristics and relationships. At the other extreme is the interaction between individuals (or groups of individuals) that is not at all affected by personal relationships, and is instead wholly determined by the social groups and categories to which they belong. They note that both these extreme types of interaction

rarely occur in real life, but they provide the relations between husband and wife as a possible example of the former, and the behaviour of soldiers from opposing armies as an example of the latter (1986:277).

According to Tajfel and Turner (1986:277), the more intense an intergroup conflict becomes, the more likely it is that individuals will behave toward members of the outgroup as a function of their respective group membership, as opposed to their individual characteristics or interindividual relationships. In addition to the *intensity of intergroup conflict*, Tajfel and Turner (1986:278) identify another factor that influences the *interpersonal-intergroup continuum* of social behaviour, namely the *continuum of systems of beliefs*.

The continuum of systems of beliefs refers to an individual's belief system regarding the nature and structure of the relations between social groups in their society, and has *social mobility* at its one extreme, and *social change* at the other. Tajfel and Turner (1986:278) define the social mobility belief system as follows:

> The belief system of "social mobility" is based on the general assumption that the society in which individuals live is a flexible and permeable one, so that if they are not satisfied, for whatever reason, with the conditions imposed upon their lives by membership in social groups or social categories to which they belong, it is possible for them (be it through talent, hard work, good luck, or whatever other means) to move individually into another group that suits them better.

Proponents of rational choice theory, and constructionists more broadly (see Chapter 2, subsection 2.1.3), share this conceptualisation of ethnic group mobility. In contrast to this belief system, Tajfel and Turner (1986:278) define the social change belief system as follows:

> At the other extreme, the belief system of "social change" implies that the nature and structure of the relations between social groups in the society is characterised by marked stratification, making it impossible or very difficult for individuals, as individuals, to divest themselves of an unsatisfactory, underprivileged, or stigmatised group membership. The economic or social realities of a society may be such (as, for example, in the case of the millions of unemployed during the Depression of the 1930s) that the impossibility of "getting out" on one's own, as an individual, becomes an everyday reality that determines many forms of intergroup social behaviour.

According to Tajfel and Turner (1986:278), in social intergroup situations that contain strong elements of (perceived) stratification, social behaviour tends to move away from the interpersonal pole towards the intergroup pole, regardless of whether the group is 'superior' or 'inferior' to other groups in the social system. In intergroup situations, an individual who has this social change belief system will not interact as an individual (based on their personal

characteristics and/or interpersonal relationships), but as a member of their group "standing in certain defined relationships to members of other groups".

Tajfel and Turner (1986:278) note that a strong correlation is to be expected between the degree of objective stratification in a social system and the spread and intensity of the social change belief system. However, they argue that this is not a one-to-one relationship, as there are a number of sociopsychological conditions that could determine "the transition in certain social groups from an acceptance of stratification to behaviour characteristic of the intergroup pole of our first continuum – that is, to the creation of social movements aiming to change (or to preserve) the status quo". In other words, whereas one group might come to resent their position in society, and wish to change it, another group might accept their lower position as justified, and rather lean towards the social mobility extreme of the continuum (see negative internalisation in subsection 3.2.1.2).

Tajfel and Turner (1986:278) further note that there is a strong link between explicit intergroup conflict of interests and the social change belief system. In situations of intense conflict of interests, an individual will find it difficult to consider "betraying" their own group by moving to the competing group – that is to say, they will espouse the social change system of beliefs. Tajfel and Turner (1986:279) state that although individuals sometimes do move to an opposing group, there are powerful sanctions against such a shift, and the value systems of many cultures are in clear opposition to it. They elaborate on these obstacles to social mobility as follows:

> The intensity of explicit intergroup conflicts of interests is closely related in our cultures to the degree of opprobrium attached to the notion of "renegade" or "traitor". This is why the belief systems corresponding to the "social change" extreme of our continuum are associated with intense intergroup conflicts. These conflicts can be conceived, therefore, as creating a subclass or a subcategory of the subjective intergroup dichotomisation characteristic of that extreme of the belief continuum. They share the basic feature of the "social change" system of beliefs, in the sense that the multigroup structure is perceived as characterised by the extreme difficulty or impossibility of an individual's moving from one group to another.

I will elaborate on the various social mobility and social change strategies available to group members in subsection 3.2.3.6.

3.2.3.3. Group uniformity and intergroup similarity

Tajfel (1982:13) identifies two characteristics of intergroup behaviour that are relevant to the interpersonal-intergroup continuum. The first characteristic is the uniformity of behaviour and attitudes displayed by members of the ingroup toward the outgroup. Tajfel notes that this

transition to uniformity reflects "the transition from the interpersonal to the intergroup ends of the continuum as the behaviour is increasingly determined by the reciprocal group membership of the constituent individuals". The second characteristic of intergroup behaviour is the increased uniformity of the characteristics and behaviour of the members of the outgroup as perceived by members of the ingroup. This characteristic also involves the transition from the interpersonal to the intergroup end of the continuum, as Tajfel (1982:13) explains:

> In this process, members of the outgroup become "undifferentiated items in a unified social category" (Tajfel 1981, p. 243). The phenomena of depersonalisation, dehumanisation, and social stereotyping which tend to increase in scope as and when intergroup relations deteriorate are no more than special instances of this wider principle of the increased *un*differentiation of the outgroup.[46]

According to Tajfel and Turner (1986:279), the closer members of a group are to the social change end of the continuum of belief systems, and to the intergroup end of the interpersonal-intergroup continuum, the more *uniformity* they will display in their behaviour toward outgroup members. On the other hand, the nearer members of a group are to the opposite ends of these continua (i.e., the social mobility and interpersonal ends), the more *variability* of behaviour toward outgroup members there will be. Tajfel and Turner (1986:279) argue that this constitutes an approach to the social psychology of intergroup relations that considers both social realities and their reflection in social behaviour through the mediation of socially shared belief systems.

> This convergence occurs at both ends of the sequence just discussed; at the beginning, because it can be assumed without much difficulty that the "social change" belief system is likely to reflect either an existing and marked social stratification or an intense intergroup conflict of interests, or both; at the end, because the consequences of the systems of beliefs arising from the social situations just mentioned are likely to appear in the form of unified group actions – that is, in the form of social movements aiming either to create social change or to preserve the status quo.

Tajfel (1982:25) cites research conducted by Oakes and Turner (1980) which found clear evidence that increased self-esteem is related to the opportunity of engaging in intergroup discrimination. He also notes that further studies have shown that "an increase in the salience of group membership leads, through intergroup comparisons, to more marked ingroup favouritism". Tajfel argues that contrary to Rokeach's (1960; 1968) *belief congruence theory*

[46] Perhaps May's (2012) treatment of dominant ethnies vis-à-vis sociological minorities could be accused of undifferentiating majority-group members by assuming their uniformity. As it concerns MLR decision-making, it is important to distinguish between outgroup members in general, and the locus of power, or political elite, within the outgroup (see Chapter 5 for such an attempt).

of prejudice, which posits that prejudice is based on the assumption of dissimilarity of beliefs between oneself and outgroup members, this research would suggest that prejudice is based on socially derived *value connotations* directly related to intergroup categorisations.

Tajfel (1982:25) also cites research conducted by Allen and Wilder (1975), which directly compared the influence of interpersonal similarity and intergroup categorisation on intergroup attitudes and behaviour. Using a minimal categorisation procedure, they found that ingroup favouritism occurred even when there was similarity of beliefs with outgroup members and dissimilarity of beliefs with ingroup members. So too Billig and Tajfel (1973; cited in Tajfel, 1982) found that minimal intergroup categorisation was a stronger determinant of ingroup favouritism than was interindividual similarity. Sole *et al*. (1975; cited in Tajfel, 1982:25) reported a marked increase in the extent of helping strangers when they could be "unambiguously categorised" as ingroup members ("we") as opposed to being similar in terms of holding some beliefs. Tajfel (1982:25) elaborates:

> An inference from the CIC theory is that in conditions of salient intergroup categorisation, groups will tend to work harder at establishing their distinctiveness from the outgroups which are perceived as similar than from those which are seen as dissimilar. This is in direct contradiction to the "belief congruence" view.

Turner (1978; cited in Tajfel, 1982:26), in support of the CIC theory,[47] found that in competitive situations, groups with similar views exhibited more intergroup discrimination than groups with dissimilar values. In another study, Turner *et al*. (1979; cited in Tajfel, 1982) found that people are more willing to sacrifice self-interest when faced with similar outgroups, in order to maximise intergroup differences (through discriminatory behaviour). Taylor and Guimond (1978; cited in Tajfel, 1982), however, found that in conditions where group membership was salient, similarity of beliefs was more important in dictating intergroup behaviour, than was group affiliation (thus supporting Rokeach's theory).

Taylor and Guimond's (1978) findings may have been impacted by the *type* of group in their study (or its *arbitrariness*) – indeed, all of the experimental studies listed above might have shown different results had pre-existing groups with substantial meaning to participants been used. Perhaps the focus on establishing intergroup difference is actually an attempt at creating a meaningful group definition (and in doing so, group unity), once the group boundaries had already been established by the researchers. When real-world groups are based on specific

[47] In his earlier work, Tajfel (1982:22) referred to his SIT approach to intergroup behaviour as *Social Categorisation – Social Identity – Social Comparison* (CIC) *theory*.

attributes (both objective and subjective), and carry significant meaning for its members, perceived similarity (on some attributes) with other groups might not elicit the same degree of intergroup discrimination aimed at establishing intergroup differentiation. Group distinctiveness might thus serve an additional function aside from positive differentiation and social identity – that is, *creating* group boundaries.

If negative intergroup behaviour can be so easily elicited in experimental settings, regardless of the absence of competition, or of group categorisation based on any perceivable (and meaningful) similarities, thus for the sole reason of achieving group distinctiveness, it stands to reason that in real-world situations, ingroup-favouritism and outgroup bias will be even more acute in cases of objective competition between clearly demarcated groups with marked dissimilarities. In situations with more than one outgroup, some more dissimilar than others, perhaps when objective competition exists between the ingroup and a dissimilar outgroup, the ingroup will be less concerned with achieving intergroup distinctiveness with other (similar) outgroups with whom they are not in direct competition.

Brown (2000:750-751) states that conventional wisdom before SIT was that outgroups are always perceived to be more homogeneous than ingroups, owing to a difference in levels of familiarity with ingroup and outgroup members. However, as the prevalence of perceived ingroup homogeneity became documented, SIT offered another analysis. Brown (2000:751) notes that minority group status usually leads to enhanced ingroup identification, and ingroup homogeneity is most often seen on identity relevant attributes (think core cultural values), suggesting that identity maintenance (or protection) underlies the process of perceived ingroup homogeneity. He further discusses the interesting link between perceptions of homogeneity and group identification as follows:

> For example, reaction to low ingroup status, with its negative implication for identity, can be to emphasise ingroup variability so as to mitigate the consequences of being tarred with the same brush (Doosje, Spears & Koomen, 1995a). Moreover, if that status designation is made to seem unstable (see above), then it is those who identify more strongly who react by seeing the ingroup as more homogeneous (Doosje, Spears, Ellemers & Koomen, 1999). In fact, in general, high identifiers tend to see both ingroups *and* outgroups as more homogeneous than low identifiers, particularly if the intergroup context is salient (Doosje et al., 1995a; Ellemers, Spears & Doosje, 1997; Kellu, 1989). That these effects are found whether identification differences are based on standard scales or derived from experimental manipulations, strongly implicates social identity as playing a causal role in mediating these perceptions of group homogeneity.

The discussion in Chapter 5, subsection 5.4.1.2, includes a demonstration of these findings that in situations of threat and/or low status, high identifiers perceive more intragroup homogeneity. In addition to these findings regarding intra- and intergroup uniformity and similarity, SIT also offers insights into the effect of interpersonal relationships on intergroup conflict and vice versa. Tajfel (1982:14-15) cites experimental research which found that when participants were friends prior to the commencement of the 'official' intergroup competition, during which they were placed in opposing groups, their behaviour was influenced by the present intergroup conflict, and not by their previously held interpersonal attachments. This would suggest that *social cohesion* gains made on an interpersonal level cannot adequately mediate intergroup conflict between groups that are clearly delineated. In fact, further research has indicated that social interaction between groups tends, in general, to be more hostile than between individual members of those same groups. Tajfel (1982:15) continues:

> There is also more recent evidence that the effects of groups membership can overwhelm the unfolding of interpersonal relations, or as Turner (1981) put it "that social groups seem to be more competitive and perceive their interests more competitively than individuals under the same functional conditions" […] There are also data showing that aggression or retaliation involving groups can be stronger in some conditions than is the case for individuals.

While it is clear that intergroup conflict is harmful to the social cohesion between groups, Tajfel (1982:15) notes that there is a long history of evidence which shows that intergroup conflict is beneficial to the *internal cohesion* of a group. He cites Sumner (1906:12) who stated that "the relationship of comradeship and peace in the we-group and that of hostility and war towards other-groups are correlative to each other. The exigencies of war with outsiders are what makes peace inside". Stein (1976; cited in Tajfel, 1982), who conducted a review of relevant work within various social science disciplines, states:

> [T]here is a clear convergence in the literature in both the specific studies and in the various disciplines that suggests that external conflict does increase internal cohesion under certain conditions … The external conflict needs to invoke some threat, affect the entire group and all its members equally and indiscriminately, and involve a solution … The group must be able to deal with the external conflict, and to provide emotional comfort and support to its members.

I discuss these group threats in section 3.4, and again in Chapter 5, section 5.3, as they apply to white Afrikaans speakers.

3.2.3.4. Social and realistic (instrumental) competition

As mentioned in subsection 3.1.2, RCT proposed that opposing group interests in obtaining scarce resources cause competition and consequently intergroup conflict; however, Tajfel and Turner (1986) did not believe this to be an adequate account of intergroup conflict. In addition to competition for goods or resources, Turner (1975; cited in Tajfel, 1982:12) identified another basis for competition, namely *social competition*. Examples include groups competing to win a contest, or to achieve a higher rank, status or prestige.

Tajfel and Turner (1986:284) explain that the goal of differentiation is to maintain or achieve superiority over an outgroup, and as such, is fundamentally a competitive act. In order for groups to engage in completely *reciprocal* competition, they have to mutually compare and differentiate on a shared value dimension. Intergroup competition, Tajfel and Turner argue, can be predicted to occur in these conditions, and may be unrelated to the "objective goal relations between the groups". In other words, the shared value dimension used in intergroup comparisons, and the subsequent intergroup competition, might be unrelated to the actual (realistic) interests of the groups involved.

With SIT, Tajfel and Turner (1986:289) integrated the three processes of social categorisation, self-evaluation through social identity, and intergroup social comparison into a coherent and testable framework aimed at explaining the various forms of intergroup behaviour. Tajfel and Turner (1986:290) caution, however, that their framework should not be understood to imply that the sociopsychological or "subjective" type of conflict has a more important causal function in social reality than the "objective" determinants of social conflict (that is, the social, economic, political, and historical structures of a society). Instead, they believe that while the effects of the sociopsychological variables are often co-determined by the preceding social, economic and political processes they can, however, acquire a relatively autonomous function which allow them to deflect the subsequent functioning of these processes.[48]

On this basis, Turner (1975; cited in Tajfel and Turner, 1986:284) distinguishes between *social* and *realistic* (or *instrumental*) competition, where the former is motivated by self-evaluation and occurs through social comparison, while the latter is based on "realistic" self-interest and represents "embryonic conflict". Tajfel and Turner (1986:284) posit that incompatible group

[48] If social competition is linked to social reality, and can become an autonomous motivator of intergroup conflict, it becomes equally important to investigate the *historical* social reality between relevant groups, which may be found to inform current social competition, potentially even in the absence of current realistic competition.

goals (i.e., objective interests) are necessary for realistic competition, but mutual intergroup comparisons are necessary, and often sufficient, for social competition. They state that this is supported by data from minimal group experiments, which, as has been noted above, show that mere awareness of an outgroup results in ingroup favouritism, and that the possibility of social comparison leads to "spontaneous" intergroup competition.

According to Tajfel and Turner (1986:284), social and realistic competition also differ in terms of the predictions that can be made regarding the impact of winning or losing on subsequent intergroup behaviour. They suggest that after realistic competition, the losing group will be hostile to the winning group, since they lost out on a reward and because their interaction had been exclusively conflictual. When winning and losing, however, establishes shared group evaluations about comparative superiority and inferiority, then – if the terms of the competition are perceived to be legitimate and the competition itself is perceived to be fair according to these terms – the losing group may acquiesce to the superiority of the winning group. Tajfel and Turner (1986:285) note that several studies found that losing groups do not always derogate, but sometimes upgrade, their evaluations of the winning group, and may consider themselves to be "legitimately inferior".

3.2.3.5. Power and status differentials

Tajfel and Turner (1986:286) redefine *status* as not simply a scarce resource (such as wealth or power), but as the *outcome* of intergroup comparison, and a reflection of a group's relative position on some evaluative dimensions of comparison. Read alongside May's (2012:30) argument that ethnic identities are unfavourably juxtaposed with national identities, the notion of a hierarchy of identities becomes clear. Tajfel and Turner (1986:286) explain that low subjective status does not directly promote intergroup competition; instead, its effects on intergroup behaviour are mediated by social identity processes. The lower a group's subjective status is in relation to relevant comparison groups, the less it can contribute to positive social identity.

According to Bekker (2003:64), power relations between groups influence the success of achieving a positive social identity. He maintains that while the majority group may disseminate its own system of beliefs, opinions and attitudes, and have it become naturalised, minority-group members instead are often under pressure to adopt this ideology. This relates to so-called banal nationalism and the notion of the Staatsvolk discussed in Chapter 2. By controlling the dimensions of comparison (and the values of attributes), Bekker (2003) states

that majority-group members may create a positive social identity for themselves and cause a *negative social identity* for minority-group members.

Tajfel (1982:16) points out that matters of power and status, including rank, prestige, privilege and majority/minority distinctions are relevant to the interpersonal-intergroup continuum, as will become clear below. He states that research on the topic of social differentials in intergroup conflict have concerned (i) the functioning of minorities, (ii) the "experimentally induced" effects of intergroup power relations, (iii) the effects of status on intergroup attitudes, and (iv) the role of perceived illegitimacy and/or instability of social differentials in intergroup behaviour (1982:17).

Tajfel (1982:17) also cites research which emphasises the "innovating potentialities of minorities" as opposed to the traditional focus on "a one-way majority influence on minorities". Such research (Di Giacomo, 1980; Fromkin, 1972; Lemaine, 1974 Moscovici, 1976; Mugny, 1981) has found that the major determinant of *minority influence* is "the unwavering consistency of its viewpoint which confronts the differing views of a majority".[49] It has also found intergroup behaviour aimed at achieving a distinctive (minority) group identity associated with positive value connotations.

Tajfel also cites the work of Ng (1978, 1980) as an important synthesis of the social psychology of power and intergroup relations. According to Tajfel (1982:18), the latter's research draws on several background conceptions, including Mulder's (1971) *theory of power distance reduction tendencies* which concerns (i) the conditions that result in individuals who have little power to "attempt an equalisation" with those with more power; (ii) the effects of group membership on competition for power; and (iii) the conditions of social exchange in which "exit" from a relationship is either more or less likely than attempts to change an existing social situation "from the inside". Tajfel (1982:18) explains that one of the points of departure of Ng's work is the acknowledgement that, as opposed to purely interpersonal situations, the "real-life exit of a group from a multigroup structure" is usually difficult if not outright impossible.

[49] If minority groups thus consistently question and reject attempts at achieving nation-state congruence, they are able to influence the construction of the nation-state in more plural ways (see Chapter 5 for some of the "innovating potentialities" of white Afrikaans speakers). Tajfel (1982:17) cautions, however, that attempts to influence could fail if done incorrectly, such as when statements by leaders lead to supporters viewing the movement as an outgroup (or otherwise negatively). See footnote 23 for such an example where a MLR movement failed because of its reliance on discourses of endangerment.

Tajfel and Turner (1986:279) state that following from the above conceptualisation regarding the link between social realities and intergroup behaviour, whenever social stratification is based on an unequal division of scarce resources (such as power, prestige, or wealth) – signifying a definite conflict of interests between groups – the social situation should be characterised by pervasive ethnocentrism and outgroup antagonism across the over- and underprivileged groups. They contend, however, that ethnocentrism in these circumstances is *usually* a one-way street, where the minority or subordinate group members derogate their own ingroup and have positive attitudes toward the dominant outgroup. May (2012:51) referred to this phenomenon as negative internalisation in the previous chapter; achieved by what Bourdieu termed misrecognition. As I posited in subsection 3.2.1.2, some cultural groups might be less prone to negative internalisation in contexts of lower status.

Tajfel and Turner (1986:280) state that data showing "deprived groups" as positively oriented toward the "depriving group" is inconsistent with a simple application of RCT. According to RCT, status differences would emphasise intergroup conflict of interests. This would mean that the low status of a subordinate group would lead to an increase in antagonism toward the high-status group. However, under certain conditions, it seems there is often an increase in positive outgroup attitudes. They speculate that since hostility is only created when conflicts of interest are perceived as such, and since only relatively similar groups tend to engage in mutual comparisons, it stands to reason that "status systems may reduce social conflict by restricting the range of meaningful comparisons available to any given group".

According to Tajfel and Turner (1986:280), this hypothesis – while possibly accounting for some instances of social stability – fails to account for *social change* (changes in the mutual relations, behaviour and attitudes of groups), especially when the processes of change become very rapid. They note that despite the evidence given above regarding the tendency towards the elimination or reversal of ethnocentrism on the part of subordinated groups, patterns in intergroup relations can indeed change, i.e., where subordinated groups reject their previously negative ingroup evaluations and develop a positive ethnocentric group identity (such as among African Americans, French Canadians and the Welsh). They add that this construction of positive ingroup attitudes is often *followed* by "a new militancy over political and economic

objectives".[50] Despite this phenomenon, Tajfel and Turner (1986:280) insist that RCT still does not offer a satisfactory account of intergroup conflict:

> But these developments do not rescue RCT in its original form. The very suddenness with which the scene has changed effectively rules out objective deprivation and therefore *new* conflicting group interests as sufficient conditions for the "subordinate" group ethnocentrism. On the contrary, there has often been less objective deprivation than there was in the past. An active and new search for a positive group identity seems to have been one of the critical factors responsible for the reawakening of these groups' claims to scarce resources (Dizard, 1970).

Tajfel and Turner (1986:281) thus summarise their hypothesis as follows:

> An unequal distribution of objective resources promotes antagonism between dominant and subordinate groups, provided that the latter group rejects its previously accepted and consensually negative self-image, and with it the status quo, and starts working toward the development of a positive group identity. The dominant group may react to these developments either by doing everything possible to maintain and justify the status quo or by attempting to find and create new differentiations in its own favour, or both.

Tajfel and Turner (1986:288) further hypothesise that "a status difference between groups does not reduce the meaningfulness of comparison between them providing that there is a perception that *it can be changed*". This relates to so-called *secure* and *insecure* intergroup comparisons, a distinction which depends on whether *cognitive alternatives* are available. Tajfel and Turner (1986:289) explain that when status relations are perceived as immutable, the social identity is secure. In contrast, when the status quo is questioned, the social identity becomes insecure. Crucially, they point out that the dominant or high-status group can also experience insecure social identity:

> Any threat to the distinctively superior position of a group implies a potential loss of positive comparisons and possible negative comparisons, which must be guarded against. Such a threat may derive from the activity of the low-status group or from a conflict between the high-status group's own value system (for example, the sociopolitical morality) and the actual foundations of its superiority. Like low-status

[50] This seems to corroborate May's (2012) views regarding nationalism, i.e., that although it does give rise to *national* identity, it is preceded by historical antecedents or ethnies (see Chapter 2, subsections 2.2.4 and 2.2.5). In other words, political mobilisation is downstream from *increased* ethnic identification, which itself relies on pre-existing communal ties and/or commonality, and is caused by some change in the context or intergroup situation. The onset of minority-group radicalisation (or social change) is thus the widespread *perception* of illegitimate and/or unstable power and status differentials (and the related need to achieve positive social identity), and not the first perceivable act in an intergroup conflict over objective resources. An analysis of such minority-group radicalisation should therefore depart from an in-depth exploration of the social reality (including the hierarchy of identities), and not simply investigate (consequent) political actions. I criticise such context-free discussions on Afrikaner radicalisation in Chapter 5, where I attempt to offer a more complete presentation of the topic.

> groups, the high-status groups will react to insecure social identity by searching for enhanced group distinctiveness.

Tajfel and Turner (1986:289) argue that although obvious status differences could exist in a social system in which neither the inferior nor the superior groups display ethnocentrism (and thus the sociopolitical stability of the nation-state and social cohesion are not at risk), such an "ideal type" situation relies on the *perceived stability and legitimacy of the system*.

> Perceived illegitimacy and/or instability provide new dimensions of comparability that are directly relevant to the attitudes and behaviour of the social groups involved, whatever their position in the system. This is the social-psychological counterpart to what is widely known today as "the revolution of rising expectations." Providing that individual mobility is unavailable or undesirable, consensual inferiority will be rejected most rapidly when the situation is perceived as both unstable and illegitimate.[51]

According to Tajfel and Turner (1986:289), if the dominant group perceives their superiority to be legitimate, they will most likely react in an "intensely discriminatory fashion" to attempts by the subordinate group to change the intergroup situation.[52] They note too that the reactions of illegitimately superior groups are more complex, arguing that conflicts of values are reduced by greater discrimination when superiority is secure, and by less discrimination when it is unstable.[53] In other words, illegitimately superior groups will display less negative intergroup behaviour against subordinate groups, when their position as superior group is insecure (i.e., changeable).

Tajfel (1982:18) cites research conducted by Knippenberg (1978), which found that status was evaluated more highly by the lower-status group, since it is in the interest of the higher-status group to minimise the importance of "consensual status differentials", and it may be in the interest of the lower-status group to magnify them. Tajfel (1982:19) elaborates as follows:

> These studies all point to an implicit conflict between ingroup-favouring tendencies and the acknowledged realities of social differentials in power, status, rank, or privilege. This conflict, in turn, reflects the fact that these differentials are often not accepted as immutable and legitimate. The perceived *il*legitimacy of intergroup differentials leads

[51] Tajfel and Turner (1986:289) believe that this was in all likelihood the set of conditions which gave rise to the development of ethnocentrism among black Americans, French Canadians and New Zealand Māori – that is, their inferiority was rejected as illegitimate and unstable (changeable).

[52] Tajfel and Turner (1986:289) provide as an example the postbellum situation in the southern US, when white people, feeling threatened by their former slaves, abruptly abandoned "their paternalistic stereotypes of the blacks as 'childlike' in favour of openly hostile and derogatory ones".

[53] Tajfel and Turner (1986:289) cite the Prisoner Dilemma as an example, wherein white discrimination against black opponents increased when the opponent was co-operative, but decreased when they were more competitive.

> to a variety of consequences in the reciprocal behaviour and attitudes of the groups involved.

According to Tajfel (1982:19), existing research suggests that the experimentally induced illegitimacy of intergroup status differentials increases ingroup-favouring bias. For example, Commins and Lockwood (1979) provided such an example of inequitably disadvantaged groups demonstrating the most ingroup bias. Furthermore, when the responsibility of assigning illegitimate advantage or disadvantage was shifted from the experimenters to the participants themselves, results were even more pronounced.

Likewise, Brown and Ross (1982; cited in Tajfel, 1982:19) found that in conditions of "'high threat' caused by the outgroup's defence of illegitimate differentials, both the higher and the lower status groups showed marked outgroup discrimination; the lower status group actually *reversed* the pattern of ingroup derogation which it had shown in the 'low threat' condition". These findings seem to support my hypothesis that instead of being caused by the mere existence of (minority) ethnic identity and identification (or even, according to SIT, power and status differentials), minority group radicalisation is in response to changes in the broader sociopolitical landscape, including (potentially) the radicalisation of the majority group. In the same vein as reciprocal intergroup behaviour and conflict, we may thus speak of *reciprocal radicalisation*. This term is consistent with Schmid's (2013:19) conceptualisation of radicalisation as occurring within a "conflict dyad".

3.2.3.6. Strategies for status improvement

Subordinate groups (and members) in search of positive social identity have several strategies for status improvement available to them, depending on their position on the continuum of systems of belief (see subsection 3.2.3.2). Tajfel and Turner (1986:286) identify three broad reactions to negative or threatened social identities, namely: (i) individual mobility; (ii) social creativity; and (iii) social competition.

The strategy of *individual mobility* most often implies individual attempts to achieve upward social mobility and move to a higher-status group. According to Tajfel and Turner (1986:286), individuals may attempt to leave, or dissociate themselves from their original group, especially if they approach the "social mobility" pole of the continuum of belief systems. They state that tendencies to dissociate oneself psychologically from fellow members of low-prestige categories are commonly known through everyday experience, but have also been noted in the literature.

> The most important feature of individual mobility is that the low status of one's own group is not thereby changed: it is an individualist approach designed, at least in the short run, to achieve a personal, not a group, solution. Thus, individual mobility implies a disidentification with the erstwhile ingroup.

In contrast to this individualist approach, group members may respond to negative or threatened social identities by seeking positive distinctiveness for the ingroup by redefining or altering the elements of the comparative situation (Tajfel and Turner, 1986:287). This second strategy, termed *social creativity*, does not necessarily involve any change in the group's social position or access to resources relative to the outgroup, and can be accomplished in the following ways (Tajfel and Turner, 1986:287):

(a) Comparing the ingroup to the outgroup on some *new* dimension. This requires the value assigned to the new social attribute to be legitimised first in the ingroup and then in the other groups involved. Intergroup tension can be predicted if this legitimisation threatens the outgroup's superior distinctiveness.
(b) Changing the values assigned to the attributes of the group, so that previously negative comparisons are now perceived as positive. A classic example is the "Black is beautiful" movement, where the salient dimension (skin colour) remained the same, but the prevailing value system related to it was rejected and reversed.
(c) Changing or selecting the outgroup with which the ingroup is compared, in order to cease or avoid using a high-status outgroup as a comparative frame of reference. Avoiding comparisons with the high-status outgroup leads to a decrease in the salience of inferiority and the recovery of self-esteem.[54]

Tajfel (1982:19) cites a study by Lemaine and Kastersztein (1972) which randomly but explicitly provided one of two competing groups with poorer materials for the building of a hut. The "underprivileged" group built a hut of lower quality. However, in an act of *social creativity*, they surrounded it with a garden, and attempted to legitimise the garden as an integral part of the competition in the eyes of the outgroup and the judges.

[54] Tajfel and Turner (1986:287) cite Hyman's (1942) work on the psychology of status, which suggested that discontent among low-status group members is lessened when *intraclass*, rather than intergroup comparisons are made. They also note Rosenberg and Simmons's (1972) study which found that the self-esteem of black people was higher when they compared themselves with other black people, rather than with white people. Tajfel and Turner argue that competition between subordinate groups is sometimes more intense than between subordinate and dominant groups, pointing at the example of lower-class or "poor white" racism.

The third strategy for dealing with negative or threatened social identities, *social competition*, is also a group approach, whereby group members seek positive distinctiveness through *direct competition* with the outgroup. According to Tajfel and Turner (1986:287), they may attempt to reverse the relative positions of the ingroup and outgroup on salient dimensions. This strategy thus implies changes in the groups' *objective* social locations. In other words, this strategy is not merely a reinterpretation of the social hierarchy, but the actual alteration thereof. This strategy is associated with the "social change" pole of the continuum of systems of beliefs. Following RCT, Tajfel and Turner (1986:287) speculate that this strategy will lead to conflict and antagonism between subordinate and dominant groups insofar as it focuses on the distribution of scarce resources. Tajfel and Turner (1986:287) raise the following question regarding how unequal societies can avoid such intergroup conflict:

> Let us assume as an ideal case some stratification of social groups in which the social hierarchy is reasonably correlated with an unequal division of objective resources and a corresponding status system (based on the outcomes of comparisons in terms of those resources). Under what conditions will this *not* lead to intergroup conflict – or, more precisely, to the development of competitive ethnocentrism on the part of the subordinate group?

According to Tajfel and Turner (1986:287-288), to the extent that "exiting" the ingroup and "passing" as a member of the outgroup is objectively and subjectively perceived as possible, in situations of negative social identity, low status tends to promote the widespread adoption of individual mobility strategies. This weakens the internal cohesion of the subordinate group (i.e., subjective attachment to the ingroup among members) which, in turn, blurs the perception of distinct group interests corresponding to the distinct group identities, and thus creates obstacles to mobilising group members for collective action over shared interests and ultimately hinders a change in the group status. In other words, while intergroup conflict might be avoided if the individual mobility strategy is followed, doing so depends on the permeability of group borders, and will negatively impact the improvement of the status of the ingroup as a whole.

When there are strong objective, moral and/or ideological barriers to exiting the ingroup,[55] Tajfel and Turner (1986:288) believe that negative social identity may stimulate social

[55] SIT's acknowledgement of the potential inability to exit the ingroup, stands in direct opposition to rational choice theory and cosmopolitanism as discussed in the previous chapter. As Nagel (1994; cited in May, 2012:43) suggested, individuals' choice of group membership is constricted by the *external* imposition of categorisations. Calhoun (2007; cited in May, 2012:114) similarly intimated that only the privileged few are able to pursue their interests through individual action, while the rest face categorical *ascription* and discrimination.

creativity that often reduces the salience of the subordinate/dominant group conflict of interest (that is, aside from the social competition which frequently results from the inability to exit the ingroup). They note that strategy ii(c) is often employed since certain comparative dimensions (access to housing, jobs or education) are very central to the fate of a group and cannot easily be revalued: "Few underprivileged groups would accept poverty as a virtue, but it may appear more tolerable to the degree that comparisons are made with even poorer groups rather than with those that are better off".

According to Tajfel and Turner (1986:288), both individual mobility and some forms of social creativity can reduce intergroup conflict over scarce resources, although, not without some negative consequences. The former destroys subordinate group solidarity and does not address negative social identity at the group level, whereas the latter may involve the "collective repression of objective deprivation" or the "spurious rivalry" with another deprived group.[56] In search of a way to avoid social competition, they thus hypothesise:

> By reversing the conditions under which social stratification does not produce intergroup conflict, we can hypothesise that negative social identity promotes subordinate-group competitiveness toward the dominant group to the degree that: (a) subjective identification with the subordinate group is maintained; and (b) the dominant group continues or begins to be perceived as a relevant comparison group.

Based on Tajfel and Turner's (1986) views on the three status improvement strategies, we can surmise that an actual change in the relative status of a subordinate group (thus the social competition strategy), or achieving social change, cannot occur without resulting in intergroup conflict to some degree. Tajfel and Turner (1986:278) noted the strong link between the social change belief system and explicit intergroup conflicts of interest in subsection 3.2.3.2.

Tajfel and Turner (1986:289) caution, however, that their equation of social competition and intergroup conflict rests on the assumption that the salient dimensions of intergroup differentiation involve scarce resources, thus the main contention of RCT. They highlight that there is little reason to believe that intergroup differentiation is *inherently* conflictual, although it may lead to overt conflict and hostility "when a group's action for positive distinctiveness is frustrated, impeded, or in any way actively prevented by an outgroup" (1986:289-290). Taken together, this suggests that if status differentials are linked to (realistic) conflicts of interests,

[56] Tajfel and Turner (1986:288) cite Berry *et al*. (1977) who found that French Canadians are more disparaging of other minority groups than English Canadians.

and if, additionally, the outgroup inhibits the subordinate group from achieving positive distinctiveness, intergroup conflict could be especially potent.

3.2.3.7. Ethnic identity and psycholinguistic distinctiveness

Much of the discussion on groups so far in this chapter has been on groups in general, and not on ethnic or linguistic groups specifically, which is what this thesis is ultimately concerned with. Tajfel (1982:26-27) points out that SIT's deliberations on intergroup behaviour and cognitive processes are very applicable to ethnolinguistic groups – in particular strategies for group distinctiveness:

> An area of work which has proved sensitive to testing the CIC interaction is that of the linguistic aspect of ethnic and national identity. There is a vast amount of evidence from history, anthropology, and political science that various forms of linguistic distinctiveness are perceived as a crucial mainstay in the revival or preservation of a separate ethnic or national identity. This has led in recent years to a considerable amount of research, conducted in many sociocultural contexts, which attempted to integrate sociocultural aspects of language use with the study of psychological intergroup processes. Several discussions and reviews of this work are now available (e.g. Bourhis & Giles 1977, Giles 1979, Husband 1979, Lambert 1980, Giles & Johnson 1981). The achievement by ethnic or national groups of "psycholinguistic distinctiveness" (Giles et al 1977) is equivalent to the "positive group distinctiveness" discussed earlier in relation to the CIC processes. The nature of the existing relations between the groups determines the choice of one or more between a number of possible strategies which are available to an ethnolinguistic minority for coping with its disadvantages. When the boundaries between the groups are not firmly drawn, in the sense that access to the dominant language group does not present too much difficulty, a strategy of individual assimilation is often adopted (see Giles & Johnson, 1981). Another individual strategy is that of "illegitimate" assimilation (Breakwell 1979, Tajfel 1981, Chap. 15) which consists of concealing one's background or origin in the use of language as well as through other forms of concealment (e.g. changes of name, the "passing" of light-skinned blacks, etc.). These individual strategies differ sharply from group strategies which are sometimes determined by difficulty of access to the outgroup, sometimes by strong internal pressures for preserving group identity, and very often by a combination of both these conditions. The attempts to achieve positive group distinctiveness are translated here into various forms of linguistic "social creativity", some of which are conceptually similar to the behaviour shown by the disadvantaged group in the Lemaine & Kastersztein (1972) study mentioned earlier in this chapter. In some cases there is a positive re-evaluation of the group's language or dialect (e.g. Bourhis & Giles 1977). In others, linguistic divergences from the outgroup are accentuated (e.g. Doise et al 1976, Bourhis et al 1979). In still others, this accentuation of divergence takes the form of intense efforts to revive the separate language of the group, as was the case, perhaps most dramatically, with modern Hebrew in Israel and with the corresponding attitudes widely shared in the national groups (e.g. Seckbach 1974).

In order to achieve a positive social identity, Bekker (2003:66) states that minority-group members may attempt to assimilate into the majority group by acquiring the *markers* of majority-group social identity – that is, by following a strategy of social mobility. Since language is often a symbol of group membership, he believes that it can become the focus of social comparisons aimed at achieving positive social identity (2003:65). In cases where language is a central comparative dimension, social mobility would involve adopting the variety of the majority group and, possibly, passing as an outgroup member in certain situations.

According to Bekker (2003:65), minority groups, however, often pressure members to refrain from attempting to follow social mobility strategies – although, this might be difficult in any case if group membership is (at least partly) based on immutable attributes (such as skin colour).[57] Contrastively, majority groups tend to encourage the belief in social mobility "in order to obscure social inequalities" and avoid challenges to the status quo (through the strategy of social competition), and thus any changes to power and status differentials between groups.

If minority groups view the power relations as unstable or illegitimate (or both), Bekker (2003:65) maintains that they will instead engage in social competition with the majority group with the aim of changing the existing balance of power. The strategy of social competition, as it relates to language, involves changing the relative status of the minority and majority languages, and the attempt to increase the use of the minority group's language in the public sphere (see Afrikaans Language Movements in Chapters 4 and 5). He also cites the abovementioned example of the resurgence of Hebrew as language of Israel, as well as the resurgence of Welsh as an important symbol of ethnic identity (2003:66).

Fishman (2011:51; 59) notes the link between "the beloved language" and affect, and highlights the central position that language often occupies in both individual and group identity. According to Tollefson (2002d:5), the symbolic value of a language can have profound consequences for both minority-language groups, who are attempting to negotiate complex and changing identities, as well as majority-language groups, who are attempting to retain political and economic power. Tajfel (1982:27) maintains, however, that intragroup heterogeneity of linguistic groups is to be expected:

[57] See Kymlicka's (1995; cited in May, 2012:124) internal restrictions in Chapter 2, which suggests that members' individual liberty is restricted in order to maintain group solidarity.

> It would be an oversimplification, however, to exaggerate the ingroup's uniformity of attitudes and behaviour in these psycholinguistic expressions of the push toward a distinctive ethnic or national identity. In this and other areas, multiple group memberships, differences of individual positions within the group, and the salience of subgroup membership (Zavalloni 1972, 1973, 1975) determine a diversity of patterns. Any conceptual scheme can only account for a limited part of the variance. Its range of validity and the appearance of alternative patterns can be interpreted adequately only when the relevant psychological processes are looked at in conjunction with the study of their socio-cultural contexts.

3.3. SIT: Evaluations and Additions

3.3.1. Criticisms of social identity theory (SIT)

According to Brown (2000:753), there are five main issues that are problematic for SIT, namely (i) the relationship between group identification and ingroup bias; (ii) the self-esteem hypothesis; (iii) the phenomenon of positive-negative asymmetry in intergroup discrimination; (iv) the effects of intergroup similarity; and (v) the choice of identity maintenance strategies by low-status groups. While the exact particulars of these issues are beyond the scope of this chapter, I note this to acknowledge that no theory is without its weaknesses or contradictions when applied in real-world contexts.

For example, some studies have found, contrary to SIT's predictions regarding intergroup similarity and discrimination, that groups that perceive themselves to hold similar attitudinal norms, or to enjoy equivalent status, show more intergroup attraction and less bias than dissimilar groups (I noted this discrepancy in subsection 3.2.3.3, and deliberated on potential reasons). As regards the fifth issue, Brown contends that SIT suffers from a lack of predictive power in specifying the reactions of low-status group members to negative identity. He elaborates on this point as follows (2000:760):

> This imprecision in being able to specify how members of low-status groups will react to their negative identity needs rectifying. Both psychologically and politically, there is all the difference in the world between members of underprivileged groups directly challenging the dominant group's position, emphasising unconventional values, turning to the past for solace, seeking out other oppressed groups for more comfortable comparisons, or 'jumping ship' altogether. At present, only the choice of the latter option seems well predicted by SIT; the remaining strategies have yet to be theoretically and empirically differentiated.

In other words, while SIT offers a comprehensive analysis of the strategy of individual mobility, or exiting the ingroup, and can predict under which conditions this strategy will be followed, strategies to maintain the ingroup and improve its status (including maintaining and

improving the status of the minority language, if important to the identity) are under-researched. As, I believe, the Afrikaner case study will demonstrate, lower-status groups may be predicted to follow group-based strategies when exiting the ingroup is not possible, or for as long as they continue to derive positive social identity from their ingroup (and thus view their lower status as illegitimate and unstable).

In the case of ethnolinguistic groups, this translates to a deep sense of pride in the language, history, and other cultural items associated with the particular ethnic identity, despite derogation of these items by the majority group.[58] This hypothesis mirrors the recognition within the field of MLR of the role of sentimental attachments to minority languages, both in language maintenance and ethnolinguistic conflict. Furthermore, the choice between social creativity or social competition strategies will depend on the specific sociopolitical landscape; the more political and/or economic power wielded by the minority group within the nation-state, the higher the likelihood of engaging in social competition and direct intergroup conflict.

In order to strengthen SIT, Brown (2000:760) argues that there are five areas that have to be developed, namely: (i) expanding the concept of social identity; (ii) predicting comparison choice; (iii) adding an affective component to the theory; (iv) managing multiple identities simultaneously in multicultural contexts; and (v) incorporating implicit social identity processes. While I do not attempt to address all these shortcomings of SIT, by merging May's (2012) MLR framework with SIT, my thesis does include an expanded conceptualisation of social identity, as well as an understanding of the presence of multiple group identities.

With regards to area (i), Brown (2000:760) states that social identities can be sustained in other ways than through intergroup comparison, namely through ingroup evaluations in the form of comparisons over time or against abstract standards. Brown (2000:760-761) also contends that SIT does not acknowledge that a variety of groups can serve as the basis of people's social identity, nor does it differentiate between different kinds of groups which "might serve quite different identity functions" (consider the different instrumental and sentimental functions served by national and ethnic identities). He states that when participants are asked to classify

[58] This hypothesis should not be understood to mean that minority ethnic identification is the source of intergroup conflict, which would thus be prevented if minority-group members would follow the strategy of individual mobility (i.e., assimilate). The unequal power dynamic which sees the dominant outgroup derogate the subordinate ingroup, and pressure its members to assimilate, should be critically analysed, and should not be assumed to simply disappear once assimilation is complete (to the extent that this is possible for ethnolinguistic groups, especially where race is also a divider between in- and outgroup).

a large number of groups, major clusters appear surrounding occupation, political affiliation, and larger categories like ethnicity and religion.

> Not only did these studies reveal that different kinds of groups were imbued with different psychological meanings and properties, but when different identities were experimentally invoked, once again disparate correlations between identification and ingroup bias were observed, despite the fact that levels of identification were approximately the same (and positive) in all cases (Brown & Torres, 1996). It seems to me that an important step for SIT to take is to incorporate these central dimensions of group diversity and no longer to assume that a group is a group is a group as far as key social psychological mechanisms are concerned.

Brown (2000:761) argues that following from this expanded view of social identity, it stands to reason that group membership(s) may serve a host of identity functions, many of which are not currently addressed by SIT's account of social identity processes. When participants were asked to rate key aspects of their group membership, seven functions emerged, namely: (i) self-insight; (ii) intergroup comparisons; (iii) cohesion; (iv) collective self-esteem; (v) interpersonal comparisons; (vi) social interaction opportunities; and (vii) romantic relationships (assumed to mean opportunities to establish them). Only the second and fourth functions are described by SIT. Brown highlights that different kinds of groups emphasised different functions. For example, sports team members indicated (ii), (iv) and (vi), whereas religious group members emphasised (i), (iii) and (iv).

Brown (2020:10) believes, in addition, that SIT as a theory of identity (as opposed to a theory of intergroup relations) does not do justice to the complexities of group-based identities in the world today. He states that the omission of the words "social identity" from the original 1979 version of SIT (intergroup behaviour, social comparison, and social change) is telling (2020:12). He recounts that it was, in fact, Turner who first used the term "social identity", and that Tajfel disliked it because he deemed it to be misleading. Brown (2020:10) argues that there are many other reasons, in addition to the search for positive distinctiveness, which motivate identity maintenance, enhancement or restoration.

According to Brown (2020:17), SIT predicted the well-being benefits of groups through *intergroup comparisons*; the need for positive self-esteem motivated the search for distinctiveness, which would presumably result in increased well-being. He states, however, that social cure research found that group memberships and identifications are beneficial to health and well-being *in and of themselves* – that is, whether or not other groups are physically

and/or psychologically present (2020:18).[59] Maintaining a minority ethnic identity is, therefore, not simply done for instrumental reasons as a function of intergroup conflict, but for the personal benefits that membership of an ethnic group offers individuals. Finally, Brown (2020:11) maintains that SIT does not account for multi-faceted identities, intersectionality, and the matter of salience of various identities, or the possibility of intragroup variation in strength of group identification.

Area (ii) of the shortcomings of SIT is the lack of prediction power regarding comparison choice. Brown (2000:762) highlights that SIT has paid little attention to the choice of comparator in intergroup comparisons, reflected in its experimental practises which leave participants with no choice of outgroup referent. SIT studies also do not account for temporal comparisons, i.e., comparing with one's own ingroup at some point in the past or future. Brown (2000:763) also points out that although SIT emphasises intergroup comparisons for strategic purposes, in real-world situations, comparisons and choices of referents might not always be "under people's conscious control" (see below for elaboration).

Addressing area (iii), Brown (2000:763) cites Brewer's (1999) statement that SIT is "a theory of ingroup love rather than outgroup hate". Brown argues that while SIT does focus on intergroup relations marked by prejudice and hostility, it struggles to answer how, when and why groups display negative affect toward each other, as ingroup-favouring bias can occur *without* outgroup hostility.[60] In subsection 3.3.3, I discuss group-related emotions in intergroup situations.

According to Brown (2020:13), SIT predicted possible reactions to identity threats in terms of achieving positive distinctiveness, operationalised through ingroup favouritism, and measured by differential evaluations or reward allocations. He argues that both at an empirical level, and

[59] Social cure research investigates how group memberships and the social identities related to them, impact people's mental and physical health. See Jetten *et al*. (2012) for a comprehensive overview of such findings which demonstrate that social identity (and the social support and sense of community they offer individuals), constitutes a "social cure" to individuals facing physical illnesses and mental trauma.

[60] To this end, Smith (1993; cited in Brown, 2000:763) suggests incorporating appraisal theories of emotion into the SIT framework, distinguishing between five major emotional states (fear, disgust, contempt, anger and jealousy) and posits that each might have its own antecedent conditions as well as different consequences for intergroup behaviour. Relatedly, Fiske *et al*. (1999; cited in Brown, 2000:763-764) suggest that greater attention be paid to the *content* of stereotypes. Brewer (1999; cited in Brown, 2000:764) meanwhile believes that a number of societal and sociopsychological variables may transform ingroup narcissism into outgroup derogation. These include, among others, *societal complexity* (simpler societies with less cross-cutting categorisations may be more prone to intergroup antagonism); the development of *ideologies of moral superiority* which legitimise maltreatment of outgroups; and the presence of *superordinate goals without a corresponding superordinate identity*, where groups are opposed to the implied loss of subgroup identities.

at a theoretical level, emotions (such as derogation towards the outgroup) were nearly completely absent, and no hypotheses were made about when groups might actually dislike or hate each other. He elaborates as follows (2020:13):

> This is both an ironic and a lamentable omission. Ironic because Tajfel's life mission was to understand how human barbarity, as manifested in the Holocaust and other genocides, could come about (Brown, 2019). And lamentable because then, as now, many of the most serious manifestations of prejudice in everyday life self-evidently involve strongly felt emotions. When people deface Jewish graves with swastikas, or rip a hijab from a Muslim woman's head, or brutally assault a Gay couple holding hands in the street, surely the perpetrators are doing something more than seeking to establish some positive distinctiveness for their ingroups? Not for nothing are such behaviours called *hate* crimes.

Manstead (2018; cited in Brown, 2020:13) argues that the classic version of SIT dealt with emotions implicitly through ideas such as identity threat and the (presumably emotionally driven) search for positive distinctiveness. However, ultimately it treated emotions as an epiphenomenon. Billig (2016; cited in Brown, 2020:14) believes that SIT may explain how marginalised groups can "boost themselves" and affect social change, but it does not explain what it originally set out to, that is, why the Germans persecuted the Jews. Brown (2020:13) insists that there is "little explicitly stated in the theory which permits specific predictions about when, where, and how prejudice will be shown".

> SIT is at its most detailed when discussing the plight of lower status groups and the conditions when they may agitate for social change; it is much less specific about members of privileged or majority groups who, after all, are often the main perpetrators of prejudice and discrimination.

Regarding area (iv) of the shortcomings of SIT, Brown (2000:765) emphasises the importance of developing the SIT framework in order to strengthen its predictive power regarding intergroup conflict within nation-states:

> The urgency of this task is underlined by the increasingly multicultural nature of many societies: national or supranational categories may contain several ethnic, linguistic or religious subgroups. There is thus a political problem of devising policies to ensure that contact between these groups results in the most harmonious (or least destructive) outcomes, and a theoretical problem of understanding how (or if) multiple social identities can be simultaneously sustained.

To this end, Brown (2000:765) cites acculturation theory research, which suggests that minority groups prefer integration, where they identify with both their own culture and "the host community". He also cites research which suggests that integration, or dual identity

strategy, which allows for the maintenance of subgroup and superordinate identities, "lead to favourable outcomes" (see subsection 3.5.3 for full discussion) (2000:766). Brown emphasises, however, that the challenge remains to persuade majority groups to "adopt such a dual identity approach in their dealings with outgroups". He notes, however, that attempts to create a more inclusive category in intergroup situations involving "the evocation of a superordinate category", could lead to subgroups defending their subgroup attributes as well as intergroup conflict over the composition of such a superordinate category.[61] In Chapter 1, subsection 1.4.1, I highlighted the potential for intergroup conflict when nation-building is pursued by the majority group. This also corresponds with May's (2012) views regarding minority group responses to the pursuit of nation-state congruence.

Elaborating on area (v), Brown (2000:766) notes that there is a growing interest within social psychology in the distinction between *automatic* and *controlled* processes. He cites studies which show that there are quite pervasive ingroup-favouring biases associated with ethnicity at an automatic level, that is, unconsciously or implicitly, but that these biases are only weakly or not at all related to more explicit measures of intergroup evaluation or prejudice. This conflicts with instrumentalists' conception of (minority) ethnic identification as cynically mobilised to instrumental ends, and thus controlled processes. Brown adds that further evidence suggests that these ingroup biases might be "generic", considering the fact that they can be observed using "subliminal primes" such as 'we' and 'they', or minimal category labels. On the other hand, he points out that there is contrasting evidence which counters this "universalist" tone, highlighting that people display different levels of prejudice, identification and thus different patterns of stereotype activation (2000:767).

With its focus on *active* attempts to navigate social identities in social environments, Brown (2000:767) maintains that SIT is largely concerned with the *strategic*, and therefore *voluntary*, nature of the sociopsychological processes involved in social identity maintenance or enhancement. Brown believes that because of this "constructivist perspective" – note the overlap with May's critique of constructionist views of ethnicity – SIT research has focused on controlled processes, and thus "on various explicit measures of intergroup attitudes and behaviour". He thus recommends that the SIT framework be improved by developing the theoretical and methodological tools with which to interpret "which (if any) social identity

[61] Mummendey and Wenzel (1999; cited in Brown, 2000:766) argue that the optimal superordinate prototype is one that is sufficiently ill-defined in order to accommodate a wide range of interpretations of such an inclusive category.

processes operate at an automatic level, how they do so and with what consequences for attitudes and behaviour at a more controlled level.[62] Summarising his appraisal of Tajfellian SIT, Brown (2020:14) states:

> In summary, then, as a formal theory, with clearly stated propositions and hypotheses and well-specified boundary conditions, SIT is lacking in several respects. It also is insufficient as a theory of identity or of prejudice. Nevertheless, those deficiencies do not detract from its remarkable generative power in stimulating many diverging and highly productive lines of enquiry. This is where the true value of SIT's legacy lies: as an invaluable general framework which provides the foundations, but not the detailed building plan, for understanding the manifold ways in which social behaviour in intergroup settings can be transformed, once people's identities as group members become psychologically salient.

3.3.2. Self-categorisation theory (SCT)

3.3.2.1. Prototypicality and polarisation

Seeking to address these shortcomings, *Self-Categorisation Theory* (SCT) grew out of SIT, but significantly extended it by offering a general theory of group processes. Brown (2020:16) states that while (internal) cohesion had traditionally been conceptualised as the sum total of interpersonal attractions among group members, SCT posited that group cohesion often arises not from liking fellow group members, but from liking the *idea of the group* as embodied by the most prototypical members. SCT, Brown explains, also suggests that interaction between group members influences the ingroup's perception of itself, and potential behaviours towards outgroups:

> It is by talking to our fellow group members about matters of concern to us – our country's immigration policy, or our political party's manifesto, or our football club's playing style – that we construct images (stereotypes) of our group and others and plan how to give expression to those identities in behaviour.

According to Hogg *et al*. (1990:77), SCT explains group polarisation as "conformity to a polarised norm which defines one's own group in contrast to other groups within a specific social context". They define *group polarisation* as follows (1990:78):

> Group polarisation is the tendency for group discussion to produce a group decision or consensual group position that is more extreme than the mean of the individual group

[62] Brown (2000:767) provides as an example of such work, the hypothesis offered by Dovidio *et al*. (1997), which is that implicit measures of social attitude (utilising response time association measures or subliminal primes) are more predictive of automatic (or spontaneous) behaviour, whereas explicit measures (such as traditional attitude scales) better reflect controlled (or deliberative) behaviour.

> members' prediscussion attitudes and opinions in the direction already favoured by the group.

Hogg *et al.* (1990:78) claim that this phenomenon, a reliable empirical finding of social psychology, lies beyond "the explanatory range of the traditional 'conformity' perspective on social influence, that mutual influence in groups should lead to convergence on the mean of the group members' positions". They identify *persuasive arguments* or *informational influence theory*, as well as *social comparisons/cultural values theory* as possible explanations for group polarisation.

The first of these theories relates to the expanded pool of novel pro and con arguments to which an individual is exposed through discussion with others, and the resulting increased support for, greater confidence in and more extreme endorsement of "one's original tendency". The second theory, Hogg *et al*. (1990:78) explain, posits that an individual in any given society will be aware of the views, opinions and behaviours that are valued in that society, and will attempt to adhere to those standards in order to avoid social disapproval (including rejection from the ingroup). This social approval motive, they add, ensures that during interaction each individual will express a more extreme position (1990:79). This theory concerns so-called bandwagon effects and the removal of pluralistic ignorance. The latter is a phenomenon that occurs when people mistakenly believe their own view to be the minority position, leading to a false consensus on the actual minority position with which most people disagree (Nickerson, 2023).

According to Hogg *et al*. (1990:79), these two theories (neither of which has won complete acceptance) each represent two distinct processes of social influence – namely, true cognitive change and simple behavioural compliance – which, in combination, has been termed the *two-process dependency model* of social influence. They state that while both theories enjoy empirical support, there are some conceptual weaknesses and problematic findings (1990:79). Although utilising the two-process model could mitigate some of these issues, they suggest employing SCT instead to investigate group phenomena such as social influence, specifically in terms of social identity processes. They outline SCT's explanation of group polarisation as follows (1990:79-80):

> [SCT] argues that under conditions which render an ingroup psychologically salient, people conform to the ingroup norm, the position perceived as most consensual. In many circumstances the group norm will be that position which is the average of the ingroup distribution. What better expression can there be of the ethos of the group than the average of the individuals who constitute the group: the position which *minimises* differences between ingroup members. It is equally likely, however, that the ingroup

> norm will not be the group mean, simply because groups do not exist in isolation, but in a wider social frame of reference which encompasses both ingroups and outgroups. The defining features of a group, its norms and stereotypes, not only characterise the ingroup's qualities, but also distinguish the ingroup clearly from relevant other groups and thus *maximise* differences between ingroups and outgroups. The actual position of the ingroup norm is a trade-off between minimisation of intragroup differences and maximisation of intergroup differences.[63]

In support of the SCT analysis of group polarisation, Hogg *et al*. (1990:81) state that there is evidence that individuals are more persuaded by the same information from ingroup sources, as opposed to outgroup sources, showing that social identity is "implicated in group polarisation and can override or subsume persuasive arguments and cultural values effects". They hypothesise that polarisation is "a function of the position of ingroup responses within the relevant salient social frame of reference", that "the direction of polarisation can vary for the same ingroup and is controlled by the relative position of the outgroup" and crucially, that "convergence on the mean and polarisation are both reflections of the same process, the social contextual definition of the ingroup-defining norm" (1990:82).

We can thus start to think here – with an eye on the main topic of this thesis – about what insights can be gleaned from these processes of *polarisation* or *extremitisation* (see Mackie, 1986; cited in Hogg *et al*., 1990) as it relates to the processes of *essentialisation* and *radicalisation*. SCT's conceptualisation of the ingroup norm (which involves ideologies and behaviours) as being polarised by the outgroup norm through intergroup differentiation, further supports my hypothesis regarding the reciprocal nature of group radicalisation.

In the introduction to this thesis, I noted Schmid's (2013:19) definition of radicalisation as a situation of political polarisation between groups with conflicting interests, wherein a shift occurs from "mainstream or status quo" positions, toward more "radical or extremist" positions involving a dichotomous worldview. As I have argued throughout Chapters 2 and 3, the relationship between radicalisation and political turmoil is not a one-way causal process; rather, the radicalisation of one group often occurs in conjunction with (or in response to) the

[63] This contrast between differences is referred to as *metacontrast* – a ratio which can be calculated based on an equation, and in doing so, locate the "theoretical ingroup norm embodied in the prototypical ingroup position" (Hogg *et al*., 1990:80). Hogg *et al*. (1990) state that it is possible for the prototype, which varies with the social context of intergroup comparison, to be more extreme that the mean, signifying polarisation. For example, the norm of a group of "moderate vegetarians" would be roughly the mean of their individual positions. However, the norm would polarise away from "extreme vegetarianism" when confronted by a group of vegans, and toward "extreme vegetarianism" when confronted by a group of meat eaters, in order to maximise intergroup difference. In this ironic way, the beliefs of the outgroup reinforce and exaggerate differing ingroup beliefs.

radicalisation of some other actor, so that political stability cannot be achieved by simply addressing the radicalisation of one party, and not the other.

Experimental research conducted by Hogg *et al*. (1990:96) suggest that group polarisation (as convergence on a polarised group norm) is a function of "the salient subjective frame of reference and to some extent the degree of identification (as monitored by our variables) with the group".[64] There exists, therefore, a relationship not only between group polarisation and outgroup norms, but also between group polarisation and increased ingroup identification (which could potentially involve essentialisation of identity-relevant attributes).[65] Brown (2000:746) summarises how SCT has expanded SIT's understanding of group behaviour as follows:

> Perhaps foremost of these was that [SIT] offered the possibility of addressing a classic social psychological problem of the relationship of the individual to the group and the emergence of collective phenomena from individual cognitions. This analysis has been developed more formally in Self-Categorisation Theory (SCT) where it is shown how uniform behaviour can result from the internalisation of the same group concept and categorical attributes by ingroup members (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987).

3.3.2.2. Uncertainty-identity theory (UIT)

Building on the insights on social identity and intergroup behaviour offered by SIT and SCT, Michael Hogg pioneered *uncertainty-identity theory* (UIT), attempting to explain why people continued to maintain "exclusionary ethnocentric identities" and to find ways to foster integration and social cohesion (2023:826). He posits that the social context may cause people to experience a feeling of *uncertainty* regarding their identity, as well as the way they (and others) are 'supposed' to think and behave (2016:10; 2023:827). Hogg (2016:10) elaborates on this phenomenon as follows:

> Uncertainty-identity theory (Hogg, 2007, 2012) is based on the premise that feeling uncertain about our world and in particular how to behave and how others will behave can be unsettling, even aversive. Uncertainty makes it difficult to predict and plan behaviour in such a way as to be able to act efficaciously. Not surprisingly people try to reduce uncertainty about their perceptions, attitudes, feelings, and behaviours. We

[64] As the groups were assigned in this study, it is unclear whether pre-existing groups (such as ethnic groups) would have delivered stronger results.

[65] SCT seems to support Barth's (1969; cited in May, 2012:33-34) (and other constructionists') view of ethnic identity formation as an intragroup process which is in response to outgroup members and changing circumstances. From May's (2012) framework, we know, however, that this is an incomplete notion of identity, as it fails to recognise the pre-existing ethnies on which groups are based, and which are not in service of instrumental goals. Instead, we can refer to Bourdieu's (1990; cited in May, 2012:47-51) notions of habitus and field to better understand the process of intragroup norm-making within an intergroup environment of polarisation.

> are particularly motivated to reduce uncertainty if we feel uncertain about things that reflect on or are relevant to self, or if we are uncertain about self per se; about our identity, who we are, how we relate to others, and how we are socially located. Ultimately, people need to know who they are, how to behave, and what to think, and who others are, how they might behave, and what they might think.

According to Hogg (2016:10), uncertainty is reduced through the process of social categorisation since the latter provides prototypes. Despite these prototypes, he states that groups are almost always internally differentiated – more prototypical members influence the group, while less prototypical members are met with suspicion from fellow group members (2016:12).[66] Hogg (2016:12) describes the dire implications of non-prototypicality for ingroup members as follows:

> We have already seen that prototypically central members are more influential than less prototypical members. Less prototypical members, particularly those who are prototypically marginal, are not liked or trusted much by the group, and are therefore not only relatively uninfluential but can be viewed with suspicion as deviants who potentially threaten the group (Marques, Abrams, Páez, & Hogg, 2001). Indeed, people on the normative boundary between in- and outgroup, particularly if they are generally not very likeable individuals, are disliked more and are more strongly rejected if they are ingroup than outgroup members – they are treated as "black sheep" (Marques & Páez, 1994).

In Chapter 4, subsection 4.3.3.3, and Chapter 5, subsection 5.3.2.5, I touch on (a segment of) the "black sheep" within the Afrikaner group, so-called internal dissidents. To Hogg's point above, Brown (2020:16) emphasises that in intragroup processes, not all group members are equal – leaders may emerge who exert more influence over the group. He states that successful leaders, or *entrepreneurs of identity*, are perceived by their followers as reflecting the prototypical attributes of the group, and they may actively shape group members' social identities by defining what ingroup membership means (2020:16-17).[67] Despite the marginal

[66] Hogg (2023:832) contends that less prototypical members have greater uncertainty, and either try to win the ingroup's trust, or disidentify and seek identity confirmation elsewhere. The ability of these members to function in social contexts without (or with less) social categorisation and adherence to prototypes (i.e., their behaviour is located closer to the interpersonal end of the continuum), suggests that they are relying less on social identity (and more on personal identity) for their positive self-concept. Korf and Malan (2002:153) cite research which found that strong personal identity and self-esteem may act as a buffer against the threat of social evaluation. The fact that less prototypical members' non-normative behaviour triggers suspicion among prototypical ingroup members, may indicate that the latter have identity uncertainty which they mediate through the imposition of norms on other group members (see internal restrictions in Chapter 1, subsection 1.3.5).

[67] This relates to Brass's (1985; cited in May, 2012:39) notion of the dual dimension of ethnic identity formation: interaction/competition with outgroups, and internal struggle for control of the ingroup.

status of less prototypical group members, Hogg (2016:12) argues that in some cases, they may also affect change in their group.

> Although marginal members are generally perceived and treated unfavourably, they may sometimes fulfil important social change functions for the group (Hogg & Wagoner, in press). For example, deviants can serve as ingroup critics (e.g. Hornsey, 2005), or as minority groups that challenge the accepted wisdom of the majority (e.g. Nemeth & Staw, 1989). In both cases, it can be a struggle for marginal members to be heard, but their contribution to the group is, ultimately, constructive – minorities and critics are effectively trying to change the group's identity from inside.

Hogg (2023:830) suggests that the biggest contributor to uncertain social identity is "the perception that there is a fraying of social cohesion, and a fragmentation of society into polarised subgroups". He adds that the perception of marginalisation and exclusion among individuals and subgroups can lead to radicalisation and the further unravelling of the fabric of society, causing even more uncertainty (2023:831). In order to reduce this uncertainty, ingroup identification, solidarity and cohesion is strengthened, and intergroup differentiation is accentuated. Hogg (2023:831) argues that some groups are better able to reduce uncertainty:

> One group attribute that is, particularly well suited to reducing self-uncertainty through group identification is *entitativity* – the property of a group that makes it a distinctive, coherent and clearly structured unit with sharp intergroup boundaries, within which members share attributes and goals, have a shared fate, and interact with one another in a climate of interdependence (Campbell, 1958; Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). Highly entitative groups tend to be cohesive, and have social identities that are simple, clear, unambiguous, prescriptive, focused and consensual. Such identities, which can also be anchored as fixed underlying essences of the group (e.g., Haslam et al., 2006, 1998), are more effective at reducing self-uncertainty than those that are vague, ambiguous, unfocused and dissensual.

In situations of uncertainty, Hogg (2023:831) maintains that people will disidentify from low entitativity groups and identify more strongly with high entitativity groups, that is, groups that are clearly defined and delineated. He also argues that "subgroups within a larger group that has an unclear social identity may, with the right leadership, pursue subgroup autonomy or separation from the larger group", citing empirical evidence which supports this prediction. Echoing May's (2012) recommendation regarding MLR and ethnolinguistic conflict within the nation-state, Hogg (2023:835) recommends that so-called "intergroup leaders" should advance cultural pluralism, multiculturalism, or polyculturalism, which "celebrates subgroups' distinctiveness" and thus "circumvents subgroup identity threat that can fuel balkanisation and entrenchment of separate identities".

3.3.3. Intergroup emotions theory (IET)

Brown (2020:14) states that SIT has spread to many diverse fields, and has been incorporated into the study of, among other things, intergroup emotions, nationalism and patriotism, and intragroup processes (cohesion, social influence, and leadership). He maintains that these topics represent "the majority of the current liveliest and most productive research off-shoots from SIT" (2020:15). Smith and Mackie (2015; cited in Brown, 2020:15), for example, rectified the omission of affect from Tajfel's SIT through their *Intergroup Emotions Theory* (IET), which aims to predict which emotions will be felt by group members in particular intergroup contexts, and to specify which behavioural responses those emotions will give rise to.

According to Mackie and Smith (2018:3), *group-based emotions* are distinct from individual emotions, and arise from and are determined by intragroup and intergroup processes linked to group membership. These are emotions people feel owing to their membership in a group and with which they identify, and they are experienced in the same way as individual emotions. They established, through experimental research, that people have different "emotional profiles" depending on which social identity is made salient (2018:6). They also found that the intensity of identification with a particular group positively correlates with the intensity of positive group-based emotions (2018:7).

Mackie and Smith's (2018:8) group-based emotions are activated and adopted once group membership is activated. They note that there is evidence which suggests that individuals' emotions move toward the emotional *norm* of the group when they are categorised as group members (2018:10). Group membership also activates group-based emotions through an appraisal, construal, or interpretations process. Mackie and Smith (2018:13) explain that group members see the world in terms of what it means for the group, meaning that the appraisal, construal or interpretations processes of objects or events – which determine emotions – are changed by group membership. IET proposes that group-based emotions depend on group members' appraisal of the current intergroup context in which they find themselves (Brown, 2020:15; Mackie & Smith, 2018:14). Brown (2020:15) succinctly summarises group-based emotions and their antecedent appraisals as follows:

> If they [group members] are confronted with a powerful outgroup that looks set to threaten their existence, they will probably feel fear; if they perceive a weaker outgroup that seems to be challenging their superiority, they will feel angry; if they perceive a

> subordinate group which appears to endorse moral values at variance with those of the ingroup, they may well feel disgusted.

Mackie and Smith (2018:14) highlight that group-based anger is "rooted in appraisal of an external threat or obstacle with which the ingroup has resources to cope" and is "affected by appraisals of injustice and illegitimacy". This overlaps with the perception of illegitimacy and/or instability of situations as hypothesised by SIT, and which motivates subordinate groups to seek social change. In addition to anger, fear and disgust, Mackie and Smith (2018) also identify hatred, envy, resentment and guilt as negative group-based emotions. They argue that the latter (termed collective guilt and shame by Brown, 2020:15), are rooted in the appraisal that the ingroup has acted unworthily (or immorally), and/or enjoys an unfair advantage (or benefits) over another group (2018:14). Positive group-based emotions include satisfaction and joy, which may turn into pride, as well as admiration or respect, and hope.

According to Mackie and Smith (2018:17), outgroup emotions may influence the ingroup's emotions, although the latter's perception of the former might involve bias. They state that the more motivated group members are to belong, the more they are motivated to experience (negative or positive) group-based emotions, as long as they believe that doing so will be socially binding (2018:19). They further argue that negative ingroup emotions motivate members to perform ingroup re-defining and re-affiliative behaviours:

> Group-based nostalgia, a yearning for the way the group "used to be", correlates with tendencies to protect ingroup identity (Smeekes, 2015). Collective angst is aroused by contemplation of an extinction threat to the group, and increases members' desire to engage in behaviours such as ensuring that the group's culture and history is passed on, donating to ingroup organisations, preference for ingroup rather than outgroup marriage, and opposition to immigration (Jetter, Mils, Healy & Spears, 2017; Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2015; Wohl, Branscombe & Reysen, 2010).

Mackie and Smith (2018:20) cite evidence which suggests that (even negative) emotions can determine group membership, even when other possible bases for group belonging are available. They explain that group-based emotions and the knowledge that they are shared can "create, maintain, and strengthen identities, particularly when they are under threat", and, consequently, motivate group action. Importantly, Mackie and Smith (2018:22) highlight that certain group-based emotions lead to predictable behaviours; anger leads to "approach, confrontations, and aggression" more often than other group-based emotions, fear to "avoidance and withdrawal", whereas pride tends to increase ingroup affiliation.

3.3.4. Evolutionary psychology

In addition to social psychology, evolutionary psychology also has some interesting insights into group behaviour. While this is rather beyond the scope of this chapter, I include below a brief summary of some of the perspectives on intergroup behaviour which evolutionary psychology offers.

According to McDonald *et al*. (2012:670), there are numerous examples of human tribalism and parochialism described in the social science literature – that is, "the tendency to categorise individuals on the basis of their group membership, and to treat ingroup members benevolently and outgroup members malevolently". They argue, however, that intergroup conflict is neither a modern cultural phenomenon – ethnographic accounts illustrate that intergroup conflict was present in many past hunter-gatherer societies – nor is it limited to humans, noting that intergroup conflict has been documented in hyenas, wolves, lions and most social primates.

McDonald *et al*. (2012:670) provide a synthesis of perspectives from evolutionary and social psychology in order to better conceptualise intergroup conflict. They locate the desire of humans to belong to groups, and the tendency to display ingroup favouritism, in human evolutionary history in which group membership provided "immense survival and reproductive benefits" (2012:671). Intergroup discrimination and aggression, in turn, may be explained through evolutionary theories of sexual selection, parental investment and group selection. Different reproductive strategies between males and females result in strong intrasexual competition among men. Included in this reproductive competition among men, McDonald *et al*. (2012:670) explain, are conflicts over territory, social influence, power and status – resources that may be "converted into reproductive opportunities".

McDonald *et al*. (2012:671) adopt an evolutionary perspective in order to understand the basic sociopsychological processes underlying intergroup conflict. In doing so, they argue that men possess psychological mechanisms which enable them to "form coalitions capable of planning, initiating and executing acts of aggression on members of outgroups (with the ultimate goal of acquiring or protecting reproductive resources)". They refer to this as the *male warrior hypothesis*. In support of this hypothesis, they cite self-report survey research across cultures which demonstrate that men display more xenophobic and ethnocentric attitudes than women.

They cite further research which suggests that men demonstrate greater preference for group-based systems of social hierarchy than women.[68]

According to MacDonald (2009:209), evolutionary theories of culture have generally emphasised the conditions under which certain norms could have evolved,[69] or they have highlighted that random processes of imitation may result in some patterns of culture. He instead proposes a (evolution-based) conflict theory of some aspects of human culture, arguing that conflicts of interest exist over the *construction of culture*, a phenomenon which may be described as *Kulturkampf*. Regarding the mechanisms of cultural production, MacDonald (2009:210; my italics) argues as follows:

> The psychological tools required to understand cultural conflict and its role in the control of behaviour in economically advances societies are general intelligence and, in particular, explicit processing. Explicit processing underlies humans' ability to regulate evolved modular mechanisms related, for example, to aggression, ethnocentrism, and sexuality in accordance with culturally constructed norms and culturally constructed cost/benefit payoff schedules. Moreover, explicit processing enables explicit construals of the costs and benefits associated with different cultural alternatives, and thus motivates behaviour that attempts to influence culture. The result is a theory of culture in which humans are creative, intentional originators of culture that serves their *perceived* interests.

MacDonald's (2009) conceptualisation of culture is thus explicitly constructionist and instrumentalist (although perhaps not on an individual level; see below). On general intelligence and its link to a conflict theory of culture, MacDonald (2009:212) states:

> People are able to imagine alternative scenarios and are able to devise creative, novel solutions to attaining or avoiding these scenarios, and they are able to use analogical reasoning to do so. This process creates new cultural categories as well as new artifacts designed to achieve these solutions.

MacDonald (2009:221) distinguishes *ideology* from idiosyncratic beliefs, claiming that the former signifies a coherent set of beliefs that characterise a significant group of people and motivates their behaviour. He adds that they often define a group for its members, regulate relationship among ingroup members and with outgroup members, provide rationalisations for

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[68] According to McDonald *et al*. (2012:672), research on social dominance orientation (SDO) show that men consistently score higher on SDO than women, which indicates that they have stronger preferences for group-based hierarchy. They also note that SDO scores are often positively linked with a host of social attitudes and ideologies which legitimise existing hierarchies, such as social conservatism, racism, patriotism and support for wars of aggression. They further claim that research suggests that men identify more strongly with their tribal group membership.

[69] He lists as examples *a reciprocity norm* (obliging people to return favours or repay acts of kindness) and *a norm of altruistic punishment* (punishment that incurs a cost for both the punisher and the one punished).

social controls,[70] and explain "the way things are and how they came to be". He argues that individuals who do not benefit from adopting a particular ideology will be socialised to do so, or punished for failure to publicly support the ideology,[71] although he emphasises that people are able to dissent from ideologies despite them being enforced by social controls (2009:222; 224). He explains that this imposition of ideology (and social controls) is caused by conflict within societies.[72] MacDonald (2009:224) further highlights that those seeking to disseminate ideology "utilise the power of the state", in particular educational institutions, to "impose their ideologies in the public socialisation process for children".

Cultural artefacts, language, rituals, norms and public behaviour, McDonald *et al*. (2012:677) contend, serve as "tribal markers", and that by reducing the salience of these "cultural cues", or creating more inclusive cues that cut across ethnic and racial groups, outgroup discrimination may be decreased. As discussed in Chapter 1, a common national language, culture and identity are often promoted as a way to decrease language conflict and engage in nation-building (see also Staatsnation and Kulturnation in Chapter 2). MacDonald (2009:227) believes, similar to May (2012), that conflicts of interest may exist between ethnic groups regarding the construction of culture, noting that some groups have attempted to impose their culture on other groups. In such cases, the subordinate group may experience an identity threat, and could respond by increasing negative intergroup behaviour.

3.4. Social Identity Threat

3.4.1. Types of identity threats

Plenty of references to identity threats have been made throughout this chapter. I deal with this topic at length only now, however, since a thorough understanding is required of SIT's

[70] Similar to internal restrictions, *social controls* refer to "restrictions imposed on people as a consequence of their membership within a particular society or group" (MacDonald, 2009:217). In the field of the evolution of culture, they are norms that involve punishment for transgressions, and may even include "individually costly behaviour that does not benefit either any individual or the group as a whole". MacDonald suggests that social controls may help explain altruistic, self-sacrificing behaviour within groups. He states that social controls could play a role in maintaining co-operation in groups (via altruistic punishment). For example, gossip, withholding social benefits, ostracism and execution have been recorded in ethnographic literature as methods of punishing "free-riders" and enforcing "high-levels of within-group charity" (MacDonald, 2009:218-219).

[71] MacDonald (2009:222) states that social controls and ideology alike are "relatively insensitive to individual self-interest". This has interesting implications for instrumentalist interpretations of ethnic identity, such as rational choice theory, Sandall's (2001) concepts of culture cults and designer tribalism, or Brubaker's (2002) groupism.

[72] This link between conflict in broader society and the imposition of ingroup norms (i.e., prototypicality through internal restrictions) – which in terms of culture, could involve adherence to certain language practices and essentialised notions of ethnic identity – reinforces my hypothesis regarding the relationship between group polarisation, ingroup identification, and broader political turmoil (intergroup conflict).

cognitive processes and behavioural motivations, SCT's group processes, as well as the affective function of social identity (IET). Tajfel and Turner (1986) recognised that social identities may be negative or threatened and offered three broad reactions to such identities. These strategies, which may be followed by individuals or groups, were discussed in subsection 3.2.3.6. SIT has since developed beyond this initial conceptualisation, as specific *types of threats* have now been identified, as well as a more exhaustive list of potential reactions. Branscombe *et al*. (1999:36) propose a taxonomy of four distinct classes of social identity threat:

- *Categorisation threat*: Being categorised against one's will, and treated based on group membership, instead of on an interpersonal level (such as when gender becomes a salient identity in the workplace).[73]
- *Distinctiveness threat*: Group distinctiveness is prevented or undermined.[74]
- *Value threats*: The group's value is undermined.
  (a) *Competence threat*: The group is devalued based on performance or status. Alternatively called *group-status threat* (Ellemers, 2017).[75]
  (b) *Morality threat*: The group's moral value is called into question, especially related to its perceived ill-treatment (past or present) of the outgroup.[76]
- *Acceptance threat*: One's position within the group is undermined, by receiving negative feedback from the ingroup, or not being recognised by the ingroup as a member.

Working from Breakwell's (1986) model of threatened identities, termed *Identity Process Theory* (IPT), and which identified people's need for distinctiveness, identity continuity and self-esteem, Korf and Malan (2002:152) distinguish between two broad categories of identity threats:

[73] We can perhaps add here *miscategorisation threat*: when someone is categorised as a member of a group with which they do not (or no longer) identify and are treated accordingly, or, being treated based on a subgroup identity, instead of a superordinate group identity.

[74] Ellemers (2017) states that distinctiveness threats are experienced when subgroups of people, such as members of linguistic minorities, are included in "larger, more inclusive groups [or] nations".

[75] *Stereotype threats* could be subcategorised under competence threats. Stereotype threats occur when negative stereotypes of a social identity group are evoked, which causes the target group member to be fearful of confirming the stereotype and might lead to underperformance, thereby reinforcing the stereotype (Holmes *et al*., 2016:7).

[76] When ingroup members experience morality threats based on the behaviour of their group in the past, they may experience feelings of collective guilt and shame as mentioned in subsection 3.3.3.

- *Threat to distinctive continuity*: A group's continued existence as a distinct group in society is threatened (including distinctiveness threat and *continuity threat*).[77]
- *Threat to well-being*: The ability of group membership to contribute to positive self-esteem is threatened, which includes *threat to self-esteem* and *threat to quality of life* (e.g. discrimination, affirmative action, personal safety and economic security).

Also following from Breakwell (1986), Korf and Malan (2002:152) distinguish between *threats to the content of identity*, meaning the descriptions associated with a particular identity change (i.e., the ingroup norms and attributes change); and *threats to the evaluation of identity*, meaning an identity that was evaluated positively in the past is now evaluated negatively because of social changes. The value of the identity is thus questioned.

In the discussion on IET (see subsection 3.3.3), it was mentioned that Brown (2020:15) stated that groups may feel anger when their superiority is challenged, or feel fear when a more powerful group threatens their existence. These group-based emotions are in reaction to threats to the group's objective circumstances. Based on the discussion on realistic and social competition (see subsection 3.2.3.4), these threats could be termed *realistic threats.* Considering that people derive social identities from the groups to which they belong, it goes without saying that a negative change in a group's status (as a result of the loss of political and/or economic power) will weaken its ability to provide a positive social identity to its members (by causing negatively discrepant comparisons with outgroups). Realistic threats thus also constitute social identity threats per SIT's conceptualisation of cognitive processes, or at least, could cause them.

These threats to a group's position in the hierarchy of social identities (from below or above), do not fit in neatly with Branscombe *et al*.'s (1999) taxonomy, as they do not (only) involve discrimination and devaluation based on negative evaluations of a group's competence, status or morality (value threats), but could potentially involve an actual change in a group's status (and other resources). Since Tajfel and Turner's (1986) strategy of social competition is associated with the social change pole of the continuum of systems of belief, which is what these threats involve, we could also refer to them as *social change threats*.

[77] In Chapter 2, subsection 2.4.3, May (2012:151) argued that the loss of one's language (especially in cases where it represents an important feature of collective identity) is a traumatic experience. Presumably, this trauma extends beyond language shift, and could include other forms of culture shift. Using SIT terminology, we may thus also use the term *social identity change threat*, denoting threats to the continuance of one's existing social identity (such as through migration or public policy).

Stephan and Stephan's (2000) *Integrated Threat Theory* (ITT) proposes that prejudice and discrimination against outgroups may be explained by four types of group-based threats:

- *Realistic threats*: Threats to the physical well-being and economic and political power of the ingroup.
- *Symbolic threats*: Threats to the cultural values and norms of the ingroup.
- *Intergroup anxiety* in interactions with members of the outgroup.
- *Negative stereotypes* of the outgroup.

This theory has since been updated to only distinguish between realistic and symbolic threats, and is now called *intergroup threat theory* (Stephan *et al*. 2009). In Chapter 1, subsection 1.4.2, and as it concerns minority-language groups, Kelman (1971:178-179) similarly differentiated between instrumental and sentimental threats, and suggested that the presence of both simultaneously (as is usually the case) is experienced as an *existential threat*. Under these circumstances, the intergroup conflict develops beyond mere issues of power and resources, and into a concern with the "self-preservation of the group and defence against genocide".

3.4.2. Identity threat responses

Branscombe *et al*. (1999:37) provide the following taxonomy of the likely responders and responses to each identity threat listed above:

Class of threat	**Who is likely to respond?**	**Type of response**
Categorisation	Low identifiers	Stress ingroup heterogeneity
		Further disidentification
		Stress unique personal qualities
	High identifiers	None
Distinctiveness	Low identifiers	Perceive groups at superordinate level
	High identifiers	Display outgroup derogation
		Perceive ingroup homogeneity
		Increased self-stereotyping
Value		
(a) Competence	Low identifiers	Further disidentification
	High identifiers	Display outgroup derogation

(b) Morality	Low identifiers High identifiers	Perceive ingroup homogeneity Increased self-stereotyping Undo morally objectionable behaviour Defensive reactions Perceive ingroup heterogeneity
Acceptance	Low identifiers High identifiers	None Display outgroup derogation Sliming (to attain acceptance)[78]

Figure 2: Branscombe et al.'s (1999) taxonomy of identity threat responses

According to Holmes *et al*. (2016:205), identity threats may lead to antisocial behaviour and even ingroup denigration.[79] They state that research in various disciplines has found that individuals who perceive threats tend to react defensively in order to reaffirm their social identity, restore justice, or deter future threats (2016:206). These defensive strategies against outgroups may take overtly aggressive forms (such as negative stereotyping and discrimination, conflict or resistance, criticism of one's abilities, and public humiliation) or more covert forms (such as physical or psychological withdrawal, decreased commitment, and ingroup solidarity).

Holmes *et al*. (2016:206) cite Petriglieri's (2011) *Identity Threat Response* (ITR) *theory* as a framework which incorporates these findings and offers a coherent explanation of "the appraisal process and how people respond to identity threats and the likely consequences of those threats". ITR outlines six responses an individual may have when experiencing an identity threat, which can be divided into two broad categories:

The first category consists of the *identity-protection responses*:

- *Derogation*: Criticise or denounce the attacker to mitigate the identity threat and discredit the attacker.

[78] High-identifying members who face rejection from the ingroup, will attempt to demonstrate their loyalty and commitment to the group by increasing their prototypicality and displaying "hyper-conformity" to perceived ingroup norms (Branscombe *et al*., 1999:51; 55).

[79] Branscombe *et al*. (1999:51) also observe this behaviour among members of a lower-status group attempting to pass as members of a higher-status group. Employing the strategy of individual mobility could thus involve differentiation from the (former) ingroup and derogation of fellow group members (see moral grandstanding in Chapter 5, subsection 5.4.2.2).

- *Concealment*: Tone down or hide the threatened identity in the hope that reduced salience of the identity will persuade the attacker to stop the identity threatening behaviour.
- *Positive distinctiveness*: Attempt to change the attacker's opinion of the threatened identity by arguing the virtues of the identity.

Holmes *et al*. (2016:206) believe that positive distinctiveness is the most proactive identity-protection response, and that derogation and concealment do not eliminate the identity threat as they do not alter the threatened identity or the attacker's view of the identity.

The second category consists of the *identity-restructuring responses*:

- *Identity exit*: Discard completely one's affiliation with the threatened identity.
- *Meaning change*: Cognitively shift one's perception of what the identity means to oneself.
- *Importance change*: Cognitively shift one's perception of how important the identity is to oneself.

These responses overlap with the strategies of social mobility (identity exit), and social creativity (meaning and importance change). Individuals may display only one or several ITRs simultaneously. Holmes *et al*. (2016:206) state that identity-restructuring responses involve changing one's identity "in fundamentally dramatic ways" in order to eliminate the identity threat. Due to the importance of certain identities to people, they are less likely to employ identity-restructuring responses than identity-protection responses – and where identity exit is the least likely ITR.

Petriglieri (2011; cited in Holmes, 2016:207) distinguishes between identity threats and *harm/loss appraisals*, which occur when individuals "perceive a comment or situation to be offensive to one or more of their identities, but the perpetrator of the comment or situation does not have legitimate authority over the individual and cannot affect the individual's occupational outcomes",[80] and is not sufficient to threaten identity. Holmes *et al*. (2016:207; 214), however, argue that in practical terms, this is a distinction without a difference, and found evidence that

[80] While the focus of this research is on organisational behaviour, we can understand this to mean impacting the life and livelihood in manners other than directly occupationally (i.e., realistic threats).

people perceive a harm/loss appraisal as an identity threat.[81] Holmes *et al*. (2016:210) also found a further three ITRs not previously included in Petriglieri's (2011) framework, namely:

- *Constructive action*: Attempt to overcome an identity threat by engaging in what is perceived to be productive behaviour,[82] without addressing the threatened identity directly.
- *Ignore*: Ignoring an identity threat because of the perception that responding in any manner will worsen the situation.
- *Seeking assistance*: Approaching someone, often an authority figure, to assist by intervening on one's behalf.

3.4.3. Threats to underlying motives of social identity

Lüders *et al*. (2016:34) maintain that individuals derive a sense of self from social identification, as it nurtures their underlying identity motives on a cognitive, affective, and behavioural dimension.[83] In addition to the identity threats already discussed, Lüders *et al*. (2016:33-34) state that people's need to understand their place in the world may also be threatened, which causes "anxious uncertainty" (see UIT in subsection 3.3.2.2),[84] and may lead to increased group identification and negative intergroup behaviour.

> [People have a] need for epistemic equilibrium, self-esteem, belonging, and control as underlying identity motives. According to the anxiety-to-approach model of threat and defence (Jonas et al., 2014), violations of these needs trigger neural processes sensitive to goal conflict and potential dangers that catalyse an aversive state of *anxious uncertainty*. As a consequence, people automatically engage in defensive behaviours to relieve aversive feelings and to re-establish approach motivation. Given that identity motives largely derive from group membership, affirming one's social identity may represent a functional tool for maintaining a positive self-view in the face of threat.

[81] This is to be expected, since positive social identity relies on favourable comparisons with other groups, and will thus suffer if negative comparisons are made, even by someone who cannot affect the life of the individual in a more direct way. This suggests a misconception of social identity threats on the part of Petriglieri (2011). What she terms harm/loss appraisals seem indistinguishable from value threats.

[82] While "productive" has a specific and narrow interpretation within the confines of this study, from context, we can extend the meaning to include those activities which 'prove someone wrong' through positive actions, as opposed to the positive distinctiveness response, which directly tries to change the threat initiator's opinion.

[83] In other words, identity motives explain why people maintain social identities and social categorisation. According to Vignoles (2011:403), people are motivated to see themselves in a positive light (*self-esteem motive*), believe their identities are continuous despite life changes (*continuity motive*), be distinguished from other people (*distinctiveness motive*), believe that their lives are meaningful (*meaning motive*), that they are competent and able to impact (or control) their environments (*efficacy motive*), and that they are included and accepted in social contexts (*belonging motive*).

[84] The identification of underlying identity motives means we could add *uncertainty threat* to the social identity threats listed above (although there is overlap), to denote threats to someone's understanding of their place in their world, comprising all these various underlying motives.

> Unfortunately, such reactive ingroup affirmation is often accompanied by ingroup bias and xenophobia and may also foster radical antisocial reactions (Hogg, Kruglanski & van den Bos, 2013).

On a *cognitive* level, social identities satisfy people's underlying identity motives by reducing informational complexity through social categorisation, and thus achieving epistemic equilibrium (as per UIT). On an *affective* level, these motives are nurtured since membership of a highly rated group and positive distinctiveness from outgroups enable people to think and feel positively about themselves, thereby gaining positive self-esteem (as per SIT). *Sociometer theory* further identified people's need to enjoy stable and valuable social bonds, and thus attain a sense of belonging. On a *behavioural* level, social identities are able to serve people's need for control of their environment through their autonomous self (as identified by the *model of group-based control*), since groups provide members with a sense of collective agency (Lüders *et al*.; 2016:34-35).

According to Lüders *et al*. (2016:38), two typical responses to identity threats have been observed: (i) an aversive state of anxious uncertainty; and (ii) engaging in reactive defence mechanisms "that help to reduce negative feelings either directly by resolving a threat at hand or by indirectly providing alternative resources that are not affected by the threat". They state that people tend to affirm their social identity in the face of threat.[85] Regarding responses to threats to personal control, (i.e., the behavioural dimension of social identity) Lüders *et al*. (2016:37) state:

> In fact, Stollberg et al. (2015) found that, when reminded of lacking personal control, people were more prone to identify with agentic (vs. non-agentic) groups. In addition to mere identification, people have been shown to cope with threatened personal control by engaging in collective behaviour, indicated by increased ingroup bias (Fritsche, Jonas, & Fankhanel, 2008; Greenaway, Louis, Hornsey, & Jones, 2014), conformity with ingroup norms (Stollberg, Fritsche, & Jonas, submitted), and pursuit of ingroup goals (Fritsche et al., 2013). The latter effects of threatened personal control have been shown to be most pronounced when in addition to personal control threat, ingroup agency was also at stake or when ingroup identification was high.

Lüders *et al*. (2016:41-42) claim that research suggests a direct link between the experience of identity threat, reactive group affirmation, and "extreme antisocial responses".

[85] In the previous chapter, May (2012:44) argued that people will seek to reproduce their ethnic identity, even when it reduces their odds of achieving prosperity and political power, because it provides the basis for meaning, identity, a sense of belonging, and political action. The underlying identity motives outlined above support May's (2012) dual view of ethnic identity, as it acknowledges both instrumental and sentimental attachments to identity.

> As Hogg, Meehan, and Farquharson (2010) noted, when people are under threat, one explanation for the heightened appeal of radical groups lies in their high entitativity combined with an explicit action component to achieve their goals (i.e. radical strategies). Thus, in case of threat, people may feel that radical groups will do a much better job fulfilling their desire for epistemic equilibrium and collective agency. Moreover, as many extreme ideologies rest on the assumption of superiority over others, radical groups also nourish needs for positive self-evaluation more effectively than groups that believe in equality.

In contrast to these negative intergroup behaviours in response to identity threats, Lüders *et al*. (2016:42) argue that the *reactive* increase in ingroup identification does not inevitably lead to "closemindedness and hostility towards others". Therefore, increased ethnic identification is not in itself a sociopolitical problem, but possibly indicates such a problem, and has to be managed carefully in order to avoid negative and destabilising intergroup behaviour and collective action. It is my contention that in order to prevent negative outcomes, the sources of the identity threats have to be addressed, especially if there is evidence of a worsening intergroup dynamic. Intragroup processes, as I argue in Chapter 5, also have an important role to play in moderating ingroup behaviour. I discuss solutions to intergroup conflict further in subsection 3.5.3.

3.4.4. Identity-related stress and trauma

Muldoon *et al*. (2016:136) argue that an analysis of political violence and intergroup relations requires an understanding of the role of social structures, group divisions and power. Reflecting on Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), they cite the *integrated social identity model of stress*, which views group membership and the associated social identity as central to the stress process,[86] and proposes that they shape stress outcomes (2016:137). Muldoon *et al*. (2019:312) argue that social identities can be "antecedents, mediators, and outcomes of trauma experiences". Muldoon *et al*. (2016:138) summarise Muldoon and Lowe's (2012) argument as follows:

> [T]he appraisal of stressful and traumatic events is fundamentally related to group memberships and identity and that this is particularly the case relative to the stress and trauma associated with political violence where group memberships and identity are central to the conflict itself.

Muldoon *et al*. (2016:138) suggest that social identities play a role in the process of meaning-making after traumatic experiences and can be either an obstacle or a resource to "individual

[86] The stress process consists of *primary appraisal* (assessing the degree to which a particular stressor poses a threat) and *secondary appraisal* (assessing the ability to cope with the threat).

resilience", depending on the *content* of those identities. Muldoon *et al*. (2019:321) argue that the psychological consequences of trauma can be predicted by "a person's affiliation with groups that espouse a particular social and political worldview".

According to Muldoon *et al*. (2016:138-139), a recent line of research within social and political psychology has focused on the role of social identification as a consequence of negative experiences based on specific group membership; and has, in addition, been concerned with the negative impact of social identity-related stressors on self-esteem and psychological well-being. They state that substantial research evidence suggests that "members of disadvantaged groups cope with adversity by increasing identification with their disadvantaged group" (2016:139).[87] The Afrikaner case study in Chapters 4 and 5 will provide further evidence to this claim. It is not only personal trauma, however, but also secondary trauma, that may have these effects. Muldoon *et al*. (2019:323) explain:

> In the case of trauma, the experiences of other ingroup members can also have a ripple effect on the wider group (Muldoon & Lowe, 2012). An individual's personal fate becomes psychologically tied to that of other ingroup members via social identification (Drury, 2012).[88]

Muldoon *et al*. (2016:139) cite the *rejection-identification model* (RIM), which proposes that perceiving rejection or discrimination based on group membership may lead individuals to increase identification with their ingroup which, in turn, has a positive effect on psychological health "effectively reducing the potential adverse direct consequences of perceived discrimination". The emphasis here is on *perception of rejection/discrimination*, as they argue that in times of conflict, differentiating between victims and perpetrators can become difficult, since the *concept of victimhood* is often central in forming social identities (2016:139).

> Groups often develop a collective narrative and memory of the conflict that indicates that the rival group continuously inflicted unjust and immoral harm upon them throughout the conflict.[89] In this way, many groups present themselves as the disadvantaged group during hostilities. This collective sense of victimhood has

[87] According to Muldoon *et al*. (2019:323), it is only when a group is relevant to trauma, that increased identification with that group can mediate the impact of traumatic experience. As an example, they highlight that in Northern Ireland, only British or Irish national identifications are used to frame and make sense of the animosities of the conflict, and not the more recent Northern Irish identification, which is not associated with the "long-standing oppositional intergroup attitudes".

[88] Collective trauma could therefore signify trauma experienced *by* a group, as well as trauma experienced *within* a group (see imagined communities in Chapter 2, subsection 2.2.4).

[89] This narrative process in group identity formation (and maintenance) reminds one of Smith's (1991; cited in May, 2012:52) concept of ethnie: successive generations have shared memories, myths, and notions regarding the "collective destiny" of the group, which are both grounded in history and changed by it.

> important effects on the way individuals and societies manage the course of the conflict, and adjust their experiences during war and peace (Bar-Tal, Chernyak-Hai, Schori & Gundar, 2009; Ferguson, Burgess & Hollywood, 2010). And it is probably universally the case that even in very violent or asymmetric intergroup conflicts, at least one and very often both sides believe themselves to be *the* victim in that conflict.[90] […] The context in situations of intractable conflict is often one that is built on the negative interdependence (Kelman, 1999) of identities implicated in the conflict, where each group perceives the other group as threatening to its own group identity. As such, the mere existence of the outgroup together with their expression of identity can be perceived as threatening, over and above the more direct or immediate threats associated with political violence (Kelman, 1987, 1999).[91]

Muldoon *et al*. (2016:140) also offer the *threat-identification model* (TIM), which hypothesises that intergroup threat can have a negative effect on psychological well-being, but it can also indirectly protect psychological well-being, by causing an increase in social identification, which is an important tool for coping with elevated intergroup threat perceptions. Importantly, they note that in intergroup conflict, threat may be perceived by both dominant and subordinate groups (2016:140). In fact, it might even be "the ostensibly more powerful group" that perceives higher levels of threat, since the conflict represents a threat to the status of the group. They further argue that group status influences the perceptions of the conflict, not only by those involved, but also by the broader community:

> Those engaged in conflict from a position of power (a majority or dominant group) are often seen as morally questionable; whilst there is generally moral kudos attached to the minority group position by the wider international community. So for minority group members, this attribution of illegitimacy to the majority group behaviour can fuel identification (Livingstone, Spears, Manstead & Bruder, 2009) and may be used to justify even violent collective action (Van Zomeren, Postmes & Spears, 2008). On the other hand, for majority group members, because of their tendency to orient to concerns about morality and moral behaviour (Leach, Ellemers & Barreto, 2007), questions about legitimacy of their actions can act to undermine identification and perceived collective worth of the group.

[90] The ongoing devastation in Gaza comes to mind.

[91] The minimal social category findings illustrated that in experimental settings, the mere awareness of the presence of another (arbitrary) group is sufficient to trigger outgroup discrimination, in order to achieve positive distinctiveness. Considering that in real-world contexts groups often have long histories of conflict, including violent conflict, and are locked in fights over objective resources, it is doubtful that positive distinctiveness is the only motivator behind negative intergroup behaviour. It is easy to imagine that fear, anger, and a desire for retribution, as well as the presence of realistic competition, all influence ingroup identification and intergroup behaviour. Under these circumstances, the visceral reactions ingroup members have when the identity of a historic 'enemy' becomes salient, might warrant the designation of a further social identity threat.

White Afrikaans speakers present a fascinating case study on this dynamic, seeing as they have been both the minority group and the majority group in various intergroup situations throughout their history.

3.5. The SIA and Minority Groups

3.5.1. MLR and linguistic discrimination

According to Wright and Bougie (2007:157-158), while debates about language rights and linguistic discrimination are common in anthropology, political science, applied linguistics and education, social psychology "has paid little attention to prejudice and discrimination against groups defined by the language they speak", instead viewing language as "secondary to another 'principal' distinction" such as ethnicity, race or nationality. They argue that actions which limit linguistic rights or undermine the very existence of a language are seldom regarded as discrimination within social psychology.

One could also argue that SIT's focus on positive distinctiveness as behavioural motivation to intergroup behaviour trivialises the unique position of linguistic minorities vis-à-vis dominant majorities. The social and political pressure on lower-status groups to assimilate certainly pulls into question the presupposition that the negative intergroup behaviour of higher-status groups is motivated by their need for positive distinctiveness. Similarly, lower-status groups' resistance to assimilationist pressure surely cannot (solely) be ascribed to their own desire for positive distinctiveness. Instead, interethnic language conflict often seems to be motivated by an intolerance to difference, and is usually accompanied by realistic competition. These conflicts are, however, as predicted by the SIA, enflamed by social identity threats.

Wright and Bougie (2007:159) distinguish between two types of language discrimination using social psychology terminology. First, *intergroup discrimination* refers to institutional policies and practices that undermine the opportunities, status or well-being of the minority-language group, and that target them for assimilation. Second, *interpersonal discrimination* refers to the actions of individuals (or small groups) directed toward an individual because of their membership in a specific language group.

They further distinguish between the targets of linguistic discrimination. Policies which target the use or status of the minority language itself (such as monolingual education legislation), and which are often accompanied by claims that they are in the interest of minority-group members, are termed *violation of language rights*. When a group or individual is the target of

discrimination based on the language they speak, but where the use or status of the language is not of direct concern (such as refusing to hire someone), it is termed *language-based discrimination* (2007:159).[92]

According to Wright and Bougie (2007:174), *perceiving* oneself as the target of discrimination is linked to many negative outcomes, such as decreased personal and collective self-esteem, increased depressive symptoms, psychological distress, anxiety, decreased well-being and other health problems. Minority-group members may engage in a number of strategies that reduce these harmful effects of discrimination, chief among them being strong identification with one's ethnic ingroup. They state that evidence suggests that although discrimination has a negative *direct* effect on psychological well-being, increased ingroup identification provides an *indirect buffer* to this effect (see TIM in the previous subsection). Tropp and Wright (2003; cited in Wright & Bougie, 2007:174-175) hypothesise that part of the "buffering effect" of identification is due to its influence on how discriminatory experiences are reconstructed in memory:

> They propose that those with a strong psychological connection to the ethnic ingroup (i.e., high ingroup identification) will construct a memory of this initially painful event that focuses blame on the perpetrator and on the injustice and illegitimacy of the action. This representation – perhaps strengthened by retelling the story to other ingroup members – allows the high identifier to confirm his or her understanding of the social world and may strengthen his or her resolve to take action. Those who are low in ingroup identification may not benefit from this process and may experience discrimination only as their having been poorly treated by others. Thus, a lack of strong ethnic identification may leave ethnolinguistic minorities vulnerable to the negative effects of discrimination by members of the majority group.

As to the centrality of minority languages and MTE in this process of buffering against the negative effects of discrimination, Wright and Bougie (2007:175) argue:

> For many ethnic groups, language is a critical component of group distinctiveness. In some cases, such as Francophones in Canada, language is *the* defining characteristic that distinguishes the minority group from the dominant group. When language is key to group identity, competence and confidence in one's heritage language and opportunities to use it with pride may represent key expressions of ingroup identification. So if ethnic group identification is a vital buffer against the negative

[92] In their research, Wright and Bougie (2007:159) suggest a dual approach to combating language discrimination. The first approach is concerned with reducing prejudice and focuses on "the perpetrators of discrimination, members of the dominant-language group". The second approach focuses on the psychology of the targets of discrimination, and the role of mother-tongue education (MTE) in reducing the violations of rights and the language-based discrimination perpetuated by educational institutions. They argue that MTE not only improves the academic outcomes of minority-language children, but also has a positive effect on their personal and social identity (2007:168).

> psychological effects of discrimination and language ability and use are key aspects of ingroup identification, the maintenance and consistent use of the heritage language should play a critical role in buffering the negative impact of discrimination. Thus, if dominant-language-only education undermines the development and maintenance of children's heritage language, these programmes may also undermine minority children's future capacity to deal with the discrimination they are likely to face.

May (2012:327) also recognises the vital role that language and education play in the marginalisation and stigmatisation of minority languages (and hence, their speakers), and in the establishment of a hierarchy of languages (see linguistic capital in Chapter 2). Skutnabb-Kangas (2001:203) suggests that globalisation (and the threat it poses to minority languages and speakers) represents both a war over material resources, as well as the colonisation of minds. Considering the centrality of language to many identities, she argues that threats to identity, together with economic and political matters, are responsible for many conflicts "regardless of how fluid the identities may be".

3.5.2. Collective action and identity mobilisation

Brown (2000:749) identifies *Relative Deprivation Theory* (RDT) as a theoretical perspective which seeks to explain reactions of collective protest by subordinate groups:

> RDT proposes that the driving force behind feelings of discontent and subsequent collective action is a perception of discrepancies between what one's group currently experiences and what it is entitled to expect. There can be both historical and contemporary sources of such discrepancies, the most pertinent for the present discussion being social comparisons with other groups (Tyler & Smith, 1998).

According to Brown (2000:749), SIT shows that the discontent fuelled by relative deprivation is affected by social identity processes, and that collective action can sometimes be better predicted by group identification than by relative deprivation.[93] He explains that SIT predicts that permeability of group boundaries tends to weaken identification and ingroup-favouring bias, which would thus make group-based action less likely (2000:750). Relatedly, studies have found that only under conditions of complete group impermeability were people willing to protest collectively against injustice, rather than follow individual strategies. Brown (2000:768) notes Tajfel's (1981) view that social psychology should engage more closely with social problems such as minority rights, nationalism and racism, and highlights SIT's insights on collective action by minority groups:

[93] Collective action refers to any action taken by a group of people in the pursuit of a common goal, such as protests, petitions, donating, campaigns etc.

> Turning now to attempts by minority or lower-status groups to achieve equality of treatment and recognition by the majority, the lessons from SIT seem clear. The first is that fostering a strong sense of collective relative deprivation is obviously an important motivator for members of such groups to seek some societal redress for their grievances. However, at least as important – and, in some contexts, even more so – is the need to foster a strong psychological allegiance to the minority group in the first place. This, as I indicated earlier, may be a necessary precondition for collective action and, occasionally, may be sufficient as well. In addition, bearing in mind the effects of different structural conditions on propensity/desire for social change, it seems that developing clearly visible identity markers and less permeable category boundaries can also pay dividends for such groups.

La Macchia and Louis (2016:92) review research that applied the social identity approach to the phenomenon of crowd behaviour, and which provide an account of the process of *deindividuation* during urban riots. Reicher's (1984; cited in La Macchia & Louis, 2016:92-93) analysis of the 1980 St. Paul's Riot in Bristol was the first application of the social identity model to urban riots, and suggested a reciprocal interplay between social identity and crowd behaviour, where the behaviour reinforces and redefines the identity. Reicher argued that the riotous actions by locals were neither senseless nor chaotic:

> Rather, they reflected the shared motives of an antagonised community: the violence, burning, and looting was orderly and directed at symbolic targets (e.g. police vehicles and buildings), and the crowd remained within the confines of its locale (the St. Paul's neighbourhood). In addition, rioters felt a strong sense of positive identity as members of the St. Paul's community before and after the event.

Reflecting on the 2011 UK Riots, Reicher and Stott (2011; cited in La Macchia & Louis, 2016:93) insisted, contrary to the "moral denouncement of the riots by politicians and commentators", that the riots were "products of political expression by communities galvanised by years of perceived economic injustice and mistreatment by authorities, including heavy-handed police response to initially peaceful demonstrations". Reicher and Stott (2011; cited in La Macchia & Louis, 2016:64) recommended that politicians and the media recognise the legitimate causes underlying such riots, and that they avoid actions which fuel "social identity dynamics that induce, exacerbate, and sustain riots". I discuss various forms of collective action by white Afrikaans speakers in Chapter 5, section 5.2. Mirroring the argument I have made to investigate the historical social reality when analysing minority group behaviour (see subsection 3.2.3), La Macchia and Louis (2016:94) state:

> By placing due emphasis on historical and political context and the dynamics of identity and intra- and intergroup relations, the social identity approach to crowd behaviour has built a bridge between crowd behaviour research and collective action research. It has done so by treating the examined crowd behaviour events as *purposive*, rather than as

> incidental and compulsive. Hence, protests, riots, and other purposive forms of crowd behaviour are, by definition, instances of collective action.

La Macchia and Louis (2016:94) define *collective action*, from the perspective of social psychology, as "action taken on behalf of a group or groups in order to influence their status, conditions, and/or identity. Such action is usually examined in the form of political behaviour". The *integrative social identity model of collective action* (SIMCA), which La Macchia and Louis (2016:96) state is the most influential quantitative model of collective action in social psychology, shows that "it is the extent to which a group's identity is *politicised* – rather than merely salient – that predicts collective action".

These authors explain that while analyses of crowd behaviour have focused on temporal and situational dynamics, "documenting how intergroup and identity processes have behaviourally unfolded in real time", research on collective action has focused on "campaigns taking place over months and even years" (2016:97-98). The literatures of crowd behaviour and collective action do, however, share a focus on political behaviour, participation, protests and activism, and an emphasis on social identity as a key factor in motivating behaviour.

According to La Macchia and Louis (2016:99-100), recent collective action models recognise the role played by third parties. Observers and commentators "outside of the conflict dyad" are thought to "contribute to a discourse that influences how social identity and categorisation processes play out in subsequent, related crowd events". Muldoon *et al*. (2016) also noted the influence of the broader community on conflicts and collective action. May's (2012) critique of the negative view of (minority) ethnicity in academic and political discourse suggests that he, too, recognises the role of third parties in intergroup conflict.

La Macchia and Louis (2016:100) suggest that peace and conflict can be conceptualised as alternative normative forms of collective action. They believe that "another way in which social identity drives conflictual and peaceful forms of crowd behaviour and collective action – and thus the very mechanics of history – is through intragroup processes such as leadership" (2016:101). They maintain that through *identity entrepreneurship*, visionary leaders may bring about social change by "pioneering and redefining group identities". As noted in subsection 3.3.2.2, entrepreneurs of identity, who are viewed as prototypical members by their followers, are thus able to change the social identities of ingroup members. While these leaders could pursue positive social change, they could also promote an essentialised and exclusive group identity which 'otherise' less prototypical members, and cause outgroup hostility.

Phillips DeZalia and Moeschberger (2016:121) maintain, in addition, that the symbols within a society connect individuals to previous generations, promote valued cultural narratives, and provide a lens through which the world is viewed. They explain that these symbols play an integral part in the promotion of social identities, especially when the latter are being mobilised to advance either violence or reconciliation between groups. They suggest utilising *Dialogical Self Theory* (DST) and *Social Representation Theory* (SRT), in conjunction with SIT, in order to better understand the *symbolic reminders of identity*. DST views social identities as continually shifting in their importance and relationship with each other as they negotiate their position within the self, whereas SRT focuses on the ways that communities affect and are affected by the changing beliefs (or the social representations) embedded in society. They explain the importance of symbols of identity in mobilisation and collective action as follows (2016:121-122):

> Social representations are created, adapted, or eliminated in our environment to emphasise, modify, or devalue certain social identities that the individuals use to initiate and perpetuate a conflict or encourage peace. These symbolic reminders of our identity can be promoted through political and social movements as well as through historical narratives of previous struggles and victories passed through the generations. By emphasising certain aspects of our identities, leaders can encourage political engagement and solidarity with those who they perceive as part of our ingroup along with bias and aggression against the outgroup. Although these semiotic reminders are often subtle, they are emotionally salient and can significantly impact the trajectory of a conflict.

Phillips DeZalia and Moeschberger (2016:125) thus conceptualise social identities in much the same way as May's (2012:46-47; 52-53) dual constructed/primordial view of ethnicity as malleable but not arbitrary, and as being maintained by cultural elements and reinforced by symbols. They argue that social institutions use belief-based and knowledge-based social representations (historical or folk narratives, educational curricula, songs, remembrances, or uniforms) to guide people to their related identities. These representations require a revision of the collective memory and social representation of history, and are "not stable, rigid representations but malleable ones based on the current situation" (2016:125).

According to Phillips DeZalia and Moeschberger (2016:125), such social representations are "revived, revised, or created" to promote the necessary identities for the group, through the processes of anchoring and objectifying. *Anchoring* refers to linking new phenomena to established representations, a process which enables new and foreign concepts to be better understood. They refer to anchoring as a form of social categorisation, explaining that new

ideas are anchored to established ones, similar to categorising new individuals based on groups we have previously formed ideas about, in order to avoid discomfort brought on by ambiguity and novelty. Through *objectifying*, these new phenomena or groups can become independently recognised categories. They provide the post-World War II creation of Israel as an example, stating that this new nation was anchored through well-known historical narratives of the Israelites finding their promised land, but the new "identity of Israel" has since become self-sustaining through the process of objectifying (2016:126).

Categorising someone as a member of either the ingroup or the outgroup, Phillips DeZalia and Moeschberger (2016:127) argue, depends on which identity is "the loudest in the *dialogical self*" – this refers to the notion that one's identity consists of elements such as work, family and community, which are in dialogue and working and/or conflicting with one another. The dialogical self may intentionally be shaped to ensure that a specific identity becomes salient. Kelman (2001; cited in Phillips DeZalia and Moeschberger, 2016:127) believes that "although national identities are generally constructed out of real experiences, these experiences can be ordered in different ways, resulting in different boundaries and priorities". They explain the process of manipulating the dialogical self as follows:

> This ordering is done by either social institutions or the individual and social representations can play an integral part in this process by encouraging ideals or historical narratives that promote specific identifications. It is through semiotic mediation, the use of symbols to guide thinking and identification, that this process takes place.

In the previous chapter, Stack (1986; cited in May, 2012:37) defined the *mobilisation of ethnicity* as "the process by which a group organises along ethnic lines in pursuit of collective political ends". From the insights of the current and previous sections, we may summarise that the mobilisation of ethnic identity occurs when (i) group members perceive a threat (probably both social identity and realistic threats), (ii) they respond by increasing their ingroup identification which mitigates the threat by nurturing their underlying identity motives (i.e., provides them with a sense of self-esteem, belonging, control, etc.), and when (iii) group leaders capitalise on this increased salience of the identity, employing it (such as through the use of symbols and narratives) in service of collective action to achieve social change.

In Chapter 2, May (2012:37; 44) argued that ethnic identity is not comparable to other interest groups (due to the significant sense of meaning and belonging people derive from it), while Anderson (1991; cited in May, 2012:136) argued that instead of being merely an emblem of

ethnic identity, language can create *imagined communities* or *particular solidarities*. Kelman (1971:174) believes that language can function as a symbol of attachment and link an individual to a dispersed population whose members they do not personally know. He suggests that this attachment to distant group members can grow so strong that it can take on the emotional intensity of a primary relationship (see secondary trauma in subsection 3.4.4). Ethnolinguistic groups are therefore likely to operationalise the phenomena discussed above to a much higher degree than other types of groups.

3.5.3. Solutions for social cohesion

3.5.3.1. Intergroup co-operation

Haji *et al*. (2016:xv) state that peace psychology suggests that peace is not merely the absence of conflict, but rather distinguishes between *negative peace*, the absence of violent conflict, and *positive peace*, the integration of society. They believe that just as social identities can create conflict, they can also be utilised to promote peace (2016:xv-xvi). A social identity approach to understanding peace and conflict is very relevant in today's world, Haji *et al*. (2016:xvi) explain, since most of the conflicts permeating the news have at their core some difference in cultural, religious, ethnic, political and/or national affiliation. Tajfel (1982:32) notes the urgency of addressing these problems:

> The increasing global interdependence since the end of World War II has enormously increased the diversity and complexity of intergroup relations. The psychological study of these problems, which will manage to combine some of our traditional preoccupations with an increased sensitivity to the nature of social realities, is one of our most important tasks for the future.

According to Tajfel (1982:28), in experimental studies, intergroup discrimination can be reduced when intergroup competition is offset by *intergroup co-operation*. The efficacy of Sherif's (1966; cited in Tajfel, 1982) so-called "superordinate goals" shared by previously competing groups have, however, since been found to be much less applicable than originally hoped.

Tajfel (1982:28) points out that in Sherif's study, as soon as the two groups of participants had to work together to achieve a common goal, any competitive conflict, and notion of groups for that matter, was over. As he explains, however, the dissolution of prior groupings and the related conflict in this scenario, does not mean that the subsequent full co-operation of participants is "representative of other situations in which groups retain separate entities despite the occasional situations when they must work together for a common goal". Tajfel cites

Worchel (1978) who found that "the salience of previously existing group identities strongly affected the conflict-reducing effects of subsequent intergroup cooperation".

In other words, it is unclear what degree of intergroup co-operation, and therefore reduction of discrimination and conflict, can be achieved between two firmly established groups, especially where realistic competition is present brought on by resource scarcity. This complicates the ability of nation-building (involving a common identity and, presumably, common goals) to ameliorate interethnic conflict. The fact that the dominant majority group usually controls the process of nation-building, to the exclusion of the subordinate minority group (as May, 2012 argued in Chapter 2), makes it even more unlikely that nation-building (alone) will bring about lasting positive peace (see subsection 3.5.3.4 for further discussion on nation-building). In addition to intergroup co-operation, several other solutions to intergroup conflict have been offered, which I discuss below.

3.5.3.2. Intergroup contact

The basic premise of the *Contact Hypothesis Theory*, suggested by Allport (1954), is that "interaction/contact between individual members of different groups, under a proscribed set of conditions, can lead to a reduction in prejudice" (Wright & Bougie, 2007:160). Tajfel (1982:28-29) states that several studies have investigated the impact of interpersonal contact on reducing intergroup discrimination, especially in situations of interethnic or interracial conflict. These studies reported "either no-difference findings, qualified results, or unfavourable changes" (Amir, 1976:283; cited in Tajfel, 1982). Tajfel (1982:29) summarises: "[W]henever the underlying structure of social divisions and power or status differentials is fairly resilient, it is not likely to be substantially affected by piecemeal attempts at reform in selected situations of 'contact'". These findings suggest that the broader context in which the intergroup conflict occurs should be addressed.

3.5.3.3. Individualisation and hybridity

Brown (2000:751-752) states that while SIT has focused mainly on the negative aspects of intergroup relations, three modifications to the Contact Hypothesis Theory have been made based on SIT, aimed at potentially improving intergroup attitudes and thus reducing conflict. The first is the *decategorisation model*, which speculates that since salience of social categories leads to increased discrimination and bias, these categories have to be made "less useful as psychological tools". This reminds one of the perspective on ethnic and national identity held by proponents of cosmopolitanism, and which requires a high degree of individual mobility.

Proposed strategies for 'decategorising' situations include personalising the intergroup situation and finding additional categorical dimensions that cut across the original ones. While there is evidence in support of this model, it largely comes from "laboratory research with *ad hoc* groups whose transitory nature makes their psychological abandonment easier to achieve". I discuss the other two modifications in the next subsection.

According to Tajfel (1982:29), anthropological studies have found that tribal societies often manage intergroup conflict and hostility through various methods of "crossing" the membership of groups, "so that some individuals find themselves belonging to one group on the basis of one set of criteria and to a traditionally hostile group according to other criteria". So-called *criss-crossing*, Tajfel explains, can be achieved through exogamous marriages for example, and results in a structure of social categorisation wherein individuals who belong to categories A and B are further subdivided into categories AC, AD, BC and BD. It is important to note that these categories represent hybrid identities, involving membership to more than one group on the same hierarchical level (i.e., ingroup and outgroup), or indeed, social identities which defy social categorisation. This is different from ethnic layering, which involves membership to more than one group on different levels of the hierarchy (e.g. national, subnational, tribal, etc.).

Deschamps and Doise (1978; cited in Tajfel, 1982:29) studied "criss-cross" categorisations, and found that there was a decrease in intergroup discrimination as compared to a dichotomous basis for social categorisation. However, Brown and Turner (1979; cited in Tajfel, 1982:30) have questioned the interpretation of these results. Commins and Lockwood (1978; cited in Tajfel), who "superimposed an experimentally induced transient categorisation upon the important and pervasive Catholic/Protestant division in Northern Ireland", could not deliver statistically significant results. Contrasting the salience and power of the "real-life" religious categorisation in Northern Ireland, with the "relatively trivial one" introduced in the experiment, Tajfel (1982:30) argues that stronger results may be obtained when "two equally powerful social categorisations can be made to overlap and compete".

According to Tajfel (1982:30), criss-cross categorisations can potentially break down the perceived homogeneity of the outgroup – a key feature of intergroup behaviour. He notes that Wilder (1978) used a similar principle in a series of studies when he attempted to reduce intergroup discrimination through *individuation of the outgroup*. Without allowing for interaction between the ingroup and outgroup, Wilder showed that discrimination could be

decreased when the perception of outgroup homogeneity is decreased. It is reasonable to expect that criss-cross categorisations will also decrease the perception of ingroup homogeneity, which will make ingroup cohesion and collective action less likely (see entitativity in subsection 3.3.2.2). While theoretically logical, in situations of longstanding conflicts between groups separated by race, ethnicity, religion and other factors, the possibility of criss-crossing seems highly improbable.[94] It seems that intergroup peace might lead to criss-cross categorisations, rather than the other way around.

3.5.3.4. Nation-building and common identity

The second approach to reducing intergroup conflict identified by Brown (2000), the *Common Ingroup Identity Model* (CIIM), seeks to redraw the category boundaries so that groups become subsumed into a new superordinate category, resulting in a "common ingroup identity" shared by ingroup and (former) outgroup members, and thus a decrease in intergroup discrimination.[95] According to Stathi and Roschini (2016:61-62), the CIIM suggests that through the creation of a "more inclusive" common superordinate identity, people may develop more positive attitudes towards former outgroup members.

They caution, however, that the attempted imposition of a superordinate identity "may pose a threat to people who identify highly with their ethnic culture, since the culture's distinctiveness may be threatened", which may cause them to react with more bias (2016:62). Brown (2000:752) warns that while there is "an impressive literature documenting the potency of this strategy", there is a need to stress the difficulty in applying this strategy to actual groups outside of a laboratory setting:

> Both the decategorisation and common ingroup identity models involve the dissolution of category boundaries and hence the abandonment of subgroup identities. When the groups concerned are real-life entities, such a strategy may be psychologically and practically harder to implement. It may be difficult to resist using some subgroup categories if they are chronically accessible, and some groups, particularly minorities, may actively resist policies which mean their assimilation into a dominant cultural identity. Furthermore, contact strategies which break the link between the individual

[94] Consider, for example, the virtual impossibility of marriages between Israelis and Palestinians which could give rise to criss-cross categorisations.

[95] See nation-building in Chapter 1, and, in particular, May's (2012:6-7) discussion on the state's preoccupation with establishing a common national language and culture (the language and culture of the majority group), in order to achieve nation-state congruence, as well as the myth of an ethnically neutral state and homogeneous common culture (May, 2012:108-109). Thus, a common component of nation-building is the banishment of minority languages and cultures from the public realm. Such elimination of subgroup (minority) identities is done in favour of assimilation into the majority identity. Advocacy of such assimilation into the dominant identity essentialises the national identity, whereby only a specific set of attributes constitute full membership (citizenship) to the nation-state.

> outgroup members actually encountered and the larger outgroup may impede the generalisation of any positive intergroup attitudes (Brown & Turner, 1981).[96]

This ties in with May's (2012:22-25) deliberations regarding the valorisation of national identity and the related dismissal of ethnic identity as a legitimate form of identification, and is consistent with his observation that ethnic identities frequently "'trump' the competition". It also relates to Kelman's (1971:180-181) argument that deliberate attempts to create a common national identity may actually decrease the unity of a society. Thus, positive peace and social cohesion cannot be accomplished by the prescribed "abandonment" of minority identities.

Similar to criss-cross categorisations, a common superordinate identity seems to be a consequence of improved intergroup relations, and not a solution to intergroup conflict in itself. Instead, following this approach as a presumptive solution may even worsen the conflict situation by causing identity threats. Phillips DeZalia and Moeschberger (2016:128) maintain that in order for reconciliation to occur after a conflict between groups, social identities and social representations have to change. While they believe that the creation of a superordinate identity is an effective way to connect individuals of previously different groups and promote peace, they note that there is disagreement as to whether subordinate identities should correspondingly be "silenced".

Due to the limitations of the Decategorisation Model and the CIIM discussed above, Hewstone and Brown (1986; cited in Brown, 2000:752) suggested a third approach to reducing intergroup conflict, based on the Contact Hypothesis Theory, in which some subgroup salience is retained while contact conditions are optimised. Brown (2000:752) states that this can be achieved by accentuating the typicality of the outgroup members with whom contact was occurring, or by focusing the participant's attention to their respective group memberships during the interaction. Brown explains that the common theme of these strategies is to shift the interaction towards the *group* pole of the interpersonal-group continuum, while ensuring that the interaction that occurs is between "equal-status protagonists and is of a cooperative nature". According to Brown (2000:752), several studies conducted in a variety of intergroup contexts involving real-life groups have provided support for this approach.

[96] In other words, in decategorised contexts, positive interpersonal interactions with individual outgroup members cannot lead to the formation of positive stereotypes about the entire outgroup (or mitigate any existing negative stereotypes of the outgroup).

3.5.3.5. Multiculturalism and dual identity

According to Stathi and Roschini (2016:55), social, political and academic debates are raging on how to peacefully coexist in multicultural societies. They propose investigating multiculturalism, which implies "the integration of distinct cultural groups in addition to the preservation of each group's ethnic and cultural identity", from a social psychological perspective. May (2012) also recommended multiculturalism (or corporate pluralism) as a solution to ethnolinguistic conflict (see Chapter 2, subsections 2.3.4 and 2.5.1).

Stathi and Roschini (2016:57) define *acculturation* as the changes that occur through contact between different groups, both on collective and individual levels, and which may be divided into two categories: (i) immigration-based acculturation, when people move to a new country and have to manage different cultures and shape new identities through the acquisition of the language, norms and traditions of the new country; and (ii) globalisation-based acculturation, when people develop a multicultural identity and a sense of belonging to a global culture through contact with different ethnic groups they encounter in their country.[97] Stathi and Roschini (2016:61) define identity as "an 'anchor' during the transitional and adaptive period of the acculturation process".

Berry (1980; cited in Stathi & Roschini, 2016:58) identified four different acculturation strategies that correspond to the attitudes and behaviours of majority and minority groups, and with identification as a central component in their development.

From the *perspective of minorities*, the acculturation strategies are:

- *Integration*: Members of the minority group identify with both the ethnic and the mainstream culture (i.e., national or majority culture).
- *Assimilation*: They do not identify with their ethnic culture and want to interact with and assimilate into the mainstream culture.
- *Separation*: They identify with their ethnic culture and do not want to interact with that of the majority.
- *Marginalisation*: Individual members end up not identifying with either of the two cultures.

[97] In my opinion, this model does not take into account the heterogeneous state of most countries prior to modern migration and globalisation, mainly as a result of colonialism and the related peculiarities of border creation. This perpetuates the myth of (the historically normative existence of) nation-state congruence and does not recognise the various types of sociological minorities (see subsection 2.2.6 for full discussion) present in many countries.

From the *perspective of the majority group*, these are:

- *Mutual accommodation*: The majority group supports the minority group's wish to maintain their ethnic culture as well as adopt aspects of the majority's culture.
- *Melting pot* (or *pressure cooker* when forced): They support the assimilation of the minority group.
- *Segregation*: They keep ethnic minorities separated.
- *Marginalisation* (that has been relabelled as *exclusionism*): They expect the minority group not to be in contact with the majority group and, at the same time, to renounce their ethnic origin.

Stathi and Roschini (2016:59) argue that integration is "the most positive and balanced strategy", which requires the majority group to be open and inclusive and the minority group to have a desire for contact. They state that this strategy recognises the importance of identifying with different cultures while still identifying with a common culture. In order for the integration strategy to be successful, they believe that societies must have a multicultural ideology, low levels of prejudice, and positive intergroup attitudes towards outgroups.

The *Interactive Acculturation Model* (IAM) also identifies *individualism* as a minority and majority strategy, when group members consider themselves as individuals with no sense of belonging to any group. The selection of this strategy seems the least likely, based on May's (2012) view on ethnicity and nationality, SIT's conception of social identity, and considering the difficulty with which people follow the individual mobility strategy of exiting a group.

As I argued in subsection 3.3.1, the pressure on minority-language speakers to assimilate (or to leave their subgroups) indicates the unequal power dynamic between groups. Stathi and Roschini (2016:60) cite the *Concordance Model of Acculturation* (CMA) which recognises these power disparities between minority and majority groups in affecting public policies, and warns that greater discord between majority and minority strategy preferences relates to higher levels of (perceived) threatening contact. Thus, if minority groups want to follow the strategy of integration, it is crucial that majority groups be encouraged to follow the strategy of mutual accommodation. As May (2014b:387) argued in Chapter 1, subsection 1.3.5, the nation-state "is not the sole preserve" of the majority group, and minority groups should enjoy the right to equal inclusion and representation in the public sphere.

Brown (2000:766) states that there is experimental evidence to suggest that a *dual identity strategy* (i.e., integration, as opposed to assimilation), which encourages the maintenance of both subgroup and superordinate identities in contact settings has favourable outcomes. He notes, however, that the advantage of this approach is largely limited to minority groups, and that the conditions under which majority groups will adopt this approach in intergroup situations is unknown. This relates back to the discussions in Chapters 1 and 2 regarding liberal democracy, majoritarianism and pluralism. It is also worth pointing out that if the dual identity strategy may lead to intergroup peace, this approach is not only to the advantage of minority groups. Indeed, as we have seen, the political stability of the nation-state itself might be at stake.

Glasford and Johnston (2018:202) also acknowledge that in order to affect social change, a numerical minority group must, by definition, have the support of the majority group. In other words, the collective action of a minority group is not sufficient without some degree of social cohesion with the majority group. This is, of course, assuming that the minority group's collective action stays within the confines of legal and democratic methods (and thus does not threaten the state's supremacy), which it often does not, once their efforts are frustrated by the majoritarian state. In his definition of radicalisation, Schmid (2013:19) explains that it is only once the "normal practices of dialogue, compromise and tolerance" between groups break down, that "political mobilisation outside the dominant political order [is accepted] as the existing system is no longer recognised as appropriate or legitimate". The onus, therefore, rests equally on majority groups to achieve peace and social cohesion, by respecting minority group's desire to maintain their subgroup identity.

Conventional wisdom insists that emphasising commonality is the best way to increase positive attitudes between groups. From a social identity perspective, Glasford and Johnston (2018:202-203) argue, however, that minority groups prefer approaches that acknowledge their group distinctiveness, as opposed to those that threaten or obscure it.

> For example, relative to majority group members, minority group members typically prefer multiculturalism over assimilation (Verkuyten, 2006) and dual identity over common identity (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Kafati, 2000). Moreover, and of particular relevance to the current work, racial/ethnic minorities are often more concerned with being respected, than being liked, by majority group members (Bergsieker, Shelton & Richeson, 2010). As a result, minority group members, whether within interpersonal interactions (Bergsieker et al., 2010) or in attitudes toward the larger group (Glasford & Dovidio, 2011; Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio & Carmi, 2009), are more comfortable approaching majority-groups and contexts under conditions that recognise

> the minority subgroup identity. For example, when racial/ethnic minorities feel respect they are more likely to actively support majority-group institutions (Huo & Molina, 2006).

Note that in Glasford and Johnston's (2018) assessment, minority groups do not *only*, but rather *also*, want to maintain their subgroup identity. In the previous chapter, May (2012:158) argued that instead of cultural and linguistic stasis, those who desire to maintain their own language alongside the common/dominant language, actually demonstrate a greater ability to manage multiple identities. Thus, it is important to clearly differentiate between a minority strategy of separation versus integration, as these two are often conflated when rejecting minority groups' attempts to maintain their subgroup languages, cultures and identities.

Based on these insights and their own experimental findings, Glasford and Johnston (2018:203; 208) advocate for a *status-based respect* approach, in order to produce positive attitudes toward and interest in contact with the majority group (i.e., positive peace and social cohesion). They believe that this approach, which recognises power relations, "may not only allow for more difficult conversations around inequality (as compared to commonality), while supporting social cohesion (improved relations between groups), but also support minority group collective action, both of which can raise awareness of structural systems of disadvantage and promote positive social change" (2018:210).

Glasford and Johnston (2018:208-209) found that strictly focusing on intergroup commonality actually decreases minority collective action tendencies,[98] due to a reduction in subordinate group identification, and even reduces minority-group members' preference to differentiate from the majority group. This means that while intergroup conflict may be ameliorated, neither the differential power structure between majority and minority groups, nor the assimilation and lack of MLR to which it leads, are actually addressed.

[98] Collective action is meant positively here, referring to acts that lead to positive social change (equality between groups). Considering that minority collective action of any kind fundamentally seeks a change in the behaviour of the dominant majority and/or the state, the latter is likely to view such action as negative and politically destabilising (by challenging the supremacy of the state) in all instances. Relatedly, and which has oftentimes led to grave rights abuses, the majority group has the ability to determine the legality of minority actions through its control of the state apparatus, including the very use of the minority language (e.g. the imposition of Mandarin on the Uyghurs). Instead of exclusively deliberating on the desirability, justifiability or legality of either positive or negative minority collective action, in my view, the focus should mainly be on those state-imposed policies and approaches, ostensibly aimed at fostering greater social cohesion, but which seem to have the opposite effect. Fishman (1989, cited in May, 2012:77) advocates for a similar approach to nationalism research in Chapter 2, subsection 2.2.5. From everything we know about minority groups and identity (including threats and responses), it is clear that in pursuing nation-state congruence, the state itself threatens the social cohesion and political stability of the country. In short, if secession or separation is to be avoided, integration has to be the official policy of the state.

According to Glasford and Johnston (2018:209), majority-group members usually have a preference for common identity, colour-blindness and assimilation, whereas minority-group members often have a preference for dual identity, multiculturalism and integration. Martiny and Rubin (2016:28) argue that in order to develop potential solutions for conflicts and achieve peaceful co-operation between members of different groups, group members' need for a positive collective self-esteem have to be taken into consideration. Stathi and Roschini (2016:62) state that the dual identity approach allows groups to "sustain the distinctiveness of their cultural and ethnic identity and at the same time be part of an inclusive (national or state) identity".

Phillips DeZalia and Moeschberger (2016:128) cite the *Mutual Intergroup Differentiation Model* (MIDM), which suggests that the individual subordinate identities must be maintained within the superordinate one. Doing so allows individuals to maintain a connection to their previous ingroups, which means they are less likely to reject the new superordinate one. They believe that although the superordinate identity may become the most salient, it is possible for multiple identities to coexist in dialogue with each other (2016:129).

3.5.4. The social identity approach and May's (2012) MLR framework

As argued in Chapter 1, there are often conflicts of interests present in situations that require language policies and planning. Intergroup competition over scarce resources exists – usually public-funded mother-tongue education, and the ability to disseminate culture and ideology through state institutions. Recall Skutnabb-Kangas (2001:204) who defined MTE as a crucial element of the right to a separate identity, and of the reproduction of this identity. There may, however, also be substantial conflicts present over other resources. As representative of the majority group, the state is ill-suited to mediate in these disputes. Patten (2009:104) maintains that the majority group has the ability to privilege their own language, control the state, and advantage their own members in the competition for economic resources and opportunities (see majoritarianism in Chapter 1, subsection 1.4.2.).

May (2012:324) cites Billig's (1995) view that the "intolerance of difference" embedded in nation-states has subjugated and eviscerated minority languages and cultures, "validated on the basis that it is necessary for establishing social and political cohesion within the nation-state". De Varennes and Kuzborska (2016:305) argue that considering its centrality to many people's identity, language is "the key to inclusion". Paz (2013:161) agrees with a legal document which

states that "respect for a person's dignity is intimately connected with respect for the person's identity and consequently for the person's language".

May (2012:18) believes that a "greater accommodation of minority language and culture within the nation-state provides a more just representation of the (at times differing) interests of all its citizens". He argues that this requires some form of group-differentiated MLR in modern liberal democracies, while also avoiding essentialising group identities. May (2012:19) insists that the language and identity processes necessary to avoid essentialism can "be negotiated from *within* rather than determined from *without*". In other words, instead of external intervention, identity negotiation and formation should be allowed to remain intragroup processes (see black sheep and entrepreneurs of identity in subsection 3.3.2.2).

He warns that failure to meet the demands of minority groups for greater linguistic and cultural representation, may lead to "secessionist pressures and the potential fragmentation of nation-states", along with "the hardening of ethnic and national boundaries" (2012:19). Regarding the relationship between sociopolitical stability and minority-language groups, May (2012:324) contends:

> It is not the cultural, linguistic and political expression or mobilisation of minority ethnicities and nationalisms which are the cause of so much contemporary mayhem in the modern world, but their disavowal. We ignore their ongoing influence and purchase at our peril.

Important for this thesis, the Social Identity Approach reviewed in this chapter offers many levels of analysis of group identity and intergroup conflict not included in May's argument for minority-language rights, in particular the former's focus on intragroup processes (SCT), group-based emotions (IET) and identity threats. The combination of the two frameworks is therefore a more complete 'take' on the relationship between ethnicity, language, identity, conflict, nationalism and radicalisation. We now understand, for example, precisely what motivates the maintenance of (ethnic) group identity (and why exiting is unlikely), the link between identity threats and interethnic conflict, as well as how identities may be mobilised and under which circumstances. Based on the findings discussed in the previous subsection, the SIA also seems to provide support for May's advocacy of minority-group rights in pursuit of sociopolitical stability. That being said, May's critical perspective on nation-states, the power dynamics between minority and majority groups, and the phenomenon of language shift, as well as his full-throated defence of group-based rights, specifically ELR, supplements some of the gaps that the SIA has as it relates to minority-language groups in particular.

Perhaps because of the separation between the disciplines of linguistics and social psychology, those social psychologists who have focused on minority ethnic and/or linguistic groups specifically, have not offered much in terms of concrete proposals for language policies or any policies for that matter (beyond the general notions of "integration", "accommodation", and "dual identity"), the exception being Wright and Bougie (2007) who specifically advocate for MTE. Social psychologists, generally, seem to barely note the centrality of education and public institutions in maintaining minority identities and languages, and seem to pay little attention to the role of political figures and state institutions in driving many of these conflicts, and thus being key to their solution. May (2012) also adds an important component to this discussion with his focus on the impact of English and globalisation on minority identities.

In summary, the SIA is a valuable tool for understanding minority identities, ethnolinguistic conflict and radicalisation/mobilisation. I will attempt to demonstrate its explanatory power (in conjunction with May's (2012) framework, throughout the case study of white Afrikaans speakers. I believe it certainly has recommendation power in terms of avoiding triggering negative intergroup behaviour and conflict. Whether this combined framework has predictive power remains to be seen. While the SIA can likely reliably predict which circumstances may lead to negative intergroup behaviour, each intergroup conflict is uniquely impacted by history and situational factors and will thus vary in terms of how they unfold. In the following two chapters, I turn to one ethnolinguistic group which has seen its fair share of such conflict (and which have led to remarkably divergent outcomes).

CHAPTER 4

A historical account of white Afrikaans speakers (1652-1994)

Introduction

Afrikaners present an exceptionally interesting case study illustrating and synthesising the topics and theories discussed in this thesis. Their language struggle, dating back to the 19th century, including the standardisation of Afrikaans and advocacy of MTE, their particular situatedness in a multilingual and multicultural society demanding social cohesion, and their minority status in a majoritarian democracy, as well as their engagement in language conflict all dovetail nicely with the content covered in the first chapter of this thesis.

The fascinating history leading up to their relatively recent group identity formation, how this history continues to inform various interpretations of Afrikaner identity, their emotional attachment to and mobilisation based on ethnicity, the centrality of language to their ethnic identity, their history of nationalism, the clash between their cultural (and other) interests and the nation-state, and the pressure of language shift (specifically anglicisation) they face, tie in well with May's (2012) MLR framework laid out in the second chapter of this thesis.

The presence of intergroup conflict throughout Afrikaner history, co-occurring with the struggle for internal cohesion of the Afrikaners and intergroup differentiation, their use of strategies for status improvement, the continuous changes in the subgroup/superordinate group identifications of individual members, the presence of group polarisation, identity threats and radicalisation and, in particular, the present-day seismic shifts in Afrikaner identification, ingroup boundary-making, and reinterpretation of Afrikaner identity, will serve to illustrate the SIA and related theories discussed in the third chapter of this thesis.

The Afrikaners are a controversial topic for discussion in an academic inquiry, in large part because of the system of Apartheid and the staying power of that ideology among a segment of the Afrikaners, as well as the consequent inferences made (by non-members and dissident members alike) regarding the present-day views and actions of the Afrikaner group as a whole. This reductionist view unfortunately abounds in public discourse, and not only ignores much of Afrikaner history,[99] but in doing so, fundamentally fails to offer a comprehensive analysis

[99] In response to Jan Smuts's 1949 statement that the Afrikaners had a "romantic history", Giliomee (2009:xiii) states that Afrikaner history is not only marked by drama, heroism and magnanimity, but also by oppression, greed and dehumanisation.

of modern Afrikaners, their cultural and political movements and the implications for South African society.

In Chapter 2, subsection 2.2.5, I noted Fishman's (1989; cited in May, 2012:77) belief that inquiries into cases of nationalism must not seek to answer whether it is good, logical and/or justifiable, but rather, to understand why and when it occurs, and how its "obvious power" may be best directed. May (2012:56; 77) argued that an ethno-symbolic approach can achieve this, such as by differentiating between *factual* and *felt* history, and avoiding "the trap of essentialism". Following from Fishman's and May's approaches to these matters, I believe that a responsible and honest academic study into cases of nationalism seeks neither to justify nor demonise individuals or groups, but rather to increase understanding, and by doing so, inform positive action. Preeminent historian, Hermann Giliomee, produced the seminal work on Afrikaner history titled *The Afrikaners: Biography of a People* (2009). In it, he attempts to recount the story of the Afrikaners "with empathy but without partisanship", aiming to understand but not necessarily pardon them.[100] It is with this perspective that I carry out a case study of white Afrikaans speakers.

In this chapter, I wish to offer extensive coverage of Afrikaner history, aimed at informing an accurate analysis of this group. Du Plessis (2003:100) recommends a historical-structural approach to language-in-education policy which highlights the role of underlying ideologies and offers insights on group competition, conflict and domination, as opposed to a neoclassic approach that focuses on the role of individual motivation. Bekker (2003:62-63) advocates a historical analysis that does not simply review factual events, but that relates to a theoretical framework (such as SIT, which he utilises in his language attitude study). With this in mind, I will weave the theoretical framework built throughout the previous three chapters throughout the history of the Afrikaners, where relevant.

Periodisation

Du Plessis (2003:103-104) offers a historical periodisation of South African language-in-education policy, identifying two broad political eras, the *Colonial era* (1652-1902) and the *Statehood era* (1910-present). These eras are further divided based on periods of different political dispensations, each of which ended with an incident, a conflict, or negotiations after a

[100] Elsewhere, Giliomee (2009:xvii) cites Irish historian Roy Foster (1999), who argued that "apology is easier than explaining", denoting the great difficulty of offering a comprehensive and nuanced account of history and attempting to recognise the complexities and contradictions within society, groups and individuals.

conflict. The Colonial era consists of five discernible periods, namely: the *Dutch period* (1652-1814) involving white settlement and which ended with British occupation and Dutch secession; the *first British period* (1814-1834) which consisted of British settlement and concluded with the abolition of slavery and the frontier wars which preceded the Great Trek; the *second British period* (1834-1899/1902) which saw the consolidation of the British presence and ended with the Anglo-Boer War; *the Republican period* (1834-1899/1902) which ran concurrently to the former period and involved the establishment of the Boer republics and ended with the war; and lastly the *third British period* (1899/1902-1910) during which British power in South Africa was consolidated and which ended with unification and the ensuing anglicisation.

The Statehood era is also divided into five periods, namely; the *Unification period* (1910-1948), during which the Afrikaner and English groups were unified under the Union government and which ended with political conflict post-World War II that led to the rise to power of Afrikaners; the *Apartheid period* (1948-1976), which saw the establishment of Apartheid, Bantu Education, and the Republic in 1961 and ended with the Soweto Uprisings; the *Reformist period* (1976-1989), when the reformation of Apartheid was underway and which ended with a series of states of emergency as a result of opposition to Apartheid; the *Transitional period* (1989-1994), which involved the De Klerk era of government and negotiations on an interim constitution (Act 200 of 1993) and culminated in the first democratic elections in 1994; and lastly the *Democratisation period* (since 1994), the current period, which has seen the establishment of the first fully representative and non-racial government and the adoption of a new constitution (Act 108 of 1996).

Kamwangamalu (2005:737) also offers a periodisation of South African history based on language policy. He identifies the *Dutchification era* (1652-1795), the *Anglicisation era* (1795-1948), and the *Afrikanerisation era* (1948-1994), each of which corresponds to a time in which knowledge of a particular language (Dutch, English and Afrikaans respectively) was especially needed for access to employment and other resources available in the polity. For the purposes of the Afrikaner case study, which investigates not only language policy, but also identity and politics, I believe Kamwangamalu's (2005) periodisation will be best able to reflect the different waves of Afrikaner ethnic identification and mobilisation, and the power dynamics involved.[101] His emphasis on the dominant (and privileged) language reveals the majority

[101] We can also identify the post-Apartheid period, which I term ANCification (1994-2020s). This period is characterised by the extension of the franchise and the development of a superordinate South African identity

group that, during each period, was able to wield the state apparatus against other groups in service of its own interests. May's (2012) MLR framework highlights the importance of the state and public institutions in the pursuit of nation-state congruence and marginalisation of minority groups – a perspective that I maintain throughout this chapter and the next.

I will, however, make a minor amendment to Kamwangamalu's Afrikanerisation period, to accurately reflect the Afrikaner political and cultural movements in the period after the Anglo-Boer War and prior to the formal recognition of the onset of Apartheid. Each section of this chapter will correspond to the three periods listed above. The Dutchification period (1652-1795) is discussed in section 4.1, the Anglicisation period (1795-1910) is discussed in section 4.2, and the Afrikanerisation period (1910-1994) is discussed in section 4.3.

4.1. The Dutchification Period (1652-1795)

4.1.1. The Cape of Good Hope: from outpost to settlement

4.1.1.1. The VOC's refreshment station

On 6 April 1652, on orders from the Dutch East India Company (VOC or *Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie*), Jan van Riebeeck (along with 90 others including some women and children) founded a refreshment station at what would later be called the Cape of Good Hope, tasked with servicing VOC ships on their way to and from its empire in the East. According to Giliomee (2009:1) and Raidt (1991:89), the Lords Seventeen, the directors of the VOC, were not intent on founding a colony for European settlement at the Cape. The station would thus be kept to a minimum in terms of both size and staffing for its intended purpose.

4.1.1.2. Release of the free burghers

In 1657 Van Riebeeck, commander of the station, released nine VOC servants to become full-time farmers on their plots. These farmers, called *vrijburghers*, or free burghers,[102] were charged with producing fresh food – sowing and planting what the Company demanded for the prices they offered. In 1658, Van Riebeeck banned all trade between the burghers and the indigenous Khoikhoi, and barred the burghers from selling cattle to each other or passing ships

(Mandela phase); slowly rising standards of living of black and coloured people (growing middle-class), significant capital gains among Afrikaners (and Indians), and growing anti-minority sentiments and anti-pluralist policies (Mbeki phase); mass emigration, massive state corruption, and drop in service delivery (Zuma phase); and the rise of privatisation of government services (education, policing, and lately, basic service delivery, water and electricity), and with it, the redefining of national, local and private governance (Ramaphosa phase). This period will be discussed in the following chapter.

[102] The Dutch word *burgher* translates to citizen or resident.

without government permission. That same year 14 free burghers handed Van Riebeeck a petition. They demanded to know the price the VOC would pay them for their wheat, complained that they were left unaided "against threats by the indigenous Khoikhoi to their lives and livestock", and bemoaned the ban on the cattle trade with the Khoikhoi. In this petition, they described themselves as "the defenders of the land" who, instead of being assisted, were oppressed by the VOC for whom they were "Company slaves" (Giliomee, 2009:1; Raidt, 1991:89).

Van Riebeeck's superiors in Amsterdam had offered the burghers a wheat price he knew to be far too low for them to subsist on. A few years later, a smuggling trade developed which saw the burghers receive more than twice what the VOC offered for their produce. Although Van Riebeeck knew the VOC prices were too low, and that the burghers had a right to protest, he took great offence at their petition and believed that more was at stake than simply wheat prices. Giliomee (2009:2) relates Van Riebeeck's thoughts on the dispute as written in his diary:

> [T]he burghers 'would greatly like to be their own masters and overrule the lawful authorities placed over them, yes, even the Company and their Lords and Masters'. Accordingly, he admonished them 'to behave as behove obedient servants, and not to compel the Company in any way or to threaten it as has now been done pretty seditiously and rebelliously.' The Company had fed them and had provided them with everything they needed. It had raised the burghers 'from a lowly position and at great expense to itself.' Although not the Company's slaves, they were its subjects.

On instruction to sell their produce to ships only three days after they had docked, and with their appeals to export their produce on VOC ships rejected by the Company, the free burghers struggled to survive and, in the words of a visiting commissioner, "Dutch colonists here bear the name of free men but they are so … restrained in everything that the absence of freedom is rendered only too evident" (Giliomee, 2009:10). While those in the town in Table Bay were able to circumvent some of the restrictions on trade with passing sailors, requests by other free burghers to move there and practice a trade instead of farming were often refused.

4.1.1.3. Introduction of slavery

Not without coincidence, 1658 also saw the importation of the first slaves to the Cape. According to Raidt (1991:90), the increasing demand of passing ships for fresh meat and produce necessitated Van Riebeeck to import more slaves, to trade with the Khoikhoi in the interior, and to raise cattle.[103] She argues that this was the motive behind the 1657 decision to

[103] During the first decade of the station's existence, 205 ships with 40,200 passengers sailed to the East, while 103 ships with 13,000 passengers returned to the Netherlands (Giliomee, 2009:3).

award farms to nine free burghers. Giliomee (2009:6) insists that this move was made because the VOC had wanted to save money. By 1664, the government had begun distributing Sunday church collections and proceeds from petty fines to poor burghers who were living in squalor (Giliomee, 2009:2).

Low opinions of the burgher's willingness to work also played a role in the import of slaves. Some of the VOC's top officials would have preferred "Chinese or free blacks to European farmers", and often expressed contempt for the abilities of the free burghers. Van Riebeeck had referred to the 90 Europeans who arrived with him at the Cape as "weak and ignorant people" (Giliomee, 2009:2-3). Giliomee maintains that the burghers' "sense of vulnerability and distrust of the government would not subside for more than three centuries". In addition to the first shipload of slaves that came from West Africa (mainly Angola), he cites an analysis of slave imports to the Cape between 1680 and 1731 which shows that roughly half were of Malagasy origin, and about a third were of Indian or Indonesian origin (2009:12). The rest were slaves imported mainly from the East African coast (Madagascar and later Mozambique).

4.1.1.4. The origins of the burghers

Giliomee (2009:xiii) suggests that Afrikaner history begins at the Cape of Good Hope, the settlement at the tip of Africa founded by the VOC in 1652. Settlers were mostly immigrants from Western Europe who worked as soldiers or sailors for the Company, before becoming farming free burghers at the Cape. The release of the free burghers from the employ of the VOC, Raidt (1991:90) believes, signified the beginning of the development of a permanent European population. By 1662 (when Jan van Riebeeck left the Cape), the population had grown to a couple hundred people (consisting of Europeans and slaves; company servants and free burghers). Giliomee (2009:2) estimates the European population at this time at roughly 150. In 1679 the new commander of the Cape, Simon van der Stel, arrived at the settlement and founded the inland settlement of Stellenbosch. His government built a *drostdy* (the seat of local government), and appointed a *landdrost* (chief government official) and four free burghers as *heemraden* (councillors) to administer the district, keep order and settle minor civil suits. By the end of the 1710s, Stellenbosch, and present-day Paarl, Franshoek, Tygerberg, Wellington, Malmesbury and Tulbagh were all settled (Giliomee, 2009:9-10).

Raidt (1991:90) states that in the Cape settlement there was a small group of people who, in contrast with the constantly changing officials, planned on staying in Africa permanently. As early as 1707 they began referring to themselves as *Afrikaners* (see subsection 4.1.3.2). They

largely cut ties with their family and community in Europe, and developed "a distinct sense of self-consciousness; they made the new land genuinely their own" (Giliomee, 2009:xiv). In addition to these settlers, nearly 200 French Huguenots also made the Cape their new home, and quickly became assimilated into the burgher community.

The majority of the immigrants who arrived for the first three decades were single Dutch men, most of whom were illiterate or semi-literate peasants or labourers, who worked for the VOC as sailors or soldiers. Giliomee (2009:4) explains that a career on the lower rungs of the Company was undesirable, and only out of dire necessity would citizens of the free Netherlands sign up for one. He insists that a career in the VOC "was truly for those who could think of no other solution to their problems". Female European immigrants at this point in history were also Dutch, some of whom were orphans sent from the Netherlands. By the 1700s, European immigrants were mostly single German men, who typically went to Holland in search of employment in order to escape poverty, and swiftly became assimilated into the Dutch community at the Cape. Giliomee (2009:5) notes that while most immigrants were from the lower rungs of society, they "were enterprising enough to take the risk of working in a distant country for the required term of five years".

4.1.2. Society at the Cape

4.1.2.1. The assimilation and influence of French Huguenots

In 1688, approximately 180 French Huguenots (comprising mostly families) arrived at the Cape, fleeing religious persecution. While most were peasant farmers, artisans or labourers, some had been more successful in their native countries than the Dutch or German immigrants. Given an initial assumption by the VOC that the Cape would remain Dutch, Van der Stel emphasised the *Dutch dimension of the burghers' identity* in response to the arrival of the Huguenots. A survivor of the Dutch-French war of the 1670s, he "had no intention of allowing a French enclave to take root at the Cape", and so settled them with the instruction of interspersing them with the other burghers so that, in his words, "they could learn our language and morals, and be integrated with the Dutch nation" (Giliomee, 2009:4; 10-11).

In the late 1690s, the new governor, Van der Stel's son Willem Adriaan, allowed the French congregation to have a French-medium sermon every other week. In 1701, however, a strict policy was imposed by the Lords Seventeen aimed at ensuring that "the French language [would] gradually become extinct and disappear". The forced cultural assimilation was successful and by 1750, no one under the age of 40 could speak French (Giliomee, 2009:11).

Although immigrants from France only represented 8.5% of the total population of male free burghers at the Cape in the first five decades,[104] they and their descendants had an outsized impact on stabilising the free burgher population and on establishing positions of leadership in Afrikaner society as, without a fatherland to return to, they were more determined to take root in Africa. Their presence also resulted in the gradual shift to endogamy among European immigrants. The shortage of European women saw European men taking "half-caste slaves as brides or mistresses", whereas the French Huguenots were mostly married already with large families. As the girls from these families grew up, "stable liaisons with non-European women declined" (Giliomee, 2009:11).

While the German language was also present at the Cape, the diverse dialects spoken by the mostly male immigrants, and their intermarriage with Dutch and French women, meant that the language of their children were Dutch. Only in 1780 did the VOC grant permission for a Lutheran Church, but by that time "the principle of one language [Dutch] and one church for the European community had become well established" (Giliomee, 2009:11-12). The French Huguenots, through their influence on marriage patterns, and the VOC, through its language policies of the churches at the Cape, were thus instrumental in homogenising the European community at the Cape.

4.1.2.2. The imposition and transformation of Dutch

Giliomee (2009:19) states that although the VOC was a profit-driven business like any other, it was not wholly indifferent to matters of Dutch culture and "the moral welfare of its subjects" at the Cape. The Dutch language and the reformed faith had to be taught in both the church and school, and there were strict instructions that only Dutch should be spoken to slaves (who had to be proficient in order to be manumitted). The Company also appointed ministers, sick-comforters and teachers for the burgher's benefit. The church, in turn, demanded literacy in order for a congregant to be confirmed – a policy which became an important incentive for burghers to obtain a basic education in the 18th and 19th centuries.

The diverse origins of slaves meant that many languages were brought to the Cape, but they eventually spoke a lingua franca. A creolised Portuguese survived until the end of the Company period, while Dutch gradually became Afrikaans (Giliomee, 2009:46). The burghers, together with their slaves and servants, created Afrikaans from the Dutch language (Giliomee,

[104] Immigrants from the Netherlands made up 40.4% of free burghers, those from German-speaking territories 32.3%, and 6.9% were born in the Cape.

2009:xiv). Giliomee (2009:53) explains that Afrikaans was essentially a dialect of Dutch which had undergone limited creolisation; slaves and Khoikhoi were the first to deviate from standard Dutch, whereafter interactions between burghers and their servants led to further restructuring.

It should be noted, however, that various Dutch varieties were brought to the Cape, where a process of koineisation occurred. So too, the second language varieties spoken by German and French settlers would have also contributed to a new form of Dutch. By the end of the 18th century, once Dutch was simplified and a significant amount of loan words from slave languages were incorporated, a "bad sort of Dutch language", or *Cape Dutch*, had taken shape – a *proto-Afrikaans* which would eventually become Afrikaans as it is known today. Of the origins of Afrikaans, Giliomee (2009:53) states that the language is the "shared cultural creation […] of Europeans and non-Europeans, of whites and blacks, masters and slaves".

According to Giliomee (2009:53), half of Afrikaans speakers by the end of the 18th century were of European descent, who continued to uphold Dutch as the standard written and main public language. Dutch bibles were read, and the church fought to preserve Dutch until the 1920s. Interestingly, he speculates that while Dutch both supported and stemmed the development of Afrikaans, had it not been for its continued use (especially in the Church and as a written medium), Afrikaans would probably not have survived against English in the 19th century.

4.1.2.3. Conflict and co-operation with the Khoikhoi

The free burghers' growing involvement in cattle farming, and the shift to extensive agriculture threatened the way of life of the roughly 100,000 Khoikhoi who lived in what is now the Western Cape (Giliomee, 2009:7). When "the burghers ploughed their fields for the first time", those living at the Cape Peninsula realised the Europeans had come to stay, and became hostile and anxious. In 1659, to prevent further occupation of their grazing lands, the Khoikhoi attacked and destroyed most of the farms and went off with the bulk of the livestock. While Van Riebeeck claimed in 1660 that peace had been achieved, the conflict over land, cattle and access to water continued. Giliomee (2009:8) continues:

> Van Riebeeck wrote that living in peace with the Khoikhoi was impossible, but killing them was 'barbarous and unchristian.' As a compromise he considered enslaving the Peninsulars, but slavery would contravene the Company's specific instructions.

The burghers, in response, drove the Khoikhoi who wanted to remain independent deeper into the interior, while others remained to work on burghers' farms. Van Riebeeck attempted to

erect a border to keep the Peninsula Khoikhoi separate from those in the interior, but this was in vain, as the settlement still relied on the interior Khoikhoi for their cattle. Giliomee (2009:9) states that a "complex plural society was taking shape" and in the settlement "there were already slaves, people of mixed racial origins and Khoikhoi who were beginning to embrace a new composite culture".

Soon, both the Peninsula Khoikhoi and the burghers were acting as middlemen between the interior Khoikhoi and the VOC, making profits in the cattle trade. By the 1670s, as Khoikhoi resistance waned, expansion of the settlement was underway, at which time there were nearly 150 free burghers, half of whom were farmers. Giliomee (2009:9) believes that what made the Cape Colony unique among its equivalents elsewhere was its preferred policy of getting the indigenous people to work for them, instead of "exterminating or expelling" them. While this is hardly reason for applause, it does provide some insight into the Afrikaners' later dealings with indigenous peoples, and black tribes in particular.

4.1.2.4. Burgher status and labour

The cultural character of the Cape was influenced by the Netherlands, and in particular, the principle of egalitarianism established by Roman-Dutch law. Citizens in the Netherlands had more liberty to pursue their own interests compared to the rest of Europeans at that time. In 1665, a French visitor expressed his amazement that "Dutch servants enjoyed so many privileges that their masters could not even hit them" (Giliomee, 2009:5-6). Lower-class Dutch immigrants to the Cape, therefore, might have had an expectation of continued liberty and (relatively) higher status, despite their socio-economic position.

While only about half of the population of the Netherlands were members of the Reformed Church, based on the Calvinist doctrine, at the Cape the Reformed Church was the only church for more than a century. Here, the church opposed the strict hierarchy of the Catholic Church, and "more than one Dutch minister contrasted the lack of respect of Dutch laymen for their ministers with the humble deference displayed by Spanish and Portuguese Roman Catholics towards their priests" (Giliomee, 2009:5). The principle of egalitarianism had thus made its way to the Cape, which saw burghers expect a degree of (social) equality with their fellow Europeans, despite class and other differences.

Giliomee (2009:6) suggests that there was ambiguity surrounding the status of the free burghers. They expected a similar status to that of the burghers in the Netherlands – citizens,

not subjects or subordinates. He relates the growing political consciousness of the burgher (and I would add, the development of a political bloc) as follows (2009:6-7):

> The claim [that burghers were equal *citizens*, not *subjects*] may not have been factually correct, but the burghers never abandoned this aspiration. The burghers in the western Cape who were to take part in the Patriot struggle during the 1780s described themselves as 'free citizens of a colony of the free United Netherlands, sharing the same rights and privileges'. The Cape burghers soon embraced their own foundation myth: that they were indispensable to the Cape settlement and that their interests were of key, if not of paramount importance, to maintaining the settlement. The term 'defenders of the land' offered the first sign of an emerging political consciousness. It was further stimulated by the important role that burghers played in the administration.

According to Giliomee (2009:12), the introduction of slavery at the Cape had an immediate effect on social and economic life. Only in 1716 did the Lords Seventeen raise the question of whether the Cape Colony should be based on slave labour, or rather sponsor the immigration of free European wage labourers, who would work on existing farms until they were able to set up their own. Aside from the lone moral voice of one Councillor, the Council – having no desire for a class of labourers who would, in the words of the secretary, "have little respect for their master", and predicting that more immigrants would simply lead to more poor burghers – decided that the importation of slaves would be the best option (Giliomee, 2009:12-13).

The question arose once more in 1750, when the Lords Seventeen instructed the Cape government to investigate the feasibility of European immigration. Burgher councillors, who acted as spokesmen for the burghers, were consulted by the government and they argued that the policy was "absolutely impossible" and would "bring ruin upon the Cape, and merely add to the very serious state of poverty which already exists". Giliomee (2009:13) points out that this suggests that the burghers were primarily driven by *economic survival*, and not *ethnic survival*, 100 years into the existence of the Cape Colony:

> The die was cast. The colony would not be able to grow out of its economic straitjacket by enlarging the market through a steady increase of cash-earning wage labourers. The burghers also saw little need for European immigrants to supplement their numbers and assist them in building a European colony. Slave labour satisfied most of the labour needs of the western Cape. The burghers were defining their survival not in terms of a large self-sufficient European society but in their ability to ensure that the land and other opportunities were reserved for them and their children.

The introduction of slavery at the Cape also gave the burghers the opportunity for upward social mobility. Giliomee (2009:7) states: "Officials in colonies across the world discovered that, if slaves or indigenous labour could be found, European immigrants refused to work on

the land as their kinsmen did in Europe". In other words, the import of slaves not only averted competition from European immigrants, but also allowed the free burghers to move away from 'lower-class labour' and in doing so, elevate their own position in the social hierarchy vis-à-vis Company officials and other higher status Europeans.[105] Giliomee (2009:12) argues that slavery fundamentally changed the course of the Cape's history:

> Unless a government banned slavery from the outset, as happened in Australia, the introduction of slavery in European colonies in this period was almost automatic if land was abundant and labour scarce. Freemen who owned land sought slaves to work for them. Slavery transformed the social ethos of a society, defining freedom and the status hierarchy. High status belonged to those who were free, kept slaves and did not have to work with their hands. To be a servant doing manual work in the employ of someone else carried the connotation of slave status, which the burghers at the Cape did everything possible to avoid.

While the Afrikaners were, as we will see later, a colonised people and victims of European imperialism, they were also colonisers and imperialists (and slaveowners) themselves. The burghers who lived in great isolation in the interior – without a police force or army outside of the Cape – asserted their authority as masters and were opposed to any form of *gelykstelling* (social levelling) with their slaves and servants. Having maintained ties with the *Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk* (NGK; henceforth Dutch Reformed Church (DRC)), they developed paternalistic practices towards these groups, the African tribes they would later encounter, and within their own families (Giliomee, 2009:xiv).

4.1.2.5. Race, religion and class

Giliomee (2009:13) states that the incorporation of slaves and Khoikhoi as the labour force meant that from its onset, the Cape Colony was "a multiracial society in which Europeans set the tone". He explains that early modern Europeans considered themselves to be "heirs to and beneficiaries of a superior civilisation and religion", a sense of self that became crystallised through their interactions with others amid European colonial expansion. He cites historian Charles Boxer who stated that the "Portuguese, Spaniards, Dutch, English and French were nearly all convinced that a Christian European was ipso facto superior to members of another race" and that "one race cannot systemically enslave members of another race without acquiring a conscious or unconscious feeling of racial superiority" (2009:13-14).

[105] This suggests that the split between white and coloured Afrikaans speakers may have been caused (in addition to race) by class and social status.

According to Giliomee (2009:14), race as a biological concept only appeared in South Africa by the late 1800s, before which the term *race* was used loosely and often to denote *nation* – of which the foundational element was considered to be *culture*. Seventeenth-century Europeans did, however, emphasise the differences in colour that coincided with differences in culture. Seventeenth-century Dutchmen, Giliomee (2009:14) explains, viewed blackness as the opposite of what they regarded as normal and beautiful, an attitude towards colour which was bolstered by "the cultural superiority Christians felt towards heathens". The Dutch in the early modern period considered Africans to be "godless and licentious heathens: people fundamentally different from Europeans".

Christianity played a vital role in justifying racial slavery and servitude throughout medieval and early modern Europe. The co-occurrence of religion and slavery also made an appearance at the Cape Colony, when in 1703, a church council declared that it wanted to convert the Khoikhoi so as to free these "children of Ham" from their heathen bondage (Giliomee, 2009:14).[106] Racial and cultural superiority meant that although the assimilation of indigenous peoples and slaves was actively pursued, their (equal) integration into burgher society was still resisted or prevented. This maintenance of a hierarchy of identities illustrates that assimilation (or the abandonment of subgroup identity) does not alter the power dynamic between groups.

Despite the strong European influences on how they dealt with non-Europeans, burghers at the Cape Colony were also influenced in the opposite direction by policies and practices that developed in the Dutch East Indies. In Ceylon and Batavia (present-day Java), where the VOC also operated, there were shortages of European women and it was thus common for Dutchmen to form relationships, and even marry, Eastern women. Children from these unions were raised Christian, and they and their mothers were legally and socially viewed as part of the European community, and referred to as European. The Cape's own Simon van der Stel (first Governor of the colony from 1691-1699) was the descendant of one such union (Giliomee, 2009:14-15).

According to Giliomee (2009:15-16; 18), racial mixing was commonplace in the first 75 years of the Cape settlement's existence, largely because of the huge gender disparity among the European population. In 1700, men outnumbered women two to one, and in the interior three to one. Marriages and stable liaisons between white men and fair-skinned non-white women (such as freed slaves from the East) were common, as well as casual miscegenation.

[106] This refers to the biblical story of Noah's curse on Canaan, the son of Ham.

It is estimated that 7% of so-called 'white' Afrikaner families have a non-European *stammoeder* (progenitress). Many cases exist of children who were considered *halfslag* (half-caste) being absorbed into the European community and what eventually became prominent Afrikaner families (for example, the Du Plessis and Pretorius families). There are also cases of European women marrying non-white men, and whose children were absorbed into the European community and are today prominent Afrikaner families (such as the Snyman family).[107] Childrearing of European children were left largely to female slaves, who consequently had a substantial influence on the culture at the Cape through their dress, household remedies and food preparation (Giliomee, 2009:15-16; 18-19).

The system of classifying people at the Cape was not based on colour, but on legal status instead, differentiating between Company servants, burghers, and slaves. The Khoikhoi, ironically considered "aliens", did not initially fall under colonial law. According to Giliomee (2009:16) "these distinctions, along with the identities of Christian and heathen, exerted the single most important influence on the way in which people in the Company's possessions thought about their status in life". In addition to the three legal groups, he also identifies an intermediate category of "free blacks". This referred to people who had exited the slave category to become free persons by one of two manumission processes: (i) a slave was freed and then registered in the census as a free citizen (or burgher in the Cape settlement); or (ii) a freed slave was assigned to another category, that of a free person, but not a full citizen. Giliomee (2009:16) states that the second category applied to most slaves at the Cape, where the term *free black* was both a racial and a legal term.

Giliomee (2009:18) argues that despite the overlap between legal status, colour and religious identity, there was no rigid racial division at the Cape at this time. He states that people of mixed origins were prominent as burghers and free blacks, and "did not appear to suffer any *racial* discrimination". While there certainly were not any white slaves at the Cape, the treatment of black slaves was therefore due to their legal status, and not their colour.

Social standing quickly became of great importance at the settlement, which saw top VOC officials and the wealthiest burghers "set the tone in the development of a new composite culture" (Giliomee, 2009:15). Wealthy, upper-class people at the port city of Cape Town and

[107] A recent study into the admixture of Afrikaners found that 4.7% of their DNA has a non-European origin, and that almost all Afrikaners had admixture from non-Europeans. Coloured people are much more genetically diverse: 20-24% of their DNA has a European origin, the figure becoming lower the further they live from the Cape (Hollfelder *et al*.. 2020).

Stellenbosch displayed their position of power and status, while landed and other property owners tried to become heemraden, militia officers or church wardens – "offices which then conferred dignity" (Borcherds, 1861; cited in Giliomee, 2009:16). Even church seats were allocated according to rank. Giliomee (2009:16) notes, however, that "the further one went into the interior the less significant these differences became, and the more ridiculous the rituals that accompanied them".

While the non-white inhabitants of the Cape were clearly a very diverse bloc, both in terms of racial background and legal status, Giliomee (2009:19) insists that the white settlers were far from being a monolith. Aside from the divisions between Company servants and burghers, and the differing unions entered into, he also identifies a further split between burghers. Of the 1613 free burghers who lived at the Cape from 1657 to 1707, a third were farmers and a quarter *knechten* (foremen). Knechten were viewed unfavourably by high-status people. On the farms that they worked (in some cases for free blacks) they lived in outbuildings and referred to their employers as *baas* (boss).[108]

In exceptional cases, knechten became independent farmers or otherwise wealthy. However, by the end of the 1600s, slaves were squeezing knechten out of the pool of manual labour, and later supplanted them as overseers of labour. In the 1700s, some knechten began to move to the interior where they became teachers on farms, and where "their status was humble and their pay extremely modest". Children born from liaisons between knechten and free black or slave women (or Khoisan women for those on the frontier), were not usually absorbed into the dominant group (Giliomee, 2009:19). The European ingroup boundaries thus did not include the offspring of lower-class European men and non-European women.

4.1.3. Changes at the Cape

4.1.3.1. Burgher politics and protests

From 1705 to 1707, when the colony's population was nearing 4000 (Khoikhoi excluded), a political crisis swept the Cape settlement. Despite the Company rule dating back to 1657 that officials may not compete with free burghers in farming, as the latter depended on food production for their survival, in 1685, Simon van der Stel (commander at this point) received the farm Constantia, and a few years later his son was awarded the Vergelegen farm. By 1705, a third of the farming land of the colony was in the hands of twenty VOC officials. The

[108] Today, this term is often associated with white supremacy, especially through the Apartheid-era notion of *baasskap* (boss-ship).

Vergelegen farm, developed in the grand European estate style, alone employed 200 slaves and 60 white knechten. Rumours of the Company officials' "opulent lifestyles, and about graft, nepotism and bribery" spread throughout the burgher community (Giliomee, 2009:16; 23-24).

The younger Van der Stel and his family produced a fifth of the total wheat crop, all the wine needed, and owned enough sheep and cattle to supply the Company, hospital and arriving ships. Giliomee (2009:24) states that some officials openly boasted that within a couple of years four or five officials could fully supply the Cape and there would be no need for free burghers. Wealthier burgher farms who enjoyed government contracts were most under threat, thus Giliomee argues, the situation could be considered a "feud between two sets of elites who had fallen out in a fight over the spoils". However, he notes, even Van der Stel could clearly differentiate between officials who rarely stayed long, and his adversaries, whom he called *boeren* (farmers),[109] and "who knew no other fatherland".

Adam Tas, who, unlike most burghers, came from a wealthy and educated background, drafted a petition to the Batavian authorities, accusing the Cape officials of misconduct (Giliomee, 2009:24).[110] Once news of the petition reached the Cape officials, they arrested several burgers, detained Tas and others in the Castle's dungeon known as the Dark Hole, and eventually deported 13 burghers. Stellenbosch was engulfed in protests against the officials. The Landdrost, a farm recipient himself, was "deeply disturbed by the anarchy and the open contempt the burghers were displaying toward the government and toward him personally". Giliomee (2009:25) elaborates:

> [The Landdrost] wrote in a letter to the governor: 'One must wage war against those who cannot be restrained by laws'. He was most upset by a demonstration in 1706 in the town of Stellenbosch where some burghers danced around him, vowing that they would not abandon the struggle. He took refuge in his house, where he wrote to Van der Stel: '[The] women are as dangerous as the men and do not keep quiet'.

Giliomee (2009:16) contends that these events also revealed the colour and class tensions present at the time. The maintenance of slavery at the Cape depended on the co-operation between the two dominant status groups, the Company servants and the burghers. When Stellenbosch burghers protested against senior VOC officials, who retaliated by arresting them,

[109] Giliomee (2009:24) states that the term *boeren*, which became a common term for rural Afrikaners, was sometimes capitalised as if to denote a political rather than class category (see Kriel, 2021).

[110] One of the supporters of the petition believed that "the Cape was going to ruin", while another explained that he signed the petition for the "whole community" and because of "love of his people", while Tas expressed his wish 'that there were many more patriots like him' (Giliomee, 2009:25). This suggests the existence of a sense of group identity, which included not all Europeans at the Cape, but specifically the farming burghers.

some of the slaves were accused of beginning to behave in a manner ill-befitting to their class. The younger Van der Stel, who, like his father, was known to have good relations with his Khoikhoi servants and slaves and baptised and manumitted many of them, enjoyed the support of the free blacks in town (roughly 60 at the time), who worked in fishing and vegetable farming, in his conflict with the burghers. Giliomee (2009:17) describes the burghers' political and racial sentiments during these events as follows:

> As would happen so often later, the burghers were quick to suspect the government of undermining their position in order to protect and win the support of the subordinate population. In response, the burghers expressed their interests as part of a general concern about European survival in the colony. In a letter to the Lords Seventeen Adam Tas and some other leading Stellenbosch farmers voiced the concern that the Khoikhoi might seize upon the divisions between farmers and officials 'to annihilate all Christians, bad as well as good.' The farmers also claimed that Van der Stel was constantly favouring the '*swart volkje*' (the black populace) over its 'Christian' subjects, probably enraged by the fact that Van der Stel, in his campaign for signatures for his defence, had entertained free blacks and other coloured people, along with Cape Town burghers, with wine, beer, coffee, and tobacco. Tas and the Stellenbosch farmers wrote that they feared the 'Kaffirs, Mulattoes, Mestiços and Castiços[111] and all that black brood living among us, who have been bred from marriages and other forms of mingling with European and African Christians. To our amazement they have so grown in power, numbers and arrogance and have been allowed to handle arms and participate with Christians in … military exercises, that they now tell us that they could and would trample us … For there is no trusting the blood of Ham, especially as the black people are constantly being favoured and pushed forward.'

Despite a counter-petition by the Governor, the Lords Seventeen recalled Van der Stel, the Landdrost and other officials, and banned officials from owning land or trading on the Cape market. Giliomee (2009:25) states that through this victory, the burghers "entrenched their role as the sole suppliers of food". In drunken celebration of these events, one burgher identified himself as an Afrikaner, some 80 years before the term became widely used among free burghers (Giliomee, 2009:25-26). The burghers' victory and the introduction of the loan farm

[111] According to Giliomee (2009:17), the terms used here were all taken from social hierarchies elsewhere. *Kaffir* was a term used by Arab Muslims to refer to pagan Africans, meaning heathen. At the Cape, slaves from the East and from Africa were referred to by this name. By the end of the 18th century, this term was being used to refer to the Xhosa people in the east, the first Bantu-speaking people the Europeans encountered. Giliomee (2009:18) states that the terms *mulatto*, *mestiço* and *castiço* were widely used by Europeans in Portuguese colonies in South America, and referred to people of mixed origin between the dominant white and subordinate black population. The term 'mulatto' is derived from 'mule', which Giliomee argues implies a cross between different biological species, while all these terms "denoted both a racial consciousness and the rejection of racial mixture".

system in 1713 (see subsection 4.1.3.3), allowed 'surplus burghers' to move further out to the frontier and become farmers themselves or *bywoners*.[112]

4.1.3.2. Burgher identity: "Ik bin een Afrikaander!"

Giliomee (2009:21) suggests that the burghers drew their identity from three sources: their European descent closely linked to their Christian faith; their burgher status; and the Dutch language. He distinguishes between the *farming burgher* and the *town burgher*, claiming that the former was concerned with more than just his immediate interests:

> They had become defenders of the land against internal enemies, along with being the indispensable producers of food. But indispensable as they were, their survival depended on the government respecting their rights and privileges.

According to Giliomee (2009:22), the term *Afrikaner* originally referred to indigenous people or to the offspring of natives and slaves or free blacks. In 1707, however, the European Hendrik Biebouw, in a public protest against the Landdrost, proudly declared: "*Ik bin een Afrikaander*" (I am an Afrikaner).[113] The following year, a reverend used it to warn that "the Africaanders will fall to the level of Hottentotdom". In 1712, in an official document on the conflict between the burghers and Van der Stel, the Company used the term to differentiate between Europeans according to their place of birth ("three Dutchmen, three French refugees and three Africanen") (Giliomee, 2009:23). This early Afrikaner identity predates Afrikaans, and since the burghers and the VOC officials alike spoke Dutch, this early identity was thus not linked to language.

4.1.3.3. In search of land and self-determination

In 1710, prosperous farmers only represented 7% of the total free population. Farmers were desperate for licenses to graze their cattle further from their own farms. The government eventually began to issue grazing permits and by 1714 this became known as the *loan farm system* (Giliomee, 2009:20). Burghers, finally free from the VOC, moved deeper into the interior in search of land. Giliomee (2009:21) states:

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[112] Bywoners, or tenant farmers, were often "prospective white farmer[s] who provided company, helped protect the farm against wild beasts and enemies, and went on commando, often in the farmer's place". Bywoners were not associated with dependence or inferiority, and were considered as partners, not knechten (Giliomee, 2009:26).

[113] Giliomee (2009:23) notes that Biebouw, with his German father, Dutch mother, and black half-sister, was "far from being an ethnic nationalist" but rather "perhaps more confused than anyone about his identity". Giliomee argues that historians cannot state with any degree of certainty whether Biebouw was merely indicating that he was a native of Africa, and not of Europe, or whether he wanted to differentiate himself (in terms of rights and status) from the immigrant Landdrost.

> [T]his system of landholding would encourage dispersal and limit the government's ability to control its subjects. As the burghers moved deeper into the interior, they developed a strong sense of self-reliance and independence.

Giliomee (2009:26) argues that burghers, although having higher status than knechten and slaves, enjoyed only a second-class citizenship, as they were "the Company's burghers":

> The fact that the Company could banish them or force them to return to its service reinforced the low status the burghers had in the eyes of top government officials. Although this kind of punishment occurred infrequently, it was a nightmarish prospect that haunted the burghers.

4.1.3.4. Governance and administration

According to Giliomee (2009:27), the Cape had grown from the original idea of "a self-sufficient refreshment post based on intensive agriculture", to not simply "a slave camp watched over by transient officials", but was instead "becoming a European colony of settlement, steadily expanding as the burghers practiced a form of subsistence farming". With the introduction of the loan farm system, the boundaries of the colony were slowly expanding, necessitating administrative systems in new districts. The administrative system of the interior districts comprised a local board called the *collegie* (college), which consisted of a landdrost and heemraden (Giliomee, 2009:27).

> The system relied heavily on burghers filling the office of *veldwachtmeester* (later field cornet), one for each *wyk* (ward or division) of the district, doing their duty. They had to inform the burghers of government proclamations, report on crimes, hold post-mortems into unnatural deaths and call the burghers out on commando.[114] From the start the burghers played a key role in the defence of the district. All male burghers had to perform military service and take part in annual training. In each division the burghers elected their officers and each district had a *Krygsraad* or Council of War of senior officers, who supervised the militia under the overall control of the landdrost. Soon it was apparent that an unofficial division of labour was taking place. After 1715 the Company largely turned the defence of the interior over to the burghers, now indeed as the 'defenders of the land'.

4.1.3.5. Burgher communities

Throughout the 18th century, the burgher population grew exponentially, owing to the burghers marrying early and having large families.[115] In 1730, the free burgher population stood at 2,504,

[114] The commando was the fighting arm of the burghers, originating from expeditions to recover stolen livestock (Giliomee, 2009:59).

[115] Willem Schalkzoon, the progenitor of the Van der Merwe family (the largest and best-known Afrikaner family) had 13 children. His fourth son, Schalk Willemzoon (later Van der Merwe), had seventeen children and 135 grandchildren.

and by 1820, they numbered 42,975 (Giliomee, 2009:28). The colony during this time could be divided into three distinct areas (economically and socially speaking): (i) those living in *De Kaap* (Cape Town); (ii) the wine and wheat farming community of the rural western Cape, and (iii) the stock farmers of the frontier.

Cape Town, where a quarter to a third of all the burghers lived, was a mixture of garrison, market and port. It was multiracial, multilingual, and (incorrectly) thought of as the centre of cultural and intellectual life. Giliomee (2009:28) notes that there were no high schools, theatres, public halls of entertainment, bookshops or newspapers, but neither were there in the interior of the colony.

Production in the rural western Cape expanded, resulting in wealthy plantation owners especially in the Stellenbosch and Drakenstein districts, who tended to pass their wealth down to the next generation (Giliomee, 2009:29). By the second half of the 18th century, "the western Cape gentry had amassed sufficient wealth to engage in some conspicuous consumption", seen for example in the Cape Dutch style mansions built during that time. While preferring to intermarry, the shortage of European women which persisted until the end of the 18th century meant that members of the gentry married across class lines. Burgers of all classes attended the four churches in the western Cape, participated in the same militia exercises and rode out on commando together, and were further bound by the extension of credit to each other (in the absence of a banking sector) (Giliomee, 2009:30).

The third socio-economic region also saw massive expansion throughout the 18th century. According to Giliomee (2009:30), "a thin layer of Europeans with a voracious demand for labour spread themselves thinly over a large area" driven by both push and pull factors. The push factors included the lack of opportunities in the western Cape for those with insufficient capital, as well as the inheritance rule for those who died intestate, which saw half of the estate divided equally between the children – resulting in some having to move away and set up on their own. The pull factors included the "seemingly abundant land and the system of grazing permits" which was transformed into a new system of land holding, namely the loan farm system.[116]

[116] Giliomee (2009:30-31) notes that while there were no statutory restrictions prohibiting non-Europeans from acquiring loan farms, it became customary for only burghers to do so.

4.1.4. The birth of the Boer and/or Afrikaner 'nation(s)'

4.1.4.1. "Barbarised" trekboers in the interior

In the interior district, there were no mining, industry, shops or professional military establishment, and the majority of burghers lived on farms. Stock farmers represented 10% of all farmers in 1716; while by 1770, they numbered two-thirds of all farmers in the colony. While subsistence farming was the norm, all farmers were tied to the market in order to purchase a gun and ammunition, tools, clothes and essential groceries. Giliomee (2009:31) insists that the expansion of subsistence farmers over a great area, led by *trekboers* (migrant farmers), was not systematic colonisation, as markets, towns and proper roads were extremely slow to emerge. While life for the trekboers on the frontier was tough and lonely, they were better off than as labourers or knechten on a wine or wheat farm. Giliomee states that in spite of their difficulties, and having to drastically alter their material culture, they "desired no other life". The burghers, who did not conserve the *veld* by limiting grazing stock, quickly found that the once abundant land was "aging", and that further expansion would be needed for their survival (Giliomee, 2009:32).

According to Giliomee (2009:33), a fear existed among some that the trekboers had become "barbarised". Without any schools and churches, the first stock farmers were cut off from society and lived a solitary life. An inhabitant of the colony in the 1730s and 1740s wrote that "Some of the Boors [sic] have accustomed themselves to such an extent with the carefree life, the indifference, the lazy days and the association with slaves and Hottentots that not much difference may be discerned between the former and the latter". Several travellers remarked that the houses and sleeping arrangements of trekboers were "in Hottentot fashion". Giliomee (2009:33) states that the burghers' interaction with the Khoikhoi in the interior led to large-scale cultural borrowing, resulting in the trekboers being "more African than their kinsmen in the west". He elaborates on the Africanisation of the trekboers as follows (2009:33-34):

> Both Afrikaners and Basters[117] were forced to develop a pragmatic lifestyle that made survival possible in the African interior. Observers expressed shock about a European community that appeared to become ever more African, or as some phrased it, 'degenerate and wild'. Church ministers warned darkly of the threat that the frontier posed to European civilisation.

[117] Referring to those with a European parent, invariably the father, and a Khoikhoi or free black as the other parent (Giliomee, 2009:28).

A visitor to the interior warned in 1776 that the frontiersmen were in danger of "becoming a completely wild nation", while burghers in Cape Town and Stellenbosch similarly feared that the morals of their fellow burghers in the interior could become "bastardised", leading to a "completely degenerate nation". The frontier farmers themselves were anxious about "the prospects for their cultural survival", however, Giliomee (2009:34) argues, all these fears were unfounded since, although frontiersmen were desperately poor and without churches and schools, they still desired to maintain "the values and norms of the racially exclusive burgher community of the rural western Cape". Raidt (1991:99) suggests that the need to read the Bible saved Afrikaners on the frontier from complete illiteracy.

Giliomee (2009:35) maintains that the farmers in the interior lived a life of "complacency and intellectual insularity". He argues that during the VOC period farmers were never challenged to "change their set ways"; only when the British took over in 1795 were farmers incentivised by market demands to improve farming practices and the quality of their products. Raidt (1991:105-106) agrees that the trekboers did not keep up with European thought and fashions, and were unconcerned with political organisation, unless their independence was threatened. The isolation of the interior trekboers would ultimately give rise to a new identity, separate from identities found at the Cape, including those of other burghers. Giliomee (2009:34-35) cites historian Cornelius de Kiewiet's description of the formation of the Boer "race", or nation:

> [In] the long quietude of the eighteenth century the Boer race was formed […] Their life gave them a tenacity of purpose, a power of silent endurance, and the keenest self-respect. But this isolation sank into their character, causing their imagination to lie fallow and their intellects to become inert. Their tenacity could degenerate into obstinacy, their power of endurance into resistance to innovation, and their self-respect into suspicion of the foreigner and contempt for their inferiors.

Giliomee (2009:41) notes the existence of the "swarthy Dutchmen", or the Griqua community, a group of Basters, Khoikhoi and escaped slaves, who accepted Christianity and spoke Afrikaans or Dutch. Giliomee describes them as "a slightly rougher version of their Afrikaner frontiersmen" although they were never incorporated into burgher society.

4.1.4.2. Whiteness

Giliomee (2009:35) states that historians have long since attributed to Afrikaners a deeply held belief about black inferiority, credited to a "degenerate form of primitive Calvinism" formed on the frontier as well as a culture clash between black and white. He notes that some believe that that racism was a fundamental organising principle in race relations since the inception of the Cape of Good Hope. He argues, however, that Boer racism was a result not of decrees and

political institutions, but of processes and social institutions (specifically the family and the church).

While acknowledging the clear identity hierarchy present since the very beginning of the Cape settlement, in which descent, legal status, class, colour and culture correlated at the top and at the bottom, Giliomee (2009:36) points out that in the middle rungs of society, ambiguity existed and race was "not yet decisive". Although colour as a sign of difference and correlation between colour and social position was present from the start, Giliomee ponders how this correlation was maintained over time, when in other places (such as Brazil) it was not: "[W]hy did almost all the people in the most important status groups remain white and almost all those at the bottom black?".

Giliomee (2009:36) points to racial exclusion in burgher families and the church, as well as the functioning of the economy and the legal system within the context of slavery. He argues that in the 18th century, once the gender imbalance became less pronounced and mixed marriages declined, European women could "use their relative position of power to employ sanctions against mixed marriages and against legitimising the racially mixed offspring of their husbands and sons" (2009:37).[118] Citing the 1731 census which showed that more than half of European men at the Cape and in the interior never married, Giliomee posits that marrying a free black women entailed a heavy loss in status, so much so, that many chose to remain bachelors. He also states that it became increasingly difficult for children from mixed extramarital liaisons to be accepted into the European community. Giliomee (2009:38) further notes that children born out of wedlock could not claim an inheritance from their father's estate, meaning that wealth stayed in European families.

As for the economic reasons behind the lack of mobility of those in the middle rungs of society, Giliomee (2009:39) points to the specific kind of labour market at the Cape. Whereas in Brazil, freed slaves became soldiers, tradesmen and shopkeepers – bridging the divide between black and white and "bringing into existence a society based more on class than on race" – at the

[118] Giliomee (2009:37) argues that women in the Netherlands enjoyed significantly more rights than women elsewhere in Europe, such as in Spain and Portugal, where the Catholic Church disallowed divorce. Roman-Dutch law, which was in operation in the Cape, meant women could take their husbands to court for adultery, and since most marriages were concluded in community of property, women would accrue half the estate in case of divorce. Women in Brazil, on the other hand, had little recourse when their husband took a slave mistress and insisted on welcoming resultant children into the family fold (Giliomee, 2009:38).

Cape, not many intermediate jobs were available to free blacks, and they consequently remained poor.

According to Giliomee (2009:50), throughout most of the 18th century, the colonists referred to themselves as burghers, Christians and, to a lesser extent, Dutchmen. During this time, the self-concepts of being white and being Afrikaners came into existence. Giliomee (2009:51) believes that the increased visibility of free blacks from the 1770s onward led to governmental regulations to control them and attempts by burghers to ostracise them. The government and the church began to keep separate lists for certain categories of people, a special military unit for free blacks was formed (in 1789), the term white appeared increasingly often in official records, and fewer non-Europeans entered burgher families.

4.1.4.3. Christianity

In other European colonies, Christian identification overlapped with a sense of being civilised, European and white, as opposed to barbarous, African and black. Giliomee (2009:41) believes that at the Cape, where many different European nationalities came to settle, "the colonists were even more inclined to use their Christian identity as a political identity". He insists that Christianity soon began functioning as a justification for European domination, even though ironically, free burghers initially did not appear to be very religious.

The VOC established a congregation at the Cape immediately after its founding. Further congregations were slow to follow in Stellenbosch (1686), Drakenstein (1691), Tulbagh (1743), present-day Malmesbury (1745), Graaff-Reinet (1792) and Swellendam (1798). Giliomee (2009:42) suggests that a religious awakening swept over the colony in the 1790s, seen in the rise in confirmed members of the church among the burgher population. A traveller in the 1830s remarked that "[t]here are certainly no people in the world who are so truly God-fearing as the Afrikaner", while another observed the burghers to be "a serious and religious people … with strong sentiments of genuine piety".

Throughout the 18th century, the church largely became a white church, usually attributed to the lack of resources for missionary work. Giliomee (2009:42-43), however, argues that the organisation of religion and education, as well as the prevailing theological interpretations, are equally notable.

> The Company gave a specific imprint to organised religion at the Cape. In the prayer it prescribed to its Commanders and in its instructions to teachers at church schools, special mention was made of the need to preserve the Reformed faith and the Dutch language at the Cape. The burgher community and its church had come to be defined

> by a particular kind of Christian faith and a particular language. The notion developed among the burghers that some kind of covenant existed with God to preserve this community with its cultural characteristics. This covenant theology argued that there was continuity between God's covenant with the Jews and the one He had with Christians. It reinforced the idea that Christianity marked the community of burghers. It was birth rather than personal conversion that determined who the 'real' Christians were. Hence they formed a particular social group rather than a community of the faithful. The historian Jonathan Gerstner observed: 'The continuity, through the covenant, of Christians with the Old Testament people of God provided a ground for group cohesion in the midst of the individualism inherent in the Protestant doctrine.' The strand of baptism theology finally accepted in the DRC at the Cape argued for internal generation, which deemed children of Christian parents to be saved in the womb, which was symbolised by baptising the child as an infant. At baptism parents were merely expected to promise to educate the child in the faith. When the child reached adulthood he or she made a formal confession and as a confirmed person was permitted to receive the Lord's Supper. Out of this developed the conviction that God had a covenant with a particular body of people and their descendants.

Giliomee (2009:43) interestingly argues that such a theology served to reconnect burghers with the broader community of Christians and Europeans. Religion was utilised in ingroup boundary-making in another way. Giliomee states that confirmation into the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) became "the threshold that had to be passed for full incorporation into burgher society", a process which was much more complicated for the children of slaves, free blacks or Basters (here, the theology of external regeneration applied, or an *earned* salvation as opposed to an *inherited* one).

While the DRC put the responsibility for baptising slaves on the shoulders of the "Reformed head of the household", burghers were slow to do so, fearing that they would then have to free their slaves and thereby lose their investment (Giliomee, 2009:43). Most importantly, however, the burghers feared gelykstelling, as sitting next to their slaves in church would jeopardise their control as masters, and weaken their sense of exclusivity and superiority (Giliomee, 2009:44). The inaccessibility of Christianity saw many slaves turn to Islam (Giliomee, 2009:100).

4.1.4.4. Slaves, security and paternalism

According to Giliomee (2009:45), the fundamental dividing line in society in the Cape was between slaves and free people, whereby (as noted in 1743 by Baron van Imhoff) ordinary or common Europeans could become gentlemen, preferring to be served rather than to serve. In 1750, half of male burghers were slave-owners, of which some 80% had ten or less slaves.

While slaves made almost every facet of burghers' lives easier, they also made it more insecure, Giliomee (2009:46) claims, as they outnumbered male burghers (one to three in the 1760s),

and there were no visible armed forces outside Cape Town. Giliomee states that the daily close contact between burghers and slaves resulted in "a kind of schizophrenia" with a familiarity of contact (and the famous contempt it breeds), and the desire of the slave-holding class to remain exclusive, especially in the church and family. Fears of a revolt by slaves was commonplace, as were fears about safety and security (Giliomee, 2009:47). Giliomee (2009:48) elaborates on these fears (see *swart gevaar* in Chapter 5) as follows:

> Negative views of blacks, although not reflected in documents before about 1780, were part of the identity map of burghers well before they met blacks on the frontier. So was racial apprehension. Burghers were not so much afraid of a general slave uprising as of their own slaves murdering them or setting fire to their houses. The insecurity springing from life on isolated farms produced the phobias that were to mark white society in the centuries to come.

As opposed to offering slaves inducements (such as schooling, ranks or manumission) as other slave-holding societies had done, the Cape, with its limited economy, offered little such rewards to slaves. Instead, Giliomee (2009:48) argues:

> The ideology of paternalism had to bear the brunt of the burden in reconciling slaves to their fate. Owners propagated the myth that slaves were members of the household and even part of the extended family, consisting of the patriarch's immediate family, some brothers or sisters and their families, one or more bywoner families, Khoikhoi servants and slaves. The master called the slaves and servants his '*volk*' (people).

Giliomee (2009:48-49) explains that this paternalism meant that slaves had to display respect and loyalty towards their masters, who, in turn, cared for them and disciplined them as their own children. The notion of a bonded extended family also appeared in the religious worship shared by master and slaves alike. It became common practice for masters to welcome loyal slaves to the daily family prayers (normally standing against a wall). Giliomee (2009:49) argues that in the mind of the master "the action of inviting the slave briefly into the inner sanctum of his family demonstrated his benign and moral intent", a benevolence which served to counteract the negative effects of the violence perpetrated upon erring slaves, as well as enhance the burghers' belief in themselves as *Christian* colonisers of the land. The true purpose of paternalism, however, argues Giliomee, was "to justify slavery not to the slave but to the master and to boost the master's own self-respect".

4.1.4.5. Politics and protests

By the end of the 18th century, a sense of being Afrikaners (and not Dutch, French or German) had crystallised. Giliomee (2009:51) cites Admiral Stavorinus, as one of the first visitors to report on the emergence of a new social identity, who wrote in 1770:

> Although the first colonists here were composed of various nations, they are, by the operation of time, now so thoroughly blended together, that they are not to be distinguished from each other; even most of such as have been born in Europe, and who have resided here for some years, changed their national character, for that of this country.

Biebouw's *Afrikaner* resurfaced under very similar circumstances in 1739, when Estienne Barbier, a French-born sergeant of the VOC, deployed the term in an act of "political insubordination" and "rebellion". Believing government officials to be prejudiced in a dispute between burghers and Khoikhoi,[119] while being imprisoned for falsely accusing a Company official, Barbier escaped and sought refuge among Drakenstein Valley farmers. There, he wrote a manifesto appealing to his "'Af*rikanders broederen*' ('Afrikaner brothers') to join him in opposing a government that favoured 'Hottentots', who knew neither salvation nor damnation 'above white men'". While only gaining a couple of active supporters,[120] the government granted amnesty to the rebels knowing the broad passive support the rebels enjoyed. Barbier, however, was executed later that same year (Giliomee, 2009:52).

After the Cape Patriots movement of the late 1770s and early 1780s – during which burghers referring to themselves as *Africaners* demanded more rights – the term was increasingly used by burghers. In some instances, the term referred to Cape colonists, to city-dwellers (as opposed to *Boeren* for those living in the countryside), or to light-skinned slaves born at the Cape. Afrikaner eventually came to refer broadly to Europeans who spoke Dutch or Afrikaans. Giliomee (2009:52) adds:

> In 1822 Burchell observed that all those born in the Cape Colony who were not of English but of German, Dutch or French descent, and who spoke Dutch called themselves '*Africaanders*'. A few years earlier Fisher had written: '[They] all speak a very bad sort of Dutch language … and style themselves as an original nation, Africanes [sic]'.

[119] Namas from near the Orange River had come to the western Cape to complain about theft of their cattle. The Landdrost of Stellenbosch "took them under his protection", and the accused were summoned to appear in Court.

[120] Barbier's rebels ripped a government proclamation against the burgher-Khoikhoi stock trade off a church door.

Giliomee (2009:54) argues that a "much-enhanced sense of political consciousness" was present in the Cape Patriots' struggle (1778-1787), and that a *founding myth* was at the heart of the conflict between the Patriots and VOC officials. Whereas the latter (specifically Hendrik Boers, chief prosecutor from 1774) held that the colony did not exist for the benefit of the burghers, but rather for the benefit of the Company, and that the Company enjoyed the right to redeploy disobedient burghers, the former was fiercely opposed to the use of banishment:

> The Cape Patriots used the natural rights philosophy along with their version of the foundation myth. One of their pamphlets claimed that the Company and the first settlers it sent to Africa entered into an 'original social contract'. Implausibly it depicted Van Riebeeck's administration as a golden age, in which the settlers enjoyed 'proper, natural and fitting freedom'.[121] Subsequently the colonists had been exposed to an 'arbitrary despotism'. The Patriots considered Boers' claims 'absurd'. In their view every person released from Company service enjoyed all the rights of citizens who had never been in Company service.

The main spokesmen for the Patriots were relatively wealthy men from in and around Cape Town, at a time when the western Cape was experiencing an economic boom. Among the Patriots' many political demands were economic and judicial reform, and further democratisation and representation by burghers. Giliomee (2009:55) highlights that what makes this struggle of great historical significance, is that it represents the first instance of burghers "addressing the issue of their survival in a way that transcended the immediate self-interest of the authors". Giliomee believes that the Patriots had begun to think *nationally*, and were mainly arguing that "the 'constitution' of the colony had become so defective that the survival of burgher society as a whole was imperilled". The VOC rejected the key demands.

4.1.5. Expansion of the colony

4.1.5.1. The frontiersmen, Khoisan and Xhosa

Without police or a military force, Giliomee (2009:58) claims that the task of colonising the interior was left to the burghers themselves (along with their Khoikhoi auxiliaries). This is evident in the existence of commandos to defend the land frontier. At the frontier, burghers encountered mostly Bushmen (or San, who were mainly hunters) along the northern and northeastern borders. They encountered the Xhosa on the eastern border, who similarly engaged mainly in pastoralism, moving on once pastures had been depleted (Giliomee,

[121] See temporal comparisons in Chapter 3, subsection 3.3.1.

2009:59). Giliomee (2009:60) states that the Xhosa were "[m]uch more numerous and settled than the Khoisan [… and] proved to be formidable adversaries".[122]

Giliomee (2009:60) highlights that no attempt at extermination was made, not only since there were so few frontiersmen, but also because of the need for indigenous labour. Throughout the 18th century, as the frontier was becoming increasingly settled, competition for labour increased. This led to a breakdown in the relationship between burghers and Khoikhoi, which, in turn, led to the introduction of passes and indentureship (slavery mechanisms developed in the western Cape) at the frontier, in order to prevent labourers from leaving farms (Giliomee, 2009:61).

Clashes between frontiersmen and native peoples were quite common (Giliomee, 2009:59). Battles between the burghers and the Bushmen (1770-1810) were especially brutal. The frontiersmen are said to have lived under a cloud of "pervasive insecurity", fearing for their property and their own lives, always carrying a gun (Giliomee, 2009:62). Despite this, the Khoikhoi bore most of the brunt of the burghers' conflicts, and soon, the burghers would be massacring Bushmen and capturing and enslaving Bushmen women and children (Giliomee, 2009:63-64). In 1798, field commandant J.P. van der Walt ended the commandos attacking the Bushmen, and under his leadership, sheep and other gifts were periodically donated to the Bushmen to dissuade them from stealing the burghers' livestock. While sporadic attacks by the Bushmen continued to occur until 1810, peace at the northern frontier had been achieved (Giliomee, 2009:65).

The border to the east, however, would prove more difficult to secure, resulting in nine wars spread over a century (1779-1879) between the Xhosa and the trekboers, and later the British. The burghers and the Xhosa were both cattle-farming societies requiring continued expansion and competing for finite land on the frontier. While in the early stages they lived relatively peacefully together, Giliomee (2009:68) posits that "neither knew a way to compete for land other than by force". He states that they became "unable to live with or without the other", with the burghers requiring labour, and the Xhosa increasingly visiting houses to beg for "presents", once again triggering the anxieties of the frontiersmen (2009:68-69). The burghers, who felt superior to the Xhosa for their Christian religion, monogamous marriages, and Western dress and artefacts, referred derogatively to the Xhosa as "Kaffers". The meaning of this term grew

[122] Khoisan is a catch-all term referring to both the cattle-herding Khoikhoi, and the hunter-gatherer San indigenous peoples.

far beyond the initial implication of heathen, and came to reinforce in the minds of the burghers the belief in their own racial, cultural and moral superiority.

Hostilities between the burghers and Xhosa gave rise to the First Frontier War (1779-1781). At the end of the war, a government policy was in place which banned contact between the burghers and the Xhosa (Giliomee, 2009:70). Without a police force to ensure compliance, a "rebellious band" of burghers threatened to provoke further hostilities. By the 1790s, the Xhosa would routinely assemble on burgher farms, demanding goods with weapons in hand. One farmer lamented: "It is hard to be oppressed by the heathens on our own loan farms". In an unauthorised act of retaliation, the burghers began the Second Frontier War (1792). The burgher loss was devastating. Tens of thousands of cattle, sheep and horses were stolen, virtually all the homesteads were burned down, and the farmers abandoned the area (Giliomee, 2009:71).

4.1.5.2. Rebellion and anarchy

Landlocked between the Bushmen and the Xhosa, one frontiersman (the 'devious and recalcitrant' Adriaan van Jaarsveld, heemraad and captain in the Graaff-Reinet militia) attempted and failed to explore further north as far as the Orange River. After facing a trial for disobedience, he instigated a rebellion in 1795 (Giliomee, 2009:73). Perturbed by the ill-advised appointment of Honoratus Maynier as landdrost of the new Graaff-Reinet district, and the increasingly aggressive tax collection by the Company, armed burghers claiming to be acting on behalf of the *volkstem* (the voice of the people), and wearing the tricolour cockade of the French Revolution, deposed Maynier, refused to pay Company taxes or obey its laws, and declared their district government a "National Convention". Later that same year, a group of burghers did the same at the Swellendam district (Giliomee, 2009:72-73).

The rebels did not proclaim their own republics, but instead wanted their districts to fall under the new republic of the Netherlands (see below). With no way to make contact with the government in The Hague, and considering the Cape government's embargo on supplying the frontiersmen with ammunition (thus leaving them exposed to attacks), but more importantly, the arrival of the British, the rebels capitulated and the regions accepted British authority the following year (Giliomee, 2009:73-74).

Instead of signifying "the dawn of a new democratic scheme of thought on African soil", Giliomee (2009:74) believes that these events demonstrated "the breakdown of orderly government and the rise of anarchic tendencies". A German traveller to the area remarked that

"unexampled disorder" reigned in the administration of the district, that burghers had "bitterness and irreconcilable animosity" towards each other and "harshness" towards their servants, and that despite the "hospitality, a firm adherence to the truth and a great respect for religion" of the burghers, "selfishness, lawlessness, hardiness, intolerance and a thirst for revenge are the reigning vices of their character".[123]

4.1.6. Social identity at the VOC Colony

There is much to glean from the early history of colonial South Africa about social categorisation and intergroup behaviour in the country today, as well as Afrikaner identity in particular. Although the Dutchification period is 200-350 years ago, the parallels between this era and the current context are staggering. First, it is clear from the moment the first burgher was released that realistic threat and competition was present, initially between the burghers and the VOC officials, and later between the burghers and the indigenous peoples, slaves and African tribes they encountered. This led to a persistent and pervasive sense that the economic, existential and, eventually, ethnic survival of burghers was in danger, triggered by actions from slaves, indigenous peoples, African tribes and Company officials alike, and exacerbated by socio-economic conditions and the isolation at the frontier. In particular resource scarcity and the *swart gevaar* ('black danger') threat surrounding violence on farms reverberates to this day.

Relatedly, and even before any hint of burgher identity had taken root, there was a constant perception of oppression by the state (the VOC in this case) which, combined with their dependency on the state, served to alienate the burghers from their rulers. Once a group identity had begun to take shape, the perception of being second-class citizens (which also persists to this day) gave rise to protests and, later, identity mobilisation for collective action. This was also accompanied by a general desire for self-rule, which increased as the burghers grew accustomed to a large degree of involvement in local governance. The payment of taxes to the Company on the one hand, and donations to placate threatening outgroup members on the other, further served to radicalise the burghers in the pursuit of self-governance; and also has echoes in contemporary South African society.

[123] Giliomee (2009:74-75) recounts the fascinating story of Coenraad de Buys, and his ruthlessly self-interested interactions with the Xhosa, and later his co-operation with the equally ruthless Ngqika, a Rharhabe chief. He also relays the conspiracy between Marthinus Prinsloo (who actually wanted to steal cattle back from the Xhosa) and Adriaan van Jaarsveld, to agitate De Buys's known anti-British sentiments, and intimidate fellow burghers with the threat of Xhosa attacks under De Buys's command, all in a bid to assemble a burgher commando against the British. This would give rise to the second rebellion in 1799.

Even in this early history the power of the state over society is abundantly clear. Not only was the VOC acting as arbiter between the burghers and the indigenous peoples, but it had started to develop a social and legal system which would form the basis of the intergroup relations that would follow over the next two centuries, and which, to some extent, persists to this day. The designation of various groups of people into distinct legal classes which determined rights and privileges, and later, the VOC's sanctions on mixing between groups (when it did initially occur), highlights not only the presence of intergroup competition, but also the state's ability to establish social categories, impact social identities and, in so doing, privilege certain groups. The use of schools and churches, both to disseminate Dutch culture and to marginalise lower-class groups, is also noteworthy.

On a related note, the desire for differentiation began close to instantaneously with the arrival of the Dutch colonists. Having only known low status vis-à-vis VOC officials, the burghers emphasised their shared religion in an attempt to ameliorate their status (through the association with the high-status group), and to distinguish themselves from indigenous peoples, slaves, and African tribes. The burghers also emphasised Christianity as the core cultural value of their group in order to maintain a connection with Europe, which conferred further status. As opposed to (directly) emphasising their Europeanness, this allowed them to maintain positive self-esteem, without having to relinquish their claim to contested land on their new continent. This also served to separate the burghers from those VOC officials that eventually returned to Europe. The increased salience of Christianity further provided the burghers cover from morality threats and thus negative self-esteem regarding their practice of slavery.

As much of society at this point was speaking some form of Dutch, religion was also a clearer marker of ingroup boundaries than language. Only once Christianity had spread to outgroups was race used to differentiate the burghers, requiring a merger of the various social classes of Europeans that had not yet occurred. The use of outgroups for labour (including through slavery), in addition to being materially beneficial to the burghers, also helped them improve their status through association with the wealthier officials and separation from the lower classes.

Language was initially an explicit characteristic of burgher identity, seen in the assimilation of French Huguenots and German immigrants. Instead of intergroup differentiation between the Dutch burghers and the new European arrivals, the pre-existing European identity allowed for a continued community of these groups at the Cape. The sheer number of ethnolinguistic

groups present and the distinctiveness threats to which it led (not to mention the historical conflicts between the European nations), caused the burghers and the VOC to insist on Dutch as a defining marker of ingroup membership. In this sense, the burgher (or Afrikaner) identity became a superordinate identity by subsuming the various Dutch, French and German identities. Although the core cultural value changed many times throughout early Afrikaner history, and mixing between the burghers and the outgroups did initially occur, by the end of the Dutchification period, there was little ambivalence as to who qualified for membership.

There are thus several aspects of burgher identity which remain prevalent (to different degrees) in Afrikaner identity today. These include (i) their numerical minority status, and their acute awareness thereof; (ii) the link between the salience of their social identity and political opposition to the state, in addition to its connection to intergroup competition and conflict; (iii) patriarchal tendencies coinciding with religious beliefs; and (iv) significant intragroup heterogeneity on the basis of class, geography and ideology. The growing cleavages between the social realities of burghers at the Cape and trekboers on the frontier led to their remarkably divergent paths in the 19th century (see subsection 4.2.2), the 20th century (see subsection 4.3.2), and perhaps again today (see Chapter 5, subsection 5.2). Notice that the first few incidents of collective action came from wealthier burghers at the Cape, and not the burghers in the interior, who were locked in battles with other groups and were far removed from the political centre of the colony. The 'barbarisation' of the frontiersmen may have actually threatened the status of 'civilised' burghers at the Cape.

This societal complexity present since the founding of the colony likely resulted in uncertain identity, necessitating explicit categories and external categorisation of people, accompanied by laws and policies, in order to achieve epistemic equilibrium. The rise in intragroup differences across all groups might also explain the shift from legal status to race as the dominant feature of categorisation, despite the racial mixing that had initially occurred. This racial mixing (and thus admixture of burghers) could possibly explain to some extent why intergroup differentiation alone was not enough to maintain higher status, but instead, separation from other groups became the norm, perhaps in order to avoid association or even miscategorisation. External categorisation was also instrumental in the formation of the 'Boer' identity, judging from visitors' comments regarding their 'otherness'.

Finally, the burghers only employed group strategies for status improvement, based on the perceived illegitimacy of their (relatively) low status, and/or because of the inability to move

to a higher status group (lacking the wealth and political power necessary to do so). It was only once the British arrived that the option of individual mobility (through anglicisation) became available.

4.2. The Anglicisation Period (1795-1910)

4.2.1. From Dutch to British Colony

4.2.1.1. British arrival and frontier resistance

The Cape Patriots discussed above drew inspiration from the Patriot movement in the Netherlands, which sought to overthrow the Stadtholder and self-elected regents who stymied the upward mobility of burghers. In the background, the American Revolution was also providing inspiration to European colonists in other parts of the world (Giliomee, 2009:54). While the American colonists were victorious against the British Empire, the Patriot movement in the Netherlands failed in 1787 with the arrival of Prussian troops. The French Revolution soon reinflamed tensions in the Netherlands, and in 1795, the French cavalry entered Amsterdam, the old constitution was cast aside, the rights of burghers proclaimed, and the Stadtholder fled to London. There, the Prince of Orange requested the British government to occupy the Cape and other Dutch possessions abroad. In September 1795, a British force arrived at the Cape. Giliomee (2009:56) recounts the ensuing events as follows:

> It encountered a deeply divided white population with most of the top Cape officials Orangists, anti-revolutionary and pro-Britain, but the burghers, in general, strongly pro-France, pro-revolution, and anti-Britain[124] […] In the western Cape the British force soon intimidated aspirant revolutionaries into sullen resignation, but the burghers on the eastern frontier would challenge the political order, with near fatal consequences for the colonial settlement in the east.

The defeated Graaff-Reinet rebels of 1795 did not stay down for long. Once word of a second Van Jaarsveld Revolt (see footnote 123) was received in 1799, the newly arrived British cut the road link between Cape Town and Graaff-Reinet, suspended the supply of ammunition to the frontier, declared martial law, and arrested frontier rebels. The arrival of the British force along with Khoikhoi soldiers, coupled with the disarmament of the trekboers, inspired the burghers' Khoikhoi servants to rebel against their masters, allegedly incited by the British force (Giliomee, 2009:76).

[124] Raidt (1991:107) suggests that the Afrikaners were divided into pro-English and anti-English factions at this time.

Giliomee (2009:77) claims that what followed was "the darkest moment since the founding of the settlement" for burghers. The eastern Khoikhoi rebels, many of whom were intimately familiar with the burghers' strengths and weaknesses having fought alongside them, armed with guns, horses and thousands of Xhosa fighters, wanted to reclaim their country from the burghers, who at this point were suffering a severe ammunition shortage. The British authorities at the Cape refused to send ammunition or British troops to help the burghers. Farm attacks occurred, burgher commandos were easily defeated, and families soon fled and sought refuge in *laagers* (military camps made up of wagons and thorn trees in a circle) (Giliomee, 2009:71; 77-78).

After conquering the Graaff-Reinet district, the Khoikhoi-led force invaded the Swellendam district, where they killed burghers and captured women and children. General Dundas, acting British governor, and General Vandeleur of the British force blamed the burghers for their cowardice and failure to fight. Giliomee (2009:78) believes that the British at this time had "little intention of committing any real resources to restoring the colonial order on the frontier". They instructed the burghers to return to their farms or forfeit them, and Maynier returned as resident commissioner of Graaff-Reinet with twenty British soldiers and one hundred armed Khoikhoi. Maynier provided the Khoikhoi with supplies, and allowed British missionaries to use the burghers' church for religious instruction. The burghers were suspicious and outraged by these acts. By 1803, nearly half of the farms in Graaff-Reinet and Swellendam were "burnt, plundered and abandoned", with livestock losses totalling 100,000 (Giliomee, 2009:78-79).

After these events, the Cape was briefly returned to the Netherlands (representatives of the Batavian Republic administered it from 1803 to 1806), whereafter the British took final control of the Cape settlement. The Afrikaners (the moniker relatively common by this time), although finally free from the VOC, became British subjects and were treated with contempt by their new rulers, who often viewed conquered groups as "lesser cultures and breeds of men". The British considered the Afrikaners to be "backward, lacking in industry and cruel and unjust for their dealings with the indigenous people" (Giliomee, 2009:xiv; 79). Raidt (1991:109) posits that the first real threat to Afrikaners and Afrikaans came from the arrival of the British and English.

Between 1770 and 1812, white and black people lived together in the Zuurveld area on the frontier, "with neither side able to establish ascendancy over the other" (Giliomee, 2009:130). The area represented an incomplete conquest to both sides, and from it many problems flowed.

After the Third Frontier War (1799-1802) the British separated the two groups on either side of the Fish River, in an attempt to bring peace (Giliomee, 2009:131).

The first British governor under the second occupation, the Earl of Caledon, was convinced by former VOC servants that some frontiersmen suffering was preferable to risking a frontier war. Consequently, burghers were prohibited from pursuing or firing on marauders, except in self-defence. It was said that the gifts offered to the Xhosa by the burghers only achieved "a general mockery of and contempt for Christians". British administrators began to fear that the border of the colony was in jeopardy, with no clear idea of how to keep the burghers separate from the Xhosa (Giliomee, 2009:80).

In 1811, second governor of the colony, Sir John Cradock, commented that no good could "possibly arise either to the Kaffir tribes or the Dutch settlers from any intercourse and all present evils proceeded from their intermixture". Armed with a large force of British troops, Khoikhoi soldiers and burghers on commando, Colonel John Graham ordered the pursuit of Xhosa plunderers and the slaying of every Xhosa man, in order to instil within them "a proper degree of terror and respect" to prevent their return (Giliomee, 2009:81).[125] The Fourth Frontier War (or Xhosa War) followed, the first under British rule.

Giliomee (2009:82) describes the events of 1811 to 1812 as "nothing less than total war" – a level of death and destruction the Xhosa found "incomprehensible". After their expulsion, the Xhosa were rejected and rebuffed in other ways "as if they were unfit to live with". Giliomee claims that for the first time in the 40 years since the burghers and the Xhosa's paths crossed, the cultural differences between Africans and Europeans were "etched out in the starkest possible way", while the lines between the frontiersmen and their new British rulers became somewhat blurred, although the burghers remained suspicious of the intentions of the British.

The third governor, Lord Charles Somerset's approach to the frontier amid the Xhosa Wars was "a hodgepodge of policy, destined to destabilise the frontier" (Giliomee, 2009:132). The situation was exacerbated when in 1820, after the British took control of the Cape Colony for the second time, approximately 4,000 British immigrants arrived in the eastern Cape to settle the Zuurveld area (in particular the farms abandoned by the burghers). The districts of Grahamstown and Somerset were created to improve administration on the frontier. An influx

[125] Giliomee (2009:81) insists that while Col. Graham viewed the Xhosa as "horrid savages", the burghers had, while undoubtedly seeing them as "foes", also regarded them as "trading partners, labourers and potential military allies".

of refugees to the area also occurred after the *Mfecane* and other violence (especially by the Zulu chief Shaka) in the deeper interior (Giliomee, 2009:133).

According to Giliomee (2009:133), in the years after the Fourth Frontier War (1811-1812), and before Lord Somerset's departure from office in 1826, two Afrikaners "with sharply divergent views on survival on the frontier" emerged to influence frontier politics – Andries Stockenstrom and Piet Retief (whom I discuss in subsection 4.2.1.5). Appointed landdrost of Graaff-Reinet in 1815 at the age of 22, Stockenstrom believed that while it was important to "root out any gang of robbers, murderers and marauders, as soon as they were discovered", he believed that military force had to be employed sparingly.[126] He expressed his concern over the innocent kraals that had been plundered, which only ended up inviting more Xhosa raids (Giliomee, 2009:134). He believed that liberal missionary Dr John Philip "downplayed Xhosa and Khoisan responsibility for cattle raids" and had a penchant for blaming burghers, instead of the British military or settlers, to win his arguments in London (Giliomee, 2009:135).

Departing from the simple goal of missionary work, and aiming to achieve a liberal order at the Cape, Philip released a book in 1828 disparaging the burghers and "arousing the Afrikaner colonists".[127] Having become convinced of the free-market ideals of Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations*, Philip "effectively combined political and economic arguments with moral and religious exhortations" in that the abolition of slavery signified both an act of justice, and a boon in the economy and "the consumption of British-manufactured goods" (Giliomee, 2009:103). Although British settlers were prohibited from owning slaves, missionary Philip believed them to exploit native labour all the same (Giliomee, 2009:102). But, Giliomee argues, he reserved the bulk of his antipathy for the Afrikaners, whom he believed to be guiltier than the British of the brutalities committed at the frontier, despite the fact that British settlers and soldiers were also involved in the military action against the Xhosa.

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[126] Stockenstrom was the Cape-born son of Swedish immigrant Anders Stockenström. In 1811, as landdrost of Graaff-Reinet prior to his son, Stockenström went unarmed to a group of Xhosa, to warn them to retreat across the Fish River before Sir Cradock's large force attacked. When the Xhosa received word that a soldier had shot some of their men, they killed Stockenström along with seven of his (Giliomee, 2009:81). Although Stockenstrom had a much more measured approach to the Xhosa than either the burghers or the British colonists, he too was once a slave-owner (Giliomee, 2009:84).

[127] Stockenstrom believed it to be dishonest to dismiss the facts about colonial conquest highlighted by Philip, but insisted that every burgher "with the slightest decency and respectability" ruefully accepted these facts (Giliomee, 2009:135). He expressed his exasperation at the fact that Philip and others, at an informal discussion on the future of the frontier in 1825, "persisted to denounce the present generation of the colonists and refused to make any allowance for their actual position, which rendered self-defence absolutely necessary for the preservation of both parties". When dismissed by the remark "You [the colonists] have no business here at all", Stockenstrom answered that the British violated this principle more than anyone (Giliomee, 2009:136).

While acknowledging the "oppressions" committed by the colonists, and how it negatively impacted upon the "degradation of most of the natives" and the hostile relationship at the frontier, Stockenstrom insisted that burghers had the right to security, fair treatment by the government and the right to protect their lives and property (Giliomee, 2009:135). He believed that truth and justice had to be the guiding principles at the frontier to ensure the survival of all groups, swearing fealty to these principles instead of any group (Giliomee, 2009:136). He would later go on to condemn the Great Trek, the hugely impactful frontier rebellion that was to come (see subsection 4.2.2).

The appointment of "shrewd frontier landdrosts" such as Stockenstrom, a fair arbitrator between the burghers, the Khoikhoi and the Xhosa, improved frontier stability. He believed that "the Afrikaner colonists had to be won over to the cause of reform rather than have reforms imposed from without" (Giliomee, 2009:84). But "frontier ruffians" such as Marthinus Prinsloo, with "a tradition of fractiousness and revolt", were soon agitating again for change. Recurrent complaints of preferential treatment of the Khoikhoi by the British, as well as a shortage of land (only 25% of burghers in Graaff-Reinet owned land in 1812),[128] led to another burgher rebellion in 1815, called the Slagtersnek Rebellion (Giliomee, 2009:84-85). The rebels used many of the same tactics as the 1799 rebels, only this time, Stockenstrom, who viewed the matter as a choice between civilisation and anarchy, was able to convince disaffected burghers to side with the government against the rebels. The rebellion ended as soon as it began. The government's control of the frontier became more established. British governors began to speak positively about the "Dutch Boers", who in turn, accepted that it was in their own interest to obey the government and its laws (Giliomee, 2009:86).

4.2.1.2. Social levelling and other reforms

The new British government attempted to bring the relationship between the burghers and their Khoikhoi servants within the rule of law, and for the first time, burghers were made to answer for their maltreatment of their servants in court (Giliomee, 2009:83).The British abolished the burgher status and in 1828 freed the Khoisan, but due to the Khoisan still remaining at the margins of economic life, the trekboers continued to view themselves as "a superior kind of subject with special duties and privileges". A government plan that came in the wake of the Sixth Frontier War (1834-1835), which would summon burghers for regular militia service,

[128] A new system of landholding to replace the loan farm system was introduced, although this reform had several unintended negative consequences, leading to further insecurity among frontier burghers (Giliomee, 2009:83).

was met with fierce opposition as the burghers did not want to be considered as anything other than *free* burghers. The term was still used by the end of the 19th century (Giliomee, 2009:89).

According to Giliomee (2009:88), burghers were opposed to gelykstelling not because of race, but because of the class hierarchy at the colony, as evidenced by the fact that western Cape farmers refused to take white indentured servants brought from Britain with them to church. The VOC's status hierarchy was transposed to the British colony: propertied burghers enjoyed high status, and below them (in descending order) were burghers without property, white knechten and servants, free blacks, Khoikhoi servants, and finally, slaves.

Eventually, equality before the law became more accepted (as servants could lay complaints at court against their masters), while opposition to the welcoming of the Khoikhoi in the burghers' church in Graaff-Reinet, the prospect of suffrage for large numbers of non-Europeans, and miscegenation intensified. Giliomee (2009:89) believes that the underlying reason for this opposition was "a fear that the loss of control over labourers would have a ripple effect, ultimately causing a collapse of law and order that would pull the master class down into a morass of squalor and licentiousness".

Giliomee (2009:90) claims that a clear correlation between slave numbers and farm output can be seen for a certain period under British rule. He explains that since slaves were a crucial form of property, any attack on the institution of slavery would harm the financial prospects of slave-owning farmers. He further states that for most colonists at the western Cape "their own survival and that of slavery as an institution had become identical", and that "they could scarcely imagine how the financial, economic and security structure of the Cape could withstand a radical attack on the institution". In a 1717 debate on slavery, K.J. Slotsboo also recognised that poor whites would not perform the labour normally done by slaves, as this threatens their class status vis-à-vis slaves.

While Roman-Dutch law, the Christian church and many western political leaders had grown somewhat uncomfortable with slavery by the end of the 18th century, some viewing it as a 'necessary evil',[129] the institution had become unacceptable in Britain. Rumours of the 1793 abolition of slavery in all French colonies spread at the Cape, and with it, fear among burghers not only of losing their property, but of retaliatory attacks by their slaves (Giliomee, 2009:91). The British retained slavery upon taking control of the Cape, but got rid of the practice of

[129] According to Giliomee (2009:117), arable production was back to pre-emancipation levels by the mid-1840s, proving fears that the colony could not survive without slavery to be groundless.

judicial torture. Another inquiry into the institution heard views such as that while slavery made the burghers "lazy, haughty and brutal", it cannot be abolished "without sacrificing the Colony" and all its inhabitants. In 1798 the government announced firm borders of the colony in order to prevent burghers from spreading further north, as the continuing availability of land meant more labour was necessary, which the sons of burghers did not wish to fulfil as long as they had the hope that they too could become landowners. This policy was, however, not enforceable (Giliomee, 2009:92-93).

A slave revolt broke out at the Cape in 1808, following abolition in Britain, and again in 1825 following reforms to ameliorate slavery (Giliomee, 2009:93).[130] Slavery was finally abolished at the Cape in 1834,[131] which Giliomee (2009:94) believes "did not all go horribly wrong" because the most powerful empire in the world was in control of the process. The British officials at the Cape castigated the burghers for their abhorrent treatment of slaves and Khoikhoi servants. The 1823-1825 Commission of Inquiry bemoaned the burghers' "'want of intelligence', their habits of 'severe economy' in their mode of living, and 'their indifference to those comforts that are indispensable to Englishmen'". It was said that abolition would "infuse them with 'a spirit of active industry and intelligence in their life'" (Giliomee, 2009:103).

Some burghers thought even the mild reforms to slavery were problematic. The landdrost of Stellenbosch commented: "What would become of us and of the whole country if the natives were to feel that they should be free, were to know their power, and then to join together to regain their natural freedom as the original possessors of this country? In effect, nothing but a second Saint-Domingue". Others understood that "the Enlightenment insistence on the freedom and dignity of all people" could not be resisted, and tried to convince their fellow burghers to accept reforms (Giliomee, 2009:95).

Giliomee (2009:112) argues that paternalist slave-owners at the Cape had developed exaggerated ideas about their own personal, civic and sovereign freedoms, and when Britain curtailed their sovereign freedom over slaves, they experienced it "as an assault on their own freedom". He suggests that some Afrikaner slave-owners did recognise that "slavery as an

[130] In 1820, the Cape Colony's population included roughly 43,000 white people, 2000 free blacks, 32,000 slaves and 26,000 Khoikhoi and Basters (Giliomee, 2009:93).

[131] A form of indentured servitude continued for several years after formal abolition.

institution was doomed and that it would be a wise step for the owners to take the initiative in bringing about its demise".

The abolition of slavery, Giliomee (2009:110) insists, was not only of economic concern to burghers, but as it threatened the public order and social status hierarchy, burghers began to fear deeply for their security, while having no form of political representation. He maintains that fears surrounding safety was not wholly unfounded, as rural towns had no regular police force, while Cape Town, a city without any streetlights, had a force of only 20 men for a population of 20,000 (2009:111). The short-lived slave uprising of 1825 still haunted the burghers. A memorandum signed by several Stellenbosch colonists was handed to the Cape Town Burgher Senate in 1826, in which the "apocalyptic […] nightmares of the colonists" were expressed as follows:

> The flame of devastation will not alone destroy our habitations, but will also cause your houses to fall in ruin! Not only our wives and daughters, but also yours will in libidinous manner be prosecuted by our slaves with rape and defloration, and when, after all this is out of the pit of our murdered fellow citizens a Saint Domingo has arisen, then may God grant that we be no more amongst the living, but then you yourselves will be compelled by the slaves who fought themselves free to carry the bones of your wife and your child to make a monument of their freedom obtained by fire and murder.

Declarations like these use elements of truth, including the collective (and secondary) trauma of burghers (see Chapter 3, subsection 3.4.4), to construct a narrative which can have profound and enduring effects on the people they are intended to motivate to some end. Such narratives can similarly be maintained and handed down through generations of ingroup members.

Giliomee (2009:104) states that *Ordinance 50* (1828), which put the Khoisan on an equal legal standing as the burghers, was largely the result of work done by Philip and Stockenstrom. The latter observed that "all decent and respectable 'Boers' agreed that the Khoisan had been cruelly dispossessed and were suffering harsh legal discrimination". The Ordinance was met with criticism by the burghers, not because of the newfound freedom granted to the Khoisan, but because it was not accompanied by a law or policy which dealt with their "depredations", leaving burghers vulnerable to continued stock theft (Giliomee, 2009:106).

Stockenstrom discovered that security threats were somewhat exaggerated. Giliomee (2009:107) believe that while some kind of vagrancy law was needed to deal with theft, as was proposed at that time, it would severely limit job-seekers' ability to move around in search of better wages. Stockenstrom told a farmer from Colesberg that if labourers were paid according to their demands, and not according to the will of the farmer, there would be no reason to force

them to work on their farms. Giliomee (2009:107) elaborates on Stockenstrom's beliefs as follows:

> Stockenstrom had developed an idea about survival strikingly different from that of most colonists. He told Van der Walt [the farmer] that an 'oppressive partiality', which the old status order represented, did not guarantee the colonists' safety. Quite the opposite was true: 'We should thereby entail upon us the hatred of the blacks and be in danger every moment that they would avail themselves of the first opportunity to break their bonds and be revenged upon us.'

Believing the burghers' institutions to be irredeemable, the government overhauled the administrative and legal systems between 1825 and 1834, abolishing burgher systems such as the colleges of landdrosts and heemraden, as well as the Court of Justice and the Burgher Senate. In the new judicial system, all judges had to be appointed from the British bar, and all lawyers had to obtain their degrees in England, effectively removing burghers from the administrative and judicial realms of the Cape. A policy to anglicise the administration was put in place as well (Giliomee, 2009:104). An 1891 commission of inquiry declared that the education policy of the British government was "to get the burghers to learn English" (Giliomee, 2009:89). The economy was also overhauled, leaving many merchants of the Company era lagging behind English-speaking traders (Giliomee, 2009:104).

> All of these reforms were imposed from the outside on a hostile people who had virtually no form of representation. The historian Eric Walker wrote that the effect of the reforms was to give the colony a greater efficiency at the price of almost all proper sharing in the functioning of government. Stockenstrom, undoubtedly the most liberal Afrikaner, had no problem with the reforms in principle; he favoured thoroughgoing modernisation. Still, he considered it of the greatest importance to win broad acceptance for the far-reaching reforms among the burghers. He would later call it a great mistake to abolish the colleges of landdrost and heemraden, the means through which government could influence the whole community. From this point on, he wrote: '[All] confidence between the Government and the masses ceased, and many of the evils which have retarded our advancement and disturbed our peace may be traced to misunderstandings which the executive had not the means nor the channels of clearing up'.

Missionaries from Britain, as well as France and Germany, arrived at the Cape throughout the early 19th century (Giliomee, 2009:98). Giliomee (2009:96) argues that in some ways, missionary work was a more direct assault on the burghers' worldview than the legal changes. Burghers objected that educated slaves would not be controllable. So too the burghers opposed the inclusion of women as participatory members of the church, able to influence policy, which would undermine the dominance of male members (Giliomee, 2009:97). Giliomee (2009:99)

states that although the DRC was open to all who had been baptised, they showed little interest in missionary work.

4.2.1.3. Racial segregation

Despite the introduction of free government schools by Lord Charles Somerset, most of the children of slaves and Khoikhoi, as well as poor white children (about a third of white children by the end of the 19th century) attended missionary schools (Giliomee, 2009:109). In a case of "supreme irony" the missionary Dr Philip (a staunch proponent of integration and equality), for purely practical purposes, organised converted slaves into separate parishes, leading the way to religious segregation (Giliomee, 2009:100).[132] Giliomee (2009:117) emphasises that emancipation did not improve racial fluidity, and the majority of whites and non-whites continued to go to separate churches and schools.

In 1829, the DRC synod declared firmly that no racial segregation in churches would be tolerated, a position it reiterated in 1847 (Giliomee, 2009:122-123). Despite this, in some places DRC congregations or individual members erected separate buildings for coloured Christians to worship in. Giliomee (2009:124-126) argues that the debate about inclusion at Afrikaner churches was not focused on segregation at this point, but rather, involved an option between "fusion", or full non-racial integration, or a "third or middle way", consisting of separate facilities but not segregated parishes. The adoption of a third way policy ultimately "opened the door for prejudiced whites to exclude coloureds". Eventually, church segregation became a formalised policy, in part because of polarisation between Afrikaners and coloureds after the Anglo-Boer War (Giliomee, 2009:128). Giliomee (2009:128) suggests that despite racial polarisation and church segregation, there was a growing tendency towards non-racial liberalism among segments of the Afrikaner population:

> The burghers had adapted remarkably well to two major changes in the social order between 1806 and 1853: the freeing of the Khoisan and the emancipation of the slaves. While some frontier farmers may have joined the Great Trek because of labour shortages, most burghers generally found ways to attract and keep labour. With slavery consigned to history, the Afrikaner elite in the middle third of the century became increasingly attracted to the idea of liberal progress, with its emphasis on the non-racial franchise, representative democracy, separation of church and state, secular education, and the value of scientific inquiry. On issues of colour, the burghers continued to search for a way to reconcile their older paternalism with the new non-racial liberalism, accepting the principle of equality before the law and the universal franchise, but rejecting gelykstelling, which was rooted in the old status hierarchy of burghers and

[132] Giliomee (2009:135) argues that Philip saw missionary work as a vehicle for promoting both indigenous rights and liberties, and also British cultural, social and political interests, regardless of whether these clashed at times.

> slaves. They supported missionary work with much more enthusiasm now than before, but the price was allowing segregated facilities as a concession to 'the weakness of some'.

According to Giliomee (2009:128), this "hybrid racial ideology" was supported by J.H. ('Onze Jan') Hofmeyr, leader of the *Afrikaner Bond* (Afrikaner League), the first Afrikaner political organisation, in the 1880s (see subsection 4.2.4.4). Coloured people wanted to join the Afrikaner Bond, but were rejected (Giliomee, 2009:129). Raidt (1991:112) reminds that the English as the ruling class was socio-economically above the Afrikaners. It could be argued that the rejection of coloured people from the first Afrikaner political organisation, in addition to being founded on racial prejudice, may have been an attempt to improve (or maintain) the group status of the Afrikaners.

Giliomee (2009:107-108) argues that although *Ordinance 50*, which enacted Khoikhoi equality, represented a turning point in establishing the principle of non-racial equality, without land and any restitution or social rehabilitation, very little changed for the Khoikhoi. *The Masters and Servants Ordinance* (1841) removed any distinctions between the Khoikhoi and slaves, resulting in a polarisation in Cape society between "whites and an undifferentiated category of people who were very poor and brown or black, and who could do little but work for whites".

Reports came in that the Khoikhoi were shirking commando duty and not paying taxes, as was expected of burghers. Although large swathes of white burghers lived in precarious situations on farms as tenants, overseers or poor relatives, there was a growing trend "for whites to define themselves as a community in which a common racial identity transcended the internal class divisions". A traveller in 1827, noting this lack of an internal hierarchy, remarked that: "Every man is a burgher by rank, and a farmer by occupation". In the 1840s another traveller commented on the lack of rank or distinction in Cape society, aside from skin colour (Giliomee, 2009:109).

Even though *Ordinance 50* eliminated all status distinctions, Giliomee (2009:109) suggests that the government and the white colonists began grouping all people of colour together as a separate category. In the 1830s, the government counted freed slaves and the Khoikhoi together as the "Coloured population", despite them not sharing the same ethnic background or sense of shared group identity, while the terms *gekleurden*, coloureds, and Cape coloured became

increasingly used to refer to people of mixed descent.[133] Giliomee (2009:110) notes that colour and poverty were increasingly associated, as there was no significant portion of coloured people who could "break down the correlation between race and status and the simultaneous polarisation of society between whites and the rest" (see Chapter 3, subsection 3.2.1.2).

The changing society at the Cape, brought on by the arrival of the British, had far-reaching consequences for burgher identity. Their pre-existing opposition to being governed was further provoked by a British government that initially failed to protect them at the frontier, used lower-class Khoikhoi against them, effectively decreased the burghers' status through social levelling with lower-class outgroups, removed their systems of governance, although mandating commando duty, and pursued their anglicisation. This, together with the fear that abolition would threaten their lives and livelihoods, the perception that burghers were contributing more to the state than freed slaves and Khoikhois, and the relentless disparagement by the British of their morality and derogation of their culture, signified a level of realistic and social identity threats (including distinctiveness and value threats) the burghers had not yet experienced.

Intergroup competition and conflict (against lower-status groups instead of the British) served to improve the association of the burghers with the high-status group, especially at the frontier where the salience of a European identity in contrast to an African identity had begun to form. It also improved the internal cohesion of the group, evident in the decreasing salience of class distinctions, as well as increased the group's ability to confer positive self-esteem to its members. This is, of course, in addition to the material incentives of realistic conflict with outgroups, especially over land. Despite this lack of an internal hierarchy, the social situation of burgher women was still precarious. The increase in internal cohesion also does not mean intragroup homogeneity had been established. The differences between disaffected burghers and rebels at the frontier, varying opinions on slavery and abolition, and the emergence of contrasting ingroup leaders illustrate the intragroup heterogeneity of the burgher group. On the last point, Andries Stockenstrom and rebels like Marthinus Prinsloo (or later, Great Trek leaders) could be considered entrepreneurs of identity, whereas the former might be considered a less prototypical member, or black sheep, also able to influence ingroup members.

[133] Thus, ironically and unintendedly, the social levelling advanced by the British government actually led to increased racialisation at the Cape Colony, because of the overlap that existed between race and legal status and/or social class, and the decreasing salience of the latter.

4.2.1.4. Pursuing and preventing non-racial franchise

The South African Commercial Advertiser, under editor John Fairnbairn, and *De Zuid-Afrikaan*, associated with Christoffel Brand, became embroiled in a political conflict surrounding representative government, which spilled over into "a struggle between Afrikaner and English colonists for the higher moral ground". While both Fairbairn and Brand were proponents of a representative government, Fairbairn grew suspicious of *De Zuid-Afrikaan*'s commitment to the abolition of slavery, and eventually came to the insight that: "JOHN BULL has been awakened from his dream of confidence in the Afrikander" and thus "all danger of Dutch domination" was over (Giliomee, 2009:114). Self-government was delayed for more than two decades out of fear that it would worsen friction between the Dutch and English-speaking colonists. Despite this, Giliomee (2009:115) argues, these two white groups had more in common than not, both representing a small minority in a colony with a large slave population and an insecure eastern frontier.

Giliomee (2009:117) states that Afrikaners in the western Cape attached great importance to their rights as British citizens, and in the 1840s demanded political rights on this basis, instead of their Dutch or Cape descendancy. "In 1837 the government made provision for the election of municipal councils by British subjects of all colours on a low franchise qualification as a first step in a democratic government. The imperial government's introduction of local government institutions opened a door to Afrikaners for entering into politics" (Giliomee, 2009:118).

At the time of the election of Cape Town's first council in 1840, Afrikaner and English businessmen had joined together in common interest to oppose the government they viewed as autocratic (Giliomee, 2009:118). When the matter of a parliament arose, two factions formed: a conservative party made up of British settlers mostly in the eastern districts, who opposed universal franchise for fear of being dominated by the Afrikaners and coloureds, or, an "unprogressive majority", and a popular party made up of Afrikaner and English businessmen and Afrikaner farmers, who opposed imperial rule. When the Seventh Frontier War broke out in 1846, frontier burghers refused to fight in a commando under British command, and only joined once Stockenstrom, a leader of the popular party, was put in charge (Giliomee, 2009:119). A draft bill, backed by the popular party, became the framework for the new constitution of the Cape Colony (Giliomee, 2009:120).

When the Eight Frontier War broke out in 1850, residents of the Kat River and other missionary stations joined the Xhosa. Giliomee (2009:120) states that they projected themselves as representatives of a "coloured nation" aiming to regain their independence, and proclaimed that their fight was not with the Boers but with the British. He claims: "When Stockenstrom's house on the frontier was the only house left standing in an area devastated by the Xhosa invaders, some British settlers burned it down".

Rumours of a coloured uprising at the Cape was found to have been deliberately spread to rouse opposition to a non-racial franchise. According to Giliomee (2009:120), an 1852 appeal by the conservative party to the imperial government "catches the potent amalgam of racial, ethnic and language fears that pervaded the rhetoric of the conservative party". The appeal said "diversity of race, the extensive influence of the Dutch colonists and the exercise of a common language by the Dutch, Malay and Hottentot communities was a further fact, the consideration of which, with the evil of the low franchise, placed at once this large majority in the ascendancy, to the imminent peril and jeopardy of the rights and privileges of the English colonists" (Giliomee, 2009:120-121). Giliomee (2009:121) notes Stockenstrom's response as follows:

> Stockenstrom, who for so long had stood virtually alone among Afrikaners in pressing the liberal cause, now wrote to the delegation as 'a countryman and as a boer like yourselves', to tell them how proud he was of their 'noble generosity'. In an obvious rebuke to some of his English-speaking opponents, he wrote of his admiration for the way the delegation had upheld the interests of the weaker and coloured class 'in defiance of the machination and intrigues of those who have always boasted of their superior education, liberality and philanthropy.'

Remarkably, Giliomee (2009:121) describes, the Afrikaner slave-owners had come around to the idea of a qualified franchise for former slaves:

> The Cape Afrikaners, particularly the modernising elite, accepted the liberal idea of progress and the English language as public medium. They offered little open resistance to the introduction of secular education in 1863. So, too, an Afrikaner took the lead in elaborating on the liberal principles in the field of jurisprudence; J.H. de Villiers, who was to become chief justice in 1874, broke new liberal ground in taking a stand for the principle that 'no man's fundamental rights should depend on the colour of his skin.'

These liberal Afrikaners, although numerous, were still a minority within the group. As the unfolding history below will elucidate, some of these non-prototypical members leveraged their privileged positions in society to anglicise and exit the Afrikaner group (i.e., individual mobility), whereas lower-class Afrikaners were perhaps more incentivised to stave off competition from other groups, were still economically dependent on cheap labour, and/or

wanted to prevent further social levelling between them and the groups below them. Throughout the height of Afrikaner nationalism (see subsection 4.3.2), many liberal non-prototypical members instead became internal dissidents, rejected as ingroup members (i.e., acceptance threat), but maintaining enough ingroup identification to attempt to influence other ingroup members.

Before conclusions are drawn regarding the political beliefs and prototypicality of Afrikaners as a whole, at any point in history (see theories of group polarisation in Chapter 3, subsection 3.3.2.1), it should be remembered that leaders strongly influence group members, especially when the latter highly identify with a clearly demarcated group. Radicalised leaders, in particular, are able to sway the group, whose members respond much more strongly to arguments employing their social identities and often triggering their fear, than to those appealing to their principled morality. By defining the group and determining ingroup norms, radicalised leaders are thus able to silence internal critics.

4.2.1.5. Chaos on the frontier

Piet Retief, "an atypical frontiersmen", was the son of a wealthy wine farmer in the western Cape. He arrived at the frontier as part of the reserve force in the Fourth Frontier War, having lost all his property in speculation. His situation improved through marriage, but he again faced financial disaster caused by speculation. After a failed farming venture and liquor business, he was appointed in 1822, at the age of 40, as field commandant at the frontier (Giliomee, 2009:136). After losing 400 sheep in a raid, he followed the tracks up to the border, beyond which he saw thousands of cattle. Barred from crossing the border, as all burghers were, Retief held that no commando could ever succeed with such restrictions. Believing that he could have retrieved his stolen cattle peacefully while punishing the thieves, he resented being "a mere functionary of a distant government without having the discretion to act as necessary" (Giliomee, 2009:137).

Retief bypassed the office of the landdrost to write to Governor Somerset directly, detailing the thefts and murders that had occurred at the hands of the neighbouring Xhosa, and requesting permission to cross the border. This was denied on the grounds that he could not act independently from the landdrost. Retief was dismissed in 1824 because of his questionable business practices, despite a letter of support from farmers "caught between a government unable to safeguard their property and unwilling to allow them to maintain themselves as they had in the old frontier days" (Giliomee, 2009:137). Commandos were seldom allowed to track

stolen cattle on their own, and when they did, faced several restrictions. *Ordinance 9* (1825) regulated the use of weapons when dealing with suspects. Giliomee explains that with the abolition of the landdrost and heemraden in 1828, burghers had become side-lined, which they found unsettling.

The appointment of Stockenstrom as commissioner-general in 1828 made him the sole representative of the Dutch- or Afrikaans-speaking community able to influence frontier policy. He recognised the farmers' bitterness toward faraway Cape officials who believed they knew best how to manage the frontier, himself claiming that without "occasional examples of severity", the frontier would be uninhabitable for the colonists (Giliomee, 2009:137-138).

Another leading voice in frontier politics was that of British military officers on the frontier and British merchants from Grahamstown, who, through the *Grahamstown Journal*, advocated for the expansion into Xhosa territory and the subjugation of the Xhosa people through military might. Lord Somerset's son, Colonel Henry Somerset, became commandant of the frontier and officer in charge of the Khoikhoi-manned Cape Regiment in 1823 (Giliomee, 2009:138). He led forces comprising burghers, Khoikhoi mercenaries, British soldiers, and African auxiliaries far beyond the border to strike at various chiefdoms, murdering, pillaging and indenturing as they went. The imperial army evaded censure from the British missionaries or journalists. According to Giliomee (2009:139), the frontier burghers "fiercely resented such double standards", especially regarding the massacre of the Fetcani in 1828. Retief would later echo these grievances in his Great Trek manifesto. Giliomee (2009:139) elaborates on the burghers' frustration:

> The burghers' overriding concern on the frontier was security; in pursuit of this they used methods considered both brutal and anarchical. Although the government tried to enforce humanitarian notions, it could not ensure security under the law, and allowed British commanders to inflict extensive violence on African peoples.

In 1828 Retief resided in Grahamstown, moving in the circles of Stockenstrom's enemies such as Colonel Somerset and those linked to the *Grahamstown Journal*. That same year, Stockenstrom had moved from Graaff-Reinet to Grahamstown after being appointed commissioner-general of the eastern province, which at this time consisted of the south-eastern area including the Zuurveld and Grahamstown, the north-eastern area in Somerset, and the central area in what was formerly a neutral area between the colony and the Xhosa (Giliomee, 2009:139). In 1829, Stockenstrom and Somerset expelled a Xhosa tribe from the neutral area (one of the few well-watered spots at a time of drought) and created the Kat River settlement

for the Khoikhoi, in order to create a defensive barrier against invaders. Rumours that burghers would be displaced from their farms to make place for the Khoikhoi and British settlers ran rampant (Giliomee, 2009:140).

Colonel Somerset's excessive commandos to retrieve stolen cattle continued, leading Stockenstrom to conclude that Somerset was trying to push the Xhosa to desperately cross the border into the colony, which could then be used as a pretext for a further colonial land grab. In 1833, Stockenstrom travelled to London to ask for more power of office, which was refused. He resigned his post and left the Cape altogether for Sweden. Giliomee (2009:141) states that what little credibility the government policy at the frontier had left in the eyes of the burghers and the Xhosa was now lost. That same year the government began the curb the sale of guns and gunpowder to burghers, in an attempt to curtail the illicit trade of firearms with the Xhosa. Philip advised Sir Benjamin D'Urban, appointed governor in 1834, that the frontier conflict was the result of the commandos, but thefts and patrols continued unabated. An English surveyor on the frontier wrote that 1834 was a year of relentless plunder, seemingly designed to provoke the Xhosa into a war, as Stockenstrom had suspected. At the end of the year, the Xhosa's retaliation initiated the Sixth Frontier War, which devastated the "Boors" and the Khoikhoi in the area (Giliomee, 2009:141-143).

When Governor D'Urban arrived at the frontier, he concluded that Philip had misrepresented both the farmers and the Xhosa. He decided to support the policy proposed by some British settlers: further expansion into Xhosa territory, land speculation and white settlement (Giliomee, 2009:143). At the end of 1835, the imperial government's colonial secretary, Lord Glenelg, reversed D'Urban's policy and reverted to the previous colonial boundary, as he had come to believe that the Xhosa were driven to their acts by the colonists. Prior to this, Stockenstrom had travelled to London from Sweden and testified to this effect, while also suggesting a treaty system. Upon Glenelg's request, Stockenstrom returned to the Cape as lieutenant governor to implement his treaty system (Giliomee, 2009:143-144).

In September 1836, when Stockenstrom returned to Grahamstown after three years abroad, he found burghers leaving or preparing to leave the colony. According to Giliomee (2009:144), the mass emigration of frontier farmers was a massive setback to Stockenstrom's plans for "a more orderly form of colonisation, which he saw as essential for Afrikaner survival". Below is a map depicting the border changes on the eastern frontier of the Cape Colony, before and after the Great Trek:



Figure 3: Map of the changing eastern frontier of the Cape Colony (1800s)

4.2.2. The Great Trek

4.2.2.1. Voortrekkers in search of security and self-determination

In what is known today as the Great Trek, parties of burgher families, or *Voortrekkers*, moved out of the Cape Colony from 1835 to 1845. According to Giliomee (2009:144), there were two groups of emigrants who had left the colony – the Voortrekkers participating in the Great Trek, and *trekboers*, who had been crossing the colonial border since the mid-1820s, and involved *individual* burghers or single families, in search of sufficient pastures, slowly crossing the border to improve their material prospects.[134] The Voortrekkers, on the other hand, involved parties, often *groups* of families, aiming to move far away in pursuit of individual interest as well as collective goals.

The Voortrekkers joined the trekboers in the Transorange area, with many moving further to the Transvaal or Natal (see map in subsection 4.2.2.3). The first wave of emigration (ending in 1840) saw the exodus of 6,000 burghers – constituting 20% of white people in the eastern districts or 10% of the total white population of the colony. By the end of the Great Trek, 2,308 families, or 15,000 burghers, along with 5,000 servants, had left the colony. According to Giliomee (2009:161), officials and church leaders quickly realised that this "strange and

[134] By the mid-1820s, trekboers were requesting the landdrost to pasture livestock across the border as temporary relief measures (such as in cases of drought), but by the end of the 1820s, they simply informed the landdrost of their crossings. By 1830 many trekboers had sold their farms and crossed the borders permanently. According to Giliomee (2009:146), frontiersmen in the southeast took note of the government's inability to prevent the trekboers from leaving or force their return.

moving spectacle" (in the words of DRC minister Andrew Murray) was a significant event, and most people in positions of power (including *De Zuid-Afrikaan*) were quick to condemn it. Many feared for the fate of the indigenous populations, while others worried about that of the Voortrekkers. Giliomee (2009:144) describes the basic motivation underlying the Great Trek as follows:

> The Great Trek was in fact a bold and dramatic response to a survival crisis that had engulfed the eastern and northeastern districts of the Cape Colony from the mid-1820s to the end of the 1830s. It was not so much 'running away', the term Stockenstrom had used in the 1825 debate with Philip, as an abrupt, yet fairly orderly, mass rebellion against a breakdown of security that the participants considered intolerable.

This mass rebellion has a modern-day equivalent, in the form of mass Afrikaner emigration from South Africa in the post-1994 era, to a large extent because of security concerns and other state failures (see Chapter 5, subsections 5.1.1.4 and 5.3.2.3). Giliomee (2009:144) explains that the causes of the Great Trek are diverse, and summarises them as a lack of land, labour and security, coupled with a pervasive sense of being marginalised. In 1812, only 40% of married burghers in the Graaff-Reinet district were landowners. As a result of the steady population growth of burghers, without the possibility of further expansion, the situation became increasingly dire. The abolishment of the loan farm system for the "perpetual quitrent tenure" system also made it much more expensive to own land. By 1832, there was officially no more available land and applications were returned.

Stockenstrom maintained that for as long as the frontiersmen's way of life depended on expansion, they would "continue to covet the native peoples' land". He envisioned a frontier where only the most efficient farmers had land, while the rest of the burghers either worked on those farms, or left to find work in the towns. Whereas Stockenstrom imagined modern, efficient farms, burghers wanted to continue practising traditional subsistence farming, because of the "seemingly abundant free land beyond the colonial borders". Expansion thus had to be conclusively ruled out (Giliomee, 2009:145-146).

In addition to the lack of land, labour shortages also motivated frontiersmen to exit the colony. Afrikaner colonists' insistence on their system of 'benign' paternalism as a form of compensation of Khoikhoi servants after the abolition of slavery, instead of switching to commercial farming and cash wages, led to an acute labour shortage. Complaints about a lack of herdsmen continued until the mid-1840s, whereafter Xhosa people began to fill the shortage (Giliomee, 2009:146).

Giliomee (2009:146-147) argues that the Great Trek also involved "common people being inspired or swept along by strong, patriarchal leaders with their own reasons for emigrating". These include Louis Tregardt (later spelled Trichardt) and Gert Maritz, both slave-owning farmers who became disaffected with the government as a result of the impact of emancipation on their financial interests. But, Giliomee (2009:147) insists, wealthy slave-owners would not have been able to rally support for the Great Trek by merely denouncing emancipation. He supports this claim by pointing to the fact that the 29 families who joined Tregardt had only five slaves among them, and that the Voortrekkers tended to come from districts with smaller slave populations. Piet Uys, another Voortrekker leader, initially wanted to emigrate to spread the gospel in the deep interior, but after the arrest of his wife on charges brought by a slave, he, along with many other Voortrekkers saw emigration as an opportunity to "reassert their old paternalist order".

The insecurity on the frontier, another cause of the Great Trek, was the result of stock theft and begging by the Bushmen, the Xhosa and refugees fleeing across the border from enemies (Giliomee, 2009:147). According to Giliomee (2009:148), frontier burghers did not know how to deal with the vagrancy and constant cattle theft, and some were afraid for their lives. While the frontier had been insecure since the 1770s, the situation became especially grave by the late 1820s. As examples, throughout the many Frontier Wars, Maritz's father lost all his cattle, his brother survived near-fatal stab wounds, and Retief's farm was plundered. After countless wars the government spent virtually no resources on the administration of the worst-hit northeastern district of Somerset. Most burghers also faced the prospect of having to travel two to three days to the drostdy to lay a complaint or appear before a court. Giliomee (2009:148) elaborates on the motivations of the Voortrekkers as follows:

> Responding to Stockenstrom's remark that they intended to leave the colony in order to lead a lawless existence, some of the prospective Voortrekkers in the northeastern divisions replied: 'It is the contrary, we leave the Colony because we know of neither Government nor Law – of the Government we know nothing except when we have money to pay and the law never reaches us except to fine or otherwise punish, often for acts we did not know to be wrong. Our Field Cornets can give us no assistance, as they are as much in the darkness as ourselves. We are like lost sheep.'

After the Sixth Frontier War (1834-1835), burghers were shocked that despite the colony's brutal counterattack, "marauding bands were again squatting on land, plundering and stealing cattle" (Giliomee, 2009:148). Giliomee (2009:149) argues that the whole frontier had become unsettled, and that "people were jumpy and preparing to move immediately". He maintains that

although the lack of land, labour and security were sources of great discontentment, they are not enough to explain why wealthy farmers, and not only landless people, left the colony (2009:149). He cites Stockenstrom, who recounted burghers telling him "that they no longer felt at home in their own country". He also cites the thoughts of Olive Schreiner on this matter, who said:

> But that which most embittered the hearts of the colonists was the cold indifference with which they were treated, and the consciousness that they were regarded as a subject and inferior race … [The] feeling of bitterness became so intense that about the year 1836 large numbers of individuals determined to leave for ever the Colony and the homes which they had created.

It is clear that a potent mix of realistic and social identity threats motivated the drastic course of action that was taken by frontier burghers. Giliomee (2009:149-150) argues that the burghers' treatment by the English press, culminating in Philip's book singling them out for condemnation for the frontier violence, had made them hopeless of "ever being considered as anything but the white outcasts of the British Empire". Through governmental actions and inactions, and their unfailingly negative depiction in the media,[135] burghers had begun feeling marginalised and disempowered in their home country.[136] Giliomee (2009:150) states that Hendrik Potgieter, one of the most important Voortrekker leaders, made it clear in a letter to the governor that "he found it impossible to live any longer under what he regarded as the yoke of an alien and bungling government". Andries Pretorius, another influential Voortrekker leader, expressed similar sentiments, and argued further that the trekkers "presently wandering around will still become a volk and live in His honour". Giliomee (2009:150) elaborates on the Voortrekkers' growing disillusionment in their new government, and their increasing political mobilisation:

> Here was a manifestation of the kind of political consciousness that had been absent in the 1820s. This sense of marginalisation and disaffection developed within the context of a government that introduced a social revolution at the same time as removing virtually all the local government institutions with which the burghers had identified.

[135] Before the outbreak of the Sixth Frontier War, *The Spectator* wrote that "scarcely any is equal in atrocity to the conduct of the Dutch Boers" (Giliomee, 2009:150). See value threats in Chapter 3, subsection 3.4.1.

[136] As this chapter has recounted, the Afrikaners' 'home country' largely came into being by displacing native peoples, thus undercutting at least some of their claims to land. However, narratives are in many instances more powerful than historical facts. To the burghers, they were born in this land, and knew of no other home. Through the farming economy, their survival on every level depended on the land. After generations of this existence, they had come to feel a deep sense of ownership of this land. In their eyes, their heritage gave them not only a claim to land, but the right to rule it. While the ownership of the land was certainly disputed (and still is to this day), the Afrikaners did not consider any other place home. The continued connection with the land makes modern emigration a particularly traumatic experience for those who follow this individual mobility strategy.

> There were no longer burghers serving as heemraden to advise landdrosts, and the function of burghers serving as field cornets had been sharply reduced. The burghers had come to feel like foreigners in their own land.

Stockenstrom himself, while being a staunch critic of the Great Trek, believed that the government and judiciary were not working in favour of the burghers (Giliomee, 2009:150). Giliomee (2009:150-151) states that while the British government had long since abolished the burgher status along with other Company-era class distinctions, the burghers "clung to it as part of their social identity". He argues (2009:151):

> In their eyes the status of a burgher was distinct from that of a subject. As burghers they produced most of the food, paid a large part of the taxes, served as field cornets without whom local government would collapse, and fought in the commandos that were indispensable to the colony's defence.

The burghers thus did not want to be mere citizens, but had grown accustomed to the active (and voluntary) participation in a variety of governmental functions, and incorporated that as a key part of their group identity. Giliomee (2009:151) believes that despite the burghers' contributions, they were treated as "mere underlings" by some British officials and officers. He claims that their "feelings of violated dignity" culminated in the Sixth Frontier War, during which they were "subjected to humiliating conditions" – "a degrading affair that affronted their sense of dignity and civic self-worth". After the war, the government announced, to the chagrin of burghers, that they would be enlisted as a militia to defend the frontier, eliciting fears that they would suffer the same conditions as during the war. Giliomee (2009:151) states:

> Fears that dated back to the Company era, of being taken back into government service as sailors or soldiers, were rekindled. An impetuous Colonel Harry Smith contributed to this fear. When he disbanded the commandos after the 1834-1835 war he told the burghers that they held their lands in this Colony 'only on condition of serving the Government when called upon.' (This was the condition under Company rule.) Smith suggested that they were indeed 'very lucky' to get away on such 'easy terms', by which he hinted that he considered their military duties fairly light.

In this sense, the British not only replaced the Company in the sociopolitical hierarchy, but also supplanted the burghers in local self-government. Together with the abolishment of the burgher status, this signified a demotion of social class of burghers as a collective group. The threats to the material well-being of burghers, as well as to the value of the group with which they strongly identified, implicating historic fears by now imbedded within the psyche of the group, caused a level of distrust and disaffection between the burghers and the state, many times worse than their ancestors' strained relationship with the VOC. It is important to note that at this point

in Afrikaner history, distinctiveness or symbolic threats were not fundamental to the political mobilisation of the frontier burghers.

Stockenstrom for his part criticised the "designing miscreants" for resurrecting "the old stupid suspicion that the British Government intends by degrees to make Soldiers and Sailors of the redundant male population". One Voortrekker expressed their fear that their children would be sent to foreign countries as soldiers. In 1848, officials explained the opposition to the burgher militia plan by referencing the burghers' "dislike to be considered other than as free burghers". On another level, a niece of Piet Retief bitterly complained that slaves had been "placed on an equal footing with Christians, contrary to the laws of God, and the natural distinction of race and religion … wherefore we rather withdraw in order to preserve our doctrines in purity" (Giliomee, 2009:151-152).

> On the frontier it was [however] not so much a *racial* hierarchy that the burghers wanted to preserve; but rather their fight was against the *gelykstelling* or social levelling of people belonging to different status groups – master and servant; people born into the Christian community and those the missionaries had converted; and finally – and perhaps most important – burghers who farmed and defended the land and non-burghers.

The maintenance of a (race-based) class hierarchy was integral to the continued availability of cheap labour to (white) burghers. In addition to outgroup hostility towards non-white groups, the burghers also harboured resentment toward missionaries of the London Missionary Society (LMS), such as Philip (who they knew played a leading role in preventing the *Vagrancy Act* of 1834 from passing) and James Read (whom they wrongly suspected of conspiring with the Xhosa). The final straw, Giliomee (2009:152) believes, was Lord Glenelg's reversal of D'Urban's annexation of the Province of Queen Adelaide (formerly Xhosa land). Burghers blamed LMS missionaries for smearing them and holding up the Xhosa and Khoikhoi as more deserving than burghers. Remarkably, despite Stockenstrom being instrumental in this policy change, he, as an ingroup member, does not seem to have faced the scorn of fellow Afrikaners.

4.2.2.2. Different paths: Retief and Stockenstrom

Giliomee (2009:153) describes the early beginning of the Great Trek as follows:

> The Great Trek was not an impulsive move; it was preceded by a careful examination of the prospects in the deep interior. During the early 1830s three reconnaissance parties, called 'commission treks', went out to investigate the options for those wishing to emigrate. One went to Damaraland in the present Namibia, another to the present Mafikeng and Gaborone, and the third to Natal. The third commission trek returned with glowing reports of a most fertile land with abundant pastures. As a result of the

> *Mfecane*, many areas were sparsely populated or seemingly devoid of people. On their return, the members of the commission treks planted or nourished the idea of emigration. The implications of the Mfecane for the Afrikaner trekkers who moved into the deep interior in the late 1830s and the 1840s were profound. It did make the Voortrekkers' task of settling the deep interior much easier because large areas were temporarily depopulated. Desirable land seemed to be there for the taking. But some of the greatly strengthened African polities, particularly the Zulu and Swazi states, would offer much tougher resistance than they would have done fifty or sixty years earlier.

The first Voortrekkers left the colony between late 1835 and early 1836. In September 1836, Gert Maritz left from Graaff-Reinet with a large party. No comprehensive explanation for the emigrations had been offered by the end of 1836. Piet Retief was still trying to convince people in his division to stay in the colony. While Stockenstrom could be "undiplomatic" and "aloof", Retief, on the other hand, was "affable", "charismatic", and well-liked among both burghers and British settlers (Giliomee, 2009:153).

Upon Stockenstrom's arrival in Grahamstown on 3 September 1836, he received a message that Retief wanted a meeting with him (Giliomee, 2009:154). Giliomee (2009:155) believes that there was no reason why Retief and Stockenstrom could not work together. However, Stockenstrom strongly suspected (as does Giliomee) that Retief conspired with the former's expansionist enemies to spread rumours that would egg on the trek. Prior to Stockenstrom's appointment, Retief had also attempted to discredit him, falsely accusing him of representing the burghers to the English government in London as "[m]onsters of cruelty and barbarism" (Giliomee, 2009:155).

The two met on 20 September 1836 at the Kat River settlement, where Retief complained about the conditions and policies at the frontier. Stockenstrom responded that his principles of justice and equality for all groups had not changed, and dismissively advised Retief to move to another country if he thought he would be happier there (Giliomee, 2009:155). A month later, in a letter to military officers, Retief expressed his dismay regarding the government passes issued to the Xhosa allowing them to come to the colony where, he believed, they were "congregating with not the least other purpose than to live solely on plunder", and asked whether he could arrest them. Stockenstrom instructed Retief to abide by existing laws, or risk losing his position as field commandant (Giliomee, 2009:156).

By the end of the year Retief had decided to leave the colony, and in January 1837 went to pay Stockenstrom farewell. The latter asked Retief, in Giliomee's words, "how the trekkers could survive as whites in Africa except by remaining under the British government and its system

of law and order", and remarked that the trekkers seem to prefer the protection of Dingane and Mzilikazi (African chiefs in the interior) to that of the British government. On 2 February 1837, Retief published his manifesto in the *Grahamstown Journal* with the help of his editor friend. Giliomee (2009:156) describes it as follows:

> The manifesto was no ringing declaration of independence, but a document aimed above all at dispelling the impression that the trekkers were anarchic frontiersmen desperate to escape the restraints of law. It sought to create the impression that an ordinarily law-abiding people, pushed beyond all limits, had chosen to trek rather than rise up against the government. 'We despair of saving the colony from those evils which threaten it by the turbulence and dishonest conduct of vagrants.' The trekkers had decided 'to quit this colony with a desire to lead a more quiet life than we have heretofore done … under the full assurance that the British government had nothing more to require of us, and will allow us to govern ourselves without its interference in future.'

The manifesto outlined the reasons for the trek – lack of security, losses sustained during the last frontier war, the presence of vagrants, laws regarding slaves and losses sustained during the emancipation process, and the "unjustifiable odium" that missionary propaganda cast on burghers – while emphasising that a return to the paternalistic master-servant relationship, and not slavery, was sought. The manifesto declared that the emigrants would not take anyone's property, but would defend their own, and that they would make their intention of peace clear to the black tribes among whom they would settle. Stockenstrom dismissed Retief as field commandant that same day. In a July 1837 letter, Retief again pledged to the British government that no animosity towards the "British nation" was intended, but insisting on the trekkers' "desire to be considered a free and independent people" (Giliomee, 2009:156-157).

A little earlier, in November 1836, Stockenstrom had finally implemented his own system to address the problems at the frontier. In order to solve issues like stock theft, treaties would be concluded between the colony and the chiefs of the neutral territory. What made Stockenstrom's proposal novel, was the idea that agreements between the colonial government and the chiefs would be on par with treaties between independent states, a notion some found absurd in the context of dealing with "savages" (Giliomee, 2009:157).

Stockenstrom did not believe in culturally assimilating the Xhosa (from how they settled disputes to English laws) as, in his words, "the prejudices of a nation however absurd they may appear are not easily removed or disregarded". According to Giliomee (2009:158) the actual success of Stockenstrom's treaty system in maintaining stability is disputed among historians, but his enemies (British officers, speculators and settlers) were soon conspiring and managed

to get him dismissed from his post in August 1839. Giliomee (2009:159) states that this was a massive disappointment to the Xhosa chiefs who had trusted Stockenstrom and did try to make the treaty system work. One such chief, Maqoma, commented five years after the dismissal: "I will hold by Stockenstrom's word until I die … If the treaties are forced from us, nothing can preserve us from war".

According to Giliomee (2009:159), the treaty system was doomed "without Stockenstrom, and perhaps even with him". Stock thefts rose after 1839, a policy resembling the old reprisal system was implemented, and treaties scrapped. Giliomee asks whether Stockenstrom's treaty system, if properly applied, had a chance of ensuring stability, to which he cites Stockenstrom's comments that the Xhosa were not "mild, gentle shepherds" and that "vigour is as necessary as justice in your dealings with them". Giliomee states that the colonial government would have to enforce the treaties, but that they lacked both the vision and the will to do so.

4.2.2.3. Off to a rocky start: failures and fatalities

Aside from the roughly 200 kilometres of frontier border where Europeans and Africans had intensive contact, before the Great Trek there were few other places that had contact between these groups. The Great Trek greatly extended this contact (Giliomee, 2009:162). According to Giliomee (2009:163), the Voortrekkers saw Africans as "people with whom they had to reach a working relationship", as they required them as labourers and allies against other tribes.

But the Voortrekkers had mixed success with their new neighbours and with the expedition in general. Van Rensburg's trek was wiped out by hostile tribes near the Limpopo Valley, while Tregardt and most of his party died from fever on their way to Delagoa Bay. A Ndebele patrol attacked the Liebenberg family, part of Potgieter's party, killing 14 men, women and children. A Ndebele army would later again attack the Potgieter laager, which ended in commandos that succeeded in chasing their enemies to present-day Zimbabwe, and thereby removing any serious rivals from the Highveld (Giliomee, 2009:163).

Giliomee (2009:163) suggests that the trek further levelled the internal class hierarchy, forcing leadership to rely on patriarchal family structure and military reputation to maintain control over their parties. Leaders also disagreed with each other, with Retief intent on Natal and preferring to negotiate with Britain for independence, while Potgieter was set on the Highveld of the Transvaal and wanted to establish de facto independence far away from the British. Giliomee (2009:164) further notes that ecclesiastical and political disputes abounded –

Potgieter's trek party became an autocracy under his patriarchal rule, while Maritz saw the trek as a united community or volk, and "called for the leaders' submission to an elected council".

A *Burgerraad* (Burgher Council) was soon elected with Maritz as civilian president and Potgieter as military commander, but the two fell out and the Burgerraad collapsed. When Retief joined their parties in Thaba Nchu, he was unanimously elected governor of the trekkers and took over from Potgieter, while Maritz became deputy governor and judge president of the Council of Policy. In 1837 the "Free Province of New Holland in South East Africa" was set up, and Retief became "overseer" of the *Maatschappij*, as the collective Voortrekker society was called. When Uys's party arrived, he refused to accept resolutions in which his party had no say. According to Giliomee (2009:164), the exclusion of Potgieter and Uys from the governing body caused tension, and Maritz became increasingly concerned with Retief's autocratic tendencies.

Later that year, Retief met with the Zulu chief Dingane (who had come to power after assassinating his half-brother Shaka) to negotiate a treaty for land to settle in Natal. Although Retief was warned about Dingane's treacherous ways, he proceeded with the risky deal much like with his failed business ventures. In addition to the unlikeliness of the deal succeeding, several other missteps were made on the part of Retief and other trekkers that elicited Dingane's suspicions and insecurity. In February 1838, at the treaty signing ceremony at Dingane's kraal, Retief, along with 70 white trekkers and 30 servants, were clubbed to death one by one, with Retief the last man standing. Dingane proceeded to send thousands of Zulu warriors to the unsuspecting trekking parties, killing 300 white trekkers and 200 servants, and raiding cattle which left the survivors destitute. A commando was defeated in which Uys was killed. Potgieter and his party left for the Highveld, as he had wanted to do from the outset, while other trekkers stayed behind in a precarious situation, worsening when Maritz died later that year (Giliomee, 2009:164-165).

In November 1838 Pretorius arrived with a party of 60 to exact revenge on the Zulu army. He encouraged a covenant, and on 9 December the commando, under the helm of Sarel Cilliers, made a vow to God that if they were victorious, they and their descendants would commemorate the day of the battle and build a church. On 16 December, a laager of 468 trekkers, three Englishmen and 60 servants, faced upwards of 10,000 Zulu at the Buffalo River (later renamed Blood River). After a two-hour battle, the trekkers had slain 3,000 Zulu with no casualties on their side, dealing a death blow to Dingane's power. In a treachery similar to what

Shaka faced, Dingane's half-brother Mpande aligned with the trekkers and assisted Pretorius in the "Cattle Commando",[137] whereafter Dingane was killed and Mpande declared King of the Zulu nation.

In addition to the impact that the Great Trek would have on Afrikaner identity for generations to come, this victory, and the covenant that preceded it, became incorporated as important cultural symbols. Giliomee (2009:165) states that over the next century, Afrikaner nationalists considered the *Slag van Bloedrivier* (Battle of Blood River) as the battle that "'saved' the trek and secured the victory of Christianity and 'civilisation'". He argues, however, that the victory proved unimportant, as the fate of the Great Trek would be decided on the Highveld, and not in Natal.

The Voortrekkers had a sense of mission from early on, writing to Governor Napier in 1841 than they viewed themselves as "an instrument in God's hand to promote Christian civilisation and to protect blacks from internecine 'murder, pillage and violence'" (Giliomee, 2009:165-166). The trekkers built the church of their covenant in Pietermaritzburg, for their use, and played virtually no role in the promotion of Christianity among the Zulu. Giliomee (2009:166) states that aside from the church, the vow was all but forgotten about until Paul Kruger, a teenager in Potgieter's trek, resurrected it in 1880. Below is a map indicating the various Voortrekker routes, as well as the location of the Battle of Blood River:

[137] Zulu children were seized to work as indentured servants until the ages of 25 for boys, and 21 for girls (Giliomee, 2009:167).



Figure 4: Map of Great Trek routes across Southern Africa

4.2.2.4. Natal republicanism

The Boer republic in Natal was established in 1839, with Pietermaritzburg as the capital. The constitution provided for a 24-member *Volksraad* (council of people's representatives), and a system of local government comprising a *landdrost* (magistrate) assisted by the *heemraden* (councillors). In the districts, field cornets acted as representatives of government authority, who, together with district commandants, could call up burghers for commando. The Volksraad appointed a commandant-general (Pretorius at this time) who was essentially the head of state. The republic was enlarged in 1841 to accommodate the trekker communities of Winburg and Potchefstroom, with each electing a representative to serve on the Pietermaritzburg Volksraad (Giliomee, 2009:166).

According to Giliomee (2009:166), when the Voortrekkers left the colony their allegiance was to their own party; freedom meant to be free from constant threat to life and property; and they had not yet conceptualised their right to settle the interior or what type of system they would establish. He argues that the Voortrekkers developed various "survival strategies", or systems of government, such as: (i) the republicanism supported by Pretorius and a "Volksraad party" in Natal; (ii) the semi-autocracy of Potgieter on the Highveld; and (iii) the "statelessness" and extreme individualism of the trekkers in the southern part of what eventually became the Orange Free State.

In a letter to Governor Napier, the Natal Volksraad declared their right to colonise the interior in 1842. A section of the Natal trekkers began viewing all emigrants as a collective; a *vereenigde burgerlyke maatskappij* or united society of burghers that had a right to make their own laws in the settlements they founded. This section, called the Volksraad party, was strongly opposed to unchecked personal power (Giliomee, 2009:166). According to Giliomee (2009:167), they abolished the post of commandant-general in peace times, advocated the subjugation of leaders to the will of the people as voiced through the elected council, and introduced "a radical form of self-rule" with annual elections, white male franchise and frequent memoranda and appeals to the Volksraad. One commentator noted in 1843 the 'stern republicanism' in Natal, where trekkers believed in *collective governance* and fiercely resisted "becoming subject to any permanent chief or supreme head". Giliomee (2009:167) comments as follows:

> The republicanism of the burghers of the eighteenth and the early nineteenth century had little philosophical depth, the ideas of the American or French republic transported to the frontier as slogans rather than as thoughtful published tracts. Yet one of the core ideas of the ideology of republicanism, a free, independent, propertied class of burghers with rights, duties and privileges, had taken root by the end of the eighteenth century.

Due to a small community (only 6,000 trekkers at its height), the lack of a strong executive, low revenue and the resultant lack of policing, a depleted currency and shortage of ammunition, building the state of Natal was an "arduous task". Soon Pretorius was conducting commando raids in the style of Colonel Henry Somerset, less concerned with punishing the guilty than with intimidating all chiefdoms (Giliomee, 2009:167). The Natal trekkers abducted Zulu children to work as indentured servants, while forcing Zulu men to work for them on their farms through fear and the threat of death. Giliomee (2009:168) notes the irony of the Natal trekkers' quest for freedom and subjugation of the Zulus:

> The trekkers' passionate commitment to freedom and self-government did not include Africans. They were regarded as less civilised people who could be ordered to work and punished if they refused. Freedom was a right reserved to whites by this rationale.

While the British government tolerated the Voortrekkers' emigration, as they did not have a claim on the interior, reports of Pretorius's commandos and disruption of African communities made them fear the repercussions for the Cape: Zulu resistance and the destabilisation of the frontier. The British consequently occupied Port Natal briefly in 1838, and in July 1842 the Volksraad submitted to British authority (Giliomee, 2009:168).

Giliomee (2009:168) argues that these events exposed class and gender divisions within trekker society. While the poor and illiterate trekkers were opposed to living under British rule once again, and would rather try to find prosperity across the Drakensberg, "wealthy, literate, influential people who had already put down roots", such as Pretorius (who unbelievably had ten cultivated farms at this point), trusted that the British would recognise their land claims and thus chose individual material interests above the freedom of the collective.

Similarly, Giliomee (2009:169) notes, Afrikaner women – who were a "driving force behind the trek", and not merely "adjuncts of their husbands" – strongly opposed the return to British rule.[138] One such woman, Susanna Smit (sister of Gert Maritz and Stephanus Maritz, chairman of the Volksraad), led a delegation to meet the British commissioner, the anglicised Henry Cloete. The latter reported that they swore "never to yield to British authority", and that they told him after all the battles they had fought alongside the men, they were promised "a voice in all matters concerning the state of this country".[139] The all-male Volksraad reneged on their promises and submitted to the British in spite of the women's objections. In Cloete's view, it was "a disgrace on their husbands to allow them such a state of freedom". Pretorius left Natal more than four years after the annexation, when it became clear that the British administration would not allow the trekkers to compel black people to work on their farms.

4.2.2.5. Frontier Afrikaners after the Great Trek

With land prices increasing in the 1830s and 1840s as a result of the development of wool farming, pressure on the Cape government to allow expansion into Xhosa land intensified. In 1846, the Seventh Frontier War broke out as a result of the killing of a white frontiersman and the siting of a military fort in Xhosa territory, which even took Philip by surprise, as he believed the colonists had been acting more 'Christian-like' than before (Giliomee, 2009:159). The Xhosa were defeated in 1847, and their land annexed; land which the government sold to British speculators "to fill its own coffers". Their constant harassment led the Xhosa to initiate the Eight Frontier War in 1850, during which some Khoikhoi and farm workers joined them. The frontier burghers did not want to get involved in the colonial force, which made Sir Harry

[138] Giliomee (2009:169) argues here that women enjoyed relative authority in their households through slavery and servitude, in which they could enforce discipline over servants. This position of power was undermined by abolition and other reforms to servitude.

[139] Perhaps through the breakdown of the regular internal hierarchy during the Great Trek, and in fighting alongside their husbands, these women had temporarily acquired a higher status they did not wish to lose by returning to the old colony class hierarchy.

Smith denounce the "indifferent" and "apathetic" Boers, while a British settler expressed his shock at how "anti-English" the frontier Afrikaners had become (Giliomee, 2009:160).

Historian Jeffrey Peires referred to this war as the "longest, hardest and ugliest" war on the eastern frontier. British forces aimed to destroy the subsistence base of the Xhosa, burning huts, destroying crops and capturing cattle, with 16,000 Xhosa including women and children becoming collateral damage. Stockenstrom, who had returned to the frontier to serve as commander in the Seventh Frontier War, testified in London that it was not ordinary colonists who were responsible for this latest war, but rather the aggressive local governor and rapacious speculators. He noted that all the Xhosa wars had brought benefit to only the speculators, and not the colonists, and advocated for a system of representative government to avoid further wars. In 1853, representative government was introduced in the Cape Colony, at which time most Afrikaner leaders in the western part of the colony opposed further expansion beyond the frontier (Giliomee, 2009:160).

4.2.3. The Boer Republics

4.2.3.1. Transvaal and Transorangia

After the annexation of Natal, the Potchefstroom-Winburg area, under the authority of Potgieter, informed Cloete that they considered themselves unbound by the Pietermaritzburg submission, and thus independent. In 1844 a *Burgerraad* (Burgher Council) was formed and a constitution accepted which allowed for annual elections. Potgieter ill-fatedly moved the capital from Potchefstroom to the newly founded Ohrigstad, which was infested by the tsetse fly and led his trekkers to abandon farming for elephant hunting and the ivory trade (Giliomee, 2009:170).

Between 1845 and 1860, the far northern frontier was "a Potgieter fiefdom". His son succeeded him after his death in 1852, and acknowledged that his father was interested in "a system of 'one-headed' government". Trekkers from the "ultra-democratic" Volksraad party in Natal moved to the area under the leadership of J.J. Burger, who became the secretary of the Volksraad launched in 1845. The Potgieter and Burger 'sides' immediately clashed over the political system, and the path to survival for the trekkers. Whereas Burger wanted to live orderly in permanent cattle-farming settlements, Potgieter preferred nomadic hunting, seizing African women, children and cattle along the way (Giliomee, 2009:170). The latter would send out weakly-justified commandos, and when he could not find his target, he attacked innocent chiefdoms – including allies of Ohrigstad. Some members of Potgieter's commando left in

disgust, and he faced fierce criticism back home. In 1849 Potgieter and his followers established the settlement of Schoemansdal, while his opponents founded Lydenburg. By 1850 Ohrigstad was completely deserted (Giliomee, 2009:171).

On both sides of the upper Orange River, trekkers encountered the semi-autonomous Griqua people, who had established "captaincies" at Klaarwater (later Griqua Town) and Philippolis, both of which were recognised by the British colonial government. They also had a *raad* (council) consisting of field cornets as officials (Giliomee, 2009:171). Trekboers were the first trekkers to move to the present-day Free State. They pledged loyalty to the government in Cape Town, and lived peacefully with other groups. On the other hand, the impending arrival of the Voortrekkers in the area made Philip anxious that they would destroy the independence of the Griquas, as well as the Basotho people living both sides of the Caledon River (which separates the Free State and present-day Lesotho). In 1843, under the persuasion of Philip, Governor Napier signed peace treaties with the captains of the Griquas, Waterboer and Kok, and the Basotho chief, Moshweshwe. In an 1844 treaty, Potgieter's Voortrekkers expressed their desire to live equally among the Griqua and Basotho. But when the Griqua authority arrested Afrikaner farmers, both Voortrekkers and trekkers protested, leading to an armed standoff with Kok (Giliomee, 2009:172).

In 1848, Pretorius and his trekkers left the British-led Natal for the Highveld. En route, he encountered Sir Harry Smith, who told them that Britain was planning on annexing both the Transorange and Transvaal as British territory. Soon afterwards, Pretorius announced that he would turn these areas into an independent state, with military force if necessary. That same year, Governor Smith annexed the area between the Orange and Vaal rivers as the Orange River Sovereignty, and placed a small British force at the present-day Bloemfontein. Giliomee (2009:172) describes this as "a major setback for the Voortrekkers, who had hoped to establish themselves as an autonomous community in this area".

For the first time, Giliomee (2009:173) contends, Pretorius identified the source of the trek as "a desire for independence and freedom". In a manifesto written that same year, Pretorius suggested that the Voortrekkers were being discriminated against by the British based on their colour and status as "white African Boers", as they had allowed the Griquas "self-government and all the rights of liberty", but were now denying them to the Voortrekkers.[140] Governor

[140] This dynamic highlights that intergroup conflict between one ingroup and one outgroup, as conceptualised by SIT, is often insufficient to explain real-world conflicts. May's (2012) recognition of the power of the state comes closer, but he too envisions conflict between one minority group and one dominant group with control of the state.

Smith promptly assembled an 800-strong force which defeated the Voortrekkers at Boomplaats. Pretorius fled and amassed a new following near the present-day Pretoria. He established a Volksraad for the entire Transvaal region in 1849, commandants-general were appointed for each of the four main regions, and Pretorius was tasked with negotiating a political settlement with the British for the Voortrekkers living north of the Vaal.

According to Giliomee (2009:173), British control over Transorangia was tenuous, as a limited administration was left in place to manage the Sovereignty. English settlers soon moved to the area where they, like the English on the eastern frontier, started agitating for a stricter policy against Moshweshwe and border adjustments to acquire the fertile Caledon River valley, insisting that they and the Basotho could not live together in peace until separated. Whereas the English settlers relied on the British imperial government in creating a state, the Afrikaners were not primarily concerned with creating a state, and preferred the rule of Moshweshwe to that of the British. When resident Henry Warden appealed to the burghers to unite along racial lines "to put down the common enemy of the white man", Josias Hoffman (later the first president of the Free State) objected to the forced removal of Basotho from the Caledon River valley, stating that the Basotho people "will revenge such unjust treatment" and "if Southey [a prominent settler entrusted with fixing the border] thinks that he can bind the Boers to the British government by giving them all the land he is mistaken and knows neither the Boers nor the natives" (Giliomee, 2009:174).

An unsuccessful attempt to move the Basotho, combined with the outbreak of the Eighth Frontier War in 1851, caused panic among English settlers in the region. *The Friend*, the English settler newspaper in Bloemfontein, promoted a conspiracy that Africans across South Africa were planning to "drive the white man into the sea", and called for unity among the white settler groups. In 1852 Governor Cathcart sent a force to attack Moshweshwe and achieved "a hollow victory". He advised the imperial government to set up a permanent garrison, but the latter were hesitant to become involved in the mess in the deeper interior (Giliomee, 2009:174).

Giliomee (2009:174) suggests that previous detractors of the Great Trek had begun to sing a different tune. Fairbairn, who had helped to free the Khoikhoi and the slaves at the Cape, now

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Here we see an example of various minority groups, as well as *the* dominant group that wields the most power. In diverse countries such as South Africa, intergroup conflict can and often does involve more than one group, with a more complicated sociopolitical structure that sees a group be subordinate in one circumstance, and dominant in another.

wanted to open up the interior in order to "civilise" the native peoples. *De Zuid-Afrikaan* now viewed the trek as "similar to Israel's exodus from Egypt, and as a means of bringing the Gospel and civilisation to the 'wild national tribes into the deep interior of South Africa'". Notice the ability of the media, as an extension of the state and related powers, to shape the discourse.

In order to secure "white allies" on the Highveld – who could settle border disputes with African chiefdoms, subjugate Africans into a labour force and establish trade relations with British colonies – Britain granted Transvaal Afrikaners the right, at the Sand River Convention of 1852, to self-govern and purchase ammunition from the British on the condition that slavery not be permitted in the republic (Giliomee, 2009:174-175). With the British eager to withdraw from the Orange River Sovereignty, the Bloemfontein Convention of 1854 allowed for the trekkers between the Vaal and Orange rivers to self-govern and buy ammunition from the Cape Colony or Natal. Giliomee (2009:175) elaborates on the creation of these two self-governing Afrikaner areas as follows:

> Britain had, in effect, abandoned its treaties with non-European chiefs, and had given the trekkers political power and access to ammunition. Without much preparation and with no fanfare, the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR) was established in 1852, and two years later the Republic of the Orange Free State (OFS). There were now some twenty thousand burghers in the ZAR north of the Vaal and fifteen thousand in the OFS between the Vaal and the Orange rivers. Some OFS burghers kept alive the idea of the incorporation of their state into the Cape Colony until the late 1860s, but the great majority of burghers became staunch republicans. Since it controlled the ports and the supply of ammunition, Britain had little to fear from these financially strapped republics.

According to Giliomee (2009:175), the two new republics were "states in little more than name", and cites Potgieter who, in a letter to Pretorius shortly before his death in 1850, lamented "the difficulties of developing a sense of nationhood":

> The time of our general deliverance has not yet been born, and that day will only dawn once we, through our own industry, concern and peaceable behaviour, as well as through the blessing of God, will have become a nation, substantial in numbers, acting in accord, courageous, with the sword of righteousness in our hands and with available resources in a struggle to defend ourselves … God only knows how long that day had to await us.[141]

[141] This perfectly illustrates Smith's (cited in May, 2012) distinction between ethnies and nations (see Chapter 2, subsection 2.2.2). At this point in history, Afrikaners were (only) an ethnie, and were about to become a nation through the creation of a state and pursuit of nation-state congruence (i.e., nationalism).

Giliomee (2009:175) notes that during the drafting of the constitution of the republics, the burghers considered the membership qualifications of their society. He argues that they would not easily contradict established practice at the Cape, as evidenced by their deep disappointment that the Cape Synod disapproved of the Great Trek and failed to send them a minister (2009:176). They knew that the Reformed Church was embracing a non-racial character, and that the Cape Afrikaners supported the 1853 constitution which provided for a non-racial franchise with low property qualification. On the other hand, British settlers at the eastern frontier opposed such a system, with the editor of the *Grahamstown Journal* referring to universal franchise as "a great wrong to the European inhabitants". Giliomee believes that the two Boer republics were each influenced differently by these facts.

The Free State constitution, drafted by a Dutch teacher and two members of the English-speaking party in the Free State, considered citizens to be all white people who had lived in the republic for a minimum of six months. Thus, while the franchise was granted in non-racial terms to adult male burghers, in practice it was racial because only white people could become citizens. All parishes in the *Oranje-Vrijstaat* (Orange Free State, OFS) were absorbed into the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) of the Cape and thus were non-discriminatory on the grounds of colour or race. The *Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek* (South African Republic, ZAR; or Transvaal) constitution of 1858, on the other hand, made it explicit that equality between white and non-white inhabitants would not be allowed, either in the State or the Church (Giliomee, 2009:176). The OFS was thus relatively more moderate than the ZAR, likely because of the history of the trekboers in the area, who lived peacefully with other groups and maintained a link with the British.

4.2.3.2. Churches, Kruger and the 'uitverkore volk' narrative

The *Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk* (NHK) was formed from the first congregation in Potchefstroom founded it 1842, and held its first meeting in 1853 in Rustenburg. The NHK would be the state church of the ZAR and not join the Synod of the DRC. According to Giliomee (2009:177) these events were strongly influenced by the Dutch minister Dirk van der Hoff, who had found favour with Pretorius's son, now the most powerful political and military figure. Giliomee posits that Van der Hoff's racial agenda might not have succeeded, had the Cape DRC sent ministers to the Transvaal. Burghers from Lydenburg formed a DRC parish that was absorbed by the Cape synod, while another group of burghers in Rustenburg founded the *Gereformeerde Kerke in Suid-Afrika* (GKSA; the "Doppers") in 1859, the most theologically and morally conservative church of the three. One of the founders of the church

was Paul Kruger, who Giliomee (2009:177) states influenced the ZAR politically and ideologically more than anyone else:

> He is more closely associated than any other leader with the concept of the Afrikaners as a Chosen People like the Ancient Hebrews, with a covenant with God to fulfil a divine plan. Kruger was born into a trekboer family in 1825 and had no more than three months of formal education. He never read any book but the Bible. His Dopper community of the northeastern districts of the Cape Colony was considered more pious and socially conservative than any other community in the colony. He himself was deeply religious, and in his later life strongly influenced by Calvinist beliefs. He frequently relied on a literal interpretation of the Bible as a guide, and there is reason to think that he believed the earth was flat until the end of his life.

According to Giliomee (2009:177), Kruger's main religious influence was orthodox Calvinism, which in the early days of the Cape Colony, preached a gospel of an omnipotent God who directly intervened in individuals' and communities' lives, as well as the doctrine of predestination and of the Elect. This strand of Calvinism held that the covenant with God extended to the children of the faithful "unto a thousandth generation" – a belief of Kruger's that was strengthened through the "drama and trauma" of the Great Trek. Kruger was ten years old when he left the colony with his family to join Potgieter's party, and at twelve years old, he was in Natal during Dingane's massacre of Retief and his men.

Some have argued that Afrikaners viewing themselves as an *uitverkore volk*, or "a Chosen People with a Divine mission" has its roots in Kruger's exposition of this idea in the 1880s, while others have claimed that this idea only became a motivating ideology after the activities of a group of Potchefstroom intellectuals post-Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902). Giliomee (2009:178) believes, however, that this notion can be traced back further, an important argument in the analysis of Afrikaner nationalism. He reasons that if Afrikaners did have a sense of a "national mission" earlier than what is commonly thought, a "nationalist idea" thus significantly predates the industrialisation of South Africa.[142] He maintains that "it was to be expected that this nationalism would be a durable force, able to overcome temporary setbacks".[143]

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[142] See May's (2012) critique of Gellner's theory of industrialisation in Chapter 2, subsection 2.2.4. Giliomee (2009) seems to agree here with May that groups (and identities) do not simply spring into being whenever political goals arise. In my view, Giliomee's use of the term 'nation' does not imply the creation of a state per se, but rather, the existence of a group with shared myths, memories, cultural attributes and a sense of solidarity (i.e., ethnie).

[143] Giliomee's (2009) use of the term 'nationalism' here should also rather be conceptualised by differentiating between ethnies and nations. I believe that what he describes here corresponds with May's (2012) recognition of the enduring power of ethnicity.

Andrew Murray, DRC minister in Bloemfontein from 1849 to 1860, most likely referring to the Doppers, commented on the failure among some burghers to clearly distinguish themselves from Israel. An account of 1858 by an English settler in the OFS referred to the Doppers as a "peculiar sect", and noted their obsession with the ancient people of the Old Testament and their belief that "they too are a Divinely favoured people in the same sense that Israel was" – and idea handed down "from father to son". Giliomee (2009:178-179) points out that if indeed this notion had been passed down from the previous generation, the Doppers had already developed it in the Cape Colony and (at the least in Kruger's case) it was strengthened through the Great Trek experience.[144]

Giliomee (2009:179) emphasises though that this "sense of mission" was not widespread or well-articulated among the Voortrekkers; even the Doppers had diverging views on their mission. He similarly notes that the "chosen people" theology was not mainstream, and various other disagreements between the three Reformed churches in the ZAR saw them view each other suspiciously. He adds that aside from Calvinism, Kruger's main guiding principle was "a fierce determination to preserve the ZAR's republic freedom" – literally convinced that "he would be accursed should he sacrifice the independent state in which the burghers lived".

According to Giliomee (2009:179): "[The Great Trek] failed to create an overarching community or a crystallised sense of national identity. Most Voortrekkers and their children knew better what they were not – they were not British subjects – rather than who they were". During the OFS constitutional committee, *Afrikaner* was only one of several identifications, including "Hollandse Afrikanen", "Hollandse Boeren", "Emigrants", "Boeren" and "Boers".[145]

4.2.3.3. ZAR dysfunction and OFS stability

The weak economy of the ZAR, Giliomee (2009:179) believes, could not unite Boer society or maintain an efficient democratic state. Without a major export or marketable commodities, and with the colonial ports so far away, the ZAR currency was soon exhausted and the state and burghers became indebted to foreign lenders. Taxes were burdensome and commando duty was ignored. Subsistence farming was the main enterprise, meaning markets and towns grew

[144] The use of this pre-existing narrative by some Afrikaners to understand their current place in the world is an instance of anchoring, discussed in Chapter 3, subsection 3.5.2.

[145] These terms illustrate the ethnic antecedents that *could* be incorporated into a new and unifying national identity. Through these identifications, one can see an attempt to establish the group boundary, or key characteristics of the ingroup identity. Mention of the Netherlands might have been a way of saying white person, but not British. Emigrants could refer to the families of the Great Trek, thus excluding the Afrikaners who stayed in the Cape Colony. The mention of farming signals their burgher ancestry. What is clear is that with the task of building a state before them, there was a desire to create a (national) community out of the Voortrekkers.

slowly. Giliomee (2009:180) argues that a commitment to egalitarianism among trekkers actually undermined efforts to build a functioning republic, as both republics provided free land to burghers and within two decades "both states had squandered virtually their only resource, land", and land speculation had become rife. By the end of the century, half the land in the Transvaal was in the hands of absentee landowners and companies, while half of the burghers were landless.

During the 1850s and 1860s, several factions were constantly battling for power, and civil war seemed possible. However, when Paul Kruger was made commandant-general in 1863, he made "Herculean" strides in defending the existing authority and instilling a sense of civic virtue among the burghers. Giliomee (2009:180) notes that state-building in the OFS was also a complicated endeavour. He cites the Bloemfontein journal *De Tijd*, which in 1866 described the weak young state as follows: "Simple people find themselves in a vast land, surrounded in all quarters by enemies, without judges, without soldiers, without money, divided through ignorance and derided by a Colony adjacent to it".

In both republics, hyper-localisation further threatened the functioning of the central state. While Africans were excluded from the state and church, they did accompany trekkers unarmed as auxiliaries on commandos – still the chief instrument for policing and military action. Giliomee (2009:180) claims that although egalitarianism among trekkers was the official ideology, a class hierarchy quickly formed, wherein large landholders would become (or dictate to) elected field cornets and commandants, many turning into local strongmen.[146] Giliomee (2009:181) also notes that large farmers would send their *bywoners* (tenant farmers) or other poor whites to commando duty in their stead.

Even though black people vastly outnumbered white people, Giliomee (2009:181) posits that a lack of a sense of racial identity among African chiefdoms enabled the burghers to avoid "having to contend with overwhelming numbers". Similar to the burghers on the eastern frontier of the colony, the republic burghers usually formed alliances with certain African chiefdoms, and would also foment conflict between factions of a chiefdom – mitigating strategies to ensure that they, as a minority group, did not have to face a united majority.

According to Giliomee (2009:181), the trekkers were uninterested in achieving self-sufficiency, and remained heavily reliant on African labour. The more peaceful strategy was to

[146] These local strongmen controlled the commandeering and (unequal) distribution of black labour, and in all likelihood pocketed taxes paid by Africans (Giliomee, 2009:181).

settle close to an African settlement, and make an informal deal with the chief. In 1853, Pretorius banned the trekkers from settling too close to such settlements, whereafter the trekkers resorted to other coercive and violent methods. In the OFS, the formidable Moshweshwe held off such practices, but by the mid-1860s, in his old age, the Basotho came under increasing pressure from a growingly forceful burgher population. Wars in 1865 and 1868 saw the burghers acquire the majority of present-day Lesotho, and continuing hostilities throughout the 1870s and 1880s saw Basotho communities in the OFS and Basutoland (as Lesotho was then called) flee to Natal (Giliomee, 2009:182).

The ZAR had much more difficulty dominating its large African population, and by the early 1870s had lost their monopoly on guns. The culture of brutality and impunity with which Potgieter ruled was continued in subsequent administrations, and trickled down to local commandants and field cornets, leading to resistance and counterraids by, for example, the Venda people (Giliomee, 2009:182).

Kruger became commandant-general of the ZAR in 1864, when it was at its weakest amid war with native peoples, the threat of civil war caused by sparring trekker factions, the imminent collapse of dispersed settlements, and the burghers' widespread dereliction of commando duty. In that same year, a burgher wrote to Kruger that "the name of the Afrikaner nation had been lost and along with that the fear it had inspired among the natives" (Giliomee, 2009:182). According to Giliomee (2009:183), Kruger urged the state to punish burghers and the church to censure them. A series of attacks on trekker settlements in the late-1860s led to the abandonment of the northern part of the republic. The 1870s saw the eastern part of the republic continuously raided by the Pedi, which resulted in many burghers moving to the central Highveld. In 1871, Kruger declared Africans the "fervent enemies of the whites", who, if given the chance, "would not let the whites remain in the country for a single day".

During the British occupation of the Transvaal (1877-1881) – which ended with British defeat in the Transvaal War (1880-1881), also known as the First Anglo-Boer War – the British adopted some of the Boer tactics in fighting, in addition to more modern methods. While formerly opposed to military alliances with Africans, the British defeated the Pedi in 1879 with 15,000 Swazis on their side. Giliomee (2009:183) states that while African resistance continued, from the early-1880s the Voortrekkers (energised by their victory over the British forces) began to gain control, roughly four decades after the Great Trek.

The trade in "black ivory" and *inboekelinge* (indentured servants) was widespread in the ZAR, referring to the practice of abducting African women and children, indenturing the children and selling them to other burghers – even those in the OFS. In a bid to hide the continued practice of slavery, the Transvaal Volksraad issued the *Apprentice Act* (1851), weakly suggesting that since these children are received as "gifts", or obtained by other "legal" means, and they have to be released by the age of 25, this practice does not constitute slavery (Giliomee, 2009:184).

Burghers also did not consider this practice to be a crime or to constitute slavery, although it is unfathomable that they could have believed this to be ethically and morally just (except only by extensive dehumanisation). According to Giliomee (2009:185), these children were given new names, were taught Dutch or Afrikaans, and eventually became detached from their indigenous cultures and adopted Boer culture. Considering their brutal introduction to the trekkers, they were apparently treated well and usually received some farmland and cattle when adulthood freed them from indentured servitude (Giliomee, 2009:186). It is conceivable that trekkers who engaged in this practice convinced themselves that their paternalism (including converting their servants to Christianity) was more beneficial to these children than remaining with their own families.

In 1868, Britain annexed Basutoland at the request of the Basotho king, just before the Free State could conquer it. The diamond-rich Kimberley was also annexed by the British in 1871, after the strong claim of the Republic of the Orange Free State was rejected, which the latter saw as a grievous injustice. According to Giliomee (2009:186), the annexation turned out to be in the OFS's favour, as it benefitted from a larger market on its border, without having to extend the franchise to immigrant labourers. Jan Brand, president of the OFS from 1864-1888, negotiated a compensatory settlement with Britain, and invested the funds in a state bank which improved the state's financial autonomy. Giliomee (2009:186) argues that while the OFS was not wealthy or modern (lacking infrastructure), Brand succeeded in establishing a stable state by prioritising the formation of a sound legal system which could attract trade and other forms of business, and rooting out corruption.

A Dutch newspaper, *De Express*, was founded in 1875 in Bloemfontein, although British cultural influence remained strong. Giliomee (2009:186) explains that from its inception Bloemfontein was a predominantly English town, the language being used in both private schools and rural schools established by wealthy farmers. In 1881, the Volksraad declared that

the use of English as medium of instruction at the leading state school, Grey College, taught "children to despise and forget their own language and to consider their nation with contempt". In 1899 the Dutch paper wrote that "although the English praise the Free State as a model republic they are ceaselessly fusing it with the Empire in language, civilisation and culture".[147]

Giliomee (2009:187) argues that burghers in the OFS developed a republic spirit, unlike the "colonial patriotism" of the Cape Afrikaners. He cites Jan Hofmeyr, who, when visiting Bloemfontein in 1883, remarked that Afrikaners at the Cape were reluctant to avail themselves for Parliament as they did not speak English well enough, had their court cases heard in a language they did not understand, and when called up for commando duty, "must serve under the command of a man who he has not elected, who does not know his language, who does not understand his character, and who despises him", while in the OFS, there exists the feeling that "Government and people are one".[148] According to Giliomee (2009:187), the OFS was considered the best administered part of South Africa by 1881, owing to its agrarian character, relatively homogeneous electorate, the absence of significant wealth concentrations, and the absence of xenophobia towards foreign settlers, leading Lord Bryce, a British constitutional expert, to refer to it as an ideal commonwealth.

In 1872, the population of the ZAR comprised 30,000 white people, of which 8,000 were men, and 12,000 African farm labourers. According to Giliomee (2009:187), the ZAR was, contrary to the stability of the OFS, plagued by "bungling, incompetent leaders", such as Marthinus Wessel Pretorius, ZAR President in the 1860s. In 1872, pursued by Transvaal burghers set on getting an intelligent president, the radically liberal Thomas François Burgers became president. His reign is defined by his disastrous Delagoa Bay railway plan, and his alienation of the "relatively backward agrarian" ultra-conservative community through educational reforms.

Burgers managed to create an education department with its own education system, a museum, the Supreme Court, and a small regular army. However, it was his secular policies and plans in education, such as the ban on religious instruction during school hours and relaxing the

[147] The importance of language to Afrikaner ethnicity, the process of nationalism which creates the nation, and the need for positive differentiation from the British, could have all contributed to this focus on language policy and the salience of language in general.

[148] See Kulturnation and cultural nationalism in Chapter 2, subsection 2.2.5. The fact that such cultural concerns persist, despite the goal of political nationalism having been reached (self-determination in a sovereign state), demonstrates the staying power of ethnicity, as May (2012) argued.

requirement of church membership for teachers,[149] that, together with the railway failure, ultimately led to his downfall.[150] Burgers helped found the first Dutch newspaper in the ZAR, *De Volksstem*, and tried to unite Afrikaans and English speakers in a common identity. Giliomee (2009:188) elaborates:

> He propagated a composite (white) nationality, not based on a particular ethnic group but on the white community as a whole who had settled in South Africa and had made the country its home. 'We must stop talking of different nationalities', he told Afrikaner and English diamond diggers. 'We should be only one nation, and know only one nationality – the Afrikaansche.'

Giliomee (2009:188) suggests that the ZAR was for all intents and purposes a failed state – severely in debt and in administrative disarray. In April 1877, on instruction of Lord Carnarvon, Theophilus Shepstone, Native Administrator in Natal, annexed the Transvaal with a 25-man strong force. Leaders including Kruger kept their seats and civil servants pledged loyalty to the new government, reassured by Shepstone's promise of self-rule and the use of Dutch as a second official language. British administrators reformed the Transvaal's affairs, while also enacting a hut tax on Africans and clarifying pass regulations (Giliomee, 2009:189).

By the early 1880s, after nearly 200 years of white settlement, the frontier of South Africa had effectively closed as there was no more readily available land to settle. Giliomee (2009:189) argues that disorder and lawlessness at the frontier was largely over, with mainly Britain promoting the national cohesion necessary to overcome the anarchic tendencies of the frontier. He cites an English observer who said of the republican Afrikaners at this time that "their impatience of restraint, their unwillingness to submit to the irksomeness of government is proverbial" and cited a statesman's (most likely F.W. Reitz) assertion that it was only "the constant succession of acts of British interference that increased the spirit of Republicanism" (see reciprocal radicalisation in Chapter 3, subsection 3.2.3.5).

4.2.3.4. Family, community and society

According to Giliomee (2009:190), life on the Transvaal frontier revolved around the Afrikaner family on the farm. Survival essentially depended on having sufficient white people on the

[149] Burgers, although being a DRC minister in the Cape prior to his presidency, believed that the Bible did not belong in schools, since school was where science had to be taught. His unorthodox doctrine saw him suspended for heresy.

[150] Between 1874 and 1880, 500-600 conservative burghers (mostly Doppers from Pretoria and Rustenburg) fled Burgers' secularist Transvaal in search of their New Jerusalem, trekking across present-day Botswana to reach present-day Namibia and the south of Angola. Half perished or returned in what is now known as the *Dorsland Trek* (Thirstland Trek).

farm to defend property and lives, resulting in large nuclear families and co-habiting, extended families. Despite this dependence on family ties, or perhaps because of it, there was a distrust of people outside the family unit and an unwillingness to co-operate with others in improving their personal situation or societal conditions. Giliomee states that apart from the church, institutions that could foster political integration were limited – only 8% of white children in the ZAR, and 12% in the OFS, were in school in 1877, and politics and commandos were rife with *dwarstrekkery* (disunity).[151] Rugged individualism and "a refusal to think about the welfare of the state as a whole as distinct from that of the family farm or the district" was common (Giliomee, 2009:190-191).

The relationship between Afrikaners and black people at this stage was complicated, Giliomee (2009:191) suggests, as some African tribes were trusted enough to conduct trade with and maintain peace, while others were deeply feared, especially considering the low numbers of the Afrikaner population. So too relationships between burghers and servants varied. Paternalism dominated relationships between burghers and the "successive generations of African servants or apprenticed children who grew up in Voortrekker households". Giliomee states that in the most harmonious relationships, these servants were trusted with guns, and would later serve as *agterryers* (auxiliaries) to the Boers in the Anglo-Boer War.[152] In the 1930s the liberal professor Alfred Hoernlé (cited in Giliomee, 2009:192) observed that this class of trusted servants:

> [H]ave become culturally so completely assimilated to their masters that Afrikaans has become, quite literally, their mother tongue, and their habits and ways of life those appropriate to a servant class in a 'white' world … [They have] very little say in the ordering of their own lives, from political rights they are excluded; they worship apart in their own churches. But their worship is none the less a Christian worship of the same type as their masters' worship, they belong to white, not to native, society; they are completely detribalised. Divorced from their tribes and the culture of their tribes, they have become black Europeans.

The other type of relationship with servants, Giliomee (2009:192) notes, was the horrific treatment of black children in the "black ivory" trade of the 1850s and 1860s – the most acute dehumanisation of black people. Despite this practice, he suggests, the Boer Republics were not strong enough to completely control black people at this time, and farmers would

[151] The literal translation of this word is 'cross-pulling', and it is commonly used in Afrikaner politics to describe situations where the interests of an individual or faction compromise the interests of the collective (including instances of internal dissent).

[152] Agterryers were tasked with tending the horses and preparing the food (Giliomee, 2009:163).

oftentimes act more leniently than they would have otherwise, for fear that black people would simply leave their farms. The full subjugation of black people by Afrikaners would only be realised in the 20th century.

4.2.4. Afrikaners in the British Colony

4.2.4.1. English nationalism and Afrikaner inferiority

When the British occupied the Cape for the second time in 1806, it did so with the purpose of making the Cape (with its strategic location vis-à-vis India) a permanent possession. It was not, however, until the arrival of the 1820s settlers, that the British had a chance of moulding the Dutch Cape into an English colony and anglicising the upper stratum of Afrikaners (referred to as "the loyal Dutch" or "the Queen's Afrikaners"). While these settlers were generally poor, they were more skilled than the burghers and mostly ended up in various occupations in the towns (Giliomee, 2009:193). In 1824 two of them, John Fairbairn and Thomas Pringle, published the first newspaper at the Cape, *The South African Commercial Advertiser*. In what was certainly no coincidence, the first Dutch magazine, *Het Nederduitsch Zuid-Afrikaansch Tydschrift (NZAT*; The Dutch South African Magazine*)*, appeared that same year, edited by Stellenbosch-born burgher Abraham Faure (Giliomee, 2009:194). It is noteworthy here that the first Dutch printed media would only appear after the appearance of English in the public domain.

The British settlers would soon dominate the trade sector, even in the Boer republics. It was also mostly British immigrants who were responsible for the engineering of infrastructure including roads, bridges, railways and deep-level mining shafts. Sophisticated financial and industrial companies were mostly founded by them, along with English-speaking Jews. According to Giliomee (2009:194), the ideology of free trade became dominant in Britain and the Cape Colony, "essentially a secular religion" based on the belief that mankind can be freed from "the shackles of tradition and superstition" through an application of rationality and scientific examination. British settlers at the Cape spread the "gospel of progress", which held that free trade and English proficiency (and from 1853, British non-racial democracy) were essential for any "progressive" person. The British and the burghers were headed for a collision:

> From the start, an incipient tension marked the relationship between the Afrikaners and the British at the Cape. The spectacular advance of Britain as a world power had bred a conviction among the British that their way of doing things was superior. In 1822 the colonial secretary, W.W. Bird, who was married to a Dutch-speaking woman, wrote of

> the Englishmen's conviction that 'nothing can be right or proper that is not English, and to which he is unaccustomed.' An English nationalism became the dominant ideology in urban life across much of South Africa, expressed in the English language and reinforced by its symbols of dress, emblems, architecture, food and polite conventions. Robert Ross made the valid point that an English nationalism was the 'prime nationalism to which both Afrikaner and African nationalism reacted.'

According to Giliomee (2009:194-195), Afrikaner colonists were annoyed by the comments of English critics, who "deplored in extreme terms the social distortions and lack of cultural achievements" upon their arrival at the Cape.[153] The VOC was criticised for its governance of the colony, in particular its neglect of education, stifling of trade and enterprise, support of slavery and the oppression of the native peoples, and failure to control trekboer expansion. Despite their annoyance, Afrikaners could not refute the claim of English cultural supremacy. In 1806, more than 150 years after the arrival of Van Riebeeck, there were no great economic developments or cultural achievements to boast of, and no books, paintings or innovations in which the Afrikaners could pride themselves. Giliomee (2009:195) elaborates on the low collective self-esteem of Afrikaners as follows:

> They were a rural, isolated, relatively backward people with only a few who received more than rudimentary education. The lack of military resistance to the British conquests in 1795 and 1806 contributed to the sense of social impotence. The feelings of inferiority were compounded by what Barrow [one of the English critics] called 'the reluctance that a vanquished people must feel in mixing with their conquerors.'

Aside from the failed Slagtersnek Rebellion of 1815, there was little Afrikaner resistance to the new situation at the Cape. In some regards, the arrival of the British settlers aided the Afrikaners, as the former vindicated their experiences and actions on the frontier. Whereas travellers and VOC officials could not comprehend the burghers' challenges regarding labour and security, the British settlers faced the same circumstances, and many decried the extremely negative public depiction of Afrikaners. Thomas Pringle thought the burghers to be a civil, good-natured people, albeit uncultured and prejudiced, whereas George Thompson, a traveller, believed that a differentiation was warranted between "savage, indolent and unprincipled" individuals, and the group as a whole (Giliomee, 2009:195).

Giliomee (2009:195) posits that "Afrikaner colonists groped for a new definition of themselves as a community" (see meaning change in Chapter 3, subsection 3.4.2), as seen in Faure's *NZAT* proposal for a *dual identity*. This involved being loyal British subjects who identified with their

[153] In the 1820s, 16% of all marriages in Cape Town were mixed marriages, a much higher rate than in other slave societies (Giliomee, 2009:51).

particular history and cultural distinctiveness (see dual identity strategy in Chapter 3, subsection 3.5.3). The first Dutch newspaper, *De Zuid-Afrikaan*, proposed a *superordinate identity* for the Cape (see CIIM in Chapter 3, subsection 3.5.3), declaring in its first editorial in 1830 that it aimed to "hoist a banner which will serve as a rallying point for all colonists, old and new". Giliomee (2009:196) argues that the newspaper appropriated the term Afrikaner to refer to all colonists and settlers who were loyal to South Africa, and thus explicitly excluded coloured and black people from this new superordinate identity.

While it promoted the idea of a broad colonist identity, it opposed the 'silencing' of subgroup identities (see MIDM in Chapter 3, subsection 3.5.3). *De Zuid-Afrikaan* would go on to encourage Dutch-speaking colonists to assert their "nationality", and in 1835 wrote: "It is an error that we have frequently opposed to suppose that as British subjects we are compelled to adopt a British nationality. A colonist of Dutch descent cannot become an Englishmen, nor should he strive to be a Hollander". Smith's (cited in May, 2012) distinction between ethnies (or stateless nations) and nations is useful in understanding the difference between ethnic and national identity (or political identity). May's (2012) argument regarding the nation-state's conflation of the historical-cultural and the legal-political dimensions of nationhood, is also very relevant here (see Chapter 2, subsection 2.2.2).

In contrast to *De Zuid-Afrikaan*, the *South African Commercial Advertiser* advocated for an end to "national distinctions and loyalties" and for the "cordial and complete amalgamation of the Dutch and English colonists which is so … essential to the future interests and well-being of both". This policy, which advances the ethnic identity of the dominant group as the national identity, and seeks to eliminate the ethnic identities of subordinate groups (through assimilation), signifies an example of banal nationalism (see Chapter 2, subsection 2.2.6). The diverging views of the Dutch and English newspapers also corroborate Glasford and Johnston's (2018:209) statement that minority groups usually prefer integration, whereas majority groups prefer assimilation.

In Chapter 2, subsection 2.2.6, I noted May's (2012) argument that the ethnic habitus of minorities is often in conflict with the legal-political interests of the nation-state, and their claims for a higher degree of autonomy and representation in the public domain is thus seen as "inherently parochial and destabilising". In subsection 2.1.2, I also noted his argument that ethnicity is unfavourably contrasted with national identity, and dismissed as "anti-modern and regressive". This was also the case in the British Colony in the 19th century. Giliomee

(2009:196) suggests that English-speaking journalists and businessmen reinforced an image of Afrikaners as "unprogressive and parochial", viewing their concern with the survival of the Dutch language in similar terms. He offers the counterargument that the British were in their own ways parochial in retaining emotional ties with Britain and importing many aspects of British society to Africa, without attempting to get to know the Afrikaners and their Africanised ways.

When in 1814 Britain formally acquired the colony in a treaty, Giliomee (2009:197) suggests that they set out to "civilise" the Cape. In 1822 the government announced a new language policy: over the next five years, the use of languages other than English in the courts and government offices would be phased out. Similar attempts were made at anglicising churches and schools. Free government schools offered English-medium education only. Giliomee states that burgher parents demanded that schools offer bilingual education as, though eager to have their children master English, they resisted the displacement of Dutch. He insists that parents were pragmatic regarding language-in-education policies, including in tertiary educational institutions:

> In higher education there was a similar pragmatism; language only became an issue when politicians wanted to enforce English or when the Reformed clergy sensed a challenge to their interests. They did not mind that most of the staff of the Athenaeum (later the South African College and yet later the University of Cape Town), which it helped to found in 1829, was English or Scottish, but became upset when the college wanted to offer religious instruction. It feared that students would end up as members of an English church.[154]

The 1828 administrative changes included the abolishment of the boards of landdrost and heemraden in the interior districts, in exchange for largely English-speaking magistrates and commissioners, as well the replacement of the local city council by English-speaking trustees. According to Giliomee (2009:197), Cape Town Afrikaners considered these changes "an insult and abrogation of a historic political right". Similarly, the imposition of English in the judicial system further injured the self-esteem of Afrikaners. By the 1830s English dominated in administration, politics and law – so much so that even Piet Retief's Great Trek manifesto was

[154] Nearly 200 years before the *taaldebat* (language debate) at Historically Afrikaans Universities (HAUs), we can see the concern among Afrikaners that language-in-education policies affect subgroup identity and membership changes. Already at this point in Afrikaner history, there exists the recognition that an English-only policy is aimed at assimilating non-English speakers and ultimately 'silencing' their subgroup identities (which signifies distinctiveness or continuity threats).

published in English. Giliomee (2009:226) argues that the ideology of free trade (discussed above) and the anglicisation of the Cape benefitted the English greatly:

> The imperialist creed of free trade and progress disguised the interests of Britain and English-speaking people extremely well. Britain only embraced free trade as a policy after it had been strongly protectionist during its own growing age. During the nineteenth century, free trade was to the greatest benefit of British manufacturers and merchants. The policy of anglicisation in the name of progress gave a head start to English-speakers in government, the professions, and commerce. After 1828 all those not fluent in English were handicapped by the primacy of English in the courts, and the dominance of English in Parliament led to a disproportionate number of English representatives. English as the only medium of instruction in the schools imposed a great burden on the great majority of Afrikaners and other children who did not know the language.

Giliomee (2009:198) asserts that the Afrikaners were politically submissive for several economic and cultural reasons. He argues that urban Afrikaners were mostly traders who did not view language as a symbol of identity, but merely as an instrument; and they were eager to accommodate to the British. Most of the former VOC elite, comprising officials and ministers retained their positions and generally did well under British rule. Western Cape farmers, in turn, benefited from the expansion of the market, while the farmers in the interior were largely isolated and unaffected by the growing British cultural imperialism. He also cites Thomas Phillipps, a British settler, who suggested that slavery ironically made the Afrikaners submissive:

> As to the Dutch, with very few exceptions, they are so accustomed to obey that they tremble at a shadow … One of the very worst effects of the system of slavery is predominant in them, in proportion as they tyrannise over their domestic slaves, in the same ratio they degradingly crouch at the feet of their rulers.

Giliomee (2009:205) refers to the *colonial nationalism* promoted by people like J.H. ('Onze Jan') Hofmeyr and Jan Christiaan Smuts, involving a loyalty to the British Empire, a great respect for the English language, customs and the progressive changes promoted by the Empire, but with the belief that the colony should not be subservient to Britain, and should steadily become self-governing.

Self-identified Afrikaner Andries Stockenstrom admonished his fellow burghers in the 1830s for their "apathetic acquiescence" which created the impression that "with the Cape Colonists any thing may be done because they submit to everything". Giliomee (2009:198) states that Stockenstrom urged his fellow Afrikaner colonists to resist "every insult or injury", and argued that the "accidental possession of official power" should not allow British officials "to

domineer over his fellows as if they belonged to an inferior species created only to tremble at his frown".

Regardless of these calls to action, the spread of English hegemony was well underway. By the early 1830s the best-educated Afrikaners were becoming anglicised, referred to as the Cape Dutch or "Anglomen". According to Giliomee (2009:198), other Cape professionals, seeking to counter the "denigration of their history and cultural standing", promoted a Cape Afrikaner identity. In 1832 they formed the *Maatschappy ter Uitbreiding van Beskawing en Letterkunde* (Society for the Expansion of Civilisation and Literature) and began preparing a history of the settlement. Giliomee (2009:198-199) states:

> But, as the struggle for a constitution gained momentum during the 1830s, the Afrikaner leaders appealed less to the rights burghers enjoyed under Company rule and more to the common rights all British subjects shared. They downplayed cultural differences to avoid the impression of any rift between the two white groups.[155] In 1837 Brand remarked: 'England has taken from the old colonists of the Cape everything that was dear to them: their country, their laws, their customs, their slaves, yes, even their mother tongue.' The Afrikaner colonists had done everything to prove they were British, but 'their conquerors had continually worked to remind them that they were Hollanders.'[156] For Brand the priority was the amalgamation of the two white sections. In 1841 he wrote: '[We] are two who must become one and by doing so raise the banner of unanimity in public affairs.' English commentators left little doubt that this 'unanimity' would increasingly be expressed in English cultural terms.

Giliomee (2009:199) suggests that the British knew the DRC was the most important institution of the Afrikaners, and so kept it as an established church, alongside the Anglican Church. By 1834, twelve of the twenty-two DRC ministers were Scottish, who had to learn Dutch prior to their appointment. Lord Charles Somerset, governor from 1814 until 1826, began urging the church to use English. However, the DRC clergy rejected pressure to anglicise. A request by the Scottish ministers to offer some of their services in English was refused by the synod.

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[155] See concealment in Chapter 3, subsection 3.4.2.

[156] This signifies categorisation threat. See Tajfel and Turner's (1986) argument regarding passing and the constraints on individual mobility strategies in Chapter 3, subsection 3.2.3.6. It is not only the permeability of the ingroup borders that is relevant, but also that of the target, dominant group. As Bekker (2003:65) argued, majority groups tend to promote the idea of social mobility as this can obscure social inequalities and avoid challenges to the status quo. The appearance of social mobility does not, however, necessarily involve welcoming outgroup members and treating them as 'natural' ingroup members. The reason that dominant groups promote the idea of social mobility might in fact just be to spread the dominant habitus, while at the same time, and as argued by Tajfel and Turner (1986), blur the perception of distinct group interests associated with distinct group identities, which ultimately hinders mobilisation by minority groups and thus eliminates any threat posed to the interests of the dominant group.

According to Giliomee (2009:200), the British gospel of free trade and progress did not always work out in the interests of the Afrikaners. For example, the 1825 abolition of the preferential tariff for Cape wines on the British market dealt a heavy blow to wine farmers. Similarly, the abolition of slavery harmed the investments made by farmers and was compounded by the botched payments of promised compensation for freed slaves. While massive strides in equality were being made, to the burghers it was an unmitigated economic attack.

There were 50 towns in the colony when representative rule was introduced in 1853. By this time, the colony had improved in terms of credit facilities, cutting debt, and introducing a more modern education system, which increased the amount of school-going children. In the mid-1860s there were roughly 200,000 Afrikaners living across South Africa, of which two-thirds (136,000) lived in the Cape, where they represented 75% of the total white population. In Natal there were 2,750 Afrikaners (20% of the total white population), 27,000 Afrikaners were living in the Transvaal (90% of the total white population) and there were 30,000 Afrikaners living in the Orange Free State (86% of the total white population) (Giliomee, 2009:201).

Although the cities and many towns were becoming increasingly English in character, Giliomee (2009:201) states that Afrikaner colonists were not excluded from the urban economy, resulting in a many prominent Afrikaners in the colonial bourgeoisie. He claims that the system of representative government had however failed, as the governor, who was appointed in Britain, was still the dominant factor in the system, and his executive, also appointed in Britain, operated largely independently of Parliament. Although Afrikaners were two-thirds of the electorate, they made up only a third of representatives in the Cape legislature. Giliomee further suggests that Parliament was mostly concerned with issues of import to the English, resulting in widespread apathy among the Afrikaner voters.

Even though 70% of Afrikaners in the Cape Colony during the 1860s could not understand English, Giliomee (2009:202) notes that anglicisation in the public domain was spreading rapidly. Candidates for positions in central and local government had to be proficient in English (but not Dutch), all the Dutch spoken in courts was translated to English,[157] and in 1865 the government decided that English would henceforth be the sole medium of instruction in

[157] Onze Jan Hofmeyr (cited in Giliomee, 2009:203), leader of the colonial Afrikaners in the 1880s, described the burghers' perspective on the anglicisation of the courts as follows: "If the Dutch farmer in the Colony is summoned to appear before the Court, then his case is taken in a language which he does not understand, and then he repeatedly has to see acting as interpreter between the magistrate and himself a Kafir, who is far below him in society, but who now looks down on him, because he understands two languages against the farmer's one".

schools. In small town schools, English and Scottish teachers fined children for speaking Dutch, and taught them British social etiquette. Giliomee insists that the English looked down on the Afrikaners:

> In the judgement of the English-speaking Victorians, the rural Afrikaners, apart from being white, were almost everything they themselves were not: ignorant, superstitious, and conservative – and not interested in 'progress'. They lauded their hospitality, but noted disapprovingly their heavy use of coffee and brandy and the men's incessant chewing of tobacco, and their refusal to 'improve' themselves. They failed to understand how Afrikaners could attach so little value to education. The English writer Olive Schreiner, who spent much of her early life in the 1860s and 1870s among Afrikaners in the Karoo, reflected later on how as a girl she thought that it was 'not quite just of God to make us so much better than all the other nations'. She also remembered that it would have been absolutely impossible for her to eat sugar that had been touched by a Boer child or 'to sleep between sheets a Dutchman had slept between.' The Afrikaans author M.E. Rothman, who grew up in Swellendam in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, noted with resentment that the English in the town used social etiquette and other ways to demonstrate their superiority as a nation and as a class. British traders and civil servants considered Afrikaner farmers, even those who were quite wealthy, as their inferiors. They called them by their first names; the Afrikaner farmers addressed them as 'Mister'. In many ways Afrikaners, ironically, were being subjected to the same rituals of subjection and degradation as those they employed to keep coloureds and blacks in their inferior place.

Despite the clear anglicisation of the colony, and the growing identification of the Afrikaner elite with the Empire, Giliomee (2009:203) notes that the majority of church services in the DRC were in Dutch, and by 1871 there were 24 newspapers outside of Cape Town with Dutch and English pages. Parliament, however, remained strictly English, regardless of the majority Afrikaner electorate. English newspapers aggressively defended cultural imperialism, referring to the English as "the dominant race" and encouraging the governor to stop trying to "please all parties":

> They pointed out that the Cape was an English colony, and that the Dutch colonists had no reason to bewail the possible loss of their language and nationality. Dutch had little status among the languages of Europe and was steadily declining in the colony. Afrikaans was, in the words of the *Cape Argus*, a 'miserable, bastard jargon', not worthy of the name of 'language' at all. Nothing would more advance the 'moral and social progress' of the colony than the 'substitution of the English language for the present Cape Dutch.' The future language of the country was English, the *Cape Argus* boldly proclaimed on 19 September 1857, adding: 'Let your language and your nationality go, and you need not fear for your religion.'

That same year the Dutch newspaper, *De Zuid-Afrikaan,* lamented the unavoidable loss of the Dutch nationality, but advocated for the retention of Dutch heritage within a broader white superordinate identity. Giliomee (2009:203) elaborates as follows:

> The paper committed itself to resist the eclipse of the Dutch heritage; it denounced those who, in a desire to present themselves as 'civilised', abandoned 'their ancestors' language, morals, outlook, in short, their own nationality and, eventually also, their own religion.'

According to Giliomee (2009:204), despite the modernising of the Cape Colony, the Victorian emphasis on rank and class differences complemented the old VOC status distinctions and the traditional ways of the Reformed Church. While in everyday life Afrikaners enjoyed an egalitarian existence, prominent wealthy Afrikaner families could demonstrate their higher status by reserving the front pews in church and through other symbolic acts. Giliomee suggests that the Reformed Church embraced the new British rulers and disapproved of the Great Trek due to the belief in "a God-willed social order" and "a God-given dispensation".

Giliomee (2009:210) argues that many evangelical DRC ministers, such as Andrew Murray, proved to be loyal supporters of British imperialism, as they largely shied away from political or social activism, and usually encouraged submission to the existing authorities among their congregants. Giliomee believes that the strength of the evangelical tradition and its tendency to "submit to earthly powers", offers an explanation for "the extraordinary devotion of even non-anglicised Cape Afrikaners to Queen Victoria and the Empire that began to manifest itself in the 1880s".

Only when the DRC was disestablished in 1875, and thus became financially reliant solely on its congregations, Giliomee (2009:210) maintains, did most ministers wake up to the economic crisis many of its members were facing. The majority of colonial Afrikaners were subsistence farmers, which required little education. However, overgrazing had led to stagnating farming operations. Giliomee (2009:211) explains that economic decline went hand in hand with social decline, leading one commentator to worry that a criminal class would develop. Afrikaner children lagged behind their English peers in literacy, and the majority of the Cape Colony's "economic winners" were English speakers, who were much better educated. Giliomee (2009:210) states that Murray was one of the first DRC ministers to realise that the church would have to take responsibility for the education of its members.[158]

In addition to the failures of the church ministers, Giliomee (2009:211) lays the blame of the poor educational outcomes on the government's language-in-education policy. Despite the fact

[158] Giliomee (2009:212) highlights that the synod did manage to effect one pro-Dutch change in education: an 1880s reform that allowed school committees to decide on the school's language policy. This policy has recently become contested (see BELA bill in Chapter 5, subsection 5.2.1).

that the majority of Afrikaner children could not understand English, the government enacted an English as sole medium of instruction policy in 1865. Teaching of the Dutch language was also poor, with few schools offering it as a subject. In 1875 a church delegation to the education authorities demanded government support for Dutch-medium schools, but this request was rejected. By 1880 only 4,000 out of 60,000 Afrikaner children received any mother-tongue instruction, leading parents to create private schools (146 by 1889).[159] Many ministers (such as Murray) believed, however, that English would become the sole public language and thus considered it futile to revive Dutch as a public language or advocate for mother-tongue education. Giliomee (2009:212) elaborates on the anti-Dutch sentiment within the church:

> In a debate at the synod of 1880 this minority advanced arguments similar to those that would be made in a democratic South Africa 110 years later. They argued that it would do Dutch children a disservice to deprive them of full exposure to an English education. Children had no need to learn Dutch at school because they could do so at home. The language of the economy, indeed the very language of progress, was English.[160] A nationalist newspaper commented that there was a faction in the synod that seemed to believe that salvation could only be attained in English.

Giliomee (2009:204-207) traces the history of the DRC's internal conflict between the younger generation of liberal ministers and the traditional and conservative members, and its influence on society. He states that the liberal faction initially had the upper hand in the press, with publications such as the *Volksblad* spreading their worldview (2009:208). The conservative faction established their own mouthpiece in 1862, the *Volksvriend*, which supported the orthodox cause and addressed issues like Dutch culture and nationality. In 1880, the editor of this publication, Onze Jan Hofmeyr, became leader of the Afrikaner Bond, the first Afrikaner political organisation.

4.2.4.2. The beginnings of political consciousness

According to Giliomee (2009:212), Dutch (and eventually Afrikaans) language activism only gained momentum once Cape politics began to involve the masses, which he dates back to the election campaign of 1869, during which candidates proudly declared to their audience that they were "Afrikanders". In the following couple of years, Afrikaner farmers began forming *boereverenigings* (farmers' societies) to promote farming interests. English-speaking farmers usually had their own associations. Giliomee believes that this newfound political

[159] Notice here the strategy of turning to the private sphere when state services are lacking (see Chapter 5, subsection 5.2.4).

[160] This echoes much of May's (2012) comments in Chapter 2, subsection 2.5.2, regarding the pro-English monolingualism arguments amidst globalisation.

consciousness was triggered by both political and economic circumstances. He states that the British annexation of Basutoland, the diamond fields in Kimberley and then the Transvaal caused widespread Afrikaner resentment "sometimes mistakenly interpreted as signs of the 'awakening' of Afrikaner nationalism" (2009:213). He suggests that the Cape Afrikaners gave up protesting and believed their interests best served by working within the liberal constitution of the Cape Colony.

As to the economic reasons for the growing Afrikaner political consciousness, Giliomee (2009:213) points to the disillusionment with free trade, which saw (mostly English-speaking) bankers, manufacturers and merchants profiting, while Cape wine exports dropped by more than 80% by 1875 leading to depressed prices. So too, the 1860 Supreme Court ruling that lifted the cap on interest rates, and the resulting dominance of "imperial banks" such as the Standard Bank, negatively impacted (and even bankrupted) Afrikaner farmers. Giliomee further argues that while the relationship between Afrikaner farmers and British or European Jewish merchants was largely mutually beneficial up until the 1870s, once the latter began importing foreign produce and products – directly conflicting with the interests of the former – Afrikaner farmers concluded "that their own interests lay in acting also as Afrikaners rather than only as farmers".[161] The growing wealth of the colony as a result of the diamond fields also increased political engagement, as politics began to focus on government spending on benefits for voters and their constituencies, as well as the controversial increase in spending on military expeditions.

When in 1872 the Cape Colony progressed to a new form of colonial self-rule called "responsible government", in which a prime minister headed a cabinet that was accountable to Parliament, the devolution of power to the colony saw voters become increasingly agitated by the abovementioned military expeditions that landed the colony in debt. Giliomee (2009:214) argues that the final straw came from the Sprigg cabinet – referring to British imperialist Gordon Sprigg, who assembled his cabinet from politicians from the east and the Midlands in Natal, excluding western Cape politicians and Afrikaners entirely. In order to fund new railways and colonial interventions into wars between different Xhosa factions, the Sprigg cabinet introduced a tax on brandy producers – almost exclusively western Cape Afrikaners.

[161] The perception of *unfairness*, levied at the group as a whole, is a recurring theme in Afrikaner political consciousness throughout history. It is also common among minority groups more generally, and suggests an awareness of the ingroup favouritism occurring among dominant group members.

After receiving many complaints, Onze Jan Hofmeyr, editor of *De Zuid-Afrikaan*, launched the *Zuid-Afrikaansche Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging* (BBV; South African Farmers' Protection Association) in 1878 to oppose the excise law. Giliomee (2009:214) notes that coloured Afrikaans speakers were hardly mentioned, and could vote for the party but not become members. The BBV was very successful in the parliamentary election the following year, but enthusiasm was short-lived and the BBV failed to grow its voter base. Giliomee (2009:214) argues that the sustained momentum of entry of colonial Afrikaners into politics would only be achieved through the efforts of Stephanus Jacobus du Toit, who "promote[d] the language of Afrikaans as the vehicle of a new political consciousness". Notice the use of language as a proxy to address other social, economic and/or political inequalities.

4.2.4.3. The First Afrikaans Language Movement (1875-1890)

Giliomee (2009:208) recounts the 'Great Revival' that occurred in the western Cape in the early 1860s, as a result of growing evangelicalism. He states that in the decades afterwards, Cape Afrikaners displayed a "fervent piety", and a strong emphasis was placed on personal conversion as a highly emotional and life-altering experience, and on warning those not yet converted about the wrath of God and the suffering in Hell (2009:209).[162] A preoccupation with "lost souls" resulted, leading to a newfound interest in missionary work, and consequently, efforts to translate the Bible to a simpler language than Dutch. Today, this is known as the *First Afrikaans Language Movement.*

By the 1850s, only well-educated Afrikaners could still speak 'proper' Dutch, as the rest of the Afrikaners were speaking the vernacular later known as Afrikaans (Giliomee, 2009:205). According to Raidt (1991:248), Arnoldus Pannevis and Casper Peter Hoogenhout called for an Afrikaans Bible translation for the benefit of coloured people, who were no longer proficient in Dutch. Despite this original motivation, Raidt argues that the movement almost exclusively focused on white Afrikaans speakers.

In a rather ironic chapter of Afrikaans history, it was the spread of Islam among slaves (and not the spread of Christianity) that first contributed to the development of Afrikaans beyond merely a spoken variety of Dutch. Afrikaans was used for the first time in written form in Muslim schools, where slaves were taught to read and write in the Arabic script. The first Afrikaans book, using Arabic script, was printed around 1856. Several other Arabic-Afrikaans

[162] Giliomee (2009:210) notes that the emotional and personal outpourings of church members was very alarming to the liberal faction of the church, who placed great emphasis on a rational, unemotional, form of religion.

books followed. When the task of translating the Bible into Afrikaans was being considered in the 1870s, it was already an established medium of religious instruction in the Cape Muslim community (Giliomee, 2009:101). Thus Afrikaans as a written language, and as a medium of instruction, was first developed by Cape slaves, and not burghers.

S.J. du Toit, a Calvinist minister, was the driving force behind the First Afrikaans Language Movement during the period 1875 to 1890. By 1875, a simplified Dutch or Afrikaans was spoken across most of present-day South Africa, and was the common language of Afrikaner colonists, ex-slaves and servants, since most of them lacked a proper education (Giliomee, 2009:215). After the first Afrikaans writings appeared in the Muslim community during the 1840s and 1850s, the first secular Afrikaans book was published in 1861. During the 1860s and 1870s, Afrikaans was used in newspapers and poems with the goal of comedic effect. Giliomee (2009:216) highlights the prevalence of disparaging views of Afrikaans during this time:

> A section of the English-speaking part of the population considered Afrikaans as a public language beneath contempt.[163] But Afrikaans' greatest enemies were the status-conscious colonial Afrikaners in towns and cities, desperate to win acceptance in a society dominated by English-speakers.[164] To them Afrikaans was an embarrassment; a language welded from different tongues by white, brown and black people that sent the wrong signal in a society obsessed with class and racial distinctions. According to J.H.H. de Waal, these educated Afrikaners considered Afrikaans an impoverished dialect, degenerate Dutch, and incomprehensible Creole tongue, a 'Hotnotstaal' (Hotnot is a derogatory term derived from Hottentot) without any future. In 1876 a lecture by the Chief Justice, Lord John Henry de Villiers, whose parents in Paarl had once fervently prayed for him to succeed [conservative, pro-Dutch] Van der Lingen as [DRC] minister, dismissed the possibility that Afrikaans could ever become a literary language. He characterised Afrikaans as follows: 'Poor in the number of its words, weak in its inflections, wanting in accuracy of meaning and incapable of expressing ideas connected with the higher spheres of thought, it will have to undergo great modification before it will be able to produce a literature worthy of the name.' For De Villiers the energy of colonial Afrikaners would be better spent in appropriating English, 'that rich and glorious language', which ultimately would become 'the language of South Africa.'[165]

Giliomee (2009:216) argues that unlike many other language movements, the attempt to develop Afrikaans as a public language sprang from religious enthusiasm, brought on by the abovementioned Revival in the decade before, which aimed to disseminate the Christian

[163] By the 1850s, Afrikaans would be castigated as *Kitchen Dutch* by the British settlers (Raidt, 1991:112).

[164] See misrecognition and negative internalisation in Chapter 2, subsection 2.1.4, which occurs when the minority ethnic habitus is not considered cultural capital.

[165] Lord John Henry de Villiers was born Johan Hendrik. Another De Villiers with family roots in the Paarl would later clash with Afrikaners on Afrikaans in the public sphere (see Chapter 5, subsection, 5.2.1).

message to very poor coloured and white people. Two Dutch immigrants, Pannevis and Hoogenhout, began to champion the translation of the Bible into Afrikaans, as many coloured people were illiterate or only semiliterate, and many white people no longer understood Dutch. The DRC acknowledged that "simple Afrikaners" could not understand Dutch, but believed that the solution was not an Afrikaans Bible, but rather better education and Dutch proficiency.

When Du Toit entered the debate in *De Zuid-Afrikaan*, under the moniker "*Ware* [True] Afrikaander", he "took the debate to a new level of sophistication", in Giliomee's (2009:217) estimation. Du Toit argued that a mother tongue is one's most precious possession, stating that: "The language of the nation expresses the character of that nation. Deprive a nation of the vehicle of its thoughts and you deprive it of the wisdom of its ancestors". According to Giliomee, Du Toit believed that great damage had been done to the Afrikaner colonists by the colony's English-monolingualism language policy, and by the DRC's promotion of English in its schools. Du Toit also aimed to improve the prestige of Afrikaans by employing a narrative strategy:

> He refuted the argument that Afrikaans could not be considered a proper language since it supposedly lacked grammatical structure and was composed of different linguistic elements. He also denied that Afrikaans was the language of the coloured people; instead, the 'Hottentots had abandoned their language and had adopted ours.' Afrikaans was a white man's tongue, 'a pure Germanic language',[166] one of purity, simplicity, brevity and vigour. Afrikaners must be taught that Afrikaans was their mother tongue, and that their duty was to develop Afrikaans as a *landstaal* (national language), along with Dutch.

Pannevis managed to convince the *British and Foreign Bible Society* that the lack of a comprehensible Bible to so many was contributing to social degradation, and suggested Du Toit as translator. In 1875, the *Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners* (GRA, the Society of True Afrikaners) was founded. At their first meeting, the GRA decided that the time for a Bible translation was not ripe, and that Dutch and Afrikaans-speaking white people would first need to be persuaded of the importance of Afrikaans in their national life, and to consider themselves as a community called Afrikaners. Giliomee (2009:217) explains that while this term had also been used in the past to refer to slaves born in Africa, or to the offspring of slaves, free blacks

[166] In an effort to improve the prestige of Afrikaans and Afrikaners, Du Toit not only excluded coloured Afrikaans speakers from the ingroup, but propagated a myth regarding the origins of their shared language. Considering perceptions of Afrikaans and Afrikaners at that time, and the pressure of English nationalism, it is clear why Du Toit refashioned Afrikaans as a purely European language, on par with English. The whitewashing of Afrikaans was thus a consequence of both Afrikaner prejudice and English prejudice, and had as its goal the survival of Afrikaans in 'proper' white society, and by extension, of Afrikaners.

and Khoisan, it was mostly used to refer to burghers, and eventually, colonists of Dutch, German and French origin. He states that 'Afrikaner' at this point in time referred to *descent*, and not *language*. He emphasises, however, that the term was elastic, and was sometimes made to apply to British colonists as well in an effort to join the white communities.[167]

In the 1830s such an attempt was made to expand the definition to all white settlers, thus basing it on colour or European descent. This altered definition failed as imperialists who wanted to maintain close ties with London "considered it a dubious honour to have the name Afrikaner bestowed on them" (Giliomee, 2009:218).[168] The *Cape Times* rejected the term Afrikaner due to its association with slaves, claiming that it referred to "the half-bred offspring of slaves, and even in a word the mark of slavery is detestable".

According to Giliomee (2009:218), the GRA identified three kinds of Afrikaners: those with Afrikaans hearts, those with English hearts, and those with Dutch hearts. Its mission was to build a group of Afrikaners with "Afrikaans hearts", mostly from the large mass of relatively poor and uneducated Afrikaners. The GRA launched its own newspaper, *Di Afrikaanse Patriot*, in 1876, which was the only Afrikaans paper until the early twentieth century and enjoyed wide circulation. What originally began as an idea to uplift mainly coloured people through a mother-tongue Bible translation, was now a movement "with classic [cultural] nationalist aims". Giliomee notes that in his *De Zuid-Afrikaan* articles, Du Toit linked the Afrikaans language to Afrikaner identity. He states that while Du Toit continued to publish in Dutch as well, to him, Afrikaans was the language of white Afrikaners (2009:219).

> That Du Toit could entertain such grand ambitions for Afrikaans as a language, which at that stage was virtually without literature, suggests both his boundless intellectual self-confidence and his nationalist zeal. He worked himself almost to a standstill in his constant emphasis that Afrikaners had to do more than champion their language: they had to speak up for 'their nation and their country.'

In 1877, Du Toit and his team published a nationalist history, *Die Geskiedenis van ons Land in die Taal van ons Volk* ('The History of our Land in the Language of our People'),[169] in order

[167] Aside from the differing applications of the term 'Afrikaner', it is clear that by this point, there was a strong awareness of group boundaries. The various racial and class distinctions meant that most Afrikaners (at least, those to whom individual mobility and anglicisation were not readily available) did not feel a sense of community or solidarity with either fellow Afrikaans speakers who were not white, or fellow white people who did not speak Afrikaans.

[168] This demonstrates that both external categorisation and internal identification is necessary to decide who is an Afrikaner.

[169] The GRA also published *Eerste Beginsels van die Afrikaanse Taal* ('First Principles of the Afrikaans Language') among other Afrikaans publications.

to counter the focus on British history in schools and drum up a feeling of nationality among Afrikaners. Giliomee (2009:219) states that this publication presented the history of Afrikaners in heroic terms, claiming that despite the oppression *they* had faced they still clung to their religion and values while, needless to say, the British government and the English were deemed "scoundrels from the earliest times".

Giliomee (2009:219) argues that the work of the GRA simultaneously exposed class divisions within the Afrikaner community, as well as bridged these divisions. *De Zuid-Afrikaan*, the publication of choice for more educated and affluent Afrikaners, dismissed the GRA's *Patriot* publication as 'an enemy of civilisation'. Despite this critique, a correspondent of the Free State paper, *The Friend*, reported that "it is not only the lowly bywoners who read it [the *Patriot*], but also the civilised people among us".[170] Giliomee (2009:219) further states that while the *Patriot* was circulated in the Boer republics from its inception, interest in the publication skyrocketed after Shepstone's annexation of the ZAR in 1877:

> Although both the *Zuid-Afrikaan* and the *Patriot* were critical of it, in October 1880 the *Patriot* went one step further by arguing that the time had come for active resistance. Some Transvaal leaders later claimed that this had been a decisive spur for them to take up arms.

4.2.4.4. Cape Afrikaner political mobilisation

According to Giliomee (2009:220), the church became increasingly concerned with the *Patriot* and Du Toit, their opposition to the DRC's revivals and special prayer meetings, English schools, and submission to the colonial and imperial government, culminating in the call to the Transvaal to resist their God-given authorities. After the synod nearly unanimously condemned the paper in 1880, circulation soared, assisted by the successful Transvaal revolt against British annexation.[171] Giliomee suggests that the Voortrekkers and their descendants were finding

[170] This would corroborate May's (2012) argument that the cultural-historical element of ethnic identity is meaningful to people aside from personal material interest, as well-off people in the OFS too were connecting to the cultural nationalist messaging of the GRA, and despite already being self-governing (the goal of political nationalism). See also the underlying motives of maintaining social identity in Chapter 3, subsection 3.4.3. Also notice that Afrikaner cultural nationalism originated from the British Cape Colony, where Afrikaners did not have self-rule or representation, and not in the Boer republics, contrary to what some writers on nationalism might have expected.

[171] This suggests that not only did the cultural nationalism at the Cape contribute (to whatever degree) to the mobilisation of the Boers in the Boer republics, but the political events in the Boer republics further egged on the Afrikaners at the Cape. This might suggest greater (latent) unity between the Voortrekkers and some of those who stayed at the Cape than perhaps initially expected.

common cause – and common identity – with the Cape Afrikaners who did not partake in the Great Trek:

> An Afrikaner movement seemed ready to take off across political boundaries, with burghers in many places expressing solidarity with the Transvaal burghers, viewing the revolt as a struggle that affected everyone 'with a true Afrikaans spirit'. In Hofmeyr's words it filled the Cape Afrikaners, 'otherwise grovelling in the mud of materialism, with a national glow of sympathy for their brothers across the Transvaal.'

This enthusiasm, according to Giliomee (2009:220), was channelled into creating the first modern political party in South Africa. In an editorial in 1879, Du Toit proposed the formation of the Afrikaner Bond, an organisation in which "any Afrikaner can feel at home and work together for the good of a united South Africa". Diverting from the GRA's focus on 'Afrikaners with Afrikaans hearts', Du Toit widened the definition of Afrikaners to "everyone who recognises Africa as his Fatherland … be they of English, Dutch, French or German origin". The Afrikaner Bond thus identified the core cultural value of the Afrikaner identity as (South African) whiteness.

Giliomee (2009:220) posits that the advance to modernity in the 19th century in the Western world gave rise to socialists (who opposed the profit system), populists (who opposed capital concentration) and nationalists (who celebrated a national culture and history). He states that while Hofmeyr (of the BBV) demanded *some* respect for the Dutch culture and supported capitalism, Du Toit had begun showing both nationalist and populist leanings. In his editorial, Du Toit tasked the Bond with preventing "the sacrifice of Africa's interests to England and those of the Farmer to the Merchant", by ensuring that trade and industry benefits the land and not speculators, and that English banks do not dominate the money market. Du Toit also objected to the large sums of money spent on education for English speakers, while the majority group (of white society), the Afrikaners, were neglected, and he demanded the recognition of Dutch as a public language on par with English (Giliomee, 2009:220-221).

The *Patriot* further developed these points, playing on the existing resentments Afrikaners had towards the British colonial economy, and in particular the imperial banks (such as Standard Bank, which extracted dividends to its London office). Consumer boycotts against 'Englishmen's shops' were proposed, as well as the establishment of *boerewinkels* (Afrikaner-run co-operative stores) in every town (see Chapter 5, subsection 5.2, for parallels with contemporary forms of Afrikaner mobilisation). According to Giliomee (2009:221), Hofmeyr opposed this kind of divisive populist politics, and instead wanted to unite the Afrikaners and

English and not alienate the pro-Empire church or the English who could easily be swayed to view the Bond as "a radical organisation". He believed that Cape Afrikaners were "as loyal British subjects as any other people" but that they were not willing to become Englishmen.

Giliomee (2009:222) states that in the wake of the British defeat at Majuba in February 1881 (ending the First Anglo-Boer War), there was an "upsurge of nationalist emotion" and Du Toit became increasingly "radical", pushing anti-liberal and neo-Calvinist beliefs. In early 1882 (the same year he moved to the ZAR as the new head of the education department) Du Toit redefined the Bond's mission in "more explicit nationalist terms" – now defining Afrikaners as all those of predominantly Dutch or Huguenot descent, and advocating for self-determination and "a united South Africa under its own flag". While the Great Trek was certainly a radical step for the frontiersmen, Du Toit's work signifies the first wave of Afrikaner radicalisation and the development of Afrikaner nationalism, both political and cultural.

In an ingenious plot to moderate the Bond, Hofmeyr – by now realising that his BBV "lacked emotional appeal in its narrow focus on material interests" – became a member of the Bond himself. In late 1882, he argued at a Bond congress that independence for South Africa could not be attained before a sense of common nationality had developed between Afrikaners and the English, not based on language but on mutual respect and "their ability to act as a cohesive force". In 1883, the BBV merged with the Afrikaner Bond, resulting in a more inclusive definition of the term Afrikaner in its constitution (cited in Giliomee, 2009:222):

> The Bond knows no nationality at all except that of the Afrikaners and regard as belonging thereto anyone, of whatever origin, who strives for the welfare of South Africa.

The new constitution also moderated Du Toit's focus on South African unity as a goal to be actively pursued. Giliomee (2009:222) states that "Hofmeyr constructed a new identity in which the two white 'nationalities' were envisaged as growing into a composite nationality that recognised each other's language, culture, education and religion" (i.e., integration). He won the right for Dutch to be used in the Cape Parliament in 1882, knowledge of Dutch became compulsory for certain civil servants in 1883, Dutch was permitted in court in 1884, and Dutch became a compulsory subject for civil service candidates in 1887. Giliomee emphasises, however, that many of these reforms represented "a permissive form of language rights" in which Dutch use was permitted but not enforced (see negative, toleration and accommodation rights in Chapter 1, subsection 1.3.3). According to Giliomee (2009:223), Hofmeyr also favoured secular education, and while he introduced legislation that gave school committees

discretion over religious instruction, education remained largely secular in the decades that followed.

Du Toit, on the other hand, had a much less successful career in the Transvaal. He had a falling out with Paul Kruger, neglected his duties at the education department, and became personally bankrupt due to gold mine speculation. Giliomee (2009:223) describes Du Toit's demise, and his surprising abandonment of the Afrikaner cause, as follows:

> Having arrived as a hero in the Transvaal in 1882, he returned to the Cape in 1890 embroiled in personal feuds and nourishing a bitter resentment of Kruger. His nationalist views had been discarded. He was now in favour of the unification of the states in Africa under British coastal protection. It is quite likely that Cecil John Rhodes was now supporting him financially and that Du Toit was playing his backer's tune. This led to a break with his brother D.F. (Oom Lokomotief) and Hoogenhout at the *Patriot*. In 1896 he started a Dutch daily newspaper, *Het Dagblad*, in the Cape, but it lasted only two years. He continued to back Rhodes even after Hofmeyr had irrevocably broken with him over the Jameson Raid. Du Toit ended up as a British supporter in the Anglo-Boer War.[172]

According to Giliomee (2009:223), Du Toit's language movement had run its course by 1890, due to the unfavourable view of the GRA's secret meetings and the focus on neo-Calvinism, the dependence of the movement on one (by now, very unpopular) man, the choice of an "ultra-phonetic" form of spelling that reflected the movement's western Cape origins,[173] and the goal of replacing English with Dutch and Afrikaans, instead of developing Afrikaans to replace Dutch. One big obstacle to the latter goal, Giliomee (2009:224) states, was that Afrikaans was still considered a *bastertaal* (bastard language) and the language of the uneducated, and would need to be destigmatised by educated people claiming it as their mother tongue and as medium of instruction. Hofmeyr's Bond continued to promote Dutch with little success, considering the positive view of English by the Afrikaner elite – some of whom had switched to English in the private domain. This led Hofmeyr to lament in 1890: "Do not ask for rights in Parliament and school which you do not wish to have in your home. The language question is a matter of life and death. Despise your language and you despise your nationality".

[172] Instrumentalist accounts of ethnicity hold that ethnicity is constructed and weaponised in the pursuit of material interests, and yet here we have an example of the pioneer of Afrikaner nationalism 'switching to the other side' for personal financial gain. His alienation from Kruger and Hofmeyr, and his connection with Rhodes, made individual mobility possible (and perhaps even necessary) for Du Toit.

[173] As I will argue in Chapter 5, the Western Cape still, in some respects, dominates conversations on Afrikaans and Afrikaner identity.

The *Zuidafrikaanse Taalbond* (South African Language League) was established in 1890, with the mission of promoting the *volkstaal* (people's language) and an awakening of a "developed feeling of nationality". High Dutch was elected as volkstaal, despite the fact that it was a dying language in South Africa. But, Giliomee (2009:224) notes, Afrikaans was also struggling to survive – especially as a written language – and only the Cape Muslims were reported to still be loyal to it. Predictions were that Afrikaans would cease to be spoken in the cities and among the better educated in rural areas within a generation. Not only English was spreading, but also its symbols of imperialism, seen in the name change of Stellenbosch Gymnasium, which became Stellenbosch College, to Victoria College. This is the precursor to Stellenbosch University, an achievement of Afrikaner nationalism (see subsection 4.3.2).

Giliomee (2009:225) argues that the Afrikaners at the Cape displayed a wavering solidarity with the Afrikaners in the Boer republics:

> The Cape Afrikaners valued the freedoms they enjoyed under the British crown and had no desire to free themselves from a colonial yoke that sat lightly on them. In a revealing 1878 editorial *De Zuid-Afrikaan* declared that the Afrikaners wanted no 'republican freedom, equality and fraternity' […] The colonial Afrikaners identified themselves with their kinsmen across the Orange River, but put the Cape's interests first and rarely hid their sense of superiority over the northern Afrikaners.[174]

Although the Afrikaner Bond held half the Parliamentary seats in the Cape by the second half of the 1880s, Giliomee (2009:225) suggests that Hofmeyr refused to form a government and become Prime Minister, fearing the divisions in his own camp, and the resentments of English speakers that would result. The Bond effusively declared its loyalty to the Queen in 1887, the jubilee year of Queen Victoria, leading the *Patriot* to complain that it was becoming too "*Engelsgesind*", or well-disposed to the English. Despite such protestations, Giliomee states, Cape Afrikaners enjoyed displaying their English proficiency, and would be praised by English politicians for their loyalty.

Giliomee (2009:226) argues that aside from the Great Trek (which he characterises as a peaceful revolt), "colonial [i.e., Cape] Afrikaners made no serious attempts to resist British domination or engage in civil disobedience". He lists one instance of widespread disobedience – the refusal of many Afrikaner farmers to comply with government mandated methods of

[174] There is reason to believe that this North/South divide between Afrikaners remains to this day (see Chapter 5, subsections 5.2.5 and 5.3.1.7). It is arguable that at this point in history, Cape Afrikaners were, generally-speaking, *cultural Afrikaners*, whereas republic Afrikaners were *political Afrikaners*, to borrow from anti-Apartheid journalist Max du Preez (Kok, 2024a).

combatting scab disease in sheep, which went against their own interests. Giliomee explains that Afrikaners resisted the march of progress and scientific rationality because of their identification with the traditional (some interpreting the disease as a God-inflicted plague), and their insistence on their liberty. He argues that this highlights the ambiguous identity of colonial patriotism (2009:226-227):

> The colonial patriotism that the Bond espoused allowed multiple identities and sympathies: patriotism towards the colony; loyalty towards the monarchy and the imperial tie; solidarity with their republican brothers across the Orange River; and pride in their own cultural distinctiveness, giving rise to a demand for formal equal language rights.

4.2.5. Boer versus Brit

4.2.5.1. Kruger's republicanism and Transvaal independence

According to Giliomee (2009:229), Paul Kruger believed that without republican independence, the Transvaal Afrikaners could not survive as a people with their own language, beliefs and livelihood. While sometimes appealing to Afrikaners across South Africa, Kruger and other Transvaal leaders were much more concerned with the republic's independence than with pan-Afrikaner unity – indeed some arguing that only Transvaalers should be viewed as Afrikaners. Kruger effortlessly combined Transvaal independence with his personal religious and political beliefs.

> For Kruger the annexation and loss of republic freedom was the result of the people's unfaithfulness to the Word. Victory would be the blessing of the faithful. He saw a close parallel between the people of Israel and his own people in the experiences of the Great Trek and the revolt of 1880-1881. Both were 'God's peoples', specially called. God punished them when they sinned and saved them when they repented. Military victory and survival as an independent people was God's blessing to a faithful volk.

Kruger led the resistance against Shepstone's annexation of the ZAR in 1877; he visited London twice to demand a referendum from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Carnarvon. According to Giliomee (2009:230), the British officials offered Kruger a generous loan and other spending on education and infrastructure, as well as the type of self-rule enjoyed by the Cape government and equal status for the Dutch language. They were surprised that Kruger refused the offer of great material benefit to the Transvaal and the concession of self-government as a colony within a federation. Giliomee cites Kruger's description of the offer to his fellow Transvaalers:

> I will try to explain to you what this self-government in my opinion means. They say to you, "First, put your head quietly in the noose, so that I can hang you up: then you may kick your legs about as much as you please!" That it what they call self-government.

Between a half and two-thirds of Transvaalers signed petitions of protest against the annexation, the Orange Free State Volksraad publicly stated its support for ZAR independence, and influential Afrikaner and English politicians in the Cape, including Hofmeyr, applied further pressure on Britain. In December 1880, the old Volksraad of the ZAR convened under the leadership of Kruger, Piet Joubert and M.W. Pretorius, and declared the restoration of the republic. The British forces sent to disperse the armed rebellion were swiftly defeated (Giliomee, 2009:230). The British acquiesced, fearing that Zulu hostilities in Natal would be reignited, and negotiated a type of government in which Britain would retain a say in the Transvaal's foreign and 'native' affairs. Giliomee (2009:231) believes that the Transvaaler's military victory earned the respect of the British and gave birth to a strong political awareness among the Boers.

Giliomee (2009:234) notes that in developing his republican ideology, Kruger emphasised the "historic links between the heroic acts of the Voortrekkers [during the Great Trek] and the triumphant rebellion" of the ZAR Afrikaners in 1880-1881 (see anchoring in Chapter 3, subsection 3.5.2). In addition to turning the Great Trek into a "heroic myth emphasising the trekkers' 'secret passion for freedom'", Kruger also conjured up the memory of the Battle of Blood River of 1838, and in regular speeches bemoaned the injustices and oppression that the Boers has suffered at the hands of the British. Giliomee posits that for the burghers in his audience, a link between religious and national identity had been established, as well as a "growing loyalty to the state as the guardian of those identities". Take note of the fact that this increase in ethnic identification and mobilisation occurred as a result of the annexation (which likely caused both realistic and social identity threats among the Afrikaners).

Just as women had played some part in agitating for the Great Trek, and thus, the creation of the Boer republics, so too, Giliomee (2009:231) believes, they played an important role in ending British rule in the Transvaal. He cites Olive Schreiner who argued:

> The Transvaal War of 1881 was largely a woman's war; it was from the armchair beside the coffee-table that the voice went out for conflict and no surrender. Even in the [Cape] Colony at the distance of many hundred miles Boer women urged sons and husbands

> to go to the aid of their northern kindred, while a martial ardour often far exceeding that of the males seemed to fill them.[175]

Giliomee (2009:231) provides the following underlying reasons for the strong position of Afrikaner women in their families and community: they and their brothers shared equally in the estate of their parents; as children they usually received the same primitive education as their brothers; and they married as equal partners bringing "to the household an equal share of material goods" and "an equal culture" (Schreiner; cited in Giliomee, 2009:231). The insecure and isolated farm existence, Giliomee posits, further enhanced women's position as they were vital in expanding the nuclear family, providing childcare, and propagating the religion and cultural traditions among their children, and also faced death alongside their husbands (see *volksmoeder* (mother of the nation) in subsection 4.3.2.3 and Chapter 5, subsection 5.3.1.6). Giliomee (2009:232) argues that Afrikaner women displayed "even greater hostility to British rule than men" and after the Great Trek "vowed never to return to the Cape Colony".

4.2.5.2. British imperialism

Giliomee (2009:232) argues that the British Empire pursued its imperial goals in southern Africa by convincing people in the colonies of the benefits of their "liberal idealism", that is, development, liberty and peace through non-racial democracy and industrial and social progress. This façade was about to be 'broken' through the British actions in the Boer republics:

> In an anguished open letter just before the [second] Anglo-Boer War broke out in 1899, Andrew Murray, moderator of the Dutch Reformed Church, called Britain the 'noblest, the most Christian nation in the world' in imploring it not to go to war against the republics. For Murray war threatened his fervent belief that the Empire was one of the most benign forces in the world, working for order, liberalisation, modernisation and the rehabilitation of subject peoples. But he appealed in vain, for the other face of British imperialism was aggressive, authoritarian and condescending towards other cultures. It emphasised the autocratic values of hierarchy, obedience, and order, and sanctioned ruthless aggression on their behalf.

According to Giliomee (2009:233), Joseph Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary in the Unionist government in the Cape Colony, and Alfred Milner, High Commissioner for Southern Africa,

[175] If Giliomee's and Schreiner's views on Boer women's heightened engagement in identity-based political mobilisation are correct, it opens an interesting path of inquiry regarding the varying applicability of gender on the main tenets of SIT. Some research exists that indicate women's *personal* identities are generally formed and viewed in the context of their relationships and connections to others (Laney *et al*, 2013), and that women's *social* identities have historically been linked to their natal family, in particular their patriline (Bender, 2013); that men and women experience the psychological effects of ethnic ingroup identification and discrimination differently (Mossakowski, 2018); and that gender identification and in-group bias is stronger among women than men (Rudman and Goodwin, 2004). However, I could not find any studies investigating whether ethnic identification is stronger among women than men (also see footnote 68).

both displayed an "unusual mix of radical enthusiasm, liberalism and jingoism". Milner, a self-described "British Race Patriot", argued that the bonds of "common blood, a common language, common history and traditions" were "deeper, stronger, more primordial than material ties".

Cecil John Rhodes, who arrived in South Africa in 1870 at the age of 17, was also a self-confessed jingo. By 1880 he had made a fortune in the Kimberley diamond fields, and he went on to become a member of Parliament, founded *De Beers Consolidated* (which controlled 90% of South Africa's diamonds) and become a dominant figure in *Consolidated Gold Fields* and the *British South African Company*. Giliomee (2009:234) argues that Rhodes wished to expand the British Empire throughout Africa through "sub-imperialism" in which the Cape Colony would rule and colonise semi-autonomously under the British flag. Giliomee states that he blended "his imperialism with Hofmeyr's colonial patriotism without, initially at least, giving any hint of being on a collision course with Kruger's republicanism".

4.2.5.3. The discovery of gold

Paul Kruger became president of the ZAR in 1883, and led a delegation to London to renegotiate its agreement with Britain. He secured the right to call the state the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek once more, and got rid of the British oversight on 'native' affairs, but Britain would remain in control of its foreign affairs (as it was in the OFS as well) and could veto treaties with other countries. Giliomee (2009:234) explains that the Boer republics were thus not free from British control under international law, and that this led British politicians in the 1890s to argue that Britain could claim supremacy over South Africa and intervene in the ZAR's internal affairs despite its status as a republic. For the first three years of Kruger's presidency he struggled to build the state, but this would all change when the goldfields of the Witwatersrand were discovered in 1886. Giliomee (2009:236) elaborates:

> Never before in world history had a mineral discovery so suddenly and dramatically, and so utterly, transformed an obscure rural backwater. Gold became the foundation of the monetary system of the industrialised nations and was to dominate the South African economy and its politics for the next sixty years.

Two years after the discovery of gold, 44 mines were already in operation backed by large-scale investment (particularly from Britain), and soon the industry was employing 100,000 men and producing a quarter of the world's gold. The capital Pretoria was quickly overshadowed by Johannesburg (with a white population of 50,000 of which only 6,000 were Afrikaners), where so-called Randlords (mining house magnates) topped the social hierarchy. Poor

Afrikaners flocked to the city in search of jobs. By the end of the century one-third to half of the land in the Transvaal belonged to foreign individuals or companies (Giliomee, 2009:236):

> After a visit to the Transvaal the young Jan Smuts wrote that the economic revolution was undermining the old farming and burgher community in a more dangerous way than English supremacy itself would ever have been able to do. President Steyn of the OFS remarked that the struggle to survive had become fierce: 'Capitalism had appeared in South Africa, the enemy of labour had slung its octopus legs over all forms of labour.'

According to Giliomee (2009:236), Kruger quickly realised that while the discovery of gold had delivered the ZAR from its financial predicament, it was threatening its very survival. He only reluctantly tolerated the influx of the indispensable *Uitlanders* ('Outlanders' or aliens), who themselves were growing disaffected and considered themselves to be "ruled by a small group of people they saw in every way as their inferiors". As Kruger attempted to manage industrialisation in the ZAR, he made enemies in the Cape Colony and in the mining industry. Despite the low tax rate on declared profits, the ZAR was suddenly flush with revenue it reinvested in infrastructure (Giliomee, 2009:237).

Under Kruger the ZAR introduced a conservative education policy based on religion, and actively promoted Dutch-medium education. Its administration was bolstered by immigrants from the Netherlands, who themselves were anti-British and critical of the anglicised Afrikaner elite of the Cape Colony. Kruger's main opposition was the Progressives led by Piet Joubert, who supported the rapid modernisation of the ZAR, and opposed the ruling party's maladministration, corruption, conservative education system, and the parochial ways of Kruger's government.[176] In 1890, fearing the dominance of the Uitlanders at the ballot box, Kruger changed the franchise qualification from one year residency to 14 years, and created a second Volksraad to represent Uitlander interests. Giliomee (2009:238) argues that this was a mistake as it "became the focus of all the wrath of the immigrant population".

Giliomee (2009:239) speculates that had Kruger made reforms to the strict franchise qualification in the face of opposition, and made a concession on the price of dynamite (one of the complaints of the mining sector), "much of the agitation against the ZAR" would have been eased. But his obstinance ultimately served as sufficient pretext for British aggression led by Chamberlain and Milner. Giliomee insists that these two did not want war because Kruger blocked development, but rather because he was flexible and pragmatic on most issues and was

[176] Note the intragroup heterogeneity, even among leaders, despite the period of Afrikaner mobilisation and the presence of outgroups.

succeeding in modernising the ZAR, which if left alone, would soon dominate South Africa – a prospect they had to prevent "even if it meant war".

According to Giliomee (2009:239), Cape Afrikaners considered the Transvaal to be backward, and responded to the news of the discovery of gold with a mixture of awe and envy. While there was some measure of solidarity between the two (Hofmeyr believed them to be connected by ties of descent, language, religion, and inter-marriage and friendship), relations between northern and southern Afrikaners became more strained. Giliomee states that the Afrikaner Bond saw the survival of Afrikaners purely from a Cape-centric perspective, meaning they did not prioritise the Dutch language or republicanism, and believed that free trade and the integration of the Boer republics under the British flag would best serve Afrikaners across South Africa. He notes that this outlook ideally suited the grand vision of Cecil John Rhodes.

4.2.5.4. All Rhodes lead to the ZAR

After becoming a member of Parliament representing Barkly-West, Rhodes set out to woo the Afrikaner Bond. Giliomee (2009:240) notes that while other English-speaking politicians derogated the Afrikaners, Rhodes respected Cape Dutch culture and the Cape Afrikaners as a people. Instead of constructing a British style house as other affluent Englishmen at the Cape did, Rhodes admired Cape-Dutch architecture and furniture and lived in the Cape-Dutch style house *Groote Schuur*. Giliomee (2009:240) comments that the Cape Afrikaners were won over, or as a 20th century historian described, they were "ideal prefabricated collaborators". Rhodes even began calling himself an Afrikaner. Jan Smuts (cited in Giliomee, 2009:240) commented on the spell that Rhodes had cast over the colonial Afrikaners: "He had become the national idol of the [Cape] Dutch Afrikanders. The Dutch are perhaps a suspicious people, but when they do come to put their trust in a man … then the trust becomes almost absolute and religious; such was their faith in Rhodes". In Chapter 5, subsection 5.1.1.2, I note more recent examples of using cherished symbols of ethnic identity, by outgroup members, in order to build trust or possibly to deceive.

Rhodes backed the Afrikaner Bond's demand for official recognition of Dutch and its policy of religious instruction in state schools. He also helped to get the brandy tax repealed, and supported protection from cheap foreign imports, a limit on the compulsory dipping of sheep to combat scab disease, and the exclusion of traditional Africans from the franchise (Giliomee, 2009:240).

Britain became concerned that its hegemony was being challenged, when it seemed as though the ZAR wanted to secure its own seaport and extend its western border, blocking expansion of the Cape's trade route through Bechuanaland (present-day Botswana). In 1882, two short-lived Boer republics to the west of the Transvaal were declared (Stellaland and Goshen), and Germany declared its protectorate over South West Africa (present-day Namibia) in 1884, meaning that the two could possibly link up (Giliomee, 2009:240). Below is a map of the area in 1885:



Figure 5: Map of Southern Africa in 1885

According to Giliomee (2009:240), both Rhodes and Hofmeyr believed that Britain must remain the supreme power in southern Africa, and that attempts by Germany to extend its reach had to be stopped. Further conflict occurred between the ZAR and the Cape government regarding a customs union, ultimately aimed at uniting South Africa under the British flag, which Kruger rejected. Giliomee (2009:241) states that Kruger demanded that "Cape Afrikaners support the ZAR as the representative of a pure Afrikaner spirit".

Giliomee (2009:241) believes that Kruger's rejection of a customs union drove Hofmeyr into Rhodes arms; he even warned Kruger about the consequences of divisions between Transvaal and Cape Afrikaners. When Hofmeyr told Kruger that he could not expand the ZAR into Swaziland (a previous concession for not expanding westward) unless he joined the customs union, Kruger accused him of being a traitor to his people. Rhodes founded the *British South African Company* (BSA) in 1889 to aid in the northern expansion into Africa, and became

prime minister of the Cape Colony the following year with the help of Hofmeyr's Afrikaner Bond. Expansion began that same year. Giliomee (2009:242) notes that the Bond supported Rhodes in retaining the diamond monopoly of De Beers Consolidated and allowed him to serve as both prime minister and chairman of the BSA. Bond leaders acquired significant numbers of shares in De Beers and BSA, leading to allegations of graft, corruption and an abandonment of all principles.

According to Giliomee (2009:242), Rhodes' expansion into Mashonaland and Matabeleland (provinces in present-day Zimbabwe) proved financially disappointing. By 1895 the ZAR had overtaken the Cape Colony in terms of the value of its exports, and Britain was set to lose its position as supreme power on the subcontinent. Giliomee suggests that in order to stem the ZAR's developing power, Britain prevented it from further expansion. The ZAR held firm in refusing to join a railways and customs union with the Cape, and finally completed the railway link to Delagoa Bay, thereby diverting its foreign trade away from the Cape.

Rhodes became increasingly frustrated with the ZAR circumventing his grand plan and began to plot a conspiracy (along with Chamberlain and Sir Graham Bower, Imperial Secretary in Cape Town) to overthrow the government. In 1895 Leander Starr Jameson and an armed force of 500 men drawn from the BSA's private army, invaded the Transvaal with the goal of igniting an Uitlander rebellion, and in doing so, provide a pretext for the Cape to intervene and proclaim sovereignty over the ZAR. His plan failed spectacularly and he was forced to resign as prime minister (Giliomee, 2009:242).

According to Giliomee (2009:242-243), the Jameson Raid cost Rhodes his friendship with Hofmeyr (who made it clear that he would not tolerate any aggression against the Boer Republics), and exposed him as having deceived the Afrikaners, instead of being their genuine ally as Hofmeyr had presented him. While the conservative establishment in Britain was embarrassed by these events (despite their involvement), once the British press reported that the German Kaiser congratulated Kruger on his victory, Jameson was lionised and fierce anti-German and anti-Boer sentiment was enflamed in London society, which became known as "jingoism". These events would inspire Rudyard Kipling, whom Giliomee (2009:243) disparagingly calls "bard of the jingoes", to write his famous poem *If* in defence of Jameson against the British establishment that imprisoned him (Wansell, 2009). While Hofmeyr did not publicly denounce Rhodes's imperialism, the leading Dutch paper in Cape Town at the time, *Ons Land*, lamented: "Once again one writes our history with blood. The monster of jingoism

has again shown its abhorrent face. The affairs of South Africa are again arranged from Downing Street".

Rhodes, refusing to apologise for the Jameson Raid, re-entered politics in 1898 "on an unabashedly jingoist ticket", as Giliomee (2009:243) describes it, supporting Sprigg's Progressive government. Cape liberals such as John X. Merriman and Jacobus Wilhelm Sauer, who were previously opposed to the Afrikaner Bond for their 'native' policy, were now so revolted by the jingoism displayed by many English speakers at the Cape that they joined forces with the Bond and helped secure them electoral victory over Rhodes in 1898. The new prime minister, William Schreiner, criticised the previous Sprigg government for failing to show "any sympathy or conciliatory approach" to "the sister republic". The opposition of Englishmen like Merriman and Schreiner demonstrate that even during a time of increased intergroup conflict and outgroup hostility, some degree of intragroup heterogeneity is always present.

4.2.5.5. Steyn and the moderate OFS

After the Jameson Raid, Kruger, expecting further aggression from Britain, embarked on arming the state by expanding the small regular army and reforming the administration of Johannesburg. Jan Christiaan Smuts and Marthinus Theunis Steyn would rise up during this period to support Kruger. Smuts was originally from the Cape, studied law at Cambridge University, and supported Rhodes in 1895, before he moved to the Transvaal and became State Attorney (Minister of Justice) of the ZAR in 1898. Steyn grew up on a farm near Bloemfontein and moved in the circles of its elite residents (who spoke English until the Jameson Raid). Initially studying law in the Netherlands, he completed his studies in London, and in 1895, became the first Free State-born president of the OFS (Giliomee, 2009:243-244).

Giliomee (2009:244) states that under his rule, the OFS balanced itself between the republican Transvaal and the colonial Cape; being more politically aligned to the ZAR but more culturally aligned to the Cape. This stance attracted moderate English-speaking South Africans, like Merriman, who were opposed to the jingoist tendencies of the British. In 1899 prominent Free Stater Abraham Fischer – seemingly redefining the term Afrikaner as anti-imperial (white) South African – declared: "One could be a good Afrikaner and sincere Republican regardless of the language he spoke".[177]

[177] The fact that anti-imperialism became a cornerstone of Afrikaner identity during this period is somewhat ironic considering the Afrikaners' origins from the VOC and Dutch imperialism.

According to Giliomee (2009:245), Steyn, who had many English speakers in his cabinet, began to concern himself with the preservation of the Dutch language and culture as "an embodiment of nationhood". He believed that the Free State "nation" would decline if the Dutch language did, and thus declared Dutch the official language. Officials were instructed to communicate in Dutch with the Cape and Natal governments, and schools were pressured to introduce Dutch as medium of instruction. It is conceivable that Steyn's turn to Dutch cultural protections at this time could be ascribed to the need for positive differentiation (from the Cape) in order to derive positive self-esteem from a 'Free State identity'. It is also possible that the use of Dutch, instead of English, with the British colonies was viewed as a sign of (political) power.

Giliomee (2009:245) suggests that Steyn was in favour of franchise reform in the ZAR (regarding the matter of the Uitlanders) until 1898, when he became convinced that it was used as a pretext by the British for further involvement. Steyn told Kruger that he would not enter the fight between the ZAR and Britain on the grounds of the dynamite concession and the 14-year franchise qualification which he believed to be undemocratic and unrepublican (see subsection 4.2.5.3). However, should Britain be shown to use the franchise issue as a ploy for attacking the independence of both Boer republics, Steyn would join the fight. The ZAR and the OFS thus signed a treaty in 1897 pledging mutual support in case of war.

4.2.5.6. Milner and the Cape Afrikaners

At this point in time, Alfred Milner was both Governor of the Cape Colony and High Commissioner for South Africa. Giliomee (2009:245) contends that Milner's race ideology (including his Anglo-Saxon supremacist views which meant white Afrikaners too were considered racially inferior) and his quest for world domination seriously qualifies him for comparison with Hitler. While Chamberlain was unwilling to press ahead so soon after the Jameson Raid, Milner began to apply pressure on Britain by mobilising the Uitlanders and forming an alliance with gold magnates (one of whom admitted to financing the Jameson Raid). Giliomee states that Milner began to push a narrative of "a seditious Cape Afrikaner community ready to undermine British authority in order to help Kruger" and believed that reinstating British supremacy over the ZAR would stave off disaffection in other British colonies and strengthen its position vis-à-vis other great powers.

Despite the Afrikaner Bond's best efforts to persuade Milner that no such pan-Afrikaner conspiracy existed, Milner was, in the words of James Tenant Molteno (cited in Giliomee,

2009:246), son of a previous prime minister and outspoken critic of Rhodes, Milner and British imperialism, "constantly insulting the Dutch and, with his superior Oxford manner, was sneering at their loyalty". Milner told Cape Afrikaners bluntly to pick a side.[178] Giliomee believes that had Britain honestly believed the Cape Afrikaners would rise in revolt, they would have hesitated to proceed with war. He notes the internal conflict that plagued the Cape Afrikaners (2009:246):

> But the Cape Afrikaners were immobilised by their own multiple identities. Above all, they were colonial patriots with a loyalty both to the Crown and to their own colony. If they had a preference for republicanism, it was, as the liberal politician James Rose Innes called it, 'academic', and an aspiration to be realised 'in a dim and distant future.' Another of their identities was as core of a future white South African nation. They feared that any military contact between Britain and the republics would set the realisation of this ideal back for many years. Against these two principal identities was a weaker sense of a common Afrikaner *ethnic* identity, prepared to stand shoulder to shoulder with the republican Afrikaners.

According to Giliomee (2009:247), Milner, the mining magnates (who were agitating for reforms to ensure efficient gold production) and Rhodes created the impression among British politicians that Kruger would concede under diplomatic and military pressure, knowing full well that the republics would fight for their independence. In May 1899, Steyn hosted a meeting in Bloemfontein with Kruger (accompanied by Smuts) and Milner to prevent war. Hofmeyr and Prime Minister W.P. Schreiner were also invited, but declined to attend on account of pressure by Milner. Steyn and Smuts believed that Milner was not negotiating in good faith as an exasperated Kruger finally exclaimed to Milner "It is our country you want". The Bloemfontein Conference had failed, with wide-ranging implications that no one, including Milner, could have anticipated.

4.2.5.7. The Anglo-Boer War

Giliomee (2009:248) believes that the desire to secure its geo-political position in South(ern) Africa and elsewhere, and in doing so, protect British honour, made Britain go to war. On 9

[178] The precarious situation of Cape Afrikaners who opposed British imperialism is one of the more extreme examples of the pressure minority group members may face to denounce their subgroup identities. Here, they are threatened with severe social (and possibly legal) sanctions should they choose to maintain their subgroup identity. Compare this with Tajfel and Turner's (1986) recognition that in cases of intense intergroup conflict, ingroup members may restrict the individual mobility strategy from being followed by branding defectors "traitors" (see Chapter 3, subsection 3.2.3.2). The fact that Cape Afrikaners would choose to maintain their subgroup identity, despite the threat of being accused of treason by Milner, (one of) the most powerful member(s) of society, illustrates that minority identities are not maintained purely for instrumental reasons. Milner's threats to the Cape Afrikaners demonstrate that they were indeed second-class citizens. That they, as born British subjects, could possibly face action by their own government for the same dissent expressed by many English speakers at the Cape, shows they were not accepted as ingroup members.

October 1899 the two Boer republics issued an ultimatum to Britain for the removal of troops from their borders. The British government rejected the ultimatum and the ZAR and the OFS declared war. On 12 October 1899 the first shots were fired. When the war broke out there were 54,000 republican troops and 27,000 British troops. At the height of the war there were 250,000 British troops (Giliomee, 2009:250). According to Giliomee (2009:249), Smuts launched a diplomatic offensive, mainly focusing on the capitalists fomenting war, leading to a substantial pro-Boer lobby in Britain. Despite this, the Boer republics would take on the world's greatest imperial power virtually completely unaided by lobbyists or other European countries. Eventually 6,000 Cape rebels joined the Boer forces, but there was no uprising at the Cape, which would have put pressure on Britain.

The first stage of the war saw the Boer forces move into northern Natal and the north and northeast of the Cape, where they became tied up in sieges in Ladybrand, Kimberley and Mafeking. By December 1899 they had defeated the British on these fronts. By March 1900 the Boer forces had captured several small non-strategic towns along the northern border of the Cape Colony, but failed to attract mass support from the Cape Afrikaners. The Boer forces were debilitated by the ill-judgement of older generals, the lack of mobility of some of the forces (as some Boers joined the commandos with their families on wagons) and a general lack of discipline and commitment (Giliomee, 2009:250).

When Louis Botha and Koos de la Rey in the Transvaal, and Christiaan de Wet in the Free State assumed command, it was already too late as British forces were flooding into the country. In the second stage of the war, the besieged towns were relieved, 4,000 Boer men were captured at Paardeberg, and Bloemfontein, Johannesburg and Pretoria were all taken by June. By July 1900 at least 12,000 burghers had surrendered – many under Commander-in-Chief Lord Roberts' 'oath of neutrality' which permitted them to return to their farms. They became known disparagingly as *Hendsoppers* (Hands-uppers). Those who refused to take the oath were sent to prisoner-of-war camps. Some joined the British forces as scouts or spies in countering Boer guerrilla fighters. These *Joiners* or National Scouts also took part in the peace committees that tried to get Boer fighters in the field to surrender. By the end of the war almost 5,000 republican Afrikaners were serving in the British army (Giliomee, 2009:251).[179]

[179] Intergroup conflict is thus not always beneficial to internal cohesion, as postulated by SIT. While it can bound high identifiers together, it might also increase the prevalence of exiting the ingroup. It is possible that the Joiners employed *identity-restructuring responses* (see Chapter 3, subsection 3.4.2) to mitigate their switch from the Boer to the British side.

Giliomee (2009:251) speculates that it was the wealthy and very poor who were most prone to giving up the republican cause. Wealthy burghers, who had sent poor burghers in their stead on commandos, were unaccustomed to fighting, and also wished to return to their farms and avoid material disaster once British forces began destroying Boer homesteads. He also states that the majority of Joiners were *bywoners* (tenant farmers) before the war, and he believes there is evidence that suggests they were dissatisfied with being sent on commandos to fight against Africans without proper recompense, and with having to defend the property of landholders while their own families were destitute. He characterises their treason as "a rebellion against exploitation". The individual mobility strategy is thus not restricted to higher-status socio-economically mobile individuals.

In October 1900 Kruger left for Europe, just before the British could capture him, where he died some years later in exile (Giliomee, 2009:251). Lord Roberts declared British sovereignty over the Orange River Colony (the OFS) in May 1900 and over the Transvaal Colony (the ZAR) in September 1900. Milner elatedly wrote to a friend: "I have saved the British position in South Africa, and I have knocked the bottom out of 'the great Afrikaander nation' forever and ever" (Giliomee, 2009:252). But to some Afrikaners, surrender was not an option:

> If the fighting had ended in June 1900 the war would have been a rather insignificant event, unlikely to haunt memories and inflame passions for many years to come. But the heights of heroism, the depths of suffering, and the full horrors of the war were yet to unfold.

After the fall of Pretoria in June 1990 Transvaal military leaders, including Smuts, Botha and De la Rey, met and decided surrender would be the best course of action. Steyn furiously chastened the Transvaalers for wanting to conclude "a selfish and disgraceful peace", noting how the Free State had been devastated upholding republicanism.[180] He vowed to continue fighting against British imperialism and became, in Smuts's words, "the most heroic figure" of the war. In the final stage of the war, Transvaal burghers thus decided to continue fighting to the "bitter end" – until they were completely crushed in defeat, or had restored the republics' independence (Giliomee, 2009:252)

[180] Although their right to self-governance was at the forefront of the Boers' minds, it is conceivable that distinctiveness threats may have also, to some extent, motivated their desire to remain separate and free from British rule.

De la Rey became a leading figure among the Transvaal *Bittereinders* (Bitter-enders).[181] As member of the progressive opposition to Kruger, he correctly predicted before the start of the war, when Kruger questioned his patriotism, that he would still be fighting for independence long after Kruger "has gone away and left us". While those who, along with Kruger, opposed major concessions to avert war were "old and incompetent generals", the Bittereinders were mostly commercial farmers and educated professional men, belonging to the ZAR party that were least in favour of war to begin with, and as opposed to Kruger's political policy as the English. It is notable that these men did not exercise individual mobility, at great personal cost to themselves, and even with the prospect of their own death. In addition to De la Rey, other prominent Bittereinders include the progressive farmers Christiaan de Wet, Louis Botha and Jan Kemp, and educated townsmen like Steyn, Smuts and J.B.M Hertzog (Giliomee, 2009:252-253).

The Bittereinders adopted guerrilla war tactics, striking in small mobile commandos to harass British forces, sabotage railway links and seize supplies. This "unexpected prolongation of the war by elusive enemies" frustrated the British, who did not wish to spend any more time or money on the war. Instead of an approach that would be "methodical without exceeding the limits of brutality", Field-Marshal H.H. Kitchener and Milner resolved to crush the Boers, whom they had certainly dehumanised to some degree. In the same way that the Voortrekkers relied on their Christian beliefs during the Great Trek, Giliomee (2009:253) notes the presence of religion in motivating the Bittereinders:

> But the Bittereinders had developed a steely resolve to fight as long as was humanly possible. They were, in Smuts' terms, 'the men of invincible hope in the future and childlike faith in God.' Their belief was in a very personal God who took a direct hand in shaping the destiny of nations, punishing those who sinned and rewarding the faithful. Contemporary accounts spoke of their fierce conviction that the British cause was so palpably unjust – indeed so sinful – that God would never grant Britain victory. Faith in the country's cause and faith in God had become synonymous. Voluntary surrender would not only be betrayal of the Boer cause, but, as a Free State fighter was reported as saying, an act of *ongeloof* – an absence of faith.

According to Giliomee (2009:253), the British did not fight an unscrupulous war – they differentiated between civilians and soldiers and instances of rape were rare – however, they

[181] Notice the (surely unintended) use of an Afrikaans word to describe those who kept fighting (Bittereinders), an English word for those who betrayed the Afrikaners (Joiners), and an Afrikaans neologism from an English expression to describe those who did not keep fighting, but also did not exit the group per se (Hendsoppers). Both the meanings of the words, and the differential use of Afrikaans, serve to determine who is an Afrikaner (see acceptance threat in Chapter 3, subsection 3.4.1).

fought a "hard war" characterised by "directed severity". When a railway line had been sabotaged, Lord Roberts destroyed the surrounding farms. Giliomee (2009:254) states that Kitchener soon introduced the "scorched earth policy" (razing houses and destroying livestock and crops) in order to terrify Boer guerrillas and deprive them of supplies. In September 1900, Smuts bemoaned the "indescribable destruction" which the British armies brought to large parts of the Free State and Transvaal.

The families of so-called Joiners, who faced the wrath of the Boers, were offered refuge in camps by the British. By the end of 1900 the British began putting the families of Boer guerrilla fighters in these camps too, after destroying their homesteads. Africans displaced by the war were placed in segregated camps. The inadequate food rations, general squalor and high death toll at these camps now qualify them for classification as concentration camps.[182] Giliomee (2009:254) describes the outgroup derogation and dehumanisation that enabled the existence of such camps:

> Almost all the concentration camps in the twentieth century had one thing in common: people were put in camps not for what they did, but for who they were. Invariably the inmates were people who were members of an 'enemy' group, or at any rate a category of people who, for reasons of their race or their presumed politics, were judged to be dangerous or extraneous to society. The British anti-Boer propaganda that preceded the war created the conditioning that was necessary for treating harmless civilians callously. A British writer wrote: 'We have conjured up for ourselves a fantastic and outrageous image which we call *a Boer*. This savage being was hideous in form, unkempt and unwashed, violent, hypocritical, a persecutor and an assassin of the English.' Once the Boers had been defined in derogatory terms, it was not too difficult to put Boer women and children in camps in shocking conditions.

A total of 154,000 Boer and African civilians were interned in concentration camps. Unsanitary conditions combined with the underfed inmates' weakened state led to the spread of illnesses and many deaths – mostly from measles and typhoid. While Milner and those directly involved were aware of the deterioration of the concentration camps, neither British politicians nor the general public knew of the atrocities being committed until Emily Hobhouse, a British anti-war protestor, received permission to inspect the camps. She arrived in South Africa in December 1900 and upon returning to England in May 1901 informed the British public of the horrors she had witnessed. In June 1901 the leader of the opposition party, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, declared: "When is a war not a war? When it is carried on by methods of barbarism

[182] Wessels (2011:137) prefers the term *internment camps*, to the more "emotionally charged" concentration camps.

in South Africa". By October of that year the death rate stood at 344 per 1,000. By the end of the year a commission, after more visits were made, recommended changes to the camps and the death rate fell dramatically (Giliomee, 2009:255).[183]

By the end of the war, 4,177 Boer women and 22,074 Boer children had died in concentration camps.[184] Giliomee (2009:256) recounts the story of an English woman imploring Boer children at a camp to cultivate a spirit of forgiveness, to which a Boer woman responded: "To my mind it is not only impossible but also undesirable". He notes how the indomitable resistance of Boer women baffled Boer and British men alike; some asserting that they would rather see their houses burn down than their husbands surrender, and vowing to continue fighting even in the face of great suffering. Hendsoppers allegedly did not escape their indignation at the concentration camps either. Giliomee cites the historian G.M. Theal who claimed that "[Boer] women are the fiercest advocates of war to the bitter end …" and a British visitor, J.R. MacDonald who argued: "It was the *vrouw* who kept the war going on so long. It was in her heart that patriotism flamed into an all-consuming heat, forgiving nothing and forgetting nothing".[185] Giliomee (2009:256) further argues:

> Defeat in war also made women cling to their culture. Indignation about British war methods prompted a Bloemfontein woman to wonder aloud whether she should continue letting her children speak English. Reflecting on what separated her from the English, another Free State woman came up with an answer: republicanism, history, the *taal* (language) and 'hatred of the [British] race.'

Giliomee (2009:256) describes the dilemma Cape Afrikaners were presented with in the face of the horrors of the second Anglo-Boer War. Though they had always considered themselves

[183] Giliomee (2009:255) points out that at no time were African concentration camps visited. The outcry by the British public and the improvements made to the concentration camps were thus dependent on the racial hierarchy at play, and the shock that *white* people could be suffering such a fate – not necessarily that the British were causing such suffering.

[184] According to Giliomee (2009:257), an official death toll of 14,000 was recorded for black people in concentration camps.

[185] While I do not dispute the strength with which Boer women endured their suffering, these comments do appear to me to shift undue blame on them for not only their own suffering but also the brutality of the war in general. I would characterise this as a fallacy which paints women as instigators or agitators, and the men (including Kruger who led the republics to a preventable war, Milner, Roberts, Kitchener and Rhodes for their attack on the republics, and the Bittereinders who decided amongst themselves to persist to the very end) as mere bystanders or hapless participants in the 'women's war'. This would not be the first instance of women being blamed for the historic misdeeds of men – which we may call the Eve/Delilah Effect. Sharp (2007:67) similarly notes that German women were blamed for the actions of men during the First World War, despite their lack of power and legal rights, as they could "influence" their husbands. Consider Steyn's (cited in Giliomee, 2009:260) words to fellow Bittereinders in the final year of the war: "It was true that the women and children were suffering, but that was preferable to the fate of ourselves, our children and grandchildren becoming serfs of the enemy". Notice the elision of Boer women in the second part of his statement, suggesting that they were indeed sacrificed by the Boer leaders.

loyal British subjects, most were now anti-imperial. He states that DRC ministers were now preaching against the British Empire and Afrikaner Bond members were accused of committing "outspoken treason". In August 1901 Smuts led a troop of 250 men from the Transvaal to the Cape Colony in order to instigate an uprising. They came within 100 kilometres of Cape Town, but failed to attract significant numbers of rebels.

The Anglo-Boer War did not just pit the two white 'nations' against each other. According to Giliomee (2009:257), roughly 10,000 *agterryers*, black auxiliaries, were on the Boer side, while the British side had 10,000 – 30,000 black people as scouts, guards and drivers. The British army also recruited thousands of coloured people from the Cape. He suggests that the Afrikaners were shocked by the use of black and coloured people to fight them; Smuts argued that this violated "a special code of morality" on which the continued existence of white people as ruling class rested. Giliomee (2009:258) contends that the participation of coloured people in the British defence "brought them no political gain", while it angered colonial Afrikaners and Boer forces, and deepened the divide between the politically conscious coloured people and Afrikaners.

Milner placed nearly the entire Cape Colony under martial law which further alienated Cape Afrikaners. Military courts sentenced more than 1,000 Cape rebels to jail and 360 to death, compelling the families to attend the executions. Afrikaner Bond politicians were constantly accused of disloyalty by English jingoists, Dutch language protections in the civil service were substantially weakened, and many Afrikaners chose to speak in broken English in public, rather than Dutch, "as if to prove their loyalty" (Giliomee, 2009:258). But some waves of a resistance persisted. Giliomee (2009:259) describes how Cape Afrikaners used boycotts (some in sole support of Afrikaner businesses, others against loyalist businesses) to promote "the interest[s] of the Afrikaner people".

While some Afrikaners in the eastern Cape Colony supported the Boers during the Anglo-Boer War, Giliomee (2020:279) suggests that virtually no Afrikaners from the western Cape offered them support. He cites writer Hennie Aucamp who claimed: "The Boer in the interior and the Afrikaners of the Boland are two different species. The Boland's beautiful mountains form the shield which keeps out the stink of the spilled blood of Boers in the war. That is why the Cape remains so Dutch, which in fact means British".

By the final year of the war, the Bittereinders had become fatigued and were running low on supplies. When Kitchener decided to reverse course on the concentration camps by the end of

1901, freed Boer women and children placed an extra burden on the Boer forces. An approaching winter and hostilities from a Zulu force in Transvaal made the burghers increasingly anxious (Giliomee, 2009:259). By the beginning of 1902, the Boer forces were reduced to less than 20,000, and Joiners now numbered 5,000. In May of that year, peace negotiations between the British and 60 Boer leaders commenced in Vereeniging. Smuts, no longer believing that independence was possible, persuaded the delegates (somewhat suspiciously, due to private talks between him and Kitchener) that a united South Africa as part of the British Empire was the best course of action (Giliomee, 2009:260-261). The franchise of Africans was a major point of contention during discussions. Giliomee (2009:261-262) argues that the British, having decided to build on a white-ruled South Africa, accepted a proposal drafted by Smuts which left the question of the African vote in their territories up to the Boers.

According to Giliomee (2009:262), those leaders who wanted to continue fighting, like De Wet and Kemp, believed that "the republics were the very foundation of Afrikaner power and cultural existence in the northern part of South Africa" and questioned whether their disappearance would not mean the destruction of Afrikanerdom itself. Those who wanted to surrender, like Botha, argued that a bitter end which concludes in "universal burial" would make them guilty of "national suicide". Smuts (cited in Giliomee, 2009:262) stated that "[We] must not sacrifice the *Afrikaansche volk* on the altar of independence".

Without independence, Giliomee (2009:263) suggests, the Afrikaners would need some other issue on which to "unite to remain a people". Jozua François Naudé, a young teacher from the Transvaal who would go on to co-found the *Afrikaner Broederbond* (League of Afrikaner Brothers), suggested that the maintenance of the Dutch language become the basis of future survival. He argued that Dutch "was of great significance to the volk, forming a channel through which the volk could again become volk".

The terms of the Vereeniging peace treaty were that the Boers unconditionally surrender, prisoners of war be repatriated, Boers be guaranteed their freedom and property, military rule be ended, the issue of the franchise of black people be deferred until after self-rule had been achieved, and £3 million be allocated to help the Boers. Giliomee (2009:263) notes that when news reached Steyn of the treaty he cried: "You have sold out the *volk* for £3 million". The treaty was signed, Acting President of the ZAR, S.W. Burger, urged the Bittereinders to forgive those Afrikaners who were disloyal, and Kitchener (cited in Giliomee, 2009:263) declared "We

are good friends now". Giliomee believes that despite the crushing defeat, the Bittereinder stage of the war had "won the Boers universal respect as freedom fighters". Smuts (cited in Giliomee, 2009:263) commented that now, "every child to be born in South Africa was to have a proud self-respect and a more erect carriage before the nations of the world".[186]

In addition to the nearly 27,000 Boer women and children that died, a further 5,000 Boers died in the field, representing altogether approximately 10% of the Afrikaner population of the republics. Giliomee (2009:264) states that the Boer leadership was in disarray during the years immediately after the war, as Kruger died in exile in 1904, Steyn was seriously ill, Botha, De Wet and De la Rey returned to their farms and Hertzog and Smuts resumed their legal careers. The latter, who Giliomee (2009:264) claims was now suffering from depression like the other leaders, in a letter to Abraham Fischer warned of the new threats Afrikaners faced:

> [There] are years of great danger before us – partly because people have fallen so deep, so fathomlessly deep, into poverty and misery, partly because everything will be done by the other side, through their education system and otherwise, to anglicise the generation now growing up. It is our duty to guard against this and that is why I am so strongly in favour of ourselves, if necessary, providing for the education of our children.[187]

4.2.5.8. Post-war reconstruction: white unity or language equality

Milner became High Commissioner of the Cape Colony as well as Governor of the Transvaal Colony and the Orange River Colony, while the Progressives, led by Jameson, won the 1904 Cape election. The British were now fully in control of all four colonies, including the Natal Colony (Giliomee, 2009:264). Strict policing of Africans soon followed, often in collaboration with Afrikaners. In 1903 at the *Transvaal Labour Commission*, Louis Botha (cited in Giliomee, 2009:265) declared that black people are "beginning to see that the Boers are just as much masters as the other white men", indicating that the Afrikaners viewed the suppression of black people as a strategy to ameliorate their own status vis-à-vis that of the British (i.e., entry to the

[186] The deep-seated need among Afrikaners (both at the Cape and in the interior) to be positively evaluated by outgroups, especially those with higher status, is a recurring theme (see value threats in Chapter 3, subsection 3.4.1). Afrikaner identity bestows on high identifiers a deep sense of pride, but it also seems to exact a psychological toll in the form of low or insecure self-esteem. This is, however, a reflection of the intergroup dynamic and hierarchy of identities, and not the inherent nature of Afrikaner identity.

[187] The pre-occupation with language and education as integral to the survival of a people, in the immediate aftermath of a deadly war that wiped out a tenth of the group, is noteworthy. That the Afrikaners' strongest efforts to safeguard their culture (especially through education) would only come *after* the Anglo-Boer War, a full 250 years after Van Riebeeck's arrival at the Cape, exemplifies my insistence that cultural nationalism and/or ethnonationalism must be viewed in a broader context of reciprocal intergroup competition and conflict.

'master' class). Also in 1903, Milner appointed a *South African Native Affairs Commission* to develop a common policy towards Africans.

After a failed large-scale British immigration plan to change the Afrikaners' electoral majority to a loyalist majority, Milner decided on an anglicisation policy for the two former Boer republics. In other words, to curb their collective power, the Afrikaners would have to be assimilated. English was declared the sole official language and the sole medium of instruction, with only three hours per week set aside for Dutch language and Dutch-medium Bible study, if parents requested it (Giliomee, 2009:265). The Acting Director for Education in the new colonies, E.B. Sargant, was intent on infusing Afrikaner children with "the greatness of the English Imperial idea" as well as "our language and ideals". Teachers from Britain would be brought in to conduct this mass re-education. Giliomee (2009:266) unequivocally calls this indoctrination, and cites Sargant who instructed his teaching staff to "have a political aim in all your school work and that aim should be to make political parties unnecessary". He also credits these assimilationist policies with the Afrikaner nationalism that was to follow (2009:266):

> Milner scoffed at the possibility that Afrikaner nationalists could thwart his imperialist project. It was a complete illusion, he wrote, that the Afrikaners cared much about 'the great Afrikaner nation'. What he could not see was that his policies and utterances provided the very stuff from which nationalist movements were made. Looking on from the sidelines, Smuts wryly commented: '[Milner] has dreamed a dream of a British South Africa – loyal with broken English and happy with a broken heart.'

The importance of group membership, and its manipulation, during this time is evident. Gilliomee (2009:266) argues that for Milner's vision to succeed, he would have to unite the English in South Africa, split the Afrikaners by attracting "a collaborating elite", and promote rapid economic growth. A severe labour shortage as a consequence of the war, coupled with the repression of wages to keep mines profitable, posed problems for the latter objective. Eventually 63,000 Chinese labourers were imported, a third of the mining workforce by the end of 1905. Due to the low wages and awful conditions at the housing compounds, accusations of slave labour began to arise.

According to Giliomee (2009:267), Milner now faced his worst political nightmare: revolt against a capitalism that had brought about the war, and complaints that mining magnates were ruining the post-war reconciliation effort. The issue further served to split the English population of the Witwatersrand. Giliomee (2009:267-268) also claims that Milner's attempt to suspend the constitution of the Cape Colony served to unite English and Afrikaner politicians

in achieving reconciliation and unification on their terms, and not Milner's.[188] So too Boer leaders' expressed desire for reconciliation bridged the gap between them and English speakers.

The *Afrikaner Bond* formed the *South African Party* (SAP) which aimed to develop "a feeling of unity" among the various groups in South Africa, and to achieve unification of the four colonies. Boer leaders in the former republics set out to heal the divisions between the Joiners and the Bittereinders. While mostly successful, in some instances separate Joiner churches were established. The Boer leaders however avoided collaboration with Milner and formed the political party *Het Volk* in the Transvaal in 1905 and *Orangia Unie* in the Free State in 1906 (Giliomee, 2009:268).

Giliomee (2009:268) argues that Milner's extreme education policy agitated and angered the Afrikaners, without really helping his cause. The synod of the Transvaal DRC worried that if children could no longer speak the official language of the church, it would threaten their existence. In 1905, the *Pretoria News* proclaimed that the "church is dying out … and the language of this church will in a short time wholly disappear". Afrikaner teachers who had been dismissed by Milner established Christian-National private schools. These schools enjoyed strong support from Dopper ministers and teachers who studied at the theological school in Potchefstroom – most notably Willem Postma, later a DRC minister and political columnist, his brother Ferdinand Postma, a professor and later rector, and the son of S.J. du Toit, J.D. du Toit (known as Totius), an Afrikaans poet. Giliomee (2009:269) asserts that the Doppers had an outsized impact over the formation of Afrikaner identity and politics:

> The Doppers' influence was out of all proportion to their small numbers. Taking 'In isolation lies our strength' as a motto, the Doppers wove the strands of religion, language and nationhood into a nationalist cloth. Willem Postma urged Afrikaners to protect their identity from being destroyed by English-speakers and their culture. 'Our people are Christian Afrikaners. This is our tradition. The whole development of our people comes from and is the fruit of Christian principles.' To adopt the mother tongue as a badge of identity and to give it a central place in the school and the church was a way of building a strong, separate nation and religious community. 'Take away our language and we will become Englishmen and accept their religion.' He extended the principle of separation between the two white groups to separation between whites and blacks. He envisaged a piece of land for the black nations with their own schools, churches, parliaments and universities; however if 'they came here they must work and

[188] Milner wanted to suspend the Cape Colony's constitution while working on unification, so that all the colonies would have a similar constitutional status (Giliomee, 2009:267).

not play tennis.' Ferdinand Postma urged the teaching of Afrikaner history to counter the imperialist history taught in schools.

Giliomee (2009:269) states that by 1904, the Afrikaner intelligentsia in general had become opposed to Milner – mostly Calvinists who believed in shaping the world according to Biblical principles. He argues that an "activist Calvinism aligned to a political nationalism represented a potent force". He cites Milner who observed: "[The] Afrikaner doctrine emanates essentially from the towns and the agricultural middle class and is pumped into the country Boers" and that without the influence of the educated professional class, "the country Boers would not be irreconcilable" (2009:269-270). Afrikaner activism, therefore, did not just consist of efforts to maintain Afrikaans or uplift Afrikaners after the war, but also involved the active redefinition and manipulation of the Afrikaner identity by a small group of 'activist Calvinists' (i.e. identity entrepreneurs).

Giliomee (2009:270) suggests that Botha and Smuts (both of Het Volk) realised the utility of *private* schools in "build[ing] a political constituency without directly challenging the imperial authorities".[189] Thus with the support of Botha and Smuts, the Netherlands,[190] and the church leaders, *Christian National Education* (CNE) schools spread rapidly throughout the ex-republics; by 1905 there were 228 CNE schools in the Transvaal with 9,335 pupils, versus the 33,000 *public* school pupils. These CNE schools had mother-tongue instruction, with the gradual introduction of English as a second and equal medium by the fifth school year.

In 1906, after Smuts presented his case to the newly elected Liberal government, the former republics were granted self-government once more. Giliomee (2009:270) speculates that the reason behind the decision was the Liberals' desire to extricate themselves from Milner's failing Chinese-labour policy, and their ability to ensure British interests in South Africa without having to dominate the region. Since Afrikaans speakers represented only half (at most) of the all-white electorate of Transvaal, Het Volk was careful to downplay the language issue in its appeal to English voters (Giliomee, 2009:270). The editor of *De Volksstem*, F.V. Engelenburg (cited in Giliomee, 2009:271), noted the "red-hot indignation" with which English speakers reacted to suggestions that their children might be compelled to learn Dutch.

The relatively slow growth of CNE schools in the Orange River Colony saw Botha criticise Hertzog (of the Orangia Unie) for his lack of commitment to the Afrikaner cause, while the

[189] The contemporary use of privatisation to circumvent the state is discussed at length throughout Chapter 5.

[190] See seeking assistance in Chapter 3, subsection 3.4.2.

Transvaal Afrikaans press criticised leaders who risked "the suicide of a language, volk and religion". Whereas advocates of CNE schools hoped that self-rule would mean a policy of free schooling through state subsidies, which would strengthen the position of their schools (seeing as few families could afford private education), Smuts no longer saw any need for CNE schools and they rapidly declined.

By 1906 a third of CNE schools in the Transvaal had disappeared, and by 1907 only 700 pupils in the Orange River Colony attended such schools. Now that the former Boer republics had achieved self-government, Smuts believed that state schools should (rather) aim to foster reconciliation between the two white communities.[191] When Botha announced Het Volk's withdrawal of support for CNE schools, he expressed the need to create "in this country a single nation of whites". The dismal performance of Afrikaans children in the examination for the highest school standard in the Transvaal further prompted Smuts to support an education policy that focused on job preparedness and English proficiency (Giliomee, 2009:271).

Giliomee (2009:271-272) argues that the language issue was the weak spot of the Het Volk leaders: Botha, who only mastered English later in life (and was married to an English-speaking woman), "never seemed to understand the political potency of the language issue"; and Smuts, although harbouring sentimental attachments to Afrikaans, did not deem it instrumentally useful. Their failure to address the language issue, a pressing concern to so many Afrikaners after the war, left an opening for other leaders to arise and mobilise the Afrikaners. Instead, Het Volk secured the 1907 election by running on an anti-capitalist message and winning over some English-speaking constituents.[192] According to Giliomee (2009:272), anti-capitalism also helped the Boer leaders attract support from the British liberals, and to strengthen ties with the South African liberals such as Merriman. He states that what began as an election strategy became the core belief of the party i.e., the unity of the two white communities, which Smuts pursued until his death in 1950.

The Het Volk administration ushered in an educational policy that had Dutch children start school with mother-tongue education, which would be phased out to make way for monolingual English-medium education by the sixth school year, while English schools were

[191] Note the implication that reconciliation can only be achieved through English, and that Afrikaans, or the minority ethnic habitus, is inherently destabilising (see Chapter 2, subsection 2.2.6).

[192] Meades (2019:30-31) notes the Afrikaners' dislike of capitalism, due to its link with British imperialism, as a result of the events leading up to the Anglo-Boer War.

not required to include the use of Dutch. CNE schools, on the other hand, made provision for bilingual education and used both Dutch and English as media of instruction (Giliomee, 2009:272). The educational policy also did not include provisions for the teaching of a nationalist or patriotic Afrikaner history, as opposed to the imperialist interpretation of history. According to Giliomee (2009:273), Botha complained that "Hollanders, Krugerites and a large section of the *predikanten* [ministers]" were growing agitated with the policy of union and reconciliation, while the journal of the Transvaal DRC, *De Vereeniging*, wrote: "We must seek our political, national, religious and educational salvation along authentic Afrikaans lines".

Giliomee (2009:273) claims that once in office, the Het Volk leaders abandoned the anti-capitalist agenda and sought to reassure mining magnates of the stable environment in which they operated. He explains that the mines were integral to generating revenue to build the state (improving infrastructure and schools) and thereby served the material interests of the rapidly urbanising Afrikaner population who could no longer sustain themselves through their destroyed farms.

According to Giliomee (2009:273), the post-war reconstruction looked quite different in the Orange River Colony, where Afrikaners were estimated to account for 90% of the electorate. Milner, in an attempt to sway the demographics in his favour, expropriated farms in order to settle British immigrants. Hertzog and Steyn's Orangia Unie, which attracted all classes and factions into a single movement, won the 1907 election in a landslide, whereafter Abraham Fischer became prime minister. Hertzog and Steyn placed the issue of language policy at the centre of "the political recovery of the Boer people". Meades (2019:33) believes that the OFS had anglicised so much that Afrikaans might have disappeared had it not been for the Anglo-Boer War. Giliomee (2009:273-274) sets out the Free State leaders' insistence on Dutch language rights as follows:

> Steyn's determination to fight the Anglo-Boer War to the bitter end was driven by the conviction that the British would look down on the defeated Boers. Lord Kitchener tried to assure him that the valour of the Bittereinders would ensure that this would never happen, but Steyn was not convinced. Steyn and Hertzog now declared that the respect the British displayed towards Dutch as a public language would be the yardstick of the respect the British had for their community. Hertzog stated: 'It is impossible to co-operate with someone who displays contempt for the language. Someone who is lacking in respect for the language in which I was educated is lacking in his respect for me.'

May (2012) similarly argued that the contempt shown towards minority languages is reflective of the contempt felt towards the ethnic groups with which they are associated (see Chapter 2,

subsection 2.1.2). Thus, in an ironic turn of events, Hertzog, who had previously been criticised by Botha for his lack of commitment to the Afrikaner cause, was now leading the charge in language equality while Het Volk had abandoned the language issue completely. Giliomee (2009:274) points out that when Hertzog drafted his educational policy for the Orange River Colony (later renamed Orange Free State), he had no need to placate the English voters as Smuts had to, and as such, granted equal status to Dutch and English as media of instruction in state schools. Mother-tongue education was mandated for Dutch and English pupils until the sixth year of schooling, whereafter the other language would be gradually introduced as a subsidiary medium (i.e., dual medium education). A minimum of three subjects had to be taught in the non-mother-tongue language.

The English backlash to the egalitarian language policy of Hertzog's Orangia Unie demonstrated the hollowness of calls for 'white reconciliation and unification', and the fact that its proponents really meant Afrikaner assimilation. Giliomee (2009:274) offers the argument of Australian historian W.K. Hancock, who observed that if there were "racialists", as Hertzog was accused of being, it was the English parents "who thought it proper for other people's children to speak English, but improper for their own children to speak Dutch". According to Giliomee (2009:274), discord grew between the Afrikaner leaders of the two defeated republics, and Hertzog and Steyn often felt that Botha and Smuts were not being completely forthright (including during the Anglo-Boer War). He recounts how when Botha's Het Volk government presented the Cullinan diamond (the largest diamond in the world ever found) to King Edward VII as a token of the Transvaal people's loyalty, Steyn remarked: "It would be better if Botha did not lay the loyalty butter on so very thick".

Milner left South Africa in April 1905, dismayed by the Liberal government's decision to grant self-rule to the ex-Boer republics, and no longer believing that he could, in his words, "make a good job of South Africa for the British people" (Giliomee, 2009:274). With the absence of large-scale immigration from Britain, and Milner and Chamberlain's vision for an imperial South Africa defeated, Giliomee (2009:275) maintains that Afrikaners began to unite behind the idea of a *South African* South Africa. Smuts in Pretoria and Merriman in Cape Town were instrumental in creating a political union of the four colonies, which would allow for the maximum power free from British interference, but short of independence. In February 1908 Merriman's SAP won the election in the Cape Colony, while Pretoria and Bloemfontein also had parties in support of unification. An English Bondsman and cabinet member, Henry Burton, wrote to Steyn in Dutch exclaiming: "Thank God, there are now *Afrikaansche*

regerings [Afrikaner governments] from here to the Limpopo". Giliomee points out the inclusive use of the term here, referring to all white South Africans, regardless of language.

In May 1908, Smuts's proposal for unification was unanimously accepted at an intercolonial conference (Giliomee, 2009:275). The meetings of the national convention to draft a constitution occurred from October 1908 to May 1909. With only white delegates in attendance, Giliomee (2009:276) insists that the continued political exclusion of black people across South Africa was now a fait accompli. He argues that the modelling of the new union on the British Westminster system ignored how diverse, colour-conscious and torn South African society was. Hertzog and Steyn advocated for equal Dutch language rights and full institutional bilingualism of the state, which was accepted and enshrined in Article 137 of the Union Constitution, which reads (cited in Giliomee, 2009:276):

> Both the English and Dutch languages shall be official languages of the Union and shall be treated on a footing of equality and possess and enjoy equal freedom, rights and privileges; all records, journals and proceedings of Parliament shall be kept in both languages, and all Bills, Acts and notices of general public importance or interest issued by the Government of the Union of South Africa shall be in both languages.

The four colonies approved a draft constitution and the *South African Bill* passed in the British Parliament (Giliomee, 2009:276). On 31 May 1910, precisely eight years after the signing of the *Vereeniging Peace Treaty*, the four colonies became the provinces of the Union of South Africa. Giliomee (2009:277) states that the British government instructed Botha to form a government before the first election, and so, in what has to be one of the most ironic turn of events, the Afrikaners came to inherit a "political kingdom" merely eight years after their crushing defeat in the Second Anglo-Boer War. While not a republic, with the provision of self-rule the Boers now wielded much more power than they ever had before. They had not only regained control over the Boer republics, but also acquired power over the two English colonies, without ever having an interest in doing so.

Giliomee (2009:277) explains that, as opposed to the imperialism of Milner and the republicanism of Kruger, the prevailing ideology was colonialism, or *colonial nationalism*. The latter term was coined by Australian writer Richard Jebb, who argued in 1905, after visiting the Transvaal, that colonies with a substantial white population demanded the removal of British influence, and wanted to develop their own sense of nationhood – or national identity. While Smuts embraced the idea of the British Commonwealth, republican sentiment once more

began to spread, putting Botha's SAP on the defensive.[193] Giliomee (2009:278) suggests that the republican issue concealed a much larger issue though – that of creating a national identity. He cites Olive Schreiner, who in 1890 pondered (2009:278): "*How, from our political states and our discordant races, can a great, a healthy, a united and an organised nation be formed?*"

4.3. The Afrikanerisation Period (1910-1994)

4.3.1. The Union of South Africa

4.3.1.1. The formalisation of black suppression

According to Giliomee (2009:278), the British failure to keep its promises and improve the political rights and status of black and coloured people post-War "produced a bitter harvest of racial distrust". He postulates that the unification of South Africa confirmed the fears of black people that the colonists did not want to share the land. In 1909, the British government refused the demand of a delegation led by W.P. Schreiner (Olive's brother) to override the constitution on the matter of the political exclusion of black people. He suggests that South Africa was now on the road to becoming "a white man's land". Giliomee (2009:306) states that an African elite demanded a qualified non-racial vote in the Union, and formed the S*outh African Native National Congress* in 1912, which became the *African National Congress* (ANC) in 1923.

Giliomee (2009:279) emphasises that South African society was unique in the world of European colonisation, as its white population was neither self-sufficient (as in Australia), nor did they merely have limited roles as rulers, traders and missionaries (as in India), but rather, they settled in considerable numbers where they dominated but remained dependent on black labourers. The fact that the dominant racial minority was ethnically divided also made South African society unique. Only when white supremacy itself was threatened, Giliomee argues, did these groups suspend their political rivalry.

While the Cape English, through the policies of Sir George Grey in the 1850s in British Kaffraria, aimed to break up the "African 'tribes' and 'nationalities'" for assimilatory purposes, Cape Afrikaners remained sceptical that the Xhosa would voluntarily assimilate (Giliomee, 2009:281). Giliomee (2009:284) argues: "[I]n both imperial circles and among Cape politicians and administrators the conviction had grown that subjected peoples had to be ruled through their own customs rather than be assimilated into Western culture". Giliomee states that while

[193] Wessels (2011:151) argues that as a result of trauma from the Anglo-Boer War, Afrikaners "developed a terrible fear of foreign (non-Afrikaner) domination".

in British India the focus was on preserving native customs in the personal sphere (marriage, inheritance and family succession), in Africa it also focused on land (owned by the community, held in a trust by the chief). The Cape Colony administration also came to believe that traditional African culture had to preserved in order to bolster the colonial government (through the use of traditional authorities). In the Natal Colony reserves were set aside and chiefs and the validity of customary law were accepted.[194]

Giliomee (2009:285) states that in the post-war era, "the Afrikaner-British clash over power and group status was played out predominantly in the field of politics". At the Cape, where the qualified non-racial franchise introduced in 1853 had resulted in a significant coloured voting bloc that could sway elections, Afrikaner and English-speaking politicians competed for this coloured vote in order to keep each other out of power. While the Afrikaners had much success in securing the coloured vote, they tended not to capture the African vote, apart from the liberal Sauer.

Because of this dynamic between the two white groups, Giliomee (2009:286) suggests that English politicians viewed attempts by the Afrikaners to limit the African vote less as an attack on liberal values and more as an attempt to weaken their support base.[195] He cites Rhodes who also seemed to suggest that the franchise issue was actually a fight for power between the two white communities, as at that same time, Indians did not have the right to vote in India, and Māori's could elect only four representatives in New Zealand. A member of Parliament, P. Solomon admitted as much in 1887 (Giliomee, 2009:288).

Giliomee (2009:304) states that when contemplating the constitution of the Union of South Africa, Smuts and Merriman were "focused on the imbalance of numbers between whites and Africans". The Union's first census of 1910 found a population of 5,878,000, comprising 3,956,000 black people, 517,000 coloured people, 148,000 Asian people and 1,257,000 white people (of whom roughly 700,000 were Afrikaners) (Giliomee, 2009:304; 356). Their minoritarian status (only 11.9% of the total population) was always perceived as a threat to the

[194] Customary law is still practiced in many rural areas in South Africa today, and is protected under Section 211 of the Constitution (1996).

[195] Giliomee (2009:122) states that Afrikaner politicians tried to win the non-white vote in the Cape and defended the coloured vote in the constitutional debates of 1908 and 1909. It is open to debate whether white Afrikaans speakers at the Cape felt a genuine sense of share community with coloured Afrikaans speakers, or whether they were merely cultivating such an idea in order to maintain power over the English. The coloured vote remains a powerful bloc at the Western Cape, without which no political party can achieve victory in the province.

Afrikaners.[196] Smuts (cited in Giliomee, 2009:338) once lamented that: "We suffer for our very smallness". In his book *Coming of Age* (1931), written against the backdrop of the Great Depression, J.H. Hofmeyr (nephew of 'Onze Jan' Hofmeyr) identified three threats to stability in the Union, namely: (i) the lack of unity between the two white groups; (ii) the defects in the economic structure; and (iii) the changing racial demography which "[gave] rise to the white fear that ultimately black 'numbers will tell' in the struggle for power" (Giliomee, 2009:403-404).

Giliomee (2009:290) succinctly explains that "segregation developed in South Africa by marrying an economic system based primarily on migrant labour and a political system that ruled out black competition". He further states that "the idea took root that the small, scattered African reserves provided a home base for the African labour force and for their exclusion from political rights (2009:291). That these territories were quite insufficient to provide subsistence in the longer term, or a political outlet for all, seemed to trouble few whites". These ideas culminated in Rhodes and Hofmeyr's brainchild, the *Glen Grey Act* of 1894, which saw territories become "reservoirs of labour" (Giliomee, 2009:299). The *Natives Land Act* was passed in 1913, restricting Africans to certain land, and the *Native Urban Areas Act* followed in 1923 (Giliomee, 2009:311). Giliomee (2009:313) states that the latter two acts, in conjunction with the Union Constitution of 1909, "formed the basis of policy towards blacks for the rest of the century".

4.3.1.2. The poor white problem

According to Giliomee (2009:315), the most pressing social issue in Afrikaner politics from the early 20th century until the early 1940s was the *poor white problem*, after which the *racial problem* took over. Instead of poverty among white people suddenly becoming a problem, Giliomee argues that it was more a matter of the ruling class only now taking note of the existing phenomenon, in a bid to consolidate the white groups in order to enable the domination of the black majority. He links this concern with white poverty to a broader trend among Europeans at that time to safeguard white supremacy by preventing white people from "losing

[196] As far as I am aware, SIT research has not investigated whether in the absence of any other inequities, and without intergroup competition, the differing sizes of the ingroup and outgroup elicit more intense negative intergroup behaviour, than would otherwise appear in minimal social category studies (see Chapter 3, subsection 3.2.1.4). If there is a threat that is specifically experienced by minority groups owing to their numerical weakness, it is conceivable that *uneven* ingroup favouritism and outgroup hostility could be present in intergroup situations between minority and majority groups.

caste". To achieve this, Giliomee (2009:316) argues, "administrators and politicians began to delineate the criteria for membership of the dominant white community".

Post-war relief efforts in the Transvaal and Orange Free State which only focused on white people did not have to be justified, Giliomee (2009:316) explains, as citizenship and racial identity were identical. So too the increasingly segregated DRC in the Cape began to focus primarily on white poverty (Giliomee, 2009:317). Giliomee (2009:318) notes that a fifth of the white poor were English-speaking, and that some of them assumed an Afrikaner identity, indicating that there were not only racial and language components to the identity, but also class.

The lack of a proper education (as compared to English-speaking competitors), and the unwillingness to do manual labour for low wages (which hundreds of thousands of black people were willing to do), or to do regular manual labour at all, were the main causes of white poverty (Giliomee, 2009:318-319). Industrial and agricultural schools for poor white children were established in the Cape, and in 1905 compulsory education until the sixth school year was introduced for white children. The *African Political Organisation* (APO) protested the exclusion of coloured people to not avail. By the 1920s white and coloured schools were fully segregated (Giliomee, 2009:320).

While Afrikaner poverty was mostly initially a rural problem, after the Anglo-Boer War, when thousands of Boers who could not be resettled on their destroyed farms moved to the cities, it became an urban problem as well (Giliomee, 2009:321-322). At the goldmines in the Transvaal, black men were "a source of ultra-cheap labour" and posed "a constant threat to unskilled and even semi-skilled Afrikaner workers" (Giliomee, 2009:323). The interests of Afrikaners and black people were thus constantly, and throughout much of the history of South Africa, diametrically opposed to each other, explaining the persistent intergroup conflict (in addition to racial prejudice) between these groups.

Giliomee (2009:323) describes the urbanisation of Afrikaners after the Anglo-Boer War as "rapid, chaotic and almost always traumatic". In 1890, before the war, only 2-3% of Afrikaners were urbanised; by 1936 that figure had risen to 50%. By 1960 it was 75% (Giliomee, 2009:405). Their lack of English proficiency and relatives who could refer them for work (under unions operating on the closed-shop principle), meant these Afrikaners were excluded from the formal job market and became known collectively as the *urban poor whites*. Giliomee

(2009:324) states that the urbanising Afrikaners found accommodation in slums in the Witwatersrand.

> The traumatic urbanisation of Afrikaners had cultural and political dimensions as well. A study depicted the scene: '[Urban Afrikaners] were working like black people, taking orders like black people, living in shabby residential streets adjacent to black shanty towns, and having to speak a foreign language – English – like a conquered race.' Their better-off fellow-Afrikaners did not know whether to avert their eyes or rush to their help, but, whatever they did, the poor represented an acute embarrassment. In the view of English-speakers the Afrikaner usually appeared as 'the poor, uneducated railway worker, the ignorant policemen … vacant low class beings. A stigma of poverty and ignorance was attached to the whole group.'

When in 1907 a group of unemployed English and Afrikaans speakers marched to Pretoria to demand white employment at fair wages, they were appalled at Smuts's answer that there was work for them on the Pietersburg railway line for three shillings and four pence a day and a bag of mealie (maize) meal. Giliomee (2009:325) cites the editor of *De Transvaler*, Haas Das, who complained that the offer of the mealie meal "was most insulting to the Afrikaner nation" in that "[i]t was placing them on a level with Kaffirs".

Smuts, convinced of the neo-classical economics of Alfred Marshall, author of *Principles of Economics* (1890), was opposed to government intervention in the plight of the poor, believing that only a free market, time, and improved education could remedy the situation. In 1923, as prime minister of the Union of South Africa, Smuts argued the inevitability of some white people being pushed out to "lie there as the wounded on the battlefield", insisting that all that can be done was to focus on the next generation. Giliomee (2009:326) states that this callousness with regard to the poor white problem was widely credited as the reason for the ruling SAP's defeat the following year (see subsection 4.3.1.4).

Giliomee (2009:327) states that Hertzog, who had become wealthy through inheritance after the war, was part of a small class of *Heere-boeren* (landlords). This class is said to have had little influence among the conservative, traditional Boers, one of whom stated: "These rich farmers … these selfish, self-righteous bloodsuckers! … Even our great generals who make such nice speeches, oppress the poor in private and enrich themselves from the impoverished". Aside from the perception that Afrikaner leaders were contributing to the suffering of poor Afrikaners, the ability of leaders to influence the group is also affected by the perception of their prototypicality (see Chapter 3, subsection 3.3.2.2).

Despite Smuts's and Hertzog's best efforts, Daniël François (D.F.) Malan ultimately channelled this visceral sense of marginalisation into the political system of Apartheid. Malan believed in the pastoral obligation of the DRC, as the Afrikaner's church, to help Afrikaners "in overcoming their poverty and maintaining their cultural and national character". This belief was called the *volkskerk* (people's church) position (Giliomee, 2009:327). Concerned with the abject poverty of the Afrikaners in the wake of the Anglo-Boer War, and the intra-Afrikaner political divisions, Malan came to believe that the "native question" was the root cause, and could only be solved by further segregation (Giliomee, 2009:328).

Giliomee (2009:346-349) discusses the *Carnegie Commission on the Poor White Problem* in South Africa in depth. He states that its greatest accomplishment was debunking some of the myths regarding the problem, including the belief that the Afrikaners were genetically and intellectually inferior (compared to the English). It also cautioned against the growing dependency of poor whites on the government for free education, cheap housing and medical services and job protection – a "national pathology" as one DRC minister termed it. Giliomee argues that this dependence on the government was grounded in the political system that granted universal franchise to white people but denied it to black people. The votes of poor whites thus carried a lot of weight, something they were well aware of. The DRC minister consequently proposed that the right to vote be withdrawn once a person became wholly dependent on the state.

4.3.1.3. Smuts's SAP against the mobilised miners

The Afrikaner poor thus began wielding some political power. Giliomee (2009:325) states that by the 1920s urban Afrikaners, while still poor, had begun to form a community which they organised around Afrikaans schools and churches. They were prioritising their education and training and "were expressing their power at the ballot booth in a way no politician dared to ignore". The urban poor white problem was increasingly becoming a political problem, and would soon spill over into the political mobilisation of the masses, further intensified by the post-war animosity between the two white communities. Giliomee (2009:329) states:

> Impoverished Afrikaners roamed the streets of Johannesburg and other towns, nourishing a bitter grievance about the Anglo-Boer War and a fierce desire to return to the land. Afrikaner workers wanted a republic, but not the sort of socialist republic advocated by the communist activists. They were also deeply suspicious of the capitalist class, with good reason. […] To aggravate the Afrikaners' position, white trade union leaders, like the employers, were almost all English-speaking. Both capital and organised white labour were staunch imperialists with little sympathy for Afrikaner aspirations.

According to Giliomee (2009:329), the most militant section of the Afrikaner working class were mineworkers, who became "thoroughly radicalised by the fear that the employers would undercut them with cheaper black labour". Regulations followed that limited some jobs to white people only. In 1913, a strike by white miners at gold mines was met with a heavy government response in which a hundred were killed. When strikes broke out at the coal mines in 1914, it spread to the railways and harbours. Martial law was declared and the English-speaking union leaders were arrested. Giliomee (2009:330) suggests that Smuts relied on the support of those he had fought with in the war, with some enthusiastically arriving for commando duty "to shoot Englishmen" in Johannesburg.

The rise in white poverty, anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism threatened the stability of the state and the SAP directly. Giliomee (2009:331) states that the suppression of the 1914-1915 rebellion (see subsection 4.3.2.1) led by General Christiaan de Wet, shrank the SAP's support base to mostly richer and older Afrikaners. At the same time, Hertzog's *National Party* (NP), founded in 1914, had captured the vote of the rural poor, and was reaching out to urban voters through two publications, *Ons Vaderland* in Pretoria and *Die Burger* in Cape Town. The latter was zealously anti-imperial and anti-big capital, and through its cartoonist, D.C. Boonzaaier, employed anti-Semitic tropes to pull voters from the SAP. Giliomee (2009:331) explains:

> His cartoons were inspired by a fierce hatred of the greed of the mining magnates and the sycophantic admiration het believed Botha and Smuts displayed towards them and the Empire. He depicted the bewildered urban poor whites as scorned and exploited by the unscrupulous capitalists, portrayed by a repulsive Hoggenheimer figure, who regularly got Botha and Smuts to dance to his tune.[197] Although Boonzaaier denied it, Hoggenheimer was unmistakenly Jewish, and the cartoons stimulated the populist opposition to big capital, Jews in business and the culture of materialism.

The South African economy stagnated in the aftermath of World War I, while the number of white youths entering the job market skyrocketed after a post-Anglo-Boer War baby boom. Inflation and unemployment increased sharply. Giliomee (2009:332) notes that since many immigrant workers left the mines for Europe to go fight in the war, by 1918 the majority of white miners in the dangerous underground jobs were Afrikaners, who would "soon prove to be the most radical force the mines had ever employed". After returning from the war himself, Smuts made several violent missteps, such as the killing of 163 Israelites (a black religious sect) near Queenstown in 1921, and more than a hundred tribesmen in present-day Namibia

[197] One such cartoon depicts Smuts in the famous military call with the words "Hoggenheimer needs you" (Steyn, 2015:75).

who were resisting taxes in 1922, as well as his response to the Rand Strike of 1922, after which Hertzog remarked that Smuts's footsteps "dripped with blood" (Giliomee, 2009:332).

Although both black and white miners were disaffected, a government commission found that 75% of the militant strikers were Afrikaners, and mostly nationalists seeking the formation of an independent republic (as opposed to socialists and communists seeking to upend the ruling class). So too the majority of the police forces and commandos that crushed the strike were Afrikaners. According to Giliomee (2009:333), the republican strikers "presented the conflict in atavistic terms as a re-enactment of the frontier struggle between white and black" (see anchoring in Chapter 3, subsection 3.5.2) and soon the mineworkers' strike had also become about toppling British imperialism.

Another faction within the strike were English-speaking Communist revolutionaries who, through their publication the *International*, appealed to the policemen and armed civilians (cited in Giliomee, 2009:333-334): "Are you prepared to serve idiotic capitalists as their stupid underlings and accomplices in suppressing your fellow Afrikaners? It is their intention to replace us and also you with cheap black labour".[198] As a result of the competition between white and black labourers, appeals were made for workers to "unite and fight for a white South Africa". Giliomee (2009:334) argues, however, that this message did not enjoy mass appeal, as the capitalist too were white.[199] The Labour Party invented the term "civilised labour", later used by white workers in calls for "civilised wages for civilised labour", an approach the NP later adopted in lieu of its republicanism (Giliomee, 2009:334).

Similar to the political activation of women in the Great Trek and the Anglo-Boer War, Giliomee (2009:334) asserts that a "radicalisation of Afrikaner women" occurred during the 1922 strike which saw them head a parade of hundreds on horseback. He cites as evidence the Governor General's report to London that "in the attacks on scabs, women have played a prominent part on several occasions". He further states that extremist strike leaders employed the *swart gevaar*, or "black peril" argument to radicalise the strikers, which saw fights break out between white and black miners, some deadly. After two months of striking, a force of

[198] Note the merging of anti-imperialist sentiment with generalised anti-black sentiment, as a result of labour competition faced by the urban poor whites. These sentiments mirror that of the anti-immigration Great Replacement theory which enjoys significant support throughout the West today.

[199] The fact that race could not properly be used to separate friend from foe, might suggest why language became so prominent in the political mobilisation over the next few decades. While religion was once used to differentiate the burghers from the natives, it could also not be employed here, as not only did the missionaries effectively spread Christianity among the black population, but the English were, just as the Afrikaners, Protestant.

10,000 workers stormed Johannesburg, attacking police stations, mines and railways. Fearing a "red revolution", Smuts declared martial law and began shooting and bombing at the strikers' position, killing 214 people (Giliomee, 2009:334-335).

The strikers' request for the extension of the colour bar was denied, as Smuts believed that the government could not help the poor whites by committing injustice against other groups. Giliomee (2009:335) states that the colour bar was "an admission by whites that they could not compete against blacks, and had to take recourse to laws that violated right and fairness". Smuts did, however, pass legislation in 1924 that discriminated against black workers by excluding them from trade union membership. Several other pro-white worker pieces of legislation were passed in the following years, leading to employers and the white working class seeing the state as an "active player", instead of a "watchdog". Giliomee (2009:336) argues that both began to "see their salvation not in independent organisation as a class or in aggressively expressing their interests, but in developing a symbiotic relationship with the state". He believes that the state began at this point to actively define the relationship between white prosperity and white supremacy.

4.3.1.4. Hertzog's NP and the mobilised state

Oddly-enough, both J.B.M. Hertzog and D.F. Malan began courting African voters in the period after the 1922 strike, referring to them as "black Afrikander" (indicating the white normativity of the Afrikaner identity at this point in time) and intimating that they should enjoy equal status with white nationalists. The SAP government, on the other hand, lost some black and coloured votes as a result of its brutal response to the 1922 strike. The ANC implored black and coloured voters to vote against the SAP. The NP defeated the SAP in the 1924 election (Giliomee, 2009:337). The NP's language on black and coloured people changed after coming to power, however, and they soon began preaching segregation (Giliomee, 2009:338). Giliomee (2009:340) explains that once the non-racial qualified franchise was ruled out as an option to bring in more Africans (because it would disqualify poor and unemployed white people from voting), the reserves became central to the solution of the racial question.

The Pact's 1924 victory (i.e., the coalition of the NP and the Labour Party) accelerated the trend towards economic nationalism and industrial protection. The *Iron and Steel Corporation* (Iscor) was established in 1928, some years after the founding of the *Electricity Supply Commission* (ESCOM, later Eskom). The government used the "civilised labour" policy to ensure that every white man could maintain a "civilised standard" of living, for example by

rewarding companies that only hired white people with preference for state contracts.[200] The *Riotous Assemblies Act* of 1930 made it easier to crush (African) protests (now that poor and working class white people no longer needed to protest as they could rely on the state), and by 1932, the ANC were criticising the government for the "retrograde and medieval laws" directed at black people (Giliomee, 2009:341-342).

According to Giliomee (2009:342), the NP promised coloured people in the 1924 election that they would treat white and coloured people as one group who economically and politically belonged together. While they were better off under the civilised labour policy than black people, they were certainly not treated as equal to white people. Despite all the protections for white workers, Giliomee (2009:343) states that rural white bywoners and other poor whites on farms were not affected by any legislation.

4.3.1.5. White unity and purity

Hertzog, growingly exasperated with Afrikaner lobbies (especially farmers), and Smuts, eager to get off the opposition benches, decided to join in a broad political coalition. This coalition was successful in the 1933 election and Hertzog became the leader of the ruling United Party (UP) in 1934 (Giliomee, 2009:349; 407). The fusion of the SAP and NP was met with strong opposition by the Cape NP under D.F. Malan's leadership, and other nationalists who believed the Afrikaner cause would be sacrificed by kowtowing to big capital (as Smuts was regularly accused of doing) (Giliomee, 2009:408). Malan opposed the UP as a bulwark of capitalism and imperialism, and countered its policy of *vereniging* (unification of all white people), with a policy of *hereniging* (reunification), or, unifying all white people who accepted an independent South Africa as well as institutional bilingualism. He and other breakaway members of Parliament formed the *Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party* (GNP; Purified National Party), which became the official opposition (Giliomee, 2009:349; 408-409).

In 1934, Hendrik Verwoerd (as an academic, prior to his entry into politics) proposed a comprehensive social welfare system for white people as a solution to the poor white problem (Giliomee, 2009:351). In 1937, he became editor of the nationalist newspaper *Die Transvaler*, and proposed among other things, quotas for the Afrikaners to help them advance in commerce and the professions (see footnote 200).

[200] A similar government policy in South Africa today is heavily criticised by many Afrikaners (see BEE in Chapter 5, subsection 5.1.1.4).

At the centenary celebrations of the Great Trek in 1938, a call was made for a *reddingsdaad* (rescue act) to save the descendants of the Voortrekkers. Here, Giliomee (2009:352) speculates, a shift occurred from believing the state or outside help would solve the poor white problem, to relying on ethnic solidarity, expressed through the phrase "*'n Volk red homself*" (a people rescues itself) – which he emphasises belies the massive contributions made by the state to the Afrikaner cause (see subsection 4.3.2.4). In another instance of anchoring (see Chapter 3, subsection 3.5.2), at the centenary celebrations, Malan (cited in Giliomee, 2009:353) likened the current situation of urban Afrikaners to the Great Trek and the Blood River battle:

> The odds in the struggle are changing, but to the detriment of whites … [The Afrikaners of the new Great Trek to the cities] were meeting the non-white at his Blood River, partly or totally unarmed, without a ditch or even a river to separate them, defenceless on the open plains of economic levelling.

According to Giliomee (2009:353), the legislation of the 1920s introduced stability to the system of industrial relations and greater security to white workers. However, as he suggests, a truly united, dominant white group would only come about once political leaders turned their gaze to the private domain (2009:354):

> While the 'civilised labour' policy, education and training all helped to incorporate whites in the dominant group, the intensification of residential segregation probably did more than any other measure to bring about a consolidated white group. By the early 1930s racially integrated slums were a dominant feature of all the major towns. Over the next two decades the white elite across party divisions began to unscramble this omelette.

Several Afrikaner women's welfare organisations were formed in the aftermath of the Anglo-Boer War, of which the largest was the *Afrikaanse Christelike Vrouevereniging* (ACVV; Afrikaans Christian Women's Association) in the Cape. Equally concerned with white poverty and white purity, leader of the ACVV, Miems Rothman (also known by her nom de plume MER) lamented conditions at white slums in 1925 as follows: "[P]oor [white] people often have to live with coloureds … they sometimes chat like neighbours, they help each other when there is illness (it is especially the coloureds that help the whites), their children play together in the streets" (Giliomee, 2009:343-344).[201] Giliomee (2009:344) argues that for Rothman, "the survival of the Afrikaner volk depended on its working class becoming consciously white and

[201] This suggests better social relations or a greater sense of community between lower-class white people and coloured people, at least in urban areas.

consciously Afrikaner". He notes that fears about the racial mixing of urban white people in the slums became widespread.[202]

Giliomee (2009:354) points out that the UP, not the NP or GNP, passed the *Slums Act* in 1934 which enabled the expropriation of whole areas. In Johannesburg, white slum dwellers were rehoused while black people were moved to new townships away from the city. New coloured townships were established in Cape Town. He states that by 1945 the poor white problem was over, and by the 1950s economists had found that white and black people were no longer competing for the same jobs.

4.3.2. Afrikaner nationalism

4.3.2.1. The First World War and the Afrikaner Rebellion

Britain's declaration of war in 1914, which also put South Africa in a state of war, triggered the Afrikaner Rebellion of 1914-1915 (also known as the Maritz Rebellion). Britain's request to the South African cabinet to seize part of the German South West Africa colony, and Botha's willing assent, angered Afrikaners who would now have to assist the British Empire in battle, only a decade after they themselves were conquered (Giliomee, 2009:380). Steyn (cited in Giliomee, 2009:381) commented that Afrikaners were being expected to fight against Germany, which had been sympathetic to the Boer republics: "Never did I think that any government, and least of all an Afrikaner government, would use the children of concentration camps against the [German] nation".[203]

Giliomee (2009:381) argues that De la Rey's conduct was an early warning sign for things to come. He states that De la Rey was under the influence of Nicolaas ("Siener") van Rensburg, a "religious mystic" from Lichtenburg, who claimed to have had a vision of a call from God for "the release of the Boer people". De la Rey called a meeting with armed burghers to discuss Siener van Rensburg's vision. Giliomee believes that due to De la Rey's popularity, he would have been able to rally the support of thousands of Transvaal Afrikaners to fight for the independence of the republics.

Conspiracy theories surrounding his accidental shooting death at a police road blockade abounded. Within a week of De la Rey's death, Generals Christiaan Beyers, Christiaan de Wet

[202] A law banning marriages between white and black people (but not between white and coloured people) had already been passed in 1928 under Hertzog's NP (Giliomee, 2009:344).

[203] This remark, needless to say, has to be viewed in context, that is, before the atrocities committed by Germany in the Second World War.

and Jan Kemp published a memorandum demanding that no South African forces participate in the war (Giliomee, 2009:382). The Afrikaner Rebellion of 1914-1915 followed, which involved an armed revolt against the government, and saw Manie Maritz and some of his men joining the German forces in South West Africa. Giliomee (2009:382) notes that the split between Afrikaners and their leaders had reached a breaking point, with Botha and Smuts, and Steyn and Hertzog, in opposite corners.

The Afrikaner Rebellion, consisting of nearly 12,000 rebels, was limited to a few districts in the northern Free State, the northwestern Transvaal and the northern Cape, and was largely fought between Afrikaners. Casualties included 190 rebels and 132 government troops. Giliomee (2009:383) believes that rebels were treated with leniency since the government recognised how unpopular the South West Africa invasion was, as well as the martial law it had imposed during the rebellion.

As editor of *Die Burger* and Afrikaans language activist, Malan had earned his political bona fides and became leader of the Cape NP in 1915. That same year, in the aftermath of the Afrikaner Rebellion, the NP achieved a political upset in a parliamentary election when it received broad Afrikaner support "putting itself within reach of power" (Giliomee, 2009:383-384). Giliomee (2009:384) believes that the Rebellion also precipitated another development in the Afrikaner nationalist movement, namely the DRC's firmer stance on certain issues and its refusal to censure the Afrikaner rebels on the request of Botha's government. As a result of Malan's proposal at a DRC conference, and of his writings in *Die Burger*, the church was now "taking a political stand and declaring its ethnic character" (Giliomee, 2009:385). Giliomee (2009:385-386) elaborates on Malan's view of the church and its centrality to Afrikaner politics and identity formation:

> [Malan] realised that for a national movement to succeed its members had to believe their community unique. For over 250 years in South Africa, he said, the church had held the colonists together as a social unit on that basis: 'The church was the means by which God guided and forged our people and our church is still the guarantee of our nationality.' The SAP's policy of Afrikaner-English reconciliation had erred by undermining the sense of Afrikaner uniqueness and insisting on separating politics and religion. Malan saw his duty as building up the NP as a party to preserve both language and community, which was also the call of the church.

4.3.2.2. Afrikaner inferiority and the language issue

According to Giliomee (2009:380), finding themselves in a country in which *God Save the King* was the anthem, the national flag was the Union Jack, and the King's face appeared on

every stamp, Afrikaners had difficulty identifying with the new state and its institutions. Giliomee (2009:369) argues that while the SAP was based on values, and the Labour Party on interests, the Unionist Party (founded by Jameson in 1910) was in effect an ethnic party of English speakers seeking to maintain British ties. Hertzog became increasingly combative in parliament, criticising the SAP's policies of loyalty and reconciliation with open derision, resulting in his exclusion from Botha's cabinet in 1912. By 1913 Botha would lament being viewed as "a traitor to [his] race" by some sectors of the Afrikaner group.

After his dismissal, at a festival in Stellenbosch celebrating constitutional language equality, Hertzog read a telegram from Steyn, mirroring (in Dutch) sentiments first expressed by Cicero: "The language of the conqueror in the mouth of the conquered is the language of slaves". Giliomee (2009:370) states that the act caused a sensation and even led some to immediately stop speaking English in public. The following year, Hertzog founded the *National Party* (NP) in Bloemfontein, with the most support received from the Doppers still harbouring resentments towards Botha and Smuts for their betrayal of the Christian National schools. According to Giliomee (2009:370), neo-Calvinism never, however, won the majority support in the Afrikaner nationalist movement.

As noted in subsection 4.2.5.8, Smuts and Botha founded Het Volk in 1904, to oppose restrictions on Dutch and advance the cause of self-government (Steyn, 2015:45). But Steyn and Hertzog, and Smuts and Botha had different conceptualisations of nationality, which Steyn (2015:49) argues split Afrikanerdom. R. Steyn (2018:182) contends that a schism within Afrikanerdom saw the SAP try to hold the middle ground between "ultra-Afrikaners" and "English jingoes". He not so subtly asserts that "the clash was between one political leader [Botha] trying to turn out good South Africans and another [Hertzog] trying to turn out staunch Afrikaners".[204] He believes that whereas Botha "thought in Afrikaans" and only spoke English when he had to, Smuts was fluently bilingual and although speaking Afrikaans to friends and family, "had been taught to think in English" (2015:51). Steyn (2015:60-61) says of Smuts:

> While he believed that Afrikaners should hold dear the language in which they honoured their forefathers, their families and God – as he always did himself at home - he felt that English was more suitable as a literary and intellectual medium. Accordingly, he underestimated the link between language and nationality, and failed to support the growing campaign for Afrikaans to replace Dutch as one of the two official languages. This turned out to be a political mistake. It allowed Hertzog to put

[204] May (2012) critiqued the persistently unfavourable juxtaposition of minority ethnicity with national identity in academic and political discourse (see Chapter 2, subsection 2.1.2). Note that the author is an English speaker.

> himself forward as the true champion of his people and don the mantle of Afrikaner leadership that Botha and Smuts were equally entitled to.

Giliomee (2009:371) credits Tobie Muller, a young DRC minister who died in the 1918 flu pandemic, with making the first "substantial intellectual" Afrikaner nationalist appeal, while also warning against the pitfalls of nationalism. Muller argued, among other things, that Afrikaners had developed their nationalism in the "school of misery", that the line of distinction between them and the English was "drawn in blood", all while cautioning Afrikaners not to permit their nationalism to degenerate into hatred of other nations, or to simply aim at distinguishing themselves from English speakers. Giliomee states that Muller wanted English speakers to develop a distinctive South African identity, and for black South Africans to "cultivate their own national self-respect instead of imitating one of the two white communities".

Muller also believed that Afrikaners had to first overcome their sense of marginality and inferiority through education, and that Afrikaans was inextricably linked to Afrikaners' search for social identity. He was a proponent of mother-tongue education and the teaching of national history, and believed that the continued inferior position of Dutch and Afrikaans in the public sphere would embitter Afrikaners (Giliomee, 2009:371-372).

Hertzog argued at length for the link between the individual use of Afrikaans in the public sphere and the material benefits to Afrikaners as a whole, criticising Afrikaners who failed to speak Afrikaans in public or who sent their children to English schools (Giliomee, 2009:372). Giliomee (2009:356) describes Hertzog's NP as a typical ethnonationalist party which insisted on prioritising South African interests (above imperial interests), and that a sense of "white nationhood" had to be based on a recognition of both Afrikaans and English culture. Only by developing their own identity and institutions could the Afrikaner community progress. Hertzog argued that the Afrikaners had to wage a language struggle "to stop considering themselves as *agterryers*" – mere auxiliaries of the English. Giliomee states that these political battles would give rise to a more exclusive Afrikaner identity:

> This included a strong identification with Afrikaans as a public symbol of its 'nationality', with South Africa as its only national home and with indigenous or local forms of cultural or artistic expression – new attachments that were manifested alongside older ones such as an adherence to the Reformed faith, an insistence on racial exclusivity, and a rejection of *gelykstelling* or social levelling. Other identities, particularly that of 'Boer', used predominantly in the republics, faded away in an increasingly urban environment. The battle between the two main parties, waged mainly along language lines, resulted in the term 'Afrikaner', previously used in an

> inclusive sense, increasingly being defined exclusively in terms of both race and culture.

According to Giliomee (2009:357), amid unification, many English and Afrikaner leaders supported reconciliation between the two white groups. But the reconciliatory tone struck by, for instance, Smuts, dismayed Afrikaners still scarred from the Anglo-Boer War. Giliomee (2009:358) argues that the war was not simply a military battle, but also a propaganda battle, in which Afrikaners faced continuous denigration. Even after the war, he states, some newspapers seemingly enjoyed provoking Afrikaners, *The Star* for example defending the concentration camps. Hertzog considered Botha's "euphoric talk of Union and reconciliation" very premature. In 1917 Malan decried the doctrine of Afrikaner inferiority that permeated throughout the state and society, and which led to Afrikaners believing themselves to be inferior.

Giliomee (2009:359) believes that the attempt to establish a national community and have its language enjoy parity of esteem with English, in order to overcome the feeling of marginalisation, was the main motivation of the Afrikaner nationalist struggle. In addition to the widespread public use of Afrikaans, Giliomee postulates that Afrikaners wanted to define and represent themselves as the true South Africans, instead of being represented by English speakers as "unrefined, semi-literate, racist, dogmatic, and unprogressive". But, as Hertzog recognised, due to the preceding century of British immigration, Afrikaners had already "largely assimilated English customs, culture and ideals", leaving only language as a discernible difference between the two white groups.[205]

The imported Westminster political system, Giliomee (2009:360) argues, which concentrates power at the centre (in Parliament, and not the constitution) and allows the majority to make sweeping changes, was not appropriate for use in South Africa, as it leads to divisions along racial and ethnic lines in heterogenous societies. He states (2009:361-362):

> From the very first days of the Union of South Africa the language issue surfaced as the key issue that divided the two white groups and could split the ruling SAP. Accused of politicising the language issue, Hertzog pointed out that the British imperialists themselves did not consider language as a neutral instrument. He quoted a letter of

[205] The Afrikaner nation would not have come into being (especially one that united white Afrikaans speakers across South Africa, separated by the Great Trek and the Anglo-Boer War), had it not been for British imperialism, which enflamed the Afrikaners' nationalism. All signs were pointing to the gradual decline and eventual loss of both Dutch and Afrikaans, and eventually, any traces of ethnic identity separating Afrikaners from white English speakers. It was in their opposition to the British that the Afrikaners ultimately decided to maintain their distinctive ethnic identity, especially through the use of Afrikaans.

> Alfred Milner's Director of Education in the post-war reconstruction, E.B. Sargant. It instructed English teachers to complete the work of the military in teaching 'the children of burghers our language and our ideals … and eventually our great Imperial ideals.' Language had become embroiled in the issue of war, reconstruction, social identity, and the relative status of the two white communities.

Giliomee (2009:362) cites a British journalist's view at the time that the Afrikaners' language struggle was a lost cause, an English politician from Natal who stated unequivocally that union between the Afrikaners and the English meant anglicisation, and an Afrikaans editor, who noted that bilingualism and other political recognition of the Dutch language were seen by English speakers as "a menace to the interests of their own race". He also cites Botha's Darwinian belief that the language issue will resolve itself (without state intervention) since "the fittest language will survive". Giliomee explains that the Smuts administration ignored the constitutional provision which mandated the equal use of Dutch in the state due to pressure from English speakers who "suddenly [found] themselves in a political minority despite winning the war". As a result of the rollback of language provisions, and the continued educational disparities between the two white groups, the dominance of monolingual English speakers of the higher ranks of the civil service remained a political issue until the 1950s (Giliomee, 2009:362-363).

Conflict over the language issue, of course, also involved language-in-education policies. The dual-medium policy of the Free State came under fire from the Unionist Party, and eventually, Hertzog had to settle for a government *recommendation* to the provinces of mother-tongue education until the sixth grade and the teaching of the second language as a subject. After the sixth year, parents could choose between monolingual and bilingual education. All provinces except for Natal made mother-tongue education compulsory (Giliomee, 2009:363).

In higher education too, language conflict followed unification. Aside from the college at Potchefstroom, English was the sole medium of instruction at university colleges across South Africa. Rhodes' proposal for an English-medium university at Groote Schuur in Cape Town, aimed at strengthening white unity and imperial ties, was fiercely opposed in Stellenbosch as it would subordinate Victoria College and threaten the continued use of Dutch as medium of instruction beyond primary education (seeing as the highest level of education in South Africa would only be available in English). The Minister of Education at that time, although recognising the needs of both white communities, rejected the idea of separate tertiary educational institutions, emphasising that the need to "[fuse] the two races into one nation" was of greater importance (Giliomee, 2009:363).

In 1913, Malan contrasted the "institution [in Cape Town] artificially called into being for political and other reasons" with Victoria College and its connection "with the spiritual, moral and national life of the Dutch-speaking section of the people" (Giliomee, 2009:363). While the plan for a university in Cape Town continued despite opposition, the government did agree to a university in Stellenbosch if Victoria College could raise £100,000. In 1915 Jan Marais donated the sum,[206] on condition that Dutch or Afrikaans would enjoy equal status as medium of instruction with English. The Victoria College became Stellenbosch University in 1918 (the same year as the founding of the University of Cape Town), at which time at least half of lectures had to be conducted in Dutch or Afrikaans, and by 1930 English was almost completely phased out (Giliomee, 2009:364). The establishment of an Afrikaans-medium university would be one of many achievements of the Second Afrikaans Language Movement.

4.3.2.3. The Second Afrikaans Language Movement (1903-1925)

Whereas the First Afrikaans Language Movement (1875-1890) rested largely on the shoulders of Du Toit and the GRA, the Second Afrikaans Language Movement (1903-1925) was a community-wide endeavour. It involved various aspects of language planning and language domains (see Chapter 1, subsection 1.1), and formed part of a much larger social, economic and political movement in the aftermath of the Anglo-Boer War. Despite some having enjoyed self-rule in their own states in the Transvaal and Free State since the Great Trek, white Afrikaans speakers scattered throughout a united South Africa, would only now become one nation.[207]

According to Giliomee (2009:364), it was not immediately apparent which language would be best able to rally Afrikaners. When the *Zuid-Afrikaansche Taalbond* was founded in 1890, delegates were given a choice between old Dutch, modern Dutch, Dutch with a simplified spelling and Afrikaans: nearly half voted in favour of using any of the four options, more than a third voted for Afrikaans, while the minority opted for Dutch. Dutch with a simplified spelling was ultimately selected. Hertzog called it "complete arrogance" to try to maintain Dutch believing instead that Afrikaans would naturally become the volkstaal, though even he only began using Afrikaans in speeches in 1922.

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[206] The present-day equivalent of this sum is approximately £8,7 million. https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetary-policy/inflation/inflation-calculator

[207] In agreement with the scholarly consensus, Kriel (2021) affirms that the Great Trek was not an expression of *Afrikaner* nationalism. She does argue, however, that it signified the rise of *Boer* nationalism, in which white Dutch-speaking farmers on the eastern frontier of the Cape Colony became *ethnic Boers*. This corresponds with Pretorius's (2022) view of a separate Boer nation (see Chapter 5, subsection 5.3.1.7).

Giliomee (2009:364) identifies Eugène Marais as one of the first supporters of Afrikaans as a written language. As editor of the *Land en Volk* newspaper in Pretoria before the war, Marais opposed the corrupt Kruger government as well as Kruger's large-scale appointments of Dutch immigrants, and used Afrikaans alongside Dutch to attract readers. Instead of the usual Transvaal patriotism, Giliomee argues, Marais emphasised the "ties of blood" of Afrikaners throughout South Africa. Giliomee (2009:364-365) also identifies Gustav Preller, journalist with *De Volksstem* in Pretoria, as a champion for Afrikaans who, after noticing that people switched to English because of low proficiency in Dutch, began to advocate for the use of Afrikaans as written language. Giliomee believes that Preller viewed the development of Afrikaans, which would give rise to a "distinctive nationality", as not simply the task of the church, the school and educated people, but of all Afrikaners.

But many prominent Afrikaners still preferred Dutch to Afrikaans. The attempt to promote Dutch with a simplified spelling, Giliomee (2009:365) argues, was mostly an elite project of Stellenbosch professors with the support of western Cape teachers' organisations. A central figure in this endeavour was professor Gawie Cillié, who was opposed to Afrikaans as a dialect of the uneducated. So too, many Cape politicians preferred a simplified Dutch to Afrikaans, such as Onze Jan Hofmeyr, who asked Afrikaners whether they were serious about maintaining Dutch. Giliomee (2009:365) notes the answer as follows:

> But a new generation of Afrikaners had concluded that only Afrikaans could develop as a public language and as the main symbol of their social identity. Responding to Hofmeyr's call, Gustav Preller declared that Afrikaners were, indeed, not serious about Dutch, which they could not speak without stammering. The written language of a people had to evolve out of its spoken language, and that language was Afrikaans. The real question was whether Afrikaners were serious about their mother tongue, Afrikaans.

And they were. In the years immediately following the war, Willem Postma argued that Afrikaans had already become an independent language. D.F. Malherbe, after studying linguistics in Germany, maintained that Afrikaans was not merely a dialect, but a fully-fledged language (Giliomee, 2009:365). Malan, under the influence of Fichte, became enamoured with German romantic nationalism and its equation of language, state and nation, and its view of language as central in human development (see Chapter 2, subsection 2.2.3). According to Giliomee (2009:366), Malan, one of the leading architects of the Afrikaner nation, said that Afrikaners could only become strong if united. He explains (2009:366): "The best defence

against anglicisation was the realisation that they had their own heritage, based on their nationality, language, religion and character".

Giliomee (2009:366) asserts that while Smuts aimed for white unity, Malan was preoccupied with unity on a lower level – that of the volk or ethnic nation. In 1908 he declared: "Raise the Afrikaans language to a written language, let it become the vehicle for our culture, our history, our national ideals and you will also raise the people who speak it". In this same vein, Jan Celliers urged writers and poets to produce a literature "steeped in the Afrikaner spirit and intelligible to Afrikaners". C. Louis Leipoldt, Totius and Eugène Marais answered this call and produced Afrikaans poems reflecting on the Anglo-Boer War and its after-effects. In addition to the desire for Afrikaans literature, Giliomee (2009:367) argues that there was also a demand for an Afrikaner nationalist history, evidenced by the huge success of Preller's series of articles (and later a book) on Voortrekker Piet Retief (see subsection 4.2.2).

According to Giliomee (2009:367), the simplified Dutch lobby realised it could not expel Afrikaans, while the Afrikaans lobby recognised that the language would have to be standardised in order to replace Dutch. In 1909, both factions partook in establishing the *Zuid-Afrikaansche Akademie voor Taal, Letterkunde en Kunst* (today the *Suid-Afrikaanse Akademie vir Wetenskap en Kuns* (SAAWK; South African Academy for Science and Arts)), which set out to promote both Dutch and Afrikaans. The *Cape Times* meanwhile published readers' letters calling Afrikaans "'a mongrel', 'kitchen', 'hotchpotch', 'degenerate' and 'decaying' language, fit only for 'peasants and up-country kraals'". *The Star* fervently declared:

> Any man who knows the real Dutch language is painfully aware of what a truly stupid patois this South African 'taal' is, and it must be a source of surprise and astonishment to the serious inquirer why such a degenerated branch of an originally sound language is so stubbornly maintained in its provoking ugliness.

Giliomee (2009:367) believes that Cornelis Jacobus (C.J.) Langenhoven was the most successful at mainstreaming the idea that Afrikaners should use Afrikaans for all purposes. He argued that maintaining Dutch was futile since Afrikaans, although in need of further development, was the true mother tongue of the Afrikaners and "it is our only national characteristic" (Giliomee, 2009:368). Langenhoven (cited in Giliomee, 2009:369) further argued: "Afrikaans is our own, adapted to our own conditions.[208] Having grown up as part and parcel of our national character, it is the only tie that binds us together as a distinct people" and

[208] See habitus in Chapter 2, subsection 2.1.4.

"[i]t is our highest honour, our greatest possession, the one and only white man's language which was made in South Africa and which had not come ready from overseas … [It is] the one bond which joins us as a nation together, the expressed soul of the *volk*".[209] Langenhoven successfully proposed Afrikaans as an alternative medium of instruction in Cape primary schools in 1914, and the Free State and Transvaal following suit (Giliomee, 2009:369).

Hertzog, who was dismissed from Botha's SAP cabinet in 1912, and founded the NP in Bloemfontein in 1914, became a vocal supporter of Afrikaans *taalhandhawing* (language maintenance), in contrast to the SAP's focus on unity, loyalty and reconciliation on English terms. The Second Afrikaans Language Movement also involved an elite project of standardisation; distinguishing street Afrikaans from civilised middle-class or, *algemeen beskaafde Afrikaans*. Giliomee (2009:372) elaborates:

> A new identity for Afrikaners ass a modern, increasingly urbanised people with an expanding intellectual horizon had to be forged on the basis of 'civilised' Afrikaans. The aim was nothing less than 'to build a nation from words.'

After the Anglo-Boer War there was a proliferation of (mostly Cape-based) Afrikaner ethnic institutions, such as teachers' organisations (that parted from the pro-Empire English ones that existed at the time), welfare organisations tending to Afrikaner poverty, and even some Afrikaner financial institutions. By 1900 all banks except for the District Bank of Stellenbosch remained, but trusts were more successful. (Giliomee, 2009:372). The *Land Bank* was established in 1912 (Giliomee, 2009:379). Giliomee (2009:372) states that during and immediately after the Afrikaner Rebellion of 1914-1915, Afrikaner capital began to flow to such institutions, and between 1914 and 1922, 26 Afrikaans trust companies were established. He notes that a Cape Town lawyer, W.A. (Willie) Hofmeyr realised that Afrikaans would have to become the language of successful business and gain commercial value in order for it to survive (2009:373).[210] He left his successful law career in 1915 to join the Cape NP, and would go on to convince Malan to leave the church for politics.

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[209] Giliomee notes Langenhoven's error in classifying Afrikaans as a white man's language, suggesting that this was a strategy to improve the prestige of the language in the eyes of "middle-class Afrikaner and English snobbery". While it has certainly never been a white man's language, Langenhoven's remark does ring true when read that Afrikaans was the only language spoken by white people in Africa, that was not also spoken in Europe.

[210] In other words, the ethnic habitus of Afrikaners would have to become cultural capital in the field of the post-war South Africa (see Chapter 2, subsection 2.1.4). Afrikaans would have to become instrumentally valuable in order to survive, thus be able to mobilise Afrikaners.

Giliomee (2009:373) states that the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, the cabinet's decision to invade South West Africa, and the overwhelmingly pro-war media led to the idea of creating a pro-Hertzog Dutch daily newspaper in Stellenbosch. Spearheaded by the manager of the Stellenbosch District Bank (an Afrikaner institution with "proto-nationalist" members, mostly affluent farmers, professional men and Victoria College professors), together with a businessman and private secretary to Jannie Marais (a diamond magnate, largest shareholder of the bank, and eventual investor), the publishing house *De Nationale Pers* (Naspers) was born. In 1915 the first issue of *De Burger* appeared under the editorship of Malan. Giliomee (2009:374) believes that when the newspaper changed its name to *Die Burger* in 1922, it "signalled the final transition to Afrikaans".

In 1917 the SAAWK released the first list of suggested spelling of Afrikaans words, and the following year Akademie member and linguist J.J. Smith provided a list of "civilised standard" pronunciations (which, among others, leaned away from the pronunciation of coloured people, such as *djy* for *jy*).[211] Smith was the editor of another Naspers publication, *Die Huisgenoot* (The House Companion), which became known as "the people's university" as it had reached one-fifth of Afrikaner families by the early 1930s. This magazine was not chiefly concerned with the political or language struggle, but aimed to educate Afrikaners on matters of art, science and commerce. In an editorial of Smith's successor, it did though laud white supremacy as "the core principle of our civilisation" (Giliomee, 2009:375).

According to Giliomee (2009:375), the *Huisgenoot* aimed to build the Afrikaner "personality" (read group identity) by focusing on Afrikaner history and on "the heroism and martyrdom of the Voortrekkers and the Boer commandos in wars against the British". He maintains that the *Huisgenoot* successfully stimulated a consciousness of history and in doing so, paved the way for the incredibly successful 1938 centenary celebrations of the Great Trek. So too the women's magazine, *Die Boerevrou*, (The Boerwoman) under the editorship of an anglicised Mabel Malherbe, who nonetheless decided to still identify as Afrikaner, imparted knowledge regarding childrearing, housekeeping and health to Afrikaner women. Giliomee (2009:375-376) argues:

> The journal addressed Afrikaner women in their new social position: as mothers and as bearers of the Afrikaners' cultural and nationalist aspirations. Materially their task was

[211] The low status of coloured people was certainly the overwhelming motivation for leaning away from 'coloured Afrikaans'. However, many of these forms are also associated with the Cape in general, meaning it is possible that the move away from a regional form of Afrikaans was also informed by the need to unify the diverse white Afrikaans-speaking groups across South Africa.

> to manage the family household with knowledge of hygiene and domestic science. Their reward would be successful sons and daughters who achieved much for the country and for the Afrikaner people.

Especially after the war there was a need to encourage Afrikaner women, many of whom were traumatised and shamed by what they had endured in the camps and by the loss of their children. *Die Boerevrou*, with its logo of a Boer *noitjie* (maiden), was integral in the formation of the *volksmoeder* (mother of the nation) ideal to which many Afrikaner women throughout the 20th century aspired, and to which they were held – an amalgam of wife, mother, longsuffering and submissive servant of the Volk, and keeper of the nation's collective memories (Brink, 2011).

In addition to the political mobilisation of Afrikaner women in the Great Trek, the Transvaal rebellion of 1880-1881 and the Anglo-Boer War, Giliomee (2009:376) argues that they were also active during unification. He states that Hertzog took note of the many women in his audiences and claimed that "they feel more than the men". So too Hertzog commented after the Afrikaner Rebellion of 1914-1915, that Afrikaner women were perhaps "the greatest rebels", and warning that "[i]f one ignores the voice of Afrikaner women, one will land this country in a political hell". Despite the suggestion of the power of Afrikaner women, the volksmoeder ideal ensured that they were consigned to the home and community life, where they were tasked with the creation, and recruitment, of members of the nation. Giliomee (2009:376) elaborates:

> Afrikaner women were prominent in the violent 1922 strike, but two years later the NP came to power and the women, except for some fiery trade unionists, abandoned all political activism. Increasingly Afrikaner women became full-time wives and mothers, staying at home and employing a servant. They abandoned many of the tasks that had once occupied their time: cooking, slaughtering, making clothes and educating their children. They became politically conservative and took little part in the public agitation for the franchise for women. They resigned themselves to the judgement of men, who deemed competition for positions on public bodies (except in women's organisations) not suitable roles for women […] Women occupied no offices in the Dutch Reformed Church, which increasingly influenced Afrikaner community life in the towns and cities. The church encouraged women to see their main role as the anchor of their family whose place was at home. Many middle-class women became involved in Afrikaner welfare organisations, which concentrated on the Afrikaner poor, incorporating them socially into the ranks of 'respectable' white society and politically into the Afrikaner nationalist movement. Between 1910 and 1974 only three Afrikaner women went to Parliament.

When the Pact alliance under Hertzog came to power in 1924, Malan introduced a bill to grant equal status to Afrikaans alongside Dutch and English. By that time, Afrikaans was already

being taught in all primary schools, theses were written in Afrikaans, and more Afrikaans books were published in South Africa than English ones (Giliomee, 2009:376). While Smuts seemed less than thrilled, referring to the "mighty flood" of Afrikaans and teasing Malan for the "Dutch without grammar" he spoke, Malan (cited in Giliomee, 2009:377) saw the granting of official status to Afrikaans as monumental: "For the first time the Afrikaners felt that they were fully recognised and fully free and at home in their own country".

In 1925, when Afrikaans became an official language, it almost immediately replaced Dutch as medium of instruction and in the government domain (Giliomee, 2009:377). But without a serious body of literature, it was unclear whether Afrikaans would stand the test of time. N.P. van Wyk Louw, the greatest of a new generation of Afrikaans writers called the *Dertigers* (Generation of the Thirties), believed that along with the Great Trek and the Anglo-Boer War, the replacement of Dutch with Afrikaans was one of the greatest gambles in which the future of the Afrikaners was at stake. Smith, now professor at Stellenbosch, believed that this gamble could backfire, resulting in a *boerevolkie* (little boer nation) that would not be considered a *kultuurvolk* (a cultured people) with a *kultuurtaal* (a high culture language).

According to Giliomee (2009:378), the establishment of Afrikaans as a public language was largely a result of its successful introduction and use in schools (confirming the centrality of *public* education in maintaining minority languages). The first Afrikaans-medium secondary school was established in 1921. One of its founders believed that the dominance of English schools in the twenty years since the war amounted to theft of "an entire generation out of our national existence" and that "[our] children can only be preserved for our people through Afrikaans schools" (Giliomee, 2009:379). We can clearly see the links here between language, politics, education and ethnic identity.

Although the introduction of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction initially resulted in bilingual institutions, monolingual language policies soon followed. From the 1920s a growing number of schools became single-medium. At first, both Afrikaans or Dutch and English were used at several universities, including the Uni*versity of Cape Town* (UCT), *Stellenbosch University* (SU), the *Transvaal University College* which later became the *University of Pretoria* (UP), *Grey University College* which later became the *University of the Free State* (UFS) in Bloemfontein, and the *Huguenot University College* in Wellington. However single-medium Afrikaans instruction was eventually introduced at SU, UP and the UFS, joining Potchefstroom, now the *North-West University's* (NWU) Potchefstroom campus, which had

(by this point) always been single-medium Dutch/Afrikaans. So too, UCT switched to single-medium English instruction (Giliomee, 2009:379).

The granting of equal official status to Afrikaans in 1925 was the result of more than 20 years of language planning and activism by Afrikaners.[212] It marks the greatest achievement of the Second Afrikaans Language Movement. The decades that followed was a period of "cultural consolidation", in which Afrikaans was further developed and standardised, Afrikaner cultural organisations were established, and Afrikaners became 'politically confident', no longer plagued by feelings of inferiority to the English, culminating in the attainment of political dominance in 1948 (Van Coller & Odendaal, 2005:26). Throughout the Second Afrikaans Language Movement and beyond, Afrikaners discovered the power of collective action in the private sphere, giving rise to *the organisation Afrikaner* which promoted cultural nationalism, and a host of Afrikaner enterprises which profited from mobilised ethnicity.

4.3.2.4. The 'organisation Afrikaner' and volkskapitalisme

After the suppression of the Afrikaner Rebellion, rebels faced financial ruin as a result of civil claims for the widespread looting that had occurred. The *Helpmekaar Vereniging* (Mutual Aid Association) was set up, and after appeals by Malan in *Die Burger* that synthesised nationalism with Christian duty, wealthy donors as well as regular Afrikaners were contributing to the fund. After settling all the claims throughout the country, the fund was left with a substantial surplus. Giliomee (2009:386) argues that the success of the effort led to a sense of self-empowerment among Afrikaners. He also claims that this moment in the "nascent social movement" boosted the status of the NP, *Die Burger* and Naspers. Giliomee (2009:387) argues that Naspers, which only paid its first dividend in 1928, was an *ethnic*, and not a *commercial* enterprise (2009:387).

In 1918, after the success of the *Helpmekaar Vereniging*, the *Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Trust en Assuransie Maatskappy* (Santam; South African National Trust and Insurance Company) and the *Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Lewens Assuransie Maatskappy* (Sanlam; South African National Life Insurance Company) were launched. According to Giliomee (2009:387), both companies were associated with the NP, and marketed themselves as "genuine Afrikaner people's institutions" with the latter using the motto "*Uit die volk gebore om die volk te dien*" (Born from the people to serve the people). Their success relied on the growing prosperity of (especially Cape) farmers, who would go on to establish a wine co-operative called the *Ko-*

[212] Plans for the centenary celebrations of this achievement have not been without controversy (see Chapter 5, subsection 5.3.1.4).

operatiewe Wijnbouwers Vereniging (KWV; Co-operative Wine Growers Association) in 1918. After the passing of the *Co-operatives Act* of 1922, a co-operative movement in agriculture followed (Giliomee, 2009:388).

According to Giliomee (2009:388), the management of the public corporations Eskom and Iscor was dominated by Afrikaners, but the latter's entry into private business was lacklustre. He believes that Afrikaner entrepreneurs were not driven by profit alone, but by the desire to prove that Afrikaners could succeed in the business world which had thus far been dominated by English and Jewish South Africans. Giliomee (2009:388) cites Albert Wessels, who was born in 1908 and would go on to become an exceptionally successful Afrikaner entrepreneur, who reflected on his early years in Johannesburg as follows: "We remained aware of the fact that our parents had been defeated, and deep in our consciousness there was a craving for rehabilitation and the urge to prove that we were at least the equals of the conquerors and their descendants".

The *Afrikaner Broederbond* (League of Afrikaner Brothers; not to be confused with Hofmeyr's Afrikaner Bond) was founded in 1918, led by Rev. Jozua Naudé, one of the Bittereinders who refused to sign the peace treaty. It restricted membership to Afrikaans-speaking Protestant financially-independent white males, and aimed for "the promotion of a healthy and progressive spirit of unity among all Afrikaners aimed at the welfare of the Afrikaner nation; the cultivation of a national self-consciousness in the Afrikaner and love for his language, religion, traditions, land and people, and the advancement of all the interests of the Afrikaner people" (Giliomee, 2009:400-401). In 1929 the Broederbond founded the *Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge* (FAK; Federation of Afrikaans Cultural Associations) to systematically promote Afrikaans. Giliomee (2009:401) states that with the FAK the "organisation Afrikaner" was born, willing to fight the language struggle on an organised, and even secret, basis.

Giliomee (2009:401) maintains that it was a legitimate struggle; by 1936, 60% of senior civil servants were still English monolingual. He states that Afrikaans language activists had their work cut out for them, and were first preoccupied with *taalhandhawing* (language maintenance). The FAK published guidelines for Afrikaans use in commerce and the civil service in 1931, which entrenched the middle-class variety as the standard form. The FAK also modernised and elaborated the language by issuing glossaries on motorcars, sports and trade. Giliomee (2009:402; my emphasis) highlights some of the FAK's loftier ideals:

> It is not only a matter of building and expanding our literature, stimulating our desire to read and developing an ability to appreciate, create and sing our own songs and make our own music. We must express an *authentic* Afrikaans spirit in the houses in which we live, the furniture we use, the paintings on our walls, the books on our shelves, the naming of our places – in short our outlook, frame of mind and spiritual inclination. Our nationhood must be our highest national pride.

These ideals amounted not only to the maintenance of (minority) ethnic identity, but the essentialisation of Afrikaner identity, and the establishment of its primacy as a social and political way of life. The FAK released a *Volksangbundel*, a volume of folk songs comprising translated German songs and some local ones (including a couple with Malay origins), all passed off as 'authentic' Afrikaner culture. It agitated for an Afrikaans national anthem, an Afrikaans radio service and obtained government support for a monument to commemorate the Voortrekkers. In 1930 the *Afrikaanse Taal- en Kultuurvereniging* (ATKV; Afrikaans Language and Culture Association) was founded and in only a couple of years had 46 branches and 11,000 members. It would go on to organise the successful ox wagon trek of the 1938 Great Trek centenary celebrations (Giliomee, 2009:402).[213]

Pre-eminent Afrikaans writer, N.P. van Wyk Louw (cited in Giliomee, 2009:402), observed in 1935 that in the first 25 years of Union "a small amount of literature had been produced; a whole people had developed a sense of personal worth; and the mother-tongue education they received was more valuable than any other form of education". Giliomee (2009:402) contends that although the Afrikaans language struggle was very successful, it rejected any possible contribution from coloured Afrikaans speakers and, because of a short supply of wealthy Afrikaners who could fund cultural initiatives, there was a heavy reliance on "Afrikaner political power being concentrated in a single party". Such a party would have great control over Afrikaner cultural and political nationalism, and the very definition and delineation of Afrikaner identity.

Giliomee (2009:428) states that Malan's nationalists identified two areas that required collective Afrikaner action: obtaining a larger share of the urban economy and developing a *cultural nationalism*. The underdeveloped state of Afrikaans complicated an Afrikaner cultural nationalism. However, Giliomee notes that the "struggle to develop Afrikaans as a public

[213] According to Giliomee (2009:86), 20th century nationalists, including D.F. Malan, used the unveiling of the Slagtersnek monument 100 years after the Slagtersnek Rebellion to support a nationalist myth. Rebels were depicted as brave martyrs who died standing up to the British. He argues that these nationalists ignored the fact that the rebellion was not quite that popular (see subsection 4.2.1.1). This illustrates the part-fact part-fiction nature of ethnic identity construction.

language went hand in hand with the political energy unleashed by the Afrikaner nationalist effort to claim for Afrikaans the same rights as English, and to seek to give expression to an authentic local identity". And thus, by the early 1930s Afrikaans had largely taken its present syntactic and lexical form. The much-lauded Afrikaans Bible appeared in 1933,[214] and several Afrikaans academic publications and literary works also followed throughout that decade. Poets called the *Dertigers* (Generation of the Thirties), including N.P. van Wyk Louw, his brother W.E.G. Louw, Elisabeth Eybers and Uys Krige, produced Afrikaans poetry of high quality, breaking from the romantic and particularist style of the writers before them (Giliomee, 2009:429).

Van Wyk Louw embraced cultural and political nationalism and believed that "it was language that distinguished a nation and held its people together". Van Wyk Louw did not, however, have a primordialist conception of Afrikaner identity, but instead, he recognised that a nation "had to be created anew on a daily basis through the will and the act" (cited in Giliomee, 2009:430). He also offered two concepts to "combat abuse of the nationalist idea": the *oop gesprek* (open conversation), in defence of a fluid conception of Afrikaner identity and the need for intragroup processes to withstand dogmatic beliefs; and *lojale verset* (loyal resistance), to signify the necessary act of internal criticism which serves as "the conscience of a nation" (Giliomee, 2009:431).

Van Wyk Louw, Giliomee (2009:431) contends, recognised that the Broederbond, the FAK and other nationalist organisations had largely taken over the Afrikaans language struggle and, although successful in countering the dominance of (the) English, this ran the risk that "cultural leaders without culture" would consider Afrikaner identity "a finished product", and become self-appointed "guardians of an ossified culture, driving out all that was daring and innovate". Believing that only ingroup members who maintain identification can meaningfully impact the group, Van Wyk Louw vowed to maintain his loyal resistance. Giliomee (2009:431) elaborates:

> A 'loyal resister' voluntarily accepts the limits and obligations of identifying with a people. In order to be heard, he needs to be connected to his people, 'inextricably linked in love, fate and guilt to the people that he dares to castigate: he does not speak of "they", but of "us".' He does not love the people for what they are but for what they can become. 'He must be prepared to go down with them if there is no alternative.' Louw's 1938 invitation to Afrikaners to remain cultural nationalists, even if they found political nationalism repugnant, would retain its appeal for the rest of the century.

[214] Centenary celebrations of this achievement can also be expected, possibly followed by a second centenary celebration of the Great Trek in 2038.

In discussing the politicisation of the Great Trek and the Anglo-Boer War, Giliomee (2009:432) notes that there was an uptick in interest in Afrikaner history in the 1930s, after decades of a "remarkable" public silence about the war. There was a surge in books and other writings on the war which nearly all glorified the Boer fighters and criticised the British concentration camps. One of the components of the centenary celebrations of the Great Trek, a re-enactment of the trek involving nine ox wagons from Cape Town, was an "electrifying event, sparking mass Afrikaner enthusiasm". Giliomee states that it was at this time, that Langenhoven's *Die Stem van Suid-Afrika* (The Call of South Africa) effectively became the national anthem and the FAK's *volksliedjies* (folk songs) and *braaivleis* (barbecue) – a re-enactment of Voortrekker cooking methods – became part of popular culture.

Giliomee (2009:433) states that the culminating event of the centenary celebrations on 16 December 1938 in Pretoria was attended by over 100,000 people, and cites the view of a journalist who was there: "It brought about positively the same result as that which occurs negatively when war breaks out or is being waged, when the volk feels its very existence being threatened. The peaceful wagons made the volk mightily aware of its own existence". Although the celebrations were not strictly associated with the NP (Smuts was also in attendance), Malan capitalised on the event, while Hertzog (cited in Giliomee, 2009:433), skipping the event, warned that "the holy things" of Afrikaner identity were being dragged into politics and soiled.

By the end of the 1930s, the Afrikaners had made massive gains on cultural issues, and although being politically dominant, were virtually absent from the non-agricultural private sector (Giliomee, 2009:433). They had no publicly listed companies, and their share in the private sector, including mining, manufacturing and construction, trade and commerce, and finance, was only single digit percentiles. Instead of pursuing nationalisation, which would spook the markets and enflame tensions between the two white communities, the Afrikaners began to promote a different kind of economic mobilisation. One such businessman suggested, in Giliomee's (2009:434-435) words, that Afrikaners were "too proud to ask others for help to work on their economic salvation", indicating that in addition to the desire to improve their material interests, the Afrikaners were still pre-occupied with their status and the way the English perceived them. If they were to become the equals of white English speakers, they would have to earn that position by themselves.

But Afrikaners first had to rid themselves of their fear and distrust of capitalism and private enterprises. Giliomee (2009:435) cites Verwoerd, who in 1939 stated that Afrikaners were

"almost over-organised on the cultural terrain and unorganised for economic purposes". He suggests that with the creation of the *Volkskas* (People's Bank), and its fundraising by the Broederbond and FAK secretary, "cultural and economic mobilisation had become entangled". The economic boom of the 1930s virtually eliminated white urban unemployment, and saw Afrikaner savings dramatically increase. With Afrikaner capital largely locked into bonds, Malan and J.D. Kestell, a Free State church leader, "suggested that the best tribute to the Voortrekkers would be to save poor Afrikaners through a *reddingsdaad*, a rescue act. They stressed that only limited help could be expected from the state or the corporate world. *'n Volk help homself* (A people rescues itself), a call Kestell made, soon captured the imagination" (Giliomee, 2009:436).

Instead of such a *volksfonds* (people's fund), which would act as a charity fund for poor Afrikaners, at the *Eerste Ekonomiese Volkskongres* (First Economic Congress of the People), held in Bloemfontein in 1939, politicians, academics and businessmen decided amongst themselves that Afrikaner capital would be best deployed in enterprises that could employ poor Afrikaners. In other words, the Afrikaners would in fact be supporting "fledgling Afrikaner enterprises", with the promise that profits would benefit Afrikaners as a whole (Giliomee, 2009:436-437).

From this grew the philosophy of *volkskapitalisme* (capitalism of the people), or the notion that Afrikaner enterprises were not purely driven by a profit motive, but also by a commitment to the Afrikaners who fund and support them. Afrikaners (including children) were asked to invest their money in Afrikaner enterprises, mostly through Sanlam's *Federale Volksbeleggings* (FVB, Federal People's Investments), while the Broederbond asked Afrikaners to support them through their patronage. Volkskapitalisme was an extremely successful instance of ethnic mobilisation. One of the beneficiaries of the FVB was billionaire Anton Rupert of the Rembrandt group, which has since split into the multinational companies Remgro and Richemont (Giliomee, 2009:438-439).

4.3.2.5. Separating the coloureds from the whites

Afrikaner ethnic enterprises did not limit themselves to the patronage of Afrikaners, however. Giliomee (2009:388) states that Sanlam, recognising the Afrikaans-speaking coloured community of the western Cape as a growing market segment, appointed coloured agents to attract them, evidently believing them to be "different enough to require a special approach". According to Giliomee, defining coloured people had always been a strenuous task: a coloured

leader Abdullah Abdurahman believed the term to refer to all British subjects in South Africa who were not European, while the Apartheid government defined it more narrowly as neither white nor African, despite the overlap in appearance between many coloured people and both groups.

Coloured people (as discussed in the first section of this chapter) share some common ancestry with white Afrikaans speakers and, due to their close mixing in the Cape Colony (where more than four-fifths of all coloured people lived), also share a language and some other aspects of a common culture. Their diverging histories did, however, cause separation between these two communities – not only the uneven master-servant relationships that predominated, but also the Great Trek and Anglo-Boer War, with which many white Afrikaans speakers associated, and not many coloured Afrikaans speakers. The fact that their political fates had not been intertwined, other than in the Afrikaans language struggle, meant that a solidarity between white and coloured Afrikaans speakers never fully developed.

Giliomee (2009:388) argues that coloured people were purposefully kept out of the Afrikaner group: "Coloured people were formed by their exclusion from the white dominant group, particularly in the church and schools, and by the identification of most with Western culture and Christian faith". He recounts the disagreement among white Afrikaans speakers regarding the group boundaries of the Afrikaner identity (2009:389):

> During the entire twentieth century activists for Afrikaans were confronted with a key issue that was never confronted squarely. Was the Afrikaner community a racial community whose language struggle was subordinate to the entrenchment of white supremacy? Or was it predominantly a language community whose social identity was shaped by the struggle for the acceptance of Afrikaans as a public language co-equal with English? If the latter was the case, the salience of race had to diminish and the creed '*die taal is gans die volk*' (the language constitutes the entire people), which activists often cited, had to be made a reality across racial boundaries.

A century later, this disagreement regarding the content and borders of the Afrikaner identity has still not been settled. I discuss this topic further in Chapter 5, subsection 5.3.1.4, where I suggest that contemporary white Afrikaans speakers tend to view the Afrikaner identity neither as a racial community nor a language community, but rather an ethnic community, comprising myths of common ancestry (including racial purity), a common culture (of which language is the most important attribute) but, importantly, also shared historical memories and a sense of solidarity (see Chapter 2, subsection 2.1.4). While the Afrikaner identity, as any other ethnic or national identity, has (partially) been constructed, meaning it can theoretically be

reconstructed, its enduring power should not be underestimated, especially when considering the power of ethnic categorisation (see Chapter 2, subsection 2.1.3). Instead of supplanting Afrikaner ethnic identity with a superordinate racially inclusive Afrikaans identity, there is reason to believe that the two will have to be made to co-exist.

Giliomee (2009:389) offers J.H.H. de Waal, writer of the first Afrikaans novel, as an example of a nationalist who supported a racially inclusive Afrikaans-speaking community, who believed the struggle to be between the British imperialists and other "selfish fortune seekers", and the "permanent population" of South Africa. Seemingly, the inclusive Afrikaans community was not envisioned as righting a wrong and reuniting two groups who belong together, but instead was intended to bolster Afrikaner numbers in an intergroup conflict with white English speakers. De Waal (cited in Giliomee, 2009:389) argued that coloured Afrikaans speakers, "speak the same language, have the same love for South Africa, have mostly the same history and interests and are hoodwinked by the same friends" as white Afrikaans speakers.

Abdurahman, leader of the *African Political Organisation* (APO), the first major coloured political movement founded in 1902, believed the Afrikaans language struggle to be the result of Boer resentments toward the other white group, and thus encouraged his coloured followers to stop speaking "the barbarous Cape Dutch" in favour of English. Despite this position, Giliomee (2009:390) points out that the APO's newspaper used Afrikaans and Dutch, as it was the language of coloured people, and in 1912 they supported the use of the term *Cape Afrikaners*, instead of coloureds. Between 1909 and 1922, the APO would publish the column *Straatpraatjes* (Street Talk), which utilised the variety of Afrikaans spoken by the coloured and white working class and petite bourgeoisie, in contrast with the white middle class variety of Afrikaans used in *De Zuid-Afrikaan*'s column *Parlementse Praatjes* (Parliamentary Talk).

According to Giliomee (2009:390), while the SAP was at least publicly in favour of the advancement of coloured people, in the five years after coming to power, it removed white children from missionary schools, where they were freely mixing with coloured and black children. Abdurahman's APO was critical of the SAP but was especially fearful of Hertzog's NP, in particular of its suggestion of the segregation of black people in the north, and what that would mean for coloured people in the south (Giliomee, 2009:391). Giliomee (2009:391) insists that for the first two decades of its existence, the NP was ambiguous towards coloured people, at one time intent on building a coalition between white and coloured people to counter the "common threat" they faced in the form of cheap black migrant labour. In Malan's pamphlet

Die Groot Vlug (The Great Flight) of 1916, he suggested that the segregation of black people would solve the poverty of both white and coloured people.

Giliomee (2009:391) argues that even though Hertzog believed that coloured people belong with white people politically and economically, they had to be segregated socially. The *Afrikaanse Nasionale Bond* (ANB; Afrikaans National League) was founded in 1924 by the NP, and its constitution identified white, coloured and African people as three separate races. The ANB pledged to protect the former two, from the latter. It implored coloured people to not try to pass for white, but to also not despise their Afrikaans heritage. After the 1924 election, the Pact government increased spending on education for coloured people, improving the school-going rate by 30%. The Pact did, however, discriminate against coloured people in employment and perpetuated pay disparities between the two groups.

The NP lost substantial support from coloured voters in the 1929 election, which Giliomee (2009:392) believes was largely due to Hertzog's proposed policy of enfranchising white (but not coloured) women and disenfranchising black people,[215] and what this would all mean for the voting rights of coloured people. During that election the ruling government introduced the concept of revision boards, which would attempt to define and classify the coloured group in order to determine whether a potential voter was coloured or African. While the NP won the election in 1929, it, as mentioned, lost the support of coloured voters, leading Malan to backtrack on their policy of designating coloureds as a separate race with separate interests (Giliomee, 2009:393).

According to Giliomee (2009:393), Malan again changed track by calling for the removal of coloured people from the voters' roll, when the NP and the SAP merged in 1934 to become the UP, while Malan headed the new *Gesuiwerde* or Purified National Party (GNP). He states that the agitation for social and residential segregation by Malan's NP further widened the gulf between educated white and coloured Afrikaans speakers and by 1934, English was the dominant medium of instruction in coloured schools (2009:394).

The centrality of Afrikaans in Afrikaner identity (at least at this historical point in time) is evident considering that both the self-identification and external categorisation of coloured

[215] Giliomee (2009:xvi-xvii) states that "after the Afrikaner nationalists won power in the mid-1920s, the political militancy of women dwindled and they played almost no role in the agitation for the franchise of women. Female liberation and nationalist liberation did not go hand in hand; the latter in fact undermined the former".

people as either Afrikaners or their own race, was strongly impacted by their language usage (in addition to racial exclusivity). Giliomee (2009:394) notes that by the 1930s coloured people had stopped referring to themselves as Afrikaners, due to the wedge the NP drove between white and coloured people. He explains that for as long as coloured people were part of the political system in the Cape, the Afrikaner identity in the Cape remained fluid and malleable, and only when the system become racially exclusive, did the identity become rigid (2009:393). This suggests that the Afrikaner identity in the interior of the country (where there were significantly fewer coloured people, and those that were had never been enfranchised), was rigid for much longer.

4.3.2.6. White polarisation and the Afrikaner split

The exclusion of coloured people from the Afrikaner group served to uphold the white supremacy long since entrenched in South Africa. While Afrikaner nationalism also saw the separation of the two white communities – Afrikaans and English white people became increasingly segregated, living in separate suburbs and sending their children to different schools (Giliomee, 2009:394) – as a white group (and at this point still the most successful of the two), English-speaking white people did stand to gain from Afrikaner nationalism. Giliomee (2009:395) maintains that English-speaking white South Africans were not opposed to the politics of the NP because of a moral opposition to racial segregation, but rather to the republicanism and pro-Afrikaans policies, which would lead to the removal of the symbols they held dear.

Giliomee (2009:396) states that most SAP Afrikaners loved the Afrikaans language, but believed that the nationalists "made a fetish of it". Smuts, Giliomee (2009:397) argues, was indifferent to the development and equality of Afrikaans in the public sphere, and suggests that this opened up a political opportunity upon which the NP could capitalise. When the NP (under Hertzog's Pact alliance) took power in 1924, and promoted equality of English and Afrikaans in the civil service, the SAP accused it of Afrikaner favouritism. In response to the fusion of the SAP and NP in 1934 to form the United Party, aimed at achieving *national unity* between the two white communities based on equality and mutual recognition of their different cultural backgrounds, Alan Paton (cited in Giliomee, 2009:407) highlighted English speakers' condition of anglicisation and assimilation for white unity: "I believe that we are more inclined to believe in co-operation than we are in '*samewerking*' (co-operation). I believe we are inclined to co-operate in English".

Steyn (2015:251) argues that while Hertzog "saw Afrikaners as a group whose primary task was to establish its own identity, Smuts wished the Afrikaner to become part of a much larger entity – the diverse British Empire – which embraced many races and creeds". This diversity is narrowly limited to immutable characteristics, meaning that Smuts (in Steyn's view) was a proponent of the assimilation of the Afrikaners, and not of pluralism or multiculturalism. Steyn further suggests that Afrikaners incorrectly viewed Smuts as "an Englishmen at heart", while the view of "General Smuts" in Britain and across the world, that he was "a true and patriotic Afrikaner – the finest example of his tribe", was the correct interpretation. This amounts to an external attempt at defining Afrikaner identity, despite the fact that many Afrikaners rejected Smuts as an ingroup member. The argument that Smuts acted as a non-prototypical ingroup member, or black sheep (see Chapter 3, subsection 3.3.2.2), is complicated somewhat by his tenuous ingroup identification in his later life and his beliefs which threatened the very continuity of the group identity itself.

Smuts seemed to oscillate between his subordinate (ethnic) identity and his newfound superordinate (global) identity, which personally served him very well. Smuts was instrumental in founding the League of Nations, the predecessor of the United Nations (Steyn, 2015:147). The majority of Smuts's children married Englishmen, and took on English surnames (Steyn, 2015:180). Smuts himself formed intimate friendships with many Englishwomen (Steyn, 2015:188; 198). Steyn (2015:190) cites British historian Kenneth Ingham who argued that these friendships "linked him most firmly with the wider world beyond South Africa", whereas his own wife "shared more deeply the Afrikaner side of his nature".

It is open to interpretation whether Smuts formed a dual identity (where his Afrikaner identity was maintained alongside a superordinate national or global identity) or a hybrid identity (where his subordinate Afrikaner identity became increasingly irrelevant). Steyn (2015:244) suggests that Smuts felt "flattered […] to be courted and lionised by the crowned heads of Britain and Europe". The sophisticated life he led after the Anglo-Boer War included many friendships with well-to-do people in Britain, America and elsewhere, and consisted of receiving dignitaries, esteemed speaking engagements and mingling with much more successful and esteemed people than his fellow Afrikaners. Although discussions between Smuts and "those in higher stations" revolved almost exclusively around international and intellectual matters, Smuts allegedly taught Queen Elizabeth the Afrikaans song *Sarie Marais* at Balmoral, which would later be played at her funeral (Steyn, 2015:244-245).

Despite maintaining sentimental attachments to Afrikaans and ethnic symbols, Smuts, post-Anglo-Boer War, does not seem to have maintained strong (Afrikaner) ingroup identification, and was neither a cultural nor a political Afrikaner. Either the Afrikaner identity was not his primary social identity, or he was able (through individual mobility) to function largely sans social identification. Smuts's life after 1902 was extremely non-prototypical for an Afrikaner (or any regular citizen for that matter), and reminds one of May's critique of the elitist nature of cosmopolitanism (see Chapter 2, subsection 2.3.3). His non-prototypicality, coupled with the identity threats he posed to Afrikaners who wanted to maintain their subgroup identity, severely limited his ability to impact ingroup members. Steyn (2015:250), noting that Smuts was often accused of neglecting his obligations in South Africa because he "spent long periods out of the country trying to solve the problems of others", suggests, however, that Smuts's Afrikanerness is unjustifiably questioned:

> In Smuts's case, it remains extraordinary, even in retrospect, that he was thought by so many of his countrymen to be less than a true Afrikaner – a man who did not have the interests of his own people at heart. So great was the bitterness felt by many Boers at his rapprochement with the British at a time when the wounds of the Anglo-Boer War were still raw, that for most of the second half of his life he was a figure of hate for many of his erstwhile admirers. He was charged with forsaking his language and culture in order to achieve the fame and glory that his own country could not give him. It also rankled that when in power, he never associated himself closely with the struggle for recognition of the Afrikaans language.

Steyn (2015:250) views this opposition to Smuts unfavourably, arguing that Afrikaners either "could not comprehend, or, if they did, readily subscribe" to Smuts's philosophy of "wholeness" (a reference to his book on holism), that is, "the gradual progression of disparate parts into a greater whole". This would not only require the unification of the two white communities under the British Empire, as Steyn proposes, but presumably also an ever-increasing assimilation of all subordinate groups into one global, undoubtedly English, identity. The proliferation of World Englishes, which continue to cause (some) separation between groups, goes some ways toward dispelling this 'unity through assimilation' argument. The uneven power relations which dictate unification strictly through English, should also be questioned.

Botha also faced criticism from Afrikaners that he was "an Afrikaner who had lost his identity" (Steyn, R., 2018:192). He married the daughter of an Irishman, but as he was not comfortable in English, mostly spoke his mother tongue with his wife (Steyn, R., 2018:16). Despite this, he remained uninterested in language activism, which worsened when he suspected "Afrikaans

was being misused as an instrument for anti-English propaganda" (Steyn, 2015:xiv-xv). Botha was also "disarmed by the warmth and splendour of the reception he was given in Britain", where he was treated as an honoured guest equal to the leaders from Canada and Australia, and even (controversially) befriended Jameson, leader of the Jameson Raid (Steyn, R., 2018:143; 145). R. Steyn (2018:173) states that the "outspokenly pro-Boer Emily Hobhouse […] [d]eeply disillusioned with the British establishment […] castigated Botha (as well as her good friend Smuts) for being so subservient to 'monarchical flummery'".

R. Steyn (2018:133) continues to unfavourably contrast (minority) ethnic identity with (majority ethnic) national identity, as May (2012) argued is ubiquitous, stating: "Botha's vision of the future was of a united white South Africa in which it did not matter whether one was Afrikaner or English. Hertzog's vision was much narrower: a country in which both white races lived side by side while retaining their separate identities, languages and cultures". R. Steyn (2018:xiv) does acknowledge that without Hertzog's insistence on the cultural, educational and language rights of Afrikaners, Afrikaans would probably not have survived, and Afrikaners would have likely been "subsumed by an omnipresent English culture", although I suspect Steyn views the latter as the preferred outcome. As noted above, white unity from the English perspective was always predicated on the full assimilation of Afrikaners.[216]

Giliomee (2009:396) notes that to the English, more was at stake than merely language policy. He cites G.H. Calpin who argued: "The British in fact, did not want to learn Afrikaans – and for reasons which have little to do with the oft-repeated assertions that Afrikaans was no language at all, and much to do with the fear of an Afrikaner advance". In addition then to language being linked with identity from within and without, 100 years ago in South Africa, language was also recognised as not merely a proxy for political battles, but as a symbol of the success of political battles between different identity groups. In other words, the bilingualism of English-speaking white South Africans would be proof that the (already bilingual) Afrikaners had achieved equality (politically and socio-economically) with the English. Conversely, rising English-monolingualism among Afrikaners would strongly suggest that English South Africans still had the upper hand.

[216] In my view, increased ethnic identification and mobilisation does not occur despite the opportunity for integration (see Chapter 3, subsection 3.5.3.5), but because of the absence of such an opportunity and the presence of assimilationist pressures.

According to Giliomee (2009:398), the adoption of a national flag for South Africa, which the *Balfour Declaration* (1926) allowed, became a polarising issue between the two white communities. Malan proposed a "clean flag" which would be free from reminders of the painful past. Smuts initially supported this idea, but came under pressure from his English supporters to keep the Union Jack in a prominent position on the new flag. In the end, after political manoeuvring by Smuts, South Africa adopted two flags, one which displayed both the Union Jack and the old Vierkleur flag under which the Afrikaners fought the Anglo-Boer War, and the traditional Union Jack.

The *Status Act* (1934) recognised South Africa as "a sovereign independent state along with Australia, Canada and other Dominions". Giliomee (2009:398) states that this successfully addressed the feelings of inferiority and subordination that Hertzog and many other nationalists harboured. He also believes that the British Empire, or the Commonwealth as it was now called, had effectively eliminated a hierarchy between itself and its voluntary members (but only for so long as a war did not break out which involved Britain). He states (2009:398-399):

> This did not mean that the Afrikaners now felt themselves more British or experienced a sense of dual loyalty. The Afrikaners' source of strength was their identification with South Africa as their only fatherland. Their name and the language they spoke derived from the name of the continent on which they had taken root. An English journalist wrote that the English-speaker regarded himself as 'a proliferation from an European stem' and had a strong emotional attachment to the 'British national home.' The Afrikaner, by contrast, saw himself as 'a transplant to the African soil.' For him the thought of having roots in both Europe and Africa was 'as bad as having a wife in every port.' Addressing the Briton he would say: 'The Afrikaners' ancestry is Dutch, French and German. But has the Briton ever heard him proclaim his faith in the culture of these countries? Thus the Afrikaner is driven to making a boast of his own insulation.'

Afrikaner nationalists identified several fears they had regarding English-speaking South Africans, such as that: (i) the English are stronger because they speak a world language; (ii) they are stronger economically because they dominate enterprise; (iii) they are generally better educated; (iv) they possess a political and moral strength due to their connection with Britain; and (v) a large number of Afrikaners are *Engelsgesind* (Anglophiles) and seek to curry favour with the English (Giliomee, 2009:405).

Giliomee (2009:399) notes how the Afrikaners had become influenced by continuous exposure to English South Africans in the cities, so much so that a Dutch visitor in the 1930s remarked that everything the Afrikaners thought and did were "Made in England". He recounts, however, how through especially literature, the Afrikaners were, on the other hand, attempting to "do

their own thing", i.e., build their own culture. Giliomee (2009:399) argues that the nationalist intelligentsia urged Afrikaners to develop their own cultural practices and "resist merely aping a foreign culture".

According to Giliomee (2009:399-400), English-speaking South Africans embraced loyalty to the Commonwealth (instead of just to South Africa), individual (versus community) rights, middle-class values (as opposed to populism), with English as a universal language at the centre. He argues that by the 1930s English culture and values had failed to unite the two white groups, as the Afrikaners were making headway in many regards, such as the official use of Afrikaans, winning elections, and producing a national literature (2009:400). In 1935 the otherwise pro-Empire *Cape Times* admonished English South Africans for relying on English literature produced abroad, instead of cultivating their own literature. Giliomee (2009:400) claims:

> People in both white communities had become receptive to Hertzog's approach towards white unity. The answer lay not in assimilation but in ethnically separate institutions in the white community that were committed to 'South Africa First'. The paradigm of this process was the establishment of the Voortrekker youth movement for Afrikaners, which was officially launched in 1931, following an effort by Hertzog to draw white boys into a single youth organisation with a South African ethos. Talks with the Boy Scout movement broke down when its leadership refused to abandon the oath to God and King, and flying the Union Jack. By now white education had adopted single-medium mother-tongue schools, and the concept of a separate Afrikaner youth movement had become respectable. The Governor General, Chief Justice, Prime Minister (Hertzog) and leader of the Opposition (Smuts), all agreed to serve as patrons of the Voortrekkers. The main parties now officially sanctioned such a form of nation-building.

4.3.2.7. Northern vs southern nationalists

Giliomee (2009:424) recounts the history of the Afrikaner working class and rising nationalism and communism in South Africa. He notes how, in an attempt to garner the support of Afrikaner workers, nationalists appealed to racial pride, culture and history, and communists to improved wages and working conditions (2009:427). The *Blanke Werkers Beskermingsbond* (White Workers Protection League), established in 1944, was one nationalist attempt at courting the Afrikaner worker. Giliomee (2009:427) argues that its journal, *Die Blanke Werker* (The White Worker), "was more concerned with spreading the nationalist ideology than with a typical working class agenda; it engaged in mythmaking about idyllic early times when there were no class divisions in the Afrikaner community, when the humble sharecropper ate at the table of the farmer. It blamed the capitalist and the trade unionist for antagonism in Afrikaner ranks".

According to Giliomee (2009:418), there was animosity between the northern and southern intelligentsia, even though they shared a mutual nationalist cause. "Provincialism", usually in the form of hostility between the Transvaal and the western Cape, was common throughout the 1900s among Afrikaner nationalists. He states that by the end of the 1930s, Transvaal nationalists' chief resentment was the Cape domination of nationalist politics. Giliomee notes the close relationship between Cape-based Naspers and Malan's NP, suggesting that they tried to censor Verwoerd when advocating a republic. Only in 1954, when J.G. Strijdom became Prime Minister as NP leader, did Transvaal nationalists gain power of the state.[217]

While both factions were nationalist and rejected liberalism, they had crucial differences between them. Giliomee (2009:418-419) argues that the north was influenced by its defeat in the Anglo-Boer War,[218] and the contempt for Afrikaners and Afrikaans expressed in English-language papers, and had experienced "unbridled mining capitalism" resulting in a primary concern with the competition white people faced as a result of cheap and plentiful black labour. Meades (2019:62) agrees that a split occurred between northern and southern Afrikaners post-Anglo-Boer War, which saw the south embrace capitalism whereas the north relied on co-operative endeavours and socialism.

Verwoerd (cited in Giliomee, 2009:419) was especially preoccupied with the spread of Afrikanerdom among urban workers, and wrote: "The Afrikaners of the cities, particularly the workers, have to be retained for Afrikanerdom, religiously, socially and politically … [The] future of our *volk* will be won or lost there […]" and "The threat to the Afrikaner is not Anglicisation, but that in urbanising he would undergo a process of proletarianisation in which he would lose all interest in the Afrikaner culture and would become merely an international worker".[219]

[217] Although Strijdom was leader of the NP in Transvaal, he was born in the Cape Colony in 1893, and attended Victoria College in Stellenbosch before resettling in the north. He was the uncle of the last Apartheid-era president, F.W. de Klerk (Wikipedia, 2024a). Verwoerd was also not originally from the Transvaal. He was born in the Netherlands in 1901, grew up in the Cape and later Rhodesia, and completed his studies at Stellenbosch, and in Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. As a professor at Stellenbosch, he protested the immigration of Jews fleeing from Nazi persecution in 1936, which opened up a political career for him in the Transvaal where he moved the following year, by this time already in his mid-30s (Wikipedia, 2024b).

[218] The differing histories regarding the Great Trek may have also had an impact on diverging ideologies between northern and southern Afrikaners, although, see footnote 217. These historical events may have impacted the local electorate more so than the politicians who mobilised them.

[219] Verwoerd seems here to juxtapose forced assimilation versus voluntary anglicisation and renunciation of subgroup identity as a consequence of globalisation.

Southern Afrikaners, on the other hand, had been in contact with English capitalism for more than a century, had a tradition of mutual tolerance with English-speaking white people, did not have a significant impoverished working class, and were more accustomed to living in close proximity to coloured people (although still being vehemently opposed to racial mixing) (Giliomee, 2009:419).

According to Giliomee (2009:419), the nationalist intelligentsia in the north and south also had different conceptualisations of Afrikaner identity. Members of the Dopper Church (in the north) viewed their identity as Afrikaners as the chosen people of God, similar to Israel. He states that in the Transvaal, Afrikaners were viewed "in metaphysical terms, emphasising a *volksiel* or a national soul". In the Cape, Malan spoke of a "God-given Afrikaner identity and of the hand of God in the Afrikaner history", but criticised those who exalted Afrikaners as "God's special favourite" above other groups. Giliomee (2009:419) argues: "In his secular mode he thought of the Afrikaners as people who had evolved as a distinct people, with their own religion, church, language and nationality, as a result of a particular historical process. Hence he used the term 'Afrikaner' inclusively [in terms of race] along with an exclusive ethnic definition".

Giliomee (2009:420) further states that Strijdom wanted Afrikaans as the only official language (and for English speakers to become Afrikaners),[220] whereas Malan wanted co-equal status between Afrikaans and English and the two white groups. The north was also much more unwavering in their demand for a republic than the south, which sought the support of English speakers. He also claims that the north was more "dogmatic, rigid and uncompromising" on the racial issue, whereas the south nationalists were more "ambiguous and very often hypocritical". He points to the south entertaining the theoretical possibility of coloured people becoming part of the dominant group, contrasted with their exclusion in practice. Giliomee (2009:420) continues:

> Except during the early 1960s, when Hendrik Verwoerd dominated the nationalist movement, it was the southern tradition that prevailed. Within the Cape Town-Stellenbosch-Paarl triangle a true ethnic establishment of politicians, academics, journalists, church leaders and businessmen that would form the main opposition to the UP had evolved, and would shape the apartheid ideology. In the north there was no

[220] In other words, Strijdom wanted English speakers to assimilate in the pursuit of (Afrikaner) nation-state congruence.

> such establishment, and little financial support for the academics and professional men who organised themselves into the Afrikaner Broederbond.[221]

4.3.2.8. The Second World War and political polarisation

Two attempts were made to unite the two white groups: the formation of the SAP during Union (see subsection 4.2.5.8), and Fusion which resulted in the establishment of the United Party (see subsection 4.3.1.5) (Giliomee, 2009:440). While Smuts and half the cabinet favoured intervention in World War II, Hertzog and Malan wanted to remain neutral, believing that this issue could greatly divide the two white groups. Giliomee speculates that the majority of the electorate was opposed to taking the country into the war. Smuts prevailed.

> It was a watershed event in white politics, also destroying the middle ground with respect to the issues of race and colour well before the NP announced its apartheid programme. Without the political polarisation brought about by the war, which from the war vote in 1939 was increasingly drawn on language lines, Malan's NP would have been unlikely to come to power in 1948. The premier Afrikaans man of letters, N.P. van Wyk Louw, typified the radicalisation the vote produced among the nationalist intelligentsia; he thought it despicable to fight 'for those who have conquered your own people.' The only option now was to construct an 'uncompromising spiritual Afrikanerdom.'

In 1940, Hertzog and Malan created the new *Herenigde Nasionale Party* (HNP; Reunited National Party), with Hertzog as leader.[222] He was unpopular among radical northern nationalists for his moderate stance on republicanism and his rejection of the idea to relegate English (and English speakers) to a subordinate position. At a party congress late in 1940, he withdrew from the party and Malan became leader (Giliomee, 2009:441).[223] According to Giliomee (2009:442), the most important anti-war effort was made by the paramilitary *Ossewabrandwag* (OB; literal translation is Ox wagon fire guard). He states that the "one war measure that outraged the anti-war camp was the order that civilians, including farmers, had to surrender their arms and ammunition" (2009:442). Civilians and teachers were also instructed by the government to resign from the OB and the Broederbond. Large scale internment without trail was also used against Afrikaner nationalists. According to Steyn (2015:146), Smuts

[221] Giliomee (2009:421) argues that the predominantly northern organisation was not nearly as influential as the Cape NP and *Die Burger* in the Afrikaner nationalist movement. He believes the Broederbond was at its strongest at the height of Apartheid in the 1960s, but still paled in comparison to the ideological influence of the NP. He maintains that the Broederbond's greatest influence was in the movement in the 1930s that transformed the universities in Pretoria and Bloemfontein from bilingual to Afrikaans institutions.

[222] Hertzog and his NP faction split away from the United Party merger with Smuts's SAP, due to his opposition to entering World War II on the British side. Malan's GNP rejoined the NP, which then became the HNP (Wikipedia, 2024c).

[223] Before his death in 1942, Hertzog had professed his support of National Socialism (Giliomee, 2009:441).

viewed the Afrikaner Broederbond as "anti-South African and dangerous" and purged Broederbond members who refused to give up their membership from the civil service.

According to Giliomee (2009:443), many Afrikaners felt victimised by Smuts's ruling government and its sweeping powers, which blurred the distinctions between the ruling party and the civil service, and stigmatised those who did not want to fight in the war. Giliomee claims that war-time measures also saw the bilingual requirements for civil servants ignored, and there were widespread complaints by Afrikaners that they were denied promotions because they were suspected of harbouring anti-war sentiments.

According to Giliomee (2009:416), Hendrik Verwoerd, editor of *Die Transvaler* from 1937 until 1948 when he joined the NP,[224] was not ideologically aligned to either neo-Calvinism, Nazism or racism, but instead was a social engineer willing to use the power of the state to steer social development in what he considered to be the right direction. He opposed the arrival of Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany in 1936, believing that it brought a conflict of interests between the "disadvantaged Afrikaner majority and a privileged Jewish minority". Verwoerd did, however, praise the Jews for their protection of group interests (Giliomee, 2009:417). Giliomee (2009:418) explains that anti-Semitic sentiments among Afrikaner nationalists were not rooted in German anti-Semitism, but rather local frustrations about the lack of economic progress among Afrikaners. He believes that the NP's anti-Semitism was "opportunistic rather than deep-rooted". Giliomee (2009:xv) argues that the historically low economic position of Afrikaners had a strong influence on their politics:

> Their relative economic backwardness is analysed here with reference to the heritage of more than two centuries of subsistence farming, the devastation of the Anglo-Boer War, the Afrikaners' late and often traumatic urbanisation (until 1890 more than 90 per cent lived on farms) and their lack of industrial skills. This gave rise to the problem of the poor whites, who formed approximately a quarter of the Afrikaners by the early 1930s. The voters who supported the National Party in the 1920s and 1930s were mainly less successful farmers, semi-skilled or unskilled workers, civil servants on the lower rungs, teachers and clergymen.[225] Lewis Gann was not far off the mark when he wrote: 'The National Party resembled a pre-World War Two peasant party in Eastern Europe – anti-capitalist, anti-urban, ethnocentric and anti-Semite'. Yet, significantly, the Afrikaners made no serious attempt to nationalise any part of the economy despite

[224] Prinsloo (1981:18-19) describes *Die Transvaler* as the mouthpiece for the Transvaal NP.

[225] Wessels (2011:154) argues that during the Great Depression, the Afrikaners' fear of British imperialism and domination had largely been replaced by their fear of black domination. He states that this was especially true in the cities where poor whites had to compete with black workers in the labour market.

> the fact that foreign capital and local English-speakers totally dominated mining, industry and commerce during the first half of the twentieth century.

Giliomee (2009:444) further argues that the NP was not Fascist or proto-Fascist in the same vein as European fascism, as its leaders could be voted out, followers were free to express their views, criticise their leaders, or leave the party without fear of retaliation, the party was divided over key issues such as the republic, and Apartheid was not yet a pillar of party unity. He also states that NP leaders largely found the imitation of the paramilitary style of Fascist movements distasteful. Malan, Verwoerd and Strijdom also disavowed National Socialism. Giliomee claims that "radical right-wing movements like the Ossewabrandwag or the Greyshirts" only had a fleeting impact on Afrikaner nationalism or the ideology of Apartheid. He states that by 1945 support for the UP and OB had dwindled so much that the *Broederbond* endorsed the NP as the only party that could serve Afrikaner interests (2009:445). Giliomee (2009:446) believes that the opposition among Afrikaners to entering World War II was integral to the NP's electoral success in 1948 and thus the creation of Apartheid:

> The orthodoxy among historians is still that the NP victory in 1948 was the outcome of the Broederbond's manipulative abilities, the upsurge of mass nationalist sentiments in the 1938 commemoration of the Great Trek and, above all, the formulation of apartheid as an ideology in the early 1940s. However, these factors, separately or jointly, were not decisive. The crucial turning point was the Afrikaner nationalists' outrage over the country being taken into the World War on a split vote, confirming in their eyes South Africa's continuing subordination to British interests, and the disruption brought about by the war effort. This was the catalyst that enabled the NP to draw together diverse people in a powerful alliance: cultural nationalists seeking cultural autonomy, farmers seeking labour, businessmen seeking investment capital and clients, and workers seeking racial protection and opportunities for training; and all of them seeking to secure Afrikaner political survival and a changed relationship between South Africa and Britain. This nationalist alliance formed the basis of the NP victory in 1948; apartheid would soon become the operational ideology of the alliance, and would form part of the NP's 1948 platform, conceived primarily by people in the DRC concerned with strategy towards missions and by the nationalist intelligentsia in the western Cape. Their ideas had started to take shape in the 1930s and were fleshed out in the five years between the 1943 and 1948 elections.

Giliomee (2009:xvii) here rejects a number of orthodox views regarding Apartheid, arguing that: (i) the attempt to project South Africa as a 'white man's country' dates back to the late 19th century; (ii) an elaborate system of racial segregation was in place by the 1920s; (iii) it was not the appeal to Apartheid that allowed the National Party to come into power in 1948, but rather South Africa's entry into the Second World War, and the divisions that consequently developed within the white community largely along language lines; (iv) that Apartheid was

not mainly the work of populist Afrikaners in the north, but was forged in the Cape as a result of the preoccupation with the removal of the coloured vote and the reduction of Africans in the region; and (v) the main ideological influences on Apartheid were not Nazi racial dogmas but the established practice of segregated schools, the theology of the Dutch Reformed Church and its mission to achieve self-governing indigenous churches, racial discrimination in the US, imperialist ideas about indirect rule and trusteeship, and the emerging theories of social conflict in plural societies.

4.3.3. Apartheid

4.3.3.1. Ethnic survival and other motivations

With only 40% of the overall electorate vote, D.F. Malan's NP, in coalition with the Afrikaner Party, came to power in May 1948 (Giliomee, 2009:487). Giliomee (2009:482) states that when Smuts mourned that his followers had deserted him, after his defeat to the NP in the 1948 election, he was placated by an advisor who remarked that his people did not desert him, but were probably all dead. Giliomee claims that the new generation of Afrikaners was overwhelmingly NP. This suggests that the younger generation, who had no experience of the Anglo-Boer War, had become more radicalised than the generation before them. The inauguration of the Voortrekker Monument in Pretoria in December 1949 only followed 100 years after the Great Trek (Giliomee, 2009:488). In a speech at this event, Smuts warned against romanticising the past, and argued that the greatest problem Afrikaners had to solve was "inherited from our ancestors, the problem of our native relations".

Giliomee (2009:447) states that in the 1940s, liberal thinkers in South Africa advocated an open society and *racial integration*, built on a shared political identity, a common loyalty and English as lingua franca. Hampering these ideals, he argues, is the fact that race relations were strained well before the 1948 election, and racial discrimination and exclusion firmly entrenched (2009:448). Throughout the 1940s, segregation of workplaces, recreational areas and public spaces were spreading (Giliomee, 2009:451). Education had already been fully segregated by 1920 (Giliomee, 2009:456).

In 1946 the United Party (UP) introduced a bill that designated white and Asian residential areas, and banned Asians from buying property in white areas. Giliomee (2009:450) believes that they had begun laying the groundwork for the NP's Apartheid system, especially the act of classifying people into racial groups. J.H. Hofmeyr (nephew of Onze Jan Hofmeyr of the Afrikaner Bond), whom Giliomee (2009:449) refers to as the main exponent of liberalism in

the UP, and who supported a non-racial franchise, nonetheless expressed some trepidation regarding the numerical strength of black South Africans. Giliomee (2009:453) states that on the eve of the 1948 election, the NP decried the UP's policy of integration, claiming that it would result in "national suicide on the part of whites". After its electoral victory, the NP was in the position to further advance its ideology of *racial separation*, or segregation, and would do so through the system of Apartheid (apartness).

Giliomee (2009:301) identifies J.B.M. Hertzog as the politician mainly responsible for segregation. He states that Herzog turned down a Law chair at the University of Leiden, in order to focus on helping the Afrikaners in the Free State. Giliomee notes that based on a study of the United States, Hertzog concluded that racial integration was not possible, and set out to "ensure the security and solidarity of his own group". Hertzog became the first minister for Native Affairs in the first Union cabinet (Giliomee, 2009:308).

According to Giliomee (2009:454), the first use of the word *apartheid* dates back to 1929, in the context of DRC missionary work, wherein the teaching of the Gospel aimed to strengthen the African "character, nature and nationality" while also ensuring the continued cultural existence of the small Afrikaner population. Giliomee explains that this policy sought to protect the *volkseie* (the people's own) and was based on the belief that "only identification with one's own ethnic community was authentic". He suggests that this view can be traced back to the beginning of the Cape Colony, when the VOC emphasised the importance of Dutch and the Reformed religion in institutional life, and which led to the notion of a *volkskerk* (people's church), or, a church reflecting the linguistic, cultural and social character of its members. He states that the DRC regarded the separate black, white and coloured churches as "an association of co-equal churches, each representing different peoples, but all equal before God as peoples" (2009:456). The Dopper Church also supported the view that African culture was different, but not inferior, to white culture, and that it was the duty of white Christians to help Africans maintain their racial and cultural identity (Giliomee, 2009:459-460).

The first published theological defence of Apartheid utilised the Tower of Babel story, where God separated people into different groups each with their own language, to argue that members of the same group had to remain united, and that different groups had to remain separated (Giliomee, 2009:462). This was, in essence, a primordialist view of group identity that argued against nation-building, assimilation and/or integration.

In 1940, Rev. William Nicol argued that racial separation had to be accompanied by self-determination rights for all groups (Giliomee, 2009:461). Giliomee (2009:468-469) postulates that the Afrikaner nationalist intelligentsia convinced themselves of the virtuousness of Apartheid, by pointing to the fact that Afrikaners were granting black South Africans everything they had fought to achieve for themselves – their own institutions with their own cultural likeness. Their struggle against assimilation and for self-rule would thus be continued on behalf of all other groups in South Africa.

In addition to anxiety over the numerical strength of black people, the maintenance of their own political power and ethnic identity, and ideas regarding the 'differentness' of all groups, the fear of the *swart gevaar* also motivated the Apartheid ideology. When the NP came to power, fears about interethnic conflict was widespread. This was not limited to white versus black, as a deadly clash between Zulus and Indians in Durban in 1949 demonstrated. "The removal of friction" was said to be the main goal of separating the racial groups and preventing interracial contact (Giliomee, 2009:497). Giliomee (2009:552) argues, however, that the main purpose of the Apartheid system was the maintenance and management of cheap labour.

Giliomee (2009:460-465) explains that Apartheid ideology constituted a "radical survival plan" for Afrikaners, concerned with miscegenation, economic competition from black and coloured South Africans, and the numerical strength of black people which threatened white political power. In other words, Afrikaners felt their cultural, economic and political existence was threatened. Giliomee (2009:470) states:

> Afrikaner nationalists argued that their survival as a volk was inseparable from maintaining racial exclusivity, and that apartheid was the only policy that systematically pursued that end. But apartheid with its racist outcomes was not a goal in itself; political survival was.[226]

Giliomee (2009:470) contends that white supremacy was not in fact the main driver behind Apartheid, but that the numerical weakness of Afrikaners, and its impact on political power, was the motivating factor. He states, however, that this argument in support of Apartheid breaks down with respect to the treatment of coloured people, who did not pose this same threat to white people, and did not constitute an entirely different group. Giliomee (2009:416) also points out that "[t]here was, however, no coloured homeland to use as justification for coloured political exclusion". Despite coloured people posing no numerical, and thus political, threat,

[226] This is in contrast to segregation in the US, where the enfranchisement of black people would not cost white Americans their political dominance (as they are the numerically stronger group).

Afrikaners may have been economically threatened by them (Giliomee, 2009:476). Giliomee (2009:471) cites Rev. Z.R. Mahabane who argued that Apartheid was driven by both a fear complex (seen in the persistent anxiety about survival) and a superiority complex (evident in the racist views predominating politics).[227] Giliomee (2009:xviii) insists:

> The Afrikaner nationalists applied apartheid with a mixture of political zeal and ideological bigotry that went beyond their economic interests. The explanation lies not – at least not principally – in their Calvinist beliefs or racial obsessions but in their preoccupation with ethnic survival.[228] Afrikaner nationalist leadership of the mid-twentieth century was obsessed with the idea that the NP's surprising victory of 1948 was a God-given chance to secure finally the future of the Afrikaners as a small white people on the African continent. Fighting to ensure survival was seen as a personal responsibility, a higher calling. In a host of ways the nationalist obsession with survival became intertwined with apartheid projected as a policy aiming at the maintenance of ethnic groups and cultures. Apartheid failed because the plan was imposed, because whites lacked the numbers to make it work and because the world had changed.

4.3.3.2. Building the Afrikaner state

Once the Afrikaner nationalists gained control of the state, they could, for the first time in Afrikaner history, begin to pursue nation-state congruence, i.e., to build an exclusively Afrikaner state. Since the nationalists were not in favour of assimilation, other groups were to be limited to their own separate spaces and structures. Giliomee (2009:491) interprets leading nationalists' view on this enforced ethnic separation as follows:

> For [journalist, Piet] Cillié the festival [inauguration of the Voortrekker Monument] celebrated the Afrikaners' 'refusal to be absorbed in other groups'; it was the Afrikaners' isolation, their 'separate development and growth that had blossomed so spectacularly and movingly at the festival'. Cillié and other Afrikaner nationalists became attracted to the idea of imposing the Afrikaner mode of ethnic self-encapsulation on the subordinate groups. Few recognised the fact that the model worked in the Afrikaner case because there was a large degree of voluntary identification of the group, and because the Afrikaners' cultural and political struggle reinforced each other.[229]

Giliomee (2009:491) claims that the majority of Afrikaners were not motivated by Apartheid, but by nationalism, through which they could achieve Afrikaner unity and thus build the Afrikaner nation, as well as build a state that reflected their identity through language policy,

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[227] In 1949, Alan Paton (cited in Giliomee, 2009:464) said: "We in South Africa also have a conscience. But our fears are so great that our conscience is not so clearly apparent".

[228] Social identity was thus central to the motivations underlying Apartheid ideology.

[229] As opposed to Afrikaners, black people stood to gain little from increasing or maintaining their subgroup identification in terms of their political inclusion into the state. In fact, if anything, anglicisation and cultural assimilation would increase their chances of being accepted into 'civilised' white society.

symbols and giving institutions an Afrikaner character. The proliferation of Afrikaner culture was seen as a *volksbeweging* (people's movement), in which *boeremusiek* (boer music), *volkspele* (folk games) and *volksfeeste* (folk festivals) were ubiquitous. One slight cultural misstep, Giliomee points out, was the growing popularity of rugby in Afrikaner culture, an import from Britain.

According to Giliomee (2009:494), whereas English speakers believed that white South Africans should cultivate dual or multiple ties and loyalties, Afrikaners believed that white unity could only be achieved through the development of a single loyalty to South Africa. Nationalists suggested that Afrikaners do not have a homeland to return to in case their position in South Africa became untenable, but that English speakers would be able to leave if they continued to have links with the Commonwealth and were thus less loyal to South Africa.

In 1957 the British national anthem and national flag were removed, and in 1961 the British currency was replaced and South Africa became a republic and withdrew from the Commonwealth. Giliomee (2009:494) states that the constitution remained largely the same as the Union constitution, and Afrikaner nationalists hoped that white English speakers would abandon their dual loyalty now that the main tie with Britain as fatherland had been broken.[230] The Apartheid government's introduction of military conscription for all white men in 1967 was met with little resistance by English speakers (Giliomee, 2009:494).

Apartheid involved restricting political power to white people (political apartheid), enforcing the separation of existing communities (communal apartheid), segregating education, protection for white people in the labour market, controlling the influx of black people into cities, and the creation of reserves for black people, called Bantu homelands or Bantustans (Giliomee, 2009:500).

Giliomee (2009:502) states that the Apartheid system embraced the idea that "each African ethnic group had to be located in its own territory with its own form of government and national identity". This so-called communal apartheid relied on the racial classification of citizens, which were especially onerous in the case of coloured people, who were more readily identified

[230] According to Giliomee (2009:xvi), Afrikaners falsely depicted themselves as the only white group "who had become truly indigenous and were prepared to fight to the end for white supremacy". He explains that the Afrikaner-British rivalry is a typical example of "fights over relative group status and symbols similar to other such struggles around the world".

by who they were not, and shared a Western cultural identity and aspired to be subsumed into the dominant (white) group (Giliomee, 2009:503). Smuts (cited in Giliomee) regarded this policy as trying "to classify the unclassifiable". Racial identification of coloured people was based on the judgement of white classifiers, and eventually came to rely more on descent than on appearance. By the mid-1950s 100,000 "borderline cases" existed wherein "people were trapped in a Kafkaesque racial maze" (Giliomee, 2009:504).

The *Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act* (1949) and the *Immorality Amendment Act* (1950) sought to enforce strict group boundaries and discipline people who 'mixed' with outgroup members. Believing black people to lack *groepsgevoel* (group feeling), or ingroup identification, the Apartheid government set out to inculcate pride in African culture. The use of mother-tongue education was made compulsory in primary school and later secondary school as well (Giliomee, 2009:508). Single-medium Afrikaans schools reinforced Afrikaner nationalism among school children (Giliomee, 2009:545).

The development of Afrikaans as a public language was tremendously successful, and led to the upward mobility of Afrikaners. Van Wyk Louw (cited in Giliomee, 2009:545) called Afrikaans the "socialism of the Afrikaner", referring to the fact that constitutional bilingualism in the state offered Afrikaners a sense of personal worth and employment opportunities. Eventually more than a third of the Afrikaner workforce was employed in the civil service. Giliomee (2009:546) argues that this had two drawbacks: the eventual loss of white political power would render many Afrikaner civil servants unemployable, and Afrikaans was increasingly viewed as "the language of the oppressor". Afrikaans was increasingly rejected in the homelands and black schools in favour of English, due to the former's association with the Apartheid state (Giliomee, 2009:547).

When the NP came to power Afrikaners made up 57% of the white population, and held 29% of total personal income, compared to 46% for English speakers and 20% for black people (who formed 68% of the total population of South Africa) (Giliomee, 2009:489). Mother-tongue education in monolingual institutions became the norm, and the economic and educational position of Afrikaners improved markedly throughout the 1950s and 1960s, while a remarkable level of income equality among Afrikaners was maintained until the 1970s, whereafter a class of wealthy Afrikaners appeared who were indifferent to ideologies of collectivism (Giliomee, 2009:490).

Meades (2019:8) states that when the National Party came into power in 1948 it gave new impetus to a desire for standing in the business world. The following decades saw tremendous progress for Afrikaners and growth of *volkskapitaal* (people's capital). After every yearly congress of the *Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut* (AHI; Afrikaans Trade Institute), where the biggest names of Afrikanerdom gathered, Meades (2019; my translation) remarks that "everyone could proudly pat each other on the back knowing that the Afrikaner came out on top!".

Giliomee (2019b:xii) argues that despite the often accepted link between Protestantism and capitalism, Afrikaners were virtually free of capitalism up until the 1970s. He explains that, earlier, since Afrikaners were mainly subsistence farmers, a profit motive was not of primary concern, and those that did try their hand at business mostly failed. The rise of Afrikaner enterprises, Giliomee (2019b:xv) claims, went hand in hand with the rise and development of the Afrikaans language.

As the Afrikaners became more prosperous during the 1960s, Giliomee (2009:542-543) suggests that Afrikaner businessmen began to abandon the ideal of wholly Afrikaner-owned enterprises growing their share of the market, and instead, increased co-operation with English South Africans. Rather than talking about the Afrikaners' *share* in the economy, Sanlam was now encouraging Afrikaners to *contribute* to the economy. Giliomee (2009:544) cites a study which found that while Afrikaner businessmen used successful enterprises to build prestige and esteem for the entire Afrikaner group, they increasingly began to value the recognition of other businessmen more than that of their own ethnic group members.[231]

In 1966, Verwoerd (cited in Giliomee, 2009:544) warned that the increased prosperity and decreased political dangers pose a threat to Afrikaner unity.[232] By the 1970s the idea of "Afrikaner Hoggenheimers" had appeared, based on an anti-Semitic trope (see subsection 4.3.1.3), referring to Afrikaner businessmen who ignored the welfare of the Afrikaner people

[231] Whereas Afrikaners built group solidarity after the Anglo-Boer War *despite* class differences, group solidarity was now being undermined by the prosperity of individual members. Upward mobility seemingly allows for a mild form of exiting the ingroup (as predicted by SIT). What is noteworthy, however, is that this strategy was very scarcely employed (in the case discussed above applying only to very wealthy businessmen), even though Apartheid had improved the economic prosperity, and thus social mobility, of all Afrikaners. As May (2012) argued, ethnicity can remain important to people even in spite of individual material interest.

[232] Perhaps then the exit strategy employed by wealthy Afrikaners had less to do with social mobility, and more with a perceived lack of threat from outside the ingroup. This would explain the broad Afrikaner solidarity in spite of class differences in the face of assimilation and anglicisation pressure from English speakers after the war. Heightened ingroup identification and radicalisation as a response to outgroup radicalisation mirrors May's (2012) warning about the consequences of failure to accommodate minority groups.

in favour of pursuing their own material interests. Giliomee (2009:544) argues that the white elite opposed growing the reserves by making more 'white land' available, which would have made the Apartheid system more stable, for their own financial benefit: "White prosperity steadily undermined white domination".

The NP had toyed around with the idea of introducing Afrikaner quotas in the private sector and nationalising the mines (Giliomee, 2009:499). Giliomee (2009:498) states that the ANC presented a "radical opposition" to the NP, and accused them of being less concerned with the preservation of white identity, and more with the exploitation of black people. Their demand for direct representation for Africans in Parliament and other legislative bodies was rejected by Malan. Unfortunately, a just racial policy, Giliomee (2009:498) believes, would only be pursued if the "internal decolonisation and deradicalisation" it entailed did not threaten the Afrikaner group and the broader white community.

4.3.3.3. Opposition

According to Giliomee (2009:522), the Sharpeville Massacre of 1960 and the mass march that followed was a turning point for many Afrikaners who had begun doubting the Apartheid system. He states that all business associations, including the AHI urged Verwoerd, then Prime Minister, to relax the curbs on black people, specifically the pass laws, but were accused of being traitors more concerned with profits than white survival. At this time, Beyers Naudé, a DRC minister and the son of Jozua François Naudé (founder of the Afrikaner Broederbond), would become disillusioned with the Broederbond and the DRC's support of Verwoerd and Apartheid (Giliomee, 2009:528-529). Beyers Naudé maintained his self-identification as an Afrikaner, despite his opposition to Apartheid and the scorn he faced from many Afrikaners.

Internal and external opposition to Apartheid was now in full swing (Giliomee, 2009:523). But an unexpected economic boom and Verwoerd's push for a referendum on a republic soon calmed the political storms (Giliomee, 2009:525). Renewed attempts to join the coloured and white communities politically and allow coloured people political representation was rejected by Verwoerd, who expressed his fear of "biological integration" between the two groups (Giliomee, 2009:526). Giliomee (2009:587) describes the removal of coloured people from District Six in 1966 as "the symbol of the Afrikaner rejection of a community of fellow-Afrikaans-speakers".

Giliomee (2012:27-28) notes the irony of Verwoerd, as the child of European immigrants (he moved from the Netherlands with his parents as a child), becoming an Afrikaner nationalist,

and offers the following interpretation: "[W]hile nationalism tends to come easily for those who interpret it as an extension of family and community, for immigrants and their children it is a willed action and a deliberate choice". Giliomee (2009:28) cites one of Verwoerd's colleagues, Ben Schoeman, who complained about Verwoerd's mythmaking as follows: "He always spoke of our ancestors, our glorious past … It was as if he wanted to convince himself and his supporters of his *Afrikanerskap* [Afrikanership]". Perhaps then in an attempt to gain acceptance as an ingroup member, Verwoerd displayed what he perceived to be prototypical ingroup norms.

In 1961, Verwoerd appointed John Vorster as Minister of Justice, who believed that the security of the state was of prime importance. That same year, the government extended its ability to ban organisations and banish people, and to detain people without charge for twelve days, and later for an unlimited period. Newspapers could not report on torturing. Censorship (including of Afrikaners critical of Apartheid) was systematised in 1963 through the creation of the *Publications Control Board*, tasked with banning material that threatened public morals or security (Giliomee, 2009:532). In addition to the NP's suppression of black people, the identity entrepreneurs in the NP imposed internal restrictions on Afrikaners. Not only were their political thoughts policed, but non-prototypical behaviour faced social and legal sanctions.

After the ANC's banning in 1960, and the growing radicalisation of the Apartheid government (and the Afrikaners who elected and enabled them), the armed wing of the ANC, *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (MK; Spear of the Nation) was founded at the end of 1961 (on 16 December no less), under the leadership of Nelson Mandela (Giliomee, 2009:533).[233] After acts of sabotage, Mandela and his co-accused, including Bram Fischer (the grandson of Abraham Fischer, Prime Minister of the Orange River Colony), were sentenced to life imprisonment. Bram Fischer continued self-identifying as an Afrikaner, despite the persecution by the Afrikaner government. In 1966, Verwoerd was assassinated, after a failed attempt in 1960 (Giliomee, 2009:536).

[233] Giliomee (2009:630) states that Nelson Mandela gave the Afrikaners recognition, treated their history with respect, and while condemning Apartheid as a crime against humanity, believed that Afrikaner nationalism was a legitimate indigenous movement which, like African nationalism, had fought British colonialism. In order to demonstrate the similarity between Afrikaner and African nationalism, Mandela decided that the first act of sabotage by Umkhonto we Sizwe would occur on 16 December, the day the Voortrekkers defeated Dingane in 1838. While in prison, he learnt Afrikaans in order to understand Afrikaners and demonstrate the Freedom Charter's commitment to cultural diversity.

The ANC supported "an inclusive democracy and the building of a united and multiracial nation in South Africa" (Giliomee, 2009:563). In their absence (after being banned by the Apartheid government), Mangosuthu Buthelezi, chief of the KwaZulu Bantustan, revived Inkatha (now the *Inkatha Freedom Party*, IFP), a Zulu cultural movement, and also founded the *Black Unity Front* to promote a supra-ethnic African nationalism. In other words, the disparate African groups would be subsumed under a broad superordinate black identity, since doing so would strengthen their collective political struggle. Similarly, Steve Biko led the *Black Consciousness Movement* (BCM) which advocated for a non-racial democracy, and would first require the co-operation of the various non-white groups in a movement that "fostered black pride". Biko (cited in Giliomee, 2009:564) encouraged black people to develop "group power" and "group pride".

True to their history of advancing Afrikaner nationalism, Afrikaans newspapers did not report on the tensions within the NP, or the actual effect of Apartheid on the non-white population.[234] Afrikaner dissidents were swiftly removed from positions of power and influence. The radical right smeared "disloyal" reformist Afrikaners as communists, with one FAK official stating that the struggle against anglicisation was now a "struggle against the enemy from within" (Giliomee, 2009:548). In contrast to SIT predictions, intergroup conflict was now harming internal cohesion. The rampant racism and radicalism of the Apartheid government had become a bigger threat to the Afrikaners than outgroups.

In 1967, Potchefstroom academic, Willem de Klerk, brother of the last Apartheid-era president, F.W. de Klerk, identified three types of Afrikaners in the nationalist movement, namely: (i) the *verligtes* (enlightened ones), or liberals "in a new Afrikaans disguise" who rejected tradition and preferred openness and freedom, including in race relations; (ii) the *verkramptes* (constricted reactionaries), who were narrow-minded and insular, and clung to the past and tradition; and (iii) the (preferred) middle-of-the-road position; a "positive Afrikanerhood" that favoured both exclusivity and openness, and tradition and progressive thinking.[235] Giliomee (2009:549) states that verligte came to refer to those in favour of reforming Apartheid, while

[234] According to Giliomee (2009:501), from the mid-1950s, *Die Burger* became increasingly radical in its defence of the Afrikaner nationalist "revolution" that was ushered in by the 1948 election.

[235] This approach may have involved the voluntary maintenance of subgroup identity, without the repression of other ethnic groups or opposition to superordinate group identities, as well as the recognition of the fluidity of group identity. It could also denote intergroup behaviour closer to the interpersonal pole of the continuum (see Chapter 3, subsection 3.2.3.2).

verkrampte referred to those "archconservative" individuals who dug in their heels. The third way, he argues, was quickly forgotten, until F.W. de Klerk ascendancy.

Giliomee (2009:549) explains that while both verligtes and verkramptes were in favour of maintaining Afrikaner or white power, verligtes tended to be better educated, wealthier and less dependent on the state. He suggests that they also increasingly viewed themselves as white, and not only as Afrikaners, and the state as becoming multiracial in order to represent the various groups in South Africa. One such verligte considered coloured people to be "brown Afrikaners", realising that their exclusion disproved the argument that Apartheid was not based on racism (Giliomee, 2009:550).

During the 1960s a new Afrikaans literary movement promoted "secularisation, modernity, racial tolerance and sexual freedom", embodied by writers such as Etienne Leroux, André P. Brink, Ingrid Jonker and Breyten Breytenbach who became known as the *Sestigers* (Generation of the Sixties) (Giliomee, 2009:554).[236] Giliomee argues that the literary work produced during this period "helped to change the political imagination of the Afrikaans reading public in subtle yet profound ways. They offered a new conceptualisation of the Afrikaners and their history that differed starkly from the image the political leaders and cultural leadership tried to project of the Afrikaners as a people determined to crush all threats to their survival".[237] So too Van Wyk Louw (cited in Giliomee, 2009:554) criticised the fixity of Afrikaner identity enforced by political leaders:

> A volk […] is not a sect, or clique or association with a fixed programme … Among the greatest enemies of our volk are those desiring a spiritual one-way traffic and who wish to impose their own narrow vision for this time and eternity.

Giliomee (2009:472) identifies Van Wyk Louw as a liberal nationalist, who sought to justify racial separation by arguing for the rights of Afrikaners to self-determination in the context of being a numerical minority, and said "to be liberal in South Africa looks to the Afrikaner – who unlike the English-speakers does not have another country to flee to – like national suicide

[236] Ingrid Jonker's (1933-1965) father, Abraham Jonker, was an NP member of parliament, who publicly disowned her for her opposition to the Apartheid government and the censorship laws which he was tasked with enforcing. He died six months after her death by suicide (Wikipedia, 2024d). Breyten Breytenbach's brother, Jan Breytenbach, served in the South African special forces during Apartheid and did not agree with his brother's liberal views. Breyten Breytenbach was especially active in the political struggle against the NP, which saw him face severe government sanctions. He was banned from entering South Africa, and was imprisoned for seven years under charges of high treason (Wikipedia, 2024e).

[237] In Chapter 3, subsection 3.3.2, I discussed the higher level of ingroup influence exercised by prototypical group members versus less prototypical members (or black sheep). Extending this line of thinking, we should expect internal criticism (or dissent) to be more impactful than external criticism.

and individual destruction". Greatly concerned with the survival of the Afrikaners, Van Wyk Louw (cited in Giliomee, 2009:473-474; 2020:277-278) identified three *volkskrisisse* (national crises), or situations that threatened the continued existence of the Afrikaners.

The first such crisis was when the Afrikaners were overwhelmed by external military might and the possibility of mass immigration – referring to Lord Milner's post-war immigration policy that threatened to weaken the Afrikaners' relative position in the white community. Approximately 70,000 British immigrants arrived after the Anglo-Boer War (Giliomee, 2009:488). The second crisis was the large number of Afrikaners who wondered "whether we ought to survive as a *volk*", and risked becoming assimilated into other groups. While individual Afrikaners might survive and some even prosper, the distinctive group would no longer exist. The third crisis was described by Van Wyk Louw (cited in Giliomee, 2009:488) as follows: "When some time in the future a great number of our people would come to believe that we need not live together *in justice* with other ethnic groups; when they come to believe that mere survival is the chief issue, not a just existence".

Giliomee (2009:474) states that Van Wyk Louw, albeit a supporter of Apartheid until his death in 1970, could conceive of a scenario in which a people no longer deserved to survive based on their unjust treatment of others, and ultimately, converged on many points with liberalism. Giliomee suggests that because of his rejection of "ethnic survival at all costs", Van Wyk Louw might have come to denounce nationalism and Apartheid. Van Wyk Louw (cited in Giliomee, 2009:474) pondered: "Can a small volk survive for long, if it becomes something hateful, something evil, in the eyes of the best in – or outside – its fold?"

After the passing of Van Wyk Louw, Giliomee (2009:555) identifies two influential Afrikaner dissidents who continued (and amplified) his opposition to Apartheid. The first was a Stellenbosch philosopher, Johannes Degenaar, who argued that the *volk* is only one of several identifications, and that Afrikaners had to find a solution other than nationalism (which was prone to descending into racism and "the search for divine sanction for dominance"). The second was Breyten Breytenbach, one of the Sestigers, who believed that "if apartheid was representative of Afrikanerdom", there was no hope for the Afrikaners. In a statement reflecting both his internal criticism of Afrikanerdom and his continued identification with the group, he remarked (cited in Giliomee, 2009:556; my italics): "If I could renounce my being an Afrikaner I would do it. I am ashamed of *my* people".

Breytenbach lived in exile due to his opposition to the Apartheid government. Giliomee (2009:556) suggests that this was due to a personal grievance of B.J. Vorster (Verwoerd's successor) who easily "dismissed criticism from the liberal [English] press with disdain but was extraordinarily sensitive to attacks from Afrikaners, whether it be from the far right or far left".[238]

Locked in arguments with verkramptes, and growingly aware of the external and internal opposition to Apartheid, Vorster (cited in Giliomee, 2009:557) argued that the main principle of the NP was "the retention, maintenance and the immortalisation of Afrikaner identity within a white sovereign state", and that Apartheid was but one possible method of attaining this goal. Although expanding political Apartheid, some minor amendments to relax communal Apartheid drew the ire of "Super-Afrikaners", or the far right within his own party. One of these verkramptes was Albert Hertzog, son of J.B.M Hertzog, who left the NP in 1969 and founded the *Herstigte Nasionale Party* (HNP; Re-established National Party), drawing 10% of the Afrikaner vote in 1970. While the intragroup heterogeneity of Afrikaners is evident through internal dissidence, it is important to note the ideological struggles within the NP as well. In Chapter 3, subsection 3.3.2.1, I discussed SCT's analysis of ingroup norms as a trade-off between minimising intragroup differences and maximising intergroup differences (see metacontrast).

Increasingly faced with distinctive continuity as well as morality threats (see Chapter 3, subsection 3.4.1), Afrikaners displayed a deep need to gain acceptance from outside. Giliomee (2009:567) states that whereas Verwoerd handed down Apartheid policy like a European colonist in Africa, Vorster wanted the Afrikaners to be accepted in Africa. Vorster had said: "Africa is our mother … You want to do your level best to get your people accepted by Africa, accepted as an African people with every right to be in Africa … We are Africans". Giliomee (2009:577) cites the following observation regarding these views:

> Chester Crocker, US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa during the 1980s, observed that while the Afrikaner elite behaved as if the country belonged to them, they displayed a strange mix of ethnic insecurity and arrogance. Loyalty and solidarity were the

[238] Breytenbach, despite his strong opposition to Apartheid, did not disidentify as an Afrikaner, as some would do throughout Apartheid and post-1994. He believed that he "cannot and will not disassociate myself from this mess" and that only internal criticism is effective, that is, when the critic speaks "in his language, his land" (cited in Giliomee, 2019a:77). In the post-Apartheid era, Breytenbach had spoken out in defence of Afrikaans MLR.

> supreme virtues, and outsiders were distrusted. The government had largely cut itself off from the advice of outsiders, but craved Western acceptance.[239]

By the mid-1970s the DRC was still justifying Apartheid using the tower of Babel parable (Giliomee, 2009:559). Giliomee states that increasing rejection of the church's position by Afrikaners signalled the end of the Afrikaans *volksbeweging* (people's movement) after more than four decades of allegiance between the party, press and interest-based organisations. International condemnation was steadily building up throughout the 1970s. From the 1970s onward, Afrikaans newspapers began increasingly reporting on the injustices of Apartheid (Giliomee, 2009:552).

The Soweto Uprising of 1976 was as a result of discontent with the so-called Bantu education system, and the language-in-education policy in particular.[240] The official policy stated that Afrikaans and English had to be used equally in secondary education in black schools, but this was often ignored in favour of a de facto English as sole medium policy. As a result of "Afrikaner political arrogance and cultural insecurity", and with the view that the government could determine language policies of schools because white taxpayers subsidised them, it was decided that the official policy would begin to be enforced. In other words, Afrikaans would be enforced as medium of instruction in black schools, a language which at this point was widely despised as language of the oppressors (Giliomee, 2009:578-579).

While language was very much the catalyst of the uprising, Giliomee (2009:579) believes that issues like unemployment, poverty, and Apartheid policies were also motivating factors. He states that the uprising, which by October 1977 had led to roughly 700 deaths, the killing of Steve Biko in police custody, and the banning of black organisations sped up the international isolation of South Africa (2009:580). He believes that Biko's death "in a special way demonstrated to Afrikaners the atrocities that were being committed in the state's defence and in their name" (2009:580). The arrival of the television in Afrikaners' homes which could disseminate images of oppression and opposition to Apartheid, and the higher degree of

[239] This perhaps also suggests the presence of miscategorisation threats (being identified as white, or European, instead of as an Afrikaner, meaning African).

[240] Cuvelier, Du Plessis and Teck (2003:2) argue that the two most significant events in the history of language-in-education policy development in South Africa are the Anglo-Boer War and the Soweto Uprising of 1976, both of which led to conventions for a new South Africa and consequently, the establishment of less restrictive and less repressive language-in-education policy dispensations. Regarding the latter dispensation, a case is to be made that this is increasingly only true in terms of the de jure national language policies (see Chapter 5, subsection 5.1.1.1). In Chapter 2, subsection 2.5.1, I noted the widespread suspicion of MTE among black people as a direct result of Apartheid-era language-in-education policies.

political disaffection of black youths relative to their parents' generation, meant the Soweto Uprising was much more potent than the Sharpeville uprising (Giliomee, 2009:580).

Afrikaans literature continued its history of internal dissent through the publication of Elsa Joubert's *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena* ('The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena') in 1978, which was said to have had a massive impact on Afrikaners' view of the Apartheid regime. Giliomee (2009:594) states that Jeanne Goosen's *Ons is nie almal so nie* ('We Are Not All Like That') "captured the idea that Apartheid also classified and dehumanised whites, even those who opposed it". Giliomee (2009:609) states that the conclusion of André du Toit's *Die sondes van die vaders* ('The Sins of the Fathers') – which presented a generational struggle and which on the cover utilised Van Wyk Louw's sobering words about whether Afrikaners can survive if they come to represent evil – is that the moral crisis of Afrikaner power and survival will become increasingly dire.[241] Giliomee (2009:609) summarises: "The government's insistence that power was essential to ensure Afrikaners' cultural survival would almost inevitably encourage black nationalists to define that culture as its enemy. To survive it was imperative to detach the Afrikaans culture from Afrikaner power".

The DRC finally broke from the Apartheid government in 1986 when it announced the church would be open to people of all races, and in 1990 when it accepted responsibility for its role in the Apartheid system (Giliomee, 2009:620-621). By the mid-1990s, 100,000 members would break away to join the newly formed *Afrikaanse Protestantse Kerk* (APK; Afrikaans Protestant Church). Giliomee states that this signified the removal of one of the most important pillars of Apartheid. The Afrikaner Broederbond soon followed, and offered a system aimed at checking majoritarian rule through special representation of racial groups, group vetoes and a division between 'own' and 'general' affairs.[242] Giliomee (2009:621-622) points out that a contradiction existed in their proposals: their reliance on the Apartheid system's legally entrenched racial categories could not co-exist with the principle of freedom of association inherent in the model of consociationalism or power-sharing, as devised by Dutch scholar Arend Lijphart, that they promoted.

[241] These novels correspond with Branscombe *et al.*'s (1999) identity threat response taxonomy, which notes that in the face of morality threats, high identifiers respond by highlighting ingroup heterogeneity (see Chapter 3, subsection 3.4.2).

[242] The Tricameral Parliament was introduced in 1984, and white, coloured and Indian representatives obtained jurisdiction to administer their 'own' affairs, each in their own chamber (Giliomee, 2019a:176). See group-differentiated rights in Chapter 1, subsection 1.3.5.

Giliomee (2009:623) states that in addition to the crumbling of ideological cohesion among Afrikaners (seen, for example, in the course change of the DRC), the Vaal uprising of 1984-1986 (which saw widespread revolt in black townships over both local issues and Apartheid) also resulted in another pillar of Apartheid crumbling, namely black fragmentation. The ANC managed to establish itself as the leader of black politics, and the government struggled to pit various factions against each other, as had often been done throughout South Africa's history. The power of the state in dealing with uprisings also became increasingly weakened, as well as its ability to process violations of the pass laws (Giliomee, 2009:624-626).

4.3.3.4. Reform

By the late 1970s, Afrikaner nationalists were starting to make peace with the fact that "demography is destiny", as the French philosopher August Comte said, or as the American demographer Nicolas Eberstadt called it, "the tyranny of numbers" (Giliomee, 2009:595). The projected population growth for black South Africans, which informed the homelands policy, the cornerstone of Apartheid, turned out to be completely erroneous. By 1991, there were ten million more black people than was projected in 1951 for the year 2000 (Giliomee, 2009:596).

Throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, when P.W. Botha was Prime Minister, the South African military was very active in neighbouring countries and Angola in particular, under the guise of staving off the Communist threat, because of the links between the Soviet Union and Cuba and the ANC (Giliomee, 2009:589). Giliomee (2009:595) explains that the ANC's economic policy posed a great threat to white interests, so much so that nearly half of surveyed Afrikaner students were willing to physically resist an ANC government, and a third declared that they would emigrate if the ANC ever came to power. Giliomee (2009:607) cites a mid-1970s poll which found that middle-class Afrikaners were much more concerned with defending their material interests than with the future of Afrikaans. He believes that they came to view survival as maintaining their lifestyle under a government they could trust.

The heyday of both Apartheid and Afrikaner nationalism had come to an end. Giliomee (2009:637-638) argues that although all the main Afrikaner nationalist goals had been achieved by 1970, especially the proliferation of the use of Afrikaans in the public sphere, and education in particular, by the end of Apartheid, Afrikaner culture was once again in danger:

> The apartheid state's zeal to protect the different cultures had led Afrikaners to relax their vigilance with respect to the Afrikaans language and culture. It had weakened Afrikaner civil society by fostering a paralysing dependence on the state as the benign patron that co-ordinated the interests of the ethnic groups.

Only once Afrikaners had lost power of the state apparatus, would Afrikaner civil society regroup (see Chapter 5, subsection 5.2). The mid-1980s saw widespread political violence and severe international sanctions followed Botha's Rubicon speech in the late 1980s, in which he reaffirmed his commitment to Apartheid despite the internal and external opposition to the system (Giliomee, 2009:614; 616). Giliomee (2009:638) notes the power of morality threats:

> The issue of 'morality' was an important factor in the changing power balance. The West's sanctions had hurt the Afrikaners who supported apartheid morally much more than economically. Afrikaners had always considered themselves part of the West, and their ostracism on account of apartheid had seared their leaders' souls.

Branscombe *et al*. (1999) predicted that in the face of morality threats, high identifiers would react defensively or perceive ingroup heterogeneity, whereas low identifiers would seek to undo the morally objectionably behaviour. The Afrikaner case study is unique in that some high identifiers also responded by seeking to rectify the immoral behaviour. In other words, their desire to be accepted and respected as a distinctive group made internal dissidents of 'regular' Afrikaners, who (eventually) joined less prototypical members in their internal criticism, without (necessarily) decreasing their self-identification as Afrikaners. See also constructive action discussed in Chapter 3, subsection 3.4.2.

Giliomee (2009:607) states that due to the widespread condemnation of white South Africa, "[t]he old Afrikaner-English antipathies had largely dissolved". Despite the fact that 25% - 40% of English speakers were amenable to the NP's reformist approach, the party was not interested in changing its character from an Afrikaner one to that of a broader white community, and thus remained an ethnic movement.

Almost half of Afrikaners voted for right-wing parties by the end of the 1980s (excluding the NP, which was at this time considered more moderate because of its desire to reform Apartheid). Giliomee (2009:608) states that polls during that decade found that more than 80% of Afrikaners distrusted black majoritarian rule, and believed that under such a regime, there would be reverse discrimination, that their language and culture would be threatened, as would their physical safety and material possessions. Giliomee argues that these fears were visible in the widespread ownership of firearms, and led to increased right-wing support.

Giliomee (2009:608) states that the ANC preferred what it called an "ordinary democracy", meaning a liberal democracy in a unitary state without checks (like a second house) to ensure minority rights. White South Africans were overwhelmingly opposed to such a system. Alan Paton, a liberal voice throughout Apartheid, was opposed to the ANC's demand for a unitary

state, instead supporting a federation (Giliomee, 2009:618).[243] Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert, leader of the official opposition the *Progressive Reform Party* (PRP), led the effort to establish a multiracial coalition that could oppose the ANC. Giliomee (2009:616) states that while Van Zyl Slabbert came to believe that black majority rule under a liberal constitution was the only viable option for South Africa, he was doubtful about whether a deeply divided society could remain peaceful, and indeed democratic, without significant checks to the power of the majority.

Botha and the NP rejected Van Zyl Slabbert's offer to assist with future negotiations, without which, and in the absence of substantial support from any other parties, the NP was ill-positioned when it entered into negotiations with the ANC some years later. After Van Zyl Slabbert was side-lined by the NP, he resigned from Parliament and became an ally of the liberation movement, believing that safeguarding the minority's *individual* rights in a future majoritarian-led democracy would be sufficient (Giliomee, 2009:617):

> Slabbert's thinking was influenced by the literature on democratisation in the 1970s and 1980s with its emphasis on Latin America. But there was a problem with applying insights from these studies to South Africa. Here huge disparities in wealth and income largely along racial lines existed along with an absence of national cohesion and a lack of institutions where people across the political divide interacted with each other. Hence the need for pluralism, for checks and balances. What was missing in Slabbert's analysis was the recognition that simple majority rule in a deeply divided society could easily become a liberal veneer for racial domination. Eli Kedourie, noted student of nationalism, wrote after visiting South Africa that the principle of majority decision is 'workable only on condition that majorities are variable, not permanent … The worst effects of the tyranny of the majority are seen when the unalloyed Western model is introduced in countries divided by religion or language or race.' Donald Horowitz, an authority on polarised societies, warned South Africans to distinguish between two types of majority rule: one based on racial identity and demography with few floating voters; and another whose outcome was not foreordained by demography. The latter type would require an electoral system and a constitution that broke up a compact black majority. But this was the last thing the ANC wanted, since it was increasingly assuming an African nationalist guise with occasional bows to the type of non-racialism in which Slabbert as leader of the liberal opposition and also some leaders of the United Democratic Front believed. Slabbert recognised the dangers of the 'unalloyed Western model', but undertook to fight the liberation movement if it became a tyranny.

[243] In 1974 Buthelezi proposed a federal system under a multiracial government, where majoritarian rule would be balanced with power-sharing (Giliomee, 2009:567).

I discussed the pitfalls of majoritarianism in ethnolinguistically divided countries in Chapter 1, section 1.4, and the need for pluralism to safeguard MLR and minority group rights more broadly in Chapter 2, sections 2.3 and 2.5, where I also critiqued May's recommendation of regionalism. Giliomee (2009:560) believes that the notion of a homeland for white people, or *volkstaat*, would require Afrikaners to become independent of black labour as well as a "determination and commitment to choose ethnic survival above the fruits of materialism". Giliomee (2009:619) argues that despite the Afrikaners' deep attachment to a homeland (at this historical moment) and their unwillingness to cede all political power, due to the impact of television and the global cultural revolution, they were becoming increasingly materialistic, individualistic and aware of the clash between Apartheid and universal norms. [244]

Piet Cillié, editor of *Die Burger* and Broederbond member, was sceptical of the possibility of building a single nation, but saw the choice Afrikaners faced as one between "probable destruction" if they entered negotiations and "assured destruction" if they failed to enter negotiations. Afrikaner billionaire Anton Rupert argued that Apartheid threatened the survival of the Afrikaners and said that Apartheid "is crucifying us; it is destroying our language; it is degrading for a once heroic nation to be the lepers of the world". Botha himself remained opposed to the universal franchise in either a unitary or federal system (Giliomee, 2009:622).

The government asked the South African Law Commission to investigate a non-racial Bill of Rights, as well as the matter of individual and group rights. In its report, it held that individual rights as enshrined by a Bill of Rights offered sufficient protection, and made no recommendations regarding language. Giliomee (2009:623) believes that the Commission incorrectly believed that the status of Afrikaans as official language would not be undermined in negotiations, and it did not provide the government with expert backing for group rights. One of the commissioners would later acknowledge that they erroneously assumed that the NP would retain sufficient power in the post-Apartheid government to be able to protect language rights, thus making provisions for group-based rights redundant (Giliomee, 2009:676).

In the 1987 election, the NP committed itself to pursuing a system of equal rights, and joint decision-making and power-sharing between groups. It also assured white people that it would secure "community protection" (referring to residential areas) and "protection of communities"

[244] Giliomee (2019a:221) highlights the phenomenon of Israelis and Palestinians merging their personal identity with the national identity, whereby the nation and the homeland become part of the extended self, and whereby the loss of one's homeland risks the fragmentation of the self, a condition which many will resist with their lives. He convincingly argues that this same phenomenon could be found among Afrikaners during Apartheid.

(relating to public school educational policies). This was rejected by the ANC and the liberal opposition on the grounds that such a concession would mean the continuance of Apartheid in residential areas and that white people would retain exclusive access to the better funded white schools and universities (Giliomee, 2009:628).

With the retreat of the communist threat after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the ANC's shift away from nationalisation, the government could no longer count on Western powers forcing the ANC to accept power-sharing (Giliomee, 2009:629). In 1990, Minister of Constitutional Development, Gerrit Viljoen (cited in Giliomee, 2009:631), remarked: "The government does not question that the majority has to govern but does ask whether stability and nation-building – especially in a plural society – can be served best by a majority that rules on its own".

4.3.3.5. Negotiation

In 1989 the NP pledged to create an inclusive democracy where *groups* would form the basic components of the system. *Power-sharing* among these groups would ensure that no group dominated another, and each group would enjoy *self-determination* in its own affairs, the latter referring especially to schools and residential areas. Prime Minister F.W. de Klerk also floated the idea of a rotating presidency based on the Swiss model (Giliomee, 2009:627; 633).

The ANC prevented the IFP and other stakeholders from meaningful participation in negotiations. The loss of NP allies at the negotiating table weakened its ability to achieve some form of federalism which could hedge against black domination (Giliomee, 2009:632). Giliomee (2009:633) states that in 1991 it was decided "to pin everything on a power-sharing government instead of demanding group rights or federalism, and the choice was made for a proportional vote electoral system" which would result in the disintegration of Afrikaner nationalism and the relegation of the NP to minor party status.

Giliomee (2009:633) suggests that De Klerk overestimated the threat posed by the anti-negotiation *Conservative Party* (CP) after a single victory in a by-election, leading him to use the referendum promised to Afrikaners, not to give them the opportunity to check the ANC's demands, but to defeat opposition to ongoing negotiations. The referendum of March 1992 asked the white electorate: "Do you endorse the continuation of the reform process … which is aimed at a new constitution through negotiation?" The 87% voter turnout delivered a yes verdict with 69% of the vote. Giliomee (2009:634) argues, however, that the question was ambiguous, as some thought it to mean support for the transfer of power to the black majority, while others thought that implicit in the question was the NP's assurances that power-sharing

would be pursued. He provides as evidence an NP election poster which stated: "Oppose majority rule: Vote yes". Nonetheless, all voters would have understood though that a 'yes' vote meant the end of Apartheid. Giliomee (2009:634) states that the 'yes' vote was widely celebrated around the world:

> The Afrikaners were making their exit with some grace. In the referendum of 1992 they surrendered their position of sole rulers before they were defeated. What remained to be seen was whether there was such an animal as a power-sharing government in a racially divided society. On this the government was pinning all its hopes.

He argues that the negotiations could have brought about different types of democracies (2009:635). Giliomee (2009:636) cites Donald Horowitz who argued: "[A]scriptive majority rule … kills democracy by turning elections into censuses and locking minorities out. If democracy requires the creation of 'shifting temporary alliances', the pre-formed racial or ethnic majority is not democratic". He believes that white people wanted a balance between the interests of the black majority and the white minority, in which matters were decided by consensus, and in which white history was integrated with black history, instead of having an ANC-authorised version or interpretation of history. Giliomee argues:

> A government demand that the power of a single, undifferentiated majority be broken up by a strong form of federalism would have encountered strong ANC resistance. But there was a chance that it could have created the conditions for a more complex form of negotiations, producing a better system in the end.

Despite the government's relative position of strength, Giliomee (2009:638) suggests that De Klerk and his fellow negotiators managed to extract far fewer concessions than what was possible. While Giliomee commends his decision to enter into negotiations, he believes that De Klerk had a failure of leadership in not achieving "the first prize, namely a balanced system", such as through federalism and (white) self-determination. Giliomee (2009:639) explains that in its strongest form, self-determination would involve a white veto in government, while its weakest form would ensure white control over the predominantly white schools and universities. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, educational institutions represent the main avenue of cultural maintenance and reproduction, and are usually the focal point in language conflict. May (2012) also advocated group-based rights in the form of regionalism and educational-language rights.

Roelf Meyer (cited in Giliomee, 2009:639), who became the government's chief negotiator in May 1992, insisted in Belfast, Northern Ireland, that the South African situation differed greatly as there was "basically no differences to resolve", and only skin colour separated the

groups. This view was not only a gross oversimplification of the differences between the ethnocultural groups, but it was also completely ahistorical, disregarding the hundreds of years of fraught relations. Giliomee argues that Meyer's words undercut the ability of minorities to demand protections against majoritarianism, in favour of the pursuit of what Mandela termed "an ordinary democracy" which is only suitable for a "prosperous country without deep racial or ethnic divisions [and] in which individual rights are thought sufficient to assuage minority fears". Giliomee (2009:640) states:

> Unlike Britain and the USA, South Africa was not dealing with a civil rights movement but a liberation movement. The struggle in South Africa was, in fact, a battle for the great prize – the state – with an understaffed and often undisciplined police force on one side, and embittered, sometimes desperate, freedom fighters on the other.

The discussion on May's (2012) MLR framework in Chapter 2 showed how vital the state apparatus is to the dominant majority, and how it may be wielded against subordinate minorities in the pursuit of nation-state congruence. Apartheid itself demonstrated this (although instead of seeking the assimilation of all groups into the dominant culture, Apartheid in effect sought the creation of several states corresponding to each nation). Giliomee (2009:643) believes that simple majority rule "held the risk of massive state intervention in the labour market, pressure to change the ownership of productive assets and the marginalisation of Afrikaans as a public language". Before the first democratic election in 1994, the NP ran an advertisement which incorrectly stated: "We have kept all our promises. We have a Government of National Unity, which means that the political parties will share power".

Giliomee (2009:645) suggests that the NP was overly concerned with the symbolism and rituals of power during the negotiations, as opposed to the ANC who focused on the substance. As details of the deal became known, the threat of a right-wing revolt increased. Under the leadership of General Constand Viljoen,[245] who believed that De Klerk had caved to the ANC's demands, the *Afrikaner Volksfront* (AVF; Afrikaner People's Front) was created, a separatist coalition of right-wing parties, organisations and movements. Their main goal was to establish an Afrikaner volkstaat, or ethnostate, which they would achieve by disrupting the elections.[246]

[245] Viljoen (1933-2020) was the Chief of the South African Defence Force from 1980-1985 and an NP member of Parliament. His twin brother, Braam Viljoen, was an anti-Apartheid activist (Wikipedia, 2024f).

[246] A 1993 poll found that half of Afrikaners either outrightly rejected the notion of a volkstaat, or were unsure about the idea, while one-fifth indicated that they themselves would move to such an Afrikaner volkstaat (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2007:402).

This plan designated an area including parts of the eastern and western Transvaal (with Pretoria as the capital) and the northern Free State. Although this area captured two-thirds of the Afrikaner population, they would still only constitute a small minority. Viljoen abandoned this project and joined the election under the newly founded *Freedom Front* party (now the *Freedom Front Plus*; FF+), in part because he wanted to distance himself from the *Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging* (AWB; Afrikaner Resistance Movement), an "ill-disciplined paramilitary organisation" headed by the aptly named Eugène Terre'Blanche,[247] and because of an ANC promise to revisit the issue of an Afrikaner volkstaat after the election (Giliomee, 2009:646).

Giliomee (2009:537) argues that while a free-market economy and democratic politics lead to high growth, political liberty and a decrease in ethnic tensions in developed countries, as touted by liberals, in developing countries where ethnic and class differences overlap, a free-market democracy tends to worsen racial or ethnic conflict, suppress growth and result in an erosion of democracy. He explains that liberals in South Africa had hoped, against evidence from other countries, that extending the franchise would lead to a moderate multi-racial electorate which voted not according to their racial or ethnic identity, but in their own material interests (2009:538).

The ANC won the 1994 election with 62.7% of the votes, attracting an overwhelming majority of black voters. The NP won 20.4% of the votes, attracting the support of 60% of both the white and coloured communities, which enabled the party to take control of the new Western Cape (WC) province. Giliomee (2009:647-648) writes that in the immediate aftermath of the election, "[a] spirit of reconciliation marked the start of the era with Mandela the symbol of the new democracy". He suggests that Afrikaners were captivated by Mandela, culminating in his appearance at the final of the 1995 Rugby World Cup, after allowing the national team to retain their green and gold jerseys with the springbok emblem, despite many considering those to be symbols of Apartheid (2009:648). The creation of the Rainbow Nation, as late archbishop Desmond Tutu coined it,[248] was under way.

[247] After some years with the South African Police and an unsuccessful career in politics with Albert Hertzog's HNP, Terre'Blanche (1941-2010) founded the AWB in 1973, which claimed 70,000 members at its height. He spent three years in prison for the assault of a black man and the attempted murder of another. He was murdered on his farm in 2010 (Wikipedia, 2024g).

[248] Tutu (1931-2021) was a South African Anglican bishop and an anti-Apartheid activist, for which he won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1984.

CHAPTER 5

Afrikaners, Quo Vadis? An analysis of contemporary white Afrikaans speakers (1994-2020s)[249]

Introduction

In the previous chapter, the Afrikaner 'case' was studied from the time when Jan van Riebeeck arrived at the Cape in 1652, up until the first democratic election in South Africa in 1994. These nearly 350 years of history were divided into the Dutchification period (1652-1795), the Anglicisation period, (1795-1910) and the Afrikanerisation period (1910-1994), denoting the dominant cultural and political power of the time.

In this chapter, the Afrikaner case study will be continued, with a focus on the period from the 1994 election up until the present moment. In the same vein as the abovementioned periodisation, I will refer to these three decades as the ANCification period (1994-2020s), to indicate the dominant power, during this time, in South Africa, i.e., the ruling political party the African National Congress (ANC).

Chapter 5 is divided into four sections. The first sets out to establish the background to ANC dominance and the post-1994 realities of South Africa. The second section provides a brief overview of Afrikaner mobilisation during the ANCification period. Section three then provides an in-depth discussion of contemporary Afrikaner identity, covering topics including variation within Afrikaner identity, identity threats and strategies, and the reformation of the Afrikaner identity. The final section aims to comprehensively integrate the key findings of May's (2012) MLR framework, the Social Identity Approach (SIA) and the Afrikaner case study as contained in this thesis, in an attempt to offer concluding insights into the future of Afrikaner identity, the minority-rights claims of this community, and its functioning in and impact on the nation-state, inclusive of the concepts of social cohesion and pluralism.

[249] The first use of the Latin phrase, meaning 'where are you going', in conjunction with the Afrikaners was in a 16 December 1949 speech by D.F. Malan at the inauguration of the Voortrekker Monument (Langner, 2019). This phrase has become a popular way of opining about the future of Afrikaners, not limited to a specific political ideology. In 1955, Bennie Keet, Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) minister, lecturer, and one of the translators of the 1933-Afrikaans Bible, published his book titled *Suid-Afrika Waarheen*? (Whither South Africa?), wherein he fiercely opposed Apartheid. He distinguished between *different* ethnic groups and *separate* ethnic groups in criticising the latter (Wikipedia, 2023a). In 1971, F.A. van Jaarsveld released *Afrikaner, Quo Vadis*, wherein he lamented the changes occurring from within and without the Afrikaner community (Kapp, 1982:80). The cover of Rebecca Davies' (2009) book on the Afrikaners similarly depicts a road sign indicating the direction of Afrikaners.

5.1. ANCification (1994–2020s)

5.1.1. The New South Africa / Rainbow Nation disillusionment

5.1.1.1. The South African Constitution: Kicking the can down the road

Section 6 of the *South African Constitution* (1996) makes the following language-rights provisions: (i) South Africa has eleven official languages (Northern Sotho,[250] Sotho, Tswana, Swazi, Venda, Tsonga, Afrikaans, English, Ndebele, Xhosa and Zulu); (ii) Indigenous languages should be developed and promoted; (iii) The national government and provincial governments may choose which official languages they want to use (at least two); (iv) The national government and provincial governments should regulate and monitor their use of official languages, in order to ensure parity of esteem and equitability between the official languages; (v) A *Pan South African Language Board* (PanSALB) will be tasked with the promotion and development of the official languages, the Khoi, Nama and San languages, and South African Sign Language (SASL) (Erasmus, 2019:120). In 2023, SASL became the twelfth official language of South Africa (South African Government News Agency (SA news), 2023a).

Section 9(3) prohibits the state from "unfairly" discriminating directly or indirectly against anyone on the basis of (among others) race, ethnic or social origin, culture or language. Section 18 affirms the right to freedom of association. Section 29(2) confers the right to education in an official language of one's own choice in public education institutions "where that education is reasonably practicable". This right is further limited by the need to consider (a) equity; (b) practicability; and (c) the need for the redress of past racially discriminatory laws and practices. Section 29(3) confers the right to establish and maintain private, independent education institutions, limited by the requirement that they (a) do not discriminate based on race.

Section 30 declares that all citizens have "the right to use the language and to participate in the cultural life of their choice", but may not do so in a way that is "inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights". Section 31(1) states that members of a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied the right to (a) enjoy their culture, practise their religion and use their language, and (b) to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations and other organs of civil society, limited by the requirement that (2) these rights are not exercised in way that is inconsistent with the Bill of Rights. Section 184 of the Constitution

[250] The Constitution (1996) incorrectly lists *Sepedi* (Pedi) as an official language, instead of *Sesotho sa Leboa* (Northern Sotho), the umbrella term for roughly 30 dialects, of which Pedi is one (PMG, 2011).

awards powers to the *South African Human Rights Commission* (SAHRC), and section 185 bestows powers on the *Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities* (CRL Rights Commission). Section 235 confers the right to self-determination of any community sharing a common cultural and language heritage, within a territorial entity or in any other way.

The Constitution of South Africa has been roundly applauded for its adherence to liberal democratic principles and its wide-reaching protections of minorities. Considering the political turmoil during its drafting, and the severe polarisation between white and black South Africa, it seemed as though the defeated Afrikaner leaders and the incoming black leaders had achieved the impossible. Giliomee (2009:643), however, disagrees with the widespread view that the fact that the NP and ANC could agree on an interim constitution was "a miracle". Instead, he believes that consensus was achieved by including conflicting demands and "deferring their resolution to the post-apartheid era". He cites Thabo Mbeki who, in 1995 as deputy president at an ANC conference, referred to the negotiations for an interim constitution as "contrived elements of a transition" and not "elements of permanence" (2009:644).

Giliomee (2009:644) provides two examples of the conflictual and contrived nature of certain parts of the Constitution. First are the provisions on the labour market, which includes both the principle of merit and the need for affirmative action, and the application of which has been skewed heavily in favour of the latter under ANC rule. Second is the issue of language rights. The granting of official status to a staggering eleven (now twelve) languages was widely predicted to lead to the entrenchment of English as the sole public language. Furthermore, the constitutional language provisions included both the NP's demand for mother-tongue education, as well as the ANC's demand for allowing all races access to all schools. Giliomee explains the obvious problem with these conflicting demands regarding media of instruction:

> The constitution-makers made no attempt to spell out how potential conflicts were to be resolved. This would give a future government the liberty to emphasise what it called the right of black children to have access to all schools and to insist on the language of instruction they preferred. It relegated mother-tongue instruction as a value enshrined in the constitution to a distant third. The new government put pressure on Afrikaans schools to offer English-medium classes parallel to those in Afrikaans where the numbers merited. Most of the Afrikaans universities voluntarily introduced English streams. Parallel-medium institutions held the real risk that English over the medium term would drive out Afrikaans.

Reddi (2002) agrees with this assessment of the inadequacy of minority-rights protections in the South African Constitution. She compared the South African constitutional provisions in

terms of minority-language and cultural rights with international law provisions, and found a disparity between the two (2002:328):

> What is evident in the comparison is that minority groups in South Africa enjoy the same rights, without exception, as the rest of the population of the state. There are no special protective measures designated specifically for the benefit of minorities in South Africa. The South African Constitution does not recognise the identity of minorities. Consequently, no individual enjoys rights that are additional to those enjoyed by the population at large.

According to Webb (2002:160), the South African Constitution grants personal rights, not territorial rights, since the individual is granted the freedom to practise his or her language rights and to insist on the recognition of his or her rights. Reddi (2002:333-334) also notes that the Constitution confers individual rights (not group-based rights) and negative rights (not positive rights). However, Section 29(2), which grants every person the right to receive education in the official language of their choice, does, it seems, confer a positive right, as it imposes a duty upon the state to provide this education. Importantly, however, this duty is restricted by the qualifier 'where reasonably practicable' (Reddi, 2002:335). Reddi (2002:348) argues that it is therefore "not a guarantee of ethnic mother tongue education for minority groups". She concludes (2002:350):

> The South African Constitution does not recognise the identity of minorities […] it is insufficient in respect of persons belonging to linguistic minorities, to simply guarantee that they have rights that are identical to those enjoyed by the rest of the population. This equality of status may not be perceived by the persons belonging to such minority groups as adequately protecting their interests.

Giliomee (2009:703) suggests that there was a reluctance to refer cases regarding affirmative action and minority languages to the Constitutional Court, based on the belief that the Court would give preference to redress and restitution, and neglect minority rights. Relatedly, in 2009, former Constitutional Court judge, Johann Kriegler, criticised the *Judicial Services Commission* (the body tasked with assessing prospective judges and making recommendations to the President) for elevating *transformation* to an "overriding fundamental requirement", trumping the qualification requirement (i.e., meritocracy). The related goals of transforming South African society and nation-building have resulted in a de facto centralist language policy (see Chapter 1, section 1.1), in clear violation of the constitutional language protections, and especially of Afrikaans speakers' educational-language rights.

5.1.1.2. From non-racialism to black nationalism

In 1998, when the constitutionally mandated CRL Rights Commission was being established, one ANC Minister stated that the body would have no significant power, and that its purpose was to "destroy the spirit of ethnicity and tribalism", in Giliomee's (2009:691) words. At the same event, Thabo Mbeki (then Deputy President of South Africa), critiqued the application of international conventions to South Africa, arguing that in South Africa, the "minority is not the disadvantaged", and thus promoting the notion that Afrikaners, despite their numerical weakness (and thus political weakness in a majoritarian democracy), do not require any language or group-based legal protections because of their relative economic strength. Giliomee (2009:691) believes that with this conception, the focus shifted from managing ethnic diversity, to eliminating racial inequality. He argues elsewhere that racial representation based on demography eventually became the end-goal of non-racialism (2009:668).

According to Giliomee (2009:xx), the ANC sent contradictory messages from 1987 onwards which resulted in various "responses [by] the so-called minorities (white, coloureds and Indians) in dealing with the dominant party and its syncretistic policies". During the constitutional negotiations of the 1990s, "the ANC presented its curious mix of 'African hegemony' and 'non-racialism'".

> The ANC also insisted on the hegemony of the English language (and the right to access to educational institutions in that language), while at the same time paying lip service to the equality of the eleven official languages. Rejecting the principle of equality of opportunity, it demanded demographic representivity not only in the civil service, but also in the corporate sector, welfare bodies and sports teams. Since 1999 [when Mbeki succeeded President Nelson Mandela] the ANC has shown an increasing disregard for key sections of the constitutional settlement. In 2005 Pik Botha and FW de Klerk stated that they would not have signed the Constitution had they known how the yardstick of demographic representivity would be used.

During negotiations in the 1980s, the ANC rejected minority rights as "a cloak for the retention of 'white privilege'" (Giliomee, 2009:670-671). Perhaps somewhat unexpectedly, academics and bureaucrats from the Soviet Union attempted to get the ANC to soften its stance on minority issues, even advocating for a minority veto and equal representation for the different racial communities. Giliomee (2009:676) states that they "stressed the need for a future ANC government to recognise the salience of ethnicity and to develop forms of political pluralism in order to hold the state together". This statement is consistent with May's (2012) views on maintaining sociopolitical stability in diverse societies.

US ambassador to South Africa during the late 1980s, Edward J. Perkins (cited in Giliomee, 2009:676), believed that Afrikaners and black people constituted "two competing nationalisms". This is in accordance with my argument regarding reciprocal radicalisation, and May's (2012) suggestion that the majority and minority group are in competition with each other for the state apparatus. Giliomee argues that the Soviet Union and the US (in advocating for equal opportunities post-Apartheid), were better advocates of minority rights than the majority of the Afrikaner negotiators (during informal talks prior to formal negotiations). So too "(less guilt-ridden) 'English liberals'" were able to provide much tougher opposition to the ANC (Giliomee, 2009:677). He continues this line of argument (2009:678):

> Debilitating feelings of guilt over apartheid made the 'internal South Africans' as well as the negotiators of the NP government loath to ask tough questions of the ANC. Questions dealing with minority rights and an electoral system that would ensure checks and balances were never properly debated.

Despite the NP and De Klerk's weakness, Giliomee (2009:679) believes that the ANC would in any case have been unlikely to move on the issues of majority rule and minority rights, knowing that they enjoyed sufficient popular support, enabling them to hold out for full political control. According to Giliomee (2009:680), the electoral system of proportional representation with a closed list resulted in political parties making "general appeals to attract maximum support", which allowed the ANC to appeal exclusively to the black majority for votes, with no need to win over moderates within any of the racial groups.

During negotiations and throughout the 1990s, the ANC utilised the most cherished symbols of Afrikaner identity in establishing trust with the Afrikaners. On their first meeting, De Klerk reflects that Mandela "spoke almost exclusively about the Afrikaners and their history", and discussed at length (and in positive terms) Generals De la Rey and De Wet. Mandela used Afrikaans in his first inaugural speech, and recited a poem by Afrikaans writer Ingrid Jonker at the opening of the first democratic parliament, referring to her as both an Afrikaner and an African. Mbeki was also said to have realised the value of "petting, coddling and cajoling" the Afrikaners, but he completely abandoned any interest in Afrikaners or Afrikaans once he took office (Giliomee, 2009:681-682). This reminds one of Rhodes calling himself an Afrikaner to charm Cape Afrikaners (see Chapter 4, subsection 4.2.5.4). It is worthwhile noting the phenomenon of disarming outgroup members, especially high identifiers, in this manner, and what may be gleaned from this in terms of interethnic conflict management.

Shortly after becoming president, Mbeki did promote nation-building (based on pluralism, not assimilation), declaring that "Afrikaners are Africans" and proposing "cultural exchange through multilingualism" which would involve black and white children learning each other's languages. He also proposed a structure for minority groups in the President's office, which would liaise with PanSALB and aim to ensure the practical application of the constitutional principles regarding minorities. Giliomee (2009:693) suggests that there was a failure of implementation.

Giliomee (2009:688) cites a 1998 report by James Myburgh titled *Death of the Rainbow Nation*, which demonstrates the ANC's shift "within three years from Mandela's vision of an 'inspiringly united society' to the deliberate fostering of racial division". He insists that Mbeki departed widely from Mandela's active pursual of reconciliation (2009:683). In 1998, Mbeki "made his most divisive speech" aimed at racial division, wherein he identified and contrasted the "white, relatively prosperous" nation with the "larger […] black and poor" nation. Giliomee believes that this ignored the increase in white poverty (which Mbeki said he found "very encouraging" as a sign of income levelling between black and white), as well as the growing income inequality between the black elite and the rest of the black population.

The radicalisation of the ANC in the post-Apartheid era is clear to see. Giliomee (2009:666-667) postulates that the ANC devised an alternative radical programme concerning minority rights, economic policy and affirmative action, as expressed through its theory of a *National Democratic Revolution* (NDR). The NDR involves taking over the political and economic system, and then ushering in a socialist state. It states that the "oppressing white nation" enjoys the wealth produced by the "oppressed black nation", and it aims to overthrow the "colonial state", establish popular control over the economy and all institutions, and return the land to black people. Giliomee (2009:668) argues that leaders of the ANC demonstrated a deep belief in the moral virtuousness of the organisation. He cites Lawrence Schlemmer, who argues that the ANC hides behind the concept of non-racial democracy, as follows:

> The ANC has perfected a code in responding to the issue of race. It invariably starts off from the position of non-racism, and it then qualifies this with a commitment to closing racial gaps in order to achieve a legitimate basis for non-racialism, and from there it proposes a range of race-based affirmative action and empowerment policies to give effect to this. In the latter aspect it is able to assure its African or black supporters that, although 'non-racial', it is 'on their side'.

This statement perfectly illustrates the blending of the civic and ethnic ties of the dominant group and banal nationalism (see below). Davies (2009:66) similarly maintains that Mandela's

overtures to Afrikaans speakers represent the height of Rainbow Nation-ism, which by the late 1990s made way for an increasingly race-conscious Africanist discourse. This departure from non-racialism, she argues, has upended the inclusivity guaranteed during the transition as well as the meaning of citizenship (2009:67). Davies (2009:67) believes that both during the Apartheid regime, and now under the post-Apartheid dispensation, an incompatibility between different notions of citizenship exists:

> Under the previous dispensation, a profound instability was apparent in the nation-state whereby the relationship of the individual to the community was set by two different criteria, namely: citizenship in the state and membership in the nation. The first formulation dictates an equal and formal participation in the political nation whereas the second, more complex construction depicts a particularistic belonging in the cultural nation. These inherently incompatible interpretations of citizenship have been effectively renewed under the terms of the post-apartheid democracy.[251] In fact, there are at least three distinct types of liberal projects in play, namely: a minimalist liberalism aimed primarily at the establishment of the rule of law and minimalist government; a juridical liberalism concerned with rights, justice and obligations; and, a communitarian liberalism concerned with cultural pluralism, communal values and group rights. Amid these competing liberalisms, the government treads a careful line claiming equal citizenship rights for all citizens whilst at the same time defining the nation in cultural terms so as to give priority of some kind to those possessing the attributes of cultural nationhood.

According to Davies (2009:67-68), this new cultural nationalism, or racialism, and the "strategies of exclusion" it necessitated was dominant ANC ideology by the late 1990s. The ANC's black nationalism, as Davies explains above, involves the legitimation and naturalisation of the *ethnic* interests of the majority group as *civic* ones, and the rejection of the legitimate claims for similar recognition and inclusion in the public sphere by minorities (see Chapter 2, subsection 2.2.1). Nationalism is then projected onto minorities, while that of the dominant majority is naturalised, and thus not viewed as problematic (see banal nationalism in Chapter 2, subsection 2.2.6).

As it pertains to language policy, the ANC's black nationalism has not led to the dominance of any indigenous African languages. Instead, and in large part because of widespread negative internalisation among black South Africans, English has become the dominant language in the public sphere.[252] Even during President Jacob Zuma's term (2009-2018), which had a more

[251] Both the Apartheid regime and the ANC government have therefore pursued nation-state congruence, where race (and not ethnicity) is the criteria for membership of the (cultural) nation.

[252] Black South Africans have instrumental attachments to English, and arguably also sentimental attachments as 'liberation language' during Apartheid. English preference could be viewed as a way to achieve positive distinctiveness from Afrikaners, especially since this valorised language confers more positive self-esteem than

distinct Zulu ethnic character, English dominated the public sphere. Since the ANC represents various (minority) ethnic groups, an 'ethnically neutral language' – the colonial language – has been chosen, as is often the case in African countries (see Chapter 1, subsection 1.4.1). Thus, instead of the habitus of any one black ethnic group being viewed as cultural capital, no minority ethnic habitus is viewed as such.

The designation of English as the only cultural capital by the (ANC) state, is a different form of nation-state congruence than conceptualised by May (2012). In what amounts to the re-racialisation of South African society, mostly black people (of various ethnic groups) comprise a dominant majority who prefers and imposes English, while mostly white and coloured people comprise the sociological minority whose ethnic habitus (Afrikaans) is banished from representation in the state. As membership of the nation is based on race, assimilation through anglicisation does not allow members of the sociological minority to become members of the dominant majority.

5.1.1.3. TRC polarisation

Giliomee (2009:649-650) discusses the ANC's political involvement in the *Truth and Reconciliation Commission* (TRC), whose 17 members were overwhelmingly ANC supporters. He specifically cites the ANC's framing of the conflict in South Africa as being caused solely by racism and Apartheid, and not affected by the Cold War and the struggle between capitalism and communism; and its attempts to paint Apartheid as a crime against humanity, not comparable to segregation in the American South, but instead amounting to genocide. Kader Asmal *et al*.'s *Reconciliation through Truth: A reckoning of Apartheid's Criminal Governance* (1996) is one such example of the effort to compare Apartheid to Nazi Germany and the concentration camps.[253]

Giliomee (2009:651) cites late archbishop Desmond Tutu, chairman of the TRC, who called on "all whites, especially the Afrikaners" to acknowledge the crimes of the past and warned: "You white people – if you reject the TRC you will carry the burden of guilt to your graves". He also cites *Die Burger*'s response that Tutu meted out "one of the most dangerous doctrines in history", namely collective guilt. Giliomee (2009:653-654) suggests that the TRC exposed

(often underdeveloped) indigenous African languages. This helps to explain the phenomenon of anglicisation among upwardly mobile black people, similar to Cape Afrikaners during British rule. Plüddemann (2015) provides a comprehensive discussion on the rejection of MTE among black South Africans.

[253] Adam (1997) provided a contemporaneous critique of such ill-advised comparisons between Apartheid and the Holocaust.

the existing cleavages between white and black, Afrikaner and English, and those advancing liberal principles versus those advancing the liberation struggle. A 2000 poll found that while 77% of black people, and 56% of coloured people believed that the TRC promoted the building of a united nation, only 29% of white people believed the same.

5.1.1.4. Incapacity of the state

Giliomee (2020:182) argues that the ANC, in its moral opposition to Apartheid, did not fully appreciate the difficulty and complexity of governing South Africa. By the end of Apartheid, the majority of the black population was not integrated into the modern economy and service delivery was mainly geared towards white and/or urban rate-paying populations. The ANC thus faced the mammoth task of having to extend service delivery to millions of poor, mostly unemployed citizens in rural areas, while also improving the employment rate in order to grow the tax base needed to fund such an expansion of the state's capacity.

After three decades of ANC rule the official unemployment rate is 33.5% (Statistics South Africa (Stats SA), 2024a). More than one-third of young South Africans (aged 15-24 years) are not currently in employment, education or training (NEET), and the total NEET rate (ages 15-60) is 44.2%, or 17.1 million people (Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET), 2023). Only seven million South Africans pay personal income tax (SA news, 2023b), while 11.6 million receive social welfare grants (South African Social Security Agency (SASSA), 2024). In addition to the persistent socio-economic inequality and economic malaise endemic to South Africa, the country is plagued by (often) violent protests, one of the highest crime rates in the world, and mass corruption throughout much of the public sector.

Various ANC leaders, including Govan Mbeki, Mathews Phosa and Kgalema Motlanthe compared the situation of the black population at the end of Apartheid, to that of the Afrikaners immediately after the Anglo-Boer War, desiring the same type of development for black people (Giliomee, 2009:684). But the ANC's black nationalism did not follow the model of Afrikaner nationalism of the 20th century. Motlanthe lamented the fact that the ANC had not prioritised the upliftment of black people to the same extent as the Afrikaners.

The ANC's failure to make inroads into black poverty does not, however, mean that the racial composition of wealth and proximity to state resources remained unchanged after Apartheid. While the majority of white people are still more privileged than the majority of black people,

the black middle class is now numerically larger than the white middle class,[254] white poverty has increased, and a burgeoning black, politically connected, elite has appeared.

Giliomee (2009:688) argues that the ANC's policy of "rapid Africanisation of the civil service with 'loyal cadres' being deployed to strategic positions" saw the exodus of 117,000 white civil servants, which severely affected the "capacity of government to deliver services". The *Employment Equity Act* (1998) furthered the radical goal of demographic representivity. Soon welfare organisations and national sports teams alike faced pressure to become demographically representative (Giliomee, 2009:689). Even a government relief fund during the Covid-19 pandemic allocated funds subject to *Black Economic Empowerment* (BEE) status (Khumalo, 2020).

Eventually racial quotas became less about alleviating black poverty and more about entrenching ANC power and enriching a handful of connected individuals. Giliomee (2009:689), citing an ANC report, states that by the early 2000s, the ANC began pursuing the "deepening of party control within the civil service and an expansion of the scope and reach of 'state transformation' within 'the security forces, the judiciary, parastatals and regulatory bodies.'" This saw the expansion of corruption networks, or so-called state capture, highlighted in the 2022 report of the *Zondo Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture*. As journalists began uncovering the extent of state capture, one prominent family was identified as central to many of the ANC's corrupt dealings, giving rise to the so-called *Guptagate* scandal. In response, the *White Monopoly Capital* (WMC) media narrative was created and promoted by several politicians, as a way to obfuscate the allegations against them and turn the ire of the public against white people. Bell Pottinger, the (now-defunct) London-based public relations firm, was later identified as the origin of this racially divisive campaign (amaBhungane, 2017).

Under ANC rule, Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) deals have abounded, which Giliomee (2009:690) states only benefit "a very narrow stratum of black individuals well connected to government and often related to one another". He also argues that the ANC "succeeded in creating an elite of black managers in the public and the corporate sectors beholden to it, and a small cadre of spectacularly rich businessmen". This includes leader of the ANC and president of South Africa since 2018, Cyril Ramaphosa, and his brother-in-law Patrice Motsepe, both of

[254] Although the black middle class is numerically the largest (which is to be expected considering the demographic make-up of South Africa), it only represents 8%-27% of the total black population, depending on which measure is employed (Mattes, 2014:6).

whom became exceedingly wealthy through the mining sector. The *National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa* (NUMSA) rejected President Ramaphosa's apology for his role in the Marikana Massacre in 2012, in which 34 striking mineworkers were killed by the police (Cele, 2017; Jim, 2017).

Moeletsi Mbeki, brother of former president Thabo Mbeki, has been very critical of the black elite in the public sector, directly linking their perverse incentives to state decay under the ANC government. He has also compared the ANC to the NP on the basis of being a nationalist organisation driven by grievances (no longer against the British, but now against Apartheid). Whereas the NP's grievances led to Apartheid, Mbeki argues, the ANC's grievances led to their BEE policy, both of which he considers discriminatory and not in service of nation-building (Willemse, R., 2024).

Davies (2009:51-52), on the other hand, blames the ANC's adherence to neo-liberalism for its failure in building state capacity to deliver services and alleviate poverty and inequality. Her research was conducted during Mbeki's tenure, and because of its lack of emphasis on corruption – which became especially rampant during Zuma's tenure from 2009 onward – this argument feels a bit outdated. The findings of the Zondo Commission, for example, have since laid bare the extent of the criminal inner-workings of the ruling party.

Giliomee (2009:700) believes that the "most spectacular change" since 1994 was the enormous growth of the multiracial middle class, which by 2008 consisted of more black people than white people. By this time the civil service was fully demographically representative. He continues: "Since 1994 a major racial transformation had been brought about: South Africa was now an African nation with predominantly a black state but one that was of a special kind". This caveat refers to the continued "overrepresentation" of white people in the top levels of private industry.

The ever-shrinking public sector employment opportunities for skilled white people led many to emigrate, while others turned to the private sector (Giliomee, 2009:690). According to Giliomee (2009:701), there was a dramatic shift among white people from salaried employment to entrepreneurship. He also states that many skilled white people had been squeezed out of the public sector and large corporations, but that they managed to do well in the technology and services sector.

The middle class in South Africa faces an increasingly high tax burden, despite a noticeable drop in service delivery. One notable example is the decay at the state-owned enterprise Eskom,

and the resultant rolling blackouts, locally called *loadshedding*, which has plagued the country since 2007. Giliomee (2009:703) cites economist Mike Schussler, who notes the mismatch between the tax burden and service delivery in South Africa, combined with the shrinking tax base, as follows: "Never had so few paid so much for so little". This disparity, I believe, led to growing disaffection among some Afrikaners (and likely other middle-class South Africans as well), and may have precipitated, or at least contributed to, the delegitimisation of the state in some sectors (see Solidarity Movement in section 5.4).

Wessels (2011:160) argues that celebrations for the dawning of the 'New South Africa' in 1994 had been premature, as the country today is plagued by crime (which continues to traumatise) and corruption (which harms the ability to uplift victims of Apartheid). Giliomee (2009:713) believes that rampant crime and corruption have left South Africans of all ethnic communities feeling increasingly disaffected. Wessels (2011:160) further suggests that affirmative action is considered by many white South Africans to be "reverse racism", which has led to a "new Great Trek" of primarily Afrikaans-speaking white people out of the country. He notes that they have primarily fled to Britain and other former British colonies, undoubtedly because of their English proficiency (2011:161). Giliomee (2009:702) also suggests that many Afrikaners became disillusioned with the New South Africa:

> [Afrikaners] had thought that the minorities would largely be left in peace by government. Now it appeared that, while they would not be subjected to any persecution for their political views, their opinion did not count for much. They had assumed that as the main ratepayers they would retain a reasonable measure of control at municipal level, but they were soon confronted with a growing loss in the capacity of the state to deliver services.

Before Afrikaners became disillusioned with the capacity of the state, some began to question their status and role in the state altogether. In addition to the cull of white state employees, the ANC rejected power-sharing as a constitutional principle, leading F.W. de Klerk (then Deputy President) to withdraw the NP from the transitional government with the ANC in 1996, and later to resign as head of the NP, by then only an opposition party, amid criticism that he failed to deliver on his promise to secure Afrikaner interests (Giliomee, 2009:656). Giliomee (2009:656-657) argues that the political displacement of the NP led to disillusionment among Afrikaners, in a context of a crime-wave – especially farm murders,[255] which some linked to

[255] Farm murders, especially, continue to this day to be a particularly racially polarising crime, and incidences are met with great emotional responses by many Afrikaners. This type of crime seems to be especially traumatising to Afrikaners as a collective group, not only because the remoteness of single white farming families and the ever-present threat of black violence mirrors their concerns as a minority group, but also because this crime has been

the loss of national sovereignty to black people – and a decrease in prosecutions, as well as the ANC's transformation policies, including in the private sector. Crime and affirmative action led to a marked increase in Afrikaner emigration. Giliomee (2009:658) cites Ton Vosloo, then Chairman of Naspers and Sanlam, who in 2002 remarked bleakly:

> It is not to spread panic when one says that Afrikaner people are in a crisis with red lights flashing along their survival path. The examples of marginalisation are numerous; the places where space to exist had been conquered, negotiated or established on own initiative are increasingly being questioned. This includes even the self-evident right to be served by the authorities in a language that is officially recognised.

5.1.1.5. Anglo-centric nation-building

The declining use of Afrikaans in the public domain has given rise to what is commonly referred to as the *taaldebat* (language debate). According to Romaine (2006:218), the language debate in South Africa concerns the continued use of Afrikaans in higher functions, and in particular in higher education in post-Apartheid South Africa. According to Giliomee (2009:695), genuine efforts to advance the use of languages other than English in the public sphere were rejected by the cabinet. Ministers either avoided the language issue, or "stigmatised the battle for Afrikaans", such as Pallo Jordan, who in 2008 dismissed Afrikaners' struggle for Afrikaans language rights as "a resurgence of isolationism" rather than "a genuine concern for the future of the language".

Despite 25% of *South African Broadcasting Corporation* (SABC) license holders being Afrikaans-speaking, throughout the late 1990s the SABC began to purge Afrikaans board members and relegate Afrikaans radio and television to "subordinate 'ethnic' categories on a par with, for example, Xhosa and Zulu" while English was promoted as the main language (Giliomee, 2009:696). Giliomee (2009:697) argues that throughout universities and media, the degree of support for Afrikaans was not determined by policy, but by the personal leanings of those in senior positions at the respective establishments:

> Culturally-based institutions almost immediately fell by the wayside and the battle became one to preserve Afrikaans as the single medium of instruction in schools and universities, the only effective policy to protect a language competing against a universal language. As the noted authority on language in education, Jean Laponce, wrote: 'Bilingualism in education is generally a bilingualism of transition, which in the long run facilitates linguistic assimilation.' The Constitution mandated single-medium institutions where practicable, while also stressing equity and the need to address the

a regular fixture throughout their history, dating back to the dangers faced by free burghers. (This is, of course, not to discount the fear that the Khoikhoi must have felt at the arrival of the Europeans, or the Xhosa and other black tribes facing the threat of the advancing frontiersmen and trekkers.)

> results of past discrimination. The government rarely followed a consistent policy line. […] The ANC's weekly electronic newsletter, ANC Today, posed this question: 'If we accept that no school in South Africa may any longer claim to be for the exclusive use of any race, why is it so hard to accept that no school may any longer claim to be for the exclusive use of any one language group?'

Giliomee (2009:698) states that despite Afrikaans single-medium schools only constituting 3% of total public schools ten years after the ANC came to power, they attracted the most scrutiny for their "failure to transform". He notes that the number of Afrikaans children attending Afrikaans single-medium schools dropped from 90% in the early 1990s to 60% in 2004, not only because of government pressure on schools, but also parental choice and demographic changes. Afrikaans schools were further hamstrung by emigration of Afrikaans teachers. Giliomee (2009:698) also claims that the "[h]istory syllabi over-corrected the former dominance of Afrikaner history by giving scant attention to the Great Trek and the Anglo-Boer War".

The Historically Afrikaans Universities (HAUs) also came under increasing fire – plagued by accusations of discrimination based on language and racial exclusion. Consequently, the *University of the Free State* (UFS) introduced a parallel-medium education policy to accommodate English and Afrikaans students, and eventually adopted an English-medium language policy in 2017. A case was brought to the Constitutional Court, which ruled in favour of the university management, citing 'access' as the dominant consideration. The *University of Pretoria* (UP) similarly introduced bilingualism and finally phased Afrikaans out in 2019. The *Rand Afrikaans University* (RAU) was merged with other institutions in 2005, by government order, becoming the *University of Johannesburg* (UJ) and immediately ceased the use of Afrikaans.

The Potchefstroom campus of the *North-West University* (NWU) introduced simultaneous interpreting to accommodate English students in Afrikaans lectures, and remains as the last university still offering (mainly) Afrikaans-medium tertiary education in South Africa. *Stellenbosch University* (SU) introduced English as a medium of instruction alongside Afrikaans, making the removal of the latter a forgone conclusion (more on this in subsection 5.2.1).[256] Giliomee (2009:699) notes that the proportion of Afrikaans students at each of these

[256] Recall the origin of Stellenbosch University: an Afrikaans university that challenged the idea of fusion, or nation-building, based on English-medium public institutions (see Chapter 4, subsection 4.3.2.2).

universities dropped precipitously: by 2009 it was 60% at SU, 40% at UP, 35% at the UFS, and less than 20% at UJ.

The *Pan South African Language Board* (PanSALB), a body established by the Constitution, regularly found the government (which promoted English as lingua franca) in contravention of the constitutional language provisions, without effect (Giliomee, 2009:659). Giliomee (2009:658) explains that Afrikaans is not in danger because of a loss of speakers, or the loss of the will of speakers to continue using Afrikaans. In 2002 there were six million mother-tongue Afrikaans speakers (15% of the population), the majority of whom were not white, and who comprised 33% of consumers. Instead, Afrikaans was being threatened by changes to the structures necessary for the reproduction of language, culture and an ethnic community.

> Between the 1920s and 1980s single-language Afrikaans schools and universities were the main institutions for socialising youth with a particular set of cultural values into the Afrikaner community. Soon after the transition in 1994 the new government claimed that Afrikaans was used as a language to retain 'apartheid-style racial exclusivity'. It put pressure on schools to introduce parallel courses in English to cater for blacks. By the beginning of the 1990s there were 1,800 schools which were white and Afrikaans; by 2002 only three hundred single-medium Afrikaans schools remained, of which almost all were racially inclusive. […] The growing use of English as a language of instruction in schools and universities was a major source of concern. Elsewhere in the world dual-medium education had led inexorably to the displacement of the local language. It also undermines the resolve of the management of these institutions to take responsibility for the transfer of the language from the present to future generations.

From the discussions in Chapters 1 and 2, we know that for many minority-language groups, MLR often boil down to ELR, and the 'ownership' of educational institutions. Instead of language shift and loss caused by the voluntary anglicisation of Afrikaans speakers (although we know that unfairness often tilts the scales in favour of the dominant language, making the use of the word 'voluntary' questionable), the continued activism from the Afrikaans-speaking community demonstrates that the threat to Afrikaans is external, and that this community is actively fighting for a part of the state apparatus necessary for the reproduction of their culture.

One might expect the gradual removal of symbols of Afrikaner identity from the public sphere, Afrikaans being chief among them, to have an adverse effect on continued identification with that identity, especially in a wider context of stigmatisation of said identity, and valorisation of an anglicised dominant national identity. Instead of (or perhaps, alongside) the development of a superordinate South African identity (the goal of nation-building), white Afrikaans speakers seem to have increased their subgroup (ethnic) identification, in direct response to controversial

assimilationist policies. In other words, distinctiveness threats increase the salience of the relevant social identity.

Giliomee (2009:661) believes that despite some lingering Afrikaner-English intra-white tensions and language struggles, the two communities had grown closer in their political views and in their socio-economic status. He states (2009:662):

> Below the surface there were still major cultural differences between the two [white] communities. History had happened to the Afrikaners. Their forebears were both colonisers and a colonised people. They had defeated blacks in war but had suffered a shattering defeat at the hands of the British; they had known poverty and contempt for their culture; they had won power and had experienced the corruption of power. With the English-speakers it was different. They were the first nationalists in South Africa who imposed not only their economic but also their cultural values on society – in short how a 'respectable society' should organise itself or more precisely how groups should behave in order to be considered respectable. Both Afrikaners and blacks reacted to this 'first nationalism.' The black intelligentsia embraced it and English as a public language; Afrikaners first accepted it and then embarked on the project of developing a particular culture rooted in the country and Afrikaans as public language.[257]

Giliomee (2009:662) argues that while the new ruling black elite, personified by Thabo Mbeki, "divested itself of all ethnic distinctiveness [and] embraced British-American culture", Afrikaners continued to resist absorption into the growing anglicised monocultural identity. Because of this, Giliomee (2009:663) suggests that Afrikaners were more likely to feel disaffected by the "ANC-led cultural revolution" than white English speakers. Despite this, he claims that the "Afrikaner elite were defecting from the language group", believing the continuation of the Afrikaans language struggle to be futile, and opting to educate their children in English.

According to Giliomee (2009:690), Afrikaner leaders viewed the displacement of white civil servants, the demand for 'access' to public schools and universities, the de facto national language policy, and symbolic changes (such as controversial place-name changes) as policies targeting Afrikaans and Afrikaners. Rampant crime, including the uptick in farm murders (and the government's response of disbanding the rural commandos) further contributed to a sense of persecution among Afrikaners, and in the face of inadequate actions by the government, as state-sanctioned persecution. The *Freedom Front Plus* (FF+), for one, characterised the ANC

[257] It could be argued that Afrikaners are better situated to oppose anglicisation, as they are able to derive positive self-esteem from their Europeanness (historically a highly valued identity), which black South Africans cannot, and thus the former do not require the English language for status amelioration to the same extent as the latter.

as “an oppressing majority sowing racial divisions between white and black” (Giliomee, 2009:691).

5.1.1.6. Centralisation and majoritarianism

According to Giliomee (2009:668; 678), the ANC increasingly began to model the new government after the *democratic centralism* of Eastern European dictatorships and one-party African states, where “the ruling elite enriched itself enormously and marginalised the opposition parties and ethnic minorities”. Diverging views among members would be quashed by the leadership, and the legislature became a mere rubberstamp. In other words, while the ANC’s dominance over other parties is a result of ‘democracy by census’, power is further concentrated away from members (and black people in general) into the hands of the ANC elite. Giliomee (2009:668) states that this highly centralised system which fused the ruling party and the state, left little room for an opposition party. Giliomee (2009:668-669) further criticises the justness of ANC rule in South Africa:

> The great moral alibi of African nationalism has been the main liberal principle, namely majority rule. Majority rule, however, meant something radically different in a homogeneous society, where social class interests and beliefs rather than racial or ethnic identity determined voters’ choices. In societies deeply divided by race and ethnicity, by contrast, the ascribed identity strongly shaped the voters’ affiliation. Invariably this resulted in the largest racial or ethnic group in the electorate forming a ‘permanent majority’, using democratic terminology and mechanisms to exclude minorities as participants in decision-making.

Giliomee (2009:670) argues that when Thabo Mbeki referred to himself as an Afrikaner in 1987, it signified both a rejection of the exclusive use of the term, but also introduced the idea of a shared sense of nationhood and belonging. He also believes that the use of the term ‘Afrikaner’ in this context recognised all South Africans as indigenous to Africa, although it denied the concept of “deep-seated ethnic differences requiring a system that accommodated both minority rights as well as individual rights”. Giliomee’s (2009:671) description of the ANC’s rationale for its opposition to minority rights below, exemplifies the rejection of ethnic identity as constructed, as discussed in Chapter 2, subsection 2.1.3:

> Pallo Jordan, the ANC head of research, led the attack on minority rights, insisting that the new South Africa had to be based on a rejection of the cultural and ethnic divisions on which apartheid was based. In the most sweeping of statements he argued that all groups existing in South Africa had been ‘created, sustained and nurtured by state policy’, which had first tried to deflect the consciousness of the black masses into channels of ethnic nationalism and, when that had failed, proposed devices such as group rights, power-sharing and federalism. The cleavages could be unmade precisely because they had been created by apartheid.

Although the Apartheid system certainly formalised and enforced arbitrary racial distinctions, artificially solidified group boundaries, and the Afrikaner nationalism of the time mythicised elements of Afrikaner identity, it is a complete fallacy to suggests that various group identities did not exist prior to 1948. As May (2012) argues, the truth lies in the middle: between identity as primordial and identity as constructed. The historical facts underlying the various ethnic group identities in South Africa cannot be denied. While this does not presuppose the fixity of identities, it does preclude the possibility of eliminating these identities in favour of a superordinate identity by merely abolishing Apartheid, or by any other action or decree on the part of the state. Giliomee (2009:671) further states:

> Jordan claimed that a new national consciousness was developing among the oppressed that took 'no account of ethnicity, skin colour, linguistic affiliation'. National liberations had to be achieved through the creation of democratic institutions in the context of a unitary state that accorded rights to all citizens as individuals. He warned that the future government would adopt a policy of 'liberatory intolerance' towards organisations based on race or ethnicity. He went as far as citing Mbeki's call 'I am an Afrikaner' as evidence that blacks were prepared to embrace Afrikaners as fellow-countrymen. Jordan's idea that the racial and ethnic categories were the creations of the apartheid state was supported by some theorists who argued that modernisation would sweep racial and ethnic divisions away, but it flew in the face of the stubborn persistence of these divisions in all divided societies in the developing world. There was also an obvious contradiction in his argument. If the ANC wanted to retain race as a category to advance blacks and measure progress in this regard, then there could be no objection in principle to ethnic minorities mobilising on the basis of descent.

In addition to the fallacious view of ethnic identity constructedness, the ANC and its ancillaries thus also incorrectly support the notion that modernity and minority ethnic identity are in opposition to one another (see Chapter 2, subsection 2.1.2.) Moreover, they also seem to hold the belief that minority political mobilisation is inherently destabilising because their ethnic habitus (the cultural-historical dimension) conflicts with the legal-political interests of the nation-state (see Chapter 2, subsection 2.2.6), while also upholding the habitus of the dominant majority as the civic ties of nationhood, thus normalising the majority culture as the unifying *national* culture.

5.1.2. Dislodging the Afrikaner

5.1.2.1. The end of Afrikaner nationalism

The post-1994 period is not only marked by disillusionment with the ANC and the New South Africa, but also with Afrikanerdom itself. Giliomee (2009:659) suggests that the first 'component' of the once thriving Afrikaner nationalist movement to defect was Afrikaner

business, eager to appeal to a wider customer base. So too the NP tried to shed its Afrikaner character in a bid to appeal to a larger voter base. Its support dropped to 7% in the 1999 election. Giliomee (2009:660) argues that this election saw the dissolution of ethnic bonds of both the white and black communities, in favour of the consolidation of two racial blocs. The Broederbond lost up to half of its members. Giliomee (2009:661) states that despite a similar drop in support for the main Afrikaans churches, Afrikaners maintained a strong commitment to their Christian faith. But disidentification with Afrikaner nationalism, and even Afrikaner identity, quickly followed the end of Apartheid, as Giliomee (2009:692) notes:

> With the loss of power and the NP's steady disintegration after 1994, it became increasingly difficult to talk about a coherent Afrikaner community with a sense of common destiny. Many white Afrikaans speakers, particularly business and professional people, refused to identify themselves with the Afrikaners. Some who tried to forge a bond between white and coloured or black Afrikaans speakers coined the awkward word 'Afrikaanses' to depict the new group. There was no single organisation that could speak for all Afrikaners on the rights of Afrikaans speakers.

According to Giliomee (2012:422), the negotiated settlement meant not only the end of Afrikaner power, but also of "leaders who were unambiguously Afrikaner leaders". He also posits that in the post-1994 dispensation "there was no real Afrikaner resistance to the new order". Giliomee (2009:661), however, cites the trade union *Solidariteit* (henceforth Solidarity) – which originated from a mineworkers' union established in 1902 – as an Afrikaner organisation that was able to weather the post-Apartheid transformation. (I will argue in section 5.4 that Solidarity has since developed into an 'unambiguous form of Afrikaner resistance' to ANC rule.) The end of Afrikaner power was followed by a period of profound uncertainty among many Afrikaners about how to navigate their new sociopolitical reality. Giliomee (2009:680) notes:

> There was also relief that an honourable leader such as Mandela, with his appreciation of Afrikaner history, would assume the mantle of power. Yet few realised how severe a blow the loss of power was. The Afrikaners had organised themselves around the state as the hub with state-funded single-medium schools and universities, the church and the civic organisations of the Afrikaner nationalist movement serving as spokes or blades. Without the hub there was little coherence.

The *New National Party* (NNP; formerly the NP) was absorbed into the ANC in 2004, handing governance of the Western Cape (WC) to the ANC, and advancing the career of only one NNP member, its leader Marthinus van Schalkwyk (who was a minister in the ANC cabinet until 2014, whereafter he was Ambassador to Greece and later Australia). De Klerk referred to this as a case of *boedel oorgee* (surrendering of the estate) and called on minorities to fight for their

rights instead of kowtowing to the ANC. The NNP was disbanded in 2005, signifying the defeat of the party that was once "the vanguard of the Afrikaner nationalist movement and could take credit for the establishment of the parastatal sector" (Giliomee, 2009:694-695). At this point, without meaningful Afrikaner and/or Afrikaans political representation, the shape that minority group and language rights advocacy would take was uncertain. In 2006, only one year after the dissolution of the NNP, the Afrikaner civil rights organisation *AfriForum* (an ancillary of Solidarity) was established.

The transition has been described as "nothing less than traumatic" (Visser, 2007 cited in Van Zyl-Hermann, 2018:2675) for white people, and especially Afrikaners had their "worldview […] imploded" (Steyn, 2004 cited in Van Zyl-Hermann, 2018:2676). Botha (2020:498) believes that the transition had a radical influence on Afrikaner identity. Davies (2009:1) also identifies the "profound dislocation" in Afrikaner identity in the post-1994 era. Giliomee (2009:715) elaborates:

> By 2009 a considerable section of well-educated white Afrikaans speakers no longer considered themselves to be Afrikaners, although they were educated in Afrikaans single-medium schools and universities. At the same time, however, very few Afrikaners were attracted to the nation-building creed of one history, one public language and one 'patriotic' party. The Afrikaners were without national leaders or strong organisations, but with apartheid receding into the past, the hope was that many would rediscover and re-invent that part of their identity forged by the Afrikaners' complex and turbulent history, by the Afrikaans language itself and by the harsh but beautiful land in which they lived. Their challenge was to come to terms with this history, to nourish and replenish this love for their language and take up their responsibility to hand over their cultural heritage to the next generation in a second state. If they were to accept this challenge, they would become part of a new, democratic South Africa in their own special way.

Davies (2009:1) believes that despite Afrikaner nationalism no longer being central in South African politics, and in spite of ingroup variation, Afrikaner identity politics continues to be an important issue in post-Apartheid South Africa, because of the economic and cultural strength of Afrikaans speakers, in particular their growing economic influence in spite of their loss of political power. She emphasises, however, that many of the fears surrounding the Afrikaner response to losing political power was overblown (2009:2):

> With the end of minority rule, many analyses painted a bleak future for Afrikanerdom subjugated beneath a state dominated by the ANC government and broadly aligned against Afrikaner interests. Some scholars predicted the tendency of important groups and sectors to simply 'opt out' of the state, whilst a resurgence of rightwing militancy and the Boeremag's [see subsection 5.2.6] thwarted bombing campaign raised the spectre of a race war. None of these situations has materialised. The once sound link

> between an Afrikaner nationalist identity, regime and state which characterised the years of apartheid government, and that sustained a delicate balance of ethnic, racial and class forces, has been irretrievably broken. Notwithstanding the recent and marked increase in white poverty levels, it is evident that this newly disempowered minority still commands a vast material and cultural capital accrued under the previous dispensation. Whilst certain of these constituent parts have been increasingly marginalised in the new order, others have become important players in the new South Africa and upon the world stage, embracing elements of the wider politico-economic order. It is suggested that a select number have been able to refigure the character of the government's hegemonic project itself due to their position within the leading historic bloc.

5.1.2.2. The flight of Afrikaner capital

In 2000, a delegation of Afrikaner business leaders led by Willie Esterhuyse, formerly an *Afrikaner Broederbond* member (Louw, 2000), praised Mbeki's administration for establishing a mutually beneficial relationship between the state, business, organised labour and society. Prior to this, Esterhuyse dismissed concerns about Afrikaans rights, suggesting that they were undermining the state (Giliomee, 2009:685). One CEO remarked that Mbeki wanted to unite the elites, as they were the ones who could oppose transition (Giliomee, 2009:686). Giliomee states that neither Afrikaans nor English business leaders advocated for the white workers who were becoming less likely to find employment in the state sector, and because of demographic representivity policies would also find it harder to find employment in the private sector. He cites former Director of the *Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut*, (AHI; Afrikaans Trade Institute) Jacob de Villiers, who stated that the Afrikaner business community did not want to "initiate a broad-based dialogue regarding the Afrikaner community". Giliomee (2009:686) scathingly remarks that "[c]orporations that had built their business on Afrikaner custom conveniently forgot their roots", providing Sanlam's R700,000 donation to the ANC as evidence.

> Afrikaner nationalism had been forged primarily through competition with the English in the 60 years after Union. With that rivalry gone, many Afrikaner businessmen came to assume the business identity of their English counterparts: individualistic and materialistic and showing little concern for cultural or community issues. They did not challenge the ANC's hegemonic project of celebrating the English language as the binding element of the national culture and the lingua franca of global capitalism.

Davies (2009:43) agrees that at the end of the Apartheid era, when it became clear Afrikaner nationalism would not survive (at least in its current form), Afrikaner capital "revealed itself to be driven by the same motives as its English-speaking counterpart". Giliomee (2009:686) does though point to several (Afrikaner) trusts that enabled the proliferation of Afrikaans books post-Apartheid, as well as Naspers, which began sponsoring Afrikaans cultural festivals

(namely the *Klein Karoo Nasionale Kunstefees* (KKNK; Klein Karoo National Arts Festival) in Oudtshoorn, *Aardklop* (literally earth-beat) in Potchefstroom, and the *Vrystaat Kunstefees* (Free State Arts Festival) in Bloemfontein), and thus promoted the consumption of the Afrikaans language in the private domain.

In his book on the history and development of Afrikaner capitalism, Meades (2019:1) argues that on 27 April 1994, *Afrikaner volkskapitalisme* (capitalism of the people) died, and was replaced by *capitalism in Afrikaans*, a new kind of entrepreneurship without the 'baggage' of the past. Along with the creation of numerous Afrikaner billionaires post-Apartheid, he notes that greed and excess has flourished (as evidenced by the Steinhoff collapse and the *Boeremafia* of Stellenbosch) (2019:2-5). Meades (2019:6) insists that the new generation of superrich Boer billionaires and *megaboere* (large-scale farmers) do not carry any baggage from the old era of Afrikaner capitalism; the majority of them still have Afrikaans as mother tongue, however, today they are Afrikaans-speaking South Africans, rather than Afrikaners.

Davies (2009:126) argues that due to having to compete in an increasingly volatile free-market environment, the concerns of the Afrikaner farming community, "previously a stalwart of nationalist politics", are not only cultural or group-based, but also economic. She cites various examples of the agricultural community's co-operation with the ANC government on matters such as land reform and black empowerment, as some members have sought reassurance that Zimbabwe-style land grabs would not occur.[258] Davies (2009:127) argues:

> Even whilst there is a very considerable sense of alienation in certain farming quarters, deregulation has meant the more successful commercial farmers have become integrated into the dynamics of the neoliberal global market, enthusiastic if circumspect advocates of the ANC's macroeconomic policies.

According to Meades (2019:7), there exists a new generation of Afrikaans-speaking entrepreneurs that, as opposed to the older generation, are unconcerned with the definition of 'Afrikaner', do not harbour feelings of guilt regarding the past, and are willing to work side by side with fellow citizens of other races in search of prosperity. They have, however, remained attached to their language and culture, as evidenced by the proliferation of Afrikaans music, literature and film. Meades (2019:7-8; my translation) contrasts this disposition with that of the

[258] The controversial 'expropriation without compensation' (EWC) bill was introduced in 2021, formally the *Constitution Eighteenth Amendment Bill* (2021) to amend Section 25 of the Constitution.

older generation, and traces the history of Afrikaner capitalism back to Afrikaner identity formation:

> They [the older generation] grew up in an environment where they were regularly exposed to Afrikaner sentiments and never even questioned the existence of an Afrikaner identity. This Afrikaner identity was established over more than a century and got a large part of its building blocks from a kind of universal sense of injustice. Afrikaners saw themselves very early on in the colonial history of the country as a minority that had to fight for its existence. It developed particularly strongly under British rule, and the struggle between Boer and British finally reached a breaking point with the Anglo-Boer War. […] [The war] made the defeated *Boerevolk* [Boer nation] see itself even more as an aggrieved nation and in the next couple of decades there were numerous *volksaksies* [people's actions] to do something to save the volk. It necessarily also involved the business world. So there was the First Economic Congress of the People in 1939 with the slogan *A volk saves itself!*

According to Meades (2019:9), the AHI and other trade organisations eventually opened up to other races post-Apartheid, but they could never rid themselves of the 'Apartheid baggage' and are no longer the influential organisations they once were. He states that several companies that were once considered *volksbesit* (people's property) changed dramatically post-Apartheid (most notably Sanlam) (2019:9-10). He believes that the Rupert's Rembrandt group was best able to make the transition to the New South Africa, and that Johann Rupert, in particular, represented a new kind of Afrikaner capitalist that "no longer felt called to serve the cause of the *Afrikanervolk* at any cost", and who could pursue their own goals without becoming part of *volkskapitaal* (people's capital) (2019:11; my translation).

While the Afrikaner capitalists or "Afrikaans-speaking capital elites" who co-operate with the ANC government, as described by Meades, Giliomee and Davies, have abandoned 'the Afrikaner cause', a new kind of capitalised Afrikanerdom has since appeared. This force is moulding itself after the original volkskapitaal movement of the post-Anglo-Boer War period (see Chapter 4, subsection 4.3.2.4), and is attempting to mobilise Afrikaner identity and reconfigure the sociocultural and political landscape of post-Apartheid South Africa.

5.1.2.3. The plight of the Afrikaner minority

Giliomee (2009:692) states that in the aftermath of the 1994 transition, some Afrikaners believed that the group should not antagonise the ANC, and should rather appeal to individual rights when opposing government policy, while other Afrikaners urged the mobilisation of Afrikaans speakers in fighting for their constitutional language rights. The language struggle was presented in the context of all the indigenous languages being supplanted by English. According to Giliomee (2009:699), opposition to language policies steadily grew. He cites a

survey which found that many students felt the legacy of Apartheid prevented them from advocating for their language rights.

In 1998 the chairman of the *Afrikanerbond* (the post-Apartheid successor to the Afrikaner Broederbond; not to be confused with Onze Jan Hofmeyr's Afrikaner Bond) complained to Mbeki that the promises made to the Afrikaners were not being honoured. The pressure on Afrikaner culture and institutions, specifically the attack on mother-tongue education, as well as farm murders and affirmative action, were the main areas of concern. Mbeki reported back to Parliament that the Afrikaners felt threatened, powerless, and marginalised, but that they were determined to help build the New South Africa. A group of dissident Afrikaners including Breyten Breytenbach and Frederik van Zyl Slabbert (both of whom were active in the struggle against Apartheid) criticised Mbeki for only meeting with Afrikaner organisations linked to the former administration, which ran the risk of "an ANC-sponsored re-consolidation of the Afrikaner nationalist establishment" (Giliomee, 2009:693).

> Later in 1999 Breytenbach joined 23 other Afrikaners (including [Giliomee]) in sending a public letter to Mbeki, making the strongest demand yet for minority rights. The letter pointed out that the government promoted English at the expense of all the other official languages. The marginalisation of Afrikaans had given rise to apathy, alienation and disaffection among many Afrikaners. Large numbers had emigrated, resulting in a major loss of skills. The government was asked to appoint a special constitutional committee to draw up a Bill of Minority Rights that was in line with international conventions. It singled out the rights to mother-tongue instruction as an issue of particular importance.

Giliomee (2009:705) states that after the overwhelming victory of the ANC in the 2004 election, and the weakness of opposition parties, Afrikaners "realised that they were without any power on a continent where the fate of powerless wealthy minorities had rarely been pleasant". He elaborates on the new-found powerless of this minority group (2009:705-706):

> In a speech in March 2005 De Klerk referred Mbeki to his statement that the ANC does not want black domination to replace white domination, and then asked: 'How will we be able to avoid black domination in a situation in which the black majority in effect now has a monopoly of power? What else is it if the black majority dictates the agenda for the white, Indian and coloured minorities, and negatively affects their core interests?' In his view the ANC policy of 'representivity' meant the minorities 'would become subject to the majority in every area of their lives – in their jobs, schools, universities and sports.' Representivity, coupled with the ANC doctrine of African leadership, meant that the members of minority groups were prevented from reaching the top no matter how competent they were. De Klerk called for a frank and fundamental discussion between the government and representatives of the minority communities on the principles and approaches underlying social and economic transformation. Mbeki dismissed the call. […] He wrote to De Klerk: 'We have

> absolutely no need for a convention of race and ethnic representatives based on the false, backward and racist thesis that these racial and ethnic groups share common racial and political objectives.'

According to Giliomee (2009:706), Solidarity drew up a *Code of Good Practice for Affirmative Action* "for employers keen to balance merit and affirmative action". The *Democratic Alliance* (DA), the *Inkatha Freedom Party* (IFP) and the *Freedom Front Plus* (FF+) supported this initiative.[259] The ANC responded by reiterating its support for its implementation of affirmative action in both the public and private sector, with Mbeki (cited in Giliomee, 2009:707) warning white people that the ANC acted "as a buffer between a deeply divided aggrieved black majority and a white minority that seems mercilessly insensitive to the grievous harm that was done to millions". This represents a novel use of the *swart gevaar* (black danger) narrative. Historically, Afrikaner leaders used this device to mobilise Afrikaners, but here Mbeki was employing it to immobilise them.

The defeat of Apartheid and Afrikaner nationalism, Giliomee (2009:663) argues, forced Afrikaners to reconsider their views on survival, as their history of attempting to prevent *gelykstelling* or racial levelling now indicated insecurity and bigotry. He states, however, that N.P. van Wyk Louw's notion of 'survival in justice' (see Chapter 4, subsection 4.3.3.3) presupposed the ability of Afrikaners to determine their own political fate, seemingly an impossibility (or at least an enormous challenge) now that they were left without any formal political power.

From 1996 to 2022, the white population in South Africa grew at a rate of only 1.57%, compared to the growth rates of 62.20%, 40.33%, and 62.35% of the black, coloured and Indian/Asian populations respectively. As a proportion of the total population, this low growth rate of the white population represents an actual decline from 11% in 1996 to 7.3% in 2022. Despite the higher growth rate of the coloured population, their share of the total population also shrunk from 9% to 8.2% over the same time period. The Indian/Asian population remained roughly stable (from 2.6% to 2.7%), while the black population grew from 77.4% to 81.4% as a share of the total population. Between the period 2011 to 2022, the white population actually

[259] While Giliomee (2009:706) praises the DA for its leadership on minority rights issues, in the years since the publication of his book, they have, however, at times been criticised for their neglect of Afrikaans issues, and for taking incorrect stances on some public matters (see subsection 5.2.3).

decreased by 1.83%, indicating that emigration, and not merely a low birth rate, is one of the reasons for their population decline (Stats SA, 2022:6).[260]

The proportion of Afrikaans speakers in South Africa declined from 14.5% in 1996, to 10.6% in 2022, although it remains the third most spoken language in the country. The proportion of English speakers remained unchanged at 8.7% of the total population, and also remains the fifth most spoken language in South Africa (Stats SA, 2022:22). This indicates that the decline of Afrikaans is not as a result of language shift and anglicisation, but because of demographical changes and emigration.[261] In 2009, Giliomee (2009:700) estimated that white Afrikaans speakers constitute 60% of the total white population, and 43% of the total Afrikaans-speaking population. These population trends over the past three decades since the end of Apartheid highlight that white Afrikaans speakers are becoming an increasingly smaller minority in South Africa each year.

During the post-Apartheid period, Giliomee (2009:700) states that there was an increasing tendency for the political and cultural leadership of the coloured community to shift to the ANC or the DA, and that they would "rebuff any approach by Afrikaans cultural organisations if there was a suspicion that they were being used merely to increase the numbers". This reminds one of the fighting between the two white communities over the coloured vote at the Cape during the 20th century (see Chapter 4, subsection 4.3.1.1). He believes that the growing use of the term "Afrikaans-speaking community" did not accurately depict the historical divisions among the different races of Afrikaans speakers (see subsection 5.3.1.4).

Giliomee (2009:703) suggests that major divisions appeared among Afrikaners regarding perspectives on the 'new' South Africa. He identifies four groups of Afrikaners that formed post-Apartheid, namely: (i) the hardcore rejectionists, who maintained belief in racial exclusivity and Afrikaans as a white language; (ii) those who passively acquiesce, remaining silent about Afrikaans and affirmative action and seizing economic opportunities, while being ready to emigrate; (iii) the apologetic Afrikaners, who, in order to atone for Apartheid while pursuing their individual interests, are willing to sacrifice Afrikaans as medium of instruction and condone affirmative action so long as they are not personally affected; and (iv) activists

[260] Roughly one million South Africans currently reside overseas (Stats SA, 2024b:57).

[261] Afrikaans in South Africa is currently in Stage 1 of language shift, characterised by diglossia (see Chapter 2, subsection 2.4.4).

for Afrikaans and Afrikaans people of all colours, who use the Constitution to promote Afrikaans and oppose supposed discrimination against minority groups.

A 2004 poll found widespread disaffection among Afrikaners: approximately a third were uninterested in voting, three-quarters rejected the ANC, and nearly half felt that the government neglected white people and/or Afrikaners (Giliomee, 2009:704). Giliomee argues that whereas white English speakers "adapted to the transition by acting as individuals determined to make it on their own, even if they felt isolated or marginalised", the Afrikaners "showed a much greater need for political solidarity and cohesiveness". The more Afrikaners feel persecuted, the more they seem to retreat to group identity:

> They wanted a constitution that provided a place for them to live satisfying lives as members of communities. Many were angry and some even disaffected, yet Afrikaners showed no sign of an ability to develop networks for political mobilisation. They had lost their faith in any Afrikaner political leadership and there was no common Afrikaner ideology. A gulf had opened up between, on the one hand, those members of the intelligentsia fighting for an adequate and secure place for Afrikaans as a language of instruction, and on the other, those who were prepared to open the door ever wider for English, while stigmatising opposition as a throw-back to an exclusive Afrikaner nationalism. The appeals of the latter group to the Constitution and a human rights ideology seemed quite out of touch with the way in which the ANC by 2009 was appropriating the Constitution to promote the interests of its own constituency.

De Klerk (cited in Giliomee, 2009:708), proposed a "Credo for the Afrikaners" in 2009, urging Afrikaners to insist on equality in the New South Africa, arguing that: "We must break with the apologetic view that some of us have held so far. We are the co-founders of the new South Africa and we enjoy moral equality with all our fellow citizens". While one could debate whether this sentiment is true for De Klerk personally – having been a NP politician throughout Apartheid – it became clear (especially through Afrikaans protest music; see subsection 5.2.2) that many younger Afrikaners who came of age or were born after the end of Apartheid shared this view. In the following two sections, I will discuss contemporary Afrikaner mobilisation and social identity in-depth.

5.2. Afrikaner Mobilisation in the Post-Apartheid Era

5.2.1. The Third Afrikaans Language Movement (2003-present)

The Third Afrikaans Language Movement (2003-present) refers to efforts by leaders in the Afrikaans community to maintain the language-political status of Afrikaans in the post-1994 era. Webb (2010:107) states that starting in 2003 several Afrikaans institutions co-operated in the establishment of a new Afrikaans language movement, including the *Suid-Afrikaanse*

Akademie vir Wetenskap en Kuns (SAAWK; South African Academy for Science and Arts, the *Afrikaanse Taal- en Kultuurvereniging* (ATKV; Afrikaans Language and Culture Association) and the *Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigingе* (FAK; Federation of Afrikaans Cultural Associations) – all originating from the Second Afrikaans Language Movement (see Chapter 4, subsections 4.3.2.3 and 4.3.2.4). Webb (2010:108) notes that from its onset, the movement emphasised the need to promote a racially inclusive and cohesive Afrikaans-speaking community. To this effect, the *Afrikaanse Taalraad* (ATR; Afrikaans Language Council) was established in 2008, a confederal body uniting nearly 40 Afrikaans language- and culture organisations in South Africa, Namibia and the Netherlands (Wikipedia, 2024h).

Webb (2010) offers a comprehensive overview of the challenges involved in establishing a racially unified Afrikaans speech community. He concludes that "it is difficult to see how Afrikaans can develop into a symbol which represents a common identity (whatever one understands by this term), can carry a common heritage and can meet the emotional needs and demands of all its speakers" (2010:113). I will discuss this unified Afrikaans identity further in subsection 5.3.1.4. While the feasibility of the creation of a non-racial Afrikaans community was uncertain, there was no doubt as to the scale of the threat Afrikaans was facing. Giliomee (2009:713) states:

> Since the early 1990s Afrikaans had to vacate a large field in the face of the global impact of English and a new regime insistent on promoting English as far as possible. Afrikaans adapted and even flourished in some fields in both the 'lower' and some of the 'higher' functions. There was little doubt that it would survive over the longer term as a 'grassroots' language, in the sports stadiums and at home. But a comparative perspective made it clear that it would not be respected if it failed to make its mark as an intellectual and professional language. If squeezed out of high schools and universities, it would become decapitated like the other indigenous languages. The greatest immediate threat to Afrikaans was its weakening or disappearance as a language of instruction on university level. This would signal its demise as a language of intellectual discourse and as a literary language.

In the present Third Afrikaans Language Movement, the use of Afrikaans in higher education has been a particularly busy battlefield, commonly referred to as the *taaldebat* (language debate). Webb (2002:161) states that one of the main language rights issues in the language debate is the matter of the government's obligation to recognise and fund single-medium Afrikaans public schools and universities. With the Potchefstroom campus of the NWU remaining as the sole tertiary education institution in the public sphere that mainly uses Afrikaans as medium of instruction, out of a total of 26 public universities, it seems clear that

this objective of the movement has failed. Afrikaans is, however, flourishing in the private sphere in the post-Apartheid era.

State pressure to anglicise Afrikaans schools and universities elicited a particularly strong wave of Afrikaner mobilisation (Visser, 2007:19). According to Visser (2007:20), however, the most "ferocious" debates on the issue was waged among Afrikaners themselves, specifically concerning the future of Afrikaans as medium of instruction at Stellenbosch University (SU). After the decision to introduce dual-medium education at the institution in 2005, the language debate became highly polarised. Giliomee (2019a:302-303) states that when the *taalstryd* (language struggle) erupted at SU in 2005, then CEO of Naspers, Koos Bekker, also a University Council member, stated that if SU succumbs to anglicisation it will be because of *papbroekigheid* (spinelessness). Visser (2007:22) recounts some of the highly charged incidents during the debate:

> According to *Die Vrye Afrikaan* the Afrikaners in the Brink [then Vice Chancellor of SU] camp suffered from "pathological guilt" because of the apartheid past. They could only maintain the positions of power or influence they enjoyed under the new dispensation by "relativising, denying or even renouncing their ethno-linguistic identity". One the other hand, the Brink camp accused the Afrikaans lobbyists of being "neo-Afrikaners", "neo-conservatives", "reactionary", and of "clinging to privileges", who with their arguments were pursuing an Afrikaner "volkstaat of the mind", or an "Afrikaner enclave" and were "yearning for a discredited past and a defunct Afrikaner nationalism".

Giliomee (2020:280; 283) agrees that while the ANC government did exert pressure on SU to ramp up anglicisation, the marginalisation of Afrikaans as medium of instruction at the institution would not have been possible without the willingness of the university council and management, and in particular, the leading role played by a select few Afrikaners; a so-called "treason of the intellectuals" (Giliomee, 2020:284). Twenty years later, this fight is still being waged, although the Brink camp, through his successor Wim de Villiers,[262] are certainly enjoying the upper-hand, and not allaying fears that a dual-medium language policy will eventually lead to the removal of Afrikaans as medium of instruction altogether.

Giliomee (2009:713) argues that a gap has opened between the elite and the community over Afrikaans, similar to the one between the common burghers (Cape Dutch) and an anglicised

[262] Brink resigned in 2006 amidst the chaos surrounding the language policy. He was succeeded by Russel Botman, the first coloured Vice-Chancellor, whom Visser (2007:23) considered to be more moderate on the issue. Botman died in 2014 while in office, whereafter Wim de Villiers was appointed. De Villiers had lived in the UK and later the US since 1992 until 2013 when he joined the faculty at SU. Under his leadership, a new dual-medium language policy was drafted in 2016 and updated in 2021, which further diminishes the status of Afrikaans at the university.

elite (Anglo Dutch) in the late 1800s Cape Colony. In 1876 Chief Justice Lord John Henry (born Johan Hendrik) de Villiers remarked that the efforts of S.J. du Toit and others to turn Afrikaans into a literary language during the First Afrikaans Language Movement (1875-1890) would fail, as "that rich and glorious language" English would become "the language of South Africa" (Giliomee, 2009:714).

So too in the early 1900s, after unification, an elite faction supported the establishment of a single national university in Cape Town that would only use English as medium of instruction. The opposition to this resulted in the establishment of Stellenbosch University, which at that time signalled "the beginning of an Afrikaner renaissance" (Giliomee, 2009:714). Similar to today's political response to the Afrikaans language struggle, some English newspapers and politicians decried the demands for Afrikaans institutions as a form of racism, since English and Afrikaans speakers were at that time considered to be different races (ethnicities). At this point, the fusion of the two white communities into one nation (in English) was considered more important than the survival of Afrikaans.

The current schism among Afrikaners has led to a decline in status of Afrikaans as a public language. The Afrikaner community overwhelmingly sought the maintenance of Afrikaans as a public language and especially as medium of instruction, as the so-called *taalblyers* or *taalstryders* (Afrikaans MLR activists) supported at Stellenbosch University. However, the so-called *taalglyers* (those enabling the loss of higher functions of Afrikaans), Giliomee (2009:714) argues, narrowly pursued their own individual and corporate interests, and did not feel accountable to students, parents, clients or the Afrikaans-speaking community. He notes Dutch literary critic Gerrit Komrij's description of Afrikaans as *lewend-dood* (alive-dead), and argues that the "elite was busily amputating limbs from Afrikaans despite the fact that the body was healthy and indeed alive and kicking". Komrij (cited in Giliomee, 2009:715) believed that the greatest threat to Afrikaans was Afrikaans speakers, which Giliomee relates back to "the threat of fatal amputation" at Historically Afrikaans Universities (HAUs).

Shortly before the 2018 Constitutional Court judgement which upheld the new language policy of Stellenbosch University, Professor Hermann Giliomee wrote an open letter to Vice-Chancellor, Professor Wim de Villiers, opposing the latter's views expressed in the centenary edition of the SU magazine for alumni. In the open letter, Giliomee (2019a:297-298) criticises De Villiers for depicting the origin of SU as a "*volksuniversiteit*" (university of the [Afrikaner] nation) which stood for the upliftment of Afrikaners to the exclusion of others, instead of

properly locating the university's origin in the historic language struggle against anglicisation.[263] Put differently, SU was not established to propagate racism, as UCT had the exact same racially exclusive admissions policy, but rather to safeguard a minority language and culture against the behemoth that was and remains English. He also highlights De Villiers' limited conception of language as merely an instrumental tool, devoid of any meaning to its speakers (2019a:299):

> The Vice-Chancellor gives the assurance that neither he nor the university is against Afrikaans, and then continues: 'Afrikaans is one of our languages of instruction – but on the basis of sound pedagogical principles, not fomented by ideology or ethnic identity.' The Vice-Chancellor is clearly unaware of the consensus in the literature about language maintenance: a sectional or national language cannot maintain itself against a world language, such as English, without speakers of the former language regarding it as an important part of their social identity. In the book *Language Endangerment and Language Maintenance* (2002) Stephen Wurm defines the iron law of language preservation as follows: 'One of the most important factors for the maintenance and reinvigoration of a threatened language is the attitude of speakers towards their own language and the importance they attach to it as a major symbol of their identity.'

Giliomee (2019a:299) further castigates De Villiers's statement that the SU should not be driven by ideology, arguing that there is no such thing as an ideology-free university. This argument mirrors that of Billig (1995; cited in May, 2012) noted in Chapter 2, subsection 2.2.6, regarding the projection of nationalism onto minorities, and the naturalisation of the nationalism of the majority. He notes De Villiers' failure to acknowledge the greatest accomplishment of the SU, namely "its resistance against British imperial ideology and the establishment of an indigenous intellectual tradition". It certainly is a bitter irony that the so-called decolonisation of universities seems chiefly concerned with the removal of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in favour of English (Giliomee, 2019a:311). Giliomee (2019a:301) lastly notes the lip-service paid by De Villiers to Afrikaans and the need for Afrikaans-medium instruction, when in actual fact it has all but disappeared from the university:

> In his article the Vice-Chancellor offers an explanation for SU's virtual abandonment of Afrikaans as a language of tuition. He states that instead of a '*volksuniversiteit'*, SU wants to become a 'world-class university'. The rush to climb in the world rankings is indeed one of the important reasons why the university has anglicised so rapidly.[264] This attempt seems to have been futile. The international Centre for World University

[263] Giliomee (2019a:297) argues that De Villiers "is violating the most important principle when one deals with history, namely to judge every action within the framework of the time during which it took place".

[264] Giliomee (2019a:305) cites J.F.W. Grosskopf who in 1918, when SU was established, warned that 'internationalism' is often a cloak for advancing the interests of empires. He also discusses the financial incentives behind the anglicisation of universities at length (2019a:312-315).

> Rankings, which assigns rankings to a thousand universities, shows that SU dropped from 330th (third in South Africa) in 2017 to 448th (fifth in South Africa) in 2018.[265] Philip Altbach and Ellen Hazelkorn have sounded a warning in this regard: the ranking system perverts the true function of the university, namely to transfer the knowledge and skills graduates will need in the communities they will one day serve. The Afrikaans-speaking community in the Western Cape, which makes up more than half of the people in the province, requires a university where they can be trained in the language with which they can one day serve this community.[266]

The Vice-Chancellor of SU in the early 2000s, Dr Chris Brink, claimed that the idea that the university had a special duty to transmit a specific culture, and thus the continued existence of Afrikaans as medium of instruction, was "Orania of the mind" (Giliomee, 2019a:319), referring to the Afrikaner separatist town (see subsection 5.2.6). This is yet another example of the naturalisation of the dominant majority's ethnicity (see Chapter 2, subsection 2.2.1) and banal nationalism (see Chapter 2, subsection 2.2.6) – wherein the nationalism of the dominant majority goes unnoticed and/or unscrutinised. The notion of a 'cultureless' university, or one which transmits no culture, is fallacious, especially an English-medium university serving a diverse community of people colonised by the British. The idea of non-English-medium education in former British colonies seems to elicit a degree of scorn and suspicion not present when discussing, for instance, Dutch-medium education in the Netherlands.

Giliomee (2020:283-284) cites Nobel Prize-winning author J.M. Coetzee who argued: "Universities have been fully absorbed into the neo-liberal economy. Young people don't think of them as cultural institutions any longer … The English language is not thought of as the bearer at a deep level of a particular Anglo-Saxon view of the world; it is thought of simply as medium of communication". Coetzee (cited in Giliomee, 2020:284) also stated regarding the SU's language policy: "[T]he official "*Taalbeleid*" [language policy] document does not once use the word "*kultuur*" [culture]. The university management seems to conceive of language as an instrumental communication system without any culture-bearing role".

Giliomee (2019a:321) references a court ruling that upheld UP's most recent language policy (which abolished the use of Afrikaans) "on the grounds that Afrikaans tuition constitutes a form of privilege since it gives Afrikaans-speakers a pedagogic advantage over speakers of

[265] In 2024, the *Centre for World University Rankings* (CWUR) puts them at 440th overall, and third nationally (CWUR, 2024).

[266] Based on admission patterns, Giliomee (2019a:302) insists that the greatest beneficiaries of the SU's anglicisation have been white and coloured English speakers.

other African languages". This would mean that Afrikaans mother-tongue education could be removed from primary and secondary schools on the same basis. A Constitutional Court ruling on the UFS's language policy (which also abolished the use of Afrikaans) agreed with the university management's claim that parallel medium education promoted racism.[267]

Concerns such as access to educational institutions and anti-racism, or mother-tongue education and anti-imperialism, are all related to a key driver of the language debate in South Africa, i.e. resource scarcity. Realistic Conflict Theory (RCT, see Sherif's hypothesis in Chapter 3, subsection 3.1.2) has been applied to bussing in the US, showing that the integration of schools was met with anger and scepticism not merely because of latent prejudice, but also because of competition over resources (not only money, but also power and status). South African universities are a scarce resource, not only because there are so few having to serve large and diverse communities with limited state funds, but also because of the background of economic malaise in which higher education is situated. Black students seeking to escape poverty and unemployment,[268] and white students concerned with their own employment prospects under a regime which seems increasingly hostile towards them, are thus issues underlying the language debate, and result in, essentially, a fight over 'ownership' of universities in South Africa.[269]

In Chapter 3, subsection 3.2.3.4, I noted that the shared value dimension used in intergroup comparisons (language in this case), and the subsequent intergroup competition (language policy), might be a surface-manifestation of a deeper conflict of interest between groups (economic and political power). To put it differently, Afrikaner language activism and radicalisation thus seem to occur as a result of economic and political pressures from the majority group, or the threat of losing power of some sort, and not merely due to the presence of differing ethnolinguistic groups. For example, the introduction of the *Basic Education Laws Amendment* (BELA) bill, which many fear will centralise language policy decisions away from school governing bodies (SECTION27, 2024), and thus enable the anglicisation of the last

[267] While the notion of an Afrikaans SU (or any other university) is criticised as racially exclusive, Giliomee (2019a:320) suggests that based on the admission patterns of SU and UCT, white, and to a lesser extent coloured, English-speaking students seem to be 'fleeing' from the latter due to a larger black student populace.

[268] Those seeking English-medium tertiary education do not (necessarily) have a mother-tongue advantage; in fact, they may be disadvantaged because Afrikaners have historically been more proficient in English. Instead, the preference for English is based purely on language attitudes, and in particular, the devaluation of indigenous African languages.

[269] Note that whereas black students tend to associate an English-medium education with upward social mobility, white students do not seem to view (Afrikaans) MTE as an impediment to such mobility.

remaining Afrikaans-medium schools, elicited strong condemnation from within the Afrikaner community, as well as from AfriForum, the DA and the FF+.

Afrikaans language-rights advocacy can, however, also be viewed as an attempt to achieve positive social identity. During the First Afrikaans Language Movement (1875-1890), negative views of Afrikaans were informed by negative views of Afrikaans speakers (see Chapter 4, subsection 4.2.4.4). Ameliorating negative outgroup attitudes towards Afrikaans might thus also be an attempt to increase the status of Afrikaans speakers. The fact that these speakers do not simply switch to English (which normally confers high status), highlights the importance of language in Afrikaner identity, even when it seemingly serves no instrumental purpose.[270] And thus the final motivator behind the Third Afrikaans Language Movement can be identified: the strong desire to maintain Afrikaner ethnic identity, in which language has historically been central.

Giliomee (2009:712) argues that in the post-1994 era, "[t]he Afrikaners were thrown back on developing a form of minority politics, not because they saw themselves as a powerless minority but because the government treated them like one". The South African case study is unique in that the application of the concepts of minority and majority are more complex, and often contradictory. While black South Africans are the numerical majority, they have historically been the oppressed group. In spite of the rise of the black political elite, the majority of black South Africans still do not enjoy the same economic prosperity as the majority of white South Africans. Despite this, and as a consequence of majoritarian democracy, they (as a voting bloc) enjoy more political power than do white South Africans, although they suffer under the ANC's failures all the same. Power and privilege do not, therefore, neatly follow along the lines of minority or majority status.

For example, while Afrikaners enjoy the economic power to open their own private Afrikaans schools and universities, the ANC government, theoretically, has the political power to thwart such plans, or legislate against such institutions. Panyaza Lesufi, then Gauteng MEC (Member of the Executive Council) for Education, now the Premier of the province (see map in subsection 5.2.3), has stated that there is no room in South Africa for a "racist" private

[270] In the post-Anglo-Boer War reconstruction period, Jan Smuts doubted the ability of Afrikaans to serve as a public language, advocating anglicisation for the benefit of the Afrikaners (see Chapter 4, subsections 4.3.2.2 and 4.3.2.6). The massive success of the Second Afrikaans Language Movement (and related ethnonationalist mobilisation on the grounds of Afrikaans) in ameliorating both the status and material wellbeing of Afrikaners, casts doubt on the ability of anglicisation to have accomplished the same for this group of people.

Afrikaans-medium university, referring to Solidarity's *Akademia* (which I discuss again in subsection 5.2.4). He correctly locates the conception of this institution as a response to the Constitutional Court's backing of the removal of Afrikaans from (public) HAUs, leading him to conclude that such an institution is "a disgrace to our Constitution" (Lesufi, 2019).

Giliomee (2019a:304-305) points out that the rise of Afrikaans (and Afrikanerdom) was precipitated by the Anglo-Boer War, and the reconciliation efforts afterwards that emphasised the equal status of the languages of the two white communities. He notes that Afrikaans became the symbol of Afrikaner identity soon afterwards. The perception of 'oppression' of Afrikaans (and Afrikaans speakers) has the potential to be experienced by Afrikaners as a signifier of unequal citizenship. This tends to elicit mobilisation from this community which, in turn, increases the salience of both language and ethnicity.

5.2.2. Protests and Afrikaans protest music

The Third Afrikaans Language Movement (2003-present) constitutes one of the strongest areas of mobilisation among Afrikaners post-1994, but it has not been the only grounds for political activism in the post-Apartheid era. Other ethnic identity related protests have followed high-profile farm murders, although these have usually been rather muted and very sporadic. The most controversial instance of such a protest was the Senekal riots in 2020, which followed the brutal killing of a young Afrikaner farmer (BBC, 2020). It remains to date, the only instance of public violence committed by Afrikaner-identifying protestors.

Not all mobilisation and political activism has, however, pitted white and black South Africans against each other. The overlap of Afrikaner and black disaffection with the ANC has resulted in non-racial anti-corruption protests aimed at the ANC government. The most successful of these is the largest act of civil disobedience in the post-1994 era, involving court challenges brought by civil rights organisation OUTA (*Organisation Undoing Tax Abuse*); and which saw the scrapping of the controversial 'e-toll' public toll-roads scheme (Sguazzin, 2024).

Following in the footsteps of the Cape Afrikaners in the 19th century (see Chapter 4, subsection 4.2.4.4), some Afrikaners have also shown their willingness to use their relative economic power to collectively mobilise around political matters and make their grievances known, through calls to boycott (especially online). The most successful cases include the 2017 boycott of *Spur* (a family restaurant chain) after a white patron was banned over an aggressive interaction with a black patron. The boycott saw Spur's sales drop by 9% in six months. Solidarity provided the following motivation behind the boycott: "This is about a community

that feels estranged in the country. Now, they feel strange in their favourite restaurant as well" (De Greef & Onishi, 2019).

Dis-Chem (a pharmacy chain) also faced a boycott in 2022 when a letter was made public by Solidarity in which the CEO put a moratorium on the appointment and promotion of white people (BusinessTech, 2022). In the immediate aftermath their share price declined by 7%, and after threats of legal action (also by Solidarity) the company publicly apologised and backtracked on this employment policy (Daily Investor, 2022). Another boycott of *DStv* (a broadcast satellite service) was attempted in 2019 when all content featuring popular Afrikaans musician Steve Hofmeyr was banned, after his increasingly controversial public opinions (News24, 2019). Although it has proven to be a successful form of protest, boycotting is not a very common form of Afrikaner mobilisation, and it is limited to certain sections of the community. It has been suggested that instead of protesting, Afrikaners emigrate when they are dissatisfied (Buys, 2024a).

Another, more prolific, avenue of Afrikaner protest is Afrikaans music. Senekal and Van den Berg (2010) provide a comprehensive collection of post-1994 Afrikaans protest music, which by now requires an update. Anon. (2014) adds to this list, and also provides examples of English protest songs, in particular internet parody songs. In their study, Senekal and Van den Berg (2010:109-117) identify several themes that emerge from post-1994 protest music, namely: (i) crime; (ii) service delivery; and (iii) Afrikaner identity (including the role of Afrikaners in modern-day South Africa, and Afrikaner emigration).

Popular examples of Afrikaans protest music from the 2000s include Fokofpolisiekar's *Brand Suid-Afrika* (Burn South Africa), *Nie langer* (No longer) from Klopjag, Die Melktert Kommissie's *Proudly South African* and *Die Fokkol song* (The fuck-all song) by Koos Kombuis. These songs are marked by varying degrees of disillusionment, despondency and anger with the failures of the ANC government, as well as uncertainty with the Afrikaners' place in the New South Africa (see UIT in Chapter 3, subsection 3.3.2.2). Fokofpolisiekar's *Parkiebank, herfs 2017* is a more recent example of Afrikaans music grappling with the post-1994 reality, and seeking to come to terms with Afrikanerdom. The song's lyrics demonstrate agitation both with the country and with the Afrikaner identity:

Wat maak ons nog hier?	What are we still doing here?
Hierdie plek is nie ons s'n nie	This place is not ours
Huis is waar jou mense is	Home is where your people are
My mense het nie tuisland nie	My people don't have a homeland

The song's official music video contains the vivid imagery of a dying Afrikaner woman in traditional wear (presumably referencing the Great Trek and/or Anglo-Boer War), handing a young Afrikaner man a precious stone. He proceeds to throw this stone in anger at a chest full of Afrikaner memorabilia (including the body of Afrikaner nationalist and founder of the AWB, Eugène Terre'Blanche) which then explodes, signifying the difficulty of squaring the positive heritage of his ethnic group, with their history of oppressing (Fokofpolisiekar, 2018).

A more well-known Afrikaans protest song is about Anglo-Boer War General Koos de la Rey, titled *De la Rey*, which was released in 2006 by Afrikaans singer Bok van Blerk to much controversy. Pleading with De la Rey to 'come lead the Boers', assuring that 'a nation will rise again', and accompanied by a music video depicting the Boers' struggle in the Anglo-Boer War, the song tapped into the frustrations felt by Afrikaners in the post-Apartheid dispensation (Van Blerk, 2013). The massive success of the song, including reports that crowds would spontaneously and passionately sing it at festivals and rugby matches, prompted the Ministry of Arts and Culture to warn that the song was "potentially subversive" and could be used as a "rallying point for treason" (Giliomee, 2009:703). No deeds of treachery linked to this song were ever committed, but it did capture very real sentiments among some Afrikaners.

Giliomee (2009:703) argues that especially younger Afrikaners had become "fed up with being constantly reminded of their 'shameful history'". He states (2009:704-705): "In [Afrikaans writer Antje Krog's] view the song, along with the other songs on the CD, legitimately tried to celebrate a heroic epoch in Afrikaner history as part of the process of becoming reconciled with the present. The song contained no reference to problems with or grudges against the new South Africa, but it insisted on Afrikaners taking their place in the new order without any apology".

Based on Krog's interpretation of the *De la Rey* song and its cultural impact, the political awakening of young Afrikaners does not seem to be concerned with relitigating Apartheid, but with building a new identity and existence in South Africa that is not defined solely by Apartheid (but also looks before Apartheid and beyond). Young Afrikaners are seeking an identity that confers positive self-esteem. It is thus a movement to reclaim ownership of the Afrikaner identity: that is, the ability of ingroup members to reformulate historical facts, pre-existing mythologies and modern realities into a dynamic identity that satisfies their underlying identity motives (see Chapter 3, subsection 3.4.3). Davies (2009:119-120) cites the artist's own explanation of the song:

> The song wasn't written for [a political] reason. I'm a singer not a politician. I wanted to create something for people to be proud of. It's like "Flower of Scotland". There's a warm feeling inside and it's got that feel to it. My generation of Afrikaners wants to be proud of who we are, and where we come from, and our language, this whole Afrikaans things [sic]. We grew up with the guilt of apartheid, being told, "You are wrong – apartheid is on your heads." We don't want to say sorry any more. This is a democratic South Africa and we have moved on. We keep on being told that if we have a white skin, we can't get a job. You walk into an interview and are told, "Sorry." People are fed up. The younger generation says "enough".

While Afrikaans protest songs, especially during the 2000s, largely emanated from the rock and alternative genres, mainstream artists are increasingly producing protest songs. Notably, as this new wave of Afrikaans protest music is becoming more upbeat, the lyrics are significantly less angry or pensive, and are much more celebratory and assertive. This reflects a similar trend in Afrikaner politics (see subsection 5.4.1). One recent example of this is another song by Bok van Blerk, together with Bernice West, titled *Die Afrikaner maak so* (West, 2024). Following are select lyrics from the song released in 2024:

Is jy reg om die vloek	Are you ready to let go
Van 'n sondebok te laat gaan?	Of the curse of a scapegoat?
Is jy reg om die kruis	Are you ready to carry the cross
Van jou moedertaal weer te dra?	Of your mother tongue again?
Sê my staan jy vir iets	Tell me do you stand for something
Of is jy soos die res uitverkoop?	Or are you a sellout like the rest?
Kan jy onthou hoe dit was	Do you remember what it was like?
Toe jy Afrikaner was?	When you were Afrikaner?
Die Afrikaner maak so	The Afrikaner does it like this
Hy weet sy krag kom van bo	He knows his power comes from above
Dis maar hoe hy gemaak is	That's how he was made
Jy's hier geplant en gebou	You were planted and built here
Kan jy dit enigsins onthou?	Can you remember it at all?
Wie jy was	Who you were
Wie jy is	Who you are
Dis weer tyd om te glo	It's time to believe again
Is jy moeg om te hoor	Are you tired of hearing
Dat die skuld wat jy dra was jou skuld?	That the guilt you carry was your fault?
Want as die ruggraat ontbreek	Because if the spine is missing
Sukkel hul om die hand op te steek	They struggle to raise their hand
Jy's nie gemaak om te volg	You weren't made to follow
Jy was altyd gemaak om te lei	You were always made to lead
Sien jou refleksie in jou verlede	See your reflection in your past
En onthou wie jy is	And remember who you are

The heavy use of Afrikaner history and symbols of identity is another trend in this latest wave of protest music (see DST and SRT in Chapter 3, subsection 3.5.2). Bok van Blerk, who has made a career of singing to the *Afrikanerhart* (Afrikaner heart), best exemplifies this new form

of Afrikaans protest music. His latest song, titled *Ik ben een Afrikaander*, directly references Hendrik Biebouw and the first use of the term 'Afrikaner' (see Chapter 4, subsection 4.1.3.2). There is also a distinct turn from individual lamentations to calls for collective action in recent Afrikaans protest songs, as evidenced by the speaker addressing someone else, and often the entire Afrikaner group. Van Blerk's (2024) latest song also demonstrates this trend:

Saam met Hendrik Biebouw	Together with Hendrik Biebouw
Sal ons nie die massas in verdwyn nie	We will not disappear into the masses
Saam met Hendrik Biebouw	Together with Hendrik Biebouw
Sal one almal saam uitbasuin	We will all trumpet together
"Ik bin een Afrikaander!"	"I am an Afrikaner!"

In Chapter 3, subsection 3.5.2, I concluded that the mobilisation of ethnic identity occurs when group members perceive a social identity threat (including uncertainty threat identified in subsection 3.4.3), increase their ingroup identification in response (which nurtures their underlying identity motives), and group leaders capitalise on the increased salience of the identity in the pursuit of collective action. I will return to the theme of Afrikaner identity in Afrikaans music in subsection 5.3.2.4, and again in subsection 5.4.1.2, where I discuss the ability of Afrikaans music (and recently, Afrikaans theatre) to be used in the mobilisation of ethnic identity for collective political goals.

5.2.3. Electoral politics

Afrikaner electoral politics has been rather subdued post-Apartheid, undoubtedly because of this group's relative demographic weakness. Afrikaners have largely consolidated their vote under the political party the *Democratic Alliance* (DA), historically an English liberal party, while a tiny fraction continues to support the centre-right *Freedom Front Plus* (FF+) party. In the 2009 election, more than 80% of Afrikaners voted for the DA which supports "an open-opportunity society for all" (Giliomee, 2009:708). In contrast to the current groundswell of far-right political parties in Europe, no such trend is visible among Afrikaners. Their numerical, and thus electoral, weakness means that electoral politics has not been a particularly productive area of Afrikaner mobilisation.

Davies (209:124) identifies the FF+ as "the political mainstay of the right wing", and which has sought to balance its original *volkstaat* (Afrikaner ethnostate) ideal, with a constitutionally justifiable self-determination ideal:

> [T]he FF+ has moved inexorably closer to a new policy of 'more than just opposition', sold as 'a home to Afrikaners who love South Africa and who love its people, but who

> would like to see that democracy is entrenched to such an extent that South Africa will be seen as a community of communities, that offers a home and a place for all in the sun'. Their platform is to represent the 'natural home' for those who desire to be modern and up-to-date and who think accordingly; cherish Afrikaans and wish to promote and protect the language; say crime must be tackled and corruption eradicated; aspire towards economic prosperity and progress; are proud of their Afrikaans identity and who work towards protecting their own culture, education and values; work towards a society based on true Christian values; and, promote regional autonomy for all communities claiming that right. Although somewhat diffuse, there is little doubt that the crux of this programme centres upon 'self-determination and minority rights for those who want it [as] part of the South African political solution [which] must include cultural and territorial self-determination'.

Southern (2008:475) similarly describes the FF+ as an ethnic party, but not as an extremist party, as it "operate[s] within the confines of the new democracy rather than agitat[ing] or mobilis[ing] outside it". Davies (2009:124) details the lack of inroads made by the FF+ up until the publication of her book. The 2.17% of the vote they won in 1994, decreased to 0.8% in 1999, and increased again slightly in 2004 to 0.89%. Their support during these elections were concentrated in the northern provinces. Up until the 2019 election their position remained stable: in 2009, they received 0.83% of the vote, and in 2014 this increased slightly to 0.9%. In 2019 they enjoyed unexpected support, reaching their highest share of the vote in the post-Apartheid era yet at 2.38%. This represents 250 000 more votes in five years during an election when voter turnout was down 7.43%. These votes were overwhelmingly cast by defectors from the DA, who lost nearly half a million votes in the 2019 election. The FF+ support again tilted more north, however, the party grew their share of the vote in every province during this election, including in the Western Cape, where in 2019 they won 2.81% of the vote, up from 1.07% in 2014 (Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC), 2024)

In the 2014 election, the DA won their largest share of the vote to date, at 22.23%. During the following election cycle, the DA did much to shed its image as a white party (even though it is by far the most racially diverse political party in South Africa),[271] by, for example, electing Mmusi Maimane as its first black leader, and supporting minor reforms to BEE rather than its outright abolishment (Rumney, 2019). Its handling of certain language and race-related incidents further alienated many white Afrikaans speakers – which they acknowledged in their

[271] Due to the racial demographics of South Africa, any political party aiming to win a majority of the vote would have to enjoy overwhelming support from black South Africans (who make up 81.4% of the total population).

own report into their losses at the 2019 poll,[272] when their share of the vote decreased for the first time since 1994 to 20.77% (IEC, 2024).

It is clear that the political and cultural alienation experienced by many white Afrikaans speakers led them to change their votes from the DA to the FF+ in the 2019 election.[273] However, this might not be the only explanation. It could also be that the increasing disillusionment with majoritarian democracy and the realisation that white people simply do not have the numerical strength to impact the outcomes of national elections (seen in the inability of the DA to wrestle power from the ANC) might have led white Afrikaans speakers to try a different approach. With this kind of strategic voting, the aim is not to unseat the ruling party, but rather to gain seats in parliament for a political party sympathetic to minority rights and Afrikaner interests.

The 2024 election, however, upended many of these trends as, for the first time since the end of Apartheid, the ANC did not win a majority of votes (although still maintaining a plurality or relative majority), and only managed to secure 40.18% of the total votes cast (down from 57.50% in the 2019 election).[274] This election result ushered in a new era of coalition politics which means that the official opposition as well as smaller political parties all wield much more power. The notion of an Afrikaner party is now much more theoretically plausible, considering the outsized impact that smaller political parties may wield in coalition governments. However, there is no evidence yet that Afrikaner electoral politics will follow this direction.

After damage control, the DA managed to claw back some of the support it had previously lost to the FF+ (whose share of the vote decreased to 1.36% in 2024). Even though the DA only garnered 21.81% of the votes cast in the 2024 election (still lower than its peak in 2014), because of the ANC's bruising results and the need for a *Government of National Unity* (GNU), the DA now has more power than ever, holding six out of 32 ministerial positions. Even the FF+ now holds one such position (SA news, 2024). The 2024 cabinet is by far the most racially

[272] The report can be accessed here: https://cdn.da.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/29170634/Review-Panel-Report.pdf.

[273] The FF+ certainly capitalised on the DA's identity crisis, widely distributing an election poster of three of their leaders (a white woman, a white man, and a coloured man), accompanied by the words *Dis mos JOU mense* (It's YOUR people). The poster can be viewed here: https://www.capricornfm.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ff-plus-poster-use-.jpg. It is noteworthy that the FF+ signalled its racially inclusive (language-based) understanding of Afrikaner identity, in a bid to win more votes. In other words, the FF+ attempted to brand themselves as the Afrikaans party, and not the white (or Afrikaner) party, by putting a coloured Afrikaans speaker front and centre of their election poster.

[274] Nearly all of the ANC defectors voted for the new *uMkhonto weSizwe* party (MK Party), headed by former ANC president, Jacob Zuma.

(and ideologically) diverse cabinet in South African history, aside perhaps from the short-lived GNU of 1994.

However, it is still appropriate to speak of an ANC state and an ANC government. Of the entire cabinet (including deputy ministers), the ANC holds 53 out of 75 positions (or 70.1%). The ANC's Cyril Ramaphosa also has complete presidential powers over cabinet picks, and could make changes with no warning. So too, the ANC, as the dominant party in the GNU (comprising eleven political parties), could break up the current coalition and find different partners, such as Julius Malema's *Economic Freedom Fighters* (EFF) and Zuma's MK Party (which are not presently included in the GNU). Christi van der Westhuizen (2024) (whose critical views of Afrikaner identity and nationalism I discuss in section 5.3) provides a bleak analysis of the current GNU, comparing the ANC to a *luislang* (python) that squeezes the life out of its coalition partners. Unstable coalitions at a local level have most recently seen the ousting of the DA's mayor of the City of Tshwane (the greater Pretoria area). In addition to the ANC's dominance in elected positions (on national, provincial and local levels of government), its members (and patronage networks) dominate the rest of the administrative state, most importantly in vital parastatals such as Eskom. While the advent of coalition politics could signify the beginning of (stable) power-sharing in South Africa, it is too early to conclude that the ANC's might has been broken.

Giliomee (2009:709) argues that while the ANC used to attract significant support from the coloured and Indian communities, by 2009 they had lost most of this support. Their emphasis on black African nationalism quickly alienated minority groups of all races in South Africa. Corruption and service delivery failures have also served to alienate a segment of the black population, especially an educated middle class in the Gauteng province who have voted for the DA in recent elections. Giliomee (2009:709) believes that "the main hope for a more balanced system lay in the opposition parties making inroads on the local level".

Despite the DA's current comparatively strong position, it has reason to fear future election outcomes. Not only do smaller parties such as the FF+ threaten to win over Afrikaner voters, but they are also in danger of losing their grip on the Western Cape (WC) province, as a result of the *Patriotic Alliance* (PA) winning over the coloured vote. The 2024 election result thus also suggests further voting along both ethnic and regional lines. In addition to the PA enjoying massive support among coloured voters in the WC, the MK Party was mainly supported by Zulu voters in the Kwa-Zulu Natal (KZN) province. It thus seems as though the ideal of a

multiracial ruling party has been replaced by the reality of a multiracial coalition government consisting of several ethnic parties.[275] In essence, the 2024 election has far-reaching implications on political identification, identity politics, and group (including localised) identities – and not only for Afrikaners. Below is a map showing the provinces of present-day South Africa:

Figure 6: Map of South African provinces (post-1994)

5.2.4. Organisation and privatisation

In his foreword to Meades' (2019) book on Afrikaner capitalism, Hermann Giliomee (2019b:vii-viii) distinguishes between the *consumption of language* (to speak and read a language) and the *reproduction of language* (to pass a language on to the next generation through education). Giliomee (2019b:xv) argues that the continued existence of Afrikaans in the public sphere relies on its consumption (to speak Afrikaans and to buy Afrikaans media), as well as its reproduction (the existence of Afrikaans-medium schools and universities which cultivates new Afrikaans speakers). Giliomee (2020:283) believes that while the consumption of Afrikaans is "vibrant", the prospects for the reproduction of an Afrikaans-speaking community are "bleak".

[275] Gayton McKenzie, leader of the PA, seems to be leveraging his position as Minister of Sports, Arts and Culture well and, through his defence of Afrikaans and minorities, may be able to win over white voters from the DA.

Naspers (the Afrikaner publishing house turned multinational consumer internet company) remains one of the greatest promotors of Afrikaans consumption, through its support of Afrikaans arts festivals throughout the country, as well as through its holdings of Afrikaans print media, and its Afrikaans digital news media outlet, *Netwerk24*, which boasts 100 000 paying subscribers, a third of whom are in their 20s and 30s. There has also been a proliferation of Afrikaans-medium entertainment in the post-Apartheid era, including music, literature, film and television. In addition to Afrikaans consumption, the ATKV aids in the reproduction of Afrikaans through its various language and cultural projects for Afrikaans school children, such as debate, choir and theatre competitions.

Giliomee (2019b:vii-viii) ponders whether Afrikaner entrepreneurs today have a responsibility towards their community (defined inclusively) and its language, i.e., mobilising so-called *volkskapitalisme* (capitalism of the people) in service of the reproduction of culture, as was done during the Second Afrikaans Language Movement (1903-1925). Afrikaner mobilisation post-1994 has been marked by privatisation – both in terms of a commercialisation of Afrikaner culture in the private domain, as well as the wielding of private funds (from big and small donors alike) to achieve other larger cultural and political aims. This privatisation has become a hallmark of contemporary Afrikaner identity and politics, and has seen the return of the "organisation Afrikaner" (see Chapter 4, subsection 4.3.2.4), of which the *Solidarity Movement* (the umbrella term for the labour union Solidarity and all its ancillary bodies) is at the forefront. While I briefly note this phenomenon here, I will discuss it in greater depth throughout the following sections.

According to Davies (2009:95), Afrikaner companies such as Rembrandt and Naspers were able to weather the storms post-1994 and to achieve great success through various methods such as restructuring and diversification of interests. She states that the response of the Afrikaans media sector in particular, can be classified into three processes, namely *mobilisation*, *privatisation* and *ideological repositioning*. She quotes Wasserman (2006) as explanation (2009:95-96):

> [The sector] played a paradoxical role in this refashioning of identity and cultural citizenship. While on the one hand drawing on international discourses of group rights in multicultural societies and an insistence on acknowledgement of minority cultural rights on the level of the state, Afrikaans media also embarked on an increased commercialisation where culture was privatised and commodified, within reach of those that are able to pay for it.

When the ANC introduced the controversial *Expropriation Bill* in 2008,[276] which conferred them "the right to expropriate any property for the purposes of BEE or land redistribution", some minority-group representatives "interpreted this bill as a lethal attack on white-held property, particularly farms" (Giliomee, 2009:707). This ushered in a new era of Afrikaner civil organisations opposing the state. Giliomee (2009:707-708) argues:

> Up to that point South Africa did not have a tradition of developing issue-based campaigns that challenged government's ability to set the agenda and manage the news. The Solidarity-led mobilisation against affirmative action highlighted the issue but did not force government to change the law. The Expropriation Bill launched a new form of minority politics: a broad-based alliance, coupled with a press campaign, parliamentary speeches and the lobbying of foreign decision makers that ultimately forced government to withdraw the bill. The campaign was spearheaded by the De Klerk Foundation and the farmers' organisation Agri-South Africa […] A broad alliance consisting of organisations and opposition parties kept the issue in the spotlight. Spokespersons briefed the local and foreign media.[277]

Blaser and Van der Westhuizen (2012:384) argue that in response to the threat of white poverty, labour union Solidarity is "adapting its brand of ethnic entrepreneurship to new circumstances, and is successfully mobilising white Afrikaans-speaking workers". They cite Boersema's finding that the narrative of the union leadership has shifted from racism and Afrikaner nationalism to "a language of rights". Davies (2009:123-124) claims that mobilisation is particularly acute among non-elite Afrikaners:

> [A] resurgent nationalist politics, rejuvenating identification in the common pursuit of group-based material and cultural interests. The right's agenda is broadly phrased in terms of Afrikaner problems including issues of marginalisation and the objective of self-determination that have considerable appeal for a sizeable tract of lower-middle and working class, and even unemployed Afrikaans speakers. Parties and organisations continue to build upon a potent sense of betrayal and a common enemy, perceptions of alienation and a very real if fluid sense of disillusionment among their by and large non-elite membership.

Giliomee (2020:197) distinguishes between ethnonationalism (associated with Eastern Europe; and of which Afrikaner nationalism of the 20th century is an example) and territorial nationalism (associated with Western Europe). The former occurs in multi-ethnic states and

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[276] This bill should not be confused with the EWC bill introduced in 2021, and which requires a constitutional amendment to allow for expropriation without compensation (see footnote 258). When the motion regarding EWC was adopted in the National Assembly in 2018, the EFF's Malema declared: "The time for reconciliation is over. Now is the time for justice" (Gerber, 2018).

[277] After the adoption of the EWC motion in 2018, AfriForum's Ernst Roets appeared on Tucker Carlson's *Fox News* show where he was interviewed about the policy as well as farm murders (AfriForum, 2018a). This is a clear instance of Identity Threat Response (ITR) Theory's seeking assistance (see Chapter 3, subsection 3.4.2).

involves members of a cultural group developing a strong sense of unity. This ethnic group identification leads to claims for full political control in pursuit of ethnic self-determination. The latter, on the other hand, involves the creation of a culturally homogeneous nation that is self-governing. He states that ethnonationalism is a strong form of political nationalism as it "combines a strategy to promote or defend the discrete interests of classes within the group with a dimension that relates to ethnic or communal power and status".

Giliomee (2020:198) insists that recent analyses of Afrikaner nationalism overemphasise the economic factors, albeit profound, and neglect the political and emotional dimensions. Giliomee (2020:199) argues that once the income gap between Afrikaners and English speakers was closed during the 20th century, one would expect ethnonationalism to make way for a class politics, if indeed economic considerations were the only reason for Afrikaner mobilisation (see the critique of an instrumentalist view of ethnicity in Chapter 2, subsection 2.1.3). And yet this did not occur. He reiterates that ethnonationalism cannot be explained merely in economic terms.

Based on our knowledge of the importance of social identities to individuals, and of the link between language and ethnic identity, we may conclude that Afrikaner mobilisation is not only motivated by the pursuit of material interest. As the realisation set in that Afrikaners can no longer rely on the state for cultural maintenance, privatisation offered a new avenue.[278] Most notable is the private Afrikaans-medium university, *Akademia*, founded by the Solidarity Movement, and funded by its members. Giliomee (2019a:322) states:

> To an important extent the movement Solidarity has come to fill the gap left by the disappearance of Afrikaans-medium universities. In a short period of time it has made remarkable strides to set up a private institution for higher education using distance teaching.

Mpofu-Walsh (2021) argues that although Apartheid was formally abolished, it lives on in a privatised form. Fairbanks (2017:53) suggests that as a result of racial polarisation, "feelings

[278] Whereas ethnonationalist movements undermine the sovereignty of the state by seeking to replace or secede from it, this type of cultural nationalism is concerned with assuming responsibility over cultural issues neglected by the state, and is not in and of itself destabilising. However, as the Solidarity Movement and other organisations have been vocal on issues beyond the cultural realm, and are increasingly taking over duties from the state in local areas (or rather, offering duplicate services), one could argue that this constitutes a type of privatised secession, or indeed the formation of a duplicate private Afrikaner state, at least in its infancy. I discuss the nature of contemporary Afrikaner political and cultural mobilisation further in subsection 5.4.1.3.

of white nationalism", "Afrikaner pride" and support of the Solidarity Movement is increasing among white born-frees (a term designating those South Africans born after 1994).

5.2.5. Cape nationalism and the seeds of secession

In addition to the various forms of Afrikaner mobilisation discussed thus far, there is another form which is restricted to Afrikaners in the Western Cape province, although it is not exclusive to this group; namely Cape nationalism. It should also be noted that while the privatisation and organisation discussed above is found all across South Africa, especially the Solidarity Movement has a definite northern footprint, with most of its operations in the greater Pretoria area (although it does continue to draw support, and donations, from across the country, and has plans for a new Akademia campus in the Western Cape). According to Davies (2009:99), white Afrikaans speakers today demonstrate the highest degree of variation in terms of social identification when analysed at the local level (more on these differences in the following section). Her study found that geographic location, generation and provincial politics significantly influence Afrikaner identification:

> Introducing a subjective element of group identification makes it possible to address the increasing plurality of constructions of Afrikanerness. For whilst a pervasive sense of 'being Afrikaans' exists, habitually expressed in terms of language and less commonly descent, the meanings and significance attached to this self-understanding are so varied, at the local level in particular, that it is problematic to speak of an Afrikaner nation or ethnic group in any formal sense.[279] This careful balance between the subjective and objective elements of identification does not imply a distinct, bounded group or exclusive identity. Instead it accepts that there are major discrepancies among Afrikaans speakers in South Africa today which are part of a historical legacy and structural change that continue to be very much a contemporary reality.[280]

[279] I am certain this is the case with all other nations or ethnic groups. This belief that only a strictly homogeneous group qualifies as a group at all, may be viewed as promoting essentialism itself. May (2012), for example, noted the ironic essentialism of orthodox liberals who deny the possibility of maintaining both ethnic and national identities (see Chapter 2, subsection 2.3.2). Davies' (2009) local identification may thus instead be viewed as a subgroup identity below the level of ethnic identification (or perhaps above), and the variation between individuals as the normal differences (not "discrepancies") that exist in terms of social and personal identity between all people of any group. I do, however, agree with Davies's assessment that there is no 'true' definition of a contemporary Afrikaner, that conceptualisations thereof are strongly influenced by local conditions, and that attempts to define the group and establish ingroup norms by identity entrepreneurs are highly disputed among these heterogeneous ingroup members.

[280] While Pretorius (2022) uses these local 'discrepancies' to argue for the existence of two (essentialised) groups (Northern Boers and Southern Afrikaners; see subsection 5.3.1.7), Davies seems to imply that in the face of historic and contemporary local variations, Afrikaner ethnic identity is less potent and durable because of a lack of group uniformity and internal cohesion. This, of course, did not stop nationalism in the post-Anglo-Boer War era from creating a unified Afrikaner nation (see Chapter 4, subsection 4.3.2).

Davies (2009:100) argues that regionalism or "a persistent provincialism" has played a significant role in "the continued evolution of Afrikaner nationalist politics". She notes the economic and class differences that have historically existed between the Afrikaans communities in the Cape, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, as well as tensions that often arose between these regions, most often between the Cape and Transvaal parties (2009:100-101). As an example, Davies (2009:101) cites the Transvaal NP's stress on anti-imperialism contrasted with the Cape NP's unease with anti-capitalist rhetoric in the early 20th century (see Chapter 4, subsection 4.3.2.7, for a discussion on these historic differences).

Davies (2009:101-102) refers to Cape nationalism of the 20th century, which involved an alliance between Sanlam, Naspers, and wealthy capitalist farmers, as a "more liberal nationalism". From Davies's (2009:103-104) discussion on the economic liberalisation of the 1980s, which saw less state spending on poor white farmers and more on black education, for her, 'liberal' thus denotes a less (white) protectionist or, in effect, state socialism, policy, in favour of a more free-market capitalist policy and non-racialism. According to Davies (2009:105), the final Apartheid election in 1989 saw the right wing capture the majority of Afrikaner votes in the Transvaal and OFS. She believes that in this way Afrikaner nationalism "laid the foundations of a new political, social and geographical home in these northern provinces". She continues:

> Joining and sustaining the link between material interests and cultural politics has become the very real dilemma for this new, locally oriented political movement that draws on a wide range of influences.

In other words, Davies (2009) suggests that contemporary right-wing Afrikaner nationalism is located in (and isolated to) the north of South Africa, whereas the south is free from such conservative pursuits. Not only does this view disregard the strong influence of 'liberal' Cape Afrikaners on the First and Second Afrikaans Language Movements, and on Afrikaner nationalism in the post-war era leading up to Apartheid, but it does not reflect a critical and current analysis of provincial and Afrikaner politics in the Western Cape. In my view, instead of being free from conservative Afrikaner nationalism because of historic reasons or ideological differences, the Cape simply has a different expression of such nationalism because of the parameters set (and opportunities created) by the local political conditions. There is also no reason to assume that these conditions will remain unchanged.

Whereas northern nationalism in the post-Apartheid era involves primarily privatisation and organisation, Cape nationalism is, in addition, further preoccupied with decentralisation,

separatism and secession, ranging from proposals to devolve and decentralise power from the state to the provinces, to complete Cape independence such as through the *CapeXit* campaign, and promoted by, among others, the *Cape Independence Party*, the *Referendum Party*, and the *Cape Independence Advocacy Group*. The latter created the controversial "We're Just Different" slogan (a clear example of positive differentiation), which began with a graphic posted on social media contrasting the Cape with 'the rest of South Africa' who is 'friends with Russia', 'ANC voters' and 'black'.[281] Davies (2009:113) cites Cornelissen and Horstmeier (2002) who argue that "the provinces of South Africa can also be said to be *territorial microcosms* of the identity and legitimacy problematique represented by the nation-building endeavour". Davies maintains that the Western Cape is unique in South Africa in terms of its political traditions, forms of provincial power sharing and racial demographics.[282]

The Western Cape is one of only two provinces to have been governed by a party other than the ANC in the post-1994 dispensation. In 1994, the National Party (NP) secured only this province, while the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) won in KZN, and again in the 1999 election, before losing to the ANC in the 2004 election. The ANC held this province until the 2024 election when it lost to Jacob Zuma's new MK Party. After a decade of ANC rule in the WC, the Democratic Alliance (DA) took control over the province in 2009, which it maintains to this day. This demonstrates the different electoral make-up to the rest of the country, which has given the province a much stronger position in terms of resisting the ANC government (through electoral politics).[283] This has further allowed local concerns in the WC to often dominate certain discourses in South Africa, especially as it concerns the Afrikaans-language debate.[284]

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[281] The post can be viewed here: https://x.com/LetsFreeTheCape/status/1510165711724978181.

[282] The extent to which so-called *semigration* of white Afrikaans speakers from the north, and (black) economic migrancy mainly from the Eastern Cape, both of which affect the Western Cape's demographic make-up, influence support for Cape independence is unknown. More than one million people born in the Eastern Cape now reside in the Western Cape (Stats SA, 2022:28). In addition, while anti-ANC rhetoric is usually deployed in arguing for independence, it is likely that negative attitudes towards other South African groups might be driving the movement as well. As an example, the *Gatvol Capetonian* organisation, a coloured nationalist movement is openly anti-black African (Jacobs, 2018).

[283] Should the electoral make-up of the Western Cape change, or the DA lose the coloured vote and thus the WC, there is little reason to presume that a historically 'liberal' tradition will trump the new political reality, and prevent Cape Afrikaners (and white people in the WC in general), from adopting similar nationalist strategies than northern Afrikaners. To put it differently, had coloured Afrikaans speakers also been the numerical majority group in the north, Afrikaner politics there might have mimicked that of the Cape. It is thus not necessarily (historical) ideological differences between northern and southern Afrikaners that give rise to their distinct forms of nationalism, but perhaps (changeable) local conditions.

[284] It is not only the Western Cape (Cape Town and Stellenbosch in particular) that enjoys relative dominance in the discussion on certain issues. Because of its economic might and large white Afrikaans community, Pretoria also exerts great influence on shaping Afrikaner identity and politics throughout the country.

For instance, attempts to ameliorate Afrikaner identity and promote Afrikaans language rights through the advancement of the 'Afrikaanses' identity (the merger of white and coloured Afrikaans speakers into a single group), reflect the demographics of the Western Cape, and are less effective strategies in the rest of the country, due to the numerical weakness of coloured Afrikaans speakers outside of the Western Cape. Similarly, whereas white Afrikaans (and English) speakers in the Western Cape can rely on coloured voters to swing elections away from the ANC, and to thus attain some measure of provincial self-determination, the demographical make-up in the other provinces precludes electoral politics from achieving the same outcome there. Afrikaners in the north thus have to pursue other avenues for achieving a similar level of self-determination and freedom from the ANC.

According to Davies (2009:114), the Cape Province was the largest of the four pre-1994 localities, and the Western Cape (WC) has "retained much of its distinctive character". She suggests that the WC is the best-developed province with a high rate of urbanisation. Coloured people make up the majority of the population, and Afrikaans is the majority language of the province. She questions the assumption that the voting patterns in the province support the notion of shared identity and interests between the white and coloured Afrikaans communities. Fifteen years after the publication of her book, I believe her scepticism has been vindicated. Recent voting patterns suggest that these two Afrikaans communities might be diverging politically-speaking (I discuss the cultural aspect in subsection 5.3.1.4). Coloured people are becoming much more politically assertive than they have been throughout most of the post-Apartheid era.[285]

At the time of Davies's writing, the WC was ruled by an ANC-led coalition with the DA (before the DA took full control in 2009). She remarked as follows (2009:113):

> Despite these political upheavals, the convoluted history and degree of dislocation between federal and provincial policies suggests that 'Cape politics' will continue to influence patterns of identification in the region. Whether the current solidarity between the national and provincial governments will weaken or strengthen such localism remains unclear.

[285] It is an interesting development that coloured Afrikaans speakers have lately demonstrated attempts to differentiate themselves not only from white Afrikaans speakers, but also from the dominant national ethnie (black South Africans). Coloured identity, perhaps more than any other ethnic identity in South Africa, is currently being renegotiated and redefined. Lagardien (2024) provides an interesting discussion on coloured 'belonging', arguing that this group is "crushed between [Afrikaner] ethnonationalism and African nationalism".

Davies (2009:114) predicted that the growing challenge in the WC to the ANC's hegemony would "complicate this politics and the maturity of a distinct local identity and emergent subnational identities in the region". She also noted the "overt concern" among WC communities that they were being negatively impacted by national policies, especially economically as it related to affirmative action (which often failed to recognise coloured people as previously disadvantaged while a distinctly black African nationalism became normalised) (2009:115). The "solidarity" between the ANC and DA was, however, short-lived, and it is clear today that localism and Cape politics and identity have been strengthened by the DA's electoral victories over the past four elections.

Davies (2009:115) cites a study into identity formation in the WC which found that there were two distinct flows of identity construction: from above as exercised by political actors in positions of power, and from below as occurring within and between social groups. Through separate interviews with opinion-makers (political leaders) and community focus groups, the study found that while the opinion-makers believed in a Western Cape identity that is "historically grown, reinforced by natural elements, cosmopolitan, almost completely Afrikaans-speaking, constituted of 'white' and 'coloureds', different from the rest of South Africa, economically stronger, and mainly rugby-playing", the community focus groups had "an 'overtly local orientation', often to their 'immediate dwellings or surroundings'". She continues:

> This translated into a 'powerful and pervasive dissatisfaction with local government and municipality structures across the province, and occurred in different types of residential areas'. The subject of most antagonism was 'economic opportunities' relating to perceptions of being handicapped vis-à-vis affirmative action legislation. This meant that the concept of race surfaced significantly and suggest that race remains a 'principal identifier' for people […]

The study found that residents of the WC were much more likely to hold local or sub-provincial identities, as opposed to provincial or national identities. These identities were described as "a continuance of older identities", especially as continued racial division in residential areas resulted in clearly defined racial identities which remained ignorant of "the others" (Davies, 2009:115-116). Davies (2009:116) argues:

> Certainly, the shifting coloured vote demonstrates the complexity of a population delineated by a range of important cleavages that may be 'regional, religious, class-oriented, linguistic, ethnic or gendered, with shifting combinations of these at different moments'.

Davies (2009:123) believes that the history of conflict between the conservative nationalism in the north and the more liberal nationalism of the Cape continues to this day. While I agree with her identification of the different strands of nationalism (although they are not necessarily in conflict), I disagree with her use of the word 'liberal' to characterise Cape nationalism. The co-operation between white and coloured people in the Cape seems to be less motivated by an ideology of non-racialism, than by a mutual distrust and/or rejection of the ANC (and possibly Xhosa migrants, black South Africans in general and even white northerners). Moreover, separatist and seccessionist movements such as Cape independence are normally not referred to as liberal.

It could be argued that the divide that existed between many Cape and Republican Afrikaners from after the Great Trek and throughout the Anglo-Boer War, persists to this day (see subsection 5.3.1.7 for such an argument). CapeXit and the pursuit of Cape independence (based on the notion of the Cape's uniqueness and superiority), is then another instance of Cape Afrikaners rejecting a sense of solidarity with northern Afrikaners, or the rest of South Africa, for that matter.[286] While it presently seems unlikely that this movement will make much progress,[287] this type of political nationalism has the potential to further radicalise, and it represents the clearest threat to the authority of the South African state. It should be noted here that Cape independence is by no means an exclusively Afrikaner movement, however, and also enjoys support from coloured Afrikaans speakers and white English speakers.

5.2.6. Right-wing extremism

In addition to the types of Afrikaner mobilisation discussed thus far, it is also possible to identify a fringe right, most readily (and incorrectly) associated with the 'whites-only' town of Orania in the Northern Cape, however, more accurately represented by groups such as the *Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging* (AWB; Afrikaner Resistance Movement), *Suidlanders* (Southlanders), the *Boeremag* (Boer Force), *Bittereinders* (Bitterenders), *Kommandokorps*

[286] Anchoring (Chapter 3, subsection 3.5.2) may be present among proponents of CapeXit, seen, for example, in the emphasis of the Cape as a *historically* distinct and separate entity from the rest of South Africa.

[287] The DA does not support Cape independence outright, but does advocate for greater decentralisation or devolution of state powers to the provinces (which I do not argue qualifies as either secession or separatism). Referring to its plan as federalism, in 2023 the party tabled the *Western Cape Provincial Powers Bill* to this effect (Steenhuisen, 2023). The ANC branded it as unconstitutional and accused the DA of trying to create an independent Apartheid state (Bhengu-Motsiri, 2024). It has been pointed out that the DA is disincentivised from boldly pursuing WC independence, as it undermines the legitimacy of its efforts elsewhere in the country (Johnson, 2016). Both the (northern organisations) FF+ and AfriForum's offices in the Western Cape support Cape independence.

(Commando Corps), *Boerelegioen* (Boer Legion), and the *Nasionale Christelike Weerstandsbeweging* (National Christian Resistance Movement), who have a paramilitary component and/or engage in violent rhetoric or terrorist acts.

Davies (2009:127) refers to Orania as "a prototype of Afrikaner self-determination". Orania's establishment and management follows much the same structure of the organisation and privatisation discussed above, although it has formally exercised its constitutional right to self-determination by legally becoming a private town, on private land, and with its own currency, while remaining subject to the South African Constitution. It is thus, unlike other Afrikaner organisations, necessarily territorially confined. The town is not access-controlled, and while people of any race may visit there, only self-identifying Afrikaners are allowed to buy homes and reside there.[288] Orania largely promotes an essentialist view of Afrikaner identity, and its desire for Afrikaner separateness and self-determination illustrate its rejection of national identification.

A similar Afrikaners-only private town, *Kleinfontein*, to the east of Pretoria, was created in the 1990s. The High Court recently declared the access-controlled town an illegal settlement, as the farmland it is located on was never rezoned, leading to significantly lower property taxes for its inhabitants (Slabbert, 2024). While Orania provides for a fascinating discussion on ethnonationalism and, in particular, self-sufficiency from a central government (and cheap black labour, in order to remain culturally 'pure' and separate), its inability to grow its population beyond a couple thousand people over many decades, or to replicate itself elsewhere in South Africa, strongly suggests that this mode of mobilisation will not be the dominant outlet of Afrikaner frustration in the years to come.

Davies (2009:127) suggests that fringe groups "offer one of the only remaining political avenues" to non-elite Afrikaans speakers who are on the traditional right of the political spectrum. Referencing the 2002 white militant extremist plot by the Boeremag to overthrow the government,[289] she makes special mention of the fact that such extremism is very uncommon, and that it is limited to the northern provinces. Davis (2022) identifies various

[288] President of the Orania Movement, Carel Boshoff IV (whose father founded the town and whose grandfather is Hendrik Verwoerd), has stated that people of any colour may live in Orania if they assimilate to 'Afrikaner culture'. Prospective residents are subject to a screening and interview process and so far, either no non-white people have applied for residence, or no applications have been accepted (Smith & Pitts, 2019). Boshoff is also the chairman of the FAK, and holds the honorary professorship of Akademia's *NP van Wyk Louw Centre*.

[289] In October 2002 several bombs exploded in Soweto, in which one woman was killed. The Boeremag claimed responsibility whereafter 26 of their members were arrested (Anon., 2023).

splinter groups of the *Israel Vision*, a religious extremist "cult" of which some Boeremag members were a part. She also notes that "a devout belief in the prophecies of the Boer mystic Siener (Seer) van Rensburg", who lived from 1864 to 1926, is common among the Afrikaner far right. While these groups do not enjoy significant support, that does not mean they do not pose a danger.

The Bittereinders, established in the wake of the Senekal riots (see subsection 5.2.2), gained prominence in the media due to their involvement in the Groblersdal protest, a march in defence of an Afrikaner farmer and his stepson accused of assaulting a black farmworker (Mutsila & Evans, 2024). The 26-year-old leader of the Bittereinders was arrested for assaulting a police officer during this protest (Venter, 2024a), along with three other leading members (Venter, 2024b), demonstrating a proclivity towards violence absent from other forms of Afrikaner mobilisation in the post-1994 dispensation. While still very much on the fringes of society, right-wing extremism is increasingly online and targeted towards young Afrikaner men, and has the potential to develop similarly to online radicalisation among young white men in Western countries.[290]

5.3. Contemporary Afrikaner Social Identity

5.3.1. Resurrecting, rejecting and reforming Afrikaner identity

5.3.1.1. Alienation from the state and national identity

As argued in section 5.1, the post-Apartheid era has seen disillusionment with the ANC government and the Rainbow Nation ideal, as well as with Afrikanerdom itself. As a direct consequence of Afrikaners losing control of the state, and the ANC government's shift to black nationalism, changes in national identification among Afrikaners have occurred. While some attempts at nation-building were more successful at cultivating a sense of 'South Africanness', and there are still many instances of identification with a shared non-racial national identity – such as through support of the national rugby team, the Springboks (Phillips DeZalia & Moeschberger, 2016:131) – a reconfiguration of national and ethnic identity and identification has been in process among white Afrikaans speakers, and which illustrates the enduring power of ethnicity.

The percentage of Afrikaners who agreed with the statement "South Africa is today a land for blacks; whites will have to accept that they will have to take second place", increased from

[290] Kucera (2022) provides an analysis of right-wing extremism in post-Apartheid South Africa.

only 4% in a 1992 poll, to 43% in 1998. Giliomee (2009:664) suggests that despite the sense that "the tables had been turned", younger Afrikaner were relieved to find themselves in a democracy in 1994, free from security anxieties (and conscription) and "stifling cultural conformity", and now able to travel internationally. In spite of these newfound possibilities of superordinate group identification, Giliomee insists that, for most Afrikaners, Afrikaans remained the symbol of their sense of place and community, and that ethnic identification has increased among certain segments of the white Afrikaans-speaking population. He states (2009:664-665):

> [In 2002] Ton Vosloo called Afrikaans 'the single issue around which all the minority demands of Afrikaans people revolve.' He wanted everything possible to be done to negotiate for it a secure place, and suggested that the best way to do it was to mobilise numbers across colour and religion and to be inclusive as possible. He was heartened by what he called the 'astonishing rapport' between white, brown and black Afrikaans-speakers that had grown and concluded: 'We have much to contribute to a united nation.' Some attempted to reclaim the language, but left open the question whether a new, sole Afrikaner identity would also be claimed. There was a tendency to couple an Afrikaans identity with other identities: people were Afrikaners and South Africans, Afrikaners and Africans, Afrikaners and Afrikaanses, an awkward term used to designate all Afrikaans-speakers regardless of colour. The Group of 63, a post-1994 Afrikaans organisation, encouraged a search for new myths in the campaign to secure the future of Afrikaans as a public tongue. Its emphasis was not on the unity of Afrikaans-speakers but on their diversity. For the Group of 63, Afrikaans was not simply a standardised, white middle-class language, but a language with many accents, myths and idioms. The group called on those who wished to promote Afrikaans to fight not only for Afrikaans but for all minority languages in South Africa, like Zulu and Xhosa, which were experiencing even more severe marginalisation. By 2000 it appeared as if Afrikaners had become a minority linguistic group rather than an organised ethnic group with myths of origin and kinship, capable of mobilisation as a potent force. Leading black intellectuals were prepared to support this non-ethnic linguistic identity in a strategy of avoiding a confrontation with the government on the language issue. They rejected any effort to promote Afrikaans under the banner of a resurgent Afrikaner ethnic group. Approximately 40 per cent of white Afrikaans-speakers identified with what one can call an ethnic Afrikaner identity. The evidence was that the more unfairly Afrikaans-speakers felt treated, the more they identified themselves as Afrikaners. It was from such a group that the more determined efforts of the future to oppose government policies on affirmative action, education and language could be expected to come.

According to Giliomee and Mbenga (2007:433), early in the 21st century, the majority of white and black people considered themselves 'proudly South African' and regarded their South African identity as an important part of their social identity. Bornman (2010:237) found that while national and African identification has strengthened among black South Africans post-1994, Afrikaans-speaking white people have on the contrary displayed a decrease in national

identification and an increase in ethnic identification. In other words, the political majority increasingly adopted superordinate identities, while the political minority adopted subordinate identities (as nation-state congruence was advanced). She argues that social and political stability in diverse societies is influenced by the interface between identification with subnational groups (racial or ethnic groups), national (nation-state) identification and identification with supranational power blocs in a globalising world (2010:238):

> Heterogeneous states, in particular, face the possibility of multiple and often contending social identities (Mattes, 1999). Social identities and associated loyalties are believed to be torn between subnational groups and the larger political community represented by the nation-state. It is believed that those who perceive themselves as members of the group that holds power will identify more easily with the government/state. Groups on the periphery of power, on the other hand, will often feel marginalised and identify less with the state. Heterogeneous states therefore, almost by definition, lack a common agreement on social identity or a common nationhood.

According to Bornman (2010:239), as the national identity in South Africa during Apartheid was exclusionary, during the transition it was agreed that no commonly accepted national identity existed, and an ideology of new nationalism and nation-building was viewed as the solution. This gave rise to the concept of the "new South Africa" as expressed through new national symbols and the moniker "Rainbow Nation", denoting the unity in diversity of South African groups. She concurs with Giliomee that especially under President Mbeki's leadership, a shift from nation-building to Africanism occurred. The expression "African Renaissance" came to denote increasing African nationalism on the part of the ruling ANC government. The 'Africanness' of white South Africans (and lately also coloured and Indian South Africans) became increasingly questioned (Bornman, 2010:240).

In addition to these disputed identities, globalisation and South Africa's participation in international politics creates further cleavages between white people and identification with the state. Whereas the Apartheid government was opposed to the former communist countries, and was more aligned with the West, the ANC's alliances have historically been the complete opposite. Under its leadership, the South African state has oftentimes been hostile towards the West, such as by voting against the US at the UN and criticising it publicly – not always without merit – while they have become close allies with Russia and China, evident in its partnership in BRICS.[291] These new affiliations further alienate white people from the ANC government,

[291] The ANC's neutrality on the Ukraine invasion (and allegations of Russian support) has proven very unpopular domestically. Due, at least in part, to the historical myth of connection to Israel among many Afrikaners (noted in Chapter 4), many of them have also been highly critical of the ANC's ICJ (*International Court of Justice*) case of

the South African state, and consequently, the national identity, as they tend to view themselves as Western, and do not have the same history of 'comradeship' with eastern countries.

Bornman (2010:241) also notes the impact of globalisation and international engagement on social identification, arguing that South Africa's membership of the *African Union* (AU) and the *Southern African Development Community* (SADC) might have strengthened supranational identification with Africanism. She also believes that globalisation could result in identifications with different global societies. Davies (2009:131-133) views the ANC's participation in the global neo-liberal economic order as a catalyst for change in Afrikaner identifications. While she argues that Afrikaner capitalists have been able to act as "a counterweight to particular (redistributory) tendencies within the ANC government", globalisation has also allowed them, and the upper-middle class, to discard their ethnic, and even national identification, in the pursuit of their personal material interest (2009:133).[292]

Botha (2020:141) suggests that many Afrikaners are disillusioned by the New South Africa, considering that they not only lost political power, but are also burdened by the increase in crime and violence (which affect all South Africans), and are negatively impacted by affirmative action (and state decay). They therefore experience a sense of alienation and confusion in the New South Africa. This has given rise to an Afrikaner diaspora, defined as Afrikaners who have emigrated, or those who have migrated inward away from the realities of South Africa, such as by moving to exclusive high-security estates,[293] or through other psychological strategies (more on this diaspora in subsection 5.3.2).

Visser (2007:11; 16) suggests that Afrikaners suffer from an identity crisis, both emigrants dealing with the loss of their "South Africanness" and/or Afrikaner culture, and those who have stayed in South Africa but are dealing with the profound effects of the 1994 transition on the Afrikaner identity. Visser (2007:16) cites Gouws who, in reference to "the soul-searching about their cultural and political existence in and relationship to the new South Africa", asked

genocide against Israel for its conduct against the Palestinians since the terrorist attack by Hamas on 8 October 2023. The DA and the ANC's foreign policies are nearly exact opposites (Ndzendze, 2024).

[292] As a result of skills shortages in other parts of the world, nurses, teachers and some blue-collar workers (especially plumbers, electricians and farm workers) have also recently been able to discard their ethnic and national identifications through emigration. It remains, however, an option largely limited to a privileged segment of the Afrikaner population, and thus the criticism of so-called cosmopolitanism remains valid (see Chapter 2, subsection 2.3.3).

[293] It should be noted that these estates are not racially exclusive.

whether there is any other group in the world equally "obsessed" with its identity than the Afrikaners.

According to Bornman (2010:250), black South Africans have increasingly identified with the South African state since gaining political power in 1994. The political transformation also strengthened their (supra-ethnic) African identification, which seems to have become their primary social identity. This is the expected outcome when nation-state congruence is pursued by a black nationalist party. Losing political power has caused white Afrikaans speakers to "withdraw to the confines of their ethnic group" (Bornman, 2010:251).[294] While the strength of their ethnic identification remained stable post-1994, their national identification decreased. They identified strongly as South Africans in a 1994 study, and expressed pride in this identity in a 1998 study, but by 2001 a study found their identification with the South African nation and state to be the least of all the groups in South Africa (Bornman, 2010:251). This illustrates the effect of the Staatsvolk's banal nationalism on the Afrikaner minority group who is not represented in the state (see Chapter 2, subsection 2.2.6), and strongly suggests that the increase in the salience of Afrikaner ethnicity (and mobilisation) is in reaction to the ANC's black nationalism, instead of merely being a remnant of Apartheid-era Afrikaner nationalism.

Instead of race and ethnicity disappearing with the advent of the New South Africa, both are thriving (the ANC government still employing the old Apartheid-era racial categories), with language as the main marker of identity and thus the greatest factor in delineating groups in South Africa (Bornman, 2010:252). Post-Apartheid society is thus still saturated with ethnicity (see Chapter 2, subsection 2.1.3). Stroud (2018:24) argues that in spite of this, identities in South Africa remain unfixed and negotiable:

> Post-apartheid South Africa inherited a complex, shifting and divisive system of racial classification that continues to seep into the minutiae of everyday life of the majority of South Africans. The structural category of race remains a primary mould into which everyday interactions and identities are cast, providing an enduring and familiar trope, a point of certainty amid the messy ambiguities of post-apartheid transformation.[295] Despite the persistence of race as a lived category, *discourses of racialisation* – that is, the words and ways through which people construct and navigate race on an everyday basis – are fluid, shifting and entangled, 'a complicated multiplicity of identifications

[294] Note the negative view of ethnicity; as something that "confines" and needs to be 'liberated' from.

[295] Hogg (2016) argues that social identity uncertainty is reduced through the process of social categorisation since the latter provides prototypes (see Chapter 3, subsection 3.3.2.2). The old Apartheid race categories are thus very effective at removing uncertainty.

> producing, reproducing and transforming identities under changing social and historical circumstances' (Walker, 2005).

5.3.1.2. Multiple social identities in an age of globalisation and localisation

In her book on post-1994 Afrikaner identity, Davies (2009:4) advocates for the analysis of identity politics within an era of globalisation. May (2012) also notes the influence of globalisation on the spread of English and thus its effect on minorities. In addition to globalisation, the current wave of Afrikaner identity politics in South Africa should also be viewed within a context of localisation. Davies (2009:6) makes note of the shortcomings of both constructionist and primordialist perspectives on identity, similar to May (2012), and suggests a Gramscian framework for the Afrikaner case study.[296]

According to Davies (2009:8), there is little agreement on the link between identity and globalisation, as traditional views are being supplanted by a new politics which argues that the erosion of national identities, economies and state policy capacity in the face of globalisation leads to subnational, transnational and supranational cleavages, tribalism and the flourishing of *revived* or *invented* identities. She, however, contends:

> Much of the literature is not fully cognisant of the paradox between 'homogenising global flows and continued cultural heterogeneity', which gives expression to ethnic fundamentalisms as well as new diasporic or transnational identities. Yet closer examination demonstrates that 'locality has survived alongside globality'.

In this globalising *and* localising space, "social identities now fluctuate along a spectrum between tradition and translation, whereby those which adapt are capable of substantive reconfiguration, revision and even renewal" (Davies, 2009:9). The return then to localised identities alongside the development of supernational identities, suggests the opposite of essentialism or returns to 'confining' ethnic groups, and instead, indicates a high degree of flexibility and malleability of multiple social identities. Davies maintains that globalisation might explain the "structural realignment and possible reconfiguration of Afrikaner identity".

A globalisation-based theory of identity must include the concept of power, Davies (2009:9) argues. As such, the South African context demands a historical-structural analysis of the post-

[296] Antonio Gramsci held that the state and ruling capitalist class establish a hegemonic culture by means of ideology, as opposed to violence or other coercive means, in order to maintain and legitimise the capitalist state (Wikipedia, 2024i). The maintenance and legitimisation of the nation-state itself might be more relevant here considering the themes of this study. Davies (2009), however, interprets Afrikaner capital elites, the Afrikaner middle class, and the Afrikaner intelligentsia, as participants (or perpetrators) in the (global) neoliberal order to secure their own material interests. This could explain the abandonment of the Afrikaans MLR cause by so-called taalglyers, such as at the Stellenbosch University.

1994 transition. She insists that although a global political economy analysis does not address all aspects of the transition, it does focus on an area largely ignored by identity politics studies. She substantiates as follows (2009:9-10):

> And this is nowhere more apparent vis-à-vis prominent constituent parts such as capital elites, a globalised middle class and cultural intelligentsia who have participated to very different extents in the neo-liberal revolution, and in measures to protect their material position and manufacture a new cultural commentary. For it is this transformation which provides the backdrop to the structural shifts in South Africa that have impacted upon the process of identity adjustment and the reconfiguration of Afrikaners identifications.

In addition to globalisation, Davies (2009:10) believes that an analysis of Afrikaner identities must include a local or subnational level, which also helps to explain the behavioural variety within this group. So-called non-elite Afrikaners respond to the same global and hegemonic forces as elite Afrikaners, but their identifications are also influenced by local conditions. Davies points to the "new nationalist movement" whose politics have "taken a more markedly provincial turn in recent years". An analysis of Afrikaner identities should thus reckon with how it is simultaneously influenced by "the global and national logics of the neo-liberal hegemonic consensus and the ANC's hegemonic project respectively", as well as local logics of geographic location, generation and provincial politics. Davies argues that this analytical framework can help to explain how:

> [C]ertain Afrikaans speakers have disconnected entirely from any notion of a formal grouping, but remain connected to a pervasive if subjective understanding of Afrikanerness.

Davies (2009:10-11) contends that this dynamic historical-analytic framework (based on the work of Antonio Gramsci) offers a non-reductionist and non-essentialist lens through which to investigate social identities, and regards identity as being both influenced by "systemic transactions" (within specific sociopolitical structures) and shaped by "agents". We can relate this to Bourdieu's notion of fields as structured and structuring spaces, that are also relational and competitive (see Chapter 2, subsection 2.1.4), as well as the concept of identity entrepreneurs, or those who have a greater ability to affect the social identities of fellow ingroup members (see Chapter 3, subsection 3.3.2.2).

Vanderhaeghen (2018:16) concurs that "the construction of identity does not take place in a vacuum", but that it is part of political contestation in broader society. Alberts (2012:289) believes that young Afrikaners "are engaged in complex identity struggles in the post-apartheid

society". Through research interviews, he found that identities are *collectively* produced between Afrikaner adolescents and their parents, that is, discursively constructed in dialogue, and not in terms of an intra-psychical or individualistic process (2012:299).

According to Davies (2009:16), even though South African society is largely dominated by group politics, Afrikaans speakers display a variety of identifications, some of which do not involve an Afrikaans ethnic or language heritage. While ethnicity as a form of identification might not be disappearing altogether, she argues that previously important characteristics are making way for new ones (2009:17). She could not conclude whether a broad ethnic group based on European ancestry is evolving (see the information on the merger of white Afrikaans and English speakers in Chapter 4, subsections 4.2.5.8 and 4.3.1.5). Davies does, however, find that "a metamorphosis of sorts" is taking place, which sees "a loosely bound grouping apparently in the process of both retrenching and rebuilding under a new regime ambivalent towards the fortunes of this population as a whole, and within an increasingly hospitable global context in which important constituent components of Afrikanerdom are now functioning".

5.3.1.3. New Afrikaner identity and leadership

Thus, in addition to changes in the various social identities that Afrikaners hold, and how they layer these identities, changes are also being made to the content of Afrikaner identity itself. These changes are being negotiated at both a group and an individual level. Botha (2020:510) cautions that authoritative generalisations about how Afrikaners feel about their identity in a postcolonial context cannot be made. Davies (2009:8), as also noted in subsection 5.2.5, argues: "Despite the presence of a pervasive sense of Afrikanerness or 'being Afrikaans' then, the meanings and significance attached to this subjective groupness or self-understanding are now so varied that it is moot whether an Afrikaner grouping exists in any formal sense". Botha (2020:142) claims that there is a trend away from the 'value-laden' notion of 'Afrikaner' towards 'neutral concepts' such as 'Afrikaans speakers', 'South Africans' or 'white people'.[297]

Notwithstanding this (supposed) trend away from the term 'Afrikaner', Botha (2020:143) identifies several sources arguing that the term should still be made to apply to all Afrikaans speakers who want to promote the Afrikaans language and who identify with South Africa as

[297] While some white Afrikaans speakers choose not to self-identity as Afrikaners, they might still be categorised as such by both ingroup and outgroup members (see distinction between ethnic categories and ethnic communities in Chapter 2, subsection 2.1.3). Also, a rejection of the stigmatised label does not necessarily involve a rejection of the grouping altogether. In other words, discomfort with the use of the term 'Afrikaner' does not inevitably entail exiting from the ingroup, or the cessation of 'feelings of belonging' with other ingroup members.

a nation-state (meant here simply as country) and with Africa as continent. Other authors insist that different types of Afrikaners can exist, while some believe the lack of internal cohesion to be a problem, and still others believe that despite the variety of Afrikaner identities, an Afrikaner is still identifiable in terms of both language and race. Many researchers, however, argue in favour of the rediscovery of Afrikanership with a new set of values, content and meaning, a so-called New Afrikaner identity.

Commentators arguing in favour of the redefinition of Afrikaner identity or the abolishment of the term altogether, implicitly depart from the point that 'Afrikaner' (still) refers exclusively to white Afrikaans speakers. And thus, while the meaning of the term surely can change (as it has in the past), and might be in the process of changing, it is premature to conclude that some different meaning for the term has been widely adopted in the current context. Although some white Afrikaans speakers choose to disassociate themselves from the term 'Afrikaner' (due to its negative association with Apartheid), there has not been a significant trend of Afrikaans speakers of other races adopting the identity, and many outgroup members continue to categorise white Afrikaans speakers as Afrikaners, and even Boers. Deliberating on Afrikaner identity in isolation omits the reality of continued racial categorisation and polarisation in South Africa. In such a racially divided country, it is doubtful that being categorised as 'white' is significantly less value-laden than being categorised as 'Afrikaner' (see, for example, Blaser & Van der Westhuizen's, 2012 discussion on whiteness in subsection 5.3.2.4).

It is not only racial categories, but also ethnic categories that persist in South Africa, regardless of self-identification. Vanderhaeghen (2018:5) provides an interesting personal account of a Catholic English-speaking South African, fluent in Afrikaans, who has been rejected by both fellow English speakers and Afrikaans speakers as an ingroup member because of his Flemish surname and mother tongue respectively. He offers the following insight regarding the definition of the term 'Afrikaner' (2018:15):

> There may no longer be a significant, overtly Afrikaner-nationalist ethnic bloc as such. But to define Afrikaners, even shorn of a nationalist ideology, is possible if they are viewed as a Higgs boson group, that is, one whose co-ordinates are known (through language, religion and common history, but also, and still, race), but not visible except when it flares in the particle collider of identity politics and whose presence is known from the way it agitates the world around it. Thus Afrikaners have a material force that serves as a point of reference for any discourse that suggests the marginalisation or victimisation of the group.

In her research, Davies (2009:136) did not find reasons to suggest that "any broad-based communal dialogue […] that would give impetus to an Afrikaans community as a whole" existed, although she did find clear evidence of "a new round of identity politics". I believe that both of these processes are co-occurring today. She notes, however, that the development of a heterogeneous albeit cohesive group identity has been slow (2009:136):

> Whilst the formal minority group is protected to some extent within the ambit of the constitution, the complexity of the population suggests that it represents a far looser and overwhelmingly non-ethnic community. Indeed, there is a plurality of subjective meanings of Afrikanerness and 'being Afrikaans' no longer simply refers to a purely ethnic or even group-based identity. It has been shown that the acceptance of the global neo-liberal consensus in the domestic realm has overwhelmed and largely destroyed the ethnic slant of the social coalitions and sentiments that previously buoyed up Afrikaner solidarity.[298] It comprises an echo of the class divisions which have afflicted the community since the 1960s. So whilst language might be the bottom line for many in this very heterodox community, even here initiatives have been circumscribed as much as sustained by their local origins.

Botha (2020:504) stresses that Afrikaner identity is complex, rather than confused. He explains that many Afrikaners experience a sense of guilt regarding Apartheid, leading to feelings of inferiority, and that Afrikaner melancholy or nostalgia is a prominent feature of contemporary Afrikaner identity (2020:142). He states that Afrikaans as mother tongue remains the highest priority for most Afrikaners, and that contemporary Afrikaners insist that they are 'from Africa', in an attempt to lay claim to the land, but also to justify their place in the country.

According to Botha (2020:508), contemporary Afrikaans literature is rife with reflections on Afrikaner identity. Interpreting the novel *Raka die roman* (2005) by Afrikaans musician Koos Kombuis, a satirical reinterpretation of N.P. van Wyk Louw's canonised epic poem *Raka* (1941), Van der Berg and David (2007; cited in Botha, 2020:323) argue that while Raka is still considered a threat to the *Afrikanervolk* (Afrikaner nation) as in the original text, the threat now emanates from within, from the individual self. They also highlight that the church no longer provides the answer, but rather the *besete, bedwelmde* (possessed, intoxicated) individual who, like Nietzsche's Übermensch, must lead the Afrikaners.

In the original text, Raka is depicted as an unthinking half-beast threatening a community somewhere in Africa. Against the warnings of one member, Koki, that Raka will rule over them and cause great suffering, the community finds Raka appealing and refuses to kill him. Raka

[298] As even wealthier Afrikaners are starting to struggle under an ANC government, or have grievances regarding the status of Afrikaans, I believe the salience of ethnicity and Afrikaner solidarity are increasing again.

eventually kills Koki. Contemporaneous (and persistent) interpretations of Louw's Raka view him as a biblical evil, from which the Church provides the Afrikaners protection (Anon., 2016). In Kombuis's reinterpretation, it is made clear that Raka is the evil within, and that protection from Raka comes from the leadership of one individual member, whom the group has declared insane (Van der Berg & David, 2007). This strongly reminds of marginalised non-prototypical members, or black sheep, discussed in Chapter 3, subsection 3.3.2.2, who, through internal dissent, may effect social change within the group.

Botha (2020:144) suggests that there is a pronounced lack of Afrikaner leaders.[299] He argues that the pining over past Boer heroes – as found in Bok van Blerk's popular 2006-song *De la Rey* – should thus be viewed merely as nostalgic yearning for times when the Afrikaners had strong leadership figures (and perhaps, less identity uncertainty), since the Boer general belongs to a bygone era with different codes, which has no place in the New South Africa (2020:323). He further states that the novel *Verwoerdburg* (2014) by writer and academic Johann Rossouw, of the *Group of 63* (see subsection 5.3.1.1), illuminates the Afrikaner's need for contemporary heroes and leaders (2020:420). He believes that *Verwoerdburg* ends on a hopeful note, wherein the main character successfully confronts his past, is no longer ashamed of the group of people to which he belongs, and expresses the desire to repair the Afrikaner's name.

5.3.1.4. White and coloured unity

Apart from disidentification with Afrikaner identity, or attempts to ameliorate the content of the identity (i.e., destigmatise it), a significant effort is being made in the post-Apartheid era to foster greater unity between white and coloured Afrikaans speakers. This is usually done in an attempt to strengthen the MLR case of Afrikaans, or even for purposes of electoral politics, especially in the Western Cape province.[300] Certainly not all advocacy for the unification of white and coloured Afrikaans speakers are for material self-interest, as there are supporters of unification for its own sake. Regardless of the motivating reasons, greater co-operation between these two speech communities is assuredly a positive step towards non-racialism.

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[299] See entrepreneurs of identity in Chapter 3, subsection 3.3.2.2. Contemporary Afrikaner leaders, in this definition of the word, are not primarily found in politics, but rather in civil society, the entertainment industry and among the intelligentsia (including internal dissidents).

[300] Kriel (2012:427-428) identifies a "preoccupation" with Afrikaner identity, Afrikaner history, and power as a continuation of Afrikaner nationalism, and argues that this very same nationalism masquerades as a racially inclusive Afrikaans language movement. Elsewhere, she emphasises that the movement to promote Afrikaans is an Afrikaner cultural nationalist movement (2006).

To many, the establishment of a racially inclusive Afrikaans community necessitates the abolishment of ethnicity. Giliomee (2020:308) stresses that a racially-integrated Afrikaans-speaking community is no longer ethnic but communal – as ethnicity hinges on a common belief in a shared ancestry and history. Considering that ethnic identity has "enduring influence" (May, 2012:44; see Chapter 2, subsection 2.1.3), in the process of unifying the two Afrikaans speech communities, white Afrikaans speakers may then continue to display patterns of *ethnic layering*, where they identify as both ethnically Afrikaner and communally Afrikaans.

According to Davies (2009:3), empirical research suggests that there is both a decrease and an increase in ethnic affiliation among Afrikaans speakers. While many coloured, black and *verloopte* ('walked away') white Afrikaans speakers reject formal grouping, and the "new politics of Afrikaans" aims to disassociate the Afrikaans language and culture from ethnic background, she believes there is a resurgence of group-based politics centred on the legitimacy of minority cultural rights (2009:4). Davies (2009:116) notes that unity between the Afrikaans communities is "a delicate issue". She argues that while language has proven to be an effective way to increase group identification among Afrikaans speakers, the lack of conformity in this speech community "demonstrates the very real limits to the safeguarding of an Afrikaans language and culture today".

Raidt (1991:256; my translation) argues that while Afrikaner nationalism can be credited with the rise, development and standardisation of Afrikaans, it also led to the stigmatisation of Afrikaans as the language of Apartheid and did great damage to the language. As a result of this, she argues that the Afrikaans-speaking community, including white and coloured speakers, became divided and alienated from one another, while a further "secondary Afrikaans community of black speakers" were dealt a heavy blow. She proposes that as the language mobilised a segment of its speakers, it would now have to unite a divided language community.[301]

[301] See manipulation of the dialogical self in Chapter 3, subsection 3.5.2. The goal of broadening the group borders thus requires that race and ethnicity be replaced by language as the symbol which defines the ingroup. The *Dis mos JOU mense* (It's YOUR people) election poster (see footnote 273 in subsection 5.2.3) can then be viewed as an act of semiotic mediation, signalling through the diversity in the accompanying photo that race is irrelevant, and underscoring in the text that language is relevant. This process is complicated, however, by the extent to which white Afrikaans speakers value their ethnic identity (including other facets of culture: ancestry, history and myths). It is also conceivable that coloured Afrikaans speakers value other parts of *their* ethnic identity, in addition to, or more than, their language. The implications of intergroup comparison and differentiation (see Chapter 3, subsection 3.2.2) on the proposed unification of these two groups should also be considered here.

Ferreira (2020) provides a comprehensive overview of the post-Apartheid transformation of the ATKV from an exclusive Afrikaner organisation which aided in the formation of this group identity, to an inclusive Afrikaans organisation actively promoting a united Afrikaans community. He suggests that the ATKV discontinued its affiliation with other organisations such as the FAK, which focus on Afrikaner unity, in order to reposition itself towards the broader Afrikaans population (2020:295).

Discussing Social Identity Theory (SIT), and the effect of ethnic and racial identities on democracy, Giliomee (2019a:6) notes the case of the poor whites in the American South of the 1890s, whose status was disputed and whose group membership was not yet firmly established, and who were thus disenfranchised along with black people in many states.[302] This leads him to ask an important question: "How are the criteria formulated by which groups establish norms for likeness and unlikeness?" He provides the argument of Donald Horowitz that the role of "the cultural mix" in determining political identity is greatly overstated, arguing that it is much more likely that "adaptations in a group's culture *follow* or *accompany* rather than precede changes in the way in which an elite defines a group's political identity".

In other words, the elite of a particular ethnic group, in the above case wealthy white Southerners, has the ability to manipulate group boundaries to meet their own ends. If it is in their political or material interest to extend the group boundaries, only then will a larger cultural community come into existence. Giliomee (2019a:6) argues further that it is not modernisation or industrialisation that leads to identity change, but rather "whether the political context favours the expansion or contraction of an ethnic boundary". Suffice it to say that from the perspective of white Afrikaans speakers concerned with MLR, and in the context of the ANC's approach to minorities more generally, the current political context strongly favours the expansion of group boundaries.

Illustrating the dynamic described above, Giliomee (2019a:25) suggests that once the coloured vote had become insignificant in the 1920s (merely 6% of the Cape electorate), it was promptly followed by their political (and communal) abandonment by the early 1930s – only a couple of years after Malan had argued that coloured and white interests were identical, and rejected a

[302] Giliomee (2019a:7-31) provides a thorough discussion of the coloured case study in terms of this same concept of elite identity manipulation, which saw coloured people defined alternatively as Afrikaners, non-white, and as an ethnic and/or racial group on their own, and used as bargaining chips by the white English and Afrikaans communities (and later, the ANC) – not to mention the ridiculous attempts at racially classifying individual coloured people.

system of separate racial representation.[303] *After* the abandonment of coloured people, the Afrikaner nationalist intelligentsia began to vigorously proclaim an exclusively white Afrikaner identity.[304] He explains:

> The fact that the new line of political demarcation was not preceded by an upsurge in racist thinking or a more exclusive definition of ethnic identity confirms Horowitz's suggestion that the contraction of boundaries is not so much the product of the cultural mix of a particular group but of the calculation that party leaders in democratic systems make about gains which can be achieved by exclusion.

Findings from SIT corroborate this perspective on the impact of demarcation. As shown in Chapter 3, subsection 3.2.3.3, intergroup categorisation is a stronger determinant of ingroup favouritism than interindividual similarity. In other words, the explicit categorisation of white and coloured Afrikaans speakers as members of the same group, has a higher likelihood of eliciting ingroup favouritism, than does the fact that they speak the same language. One may thus also conclude that as long as ethnic and racial categories remain salient in South Africa (such as through the ANC's reliance on Apartheid-era racial classifications), white and coloured Afrikaans speakers will show less ingroup favouritism (indicating a lack of group ties), even if they do have Afrikaans in common.

Giliomee (2019a:28) highlights that by the 1990s, the Afrikaner and white community more broadly (once again) "eagerly welcomed as allies the coloureds, whose embourgeoisement was well under way". He believes that once Afrikaners were forced to open up the political system "social identities again become fluid", which enabled the competition for votes "which is the essence of democracy" (2019a:31).

This view of ethnic boundary-making aligns with constructionist and instrumentalist views of ethnicity. While there is certainly merit in this interpretation, as May (2012) suggests, it only offers half the truth. For if political mobilisation were the end goal, it raises the question why there are scant efforts to create an even broader minority coalition, which would also include Indian South Africans. The construction of a pan-Afrikaans group, instead of a larger, and thus,

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[303] At the time of the Pact government, Malan even publicly thanked Cape Muslims for maintaining Afrikaans when white speakers had abandoned it, a notion which became unfathomable only years later when Afrikaans was rebranded as a modern white European language. Giliomee (2019a:26) reiterates: "Democratic politics determined culture, not culture democratic politics".

[304] One might wonder to what extent the desire to improve the status of Afrikaners after their defeat in the Anglo-Boer War (and their even longer history of lower status vis-à-vis British settlers), drove the 'whitening' of Afrikaans and the contraction of the Afrikaner identity to exclude lower-status coloured Afrikaans speakers.

more politically powerful minority bloc, indicates the lasting importance of ethnicity, and language in particular, to group members.[305]

As discussed in Chapter 2, subsection 2.4.1, language has the ability to create *particular solidarities* and thus to mark group boundaries. The less salient race becomes in South Africa (if that is indeed the current trajectory), the more white and coloured Afrikaans speakers will experience this particular, language-based solidarity, regardless of top-down efforts to will this community into existence. However, language, although central to Afrikaner identity, is not the only aspect of ethnicity white Afrikaans speakers value; and will thus strive to maintain. For as long as ethnicity endures, these aspects (history, myths, etc.), which are not shared by coloured Afrikaans speakers, will continue to separate the two communities to some extent. Davies (2009:82-83) argues:

> Whilst language and identity may be close political bedfellows, the relationship invokes a wide spectrum of attachments: language can act as an ethnic marker, but similarly a high level of linguistic sentiment does not always translate to increased ethnic consciousness.

We must wonder why, if it is in the political interest of Afrikaners to unify with coloured Afrikaans speakers (as Giliomee suggests),[306] and they are able to enjoy the particular solidarity created by their shared language, this unification has been slow in coming into effect. Thirty years after ANC rule, prominent coloured and white Afrikaans intellectuals are still arguing over the matter. The most recent such public debate involved the executive director of the F.W. de Klerk Foundation, Christo van der Rheede, a coloured Afrikaans speaker, and his predecessor, Theuns Eloff, a central figure in the controversial *Afrikaner-verklaring* (Afrikaner Declaration) which I discuss in subsection 5.4.1.1 (De Beer, 2024a).

Many posit that racism underlies white Afrikaans speakers' maintenance of an exclusive Afrikaner identity. However, there is reason to believe that the enduring power of ethnicity, or the sense of meaning and belonging people derive from their ethnic identity, is (at least also)

[305] Detractors of Afrikaans MLR activists, who believe that their language activism is merely a ploy for attaining other political goals, will have to contend with the fact that their Afrikaans-related goals do seem to supersede other minority or political goals, as reflected in the choice of coalition partners.

[306] On the topic of white Afrikaans speakers and minority-rights activism, journalist Max du Preez has argued that "[i]t is in Afrikaners' interest to simply be viewed as South Africans" which, if correct, does not leave much room for either Afrikaner ethnicity or Afrikaans (Leonard, 2012).

responsible for the slow unification of the Afrikaans community.[307] The fact that white Afrikaans speakers choose to maintain their ethnic identity, and a stigmatised one no less, despite it being against their political interests, suggests that they are not motivated purely by instrumental considerations, but also sentimental ones.[308]

Resistance to the merger of the two Afrikaans groups could also be explained through Tajfel's (1982:25) observation that in contexts of salient intergroup categorisation, *similar* groups will work harder to achieve distinctiveness from each other. It is not only white Afrikaans speakers who are motivated to maintain positive distinctiveness, but also coloured Afrikaans speakers, as evidenced by the recent discourses on *Afrikaaps* (the dialect of coloured speakers at the Cape; also referred to as *Kaapse Afrikaans* or *Kaaps*). In addition to reclaiming Afrikaans as a multiracial language and questioning the basis for standardised Afrikaans, the promotion of Afrikaaps implicitly involves intergroup comparison and differentiation, as well as intergroup competition and conflict over the origins and ownership of Afrikaans. Some have proposed that Afrikaaps (and thus Afrikaans) actually predates the arrival of the Dutch settlers (Haupt, 2021).[309]

So too, the centenary celebrations of the granting of official status to Afrikaans in 1925, have been met with accusations that white Afrikaans speakers are yet again excluding coloured speakers, their contributions to the language, and *their* Afrikaans (Van Heerden, 2024; Willemse, H., 2024). While Afrikaans is often viewed as the tie that binds white and coloured people, it is clear that Afrikaans has the ability to separate these two groups (see linguistic differentiation in Chapter 3, subsection 3.2.2). In this sense, Afrikaans ceases to be a shared language, and becomes a contested resource, and even splitting into directly competing varieties.

Le Cordeur (2024) makes a comprehensive case for including Afrikaaps in schools which serve communities that speak Afrikaaps at home. Pointing to poor educational outcomes, the benefits

[307] Of course, not all white Afrikaans speakers value their ethnic identity equally, but for many (and possibly even most) it is an important part of their self-conception. Intraindividual fluctuations of the salience of ethnicity, depending on the context, is also conceivable.

[308] Bear in mind here the so-called constrained change process regarding people's ethnic habitus (see Chapter 2, subsection 2.1.4), which sees practices viewed as antithetical to group mores being rejected (e.g. anglicisation). The range of acceptable practices can, however, change over time. Also see the critique of rational choice theory in Chapter 2, subsection 2.1.3.

[309] The promotion of Afrikaaps, which arguably elides coloured identity and a localised Cape identity, also has implications for the internal cohesion of the coloured Afrikaans community spread across South Africa. Coloured Afrikaans people in the interior of South Africa might associate with Afrikaaps and Cape identity as little as inland white Afrikaans speakers.

of MTE, the stigmatisation of Afrikaaps and its speakers, and relatedly, their anglicisation, his argument reminds one strongly of the situation white Afrikaans speakers faced back when Afrikaans was derisively referred to as "Kitchen Dutch" vis-à-vis English. Similar to their solution, Le Cordeur proposes the 're-standardisation of Afrikaans', underscoring the fact that this shared language is also a separating language.

The unification of white and coloured Afrikaans speakers has several hurdles to overcome. The attempt to create a salient Afrikaans social *category* is seriously hamstrung by the ANC's continued use of racial categories, which clearly delineate white from coloured Afrikaans speakers. Also, the substantial spread of English and Islam among the coloured community introduces many other overlapping categories which, in addition to race, introduce further complexity and ambivalence to already uncertain identities. So too, the historic ambiguity of coloured identity, and contradictions and cleavages within the coloured community, cannot be overcome simply by their conscription into Afrikaansness. Taking these factors into consideration, Afrikaner identity thus has much higher entitativity than an Afrikaans identity (see Chapter 3, subsection 3.3.2.2), i.e., it is more clearly defined and delineated, and as such is more likely to be the preferred social identity of white Afrikaans speakers.

Furthermore, the attempt to create a sense of *community* between white and coloured Afrikaans speakers faces some obstacles. Just as Afrikaners would have to undergo substantial changes in their social identifications, coloured Afrikaans speakers cannot simply be co-opted into an identity they do not want, or into a cause they do not care about. While the ideal of a broad Afrikaans-speaking language community is desirable, the onus rests equally on coloured Afrikaans speakers to reformulate their identity, should they wish to form a cultural (and political) community with their white counterparts. Then there is the matter of removing ethnicity as a group marker. For Afrikaners, who tend to deeply value other aspects of their identity besides Afrikaans, it is unlikely that the salience of ethnicity will disappear altogether.

Considering that white and coloured Afrikaans speakers sat on opposite sides of the Great Trek and the Anglo-Boer War (not to mention Apartheid), the importance of this history to Afrikaners as markers of identity will continue to cause separation.[310] Despite the initial malleability of the term 'Afrikaner', and the mixing between various groups in the early days of the Cape, there is, by now, a very long history of political and communal separation between

[310] Note the reliance on *constructed* myths of shared descent and history (although these are still bound by a degree of historical fact), as white Afrikaans speakers were also split by the Great Trek and the Anglo-Boer War. Afrikaner nationalism of the 20th century did manage to bridge these gaps though.

the two groups. In the 1880s already, coloured people were rejected from the Afrikaner Bond (see Chapter 4, subsection 4.2.1.3). So, while interpersonal relations between white and coloured people have greatly improved since Apartheid, and political and cultural co-operation between the two groups has also grown immensely, the diverging paths of these two groups throughout history mean that an Afrikaans identity is (as of yet) unable to fully satisfy the underlying motives of social identity of many white Afrikaans speakers, whereas the Afrikaner ethnic identity (which possesses a myth of common descent, shared historical memories, and a sense of solidarity) is clearly able to do this.

In conclusion, the proposed merger of white and coloured Afrikaans speakers into a single group either entails a redefinition of the term 'Afrikaner' to include coloured people, or (usually) implies the abolishment of the term (and ethnicity) in favour of an Afrikaans identity and language community. Both these options require the decrease in the salience of Afrikaner ethnicity, and eventually its cessation, in favour of a language-based identity. Although the goal of non-racialism should surely be aspired to, I believe this proposal underestimates the enduring power of ethnicity, and the importance of symbols of ethnic identity to white Afrikaans speakers. It also overestimates the ease with which Anderson's communities may be imagined (see Chapter 2, subsection 2.2.4), and the ease with which historic divisions and persistent (and formalised) racial categorisation may be overcome.

Furthermore, in discounting the possibility of ethnic layering or dual identities, which sees white Afrikaans speakers identify as Afrikaners, Afrikaans speakers and South Africans (and possibly other local and supranational identities), the proposed merger implicitly suggests that ethnicity equals racism. In other words, from this perspective, the maintenance of Afrikaner ethnic identity, aside from the shared language, that is, the history, myths and other symbols, becomes racially exclusive, despite the fact that white Afrikaans speakers may *also* form a racially inclusive language community with fellow Afrikaans speakers (in public and private spheres). This prescribed removal of all aspects of Afrikaner identity which are not shared by coloured Afrikaans speakers, arguably amounts to an assimilationist approach. Lastly, and ironically, whereas minority ethnicity is often dismissed as illegitimate for being, allegedly, entirely constructed for purely instrumental motivations, much of the advocacy of the white-coloured Afrikaans merger is to instrumental ends, in bolstering the numbers for Afrikaans activism, and/or in resisting ANC rule in the Western Cape.

5.3.1.5. Language, religion, ethnicity, race or class?

Since 1994, shifts in the core cultural values of Afrikaner identity have occurred (see Smolicz's 1979 theory in Chapter 2, subsection 2.4.3; also refer to Rosch's 1977 notion of category prototypes in Chapter 3, subsection 3.2.1.2). Although Christianity is still often associated with Afrikaner identity, it is not *the* core cultural value. Seeing as the majority of all ethnic groups in South Africa identify as Christian (85.3% of the South African population; Stats SA, 2022:24), it is an insufficient group boundary marker (similar to the English language vis-à-vis Irish identity). However, considering the centrality of religion throughout Afrikaner history, and keeping in mind that different ethnic groups are largely affiliated with different Christian denominations, Christianity may still be used as an important marker of Afrikaner identity, and even to mobilise ingroup members.

Botha (2020:144) argues that Afrikaners are 'outgrowing' conservative Christian values and are undergoing drastic religious changes as the traditional Afrikaner churches become increasingly obsolete. However, many organisations, including the ATKV, continue to maintain Christianity as an important aspect of Afrikaner identity, or even, Afrikaansness (see also the use of 'Christian values' by the Solidarity Movement in subsection 5.4.1.2). Ferreira (2020:61-62) discusses the historic importance of Christianity to Afrikaner identity at some length, but also notes the growing atheism among especially 'the intellectual Afrikaner'. Rossouw (2024), of the *Group of 63* (see subsection 5.3.1.1), criticises the loss of religion among young Afrikaners at length.

While there is some debate as to the importance of race, ethnicity and class to contemporary Afrikaners, there is little disagreement that the Afrikaans language is currently the core cultural value of Afrikaner identity. Language as the core cultural value of Afrikaner identity dates back to the first interactions with the British settlers, who were also mostly white Protestant Christian.

Davies (2009:83) cautions that as a result of the centrality of language in Afrikaner identity politics, minority nationalism is being legitimised.[311] She questions whether the sentiments of the *taalstryder* (Afrikaans MLR activist) "cabal" "are shared by even a minority of Afrikaans speakers" (2009:86). Davies (2009:91) proposes that the biggest chasm in contemporary

[311] Critiques of this minority nationalism should be accompanied by a similar critique of the preceding anglicisation on the part of the state, bearing in mind Billig's (1995, cited in May, 2012) argument that dominant ethnie nationalism is neither treated as nationalism, nor as a problem worth investigating (see Chapter 2, subsection 2.2.6).

Afrikanerness is between the minority-rights advocates and those "keen to dispel the impression of a 'white minority *kraal'* [pen] or '*boere laager*' [military camp]". She believes that the "genuine flux and debate" surrounding the definition of Afrikanerness in the immediate aftermath of 1994 has dissipated, and that "the label has hardened" making it unlikely that "a more [racially] inclusive refashioning of Afrikanerness can resume". It is unclear whether Davies ascribes this supposed hardening of Afrikaner identity to Afrikaners or external forces.

Davies appears to be in support of removing ethnic identity (and race) from Afrikaner identity (albeit sceptical that this is even possible), leaving, presumably, language as defining characteristic of this group identity. Although, as she is critical of language rights activism by white Afrikaans speakers, it is not exactly clear what kind of 'reformed' Afrikaner identity she is advocating for. She further contends that the white Afrikaans-speaking cultural intelligentsia has failed to "build a common project not only with the range of Afrikaans constituencies but also the majority of other South Africans" (2009:91).

Davies (2009:128) nonetheless believes that language is the greatest unifier of the Afrikaans-speaking community, even though opinions on the subject range widely. She adds that while disillusionment and perceptions of marginalisation are widespread, no single organisation or grouping has managed to offer "a definitive definition of the *eie* [own] of Afrikanerdom". Davies (2009:128-129) continues her criticism of both Afrikaner identity and Afrikaans MLR activism as follows:

> The lines of division which define these extremities are exactly those same global, national and local logics that dissect the entire spectrum of Afrikaans speakers from *verloopte* Afrikaners to their *taalstryder* brethren. Certainly the continued success of an increasingly globalised Afrikaans middle class has driven a wedge through much of what once represented the traditional Afrikaner electorate. The most vocal and visible proponents of an Afrikaner identity are these guardians of the language or cultural mafia for whom the nature of the link between politics and culture remains key. Many of these figures are prominent in more than one of the plethora of cultural and political organisations suggesting that linkages here are relatively deep. As historical experience illustrates, the idea of a common enemy or threat has real purchase and is manipulated in order to right the propensity towards internal differences. Once this was the British imperialists, then *swartgevaar*, and now not so much the ANC government and its neo-liberal turn as policies including affirmative action and empowerment, and a few select pillars of the global regime such as the English language and threat of cultural homogeneity. Outside these populist circles, there is greater emphasis upon the development of new and manifold cultural agendas which simultaneously advance a cornucopia of identifications beyond any renovated Afrikaner establishment or

> identification with Afrikaans whatsoever.[312] It is early days as yet, but the character of any solidarity here is so rich, varied and malleable that it should be considered fragile if it is manifest at all.

According to Davies (2009:136), the salience of ethnicity present in the national political sphere is not mirrored in everyday life. Although an attachment to ethnicity remains, she believes that *symbolic ethnicity* best describes contemporary ethnic identification among white Afrikaans speakers, denoting "the desire to retain a sense of being ethnic, but without any deep commitment to ethnic social ties or behaviours". Davies (2009:136-137) argues that class and race distinctions are more important to Afrikaans speakers than ethnicity. Botha (2020:144) claims that concerning race, Afrikaners are either racist, *swartbehep* (black-obsessed) or politically correct.

Davies (2009:98) maintains that globalisation and its impact on power dynamics has effected certain political, social, cultural, ecological and gender results. She believes that when considering the growing globalised middle class, as well as the participation of the capital elites in "the prevailing hegemonic consensus", it becomes evident that ethnic and other affiliations once important are being eroded and replaced by affiliations such as class. In this sense, the Afrikaner group might be returning to the internal heterogeneity that existed before they could leverage the power of the state to essentially remove class distinctions.[313]

While class divisions have certainly (re)appeared among Afrikaners, it is worth considering why higher-status Afrikaners are better situated to disidentify with the Afrikaner ethnicity. The "growing globalised middle class" enjoy economic mobility, and are able to pursue their own material interests through individual economic opportunities at home or abroad. This means that they are able to alter their social identifications and move to higher-status groups through individual mobility strategies. In contrast, lower-class Afrikaners, who have limited individual mobility, might reasonably be expected to identify with the highest-status group available to them (Afrikaner versus lower class). Identification with Afrikaner ethnicity is then not only useful in the (collective) pursuit of their own material interests, but they are also incentivised

[312] In other words, Afrikaner ethnicity is, as cosmopolitans argue, "irremediably passé" (May, 2012:114; see Chapter 2, subsection 2.3.3).

[313] Intragroup class differences are not often spoken about among Afrikaners. Perhaps as a result of the larger middle class during Apartheid (and thus at the height of Afrikaner nationalism), middle-class-'hood' became an unacknowledged and assumed characteristic of Afrikaner identity.

to maintain their ethnic identity as the one social identity which affords them higher status (see positive social identity in Chapter 3, subsection 3.2.2).[314]

Even though substantial changes are occurring in Afrikaner identity, as noted above, it still has high entitativity. Afrikaans is widely recognised as the core cultural value of Afrikaner identity, and other characteristics such as Christian beliefs and Afrikaner ethnic symbols are commonly associated with this identity. Despite high entitativity, ingroup heterogeneity should not be disregarded. In addition to the ingroup divisions that have always existed, the end of Apartheid, and with it Afrikanerdom, caused significant splits in the Afrikaner community, or a loss of internal cohesion. It could be argued, however, that the ANCification period – entailing the continued use of old social categories, the lack of other meaningful social identities, and the perception of Afrikaner persecution – has gone some ways toward regrouping Afrikaners.

5.3.1.6. Types of Afrikaners

As is becoming clear in this section, white Afrikaans speakers are by no means a uniform group. With that being said, it is possible to identify, in broad strokes, various types of Afrikaner identity in order to analyse the behaviour of specific subgroups and individuals. Davies (2009:106-107) highlights the diversity of identifications among Afrikaans speakers as follows:

> Identification is formed by the three global, national and local logics, extending along a highly mobile spectrum that runs from *verloopte* (walked away) Afrikaners to white Afrikaans speakers who identify strongly with their ethnic group, and all colour (including black and coloured Afrikaans speakers), shape, and manner of identifications in between.

In his sociological study focusing on adult white Afrikaans-speaking males, Kotze (2013:100) identifies three main collectivities, namely (i) *Afrikaanses*, (ii) *Afrikaners* and (iii) *Pseudo-Boers*. He sets out his typology of modern-day white Afrikaans-speaking identity as follows:

[314] In Chapter 3, subsection 3.2.3.5, Knippenberg (1978; cited in Tajfel, 1982) argued that status is evaluated more highly by lower-status groups, whereas higher-status groups attempt to minimise status differences.



Figure 7: Kotze's (2013) typology of 21st century white Afrikaans-speaking identity

Kotze (2013:103) describes *Afrikaanses* as the most postmodern group, where the identifications 'Boer' and 'Afrikaner' are rejected, inclusion into the group is based on Afrikaans as mother tongue, and membership does not necessarily involve any shared identity or behaviour. Members tend to "embrace the secular, scientific and economic values of the modern globalising world", are citizens of the world who speak Afrikaans, and their membership is terminated by the cessation of their use of Afrikaans. Kotze (2013:104) states that Afrikaanses adopt highly individual identities and avoid collective expressions – especially through traditional Afrikaner institutions such as the church, politics and cultural organisations.

Pseudo-Boers are characterised by their self-identification as 'Boers', as opposed to 'Afrikaners', which Kotze (2013:109) believes relies on "either one or more extinct cultural atavisms or a combination of newfangled racism and religious fanaticism", since "the collective representations underlying the existence of the historical Boers […] a developmental precursor of the historical Afrikaner, were eroded by the end of the 19th century". Members include right-wing Christian conservatives and radical followers of *Christian Identity* (rooted in British Israelism), which holds that Northern and Western Europeans are direct descendants of the biblical Israelites. Believers in the prophecies of Siener van Rensburg are also members of this group (also discussed in subsection 5.2.6). Kotze (2013:110) cautions that this group is growing, finding members both from the working class as well as the middle-class disaffected

youth. Pseudo-Boers view Afrikaners as "liberal traitors". Kotze (2013:115) identifies the Boeremag members convicted of a terrorist plot in 2002 as Pseudo-Boers (the next subsection details the views of one of these Boeremag members on the Boer/Afrikaner split).

Kotze (2013:116) states that the *Afrikaner* grouping is the most direct descendant of their 20th century predecessors. Group members include the intelligentsia of the white Afrikaans-speaking community concerned with the establishment of "a clear identity rooted in traditional Afrikanerdom". Afrikaners participate actively in traditionally Afrikaner cultural practices, and utilise formal institutions to pursue the status of a globally recognised ethnic minority and the legal protections it entails. Kotze suggests that whiteness is not an overt prerequisite, though it might be unspoken. He further argues that this grouping's claim for group-based rights is "a much less arrogant and more respectful" call for identity maintenance than their Apartheid predecessors, in that they do not view themselves as "the only true South African nation" and rightful owners of the state, but "merely seek formal acknowledgement of their right to existence as one of the many cultural groups comprising modern South African society" (2013:17).

In discussing the differing views obtained in research interviews with an Afrikaner father and his daughter, who intimated that she would one day raise her children in English, Alberts (2012:246-250) contrasts a *traditional Afrikaner identity*, with a *hybridised Afrikaansness* or "cultural (English) identity", free from the "restrictiveness" of Afrikaans. This suggests that a reformed Afrikaner identity, or indeed a reformed white Afrikaans speaker, necessitates the relegation of Afrikaans not only in the public sphere, but also in the private sphere (cultural assimilation).

Working from Kotze's (2013) typology of Afrikaners, and quoting Blaser (2012), Alsheh and Elliker (2015:443-444) come to the conclusion that "there is no longer, if there was ever, a monolithic, dominant Afrikaner identity". The fact that Afrikaners demonstrate high intragroup heterogeneity should not, however, be considered as indicating a lower risk of nationalism or other forms of mobilisation. If the Apartheid regime could come into existence despite intragroup heterogeneity – which saw both explicit internal dissent (see subsection 5.3.2.5) as well as passive acquiescence – the current variation among white Afrikaans speakers does not preclude the possibility of broad-scale ethnic mobilisation.[315] That being said, the extension of

[315] Consider, for example, that the majority of Afrikaners did not take part in the Great Trek, nor did they vote for Malan's HNP in 1948. Smuts's UP received 11.48% more votes than the HNP, who were able to take power through the first-past-the-post system, despite them and their coalition partner, the Afrikaner party, only having a

the franchise has made it virtually impossible for Afrikaners to take control of the state apparatus, meaning that radicalisation will likely take a different form than it did throughout the 20th century.

Similar to Kotze (2013), Van der Westhuizen (2018:37) identifies three distinct groupings of white Afrikaans speakers in the post-Apartheid era, namely: (i) the *Afrikaans African nationalists*, including former NP members who have joined the ANC; (ii) the *neo-Afrikaner* – or *Afrikaans enclave nationalists* – including the Solidarity Movement; and (iii) the *Afrikaans South Africans*.

Van der Westhuizen does not directly provide any names of so-called Afrikaans African nationalists, but does mention the *Progressive Business Forum*, a corporate fundraising vehicle for the ANC, founded in 2006 by Daryl Swanepoel and Renier Schoeman, both former NP members (Wikipedia, 2023b; 2024k). In 2019, President Ramaphosa appointed Schoeman as Commissioner of the CRL Commission, tasked with the protection of minorities (The Presidency, 2019). Swanepoel is CEO of the *Inclusive Society Institute*, a think-tank promoting "an inclusive society, in which the composition of the economy, government and civil society equitably reflect the demographics of the nation" (ISI, 2024).[316] Marthinus van Schalkwyk (discussed in subsection 5.1.2.1) may also qualify as an Afrikaans African nationalist.

Van der Westhuizen's (2018) *neo-Afrikaners* closely resemble Kotze's (2013) Afrikaners, and her *Afrikaans South Africans* share similarities with his Afrikaanses. She does not identify the most radical Afrikaner grouping, Kotze's Pseudo-Boers, and is instead most concerned with the neo-Afrikaners, who she believes are the most vocal, and are often identified by other South Africans as *the* Afrikaners, despite them not being representative of all Afrikaners. Although Kotze's Pseudo-Boers are an interesting cohort, I also do not believe that they are the grouping to watch, as they have very limited appeal, and the overwhelming majority of political and cultural mobilisation is currently found among Van der Westhuizen's neo-Afrikaner grouping (see subsection 5.4.1).

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combined 41.63% share of the vote (Wikipedia, 2024j). Bourdieu's (1990; cited in May, 2012) notion of field is also relevant here (see Chapter 2, subsection 2.1.4): the action of any individual or collective taken in the field impacts all others within that field, i.e., Afrikaners have the ability to influence one other, as their behaviour is similarly influenced by outgroups and their members.

[316] Academic Susan Booysen remarked that Swanepoel and Schoeman were "die-hard Nats among the last of the Nat remnants that eventually joined the ANC not out of principle but out of desperation for a little place in the ambit of political power" (Leonard, 2012).

Van der Westhuizen (2018:38) explains that the neo-Afrikaner grouping comprises both *verkramptes* (constricted reactionaries) and *verligtes* (enlightened ones), and that the latter enjoy "the fruits of neo-liberal access and affluence but increasingly turn towards the verkramptes' vision of enclave nationalism to find identity anchors amid the postcolonial tumult" (enclave nationalism is further discussed in subsection 5.3.2.4). She astutely observes that neo-Afrikaners take their cue from the Global North, and embrace a specific version of 'the return to the local' – or inward migration – involving "class-based territories with very specific versions of sexuality, gender and race that create an exclusive and excluding ethnic configuration". In these localities, privatisation and consumption are paramount:

> Enclave nationalism hinges on the basic precept of capitalism – private property – and is enabled by the wholesale privatisation and monetisation of life under neo-liberalism. Individuals become Afrikaners by being consumers of Afrikaner culture, spaces and anti-politics. Afrikaner identity is enacted through consumption.[317] In this regard, Solidariteit and AfriForum have stepped forwards as the masters of the trade in Afrikaner identity, the twenty-first century versions of the cultural entrepreneurs who first cobbled together the Afrikaner a century ago.

Van der Westhuizen (2018:40) optimistically identifies Afrikaans South Africans, who "refuse attempts to interpolate them into neo-Afrikaner enclave nationalism", as the antidote to neo-Afrikanerdom. Importantly, she emphasises that some Afrikaans South Africans continue to self-identity as Afrikaners. This grouping,[318] she explains, recognises the "racism and sexism inherent to Afrikaner nationalism" and actively combat it in their own families and in other relational contexts. They acknowledge their white privilege and "resist the intra-Afrikaner mode of gendering". This group, in which she undoubtedly positions herself, are actively pursuing the moral betterment of the Afrikaner group as a whole (2018:41):

> Most interesting is the re-working of the best of their cultural legacy – the hard-working, tenacious *volksmoeder* (mother of the nation) – to shed its patriarchal racism and redirect its values to advance an ethical life. They are feminist *volksmoeders*

[317] While identity consumption is mostly thought of as concerning Afrikaans music, films, and arts festivals, it is also visible in less obvious areas, such as clothing. Recently, there has been somewhat of a revival of the *vellie*, a traditional shoe made of leather closely associated with Afrikaner farmers. This phenomenon can be seen elsewhere, such as the consumption of *Tracht*, or traditional wear, including *Dirndl* and *Lederhosen*, in German Bavaria (where its historical roots are itself an imagined past to a certain extent) as well as the consumption of the kilt in Scotland. Afrikaner identity consumption may even be evident in traditional food, for instance, Afrikaner expats buying or making their own *biltong* (cured meat) or *boerewors* (sausage), or frequenting 'South African shops' abroad which sell imported food products familiar to Afrikaners. The desire for such "identity anchors" directly relates to UIT, which posits that highly entitative groups provide clear prototypes to its members, and that by increasing ingroup identification, solidarity and cohesion, and emphasising intergroup differences, uncertainty may be reduced (see Chapter 3, subsection 3.3.2.2).

[318] Her research is based on heterosexual, white, middle-class females.

creating new ways of being to unlock their own and others' potential for an inclusive humanity based on social justice.[319]

5.3.1.7. Northern Boers vs southern Afrikaners

The first step in becoming Afrikaners involved differentiation between the free burghers and the VOC officials – the former developing an identity beyond merely being Dutch employees at the Cape Colony. Pretorius (2022:78), a convicted Boeremag member and an exemplar of Kotze's (2013) Pseudo-Boer grouping, argues that the divide between the burghers and the company officials deepened through the 'Cattle farmer movement',[320] which culminated in the establishment of two clearly distinguishable groups, identified by the British settlers as the *Boer* and the *Cape-Dutch*. Pretorius maintains that these so-called Boers were the antecedents of the *Boervolk* (Boer nation), and thus terms them *Proto-Boers*. He similarly reasons that the Cape-Dutch were the antecedents of the later Cape Afrikaners, and thusly calls them *Proto-Afrikaners*.

Pretorius (2022:91) insists that while the Proto-Afrikaners displayed social consciousness, group formation and group identity, they did not display cultural consciousness, *volk*-consciousness or *volk*-identity. In other words, there were no indications of a growing ethnic identity, which Pretorius believes was present among the Proto-Boers, although a clear Afrikaner identity did not appear among either group until the 19th century. It was the Proto-Boers, and not the Afrikaners, who partook in the Great Trek, he explains, during which the former became the Boervolk (2022:100).

Pretorius (2022:112) further claims that the Cape Afrikaners were not involved in any conflict with the British colonial settlers, and even sided with 'the enemy of the Boervolk' during the Anglo-Boer War. He does, however, distinguish between two types of Cape Afrikaners during the 19th century, namely the *Pro-Republican Colonials*, who were sympathetic towards the Voortrekkers and somewhat opposed to anglicisation (although they did not develop a volk-identity) and the *Pro-Colonial Colonials*, who either accepted or embraced anglicisation and British colonialism (2022:120). He characterises the former subset of Cape Afrikaners as cultural nationalists, and the latter as political nationalists (2022:129). The cultural nationalists established the Afrikanerbond in 1880 in Paarl, which Pretorius (2022:130-131) argues was

[319] I referenced Brink's (2011) views regarding the *volksmoeder* ideal in Chapter 4, subsection 4.3.2.3.

[320] This movement refers to the crossing of the colonial border in search of pasture for grazing cattle (Pretorius, 2022:79). In Chapter 4, I referred to these burghers as 'trekboers'.

taken over by the political nationalists, who would later assist Rhodes, through the Bond, to become first minister, and in so doing pave the way towards the defeat of the Boer republics.

Pretorius (2022:132) states that this iteration of the Bond defined 'Afrikaner' loosely, meaning a volk-identity was still not present among the Cape Afrikaners. He believes that only after the Anglo-Boer War, during the period 1920-1960, did the Afrikaner nation as a political bloc come into being, and during which the Boer and Cape Afrikaner were merged through social engineering (2022:137). He maintains that the elite Cape Afrikaners promoted this development of an Afrikaner identity and Afrikaner nationalism, and promoted the term 'Afrikaner' instead of 'Boer' (2022:153). The unification process into a single ethnic group saw components of each group's cultural heritage become subsumed into a broader Afrikaner culture: the *ossewa* (ox-wagon), *braai* (barbecue), *potjiekos* (stew prepared outdoors in cast iron pot), *biltong* (cured meat) and hunting of Boer culture; and Cape architecture and Cape Malay cooking of the Cape Afrikaner culture; along with the creation of new (constructed) cultural practices, such as the *volkspele* (folk games) and FAK-songbook (Pretorius, 2022:162), which I also discussed in Chapter 4, subsection 4.3.3.2. Pretorius (2022:172) points out that this Afrikaner grouping was an *imagined community* (see Chapter 2, subsection 2.2.4).

His recognition of the constructedness of (Afrikaner) identity does not, however, prevent him from viewing so-called Boer identity in primordialist and essentialist terms. Pretorius (2022:155) suggests that the main difference between the Boer and the Cape Afrikaner is the former's quest for freedom, versus the latter's acceptance and promotion of foreign dominance. He insists that this division remains among modern-day Afrikaners (2022:162). Pretorius (2022:208) claims that the Boervolk was 'indoctrinated' to identify as Afrikaners, but since the 1970s there has been a reawakening of Boer identity, and especially after 2005 the rediscovery of Boer identity has resulted in more self-identification as Boers.[321]

Pretorius (2022:201) further hypothesises that an intermediate group, the so-called *Boer-Afrikaners*, has formed in the post-Apartheid era. This group identifies as Afrikaners, but has attempted to distance itself from the 'liberal Afrikaner', and tends to associate with the Boers' 'strive for freedom'. He argues that the FF+, the FAK, Solidarity and AfriForum represent this middle group (2022:217). He also claims that the DA, due to its 'Englishness', is not concerned with Afrikaner interests, and certainly not with Boer interests, and that Solidarity and

[321] This date refers to the *Majuba Declaration* (2005), in which 'representatives of the Boervolk' (none other than Pretorius himself) demanded their independence (Pretorius, 2022:212).

AfriForum, while involved in Afrikaner issues, are inclusive of the broader Afrikaans community and are thus unconcerned with the *Boervolk* (2022:218-219).

In addition to having negative attitudes towards transformation, BEE and racial quotas, Pretorius (2022:222) also suggests that Boers are antagonistic towards the new South African flag and anthem, and that the Senekal rioters are from this conservative grouping. He argues that the Boer-Afrikaner middle group has an identity crisis, due to their association with both the liberal Afrikaner and conservative Boer groups, whereas the members of these two groups are certain of their identity as either Afrikaners or Boers (2022:233-234). He finally suggests that the solution to the confusion regarding Afrikaner identity is for the establishment of identity around the term Boer, resulting in two clearly delineated Boer and Afrikaner groups, which relies on the middle-group Boer-Afrikaners to self-identify with either of these two poles, resulting in the dissolution of this middle position (2022:236). In other words, Pretorius wants to essentialise the Boer and Afrikaner identities, and eliminate any heterodoxy from both.

This subsection has gone some ways towards demonstrating the very wide range of opinions on contemporary Afrikaner social identity, a theme that continues into the next subsection. It is clear that Afrikaner ethnic identity is currently being reconstructed in various ways, in order to meet the divergent needs of those who identify with this group. In Chapter 2, subsection 2.1.3, Brass (1985; cited in May, 2012) emphasised that ethnic identity formation involves both interaction and competition with outgroups, as well as an internal struggle for control of the group. We can clearly see this dynamic of negotiation between ingroup and outgroup members, and among white Afrikaans speakers themselves, over the content and borders of Afrikaner identity. Outgroup members may strive to be accepted as ingroup members or, through stigmatising the ingroup (i.e., assigning low status), may attempt to radically impact the social identifications of ingroup members. In Chapter 3, subsection 3.5.2, I also noted the ability of third-party commentators to influence the outcomes of intergroup conflict. So too, the struggle between identity entrepreneurs and non-prototypical black sheep in determining the ingroup norms is manifest.

In Chapter 3, subsection 3.3.2.1, I highlighted one of the core tenets of SCT, that the ingroup norm is a trade-off between minimising intragroup differences and maximising intergroup differences, so-called metacontrast. In considering (some) white Afrikaans speakers' desire to achieve positive distinctiveness, we must take care not to confuse ingroup-favouring bias with outgroup hostility, as these phenomena do not necessarily co-occur. In Chapter 3, subsection

3.3.1, Brown (2000) cited research which found pervasive ingroup-favouring biases associated with ethnicity occurs at an automatic level, as opposed to being a controlled process, and that these biases are only weakly or not at all related to other forms of intergroup evaluation and prejudice. In the following subsection, I focus on the influence of intergroup dynamics on contemporary Afrikaner identity.

5.3.2. Afrikaner identity threats, responses and strategies

5.3.2.1. Intergroup relations in South Africa

Adams *et al*. (2018:7) describe identity and intergroup relations in South Africa as complex, arguing that cultural traditions which preceded Apartheid were reinforced by the system, and continue beyond it. They believe that every ethnocultural group in the country face different forms of legal, political and economic oppression, and thus maintain that the traditional distinctions between dominant and non-dominant groups are inappropriate for this setting. They further argue that historic and current political, social and economic segregation between the various ethnic groups hamper nation-building (2018:9).

In a study exploring the orientations of emerging adults (students at South African universities)[322] toward their own (ethnic) group and outgroups,[323] Adams *et al*. (2018) employ both the Social Identity Approach (SIA) and Integrated Threat Theory (ITT) as frameworks of analysis. Adams *et al*. (2018:8) state that ethnic, religious and personal identity influence intergroup relations in South Africa, and that both realistic and symbolic threats (see ITT in Chapter 3, subsection 3.4.1) impact the quantity and quality of intergroup contact, as well as drive the need for distinctiveness and separation (especially among higher-status groups).

Adams *et al*. (2018:9) divide their sample of emerging adults into four ethnocultural groups: (i) the Black-Zulu group, which is part of the numerical majority and politically dominant Black group;[324] (ii) the White-Afrikaans group, which is part of the economically dominant White group; (iii) the Coloured group, positioned between the White and Black groups; and

[322] The authors explain the choice of this setting by referring to South African universities as a microcosm of South African society, and noting the diverse environment that these institutions provide for identity formation.

[323] *Group orientation* refers to the degree to which individuals identify and interact with ingroup and outgroup members. Strong in-group orientation positively correlates with clearly defined group boundaries (Adams *et al*., 2018:8).

[324] The exclusion of other black ethnic groups from this study seems to have been motivated by the fact that the Zulu ethnic group is the largest segment of the black majority, and is the largest ethnic group in South Africa at 24.4% of the total South African population (Stats SA, 2022:22). As a share of the total population, Adams *et al*. (2018:9) suggest that the White-Afrikaans group comprise 5.3%, while coloured people comprise 8.2% and Indian people 2.7% (Stats SA, 2022:7).

(iv) the Indian group, which is also positioned between the White and Black groups, but in a stronger position than the Coloured group.[325] The latter two groups have never been in a dominant position either politically, socially or economically.

Adams *et al*. (2018:13) found that while all four groups showed significant ingroup favouritism, the White-Afrikaans group displayed the strongest ingroup and weakest outgroup orientation. For this group, ethnic identity superseded religious identity both in contact with ingroup and outgroup members. They speculate that the White-Afrikaans group's strong ingroup identification and differentiation from the outgroup could be the result of the realistic and symbolic threats that the transition to a multicultural society poses, especially as a historically politically, economically and socially dominant group. They found, contrastively, that the Black-Zulu group was more open to outgroup members, while still maintaining strong ethnic identity (indicating that these are not mutually exclusive orientations).[326]

Adams *et al*. (2018:13) also found low ethnic identification and ingroup orientation among the Coloured group, which they argue "confirms the lack of a clear, positive distinctiveness of their own ethnocultural group", and demonstrates that the group is heterogeneous without a clear shared culture, religion, language or ethnic descent. These findings have direct implications for the proposed merger of white and coloured Afrikaans speakers. They further explain that:

> [Coloured group members] may find it more difficult to navigate not only their own ingroup-related identity processes but also how they relate to outgroups, as there is a lack of clarity as to where they are positioned in the South African cultural plethora.

Adams *et al*. (2018:14) argue that although all four groups experience some form of threat (as a result of no one group being dominant), they differ in their responses. Only the White-Afrikaans group adheres to the ITT model, where ingroup and outgroup orientations are "stronger and more focused on maintaining the status quo". They contrast this with the low ingroup and moderate outgroup orientation of the Coloured group, which do not seem to be the result of threats, but rather "a historically less-developed sense of unity within the group".

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[325] Indian South Africans are comparable to coloured South Africans in not sharing the political power of black South Africans nor the economic power of white South Africans. However, Indian South Africans do not enjoy the near majority status that coloured South Africans do in the Western Cape in any province, although they are more economically prosperous.

[326] The authors contrast this finding with a 2005 study which found marked reciprocal hostility between black people and Afrikaners, and thus posit that the increased political and economic power gained by black people in the intervening years tempered their negative outgroup evaluations. This provides support for the pursuit of pluralism (i.e., minority representation in the state) in order to achieve sociopolitical stability and social cohesion.

Gibson and Gouws (1999; cited in Huddy, 2001:130) claim that "strong racial and ethnic identities among South Africans increase their perceived need for group solidarity, which in turn produces greater antipathy toward outgroups, increases the perception that such groups pose a threat, and promotes intolerance". In addition to race and ethnicity, language (already the core cultural value of white Afrikaans speakers) becomes an even more salient dimension of comparison through language policies and politics, giving rise to pro-Afrikaans and pro-English factions which crosscut racial and ethnic categories. However, as noted in Chapter 3, subsection 3.5.2, it is the extent to which identity is politicised, not merely salient, that predicts collection action (see SIMCA).

Intergroup comparison and competition also sees black South Africans magnifying economic differentials, while white South Africans magnify political differentials. As discussed in Chapter 3, subsection 3.2.3.5, if intergroup differentials are perceived to be illegitimate, the result is more ingroup bias and outgroup discrimination. In Chapter 3, subsection 3.4.4, Muldoon *et al*. (2016:140) noted that the "attribution of illegitimacy to the majority group" increases ingroup identification among the minority group. In that same subsection, it was also shown that the perception of discrimination based on group membership (think BEE) leads to increased ingroup identification (see RIM). Similarly, Brown (2000:751) noted in Chapter 3, subsection 3.2.3.3, that minority group status alone may lead to more ingroup identification.

The continued use of Apartheid-era racial classification promotes a social change belief system among Afrikaners which prevent them from "divest[ing] themselves of an unsatisfactory, underprivileged, or stigmatised group membership" (Tajfel and Turner, 1986:278). This belief system leads to more intergroup behaviour, as opposed to interpersonal behaviour, and is associated with intense intergroup conflict which makes it less likely that individuals will follow the social mobility strategy (see Chapter 3, subsection 3.2.3.2). As posited by SIT, negative intergroup behaviour can be linked to social identity threats.

5.3.2.2. Threats to Afrikaners

According to Alberts (2012:282), the sense of threat among Afrikaners can be traced back to 1652, and "runs like a golden thread through the history of Afrikaners up to the contemporary post-apartheid society". The social hierarchy in South Africa has been upended since 1994, leading to Afrikaners no longer being the dominant group in many comparative dimensions (even if they are still economically more dominant than most), and resulting in their negative

or threatened social identities. Each of the threats identified in Chapter 3, subsection 3.4.1, can be found, to some degree, among contemporary white Afrikaans speakers.

Categorisation threats, which are extremely common, are especially pronounced in the workplace, and concern BEE, affirmative action and other transformation policies. Miscategorisation threats may be found among white Afrikaans speakers who have disidentified as Afrikaners, but still face external categorisation as such. White Afrikaans speakers may also experience this threat when their 'South Africanness' is questioned, and they are treated based solely on their Afrikaner identity. Non-prototypical members may face acceptance threat from other ingroup members, while Afrikaners could possibly experience this threat from fellow South Africans. A unique combination of miscategorisation and acceptance threats may be elicited when white Afrikaans speakers are referred to as 'Dutchmen'.

Together with categorisation threats, distinctiveness threats are a leading motivator in Afrikaner mobilisation. These occur when Afrikaners sense assimilationist pressures, specifically their forced anglicisation in the public sphere and, potentially, also when their merger with coloured Afrikaans speakers is proposed, accompanied by beliefs that their distinct ethnic identity should be discontinued. These language and culture shifts induce continuity threats, or social-identity change threats, which may also be found among emigrated Afrikaners (or those considering emigration). These threats overlap with threats to the content of identity, which may also be found when intragroup processes threaten to alter social identities.

Value threats are commonly caused through the media, political and popular discourse. For example, competence threat, or group-status threat, occur when Afrikaners perceive that they are being devalued based on their low status, such as when they are sidelined from political decision-making or their attempts to contribute to the governing of the country are rebuffed.[327] Among this community, stereotype threats and morality threats overlap, as Afrikaner stereotypes (being racist, backward and unintelligent) are largely informed by their association with Apartheid. Morality threats see white Afrikaans speakers faced with accusations of racism, as the Afrikaner identity is stigmatised as irredeemably immoral. One of the more

[327] Most recently, a Tshwane MMC (Member of the Mayoral Committee) has stated his intent to stop AfriForum from helping the city with service delivery issues, which they have been doing for free under a 5-year agreement with the city. This EFF member was previously in the news for declaring that he wants to "moer [hit or beat] a Boer" and "want[s] the blood of an Afrikaner" (Boonzaaier, 2024). The policy change regarding AfriForum's assistance came only weeks after the ouster of the DA mayor by the new EFF-ANC-ActionSA coalition.

extreme examples of such threats being invoked is the EFF's Julius Malema's singing of *Kill the Boer*, which was ruled not hate speech.[328] These threats also signify threats to self-esteem, and overlap with threats to the evaluation of the identity.

Threats to well-being, in particular threats to quality of life, are evident in the widespread perception of discrimination among white Afrikaans speakers, and of a decreasing standard of living (crime, lack of service delivery, sociopolitical and economic insecurity). Social change threats involve Afrikaners losing resources they have grown accustomed to, such as political power and state infrastructure (including security), while the overlapping realistic threats comprise threats to employment, financial prosperity and physical safety.[329] The loss of Afrikaans-medium universities, and the removal of Afrikaans from the public sphere in general, may be thought to invoke both realistic threats (or social change threats) and social-identity change threats. The removal of symbols of Afrikaner identity from the public sphere may also be viewed as symbolic threats. The combined presence of both instrumental and sentimental threats (roughly equivalent to realistic and symbolic threats) has also given rise to existential threat among a significant portion of white Afrikaans speakers.

Social identity threats lead to increased ingroup identification which mitigate these threats (see TIM in Chapter 3, subsection 3.4.4). Based on the insights on ingroup norm-making discussed in Chapter 3, subsection 3.3.2.1 (see metacontrast), we can conclude that anti-Afrikaans sentiments on the part of outgroup members reinforce pro-Afrikaans sentiments among Afrikaners. Relative Deprivation Theory (RDT) (see Chapter 3, subsection 3.5.2) predicts that collective action follows when there is the perception of a discrepancy between a group's expectations and actual experience. Afrikaners do not only compare themselves to other groups, but also to the Afrikaners of the past, concluding that they are, in some regards, worse off today.

Alberts (2012:151) found that when Afrikaners discuss their identity in post-Apartheid society, discussions are marked by discourses on threat, sense of loss, protest and stigmatisation. He

[328] De Vos (2022) offers a convincing argument that the singing of this song qualifies as freedom of speech in some contexts, and hate speech in others (such as when EFF supporters sang it during the Senekal riots). White Afrikaans speakers (and white people in general) tend to fear the EFF, who are prone to violent rhetoric, more than the ANC, although that fear is mitigated through the EFF's relative lack of political power.

[329] The fear of violent crime is an especially visceral (realistic) threat among Afrikaners. High identifiers are prone to view stressful events through the lens of their social identities, leading to reports of another farm murder being experienced as an attack on (all) white people, and from there to the myth of the perpetration of a white genocide in South Africa. Afrikaners have been affected by personal (crime), secondary (farm murders) and collective trauma (Anglo-Boer War; 1994 transition) (see Chapter 3, subsection 3.4.4).

notes that "the stigma attached to Afrikaners' historical and structural position of being fundamentally privileged under Apartheid, and of having been labelled as 'oppressors' and 'racists', are major contributing factors to their current experience of loss, threat, and protest" (2012:152).

Verwey and Quayle (2012:551) concluded from "backstage talk" occurring in "the private sphere of the *braai*" and which is "reserved for fellow whites" that there is a schism between public and private constructions of Afrikaner identity. They cite as evidence participants of their study rehashing Apartheid-era discourses of "black incompetence" and "whites under threat", despite them rejecting many stereotypes of Afrikaner identity. They further point to participants identifying as "Africans", while also rejecting assimilation with a broader African identity. According to Verwey and Quayle (2012), "the construction of the Afrikaner community as embattled and systematically oppressed might provide powerful support for extremism".

Alberts (2012:193) also found a variety of discourses employed by Afrikaners, and highlights the discourse of the *Swart Gevaar* (Black Danger) as being the most frequently utilised to construct narratives of threat. This, he explains, involves the construction of black South Africans (as 'they' or the 'government') as a threat to the survival, wellbeing and interests of Afrikaners. It includes the fear that an enemy wants Afrikaners out of South Africa, the concern that Afrikaner history and heritage is not being respected, anxiety about employment opportunities in the New South Africa, fear of black people in power and governance, and the personal threat of crime (Alberts, 2018:193-206). Vanderhaeghen (2018:18) argues that Afrikaners are drawn to a narrative of victimhood because of their need to "negate the stigma of 'oppressor'" and "neutralise assaults on them as either Afrikaners, or whites, or political reactionaries". He states that this narrative "finds echoes in plaintive cries of 'reverse racism'" (see concept of victimhood in Chapter 3, subsection 3.4.4).

Alberts (2012:181-192) further identifies the following discourses (derived from Apartheid-era Afrikaner nationalism) used in the construction of Afrikaner threat narratives: (i) *In the laager* (military camp), denoting the need for the Afrikaner minority to stand united against outsiders; (ii) *out of the laager*, referring to the deep sense of loss, threat and anxiety accompanying the disintegration of traditional Afrikaner cohesiveness; (iii) the purity of the Afrikaans language as threatened; and (iv) Afrikaners' moral life as threatened. He believes that Afrikaners construct themselves as presently disadvantaged, disempowered, and "the

Other" in that oppressors are punishing their victims as penance for the distant past (2012:209). Alberts (2012:210-211) also argues that Afrikaners employ "the strongest form of denial of racism", the accusation of reverse racism, not merely as a strategy of social defence, but of counterattack.

Korf and Malan (2002:152) suggest that white Afrikaans speakers "may have been historically sensitised to threat". During the 1970s and 1980s, it was said that white Afrikaans speakers have an "obsessional national character", a "persecution complex" and that "fear are part and parcel of the Afrikaner mentality" (Korf & Malan, 2002:153). They note that the social change from a dominant (ruling) group to a political minority, involving changes to the power and status of white Afrikaans speakers, constitutes a threat to Afrikaner identity (2002:151).

Working from Breakwell's (1986) model of threatened identity (see IPT in Chapter 3, subsection 3.4.1), Korf and Malan (2002) investigated social identity threat among white Afrikaans speakers. In their study, respondents demonstrated greater threat to the evaluation of their identity than to the content of the identity. The seismic shifts in Afrikaner social identity since their research could possibly lead to different results today. Overall, the majority of the respondents experienced significant threat to well-being, but much less threat to distinctive continuity. Here too, the social changes in the intervening years, in particular the retreat of Afrikaans from the public sphere, might lead to different results today.

Korf and Malan (2002:160-161) found that among white Afrikaans speakers, those who experienced a threat to the distinctive continuity of the group identity tended to have a positive attitude toward the sociopolitical changes, were low identifiers, more politically liberal, and had a negative collective self-esteem. In other words, they explain, "respondents with positive attitudes toward the political changes believed that White Afrikaans-speaking people would not continue as a distinctive group with a unique identity" (2002:165).

On the other hand, those who experienced a high level of threat to well-being as group members, tended to have a negative attitude toward the sociopolitical changes and a perception of the illegitimacy and instability of the political system. Korf and Malan (2002:159) also distinguished between those with politically and culturally based ethnic identities, finding that the former experienced significantly more threats to well-being. Strong ethnic identification was related to the insistence that Afrikaners would remain a distinctive group (Korf & Malan, 2002:165). High identifiers thus have a perception of high ethnolinguistic vitality (see Chapter 2, subsection 2.4.4, and Chapter 3, subsection 3.2.2).

According to Korf and Malan (2002:165), high identifiers experienced less threat to distinctive continuity "because individuals with strong in-group identification are able to isolate themselves from negative feedback regarding their group by concentrating on the group's positive aspects". They also found that positive *personal* self-esteem predicted a lower experience of both realistic and symbolic threat. They further found that perceptions of illegitimacy and instability of the political regime was linked with higher levels of realistic threat (2002:165).

5.3.2.3. Strategies for self-esteem, status and self-interest

In *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Donald Horowitz (cited in Giliomee, 2019a:84) argues that "the struggle in multi-ethnic societies is primarily between groups over *relative* group worth and capacity". According to Giliomee (2019b:viii), an economically disadvantaged community has two options for ameliorating its situation. First, it may use the state to compel businesspeople of the economically dominant group to make the economy more demographically representative – as former president Thabo Mbeki states the ANC government did post-1994. Second, which Giliomee (2019b:ix) argues Afrikaner entrepreneurs throughout Afrikaner-rule did, is to use community-based enterprises to get on their 'feet' and to increase the status of the community. He cites Horowitz (1985:185) who also recognises the value of positive social identity to individuals as discussed in Chapter 3, subsection 3.2.2:

> If the need to feel worthy is a fundamental human requirement, it is satisfied in considerable measure by belonging to groups that are in turn regarded as worthy. Like individual self-esteem, collective self-esteem is achieved largely by social recognition.

In an interesting case of the strategy of ameliorating the status of the ingroup, Chris Louw (cited in Giliomee, 2009:672), a journalist, reflects on the Afrikaner negotiators' conflicting aims during the Dakar Conference of 1987.[330]

> Only much later did I realise how naïve I was at Dakar. There was a kind of bravado among the younger Afrikaners, tired of the stereotyping of Afrikaners as rigid and racist. Shunned by the West, we considered it the highest priority to show that 'we are not all like that'. Most of us were more interested in demonstrating that difference, through our actions and words, and so to demolish stereotypes, than we were in confronting intellectually the arguments of the ANC delegation. We wanted to show we were even more African than the ANC; in that sense the meeting on our part was

[330] The Dakar Conference was a precursor to the official negotiations held between the ANC and the ruling NP (see Chapter 4, subsection 4.3.3.5). A collective led by Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert, comprising (among others) Afrikaner intellectuals, including Hermann Giliomee and Theuns Eloff, met with the ANC under Mbeki's leadership in Senegal to discuss the path to transformation in South Africa, much to the dismay of the NP government (Wikipedia, 2024l).

> more about show and symbolism than substance. We were so very ashamed of our government, of P.W. Botha's boorish conduct, of the mish-mash of NP policy, that we fell for the temptation to side with the ANC and its ideology and in that spirit dismissed any reference to minority or group rights as being code language for NP support. We wanted to create as much distance as possible between the NP and us.

This statement reflects an attempt to improve the status of the Afrikaners in the face of morality threats by redefining the group, i.e., employing the strategy of social creativity. However, it could also be viewed as employing the strategy of individual mobility, not by exiting the group, but by creating significant distance between an individual and a stigmatised group (with which they continue to identify). In other words, individual members of the group emphasise ingroup heterogeneity (see Branscombe *et al*.'s 1999 taxonomy in Chapter 3, subsection 3.4.2) in order to mitigate their own personal morality threats, and not necessarily to increase the status of the group as a whole.

The failure to secure strong minority-rights protections for Afrikaners suggests that, in at least some instances, pursuing certain strategies for status improvement in order to address a threatened social identity (see Chapter 3, subsection 3.2.3.6) could actually be to the detriment of the material interests of ingroup members. The strategy of social competition would thus appear to be more successful at securing group interests (or social change), although as noted in Chapter 3, this inherently involves some form of intergroup conflict. But these strategies are not the only ones contemporary Afrikaners (and white people in general) use to ameliorate their low status and self-esteem, mitigate social identity threats and secure their own self-interest. Davies (2009:135-136) believes that while some post-1994 Afrikaners are banding together against a common enemy, others are removing themselves from South African society in a variety of ways:

> The traditional tendency for Afrikaans speakers to rally together as a community, ignoring their divisions against a common threat is more problematic because the nature of the threat is now far more complex. Solidarity remains imperfect even upon the local stage with diversity reinforced by all the global, national and local logics. Even so, perceptions of marginalisation and alienation are coming to characterise an increasingly marked shift as many whites including Afrikaans speakers continue to withdraw from public life. This retreat takes many forms. Perhaps the most common comprises the 'stepping outside everyday rituals' or 'ethnic nesting' which is typified by the 'festivalisation of Afrikanerdom' and rise of consumerism. Equally marked is the 'semigration' whereby whites give up their citizenship and withdraw to the gated communities now spread across the country. But perhaps the most stark is the loss of the white skills base and young professionals with rising emigration representing the key driving force behind the declining white population. This 'huge cry of insecurity' is perhaps so profound because for many white Afrikaans speakers sovereignty is

> understood narrowly 'in terms of power and territory', and the sense of loss – cultural and otherwise – remains acute.[331] However, the manner in which different Afrikaans constituent parts have reacted to both the opportunities and challenges presented by neoliberal globalisation has become the most significant catalyst in determining the process of identity adjustment among the grouping. For it is against the structural backdrop of the global economy and closely associated ideology of globalisation that the dynamics of identity politics and Afrikanerness can now be best understood.

These behaviours relate to the covert forms of defensive strategies noted in Chapter 3, subsection 3.4.2, namely physical or psychological withdrawal, decreased commitment, and ingroup solidarity, which stand in opposition to aggressive forms defending against identity threats. Adding to Davies, Alberts (2012:106-116) lists the following strategies for dealing with identity threats faced by Afrikaners in the New South Africa:

- Emigration – Also termed *mobility*,[332] refers to Afrikaners leaving South Africa permanently or temporarily, many feeling that there is no place for them as white people in the New South Africa. It has been argued that these Afrikaners are willing to give up their Afrikaans identity in order to safeguard their white identity.[333] Afrikaner emigrants are said to desire a physical space, or comfort zone, which mirrors their European sense of self (and thus necessitates the absence of contradicting languages, cultures and people) similar to that imposed through Apartheid segregation.[334]
- Semigration – Also called *laer trek* (form a laager/military camp) or *partial emigration*, refers to Afrikaners moving to a separate homeland or volkstaat, such as the settlement of Orania, or to Cape Town.[335] Semigration may also refer to the "withdrawal from

[331] In my view, mass Afrikaner emigration points to the fact that many Afrikaners no longer prioritise political nationalism or (sovereign) political power, but rather, economic and (for some) literal survival, as they are even less likely to attain 'power and territory' in their new countries. Even cultural survival is sacrificed (to some extent; see below) in the pursuit of material interests, although rarely without serious personal trauma due to language and culture shift and loss. Further trauma is inflicted on both emigrants and the 'left behind' friends and family members, as it is not only the Afrikaner group that splinters, but also personal networks. These heavy costs incurred indicate that a deeper understanding of why Afrikaners choose to emigrate is necessary.

[332] Due to the fixity of racial and ethnic classifications in present-day South Africa, emigration might be the nearest approximation of exiting the ingroup, although it is more accurately exiting the intergroup dynamic. While the social identities of emigrants will certainly undergo changes, most will continue to self-identity to some degree as Afrikaners.

[333] Although cultural survival is sacrificed to some extent, there is a proliferation of Afrikaans culture among many Afrikaner expat communities around the world. Considerations involving financial, employment and physical security, as well as a decrease in living standards, contrasted with the loss of family, friends and ethnocultural identity, seem to be common among Afrikaner emigrants. The former can certainly not be attributed solely to attempts to safeguard 'white identity', as members of other ethnic groups also emigrate for these reasons.

[334] If true, this suggests that intergroup differences in themselves pose an identity threat to group members. It should be noted that although Afrikaners mostly emigrate to 'white countries', they do not do so exclusively.

[335] The popular application of the term refers to moving from the interior of South Africa to the Western Cape, and thus away from ANC rule to DA governance. While the Western Cape is certainly not an Afrikaner or white

democratic South Africa" through spatial practices such as moving to gated communities and enclosed neighbourhoods (Alberts, 2012:109).

- Surrendering Afrikaansness – This involves voluntary anglicisation by white Afrikaans speakers who wish to unburden themselves of the history of Apartheid and oppression.[336]
- Strengthening whiteness – This (group) strategy involves the organisational alliance between Afrikaners and white English speakers, as a way to strengthen opposition to black political power.
- Embracing semi-whiteness – This refers to the shift from race to culture (in particular language) as qualifiers of a broad, inclusive Afrikaans community, termed *Afrikaanses*.[337]
- Launder whiteness – This (group) strategy refers to Afrikaners building alliances and coalitions with other ethnic groups, under the auspices of aiding these groups or furthering mutual interests (or even reconciliation), while still maintaining separation from them.[338]

volkstaat, such as Orania, it functions in much the same way to mitigate against some of the threats discussed. The province is overwhelmingly Afrikaans, and has a much smaller black population than anywhere else in the country (as a percentage of the population). It is also one of only two provinces not under ANC administration (the other being KZN which is governed by former President Zuma's MK Party), and the only province to have had (and continues to have) a white premier since the end of Apartheid.

[336] Anglicisation (an individual mobility strategy) is less common considering the importance of Afrikaans to most white Afrikaans speakers, as well as the fact that being categorised as a white English speaker will not safeguard them from all identity threats, nor realistic threats (e.g. BEE). It is also unclear to what extent anglicising alters self-identification, as well as external categorisation. Implicit in this strategy is the fallacy that English is a neutral language and 'clean' from any history of oppression.

[337] This shift to a language-based community requires a decrease in racial identity as well as ethnic identity, as argued in subsection 5.3.1.4.

[338] There is a case to be made that *some* attempts to promote the Afrikaanses identity also qualify as 'laundering whiteness', that is, concealing the true underlying motives. Similarly, AfriForum has recently signalled its intent to pursue greater "cooperation between Zulus and Afrikaners" when it hosted a commemorative event for King Dinuzulu (1868-1913) (AfriForum, 2024a). Strong ethnic identification among black people has the ability to decrease the political dominance of the ANC, as evidenced by Zulu identity leading to the defeat of the ANC in KZN to Zuma's MK Party. It may thus be in the interest of white Afrikaans speakers concerned with their lack of political power to encourage black ethnic identification.

- Activism – This (group) strategy aims to maintain that which is "regarded as essential to the Afrikaans world", namely the place of the Afrikaans language,[339] and may involve legal action.[340]
- Melanise whiteness – This strategy involves Afrikaners identifying more closely with their Africanness, or as "non-Boer".[341]
- Renewal – This strategy involves a fundamental redefinition of Afrikaansness, wherein Afrikaners come to terms with the restoration of their historical position as a minority group, or their "drastic change of status".[342] Alberts (2012:115-116) argues that the myth of racial and language purity, and group homogeneity have to be rejected, as well as "elitist ideals" regarding membership; such as having achieved a certain educational level or speaking standard Afrikaans. So too holding a "white view" of the history of Afrikaansness has to be discarded.

Alberts (2012:116) continues his advocacy of this "process of hybridisation" (see discussion on hybridity in Chapter 2, subsection 2.1.3) as follows:

> What is crucial is that 'white' Afrikaans-speakers renew and re-create their Afrikaansness in such a way that it is perceived by non-Afrikaans-speakers as being compatible with the interests of the majority of South Africans. It is evident that Afrikaansness has to be democratised in the post-Afrikaner-nationalist era. […] 'White' Afrikaans-speakers will only start earning respect in post-apartheid South Africa, and move towards transcending identities of threatened Afrikaansness, when they authentically express and realise moral (and selfless) subjectivities in their daily dealings with fellow South Africans in all spheres of life: politics, business, sport, church, to mention a few.[343]

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[339] So-called *handhawers* (maintainers) are said to be disillusioned with the New South Africa as they are required to "sacrifice in terms of privilege and power in the transformation and building of a new society" (Alberts, 2012:114). The author propagates the fallacy that English-only public institutions (and the assimilation it demands) are devoid of ideology and/or power dynamics (i.e., banal nationalism).

[340] Alberts (2012:114) characterises legal action as "confrontational" and argues that activism is nothing more than a "search for the lost paradise of Afrikaner power and privilege". He further suggests that activists face a "moral dilemma" in having to convince others "of their seriousness in promoting the interests and quality of life of all South Africans and not just their own, sectional interests".

[341] In other words, 'Africanness' replaces 'whiteness' or 'Europeanness' as aspects of one's social identity. Alberts (2012:114-115), who identifies himself as following this (individual) strategy, claims that it perpetuates "white privilege" the least, appeals most to "progressive thinking" Afrikaners, is the functional opposite of emigration on the Europe-Africa axis, and "reinterprets the meaning of Afrikaansness most radically, rehabilitating it of a great deal of the negative baggage that it acquired through the apartheid history". The use of the words 'reinterpret', 'rehabilitate' and 'baggage' suggests that this strategy is primarily concerned with mitigating morality threats.

[342] My understanding is that this would also involve an acceptance of ANC black nationalism and public sphere anglicisation.

[343] The author is thus advocating the low identifiers' response to morality threats, i.e. 'undo morally objectionable behaviour' (see Branscombe *et al.*'s taxonomy in Chapter 3, subsection 3.4.2), which he appears to believe is

SIT research has revealed key insights regarding minority and/or low-status groups attempting to ameliorate their situation and affect social change. First, group members are motivated to pursue redress when they have a strong sense of collective relative deprivation. Second, allegiance to the ingroup is a necessary, and in some instances sufficient, precondition for collective action. Third, the development of clear identity markers and less permeable group boundaries is beneficial to these pursuits (see Brown, 2000:768 in Chapter 3, subsection 3.5.2).

Among white Afrikaans speakers, a sizeable (albeit difficult to quantify) number have a sense of collective deprivation, and a deep allegiance to the group. In subsection 5.3.1.4, I argued that Afrikaner identity is more entitative than Afrikaans identity, meaning that white Afrikaans speakers are more likely to identify with the former. But this does not mean that Afrikaner identity is the preferred identity to be mobilised in all instances, even among high identifiers. In Chapter 2, subsection 2.1.3, May (2012:41-42) cautioned against "collapsing important distinctions between ethnic identity formation and ethnic mobilisation", which constructionist and instrumentalist commentators fail to do. This is to say that the decisions individuals make regarding their own social identifications (in order to ameliorate uncertain identities), is a separate process from the selection of identity to be mobilised for collective action.[344]

White Afrikaans speakers may, and do, mobilise Afrikaner ethnic identity in some instances, usually involving essentialised conceptualisations of Afrikaner identity with clear identity markers and less permeable group boundaries. However, in the collective pursuit of Afrikaans MLR, the Afrikaans identity is often mobilised, despite it being less entitative. It could be argued that the movement to unify Afrikaans speakers of all races, on the basis of language alone, signifies the establishment of a clear identity marker (Afrikaans-speaking). In this context, this (newfound) Afrikaans identity is actually less permeable than the Afrikaner identity (resulting in significantly more members), as the contentiousness of and disagreements over Afrikaner identity result in both voluntary disidentification and involuntary exclusion. Thus, in the call to action (by identity entrepreneurs), the question 'Who speaks Afrikaans?' has a much more definitive answer than 'Who is an Afrikaner?'.

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mutually exclusive with Afrikaans MLR. Also noteworthy about Alberts's statement is the pressure exerted by both ingroup members (the author himself) and outgroup members (expressed in the need to 'earn the respect' of other South Africans) on ingroup identity formation. Majority-group members (meant here in the political, not numerical, sense) are much more likely to be able to influence the social identities of minority-group members than vice versa.

[344] The choice of identity to be mobilised is heavily informed by the issue at hand, i.e., what is causing the perception of collective relative deprivation. In collective action against BEE, for example, a broad Afrikaans coalition makes much less sense than a broad white coalition.

Afrikaans MLR activists who advance the unification of Afrikaans-speaking communities of all races, might therefore follow the strategy with the greatest chance for success.[345] It should be noted again that the adoption of this identity does not necessarily entail the end of Afrikaner ethnic identity, as ethnic layering (see Chapter 2, subsection 2.1.3) makes it possible to identify as, for example, an Afrikaner, Afrikaans-speaking, Capetonian, South African, citizen of the world. Due to the importance of ethnicity (in general, and to Afrikaners specifically) it is unlikely that this identification will disappear altogether.

Based on Alberts's (2012) classification of the identity strategies employed by white Afrikaans speakers in the post-Apartheid era, as well as Kotze's (2013) and Van der Westhuizen's (2018) typologies of contemporary Afrikaners, I propose the following broad categories of contemporary Afrikaner identity threat responses: (i) *Regression*, involving the return to traditional ideas and behaviours associated with Afrikaner identity, and marked by the resistance of attempts to redefine the identity and/or redetermine the group boundaries; (ii) *Suppression*, denoting the rejection of Afrikaner identity such as through promoting the end of ethnic-based identities (in favour of language-based identities), anglicisation,[346] and to a lesser extent emigration; and (iii) *Reformation*, including the rejection of some aspects of the identity, either for moral, personal or political considerations, and attempts to redefine the identity in order to maintain self-identification (with an identity that confers positive self-esteem).

My categories can also be integrated with Petriglieri's (2011; cited in Holmes *et al*., 2016:206) Identity Threat Response (ITR) theory (see Chapter 3, subsection 3.4.2). *Identity-protection responses* may be found in regression (*derogation*), suppression (*concealment*) and reformation (*positive distinctiveness*), whereas *identity-restructuring responses* are only found in suppression (*identity exit* and/or *importance change*) and reformation (*meaning change*). Furthermore, Tajfel and Turner's (1986:286, see Chapter 3, subsection 3.2.3.6) *individual mobility* strategies correspond with my suppression category, and *social creativity* strategies correspond with both suppression and reformation. As was argued in Chapter 3, the more important an identity is, the less likely identity-restructuring responses are, of which identity

[345] One potential complicating factor here is the question of the centrality of the Afrikaans language in coloured identity, i.e., if Afrikaans is as an important part of their social identity as it is to (most) white Afrikaans speakers.

[346] Some white Afrikaans speakers are also able to disassociate from Afrikaner identity by adopting a South African English accent in interactions with members of other ethnic groups, including white English speakers, without necessarily ceasing the use of Afrikaans in the home or with other Afrikaans speakers. They are thus able to pass as white English speakers, especially if they have English-passing names. Verwey and Quayle (2012:564) also argue that those who can "speak English properly" are able to hide their Afrikanerness in certain contexts. This desire to avoid categorisation as an Afrikaner demonstrates the stigmatisation of the identity.

exit is the strategy least likely to be employed. My regression category would then likely entail *social competition* in order to enact social change which will ameliorate the threatened identity.

Some Afrikaners may engage in direct group behaviour to regain the high self-esteem they had before an identity threat (see the self-esteem motive in Chapter 3, subsection 3.2.3.1). Through ethnic mobilisation, they may also engage in realistic competition in pursuit of group interests. One can further imagine that some Afrikaners may experience anger at the perceived illegitimacy of the power dynamic and their low status, nostalgia for a time when they had higher status, and angst over the threat to their distinctive continuity. As highlighted in Chapter 3, subsection 3.3.3, such negative group-based emotions promote ingroup re-defining and re-affiliative behaviours

As argued in Chapter 3, intergroup competition is beneficial to intragroup morale, cohesion and co-operation, suggesting that direct competition may be employed for the sake of identity maintenance. It is necessary to emphasise here that none of Tajfel and Turner's (1986) strategies are mutually exclusive, and it is entirely possible for movements, subgroups, and even individuals, to display aspects of all three strategies depending on the context and the perceived utility of each strategy in ameliorating a threatened identity or improving the status of a group.

The perceived fixity of group identity (because of immutable qualities and external categorisation) leads to a social change belief system among white Afrikaans speakers, and social behaviour on the intergroup pole of the continuum (see Chapter 3, subsection 3.2.3.2). This involves group action in order to improve the social, economic and/or political standing of both the individual and the group. Presumably then, in order to discourage negative intergroup behaviour among Afrikaners, their perception of the possibility of individual mobility has to be increased in order to encourage social behaviour on the interpersonal pole of the continuum. This has implications for public policy, since if people are treated as members of a group, they are unlikely to respond as 'group-less' individuals.

According to Davies (2009:93), the post-1994 dispensation has seen rising intragroup inequality among white Afrikaans speakers. She identifies trade union Solidarity as one of only a handful of organisations aimed at the upliftment of working-class Afrikaans speakers. Despite the considerable rise in Afrikaner unemployment and poverty post-Apartheid, Davies notes that the white middle and upper classes have benefitted greatly from "neo-liberal globalisation and the post-apartheid capital consensus", as evidenced by the large number of white South

Africans working overseas (usually on a permanent basis after emigration).[347] Interestingly, Davies states that both these beneficiaries and the economically marginalised share "strong perceptions of disillusionment and dissatisfaction vis-à-vis legislative initiatives such as affirmative action which has contributed to the changing racial composition of the workforce".

Therefore, while both economically privileged and marginalised Afrikaners experience identity threats (and realistic threats),[348] only the privileged are able to access certain options to mitigate these threats. If individual mobility is a popular strategy to deal with identity threats among privileged Afrikaners (which involves disidentification with the low status ingroup) and it often includes emigration, utilising this strategy implies exiting the ingroup without joining the outgroup. Tajfel and Turner's (1986) original theory makes provision for the amelioration of social identity without joining the outgroup under the social creativity strategy; however, it presupposes continued identification with the ingroup. Emigration thus presents a novel combination of the individual mobility and social creativity strategies, which sees individuals exit the context of intergroup comparison altogether.

However, to complicate matters, ingroup disidentification does not necessarily accompany emigration. Since the context of intergroup comparison changes post-emigration, the meanings and values associated with the Afrikaner identity will also change, and thus also the identity threats faced by Afrikaners in their new contexts. Emigration thus enables white Afrikaans speakers, if they choose, to continue self-identifying as Afrikaners in their new countries, without facing the same identity and realistic threats they did while in South Africa.

Most first-generation Afrikaner expats will presumably find it difficult to pass as ingroup members in their new country (due to accent, non-proficiency in the new dominant language, names, employment history, citizenship status, etc.), however, they could mould their Afrikaner identity to ensure that their outgroup identity in their new country does not carry low status. Emigration therefore allows the individual mobility strategy to be employed without joining the outgroup *or* leaving the ingroup. Visser (2007:1; 28) believes though that the maintenance of an Afrikaner identity among the diaspora is unsustainable in the long-term – the reproduction of Afrikaners culture and transfer of Afrikaans to children being key issues.

[347] In especially the last decade the TEFL (Teaching English as a Foreign Language) market has enabled a large number of recent graduates, many of whom would otherwise not have been in a financial position to emigrate, to live and work abroad.

[348] Marginalisation here does not necessarily denote poverty relative to outgroup members, but rather to other ingroup members.

The extent to which Afrikaners abroad, who continue to identify as ingroup members, are still members of the Afrikaner community is open to debate. However, their ability to maintain links with South Africa through contact and visits with family and friends, keeping in touch with current events, and transposing Afrikaner identity and symbols to their new country, all made possible through globalisation and the omnipresence of the internet, means they are able to partake in the transmission of memes,[349] and thus influence and be influenced by Afrikaners in South Africa. Afrikaner expats also potentially have the ability to shape how Afrikaners are viewed abroad, and through their continued relations with South Africans, may impact the reimagining of the Afrikaner identity.

The experiences of the sizeable Afrikaner expat community also highlight another unexpected intersection between SIT and May's (2012) conception of ethnicity. Even though emigrants have successfully leveraged the individual mobility strategy in the pursuit of their own material interests, many maintain not only sentimental attachments to Afrikaans, but also a deep emotional attachment to their Afrikaner identity. As evidence, consider the availability of Afrikaans language programmes in Australian schools, Afrikaans festivals and concerts in the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe, and even public gatherings to view Springbok-rugby matches (although the Springboks have also become a marker of South African identity). In this context, ethnicity serves no instrumental purpose, but rather nurtures the underlying identity motives of individuals. As May (2012) suggested, ethnic groups signify more than mere opportunities for instrumental mobilisation. Distrust of the motivations of those seeking to maintain their ethnic identity should thus be measured.

Since not all economically privileged Afrikaners decide to emigrate, but the individual mobility strategy is still available to them, we might expect this bloc of Afrikaners to prioritise the pursuit of their own economic interests, ahead of securing group rights or benefits to Afrikaners as a whole. Given the salience of race in South Africa, individual mobility in this context also does not involve moving to the dominant group, i.e., passing as black African. White Afrikaans speakers could either join a higher-status group by anglicising and passing as English speakers, or they could discard their ethnic subgroup identity (but maintain Afrikaans) in exchange for a superordinate national identity, although they remain constricted by external categorisation. Considering the importance of ethnicity once more, it is likely that many privileged Afrikaners

[349] This term denotes the cultural equivalent to genes, as coined by Richard Dawkins.

will follow group strategies in pursuit of Afrikaans MLR and Afrikaner group-rights more generally.

Marginalised Afrikaners who, however, do not have the option to participate in the global economy, have only social creativity and social competition as mitigating strategies to employ in the face of identity threats and in the pursuit of their own material interests. Put differently, Afrikaners who are not able to emigrate, or achieve higher status through their own individual mobility, are left with only group-based strategies to employ. As it is the political and legislative context that gives Afrikaners their low status, marginalised Afrikaners could employ social creativity by comparing themselves to the dominant group on another dimension. Since these groups are racially codified, such comparisons would certainly appear inherently racist. This strongly favours selection of the social competition strategy, as employed by Afrikaner organisations aimed at the upliftment of marginalised Afrikaners, who advocate for group-based rights and actively challenge the status quo.

Employing individual and group strategies are, however, not mutually exclusive. Privileged Afrikaners who remain in South Africa can prioritise their own individual self-interest, while also engaging in social competition. For example, they can expend capital that benefits Afrikaners as a whole, such as through supporting the consumption and reproduction of Afrikaans, or by directly contributing to Afrikaner civil organisations. Advocacy for the merger of white and coloured Afrikaans speakers can be viewed as a unique kind of strategy which combines aspects of social creativity and social competition, as it tries to ameliorate both the status and material position of the group, through at the same time fundamentally altering the boundaries and definition of the group.

Because of the Afrikaners' economic strength in the post-Apartheid era (their 'transformation' out of civil service and into entrepreneurship having served many of them particularly well), this is the first time in their history that they have been able to follow the individual mobility strategy en masse. Consequently, we might have anticipated seeing the social creativity and social competition strategies feature less, as many Afrikaners are able to secure their own interests independently from other group members. Under these circumstances, it would also be expected that ethnic identity would become increasingly irrelevant to these white Afrikaans speakers, as not only do they not need the identity and group mobilisation in order to pursue their personal material interests, but there is also a social price to pay for continued identification as an Afrikaner (such as morality threats). Instead, what is becoming clear from

the proliferation of Afrikaans-media consumption in the private sphere, as well as the ubiquitousness of the Solidarity Movement, is that middle- and upper-class white Afrikaans speakers continue to spend funds on Afrikaans, Afrikaners and Afrikaner identity (including following the social competition strategy). This might be considered evidence of the staying power of ethnicity to many minority groups, as predicted by May (2012).

5.3.2.4. Rehabilitating whiteness: a critical race theory critique

Building on the work of writers such as Rebecca Davies (2009) and Mariana Kriel (2006; 2012), Blaser and Van der Westhuizen (2012) offer a critical race theory critique of contemporary Afrikaner identification and mobilisation, similar to Alberts's (2012) perspective above. According to Blaser and Van der Westhuizen (2012:382), after the post-Apartheid optimism dissipated, the "re-racialisation of citizenship" has occurred, as has "black racial nativism in co-constructive relation with white racial denialism". They argue that social sciences research should focus on "the reproduction of whiteness, including its 'disgraced' Afrikaner manifestation" and should critically investigate whiteness in order to "destabilis[e] currently resurgent attempts at rehabilitating whiteness" (2012:383). (See Van der Westhuizen's (2018) support of an 'Afrikaans South African' identity in subsection 5.3.1.6.)

Blaser and Van der Westhuizen (2012:385) ask whether attempts to "rehabilitate an ethnic whiteness in distress" should be viewed as "resurgences of an Afrikaner ethnonationalism". They identify two modes of rehabilitation, both of which they believe move away from "state-focused ethno-nationalism" but may cause "re-racialisation". The first is various forms of "opportunistic adoption of democratic elements to advance Afrikaner priorities", such as the Third Afrikaans Language Movement and other attempts to "recruit 'brown' Afrikaans-speakers as partners in advancing the interests of Afrikaans", and which depart from the race purity of traditional Afrikanerdom. They also cite Solidarity and its discourse of rights, which they believe "is belied by its race politics, which reifies whiteness with a mixture of National Party-esque minority rights talk and ethnicity claims".[350] They suggest that these developments are promoting essentialism (2012:386):

> In these processes of creating apparent openings amidst contestations about categorisation and co-option, new essentialisms emerge. We are seeing a reaffirmation of ethnic closure, albeit with adjusted racial boundaries. This would correspond with large-scale sociological opinion polls showing that, since the 1990s, South Africans

[350] Although I share many of the same concerns as the authors, I believe they do not adequately consider disaffection among minority groups members, and thus summarily dismiss their claims (and group mobilisation in general) as racist ploys. Doing so does not provide solutions for sociopolitical stability and social cohesion.

> think of themselves less in racial terms, but that there is an increase in ethnic identification (Alexander 2006:60). The modernist project of a white nation state, an outpost of Europe at the southern tip of the African continent, has unravelled and, in this sense, Afrikaner nationalism has ceased to exist. What instead seems to have emerged is what Hall (1991:35–6) warns of: a 'return to the local', in which a defensive and exclusivist ethnicity is rediscovered as grounding in the face of the destabilisations of postmodernity and globalisation.[351]

The second mode of rehabilitation concerns "the globalisation of the Afrikaner", which allows Afrikaner capital elites, through the adoption of neo-liberalism, to "withdraw to exclusive spaces while resisting ethnic enclosure". Blaser and Van der Westhuizen (2012:387) link this trend with the boom in Afrikaans consumption (music, film and literature industries, arts festivals and the Naspers media ecosystem), positing that the Afrikaans middle class constitutes an *ethnicised group of individual consumer-citizens*, operating from neoliberalism and "defensive ethnicity" in pursuit of the "retreat from public spaces".[352] They again offer Solidarity as such an example of ethnic consumer-citizenship which blends defensive ethnicity with neoliberalism, illustrated by their support of growth-oriented free-market economics.

Blaser and Van der Westhuizen (2012:388) insist that while Afrikaners have abandoned the goal of a state-based ethnonationalism (i.e., political nationalism and pursuing nation-state congruence), they utilise ethnicity and neo-liberalism as "defence strategies for a whiteness in rehabilitative mode". M. Steyn (2018:10) continues this same line of argument:

> By and large, white South Africans have dealt with their changed political circumstances by thoroughly deploying the cultural capital of whiteness to influence, and even where possible control, the dominant understandings of critical issues within South Africa so as to stem the erosion of the privilege that their whiteness affords them.[353]

Van der Westhuizen (2016:3) cites Hall's (1997) term "the global postmodern" which subsumes two conflicting phenomena: the homogenising force of global capitalism, and the appearance of an "enclosed, defensive national cultural identity". This latter "return to the local" involves a search for "past and hidden histories, local roots" including "a rediscovery of

[351] Note the contrast made between a regressive, reactionary minority ethnicity and globalisation (and the ideal of 'group-less' individuals), a view May (2012) noted is common among academics (see Chapter 2, subsection 2.1.2).

[352] The authors are criticising the maintenance of ethnic identity in the private sphere, even in racially inclusive spaces, demonstrating their inherently negative view of ethnicity (or perhaps only of Afrikaner ethnic identity). While it is vital that researchers critically analyse cultural and political movements, and guard against essentialism, top-down prescriptions regarding 'correct' social identities should be delivered with caution.

[353] Although not in defence of 'whiteness', these authors are also leveraging their own privileged positions to try to influence both identities and politics in South Africa.

ethnicity" in opposition to "the standardising of the global postmodern and its 'flux of diversity'". She continues:

> Similar to the global postmodern, it is a contradictory terrain, and it can adopt an outward or inward-moving posture. Outward postures remember the positioning of the particular within a discourse to avoid mistaking itself for a universal identity, and to think ethnicity as a continuous process, filled with contradictions. In contrast, inward postures can usher in a withdrawal into self-protective, exclusivist enclaves, resisting modernity in a turn towards fundamentalism.

In other words, Van der Westhuizen (2016) conceives here of a rediscovery of ethnicity which avoids the trap of essentialism. In practical terms, it is unclear to me how those with so-called outward postures might engage in ethnic identity maintenance (not mobilisation), in either the public or private sphere, which would not amount to nationalism or (racial) exclusivity in her estimation, and thus be acceptable. Van der Westhuizen (2016:1) coins the term *Afrikaner enclave nationalism*, which acknowledges the defeat of Afrikaner nationalists' territorial claims to a nation-state post-1994, but highlights the "inward migration" and creation of "privatised micro-apartheid in sites ranging from homes, to commercial and religious enterprises, to suburbs", as well as "[v]irtual white spaces in the form of Afrikaans media products".[354]

This unflattering view of Afrikaners equates free association and cultural consumption and maintenance in private spaces with a form of ethnic nationalism, and even Apartheid.[355] While I would not dispute that minority group members might feel more 'comfortable' in minority private spaces than in diverse public spaces, I find the suggestion that participation in the former necessarily means negation of the latter questionable, i.e. in the way Van der Westhuizen (2016:2) puts it: "Inward migration is a wielding of ethnicity (Afrikanerhood) to withdraw from shared national spaces while whitening 'own spaces'".[356] She thus makes herself guilty of the trend May (2012) identified: the pejorative view of minority ethnic identity

[354] In Chapter 3, subsection 3.2.1.3, Tajfel (1982) noted that social distancing from outgroups is not directly related to intergroup conflict.

[355] It has been shown in Chapter 3, subsection 3.4.2, that high identifiers may mitigate morality threats by perceiving intragroup heterogeneity. While one might hesitate to call Van der Westhuizen (and other Afrikaner critics) a high identifier, she does seem to be following this strategy (see especially her use of the volksmoeder symbol to promote the Afrikaans South African identity over other types of Afrikaner identity in subsection 5.3.1.6). Note that perceiving intragroup heterogeneity does not involve disputing the allegation of immorality, but rather, removing the individual self from those who 'deserve' the accusation of immorality. In other words, this strategy sees an ingroup member respond to morality threats by extending (or transferring) that same threat to other ingroup members, or even to the group as a whole.

[356] Van der Westhuizen (2016:4) refers to (Afrikaner) ethnicity and culture as Trojan horses for racism.

and its unfavourable juxtaposition with a valorised national or global identity. She presumably does not regard private black spaces as signifying enclave nationalism, or at least as a problem equally worthy of discussion.

Van der Westhuizen (2016:2) locates enclave nationalism within the broader framework of nationalisms without states which aim for cultural, economic and social autonomy while accepting the political framework of the existing state. She notes that in addition to institutional expression, these types of nationalisms are preoccupied with the preservation of a cultural community. In other words, the maintenance of a subordinate (cultural and/or ethnic) identity, which is not the dominant national identity, equates to enclave nationalism, which she continues to treat as a *sociopolitical problem*, and not simply a *sociocultural matter*. Van der Westhuizen (2016:6) thus argues:

> The Afrikaner enclave nationalists gather under the sign of consumption. This neo-nationalism hinges on the basic precept of capitalism – private property – and is enabled by the wholesale privatisation and monetisation of life under neoliberalism (Brown 2005). Individuals become Afrikaners by becoming consumers of Afrikaner space and culture. Afrikaner identity is enacted through consumption. As was the case with Afrikaner nationalism (Hofmeyr 1987), *die taal* (the language) is central. White Afrikaans subjects beat their retreat into their white Afrikaans world through the plethora of Afrikaans-language cultural products spawned by reinvented neoliberal Afrikaner organisations, from the media to cultural industries to trade unions (Van der Westhuizen 2015). A wholesale neoliberalisation of Afrikaner identity occurs.[357]

Davies (2009:117) believes that "the culture industry" is delivering much more interesting conceptions of identity than the "traditional cultural organisations", which I believe is still the case today. Just as Afrikaans writers questioned and ridiculed Afrikanerdom during the Apartheid years (see Chapter 4, subsection 4.3.3.3), so too contemporary Afrikaans musicians are reshaping Afrikaner identity,[358] and even Afrikaans identity. One such example is musician Peach van Pletzen who promotes the use of *Mengels*, a portmanteau of *meng* (mix) and *Engels* (English) to denote code-switching, and who often collaborates with coloured Afrikaans

[357] Note the emotive language used by the author in this excerpt (such as the use of the word 'spawned' to denigrate Afrikaans institutions and cultural items, essentialist or otherwise). In the same way as Van der Westhuizen (2016:5) accuses one of her interviewees, she might be making herself (an Afrikaans-speaking white woman) guilty of "performative anti-racism", in an attempt, it seems, to separate herself from a stigmatised identity (using the '*ons is nie almal so nie*' (we are not all like that) defence as a social identity threat response).

[358] Klopper (2011) provides an extensive overview of the contribution of Afrikaans Punk Rock music to Afrikaner identity formation, especially the impact of Fokofpolisiekar, the Afrikaans band who for years acted as the voice of an Afrikaner youth struggling with an identity crisis.

musicians, as well as black musicians performing in English. As for young Afrikaans speakers and their views on the Afrikaans culture industry, Davies (2009:118-119) states:

> Language remains unquestionably the focal point of cultural activities and identifications, but there is little common ground between individuals as to the significance of what singing, writing or performing in Afrikaans might mean. Different Afrikaans speakers have responded very differently to the fate of the Afrikaans language and the younger age group is not dissimilar in this respect. Their identifications are similarly moulded by various patterns of integration within the three global, national and local logics. Indeed, the generation gap is most telling again of a local celebration against what are generally perceived as the homogenising tendencies of globalisation. Only within these circles, the local is more strongly associated with 'African influences' and the 'Africanness implied by the very name of the mother tongue'. Undoubtedly there are huge distances still between young black and white South Africans upon the legacy of the past, reconciliation, minority rights and economic imbalances. But there is certainly a high degree of awareness of being Afrikaans and a solid sense of Afrikanerness among young Afrikaans speakers that is to varying degrees far removed from traditional conceptions. Despite this contemporary cultural flowering, marked by a range of lineages and concerns which are indicative of difference as much as commonalities, there are as yet few signs either of the emergence of a definitive subculture or of collective identity.

Of the burgeoning Afrikaans music industry, Davies (2009:119) believes:

> Once again young pioneers are using a far from *suiwer* (pure) Afrikaans in a profusion of different sounds that include metal, hip-hop, popular Afrikaner songs and African music. This resurgence does not so much challenge the establishment as celebrate their country and the language itself: this is a 'new generation of South Africans who believe *local is lekker* (best). They have disposed of their hang-ups about identity and language, in particular being Afrikaans. They speak it, they write it and they rock 'n roll in it'.

Although many Afrikaans musicians are increasingly experimental, both with sounds and conceptualisations of Afrikaner identity, this return to the local and the celebration of South Africa and Afrikaans has also given rise to a sense of nostalgia in Afrikaans music. A recent example of this trend is Die Heuwels Fantasties's popular cover of Lucas Maree's *Victoriabaai* (1996). Crucially, this nostalgia is not for an Apartheid past (most of the song's new listeners are too young to remember this period), but rather, for a (perhaps imagined) past of cultural Afrikanerness free from its current political load. The song describes a longing to visit the coast, where your 'soul can be free', and you may 'find hope'.[359] The music video of the new

[359] Among white Afrikaans speakers (especially from the inland where Maree was from), this specifically conjures up images of a long longed-for summer holiday at the beach over the December school break, and thus elicits a further emotional response due to the connection with one's childhood. The innocence associated with childhood underscores the desire for simplicity in a present filled with complexity. The original song, but also the cover, is pure escapism. Blaser and Van der Westhuizen (2012) characterised such returns to the local much less flatteringly as a rediscovery of defensive and exclusivist ethnicity in the face of globalisation and postmodern destabilisations.

Victoriabaai plays on the nostalgia, featuring an old portable audio player throughout as well as parts of Maree's original music video (Die Heuwels Fantasties, 2021).

Where nostalgia is present in Afrikaans music, it seems to be oriented towards a time (real or imagined) when white Afrikaans speakers lived without shame and guilt (i.e., free from morality threats), and when Afrikaans was not considered political in itself, rather than referencing a time when Afrikaners had political dominance.[360] Furthermore, the function of nostalgia in Afrikaans music is to inform contemporary Afrikaner identity formation.

Davies (2009:119) points to the Afrikaans song most readily identified as political, Bok van Blerk's *De la Rey* (which was also discussed in subsection 5.2.2), arguing that while it is not exactly apolitical, it is not "indicative of any new or distinctive cultural shift or a longing for the past". Grundlingh (2011:155) argues that the song does have a "nostalgic undertone", wherein the present is unfavourably compared to the past, from which "emotional strength" is then drawn.[361] He argues that in this context, nostalgia should not be considered "atavistic in so far as it rather attempts to overcome a modern kind of fragmentation by energising images of the past". He cites Afrikaans writer Dana Snyman in order to explain this function of nostalgia: "[A]fter 1994 many Afrikaners were slightly ashamed of our past […] now we are unashamedly involved in rediscovering ourselves. To rediscover yourself you must know who you were. That is why we become nostalgic about the past". This statement directly links the resurgence of Afrikaner ethnicity with a search for positive social identity.

Popular Afrikaans musician Koos Kombuis, an internal dissident during the 1980s (see the next subsection) who famously 'resigned from Afrikanerdom' early in 2006 (Kombuis, 2006), had a confusingly nostalgic response to *De la Rey* after first being critical of the song. This perhaps illustrates both the staying power of ethnic identity, as well as the generation gap noted by Davies (2009). Steyn (2014:144) cites his response and provides a translation:

> *Ja, wanneer ek die liedjie "De La Rey" hoor, wil ek teruggaan Sondagskool toe, wil ek weer die Kinderbybel lees, wil ek sommer vandag weer by die army aansluit en die*

[360] It is important to differentiate here between Afrikaans music from the 'cultural industry' and Afrikaans music associated with the 'traditional cultural organisations' (including music by Bok van Blerk; see subsection 5.4.1.2). While these two streams of Afrikaans music share many of the same themes (and protest music emanates from both), the latter stream is often preoccupied with essentialist conceptions of Afrikaner identity and even mobilisation. Refer back to the lyrics of *Die Afrikaner maak so* discussed in subsection 5.2.2, as an example.

[361] The music video of *De la Rey* depicts the downtrodden (albeit stoic) Bittereinders (see Chapter 4, subsection 4.2.5.7) during the last stage of the Anglo-Boer War (Van Blerk, 2013). A sense of hope can be derived from this bleak image because of the knowledge that Afrikaners were able to uplift themselves in the decades afterwards, both through Afrikaner organisations and utilising the state apparatus to advance their own interests (see Chapter 4, subsection 4.3.2.4).

> *kakies en al die ander k-goeters sommer in hulle moere gaan skiet. Hoekom? Watter meestersimbool is hier aan die werk? Wat gaan aan met hierdie liedjie, en hoekom doen hy sulke vreeslike soetsappige, simpel dinge met ons onderbewussyn?*
>
> (Yes, when I hear the song "De La Rey," I want to go back to Sunday school, I want to read the Children's Bible again, I even want to join the army again today and just shoot the kakies and all the other k-things to hell.[362] Why? What master symbol is at work here? What is going on with this song, and why does it do such terribly syrupy, stupid things to our subconscious?)

Davies (2009:120) believes that although contemporary Afrikaans musicians draw increasingly diverse audiences, they do not seem "inclined towards disrupting the politico-economic status quo, or joining with wider national or even provincial concerns" (see the recent collaboration between Afrikaans artists and Solidarity in subsection 5.4.1.2). Somewhat contrary to Van der Westhuizen's (2016) views on Afrikaner enclaves, Davies (2009:120-121) highlights the role of Afrikaans arts festivals in "foster[ing] an increasingly inclusive, innovative and vibrant culture". She does, however, remain largely critical of the Afrikaans culture industry (2009:122):

> At the same time, the 'festivalisation of Afrikanerdom' also represents a changing consciousness about the meaning of Afrikanerness in post-apartheid South Africa. It represents a clear assertion of 'ethnic nesting' where 'time is in suspension' and Afrikaans speakers can 'step outside their everyday rituals'. Perceptions of marginalisation and the language being under threat drive these overwhelmingly middle class festivals where creativity and originality in the form of visual arts, dance, classical music, theatre and even the intellectual debates which initially excited much comment are increasingly being sidelined for popular music.

Davies (2009:122) contends that corporations such as Naspers which sponsor Afrikaans arts festivals do so in order to comfort the "cultural sense of loss" as well as to "fan the language debate and 'retain an audience'". She notes the vibrant Afrikaans publishing market, insisting that it does "not suggest the beginnings of a new, formal movement or any willingness to rebuild a culturally-based ethos, but indicates that Afrikaans as a medium of cultural expression is gaining in popularity" (2009:122-123).

As I argued in the previous subsection, the consumption of Afrikaans in the private sphere, despite the availability of the individual mobility strategy (as evidenced by disposable income), suggests that ethnic identity is not as easily discardable as argued by many of its detractors. For some minority groups, such as the Afrikaners, sentimental attachments to group identity

[362] These are derogatory terms referring to the British and black 'enemies' respectively.

(and language in particular) seem to remain despite the fact that it provides little obvious instrumental value to the highly mobile individual in an anglicised global context. Even in the face of identity threats, many white Afrikaans speakers choose to maintain their Afrikaner identity. Whether one considers this to be regressive, nationalist and thus dangerous or not, it certainly challenges a purely instrumental view of ethnicity. As May (2012:44) argued in Chapter 2, subsection 2.1.3, ethnic identity should not only be viewed as a vehicle for attaining resources, but also for providing a vital sense of meaning and belonging to its members.

5.3.2.5. Insights from Afrikaner dissidents of the 1980s

According to Van der Westhuizen (2018:36), nationalism during Apartheid enforced the Afrikaner identity by creating the disciplinary mechanism of *volksvreemdheid* (strange to the people), in which *andersdenkendheid* (thinking differently) was penalised. This effected not only the exclusion of outgroup members, but also of ingroup members who would not conform to the culture of *eendersdenkendheid* (thinking the same).[363] This phenomenon was described through Uncertainty-Identity Theory (UIT) in Chapter 3, subsection 3.3.2.2.

In her study on Afrikaner dissidents during the 1980s, Louw-Potgieter (1988:1-2) argues that the history of "internal strife and shifting intragroup alliances" within the Afrikaner group has been long overlooked, and a large degree of homogeneity and cohesiveness simply taken for granted. These dissidents (or non-prototypical members) could espouse either a left-wing or ultra-right-wing political ideology (within the construct of her study, which located the normative position – the NP – as right wing). She confirms that the perception that an individual has of their own group could affect identification (1988:49).

According to Louw-Potgieter (1988:60), the majority of dissident Afrikaners still identified as Afrikaners, suggesting, among other things, that there is low perceived permeability of ingroup boundaries (especially during Apartheid when group membership was "inescapable and ascriptive"). Many dissidents doubted whether one could ever stop being an Afrikaner, and suggested that anglicising, emigration, and ceasing association with fellow Afrikaners were possible strategies to exit the group (Louw-Potgieter, 1988:61). She notes that some dissidents believed that no matter how hard they tried to 'cancel their Afrikaner group membership', they were prevented from doing so both because of "residual identification", referring to some

[363] Van der Westhuizen (2018:37) lists high profile examples such as Bram Fischer, Breyten Breytenbach and Ingrid Jonker. It is important, however, to note the extraordinary amount of internal policing that all Afrikaners were subjected to at this time, not only by a fundamentalist government, but also through informal social sanctions.

remaining cultural traditions and heritage that will be passed on to the next generation,[364] as well as "ascription by others", in other words, external categorisation (1988:62).

Louw-Potgieter (1988:82-83) notes the views of some respondents that "it was impossible to hide their Afrikaner membership, because of their language, accent or name. For them, group membership was an ascription, something from which one could not escape should one wish to do so". As to the permeability of outgroup boundaries, Louw-Potgieter (1988:63) states that the dissidents believed that they would not easily be welcomed into the English group even if they tried to assimilate, because of remnants of their Afrikaner identity as well as the "perceived superiority" of the target group.

Louw-Potgieter (1988:66) found that dissidents who wanted to maintain ingroup membership employed identity management strategies on an *intragroup* level, concerned with making the ingroup more inclusive (such as by emphasising language and culture) and ignoring exclusive attributes (such as skin colour or political orientation). She believes that in doing so, dissidents were creating a "radical" image for the ingroup, while traditional Afrikaners maintained a conservative image.

Those dissidents who viewed Afrikaner group membership as undesirable employed identity management strategies on an *intergroup* level, which could involve membership in multiple groups, or complete individualisation. Louw-Potgieter (1988:66) highlights one interesting finding from her study, which is that none of the dissidents, including those who perceived a high degree of permeability as well as indicating the desire to exit the Afrikaner group, employed "one of the most obvious strategies of identity maintenance of disaffected group members" which is discarding the ingroup language. Louw-Potgieter (1988:67) continues:

> The autobiographical data concerning the process of becoming a dissident group member […] confirmed Dollard's (1936) idea of each respondent as part of a group with a past older than its members. The social representations concerning the group's past, transmitted via the group's language (for instance, respondents mentioned stories parents told them, history lessons in school, learning the group's poems by heart), served to socialise the respondents effectively into the specific group ethos. Thus the individual became a microcosm of the group. On a different level, the family environment in which the individual served his/her apprenticeship as a group member could also be regarded as an extension of the group and as reflecting stereotypical group norms and folkways. Nationalist, NGK and ethnocentric parents provided an Afrikaans

[364] It is indeed difficult to imagine a person without culture; every individual who exits their ethnic/cultural group, will have still been shaped by a certain environment (see habitus in Chapter 2, subsection 2.1.4).

> background against which social representations were transmitted and identification with the group was forged.

Louw-Potgieter (1988:67) cites Moscovici and Hewstone's (1983:118) explanation: "[E]very member of a group, by birth or otherwise, has the group's representations impressed on him or her. In this way representations infiltrate to the core of the individual's personality. They restrain one's attitudes and perceptions, and one's attachments or repulsions with regard to objects". Louw-Potgieter (1988:68) posits that disaffected Afrikaners display *co-existing identifications* of past and present identities. She terms this phenomenon *residual social identity*, referring to the "influential, former group identifications".

Louw-Potgieter (1988:73) states that disidentification with the former ingroup may result in *psychological ambivalence* among dissidents, as opposed to *indifference*. She found that dissidents displayed increased identification with their past Afrikaner identity in intergroup situations. Especially when overseas, many felt compelled to correct misrepresentations of Afrikaners and/or defend certain issues. Within South Africa, many commented that they 'felt the most Afrikaner' when among people of other ethnicities and rejected Afrikanerdom the most when with 'their own people' (1988:74). These findings illustrate the need for positive differentiation,[365] as well as the greater efficacy of internal versus external criticism (as predicted by SCT; see Chapter 3, subsection 3.3.2.1). She explains (1988:75):

> Dissident Afrikaners were extremely critical of traditional Afrikaners and did not react to critical views of this group when expressed by fellow Afrikaners. However, when outgroup members (foreigners or other South African groups) raised criticisms of Afrikaners, some respondents experienced an unexpected solidarity with this ingroup, even though they had, to a greater or lesser extent, distanced themselves psychologically from it. These feelings of solidarity were particularly salient in situations of social comparison.

So too, residual social identification was found to be influenced by intragroup situations. Louw-Potgieter (1988:77) found that since "language has been identified as *the* criterial attribute for Afrikaner group membership", the use/consumption of Afrikaans had the effect of increasing identification with the past Afrikaner identity. In intergroup situations too, she found that Afrikaans had the ability to increase identification, especially in situations where "their

[365] Internal dissidents demonstrate that the individual mobility strategy is not a conclusive and final choice made once, nor does it exclude the employment of other strategies (even concurrently) as I similarly suggested in subsection 5.3.2.3. Instead, patterns of disassociation and reidentification emerge, wherein individuals manage their social identities in a variety of different intergroup and interpersonal contexts, in service of their underlying identity motives and their material interests. This same phenomenon is visible among Afrikaner emigrants.

language was not appreciated and/or suppressed by outgroups" (1988:78). She notes that this supports Giles and Johnson's (1981) hypothesis that ethnolinguistic vitality (see Chapter 2, subsection 2.4.4) could influence the salience of ethnic identification. In other words, threats to the distinctive continuity of the group identity serves to increase identification. To a lesser extent, Afrikaner history, in particular the Anglo-Boer War, was found to be able to invoke strong ethnic affiliation.

Only one respondent (cited in Louw-Potgieter, 1988:80) felt more Afrikaans when with family, stating: "Around the fire, you know, where we sit and talk … it is like when I was a child … then I feel: I am still part of this group. They are still my people". Another respondent, who reported feeling more 'at home' with like-minded English-speakers than with Afrikaners, did express feeling the most at home with Afrikaans-speaking like-minded people. A third respondent reported feeling more at home with Afrikaners who shared the same political opinions, than other groups who share the same political opinions, because of the common language as well as "loyalty, because we are Afrikaners" (Louw-Potgieter, 1988:81).

It is important to note regarding Louw-Potgieter's (1988) study that respondents were clearly high status, upper-middle class and educated, as numerous mentions are made of overseas travel, and professions include writers, academics and theologians. This profile would fit in with the highly mobile individuals presupposed by hybridity theory and cosmopolitanism. However, the question of dissidence and disidentification among the rest of the Afrikaner population remains unanswered.

According to Louw-Potgieter (1988:81), the majority of respondents did not try to conceal their membership of the Afrikaner group, while a minority disclosed it selectively, or identified with "less selective groups memberships", for example, as South African. She believes that this supports a situational view of ethnicity (see Chapter 2, subsection 2.1), where members have a choice of emphasising or obfuscating their ethnic identity, and assuming other social identities. In addition to this strategy for "presentation of membership in a non-desirable group", she identifies several other self-presentation strategies aimed at intragroup differentiation, wherein the group membership was acknowledged, but dissimilarity with the ingroup was highlighted.

The first such strategy is *enhancement of group membership*, which involves the dissident flaunting their Afrikaner group membership, in order to accentuate their differences from other members. This strategy thus ironically relies on heightened ethnic identification, in order to actualise decreased ethnic identification by emphasising intragroup heterogeneity. The second

strategy is *self-mockery*, wherein stereotypes of Afrikaners would be invoked humorously. The third strategy is to *allow others to categorise one incorrectly*, for example, by being perceived as an English speaker because of native English fluency and/or liberal political views, and then identifying the correct categorisation. One respondent noted their pleasure at situations wherein they were miscategorised and could "come back with a vengeance and, you know, to change into broad Afrikaans. Such a nice game …". This suggests that dissidents who emphasise intragroup heterogeneity in the face of morality threats, might do so (partly) in defence of their ethnic group, and not just themselves, in a case of "*ons is nie almal so nie*" (we are not all like that). It would also suggest that miscategorisation threat applies differently to dissidents in some contexts.

Louw-Potgieter (1988:83-84) notes the link between residual social identity and shared pride (especially regarding Afrikaans) and shame and collective guilt (regarding Apartheid), claiming that these emotions are experienced as a group member, regardless of prior disidentification with the ethnic group. She explains that despite being ashamed of other Afrikaners, respondents were not ashamed of their own group membership. This ambivalence towards the ethnic group, as opposed to indifference (or outright hatred), reinforces May's (2012) views regarding the "enduring influence" of ethnic groups. Louw-Potgieter (1988:84) emphasises that even a repudiated group can thus contribute positively to a person's social identity. She argues that one can therefore expect even dissidents to seek to retain their group membership, although it might involve them redefining Afrikaner identity so as to exclude other ingroup members.

> They identified with positive aspects of the group, like the common language or a shared background, but at the same time sought to differentiate themselves from the negative aspects of the group. These negative aspects were those identified by the respondents as the sources of feelings of shame. Respondents reported feeling ashamed of ingroup members when they engaged in acts of outgroup hostility (racism, prejudice, injustice), or when ingroup members displayed negative ingroup traits (stupidity, isolationist mentality, normative prescriptions regarding Afrikaner group membership, superiority, uncouthness, etc.). This again illustrates that, as critical group members, dissident Afrikaners might have radical representations of their group and might identify with this group in terms of these representations.

Louw-Potgieter (1988:86) found that the majority of respondents displayed negative emotions when perceived as different from the Afrikaner group, as exceptions to the ingroup. Thus, their ingroup membership was being questioned by outgroup members (a combination of miscategorisation threat and acceptance threat). She elaborates (1988:86): "These negative

emotions were attributed to irritation or anger with such a stereotypical way of thinking, or a normative conception of what an Afrikaner should look like". Dissidents displayed a more fluid conception of Afrikaner identity than some outgroup members, who promoted Afrikaner stereotypes and (perhaps unwittingly) enforced *eendersdenkendheid* by policing the group boundaries from outside.

Louw-Potgieter (1988:87) concludes that while social comparison is the link between social identity and social categorisation, as Tajfel's SIT posits, when examining residual social identity, *intragroup comparison* should be examined alongside intergroup comparison. She states (1988:88):

> *In toto,* the social identity of a dissident Afrikaner could be conceived of as a process of negotiating different group memberships in different situations, and the active construction of a new self-image in which former group memberships are sometimes unexpectedly affirmed or even act as constraints to new memberships. If one adds to this the fact that all these complicated identification manoeuvres seem to take place in a very casual, almost reflexive and automatic way, one might have a more accurate image of how a dissident member manages to be member and non-member at the same time.

Louw-Potgieter (1988:90) categorises respondents into four sub-categories, depending on their perceptions of group formation among fellow dissident Afrikaners. These subcategories are: (i) dissidents as group members; (ii) dissidents as interacting individuals; (iii) dissidents as individuals; and (iv) dissidents in isolation. On the whole, Afrikaner dissidents were prevented from enacting social change due to a lack of group formation among them, which had a negative effect on political mobilisation. Respondents largely rejected the notion of co-operation with existing political groups, owning to their tendencies towards individualism, reluctance to engage in politics, as well as opposition to group memberships (Louw-Potgieter, 1988:106).

Some of the respondents doubted their role as agents of social change and appeared to believe that *intragroup attitude change* was their main role, rather than impacting outgroup members or influencing intergroup relations (Louw-Potgieter, 1988:94-97). I would argue, however, that affecting ingroup members amounts to social change, especially if the effect is to improve intergroup relations. Some were focused on interindividual contact between ingroup and outgroup members (Louw-Potgieter, 1988:106). Still others believed they had no role and were not interested in political activities (Louw-Potgieter, 1988:102).

Louw-Potgieter (1988:108) rejects a primordial view of ethnicity in support of a situational or constructed view, although she does acknowledge that certain limitations exist on individual member's choices of identification (see the critique of rational choice theory in Chapter 2, subsection 2.1.3). Her position is thus amenable to May's (2012) third way approach, which considers ethnicity to be malleable but not entirely arbitrary.

Louw-Potgieter (1988:113) constructed a model of Afrikaner identity during the 1980s, wherein she identified the dominant normative subgroup (the faction with political and cultural power able to construct social categories and disseminate essentialist conceptualisations of social identities) as white NP voters, whom she terms *Afrikaners*. Members of this subgroup may therefore be viewed as prototypical, some of whom are entrepreneurs of identity. Louw-Potgieter (1988:113-114) identified several other subgroups in this model of Apartheid-era Afrikaner identity, similar to the types identified in subsection 5.3.1.6.

From the perspective of Louw-Potgieter's Afrikaners, these subgroups are: *Liberale/liberaliste* (liberals) were viewed as too left-wing and as proponents of racial integration. *Ware Afrikaners* (true Afrikaners) were viewed as too right wing, having joined ultra-right-wing parties like the Conservative Party (CP), the Albert Hertzog's HNP, or belonging to organisations such as the AWB, and were thus excluded from the ingroup. Louw-Potgieter (1988:114) explains that normative Afrikaners, who did not view this latter subgroup as belonging to the ingroup, had to reject from their ranks even "those who consider themselves essential and prototypical group members". They could do so by propagating a new ideology of reform; emphasising the outdatedness of the Ware Afrikaners' conception of Afrikaner identity.[366] In addition, *Coloureds* were not viewed as ingroup members because of race. Louw-Potgieter (1988:115-116) argues that the Afrikaners group (re)constructed Afrikaner identity for political interest:

> One of the basic assumptions of this model of Afrikaner identity and dissent is the idea that the *Afrikaners'* definition of identity might change over time. For instance, a respondent in the interview study alleged that "NP Afrikaners do not have a consistent viewpoint regarding Afrikaners". At times, a rigid ideology of apartheid might be adhered to, resulting in firm boundaries between outgroup and ingroup. At other times, for instance when the superior position of the group is threatened (e.g. by cultural assimilation with the English-speaking group, or by political domination by the black majority), *Afrikaners* might, in an expedient, pragmatic manner, attempt to include in the ingroup those formerly regarded as outgroup members. Such attempts at inclusion have resurfaced recently with the new ideology of "reform", and it has been noted that there has recently been more tolerance for "heretics" (white, left-wing Afrikaans

[366] 'Liberale/Liberaliste' correspond with Kotze's (2013) 'Afrikaanses', 'Ware Afrikaners' with his 'Pseudo-Boers', and 'Afrikaners' with his 'Afrikaners' group.

> speakers) and that intergroup alliances, especially with "our Afrikaans-speaking brown people" (Editorial, *Rapport,* 17.7.1983), are mentioned with more frequency. It should be noted, however, that just as "reform" remains on the ideological level for *Afrikaners,* so do the attempts at inclusion of these subgroups. A complex approach avoidance strategy on the part of the *Afrikaners* in relation to these subgroups could thus be expected. It should also be noted that, despite the fact that Afrikaans is their home language, specific subgroups of dominated Afrikaans speakers might not define themselves as Afrikaners and might, therefore, experience a "misfit" between self and other definitions in these situations […]

Louw-Potgieter (1988:116-117) also identifies *politically left-wing, white Afrikaans speakers* and *Bruin Afrikaners* (Brown Afrikaners) as subgroups. She notes that coloured and Indian representatives have been included in the political system by Afrikaners when "the existence of the Afrikaner group is threatened". In the case of Bruin Afrikaners, this could also involve accentuating the common language and culture between them and Afrikaners. Other subgroups include *white Afrikaans speakers who have become anglicised*, involving former group members following strategies of individual mobility to exit their ethnic group (such as anglicising the pronunciation of their Afrikaner names), *politically "extreme" white Afrikaans speakers* who were disparagingly called communists (such as Bram Fischer) and Black Afrikaans speakers,[367] a subgroup that is considered too different to be included in the ingroup despite their shared language (Louw-Potgieter, 1988:118-119).

According to Louw-Potgieter (1988:130), Afrikaners, Liberale and Ware Afrikaners displayed firm confidence in their own group membership, all believing that "*their* specific definition of 'Afrikaner' was the *true* definition". At the time of her study, Afrikaners, however, had the political power and controlled the media and could thus disseminate their group ideology and impose it upon others. Louw-Potgieter (1988:130) concludes her study by noting that despite this control, intragroup heterogeneity persisted:

> What emerged […] was not a single, coherent, divinely determined identity which all group members inevitably inherit at birth, but a multitude of different "Afrikaner identities", actively constructed by various groups of Afrikaans speakers. The "social acrobatics" (Codol, 1984) of identity management on the part of these subgroups involved, *inter alia,* the *Afrikaners'* everchanging definition of what constitutes group membership, the complexity of dissident Afrikaners' residual social identification, and the conflict experienced by "true" Afrikaners between their own claims of prototypicality and *Afrikaners'* constant repudiation of such claims. In the final analysis, Afrikaner identity thus equals contested identity and will remain a

[367] Louw-Potgieter (1988:119) characterises the continued use of Afrikaans by this subgroup, in the same areas as the 1976 Soweto Uprising (see Chapter 4, subsection 4.3.3.3), and the neglect of this subgroup by the Afrikaners, as "extraordinary".

> controversial issue as long as the Afrikaans language exists to express the claims and counterclaims of Afrikaans speakers.

Louw-Potgieter's (1988) prescient statement remains valid nearly four decades later. Davies (2009:107) suggests that younger white Afrikaans speakers, who might be heavily politicised, tend to question nationalist and group values. She believes that although internal dissent is an integral part of Afrikaner identity, the concept of generation is better able to highlight factors that lead to shifts in identification, noting that instances of counterculture movements usually occur among the youth. Davies explains that just as historical context is necessary to understand Afrikaner identification, and heterogeneity in particular, so too social and economic change have to be taken into account. Generation, she argues, acts "as a marker of broader and changing patterns of employment, roles and responsibilities, mobility and new patterns of inequality in the restructuring of social relations". Davies (2009:107-108) believes that Afrikanerdom has always been "an ideological construct, always in a state of becoming".

> By the early 1990s, any sense of a collective ethnic identity had disintegrated along with most remnants of an official culture. What remains are hugely diverse sentiments and identifications expressed by former anti-apartheid dissidents, proponents of Afrikaner group self-determination, capital elites, and a younger generation freed of the political and intellectual constraints of apartheid amongst others. A generation that is increasingly different from their parents not merely in terms of material well-being, but also their willingness to engage with their moral inheritance.

According to Davies (2009:108), the *Sestigers* (discussed in Chapter 4, subsection 4.3.3.3) began the history of internal dissidence in the 1960s,[368] which was continued in the 1980s by the *Voëlvry* (outlawed) music movement, a rebellious anti-Apartheid Afrikaans protest music movement including artists such as Koos Kombuis, *grensliteratuur* (border literature) in protest of the South African Border War (1966-1990) in Namibia, Angola and Zambia, as well as cultural activism at the time. She states (2009:109):

> What is most evident is that this relentless barrage of ridicule, disillusionment, malaise and creativity was, and in many respects continues to be, virtually an entirely internal affair, part and parcel of the grouping's broad cultural pantheism. Any idea of an official Afrikaner culture was very firmly laid to rest during these critical decades. Expressions of dissent became far more open, even as the dissenters themselves were embraced in part by the very establishment they derided. Indeed, a tradition of dissident activism was entrenched that not only borrowed from Afrikanerdom's recent past, but

[368] Davies (2009:110) cites the interesting case of one of the Sestigers, Breyten Breytenbach, who "has come almost full circle from preaching indifference to the fate of Afrikaans, to speaking out strongly in its defence".

> also, by tampering with and stretching the Afrikaans language, elevated its resonance as an instrument and expression of this activism in political and cultural circles.

As Afrikaans was (and remains) an integral part of Afrikaner identity, so too the language was central in internal dissidence and efforts to reform the identity. Despite the undeniable impact of these cultural activists during Apartheid, Davies (2009:109) insists that their dissidence did not "develop an especially creative or constructive intellectual project". Davies (2009:109-110) cites Nash (2000) as explanation of the failure of internal dissidents as follows:

> [Their arguments were] conducted strictly at a normative level. That is, it proposes a single norm for "the Afrikaner", regardless of whether that norm should be adopted by all Afrikaners, or by none, or some number in between. The argument never reflects on the likelihood that Afrikaners differ with one another on apartheid, or on the need to preserve political power. It does not consider the differing ways in which Afrikaners (or others) could align themselves with the aspiration of the oppressed majority, nor how the meaning of their political choices may change over time. It takes no account of how Afrikaans culture and language has been formed by the context of racial domination, nor of how this legacy would be contested in a post-apartheid context. Within this perspective, the burden of the past could be shaken off through a simple normative choice. The "sins of the fathers" would not be visited upon the generations to come.

In this section, I discussed various aspects of Afrikaner identity, including its position in South Africa and in a globalised world, its proposed reformation, its importance and meaning to different types of Afrikaners, and the latter's responses to various identity threats. The previous section covered the various modes of political mobilisation found among Afrikaners in the post-Apartheid era. In the next and final section, I aim to deepen the understanding of the intersection between Afrikaner ethnic identity, mobilisation and national politics, as well as assess the danger this group poses to sociopolitical stability and social cohesion. I will attempt to evaluate their claim to minority-language rights and group rights; and offer my own insights regarding the trajectory of current identity and political trends and movements among Afrikaners, incorporating the arguments made by May (2012) in Chapter 2, especially concerning educational-language rights, nation-state congruence and pluralism.

5.4. Afrikaner Rights Claims: Validity and Projections

5.4.1. Are Afrikaners dangerous?

5.4.1.1. Who speaks? And on whose behalf?

Davies (2009:110-111) argues that in contemporary debates surrounding Afrikaans, identity and "so-called Afrikaner alienation", issues such as crime, farm murders, affirmative action

and anglicisation policies are presented as purely Afrikaner problems, and thus Afrikaners are painted as the only economically, politically and culturally marginalised community. I suspect that through the increasing co-operation between the white and coloured Afrikaans communities, as well as a broader understanding of the situation of all minority groups in South Africa, this critique may be somewhat less relevant. However, despite some overtures to black communities (such as Afrikaner agricultural organisations assisting black farmers), I agree that there is no broad-scale dialogue among Afrikaners regarding *other* marginalised communities.

Afrikaner organisations (particularly the Solidarity Movement, which I discuss in depth in the next subsection), which receive private donations and fees from mostly white Afrikaans speakers, are not concerned with solving all of the abovementioned problems, an undertaking surely outside the scope of civil organisations and cultural institutions. Instead, they attempt to safeguard their members from (some of) the failures of the state (such as through community policing and fixing potholes), defend their members legally against encroachments by the state (such as in labour and employment disputes and by challenging language and other national policies), and provide Afrikaans-medium entertainment and services. While one can certainly criticise the (largely) ethnic exclusivity of these organisations, it is unreasonable to suggest that they should assume responsibility over state functions for all citizens (i.e., urge them to either help everyone or no one). The prospect of (unelected) Afrikaner organisations taking even wider control of the delivery of services in South Africa undoubtedly threatens the supremacy of the ANC state. It seems then that it is not so much their mobilisation that is viewed as problematic, but rather their *ethnic* mobilisation.

The unprecedented growth of Afrikaner organisations, seen both in their membership numbers and in their spheres of influence, opens up a larger debate, that of the democratic nature of these organisations. While they insist that they act and speak only on behalf of their members (already a broad claim), their actions impact the entire white Afrikaans community. Considering that they attract so much attention in the media and are actively shaping not only Afrikaner politics but also Afrikaner identity, white Afrikaans speakers should begin to wonder about their new unelected representatives. Davies (2009:111) also notes this troubling trend:

> The question of who has the (moral) authority to speak on behalf of Afrikaners, as well as a fitting definition of 'who or what the Afrikaner is' is far from resolved. Nonetheless, the defence of Afrikaans culture and language in the new South Africa has, for the most part, fallen to a number of cultural and nationalist organisations – the culture industry – as well as the same band of dissidents who spoke out against the *ancient regime*.

Van Zyl-Hermann (2018:2679), who conducted fieldwork at Solidarity's headquarters in 2011, found that it was increasingly "downplaying its working-class roots" in favour of a narrative that it has historically been "tied closely to the fortunes of the 'Afrikaner people'". She cites their emphasis on the Anglo-Boer War aftermath as the background to their establishment in 1902 as an example. She further argues that the Solidarity Movement, a conglomerate of Afrikaner organisations centred around the Solidarity labour union, positions itself as the voice of Afrikaners, not only in the present but also throughout its history.

In 2011, present CEO of Solidarity, Dirk Hermann, referred to the union as "a golden thread [running] through this early development of the Afrikaner" and insinuated that the union played a central role in the NP's electoral success in 1948, while simultaneously distancing the union from Apartheid and the NP in the post-1948 period. According to Van Zyl-Hermann (2018:2680), "both Hermann and Buys [chairperson of the Solidarity Movement] maintained this historical misrepresentation, presenting the Movement as having a history of political opposition, independence from the state, and being critical of the government of the day". She claims that their "selective representation of the past" involves obscuring the history of white supremacy while emphasising "Afrikaners' victimhood and resilience". According to Van Zyl-Hermann, in Hermann's book *Basta! Ons voetspore is in Afrika* (Enough! Our footprints are in Africa), he "explicity sought to decriminalise the Afrikaner past".

Van Zyl-Hermann (2018:2681) points out Solidarity's sleight of hand: co-opting a pre-existing narrative among Afrikaners – that of "national suffering and redemptive resistance to oppression" (Dubow, 2014:18 cited in Van Zyl-Hermann, 2018:2681), which was expertly employed by Apartheid-era nationalists (and which itself originates from earlier Afrikaner history) – and centring and naturalising themselves as "the defender and voice of 'the people'".

Flip Buys (2019:347), in turn, has stated that there is no one who has the mandate to speak for Afrikaners (to the government), emphasising that Afrikaners 'need an address'. He has suggested that if a sufficient number of Afrikaners support a 'national forum of organisations', it can be extended to a representative body, and even an elected body (2019:349-350). This forum would liaise with the government, and with other communities on behalf of Afrikaners.

Buys (2019:350) makes it clear that because of its large support base, the Solidarity Movement will be the starting point for such a forum.[369]

They have recently put this in practice with their involvement in the *Afrikaner-verklaring* (Afrikaner Declaration), a joint statement released in April 2024 and signed by 19 individuals, mostly leadership within the Solidarity Movement, the Afrikanerbond and the FAK.[370] Despite them acknowledging that they *only* speak on behalf of the two million Afrikaners represented by the organisations involved, this declaration set out to demonstrate "the disposition and good faith of Afrikaners", convince other Afrikaner organisations, leaders and individuals to sign on, and convince the government of the need to establish "a cultural accord with Afrikaners" (Politicsweb, 2024). Below is the summarised version of the twelve points highlighted in the declaration:[371]

- Afrikaners are an indigenous cultural community of Africa.
- We want to stay here and contribute to the well-being of the country and all its people.
- Co-operation is in the interest of the freedom, safety and prosperity of everyone.
- We are building to remain here.
- Cultural freedom is a condition for democratic freedom.
- We subscribe to the equal worth of all communities.
- The past must not destroy the future of us all.
- The Constitution acknowledges the aspiration for territory.
- Unity in diversity.
- Participation in relevant governmental decision-making.
- Economic empowerment.
- A cultural accord.

Notwithstanding questions regarding their mandate, the timing of the declaration (in the run up to the national election), or the sincerity of some of these points, this is by no means a particularly radical political action – perhaps with the exception of the recommendation of

[369] Now that the dawn of coalition politics in South Africa has increased the potential political power of an Afrikaner party (see subsection 5.2.3), a Solidarity political party is also not a completely far-fetched notion, at least not a local Pretoria-based one contesting municipal elections.

[370] Only one of the signatories, the wealthy winemaker Schalk Burger, is from the south of the country.

[371] The full version can be accessed here: https://afrikanerverklaring.co.za/en/#tab-signthestatement. Interestingly, several edits were made from the original press release to the version now available online. What used to be "connected to Africa" is now "of Africa", "welfare" became "well-being", and "equality of all of communities" became "equal worth of all communities".

"special cultural zones with a geographical base" (which I discuss further in subsection 5.4.2.1). Instead of defiance of the ruling government, this declaration indicates the depth of the insecurity and frustration many Afrikaners experience as a minority group without representation in the state. The ANC government responded by swiftly dismissing the need for an Afrikaner pact (Prince & Van der Westhuizen, 2024), with President Cyril Ramaphosa (2024) pleading with Afrikaners not "to retreat into laagers of ethnicity and race". With no other means of persuading the government to include Afrikaners and respect their Afrikaans minority-language rights, the Afrikaner Declaration has thus amounted to nothing but more insecurity and frustration among this segment of white Afrikaans speakers.

While it did not manage to achieve much politically, the Afrikaner Declaration set in motion a vigorous (and ongoing) public debate about Afrikaner and Afrikaans identity and identification among prominent Afrikaans writers, intellectuals and leaders such as Theuns Eloff (2024), Wannie Carstens (2024a; 2024b; 2024c), Christo van der Rheede (2024), Tim du Plessis (2024), Barnard Beukman (2024), Alida Kok (2024a), Jan Bosman (2024), Heindrich Wyngaard (2024), Carel Boshoff (2024), Pieter Malan (2024) and Theo de Jager (2024). The focus of these writings (and the lively comment sections where 'regular' Afrikaans speakers were able to join the debate) seems to have shifted from critiques of the Afrikaner Declaration and the organisations and individuals involved, to the question of, and resistance to, white and coloured unification. This shift appears to be largely in response to Van der Rheede's critique of the 'Afrikaner agenda' (and thus perhaps suggests the presence of identity threats in the face of external criticism by an outgroup member). I am, however, uncertain of how representative these views are of white Afrikaans speakers in general.

Davies (2009:111) believes that in addition to cultural elites and dissident intelligentsia are groups of "non-elite" Afrikaners, who identify with Afrikaans and/or Afrikaners only marginally or not at all. Among the younger generation, Davies insists, "a novel politics" is appearing, as postmodernism is contributing to increased plurality. Of this contemporary adoption of a postmodernist conception of identity, Davies (2009:111-112) states:

> […] it has been absorbed into an embryonic post-nationalist identity that is potentially more tolerant, plural and porous that its earlier, nationalist counterpart. It represents the climax of a process begun as a 'coming of age' (*mondigwording*) that has culminated in a political and philosophical outlook that seeks to protect Afrikaner cultural values and minority rights. Although it represents a break with the ideology of Afrikaner nationalism as a means of ensuring the survival of Afrikaans language and culture, it nonetheless operates squarely within the hegemonic ideology of the neoliberal global capitalist system. Certainly it is committed to 'pluralism in politics, culture and

> religion', albeit one that is 'never developed into a larger programme of social change, nor engages in any sustained way with actual historical struggles'. What this means is that although the connections between politics and culture today might be somewhat more oblique, hegemonic and global forces still play a critical role in the alternative project offered by postmodernism and its commitment to pluralism.

According to Davies (2009:112), this novel politics is concerned with increasing localisation and opposing homogenisation:

> The historical context against which this project is set is highly significant. It seeks to protect 'cultural diversity and *local forms of community* against the homogenising pressures of capitalist globalisation', and to defend '*local forms of autonomy*' in order to create an 'anti-hegemonic position against the powers that be'. Only certain forms of community and political marginalisation are addressed. In this way, its concerns are narrow and limited to a defence primarily of marginal cultural values and language, and without a wider agenda or outlook it has most appeal within localised pockets or groupings. Its targets might appear extravagant to the majority of South Africans – for example, a future Afrikaans university – but it is all about 'creating spaces in which the Afrikaans language can be vibrant', 're-imaging ourselves along radical democratic terms' and thus 'linking with democratic impulses in our past'.

Davies (2009:113) notes that Solidarity has become popular among non-elite Afrikaners who "exist outside the political mainstream but who cling to their version of the Afrikaner 'ideal'":

> Apart from a number of shared cultural concerns and a distaste for selective aspects of neo-liberal capitalism, however, there is as yet little common ground in the programmes promoted by the younger generation of cultural activists and the Solidarity trade unionists.

In the decade and a half since the publication of Davies' (2009) book, under the leadership of Flip Buys, the Solidarity Movement has been enacting a wide and far-reaching plan for Afrikaners in South Africa and have so far been extremely successful. So too, I suspect that there has been an uptick in ethnic identification among "non-elite Afrikaners". According to Van Zyl-Hermann (2018:2673), national populism is having a resurgence worldwide, resulting from the economic insecurity, lack of local autonomy and challenges of multiculturalism present in globalised societies. She identifies the Solidarity Movement as a populist actor in South Africa (2018:2674):

> Here, the Solidarity Movement is driving a national populist reinvigoration of ethnic and racial identity politics. Contrary to whiteness scholars' portrayal of white racial and ethnic identity as fractured, "in distress" and on the defensive, this represents a new assertiveness in the white minority. The Movement's anti-establishment attitudes, calls for autonomy, and cultural nationalism are cast as a response to the corruption and state failure which has increasingly characterised South Africa since president Jacob Zuma of the African National Congress (ANC) took office in 2009. Closer examination

> shows, however, that more than just an anti-Zuma movement, its antagonism is directed at all black South Africans, represented as the unscrupulous majority "other" threatening white livelihoods and cultural identity.

In my view, the Solidarity Movement positions itself squarely as an alternative to ANC rule in the north, similar to the positioning of the DA in the south, albeit with an added ethnic component. Instead of aggression towards the black population at large, I believe they usually display indifference. Van Zyl-Hermann (2018:2675) further suggests that:

> [T]he Solidarity Movement's discursive strategies […] reinvent the past; recast race; and reformulate nationalist narratives by neoliberal logics. Throughout, this involves foregrounding ethnic and racial identities while downplaying other social divisions. In this way, the Movement legitimises its claim to be the voice of the post-apartheid white minority, and Afrikaners in particular, and mobilises support for strategies which bolster white power, privilege and ideologies of superiority.

The growing assertiveness of Afrikaner organisations, which Van Zyl-Hermann (2018) noted, is visible in the 2019 election poster of the FF+, which reads "Hit Back: Now or Never", as well as the marketing graphic from Solidarity below:

Figure 8: FF+ 2019 "Slaan Terug" election poster

Figure 9: Solidarity #taxfist campaign

Van Zyl-Hermann (2018:2676) insists that the scholarly consensus of "defensive whiteness and fragile Afrikaner ethnic identification" is belied by the national populism presented by the increasingly "ambitious and assertive" Solidarity Movement. She states that since 2015, Solidarity has ramped up its criticism of the ANC government with Flip Buys warning of "imminent state collapse" and the shift "from majority rule to majority domination" (2018:2677). At its *Toekomsberaad* (Future Summit) held in October 2015, *Helpmekaar 2020* (Mutual Aid 2020) was launched. This R3,5 billion fund, described as a "Plan B" for Afrikaners, would "do the things the government is not doing for Afrikaners".

5.4.1.2. The Solidarity Movement's identity entrepreneurship and mobilisation

According to Van Zyl-Hermann (2018:2678), economic downturn and black resistance during the 1970s led to the NP reforming its race-based labour laws. This led to a schism between them and white labour, which saw the Mine Workers' Union (MWU; the precursor to Solidarity) aligning with right-wing organisations. However, in 1994 "the futility of right-wing resistance" became apparent, and both the union and white people in general were forced to accept the 'new' South Africa.

Van Zyl-Hermann (2018:2678) states that Flip Buys's appointment as general secretary of the MWU in 1997 ushered in a period of renewal of the union. By its centenary, when it was renamed *Solidariteit* (Solidarity), its membership had evolved from blue-collar workers to professionals across various industries, and was no longer exclusively white. Its scope grew beyond merely labour, to a civil society organisation representing minorities broadly, but especially white Afrikaans speakers.

Today the Solidarity Movement comprises roughly 50 institutions, including the labour union Solidarity, the civil rights organisation AfriForum, the FAK, educational institutions (*Sol-Tech* and *Akademia*), a social welfare organisation (*Helpende Hand*), an internet-based media house (*Maroela Media*), a Christian think-tank (*Begrond Instituut*), a publishing house (*AfriForum Uitgewers*, formerly *Kraal Uitgewers*) and various others. Below is a graphic illustrating their ever-expanding spheres of influence:



Figure 10: The Solidarity Movement's spheres of influence

Together, the institutions under the Solidarity Movement boast more than 500 000 members,[372] who together with their families represent two million people by Solidarity's estimates (Solidarity Movement, 2024a). It recently launched the *Afrikanerstigting* (Afrikaner Foundation) to raise international support, including from the Afrikaner diaspora, and to foster co-operation with international institutions (see seeking assistance in Chapter 3, subsection 3.4.2). Representing a "digital culture home for the Afrikaner diaspora", the expressed goal of this initiative is to "make it possible for Afrikaners to stay in South Africa" (Jansen, 2024).[373] Below is a diagram (partially) outlining the Solidarity Movement conglomerate:

[372] Its membership in 1980 was 18,000 and in 1992 it had grown to only 44,000 (Van Zyl-Hermann, 2018:2678). The success of Solidarity is thus clearly linked not to white agitation about the prospect of black-majority rule, but with the reality of ANC rule and the post-Apartheid dispensation, and what this meant both for Afrikaner cultural rights and material interests.

[373] Head of Solidarity's International Liaison office, Jaco Kleynhans, intimated that it is not only Afrikaners who have something to offer the world, but also South Africa and the whole of Africa.



Figure 11: The Solidarity Movement and some of its subsidiaries

On their website, the Solidarity Movement (2024b) lists the following principles as foundational to their organisation:

- A Christian Democratic framework
- A free-market economy and the right of ownership
- The rule of law
- Healthy race relations and mutual recognition and respect
- Federalism instead of centralism
- Community self-reliance instead of relying on the state
- Safe communities
- Good jobs for people and a productive, well-trained and well-paid workforce
- Mother-tongue education and training
- The family as cornerstone of the community
- Afrikaans, our cultural way of life, history and heritage

- The republican tradition of citizenship characterised by consent and participation instead of mere subservience
- The freedom of persons, cultural communities, the economy, the courts and the media
- Social care for vulnerable persons
- Multiple identities such as being Africans, Afrikaners, South Africans and Afrikaans-speaking persons

Across the Solidarity Movement's organisations, two core values are consistently expressed: Christianity and Afrikaansness. While they predictably do not mention whiteness, it is clear that they are by and large an organisation for and of white Afrikaans speakers. What is more interesting though is the seemingly greater weight given to religion as foundational and guiding principle (and thus in conflict with the core cultural value of Afrikaner ethnic identity). The website of the private Afrikaans university, Akademia (2024), lists Christianity as the first foundational principle, even before the Afrikaans language, despite its establishment being directly related to the language debate surrounding HAUs. Similarly, the website of news outlet Maroela Media (2024; my translation) states that 'Maroela Media's Christian character is the core of our editorial policy'. The blending of Afrikaans and Christianity occurs commonly, such as in this Helpende Hand graphic which reads 'my heritage is beautiful' from the Afrikaans translation of Psalm 16 verse 6:

Figure 12: Afrikaans and Christianity in Solidarity

The selection of Christianity as core cultural value of Afrikaner identity is interesting since, as I noted in subsection 5.3.1.5, the majority of all South Africans are Christian, and this would seemingly disqualify religion from use in achieving positive distinctiveness. My suspicion is that Christianity is instead being used to elicit an emotional response from white Afrikaans

speakers, who are mostly still very devout, in an attempt to mobilise them; such as by driving new membership. That, and the fact that the leadership throughout the Solidarity Movement are themselves Christians and seem to believe that there can be no Afrikaner identity without religion. The recent spat between academics and leadership at Akademia over the teaching of evolution demonstrates the latter's unwavering commitment to promoting a Christian belief system among Afrikaners, and not simply to provide Afrikaans-medium education (Eybers, 2024).[374] Buys (2019:270-272) has argued emphatically that Afrikaners are Westerners, and that the most important value of Western culture is Christianity.[375]

The extent to which the use of Christianity to motivate Afrikaners relies on the historic narrative of the Christians versus the heathens/barbarians (as was discussed throughout Chapter 4) is unclear to me. I do, however, believe that emphasising the Christian values underpinning all acts undertaken by Solidarity, provides them with a sense of the moral justness of their cause (and thus mitigates morality threats). This shifts the focus, to some extent, away from being an Afrikaner cause, to a righteous (and perhaps even a God-ordained) cause.

It is also possible that the salience of Christianity might make the proposed unification with coloured Afrikaans speakers more palatable to many white Afrikaans speakers (although a minority of coloured people are Muslim), as their deeply emotional connection to God makes the rejection of fellow worshippers untenable. This reminds one of how (already) Dutch and/or Afrikaans-speaking slaves were invited into the inner sanctum of Afrikaner homes by attending daily family prayers (see Chapter 4, subsection 4.1.4.5). The Solidarity Movement does not, however, seem to support greater co-operation between white and coloured Afrikaans speakers (as evidenced by a lack of coloured people in stock images on their various platforms and in promotional material). Shared Christian beliefs also did not aid in achieving social cohesion between white people and marginalised groups during Apartheid and before. Instead of unifying South Africans, emphasising Christianity might instead serve to ingratiate Afrikaners with other South Africans. Flip Buys (2024b; my translation) has commented: "We feel strongly about Christianity, also because it is one of the few unifying values in our divided country".

[374] Flip Buys was also vehemently opposed to the 2017-court case brought by the *Organisasie vir Godsdienste-Onderrig en Demokrasie* (OGOD; Organisation for Religious Education and Democracy), which was in pursuit of establishing secularism in public schools (Buys, 2017; Karim, 2017).

[375] White Afrikaans speakers exhibit an interesting case of ethnic layering (Chapter 2, subsection 2.1.3), whereby they emphasise their Europeanness in some contexts, and their Africanness in others.

Solidarity distinguishes between the Christian tradition of its own trade unionism, in the same style as Belgian, German and Dutch trade unionism, and the socialism of black South African trade unionism such as ANC-alliance partner COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions), which Van Zyl-Hermann (2018:2682) argues causes racialised us-versus-them divisions and plays on historic fears about the Communist threat. She suggests that this identification establishes Solidarity's position within a global white Western community, and that 'Christian' is utilised as "a cultural, racial or even moral marker". She notes how Solidarity suspends ethnic nationalist identifications to include English-speaking South Africans, whom they view as fellow 'Christians' or 'Westerners'. Solidarity further differentiates between Christian and socialist unions in terms of their relation to the state, whereby the former embraces a self-help and personal responsibility approach, while the latter cultivates dependency on the state (Van Zyl-Hermann, 2018:2683).

In reference to events that transpired at Solidarity's food distribution point after the 2005 liquidation of the Stilfontein goldmine, Buys (cited in Van Zyl-Hermann, 2018:2684) stated: "[T]hat's the difference between us and COSATU, NUM [National Union of Mineworkers]. If there's a crisis, their people don't have a *selfdoenkultuur* [do-it-yourself culture], they are socialists who wait for the state" […] I don't like it, but I can't change it, it's in them, I have the impression they're programmed like that". Although Solidarity downplays its labour union roots to signal its Afrikaner organisation bona fides, Van Zyl-Hermann (2018:2684) points out how Solidarity emphasises these roots for other purposes:

> The Movement's us-and-them polarisation represented a truly innovative discursive strategy: Although the Movement's historical narrative obscured its working-class past, it utilised its trade union roots to claim an apparently objective basis for its divisive identity politics. Its critical portrayal of socialist unionism invoked race-based cultural and biological differences which fed off existing understandings prevalent among its target audience. The resulting moral hierarchy in which "the [white] people" emerged as superior and virtuous vis-à-vis the black majority served to undermine the integrity of majority rule and subvert moral obligation to the state in favour of racial and ethnic solidarities. In this way, authority was transposed to the Movement as saviour organisation, making it a contender for political power and legitimacy, albeit outside formal party politics. This naturalisation saw the Movement's historical narrative and racial polarisation merge in a powerful mobilising framework.

Van Zyl-Hermann (2018:2684) quotes Hermann as follows:

> You'll start to see now that the ideas we are talking about here are very familiar in the Afrikaner's DNA. If you look back through our history, you'll recognise exactly the same DNA that was used to stand up after the war. It's exactly the DNA which was employed to stand up out of the 1930s. Those ideas – simple ideas – of calling, work,

> responsibility. These were powerful things that were used to let Afrikaners stand up out of difficult circumstances. […] The fact that Solidarity is part of the Christian tradition of trade unionism is a powerful instrument for Afrikaners to also stand up after 1994, it is a powerful political answer to say that we will take responsibility, we want to be self-reliant, we won't be dependent on the government.

In addition to the various possible reasons for Solidarity's promotion of Christianity as pre-eminent marker of Afrikaner identity discussed so far, and perhaps most importantly, I believe that the focus on Christianity is motivated by the desire the (re-)establish familiar power structures within the Afrikaner group (see SDO in Chapter 3, subsection 3.3.4). This sees class divisions disappear in favour of a gender hierarchy, which also coincides with the marginalisation of (liberal) internal dissidents and with social conservatism more broadly. This is made apparent through the emphasis on 'the family as cornerstone'. While most Afrikaners, especially in the north, may indeed be socially conservative, my contention is that Solidarity does not merely reflect its members' position, but actively propagate an ingroup norm through identity entrepreneurship.

For an Afrikaner civil organisation, intent on safeguarding its members from the ANC government, to focus so heavily on religion, when its members face no discernible sanction for their religious beliefs, suggests to me that Solidarity is concerned with more than the cultural rights and material interests of white Afrikaans speakers. They also seem to desire, to whichever degree, social change *within* the Afrikaner group, by impressing *its* definition of Afrikaner identity on all white Afrikaans speakers – regardless of whether they self-identity as Afrikaners, and in spite of the fact that they regard Afrikaans, and not Christianity, as the core cultural value of their group. This need for group uniformity may be linked to Solidarity's desire for ethnic mobilisation.

The politics of the Solidarity Movement seem to mimic that of American conservatism and the Christian right. In a press release and marketing video for their latest campaign branded #*JyHoortHier* (You Belong Here), Hermann (2024) describes a chaotic world, including an open-border America with a civil war looming, a godless, centralised Canada, an invaded Europe, and a world where 'cancel culture' and 'wokeness' reign supreme. The video makes ample use of Afrikaner history and culture throughout, depicting the arrival of Jan van Riebeeck, eating *beskuit* (rusks) no less, as well as military strategising presumably during the Anglo-Boer War, and prominently featuring biltong, braaivleis and other Afrikaner food (see symbolic reminders of identity and semiotic mediation in Chapter 3, subsection 3.5.2). In its campaign logo, images of a Strelitzia, the Voortrekker Monument, an ox wagon wheel, and a

compass appears (as well as the characteristic Cape Dutch gable), seemingly providing an answer to the question “Afrikaner, Quo Vadis?”.

Figure 13: Solidarity #JyHoortHier campaign logo

Their conservative family values, as confirmed in their foundational principles, is also on display in the video, which concludes with the image of a husband returning home from work being greeted by his children, while his wife is preparing food in the kitchen. It also shows various (heterosexual) couples reading the Bible and praying together. The #JyHoortHier campaign is further supported by an eponymous song and music video which shows a man in a suit behind a laptop, and young couples around the braai and watching sport (presumably rugby). The music video also depicts generations of women preparing food in the kitchen, and a congregation of almost entirely female worshippers (Afrikaans is Groot, 2024). The Solidarity Movement has a glaring lack of female leadership and is evidently consigning women once more to the role of volksmoeders (see Chapter 4, subsection 4.3.2.3), bound to the home and tasked with reproducing (an essentialised version of) Afrikaner identity.

Just as Afrikaner nationalism during Apartheid was preoccupied with much more than racial segregation and maintaining a certain political and economic system – ensuring religious, ideological and social conformity through both informal social sanctions and censorship – so too Solidarity seems to be concerned with more than simply creating prosperity for Afrikaners and spaces for Afrikaans. The active promotion of an Afrikaner ideal, or a well-defined delimitation of *the* Afrikaner, suggests that Solidarity might also be concerned with the internal cohesion of white Afrikaans speakers (see internal restrictions in Chapter 1, subsection 1.3.5, and Chapter 2, subsection 2.3.4). Brown (2000) found that a rise in ingroup identification

(which I linked to identity-threat responses in the previous section) positively correlates with a rise in *perceptions* of ingroup homogeneity (see Chapter 3, subsection 3.2.3.3).

AfriForum's Kallie Kriel (2024) contested an ingroup member's suggestion of Afrikaner isolationism by stating that a 'plurality of thoughts' is encouraged in the Afrikaner community. As evidence, he provides the different approaches towards Christianity among this community, ranging from 'reformed' to 'charismatic', and notes that despite these differences, Afrikaners are still able to work together towards common goals. He accuses a 'small minority' of wanting to stoke the *broedertwis* (sibling rivalry) of the 1980s, and by characterising dissidents as such, questions their Afrikanerness (see acceptance threat in Chapter 3, subsection 3.4.1). The mismatch between inviting ingroup heterogeneity and then meeting it with intolerance remains unnoticed by Kriel and others. Kriel also seems impervious to the irony of a minority-rights movement leader suggesting that the '80% - 90% middle group Afrikaners' should enjoy a privileged position as majority over less prototypical group members (disregarding whether that is indeed the extent of uniformity among white Afrikaans speakers).[376]

Aside from its various institutions and projects, the Solidarity Movement has demonstrated its desire to influence Afrikaner identity formation, or at least to capitalise on increased Afrikaner identification, through the entertainment industry. In 2018 a compilation album was released titled *Die Gelofte* (The Vow), in reference to the Battle of Blood River (see Chapter 4, subsection 4.2.2.3), comprising 13 songs by a variety of popular Afrikaans artists.[377] AfriForum (2018b), which commissioned the album, released the music video to the title song on their YouTube channel, where it has been viewed more than five million times. AfriForum (2019) also published the music video of another track off the album, titled *Goliat* (Goliath).

Ernst Roets, Deputy CEO of AfriForum (and CEO of *Forum Films*), stated that the album can largely be labelled as protest music, and that *Die Gelofte* is a devotional song (Anon., 2018). In addition to the blending of Christianity with Afrikaner identity, the (especially military) history is heavily drawn upon (see anchoring in Chapter 3, subsection 3.5.2). The lyrics of these songs suggest that the same historic 'enemy' is being faced, that a righteous fight is being waged, and that the outcome is determined by God, to whom not only 'the Volk' will remain

[376] Further irony is present in the naming of Akademia's NP van Wyk-Louw Centre, tasked with 'shaping the hearts and minds of Akademia's employees and students', after the writer who conceived of the notions of *oop gesprek* (open conversation) and *lojale verset* (loyal resistance) (discussed in Chapter 4, subsection 4.3.2.4) when the Solidarity Movement apparently values neither.

[377] The full album can be accessed here: https://music.youtube.com/playlist?list=OLAK5uy_nqlyqyQ2lS38Sl_DiV0kFgAWAm1AV5iCg.

faithful in gratitude of victory, but also their future descendants. The following selected lyrics are from another song off this album, titled *Roepstem* (Calling voice),[378] evoking Afrikaner warfare history:

Afrikaner waarheen dan nou?	Afrikaner whereto now?
Kan jy jou afkoms nog steeds onthou?	Can you still remember your ancestry?
Hoe daar geveg was op die grense	How there was fighting on the borders
Vir jou land en vir jou mense	For your country and for your people
Afrikaner identiteit	Afrikaner identity
Wat dit beteken in nou se tyd	What it means today
Sal jy die vraag kan antwoord?	Will you be able to answer the question?
Met die tekens van 'n volksmoord	With the signs of a genocide[379]
Wat nou voor ons deure lê	Which now lie before our doors
Hoor jy die roepstem	Do you hear the voice
Van 'n Vaderland wat roep?	Of a Fatherland calling?
Is jy verlore of is jy nog opsoek?	Are you lost or are you still searching?
En Siener hy het gesê	And Siener said
Ons sal eers opstaan	We will only stand up
As ons niks oor het	Once we have nothing left
Jy moet weet ons was gevrees	You must know we were feared
Op 'n tyd helde gewees	Were heroes once

Another song off the album titled, *Bloedgrond* (Blood soil) has the following lyrics:

Jy kan ons nie breek nie	You cannot break us
Of selfs laat vergeet nie	Or even make us forget
Ons kies om te bou	We choose to build
Onsself te behou	To keep ourselves
Want dis al wat ons het	Because it is all we have
Op hierdie grond	On this soil
Is 'n belofte gemaak	A promise was made
Diepwaters gevloei	Deep waters flowed
Het ons voorvaders gebloei	Our ancestors bled
Op hierdie grond	On this soil

Sing Afrikaner Sing, another protest song by Bok van Blerk, makes a call for Afrikaner unity and admonishes internal dissidence (or encourages eendersdenkendheid):

Jy mag niks meer sê	You can't say anything anymore
Jy is klaar gepraat	You're done talking
Dis 'n hartseer saak wat ons almal raak	It's a sad matter that affects us all
Want die groot verraad	Because the big betrayal
Kom vanuit ons eie mense	Comes from our own people
Want die een skeur die woorde	Because the one tears up the words

[378] An Afrikaans dictionary offers the following range of possible interpretations of this word, including: (i) Voice that calls; voice that summons, admonishes, urges, awakens; exhortation; cry for help; but also (ii) inner voice of conscience (Odendal & Gouws, 2005:941; my translation).

[379] See footnote 329.

Van 'n ander op	Of another
En gebruik dit net vir sy eie lot	And uses it only for his own fate
En hy staan vir niks	And he doesn't stand for anything
Nie soos ek en jy nie	Not like you and I
Sing, Afrikaner Sing	Sing, Afrikaner, Sing
Laat jou stem gehoor word	Let your voice be heard
Laat jy nooit verdwyn	May you never disappear
As ons almal een word	If we all become one
Kan ons die stilte breek	We can break the silence
Want die dag sal kom	Because the day will come
Dat die koning val	That the king falls
En hy plek moet maak vir 'n Generaal	And must make place for a General
Wat hom uitoorlê met sy eie mense	Who outsmarts him with his own people
Want alles moet verander	Because everything has to change
Maar alles het verander	But everything has changed
Is dit klaar te laat?	Is it already too late?

In die huis waar stilte woon (In the house where silence lives) by Adam Tas (after the protesting burgher mentioned in Chapter 4, subsection 4.1.3.1) tells the fictitious story of a woman killed in a farm attack, whose ashes are scattered in the Blood River. *Boer loop deur my are* (Boer runs through my veins) includes the following select lyrics:

In Afrikaans het ek geleer	In Afrikaans I learned
Hoe om te bid en praat	How to pray and speak
Dit is my taal my trots	It is my language my pride
Die rots wat ek by my dra	The anchor I carry with me
Niemand sal dit wegneem	Nobody will take it away
Baie het al probeer	Many have tried

In addition to its hand in Afrikaans protest music, the Solidarity Movement is also spreading its narrow conception of Afrikaner identity through the *AfriForum Theatre* in Pretoria. A musical titled *Die Gelofte* saw the stage in 2022, and was well-attended by young Afrikaners (Rademeyer, 2022). *Die Kaplyn* followed in 2023, a musical about a father and his sons' deployment in the 1980s during the South African Border War, and his wife and daughter on the home front who 'kept morale high' such as through charity work (AfriForum, 2023).

AfriForum Theatre's most recent production is another musical titled *Die Afrikaner Maak Só*, after the protest song discussed in subsection 5.2.2 by Bok van Blerk and Bernice West (who also stars in this production, as she did in *Die Gelofte*). The writers of these musicals also wrote the song for Van Blerk and West (Hattingh, 2024), illustrating how imbedded the Solidarity Movement has become in the (traditional) Afrikaans entertainment industry. *Die Afrikaner Maak Só* follows the Van der Merwe-family who in 1994, instead of emigrating, sought cover

in an underground bunker, from which they emerge in 2024 to find they are the only Afrikaners left in a South Africa they no longer recognise (AfriForum, 2024b).

Among the many questionable depictions of contemporary Afrikaner identity is the performance by a joyous couple of the song titled *Ribbetjie* (Little Rib), in reference to Eve's creation from Adam's rib. The light propaganda continues with direct references to AfriForum and Solidarity in the dialogue, reminding the audience of all that they have done for the Afrikaner (Opperman, 2024). The Solidarity Movement's engagement in Afrikaans entertainment seems to be motivated less by the desire to aid in the maintenance of Afrikaans in the white Afrikaans community, and more by the desire to disseminate its Afrikaner prototype and to naturalise itself as the voice of that community.

In 2020, Solidarity launched the *Werkherstelprogram* (Work recovery programme), a five-year post-pandemic economic recovery project, armed with nearly R5 billion (Rademeyer, 2020; Solidarity, 2020). The programme came on the heels of the decision by the Minister of Small Business Development to use BEE criteria in determining which businesses receive Coronavirus relief funds (SABC, 2020). So too, the Minister of Tourism included BEE as a criterion to receive Covid-19 relief funds in the tourism sector. Solidarity and AfriForum challenged the legality of this policy, and after first losing their case, won on appeal in late-2021. In 2023, the Constitutional Court denied the Department's leave to appeal, noting that the matter is "moot" as the funds had already been distributed (Cronje, 2023).

A marketing video accompanied the launch of the programme, in which Hermann narrates a heroic overview of Afrikaner history that pits the independent, industrious Afrikaners against the state (Solidarity, 2020). Even in their swift mention of Apartheid, the emphasis is on a state that '*oorheers*' (dominates). During the narration of the current dispensation, the following text appears on the screen (my translation): "People are suffering, black and white. The state gives billions, but whites get nothing". Considering though the questionable BEE policy regarding state support for distressed businesses facing the effects of an unprecedented global pandemic, it is no wonder that Solidarity promotes this message.

As May (2012:19) suggests, political mobilisation by minorities is often in response to nation-states not meeting their demands, or in this case, their needs. This is also evident in the creation of the private Afrikaans-medium university, Akademia, only after the systematic removal of Afrikaans from public universities had begun. In addition to its two campuses in Centurion, plans for a third campus in the Paarl-Stellenbosch region have been announced, explicitly

linked to the progressing anglicisation at Stellenbosch University and the desire to serve both white and coloured Afrikaans speakers in the area (De Lange, 2024). Considering this, it could be argued that white Afrikaans speakers' instrumental attachments to the state are weakening (see Kelman's, 1971 argument in Chapter 2, subsection 2.4.4). Solidarity is thus not so much usurping the power of the state, but circumventing it where it is found not to meet the needs and demands of Afrikaners. It is therefore in clear reaction to the (perceived) failures of the state, or even its radicalisation. Hermann states in the promotional video (my translation):

> There is a rift between the state and the white tribe of Africa. We cannot rely on the state anymore. On the one hand it makes us angry, on the other hand it makes us free, because *ons sal self* [we will (do it) ourselves].

While it is certainly assuming responsibility over some areas normally presided over by the state, the Solidarity Movement represents a fundamentally anti-state approach, where through privatisation and crowdfunding, communities meet their own needs. It remains to be seen how scalable this project is, how far the scope of Solidarity's powers can be stretched, and what this means for democracy both in South Africa and within the Movement itself. Van Zyl-Hermann (2018:2675) points out that while studies on populist mobilisation usually focus on disaffected majority communities, the Afrikaner case study is unique in that this group is a minority, and their mobilisation holds different consequences for democracy. She argues:

> While in white majority contexts national populists have sought to capture formal political power, South Africa's white minority shows that this challenge can also emerge in the civil society arena. […] national populist rhetoric and campaigns in this arena serve to undermine the legitimacy of majority rule and create spaces in which minority privilege, power and identities can be maintained and strengthened.

Identifying the problem as a crumbling state, further weakened by the Covid-19 pandemic, Hermann (cited in Bezuidenhout, 2020; my translation) argues that "our community" is yet again facing a historical challenge, and uses anchoring to inspire:

> It is our generation's responsibility to find a solution. The uprising after the Anglo-Boer War, the *Helpmekaar* Movement after the 1914 Rebellion, and the *Reddingsdaadbond* [Rescue act league] after the depression and poor whites problem of the 1930s were all reactions to a crisis. Now it is our generation's turn to stand up.

As part of the launch of the Werkherstelprogram in 2020, Solidarity invited various Afrikaans musicians to record a song and music video titled *Ons sal self* (We will [do it] ourselves), further supported by an accompanying #O*nsSalSelf* campaign (Afrikaans is Groot, 2020). The utilisation of the cultural sphere to promote political goals is noteworthy here, albeit by no

means a novel strategy among Afrikaner political elites (or any political elites for that matter). Hermann (cited in Bezuidenhout, 2020; my translations) asserted: "Artists have the tendency to look into the heart of a community and to then articulate it". Of the musicians involved, he said: "This group of artists scratched a bit in their historical DNA and found an answer: *Ons sal self*. It is good to see how artists are at the forefront of the wave of the community".[380] Below are select lyrics of *Ons sal self*, which mirrors the sentiments expressed in the promotional video:

Hier was niks	Nothing was here
'n Paar honderd jare terug	A couple hundred years ago
Toe kom ons hier	Then we came here
En nou dra ons die gewig	And now we carry the weight
Van 'n land wat by ons vat	Of a country that takes from us
Elke druppel sweet	Every drop of sweat
Wat ons kon sweet	That we could sweat
En hulle weet	And they know
Ons sal durf en saai	We will dare and sow
Waar niks wil groei nie	Where nothing wants to grow
Niks kan ons maak kniel	Nothing can make us kneel
Behalwe God nie	Except for God
Ons sal self	We will (do it) ourselves
Maak soos ons gemaak het	Do as we have done
Begin soos ons begin het	Begin as we have begun
Oorwin het	Have conquered
Toe alles teen ons staan	When everything was against us
En ons sal self	And we will (do it) ourselves
As jy ons nie wil lei nie	If you do not want to lead us
As jy ons niks wil gee nie	If you do not want to give us anything
Dit keer nie	It does not prevent
Wat ons nog gaan bereik nie	What we are still going to achieve
Soos dit is	As it is
Word alles oorgegee	Everything is given up
Maar daar is niks	But there is nothing
Wat ons spore weg kan vee	That can wipe away our tracks
En na al die jare	And after all the years
Ken ons die waarde	We know the value
Van staan as een man	Of standing firm as one man
En ons onthou	And we remember
Waar ons begin het	Where we began
Gedink hul ons stilhet	Thought they silenced us
Maar dis wie ons is	But it is who we are

[380] Solidarity's whitewashing of history is on full display here, as they completely omit the Afrikaners' history of slave-ownership which enabled them to not 'do it themselves'. The reliance on Apartheid-era state socialism to uplift the Afrikaners is also ignored. (One might also mention here the continued reliance on black labour in many white homes in South Africa.) The need for *positive* self-esteem may be credited for this selective depiction of history.

The lyrics of the latest wave of Afrikaans protest music (especially emanating from Solidarity) certainly *suggest* that radicalisation is taking place among white Afrikaans speakers. There is evidence of increased ethnic identification and an eagerness to engage in politics. Van Zyl-Hermann (2018:2687) cautions that "[w]hen emanating from a powerful minority, the antagonism towards the ostensibly hostile (ruling) majority which this involves may undermine democratic consolidation and social cohesion".

Despite somewhat alarming lyrics (and rhetoric), I do not believe that the Solidarity Movement, and mainstream Afrikaner mobilisation more broadly, is as threatening to sociopolitical stability in South Africa as some commentators seem to suggest. For one, there is no evidence of a threat of violence among this group of Afrikaners, whom I consider to be the most numerous, prominent and active. There is also no evidence that the Solidarity Movement is pursuing the overthrowing of the ANC state, the creation of their own, or the oppression of any other ethnic group. Instead, the Movement's various projects signify a plan for Afrikaners to exist within an ANC state, while building prosperity and maintaining their ethnic culture in the private domain – or as Van Zyl-Hermann (2018:2675) characterised it, maintaining and strengthening "minority privilege, power and identities". The Solidarity Movement's subversion of the state is rather the result of the dereliction of duty by the state, and the consequent response by community leaders.

Reasonable criticisms may be levied against the Solidarity Movement's ethnic exclusivity, traditionalism and essentialism (which overemphasise intergroup difference and intragroup similarity). However, there is little reason to suggest that their members are currently any more radicalised than any other ethnic group in South Africa (or indeed the ANC itself). Consider, for example, the rampant xenophobia among some black communities, which has resulted in violence in the past, most recently through the *Operation Dudula* organisation,[381] as well as other extremist organisations such as *Black First Land First* (BLF), and frequently polarising rhetoric from the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and its leader, Julius Malema.

[381] Claassen (2017) provides an analysis of xenophobia in South Africa utilising Social Identity Theory (SIT), identifying the following theories which might explain the phenomenon: (i) resource competition; (ii) poverty; (iii) relative deprivation; (iv) frustration with government; (v) mobilisation; and (vi) symbolic threat. It mirrors much of the discussion in this chapter regarding Afrikaner mobilisation. His findings indicate that African immigrants are "treated as scapegoats for the failings of the government" (Claassen, 2017:17). The Solidarity Movement's anger seems to be largely directed towards the government, although they do employ the Afrikaners' history of opposition to the British and black people to motivate their projects and mobilise their base.

Also consider the July 2021 riots, where mass looting – sparked by supporters of former President Jacob Zuma protesting his brief imprisonment – caused R50 billion worth of damage to the economy and resulted in the deaths of more than 350 people. The ethnic undertones of this unrest are obvious: (Zulu) supporters of former President Zuma commanded current President Cyril Ramaphosa to "go back to Venda" (Davis, 2024), and the Indian and black communities in Kwa-Zulu Natal came into direct conflict leading to what is now known as the Phoenix massacre (Davis, Nicolson & Simelane, 2021), an eery echo of the Durban riots of 1949. Reducing polarisation in South Africa to Afrikaner versus black is reductionist, and serves to distract from legitimate criticism of the ANC and *its* role in sociopolitical instability in the country (including its failure to maintain order during July 2021).

Instead of undemocratic means, it is precisely the economic power of white Afrikaans speakers that opens up other avenues to them, and which makes it much less likely that they would resort to violent or otherwise illegal means in the pursuit of their interests – in contrast to other instances of minority radicalisation. Concerns over social cohesion in South Africa are, however, not unwarranted. Although I do not consider the maintenance of ethnic identity to be subversive in itself (see Tajfel's, 1982 view on ethnocentrism in Chapter 3, subsection 3.2.1.2), the marked rise of mobilisation on these grounds from various ethnic groups in South Africa is a worrying trend in a country still fraught with racial inequality and separation. But analysing Afrikaner radicalisation in a vacuum is inaccurately alarmist and wholly unproductive.

As I noted in subsection 5.2.3, the 2024 national election saw a surge in ethnic voting patterns, including considerable support for the PA among coloured voters. Anti-Apartheid stalwart Alan Boesak, who notes that the PA has been accused of coloured nationalism, argues that growing ethnonationalism in South Africa is partly in reaction to existing racism and deepening intergroup conflict. He blames the ANC for its rejection of non-racialism and reliance on the old Apartheid-era racial classification system. This, Boesak (cited in La Vita, 2024; my translation) suggests, has led to coloured South Africans viewing the ANC as not only an ideological enemy, but also a racial enemy.

> I think the fact that we have such a big problem with social cohesion today has something to do with it. Those people on the Cape Flats get votes and support because what they experience is real. And you are making the biggest mistake if you just want to write it off as the grievances of people here who want more than they are entitled to. It is not only about the denial of what they are; it is also about the denial of those people's contribution to the struggle for freedom and a denial of their role in building the country. It is denial, above all, that they are from Africa.

Though increased interethnic conflict is certainly a disturbing trend, a critique of its manifestations must take into account the broader sociopolitical reality in which they are situated. A rebuke of ethnic mobilisation in South Africa must surely be complemented by a remonstration, or at least an acknowledgement, of the increasing nationalism of the ANC government, and the effects of its policies on race relations in South Africa. It is not difficult to draw a sequential line between the ANC's growing rejection of minority ethnic groups, as well as their continued treatment of individuals based on their ethnicity, and the rise in ethnic identification and mobilisation among minority ethnic groups in South Africa. So too, the growth of Afrikaner privatisation and organisation can be linked directly to the service delivery failures of the ANC, as well as its reluctance to Afrikaner representation in the state.

There are some positive indications, however, that rising ethnic identification and even mobilisation among white Afrikaans speakers, are not *necessarily* detrimental to social cohesion in South Africa. First, it appears as though most white Afrikaans speakers are continuing to maintain their national identities, and to positively engage in public life with people outside of their own ethnic group.[382] Second, there is evidence of earnest attempts at fostering a non-racial Afrikaans community among MLR advocates. Third, there are encouraging signs of internal dissent and ingroup debate which will hopefully have a moderating effect on the direction of Afrikaner mobilisation and on white Afrikaans speakers in general.

As May (2012) argued in Chapter 2, minority ethnic identities are often regarded as antithetical to social cohesion, despite the fact that the dominant majority is able to maintain *its* ethnic identity and naturalise it as *the* national identity, and with countless examples of such regimes leading to ethnolinguistic conflict. With such a negative view of ethnicity, there is little room for diversity or pluralism in the public or private sphere. Instead, it is the power imbalance between groups, and the rejection of minority groups and denial of minority-language rights to which it leads, which ultimately poses a threat to sociopolitical stability and social cohesion.

5.4.1.3. Nationalism, populism or politicised ethnicity?

Van Zyl-Hermann (2018:2686) emphasises that the Solidarity Movement does not seek formal political or territorial autonomy but instead "envisage[s] institutional, community and even virtual spaces in which Afrikaners and whites could organise their own affairs, self-sufficient

[382] Tajfel (1982) did, however, find that social cohesion gains made on an interpersonal level cannot adequately mediate intergroup conflict (see Chapter 3, subsection 3.2.3.3).

and free from black, majority intervention". She explains that they perform "state-like functions" in a privatised capacity, and despite not pursuing self-determination, their initiatives constitute "political interventions". Van Zyl-Hermann (2018:2687) juxtaposes this form of populism with the more common variety currently sweeping the Northern hemisphere:

> In the white majority contexts of the United States and Europe, national populism in its current incarnations seeks to capture formal political power, from whence it claims it will return sovereignty to "the people" and cast out the forces which threaten them (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008). In South Africa, the white minority's lack of political leverage and territorial dispersion is seeing an assertive new national populist challenge for white autonomy mounted in the civil society arena rather than the formal party political sphere. Anti-establishment sentiments in the global North – whether directed at the European Union's alienating supranationalism or a class of elite politicians – have been a driving force of the rise of national populism. In South Africa, too, the crisis of the state under Zuma, and popular outrage about it, is not in doubt. To this, the new white minority politics of the Solidarity Movement offers a racialised response, built on its whitewashed portrayal of the past and subversion of black majority rule. Indeed, collapsing vertical and horizontal dimensions of polarisation, the Movement extends the corruption and state failure associated with ANC elites to a general callousness among all black South Africans. In contrast, Afrikaners – and whites generally – emerge as moral, biological, indeed racial superiors on account of their "self-doing culture". This serves to cast aspersions on black majority rule.[383] In typical national populist fashion, the Movement claims to be the authentic representative of this homogenous and virtuous "people" and promises to put their interests first. Downplaying class and maintaining an ambiguous rhetoric appealing to exclusive ethnic identity and broader racial interests figure centrally in this strategy. Thus, despite its humble working-class roots and right-wing marginality in the late apartheid period, the Movement attracts broad-based support and increasingly claims to represent the central ground.

Alsheh and Elliker (2015:429-430) criticise studies which interpret efforts to promote and preserve Afrikaans as a language, culture, and a network of identities and communities as inherently a nationalist project and, by doing so, imply that seeking to protect cultural and linguistic practices represents a revival of Afrikaner nationalism.[384] They suggest that a

[383] 'Ramaphoria' somewhat disproves the idea that Afrikaners are inherently opposed to black majority rule. This is in reference to the sense of 'euphoria' many had with the prospect of Cyril Ramaphosa's first presidential term, after nearly a decade of state plunder and decay under former President Zuma (Blomfield, 2019).

[384] They provide as example one author's view that Afrikaner nationalism, still aiming at the establishment of a volkstaat, covertly operates through civil society organisations advocating for Afrikaans language rights. Alsheh and Elliker (2015:430) argue that this author equates not only any politicisation of ethnicity with nationalism, but also any "ethnic conspicuousness", in other words, the mere existence of ethnic identities. Once more the concept of banal nationalism is relevant, and the idea that the dominant group's ethnicity ceases to be viewed as ethnic identity but becomes the approved national identity. They also believe that this author mistakes attempts to mobilise a *transformation* of Afrikaans ethnicity, with attempts at its *revival* (2015:431). This dovetails well with May's (2012) suggestion that critics of minority ethnic identity ironically end up reinforcing an essentialist view of ethnicity.

distinction between *political ethnicity* and *nationalism* is needed, arguing that the former is more fitting for an analysis of contemporary ethnopolitical demands. They insist that "a (hidden) long-term intent of creating a self-determined Afrikaner nation should not be presupposed but be an empirical question in each case studied" (see Flip Buys's long-term goals in the next subsection). Advocacy of collective/group-based rights is too readily suspected of being aimed at secession and the establishment of a separate sovereign polity (in other words, the creation of an Afrikaner nation-state). Alsheh and Elliker (2015:431) explain that political ethnicity should not be characterised as nationalism if it does not seek to create a sovereign nation-state:

> Identifying all forms of political ethnicity with nationalism forces one to assume that all political ethnicities are necessarily subversive, i.e. ultimately working to undermine the sovereignty of the state, whenever and as long as it is not their nation-state. This is however evidently false, given the multiplicity of political ethnicities currently prospering under the sovereignty of various liberal democracies without questioning, let alone challenging, their legitimacy. In some cases, political ethnicities successfully operate under several sovereignties, a formation misleadingly titled Diasporic, though no aspiration of returning to, or resurrecting the homeland really exist, albeit symbolically and ritualistically (Schnapper & Davis 1999; Lie 2001; Montserrat 1999). Some political ethnicities are spread throughout the state's territory, always a minority and nowhere a majority, without being interested in revising their pattern of distribution across the county and its populations. Some political ethnicities practise various forms of indifference towards the state to effective state-evasion (Scott 2010), without however challenging the legitimacy of the state.

The Solidarity Movement certainly qualifies, I believe, as political ethnicity evading the state without challenging its legitimacy. Alsheh and Elliker's (2015) critique of the premature accusation of nationalism is dealt with by May (2012) by distinguishing between political nationalism and cultural nationalism (see Chapter 2, subsection 2.2.5). The Solidarity Movement represents an instance of cultural nationalism, which May (2012) emphasises has the potential to develop into political nationalism. Alsheh and Elliker (2015:431) make the point that Afrikaans political ethnicity is in fact an attempt at *becoming a minority*, the very opposite of nationalism. They argue that nationalism incorrectly views minority status unfavourably:

> [I]n view of the rich history of various kinds of minorities throughout the world since the dawn of the democratic era, it is simply not true that being a minority is only and necessarily an undesirable fate. […] there is an art to becoming a minority: transforming populations that happen to have a shared interest that is different from what the sovereign demos defines as the general interest (Mann 2005:55-69), into a self-conscious and self-organised community that is politically effective in legitimately promoting its interests.

Davies (2009:76) seems to suggest that the South African Constitution's provisions regarding cultural, linguistic and religious communities enshrine ethnic politics and promote politicised ethnicity. She believes that most Afrikaans speakers do not readily identify themselves "in a minoritarian style", but that a vocal cultural intelligentsia use the constitutional provisions in their advocacy of minority rights (2009:77). She contends that this "marginalisation rhetoric" faces competition from other "genuinely liberal, postmodern, non-hegemonic and multiple forms of identity". This implies that Afrikaans MLR advocacy is inherently regressive and promotes cultural stasis. Alsheh and Elliker (2015:432) maintain that political ethnicities are very malleable, which is of course, the opposite of essentialism:

> We argue that becoming a minority is yet another kind or way of politicising ethnicity. Insisting that politicisation of ethnicity is and can only be nationalism blocks one from noting the plasticity of political ethnicities. It overlooks political ethnicities' ability to dramatically readapt to changing political and economic environments by means of revising their logics of inclusion and exclusion, i.e. their underlying coalition of interests.

This instrumentalist use of ethnicity is roundly criticised by researchers, who often extend this criticism to delegitimise ethnic identities themselves. It should be asked what the exact concerns are of commentators who brandish Afrikaner political ethnicity and its associated acts (such as MLR advocacy) as nationalism, and thus as a fundamental threat to South African society. Is it the (racial or ethnic) borders of the Afrikaner identity which offends, or simply the act of maintaining group identity at all in a liberal democracy which confers rights to the individual? Is it political mobilisation based on ethnicity (as opposed to some other interest group) which is troubling, the presupposition of shared interests which motivates collective action, or the inherent threat which civic action of any kind poses the nation-state? Is it the higher economic status of Afrikaners which makes them ineligible to voice grievances in a country with abject need? Or is it perhaps rather the history of Afrikaner mobilisation which led to Apartheid which justifies the perpetual exclusion of white Afrikaans speakers from the state? Many commentators on Afrikaner politics in the post-Apartheid era seem to expect of white Afrikaans speakers not only to remain content with having no political power, as a numerical minority, to challenge the state which is increasingly unwilling and unable to service their sentimental or instrumental attachments to it; but also to refrain from acting in their own interest, or maintain their ethnic identity, in the private sphere.

As has been noted throughout this thesis, there are limitations to rational choice theory and instrumentalism, i.e., viewing ethnic identification *only* as ploys to pursue material interests,

without taking into account the importance and meaning that people *may* derive from ethnicity, and language in particular; as well as ignoring the continued social categorisation minority group members face regardless of their (dis)identification. Giliomee (2009:xix) recognises that "a concern expressed over the survival of a culture or a people" may be "a camouflage for concern about a standard of living, a concern about privilege or even sheer racism". He insists, however, that "it would be short-sighted to dismiss the Afrikaner debate over ethnic survival as peripheral compared to an assessment of interests".

Alsheh and Elliker (2015:432-433) criticise the view that cultural nationalism *inevitably* leads to a nationalism preoccupied with self-determination, or in other words, that concerns with cultural maintenance (such as minority-language activism) is a preamble to acquiring the power of the state (either by supplanting the current administration or by creating a new state, i.e., secession). While the Second Afrikaans Language Movement (1903-1925) indeed led to Afrikaner nationalism in the 20th century, they believe it was rather "a contingent historical trajectory than a deterministic process, and hence one should not assume that similar beginnings will necessarily lead to similar outcomes". They note the harm caused by Afrikaner nationalism to all forms of Afrikaans political ethnicity, demonstrated by the "pervasive apprehension (if not full-blown aversion)" towards any and all instances of Afrikaans political ethnicity. Alsheh and Elliker (2015:444-445) argue:

> There is no reason to assume that any politicised ethnicity is necessarily driven by a political claim at the core of which is – in one or the other form – the aim of creating or gaining ownership of a relatively autonomous and sovereign polity. Ethnicities do not only predate nations, but may relate in several ways to existing nation-states, and they may have the ability to (dramatically) readjust to new political and economic circumstances. To equate politicised ethnicity *per definition* with nationalism does not allow us to analyse to what extent, in what ways, and for what purposes the underlying coalitions of interests seek power and to what extent they see a nation-state as exclusive expression of their ethnicity.

May (2012) made a similar point regarding the legitimate claims of national minorities without state representation, or so-called stateless nations (see Chapter 2, subsection 2.2.5). Due to the territorial scatteredness of Afrikaners, secession is highly improbable, in addition to the fact that this objective is not popular among the majority of contemporary Afrikaners (as evidenced by the low uptake on Orania and/or the creation of more such towns). It may therefore be assumed that Afrikaner cultural nationalism will remain as such, at least within the current understanding of what constitutes a state. For as long as Afrikaners remain taxpaying citizens

of South Africa, subject to the laws and policies determined by the Constitution and the ANC administration, there can be no doubt as to the locus of political power in the country.

5.4.2. The path forward for Afrikaners

5.4.2.1. Pluralism, power-sharing and the nation-state

In Chapter 2, May (2012) made a persuasive argument in favour of extending pluralism and power-sharing in nation-states in order to accommodate national minorities. In subsection 2.5.3 I did, however, argue that his proposal for regionalism does not take into account that not all minorities are sufficiently territorially concentrated. This means that in order to accommodate white Afrikaans speakers, and stave off secessionist and separatist sentiments, some other form of governance in South Africa will have to be conceptualised.

In his book outlining his vision for Afrikaners as a cultural community, which he likens to the Scots, the Flemish, the Kurds, and the Catalans, Flip Buys (2019:115) argues in favour of a federalist approach to South Africa's problems. He offers Switzerland, Canada, Belgium and others as examples of peaceful, prosperous federal countries, where loyalty to the country is maintained among all constituent parts of the population (2019:146-148).[385] He points out that the power of the centralised ANC government is already being eroded from below, by privatisation, technology, organised communities and state decay (2019:148-149). Evidence of this de facto decentralisation include the proliferation of private hospitals, schools, security companies and "lifestyle towns" to combat the decline in service delivery, the uptick in solar-powered houses and businesses to escape Eskom's loadshedding, and rural communities who are progressively replacing non-functioning municipalities.[386]

Buys (2019:186) identifies the Afrikaners' *bestaansvraagstuk* (existential question) as the fact that the Afrikaners are not geographically concentrated as other minorities, meaning there are no areas that are *mainly* inhabited by white Afrikaans speakers. He emphasises that it is not small numbers, but sparse distribution, which results in Afrikaners being "a powerless minority with the same challenges everywhere" (2019:187; my translation). The Afrikaner *bestaansprobleem* (existential problem) is also being mitigated naturally, as increasing urbanisation by rural inhabitants seeking better services (or the 'new Great Trek') is resulting in the concentration of Afrikaners in cities (Buys, 2019:193-194).

[385] The continued agitation for secession of Flanders might suggest differently (Ryckewaert, 2024).

[386] The festivalisation of Afrikaans, and more broadly the delivery of Afrikaans-medium entertainment, may then be linked to the decrease in Afrikaans content by the SABC, the state-owned national broadcaster (Ferreira, 2024).

Research by the *Solidarity Research Institute* (SRI) estimates that by 2030, more than half of Afrikaners will live in only ten places, and two-thirds will live in only 29 cities and towns (Buys, 2019:195). These *ankerdorpe* (anchor towns) are already home to more than 70% of the Solidarity Movement's members (Buys, 2019:196). Pretoria will have (by far) the largest share of the Afrikaner population and will thus be the headquarters of participating organisations as well as Akademia, Sol-Tech and other institutions (Buys, 2019:352-353).

Buys (2019:198) argues that in the interest of sustainability, at least three *kulturele kantons* (cultural cantons) have to be developed. First, "cultural infrastructure" such as schools, nursing homes, security structures, municipal services, training, job opportunities and other essential services will be supported in anchor towns. Here, *dorpsforums* (town forums) could be established which will, like *kulturele stadsrade* (cultural city councils), join those who want to work together. Second, these anchor towns will support people living in smaller towns and rural areas. Buys (2019:199) notes that their biggest strategic challenge is the delivery of state services without state income (i.e., tax revenue).[387] Buys (2019:199-200; my translation) further explains his proposed plan of anchor towns and cultural cantons – and their relationship to the Solidarity Movement – highlighting that both function within the current legal framework of South Africa:

> We are, of course, not going to determine the 'ceilings' of self-management that these anchor towns may reach. It will depend on each town's distinctive community energy, on the surrounding population composition and leadership in each community. The circumstances of each town will determine which town forums develop so far that they can become in practice cultural city councils or even eventually cultural cantons. These are community structures which means there is no need to ask for prior permission from the government. We only want to be recognised afterwards for what has been established in practice, for example a private school or a neighbourhood watch. Of course this is also completely legal, because it does not go against the Constitution or any law. In a nutshell, this concentration plan is the Movement's plan to overcome the Afrikaner's historical existential question of sparse distribution through a process of growing self-management until the achievement of self-management in cultural cantons.

Buys (2019:215) contrasts *staatsbestuur* (state-management) and *selfbeskikking* (self-determination) with his preferred system of *selfbestuur* (self-management), which does not

[387] Buys (2019:201-202) proposes the creation of an investment company in which ordinary Afrikaners can invest for both monetary and cultural dividends (such as the existence of good Afrikaans private schools and safe nursery homes) – similar to The *Helpmekaar Vereniging* (Mutual Aid Association) and other companies established in the post-Anglo-Boer War reconstruction period (see Chapter 4, subsection 4.3.2.4). He also proposes turning to the international community and the Afrikaner diaspora for financial support. *Kanton* (a property investment company) and the *Afrikaner Foundation* have been established, suggesting that his plans are being set in motion.

involve the creation of an independent state. While it appears as if Buys (2019:219) considers an independent Afrikaner *volkstaat* (ethnostate) to be desirable, he does acknowledge that due to the geographical distribution of Afrikaners this goal is a practical impossibility. Whereas state-management is centralised governance of individual citizens, self-management is localised governance of a cultural community.

Buys (2019) is thus advocating for group-differentiated rights (specifically self-government rights) as a national minority, and/or collective rights, in particular external protections from a dominant majority (see Kymlicka, 1995 in Chapter 1, subsection 1.3.4). He maintains that the South African Constitution already confers these rights on Afrikaners, which privatisation makes practicable. Importantly, the voluntary nature of his Afrikaner self-management should be noted, meaning white Afrikaans speakers and members of other groups do not have to make use of the Movement's private sphere services, and remain free to continue under the current state-management system, even if they live in one of the anchor towns. Thus, the Solidarity Movement's "cultural infrastructure" does not replace the state, but rather provides a second (and limited) option in the private sphere. It is unclear whether members of other ethnic groups would be denied Solidarity services if sought, such as access to Afrikaans-medium schools, and especially those unrelated to culture (such as security).

According to Buys (2019:343), articles 185 and 235 of the Constitution allow for the creation of *kultuurrade* (culture councils) and the possibility of self-determination, and other areas in the Constitution also allow for cultural freedom or autonomy. He states that the Solidarity Movement has always followed a three-leg strategy: (i) the protection of the constitutional rights of their members and community; (ii) the use of constitutional 'spaces' for members of language and cultural communities, and (iii) the promotion of the interests of the South African public as a whole. He insists that the Movement does not long for an Apartheid past, but that they also "do not look forward to a future of eternal subservience in an unsafe, weakening country". He also maintains that they are neither pursuing the creation of a volkstaat nor the isolation of Afrikaners. It is, however, conceivable that with continued state decay under the ANC, and the Solidarity Movement's growing assertiveness, they might eventually pursue a separate political state as well. Buys (2019:234-235; my translation) characterises the need for self-management both as insurance against ANC rule, and as an alternative to emigration:

> Afrikaners who have more confidence in the possibilities of self-management than in the possibility of successful ANC state-management, can utilise the constitutional space for self-determination like this to build a city from below, because a state cannot be

> given from "above". Even for liberal Afrikaners it is better to help build a safe Perth here, than to see their loved ones move to Perth in Australia. This could be a part of a much larger and nationwide project of growing self-management. Emigration is only a solution for rich and well-qualified individuals, not for an entire volk. It does not help to keep telling each other that a successful ANC-ruled South Africa, or an Afrikaner city, are unattainable dreams. There is nothing wrong with working on both. Unfortunately, there are no more easy solutions left, therefore our vision of the future will have to be stronger than our memory of the past.

Buys's (2019) plan for Afrikaners puts into effect a cultural state within a political state (which maintains control over national issues such as legislation, trade, foreign affairs, budget spending, etc.). However, due to the continued territorial scatteredness of Afrikaners even under Buys's vision, his proposed cultural state is not a single geographic zone, but rather, a network of connected organisations and communities, even potentially those overseas, and in particular the Afrikaner diaspora. The Solidarity Movement's *Afrikanerstigting* (Afrikaner Foundation), that aims to raise capital for these expansive goals from the international community, sets out to create a "digital culture home for the Afrikaner diaspora" (see Chapter 5, subsection 5.4.1.2).

This form of society reminds one strongly of Neal Stephenson's conception of a post-nation-state globalised world in his 1995 novel *The Diamond Age*. In this science fiction novel set in a technologically advanced future, nation-states have been crippled by an inability to collect tax revenue and have made way for city-states with limited power. Cities comprise various enclaves associated with different non-territorial *phyles* – groups of people sharing values, ethnic identity or other cultural similarities. Individuals who do not enjoy membership to a phyle are usually socio-economically disadvantaged, but continue to receive basic goods from a central authority. Stephenson (who is American) even conceived of Boer and Zulu phyles (Carson, 2014). Stephenson's notion of a phyle has since been developed into the concept of a *network state* which is "a highly aligned online community with a capacity for collective action that crowdfunds territory around the world and eventually gains diplomatic recognition from pre-existing states" (Srinivasan, 2022).

The Solidarity Movement's vision for Afrikaner cultural cantons represents one of two main approaches to the problem of securing minority rights within a nation-state that seems non-responsive to white Afrikaans speakers' demand for a space for Afrikaans. The other approach involves the unification of white and coloured Afrikaans speakers, first to combat the perception that advocacy of Afrikaans minority-language rights is code for racial separatism, and second to bolster the groups' numbers in the hope that the ANC government responds to

this numerically stronger minority group. The latter strategy thus relies on the political goodwill of the central government, without posing any threat to this centralised locus of power. The former strategy forces a decentralisation of power over cultural and community matters, without the need to create a separate state.

Although these strategies differ in terms of the threat that they present to the supremacy of the nation-state, both promote (and rely on) the consumption of Afrikaans in the private sphere. While Buys's Afrikaner cultural cantons appear to be ethnically exclusive, this is not an inherent requirement of the strategy, meaning a unified Afrikaans cultural canton is also theoretically possible. These two approaches are also not mutually exclusive, as Buys (2019) alluded to above: a future with ANC co-operation and without can be prepared for simultaneously. It is arguable that Buys's (2019) radical vision for the future of Afrikaners constitutes a way of re-imagining the nation-state in more plural terms, as recommended by May (2012), and specifically with minority groups without geographic concentration in mind. This will largely depend on the extent to which white Afrikaans speakers remain committed to their fellow South Africans and maintain their national identification.

What is certain, however, is that there is no indication that white Afrikaans speakers who strive for the reproduction of Afrikaans will remain content with ever-increasing anglicisation in the public sphere. When nation-state congruence is actively pursued by the dominant majority, it is to be expected that the minority ethnie (or stateless nation) will seek the protection of their culture, political power, or finally, separate territory. Davies (2009:72) predicted a new dawn for Afrikaner cultural and identity politics:

> Afrikaner cultural activists are today faced with a very different task from that which confronted their predecessors. Long past the apogee of a cohesive ethnic identity, cultural politics has become the new battleground and the yardstick by which the success of any post-apartheid grouping is to be measured. That said, the terms of the debate have altered paradigmatically and the challenge is formidable. The crisis of cultural politics stretches not only to minority rights and nation-building, but also the global hegemonic consensus itself: the triumph of a neo-liberal economic regime and its adjunct liberal democracy. Notable divisions are evident in the multidimensional nature of contemporary Afrikaner identifications. On the economic front, these have been interrupted by the success of Afrikaner capital and the continued rise of an increasingly globalised middle class under the new dispensation. By contrast, in the cultural arena, the old foundations of cultural identity are no longer credible and consideration of an 'Afrikaner problem' remains disputed if it is considered as a problem at all. Even a 'more liberal Afrikanerbond with a new approach' is battling to find a suitable niche. Nonetheless, among white Afrikaans speakers, stronger ethnic identification is associated with active involvement in cultural organisations and activities that involve mostly in-group members, suggesting cultural politics could

> perhaps represent the base of a new programmatic axis for an Afrikaans grouping. A new round of Afrikaner identity politics then looms large. With the issue of material resources or entitlement virtually obsolete despite rising white poverty levels, there is an increasing focus on more abstract and intellectual disputes concerned with perceptions of marginalisation, entitlement and belonging, as well as clashes over institutional and symbolic power. The basis of both inclusion and exclusion is now concerned with the drawing of cultural boundaries although these boundaries remain the subject of considerable debate, most especially with regard to race.

According to Davies (2009:73), increased globalisation has revealed the political dimension of culture, by demanding "a reconsideration of the relationship between culture, identity and national or territorial solidarity". This relates to the growing unfeasibility of nation-state congruence noted by May (2012) in Chapter 2, as countries become more heterogeneous. She elaborates:

> Certain group interests have been well served by this overt politicisation of the cultural domain and the multidimensional redrawing of global space, and the revitalised relationship between the local and the global has sponsored a voice for localities. The concept of community has become far more complex in this new geography and hybrid identities often rooted in post- or non-national traditions have flourished.

Davies (2009:127-128) states that despite the "political ambiguities" among contemporary Afrikaners, a variety of issues have been able to straddle some of the divisions between them, for instance controversial place name changes or the removal of statues of Afrikaner leaders. So too, most white Afrikaans speakers are opposed to the removal of Afrikaans from public educational institutions which the BELA bill (see subsection 5.2.1) threatens to accelerate. In the political domain, policies such as expropriation without compensation and the *National Health Insurance* (NHI) scheme (which would prohibit private health insurance) have appeared to be able to bridge the divide among most Afrikaners as well. Loadshedding, e-tolls, and state capture have been able to do the same for many South Africans from all ethnic backgrounds.

Fifteen years ago, Davies (2009:128) argued that "nationalist politics" have not been able reach "any singular political agenda, and remains beset by class, generational and regional differences". In my view this has greatly changed in the intervening years, at least in part because of another observation she had made:

> Nonetheless, many of the policy changes of the last decade appear to have entrenched a deep sense of polarisation among certain Afrikaans constituencies. They have lent weight to the increasingly widespread language of minority rights centring upon affirmative action, economic empowerment and multiculturalism that has been borrowed by certain political organisations.

I believe that identification with Afrikaner ethnic identity is increasing, as Afrikaner organisations continue to position themselves as a functional alternative to the central government. In the Western Cape, due to the local demographics, the DA and opposition political parties more broadly are able to fill this role. In the interior of South Africa, Afrikaner civil organisations will likely continue to take over functions from the ANC government in the private sphere. It may thus be projected that Afrikaner identification will not increase in the WC to the same extent as in the North, although anti-ANC mobilisation will be present in both; in the former in the shape of growing calls for decentralisation and even provincial independence, and in the latter in the form of increasing privatisation and localisation.[388] The WC could thus see a strengthening of provincial identity, instead of ethnic identity or local/community identity (although growing coloured nationalism and demographic and electoral changes could upend this; as well as Solidarity's ability to impact others in Bourdieu's relational field). Kok (2024b; my translation) has also noticed the chasm forming between local politics in these regions:

> One understands that middle-class residents of the Western Cape, who for the most part have good infrastructure and a good provincial government and live fairly comfortably, think that the North's post-liberal emphasis on self-management and ties between cultural groups is out of step with the rest of South Africa. The view from the North does confirm though that the Western Cape is the lucky exception and that shifts in broader practices are indeed taking place.

In my view, the moral and practical failure of the ANC over 30 years of rule, specifically its unmitigated plunder of state resources and the consequent damage done to state-owned enterprises (SOE) and service delivery, has allowed (especially younger) Afrikaners to rid themselves of collective guilt and shame over Apartheid. Even though the lingering consequences of Afrikaner rule is still clear to see, a new form of moral decay has appeared, and a new 'enemy of the people' has been born, as one book referred to former President Zuma. The fact that South Africans of all ethnic backgrounds now commonly criticise the ruling government and blame *it* for the current state of the country, has given white Afrikaans speakers license to pursue both their personal and collective interests, without feeling responsible either as individuals or as a group for the problems of South Africa.

[388] Two different forms of Afrikaner mobilisation have already been seen: Afrikaner nationalism (such as by S.J. du Toit) and peaceful revolt (during the Great Trek). The latter approach is only possible if a group can (physically) exit the political system, which is what proponents of Cape independence are trying to do. Those in the North, however, are not able to exercise this option.

One of the Afrikaners' historic grievances – a cornerstone of their psychological heritage – has been the fear of not being burghers. Throughout VOC and British rule, and now ANC rule, they have been highly suspicious of being treated as second-class citizens, a term that often crops up in popular discourse. Both the Great Trek and Apartheid represent their attempts at remedying their perceived marginalisation and lack of self-determination (in addition to the other benefits it brought). Both have involved a separation from others as a way to maintain self-rule. Cape independence and northern privatisation are new approaches to not simply achieving separation and self-rule, but to force power-sharing on to a majoritarian democracy actively pursuing nation-state congruence.

It has become clear throughout this chapter that the latest round of Afrikaner radicalisation does not continue the Afrikaner nationalism of the Apartheid-era, but instead, mimics the post-Anglo-Boer War Afrikaner reconstruction. Today, ethnic mobilisation is not at its most active in electoral politics, but rather in the private domain where the "organisation Afrikaner" has been reestablished. Its focus is less on race, and more on language and cultural, regional and local communities. The latter is especially present in the growth of gated estates in South Africa – a non-racial middle- and upper-class radicalisation of sorts – and other efforts to fortify neighbourhoods against municipal and state decay as well as crime. At the heart of all these developments is decentralisation; an attempt to escape the ANC's service delivery failures as well as its imposition of nation-state congruence. If sociopolitical stability and social cohesion are under threat, the ANC surely shoulders some of the blame.

Academic Hussein Solomon (cited in De Beer, 2024b) believes that democracy in South Africa is not functioning and, as it concerns elections, merely represents another form of populism. He rejects the notion that democracy inevitably translates into economic benefits, and to save South Africa from becoming a failed state, insists that unpopular decisions will have to be made, pointing specifically to the unsustainable ratio of welfare recipients to taxpayers. He advocates for a small liberal technocratic government, comprising experts from the private sector, and the privatisation of services which the government is currently struggling to deliver (such as fixing potholes and providing water and electricity).

In his technocratic cabinet, Solomon would like to see CEO of Standard Bank Sim Tshabalala, CEO of OUTA Wayne Duvenhage, and the Solidarity Movement's Flip Buys, whom he praises for his 'innovative ideas'. After the goals of this government have been reached, necessitating a period of at least ten years Solomon estimates, democracy will be restored. Defending his

unorthodox proposal, to put it mildly, he maintains that his plan would only formalise a process which is already underway: a loss of power on the part of the state, as evidenced by local communities fixing roads, private companies removing refuse, and private banks issuing national identification documents and passports.

The 2024 election outcome is an indication that power-sharing might still be possible in a democratic South Africa. The Government of National Unity (GNU), but more importantly, the prospect of coalition politics for the foreseeable future in South Africa, might spell the end for majoritarian democracy and ANC rule. Although the uptick in ethnic-based voting is concerning, it could ultimately lead to minority groups enjoying more political representation. The third cabinet of President Ramaphosa is the most ethnically and ideologically diverse cabinet South Africa has ever had, including the cabinet of the first GNU of 1994. However, as I argued in subsection 5.2.3, it is too early to conclude that the ANC's stranglehold on the South African state has been broken, and more radical paths thus avoided.

5.4.2.2. Afrikaans MLR and maintaining Afrikaner identity

In the Afrikaner case study, the language struggle for Afrikaans is closely related to issues such as affirmative action, crime and lack of service delivery. All these issues are traced back to the ANC, who is perceived as being indifferent to the concerns and wellbeing of (among others) white Afrikaans speakers. This indifference, or even antagonism, is experienced especially strongly because of white Afrikaans speakers' numerical weakness and consequent lack of political power in a majoritarian democracy (without group-based rights in practice).

According to Thomas (2009:85), the closure of minority-language schools and universities has contributed to heightened ethnic tensions in many countries. Tollefson (2002d:5) states that a major goal of policymakers may be the use of educational-language policies to reduce the potential for social and political conflict. May (2012) similarly argued in favour of ELR in Chapter 2, subsection 2.5.1. Appiah (2006:1620) argues: "Where people can acquire an identity by learning a language and they wish to do so, it is not the state's business to stop them". In other words, in order to maintain ethnolinguistic peace in diverse countries, fairness rights and the right to linguistic security (see Chapter 1, subsection 1.3.4) have to be protected.

The retreat of Afrikaans from the public sphere in South Africa is not an indication of language shift or loss on the part of Afrikaans speakers. On the contrary, Afrikaans speakers have clearly indicated their desire to maintain their language. Instead, the removal of Afrikaans from higher functions is indicative of an ANC government unyielding and unwilling to share power, or to

allow for a more pluralistic conception of the nation-state. If they wish to keep white Afrikaans speakers positively engaged in the public domain, instead of retreating to the private sphere, they have to allow Afrikaners to maintain their ethnic identity and to exercise some political power over public cultural institutions. As it stands, the ANC is perceived as attacking not only their language, but also their social identities.

I believe a strong case can be made for Afrikaners enjoying both toleration and promotion rights (see Chapter 1, subsection 1.3.2), since they are a national minority (Chapter 2, subsection 2.2.6) without a territory upon which they may base their claim for self-government rights (Chapter 1, subsection 1.3.4). Considering their territorial dispersion, they might also be able to make a claim for special representation rights. That is to say, if Afrikaners may not enjoy self-rule over their own territory, they have to be given space in the nation-state, in terms of both political and cultural representation. Vestergaard (2001:39) is, however, sceptical of Afrikaners' claim to minority rights:

> Minority rights, such as articulated by the UN, were meant to protect fragile, weak minorities against the oppression of the strong, wealthy majority. This is not the case with the Afrikaners: they are not weak, and they are as a whole wealthier than the majority. But more importantly, they are the old power elite – the oppressors. This makes a difficult case for those Afrikaners claiming their constitutional right to minority protection.

Davies (2009:135) is also sceptical of white Afrikaans speakers' claim to minority rights due to their "privileged material position". In contrast, Bornman (2010:252) points out that the post-1994 political dispensation has not "eradicated and/or solved the problems of heterogeneity, diversity, and potential identity conflict". She argues that policymakers wanting to prevent intergroup conflict and social and political instability should focus on identity formation, by both encouraging national identity and embracing subnational identities. She also argues that it is important that language identities are allowed space to flourish, and to limit 'propagandising' exclusive identities such as Africanism (presumably on the part of the state). Giliomee (2009:xx) also emphasises the need for a pluralist approach in South Africa:

> [T]he assumption that South Africa would adopt the one-way cultural assimilation model, with English and middle-class values at the core, has also been challenged. I prefer the model of cultural pluralism, 'which celebrate[s] differences among groups rather than seeking to obliterate them'. I hope that this cultural pluralism will be strengthened by identities forged through language rather than race despite the large socio-economic gap that exists.

Duvenage (2018:112) contends that the main challenge of South African society is how to live with diversity, and that those who hold power are always tempted to overemphasise either difference or similarity. Degenaar (cited in Duvenage, 2018:110), in support of political pluralism, wrote that it is a "political philosophy that describes and prescribes value to the fact that man in society is *not* an isolated individual, but still acts in a plurality of groups. Groups here mean a great variety that come down to the following classes: peoples, cultural groups, communities, associations, organisations, institutes".

Giliomee (2019a:78) also cites Degenaar who, in 1982, offered an analytical framework which attempted to reconcile the concern for Afrikaner survival with a just political system. Degenaar's framework (cited in Giliomee, 2019a:79), similar to May's (2012) midway approach, rejects the liberal model (which emphasises the individual and denies the possibility of individuals becoming 'mature' as Afrikaners),[389] as well as the nationalist model (which emphasises ethnic structures and believes individuals can *only* become mature within the structure of the volk), in favour of a pluralist model, which allows for the possibility that individuals could *also* attain 'adulthood' as Afrikaners. Reaching 'maturity' as an Afrikaner would necessitate a critical review of Afrikaner history, combined with a flexible interpretation of that ethnic identity, and the equitable co-operation with other such groups.

> Degenaar contended that identity was not God-given but was the product of voluntary identification with a group and its values. Attaining adulthood did not mean becoming alienated from the Afrikaner group but it did represent a critical assessment of obsolete Afrikaner idioms and an opportunity to renew one's membership of the Afrikaner people creatively. That meant choosing values in the history of one's group which could pass the test of fairness and morality. It also meant thinking in moral terms about survival. It was necessary to take justice, rather than the sovereignty of the volk, as the yardstick for politics and to seek co-operation between whites and blacks on the basis of negotiation, not consultation. What would a just political order look like? Degenaar did not elaborate on this but made it clear that the final test was justice: 'A creatively renewed Afrikanerhood in changed conditions … means choosing not mere survival, but survival in justice which was the essential condition for physical survival.'[390]

Vestergaard (2001:38-39) believes that Afrikaners carry what sociologist Erving Goffman termed "tribal stigma", which means they are "constantly at risk of being labelled 'people

[389] Maturity in this sense refers to Immanuel Kant's view on the Enlightenment, involving "a process of liberation from immaturity to one in which a person could critically review those presuppositions and structures of his which could not pass the test of morality" (Giliomee, 2019a:78-79).

[390] Degenaar seems to suggest here that if Afrikaners continued to pursue their ethnic survival by perpetuating unjustness (as they were at the time of his writing in the 1980s), they were actually jeopardising their physical survival, considering that that unjustness was directed at a majority which would eventually exact revenge.

against transformation,' reactionary, racist" and that they must "prove their loyalty to the new South Africa – more than any other group of South Africans". For this reason, Engelbrecht (2007:29) distrusts continued Afrikaner identification:

> [A]ttempts at the resuscitation of Afrikaner-identity might represent a residue of essentialist thought regarding the notion of Afrikaner-ness. Alternatively, they are attempts to establish a questionable political platform from which to strategize in the South African context. This platform is questionable as it carries with it a heavy load of ideological baggage, and because it excludes many South African citizens who sympathise and stand to gain from the political objectives of "Afrikaner"-movements (the promotion of the Afrikaans language, for instance, and the protection of the rights of minorities).

Working from Slavoj Žižek's Lacanian analysis of group formation, Engelbrecht (2007:39) contends that despite its subjective nature, the Afrikaner identity is a powerful force, and views arguments that the Afrikaner identity should be disposed of as naïve for two reasons. First, while the Afrikaner identity is an illusion (an ideological, rather than a metaphysical, reality), the social sphere is always comprised of one or the other illusion, or indeed 'a network of fantasies'. Second, people cannot be dissuaded from their identifications, especially since many of the behaviours and practices associated with such an identity cannot simply be removed.

Instead, Engelbrecht (2007:40) argues that in the midst of disillusionment with and rearticulation of Afrikaner identity, white Afrikaans speakers should ask themselves what the political, social and personal value and benefits are of maintaining such an identification, as well as whose interests are served by this identification. He identifies two reasons for maintaining an Afrikaner identity: (i) the inability of people to escape essentialist beliefs; and (ii) to achieve political aims by making group-based claims. As a result of Afrikaner history, Engelbrecht is sceptical of the political utility of this identification, expressing his concern that the re-establishment of the Afrikaner identity as a political power bloc excludes and alienates – not only Afrikaans speakers of other races and other minorities, but also dissenting Afrikaners, who might otherwise have shared interests. He treats the reformulation and/or reformation of the Afrikaner identity as an impossibility (or a desperate act of mythmaking and an elision of Apartheid and other history by essentialists).

Engelbrecht's understanding of ethnicity ironically essentialises Afrikaner identity by determining what its contents are, and making no allowance for its malleability. So too, he does not entertain the possibility of maintaining multiple social identities. His instrumentalist view, which largely equates ethnic identification with ethnic mobilisation, also ignores the sense of

meaning and belonging, and positive self-esteem, people may derive from their ethnic identity. In her article addressing the controversy surrounding the De la Rey song (discussed in subsection 5.2.2), Afrikaans writer Antjie Krog (2011:33) argues:

> De la Rey is a surrogate father, not leading to an uprising, but assisting children to deal with their guilt in such a way that they can at last begin to integrate into the new society in which they feel they actually belong.

Krog (2011:34) interprets the song as a sign that young Afrikaners are searching for ways to "participate in the making of [the] country" and to "legitimise [their] contribution as useful, worthy and equal". She lambasts those journalists and academics who immediately jumped to the worst conclusion about Afrikaners, and suggests that some appear to relish and employ the "bad racist Afrikaners on the rise" narrative for their own personal gain. Grubbs *et al*. (2019) contend that so-called virtue-signalling, or moral grandstanding as they term the phenomenon, is employed as a strategy for (individual) status improvement. They found that moral grandstanding is not associated with any particular ideology but rather with political polarisation (2019:24). They posit that moral grandstanding is "likely predictive of greater conflict about moral or political issues over time", and that it might lead to greater polarisation as well (2019:25-26).

Krog (2011:34) observes that "[i]t is apparently confusing when Afrikaners try to work through their guilt or try to become part of the country", and that when attempts to this effect are made "the coals are stoked so that nobody dares escape the bondage of shame or victimhood". Many commentators on Afrikaner nationalism – especially those white Afrikaans speakers who dissent without providing a framework for achieving moral Afrikanerness – banish white Afrikaans speakers to irredeemability, while positioning themselves as righteous through the act of banishment. They thus mimic the main characters of Rossouw's *Verwoerdburg* (see subsection 5.3.1.3), who avenge themselves on the Afrikaner through creative writing and academic research focused on Afrikanerdom (Botha, 2020:505). Some of these writers also do so from privileged positions overseas, exercising their own individual mobility while judging those who do not have the benefit of deriving positive self-esteem from cosmopolitan identities, and/or might only be able to rely on collective action in the pursuit of their own interests.

In order for white Afrikaans speakers, who show little sign of wanting to part with either Afrikaans or ethnic identity, to reformulate Afrikaner identity and renew their commitment to South Africa, they have to be allowed the opportunity to wrestle with the issues addressed throughout this chapter, not primarily with outgroup critics, but amongst and with each other.

External critique does not seem to have much positive effect and usually causes further identity threats and intergroup polarisation. There is ample evidence of andersdenkendheid and dwarstrekkery, or internal dissent, in this group which, in combination with the collective memory of the consequences of Afrikaner nationalism, makes essentialism much less likely. Here, especially the Solidarity Movement's stranglehold on the meaning of Afrikaner identity will have to be challenged by internal dissidents. It is vital that the borders of Afrikaner identity remain porous and voluntary, and the contents malleable and negotiable. At the same time, Afrikaner politics seem inextricably linked with national politics, making the achievement of pluralism in the nation-state imperative if ethnonationalism is to be avoided. Krog (2011:35) similarly argues:

> It is essential for Afrikaners to invest everything in redefining themselves in a positive and honourable way. It is even more essential that the attempts of Afrikaners are respected and accepted. Research has found that where people were not allowed to redefine themselves, they solidify into an intransient and destructive entity.

Kotzé and Griessel (2012:8) apply a post-Jungian model on Afrikaner history, and argue, among other things, that "the Afrikaner collective identity […] needs to become safe and secure enough to affirm its own authentic existence in a culturally diverse society". Perhaps then Van der Westhuizen's (2016) enclaves represent safe spaces where the reformulation of Afrikaner identity can take place. They also provide the opportunity for different types of Afrikaners and white and coloured Afrikaans speakers to congregate, thereby keeping the Afrikaner identity fluid. Davies (2009:137) suggests that in order to challenge the ANC's power, white Afrikaans speakers will have to co-operate with other groups:

> Some form of counter-hegemony would need to be assembled in order to overcome the 'sub-imperialist' consensus compiled by the ANC government, its hegemonic allies and connected global social forces. But contesting any hegemonic form of politics would require the participation of key Afrikaans speaking elites who presently form a critical part of this politics. Renewing the consensus need not mean a renewed process of ethnicisation. There can be no suggestion of any renegotiated pax Afrikaner, but the wideness of the spectrum suggested by that same label now encompasses the rudiments of more alternative if localised and perhaps even diasporic visions as well. What began life as a minority nationalist movement has come full circle, with political dominance exchanged for economic advantage and series of culturally-based and localised revivals in a new, globalised chapter of history. The challenge then surely is to build a degree of rapprochement not merely between these diverse Afrikaans constituencies, but also with the majority of South Africans.

Visser (2007:28) argues that the continued existence of the cultural identity depends on the extent to which Afrikaners can redefine the identity according to a new value system, and in

this manner unite all Afrikaans speakers in the Afrikaans language struggle, while also maintaining their South African identity and not alienating themselves from the black majority:

> According to the respected Afrikaner intellectual and former politician, Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, in future the term "Afrikaner" will have to be associated with a new set of values which are unknown as yet, because those who wish to be Afrikaners will have to start moulding and refining those values. How this opportunity is used will determine whether there is a future for Afrikaners in the new South Africa. The challenge for those wishing to be Afrikaners is to bring about a new, common, internal process of value identification that can contribute towards a new, external ascription of what being an Afrikaner represents. Any group that would undermine the striving towards transcending values of a common South African patriotism by claiming special minority status can expect less sympathy for those minority interests from the black majority. Therefore Afrikaners would have to become a new "imagined community". They will have to apply themselves imaginatively to the task of establishing who they are in South Africa and in this process they will have to disengage their thinking from the negative aspects of their history and endeavour to create a new one.

Giliomee (2019a:324), pointing to the divergent demographic trends of white and coloured Afrikaans speakers respectively, insists that "[t]he future of Afrikaans is literally in coloured hands, and so is the future of the Afrikaners". Although the growth rate of the coloured population outpaces that of the white population, the 2022 Census demonstrates that it is still not enough to numerically improve the minority status of Afrikaans speakers. From 1996 to 2022, the combined share of the total population in South Africa of white and coloured people (of whom not all are Afrikaans-speaking), decreased from 20% to 15.5% (Stats SA, 2022:6).

As much as white Afrikaans speakers have to reformulate Afrikaner identity, and co-operate with Afrikaans speakers of other races, the future of Afrikaans is still very much in the hands of the ANC government and the non-Afrikaans-speaking majority more broadly. The continued removal of Afrikaans from educational institutions seriously hampers the reproduction of Afrikaans which, in spite of private sphere consumption, makes Afrikaans language shift and loss increasingly possible. There is unfortunately little indication of a desire or intent to reconceptualise the nation-state in more pluralist ways, so as to allow space for Afrikaans and Afrikaners. Political scientist and anthropologist, James C. Scott (2009:35), argued that (minority) ethnicity inherently threatens the nation-state, as it functions in the private domain away from its sphere of control.

> The ethnic zone was feared and stigmatised by state rhetoric precisely because it was beyond its grasp and therefore an example of defiance and an ever-present temptation to those who might wish to evade the state.

CONCLUSION

Overview of the Study

In Chapter 1 of this study, I highlighted the different schools of thought within the field of language rights, arguing in favour of minority-language rights (as opposed to language ecology or linguistic-human rights). Kymlicka's (1995) group-differentiated rights were discussed, adding to the argument that minority-group protections cannot be incorporated under individual human rights. These rights were found to not necessarily conflict with the ideals of liberal democracy. Lastly, the pursuit of a 'common' national language and identity, and its link to conflict, was discussed; a discusion which emphasised the unequal ability of majorities to engage in nation-building, contrasted with the undue pressure on minorities to assimilate.

Chapter 2 systematically examined May's (2012) MLR framework, highlighting the formation and construction of ethnic and national identities, the pejorative views on minority ethnicity in academic and political discourse, and the nationalism which gives rise to modern nation-states. The difference between ethnic categories and communities was noted, and ethnic identification and mobilisation were clearly distinguished. It was shown how the ethnic habitus of the dominant majority becomes naturalised as the national identity, while that of the minority is viewed as parochial and destabilising to the nation-state. Cosmopolitanism and hybridity theory was contrasted with multiculturalism, emphasising the unequal power dynamic which precipitates language shift and loss. Finally, I discussed May's (2012) recommendations for achieving a pluralist nation-state, namely the conferral of educational-language rights (ELR) and regionalism.

The origin of Social Identity Theory (SIT) was noted in Chapter 3, whereafter a comprehensive discussion of the core tenets of this theory, including criticisms, followed. Several complementary theories, most notably Social Categorisation Theory (SCT), were also explained, which together make up the Social Identity Approach (SIA). This discussion also dealt with identity threats and the underlying motives behind social identities. The chapter was concluded by demonstrating the link between the SIA, minority groups and collective action, investigating the various options for achieving social cohesion in situations of intergroup conflict, and finally, by providing an evaluation of the applicability and integration of the SIA into May's (2012) MLR framework.

In Chapter 4, I traced the history of white Afrikaans speakers starting from the arrival of the Dutch, throughout the Dutchification Period (1652-1795), the Anglicisation Period (1795-1910) and the Afrikanerisation Period (1910-1994). The discussion focused on matters of language, identity and group mobilisation in particular, demonstrating the extent of the relationship between these elements. In describing the formation and construction of the Afrikaner group, Afrikaner identification, mobilisation and nationalism, and continued intergroup conflict, I integrated the theories from May's (2012) MLR framework and the SIA, illustrating their joint applicability to the study of minority-language groups.

The case study of white Afrikaans speakers was continued in Chapter 5, covering the ANCification Period (1994-present) and drawing particular attention to the contextual reality in South Africa which leads to heightened ethnic identification and mobilisation among this group. I proceeded to identify the various forms of contemporary mobilisation within this group, and assessed their success, local influences, and potential to impact sociopolitical stability and social cohesion in South Africa. A comprehensive analysis of contemporary Afrikaner identity followed, including discussions on identity reformation, types of Afrikaners, identity threats, and identity threat responses and strategies. I concluded the chapter by assessing the danger posed to South Africa, and white Afrikaans speakers themselves, by the most dominant form of Afrikaner mobilisation, and offered by own recommendations in pursuit of pluralism and social cohesion in South Africa, as well as the future of Afrikaner identity and Afrikaans MLR.

Main Arguments of the Study

Throughout this study, many insights into the social identification and group mobilisation of contemporary white Afrikaans speakers were provided. In general, it was found that while ethnicity is constructed, it is not completely arbitrary; and continues to be of great meaning and importance to many people. While ethnicity can be mobilised to instrumental ends, it was argued that the pursuit of material interests is not the only reason many choose to maintain their ethnic identity. In fact, it was emphasised that the maintenance of ethnic identity often conflicts with the material interests of minority-group members. To this point, it was underscored that a distinction should be made between ethnic identification and ethnic mobilisation, as these are two separate phenomena.

Considering that dominant majority groups are able to maintain their (subnational) group identities which they, through banal nationalism, naturalise as the national identity, it was

argued that minority ethnicity is unduly derided as backward and destabilising. Instead, allowance has to be made for continued ethnic identification among minority groups in pluralist nation-states, alongside the maintenance of national (and other social) identity. To this end, May (2012) recommended the protection of the educational-language rights (ELR) of minority-language speakers, as well as the potential application of regionalism to safeguard minority groups from the dominance of majority groups, specifically as it pertains to autonomy over cultural matters. While I concluded in favour of May's MLR recommendation, I found that his recommendation for regionalism is informed by Western contexts, and does not take into account those minority groups without sufficient territorial concentration (nor the history of Apartheid which severely complicates and constrains the implementation of ethnic-based territories in South Africa).

It was argued that in order to provide an accurate analysis of minority-group radicalisation, the broader context in which it occurs has to be fully investigated. Instead of occurring in a vacuum, the increase in ethnic identification and collective action was found to be causally linked to the behaviour of outgroups, or the state in particular. I found that when outgroups threaten the social identities of minority groups, the latter respond by increasing their ethnic identification, especially in situations where it is difficult to exit the ingroup, such as in racially polarised societies. I further found that the active pursuit of nation-state congruence, and the exclusion of minority groups from the state, which I characterised as radicalisation on the part of the state, causes distinctiveness threats and group-based mobilisation among minority groups. This process I termed reciprocal radicalisation, to denote the intergroup behaviour and conflict underlying ethnic mobilisation, such as that of white Afrikaans speakers.

I thus concluded that the mobilisation of ethnic identity occurs when (i) group members perceive a threat (usually both social identity and realistic threats), (ii) they respond by increasing their ingroup identification which mitigates the threat by nurturing their underlying identity motives (i.e., provides them with a sense of self-esteem, belonging, control, etc.), and when (iii) identity entrepreneurs capitalise on this increased salience of identity, employing it (such as through the use of symbols and narratives) in service of collective action to achieve social change.

After several rounds of radicalisation throughout their history, the language-identity link has been 'hardened' among white Afrikaans speakers. While the content and group borders of Afrikaner identity remain highly contested, Afrikaans is clearly the core cultural value of this

group. Although they share this language with coloured Afrikaans speakers, I explained why the proposed unification of these two groups is slow to come into being, pointing to the continued salience and importance of Afrikaner ethnic identity, and the presence of linguistic differentiation between these two groups. Arguing in favour of increased co-operation between white and coloured Afrikaans speakers, I suggested that, for the time being, a broad language-based identity will have to co-exist with Afrikaner ethnicity, as the former is not (yet) able to fully satisfy the underlying motives of social identity of many white Afrikaans speakers.

Identifying the Solidarity Movement as the most dominant form of contemporary Afrikaner mobilisation, I noted the identity entrepreneurship occurring and the threat of internal restrictions and essentialism this poses white Afrikaans speakers. I argued that while this movement's privatisation and long-term goals do threaten the supremacy of the ANC, it is neither illegal nor undemocratic. In fact, some possible iteration of their future plans might even be considered to accomplish what May (2012) recommended, i.e., the re-imagining of the nation-state in more pluralist terms. The success of this approach will depend on whether white Afrikaans speakers can avoid the trap of essentialism, keep the Afrikaner identity malleable, and maintain their national identification and commitment to their fellow South Africans. So too, sociopolitical stability and social cohesion will depend on the ANC's willingness to include and accommodate minority groups in the nation-state; and truly embrace multiculturalism.

Aside from the mobilisation of Afrikaner ethnic identity, I argued that white Afrikaans speakers are currently engaging in the restructuring of Afrikaner identity, resulting from, among other things, morality threats, and in an attempt to achieve positive self-esteem. Various strategies to this end are occurring, and with continued internal dissidence, I predicted that the Afrikaner identity will likely remain contested and thus avoid essentialist conceptualisations. Together with the consideration that the majority of white Afrikaans speakers continue to positively engage in the public sphere, and with members of other groups, I suggested that concerns over the potential threat Afrikaners pose to sociopolitical stability and social cohesion in South Africa might be somewhat overblown.

Regardless, I concluded that in the midst of the ANC's loss of their grip on the nation-state, as evidenced by rampant crime, and increasing localisation and privatisation which is replacing the state in many contexts, the situation in South Africa remains delicate, and should be managed accordingly. To this end, I proposed the protection of Afrikaans MLR, specifically

ELR, in order to stave off the sense of marginalisation among white Afrikaans speakers. I finally argued for the accommodation and inclusion of minority-language groups in the nation-state, and an integration approach, as opposed to an assimilationist one.

Through this thesis, I have also demonstrated the applicability of May's (2012) MLR framework, in combination with the Social Identity Approach (SIA), to the study of minority-language groups, and the link between language, identity and radicalisation. The findings from this expanded framework are able to predict the further radicalisation of white Afrikaans speakers, should the status quo persist, making a course-direction change from policymakers imperative. I have thus answered my research questions and confirmed my hypotheses.

Significance and Limitations of the Study

This thesis represents original research in its investigation, through the case study of white Afrikaans speakers, of the applicability of May's (2012) MLR framework and the SIA on minority-language group identity formation and mobilisation. This provides a model for similar studies on ethnolinguistic conflict in diverse countries. Considering the unique position of white Afrikaans speakers as a numerical and political minority, with relative economic strength, and as having historically high ingroup identification, this study also forces a reconsideration of some of the finer points on intergroup dynamics presupposed by May and the Social Identity Approach.

While this thesis was able to offer many insights into the language conflict situation in South Africa, due to the scope of a PhD, it only focused on issues from the perspective of white Afrikaans speakers. For one, I do not offer a discussion on reciprocal radicalisation from the perspective of black nationalists, possibly linking their behaviour to Apartheid and the centuries of subjugation of black people before that. Similarly, in discussing the unification of white and coloured Afrikaans speakers, I do not attempt to comprehensively address the concerns of coloured Afrikaans speakers. Including these voices will, however, not have made a difference to my findings on white Afrikaans speakers, as the *perception* of marginalisation or relative deprivation, or even the mere presence of social categories (as confirmed by SIT), is sufficient to motivate negative intergroup behaviour.

Recommendations for Further Research

There are many possibilities still for further research on the topic of this thesis. As the increased ethnic identification and mobilisation of white Afrikaans speakers is an ongoing process,

coupled with continuing state decay, localisation, privatisation and the growth of coalition politics, my investigation is in one sense, not complete. I suspect the next decade will see major shifts still, not only in the identifications and collective actions of white Afrikaans speakers, but also in the very composition of the South African nation-state. I would also like to see some of the findings of this thesis corroborated with quantitative research, especially geared towards 'regular' white Afrikaans speakers, as opposed to entrepreneurs of identity. Such research could also analyse patterns of ethnic layering which occur among this cohort. The possibility of a north-south identity split among white Afrikaans speakers should also be further investigated. So too, I believe that research on the social identities of Afrikaner emigrants is a worthwhile pursuit, including interactions between these emigrants and their 'left behind' families and friends, as it pertains to co-constructive social identity formation.

Another avenue for future research could see the same enhanced MLR framework applied to coloured Afrikaans speakers, aimed towards analysing the identity shifts and forms of mobilisation occurring in this community in the post-Apartheid era. I believe there is also fascinating research to be done on black South Africans, in particular the growing middle class, who are highly mobile, many of whom anglicise in the private sphere, but some maintaining a form of 'symbolic ethnicity'. It may also be useful to conduct research investigating social cohesion between members of the various groups in South Africa, looking for correlations such as between ethnic identification and socio-economic mobility and class.

Concluding Thoughts

I conclude this study in the midst of severe political conflict over the proposed BELA bill, and what its enforcement might mean not only for the continued use of Afrikaans in schools and in the public sphere in general, but also for the 'Rainbow Nation' project and the place of white Afrikaans speakers in South Africa. While language policies may seem a trivial concern in a country with such acute poverty, violent crime, rampant corruption, state decay, and racial polarisation, it is by no means an inconsequential matter. Due to the economic strength of white Afrikaans speakers in general, which not only allows them to exit the country, and thereby adding to the unsustainable ratio between taxpayers and welfare recipients, those who remain are able to collectively mobilise in ways that may fundamentally alter the social fabric and nature of the South African state.

As white Afrikaans speakers, led by the Solidarity Movement, march to the Voortrekker Monument on the fifth of November 2024 in protest against the BELA bill, which to many of

them signifies not only a threat to their distinctiveness, but to their ethnic survival, and even their very existence, it has become evident that South Africa is at a crossroads. In combination with their deep sense of persecution regarding race-based employment policies, and polarising rhetoric from some politicians, this growingly assertive minority group is indicating its refusal of the status quo – their forced anglicisation and assimilation, but also the ANC's failure to govern.

Their mobilisation has the potential not only to aggravate race relations in South Africa, but through the essentialist conceptualisation of Afrikaner identity promoted by identity entrepreneurs, also has to the ability to create 'internal minorities' of non-prototypical members. What we may deduce from Afrikaner history is that an aggrieved, internally cohesive white Afrikaans group is a potent force, and that criticism, especially by outgroup members, largely serves to feed their sense of marginalisation and thus their further radicalisation. If the goal is to prevent the fracturing of the South African state and maintain sociopolitical stability and social cohesion, a renegotiation of the democratic settlement may be needed. By this, I mean two things.

First, the Apartheid-era racial classification system, which continues to be maintained through the application of race-based social categories, thereby reinforcing ethnic and racial identification and polarisation, has to be abolished. The growth of the ANC elite, alongside black poverty, clearly demonstrates that race-based policies have not been in the service of redressing the consequences of Apartheid and centuries of subjugation of black people. Second, multiple identities have to be embraced, meaning instead of top-down nation-building which attempts to assimilate all South Africans into a 'common' national identity, integration needs to be pursued, whereby those who want to maintain their ethnic identities are able to do so alongside the maintenance of their national identity. This allows for continued interaction between members of different groups in the public sphere, which has the potential for bottom-up nation-building. This process cannot occur if white Afrikaans speakers retreat to exclusive private domains. If the ultimate goal is the liberal ideal of individualism, denoting interpersonal, instead of intergroup behaviour, or in the case of collective action, coalitions based on interests that cross-cut racial and ethnic categories, individual mobility has to be extended so that people may identify and disidentify as they please.

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