

**IMPLEMENTING THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT
(NEPAD): CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS**

BY

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DEDICATION

This report is dedicated to those I live for : my wife, daughter, mother, and all my family members.



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
Lastly, I would like to thank my family for their long suffering patience.

DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis titled *Implementing New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD): Challenges and Prospects* hereby submitted has not been submitted by me for a degree at this or any other university; that it is my own work in design and execution and that all materials contained herein have been duly acknowledged.

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ABSTRACT

The study examines the challenges and prospects of implementing the New Partnership for Africa's Development in Africa. Relying on qualitative and quantitative research designs and deploying key assumptions of dependency theory as framework, the research concludes that these challenges are not only structural, endogenous and exogenous, but the ideological underpinnings of the conceptualisation has rendered the implementation of NEPAD incomplete and unproductive. The key finding of the research is that no single country can push for the full implementation of NEPAD without the rest of the countries in Africa. This is part of the missing link, where support for a continental plan like NEPAD has had to suffer failure. Besides, though paraded as a partnership, the underlying philosophy is to perpetuate existing unequal relations between Africa and the developed countries in view of Africa's post-coloniality. The study suggests that the concept of African Renaissance, which conveys a deep desire for Africa's re-birth might be a better way of approaching the development of the continent.

OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

African Renaissance

The re – birth and renewal of Africa socially, politically and economically premised on: emancipation of African women from patriarchy; broadening and deepening of democracy and the initiation of sustainable economic development.

Africa's Marginalisation

The decline of Africa's importance to the world economy. This has subsequently resulted in Africa's low GDP and GNP compared to the rest of the world.

Authoritarianism

A form of government in which power is located and centralized in one person, elite group, religious group or political party.

Aid

A form of official developmental assistance in the form of finance and technical expertise provided by the rich, developed countries to poor, underperforming and underdeveloped countries

Bretton Woods Institutions

Global institutions of finance and trade that were established after the World War II. They include: the World Bank, IMF and General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) currently known as WTO.

Conditionalities

List of prescriptions accompanying aid to poor countries presented by the donor countries

Foreign Policy

Actions undertaken by states in reaction to conditions in their external environment which are normally outside their control.

Foreign Policy Objectives

A variety of collective national interests, goals and values that operate in foreign policy.

Globalised World

Interconnection and interdependence of countries in the modern world.

Globalisation

A process of the widening and deepening of linkages of national economies into the world or global markets for goods and capital services.

Good Governance

The enhancement of free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberties, freedom of speech and religion as well as freedom from political oppression

G – 8

The group of originally seven, now eight rich, developed and industrialized countries

G – 77

A group of poor, underdeveloped, developing countries that enhance south - south cooperation to change the existing imbalances in the global economic order

Hegemon

A global regional leader in terms of military, economic and cultural affairs.

Human Security

The ability to pursue any choices in a safe environment which possesses seven dimensions of protection which are: economy, food, health, environment, personal, community and political

Neo Liberal Economy

This is a relatively open, market based free trade with a minimum of tariffs and other government initiated trade barriers. It also encapsulates currency devaluation, subsidy withdrawal from agriculture and social welfare as well as the privatization of state assets

North

A group of rich, powerful industrialized countries which emphasise the status quo by manipulating the world economy to advance their own interests.

Partnership

Principle of cooperation between the donor countries and Africa.

Peacekeeping

The deployment of armed forces into a conflict area to protect civilians and maintain peace between warring factions.

Regional Integration

A situation when geographically and proximate nations at equal stages of development come together to form a regional bloc to raise common tariffs against products of non member states and promote internal trade among members.

South

Poor underdeveloped countries which jostle for the removal of the status quo in the world economy.

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACCRONYMS

AAF – SAP	African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes
AEC	African Economic Community
AHSG	African Heads of State and Government
AISA	Africa Institute of South Africa
ALF	African Leadership Forum
AMIB	African Mission in Burundi
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AMIS	African Mission in Sudan
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
ANC	African National Congress
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
APPER	Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
APSA	African Peace and Security
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nation
ASF	African Standby Force

AU	African Union
CA	Constitutive Act
CEMAC	Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
CIDO	African Citizen's Directorate
CONSAS	Constellation of Southern African States
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSSDCA	Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation
DIRCO	Department of International Relations and Cooperation
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DSE	German Foundation for International Development
ECA	Economic Commission of Africa
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EEBC	Ethiopia – Eritrea Boundary Commission

EPLF	Eritrean People's Liberation Front
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
FAL	Final Act of Lagos
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FIFA	Federation of International Football Association
FTA	Free Trade Area
GDP	Gross Domestic Products
GEAR	Growth, Employment and Redistribution (South Africa)
GNP	Gross National Products
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Countries
HSGIC	Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee
HSGOC	Heads of State and Government Orientation Committee
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICT	Information Communication and Technology
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IGD	Institute for Global Dialogue

IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOC	International Olympics Committee
IPE	International Political Economy
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
LPA	Lagos Plan of Action
MAP	Millennium Partnership for African Recovery
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MNCs	Multinational Corporations
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NAI	New African Initiative
NAM	Non Aligned Movement
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGOs	Non Governmental Organisations
NIEO	New International Economic Order
NPCA	NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency
OAU	Organisation of African Unity

ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation in Europe
OPEC	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PRGF	Poverty Reduction Growth Facility
PRPS	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSC	Peace and Security Directorate
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme (South Africa)
RECs	Regional Economic Blocs
SACP	South African Communist Party
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAIIA	South African Institute of International Affairs
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programmes
TNCs	Transnational Corporations
TSZ	Temporary Security Zone
UAR	United Arab Republic
UN – PAAERD	United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNMEE	United Nations Mission for Ethiopia and Eritrea
WB	World Bank
WEF	World Economic Forum
WFP	World Food Programme
WOZA	Women of Zimbabwe Arise
WTO	World Trade Organisation

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND ORIENTATION

1.1. Background

This chapter provides an introduction and orientation to the study encapsulating *inter alia*, the background, rationale of the study and statement of the problem, aim of the study, objective of the study, literature review and methodology.

Southall (2006) argues that Africa entered the 21st century as a heavily indebted poor continent because of its excessive dependence on external aid as well as endogenous factors, and that has subsequently entrenched and tethered the continent into the quagmire of socio – economic and political malaise. In order to address Africa's socio - economic and political quagmire, the *International Financial Institutions* (IFIs) which include *inter alia* the World Bank and *International Monetary Fund* (IMF) solely and without consulting Africans developed and imposed reform policies such as Stabilisation Policies and *Structural Adjustment Programmes* (SAPs) in the continent. This unilateral decision exacerbated the plight of the continent. The IFI's understanding of Africa's plight was premised on a narrow assumption that development is linked to economic growth by referring to qualitative change and restructuring within the continent's economy in relation to technological and social progress. The major indicator of such a skewed developmental agenda is accelerated *Gross National Product* (GNP) per capita or *Gross Domestic Product*

(GDP) per capita which are envisaged to increase socio – economic productivity and the average material well being of the country's population.

As a means to find an Afrocentric development programme, African leaders engendered the *New Partnership for Africa's Development* (NEPAD). NEPAD as an African product is a continued search by African leadership and its peoples to create pan African structures able to lead to socio-economic transformation of the continent in a rapidly *globalising world*. Conversely, NEPAD is an instrument of contestation between Africans seeking self-determination in their development endeavours and those forces on a quest to perpetuate their exploitation of the continent's resources upon which the accumulation of their wealth depend. The relationship of this contestation is historical but also solid because it manifests itself in the continuing structures of imperialist domination of the African populace through the postcolonial state to continue a neo-colonial instrument of domination. In this regard, NEPAD illustrates this on-going historical contestation continuing to take place between these two forces. The postcolonial state finds itself at the centre of the contestation because of its ambivalence in facing the two forces. On one hand, it endeavours to respond to the demands of the people but the leaders lack determination to pursue those demands on the basis of people's own decisions in a democratic state. On the other hand, because of lack of determination to trust the Africans, it seeks the support of the enemy to help in envisioning and implementing what they believe are people's aspirations (Nabudere, 2002).

One of the cornerstones of NEPAD is good governance that is the pedestal for democracy and the provision of human and national security. In this regard, the actions of some

African leaders such as President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and Hassan Omar Bashir of Sudan do not conform to good governance. President Mugabe continues to violate Zimbabwe's election protocol by rigging elections and arbitrary detentions whereas Bashir's government continues to marginalise people in the South by disallowing them financial benefits accrued from the extraction of oil in their region. The African Union (AU) exacerbates matters through its policy embracing respect for self-determination, territorial integrity and independence, which advocates non-interference in the affairs of member states. This poses a serious challenge for NEPAD to achieve its envisaged goals because the people who are supposed to take leadership are in fact the perpetrators. A golden question is that of who guards the guards? Moreover, how can NEPAD operate under such inappropriate conditions? These aspects explain why Africa's implementation of NEPAD is confronted with problems emanating from lack of cooperation from some African leaders such as Mugabe and Al Bashir.

Obi (2001) argues that NEPAD is a new strategy of an African ruling elite with ambitions to energise Africa's development by accepting numerous imposed models premised on trade liberalisation and good governance as well as forging new but unequal partnerships with the advanced capitalist countries or the G-8 group of industrial powers. Akokpari (2004) adds that NEPAD is a partnership programme established between Africa and the G-8 countries to emphasise three dimensions of governance; namely economic and corporate governance, political governance, and peace and security. In this context, NEPAD represents a moral contract between African countries and the G-8 countries, under which African countries endeavour to improve governance and promote democracy

by undertaking political reforms and marked by friendly economic policies. Conversely, the G-8 countries commit to assist African countries that are upholding good governance, the promotion of human rights, poverty eradication and economic growth. Such assistance is allocated through a programme of “*enhanced partnership*” established by the G-8 at the Kananaski Summit in June 2002. The moral of this partnership is worrisome because the G-8 countries are dictating the framework through which African development should progress. The catalogue of Africa’s good governance and human rights leaves too much to be desired because some African states such as the ones mentioned above are grossly violating the rights of the people without any punitive action instituted against them. On economic terms NEPAD embraces the liberal principles of the economic order that were vehemently refused by earlier African initiatives, by prescribing an important engagement with the global economy. There is no punitive instrument when the G-8 is unable to fulfil its golden promise whereas this creates a skewed development in Africa because those who comply with G-8 might be rewarded and those who are intransigent would be ignored. Such a situation creates divisions characterised by “*us and them*” which is a recipe for disunity at the *African Union* (AU). Moreover, developed countries might be flooded with numerous refugees seeking greener pastures and habitat.

Gelb (2002) on the other hand perceives NEPAD as the formation of a “*club*” of African heads of state who are collectively undertaking to improve governance amongst themselves by engaging in both joint and individual actions. Regardless of the G-8’s contribution towards the construction of NEPAD, the formulation rests on the leadership of a small group of African heads of state. Its success relies on the small *de facto* leadership from a

smaller group within 15 member Heads of State Committee. This assertion reflects that the origin of NEPAD arose from a few African leaders claiming to represent the aspirations of the entire continent.

Ikome (2007) argues that as enshrined in NEPAD's external compact, developed countries and other international actors would have to reduce subsidies to their farmers and also remove various disguised tariff and non-tariff barriers to African products entering their markets. These measures would make African products more competitive in international markets and potentially reduce Africa's marginalisation in the global economy. Concomitantly, this would engender higher foreign exchange earnings for African economies and address their balance of payment deficits. This is expected to bring about economic growth and enhance the development prospects of the continent generally. However, the G-8 countries did not commit to the removal of agricultural subsidies and tariff barriers. Their intransigence has been evident in the Doha round of trade negotiations where they are defending their unscrupulous actions of the status quo on agricultural subsidies. Subsequently they end up apportioning artificial prices to their agricultural products that makes it difficult for African products to penetrate their markets because they are unable to compete with heavily subsidised products. This nefarious interaction kills African agriculture that is the backbone of Africa's economy.

Ikome (2007) further argues that, by formulating their expectations of the G-8 countries, the progenitors of NEPAD have ignored the fact that *Foreign Direct Investment* (FDI), *Overseas Development Assistance* (ODA), debt cancellation and market access are within

the realm of politics. The G-8 leaders and the multilateral institutions pledged to support NEPAD within political environments that impose limitations on their ability to do so. In this context NEPAD assumes that once African countries commit themselves to the norms of good governance then their superior partners will deliver on their part of the deal in terms of ODA, FDI, debt cancellation and market access because of NEPAD's moral, historical and security arguments.

It is doubtful that the G-8 countries would engage in a new "*chapter*" with Africa resulting from African leaders making declarations on the new beginning. It is argued that the prospects of the governments of G-8 honouring their commitments to NEPAD depend on the dynamics of the interests of Northern countries and related operational limitations that underpin the *modus operandi* of the G-8 countries. For example, other poor countries including Russia and its former satellite states compete with Africa for ODA and FDI. However, these countries are more important to the G-8 in economic and strategic terms than Africa. The former communist states of Eastern Europe are prospective members of the expanding *European Union* (EU) and it makes more political and economic sense to dedicate resources to facilitate their eventual integration into a united Europe than helping Africa. In the context of Russia, the G-8 has a particular strategic interest in helping it economically in order to prevent the misuse of its colossal nuclear weapons. This explains the reason why, while the African continent was promised a meagre US \$6 billion by 2006 for poverty reduction, the G-8 gave out US \$20 billion to Russia to assist the safe decommission of its nuclear weaponry (Samasuwo, 2004). No matter how successfully Africa transforms its political and economic environment through good governance, there

is no guarantee that it will all of a sudden become a popular destination for resources from the industrialised countries.

The above-mentioned argument highlights that NEPAD is not a major priority in the operational framework of the G-8 countries. The only thing that interests G-8 countries is for Africa to create an appropriate atmosphere necessary for their products to penetrate African markets without any glitches. In order to achieve this, the G-8 countries masquerade by forging an asymmetric partnership with Africa under the pretext of Africa embracing the principles of good governance and trade liberalisation. Conversely, the G-8 countries abuse their position of authority at trade negotiations by refusing to embrace a new trade regime characterised by removal of agricultural subsidies and tariff barriers.

South Africa remains one of the countries working hard to implement NEPAD. The country's endeavour is influenced by its foreign policy pillar which advances the promotion of an *African Agenda* as a beacon of foreign policy objectives. The ultimate goal of this pillar is to explain South Africa's quest for promoting the *African Agenda* in its engagement with the rich and developed countries in the North. Furthermore, this agenda aims at working in concert with other African states to address Africa's marginalisation from the rapidly globalising world and attract FDI. Given the country's past negative experience of apartheid, the principle for promotion of democracy and protection of human rights is invoked in the country's foreign policy as a guide to engage with its neighbours, the continent and the rest of the world. Democracy remains the precondition set by the G-8 to release and inject funds into the continent (Vaahtoranta, 2002)

Although South Africa's quest to implement NEPAD is encouraged by her quest to maintain peace, security, democracy and good governance, including development, which are the rudiments for sustainable development, the country's endeavours are confronted with resistance from Zimbabwe and Sudan whose catalogue in violating democracy and human rights is well documented. Furthermore, other African countries remain sceptical about South Africa's role in the continent because of their parochial perception about the country. In their view, South Africa's foreign policy encapsulates hallmarks of a bully and hegemonic tendencies utilised to dominate the continent.

1.2. Rationale of the Study

There are many reasons that influenced and encouraged the researcher to undertake this study. These include, *inter alia*:

- To gather more information about NEPAD.
- To find out about challenges facing Africa and South Africa in implementing NEPAD.
- To understand the relationship between Africa and NEPAD.
- To gather information about NEPAD's dependency on G-8 countries.
- To understand the nature and type of partnership between NEPAD and G-8 countries.

1.3. Statement of the Problem

The African developmental discourse provided salient features about the role and importance of NEPAD in developing the continent. In this regard, there has been

insufficient data regarding the challenges facing Africa in implementing NEPAD. However, the study presented these salient questions probing into the relationship between Africa, the North and NEPAD. What is NEPAD? What motivated African leaders to engender NEPAD as the developmental programme for the continent? Drawing from Africa's failed developmental programmes, what is unique about NEPAD and the challenges facing Africa in implementing it? Through NEPAD, Africa engages in an asymmetric partnership with the rich north countries premised on certain conditions. What are the benefits for Africa to implement good governance and trade liberalisation?

The above-mentioned questions constitute the preeminent point of the study in examining the challenges faced by Africa in order to implement NEPAD. In formulating responses to these questions the study examined the fundamental aspects which are; the role and behaviour of Africans, the attitude of the North countries as well as the importance of good governance and trade liberalisation. The study managed to develop an appropriate framework for understanding the role and behaviour of African leaders within NEPAD as a developmental programme. Adding to that, the study examined the constraints, limitations and importance of the conditions attached by the developed north countries to Africa. The analysis of the challenges faced by Africans and the attitude of the North contributed to the understanding of the existence of *asymmetric power relations* between the rich, north countries and poor countries of the South including those in Africa.

1.4. Aim of the Study

To investigate and analyse challenges faced by Africa and South Africa in implementing NEPAD.

1.5. Objectives of the Study

The study aims to attain the following objectives:

- To critically evaluate NEPAD.
- To determine if there is a correlation between NEPAD and Africa.
- To identify and understand challenges faced by Africa and South Africa in implementing NEPAD.
- To evaluate challenges faced by South Africa in implementing NEPAD.
- To determine the importance of good governance and trade liberalisation in Africa.

1.6. Literature Review

The *New Partnership for Africa's Development* (NEPAD) is regarded as a global, comprehensive, and integrated strategic framework for socio – economic development of the African continent, explaining the shared vision for Africa in the new millennium and serving as a statement of the problems facing the continent. It is perceived as a plan of action gravitating towards resolving Africa's socio –economic and political problems in order to reach the stated vision. It is a plan conceived and developed by African leaders to address myriad social, economic and political priorities in a logical, balanced and forward looking approach. However, it is a commitment that African leaders are making to the African people and to the international community in order to place Africa on the path of sustainable growth. It is a commitment African leaders are dispensing to increase the integration of the African continent into the global economy. It is also a framework for a new partnership with the rest of the world – a call to the rest of the world to partner Africa

in its own development on the basis of its own agenda and the programme of action (Diescho, 2002).

The above mentioned expose presents evidence that NEPAD was produced by Africans with a common vision to get rid of Africa's socio economic and political malaise. In this regard, African leadership took upon itself to develop an African blue print for a developmental programme aimed at accelerating economic growth which is the pedestal for sustainable development. This is an account of Africans taking necessary initiatives and endeavours towards extricating themselves from the quagmire of socio – economic malaise (Mokone, 2010).

Motula (2005) adds that NEPAD is a pledge by African leaders premised on a common vision and shared belief that they have a pressing duty to the African people to eradicate poverty, and place their countries on the way to sustainable growth and development, and simultaneously participate in the world economy and politics. These two explanations of NEPAD reflect that it is mainly geared towards promoting sustainable development in the continent. It is implied that NEPAD envisages that it will guarantee the social and economic development of African states. In this regard, NEPAD becomes a holistic vision shared by African leadership to steer the continent towards economic development. In this quest African leaders' endeavour faces a mammoth task of engaging with the rich developed countries to loosen their grip on global economic governance for Africa's benefit.

According to Farrel *et al.* (2005), NEPAD is an African continental initiative aiming to accelerate development in Africa through mobilisation of resources for sustainable development and eradication of poverty. In this regard, continental initiative refers to structures and programmes designed to promote development within Africa. The term *Continental Initiative* refers to a political philosophy focusing on the interests of a particular continent. The fundamental aim is to increase Africa's influence and power and its capacity to engage mutually and beneficially in the international system.

According to Vale and Maseko (2002), NEPAD prioritises the importance of African solutions to African problems without necessarily extricating exogenous intervention. Adding to that, it comprehends the development context of the continent and aims to address those challenges by means of intertwining continental and international endeavours. This shows the fact that Africa is desperate to develop its economy and infrastructure. According to NEPAD's explanation, economic development should not only be narrowed to economic indicators like *Gross National Product* (GNP) and *Gross Domestic Product* (GDP) but be widened to incorporate factors such as the eradication of poverty, hunger, starvation and social investment which includes harnessing resources in health and education. The focus is on both social and capital spending, with an accelerated emphasis on social wellbeing.

Moreover, NEPAD is perceived as a well detailed and integrated development plan geared towards addressing major social, economic and political priorities consistently and objectively. In this regard, it is important for the international community and more

particularly, African leaders to commit themselves in building a strong and long lasting culture of democratic respect for human rights and accountability within African states while accelerating African integration into the world markets. NEPAD proposes the achievement of this through forging alliances with the international community and multilateral organisations as well as by the consolidation of Africa's capacity to lead its own development through improved coordination with development (Pahad, 2002).

NEPAD advocates new policies of development in Africa and the world such that the continent must ascend and take advantage of new opportunities and trends in the global economy. The over - arching aim of NEPAD is to eradicate poverty in the continent and to place African countries, both collectively and individually, on a path of sustainable growth and development as well as rescinding the marginalisation of Africa in the globalisation process. The basic cornerstone of NEPAD is the focus on partnership and integration into the global economy to maximise benefits from them. Strategic cooperation with the international community will assist the continent to achieve its goals and eradicate poverty and hunger. This is not about aid only, but also about the prioritisation of institutional capacity development. Technological transfers and opening up of opportunities for Africa's participation in the global economy are also the aims of NEPAD (Hope, 2002).

African leaders recognise NEPAD as an important vehicle to facilitate the continent's transition from underdevelopment to development as well as from exclusion to inclusion into the mainstream of a rapidly globalising world. This implies that NEPAD is regarded as a historic and important opportunity utilised by Africans to seize the advantage of the

current unipolar situation to integrate Africa on more equal terms into a circle of capitalist economic globalisation. It is through NEPAD that African leaders become confident to extract the continent out of the quagmire of poverty, conflict, environmental degradation, crisis and disease (Boko and Seck, 2008). This development affords the African leadership an appropriate platform for raising their problems while engaging with the developed world in resolving Africa's socio economic malaise.

Gibb (2002) emphasises that NEPAD is unique in various respects and the following three hallmarks attest to that:

Firstly: NEPAD is an African initiative premised on African ownership and African management. This initiative was not inspired or imposed by the IFIs. Its agenda is based on what African leaders considered to be relevant for the renaissance of the continent. In so doing, the initiative assists to confront a deeply entrenched racist stereotype of Africa.

Secondly: NEPAD presents an extraordinary wide and comprehensive plan premised on policy initiatives at three levels or scales which are: national, regional and multilateral. Nationally, NEPAD prioritises peace, security, economic and political governance matters. Regionally, NEPAD prioritises enhancing economic and political integration, while multilaterally, the programme advocates global economic and political governance.

Thirdly: NEPAD links domestic reforms to advance new global partnership between Africa and the rich developed countries.

These three attributes highlight that Africans developed a *modus operandi* geared towards extrication of the continent out of a socio – economic quagmire. At the heart of this

programme is the respect for democracy and human rights which are regarded as the rudiments for sustainable development. Development in this regard is not only linked to economic indicators such as GDP but is also aimed at uplifting African masses from the scourge of poverty, hunger, squalor and diseases.

According to Rondilinelli and Montgomery (2000), NEPAD endeavours at its best to develop a strategy aimed at addressing four policy problems characterising the African continent. These policy issues are: economic growth, social equity, international transaction and public sector management:

Economic growth implies an accelerated increase in the GDP and GNI, and primarily looks at economic activities and production. Africa is confronted with the challenge of turning around weak and fragile economies to become strong and competitive through industrialization, acquisition of new technologies and investment in production. Too much attention is focused on services and goods which accrue greater income and revenue versus public ones that are classified as social good and services. This implies that the state is duty bound to provide basic social services for its citizens.

Social Equity focuses on the role envisaged to be played by the state in ensuring that resources are evenly distributed, primarily so that those who are marginalised will benefit from such a distribution. In this context, it becomes the duty of the government to develop appropriate *modus operandi* through *safety nets* to protect vulnerable groups. This is necessitated through social welfare systems which makes provision for free basic

education, health care, pension and unemployment. States are supposed to continue generating additional sources of funding such an expensive system to be efficient. Such a system is popular in developing countries where numerous people are poor and entirely depend on the state's intervention for their survival.

International transaction refers to all institutions and policies developed by states for effective participation in a rapidly globalising world. In case of economic growth, governments can focus their energy to create appropriate conditions necessary for trade and economic growth, thus allowing them appropriate platforms for their engagements with the world. This primarily looks at interest rates, exchange rates, inflation, trade policy and free market policies.

Public sector management: This focuses on endeavours undertaken by governments to ensure that the public sector is efficient enough to manage projects and finances. New forms of government focus on strict measures of efficient public sector management similar to those in the corporate sector. This ensures that similar levels of efficiency in the corporate sector are found in the public sector from recruitment and remuneration to operational models which are related to the consumer. This has been influenced by neo – liberal reconfiguration of the role and function of the state in a globalized world.

It is through NEPAD that Africa manages to invite the rich, developed countries and IFIs to support the plan developed by African leadership. This is a clarion call for a new relationship based on equal partnership between Africa and the international community,

especially the highly industrialised and rich countries as well as IFIs to overcome unequal relations which accelerated the development gap between the two partners over centuries. In this context, during the year 2000, Presidents Obasanjo, Mbeki and Bouteflika converged with the G-8 countries in Japan where the elements of partnership and ownership were expounded within the developmental framework dialogue between Africa and the developed world. The outcome of the meeting resulted in the G-8 leaders demanding a workable plan for cementing that relationship. This resulted in President Mbeki being given the mandate by Obasanjo and Bouteflika to develop the workable plan that was demanded by the G-8. The mandate given to President Mbeki by his counterparts gives credence that NEPAD is driven and influenced by a distinct South African comprehension of developmental problems facing Africa (Taylor, 2005).

According to Owusu (2003), the invitation to partner with African leaders on a new development policy called NEPAD was extended to myriad actors and each responded differently. However, NEPAD was crafted out of the need for accelerating the developmental agenda between Africa and the developed world premised on a common vision for the development of the continent. This vision is premised on three factors:

Appreciation for the development needs of Africa: Africa's shortage of industrialisation and skilled human capacity renders the continent incompetent to participate fully and reap the rewards from the globalized economy. This is premised on the fact that the continent is inhibited in a lack of or insufficient capital, finance and new technologies for accelerating its integration and growth. Africa's lack of serious commitment and allocation of resources to important sectors of the economy will always increase the continent's marginalisation

from the globalized world. This highlights the continent's inclination towards ways to accumulate and distribute wealth which became the necessary and primary development focus on Africa (Van Niekerk and Houdart, 2005).

Democratic Accountability: African governments are expected to be responsible and accountable in endeavours they undertake to expedite development and improvement of the lives of people. Decisions regarding the distribution of income and resources should be commensurate with development goals as well as finding ways to protect and promote those goals. This implies that the role of governments should be measured against their commitment and ability in addressing development challenges. This thinking was succinctly expressed through the *Millennium Development Goals* (MDGs) introduced by the *United Nations* (UN). These encapsulated objectives which *inter alia* included reducing the poverty rate by half, achieving universal primary education, promoting gender equality and combating HIV/ AIDS by 2015 (UNDP Conference Papers, 2004).

Inability to hide behind the scapegoat of sovereignty: For many years governments utilised the sovereignty scapegoat to hide their corruption activities and contribution to plunge the continent into the abyss of underdevelopment. They failed to reveal the manner in which foreign aid was misappropriated to sponsor illegal military operations and maintenance of patronage which perpetuated insurance of the security of particular regimes. Their unscrupulous activities such as gross violation of human rights and abuse were obliviously covered up. For development to be successful, a concerted effort by governments should commit to a reality check, transparency and open scrutiny. This implies that external actors

should be allowed to participate in the developmental process of the continent (Ndulu and O' Connel, 2000).

Obi (2001) raised concerns about the ownership and originality of NEPAD. In this regard NEPAD is *home – grown* because it was developed by Africans who comprehend the continent, but that does not mean that it is *home based*. This is because it clearly focuses on Africa's integration into the globalized capitalistic system which marginalized the continent for a long time. NEPAD is *home – grown* because it supports G8 demands that African leaders should “*voluntarily*” take the responsibility masqueraded as “*ownership*” for a new “*partnership*” between the two partners aimed at Africa's development. This form of masqueraded partnership relies on western *conditionalities* but hidden in African colours by African leaders.

It is in this context however, that NEPAD was introduced to the international community and the new framework created an opportunity for African leaders to think differently about their present and future development strategies. It is a bold step forward, *compared* to previous plans. Over and above it puts the responsibility of solving the continent's problems in the hands of Africans themselves. Instead of apportioning the whole blame to the developed countries and exogeneous factors which contributed to their underdevelopment, such as unfair trade policies, insufficient aid and debt burden among others, African leaders ascertained and understood how they failed their own people and entrenched the continent in a quagmire (Van Der Walle, 2000).

NEPAD is committed to finding new solutions to old problems by driving the process continentally as a point of departure. Whenever an institution owns a process it implements it and the process runs effectively because implementation is executed by those who designed and comprehend it. In this regard, NEPAD is owned by African leaders themselves who have a vantage point and are better implementers of their own policies which were designed in accordance to their understanding of the continent (NEPAD Documents, 2000). Because NEPAD operates within the neo – liberal framework that afford it the opportunity to extend its development radar to include not just economic growth, but poverty eradication, environmental sustainability, peace and security, democracy and institutional governance. These factors are regarded as pre – conditions for any sustainable growth and development. It is in this regard that conditions for development are prescribed by African leaders themselves rather than being pressurized by G8 and IFIs. This reflects their own understanding of their limits to growth and what they can do to overcome them (NEPAD Document, 2000).

The internalisation of conditionalities can also be attributed to the global position of Africa in world politics and its curtailed leveraging power in areas of development policy and economic growth. Africa's political and economic power declined significantly over the years and the African agenda, which was about how developed countries underdeveloped the continent, lost speed. Therefore, the establishment of NEPAD in this regard provided the platform for the re – definition of that agenda by emphasising how development is projected to be achieved by recognising the emerging changes in the global economy (NEPAD Document, 2000).

NEPAD was well received by the G-8 and IFIs because it recognised a new engagement with the developed community and donor agencies which was not only linked to aid. This new partnership focused more on integrating Africa into the global economy instead of accelerating marginalisation. It uses myriad strategies and means to become part of the global economy in a progressive manner. Again, NEPAD is used by Africans to work in concert with the international community to solve Africa's problems. What distinguishes NEPAD from other developmental programmes is its endeavour to look and develop a strategic equal partnership with the international community to resolve Africa's underdevelopment (NEPAD Documents, 2000).

The G8 and IFIs on the other hand defended the development of NEPAD and its ability to accelerate development in the continent. In this regard, the World Bank's Report of 2002 gave NEPAD a vote of confidence. The 2002 NEPAD Annual Report entitled *Towards Claiming the 21st Century* was published to review the achievements registered by NEPAD to move forward and ensure that the continent achieves its developmental goals. The then Chairperson of *Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee* (HSGIC) President Obasanjo reflected that NEPAD is uniquely positioned to take the continent forward because of the then developments and changes in the global economy (NEPAD Annual Report, 2002).

Gelb (2002b) maintains that the idea behind NEPAD is a formation of a "club" of like minded African heads of state who are collectively undertaking to improve governance

amongst themselves by engaging in both joint and individual actions. NEPAD's formulation rested on the leadership of a small group of African heads of state, from South Africa – President Mbeki, Egypt – President Mubarak, Algeria – President Bouteflika, Nigeria – President Obasanjo and Senegal – President Wade. This created a feeling among Africans that NEPAD is a development plan developed by a small group of political elites. African civil citizenry criticizes and rejects NEPAD because of the failure by its crafters to consult with them. Such a problem is not only confronting ordinary citizens but ordinary parliamentarians as well. For example, in Ghana, a member of parliament for Gomaa West, Ms. Ama Benyiwa – Doe shocked participants at a roundtable discussion on *Strengthening Regional Capacity for Conflict Resolution in West Africa* held in Accra 2003 when she lamented that members of parliament do not understand NEPAD. Surprisingly, neither of the present members of parliament denied Benyiwa – Doe's position. The fact of the matter in this assertion is that NEPAD was sold to the governments of developed states prior to being shown to African civil society (Ukeje, 2008).

According to Startup (2007) some African citizens are despondent and hopeless about NEPAD. Many feel that NEPAD offers nothing new and it is just another plan destined to be mired in Africa's old problems of corruption and self interest. At a multi – stakeholder dialogue held in South Africa in October of 2004, the consensus was reached that NEPAD was primarily another “*talk shop*”.

Landsberg (2003a) adds that many African civil society actors have vehemently rejected NEPAD. They perceive it as an external programme that ignores the uniqueness of Africa's

internal problems. Bodibe (2002) adds that African civil society rejects NEPAD because it maintains that the only way to advance African development is through a neo – liberal capitalist path and yet in most of Africa capitalism does not exist. Stuurman (2004) further emphasises that civil organizations complain that the knowledge of NEPAD is relatively low among its ranks. Findings highlight that a large percentage of the African population knows hardly anything about NEPAD. Civil society argues that it was imposed by senior officials to entrench an elite top – down approach. The policy document of NEPAD became available via the internet to which a myriad of Africans, especially the rural masses do not have access. The limited knowledge of NEPAD within the civil society is problematic because its good intents are unknown. Even if it delivers reasonable results it becomes difficult for civil society to interrogate and evaluate its outcomes because its terms of reference are unknown. In this regard, how can an individual evaluate a process which he/she does not understand? This results in a situation of “*us*” civil society and “*them*” African leadership in which the former will totally reject NEPAD.

As contained in Alternative 1 information and Development Centre document of 2007, the elites know more about NEPAD than ordinary Africans. Consequently, the government launched NEPAD’s outreach programme to reach the African masses. Civil society complained that the programme was imposed on people without any consultation for inputs. Civil society vehemently rejected it and maintained that it depended heavily on the policies of the Bretton Woods Institutions which entrench people in the quagmire of underdevelopment and poverty.

NEPAD's relationship with the African Union was unclear. NEPAD was formally described as an instrument, programme or mandate initiative of the AU. However, since its inception the key leaders of the initiative, especially President Mbeki, were very interested that it should not be subjected to the slow and difficult procedures of AU decision – making. They were afraid of the dangers of it being derailed by the interference of small, ill governed countries wanting to ensure that their voices were heard and their rulers paid off (De Waal, 2002). Regardless of that, NEPAD was incorporated into the AU Commission through the Kampala Declaration known as the *Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation* (CSSDCA) in 2002. Some analysts regarded NEPAD's incorporation into the AU as a dilution of its objectives, arguing that it stands for better governance, but it is an AU programme, vulnerable to the myriad agendas of its members (Sidiropoulos and Hughes, 2004).

There is a serious concern raised about the acceptance and commitment from some AU member states to NEPAD. At the inaugural Summit of the AU, President Gaddafi referred to NEPAD as the project of the former colonisers perpetuating racialism. One of the progenitors of NEPAD, President Wade, criticised it by emphasising that it has achieved nothing since its inception. Conversely, the NEPAD implementation committee included some leaders who are realists, intransigent or oppose any challenge to their leadership positions, for example, Muammar Gaddafi of Libya, Omar Bongo of Gabon and Paul Biya of Cameroon are of the opinion that the principles and vision of NEPAD should be balanced with the necessity of broad support of the programme (Tieku, 2004a).

NEPAD faces a daunting task when dealing with the *World Trade Organisation* (WTO). NEPAD maintains that African states must implement and measure trade regulations up to global terms and standards in order for trade to be more effective. This fails to highlight Africa's position in the WTO. Most of the developing states, including those in Africa perceive WTO agreements as being grossly imbalanced, internally inconsistent and even mutually contradictory (Jacques and Lesetedi, 2005). Matters are aggravated by the rich countries' intransigence to codify a new trade regime that is fair and balanced. Through the current system these countries wield much power and abuse it to impose their demands on poor countries. The major contestation in this regard lies in the domain of tariff barriers and agricultural subsidies.

1.7. Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

The term "*NEPAD*" is conceptualized and dependency theory linked to NEPAD is explained in this section.

1.7.1. Conceptualising the acronym NEPAD

NEPAD is an acronym for *New Partnership for Africa's Development*. It is an innovative, people centered framework seeking to accelerate sustainable development in Africa. It is crafted to address the current socio-economic challenges facing the African continent. It is a pledge by African leaders, premised on a common vision, to address challenges such as growing poverty, underdevelopment and perpetual marginalization. It is a programme of the *African Union* (AU) crafted to meet its development objectives. The NEPAD strategic framework document was adopted by the 37th Summit of the African Union in 2001 (Melber, 2004).

The implementation of NEPAD is an undertaking by African countries, to ensure continental commitment to governance, democracy and human rights while attempting to prevent and resolve situations of conflict and instability on the continent. It recognises good governance as one of the pre-conditions for sustainable development. Such governance is premised on two pillars which are democracy and political governance, and economic and corporate governance. Within democracy and political governance there must be:

- A multiparty political system - free and fair elections, an independent electoral commission and inclusivity;
- Protection of human rights by means of the respect for the rule of law, freedom of speech and freedom of association; and
- Gender balance in political representation and the redistribution of wealth – there should be a proportional representation of women and disabled people in decision making structures such as governance and judiciary. Over and above continental wealth should be distributed evenly among all the sectors of the society, especially the marginalised groups (Ramsamy, 2004).

Economic and corporate governance relies on institutional arrangements within which the public and private organisations operate. The primary concern here is about the capacity of national governments to promote economic growth and development through correct policy and regulatory frameworks for private sector led growth, and to implement social programmes aimed at reducing poverty with a strong element of inclusive participation. Furthermore, the implementation of NEPAD in this regard refers to the operationalisation

of NEPAD to promote the African agenda and African Renaissance which are the objectives of the AU.

1.7.2. Theoretical Framework

According to Le Pere, van Nieuwerk and Lamprechts (1998) a theory provides the basis for understanding a phenomenon. In this regard, the researcher utilises dependency theory to expound the phenomenon under investigation.

1.7.2.1. Dependency Theory

According to Genest (2004), Dependency theory explains and reflects an uneven development of wealth between the rich and poor countries. This form of development is highlighted as the propensity of capitalism creating and perpetuating an unequal dispersal of global wealth and prosperity. Marsh and Stoker (2002) add that Dependency theory emphasises that trade, foreign investment and even foreign aid between advanced, industrialized countries, and poor as well as less developed states are highly exploitative; disadvantaging poor nations; and perpetuating the dependency of poor countries on rich ones. Furthermore, Ebegbulem, Adams and Achu (2012) explain Dependency theory as a situation in which a certain group has their economy conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy, to which the former is a subject.

Todaro (2000) argues that Dependency theory refers to the school of thought highlighting the underdevelopment of poor countries to the dominance by rich countries in the international system. This creates a system of the core and the periphery, the latter being developing countries in the South and the former being rich industrialised countries in the

North. In this context, Dependency theory becomes an exploitative relationship aimed at ensuring that weaker countries are entirely dependent on developed countries for their prosperity and well – being. It encourages endeavours by poor countries to be self-reliant and independent in their development, but such an effort is difficult if not impossible.

Dependency theory characterises the international system to comprise two sets of states which are described in the formats of dominant / dependent; centre / periphery; and metropolitan / satellite. The dominant, centre or metropolitan states are in the *Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development* (OECD). The dependent, periphery or satellite states are those in Africa, Asia and Latin America which have low per capita *Gross National Products* (GNP's) and rely heavily on the export of a single commodity for foreign exchange earnings. The other assumption of Dependency theory is that external forces are of singular importance to the economic activities within dependent states. These external forces include *Multinational Corporations* (MNCs), internal commodity markets and other means through which the industrialised countries represent their interests abroad. The relationship between dominant and dependent states is dynamic since the interactions between them reinforce and intensify the unequal pattern. Dependency theory presents the current state of underdeveloped nations in the world by examining the patterns of interactions among nations by arguing that inequality among nations is the core of those interactions (Adams, 2006).

Dependency theorists realise that underdevelopment results from asymmetrical relationship between the poor countries located in the South, and rich developed countries located in the

North. Such a relationship is characterised by the ruthless incorporation of the South into the global economy which is controlled by Western capitalism. It lies in the position of influence that foreign aid accelerated by the North is more harmful than beneficial to economic development of the recipient countries, and it remains an instrument of exploitation of the recipient countries by developed states (Posthumus, 2009).

The above mentioned explanations are relevant to the position of NEPAD and its dependency on Western capitalists who extend their aid services to Africa. The conditions attached to aid are always unpalatable and this makes repayment of aid difficult and overstretches poor nations to perpetuate dependency. The countries in the South are not poor because they lagged behind in the scientific transformations or enlightenment values of the developed states, rather because they were coerced into the European community system only as producers of raw materials or to serve as the repositories of cheap labour, by being denied the opportunity to market their resources in a way that competed with dominant states. In this regard, significant development will only be possible if countries in the South attempt to isolate themselves from the capitalist world economy and establish independent socialist societies (*ibid*).

Olaopa (2006) argues that Dependency theory is appropriate to analyse NEPAD, because many sections of its document (NEPAD) portray dependency on exogenous bodies for the development of Africa. This is encapsulated in Section V, sub section (C) of NEPAD document – *Mobilisation of Resources* which emphasises that “Africa needs to fill an annual resource gap of 12 % of its GDP or US \$64 billion. This will require increased

domestic savings, including improvement on the public revenue collection.” However, the bulk of the required resources will have to be obtained externally. Paragraph 41 of NEPAD document also speaks of Africa’s dependence on the international community for the continent’s development by emphasising that: “*We hold that, it is within the capacity of the international community to create fair and just conditions in which Africa can participate effectively in the global economy and body politics*”.

The NEPAD document lays out a clear role for the international community to assist African development. It *inter alia* advocates for debt relief for African countries participating in the NEPAD programme. In its pursuit of debt relief, the programme proposes two-way approaches which are: debt service ceilings be fixed as a proportion of fiscal revenue while in the long run debt relief be linked with costed poverty reduction outcomes. Apart from debt relief, international aid is another area recognized by the NEPAD document where the international community plays a leading role. In this context, the dossier seeks increased *Overseas Development Assistance* (ODA) flows in the medium term as well as the reform of the ODA delivery system to ensure that flows are more effectively utilised by recipient African countries (Ezeoha and Uche, 2005).

NEPAD’s major flaw is its reliance on exogenous forces for the realization of its goals. The NEPAD dossier maintains that in order to achieve a 7 % annual growth of US \$64 billion is required, acknowledging that the bulk of the resources will be obtained externally, outside the continent. However, African leaders presented NEPAD to the G-8 Summit held in Kananaski, Canada in 2002 to solicit funds from the rich industrialised countries. The two

parties formed a “*partnership*” which became known as *the G8 Africa Action Plan* in which the G-8 pledged to inject US \$55 billion annually to the continent for debt relief and aid. Subsequently, the continent managed to receive US \$7 billion. (Karuuombe, 2003). The amount injected by the G8 is far less than the original amount required by NEPAD’s progenitors. The major challenge in this regard is where will other funds come from because the continent is engulfed in the quagmire of debt?

The G-8, potential donor states and IFIs impose certain *conditionalities* for injecting aid in any part of the world. Much of the *conditionalities* gravitate towards a commitment to the promotion of peace and security and adherence to principles of good governance. Myriad African leaders are highly concerned about the dichotomy in which Africa rests. They are eager to affirm its independence from the West and so called neo – colonialism and yet depend entirely on northern countries for the realisation of their initiatives. Former Nigerian President Obasanjo remarked at the UN sponsored International conference for Development in Monterrey, Mexico in March 2002 that there must be guarded endeavours against NEPAD not developing into a tool for new conditionality (Bala *et al*, 2003).

It is inevitable for NEPAD to evade these *conditionalities* from the donor countries because the programme depends on foreign funds for its operationalization. In this regard the donor countries impose conditions to ensure that their interests such as economic investment are preserved and safeguarded. The conditions applied to NEPAD will result in skewed development of African states. Those adhering to conditions will be rewarded while those reneging will suffer the wrath of unavailability of funds. However, this approach divides

African states and pushes people, especially skilled people to countries which are prospering.

The architects of NEPAD are convinced that African development can be accelerated by more aid and credit, both of which have been granted to Africa for about forty years without significant impact on poverty eradication. A particular problem with aid as indicated above is that it is accompanied by certain stringent conditions. Borrowing countries are often obliged to purchase input from corporations that are based in the countries that are granting loans. In other cases, certain conditions such as the liberalisation of markets and other conditionalities are attached, even though the donor countries are sometimes the worst violators of every prescription they attach to aid. One classic example is their inability to democratise Multilateral Organisations.

According to Landsberg (2003), NEPAD attempts to forge an agreement between two unequal partners in global politics which are the rich, developed and industrialised North and poor, underdeveloped Africa. The foundation of this pact is based on the exchange for Africans and Africa's governing elite becoming more accountable and embracing the politics of democratic accountability, transparency, and good governance. Conversely, the West and the industrialized North will re – engage Africa in the following three areas; renewed commitments on ODA, market access for Africa and Africa's trading routes to the North, and world debt relief. The implementation of NEPAD depends on external capital whereas African resources are ignored. The issue of market access remains but a talking shop because rich countries are adamant about maintaining the status quo. This rhetoric is

utilised to appease Africa and encourage Africans to implement the conditions attached to NEPAD. These conditions remain favourable for the North for dumping their products in Africa. These products are not exposed to any competition because of Africa's weak production base.

The implementation of NEPAD depends on domestic resource mobilisation and foreign aid which is attached to certain strict conditions such as reduction of state intervention on trade related issues. The relationship between Africa and the international community has been characterised by failed lip service translating into the failure by the donor community reneging on their commitments. Subsequently that resulted in a litany of failed developmental programmes which did not yield any results and plunged the continent into a developmental quagmire. The problem with domestic resource mobilisation is that some of the African states are unable to generate enough revenue because of weaknesses in tax collection revenue as well as corruption resulting from revenue generated from mineral deposits. Over and above this African states export raw materials and foodstuffs which do not generate sufficient revenue because of the stringent measures imposed such as tariff barriers and less money generated from raw materials. Africa's inability to industrialize creates a serious loss of revenue necessary for the success NEPAD because between a finished product and raw materials lies a multiplier, which is industrialisation. The latter demands knowledge, mechanization, technology and increased returns. Over and above this industrialization creates employment which is a source for revenue (Boateng, 2011).

Generally speaking, NEPAD is positioned for Africa to “*catch up*” with the rich north countries, and for this to be possible these countries should assist Africa. This is stated succinctly in the provisions of paragraph 66 of NEPAD document which states: “*The new long term vision will require enormous and heavy investment to bridge existing gaps. The challenge ahead for Africa is to be able to increase the required funding under the best conditions possible. We therefore call on our development partners to assist in this endeavour*”.

1.8. Hypothesis

The operational hypothesis of the study is premised on the rationale that Africa’s developmental success ushered in by NEPAD depends on the continent sticking to the prescribed conditions of the rich north countries. In this regard, the rich north countries entered into an *asymmetric partnership* with African leaders with the aim of developing the continent. The development of Africa depends entirely on adherence to good governance and trade liberalisation. However, the rich north countries are hypocrites on trade liberalisation because of their continued tariff barriers for exports as well as subsidies for their own agriculture sector.

1.9. Significance of the Study

The study is important conceptually and policy-wise for policy makers. Conceptually, the study applies dependency theory to analyse Africa’s implementation of NEPAD. In its implementation of NEPAD, Africa is guided by the pan-African spirit for promoting the African Agenda and African Renaissance, which are aimed at promoting democracy and

protection of human rights across the continent. In this context, democracy and human rights are regarded as the rudiments of socio – economic and political development of the continent.

Dependency theory is applied to highlight NEPAD's dependence on external aid and credit for its implementation. In this regard, the architects of NEPAD emphasise that in order to achieve 7 % annual growth rate, an amount of US \$ 64 billion is required, and the bulk of these resources should be acquired externally outside the continent. The other dependency factor is that of NEPAD's expectation for developing countries to reduce subsidies offered to their own farmers and also the removal of various disguised tariff and non – tariff barriers to African products entering their markets. The element of partnership with the rich developed countries highlights that Africa is unable to develop on its own but depends on assistance from the international community.

In policy terms, the study provides the policy makers and technocrats with an alternative mode necessary for implementing NEPAD. This alternative approach directed to policymakers is that they should protect the domestic market from dumped goods coming from rich industrialised countries. Furthermore the study continues to amplify the dangers of Africa's dependency on the North for the development of the continent. In this regard, it is important for African policy makers to seek alternative means of generation of funds which are not accompanied by certain conditionalities.

The study will be helpful to a broad spectrum of society such as researchers, government officials, development practitioners, as well as to students of Politics, Peace Studies and International Relations. Preeminently, the study provides original and innovative ways of the implementing NEPAD to policymakers.

1.10. Methodology

1.10.1. Research method

This study mainly employs a qualitative, analytical and theory-testing approach based on the relevant international relations theories and methodology. An important theoretical - analytical tool was derived from the well-developed concepts and notions of NEPAD, particularly partnership, good governance, socio economic development and trade liberalisation. Throughout the study, appropriate documents relating to the topic were examined. These included books, articles, journals, and official websites of NEPAD, AU and South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation. This study is original and all references are included.

1.10.2. Research Sites

In order to have a comprehensive and critical understanding of the research problem, the researcher undertook efforts to collect data from various government and international institutions and relevant organisations associated with the implementation of the NEPAD. These include:

South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO): The researcher is based in South Africa and much of the work was compiled in the country. The country, through its foreign policy objectives and the vision of African Renaissance crafted by former President Thabo Mbeki, contributed to the development of MAP that was joined to Omega Plan to form NEPAD. Thabo Mbeki travelled globally especially to rich countries to present the programme. Secondly, South Africa plays host to the Secretariat of NEPAD located in Midrand. Another reason why the research takes place here is that a good number of Research institutes dealing with NEPAD are located in the country. They include:

South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA). The institute has a long and proud record as South Africa's premier research institute on international issues. Its key strategic objectives are to make input into public policy and to encourage wider and more informed debate on international affairs and with particular emphasis on African issues and concerns. There is a programme dealing with development through trade, focussing on unpacking key multilateral (WTO) and regional issues as well as free trade area negotiations. SAIIA has been playing an appropriate role in providing the researcher with primary information on issues around trade and WTO, including challenges they pose to South Africa's implementation of NEPAD.

African Institute of South Africa (AISA): AISA is an independent research organisation focussing on African political, economic and social issues. AISA has been important in

providing an African perspective of the challenges, especially the socio economic and political, facing South Africa in implementing NEPAD.

Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD): This is a South African non – governmental organisation providing policy analysis on the changing global environment. It covers areas on Africa, multilaterals and foreign policy. The research afforded the researcher an opportunity to understand the dynamics of South African foreign policy in relation to Africa and multilateral institutions. Furthermore, it offered the researcher a deeper understanding of those challenges faced by South Africa in implementing NEPAD.

Institute for Security Studies (ISS): The ISS works towards a stable and peaceful Africa characterised by sustainable development, human rights, and the rule of law, democracy and human security. This institution helped to expand the researcher's understanding of human security problems confronting South Africa to implement NEPAD.

NEPAD Secretariat in Midrand: The Secretariat has been the centre for NEPAD. It afforded the researcher an opportunity to understand newer developments on NEPAD including issues relating to challenges faced by South Africa to implement the programme.

Addis Ababa – Ethiopia – This city is the *de facto* capital city of Africa. The researcher visited this city once to carry out the research. Here information on the role of the AU and the prospects of NEPAD was found. The researcher conducted interviews with the Deputy Permanent Representative of South Africa to the AU and also attended the 2010 Ordinary Summit of the AU held in Addis Ababa. The researcher also conducted interviews with

various international relations practitioners from DIRCO and provincial government of the Republic of South Africa. In addition, a focus group discussion comprising of fourth year students of Peace Studies and International Relations of North West University, Mafikeng Campus was conducted.

The researcher also visited the United Nations in New York, the United States of America. The researcher visited the UN twice to carry out the study. Here, much needed information on challenges facing South Africa in implementation of NEPAD was acquired. The researcher attended various sessions of the United Nations Security Council, General Assembly, Africa Group as well as the Economic and Social Council. These sessions provided the researcher with a deeper understanding of the challenges facing South Africa in implementing NEPAD. The researcher held interviews with Sipho Seakamela, First Secretary Political, and Lulama Rhulumeni, Counsellor Political who were deployed by South Africa to the United Nations at that time. In addition, a focus group comprising of cadets deployed by DIRCO to the UN was conducted.

1.10.3. Instrumentation

Qualitative research methods such as key informants interviews, focus group discussions and examination of secondary data formed the core of data collection methods. Interviews were also conducted with key informants from Africa Institute of South Africa, Institute for Global Dialogue, Institute for Security Studies, South African Institute of International Affairs, The Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations, Deputy Permanent Representative of South Africa to the African Union, Officials in the

Department of International Relations and Cooperation Foreign Affairs and Civil Society Organisations working on developmental issues to gain in-depth qualitative information.

This is a traditional method used by social scientists for extracting information through well-placed individuals in society and institutions. It is part of an ethnographic approach often used in situations where access to official records or data is weak or non-existent. Where official records exist, it is used as a means to gain further insight by questioning key people about specific social, political and economic problems. Social scientists also use the approach within the field of social interactionist or ethno – methodological research. Key informant interviews consisted of asking questions that are mainly semi structured or open, allowing detailed full answers from respondents. This approach contrasts with quantitative questionnaires that allow only controlled and structured responses with narrow parameters.

Another approach used in this study to collect data was focus group discussions with randomly selected groups of six to ten people relevant to South Africa's implementation of NEPAD. A focus group discussion is a semi - structured interview in which the discussant knows in advance the topics to be covered. The people to be included are known to have been involved in a particular situation or have experience related to the research problem.

Focus group discussions are different from other types of interview in that they focus on a particular topic and they rely on group dynamics in order to generate data. The interaction is mainly between group members themselves and not between the members of the group and the interviewer. A Focus group discussion was conducted with the employees of the

Department of International Relations in Pretoria. The other focus group discussion was conducted with the fourth year students of Peace Studies and International Relations of North West University

Group interaction is used in this type of research to generate data and as a source of data analysis. The assumption is that there is an interaction that is productive in widening the range of responses, in activating forgotten details of experience or knowledge, and in releasing inhibitions that are part of interviews with individuals.

1.10.4. Units of Analysis

Taking into cognisance the complexity of NEPAD and the failures regarding Africa's developmental endeavours, a combination of sources of information and units of analysis were involved. A total of 25 interviews were conducted with people of various strata of society with a range of their fields of specialisation. A set of interview questions was prepared for the interviewees. All interviews comprised formally written questions submitted to the interviewee before face-to-face meetings. This afforded the interviewee a clue as to the subject matter before the encounter with the interviewer.

Furthermore, one focus group discussion was organised in Mafikeng – North West involving Honours and Masters students of the class of 2007 in the department of Peace Studies and International Relations of North West University. In this regard, the researcher engaged with the prospective diplomats and future international relations practitioners who

articulated their views on the subject matter. That interaction assisted the researcher in obtaining the information on the different perspectives at the same time.

All this information was supplemented by secondary sources such as books, internet sources, workshop reports, journals and newspaper articles.

1.10.5. Methods of Data Collection

To collect the bulk of data used in this study, the following methods were used:

Document Analysis

The researcher compiled a huge reading list. It was made up of books on the history of development in Africa, books on NEPAD, publications on multilateral institutions, publications on regional integration and publications on human security in Africa.

Reports Review

Information from the following sources was reviewed: strategic reports, evaluation reports and annual reports of programmes and projects related to the subject matter.

Interviews

This served to ask individuals about their opinions, reactions and attitudes towards issues related to the subject matter. The questions were structured and open-ended questions

Focus Group

This was instituted to ascertain people's perception and knowledge about NEPAD. In this regard, participants engaged in a robust and polite debate under the guidance of the researcher. The focus group comprised of Honours and Masters students from the

Department of Peace Studies and International Relations from the North West University,
Mafikeng Campus

1.10.6. Participation Rate

Out of the 25 people asked to be interviewed, 20 participated in the interviews. This represented a participation rate of 80 per cent. However, two of the interview responses were judged unusable because they were considered to be propaganda, thus reducing the actual participation rate to 72 per cent.

The participation rate however varied by the categories of people interviewed. Of the experts interviewed, all 8 satisfactorily answered the questions. This constituted a participation rate of 100 per cent in this category. Conversely, out of the six actors in the implementation of NEPAD, only four satisfactorily answered the question. This constituted a participation rate of 66.6 per cent in that category.

Out of the eight professionals interviewed, all eight provided satisfactory responses to the questions, also representing 100 per cent participation rate.

1.10.7. Data Analysis Technique

The methodology adopted in this study was based on qualitative research methods. This method served to gather information on the opinion, reactions and the observation of the dynamics, processes and behaviours and people in the study. The data was analysed using content analysis.

Content analysis enabled the researcher to sift through large volumes of data with relative ease in a systematic fashion. Through this method, inferences were made which were corroborated with information from other methods of data collection such as focus group discussion.

1.10.8. Ethical Consideration

A major ethical consideration of any research is that the respondents do not come to any harm as a result of their participation in the study. By its nature, this study may expose some of the respondents to some danger.

Therefore, the respondents were informed from the onset that participation is voluntary. All respondents were asked whether they objected to their names being mentioned in the study. Although none of the respondents objected to this, no names have been mentioned although the description of the portfolios of some of the respondents can be used to identify them. In this regard, no specific statements were quoted and attributed to the respondents.

Secondly, answers to questions were kept confidential, and the researcher undertook to provide the research reports to the organisations, and participants to make sure that their views are not wrongly represented. The respondents were also informed about the objectives of the study at the beginning of the interview and the purpose of the information.

1.11. Organisation of the Final Report

Chapter One: Introduction and orientation

Chapter Two: Historical background of developmental initiatives in Africa

Chapter Three: Challenges facing Africa in the implementation of NEPAD

Chapter Four: Relationship between NEPAD and South African foreign policy

Chapter Five: Findings, Conclusion and Recommendations

CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF DEVELOPMENTAL INITIATIVES IN AFRICA

It is necessary and important to recognise that NEPAD is not the only developmental programme for the restoration of Africa. Myriad continental and internationally inspired plans were initially undertaken by the *Organisation of African Unity* (OAU) and the *United Nations* (UN) to develop the continent, but they failed to produce the envisaged socio - economic developmental goals. That was because of lack of commitment and financial assistance from Africa and international donors. Khor in Aderemi (2002) expounds that developmental strategies in Africa were inspired by externally influenced and international liberal policies supplemented by inward continental alternatives. The latter were Afro - centric and stimulated by an ideological interpretation of continental problems. Conversely, the international approach was informed by the current neo – classical economic theories which were to contain or checkmate communism by denouncing it as an inappropriate economic doctrine.

2.1. Earlier Initiatives

Over the years, Africa was known as the *Dark Continent*. This derogatory term derived from Afro Pessimistic perceptions resulting from slavery, colonialism, World Wars I and II as well as economic marginalisation. Through slavery and colonialism, Africans felt their non-existence in the following worldview; the social, economical and political realms. That human non-existence was exacerbated by persecution, inferiority, discrimination and

dependency. That was tantamount to loss of independence, freedom and dignity. That appalling state of affairs propelled Africans in the Diaspora to wish to restore continental dignity (Boateng, 2005). In this regard, Africans were marginalised from the mainstream economy whereby decisions regarding their destiny were taken by the coloniser without any consultation.

According to Barrel (2000), Marcus Garvey in 1900 enunciated a philosophy of Pan Africanism in order to free Africans from the bondage of slavery and colonialism. Mentam (2000) adds that Garvey felt that Africa was his ancestral home and the spiritual cradle of all people descended from Africans. His paramount goal was to release Africa from the tyrannous European imperial grasp and build a free, united and black Africa. That philosophy was further embraced and enhanced by Aime Cesaire, Leopold Senghor and Leon Damas through the movement of Negritude explained as “*affirmation that one is black and proud of it*”. These movements emphasised the desire for identity, racial unity and freedom.

Another proponent of Pan Africanism was W.E.B. Du Bois who was spearheading Garvey’s philosophy. In his quest to spread the philosophy, in 1919 Du Bois convened a Pan African Congress in Paris, followed by the second one in London in 1921, Paris and Brussels, the third in London and Lisbon in 1923 and the fourth in New York in 1935. The fourth Conference was held in Manchester in 1945 under the following theme: “*We ask in all the world, that black folk be treated as men*”. The congress declared that freedom, education, democracy and social betterment should be apportioned to the African folks.

African luminaries such as Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta and Wallace Johnson attended the congress. Nkrumah was the rapporteur of the two sessions when West African colonies were discussed. Upon his arrival in his native Gold Coast, Nkrumah promoted the resolutions of the Congress. These ideas, mobilisation of internal support and fight for independence led to the independence of Ghana in March 1957. Other leaders such as Kenyatta followed those principles by introducing African Humanism in Kenya, Kenneth Kaunda followed by introducing African Socialism in Zambia and Julius Nyerere introduced Ujamaa in Tanzania (Nabudere, 2001).

The joy and excitement that was experienced by Africans resulting from self-determination and independence diminished dismally because Africa was plunged into a quagmire of poverty, conflicts and underdevelopment. The fruits of independence benefited a coterie and their cohorts such as political leaders, their associates, families, ethnic groups and a few members of their political parties. Nzongola – Ntalaja (1987) emphasises that

“For the people, independence was meaningless without better standard of living; greater civil liberties and the promise of a better life for their children. Instead of making these promised benefits available to the masses, the politicians who inherited state power...lived in much greater luxury than most of their European predecessors and used violence and arbitrary force against the people. For the latter, the first or nominal independence had failed. Their discontent with neo-colonial state served as a basis for an inspiration towards a new genuine independence...”

According to Taylor (2005), endeavours undertaken to develop Africa emerged before, during and immediately after the decolonisation process. The most symbolic endeavour happened at the Bandung Conference in 1955. During the 70's African leaders and intellectuals became concerned about Africa's position in the *International Political Economy* (IPE). Most resolutions adopted by African leaders through the *Organisation of African Unity* (OAU) maintained that economic integration of Africa in the global world was a prerequisite for real independence and development. That became the main theme for OAU's declarations at Addis Ababa (1970 and 1973), Kinshasa (1976) and Libreville (1977).

According to Aaronson (2005), African states acquired independence that reflected weaknesses in economy, politics and societies. In this regard, Africans were marginalised from the global economy and the political situation in various countries was confronted with authoritarian governments and lack of democratic institutions. These weaknesses were intensified by external forces such as the economic crises of the 70's caused by the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 when an oil cartel, *Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries* (OPEC) raised the price of petrol by 400 %. That affected the balance of payments negatively because the USA and Western Europe responded by trying to counter inflation through interest rates hikes. Suddenly, the interest payable on loans that were granted to developing states at lower rates increased. That began the debt trap cycle in which African countries are entrenched.

Africans attempted to respond to their plight through a litany of "*Pax – Africana*," that is, African solutions to African problems. It all started by forging links with the other

developing countries through the establishment of the Group of 77, currently known as *G 77 and China*. This group demanded a *New Economic International Order* (NIEO) to advance the interests of developing states in a global economic situation that has marginalised their interests. The *United Nations Conference on Trade and Development* (UNCTAD) became a formal platform where demands were presented. NIEO was quickly rejected by the major industrial powers because it was perceived as a communist plot for destroying the system of capitalism along with western civilisation (Leysens and Thompson (2006). Olukoshi (2002) adds that the lack of economic development in the continent propelled the creation of NIEO that was geared towards global economic development and the re-positioning of Africa within the global trading system. NIEO became an issue raised by all Third World countries, including Africa, in all multilateral forums. The rejection of NIEO by the major industrial powers reflected a contestation of the two major ideologies of Soviet led communism and US led democracy. The West rejected it to consolidate the grip for its ideology in Africa.

NIEO proposed massive export relocation of industry from the north to the south in order to raise global profit. It addressed the problem of lower wages and ineffective utilisation of abundant natural resources. The NIEO, moreover, far from begging additional transfer whose limitation and largely harmful character was shown in history, envisaged an increase in prices for traditional exports from the south as well as the mobilisation of additional resources generated in this way (mining and oil resources in particular) to finance the new stage of growth without any transfers (United Nations Documents on Development, 2007).

NIEO proposed massive relocation of industry but failed to come up with a plan to develop industrial capacity in the continent to exploit raw materials.

Taylor (2005a) further asserts that the Dependency Theory propelled and enhanced NIEO. It argued that the south's relationship to the north was historically contingent on, and that its status of impoverishment and dependence was rooted in the process through which it was integrated into the capitalist world economy during the colonial period, a theme that drew its intellectual heritage from Lenin. Although originally drawn up by Latin Americanists, African scholars soon applied the theory to the continent, arguing that Africa was integrated into the world economy in a subordinate position in the emerging global division of labour. NIEO, as applied to Africa, was supposed to address various issues surrounding on-going global trade and investment regimes that were felt to hinder the continent's development. It called for the restructuring of the perceived external and structural constraints on development. NIEO called for the restructuring of structural constraints but ignored developing appropriate endogenous mechanisms necessary to counter the external structures. It failed to recognise continental problems such as lack of transparency and good governance.

Tesha in Maloka (2002a) emphasises that the failure of NIEO did not discourage Africans from continuing producing developmental programmes. The first Afro centric policy initiative of that era was the adoption of the *African Declaration on Cooperation, Development and Economic Independence* in 1973. The Declaration provided a strategy for Africa's gradual disengagement from the world economy within a framework of individual

and collective self-reliance. This was an instrument for translating the provisions of the OAU Charter on Economic Cooperation into reality. The Declaration provided a pedestal for yet another Declaration, The Kinshasa Declaration on the Principle of the Establishment of an African Economic Community. The OAU's Heads of State and Government adopted it in 1973.

It is poignant to uncover that five years passed and no results from either of the two Declarations were visible. That raised a serious alarm and concern among African leaders. Responding to that, the OAU Secretary General convened a meeting of African experts to address the problems and establish the way forward to accelerate the implementation of the two Declarations adopted in 1973. A group of African experts converged in Monrovia, Liberia, in 1979 and drafted the Monrovia Strategy for the Economic Development of Africa (Maloka, 2004b).

Nyong'o (2007) adds that the 1979 Heads of States and Government convergence in Monrovia debated and examined the economic problems facing the continent. The debate focussed on NIEO and a resolution was reached to develop Africa in the context of NIEO. It is noteworthy to ascertain that a 1976 document entitled "*The Revised Framework of the Principles for the Implementation of New International Economic Order in Africa*" became the intellectual and theoretical foundation of the Monrovia strategy.

Makgetlaneng (2003) maintains that the meeting in Monrovia aimed to analyse and discuss socio economic problems facing Africa as well as providing appropriate mechanisms to

address and solve those problems. Experts declared that concrete measures for achieving socio – economic national and collective or continental self-reliance within the framework of NIEO were needed. Africans perceived political commitment to the achievement of rapid economic growth as essential to the realisation of collective self – reliant development. This meeting culminated in the drafting of the Monrovia Declaration. It emphasised:

- *Enhancement of collective self-reliance and self-centred development through socio-economic integration of African economies:* This emphasised African countries pooling their resources together to generate income which would accelerate socio-economic development. In this regard, mineral resources such as mining were to be utilised in the form of selling concessions to investors to generate wealth for Africans.
- *Pursuance of self-reliance through the creation of national, sub regional and regional institutions:* Various governance institutions that developed common policies domestically, sub regionally and continentally were to be established to harmonise self-reliance policies aimed at advancing development.
- *That science and technology should form the backbone of Africa's developmental process:* As a continent aspiring to industrialise, science and technology were seen as means to advance the attainment of development in order to increase manufacturing and engineering.
- *Ensuring self-reliance in food production and guarantee the African peoples proper and enough nutrition, together with other basic needs for a civilised*

standard of living; African agriculture was to be developed, promoted and encouraged for providing food security and commercial purposes. and

- *Maintaining a proper planning for all sectors of development especially in agriculture, environment and natural resources – to achieve modern economies at sub-regional and regional levels by the year 2000: An all-integrated and common approach was to be developed for harnessing Africa's development through the proper utilisation of agriculture, protection of the environment and production of mineral resources for beneficiation.*

2.2. Lagos Plan of Action

According to Baah (2003), African experts have for quite for some time been searching for guidelines and measures for national and collective self-reliance in social and economic development. In order to achieve that, the experts requested the OAU to prepare a plan for a detailed elaboration of the principles and objectives outlined in the 1979 Monrovia Declaration. That led to the Second Extra Ordinary Session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Lagos, Nigeria in July 1980. The session produced and approved the *Lagos Plan of Action* (LPA) and the *Final Act of Lagos* (FAL). Zounmenou (2006) adds that the assembly that was organised by the OAU in 1980, in Lagos, Nigeria culminated in a unilateral endorsement and acceptance of LPA as the framework for the socio – economic development of Africa. According to Le Pere in Ikome (2007)

“The LPA was self – consciously autarchic and inward – looking. It was a watershed in Africa's regional co-operation history. It was the first genuinely

indigenous and continent – wide effort to forge a comprehensive, unified approach to Africa’s problems of economic development. Emerging from perceptions of the continent’s general vulnerability to global economic forces, the initiative’s central thrust was that Africa needed to actively strive to reduce its dependence on external nations and to replace this dependence with a self - sustaining development strategy based on the maximum internal use of the continent’s strategy. This approach did not imply an attempt to sever all economic relations with the outside world. Rather, it called for a disengagement from those features of the international economic system that was keeping Africa poor and weak.”

According to Roussel (2005), the LPA consisted of some fundamental principles that included:

- *Development process centred on citizens:* This is a form of development accommodating all stakeholders, including civil society to identify the needs and processes required for development.
- *Developmental process that is democratised:* This is a form of development which is based on consensus, debates and accommodation of the deliberations of all stakeholders for advancing their livelihoods. and
- *Collective promotion of self-reliance and self-sustainability:* This is a development that is orientated around people choosing the best available means for achieving a long lasting progress.

It is through the LPA that African leaders were committed to take solid moves for realising national and collective self-reliance in economic and social domains encapsulated in NIEO. Fundamentally, the LPA was a detailed elaboration of the general principles and objectives reached in Monrovia. It went into details, sector-by-sector about the way in which Africa could, through collective self-reliance, achieve rapid economic and social development during the last two decades of the 20th century. Conversely, the FAL committed African governments to establish the *African Economic Community* (AEC) by the year 2000 and outlined necessary steps available to this effect. The FAL took the principles, programs and projects explained succinctly in the LPA and went further to state the kind of economic and political institutional agreements necessary to realise these.

Aderemi in Roussel (2002) maintains that FAL is an adjunct of LPA because it strongly emphasises sub-regional economic cooperation and integration. It further incorporates succinct suggestions for regional integration, and proposed the establishment of the AEC by the year 2000. Ikome (2007) adds that in the early 1980's, the LPA, which was a collective self – reliance strategy, became the pre-eminent feature of Africa's international relations. It was translated into a series of resolutions and treaty agreements that created, rapidly economic co – operation and integration institutions across the continent.

De Sa in Makgetlaneng (2003) maintains that the LPA was established as a strategy for Africa's socio-economic development. Cheru (2002) emphasises that LPA was driven by the crisis of the inherited structures of the political economy. It focussed on attaining socio-economic growth within each member state in areas such as food and agriculture, industry,

environment, and energy. It adopted specific as well as general targets with time limits for each aspect of the economic planning.

According to Adesina (2003), the LPA is divided into thirteen chapters, covering a wide array of issues ranging from food and agriculture to industry, development of human resources, science and technology, transport, trade and finance, technical cooperation for strengthening economic development, environment and development as well as energy. It also addressed the issue of “women and development”, planning coordination, and mechanisms for implementation. Its core principles were around the need to domesticise Africa’s development in the framework of “*collective self reliance and self sustaining development*” through the integration of the various economic sectors across regional economic communities and the continent.

Adedeji (2002) outlines the objectives of the LPA, which are:

- *To alleviate poverty and improve the living standards of the people:* This aims at reducing poverty which is a scourge attacking Africans. Furthermore, it aimed at creating jobs, skilling people and educating masses to sustain and maintain their livelihoods and
- *Self-reliance and self-sustaining development at national level, and collectively at Continental level:* In this regard, an inward form of development, which relies on the mobilisation of African resources, was encouraged nationally and continentally. This is a means to alleviate “*aid mentality*” which has been pervasive across the continent.

Self-reliance involves the following:

- *The internalisation of the forces of demand which determines the direction of development, economic growth process and patterns of output:* In this regard, development should be harnessed according to the needs of the society and all resources necessary for that process should be converged and utilised to steer the process
- *Increasing substitution of domestic factor inputs for external factor inputs:* This advocates export of finished products rather than export raw materials and purchase finished products.
- *Increasing participation of the mass of the people in the production and consumption of the social product:* In this regard, the integration of many processes in the form of education and skilling of people is required to accelerate development. And
- *Increasing sustained self-reliance through the promotion of the patterns and processes of a holistic human development in which various sectors and sub sectors, programmes and activities mutually support and reinforce each other so that when related to the internalisation of the forces determining demand and supply, the whole economic, social and political system develops its own internal dynamics.* This involves an integrated development whereby people are educated, industries are developed and international knowledge is brought into the continent to develop Africa.

As contained in the Final Act of Lagos (1980), the LPA identified Africa's development crisis as structural and enmeshed in a hostile external environment, which includes developed countries and foreign *Transnational Corporations* (TNCs). The LPA became the platform for moving Africa towards a sustainable developmental route through collective "self reliance and self sustained development" at three levels which are national, sub – regional, regional (Africa) and international.

The sub – regional and regional dimensions involve integration of economies in various phases, while the international dimension involves enhanced cooperation with other developing regions of the world. National policies are required to be oriented towards sub – regional and regional integration, and pooling of resources to build institutions that will be viable within national contexts. Capacity-sharing in human resources, scientific and research capacity as well as trade negotiations are cardinal to the LPA.

According to Aderemi (2002), the core objective of self-sufficiency in food production required a strong political will to channel a greatly increased volume of resources to agriculture for carrying it through essential re - orientations of social systems. The focus was to develop policies that will induce small farmers and members of agricultural cooperatives to achieve higher levels of productivity. By taking the structuralist approach, the LPA emphasised improvements in the living conditions of farmers and increased incomes making farming more attractive and remunerative. Infrastructural support (roads, storage and processing facilities), resource inputs, technical support, training and education areas were highly emphasised. The LPA put research at the heart of transforming

agricultural production. Agriculture was not considered in isolation but it included a wider social and economic framework.

The LPA emphasised industrialisation to be indispensable for providing basic needs of the African population and ensuring the integration of the economy and the modernisation of the society. Industrialisation was emphasised for the transformation of sub regions and the whole of Africa. It was perceived to be the heartbeat that would remove Africa from underdevelopment and economic dependence by creating jobs, domesticising technological absorption and development. A domesticised collective industrialisation was directed to achieve inter sectoral linkages for sub regional interdependency as well as the provision of the markets. This would be achievable through the exploitation of local markets. All-in-all, the programme was aimed at Africa achieving 2% of the world's industrial production by the year 2000 (OAU, 1980).

According to the LPA, national policies would emphasise development of technical, supervisory, and managerial capacity through a wider human resource development framework and financial institutions that would focus on accelerated industrial development. Small and medium scale enterprises were to be the concerns of national policymakers. Regional emphases were to be placed on industrial complexes with financing beyond the capacity of individual countries. The LPA assumed a mixture of private sector, semi – public and public sector ownership structures (Karuuombe, 2003).

In creating cross border investment, the LPA emphasised a joint venture option. The area of comparative advantage for such a cross – border investment was to be in the heavy industrial sector, especially in the production of capital goods. In both the industrial and agricultural strategies, the LPA emphasised ecologically sensible and sustainable practices, employment technologies appropriate to local conditions, with significant emphasis on conservation. In agricultural, industrial policies and trade negotiations, the LPA emphasised pooling capacity and strategy (*ibid*).

The LPA linked industrial production to energy by emphasising a regional approach in the key areas of the exploitation of energy resources, researching into renewable energy, facilitation of an intra – Africa supply chain and a payment system that would minimise the demand on limited foreign exchange. The option of paying for petroleum in local currency or barter trading was suggested. However the major oil exporting countries had entered into a reservation on the short-term implementation of such an arrangement despite the call for the demonstration of African solidarity. The LPA emphasised the coordination of energy policy and industrial policies at sub – regional and regional levels. Rural access to energy for electrification and production was also emphasised. A number of regional research centres on different energy sources was suggested through the establishment of an African Energy Commission as the regional policy organ (Adesina, 2003).

In its policy framework on human resource development, as well as science and technology, the LPA called for a large-scale curriculum revision to render all levels of education and training to be more relevant to the development needs of the local African

environment. Both as an object of development and mentor of socio – economic development, the emphasis of LPA focussed on the continent and relevance. Although it welcomed international support, the LPA was insistent that this should be supplementary to the African self-reliant effort. Regional cooperation in the creation of multinational training institutions and research facilities was another point of LPA's regional integration approach (*ibid*).

Within the LPA programme, therefore, the agenda of regional economic and social integration required a reconfiguration of the transport and communication infrastructure to boost regional trade, open up landlocked countries, and minimise barriers to the movement of goods and persons within the region. This was not only to construct infrastructures, but also to localise and internalise production processes. That involved the stimulation of the use of local, human and material resources and the standardisation of networks and equipment, research and dissemination of techniques adapted to the African context in the building of transport and communication infrastructures. This was expected to connect with industrial strategy (Taddesse, 2003).

Makgetlaneng (2003) continues to point out that the major underlying principle of the LPA was that the relevance of economic development was only measured by the advancement of the wellbeing of the people. He emphasised that neither an adjustment programme nor an economic programme was relevant if it made the material conditions of the people extremely miserable. Given that, the LPA maintained that the main objective of Africa was the reduction and eradication of poverty and a qualitative improvement of the living

standards of the people. The second objective was geared towards achieving the first objective for increasing production through expanded and diversified productive capacities. That was perceived to be sustainable over a long period. The third goal promoted self-reliance nationally and collectively. The only way for African leaders to solve Africa's socio – economic problems as it was stated, has been through their own efforts. In that context, external assistance was secondary and complementary to self – reliant efforts.

As contained in the United Nations Documents on Development (2007), the LPA emphasised regional food security through national production. That emphasised the promotion of self-reliance in food production as well as a solution to Africa's socio – economic problems. That inward approach relegated external assistance or support to a secondary role, but failed to identify social agents for the achievement of its objectives. Conversely, the plan perceived self-reliance and auto centric development within international capitalism, but failed to address questions as to whether international capitalism could be adjusted to serve the achievement of self-reliant and auto centric development. The plan rather assumed that international organisations for the governance of capitalism, which were criticised, could be reformed to support its auto centric development and self-reliance. Maloka (2002) adds that the LPA's main weakness was its inability to provide enough resources for its implementation. It remained a blueprint for Africa's development without requisite resources for its implementation.

Mkandawire and Soludo (1999) highlight that in evaluating Africa's underdevelopment, the LPA was lopsided and marginal by focussing only on the external factors that created

and sustained dependency on capitalism. This became evident in the area of trade, where Africa depended too much on the export of primary products (agricultural and minerals) which exacerbated openness to external shocks. The excessive outward orientation, in the context of inherited colonial structures of production and fragmentation of the continent produced considerable dislocation in the economies.

Olukoshi (2002) identified four key elements distinguishing the LPA:

First: The definition adopted in the LPA as the source of Africa's economic problems was essentially a mixture of domestic weakness and external constraints. The LPA located a greater accent on the hostile and difficult external environment, which confronted Africa in the course of the 60's and 70's. In this instance, too much emphasis was put on the questions of trade. The reversal of the hostile international environment became one of the strategies of the LPA

Second: The problem of import substitution industrialisation and the failure of many African countries to move beyond basic light manufacturing; imbalances between light manufacturing intermediate and capital goods sectors of African economies. Concerning these, the LPA failed to adopt a solution, which involved jettisoning import substitution wholesale. It called for the articulation of domestic foundations of the African economies and also as part of this restructuring, a diversification of industrial investment through a more even spread investment of light, intermediate and heavy industry;

Third: There was never any attempt undertaken to involve the state as the key player in the developmental process. The LPA criticised lack of state involvement in economic policy making, rigidity in the planning of systems, and distortions in the allocation of resources for technical background that have been produced ahead of it. The question of the role of the state was considered strategic in getting Africa out of the crisis. All told, the LPA was critical of the state; and

Fourth: the LPA emphasised the need to strengthen sub – regions and regional cooperation. It failed to address itself decisively to the centrality of the political factor in the regional integration project. It assumed that African leaders were members of one race and that, because they are in one region, they would be able to work together to achieve regional integration.

For that reason, the LPA assumed the position of those African leaders, whose interests were different and antagonistic, working towards a united front in the struggle for regional integration. It did not encourage them to regard their common objectives as the key factor to facilitating their merger. It failed to call upon African countries, individually and collectively, to commit them in practicing the rational utilisation of resources in their efforts for achieving socio – economic and political stability.

According to Asprenger (2002), the following reflect the failures of LPA:

- *The LPA failed to blame African leaders for Africa's failure at the expense of exogenous forces:* In seeking solutions to Africa's problems, the LPA apportioned the blame to external forces such as IFIs and ignored the role played by Africans such as corruption and authoritarian regimes.
- *LPA exonerated postcolonial leaders concerning Africa's socio economic and political predicament:* The factors that complemented external factors, African leadership which entrenched authoritarianism and poor governance policies, were exonerated of Africa's failures. Largely, this skewed assessment of the situation compounded Africa's problems.
- *The LPA reflected a top-down approach to resolve Africa's crises:* The development of LPA ignored the other important sector of the society, civilians, in formulating relevant approaches to Africa's development.
- *The LPA failed to recognise poor governance as the cause of Africa's underdevelopment and apportioned the blame to the external forces:* Poor governance that involved violation of human rights and democratic practices resulted in Africa's socio – economic malaise. These factors were ignored by African leadership to hold on to power for a long time at the expense of the masses and
- *The LPA identified Africa's problems, provided solutions but failed to provide appropriate financing to address that:* The LPA was unable to mobilise resources for the implementation of its plan and that made it to be workable on paper but inefficient practically. That was a case of improper planning.

Based on faulty assumptions about Africa's economic condition and ignorance of systematic failures of proper governance, the LPA's prescriptions were economically illiterate. Its main strategy was based upon the continuation of import substitution and relied on three conditions, that Africa lacked the following:

First: The actual surplus extracted from agricultural sector was invested in the industrial sector, where it would be converted into additional manufacturing capacity. This implied that agriculture was basically to provide security for citizens and the surplus production was to be diverted into industry to generate industrial capacity and manufacturing for peasants;

Secondly: Peasants were to continue producing and expanding production despite conditions that clearly work against them: The peasants who constitute the bulk of the agricultural sector were encouraged to work hard to expand their production capacity regardless of conditions confronting them such as inappropriate technology and lack of subsidies from the state; and

Thirdly: Certain heavy industries need a specialised work force and relatively large markets to be efficient and viable. The government should create an environment which would develop a curriculum in concert with industries to produce people who are geared to work in the industrial sector to sustain efficiency and make them viable.

The reason why these measures were undertaken and what priorities were to be given to them were not stated. This is based on the reasoning that the LPA failed to trace and point

out the origin of the crises in African agriculture. The World Bank criticised the LPA for not giving enough room to the private sector. It further took the LPA to task for not conceding to the reforms necessary in the public sector to stimulate growth. The criticism of the LPA by the World Bank reflects an asymmetric relationship between the donor and the continent. In this context, what is best for the donor is best for the continent. The donor then releases funds on account of upholding its values and principles at the expense of socio-economic realities confronting the continent.

The LPA reflected the African development thought of that time, with its emphasis on self-reliance and state-led development. In this context, the state was the leading actor and should withstand the worst in elaborating the social, economic and cultural policies that enable the mobilisation of resources and capabilities of the country. The LPA also emphasised the role of the state in the fair distribution of both development burdens and benefits. The LPA did not clearly discuss the role of the state in development but it made it clear that the state was part of the development crisis and the main agent for its resolution. Although the LPA provided for integration, it did not adequately address crucial elements for African development such as capacity, autonomy and partnership.

According to Bujra (2004), the *World Bank* (WB) responded to LPA's crises by constructing a document called *Accelerated Development in Sub Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action*. That document prescribed a different development formula for Africa in this pattern. While the LPA avoided raising political issues, it devoted attention to politics and economics for development. For the latter to be accelerated, the document

recommended that the state was supposed to decrease its role in the economy and social welfare, through *inter – alia*, privatisation of state enterprises; promotion of private sector participation in the economy; liberalisation, the increase of the rule of the economy through market force, and export – led growth programmes. That fundamentally advised African countries to adopt and implement *Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs)*. These are programmes which encouraged reduction of social spending and privatisation of state enterprises as well as allowing a free market economy. That document was accepted by the donor countries and criticised the LPA and other Afro – centric initiatives which were aimed at Africa’s development. That resulted in donor countries coercing African leaders to implement SAPs for Africa’s development.

Turok (1987) points out that the WB and the *International Monetary Fund (IMF)* continued to frustrate Africa’s development by introducing the intervention strategy called “*policy-based lending*”. The IMF’s programme became known as *Stabilisation Policies* whereas the World Bank introduced *Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP’s)*. These policies aimed at addressing Africa’s ailing developmental process but they employed different mechanisms. In this context, *Stabilisation Policies* aimed at reducing short-term disequilibrium by paying attention to, budget deficits, balance of payment deficits and inflation. Conversely, SAPs focussed on restructuring of economies towards greater efficiency in the medium term.

In 1981 another endeavour to resolve Africa’s crises resulted in the production of a document called “*Towards Accelerated Development in Africa*” jointly produced by the

WB and the *United Nations Development Programme* (UNDP). That dossier was commonly known as the *Berg Report*. The report solely blamed African internal crisis as the main causes for Africa's economic failure and development while exonerating the prescriptive international economic systems and their trade regime. The report continued to prescribe both *Stabilisation Policies* and SAPs and enforced the following conditions for Africa's development:

- *Devaluation of national currency and adoption of a floating exchange rate regime:* The over-valued currency that was not in commensurate with the production and economic standing of the country was to be devaluated in accordance with international standards.
- *Deregulation of domestic interest rates:* Interest rates were to be regulated to control supply and demand of goods. This is envisaged to apportion value to the country's production, sale of goods and property. Investors will get value for money and FDI is accelerated in this regard.
- *Liberalisation of external trade and financial transfers:* This encourages privatisation and minimises the role of the state in the economy.
- *De – control of prices:* Market forces and economists should play a major role in the determination of any pricing.
- *Elimination of subsidies:* This involves the removal of subsidies to the social sector such as education, health and agriculture.
- *Imposition of cost recovery measures in educational and health sectors:* Excessive benefits such as free services for employees were eliminated

- *Rationalisation of public enterprises, through privatisation or outright liquidation:* This involves rightsizing and downsizing of civil society in government sectors. Furthermore, certain state assets were to be privatised and
- *Reduction in the size of the civil service to curb budget deficits and public borrowing:* Right sizing and downsizing of the public sector.

By 1988, over 30 African countries had already adopted Stabilisation Policies and SAPs which were supported by the WB and the IMF. Economically these policies were regarded as *orthodox* policies and assumed that premium instruments of control on money supply, credit squeeze, exchange rate and interest adjustment including trade liberalisation could bring positive results in African states which struggled within weak and disarticulate structures. However, there is documented evidence that both SAPs and Stabilisation Policies had failed Africa dismally. In implementing these policies, Africa experienced the following: Sustained economic growth failed to materialise; the rate of investment decreased; budget and balance of payment deficits widened after some temporary relief and debt service obligations become unbearable (Lawson, in Baylis and Smith, 2005).

According to Steward, Lall and Wanngwe (1992), Africa's development did not only raise doubts and questions at policy-making levels endogenously in Africa, but also exogenously at international forums such as the 43rd session of the United Nations General Assembly. During the Assembly, it transpired that the implementation of these programmes resulted in reduction of expenditures in social sectors especially in education, primary health care as well as in the public sector and parastatals where it reduced employment capacity. Both

policies failed to materialise in Africa because they neglected to tackle fundamental structural requirements such as poverty reduction and provision of employment.

2.3. Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery (APPER)

According to Lawal (2006), the failure of the LPA and the deepening crises caused by the imposition of SAPs and Stabilisation Policies resulted in the OAU developing and delivering another programme called Africa's *Priority Programme for Economic Recovery of 1986 - 1990* (APPER). This programme aimed at resuscitating Africa by emphasising deep commitment to the principles and objectives of LAP and FAL. These were planned to be achieved through a five-year plan focussing on:

- *Developing approaches suitable to accelerate the implementation of LPA:* Africa was to develop mechanisms, time frames and terms of references which would be the basis for implementation of LPA;
- *Developing an ad hoc mechanism necessary to improve food security and the rehabilitation of agriculture to overcome drought:* Special mechanisms, approaches and programmes were to be developed to improve the production of food and the agricultural sector;
- *Development of a common platform of action sub – regionally, continentally and internationally;* a well-coordinated common platform was to be developed nationally, regionally and continentally to implement the aims of the LPA. This was aimed at ensuring consistency and uniformity.

Mashele (2006) emphasises that APPER failed to address the lower rates of FDI into Africa. The programme was lopsided by concentrating only on debt which it regarded as a buffer for development. Apart from that, there were debt-servicing problems that were external and beyond Africa's control. These problems included deteriorating terms of trade; reduction in export earnings for debt servicing; unprecedented rise in interest rates; sharp exchange rate fluctuations; deteriorating terms of borrowing; and the reduction in the flow of concessional resources. These negative effects resulted in the net capital outflow from most African states to developed states. This affected about 26 *Least Developed Countries* (LDCs) in Africa. Just like its predecessor, APPER blamed the continent's misery and quagmire on external factors and absolved African leaders from any responsibility. Furthermore, external debt burden and the apartheid government in South Africa were highly blamed for Africa's socio-economic miseries.

Owusu (2006) emphasises that APPER continued the general principles of LPA and perpetuated some ideas contained in the Berg Report. The donor community used APPER to convince the African leadership that internal problems have been responsible for developmental shortcomings. Just like its predecessors, APPER relied heavily on prescriptive measures and conditions attached by the donor community. However, the donor countries and agencies failed to provide the much-needed financial resources and concentrated on talking too much (United Nations Documents, 2005).

2.4. United Nations Programme of Action for Africa Economic Recovery

(UN – PAAERD)

As contained in the United Nations Documents (2007), APPER relied heavily on external and technical assistance that attributed to its failure. The failure of APPER introduced the external intervention by the UN aimed at Africa's recovery. The UN introduced a programme called *the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery (UN – PAAERD)* and combined it with APPER for Africa's economic recovery. The UN – PAAERD resulted from the concern raised by the UN regarding Africa's socio – economic malaise. In inaugurating the UN PAAERD, the Secretary General of the UN, Javier Perez De Cuellar said the following:

“The international community, in adopting the Programme of Action had clearly expressed their human solidarity with their brothers and sisters in Africa; determined and continued efforts were needed to meet the challenge. The image of Africa as a dependent continent must disappear. Africa is a continent rich in physical and human resources. The realisation of its potential will not only fulfil the hopes and aspirations of the peoples of Africa, but also contribute immeasurably to the economic and social wellbeing of the entire world”

This quote expresses the UN's mutual desire to work in concert with the OAU to provide an appropriate framework necessary for Africa's development. The UN – PAAERD was a programme based on an equal partnership reflecting: *“mutual commitment and*

cooperation” between the UN and Africa. It was highly centralised on two pillars, which were:

1. Determination and commitment of African countries to launch national and regional programmes of economic development; and
2. The response of the international community and its commitment to support and complement African development efforts (UN Chronicle, 1986).

The UN – PAAERD which was adopted in May 1986 by the *ad hoc* session of the *United Nations General Assembly* (UNGA) was devoted to address Africa’s socio - economic malaise. It was through that effort that African countries together with the UN agreed to undertake structural reforms geared for national and regional programmes in priority areas such as: food and agriculture, human resources, transport and communication, population, the promotion of the role of women in development, as well as regional and sub – regional cooperation and integration. African countries committed to mobilise US \$82.5 billion from domestic resources to make up the US \$128. 1 billion required for its implementation. That concerted endeavour reflected a consensus between Africa and the international community to resuscitate Africa’s ailing development. The major weakness of the UN – PAEERD was that it was too descriptive and prescriptive and lacked appropriate implementation mechanisms as well as punitive measures necessary for donor countries when they failed to fulfil their promises (Bujra, 2004).

Rasheed and Chole (1994) emphasise that the UN-PAAERD was regarded as an unprecedented unique partnership between Africa and the international community to

develop the continent. Nyong'o (2007) adds that apart from the cooperation, UN PAAERD perpetuated the SAPs and *Stabilisation Policies* by exposing Africa to economic programs and objectives prescribed by the external donor countries and their agencies. In its approach to develop Africa, UN – PAAERD ignored addressing external problems such as debt and unequal exchange of trade.

Owusu (2006) further expounds that the UN PAAERD adopted APPER and requested international support to accelerate its implementation. The programme cajoled developed nations to consider changing their asymmetric relationship with Africa by looking into the following: elimination of protectionism, removal of higher prices for agricultural commodities, support balance of payment, reduction of debt burden. Apart from the adoption of APPER by UN PAAERD, African leaders were obviously unaware that the programme perpetuated and entrenched the failed SAPs and *Stabilisation Policies*. It is not surprising that between 1980 and 1989 about 241 adjustment programmes were implemented in 36 countries while APPER failed like its predecessors.

According to Adedeji (1988), the adoption of the UN PAAERD has further deteriorated Africa's ailing socio – economic and political conditions. The worst affected areas of education, health, employment and income caused more damage to women and children. The South African Communist Party Perspectives document of 1995 adds that the adoption of the UN PAAERD deeply plunged Africa deeply into a socio-economic quagmire worse than before. For an example context, real wage per capita income fell by an annual average of 0.7 % while the rates of illiteracy, mortality and debt have all risen.

Ohiorhenuan and Keeler (2011) further explain that by the late 80's, after the introduction of the UN – PAAERD, one third of the urban population in sub – Saharan Africa remained below absolute poverty level. Infant mortality rates averaged 105 per thousand for Africa vis-à-vis 70 for all developing countries. Child death rates in Africa were twice the level of all developing countries. Only 25 % of the rural population in Africa had access to safe and clean water compared with 40 % of other developing countries. The percentage of enrolment in secondary school was for example, 20% in Kenya, Zambia and Cote d'Ivoire and 30 % in Nigeria. The percentage of age group enrolled in post secondary school system was less than 3 % in Africa compared to 7 % in Indonesia and 10 % in Brazil. No African country achieved a domestic savings rate of 10 % of *Gross Domestic Products* (GDP) economically.

According to Nwanko and Richards (2004), by the late eighties the UN-PAEERD managed to cajole over 30 African countries to adopt *Stabilisation Policies* and SAPs of the WB and IMF by 1988. The impact of these programmes was intensively negative on socio - economic development of the continent.

Economically, the orthodox Structural Adjustment Programmes, by their design, assumed that instruments of control of money supply, credit squeeze, exchange rate and interest rate adjustments as well as trade liberalization could yield positive results in African countries which struggled with weak and disarticulate structures. The practice has failed to materialise because of the highly anticipated improvement on the rate of investment has

tremendously plummeted, whereas the budget and balance of payment deficits widened after some temporary relief, and debt service obligations became unbearable.

Socially, the negative impact raised more doubts and questions not only at policy making levels within and outside Africa, but also in international fora such as the 43rd session of UNGA's mid – review of UN – PAAERD. It became well known that the implementation of these programmes reflected a significant reduction of expenditures in social sectors, especially education and primary health care, shrinkage of the public sector and parastatals.

Tesha (2002) in Maloka (2002a) continues to explain that OAU members ascertained that the promised additional resources promised by the donors were not provided. The reason for this was that the donor community ignored demands for new and additional resources. The new partnership proposed under the UN – PAAERD became a mockery to African development. Consequently, the duration provided for its implementation lapsed without any significant improvements in the resource flows to Africa. Furthermore, SAPs and *Stabilisation Policies* continued to devastate African socio – economic policies.

2.5. African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes

(AAF – SAP)

The general assessment of orthodox adjustment programmes led to the conclusion that, those programmes aimed at restoring growth, especially the achievement of fiscal and external balances and the free play of markets, would not be achieved without addressing the basic structural bottlenecks of African economies. Consequently, at the beginning of

1988, the *United Nations Economic Commission of Africa* (UNECA) with the assistance from the *United Nations Development Programme* (UNDP) searched for a suitable African alternative framework for SAPs and *Stabilisation Policies* necessary to address Africa's socio – economic problems (OAU Report, 1989).

Maloka (2002a) emphasises that the search for an alternative framework resulted in extensive consultation within and outside Africa. The search was premised on the perception of reaching a common consensus among Africans as well as bilateral and multilateral development partners. In that regard, an *ad hoc* International Advisory Board comprising African high-ranking office and non-office bearers including officials from the Bretton Woods Institutions was established. The primary objective of that board was to develop a broad orientation appropriate to study Africa's development. Consequently, the study presented preliminary findings resulting from discussions of consensus building at an international workshop of African and non-African economists held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from the 3rd to the 5th of January, 1989. The outcome of the convergence encouraged UNECA to prepare a preliminary draft for government officials comprising Ministries of Finance and the Ministries of Economic Planning and Development.

At inter – governmental level, the proposals were examined during the meeting of senior officials of Ministries of Finance and Central Banks in Blantyre, Malawi in 1989. The meeting produced the "*Blantyre Statement*" constituting inputs which revised proposals for presentation at the 24th session of the Commission and the 15th meeting of the Conference of African Ministries responsible for Economic Planning and Development. Both meetings

took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 27 March to 9 April 1989. The final stage of the consensus building resulted in a joint meeting of African Ministries of Economic Planning and Development and the Ministers of Finance held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on the 10th of April 1989. The meeting culminated in the adoption of the *African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio – Economic Recovery and Transformation* (AAF – SAP) (Maloka, 2002a).

AAF – SAP was a document that contained 60 pages covering a wide range of policies and other development related issues. It described the structure for Africa's political economy as well as development objectives. It provided the necessary framework to probe orthodox adjustment programmes which outlined an alternative framework and also recommended new policy directions and instruments and discussed implementation strategies necessary for Africa's development. AAF – SAP rejected *Stabilisation Policies* and SAPs which were sponsored by the Bretton Woods Institutions because of empirical and theoretical reasons (Shaaeldin, 1991).

Orthodox adjustment economic policies were criticised because they prescribed a fallacious approach aimed at improving Africa's financial balances and price structures. That was at the expense of handling structural realities that generated the crisis. It was ascertained that weak production structures and imperfect markets in Africa resulted from orthodox programmes. It was also realised that factor immobility and weak supply elasticities reduced the impact of devaluation by switching expenditures; and stimulating exports. Imperfection in money and capital markets resulted in a situation whereby high interest

rates propagated inflationary pressures and aggravated speculative behaviour (OAU Resolution, 1989).

The document further criticised and challenged a pronouncement from the Bretton Woods Institutions that countries that pursued orthodox structural policies were good economic performers compared to those that were against their implementation. It pointed out that the growth rate of various countries differed broadly during the period between 1980 and 1987. That was false because other factors such as weather, commodity market conditions, inflow of external resources and debt situation accounted for varied growth in different countries (*ibid*).

As contained in Africa Policy Information Centre (1992), AAF – SAP clearly reflected a valid point by pointing out inseparable and intermingling effects of structural weaknesses, external factors, external financing and policy reforms as the causes of underdevelopment in the continent. That was because several observers noted that market imperfections, infrastructural inadequacies and institutional rigidities often reduced the degree of responsiveness of the economic agents against price incentives.

As a means for addressing Africa's developmental malaise, AAF-SAP made the following recommendations which were presented in three groups. They were:

One: Those intended to strengthen and diversify production capacity;

Two: those designed to improve income level and distribution pattern, and

Three: those related to the pattern of expenditure for needs satisfaction. The pre-eminent features of the recommended measures were:

- Reliance on selectivity in foreign exchange and credit allocation, import licensing and export promotion;
- Manipulation of prices in relation to multiple exchange rates, subsidised interest rates and guaranteed minimum prices for food crops; and
- The improvement of institutional arrangements. For example, land reforms, creating greater access to rural finance and strengthening intra – African monetary co – operation.

One of the main characteristics of AAF – SAP was its emphasis on the direct and indirect role of governments to influence the allocation of resources (United Nations Economic Commission For Africa, 1990).

According to Adedeji (1988b), the other characteristic of AAF – SAP was its holistic approach to development by embracing macro – economic framework policy directions and measures. In this context, implementation strategies were to consider the dynamic relationships which existed among all major elements relating to adjustment concerning transformation. For that to succeed, the difference between structural adjustment and long-term development were to be eliminated.

The alternative framework emphasised full mobilisation as well as efficient utilisation of domestic resources. That created a necessary platform for the establishment of a conducive environment for development by adopting a pragmatic approach between the public and

private sectors for Africa's development. The cardinal point of AAF – SAP was its human dimension, which recognised, motivated and empowered people to ensure the equitable distribution of income for development on a sustainable basis. It categorically maintained that a development programme that marginalised its people was inappropriate. Other major hallmarks of AAF – SAP were:

- AAF – SAP was not a standard programme applied indiscriminately in all countries under all circumstances. In some circumstances, it would be used for designing specific country programmes, selecting relevant policy instruments and measures as well as adopting the relevant implementation strategy;
- As a human centred framework AAF – SAP acknowledged full democratisation of all levels of economic and social activities in all stages including decision making to implementation;
- It called for high and intensified inter – country cooperation in the creation, implementation and monitoring of national programmes; and
- It was perceived as the pedestal for a constructive dialogue between African countries and their development partners in the implementation and financing of country programmes.

Development scholars regarded AAF – SAP as the basis for cooperation where the resources provided by the international community were to be merged with those provided by African governments towards sustainable development That was achievable

through adjustment of transformation which ensured that the 1990's would witness the socio – economic revival of Africa.

2.6. African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation

The beginning of the last decade of the previous century brought about the concerted attempts by Africans (governments, NGO's, civil society and labour movements) to develop Afro centric processes aimed at addressing Africa's socio economic and political malaise. Those endeavours began with the Conference on Popular Participation in the Recovery and Development of Africa held in Arusha, Republic of Tanzania, from the 12th to 16th of February 1990. This unprecedented meeting in African affairs was a joint undertaking of African people's organisations, African governments, Non Governmental Organisations and the United Nations' agencies. The conference was attended by over 500 people consisting of grassroots, labour movements, representatives of African governments, agencies of the UN System, regional and sub regional organisations, bilateral donors, as well as specialists from in and outside Africa (Popular Participation in Economic Recovery in Africa, 2007).

The conference provided a platform for the debate towards finding appropriate means necessary to attach meaning to concepts relating to democratic development, people's solidarity and creativity, self-reliance as well as the construction of policy recommendations for national governments, popular organisations and the international community aimed in establishing consolidation for participation and developmental

patterns. These participants searched for collective and mutual understanding concerning the role of popular participation in the development and transformation of Africa (AU Documents, 2004). The conference was proposed by Non-Governmental Organisations as the mid term review of the failed UN – PAAERD (*ibid*).

Herbert (2007) expresses the view that the conference resulted from a concern among Africans regarding Africa's deteriorating socio-economic situations. Africans became perpetually worried about a severe downturn in human and economic conditions around the continent during the eighties, inability to achieve popular participation, as well an inability to accept the role of popular participation in the process of recovery and development. The following objectives were developed to create platforms necessary for popular democratic participation:

- Recognition of the role of African people for participation in continental recovery and developmental efforts;
- Infusing sense to national governments and the international community to the dimensions, dynamics, processes and the potential for a development approach entrenched in popular initiatives and self - reliant endeavours;
- Identification of barriers to people's participation in development and articulation of appropriate approaches promoting development for articulating succinct approaches to the promotion of popular participation in policy formulation, planning, implementation monitoring and evaluation of development programmes;

- Recommending appropriate measures to be taken by various stakeholders such as governments, the UN system, private and public sector, donor agencies for the development of an appropriate environment for tangible popular participation in the development process and encouraging people and their organisations to undertake self – reliant development initiatives;
- Creating a conducive framework for exchanging data, experience and knowledge for mutual support among people and their organisations; and
- Providing indicators to monitor progress by facilitating people’s participation in development.

These objectives were contained in the Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation (1990) in the conference that lasted for five days whereby stakeholders engaged in dialogues and debates through plenary sessions and workshops. These endeavours culminated in the identification of common areas for concern which are necessary for popular participation in Africa’s development. These areas are:

- Asserting the role of popular participation,
- Promotion of popular participation,
- Popular participation in development; and
- Monitoring of popular participation.

A detailed explanation of each area is provided here under:

Asserting the role of Popular Participation

The conference has unilaterally accepted that the causes of Africa's underdevelopment did not only embrace economic problems but included human, legal, political and social ones. These problems reflected unprecedented proportions of human suffering, poverty and hunger to African masses. Delegates emphasised that those problems were to be addressed through institutionalisation of political freedoms such as speech, opinion, tolerance of differences, and ensuring people's maximum participation, their organisations as well as associations. Everyone in the society should be incorporated in the process to ensure that a people centred approach was enhanced.

The conference further emphasised that development objectives in Africa should reflect the goal of human centred development. That was achievable by satisfying people's needs, socio – economic justice and people's empowerment by determining the direction and content of development. Ecological and environmental crises were never to be addressed without a sustainable development process commanding full support and people's participation. That could be achieved by using AAF – SAP which provided the best framework to address the problem. The orthodox structural programmes which undermined development of human beings and disapproved of the role of popular participation was disregarded. Popular participation was perceived both as an end and means suitable to address Africa's fractured socio – economic situation. It provided the platform for collective commitment to determine people-based development process and willingness by sacrificing and directing their energies for its application (Kufuor, 2000).

Promotion of Popular Participation

The delegates confirmed that popular participation was a consolidation of people's efforts for developing and creating appropriate policies and programmes which served their interests fully. For that to be possible, a political processes accommodating freedom of opinions, tolerating differences and accepting joint agreement on issues was necessary. That was perceived to be able to maximise effective participation of people, organisations and delegates. Such an action required participation from people within all sectors of the society. Additionally, the roles of the state and international community were cardinal for the creation of such conditions (African Charter for Popular Participation – 2007).

Women's marginalisation and child abuse became a primary concern for all delegates. The conference affirmed that women and children's rights should be enshrined in national laws of all African states, which should accommodate social, economic and political rights. These rights are perceived to be the primary features of a democratic and participatory pattern of development (Mindzie, 2007).

The state is highly regarded as the base for popular participation. African governments were encouraged to develop an appropriate platform and environment that is conducive for the people to realise their maximum participation. That would be achievable by forging a new partnership between African governments and civil society. That partnership should not only recognise the importance of gender related issues but also create a platform that will ensure the involvement of women at all decision – making levels. Governments were highly encouraged to set specific targets for ensuring appointment of women in senior and

management positions in all government departments. People's full participation in self-development, freedom of expression and freedom from fear were encouraged to be guaranteed by African states. That was perceived to be achievable through the extension and protection of people's fundamental rights that were indicated earlier. Governments were encouraged to implement the African Charter on Human and People's Rights; Convention for the Rights of the Child and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation – 2007).

Popular Participation in Development

It is important to note that the following strategies, frameworks and actions were highly emphasised for popular participation in development:

(1) At Government level

African governments were strongly advised to develop and adopt development strategies and approaches containing aspirations and interests of Africans. These should reflect African values, economic, social and cultural realities. It was believed this would be achievable if African governments promoted the formulation and implementation of national development programmes drawn from popular participation. Apart from that, these programmes were to aim at achieving self – reliant and self-sustaining people centred development premised on democratic agreements (African Charter For Popular Participation, 1990).

An environment conducive for enabling a people centred and broad based participation was regarded as necessary. That environment was necessary to enhance initiatives and creativity through the following mechanisms:

- Promotion of massive literacy and skills training advancing human research;
- Extension of economic power to the people through equal distribution of income, support of people's production by providing access to land, credit and technology; and
- Provision of a platform allowing people to participate in the formulation and implementation of social policies.

(11) At the Level of People and their Organisations

Participation of the people has been highly regarded as the cornerstone for development. The following were regarded as appropriate means necessary to enhance people's participation and democratic governance:

- Establishment of independent grassroots organisations encouraging self – reliant participation development aimed at increasing output productivity of the masses;
- Provision of conducive platforms capacitating people's effective participation in debates regarding economic policy as well as development issues;
- Promotion of education, literacy, skills training and human resource development enhancing people's participation in governance; and
- Shaking off lethargy and traditional beliefs derailing development. That focussed on customs and cultural practices undermining the status of women in society while recognising and valuing patriarchal beliefs and practices contributing to development. Rural and urban people's organisations such as workers, peasants,

women, youth, students, should be encouraged to initiate and implement strategies intensifying their productive power and meeting their basic needs; and

- Joint endeavours were to be undertaken to transform negative attitudes projected to the disabled to incorporate them into the mainstream of development.
- *(111) At the Level of the International Community*

As developmental partners, the international community was persuaded to support African popular participation through:

- Supporting African countries in their drive to internalise development and transformation process. The IMF, WB and other multilateral and bilateral donors were requested to unconditionally accept and help African initiatives to conceptualise, formulate and implement Afro-centric development programmes;
- Directing technical assistance programmes which consolidate national capabilities for policy analysis and design as well as in the implementation of economic reform and developmental programmes;
- Assisting in democratising development in African countries by supporting decentralisation of developmental processes, activating participation b African people and their organisations to formulate developmental strategies and economic reform programmes, open debate and consensus building process on development and reform;
- Reduction of Africa's debt and debt servicing obligation through the provision of the extension of the moratorium on debt servicing obligations releasing resources for financing development; and

- Ensuring that the human dimension is cardinal to the adjustment programmes that must adhere to the objectives and aspirations of African people (*ibid*).

(IV) At the Level of Women's Organisations

Many African women's organisations should pay particular attention to the following to ensure maximum participation of women in the process of development.

- As architects of confidence among women, popular African organisations were encouraged to strengthen women's capacity;
- African social organisations should concertededly struggle to attain policies and programmes that reflect and recognise the role of women as producers, mothers, active community mobilisers and custodians of culture; and
- African social organisations should work to ensure that men in particular and society in general understand women's role in the recovery and transformation of Africa so that they can pursue appropriate common courses of action.

Monitoring of Popular Participation

According to Dias (2007), the Conference adopted the *African Charter for Popular Participation in Development* that was used to monitor the progress of recommendations and resolutions undertaken. The Charter emphasised the following:

- Acceleration of literacy rate. That was regarded as the index of capacity for mass participation in public debate, decision making and general development process;
- Enhancement of freedom of association, especially political association and the presence of democratic institutions such as political parties, trade unions,

people's grass roots organisations and professional associations and the guarantee of constitutional rights;

- Provision of ample representation for people and their organisations in national bodies;
- Provision of the rule of law and socio – economic justice including equal distribution of income and the creation of full employment opportunities;
- Protection of ecological, human and legal environment; and
- Creation of a platform for press and media freedom to facilitate a public debate on major issues.

It is imperative to comprehend that the above-mentioned endeavours were based on African self-reliance and integration, popular participation in development, centrality of the state to the developmental processes, the removal of inequalities in the international economic and trading system and an African alternative to market growth. In the past African home-grown strategies of continental development were opposed, undermined and thrown away by the international donors especially the World Bank and IMF.

Africa's developmental programmes failed because of a vacuum of real leadership to steer the continent into a brighter future because the past independence leaders were pre – occupied with their own positions of power, tenure and material well – being, more often than not at the expense of their own citizens. Almost all African leaders, civilian or military, ran Africa into a quagmire as they believed that their names were synonymous with the names of the countries they liberated. They became sacrosanct and turned into

dictators who pillaged African resources, human and material, together with the developed world.

The chapter on historical development in Africa highlights that it will be a monumental mistake in African international relations discourse to talk of NEPAD as the first endeavour to address continental socio-economic and political malaise seriously. The crux of the matter is that the previous endeavours failed and therefore Africa has every reason to want NEPAD to succeed where others failed. It is clear that Africa approached the developed world for assistance on the path to recovery and sustainable development. These attempts failed to deliver envisaged results as they were essentially, opposed, undermined and thrown away by the very Bretton Woods institutions or international financial regimes that NEPAD invites to partner today. The donor communities' reluctance to support these initiatives implied that African countries were unable to guarantee investment for development on the continent. This however, does not mean that African leaders are not responsible for the lack of development because few of them undertook the responsibility for development. It appears that NEPAD changes this because Africans are being tasked with securing their own development by the West as long as this new phase of development is implemented in partnership with the West.

The Africans who were involved in these programmes relied heavily on foreign sponsorships from the developed countries who attached strict conditionalities on the Africans' exercise of basic rights to decide about the future of their nations and the continent. This situation was supposed to improve if the African leaders were committed to

carry out their own development agenda that was developed in accordance with the needs of the people of the continent. However, given the leader's excessive exogenous dependence, their narrow political base and their perpetual failure to demonstrate tangible commitment, the implementation of these plans suffered from gentle neglect because of the unavailability of funds and visionary leadership.

It is important to acknowledge that until the establishment of NEPAD, African leaders ignored and abandoned their own strategies, including two United Nations Programs of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development, as well as the United Nations Agenda for the Development of Africa which were created together with the international community under the auspices of the United Nations. Meanwhile it is true to say that the international community is responsible for stifling African development; even in cases where there has been an agreement on the way in which development should take place, African states lack the ability to implement these projects.

The developmental programmes in Africa originated from a few elite who did not consult with academics and civil society to construct developmental plans that included all stakeholders. The neglect of other stakeholders reflected a top down approach to resolve continental problems. Such an approach neglects the contributions of other stakeholders who can bring informative and alternative ideas that might corroborate the ideas of the policymakers to become a plan which reflects the perceptions and ideas of a variety of stakeholders from civil society, academics, religious organisations and policymakers. African leadership failed to recognise endogenous problems to address developmental

failures. These leaders were mostly interested in entrenching their grip on domestic leadership. In their quest, there was serious violation of principles of democracy and human rights that was characterised by suppression of opposition parties, corruption, dictatorship and pervasive corruption. For example, the former leader of Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko imprisoned anyone who opposed his leadership and became extremely rich because of his corrupt practices. These domestic malpractices resulted in millions of ordinary people in various countries entrenched in the quagmire of poverty to the oblivion of political leaders. In addressing continental developmental failure, a lopsided perception directed at exogenous parties, for example, the donor parties, became a cardinal feature in the thinking of African leadership. Apart from that, donor partners carry the blame of failing to adhere to their promises and attach myriad conditions, such as SAPs, for Africa's development. The very same conditions are attached to NEPAD through good governance and trade liberalisation in exchange for accelerated aid from the donor partners.

CHAPTER THREE

CHALLENGES FACED BY AFRICA IN IMPLEMENTING THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT

The chapter looks into the challenges faced by Africa in implementing NEPAD. It commences by providing building blocks that resulted in the production of the NEPAD document. Throughout the chapter, the reader is drawn towards developing a deeper understanding of the role played by numerous leaders, for example President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, to produce an Afro-centric developmental programme. Furthermore, the chapter zooms in on the challenges faced by Africa in implementing NEPAD. These challenges include *inter alia* the search for sustainable development, sectoral priorities and mobilisation of resources. The last part covers critiques of NEPAD where the views focus on the asymmetric relationship between the donor countries and Africa regarding implementation of NEPAD.

3.1. New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)

According to Cilliers (2002a), the last years of the last century witnessed African leaders searching for appropriate strategies aimed at releasing Africa from the economic quagmire and socio – political malaise. This energetic search resulted in the creation of the *New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)* in the 21st century. NEPAD results from the merger of two prominent initiatives aimed at addressing Africa's underdevelopment that was caused by unfavourable terms of trade, lack of good governance and the entire

dependency of African development on Western funding. These two initiatives are the *Millennium Partnership for African Recovery* (MAP) and *the Omega Plan*. These two widely known documents incorporated the little known document called *Compact for African Recovery* produced by the *United Nations Economic Commission for Africa* (UNECA, 2010).

The production of three documents by the African leadership reflects the burning desire arising from an African experience of unfulfilled missions over the last decades of political independence. The motivation behind these initiatives has been premised on a common vision and shared belief that those leaders had an obligation to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development in the 21st century. Those initiatives were strongly based on the determination and desire by Africans to extract themselves from the quagmire of underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalizing world.

In this regard, MAP resulted from separate mandates given to three African leaders, Presidents Obasanjo of Nigeria, Mbeki of South Africa and Bouteflika of Algeria, to engage with the rich North countries and the IFIs regarding the economic and financial situation of poor countries in the South generally and Africa in particular. The crusade began at the Extra Ordinary Summit of the OAU held in Sirte, Libya in 1999, when Presidents Mbeki and Bouteflika were mandated in consultation with the OAU's Contact Group on Africa's External Debt to engage with Africa's creditors regarding the cancellation of the continent's external debt (Ikome, 2007). This mandate was given to

both Presidents to engage with Africa's creditors to find appropriate means for the cancellation of Africa's debt which had resulted in socio – economic and political malaise. That was the bold endeavour undertaken by the OAU to look for a common platform with the donors to resolve Africa's debt crisis. It should be comprehended that the mandate was not the sole activity of both mandated leaders. The mandate was sanctioned under the auspices of the continental organisation.

Within seven months, the South Summit of *Non Aligned Movement* (NAM) and the Group of 77 poor countries, affectionately known as G77 and China, in Havana, Cuba mandated Mbeki and Obasanjo, chairpersons of NAM and G77 and China respectively to convey the concerns of the South to the G8 and IFIs. Analysts maintain that these two separate mandates given to the OAU troika were aimed at addressing the continental plight and the marginalization of the South in a rapidly globalising world. The common factors in these mandates, poverty eradication and debt reversal, culminated in the development of MAP (Kanyegirire and Ndangam, 2006). The plight of poverty and debt escalation has been a common feature of South – South cooperation. The above mentioned organisations provided an appropriate platform for Africa's socio economic marginalisation to be debated. That is where the mandate which formed the backbone of MAP was developed. The problem with the mandate given to the two Presidents was that it did not have any time frames and actions to be undertaken if the donors are intransigent. These meetings became talking shops for the South to raise their common frustrations.

The leaders began their crusade by meeting with the G8 countries in Okinawa, Japan, in July 2000 (Sidiropoulos and Hughes, 2004). Gelb (2002) maintains that the African delegation dominated representation of the South at that meeting. The discussion was transformed from a mere debate concerning debt relief into discussions focusing on development, and African development in particular. It became evident that during those discussions, the G8 requested African leaders to develop a plan of action that succinctly explained Africa's expectations from the rich and developed countries. After the Okinawa meeting, Obasanjo and Bouteflika mandated Mbeki to develop an African developmental plan. Mbeki responded by producing MAP which was presented by African leaders for the first time at the *World Economic Forum* (WEF) in Davos in 2000. The presentation of an African development for the first time in public at Davos reflected Africa's high regard for the rich developed and donor countries, and lack of respect to the masses they lead. African scholars and development specialists were not consulted in this regard. That is the reason why MAP is perceived as a top – down approach by African citizenry.

Obi (2001) adds that after the presentation, the developed countries, especially the G8 countries, demanded that the elements of “*partnership and ownership*” be incorporated in the African recovery programme. In their explanation, the G8 countries emphasised that the programme was proudly *owned* by Africans to develop the continent in *partnership* with the rich developed countries. Over and above, the forwarding of the mandate to Mbeki resulted in the programme being diluted into the objectives of South Africa's foreign policy. “*This explains why the early drafts of the early MAP document were driven by a Deep South African reading of the development problems facing Africa and the prognosis*

for Africa extricating itself from the development quagmire". It should be understood that the transfer of the mandate to Mbeki afforded him the opportunity to drum up support for democracy, promotion of human rights and economic development which are the cornerstones for South Africa's foreign policy. This gave South Africa an opportunity to assert itself in the continent and globally

Adesina (2001a) argues that the 35th Ordinary Session of the OAU, 3rd Ordinary Session of Africa's Economic Community as well as the Declaration and Programme of Action of the G77 in Havana, 2000, did not mention the mandate enshrined in MAP. However, the OAU Session focused on: *(I)* A commitment to exclude those who came to power by *coup d'etat* from attending OAU sessions; and *(II)* the adoption of a proposal submitted by President Obasanjo on peace and security issues. Furthermore, the G77 and China Summit focused primarily on debt eradication and poverty in the South. This raises questions as to who gave the mandate to the three Presidents, but above all a workable programme was produced after those high level engagements. This attests to why some of the Presidents such as Gadhafi and Mugabe heavily criticized NEPAD which originates from MAP.

MAP, which prioritised the promotion of democracy, protection of human rights, and good political as well as economic governance as cornerstones of Africa's development, differs from previous African development initiatives. This is because it acknowledges both exogenous and endogenous factors as impediments to African recovery. Furthermore, its origin raises suspicion because it revolves around three Presidents, excluding the rest of Africa. Matters are further exacerbated by the fact that President Mbeki proclaimed it

publicly outside the continent at the WEF in Davos, Switzerland where he emphasised that participation in the programme was open to all African countries prepared and ready to commit themselves to the underlying principles guiding the initiative. Mbeki's declaration caused an anxiety among African leaders such as Abdoulaye Wade, also present at the WEF gathering. After WEF's convergence, Wade crafted the *Omega Plan* to counter MAP because he assumed that it was entrenching Anglophone philosophy in the continent (Adesina, 2001a). Mbeki's action and Wade's aftermath reaction resuscitated the Anglophone and Francophone competition in the continent. This is because there is secrecy surrounding the development of MAP, and Wade countering the programme which is aimed at developing the continent. One of the major problems surrounding MAP is its lack of consultation.

Boko and Seck (2008) add that the *Omega Plan* is perceived as a symptom of the deeply anchored Francophone – Anglophone divide in African politics. Senegalese diplomats defended the *Omega Plan* as an original and independent plan developed earlier by Wade. By developing the plan, Wade aimed at developing Africa by constructing regional infrastructure and educational projects. Senegalese diplomats continued to defend Wade by emphasising that the plan was long developed before his election as president of Senegal. The plan identified the development of infrastructure and human resources, including investment in agriculture as the basic important elements of any renewal plan. It emphasised that after African states freed themselves from the burden of investment in infrastructure and human resource development then they would possess the resources necessary for improving the quality of their economic governance. The *Omega Plan* was

initially presented by Wade at the Franco – African Summit held in Yaounde, Cameroon in January 2001 (Bala and Vickers, 2002).

The *Omega Plan* and MAP were jointly presented at the extraordinary Summit of the OAU in Libya in March 2001. The Summit endorsed both initiatives and decided that every effort should be taken to merge both. This was because both plans pursued similar objectives aiming for the recovery and development of the continent. African leaders realised that, for the continent to be taken seriously, it had to present a single, coordinated initiative to its international partners and, moreover, more than one initiative would confuse Africa's partners. Therefore, the main motive for merging the initiatives was to ease Africa's dealings with its external partners (Ikome, 2007). Regardless of the problems surrounding the secrecy of MAP and counter-measures from Francophone countries by producing the *Omega Plan*, African leaders took the initiatives necessary for the development of Africa. It was a wise move by the OAU to recognise both initiatives and further demand their merger. This action is unifying because the continent comprises of various countries with different perceptions. In this regard, the merger of both plans will be accepted across the continent.

Myriad endeavours were undertaken by African leaders and development specialists to merge the two plans. Those endeavours culminated in the production of the *New African Initiative* (NAI) which consolidated MAP and the *Omega Plan* ready for presentation at the OAU Summit scheduled for Lusaka in July 2001. Before the submission of the consolidated plan, Presidents Mbeki and Wade held a serious meeting in Pretoria to iron

out a few differences and consolidate their presentation for the Summit. NAI was finally presented at the OAU Summit in Lusaka on the 11th of July 2001 where it was unanimously accepted as the declaration of the Summit. In terms of the declaration, a 15 member *Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee* (HSGIC) was appointed to drive NAI forward. It was to be chaired by Obasanjo, assisted by Wade and Bouteflika, with Mbeki as the secretary (Akokpari, 2004b).

Diescho (2002) adds that on the 11th of July 2001, the 15 members of the HSGIC were elected and mandated to steer the NAI framework forward. Adding to the executive were three Heads of States each from the 5 OAU regions. These three states comprised *Central Africa* represented by Cameroon, Gabon, and Sao Tome and Principe; *East Africa* represented by Ethiopia, Mauritius and Rwanda; *North Africa* represented by Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia; *Southern Africa* represented by Botswana, Mozambique and South Africa while *West Africa* was represented by Mali, Nigeria and Senegal. It is imperative to realise that the formation of the 15 member HSGIC and three additional members from each of the five regions symbolized unity and acceptance from African heads of states that they were ready to engage with the rest of the world to develop the continent. This highlighted that the continental Organisation regarded Africa's development as a concerted effort.

Tawflik (2008) highlights that African leaders perceived NAI as "*Africa's strategy for achieving sustainable development in the 21st century*". In this context, it was important to recognise the contribution of the little known document called *Compact for African*

Recovery produced by the *Economic Commission for Africa* (UNECA) indicated earlier. It presented an important component of UNECA's response to the implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration (MDG's) and called for African countries to foster partnerships with developed countries by investing in the necessary resources through aid, debt relief, and market access necessary to "*jump start*" African economies in their recovery effort. However, Africa was called upon to put in place the necessary political reforms ensuring that their economies would take off. The Compact became the valuable document for welding two African documents into NAI. The incorporation of the Compact into NAI extends the role of the international community in Africa's recovery. This brings in another element, that NAI was not only produced in Africa but by UNECA which is the subsidiary body of the UN which contributed its knowledge of development in the programme. This raises the question of the UN's role in playing its part for ensuring the success of the plan because it failed to commit to its earlier developmental plans in Africa.

African leaders worked hard to garner support for the new initiative from the continent's external and international partners. On the 20th of July 2001, a group of some of HSGIC members presented NAI to the G -8 Summit in Genoa, Italy. The G 8 leaders welcomed the initiative and endorsed it as the *Genoa Plan for Africa*. The G8 committed itself to forging a new partnership with Africa aimed at addressing the continent's developmental problems. The G8 also undertook to help in promoting the initiative in multilateral forums. The Summit then appointed a committee of personal representatives to work with the African leaders to develop a plan of action for adoption by the G8 Summit to be held in Canada in June 2002 (Malcolmson, 2004). The problem here is that the G8 leaders did not provide

time frames for ensuring that the plan of action would be undertaken satisfactorily. Over and above junior officials were African Heads of State and Government to work out modalities of implementing the plan. That culminated in a meeting held in Abuja, Nigeria on the 23rd of October where a decision was taken to rename the initiative from NAI to *New Partnership for Africa's Development* (NEPAD). NEPAD is an innovative Afro centric developmental framework. It seeks to address the current challenges facing the African continent. These challenges include, *inter alia*, poverty, underdevelopment and continued marginalization. It is premised on African countries making a commitment to good governance, democracy and human rights while attempting to prevent and resolve situations of conflict and instability on the continent (Ramsamy, 2004). The G8 ensured their presence by enforcing the concept of *partnership* into the developmental programme. This highlights that NEPAD cannot succeed without external donors who impose their terms on Africa as is the case by invoking the concept of *partnership* in the developmental plan.

3.2. Goals for NEPAD

The following goals have been identified:

- To promote growth and sustainable development. By enrolling all children of school going age in schools by 2015; progressing towards gender equality through women empowerment and elimination of gender inequalities in schools by 2015; reduction of infant and child mortality ratios by two – thirds by 2015; increasing access to reproductive health services by 2015; and reversing the loss of environmental resources by 2015;

- Eradication of widespread and severe poverty: To develop programmes which will educate people, skill them and allow them to contribute to the labour of the continent in order to eradicate poverty; and
- Halting the marginalization of Africa in the globalization process – Active participation and involvement at all multilateral levels to change multilateral regimes in order to incorporate Africa into a rapidly globalising world (Spicer, 2002).

The probable achievement of these goals is categorized into seven initiatives which are:

- (1). ***Peace, Security, Democracy and Political Governance:*** This is subdivided into two categories: *Peace and Security* initiative which ensures peace and security through conflict prevention and resolution, peacekeeping and post conflict reconstruction, and the *democracy and political governance* initiative aiming at promoting the principles of democracy, transparency, accountability, integrity, respect for human rights and the rule of law;
- (11). ***Economic and Corporate Governance:*** Aiming to deliver sound, stable fiscal and macroeconomic management, investor friendly systems of commercial law, sound banking and insurance as well as sound government fiscal management;
- (111). ***Bridging the Infrastructure Gap:*** This includes roads, ports, railroads, electricity, water, sanitation and facilities for health and education. This would incorporate information and telecommunications areas;

(1V). **Human Resource Development:** Envisaged to incorporate all development themes to include *inter alia*: health, education, poverty reduction, agriculture, gender development;

(V). **Capital Flows:** Looking at investment promotion, debt reduction, increased aid and aid reform;

(V1). **Market Access:** Focusing on increased resource beneficiation, diversification of agriculture and increased manufacturing and

(V11). **Environment:** Focusing on all matters relating to climate change, global warming, preservation of wetlands and transnational parks to pursue sustainable development (NEPAD Document, 2001).

3.3. Challenges faced by Africa to Search for Sustainable Development of NEPAD

3.3.1. Challenges faced Africa by Africa to Implement Peace and Security Initiative Of NEPAD

The major challenge confronting implementation of NEPAD is the continent's lack of capacity building for peace and security. This is because NEPAD aims to solve problems relating to armed conflicts and civil unrests in the continent and these are within the political jurisdiction of member states which the implementation of the programme does not control. Regardless of lack of control over the state of affairs within member states, currently twenty per cent of Africans are exposed to conditions of conflict which cause terrible suffering and hold back economic development of the affected countries. The extent of conflict is so severe that the whole continent is affected and this creates a major

barrier to inward investment. The World Bank estimates that conflict is costing Africa 2 % of economic growth annually.

3.3.1.1. Role Played by People in Power to Exacerbate Conflicts: The Case of Darfur

Since 2003, Darfur has been engulfed in a series of catastrophic conflicts. The AU and its predecessor, the OAU, failed to find a sustainable and lasting solution for resolving that calamity. The situation is so severe that currently the region of Darfur is experiencing a conflict between the Arab nomads and the African farmers. The conflict results from the competition over land and scarce resource such as oil. The government backed militia, the *Janjaweed* (known as devils on horseback) continue to commit horrendous atrocities such as torture, murder, rape, destruction of villages and ethnic cleansing against Africans, thus exacerbating the conflict (Wakabi, 2006). The government-backed militia fights a proxy war waged by the government of Sudan on ordinary civilians who should enjoy the wealth which is produced in their area.

Patterson (2008) emphasises that the current conflict resulted from local rebel groups attacking the military posts in the region by accusing the central authority of ignoring their regions and discriminating against its inhabitants in order to gain the profits from mineral deposits. The central authority, the *Government of Sudan* (GoS) retaliated by unleashing the *Janjaweed* to attack rebel forces and allowed them to loot the affected villages. With the government's support and arsenal, the *Janjaweed* employed brutal and horrendous tactics by burning, raping girls and women and destroying villages. This has been a

poignant state of affairs because of the government that utilised its authority to allow one group to act ruthlessly against unprotected civilians. The case in point was that the government was supposed to provide a secure environment for all its citizens without discrimination. The use of advantage and state apparatus to oppress one group by another is unacceptable, as enshrined in the universal declaration of human rights. This poses a serious challenge for NEPAD's search for implementing peace and security initiative because of the involvement of the state in the armed conflict. Matters are exacerbated by the Constitutive Act of the AU, which advocates for the principle of non – interference in the affairs of member states. This simply means that the matter is beyond the control member states to implement NEPAD.

By late 2006, the *Janjaweed* managed to destroy about 2000 villages in Darfur. In this regard, both the USA and the EU labelled the atrocities in Darfur as genocide. It became the first time the USA mentioned the concept of genocide since the Holocaust of World War II. However, it is surprising why the USA and two EU members in the Security Council, France and the UK, failed to sponsor a draft resolution aimed at addressing the situation in Darfur. As enshrined in the International Criminal Court's dossier (2007), President AL Bashir is alleged to have orchestrated the conflict by waging a political and military struggle against the groups in Darfur. In this context, he reflected that the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups are socially, politically and economically weak in the region. These groups mobilised and launched an armed rebellion to challenge economic and political exclusion levelled against them. President AL Bashir issued *carte blanche* orders to his subordinates to crush and quell the rebellion. The forces connived with the

Janjaweed and attacked small towns occupied by these groups. These attacks became systematic in such a way that the armed forces were delivered in trucks and land cruisers. On the other hand, the *Janjaweed* would arrive on camels and horseback. The joint forces would then surround a village and occasionally the Air Force would be called to drop bombs on that village as a precursor to the attacks. The forces on the ground would then invade a village or town and attack civilian inhabitants. They would then kill men, children, elderly, women and subject women and girls to massive rapes. Thereafter they burned and looted the village (ICC, 2007).

According to Polgreen (2006), the results of these unlawful activities were devastating and destructive to the Darfurians. The targeted groups ran away from the region to neighbouring Chad. By December 2007, the total number of Darfurians exiled in refugee camps in Chad stood at about 235 000. Of those, there were approximately 110 000 Zaghawa, 103 000 Masalit and 7 750 Fur. It is imperative to note that these tribes were not only externally but internally displaced.

The situation in Darfur was not ignored by the international organisations, especially the UN. As the custodian of international peace and security, the United Nations Security Council adopted numerous resolutions, presidential statements and press releases for resolving the crises in Darfur. Among resolutions were, resolutions 1556 (30 July 2004), 1591 (29 March 2005), 1672 (25 April 2005) to impose sanctions against the Government of Sudan; resolution 1590 (24 March 2005), 1769 (31 July 2007) for deploying peacekeepers. President AL Bashir had at first refused any UN intervention by claiming

that the UN forces have levelled a hidden agenda against Sudan. In his explanation, AL Bashir implied that the UN forces were not bringing peace but recolonisation of his country. Another fear stopping the Sudanese government from cooperating with the UN was that many government officials might face charges of war crimes from the ICC (Doria *et al.* 2008).

In 2005, the UNSC adopted resolution 1593, to refer the situation in Darfur to the *International Criminal International Court* (ICC). This referral of the situation in Darfur to the office of the Prosecutor of ICC through resolution 1593 (2005) exacerbated the situation in Darfur. This is because investigations concluded that certain leaders such as AL Bashir, Muhammad Harun and Ali Kushayb were responsible for the crimes such as:

(1) **Genocide** under article 6 (a) of the Rome Statute by systematically killing members of the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups, causing serious bodily or mental harm to those groups and deliberately inflicting on those groups conditions of life calculated to bring about their physical destruction;

(11) **Crime Against Humanity** under article 7 (1) of the Statute. In this regard, the crime committed forms part of a widespread and systematic attack directed against the civilian population of Darfur with the knowledge of the attack through the acts of murder, extermination, forcible transfer of the population, torture and rapes;

(111) **War Crimes** under article 8 (2) (e) (i) of the Statute for intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population by pillaging a town or place (ICC Document, 2008).

According to Gentile (2010), in April 2007 the ICC issued warrants of arrest for Harun and Kushayb and cascaded the message for their surrender to GoS. The charges against both men related to war crimes and crimes against humanity. On 14 July 2008, the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC, Luis Moreno – Ocampo allegedly linked President AL Bashir to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed since 2003 in Darfur. The Prosecution does not allege that AL Bashir physically or directly carried out any of the crimes. It emphasises that he committed crimes through members of the state apparatus, the army and the Militia (Janjaweed) in accordance with article 25 (3) (a) of the Statute which means indirect perpetration or perpetration by means. In July 2009, the ICC issued a warrant of arrest against AL Bashir.

The Government of Sudan has openly and defiantly protested the related ICC prosecutions of its senior officials for their alleged crimes in Darfur. The Government defended its action by pronouncing that it is not a party or signatory to the Rome Statute and therefore it would not comply by apprehending its officials. Some international or regional bodies such as the African Union, Arab League and Organisation of Islamic Conference supported Sudan in defying the request of the ICC (Slomanson, 2006). These organisations alleged that the ICC is a Western creation aimed at incriminating African leaders. In a statement presented to the Security Council on the 5th of June 2005, Luis Moreno Ocampo complained that GoS was intransigent in not complying with resolution 1595 and that they were not cooperating with the court. Above all, GoS officials emphasised that “*the ICC has no jurisdiction over Sudan*” (ICC, 2008). The reaction by GoS makes it very difficult for NEPAD to promote peace and security in Darfur because of the principle of jurisdiction

and non-interference enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the AU. This makes NEPAD a toothless dog, which barks without executing its gnawing and biting capabilities.

The AU has conversely exacerbated the situation when its member states have openly refused to cooperate with the ICC by not apprehending President Omar Al Bashir for war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed in Darfur. In its intransigence, the AU criticised the ICC by labelling it to be Western institution aimed at destroying African leadership. Such an action is unfortunate to the Darfurians living under constant fear and attack, where basic democratic rights are threatened by the action of GoS. The continental organisation formed to promote peace and security is openly supporting GoS at the expense of ordinary citizens. However, the AU is supposed to launch its own investigation to find out what has really happened in Darfur. This is because the elements in Darfur allow the continental organisation to intervene. In case their finding coincides with that of the ICC, it is therefore imperative for the organisation to persuade GoS to cooperate with the ICC. In case these allegations are unfounded then the AU should persuade ICC to withdraw. In such circumstances, it becomes the duty of the AU to assist both parties to find an amicable solution to resolve those crises.

3.3.1.2. Rejection of the Outcomes of Negotiated Settlements: The Case of Ethiopia – Eritrea Border Crisis

It becomes important for the reader to realise that NEPAD places a high importance on peace and security as the cornerstones of successful development. The continuous border crises between Ethiopia and Eritrea do more than harm to NEPAD's quest for sustainable

development of which peace and security are its tenets. This is because state resources which are supposed to develop the daily lives of ordinary citizens are then redistributed to sustain the war. Even though NEPAD is far beyond resolving the impasse between these two states, their actions and attitudes in failing to find a lasting peace stifle the successful implementation of the programme.

During the decolonisation of Africa, which gathered pace, and momentum during the fifties, Italy, which had colonised Eritrea relinquished power in the latter in 1952, but Ethiopia annexed the state from April 1962 until 1991. The current impasse between the two states in the Horn of Africa dates back to April 1991. The conflict began when the *Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front* (EPRDF) led by Meles Zenawi, who is the late former Prime Minister of Ethiopia, and the *Eritrean People's Liberation Front* (EPLF) led by Issayas Afwerki, who is the current leader of Eritrea, overthrew the government of Mengistu Haile Mariam in Ethiopia. EPRDF merged with other political groups in Ethiopia to establish the transitional government. Meanwhile in Eritrea the EPLF established another transitional government that lasted in 1993. However, Eritreans voted for self-determination in a UN monitored plebiscite (Ewing, 2008).

According to Kaarsholm (2004), the problem concerning the referendum and the newly established government in Ethiopia became the failure to demarcate and define the borders between the two neighbouring countries. Eritrea continued to refuse Ethiopia access to its ports of Massawa and Assab. The matter has been so contentious that both countries are unable to compromise on those issues.

On the 12th of May 1998, Eritrean forces invaded the border area of Badme resulting from a shooting incident between the Ethiopian militia and the Eritrean border patrol. The international community launched concerted endeavours to address the impasse but failed. In this regard, the USA and Rwanda tabled a quick proposal to persuade the two forces to withdraw their forces from Badme (Healy, 2008).

Zondi and Rejouis (2006) emphasise that both countries exercised differences when they responded to these international endeavours. In the first instance, Ethiopia accepted the USA/ Rwanda proposal but Eritrea rejected it. Conversely, in another round during the 1999 conflict, Eritrea accepted the diplomatic initiative that was rejected by Ethiopia. After these differences, these countries were embroiled in a conflict that lasted for two years. During this conflict, heavy artillery, tanks and warplanes were utilised. Rivalry reflecting history, peoples, ruling elites and leaders between the two countries accelerated and exacerbated the war that resulted in casualties and economic costs incurred. About 70 000 - 100 000 people lost their lives whereas about 1 million have been displaced.

In June 2000, an unprecedented breakthrough was reached when an agreement about ending hostilities was signed. One of the conditions aimed at resolving the impasse was the creation of a 25 kilometre wide demilitarised *Temporary Security Zone* (TSZ). Another breakthrough was reached on the 12th of December 2000, when both parties signed the Algiers Agreement to end their hostilities officially. The agreement called for the official adjudication of the disputed border, settlement of all compensation claims between the two countries as well as the deployment of 3 800 peacekeepers under the auspices of the *United*

Nations Mission for Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). The mandate of the peacekeepers was to monitor the TSZ. Pre-eminently, the mandate was neutral:

Ethiopia – Eritrea Boundary Commission (EEBC) was established to “*delimit and demarcate the colonial treaty border premised on colonial treaties from 1900, 1902 and 1908 that are applicable to international law*” (UN Security Council Resolution, 2008).

Above all, other parties agreed to accept the outcome of the ruling.

Both parties nominated the panel for the EEBC and it comprised of five internationally acclaimed jurists. They are:

- Sir Elihu Lauterpacht (President – appointed by lawyers from both parties);
- Professor W. Michael Reisman (appointed by Eritrea);
- Judge Stephen M. Scwebel (appointed by Eritrea);
- His Excellency, Prince Bola Adesumbo Ajibola (appointed by Ethiopia); and
- Sir Arthur Watts KCMG QC (appointed by Ethiopia).

The proceedings stretched for several months during which both parties to the conflict presented their cases and necessary evidence to corroborate their claims. On the 13th of April 2002, the Commission presented its final ruling enshrined in a 125-page dossier which was dense and complicated for a lay person to comprehend. The maps for illustration and corroboration of the findings accompanied the dossier. The Commission ascertained and declared that Badme is an Eritrean territory. Ethiopia objected the ruling by arguing that the EEBC erred on their findings and demanded some adjustment in their

findings. Ethiopia reacted by suspending its cooperation with EEBC and elevated their demand by appealing to the UNSC (Plaut and Healy, 2007).

Eritrea responded by violating the mandate of UNMEE. In so doing, Eritrea expelled and limited the movement of UNMEE and restricted them from acquiring oil supplies. Subsequently, Eritrea expelled UNMEE peacekeepers from the TSZ separating the two armies. That left the UNMEE unable to maintain peace and security in the contested area. Eritrea justified its actions by emphasising that the border has been legally demarcated and that the UN has completed its mission. The UNSC issued myriad Presidential statements and press releases that *inter alia* include S/2008/ 226 and S/2008/496 persuading the two parties to exercise restraint and abide by the EEBC ruling. After all its endeavours, the UNSC terminated the mandate of UNMEE by adopting resolution 1827 of 2008 on the 30th of July (Ewing, 2008).

3.3.1.3. Lack of capacity in African Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is defined as *“an operation involving civilian and military personnel, to monitor ceasefires in the conflict areas and maintain international peace and security* (United Nations, 2006). Peacekeeping is divided into three categories including (1) Monitoring the maintenance of ceasefires and peace agreements by involving military and civilian personnel; (11) Implementation of a comprehensive reconciliation between warring parties commonly known as a multi – dimensional peacekeeping comprising of various operations including local security, elections, re – integration of combatants to civilian life, strengthening the national institutions, assuring democracy and human rights

as well as promotion of economic rehabilitation in the conflict zones and finally (111) Protection of civilians and provision of humanitarian assistance by mitigating conflict and violence to protect vulnerable groups. Conversely, Stassen, Davies and Brion (2000) define peacekeeping as an extra – ordinary military art advocating the use of soldiers not to fight and win, but to prevent fighting, maintain cease – fires, and maintain order while negotiations are being conducted.

The UN undertook peacekeeping operations for sustaining international peace and security. In this context, the *Cold War*, which was an ideological war between superpowers such as the West, led by the USA, and the East, led by Soviet Russia, accelerated the utilisation of peacekeeping globally. The UN began utilising peacekeeping in the Middle East in 1948 to minimise the conflict. In its initial stages, peacekeeping was used to monitor ceasefires, separate hostile conflicts, and sustain buffer zones. Over the years, peacekeeping has undergone systematic changes making it more integrated and complex. This is why the scope and functions of peacekeeping were enlarged to include monitoring of elections, humanitarian relief and military operations (Malan, 1998).

In order to ensure collectivism, accountability, ownership and efficiency, article (1) of the UN Charter asserts that:

“The Purpose of the UN is to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful

means, and in conformity with principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace” (UN Charter, 1945).

Cilliers and Mills (1999) expound that the UN Charter further mandates the element of collectivism to regional organisations to systematically organise and group themselves for addressing matters relating to international peace and security. In this regard, Chapter VIII articles 51 (1) (2) (4) of the UN Charter maintains that:

- (1) *“Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations”;*
- (2) *“The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council”;*
- (4) *“The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilise such regional arrangement or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional agencies without authorisation of the Council”...*

The OAU transformed into the AU in 2002. As a regional organisation, its purposes and principles conformed to those of the Supranational United Nations as espoused in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The aims of the Union are outlined in one of the sub topics in the dossier. Since its establishment, the AU has concertedly endeavoured in the domain of peace and stability on the continent. In this context, the Peace and Security Directorate (PSC), Conflict Management Centre, the Panel of the Wise, and the African Standby Force were established by the AU to play a pre-eminent role in conflict management (Malan, 1998).

Schumer (2004) reflects that the AU played a prominent role in continental peacekeeping in countries such as Sudan, Somalia, Comoros and Burundi. These endeavours illustrate that the AU has been playing a significant role in the management and resolution of security matters. It is necessary to realise that AU's peacekeeping operations have experienced the challenges of political differences among member states, financial and human capacity and deficiencies in infrastructure.

During its inception, the AU adopted the "*Protocol Relating to the Establishment of Peace and Security*" on the 9th of July 2002 in Durban. The protocol advocates promotion of peace, security and stability, prevention and resolution of conflicts on the continent. Furthermore, the protocol emphasises the importance of consolidating cooperation and establishment of a durable and robust partnership among AU member states by responding to continental conflicts effectively (African Union, 2002).

On paper, the AU endeavours to keep peace by preventing and managing conflicts but there are many hurdles it faces. Fundamentally, the AU sub regions differ historically, politically and economically. For example, the political experience of African countries from the North, East, West and South differs in varying degrees. Mostly, colonial history and legacy differ from one country to another. This implies that each country possesses a different political system including democratic and non-democratic countries as well as various security regimes for each country. These differences challenge and undermine the Union's common defence policy and the success of peacekeeping operations (Schumer, 2004).

The AU deployed its first peacekeeping mission in Burundi in 2003 known as the *African Mission in Burundi* (AMIB). The mission comprised troops from South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique dispatched for preventing and resolving that conflict (Murithi, 2008). The second peacekeeping endeavour was experienced on the 25th of May 2005 called the *African Mission in Sudan* code named (AMIS). Only Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Gambia, Senegal, Kenya and Mozambique dispatched troops for the mission. In May 2006, PSC authorised a peacekeeping mission in the Comoros Islands to observe and secure elections. The countries that dispatched personnel were South Africa, Egypt, the DRC, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Madagascar and Mauritius (Department of Defence - South Africa, 2006). Within the current, *AU Mission in Somalia* (AMISOM) only Burundi, Nigeria, Uganda, Malawi and Ghana contributed troops (Farinha, 2007).

According to Sharamo (2006), the prevalence of different political views among AU members undermines peacekeeping missions. This results in the AU failing to deploy

sufficient troops on the peacekeeping operation in Sudan because AU members were not unified regarding the problem. The very same problem has weakened AU's peacekeeping mission in Somalia because many countries failed to contribute troops needed for maintaining peace and resolving the conflict. The country with the largest army in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia failed to contribute troops to Somalia because of its political feud with Somalia. This state of affairs impacts negatively on continental peacekeeping (Farinha, 2007).

Financial and logistical constraints are the major contributing factors to the weaknesses of AU's peacekeeping mechanism. When the OAU transformed into the AU, the latter inherited a debt of US \$ 42 million incurred by the former. The protracted conflicts and problems across the continent resulted in AU's budget escalating from US \$ 42 million to US \$ 158 million since December 2004. Of that amount, about US \$ 75 million is reserved for PSC expenditures. In this context, the AU undertook peacekeeping operations in Burundi, Sudan, Somalia and the Comoros under severe and constraining logistical and financial hurdles (Bria, 2007). Such severe logistical nightmares results in African peacekeeping becoming complex, elongated and sometimes unable to resolve African conflicts effectively. This handicap delays the progress for NEPAD to provide a platform full of bliss and happiness leading to sustainable development.

In 2004, the AU undertook AMIS 1 for the preservation and maintenance of peace and security in Darfur. About 465 human resources were dispatched from ten countries. Indeed this was a limited and weak peacekeeping mission for an event of that magnitude. On the

20th of October 2004, the AU organised an *ad hoc* convergence in Ethiopia and resolved to strengthen AMIS 1. The PSC urgently requested support from its member states and international community to contribute additional troops and logistical support to the mission. The reluctance to respond to the request presented by AMIS 1 resulted in the mission being unable to achieve the necessary mandate aimed at maintaining peace and security in Darfur (African Union, 2004).

According to Mensah (2006), the AU does not have a specific and direct budget that is allocated for peacekeeping activities in the continent. Unfortunately, peacekeeping activities occur on an *ad hoc* basis and subsequently this results in the AU being unable to fulfil its peacekeeping mandate. This then opens avenues for donors to inject funds accompanied by stringent conditions. However, this donor dependency around the continent is problematic because it handicaps the AU's capabilities to make rational decisions and it becomes pre – occupied with reporting to donors. Matters are exacerbated by the fact that donors always complain about the AU's lack of transparency and accountability.

Although the mandate of African peacekeeping is within the parameters of the AU, lack of capacity makes it difficult for NEPAD to maintain peace and stability, paving the way for sustainable development. The financial and human resources which are supposed to develop African states are channeled towards peacekeeping which in turn means its perennial operations do not yield fruitful results on time.

3.3.2. Challenges faced by Africa in Implementing Democracy and Political

Initiative of NEPAD

NEPAD's democratic and Political initiative is informed by the AU's African Charter on Democracy, elections and governance which is inspired by the objectives and principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the AU. These are expressed in Articles 3 and 4 which emphasise the significance of good governance, popular participation, the rule of law and human rights (AU Documents, 2010).

In emphasizing the democratic and political endeavour, NEPAD recognizes the contributions of the AU and Regional Economic Communities for promoting, nurturing, strengthening and consolidating democracy and governance. Furthermore this is utilized as a quest to entrench in the continent a political culture of change of power premised on the holding of regular, free, fair and transparent elections conducted by competent, independent and impartial national election bodies (Malek, 2012).

The Charter guides African states to implement the Charter in accordance with the following principles:

- Respect for human rights and democratic principles;
- Access to and exercise of state power according to the constitution of the state and the principles of the rule of law;
- Promotion of a system of government that is representative;
- Holding of regular, transparent, free and fair elections;
- Separation of powers;

- Promotion of gender equality in public and private institutions;
- Effective participation of citizens in democratic and development processes and in governance of public affairs;
- Transparency and fairness in the management of public affairs;
- Condemnation and rejection of acts of corruption, related offences and impunity;
- Condemnation and total rejection of unconstitutional changes of government; and
- Strengthening political pluralism and recognizing the role, rights and responsibilities of legally constituted political parties, including opposition political parties which should be given a status under national law (AU Document, 20120.

The promotion of democracy, rule of law and human rights will be advanced in this manner:

- State parties shall commit themselves to promote democracy, the principle of the rule of law and human rights;
- State parties shall recognize popular participation through universal suffrage as the inalienable right of the people;
- State parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure constitutional rule, particularly constitutional transfer of power;
- State parties shall ensure that citizens enjoy basic freedoms and human rights taking into account their universality, interdependence and indivisibility;
- State parties shall take all necessary measures to strengthen the organs of the union that are mandated to promote and protect human rights and to fight impunity and endow them with the necessary resources;

- State parties shall eliminate all forms of discriminations, especially those premised on political opinion, gender, religious and racial grounds as well as any other form of intolerance;
- State parties shall adopt legislative and administrative measures to guarantee the rights of women, ethnic minorities, migrants, people with disabilities, refugees and displaced persons and other marginalized as well as vulnerable social groups;
- State parties shall respect ethnic, cultural and religious diversity which contributes to strengthening democracy and citizen participation;
- State parties shall entrench the principle of the supremacy of the constitution in the political organization of the state;
- State parties shall ensure that the process of the amendment or revision of their constitution rests on national consensus, obtained if need be, through referendum;
- State parties shall establish public institutions that promote and support democracy and constitutional order; and
- State parties shall ensure that the independence or autonomy of the said institutions is guaranteed by the constitution.

The above-mentioned principles ensure that peace and stability that are the cornerstones of development as embraced by NEPAD are strongly guaranteed. In order to adhere to these principles, governments are expected to work with all stakeholders such as opposition parties, labour movements, religious institutions and academic institutions among others, for incorporating the element of inclusivity and pluralism in governance. There are myriad challenges confronting the implementation of these principles across the continent because

of pervasive gross violations of human rights, authoritative regimes, as well as repression of various basic freedoms. This subsequently threatens NEPAD's political and governance initiative. Matters are exacerbated by the non-interference clause invoked in the Constitutive Act of the AU. In this context, South Africa, through NEPAD should work in concert with the AU member states to resolve these socio – political ills. Conversely, as a leading country in the implementation of NEPAD, South Africa's innovative actions are highly regarded as the country's manoeuvres, means and endeavours to perpetuate its hegemonic tendencies in the continent. Over and above, all these intricacies make it difficult for the South Africa to implement NEPAD across the continent.

The actions of some governments across the continent have violated the spirit of pluralism that is strongly emphasised by the Character. For example, the government of Zimbabwe enacted repressive legislation aimed at violating basic rights of ordinary citizens in 2006. In August of that year, the ruling party unilaterally amended the constitution by passing the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act (No. 17) and the President finally signed it into law. The Act violated the principle of promotion of equal rights of the AU Charter, including the right to equal protection of the law and the right to freedom of movement. Clause 2 of the Act removed the power of the courts to hear any challenge or appeal against the illegal acquisition by the state of agricultural land under Section 16 of the constitution. Landowners and anyone with an interest or right whose agricultural land was acquired illegally are barred from challenging the unlawful acquisition. Clause 3 of the Act extended the grounds under which it is possible to curtail the right to freedom of movement enshrined in in section 22 of the Constitution. Under this clause, freedom of movement is

limited in the public interest and in the economic interest of the state (Amnesty International, 2006).

Furthermore, the government of Zimbabwe continued to curtail the freedoms of speech and assembly through the Public Order and Security Act and the Miscellaneous Offences Act. These Acts were selectively utilised to prevent the political opposition and civil society groups from meeting or engaging in peaceful protest. Hundreds of human rights activists and opposition supporters were arrested and detained to enforce those laws. Dozens of people were assaulted during arrest or while in police custody. Police repeatedly obstructed or denied detainees access to lawyers, food and medical care. On the evening of 31 March 2006, the day of parliamentary elections, police apprehended approximately 260 women some carrying babies, when a group of *Women of Zimbabwe Arise* (WOZA) attempted to hold a peaceful post - election prayer vigil at Africa Unity Square in Harare. During and after the arrests, several women were brutally beaten. Some of them were forced to lie on the ground and were beaten on the buttocks by the police. Several women were seriously injured and required hospital treatment. No woman was allowed access to adequate medical treatment during detention. They were detained overnight in an open-air courtyard at Harare Central police station under armed guard (*ibid*).

The Zimbabwean example reflects serious violations of human rights that are not commensurate with the African Charter on democracy. This is a serious challenge to NEPAD's spirit of political and democratic initiative. This is because the people mandated to promote and protect human rights, in this case government leaders, abuse their positions

of power by becoming principal perpetrators. These unlawful actions sometimes threaten development because land, which is the necessary means for food production and economic development for society, is unlawfully expropriated and seized and law does not protect ordinary citizens who own land. Furthermore, this entrenches poverty and unemployment that are the main sources of underdevelopment. Above all, NEPAD is unable to control the domestic affairs of various countries and the programme is guided by the AU principles that are vague and utilised very slowly at the expense of the struggling masses.

Another problem confronting NEPAD's democratic and political initiative is that of authoritative regimes. Authoritarian rule is the form of government in which power is centralised to one person, an elite group, religious group or political party. The holders of power occupy the supreme seat in government by exposing their subjects to oppression. The authority constantly withholds the rights and liberties of the entire masses as well as rendering the constitution obsolete and ineffective. Consequently, certain privileges and prerogatives that are guaranteed by the state are curtailed by the authority (Malone, 2004).

Authoritarianism and totalitarianism are rife and perennial in Africa. Authoritarians ascend to power through the barrel of the gun, or through illegally extended term of office resulting from tinkering or tampering with certain clauses of the constitution to extend their grip on power. Once in power these leaders and their cohort abuse state institutions for personal advantage and enrichment. For these there is no distinction between state apparatus and their personal assets. They then become powerful and instil fear to

opposition through arbitrary detentions deity referring them as authority (Buur and Kyed, 2009).

In this type of the system, clientelism or patronage develops whereby the leaders perceive the state as their client. In order to eliminate any form of opposition or discontent, draconian laws are enacted to render independent institutions such as courts powerless and inefficient. Some of these decrees include *inter alia*, banning of opposition parties, detentions without fair and equitable trial and the suppression of the media. For example, President Yahya Jammeh of Gambia seized power unconstitutionally in 19994 and tinkered with the constitution to eliminate any opposition. In Gambia, people are subjected to detention without trial and others disappear without trace. One such person is a journalist Ebrima Manneh, of the *Daily Observer*, who has since been detained and disappeared without trace. The government denies all knowledge of detention and rejects the court's jurisdiction (Africa Confidential, 2009).

Another example of authoritarianism and totalitarianism is the Kingdom of Swaziland. In this regard, on the 22nd of June 2001, King Mswati III issued a proclamation to the nation with decree number 1 of 2001, a decree effectively enhancing the 1973 decree of his father that suspended the constitution and declaring a *de facto* state of emergency in the country. The decree ushered in a period in which communities who oppose chieftainship of the member of the royal family are removed by force from their land. Adding to that, two private publications were banned. In authoritarian regimes, political parties are banned and not allowed political space and freedom. That has been the case in Swaziland where decree

no seven authorised the King to ban political parties. That extends to the constitution of 2005 that fails to mention political parties but enshrines a clause guaranteeing freedom of association (Gumedze, 2005).

The proponents of authoritarianism use the sanctity of the constitution by amending it to ensure that they remain perpetually in power. That has resulted in African presidents hesitating to leave office. In this context, African leaders eliminate opposition, narrow the political field, establish personal armies and often loot the national wealth. This elevates personal politics or personality politics, which are the distinguishing features of contemporary African politics. This relates to the centralisation of all political power in the executive, that is the institutionalisation of executive political leadership. Authoritarianism in Africa produces a patriarchal political system where the political father figure emerges as the symbol of excessive respected, venerated elder and patriarch. This often resulted in personal rule or personality cults (Van Wyk, 2007).

Van Wyk (2007) continues to reflect that post-independent Africa experienced a proliferation of leaders who were able to retain power coercively. That signalled the rise of the so – called *Big Men* who use their control of state resources to build vast networks of clients across ethnic boundaries. Sometimes this is referred to as the *Iron Law of Oligarchy* in which powerful individuals retain their position as long as possible. Bond (2006) outlines the incumbents comprising: Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe who has been ruling for the past 26 years, Paul Biya of Cameroon who has since been ruling for almost 24 years, Muammar Al Qaddafi who ruled Libya for 40 years, Yuweri Museveni has been

ruling Uganda for the past 21 years, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt ruled the country for almost 26 years, and Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso who won a third successive five year term in 2005 after 18 years in power. While in power, these leaders amassed vast sum of money at the expense of poor people. For example, Omar Bongo has amassed US \$80 million while Paul Biya amassed US \$70 million. Longevity in power presents a daunting challenge for South Africa's promotion of NEPAD in which African leaders affirmed their commitment to the promotion of democracy and its core values.

The continuation of authoritarian regimes is a menace to NEPAD's principle of democracy and political initiative. This form of government erodes the constitutional order which is the basis of democracy and sustainable development, and these are replaced by repressive oppression, detention without trial and exclusion of certain sectors of society from economics and politics. These result in acute and severe socio-economic disorder where the marginalised groups experience poverty, lack of education and decent housing, which NEPAD's implementation aims to reverse. As indicated earlier, the problems make it difficult for NEPAD to achieve its stated goals because it receives orders from the AU and it cannot operate separately from the principles of the continental organisation.

3.3.3. Challenges Facing Africa in Implementing Economic and Corporate Governance Initiative of NEPAD

NEPAD regards state capacity building as a critical aspect for creating suitable conditions for development. In this regard, the state is expected to play a leading role to promote economic growth and sustainable development through poverty reduction programmes.

The current situation reflects that many governments lack the capacity to play this role. Because of this, many African countries lack the necessary policy and regulatory frameworks necessary for private sector led growth. Matters are exacerbated by the fact that African countries lack the capacity to implement programmes even when funding is available (NEPAD Document, 2008).

Okeahalam and Akinboade (2003) define corporate and economic governance as *“private, public institutions including laws, regulations and accepted business practices which in a market economy, govern the relationship between corporate managers and entrepreneurs on one hand and those who invest resources in corporations on the other hand”*. Corporate and economic governance is concerned with the creation of a balance between economic and social goals as well as between individual goals while encouraging the efficient utilisation of resources, and accountability in the use of power and stewardship and aligning the interests of individuals, corporations and society. It also encompasses the establishment of an appropriate legal, economic and institutional environment which allows companies to excel as institutions for the advancement of long – term shareholder value and maximum human centred development, while remaining conscious of other responsibilities to stakeholders, the environment and the society.

Corruption remains one of the challenges faced by economic and corporate governance in Africa. Corruption which is defined as the total disrespect of moral and ethical values, of institutions of governance, of societal traditions and of personal behaviours, derails effective implementation of NEPAD (African Development Bank, 2003). Conversely, the United Nations Development Programme in Tropp (2005) defines corruption as:

“The misuse of public power, office or authority for private benefit – through bribery, extortion, influence peddling, nepotism, fraud, speed money or embezzlement. Although corruption is often considered a sin of government and public servants, it also prevails in the private sector”.

Corruption is perceived as a major developmental challenge impeding and derailing socio economic development as well as national economic growth in Africa.

According to Lesetedi and Mulinge (2002), corruption is a global endemic devastating world states in different proportions. In Africa, the pandemic is extremely severe in a cancerous way and it has become a global concern. This is because it has penetrated almost all sectors, public, private, governmental and NGO's. Such a penetration resulted in corruption becoming an indispensable part of African human life as well as the easiest and most appropriate way to acquire private property. This malpractice is not only limited to a particular group, but also extends to people from all occupations including professionals. For the latter, the extent is pervasive in such a way that they are unable to regulate themselves through professional regulatory machinery. It is poignant for corruption to be entrenched among professionals who are supposed to be self-regulatory because of the ethics of their professions. Notwithstanding that, NEPAD is unable to provide any clear and succinct mechanisms necessary to deal with corruption. This complicates the already existing problem.

Kariuki (2005) emphasises that African corruption is extremely pervasive in such a way that resources directed at developing Africans are unlawfully siphoned into the hands of the

powerful, privileged and well-connected individuals. For example, President Kibaki of Kenya is highly concerned that his government lost about US \$500 millions since he assumed power. That is tantamount to building 10 000 primary school classrooms beneficial for the education of Kenyan children.

Adusei (2009) maintains that African corruption is endemic in such a way that it is metaphorically compared to cancer or a tumour that is incurable. Corruption has devastated and impoverished millions of Africans. Africans have deeply entrenched corruption into their daily lives even though it is illegal. Corruption, which costs Africa around US \$150 billion annually, increases the cost of goods by 20%, rescinds investment and development. The International Corruption index highlights that out of 16 corrupt countries globally, nine are in Africa. Since NEPAD does not provide appropriate punitive instruments aimed at curbing the scourge, then the problem will persist. Over and above this, matters are exacerbated by the non-interference clause of the AU.

Many international companies exacerbate corruption by colluding with public officials to inflate the costs of projects to enrich them. In this context, some projects are carried out at a cost that is three times than the original amount. The taxpayers are the ones who suffer the cost of illegal transactions. Project inspectors compound matters by failing to inspect the project and allow mediocrity to be delivered to nations at the expense of quality. Corruption in Africa is extremely severe in such a way that it is useless to bid for a contract because contracts are awarded to the contractors paying the highest bribe. Companies paying large sums of bribes to public officials are awarded tenders for contracts

clandestinely. In this context, public announcements for tenders are avoided (Ochonu, 2008).

Mawenya (2008) expounds that about 70% of public procurements in Africa are engulfed in corruption. In this regard, unscrupulous bribes and fraudulent transactions increase project costs by about 20 – 30 %. This therefore proliferates purchasing of inferior quality goods and inefficiencies in the processes of conducting business. Pervasive corruption in public procurement weakens capacity building of the public sector by protracting corrupt enterprises while killing competent and clean ones.

Adusei (2009) outlines that transactions amounting to billions of dollars were engaged by African public officials and International companies to embezzle taxpayers' funds. On the 17th September 2002, a Canadian Engineering Company called Acres International paid a bribe of about US \$260, 000 to secure an US \$8 billion dam contract. In 2002, Halliburton, a US company was accused of raising US \$180 million to bribe Nigerian officials to secure a US \$10 billion Liquefied Gas Plant in Nigeria. Corruption has become systemic and well-structured in Africa. Consequently, this engenders structural violence that manifests itself through poverty, hunger, disease and lack of confidence. This is because people who are supposed to tackle corruption operate, systemise and structure it in such a way that it is difficult to notice it.

Corruption is a monumental issue which erodes the fabric of many African economies as well as posing a cardinal challenge for reform measures in many parts of Africa. The

magnitude of African corruption reflects that the underlying economic, political and institutional causes of corruption are not vigorously addressed through a long lasting and committed political will, including an effective independent judicial sanction. Most African countries pay little attention to matters relating to corporate governance because they locate it in the domain of the private sector. Governments have little expertise to address the problem and fear that an active regulatory role would frighten private investments, especially FDI (Paul, 2007). Gatamah (2008) adds that the application of corporate governance guidelines in Africa is limited to capital markets for attracting FDI and this has a limited reach. In this regard, many people on the continent associate the enforcement of corporate governance with stock exchanges but many companies do not list on the stock exchange.

Leadership, which is the core of corporate governance, is minimal in Africa. There is no leadership efficiency, leadership for probity, responsible leadership and leadership which is transparent and accountable. The absence of these leadership aspects in Africa affects the quality of life of all country's citizens. There is no business efficiency to compete with the global economy and thereby create jobs. The absence of business probity threatens the investor's confidence and assurance from management. Most country's financial systems and structures are insecure and without credibility. This state of affairs scares investors to invest in the country.

Challenges of corporate governance in Africa are enormous. African banks are weak in areas relating to corporate governance and this affects customer's confidence in banking operations. Other corporate governance challenges in the banking systems include:

- Technical incompetence of board and management;
- Boardroom squabbles among directors;
- Squabbles among staff and management;
- Malpractice and sharp practices;
- Insider abuses;
- Rendering false returns and concealment of information from examiners;
- Inadequate operational and financial controls; and
- Very few banks have a robust risk management system.

The public expenditure management systems of most African countries have numerous weaknesses associated with budget preparation and budget execution. Several countries undertake spending without budget authority, commitments were effected but funds have not been available for payment, accounting ledgers and reports have not been maintained and there have been rather long delays in the auditing and preparation of the annual accounts of government. These weaknesses have subsequently resulted in poor budget performance. Four contributing factors to this problem are identified as:

- Budgeted expenditures were based on optimistic projections of revenues which did not materialise;
- Number of items in the budget had expenditures that were underestimated such as costs of utilities;

- General lack of budget discipline; and
- Poor expenditure controls (Economic Commission for Africa Document, 2012).

Africa is traditionally perceived as a high-risk continent by international investors. It is strongly believed that African countries are characterised by macro economic instability, trade restrictions, and a weak institutional environment regarding property rights and the judicial system, and a high state regulation of economic activities. In this regard, many African countries fail to establish acceptable standards of transparency and governance within the bounds of good laws and an efficient criminal justice system. These countries have lost the trust and support of citizens and the international community. This situation makes it difficult for them to attract trade and foreign investment. Foreign investors comfortably assess political risk, business risk, market risk and currency but they shy away from the risk of anarchy and the corruption which results from poor economic and corporate governance. These aspects reflect an unpredictability and volatility where the risk – reward equation becomes difficult to calculate (Okeahalam and Akinboade, 2003).

Corporate governance is affected negatively by lack of political will on the part of governments in Africa. This manifests itself in two ways, *Firstly*: the level of political will is measured through governments' commitment to monitoring process. This involves time and money. *Secondly*: alignment of governments' interests to those of multinational corporations. This is reflected in either a reluctance to hold multinational corporations to account or support for multinational corporations which become embroiled in allegations of corruption. The close connection between economic power and political influence is

recognised. The successful resistance of public enterprises to privatisation programs is an example that was encountered over a wide spectrum of cultural and economic environments ranging from Ghana to Nigeria to Kenya (Otobo, 2001).

The preponderance of small firms in Africa pose a serious challenge to corporate and economic governance. Economic activity on the continent is heavily concentrated within closely connected family owned and managed businesses. The informal nature of most businesses and the high level of government ownership of enterprises pose a serious challenge to the practice of corporate governance. In Nigeria for example, it has been ascertained that 13.3 % of companies were listed on the local stock exchange and only 48.5 % are registered as limited liability companies. This implies that close to 38 % businesses operate outside the jurisdiction of company law provisions while 83% of businesses operated outside the scope of stock exchange regulations (Ayogu, 2001). Such conditions pose a serious threat to economic development and investments because of limited regulatory frameworks which NEPAD is unable to provide as an approach to handle them.

In Africa, indigenous companies which are small or medium-sized do not utilise the stock exchange partially because they lack experience and resources for issuing shares, but also because their managers fear the risk of losing control when they go public. There is a serious problem of tax evasion and dumping of cheap imported products into the local market by these companies. This reflects the pursuit of short-term private enterprise goals undermining corporate governance (Bewayo, 1999).

There is restricted competition in markets for goods and services. Impediments to competition are diverse, ranging from anti – competitive practices by firms to policy restrictions on ownership and entry. In most cases, entry barriers are disguised as regulation purportedly designed to serve the “public interest”. These policies usually give the preferred producers and service providers profits in excess of competitive returns. Such profits arise from distorted prices that are a hidden tax on consumers (Malaika, Lee and Koziell, 2003).

The inability to address good economic and corporate governance in Africa is a serious challenge confronting the implementation of NEPAD. This is because corporate governance is the backbone for economic development. The lack of a judiciary and legal framework to ensure, among others, transparency and regulate corruption scares investors, or cultivates investors to collude with local people to engage in malfeasant activities that deny economic opportunities to African citizens. This problem is accelerated by lack of harmonised policies throughout the continent to ensure good and corporate governance. Such a problem creates different policies applied in different countries resulting in a different interpretation. Furthermore, lack of economic development accelerates Africa’s marginalisation in a rapidly globalised world.

It is very important for NEPAD to provide necessary measures aimed at addressing economic and corporate governance. These two components are the purveyors geared towards attracting large deposits of FDI in the continent. Even though there are barriers for the achievement of this, NEPAD should be utilised as a springboard for persuading

members of the African Union to reconsider and align their good governance practices with those espoused in the AU good governance practices for accelerating FDI.

3.3.4. Challenges Facing Africa in Evaluating Adherence to Good Governance and Corporate Governance of NEPAD

According to Hope (2002), the APRM is a concept closely tied to NEPAD. In order to understand its origin, meaning and aims it should be perused in conjunction with the NEPAD base document. Its principle is to examine and assess the performance of states that committed themselves to the mechanisms in accordance with the agreed standards, principles and codes. Its ultimate goal is to have all states comply with the sets of standards. Hope (2002) further defines APRM as:

“A systematic examination and assessment of the performance of a state by other states (peers), by designated institutions or by a combination of states and designated institutions. The ultimate goal is to assist the reviewed state to improve its policy making, adopt best practices and comply with established standards, principles, codes and other agreed commitments”.

Cilliers (2002) traces APRM to the 37th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the OAU that adopted NAI which was later transformed into NEPAD. Capturing the proceedings giving rise to the mechanism, it is perceived that the heads of states ...

“...agreed that the African leaders should develop parameters for Good Governance to guide their activities at both the political and economic level.

In this regard, it was decided that at its following meeting it would consider and adopt an appropriate peer review mechanism and a code of conduct.”

Bala and Vickers (2003) acknowledge the relationship between NEPAD and APRM. They further attest that the mechanism is designed in a three-pronged strategy aimed at evaluating NEPAD's progress. These strategies are:

- To establish a condition for sustainable development in order to strengthen states and regional cooperation between states;
- To identify priority sectors that could reserve marginalisation of Africa; and
- To mobilise resources from within and outside the continent for the implementation of policies, projects and programmes.

NEPAD base document on the other hand asserts that the sixth Summit of the HSGIC held on the 9th March 2002 adopted the Memorandum of Understanding on the APRM. In this regard, the mechanism is widely perceived as:

“.....a self monitoring mechanism voluntary acceded to by the Member States of the AU with the aim of fostering the adoption of policies, standards and practices leading to political stability, economic growth, sustainable development as well as accelerated regional and economic integration.”(AU Documents, 2002).

Put into perspective, APRM stems out of the NEPAD implementation strategy. The adoption of the dossier and mechanism was endorsed by the AU member states at the NEPAD conference in Durban. The event marked the milestone of initiatives by Africans

for Africans. It indicated the commitment among proponents to establish a tool to carry the hopes of the NEPAD programme.

Gelb (2002) asserts that APRM aims at solving the continental problems within the context of Africans. As indicated earlier in the study, Gelb (2002) adds that numerous strategies were tried and tested particularly in the spirit of getting rid of colonial chains that had entangled the continent for so long. Africa continues to struggle with the effects of underdevelopment because of colonial policies that to some extent characterise the political landscape of the continent. Key to the effective eradication of poverty, disease and underdevelopment in Africa is *“for the government in power to adopt relevant policies”*.

Akokpari (2004b) acknowledges that the key objective of APRM is around the principles of good governance set out in NEPAD and the AU. Central to the implementation is to ensure the compliance of African states with certain standards of practices of governance agreed upon by the AU Summit of July 2002 as well as to assist states to improve upon their policies and policymaking thereby maximising the attainment of their commitment to acceptable codes of conduct. At the heart the areas for concern are:

- Economic policies for growth;
- Democratic principles and practices;
- Peace, Security and Stability;
- Sustainable Development; and
- Accelerated regional and economic integration;

The benchmark for good governance on the other hand includes;

- Democracy;
- Respect for Human Rights; and
- Adoption of sound economic policies.

NEPAD and its implementation programme APRM are facing many challenges in African countries. Whilst taking note of the relation between the programme as well as implementation and the challenges the programme faces now, it is understood that there are numerous challenges. There are administrative glitches experienced in implementing and locating APRM. At the time of its establishment and adoption, the lobbying was marred by inefficiency because documentation was received later than expected. Furthermore, the document did not provide any provision for the location of the Secretariat in UNECA, but within the Commission of the AU. In this regard, a significant change regarding the placement brought tension among AU member states particularly those with little or no interest in subscribing to a process of review. This reflects that NEPAD has no adequate support for its target group (Cilliers, 2002).

Adesina (2006) on the other hand argues that APRM is no different from the post neo – liberal Washington Consensus. One of its hallmarks is that it embraces macro – economic policies which are:

“....Imminently deflationary, creating instability, exacerbating inequality and undermine commitment to inclusive social policies”.

Melber (2006) emphasises that the APRM is an initiative to be “*qualified as a pact of the elite*”. The perception emanates from the premise that as much as people, particularly ordinary civilians around the continent, do not know about NEPAD, then they cannot know about APRM. It is for that reason that only the elite will take part in the process and therefore undermine the inclusive social participation. It is the elite who know and participate in the process and so will the elite realise the impact of the process?

According to Herbert (2004), the other glitch about APRM is that it is implemented on voluntary basis as only a few countries signed up to be reviewed since its inception. These countries include Algeria, Angola, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda. This approach affects African development negatively because those states complying with the demands of the donor countries are expected to be economically rewarded. Subsequently, that will lead to skewed development and a brain drain where skilled people will be attracted to more developed states and regions. One problem is that an instrument aimed towards addressing continental problems is voluntary. In this regard, countries involved in unscrupulous activities will mask those activities and benefit from the inherent weakness of the instrument.

Landsberg and Kondlo (2007) add that African leaders are constrained in finding proper means of implementing a truly African owned review of each other's performance by the subjective determination of foreign donors. In this regard, Zimbabwe is reflected as an example in which the donor community is engaged in a collective punishment against

Africa. After the controversial elections in Zimbabwe in 2002, US officials and some members of the EU warned that the West would not support the NEPAD Plan if leaders of South Africa and Nigeria did not suspend Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth. Mbeki and Obasanjo voted to suspend Mugabe from the Commonwealth after its observers had submitted a report indicating flaws in election results. That resulted in some of the observers concluding that the two leaders voted to ensure Western support for NEPAD and revealed the vulnerability and weakness of African leaders to Western pressure regardless, and paying lip service to the ownership of APRM by Africans. The means of utilising APRM for deepening divisions in Africa is very wrong. African leaders on the other hand are supposed to be assertive in ensuring that African programmes are implemented unconditionally. The AU is the most appropriate platform in this regard.

The nature of civil society input in APRM is highly questionable. In this context, there is nothing preventing the government from naming only friendly voices for representing civil society in the APRM's panel. Ghana offers a classic example in this regard. The country has a democratically elected government which has openly adopted a defensive position on peer review. Apart from a public outcry, the government appointed a civil society panel without public consultation or involvement of the two major confederations of non-governmental organisations (Taylor, 2005). States are supposed to work in concert with all relevant stakeholders, especially civil society, to implement the APRM.

According to Agadd (2008) APRM provided *Programmes of Action* (PoA) for countries already reviewed but that was subjected to excruciating conditions. In the case of South

Africa, the Panel of the Wise warned that xenophobia against other Africans escalated in the country. That was confirmed by the wave of xenophobic attacks in 2008 resulting in the deaths of 60 people. The finding is corroborated by the Southern African Migration Project that reflected that more than 64 % of South Africans feel that foreigners should be sent back to their countries of origin. In responding to the PoA, South Africa defiantly disputed that illegal immigrants were subjected to brutal and inhuman treatment. Conversely, South Africa's rejection of some of the outcomes of its APRM raises questions about its commitment to the programme.

Another incident relating to PoA is that of the Rwandan Report which recommended the government to take necessary actions in assuring that citizens are afforded fair justice under the *Gacaca* system. That recommendation was made against the backdrop of popular concerns over the *Gacaca process*. A study conducted on the systems reflects that respondents were concerned about the reliability of witnesses, culprits lying before tribunals and judges who were corrupt. Appropriate efforts are necessary for reassuring the population about those issues and also to implement appropriate mechanisms to counter such events. The Rwandan government failed to include the recommended action item to address concerns enshrined in the PoA (ibid).

In Benin, the government ignored the item regarding the reform of political party financing in the country despite the Panel recommending its importance for development. Algeria ignored some critical recommendations, including, for example the recommendation for improvement of the banking system that was considered as the major obstacle to FDI.

Furthermore, the government disregarded recommendations on the need to establish a coherent system for the allocation of state housing, despite voters linking the matter to corruption. In Kenya, the Report warned against ethnicisation of politics and lack of balanced ethnic representation within cabinet, and the government ignored that. The failure to address that resulted in the political confrontations following the December 2007 presidential elections (Bayart, 1996). The failure and inability by certain governments to implement the recommendations of APRM misrepresent the importance of the programme. This outlines that people in power are interested only in their own interests at the expense of the powerless. This reflects that APRM is another of those instruments destined for the historical dustbin. Over and above, its flaws are the ones which make it a paper tiger.

The above-mentioned challenges are linked to NEPAD because they continued during the implementation of NEPAD and made it difficult for the programme to operate in harmony towards achieving its envisaged goals.

3.3.5. Challenges Facing Africa's Approach to Sub – Regional and Regional Development NEPAD

Africa's sub regional and developmental approach has its genesis in the *Final Act of Lagos* (FAL) of 1980. The Act espouses the acceleration and establishment of the African economic community by the year 2000, as the pedestal for Africa's development. The economic community was envisaged to ensure the economic, social and cultural integration of the continent. The aim of the community has been to promote collective, accelerated, self-reliant and sustainable development of member states, cooperation

among these member states and their integration in the economic, social and cultural fields.

As a measure to accelerate development and implementation of the FAL, the members of the *Organisation of African Unity* (OAU) committed themselves to address the following during the eighties and nineties:

1. During the decade of the eighties:

- Consolidate regional economic communities and establish other economic groupings in other regions of Africa in order to cover the continent as a whole (Western Africa, Central Africa, Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and Northern Africa);
- Consolidate effectively sectoral integration at the continental level and particularly in the fields of agriculture, food, transport and communications, industry and energy;
- Promote co – ordination and harmonisation among existing and future economic groupings for a gradual establishment of an African Common Market.

2. During the decade of the nineties:

- Undertake measures for further sectoral integration through harmonisation of continental strategies, policies and economic development plans; promotion of joint projects, particularly in the above mentioned economic fields, harmonisation of continental and monetary policies;

- Undertake measures to effect the establishment of an African common market and other measures that would lead to the attainment of the aims and objectives of the African Economic Community (Final Act of Lagos, 1980).

Although this sounds anachronistic, it is important to realise that Africa's commitment to development relies on consolidation of regional economic communities and eventually a common market. Regarding the above-mentioned endeavours, Africa found it difficult to integrate into an African economic market, and this affected negatively on development. Currently there are myriad regional economic communities overlapping one another.

According to Chacha (2008), regional initiatives are endeavours aimed to provide a platform for members within a particular bloc to gain some benefits through cooperation and commitment deepening. This commitment is negatively affected by member states involved in multiple arrangements which share similar goals. A multiplicity of memberships weakens and confuses a member state's commitment to objectives meant to either liberalise trade or coordinate policies promoting intra-regional trade. That reduces levels or targets of trade within a bloc.

Genna in Chacha (2008) explains that commitment by a member state to a regional bloc depends on the principle of *institutional convergence* perceived as the determinant of regional integration venture. One of the reasons why such a convergence is difficult to achieve is because of multiple or overlapping memberships in various regional *blocs*

simultaneously. This is a common characteristic in Africa for complicating regional integration ventures. Razeen in Chacha (2008) further expounds that many regional blocs to which a state belongs “*may have various different tariff schedules, rules of origin and implementation periods*”. The existence of these creates many problems for the nations involved including progress of integration in the blocs concerned.

According to Jakobeit, Hartenberg and Caharalambides (2005), an overlap in membership increases problems on the regional bloc, with member states still at the formative stage of integration and legal uncertainty especially when various trade arrangements apply to trade between two countries. Legal uncertainty makes implementation of policies, especially those directed at promoting intra – regional trade difficult and affects trade levels.

Asante (2001) emphasises that the necessary process for harmonisation and formalisation of the relationship among RECs is very slow in Africa. Some RECs initiated harmonisation and co ordination of their activities in the areas of trade liberalisation and common macro economic policies, but that occurs slowly. Other RECs agreed to adopt new common rules of origin to enhance the flow of trade while others concluded memorandums of understanding to foster harmonisation of their policies and programmes. For these endeavours to succeed, the support from a strong continental coordinating mechanism that is currently unavailable is required.

The absence of a well-coordinated mechanisms resulted in a major weakness of a lessening of observation of protocols and treaties in most countries. In this regard, these countries

failed to establish mechanisms and structures appropriate to deal with integration matters. Furthermore, there is an absence of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms for ensuring adherence to agreed duration on matters pertaining to tariff and barrier reductions as well as for the achievement of abstract objectives such as macroeconomic stabilisation (Summary of the Annual Report on Integration in Africa, 2002).

The provisions enshrined in the RECs treaties are very complicated. This results in situations where political declarations and perpetual endeavours by national governments produce limited results regarding regional integration. These complicated treaties provide member countries with a platform to disrespect protocols by being unable to accomplish agendas stated in those protocols (ibid).

The African continent is characterised by acute inequalities among member states. This uneven development among African countries and its interrelated political, economic and social features have exacerbated inequalities and tensions among African states and between the continent and global actors. National commitment to regional integration is influenced by the country's perceptions concerning economic and political costs as well as benefits. Misperceptions result in a lack of political will reflected by some member countries within certain REC's. This results in a lack of effective implementation of agreements, treaties and protocols at national level (African Development Bank, 1993).

The multiplicity of memberships to RECs appears to be undermining the primary objective of achieving an African Economic Community so that Africa manages to pool its resources

and expand its markets. In this regard, NEPAD's quest to approach development in the continent from the premise of sub regions and regions is proving challenging because of the above-mentioned problems. Even though this is not a South African domain, but as a lead country promoting Africa's interests by embarking on the implementation of NEPAD, regional integration faces an insurmountable task.

3.3.6. Challenges Facing Africa in Implementing Human Development Initiative of NEPAD

The human development initiative is geared towards addressing Africa's social problems including *inter alia* the reduction of poverty; bridging the education gap; reversing the education brain drain; health and agriculture.

3.3.6.1. Poverty Reduction

By the dawn of the 21st century, Africa remained the poorest continent where millions of people survive in an unimaginable quagmire of poverty, a situation that is unimaginable (Katembula – Mwansa, 2003). Poverty remains one of the most severe and worst human crises after HIV / AIDS in Africa. Masheane (2003) adds that poverty remains one of the myriad problems that haunt Africans in the 21st century. On the other hand Lekhesa and Selinyane (2003) elucidates that poverty is extremely intense and severe in such a way that it derails effective implementation of human development programmes such as NEPAD. This emanates from the fact that funds that are required to develop infrastructure are transferred to projects aimed at the eradication of poverty.

Aderemi (2002) expounds that about 50% of the African population survives on an income that is below the poverty line. The Economic Commission of Africa Report of 2005 adds that the number of people subsisting on less than US \$ 1 daily reduced by a third in other parts of the world and increased in Africa. The continent remains the only one where people survive on less than US \$2 daily.

According to Green and Luehman (2007), myriad Africans do not only live below the poverty line, but are also chronically poor and remain poor over time, or only emerge from poverty intermittently. Most chronically poor people live in Asia but the incidence of chronic poverty is high in Africa. Stunting, which is a low height for a particular age, is a common indicator of chronic poverty and this is highly prevalent in Africa. Stunting indicates sustained malnutrition signalling a continued low income. Kaya (2003) adds that stunting sometimes begins in the womb because of maternal malnutrition. This leads to low – weight babies who are more prone to die in the first month of life than babies with normal weight are. Those who survive are likely to be stunted for the rest of their lives. Children who are stunted sometimes suffer cognitive development and learning disability.

Mulinge (2003) emphasises that the number of people living in poverty escalates annually. For example, during 1990 – 98, poverty rate increased from 249 to 291 million. The rate of poverty surpassed economic growth. Motloun and Mears (2002) articulate that acceleration of poverty limits people's ability to acquire knowledge, education, and access to water, sanitation and health. Underdevelopment and unemployment appear to be the major contributing factors to poverty.

Africa remains the only region in the world where the number of people living in extreme poverty has almost doubled, from 164 million in 1981 to 314 million to date. Thirty-two of its forty-seven countries are among the world's forty-eight poorest nations and the continent accounts for only 11 % of the world's population. Africa accounts for only 1 % of the global GDP. The GDP per African fell by 13 % in 2000 compared to 1981. The continent is placed on the margins of globalisation with a share of world exports that dropped from more than 3.5 % in 1970 to about 1.4% at the end of 2002 (World Bank Document, 2005).

In its poverty reduction strategy, NEPAD works with the World Bank, IMF, the African Development Bank and the United Nations agencies to promote the implementation and adoption of the Comprehensive Development Framework, the Poverty Reduction Strategy and related approaches. The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) and the Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF) of the World Bank and IMF (IMF document, 2012) guide the poverty reduction strategy of NEPAD. These initiatives are open to heavily indebted countries, countries facing unsustainable debt burden beyond traditionally available debt relief mechanisms, countries establishing a good record of accomplishment of reform through the IMF supported programmes. This is inappropriate because NEPAD is unable to produce an Afro centric poverty reduction strategy geared towards addressing African poverty in an African perception. This inability and the collaboration with donors is always characterised by conditions, methodologies and approaches supposed to be followed by the continent. These are unfavourable to African states because of the magnitude and uniqueness of problems facing the continent.

Cheru (2001) notes that both initiatives are broad based macro economic objectives that are inconsistent with NEPAD's quest to reduce poverty. The implementation of these initiatives limits their representation. Meanwhile, the IMF and World Bank made concessions to Oxfam regarding greater involvement of civil society, but a review of these programs reflected that the template of their design was designed by donors speaking much less about the authenticity of national ownership. In several cases, consultation with civil society around policy design was ignored or considered only minimally. However, whenever there was some little consultation, the design of these macro economic policies underscored poverty conscious projects. These programmes increased poverty devastating the continent.

Africa Action (2002) maintains that these initiatives have been failing indebted poor countries over decades. It is emphasised that countries which qualified for HIPC's to receive debt relief, are still reimbursing almost US \$2 billion annually to wealthy creditors. In this regard, efforts of African countries to address urgent domestic socio – economic priorities such as poverty reduction, effective health and education delivery as well as food security continue to be undermined. Mutasa (2003) argues that the implementation of HIPC processes has been much slower than expected. This is because HIPC is closely linked to debt relief and not debt eradication. The point of concern is the inability by NEPAD to develop an African customised poverty reduction strategy to address poverty in a way that fits the conditions of the continent. This inability is adding to the economic woes of the continent.

It is unfortunate for NEPAD to be linked to poverty reduction strategies of the donor countries. This makes it difficult for the programme to achieve its envisaged goals because it operates within the prescribed framework and parameters of the donor countries for reducing poverty in the continent. One of the problems relating to these poverty reduction strategies is that they are linked to debt reduction. How can debt be reduced whilst eradicating poverty? Conversely, NEPAD is confronted by trying to ensure that debt is completely written off while attempting to eradicate poverty. It is highly significant to realise that the amount of resources required to eradicate poverty completely are directed towards addressing debt problems. These conditions serve the interests of donor countries rather than assisting NEPAD to eradicate poverty and promote the dignity of Africans.

Other problems complicating NEPAD's poverty reduction strategy are high transport costs and small markets which complicate the web of problems for NEPAD's quest to eradicate poverty. This is because most African countries are landlocked and face huge transport costs necessary for shipping goods from coastal ports to where they live and work. These costs are much higher than in other continents. Over and above, the Sahara region effectively cuts off sub-Saharan Africa from high volume overland trade with Europe, its major high-income trading partner, adding to the high costs of transport. Problems of isolation are compounded by small market size. High-intensity modern trade in Africa can only begin with an extensive road system that is expensive to build and maintain.

3.3.6.2. Bridging the Education Gap and Reversing the Brain Drain

Indabawa (2001) explains that formal education is a tool necessary for providing a better quality of life and elimination of ignorance. Cornwell (2003) adds that education is among a list of variables affecting communities or household's capability for securing survival and livelihoods. The intensity of this impact is shaped and determined by numerous conditions relating to various households and communities. Educationists maintain that the field of education comprises intertwined variables such as poverty, health, politics, security and social relations. Africa comprises myriad poor people who are disadvantaged by lack of education, skills and confidence. This situation results in limited personal capability including physical isolation, exclusion from the powerful and wealthy, lack of access to media as well as limited schooling. These factors sometimes result in limited confidence that subsequently reinforces powerlessness, lack of voice and marginalisation from society.

General education and basic adult literacy in Africa face insurmountable challenges. The SAPs introduced by the World Bank and IMF in Africa accelerate and compound Africa's existing problems in which children and parents become victims. SAPs rendered the state-centric Keynesian developmental agenda obsolete in that parents are forced to pay for services provided by the government. The introduction of school fees reduced learners' enrolment because parents could not afford payments.

According to Seutloadi (2003), by the late eighties about 50 % of learners aged between 6 – 11 years abandoned schooling and that number increased by 10 % in the nineties. Shortage of infrastructure and learner support material is exacerbating the problem. For

example, in Tanzania one textbook is available for every 20 learners whereas Zambia presents the worst-case scenario of no child possessing any textbook. Poverty affects teaching and learning negatively. Most African learners cannot afford breakfast before they go to school. In other circumstances, other children eat hardly anything daily at school. Such a state of affairs affects concentration and leads to learner fatigue. This results in the highest number of illiterates being located in Africa. It is estimated that about 862 million Africans are illiterate and 113 million of those are children. Masheane (2003) adds that two thirds of African girls of school-going age do not attend school. These appalling statistics reflects reasons behind the concentration of women in the lower ranks of the labour market and they feature prominently in less formal sectors.

According to Teng Zeng (2006), insufficient funds adversely and negatively affect the quality of higher education resulting in Africa experiencing a severe shortage of qualified personnel necessary to conduct research and publish their findings. African social problems attract publication from external publishers but despite that, these publishing houses are reluctant to publish Africa's problematic issues and continue perpetuate an Afro Pessimistic attitude in their publications. Many African Journals, which used to cover a wide range of African problems closed down because of lack of funds. For example, in 1996, over 400 journals were published in 48 African countries but the number has drastically reduced to 48 journals published in 16 African states. Aside from that, the level of African Scientific Research and Development is acutely lower. In this regard, Africa houses four Research and Development scientists for every 10 000 people compared to the global standard of eight per 10 000.

Taylor (2005b) emphasises that the African education system is adversely affected by the brain drain, as Africa is the net exporter of human talent because many highly educated Africans live and work abroad. In this regard, highly qualified Africans leave the continent for more rewarding jobs in Europe and North America. In this regard, about 30 000 Africans armed with doctoral degrees in various fields execute their skills on these other continents. Herbert (2003) expounds that the *United States of America's* (USA) and the *United Kingdom's* (UK) Green Card Lottery and Highly Skilled Migrant Programme respectively continue to drain Africa's best brains through attractive job offers.

According to King (2004), Africa has lost about 20 000 professionals since 1990 costing the continent about US \$4 billion to train them. Ghana experiences a massive exodus of highly qualified professionals to North America and Europe. In this regard, the period from 1993 – 2002 saw Ghana losing about 3 157 health professionals. This number encapsulates about 594 out of 871 doctors trained in government institutions.

Herbert (2004) adds that about 60 % of the doctors trained in Ghana during the eighties vacated the country, creating a serious deficiency in the Ghanaian public health sphere. In this context, between 1986 and 1995, 61 % of the output of one medical school vacated the country with Ghana losing an estimated US \$5 960 000 for tuition costs alone. The Ghanaian government felt hard done by and came up with a retention strategy by remunerating extra allowances to these professionals. This action infuriated external borrowers who ordered the government to withdraw its actions. Borrowers threatened the government to withdraw their loans if the practice continued.

Mukamaambo (2005) further expounds that more African scientists and engineers work in the United States than in the whole of Africa, leaving the whole continent of about 800 million people with just 20 000 engineers and scientists. To further complicate matters, about 23 000 lecturers from African universities abandon Africa annually, with another 23 000 graduates leaving for attractive opportunities abroad. A decade ago, Zambia had about 1 600 doctors, and currently about a quarter of them are practising in Zambia, while more than 21 000 doctors from Nigeria are working in the USA leaving Nigeria with an insufficient number of health workers.

Inter and intra state conflicts ravaging and devastating the continent impact negatively on education that is already compounded by problems. Learners who are stakeholders in the system abandon their classes to run for safety in various camps. During wars, school learner equipment and school buildings are destroyed. For example, the on-going border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea resulted in the destruction of 38 out of 58 schools in the area of Tigray, West of Ethiopia. Conversely, Ethiopia spends around US \$1 million daily servicing the war. It is disturbing because this amount of money was supposed to be utilised in the provision of Human Security projects such as combating poverty and provision of employment (Akokpari, 2001).

It is important to realise that the African education sector is in disarray. In this regard, African governments are unable to ensure that education remains high on the national agenda and beyond political cleavages. There is no strong commitment among the political leadership to address the problem of education. As stated by NEPAD, African governments

are unable to improve the quality and relevance of education. Furthermore, governments are unable to open opportunities for excluded disadvantaged groups by giving them access to good quality education to empower them and give them the opportunity to contribute to the development of their communities, their countries and the region. Africa is unable to adopt a holistic and community based approach in early childhood and education to include support to parents and providers other than parents.

NEPAD acknowledges key problems linked to education but fails to provide steps and ways necessary to address them. This is a contribution to the already existing problems. NEPAD should be able to call all stakeholders and discuss the problems that face education and jointly set targets and develop ways and means to address those problems.

3.3.6.3. Health

Africa is perceived to be on the horns of a dilemma concerning the state of affairs of its health provision. In this regard, Africa's standard of health operates on mundane, obsolete and backward infrastructure. This eventually leads to a pessimistic and negative experience of untimely preventable deaths, proliferation of preventable and curable diseases and disability among its population.

Despite the current state of affairs of health provision in Africa, NEPAD radically embraces neo-liberal policies that are driven by *laissez faire* market economy at the expense of state-centric Keynesian commitment to social development. It is noteworthy to realize that the development path of the rich north countries was accelerated and facilitated

by strong investment in social development but that is ignored by NEPAD. Neo liberal policies have plunged the delivery of effective social services of many African states into a catastrophic quagmire. The imposition of SAPs into Africa's developmental path by the Bretton Woods Institutions forced African states to reduce social spending which includes health care. This points out that the implementation of NEPAD faces an insurmountable challenge because of its neo-liberal policies.

The crux of the matter is that the application and embracement of neo liberal policies like privatisation links NEPAD to SAPs and adversely affects the state of health. In Zambia for example, the mortality rate has increased since the introduction of SAPs. Hospitals which were capable of providing excellent services were privatized, leaving the state with health institutions which are inadequately equipped. A visit to these institutions presents a poignant picture where emaciated patients shiver under sparse bed clothes.

Family members who are struggling are forced to make ends meet by providing food to the sick to complement hospital rations of beans and porridge. Children continue to succumb to preventable diseases like malaria, pneumonia and tuberculosis. In private hospitals half of the beds are unoccupied because ordinary citizens are unable to afford the fees (South Africa's Workers Guide to Globalisation, 2003). The introduction of SAPs which is indirectly applied by NEPAD through neo-liberal policies continues to ravage Africa's ailing health. In Kenya for example, the World Bank forced the government to impose a fee for the services offered in state owned clinics. The introduction of US \$2 charged for treating sexually transmitted diseases dropped attendance by 60 % because people are

unable to afford it. In Tanzania and Malawi expenditure per person is directed to service external debt compared to qualitative provision of health. Comparatively speaking about US \$3.50 is spent per person compared to US \$11.50 spend for debt repayment. The reduction on health expenditure is sometimes linked to the spread of curable diseases such as pneumonia, tuberculosis and meningitis (Ahwireng – Obeng and Akussah, 2003). NEPAD is unable to provide an indication on what it intends to do to provide accessible free health services to everyone. Rather, it is too vague and provides a catalogue of Africa's health problems

Africa is engulfed in serious health crises which results in a severe reduction of life expectancy. The current average African life expectancy is registered at 48.9 years compared to 77.7 years in the developed countries. The continued shortage and migration of suitably qualified doctors exacerbates the problem. Statistics reflect that there are only 16 doctors for every 100 000 people compared to 253 doctors for every 10 000 people in developed countries. As indicated in the preceding paragraph the number of people succumbing to curable diseases annually is extremely shocking. In this context, more than 3 million people die from tuberculosis; 1.2 million die from pneumonia; 500 000 die from measles; 800 000 die from diarrhoea and 250 die at birth annually (Maloka, 2004).

Zondi (2003) adds that tuberculosis and malaria continue to devastate African lives annually. About 30 000 children die in Africa daily resulting in the annual mortality of more than 10 million deaths from pregnancy and child births complications. Research highlights that 18 % of children born in Sierra Leone will not reach their first birthday.

This state of affairs reflects that mortality rates have failed to drop since the 1990's. This implies that the average rate of infant mortality stands at 60 % while stillbirths will record 39 % of the total births annually. The inability to provide financial and other interventions by NEPAD will continue to adversely affect Africa's Human Security for decades to come.

3.3.6.4. HIV / AIDS

According to Akokpari (2001a), the HIV / AIDS pandemic which was regarded as a social crisis ten years ago is currently a developmental and security crisis. This is because the pandemic adversely affects other levels of life such as the economy, not just health. Active economic participants such as professionals and the youth who are supposed to be playing pivotal roles in continental development are victims of the pandemic. Research reflects that the severity of the pandemic is such that it will wipe out Africa's human species.

Sub-Saharan Africa houses 11 % of the entire global population and about 8 % of Africa's population is believed to be HIV positive. About 16 000 new infections are reported daily globally and Africa accounts for 95 % of those infections. These infections subsequently place Africa in the leading position for the highest number of HIV /AIDS related deaths. In this context, about 14 million people have succumbed to HIV / AIDS related deaths and 11 million of that number reside in Africa.

African HIV / AIDS related deaths resulted in a reduced average life expectancy in several African states. In this regard, the average life expectancy in Botswana dropped to 39 years from 70 years of age. In another three Southern African states, South Africa, Malawi and

Zambia, the life expectancy dropped below 40 years from 50 years. The scourge is devastating in such a way that about thirty per cent of children born to HIV positive mothers are prone to contracting HIV virus through breastfeeding (Obeng and Akussah, 2003). This is a poignant picture because breastfeeding is recommended by health authorities as the best way to feed infants.

HIV / AIDS negatively affect the economy of the majority of African states. The economy of Southern African states will be reduced by 15 – 20 % resulting from the need to provide suitable resources necessary to combat the pandemic. This is further exacerbated by the cost of modern therapy imported from developed countries. It is estimated that about US \$10 000 is spent on therapy a single case annually. This appears to be exceeding the GDP per capita of many African states. About R15 – 20 000 will be needed in future to address each case. The current state of African economy will therefore make it impossible for many of these victims to afford the service (Masheane, 2003).

The education sector, which struggles to acquire sufficient and efficient infrastructure and equipment, has lost its human resources because of the pandemic. In Zambia for example, about 500 teachers die annually whereas in Cote d' Ivoire a teacher dies daily because of the pandemic. Some children are orphaned because of parents succumbing to the disease. This negatively affects teaching learning because some children are forced to abandon school because they cannot afford school fees. Conversely, older siblings who are left behind are forced to look for employment in order to raise the young ones. In some instances, children attend classes intermittently to look after their sick parents (*ibid*).

The sector of society that particularly affected is women and girls who reside in rural areas. In most cases, men abandon rural areas to search for employment opportunities in urban areas. Whilst in urban areas, some men become promiscuous and engage in casual unprotected sex exposing them to HIV / AIDS. When they return to rural areas, they sleep with their wives and infect them with the virus. In some situations, they lure young girls with money and sleep with them which spreads the disease. Subsequently, this results in a vicious cycle spreading the virus because when these young girls engage in sexual activity with boys of their own age they spread the virus (Owumi and Ezeogu, 2003).

The limited interventions and unavailability of resources accelerates the ability of the scourge of HIV / AIDS to devastate and rampage through Africa; meanwhile the rest of the world reaps the rewards of economic integration produced by globalisation. As a developmental programme, NEPAD provides scanty and limited programmes for dealing with HIV / AIDS. This state of affairs has disappointed the advisor of HIV / AIDS to the UN Secretary General who emphasised that NEPAD gives too little attention to addressing the scourge (Vickers and Fourie, 2003).

The HIV / AIDS problem in Africa is severe and costs the African population a whole, well-educated and young generation. The problem in this regard is that NEPAD does not provide a common approach for all the countries to resolve the crisis. Each country develops its own policy and as such, South Africa, through NEPAD is unable to intervene in these problems because of the non-interference clause invoked in the AU policies. Some interventions such as the Peer Review Mechanism are highly contested by member states to

safeguard and protect the interests of the government of the day. One particular country's approach to the scourge is insufficient because NEPAD is supposed to develop a continental approach followed by all the countries so that the level of addressing HIV / AIDS is similar. Matters in this regard are exacerbated by the fact that many countries lack proper facilities and resources necessary for the problem

3.3.7. Challenges Facing Africa in Implementing an Environment Initiative of NEPAD

The environmental initiative of NEPAD targeted eight themes that include *inter alia*: combating desertification; wetland conservation and climate change. The latter is extensively explained in this discussion.

NEPAD's environmental climate change initiative is threatened by the fact that Africa produces only 4% of total global carbon dioxide emissions, but its inhabitants suffer greatly from the results of global climate change. However big polluters like China, USA and EU do not want to compensate for the damages they cause and are intransigent to agree on a clause binding on transgressors. In many parts of Africa, even small changes of precipitation and water availability are having a devastating effect on agricultural output and consequently on food security. As climate change intensifies and its impact deepens, adaptation amongst the communities in Africa will become increasingly challenging

(Revision of the AU/NEPAD Africa Action Plan 2010 – 2012).

Brown and Crawford (2009) add that climate change and climate variability or unpredictability are challenges facing many African countries. Climate change has begun to adversely affect the capacity of African states on their path to development. It has disrupted the states' capability to generate wealth, decreased GNP, and affected human and ultimately national security in Africa.

Venables *et al* (2008) maintain that the implications for climate change in Africa are distinctive and its climate is likely to be more highly affected than that of other regions. Thompson (2009) highlights that Africa is highly prone to climate change and the situation will be aggravated without an immediate and comprehensive solution. Simms (2009) explains that Africa played only a minor role in climate change but pays a heavier price for that. However, NEPAD is unable to provide simple and clear mechanisms necessary to address this

According to Jenkins (2008), Africa is highly prone to climate change because of a high dependency on bio-fuels, agriculture and forestry. These factors contribute immensely to climate change because they are related to restricted population mobility, poor health facilities, high population growth rates and low material standards of living. The preeminent impact of climate change in Africa will be from events such as tropical storms, landslides, high-wind, low temperatures, droughts and increases in sea levels. These will affect health, pollution, sanitation, waste disposal and water supply adversely.

Desanker (2008) outlines that biodiversity which encapsulates consumptive (food, fibre, fuel, shelter, medicine and wildlife trade) and non-consumptive (ecosystem services and the economically important tourism industry) forms Africa's means of survival. Climate change will affect biodiversity negatively and expose Africans to vulnerable situations because of people's heavy dependence on it. Osman – Elasha (2008) adds that African habitats and ecosystems are threatened by many stresses such as deforestation, land degradation and heavy dependence on biomass for energy. About 80 % of Africans depend on traditional biomass for cooking. Climate change is likely to be another added stress factor.

According to Mannak (2009), the continent is on average 0.5C warmer than it was 100 years ago, but temperatures have risen much higher than this in some areas. For example, the temperature in Kenya has become 3.5C hotter in the past 20 years. Global warming which causes climate change continues to complicate Africa's already existing problems. Through global warming, dry areas are going to get drier and wet areas are going to get wetter. They are going to be facing devastating droughts and seas of floods.

BBC (2001) reflects that extreme weather conditions experienced in Africa, such as the recent floods in Mozambique and famine in the Horn of Africa are linked to climate change. Estimates depict that since 2007, erratic rainfall resulted in food shortages in southern Africa where droughts damaged and destroyed maize crops in Lesotho, Namibia, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zimbabwe and South Africa.

Agriculture that forms the backbone of Africa's economy will be devastated by climate change. Crop production yield is projected to decrease by half in 2020 whereas reduction of overall agricultural output could exceed 15 %. Dry and semi dry areas are projected to increase by 60 – 90 M ha by 2080. This amounts to a 5-8 % increase and it will not apply to every region (Hoste, 2009).

According to the Africa Commission Report on Climate Change (2008), reduced rainfall and water scarcity caused by climate change will have a visible and negative impact on agricultural production and food security. As a result, the most disadvantaged groups of society, which includes women, children and the disabled will be highly affected. Many African farmers struggle to deal with severe weather conditions, especially in the drought prone semi – arid areas. Higher temperatures reduce crop yields because of stress and increasing evaporation from the soil.

A severe risk of crop failure is projected. Even if rainfall is projected to increase, it will fall in heavy storms destroying crops and causing soil erosion. It is projected that rain fed crops will decline production by 50 % in 2020. Livestock farming in drier rangelands of the continent will be affected by climate change. Water scarcity, reduced size of lakes and intrusion of salt water in coastal areas will have significant impacts on fisheries. The livelihoods of livestock farmers and fishing communities are threatened by climate change and this can contribute to migratory pressures (Garrasi, 2009).

According to Cilliers (2009c), African agricultural production which relies mainly on rainfall for irrigation has become a risky business because of unpredictable variability of rainfall and river flows in the continent. This will decrease through seasonal variability exposing higher rainfall anomalies and more intense and widespread droughts. Countries lying in Southern Africa, West Africa and Sahel areas will experience a shrinkage in harvests. Agricultural yields from some rain fed crops would most seriously affect small-scale farmers and subsistence farmers because of desertification, soil salinisation and water scarcity. This would affect sorghum in Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Zambia, maize in Ghana, millet in Sudan and groundnuts in Gambia. The absence of substantial food production in Africa would result in the continent requiring higher levels of food aid surpassing the current need.

Nkomo *et al.* (2006) explain that climate change affects water and health. Regarding water, it is highlighted that over 300 million Africans do not have access to safe drinking water and appropriate sanitation. This state of affairs places Africa at the bottom end of water supply coverage of any region globally. This access is extremely lower in rural areas that obtain 47 % of water supply as against 85 % coverage in urban areas. There are sub regional variations in run – off which ultimately affect river flows, where the largest increases in run off are found in the eastern areas of South Africa and Tanzania, south west Angola, northern Zambia and eastern Tanzania. Conversely, northern regions of Southern Africa that are wet experience the largest decreases of runoff.

Conway *et al.* (2008) expound that climate change exacerbates the already existing disease problem caused by vector borne diseases. Africa accounts for about 90 % of cases of malaria and about 110 million Africans reside in regions which are vulnerable to malaria epidemics. However, most exposed populations are located in the fringes of the current infected areas. Malaria is responsible for about 91 % of all African mortalities. There is an accelerated occurrence of malaria in areas that were previously unaffected. These are located in the eastern African highlands.

Desanker (2008) adds that climate change affects the health sector negatively. This is because changes in rainfall affect the presence on absence of *vector and water borne pathogens*. In this regard, minor changes in temperature and precipitation are able to expand the population of disease – carrying mosquitoes and result in increased malaria epidemics. In some cases, flooding can facilitate the breeding of these malaria carriers in formerly arid areas. Thompson (2008) outlines that about 150 000 people die annually resulting from climate change and the largest proportions of those are Africans.

Climate change is no longer a scientific issue but a political one by the fact that international discussions on climate change are a hotly contested matter between the rich industrialised countries and the poor developing countries. The latter countries demand full compensation in the form of financial and technical assistance to make up for climate change that devastates their food security and forestry among others. On the other hand, the developed countries continue with their industrialisation projects in poor countries and they are reluctant to provide technical and full financial assistance. In this regard, NEPAD does

not have the capacity to force developed countries provide technical and financial assistance to poor countries. There is an over-reliance on international conferences on climate change which are unable to yield efficient results as anticipated by the developing nations such as Africa.

3.3.8. Challenges Faced by Africa in Implementing Mobilisation of Resource

Initiative of NEPAD

NEPAD emphasises that an estimated 7 % annual growth rate is required to achieve the development goals and particularly the goal of halving the proportion of Africans living in poverty by the year 2015. In this context, Africa needs to fill an annual resource gap of 12% of its GDP, or US 64 billion. This will require accelerated domestic savings as well as improvements in the public revenue collection systems. However, the bulk of the resources needed will be obtained from outside the continent. NEPAD focuses on debt reduction, ODA as complementary external resources required in the short to medium term, and addresses private capital flows as a longer-term concern (NEPAD document, 2012). Moreover, NEPAD remains quiet about appropriate mechanisms geared towards harnessing resources aimed at increasing GDP and continues to rely heavily on ODA which attaches stringent conditions

Ayogu (2006) argues that the estimated US 64 billion needed annually to fulfil NEPAD's aspirations will be obtained outside the continent, for example from donor partners and FDI. However, when one examines the records of capital flows to the continent then this expectation appears to be unreasonable. ODA has been diminishing since the 1990s. From

an average of about 0.34% of their combined GNP in 1993, aid to poor countries fell about 0.24% in 1998. Sub – Saharan Africa’s net receipts of ODA dropped from about US \$ 17.5 in 1993 to US \$ 14 billion in 1998. As a net percentage of its GNP, ODA to sub – Saharan Africa fell from 5.7% in 1993 to 4.1% in 1998. Two reasons are advanced to explain this drop: *Firstly*, the end of the Cold War reduced the need for industrialised countries to purchase support. *Secondly*, the logic of globalisation and neo – liberalism assumes that the market is an efficient distributor of wealth took root and thus the slogan of “*trade not aid*” was gradually implemented.

NEPAD maintains that African development can be activated by more aid and credit, both of which were granted to Africa for the past forty years or so, but without a significant impact on poverty eradication. A particular problem with aid is that it is accompanied by stringent conditions attached. Borrowing countries are sometimes obligated to purchase input from corporations based in the countries that are granting the loans. In some cases, certain conditions such as the liberalisation of markets and other conditionalities are attached, even though the donor countries are sometimes the worst violators of the very prescriptions they attach to aid (Gabriel, 2003).

The argument to advance in this regard is that the implementation of any development plan for Africa should rely first and foremost on African resources and not on external capital flows. External capital flows should be treated as supplementary. If Africans themselves are not going to be the primary givers for the development of the continent, who else should be? Countries such as Nigeria alone are able to amass US \$ 1.5 billion daily and if

such resources would be used to benefit Africa's people, there would be no reason to depend on external financial assistance.

Debt reduction is another dimension of NEPAD's resource mobilisation. With a total debt service running at 5 % of the GDP and 14 % of exports in 1999, the burden of debt service is a tangible constraint on African development in particular and the rest of developing countries generally. NEPAD intends to secure an agreement on debt relief but ignores the insistence of the Global Jubilee Movement that campaigned for the complete cancellation of Africa's debt. Africa continued to repay its debt many times over but remains indebted because of interest repayments. Debt repayments from developing countries to banks in the North drain about US \$160 billion annually. This is more than double the development aid these countries receive. Debt repayments have become the principal mechanism of transferring wealth from the South to the North (Tomori and Tomori, 2004).

NEPAD's over-reliance on donor countries fails African development. This is premised on the fact that donor countries failed to commit to previous development projects in Africa. There has been a serious decline of ODA coming into Africa and subsequently this might lead to slower and failed implementation of NEPAD. Matters are exacerbated by conditions which are attached by the donor countries on NEPAD. Conditions such as neo liberal economic policies promote export goods to enter African markets at the expense of unprotected local products. This scourge leaves local producers with no alternative but to abandon their production capacity. This proliferates acute unemployment in Africa.

3.3.9. Challenges Facing Africa in Implementing the Market Access Initiative Of NEPAD

3.3.9.1. Agriculture

The agriculture sector plan of NEPAD provides an extensive assessment of the state of African agriculture and rural poverty, but is limited in its treatment of the structural forces and exogenous causes of underdevelopment. In looking into domestic weakness, NEPAD identifies some crucial features of African poverty. It alludes to the fact that the majority of Africa's population are rural based and thus heavily dependent on agriculture for their livelihood and survival. Moreover, rural areas are home to some 80% of the entire population which includes 70 % of the continent's extremely poor and undernourished.

Africa has abundant arable land and labour which, if accompanied by sound policies could be translated into increased production, incomes and food security. This has not materialised because of lack of continuous policies and effective implementation strategies. This problem is further exacerbated by the fact that African agriculture remains largely in the hands of smallholders and pastoralists. Given the dominance of rain – fed agriculture, yields remain low and farmers are trapped in a cycle of poverty and food insecurity for decades (Odhiambo, 2006).

NEPAD faces a challenge of dealing with under – capitalisation of agriculture. In this regard, most African countries handle agriculture as a way of life for farmers who in most cases are voice – less in lobbying for an adequate share of public expenditure. As of 2008, only 19 % of African countries allocate more than 10 % of their national expenditure to

agricultural development. Many countries hardly reach 4 % of GDP and are dependent on ODA for funding agriculture and other sectors. There is clearly a need for governments to increase agricultural investment in order to enhance food production and accelerate economic transformation (Odhiambo, 2006). Ologa (2002) adds that African agriculture relies heavily on traditional technologies and is heavily undercapitalised compared to other regions in the world. For example, less than 7 % of cropped areas is irrigated and capital stock per hectare is about one quarter of that in Latin America. Fertilizer utilisation in Africa averages 19 kg per hectare, compared to 100 kg in East Asia and 230 kg in Northern Europe.

Africa's agriculture is confronted with an inadequate use of yield – enhancing practices and technologies. Sub – Saharan Africa ranks the lowest in world terms of yield – enhancing practices and techniques. Yield – enhancing practices include mechanisation, utilisation of agro – chemicals such as fertilisers and pesticides, and increased use of irrigated land. The utilisation of these practices and technologies are far lower in Africa compared to other regions. This explains why crop yields in Africa in general are far below average yields in other parts of the world. Irrigated land is only 3.6 % of total cropland on the continent compared with the world average of 18.4 % while the use of fertilisers is very low at an average of 125 gm / ha compared with the world's average of 1, 020 gm / ha. Regarding mechanisation, the continent has an average of only 13 tractors / 100 square kilometres of arable land versus the world average of 200 tractors / 100 square kilometres. In Africa, tractor ploughing and the use of other modern inputs are confined to areas with high market demand or large – scale farms (FAO, 2008).

Lowland and labour productivity is another problem faced by NEPAD. Under utilisation of agriculture as highlighted above gave rise to an agricultural sector with a weak knowledge base, resulting in low input, low output and low value-added agriculture. Land productivity in Africa is estimated to be at 42 % and 50 % of those of Asia and Latin America. Asia and Latin America have more irrigated land and use more fertilizers and machinery than Africa. Labour productivity is also lower in Africa compared with other developing regions. This is because most of Africa's agriculture is manual or semi – mechanised (EAC Development Strategy Document, 2012).

The inability to address agricultural problems results in Africa facing severe food shortages. Africa, where most of the people are farmers, is unable to feed itself and has been in this situation for many decades now. The number of chronically undernourished people rose from 173 million in 1990-92 to some 200 million in 1997 – 99. Of these, 194 million (34 % of the population) are in sub Saharan Africa. Simultaneously, there has been a progressive world growth in food imports in the last years of the 20th century, with Africa spending an estimated US \$18.7 billion in 2000. Africa's share of global agricultural imports in 1998 was 4.6 %. Its share of developing country imports was at 16.3 %. Agricultural imports account for about 15 % of total African imports. It is of particular concern that the share of gross export revenues needed for importing food increased 12 % to over 30 % in East Africa. Part of Africa's "*imports*" is food aid, with the continent receiving 2.8 million tons in the year 2000. In the mid 1990's, out of the world's total of 32 million victims of disasters receiving relief assistance from the *World Food Programme* (WFP), 21.5 million lived in Africa (FAO, 2012)

Food insecurity is greatest in Africa. Between 1990 – 92 and 1997 – 99 daily per capita dietary energy supply in sub – Saharan Africa rose slightly from 2120 to 2190 kcal. The number of chronically under – nourished people increased from 168 to 194 million during the same period. Imports of cereals by sub – Saharan countries are estimated at some 17 million tons in 2000, including 2.8 million tons of food aid (Mrango, 2002). In order to increase food security, NEPAD clearly articulates the need for vigorous large-scale community based programmes to improve the performance of small farms through regions. Expanding food production by small farms alone will not be enough to eradicate the poverty and hunger that is acute in Africa.

Regardless of the severe agricultural problems facing the continent, NEPAD, through the *Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP)*, embraces aid for African agriculture. This aid is not focussed on resource poor farmers, but it is targeted towards the funding of commodity associations, the privatisation of agricultural extension services, particularly veterinary services and support to commodity sectors, including encouragement of farmers to affiliate to commodity associations in order to acquire support. Such an approach assumes an ability to pay or participate which is unrealistic for the majority of farmers living below the poverty line. Aid on sectoral support focuses on commodity crops cultivated by better – off farmers, rather than staples. Privatisation of extension services unless carefully designed to deliver at community level, prejudice resources for poor farmers, since service provision to remoter areas is not profitable (www.practicalaction.org).

According to Kariuki (2009), NEPAD's agricultural programme is accused of collaborating with neo liberal interests at the expense of the rural poor African masses. Many irrigation schemes driven by the state, *Food and Agricultural Organisation* (FAO) and foreign Agri-capital forces' engagement focus on mechanised farming for export and ignores food crops. However, it entrenches dispossession of rural farmers' land. The Sudanese Geriza irrigation project, funded by the WB, IMF and African Development Bank, which turned rural farmers into waged plantation labourers, provides a clear example of an undertaking associated with FAO's neo – liberal approach to agricultural development.

The NEPAD agricultural strategy is steeped in a market-led framework to development management requiring a minimalist role for the African state and the approach is radically different from actually existing practices of the global agrarian development. Its principal limitation is that agricultural, trade and monetary policies of northern states directly counter the intended goals of weaker states. This is because agricultural development policy management in the developed countries is premised on extensive state intervention in product and factor markets preferring an agrarian structure comprising primarily of protected owner – operated family farms, dominated by private sector transnational firms. Matters of equity are largely ignored yet the land issue is central to issues of agriculture and food security for the small farms the plan wants to support (Omoweh, 2003).

Saruchera (2004) highlights that NEPAD's agricultural plan rests on false idealisation revealing difficult problems relating to tenure insecurity, and the way this is reinforced through its interface with unimpeded population growth, declining agricultural technology

and poor governance institutions. The general thrust of agricultural development reflects a bias with economic reductionism as highlighted in the CAADP plan. The emphasis on production, greater efficiencies and modernisation of the sector reflects a resurgence of antiquated models of rural development. This emphasis further throws into disorder any concerns for pro – poor small-scale subsistence farmers whose sole barriers towards a vertical ascent to commercialisation along the Agri – value chain are structural and resource constraints. Without measures to provide these, the growth of small-scale resource-poor farmers is heavily compromised. The modernist approach in the plan limits its own ability to recognise Africa's ailing rural economies and the need to incorporate rural development as a central facet informing any attempts geared towards the rejuvenation of Africa's agricultural sector.

Agriculture forms the backbone of Africa's economy and it is faced with critical problems that NEPAD appears to ignore. External aid that is strongly preferred by NEPAD to develop agriculture has failed to deliver to Africa on many occasions and NEPAD does not develop endogenous mechanisms necessary to address this adverse situation. Matters are further exacerbated by the problem that agricultural production relies on mundane technology, lesser soil enhancing fertilizers and lower production. The rules of engagement at the International Financial Institutions rub salt in the injured souls of Africans. According to the rules, African countries are not allowed to fund agriculture at the expense of developed states who subsidise their agriculture heavily. Subsequently African markets are flooded with heavily subsidised agricultural goods from developed nations. Such competition is unfair for African producers because they have to sell their products at

higher prizes to maximise profits. Their expensive prices scare local consumers who opt to buy imported products at cheaper rates. These Africans are left without an alternative but to stop agricultural production because they operate at a loss.

3.3.9.2. Mining

Mining is another project for NEPAD's market access initiative focussing on achieving these objectives: improvement of the quality of mineral resource information; Creation of a regulatory framework conducive to the development of the mining sector; and the establishment of the best practices necessary to ensure efficient extraction of natural resources and minerals of high quality (NEPAD Document, 2004).

According to Africa Initiative on Mining, Environment and Society (2004), NEPAD perceives mining as a catalyst for economic growth and development, but its current activities are contradictory to the interests and concerns of local communities and the developmental priorities of African national economies. This is because NEPAD's mining activities undermine Africa's economic development and environmental diversity; destroy community livelihood; violates people's rights; and account for civil strife, social dislocation and health impact.

In extending Africa's underdevelopment and violation of human rights, mining companies are generally reluctant to compensate the communities displaced to make way for mining operations. This has been the case in Ghana where hundreds of families were relocated in areas without basic amenities to pave the way for mining activities. Governments

exacerbate the matter by manipulating natural resources without providing clear structured platforms for community participation in decision-making issues, such as how natural resources are utilised that have an impact on their lives (Pambazuka, 2011).

In the Democratic Republic of Congo, there are continued violent conflicts between the communities and the government over the latter's alleged bias towards mining companies at the expense of the ordinary citizens. In this regard, the ordinary villagers suffer because of unfriendly mining operations detrimental to people's general well – being. Zimbabwe also faces the similar problem where the majority of mining companies act as if they are above the law as they continue to get away with the most dreadful environmental abuses.

NEPAD's implementation is challenged by finding necessary measures to ensure that mining enhances economic development and environmental diversity. In so doing, NEPAD is confronted by the repressive power of the state which increased over time. In this regard, the attitude of certain member states and their institutions has been hostile towards their citizens and they are determined to promote their interests and rights by upholding the values of transnational corporations. There are instances across Africa where state repression is executed by private and state security against communities and citizens for expressing dissenting views or making legitimate demands. Such an attitude inhibits transparency and participation in mining sector issues. Apart from that, the political and administrative structures are too weak to address mining sector (UNECA, 2012)

NEPAD views mining as having potential for the social and economic development of African countries. However, the main beneficiaries of mining in the continent are private corporations and economies rather than ordinary African citizens while the cost is externalised to local communities and the environment. Matters are worsened by implementation of liberalised mining regimes which resulted in the race to the bottom in terms of development on the continent as well as renewed scramble for the continent by old and emerging economic powers. The race to the bottom and the scramble for Africa collaborate to exacerbate the underdevelopment of the continent (Limpitlaw, 2008).

NEPAD ensures that mining processes in the continent are reformed to address the failure of the current continental mining regimes. However, the on going reform initiatives are under threat, particularly from a number of emerging policy initiatives such as the EU's Raw Material Initiative and the Natural Resources Charter by the World Bank. This is because, for example, the Raw Material Initiative emphasises unregulated and unrestricted access to raw materials. The Natural Resources Charter on the other hand reinforces the existing asymmetrical relationship between African governments, communities and multinational corporations. This is a serious challenge that confronts NEPAD because it cannot enforce policies in the domestic affairs of African states. Certain African governments collude with international companies to extract mineral resources at the expense of local communities and invoke repressive measures against dissent. Matters are exacerbated by economies overly dependent on aid economies run by African governments. The cost of running the aid – dependent economies tends to result in

excessive expropriation of mineral resources of the continent that are perceived as a potential for resource mobilisation by NEPAD (Abdallah, 2009).

The NEPAD's inter – governmental African Mining Partnership registered slow progress in implementing various mining-related initiatives aimed at promoting growth of mining in the continent. Chief amongst these challenges is the delay in the formulation of an integrated mining programme which was envisaged to streamline mining in the continent (Davenport, 2008). The problem is how NEPAD can accelerate the mobilisation of resources if it is slow on the implementation of mining policies. However, the formulation of an integrated mining programme to streamline mining in Africa is needed to ensure that the policies of various countries are harmonised for registering efficiency and consistency in the application of mining policies. This provides Africa with a platform to negotiate mining policies with developed countries on a common ground and in unison.

NEPAD emphasises its commitment to harmonise policies and regulations for ensuring compliance with levels of operational practices in Africa. This is an important action but it fails to provide the framework for its operation. It fails to identify relevant stakeholders who will be responsible for its operationalization. On the other hand, NEPAD fails to provide actions that will be undertaken against MNCs employing exploitative tactics to extract African mineral resources without skilling and compensating people in those areas affected by mining operations in various countries.

3.3.9.3. Manufacturing

The development of the manufacturing sector in Africa has seriously stagnated. In this regard, the share of manufacturing valued added GDP of the continent is 15 %, which is the global lowest, compared to South Asia. If South Africa is excluded, which is the most exceptionally industrialised country on the continent accounting for about 60 % of manufacturing production in Africa, the figure drops to 13 % and is well below the average of low-income countries. The performance of exports is far less than other developing countries. The overall amount of manufacturing exports in total exports in Africa, excluding South Africa is 21 %, which is less than half of that in low – income countries. This is because African countries export a large amount of natural resources which increases total exports and reduces manufacturing. The ratio of manufacturing in Africa remains at 6 %, over half the average in low-income countries (Fukunishi, 2004).

King (2010) adds that manufacturing plays a minor role in Africa's economies. This is sometimes restricted to small firms and simple products such as baked goods, apparel, and basic furniture. The reasons for this poor performance are many including an uncertain macro – economic environment, excessive regulation acting as a brake on growth and formalisation and poverty skewing domestic demand towards simple necessities. On a per capita basis, manufacturing in Africa declined at a rate of 1.0 % annually.

The implementation of NEPAD faces a serious challenge to develop manufacturing in Africa. The current lopsided situation in which South Africa accounts for over half of manufacturing presents a serious challenge to NEPAD because of serious engagements

with African countries to find common positions to advance manufacturing. In order to address manufacturing in Africa, NEPAD has to look into productivity, labour costs and exchange rates.

The elements of production in African manufacturing are the lowest in Africa. Furthermore, the growth of African firms is slow. Lower production and stagnation of African firms result from technological backwardness and lack of technological capability presented as lack of information and skills to effectively utilise technology. Most of the firms are owned by foreigners and minorities and obtain such information through clients, a parent company and ethnic network, while the rest of the firms, owned by Africans, do not have such access and they are technologically isolated. Conversely, high transaction costs add to stagnation of African firms. The African business environment is characterised by high transportation costs, imperfect contract enforcement, high information cost and poor public services. These attributes raise transaction costs and damage the manufacturing sector which requires more transaction. The small size of African firms adds to the problems affecting productivity (Agazzi, 2012).

Africa has a high exchange rate, large deviation from the equilibrium rate and large fluctuation of real exchange rate. These elements result in Africa acquiring a low share of manufacturing exports. Currencies in Africa were overvalued consistently since independence and the deviation from the equilibrium rate was larger than the deviation in other developing countries. The black market premium, a crude measure of misalignment stood at 40 % on average from the 1990 to mid-2000s, which well exceeds the average in

the LDCs that was 26 %. Correspondingly, deviation of the real exchange rate from the equilibrium rate is estimated at 40.7 % on average. The degree of misalignment from the late 90s to mid 2000s was as large as 90 %, and then it tuned to a decreasing trend in the 90s in many countries. The share of manufacturing exports followed misalignment and dropped dramatically (Juma, 2011).

The above expose` highlights that NEPAD faces a crucial challenge of fixing African manufacturing firms which produce less and their labour costs which are generally higher than other lower income countries. These characteristics as well as overvalued exchange rates have a significant on manufacturing exports. These are corroborated by the fact that competitiveness of the African manufacturing sector is relatively weak. There is no doubt that overvalued exchange rates, which NEPAD has no control over them seriously discourages manufacturing exports (interview)

NEPAD's proposal for manufacturing contrast with the plan of the *East African Community* (EAC) which clearly prioritises collective self-reliance and employment generation rather than export competitiveness as NEPAD does. In the EAC plan, such manufacturing will receive public financial and technical support drawn from local components and other inputs, and be characterised by industrial specialisation in order to enhance the complementarities of African economies and expand the intra – community base with due account being taken of national and regional resource endowments. NEPAD avoids any suggestions about state subsidies and other supports to manufacturing other than through *Private Public Partnerships* (PPP's) to support the private sector (Keet, 2003).

In addressing manufacturing, NEPAD fails to incorporate and empower Africans. The actions that are undertaken to improve manufacturing do not recognise the role of ordinary citizens in the development of new industries. The document does not highlight the ways and approaches geared towards developing new and existing industries. Furthermore, the document fails to reflect on actions to be undertaken to help those countries which fail to develop new industries (interview).

3.5. Challenges Presented by the Incorporation of NEPAD into AU Structures

In 2003, at the Summit in Maputo, Mozambique the Heads of State and Government announced they would give NEPAD three years to find the necessary approach to integrate NEPAD into the AU structures. The rationale for this decision emanates from the premise that NEPAD's launch in 2001 occurred at the time when the OAU was transforming from a non-interference to non-difference organisation. The Heads of States felt that it would be too cumbersome to overload the AU with the responsibility of building an efficient NEPAD as a socio economic development programme. On this account, it transpired that NEPAD would be incorporated into the structures of the AU after three years. Unfortunately, the incorporation process took much longer than anticipated. The other cumbersome problem was that NEPAD operated without a legally based mandate because it was formally created under the structures of AU. That created problems in addressing issues relating to agriculture, science and technology as well as infrastructure because the criterion for evaluating its delivery was skewed because the mandate was not legally binding; and also unclear (AU Documents).

The AU Summit of February 2009 presented a resolution affirming incorporation of NEPAD as a continuation of the Algiers Summit. The latter developed a procedure called the *Algiers 13 Points* to guide incorporation. The Chairperson of the AU Commission, Dr Jean Ping and the *Chief Executive Officer* (CEO) of NEPAD Secretariat were tasked to facilitate the process. By the 3rd of November 2009, visible endeavours for incorporation were achieved. Some of the achievements included the NEPAD Secretariat adopting the AU policies and procedures in the sectors of finance, administration, human resource development, auditing, protocol and procurement. It was resolved that the AU Commission and NEPAD Secretariat would work to harmonise their programmes to operationalize previous AU Summit decisions (NEPAD Documents, 2010).

On the 3rd of February 2010, African leaders who converged at the 14th Ordinary Summit of the AU adopted a decision to incorporate NEPAD into AU structures. In this context, *NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA)* replaced the NEPAD Secretariat. The mandate of NPCA encapsulates the following:

- Facilitate and coordinate the implementation of continental and regional programmes and projects;
- Mobilising resources and partners for supporting the implementation of Africa's priority programmes and projects;
- Conducting and coordinating research and knowledge management
- Monitoring and evaluating the implementation of programmes and project; and
- Advocating the AU and NEPAD vision, mission and core principles (NEPAD Documents, 2011).

The incorporation of NEPAD into AU was not spared any problems because members rescinded the annual contribution from five founding members, Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa, Algeria and Senegal. Matters were further exacerbated by the reduction of NEPAD's annual contribution by half, from US \$6 million to US \$3 million. However, this incorporation decreased the momentum of the programme because it is treated just like any other structure of the AU (AU Documents, 2010).

3.4. NEPAD and its Criticism

NEPAD is heralded as an African development programme aimed at addressing Africa's socio – economic and political malaise but it faces serious criticisms regarding its original partnership with the donor countries, embracing inappropriate policies for Africa's development, over reliance on aid and its failure to consult African citizenry.

NEPAD is regarded as a developmental agenda for Africans by Africans but it is ironic that the African citizenry does not know its content and intentions. According to Landsberg (2003), civil society organisations and NGOs criticised and complained about lack of consultation from the architects of NEPAD. They argue that it was a “*top – down process*”. This sector of the society is highly critical of what they see as the neo – liberal economic prescriptions embedded in NEPAD because according to them it is a self – imposed structural adjustment programme. Stuurman (2004) adds that critics of NEPAD emphasise that NEPAD is a “*top - down elitist initiative*” which was made available to African civil society obscurely through the internet. It is regarded as a grand continental blue print for Africa that is of little relevance or interest to ordinary citizens. It is appalling to realise that

NEPAD ignored its citizens during the planning and designing of the document. Some of these people are practitioners and researchers on development. Their consultation would have added another dimension to the dossier (interview).

According to Keet (2002), the NEPAD framework is out of touch with and lagging behind the current global debates. It is completely out of touch with the rich debates that have been going on in Africa between governments, academics, trade unions and civil society. While it claims to be the cutting-edge dossier for the rest of the continent, it lags behind the current debates in Africa. It emphasises “*debt relief*”, while the rest of the world talks about “*debt cancellation*”. Conversely, it mentions “*poverty reduction*” while the rest of the world insists on “*poverty eradication*”. In this regard, NEPAD ignores many positions that have already been undertaken by African governments, let alone social movements in the continent. This becomes a tangible retrogression for Africa if this becomes the framework with which Africa’s future would be debated.

The criticism levelled against NEPAD not only originates from civil society but extends to African governments as well. Many African governments complained about the lack of consultation by the NEPAD architects. Gelb (2002) adds that NEPAD is regarded as a club of African states who collectively undertake to improve governance amongst them by engaging in both joint and individual actions. Even though the North contributed to the political momentum towards its construction, NEPAD’s formulation rested on the leadership of a small group of African heads of state. For it to succeed, it is led by *de facto* by the same small group within the 15 member Heads of State Committee (interview).

Karuuombe (2003) emphasises that the lack of consultation in the process leading to the NEPAD's construction further complicates the neo-liberal framework within which NEPAD is located. A small group of African leaders spearheaded the policy, presenting it to their peers and to the industrialised countries for funding prior to Africans themselves being able to participate in any debate. NEPAD does not emerge from a continent-wide dialogue and therefore remains unknown to most Africans. NEPAD emphasises *partnership* for African development but it lacks, from its inception, the necessary consultation and dialogue with African civil society. Ironically, the first time many people heard about NEPAD's predecessor, MAP was in Davos at the WEF in January 2001 when President Mbeki presented the plan to the likes of George Soros who was representing the owners of global capital. Mbeki also marketed NEPAD at the G8 Summit in Genoa where he was told to include good governance in his plan.

NEPAD is regarded as a development for Africa in partnership with donor countries. The concept of *partnership* was established as an underlying cooperation between the international community and Africa. This partnership is asymmetrical because NEPAD fails to question power relations between Africa and the developed countries who dictate domestic policy in Africa. In this partnership, the developed countries prescribe neo liberal policies and good governance that have been imposed through failed SAPs. Instead of questioning these policies, NEPAD merely calls for their continuation with some adjustment, and appeals for assistance to the very same powers that played an active role in Africa's underdevelopment. A true partnership is premised on equality and until current

economic and power relations are transformed, Africa cannot hope for a true partnership with developed countries and IFIs. NEPAD fails to recognise this basic precondition for any meaningful partnership (Bond, 2002).

The partnership between Africa and the developed world is directed at eliciting more generous terms for Africa's integration into the globalised capitalist system which has over time marginalised Africa, divided the continent and widened divisions either within each country or between countries. Advantageous terms of integration are expected to yield greater market access for African goods into global markets, debt forgiveness, mobilisation of resources and support for African development programmes and policies, and attract FDI and capital into Africa. It is in this regard that the partnerships invoked in NEPAD satisfy the demands of developed countries for Africa's development based on western conditionalities under the pretext of African ownership (Obi, 2001).

The adoption of good governance and neo-liberal policies, or Washington Consensus paradigm by African leaders divorces NEPAD from its local context which is acceptable to Africa's exogenous development partners but remains unknown and exploitative to Africans. Neo-liberal policies argue that the role of the state should be minimised to create the path for private capital and the market as an engine for economic development. The neo liberal reason is that wealth will be created through an enabling environment for the public sector to generate profit and that some of this wealth will ultimately trickle down to all citizens. Experiences in Africa and elsewhere over the past decades have reflected that this rarely occurs. Instead, economic liberalisation has led to an unprecedented concentration of

wealth in the hands of a few while the majority of the world's people became poorer (Kanbur, 2001).

According to Ikome (2007), the architects of NEPAD have ignored the fact that ODA, FDI, debt cancellation and market access are political matters and that the leaders of the North and the multilateral institutions pledged to support NEPAD exist within political environments that impose constraints on their ability to do so. NEPAD assumes that once African countries commit themselves to the norms of good governance, industrialised countries and multilateral institutions will deliver on their part of the deal in terms of increased ODA, FDI, debt cancellation, and market access just because of NEPAD's moral, historical and security arguments. In this regard, it remains doubtful that the North will open a "new chapter" with Africa simply because African leaders made pronouncements on the new beginning. It is argued that the prospects of the governments of the industrialised countries and multilateral institutions honouring their commitments to NEPAD will depend on the dynamics of the interests of Northern countries and related operational constraints that underpin the workings of the multilateral institutions.

NEPAD argues that US \$ 64 billion is required annually to fulfil its aspirations. Those funds are obtained from sources outside the continent such as donor countries and FDIs. However, when one examines the records of capital flows to the continent, this expectation is baseless. For example, other poor countries, including Russia and its former satellite states compete with Africa for ODA and FDI. These countries are more important to the North in economic and strategic terms than Africa. The former communist states of Eastern

Europe are prospective members of the expanding EU and it makes more political and economic sense to dedicate resources to facilitate their eventual integration into a united Europe than to assist Africa. As far as Russia is concerned, the North has a particular strategic interest in assisting it economically to prevent the misuse of its huge nuclear arsenal. This explains why the African continent was promised a meagre US \$6 billion in 2006 for poverty reduction and but G8 gave out US \$20 billion to Russia to assist it to decommission its nuclear weaponry. Even if Africa successfully transforms its political and economic environment through good governance, there is no guarantee that it will suddenly become a popular destination for the resources from industrialised countries (Samasuwo, 2004).

On a more technical policy level, NEPAD's current outward focus on resource mobilisation targeted at market access and trade liberalisation is misguided. Contrary to NEPAD's assertions, Africa is not marginalised from the global trade system and never has been. Africa has always been the provider of cheap raw materials and resources, whether slave labour or agricultural commodities, critical for the development of the North. Trade, currently amounting to over 60 % of African countries' GDP, increased by 40 % in the late 1970s. Comparatively speaking trade is below 40 % of GDP of developed countries in the OECD. This does not imply that trade is unimportant, but rather more trade or more integration *per se* is not the answer. If the past is anything to go by, Africa is too open and thus too vulnerable to external shocks, such as changes in export commodity prices. Despite advice from the World Bank and IMF for African countries to increase their exports, this resulted in collapsing commodity prices as supply overcame demand. Africa

does not need integration in the global economy but needs global integration on better terms (Alence, 2004).

The global trade system emphasised by NEPAD appears to be a myth. In this context, trade is regarded as a product of systems of power and wealth. Much of Africa's trade is "*enforced trade*". It results from export led liberalisation demanded by the World Bank and IMF as conditions attached to the debt obligations of African countries. These conditions deny African governments and their people the right to determine their own policies. The current state of affairs governing trade highlights that the World Bank, IMF and WTO and their developed country controllers used trade as an instrument of control as a means to penetrate African markets (Botha, 2002).

Trade liberalisation imposed on NEPAD by the developed countries demands greater openness from already wide – open African economies to maintain various measures to protect their own interests. For example, the US is able to export certain commodities at less than the actual cost of production because of high levels of subsidies to its exporters. Thus even though many African producers may be lower cost producers than their counterparts before government subsidies, after subsidies they are unable to compete. In agriculture, where one would expect Africa to have a strong comparative advantage, the EU, US, and Japan provide subsidies of US \$3-7 daily for each cow, more than most African people have to survive on. These subsidies are important to people in the developed countries as it sustains profits, industries and to some degree jobs, yet Africa cannot possibly compete against such an unfair competition (Cheru, 2002).

NEPAD recommends the promotion of intra-African trade and investments through the harmonisation of economic and investment policies and practises. However, there are a number of contradictions. NEPAD pays too much attention to resource mobilisation within the continent. This highlights its priority conviction that the bulk of resources will have to be acquired externally, but elsewhere it points to an urgent need to create conditions necessary for promoting private sector investment by both domestic and foreign investors. NEPAD continues to define the priorities as “offering the necessary incentives to international investors especially with respect to their concerns over security of property rights and the need to provide them with governmental insurance schemes and other guarantees that go with PPPs. However, all of these are located in the context of deepening of financial markets within countries as well as cross border harmonisation and integration. Such measures will not only draw foreign investors into Africa but will facilitate the movement of capital across Africa, with the entire continent turned into a huge integrated and secure field for international investors (Alden and Le Pere, 2006).

It is important to realise that such a financial harmonisation or liberalisation advantages South African companies and investors through repatriation of their profits back to South Africa. This contributes to the exacerbation of the domination of the South African economy within the continent. South Africa alone already accounts for more than two thirds of the combined GDP of sub Saharan Africa and a third of the GDP of the whole continent. Financial liberalisation within and between African countries also encourages flow or flight of domestic capital from other African countries to the relatively greater

security and profitability of South African financial markets and thus reinforces the imbalances (interview).

The adoption of neo-liberal policies enshrined in the NEPAD document is not only an ignorance of historic lessons but also an exacerbation of the African development crises. The underlying assumption is that private capital will accelerate development in the continent. This offers little hope for turning around the current crisis because FDI in Africa is largely concentrated where resources such as oil and diamonds can be exploited without contributing to the development in those countries. Angola, for example, in 2002 received the most FDI in SADC, but this has not contributed to the well being of most of Angola's population (Anyemendu, 2002).

Maloka (2006) adds that at the Conference of African scholars and developmental scientists held in Accra, 2001 participants criticised neo-liberal policies that are the heartbeat of the NEPAD dossier. They emphasised that it is a repeat of the SAPs packages that devastated the continent. They argue that NEPAD claims its partnership with the donors but the relationship is asymmetric because it favours the donor countries, especially G8, at the expense of Africa.

NEPAD's agricultural plan is strongly criticised. It is argued that NEPAD is not only weaker than many existing plans and programmes for agricultural and general rural development in Africa, but it does not even acknowledge, endorse or attempt to benefit from the proposals and demands being posed by the Africa Group within the WTO

negotiations on the Agreement on Agriculture. This also reflects the more general inconsistencies and weaknesses of NEPAD's recommendations on how Africa should engage with, and within the multilateral trading system and more specifically the WTO (Muneku, 2003).

NEPAD even lags behind the widely accepted arguments by European NGO's and major institutions such as the World Bank, which deplore a call for an end to the dumping of subsidised agricultural exports from the EU, US and the other industrialised countries into Africa and elsewhere in the South. The impact of the dumping of exports is as damaging as other internal structural constraints within Africa. Furthermore, the forced removal of agricultural tariff and quota protections in Africa against such unsustainable competition will actually pre-empt the internal problems being effectively dealt with. NEPAD's silence on such Northern government agricultural policies is a clear indication of the diplomatic processes required in dealing with the policies of governments that NEPAD promoters would like to become aid partners with Africa (Amin, 2002).

NEPAD's approach to the global trading system is characterised by many severe problems. In this regard, NEPAD endorses the WTO that is not only imposing trade policies on governments, enforcing reduction of tariffs, removal of quotas, and removal of technical barriers to trade and enforcing certain standards. The WTO also utilises trade as an instrument of control in the world. Africa and Latin America know that through the IMF and World Bank, the highly industrialised countries have controlled the economies through debt and have coerced structural adjustments and deregulation of economies (Gibb, 2002).

Much of the language of the NEPAD framework highlights the position of the South African government in the WTO. South Africa operates separate and independent from the rest of the continent in promoting the expansion of the WTO. In this regard, much of the language in NEPAD reflects specific positions of the South African government. Furthermore, NEPAD claims that there are new trading opportunities in the evolving global system. The reality in this regard is that since the end of the Uruguay Round in 1994, Africa's global trade collapsed from 8% to the current 1%. The *United Nations Conference on Trade and Development* (UNCTAD) warned during the Uruguay Round that Africa was going to lose about US \$ 3 billion from the liberalised trade system and that has been the case. Africa is at rock bottom and to lose another US \$3 billion would be a disaster. In the eyes of NEPAD, that is not the case. NEPAD sees an evolving system that is beneficial and that Africa will be the one to benefit, but the reality is that Africa does not benefit from the global system (Litonen, 2004).

NEPAD emphasises that Africa should implement and measure up to global terms and standards for its effectiveness in trade. In real terms, this does not reflect the African position in the WTO. Most of the developing countries perceive the WTO agreements as being grossly imbalanced, internally inconsistent and even mutually contradictory. There is a powerful demand from developing countries, governments and civil society that there must be a review, reform and revision for these WTO agreements. For example, highly industrialised countries continue to be allowed to use subsidies for their agriculture and yet

African countries that demand to subsidise their small family producers are not allowed to utilise their subsidies (Gibb, 2004).

NEPAD continues to embrace the WTO as a forum to negotiate better terms for Africa in the multilateral global system. This is mostly an extremely naïve perception because the WTO is a ruthless arena for negotiations. This is a trade-negotiating forum and the governments go there to fight for the rights of their countries and corporations. It is not a polite meeting of men. Again, NEPAD ignores the tangible positions of Africa at the WTO. Meanwhile Africa opposes further tariff liberalisation, South Africa pushes it and NEPAD incorporates terms for more manufacturing industrial liberalisation. Africa opposes the inclusion of investment in the WTO and many countries are opposed to investment incorporated under the controls of WTO. Yet NEPAD proposes the introduction of more transparency and access to capital in Africa for Africa to develop in the WTO. This presents the manner in which NEPAD attempts to introduce matters that, in general, African countries and many developing countries do not support (Gibb, 2004)

NEPAD fails to realise that the WTO is not transparent, inaccessible, and an undemocratic institution. It is not a system premised on rules but based on power. Until NEPAD realises this, it will be impossible to engage with the WTO as an instrument to promote Africa's interests (Keet, 2004).

It is highly imperative to realise that South Africa's implementation of NEPAD in Africa is beset by many problems ranging from financial to political challenges. In this regard, the

partners who were engaged by the crafters of NEPAD imposed policies such as trade liberalisation and good governance to inject much sought after funds to NEPAD. Funds were injected but far less than what was expected. The politics confronting NEPAD were mainly domestic whereby South Africa does not possess the mandate to interfere in the affairs of member states. Such a state of affairs makes it difficult for NEPAD to establish a suitable politically stable ground that is a *sine qua non* for socio-economic development.

This chapter indicated the link between NEPAD and South Africa that is premised on the promotion of democracy, protection of human rights and the promotion of an African agenda. In developing MAP that was later dovetailed with the Omega Plan to form NEPAD Mbeki endeavoured to promote the basis of South African foreign policy that is promotion of democracy and protection of human rights in the continent which was engulfed in the quagmire of authoritarianism and tyranny. In his attempt, he wanted to attract and assure the rich developed countries in the north that Africa is a continent on a path to restore human dignity by embracing democracy which is the base for Africa and the north as enshrined in the partnership. In promoting democracy and human rights, South Africa undertook giant steps by utilising its military resources to resolve African conflicts. These conflicts remain a serious challenge to South Africa's implementation of NEPAD.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND NEPAD

This chapter focuses on the relationship between South African foreign policy and NEPAD. The chapter explores the foundations and evolution of South African foreign policy dating back from when the apartheid policy perceived South Africa as a pariah, to the current democratic foreign policy of middle power operating along multilateral avenues. Throughout the chapter, the reader is afforded the opportunity to witness the operationalisation of South African foreign policy objectives, the African Renaissance, and MAP that are the cornerstones for the relationship between South Africa and NEPAD. The rationale for focussing on South Africa is premised on the fact that South Africa is one of the architects of NEPAD and has worked tirelessly to promote and implement it across the continent. In this regard, the chapter endeavours to outline the link between South African foreign policy and NEPAD. This is to demystify wrong African perceptions about South Africa that she is a continental hegemon utilising NEPAD as a means to dominate the continent and search for markets for its industry and services.

4.1. South African Foreign Policy: Apartheid Era

According to Adebajo *et al.* (2007), the notion that South Africa should play an assertive role in African international relations pre-dates the 1940s. This wish existed in the minds of the many of leaders from various societies irrespective of colour or ideology. In April 1940, during a speech delivered at the country's main agricultural and industrial show, the

then Prime Minister, Jan Smuts requested an urgent adjustment of the country's approach to African affairs. Le Pere (1998) adds that Smuts emphasised that for South Africa to take its rightful position by leading in Pan African development, the shaping of the future policies and developments of the continent, then the country was supposed to face the realities and the facts of that time and seize the opportunities they offered. In that context, Africa would be a proper market if South Africa would but have a vision and far sighted policy. Smuts realised that South Africa could not be entirely isolated from her neighbours and the continent. However, the country was supposed to undertake initiatives aimed at cajoling African states to forge socio economic and political links with her neighbours. These links would benefit South Africa largely because she was the most industrialised and developed country at that time (interview)

During the late sixties, the white minority government revisited Smuts' idea. In this context, the regime invented two conceptual approaches suitable for South Africa's relation with her immediate neighbours in particular and Africa in general. These concepts became known as *Détente and Dialogue*. These concepts were utilised to seek continental approval for South Africa's racial policies and diplomatic recognition of its soon-to-be independent homelands. However, as was the case with apartheid South Africa, there was more behind the concepts because it was during the height of modernisation, and the idea of South Africa to develop and advance Africa was within South Africa's diplomatic outreach. The rhetoric that accompanied these successive diplomatic movements was based on substantial returns for South African business, which reciprocally supported a range of additional initiatives to accelerate the goals of apartheid's quest for an African destiny. Both Dialogue

and Détente failed. They became the victims of the Cold War divide and the minority's blind faith in apartheid rather than the ability or unwillingness of South African business community to support its government (Nolutsungu, 1975).

By the late seventies, President Botha's government presented a proposal to Southern African states to form a *Constellation of Southern African States* (CONSAS). The idea of CONSAS was premised on sub-regional integration which essentially entailed the creation of a formal group of states in Southern Africa based on South Africa's centrality and dominance within the sub region. The Constellation ideally would include Southern African states such as Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia, Zaire, Angola and the independent Namibia along with those South African homelands regarded as *de facto* states by the international community and as such could not be accorded the international recognition which is accorded to legitimate states. These states were Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (Swart and Du Plessis, 2004). The South African government utilised the concept of the homelands system as a means to persuade Southern African states to buy into the idea of CONSAS. This approach was appropriate because in the eyes of South African governments, the illegitimate black governments in homelands would dilute the element of whiteness and apartheid which was a threat to neighbouring countries (interview).

Solomon (2004) adds that the idea of CONSAS was premised on inducing states within the region to enter into a non – aggression pact with South Africa to promote the concept of mutual defence against the common enemy. Furthermore, the intention of this pact was to

lock South Africa's immediate neighbours even more firmly into the South African economic system in order to increase their dependency on and South Africa's leverage over them, thereby distracting them from assisting South African liberation movements and / or preparing for a military onslaught. In March 1979, the South African Foreign Minister, Pik Botha, in the so called Zurich Declaration, formally announced the "anti – Marxist" CONSAS perceived as a platform for regional security and economic bloc of between seven and ten states (interview).

The promotion of CONSAS was encapsulated in the *Total National Strategy* espousing the apartheid regime's necessity to mobilise economic, political and military resources for defending and advancing the interests of the country nationally and regionally and to maintain a commanding military balance relative to the states of Southern Africa. In this regard, the *State Security Council* (SSC) coordinated by the National Joint Planning Centre, which transformed the South African executive into a civil – military junta was established. The new military technocrats prepared and delivered a regional strategic policy premised on armed force for reversing the liberation movements' insurgency by instituting a counter – revolutionary strategy of destabilisation, called "*swaardmag*" which is the power of the sword. By implementing these policies and architects, the South African government launched scathing total onslaughts of military action against neighbouring states. For example, there were many large-scale invasions of and trans-border incursions into Angolan territory and raids against *African National Congress* (ANC) residences in Lesotho, Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe and Botswana (Neethling, 2003). The apartheid

government was aiming at entrenching a military fear among its neighbours to coerce them to release and never harbour liberation movements.

The information indicated above, highlights that the South African Foreign Policy was based on the preservation and protection of the white minority sovereignty. The white state was preserved through promulgation of draconian decrees which were marshalled by the segregation policy of apartheid. Domestically, the custodians of the white minority government ensured that blacks acquired the form of training and education that would make them submissive and subservient. Any people who challenged apartheid were subdued and subjugated through incarceration without trial (Van Niewkerk, 2001). The apartheid government maintained that it was obliged to elevate white supremacy nationally and domestically. Any acts counter to this idea would be obliterated, that is the reason why the government of the day went in leaps and bounds to develop exogenous policies which would preserve the white supremacy and exceptionalism.

South Africa's segregation policy received a lukewarm welcome internationally. The chief antagonist of South African white supremacy was the *United Nations* (UN) which launched scathing criticisms against the country. Many of the *ad hoc* sessions of the UN were devoted to find suitable solutions directed at the dismantling of apartheid. Subsequently, the President of the General Assembly disallowed South Africa's participation in UN's activities. That disgusted South Africa and the country responded by recalling Pik Botha, its Permanent Representative at the UN. Furthermore, the apartheid regime withheld its contributions to the UN. Neo - liberalism was exposed when other key stakeholders in

international relations exposed their dissent concerning South Africa's behaviour. The *Federation of International Football Association* (FIFA) and *International Olympics Committee* (IOC) expelled South Africa from its structures. Similarly, the *Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries* (OPEC) imposed an oil embargo on South Africa beckoning her to rescind apartheid. This outlines that in international relations states are not the only powerful players but there are other role players in the form of non-state actors such as MNCs (Knight, 2001). Foreign Policy making of the apartheid era acted as an *Oligarchic Bureaucratic* process. Decision-making was curtailed and centralised within the hands of a small, elite, white, male sector. The white electorate, pressure groups and white members of the ruling party were excluded from this exercise (Barber and Barrat, 1999).

4.2. South Africa's Democratic Foreign Policy

4.2.1. Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights: President Mandela's Regime

According to Tjemolane (2011), the collapse of communism including the mounting political pressure from the international community provided the ideal historical opportunity for the apartheid government to initiate basic political changes which necessitated the release of Nelson Mandela, the unbanning of the ANC and other political movements as well as the political negotiation dialogue that followed in the early 1990s. Subsequently, this resulted in the abolition of the apartheid government system. In this regard, the *Government of National Unity* (GNU) comprising the ANC, the *National Party* (NP), other minority political parties and labour movements was assembled on an interim basis. In 1994, the first national democratic elections took place and the ANC reigned victorious. The "new democratic" ANC led government was instituted. Subsequent to that,

the country's foreign policy was re - formulated against the backdrop of the new *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa*, Act 108 of 1996. The GNU was established to narrow the divisions between blacks and whites so that the atmosphere of peaceful co-existence gravitating towards the rebuilding of the country should be harnessed and developed. The foreign policy of the new South Africa promoted the bill of rights which advocated the promotion of democracy and protection of human rights in the country's engagement with its continental neighbours and global world (interview).

According to Spence (2001), South Africa's post apartheid foreign policy is African – oriented and particularly devoted to the Southern African region. It is also committed to “*transformation*” of the continent and further afield (Johnston, 2001). South Africa's post 1994 foreign policy content further addresses critical policy matters including human rights, peace and prosperity. This was emphasised when during 1993 – 1994, the ANC outlined foreign policy principles that would guide South Africa's approach to international relations. These were tabled in a discussion paper presented by the foreign policy group and in an article presented by Nelson Mandela. In both publications, a strong moral dimension embracing human rights, international law, peace, and disarmament were tabled. Mandela emphasised foreign policy should be based on “the belief that human rights should be the cornerstone of international relations”. The working group on foreign policy embraced and acknowledged that. It is in this regard that human rights have been extended beyond politics to embrace economic, social and environmental concerns (ANC Today).

According to Mills and Borer (2009), in 1994 the ANC proclaimed its endorsement of human rights by automatically embracing the activities of human rights activists. Currently, human rights issues are prioritised within South Africa's foreign policy principles and objectives. The advocacy for human rights as expounded by the ANC led government goes beyond political rights to incorporate economic, social, cultural and environmental rights. Former South African President Nelson Mandela, before his ascension to the highest office in the country, forewarned that the neglect of human rights matters can be catastrophic to the international system. Again, he optimistically emphasised that the foreign policy of a democratic South Africa would embrace human rights and democracy as its cornerstones. It would further maintain the perception that the country's future is entirely dependent on Africa generally and Southern Africa in particular, and that South Africa will strive for regional cooperation and not domination. The promotion of democracy and human rights are the elements linking NEPAD to South African foreign policy. This is because the neo-liberal policies invoked in NEPAD have a highest regard for democracy and human rights when the programme advocates good governance (interview).

For the afore-mentioned reason, owing to its political history, transition and eventual re-admission into the international system are perceived by many as a "*beacon of hope*" particularly for the oppressed. In this regard, the South African government is ethically expected to play a major role in promoting and protecting human rights. Over and above, the ANC pledged to attend to pervasive human rights related matters, such as the conduct of war, migration, torture, racism and apartheid, women's and children abuse as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and many other UN protocols and

conventions. It pronounced that it acknowledges the obligation of human rights custodianship in its bilateral and multilateral relations. Adding to that, the party promised to guard against biased participation in human rights violation matters, especially where its national interests might be undermined (The Economist, 2008).

Tjemolane (2011) further reveals that during the initial states of democratic dispensation, hopes were cardinal that South Africa would play a constructive leading role in the continent primarily in matters relating to security. Such an optimistic state of affairs can be linked to pronouncements of the ruling party prior to it becoming victorious during the 1994 democratic elections. In its Foreign policy Perspective in a Democratic South Africa dossier, the ANC pledges the following peace and security related commitments that *inter alia* include:

- Participation in the peaceful resolution of regional disputes, common security arrangements and disarmament in concert with neighbouring countries for the regional and sub regional continental stability and security; Recommendation for fellow regional members to sign a *non – aggression* treaty;
- Participation in endeavours to ensure a world free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction under the auspices of *Nuclear Non – Proliferation Treaty* (NPT);
- Participation in the control of conventional arms through the UN Expert Group on Conventional Arms Transfers; and
- Attention to matters of international trafficking of small arms and military intervention in foreign countries, and refugees.

According to Matlosa and Hamill (2007), the above-mentioned principles assert that South Africa is expected to assume a supreme continental role in terms of security assurance. This continues to re-emphasise that South Africa, because of its military (army, air - force and navy) capacity, resourcefulness and better organisation is anticipated to lead peacekeeping interventions and mediations in the region and sub - regions. The *South African Foreign Policy Discussion Document* released in 2008 emphasises South Africa's participation in continental conflict prevention, peacekeeping and endeavours aimed at the alleviation of the proliferation of conventional and nuclear arms.

Barber (1999) explains that it is not surprising for the ANC to emphasise a moral dimension in its Foreign Policy. The reason is that the party has fought a lengthy liberation struggle in pursuit of human rights. It had succeeded in overthrowing apartheid and in so doing; it had received resounding support from the international community. Inspired by its own *political miracle*, the ANC set out to promote its moral values. There has been some noticeable success in a number of ways, *inter alia*: taking a leading role in a campaign against nuclear proliferation; the banning of landmines; and conflict resolution in Africa.

Van Nieuwkerk (2006) adds by highlighting the economic principle of South Africa's foreign policy. This principle identifies economic development as one of the cornerstones of South Africa's foreign policy which emphasises:

- A belief that South Africa's economic development depends on growing regional and international economic cooperation in an independent world.

As a means to explain the above-mentioned aspect, the South African government identified economic development as a pedestal for foreign policy. As early as 1993, prior the change of government, Nelson Mandela emphasised that the South African government would endeavour to assist to end the international economic crisis and incorporate South Africa in the global economy. Again, in his speech to the Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committee of Parliament on 14 March 1995, the late Alfred Nzo, former Minister of the Department of Foreign Affairs emphasised the need for South Africa to promote sub - regional and continental economy. The promotion of sub - regional economic development is of high significance because the economies of the countries in the region are intertwined. For South Africa to believe the country could enter a potentially prosperous future in isolation from neighbouring countries that would be unrealistic. The Minister emphasised that South Africa would further attempt to involve the corporate world with the purpose of establishing maximum possible development of its human and natural resources by combining foreign capital with expertise (SAGI, 2008). The South African government realised that it could not isolate itself from a sub region and continent engulfed in poverty. However, sub regional and continental economic integration is highly important for all the participants to pool their resources for the advancement of the continent. As a politically stable and economically developed state, South Africa is supposed to play a leading role (interview).

The above highlighted idea reflects that democracy and human rights were at the heart of South Africa's foreign policy during the reign of President Mandela. This was premised on the ruling party's acrimonious experience during apartheid. The ANC realised that it was

important in emphasising democracy, human rights and economic development in its foreign policy in order to export such ideas across the region and continent that were pervasively engulfed in violations of human rights and democracy. These two attributes have been perceived as the pedestals for socio - economic and political development of the continent that has over the decades been underdeveloped and marginalised from the rapidly globalising economy.

4.2.2. Promotion of the African Agenda: President Thabo Mbeki's Regime

President Mbeki was officially elected unopposed as the second black President of South Africa in 1999. During his tenure, he refined South Africa's foreign policy which today rests on five pillars which are:

- *Consolidation of the African Agenda:* This is undertaken to promote democracy and protect human rights across the continent. Over and above South Africa will use its position as an economically powerful state across the continent to promote Africa's interests at the UN, WTO, World Bank, IMF, and the G8;
- *South – south cooperation:* The country should actively participate in the deliberations which are aimed at addressing the plight of the developing countries. These interactions are undertaken at the G 77 and China as well as NAM.
- *North – South dialogue :* Active interactions with the rich developed countries such as the G8 pushing for the cancellation of Africa's debt and integration into the globalised economy
- *Strengthening of bilateral relations:* Establishment of bilateral relations with various countries to promote South Africa's interests; and

- *Promotion of global governance in the areas of political and security issues as well as socio – economic matters* – Pushing for the reform of global institutions to protect and promote South Africa's and continental interests.

4.2.2.1. African Renaissance

According to Venter (2001) poor economic and political governance in sub – Saharan Africa creates a negative image resulting in low investment in the region, including South Africa. South Africa's investment possibilities are affected by the *Africa dummy*, which the country is interested in addressing; hence the need to promote governance through the African Renaissance project. The African Renaissance is part of South Africa's strategy to promote African renewal and solidarity with other African states including the rest of the global South to seek good governance and fair market access (interview).

Venter and Neuland (2005) maintain that Jules Machet, a French Historian coined the concept Renaissance and utilised it in contrast to the Dark Middle Ages. In the 20th Century, there were perceptions that Renaissance was perhaps one of a series of enlightenment movements. Subsequently, the current discussion on the renaissance became more specific, for example, English Renaissance and Italian Renaissance. Renaissance is sometimes used interchangeably with the word civilisation. In this regard, a series of African Renaissances are highlighted. These include *inter alia* Ancient Egyptian period (3100 – 343 BC), Ancient Carthage (814 BC – 697 AD), Trans Sahara Trade and Development of African Empires (800 – 1100 AD), Hausa City States (circa 10th century AD onwards), Karem – Bornu (circa 8th – 15th centuries AD), the Iron Age South of the

Sahara (from 1400 BC), Greater Zimbabwe and Mapubungwe (around 1000 AD). It is explained that the common feature for the periods of awakening included political and economic structures, social systems and religion, trade and commerce, legal systems, architecture, science, technology and manufacturing, writing, transport and art. This bears testimony that Africans have also contributed to human civilisation

In this modern Africa, the African Renaissance is the concept aiming to regenerate Africa. It is an old concept with various presentations. Pixley Isaka ka Seme called it the *Regeneration of Africa*; Leopold Senghor called it *Negritude*; Nnamdi Azikiwe called it *Renascent Africa* and Thabo Mbeki calls it the *African Renaissance*. All these visions aspire for socio – economic development of Africa. This explanation denotes that African Renaissance evolved over the years and it became the core value aimed to renew the continent in order to address socio – economic malaise (interview).

According to Vale and Maseko (1998), the African Renaissance is a holistic vision aimed at promoting peace, prosperity, democracy and sustainable development, progressive leadership as well as good governance. This is not a concept from President Mbeki alone but for the ANC collective. Mbeki was given the opportunity to drive this vision forward on behalf of the organisation. After assuming office, Mbeki carried forward the liberal policies which were started by Mandela. This was a signal to the business community that he was committed to the idea of making South Africa in particular and Africa in general a destination for FDI and international commerce. As a means to promote democracy as enshrined in South Africa's policy, Mbeki launched scathing onslaughts on one party and

personal rule in the continent. He also encouraged African peoples to govern themselves by refusing and resisting all forms of tyranny.

Mbeki's liberal reforms and open condemnation of undemocratic governments in Africa angered African leaders, many of whom have harboured the ANC during the liberation struggle. These leaders retaliated and accused Mbeki of promoting Western ideas at the expense of African values. Mbeki and the government responded by formulating a new strategy to promote neo-liberalism in Africa. This new strategy encapsulated the positioning of neo-liberal message within a broader transformational agenda. Instead of the perpetual attack on illiberal regimes in Africa, Mbeki called for the joint reconstruction of Africa. This aimed at concluding the work of earlier Pan Africanist movements and to re-invent the African state to play its rightful and effective role in the complex global economy. For the achievement of this, Mbeki introduced the concept of African Renaissance as a conceptual framework (Schoeman, 2000).

South Africa's search for a leadership role on the continent and beyond clearly matches Mbeki's doctrine entrenched in the notion of an African Renaissance. South Africa's leadership role in the notion of an African revival is not only clearly stated but also cautiously implied in this doctrine. If clearly analysed, the Mbeki administration in its reference to an African Renaissance has always utilised pronouns "we" and "us" to involve not only South Africa but also the rest of the continent. The Mbeki government emphasised that as South Africa assumes the presidency of NAM, the government needed to ask itself a question: in what way can the NAM enhance the drive towards the restructuring of the

world order and the project of an African Renaissance (Van der Ross 2004). Gumede (2006) adds that the importance of articulating such inclusive statements is to avoid being a hegemon or dominant force in its quest to promulgate an “*African agenda*”, especially as has been suspected by many people domestically and continentally. In this context, Africa is looking to South Africa’s foreign policy as a leader and a reliable partner, cooperating with African states and not as some hegemon dictating the terms of the continent.

President Mbeki eagerly supported the concept of an African Renaissance eagerly by promoting African solidarity and development. Since his speech at the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, on 8 May 1996, President Mbeki became famous for the “*I am an African*” slogan (Hudson, 2007). This provided a platform for the creation of a new constitution, “*conceptual narrative* and “*normative agenda*” for what was necessary for the renaissance of the African continent. Given Mbeki’s knowledge of Africa (since he was the ANC main diplomat placed in Africa during his exile years), his “*I am an African*” slogan elevated the hopes of fellow South Africans pertaining to South Africa’s role in continental development (Le Pere and Van Nieuwerck, 2002). Adebajo et al. (2007) emphasise that South Africa’s foreign policy clearly reflects some of the African agenda hallmarks. This is manifested by *inter alia* the country’s participation in continental peace-making and peacekeeping, African democratisation and representation abroad (interview).

According to Maloka (2000), President Mbeki’s call for an African Renaissance can be comprehended as part of the series of awakenings in the political, economic, technological,

social and cultural development of the continent so that it can be meaningfully incorporated into the rapidly globalising world. The African Renaissance ideology recognises the horrendous past the people of the continent experienced under domination but also affirms that Africans could determine their own destiny. In this regard, the perspectives of the South African foreign policy and principles as articulated by the ANC identified the following essentials of the African Renaissance:

- Continental Recovery;
- Establishment of political democracy;
- Breaking of dependency on world economic powers;
- Mobilisation of people to take ownership of their future; and
- The need for development and growth that improves people's lives

The African Renaissance is the spatial design for Africa to challenge the existing geopolitical order including the old models of state sovereignty, state boundaries, national identity, and the Northern hegemony. It emphasises the following principles:

- An economic recovery of the continent;
- Establishment of good governance and political democracy on the continent; and
- Mobilisation of African people to take their destiny into their own hands and the prevention of the continent's wealth from being expropriated (Le Pere, 1998).

Botha (2000) adds that the African Renaissance, contrary to the European counterpart, is not a celebration of the past but a future aspiration. The African Renaissance is a feasible project to return the people's destinies into their own hands after being told on a

continental scale that they did not possess anything valuable. In political terms, the African Renaissance aims to promote democratic ideals and a system of good governance across the continent. Economically, it challenges states to fight economic corruption and install institutions enhancing corporate governance as well as preparing the way for the regeneration of African economies.

As a foreign policy goal, the African Renaissance aims to promote tangible democracy and good governance that would enable the adoption of sound economic policies, promotion of anti – corruption and guarding against human rights violations in order to attract investments in the continent. Landsberg and Kondlo (2007) point out that the African Renaissance is a premise from which South Africa thinks it can promote democracy, respect for human rights as well as peace and security across the continent. This is a project directed at responding to globalisation and an endeavour to improve Africa’s geopolitical positioning in the world. These elements include promotion of interdependence and regional integration, promotion of the respect for human rights and justice as part of the African agenda, democratisation including the reform of the United Nations Security Council and IFIs.

The African Renaissance was not well received by some African scholars. According to Alden and Soko (2005), the African Renaissance was aimed at accelerating African development but it was engulfed in many flaws. It is perceived as conceptually self – contradictory and difficult to analyse because it is “*wide and vague*.” It aims at accelerating globalisation process on the continent, but at the same time, it seeks to reclaim

African history and culture. These goals oppose one another because the African Renaissance is “*Africanist*” and yet it strives to pursue a “*globalist*” or Western agenda which many African actors blame for Africa’s marginalisation from the process of globalisation and for a lack of public participation at the national spheres of government. Some critics argue that the African Renaissance is nothing but an “*elitist*” project lacking substance.

Taylor and Williams (2001) regard the African Renaissance as a “*wish list*” for continental development which is entrenched in orthodox liberal approaches to African development. For this reason, Mbeki’s African renewal concept also embodies coercive but liberal markets, trade and “*polyarchic*” organisations on the continent. Du Plessis (2002) emphasises that this vision will remain a perennial “*dream*” if Southern Africa and the continent at large are not well coordinated. Another problem with the notion is that it sounds more like a promise than a policy. It does not really define how ordinary citizens should hold governments accountable. It also singles out states as primary actors, especially at the decision making level, at the expense of the necessary participation of NGOs and ordinary people at grassroots levels.

4.2.2.2. Millennium Partnership for African Recovery (MAP)

The African Renaissance heavily influenced MAP. On 10 – 12 July 2000 President Mbeki presented it to the assembly of Heads of State and Government at the OAU summit in Lome`, Togo with a proposal to engage the developed North about developing a constructive partnership for the continent’s renewal. The Summit approved the proposal

and mandated Mbeki, Bouteflika and Obasanjo to work on the programme. This developed a foundation for engaging with the world's industrialised countries concerning Africa's development. Subsequently, the three presidents attended the G8 Summit in Okinawa, Japan on 21 – 23 July where they raised the matter of partnership with the eight industrialised countries in the world. The G8 requested them to develop a workable plan for that partnership (Venter, 2005).

Shortly after the Okinawa meeting, Obasanjo and Bouteflika mandated Mbeki with the responsibility to start developing the “*workable plan*” requested by the G8 without first consulting their peers at the OAU, or the OAU Contact Group on Africa's External Debt. In this regard, Mbeki went in leaps and bounds to prepare the first concept paper on engagement with the North and Obasanjo and Bouteflika approved it in September 2000. In October a steering committee, comprising two officials nominated by each of the three heads of state was established to develop a more detailed proposal. In February 2001, after numerous consultations with the three heads of state aimed at evaluating past and current development agendas for the continent, the steering committee produced a policy dossier entitled “*Draft 3(a)*” (DIRCO, 2002). This was intended as a vision statement as well as an outline of a programme of action for the continent's political, social, and economic revival.

According to Nabudere (2002) South Africa, and specifically Mbeki, was the prime mover of the MAP project. The task for developing the initial draft of the “*workable plan*” for Africa was entrusted to a small team working in the South African presidency in Pretoria. This explains the predominant South African reading of the development challenges facing

the continent and the prognoses for Africa “*extricating itself*” from its development quagmire. However, in championing MAP, South Africa endeavoured to give it a pan - African outlook and the country’s liberal trade focussing on continental interests remained the primary consideration. The philosophical framework for MAP diplomacy was provided by Mbeki’s notion of African Renaissance. This in turn, emerged from the notion of a “*black renaissance*” in post apartheid South Africa.

Nabudere (2002) continues to assert that MAP is the result of Mbeki’s African renaissance vision, through which he critically reassessed African states’ performance since the start of their independence in the 1960s. It is interesting to realise that Mbeki went about to mobilise support for his plan with the external powers prior to the drafting of MAP. In his report to the *ANC Today* after his initial briefing to WEF in Davos on 28th January 2001, President Mbeki explained in the way he had gone about consulting the great leaders of the developed world prior to beginning to write MAP. He said:

“During the year 2000, we spent some time meeting the political leadership of the developed world, the North. Accordingly, in May we met Prime Minister Blair and President Clinton in London and Washington D.C., respectively. We also met the then Governor George W .Bush in Austin, Texas. In June we were part of the Berlin meeting on progressive governance. ...In the same month, we visited and addressed the meeting of the Nordic Prime Ministers. Again in June, we addressed the meeting of the European Council held in Portugal, which was attended by all heads of government t of the EU. In July, together with Presidents Obasanjo and

Bouteflika, we met heads of state and governments of the G – 7 in Tokyo, and had the opportunity to hold bilateral discussions with the Japanese Prime Minister, Yoshiro Mori. While in Tokyo, we also met the President of the World Bank, Jim Wolfensohn. Later, in Pretoria, we also held discussions with the Managing Director of the IMF, Horst Kohler. In September, we addressed the UN Millennium Summit and had an opportunity to meet President Putin of Russia, among others. Before this, we had also interacted with the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, who committed the UN to cooperate with us as we worked on the MAP. ”

In this regard Mbeki is quoted lengthily to show that that he himself was keen to expound that he had gone all the way to promote his plan prior to the drafting of MAP. He explained why he had to go to this length when he wrote:

“We mention all these meetings because they enabled us to present to these political leaders the imperatives of addressing... the challenges of an African development.”

He adds that it was very...

“ inspiring to hear the entire political leadership of the countries of the North express firm commitment to the ideas of a new concerted effort to address, among other things, the challenge of African poverty and underdevelopment”.

Mbeki refers to all his visits in the plural of “we” with the exception of the G8 meeting in Tokyo. He never mentions the names of the people with whom he carried out these earlier briefings. The paragraph holistically affirms that MAP was Mbeki’s initiative alone, even though other scholars emphasise that it was a concerted effort of Mbeki, Obasanjo and Bouteflika (Nabudere, 2001a).

There is no doubt that MAP is to all intents and purposes a South Africa project in its origin and development. The South African Presidency and a few technocrats pulled all the strings to craft and develop the programme without consulting other stake holders such as the academics, think tanks and civil society who have the knowledge of socio – economic problems of the continent. This negative and exclusive approach makes it become a top down programme owned by the elite working in the office of the South African Presidency. Matters are exacerbated by President Mbeki’s injection of his energy in promoting the programme internationally without the assistance of the other two Presidents. This gives it a South African outlook in its development and promotion. That is why the rest of the continent has been sceptical about the whole NEPAD programme in which MAP was incorporated.

4.3. South Africa’s Foreign Policy Objectives: Resolution of African Conflicts

South Africa has been highly involved in conflict resolutions in Africa as part of the operationalisation of its foreign policy objectives. President Mbeki has been instrumental in this process. He has played a prominent role by persuading President Charles Taylor of Liberia to relocate to Nigeria for the facilitation of peace in that country. On the other hand,

South Africa has been involved in conflict resolutions in the DRC, Burundi and Cote d'Ivoire (interview).

4.3.1. South Africa's Involvement in the Conflict in DRC

The DRC has been gripped by a boiling and turbulent conflict that has lasted for four decades. As a measure to resolve that conflict, president Mbeki presented the concept of "*Renaissance Peacekeeping*" to the leaders of Zimbabwe, Uganda, Rwanda, and Zambia in January 1999. Mbeki invited these countries to establish a joint multinational operation aimed to resolve violence in the DRC (www.iss.co.za – 9/9/2002).

In February 2002, South Africa hosted the Inter Congolese Dialogue at Sun City. This convergence brought together all the stakeholders involved in the DRC conflict to find a suitable solution to their problems. The dialogue was sponsored by South Africa and it was envisaged to last for 45 days. Towards the 45th day, nothing concrete had materialised. Mbeki abandoned his South African government duties and personally flew to Sun City to take charge of the proceedings. In this regard, he developed and produced a compromise document that was discussed and finally accepted by all stakeholders as a cornerstone for the resolution of the conflict. It transpired that an interim government led by Joseph Kabila was to be established. Additionally, a new military force comprising all stakeholders should be instituted (www.allafrica.com- 9/9/2003).

According to Wakabi (2003), the South African government is highly involved in peacekeeping in the DRC, besides peace making. An involvement in peacekeeping is

evident when South Africa deployed troops to the DRC as a contingent of the *United Nations Mission in Congo – MONUC*. Ndaba (2004) adds that South African soldiers deployed in the DRC are heavily engaged in peace building activities apart from their original mandate. Warrant Officer Strydom has begun a child welfare programme for street kids, orphans, and children living with HIV/AIDS. The project began with donations from her husband. Thereafter she negotiated to secure an unused warehouse from its French owner. She houses these children in it. She continues visiting local schools to teach young girls about the dangers of prostitution. She also teaches them sewing skills, and ways to plant and sell vegetables.

The lower structures are involved in strengthening peace to complement the work that is done by the top-level structure. Durban based *African Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes - ACCORD* has played its part in resolving the conflict in the DRC. ACCORD organised a round table discussions for stakeholders in the DRC conflict. They included *inter alia* rebels from the *Congolese Democratic Rally*, (RCD) unarmed political parties, ministers from Mobutu's government, and the archbishop of Kisangani as well as a broad range of civil society groups. These parties were engaged in open discussions on many critical issues (Naidoo, 2000).

4.3.2. South Africa's Involvement in a Conflict in Burundi

During the year 2000, South Africa got involved in the conflict in Burundi. Former South African president, Nelson Mandela, took over from the late Julius Nyerere as Burundi mediator. Mandela committed himself together with South Africa to establish lasting

solutions for peace in Burundi. That became the core of Mbeki's Millennium African Recovery Programme intended to obliterate poverty, conflicts and underdevelopment in Africa (interview).

Mandela called a *Peace Summit* on 21 February 2000 in Arusha, Tanzania. All but Hutu rebel movements turned up. Proposals for sustainable peace talks in Burundi were drafted at the Summit. These included the creation of an integrated army; setting the date for holding of democratic elections and the provision of amnesty for perpetrators. Mandela managed to secure a meeting scheduled for the 6th June 2000. In that meeting he managed to persuade opposing parties to establish an interim government (Rankhumise, 2002).

According to Neethling (2001), the South African government sent troops to Burundi as part of negotiations. These soldiers provided VIP- *Very Important Person* protection to about 150 Burundian political leaders who had returned from exile. There were 1 467 soldiers. The South African government covered their expense. Cilliers (2003) adds that South Africa further dispatched 700 soldiers as part of *African Mission in Burundi* (AMIB).

South African troops in Burundi have been highly involved in peace building. Soldiers have been highly involved in community rehabilitation projects. They have formed projects such as: Street Kids And The hand that gives. These projects help orphans, children living on the streets, refugees and poor people. One unnamed soldier undertook to donate part of his salary to support an orphan whose parents died in the conflict. Every Sunday, these

soldiers sacrificed their lunch meals and gave them to children. Chaplains from the South African force motivate and preach in local churches (Nemtshongwana 2004).

South Africa's involvement in the resolution of conflicts in Africa is highly influenced by the country's desire to help the continent on a path to lasting peace and security. The problems with these conflicts are that they affect South Africa indirectly because the country continues to be flooded by illegal and legal immigrants who are subsequently confronted with xenophobia from desperate South Africans who accuse African foreigners of seizing the limited job opportunities. Apart from South Africa being affected, the peaceful region of SADC is flooded with small weapons, which are smuggled along porous borders of the countries in the region. The proliferation of these small and light weapons exacerbates violent crimes such as bank robberies and car hijackings. South Africa cannot be an island of wealth surrounded by an ocean of conflicts. These interventions are necessary for peace that is the foundation for development. A stable African environment is necessary for South Africa to penetrate the African market and advance the continental economy globally.

4.3.4. Perspectives about South African Foreign Policy

South Africa's foreign policy has been exposed to many controversies with regard to its identity in African international relations. On this matter, there are two schools of thought linked to South Africa's foreign policy. One perspective is that South Africa's foreign policy advances an emerging middle power or partner in the continent. Conversely, the other school of thought perceives South Africa's foreign policy as an advancement of

selfish hegemonic tendencies in the continent. The term “*middle power*” is utilised to denote:

- A certain position in a universal hierarchy of states;
- States with a size and rank that gives them an opportunity to exert moral influence over the global system; and
- States with an interest in a stable international system but without imposing an ideologically preconceived vision of an ideal world.

It is noteworthy to comprehend that a middle power operates along multilateral avenues since it cannot impose its vision on the world on its own. These states are expected to keep their backyard neat with the support of big powers, and to enforce global rules. They also have a moral status that enables them to exert their influence in certain cases where big powers cannot (Habib and Selinyane, 2006).

South Africa has clearly executed its role as a middle power in the international arena. It became an example in its control of small arms, voluntary decommission of nuclear weapons, the ban on anti-personnel landmines as well as playing a leading role in the NPT Review, Extension Conference of 1995 and the proscription of the unregulated trade in diamonds to finance regional wars. It also remained the leading voice for the South at the WTO and for debt relief. In Africa, it played a role in developing NEPAD, reformation of OAU into AU, its drive to host PAP and its bid to represent Africa in the reformed Security Council. The country was engaged in interventions in the DRC, Lesotho, Burundi and Angola and its disaster relief endeavours in Lesotho, Mozambique and Tanzania. These

engagements reflect South Africa's insistence on a stable international environment without imposing its ideological underpinnings.

Lentner (2005) explains the attributes of a hegemon which *inter alia* include:

- A yearning for economic and military dominance in the global or at the very last in the regional political sphere while marginalising rivals;
- Politically, economically and military influential in the areas where it seeks hegemonic leadership; and
- Its participation and recognition in the international system speaks volumes about its leadership prowess.

According to Mills (1998), South Africa's foreign policy has advanced selfish hegemonic interests regionally and continentally since 1994. That became evident when South Africa refused to renegotiate the unequal *Southern African Customs Union* (SACU) agreements, its trade battles with Zimbabwe between 1994 and 1997, its violation of the integrity of SACU through bilateral agreements with non – SACU countries in the region, and its unilateral abrogation of sections of the agreement that seem to threaten its dominance. Of the eight SADC trade protocols adopted by 1998, South Africa had ratified only one, that is the protocol on shared water resources which it desperately required as witnessed by the giant dam project in Lesotho. On the political level, South Africa's search for supremacy was seen in the battle with Zimbabwe on the issue around the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security.

South Africa's attributes such as economic might, military capacity, geographic size, population size and industrial capacity, the country is able to utilise these to advance its own national interests. It is never wrong for a country to advance its interests but the problem lies with how it does this. In this regard, South Africa effectively utilises multilateralism to advance its own and the continental interests. In some instances, the country is perceived as a hegemon when it attempts to correct situations in the continent. A case in point is the quest to incorporate Organ on Politics, Defence and Security into SADC structures. By all accounts, South Africa's foreign policy gravitates between hegemon and emerging middle power. This is because the country promotes its own national interests meanwhile cooperating with other states for incorporating Africa in the globalised world, challenging for the reform of the institutions of global governance.

CHAPTER FIVE

FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter presents the summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations pertaining to the study.

5.1. Findings

The study managed to test the dependency theory and ascertained that it is compatible and applicable to the subject under investigation; in this case, challenges facing Africa to implement NEPAD. In its test of the dependency theory, the study found out that NEPAD is entirely depending on foreign aid for its genesis and implementation. For the African Union and NAM to engage with Africa's creditors for debt cancellation, IFIs and rich developed countries mandated the progenitors of NEPAD to undertake that task. Their engagement with the G8 subsequently resulted in the G8 requesting the progenitors of NEPAD to develop a plan of action appropriate for developing Africa. The action of the G-8 became so persuasive in that NEPAD's progenitors diverted their initial mandate by concentrating on the new ones from the G-8. NEPAD's progenitors complied and developed a plan of action called MAP and presented it to the G-8 who accepted the plan and encouraged Africans to invoke the concept of "*partnership*" aimed at honouring the interaction between Africa and the G-8. As a token of appreciation for acknowledging the nature of the partnership, the G-8 committed to inject a whopping US \$ 67 billion annually

into Africa for the implementation of the programme. Subsequently, the G-8 injected a far smaller amount and diverted their funds to assist emerging Eastern European countries, especially to dismantle of Russia's nuclear capacity. Again, dependency is reflected when MAP, the Africa's renewal plan was unveiled for the first time, outside the continent, at the WEF in Davos. The extent of this dependency was so severe in that civil society including academics, development practitioners, politicians and other stakeholders were overlooked to the advantage of the rich developed countries. In African International Relations, NEPAD became a top-down developmental programme popular with privileged personnel.

The rich developed countries attached conditions such as good governance and trade liberalisation for injecting funds into the continent. In this regard, NEPAD was implemented for ensuring that constitutional democracy, rule of law, separation of powers, and the judiciary became the cornerstones of political governance across Africa. Unfortunately, this did not occur because there was pervasive authoritarianism, violation of human rights, utilisation of state apparatus to oppress the masses as well as gruesome armed conflicts around the continent. Economically, NEPAD was implemented for promoting a *laissez faire* market economy that encouraged privatisation, right sizing of the workforce, and abolishment of tariffs as well as reduction of social spending. This happened against the nature of the continental economy that was fledgling, weak and disarticulated. Over and above, these liberal policies such as privatisation and lesser intervention of the state in the economy resulted in catastrophic disasters such as unemployment and the raising of tariffs for services such as water, sanitation and electricity.

The study was conducted to provide answers to the following questions:

(1) What is NEPAD? The study found out that NEPAD is one of the latest African developmental initiatives with an external influence, especially from the rich and developed G8 countries geared towards addressing Africa's socio – economic and political malaise. It is the result of two well known dossiers, MAP produced by President Mbeki and Omega Plan produced by Senegalese President Wade as well as the lesser known document, Compact of African Recovery produced by ECA. By all accounts, NEPAD presents the subtle African competition between Anglophone and Francophone countries, although this assertion is rejected by its progenitors. When one looks at the development of NEPAD, then one would understand that Anglophone Presidents, Obasanjo and Mbeki were at the forefront for delivering MAP that articulated their vision of good governance and trade liberalisation at the time. In order to dilute the Anglophone dominance, President Wade delivered the Omega Plan, which was initially presented at the Francophone Summit as a blue print for Africa's development. The wisdom of the OAU intervened and suggested that both programmes should be merged into one. Furthermore, the study found out that NEPAD is a top – down developmental programme that failed to consult with civil societies, who totally reject it. Primarily, NEPAD promotes good governance and trade liberalisation as the cornerstones of Africa's development and relies heavily on external aid for its implementation.

(11) What are the challenges faced by Africa in implementing NEPAD? The study found out that the implementation of NEPAD faces myriad challenges. The main challenge is that

of domestic sovereignty invoked in the constitutive act of the African Union. This clause invokes rights within the domestic jurisdiction of a particular country by providing the rights to inhabitants of that country to determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development freely and without any interference. Conversely, NEPAD infringes on the political, economic and social rights of particular countries because AU advocates that people within certain countries should be should exercise these above-mentioned rights without any external interference.

NEPAD faces challenges when implementing the peace and security initiative because the mandate of peace and security lies within the domain of the AU's Peace and Security Council. NEPAD's actions appear to be creeping and interfering with that of the AU peace and Security Council. Notwithstanding that, the implementation of NEPAD faces an implementation gap resulting from lack of proper prioritisation and effective utilisation of existing resources by the AU. The second challenge relates to financial incapacity of the African Union. In this instance, the AU has been unable to mobilise financial resources which are needed for peacekeeping and that has handicapped peacekeeping to achieve its objectives timeously and operate within its mandate. Rather, the financial resources were sourced from donor partners such as the EU which consistently complained about the AU's lack of transparency and accountability about the finances which are injected into peacekeeping. These meagre resources are further depleted by the continued existence of conflicts around the continent which overstretch the financial and human resource capacity of the AU. This indicates that NEPAD cannot implement its own peace and security initiative and relies heavily on the African Union for maintaining peace and security.

Regarding the implementation of democracy and political initiative, the study ascertained that NEPAD is unable to interfere in the domestic sovereignty of member states. This clause also extends to the African Union. NEPAD and the African Union have a narrow interpretation of democracy whereby the narrow focus is limited only to the holding of regular elections as a benchmark for evaluating democracy and political initiative around the continent. In some instances, these elections take place, but they are rigged and the AU and NEPAD recommend a political solution to resolve the election crises even though the results are legitimate. The outcome of the political solution recommends to contesting parties to form a government of national unity composing of two sets of antagonists. Within this form of government, the incumbent president utilises his precedence to suppress and oppress the other component within the government of national unity. That has been the case in Zimbabwe when the government of national unity was formed but the members of the *Movement for Democracy* (MDC) were suppressed and oppressed by President Mugabe and his ZANU cronies. This has ultimately resulted in Mugabe remaining in power for a long time and empowered him to institute draconian decrees to victimise any form of opposition and dissent. Over and above, the situation presented by NEPAD and the AU entrenches authoritarianism in the continent and the contest over the results of elections has become an emerging trend around the continent. Within Zimbabwe, there is gross violation of human rights such as detention without trial and censoring of the media. However, NEPAD remains quiet and unable to apply pressure on the government of the day to institutionalise democracy and political stability.

The study has also ascertained that NEPAD does not have a generic African policy that is aimed at addressing economic and corporate governance. Matters are worsened by the fact that certain African governments are not committed and lack a political will to enact a monitoring process and this results in a serious loss of revenue around the continent. Secondly, some governments collude with MNCs to engage in malfeasance, incorrect and unscrupulous practices where the latter avoids commitments such as paying taxes, or exploits labourers and generate huge profits without compensating the affected parties such as the communities in which they operate. This unscrupulous activity is common within the mining industry which continues to expropriate the land of local people and collude with the government. Furthermore, these mining houses continue to pollute the environment, land and water which result in the contamination of the resources of the local people. That has been the case in the DRC. Such malpractices are a menace to socio economic development and acceleration of FDI which are highly regarded by NEPAD.

The study continued to find out that the implementation of the human development initiative faces many challenges that handicap South Africa's successful implementation of NEPAD. For example, in eradicating poverty, NEPAD continues to embrace the failed HIPC and PRGF strategies of the donor agencies which focus on the reduction of poverty rather than eradicating it. Africa's problem is not about the reduction of poverty, but the total eradication of this scourge to increase human security. Matters are worsened by the fact that these programmes, HIPC and PRGF have broad-based macro-economic objectives that are inconsistent with the NEPAD's quest to eradicate poverty. Donors designed these programmes without consulting civil society and academics who understand the African

situation. This is problematic to NEPAD which embraces imposed programmes without coming up with the ones that are commensurate with the situation in the continent.

Trade liberalisation policies are catastrophic to health, combating of HIV / AIDS as well as education and the reversal of the brain drain. In addressing health problems, NEPAD provides a catalogue of Africa's health problems rather than providing measures and means necessary to tackle these problems. There are no periods or terms of reference as well as nodal points which are equipped in developing appropriate policies necessary to address the health problems in Africa. Over and above this, each country possesses its own unique norms and standards to address health problems in its own backyard and this creates a lopsided approach to Africa's health problems. Furthermore, NEPAD is unable to provide a clear plan to address continental education that is in a mess. Learner drop-out continues to increase because of poverty and parents are unable to afford school fees because of the introduction of fees for services rendered. In order to come up with the mechanism to generate funds for children to attend school, NEPAD continues to come up with a narrow plan which insists on increasing learner enrolment but the generation of funds and means to attract learners to stay at school are omitted. Again, NEPAD is unable to develop a common African curriculum to ensure uniformity among African learners and become the building block for African learners to have a common understanding of the continent and its miseries. In this regard, each country develops its curriculum according to its own needs and standards. A Common curriculum is essential because when learners transfer from one country to the other it eliminates administrative glitches.

NEPAD's agricultural strategy is limited within a market led framework to development management which requires a limited role of the state as preached by trade liberalisation policies. This approach differs from the current practices undertaken globally. The limitation of this practice is that agricultural, trade and fiscal policies of northern states diffuse the intended policies of weaker states in this case African states. This is because agricultural development policies of the developed countries are based on extensive state intervention in product and factor markets preferring an agricultural structure which comprises protected owner-operated family farms dominated by private sector transnational firms (ibid). Furthermore, NEPAD's agricultural plan highlights a false identification revealing problems relating to tenure insecurity, and the manner in which this is reinforced through its interface with unimpeded population growth, declining agricultural technology and poor governance institutions.

(111) What is the relationship between South African foreign policy and NEPAD? The study found out that the relationship between South Africa and NEPAD originates from South Africa's foreign policy pillar advancing the promotion of an African agenda. This became the strategic area of intervention utilised by South Africa to promote the African Renaissance. Through this African Agenda South Africa invokes and cascades the principles of promotion of democracy and protection of human rights across the continent. It is in this circumstance that these elements became the cornerstones of NEPAD. In this regard, NEPAD has been used by South Africa as the vehicle transporting the promotion of democracy and protection of human rights in the continent. Promotion of democracy and human rights protection resulted in former President Mbeki endeavouring to develop

NEPAD and sell it globally to promote the cornerstones of the South African policy aimed at developing the continent socially, politically and economically in a rapidly globalising world that has marginalised the continent for many decades.

5.2. Conclusion

In conclusion, Africa's implementation of NEPAD encountered many problems which were present by the dependency invoked in NEPAD. Trade liberalisation re – introduced the failed SAPs in the continent through NEPAD and that reduced the intervention of the state in the economy of many African countries. The inability of the state to intervene in economic and social affairs plunged the continent into a serious quagmire. Over and above this, NEPAD is unable to provide clear solutions and directions to resolve the continental plight. It only manages to provide a catalogue of the continental problems. Africa's promotion of NEPAD is encouraged by the continent's quest to promote the African agenda and African Renaissance. However, NEPAD necessitates Africa to embrace democracy and human rights that are the cornerstones for development. Above all, Africa's implementation of NEPAD is made difficult by the principle of non-interference in the affairs of the sovereign states as invoked by the constitutive act of the AU.

5.3. Recommendations

The study recommends the following:

- NEPAD should develop vociferous and comprehensible common policies which invoke terms of reference, time frames and responsible people to lead implementation;

- The AU should encourage a policy of mutual interference that allows the continent to intervene in member states for accelerating socio – economic development. In this regard, NEPAD should be used as the available vehicle utilised to facilitate this process.
- NEPAD should mobilise resources needed to facilitate the implementation of its own policies, programmes and plans. This should be done by *inter alia* tax incentives for MNCs which impart knowledge and skills and accelerate development of the continent
- Civil society should always be consulted and incorporated into NEPAD by progenitors of NEPAD in utilising their expertise and knowledge for expanding the horizons of NEPAD. This will assist in narrowing existing gaps between states and civil society.
- The AU should create an environment that justifies that NEPAD is not solely a South African project aimed at promoting and protecting the hegemonic interests of South but an Afro – centric developmental project.
- In implementing trade liberalisation policies, NEPAD should develop protective regimes aimed at promoting and protecting the interests of the African citizenry.
- Africa, through NEPAD should negotiate with the developed countries, especially the G8 and IFIs for “*Marshall Plan like*” development aid which is not accompanied by any form of conditions. This form of aid should be directed at accelerating sustainable development across the continent whereby the developed countries will provide expertise. The only form of intervention should be through evaluation and assessment of projects.

The implementation of NEPAD in Africa is confronted by severe problems that are aggravated by the conditions attached by the rich developed countries. However, these conditions are favourable for developed countries because a stable Africa remains a heaven for their imports to be consumed by millions of Africans. Conversely, the rich developed countries are intransigent and adamant against the removal of tariff barriers for African exports. Furthermore, there are no punitive measures applied to rich countries whenever they are unable deliver on their pledges. The incorporation of NEPAD into the African Union structures has aggravated matters because the hype and momentum associated with the programme has eased and it has to compete with other AU structures for financing. The changes of government in the founding members of NEPAD have reduced their commitment in funding the programme. In this regard, AU member states who are unable to pay their membership become a greater burden for augmenting funds for NEPAD.

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APPENDIX

ANNEXURE 1 : INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

NAME OF RESEARCHER: Dankiso Ignatius Chungi Mabula

ADRESS: Peace Studies Programme

North West University

Mafikeng Campus

Private Bag X2046

The researcher would like to request your assistance in a research study titled: *Implementing New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD): Prospects and Challenges*
Approximately 20 minutes is needed to answer the questions.

You will be requested to answer all the questions completely and in as much detail as possible.

1. INTRODUCTORY QUESTIONS

- 1.1. What is your name?
-
-
- 1.2. What organisation do you work for?
-
- 1.3. What is your field of specialisation?

.....
.....

1.4. What is your position in your organisation?

.....
.....

1.5. How long have you been in the position?

.....
.....

2. QUESTIONS RELATED TO NEPAD AND AFRICA

2.1. When was NEPAD introduced in Africa?

.....
.....

2.2. What is the role of NEPAD in Africa?

.....
.....

2.3. Which countries played a role in the formulation of NEPAD?

.....
.....

2.4. What is the relationship between NEPAD and AU?

.....
.....

- 2.5. Who are the partners in NEPAD?
.....
.....
- 2.6. What are the challenges faced to implement NEPAD in Africa?
.....
.....
- 2.7. Why have attempts to develop Africa failed?
.....
.....
- 2.8. What will NEPAD do to ensure that it does not fail unlike its predecessors?
.....
.....
- 2.9. What is the importance of regional integration in promoting NEPAD?
.....
.....

3. QUESTIONS RELATING TO NEPAD AND SOUTH AFRICA

- 3.1. What is South Africa’s foreign policy towards Africa?
.....
.....
- 3.2. What is the role of South Africa in implementing NEPAD?
.....
.....

3.3. What are the challenges faced by South Africa to implement NEPAD?

.....
.....

3.4. What is the role of civil society in helping South Africa to implement NEPAD?

.....
.....

3.4. What does South Africa benefit to implement NEPAD?

.....
.....

4. Questions on the Subject Matter

4.1. What is your view on South Africa’s implementation of NEPAD?

.....
.....

4.2. What is your view on human security challenges faced by South Africa to implement NEPAD?

.....
.....

4.3. What is your view on the inability towards regional integration challenging South Africa to Implement NEPAD?

.....
.....

4.4. What is your view on problems within multilateral institutions challenging South Africa's implementation of NEPAD?

.....
.....

Closing

The researcher appreciates your time spent on this interview. Is there anything else you would want to say that would assist the researcher in understanding NEPAD better. I think I have obtained the information I need. Would it be alright to request another interview should I have some more questions?

ANNEXURE 11: LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

- 1. **Ezekiel Kedirileng**
Deputy Director: Department of International Relations and Cooperation
- 2. **Lulama Rhulumeni**
Deputy Director: Department of International Relations and Cooperation
- 3. **Lebo Ntsimane**
Desk Officer: Department of International Relations and Cooperation
- 4. **Oarabile Motlhaga**
Desk Officer: Department of International Relations and Cooperation
- 5. **Moses Setshedi**
Deputy Director: Department of Justice
- 6. **Itumeleng Phogojane**
International Relations Specialist: South African Revenue Services
- 7. **Bonolo Mothobi**
Deputy Director, International Relations: North West Provincial Office
- 8. **Wendy Mmatli**
Assistant Director: Department of International Relations and Cooperation
- 9. **Clive Makhubu**
First Secretary: South African Permanent Mission to the African Union
- 10. **Dalindyebo Nase**
Counsellor, Political: South African Permanent Mission to the African Union
- 11. **Ambassador Dumisani Kumalo**
Former Ambassador of South Africa to the United Nations
- 12. **Deputy Ambassador Johnny Pitswane**
Deputy Ambassador of South Africa to the African Union

13. **Thapelo Madumane**
Deputy Director: Department of International Relations and Cooperation
14. **Sipho Seakamela**
Assistant Director: Department of International Relations and Cooperation
15. **Tshireletso Nkaletse**
Desk Officer: Department of International Relations and Cooperation
16. **Sandra Lefifi**
Desk Officer: Department of International Relations and Cooperation
17. **Dr. Joseph Radebe**
Director: Department of International Relations and Cooperation
18. **Dr. Kenneth Payle**
Director: Department of International Relations and Cooperation
19. **Dan Setsile**
Deputy Director: Department of International Relations and Cooperation
20. **Kgame Molope**
Lecturer: Department of International Relations: North West University
21. **Clifton Ramesega**
COSATU Official
22. **Samuel Difetoe**
COSATU Official
23. **Tumisang Mangole**
Assistant Director: Department of International Relations and Cooperation
24. **Ngoako Rakgale**
Junior Lecturer: North West University

25. **Dr. Victor Pitsoe**

Lecturer: University of South Africa

ANNEXURE 111: FOCUS GROUP

- 1. Budzani Jomo Marotho
- 2. Tebogo Primrose Mekgoe
- 3. Letsapa Sydney
- 4. Maureen Lifongo
- 5. Euginio Njoloma
- 6. Ezekiel Molamu
- 7. Frank Tweeneboa – Kodua
- 8. Fritz Nganje
- 9. David Phillips
- 10. Innocent Masvosvere

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03 September 2013

CERTIFICATE OF LANGUAGE EDITING

The thesis entitled

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