SUSTAINABLE PEACEBUILDING STRATEGIES FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF EZZA CONFLICTS IN NIGERIA AND THE BAROLONG LAND DISPUTE IN SOUTH AFRICA

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DECLARATION

I, Kelechi Johnmary Ani, declare that this thesis, entitled "Sustainable peacebuilding strategies for the management of Ezza conflicts in Nigeria and the Barolong land dispute in South Africa", hereby submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in Peace Studies in the Faculty of Human and Social Sciences, North-West University, Mafikeng Campus, has not previously been submitted by me for a degree at this or any other university. I declare that this is my work in design and execution and that all materials contained herein have been duly acknowledged.

Signature..... ..... Date.....17/10/2017.....

Kelechi Johnmary Ani

Supervisor's signature..... Date.....17/10/17.....

Professor Victor Ojakorotu

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my lovely family; Ijeoma, my wife, Kamsiyochi and Chiziterem, my children.

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LIST OF ABREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AIGP	Assistant Inspector General of Police
APC	Armoured Personnel Carrier
ASP	Assistant Superintendent of Police
BNC	Barolong National Council
CAD	Cape Archives Depot
CP	Commissioner of Police
CRS	Conflict Resolution Strategies
DPO	Divisional Police Officer
DO	District Officer
EBSUTH	Ebonyi State University Teaching Hospital
FEGA	Federated Ezillo General Assembly
FETHA	Federal Teaching Hospital Abakaliki
FRCN	Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria
HCPCP	Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property
HRCRC	Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Centre
HRH	His Royal Highness
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IACRS	Indigenous African Conflict Resolution System
IDEA	Ijigban Development Elites Association
IDP	Internally Displaced Person(s)
IDU	Iyonu Development Union
IGA	Ishielu General Assembly

IGP	Inspector General of Police
KNCHR	Kenya National Commission on Human Rights
KLA	Kenya Land Alliance
LGA	Local Government Area
LGC	Local Government Council
LGEA	Local Government Education Authority
MP	Mobile Police
MWU	Mbaise Welfare Union
NAD	Native Affairs Department
NAE	National Archives Enugu
NEC	National Electoral Commission
NEMA	National Emergency Management Agency
NPC	National Population Commission
NTA	Nigerian Television Authority
NWPAL	North West Provincial Archives and Library
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OMO	Obeagu Mgbalukwu and Ojiegbe
PDP	People's Democratic Party
SEMA	State Emergency Management Agency
TA	Tribal Authority
UNESCO	United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization
WACR	Western Approaches to Conflict Resolution
WDC	Women Development Centre

ABSTRACT

In time past, there was enough expanse of land that humanity had no need to compete or clash over land. However, as the population expanded in different geo-political environments, land became a 'scarce' resource. Man began to compete in the scramble and quest to retain available land spaces. The situation is made worse by the fact that land, as a means of production, is fixed. The implication was the rise of conflicting interests amongst land contestants. Ironically, Africa, more than any other continent in the globe, has experienced the most conflicts in the world. This study focused on peacebuilding strategies for the management of Ezza conflicts in Nigeria and Barolong land dispute in South Africa. The study relied on theories of negative and positive peace to explain the conflict setting. It adopted non-probability sampling strategy and employed a qualitative research approach. The researcher reviewed literature on Ezza and Barolong studies as well as the causes and forms of land conflicts in the study areas. The scholars in conflict studies have neglected Ezza and Barolong peoples. Consequently, the researcher traced the historical background of the conflicts ravaging Ezza and Barolong peoples for years. The socio-political, economic and security impacts of both conflicts were documented. The similarities and contrasts as well as the road to peace in all the conflict terrain were also identified in the study. It is recommended that multi-dimensional peacebuilding strategies be implemented in the study areas. The work spelt-out, how mediation, peace communication, negotiation, dialogue, inter-group forgiveness, peace education and peace journalism could lead to sustainable peace in Ezza conflict terrain in Nigeria and Barolong land dispute setting of South Africa. Finally, the study recommends community mobilization towards the culture of peace, identification of the fears of conflict parties, creation of early warning systems, peace-based workshops, peace jingles and adverts, as well as government driven peace campaigns and developmental projects as the road to sustainable peacebuilding.

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CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Land is fundamental in man's existential needs. In traditional African societies, homogenous and heterogeneous settlements practised egalitarian and free access to land. With the evolution of societies and the emergence of nation-states governments, the multi-dimensional demand for land has created contestations for land ownership by earlier settlers in a given portion of land, which was later reinforced by government institutions in different parts of Africa. With the arrival of new settlers on such portions of land, the indigenous settlers claimed natural communal rights to a given piece of land, while the colonial settlers joined in the race to claim part or at times, the same portion of land. This created widespread land questions, disputes and land-related conflicts in many African societies.

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Paradoxically, "land conflicts can have disastrous effects on individuals, groups and even entire nations. Many conflicts perceived to be clashes between different cultures, are actually conflicts over land and related natural resources" (Engel & Graefen, 2008: iii). The impact of land conflict differs from place to place. Writing on the social organisation of land-driven warfare in nineteenth century Igboland of Nigeria, Isichei (1976:79) maintains that "wars were fought mostly over land issues. We are told that in the early days, there were few people in the clan and they had no need to quarrel over land. When the population of the clan grew, land became scarce. And as no one could be told to build his home in the air; the people of the clan began to share the available land more equitably." That was the situation for years until the honest and peace-loving generation died off. When many of them joined their ancestors, the few people that remained either got confused about the actual boundaries of their land or wanted to amass more. Others were overwhelmed by the majority who preferred the might-is-right approach, thus with the rise of the new land borders, war became the order of the day in many places. Furthermore, the quest for farmland and the role of migrant farmers helped in intensifying land-related conflicts. In the 19th and 20th centuries, the rapid expansion of cash crop and livestock farming in some areas created demand for labour that was often met through migrant labour. Boone (2009:7-8) further explained the process when he argued that the farming system in many parts of Africa was very organized to accommodate in-migration when the core social group had sufficient land to offer 'strangers' and the indigenous group had some incentive to do so. Migrants usually remained settlers or

non-citizens in their new homes (where they lived without political rights or entitlements) for a couple of generations and often longer.

Danfulani (2009:1) observed that labels such as settler, natives, non-natives, host community, foreigner, stranger, elements, squatters, non-squatters, immigrants, migrants, indigenes, non-indigenes, *mbak, gambari, Hausa-fulani, nyamiri, nasara, ngwa, arna, kirdi,* and *baro* among many others are used daily in Nigeria to describe, stigmatise, stereotype other people, as a category of who does not belong to a particular geographical area. These forms of stigmatization are widespread by one group against the other in Nigeria's ethnic and communal stratifications. Itumo (2014:1) maintains that such stigmatisation promotes artificial social boundaries. Such situations breed disaffections that generate animosities that lead to violent social conflicts among different groups in the country, which ordinarily, could not have been the case. There is a growing tendency in Nigeria for violent social conflicts to erupt between those perceived as indigenes and those regarded as settlers. This group of settlers, notwithstanding the years they have spent in the community, including those whose ancestors settled there for centuries are also regarded as outsiders as found in Ezillo and Ezza- Ezillo, Nigeria.

Ironically, in South Africa, the divide is not rooted primarily on ethnic disparity but on racism and the time of settlement in a given portion of land. Defining who is an indigene of a particular area is a difficult task, particularly in light of the mass movement over time as well as across cultures and space (Adesoji & Alao, 2009:152). However, the relative association of people with different geographical areas as a result of their settlement and the dominance of their cultures or their ability to conquer and occupy a relative virgin area, has resulted in situations where some settlers have come to identify themselves as indigenes of a particular place. It is also clear that many states, societies and communities all over the world emerged from a blend of different layers of migrants sometimes with the aboriginal groups. Interestingly, such groups have blended so well among themselves or even with autochthonous groups that they have produced relatively homogeneous cultures (Itumo, 2014). It is likely that the seemingly unnoticeable difference among groups brought about by their blending over a long period is often resuscitated due to a number of factors, including the colonial legacy in Nigeria and South Africa, the desire by the elite for power and position,

the changing status of land and other natural resources as well as the desire for separate identity among others (Adesoji & Alao, 2009:152). Beyond generating crises with the attendant loss of human and material resources, more of which have not been satisfactorily resolved to date, the indigene-settler problem has called to question the basis of citizenship in Nigeria and South Africa (Itumo, 2014:3). Unfortunately, the deep-rooted impact of state of origin, federal character, local council dichotomy and other forms of official government tags for group differentiation have worsened the indigene-settler conflict in Nigeria. The situation is worsened by the fact that indigene as a form of identity has direct links with land access, ownership and control.

That is consistent with a model of government in which legitimacy of the socio-cultural and political community and local political authority as well as access to land as an entitlement was supposed to rest on indigenes and their lineages, which may or may not include flows of migrant labourers and the in-migration of share croppers that played a central role in farming zones in the peasant economies of Nigeria and West Africa at large (Boone, 2009). In areas where there are land disagreements between individuals, lineages, settlers and migrants, conflicts, disputes and violent behaviours have become characteristic features.

In South Africa, the Molopo River area was historically inhabited mainly by the Ratshidi Barolong as well as their Rapulana Barolong and Ratlou Barolong brothers. Over the centuries, they engaged in conflicts over land-rights among themselves and with a number of other groups, including the Barolong Tlharo and the Barolong Tlhaping. The expansion of the BaHurutshe and more importantly, the ethnic chauvinism that manifested itself between Ratshidi Barolong and the people of Barolong Tlharo generally triggered conflicts and the disputes that followed. Very fundamental was the fact that the violent culture between the Batswana inhabitants of the area over land ownership was recurrent and deep-rooted, thereby over-shadowing the white/black skirmishes in the scale of the conflict. The implication was that "land regimes in Africa, which are guided in many traditional cases by unwritten customs and traditions (in many places), specifically made to fit agrarian rhythms of life are susceptible to violent conflicts" (Odey, 2008:688).

It was a combination of historical antecedents predicated on war and hunger for farmland that brought the Ezza in contact with the Agila (Onoja, 2013:343). It was the same factors that motivated the Ezza people to move down to Effium, Isu, Ezillo, Agilla and many other parts of Nigeria, where they are found today. Cotterell (1930:1) stated that Ezza people are "greedy over land." The Ezza migration and expansion out of their ancestral home arose only out of the need to settle members of their group whose number and population had increased in a stifling topography. Ezza people, who are ardent farmers, found themselves hemmed-in, and they were faced with serious demographic and economic challenges pushing them to search for alternative land elsewhere (Onuoha & Ani, 2011:5).

Furthermore, the Ezza were traditionally paid experts in mercenary warfare as well as migrant labourers. Afigbo (1987:46) maintains that one Ezza tradition claims that Ezekuna, the founder of the Ezza, prophesied that his people would expand until they were stopped by a big river to the west (the Niger), by another big river in the north (the Benue) and still another to the east (the Cross River). Thus, expansion by force would appear to have been deeply rooted in the tradition of the Ezza from the earliest times. Many social analysts believe that the Ezza are innately strong and use their natural bravery to fight as mercenaries and get rewarded for their outstanding performances in warfare. Afoke and Nworie (2010:6-7) provide specific instances when Ezillo elders sent representations to Onueke to seek Ezza protection in exchange for a large portion of land for settlement. This settlement was to serve as a deterrent to the ambitious Ngbo who were expanding northwards towards Effium and southwards towards Ezillo. An agreement was quickly reached between the Ezza and Ezillo. The agreement saw the Ezza fighting on the side of Ezillo against the Ngbo. However, for this to happen, they were first given a portion of land between the Ngbo and the Ezillo. Over the years, they began to attack their Ezillo landlords in their quest for more land. This was also the pattern of action from Ezza settlers in lands originally owned by the Mgbalukwu and Obeagu Isu in other parts of Ebonyi State, Nigeria.

It will not be out of place to argue that the Boers and the larger collection of Englishmen within the Barolong, South Africa, were amongst the first architects of land disputes in the area. This was due to the following: first, the White men should not have initially taken over land that belonged to the Black people, specifically the Barolong people. Secondly, following

the geographical demarcation of the area as an African reserve and later, as Imperial Reserve, it should not be a hunting zone for the Whites (as shown in the later part of this study). However, a combination of the superior firearms that the Boers and British imperialists carried, at that time, backed by their strong alliance with the Colonial Government of South Africa made it easier for them to violently trample upon the rights of the Barolong to own land and annex large areas where the black people had settled. There were equally cases of Africans squatting 'illegally' on 'White' areas of the reserve. Mason and Mbenga (2014:63) posit that in the North West Province of South Africa, "disputes over land acquisition and other material interests resulted in conflicts, either among the ruling factions or between the *Dikgosi* (chiefs and kings amongst the Tswana) and their followers, who were often united in opposition to the chieftainship in a popular alliance". The implication was that on a number of occasions, some Barolong people united to challenge the leadership of their Tribal Authority over the dynamics of land allocation and ownership in the area. Such forms of violent alliance are widespread amongst the subjects of many communities in Nigeria, especially when they perceive their leadership to be playing 'smart games' with their communal land.

Naturally, many pre-colonial traditional governments of heterogeneous African societies that experienced these land-related conflicts settled their differences peacefully but those that could not properly settle theirs before the onslaught of colonialism (which heightened resource exploitation) saw the colonial masters turning some of the disputed lands into tools of manipulation in order to attain different forms of imperial interest.

In pre-colonial Africa, greatness and influence lie within societies and groups that can successfully execute victorious wars against their neighbours. The British colonialists in Nigeria fought with the Ezza, while those in Barolong, South Africa, adopted inconsistent decisions that made the attainment of positive peace impracticable in the areas under investigation in this study. The post-independence governments of Nigeria and South Africa have not properly managed the structural and multiplier effects of conflicts emanating from such contested portions of land. Since 1960 till the present, the Ezillo and Ezza-Ezillo conflict has remained a contested space for political manipulation. The independence leaders and their political allies have left the Isu, Oshiri, Ezillo and Agila conflict settings in Nigeria

largely under-developed, which allows them to continuously promise the indeigenes 'heaven and earth', which they will not fulfil immediately, they have attained victory after elections. The years of the Civil War (1967-1970) influenced the dynamics of all conflicts studied on the Nigerian side, just as the Anglo-Boer War influenced the dynamics of land disputes within the Barolong. In Nigeria and South Africa, the politics of land ownership has remained a recurrent theme in the electoral education and campaign programme. Political formations have fomented violence and fissures at grass roots, revealing their contentious place in the people's worldview. The origin, growth and dynamics of these specific conflicts in Nigeria and disputes in South Africa constitute the central problem investigated in this study.

1.2 NIGERIA'S CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT

Nigeria's conflict environment (where the Ezza fought with their neighbours) could be divided into three major sub-themes as follows; Ezza wars during the pre-colonial era, Ezza conflicts during the colonial era; and inter-communal conflicts between Ezza and her neighbours since Nigeria's independence. Conflicts since independence focus mainly on major contested areas such as the Ezza-Agila and Agila conflict setting, the Ezza-Ojiegbe and Mgbalukwu-Obeagu conflict setting as well as the Ezza-Ezillo and Ezillo conflict setting. Each conflict setting is discussed in detail considering the fact that these are the three major Ezza conflicts with their neighbours that have their genesis in the colonial era and have continued into contemporary times.

The origin of Ezza settlement in Agila, Benue State has been traced to nineteenth century invitation of the Effium to the Ezza people of Ebonyi State. The Effium invited the Ezza to assist them and to check the growing aggression of the Ishieke Izzi people. "To win this assistance, they invited them to settle on their land. Large numbers of Ezza people whose descendants now far outnumber the Effium accepted the invitation. Not content with their gains in Effium, they were anxious to win territory from their northern neighbour, the Agala (properly spelt as Agila), an Idoma group. During the period of colonial rule, a war ensued and the Agala fled further north" (Isichie, 1976:90). The Ezza in Agila argued that the problem was initiated and fomented by Agila people. They disagreed on the fact that they were the architects of the conflict and argued that the Agila people attempted to use force to

eject the Ezza from their territory. The Ezza's refusal consequently angered them, resulting in the conflict (Onoja, 2013:360). According to Omerigwe Atta, the Agila District Chief (1972-1985), traced the conflict to 1944. The traditional ruler maintains that Ezza people resorted to arson and mass killing of Agila people, which sustained the dispute until the Nigerian Civil War of 1967-1970. The traditional ruler stated that the Ezza living in Agila District teamed up with their kinsmen living at Ichama, Okpoga and Adiga waylaid and killed many Agila people. Those killed included Lot Ogbilolo, Ogezi Otokpa and his wife, Ogbu Ede and his six wives and a maid killed at Akpoge village. Certain legacies, ornaments left behind by our ancestors were looted and taken away to Ezzaland, some of these spiritual ornaments were the basis of Agila society (Onoja, 2013:360).

It could be seen that the Ezza-Agila and Agila conflict started during the colonial era before Nigeria gained independence in 1960. Within the colonial era, the imperial administrators lacked the necessary policing mechanisms to check the spread of the conflict that affected the Agila and Ezza. The colonial administration did not also check the demographic factor in the sustenance of the conflict. It was the expanding population, especially on the part of the Ezza people, that increased the pressure for land and compelled the conflict situation that followed.

Dada and Ani (2009: 101-112) maintain that growth in population and number of inhabitants in a relatively small piece of land made the Ezza-Ojiegbe people extend their area of settlement, on the one hand, while on the other hand, the Mgbalukwu and Obeagu Isu communities desired to stop the rapid expansion and annexation of more of their land by the Ezza-Ojiegbe people. It is noteworthy that the Mgbalukwu and Obeagu people's gift of land to the Nkomoro people (another Ezza colony), whom they invited as assistants to fight alongside the Ojiegbe against their Onicha enemies, have never caused any crisis as they have been living peacefully with their Isu neighbours. However, the Ezza-Ojiegbe were historic tenants on Isu land, after helping them to conquer their Onicha enemies. A few years later, the Ezza-Ojiegbe people started defaulting in paying their land rents to Isu chiefs. It was the inability of Ezza-Ojiegbe people to pay their rent that became a major cause of the conflict (Dada &Ani, 2009:101-112). Thus, the long-run effect was the intermittent conflicts which started in 1910. For the next ninety-seven years, the three communities have had many documented and unrecorded conflicts until 2007, when the conflict was resolved. Eze (2007)

argues that the communities fought against one another in 1910, 1966, 1975, 1986, 1989 and 1993 as well as from 2005 to 2007.

Furthermore, at some point in their history, the people of Ezillo contracted the Ezza people whose prowess on the battle field was well-known in many communities of Igboland, to help them in fighting against their neighbours. The usual practice, wherever Ezza people were called for such mercenary assistance in war, was to request that they be given a portion of land between the people they had come to assist and the warring communities, which gave them a strategic location to attack and serve as human shields as well as protect their host from further enemy attack and aggression. The Ezillo people were under the threat of an aggressive Ngbo people who were determined to eject them out of their land located between the Ebonyi River and Okpoto (Onuoha & Ani, 2011:9). This made them to invite the Ezza people to come and assist them out in the conflict. Such act they carried-out perfectly and began to encroach further into Ezillo land.

In December 1992, the Ezza people in Ezillo were said to have killed one, Okafor Ali, over a piece of land that the Ezillo people claimed they had allocated to Amaleze youths for development projects. Within the period of the 1992 flare-up, an evening market (known as Nweke Onueke) was seized and renamed Nworie Ezza. This created intense clashes between the Amaleze Ezillo people and the Ezza settlers in Ezillo. The killing of one, Idenyi Ali, of Isimkpuma, was suspected to to have been engineered by Ezza usurpers of his land and that triggered the 1996 Ezillo and Ezza-Ezillo conflict. In 1997, Ezza settlers went on to invade Amofia Ezillo, claiming that the whole Ndiagu Amofia Ezillo belonged to them. In 2006 and 2007, there were violent skirmishes in the area. The height of the killing was the 2011 attack on 31 December on Ezillo by suspected Ezza warriors leading to the death of almost one hundred persons. Onuoha and Ani (2011) argue that the Ezillo first attacked Ezza people in 2007 but recent historical evidence from the Ezillo people reveal that they have been languishing under the burden of Ezza attacks for decades. The Ezillo people soon became disillusioned with their erstwhile mercenaries and preferred that they now leave their land. Ironically, the Ezza maintain that they secured the land and protected the Ezillo in their time of need and to request that they should vacate the area is only an invitation for trouble. The conflicts that followed led to many deaths and a lot of destruction. The result was the

carnage, destruction and waste of human and material resources that reached its climax in 2009 and the first quarter of 2010. While the ill-feeling lasted, the Abakaliki-Enugu Expressway became a theatre of death and witnessed much spilling of blood until a combined team of military and police forces managed to restore some normalcy (Onuoha & Ani, 2011:10).

1.3 SOUTH AFRICA'S LAND DISPUTE SETTING

Ramoroka (2009:16) posits that the "twentieth century Ratshidi-Rapulana dispute over Lotlhakane has not been recorded by historians." This specific land dispute of the twenty-first century is yet to be studied in detail. Pieces of historical evidence show that in 1931, Methusela was appointed chief of the people of Barolong Tlharo of Masibi living in Disaneng, after his father died in his sleep. This Methusela gradually took effective control of his traditional authority and raised a local army of about sixty brave men from the community. It was easy for him to raise this number of men due to a combination of the people's patriotic sentiment and their conscious knowledge of the bickering and crisis that existed between them and their Barolong landlords. Armed with an army loyal to his leadership, he marched them to assault Chief Lotlamoreng. The reason for the aggression was the allegation that Lotlamoreng had seized some cattle belonging to his people in Barolong farms.

In 1935, Lotlamoreng responded to the violent behaviour of the Barolong Tlharo of Masibi in Disaneng by sending a band of men, "armed with guns, bayonets, axes and assegais to seize sixteen head of cattle belonging to the baTlharo. This same group of assailants then went on to assault a dozen of Masibi's subjects residing on Barolong farms" (Manson & Mbenga, 2014:97). The above acts of violence and attacks that ensued dampened relations between the two groups to a level that the Barolong Tlharo of Masibi began to think of re-settling. However, both groups dialogued and checked the lingering conflict. Nevertheless, tensions flared-up again in 1946 over a strip of land running north to south between the designated areas of the Barolong and the Batlharo which was claimed by both (Manson & Mbenga, 2014:97). The attempt by the Native Commissioner in Mafikeng, South Africa, to resolve the

crisis in February 1946 did not produce sustainable peace. The boundary problem continued until the mid-1980s.

In 1950, the Lekgotla at Phitsane agreed to remove all settlers in Lopurung and re-settle them at Phitsane. The villagers refused to move. The people were labelled 'rebels.' The case was brought before the Department of Native Affairs and they supported the Kgosi (chief). However, the Lopurung 'rebels' got a temporary injunction restraining Tshipitota from moving them (which they claimed was aimed at dividing the land into residential, agricultural and pastoral purposes). Tshipitota appealed to the Cape Division of the Supreme Court and his appeal was upheld. Following his death, the new chief and the settlers resolved their differences and peaceful inter-group relations began to thrive.

The 1950s were characterised by negative peace among Barolong people due to a number of court litigations by both the Rapulana and the Ratshidi over the Lotlhakane parcel of land on one hand. On the other hand, the Barolong people were facing the challenge of the Group Areas Act of 1950. The areas of the Barolong including Biesjiesvley, Rietfontein, Sterkfontein, Ruitkuil, Geluk, Leeuspruit and so on were listed and classified as white areas and Africans living there were categorised as 'Black Spots' that needed to be removed according to the Act. This process of land clearance in South Africa was given credence by the Group Areas Act of 1950 passed by the apartheid government (Ramoroka, 2009:3-4).

Thus, the political behaviour of the colonial government disconnected the people from their land and made them settlers in other areas, where they naturally created pressure on land, which led to conflicts.

1.4 THE IDEA OF PEACEBUILDING

Peacebuilding is the process of developing positive peace for societal transformation. It is a constellation of all the efforts made in order to enhance peace and eliminate conflict. It is also the process of building capacity to manage conflict. Peacebuilding attempts to encourage the development of the structural conditions, attitudes and modes of political behaviour that may permit peaceful, stable and ultimately prosperous social and economic development (Smith,

2004:19). It is an attempt to enthrone sustainable peace in an environment. Sustainable peace on its own is characterized by the absence of physical, structural conflict and the elimination of discrimination (Luc Reychler, 2001:12). Peacebuilding could be understood in different ways. According to Boutros-Ghali (1995), peace building consists of a wide range of activities associated with capacity building, institutional building and societal transformation. Before the early 1990s, peace building was generally viewed as series of activities intended to help countries recover from violent conflict (Boutros-Ghali, 1995). Thus at that time, emphasis was on peacebuilding as a tool for conflict management. Paris (2004:38) underscores that peacebuilding is action undertaken at the end of a civil conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of fighting. A peacebuilding mission involves the deployment of military and civilian personnel from several international agencies, with a mandate to conduct peace building in a country that is just emerging from a civil war. The peacebuilding activities carried out by international agencies, military and civilian personnel during violent conflict could be seen in the light of strategic peacebuilding process. This perception of peace building promotes reactive peace building, hence, a reaction to the escalation of conflict. It is a kind of peace building that often creates many challenges and problems in its implementation process. This is the form of peace building that the Nigerian State often adopts in relation to the above mentioned violent land cases that have at one time or another negatively induced abortion in national peace and security.

However, by the end of 1990s, peacebuilding turned into conflict prevention. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004:1) argued that peace building is action commissioned to identify and support structures which strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. The major branches of peacebuilding include conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict peace initiatives. Peacebuilding focuses on the political and socio-economic context or humanitarian aspects of societal building. It seeks to institutionalise the peaceful resolution of conflict (Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative, 2002). It demands multi-dimensional responses from many actors, including the old people, young men and women (Agbalajobi, 2010). This study factors multi-dimensional sustainable peacebuilding strategies that move the conflict settings from negative peace to positive peace situation.

1.5 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

From the colonial era until contemporary times, inter-communal conflicts and disputes have manifested themselves in different forms and locations across Nigeria and South Africa. The dynamics of inter-communal conflicts and disputes in relations to land have become a source of concern and contention amongst scholars in Nigeria and South Africa. The Ezza conflicts with neighbours in Nigeria have been traced to the early 19th century (Anyanwu, 2005:19). During that period, the Ezza made headway against the Idoma (Afigbo, 1987:46). The indirect reference to their conflicts with neighbours started generating the attention of colonial records and diaries in the later part of the 19th century. Conflicts between the Ojiegbe-Ezza and the Mgbalukwu-Obeagu Isu continued intermittently from 1910 to 2007 when it was resolved. The same descendants of Ezza engaged in land conflict with the people of Agila, Benue State from the 1920s to the 1980s while the Ezza conflict with Ezillo people of Ebonyi State started during the colonial era (1920s) and was quelled in 2012. Itumo (2014:7) maintains that the Ezza and Ezza-Ezillo conflict provoked by the indigenes - settlers' dichotomy was already becoming intractable as all efforts made by governments to resolve the conflict proved futile.

In South Africa, 1881 marked the beginning of Ratshidi-Rapulana conflict (North West Provincial Archive 1978-1990; Shillington, 1985:128). The dynamics of land dispute amongst the Barolong continued into the twentieth century until the 1980s. It should be noted that Barolong historiography agrees on the origin of the Barolong but chieftaincy and legitimate ownership of land have remained areas of progressive disagreement amongst scholars. While Ramoroka (2009) as well as Manson and Mbenga (2014) have presented an in-depth study of chieftaincy-driven disputes, there is no comprehensive study on the multiple dynamics of the Barolong land disputes.

In spite of the common and recurrent nature of land-related conflicts in Africa, there seems to be no effective and permanent institutional apparatus for the peaceful resolution of such conflicts both within governments and traditional establishments of both countries. In other words, there seems to be no viable and permanent institutional structures at communal, clan, local government/district and state /regional/ provincial and national levels for the resolution of inter-communal conflicts and land disputes. In spite of attempts by governments and

mediating agencies to build positive peace (Galtung, 1964: 1-4), the conflict psychology still persists among residents of communities that were involved in historic conflicts in these countries, thereby preventing the rise of sustainable inter-group unity.

It is therefore suggested in this study that territorial disputes and conflicts studied in this work are historical and complex cases of settler and non-settler land disputes. Each of the communities that were involved in the conflicts has one form of legitimate claims and counter-claims to the position of the other party (parties). The threats of hostility, which called for the heavy presence of Nigeria's State security apparatus such as the police force and the army, were involved at different times to check the loss of lives and properties in Ezza conflict zones.

Consequently, one asks the following rhetorical questions: were there no mechanisms for conflict resolutions in traditional African societies? Furthermore, why was it difficult for the colonial authorities to peacefully resolve all conflicts and disputes examined in this study before the independence of both Nigeria and South Africa? How have these conflicts and disputes degenerated into tools for political manipulation in pre and post-independence era of both countries? Why were the recommendations of the Agila and Ezza-Agila Peace Panel of the 1980 never implemented? The non-implementation of the policy could easily be understood in the light of the widespread culture of poor policy implementation found across the length and breadth of the government of Nigeria. What was the impact of these conflicts and disputes on affected societies? These are some of the problematic issues explored in this study, in order to understand the dynamics of Ezza conflicts in Nigeria and the Barolong land disputes in South Africa (with a lot of lessons to be learnt by other African heterogeneous societies).

1.6 AIM OF THE STUDY

The aim of the study was to examine sustainable peacebuilding strategies for the management of Ezza conflicts in Nigeria and Barolong land disputes in South Africa.

1.7 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

In addition to the general aim of the study as stated above, the specific objectives of the research were to:

1. Identify the causes of Ezza conflicts in Nigeria and Barolong land disputes in South Africa;
2. Investigate the effect of conflict psychology on the people;
3. Compare the dynamics of both conflicts and disputes; and
4. Present sustainable peace-building strategies for both conflicts.

1.8 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. What were the causes of Ezza conflicts in Nigeria and Barolong land disputes in South Africa?
2. What comapartive experiences could be established between the nature of Ezza conflicts in Nigeria with the Barolong land dispute in South Africa?
3. What was the impact of the conflicts and land disputes?
4. What sustainable peace-building strategies could be developed for the management of both conflicts?

1.9 HYPOTHESIS

Ezza conflicts with her neighbours and the Barolong land disputes undermined national peace as well as affected development in Nigeria and South Africa respectively.

1.10 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

African societies, from time immemorial until recently, are known by their culture of communalism. The ties and bonds of kinship transcend the family, community to clan levels. However, the emergence of heterogeneous societies in many African states has led to the rise of conflicts over land, thereby stifling peaceful relations among societies. This study examines the dynamics of Ezza conflicts with her neighbours in Nigeria and compares them with the Barolong land disputes of South Africa. The rationale is to present an analytical comparison of how land affects the nation-building process in two African states, while proffering peace-building strategies.

It is popular knowledge that Africa has been described as a theatre of violent conflicts (Francis, 2008:3-15; Chabal, 2005). The nature of the conflicts differ from one African state to another. This study unravels the nature and dynamics of Ezza conflicts in Nigeria and Barolong land disputes in South Africa. The Barolong are found in what was known as the Bechuanaland reserve. The reserves have possibly not received sufficient attention from historians and other scholars in relation to their importance, for they were home to millions of black people in South Africa, many being migrants who had families back home in the reserves, hidden from sight, the inhabitants of the reserves or locations remained forgotten (Manson & Mbenga, 2014:89).

This study investigates the nature of the conflict in what was formerly a South African neglected colonial reserve. Ramoroka (2009:16) is very specific when he maintains that the "twentieth century Ratshidi-Rapulana dispute over Lotlhakane has not been recorded by historians." The Ezza people have remained largely neglected such that their history has been poorly documented by Nigerian historians and scholars. Anyanwu (2005a:24) posits that "the Ezza is an Igbo society whose military heroism has escaped the attention of popular literature."

The significance of the study would be drawn from the land resource conflict on inter-group relations and societal building in the two African states. There is no gainsaying that human beings migrate to new settlements where the interaction between their skills, talents and abilities lead to improved life conditions. Unfortunately, as men consume and accumulate resources such as land for themselves and their offspring, competition naturally arises, thereby leading to conflicts. The Nigerian State has witnessed all forms of land conflict at both inter-state (sovereign) and intra-state levels. Both forms of conflict have kept states within Nigeria and the national government on their toes in a bid to resolve it and end the bloodletting occasioned in different states of the federation as well as in its relations with some of its neighbours such as Chad (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1987; Jumare, 1994; Ani, 2012b) and the Nigerian-Cameroon land dispute (Ani & Aro, 2013; Ani, 2012a). The sovereign border problem and even its local dynamics as found in South Africa as well as the Agila and Ngbo border areas were all creations of the colonial architects. The colonialists

forcefully divided African territory to themselves and forced indigenous people to live together in badly mapped-out land spaces.

The problem of land and its implications on the life of the peasants in South Africa cannot be over-emphasized. Between 1900-1940, many of the chiefdoms in South Africa were battling with what Simpson (1986) refers to as crises of control. Bundy (1972: 369-388) and Bundy (1979) discussed the emergence of a capitalist and progressive rural African people as well as the push and pull influence of land on their lifestyles. Macmillan (1929) and Kiewiet (1941) describe how poverty and lack of land affected the history of reserves in South Africa.

This study contributes to the larger body of literature for peace and conflict studies in Africa. It also assists policy makers, peace ambassadors as well as governments across Africa and beyond to adopt strategic peace building policies through proper interpretation of early warning indices of issues that cause inter-communal conflicts in heterogeneous African societies. Post-conflict peace-building strategies recommended in the study are useful in reducing and eliminating the psychology of violent conflicts and disputes, experienced by citizens living in such societies.

1.11 SCOPE OF THE STUDY

This study focuses mainly on Ezza conflicts with her neighbours in Nigeria as well as Barolong land disputes in South Africa. It does not capture the dozens of other cases of inter-communal conflicts in Nigeria and violent attacks in South Africa. The period under examination ranges from the 1940s to 2012 in Nigeria, while the Barolong land disputes focuses on the Barolong in the North West Province of South Africa. The Barolong of the North West Province was selected in the study because the area "was one of the most hotly contested backgrounds" (Manson & Mbenga, 2014:12).

1.12 CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter has presented the importance of land to Africans. It has examined how the struggle over land leads to conflicts in a number of African societies. Ezza of Nigeria and Barolong in South Africa, which are the two conflict settings studied in the research were introduced. Peacebuilding was also conceptualized. The aim, objectives research questions and hypothesis of the study were also presented in this chapter. The statement of the problem traces how each of the communities caught-up in the conflicts engaged in claims and counter-claims over a particular disputed portion of land. The major significance of the study is that it offers parameters in resolving settler and non-settler land disputes in Africa. It also enriches the body of literature and research on peace and conflict studies in Africa. The scope of the study, was highlighted. While the Nigerian conflict setting studied all Ezza locations, the Barlong conflict setting was limited to the Barolong of North West Province, who had a history of serious land dispute. It should be noted that in the next chapter, which focuses on literature review, the study interrogates scholarly works that have been done on Ezza and Barolong. The researcher reviewed them, presenting their strengths and weaknesses before documenting the synoptic accounts of peacebuilding, forms of land conflict as well as causes of conflict.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Literature review is the act of presenting earlier studies in a particular area of research. The review process captures the strength and weaknesses of a particular study, while identifying the gap which a particular study did not provide. This chapter analyses scholarly literature that has been documented on Ezza and Barolong. It shows that while the Barolong scholarship started in the early twentieth century, studies on Ezza started in the later part of the twentieth century. Academic research on peacebuilding and causes of conflict as well as the conceptual clarification of words and phrases that have been used in diverse ways by scholars in the past has proliferated in scholarship on conflict resolution.

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This chapter shows the ideological differences between those who see the concept as a reactive process, for the promotion of social harmony in a post-conflict environment and those who perceive the concept as a pro-active process of uprooting all the factors that lead to conflict. The chapter presents the definition of conflict as well as forms of land conflict. It maintains that conflicts, which start in the minds of men, are driven by clashes of interests. It reveals that the level of violent conflict that arises when there are cases of incompatibility differs from violent actors to environments, situations and times when such conflicts cases arise. The chapter further presents the causes of conflict which range from political, economic, cultural and ethnic factors to cleavages, geographical/ territorial factors, gender, class and age factors. The last part of the chapter reviews a number of concepts that have been mis-represented in earlier studies, which affects the proper understanding of Ezza and Barolong literature.

2.2 REVIEW OF EZZA LITERATURE

There is relatively low number of literature on Ezza studies. The factors that led to that include the fact that Ezza people unlike the Onitsha area, exhibited anti colonial settlement behaviours in their land, thus it took many years for the people, who were still very attached to their traditional farm and blacksmith economy and looked-down on western education to follow the path of formal learning in the area. Ironically, even when western education

started, many educated scholars in Igbo land still looked down on Ezza area, which was a major group amongst the people and stereotyped as part of the larger *Wawa* people. Hence, a number of studies on Ezza history do not compare favourably with the growing litany of literature on the Aro, Nri and Awka and other parts of Igbo land. One major reason for that is the relative lack of North Eastern Igbo historians and scholars, when compared to the Yoruba parts of Nigeria. There was also the fact that most pioneer Igbo researches in the humanities and social sciences tended to be panoramic. "Secondly, unlike Nri and Awka, Ezza is not culturally prominent in Igboland. Besides, Ezza is an inland community and does lie at the periphery of Igboland, hence easy accessibility is difficult, thus, records about the people which would have come in the wake of frequent visits by outsiders are in short supply" (Anyanwu, 1992:17-18).

It is natural that no researcher would do a very sound work without consulting earlier studies, writings and position of other scholars as well as analysts directly or indirectly. In this study, a number of previous studies were consulted. Itumo (2014) constituted a vital source of data for this study. Unfortunately, his study is limited solely to the Ezza and Ezza-Ezillo conflict. He did not discuss other cases of Ezza conflicts with neighbours. His study covers the period from 2008 to 2010. This period was chosen by the author because of its significance in the manifestation, transformation and management of the Ezillo communal conflict. The period also historically marked a paradigm shift in dimension and transformation of the Ezillo conflict from low conflict intensity to a very high one (Itumo, 2014:11). Furthermore, the period also recorded the highest losses in terms of wanton destruction of lives and properties in the annals of the conflict, leading to the intervention of the federal government. It is pertinent to note that this study focuses mainly on identifying conditions that precipitated the outbreak of the violent communal conflict in Ezillo. According to Itumo (2014:7), the resolution of the conflict appears more problematic when weighed against the backdrop of challenges posed to analysis and policy by the failure of extant literature to provide research informed explanations domiciled specifically on Ezillo conflict. A number of weaknesses have been identified in the study, which he acknowledged when he wrote that "first, it is pertinent to note that this study is limited only to the examination of the antecedent conditions precipitating the violent communal conflict in Ezillo community of Ebonyi State. As such the extent to which its findings and conclusions could be generalized or applied to other communal conflicts is to some extent, limited" (Itumo, 2014:11).

Ani and Osisioma (2015:1-8) presented an account of the forms of migration generated by the Ojiegbe-Ezza and Mgbalukwu-Obeagu-Isu conflict as well as the forms of hospitality received by lucky members of the conflict casualties. The study does not trace the history of the conflict nor relate it to other Ezza conflicts. Ani (2015:1-15) provides a detailed account of the different phases of the Ezillo and Ezza-Ezillo conflict as well as how recurrent conflicts have affected the larger Nigerian State. The study does not account for Ezza conflicts with other neighbours, such as Ishieke, Orri, Isu and Effium. Mbah and Nwangwu (2014:681-688) discussed the Ezza and Ezza-Ezillo conflict with special emphasis on sub-ethnic identity crisis amongst Nigerian groups. Their study does not show in detail, the history of the conflict, let alone, discuss other Ezza conflicts.

Onuoha and Ani (2011:1-15) traced the origin of the Ezza people from earliest times and how they migrated to the land they currently occupy in Ebonyi State, Nigeria as well as the number of conflicts that have ensued in their relationship with their neighbours. The study does not discuss the history of Ezza settlements in other states of Nigeria, especially in Benue State, where they fought with their neighbours. Elechi (2008) only presented his speech on what the Ebonyi State Government was doing to manage the Ezza-Ezillo conflict. Ani (2009) traces the history of Ezza conflict in Isu and the process of resolving the ninety seven years conflict. Unfortunately, the study lacks the necessary details of the push and pulls effects of the conflict. Dada and Ani (2009:101-112) focus on a theoretical explanation of the Ojiegbe-Ezza and Mgbalukwu-Obeagu Isu conflict as well as the use of traditional media in the course of the conflict. The study does not account for other Ezza conflicts. Onoja (2013:343-376) discusses Ezza-Agila conflict but neglects the dynamics of conflicts experienced by the Ezza-Igumale, Ezza-Utonkon, Ezza-Ulayi, Ezza-Ijigbam, Ezza-Ekile and Ezza-Ito-Oju colonies.

Similarly, Afoke and Nworie (2010) present a detailed history of Ezza people and the patterns of their migrations and settlement in different parts of Ebonyi State in pre-independence time. The study is very rich in Ezza culture and civilisation but does not develop the theme of Ezza conflicts. Anyanwu (2005a:17-25) presents a list of the people involved in battle with Ezza people during pre-colonial times. He reveals that the Ezza people

were unsung warriors of Igboland during the pre-colonial era. The fundamental weakness of the peer-reviewed article is that it lacks the details of the causes and effects of conflict dynamics amongst these people who fought against the Ezza. The study is s more of a summary of the names of a number of Ezza conflicts during the pre-colonial era. Anyanwu (2005b) presented the demographic consequences of Ezza conflicts in the pre-colonial era. The six-page peer reviewed article documents how the Ezza wars influenced settlement patterns in North-eastern Igboland. Anyanwu (2005c) discusses the process of birth and circumcision rites in Ezza up to 1970. The study reveals that the practice of circumcision changed due to the exigencies of time, rise of Christianity and changing environmental influences. It had no link with Ezza conflicts. Anyanwu (2005d) documents the contribution of women in traditional Ezza economy. The paper makes an indirect reference to Ezza conflicts by exposing the engagement of women in economic activities and keeping the home when the men are out fighting. It shows how the women embraced cassava brought by the colonial lords as against the position of the men, who were more addicted to the act of eating and swallowing yam.

Anyanwu (2005e) published his doctoral thesis into a book with a number of additional information. He accounted for the Ezza economy, aspects of socio-political institutions, economic and social issues as well as the role of the Ezza Ezekuna Welfare Association in the politics of the decade that followed the Civil War (1967-1970). While listing the group of communities that the Ezza people fought with (during the era of their transition), he erroneously documented that the Ezza saw their people operating at the edge of the Ebonyi River. Ezza's next targets were the Isu and Onicha. The alliance of these groups proved strong at the initial stage, but a series of Ezza campaigns tightened the nose and the two groups were forced to sue for peace in exchange for a portion of their land (Anyanwu, 2005e:58). The reality was that the Isu and Onicha never formed an alliance to fight the Ezza. Rather, when a war ensued between the Isu and Onicha, following the quest by the later to take over Abanaba that belonged to the Mgbalukwu and Obeagu Isu people, the Isu people quickly invited the Ezza group from Onueke Imoha to assist them in prosecuting the war. Thus, in appreciation for their brave role in repelling the enemy, the Ezza were given a portion of land to settle and pay rent to their landlords. However, following population expansion and the Ezza strategic military advantages, they turned back to fight for years with their former landlords as explained in details later in this study. Similarly, Anyanwu

(2005f:2) argues that Ezza people are considered to be unnecessarily aggressive and warlike, always engaging in ruthless and non-progressive militarism at the slightest or no provocation at all. Ironically, Ezza people are aggressive simply because of their primary quest for more lands in any area they settle in and this has driven their progressive militarism over the centuries (from 1850-2011) against their neighbours as discussed in the later parts of the study.

Anyanwu (2004a) presented the introduction of western education in Ezza land by the British in 1919 and how the British established two schools in Amagu and Achiagu. It was until 1940 that the people began to embrace the new form of education as a group, by awarding scholarship support to their children to read in the then St. Theresa's Roman Catholic School, Abakaliki and St. Patrick Catholic Mission in Calabar. The study makes no reference to Ezza conflicts. Anyanwu (2004b) present an account of how the Ezza people produced the largest yams and heaps on record at the time of his study. He links their farming success to the role of Ezza blacksmiths who produced innovative machetes and hoes that advanced their traditional farming economy. Similarly, Anyanwu (2001) traces the factors that engineered Ezza migrant labourers as well as its push and pull effect on different parts of Igboland from 1920-1950. The study has very little to do with Ezza conflicts dynamics. Anyanwu and Ijoma (1999) traced the influence of Ezza conflicts on the inter-group relations between them and their neighbours before the arrival of the colonial masters.

However, since independence, the nature of Ezza conflicts has grown astronomically. In his PhD study, Anyanwu (1993) examines the Ezza people of Northeastern Igboland from 1905-1979. The fundamental limitation of the thesis is that it does not account for the Ezza people found outside Igboland. Furthermore, a lot has happened in Ezza history from 1979 to the twenty first century. Chukwuma (2003) only presented a number of deities found within Abakaliki. The study lacks an in-depth account and does not mention anything on the Ezza conflicts. Echiegu (1998) only traced the history of the Ezza people and related it to their Izzi brothers. The study is silent on conflicts between the Ezza people and their neighbours in the past. Isichei (1977) documents an oral account of how the Ezza people engaged in mercenary warfare during pre-colonial times.

Ochefu (1966:255-270) wrote on the Agila-Ezza contact and their relations. He maintains that by the late 16th century, there was a massive influx of Ezza and Izzi-Igbo into Agila and Igumale territories. While both communities used violence to stem the tide of Igbo migration and invasion, they also embarked on a policy of cultural and political assimilation which saw the emergence at the close of the century, of a highly centralised multi-ethnic mini-state. Ochefu's study which was predicated on violence is not in conformity with available sources. Other sources on Agila-Ezza contact are not in agreement with Ochefu's violence thesis as most of them hold that the process of Ezza penetration and subsequent settlement in Agila land was by no means violent. No cases of full scale conflict between the Agila and Ezza have been recorded so far during the early period of contact or shortly after that. Ochefu's "policy of cultural and political assimilation" seems to capture the cardinal basis or essence of the Agila-Ezza relations and can be explored on a wider scale as the central determining factor of the relations between the two people over the centuries. Since the focus of Ochefu's (1966) study was on Idoma/ Igala State system, he did not explore further, Agila-Ezza relations apart from the above passing comment (Onoja, 2011:32). Ironically, earlier historical studies on Igbo people principally neglected the Ezza as they were perceived as backward people by many in the Igbo land, let alone, people from other parts of Nigeria. Anyanwu (2005:24) maintains that "the Ezza is an Igbo society whose military heroism has escaped the attention of popular literature".

Itumo (2014:8) maintains that a critical review of related literature reveals that extant studies on indigenes-settlers dichotomy induced violent communal conflicts in Nigeria and failed to focus investigation and analysis on precipitating conditions. Studies that seek to explain the causes of communal conflicts are the most dominant in literature. These studies interrogate the root causes of communal conflict, approaching it from governance, identity, economic and territorial/geographical perspectives (Nnoli, 1998:10; Otite & Albert, 2001; Egwu, 1998; Egwu, 1999:32; Ibeanu & Onu, 2001:45; Omotola, 2006, Omotola, 2008a; Omotala, 2008b). Itumo (2014:8) further maintains that although it is important to understand the root causes of communal conflicts, it is however more rewarding to understand the antecedent conditions which precipitated the outbreak of such conflicts. This is a very important aspect of conflict studies, which has been side-stepped by scholars in the conflict literature. Ironically, some

studies have shown that it is possible to see a society that manifests these causal variables indicated earlier above, without necessarily experiencing violent conflict (Osaghe & Suberu, 2008:38).

2.3 BAROLONG LITERATURE

Ironically, notwithstanding the fact that scholars began to study aspects of Barolong history since the first quarter of the twentieth century, they have generally not engaged in a detailed study of Barolong land disputes over the years. Brown (1926) discusses the history and succession of kings among the Barolong. He presents the ancient customs and beliefs of the people and maintains that it was the tough leadership of Chief Tau that sustained the Barolong kingdom. That partly explains why the kingdom easily disintegrated after his death. Brown (1926) equally argues that paramount power of the Barolong belonged to the Ratlou but it was handed over to Montshiwa due to his alliance with the British. The study does not discuss the role of the Boers in the intra-Barolong conflict but is limited to the era of *difaqane*.

The *difaqane* was a period between 1820s and 1830s characterised by massive violence, inter-ethnic rivalry as well as the destruction and mass chiefdom formation in Southern and Eastern Africa (Ramoroka, 2009:30). Manson and Mbenga (2014: vii) consider it as a "period (c.1800 to 1830s) of political turbulence, migration and social transformation accompanied by frequent destruction of life and property in Southern and Central Africa". The period was characterised by the widespread psychology of fear due to the wind of violence and destruction that blew across the region. One cannot neglect the negative impact of fear in past and contemporary conflict management as well as the nation-building process in many pre-colonial African societies. It is argued that fear has affected the dynamics of statecraft and imperial politics in the area in recent times. Legum (1976:25) maintains that the Victoria Falls conference marked the highest point of optimism reached in the diplomacy to bring peace to Southern Africa. At the end of the conference, peace building efforts were initiated for six months but they did not produce sustainable and peaceful results due to a combination of three main factors. "The most important of these was the inability of Ian Smith and his supporters to be able to change, or adjust their traditional attitudes based on fears about the

future risks to their way of life on prejudice against the qualities of the black majority and on a wholly unrealistic assessment of their economic and military power to resist the combination of forces ranged against themselves" (Legum, 1976:25).

It should be noted that the four sections of the Barolong were temporary united during the *difaqane* when they fled from the Basotho and Ama Ndebele attackers (Molema, 1950:30). Wookey (1929) studied the origin of the Barolong and narrowed it to the Ratlou sub-group. The study does not discuss the conflict among the people in detail. Mathews (1945) presents the origins and migrations of the Barolong as well as account of the Barolong-Boer Wars. However, his work falls short of the activities of the Ratshidi in Lotlhakane that precipitated into the ethnic dispute (Ramoroka, 2009:11).

Molema (1966:5) wrote extensively on the activities of the British in Barolong and Bechuanaland in general. He promoted the actions of Chief Montshiwa and downplayed the history of the Ratlou and the Rapulana. Shillington (1985), in his writing, joins Molema to assert that Lotlhakene belonged to Montshiwa and neglected earlier writers on the subject like Brown (1926), who maintained that it was the British that handed the place over to Montshiwa. Molema (1966) presents Montshiwa as a man who fought for the Barolong land, while projecting Matlaba, the then Chief of Rapulana and Moshete as those who sold Barolong land to the Boers. He would have documented a more balanced historiography of the people if he discussed how Montshiwa handed the people's land to the British too. It should be noted that Molema's wonderful works became pro-British and pro-Ratshidi because he relied extensively on British account and interpretations, which praised Montshiwa for his unwavering loyalty to the British.

It should be noted that the colonial historiography of the area has affected its contemporary history. Denoon, Nyeko and Webster (1972:66) maintain that in the legal battle between the Ba-Thlaping and others, the lawyer handling the case, David Arnot was simply "anxious to extend British authority over the Missionary road, if necessary, by extending that authority over his clients". The legal manipulation of Arnot, at the time, contributed in reshaping the history of people living in Bechuanaland. David Arnot, who was a Colesberg law agent, who

was later represented by Southey and Rhodes championed the idea that Britain could assess the wild lands in West and North of Transvaal. He maintains that "hunters, traders and missionaries had been entering the lands of the Griquas and the Bechuana, passing to the west of the country settled by the Trekkers. If the Republics should expand westward far enough to control that road, there could be no British advance into the interior (Keppel-Jones, 1975: 84). M. W. Pretorius, the then President of South African Republic, knew the importance of the road as well as Arnot.

In addition, the British influence and concentration on the Ratshidi and Montshiwa generally presented the Ratshidi as the centre-piece of Barolong history while making Montshiwa, the people's paramount chief (Odendaal, 1984:42). Odendaal (1984) analysed the inability of Plaatje and Molema to form a Barolong organisation. The work of Sellery (1952&1971) focused more on the economic life of the Barolong as well as the humanitarian imperialism of John Mackenzie. Breutz (1996) traced the history of the Barolong and focused on the subdivisions and units found within the Barolong Ratlou group. Molema (1950) documented a very pessimistic position on the future of peace in Barolong while joining Eurocentric scholars in abusing the people. He stated in his scholarly biography of Chief Moroka "that the minds of the Barolong were blank and utterly void; a howling vacuum..., they were rude in their manners and totally illiterate and ignorant of the art of peace" (Molema, 1950:190). The truth remains that there was no way that the minds of all the people found in a clan at any point in history could be collectively blank or utterly void as well as totally illiterate and ignorant in the act of peace. This is because, in every generation and society lies a group of men and women, who are often ambassadors of peace. Such men and women try to act as third parties and mediators in times of conflict. However, it can be stated that Molema (1950:190) may have exaggerated the degree of conflict disposition and culture found amongst many actors in the then Barolong society.

Unarguably, there is the need to expand the already existing knowledge on the subject matter of land conflict beyond the causal explanatory theses. There is also a need to push or extend the search for solutions to the conflict beyond the limited shores of security and media reports and the narrow prism of legal and administrative approaches. This will, no doubt, improve understanding of conflicts and land disputes as well as enhance the management and

resolution of perennial conflicts in Africa rather than relying on allusions drawn from studies on other similar conflicts (Itumo, 2014:8).

2.4 CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION

2. 4a NOTES ON PEACEBUILDING

Peacebuilding is perceived as a process that occurs after violent conflict has slowed down or come to a halt. In the traditional sense, it is the phase of societal peace promotion, which takes place within the period or after peace keeping and peacemaking. However, Smith (2004:19) argued that peacebuilding activities are designed to contribute towards the ending or avoiding of armed conflict, and may be carried out during armed conflict, in its wake, or as an attempt to prevent an anticipated armed conflict from starting. Both strategic and reactive peace building that takes the form of pre-conflict initiative and post-conflict initiative (and some time as the conflict rages-on) often encounters great bottlenecks in the implementation process. On their part, Fearnely and Chiwandamira (2006: 15) wrote that peacebuilding refers to the full spectrum of intervention that is focused on restoring relations between groups that have been in conflict. As such, peace building involves a number of different aspects, which may include forgiveness, cooperation, negotiation, mediation, facilitation, creation of mutual understanding and /or reconciliation. These strategies of peace building listed above all fall under the historical approaches to peace building. In the traditional times, our parents and elders taught forgiveness as a practical way of solving violent situation, which enhances quick emotional healing. The act of cooperation with former enemy creates the enabling environment for emotional healing. Negotiation on its part has being used by man in all the ages as a tool to achieve desired results, which include peace. Similarly, men of good will had at all times tried to mediate amongst conflicting parties as a way to facilitate peace, create mutual understanding of the issues at stake or causes of the conflict and pave way for sustainable reconciliation.

Peace building does encompass peacemaking processes, as it can facilitate and support such processes. Peace building does encompass peacekeeping operations as it is often part of their mandate. It involves the elimination of those structural factors that generates conflict and creates violent ideas in the minds of men. Moving towards this sort of peaceful environment

goes beyond conflict-solving or conflict management to social-problem-solving. Peace building initiatives try to fix the core problems that underlie a conflict, while changing the patterns of interaction by the parties involved in the conflict (Lederach, 1997:75). They aim to move a given population from a condition of extreme vulnerability and dependency to one of self-sufficiency and well being (SAIS). Peace building is a generic term that connotes peace-oriented efforts of all forms throughout history. It is the act of promoting historical and contemporary societal norms that would destroy the chances of conflict escalation. Lederach (1994:14) defined peace building as "efforts to transform potentially violent social relations into sustainable peaceful relations and outcomes". Kombol (2009:46) agreed with Lederach, when he wrote that peace building efforts, attack the root causes of conflict. This is a place the Nigerian State and their leaders has being failing on. They tend to go blind to potential explosive issues even when the early warning signs are there for all to see. It is only when the situation has exploded that the security and political actors will begin to run around like people whose house suddenly became on fire, forgetting that before the fire sparked off, they have stored explosive fuels in the sovereign house and have neglected the need to either remove the fuel or prevent the contact between it and fire.

Maise (2003) wrote that many Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), on the other hand, understand peace building as an umbrella concept that encompasses not only long-term transformative efforts, but also peace intervention, peace movements and peacemaking. Henning Haugerudbraaten argued that it is generally agreed that the central task of peace building is to create positive peace; a stable social equilibrium in which the surfacing of new disputes does not allow for the rise of violence and war. Haugerudbraaten (1998) documented that peace building could be used in six different ways namely:

i. to remove the root cause of conflict as a way of resolving it;
ii. efforts at peace building involve security, humanitarian, political or economic intervention, separately or all at the same time;
iii. the duration of peace building could be short, medium or long term;
iv. the main actors in peace building can be indigenous or foreign;
v. the dimension of peace building could be specific actions or over all action; and
vi. the organisation of peace building could be top to down approach or vice versa.

Historically, our ancestors have always struggled to remove the latent causes of conflict. This they do by empowering different age grades to engage in security, humanitarian and economic interventions in their different societies. The patterns of polity adopted in these traditional Nigerian and South African societies also ensure that there is short, medium and long time peace building strategies across our different communities. The implication becomes that the larger traditional Nigerian society were collectively responsible in the defence of their society unlike the Nigerian State of today, where peace and security is seen as the exclusive responsibility of the government and the security officials.

Long-term peacebuilding strategies are designed to fill social and institutional gaps that cause conflict. It is equally a means to address the underlying issues and factors that causes conflict. Doyle and Sambanis wrote that it is a collection of peace building techniques aimed to move parties away from confrontation and violence, and towards political and economic participation, peaceful relationships, and social harmony. Cockell (2000:15-34), Cousens (2001:1-20), Doyle and Sambianis (2000:779-802); all believed that peacebuilding is an act of addressing the root causes of conflict. This long-term perspective is crucial for the abortion of future conflict and the promotion of a more peaceful future.

Building a peaceful future involves articulating desirable structural, systemic, and institutional relationships that would enhance a peaceful society (Maise, 2003). These include sustainable economic development, individual self-sufficiency (that would abort future greed and corruption) equitable social structures that meet human needs and building positive relationships (Lederach, 1997:77). Peacebuilding measures also aim to prevent conflict from re-emerging, through the creation of mechanisms that enhance cooperation and dialogue among different religious, cultural, ethnic and socio-cultural groups. These measures can help parties manage their conflict of interests in a peaceful means. Other peacebuilding structures would include building institutions that provide procedures and mechanisms for effectively handling and resolving conflict. Maise (2003) documented that the structural dimension of peace building focuses on the management of social conditions that foster violent conflict. This is where the political leadership at all level of the Nigerian and South African States are meant to come-in. It is worthy of note that stable peace in Nigeria and

South Africa must be built on a multi-dimensional approach, which will include religious, social, economic, and political peace foundations that serve the positive needs of the Nigerian and South African populace. This is because in most cases, crisis arises out of systemic roots that have been neglected over its years of violent incubation. These root causes are typically complex, but include religious chauvinism, which give birth to religious conflict; unequal political representation, which produces political violence; environmental degradation, which created the Niger-Delta militancy and farmers-nomads conflict. Other institutionalized treats to peace in Nigeria include, poverty, injustice (unfair and unequal treatment), illiteracy, corruption etc. Until these social problems are addressed in Nigeria and South Africa, the two countries would continue to experience multi-faceted forms of violence, disputes, xenophobia and there can be no lasting peace. Thus, in order to establish durable peace, the private and public sectors must analyze the structural causes of the conflict and initiate a multi-dimensional structural change. These challenges and bottlenecks of implementing the peace process during and after a conflict could be easily noticed in the fact that:

i. The institutional mechanism that enhances peace tends to be biased and prejudiced, thus, making objectivity in the conflict-time, as well as post-conflict peace process more difficult;
ii. The psycho-healing process on the conflict victims is very difficult and often not fully realized in reactive peacebuilding; and
iii. There is the problem of should justice come before reconciliation or reconciliation before justice.

The continuous cases of intelligence leakage in the onset of conflict in Nigeria and disputes in South Africa are often driven by the bias and prejudice of some security personnel to the negative ambitions of the sons and daughters of discord. This act of intelligence leakage has led to the loss of many security personnel and properties, hence validating the challenge of peacebuilding at the on-set of conflict. Again, the regular conflict and butchery in the Ezza-Ezillo as well as many area in Nigeria, which amongst other factors has being sustained by the settler-non-settler fillip to conflict, which is another manifestation of how the negative psychology of conflict re-enforces intermittent violent attacks, thereby making psycho-healing difficult in that state. These challenges of reactive peace building made Ghali (1995) to speak of "peace building" as the "creation of a new environment" not merely the cessation of hostilities through peacekeeping. This type of peace building activities fall under four main headings:

i. to provide security,
ii. to establish the socio-economic foundations of long-term peace,
iii. likewise to establish the political framework of long-term peace, and
iv. to generate reconciliation, a healing of the wounds of war, and justice (Smith, 2004: 19).

However, advocates for the return and endorsement of indigenous African conflict resolution system (IACRS), over western approaches of conflict resolution (WACR) have linked what they perceive as very cold conflict resolution strategies (CRS), and poor results of WACR to the nature of western communities and their conflict management strategies. According to them, while the warm nature of African communities' encourage friendly processes of conflict resolution (CR), which yield promising results, the western approaches do not in many cases. On the relationship between conflict and nature of community, Peace and Conflict scholars have in their writings established a contrast between Western approaches of conflict resolution (WACR) and Indigenous African conflict resolution strategies (IACRS) (Olowu, 2015; Ani & Ajaegbo, 2015).

2.4b Conceptualizing Conflict

Zartman (1991:299) posits that conflict is an inevitable aspect of human interaction and the concomitant of choices and decisions. Conflict can be viewed as an incompatible interaction between at least two parties where one of the parties, experiences damage and the other party causes damage intentionally. Coser (1956: 121) argues that conflict occurs "when two or more people engage in a struggle over values and claims to status, power and resources in which the aims of opponents are to neutralise, injure or eliminate their rivals". Thus, it could be stated that conflict is driven by irreconcilable competitions. Miller (2003) states that conflict is a situation of incompatibility where strong desire on the part of one party to carry out the means or achieve the ends are or appears to be incompatible with the other. Thus, the incompatibility of aims, desires and goals is a driver of conflict. Hocker and Wilmot (1985) present it as the interaction of interdependent people who perceive incompatible goals and

interference from each other in achieving these goals. Folger, Poole and Stutman (1997) explained it better when they maintain that conflict is driven by perceived incompatible goals and interference from each other in achieving these goals. It should be noted that the level of reaction or conflict that arises when there are cases of incompatibility differs from actors to environment, situation and time when such cases arose. For Stagner (1995), conflict is simply the violent expression of this incompatibility.

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Burton (1990:574) stated categorically that conflict has to do with competition and contest for acquisition of the end that would be of much benefit to the other. In our individual lives, families, age grades, communities, offices, nations, there are conflicts (Obi, 2012:105). It should be noted that anywhere where two or more people interact, conflict would tend to arise at one time or another in different scales. There are many forms of conflict. Intra-personal conflict is a form of psycho-social conflict that every individual faces at one time or another in the journey of life. Conflict arises in a situation where each party is likely to seek a maximum advantage that cannot be achieved without reducing the advantage of the other party. Thus, a conflict situation arises when a person or group of persons feels threatened by the actions and inactions of other persons and groups. The factors that drives conflict include clash of goals and values, greedy desires, poorly managed fears, especially those relating to insecurity and threat to material and resource needs (such as wealth and land). Other factors that drive conflict include threat to cultural, emotional and other forms of human rights abuses. It should be stated that every conflict has its own peculiar characteristics. The nature of a particular conflict and the issues at stake could be analysed through the interpretation of a number of factors. The history of the conflict and the dynamics of the changes that have emerged over the years would be factored. The geographical and political influence of conflict is also vital in analysing inter-group relations. The primary factor involved in the conflict as well as its secondary actors like the financiers, supporters and their interests need to be considered in many almost all conflict studies.

Otokpa (2013:17-18) proposes four stages of conflict as follows: the formation stage, the escalation stage; the de-escalation stage; and the transformation stage. The formation stage is the period when there emerge issues that contradicts the interests and goals of other individuals and groups. It is a time when there is a shift in the attitudes and behaviours of

people towards social antagonism. At this point, conflict analysts would begin to perceive early warning signs of different degrees. The period of conflict escalation is characterised by the divisive position over interests that have graduated into full enmity. At this point, people begin to build arms as well as other measures to attack and or defend themselves from perceived eminent attacks from the enemy. The next stage of conflict escalation starts with the time when the individual or groups that are in a given environment begin to exhibit the manifestation of parallel goals and needs or incompatibility of interests that leads to confrontation. At the level of confrontation, parties that exhibit opposite ambitions, interests and goals begin to clash with one another at a minimal level. Consequently, the situation graduates into a crisis level. During this period, graph of the conflict tends to move towards its climax. It is a level where peaceful communication is aborted and the hitherto private confrontation begins to widen and gets out of control. The conflict de-escalation stage "involves the gradual cessation of hostilities arising from conflict weariness, hunger and external intervention" (Otokpa, 2013:17). At this stage, conflicting parties begin to recognise the need for dialogue and improved negotiation. The stage of conflict transformation is the period when the root of conflict has been uprooted. It is a stage where multi-dimensional peace-building process is used to transform a given conflict situation to produce sustainable social outcome(s).

2.5 Forms of land conflict

Conflict is a struggle or clash by individuals, groups, institutions or states over opposing goals, aims, ambitions and interests. It could be an armed conflict or unarmed conflict. Over the years, Africa has been presented as a theatre of all manners of conflict (Ani, 2013). In Africa, conflict has become a path for the pursuit of different forms of interest by groups and communities. There are different kinds of conflicts that are deep-rooted in Africa. According to Hallet (1980:742-743), "the first involves outside powers, with African states finding themselves either being made victims of external aggression or drawn into some struggle between non-African states. The second is represented by conflict between individual African states. The third and the fourth both involve internal conflict, one between different ethnic groups, and the other between different social classes". These forms of conflicts has totally manifested in Nigeria and to a large extent in South Africa. The British and French clashed over the scramble and partition of Nigeria, while in South Africa, the British and the Dutch

settlers (Boers) went to war. It should be noted that the recurrent cases of xenophobia in South Africa is a form of inter-state conflict, where instead of the state declaring the war against other states, it is the citizenry that fights the people from other countries, thereby creating serious challenge of citizen diplomacy. Nigeria and Cameroon as well as Nigeria and Chad have clashed over their border region while ethnic and class-driven conflict have continually manifested in Nigeria and South Africa.

Land conflict is a popular form of conflict in Africa. It is a type of conflict centred on the contest over land as a form of natural resource. Land conflict has manifested in different forms across ages. There are no generally accepted forms of land conflict. Human needs, greed and scarcity are amongst the numerous factors that drives land conflict. In Nigeria, there are extensive cases of land conflict driven by the inordinate desire of a man/ group of people to forcefully take away land that belongs to another person or group of people. Individual greed for land in many African countries forces them to increasingly accumulate large expanse of land for themselves. Land conflicts could also manifest at a very minimal level of boundary crisis. In this scenario, two individuals or groups struggle over what should be the right boundary or border location for their parcels of land. There is also the inheritance-driven form of land conflict. This is a type of land conflict that is often triggered by the contest amongst relatives over who own the real right to a parcel of land. Such form of land conflict has enshrined deep divide, enmity and disunity between brothers and sisters in many societies in Africa.

Land conflicts have been experienced between groups and governments in different parts of Africa. Such conflicts are experienced when local, state, regional, and provincial or federal-national governments within a country try to subtly or forcefully grab land belonging to the masses for developmental or institutional projects. The conflict scenario is worsened when the traditional land owners are not compensated and there is no dream for that. Another difficult form of land conflict is the one between groups and the state, especially when the conflict is propelled by corrupt administrative machinery of the state. In this form of land conflict, the state leadership finds it difficult to take responsibility of the unethical actions of employees. Government employees manipulate their position as an advantage to sale land in many cases without proper approvals from necessary authorities. The buyers of the sold land

on their part, finds it difficult to accept their loss as they try to hold tenaciously on the land and demand for a better allocation, which is often not available. The original owners of the land, on their part, would be crying foul over the manner through which corrupt state administrators dispossessed them of their land.

In many countries, indigenous people have been dispossessed or live at risk of being dispossessed land of their due to either failure to recognise their rights to land or invalidation of those rights by the state (UN-HABITAT/OHCHR, 2005). In Kenya, the Ndungu's Report of 2004 revealed that former Presidents of the country, Jomo Kenyata and Moi as well as many members of the power elite and influential citizens have at one time or the other enjoyed directly from the illegal allocation of public land. Land grabbing in Kenya is a common phenomenon that it is even reflected in contemporary art (Wehrmann, 2008:3). The problem of land grabbing differs from one part of the country to another. The allocation of Ngong Road Forest provided a sad commentary of how public land could be used unjustly to enrich a few through the machinery of grand corrupt officials (KNCHR/ KLA, 2006). The same kind of scenario was obtainable in the study area in Nigeria, where the Ezillo people claim that a former Chairman of the Ishielu Local Government Area, who was an Ezza man, used his influence as the political head of the council, to sell parts of the plots of land, mapped-out by the Ezillo people for government structures to his Ezza kinsmen, thereby triggering revolt and conflict from original owners of the land.

It should be noted that there is also a form of land conflict which lingers over a very long time in Africa and other parts of the world. This form of asymmetric land conflict manifests when rich and powerful person or an oligarchy of the financial and or political elite forcefully take over land that belongs to a group of people. In such cases, the rich and powerful tends to use their wealth, connection and influence to buy part of the public opinion in support of their selfish aggrandisement of the people's land. To make matters worse, the poor have no money to go to court, let alone to pay for the services of a good lawyer.

Paradoxically, in order to assert their positions over land, powerful individuals quickly goes to court as well as throws their resources and influence on the land case, which naturally

gives them the much needed and favourable advantage to win the land legally. When the court uses the facts before it and 'manipulates' the technicalities of the law to favour the rich and powerful in its judgement, especially in the absence of a lawyer representing the poor original owners of the land: social and cultural justice meant for the poor owner of the land is immediately aborted as the rich and powerful assumes new ownership of the said land. Unfortunately, in a number of cases, the poor land owner(s) and other co-heirs to the land tends to resort over the years to violent forms of attack on the rich and other inhabitants of the land. In many countries of Africa such as Nigeria, South Africa and Kenya, there are cases of widow as well as orphans losing their land to relatively wealthier uncles and guardians. A number of orphaned children turn to a relative after the death of their parents, grow up to realise that the relatives are apparently more interested in their property than in taking care of them (Human Rights Watch, 2001).

There is also a form of land conflict that manifests itself across Africa due to the multiple sale of a piece of land to many individuals at the same time, while denying the different buyers any knowledge that such a parcel of land has been sold over and over to another set of purchasers- (who are also ignorant that it has been originally sold to another or other buyers). It is also greed that makes individuals to sell part or the whole land belonging to their kindred or community in order to make quick cash. Such selfish sale often leads to violent reactions and fully fledged conflicts. There is equally a conflict situation when the revenue from an already sold village or communal land is not adequately shared to all co-owners of the land. In Nigeria, this situation has led to the removal of a number of community leaders as well as their widespread lack of legitimacy in office.

Manson and Mbenga (2014:63) maintain that in South Africa, "disputes over land acquisition and other material interests resulted in conflict, either among ruling factions or between the *dikgosi* and their followers, often united in opposition to the chieftainship in a 'popular alliance". For instance, in 1950, the *Lekgotla* at Phitsane resolved to remove some residents in Lopurung and resettle them at Phitsane. The policy was part of colonial idea of betterment plan, which was allegedly aimed at improving the conditions of the Africans in the reserved area by dividing their land for residential, agricultural and pastoral purposes (Cape Archives Depot, 1951). Paradoxically, the villagers became instantly conscious that the policy will not

favour them, at least in the short term and following the lack of trust to the colonial administration; they refused to move and rejected the policy, which led to the rise of crisis (Cape Archives Depot, 1950; Cape Archive Deport, 1956). The crisis took different dimensions and even went to court before it was resolved. Tshipitota threatened to demolish their residences and identified five 'ring-leaders of the rebel group'. Mosii, the then headman of the geo-political area and 120 residents in their quest for justice decided to approach a legal firm in Rustenburg. When they reached the court, the Department of Native Affairs stood right behind the *kgosi* (chief), the Lopurung 'rebels' managed to get a temporary interdict restraining Tshipitota from moving them. The Native Commissioner for Mafikeng advised the *kgosi* to appeal that decision but "it took six years before the matter finally went on appeal to the Cape Division of the Supreme Court. Tshipitota's appeal was upheld. Shortly thereafter, Motseakhumo died and relations between Mosii and the new *kgosi* were much improved. This led to an adjustment between the new chief and the Lopurung people and an amicable settlement" (Manson & Mbenga, 2014:98).

In other places, there exists the culture of directly or indirectly denying a group of individuals the right to land that should hitherto belong to them. Such denial-driven land conflict could manifest as class-based denial, gender-based denial, etc. In the Eastern part of Nigeria, the female child has been over the years, innately denied the right, from conception, to inherit a plot of land from their parents or husbands. This situation continued until 2015 when a Nigerian Supreme Court ruling declared the culture obnoxious and against the fundamental human rights of the female gender in Igbo land. In other cases, land conflict could manifest as a conspiracy by a brother or group of relatives to deny a number of those who have blood ties with them access to land, naturally meant for them. Under the above scenario, those denied land rights adopts violence as a roadmap to retrieve what they believe was truly theirs. There are other forms of land conflict in Africa that manifest when the state or institutions forcefully takes over land that belongs to individuals and communities without any form of compensation. Such forceful take-over of the people's land is often driven by the desire to lunch a developmental project such as building of institutions of learning, hospitals, markets, and companies. When the aboriginal owners of the land demand for compensation for a long time and there is none forth-coming, they tend to resort to violent attacks on whatever institutions that the government has put in place on their land.

2.6 CAUSES OF CONFLICT

There are a number of factors that drives conflicts in different parts of the world. This part of the study links the likelihood of multidimensional conflict to diversities arising from ethnic, religious, racial, cultural, age, gender and class differences among groups in their different societies. Analysts of this school of thought argue that societies in which there is manifestation of artificially created boundaries based on such social identities listed above are vulnerable to violent internal conflicts than homogenous ones. The next part of this study presents and explains a number of factors that causes conflict.

2.6a Political factor

The occurrence of some forms of violent conflicts in human society can be linked to issues, problems and challenges relating to governance. It starts with the quest for power and authority before graduating into full desire for leadership position. The year 1968, tagged "Human Rights Year", marked the beginning of a broader and more active interest of the United Nations in the law of armed conflict. The International Conference on Human Rights, which met under its auspices from 22nd April to 15th May, 1968 in Teheran, adopted Resolution XXIII on human rights in armed conflicts. The resolution also requested an enquiry into the need for additional humanitarian international conventions or for possible revision of existing conventions to ensure the better protection of civilians, prisoners of war and combatants in all armed conflicts and the prohibition and limitation of the use of certain methods and means of warfare.

The General Assembly endorsed the initiative and on 19th December 1968, they invited the Secretary General in consultation with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and then passed Resolution 2444 (XXLLL). The Resolution was entitled Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts. The General Assembly and its various commissions repeatedly engaged in debates and adopted resolutions, focusing on a few narrowly defined specific questions, notably the protection of women and children, the position of journalists and the condition of liberation fighters in wars of national liberation (Kalshoven & Zegveld, 2000:30-31). Ironically, in the Ezza-Agila and Ezza-Ezillo conflict zones, the protection of women were thrown to the dust as there were reported cases of rape and mass killing of children.

Mansfield and Snyder (1995) have clearly shown that democratising states are susceptible to internal violent political conflict. The period of political conflict starts from the campaign time to the Election Day and further to the period of political regime/ administration. Policies pursued by an administration as well as its readiness to hand over power in record time influences the chances for the birth of political conflict or not. Moreover, Mansfield and Snyder (2001:18) maintain that autocratic regimes are more stable than those that are transitioning to a democratic system. However, in the case of Iraq, under Sadam Husein and Libya under Muamar Ghadafi; the removal of such autocratic leadership generated different forms of multiplier conflicts in the state and has led to more deaths since their departure than what was obtainable under their leadership. Itumo (2014) argues that putting in place democratic institutions upon a shaky foundation may exacerbate ethnic tensions through a number of processes, particularly if certain ethnic groups are shut-out of the political process. Thus, in states with precariously balanced ethnic cleavages, democratisation burdens the polity with considerable instability. When democratic institutions are nascent or non-existent, peaceful legitimate avenues for settling political and social disputes are often absent. Institutionalised methods to redress grievances and absorb remonstrations are necessary to modify distressed political and social groups.

Research on the diversionary use of force and democratic consolidation has shed light on the democratic pacifying influence upon political contestation within a polity. Dassel and Reinhardt (1999:52-60) posited that civil wars are initiated when the military responds forcefully to insurrection that arises from "contested political institutions." They further maintain that "groups do not agree on which rules are authoritative. The military cannot resolve its disputes with other groups by following political rules because the losers will reject the outcome as illegitimate and seek redress through extra-institutional means" (Reinhardt, 1999:52-60). Many military administrations in Nigeria worsened the nature of land conflict in the country as they only used the might of their decrees to forcefully claim the land that belonged to the masses, which in many cases was allocated to the oligarchy of military networks. Itumo (2014) moots that political turmoil produced by contestation of political institutions, incites military aggression, leading directly to internal strife. These findings have significant implications for civil war literature that examines how various political institutions affect a state's vulnerability to civil violent conflict. If political institutions are not consolidated and popular discontent with political system exists, the

contestation of political institutions leads to civil violent conflict. Thus, highly democratic systems should be able to circumvent this development. Furthermore, if certain ethnic groups are marginalised from the political process-(either through the lack of essential political representation or unfair policy outcomes), their incentive to initiate violent rebellion increases (Reynal-Querol, 2002a:16; Reynal-Querol, 2002b: 36). This could be seen in the quest by the Ezza people in Ezillo as well as the Ezza in Agila to develop their independent autonomous community with their own leaders, schools, markets and farms.

Lijphardt (1999:28) has presciently warned that the bellicosity and adversarial nature of Westminster or majority system of government, popularised by democracy, has the potential to inflame ethnic tensions and substantially increase the likelihood of civil strife. Itumo (2014) maintains that in majority systems, the stakes in periodic democratic elections are much higher because of intrinsic disproportional nature of such systems. Consequently, because the thresholds to secure representation are so high in these systems, groups without sufficient popular support are excluded from the political process and oftentimes left without political representation (Lijphardt, 1977: 34; Lijphardt, 1999: 75). Thus, they tend to express their anger and sense of marginalisation or negligence through different forms of conflict behaviour. Agbaje (1998) and Ihonvbere (2000:27) argued that the prolonged years of military rule have contributed to the incessant violent conflicts witnessed in Nigeria today. According to these scholars, the prolonged military rule in Nigerian led to the militarisation of the Nigeria society by successive military regimes. Ibrahim (2009:36) corroborates the above view-point by asserting that after independence in 1960, Nigeria underwent thirty years of military rule (1960-1979 and 1983-1999), during which political and social values were deeply eroded and grossly undermined. The act of undermining the traditional peacebuilding cultures of the people gave way to a new culture of might is right during the military era, thereby intensifying the use of force and naked violence to attain individual and group objectives. Ibrahim (2009) further remarks that military regimes in Nigeria typically introduced a culture of forceful seizure of political power, indefinite detention of politicians and activists, harassment and summary execution of opponents. These were accompanied with deliberate and strategic weakening by ruling powers of the political and socio-economic well being of Nigerians as a tool for domination and control as well as the use of "fear" and "divide and rule" tactics to keep Nigerians away from organising a resistance (Itumo, 2014). Administrators of the ruling military regime protected criminals as long as they served government interest of retaining power and created subservient cults of violent behaviours

and confrontations among businessmen, politicians, university administrators, traditional rulers, academics and young people (students, area boys, and militia groups) in further attempt to sustain their hegemony (Asobie, 1999:14).

Other scholars link the violent communal conflicts in Nigeria to colonialism or neo-colonialism (Egwu, 2001:25; Oyovbaire, 1984:76; Nnoli, 1978:29). For other scholars, defects in the structure of Nigeria's federalism have remained a major source of conflict in the Nigerian State (Muhammad, 2007:10). Other causes of conflict in the Nigeria's political space include problems and challenges posed by power sharing arrangements (Rustad, 2008:21) as well as conflicts of interest over the creation of more states (Suberu, 2001:18).
Among the Ezza and the Barolong people, the role of the colonial masters in the intensification of land disputes cannot be over-emphasized. The colonial lords created false land boundaries in both environments under study. Unfortunately, in the South African context, the colonial administration used their gunboat influence to grab resourceful portions of land as much as they could in the best parts of the people's environment, while pushing the original land owners in unfavourable geographical clusters.

The Ezza and Ezza-Ezillo people of Nigeria experienced the crisis of political conflict, which manifested in their economic and socio-political relations. Ani (2015:5) argues that in 1990, after the creation of Ishielu Local Government Area, with the headquarters in Ezillo, the community mapped-out a parcel of land at Isimkpuma for the establishment of the National Electoral Commission (NEC), Nigerian Police and National Population Commission (NPC) offices. It is stated that through the help of Ereke Felix, the then Chairman, Ishielu Local Government Area, who was from Ezza, his people flooded the area that was originally mapped-out for federal establishments. Anozie (1991:5) is of the opinion that the conflict, at the time, which had deepened between Ezza settlers and Ezillo indigenes in the locality, took a dangerous dimension as the Ezillo people accused the chairman of supporting the Ezza in sitting the offices of the government agencies and the allocation of land in the area.
However, among the Barolong of South Africa, the complex nature of their quest for authentic political leadership during the pre-colonial era to the colonial times was complicated by the dynamics of land disputes among the people. The implication was that it made the land dispute crisis an integral part of the intractable historical challenge of finding-out the authentic paramount chief amongst the people.

Itumo (2014) argues that the weakness of the governance perspective is that it attempts to centre the whole analysis of the cause of conflict within the narrow prism of political variables. In this attempt, it ignites other variables that could be potential sources of violent conflict such as ethnic-identity, economic, geographical/territorial factors and other conditions that could precipitate violent conflicts such as availability of small arms and low cost weapons, as well as weak state capacity to provide security and law enforcement.

2.6b Ethnic and cultural factors

The tendency of ethnicity and identity issues to generate conflict situations in a society has been emphasised by experts in peace and conflict studies. Collier (2001b:17) argues that ethnic diversity causes violent conflicts in different societies. According to Collier (2001b:33), the existence of dominant ethnic frictions generates conflicts. While Collier (2001a) is of the idea that countries have a single ethnic nature, Renal-Querol (2002:30-32) maintains that multi-ethnicity is directly related to the outbreak of internal conflict. Manson and Mbenga (2014:63) also posit that there were land conflicts in South Africa driven mainly by ethnic sentiments and affiliations from the 19th to the 20th century.

Osaghe and Suberu (2008:4) assert that threats of secession, civil strife, civil wars, minority agitation and violent conflicts are quite common threats or actual occurrences in Nigeria. This claim is supported by the fact that both in viable and non-viable economic settings, Nigerians are more likely to define themselves in terms of their ethnic affinities than any other identity (Itumo, 2014; Ani & Aro, 2013). Indeed, according to the authoritative survey carried out by Lewis and Bratton in 2000 on "Attitudes to Democracy and Markets in Nigeria", ethnicity "is demonstrably the most conspicuous group identity in Nigeria" (Lewis and Bratton, 2000: 27). The survey revealed that almost half (48.2%) of Nigerians chose to label themselves with an ethnic identity, compared to almost one-third (28.4%) who opted for class identities, and 21.0 percent chose a regional identity (Lewis and Bratton, 2000: 24-25). In essence, close to two-thirds of the population consider themselves as members of primordial ethnic, regional and religious groups. In other -words, "Nigerians tend to cluster more readily around cultural solidarities of kin than the class solidarities of the workplaces" (Lewis and Bratton, 2000:25). The force of integration and unity amongst the Ezza nation is a very powerful sub-identity bonding that holds them together irrespective of their location in space and historical time. Thus, the tendency for an Ezza man to be perceived by neighbours as supporting or

sponsoring the flame of conflict in other Ezza colonies is a widespread ideology amongst the citizenry found in different Ezza neighbourhoods. This is not surprising, considering the fact that ethnic formations are perhaps the most historically enduring behavioural units in the country, and were further reinforced by colonial and post-colonial regimes (Ituma, 2014). Matters are not helped by the fact that ethnic identities and differentiations are intricately linked with other identities such as regionalism (Osaghe & Suberu, 2008:11).

There is also the fact that ethnic identities and boundaries, including myths of common origin, are fluid and subject to continuous construction and reconstruction (Itumo, 2014). The case of Ezza migrants and other dispersed assimilated groups by the Ezza that have somewhat become distinct from the original group constitute another category of problematic classification, especially in the face of widespread stereotype (that they are militant war-mongers) (Uche, 2016; Henry, 2016; Ibini, 2016). The social stigmatization of a group in any negative form has remained a historic source of identity problem all over history. Itumo (2014) moots the idea that ethnic diversity cannot be defined only in terms of categories employed by linguists and ethnographers. There is also the whole dimension of self-definition by members of the group and outsiders, which is a much more important determinant of so-called ethnic-based behaviour. As much as possible, therefore, social identities should be consistent with 'constructed reality', self-ascribed identities, or 'realities' of members of the group's behaviour to be valid. This is one useful way of assessing the validity of various identities.

Paradoxically, the creation and multiplication of states and local government areas (from twelve in 1967 to thirty six in 1996) in Nigeria have gradually replaced these broader regions and led to the emergence of new majorities and minorities. However, the old historical context of regionalism has remained, especially with regard to major groupings. Itumo (2014) maintains that there have been other important developments in the domain of ethnic politics. The creation of more states and local government areas has led to an expansion in the domain of salient identities, but at the same time, there has been a concentration of contestations and conflicts around local issues. This has provided the impetus for the sharpening of communal identities and conflicts, which have manifested in conflicts between 'indigenes' and 'non-indigenes', 'sons-of-the-soil' and 'migrants' as well as 'settlers'. The resultant system of discriminatory citizenship has deep historical roots. However, the phenomenal rise of communal conflicts beginning from the 1990s can be partly attributed to shrinking state

resources and the attendant recourse by groups to communal resources on the one hand, and on the other, to a number of state policies, interventions and omissions. Others include the neglect and abuse of police and security establishments, whose operational dynamics in recent times shows that they are either in support of one ethnic group against another or engages in discriminatory practices to favour the desire of powerful elite in high offices.

The primary idea that a given pierce of land belong to Ezza, Agila, Ezillo, Mgbalukwu, Obeagu Isu or the ancestors of the Barolong and other groups in the Bechuanaland reserves is generally a learned culture. With the growth in the number of people within the communities discussed above, citizens are nurtured-into the unique culture of mercenary warfare such as the Ezza, crop farming such as the Agilla, Ezillo and Mgbalukwu as well as Obeagu Isu on the Nigerian side, while those from the Barolong started to learn the culture of livestock farming and wheat cultivation. Similarly, the peoples' adoption of the strategies of warfare as practised by Ezza ancestors naturally influences their greed over land (Cotterell, 1930:1). It is equally through such social learning that the citizens of Ezza colonies naturally adopt the culture of migration from their ancestral homes to the colonies. This is because in Ezza traditional culture, all the sons of a man leaves the compound, except the last son and settles in a completely new community or better still, new Ezza settlement or colony.

Land in many parts of Africa, especially among the Ezza represents social status as well as attainment of adulthood. It can be converted into social capital, provide labour, food and money for relatives as well as neighbours. At times, inherited land has symbolic value as a means of identification with one's ancestors, lineage, village or ethnic group (Stepputat, 2004). Gaining knowledge about the location of family land and where the land of another person begins is necessary for a successful return/ resettlement process. It should be recalled that "the fundamental dimension of the notion of citizenship in Africa follows attachment to one's community and through it, to the soil of the ancestors or the homeland" (Mbah & Nwangwu, 2014:684). The implication is that it was very easy to find the sons of an Ezza man from Agila going to settle separately in Ezillo, Mgbalukwu, Obeagu-Isu and Ezza-Akpoga. As the Ezza continued to settle in these new colonies, their landlords (who are also conscious of not losing their land rights) become agitated in the face of their continued expansionism.

Otokpa (2013: 32) maintains that "the bond between the Agila man and Agila land is beyond just economic necessity. It is difficult to separate an Agila man from his land. Land is *deitified* and worshiped. To lose any part of it is a threat to his very existence. This is the essence of *agilamania*, the concept of a strong bond between someone (an Agila man) and what belonged to him". Ironically, while the Agila man and his piece of land are synonymous, when they met with the Ezza settlers, who had a history of land hunger, which is mainly culturally- constructed, conflict became the order of the day.

Similarly, among the whole Igbo people, the place of *Ani/ Ali* (land) in their ontological value cannot be neglected. The Igbo people traditionally believe that land is so powerful that it could influence the destiny and storyline of man and communities. It is also expressed in general view that land is the spiritual connector of the living, the dead and the unborn (Ibeanu & Mbah, 2011:3). Thus, land rights are very serious issue among the Igbo since land touches both the material and the spiritual, the very essence of Igbo ontology. Many Igbo people believe that protection of their land is something worth losing one's life for. While land and other material interests are the major casus belli in communal conflicts, they do not explain the identities that form around them and how these identities acquire specificity and become the basis of intensification of conflict (Mbah &Nwangwu, 2014:685).

Although land and its interests are the objective causes of inter-communal conflicts, they do not explain its recurrence over decades. It should be recalled that war and conflict are not new to humanity; rather what is relatively new is the new culture of weapons of mass destruction and the qualitative improvement in weapons of war and destruction (Akpuru-Aja, 2000:2). It could also be argued that the nature of conflicts has changed over time and in different environments, just as the level of impact of conflict has changed over the years. There is a subjective dimension to explain the recurrence of these conflicts and why generations have fought to sustain them. This is based on deep-rooted conflict psychology or deep-seated cultural animosity. By deep-seated cultural animosity, the researcher refers to a sense of grievances shared by members of an intra-ethnic identity or a sustained sense of grievances towards another intra-ethnic identity arising from long-standing conflict between

the two cultures. Consequently, while land is a necessary explanation of this conflict, it is this long standing animosity that explains their recurrence over time. This transformation is aptly demonstrated in the Ezillo and Ezza-Ezillo conflicts (Mbah & Nwangwu, 2014:684). Thus, the people described in this study were historically caught-up by one form of conflict or another. The circle of the re-occurrence of conflict continually shaped their existential and cultural orientations. It is these forms of peculiar experiences that man often has in his geographical location on global space that made Burr (1995) to argue that the identity of any man is a function of the man's socio-cultural realm.

The stigmatisation of Ezza people as war mongers promotes the creation of artificial social boundaries which breed disaffections that generate animosities, lead to violent social conflicts among different groups in the country which ordinarily could not have been the case (Itumo, 2014:1). On the other one, the current scattered nature of settlement of Barolong people in different parts of South Africa and the development of independent cultural identity in their new settlements are also socially constructed over the years.

2.6c The place of cleavages

Territorial cleavages, senatorial and constituency alliances evolved from the structures, borders and demarcations created and consolidated by colonialists in the process of state formation in Nigeria. Within the Ebonyi State political structure, there is an unofficial line of divide between those from the South and those from the North. It is popularly perceived from the point of Abakaliki block and the Afikpo block dichotomy. The division of Ebonyi State into Abakalki and Afikpo blocks is a form of clandestine stereotype that breads division and undermines peace. This form of cleavage has remained in the conflict setting from the colonial era as the Ojiegbe-Ezza settlers in the then Isu land, which was under the then Afikpo Division, refused to pay their taxes to the Division but insisted that they were part of the Abakaliki Division, where their other Ezza kiths and kiln are found and can only pay their tax there. The problem brought administrative bottlenecks and challenges between the then colonial administrators of Abakaliki and the Afikpo Divisions (Ani, 2012c). Gradually, as the regional arrangements in Nigeria gave way to state formations, ethnic cleavages within the state began to emerge as a form of local alliance that influences state politics and conflict dynamics within the state. Itumo (2014) argues that the most fundamental of the cleavages is

that between the North and the South, these being the initial structures of the colonial state, were administered separately even after they were amalgamated of the two units in 1914. The other cleavages emerged with the introduction of a three region structure (North, East and West) in 1946. A fourth region (Mid-West) was created in 1963, but partly because of its status as home to minorities, the creation did not fundamentally alter the tripartite regional structure existing before the First Republic was sacked by the military in 1966. The ethnic majority-minority cleavage and the majority basis of politics took roots within these structures. The emergent elite were regionalised from inception, especially after 1946 when the political space was opened to more Nigerian participation; the majority elite segment deployed strategies of ethnic mobilisation and exclusionary politics to establish hegemonic control of the regions (Agbaje, 1998:21). Itumo (2014) further argues that with the meaning of regionalism reduced to North for "Northerners", "East, for Easterners" and "West for Westerners", a discriminatory system under which people from other regions living in these areas were deprived of rights and privileges and excluded from the political process, has become entrenched. This was how the infamous distinction between indigenes and non-indigenes became strengthened.

North West Provincial Archives and Library (1980) documents that in the Barolong setting, South Africa, the Paramount ruler, shortly after the appointment of chieftainess Neonyana Montshioa as regent, resolved that all non-Tswanas who were allowed to reside in the area of the tribal authority during the time of the late Chief Kebalepile Montshioa and who had not applied for district transfers, be given a timeframe to regularise their documents and that those who failed to comply accordingly, not be assisted. Regrettably, the policy was followed by a great influx of non-Tswana into the area, the extent of which was never experienced before. These people were allocated residential sites without first being brought before the Tribal Authority in terms of Proclamation R192 of 1967. The late headman Rantsuru, who was acting as the right hand man of L. F. Montshioa at that time, was responsible for interviewing new arrivals. He collected from each applicant, about R10.00 to R20.00 rands, which he maintained represented their settlement dues called *Sehuba*. They were also said to pay an additional R32.00 as affiliation fees. The colonial administration later discovered that the *Sehuba* payments did not reach the treasury of the chief (North West Provincial Archives and Library 1980:1). To make matters worse, there was an increasing influx of non-Tswana at an alarming rate. On 10th January, 1977, the then cabinet directed the then Secretary for Interior to request the Magistrate to instruct all chiefs and headmen not to allow non-Tswana

to reside in their territories. The then Chief, L. F. Montshioa, instead of consulting the Tribal Authorities, called for a public meeting (*pitso*) of these non-Tswana people and informed them that the then Bophuthatswana Government did not want them in their land but that he actually wanted them to reside in his territory as long as they were willing to do so. He stated that the land belonged to the Barolong tribe and not the government. North West Provincial Archives and Library (1980:1-2) also documents that Chief Montshioa was supported by headmen Rantsuru Tawana, Maadimo Lekoko and members of the Seoposengwe Party while D. P. Kgotleng, O. P. Seleka and Headman M. D. Lecholo openly warned the chief of the dangers inherent in continuous influx of non-Tswana into their territory.

2.6d Class factor

The place of class factor in the rise of conflict cannot be over-emphasised. It is generally perceived that the rich use their powerful wealth to influence the competition for resources, which they have short or long-run interest in (Ani, 2013b). When the competition begins, they tend to throw-in their weight in order to ensure that they win at all cost. When this happens, the losers, who in most cases, are the poor and those who occupy the lower echelon of the social ladder, tends to resort to conflict as a means of expressing their anger in the face of the perceived forceful claim of what belongs to them by the rich, especially if it has to do with land as a fundamental means of economic production.

Among the Barolong people of South Africa, land dispute is directly connected to the contest over paramount position in many cases, while in Ezza colonies of Nigeria, a number of wealthy Ezza aristocrats who do not live in the conflict zones have been arrested in the past by the police on grounds that they were the real hands that financed the conflict with their strong economic base. There are two main types of social class in Nigeria. Itumo (2014) maintains that the first class is the dominant one or elite, which has also been variously referred to as the ruling class (elite). They are often the main members of the political class (elite) or the privileged class. They have unlimited access to state resources and are very influential not only to national economic issues but also in the face of armed conflicts. The second social class is the dominated class also called the masses or the ordinary people in society. They are made up of the poor and underprivileged, as well as the peasantry (which is the common name for rural dwellers). There is also the working class, whose identity is built around labour and constitutes a special category of the dominated class. For a long time, analysts have talked of a middle class, made up of the educated elite and the privileged

proletariat – intelligentsia, bureaucrats and technocrats (Diamond, 1988:37; Sklar, and Williams, 1964). Today, the existence of this class in Nigeria is the subject of debate. It is argued; the middle class was wiped out by the military regime using the structural adjustment programme and their authoritarianism that encouraged massive brain drain and pauperization of members of the class (Jega, 2000:26; Olukoshi, 1993:7). The truth remains that the working class still exists in the Nigerian State as well as in South Africa. However, it is very unfortunate that the degree of their influence has been heavily reduced through the political manipulations of the members of the powerful elite. Otite (1979:93) introduced another dimension into the argument on the weakening of class consciousness. He maintains that "the attachment to the exclusive symbols of ethnicity weakens class consciousness, elite organization and occupational colleagueship".

Notwithstanding such structural weaknesses, however, both elite and non-elite have proved capable of class-based conflict mobilisation and action, especially when their constitutive interests are threatened. This is true of labour, which has been able to mobilise workers to oppose unpopular government policies and to demand better conditions of service and political transformation including decolonisation and democratisation (Ihonvbere, 1997). In short, some Nigerian analysts (of the Governor Elechi mass arrest of the Ezza aristocrats) also believe that the government simply wanted to victimise them for courageously criticising the unpopular policies of his administration (Igboke, 2016). However, this is not very true for arrests of rich Ezza men divided the political elite who had close ranks at critical points to ensure the survival and stability of the state.

Glazer (1998) also gives primacy to non-economic factors in the explanation of violence, pointing out that political leaders often encourage individuals and groups to engage in violence in order to promote parochial interest. Itumo (2014) points-out that in the society; elite members use their connections, especially legal and extra-legal social networks to manipulate violence in the society. This has a bearing on the prosecution of conflict in the Ezillo community in Nigeria. The connection of the elite to legal social networks of violence is explained in terms of their free access to institutions and individuals in charge of the legitimate coercive instrument of the state. This is exemplified by their direct or indirect connections to individuals who hold positions of power and authority in the country at local, state and federal levels. Another stance of these categories of elites comprises those who directly hold official government positions and as such, use their positions to influence the

promotion and escalation of violent conflicts. These include permanent secretaries, directors, general managers, town union leaders, and heads of local administrations and members of the national assembly members of Ezillo and Ezza extraction, who directly or indirectly, sponsor violent conflict in Ezillo community (Itumo, 2014).

Others are highly influential members of the society, who, because of their close relationship with those in positions of authority, command influence and respects among members of their clans. As such, their words are laws in their various communities. Drawing on qualitative research on ethnic violence in Northern Nigeria, particularly in Jos, Kano and Kaduna, Granovetter (1973:7) and Ensminger (2004:23) assert that individuals, who are well - connected to local-level social networks within their community, are more inclined to mobilise their people to participate in violent behaviours than less connected individuals. These elites assure their various clans of their prompt release no matter the level of atrocity they may commit during conflict. These elites are trusted by their people because they demonstrated such capacities in the past. Such actions earned them high levels of confidence among members of their clans (Itumo, 2014).

In Nigeria, the Ebonyi State Police alleged during a press briefing in Abakaliki that "some prominent Ezza personalities usually converged at Oshiegbe village in Ezza North Local Government Area where they conspired to sponsor the war and cause mayhem by physically donating money and imposing levies on other Ezza people to procure arms and ammunitions including food items" (Inya, 2010:18). The article listed some prominent Ezza personalities such as "Joseph Amaga, Paulinus Egbe Otubo, Geoffery Ozo Chukwu, His Royal Highness (HRH) Eze Christopher Ewa, H.R.H. Eze Lawrence Akochi, H.R.H. Eze Basil Nwafor, Jude Okpor, Clement Nwanga, Jude Onele, and Paulinus Ali" suspected of using their influence to bear on the conflict (Inya, 2010:18). Ironically, the popular act by the Nigerian police and other security agencies is often messed-up by the massive reality that manifests when the courts of competent jurisdictions find many of such men not guilty of any allegations levelled against them. There are even worse cases where the courts have declared that a suspect should be released and security agencies trying to continually hold them under detention due to the widespread powerful political interests in the matter.

2.6e Gender and youth factors

The place of gender in the rise of conflicts is gaining great international attention and reactions from scholars and analysts. It is widely argued that the male gender ignites and fuels conflict in many parts of the globe. In the long-run, women and children bear the brunt of its negative effects (Ani & Osakwe, 2014; Ani, 2012d). Among the Agila people of Benue State, Nigeria, the complaint and demand that Ezza settlers in their land should leave their territory was emphasised when they re-counted how Ezza warriors raped and killed their women (Onoja, 2013). The involvement of Charles Warren in the capturing of Mahikeng, South Africa into the British colony emanated from the fact that his cousin, who was an adviser to Chief Montshioa married from Barolong and was killed while fighting in the Battle of Tigele. Thus, gender has a very significant influence on conflict dynamics in areas under investigation. The coercive violent effect of conflict on women, girls and children dehumanizes them and places them on the path of perpetual struggle to overcome their violent history.

Youth identities have grown in importance over the past two decades, partly due to the strategic roles played by the youths in economic and democratisation struggles in both Nigeria and South Africa. The militarisation and violent disposition of many youth has been promoted significantly by widespread socio-economic frustrations and alienation, including relatively high levels of youth unemployment and underemployment in both countries. In the Mgbalukwu-Obeagu and Ojiegbe Ezza conflict environment of Nigeria, it was the youths who were armed to the teeth to fight and protect the lives of their communities. This study reveals confessions of youth recruited from other Ezza colonies to fight on the side of Ezza during the Ezza and Ezza-Ezillo conflict. Ironically, at the end of each phase of the conflict, the youth who were recruited in Mgbalukwu-Obeagu and Ezza-Ojiegbe as well as those recruited in the Ezza and Ezza-Ezillo conflict zones turned into security threats within their communities and against their neighbours. This fact has been extensively discussed in chapter six under impact analysis.

2.6f Economic factor

There are a number of academic research works that have traced conflicts to economic factors. Collier, (2001a:20) as well as Collier and Hoefler (1998:31) have conducted significant and persuasive studies on the economic causes of civil strife. Their study reveals the effect of economic growth rates and economic inequality on the outbreak of violent

conflicts in different settings. They portray how the existence of mineral resources fuels internal conflicts within the state as well as the relationship between per capita income and civil war. The thesis of the protagonists of the economic driven conflict contends that the propensity to indulge in violence is higher among low income and less educated people (Freedman, 1996:34). While showing that extreme economic inequality is an antecedent to civil war, Collier and Hoefler (2002:27) as well as Sen (19973:49) assert that state's propensity for intra-state war is related to the degree of inequality in society. Inter-group disputes, particularly where primordial tensions exist, may be exacerbated by inequitable distribution of financial resources (Itumo, 2014).

However, concentrating only on income inequality distorts the "deprivations that relate to other variables, such as unemployment, ill health, lack of education and social exclusion" (Sen, 1999:108). It should be noted that whether violent conflict is caused by economic or non-economic factors depend on the nature of the violence. Collier (2001:73) also found empirical support for low levels of GDP per capita as a determinant of violent conflict, although, because of its high level of correlation with other socio-economic indicators, it is "the most difficult variable to interpret" (Collier & Hoefler, 2002: 16). Blomberg and Hess (2002:223) found that harsh economic conditions generated by economic recession are significant predictors of internal conflicts. A number of studies seek to quantifiably test the effects that unmanageable debt and debt service payments have on the incidence of intra-state conflict. The literature on debt obligation is organised around debt sustainability concerns and the perpetuation of social and economic misfortune that is common in countries encumbered with exorbitant levels of debt (Cheru, 2002:43; Poku, 2002:18).

It should be stated that the pioneer challenge that triggered the first phase of the Mgbalukwu-Obeagu and Ojiegbe-Ezza conflict was the inability of the Ojiegbe-Ezza settlers to pay their centuries of tenancy fees to their Isu landlords in Nigeria. Similarly, the challenge of paying the *Sehuba* fees by non-Tswana in Barolong, South Africa as well as the R32.00 affiliation fees did not go down well with many Barolong people as well as those forced to pay the fees at the time.

Furthermore, unmanageable debt obligations, adversely affect a government's capacity to accomplish its nation building goals. Contextual information supporting this supposition is ample. Re-distributive policies are notoriously contentious in Nigeria for instance, where

ethnic cleavages, which were institutionalised through the formation of ethnically determined federal states, are aggravated through fiscal allocation (Suberu, 2001:42). Although an expansive system of federalism serves to mollify ethno-religious tensions; the potential for dissatisfaction with re-distributive outcomes and consequently secession and civil war are nonetheless, real (Itumo, 2014). Spatial inequality refers to the uneven distribution of income and other economic variables across different spatial locations. It is a component of overall inequality between individuals. Spatial inequality influences conflicts, especially when it coincides with division of socio-economic groups such as settlers and indigenous people. In many cases, the indigenous people have greater access to all the means of production, especially land, than the settlers thereby promoting spatial inequality. Itumo (2014) maintains that the link between inequality and violent conflict is among the oldest concerns in political economy. It is almost a universal assumption that an inequitable distribution of resources and wealth will provoke violent rebellion. Again, when the inequality is driven by imperialism, coercion, power and repression, it inhibits collective positive action needed for sustainable development (Cramer, 2005). At the point of massive imperialism, backed by powerful coercion and repression, the masses will gradually become resistant and conflict becomes imminent. In many of the Ezza settlements in Nike, Enugu State; Ezillo, Ebonyi State; Agila, Benue State and Isu, Ebonyi State, it is often very easy to observe the level of economic disparity between them and the rest of the host community.

2.6g Geographical and climatic factors

This aspect of the literature links the root causes of violent conflict to geo-political factors resulting from the struggle for access and control of geographical space (Prescott, 1965:27; Holdich, 1916:39; Boggs, 1940:217). Boundary questions have remained a dominant explanation for conflicts among liberal political scientists. Holdick (1916:211), Spykman and Rollins (1939:83) were advocates of this ideology. The implication of these ideas is that boundary conflicts are widespread especially in Africa and other developing countries. Itumo (2014) goes further to maintain that the more significant a boundary is, the more crisis-prone it becomes. The significance of a boundary is also related to the dynamics of statecraft. A border becomes significant if it is capable of enhancing the advantages of a community or state. In the most basic sense, a territory can be viewed as an important factor generating conflicts because of the resources found in the area (Goertz and Diehl, 1992; Hensel, 1996; Newman, 1999).

Furthermore, many territories have been the subject of dispute because they contain (or were thought to contain) valuable commodities or resources such as strategic minerals, fresh water, or fertile agricultural land. Certain territories are also considered valuable because they provide access to the sea or to other commercial routes, particularly when they include deep water ports, warm water ports, or control over strategic waterways. A territory may also be seen as important for its population, particularly when it includes members of an ethnic or religious group that inhabits a neighbouring state. For instance, an area containing useful natural and material resources is likely to induce conflicts as found in the oil-rich Niger Delta areas of Nigeria (Ani & Ohagwu, 2013) and the platinum rich North Western Province of South Africa. Prescott (1965:231) opines that "people are more aware of the influence on their lives of federal and internal boundaries than international boundaries". This is because it is the community or tribal boundaries that define the communal forms of inter-group relations. At the provincial, state or regional boundaries, the cord of social integration is often weaker but the international borders or frontiers are often a tool of manipulation in relations to national interest, foreign policy, diplomacy and territorial sovereignty analysis. This has been the case between South Africa and her neighbours on the one hand and Nigeria and her neighbours on the other (Ani, 2012a).

Prescott (1965:153) traced the neglect of international boundary by individuals to the fact that internal boundaries are ephemeral and subject to rapid change due to bilateral and multilateral relations. In addition, many communal boundaries are often not demarcated in contrast to international boundaries. Following the field interviews in Nigeria, Nkpuma (2016) maintains that there is no clear cut boundary between the Ezza settlers and the people of Ugwuomu Nike thereby, reinforcing their quest for more territories. The scenario is also applicable in the contested area between the Ezama and the Oshiri people, who had a history of boundary changes that depended on the winner of the intermittent wars fought since the 19th century to the last quarter of the 20th century. Another interviewee, Ngwuta (2016) argues that there is no proper boundary demarcation between both groups, except the Ebonyi River, which started serving as a natural boundary after the period of conflicts. Oral traditions amongst the Oshiri people still have it that their land extends beyond the river. Research has also shown that geography has a strong influence on conflicts. The thesis on the place of geographical influence on conflicts has been categorized by Diehl (1991) into geography as an influence, facilitator or source of conflict. The implication is that geography easily becomes a facilitating

factor for conflicts (Hensel, 1997; Vasques 1995). Different forms of armed conflict emanates from geographical factors.

Fearon (1995) posits that territories with strategic attributes can be an important source of war even for adversaries who would otherwise prefer a negotiated settlement, because the transfer of strategic territory can alter the relative economic and bargaining positions of the two sides. That is, control over the transferred territory may greatly increase the changes of the gaining side for successful attack or defence in future confrontations, which may make both contending sides reluctant to allow the peaceful transfer of such territory to any suspected adversary. Territory is also argued to lie at the heart of national identity and cohesion, with the very existence and autonomy of a state being rooted in its territory (Murphy, 1990). Many territories are seen as important for their perceived historical connections with a state or its citizens, particularly to the extent that the territory in question was the scene of significant events for a culture or religion. The Ezza settlers in their different colonies continued to argue that they cannot abandon a particular settlement where they have lived and buried their ancestors over the decades (Dada & Ani, 2009). It is popular knowledge among the Igbo people of Nigeria, that descendants find it difficult to resettle from communities or areas where their ancestors were buried. Toft (1997) made a similar point regarding ethnic conflict within states, by arguing that members of a nation can develop an attachment to a territory that becomes indivisible from their conception of self and nation, essentially preventing compromise over what is seen as a vital part of the national identity.

Barnet and Adger (2007) observe that climate change is increasingly being called a security problem because there is a concern that climate change may increase the risk of violent conflict. The underlying proposition is that climate change is likely to undermine human security by reducing the natural resource base and limiting access to existing natural resources which are central to sustainable livelihoods, especially in developing countries (Itumo, 2014). The impacts of climate change on socio-political systems are many. Davis (2001) cited in Barnet and Adger (2007) discuss how the El Nino events and famines of the current century triggered by droughts resulted in political and economic colonization that deprived local people of their entitlements to natural resources. The massive impact of global warming on the Nigerian environment cannot be neglected. It should be stated that the traditional Ezza farm economy has been badly affected by the dynamics of the changing

nature of the environment. The case has currently remained the same in the North Western parts of South Africa, where Barolong is located, as the growth in drought is increasingly threatening food security and the peace of men. Nordas and Gleditsch (2007) state that conflict-inducing effects of climate change have emerged today and several casual chains and/or paths to these conflicts have manifested in different parts of the globe. The fundamental environmental factors for migration are land degradation, droughts, deforestation, water scarcity, floods, storms and famine, which are directly linked to food insecurity.

Climate change-induced migration, which is likely to be more frequent given the extreme weather events, can create and intensify violent conflicts. This is particularly frequent in developing countries where because of limited options to adapt to or mitigate climate change; people migrate from the affected regions. It should be noted that the quest for a viable agricultural land is a fundamental factor that influenced many of the waves of Ezza migration in Nigeria and placed them on the part of conflict with their landlords (Njoku, 2016; Onu, 2016; Akam, 2016; Igwe, 2016; Nworie, 2016, Usulor, 2016). Itumo (2014) argues that in developing country such as Nigeria, one is likely to see significant drops in food production, with increased temperatures. The situation could also possibly accelerate grain sterility; shifts in rainfall patterns accelerate erosion and desertification as well as rendering land infertile, increases in sea-level and flows into inundating farmlands thus disrupting aquatic populations. It could also cause extreme weather/ geographical events that disturb agricultural processes. Water scarcity also may increase with shifts in rainfall, while disease may spread with increased temperatures. The degree to which societies will experience the negative environmental and socio-economic effects of climate change largely depends on their vulnerability. Itumo (2014) maintains that this vulnerability can be measured by looking at the following:

- The extent to which societies are dependent on natural resources and ecosystem services;
- The extent to which the resources and services that societies do rely on are sensitive to changes in climate; and
- The capacity of societies to adapt to changes in these resources and services as well as its adaptive capacity.

Climate change is also a major form of threat to human security. It is a widespread natural truth that many species of plants and animals are rapidly becoming extinct in different parts of Nigeria and South Africa. Itumo (2014) argues that tree density and richness is decreasing at alarming speed. Fish spawning patterns have changed; the extinction of rare and endangered species of plants and animals has increased in farm lands. The consequence of these on the economy is poor agricultural output, which can lead to excessive increases in food prices. This in turn can put pressure on economic policy leading to high interest rates. There is no doubt that the overall effect of this on the economy is likely to engender conflict in the society.

Climate change impacts directly on the local community, especially on vulnerable parts of the society. Conflicts associated with poverty are thus enhanced by the impacts of climate change. This influences the access to basic resources that meet the needs of housing, security, health and education; all these impacts negatively on the quality of life of the community. There is already widespread knowledge and evidence that poverty promotes violent behavior and the rise of conflict (Ani & Chukwu, 2014; Ani, 2014b; Ani & Okoro, 2012, Ani, 2011). Paradoxically, the increasing threat of climate change on the planting culture of the people and their farm economy threatens the collective economic and existential security of the masses living in Ezza, Nigeria and Barolong, South Africa. It is anticipated that the impacts of climate change will lead to an increase in unemployment rates. There are no sustainable public policies to prevent climate change impacts on the labor sector. There could be some changes in this sector due to three main factors: internal and external migration flows will trigger the need for groups of people to adapt both to a new territory and to new labor conditions. Also, as consequences of damaged infrastructure due to recurrence of natural disasters, it is estimated that there will be a period of mass unemployment in sectors that rely on such infrastructure, until it has been rebuilt. These climatic changes will have wide-ranging harmful effects including increase in heat-related mortality, dehydration, spread of infectious diseases, malnutrition and damage to public health infrastructure (Itumo, 2014).

2.6h Population and environmental factors

Naturally, man depends on environmental resources. As biological organisms, human beings have certain basic needs. They tend to depend on the environment for source and solution to such needs. Thus, a growing population means an increase in the demand for basic resources such as land,

which reminds man of the popular Malthusian theory. Thomas Malthus, the English Economist and Demographer argued that human population growth would in future outrun the growth of food production (Malthus, 1798). This is because population growth increases geometrically while food production increases arithmetically. The Barolong and the Ezza conflict setting reveals this pattern of population growth (the population of these areas have grown unimaginably in the last decade). Among the Ezza in Isu and Ezillo, population growth has remained a fundamental fuel to the conflict. Madu and Ayogu (2009) while commenting on the need for the management of Nigeria's population maintain that this could be managed in the future by rational means of choice or by unpleasant means. Population factors create existential pressures and demands on a society and if these demands are unmet, social dislocation, conflict and violence may occur (Choucri, 1983). What is not fully appreciated by many is the fact that conflict and violence will, in themselves, create profound demographic consequences. The burden of internally displaced persons, which is a regular occurrence in the Ezza conflict setting, is the most obvious of these consequences. Increasingly, it is believed that changes in the size, distribution, and composition of populations are critical factors which can strongly influence peace and conflict relations within and between communities. Therefore, demographic factors can affect the particular patterns of national and international behaviour which result in various types of conflict (Choucri, 1974).

According to Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, population growth and resource depletion converge to produce conflicts in many parts of the developing world. He found that environmental scarcity leads to economic deprivation, contributes to civil strife and increases economic and political pressures on governments, possibly resulting in the weakening of state legitimacy. Increased gaps between population groups within a state due to the scarcity of resource produce grievances and rivalries that lead to conflict. Due to the scarcity of resources, groups may find it necessary to migrate in search of land and other resources (Homer-Dixon, 1994:5-40; Homer-Dixon, 1993; Homer-Dixon, Boutwell & Rathjens, 1993). The cause of environmental scarcity are said to lie in environmental change such as drought or soil erosion, population growth, which places greater pressure on existing resources and the unequal distribution of resources thus limiting its access (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraft, 1997:164). The increase in population means a division of the remaining portions of land into smaller portions thus creating scarcity, struggle for scarce environmental resource and the conflict that follows.

Thomas Homer-Dixon argues that environmental scarcity creates social consequences such as insurrections, ethnic clashes, inter-communal conflicts, urban unrest and other forms of civil violence. While it is noteworthy that environmental scarcity is not in itself a necessary or sufficient cause of conflict, extensive researches exists on the links between environmental crisis and violence in developing countries. Homer-Dixon (1999) further argues that the violent consequences of scarcity should not be under-estimated, especially while considering the fact that about half of the world's population depends directly on local renewable energy for their day-to-day wellbeing. Sarpong (2006) maintains that with increasing land scarcity, tenancy arrangements are gaining importance among outsiders (settlers) as a means of accessing land. Jacobs (1996:12) moots that "conflicts over resources and political instability (which arises from population migration) are, at present, mainly regional phenomena. However, since their root causes become more critical, they will not continue to be so confined". Homer-Dixon (1996) suggests seven findings on the relationship between environmental scarcity and violent conflict as follows:

1. Under certain circumstances, environmental scarcity produces conflict and instability by generating direct social causes of conflict such as poverty or migrations;
2. The interaction of the causes of environmental scarcity (depletion, consumption and inequitable distribution) reinforces each other;
3. (Environmental) scarcity causes powerful groups to capture valuable resources and marginal groups to migrate to ecologically sensitive areas, thus increasing scarcity;
4. The capacity of a society to adapt to scarcity depends upon available social and technical ingenuity;
5. Unsuccessful adaptation contributes to poverty and migrations;
6. Without adaptation, scarcity weakens states, sharpens distinctions among groups and contributes to migration and economic decline, all of which can cause conflict; and
7. (Environmental) scarcity rarely has a direct effect on inter-state conflict but can have significant indirect effect on the international community.

The researcher concurs with Homer-Dixon that environmental scarcity and population growth as experienced by the people of Ezza (in their Mgbalukwu, Obeagu Isu, Agilla and Ezillo settlements) was a principal fillip to the conflicts with their neighbours. Furthermore, it was population growth and the confiscation of their land by the white government that pushed

Africans to accept and settle in Barolong. As their population grew, they expanded their settlement outside the designated areas. This made them to feel threatened as they perceived the new settlers as men and women on a mission to perpetually take away their land from them. It has been stated that geographical mobility enables the Igbo to balance the constantly shifting equation between population pressures and the resources of the environment. When population pressure become too great, or when towns were divided by serious disputes, a section would migrate and establish a new home, preserving the memory of its origins. Other towns may expand to accommodate new quarters of immigrants, who would become part of the new town, but preserving the memory of the first identity. This kind of migration was a safety valve both against over-population and internal wars (Isichie, 1973:27).

It should be noted that the north-eastern part of Igboland and the north-central part Nigeria where the major Ezza conflict took place had expanse of land till date. Ishichie (1973:29) argued that "the north-eastern Igbo did not suffer from land shortages in the conventional sense. Their hunger for land sprung from the unique ecological context of their agriculture and their single-minded and tireless dedication to farming". On his part Onoja (2013:350) states that "as the nucleus of the economy, land was not only crucial to Ezza life and existence but held the key to meaningful survival, sustenance and existence. As such, the struggle over land was capable of generating and engendering conflict and crisis in pre-colonial Ezza society". The contest for land in the study areas is driven by economic imperatives of land as a major source of the people's economy (during pre-colonial era till date). This is because greater population of the people are engaged in one form of subsistence farming. It is the paradox of shifting cultivation, in which a piece of land must be allowed to fallow for years that made the quest for more land very significant.

The issue of land is at the heart of rural communal conflicts. Pressure on land resulting from a combination of expropriation, monetisation, rising population density, degradation and resurgence of pre-colonial communal competition have raised land into a primal casus belli in rural communities (Mba & Nwangwu, 2014:684). The implication is that formal or modern demarcation of boundaries has ceased to be a trend. Efforts by federal, state and local government in Nigeria to demarcate boundaries in a bid to keep warring communities apart, have failed to bring a lasting solution to inter-communal violence (Ibeanu, 2003:173). To make matters worse, there are still areas where the boundary between the Agila, Ngbo and Ezza settlers have not been properly demarcated in the Ebonyi and Benue State border areas from the 1920s till date.

Environmental scarcity arises due to population growth and depletion of renewable resources, which leads to 'resource capture' by elites and consequently intensifying scarcity for the poor. Poor peasants are in turn forced to live or migrate to marginal lands, thus thereby exposing them to all forms of risk, hence creating conflict situations as well as the loss of lives and properties. Increase in population in this area and the resultant land hunger did not help matters and that seemed to have largely explained Ezza wars of expansion. It would appear that increase in population engendered political and demographic disruptions, which in turn, encouraged migration and formation of population centres. For groups that are shifting cultivators and require access to new and unused lands, this system worked, provided there were free lands for people to take. But conflict would appear inevitable when the pressure of rising population could no longer keep up with migration and a fresh wave of colonization of land. It was this type of pressure that seemed to have developed in North-eastern Igbo area; an area known for its high fertility and which permitted quick population increase. The result of all this was a struggle for a living and farming space. It was under the above circumstances that the Ezza embarked on war of survival and expansion (Anyanwu, 2005b:2).

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In the course of the Ezza conflicts with neighbours in Nigeria, many of the Ezza and some original land-owners have been forced-out of the large areas of their earliest settlements in Mgbalukwu, Obeagu Isu, Agilla and Ezillo thus creating a heavy burden of internally displaced persons at different times in the history of the process of building the Nigerian nation.

The nature of western capitalism, dehumanising segregation and exploitation of the labour of African people in South Africa was taken to a conflict level with the manipulation of access to land by the British and Boers in order to keep the Africans perpetually subservient. This situation generated multi-dimensional forms of conflict in South Africa. The dispossession of the peoples' land led to struggles and the underdevelopment of Africans (Beinart & Bundy, 1987).

Balamir (2002) presented a clear picture of how the land mafia in parts of South Africa influenced many peoples' quest to own land legitimately and peacefully. In the late 1990s, newcomers into isolated cities near Johannesburg were cornered by a network of the land mafia. They organized these individuals into groups and charged them R 50 (US $10) each to sign up on a list. Once these desperate individuals were able to assemble two thousand (2000) people to register, generating R 100,000 ($20,000), they were given a parcel of land to occupy. This was planned very precisely and often carried out with professional assistance. They completed their land search carefully in order to determine who owned the land and used skilled planners to structure a settlement or agreement on paper. They avoided occupying private lands because they knew that the government of the Rainbow Nation would treat them better than private individuals and groups; if they settle on their land. Once the squatters were settled, they had to pay a monthly rent of R50 ($10) and an additional R20 ($4) protection fee to the land mafia. They also paid another R10 ($2, 50) legal fee every month. The legal fee was paid into a fund so that a legal representative could be called in, if action was taken against the squatters. The reason why these land developers were called land mafia was because they did not only charged a protection fee but also used their guns to incise whoever was unwilling or unable to pay (Wehrmann, 2008:6). The activities of the land mafia only succeeded because of the presence of millions of desperate people looking for a piece of land to develop and put a shelter over their head in South Africa. The following synthesis captured the most prominent consensus about the relationship between population and conflict, given the evidence at hand:

1. Demographic factors can lead to conflict behaviour, which in turn affects population characteristics. There is almost always an interactive and feedback relationship linking conflict to population, not a direct or linear one;

2. Population size and growth, crowding and density, alone do not lead to violence. Population increase is not in itself the source of crowding, stress and conflict. Although there is some relationship between crowding and pathological conditions, initially, there must be a critical mass, i.e., a population 'at risk', amenable to violence or using violence as a preferred strategy;

3. Differential growth rates in population (size, composition and distribution), access to resources and access to technology contribute to the potential for conflict and to overt violence. Differentials in power variables and in demographic characteristics, such as

the rate of growth of different ethnic groups, politics and population factors could create conducive environment for conflict. Differential rates of growth are central to the evolution of the conflict spiral. The dynamics of conflict are imbedded in such differentials;

4. Conflict behaviour can influence demographic structure, creating changes in population variables. The existence of the conflict can itself politicise population variables. Demographic characteristics under these conditions are, or become construed as political ones and for all practical purposes, enter as political variables in the calculations of the antagonists. Coercive displacement of people can occur as a result of violent conflict;

5. The age composition of a population is a powerful element in its tendencies to violence. Some evidence suggests that the younger the population and the higher the level of unemployment, the greater the propensities for violence. In a prolonged conflict, advantage is with the younger population. Age structure directly affects the political process, the political agenda and the way in which social demands are articulated;

6. Ethnic differences, by themselves, are not a direct source of conflict but ethnicity can heighten the importance of numbers in the conduct of conflict. Numerous overt conflicts since World War II have had a strong ethnic character and have involved resource scarcity. Segmental divisions accentuate perceptions of conflict. Demands for social and political equality can be based on the reality of inequality compounded by the existence of ethnic differences. The ethnic composition of the ruling elites can create differential access to power for different ethnic groups and differences among ethnic or national groups can impede national cohesion;

7. Large-scale migration across national borders is often induced by political problems in sending countries and/or by economic incentives in receiving countries. The scale of such migration may have profound effects on relations among nations; and

8. Population-regulating policies in themselves can create conflict. This is a phenomenon too often overlooked. For example, policies that encourage selective immigration or alternatively, discourage mobility across national borders often create conflict. Paradoxically, such policies, which are often advocated as a means of reducing conflict or as an outcome of existing conflict can in themselves, create new population-related conflicts (Choucri 1983).

2.7 CONFLICT SETTING ANALYSIS

In order to ensure a proper understanding of the dynamics of conflicts are discussed in this study. One needs a proper over-view of the history of the people involved in such conflicts. A synoptic discussion on the different conflict milieu would help in introducing the area and conflicts studied. It is imperative to note that the use of the terms Ezza-Ezillo, Ezza-Isu or Ojiegbe-Ezza, Mgbalukwu-Obeagu Isu as well as Ezza-Agila by ordinary Nigerians living in the Southeast and North-central parts of the country often have more than one meaning, especially when used in relations to the conflicts. For instance, when the expression Ezza-Ezillo is used, it could refer to the people of Ezza living in Ezillo in a statement but when the Ezza-Ezillo conflict is mentioned, it simply refers to the Ezza and Ezillo conflict.

However, for the sake of clarity, the term "Ezza-Ezillo conflict" is widely used to represent the inter-communal conflict between the Ezillo people and Ezza settlers in Ezillo community (Mbah & Nwangwu, 2014:682; Onuoha & Ani, 2011). The term Ezza-Ezillo is also used to represent the Ezza 'colony' in Ezillo (Elechi, 2008:1-5). While the researcher, for the sake of referencing has maintained the original concept of earlier writers, it should be noted that the proper concept as used in Itumo (2014) should be Ezillo and Ezza-Ezillo conflict and not Ezza-Ezillo conflict. This is because the conflicts were not between the people of Ezza and the communities where their colonies were established but limited to the Ezza populations in the colonies and their landlords (where they settled). Furthermore, in many parts of the country where Ezza people have settled outside their ancestral home of Ezza North and Ezza South Local Government Areas; they have often identified themselves as Ezza people of the community in which they settled such as Ezza-Akpoga, Enugu State; Ezza-Obeagu, Ezza-Effium, Ezza-Isu, Ebonyi State; Ezza-Agila, Benue State etc).

Ojiegbe Ezza or Ojiegbe is one of such Ezza clusters that settled in the borders of Obeagu and Mgbalukwu of Isu clan. Just like the Ezillo and Ezza-Ezillo conflict setting described above, some analysts prefer to talk about the Ojiegbe-Mgbalukwu conflict or Ojiegbe-Obeagu conflict or Ezza-Isu conflict. It is worthy to note that the Ezza-Ojiegbe fought with Mgbalukwu and Obeagu communities located in Isu clan simultaneously. Thus, when one talks about Ojiegbe, one is simply referring to the Ezza group that fought with the Isu.

Equally, reference to Obeagu or Mgbalukwu alone could mean the period when Obeagu warriors or Mgbalukwu people attacked the people of Ojiegbe. The word Ojiegbe, on its own, could be used or but cannot be replaced by Ezza, the broader name for the Ezza nation. The same scenario is obtainable when one talk about the Ezza-Isu conflict, which is a wrong representation of the scope of the conflict. Isu communities involved in the conflict are neglected in this analysis but reference is made only to their mother clan (the eight communities, out of which only two fought with the Ezza-Ojiegbe). This situation is equally found amongst the Agilla and Ezza-Agilla conflict settings in Benue State, Nigeria. Names such as Ezza-Agila, Ezza-Igumale, Ezza-Utonkon, Ezza-Ulayi, Ezza-Ijigbam, Ezza-Ekile and Ezza-Ito-Oju colonies are used (Onoja, 2013:356). However, Onoja (2013) uses Ezza-Agila to refer to the conflict, instead of the Agila and Ezza-Agila conflict, which should be the correct terminology. The researcher has retained some of the 'wrong' conceptual presentations of the conflict in cases original citations from earlier scholarly sources.

There is also the need for conceptual clarifications on the side of the Barolong, South Africa. It should be stated that the idea of Shillington (1985:131-160) and Theal (1919:146) that Montshiwa and other Barolong people who enlisted as British volunteers in the Anglo-Boer War were freebooters because they were promised a share of the booty and parcel of land that captured by colonial lords is historically inaccurate. This is because it was illogical for the British to promise the original owners of the land, some parcels of their ancestral heritage as a reward or booty for any form of cooperation with them. Rather, it is more appropriate to hold a contrary argument that it was the Boers and the British who established one form of alliance and another with Barolong collaborators who were the real freebooters and not Africans. Ramoroka (2009:47) concurs with this position and maintains that Moshete's Boer volunteers as well as most of Montshiwa's British volunteers were freebooter because they were all opportunists who wanted the land and cattle of the Barolong people in exchange for fomenting trouble among the different Barolong groups, which resulted in the Barolong War of 1881-1884. Manson (1998:496-497) also agrees with the above position by referring to European volunteers in the war as freebooters.

2.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter started with a presentation of a number of scholarly positions on peacebuilding as a strategy for conflict management. It went on to present the literature review. Academic researches and writings conducted on Ezza and the Barolong people were extensively reviewed. Published works were cited in the chapter in order to show that conflicts and dispute dynamics as well as the over-all history of the Ezza and the Barolong have been neglected by scholars. Conflict was conceptualized and the different forms of land dispute explained. The causes of conflict were identified and explained in the chapter. Some of the causes of the conflict include political, economic, cultural and ethnic factors. Others are cleavages, geographical/ territorial factors, population, gender, class and youth factors. The researcher used specific facts from the study areas to show that there is a direct link between the above factors and conflict on the one hand as well as revealing that there is a nexus between conflict and the worldview of people living in a particular conflict setting on the other. Finally, a number of 'fluid' concepts, which scholars have used in different forms in the past that have the tendencies of confusing the reader, were clarified. The next chapter will present to the reader, a clear idea of the methodology and the theoretical framework, upon which the study was developed.

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The methodology used in conducting a research gives the reader an idea of what to expect in a particular study. A qualitative research approach was used in conducting this study. Qualitative research is often complex in nature (Liebscher, 1998:669) and often exploratory in its process of data collection (Miles & Huberman, 1994:32-48). Qualitative approach was adopted in this study because it "treats actions as part of holistic social process and context, rather than as something that can be extracted and studied in isolation" (Payne & Payne, 2004:176). This chapter captures the rationale behind the selection of the research setting. It presents the methods of data collection, which is comparative in the sense that the study extensively consulted archival materials, used oral sources as well as explored the unlimited wealth of knowledge that are stored in journals, edited book chapters, books, monographs, magazines, newspapers, internet sources as well as unpublished materials. The limitations of the study, ethical considerations as well as theoretical framework for the study were discussed in the chapter.

3.2 SELECTION OF STUDY AREAS

This study focuses on sustainable peacebuilding strategies for the management of Ezza conflicts in Nigeria and the Barolong land dispute in South Africa. Nigeria and South Africa were selected because they were the two major hegemonic states in Africa, following the weakening of Egypt by revolutions, terrorism and demonstrations, thus, as major actors in regional politics within the continent, their domestic conflict and dispute has heavy direct implications on their resource pool, which affects the amount of what is sent as aids and grants to other African States. Again, the history of intractable conflict in these states will affect their national interest and domestic policies, which affects them in their 'big-brother role' or posture in African politics and global relations.

The study location was selected also because of the influence of colonialism and the imperial balkanisation of African borders both locally and internationally by western countries, which

had direct influence on the partitioning of Barolong land as well as the demarcation of land borders between Agila, Ngbo and Ezza, which was fundamental for the progressive conflicts by the violent contestants over the parcel of land. The same colonial might was also used to suppress the Ezza and Barolong people in the Ango-Ezza and Anglo-Boer wars.

The two land-based conflict environments of Ezza and Barolong were selected due to their historical implication of determining the massive dislocation of the people's population for years as those who lived hitherto as a community in a particular part of the two countries soon began to scatter all over the country. Over the years, the Ezza conflicts and Barolong land disputes tend to be intractable. The continuous nature of such population dislocation led the rise of Ezza settlements in different parts of Ebonyi State, Nigeria against their historical location in Ezza South and Ezza North Local Government Areas. Ezza people are now found in Onicha, Ivo and Ishielu local government areas of Ebonyi State. Similarly, the conflict led to Ezza migration to Ezza-Akpoga, Nike and Aninri of Enugu State, while others are settled in Kogi, Benue and Cross River States of Nigeria. On the Barolong side in South Africa, the land dispute engineered a massive wave of migration, which led to the settlement of their descendants in present day Khunwana, Ganyesa, Madibogo, Setlagole, Morokweng, Phitshane and Tshidilamoloma in the greater Mafikeng region. The Ratshidi Barolong descendants are found in Stad while Seleka Barolong lived in Thaba Nchu. Again, the Rapulana Barolong lived in Bodibe and Lotlhakane, 15 Km to the South of Mafikeng (Dachs, 1975:13; Sellery, 1952:170).

3.3 **DATA COLLECTION**

Primary data were gathered through non-probability random sampling style, adopted to select participants to be interviewed. Open-ended questions were used, which enabled participants to provide details of their opinion on the different aspects of the study. The targeted population included the Barolong and Ezza people as well as those they fought against. The selection was determined through contact with community leaders in the Barolong setting. The research dealt on critical issues that required only the inputs of specialised and informed minds of people aged 18 years (who may have fought as guerrilla warriors in Nigeria) and above to very old men and women. Old men are the custodians of the people's culture,

especially in Africa and have become living libraries and vestiges of the ancient landscape, which scholars continue to study.

Seventy interviews were conducted in the Ezza conflict setting and within the Barolong land dispute setting. Fifty of them were carried-out in Nigeria, while the remaining twenty were done in South Africa. It was principally focused on citizens from the immediate conflict environment and their neighbours who were directly or indirectly affected by the conflict or dispute. The difference in the number of respondent on the side of the Barolong emantes from the perceived lack of information by many of the citizenry, who continually argued that a man, known as the 'Historian of Barolong' died in 2015.

The interviews were mainly done with the male gender in Nigeria however; fifteen women participated in the process. In Barolong, four ladies were exceptionally supportive of the research and they gave more assistance, guidance, direction and indebt account of the dispute than many of the men that were meet in the field. The age bracket selected for the interviews are people from eighteen years and above. Eighteen years was used as the 'bottom' or least age because many of the warlords that fought in the Ezza conflict setting were 'small boys' who are in the early phase of their youth lives. Many of them willingly joined the militia arm of their communities as a call for duty to defend their ancestral land. There was also the interview of four traditional title holders in Mgbalukwu and Obeagu Isu, Nigeria. These men used their position to create a vivid picture of the conflict, while giving documentary evidence to the researcher. Electronic copies of interview questions were sent to literate participants.

Other primary materials such as archival documents, addresses and memorandum were also utilised. In studying the history of Africa's past, the researcher often resuscitates the evidence of past events through a multi-dimensional reconstruction process and recreates it out of desecrated and scattered past evidence. Individuals such as casualties of the conflict and those suffering from the psychology of conflict, former actors in conflict and peace processes championed by the warriors, mediators and those who lost relatives and friends were fundamental in the data collection process. Furthermore, the researcher engaged in personal

observations of conflict settings in Nigeria in order to obtain first-hand account of the impact of conflict. Observations were done without the explicit awareness of the groups being studied, in order to ensure "that the researchers' presence does not affect the behaviour of those being observed" (Albert & Akanle, 2014: 90).

The researcher also engaged in focused group discussions (FGDs). There were four main focus groups that the researcher discussed with, three in Nigeria and one in South Africa. They include a number of youths that fought during the Obeagu and Mgbalukwu conflict with Ezza-Ojiegbe. The second focus group discussion was those that lost their relatives when the Obeagu warriors were disbanded and the warriors began to rob their community leading to the multiplier effect of extra-judicial killing of some people in the community. The third group were those arrested by the Nigerian police as a fall-out of the above extra-judicial killing in the Ojiegbe-Ezza and Mgbalukwu-Obeagu Isu conflict. A number of staff within the Barolong Tribal Council, North West Province of South Africa was also discussed with in the South African side. The focus group discussions differed in the number of participants, while the Obeagu/Mgbalukwu and Ojiegbe Ezza conflict setting had nine participants and fifteen relatives/ casualties of those affected by the post –conflict armed attacks from the disbanded community warriors; the Barolong setting had only five participants at the Tribal Council in North West Province. They supported the researcher with useful guidelines and insight as well as referrals in order to obtain valuable information.

It should be noted that the researcher spent three weeks in the National Archives Enugu, Nigeria and two weeks in the North West Provincial Library, South Africa in a bid to unravel historic documentaries on the land conflicts and disputes. These two archives were selected because they were the closest functional archives to the research settings. Secondary sources of data include book chapters, books, journal articles, published e-books, newspapers, magazines among others. The researcher searched for in-depth analysis and account of these conflicts and disputes from many scholars as possible. Aspects of their studies that were considered useful for this study were duly cited.

3.4 DATA ANALYSIS

The researcher conducted a thematic analysis of all data collected. With the permission of the research supervisor, cases that required language re-interpretations of original data language and inputs of experts from other fields of study were explored. Language re-interpretation was necessary while dealing with very old non-English speaking informants who, due to their age, experienced or took part in the conflicts or disputes under examination. This ensured objectivity and improved quality in the presentation of the research findings. Reliability and validity of all data was always considered during data analysis. In addition, the relationship between the contents of the data was analysed in a manner to portray the conflict trends and peace processes adopted. There was a detailed, logical and sequential synthesis of data collected in order to provide a holistic analysis of both conflicts.

3.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Conflict studies has the inherent limitation that principal actors in the conflict would often account for the conflict from a biased point of view in order to gain more score-cards of mercy, attention and support from either side of the conflict divide. However, in this study, the researcher endeavoured to objectively analyse feedback from the field as well as written literatures. A total of seventy (70) participants were interviewed during the course of data collection. The spatial nature of conflict locations studied created its own peculiar financial, security and terrain-driven challenges. This is because the Ezza-Ojiegbe and Mgbalukwu/Obeagu Isu conflict setting as well as the Ezillo and Ezza-Ezillo conflict setting are in Ebonyi State of South-eastern Nigeria, while the Ezza-Agilla conflict occurred in Benue State of North-central Nigeria. On the other hand, the Barolong conflict took place in different parts of South Africa.

Ironically, the cost of consistently travelling to these research areas by road or and by air, was a big challenge. Consequently, the researcher combined both travelling to the research sites for field interviews with e-interview of Information and Communication Technology (ICT)-competent participants. Telephonic interviews were conducted by the researcher with participants. Interview questions and interviewee's responses were also sent by post through the help of research assistant(s) in the conflict zones. Another limitation to this study was the

relative scarcity of published works on the conflicts under discussion, largely due to the years of intellectual neglect of the conflicts.

Another fundamental limitation of this study is the relative lack of documented data on the Barolong land dispute. Even in the course of field interviews, there were very few people on the Barolong side thatcould give and sustain their argument on a given land dispute. The general idea was that a man named the historian of Barolong is dead.

3.6 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

With the objective of unravelling the dynamics of the Ezza conflicts with their neighbours in Nigeria and comparing them with the Barolong land dispute in South Africa, the views of specialists and informed minds on the subject were solicited in the form of interviews. Information gathered in this regard was used solely for academic purposes. At all times, the views, socio-political and religious leanings of participants were respected. Access to information, whether confidential or not was through the free-will of participants. On no account were participants required to commit acts which could expose them to shame, embarrassment or regret. The process of data collection did not involve any acts of deception or the use of questions or any other method to expose participants to unpleasant or harmful side-effects. The autonomy of participants was protected through the use of an informed consent form. The form contained the nature and purpose of the study, the identity of the researcher and the supervisor as well as their contact details. It stated clearly that participation was voluntary and the responses of participants were to be used for academic purposes. Also, anonymity was made optional as the respondents were allowed to use coded/ disguised names as participants/ institutions, at their request. The questionnaire equally indicated that participants were free to withdraw from the study at any time without any negative or undesirable consequences. All data collected were accessible only to the researcher and finally transmitted to the supervisor. Data would be stored some years and will be disposed through shredding. It is the intention of the researcher to publish more parts of the study, including the research findings in reputable journals. Currently, a published journal paper (Ani & Osisioma, 2015) and a book chapter (Ani & Alegu, 2015) as well as a conference paper (Ani, 2015a) that was presented at the First Africa Peace Research and Education Association Conference, held at ECOWAS Parliament Building, Abuja, Nigeria 13th-15th April, 2015 has received the inputs of scholars. Consequently, after publishing parts

of the work as journal papers and chapters in edited books, the remaining will ultimately be published as a book.

3.7 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The goal of a theory is to explain something, which has occurred in a bid to manage the problems that arose or may arise as a result (Cohen, 1968:2). Several theories that have emerged in different academic disciplines and theories have emerged, which include the empirical and normative (Viotti & Kauppi, 1999; Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 1996; Booth & Smith, 1995). Empirical theories seek to explain why certain phenomena occur and focus on relationship of cause and effects. Normative theories are designed to prescribe what should be done in dealing with such phenomena. Empirical theories of conflict resolution analyze why people can sometimes settle disputes peacefully, while at other times resort to violence and war. A normative theory lays out options to use in trying to reach a certain goal, such as nonviolent outcome that satisfy all parties to the conflict (Hauss, 2010: 24).

In research works, explanation for a particular study, especially in social sciences often require theoretical models that capture certain degree of relationship with the topic of study, ironically, conflict theories due to "their focus on humans, are difficult to test" (Faleti, 2005:39). Furthermore, Galtung (1991:131) wrote that peace theory is intimately connected not only with conflict theory but also development theory. And peace research focuses on studies into the conditions of past, present and future in relations to the realisation of peace, which naturally leads to development (Galtung, 1991:131). It should be noted that Johan Galtung is widely known as the founding father of peace studies but he would be better remembered as the man who transformed peace studies into a defined scholarly discipline.

There are extensive theories on conflict studies and peacebuilding. However, this study is centred on Johan Galtung's theories of negative and positive peace. Negative peace is defined as a state requiring a set of social structures that provide security and protection from acts of physical violence committed by individuals, groups or nations (Obikeze, 2012:20). Negative peace does not deal with the causes of violence and war but centres its focus on the

suppression of conflict. It simply denotes the absence of war (Barash & Webel, 2002:7). It should be noted that in many African communities, especially Barolong, which is one of the research setting; there is no contemporary war or conflict taking place there-in but the other fundamental conditions and resources needed for sustainable peace are lacking. The increasing pressure on the Barolong land is a fundamental factor that could ignite conflict. That agrees with the position of Barash and Webel (2002:7) who defined negative peace as a condition in which no active, organised military violence is taking place. Aron (1966) captured this form of peace as a more or less lasting suspension of rivalry between political units or actors. It would be recalled that in the past, the Barolong brothers fought amongst themselves and has suspended the fighting. Thus, while there is already the suspension of armed rivalry in Ezza and her neighbours (five years ago) as well as the descendants of the Barolong family, there is yet to be planted, the necessary sustainable unity, harmony, integration and development that will transform their societal building and inter-group relations.

Barash and Webel (2002:8) capture how structural violence sustains Galtung's theory of negative peace. They argue that structural violence is typically built into the very structure of social, cultural and economic institutions. It naturally denies people living in post- conflict societies some fundamental rights which promote weakening of their economic well being, reduction of their self worth, increased hunger, starvation, malnutrition, rape, robbery as well as the destruction of their social amenities and other physical structures. These negative vices have manifested at one time or another in Agilla, Ezillo, Mgbalukwu and Obeagu Isu as a multiplier effect of the Ezza conflict with their neighbours. There was the continuous rape cases in Agila, the communication gadget of Glo Communication Company were vandalised by disbanded Ezillo mercenary warriors, while in Obeagu Isu, the erstwhile warlords took up arms, began to forcefully rob the community in the day and night. The peak of it was when they burnt the family of a group of brothers that resisted their armed exploitation and the warlords captured their parents/ relative and buried them alive leading to massive police arrests and reprisal extra-judicial killings from the gang of those lost their relatives, which made nearly everybody to flee the community including the warlords.

It should be noted that during the period of negative peace, peace loving people may begin to participate in promoting conflict situations, which gradually attracts them to do enormous degree of harm to other human beings without ever intending to do so initially. Sometimes these good people fuel conflicts as a part and parcel of the performance of their regular duties as a job defined in a workplace structure (Galtung, 1985). It is under such conditions that 'good' townsmen begin to engage in direct and indirect support to violent conflicts. That will naturally lead to the expressions of hate and ethno-based vengeance, negative stereotypes, bias and all forms of prejudice that lays solid foundations for the escalation of conflicts leading to psychological alienation, hate and all manners of reckless attacks. This is the situation currently existing in the Ezillo and Ezza-Ezillo conflict setting, where the average Ezillo man have developed perpetual neurosis against the continuous settling of the Ezza in their community, while the Ezza on their part are building markets and schools in a bid to disconnect themselves from the Ezillo landlords relatively. This situation is worse in Ezza-Agilla, where the Ezza settlers has successfully renamed what was traditionally Agila schools, farms and markets to carry Ezza titles as the Agilla people has abandoned them for the Ezza settlers. Therefore, if the forces that promote and sustain negative peace are not arrested, they tend to develop into disagreements, which harden disputes thereby creating violent activists as well as leads to the abortion of decent and peaceful behaviours.

The theory of negative peace partly captures the neo-realist idea of end to warfare, violent conflict and other forms of coercive manipulation of power and force to attain defined interests. Thus, in the conflict and dispute settings that were studied, the suppression of armed confrontation from the conflict parties at a particular point in time did not guarantee the prevention of its re-occurrence. In the Mgbalukwu – Obeagu and Ojiegbe conflict area, they fought intermittently in 1910, 1966, 1975, 1986, 1989 and 1993 as well as from 2005 to 2007. Similarly, the Ezza-Ezillo and Ezillo conflicts started in the 1950s and was intensified in 1992, 1996, 1997, 2006, 2007 and 2008-2011. Unfortunately, over the years, the Nigerian Government has used mobile police and soldiers to enforce an end to the armed confrontations between the Ezza and their neighbours. As soon as the Ebonyi State Government succeeds in quelling the conflict, they begin to use the media for continuous adverts that peace has been attained. Unfortunately, at the time of such media jingles, the government have not placed anything on ground to ensure societal transformations or present a measurable roadmap to uproot the causes of conflict, which make the place volatile leading

to recurrent conflict circles. Negative peace is naturally pro-statuesque. It retains the conditions that have sustained the sufferings and challenges of man, which gives birth to conflict circles and disputes as obtainable in the Barolong land dispute setting.

Unfortunately, when the people's social realm is characterized by conflict psychology or animosity, violence will continue to manifest. Mbah and Nwangwu (2014:685) document that animosity was a driver of the Ezza and Ezza-Ezillo conflict. It manifests when memories of past conflicts acquire a relative autonomous nature and become significant in renewing as well as intensifying conflicts. Animosity conflicts are likely to be prolonged conflicts in which the protagonists have memories of loss, hurt or humiliation. An animosity conflict often begins as resource conflict. However, over time the negative peace situation explodes as the original cause of the conflict becomes only apparent, while bitter memories become the immediate cause of the new conflict. At the same time, fears of pre-emptory attacks by the opposing side usually provide a very short fuse that ignites new round of conflict. Over the years, the Ezza and their neighbours have developed strong rooted animosity. This animosity (that has lasted for years) could be understood partly as a social construct driven by the history of conflict between them and others, handed-down to other generations by the old. The implication is that the enmity consciousness has remained in the mind of the offspring of one group against the other, even when there is no full blown conflict, which is a situation of negative peace. It is that condition of animosity conflict that has prevented the rise of sustainable unity amongst the different Barolong brothers today. It also implies that a deep gulf of social divide has been planted in the minds of Barolong citizens against their perceived brother-enemies even at the end of their historic conflicts. The central theme of negative pace theory is that it does not uproot the causes of violence but only manages its manifestation. It could be argued that sustainable peace is often aborted by the powerful impacts of structural violence that are inherent in post conflict communities like Ezza and Ezza-Ezillo leading to the re-occurrence of conflicts.

Positive peace is the search for positive conditions which can resolve the underlying causes of conflict (Woolman, 1985). While negative peace theoretically captures the conditions of post- conflict societies, "by contrast, positive peace focuses on peace building, the establishment of non-exploitative social structures and a determination to work towards that

goal even when a war is not ongoing or imminent" (Barash & Webel, 2002:9). Positive peace apologists all agree that it focuses on a progressive journey to a more peaceful world order, irrespective of how good, conducive and calm the current societal situation is at any point in history. It makes efforts to create a better societal, communal, national or world order, where optimal conditions of peace are obtainable.

Positive peace naturally promotes progressive peacebuilding. At that time, individuals, groups and institutions begins to work towards ensuring that there is continuous reinforcement of all the 'pillars' that supports societal peace in a given geo-political area. Positive peace at the international level includes all actions aimed at preventing dispute and conflict from arising among two actors in the game of nations. Thus, states are required to engage in the timely employment of diplomacy in providing satisfactory means and conditions for conflict prevention. In the global level of relations, all preventive actions that link peace and development with the aim of averting conflict promote positive peace. On his part, O'Kane (1991) maintain that positive peace is about diverse people, who willingly choose to cooperate for the benefit of all human kind, thereby calling for a system where there are no winners and losers; a system where everyone becomes a winner and preserves social order. Ironically, the fact that there is a win-win game or zero - sum game does not naturally guarantee sustainable peace. Rather, positive peace deals with how to end conflicts as well as ensuring that the factors that drive or causes it are uprooted. It is only at that time that sustainable peace can be attained.

In Nigeria, it is generally believed that the traditional Igbo philosophy, *Udochia* (let peace reign) is a deep rooted socio-political idea of positive peace that is used not just to end conflict but to uproot its roots. The South African word *Ubuntu* connotes high level of social commonwealth that promotes peace. According to Tutu (1999:34-35) a person with *ubuntu* "is open and available to others, affirming of others, does not feel threatened that others are able and good; for he or she has a proper self-assurance that comes with knowing that he or she belongs in a greater whole and is diminished when others are humiliated or diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed, or treated as if they were less than who they are". The Hebrew word *Shalom* connotes not only the absence of violence but also the presence of well being, wholeness and harmony within oneself, a community and among all nations and

peoples. (Barash & Webel, 2002:9). It is the state of *Udochia* (let peace reign), *ubuntu* and *Shalom* that will lead to positive peace in Ezza and Barolong.

It is noteworthy that it is wiser and less expensive to pay for conflict prevention and resolution than to shoulder the immense burden of internally displaced persons, refugee crisis, famine, quest for relief services as well as the search for professional intervention in conflict management, cost of peace operations and rebuilding of destroyed infrastructure. Cohen (1993:270) has used Africa to show that the cost of such reconstruction efforts weakens national development. Over the years, the Nigerian and South African governments have spent enormous amount of money and other resources in a bid to halt the recurrent nature of conflicts and disputes.

Ironically, nothing tangible has been done proactively during the period of negative peace by the political leaders at all levels to build on infrastructures, structures and institutions that will lead to positive peace. It is a collection of the 'ingredients' needed to build positive peace in Ezza conflict setting and Barolong that would be suggested in this study for sustainable peacebuilding strategies in Ezza and Barolong. It should be noted that peacebuilding is a process that is multi-dimensional and continuous in nature.

3.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter captures the research methodology and theoretical framework. It shows that qualitative approach to enquiry was adopted in order to allow for in-depth interaction between the research and the data collected from the field. Primary data were gathered through a non-probability random sampling style, while secondary research materials were randomly selected. However, it should be noted that North West Provincial Library and National Archives Enugu were valuable sources of research evidence for the analysis of the conflict. The chapter revealed a number of limitations of the study and the researcher's act of ensuring that sound ethical principles and procedures were adopted in the course of the research. Finally, the study was built on the theories of negative and positive peace, which are the foremost theories of peace studies. These theories were used to interpret the dynamics of

the Ezza conflicts with their neighbours and Barolong land dispute. The next chapter will focus on the background history of Ezza and Barolong.

CHAPTER FOUR: BACKGROUND HISTORY OF EZZA AND BAROLONG

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter captures the background history of the Ezza and Barolong. It traces their origins, migrations and patterns of settlement in different parts of Nigeria and South Africa. It will be observed that right from the earliest time of Ezza and Barolong history, they have faced the challenges of conflict from violent brothers and neighbours. In the pre-colonial era, the Ezza fought Okpoto in 1899, they were at war with Oshiri from 1901-1902 and the Izzi had their share of the conflict with Ezza from 1902-1905. On the Barolong side, it was the contest for the position of paramount chief that led to the pre-colonial conflicts. The chiefs struggled for supremacy and after the death of Chief Tau, Barolong kingdom broke-up into independent chiefdoms of the Ratlou, Ratshidi, Seleka and Rapulana. Again, on 2nd May 1881, Montshiwa attacked Lotlhakane and routed-out Motuba's people, killing over six hundred men. Few months later, specifically on 17th October 1881, Moshete and his partisans attacked Montshiwa at Sehuba, South of Mafikeng. Consequently, in the colonial era, the Ezza conflicts with their neighbours and quest for territorial expansion were quelled by the invaded British forces. The resistance of the Ezza to British colonial rule in Nigeria laid the foundation for the Anglo-Ezza War. In the course of the war, the British used their superior firearm to run-over the Ezza. The chapter further presents the dynamics of the Anglo-Boer War and how the British as well as the Boers militarized one Barolong group to fight another.

4.2 ORIGIN OF EZZA

The people of Ezza Nigeria are clustered in many communities of Igbo land, especially in Ebonyi and Enugu States. They are also found in Benue, Cross River and Kogi States of Nigeria. Their ancestral home is Onueke in Ezza South Local Government Area of Ebonyi State. Historical records reveal that the Ezza communities clustered outside Ezza North and Ezza South Local Government Areas of Ebonyi State are known collectively as the Ezza 'Diaspora' (those living outside the Ezza homeland). Members of these Ezza Diaspora moved primarily as 'war mercenaries' and labourers in pre-colonial times. Ironically, at that time, they did not accept any order form of reward for helping to defeat the enemy than a large plot of land located in the contested area. Often, at the end of the conflict, which they generally helped their landlords to win, they began to take over the contested area and sometimes,

beyond. The later Ezza migrants were paid labourers, who equally populated the clusters in the Diaspora. It is in these Ezza 'Diaspora' settlements (Ezza-Ojiegbe living in the border of Mgbalukwu and Obeagu Isu, Ezza-Ezillo inhabit Ezillo, Ebonyi State and the Ezza-Agila in Agila, Benue State) that many of the fierce Ezza conflicts with neighbours took place in Nigeria.

Colonial records trace the origin of Ezza, settlement and emergence as an ethnic group to 1600. However, Shelton and Chapman (1930:4) stated that "the suggestion originally made by N. C. Duncan that the founders of the clan lived in about 1600 AD, is therefore, very probable". The Afikpo version of Ezza origin identifies Ezekuna as one of their sons, who left Afikpo for Onueke many centuries ago. The Afikpo people argue that the name Ezekuna is a corruption of the word Eze-Ekuma, who was a powerful man in Afikpo and whose descendant left for Onueke to establish the Ezza nation (Chukwu, 2015). Elizabeth Isichei while substantiating this argument maintains that "the Ezza, Izzi and Ikwo trace their origin from three brothers, whose father came from Afikpo" (Isichei, 1977:87). Similarly, others hold that Ezekuna belonged to the massive number of migrant people, who moved from the Okigwe escarpment into the hills and valleys of Afikpo. They argue that rather than Ezekuna settling and living with his fellow trekkers at Afikpo, he proceeded northwards in his journey until he arrived Onueke, where he finally settled (Onuoha & Ani, 2011:4). Agreeing with this theory, G. B. G. Chapman maintains that "it seems probable that Ezekuna was a member of the migratory party which moved from the Aro-Bende border somewhere around 1600. Tradition has it that Afikpo and Edda were as founded as a result of that movement and it is possible that Ezekuna was not content to stop at Afikpo and so moved further north" (Chukwuma, 2003:22-23).

It is widely believed that a combination of the culture of migration amongst the Ezza people as well as the Ezza warrior nature (Anyanwu, 2005: 17-25) led to the spread of the Ezza to different parts of Igboland and beyond. Ezza is traditionally made up of Amana, Amaezekwe, Ameju, Nsokkara, Umuoghara, Idembia, Ezzama, Amuda, Okaffia, Echara, Ekka, Ogboji, Oriuzor, Amawule, Nkomoro, Inyere, Amuda, Umuezeokaoha, Umuezeoka and Ameka. The Ezza also include Ezzagu, Ezza-Umuhuali, Ezza-Effium, Ezza-Ulayi, Ezza-Ejigban, Ezza-Agila, Ezza-Iyionu, Ezza-Obeagu, Ezza-Ntezi, Ezza-Akpoga and Ezza-Nkwugbo in Nike,

Ezza-Akpugo and other smaller Ezza settlements. There are also other Ezza communities that do not share biological relationship with Ezekuna. They incude Ezechima (Ogboji), Ezeoke Oma (Inyere), Eze Ogodo (Amaewula), Echem Ama (Ekka), Okpoto Evu (Nkomoro), Okpokpwa (Echara), Oworeike (Okoffia), Ezeoke Agalama (Amudo) and Amuda (Onoja, 2011).

4.3 PRE-COLONIAL EZZA CONFLICTS WITH NEIGHBOURS

Ezza has a history of fighting from time immemorial. They fought over the years, principally to win more portion of land in order to expand their farming. The quest by the people of Ezza for land remains under-studied. The Ezza expansionist culture was said to be part of the blessing given to Ezekuna for his brevity by his father before departing to eternity. Anyanwu (2005b:1-2) maintains that prior to his death, Ezekuna perhaps influenced by his father's blessings predicted that his descendants (the Ezza) would extend their boundaries until stopped by a big river to the West, most probably the River Niger, by another big river to the North (the Benue) and still by another big river to the east (the Cross River). The Ezza felt committed to making the most of their father's prediction as well as their grandfather's blessings. Isichei (1976:91) argues that fighting using wooden swords or pointed metal-daggers were endemic (a practice, which is still very common in north-eastern Igboland). Sometimes contestants would tie themselves together, so that the one who lost his nerve first, had to cut himself free. Often young men ran riot in the market, fighting mock battles and plundering market stalls". Ezza men usually offered to go to war on Eke and Afor market days (Afoke &Nworie, 2010:22). Robert Cudjoe, a Ghanaian who worked as a colonial government interpreter in Abakaliki from 1909-1929 maintains that "the Ezzas were brave, cheerful and above all truthful and they would face death smiling and laughing. In those Provincial Court days, you would be surprised to see one, two, three or more Ezzas, charged with murder, shouting, in spite of very weak evidence for the prosecution, showing that they were ready to die" (Cudjoe, 1953:159).

The oral history of Ogboji-Ezza people reveals that they are experts in executing wars and administering orthopaedic treatments. They are also gallant and tactical traditional soldiers. They use a peculiar guerrilla strategy called *Arimogu* to attack their enemies at night and

disappear before daybreak. The Ogboji people are experts in manipulating a traditional poisonous herb called *Egvuma*, which they used to kill their enemies in war fronts. Another version to the Ezza culture of expansionism was said to be engineered by threats received earlier on from their neighbours and brothers. First, the two brothers of Ezekuna (founder of the Ezza), Olodo (Izzi founder) and Noyo (Ikwo founder), were said to have become envious of their brother and planned to kill him. After a series of meditation, Noyo went to secretly reveal the plan to Ezekuna and Ezekuna strategized an attack on Olodo and his men (Anyanwu, 2005b:1). Thus, from the earliest time of Ezza settlement in their present location, they suffered violent envy that led to conflict, which went a long way is shaping the Ezza behaviour towards warfare. Over the years, "the Ezza and their neighbours engaged in total war. Military service, for age grades of fighting age was compulsory. Defeated foes were beheaded or offered in religious sacrifices. Enemy villages were often razed, their population put largely to the sword, which helped them to expand through a series of violent wars" (Isichei, 1976:89). At end of a particular war, the defeated groups were put to death or they migrate to another site or in many cases, joined the victors and became assimilated with them. Amuda village that was founded by Okpoto is an example of a community that preferred to join their Ezza conquerors rather them migrating.

The historic cause of the contemporary Ezza conflicts in Nigeria is their widespread culture of mercenary warfare and the quest for land. "The invitation of the Ezza by any group to fight its wars was backed by the establishment of a bond of unity (*Igbandu*) between the Ezza and their hosts. In doing this, the two parties pledged to avoid any act that would be adverse to the progress and well-being of the other, (as well as) encourage activities or programmes that would be of mutual benefits to all and desist from acts that could lead to bloodshed between the two parties" (Anyanwu, 2005b:5). The above statement captured the standard practice in all the areas that they invited to assist in the war. The place where the oath is taken differs from one group that found a particular colony to another. For instance, among the Ezza and Umuhali people for example, "the first oath was sworn at Enyim-Ezzagu. The two groups later travelled to Umuhuali and under the Ukwungwu tree at Amagu-Umuhuali, another oath were sworn" (Anyanwu, 2005b:5). After the taking of oath where the Ezza are meant to fight, a portion of land is generally given to them to settle. A cock or goat is often killed and the groups dip their kola nut in the blood and eat in agreement to continue the war peacefully as well as a sign that the land has been granted to the Ezza perpetually. The boundaries of the

said portion of land are usually marked by the Ezza using the *Ogbu* (fig) tree, which serves as a beckon from where the settlers will begin to use the tree as a fence to their different parcels of land.

The Ezza defended the Ezillo and Isu peoples from being overrun by their enemies. In the course of a land dispute between Ezillo people and the Okposhi Nkwolu Ngbo brothers of Ezillo over pieces of land called Egu Echara, Egu Okwuru, Egu Uzo Oge and Abaogodo. The Ezillo people invited Ezza people to settle at Eguachara, which served as a buffer between Ngbo and Ezillo (Ezillo Memorandum, 2008:4). However, over the years, the same people they protected turned-out to become their enemies. "The Ezza settlers, in their midst, have not been cordial for a long time now because of the land grabbing tendencies of the latter, among other reasons" (Ezillo Memorandum, 2008:3).

During pre-colonial times, it is believed that relations or contacts between Agila and Ezza evolved during the North-eastern Igbo wars of expansion that stimulated waves of migration from the Ezza ancestral homeland in the Southeast via Izzi to Idoma Province through Utonkon, Benue State. This was believed to be the first phase of Ezza migration to Idomaland. Another wave of migrations started from Effium to Idoma Province. According to Anyanwu (1992:120-121) all these occurred within 1800-1905. On the other hand, Erim (1981) opines that from 1625-1655, Igbo-speaking people settled in Idoma nation. He identifies the then Igbo-speaking settlers as the Uma, Uga, Oludu, Egedegbe and Ugbeetese, who spoke one form of Igbo dialect or another. Consequently, the progressive influx of Igalla settlers dominated and assimilated the above Igbo stock.

However, he maintains that from 1805-1835, there was an unprecedented influx of Igbo immigrants from Abakaliki and Nsukka Districts (what is today known as Ebonyi and Enugu States of Nigeria) to the area (Erim, 1981:116-117). Agila oral traditions that have survived till date agrees with the position of Erim (1981) that the earliest settlers of the area were made up of diverse ethnicity, which led to the emergence of heterogeneous cultural groups and societies in the area. In the Southern Idoma, the people of Igumale and Agila, who were believed to be immigrants from Idah settled in the area with a collection of other migrants

from different parts of what is known today as Nigeria. By the late 18th century, there was a massive influx of Ezza and Izzi Igbo into Agila and Igumale territories. When the Igbo people began to arrive, many the Idoma speaking groups of Igumale and Agila did not receive them to settle peacefully with them. They were afraid that the Ezza who were widely known as mercenary warriors could one day contest their land with them. "While both communities used violence to stem the tide of Igbo migration and invasion, they also embarked on a policy of cultural and political assimilation, which saw the emergence at the close of the century, of a highly centralised multi-ethnic mini state. The dynamics of governance within both states was such that migrants who traced their origins to Idah and Apa, produced ruling houses, while either groups took charge of religious and military affairs" (Ochefu, 1995:269). The combination of resistance and cultural assimilation of the Ezza and other Igbo groups was rooted on the fact that while a number of Idoma people were hostile to the Ezza, many of them saw them as the power-house of their source of direct labour, which is highly needed to cultivate their farms and transform their agricultural-based economy.

It should be recalled that the Agila people are found in present day Benue State, North Central Nigeria. The Agila homeland settlement was a 17th century phenomenon, established in the aftermath of the migrations from Idah in C. 1625-1655 and subsequent formation of a state system and structure between 1715 and 1835AD (Erim, 1981:116). Both written sources and popular oral traditions of the Agila people trace their origin to Igala. Agila oral tradition confirms that Igbo-speaking elements were found in the area when the Igala people arrived. They list the Igbo groups to include Olodu, Otoklo, Anmeka, Egbedege, Ife, Isofia and other Igbo groups numbering up to thirty who spoke different dialect with Abakaliki-Ebonyi mother languages dominating (Onoja, 2013:348). The descendants of these groups are still found today in the area. Anyanwu (1992) argues that Ezza settlement in the Benue were a 19th century phenomena, which is in accordance with the position of Erim (1981). However, Anyanwu (1992) is silent over the Ezza-Agila colonies, which gave rise to the Ezza-Ulayi and Ezza-Ijigban colonies (Onoja, 2013:348). It was from these colonies that a number of Ezza people grew to demonstrate their military strength in defending the people from enemy attacks.

It was from those taking charge of military affairs as well as those who engaged in massive crop farming that the Ezza began to rise in social hierarchy in their Agila settlements. Onoja (2013:349) states that before the 1920s, the Ezza were already fully settled in Agila. Isichie (1977:89-90) asserts that "the Ezza fought an interminable series of wars with Igbo neighbours. Not content with their gains in Effium, they were anxious to win the territory from their northern neighbour; the Agila, an Idoma group. During colonial rule, a war ensued between the Ezza and the Agila fled further north. The war was fought over land. Nemesis ensued during the Nigerian Civil War, when the Ezza were chased back to Effium, which they had left some forty years earlier".

In addition to the hostility of his brothers, there were also non-Igbo speaking people of Orri, Okpoto, Effium and Ntezi, who probably migrated earlier from the Benue area and occupied large expanse of land within the current Abakaliki area. They soon perceived the expansion of Ezza as a major threat to their land and proactively began to pillage their farms as a way of deterring them from further expansion. Ezza continued to fight wars of survival until they had to move across the Ebonyi River by the late nineteenth century, where they met Effium, bordering the South-Eastern part of Idoma land. That was the point at which Effium appealed to Ezza to assist them in checking the aggression of Ishieke. Effium could fight but they were few in numbers. The Ezza joined forces with Effium and subdued the Ishieke people. At the end of the war in 1935, a large numbers of Ezza people remained on Effium land and with the passage of time; their descendants outnumbered the Effium (Otokpa, 2014:44). Till date, the pull and push politics between the original Effium people and their Ezza settlers is increasing. That is how the Ezza would symbiotically help a community to conquer their enemy and years later, they will become a hostile neighbour to their landlords or hosts.

Furthermore, "to each of these hostile neighbours, the Ezza held out an olive branch. Peace delegations were sent to these groups by Ezza elders asking for an end to the raids and the need for peaceful coexistence. However, the raids and attacks continued unabated. The non-Igbo neighbours of the Ezza must have mistaken them to be weaklings or outright cowards" (Anyanwu, 2005a:18). Unfortunately, as many of the then non-Igbo neighbours were vandalising and loathing the Ezza farm produce, they were igniting the fire of an attack, from a group of gallant men, whose strength and bravery they were under-estimating. This is

because a bellicose and militant environment nurtured a bellicose and militant culture. Ironically, it was not in all Ezza colonies that peace envoys were sent. Thus, as the Ezza colonies increased and their areas of competition with host communities increased, the number of wars wagged by the Ezza became intensified.

Consequently, the Ezza developed the attitude of a man surrounded by enemies and mapped-out their line of attack and almost annihilated many host population. The Ezza of Idembia and Oriuzor declared war on the Okpoto, who were initially living in that area currently inhabited by their people. The early 19th century attack was a massive failure for the Ezza, who experienced massive casualties on their side. However, in the wars fought from "1895-1897, the Okpoto people were routed and forced to flee northwards to their present location" (Anyanwu, 2005a:20). The story of how the Ezza forced different groups to migrate and took over their land in pre-colonial times is widespread. Ezza traditions also describe their war with the Agba people who originally lived in the area now occupied by Idembia. Ironically, Idembia was the most warlike sub-group of the (Ezza) people. When the Agba people were forced to flee after series of war with the Ezza, "they covered their salt ponds with enormous stones. One section fled to the Cross River, another to the west, where soon, they came in conflict with another Ezza group, Izo Imoha that was expanding westwards. This time, they determined to stand their ground and the Ezza bypassed them to settle in an unoccupied area, which became the colony of Ezzagu" (Isichei, 1976:89).

The people of Agba formerly inhabited the present Umunwagu and Ikwuate (Idembia) areas. They fiercely challenged Ezza expansion to the south but were overpowered by the superior forces of Ezza Idembia and as they retreated in defeat, they adopted the scorch earth strategy. Having been pushed further away from their original settlement and settled in a new abode for several years, the Agba thought that at last, they were out of harm with regard to Ezza aggression. But they were wrong, soon Ezza southwest expansion again caught up with them. Ofoke (1977:123) gives a detailed account when he maintains that Agba people formerly occupied the area now settled by Umunwagu and Ikwuate (Idembia) in Izikworo sub-villages. When the southwards expansion of Izikworo (an Ezza village) group of villages caught up with Agba, whose main settlements were in Ebo Ndiagu, Ochuhu Agba and Orie Agba Elu area, they put up a spirited but short-lived defence. Their defence was short-lived because

they were not warlike and they became overcome. When they discovered that they cannot continue to wage the war, the Agba blocked several brine ponds in these areas with huge stones and fled south-westwards to their present homes in Ishielu Division. After settling in their homes for several years, Izo Imoha group of villages, once more, met the Agba, in their south westwards expansion. They were determined this time to hold on to their land and the Izo Imoha group of villages, instead of driving-away the Agba passed over them to a wide expanse of land then uninhabited, which the Ezza called Ezzagu meaning Ezza farmland (Ofoke, 1977:123). This time, the Agba stood their ground as they were not prepared to take to the road again in flight from Ezza aggression.

The Ezza did not stop at fighting the Agba; they also fought the Ntezi people. Archival records reveal that the Ezza succeeded in capturing and subduing the Igboji sub-clan which is a descendant of Orri, the founder of the Orri tribe. In C. 1850 AD, one Iwere Nta from the Umu-Igboko, Izo Ikwu of Umuezoka, led a force westwards across the Aboine (Ebonyi) River and waged war with the people of Isu and Onicha clans. For some strategic reasons of ensuring that they were not attacked, the Ohoffia clan gave Ezza forces safe passage through their country as they penetrated the interior to fight. That act of goodwill was highly cherished by the band of Ezza warriors, who needed a safe location to settle and receive reinforcement of weapons, food and other logistics that they require to fight their enemies. Thus, the Ohoffia people provided such support, therefore, remains till today, "sandwiched and unmolested, between the Ezza main country and the Ezzagu colony founded by Iwere Nta. In C. 1896 A. D, there was a war between Ezza and Ntezi" (Anyanwu, 2005g: 175-176).

There are also a number of people who make up the Ezza nation, co-opted possibly by the Ezza into their clan due to their great valour in warfare during the pre-colonial era. The Ogboji and Okoffia people are a very good example of such a brave group. "Many Okoffia people behave like the Ogboji Ezechima people in terms of warfare and intergroup relations. They are fondly known as giants whose actions corroborate those of Ogboji Ezechima people" (Afoke & Nworie, 2010:26). The Ogboji and Ezza groups are said to have fought very decisive wars before their process of mutual integration. A closer examination of the Ogboji dialect reveals that despite hundreds of years of inter-group relations between them and the Ezza, their dialect is not yet exactly the same as that of the Ezza. It is believed that

the Ogboji introduced their guerrilla warfare tactics called *Arimogu* into Ezza for which they have been well-known for. Ezza oral tradition relates that the Ogboji fought wars with the Ezza before they reached a peaceful understanding to live together as friends. "There is no evidence that the Ezza conquered the Ogboji who have continued to fight their wars without Ezza's assistance even till today. The Ogboji fought the Mgbalukwu of Isu without the assistance from Nkomoro of Ezzaegu, an Izzo and Oriuzor offshoot. No one understands why this is so because the Izzo group in Ezzagu always takes the Ogboji along whenever they occupy a new territory" (Afoke & Nworie, 2010:24-25).

However, oral interview reveals that the Ogboji did not support their Ezza friends in the war that was waged by the Ojiegbe-Ezza against the Mgbalukwu and Obeagu Isu people for ninety seven years (1910-2007) (Njoku, 2016; Okorie, 2016; Onu, 2016). They stayed clear of the war due to the friendly relations and the gift of large portion of the land that they currently settle from the Obeagu Isu people.

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4.4 EZZA CONFLICTS DURING THE COLONIAL ERA

British colonialism in what was known as the Abakaliki Division started in the early years of the 20th century. Within that period, inter-communal warfare was the order of the day. It was a period known for the high degree of Ezza mercenary warfare. Thus, by the turn of the twentieth century, the main direction of expansion was towards the west and the Ezza were coming into conflict with various Nkanu clans, such as Amagunze. The Amagunze who were the historic neighbours of the Isu saw part of their lands been overtaken by the warlike Ezza group from Ezzagu. They continued to press in that direction "until the British marked the boundary with concrete pillars in 1923. Had the British not intervened, they might well have reached Enugu and beyond. The history of Ezza expansion is really the history of a colonising power, assimilating or displacing rival groups and constantly enlarging its geographical and demographic scale" (Isichei, 1976:90).

Earlier in the 20th century, the Ezza had launched a fully fledged attack on the Oshiri. Afigbo (1987:46) maintains that the Ezza fought Okpoto in 1899, the Oshiri from 1901-1902 and the

Izzi from 1902-1905. However, the Ezza are believed to have fought with their Izzi brothers and even expelled them from their Amagu ancestral home from 1902-1905. The Ezza are believed to have also attacked Amagu for giving the colonial masters, a safe landing at a time they were campaigning for alliance from their neighbours not to allow the British to pass through their land. Anyanwu (2004:61), citing a British intelligence report argues that "the hostility of the Onicha and Ugwulangu to a British party passing through their territory was due to an oath with the Ezza to make common cause against the British should the later come into their territory. The Amagu and Alike did not yield to Ezza's diplomatic overtures and as a reprisal, Ezza attacked Amagu, burnt down houses, killed one man, cut the hand of a woman and wounded several men". The war between the two brothers defied all peace initiatives until the British landed with their strong gunboat and quelled the conflict.

Ngwuta (2015) revealed in an interview that the wars between the Ezza and the Oshiri were very fierce and had massive negative impacts on both communities. The conflict between both groups re-occurred intermittently from colonial era until the 1990s. When the war started during the colonial era, the Oshiri retreated to count their losses and re-armed after series of wars against the Ezza. They went to Isu and Ugwulangwu, where they got blacksmiths to produce weapons that could aid them in prosecuting the war. From their base at the edge of the Abonyi (Ebonyi) River, the Oshiri raided Ezza farmlands. The raids caused the retaliation by the joint forces of Ezza warriors from Idembia, Amana, Nkomoro and Amegu. The battle that ensued was fierce. Between 1904 and 1905, the Ezza were mainly on the defensive with many casualties. The high casualty level on the side the Ezza was due to the strategic preparations of the Oshiri warriors. Worried over the Oshiri raids, "the Ezza women marched to Eke-Imeoha market chanting war songs and urging all able-bodied Ezza men to check the Oshiri menace. A joint action was planned and after a series of battles, which the Ezza tradition regarded as fiercest, the Oshiri were driven across the Abonyi River. The Ezza-Oshiri war was halted by the British in 1905" (Anyanwu, 1993:95; Anyanwu & Ijoma, 1999:71).

Similarly, there was war amongst the Ojiegbe-Ezza, Mgbalukwu and Obeagu communities, who are found in Isu clan, Onicha Local Government Area of Ebonyi State, Southeastern Nigeria. There, the Mgbalukwu and Obeagu Isu who were the descendants of Ezentumoke

that migrated from Isukwuato to Agbabor, Isu; where he settled and continued with his hunting career around the fifteenth century fought with the Ojiegbe-Ezza. The geography of Obeagu and Mgbalukwu consists of lowlands with innumerable swamps that make their land very fertile for commercial rice cultivation. The Mgbalukwu and Obeagu communities were the last two sons of Ezentumoke, the legendary hunter from Isukwuator of Abia State who founded the Isu clan. The Ojiegbe people, on their part, were descendants of Ezza community, who moved from their kits and kiln both in the Onueke-homeland of the Ezza and other Ezza clusters in what is popularly called the 'Ezza diaspora' to Isu land. However, it is a popular belief that the Ojiegbe people migrated from Ezzagu in the present Ishielu Local Government Area and Onueke in Ezza South Local Government Area to Isu land in Onicha Local Government Area of the same Ebonyi State; about two centuries ago.

They were given a portion of land by the Mgbalukwu and Obeagu people of Isu land to live and pay tribute to them. This was done after they successfully assisted them to gain victory during the Isu people's conflict with Onicha people of the same local government area. It could be said that at the onset of Ojiegbe-Ezza settlement in Isu, the people lived in Rousseau's peaceful, ideal state. In that state, man was naturally good, was at peace with all works of nature and is a friend of his fellow creature (Russell, 1946). During times of peace, inter-marriages were very high. The Mgbalukwu and the Ojiegbe equally shared a polling station (unit) for elections. Dada and Ani (2009) argue that many years later, the Ojiegbe-Ezza people began to progressively encroach on lands that were not initially allocated to them. When the Mgbalukwu and Obeagu Isu people tried to checkmate them, conflict exploded and lasted intermittently for ninety seven (97) years (from 1910-2007). It was during the colonial rule that a number of contemporary Ezza wars with their neighbours in Ebonyi State, Nigeria started.

Interviews from the field revealed that the Ezzagu and Onicha-Amagu conflict started within the colonial period (Usulor, 2015). It was also within that period that the Ezza-Okpoto land dispute took place (Akam, 2015). While the Ezza wanted to expand their land space, the few Okpoto people in Ishielu, who were already depopulated due to a combination of the massive re-location of their men and women back to Benue, wanted to retain their new geographical settlement and they invited the British colonial masters to halt the Ezza invasion. There were

also a number of other communities that experienced fierce conflict with Ezza in the colonial era as was recorded from the field interviews. They include the Ezza and Ugwuomu-Nike conflict (Nkpuma, 2015), the Ezza-Aninri conflict (Eze, 2016), Ezza and Obeagu conflict as well as the Ezza and Umughuali conflicts of Ishielu Local Government Areas in Ebonyi State, Nigeria (Nnaji, 2016).

4.5 THE ANGLO-EZZA WAR

The colonial conquest of Nigeria started from 1861 with the conquest of Lagos, after an attempt made in 1851. Before the military bombardment and subsequent conquest of Lagos, the British penetrated into the coastal parts of Nigeria and championed the abolition of slave trade (Flint, 1960; Anene, 1965). The conquest of Igboland was achieved through the activities of British traders, missionaries and colonial forces. Again, the conquest of Arochukwu, which was seen by the British as the only obstacle to successful pacification of the entire Igboland, was followed by the conquest of other Igbo groups and states (Onoja, 2011:158).

In 1905, the British declared a full war of conquest on Ezza people. Ezza warriors matched out in their numbers to confront the strange invaders of their country. When the British entered North-eastern Igboland in 1903, they were strategic in their penetration as they were already properly warned by other Igbo groups about the warlike Ezza people. When the British landed, they used Izzi collaborators to settle down but when their Izzi collaborators carried their message of protectionism to the Ezza, the Ezza chased the messenger away. They informed the messenger that they had heard of the British defeat of the Aro but were stronger than the Aro and that "if the British sent any more emissaries, the Ezza would cut off their heads and return them through the hands of those towns, friendly with the administration" (Afigbo, 1974:17). The British were rebuffed as the Ezza informed them that "if the white men intrude, we would drive them out. The Ezza are ruled by no one. There is heaven above and the earth below and in between, are the Ezza" (Anyanwu, 2005a:23). The brave Ezza warriors and their history of victory in warfare, gave them excessive confidence and they under-estimated the fire-power of the British.

Armstrong (1984:56) moots that "in 1905, when a British District Officer (D.O.) with military escort attempted to penetrate into Ezza country, the Ezza ambushed and killed some escorts. Fierce fighting ensued but the British firepower made them win. That must have led to the (Ezza) occupation of Idoma territories to the South". Onoja (2013:349) maintains that it was the combined attack by the Ezza-Ohiki on Major Cockburn's escort that Armstrong (1984) was referring to. From the act of ambushing and killing a District Officer, the battle line was drawn and the preparation ensued. By 1905, the British were prepared to take the field and deal with what they believed was the growing Ezza menace. They assembled what they called 'the Ezza Patrol', whose area of strategic attack was far more stretched than the borders of Ezza land and their colonies. The objectives of the Patrol were to:

1. Bring under government control, the Ugulangu, Onicha and Ezza tribes;
2. Deal with the Achara and Ohiki, who killed some soldiers of Major Cockburn's escort; and
3. Visit the town of Asaga (in Ohafia-Bende District) reported to be harbouring four murderers (Anyanwu, 2004c:62).

Consequently, the colonial government assembled a detachment of the colonial army for 'the Ezza Patrol'. They left Calabar on 11th March 1905 and the troop comprised of the following:

Commander: Captain E. C. Mergesson;

Staff Officer: Lieutenant D. C. Vickery D. S. O.;

Artillery: Lieutenant J. H. Gibbon, as well as 17 Rank and File;

Infantry: Captain H. A. Kirby, Lieutenant P. W. Colley and 134 Rank and File, Np 677 Cls, W. Pritchard. Company 'B' S. N. No 4540. Sergeant T. Jones. Captain B. M. Bryne and 68 Rank and File. Company 'C' Lieutenant G. M. Barrow (joined on 22nd March, 1905). Captain E. De H. Smith and 59 Rank and File (joined on 22nd March, 1905);

Transport: Sergeant Watts R. A. 62271;

Medical: Dr. T. D. Molfalt, MB; Dr. J. A. G. White, M.B.; and

Political: Mr. A. W. Biddel, Major W. A. C. Cockburn (joined on 21st March, 1905) and Mr A. D. C. Philips (joined on 14th March 1905) (Anyanwu, 2004c:62-63).

Between 11th and 20th March 1905, Asaga was ran-down after the community resisted the colonial demands for them to surrender the murderers of Britishmen. The British took five of their chief hostage. On 22nd March 1905, the troop landed Afikpo to start the journey of attacking Ezza but discovering that the Ezza had laid siege for them, they changed their operational strategy and left Afikpo for Onicha. They laid ambush from the Ebonyi River and its creeks and lunched their attack from 24th March 1905 (Anyanwu, 1993:144-167). Immediately, they ran-down the Onicha and Ugwulangwu people and continued their onslaught.

The Ezza fought gallantly and killed a number of British men. While a number of Ezza men were able to cut the heads of the white men, the Anglo-Ezza wars reduced the hitherto belief by the Ezza neighbours that they were invisible in warfare. Isichie (1976:122) maintains that Ogboji Agu Ogodo picked his Dane gun to flush-out the British invaders from Ezza as he and his other generals had often done. A stray shell hit the tree in front of him, splitting it into two and reducing the section still on ground to ashes. He then realised that he had encountered an enemy beyond his powers and ran as his heels could carry him. Njoku Chita, another Ezza general was so over-awed by the devastating effects of the machine gun that he dropped his gun and ran shouting *Mbeke bu Mma! Mbeke bu Mma!* (meaning white men are mystery, white men are mystery) (Anyanwu, 2005a:23). Other military and political leaders of the Ezza groups were said to have died in their numbers during the Anglo-Ezza war of 1905-1918, thereby reducing the will of the Ezza people to fight from that year. The fear of the British became a deterrent and a major source of temporal peace between the Ezza and their erstwhile enemies. Isichie (1976:91) posits that "like other powers which aggrandise themselves in violent means, the Ezza paid a price for their conquest. They lived in constant fear of reprisals".

It should be noted that when these Ezza clusters in Agila grew beyond their initial settlement space, conflict ensued. The conflict was intense and protracted until the rise of the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1980), which the people capitalised-on (as part of the broader Nigerian alliance) to push the Ezza away (as they were mainly fighting on the Biafra side). Paradoxically, at the end of the war, the few Ezza people who remained in the colony continued to fight against the Agilla people.

The Ezillo people are found in the current Ishielu Local Government Area of Ebonyi State, South-eastern Nigeria. They are mainly an agrarian population. The Ezillo people were the traditional host of the Ezza people. "They are believed to be homogenous in ethnic composition, marked out by a fairy distinct language, similar culture and a myth of common origin as well as having the same ancestral father with their kit and kin of Ngbo, Ezzamgbo, Izzi and Ikwo communities of the state" (Mbah & Nwangwu, 2014:684). This history of relationship, especially with Ngbo people whom they are not meant to spill blood with due to traditional bond, made the Ezillo to invite the Ezza to fight for them and later settled them as a 'bridge' against the threat of their Ngbo brothers in the past.

The Ezillo people clashed with their Ngbo brothers over parcels of land located in the place known as Egu Echara, Egu Okwuru, Egu Uzo Oge and Aba Ogodo. This made the Ezillo people to invite the Ezza people to settle in Egu Echara and serve as a buffer between Ngbo and Ezillo. Mba and Nwangwu (2014:686) stated that "the Ezillo community holds that only twenty-two Ezza men were invited to come and settle in Ezillo originally". With the passing of decades, after the successful prosecution of the Ngbo-Ezillo conflict, both communities lived in peace. "It is also necessary to note that the two warring groups previously lived together and, over the years, developed a good measure of cordial relationship that led to intermarriages. Ezza-Ezillo people were even represented on the cabinet of the traditional ruler of Ezillo community" (Elechi, 2008:2). At the end of the conflict they were compensated with some piece of land in Egu Echara. Later, the Ezza people began to expand into other parts of Ezillo land that was different from the original parcel that was given to them. The Ezillo leaders demanded that they should relocate to the original location given to them but that was a near impossibility, considering the population explosion over the years. This situation resulted in the intermittent Ezza-Ezillo conflicts and years of bloodshed that followed.

4.6 COLONIALISM AND PEACEBUILDING IN EZZA

The era of colonialism notwithstanding its deep-rooted exploitation of Africans still made a number of contributions to societal development. One of those contributions was the promotion of reactive peacebuilding in many conflict-laden environments, as a road map to

entrench colonial rule. The presence of colonial police was richly felt in Ezza and the whole of Abakaliki Division during colonial rule. While the police were very effective in the Anglo-Ezza Wars of 1905 and the Battle of Okwor, Ngbo as ambassadors of effective occupation; they were used to spread the imperial security policies of colonial masters. It would be recalled that on the eve of 1933, Abakaliki Division had one Sergeant, one Corporal and 23 Constables under the charge of an Assistant Commissioner of Police. Due to the insufficient number of these personnel, they demanded for more police and forty police escorts were sent specifically to assist in communal security and tax collection (Denton, 1934). The same year witnessed the presence of the Royal West African Frontier Force "D" Company of the 3rd Battalion. The Nigerian regiment of it was stationed in Abakaliki until October, 1933 when it was removed to Enugu. Men like Mr. D. L. Hill, Major Garden, Mr. Hannaford and Captain Matthew were at the same time in Abakaliki to keep the peace (Denton, 1934:23-24).

It should be stated first that the colonial police was principally there to serve the interest of the colonial Lords and promote their imperial agenda. For instance, in 1933, the Native Authority in Ngbo appealed for police assistance in tax collection and environmental security. It was recorded that the sight of the police brought people to their senses; promoted peace and that improved the speed of tax collection (Denton, 1934:15). This is not unconnected to the social culture of the Nigerian masses till date, in which the people try to avoid police brutality and any other forms of deal with them. Similarly, a police escort made up of one European and forty other ranks was employed for two months early in the same 1933 for security and tax collection. "The escort operated in the Ezza, Ikwo, Orri and Ohaffia areas and collected over £5,000. There was no active opposition and when the police had appeared in an area, the inhabitants made efforts to pay at once" (Denton, 1934:18). The use of police to enforce payment created lasting ill-feeling as people were coerced to pay their hard-earned money into the colonial treasury.

However, that form of policing process, which supported exploitation, equally witnessed the concurrent reduction of crimes and crisis in the society towards promoting sustainable security. The colonial masters through police assistance used the Native Courts that were managed by the Warrant Chiefs and later the *Ishi-Uke* age grade (Steensel, 2009) as found in Izzih land, to try people who were suspected of undermining the societal peace. Those found

guilty in such courts would be sentenced to a maximum of two years imprisonment. Difficult cases went to the Divisional Officer at Abakaliki. This system was for the good of the colonial rulers, who sought peace and favourable circumstances for trading. But it was not for the good of the population. The warrant chiefs became soon corrupted and misused their power.

The 1929 Annual Report of Abakaliki Division (National Archives Enugu, 1929) reveals that a serious affray took place in February of that year between the Ezza, Izzi and Ikwo clans. The casus belli as might be expected was land. The Igbeagu-Izzi people began to build houses on land previously farmed in common by both parties. Those who erected the structure were told years ago to remove it but they failed to do so. When the Ikwo people came to farm the land in February, 1929, a flare-up involving eight hundred men started. Captain Kelly, the District Officer decided that a case of emergency had arisen and wired at once for a police escort. However, to save unnecessary bloodshed, he made a requisition for a Platoon "A" Company of the Nigerian Regiment to accompany him to the spot and put a stop to the fighting. The arrival of the troops had the desired effect and the fighting immediately ceased; considerable bloodshed being avoided. Forty two people received wounds of a more or less serious nature but there were no deaths. The troops returned to Abakaliki after standing by for twenty four hours and their place was taken by an adequate force of police. It was stated that the colonial administration acted swiftly because they gathered an intelligent report that the larger Izzi were preparing to send forces to support their kiths and kiln.

The colonial lords promoted peace in order to have a calm society where they could easily tax the people and exploit their resources. The above generalization remained popular, but the wind of peace and security that they promoted laid the foundation for sustainable peace in many parts of Abakaliki Division as well as the relations between a number of the communities there-in and their neighbours. An attempt would be made in this part of the article to x-ray a number of peace-building initiatives by the colonial masters during the period they operated.

Foremost was the fact that the payment and collection of rent by the Isu and Oshiri people from the Ezza tenants in their land was a major source of conflict amongst the groups in the first decade of the twentieth century. Connell agreed with the need for the reduction of the tax rate on Isu people in order to reduce the conflict in the area. He stated that "the ordinary fee been at present £5/. This later point (of court fees reduction) however needs consideration in connection with the general scale of fees throughout the parts of the poorest Afikpo Division, where the fee is £2/-. At the same time there was decrease in the friendly settlement of disputes by arbitration among the villages and in my personal view, it leads to much unnecessary litigation" (Connell, 1930). Unfortunately, the tax process in Isu was "infected" by two main challenges. "The first was the land dispute between the Obeagu Mgbalukwu, Ojiegbe communities (which started in 1910) and the second was the controversy between the Afikpo Division and the Abakaliki Division, on the right to collect tax from the Ezza people in Isu land" (Ani, 2012). The colonial administration soon created a border zone to separate the Ezza people in both sides of the divide and taxed them differently for the sake of peace. The colonial masters tried to resolve the main crisis to no avail as it never eliminated the conflict history between the Ojiegbe-Ezza and Mgbalukwu-Obeagu Isu people (Dada & Ani, 2009). The colonial masters organised series of meetings between the conflict parties but instead of positive peace to be created, it lead to negative peace and the conflict was only successfully resolved in 2007.

Similarly, on the side of Ezza and Oshiri people, both had a history of inter-communal conflicts over land rights and the inability of the Ezza to pay their tenancy bills. Denton (1934) wrote that owing to the scarcity of money, the annual rent payable by the Ezzas to the Oshiris was reduced, after negotiation from fifty to twenty-five pounds. However, just like in the case of the Ojiegbe-Ezza and Mgbalukwu-Obeagu Isu people, the Ezza soon refused to pay the colonial-negotiated and reduced rent and engaged in years of warfare. "The Oshiri retreated to count their losses and re-arm after a series of wars fought against the Ezza. From their base at the edge of the Abonyi River, the Oshiri raided Ezza farmlands, which were retaliated by joint forces of Idembia, Amana, Nkomoro and Amegu. The Ezza-Oshiri war was halted by the British forces in 1905 (Anyanwu & Ijoma, 1999:17).

The conflicts between the Ezza, Ikwo as well as Izzi brothers have been cited by a number of scholars. For instance, Afoke (1977:122) posits that "the Kpakpaji group of villages also moved their frontiers north-east and northwards. In both places, they were opposed by the Izzi and the Ikwo". Ani (2015b:219) maintains that from 1902-1905, the Ezza and their Izzi kith and kin fought for years. It was the Ezza people of Oriuzor and Umuogharu who first invaded their brothers from 1902-1903. The attack was easily repelled and checked by Izzi warriors. This gave the Izzi people a victorious impression and they went to relax, while their Ezza brothers re-strategized and re-organised their forces. "By the beginning of 1904, we learn that the two Ezza groups re-opened their hostilities against the Izzi. The Izzi were forced to abandon Amegu, their ancestral homeland to the Ezza. In 1905, the Izzi suffered more defeats and because of this, they lost more lands. Fortunately for them, the British had come onto the scene and further appropriations of their land by the Ezza were checked" (Anyanwu & Ijoma, 1999: 71). Another consequence of the war was that Izzi people were pushed-out from the area now occupied by Umuome Oriuzor, one of the villages in Ezza. Fortunately, for them, the British had come on the scene and Ezza further appropriations of their land were checked.

The brevity and war-like nature as well as fear of the Ezza were the factors that made the Ngbo to resist the construction of the road from Ngbo to Effium in the colonial era. *Ngbo Assessment Report* revealed that "the troubles commenced in the years 1923-24 when the District Officer (the Late Mr. R. H. J. Sasse) decided to open up a road from Ngbo to Effium. The Ngbos did not want this road as they did not desire to have Ezza migrants passing through their country" (National Archives Enugu, 1930). It will be recalled that the Ezza has a historic culture of migration and they are not just found in Ezza Effium but also in many parts of Agila and Idoma land, other parts of Ebonyi, Anambra and Enugu States. The colonial lords lobbied a number of Ngbo men for the road construction through Mr. Ituma, the *Isiala* of Ekwasi for the success of the road project and that opened up the area, leading the creation of colonial borders between the Agila and Ngbo. Consequently, the colonial masters policed the border and ensured that there was negative peace there until the independence government of Nigeria emerged. The inability of the post-independence government of Nigeria to manage the area made the place a hotbed of intermittent conflict between the Agila and Ngbo till date.

4.7 THE BAROLONG PEOPLE

A study on the origin and settlement of the Barolong people in South Africa is challenging due to non-specialized dates and records of the succession of waves of migration into where is today known as South Africa. However, Ngcongco (2003:24-25) has linked the Barolong people to the second wave of societies who came to settle in the sovereign area originally inhabited by earlier settlers (the Khoi and San peoples). When the Barolong landed, they settled along the upper side of the Molopo River, from where they spread. According to the 'wave theory' of settlement in South Africa, each group of immigrants into South Africa subdued or conquered groups that preceded it in the area of settlement. Walton (1956) maintains that by the 11th century, when the Bafokeng crossed the Zambezi, the Barolong and the Bahurutshe were already settled in the place referred to as Bechuanaland. The Barolong were among the earliest Sotho-Tswana kingdoms to establish themselves in South Africa (Ngcongco, 2003:31).

The Barolong are Setswana-speaking people who trace their origin to Chief Morolong who led them to their base in the Molopo River around the early part of the 15th century. Manson and Mbenga (2014:8-9) maintain that there are archaeological evidence dating the origins and early settlement of Tswana-Sotho people to the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The Transvaal Native Affairs Department (1905:7) maintain that "the Barolong derived their name from the Chief Morolong, under whom according to tradition, their ancestors migrated from a country in the far North, about the year 1400". Heale (2003:2) posits that "for long years, the Barolong people lived without interference. They hunted game on the hard dry plains. They developed iron working skills and tended their herds of cattle. The Barolong grew in number, giving different tribes their own special names". By the beginning of the 16th century, they settled in Witwatersrand but were forced to move in a South Western direction from Mosega area across Molopo by the Bahurutshe (Ramoroka, 2009).

The Bokwena formed an alliance with the Bahurutshe to clash with the Barolong because they needed land for hunting as well as for the rich iron ore, which the Barolong were already using at that time to build their reputation as famous blacksmiths. This was done in order to capture the resources and use them to trade with the Kora and the Khoisan as well as make

additional wealth (Brown, 1926:216). It has been shown that the earliest Barolong people were blacksmiths, whose earlier chiefs took names traceable to iron and hammer. Etymologically, the name 'Morolong' was derived from an old Sotho verb, 'rola' meaning 'to forge' (Ngcongco, 2003:31). The love for iron works made the son of Morolong and the second ruler of Barolong to take the name, Noto (meaning hammer) but was popularly referred to as Tshipe or iron (Ngcongco, 2003:31; Walton, 1956:37-38). During the reign of Tshesebe, the ninth king of Barolong, people migrated southwards to establish themselves at Dikgatlong, located near Vaal (Lekwa) and the Harts (Kolong) rivers. They initially retained their alliances and cultural contacts with their ancestral home until the reign of King Tau, the fourteenth ruler of the Barolong, when he refused to pay tribute (*sehuba*) to their ancestral root and declared themselves independent (Ngcongco, 2003:32).

It was under the reign of Tau that Barolong reached the zenith of its power. He was a powerful leader, who conquered his neighbours and expanded the frontiers of the Barolong kingdom to the extent that it flourished from Phitshane (in the Molopo Reserve) to Molemane (Ottoshoop, Marico District) towards Klerksdorp in the South West and Morokweng (Vryburg District) in the West. During his reign, he annexed and ruled the people of Kora, Bakgalagadi, San and Bahurutshe (War Office, 1905:10).

It is argued that the people who were alienated under his reign because of insufficient food production quickly turned into fish farming and began to eat fish from the Vaal River, thus forcing people to call them the Batlhaping (Parson, 1984:47). It was one of the above conquered neighbours who formed an alliance with the Batlhaping following Chief Tau's killing of a Kora Chief to fight him. The Kora-Batlhaping alliance began to engage in guerrilla war of secession. It was during one of Chief Tau's expeditions against them that he was ambushed and killed in about 1760 in Taung (War Office, 1905:8). This was followed by the regency and leadership of chiefs, whose reign were so brief due to the deaths and internal contest for the throne, leading to the disintegration of the Barolong kingdom. The various Barolong chiefdoms (were) founded by the sons of Tau - the Barolong Ratlou, Barolong-Tshidi, Barolong-Seleka, Barolong-Rapulana and Barolong Mariba. It is only the Barolong-Seleka and Barolong-Rapulana in the South-Western Transvaal that are not situated in the Northern Cape, South of the Molopo River (Ngcongco, 2003:31).

The chiefs, who followed, struggled for supremacy. Following the death of Chief Tau, the Barolong kingdom broke-up into independent chiefdoms such as the Ratlou, Ratshidi, Seleka and Rapulana (Molema, 1950:3). After Tau's death, there was no charismatic leader who could reconcile the conflict torn people of Barolong and build them back into a strong formidable kingdom, irrespective of their scattered settlements. The Transvaal Native Affairs Department (1905:7) documents that in the course of their migration, they settled in Thabeng near the Schoonspruit District, Potchefstroom, which place is now known as Buisfontein. It is in Buisfontein that they met the Bakwena under Seemisho. The Bakwena engaged them in a battle, which forced the Barolong to retire to some other parts of South Africa. Sihunelo moved to Makwassie, near Wolmaranstad. There the missionaries, Messrs. Broadbent and Hodeson joined him and began to spread the Christian culture there. In 1826, he left Makwassie for Platberg, Boshof, and Orange River Colony. It was there that they remained until 1933 when the successors of the above-named missionaries led them to Thaba Ntshu. The clans under Matlakoe and Tawane had meanwhile returned to Khunwane, their old headquarters. Matlabe who had remained near Thabeng was forced by the Bataung under Molitsane to retire and join the clan of Matlakoe and Tawane at Khunwane (Transvaal Native Affairs Department, 1905:7).

The Barolong people lived in Thaba Nchu. It is believed that they settled there in Thaba Nchu, due to the devastating impact of the Ama Ndebele who attacked Khunwana killing the Barolong of both the Ratshidi and Ratlou sides. It is stated that those who visited Khunanwa in the era of the conflicts saw starving children sucking, but in vain, the breast of their lifeless mothers (Ramoroka, 2009:30-31). This is an aspect of the humiliation and dehumanisation that the masses faced at the outbreak of inter-communal conflicts. Molema (1951:35) argues that the movement of the Barolong people, who had earlier settled at Platberg to Thaba Nchu, was driven by water scarcity. The Barolong Ratlou people are found in Khunwana, Ganyesa, Madibogo, Setlagole, Morokweng, Phitshane and Tshidilamola in greater Mafikeng region. The Barolong Ratshidi lives mainly in Montshiwa Stad, Mafikeng. The Barolong Seleka are found in Thaba Nchu while the Barolong Rapulana live in Bodibe and Lotlhakane, located about 15 kilometres south of Mafikeng (Dachs, 1975:13; Stow, 1905:491). In the 19th century, a large population of the Barolong people were found in the present Northern Cape

Province of South Africa (Shillington, 1985:40). They moved from Northern Cape to the Orange Free State and parts of Botswana (Willian, 1984:2).

The Ratshidi and Rapulana, who are historically brothers, clashed over the control of Lotlhakane (Rietfontein). The contested area was about twenty five kilometres, southeast of Mafikeng. The economic importance of the area is that it has a fountain that can irrigate the surrounding landmass, and enable farmers to cultivate all year round. Again, the area is reputed to be a high-yielding ground for wheat cultivation. The Barolong conflict of 1881-1884 started primarily because Montshiwa regarded Lotlhakane as Ratshidi's land at the time it was occupied by the Rapulana. Montshiwa had insisted that the parcel of land belonged to his father, Chief Tawana, who died around 1849. The Rapulana, on their part argued that they had a more historic claim to the land as their then chief, Rapulana had earlier occupied the area in about 1787 (Ramoroka, 2009). The contested Lotlhakane area was strategic to all the Barolong groups because of its fertile nature.

Another underlying cause of the conflict was the fact that that whoever succeeded in establishing a legitimate claim to the disputed land had the strategic advantage of claiming the paramountcy among the Barolong chiefs. To make matters worse, the Rapulana did not want to be ruled by Montshiwa (Mothibi, 2005). They argued that Moshete should be the paramount chief of Barolong as the whole Barolong was ruled by their father. Ramoroka (2009:20) traces the remote cause of the Barolong conflict to the break-up of the Barolong kingdom, leading to migration, settlements and re-settlements. The Barolong conflict witnessed attempts by the Boers to use Matlaba and Moshete to capture Mafikeng. This strategy led to Montshiwa's alliance with the British.

It should be recalled that the Mzilikazi were a major threat to the Barolong. They raided the cattle of the Barolong and killed others that Saunders (1988:108) referred to them as "drinkers of blood". The Boers defeated the Mzilikazi and stopped their cattle looting. However, the Ama Ndebele came during the night and took back all the cattle (Ramoroka, 2009:37). The act angered the Boers who demanded for support of Barolong people to fight the enemies. Chief Matlaba led the troop against the Ama Ndebele because "he was a vassal

of Mzilikazi and had often been to Mosega and therefore, knew the country and the road well" (Mackenzi, 1887:57). They attacked the military headquarters of Mzilikazi at Mosega, killed about four thousand of the Ama Ndebele and put the rest of them to flight (Ramoroka, 2009:37).

4.8 CONFLICT IN COLONIAL BAROLONG

The disposition of Matlaba to fight for the interest of the Boers strengthened the alliance of both groups. In a bid to reward Matlaba for his bravery, they promised him unflinching support in his dream for the contested parcel of land in Lotlhakane if he remained loyal. Ironically, Matlaba's quest for the disputed Lotlhakane clashed with the interest of Montshiwa, who has occupied the area in recent times with his people too. The problem that Matlaba and the Boers had over the contested area was that for them to capture the land, they had to expel the Ratshidi from the area (Shillington, 1985: 128-129). Within this period, the Barolong chiefs perceived Matlaba as a traitor.

Consequently, by the time the Boers struck Barolong, there was little resistance because they were not united in the face of the enemy. Furthermore, the poor leadership structure meant that they needed to put their house in order before fighting the Boers. The Boers took the Barolong land in Potchestroom and increasingly dispossessed them of their land while pretending to be their protectors. Montshiwa called for the support of the British thus when the British intervened on their side, there was the arming of both sides in the conflict. Manson (1998:496-497) moots that the European volunteers or freebooters, who would be rewarded for their service with the grants of land, assisted each of the four chiefs, namely, Mankoroane and Mashua (of Batlhaping), Montshiwa and Moshete (of Barolong). Thus, the British and the Boers contributed to a great extent in the Barolong war (Sellery, 1971:41).

Montshiwa's account on the origin of the war maintains that the first time the war broke-out, it was through Machabi's people. They went to Montshiwa and asked his permission to live in his land. He granted them a parcel of land to inhabit and after that; they started stealing his horses and cattle. Montshiwa claimed that he tried to recover his cattle and that of other

members of his community but they took them and sold to the Boers. This was at a time that the British Government was fighting the Transvaal Boers. According to Montshiwa, after that they commenced reaping his corn and they told him afterwards that the corn belonged to them. Before the first war started, they fired on Montshiwa's people in the gardens. They sent Monthsiwa a message that the garden belong no more to him, and that it is their garden and that they should cut the crops. That was the first factor leading to the commencement of the war (Cape Legislature, 1885:10).

On the other hand, the account of Moshette and Machabi differed from the above. They argued that the land dispute started after a strategically planned attack to deny them their heritage. They maintain that in their effort to ensure there was peace in the land, they sent a white Ox to Montshiwa, who accepted it and the people taught there will be peace. But "without notice or provocation, Montshiwa attacked the village at Rietfontein before daylight, while the inhabitants were yet asleep, committed great slaughter of men, women as well as children and burnt the town" (Cape Legislature, 1885:10). Montshiwa vehemently denied the above account but stated that when his people retaliated over the attack from Moshette's men, only one woman was shot. It could be argued that there was an attack which led to the retaliation of Montshiwa that led to the loss of lives. Again, Machabi stated that twelve women were killed during the attack from Montshiwa's men while six men were skinned, and his brother, Stoffel, had "his heart cut-out" (Cape Legislature, 1885:10).

Immediately Moshette heard of the attack on Machabi and his men in Rietfontein on 2nd May 1881, he gathered his men to go and fight in support of Machabi and his people. It was the timely intervention of Major Buller and his Brigade that intervened and created a buffer zone that ward-off the conflict, creating room for the Transvaal Royal Commission to seat and evaluate the claims and counter- claims. Montshiwa, on his part, maintained the claim that the said Machabi's land was given to him by the Keate Award and the area included all the territory of Transvaal as well as the farms of the whites.

When the Boers heard about the Rietfontein attack, they raised 60-80 troops under the leadership of Cronje and assembled in Lichtenburg from where they sent their forces to the

Molopo River banks, while Snyman led another commando to Vleifontein, where Roode Grond is situated. Due to the peace efforts of Major Buller, the Boer commandos and their forces were dispersed but Buller was suspicious that the Boers were out to support and assist Moshette and his men. The position and suspicion of Buller was rejected by the Boers, who claimed they had assembled there to protect their interest. Moreover, both Moshete and Montshiwa waited for the Royal Commission to demarcate the border between both groups and the Boers. Unfortunately, a boundary line was undoubtedly fixed by the convention whereby, Montsiwa and Moshette were placed outside the South African Republic as independent chiefs (Cape Legislature, 1885:12). The Boers criticised the commission's decision to place the dispute-ridden communities outside the civilised government of the British and the Boer. The Royal Commission did not adjudicate the dispute nor set a mediator to manage the crisis in their frontiers but only advised them to eschew conflict and live peacefully.

The implication of the position that was taken by the Commission was that it re-enforced the conditions that triggered the dispute amongst these Barolong brothers. This was because sequel to the declaration of these chiefs as independent, the British and Boers exhibited protectionist influence over them. The declaration of this conflict-prone group as independent simply implied that the Barolong had to defend their people at all cost. Thus, each group should develop all means possible not just to protect themselves but to annihilate the enemy (ies). This was followed by the conflict between the Barolong brothers. In his submissions to Captain Nourse, Moshette gave the following account of the conflict; "Montsioa, you attacked me in the night and killed 71 of my people and 12 women were killed and burnt in the huts and 4 were wounded and I was compelled to punish such murders. After that came Piet Joubert and Major Buller. And they said to me, Moshette, you must not make war and I listened" (Cape Legislature, 1885:14-15). Piet Joubert and Major Buller told Moshette that the Royal Commission had sent them and that he; Moshette could speak and say what he has to say. Moshette lamented that while he spoke for two hours, Montsioa spoke for two days. His anger was worsened by the fact that he got no answer as to what they decided. The strategic silence from General Joubert and Major Buller made Moshette to ask Commandant Greef, how his case was going on? Moshette went back to General Joubert in Pretoria to find-out if he will get an answer or not? It was at that point that he decided to give his case over to an agent (Mr Preller). "After that I (Moshette) waited five days, until the Royal Commission

broke-up. I could not get an answer. I then said I could get no answer and determined to use my own laws and then I made war with Montsioa and that is the cause of the war" (Cape Legislature, 1885:14-15).

While giving his account of the conflict, Ramoroka (2009:51) maintains that on 2nd May 1881, Montshiwa attacked Lotlhakane and routed Motuba's people, killing over six hundred men. Few months later, specifically on 17th October 1881, Moshete and his partisans attacked Montshiwa at Sehuba, south of Mafikeng (Sellery, 1971:69) and by 1882, Moshete and Matlaba had raised a hundred men and with the support of the Boers, they attacked Sehuba and burnt it to ashes. The Boers took thirty farms that belonged to the people and destroyed their chapel (Ramoroka, 2009:51). By the time the Boers and the British came to fight on opposite sides of the conflict divide, they lost their men too. Weber and Coetzee, the leaders of the Moshete and Matlaba Freebooters were killed while on the side of Montshiwa, James MacGillivray, a British volunteer was captured (Manson, 1998:496) and murdered by the Boers. The reaction and critique from his kith and kin in England to the British Resident in Pretoria, the High Commissioner in Cape Town led to the intensification of the Anglo-Boer rivalry (Theal 1919:150).

It should be recalled that the Boers moved from Transvaal to establish a settlement they called the new Republic of Goshen (named after the Goshen Valley where Moses lived with the Israelites in Egypt). From the newly established Republic of Goshen, they attacked Barolong people frequently. In 1882, the Boers launched a series of attacks on the Barolong. Ramoroka (2009:52) maintains that Gey Van Pittius of Boer sent a message to Montshiwa on 1st May 1883 to remove his people from all the land they have cultivated for centuries and when Montshiwa refused, the Boer freebooters released their cattle to destroy the people's corn; forcing the Barolong to attack the Boers and burned down three of their houses.

On 31st July 1884, three hundred Goshenites raided Barolong and carted-away with over three thousand cattle. They later killed over a hundred Montshiwa's men and wounded several others (Ramoroka, 2009:52). Heale (2003:3) provides a better account of the attack. He argues that on 31st July 1884, this conflict turned into a full warfare. The spark, which set

fire to the constant conflict, was the theft by Boers from Goshen of about 3000 heads of cattle from the Barolong and Bangwaketse cattle posts. It would be recalled that at that time, cattle rearing was the mainstay of the people's economy and source of revenue. Thus, to steal their cattle was to make their lives miserable and they would naturally go to war to defend their economy. The war that ensued "remains the greatest battle ever fought in Mafikeng, in terms of the number of casualties. The name given to the battle, *Tigele*, means 'collapse'. Over 200 died in that bloody encounter 112 Barolong, together with 67 allied Bangwaketse, 50 Boer Goshenites and two Englishmen. One of these was Christopher Bethel, who lived in Mafikeng" (Heale, 2003:3).

Manson (1998:496-497) maintains that Montshiwa's adviser, Christopher Bethel, recruited a dozen Britons to assist his defence of the Barolong and some of these men were on Montshiwa's payroll simply as mercenaries. The killing of Christopher Bethel changed the dynamics of the conflict. This was because Christopher Bethel was a nephew to Sir Charles Warren, who at the time of the Battle of Tigele was a British army officer in the Cape. Bethel is said to have abandoned his intellectual pursuit at Cambridge University due to his gambling lifestyle, which landed him into massive debt. He was consequently moved to Africa, where he was made a Liaison Officer to Chief Montshiwa under the pay of the British colonial government. Due to the social interaction he built with the local people, he married from the Barolong nation. Thus, when the Battle of Tigele started, he fought on the side of the Barolong, in defence of his new found love and home (due to his alliance with his wife's people). The Boer captured and tortured him to death.

Paradoxically, within that period, Charles Warren, Bethel's uncle was appointed Special Commissioner for Bechunaland, which Barolong was part of. He took-of for his new post with four thousand troops. There was no need for a soothsayer in order to decipher that he was on a mission to teach the Boers, some lesson of their imperialist history. The Warren Expedition (as it was later called) took place in March 1885. The Warren-led troops used the British superior fir-arms to chase-out the Boers and the people whose land was forcefully occupied. Immediately, the area was annexed into the Crown Colony of Bechuanaland, hence Barolong land moved from the hands of one form of enemy to another. At the end of

the expedition, the people began to promote post-conflict peace building through structural reconstruction in the area that affected European interest.

A detachment of Royal Engineers, were part of the battle, began to work with other soldiers recruited from Barolong to build a new church to replace the missionary chapel destroyed during the battle. Warren and his troops camped in the East of Barolong settlement in Mafikeng, later referred to as Imperial Reserve. They left a peacekeeping force as well as the Bechuanaland Border Police there. The new settlement was half a kilometre, east of the Barolong settlement. The White men called the area Mafeking, an anglicised name, adopted to distinguish it from the African part called Mahikeng. Heale (2003) maintains that at the time, Montshiwa would have preferred that the English town be built at Rooigrond, the capital of the hitherto destroyed Goshen Republic. He did not want a British colonial town to be built very close to the Barolong settlement. This is because he considered the moral standard of the British soldiers in the reserve to be much lower than those of the Barolong Ratshidi (Heale, 2003:3).

Reserves are a common feature of the geographical landscape of Southern and Central Africa. It was generally traceable to the British and the Boers. Ideally, separate 'tribes' were meant to occupy distinct reserves; the land was allocated and used on a communal basis and was generally inalienable. In other words, white farmers could not own land in the reserves. Legally, reserve-based Africans could technically not own land outside their designated areas but the Bahurutshe were able to expand into farms bordering their reserve (Manson & Mbenga, 2014:89).

In 1841, the Barolong migrated back to their ancestral homeland in three groups. The groups included the Ratshidi, the Ratlou and the Rapulana. While the Ratshidi settled near the Molopo River (unclaimed at the time), Ratlou and Rapulana settled in the Transvaal, while holding claim to be the real owners of the land where Ratshidi settled. At the same time, a large number of Ratlou settled in Setlagole, while another band of Rapulana pitched their 'tents' and settled in Lotlhakane.

By the time the Anglo-Boer war to control the region started, the Barolong brothers allied on different sides of the conflict divide. While Ratshidi allied with the British, Ratlou and Rapulana followed the path of the Boers. At the end of the war, the strategic alliance between Ratshidi and Great Britain paid-off as they enjoyed more control of the area here-in referred to as Lotlhakene in the reserves. After the 1910 Union, a legal battle started amongst the brothers over the real rightful owner of Lotlhakene. The years of legal tussle ended when the Supreme Court ruled that Rapulana Barolong were the most senior of the three Rolong brothers contesting the land, thus Lotlhakene belonged to them (Ramaroka, 2003; Molema, 1966:110-116). Within the period of the conflict between Ratshidi Barolong with their historic brothers, they faced the challenge of another conflict with baTlharo living in Disaneng. The baTlharo lived about thirty kilometres from Mafikeng. Molema (1966:70-71) maintains that the baTlharo were asked to settle in the territory of the Barolong during the time of Montshiwa (who ruled from 1849-1896). During the 19th century, they paid tributes to Ratshidi, but by 1910, the baTlharo terminated their culture of tributes and desired full independence from the Ratshidi. They rejected the sovereignty of the then Kgosi of Ratshidi, Badirile Montshiwa and refused his territorial administrator from having any serious form of political and economic influence over them.

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4.9 BAROLONG PEOPLE AND THE ANGLO-BOER WAR

There are a number of accounts on the Anglo-Boer War; however, most of them have neglected the role of the Barolong in the conflict dynamics. It is thus vital to state that "the Boers appear to have at all times, claimed sovereignty over the Barolong territory as theirs by right of conquest and to have alleged that its occupation by the tribe was merely permissive" (Cape Legislature, 1885:2) Thus, on the eve of the Anglo-Boer War, which began on 11th October 1899, and lasted until 1902, the British engaged in strategic preparations for victory. They re-deployed Robert Baden Powell, who had raised a strong English force in India in 1876 as well as in Rhodesia in 1896 to lead part of the preparation for a military show-down with the Boers. Powell quickly raised and "commanded a force of 1230 men, which included 469 regulars of the Protectorate Regiment, various armed police units and 300 armed civilians, who called themselves the Town Guards. Outside Mafikeng, but inside the line of defensive forts and trenches were about 6000 Barolong in their *Stad*", a word used to refer to

the traditional Mahikeng area of settlement (Heale, 2003:5). The Barolong were part of the armed civilians, while those in the Stad equally armed themselves to the best of their abilities in a bid to save their head from the war, which was already on their door-step. The above men fought in the two and half year's war that witnessed the victory of English forces.

Manson and Mbenga (2014) argue that in 1899, the Barolong were active in the conflict dynamics. They maintain that in October, 1899, Boer forces under the leadership of Commandant Piet Cronje at that time, invaded Mafikeng. The Barolong Chiefs quickly requested that British forces under the leadership of Colonel Robert Baden-Powell assist them with arms and ammunition. Thus, the British quickly provided about five hundred (500) Barolong men, Snyder rifles and ammunition. According to Manson and Mbenga (2014:58-59) on 25 October 1899, the Barolong repulsed a Boer attack, killing an undetermined number of the attackers. This action encouraged Baden-Powell to give the Barolong defenders more rifles and ammunition and to increase the number under arms to about 500. The increasing arming of the people of Barolong led to the militarization of the area. It encouraged them to launch attacks. Thus, on numerous occasions, the Barolong, out of their own volition, attacked the Boer positions on the outskirts of the town, sometimes capturing guns and equipments. With such victorious attacks, the Barolong received intensive military training from their British military commandants. They were nominally under the authority of Sergeant Sydney Abrams but in practice they conducted their own operations of defence and resistance against the Boers, under their own command structure. "Their commanders even used British style military titles: Wessels Montshiwa a 'Field-Marshall'; Lekoko Marumolwa a 'General' and others were sergeants and corporals. Blacks generally acted as spies and dispatch runners, supplying the British military authorities in Mafikeng with the much needed intelligence about Boer Commando activities. Those caught by the Boers, of course, ran the risk of being shot and many of them were killed" (Manson & Mbenga (2014:59).

The most strategic attack as well as advancement from the Boers was frustrated by the Barolong. On 12th May 1900, Commander Eloff had planned to break-into the English territory before day break by penetrating through Barolong Stad, calculating that the Barolong people will be a walk-over. The Boers easily entered the Stad and began to burn the houses of the Barolong. Consequently, the Barolong signalled the British forces and used

their own firearm to block the Boers from retreating. Commander Eloff was cut-off from reinforcement and surrendered after losing one hundred and eight men (Heale, 2003).

At the end of the war, the Barolong and other Black men who participated in the war had a different perception of the British in the post-conflict era. They could remember pathetically, how the English soldiers introduced the idea of food-rationing in January 1900. The people easily remembered that during the period of food-rationing, the difference between the English, the Barolong and other 'foreign Africans' (who fought in the war) became defined. Foreign Africans were forced to leave at the risk of being way-laid and killed by Boer soldiers or remain and fight on empty stomachs. The Barolong were annoyed at the fact that they "received smaller food rations compared to White civilians. The Barolong could make bread only from oats as corn was reserved for Whites. Sent by the British to raid the Boer lines to steal cattle, the Barolong were not allowed to eat any of the meat which came from these captured beasts" (Heale, 2003:6). Thus, the degree of emotional frustrations faced by the Barolong increased.

4.10 CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter has presented the historical background of Ezza conflict with its neighbours in Nigeria and the dynamics of the Barolong land dispute. It has documented the pre-colonial Ezza conflict with Ikwo, Izzi, Oshiri, Effium and Ntezi neighbours. At the dawn of colonialism, Ezza people were fighting against the Amagunze people of Nkanu, Enugu State as well as the Oshiri people of Ohozara (today referred as Onicha Local Government Area of Ebonyi State). It has also recorded Ezza conflicts with the British, known today as the Anglo-Ezza War of 1905. The people of Ezza presented fierce resistance during the war but were easily conquered by the superior fire-power of the British. The chapter also presented leading soldiers, companies and patrol officers who executed the war on behalf of the British.

Again, the chapter also traced the origin of the Barolong people to Chief Morolong and how they migrated to the contested area of the Molopo River. It showed how internal divisions into chiefdoms or Barolong groups started as a power struggle amongst the sons of Chief

Tau. The 'dynastic' struggle for power led to massive migration and re-settlements among the Barolong groups to different parts of South Africa (from Khunwana to Thaba Nchu and Mafikeng). It also exposed how the contest for power and imperial war between the British and the Boers forced Barolong groups to fight along different lines during the Anglo-Boer War. The Barolong Ratshidi fought in favour of the British while the Barolong Rapulana fought in favour of the Boers. Finally, the Anglo-Boer War worsened the people's access to land because the Boers and later, the British took over the best portions of land while luring the different Barolong groups to collaborate with either the British to fight the Boers or align with the Boers against the British. The reader will begin to have a more detailed idea of the causes and dynamics of Ezza conflicts with their neighbours in Nigeria as he or she painstakingly read through the next chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE: EZZA CONFLICTS IN NIGERIA

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter shows how population pressure and mercenary warfare invitations led to the Ezza conflicts with their neighbours in Nigeria. The conflicts were experienced in different parts of the country at different times. It should be noted that there is no documentary evidence on the first phase of the Ezza wars (1800-1850) as summarised in the oral sources collected by Anyanwu (2005). The lack of documentary evidence on these conflicts is due to a combination of the people's non-literate status at that time as well as the inability of their descendants to record the oral traditions of the warfare before they died. Life in Ezza before the advent of the British was characterised by wars of expansion and survival. The Ezza people were not afraid to go to war. The sight of blood did not frighten them and they were accustomed to fighting amongst themselves and did not see anything bad in attacking and killing other people. People who sustained ghastly injuries in war were not perturbed. To be a 'man' in Ezza at that time, a person had to bear many ugly scars (Afoke, 1977:126). Thus it could be argued that the pre-colonial and colonial Ezza society trained their descendants to become warriors. Anyanwu (2005:19) traces the second phase of Ezza wars to about 1851-1905. On his part, Afigbo (1987) only documented Ezza conflicts in the 19th century.

In this study, emphasis is on contemporary Ezza conflicts, as experienced in Mgbalukwu and Obeagu Isu as well as Ezillo in Ebonyi State and Agilla conflict setting in Benue State. It should be stated that while population, labour pressure and mercenary warfare triggered the migrations that later led to the rise of these conflicts, the dynamics of contemporary fillips to the conflicts, especially in Ezillo, have not helped matters on the road to peace. Analysts such as Alphonsus Iwueke (2006), tried to absolve the current generation of Ezza-Ezillo and Ezillo people from the cause of the killings in their area, arguing that it was "the decisions of their fore-fathers that put them in the present mess" (Ifi, 2010b:1). The segment beow accounts for the causes and growth of Ezza conflicts in Oshiri, Agila, Ezillo and Mgbalukwu and Obeagu Isu communities of Nigeria in recent time.

5.2 CAUSES AND GROWTH OF EZZA CONFLICTS

The Ezza were invited across different parts of Igboland to fight for different communities against their enemies. At the end of such warfare, they often attained victory, or at least, deterred the enemy communities from further attacks. Ironically, all over history, the Ezza developed an extra-ordinary thirst for land reward. The implication is that while other mercenary warriors from Igbo land such as the Edda, Ohafia and Abriba fought for financial reward and glory, the Ezza mercenary warfare exclusively sought to be rewarded with large expanses of land. Iyonu was, at one stage in history, threatened by their neighbours, who were the people of Amagunze in present day Nkanu West Local Government Area. The Iyionu sued for peace by sending to Amagunze a peace delegation of mainly elderly people but these members of the delegation were physically assaulted. When they returned and told their story, the youth of the community and other age grades were not happy and war became imminent. "But fearful of Amagunze's military might, the Iyionu invited the Ezza village group of Umuezeoka to protect them. Ezza settlement in Iyionu was all it took to keep the Amagunze at bay and this Ezza military service gave rise to another Ezza colony called Ezza-Iyonu" (Anyanwu & Ijoma, 1999:74).

The Ezza settled in the land between the Iyonu and the Amagunze.The habitable expanse of land was often to the strategic advantage of the Ezza, as it was generally located between the landlords and their enemy community (ies). The first strategic advantage of such land was that such contested areas were often rich in resources for agricultural purposes. The second was that the ancestors of the people who invited the mercenaries saw the Ezza as protectors and never feared nor imagined future conflicts with the Ezza living in the spaces between. The implication was that Ezza settlers in the contested terrain did not only engage in the massive culture of farming (which they were undeniably reputed for) but also engaged in geographical expansion from their original area of settlement. Then came the time when a combination of Ezza population explosion and expansion in the settlement began to threaten the hitherto traditional landlords as they continually lost more land to their former protectors thereby turning their initial culture of social security into violent conflict. At the onset of the conflict, following the fact that the generation that took the oath of unity (*Igbandu*) had all died in most cases, younger Ezza settlers and their landlords easily sidelined the *Igbandu* as they felt not obliged to it. As the Ezza violently demanded for more land, they tended to ignite new conflict cycles.

The Ikwo, who were Ezza kith and kin, and who had fought with them in the past, invited them to settle in Oriuzor for protection. They were thus given a parcel of land at Aguinyima, leading to the rise of Ezza-Aguinyima. The Okpoto and Orri people occupied all the area of their current inhabitation down to the place occupied by the Umuezeoka people of Ezza before they were chased away. Egerton (1908) maintains that the large strip of land stretching from the western Ebonyi River to Okpoto, though having the advantages of water supply and soil fertility, but without protective geographical features, was absolutely without a population. The British came to assist the Ntezi and Okpoto from extermination by the Ezza. It was revealed that from the history of Ntezi and Okpoto, they have always been living under continuous attack from the Ezza. Beamount (1936:12) argued that they were continuously dispersed and driven away from their land by ever-advancing and stronger Ibo tribes and it is probable that today, if it were not for the British colonial government's intervention, the area would have been entirely assimilated by the Ezza or the Btezi, Okpoto and Orri would have been forced northwards and eastwards out of Abakaliki.

The Effium people initially inhabited large expanses of land in Northeastern parts of Igboland but today, they have lost such land. Over the years, their Ngbo and Izzi neighbours attacked them. Fearing total annihilation, they ran to Ezza Umuezekoha and Umuezeoka, who had shown their fighting prowess as well as produce victorious results. The Ezza came and immediately checked the Ngbo and Izzi aggression, after which they settled in Effium and began to expand rapidly. Another account maintains that the Ezza continued to fight wars of survival until they had to move across the Ebonyi River by the late nineteenth century, where they went to assist the Effium in their war against the Ishieke people. "Effium could fight but they were not many. With numerical strength and not military prowess, Ezza joined forces with Effium to subdue Ishieke" (Otokpa, 2013:44). A few years after the conquest of Ishieke people, the Ezza population exploded and became more populous than the people of Effium in their home land. It should be stated that the Ezza had both numerical strength and military prowess and this explains why they were invited across different parts of Igboland, where they fought as mercenaries. The Otobolo who occupied the land southwest of the present Effium area, were driven to the present Idoma area by the Ezza (Anyanwu, 2005b:3) and it was the same expansionism of the Nkalagu and Nkalaha people against the Umuhuali people

that forced Umuhuali people to invite Ezza warriors for assistance, thus "the Umuhuali elders invited the Ezza who settled in a semi-circular form, around Umuhali, to act as a bulwark against further attacks" (Anyanwu & Ijoma, 1999:74). Gradually, Umuhuali is seen by many observers as a near total Ezza community due to the fact that the Ezza settlers have dominated their environment as is the case in Effium.

It was the same wars of expansion by the Ehamufu, Nike and Nsukka people (that was about to annihilate the Obeagu people near Nkalagu) that made them to quickly run to the Ezza group of Nkomoro, who came to check the Ehamufu, Nike and Nsukka aggression, giving rise to the Ezza-Obeagu. Paradoxically, while a number of other Ezza groups who established colonies later fought intermittently with their landlords in the colonies, the Ezza Nkomoro should be praised for their tendency to live in peace with their landlords over the years. This peaceful inter-group relation has manifested itself between Obeagu and Ezza-Obeagu of Ishielu as well as the Ezza Nkomoro and the Obeagu Isu people of Onicha Local Government Area, Ebonyi State, even when the Obeagu Isu and Ojiegbe-Ezza were locked in almost one century of intermittent warfare.

Onoja (2013:360), traces the causes of the earliest Ezza-Agila conflict in the 1940s, and maintains that "certain legacies [and] ornaments left behind by their ancestors were looted and taken away to Ezzaland. Some of these spiritual ornaments were the basis of Agila society." When the Agila felt that the spiritual foundation of their culture was threatened by Ezza settlers, who were stealing their cultural ornaments, conflict became imminent. There were also a number of other factors that helped to fuel Ezza conflicts against its neighbours. For instance, the Agila people were not comfortable with the way the Ezza people attacked their cultural heritage. Other factors that promoted Ezza-Agilla conflict were the fact that the Ezza had begun to give their own names to schools and other important establishments in Agila district. For example L.G.E.A. School Ebo, Agila, had been renamed L.G.E.A. School Umuezokoha. Some Agila farm settlements had also been renamed. This change in nomenclature remained displeasing to their Agila hosts. Furthermore, the Ezza, who are of Igbo stock, are distinctively different culturally, socially and even in their farming methods from their hosts. The Ezza do not mix socially or inter-marry with Agila people. At present, no Agila person lives in those places occupied by them. Those who lived in the various farm

settlements in these areas were forced out during the Nigerian Civil War of 1967-1970 and have not returned. In addition, the Ezza Debar Agila, owners of economic trees, were continually prevented from utilising their products. The L.G.E.A. schools at Ebo, Ogebe, Aje-Onowa and Apa Ogbodu are attended only by Ezza children. Ezza children do not attend schools either in Agila or at Apa farm settlement. The Ezza have constructed seasonal motor roads from Anambra State (now Ebonyi) to parts of Agila district which they occupy, where they engage in indiscriminate felling of economic trees without the permission of the Local Government Council (L.G.C.). Their products (timber, plants) are subsequently carted to parts of the then Anambra State and today to Ebonyi State for sale and quick economic gains. The result is the near absolute depletion of numerous elephant palms, Iroko and Mahogany trees in the area.

5.3 EZZA-OSHIRI CONFLICT

One of the earliest documented Ezza wars was their conflict with the Oshiri. The Ezza settled in parts of Oshiri land and were paying rent to their landlords. However, due to the historic scarcity of money, drought, recession and an unwillingness to pay; the annual rent payable by the Ezza to the Oshiri was reduced, after negotiation from fifty to twenty five pounds (Denton, 1934:13). The peaceful inter-group relations between the two groups began to wane over the years and conflict exploded. The Oshiri retreated to count their losses and re-arm after a series of wars fought against the Ezza. The Oshiri continued to raid the Ezza settlements and farmlands, which forced the joint forces of Ezza from Idembia, Amana, Nkomoro and Amegu to attack Oshiri. The Oshiri resisted and launched a powerful offensive against the Ezza from 1904-1905 forcing the Ezza into defensive operation (Anyanwu, 1993:95). The brave nature of the Oshiri was widely acclaimed. Afoke (1977:121) maintains that "the gallant and indomitable Oshiri were met, when Idembia expanded to the banks of the Abonyi River. Oshiri stoutly resisted Izikworo's attempts to cross the river and a bitter war was the outcome."

The Ezza did not stop the war with the Oshiri; they marched on to attack a number of their neighbours and those who lived on the road to their war with the Oshiri. It was the Ezza warriors from Imoha and Izo Imoha who fanned out towards the south-west and north-west.

Like the Izikworo group of villages, they encountered Agba, Ntezi and Ishieke Izzi villages. Agba people, who were earlier driven off by Izikworo group of villages, were further pushed westwards; the Ntezi were equally repulsed and the area evacuated and occupied. It should be noted that following the multi-dimensional wars, the Ezza began to lose arms and their good warriors before they confronted the Oshiri. When the Oshiri were approached after Ebonyi River, they faced the Ezza warriors squarely, knowing that they had come to take over their land and push them away as they continually did to their Agba neighbours. After a protracted internecine war, Imoha and Izo-Imoha groups of villages crossed Abonyi and a gradual retreat of the Oshiri began, until the British intervened in 1905 when the battlefield was already at Egu Ogiji Obodo, two miles from the Abonyi River (Afoke, 1977:121-122). The Oshiri and Ezza continued to fight intermittently until the 1990s. It was in the course of such intermittent wars that the buildings on both sides of their Ebonyi boundaries were razed to ashes, creating a large nearly uninhabited land mass from Idembia to the current location of St. Micheals College, Oshiri. It took the construction of the Ebonyi Bridge, establishment of a police station and a busy highway to reduce the level of security threat in the contested area between Idembia and Oshiri.

5.4 EZZA-AGILA CONFLICT

The Agila people occupy the southern parts of Benue State, Nigeria. The history of their origin and migration is traceable to two main legends. The first is connected to Ago, who is believed to be the original founder of Agila by the descendants presently referred to as the non-royal group. The second is traced to the legend called Osilagama, whose descendants constitute the current royal family of Agila (Onoja, 2011:47). According to a group of elders from Agila led by Chief J. O. Attah, District Head of Agila (1972-1985), Agila and Ezza homeland of Ebonyi State have no common boundaries. Agila is bounded to the north by Igumale, Ulayi and Ijigbam peoples of Benue State, to the West it shares common borders with the Eha Amufu and Nkalaha peoples of Enugu and Ebonyi States respectively. On the East and South, they are bound by the Effium and Ngbo people of Ebonyi State. Agila patterns of settlement and her relations with neighbouring border communities are determined by economic and security factors. Agila people were bounded by hostile tribes that ravenously watched for them to take the wrong step, and they would swoop down and devour them. Yet some of the Agila kings toyed with their fate by planting more potential

dangers within [the] borders, absolutely obvious of the risk at which they put future generations (Obande, 2001:3-4). The major neighbouring enemy referred to in the above statement are the Ngbo and Ezza, who have fought with the Agila for nearly a century. The implication of the presence of enemy neighbours to the Agila is that "each of the communities has a main town, which is its traditional headquarters and the satellite settlement areas inhabited mostly by able-bodied young men" (Otokpa, 2013:31). This pattern of settlement might have been caused by the years of land conflict between the Agila and Ngbo people as well as the expanding influence of the Ezza.

The Ezza first went to Agila as labourers and got themselves attached to various prominent people for whom they did manual labour on their farms. As time went on, instead of going to Agila and returning seasonally, often during the yam planting season, some Ezza descendants begged to be given portions of land to live on in order to be available to work for their various lords all year round. Onoja (2011:164) points out that the practice of giving some portions of land to the Ezza aroused indignation amongst the vast majority of Agila people, who rightly suspected a possible massive invasion of their land in future. At the time, they opposed the practice vehemently and were told that any time a request was made by Agila to the Ezza to vacate the land, they would gladly do so (Agila District Memoranda, 1980). Other sources maintain that the Ezza settled in Effium, after they assisted them to quell Ishieke attacks, from there, they began to penetrate into Agila land.

According to Onoja (2011:164), the Ezza first came to Agila through two Effium men, Ilor and Ezeke during the reign of Chief Ebonyi Otsenata (1929-1955), who was a former District Head of Agila. They came as blacksmiths and obtained permission from the ruling chief to carry on their trade in certain parts of the district. The leader of Ezza, Aleke Ezza, had two apprentices, Awo Nwotolo and Essar. At the end of their apprenticeship, they brought their own apprentices as well and began to settle in the area, which forced the Agila to lodge strong protests against the then Resident Divisional Officers such as White Stafford and Captain Abraham and requested for the repatriation of the Ezza, which the colonial lords could not effect. Otokpa (2013:44-45) presents the scenario better when he maintains that after the war between Effium and Ishieke, large numbers of Ezza people who came to Effium as mercenary warriors remained on their land and with the passage of time, their descendants

out-numbered Effium. In order to avoid conflict with their host, as well as explore new grounds where they could make ends meet, Ezza people subtly moved northwards into the less populated vast and fertile land of Agila, Ulayi and Ijigban. Being energetic farmers, through peaceful approaches and intelligent application of strategic meekness, they eventually won the confidence of their hosts as dependable guests. Systematically, they took over more than half of the land in Ado Local Government Area, with all its attendant comparative economic and political advantages (Otokpa, 2013:44-45). The inability to manage the influx of the Ezza people is what laid the foundation for conflict-based inter-group relations between the two. It could be argued that it was when the influx of these Ezza groups continued into Effium until a saturation point was reached, that a number of Ezza crossed the boundary to establish two new Ezza colonies (Ezza Ulayi and Ezza Ejigbam) in the present Ado Local Government Area of Benue State and from the Ezza Ulayi and Ezza Ejigbam, flourished Ezza-Igumale, Ezza-Utonkon, Ezza-Ekile and Ezza-Ito-Oju colonies in Benue State.

However, the Ezza in Agila differed on their account of how they came to Agila land. According to a group of Ezza leaders in Agila, led by Chief Enyi Ukpo Nwankwo, the Ezza came to Agilaland before the boundaries of the then Eastern Region and the then Benue Plateau State were made. On coming to Agila, Chiefs in succession gave them land to settle on. These chiefs included Chief Omerigwe Ogba (who reigned from 1900s-1920s), Chief Ebonyi Otsenata (1929-1955), Chief Attah Ochoga (1956-1959), King Agbaji Omerigwe Adadu (1959-1963), King Onmonya Aje (1964-1972) and Chief Omerigwe Attah (1972). According to them, all the above-mentioned chiefs had no trouble with the Ezza, except Chief Omerigwe Attah, who allegedly sold the land to them at a cost of seven thousand, two hundred naira (#7, 200.00) as well as two cows and seven goats. He sold the land to them when he was fighting for his chieftaincy in Agila and the said amount was used by the chief till he won the case with Agila and became the chief of Agila (Onoja, 2011:165-166). They further maintain that the Ezza descendants of Umuezeoka family in Effium, led by Enyi Ukpo Nwankwo paid the sum of three thousand, eight hundred naira (#3,800.00) and two cows as well as two goats to Chief Attah, who in return, gave them the waiver to live in Avuvuland for the rest of their lives without paying tributes or tenancy. The chief handed back one of the goats to them for ritual killings and merriment in Avuvu land and placed a fig tree there, as a sign of perpetual ownership of the land. The implication is that since then,

Ezza descendants such as Enyi Ukpo Nwankwo, Otube Oganyi and Augustine Nwamba have maintained unrestrained control of the land and its economic trees. Ironically, the said Chief Omerigwe Attah in a written statement to the Benue State Government Panel investigating the Ezza-Agila conflict in 1980 denied selling any land to the Ezza (Benue State Government, 1980:46).

Paradoxically, to the Agila people, land is sacred. There is a land shrine and one day in a year is set aside when everybody in the district is barred from tilling or even scratching the soil and a special ceremony is performed at the shrine. The Ezza do not keep this rule and every year they commit sacrilege by defiling the soil in order to annoy their hosts. Other Agila sacred shrines, forests and hunting grounds which have significant cultural importance for Agila people were allegedly defiled with impunity by the Ezza. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), in its inter-governmental conference at the Hague in 1954, adopted the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property (HCPCP) in the event of armed conflict, with annexed regulations as well as a protocol specifically dealing with the export of cultural property from occupied territory (Kalshoven & Zegveld, 2000:25). Unfortunately, the sense of protection of cultural properties in Agila during the period of the conflict remained abused. Earlier, a former Administrator of Okpokwu Local Government area warned that the real problem of Okpokwu Local Government Area and by extension, Benue State, was not the Ngbo people with whom they keep on fighting everyday but the Ezza and Izzi, who are constantly migrating into the area in large numbers and systematically taking over their land without firing a shot. "Today, they come as cheap labourers and artisans. A time will come when they will contest ownership of the land with indigenes. Local chiefs are guilty in terms of aiding and abating this dangerous encroachment" (Otokpa, 2013:53-54). With the passing of time, the Ezza encroachment into Agila turned into a violent issue.

The origin of the Ezza-Agila conflict against Agila landlords could be traced to the desecration of the people's culture. It is believed that the people of Agila worshiped a sacred tree, which in Ezza culture and traditions was seen as an ordinary tree. In short, the Ezza people refer to it as *Agba* tree. Culturally, any Agila man who cuts the branches of the tree is either fined heavily or sentence to death. They showed the tree to the ancestors of the Ezza

settlers in Agila and warned them never to tamper with it, which earlier Ezza settlers swore not to do. Over the years, many Ezza settlers have continued to hold secret meetings and pledged to defend themselves as well as their children in their new found land. It was not very long before a gathering cloud appeared on the horizon. The reason for Agila's quest to send the Ezza back home was that the sacred Agila trees in Ezza farms were climbed at night and several branches cut down. Early in the morning, Agila people raised alarm and the astonished Ezza owner of the farm was arraigned before Ogaba Agila, the ruler of the people. He was condemned to death but Ogaba commuted the sentence to a fine of twenty pounds, which the Ezza grudgingly paid. Not long after the first incident, similar ones followed. It happened that on one occasion, the victim was unable to bail himself and angry Agila assailants killed him. The situation had got out of hand and the Ezza consulted their 'cousins' living at Effium and war appeared to be the only way to tell Agila people that the Ezza were warriors. Strengthened by Ezza Effium, who themselves wanted a war with Agila as a pretext to take part of their rich and extensive land, Ezza Agila attacked the owners of the land who were quickly overrun. Ogaba, their chief was killed and his head brought to Nwafia Effium on a pike and paraded through out the market while the killer, dressed in the Ogaba's ceremonial robes, received an ovation and gifts from cheering women and elders (Afoke, 1977:122-123).

Following the above conflict, the voice of Agila men and women calling for an end to Ezza settlement in their land increased geometrically. This was due to the fact that "the Ezza had been excessively cruel and barbarous in their hour of victory: all Agala houses within their reach were burned down; cows, goats, fowls and even hoes were looted and most revolting of all, the war captives were divided among the warriors and massacred" (Afoke, 1977:123). The Ezza argued further that Agila started the conflict. According to them, the Agila attempted to use force to eject Ezza settlers and Ezza's refusal angered them, leading to the intensification of the conflict (Onoja, 2013:360). According to Omerigwe Atta, the Agila District Chief (1972-1985), as far back as 1944, there was a dispute between the two groups, in which the Ezza resorted to arson and mass killing of Agila people. The conflict between the Ezza and Agila continued until the Nigerian Civil War of 1967-1970. The Ezza living in Agila District teamed-up with their kinsmen living at Ichama, Okpoga and Adiga to waylay and kill many Agila people. Those killed included Lot Ogbilolo, Ogezi Otokpa and his wife, Ogbu Ede and his six wives and a maid killed at Akpoge village. The Ezza warriors were said

to have looted the Agila cultural legacies and ornaments left behind by their ancestors, which they took away to Ezza land. Some of these spiritual ornaments were the basis of Agila society (Onoja, 2013:360).

Amongst the prominent people killed in the Ezza wars at Apa settlement of the Agila included Ogbu Otokpa, Ogebe, Ogezi-Otokpa and his wife as well as Ude and his wife. The April 1950 conflict is the recorded Ezza attack on Okpobla farm settlement. At the end of it, a number of people were killed including Agbese Onoja, Oche Egede and Aje Egede. In Otokillo land settlement, the Ezza are said to have killed Ogezi Otokpa, Ogbu Ede, Orefi Ugadu, Igwe Adegbe and Onwe Egba. Also, in Ogbilolo, sometimes referred to as Ikpeba, the Ezza people are said to have killed Otokpa Okibe and Enai Ochai Ojugwu (Onoja, 2013:361-362). A good number of Agila people, who relaxed and under-estimated Ezza carnage due to the historic good relations between them and the Ezza are said to have been poisoned. They included Oche Eno, Oche Abo, Ogaba Ebonyi and Onazi Abo killed in Ai-Otokilo as well as Imolo Anya and Ogozi Abo sentenced to the great paradise above in Aje-Ona. In Apa, part of Agila Agbara, Oga, Okibe Ugwu, Ude Agwu, Agwu Eze, Abo Igboke, Ogezi Abo, Ugbo Oja, Otokpa Onwe, Akpoge Okibe, Orinya Oganya, Ochene Agakpa and Oche Egede were also killed through poisoning (Onoja, 2013:362). The multiple strategies that the Ezza allegedly used in killing the Agila brought deep-rooted psychology of fear onto the people that the majority would keep silent and be thinking of individual and collective ways of avoiding the rampaging Ezza road to death.

The Ezza and Agila also fought from 1965-1967. The war, at the time, was fought according to the Ezza in order to ensure Ezza permanence in Agila settlements. At the time, the people of Agila were determined to forcefully eject them from the land where they were born and had come to know as their homeland. The Agila people, on their part, believed it was time to use force and eject the Ezza people from their land. This was due to the fact that the Agila had earlier obtained at least three court judgments ordering the evacuation of Ezza people from Agila land, which were not enforced by government and security forces. At the time, Agila saw the Ezza "packing their possessions to Abakaliki in Igboland and their intentions were not known. When the Ezza had packed away, the next thing they witnessed was the killing of Agila sons and daughters. The whole of Agila had to be forced into the town and to

be engaged in an impromptu war with the Ezza for the whole of 1965. The war was raging on when the Nigerian civil war broke out in 1967" (Onoja, 2011:209). The Ezza, on their part, argued that they did not willingly start to emigrate from Agila or begin the war. According to them, the 1965-1967 conflict started on a day the Ezza in Agila were to go to Ichama for a conference with their kith and kin who were settled there as well as those who inhabited Okpoga. The Agila, on hearing that they were leaving for Ichama, ambushed and attacked them. That forced them to re-organize and fight back (Onoja, 2011:210-2011). The Agila people stated that "before the Civil War (1967-1970), many Ezza people squatting on our land turned extremely hostile and began to murder our people in large numbers as they found the opportunity. For instance, between October 1966 and July 1967, there were raids on our people and hundreds of our people lost their lives. These raids were carefully planned to coincide with market days and ceremonial days, where and when large congregations of our people could be easily attacked" (Southern Idoma Delegates, 1970: 6).

The years of the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970) witnessed the mass exodus of both Ezza and the Agila from Agilaland as many people left their settlement to places where the devastation of the war had not reached. By the time the war ended, the then Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon, as part of his speech, declared that we guarantee the personal safety of everyone, who submits to federal authority. We guarantee the security of life and property of all citizens in every part of Nigeria and equality in political rights. We also guarantee the right of every Nigerian to reside and work wherever he chooses in the federation, as equal citizens of one united country... there is no question of second class citizenship in Nigeria (Gowon, 1984:77-78). This message convinced a number of people that they could go back to places they lived before the Biafra-Nigeria Civil War and would not be harmed.

A few months after the Nigerian Civil War, Ezza settlers began to return gradually to Agila. They were initially afraid of what would be the possible reaction of the Agila to their re-settlement. However, the Agila people at the time were also struggling to re-settle and had no enabling conditions to start any form of resistance against the Ezza. The two groups began to rebuild their settlements. Out of fear, the Agila vacated their farm settlements and went to settle mainly in Apa-Agila and Ifu-Ole Agila. On their part, the Ezza, who were used to inhabiting the farm settlements, expanded the area of influence and control. The strategic

expansion of the Ezza territory in Agila at the time was driven by a combination of factors that worked to their advantage. The Agila were afraid of settling in the farms as they feared an extension of Ezza post-civil war animosity against them. Furthermore, a few Ezza settlers on the farms who were not touched by both the Nigerian and Biafran conflicts expanded their land-grabbing culture. To make matters worse, the Ngbo people of Ebonyi State encroached into the forest reserve, which the Agila people claimed to be theirs and began to farm in the area, while killing any Agila man or woman who challenged them on the farm. Onoja (2011:231) maintains that at the time, the people of Agila discovered that the Ezza had encroached into their land further and had taken more arable land after the war. However, what gave the people of Agila sleepless nights immediately after the war was the encroachment on and subsequent claims of ownership of the Agila Forest Reserve by Ezza and their Ngbo collaborators.

As the Agila and Ezza returned to their pre-civil war settlements, a number of Agila men, who had lost their means of survival due to the Nigerian Civil War, turned into land speculators and began to sell the land of the Agila people to the Ezza. When the situation deteriorated, those who lost their land due to the activities of their criminal brothers were out for a total conflict with Ezza buyers of their land, thus like a boiling cauldron, the Agila-Ezza land crisis erupted again. Like an inferno, it razed peace and security and torched lives. The post civil war skirmishes by both the Agila and Ezza were characterized by frequency, premeditation and as usual, in every case violently prosecuted, thus, Agila and Ezza had no peace and security before and after the Civil War (Onoja, 2011:238).

Since then, there has never been sustainable peace between the Agila and Ezza on the one hand as well as the Agila and Ngbo people on the other. Ironically, while the Agila are of Benue State, Nigeria, the Ezza and Ngbo are of Ebonyi State origin. The implication is that the Benue-Ebonyi State border became a flashpoint for continuous conflict.

5.5 EZZA-EZILLO CONFLICT

Itumo (2014:5) argues that the Ezza-Ezillo and Ezillo land dispute was taken to an Abakaliki Colonial Customary Court in 1959. The court ruled in favour of Ezillo, mandating the Ezza-Ezillo people to move back to Egu Echara, their original locale. The Ezza-Ezillo people appealed against the decision before one O. P. Gunning, an Abakaliki Colonial District Officer, who confirmed the judgment of the Customary Court. Unfortunately, the Ezza-Ezillo people refused to relocate to Egu Echara area as directed by the District Officer. Since then, the relationship between the two clans has not been cordial.

A few decades later, what started as a land dispute graduated into a full conflict. In December 1992, the Ezza people killed one Okafor Ali over a land portion that the Ezillo people claimed to have allocated to Amaleze youths for a development project. Within the 1992 flare-up, another evening market known as Nweke Onueke was seized and renamed Nworie Ezza, which created intense clashes between the Amaleze Ezillo and Ezza settlers. The killing of one, Idenyi Ali of Isimkpuma, Ezillo, by men suspected to be the Ezza usurpers of his land triggered the 1996 Ezza-Ezillo conflict. In 1997, Ezza settlers went on to invade Amofia Ezillo, claiming the whole of Ndiagu Amofia Ezillo. In order to ensure their effective occupation of the said piece of land, they burnt houses belonging to Ezillo people and killed some Ezillo men such as Aleke Ebenyi, Egba Okeh, Ebenyi Onwe as well as Romanus Igbo and seized their land as well as their buildings. In 2006, some Ezillo boys who had gone to play football at the Community Primary School, Ezza-Ezillo, were beaten up with some of them receiving machete cuts from their Ezza opponents. In 2007, there were violent skirmishes in the area. The skirmishes were traced to some Ezza boys, who came to Nkwo-Egbirigba Ezillo evening market and inflicted machete wounds on one Ejike Igwe Ogbuewu and Ogele Onuma Eze, thereby forcing the market to stop abruptly in broad daylight. They soon began to rampage as they tried to claim the market (Ezillo Memorandum, 2008:12).

On 10th May 2008, a new round of killings started. The immediate cause of the 2008 conflict was the disagreement between an Ezillo boy and Ezza men over the location of a telephone booth. The said Ezillo boy, Sunday Idenyi, erected a telephone booth on a piece of land beside the compound of his uncle, Boniface Igiri, near Isimkpuma Motor Park. The communication booth was said to have been pulled-down by Ezza youths who claimed

ownership of the land where the booth was built. When Sunday Idenyi wanted to prevent the Ezza youths from destroying the communication booth, he was beaten-up to a comma by the boys. When the people of Ezillo descent in his neighbourhood came to find-out what led to the beating of Sunday, the youth descended on them too. In the ensuing fracas, the motorcycles of three Ezillo youths (owned by Chukwuemeka Ikiri and Obinna Ebenyi), involved in *Okada* business, were burnt to ashes. Soon, what started as a mere disagreement escalated as Ezza youths re-enforced and began to burn down the houses of Ezillo people living in Isimkpuma. This led to retaliatory attacks on Ezza-Ezillo people by Ezillo youths on Sunday, 11th May 2008 (Ezillo Memorandum, 2008:2). When the leaders of Ezillo community could not checkmate the speedily escalating situation, they contacted the Divisional Police Officer (DPO) of Ishielu Local Government and the Ebonyi State Police Headquarters, Abakaliki. They also communicated with the then Ishielu Local Government Area chairman, Onwa Ali Onwa and the Ebonyi State Government House in Abakaliki, pleading for their speedy intervention. The conflict continued throughout 2009. Mbah and Nwangwu (2014:686) maintain the conflict "resurfaced with greater force in January 2010, leaving hundreds of residents, unsuspecting travellers and police officers dead."

At the end of the 31st March 2010 invasion of Ezillo by the joint state and federal police team, there was rumour that Dada, a notorious warlord, who was seriously wounded in the operation, died in a gun battle with the police on his way to Abuja, where they were taken and charged in court as ordered by the then Inspector General of Police. However, the then Commissioner of Police in Ebonyi State, Emmanuel Ayeni, informed journalists that Dada was treated by special doctors from Government House Clinic, Abakaliki (Inya, 2010a:17). At the end of the special operations in Ezillo, the police reported that they saw the hideouts of the warriors and their shrines, where they always received power from a native doctor before departing for their violent attacks. The police also took possession of different charms which were all destroyed during the dislodging of the warlords from their enclaves. More than two hundred residential houses belonging to the two warring communities were burnt to ashes while several others were to partial destruction. Churches were also affected in the vandalism, including economic trees such as mangoes and others. Also, inside burnt vehicles, were human bones and marrow (Inya, 2010a:17). On 12th May 2010, the then Ebonyi State Commissioner of Police, Dipo Ayeni, released a security brief stating that a number of suspected militants who were part of the Ezza-Ezillo crisis had been arrested. Some of those

arrested included Titus Ede, Agnes Ogah, Friday Nwoye, Emeka Enya Ukpo, Vincent Itumo a.k. a. Democracy and Basil Nwafor. "The suspects all confirmed that some prominent Ezza personalities usually converged at Oshegbe village in Ezza North Local Government Area, where they conspired to sponsor the war and cause mayhem by donating money and imposing levies on other Ezza to procure arms and ammunition, including food items" (Inya, 2010c:18).

Prominent Ezza people listed as part of suspected sponsors of the conflict by the Commissioner of Police included Joseph Amaga, Paulinus Egbe Otubo, Geoffrey Ozo Chukwu, H.R.H. Eze Christopher Ewa, H.R.H. Eze Lawrence Akochi, H.R.H. Eze Basil Nwafor, Jude Okpor, Clement Nwanga, Jude Onele and Paulinus Ali (Inya, 2010c:18). Chief Geoffrey Chukwu, the pioneer State Chairman of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) in Ebonyi State, as well as traditional rulers and a number of the above arrested persons, continued to maintain their innocence. They vehemently denied contributing towards the sustenance and reccurrence of the Ezza-Ezillo and Ezillo conflict. On his part, the then Commissioner of Police, CP Ayeni, maintained that as a sequel to their revelations, arms and dangerous weapons were recovered from the hideouts of the militants. They included seven G3 rifles, one LAR riffle, one SMG, three AK 47 rifles, one LMG machine gun, two LAR rifle magazines, one toy pistol, one axe, one sword and one cutlass (Inya, 2010c:18). Some of them were buried in the ground to hide the arsenal from the searchlight of security agencies. By the end of 2010, people began to breathe some air of peace in the area.

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During the conflict, a number of warlords were arrested by the Ezillo vigilante group as they engaged in different forms of public utility destruction. The suspects who were identified as Sunday Jacob Nwachukwu (twenty-five years) and Chukwuma Nweke (twenty-five years) hailed from Oshiegbe and Umuoru, Onunweke of Ezza North Local Government Areas respectively. They were caught on different occasions as they tried to vandalise and loot some of the communication materials in Globacom installation at Isinvuja village, Ezillo as well as building materials at Community Boys Secondary School Ezillo. The first to be arrested was Sunday Jacob Chukwu, who was picked-up on 11th November 2009 and Chukwuma Nweke who was later apprehended on 7th December 2009 (Nwani, 2010b:1). Chukwuma Nweke who claimed to live in Onitsha, Anambra State, maintains he was invited

for the vandalism mission and participated in most of the armed conflict in the area during the peak of the crisis. He disclosed further that they had to target both private and public buildings, including schools and health facilities to inflict pains and injuries on the people of Ezillo community (since they can no longer shot guns) Nweke, who appeared unruffled in the face of the allegation of destruction and looting maintained he was determined to continue in the dastardly act until he was satisfied he had inflicted enough injuries, pains and frustration on the community (Nwani, 2010b:18).

Similarly, Sunday Jacob Nwachukwu confessed that his intention for vandalizing installations in Ezillo was to render the Globacom mast ineffective and consequently destroy communications within the community. He revealed that there were many who engaged in the destructive act but others were lucky to escape. He further maintained that they wanted to sell their loot and make money from the proceeds. Jacob Nwachukwu attributed their looting to idleness, maintaining that after they had stopped engaging in mercenary warfare, survival had been difficult, hence their decision to engage in looting "to keep themselves busy and to eke out a living from the act while waiting for the opportunity to resume attacks on the people" (Nwani, 2010b:18). These suspects were caught with already stolen items such as roofing zinc, communication cables, batteries, electric alternators and power generating equipment.

The period of Ezillo conflict with Ezza-Ezillo culminated in widespread damages, and psychology of fear, not just within the communities weighed-down by the conflict but also in the whole Ebonyi State as well as different parts of Igbo land and beyond because people were afraid to ply the Trans African Highway from Nigeria to Cameroon, which passed through Ezillo because of the conflict. Neighbouring citizens of Enugu, Cross River State and the wider Igbo people of Anambra, Abia, dreaded visiting Ebonyi State as the likelihood of death was palpable. The then Governor, Martin Elechi of Ebonyi State, lamenting the wanton destruction of lives and properties in the face of the Ezza-Ezillo conflict, stated that by no strength of imagination could the attempt to blow up the water installation in Ezillo, to blow up the Ezillo bridge and the killing of innocent people from anywhere in the country whose only fault was passing along the federal government road from Enugu to Abakaliki be

justified on the grounds of a communal dispute. It was no communal dispute and so we dreamed whatever is needed to bring peace in Ezillo (Nwani & Inya, 2010:18).

Following the massive killing in Ezillo contested zones, the then Inspector General (IG) of Police, Ogbonnaya Onovo, ordered a special operation to curtail and arrest all actors who had fomented the violence in the Ezza-Ezillo conflict zone. Consequently, the operation was carried out and a number of Ezza men were arrested and sent for questioning in Abuja. After the police investigations that followed, many of them were released while others were detained in police custody leading to massive criticism against Onovo. In response, Inspector General of Police, Ogbonnaya Onovo, maintained he had no apology whatsoever on the arrest of very important personalities summoned before the police in Abuja over Ezza-Ezillo conflict. Onovo stated that he was supposed to do what he did when the war lingered because if he did not do that, all the people both in Ebonyi and passersby, would have been killed. He re-echoed that Nigerians must learn to live in peace. He lamented that people were being killed indiscriminately including children, adults, innocent persons and others. He was very bitter at the level of human insecurity in Ezillo. He had to summon all the very important personalities to Abuja to tackle the problem because the Nigerian State could not continue to allow lives being wasted (Inya, 2010e:19). Ogbonnaya Onovo made the statement at Women Development Centre (WDC) Abakaliki, when he visited the state for an on-the-spot assessment of the police and the security situation in Ebonyi State, following the massive loss of lives and properties due to the Ezillo and Ezza-Ezillo conflict. He lamented the fact that the South Eastern part of Nigeria had become the source of the biggest security challenge faced by his leadership, especially in the face of the unimaginable cases of kidnapping in Igboland as well as the Ezza-Ezillo and Ezillo conflict. He concluded by using the opportunity of his visit to Ebonyi State to plead with the then Governor, Matin Elechi, to kindly assist the Nigerian police with necessary equipment needed to tackle the increasing wave of insecurity in the state in particular and the country at large.

The influence of Ezza-Ezillo conflict reached neighbouring communities in different ways. A number of indigenes lost their lives in cross fire between the warlords while trying to pass Ezillo en-route to their villages and communities. Iyionu community was badly hit by the multiplier effect of the conflict. Their houses were burnt by men suspected of being either

Ezza-Ezillo or Ezillo warriors. This forced the leadership of Iyonu Development Union (IDU) to write a letter entitled "Alarm over Allegations of Iyonu's Involvement in the Ezillo/ Ezza Crisis" to the leadership of the Federated Ezillo General Assembly (FEGA). They stated that the undersigned, on behalf of ourselves and the entire people of Iyonu wish to categorically refute the allegations and speculations that Iyonu people have any part in the disturbances which led to the banning of Iyonu people from passing through Ezillo to and from Iyonu. Rather, they maintained that the act of flogging some of them by Ezillo people and blocking Iyonu people from re-entering their houses at Aguonwenkeya was a regular act in the days of the conflict. They went on to assert that it not only led to the feeling of bad blood but equally made us feel that Ezillo people tend to forget that the Ezza-Ezillo appear to be fighting against Ishielu people as a whole. In essence, Iyonu as a people cannot and must not fight against Ishielu people and has done everything to ensure that Ezza-Ezillo people did not pass through our roads to fight our own Ezillo brothers (Inya, 2010f:18). Within the period of the war, it was also very difficult for the Obeagu, Umuhali and even Nkalagu people to travel home as they needed to connect Ezillo whistle blowers to know the best time to ply the road.

The death of Taye Oyewusi as well as Muritala Adisa Raji of Atakumata Local Government Area and Ayetoro Yewa Local Government Area of Osun and Ogun States on 12th February 2010, as they were on their way to Cross River for a business trip, increased the criticism and reaction of the Yoruba people over the Ezza-Ezillo conflict with their Ezillo hosts. The duo (Taye and Muritala) lost their lives at Ezillo on an ill-fated journey, which they undertook in their VW Passat car with Registration number ES 398 SMK. The duo never reached their destination and their mobile phones were not connecting. Consequently, their people, whom they left in Ogun on the ill fated Cross River journey continued to call and search for them to no avail. They reported at Kpiri-Kpiri police station, Abakaliki, before the case file was transferred to Ebonyi State Police Headquarters and the Criminal Investigation Department consulted. The Federal Radio Cooperation of Nigeria (FRCN), Enugu, and the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA), Abakaliki, were also informed to announce and disseminate pictures of the missing persons.

Later, it was the Mobile Police (MP) in Ezillo that called their relatives to come and check the dead bodies buried in shallow graves that had started decomposing at Ezillo. The police revealed that they caught two suspects holding some particulars of the deceased.The decomposing bodies were identified by the clothes they wore on the fateful day of their departure to Ogun State. Immediately, the police exhumed the dead bodies and deposited them in the then Ebonyi State University Teaching Hospital (EBSUTH), also known as Federal Teaching Hospital Abakaliki (FETHA II). The request by relatives of the deceased to claim the bodies of their loved ones soon turned into a herculean task. One of the family members stated that they had been going and coming for their release and that they had been sleeping in hotels in Abakaliki for many months, without success nor assistance from anybody in Ebonyi State. It was as a result of these difficulties, according to Babatunde Williams, that their families wrote to the Governor of Ebonyi State for assistance because their brothers had to be buried at home. "The pain will be much if there is nothing like their grave to show they died and to remember them" (Ogbonnaya, 2010:18).

The rise of Ishielu General Assembly (IGA) and other community-based non-governmental organisations were principally aimed at ensuring that prominent members of the community drive the process of peacebuilding in the protracted Ezillo and Ezza-Ezzillo conflict. The motor of the organisation is 'unity and love'. They gathered a group of men and women with the intention of building a platform of peace, unity and sustainable harmony for social development in the area. The assembly was made up of sixteen community members from Igboasa, Ezzaegu and Oriagba. The president of the group, James Abbah, maintained "this is a gathering of people who are hungry for peace and progress so the idea of government sponsorship does not arise" (Igwe, 2010:18). The association, which was formed in response to the rising killings, insecurity and loss of properties in the area could not effectively galvanise grassroot networks to drive community-based peace building. So much was expected of the association due to the fact "that all well-meaning people in the local government were members and that membership comprised of all strata of people; civil servants, politicians, artisans, business men and so on" (Igwe, 2010:18). The failure of civil association to promote peace made the then Governor of the state to instruct that the police should double their efforts in checking the violence in the area.

At the peak of the 2010 crisis, the then Governor of Ebonyi State, Martin Elechi, informed the Commissioner of Police that "wherever there is threat to peace, do not wait for my instruction no matter who is involved whether they are my friends, relatives, my children, my wife or myself, go ahead and do what is necessary because we must have peace without which there is no democracy" (Nwani & Inya, 2010:18). On 31st December 2011, there was what Mbah and Nwangwu (2014) refered to as "the Ezillo Mass Murder." According to Ubabukoh (2012:1), when relative peace eventually returned, over 70 people were dead, over 100 survivors were in various hospitals in the state while about 700 people were declared missing. The sight of the 'Ezillo near genocide' on the eve of 2012 caused massive fears and widespread condemnation of the conflict within and outside Nigeria. Osuji (2012:11) maintains that in a compound of thirty-two persons, only three persons escaped the bullets of the Ezza gunmen. The peace-loving people of Ebonyi did not forget in a jiffy, how the corpses of men, women, boys, girls and children were all littered around in Ezillo. The attack and others in the history of inter-communal conflicts in Ebonyi State created deep-rooted stereotypes of the Ezza people (Onuoha & Ani, 2011). However, due to reasons best known to them, the Ezza preferred to be secretive about their death and losses (Onoja, 2013:362).

Ani (2014:4) argues that the onslaught showed "that the episodic bloodletting between the two-sister communities is far from over." The Ezillo people have also constantly complained of the Ezza's act of abusing their cultural and traditional heritage. Ezillo Memorandum (2008:8) reveals that since their settlement in Ezillo, the Ezzas have taken delight in doing all the things that are abominable to Ezillo people. Instances of cultural denigration include the following:

a. They flout the Ezillo new yam festival rules with impunity and bring in their new yams into our markets even before the cultural rites are performed by our people;
b. The Ezza go into our sacred places, loot our people's artefacts, antiquities and defile all that we hold sacred in the town;
c. They kill fish in our sacred ponds as well as rivers and even some animals, which our traditional institutions hold sacred, today they hunt in our secluded sacred forests;
d. Ezillo masquerades are attacked, unmasked and set ablaze on regular bases without provocation and most communal deities destroyed with their sites taken over by Ezza as farm lands;

e. It is common knowledge that Ezza do not bury their dead, rather they dump their corpses on any available open land where scavengers such as pigs, dogs and birds feast on the carcasses, scattering them to every part of the community with their attendant health hazards. This, to us, is a taboo; and
f. The traditional ruler of Ezillo, Eze Chima Onyibe was severally beaten up in 2006 and his wife beaten in open market by the Ezzas without regret.

5.6 MGBALUKWU-OBEAGU AND OJIEGBE EZZA CONFLICT

Eze (2007:2) maintains that the Mgbalukwu-Obeagu Isu and the Ezza people fought in 1910, 1966, 1975, 1986, 1989, 1993 and 2005-2007. In the course of the ninety seven (97) years intermittent conflicts between Mgbalukwu -Obeagu Isu people and the Ojiegbe-Ezza people, there was sporadic outbreak of conflict leading to the loss of lives (in their hundreds). The truth remains that the conflict was driven by the contest for a plot of land around the Abanaba River. In a letter by Ukor *et. al.* (2007:1-3) to the then Governor Sam Ominyi Egwu, over the conflict, a collection of ministers of the gospel and political leaders wrongly traced the cause of the conflict to greed, ignorance, lack of forgiveness and paganism. They went on to reveal that young men were lost on a daily basis during the period of the conflict on both the Isu and the Ezza side of the conflict divide. The rain of death that went with the conflict led to the continuous quest for security and powers to evade the hands of death by members of Mgbalukwu and Obeagu Isu communities. Ukor *et. al* (2007: 2) maintain that desperate requests for security were made when the rest of the Mgbalukwu and Obeagu Isu people "were exposed to hell fire as they entered several unimaginable places in search of power for battles from satanic agents, thereby covenanting themselves with the devil".

Eze (2007:1-2) is of the opinion that "during the out-break of hostilities in 2005, over fifteen (15) lives were lost in Mgbalukwu/ Obeagu communities alone, eighty (80) buildings were burnt, while properties worth millions of naira were either looted or destroyed and two hundred and forty refugees were registered". Ukor *et. al* (2007:2) maintain that a critical analysis of the people's plight using Mgbalukwu as a case study reveals that schools are abandoned by both pupils and the teachers, churches are also deserted as men of God who were the back bone of Christ body, have equally become preys to bullets. Markets do not hold. Health workers were forced to leave their duty posts. Farms were deserted by farmers

for fear of raid. And the ministers of the Lord see the situation as a replica of what happen over there at Ogboji. Following the massive loss of lives and properties in Mgbalukwu and Obeagu Isu due to their conflict with the Ojiegbe-Ezza, the ministers of the gospel in Isu suggested in 2007 to the Ebonyi State Government that:

a. The state government re-doubles her efforts to settle the dispute, during which a two day powerful crusade/ prayer be organised while the Governor and other top government officers will attend with the heads of the two villages;
b. The Government as a matter of fact, should establish one industry, an institution or an Army barracks at the middle of the disputed land to keep the people apart; and
c. The Ebonyi State House of Assembly should make a legislation to prohibit either of the parties from encroaching upon each other's portion (Ukor *et. al*, 2007:3).

While the second and third suggestions from the pastors were wonderful, the first; which centred on the organisation of crusade within the peak of the conflict was a wrong counsel as it would have exposed the thousands of people gathered there to the largest and biggest harvest of death from any of the enemy communities, if their warriors attacked the venue of the proposed peace crusade. The Ojiegbe, Mgbalukwu and Obeagu Isu conflict was finally resolved in 2007. However, the multidimensional implications of the conflict cannot be over-emphasised. Majority of the good looking houses in the three communities were destroyed during the conflict. The people's source of water, mainly boreholes, were damaged and health centres as well as road networks destroyed as trenches were built near and across them by warlords who orchestrated the Mgbalukwu-Obeagu Isu and Ojiegbe-Ezza conflict.

Sequel to the return of peace in the area the three communities that were formerly on the part of the conflict, met and drafted a letter of appreciation as well as supplication to Governor Martin Elechi through the Executive Director of Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Centre (HRCRC). The letter, which was jointly signed by Gabriel Igwe, Mathew Nnamani, David Okene, Fidelis Nwokoroji, Bem Akam and Ani Gabriel Ani read as follows: We, the undersigned leaders of Obeagu Mgbalukwu and Ojiegbe (OMO) communities, on behalf of ourselves and our people, wish to appreciate your immense contribution towards the peaceful and successful settlement of our ninety seven (97) years old land dispute. We wish to use this opportunity to request the assistance of your government in the following areas:

1. Boundary Demarcation: Now that peace has been restored in our area, we will be highly grateful, if your government could fully demarcate the boundary between the two communities of Obeagu and Mgbalukwu on the one hand, and that of Ojiegbe on the other to avoid future clashes over boundary;
2. Road Reconstruction: We humbly appeal to you, to use your good offices to effect the reconstruction of Nkwagu Isu/ -Amagu Nze road. The road is our nearest access road to Enugu and Abakaliki, capitals of Enugu and Ebonyi States respectively;
3. Bore Holes: We highly commend the efforts of your government to eradicate water borne diseases in the state. However, as a result of our protracted war, the exercise has not met with success in our area. Health workers find it difficult to penetrate into our communities because of fear. Worse still some of the boreholes which were sunk during the period of cease-fire have been completely damaged in the war years. We humbly apply for new boreholes as well as for the repair of the damaged ones;
4. Renovation of Schools: Some of our schools were destroyed as a result of the crisis. Others are in a bad condition. We humbly appeal to you to help us financially and materially to reconstruct these schools;
5. Agriculture: Your Excellency, OMO communities are essentially agrarian communities. We used to produce rice, yams and cassava in abundance. However, since the outbreak of the last hostilities (2005-2007), 99% of our people fled their homes. These internally displaced persons became victims of terrible hunger. Now that we are gradually resettling at home, we humbly pray you to help us with ample supply of agricultural inputs such as fertilizer and herbicides this planting season;
6. Health Centres: There is no doubt that those who have fought for ninety-seven (97) years will be preyed upon by all sorts of sickness and disease. We therefore need health centres to help survivors of the war to exist. We request your assistance in this regard;
7. Relief materials from State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA): We humbly appeal to the State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) to supply relief materials to us that will help us start life once more;
8. Industry: The greatest problem facing us is youth unemployment. Our youths were the 'fighters' during the war era. They are rusting at home fully unemployed. We

passionately appeal to you to establish an industry in the area to enable them to be gainfully employed;

9. Police Post: There is need for security in our area as is the case in other areas. We therefore need a police post which will help us check, detect and bring criminals to book; and
10. Political Appointment: Our communities constitute Ward III (Obegu ward) in Onicha Local Government Area of our beloved State. Since the creation of Nigeria (1914) till today, nobody from this ward has held any political post (elective and appointive) higher than that of a local government supervisor. We have been shamefully politically alienated and totally forgotten. Your Excellency, please help us out of this ugly situation (Igwe, Nnamani, Okene, Nwokoroji, Akam & Ani, 2008:1-3).

5.7 PEACEBUILDING CHALLENGES IN EZZA CONFLICT SETTING

Peacebuilding entails training and educating the society to uphold the ideas and behaviours that promotes culture of peace. There is the lack of capacities necessary for happy and peaceful life in Ezza setting. These capacities range from the provision of social amenities to other high level scientific and technological gadgets that help in promoting peace and security. The federal, state and local governments in Nigeria only continually make promises that would not see the light of the day. The culture of peace, which is largely lacking in Nigeria include sustainable promotion of human rights, universal tolerance of humanity, especially ones neighbours, proactive management of violent situations, peaceful resolution of conflicts (reactive peacebuilding) as well as development of multi-dimensional capacities and institutions that enhances social peace.

Peacebuilding as a process is crippled by a number of factors. The first is the absence of sustainable dialogue amongst the conflict parties. It would be recalled that peacebuilding in a post-conflict situation is fundamentally driven by dialogue. Thus, if for say any reason, the representatives of parties involved in the Obeagu-Mgbalukwu and Ojiegbe-Ezza as well as Ezza and Ezza-Ezillo conflicts came together for dialogue in the pre-independence era of the

conflict, there would have been peace. Unfortunately, the fact that there was no act of dialogue in the road to peace made conflict resolution difficult until, 2007 when the Catholic Church gathered the Obeagu-Mgbalukwu and Ojiegbe-Ezza conflict parties for dialogue and negotiations towards peace. It was the same process that encouraged the dialogue initiatives on Ezillo and Ezza-Ezillo, which is currently championed by the Ebonyi State Government.

There were also all manners of human rights abuses within the years of the recurrent conflicts. It will be recalled that any environment characterised of human rights violations often faces progressive retardation of peace processes. This is because high degree of human rights abuse in Ezillo, Obeagu and Mgbalukwu-Isu, Ezza-Ezillo, Idembia and Oshiri reinforces conflicts and sustains violent memories, which naturally manifests overtime as conflicts.

Poor governance in post independence Africa and Nigeria in particular has become a major source of impoverishment of the masses, which fuels conflict and hunts peacebuilding. The negligence of good governance naturally creates room for mal-administration of human and material resources, which naturally gives birth to conditions that promotes conflicts. The lacuna created in Ezza and its neighbouring communities due to poor governance gives birth to all manners of negative political culture and unfavourable manipulations of state craft. The worst of poor governance scenario is manifested when there is a power tussle between the governor of a state and his deputy as was experienced in Ebonyi State, within the period of the conflict. The implication was that the machinery of the state was pushed towards the grabbing or protection of political power as against engaging in the process of peacebuilding.

Another bad scenario that was experienced in Nigeria was the health crisis of President Yar'Adua, which did not only incapacitate him but weakened the whole process of national governance, which directly made presidential directives to check the Ezillo warriors impossible. There was nobody on the topmost ladder of the executive echelon and power was not handed - over to the then Vice President, Goodluck Jonathan. It was very difficult to order the Nigerian national police nor did an armed military force take over the Ezillo and Ezza-Ezillo conflict axis, until Goodluck Jonathan was constitutionally empowered as the

Acting President and subsequently, the Commander in Chief of Nigeria's armed forces. The implication is often the competition within the leadership circle, which leads to the emergence of a cabal that naturally fights to promote personal interests as well as loath state resources. The process of competition for power amongst the cabal leads to political violence, which encourages other conflicts. Again, the quest to promote the strategic interest of those that have grabbed power at all cost as against the interest of the electorate that voted them to better their lives, promotes massive suffering within Ebonyi State and leads to the abortion of peace that goes with it. The multiplier effect of the rise of cabals on the administration of a state becomes the lack of respect for democratic principles of the rule of law, which naturally leads to human rights abuses.

However, peacebuilding as a process also entails education for peace. It is a combination of formal and informal education that enhances conflict prevention and resolution of violent conflicts. Unfortunately, in the wake of the conflicts between the Ezza and their neighbours, many of the schools within the immediate environment do not just close down but are vandalized. Ironically, education for peace teaches learners the need to manage historical, socio-cultural, economic, geographical, ideological factors that facilitate conflict. Such form of education that promotes friendship, social harmony and better way of life is lacking in the curriculum of schools within primary and secondary schools in Nigeria, except in the tertiary level. It is through education for peace that the learner is taught the dehumanizing and violent impacts of poverty, prejudice, discrimination, rape, conflict and war on humanity.

5.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter has revealed how the Ezza engaged in mercenary warfare and labour migration to different parts of Nigeria, where they quickly established colonies, which formed part of the Ezza Diaspora. The chapter also examined the conflict between Ezza settlers and their landlords in Oshiri, Mgbalukwu, Obeagu Isu, Ezillo and Agila respectively. The causes of the Ezza conflict with her neighbours include hunger for land, cultural factors, population explosion and labour migration. The chapter has demonstrated that in Agila, the Ezza came in as labourers and blacksmiths. They were given some portions of land and gradually began to expand from there to the level where they clashed openly with the Agila people (when they

resisted the quest for the Ezza to expand further). The chapter also discussed how both groups engaged in open conflicts in Agila in the 1940s, 1960s and 1980s. People were killed through poisoning, while a number of women were raped and many put to death. The chapter also clearly showed how the Mgbalukwu and Obeagu Isu people invited the Ezza to assist them in their war with the Onicha Igboeze people. They stayed in the Isu land and paid tributes to the people. Later on, they stopped the payment and began to expand their territories by force thus leading to violent confrontations. The Mgbalukwu and Obeagu Isu fought with the Ojiegbe-Ezza in 1910, 1966, 1975, 1986, 1989, 1993 as well as 2005-2007. The conflict in Isu was very intense and led to massive destruction of lives and properties.

Finally, the chapter revealed how Ezillo people invited the Ezza to assist them fight their Ngbo brothers. At the end of the war, the Ezza-Ezillo began to expand from the original Egu-Echara that was originally allocated to them, leading to fierce conflicts with Ezillo people. The Ezza-Ezillo fought with their Ezillo landlords in 1992, 1996, 1997, 2006, 2007, 2008-2010 as well as in December 2011. The December 31st massacre in Ezillo was one of the worst forms of killings within a day during an inter-communal conflict between Ezza and her neighbours as it left almost one hundred men, women and children dead in one night. The chapter also presented the peacebuilding challenges faced in the quest to resolve the Ezza conflicts with her neighbours. The next chapter highlights the dynamics of Barolong land dispute. It reveals how socio-political, economic, ethnic as well as other identity and settlement factors promoted the dispute.

CHAPTER SIX: BAROLONG LAND DISPUTE IN SOUTH AFRICA

6.1 INTRODUCTION

Land is a fundamental resource for human development. While some individuals, groups, communities and countries have large expanses of land, many others do everything within their power to buy or be allocated a parcel of land. Ironically, land is always a central and obvious conflict issue. "[Land conflicts] are often just the visible part of a more serious conflict which is rooted much deeper in the society and its history. Very often, land conflicts only reflect the general inequality or unfair distribution of wealth, voice and power in a given society and or the discrimination against certain groups, such as women or ethnic minorities" (Wehrmann, 2008:29). Among the Barolong people, there is a deep-rooted relationship between the historic chieftaincy conflict experience and the land conflict that manifested over the years. This is because any form of effective claim to the paramountcy of the Barolong group indirectly connotes the authentic cultural rights to a given parcel of land. The land crisis among the Barolong culminated in a judicial battle and the Circuit Court in Mafikeng ruled in favour of the Barolong Ratshidi. The judgment upheld the right of Ratshidi to appoint an administrator or headman over the baTlharo and the implementation of the power of the headman in a setting where he lacked popular cooperation and legitimacy. The legal judgment and the move to implement the power of the headman over the people soon generated bickering, resistance and increased crisis. 1881 marked the beginning of Ratshidi-Rapulana conflict (North West Provincial Archive, 1978-1990; Shillington, 1985:128). It should be noted that archival evidence exposed the letter from Molopo Magistrate to J. F. Nel, which revealed that there was still a case of unresolved land dispute amongst the Barolong Ratshidi as at February 1981, when the case was appealed (North West Provincial Archives and Library (1982).

Among the causes of the Barolong Tlharo and Barolong Ratshidi dispute include the interest on the economic and material benefits derived from the Molopo River and the boreholes drilled there in the 1930s and 1940s. The economic importance of these sources of water to both crop and livestock farmers cannot be under-estimated. This was because the characteristic history of drought and famine in the Bechuanaland reserve made these sources of water a highly-sought resource at the time. Thus, whoever controlled these water sources could be rest assured of increased crop production and even direct profit from the sale of

water during periods of drought. This chapter presents the dynamics of the Lotlhakane boundary dispute, the Disaneng and Madiba land disputes as well as the settler versus non-settler land dispute that has been experienced in Barolong.

6.2 THE LOTLHAKANE INTRA-BAROLONG DISPUTE

Manson and Mbenga (2014:93) document that the Barolong Ratlou boo Mariba and the Barolong boo Tlharo as well as the Barolong Tlhaping were allocated a jigsaw of small parcels of land in Vryburg. Members of the Baroong Tlharo Mariba also settled in Ganyesa reserve occupying Jakkalsdraai, Tlakganeng and Morokweng reserves. Others settled in Madibeng and Dinopeng. As years passed by, Batswana people became conscious that their then Bechuanaland settlement was bedevilled by a number of geographical challenges. First, the land was not very fertile for agricultural purposes. The rainfall was relatively very low compared to many other parts of South Africa. To make matters worse, the soil composition was very poor for crop farming and they faced recurrent cases of drought as well as locust and plagues, especially in 1925 and 1933. Even to date, the area has been under dangerous threats of poor yields due to the ravaging global warming that has bedevilled South Africa.

The lack of resources, especially unfavourable agricultural conditions faced by the people, increased the competition for better farming land, which led to disputes and conflicts in a number of cases. The White men who settled in the area worsened the conflict situation as these did not just struggle to get their portion of land but used all forms of coercion to expel the Barolong from fertile areas as well as good hunting grounds thus heightening the competition amongst the Barolong over land space. The problems of societal building among the Barolong "were almost always expressed in material terms - over control of land, water sources or other economic resources but they also had a strong political context. The antagonistic parties expressed their differences in terms of political rights and issues of leadership that had a longer historical context" (Manson & Mbenga, 2014:94).

The Barolong Ratshidi and the Barolong Rapulana engaged in historic land dispute over the real owner of Lotlhakane (Rietfontein), which is about twenty-five kilometres, along the

Southeastern part of Mafikeng. The parcel of land, which was very rich in nutrients, was needed for the cultivation of wheat. Ironically, neither of the two brothers wanted to lose access to such a land that did not only enhance their food security but promoted their economic well-being. However, "the issue of who owned Lotlhakane had greater implications than its productive potential. It was also connected to who had political control of the wider region" (Manson & Mbenga, 2014:95).

It should be recalled that when the Barolong brothers left Thaba Nchu around the middle of the 19th century, the Barolong Ratshidi settled *en masse* along the Molopo River while the other brothers settled in the Transvaal. Soon, a high percentage of Barolong Rapulana people were already settled in Lotlhakane at the time of Barolong Ratshidi's arrival, thus intensifying competition for habitable space. The historic division between the Barolong Ratshidi on the one hand and the Barolong Rapulana as well as the Barolong Ratlou on the other was intensified when the British and Boers fought to effectively control the people's land. In the course of the Anglo-Boer War, the Barolong Ratshidi formed an alliance with the British while the Barolong Rapulana and the Ratlou joined the camp of the Boers. As a sequel to the victory of the British in the war, the Barolong Ratshidi (that was their ally) gained unprecedented influence in the area.

Ramaroka (2003) maintains that Matlaba and Moshete, the senior *Dikgosi* of Barolong Rapulana and Barolong Ratlou petitioned the Secretary for Native Affairs in Pretoria in the second decade of the 20th century. The Lotlhakane case between them and their Ratshidi brothers was re-opened and following evidence from the thirty-three years of investigation into the case by past government officials in Bechuanaland region, the Supreme Court ruled that Barolong Rapulana were the senior of the three brothers at the time of settlement and thus the Lotlhakane disputed land belonged to them. "The ruling dented Ratshidi hopes, and the balance of political power definitely tilted more in favour of the Rapulana/Ratlou, although the former remained important in the eyes of the colonial government and still retains a presence over Lotlhakane itself" (Manson & Mbenga, 2014:95).

6.3 THE DISANENG DISPUTE

The Barolong Ratshidi and the Barolong Tlharo have lived with each other at Disaneng since the second half of the 19th century. Following the revolt from the Rapulana against the Ratshidi leadership in Lotlhakane, the death of the Tlharo chief of Masibi and the enthronement of Methusela Jan Masibi in 1931, which made him adopt an aggressive policy against the Ratshidi lords, conflict became imminent. "One of his first acts was to march with about sixty armed men to the border with the intention to assault Chief Lotlamoreng in the Protectorate and the reason for the aggression was a rumour that Chief Lotlamoreng had seized some cattle of Masibi's people in the Barolong farms" (Manson & Mbenga, 2014:97). The colonial leadership quickly reacted by planning to re-locate the whole Barolong Tlharo of Masibi to Kuruman District where many of their forefathers were settled (Cape Archive Depot, 1932).

In 1935, Chief Lotlamoreng reacted to the attack from Methusela of Masibi on his people in 1934 by sending his mercenary, who captured the farms and cattle of the Barolong Tlharo. The attack reduced the geo-political area occupied by the Barolong Tlharo of Masibi but they continued to resist the sovereignty of Lotlamoreng, then the years that followed witnessed recurrent attacks from both sides.

Manson and Mbenga (2014:97) maintain that tensions flared up again in 1946. The issue was a strip of land running north to the south between the designated areas of the Barolong claimed by both Barolong groups in Disaneng. Numerous followers of Lotlamoreng lived in the area but paid no allegiance to Masibi. Rather, Masibi had ploughed lands in the vicinity of Ratshidi cattle posts. The contest over the parcel of land continued until the mid 1950s. It should be noted that there were other factors that influenced the dispute. One of them was that the area contained boreholes drilled from 1930-1940s and served as a major source of water to cattle farmers and none of the disputants wanted to lose the area for its strategic importance. It took the intervention of the native commissioner in Mafikeng and other peace-building initiatives to resolve the conflict in the second half of the 1950s.

6.4 SETTLER VERSUS NON-SETTLER LAND DISPUTE

The Barolong geo-political milieu has received waves of immigrants over the years. Ironically, the people were used to the Kgotla pattern of settlement. This is a settlement style that ensures people of the same historical stock, inhabited the same territory. As they continually settled, the chiefs were receiving family groups of strangers and immigrants in different parts of the wards. Soon, the arrival of large family groups led to the creation of separate wards for them. Large family groups included "Mohurutshe Lucas Manyane Seate, Modiboa-Michael Tatodi, Motlhaping-Ikaneng Tong, Mokgatla-Gontekane Selebogo, Morakile-Daniel Sejamoholo, Motaba-Harry Dihele and Mokgwatlheng-Baatile who were recognised as separate wards in themselves with their traditional leaders as headmen" (Selebogo &Meiring, 1982: 4). The headmen appointed at the time were selected on the general belief that they represented the ancestors of a particular migrant group. As years passed by, the general perception that they were settlers began to wane and the younger generation saw them as their kith and kin.

North West Provincial Archives and Library (1980) shows that in the Barolong setting, the Paramount ruler at the time, shortly after the appointment of chieftainess Neonyana Montshioa as regent, resolved with the Tribal Authority that all non-Tswana who had been allowed to reside in the tribal authority during the time of the late Chief Kebalepile Montshioa and had not applied for district transfers, be given a timeframe to regularize their documents. Furthermore, they maintained that those who failed to comply accordingly would not be assisted. Regrettably, there followed a great influx of non-Tswana people into the area, the extent of which had never been experienced earlier in their history. These people were allocated residential sites without first being brought before the Tribal Authority in terms of Proclamation R192 of 1967 (North West Provincial Archives and Library 1980:2).

To make matters worse, there was an increasing influx of non-Tswana people. The then chief, L. F. Montshioa, instead of consulting the Tribal Authorities called for a public meeting, *pitso,* of these non-Tswana people and informed them that the then Bophuthatswana Government did not want them in their land but that he actually wanted them to reside in his territory as long as they were willing to do so. He stated that the land belonged to the Barolong tribe and not to the government. North West Provincial Archives and Library (1980:1-2) documents that Chief Montshioa was supported by headmen Rantsuru Tawana,

Maadimo Lekoko and members of the Seoposengwe Party while D. P. Kgotleng, O. P. Seleka and Headman M. D. Lecholo openly warned the chief of the dangers inherent in the continuous influx of non-Tswana people into their territory.

There were also individuals who were also allocating residential sites to non-Tswana immigrants without consulting both the chiefs and Tribal Authority. Following the allocation of sites to non- Tswana by Chief Montshioa, he did not question what his subjects were doing. These individuals who engaged in the 'illegal' sale of land were collecting different amounts of money from the non-Tswana people. North West Provincial Archives and Library (1980:2) maintains that people seeking residence were unlawfully asked to pay between R10 to R60.00 for a site depending on its size. This was actually where the core of the matter lies in as far as the inflow of non-Tswana immigrants was concerned. Illegal financial gain was the source of contention. Unfortunately, most of the members of the Tribal Authority were involved in this scandal. Ironically, since the passing of the Bophuthatswana Citizenship Act of 1978, some members of the Tribal Authority involved in that unlawful practice and who directly contributed towards illegal squatting of people in Barolong have been secretly working behind the scenes to legalize the residence of these people to enable them to qualify for citizenship. The aim, therefore, was to use their strategic influence as council members during meetings to achieve the objective. Ironically, a number of people in Barolong believe that if they succeed, the citizenship acquired in that fashion will be fraudulent and the inflow will continue (North West Provincial Archives and Library, 1980:2).

As these groups of people continued to enter Barolong, they increased the pressure on local people to sell their plots of land for residential purposes at the time, thus creating room for all sorts of genuine and illegal sale of land (that worsened the nature of Barolong land disputes). To make matters worse, a number of those who were able to process their papers could not attain full integration within the local population. There were a number of people who considered them as strangers and maintained that their traditional noble lineage should continue to rule over them as well as to reduce their tribal rights and privileges. Those who opposed the continued leadership role of the headmen argued that they were settled in the land used traditionally as cattle post. The chief made some of them headmen and they were generally referred to as *Batlhanka* to ensure that they maintained the cattle farm, from where they would provide the chief's household with water and milk (from the cattle under their care). To make matters worse, some of them maintained that they were faced with the

problem of how the Government recognized headmen at the outposts and paid salaries to them, while ignoring the traditional leaders who grew up with the chieftainship? They kept on asking a number of rhetorical questions like why were the traditional leaders not included in the Tribal Authority? Why were the rights and privileges of these traditional leaders not maintained and protected? Paradoxically, these headmen used to manage the affairs of their wards and their power as well as authority extended over almost every sphere of public life. They cannot entertain the hopes of having a sound and effective tribal administration without the support and assistance of the traditional leaders. The appointment of headmen at the outposts was based on the concept of nepotism. The appointment was intended at replacing *Batlhanka* as headman. However, members of the royal family who were not supposed to occupy those posts were claiming seniority (Selebogo &Meiring, 1982:5-6).

It should be recalled that according to Batswana tradition and custom, the rights of immigrants to live in a tribal area can only be acquired when the settlers accept all the obligations of a subject or pay some amount of money to the chief. People who paid the money were allocated residential sites without first being brought before the Tribal Authority in terms of Proclamation R192 of 1967. The late headman, Rantsuru, who was acting as the right hand man of L. F. Montshioa, at the time, was responsible for interviewing these new arrivals. He would then collect from each applicant, between R10.00 and R20.00 rands, which he said represented their settlement dues called *Sehuba*. They were also required to pay an additional R32.00 as affiliation fees. The colonial administration later discovered that the *Sehuba* payments did not reach the treasury of the chieftainess (North West Provincial Archives and Library 1980:1). The implication was that the money so collected was entering into the 'wallets' of private people.

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There was also no proper system of allocating residential sites. Residential sites were sold illegally by privileged members of the Tribal Authority. "There are cases where one residential site has been sold to two different groups of people. In the majority of cases, sites are sold to crooks and criminals from other areas and the inhabitants felt that the village has become a harbouring place of criminals and crooks" (Selebogo &Meiring, 1982:8). There were also cases of those whose money was collected and not given any residential sites. At the zenith of the land dispute that followed, one I. M. Mahlatsi 3571671, wrote a formal

complaint to the Barolong Boo ra Tshidi Tribal Authority. In a reply dated 12th April 1979, addressed to M. A. Majafi, the Tribal Authority replied as follows:

1. When a person applies for a residential site, he is asked to pay an amount of R32.00 at this office if his application is approved. Applicants for affiliation are in the normal course, introduced to the Tribal Authority meeting by headmen of the area where he wishes to settle. Headmen are not entitled to claim R10.00 or any fee in this respect. There is no record in the appropriate register that the complainant was accepted by the Tribal Authority.
2. On March 20, 1979, a complainant reported at this office accompanied by his brother Makhapela David Mahlatsi Nin 3714590. His brother produced his affiliation receipt for R32.00 which is the fee payable on acceptance. He was assisted by having his service contract renewed;
3. Any complainant was unable to produce an affiliation receipt; production of receipts is at present insisted upon as some people are in possession of false receipts of affiliation (allegedly issued by T. J. Molema). If a complainant did not come back with his receipt, there will be no satisfactory record produced to show that he had been accepted officially as a tribal member;
4. People like the complainant are apt to refer to the kgotla, when they in fact meet the chief and perhaps a number of important men in his reference when the Tribal Authority is not in fact in session and is well established; and
5. An applicant for affiliation must appear in person before a properly constituted Tribal Authority meeting to consider his application. When approved, an applicant's personal details are entered in a specific register for affiliates and the Magistrate's office is also notified so as to ensure the district transfer. Incidentally, since the appointment of the present chief, there are no entries in the register of affiliates because since then, no applications have been considered officially (North West Provincial Archives and Library, 1979:1-2).

Over the years, the land dispute in Barolong degenerated into a legal struggle. North West Provincial Archives and Library (1982) maintains in the case of Othusitse Kolwane vs Theesho S. Moshoela, the then Magistrate of Mafikeng made the following observations to the then Tribal Clerk of Baroong Boo Ratshidi:

i. Respondent objects to the 'judgment' as it appears on the written record, claiming that the Chief's court never gave judgment in favour of the complainant in that the arable land in dispute was awarded to the complainant. When the complainant was questioned at length on this point during the hearing of the appeal, he confirmed that the court did not award him the land in February 1981 but ordered the parties to return for the case after reaping. When confronted with the contents of the written record, he altered his version completely and thus made two conflicting statements. For this reason, I decided to ignore the written record;

ii. After the complainant had given evidence to the effect that he inherited the land in dispute from his ancestors, he was cross-examined by the respondent and the complainant admitted that his ancestors ploughed the land because of their being in the employ of the chief;

iii. Although this does not in itself prove the respondent's title, it certainly does not give the complainant any claim to the land particularly as he admitted that the land was during his adult life, also ploughed by another person for a period and that the employers intervened from time to time. The complainant also admitted that Acting Chief Montshioa has since the commencement in the Chief's Court, proceeded to Tontonyane in the presence of the parties to attempt to allocate alternative arable land to him which he refused even to inspect at the time;

iv. His precarious claim to the land in question had been explained to the complainant and also that the Chief had the power to allocate alternative land to him which will have the effect that he has undisputed occupation of the allotment. He said that he now understands the position and that he was willing to accept alternative land of equal potential; and

v. Headman M. T. Molema, who was the Ratshidi headman of the area in question, was requested to present the complainant's case to the Tribal Authority and to intercede on his behalf to obtain alternative land for him.

It was pointed out during the hearing by Chief Montshio that the disputed land was in fact, situated in the proclaimed area of Mmabatho Township and that it might be required at any time in the future for urban development (NWPLA, 1982:1-2).

6.5 Madiba Land Dispute

The contested Madiba land has other names such as Makgabaneng, Makaritla, Seboana, Gakubu and Madiba. Selebogo (1984) maintains that Makgabaneng is the historical and traditional name given to the area, and it is mostly occupied by descendants of Saane. The village is located on the eastern bank of Madiba stream. The area was established as a cattle post during the reign of Montshiwa around 1850. It was primarily reserved for animal husbandry and for agricultural purposes. Between 1864 and 1870 more farmers came to settle permanently in Makgabaneng. Many of them were said to have landed in the location from Modimola and Mafikeng (Selebogo, 1984).

In the 1980s, M. T. Molema, who was the attorney of one Kgolagano McGrey Molema, filed a complaint against one Seenyane Mokoto with the Barolong Boo Ratshidi Tribal Authority. Molema stated that Mokoto and some others were unlawfully farming and ploughing land that belonged to Kgolagano Molema. Molema also claimed the headmanship of Madiba village. The case was tried on its merit by the Tribal Authority under the leadership of Chief M. R. Lekko and ruled in favour of Seenyane Mokoto.

Molema, who was not pleased with the judgment of the Tribal Authority, appealed to the Magistrate and his appeal was heard on 1st June 1983. The Magistrate investigated the land claims and counter claims. He requested evidence of ownership and the witnesses of both parties to testify. At the end of the day, he upheld the decision of the Tribal Authority. Molema further appealed to the Honourable Minister of Lands and Rural Development at the time. The Minister sent his men to investigate the matter. After their investigations, the Secretary to the Minister informed Molema that they were upholding the decision of the Magistrate. However, Molema was still adamant and appealed to the President, who empowered H. Viviers and I. Selebogo to investigate the matter brought before the President.

Viviers and Selebogo (1984) recommended that the matter could not be heard any further and that the only remedy left, if he desired to pursue the matter further was to institute civil proceedings. Viviers and Selebogo (1984) also maintained that Molema's claim to the

Madiba village was referred to by many names, which were very confusing. However, it was generally agreed that the land was situated on the eastern bank of the Madiba stream and had been under the headmanship of Seboane, which consisted of a number of other villages.

The headmanship of Seboane was established in 1874 under the leadership of one Lekoko Marumulwa, who was a close relative to Kgosi Montshioa. Viviers and Selebogo (1984) document that the prominent lineage of the Barolong Ratshidi living in Seboane included Leteane, Molema, Leinana, Maselwanyane and Kgaje Mokolobata. They maintain that out of these inhabitants of Madiba, it was Leteane who was the most senior in terms of status and not Molema and that the headman of the area could not be appointed from the midst of young people such as Molema, when there were older people within the community. Some prominent members of the Molema lineage have been living in the city of Mafikeng. While in Mafikeng, they were placed under the leadership of Motshegare. However, as years passed by, in 1948, Molema applied to Kgosi Montshioa and his plea was that he should be declared a senior to Motshegare and be consequently recognized as the headman but the *Kgosi* dismissed his request. Viviers and Selebogo (1984) state that neither Kgolagano nor Morara Molema had any claim to headmanship and recommended that their claims should have been dismissed using the following facts of the matter:

a. That the village of Madiba is just one part of the headmanship of Seboane and has no claim to an independent headmanship;
b. Even if a headmanship for the village should be considered, the lineage of Molema be subordinate to at least two other senior lineages in the village and therefore not to be considered;
c. Morara Molema himself is very junior in status even in his own lineage; and
d. For all these reasons, the *Kgotla* of Barolong Boo Ratshidi has correctly and constantly refused to elevate the status of Molema to that of headman.

The North West Provincial Archives and Library, Mafikeng also documents the reaction of Molema to the above judgements. Molema (1984) maintains that it is an undisputable and undeniable fact that Molema and nobody else discovered Mahikeng in the early 1850s and that he was the first chief of Barolong Boora Tshidi to settle permanently in Mafikeng in 1870 and therefore, became the number one citizen. A decade later, Montshioa, Molema's half brother, joined him. In the whole political sphere of Barolong Boora Tshidi, there is not a

name that can claim to have done as much or excelled over Molema in endeavours to attain justice and a fair deal for Barolong Boora Tshidi (Molema, 1984).

6.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY

The chapter presented how the Barolong boo Ratshidi and the Barolong Rapulana clashed with one another as well as the manifestation of settler and non-settler crises. The causes of the conflict include the contest for economic and natural resources located in the Molopo River. The land produced high outputs of maize, fruits, vegetables and wheat, which were a major source of revenue for the agricultural economy. Later, the settling of the white men worsened the conflict dynamics in Mafikeng. The arrival of the British and the Boers on the South African coast worsened the conflict over land. The British and Boers strategically formed an alliance with the Barolong boo Ratshidi and the Barolong Rapulana respectively to fight each other. The land dispute in Barolong took a legal dimension when Matlaba and Moshete, the chiefs of Barolong Rapulana and Barolong Ratlou, went to court, in order for the true owner of Lotlhakene to be decided. After thirty-three years, the Supreme Court ruled that the land belonged to Barolong Rapulana. The Disaneng dispute was also discussed in this chapter. In the course of the dispute, a former Masibi chief wanted to capture the land and cattle of Barolong Thlaro. All the Barolong groups in Disaneng had been contesting over a piece of farmland from 1940 to 1950. It was the intervention of the Native Commissioner in Mafikeng that resolved the matter.

The chapter also presented how settler and non-settler land disputes manifested in Barolong. While some people were in support of the idea that non-Tswana people should live separately, others campaigned for their integration into Barolong society. The colonial government resisted the allocation of sites to settlers but the Tribal Authority upheld it, leading to the influx of many non-Tswana people and the internal crisis over land allocation that ensued. Non-Tswana-speaking people who were allocated residential sites paid between R10 to R60 depending on the size and location of the site. The late headman, Rantsuru, who was acting as the right hand man of L. F. Montshioa at the time, was responsible for interviewing new arrivals. He would then collect from each applicant, between R10.00 and R20.00 rands, which he claimed represented settlement dues (called *Sehuba*). They were also requested to pay an additional R32.00 as affiliation fees. The colonial administration later

discovered that the *Sehuba* payments did not reach the treasury of the chieftainess. The influx of non-Tswana people continued at an alarming rate and subsequently on 10th January 1977, the then ruling cabinet directed the chiefs and headmen not to allow non-Tswana people to reside in their areas of jurisdiction. Finally, settlers who discovered that their allocation documents were not genuine went to court but lost their cases. The chapter also discussed the Madiba land dispute, where Molema went to court but lost his case as the real owner of Madiba to Seenyana Mokoto, whose descendants are said to have arrived earlier than the ancestors of Molema. The the next chapter engages in a comparative analysis of peace building strategies in Ezza and Barolong.

CHAPTER SEVEN: COMPARATIVE IMPACT ANALYSIS AND PEACEBUILDING STRATEGIES

7.1 INTRODUCTION

When Kaplan (1994) proposed the concept of "the coming anarchy", he was not taken seriously. However, he was emphatic on his position that a combination of crime, poverty, environmental decay and conflicts as well as war make the world a far more volatile and violent place. Studies have shown that boundary or land disputes are amongst the most common and progressive forms of conflict in many African countries (from the colonial era until today) (Jaja, 2009:500-517; Adada 2009:476-485). Intermittent conflicts and disputes have been experienced within the Nigerian setting and among the Barolong. In the Ratshidi Barolong-baTlharo conflict, there were flare-ups in 1881, 1989-1902, 1931, 1935 and 1946-1950. Some of these flare-ups in both Barolong conflict settings lasted for years. Eze (2007) maintains that the Ezza-Ojiegbe on the one hand and Mgbalukwu as well as Obeagu communities on the other, fought against each other in 1910, 1966, 1975, 1986, 1989, and 1993 as well as from 2005 to 2007. The Ezza-Ezillo and Ezillo conflicts started in the 1950s and intensified in 1992, 1996, 1997, 2006, 2007 and 2008-2011. The recent cases of their conflict were more dangerous and devastating. The resurgence of violence has been interpreted in a myriad of ways, from being equated to tribal and ethnic clashes to being ascribed as politically motivated conflict, in which a few tribal demagogues sustain themselves by making populist pronouncements against neighbouring communities and inciting community sentiments towards general breakdown of law and order, particularly with the radicalization and brainwashing of the male youths (Simiyu, 2008:3).

Ironically, land conflict entails many forms of political, economic and social costs, including the costs of policing conflicts, loss of lives, livelihoods and property, displacements and social as well as economic insecurity. As a result of their debilitating effects, land conflicts have been a source of public concern in Nigeria and South Africa. The then Governor of Ebonyi State, while reacting to the impact of the 2008 conflict, maintained that Ezillo is now desolate and in ruins. I visited the war-torn areas. No sign of life has returned to the community. It is still desolate and now eerie and forbidding. It is a sceptre of the greatest inhumanity of man to his fellow man - the type that no one can ever wish his worst enemy (Elechi, 2008:3).

The above statement by a former governor of the state created the image of an Ezillo that had been reduced to rubble due to the conflict. Ukor *et. al.* (2007:1) while commenting on the impact of the Mgbalukwu-Obeagu Isu and Ojiegbe-Ezza conflict maintain that "the effect of the war cannot be over emphasised. For many houses have been burnt, several families have been rendered homeless and the children vagrants. What more can we say, in fact, the affected areas and their environs are in a sorry state. The crisis has negatively affected every facet of the people's lives economically, socially, religiously, academically, politically and other wise."

This chapter compares the dynamics of both conflicts, their impacts within their respective societies in particular and within the entire countries (Nigeria and South Africa) in general. It also presents lessons drawn from these conflicts, which will be helpful to other heterogeneous societies found across Africa. The historic peace strategies adopted in managing the conflicts are also discussed in this chapter.

7.2 POLITICAL IMPACT

During colonial rule, administrators spent a lot of energy and resources to monitor Ezza wars against their neighbours. They generally saw them as a group of people who engaged in ruthless and non-progressive militarism at the slightest provocation (Beaumont, 1936:12; Chapman, 1930). Ezza warfare affected the dynamics of colonialism in Northeastern Igboland. The British concluded that they must declare total war on the Ezza in order to open what later became the Abakaliki and Afikpo Divisions up for colonial exploitation. This was because Ezza clusters had spread to different parts of the communities that constituted the colonial divisions. After independence, the Ezza people's political affiliation is often driven by the protection of the bond and interest of their nation and the people at conflict with them tend to support different political parties. Uche (2016) argues that the Ezza-Ezillo and Ezillo people hardly align with each other during the period of politics. Each group tends not to join and support candidates from the other group.

Ani (2015a:5) maintains that in 1990, after the creation of Ishielu Local Government Area, with headquarters in Ezillo, the community mapped out a parcel of land at Isimkpuma for the establishment of offices for the National Electoral Commission (NEC), the Nigerian Police

and National Population Commission (NPC). It was alleged that through the help of Ereke Felix, the then Ishielu Local Government Area Chairman, who was an Ezza man who flooded his Ezza kinsmen in the area mapped out for federal establishments. Anozie (1991:5) moots that the conflict at that time, which had deepened between Ezza settlers and Ezillo indigenes in the locality, took a dangerous dimension as the Ezillo accused the local government chairman of supporting the Ezza in building houses in a place meant for government offices. At the peak of the conflict, in the 21st century, all the political actors within Ebonyi State were affected directly.

Ani (2015a:6) maintains that the then Ebonyi State Governor, Marthin Elechi, visited the conflict-ridden area on 11th May, 2008 and dispatched security forces to the area but the action did not halt the burning of houses and killing of people. He equally assessed the conflict situation and pleaded with architects of the conflict to stop further hostilities and give the Ebonyi State Government a chance to restore peace in the area. Consequently, on 18th May 2008 some major stakeholders who were very shocked and terribly disturbed at the scale of destruction in Ezillo, assembled at the Government House, Abakaliki, to deliberate on the crisis and proffer solutions on how best to handle the situation. This team of peace-makers comprised traditional rulers and other political leaders from Ishielu, Ohaukwu, Ezza, Ikwo and Izzi. They were made up of notable men of experience and status in their various communities. After they had been briefed on the situation at Ezillo, they discussed at length and recommended that traditional African methods of resolving such crisis in Abakaliki bloc be adopted to ensure an early return of peace in Ezillo. The Ebonyi State Government accepted their recommendations and traditional peacebuilding rites were performed the following day (Elechi, 2008:1). Unfortunately, the traditional peacebuilding rites of oath taking and peace covenant did not stop the wind of the conflict, which even increased. A fundamental reason for the failure of this traditional peacebuilding approach was the poor cooperation and participation of the major actors involved in the conflict. That year (2008) witnessed continuous destruction of lives and properties until December due to the conflict.

There was a dusk to dawn curfew from 3rd October 2008 to 31st December 2008, except on the Federal Highway from Abakaliki to Enugu. Elechi's government did not just rely on the position of the traditional rulers to pursue peace in Ezza through the traditional way but

engaged on a further search for peace strategies in the area. With the worsening of the conflict, the Ebonyi State Peace Committee members and leaders from Ezza North and South Local Government Areas led by the then Deputy Governor, Elder Professor Chigozie Ogbu, also visited and discussed with the Ezza-Ezillo as well as Ezillo people separately and encouraged them to follow the part of peace (Elechi, 2008:2). When the Peace Committee submitted their findings, it took the then Ebonyi State administration time to study and digest the report. As the government tried to study the recommendations, the masses of the state began to criticize them. The then leadership of the state told its critiques that government has taken time to study and reflect on the Report of the Peace Committee and their recommendations. The Ebonyi State Government also stated that they were gathering other alternative recommendations from individuals and institutions in order to ensure that peace is restored permanently at Ezillo and other parts of the state. Governor Elechi stated that he has engaged in a painstaking consideration of the report, which made uninformed people to perceive the Ebonyi State Government as slow in the conflict resolution. According to him, Government would not be precipitated into hasty decisions on matters concerning human life and security, especially as there were a plethora of petitions and allegations, which were calculated to misinform and mislead the Government into taking faulty steps in order to settle personal scores. The Government re-iterated that it is necessary to hold further dialogue with leaders and well-meaning people of both conflict sides so that Government's ultimate decisions would not be faulted (Elechi, 2008:2).

In 2010, the then Ebonyi State administration maintained that the conflict had strong political undertones. The Ebonyi State Government made their position known in a Press Conference presented by the then Commissioner of Information and State Orientation, Comrade Egwu Chima, in the presence of the Commissioner for Grants and Donor Agencies, Elder Fred Udeogu and his counterpart in the Ministry of Local Government and Chieftaincy Matters, Chief Celestine Nwali on 9th February 2010. The Ebonyi State Government stated that a gang of politicians of Ebonyi origin had turned themselves into what they called an urban guerrilla that sponsored and financed the importation of explosives, arms and ammunitions as well as mercenaries into the conflict-ridden Ezillo environment. The Government, therefore, warned its citizens to be conscious of a security roadmap that was in place to track the black sheep that was igniting the fire of conflicts within the state. Comrade Chima stated that the attention of the Ebonyi State Government has been brought to a grand and well perfected

design by the same group of unrepentant political demagogues who have vowed that Ebonyi State would not have peace. According to him, what was most painful, unfortunate and awful was that the conflict was the handiwork of Ebonyi people, most of who are domiciled in Abuja. They indulge multifariously in the sponsorship and inciting of offensive and injurious propaganda, which promotes political apathy within the state. Such publications also push the masses to withdraw their legitimate support and cooperation with Ebonyi State Government. They equally sponsor destabilising rumours, motivate disobedience to government directives and catalyze insecurity. These sons and daughters of the state who were promoting the conflict were doing everything to ensure that Ebonyi State is destabilised. Chima went on to argue that a group of evil-minded political cynics in Ebonyi State had hired mercenaries to further complicate the already violent situation in Ezillo. According to their plan, this time, they intended to embarrass the soldiers who had maintained an unusual peaceful position in the arena all these troubled times (Inya, 2010b:18). Ironically, if the then Ebonyi State Government had the necessary strategic information that warriors were hired, they should have strengthened their intelligence gathering mechanism to apprehend these foreign men and women that fuel violence in the state.

The Ebonyi State Government under Martins Elechi was equally heavily criticized for using the machinery of the state to promote the arrest and imprisonment of Ezza men and women over the Ezillo conflict with Ezza settlers. Igboke (2016) maintains Governor Elechi used the state resources to favour Ezillo people because he believed the Ezza people did not vote for him during the elections. Inya (2010a:17) argues that following the joint Ebonyi State and Federal Police attack on the hide-out of warlords in Ezza-Ezillo in March, 2010, a total of thirty four (34) people, mainly of Ezza origin were arrested in enclaves of warlords which they attacked through air and ground operations from 2am of 27th March to 31st March 2010 and on 6th April 2010. The arrest brought the number of persons arrested in connection to that Ezza-Ezillo and Ezillo conflict (of 2010) to seventy two (72). The Ebonyi State Government, speaking through the then Commissioner of Information and State Orientation, Comrade Egwu Chima thanked the police for their professionalism in raiding the area and making useful arrests to show further that the hands of the state government were clean over the allegations of politically-engineered arrests. According to Egwu Chima, the Ebonyi State Police High Command had completely absolved the Governor Marthin Elechi administration of any blame or link resulting from insinuations in some mischievous quarters that he had a

hand in the listing of those who were invited to the Police Headquarters, Abuja for interrogation, detention as well as the bail that followed. The Ebonyi State Police command through their spokesman emphasised that the arrest order were the direct steps and decisions taken solely by the police and other security agencies that had better intelligence report on the matter. He stated that Governor Elechi must be specially commended for his extra-ordinary wisdom, maturity and patience in the way and manner he had handled the crisis in spite of obvious and orchestrated provocations against the Government by those who after promoting the crisis, go behind to accuse the Chief Elechi-led administration of leadership inertia (Inya, 2010a:17).

The Ebonyi State Government also demarcated the border between the Ezillo and the Ezza-Ezillo borders after providing additional land mass to the Ezza-Ezillo as would be shown in the later part of this chapter. However, Governor Elechi maintained that "there is, for now only one traditional ruler for Ezillo community into whose cabinet the Ezza-Ezillo will appoint their representatives. The issue of autonomous community would be looked into only if and when the government decided to review such demands throughout Ebonyi State" (Elechi, 2008:4). The conflict continued throughout 2009. Amidst the conflict in October 2009, the then Speaker of the Ebonyi State House of Assembly, Rt. Hon. Augustine Nwankwagu, visited the area with the Ebonyi State Local Government Peace Committee on Ezillo. He maintained "the conflict which had lasted for fifteen (15) months, (a year and three months at that time) had affected people who were not from the area and urged them to accept government position on the matter and embrace peace" (Egede, 2009:26).

Inya (2009b:1&18) argues that it looked like a drama for more than an hour on Saturday, 29th August 2009, at Ezillo as the war raging between Ezza settlers and Ezillo rolled into the Enugu-Abakaliki Federal High Way. The warriors blocked the entire road to traffic, including the then Governor Elechi's convoy, which was on the way to Owerri, Imo State for official assignment from passing. A journalist in the Governor's convoy revealed that Governor Elechi was forced to step down from his vehicle as a result of the violence, following sporadic shooting by the warlords. Soldiers sent to the area for peace-keeping and others from Military Cantonment, Nkwagu, were mobilised to go and clear the road for the governor's convoy as the situation degenerated into what the police and soldiers in the

governor's convoy could not control, even as dead bodies were littered on the road. "When the soldiers arrived, they crossed the governor and his convoy across one of the hottest areas where a group of people suspected to be war mercenaries, were seen in the bush patrolling" (Inya, 2009b:18).

Moreover, during the period of the joint Ebonyi and Federal Police command raid on the Ezillo war zone, it was reported that the whole of Ishielu Local Government Areas was locked up. Inya (2010a:17) maintains "nobody was found at the local government headquarters, Ishielu, as offices in the council headquarters were under lock and key." The mid-year security report of the then Ebonyi State Commissioner of Police, Dipo Ayeni disclosed that his men recovered two charred bodies on a shallow grave, which he declared were part of those killed at Ezillo when the war started, adding that the relations of the dead bodies had come forward and collected the remains of their loved ones. He went on to reveal that men of his state command recovered a number of arms in isolated spots near the contested area, which they suspected had been hidden by warlords. The recovered arms include - four K2 rifles, three locally made single barrel guns, one locally made double barrel shot gun, one single barrel shot gun as well as twenty six (26) rounds of 5.56 live ammunition and a cutlass (Inya, 2010d:19).

The impact of the conflict spread to different regions of Nigeria. Babatunde O. Williams of Folahade Estate, Owode-Yewa Local Government Area of Ogun State announced to his kinsmen that his two cousins, Tayo Oyewusi of Atakumata Local Government Area, Osun State and Muritala Adisa Raji of Ayetoro, Yewa Local Government Area, Ogun State lost their lives in the Ezillo conflict-riden zone. He appealed to the then Governor of Ebonyi State, Chief Martin Elechi and re-appealed through the Governor of Osun State, Prince Olagunsoye Oyinyola for one hundred million naira (#100,000,000) to be used for their burial and family assistance, which he did not receive at the time of the report (Ogbonaya, 2010:18).

Similarly, in 2010, the Governor of Ebonyi State, Martins Elechi, travelled to Calabar, the seat of power of its neighbouring state and expressed the heart-felt condolences of Ebonyi State to the government and people of Cross River State over the killing of their citizen in

Ezillo. The same period witnessed the condolence message from the then Speaker of Ebonyi State House of Assembly, Barrister Augustine Nwankwegu on behalf of his members, expressing the law makers' condolence to Cross River people and emphasized that the killings of people from neighbouring state at Ezillo were not pre-meditated. It read partly as follows: "we the Government and good people of Ebonyi State are deeply touched by that mindless act of brutality unleashed on innocent citizens. We are indeed very sorry for it" (Nwani, 2010:1). Within the height of the Ezillo conflict, other communities that have Ezza settlers became agitated and began to strategize on how to curb their influence before their communities would become another theatre of conflict like Ezillo.

Effium was one of the communities where the multiplier effect of the Ezillo and Ezza-Ezillo conflict manifested itself. The people of Effium wanted to challenge the growing dominance of Ezza settlers in their local polity. The implication became that today, there is deep-rooted schism between the very few surviving Effium people and the Ezza-Effium, who are growing in political strength and social prowess, thereby generating increasing competition with the former landlord, who now sees them as a threat to their economic, social and political rights in the scheme of things within the community and Ebonyi State in general. The impact of Ezza conflict with their neighbours was also felt in Agila where Ezza clusters are found.

In 1992, there was a rift between Chief Oriri Ocheje and the youths of Ijigban under the aegis of Ijigban Development Elites Association of Benue State, Nigeria. They accused the chief of not doing anything serious to checkmate the influx of Ezza and Izzi people into Ojaba I, Ojaba II and Ojaba III as well as Anmeka settlements, which was a place where the youths still had vacant space to build their structures in the future. In a communiqué signed by C. O. Onuma and B. A. Ochulayi, the President and Secretary of the association after their meeting held on 22nd August 1992; they called on the District Head and elders of the community to use all available strategies to check the Ezza and Izzi act of land grabbing in their community. Otokpa (2013:52) argues that in 1976, the elders and chiefs of Ijigban agreed that the Izzi and Ezza should leave the land. The agreement, dated 28th September, 1976 was not honoured. In 1990, when the matter was brought before the Caretaker Committee of Ado Local Government Area, the Chairman, Daniel Shaibu Ede, visited Ojaba I, Ojaba II, and Ojaba III. After hearing from representatives of Ijigban, Izzi and Ezza, he advised that in

order to allow peace to reign, settlers should vacate the occupied land on or before 31st March 1991. The directive was not obeyed. On 13th May 1991, the incoming Local Government Area Chairman, Tony Iteji Ogoro visited the crisis-prone areas and ordered the Ezza and Izzi people to relocate to their original settlement in Ijigban land. The Ezza and Izzi did not obey the council boss but rather went to the High Court of Justice in Otukpo to get a legal injunction stopping the act of ejecting them and claiming ten million naira damages for their properties destroyed in the course of the conflict (Otokpa, 2013:53).

In South Africa, Manson and Mbenga (2014:94) hold that "in the baTlhaping/ ba Tlharo reserves, land was a source of frequent conflict with the White community and there are many cases of Whites illegally hunting, prospecting, grazing animals or quarrying in the reserves." In addition, Ezza and neighbours in Nigeria as well as the people of Barolong were victims of colonial imperialism. While the Anglo-Boer War was the zenith of the clash that followed the manipulations of imperial interest in South Africa, the Anglo-Ezza war was fought to open-up Ezza nation to imperial rule. The land dispute in Barolong, South Africa, affected activities of the Tribal Authority at that time. Molema (1984: ii) maintains that at that time, the Tribal Authority Council was supposed to be founded and built upon the chief and his immediate headmen. Unfortunately, Molema who was the number one headman in Mafikeng was purposefully and deliberately cut off. He argues that if for some obscure reasons, Molema's traditional rights and birth right like that of headman-ship in Mafikeng "was illegally supposed to be annulled, it was but mere phantasmagoria as far as logic is concerned" (Molema, 1984:ii-iii).

North West Provincial Archives and Library (1985:2) maintain that the colonial lords were not happy with how acting Chief Lekoko administered land in Barolong Boo-Ratshidi Tribal Authority as at 1984. Lekoko was accused of poorly managing land. They also frowned at the settlement pattern that followed in the face of widespread influx in the area. Archival documents reveal that the chief was advised to plan the areas adjoining the Mmabatho proclaimed area, with the assistance of the Government Planning Division. Unfortunately, Chief Lekoko never adhered to the request. "The Chief took long to react, prompting the government to raise concerns in Motlhabeng, North and North West of Mmabatho Sun Hotel, over the mushrooming of shanties all over the place. People were allowed thereafter to erect

shanties in spite of the warnings from his office. The chief needed some form of punishment for all these atrocities" (North West Provincial Archives and Library, 1985:3).

It should be stated that the rise of colonialism in Barolong changed their political system and worsened the nature of the conflict. It would be recalled that there was no tribal council in Barolong until 1965 when the Tribal Authority was proclaimed (Breutz, 1972). Before that time, the chief had a *Lekgotla,* which was a kind of executive council made up of twelve (12) men and the headmen, selected on the strength of their character and record of integrity as well as their contribution to the development of Barolong society. The creation of colonial boundaries added its own peculiar problems as it generated border disputes through administrative mergers. They even created puppet chiefs to replace those that were more legitimate to the local population in a bid to ensure that they attained the colonial imperial goals. North West Provincial Archives and Library (1991:1) documents that as a result of colonial boundaries, the four areas of Kraipan, Upper Setlhagole, Lower Setlhagole and Tlhakajeng had been placed under Kgosi Phoi, who became a *kgosi* by virtue of the policies of the then British Government. In terms of tradition and according to the genealogy of the chiefly family of the Barolong, the *dikgosana* of the four areas were in fact the senior of Kgosi Phoi. Kgosi Phoi and other four headmen used to be the subjects of Kgosi Moshoette of Kunana. The colonial boundaries, however, cut the tribal area into two and the Bogosi of Phoi had then, somewhat artificially, been created. Tradition and genealogical seniority played important roles and it can be expected that people senior in rank to Kgosi Phoi, will not readily accept his authority (North West Provincial Archives and Library, 1991:1).

An interesting aspect of the clash between the Barolong Ratshidi and the Barolong Ratlou manifested in the Barolong National Council (BNC). The BNC was formed in 1915. Ironically, this was the peak of the intra Barolong conflict over Lotlhakane. "The stated intention of the BNC was to unify the Barolong through the mobilisation of ethnic sentiments, but the underlying objective, strongly suggested by the timing of its founding, was to dilute the influence of the Ratshidi" (Manson and Mbenga, 2014:96). It is alleged that Rev. E. M. Sehumo, who founded the Council, after breaking away from the Roman Catholic Church to start the African Catholic Church, flooded the leadership with the Barolong Rapulana as well as the Ratlou and neglected prominent people from Barolong Ratshidi.

Manson and Mbenga, (2014:96) state that the association collapsed following the massive criticisms and reactions of the Ratshidi people when it was discovered that the then Kgosi of Rapulana, E. M. Matla and the BNC founder, Rev. Sehumo, embezzled £578 and £78 respectively from the council's fund.

Oral interviews also reveals that in contemporary South Africa in general and Barolong in particular, land ownership and its authenticity have become a hotly contested issue amongst the populace. It is so heightened that it occupies central places in the dynamics of political debates and campaigns to win electoral votes, not only in Barolong but in many parts of South Africa (Ditiro, 2016; Itumeleng, 2016; Lesedi, 2016, Masego 2016).

7.3 ECONOMIC IMPACT

Land conflicts in Nigeria and South Africa have direct negative effects on the economy of the individuals, groups and diverse populations caught-up in the face of the conflict divide discussed in this study. An environment ravaged by conflict anywhere in the world, records reduced trade and investment. This is because those who engage in buying and selling would be fighting first for the protection of their lives, followed by the security of their goods and business investments in the conflict-ravaged environment. In many cases, warlords and warriors who engage in conflict go into extensive loathing of any available item of trade, which they often perceive as part of their booties. Even those who engage in small and medium - scale enterprises are often frustrated-out of business in the face of full blown land conflict. During the era of land conflict, the remaining uncontested parcels of land receive high social demand as citizens easily begin to compete to buy parcels of land in safer parts of the community. The implication remains that there will be demand-push inflation, leading to geometric rise in price of land as well as the amounts paid to land agents/ - land speculators.

An economic analysis of the Nigerian conflict terrain shows that Ezza settlers fought for the rich Abanaba in Mgbalukwu-Obeagu Isu, Agila farm settlement and Egu-Echara in Ezillo in order to explore its fertile and high crop yielding potential. The fertile parcels of land have high multiplier economic implications emanating from the sales of harvested products from

such farms. Njoku (2016) maintains "the Abanaba contested land in Isu useful for cultivation of various food crops such as rice, cassava, yam, maize, beans, *okro* and plantian". The conflict caused serious economic setbacks for the people of Mgbalukwu, Obeagu Isu and Ojiegbe-Ezza (Okorie, 2016).

In the Isu conflict area, the quest by the colonial masters to collect tax was complicated by the dynamics of Mgbalukwu-Obeagu Isu conflict with the Ojiegbe-Ezza. Ani and Osisioma (2015:4) state that some people of Ojiegbe-Ezza descent decided to relocate to the other side of Isu land, where they would pay their colonial tax at a cheaper rate and sometimes even evade it. Some crossed over to the Abakaliki Division, due to patriotic and micro-nationalist sentiments that arose in the course of the conflict. This is because Abakaliki Division was the division of their origin while Afikpo was the division of their Isu landlords. The terrible and widespread negligence of colonial masters to the cultural history of the people (as long as their exploitative interest was involved), divided the Ezza people in Isu land of Obeagu and Mgbalukwu into the Afikpo and Abakaliki Divisions, where they were expected to pay taxes in order to avoid threats of clashes between the Abakaliki and Afikpo District Officers (Ani, 2012c: 221-237). In order to resolve the tax conflict within the Isu conflict area, a tax boundary was drawn from Efuru stream at Okpuru Nwaneke pond, back to Mgbalukwu by the British colonial lords. "Those who lived between Mgbalukwu and Efuru stream paid their tax at Afikpo, while those who live around the Efuru River to Abanaba paid at Abakaliki Division though living in Isu. Those who paid to Afikpo were given the name Ojiegbe in order to differentiate them from their kiths and kin who paid to Abakaliki" (Ani, 2009:5).

When the conflict intensified in the above Isu setting, there was massive migration by the both the Ezza settlers and the Isu landlords to evade the conflict impact. Those who migrated during the colonial era could be divided into individual and groups that fled from collapsed economic fortunes as they continually moved to other parts of the Isu and Ezza clan, thus making them a strong factor for the needed culture of hospitality in intra and inter-group relations both with their kiths and kin as well as their neighbours. Ani (2009:32) argues that "the productive population fled the communities for their security". The migration was not only done by the productive population but by those who felt threatened as well as those lacking the means to survive throughout the phases of the conflict (Ani & Osisioma, 2015: 4).

Furthermore, the economic implications of the Ezza-Ezillo conflict with the Ezillo people remain multi-dimensional. During the period of the intermittent attack, the popular Ezillo market was often closed down (Inya, 2010:17). The closure of this popular market due to attacks from warriors had multiple forms of economic impact on the conflict-ravaged society and the larger parts of Ebonyi State. Uche (2016) argues that a major form of economic dimension of the Ezillo conflict with Ezza settlers is often to launch attacks on market days to disrupt the economic activities of their presumed enemy. Similarly, Henry (2016) maintains that the Ezza attacked the Effium on their market days. Odu (2016) is of the opinion that the Ezza in Ezillo, made frantic effort to establish their own markets and engage in buying and selling the same day the Ezillo market was held. It should be noted that in Igboland, the major market in most communities is often held on one of the four traditional market days called *Nkwo, Eke, Orie and Afor* (which have no English translation). Ibini (2016) states that Ezza people in Ezillo desires were to control several Ezillo farms in order to improve their market economy. Poor farmers in the village, who sparingly went to farm due to heated-up scenarios and insecurity, were also denied the platform to sell their existing stock at home, thus increasing their financial vulnerability.

The Ezza-Ezillo and Ezillo conflict also affected quarry business in Ebonyi State. Igboke (2016) argues that the Ezza-Ezillo had quarry sites in the contested area with Ezillo people. According to Igboke (2016), Governor Elechi's administration expelled the Ezza owners from the site, thus allowing Ezillo people to make quick money from the quarry business. However, Ezillo people maintain that it was impossible for Ezza settlers to claim the quarry land and site as they were originally owned by Ezillo people before the Ezza took over through force. The site was a major source of boulders (crushed stones of different sizes) used for road construction. The high economic value of the business, which had collapsed significantly, cannot be over-emphasised.

The economic and social implications of the destruction of people's houses cannot also be over-emphasised. The houses of Okonwo Enu, Enuke Nwede, Ede Nwogbodo, Jesephat Okwor, Okpube Omeri and Ali Nwede Ebenyi were burned in Isimkpuma, Ugbonna and Ndiagu-Ugwu villages of Ezillo in the 2008 crisis. In the case of Alinwede Ebenyi, he was in the house when it was set ablaze but Ezillo people managed to rescue him half dead.

However, his wife was given a cutlass cut (Ezillo Memorandum, 2008: 1-2). Billions of naira were lost in re-building a number of these houses. The economic worth of the properties that were damaged during the war cannot be properly estimated. Furthermore, the owners of the over two hundred buildings that were completely burned-down (Inya, 2010:17) found themselves crashing from landlords and house-owners to tenants. The worst scenario was that the tenancy rate in different parts of Ebonyi State was at cut-throat prices. Some of the buildings that were burned- down had the stock of goods previously used by bread-winners of different families to make ends meet. All these goods were burned to ashes thereby weakening the economic base of many families.

There was also massive loss in the number of traders on the High Way to Enugu, Onitsha, Nnewi and Lagos for business from Ebonyi. Those who came to buy Izzi yam and Ikwo/ Abakaliki rice stopped coming in the inter-war years at Ezillo because a number of business men were burnt in their vehicles. Major transporters in Ebonyi State, from Peace Mass Transit to Young Shall Grow, Enugu North Transport Company, Onitsha South Mass Transit as well as Romchi Mass Transit, Ifesinachi Motors felt the negative impact of the conflict in Ezillo. It is said that vehicles from several companies were burned, forcing transporters to use Abakaliki-Afikpo-Owerri to Onitsha or Abakaliki-Isu-Agbani to Enugu, thus incurring multiple fuel cost, which they transferred onto commuters.

Inya (2010:17) documents pictures of fleets of vehicles burned during the Ezza-Ezillo mayhem (see Appendix). Some of the vehicles burnt had the remains of human bones that were the relics of those inside the vehicles before they were set ablaze (Inya, 2010:17). While a number of people stopped travelling out of the state, others counted their financial loss and stress due to the long distance that they had to follow. The management of these transport companies continued to complain that irrespective of the hike in the cost of transportation, they hardly covered their expenses. A number of them reduced the number of vehicles placed on the roads just to retain their customer relations. Again, Inya (2009a:1 &19) records how military men posted to the conflict-torn area in 2009, unleashed different forms of inhuman treatment on drivers using the Abakaliki-Enugu High Way.

It was a very horrible experience to travel in fear over the safety of one's life at Ezillo. But many tourists cancelled their movement because they did not want to be dehumanized by either the soldiers or warlords at Ezillo. Ani (2015a:7) moots that it was due to the hard experiences that drivers and their passengers faces at the dawn of the conflict that forced drivers and those that must engage on a very vital journey outside the state, at the time, to negotiate their bearing through Imo, Abia, Benue and Cross River states' routes; to avoid loss of lives, delays, burning of vehicles and the robbery that characterised Ezillo-hot spots in the course of the recurrent conflict. Narrating his experience during the 24th July clash of the army as well as gunmen in Ezza-Ezillo area, a mass transit driver of the Central Mass Transit (CMT), who gave his name as Ifeanyi and doubled as an indigene of one of the two warring communities, stated that on that faithful day, as he drove closer to the Ezillo market junction, there was a blockade of the area. He maintains that when he greeted a driver colleague with his horn; he was forced to come down from my vehicle, including his conductor. When they alighted, some soldiers took them to a very bushy area where they were punished with three hours intensive grass-cutting under close supervision. After the three hours of intensive work, they were liberated and given one loaf of bread each, *akara* balls and sachet water to cool off the intensive heat. They were very angry with the fate that befell them and argued that the army should have placed a notice that drivers should not hoot in the conflict area. Many of the passengers that were maltreated do not know the reason for the traffic-jam on the road. They were rather thinking it could be an accident, until they were punished (Inya, 2009c:19).

The extortion by security personnel on the different security checkpoints created its own forms of economic impact. The police, mobile police men as well as the army on the road in the communities that experienced historic conflicts with Ezza in Nigeria had a progressive culture of stopping road-users and extorting money from them in the disguise of security watch. They would, sometimes, ask for the particulars of a vehicle and if they suspected the papers of the vehicle were inappropriate or not up-to-date, then such a road user would be asked to park indefinitely. The only way to continue such journey would be to bargain with the security men for an amount of money to be paid before the vehicle and commuters continued with their journey. There were equally cases where commuters were delayed in long queues of vehicles waiting to be searched for hours. The drivers and commuters would be systematically delayed in such an annoying manner by these men until forced to 'settle' with cash before the security men would make a way for them to continue their trip. In the

course of such delay, those who had business engagements that were time-bound, lost irreplaceable time, thus implying a lot of money (as popularly stated in Nigeria, time is money). It should be recalled that there was widespread criticism of the soldiers for their brutality and strategies adopted in enforcing peace and security, especially in the course of their stop and search operations.

The direct dynamics of the Ezza and Ezza –Ezillo conflicts also affected the people's market economy. At the time of the conflict, Ezza people took-over Nwafor Isimkpuma Ezillo evening market and renamed it Eke Ezza (Ani, 2015:5). The people of Iyonu, Agila, Ezza, Ezillo, Mgbalukwu and Obeagu Isu have also lamented over the multiplier economic effects of the massive destruction of properties that befell the citizenry following Ezza conflicts. The worth of such properties remains difficult to be properly determined. Chief Sylvester Obi, an Iyonu man and a former liaison officer to Governor Sam Egwu and a People's Democratic Party (PDP) chieftain in Ebonyi State revealed that his house, which was amongst the buildings destroyed by suspected Ezillo warlords "worth not less than four million naira (#4m) was vandalized by the militants. When Iyonu invited video camera men to record all the damages in the community, Ezillo people blocked them on the road and warned them not to enter the Iyonu community with the video camera" (Inya, 2010f:1). The act of preventing a video record of the impact of the conflict is a way of reducing the hardcore evidence of the conflict and its negative effect from reaching more people, especially in this age of social media.

The destruction of the Greater Ezillo water scheme in 2010 created serious social and economic hardship for Ebonyi people. Igwe, Nwani, Ogbonna and Inya (2010:1) maintain the then Governor of Ebonyi State, Chief Martin Elechi and the then State Commissioner of Police, Mr. Dipo Ayeni went to inspect the level of damage to the infrastructure in Ezillo, "especially the Greater Ezillo Water Scheme". The water scheme was a major source of water to almost half of the communities in Ebonyi State. Consequently, its destruction created serious financial challenges for the majority of Ebonyians, who had no personal bore hole. The cost of a gallon of water skyrocketed from two gallons for five naira to ten naira per gallon. It was not just the fact that there was price hike, the number of people who will

trek very long distances in search of where to buy water and the human traffic created at the point of sale, made it difficult for a lot of people to go to work or business early.

Furthermore, Onoja (2011:177) states that Agila people complained that the Ezza and their masters in Abakaliki collaborated in felling their economic trees and carried them with the speed of lightening. They accused the Ezza of constructing motor roads from Ebonyi to parts of Agila land without their permission and used the roads to quicken the evacuation of these economic trees from Agila land. They also complained that the Ezza built their own markets in Agila settlements without seeking the permission and approval of Agila traditional chiefs and elders (Onoja, 2011:177). The economic implication of the Nkalaha conflict with Ezza settlers is that both parties hardly patronise each other in the act of buying and selling of goods in their different markets as found in Ezillo (Agha, 2016).

Farming, which is the mainstay of the people's economy in Isu, Ezillo, Agila and Ezza was disrupted for years due to the intermittent cases of Ezza conflicts in Nigeria. These disruptions had negative impact on the food security level of communities involved in the conflict. Since people could no longer go to farm and cultivate what they would eat with their immediate and extended families, everybody in the affected community competed for the few farm products produced by few farmers in the communities affected by the conflicts. The situation was worsened by the fact that those goods from other communities brought in by small-scale marketers could not satisfy the demands from the masses. Marketers counting the risk of going to sell their products in such 'unsafe' areas as well as the crisis of demand-pushed inflation often charged higher prices than their original prices in times of peace. The conflict also generated heavy economic problems for hundreds of farmers who, traditionally, earned their living from farming (in the portion of land that became contested during the conflicts).

The economic imperatives of security management in contested zones between the Ezza people and their neighbours remain multi-dimensional. In both the time of conflict outbreak between the Ezza-Ezillo and Ezillo, Ezza-Agila and Agila, Mgbalukwu-Obeagu Isu and Ojiegbe Ezza, Ezza-Idembia and Oshiri, a lot of money was spent in policing the area by

governments at Ebonyi and Benue States as well as local government levels. In the conflict areas, the Ebonyi State Government quickly built a police station in Ōshiri and a temporary police post at Mgbalukwu while a secondary school was converted into a mobile police barracks at Ezillo. Money spent in feeding, maintenance, arming and logistic support for the joint security operation during the outbreak of Ezza conflicts, cannot be over-emphasised. The then Governor of Ebonyi State, Chief Martin Elechi maintained that the Ebonyi State Government was spending the sum of seventy million naira on a weekly basis in its bid to manage the Ezza-Ezillo conflict (Nwani & Inya, 2010:1). The implication was that when a relatively poor state such as Ebonyi that had no industries and being amongst the states with the lowest federal allocation as well as poor internally-generated revenue began to spend the millions stated above just to manage one out of the many inter-communal conflicts; the resources needed to run other dynamics of state-craft would be drained into valueless dynamics of internal conflict. The Chief Executive of the State stated maintained the Ezillo experiment was been expensive and very costly to the government and people of Ebonyi State. According to Governor Elechi, the state had to send soldiers for the peace-keeping in a bid to prevent the conflict from becoming something else (Nwani & Inya, 2010:18).

In the Ezza-Agila and Agila conflict setting, the selling of land by the newly emerged Ezza land-lords to their kith and kin led to the influx of more immigrants and settlers into the land. The multiplier effect of the sale of land was the increased pressure on the already 'pressurized' land. Land shortages became acute leading to more conflict and clashes between Agila youths who needed this land for farming and building construction on the one hand and the Ezza who had strong grip of the land on the other (Onoja, 2011:206).

The issue of land grabbing and illegal sales took a more dangerous dimension after the Ezza-Agila conflict with Agila people in 1965-1967. Agila land collaborators took advantage of the abandonment of farm settlements by the people of Agila, to further the sale of land to the Ezza. Unknown to the leadership of Agila people, these collaborators sold these farm settlements, including economic trees to the Ezza, who changed their 'tenant at will' status to that of 'land owners.' The issue came to the fore when some Agila original settlers of these settlements attempted to access their economic trees and were refused entry into the settlements (Onoja, 2011:238). The new Ezza buyers of the land, maintained the place now

belonged to them and that no Agila man had the right whatsoever to claim the fruit of the economic trees in the land.

There were also economic implications of the Barolong land dispute. Manson and Mbenga (2014:98) argue that "the Lopurung 'rebels' were a fairly successful group of peasant producers" in South Africa. The implication is that the Mosii and Tshipitota Motseakhumo competed over who won the trade alliance with the Whites in Lopurung. This trade alliance with the Whites influenced other forms of strategic advantages from them and the colonial government. Hence, jealousy and strategic economic interest were part of the reasons that led to the call for the relocation of settlers in Bechuanaland reserves. Ironically, the fact that the so-called rebels were already doing 'well' in their trade, made them to fight for adjudication of the case in a competent court.

One impact of the crisis within the Barolong reserves was that among the Ratshidi Barolong, eighty-four per cent of men and fifty-four per cent of women, had sought works away from Mafikeng for months (Comaroff, 1973:54). The massive movement of men and women away from Mafikeng could be explained as a migratory push in order to escape close contact with their dispute-ravaged homeland. At the time of the crisis, the people's grazing and crop farming culture was heavily affected. This was because in the wake of conflict, in Africa and many other parts of the globe, the available healthy men and sometimes children were often recruited by force to join the 'army' to fight against the enemies of the people. Hence, in a bid to ensure that one was not forced into such blood-spilling ventures, a speedy escape to a peaceful neighbourhood and other territories became the answer. Women, on their part, tried to escape from the nightmare of rape and other forms of violent assault.

The Ezza also engaged in the culture of migration, which was worsened by conflict. In short, during the traditional times, it was expected that all sons, with exception of the youngest, would leave the fathers house and establish their homes in a different Ezza colony or settlement outside the father's community. Thus, the onset of conflict intensified such form of migration that has existed until today. Similarly, the massive exodus of men from their homes in Barolong negatively affected the imperial colonial economy in Bechuanaland

Protectorate. An ethnologist, who worked for the colonial government, revealed that in Thakwaneng, for example, he found only 1,115 registered taxpayers out of a population of approximately 3,000 inhabitants. In Klein Chwaing, he estimated that only 600 were present out of 1,800 inhabitants (Breutz, 1959:154; Breutz, 1957).

It was also revealed that in the contested Madiba area of South Africa, unemployment was very high. Ironically, the applications made by the masses for trading rights to the colonial government were turned down by the then Regional Authority. Notwithstanding the fact that the chiefs and their executives were massively recommending people for trade rights, they were barely approved. It was such level of unemployment and poverty that accompanied it at the time of dispute that made it difficult for the masses to pay their taxes to the colonial treasury, thus leading to the reduction of tax revenues. The colonial government warned the chiefs over the poor revenue generated. The chiefs on their part could not act considering the degree of poverty that was hunting their people. The Annual Confidential Report of Barolong Bo Ratshidi in 1984 maintained that during their tax tour, the clerks returned empty-handed. The matter was reported to their chief but he did not punish the councillors for failing to organise people in their respective villages. The councillors were informed on time about the tour. The council agreed that each councillor in the Kgoro should list names of taxpayers and submit it to the office. Ironically, the council members did not do so (North West Provincial Archives and Library, 1984:3).

Furthermore, in the Barolong setting of South Africa, the dynamics of the land dispute gave the white men a lot of imperial advantages. White farmers, at the time, took-over more of the Barolong farms and began farming in the people's land without adequate compensation to the masses or the knowledge and consent of government. Certain members of the Tribal Authority appropriated large portions of land to hire them out to white farmers thus enriching themselves to the disadvantage and detriment of the whole tribe (Selebogo & Meiring, 1982:7).

It should be stated that the inability of the headmen, who controlled the Tribal Authority in Barolong, during the colonial era, to ensure legitimate or peaceful allocation of the land in the

area under study was due to the fact that the political organisation was a colonial creation. This was created to serve the interest of imperialists and to ensure that the exploitation of the people was fast and easy. The tribal authority, at the time consisted of brothers and uncles of the chief who claimed to have jurisdiction over the whole tribal area. They used their political positions to allocate the most fertile land to themselves and their friends as well as relatives. This situation was created in order to have a complete control over the behaviour of people. It was also a means by which order was meant to be aborted within Barolong. It was very unfortunate that the purpose of political organization in the tribe was to create chaos, disorder, lawlessness and an eminent spirit of unhappiness among members of the tribe.

According to Selebogo and Meiring (1982:7), some lands had been usurped from the owners by the members of Tribal Authority. In this regard, complaints were brought to the Tribal Authority and the Tribal Authority ignored and overlooked these complaints, because they were the very people who were involved in the malpractice. Again, field interviews reveal that the economic implications of land ownership by non-Tswana people are increasingly generating reactions amongst indigenous Barolong people (Masego, 2016; Mmusi, 2016; Mogotsi, 2016 & Tapologo, 2016). Thus there is a subtle demand for the re-consideration of the land documents of non-indegenous people in Barolong (Boitumelo, 2016).

7.4 SECURITY IMPACT

Conflict anywhere in the world has serious security implications. In the 1944 conflict between Agila and Ezza setlers, the following were killed: Lot Ogbilolo; Ogezi Otokpa and his wife; Ogbu Ede and his six wives; as well as a maid. Amongst the prominent people killed during the Ezza wars in the Apa settlement of the Agila in 1948 include Ogbu Otokpa, Ogebe Otokpa as well as Ude O and his wife. The April 1950 conflict saw Ezza attacks on Okposobla farm settlements. At the end of the attacks, a number of people were killed, including Agbese Onoja, Oche Egede and Aje Egede. In Otokillo land settlement, the Ezza nearly killed Orefi Ugadu, Igwe Adegbe and Onwe Egba. Also, in Ogbilolo, sometimes called Ikpeba, the Ezza people were said to have killed Otokpa Okibe and Enai Ochai Ojugwu (Onoja, 2013:361-362). A good number of Agila people, who relaxed and began to dine with the Ezza due to the historic positive relations between them were said to have been

poisoned. They include Oche Eno, Oche Abo, Ogaba Ebonyi and Onazi Abo killed in Ai-Otokilo as well as Imolo Anya and Ogozi Abo sentenced to the great paradise-above at the Aje-Ona settlement. In Apa, parts of Agila, Agbara Oga, Okibe Ugwu, Ude Agwu, Agwu Eze, Abo Igboke, Ogezi Abo, Ugbo Oja, Otokpa Onwe, Akpoge Okibe, Orinya Oganya, Ochene Agakpa and Oche Egede were also killed. In the 1965-1967 conflict, the following Agila people lost their lives; they include Abo Eza, Aje Enegba, Igbaba Oga, Ocheneje, Odhori Oga, Oganya Igbaba, Ogbu Okako, Ongazi, Orefi-Ugadu, Ude Aogwu and his family of four (Onoja, 2011:295).

The multiple strategies allegedly used by the Ezza in killing the Agila people, brought deep-rooted psychology of fear on the people and the majority remained silent and thought of individual and group-based ways of escaping the rampaging Ezza road to death (Onoja, 2013:362). When the people's individual and collective efforts to save themselves were not working as expected, the Ijigban District leadership carried their request for intervention in the rescue of their land from the Ezza to the police. They also revealed the role of Agila collaborators from their district, who enhanced the speed at which they lost their land to the Ezza settlers. It stated that the smart Ezza visitors took up Agila land and the only state-level action including police involvement was trusted by the Ijigban Development Elites Association (IDEA) to resolve the vexing situation.

It will be recalled that in Nigeria, the police wait for the citizenry to report and mobilize them financially or provide them with vehicles for them to discharge their duties. The IDEA petitioned the State Commissioner of Police over what they termed fundamental issues detrimental to the existence of Ijigban District as an integral part of Idoma land. The Ijigban elite claimed in the petition that they had earlier been moved to demand action from the District Head, Oriri Ocheje (but) when they noticed that the influx of immigrants was assuming alarming proportions only to discover to their chagrin that the district head had already been extremely overtaken by the fast Ezza settlers. Accusations were traded between IDEA, the district head and the police as well as other concerned indigenes over who precisely was to blame for the alienation of Ijigban land, even as the Igbo-speaking Ezza invaders were insisting they had done no wrong (The Gazette, 1991:2).

The killings that followed the 21st century Ezza conflict are still very fresh in the minds of Nigerians and generate sorrow in the minds of people who lost their loved ones. At Ezillo alone, 31st December 2011 will not be easily forgotten as the community, Ebonyi State and Nigerian sovereign milieu woke-up into the New Year day (1st January 2012) with the news of the Ezillo mass-murder. On 31st December 2011, there was what Mbah and Nwangwu (2014) refer to as "The Ezillo Mass Murder". On that singular attack, over seventy (70) Ezillo men, women and children were killed by men suspected to be Ezza guerrilla warriors who had come to make real their threats on Ezillo people. Over one hundred (100) survivors were rushed to hospitals in Ebonyi State, while about seven hundred (700) people were declared missing (Ubabukoh, 2012). The sight of 'Ezillo near genocidal killings' on the eve of 2012 caused massive tears, widespread condemnation of the conflict within and outside Ebonyi State and Nigeria in general. Osuji (2012:11) argues that in a compound of thirty-two persons, only three persons out of the number escaped the bullets of gunmen. Many peace-loving people of Ebonyi State are yet to forget how the corpses of men, women, boys, girls and children littered Ezillo, creating widespread pathetic emotions. The attacks and earlier ones recorded in the history of inter-communal conflicts between the Ezza and its neighbours created deep-rooted stereotypes on the Ezza people (Onuoha & Ani, 2011).

It should be noted that in the course of Ezza conflicts, they also experienced loss of lives and properties. However, due to reasons best known to them, the Ezza preferred to be secretive about their deaths and losses in relation to counting or numbering (Onoja, 2013:362). It could be argued that the secretive position of the Ezza people on their human capital loss during the conflict were simply meant to present them as invisible set of warring people. Ani (2014:4) argues that Ezillo mass-murder showed "that the episodic bloodletting and blood smearing between the two-sister communities is far from over". As days and months passed by, the families of those who could not account for the disappearance of their loved ones in the attack came to the conclusion that they met their waterloo on that dark New Year eve. Many Ezillo people and Ebonyi citizens are still hoping that their relatives will one day re-appear while others have accepted that their missing loved ones now inhabit the right and left hand sides of God in heaven.

Similarly, Inya (2010c:18) provides a description of how a Mobile Police Commander, CSP David Ochala of the 31 Police Mobile Force, Delta got missing a week before Easter, 2010. He was among those sent on security assignment in the contested Ezza-Ezillo and Ezillo conflict setting. The then Ebonyi State Commissioner of Police who acknowledged the disappearance of the officer on duty, maintained such issue could not be ruled out from the job of policing anywhere in the world. Earlier in 2010, Ogbonnaya Onu, the then Inspector General of Police, mobilised 1,500 mobile policemen as well as a police helicopter and armoured personnel carrier (APC) to dislodge alleged Ezza militants who were not only killing Ezillo people in their dozens but sentencing innocent Nigerians of other ethnic nationalities, who were using the Enugu-Abakaliki highway to their untimely graves. The operation, carried-out on Wednesday, 31st March 2010 was jointly led by the then Ebonyi State Commissioner of Police, Emmanuel Ayeni and the Commissioner of Police in charge of Police Mobile Force, Force Headquarters Abuja, Assistant Inspector General Felix Uyana. During the operation, the police captured 34 militants, including nine young ladies, who cooked and satisfied the sexual needs of the warriors (Inya, 2010:17). The operation forced many Ezza settlers in parts of Ezillo to relocate *en-masse* to Ezza North Local Government of Ebonyi State. Unfortunately, the operation witnessed the loss of four hundred (400) lives, including sixteen (16) policemen and three (3) soldiers (Mkpuma, 2012:3-4).

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Military men sent to patrol the Ezza-Ezillo and Ezillo conflict setting, would hardly forget how the warlords confronted them on 24th July, 2009. The warlord- military men confrontation sent all civilians living and using the road into their hiding places. Inya (2009c: 19) maintains that for at least three hours on that day, the whole area was overtaken by the sound of gun shots as soldiers in their hundreds were all over everywhere, including the Ezillo market shooting as they encountered fierce warlords confrontation. The then Secretary to Ebonyi State Government, Chief Fidelis Mbam while reacting to newsmen on the day's attack stated that "the type of boys who handle AK-47 rifle in the crisis are not the people who brought the guns into the crisis area". He emphasized that the Ebonyi State Government would not leave any stone unturned in dealing with the real financiers of the conflict, the day any of them was caught (Inya, 2009c:19).

In addition, after the operation, forty-five (45) persons, reasonably suspected to be giving support to the warriors, were invited for a meeting with the then Inspector General of Police in Abuja. The Inspector General of Police ordered their arrest and detention. After the initial investigation, a large number of them (thirty one in number) were charged (Inya, 2010:17). Emmanuel Ayeni, the then Commissioner of Police stated that he had set the necessary machinery in motion to call the leaders of the feuding groups and other stakeholders, including representatives of the state government to a parley on how to resolve the crisis. In his words "it is on record that at least four of such meetings were held at the state police headquarters while other meetings between the two groups were reported to have been held on the same matter" (Inya, 2010:17).

Thousands of Nigerian travellers of different fields of human endeavour share the direct impact of the Ezillo conflict setting. They were often caught-up in gun-battles between the two groups. Sometimes, they were held hostage as human shields for hours by warriors of either group. Inya (2009a:1&19) described how military men posted to the conflict-torn area in 2009, unleashed different forms of inhuman treatment to drivers using Abakaliki-Enugu High way. It was due to the hard experiences that drivers and their passengers normally faced at the dawn of the conflict, which forced drivers and those who had to travel daily outside the state, at that time, to negotiate their bearing through the routes of Imo, Abia, Benue and Cross River States in order to avoid loss of lives, delays, burning of vehicles and the robbery that characterised Ezillo-hot spots in the era of the recurrent conflict.

Ifi and Inya (2010:15) argue that on 23rd March, 2010, a total of twenty (20) passengers, on their way to Onitsha, were attacked at Ezillo by warriors. They were badly wounded and rushed to the Federal Medical Centre, now Federal Teaching Hospital Abakaliki II. The following morning, one Chief Dominic Ekalaka, an indigene of Mbaise, Imo State gave up his breath. The death of Ekalaka threw the hospital into a festival of tears and created more fears of death on the remaining nineteen (19) patients who were badly injured.

Similarly, there was equally the pathetic story of one Nwigwe Nwelem and his wife, Nwakego Nwelem, from Amuzu Igbeagu, Izzi Local Government Area, who was returning

from a business trip in Onitsha, where they bought cloths to re-sale in their newly re-settled location. This couple had earlier fled where they were living due to the Igbeagu-Ukelle conflict. His brother Uguru revealed that on 11th February 2010, as they were returning from the market, the driver transporting them did not know that the Ezza-Ezillo and Ezillo conflict had resurfaced. When they reached Ezillo, they met a long queue and some men searching passing vehicles. The impatient driver transporting them wanted to jump queue and run-away unsearched. Immediately, one angry warrior hurriedly released his bullet and shot the tyres of the vehicle and they became trapped. The warriors angrily went to the bus, opened the door and ordered them to say their last prayers. They commanded them to start coming-out one by one from the vehicle. As they stepped down from the vehicle, they received some bullets directly on their individual heads, starting from the driver to the last man in the bus. The Divisional Police Officer (DPO) in-charge of Ezillo Police Station claimed that only one person survived but was badly wounded. Mr Uguru further revealed that it was later when they heard the story of the killings by the Ezza-Ezillo warlords that they quickly rushed to Ezillo Police Station. The DPO referred them to the Ebonyi State University Teaching Hospital (EBSUTH) where the corpses of those killed by the warriors were dumped at the mortuary. At EBSUTH, now Federal Teaching Hospital, Abakaliki (FETHA II), the bill they brought, which the relatives of the diseased must offset before carrying the corpses of their loved ones, was quite exorbitant and unbearable (Ifi, 2010:1&18).

Ani (2015a) argues that the killing of people during the Ezza-Ezillo and Ezillo conflict transcends the Igbo ethnic background. It was all tears, sorrow and mourning to the relatives of Babatunde O. Williams of Folashade Estate, Owode-Yewa Local Government Area of Ogun State, when he announced to his kinsmen that his two cousins, Tayo Oyewusi of Atakumata Local Government Area, Osun State and Muritala Adisa Raji of Ayetoro Yewa Local Government Area, Ogun State lost their lives in the conflict. They are said to have left Ogun State on 12th February 2010 for Cross River, State in a Pasat Wagon car with registration number ES 398 SMK.. They were on a business trip before they met their untimely death in Ezillo. The diseased were said to have communicated their relatives last, at Enugu on February 13 2010. Sequel to the loss of information concerning them, their people began to search for them using the media and the Criminal Investigation Department of the Nigerian Police. Babatunde, whom they were visiting before the call of death, took the challenge of searching and unravelling the mystery behind their disappearance mainly

because he was accused of using them "for money rituals". The relatives of the dead cousins, made sure he was detained as well as taken to prayer houses and human rights centres over the accusation that he was a kidnapper and murderer (Ogbonnaya, 2010:18).

It was under that condition, according to him, that the Police Mobile Force Commander in Ezillo, called on him on 18th April 2010, informing him that two suspects had been arrested with the particulars of his cousins. They also revealed that the suspects had shown the police where Taye and Muritala were buried in a shallow grave. He was told to come immediately for identification of the body of the late cousins. He arrived the following day and confirmed their dead bodies through the trousers they were putting on when they left Ogun State. The Pathology Department of the then Ebonyi State University Teaching Hospital (EBSUTH) helped in the process and the body was deposited in mortuary of the said hospital (Ani, 2015a:8). This was not the end of the story as the bill that the hospital brought for the young man to pay (before accessing the corps of both cousins), was very exorbitant. He subsequently called the traditional ruler of Igbeagu community, Eze Ogbonnaya Ukwa, who in turn, reached - out to the then member of Ebonyi State House of Assembly, Honourable Richard Idike. Honourable Idike then spoke with the Secretary to the Ebonyi State Government, Chief Fidelis Mbam who then gave a letter to the management of the hospital before the corps was finally released (Ifi, 2010:18).

There is also the story of one Aja Jacob from Uburu in Ohaozara Local Government Area, who was almost killed by suspected Ezillo mafia after wrongfully perceiving him to be from Ezza. Jacob, a young man of about thirty (30) years was caught around the conflict zone on his way to visit his aunty, Paulina Bernard in Ngbo near Ezillo. Inya (2009c:1) quoted the former Ebonyi State Police Command image maker, Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP), Chris Anyanwu by maintaining that "about twenty (20) young men from Ezillo caught and tied him hands and legs, beat him up and held him hostage for 5 days and on the 8th November 2009, they took him out to be killed, believing he was an indigene of Ezza". He was mercilessly beaten with deep cuts on his body before his hands were tied up and taken to a shallow grave for burial. It was reported that a young girl who saw the group as they dehumanised Jacob, quickly ran to the community to call some good spirited men and women

to assist in saving him. She informed them that she believed they were about to bury him alive, something that could have brought the wrath of God on the community.

Furthermore, "it was only at the intervention of the villagers that the man found hope of life in this world, despite the heavy cuts and injuries they inflicted on him. From how things unfolded, the only thing that could be ascribed to as the reason for the attack was the fact that they may have misunderstood him to be an Ezza man with whom they had been waging a fratricidal war"(*Citizens' Advocate*, 2009:18). The villagers then forced the warriors to take Jacob to hospital. The girl, who revealed their attack on Jacob, was said to have come from a popular family in the community. However, it was also revealed that she received the beating of her life for letting the cat out of the bag. A mild drama was also said to have happened in the hospital where the young man was rushed in a Mercedes 230 V-boot. It is also believed the hospital attendant was suspicious following the inconsistency in the statements of those that brought him. They maintained that the worst of all was that one of them was very angry with the others for accepting to have known the wounded man. With such confusion, the attention and help of the police were called over the matter, in order to help the people identify themselves better. Amidst very many efforts made by the culprits to deceive the police, law enforcement agents followed and captured three of them, leaving only one whom they confirmed they did not know how he took to his heels (Citizens' Advocate, 2009:18).

The attacked Jacob was said to have died fifteen days after he was brought to Ebonyi State University Teaching Hospital (EBSUTH), Abakaliki where he was receiving medical attention. The death of Jacob also unravelled the fact that both side of the conflict divide have engaged in one form of human rights abuses that has hunted the right to life of not only people from their area but those from other parts of Ebonyi State and Nigeria in general. Relatives of the diseased and people of Uburu condemned the incessant killings of innocent Nigerians in the Ezillo conflict environment. The above scenario was the type of multiple traumas those who lost their loved ones in the Ezza-Ezillo conflict had to go through if they were lucky to get the weight of the government before having access to the corpses of their diseased relatives. Those who were not lucky to have powerful contacts with government to release the body of their relative, who were trapped in the cross-fire, lived in the violent

psychology of not bringing the corpse home (which is generally perceived as a taboo across the length and breadth of Igboland).

There are also cases of people who were burned into ashes in the vehicle they were travelling in during the conflict. Assistant Superintendent of Police, Chris Anyanwu, the then Police Public Relations Officer in Ebonyi State confirmed that a serving Director in the Presidency, who was travelling from Abuja to Calabar, was on 14th April 2010, burned to ashes inside his jeep alongside four other occupants of the vehicle by the militants in Ezillo. Another man from Nkaliki-Izzi called Friday, who was a former driver to Engineer Onwukike Nwambam (Last Born), a top politician from Ikwo, Ebonyi State, was burned the same day in his J5 vehicle. The late Friday was said to have purchased a new vehicle and wanted to use it for commercial purposes. Some residents maintain that Friday's vehicle was also filled with passengers who burned to ashes with him as he was doing everything possible to eke out a personal living after many years of service to his former boss (Ifi & Inya, 2010:15).

There were also cases of some security officials who lost their lives in the hands of fellow security personnel alleged to have shifted their loyalty to warlords. Nwani and Inya (2010:1) state that seven (7) police officers of Ebonyi State command were behind bars, following their dishonourable roles during the Ezillo conflict. The Ebonyi State Police Command, uncomfortable with the role of individuals and groups in the Ezza-Ezillo and Ezillo conflict investigated the nefarious roles of individuals and groups in the conflict. They beamed their searchlight on men in uniform only to discover that some were allegedly enriching themselves from the kick-backs and other forms of illegal money collected from the masses in order to do dirty deals during the prosecution of the conflict. Further security report revealed that "some police officers actively participated in the killing spree while others served as fifth columnists. This accounted for the high rate of casualty suffered by the police during the war. One of the police officers, a corporal, actually pulled the trigger that killed one of the police commanders during the crisis because he was allegedly in the payroll of the warlords" (Nwani & Inya, 2010:18).

In the course of the conflicts between Ezza and their neighbours in Nigeria, human right issues, hostage taking, executions (Akinjide, 2010:69) were carried out, leading to massive loss of lives. Contemporary reality shows the increasing stereotype of Ezza as being war-like men/ - women, hence creating room for progressive stereotype and bias against Ezza people (Onuoha & Ani, 2011:13). The Mgbalukwu and Obeagu people have not forgotten how they lost their sons and daughter as well as their parents to Ezza-Ojiegbe men, who waylaid them on their way to farm lands located near the contested Abanaba land settlement (Ani, 2009:4-5). Some other Isu men were said to have lost their lives at Nwafor Ezza market because they travelled through the road, without knowing that there was outbreak of conflict in the area.

Ani and Osisioma (2015:4) state the 1980s and 1990s witnessed the establishment of mobile police men in the buffer zones of Mgbalukwu, Obeagu and Ojiegbe Ezza communities with inherent effects. One of such effects was the fact their coming created the 'militarization' of the area and increased fear, thus forcing people to migrate farther. While the guerrilla fighters from both sides attacked the security personnel, it was the contingent of soldiers sent in 2007 that quelled the progressive confrontation of 2005-2007, causing widespread destruction of lives and properties as well as massive migrations and the need for intensified hospitality.

Soon the negative multiplier effect of the conflict would hunt down the social peace of Isu people. For instance, from 2010-2013, the men who were used by Obeagu Isu people to carry out their war with the Ezza-Ojiegbe, soon re-grouped and turned themselves into a major source of threat to communal peace. They constituted themselves into a tax force that went around stealing people's properties, collecting illegal fines from the young and the old in the community as well as carting-away with the goats, chickens and other domestic animals of members of the community (Ani, 2015). Consequently, in the course of their illegal and violent collection of levy from the sceptre and crown that visited the community, they ran into a group of boys from the same community that had a strong criminal record as well as a cultic history in Enugu and Anambra States. The erstwhile Isu warlords demanded some illegal levy from these young men and when they refused to comply, members of the erstwhile community warriors engaged them in a fight. At the end, the warriors felt insulted as well as threatened. In order to show their strength, they angrily burned properties in the young men's compound. As they were carrying-out their burnings, the parents of the young

men and one of their brothers came to halt them. It was at this time that hell was to break loose as the warriors tied them up and gave them endless lashes of cane before taking them to the forest where they were buried alive. The singular act generated different forms of multiplier effects in the community and beyond.

The young men (whose parents had been killed) re-grouped with their gang from outside the state and began to kidnap as well as kill members of the warrior gang and their relatives progressively in a guerrilla way. Sequel to the fact that they were killing 'anybody' related to the warriors, who at the time had disappeared into thin air, following the request by the police to track them down, the community became unsafe for all. Members of the erstwhile warrior group were also said to have been cursed by a number of elders in the community. During the period, a number of them began to die mysteriously at home and in their hide-outs. The strange - deaths forced a number of the former warlords to willingly surrender to the police. The case also soon became an avenue for the Nigerian Police to open a tap of exploitation on the community as they unleashed their arrest warrants from as many members of the community as they could, especially those whose arrests would force their relatives or the whole community to raise money in hundreds of thousands to bail them. The implication was that members of the community raised a tax-force that went to different parts of the world to demand for financial assistance from their sons and daughters in order to manage the post-conflict violence and insecurity.

In Ezza-Ezillo conflict setting, the warlords who were demobilized after the temporal management of the 2008-2010 conflict transformed into a criminal network and began to threaten the peace and security of men and women living in the surroundings. Chief Sylvester Obi, a People's Democratic Party chieftain and former Liaison Officer to Governor Sam Ominyi Egwu, first democratically elected governor of Ebonyi State, revealed "that since the end of the Ezillo mayhem, Iyonu had been receiving various forms of attacks ranging from the burning-down of houses to kidnapping as one Udoka Ogbu had been missing since 4th April 2010. He was kidnapped while thirty nine (39) houses belonging to the community had been razed to ashes. Ezillo militants were accused of masterminding the attack and kidnap" (Inya, 2010f:1). He maintained he was breaking the silence because the suffering of the Iyonu people in the hands of the warlords has reached a point of frustration. The situation remained more disturbing in the light of the fact that Iyonu people continually declared that they did

not belong to the Ezza or the Ezillo side of the conflict divide. According to them, "Iyonu does not belong to Ezza or Ezillo. It is a different community and an entity standing on its own. It is among the Igboessa clan. Ezillo people maintained the reason for the attack was because they suspected that some Ezza boys crossed Iyonu and attacked them, which was not true because they warned Ezza people not to cross our roads during the crisis" (Inya, 2010f:1).

Consequently, the Iyonu community wrote a letter dated 6th April 2010 to Governor Martin Elechi, through the Secretary to Ebonyi State Government at the time. They also copied to the Commissioner of Police, Director of Human Rights Organisation, Commissioner for Border Security and Conflict Resolution, Coordinator of Ishielu Development Centre and Chairman of Ishielu Traditional Rulers Council. The said letter was signed by His Royal Highness Eze Dominic Onwe, Onu Eugene, Gilbert Ogbu and Honourable Peter Eze, the then supervisory councillor for finance in Ishielu Local Government Area. The community leaders also went to the then Inspector General of Police to complain that the warlords have descended on them and they could no longer sleep with their two eyes closed. Some Iyonu people whose houses were allegedly burnt to ashes by Ezillo people included Ogbungwa Ngele, Sylvester Anthony Obi, Clement Ubushi, Dennis Ani, Onweke Okoye, Alfred Egbe, Chukwudi Agbo, Nweze Okeh, Christopher Odo, Nicodemus Orinya and Anthony Ezenwachukwu. Others were James Ogbodo, Lazarus Obaji, Nworie Ani, Awoke Ngele, Desmond Odo, Evu Nwoke, Nede Nome, Solomon Chiome, John Ani and Joel Ogbu among others (Inya, 2010f:18).

Itumo (2014) affirms that a lot of arms were recovered by security agents from militant warriors during and after the 2008 conflict in Ezillo. The Ebonyi State Commissioner of Police revealed during a press conference held in Abakaliki in March 2010 that the police had recovered some arms and ammunitions from militants during the conflict. Itumo (2014) states that this goes a long way to reveal why after the first phase of the conflict in May, 2008, the then Ebonyi State Governor, Chief Martin Elechi declared amnesty for those individuals with illegal weapons and ammunitions across the state. He gave a period of three (3) months for such individuals to surrender their illegal arms to the state government. Governor Elechi further placed ransom for individuals who wanted to surrender their arms. The action of the

governor was not unconnected with the huge number of sophisticated weapons recovered from Ezillo and Ezza clans during the conflict. Besides, Elechi was also moved to declare the amnesty programme because of several security reports received from security agents over the circulation of small arms and light weapons across communities in the state (Itumo, 2014). It was also the high presence of such small arms and light weapons that made the state very vulnerable to numerous manifestations of inter-communal conflicts.

Inya (2014) argues that there was the existence of some local arm factories in many communities within the country, where small arms and low cost weapons were produced and circulated across and within communities in the sovereign state. That made access to arms by aggrieved groups of individuals very easy and further worsened the spate in the rise of communal conflicts across the country. Security agents had, in 2002, uncovered a local arm factory in Umuezeokoha community of Ezza North Local Government Area, Ebonyi State. The Police Public Relations Officer in Ebonyi State Police Command revealed that the onslaught by the police in Ebonyi State on men of the under-world, led to the smashing of illegal arms factory. The factory was allegedly owned by an 82 year – old man. Various items such as blacksmith equipment, locally fabricated pistols at various stages of manufacture, one live cartridge and two expended bullets were recovered at the illegal arms factory (Itumo, 2014).

In addition, conflict often had a direct and negative effect on the environment. In the conflict setting under investigation, its multiplier effect on environmental security cannot be neglected. "A world at peace is one in which environmental, human rights and economic issues all cohere to foster maximum growth and well-being (Barash & Webel, 2002:478). The contested rainforests in the Nigerian conflict zones have continuously been abused because there are increasingly too many people destroying the gift of nature in too little space. To worsen the scenario, the high level of poverty, which the people have been battling with for years intensifies land degradation. The people exposed to the violent impact of war-driven hunger continuously cultivate a piece of land that should be left naturally to fallow. Ironically, the rise of optimal productive and safe population in the areas studied would only occur in future, when poverty is reduced.

Similarly, a community of increasing scarce and endangered land resources may be one that could cause people to cooperate towards solving individual problems in the traditional communalism of African people. Ironically, in the face of conflict and the deep entrenchment of capitalism into the socio-political and economic fabrics of humanity today, a community of scarce land resource due to conflict would promote more violent behaviour and increased poverty. Conflicts and violent behaviours are exaggerated when wealthy individuals in conflict – prone – settings, seek to ensure continuous access to the best and largest quantity of food security and personal advantages while thousands of their poor neighbours after struggling in vain to access basic food, would begin to attack the rich and their resource ban as a way to keep body and breath alive. Sustainable peace could easily be attained in a society where the basic individual and collective environmental needs of the people could be protected as the people's commonwealth. It is very difficult to have calm, tranquillity and peace when conflict has led to the loss of the people's basic needs such as food, clothing, shelter, education and medical care. Unfortunately, in the entire conflict environment studied, these basic needs were affected in different forms and degrees.

Conflict leads to poverty and poverty gives birth to conflict. One of the most important and least recognised aspects of poverty is its psychological effects, the bitter pill of perceived injustice and inequality that must be swallowed by those who observe the affluence of others while still mired in their own poverty. Even if one's purchasing power is adequate for survival, it can be painful to witness a dramatically higher level of consumption on the part of others and with increased communication and transportation, even the most isolated people; living traditional and impoverished lives are exposed to examples of affluence. The results are deep mental suffering, envy, shame and either despair or anger. Beyond the phenomenon of envy, there is the painful physical fact of deep, absolute poverty. Hunger is the most obvious manifestation, with disease being inevitably associated as well. Other deficits usually accompanying poverty like poor housing and inadequate sanitation contribute to disease as inadequate nutrition does. Health care is minimal or nonexistent. Educational opportunities are very limited because areas of extreme poverty frequently have few and typically inadequate schools and also because the very poor often need their children to work, so they

are denied whatever limited educational opportunities that are available. The result is the deepening of the cycle of poverty (Barash & Webel, 2002:487).

7.5 SOCIO-CULTURAL IMPACT

A study undertaken to compare the conflicts situations Nigeria and South Africa revealed that both conflicts have certain similarities as they were driven by ethnic consciousness. The Ezza and Barolong have a history of not settling in the same area. Both nations have their descendants scattered across different parts of Nigeria and South Africa. The Ezza people of Effium, Nigeria, fought in support of their brothers in Agila, Benue State. Manson and Mbenga (2014) state that the common feature of these conflicts in the Bechuanaland reserves was that they had a distinctly ethnic character as they were between opposing ethnic factions, which mobilized support by appealing to ethnic sentiments and affiliation. There was no national escalation or international dimension to each of the conflicts mainly because they were caused by land ownership status as well as the push and pull forces of settler and non-settler social relations.

The conflict and disputes were mainly related to contest over land as well as the historic link between people and where they migrated to and settled for many years. The failure by both the pre and post-independence governments of South African and Nigeria to arrest the initial set of people who encroached on 'extra- land' that did not belong to them, gave fillip to a greater culture of 'land grabbing'. This culture of land grabbing, throughout the years that followed, forced new generations of settlers to lose touch with their original historic home land. Thus, at the onset of the conflict, the people began to face the dilemma of staying back in their new settlement(s) to fight-out their destiny or go back to their ancestral home and face the uncertainty of starting life afresh and face a new form of existential challenges. The psychical frustration of losing all they had worked for in their age-long settlement, placed them on the perpetual part of conflict. Conflicts over land generated fear upon the settlers and the original land owners. The scenario above was widespread throughout the length and breadth of the areas where the Ezza people were involved in fighting. Isichei (1976:91) maintains the idea when she wrote that "like other powers which aggrandise themselves by violent means, the Ezza paid a price for their conquests. They lived in constant fear of

reprisals. A visiting party of Presbyterian missionaries, early this century, observed that Ezza towns were strongly fortified with ramparts and ditches. The Ezzas themselves were usurpers and lived as uneasy conquerors in constant fear of attack".

In the Barolong setting, there was the pathetic case of one Nimrod Phoi who usurped the lands and windmill of an old blind man, championed by a member of the Tribal Authority (Selebogo &Meiring, 1982:8). The same was obtainable in Ezillo, where there were numerous cases of displacement of people from their homes and farmlands. It is even argued that land areaswhich the community donated to government for developmental purposes were seized by the Ezza, just as they seized the Ezillo peoples' markets and renamed them. For instance:

a. In 1990, after the creation of new Ishielu Local Government Area, with Ezillo as Headquarters, the community mapped out a parcel of land at Isimkpuma for federal establishments such as the Independent National Electoral Commission (NEC), the Nigerian Police and the National Population Commission (NPC). The place was acquired by Ishielu Local Government. The Ezza took over the place with the aid of one Felix Ereke (an Ezza man) who was then the local government chairman. Ereke paved the way for further encroachment of Ezza people into Ezillo village markets and they renamed many of them to bear Ezza names, which led to the clash between the Ezza and Ezillo in 1991;
b. In 1996 at Isimkpuma village, Idenyi Ali was killed and displaced by Oruna Oke of Ezza;
c. Also at Isimkpuma village, Aguworu Agbo was displaced by Nweke Idika of Ezza;
d. Oji Oduma of Ezillo witnessed the demolition of Oduma Osu's compound in Amuhu Ezillo by Ezza youths, led by Sunday Nwafor (Abacha) and the compound was taken over by them;
e. The children of Ebenyi Nwosu Echara were chased-away from their ancestral home at Amuhu village by Nwugo Ezza and Ebenyi's compound taken over with their economic trees;
f. At Umuezoke village, Ezillo, Omebe Alaji was displaced by Nwaezaka Obashi;
g. Ebenyi Udogu of the same village was displaced by Ekechi Nwaonu, an Ezza man;
h. Ebenyi Ituma Egbe was displaced by Igwe Otubo of Ezza;

i. Umoke Ebenyi was displaced by Paulinus Ogali;
j. Ebenyi Agu Ebenyi was displaced by Ede Nwa Eleke of Ezza;
k. Ogbulenwe Agwo was displaced by Agwu Nkpuma;
l. Agashi Oke was displaced by Nwanga Odeh;
m. Louis Igwe was displaced by Omebe Nwali;
n. At Ndeguba Amorie, Simon Ngiji of Ezza displaced Mba Nnodo's compound;
o. Also in that village, Alikobia Ebenyi was displaced by John Ekuma of Ezza;
p. Ebenyi Ogbodo was displaced by Eze Mkpuma;
q. In Ndiegugwu village, Ezillo, Ituma Ogbungwa was displaced by Alexander Nwali
r. John Egede displaced Omefia Nwandu of Ezillo;
s. Ukoro Ochioku of Ezza took over Ogbaso Oke's compound;
t. Ogbaso Ituma's compound was taken over by Uduma Ebilima of Ezza;
u. Agashi Ali was displaced by Augustine Egbe;
v. Igwurube Omeri was displaced by Nweke Mkpuma at Ndeguugwu, Ezillo;
w. Ogbuchi Ede was displaced by Nwigwe Egede;
x. Omebe Okwor was displaced by John Nnabu;
y. In Ugbonna village, Ede Nwojibe was displaced by Nwanja Onuoha;
z. Egbara Ebenyi Onu was displaced by Omena Ede;
aa. Ebenyi Aja was displaced by Ugbala Onele;
bb. Nwome Owugo was displaced by Igwe Nwambara;
cc. Awasa Chukwuma displaced Iyogwe Ekpaenyi;
dd. Omebe Ekpaenyi was displaced by Nwobasi and Eze Alo;
ee. Okwo Nwozali was displaced by Nwokwu Agbom;
ff. Agbo Idenyi was displaced by Igwe Nwambara
gg. Abalifi Afor was displaced by Ozone Nwoke;
hh. Oguji Elom was displaced by Nworu Ovuegbe;
ii. Omebe Aba was displaced by Nwefuru Oduburu; and
jj. Aguowo Aba was displaced by Clement Nwagwu (Ezillo Memorandum, 2008:9-11).

Also, Ezza people, who migrated to the new settlements, as shown above, fought continuously to sustain their grip on their new locations. The Ezza settlements became scattered and half-hazard. Instead of settling together to form a very powerful geographically bonded group, they were scattered in their new found settlements, which they obtained as a reward for mercenary warfare and labour migrations.

Once the Ezza had appropriated a piece of land, the land so appropriated was converted into farm land (*egu*). But the easiest way to hold such a land was for the Ezza elders to send people, mainly the unmarried, young energetic men to occupy the land. The original owners of the land could only withdraw and would continue to do so, as the Ezza settlement expanded. This gave rise to *Ndiegu* (people of the farm) villages as opposed to *Ndiufu* (people of the home). These Ndiegu groups would continue to owe allegiance or be dependent villages, with their own charter of descent through ultimately tracing same to Ezekuna. Nkomoro was a former Ndiegu colony of Umuezeoka; Echara was a former *Ndiegu* colony of Idembia. Inyere is said to be at one time, *Ndiegu* colony of Umuezeokaoha, while Ezzagu was the *Ndiegu* colony of Nkomorro (Anyanwu, 2005b:4).

The Ezza conflicts in Nigeria changed the residential pattern of Ezza people across the length and breathe of South- east and North -central Nigeria. The numerous communities that make up the present day Ebonyi State had large concentrations of Ezza clusters within their communities. The anarchy and destruction which followed in the wake of these wars appeared to have altered the pattern of population distribution as many groups abandoned their ancestral lands to seek refuge in areas whose geographical features offered hope of asylum. In other words, the pattern of population distribution in Northeastern Igboland and to a lesser extent, the Ogoja, Enugu and Afikpo areas changed. Instead of an even spread of groups with population concentrations varying according to the advantages of water and soil fertility, great agglomerations of people emerged, often located on relatively inhospitable terrain, separated from one another by considerable expanse of virtually empty land. The final settlement of Effium people in their present location was informed by its thickly forested nature. The larger strip of land stretching from the western Ebonyi River to Okpoto, though having the advantages of water supply and soil fertility but no protective geographical features was 'absolutely without population' (Anyanwu, 2005e:63). The lack of population in neighbourhoods settled by the Ezza is also driven by fear of Ezza attacks. Many people would prefer to go and erect their building in more peaceful settings where they will depend on the hospitality and goodwill of the host.

Obeagu Isu and Ojiegbe-Ezza conflict. Ironically, the Igbo traditional family system is extended and not nuclear in nature, hence members of a displaced family seeking for assistance to build a house often comprise of surviving members of a nuclear family, the grandparents and related uncles as well as aunts (with their dependent in some cases). While other men of goodwill assist male members of internally displaced persons to erect the structures, women have to fetch water, prepare delicacies, plaster and paint walls. Sometimes, the paintings on walls carry traditional messages of their conflict experiences, their struggle, and loss of loved ones as well as the pictorial story of their moment of victory. "The enclosure of the *Onuama* (extended family), for example, is a way of obliging members of the family to remain, at least physically, within the family fold. Also, the presence of several nuclear families within the same enclosure engendered inevitably, a competitive spirit within members. Hence, each nuclear family could be seen as always working for its own unity and development in a struggle not to let itself down by washing its dirty linen in public" (Aligwekwe, 1991:50).

There is equally, the culture of integration into the socio-political system of the community. In the conflicts, many Obeagu and Mgbalukwu people relocated to other parts of Isu clan, where their 'elder brothers and sisters' or relatives did not waste time to integrate them into their socio-political organisation. It was easier for the migrating Ojiegbe people to be integrated into the socio-political organisation of other Ezza communities in Igbo land based on the traditional culture that allows the sons of a man to relocate and join other Ezza kiths and kin, while leaving the father's structure and compound for the last son (Ani & Osisioma, 2015:6). Such culture has been sustained for ages through socialisation. For instance, following the emergence of Felix Ereke (an Ezza man as the chairperson of Ishielu Local Government Area in 1990), there was the socialization of Ezza men to believe that Ezillo community was an extension of Ezza nation. Ezillo Memorandum (2008:14) documents that from then onward, the Ezza started to demand for control in all facets of their relationship with Ezillo people. They coroneted their own traditional ruler, created their own schools, churches and annexed Ezillo local markets renaming them after their identities. The Ezza-Ezillo also established Afor Ezza-Ezillo market, which was the name of Afor Ezillo, the

Ani and Osisioma (2015:5-6) maintain that erecting a house where internally displaced persons can live was a form of hospitality given to displaced people in the Mgbalukwu-

major market in Ezillo. They banned their people from co-operating with Ezillo community in many developmental and social activities.

The above scenario reached its climax with the Ezza-Ezillo's application to the then Ebonyi State Government leadership for autonomous community status to be called Izzo Community in Ezillo. Their request was given a 'safe-landing' by the then Ebonyi State House of Assembly, led by Julius Ali Ucha, an Ezza person but was not adhered to by the state government. The non-adherence was due to a court action instituted against its creation by all communities in Old Ishielu Local Government Area that have Ezza settlers in their midst. The Old Ishielu people were afraid that if the Izzo community was created in Ezillo, other Ezza settlers in Obeagu, Umuhali etc will begin to demand for separate autonomous communities too. To every Ezillo person, the move for an Izzo community was the height of insensitivity, selfishness, insubordination and an affront on the sensibility of their cooperate existence as a people by Ezza settlers. Their position was based on the fact that if this social arrangement worked-out, "more than 70% of Ezillo people, including our traditional ruler, who live at the middle of the proposed area, would have been subjects of Izzo community of 'Ezza Nation', Abomination! (Ezillo Memorandum, 2008:14)".

Describing the state of things in Ezillo, the then Governor of Ebonyi State stated that "Ezillo is now desolate and in ruins. I visited the war-torn areas three days ago (29th September 2008). And no sign of life has returned to the community. It is still desolate and now eerie and forbidding. It is a sceptre of the greatest inhumanity of man to his fellow-man, the type that no one can ever wish his worst enemy" (Elechi, 2008:3). The former governor of Ebonyi State tried to create an image of a society ravaged by the dangerous hands of conflict. The relationship between Ezillo and Ezza settlers has been characterised by fear and suspicion. Ezza people were said to have engaged in "abominable denigration of our (Ezillo) cherished cultural practices and customs and of course, acts of intimidation and assault on our people without any provocation, instances of some of these activities abound" (Ezillo Memorandum, 2008:6). The people of Ezillo have an unending list of the dynamics of cultural abuse as well as desecration of their traditions and beliefs by Ezillo people.

Ani (2010: 155-163) argues that from 2008 till date, the conflict that ravaged Ezillo community of Ebonyi State, led to the closure of academic activities in many schools within and around the conflict zone (temporarily and permanently). Today, one of the then government- owned secondary school along the heart of the disputed land in the Enugu-Abakaliki express road has been transformed into a camp for the combined military force stationed there to maintain peace. The implication of such destruction of schools and suspension of teaching and learning on human capital development cannot be over-emphasised. The former secondary school, used as a camp for soldiers and mobile police officers on peace - keeping operations is now a mobile police barracks.

Not only schools were affected by the conflict, communication equipment in Ezillo community were also vandalised. The self-acclaimed Ezza mercenaries, who confessed to the destruction of private and public institutions in Ezillo, declared they ultimately desired to inflict maximum pain on the people. The Divisional Police Officer (DPO) in Ezillo, as at January 2010, engaged in the assessment of facilities vandalised with other security officers as well as senior personnel of Globalcom (whose mast was amongst the vandalised properties). The DPO praised the watchfulness of Ezillo vigilante group as they have been able to nip the activities of criminal and violent gang on the bud. He maintained the Division would ensure that suspects were properly prosecuted. The DPO urged the vigilante group not to be deterred in its bid to flush criminals out from the area, adding that the singular act of handing them over to security officials was highly welcomed and encouraging. He promised them that the police was prepared to work with them in order to ensure that crime and other vices were reduced in the area. In his own contribution, a senior staff of Globalcom, who was identified as Pastor Andrew, stated that the handover of the suspects to the Nigerian Police was done to ensure that the suspect's rights were protected from the vengeance of the crowd. Andrew went on to disclose that the mast, which was destroyed by the criminals served the immediate environment and parts of Benue State, adding that if the vandals had succeeded, they would have put the company in serious disadvantage. He thanked the vigilante group for averting the crime and said the company would collaborate with the Nigerian Police to ensure that the suspects were adequately punished (Nwani, 2010b:18).

Writing on the Agila conflict setting, Onoja (2013:369) argues that the Ezza, who are of Igbo stock, are distinctively different culturally, socially and even in their farming methods (from their hosts). The Ezza do not mix socially or inter-marry with Agila people. At present, no Agila person lives in places occupied by Ezza people. Those who used to live in the various farm settlements were forced out during the Ezza-Agila and Agila conflict as well as the national crisis of 1967-1970. The Local Government Education Authority (L.G.E.A.) schools at Ebo, Ogebe, Aje-Onowa and Apa - Ogbodu are attended by only Ezza children. Ezza children do not attend schools either in Agila or at Apa farm settlement. The Ezza have constructed seasonal motor roads from Anambra State (now Ebonyi) to parts of Agila District, which they occupy and where they engage in indiscriminate felling of economic trees without the permission of the Local Government Council (L.G.C.). Their products (timber, plants) are subsequently evacuated to Anambra State (now Ebonyi State). The result is complete depletion of numerous elephant palms, Iroko and Mohogany trees found in the contested area and in the alleged Agila reserve. The Agila also argue that the Ezza system of making huge mounds for yams deplete the soil of its nutrients and make such land useless for other agricultural purposes.

Furthermore, land is a sacred commodity to the Agila people. There is a land shrine and one day in a year is set aside when everybody in the district is barred from tilling or even scratching the soil and a special ceremony is performed at the shrine. The Ezza do not keep this rule and every year they commit sacrilege by defiling the soil. Other Agila sacred shrines, forests and hunting grounds which have significant cultural importance for Agila people have been defiled with impunity (Onoja, 2013:366). According to an Agila community leader "the most annoying behaviour of the Ezza was their war dance, using a drum called *Ugoro*. During such war dance, skulls of beheaded Agila people were displayed openly to the wide applause of the people" (Onoja, 2013:361). The act of alleged rape by Ezza warriors, created a violent conflict psychology and stigma that have remained in the memory of victims and their relatives. Samson Oche of Akpoge kindred in Agila recounted painfully to Onoja (2013:361) how the warriors violently raped his wife, Enagu Ebonyi and took her away after stealing her costly beads (*akpana*) in 1948. She was said to have been rescued by two Agila warriors, Ocheje Egbe and Eje Ochelebe.

The implications were that women's rights and their violent abuse became increasingly tied to collective security agenda of the people and the era of negative peace. The act of rape reflects, among other things, the fact that while men are the architects of most conflicts, women have been among those likely to suffer continued agony because of their vulnerability as part of the civilian population. Feminists also point out the likely connection between patriarchy (male dominance), conflict and war, as reflected in what appears to be a greater male propensity for violence, in hierarchical structuring of systems of power and in the exalting of threats and physical force over consensus building (Barash & Webel, 2002:442). At the zenith of Ezza-Agila conflict with their Agila landlords, Agila people began to protest and agitated for the 'repatriation' of the Ezza population from their land. Many analysts and commentators on security issues in Nigeria have opined that the Ezza conflict with neighbours has a lot of cultural, social and normative implications (Ebenyi, 2016; Okenyi, 2016; Egbe, 2015; Mathias, 2015). While Ezza settlers feared the Agila, Agila people on their part, are always on the alert. This has created a tense socio-cultural atmosphere for both groups. In many cases, they avoid each other and the inherent chances of violent confrontations. An Agila person would do everything possible to lord over an Ezza person, while the Ezza will ensure that he or she resists such attempt. While the Agila teach their children about their superiority over the Ezza and calls for the 'deportation' of the Ezza by security agencies and court action; the Ezza would exhibit maximal disrespect, hostility and desecration of Agila norms and traditions.

Onoja (2011:263-264) presents two major instances of cultural clashes between the Ezza and Agila people that had socio-cultural implications on the people's belief. In the first case, an Ezza settler, named Ufor, living in Ndi-Apa settlement of Agila, was caught stealing a farm produce. The farm belonged to an Agila man named Unoogwu Otokpa. When Ufor was apprehended, he insisted that he was not stealing. He was taken to the police station where he re-iterated he had committed no offence. Ufor stated that when an Ezza person is doing a second burial of his relative, he is culturally allowed to go to anybody's farm and harvest any food item, which he thinks would necessarily assist him in the second burial and that was not an act of stealing as the owner of the farm is culture - bound to support the man doing a funeral with anything necessarily found in his or her farm. Thus, he went to the farm not to steal but to explore his cultural privileges. Ironically, the police did not take Ufor's statement serious and charged him for stealing farm produce. He was later tried and convicted. The

second case happened when the Akatakpa Agila, a masquerade festival was announced to the entire community. The Agila tradition allows masquerades accompanied by human beings, to seize any stray fowls or goats within the territory of Agila. One day, the masquerade carried its action into a farm settlement inhabited mainly by the Ezza and seized their fowls. The entire Ezza colony in Agila became very restive. The Ezza pledged a reign of violence if the fowls were not returned to them. The leaders of Agila community continued to defend the action of the masquerade team as culturally allowed. Later, for peace to reign, when the situation was going out of hands, Chief Odang Ogenyi, Ward Head of Apa-Agila at the time, paid the cost of the fowls.

The cultural conflict found between the Ezza and Agila communities, no doubt, affected personality development in the respective cultures. The child in a community of the kind lived by the Ezza and Agila, cannot escape being subjected to preparedness for violence, as when and how the need arises. The Ezza is caught in-between the process of either living absolutely with their culture or accepting the Agila culture. The choice between the Ezza (squatters') social lives in Agila community left them confused. To integrate into the Agila socio-cultural milieu and worldview is an intolerable proposition. Yet, to leave or vacate the land for their (Ezza) ancestral homeland, if they choose to do so, worsens this choice, because of the problem of scarcity of land. This constitutes the dilemma of the Ezza man in Agila land. Combined economic and social factors made the life of the (Ezza) squatter intolerable and burdensome (Onoja, 2011:260-261).

The Ezza conflicts affected all forms of night life in the communities they fought with. The small gatherings and meetings in the night often stopped from time to time during the outbreak of the conflict. The night markets in Obeagu and Mgbalukwu, Isu where people gather to buy and sell from 17.00 GMT till around 23.00 GMT were all closed-down in the years of the intermittent conflicts. Those who gathered to celebrate and catch their fun at night had to cancel night programmes for fear of violent enemies. During the period of Ezza conflicts with neighbours in Nigeria, people were warned to avoid night travels too. Diipo Ayeni, a former Commissioner of Police in Ebonyi State, warned the public to shun night travels along the Abakaliki/ Enugu road notwithstanding the fact that security was beefed up in the Ezillo buffer zone (Ifi & Inya, 2010:15).

Social groups joined their voice in calling on the Ebonyi State Government to check the incessant killing of innocent Nigerians in the state due to the destructive nature of the Ezza conflicts here and there. The Mbaise Welfare Union (MWU), Abakaliki branch was one of the groups that spoke-out against the number of death befalling unsuspecting Nigerians due to the Ezza-Ezillo conflict with Ezillo landlords. Their reaction came on the heels of the death of one of their members, Dominic Ekalaka, who died while embarking on a journey to make his life better. They (MWU) wrote a letter to the then Governor Martins Elechi complaining that their member embarked on the ill-fated journey following the radio announcement from the federal government-owned Unity FM, Abakaliki on 22nd March 2010, which stated that the citizenry could embark on their lawful duties assuring motorists that the road was safe and that there was strong presence of security agents with three armoured personnel carriers (APC) on the road. The letter, which was co-signed by their Chairman, Emmanuel Amuzo and the Secretary of the Union, Okechukwu Onuoha condemned the unlawful killings of innocent citizens of Nigeria, including their own son by warlords of Ezza-Ezillo and Ezillo. They further stated that in order to avoid doubt Dominic Ekalaka was from Mbaise, Imo State and indeed all other citizens of Nigeria had no cause to be killed on a Federal High Way in a conflict they had no stake on. They urged the Ebonyi State Government to do everything possible to end the conflict, while demanding that the Elechi's administration should contribute in the burial of Dominic Ekalaka as well as compensate the wife and children, who were in dire need of a means of survival following the death of the breadwinner of the family (Ifi & Inya, 2010:15).

The churches of the Catholic Diocese of Abakaliki and Assemblies of God were used as camps for the Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) during the Ezza-Ezillo and Ezillo conflict. Stationing IDP in the churches affected religious activities of Christian faithful. The leaders of both churches pleaded on the people's emotion for better environmental behaviours, which would help them become ambassadors of peace. They engaged in the act of bringing succour to displaced persons in Ezillo. The Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), Ebonyi State Chapter was also going around counselling displaced persons on the need for forgiveness, peace and reconciliation.

Similarly, the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and the Ebonyi State Emergency Management Agency (EBSEMA) also made a contribution of material goods as a way of bringing succour to the displaced persons. Touched by the plights of the victims of the Ezillo conflict, especially the 31st December 2011 attack, the Bishop of the Anglican Diocese of Abakaliki, Rt. Rev. Chukwuma Nkwagu, on Monday 13th February, 2012 joined other good-spirited Nigerians to donate relief materials to casualties of the conflict. They handed over tubers of yam, thirty five (35) bags of rice, beans, onions, tomatoes, magi, foot wears, cloths and an undisclosed amount of money to the wife of the former Governor of Ebonyi State, Josephine Elechi. Bishop Nkwagu maintains that they did so "to console them that God is alive and will never abandon them" (Inya, 2012:19). The Bishop went on to remark that the perpetrators of the conflict were never going to have peace of mind unless they repent. The then wife of the governor stated that she had often carried the materials to victims of the crisis and "that with various donations from different quarters, the people of Ezillo were made happy and there will be no revenge" (Inya, 2012:19).

Furthermore, the people of Agila, Igumale and Utonkon of Benue State, Nigeria have continued to complain and write endless petitions to governments from the colonial era till date against the settling of Ezza people on their land. They desire to bring to the attention of government, the menace caused by the presence of a large number of Ezza, Izzi, Effium and Ukele people in their land. The menace of these foreign 'elements' according to them has lasted for years and they had persistently expressed resistance to their presence by way of court actions and petitions to the then Idoma Native Authority (INA) and the agents of the independent government of Nigeria (Onoja, 2011:172).

It was not just that the Ezza people were quickly settling in parts of Agila land, but they were rapidly changing the names of Agila settlements (replacing them with their own Ezza names). Commenting on the speed at which the Ezza spread in Agila settlements, Onoja (2011:201) states that "before the civil war, a handful of Ezza settled at Ibenda, at a small out-landish corner of Agila land, to somehow serve as essential human shield that would protect Agila from frequent attacks of Izigodo and Effium, who scattered over their land occupying more than half of the arable. Gradually, the Ezza settlers stretched like a swarm of locust from Ibenda, Ogede, Ogbozu, Udegu, Oblonu, Osewajeipfu, Ajenele, Oje Ala and beyond. Senior

indigenes of Ijigban District are today regretting how the friendship and inter-group relations between their fore-fathers and the Ezza people caused them their land (The Gazette, 1991:2). A former District Head of Apa-Agila summed up the dilemma of the Agila people thus; with the growth of Ezza population, Agila raised an eyebrow and tried to group the Ezza under prominent figures for proper monitoring and control. But these prominent figures eventually gave-in to bribery, free labour, free girls for marriage and other advantages readily provided by the Ezza and instead of these Agila farm overseers controlling the rapid growth of the Ezza, they looked away and the Ezza population quadrupled within a short period of time (Onoja, 2011:177-178). The implication is that those prominent Agila people were not just collaborators with the Ezza but that they have selfishly enthroned and re-enforced the pattern of settlement that would fundamentally become a major fuel to conflict in the years that followed.

Thus, by 1960, the population of Ezza had grown to a level that few Agila who lived in the predominantly Ezza areas, vacated their villages, which were already taken over by the Ezza. The present Apa Ward had been completely occupied by the Ezza. The Agila also complain that Ezza people have no system of birth control. The Agila are also not comfortable with the Ezza as their neighbours because their settlement pattern differed from that of Agila. In Agila, the living place is different from the hunting and farming land. If a man farmed in a plot of land, harvested his crops at the end of the season and did not have any cash crops or economic trees on his farms and he did not also want to use the land again, after three years, the land belonged to the Agila community and not the individual. The Ezza on the other side of the divide had no organised state system that control the activities of all the Ezza colonies and settlements hence, they hardly lay claim to the control of all land. The state in Ezza can only function in settling social disputes. An Ezza who planted his crops on a piece of land, carved out a large portion of land surrounding the farm will quickly calls it his own, which he defends with his blood. In that land, he built his huts, rears animals, planted crops with no possibility of rotation. Having over-used the land and killed its fertility, he sought for another land from the Agila farming space. The Ezza man is by nature, a land grabber and often takes it by force (Onoja, 2011:177-178).

The major forms of the social impacts of the land dispute in Madiba, South Africa were the intensification of hatred, bias and prejudice between Molema and those he contested land with. Molema (1984) argues that petty jealousy, suspicion and prejudice were the forces that he was constantly subjected to in order to demean him from his legitimate and rightful position and also to cast him right out of his strategic positions into socio-political irrelevance in the society.

North West Provincial Archives and Library (1985) documents that the dynamics of the land dispute as well as the role of chiefs and headmen in its distribution revealed that land was not planned thus causing hardship to crop farmers. People used the opportunity for the poor documentation of land allocation due to the sharp-practices of illegal allocation to plough all over the land and that intensified the culture of land grabbing and hunger for land.

Furthermore, in the face of the land conflict and the hunger crisis that followed, those who engaged in livestock farming were amongst the worst hit. They lost their arable land to crop farmers who were doing everything humanly possible to take over every available planting space through indiscriminate planting. Livestock farmers were thus forced to rear their stocks in the kraals at night. Another, social problem associated with the illegal allocation of land to non-Tswana squatters was that they began to settle indiscriminately abusing the settlement pattern of the people at the time. North West Provincial Archives and Library (1985:2) documents that there is a high percentage of squatters and the trend has been going on for a very long time unchecked. The chief and council members have done very little to curb the influx of people into the area. Again, one big problem was settlement of people all over the area. That has reduced grazing and ploughing land. The chief was accused of not doing enough in that regard. Lastly, the sizes of some residential sites allotted to the non- Tswana people were said to be extra-large. Others even go to the extent of ploughing in the midst of the village. Nothing is being done to reduce these big yards.

7.6 CONTRAST ANALYSIS

The earlier part of this study has highlighted a number of comparative issues in Ezza conflicts with their neighbours and the Barolong land dispute; nevertheless, there are some differences in the conflicts examined. First, the nature of land ownership as well as structure of land administration differs slightly in both countries. The contested Nigerian land in the Ezza-Ojiegbe and Mgbalukwu/ Obeagu Isu as well as the Ezza-Ezillo and Ezillo conflict zones, are both communally-owned but the Barolong is not. It should be stated that in the Nigerian conflict zone, the Ezza-Ojiegbe as well as the Ezza Ezillo refused to accept the landlord-ship and payment of tributes to the Mgbalukwu-Obeagu Isu and Ezillo people notwithstanding court judgements obtained by the Isu and Ezillo landlords. On the South African side, relations between the two parties had deteriorated to the point that in 1940, the Masibi (community) asked for permission to leave the district. However, that never happened and a compromise presumably was reached between the two parties whereby the BaTlharo recognised Ratshidi authority, in return for which they were exempted from certain obligations, for example, they did not have to plough fields for the Ratshidi or pay towards the school levy fund (Manson & Mbenga, 2014:97).

The level of intra-Barolong division in South Africa was very high. Some of the disgruntled elements of the different Barolong groups continued to fight for the legal adjudication that a particular piece of land belonged to them. While judgment over the real owners of the land as well as those who should assume the position of the paramount ruler kept changing, especially during the colonial era, judgements on the real owner of the contested land in Nigeria remained consistent.

Again, the Barolong were divided into two sections, when confronted with the colonial powers.. One group supported the Boers, while the other was on the side of the British. The alliance with foreigners was instrumental to the disintegration and intensification of conflict amongst the Barolong brothers. The colonial lords promoted the conflict in a bid to advance their imperial interest of attaining more land and expropriation of minerals in the Rainbow Nation. When the Ezza fought with the British in the Anglo-Ezza War, it was a patriotic war that the Ezza people from different parts of Nigeria came to support their kith and kin.

Similarly, the British colonial policies affected the dynamics of the Ezza and Ezza-Agila conflict. The colonial masters, in a bid to ensure sustainable convenience in the administration of Agila, first placed Agila in Abakaliki Division and following continued resistance from Agila people as well as the age-long Ngbo-Agila conflict, they were returned to Munchi Province of Northern Nigeria in 1922 (Onoja, 2011:169-170). The border demarcation that took place at the time has remained a major contentious factor in the Ngbo-Agila conflict, which is now nearly a century old.

Unfortunately, the deep-rooted racism and widespread apartheid culture in the socio-political and economic life of South Africa, at the time, made the Whites untouchables, as they breached the peace of Africans and freely walked-away with their shoulders raised high. The speed at which the Whites escaped the law, during the colonial era, irrespective of the crisis generated in Barolong and the wider South African State cannot be over-emphasised. "It is most unbecoming that whites should assault members of the tribe publicly for illicit diamond smuggling and such cases awere not reported to the government (Selebogo & Meiring, 1982:12). For instance, in 1925, there were some skirmishes between Kgosi Bareki and his group on the one hand and a group of white men from Vryburg on the other. Sequel to the clashes launched by the two groups against one another and the legal battle that followed, the court, which acknowledged the baTlharo as peace-loving still ruled that "it seems clear that for a number of years, there has been friction between the baTlharo of Heuning Vlei and European hunters, traders and others visiting the reserve and that the natives have adopted an insolent attitude towards white people" (Manson & Mbenga, 2014:94). The above level of colour-based advantage, abortion of sound legal judgement in the colonial era and exploitation, never existed in the Nigerian conflict setting.

In short, the colonial governments of both Nigeria and South Africa tried to resolve the conflicts but the unfortunate thing was that "colonial rule was something of a paradox" (Erim, 1966:6). Thus, the paradox in their system of governance as well as management of conflict manifested in the form of their changing imperial interests and the type of judgement given to the conflict groups that approached their government, which was then the ultimate hope of the common man for peace. In some cases, the judgement pronounced by the colonial masters could be said to be sound, like in the Ezza-Ojiegbe and Mgbalukwu/Obeagu Isu

conflict as well as the Ezza-Ezillo conflict. However, in the case of the Barolong dispute, the adjudication to the struggle over the ownership and access to land was a way of promoting their divide and rule policy amongst the people. It should also be noted that the colonial government's desire to re-settle the baTlharo to Kuruman District of South Africa where their kith and kin inhabited in the past never worked out unlike in Agila, Nigeria where all efforts made to resettle the Ezza to their ancestral home in Ebonyi State did not work.

While ethnic consciousness has over the years continued to hold the Ezza people on one hand and their enemy on the other together for over a century in Nigeria, the situation is different in South Africa. Ethnicity, which "was the glue that kept the desperate factions of these communities together in the later years of the nineteenth century, increasingly became contested and a source of division in the first half of the twentieth century" (Mason & Mbenga, 2014:63). It should be noted that the alliance between the British colonial government and Ratshidi Barolong influenced their moral to sustain and manage the dual conflict faced from their Barolong kith and kin and from the baTlharo, thus making such alliance a historic bottleneck to the peace process in the then Bechuanaland reserves.

Within the period of Ezza-Ezillo conflict with Ezillo people, the Ebonyi State Government declared a state of emergency in the contested area from dusk to dawn. That period was often characterised by high level of killings from the militia and warlords. The time of the curfew was often characterised by deadly attacks from the warriors, which lead to high level of human insecurity in the area. On the other hands, the Barolong land dispute setting did not witness any form of state of emergency in contemporary times considering the fact that the conflict zone did not have high human risk level in contemporary times.

In the Nigerian side, there was massive killing of unlucky citizenry, who were not in any way connected to the conflicts nor were they parties to the conflict. Their major factor that led to their death was that they were using the Trans African High Way which passed through Ezillo, when the warlords struck. The implication was that there was evidence of innocent loss of lives by people from all the regions of Nigeria unlike the South African conflict setting.

The Ezza conflicts were mainly resolved using a combination of African conflict resolution strategies (IACRS) and western approaches of conflict resolution (WACR) unlike the Barolong land dispute that was managed through western method of court arbitration (WACR). The Barolong conflict was mainly resolved using western strategies of court judgements unlike in Ezza conflict setting of Nigeria. Peace keeping forces were deployed by both the Ebonyi State and Federal Government of Nigeria to manage the excessive bloodletting in Ezillo. A Peace Committee and Panel of Inquiry were also established in Ezillo, Ebonyi State and Agila, Benue State in the course of the conflicts. Again, the traditional rulers, churches, civil society groups, oath taking etc were all used to ensure an end to the conflict both in Isu and Ezillo.

There are a number of other factors that differentiates Ezza conflicts with her neighbours to the Barolong land dispute. Both conflicts became intense in the last decades of the 19th century but by the last quarter of the 20th century, the Barolong land dispute has ceased to be violent unlike the Ezza conflicts with her neighbours that lingered to the twenty first century. The Ezza conflicts lasted for longer time than the Barolong land dispute. The Nigerian setting recorded massive loss of lives and properties in the 19th, 20th and 21st centuries as against the Barolong where the loss was mainly limited to the 19th and 20th centuries. One of the worst killings of over seventy people and nearly a thousand missing people took place on the 31st December, 2011 night at Ezillo.

The Ezza conflict affected the formal education of pupils and students of Primary and Secondary Schools in Ezillo, Isu and Agila unlike the Barolong land dispute. In Agila, there was high level identity problem that children of Agila people stopped attending schools in their former farm settlement that were already overtaken by the Ezza, leaving the schools for Ezza people alone. The implication was that soon, the Ezza settlers in Agila began to rename such schools. Ezillo was the worst hit by the dynamics of the conflict as the Ezillo Boys Secondary School was closed down perpetually and a number of schools were sent to the Special Science School Ezillo where they were temporary accommodated with heavy security within the inter-war years.

More still, many of the warriors in the Ezza conflict zone were found to have used charms, amulets and all manners of talisman to wage their war with the enemies. The Ezza conflicts with their neighbours took place in Sub-saharan Africa while the Barolong land dispute transpired in Southern Africa.

A fundamental form of contrast in the above studies lies in the scope and asses to materials for research. While in the South African conflict setting, many of the citizenry are unaware of the dynamics of the Barolong conflict, almost every breathing soul in the Ezza neighbourhood could account for the Ezza conflicts with their neighbours in Nigeria. Thus, the access to data was more easily available in Ezza and their neighbours than in the Barolong setting, where almost all documents must come from official archival or Tribal Council sources.

7.7 QUEST FOR LEGAL JUSTICE IN EZZA AND BAROLONG

The use of judicial arbitration was a strategy towards the resolution of a number of conflicts examined in this study. On the Ezza-Agila conflict terrain with the Agila people, the Ezza were said to have reported the issue of eviction by the Agila people to Captian MacBright, the then Resident Officer in charge of the Benue Province, who recommended that the Ezza should leave Agilaland. They consequently went to the Enugu Colonial Court and the Makurdi High Court where the same decision was upheld. Sensing that the colonial government and the judiciary could not guarantee their stay in Agila, the Ezza decided to adopt the act of effective occupation through warfare. Again, sequel to the intermittent conflicts that started there since the 1940s, the Ezza successfully began to attack and capture more land. They were said to have burned houses belonging to Agila and looted their properties. At the end of the strategic attacks from different fronts, they successfully took over the Agada-Ogbe land settlement and a number of other places that they have occupied till date.

Ani (2015a:3) argues that the inability of the Ezza to relocate from their land pushed the Ezillo people to bring the case to the Nkalagu Native Court in 1959. The court noticed that Ezza people had occupied the disputed area and Ezillo people had no meaningful piece of land to farm. The court also ordered the Ezza people living in the contested area to leave and relocate to Egu Echara or their ancestral home, where they had migrated from. They were given three months from the 14th December 1959 date of the judgement (Ezillo Memorandum, 2008:5) but the Ezza people did not relocate nor leave. A few years later, the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970) broke out. In the course of the war, the Agila people and other Idoma groups of Benue, formed a strategic alliance with Nigerian forces and began to kill Ezza settlers in the area. This led to massive migration of Ezza people from Benue down to their Ezillo settlement. The Ezza cashed - in on the immediate post-war situation and expanded in the town leaving in scattered form and renting to one another every available space of land in Ezillo, expanding up to the old Enugu-Abakaliki highway, several kilometers from Egu Echara. In 1972, the Ezza took over Nwafor Isimkpuma, which was an Ezillo market and renamed it Eke Ezza. "Today, they have even crossed the new Enugu-Abakaliki express way" (Ezillo Memorandum, 2008:5). The Ezillo people did not fold their hands in the face of these continuous Ezza expansion and settlement. They reported to the then post-civil war government demanding the enforcement of the Nkalagu Native Court decision of 1959, which spelt-out that the Ezza should relocate to their original Egu Echara land allocation. Unfortunately, "the Ezza gathered more settlers from their ancestral homes and seized any available space in the land, as if that was not enough, they resorted to displacing people from their compounds and farmlands" (Ezillo Memorandum, 2008:5).

Nevertheless, it was only in 2010 that some of the suspected warlords in the Ezza-Ezillo conflict, which became 'very hot' since 2008, were arraigned before the court. It was specifically on 24th March 2010 that some persons were arraigned before a Chief Magistrate Court in Abakaliki, in relations to their alleged role in the Ezza-Ezillo conflict with their landlords. The suspects, Egbe Peter (23 years) from Ezillo, Onyebishi Idu (24 years) from Ezillo, Raphael Ejike (22 years) from Amana in Ezza South, Christian Odo (43 years) from Isele Ukwu in Delta State, Ugochukwu Okorie (38 years), Ikechukwu Nwobodo (22 years) and Ejike Emmanuel (21 years) from Ezzamgbo as well as Charles Ogbu from Ogbolo in Agila-Ado Local Government Area of Benue State, Emeka Iheme from Isukwuato Local Government Area of Abia state were arraigned before His Worship, Sam Okoro Ogo for

conspiring with one another to commit felony and promote inter communal conflict. This was tantamount to committing an offence punishable in Section 516A (1) of the Criminal Code Cap C38 Vol. 4 of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Ifi & Inya, 2010:15). According to the then Commissioner of Police, Ebonyi State, Diipo Ayeni "following the sporadic shooting in the air and attempts to disrupt the free movement of vehicles on the Highway by militants in the troubled area of Ishielu, between 19th February 2010 and 24th of the same month, at various locations, the mentioned persons were reasonably suspected to have taken part in the disruption of peace and were arrested" (Ifi & Inya, 2010:15).

Ironically, the above suspects all pleaded not guilty. Egba Peter recounted how the police came to his house with a Hilux van and forced him to enter. When he entered, they drove him to the Police Station and all he heard was the accusation that he was a major actor in the Ezza-Ezillo conflict with their landlords. Rapheal Ejike, on his part, argued that it was actually the police who threatened his right to free movement as they stopped him on the road at Ori-Uzor and arrested him. When he wanted to find out what he did, they told him that he would be informed later and what followed was his being arraigned before the court. When the court wanted to know why he was the only person arrested in the whole community filled with people who moved about for their private businesses, he had no answer. Another suspect, Ugochukwu Okorie, alleged that he was returning from Onitsha to his village without any prior knowledge that the intermittent conflict had started. When their vehicle reached Nkalagu junction, police men stationed there for stop-and-search purposes searched him as well as members of their vehicle; he maintained he was very surprised to hear them ordering him to enter their security van and that was how he landed in court as one of the actors in the Ezillo conflict.

Paradoxically, Ugochukwu Okorie informed the court that "he was arrested while trekking from Ezzamgbo to Ezillo and further told reporters that he was going to Anambra State and did not want to board any vehicle to Onitsha, hence, decided to trek to Onitsha" (Ifi & Inya, 2010:15). It was during the course of the journey that he was arrested. Ironically, as simple as the Ugochukwu Okorie's argument would look, it should be stated that in contemporary time, only very few people will trek the long distance from Ezzamgbo to Ezillo.

Charlse Ogbu stated that he earned his livelihood from hunting and it was during one of his hunting expeditions that he missed his way and crossed from the Benue forest into Ngbo. While moving towards Ezillo, he was arrested on 24th February 2010. He was cross-examined on why he should enter Ngbo irrespective of his knowledge that Ngbo and Agila people had experienced conflict but he maintained the conflict was in the past and he was simply suffering like any other man who had missed his bearing and became suspected of fanning the embers of conflict. The Chief Magistrate ruled that the suspects be remanded in police custody and wait for further hearing (Ifi & Inya, 2010:15).

In June 2010, Justice Saliu Saidu of the Federal High Court, sitting in Abakaliki, struck - out charges against thirty-one prominent persons from Ezza and Ezillo alledged to be sponsoring the war in the area. The thirty one accused persons were as follows: David Egba, Michael O. Okechi, Barr. Francis Chukwu, Hon. Reginald Onwe, Joseph Ugbor, James Abba, Chief Godwin Anyim, Okey Princewill, Engr. Gabriel Edeh, Omeri Sunday, Hon. Lawson Ede, Imoke Paul, Edeh Ambrose, James Enwuru, Joseph Amagu, Paul Ogbule and Bathlomew Ugbo. Others were Micheal Akam, Chief (Barr) Onwa Ali Onwa, Chief Geoffrey Ozor Chukwu, John Williams Nwode, Morgan Eze, Hon. Moses Ogodo Ali Nomeh, Hon Cordelia Mgbada, Hon Lazarus Ogbe, Bar. Uwa Ikeomebe, Hon Maria Okohu, Okpo John, Linus Nwamba and Hon Joseph Egede Elom. Nwani and Inya (2010:1) state that according to the withdrawal sheet, which contained the names of all the thirty one accused, "the withdrawal and discontinuance was to explore further means of resolving the conflict that led to the charge in order to achieve lasting and enduring peace and order".

The news of the judgment was received with joy and celebrations by family members of those arraigned before the court. Dipo Ayeni, the then Commissioner of Police in the State at the time, quickly responded that if they were thinking that they have been dismissed and acquitted, they have another one coming because the Police would investigate the matter and come- up with other charges to enable their prosecution. Thus, the Police boss of Ebonyi State at that time emphasized that nobody has been discharged and acquitted and let them not think that they have been pardoned because it is not yet *uhuru* (independence or freedom) for

them (Inya, 2010d:1& 19). The above position of the Police leadership in Ebonyi State goes a long way in revealing how biased they were in the course of the Ezillo and the Ezza-Ezillo conflict. On the plea of amnesty to many Ezza suspects who were then in police and prison custody, Ayeni stated that he had no power to grant amnesty but he argued without mincing words that all those people that have been arrested were arrested on point of confession. They have made revelations on their active participation in the Ezillo and Ezza-Ezillo conflict. Therefore, he maintains that he had no power to grant pardon to criminals. In short, such power to grant amnesty lies with the Ebonyi State Governor or the President of Nigeria. So the Police Commissioner stated that they must face the consequences of their actions. Part of the people who killed innocent passer-by on the highway during the war were those who are being held in prison custody awaiting trial now and that was why Ayeni said they have committed acts of murder (Inya, 2010d:1& 19).

The people's quest for judicial road to peace in Ezillo recorded a number of court cases. Some of the cases were instituted by individuals and groups from either of the two conflict parties on issues relating to land disputes and illegal displacement of people from their homes. A number of them have been concluded and decided in favour of the Ezillo people, while others are still in court. Ezillo Memorandum (2008:6-7) lists them as follows:

a. Oji Nwibin and four others representing Ezillo vs Opoke Agu and nine others that were representing Ezza-Ezillo. The case was decided in favour of Ezillo in 1959 (Suit No. 23/5/59).
b. Ndeguba Amorie village Ezillo vs Umuezeoka Ezza Ezillo led by Mathias Adaka. It was decided in 1978 at Abakaliki High Court in favour of Ndeguba Ezillo.
c. Ali Nwede of Ugbonna Ezillo vs Umuezeokoha (Ezza-Ezillo). The case was concluded in favour of Ali Nwede.
d. Linus Nweze of Isimkpuma Ezillo vs Nwobasi Ebilima of Ezza. Decided in Customary Court of Appeal, Abakaliki in favour of Linus Nweze (Suit No. ECC/4/99).
e. Abel Ebenyi of Ugbonna village Ezillo vs Alex Usulor of Ezza Ezillo. This case was decided in favour of Abel Ebenyi (Suit No NKCC/19/87).
f. Ebenyi Oke of Ugbonna Ezillo vs Nworu of Ezza. It was concluded in favour of Ebenyi Oke.

g. Ndegugwu village Ezillo vs Umuezeokoha (Ezza-Ezillo). It was concluded in favour of Ndegugwu.
h. Amuji Ezillo vs Omena Ede of Ezza. Pending at the Abakaliki High Court.
i. Eje Nwebenyi vs Nwanja Onuoha of Ezza. Pending in the Customary Court of Appeal (Suit No. HAB/41M/2003, ECC/10/92).
j. John Chima of Ezza vs Sunday Ezigbo of Ugbonna Ezillo. It is pending at the High Court Ezzangbo (Suit No HKW/1/2006).
k. Boniface Igiri vs Umuezokoha Ezza over the Motor Park land at Isimkpuma. It is pending in court.
l. Martin Omebe of Ezillo vs Godwin Ucha of Ezza. The case is pending in court.
m. Ndieguugwu Ezillo vs Eze Onu of Ezza. The case is pending in court.
n. Eje Nwebenyi of Ezillo vs Nwinya Omoha. The case is pending in court.

From their above legal battles, one can easily infere that the Ezza-Ezillo and Ezillo people have recorded numerous forms of legal battle, in which many have been decided in favour of the Ezillo people, while others are pending in court. Unfortunately, the road to legal justice and arbitration as a peace building strategy does not work in all forms of conflict as exhibited in the continued conflict between the Ezza and some of their neighbours that have obtained all the needed court injunctions to quite the Ezza but the implementation has remained impossible considering the multiple dynamics of conflict.

The process of administering justice in the then land dispute in Barolong, South Africa, was championed by the headmen. They made decisions and passed judgments on who owned what portion of land and other matters. Unfortunately, some of the headmen had questionable characters and attributes, which weakened their image as custodians of justice. Some of them were said to have been reported to the Tribal Authority, who failed in taking any serious action because the headmen belonged to the royal family.

The case of Headman James Monchusi is a popular example. He was accused of harbouring and protecting terrorists in his house and even allowing another headman by the name of S. J. More, who came from Swartkop, Ventersdorp District, to meddle into the affairs of his people. Selebogo and Meiring (1982:9) state that "his judgments and decisions concerning

estates were illegal and invalid." It is stated that he even took some of the communal estates and properties for his own personal use, which many members of the society, at the time, considered to be an abuse of power. It is also morally wrong and illegal to admit that people brought some of the estate property to his house, yet knowing that there was a dispute and litigation about these properties. This was an irregularity which could not be tolerated by anybody (Selebogo &Meiring, 1982:9).

It should be noted that while there were members of the Tribal Authority who were doing the right thing and passing genuine judgments, the excesses of the bad ones generated widespread reactions. The height of the abuse of office by the Tribal Authorities was manifested in a number of instances when they "acted contrary to the judgment and decision of the Supreme Court" (Selebogo &Meiring, 1982:9). When a Tribal Authority begins to neglect, go against and behave in such a way that opposes the judgment of the highest court of the state, especially in land matters then they are simply promoting anarchy. Ironically, the illegal acts carried out by tribal authorities and the things that they benefitted from such unethical allocation/ claim of land, sustained their negative behaviour. When the Tribal Authority at the time imposed fines of sheep and goats on those they found wanting, they slaughtered the animals, cooked them and used them for feastings at the tribal courts.

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Selebogo and Meiring, (1982:10-11) argue that there are instances where people were summoned to court on several occasions and the cases were never tried because they involved the favourites of the Tribal Authority. Notes of court proceedings, documents and forms pertaining to criminal and civil cases were not submitted to the Magistrate. Members of the Tribal Authority have, in the past, adopted a practice of receiving complaints and proscribed fees direct from the public. These complaints were never brought before the tribal court for trial and fees not paid back into the tribal accounts in some cases. Some members of the Tribal Authority appointed unrecognised headmen at Dikgatlhong, Diolwane, Ramabesa and Lohatlhang, where cases were tried privately without the consent and knowledge of the chief. It goes without saying that exorbitant fines were imposed and the fees thereof were never paid into the tribal account. Most of the complaints were from these areas as well as Thutlwane. It is alleged that some members of the Tribal Authority presided over these cases without the knowledge and consent of the chief (Selebogo & Meiring, 1982:10).

7.8 THE ROAD TO PEACE IN EZZA AND BAROLONG

Mayer (2009), after reviewing the nature of certain conflicts on world stage, argues that some have no quick fix, hence people in such conflict zones, should be prepared for a life which they will stay and live with conflict. Paradoxically, such culture of staying with conflict is worse than Galtung's state of negative peace. It should be recalled that Galtung (1964:1-4) came-up with the idea of negative and positive peace. While negative peace means the absence of war and actual physical violence, positive peace is aimed at the promotion of a human society with sustainable and institutional structures that would prevent conflict and promote peace. Hence, Mayer's conflict ideology, could lead to the 'killing' of the tomorrow of many families (Gourevitch, 1998). This is because it has been stated that it is difficult for groups to willingly end a conflict on inter-group level until both parties reach the point of "mutually hurting stalemate" (Zartman, 1989; Haass, 1990). At that point, any move towards mediation tends to be more fruitful. Thus, in order to escape the future Armageddon that violent conflicts could bring on the conflict-ravaged communities and groups discussed in this study, there is need for what Hauss (1989) refers to as "a rational basis for hope". This form of hope comes to conflict zones in the form of peace processes and initiatives. While the traditional African societies offered such peace processes, the rise of colonialism exarcebated mass resource exploitation and planted a divide and rule system in many African societies which led to conflict.

In practice, colonial efforts to formalise land laws and stabilise social and territorial boundaries were complicated by the exigencies of economic exploitation and by the problems of documenting native law and custom (Roberts, 1990). European colonial governments had vested interest both in bringing African land and labour together for their imperial interest. In struggling to cope with the resulting contradictions (Lonsdale & Berman, 1992; Cooper, 1994), colonial governments pursued and promoted land as well as labour policies that were inhuman, oppressive and unstable in many African states, including Nigeria and South Africa. The governments that emerged after independence have not been able to ensure sustainable positive peace in every facet of national life. However, "much can be done to reduce conflict and release the needed energies for more productive tasks" (Zartman, 1991:299)

The road to peace in the Ezza-Ojiegbe and Mgbalukwu/ Obeagu conflict was a long and difficult one. On 2nd November, 2001, the Ebonyi State House of Assembly in its formal sitting, considered the Ad-hoc Committee Report on Land Dispute and Boundary Adjustment in respect of Onicha Local Government Area and resolved as follows:

I. That since Obeagu/ - Mgbalukwu and Ojiegbe are both found in Onicha Local Government Area of Ebonyi State and considering the fact that rancour and acrimony more often than not retard progress and development, Ojiegbe community be allowed to continue to occupy and live in the area they had inhabited for over ninety (90) years;

II. That since Ojiegbe people have been inhabiting the land before the land use decree of 1978, they were deemed to be owners in possession but not adverse possessors and not be subjected to paying yearly traditional tributes to Mgbalukwu/ Obeagu people;

III. That there be a physical boundary between Obeagu/ Mgbalukwu and Ojiegbe people so that each of the communities would know the areas within which to live and farm. Furthermore, that a physical line of demarcation be put in place between Onicha Local Government Area and Inyaba Local Government Area respectively;

IV. That a police post be set up at the area in dispute to help check the activities of dissident elements who might continue to ferment troubles;

V. That the forest in question should continue to be owned by Obeagu/ Mgbalukwu communities;

VI. That the people of Obeagu/ -Mgbalukwu and Ojiegbe do live in peace and harmony with one another;

VII. That the office of Survey-General demarcates the boundary between Obeagu/ Mgbalukwu and Ojiegbe communities;

VIII. That in line with tradition, the people of Ojiegbe should provide the under-listed items to be used on the peace day: one cow, sixty tubers of sizeable yams, twenty kola nuts and twenty gallons of palm wine. That provision of the aforementioned items on the peace day shall mark the end of Ojiegbe's yearly traditional tribute paid to Obeagu/ -Mgbalukwu communities; and

IX. That the leaders of Obeagu/ -Mgbalukwu and Ojiegbe, who had signed an undertaking with the Ad hoc Committee of the Ebonyi State House of Assembly

on Land Dispute, be held liable for any breach of peace resulting from land dispute in the aforementioned communities (Nkama, 2001:1-2).

As beautiful as the resolution of the Ebonyi State House of Assembly appeared to be, it had a number of weaknesses. The physical boundary between the Obeagu, Mgbalukwu and Ojiegbe Ezza communities was not implemented. Furthermore, the Ebonyi State House of Assembly erroneously raised the Inyaba Development Centre to the status of a local government area, a status still to be achieved. In short, what exists is the fact that Inyaba Development Centre is part of the Ishielu Local Government Area. Similarly, instead of the legislative body ensuring that a permanent police post is established in the area, the Ebonyi State Police command established a temporal police post in a rented building near the contested land that lasted just a few months before its disappearance. The fifth recommendation that the forest in question be continually owned by the Obeagu and Mgbalukwu people did not go down well with the Ojiegbe people, who had fought over the years for a significant portion of land belonging to their landlords. In addition, the suggestion that the Obeagu, Mgbalukwu and Ojiegbe Ezza people should live in peace was respected more in the breach as the years 2005-2007 withnessed intensive fighting amongst the communities.

On 22nd March 2002 the people of Mgbalukwu, Obeagu and Ojiegbe people reached an aggrement, which read partly as follows:

a. There has been a persistent land dispute between Mgbalukwu and Ojiegbe communities resulting in the loss of lives and properties;
b. Some well meaning individuals from both communities had appealed for peace and calm for the purpose of curbing the suffering and hardship on members of the two communities arising from the said land dispute;
c. These well meaning individuals had appealed to the Government of Ebonyi State of Nigeria to restore peace in the two communities; and
d. The Government of Ebonyi State of Nigeria had intervened and settled the matters amicably between the two communities.

IT IS HEREBY AGREED as follows:

1. That the two communities shall henceforth and without further assurance, live in peace and harmony;

2. That each of the communities shall respect the rights of each other to exist without molestation, intimidation or harassment;
3. That on the signing of this agreement, Ojiegbe community is no longer required to pay to Mgbalukwu community traditional annual kola nuts, tobacco, potash, goat and a leg of horse as a tribute;
4. That Ojiegbe people who are taking refuge at Ezzagu in Ishielu Local Government Area of Ebonyi State be allowed to return home;
5. That on return of Ojiegbe people, the Mgbalukwu Community shall ensure that the said Ojiegbe are received to resettle effectively and continue with their daily activities;
6. That in the unlikely event of any future conflict, an aggrieved party shall report same to Ebonyi State Government; and
7. That in event of any breach of any of the provisions of this agreement, the party in default shall pay to the other party, not in default, the sum of #1,000,000.00 (one million naira only) as damages.

The above agreement was signed by Chief Okoro Eze, Ani Mathew Odii, Chief Okorie Nwakwukwu, Rueben Chukwu and Chief Afred Akpa for Mgbalukwu and Obeagu Communities, while Pastor Simon Nworie, Chief Barnabas Nworie, Christian Aleke, Chijioke Aleke, Ichie Boniface Nwokerekwu and Ikpozu Utobo signed for Ojiegbe community. Unfortunately, three years later (2005-2007), another conflict broke-out between Ojiegbe community on the one side and Mgbalukwu as well as Obeagu Isu on the other. The massive negative impacts of the conflict did not give room for the identification of defaulters; rather, massive effort was placed on the road to sustainable peace.

Furthermore, in 2005, some townsmen from the affected communities invited the Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Centre (HRCRC) of Ebonyi State into the conflict for its resolution. The centre, formed by Reverend Father O' Hara, searched for international support for the management of the conflict. Soon, the peace initiative of the centre started in 2006. The sponsors included Manas Unidas of Spain, Catholic Relief Services and Corde Aide. On 12th April 2006, the then Ebonyi State Governor, Dr. Sam Omiyi Egwu ordered a seize-fire on the warring communities but it never stopped the ragging conflict. Then Mgbalukwu, Obeagu and Ojiegbe people scheduled a prayer rally held on 24th June 2006 and

led by Rev. Fr. Professor Emmanuel Ede at the request of the three communities. Due to the exigencies of the conflict, it never saw the light of day. The mediator in Ojiegbe-Mgbalukwu-Obeagu Isu case (Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Centre (HRCRC), Abakaliki did not judge the disputants but assisted "them to decide for themselves how to manage their differences" (Clemens, 1998:246-247). The peace process was also facilitated through faith in free choices made by community leaders rather than dictation. The people trusted in human potentials for peace with its strengths and frailties as well as the ability to distinguish the available from the desirable (Simkin, 1971:53).

Consequently, on 12th June, 2007, the leaders of the three communities wrote a letter to the then Commissioner of Police in Ebonyi State stating that in order to "assist in the restoration of peace in the disturbed communities; we have completed plans to hold a public prayer rally at Mgbalukwu Isu. We sincerely regret the inconvenience caused by the failure of the programme last year. Rev. Fr. (Professor) Emmanuel Ede of the Catholic Prayer Ministry Elele, Port Harcourt, has been invited to minister/ officiate during the rally, we strongly believe that the Almighty God, the custodian of peace, will help to quicken the peace process" (Chukwu, Ani, Nwokoro & Ujo 2007:1). Mgbalukwu and Obeagu as well as Ojiegbe communities held a prayer rally in Mater Dei Parish on 24th June, 2007 asking the Almighty God for peace.

The Human Rights Commission organised a series of seminars and workshops for elders in the conflict-torn communities, centred on the need for peace. Ani (2009) states that the prayer rally and seminars were followed by exchange of peaceful visits to the warring communities by the actors in the peace process. Among these actors were the representative of the Human Right Commission, Reverend Father Christopher Agwu and Reverend Father Christian Nwankwo. The former was the Parish Priest of St. Michaels' Catholic Parish, Isu and the latter the Parish Priest of St. James Catholic Church, Ezzagu. They ministered respectively to the communities in the theatre of the conflict. They visited Ojiegbe on 18th October 2007, Mgbalukwu and Obeagu on 6th November 2007. On 20th November, 2007 after a lengthy meeting at Saint Michaels' Parish Isu, a religio-cultural motivated boundary was accepted by the three communities. Rev. Fr. Professor Ede planted a cross and offered a covenant prayer for the three communities on the accepted boundary on 24th November 2007. On 29th

November 2007, a peace pact was signed by the three communities in the office of the Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Centre (HRCRC), Abakaliki, Ebonyi State, Nigeria. However, on 1st February 2008, the people of Ojiegbe, Mgbalukwu and Obeagu (OMO) came together and signed a Peace Accord in Onicha Local Government Area, Ebonyi State. Part of the Peace Accord read as follows:

We, the people of Mgbalukwu, Ojiegbe and Obeagu having firmly and solemnly resolved to live in unity and peace with one another as one people, dedicated to the promotion of co-operation, understanding and peaceful relations amongst us and desirous of ensuring justice, equity and fairness in all our actions towards each other, do hereby covenant as follows:

1. We the sons and daughters of Obeagu/ Mgbalukwu/Ojiegbe communities this day 24/11/07, accepted the boundary as demarcated by us, which was symbolised by a holy cross planted by Rev. Fr. Emmanuel Edeh and a beacon planted by the State Government;
2. We covenant that no member of either community shall encroach on the boundary in any way, whatsoever and that we shall at all times, respect this decision which we have reached regarding the boundary;
3. We shall not take up arms against ourselves regarding any dispute that may arise as a result of the boundary issue or any other issue whatsoever, nor show hostilities towards one another;
4. In the event of any dispute arising between us regarding the boundary or any other issue, we shall resolve our differences through dialogue ourselves or through a third party eg. Human Rights Organization, the Government and the Church.
5. That a fine of #100,000.00 (one hundred thousand naira) be paid by any of these communities for a breach of any of the provisions of this accord; and
6. We also covenant that nobody from any of our communities shall be made to suffer or be punished directly or indirectly as a result of the war. We have forgiven and forgotten the incidence and shall strive to promote peace and understanding amongst ourselves.

The above accord was signed and sealed by five representives each from of the three communities involved in the conflict before the Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Centre, the Chairman of Onicha Local Government Area, the Coordinator of the Onicha Development Centre and the Commissioner, Boarder Security and Conflict Resolution, Ebonyi State.

Similarly, the quest for peace in the Ezza-Ezillo and Ezillo conflict setting has been a long and tough journey. Sequel to the burning of the houses of Ibini Joshua, Louis Oke and Raphael Ogbu, the Ezillo people invited two Ezza elders, Chief Nwenowo and Chief Uzim from Onueke in 1998 to intervene in the growing Ezza expansionism as well as the conflict in Ezillo. Ezza peace ambassadors from their ancestral home advised their kith and kin in Ezillo to vacate Umuzoke land (Ezillo Memorandum, 2008:13) but the advice fell on deaf ears.

The issue of failed peace process has been obtainable during the years of intermittent Ezza-Ezillo conflict with landlords. The Ebonyi State Government established a peace committee after the 2007-2008 Ezza-Ezillo conflict. Governor Elechi gathered traditional rulers from Abakaliki to perform a ritual for peace. Afterwards he established a Peace Committee of thirty 'wise' men, mostly traditional rulers who had distinguished themselves in settling disputes in their communities. Their mandate included fashioning-out an acceptable arrangement to secure a permanent peace deal for Ezillo.

The Peace Committee worked assiduously for months. They met with representatives of both sides of the conflict divide. They received their memoranda and heard their oral evidence on how peace could be achieved. They also visited displaced persons of Ezillo and Ezza-Ezillo at their different locations to preach peace. At a stage, the Peace Committee set up a monitoring team comprising representatives of both sides of the conflict to accompany farmers to their farms on appointed days and ensure that nobody was attacked. Both police and military personnel were to be part of the team. The strategy which was intended to gradually rekindle the confidence of the ordinary people, but it could not take off because of mistrust. Even after members from the Ezza clan on the Peace Committee invited Ezza-Ezillo people to their ancestral home for dialogue on the need for peace, the situation did not change. At the end of the day, the Peace Committee submitted its report. Consequently, the Governor of Ebonyi State announced that the State Government had decided to approve and implement two key recommendations of the committee as follows:

i. On the demand by Ezillo people that Ezza-Ezillo should completely vacate Ezillo land, Government accepts the recommendation of the Peace Committee

which views such a request as unjustifiable on the ground that it was Ezillo people that invited the Ezza to assist them fight their Ngbo rivals over a disputed parcel of land at Egu Echara; and

ii. The Committee also recommended that for peace to reign permanently in Ezillo, the Ezza-Ezillo should relocate to Egu Echara land (which the state government expanded from where was) originally allocated to them by Ezillo people through the customary method of land allocation, *imabe ogbu* (Elechi, 2008:2).

When the conflict continued into 2009, the Ebonyi State Government organized members of the warring factions to sign a cease-fire. On 2nd September 2009, "over seventy two people from the two warring communities signed a ceasefire to end the lingering crisis after the stakeholders and leaders of the warring communities met and made a declaration of ceasefire" (Inya, 2009b:18). The declaration was made in the presence of the speaker of the Ebonyi State House of Assembly, Rt. Honourable Augustine Nwankwegu and other members of the House from the warring communities. The then speaker stated that they were not acting as the legislative arm but as a third party that intends to intervene and end the conflict. He called on them to accept government decision and join hands to build a more peaceful Ebonyi State. Also, the Chairman of Ezza-Ezillo and Ezillo Peace and Reconciliation Committee, Honourable Barrister Emma Nwobo noted that "the incidence of hit and run as well as point and kill guerrilla tactics of the people had refused to end the war. At the end of the meeting, both parties in the four-point communiqué condemned in strong terms, the prolonged hostilities between the two communities and agreed that there is need for an automatic and unconditional ceasefire" (Inya, 2009b:18).

Following the cease-fire in Ezillo in the first quarter of 2010, many Nigerians were very suspicious that the end of the Ezza-Ezillo conflict with their Ezillo landlord was yet to be seen. The sceptics were not only limited to the indigenes of the conflict zones or armchair analysts but also included the powerful elite in Ebonyi State. It should be recalled that during the inter-denominational church service to mark the end of the 2010 Democracy Day celebrations held at St. Peter's Presbyterian Church, Kpirikpiri, Abakaliki, the then Governor, Martin Elechi stated that "no amount of propaganda, virtuous or otherwise will tie our hands; the peace we have is a structural calm. Until we get to the root causes, it will not be real. We

must find lasting peace and no matter what it cost we will stand firm" (Nwani & Inya, 2010:18). The then Governor, maintained that his administration used different approaches to peace in Ezillo, but still could not maintain sustainable peace in the area. Governor Elechi maintained that the state government took a pacific approach which allowed for consultations, dialogue as well as giving room for give and take but unfortunately, peace eluded the government. When we tried to recourse again to dialogue, it was felt that we were weak and unable to stop the war, and then we had to prove that peace was of utmost importance to us and we brought in the federal government to defend its territory (Nwani & Inya, 2010: 18).

While the hopes of the Ezillo people were high that peace has temporarily returned in the areas, the night of 31st December 2011 sent shocks to all travellers of the Abakaliki-Enugu high way and the whole of Igbo land as well as Nigerians in general, when the news of the mass killing of over one hundred Ezillo men and women by suspected Ezza guerrilla fighters in Ezillo made live headlines on the media. The continuous killing of people made the Ebonyi State Government to militarise the area as a peace roadmap and convert the government-owned Boy's High School in Ezillo into a mobile police barracks, with mean-looking officers and armoured personnel careers everywhere. Unfortunately, the cloud of the conflict and its potentials of re-occurrence as well as its multiplier effects on the Nigerian State were still heavy on the people of Ezillo and Ebonyi State environment in particular and Nigeria in general.

Writing on the road to peace in Ezillo, Ani (2015a) maintains the land originally ceded to Ezza-Ezillo for their settlement, under the agreement with Ezillo, was a narrow strip of land running in a northwest-southwest direction on the boundary between Ngbo and Ezillo referred to as Egu Echara. Elechi (2008:3) states that to make it sufficient for settlement and use by Ezza-Ezillo people (currently being relocated), Government decided to substantially increase the size of land to be ceded to the Ezza-Ezillo people. The land area being added to the old settlement area by the new demarcation was 253.75 hectares; bringing the total land mass to be occupied henceforth by Ezza-Ezillo to 306.29 hectares up from the original 52.54 hectares. The new land was circumscribed within the following co-ordinates of Latitude and Longitude, beginning from the intersection of the Old Enugu-Abakaliki Road with the New

Enugu-Abakaliki Road at a point called PWD Camp (also in local parlance called Aaron Camp) at Latitude 06° 25' 56.62'' and Longitude 07° 52' 29.34''E and moving westward along the Old Road for a distance of 910.106 metres, the boundary of the land begins at a culvert on Offia-Atu Stream on Latitude 06° 25' 14.46'' N and Longitude 07° 50' 40.32''E (Elechi, 2008:3; Ani, 2015a:11-12).

A distance of 599.83 metres separates Offia-Atu Stream from Ngene Ogba Stream, which has another culvert on Latitude 06° 25' 15.66''N and Longitude 07° 51' 06.48'E. From there, the boundary is Ngene Ogba Stream, which goes northwards up to Onusahu Stream, where it intersects with Iyi Utu Stream at Latitude 06° 25' 31.52''N and Longitude 07° 51' 09.52'E. The boundary continues westward along Iyi Utu Stream for a distance of 526.17m up to Latitude 06° 25' 32.22''N and Longitude 07° 50' 46.65''E, then the river moves northward for 631.40m up to the intersection with the Omina Stream on Latitude 06° 25' 36.9''N and Longitude 07° 50' 41.47''E. The boundary further continues along Omina Stream in a southeast direction to coincide with the original boundary between Ngbo and Ezillo at Egu-Echara at Latitude 06° 25' 35.19''N and Longitude 07° 51'04.04''E. Along Egu-Echara-Ngbo boundary, the boundary continues in a Southeast-ward direction to Onwumiri Stream to the intersection of Latitude 06° 25' 24.93''N and Longitude 07° 52' 16.63''E. Finally, the boundary goes along Onwumiri Stream in a South-westerly direction up to the intersection with Offia-Atu Stream at Latitude 06° 25' 25.02''N and Longitude 07° 52' 11.14''E (Elechi, 2008:3).

The land area added to the Old Settlement Area by this new demarcation is 253.75 hectares; bringing the total land mass to be occupied henceforth by the Ezza-Ezillo to 306.29 hectares up from the original 52.54 hectares. The decision by the Ebonyi State Government was said to have been taken in the interest of peace and unity, which demands a lot of sacrifice on both sides of the conflict divide. The movement of the Ezillo people out of the area added to the Ezza-Ezillo people were scheduled to start on 3rd October 2008 and expected to be completed by 31st December 2008 (Elechi, 2008:3). The then Ebonyi State administration also stated that during the ninety day period of relocation for the two groups, a number of orders shall prevail to the letter. These orders were as follows include:

i. Not later than 12.00 noon on Friday, 3rd October, 2008, all police personnel hitherto posted to the violence-torn parts of Ezillo for purposes of peace-keeping, shall pull out. They shall be replaced by military personnel only. This is to ensure that those who may be foolish enough to test our resolve are handled in a typical military way;

ii. The imposition of a dusk-to-dawn curfew on the entire Ishielu Local Government Area, except on the Federal Highway from Abakaliki to Enugu. The curfew was to last throughout the ninety (90) days unless the prevalence of peace necessitates an early review;

iii. The Peace Committee that was earlier on put in place will continue its good work by serving as Implementation and Reconciliation Committee during the transition period;

iv. All weapons of war procured by both sides in the course of the hostilities should now be reported to the nearest military road block to enable the soldiers evacuate same and bring to the Government House. No penalty will be meted to anybody returning weapons so purchased. But after Saturday, 4th October 2008, anybody in unauthorised possession of arms and ammunition, will be presumed to be doing so in defiance of Government orders and shall be arrested and prosecuted according to the law;

   a. Military personnel sent to Ezillo Community are directed to stop and search any vehicle, group of people and any location including houses in Ishielu Local Government Area, which they may justifiably suspect to be harbouring offensive weapons. Such searches must, however, be done in a humane manner and respect for human dignity. On no account, should soldiers brutalise anybody, except for lawful defence of their lives. All findings of weapons carried by any unauthorized person should be reported directly to my office for appropriate action;

v. All canon or gun firing for whatever reason and for whatever occasion is absolutely prohibited throughout Ishielu Local Government Area during the period of transition;

vi. The Ministry of Works and Transport is hereby directed to immediately clear both sides of the Old Road from Aaron Camp to the entrance of Ezillo Water installations, in readiness for proper reconstruction of the road. This is to facilitate the movement of those going into the land and those moving from it; and

vii. The Ministry of Lands, Survey and Housing shall proceed to plant the necessary survey beacons to reflect the demarcation enunciated above (Elechi, 2008:4).

The then governor of Ebonyi State also stated that the new land which Ezza-Ezillo people were moving into did not in any way constitute an autonomous community. The Ezza there were to continue to be known as Ezza-Ezillo and not import into their new settlement the names of markets or communities of their ancestral abode, cultural observances, especially with regard to new yam festivals which were to continue to be observed within the custom and traditions of Ezillo community, which is the overall umbrella of the entire place (Elechi, 2008:4). Ironically, "the Ezza protested that they had been short-changed and swore never to relocate to the new land, leaving their houses and cash crops" (Mbah & Nwangwu, 2014:686-687). Soon, the peace process put in place by the then Governor Martins Elechi's administration could not facilitate sustainable positive peace because of government's actions and inactions, which were perceived with suspicion and the peace committee set by the government became "bearers of bad news, agents of reality and scapegoat" (Clemens, 1998: 247) depending on the conflict side that interpreted their actions and inactions.

Bartholomew Ugbo, who spoke during the visit of the then Speaker of Ebonyi State House of Assembly (Augustine Nwankwegu to them in company of the Ishielu Local Government Peace Committee) requested that the Ebonyi State Government release the children arrested and "reconsider the boundary demarcation, which puts them in the midst of the Ezillo people, stating that they wanted peace" (Egede, 2009:26). Many Ezza sons who were incarcerated in the heat of this conflict were released in June, 2016 when the judge who ordered their detention for years, decided to set them free after several years. While their release was greeted with jubilation by Ezza relatives, a number of Ezillo analysts felt that the judicial process was politicised due to change of administration. However, the truth remained that the court cases over the involvement of individuals in the conflict remained as complex as the conflict itself.

The Ezillo people, on their part, argued that "had the Ezza settlers complied with the court judgements and quasi-judicial decision on these disputes, which required them to vacate Ezillo land or approach Ezillo people for terms of their tenancy, this unfortunate incident and

others could have been avoided" (Ezillo Memorandum, 2008:3). However, the very unfortunate thing in the quest for peace through arbitration is that Ezza people have historically rejected all judicial judgements that demanded that they vacate their settlements in Mgbalukwu-Obeagu Isu and Ezillo in Ebonyi State as well as Agilaland in Benue State.

Unfortunately, in the case of the Ezza-Ezillo, where hundreds of Ezillo people were killed on the night of 31st December 2011, remains worrisome. This calls for more sustainable post-conflict peace building strategies, especially due to the negative peace that pervades the whole conflict zone. Frowe (2011:211) argues that peace settlement and the process, which is frustrating the defeated in their attempt to rebuild, can lead to further conflicts. With the current situation in Ezillo, the landlords cannot claim that they have won the conflict while the tenants cannot also claim that it is *uhuru* (independence and freedom). Orend (2007:580) argues that in order for peace to reign, there is a need for "an effective spur to atonement, change and rehabilitation on the part of the aggressor". The Mgbalukwu/ -Obeagu Isu scenario where many guerrilla fighters later turned into security nightmare against their townsmen therefore brings to the forefront the need for the rehabilitation of former guerrilla combatants used in inter-communal conflicts as another road to sustainable peace.

On 29th June 1980 the Government of Benue State brought together a six-man Panel of Inquiry to investigate the Agila-Ezza conflict. S. E. Agbara was the chairman, while A. A. Odey was the secretary. Onoja (2013:366) states that their terms of reference include to:

1. Find out the causes of the problem between the Agila and Ezza people (and if any other group is involved in the border squabbles);
2. Find out the depth of the involvement and what each group wants;
3. Find out the number involved, the area covered and if the Ezza can be confined in a kind of settlement area; and
4. Find a solution to the border problem.

The Panel was said to have sat from 4th to 9th August 1980. The panel had thirty five witnesses, who were cross-examined and testified on their conflict experiences. The

witnesses comprised of twenty six people from Agila, five from Ezza-Agila and four from Effium. They received ten memoranda in which eight came from Agila, one from Ezza and another from Effium. At the end of the day, the panel proposed the following findings:

1. The Agila-Ezza dispute is over Ezza people's usurpation of Agila farming lands within Agila District of Benue State and not boundary dispute whatsoever. The Benue-Anambra border in Agila (Benue) and Effium (Anambra, now Ebonyi) area not in dispute at all;
2. That the Ezza first came to Agilaland as black smiths and later became labourers about forty years ago;
3. The Ezza were not the traditional neighbours of Agila people and it is the Effium people who have been their traditional neighbours along the Benue/ Anambra (Ebonyi) border area through which the Ezza came to settle in Agilaland;
4. The Agila-Ezza land dispute centres on conflicting systems of land tenure practices and ownership. Among the Agila, land ownership is communal and the whole of Agila land is held in trust for future generations by the Otse Agila, the elders of his council and the present generation. Individual do not own land. On the other hand, the Ezza regard the portions of land on which they live and cultivate as exclusively theirs. The quest for portions of land which individuals can call their own is the urge behind the Ezza encroachment on the remaining Agila land;
5. Some Ezza people resident in Agilaland rent part of it to the Effium people for farming. The rent is paid in cash or by labour on Ezza farm. All Ezza people who testified before the panel, accepted living on Agila land which they claimed was sold to them or that they have the permission of Agila people to live where they are. On the other hand, all Agila witnesses maintained that no inch of Agila land was sold to Ezza people at any given time and that Ezza occupation of Agila land was through trick and violence. The solution suggested by all Agila witnesses was total evacuation of all Ezza people from the land;
6. Evidence was adduced by Agila witnesses to show that their opposition to Ezza occupation of their land has been long and persistent. As early as 1946, Agila people led by James Oginyi Ogori, reported to the colonial Resident of Benue Province, Mac Braid to carry-out the expulsion of Ezza from their land. The Ezza consequently sued Agila people to the Enugu High Court in October 1948, on the ground that they bought the land they were occupying and prayed the court to restrain Agila people

from ejecting them from the land. They (Ezza) lost the case as land could not be sold in Northern Nigeria. There have been several other court actions taken against Ezza people, including two quit notices by the Makurdi High Court, which have not been executed. The Ezza ridicule and despise court orders now since none have ever been executed;

7. Incidents of group violence by the Ezza people against their Agila hosts dates back to 1950 when Agila houses in various farm settlements were burnt and residents attacked. The unprovoked killings and attacks on Agila people by Ezza, which they later explained were in retaliation for the killings of their people at Okpoga and Ichama during the crisis of 1966-1967 are bitter memories and a cause of Agila's dislike for their hostile guests (the Ezza);
8. Various acts of violence by the Ezza against Agila people especially raping of Agila women and their recent encroachments on new areas, are seen by Agila people as a design to encircle them and cut them off from their Idoma brothers. These incidents and developments were the immediate cause of the recent clashes between the two groups in April 1980;
9. The Ezza have begun to give their own names to schools and other important establishments in Agila District. For example, Local Government Education Authority (L. G. E. A) School Ebo Agila has now been renamed Local Government Education Authority (L.G.E.A.) School Umuezokoha. Some Agila farm settlements have also been renamed. This change in nomenclature is displeasing to their Agila hosts;
10. The Ezza live scattered between the Agila/Effium border and the motor road between Igumale and Agila. This area is about 20km long and varies from 3 to 8 km wide.
11. The Agila District scribe puts the taxable Ezza adults at three hundred (300) and the total population is about two thousand (2000). The number of taxable adults is not reliable as many of them evade taxes;
12. The Ezza who are of Igbo stock are distinctively different culturally, socially and even in their farming methods from their hosts. The Ezza do not mix socially or inter-marry with Agila people. At present, no Agila person lives in places occupied by them. Those living in the various farm settlements in these areas were forced out during the national crisis of 1966 and have not returned. Furthermore, the Ezza debar Agila owners of economic trees prevent the landlords from utilising their products. The Local Government Education Authority (L.G.E.A.) schools at Ebo, Ogebe, Aje-

Onowa and Apa Ogbodu, are attended solely by Ezza children. Ezza children do not attend schools either in Agila or at Apa farm settlement. The Ezza have constructed seasonal motor roads from Anambra State (now Ebonyi) to parts of Agila District they occupy and where they engage in indiscriminate felling of economic trees without the permission of the Local Government Council (L.G.C.). Their products (timber, plants) are subsequently evacuated to Anambra State (now Ebonyi). The result is complete depletion of numerous elephant palms, Iroko and Mohogany trees. The Ezza system of making huge mounds for yams, deplete the soil of its nutrients and make such land useless for any other agricultural purposes;

13. To the Agila people, land is sacred. There is a land shrine and a day in a year is set aside when everybody in the district is barred from tilling or even scratching the soil and a special ceremony is performed at the shrine. The Ezza do not keep this rule and every year, they commit sacrilege by defiling the soil to the anger of their hosts. Other Agila sacred shrines, forests and hunting grounds which have significant cultural importance for Agila people have been defiled with impunity;
14. The grim memories of 1966 events and the ever present threat of Ezza attack have completely changed Agila settlement patterns. The Agila people in the past lived in numerous farm settlements throughout the length and breadth of Agila District. But now there is only the settlement of Apa in addition to Agila town;
15. There are many Agila people who are yet to return from where they took refuge during the war because of Ezza threat; and
16. To all intents and purposes, the Ezza are "Tenants at Will" (squatters) and have never claimed to be owners of the land on which they live and cultivate.

Following the above findings as cited in Onoja (2013:367-369), the Panel made the following recommendations:

a. It is the view of the panel that all outstanding court orders giving quit notices to the Ezza to vacate some Agila farm settlements, be executed without further delay by the (Benue) State Government;
b. The Benue State Government through the Ministry of Animal/ -Forest Resources should scrupulously embark on the a-forestation of the Anambra/ -Benue (now Ebonyi/ -Benue) boundary, especially along the Effium/-Agila boundary up to three kilometres (3kms) into Agila District and the area declared a forest reserve. This will give a clear-cut demarcation of the Anambra/Benue (now Ebonyi/ -Benue) boundary;

c. A seasonal road should be constructed by the Benue State Ministry for Rural Development and Co-operation to open up the area for government projects. This should be given top priority by the government as this area has been cut off from the rest of the state due to the absence of this vital communication system. The absence of any good road hinders the mobilization of security agents to the area in times of crisis;

d. It is also the view of the panel that both the State and Local Government should ensure that all Agila former farm settlements be re-established as soon as a seasonal road has been constructed to open up the area. In addition, the Local Government Education Authority should ensure that all schools/ institutions bearing Ezza names in Agilla District revert to their original names immediately;

e. By way of public enlightenment, the Ezza people should be educated and made to understand and accept the Agila traditional land tenure system and practices that is, that land is communally owned and not by individuals whatsoever. In addition, the Ezza should be re-educated to adapt themselves to the Agila customs and abide by the traditions of the system. They should also accept the authority of the Chief and District Head of Agila over them (Onoja, 2013:369);

f. The panel is happy to note that the Green Revolution Policy is one of the cardinal objectives of the present administration. The panel also notes that there are vast hectares of fertile farmlands uninhabited, which could be developed by the State Government in pursuance of this laudable objective. The panel, therefore, recommends that without further delay, the Benue State Government should embark on a large - scale land clearing and land development scheme, which could be used in the production of various viable economic food crops. After its initial development, the land should be partitioned to corporate and individual farmers for future developments;

g. Agila and Apa settlements should be surveyed, planned and plotted out jointly by the State Ministry of Housing and Environment and also the Local Government Survey Department. There should be about one thousand (1000) of such residential plots at Agila town extension and five hundred (500) at Apa farm settlement. All non-indigenes living in scattered settlements throughout the district should then be compelled to move physically to these new extensions within one year. Local Government officials should then ensure that only concrete and permanent structures are erected. Stiff penalties should then be imposed on all those who refuse to abide by this decision; and

h. The present police post in the area should be strengthened in terms of manpower to enable them cope with any acts of lawlessness and public disturbances (Benue State Government, 1980:65).

Onoja (2013:370) argues that the whole panel report never saw the light of the day as the then Benue State Government did not issue any white paper on the Agila-Ezza face-off based on the panel's report. Like an ill-fated child "the Agila-Ezza land dispute was left unresolved and like a seed planted, it continued to grow awaiting another point of conflagration in the foreseeable future". To make matters worse the Nigerian State does not have a firmly united federation. The Nigerian people have shown that ethnicity both engineers and fuels inter-group conflicts. "The poor performance of the federalist ideology in building a socially cohesive, politically stable and economically prosperous Nigeria is a result of weak commitment to the cultivation of 'federal spirit', thus, sufficient quantity of integrative principles and strict adherence to them in the process of governance is lacking" (Mbah & Nwangwu, 2014:684).

The challenge that has crippled the peacebuilding process in the past includes the problem of human rights violations that occur intermittently when one ethnic group attacks another. There is also the inability of peace ambassadors within the conflict zones to learn from past mistakes encountered in earlier peace initiatives. The wider culture of insecurity, impunity and criminal acts in different parts of Nigeria, which are often manipulated by petty politicians to advance their political ambitions, remains another challenge to peacebuilding.

The road to peace in the Ratshidi Barolong-baTlharo conflict witnessed the threat from the colonial government to resettle the baTlharo in Kuruman District, inhabited by their kith and kin inhabited. Unfortunately, the colonial policy of being passive to African issues, which had no positive impact on their imperial economy, prevented a proactive action on their part. The colonial government had already been roped-into the dynamics of the Barolong conflict, thus making it impossible for them to be either a mediator or peace ambassador. They saw all the signs of the conflict but did not do much to halt it. For instance, the government of the then South African Republic, proactively warned Machabi "that in case war should exist between Moshette and Montsioa, you must not go beyond the boundary line to meddle in the matter" (Cape Legislature, 1885:16). The implication was that the then government noticed all forms of early warning signs over the potential outbreak of conflict amongst the Barolong

brothers. The other side of the coin was that the imperial government had no resources and moral standard to check the rise of men, who would go into mercenary attacks, especially in the face of the fact that the same imperial government, at different times, recruited the Barolong to fight for them, while some of the white men fought in defence of the Barolong territory.

Furthermore, there was the challenge of disintegrating a society that was already integrating in the 19th century through inter-marriages and other forms of peaceful social relations. It was difficult for the baTlharo to leave a place where they had buried most of their relatives. But the British conquest of the Boers could be said to have been resolved using the so-called zero-sum outcome (win-lose situation). This is because win-win outcomes are possible only when both sides have reached a mutually hurting stalemate (Zartman, 1989).

In 1940, the desire of the baTlharo to migrate *en masse* from the area, led to a new form of peaceful dialogue between the two groups. At the end of the dialogue, "the baTlharo recognised Ratshidi's authority, in return for which they were exempted from certain obligations. For example, they did not have to plough fields for the Ratshidi or pay towards the school levy fund. In essence, it was more bluster than anything else on the part of the baTlharo, as they occupied some of the best land in the reserve" (Manson & Mbenga, 2014:97). However, it was the charismatic ability of the king that took over from Tshipitota Motseakhumo that helped in resolving the differences and settling the crisis amicably (Manson & Mbenga, 2014:98).

According to Galtung (1996:9) peace is the reduction of violence of all kinds. It is a period of non-violent and creative conflict transformation. Hence, a peace process needs to proactively nip conflict on the board as a proactive strategy to curtail and eliminate the rise of a full blown conflict, which would not allow for a reactive peace strategy. The post-conflict peace strategies must principally promote conditions for the enthronement of positive or sustainable peace. Peace and conflict studies does where possible, seek to develop new avenues for cooperation, as well as reduce significantly (and eventually to eliminate) violence, especially organized and increasingly destructive state-sanctioned violence (Barash & Webel, 2002:26).

Boulding (1978) has called for the promotion of "stable peace" among groups and states in conflict and others emerging from conflicts. Stable peace, according to him, is a state in which conflict and war will all but be impossible because the parties to past conflict have learned to settle their differences without considering the use of force (Boulding, 1988:157-167). This idea is close to what Hauss (2010) refers to as positive-sum or win-win conflict resolution strategy. "There has been an upsurge of interest in positive-sum or win-win conflict resolution strategies that leaves all parties satisfied and open to cooperative problem-solving in general" (Hauss, 2010:7).

Consequently, efforts to move from a reactive peace process towards sustainable post-conflict peace building in relations between the Ezza and her neighbours as well as amongst the Bechuanaland reserves requires some form of "transitional justice" (Nweke & Ani, 2011: 32-45) as well as "restorative justice" (Amstutz, 2005; Philpott, 2006). The idea of transitional justice lays a foundation that easily gives birth to a new societal structure that walks-away from the old era of violent behaviour. Restorative justice on its part creates the necessary healing psychology on the casualties, victors and victims of conflict. The ideas of transitional justice as well as restorative justice are meant to eliminate the bottlenecks found in retributive and social justice commonly practised in courts. The logic behind restorative and social justice is quite different. In transitional and restorative justice, the parties to the conflict find ways of working together to heal and build trust so that they can literally restore their relations in a more constructive manner (Ani & Eshaya, 2014: 503-510).

7.9 MULTI-DIMENSIONAL APPROACHES TO SUSTAINABLE PEACEBUILDING

7.9a Historical Culture of Peace Education

Informal culture of peace education was a way of life in traditional African societies. As a young child grew up, he or she learns from the immediate society that peace is fundamental to a good social order hence, promotes it. For instance, amongst the traditional Igbo people, such title like *Eze Udo*, king of peace was given to a man who has become very outstanding in the pursuit of societal peace. When people take such title, the glory, fanfare and respect that go with such personality often influences the younger generation to pursue the path of

peace with all their innate energy. Peace education is a kind of intellectual formation which increases the citizen's appetite for love, justice, good governance, development, etc and strengthens their vision as agents of peace in their villages, communities, districts, provinces and the global village at large. Gradually, the traditional informal peace education grew into a formal business. It is a form of learning that is aimed towards a non-violent orientation. Peace building is rooted on building human security through qualitative education. Gumut (2006:166) wrote that holistically, peace education acknowledges its purpose as education to facilitate the achievement of peace and related sets of social values, largely through learning to recognize and confront multiple forms of violence and conflict in Ezza and Barolong. These dehumanizing ills which are caused by man and woman's inhumanity to humankind among others includes discrimination on the basis of sex, race, religion, poverty, prejudices, violence, war etc, but peace education will create a culture of peace based upon scientific and ethical principles.

7.9b Civil Society Groups

Seligman (1995:10) contended that civil society is the ethical vision of social life. The promotion of systemic social ethics that promotes peace through structural means, typically involves institution building and the strengthening of civil society groups. Nicolaidis (1996) developed a framework of how civil society engages in peace process. They include:

i. Hands-on Method. It involves engaging in activities that are geared towards direct service provision to the masses of Nigeria and South Africa.
ii. Hands-off Method. This includes the advocacy, lobbying and fund raising activities of civil society.
iii. Ad hoc Actions. This includes short-term and quick fix measures taken by civil society to mitigate the effect of the conflict era on the societies that have experienced conflict like Ezza and Barolong.
iv. System Actions. This is the long run activities of the civil society that focuses on societal transformation which would prevent the probability of futuristic conflict in these conflict settings of Ezza and Barolong.

Civil society groups can build fair courts, capacities for labour negotiation, systems of reconciliation and a stable electoral process. Designing of new dispute resolution system is an

important part of creating a lasting peace that is often championed by civil society groups. Civil society groups try to replace the spiral of violence and destruction with a spiral of peace and development and create an environment conducive for self-sustaining and durable peace. The creation of such an environment has three central dimensions: addressing the underlying causes of conflict, repairing already damaged or endangered social relationships and dealing with psychological effects of conflict at all levels (individual, community and ethnic) in both the Ezza conflict setting and Barolong land dispute area. Each of these dimensions relies on different strategies and techniques. Konteh (2006:282) wrote that in recent times however, due to significant contributions made by civil society organizations in areas of environment and sustainable development, human rights and women issues, conflict prevention and peace-building, government are giving more recognition to the role of civil society in governance and have even proceeded to build partnerships with civil society.

Stephen (1997) argued that effective peace building also requires public-private partnerships in addressing conflict and greater coordination among the various actors. Maise (2003) documented that international governmental organizations, national governments, bilateral donors, and international as well as local NGOs need to coordinate and ensure that every dollar invested in peace building is spent wisely. To accomplish this, advanced planning and monitoring, accountability and review of peace building intervention strategy is needed.

7.9c Sound Political Structure

The political structure of a state influences peace building process. A state with an effective government, which continues to build-up the institutions of the state, is indirectly enhancing societal peace process. Nigeria and South Africa continuously operates a political system that is regularly heated-up. Thus, proper electoral reform, would promote free and fair election, which would reduce, if not eliminate the incessant cases of electoral violence and conflicts in Nigeria. That is the only time when *gunslide* victory in the land dispute will give way to landslide victory emanating from the popular support of the masses.

Judicial reform is needed to enthrone restorative justice instead of retributive justice in the arbitration of all the land cases. This would allow for easy reconciliation. It will equally help to promote social justice over legal justice. These processes attempt to deal with the complex legal and emotional issues associated with human rights abuses and ensure that the land disputes are properly resolved. It is commonly thought that past injustice must be recognized and the perpetrators punished if parties wish to achieve reconciliation. Constitutional reform is needed in Nigeria to eliminate the structural tensions and psychological violence experienced in the country due to *what the constitution said or did not say* in relations to land issues.

Fair police mechanisms must be established and government officials and members of the Nigerian Police Force must be trained to observe basic rights of the citizenry and be peace ambassadors in the execution of their duties. Again, legislations protecting the minority groups and laws securing gender equality should be advanced in the conflict areas. It also include building and strengthening opposition political parties, creating institutions that provide procedures and mechanisms for effective handling and resolution of conflict as well as the establishment of mechanisms to monitor and protect the right of opposition/ minority parties. Such institutional building and infrastructural development typically requires the dismantling, strengthening or reformation of old institutions in order to make them more effective (Maise, 2003). To provide fundamental services to its citizens, a state needs peace-conscious executive, legislative, and judicial arms of government institutions. Many Western based scholars erroneously believe that democracy is a way to create peace-enhancing structures but *democracy Nigeriana and that of South Africa* have shown that the leaders need an enhanced political will in order to fight both the roots of conflict and win the protagonists of violent acts in any country. Nigerian democratic leaders must try to establish political institutions and civil liberty organizations that allow for meaningful use of political power in building peace policies. It is important for our government to adhere to principles of transparency and good governance. For the purpose of post-conflict peace building in many towns that have been overtaken by conflict in Nigeria and party competition in South Africa, the sound democratization process should be able to rebuild society's lost amenities and promote peace building.

7.9d Economic Transformation

There is need to increase the avenues for economic transformation which include socio-structural change, whose aim will be to remedy economic injustice, promote social reconstruction and enhance improved standard of living and other factors designed to help communities ravaged by conflict, to revitalize their economies. Maise (2003) wrote that economic peace building targets both the micro- and macro-level and aims to create economic opportunities and ensure that the basic needs of the population are met.

On the microeconomic level, societies should establish micro-credit institutions to increase economic activity and investment at the local level promote inter-communal trade and an equitable distribution of land as well as expand vocational and industrial training. On the macro-economic level, the post-conflict government should be assisted in its efforts to secure the economic foundations and infrastructure necessary for a transition to peace in communities that was ravaged by violent conflict. Peace building initiatives aims at promoting nonviolent mechanisms that eliminate violent market economy and other marketing environment and promote peaceful business environment. Banks must be free of corruption and discrimination as a peace process for economic development. The Nigerian and South African bourgeoisie class must be controlled through the rule of law as a way to change their excessive exploitation of the poor masses in their profit quest. Long term peace would grow only when the poverty level in the country is reduced to the barest minimum.

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7.9e Culture of Peace Communication

Our fore-fathers have always communicated peace in one way or another. Wilson (2009:3) stated that peace building is associated with efforts aimed at conflict prevention, reconciliation, trans-national justice, education for peace, bridging the reality gap and communication of peace. Communication of peace is a historical culture that is vital in the enthronement of peace culture in Nigeria and South Africa. If bridge-building peace communication systems are in place, relations between conflicting parties can improve. They would equally promote peace agreements through their agenda-setting role. Various mass

communication programs such as peace jingles, peace adverts and media peace socialization programs can help parties to reach peace agreements (Lund, 2001:18).

Media peace programmes between people of various ethnicities or opposing groups can lead to deepened understanding and help to change the demonic image of enemy perception. It can also help parties to overcome grief, fear, and mistrust and enhance their sense of security. A crucial component of peace dialogue is peace agreements whereby parties become bonded to mutual or collective peace protection while promoting a vision of the commonly shared peaceful future, which they are trying to build. Conflicting parties often have more in common in terms of their visions of the future than they do in terms of their shared and violent past. The idea is that if the media sets the agenda for peace, it will be easier to get there, as public opinion would be shaped to support the peace process.

7.9f International Agencies

Maise (2003) wrote that outside parties typically play a crucial role in advancing such peace building efforts. Few peace building plans work unless regional neighbours and other significant international actors support peace through aids. These aids may be humanitarian relief and/ or development aids in Ezza and their neighbours or in Barolong. It often comes at the request of the country affected by conflict or voluntarily. Strategic peace building allows international organizations to intervene in the national level to transform established violent structures. The Nigerian aid history has often been exploited by the imaginary hands of mysterious loathers. This act calls for urgent behavioural change, in order to promote sound and economic-driven conflict or peace intervention process.

Doyle and Sambanis quoted in Maise (2003) wrote that international agencies do not only provide monetary support to post-conflict governments, but also assist in the restoration of financial and political institutions. Because their efforts carry the support of the international community, they can be quite effective even in the development of domestic economies of different communities in Africa. International actors therefore play a crucial role in

advancing peace building efforts. Many peace building plans do not work in developing countries until they receive the push of international support. This does not in any way imply that foreign peace building ideologies is more suitable than those generated from the culture of a given people.

7.9g Social Reconstruction

Reducing the effects of war-related hostility through the repair and transformation of damaged relationships is urgently crying for attention in Ezza and her neighbors of Nigeria as well as in Barolong, South Africa. The relational dimension of peace building centers on developing of trust, forgiveness, reconciliation and amnesty. Lederach (1997:82) wrote that social reconstruction seeks to minimize poorly functioning communication and maximize mutual understanding. But in addition to looking towards the future, parties must deal with their painful past. Reconciliation not only envisions a common, connected future, but also recognizes the need to redress past wrongdoing (Lederach, 1997:31). If the parties are to renew their relationship and build an interdependent future, what has happened must be exposed and discussed impartially to promote peace. The aggressor is required to show and express sense of sincere regret, remorse and apologies, while the aggressed would be ready to show a high sense of empathy. Unfortunately, the Nigerian and South African States are characterized with the growth of conflict, where every party to the conflict cries as the victim.

Howard (2001:330) has shown that a crucial part of peace building is addressing past wrongdoing through the rule of law, while at the same time promoting fair hearing. This act of bringing the protagonists of past conflict to the powerful arm of the law has remained an impossible mission in Nigeria. The implication become that conflict actors in Nigeria continues to influence it because, they are 'sure' that the long arm of the law will not catch-up with them. Thus, part of repairing damaged relationships is responding to past individual and societal-rights violations. Peace building needs to be promoted through the establishment and utilization of findings from truth commissions and fact finding missions. Building peace requires attention to these psychological and emotional layers of the conflict. Hugo Merwe and Tracy Vienings (2001) wrote that the social fabric that has been destroyed by war must be repaired and trauma must be dealt with on the national, community, and individual levels.

At the national level, parties can accomplish widespread personal healing through truth and reconciliation commissions that seek to uncover the truth and deal with perpetrators. Strong family units can be used to rebuild community structures and moral environments are also crucial.

7.9h Traditions and Culture

Scholars believe that the greatest resource for sustaining peace in the long term is always rooted in the local people and their culture (Lederach, 1997:94). Parties should strive to understand the cultural dimension of conflict and identify the mechanisms for handling conflict that exist within that cultural setting. Building on cultural resources and utilizing local mechanisms for handling disputes can be quite effective in resolving conflicts and transforming violent relationships. Initiatives that incorporate citizen-based peace building include kindred-peace talks, village-peace forum, community peace projects in schools and villages, local peace commissions and a variety of other grassroots peace programmes. At the community level, parties can pay tribute to the suffering of the past through various rituals or ceremonies, or build memorials to commemorate the pain and suffering that has been endured (Maise, 2003).

There is need to strengthen our neglected traditional and historical peace mechanism in this conflict times. The essence of the traditional peace mechanism is to promote the culture of peace, tolerance, peaceful co-existence and mutual development. This peace-building strategy is rooted on the principles of collective communal reciprocity, communal inclusivity and a general sense of shared destiny between different people and different communities. Music has remained a powerful form of entertainment programme that permeates the minds of Nigerians and South Africans. It is a potent force for the communication of peace messages. Peace-centred musical tracks should be promoted among the South African and Nigerian musical artists. This is because the music industry in Nigeria is continuously growing. It has the power to appeal to the soul of Nigerian and South African citizenry through its emotional appeal. Hence, when Nigerian and South African music begins to carry the message of peace, both the literate and the non-literate part of the society could tap from it, especially the youths.

7.10 FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

This research focused on Ezza conflicts with their neighbours in Nigeria and the Barolong land dispute in South Africa. Both conflicts were intermittent historic conflicts over land in the two hegemonic countries of Africa. Over the years, the contests and conflict over land led to massive migration of the citizenry of both Ezza and Barolong communities to different parts of Nigeria and South Africa. Gradually, the erstwhile neighbouring communities that make up the sons of Barolong soon became over-taken by competition over land and the position of paramount ruler in Barolong. In Nigeria, the Ezza that were historically invited to assist the Mgbalukwu, Obeagu Isu and Ezillo in waging wars against the enemy communities of Onicha and Ngbo became trapped in intermittent wars that lasted for almost a century in both Isu and Ezillo.

Unfortunately, the study found that colonialism and the imperial balkanization of African borders both locally and internationally had direct influence on the partisioning of the Barolong land as well as the land borders between Agila, Ngbo and Ezza, which was fundamental for the progressive conflicts by the disputants. The same colonial might was also used to suppress the Ezza and Barolong people in the Anglo-Ezza and Anglo-Boer wars. Following the independence of Nigeria and South Africa, the political leaders exhibited unimaginable negligence of the conflict area, thereby enhancing poverty, lack of social amenities, unemployment as well as other forms of social forces that triggers conflict and re-enforces it over time, leading to its intractable nature.

The quest for peace in the area has been approached in two broad ways, which include African conflict resolution strategies (IACRS) and western approaches of conflict resolution (WACR). Advocates for the return and endorsement of indigenous African conflict resolution strategies (IACRS) over western approaches of conflict resolution (WACR) have linked what they perceive as very cold conflict resolution strategies (CRS) to poor results of WACR in Africa. The reason is that the nature of western communities, which has increasingly influenced South Africa, has led to the success of the method in Barolong. However, in Ezza conflict setting, the strategy alone could not work because it does not encourage friendly processes of conflict resolution (CR), which yield promising results. Even when the court

passes judgement against a certain group, they tend to reject the judgement. Unfortunately, the government as well as security agencies could not enforce many of those judgements. Olowu (2015) argue that western system of conflict resolution emphasises litigation at the expense of African culture of reconciliation to the individualistic nature of western communities. On the other hand, because African communities are not individualistic, but naturally friendly and communal, they encourage more reconciliatory mechanisms for conflict resolution (Olowu, 2015).

The dominant view of the WACR is mostly around the alien, exclusionary, winner-takes-all approach, which naturally aggravate conflicts and disputes. Over all, the benefits derived through IACRS are more, because IACRS strategies are much broader than those used by the West (Olowu, 2015). But in the Barolong land dispute setting, even when the Tribal Authorities supported the miscarriage of justice and allocated lands without following due processes; it did not abort the peace process as the people still sustained confidence in the court as the final arbiter to disputes.

This study tested both African conflict resolution strategies (IACRS) and western approaches of conflict resolution (WACR) in Ezza and her neighbours conflict setting on one hand, as well as in Barolong land dispute setting. It investigated the performance of IACRS and WACR in Ezza, Nigeria and Barolong, South Africa. The study found that despite the fact that both strategies were attracting so many accolades as a promising agent of conflict resolution (CR), evidence from the conflict setting reveal that:

(i) The implementation strategies of IACRS often lack widespread legitimacy, especially through oath-taking and *imabe ogbu* as found in Ezza-Ezillo and Ezillo, which makes IACRS to be a source of conflict in relations to the Christian faith of many indigenous people;

(ii) Mgbalukwu, Obeagu Isu and Oshiri, Ezillo and Agila communities has lost faith in court judgements as a fundamental way of resolving their land conflict with the Ezza settlers because many of those court judgements (which represents WACR) were never implemented. Paradoxically, in Barolong, court judgements (WACR) were the central path to peace and resolution of their land dispute; and

(iii) While beneficiaries of the IACRS in Mgbalukwu-Obeagu Isu and Ojiegbe-Ezza conflict setting as well as WACR beneficiaries in Barolong were happy that their victory has placed the communities on the path of peace, there is need to create more alternative sources of CR to meet the choice and needs of residents, who are earnestly yearning for progressive peacebuilding especially in the hotly contested Ezza-Ezillo and Ezillo conflict setting as well as in Agila, Benue State, Niheria.

7.11 CHAPTER SUMMARY

Conflicts anywhere in the world generate all manners of impacts. The impacts of different conflicts examined in this study have been presented in this chapter. The social dynamics and the impacts of the conflict were diverse. It was found that Ezza settlers in Agila do not inter-marry with their landlords and do not attend the same schools with Agila people. In Ezillo, the Ezza started their own markets and wanted an autonomous community, which the Ezillo people and the communities that make-up Igbo Essa jointly resisted. The political impacts revealed how the Benue and Ebonyi State Governments as well as Ebonyi State House of Assembly, district heads and local government leaders were involved in the management of the conflict. The Ebonyi State Peace Commissions on Ezillo conflicts as well as the Benue State Panel of Inquiry were established at different times in Nigeria to find political means of resolving the different conflicts. Unfortunately, the Ezza-Agila conflict with their landlords and the Ezza-Ezillo conflict with the Ezillo have remained unresolved. It should be recalled that on 29th June 1980, the Benue State Government in Nigeria announced a six-man committee headed by S. E. Agbara Oga, which recommended, amongst other things that the Ezza people should vacate Agila farm settlements, while the Effium/ -Agila boundary should be turned into a forest reserve and all schools bearing Ezza names be reversed. The implementation of that recommendation has remained problematic.

The economic dynamics of the conflict are multi-dimensional. Markets were burned, shops and businesses collapsed, buses owned by transport companies were burned and the people's subsistence agriculture, which was the mainstay of domestic economy, gradually collapsed. Traders, en-route to different places to buy and sale goods were killed, shot and burned in the Ezillo conflict zone. The chapter also revealed how some traders who lost their lives in

Ezillo, were buried in shallow graves after being robbed. The security impacts of the conflicts are also multi-dimensional. The security impact revealed that on the morning of the New Year's Day (2012) when relative peace eventually returned to Ezillo, over seventy (70) people were found dead, over one hundred (100) survivors hospitalised in different hospitals within the state while about 700 people were declared missing. Lives were lost on both sides in Barolong. Soldiers and police officers lost their lives while securing the environment. The period of the conflict witnessed recurrent cases of rape, abduction and mass killings. The contrast between the dynamics of the Ezza conflicts in Nigeria on one hand and the Barolong land dispute on the other, were discussed. Finally, the chapter focused on the judicial road to peace. Agila, Ezza, Ezillo, Mgbalukwu and Obeagu as well as the Barolong went to court at different times to contest the real ownership of the disputed pieces of land. It also presented the findings of the study in relationto the efficacies of African Conflict Resolution Strategies (ACRS) as well as Western Approaches to Conflict Resolution (WACR). The next chapter develops the conclusion and recommendations of the study. These recommendations for sustainable peacebuilding are not only valuable for the Ezza and Barolong conflict settings but also for any part of Africa, where protracted land conflict has become the order of the day.

CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 CONCLUSION

Contemporary Africa has been plagued by different forms of conflict, ranging from terrorism to other forms of armed conflict. While civil wars and terrorism are contemporary manifestations of conflict in Africa, land conflict has remained a major impetus to armed confrontations in Africa. This study has presented the origin of the Ezza and Barolong people as well as how their societies became engrossed in years of land dispute. It showed how the Ezza and Barolong people engaged in waves of migration from one location to another as a response to the dynamics of the land conflict. The study also revealed that it was the invitations given to Ezza mercenaries by different Nigerian communities to assist them in prosecuting their wars against neighbouring communities which led to the rise of Ezza settlements in Mgbalukwu, Obeagu Isu and Ezillo. In Agila, the Ezza settled there as seasonal labourers and blacksmiths. Years later, the Ezza people received portions of land as reward and compensation for their bravery in warfare and hard work in agricultural activities. The land question crises started when the Ezza population 'exploded' and the portions of land allocated to them by their landlords became too small to accommodate them. They began to forcefully acquire more portions of land thus leading to fully fledged conflict at different times.

The study also revealed how the Barolong people of South Africa were divided into enemy groups under the reign of Chief Tau. Consequently, the Barolong Ratshidi and the Barolong Rapulana lost the filial bond of brotherhood between them and began to contest over the rightful ownership of Lotlhakane. The land dispute in Barolong took a legal dimension just as much as the Ezza settlers' conflict with their Agila, Ezillo, Mgbalukwu and Obeagu Isu landlords in Nigeria. When Matlaba and Moshete, the chiefs of Barolong Rapulana and Barolong Ratlou went to the Supreme Court for it to decide the true owner of Lotlhakane, the court ruled that the land belonged to Barolong Rapulana. In Disaneng, a former Masibi chief wanted to capture the land and cattle of the Barolong Thlaro. There in Disaneng, all the Barolong groups had been contesting the ownership of a piece of farm land for over a decade (1940 to 1950). It was the intervention of the Native Commissioner in Mafikeng that resolved the matter. While the Barolong land disputes have been resolved, the major Ezza settler conflict that had been resolved on the Nigerian side is that of the Ezza-Ojiegbe and

Mgbalukwu-Obeagu Isu conflict. The Ezillo and Agila conflict terrain remains 'volatile.' In the case of the Ezza-Ojiegbe and Mgbalukwu-Obeagu Isu conflict, the mediation role of the Catholic Relief Services as well as the Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Abakaliki cannot be over-emphasised. It should be re-emphasised that mediation is a process of conflict management in which an "outside" or third-party helps disputants accommodate their differences. The Catholic Church in Isu and Ezzagu facilitated peaceful communication amongst the former enemies through laity council members who occupied leadership positions in their communities. The Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Centre (HRCRC) Abakaliki and their foreign partners set the peace agenda immediately a number of communal leaders from both sides of the conflict-divide brought the case to their attention. They proposed procedural peace meetings and its terms of reference. They continuously engaged conflicting parties to move towards peace.

The remaining conflict settings of Agilla and Ezillo are yet to have durable peace. The security implication of the Ezillo conflict was that the Ebonyi State Government quickly raised a peacekeeping force (which focused on the interposition of lightly armed forces between disputants to deter fighting or monitor a cease fire). The peacekeeping force has been able to quell the intermittent killings in the area and introduce a breath of fresh air but sustainable peace and security is still a far cry from the area. The same story was experienced in Agila, Benue State, where women and girl children were raped, while others were killed and their dead bodies never returned to their homes for proper burial ceremonies. The account of killings amongst the Barolong, as earlier presented, cannot be neglected by any scholar who is conscious of the human rights implications of conflicts. The study further revealed how the conflict in Ezza and Barolong affected social, political and economic as well as security sectors of these societies. People were killed and buried in shallow graves, vehicles were burnt, roads blocked, schools renamed and others closed-down. Dozens of children, men and women were killed in Ezillo on 31st December, 2011. The study also examined the legal battles in both Ezza and Barolong settings as people struggled to lay claim over strategic pieces of land.

It should be noted that while western approaches of conflict resolution (WACR) through the court judgments was dominantly used in managing Barolong land disputes; it failed woefully

in Ezza conflict setting. The armed forces could not effectively stop the violent attacks of the warlords in the Ezza conflict setting. Again, the conflict parties in Nigeria perceive western approaches of conflict resolution (WACR) as unreliable conflict resolution strategies (CRS) that are easily influenced by a lot of factors from political leaders of the country, which weakened the road to sustainable peace.

8.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

Peace is a social ideology. It is appreciated and revered by every human society. The different societies of Africa say and take up names that denote and connote the value of peace to human life. The Barolong people call their children *Kagiso* meaning peace. Among the Ezza and Igbo of Nigeria, names such as *Udo* (peace), *Udokaku* (peace is greater than wealth), *Ezeudo* (king of peace) are carried by a number of people. *Udodirigi* (peace be unto you) and *Udochia* (let peace reign) are part of Igbo traditional salutation. Ironically, since the construction and planning of conflict is nurtured in the heart of men, it is also therein that peace building initiatives should be hatched. Men and women who answer to such peace-centred names should be encouraged by the larger society to live out their name, everywhere they go, which would enhance the societal culture of peace.

Peacebuilding is, therefore, a progressive multidimensional process that leads to the management of different forms of conflict and the ultimate crafting of sustainable peace in a given society. It includes all the strategies, approaches, attitudes and cultures as well as traditions adopted by societies to enthrone peace and reduce conflict. Peacebuilding among the Ezza and her neighbours in Nigeria should ultimately target the elimination of all societal feuding forces that lead to the recurrence of Ezza conflicts with her neighbours. It would strengthen the already "brokered peace" in Oshiri, Ezillo and Agilla. Furthermore, peacebuilding among the Barolong and Ezza in the long run, would promote the culture of inter-group forgiveness, tolerance and understanding. It will gradually weaken and uproot the roots of the different forms of social fighting and social upheavals. It is aimed at moving the society from passive peace to active peace. Active peace naturally promotes sustainable peacebuilding culture.

The sustainable peacebuilding culture is the progressive process of ensuring the rise and sustenance of attitudes, behaviours, traits, attributes, norms and traditions that would move individuals and groups, societies and sovereign nations towards rejecting and uprooting violence, conflict, dispute, war, terrorism, genocide and re-engineers their societies towards peace. This could be achieved by identifying the interests, needs, and fears that fuel conflict. It is when these conflict generating factors are identified that the process of solving them starts. For instance, someone who wants money or status does not necessarily need a particular piece of land as money is fundamental in the person's hierarchy of needs. His desires and needs may be met in other ways. However, someone else whose existence is in danger because he has nothing other than a piece of land, definitely needs land, although not necessarily the exact piece, so long as the alternative is in an acceptable location (Wehrmann, 2008: 40).

Sustainable peace will remain an illusion in the Nigerian post-conflict setting until the erstwhile warriors or mercenaries are individually and collectively trained to eliminate the negative violent ideas and culture they have developed due to the years of the conflict. This is because these former warriors gradually begin to threaten the collective peace of both their own community that used them to fight as well as the community they fought against.

There is need for the promotion of community mobilisation towards peace. This form of mobilization would involve all the agents of peace. The process must necessarily capture and present the need for unity in a dynamic and all inclusive manner. There is also the need to strengthen internal community investigations on inter-group allegations with the defined goal of bringing former disputants and disciples of conflict to a sound acknowledgement of the need for a new behavioural shift towards peace. There is need for community-driven disciplinary systems and appropriate sanctions that would be applied by community leaders on dissident individuals whose established evidence of wrong-doing has been gathered. This would promote a situation where these individuals would come forward and offer their hands of restoration and reconciliation to the victims of their violent acts or their descendants suffering from the violent psychological aftermaths of the conflict.

Furthermore, there is need to establish reliable early warning systems that are community-driven. The systems would create a community desk for gathering information relating to

reports or suspicious moves that are capable of generating violent behaviour and communalupheavals. Once evidence has been received in relation to the potential outbreak of violent behaviour, the community should intervene in a strategic manner with the view of aborting the perceived violence or group insurgence. This would include formal and informal communication as well as the promotion of transitional peace.

The youths of the community involved should also establish counselling programmes and workshops, with the aim of progressive sensitisation of communities towards social harmony with neighbours. Such counselling programmes are bound to empower the youths of the community to begin the process of un-teaching their parents and family members against the age-long divisions between them and their neighbours. Such family-based reconsideration of the historic strife and divisions would create a new platform for peaceful socialisation.

The other agents of socialisation in the communities affected by conflict need to wake up to the responsibility of acting as reliable disciples of peace. For instance, community members, who are church leaders and ministers of the gospel, should take the opportunity of their teachings and sermons to de-construct dispute and conflict, while preaching the advantages of group-forgiveness, unity and peace. Other community-based groups such as age-grade organisations, gender-based meetings and social clubs should also lend their voice in promoting peaceful integration.

There is also the need for a culture of objectivity and integrity, as opposed to the socially constructed stereotypes of enmity, discord and conflict. Such an individual value system that promotes peace should be encouraged, notwithstanding the tendency of it being a voice crying in the wilderness due to years of conflict and dispute. Within this context, individuals and groups in the community should establish peacebuilding conversations and actions that would gradually begin to attract the positive support and goodwill of those within their spheres of influence.

Positive meaning should be given to peace building through peace jingles and advertisements for peace. Peace jingles deal with the act of using songs, comic short messages or pictures to flash media advertisements that promote peace and encourage people to desist from violent activities that lead to conflict. Many of such adverts are easily internalised by little children, who adopt them in the future as a lifetime ideology. The radio and television as well as social

media are active agents that could potentially carry peace jingles and spread these like wild fire.

A combination of evidence received through early warning systems and dialogue would assist in changing the peace process from a reactive peace process to a proactive one. With the establishment of a platform for continuous dialogue, community leaders would gradually reinforce the need for peace in the society. It should be recalled that conflicts and disputes are socially constructed realities that could be deconstructed over a period of time. Dialogue and negotiations amongst disputants and former enemies could be used to approach the contentious relations amongst communities. Contentious areas such as real ownership of land and paramountcy of chiefs could be negotiated and a new condition that would allow the different communities to shift their hitherto rigid position could be attained. Dialogue and peaceful communication would also unravel areas of misrepresentation and misinterpretation, thus creating room for the unravelling of truth, which is necessary path to peace building.

The adoption of mediation as a peacebuilding strategy requires those that will facilitate mediation to have in-depth knowledge of the conflict that they intend to resolve. They need to know the factors that have fomented the conflict in the past and other variables that sustained the conflict as well as its multiplier effects. Mediators must also have a clear picture of the diverse interests and goals that have sustained the conflict. Thus, they need to watch out when the architects of the conflict are wearing out or are running out of resources to sustain their violent disposition. Also, mediators can equally positively exploit public opinion shift to their advantage. Thus, when members of the conflict-ravaged zone begin to criticise their leaders for not pursuing the path of peace, it is often a good time to initiate a sustainable mediation process. The proactive process of mediating to nip a conflict in the bud before it escalates into a crisis easily allows for the rise of sustainable peace. Integrity and trust are fundamental for the success of mediation and other forms of third party intervention. This is because when the larger society perceives the mediator as someone who could easily compromise his or her position, then the road to peace building would be blocked by suspicion and mistrust from any party to the conflict. Thus, when the mediator has the credentials of standing in the path of truth and successfully promoting peace in the past, it becomes easier for conflict actors to give those organisations the opportunity to exhibit cogent mediation abilities.

The mediator(s) would also be very tolerant and positively disposed towards forgiveness and endurance as a way to stomach the excesses or misrepresentation from either or both parties in the conflict circle. During mediation in the conflict scenario such as the case of Ezza-Ezillo and Ezillo, participants need to be broad-based and it should as much as possible try to contain the excesses of all major actors in the conflict. There is need for negotiators or mediators to encourage conflicting parties, to as much as possible, trust their sovereign faith, hope, power, skill and authority towards promoting peace, while believing that they are collectively responsible for peacebuilding with the mediating team. Mediators need to ensure that challenges faced by a particular side of the conflict divide are vividly presented to the other party, which would allow both parties to appreciate the depth of their differences and resolve these in order to promote building the bridge of peace. For example, mediators could encourage each side of the conflict to "write down what it thinks are the interests of the other party and then have members of the opposite delegation(s) to discuss their papers one-on-one" (Clemens, 1998:250).

The peace building agenda that is targeted by the mediator must be specific, measurable, and realistic as well as time-bound. The negotiating and mediating team must avoid an agenda that is driven by political propaganda to favour the opinion of the power or economic elite within the conflict zone. There is a need to schedule their meetings and peace dialogue in a public or private venue that would most importantly encourage them to concentrate upon the critical business of placing conflicting parties on the path of peace. The venue for conflict mediation and resolution should be strategic and not prone to attacks, demonstrations or distractions from disgruntled elements of any side of the conflict and those who attain certain forms of benefits through the continuation of the conflict. The conflict resolution setting needs to be conducive for the generation of constructive ideas. It should be a comfortable place where conflicting parties could brainstorm with little or no distractions.

Negotiator(s) and mediator(s) in the conflict must ensure that they encourage the parties engaged in the conflict towards the acceptance of a "walk-away-cost" of reconciliation. The walk-away-cost is the alternative forgone by parties in a conflict in the process of conflict resolution. It is often the monetary and non-monetary cost of staying back to pursue peace. The mediators would be proactive towards shaping the negotiating position of conflict parties towards peace. Such negotiation process could be done openly or otherwise depending on the

sensitivity of the conflict interests, impact of the conflict and the multiplier effects of the conflict as well as the bottlenecks to the peace process.

There is also a need for those who would be negotiating the peace process to have a clear knowledge of the material and immaterial culture of the parties in conflict. This would assist in positioning them in the right cultural footing that would save them from careless attacks on the people's values and norms which could cripple a peace process. Furthermore, a sound knowledge of the culture of those in conflict reduces and allows for the elimination or at least, the downplaying of cultural differences that ignite conflict. Cohen (1991) has shown how cultural-related obstacles affect negotiation. The Agila people of Benue State, Nigeria, consistently criticised the Ezza for abusing their cultural heritage, thus deepening the nature of their conflict. Mediation worked in the Mgbalukwu-Obeagu Isu and Ojiegbe conflict environment because mediators used grass-root actors in the process. In addition, the conflict was already ripe with long and complex impact on the warring communities, thus the people were already worn-out with sustaining the tempo of the conflict. The cost of the conflict was also already very high on poverty-stricken communities and resources needed to continually finance the inter-communal conflict were becoming increasingly difficult to raise from communities that shouldered the financial weight of re-fuelling and sustaining the conflict.

The process of peace education demands that learners start acquiring new values that would promote peace. The role of the wider society in ensuring that there is a culture of peace cannot be neglected. The informal education of the masses towards peace is fundamental as the de-escalation of violence through peace education would lead to conflict reduction. The teaching of younger people, using photographs and maps that clearly show the multiple negative impacts of violent land disputes and other forms of conflict would re-condition the learners on the dangers of violent conflict. Students should be taught songs that promote peace and reduce conflicts. Qualities that promote peace such as mutual cooperation, love, tolerance and understanding are fundamental themes for informal peace education process. Learners should be taught how to identify the factors that trigger conflicts. These factors differ from one conflict environment to another.

There is need for all actors and consigned parties in a conflict to be carried along in the post-conflict peace building process. This would place all hands on deck and puncture the

probability of escalation of new cycle of conflict by disgruntled elements in the society. Negotiators need to work with government to ensure the implementation of all forms of peace agreements reached in the peace making period.

Private and public funds should be sourced to ensure that the financial demands of carrying out the peace accord are reached at the end of the conflict; not ending up on paper. There is also the need to foster positive ties amongst the erstwhile enemies through integrative programmes, entertainment, competitions and events that encourage sustainable social cohesion, peace, harmony and unity.

Government at the grassroots in Nigeria and South Africa need to promote community mobilisation for peace. Such peace campaigns foster a culture of collective responsibility to peace and security amongst the citizenry. The implication is that the masses would honestly begin to think of peace and security as fundamental to sustainable development. This would assist in creating a new consciousness of reporting violent behaviours to community leaders before their escalation. A change in civic culture could promote peace and security in a sustainable manner. One of the potential advantages of peacebuilding through civic mobilization is that when the society has been deeply reinforced towards peace and unity, the few black sheep that would always switch-on the fire of conflict and disunity would begin to see themselves as socially rejected, thereby reducing the chances of their actions escalating into conflicts.

There is need for a standing peace committee made up of elders of Ebonyi State or North West Region as well as religious and opinion leaders of different faiths and denominations. The committee should also have members to represent women and youths of the communities involved in the conflict. The committee should be a broad-based group with the principal aim of promoting peacebuilding strategies in the hitherto conflict environment.

The government of Nigeria and South Africa should promote grass-root interactive forums. These fora will assist representatives of government at all levels, to have first hand information on the nature of post-conflict peace building process on the one hand, while boosting the faith and confidence of the citizenry that their government is legitimately inclined towards building sustainable peace on the other. There is also a need for peace visits from leaders of former conflict-ridden communities to one another's territory. Such visits

from community leadership would create the conscious move on members of the communities that were formerly divided by conflict towards cooperation, peace and unity.

There is also a need for inter-group forgiveness between the Ezza-Ezillo and their Ezillo landlords, Agilla and their Ezza-Agilla setlers. This form of forgiveness is needed amongst the Barolong brothers to bring back that historic unity among them. This is because forgiveness is a roadmap to the cleaning-up of the negative left-overs of intermittent past conflicts. It helps to heal the psychological scars of past conflicts and the deep rooted social animosity that has been transferred from one generation to another due to the destructive effect of the conflict history. This forgiveness is necessary as it drives emotional healing and prepares the way for reconciliation and sustainable peace. It also deletes, eliminates or reduces the urge of revenge that is often entrenched in the hearts of victims and casualties of conflicts. It should be noted that some of the outbreaks of violent attacks in the Ezillo and Agila environment were motivated by the sense of retribution, which creates a cycle of recurrent attacks. It is only when inter-group forgiveness is granted that reconciliation could emerge. It is after reconciliation that steps could be taken further to organise social programmes and entertainment that would create the necessary framework for social trust and social cohesion amongst such communities. The descendants of Ezza and Barolong that are scattered across the length and breadth of their countries need to start a cultural festival or a sporting competition that they would gather together former rival to participate in a regenerative and redemptive time-spaceto compete in. That will naturally promote unity and begin to heal historic animosity. At the level of these intergroup programmes, intergroup marriages would naturally be encouraged. It will also gather those formerly in conflict to a setting that will be overtaken with positive emotions, joy, happiness and entertainment thus driving emotional healing. It should be stated that the idea of inter-group forgiveness advocated for in this study should be driven by formal and informal, traditional as well as modern institutions found in communities that were formerly trapped in conflict situations.

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Finally, conflict can be prevented in some cases and managed in a number of others. It can be resolved in many cases, if the peace agreements, whether written or oral, connote the satisfaction of demands of the erstwhile violent parties rather than the total eradication of underlying sentiments, memories and conflicts. Time resolves conflicts over decades. However, the wounds that it heals remain as scars for future lessons.

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Annexures I: Ethics Approval Certificate

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Institutional Research Ethics Regulatory Committee
Tel +27 18 299 4849
Email Ethics@nwu.ac.za

ETHICS APPROVAL CERTIFICATE OF PROJECT

Based on approval by the Human Research Ethics Committee, Mafikeng Campus, the North-West University Institutional Research Ethics Regulatory Committee (NWU-IRERC) hereby approves your project as indicated below. This implies that the NWU-IRERC grants its permission that provided the special conditions specified below are met and pending any other permission that may be necessary the project may be initiated, using the ethics number below.

Project title: **Peace building strategies for the management of Ezza conflicts in Nigeria and Borolong land dispute in South Africa**

Project Leader: **Prof V Ojakorotu**
Student: **KJ Ani**

Ethics number: **NWU-00403-15-A8**

Approval date: 2015-09-29 Expiry date: 2018-09-29 Category NAS

Special conditions of the approval (if any): None

General conditions:

While the ethics approval is subject to all declarations, undertakings and agreements incorporated and signed in the application form, please note the following:

- The project leader (principle investigator) must report to the prescribed format to the NWU-IRERC:
  - annually (or as otherwise requested) on the progress of the project,
  - without any delay in case of any adverse event (or any matter that ordinarily would affect principles) during the course of the project.
- The approval applies strictly to the protocol as detailed in the application form. Should any changes to the protocol be deemed necessary during the course of the project, the project leader must apply for approval of these changes at the NWU-IRERC. Work may not commence with the project (or the changes) before the necessary approval of such changes. The ethics approval is conditional and automatically forfeited.
- The date of approval indicates the first date that the project may be started. Should the project have to continue after the expiry date, a new application must be made to the NWU-IRERC and new approval received before or on the expiry date.
- In the interest of ethical responsibility the NWU-IRERC retains the right to:
  - request access to any information or data at any time during the course or after completion of the project;
  - withdraw or postpone approval if:
    - any conditional principles or practices of the project are reversed or evaporated;
    - it becomes apparent that any relevant information was withheld from the NWU-IRERC or that information has been false or misrepresented;
    - the required annual report and reporting of adverse events was not done timely and accurately;
    - new institutional rules, national legislation or international conventions deem it necessary.

The IRERC would like to remain at your service as ethical and research, and wishes you well with your project. Please do not hesitate to contact the IRERC for any further enquiries or requests for assistance.

Yours sincerely

Linda du Plessis

Prof Linda du Plessis
Chair NWU Institutional Research Ethics Regulatory Committee (IRERC)

Annexures II: Letter of Introduction

NORTH-WEST UNIVERSITY
YUNIBESITI YA BOKONE-BOPHIRIMA
NOORDWES-UNIVERSITEIT
MAFIKENG CAMPUS

Professor Victor Ojakorotu
FACULTY OF HUMAN AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
Department of Politics & International Relations
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Office Phone:+27 (0)18 389 2259
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04 April 2016

Ani Kelechi Johnmary (26143070)

Cc: Barolong Boora Tshidi

RE: APPROVAL FOR YOUR FIELD WORK

Following an earlier approval of your Research Proposal by the Faculty Higher Degree Committee, Faculty of Human and Social Sciences of the North-West University Mafikeng Campus, I am pleased to convey to you further approval to commence your field work for the purpose of generating and collating data relevant to your Doctoral dissertation, as soon as possible **(April 4-13, 2016).**

By this approval, it is understood that you will visit the under listed Institutions/Agencies, among others, as highlighted in your proposal for the purpose of your inquiry:-

- Barolong Boora Tshidi, North West Province, South Africa
- The South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg,
- The Institute of Security Studies, Pretoria,
- The Institute of Global Dialogue, Pretoria.
- Ezza Settlement, South Eastern Nigeria

However, you reserve the initiative of making additional contacts with any other agencies relevant to your field of inquiry.

I take this opportunity to wish you all the best in your research interactions.

Kind regards,

4/4/16

Prof V. Ojakorotu, (PhD)

Annexures III: Letters of Consent



Women for Ishielu Development,

Ishielu Local Government Area,

Ebonyi State, Nigeria

Re: Kelechi Johnmary Ani on Ezza Conflicts

I write to re-affirm that Kelechi Johnmary Ani was in Ishielu for his doctoral studies in 2015. Within the said period, he was moving through the villages, where he was gathering field data, distributing questionnaire and interviewing people of all ages on the dynamics of Ezza conflicts with her neighbours.

His visit in the community was highly welcomed because he came for his alledged doctoral research, at a time when the community is doing everything to conquer the negative impact of the devastating conflict.

Please give him all the needed support!

Thanks.

Yours faithfully,



Christiana Nwigbo.

+2349097775052.

CHIEF ANI GABRIEL ANI (K.S.M)

OCEMBA I OF ISU
08121126159



UDOKA I OF ISU
07012260016

Resident
No: 1Agueke Rd
Obegu Isu
Onicha L.G..A
Ebonyi State

1st October 2016

North West University

Mafikeng

South Africa

Letter of Confirmation

I write to confirm that Ani Kelechi Johnmary was at Obegu, Mgbalukwu and Ojiegbe conflict zone to administer interviews for 3months in 2016 in order to get necessary first hand information about the conflict in the zone

Signed: _____

Chief Ani Gabriel Ani

(Ochemba 1 of Isu)

CHIEF OGBUEFI OGENYI

Omeziri Mba of Oshiri

Our Ref: .....
Your Ref:.....

Date: 21st Oct,2016

North West University

Mafikeng

South Africa

Letter of Confirmation

This letter is to confirm that Ani Kelechi John Mary spent 3months at Oshiri gathering information about the conflict between Oshiri Community in Onicha Local Government Area, Ebonyi State and Ezzama Community in Ezza South Local Government Area of Ebonyi State.

Signed:

Chief Ogbuefi Ogenyi

(Omeziri Mba of Oshiri)

Annexures IV: Questionnaire

Dear respondent, I am conducting doctoral research on **SUSTAINABLE PEACEBUILDING STRATEGIES FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF EZZA CONFLICTS IN NIGERIA AND BAROLONG LAND DISPUTE IN SOUTH AFRICA** at the North West University, Mafikeng Campus, South Africa. The main aim of the study is to unravel the dynamics of Ezza conflicts in Nigeria and compare them with Barolong land disputes in South Africa while proffering sustainable peace building strategies. Your responses to the questions that follow will be highly appreciated. **Please be informed that all your answers will be kept COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL and that you are at liberty to withdraw your participation in this study at any time, if you so wish to.**

At all times, the socio-economic, political views and religious leanings of respondents will be respected. Participation in the interview and subsequent provision of information will be treated as confidential as possible. On no account will participants be required to commit an act which might diminish their self-respect or cause them to experience shame, embarrassment or regret. The data collection process will not involve any act of deception or the use of questions or any other method that will expose participants to unpleasant or harmful side effects. The autonomy of participants will, at all times, be respected and their responses will be treated in a confidential manner.Also, anonymity would be allowed through the use of coded/ disguised names of respondents/ institutions.Thank you for taking time to participate in the study!

Name of researcher: Ani Kelechi Johnmary

Researcher's programme: PhD in Peace Studies

Researcher's contact details: +27717343533 and +2348061552284, kani4christ@gmail.com

Name of research supervisor: Professor Victor Ojakorotu

Research supervisor's contact details: +27183892000, Victor.Ojakorotu@nwu.ac.za

Name of respondent: .....

Respondent's profession:.....

Respondent's contact details (phone & email):.....

.....

.....**(optional)**

Date of interview..... ..

Place of interview (address)

.....

.....

.....

Note that the details of respondents as stated above, are necessary but not compulsory. A respondent is at liberty to remain anonymous or go by a disguised name. You are free to provide your responses in an additional piece of paper.

1. What do you think were the causes of the conflict between Ezza (Nigeria) and her neighbours (please, identify the neighbour discussed here-in)?.....
   .....
   .....
   .....

1.b. What do you think were the causes of land disputes amongst the Barolong (South Africa)?.....
.....
.....

2. Did the conflict or dispute assume an ethic dimension?
   .....
   .....
   .....

3. Did the conflict or dispute have any form of political dimension?.....
4. If yes, please explain.....
.....
.....
.....
.....(if no, skip to question 5).
5. Did the conflict/ dispute have any form of economic dimension?.....
6. If yes, please explain.....
.....
.....
.....
.....(if no, skip to question 7).

7. Did the conflict/dispute have any form of cultural dimension?.....
8. If yes, please explain.....
.....
.....
.....
.....(if no, skip to question 9).
9. What role did tradition and past events play in the growth of the conflict/ -dispute?
.....
.....
.....
.....
10. What role did colonial masters play in growth of the conflict/dispute?
.....
.....
.....

11. What role did government play in the resolution of conflict/dispute?.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

12. What alternative peace building strategies are feasible for conflict/dispute management?.....

.....

.....

.....

13. Do you think the conflict/dispute may re-occur?.....

14. If yes, why?.....

.....

.....(if no, skip to question 14).

15. What peace building strategy can be used to manage post-conflict psychology?

.....

.....

.....

.....

16. How can sustainable peaceful inter-group relations be promoted amongst former enemies.....

.....


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Annexures V: Pictures

I: Those killed on 31st December, 2011 in Ezillo, Nigeria



Source: Ireport.cnn.co (2012) Dead people in Ezillo



Citizens' Advocate

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JANUARY 14, 2012 VOL. 8, NO. 2 ISSN 0794-3814 N100 | TRUTH FOR FREEDOM

The Massacre That Was Ezillo


Police DCO, Over 70 Others Killed In Ezillo

...19 Hospitalized, Houses, Market, Vehicles, Filling Station Burnt

...Cross River, Akwaibom, Rivers Mopol Takeover Community

Source: Inya, U. (2010) "Behold the Sponsors of Ezza/Ezillo Crisis", *Citzens' Advocate,* May, 28, p. 1 & 18

II: **Weapons used in the Ezza and Ezza-Ezillo conflict**



Recovered ammunition from the warlords

Source: Source: Inya, U. (2010) "Behold the Sponsors of Ezza/Ezillo Crisis", *Citzens' Advocate,* May, 28, p. 1 & 18

Iii: Damaged Vehicles during the Ezza and Ezza-Ezillo Conflict



Source: Klin Reports (10th March, 2010) "Casualties of Ezza-Ezillo War" in klinreports.blogspot.com,



Source: Klin Reports (10th March, 2010) "Casualties of Ezza-Ezillo War" in klinreports.blogspot.com,



Burnt police vehicle

Source: Klin Reports (10th March, 2010) "Casualties of Ezza-Ezillo War" in klinreports.blogspot.com,