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SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT  
OF AFRICA WITH SPECIAL  
REFERENCE TO BURUNDI

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## ABSTRACT

This study examines the impact of conflict on the socio-economic development of Burundi. Conflicts, underdevelopment and poverty had marred most, if not all the post-colonial and African States contrary to the expectations of the world, especially after the end of the Cold War in 1989 when rivalry between Russia and United States ceased.

International and other conflicts occurred paradoxically to the United Nations' claim that considerable progress has been achieved in resolving conflicts since the end of the Cold War and the creation of the United Nations. In almost every area the individuals, nations, international communities, regional organizations, continental and global structures are working together in attempts to set the global agenda for peace and security.

Burundi is one of the African States that has drawn the attention of the United Nations in as far as conflict and underdevelopment is concerned. The ethnically motivated tension between the Hutu and Tutsi is one example where socio-economic development has been affected and the communities are suffering, especially the vulnerable ones like women and, children and old people.

Building lasting peace in Burundi will require that post-conflict regimes implement strategies that are explicitly aimed at addressing the root causes of the country's conflicts and come up with best strategies for development. Therefore I examined carefully the causes of the conflicts that occurred in 1965, 1972, 1988, 1991 and the ongoing conflict that started in 1993, drawing from the literature on the social, economics and politics of civil wars in general and on existing studies on Burundi in particular.

The socio-economic decline during 1960-1972 was due to political instability and the loss of Burundi's export markets in neighbouring Rwanda and Congo following decolonisation. During the period 1972-1988, socio-economic decline was fuelled by an increase in coffee export whereby the funds were used to create inefficient state firms used by the ruling elites as a source of economic rents and massive borrowing. During the third sub-period, that is 1988 to date the decline was due a result of three

civil wars, a total economic blockade, the freezing of aid by international donors and the collapse of investment and infrastructure.

The study characterizes the conflicts in Burundi as distributional conflicts in the sense that they arise from institutional failure and unequal distribution of national wealth across ethnic groups and regions. I illustrate the argument with the case of education and military, two key tools of consolidation of the patrimonial state. Institutional failure was not a result of incompetence on the part of leaders, but that it was carefully engineered by the ruling ethno-regional elite to consolidate power and privatise the state.

Characterizing the wars as distributional conflicts has immediate policy implications for post-conflict recovery and peace consolidation. The analysis implies that the emphasis should be on achieving equitable access to national resources and power sharing, and that the attention should move beyond the narrow confines of ethnicity to embrace all the dimensions along which discrimination has been engineered in the past, especially regionalism.

On the whole, growth and socio-economic development has been a failure because it has not been the priority of Burundi leadership. Blending traditional macroeconomic growth analysis with microeconomic, institutional and political economy approaches, the study shows that socio-economic outcomes have been endogenous to political imperatives. Controlled access to education and to the civil service and the army, the creation of a large number of state corporations, monetary policy, trade policy and a myriad of other policies were used to ensure that resources were allocated to the members of the ruling elite. The overarching objective of the leadership was the government's desire to hold its grip over the different sources of economic rents

It is therefore clear that if the new Burundian leadership is serious about building peace and developing the socio-economic situation in Burundi, it must engineer institutions that uproot the legacy of discrimination and promote equal opportunity for social mobility for all members of ethnic groups and regions. In the process, the protection of human life and the socio-economic integration of all Burundians without distinction based on regional or ethnic background should be the basic principle guiding political, social and economic reforms.

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**"GREAT HEIGHTS REACHED BY GREAT MEN WERE NEVER ATTAINED OVER NIGHTS, BUT THEY WHILST THEIR FRIENDS WERE FAST ASLEEP KEPT ON TOILING INTO THE NIGHTS." (John Melton)**

# CHAPTER ONE

## 1. INTRODUCTION

### 1.1. Background

In Africa, as in most other regions of the world, the end of the Cold War has not produced the much-desired peace dividend of conflict abatement. Apart from the resurgence of conflict in traditional areas of contention where Cold War considerations had long kept pent-up pressures in check, the immediate post-Cold War period has coincided with the emergence of new forms of conflicts. Thus, conflicts continue to pose great challenges to the security, peace, and stability, social and economic development of African states and demand the evolution of mechanisms for their management and resolution.

The new breed of conflicts present peacemakers with new challenge. These wars are usually fought not only by regular armies, but also by militia groups and armed civilians with little discipline and ill-defined chains of command. Most could be defined as guerilla wars, with civilians as the main victims and even main targets. Furthermore, humanitarian emergencies are commonplace and the combatant authorities lack the capacity to cope with them. An additional feature is the collapse of state institutions, especially the police and judiciary, and the consequent breakdown of law and order, leading to general banditry and chaos.

By conflict we mean the pursuit of incompatible goals by different groups. This suggests a broader span of time and a wider class of struggle than armed conflict. The usage here applies to any political conflict, whether it is pursued by peaceful means of force (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 2002:19-20). A conflict exists when two or more groups make mutually exclusive claims to the same resources and war is a means of allocating scarce values to resolve the conflict (Rankhumise, 1990:394). In this case war is a rational instrument of conflict. Stanger (1997:38) defines conflict as a situation in which two of more

human beings desire goals, which they perceive as being obtainable by one or the other, but not both. These definition can be clarified by saying that these must be at least two parties, each party is mobilizing energy to obtain a goal, desired object or situation, and each party perceives the other as a barrier, threat or obstacle in obtaining that goal or desired object.

Adebayo (1998: 93) further defined conflict as a social condition that arises when two or more actors pursue mutually exclusive or mutually incompatible goals. In international relations conflict behavior can be observed as was-both as a threatened outcome and as an existential reality, and bargaining behavior short of the violent idiom. Hostile attitudes are evinced by elites, attentive and mass publics through such psychological dispositions as aggression and suspicion. Conflict can however serve position functions, like consolidating group cohesion and enhance the position of leadership. It is certainly chimerical to think that conflict can be eliminated.

The concept of conflict can be generally understood as encompassing a whole range of activities (strikes, riots, crime, wars, civil wars, coup d'etat and so forth) that disrupt normal productive and social activities (Justino, 2001). However, it has been slowly acknowledged that conflict is intrinsically endogenous to the development process (Stewart and Fitzgerald, 2001).

There are many different reasons for the recurence of conflict. These can be grouped under the following: - The first is simple insincerity by one or both parties. One party may not be trusted to keep any agreement, like the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone. It was not sincere enough for its people. The second reason is disappointment on the party of one or both of the parties. This may often seem, from the outside, to be same thing as insincerity. There are many cases in which one side's acceptance of a peace agreement is only conditional, although the condition is neither publicly stated nor part of the agreement. In some cases, one side strongly expects to win the post-

war election and only for that reason agree to sign the peace agreement. If that expectation is not realized, they go back to war. An example is UNITA in Angola. The third reason is internal disagreement and even fragmentation on one or both sides. This too, may seem to be insincerity. Peace agreements often bring the tensions and conflicts within each party to the surface; the unity that was maintained for the sake of a conflict can quickly disintegrate if and when peace comes. An example is the assassination of Laurent Kabila of Democratic Republic of Congo, after overthrowing Mobutu Sese Seko in the former Zaire. Indeed the imminence of peace can often appear to be a threat to one part of the coalition on one side of the conflict, frustrating their capacity to fulfill long-term aims. Consider the splinter group from the Ireland Republic Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland in this context, or the rejection of the peace process in Israel and West Bank by militants both in Israel and among the Palestinians.

The fourth and last reason for the resumption of conflict is that the underlying causes of armed conflict remains. Failure to address the long-term causes of the conflict will mean that all efforts at reconstruction are doomed to be, at best, cosmetic, for example, five years after the Dayton Agreement to end the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, most observers continue to see a high risk that the war will resume if the international armed peacekeeping force were to withdraw.

Conflict is not always a bad thing; mass mobilization in the form of mass demonstrations, strikes, boycotts as well as civil strikes can produce opportunities for beneficial change in the distribution of land, resources, wealth and government (<http://www.library.utoronto>). For example, Tanzanian President, Julius Nyerere, abandoned his stance of one party state and embraced multiparty democracy. Again in South Africa, the uprising against the domination by whites and unequal treatment they conducted on blacks ended in democracy brought by Nelson Mandela after the democratical elections in 1994, after the uprisings and liberation struggles.

Causes of conflicts are diverse and deep-rooted. Stavenhagen (1996:26) notes that causes of conflicts include among others, "competition over resources, ethnic rivalry and struggles for political power" Goulding (1998:10) goes on to note "competing claims to power, or territory, or wealth, or rights, or justice as amounting to conflicts. Shelton (1997:3) expands those views by noting that "Africa is additionally affected by a complex array of problems that have not been remedied over the last three decades. Many problems can be traced to colonialism, while other difficulties are part of socio-political and socio-economic problems that have evolved in the post-colonial era." Goulding (1998:10) concluded that "causes of conflicts are numerous and often deep-rooted."

Kremnyck and Zartman (1995) state that for the past decades Africa has experienced bloody, long lasting conflicts. Kieh (1998) adds that after more than three decades of political independence, the incidences of armed conflicts, particularly civil ones have continually increased. Statistics show that of the thirty-five internal wars around the world, sixteen of them had been in Africa. There have been at least 80 wars since 1945, killing somewhere between 15 and 30 million people. Millions more have been driven from their homes. As Brogan (1993: 3) estimated that there are many refugees in the world today as there were during the mass movement of people after World War Two. At the end of 1991, the US Committee for Refugees calculated that 15 million people were refugees in foreign lands, and that there were between 15 to 20 million "internal refugees" who fled their homes to escape the dangers of conflicts.

While conflicts become more prevalent in the African continent, some scholars accounted the socio-political and economic crises in Africa as emanating from the greedy nature of some political leaderships and failure by Africans to adjust to democratic governance and its related status. Such scholarship portrayed elements of Afro-pessimistic scholarship and is mostly widespread in the western countries and among anti-African scholars. Afro-pessimistic scholarship has been manifested with among others, the alleged slow, social, economic, and

political progress (if any) registered by African States in the post – colonial era. The alleged lack of progress has been perceived as emanating from corruption of the African political leadership, tendency to cling to power for long periods and inclination to socialist principles. The proclaimed inclination to socialism became unpopular with the western countries. As a result the donor nations and companies of the west were reluctant to support development initiatives, especially in socialist African countries.

On the other hand some scholars saw Africa and its leadership, as the potential to overcome its conflicts, which were perceived as being rooted from the legacies of western imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism and globalization. This brand of scholarship is embedded on the motions of Afro-optimism. They argue that Africa has advanced since colonialism and is poised to march forward in spite of setbacks and disappointments.

Until the end of the 1980's, development economist showed little interest in the problems of civil war. Yet within the past decade this has changed dramatically, with a rapidly expanding literature on the economics or political economy of conflict, civil war, or so-called complex humanitarian emergencies (Stewart et al, 1997). This is not just an academic response to empirical developments, since outbreaks of armed conflict of various kinds have long been a common feature of developing countries, especially Africa.

Two plausible and probably only partial explanations may be as follows. Firstly, until the end of the Cold war many economists considered war to be purely exogenous, a given of global politics, something that occasionally disrupts from time to time more normal conditions under which economic laws apply (Fischer and Schwartz, 1992:239). However, wars have proliferated after the Cold war and has encouraged or freed up economists to consider more intimate relations between such conflicts and other variables within their models. Secondly, this has coincided with a growing confidence within the mainstream economic

profession that the precepts of economic orthodoxy can be applied to an increasingly wide range of social phenomena.

Throughout, there has been an interest in the post conflict role of economists. Post-war rehabilitation analyses can draw on cost-of-war exercises and also on analyses of the causes of war and social change (Boyce et al, 1997). Despite the expansion of the literature on these subjects, there remain areas of significant analytical and empirical weakness, and the subject as part of socio-economic development, is still in its infancy.

As well as a shift from focusing on the consequences of conflicts towards analyzing their "root causes", the shift in perspective within the economics of war in poor countries, like in Africa, has taken other forms. From treating these conflicts as exogenous events, whose economics effects are then traced through the mechanisms of economic models, economists have increasingly brought the determination of conflicts within the interaction of model variables. At the same time, there has been something of a shift in intellectual confidence, as development economists have taken more eagerly to analyzing wars. Early exercises might have spoken of the "vacuum" in the political economy of war (Green, 1999) or might have asked modestly whether economic analysis can help to mitigate the costs of conflict (Stewart, 1993). More recently, this tone has shifted to incorporate a more assertive sense that economics is the best-placed discipline for understanding the origins, dynamics, and consequences of conflicts in poor countries, like African states.

After briefly reviewing the spread of conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa and emphasizing their diversity, focus will chiefly be on the literature on the costs of conflict and on the cause of conflict. The main argument being on that conflict directly expresses social, political and economical relations and that therefore it requires analytical tools directly geared towards understanding relations. Conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa, and other parts of the world have also become a

site of reductionism colonization by mainstream economics. For example the two most commonly accepted theories of violence and war are: that violence and conflict are functions of scarcity and that conflict is a function of difference, expressed through measures of inequality or ethnic fragmentation.

Burundi as an African state is no exception to violent conflicts. "A look at the history of Burundi sheds light on the dynamics of Burundian political, economic and social development and its implication for peacemaking". As in Bosnia, ethnic violence and genocide, are by no means the inevitable results of ancient tribal hatreds. In fact, there were a few violent confrontations between Hutu and Tutsi until a little more than 30 years ago. When German colonists arrived in the capital of Bujumbura near the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Burundi was a long-established, decentralized kingdom. The principal rivals were not Hutu or Tutsi, but members of a small royal group, the ganwas or "princess of blood." Although their predominantly pastoral Tutsi benefited more from the extensive patron-client system than the mainly agricultural Hutu, the two groups inhabited the same lands, spoke the same language, shared the largely common culture and often intermarried. Despite an overall distinction in social status, their economic circumstances were often quite similar. Even status differences were subject to qualification. Some Hutu Clans were very influential, furnishing the ganwas with many of their advisers, managers, religion, authorities and local deputies, and certain Hutus were forbidden to enter the king's court. Generally, regional and family identities appear to have been more central to traditional Burundi politics than the ethnic ones (<http://ecrweb.ccr.vet.ac.za-online> Rene: 2002)

It was under the influence of colonialism that ethnic conflict in Burundi became more salient. Centralization and modernization eroded old identities based on locality, kinship and dynastic rule. Moreover, Belgium's colonial takeover after the World War 1 produced authoritarian manipulation of the ganwa system that made it less able to satisfy its Hutu constituents. At the same time, Belgium educational, cultural and administrative policies promoted the social and political

advance of the "noble" Tutsi, whose "fine bearing alone guarantee them considerable prestige over the worthy Hutu, less clever, more simple and more trusting" reported Rene Lemarchard (2002), the foremost student of Burundi politics.

The conflict in Burundi is one of the long-standing conflicts in Africa, with the present phase having commenced on the 23 September 1993. This followed the assassination of the first democratically elected President Melchior Ndadaye, with the other high-ranking officials of the government and the massacres that followed in the aftermath of the assassinations. Since that tragic and unfortunate development, the International community, including the African Union, formerly known as the Organization of African Unity, has consistently worked towards the diffusion of tension and then resolution of differences among the component groups and interest in the country (Oyekanni, 2002).

The ongoing conflict in Burundi has claimed millions of lives since its beginning, mostly women, children and elderly (International -Rescue Committee, 2002). It has taken enormous toll on children and other civilians. Presently the country is characterized by extreme poverty and poor economic performance (Mbaku: 2000). The government cannot meet the basic needs of its people without injection of foreign aid, which constitutes about 55% of its expenditure.

The most salient feature of Burundian conflict is socio-economic underdevelopment, a factor that continues to fuel conflict, high debt levels, political opportunism, global economy and international financial systems that are discriminative at the country level and are some of the factors that contribute to socio-economic under-development in Burundi.

Many Burundians has lost their lives since the beginning of the civil war in 1993, but political instability and widespread insecurity have caused a prolonged disruption in the social and economic development of the country. Government,

military and rebel groups alike have coerced men, women and children into transporting goods, they have raped women, pillaged and burned homes and violated the ceasefire by continuing to enlist combatants, many of them children (Clover, 1993).

The humanitarian situation in Burundi is now very fragile. Since the beginning of the conflict the conditions have deteriorated steadily and the ceasefire have been violated daily. The sense of insecurity is pervasive. The International humanitarian organizations report regular ambushes and the looting of aid supplies by rebels, as well as sporadic fighting between government and rebel forces, resulting in civilian deaths and the displacement of people on a scale not seen for many years. By February 2003, it was reported that as many as 100 000 people were being displaced internally every month, moving from hill-top to hill-top to hill-top in an attempt to escape violence (<http://www.iss.co.za/AF/current/Burundimay03.htm>-onlineJennyClover: 2003)

Additional pressure on already overstretched food-aid resources is being caused by a period of abnormally dry weather that has led to a massive drop in the level of food stocks in most parts of the country. The marked decline in the production of beans, the main source of protein for most Burundians, is particularly worrying. Under the current circumstances there is a great concern about the prospects for the next agricultural season, as the scarcity of basic commodities, coupled with depreciation of the local currency, has increased the likelihood of people being reduced to consuming seeds required for planting. Over and above this, under funded relief agencies are struggling, as donors are reluctant to resume major aid programs until an effective cease-fire is in place and the transitional government has begun to implement reforms in terms of The Arusha agreement (Adebayo).

Outside the country there are more than 840 000 Burundians refugees living in the region. Most of them are in Tanzania and some 470 000 of these are

integrated with the local population and do not receive United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) assistance. In March 2002 the office of the UNHCR implemented a voluntary repatriation program for the return of refugees from Tanzania. Tensions have been increasing amid accusations that camps have served as a base for Conseil National pour la Defense de la Democratie- Forces de Defense de la Democratie (CNDD-FFD) FDD rebels as well as growing resentment in local Tanzania communities that have felt the social, environmental and economic impact of sharing scarce resources (Adams, Mark and Bradbury: 1995).

Several thousand refugees hoped that the agreement signed at the end of 2002 might bring peace and returned to Burundi to assess the situation, only to head back to Tanzania in disillusionment. The continuation of fighting this year has sent new waves of refugees fleeing into Tanzania, the numbers mounting steadily to the point that the UNHCR has had to make contingency plans for an influx of as many as 60 000 newcomers.

The refugees are in an invidious position even if an improved security situation opened the way for their return, there is the real fear that their return could derail the peace process because of the lack of absorptive capacity within Burundi. Not only are general conditions not conducive, but also a major obstacle to a long-term solution for Internally Displaced Person (IDPs) and refugees is the scarcity of the land, with disputes over land worsening considerably in recent years. Population density in the country is over 240 per square kilometer, the second highest in Africa after Rwanda, and 766 per square kilometer of arable land with 90% of the population dependent on subsistence farming (AISA: 2002).

Access to health care is limited throughout Burundi, and services are generally sub-standard. Malaria is the leading cause of death; Hepatitis A, Typhoid, Yellow Fever, Cholera and Meningitis are all prevalent. HIV/AIDS is present in over

10% of the adult population. Life expectancy in 2000 was an average of 40.6 years.

The general mood in Burundi is not optimistic. The impending transfer of power to a Hutu President appears to be the main catalyst for increased political, economic and military maneuvering, with all sides re-evaluating their positions, and trying to increase areas under their control. The transitional government is trying to implement change under enormous pressure urged by the international community to meet the set deadline while the political situation remains seriously fragmented. Although international donors have been making substantial aid commitments since 2000, disbursements have lagged far behind and this will continue until a comprehensive ceasefire is in place (Agbaje: 1992).

Until the political situation improves, fighting is contained and different elements of the ceasefire implemented, the social, economic and humanitarian situation will continue to deteriorate. At the same time, the humanitarian, social and economic conditions are impacting negatively on the political situation continuing degradation of the socio-economic situation is increasing social tensions, and the failure to respond to humanitarian needs is causing a deepening sense of despair and loss of motivation to work towards peace (Africa Confidential: 1995).

Burundians are desperate for resources. The neglect of the structural problems that continue to fuel tensions has created an environment in which peace seems to be continuously beyond reach. Recognizing that they can play an essential role in building peace and that they need to be supportive of positive developments to push for change, donors are urging for transition while continuing to withhold support until true peace is achieved. International aid has been reduced to a third of the levels prevailing from 1981 to 1995, the suffering of the civilians appears to not have been sufficiently understood, or is merely considered inevitable in a region engulfed in conflict.

It is questionable whether such prudence is productive. The German GIZ donor promised food aid for FDD rebels recently on the understanding that they could be confined to the cantonment areas so that they would stop preying on civilians. However, the FDD rebels have proved unwilling to cooperate and there seems no possibility of achieving encampment. The two main parties have also called for sanctions against the Front National de Liberation (FNL) rebels so they too will be less inclined to lay down arms. There is some hope that the African Union's (AU) 3500 strong peace keeping forces deployed in Burundi will be effective the peacekeeping force is indispensable to the process of encampment and the introduction of a true ceasefire (UN's Africa Report: 1995).

Nevertheless, political insecurity over the coming months will continue to be aggravated further by the fragility of the current regional situation. Demobilization and re-integration of returning forces from DRC has the potential to exacerbate insecurity; this is against a backdrop of concerns over how the reform and integration of the government and rebel armed forces will be handled.

Political, social and economic developments over time will continue to be a major factor in determining levels of security. A critical issue is that of who will be appointed Vice-President and what his relationship will be with the Hutu President to be appointed. There is the potential for government institutions to be paralyzed by an uncooperative relationship that feeds into and aggravates divisions. Given the depth of poverty, the prevalence of violent conflict, and the scale of human rights violations, the humanitarian situation and the socio-economic situation will not improve unless and until the government upholds human rights, ends impunity, protects civilians and the displaced, improves the justice system, and the international community develops an integrated approach to working in support of such governments action. However, so long as political agendas continue to be determined by elites jostling for power and not working towards peace, the absence of peace, and thus also of funds, will continue to

destabilize the socio-economic development of Burundi (Amnesty International1995).

## **1.2. Research Problem/ Statement of the problem**

This study seeks to find answers to the following central questions:

- What are historical, economical, political and cultural backgrounds of the Burundi conflict?
- What are the effects of the Burundi conflict on its socio-economic development and Africa at large?
- What are the efforts made internally, regionally and internationally to resolve the conflict?
- What are the initiatives taken in developing the socio-economic situation of Burundi?

## **1.3. Rationale of the study**

The importance of this study is that it evaluates the conflict situation in Burundi. It helps understand the impact that the conflict has on the socio-economic situation in Burundi.

The regional and international organization/community is trying to retain the situation in Burundi and thus develop the socio-economic situation of the Burundian community.

#### **1.4. Aim of the Study**

To investigate the impact of conflict on the socio-economic development of Burundi.

#### **1.5. Objectives of the Study**

The study examines the following specific aspects:

- The historical, economical, political, and cultural background of the Burundi conflict.
- The effects of the Burundi conflict on its socio-economic development and Africa at large.
- The efforts made by African Union (AU) in resolving Burundi conflict.
- The initiative taken in developing the socio-economic situation of Burundi.

#### **1.6.1. Literature Review**

Literature review is an important part of the research process. Its main purpose is to identify related issues to research problems handled by other researchers and identify existing gaps in the literature. The main purpose of literature review is to sharpen the researcher's theoretical understanding of the research problem and familiarize the researcher with the latest theoretical developments and debates conducted in the area of research, and to familiarize him/herself with problems, hypothesis and results obtained by previous researchers (Du Plooy: 1995)

According to Du Plooy (1995), literature review ensures that people don't duplicate or copy the efforts of others, but contribute something original and meaningful to the body of knowledge by discovering a new theory. It also serves

to identify the strengths and weaknesses in previous studies, thereby alerting the researcher to possible difficulties he/she may encounter in his/her research. Valuable sources or data may be revealed that was previously not noticed of realized.

The literature review has been debated and different concepts or ideas of different writers have been defined. The following are some of the concepts:

Jones and Rosen (1990:394) defines "conflict as something that exists when two or more groups make mutually exclusive claims to the same resources or positions, and war is a means of allocating the same resources to resolve conflict."

Stranger further defines "conflict as a situation in which two of more human beings desire goals which they perceive as being obtainable by one or the other, but not both." Putting into place appropriate mechanisms for conflict management and resolution requires an understanding of causes and nature of the conflicts to be contained and/or resolved.

Since more and more conflicts in the developing world are protracted and ethnic in nature, rather than purely strategic, theorists like Azar (1990: 145) stated that in order to manage and hopefully resolve these kinds of conflicts, a comprehensive approach that identifies and tackles their multiple causal factors is necessary. He used the term protracted social conflicts "to suggest the type of on-going and seemingly irresolvable conflicts especially in developing countries like those in Africa"

Ryan (1990) defined protracted conflict as "usually conflicts between ethnic groups which have gone on for some time, and which may appear to be irresolvable to the other parties caught up in them. Protracted social conflicts have typical preconditions that plays important roles in shaping their genesis and

account for the conflicts to arise in societies characterized by multicommunal compositions.

According to Azar and Moon (1996: 305) these conflicts flourish in environments of high politico-economic underdevelopment and manifest themselves over communal identity needs. The roots of these are to be found at the interlocking nexus of underdevelopment, structural deprivation (political, economic, social and psychological) and communal or identity cleavages. Moreover, it is assumed that social, political and economic inequalities usually take the form of ethnic discrimination in kinds of societies.

They flourish in environments of high politico-economic underdevelopment and manifest themselves over communal identity needs. The roots of protracted social conflicts are to be found at the interlocking nexus of underdevelopment, structural deprivation (political, economic and psychological) and communal identity cleavages. Moreover, it is assumed that structural victimization (i.e. social, political, and economic inequalities as well as psychological oppression) usually takes the form of ethnic discrimination in these kinds of societies (Azar and Moon, 1996: 305).

In fact "structural victimization" is perceived to affect some groups disproportionately or to benefit others. It is this juncture of actual physical and psychological deprivation that structural victimization bursts into hostile and violent actions (Zinnes, 1993: 90).

According to Schmeidl and Jenkins (1998), "the causes of the conflict are complex, and frequently so thoroughly intertwined with a range of social, economic and political factors that isolating individual variables can be extremely difficult". In the past, economic issues were often held to be at the root of violent conflict, and it was these issues that seemingly propelled communist-inspired insurgencies during the Cold War. Similarly, the "hierarchy of needs" approach

which was particularly fashionable in the 1970s pointed to economic issues being the paramount factors in achieving development and preventing conflict.

Today, however, it is generally understood that the causes of violent conflict are more complex. In general, there is some agreement that the root causes of conflict include poverty, economic dependence, weak states, ethnic discrimination, international rivalries, and foreign military interventions. "Environmental security", including competition over diminishing resources, is also being pointed to more and more.

Sub-Saharan Africa like Burundi as our case study, is widely regarded as a "development failure", and large parts are embroiled in deadly conflict. A recent study by Douma et al (1999) on the causes of conflict in the developing world corroborated that socio-economic factors in and of them do not cause conflict. Instead, they interact with other issues like governance to intensify or prolong it.

Conteh-Mogan (1994) demonstrates that in countries where the interests of the particular groups (namely military) are threatened, violent response often follows. He argues that if improved civil and political rights are not accompanied by social and economic improvements, the military will tend to intervene. He shows that externally imposed structural adjustment policies are likely to run counter to the democratic impulse of society, because they are seen as a source of economic hardship. Therefore, he argues, the West is "tacitly" creating conditions for military intervention in African democracies by insisting on economic conditionality without providing resources to prop up the democratization process.

A question arises whether conflict is caused by or itself causes state collapse. Zartman (1995) and Baker and Weller (1998) hold, perhaps counter-intuitively, that violence is the result of collapse. Zartman explains this more fully, "poor performances of the state's functions are broad causes of state collapse". He

makes the point that states tyranny and state incapacity are two sides of the same coin, for both ultimately destroy the legitimacy and infrastructure of the state. As the inevitable power vacuum transpires, violence ensues, and vice-versa.

Like Zartman, Khadiagala (1995) focuses on state institutions as the central element in the state collapse. In an examination of reconstruction in Uganda, he focuses upon the return of the state to the center of the political and social stage. Although many points to the overextension of the state as the root of the collapse of Amin regime, he argues that it was the militarization of politics which resulted in the erosion of the state's purpose and causes its ultimately disintegration.

Anderson (1999) offers one of the most original examinations of the consequences of violent conflict. Rather than simply focusing on the tragedy of war, she looks at winners and losers. "Warlords", for example enjoy economic gains from control of resources, which are the basis of their patronage networks, and will thus seek to prolong the war. Reno (1998) shares this analysis, but also strongly argues that collapsed state are an important component of the global economic system, as warlords, freed from the constraints of statehood, run their territories like a very bloody business. Influenced by world systems theory, he argues that these collapsed state are in symbiotic from uncontrolled and monopolistic access to natural resources such as oil and gems.

Francis (1995) too demonstrates that the impacts of war or conflict are not evenly spread throughout a society. Her study of the cost of war is as original as it is startling. Burundi has fought most of its conflicts in its soil and thus represents an excellent case study of the costs of war to a victor that in large part escaped horrific suffering. She analyzed the direct and indirect costs to Burundi, including corruption, an inflated military, a disgruntled public, an undermined economy, and cuts to education and health services.

Two studies by Gersony (1998, 1999) commissioned by the US Department document the nature, pattern and extent of violence that compelled widespread refugee flows in Burundi during the 1980s. While out of date, these papers are excellent examples of field research into the causes and patterns of flight. The accounts of atrocities committed by rebels are particularly disturbing; the parallels between its tactics and those of government troops are a startling reminder that patterns of extreme violence are not unique aberrations, but often bear striking similarities to each other.

Another aspect that particularly stands out from these reports is how loath people are to leave their homes; one of the most shocking disclosures was how much people endured before their escape. This should be highlighted to counter perceptions that refugees seek handouts even when they are not truly in danger. It is clear that these refugees and IDPs took to flight only as an extreme and desperate last measure. Those seeking more contemporary accounts of patterns of human rights abuses may wish to consult the websites of Amnesty International ([www.amnesty.org](http://www.amnesty.org)) or Human Rights ([www.hrw.org](http://www.hrw.org)); both organizations produce excellent, timely reports on human rights around the world.

Nordstrom (1995) explores not only how violence deconstructs societies, but also how those caught in its grip employ tremendous creativity to survive against all odds. She writes:

*"For the vast majority of Burundians, war is about existing in a world suddenly divested of lights. It is about a type of violence that spills out across the country and into the daily lives of people to undermine the world, as they know it. A violence that, in severing people from their traditions and their futures severs them from their lives. It hits at the heart of perception and existence. And that is, of course, the goal of terror warfare: to cripple political will by attempting to cripple all will, all sense".*

Nordstrom (1995) perceived that to understand the process of dehumanization, one must see what it means to be human within a particular cultural context. In Burundi, this is grounded in family and community life, parameters that disintegrated as the war progress. She recognizes that African cultures – and many anthropologists – do not make sharp distinctions between self and the society; in this context, the destruction of the community in Burundi is accompanied by psychological chaos. This is countered by tremendous creativity in survival strategies. She documents several examples of Burundians re-ordering the world through the creation of new symbols, society and culture. Those interested in psychological assistance in post-conflict societies may wish to consult this article for its discussion of the ways in which traditional healers developed rituals to “take the violence out of people” and reintegrate them into society.

*“The war in Burundi... is a war on the woman. Any woman between the ages of 16 and 40 is not safe from being forcibly removed to the army camps to be raped and violated. If her husband finds out, he kills her for the shame of it all; if they know that he has found out, they kill him too; if he goes into hiding instead and she won't tell where he is, they kill her too”.*

**-Burundi woman quoted by Martin (1992), cited by Dirasse (1999).**

This harrowing account illuminates all too clearly the trauma of women in conflict. Through many still assume that the primary victims of conflict are combatants, in Africa this is not at all the case. Women and children account for up to 80% of Africa's displaced people and represent the most vulnerable populations in times of crises (Dirasse, 1999).

Dirasse (1999) further explains that stresses placed on women are immense and encompass not only war-related physical and sexual violence, but also increasing levels of domestic abuse, which result from the breakdown of traditional community and family life and the ensuing erosion of cultural

mechanisms that protect and support women. Their weak status also makes them vulnerable to shortages of food and medicines; meanwhile, the burdens on women increase as they shoulder the responsibility of safeguarding the well being of children while being forced to cope with the new demands of daily life in a crisis situation.

The Carengie Commission (1997) argues that the plight of women is of crucial importance not only because of their victimization in war, but also because in so many societies and post-conflict countries they are truly the backbone of community resilience. The Commission also discussed the effects of war upon children, showing how they suffer not only from the direct trauma of war, but also from tremendous opportunity costs stemming from interrupted education and so forth. Francis (1995) reinforces this latter point, arguing that among the economic consequences of Burundi, civil war was "the beginning of the decline of this education miracle".

As Rubin (1998) notes, that it is estimated that as many as 80% of the FDD and FNL terrorizing Burundi is made up of abducted children. Under such circumstances the lines between victims and victimizers become blurred, the ferocity displayed by half-grown killers lay bare the intense traumatization of society and the immense psychological wounding that takes place.

Abramson's (1998) documentary provides a portrait of Burundi that is hopeful and intensely disturbing. Aimed at a broad, popular audience, it sheds little light on the conflict itself. However, its interviews with former child soldiers and healer at a rehabilitation center reveals the suffering of children abducted by FDD and FNL, and forced into sexual slavery and/or appealing acts of violence, and shows the center's efforts to rescue and reintegrate them into society that has come to fear them.

Kritz (2001: 23) state that the security situation in the parts of Burundi remained volatile and report of armed robberies and attacks have increased in frequency.

Approximately 20000 residents have been displaced into the hills further east of the city as a result of fighting between the government of Burundi soldiers and the rebels. The civilian community has been victims of the conflict as they are the ones who suffer because of the insecurity in Burundi caused by the volatile situation of the conflict. The scarcity of food has caused people to resort into crime so that they could provide for themselves and their families.

Martin (1992) blames the high rate of arms proliferation and thus eligibility of armaments to the civilians and outsiders in Burundi who commits crime that is uncontrollable. He states that these weapons ended up on wrong hands and are used to commit crimes around Burundi because of the state of security ineligibility to counteract against lawbreakers, caused by the armed conflict.

Brogan (1994:3) blames the "Germans and Belgian's ignorance in not looking at the roots and culture of Burundian people (Hutus and Tutsi's) when giving them independence after post-colonialism as the cause for Burundi civil and ethnic conflicts, and the power-dominance as the other cause of its conflict?"

Stanvenhagen (1996:26) noted that "conflicts are caused by disputes over resources-sharing, arising from gross disparities in wealth among different group within the same country and the consequent struggles for reform of the economic systems to ensure equitable distribution of economic power."

Shelton (1997) further states that "Africa has been affected by a complex array of problems that have not been remedied for the last decades because of colonialism, socio-political problems that have evolved in the post-colonial war and ethnic differences or hatred."

Batchelor and Kingman (2000) stated that "violent conflicts in Africa have over the decades been pervasive, intense and protected, and has its origins related to race, land, labor and political rights that predominantly occurred as a result of

European conquest and colonial domination over Hutu and Tutsi's. When Belgium prepared Burundi for independence the minority Tutsis had been preferred over the majority Hutus. Subsequently conflict ensued between Hutus and Tutsis after Burundian independence. This war has been master-turned by the colonialists and has impacted negatively on the socio-economy of Burundi and protracted an ethnic tension between Hutus and Tutsis (Africa South of Sahara: 2002).

Lamarchard (2002) noted that "behind the murders of political opponents, the systematic cleansing of urban and rural districts, the armed attacks on refugees and internally displaced people, and the ambushes of civilians, lies the conviction held by both Hutus and Tutsis that unless the other's crimes are retaliated against the retribution, planned annihilation will inevitably follow."

Miall (2002) states that "in the context of "divide and rule", the colonial administration injected and imposed a caricatured, racist vision of Burundian society, accompanied by prejudices and clichés relating to morphological considerations designed to set the different components of Burundian population against one another on the basis of physical characteristics and character traits. It also introduced an identity card, which indicated ethnic origin, thus reinforcing ethnic awareness to the detriment of national awareness. This also enabled the colonizer to accord specific treatment to each ethnic group in accordance with its theories, thus manipulating the existing system to its advantage by resorting to discriminatory practices".

"On the eve of independence the colonizer, sensing that its power is threatened, intensified divisionist tactics and orchestrated socio-political struggles which lead to ethnic conflict and massive and deliberate killings, widespread violence and exclusions" ([www.Usip.Org/library/ pa /burundi / pa-burundi-08282000-prl. Html](http://www.Usip.Org/library/pa/burundi/pa-burundi-08282000-prl.html)).

### **1.6.2. Theoretical Perspective**

The main objective of theoretical perspective is to explain how the research topic is linked to the theory. A theory is regarded as a systematically related set of statements including some law-like generalizations that are empirically testable. It is possible to perceive a number of common characteristics of a theory, viz; abstractness, logic, propositions, explanations, relationships, and acceptance by the scientific community. It is important to base a study on a particular theory (Maaga, 1997).

Furthermore, the primary function of this part is to attempt to explain or to account for particular phenomena, which is viewed as an explanatory. It is this explanatory function, which distinguishes a theory from related but non-explanatory concept such as descriptive, typology and models.

The main theoretical concepts used in my research are derived from the general theory of conflict but also from intra-theories encompassed in it, such as structural and psycho-cultural theories. At the macro-level, the modernization theory analyzing the economic and social structures that shape the incentives of the society are used, and at the micro-level the political agent theory addresses the preferences and interaction among the political agents.

Scholars of conflict theory have written extensively about the sources of conflict, but have usually, according to their respective discipline merely looked at and emphasized only one specific source as the real explanation of the cause of conflict while sometimes undermining or diminishing the importance of others.

Therefore, in order to develop my argument, originally based on the previous general concept and to provide for the reader a precise conceptual roadmap for my analysis of the Burundian case theoretical clarification is required. An attempt will be made to develop an argument through an in depth exposition of two major

**infra-theories, namely structural conflict theory and psycho-cultural or socio-psychological conflict theory, which are direct off-shoots of protracted social conflict theory.**

**Limiting the argument to these theories does not imply the application of a reductionism approach; on the contrary these theories encompass different issues related to the emergence and evolution of protracted ethnic conflict, which allows for greater understanding of the issues in question and have an impact on the socio-economic development of the state (Haque: 1999).**

Part of my whole argument is that different factors are responsible for the emergence and development of protracted socio conflict, Burundi in particular. These factors (i.e. economic, political, institutional, cultural, geographic, demographic, psychological, military, colonial, etc) can be broken down into two main categories, despite the eclecticism of the terminology found in the literature, as structural (objective conflict) and psycho-cultural (subjective conflict) (Brown, 1993: 3-27).

#### **1.6.2.1. Structural Theory**

Structural conflict is essentially defined as an outcome of incompatible interests based on the competition for scarce resources; it is objective because it is defined as largely independent of the perceptions of the participants and emanates from power structures and institutions (Woodhouse, 1996: 137).

It emphasizes that in order for conflict to manifest itself, 'proximate' factor will have to operate as triggers. The proximate causes of conflict are those factors that transform potentially violent situations into deadly conflicts. This theory further facilitated the configuration of the otherwise coherent Burundi society into racial and ethnic groups. It therefore informs the stages that led to the massacres

process, as espoused by American human rights scholar, Dr Gregory Stanton, namely, Classification, Symbolization and Dehumanization, respectively.

Practically this theory is made evident when the Tutsi perceived the Hutu intellectuals masterminded the rebellion that fuelled ethnic tension in 1972. The Hutu intellectuals were thus perceived as a threat to the Tutsi ethnic dominance. Lemarcheand (1994: 302) notes that the Tutsi administration responded by staging brutal attacks on "every single Hutu with more than primary school education".

Kenny (2002) further lamented on the killings of Hutu intellectuals by noting the that "Tutsi death squads went into high schools, picked out all Hutu pupils, made them kneel down and then smashed their skulls with sledgehammers. Thousands of Hutu intellectuals fled the country and many found refuge in the neighboring Rwanda that was ruled by the Hutus.

#### **1.6.2.2. Psycho-cultural Theory**

The psycho-cultural perception conflict theory is about how people internalize things through emphasis of the role of culturally shared and deep 'we-they' (us and them) oppositions. This leads to the conceptualization of enemies and allies, although to a great extent these oppositions between the Hutu and Tutsi were not culturally shared.

Burundi's protracted social conflict was facilitated, animated and driven by the "constructed" Hutu identity because of the alleged underlying fear of extinction. Memories of past Hutu persecution were reconstructed so that the Hutu "ethnic" group was seen as vulnerable. FNL, FDD-ABASA propaganda expressed this 'fear of extinction', the 'fear of dying off,' the 'fear of the future,'- fears of which seemed to underlie the threat of a loss of Hutu identity. This threat, real or imagined, emanated from purported history of humiliation, oppression, victimization, feeling of inferiority, persecution and other kind of discrimination.

The polarization that resulted provided the political capital for the post-independence leadership that always thrived on underscoring the perceived differences of constructed ethnicity illustrated by the following:

- Kayibanda (1959), "Two nations in a single state – two nations between whom there is no intercourse and no sympathy, who are as ignorant of each other's habits, thoughts and feelings as if they were dwellers of different zone, or inhabitants of different planets.
  
- Habyarimana (1991), " The unity of ethnic group is not possible without the unity of the majority. Just as we note that no Tutsi recognizes regional belonging, it is imperative the majority forge unity, so that they are able to wade off any attempt to return them into slavery.

The first stage, classification can be described as the cultural and racial distinction between the three social categories of Burundi so that we have the Tutsi Caucasians, the Hutu Bantu Negroides and the Twa pigmoids.

The second stage symbolization, affirms the classification by attributing symbolic characteristics that could be physical or otherwise. For instance, the size and shape of the nose became symbolic and the very names that were used to describe a group were through stereotypes and clichés. As cited by one Belgian doctor, Sasserath (1948), the Tutsi's are 1.90 or 1.80 meters tall, they are slim and have straight noses, high foreheads and thin lips. They seem distant, reserved, polite and refined. The Hutu are a different people "possessing all characteristics of Negro: flat noses, thick lips, low foreheads, brachycephalic skulls. They are like children, shy and lazy and usually dirty.

The third stage, dehumanization is about denial of the humanity of others. It started with the Twa, who, according to Dr Sasserath, were a small minority of pygmies hunting and foraging in forests and were regarded as inferior to Hutu

and Tutsi. "The Twa keep themselves apart and are treated with contempt by the rest of the population.

On the other hand, psycho-cultural conflict theory defines conflict in terms of psychological and cultural forces that frames the beliefs about the self, others and behavior. Psycho-cultural or perceptual or subjective explanation of protracted social conflict does not exclude other explanation, however it may be argued that ethnic conflict as seen in Burundi can only be understood, and ultimately resolved, by addressing psychological elements. As Horowitz (1995: 181-182) maintains the sources of ethnic conflict are not to be found solely in the psychology of juxtaposition, but they cannot be understood without a psychology, an explanation that takes account of emotional concomitants of group traits and interactions.

### **1.6.2.3. Modernization Theory**

In discussing the influence of conflict on the socio-economic development of a state or country, with relevance to Burundi, a modernization theory has been frequently used, although it is rarely mentioned today in the political science field. The basic assumption of the modernization theory is that developing countries are on the way towards an ideal-type developmentalist model. Max Weber argued that cultural values, beliefs and interests distinguish two types of human beings, traditional and modern, with latter amenable to change and confident on the ability to bring the change around.

According to Williams (1994) the development of all societies lies in five stages, which develops consecutively: (i) the traditional society, developed with limited production functions; (ii) the preconditions for the take-off, embracing societies in a transition process; (iii) the take-off, where growth becomes the normal condition in a society; (iv) the drive to maturity, when modern technology expands over the whole front of the economy, social and political activities; and



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finally (v) the age of high mass-consumption, in which a large number of persons gain command over consumption, transcending basic food, shelter and clothing.

In this the Burundians started as a traditional society which relied on indigenous life, like farming. After colonization and influence from outside they started to change from traditional to modern life and practiced commercial farming. Their social structured life ruled by traditional leaders was transformed from the monarchial rule to political leadership, which has been dominated by military dictatorship.

Burundi's economic performance over the period 1960 – 2000 has been catastrophic. The usual economic factors determining growth are endogenous to political objectives, suggesting that politics and conflict explains the dismal performance. Economic development has been shaped by the occurrence of violent conflict caused by factions fighting for the control of the state and its rents. In this regard performance and development of socio-economic performance will not improve unless the political system is modernized from a dictatorial regime playing a zero-sum game to a more democratic and accountable regime.

### **1.7. Hypothesis**

The current armed conflict has an influence and the socio-economic development of Burundi.

The Burundi armed conflict affects its neighboring states and the African Continent at large in terms of social and economic development in relation to creating refugees.

Various measures are taken by African Union, previously known as organization of African Union (OAU) to alleviate the conflict situation in Burundi, such as the deployment of South African National Defense Force (SANDF) as a preventive or

peacekeeping force and appointment of the late Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere, followed by former South African President Nelson Mandela and then present Deputy President of South Africa Jacob Zuma.

The African Union is highly involved in the Burundi conflict by funding the peace process, hosting the donor conference to raise funds, involvement of United Nations to avail funds and assisting in the process, whereby young Burundians are to be trained in Washington and other European countries on how to manage a transformation of economy from agricultural economy to modern economy and from war-torn dictated government to social democratic ruled country.

Various problems are encountered by all conflict resolution stakeholders, like the mounting of security during peace process, assembling of all parties on the negotiations table and the protests against the deployment of peace security force.

#### **1.8. Significance of the study**

The study provides information and knowledge to Peace Studies and International Relations disciplines concerning the current situation of armed conflict in Burundi and its impact on the socio-economic development of the country, and the role-played by all stakeholders (Regionally and Internationally) in resolving the Burundian conflict. Other disciplines like political studies and History will also benefit from the study.

This study will also be beneficial to researchers and policy-makers in Africa and other stakeholders by providing them with data concerning the problems and achievements encountered during the Burundian armed conflict and its impact on the socio-economic development of the country.

## **1.9. Methodology**

This was a survey of regional and international organization's involvement in the conflict situations in Africa, with special reference to Burundi and how conflicts impact on the socio-economic development of Africa, with relation to Burundi. Both qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection were used to have a comprehensive understanding of the problem. The study is mostly qualitatively based on interviews and examination of secondary data relevant to the study problem, these include documents, literature as well as internal documents related to conflict and its impact on the socio-economic development in Burundi.

## **1.10. Subjects**

Key persons involved in the conflict situation in Burundi such as:

The south African foreign affairs officials, Non-governmental organizations, United Nations Officials based in Pretoria, South African National Defense force soldiers deployed in Burundi, etc. These people had an understanding of the issues pertaining to the conflict in Burundi.

A random sample of 20 people from Burundi living in South Africa who has knowledge of the situation in Burundi to get their views on the conflict and the social and economic state of the country.

## **1.11. Methods of Data Collection**

The examination of secondary data related to the Burundi conflict situation. Semi-structured interviews with key persons stated above will be used to acquire information on Burundi conflict and its impact on the socio-economic development.

A questionnaire with both open and close-minded questions will be used to collect information from randomly selected foreign affairs personnel and Embassy personnel. Open-ended questions will be used to collect information about opinion, attitudes and suggestions about the conflict and the socio-economic situation in Burundi while close-ended questions allow respondents to answer in short (yes/no or true/false).

#### **1.12. Ethnic Consideration**

- The researcher ensured the confidentiality of information from respondents.
- Participation of the respondents in the study was voluntarily.
- Respondents were informed that participation was voluntarily.

#### **1.13. Procedure**

The researcher will ask for letters of authorization from the department of political studies and international relations addressed to the foreign affairs department ministry, embassy personnel and United Nations personnel to have access to sources of information and request necessary information from them.

The following will be asked in the letters:

- Confirmation of the appointment
- The kind of research to be conducted.
- The key persons to be conducted as sources of information.
- The duration of the research.

#### **1.14. Data Analysis**

Data analysis involves both qualitative and quantitative approaches. Content analysis was used to analyze qualitative data such as attitudes, opinions and feelings. Quantitative data such as demographic information were subjected to descriptive statistical analysis in order to describe the characteristics of the respondents.

#### **1.15. Organization of Research Findings**

CHAPTER 1 provides the background, aims and objectives, methodology and significance of the study. It is an introduction.

CHAPTER 2 provides the literature review of the historical background and the impact of the armed conflict on the socio-economic development in Burundi.

CHAPTER 3 provides the efforts made by African Union (AU) in resolving Burundi conflict.

CHAPTER 4 provides the research findings and the interpretation of data.

CHAPTER 5 provides the summary, conclusions and recommendations.

## CHAPTER TWO

### 2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND EFFECTS OF THE ARMED CONFLICT IN BURUNDI

This chapter seeks to provide the historical background of Burundi and how did the conflict came about. It provides an in-depth analysis of what influenced the Burundi people to rise against each other and the effects that were caused by the conflict. The relevancy of this chapter to the research problem is that it provides an answer to what impact has the conflict done to the socio-economic development of Burundi, its people and Africa as a whole.

#### 2.1. History as a pretext

Burundi is a francophone landlocked country in the central part of Africa. Tanzania incepts it on the East and South, Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) on the West and Rwanda on the North. Culturally Burundi comprises 99% of the total popularity that dominates the country. They are divided into two sub-groups, the Hutu and Tutsi, with the Hutu making 85% of Burundi's total 6.6 million people, and the Tutsi minority, who represent 14% of the population and the Twas making 1% ([www.usip.org/pubs/wessn\\_22.html](http://www.usip.org/pubs/wessn_22.html)).

History is a source of conflict in Burundi. Every historical account of the conflict has political connotations as the interpretation of history often serves to legitimize violence as "retaliation" or "pro-active", while neighbors and family suddenly are draped in a lethal language of ethnicity. On a general level, two different historical narrations can be identified in the literature as well as in the interviews with concerned actors in today's conflict. One vision sets the start of the current conflict at the 1993 elections and the assassination of Burundi's first elected president Ndadaye. Most telling with this version is not its content, but its omissions. Among events left out are the decades of systematic marginalisation

of the majority of the population (mainly Hutu, but also including Tutsis), and the 1972 massacres of some 250,000 people (including much of the burgeoning Hutu elite). Not surprisingly then, these omissions are among the cornerstones of the second narrations of the Burundi story. Again a general pattern can be detected in which Hutus embrace the second story while the incumbent Tutsi elite fosters the first (Bayart: 1993).

Burundi's pre-colonial history bears no confidence of ethnic conflict between Hutu, Tutsi and Twas from the 16<sup>th</sup> century; Burundi has been under the leadership of rural kingdom. For example, the Ganwa identity that represent the royal family containing both Bahutu and Batutsi members. At that stage the ethnic rivalry between the two tribes was minimal, as they both perceived the kingdom as unifying factor (Weisman, 1998:34).

It would appear that the differences are more socio-political than "ethnic" or cultural. Prunier (1995) states that power struggles were expressed in different terms, for reasons other than "ethnocentrism" and against external enemies. When conflicts did take place, there were cultural traditions and mechanisms to bring the system back to normalcy, like the Kubandwa (native religion with Imana as the supreme God) and Bashingatahe (legitimized elders) courts.

Nicayenzi (1995) identified the following five institutional foundations of Burundian society, which helped to provide or create social cohesion: -

1. The Mwani (King) – source of life and unity for the nation, he was directly connected with Imana and awarded favours like cows, land, riches, etc evenly to all his subjects for serving as official intermediaries to Imana.
2. Imana – God Creator of all
3. Mupfumu and Kiranga – Intermediaries between Burundians and Imana.
4. Mushingatahe – guardian and protector of peace and justice for Burundians, selected by the local population for his wisdom.

5. Twiyungunganye – Common Faith and Destiny. Communal work, collective needs; responding to one Mwami on earth while honoring one Imana in the heavens.

With objectivity and impartiality out of sight, one way of starting an account of the Burundi conflict is with the death of King Ntare Rugamba around 1850. After the King's death the power dynamic in Burundi shifted from a centralized kingdom to take a more feudal-like appearance with strong princes, the Ganwas, ruling different parts of the country. With the sons of Rugamba seeking to manifest their power base, Burundi expanded into a political entity twice the size of their father's nuclear kingdom (Eggers: 1997).

However, in contrast to Rwanda, it seems as if the level of homogenization between ethnic and economic groups was quite high. The loyalty of the powerful Rwandan army gave the Rwandan chiefs a relative independence that was used to perpetuate and substantiate asymmetric relations. While not necessarily holding what would today pass as "legitimacy", the feudal element in Burundi provided an element of institutional competition which called on the Ganwas to be relatively more sensitive to the demands of the masses. Historical accounts suggest that the monarchical system of the Ganwas was frequently the target of joint rebellions of Hutu and Tutsi groups. However, the very existence in Burundi of the Ganwa class, being neither Hutu nor Tutsi and thus able to function as an arbitrator in the distribution of goods and justice between these groups, can be seen as an explanatory factor for differences in the history of conflicts between Burundi and Rwanda (1994).

On the eve of the colonial period, Burundi was fragmented into four rather distinct spheres of influence each with its own geographic area and under its respective Ganwa leadership. From the perspective of the current power struggle in Burundi the most interesting feature in the precolonial distribution of power is the marginalized position of the Bururi area inhabited by the Tutsi group known as the Hima. A dominating theme in the postcolonial power struggle is how this

group, through their control of the army, and hence the state, has turned its position as the “underdogs” of the precolonial system into a position from which it has controlled much of Burundi from independence until today.

Burundi was colonized first by Germany in 1899 and then ruled by Belgium under a League of Nations mandate, from 1916 to 1962, when Burundi gained its independence. Following a familiar pattern, the colonial powers introduced a package of burdens on the masses including compulsory labour, taxation, and obligatory crop cultivation. Illustrating the connection between demands from international markets, increased scarcity of natural resources and conflict in Burundi, the pressure derived from these demands made local people turn to the Ganwas for protection and aid (Reyntjens: 2001). This strengthened the Ganwas at the expense of lineage powers in the country and hence the centralization of power was increased. The centralization of power in the Ganwas provided the colonial rulers with a small number of political actors by which they could manipulate the country using their familiar divide and rule strategy.

The high level of centralization that characterizes today's Burundi was further entrenched by a series of administrative reforms. For example, from 1929 to 1945 the number of chefferies (chiefdoms) was cut down from 133 to 35. During the same reform the colonials further entrenched marginalisation of Hutus in Burundi. Out of the 133 chiefs in 1929, there were 27 known Hutus; in 1945 there were none. Using the number of chiefs as an indication of power, the Tutsis slightly increased their positions during the reform. The winners of the colonial administrative reform were two Ganwa groups known as Batare and Bezi. Before the rise to power of the current Tutsi/Hima rulers, we would see the demise of these two groups (Reyntjens: 2001).

During the years prior to independence, the power struggle in Burundi indicated that colonialism would be replaced by a return to a sort of precolonial, monarchical system under the leadership of the Batare group and its leader prince Louis Rwagasore. In contrast to the precolonial period, the struggle was

no longer about the control of certain chiefdoms but about capturing the state apparatus that was becoming the nexus of power, wealth and security.

What is more, the power struggle had taken on political colours and Rwagasore had founded the political party UPRONA that managed to transcend existing divisions in society and gained wide political support. (UPRONA won 58 of the 64 seats in the 1961 legislative elections, which was part of the political reform process prior to independence). For various reasons the Belgians and the UN through their weight behind UPRONA'S main opponents, the Bezi's party PDC (Parti Democrate Chretien). However, from a regional perspective, it is interesting to note that Rwagasore was widely associated with the agenda of Patrice Lubumba in what was becoming Zaire. As a historical presidency of today's strong connections to Tanzania, it is also interesting to note that discussions on far-reaching political integration was undertaken between Rwagasore and Julius Nyerere (Agence France Press: 1998).

The assassination of Rwagasore in 1961 seriously undermined the viability of the monarchical system in Burundi, given a symbolic position at independence, the system played a stabilizing role during the first years of independence. But it could not contain nor channel the increasing discontent amongst the Hutu population (Chretien, 1996: 206-210). The discontent was instead manifested in the 1965 coup in which a group of Hutu military officers made an attempt to obtain the state powers. The coup was mainly directed at the monarchs. And was successful in that it eroded whatever power was left for the monarchs. Contrary to the expectations of the coup leaders, however, the coup did not lead to Hutu rule but was in fact used as a political pretext to accelerate the system of Tutsi domination.

In the eyes of many Burundian Tutsis, the 1965 coup attempt was an early warning that the bloody events in Rwanda 1959 and the subsequent accession to power by the Hutus was now about to be repeated in Burundi. This association between Rwanda and Burundi formed a significant part of the legitimization of the

subsequent bid for power by Tutsi/Hima factions in the army. Much like today, the events during the decisive years of the late 1950s and early 1960s illustrate that the Great Lake regions share a conflict psychology in which the collective construction of events and others constituted "legitimate" reasons to retaliate on what more objective assessment probably would discount as the acts of a small extremist elite. From the debacle of the first years of independence and the 1965 coup rose a new president, Michel Micombero. Interestingly, he can be characterized by reference to a set of characteristics that are representative of three Burundian presidents up to the 1993 elections: Michel Micombero (president from 1965-1976), Jean Bagaza (1976-1987), and Pierre Buyoya (1987-1993) were all trained army officers of Hima descent, i.e. being a Tutsi group from Bururi province (Human Rights Watch, 1999-2000: 807).

With the inauguration of Micombero, Burundi embarked on its post-colonial, self-reinforcing cycle of structural and direct violence. The cycle was fed by a complex of structural and political factors around the nexus of ethnic and geographic stratification and control with different social groups trying to obtain some degree of livelihood under increasing structural constraints. The dramatic events of 1965 were followed by new and violent uprisings in 1969, 1972, 1988 and 1993. During the particularly savage violence in 1972, Micombero received support from common enemy: the Mulelists. In the 1972 events, an estimated 250 000 people were killed including most of the educated Hutus. Another 150 000 Burundians fled the country in terror, seeking refuge in neighbouring Tanzania where the vast majority remain to this day. The 1972 events unleashed a cycle of violence, which has continued until the present time. During these cycles, periods of relative calm and security have been replaced by periods of killings and disorder.

Both the second and Third Republics that followed Micombero's First Republic were inaugurated by bloodless coups. Both Republics offered a new set of political rhetoric and, to some extent, institutional reform. The call for "National Unity" under Bagaza's turn at the presidency turned out to be little more than a

rhetorical disguise for continued marginalisation perpetuated in his educational reform, secularization of society and state, and half-baked "villagization" programme introduced in 1986 contributed to feeding the rhetoric and hopes of reform but not the people. The political reforms undertaken by Buyoya increased the diversification of power, including the installation of a Hutu as Prime Minister. However, it was not until Buyoya was convinced by international and domestic actors to put democracy to the test that Burundi arrived at its biggest postcolonial window of opportunity (Herise: 2000).

Following the adoption of a new constitution and introduction of a multiparty system. Melchior Ndadaye emerged as the winner of the June 1993 first democratic presidential election since independence, Buyoya's eventual handover of power increased hope for long-term stability and broader political participation, and Burundi was hailed internationally as a symbol of peaceful democratic transition in Africa.

This fledgling hope was, however, abruptly shattered when president Ndadaye was assassinated on October 21<sup>st</sup> 1993, only four months after gaining power. The assassination unleashed yet again years of accumulated fear, resentment and rage. Massacres carried out in retribution for the killing of the president led to reprisal undertaken by the army to regain control of the countryside. Tens of thousands of people were killed and hundreds of thousands of thousands of others fled their homes and country, mainly into Tanzania and former Zaire. Those lucky enough to escape with their lives lost nearly everything else, including their homes, their land, their livestock and their future. The events of 1993 spurred a cycle of violence with a total toll until today some 300 000 lives, 600 000 to 800 000 regional refugees, and 280 000 to 380 000 IDP (Beuls: 2000).

After the assassination, Burundi was ruled by a succession of weak and divided administrations and unrest continued. In March 1996, the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights went as far as to refer to the ongoing civil war

embroiling Burundi as “genocide by attrition”. Just four months later, Major Buyoya returned to power through a bloodless coup, which was widely condemned by neighboring countries and the international community. Under the auspices of the UN, economic sanctions were imposed and remained until January 1999. Under the leadership of the former Tanzanian President in Arusha, nineteen Burundian political parties signed a peace agreement on August 28<sup>th</sup> 2000, in the presence of United States President, Bill Clinton, and many regional Heads of States. Signed under intense pressure from the facilitator, former South African President, Nelson Mandela, and from regional leaders, the agreement did not include a cease-fire agreement (protocol III), although it did establish three protocols (I, II, IV), which establish a clear programme, including the creation of a transitional government, national assembly and senate, tasked with advancing the cause of reconciliation, democracy and reconstruction (<http://www.ai.org.za-online> N. Nkosi: 2000).

## **2.2. Summing up Burundi's political history**

Burundi's political history can be depicted as a series of provocations and reactions where opposing groups take turn in identifying the others as the primus motor in an endless historical regression to justify the next wave of violence. The most significant features of this deplorable dynamic are:

- The erosion of the pre-colonial monarchical system.
  
- Colonial rules fails to create a functioning state but succeeded in entrenching imagined ethnic identities: In the context of a strategy of divide and rule the colonial powers introduced and supported economic structures and a culture of ethnic categories that in fact have shallow sociologic and historic foundations but provided a “tool kit” instrument to

putting up different components of Burundi's population against one another.

- The centralization of patronage resources in the state apparatus making the state the main instrument of group domination and an arena for competition between segments of the dominant group, but never anything that could be described as a legal-rational institution.
  
- The centralization of the state apparatus with all tax revenues being deported to Bujumbura and all public officials appointed from the capital.
  
- The failure to install majority rule with security guarantees for the Tutsi elite who use the national army for its protection.
  
- The systematic, violent and bloody system of minority rule by different constellations of elite networks centered around the Tutsi minority in general and the Hima from Bururi in particular, making geography the second most salient line of political mobilization after ethnicity.

**Table2.1: Succession of governance in Burundi**

1. King Mwambutsa IV, 1915 – 1966	Several Prime-ministers succeeded each other, 1962-1966, two were assassinated
2. King Ntare, 1996	Palace revolution, July 1966
3. Gen Michel Micomber, 1966-1976	Military takeover, Nov 1966
4. Lt Gen Jean Baptiste Bagaza, 1976 – 1984	Military power struggle
5. Pres Jean Baptiste Bagaza, 1984 – 1987	Single party system introduced in 1981
6. Pres (Major) Pierre Buyoya, 1987 – 1993	Military takeover
7. Pres Melchior Ndadaye, 1993	Multiparty restored, 1992. Ndadaye popularly elected, killed in coup, October 1993
8. Pres Cyprian Ntaryama, 1994	Killed in aircraft disaster, April 1994
9. Pres Sylvestre Ntibanyugany, 1994	Appointed April 1994, elected by NA, September 1994
10. Major Pierre Buyoya, 1996	Military takeover
<b>Source: Esterhuyzen (1998)</b>	

### **2.3. Themes in Burundi's conflict configuration**

The conflict configuration in Burundi is multidimensional and compounded by a number of different sources of conflict. Amalgamation of the following factors is the key to understanding the conflict complex: -

- Direct violence
- Structural violence
- Production of knowledge and identities
- Deficiencies in the rule of law and democratic governance

Each of these factors should be understood as process oriented and hence not as either cause or effect of the conflict. Each factor contributes to the conflict complex, and is at the same time part of the same complex in a way that challenges distinction between dependent and independent variables in conflict analysis. In addition, conflict analysis in Burundi is intricately interwoven into the regional conflict configuration of the Great Lake region.

The sources of the conflicts have a multi-country character and the consequences of the conflicts affect several countries. Consequently, the problems cannot be managed if the development in the different states does not pull in the same direction. Processes in a neighboring country could easily undermine a reform process or aid intervention, even if the intervention as such a given context is internally coherent. This points at the need to support and coordinate interventions in several countries at same time---as well as analyze what side effects interventions in one country have on the neighbors. The problem described, is in turn an expression of sources of conflicts and dynamic processes. A number of the sources of conflicts are, also sources of development, if managed properly.

## **2.4. Direct violence in Burundi**

### **2.4.1. Geographic variability**

Burundi is characterized by variations in the level of direct violence in different parts of the countries. Only on a few occasions during the decades of conflict pattern been homogenous throughout the country. Each stage of the conflict has been simultaneously pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict which makes awaiting a national cease-fire in Burundi a futile exercise. At any particular time, different geographical areas will be hit by violence while others are relatively peaceful.

The conflict in Burundi has shown a high degree of variation in the set-up of actors engaged in direct violence. Low level of institutionalization of actors, high costs of communication with geographically dispersed troops, and the accessibility of arms, has led to the repeated break-up of actors into sub-units taking on new names and leadership (Yeros: 1999).

In addition, the fractions show a surprisingly high level of flexibility in the patterns of alliances. The absence of clearly manifested goals facilitates a pragmatic approach in the constellation and change of actor alliances and networks and some groups seem to lack a coherent, long term goal or military strategy. As one commentator put it "Their goal is on their nose, so they can't see it". Instead fighting in itself has become a self-generating objective for groups typically consisting of a high proportion of child soldiers and young fighters brought and traumatized by war.

### **2.4.2. Militarisation of societies throughout the region**

The long drawn-out conflicts have brought about a general militarisation of all Burundi, both in terms of budget allocation, lifestyle and security situation. Interlinked to the militarisation of society is a staggering level of criminalisation of the every-day lives of millions of people which amount to a generally very high of insecurity.

The proliferation of armed groups of different character and extent is a major challenge both for conflict prevention, post-conflict rehabilitation and peace building. The term "rebel" group or "militia" refers to wide variety of groups, ranging from loose gangs of bandits, at times with a political objective, but not necessary so, to relatively well-organized groups. As is further elaborated in the section below, the armed groups in Burundi are linked to a cobweb of networks, with local, national, regional and international dimensions, often with formal and informal connections and illegal activities on all levels (Newbury: 2001).

In this context one should also point to elite rivalry on a regional level regarding hegemonic power. As will be evident from the section below, hegemonic efforts from elites Tanzania, Tanzania stand out via the support to FDD and the "Hutu-movement". In addition, Burundi is also affected by elites from Uganda and Rwanda as well as in DRC who try to further its positions. The efforts are often channeled through proxies on other countries' territories. This has contributed to the situation with multiplication of local warlords, often with weak social bases, but with protection from a government in another country. Patterns of alliance shift with a speed and flexibility that sometimes defies an outsider's comprehension. In the process, spreading of rumours, disinformation, stereotyping, and manipulation of identities all contribute to aggravating an already difficult situation.

## **2.5. Main actors in Burundi's conflict configuration**

FNL, the oldest of the Hutu-oriented rebel groups and currently under the leadership of Agathon Rwaswa, is linked up to and gains support from Hutu oriented groups based in DRC, i.e. Interahamwe, Ex-Far, and Mayi-Mayi. The low level of institutionalization of FNL and the DRC based groups calls into question any coordination between the groups.

Nevertheless FNL are said to consist of 3-4000 men under arms. The support from DRC allegedly consists mainly of supplies of food and arms, temporary

shelter from the fighting in Burundi. There also seems to be a political/ideological link between FNL and Hutu-based groups in DRC that prompts the idea of an increased Hutu power in the region. Unconfirmed sources would claim that, together, these groups nurture a dream of a "Hutu-land" located somewhere in the borderland of Rwanda, Burundi and DRC. The actual viability of an alliance formed around a common dreams, is questionable due to the low level of institutionalization of these groups (Lemarchand: 1990).

FDD under Peter Nkurunziza is the largest Hutu based group in Burundi with 10-20,000 men under arms. The main support base is in Tanzania. Evidently, the support comes from refugee camps in Tanzania and consists of supplies of military equipment, funds, food, and personnel. FDD, as well as FNL, obtain much of their material base through looting and informal taxation of the local population. FDD is said to have at least a core of very well organized fighters that are structured on the pattern of the Burundi National Army.

Several Independent sources point to individual members of the Tanzanian government, most notably the Minister of Foreign Affairs, offering political and strategic support to FDD. The motive for this support is not clear but personal profit through the exploitation of patron-client relation is likely candidate. It is not clear what degree the Tanzanian adventure in Burundi has the blessing of President Mpaka, but it is frequently argued that Tanzania has the ambition to strengthen its political and economic position in the region, and that it does not look kindly upon the increased role played in the peace process by South Africa. In this context it should be borne in mind that there is a long history of close political interaction between Burundi and Tanzania. During the early 1960's the issue of a political union between the countries was on the table in top-level discussions. Through much of the post-colonial period Tanzania has been known to side with the Hutu majority in Burundi. This has been as an expression of Tanzania's socialist tradition and support of marginalized groups. In this tradition, support to FDD or similar Hutu groups could be seen as an extension of the liberation movement in Africa (Lemarchand: 1994).

FDD troops use DRC for remobilization. Although the reports are more scant than in the case of FNL, it seems evident that FDD receives support from other "Hutu" movements in DRC including Mayi-Mayi, Interhamwe, and Ex-Far. The connection between Hutu-based groups in Burundi and DRC creates a direct link between DRC's peace process and the relative power position of the alliances tied to the Burundi conflict configuration. The nature of this implication is, however, not clear (Mathews and Rubinoff: 1994).

Peace in eastern DRC could imply the cutting off of support and hence the weakening of FNL and FDD. However, if a peace settlement in DRC is not inclusive, excluded groups, most likely various Hutu groups, could try to join up with FNL and/or FDD and found an asylum in Burundi. Burundi and Rwandan Armed Forces, directly or via their proxies, have on several occasions joined forces in the fight against common enemy of Hutu based groups in the border areas of Burundi, DRC and Rwanda (Hintjens, 1999: 241-286)

AMIB (African Mission in Burundi) represents an international, military commitment in Burundi. The mission was agreed upon on February 3<sup>rd</sup> 2003 at the AU Heads of State and Government meeting in Addis Ababa. The mission comprising troops from Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Africa, with the mandate to monitor the transition to democracy and provide protection for politicians returning to the country from exile. Central to the mandate is assistance in the DDR process. Recently arrivals by Mozambican troops (Oct 19<sup>th</sup> 2003) have brought the mission to its full strength at 3,128 peacemakers.

Out of the AMIB troops, Ethiopia is contributing 1,297 soldiers, Mozambique 202 and the remainders are from South Africa. The mission represents the AU's first military engagement, and is executed in close cooperation with UN. Funding difficulties and logistics problem within the DDR process has beset deployment of the peacemakers. The United States has financed the deployment of Ethiopian contingent and Britain has paid for the Mozambicans. The Mozambican Ministry of Defense announced on October 15<sup>th</sup> that the government in Maputo would

spend at least US \$14 million to support its contingent over the next 12 months, with some of this money coming from donors such as Britain, France and United States. In December 2003, South Africa Deputy President and facilitator of the Burundi peace process, Jacob Zuma, called on the UN and the international community to increase its commitment and financial support to the peace process (Ndikumana, 2000: 431-459).

### **2.5.1. Child soldiers**

The horrendous situation for the future generation in Burundi is complicated by the culture of recruiting children to armed groups. These children become highly traumatized, often lack proper education and thus are highly destabilizing element in a post-conflict transformation process.

Burundian children, including adolescents, live in extremely precarious conditions. Recent reports provide evidence that urgent attention is needed. There are gaps in child specific information. Burundi's interim Poverty Reduction Strategic Plan states that proportion of the population living below threshold went from 35 percent in 1992 to 60percent in 2001. Burundi has faced food deficiencies and risk of drought in recent years. This has left over 50 percent of Burundi's children with chronic malnutrition levels (resulting in risk of death from malnutrition) of 24 percent (<http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/alldocs> - By UNID/d0794a771ea54ad885256bd600696).

Despite these difficult circumstances Burundian children are bombarded with violence and its consequences. Children have been forced to perpetrate and witness violence, been displaced from their homes, left as heads of households, infected with HIV/AIDS and become victims of sexual violence, including rape of young girls.

Many children and adolescents live in extreme poverty with little access to healthcare and education. They face abduction and forcible recruitment as soldiers. War, disease and HIV/AIDS have orphaned approximately 620 000

children in Burundi. According to UNAIDS almost 230 000 identified as having physical and mental handicaps, including speech impediments, physical trauma related to the war, mental illnesses, blindness and deafness (The Defence Bulletin: 2002).

Both the physical and psychological repercussions of violence and conflict on Burundian children warrant special attention. In a UNICEF survey of 2770 children in 1993, over 2500 reported witnessing acts of violence and 93 percent showed signs of troubled behaviour. While these children came from three particularly troubled provinces, the results demonstrate the severity of the psychological impact of conflict on Burundian children, including the manifestation of clinical symptoms of trauma.

### **2.5.2. Arms trade**

The almost unlimited access to weapons in the area is an important source and amplifier of conflicts. Control of the trade and distribution of arms is a prerequisite for stability in Burundi and the region. The difficulties in addressing the arms trade stems from the strong economic and political interest involved, and the fact that the trade is typically conducted in the nexus of (i) formal / (ii) legal economy. Add to that the global increase in availability of arms and the regional interconnectedness of distribution (Human Rights Watch: 2003).

Small arms, as opposed to conventional weapons, are easy and inexpensive to manufacture and transport, and several factories in the region produce weapons. As a consequence, their production is highly decentralized which adds to the problem of control. In addition, the recycling of weapons from different conflicts in the region has increased access to weapons. FDD's heritage of weapons from Zimbabwe's DRC adventure stands out as a tragic example.

### **2.5.3. Security sector reform**

The perhaps single most important issue in containment of direct and structural violence in Burundi and the Great Lakes region is a holistic and long-term commitment to a security sector reforms. On a technical level, the issue of security reform is much about how to integrate former rebels into national army and at the same time down size the army to make it reasonably large and diversified. The security sector reform was part of the negotiations in Arusha but sorts under Protocol III that was not signed. Nevertheless, the process of security sector reform is at the top of the political agenda.

However, the technical aspects of security sector reforms are at best the first step in a solution to the fundamental problem of security. In Burundi, control of the army has equaled not only control of the state, its resources and positions, but more importantly security against the perceived threat of extinction through genocide. Whereas many Tutsis today literally think that they will not live if they give up control of the army, many Hutus believe that they need to control the army or be killed by it. For the Hutus no sustainable solution to the security sector reform can be reached without sustainable reform of the army, but any attempt to reform the army without including a solution to the Tutsi's security situation is not likely to be successful (Bootha, Pinar and Wyn Jones, 1998: 131-157).

Moreover, the network of formal and informal military alliances between governments and rebels in the region calls for a regional approach to "domestic" security problems. For example; the willingness of the incumbent Tutsi elite to reform the army hinges on a comprehensive solution including the FNL and FDD whose strategic agendas, and mobilization patterns are highly regional.

### **2.6. Structural violence in Burundi**

A structural violence is at the center of conflicts in Burundi as in most of the societies in the Great Lake's area. This includes extreme and increasing poverty,

**exclusion or marginalization of the majority from economic, social, human and cultural rights, inequality in all respects, not the least of women, youths and children. This is a situation that creates widening frustration gaps both in the marginalized poor sections of the societies as among various elites.**

Since its inauguration on 1<sup>st</sup> November 2001, and the successful turnover of power on 1<sup>st</sup> May 2003, the National Transitional Government has made some progress. However, the combined deprecation of continued fighting and economic stagnation continues to sap morale and erode vital support for much of the population. Even in the case of a ceasefire leading to the end of direct violence in much of the country, the structural constraints for successful structural violence alleviation in Burundi are staggering. The economic growth during the SAP period (1986-92) was almost 4% per year, but this barely managed to topple the population growth. The SAP did not manage to set off structural reform in the agricultural or secondary sectors, and since 1993 the per capita GDP has halved while poverty incidence is reckoned to have doubled to 80% of the population (Barret: 1993).

Commercial agriculture accounts for less than 5% of the GDP but still agricultural export, mainly coffee and tea, generate 90% of the official export earnings. This creates a high vulnerability to fluctuation in international markets. Burundi's external debt is in the area of 200% of its annual GDP. Add to that the HIV/AIDS pandemic, the generation of children traumatized by war and deprived of their right to education (Agence France Press: 1998).

Finally and perhaps most worrying, given what we know about political mobilization under increasing structural strains, population density in the country is 240 per sq Km, but with 90% of the population living in rural areas and dependent on subsistence farming, the more relevant figure is that the density is close to 770 inhabitants per sq km in what is classified as arable land.

A high degree of structural violence in combination with incomplete nation building processes, lack of inclusive legitimate political processes, power sharing and institutions for the maintenance of a certain rule of law create a situation where structural violence turns to acute violence, both at macro and micro level. Structural violence hollows out cohesion in local communities, fuelling communal conflicts and within families resulting in domestic violence, splintered families and collapse of social structures and values. Making the vulnerable even more and frustrated, and potentially easier to mobilize by various elites (Evans: 1997).

### **2.6.1. Scarce resources and demographic stress**

This rapid growth of population density in Burundi as well as in different areas in the region (in particular in parts of Uganda, Rwanda, and East DRC) creates increased demands on land, water, firewood, economic resources and social services. FNL and FDD are known to recruit from social groups under stress, and if not managed properly, increased stress can become a breeding ground for widespread social frustration and mobilization to ragtag armies (Walt, 1991: 211-239).

### **2.6.2. Regional demographic fluidity**

With the porosity of its national borders in the Great Lakes region, conflicts create a high level of regional demographic fluidity. Burundi is the largest net contributor to the refugee in the Great Lakes Region. Adding to the magnitude of demographic fluidity are the vast numbers of IDPs in the country. Some of the people currently classified as refugees, know no other home than the refugee or IDP camps, which calls into question these categorizations (Waeber, Barry, Morten and Pierre: 1993).

A second methodological issue pertains to the elusive accuracy in the reports on refugees and IDPs. A report on the situation may present the odd combination of

very accurate numbers of IDPs and refugees subdivided along different social strata, while at the same time include caveats like "the IDP figures exclude a possible further 100 000 IDPs, and possibly more (UN OCHA July 31<sup>st</sup> 2002 pp 5-6). These "margins of error" reveal some of the problematics related to the demographic fluidity in the region (Waever et al: 1993).

Camps are often located in areas with a very low level of infrastructure. This adds to the general problem of the control of the inhabitants and the high level of militarization. IDPs and refugees are "hard currency" in the cynical market for attention and aid from the international donor community, which calls for the systematic inflation of the figures. These displaced populations often live in squalid conditions marked by a lack of personal security, fragile food security and an absence basic health and education services. Displaced populations tend to be at a greater risk of sexually transmitted infections, including HIV/AIDS.

The displaced populations typically constitute a security risk both for the receiving communities and the country of origin. The influx of large groups of people increases the strain on the local communities and their ability to provide for their own food security. Increases in demand for food, land, water, sanitation provides structural conditions conducive to political mobilization against the displaced groups, for example as genocidaires hiding for justice, further hampers the integration into the receiving communities (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson: 2004).

The presence of large uprooted populations outside their country of origin provides opportunities for armed groups to use refugee camps as shields against military attacks, to profit from humanitarian aid, and to recruit new members, if necessary by force. FDD use refugee camps in Tanzania, and to some extent in DRC, as safe havens to launch attacks into Burundi and as recruitment centres for new members. Burundi refugees in DRC are also known to have mingled with

**Ex-FAR and Interhamwe and their conflict with Rwanda (Doom, Ruddy and Gorus: 2003).**

Tanzania is by far the largest receiver of Burundi refugees, which has generated both incomes and conflicts over scarce resources and insecurity for the population in the areas where camps are located. In addition, the future of the refugee camps constitutes a concrete reason for Tanzania's involvement in the Burundi conflict.

Demobilization, repatriation and -above all - the reintegration of refugees and IDPs is a key question, both for reducing human suffering and stabilizing the security situation. At the same time this is a politically sensitive process. Among the issues that need to be addressed are: How shall returning refugees be integrated, in particular if there is a shortage of land? Have the possessions of the refugees been appropriated by another returning refugee or a former neighbour? How shall repatriation and reintegration be carried out without tilting a precarious political balance? How shall crimes and violence committed by various groups be reconciled? The National Commission on Refugees and IDPs (CNRS) is the institutional arrangement set out in the Arusha Agreement with the mandate to lead the reintegration of refugees and IDPs in Burundi. According to the Arusha Agreement, CNRS was to have an independent status in relation to the government. This independence has been called into question by a recent law passed in Parliament placing it under the supervision of the Ministry of Reconstruction (Colliers, 2001: 225-245).

### **2.6.3. Infrastructure**

Insufficient, deficient or destroyed infrastructure is a source of conflict; it creates a foundation for isolated rebel groups as it undermines the development of formal economies and integration in national and international economy as well as societies. Denying remote areas access to markets, social service, information

etc., provide a hotbed for rebel groups to mobilize frustrated marginalized populations. Economic and social development in urban/central areas but not in the periphery create uneven development and increasing frustration gaps in the periphery, as clearly illustrated by current tensions between Bujumbura and the rest of Burundi. In addition, it is costly and difficult to control areas with incomplete infrastructure (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002: 13-28).

#### **2.6.4. HIV/AIDS**

HIV/AIDS is reported as the most frequently cause of death in Burundi. In 2001, 40 000 people died from Aids, and with an average infection rate of 8.3 percent, the prognosis is bleak. Add to that the quarter of a million Aids-related orphans in Burundi and the horrors of the pandemic defy description. Many Burundians are known to subscribe to sexual habits conducive to the spread of the virus. In addition, the conflict in Burundi and the region increase the speed by which the virus spreads (Ndikumana, 2004: 325-340).

Among the processes by which the HIV/AIDS problematic is accentuated by the regional conflict dynamic are (i) social and demographic disruption increasing the general level of vulnerability and risk, and placing highly marginalized people, in particular women and children, in a position where security can only be obtained in exchange for sexual services; (ii) the use of rape as a weapon to inflict long term psychological traumas; (iii) men under arms trade their social military prestigious positions for high levels of sexual interactions and partners.

Among the projects set out to counter the pandemic are the World Bank programme Great Lakes Initiative on Aids, and the Society for women against Aids in Africa, stand out in their support for women.

A recent review commission by USAID and UNICEF, "HIV/AIDS and Conflict: Research in Rwanda, Burundi and Eastern-DRC, argues that the major problem

with the current approach of the international donor community is not the level of engagement but rather that their work is "slow and uncoordinated". The countries in the region are reported to have launched multisectorial national Aids strategies backed by international, national, and an impressive number of local initiatives and actors. The call is however made for an increase in the evaluation of efforts, coordination in programmes and funding, and transparency in the distribution of funds (Cetinoglu, Delchevalerie and Parque: 2004).

## **2.7. The construction of knowledge and identities**

The third, and to our minds, a very significant source of conflict is the cognitive process where the histories, identities and interpretations of today's situation is constructed. A key process is the systematic manipulation by elite's of uneducated and marginalized masses, selling off self-sustaining processes of the construction of identities built on fear and stereotypes of the other.

Perhaps the most complex knowledge construction in Burundi is "ethnicity" which of course is also a major source of mobilization and violence. The challenge is to understand the complexity, and ambiguous fluidity of identity as a social (re-) construction. A prime conflict generator in the region is the interpretations of historical atrocities by constructed collectives, legitimizing retaliation on individuals at best loosely connected to the actual event. Constructing history so that blame can be attributed to a certain group constitutes a "legitimate" cause for retribution (Collier, 2000: 225-245).

Reports about "reality" are never neutral. Whether or not it is the intention of the reporter to report on conflicts containing a message of who is to blame and what the "legitimate" response is. For example, a recurrent pattern in conflict reports is that the Hutu militia, which called on the response of the government's armed forces, started them. Such reports rationalize the intervention of the government by stating, "They started it". No mention is made of circumstances that would

place the actions of the so called Hutu militia in an historical context (Where were these "militia" men from? What is their rationalization for their action? What historical atrocities have they been subjected to?). The role of history as a conflict generator calls for information pluralism and processes of critical evaluation and conceptualization of "facts" (Bayart: 1993).

### **2.7.1. Regional conflict psychology**

The historical and cultural proximity between Burundi and the regional conflict configuration creates what we would call a "regional conflict psychology". This regional conflict psychology is fed by, and feeds, conflicts through the region. Events anywhere in the region are interpreted in light of this psychology and add to the narrations in which different groups are stigmatized or portrayed as martyrs. The region's cycle of violence has also served to legitimate violence through the establishment of a culture of impunity for politically sanctioned violence.

To give an example, the current level of ethnic violence in Burundi cannot be understood without factoring in the 1972 events in Burundi, which in turn must be seen in light of the psychological factors stemming from Rwanda in 1959. A more recent example is the interpretation of recent events in Ituri as a conflict between Hutu (Lendu) and Tutsi (Hima), which adds to the pattern of ethnic strife in Burundi and Rwanda. Similarly, FNL's recent shelling of Bujumbura stands as a reminder to the inhabitants of Kigali of what damage can be inflicted by a small group of "violent Hutus" (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000: 370-400).

### **2.7.2. Competing "reversed mirror" models for legitimate management of societies**

The state-based elites in Bujumbura and Kigali have chosen contradictory strategies to address the dilemma of ethnicity in their two countries. The relative

success of either regime has implications for the legitimacy of the other's strategy. This constitutes the basis for mutual interests between the two state-elites. If the Burundian strategy, with an explicit and very outspoken approach to ethnic differences and a system of ethnic quotations, proves relatively more successful, the Rwandan strategy, characterized by a "de-ethnification" of the society, will be called into question. The reverse is also true (Rankhumise, 2001: 26).

### **2.7.3. Reconciliation, rehabilitation and trauma**

The history of violence in Burundi has created generations of traumatized people; this presents one of the absolute biggest challenges in the reconciliation and rehabilitation of those deeply psychologically affected by the violence and social stress. The enormous numbers of severely traumatized people, not least women and children, is a source of immense suffering, but also a time bomb if not properly managed, which the situation in former Yugoslavia so clearly demonstrates. Unfortunately, the available capacity and expertise is far too low.

### **2.8. Deficient democracy, governance, and rule of law**

Burundi faces a situation of lack of democracy, good governance and a legitimate political order based on a "social contract" between the ruler and the ruled providing a foundation for citizenship. The structures, institutions, regulatory frameworks and the culture of democracy and good governance' are weak. A number of more or less elaborated democratic institutions existed in the traditional society, but most of these have been destroyed or hollowed out during the postcolonial period. Consequently there is a lack of arenas for voicing political dissent and a lack of culture, and national and local power sharing.

### **2.8.1. The logic of state power in Burundi**

The state in Burundi functions in agreement with the familiar pattern of patrons seeking to gain personal interests through exclusive relations with selective clients rather than seeking the good of the nation. The state-based patron-client relations comprise all spheres of life leaving little room for an independent private sector or civil society. As this pattern of exchange is epiphenomenal to a complex and historically entrenched system of political, economic and social life, any expectations for quick changes face very high odds. The extent to which reform is currently taking place in Burundi will mostly be in terms of changing the player, not the name of the game.

The institutional capacity within the government is exceptionally low following the long conflict period, and the economic free fall, experienced in the aftermath of falling coffee prices, the regional embargo, and the massive cutbacks in international aid. The fieldwork in Bujumbura confirmed the assessment by ICG that "The government lacks the information and analysis necessary for accurate planning, along with the staff capacity to actually monitor programmes or assess situations on the ground. In addition, once information is available and plans are developed, there is uncertainty as to who can effectively implement the programmes ([http://web.worldbank/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICA\\_EXT/BURUNDI...](http://web.worldbank/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICA_EXT/BURUNDI...)).

No quantitative figures exist on the level of corruption in Burundi. But different assessments seem to compete in finding the most derogatory, and hence most fitting, wording to describe this pandemic. In addition, a high level of centralization characterizes the administrative structure. All administrators are appointed by the central government. Taxes collected from the commune level are centralized in Bujumbura, and there are basically no institutionalized mechanisms for public accountability. This calls for a close partnership with the Burundian government as well as any other collaborating partner in Burundi.

Some bilateral donors, the UN and the IFIs, most notably within the fiscal, education, and health sectors, have undertaken capacity building. Nevertheless, the needs remain staggering (Brogan:1992).

### **2.8.2. Democratic**

The lack of a legitimate social contract and efficient political institutions makes the current process of democratization a veritable powder keg. According to democracy theory, democracy is the most efficient way to manage societal conflicts, both within and between countries. It provides framework for negotiations and brokering between different interest, solving disputes by peaceful means. However, it might be that this form of democracy theory is based on specific western experience (Copson and Raymond: 1994).

Having being hailed as a democratic success story, the 1993 experiences from Burundi of rapid introduction of a "multiparty system" now stands out as a deterring example of the risks of failed democratization processes. The lesson learnt is that it is more important to focus on the content than on the form. Elections too early in a democratization process might generate conflicts, in particular in a context with ethnicity as a dominating line of social stratification. Without proper institutions and establishment of a political culture, an early election might lead to continued polarization of ethnicity, openly or candidly, or territorial belonging and xenophobia.

The democratization process in Burundi is in a dilemma. In short, the dilemma is this: Elections in November 2004 are likely to offset a new wave of violence, while postponing them will undermine the legitimacy of the process out of the current conflict. The Arusha Agreement stipulates that democratic elections be held in November 2001. However, a very frequent assessment in Bujumbura is that this goal will be very difficult to achieve. Not withstanding practical constraints, such as the lack of a cease-fire, lack of an election law, the need to

update the electoral register, the need for infrastructure arrangements to conduct elections, the main objection towards the elections is the eminent risk that the election campaign will be turned into a rally on ethnic grounds which would most likely ignite a new wave of violence throughout the country (Adebayo: 1997).

However, considering the weight given to the elections in the Arusha Agreement, any attempt to postpone the election date risk setting off the current momentum for the Arusha process. Such attempts would most certainly be used by FNL (and possibly FDD) to boost its *raison d'être*. In the eyes of the international donor community, postponing the elections could be seen as a severe break with the Arusha process that certainly would not increase the likelihood of the reimbursements to Burundi (Shelton: 1997).

### **2.8.3. Inter- and Intra-elite rivalry for resources via the regional conflict**

The structural violence is fuelled by inter- and intra-elite struggle of the resources. The foci of the struggles take different shapes deluding on the type of resources that are available. In Burundi, with little available natural resources, the control over the state is in focus while in eastern DRC the struggle is more directly linked to control over various resources outside the state apparatus. This means that, in DRC, different actors could gain from keeping the state weak (in DRC) to be able to maintain their relative position. However, through the high degree of regional interconnection, it also means that elites in DRC may have an interest in keeping the struggles running in Burundi in order to bring out resources from DRC more easily (Terry: 2002).

### **2.8.4. Inter- and intra-elite rivalry for resources in Burundi**

Given the Arusha signatures the following question can be asked about Burundi: Does the co-habitation of UPRONA and FRODEBU in the current government imply a tendency towards a fusion between the parties' elites? The likelihood of

such a scenario would be increased by the fact that urbanized elites in Bujumbura - representing both Hutu and Tutsi - are increasingly subjected to a common enemy in the rural based guerrilla movements occupying the areas around the city. If this would be the case it could be seen as a sign of a new elite formation based on an urban class interests cutting across ethnic lines.

However intriguing, this scenarios did not find any support during the fieldwork in Bujumbura. On the contrary, ethnicity was the absolutely dominating filter through which actors interpreted the conflict. Nevertheless, the conflict in Burundi should not be seen as a struggle between Hutu and Tutsi. The above section "History as a pretext" stressed the different between Tutsi groups, and even now there is nothing like a joint Tutsi front in Burundi (Reyntjens: 2000).

Among the groups frequently mentioned are AC-Genocide, PA-Amasekania, Accord Cadre, former President Bagaza joins some "extreme" Tutsis under PARENA (Partie pour le Redressement National), and his successor Pierre Buyoya is frequently cited as the leader of some ready-to-talk-Tutsis in UPRONA.

Another increasing power struggle is that between different Hutu-based actors. With Mugabaraboma, Ndayikengurukiye, and Karumba part of the Transition Government the main self-proclaimed representatives of the Hutus are Rwasa (FNL) and Nkurunziza (FDD). While Rwasa's FNL might BE the most vocal actor claiming to represent the "true" Hutu cause, FDD is the more serious candidate for increased power. In this context it should be borne in mind that FDD has a history of close relations with FRODUBU and increased cooperation is likely. It is however not evident that FDD will remain as an actor under the current leadership of Nkurunziza. Signs of a split within FDD have already been visible, and if FDD moves closer to FRODUBU it might have to pay, by once again being divided (Evan: 1997).



The most prominent Hutu leader in Burundi is perhaps not President Ndayizeye but the Speaker of the House, Minani. With the Arusha Agreement disqualifying Ndayizeye as a candidate in the upcoming elections Minani is FRODEBU's likely candidate (Weisman: 1998). What is more, Minani is known to have exceptionally good connection with Tanzania and FDD. Some observers even argue that some of the FDD troops are under Minani's command. In the history of alliances and acronyms in Burundi, this "unholy" alliance might constitute the foundation for a new Hutu platform in Burundi (maybe known as "Frodebu-FDD"?).

### **2.8.5. Legal justice and the culture of impunity**

It is commonly assessed that the prisoners in Burundi are too few and that the 10,000 imprisoned to a large extent are the "wrong" people. They are the "small" criminals in comparison with the big criminals still enjoying freedom and affluence as part of Burundi's elite. The capacity and will of the justice system to enforce law and order is highly questionable and for decades, impunity has become part of the lifestyle endorsed by Burundi's elite.

Nevertheless, impunity receives center stage in the current conflict, and the incumbent elites engage in trying to set the agenda for Burundi, based on how to handle the past rather than build a future. Lack of security mechanisms for these actors and their current control of armed forces has put Burundi in a dilemma: While many argue that no peace can be built without addressing historical atrocities, actors who stand the risk of being brought to justice have the capacity of perpetuating the fighting (Herise: 2000).

### **2.8.6. Human Rights**

Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch concur in their reports on the systematic violation of human rights in Burundi. The atrocities have been carried

out by the national army and the rebel movements alike and include torture, violence against non-combatant parties, and sexual violence. FNL as well as FDD, despite having signed the Arusha Agreement, use child soldiers, and more or less explicit kidnapping to recruit troops (Beuls: 2000). Despite the Burundi's commitment to human rights agreements, the Burundi national army is frequently reported to have killed civilians and government forces have barred access by humanitarian agencies to displaced persons leaving them without adequate food, water and medical assistance.

In a report covering January to May 2003, the Burundian human rights group, Iteka, says that despite the signing of the cease-fire agreement between the government and FDD/Nkurunziza, the human rights situation has not improved in the country. Murder, torture, sexual assault and other violations continued during the period covered by the report. Iteka also points to the systematic exploitation of civilians by belligerents, including the transport of ammunition and looted goods (AISA: 2000).

Iteka further points to the role of the government to cater for recently repatriated people. As an indication of the need for action, Iteka reports that of the 57 000 people, repatriated during the reporting period, 46 percent had no access to housing, 22 percent had no land, and 34 percent had no access to medical care.

The history of human rights violations in Burundi evokes the question of impunity. The question of impunity applies to the national army and the rebel forces alike. Neither of the rebel forces has announced any form of accountability for combatants guilty of violating international humanitarian law. Even though the government forces stand under national laws, the de facto implementation of international commitments to human rights is deplorable (Africa Report: 1995).

Nevertheless, the Assembly and the Senate against genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity can see some progress in the recent passing of a law.

Human Rights Watch argues that the law "marks a major step" in Burundi, but point to the tremendous problems with implementation. The new law includes a call for an international judicial commission of inquiry under the UN to investigate crimes in the whole post-colonial period, i.e. a period of more than forty years. It also asks for an international criminal tribunal to be created. Without further details on the division of labor, the assembly further proposed the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to cover the same period (Agbaje: 1992).

Civil society is reported to have played a critical role in these recent changes, and managed to force the government to back down from its claim to have a seven-year respite on certain clauses in the new law that would have restricted the sphere of investigations.

#### **2.8.7. Civil society**

A vibrant web of formal and informal organizations for material exchange and social and political interaction enriches Burundi. There is need for additional documentation of the dynamics of Burundi's civil society. Informants testify to an increasing bifurcation between a rural and urban civil society. Whereas the rural civil society is typically informally organized and concerned with issues of physical security, food production, civic training, and associative life in Bujumbura reflects the interests of the elites (Amnesty International: 1995).

Coordination between the rural and urban civil society remains weak, and the close connection between the ruling elite and the urban civil is reflected in the low level of critical engagement with the government. This limits the degree to which support to (urban) civil society will contribute to the development of the country.

In relation to human rights, the less active role taken by civic organizations should also be seen against reports on intimidation by the government. Without the ambition to provide a comprehensive list of civil organizations that stand up for civic rights, the human rights group Iteka deserves to be mentioned for its continued outspokenness. In addition, Search for Common Ground champions universal rights through activities within a number of sectors, including media and women groups. In addition, representatives of Pentecostal as well as Catholic churches are known for their broad engagements and have frequently voiced criticism against the abuse of force and the need for democratic and human rights reforms.

### **2.8.8. Media**

The government record in relation to the media includes repeated violations of national and international proclamations on the freedom of expression. As an example of the harassment, it can be mentioned that the web-based information service, Net Press, was shut down for two months in 2002 on accusations of undermining national unity. The police are known to have beaten a journalist from Studio Ijambo in March 2002 after he had covered a meeting of a radical Tutsi group. Harassment has also followed reports from military attacks on civilians. In March 2003 President Buyoya summoned journalists to inform them that they must not allow rebels to speak on the radio (Weisman: 1998).

Adding to the bleak picture are reports of recent setbacks in the efforts to establish a stronger guarantee for the freedom of expression as a proposed press law was tabled by the Assembly and sent back to the Council of Ministers. Nevertheless, comparing their situation with colleagues in Rwanda, journalists in Burundi underline that the restrictions they face still leave quite some room for critical and nuance reporting. It is also commonly held that for some years, Burundi has experienced a positive trend for freedom of expression. Today there are a number of private newspapers published, and even though the government

monopolizes national TV, there are about 6 - 9 private radio channels with a wide outreach. Association Burundi de Journalist (ABJ) has 300 registered members, and the Maisson de la Press also gathers a fair number of journalists in Bujumbura (Northedge and Donelan: 1991).

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **3. AFRICAN UNION (AU)'S ROLE IN CONFLICT IN BURUNDI**

This chapter deals with the role that African Union (AU) played in resolving the Burundian conflict. It provides all the details concerning AU's involvement in the Burundian peace process and socio-economic development.

The conflict management arena in Africa has undergone radical change over the past decade. Africa's colonial legacy resulted in the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states being imbedded in the Charter of the African Union (previously OAU) as one of its "unshakeable" founding principle. This principle effectively precludes collective action to address civil wars and other internal conflict in Africa by the African Union or other government institutions in the past (AU report: 2001).

As a result the conflict management arena in Africa was dominated by foreign, mostly European concerns, interests and initiatives. For example, the Portuguese facilitated negotiations between Angola's factions in 1990-1992, followed by the United Nations in 1993-1995. The Italians mediated the end of the Mozambique civil war during 1991-1992, and the United States took the lead role to Ethiopia in 1990-1991 and Somalia in 1992-1993.

This changes in June 1993 when the 29<sup>th</sup> African Union OAU Assembly of Heads of States and Governments met in Cairo to establish the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. The mechanism of conflict resolution at the center of the African Union's being, established the Central Organ, a committee of member states to take charge of the process (AU Report: 2001).

The AU was first proposed by Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi as a more effective institution for increasing prosperity throughout the region. In general, it was hoped that the new AU would have the authority and the ability to achieve

true social, economic and political integration values, defending human rights and providing a forum for internal and regional conflict in Africa (AU News:2001).

The decision to transform the OAU into the new AU was announced at final summit meeting of the OAU in July. The OAU was originally established in 1963 to promote unity, solidarity and international cooperation among newly independent African states. During the past four decades, however, the old organization struggled to achieve its stated goal of a "better life for the people of Africa" and instead was hindered by internal conflict and self-serving heads of states. According to some critics, the OAU protected the interests of African heads of State without addressing the real problems that plugged the continent (SAPEM, Vol 13 No 6: 2000).

The transition from the organization of African Union (OAU) to the African Union was actually a problem solving approach. Whereas the OAU was in the principle a political organization that also discussed matters of the economic and social concern, the AU was constructed to be an organization aimed at economic integration and social development, which should lead to political unity ([www.oau-oua.org/document/mechanism/mech07.html](http://www.oau-oua.org/document/mechanism/mech07.html)).

The OAU has served its mission which was proud of winning the independence of Africa, but shy of gaining economic and social development since its independence. The making of the AU already made a step beyond the old by encouragement of wide and broad participation; invitation of regional economic communities to implement mechanism for the programs of the AU; agreement to intervene in member states under specific circumstances; and the creation of the Permanent Representatives Committee allowing an interactivity previously not experienced (Akinrinade, 2002: 13).

One of the peace missions the AU/OAU undertook was in Burundi. After the assassination of a democratically elected president in October 1993 resulted in a breakdown of law and order, violence and general instability and the rejection of

UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Gali's proposal to send a special mission to Burundi by UN Security Council, the AU organized a mission of its own, and it was able to negotiate, among other the deployment of the AU Military to Burundi (AMIB). It was a confidence building mission of military and civilian officers with a mandate of working towards the restoration of peace and security in Burundi (de Coning: 1997).

### **3.1. OAU Observer Mission in Burundi**

Having made an impact in Rwanda, the OAU proceeded to play a role in Burundi after a military coup in October 1993. According to Bakwesegha, as quoted by Berman and Sams (2000: 6) the OAU saw "Burundi as an opportunity strengthen the peace process and improve on its performance in Rwanda. The concern was not to obtain economic and material support for the operation, but whether the government of Burundi would accept an OAU Mission. Discussions with the Burundian authorities reduced the size of the observer mission from 180 to 47 and the operation was to be "preventive diplomacy" and not peacekeeping.

Given the volatile situation and not very cooperative attitude from the local forces, the OAU initiative was a limited success. OAU observers served as "useful intermediaries between the military authorities and civilian leaders and managed to diffuse numerous explosive situations. The provision of medical care by the military observers *cum* medical doctors helped to win public support (Sangare as quoted by Berman and Sams, 2000: 70).

The OAU was a very important continental political institution that oversaw the political liberation of many African countries from colonialism. As a forerunner of the AU, the OAU has played a significant part in promoting unity and solidarity among African states and also coordinated and intensified cooperation for development. It was a valuable forum for networking, enabling all member states to adopt coordinated positions on matters of common concern to the continent in

international fora and defended African interests effectively. This is showcased by its involvement in the Burundi intervention even if it had limited powers.

### **3.2. The African Union's African Mission in Burundi (AMIB)**

In April 2003 the AU deployed its first peacekeeping mission to support the peace process in Burundi. While the 2000 Arusha Agreement originally called for a UN peacekeeping operation to assist with the implementation of the peace agreement, the UN would not authorize a mission in the absence of a comprehensive ceasefire agreement. Consequently, the AU, regional leaders and the Burundian parties agreed to the deployment of the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) to operate under the auspices of the AU. At full capacity, AMIB consisted of some 3,335 troops from South Africa, Ethiopia, and Mozambique with additional military observers from Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Togo and Tunisia.

AMIB's central objective was to create conditions sufficiently stable for the UN Security Council to authorize a UN intervention. AMIB was deployed based on an understanding that the UN would take over peacekeeping responsibilities in Burundi after twelve months. It consisted of what de Coning refers to as a "hybrid mission" in as much as AMIB was deployed for peacekeeping in the absence of a comprehensive ceasefire but lacked the civilian functions that usually form part of such complex peace operations. AMIB essentially provided the security dimension of the UN's political mission in Burundi. It was through this political mission that it was officially linked to the rest of the UN system. AMIB was specifically mandated to, among other tasks, to:

- Establish and maintain liaison between the partners;
- Monitor and verify the implementation of the ceasefire agreements;
- Facilitate movement of combatants toward assembly arrears;
- Facilitate and provide technical assistance to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process;

- Facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, including to refugees and internally displaced persons; and
- Coordinate mission activities with the UN presence in Burundi.

It is important to note that the mission was not given an explicit mandate to protect civilians. However, after several months on the ground, senior AMIB officials drafted rules of engagement (ROEs) to allow their troops to use force to protect civilians in "imminent danger of serious injury or death". According to these ROEs, troops could intervene with force to protect civilians in cases of genocide and mass killings along ethnic lines, although they required prior authorization from military and civilian officers.

A number of factors help explain why key African leaders and AU Commission were eager to support the deployment of AMIB. At the Regional Summit held in Arusha in December 2002, regional leaders and the AU recognized the importance of securing peace in Burundi in order to bring some stability to the conflict-prone Great Lakes region. The AU also situated the deployment of AMIB within the context of its Constitutional Act. It acknowledged its responsibility for the management and resolution of conflicts on the continent and recognized its right to intervene in grave circumstances in accordance with Article 4 (j) of the Constitutive Act, particularly in situations where the international community was not willing to provide robust support.

Moreover, the then chairperson of the AU, South African president Thabo Mbeki, and other African leaders saw the deployment of AMIB as a crucial opportunity for the pan-African organization to demonstrate its departure from the OAU and to assign itself a prominent role in delivering on a peace and security agenda in Africa. At the same time, however, African decision-makers anticipated receiving willingness from the international community for AMIB's role in Burundi, especially in light of the perceived similarities to the conditions preceding the genocide in Rwanda.

In May 2004, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1545 (2004) authorizing the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation in Burundi. One month later, after 14 months on the ground, AMIB was officially taken over by and absorbed into the UN Operation in Burundi (known by its French acronym, ONUB). The UN Mission comprises 5,650 troops from the three AMIB contributing nations as well as Kenya, Nepal, and Pakistan. It has an annual operating budget of close to US\$333.2 million. ONUB has been provided with a Chapter VII mandate and has been deployed to ensure respect for the ceasefire agreements, to carry out disarmament, demobilization and cantonment activities, and to contribute to the successful completion of the electoral process. It is also authorized to protect civilians under direct threat of physical violence.

### **3.3. The Burundi Peace Process**

The Burundian peace talks began in 1995 with the former President of Tanzania, the late Julius Nyerere as the mediator. Since then Nyerere had been trying to bring peace in the ethnic conflict ridden Burundi, yet the bloodshed continued.

The stature of Nyerere as one of Africa's most respected leader and as one of the pioneers of African nationalism did less to convince the warring Tutsi and Hutu about the irrationalism associated with war. Nyerere's inclination to socialist ideals made him less popular with the Western countries. Diplomatically they denounced his socialist inclination. That could be judged by less support the Western countries gave Nyerere's peace initiative in Burundi.

After the death of Nyerere the former South African President, Nelson Mandela took over as Burundi mediator. With the support of his predecessor, Thabo Mbeki and Uganda president Yoweri Museveni, Mandela immediately committed himself and South Africa to strive to find peaceful solution to Burundi, which had been ravaged by decades of ethnic confrontations. That became core of Mbeki's Millennium African Recovery Plan (MAP), which was intended to rid Africa of

conflicts, poverty and underdevelopment ([www.afrcaction.org/docs98/bur9806b.html](http://www.afrcaction.org/docs98/bur9806b.html)).

Following the footsteps of Nyerere as the Mediator and reluctance of the parties in conflict to reach a peaceful agreement, posed very serious challenges to internationally renowned fighter of civil liberties, Nelson Mandela.

Mandela called a peace summit on 21 February 2000 at Arusha, Tanzania to continue with peace efforts that were started by Nyerere. According to The Africa Policy Information (APIC), (2002), several African heads of states and European ministers "had been at Arusha to support the peace process". These included South Africa's Thabo Mbeki, Mozambique's Joachim Chissano, Namibia's Sam Nujoma, Zambia's Frederick Chiluba, Nigeria's Olusegun Obasanjo, and the former US President Bill Clinton. The main armed Hutu rebel groups failed to turn up. The February summit however drafted proposals for sustainable peace talks in Burundi. That included the creation of integrated army, setting a date for democratic election and provision of amnesty to perpetrators of killings. According to Herisse (2002:16), Mandela committed himself to involve the rebels in the peace talks and the next summit was scheduled for June.

The Burundian negotiators met on 06 June 2002 at Arusha to discuss peace proposals, which included the integration of Hutu rebels into the Tutsi dominated army, the drafting of an election timetable and amnesty for those responsible for the killings. Following the Arusha peace Accord signed on 28 August 2000; Mandela managed to have the opposing parties agree to the establishment of a transitional government. The transitional government was sworn in 01 November 2001. It was envisaged that such transitional government to run for three years during which Pierre Buyoya, a Tutsi was going to serve as the President for 18 months. Domitieu Ndayizey, a Hutu, was to serve as the Buyoya's deputy. After 18 months, Buyoya was expected to hand over power to a Hutu leader. In theory, the political transition set at Arusha seemed to be long over due, to end the eight years of ethnic conflict in Burundi. But the big question was that. "would the

ordinary Tutsi, especially the militia, be prepared to lose the power which has been so important for their survival as the minority?

In order to make the environment conducive for the implementation of the Arusha ceasefire agreements, Mandela pledged the South African government to provide a preventive or peacekeeping force Mbeki's administration showed its willingness to send soldiers to the war-torn Burundi. The South African agreed to provide 1467 soldiers to render VIP Protection to returning exiled politicians (Defence Bulletin, 2002:18)

The United Nations approved the sending of South African soldiers to Burundi, but the mission did not form part of the UN peacekeeping. On 14 October 2001 Mandela brokered the deal to send soldiers with South African Defence Minister Mosioa Lekota and his Burundian counterpart, Cerille Nyayirukiye. The deployment of SA prevention force serve as a milestone in aspects of policy development and it formed part of Mbeki's African political renaissance. It displayed the willingness and preparedness of South African political leadership, SANDF and civilians to assist in African conflict resolution endeavours besides not been sanctioned by the UN. Nkosi (2002), further notes, "lack of UN mandate call into a question of the legitimacy of the operation".

It was agreed that the contingent was to carry light weapons that they could use in self-defence. Their roles at Burundi included the provision of security to returning politicians and offer military training to the Burundian forces. Belgium, European Union and the US funded the mission. The South African Government funded the mission with the previous apartheid fund scheme (money used previously to fund apartheid missions) for the daily running of the protective units. External funding of the Burundian peace became important aspects of Economics and social Action.

On 28 October 2001 some 700 South African troops were sent to Burundi on a peacekeeping mission. The protection force, as The Defence Bulletin (15/02)

notes, composed of "the members who are qualified in courses that include Visual Tracking, Basic Rope Work, Static VIP Protection, Basic Photography, Specialist Dog Course, Basic and Instructor Law of Armed Conflict and Peacekeeping observers. Members of the protection force have previously participated in peacekeeping missions, including operation BOLEAS and flood relief efforts in Mozambique. The force became officially known as South African Protection Support Detachment (SAPSD). Shelton (1997:03) notes " In the African context, South Africa has identified by many observers as one state able to execute effective peace operations in the continent". Liebenburg et al (1997), account for South Africa's readiness to assist in conflict resolution endeavours in the continent by commenting that: -

"South African policy guidelines for participating in peace operations are reflected in a number state of official documents and policy positions, such papers as the White paper on Defence and a range of key position papers pertaining to foreign policy and development requirements".

Liebenburg et al (1997:05) further note that in addition 'South Africa is a member state of the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) with aspiration towards a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.

In December 2001 Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal also sent pledged soldiers to participate in the Burundian peace process. Ntabona (1999:263) reports that had materialized as the three countries put the signing of the ceasefire as a pre-condition for sending their protection forces. That demonstrated Obasanjo's and the World Bank's commitment in involving Nigeria and its resources in conflict resolution endeavours in Africa. By involving their troops at their own expense and risk, both Nigeria and South Africa showed their commitment to the African Renaissance.

According to Nkosi (2002:40), the involvement of Nigerian and South African preventive forces also received full support from the President of the European Union (EU) Romano Prodi and Belgian Minister Guy Verhofstadt.

In December 2000, French President, Jacques Chirac hosted a donor conference to raise funds for the Burundian peace process. This conference raised an amount of 400million dollars "because of Mandela's involvement as a mediator in Burundi". Mandela also used his international reputation to get "the World Bank agree to take young Burundians to train in Washington on how to manage a transformation of economy from agricultural economy to modern economy". He also pledged to grant university scholarships to Burundian youths (<http://www.usip.org/grants/burundi/burmcmahou.htm>).

Mandela's efforts that led to the birth of democratic South African dubbed "the south African miracle" after a long battle against apartheid, earned him respect from all over the world and that also paid dividends in the transformation of the Burundian peace process.

In his tribute to former South African president, Nelson Mandela, Angolan president Eduardo dos Santos (Goulding, 2000:10) summarized his complimentary message to Mandela's international reputation by noting that:

"The international prestige that your Excellency has gained makes you a statesman of a dimension that transcends the limits of your country's borders. This fact gives you the unique quality needed for combined efforts we should make with view to overcoming crises, whether political or economic, that our continent still faces so that the positive results that follow may contribute to the development and prosperity of our people and countries".

The general secretary of the united nations, kofi Anan (Mokgola, 2002:11) further notes " people often ask me what difference one person can make in the face of the conflict, injustice violations of human rights and other entrenched and

**complex problems of our times. I answer by citing your (Madiba) integrity, your bravery, and your wisdom"**

Initially the South African protection Detachment (SAPSD) received hostility from the Burundian forces. The Burundian forces were unhappy with the SAPSD occupying the capital, Bujumbira, while they were deployed in the outskirts. The hostility was reflected when both forces drew weapons at each other in the road accident early in 2002, but nothing happened. Since then cooperation and togetherness prevailed between the forces (Defence Bulletin No.15/02:26 march 2002).

The defence bulletin (2002:13) further reported that in separate incidents a member of the SAPSD was found strangled in January 2002, another member of the SAPSD was shot and wounded and another was killed. These incidents however were seen as posing no threat to the activities of SAPSD. According to Schoeman (2002: 09-12), the SAPSD, according to the chief of South Africa\national Defence Force (SANDAF), Sipiwe Nyanda, "would remain in Burundi until the transitional government felt secure and the military training is completed". Besides protecting the returning political leaders the SANDAF protective force engaged in social projects intended to heal Burundi from its past conflicts. They included sporting activities like rugby, soccer, volleyball, cricket, swimming, marathons and angling which were played on 26 January 2002. According to Herisse (2002:4) these sporting activities tried to revive recreation "to a country which has known few recreational activities because of ongoing civil strife".

The Defence Bulletin (2002:21) further outline the importance of the games as promoting the image of the SAPSD, interacting with the community of Burundi and developing mutual trust with the Burundi Armed Forces (FAB). Again it was another strategy of developing friendship and mutual co-operation between different Burundian ethnics.

Maloka (2002:3-4), further reported that SAPSD, through collaboration with Burundi non-governmental organisations and churches had set up several, rehabilitation projects. They included among others "street kids" and "the Hand that Gives" which are intended to benefit orphans, street kids, refugees, abused children and women and child soldiers. In addition one unnamed SAPSD member has undertaken to donate part of his salary to supporting an orphan whose parents died in the conflict.

The contribution of the unnamed soldier and that of the social projects served as positive contribution of SAPSD in peace building and restoration of human dignity. The contribution has again made South Africa Union (AU) to be admired by the Burundians. The letter addressed to Mandela from the Methodist Church of east Africa Bishop Alfred Nduricimba had supported that. The letter reads "We, the Burundians, admires your perseverance during all time that you mediated the Burundi reconciliation process. We are very proud of you and thank God for the great African Statesman that you are". That acknowledgement shows Mandela, South Africa and AU's contribution in resolution of Burundian conflict and its post war reconstruction (Nkosi, 2002:56).

Mandela stepped down as a mediator in the Burundian peace process after the installation of the transitional government on 01 November 2001. It was further hoped that the United Nations Security Council would handle further peace process. UN dragged its feet in intervening in Burundi, and in January 2002 South Africa sent a delegation intended to speed up the peace process. The delegation composed of among others, Deputy President Jacob Zuma, Justice Minister, Panuel Maduna, and Foreign Affairs Deputy Director Welile Nhlapo. The sending of the delegation was part of South Africa's diplomatic action, sometimes called preventive diplomacy, which was intended to serve as a follow up to the preventive peacekeeping force. Goulding (2002: 12) perceived Diplomatic Action as involving "techniques of persuasion, of negotiation and, frankly, political manipulation to persuade hostile parties to do things which they do not wish to do". That is compliant to end hostilities.

The AU further included women in the Burundian peace process, so as to give them an opportunity of highlighting their visions and plans on how Burundi should be governed without uprisings that had been prevailing. Women's inclusion was another strategy by the AU in helping curb ongoing conflicts and build a new Burundi that will be suitable for everyone to live on.

In spite of whatever reservations still may exist amongst many parties about aspects of the Arusha Accord, parties will from the outset have to demonstrate that they are willing and able to implement the letter and spirit of this Accord, which is after all the founding document of the Transitional Government. If the Arusha signatory parties, who will become partners in the Transitional Government, really want this new Government to work\succeed, and to achieve their objectives, they should firstly remember that "Rome was not build in one day" and secondly that they should not put "revenge" on their hearts.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### 4. Research Findings and Interpretation of Data

This chapter examines the causes of conflict in Burundi and discusses the strategies for building peace. The analysis of the complex relationships between distribution and group dynamics reveals, that these relationships are reciprocal, implying that distribution and group dynamics are endogenous. The nature of endogenously generated group dynamics determines the type of preferences (altruistic or exclusionist), which in turn determines the type of allocative institutions and policies that prevails in the political and economic system.


With regard to the conflict in Burundi, participants observed that the main focus of the Burundi conflict has shifted from ethnicity to the question of power sharing and that in the absence of equitable power sharing, the underprivileged segment of society would see no alternative other than violence; and on the other side, the privileged segments would try to protect themselves by using pre-emptive violence (Ndikumana, 2005:1).

The underdevelopment of Burundi is the result of colonization followed by decolonization and dependency, and is sustained by an array of problems that constitute a vicious circle. Although Burundi is one of the recipient of various forms of development aid from the international community, the evidence suggests that most of this so-called aid has been given under a mistaken understanding of what constitutes development, thus continuing the original problem of decolonization and dependency (Bigombe, Collier and Sambanis, 2001:1).

Distribution of economic resources and political power may be equal or unequal. Equal distribution of resources promotes cohesive group dynamics while unequal distribution creates antagonism between the privileged groups and the

marginalized ones. In turn, the nature of endogenously generated group dynamics determines the type of preferences which may be altruistic or exclusionist. These preferences in turn determine the type of allocative institutions and policies that prevail in the political and economic system. Altruistic preferences promote egalitarian and nationalistic policies while exclusionist preferences induce sectarian and inequalitarian allocative policies. Hence the distribution of national resources (economic resources and political power) is endogenous in the sense that equality or inequality arises from the type of allocative policies that prevail in the system.

**Figure 4.1. Group dynamics and distributional conflict**



It also follows from the foregoing analysis that while unequal distribution of resources may be socially inefficient, it nonetheless can be "rational" from the perspective of the ruling elite, especially because inequality perpetuates dominance. For example, the concentration of education infrastructure in the southern province of Bururi in Burundi led to sub-optimal human capital

development (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2000; Jackson 2000). Yet this policy was a vital mechanism of consolidation of power for the southern Tutsi oligarchy. Obviously, because of the conflict that unequal distribution generates, systems based on equality are difficult to sustain in the long run as they require ever increasing investments in repression.

#### **4.1. Group dynamics**

##### **4.1.1. The role of ethnicity**

The question of the role of ethnicity in explaining conflict in Burundi has occupied a central place in the literature. Conflicts in Burundi have often been characterized as clashes between two inherently antagonistic groups. Argument should be brought forward that this characterization is fundamentally flawed and inconsistent with historical evidence.

In his influential book on conflict in Burundi, Lemarchand (1995) pointed out an important "paradox" in the history of Burundi. He noted that uncharacteristically for a sub-Saharan African country, ethnic groups in Burundi have a long history of peaceful cohabitation, speaking the same language, sharing the same culture and having the same traditional monarchy. However, in the end of the colonial era and throughout the independence era, the country experienced conflicts that, on the surface, opposed the Hutu to the Tutsi. Given that the Hutu and the Tutsi have not always antagonized, the question that must be asked is what happened during the colonial and post-colonial periods that generated violent conflicts along ethnic lines.

One source of explanation for why conflict happened is the introduction of ethnicity as a primordial determinant of access to power starting from the colonial era. The 1929 reorganization of the territorial administration marked a turning point in the history of the country with regard to the role of ethnicity in politics.

The Belgian colonizers orchestrated an overhaul of the administration that resulted in the domination of the political system by chiefs from the Tutsi ethnic group. In 1929, 20 percent of the chiefs were Hutu but by 1945 there were no Hutu chiefs in the administration. This administration reform marked the beginning of marginalization of the Hutu politics. Tutsi domination of the political system continued since then and was consolidated especially after the 1972 massacres (Eggers: 1997).

Ethnic diversity is not a direct cause of conflict in Burundi but ethnicity is intertwined with other political and regional factors in contributing to conflict. A similar "spontaneous outbursts of mutual antagonisms between ethnic groups." Fedderke, Luiz and de Kadt (2004) make a similar argument in the case of South Africa. They argue that "what really matters is not the social cleavage, but it [cleavage] comes to serve as a political tool in distributional conflict" (Fedderke et al 2004: 19). Collier (2000) finds that ethnicity has negative effects only in bad political environment (with limited political rights) but has no link with conflict in democracies. Alesina and La Ferrara (2004) argue that diversity (including ethnic diversity) may actually increase productivity through diversity of skills and innovative abilities.

On the one hand, the Tutsi-Hima from the southern province of Bururi exploited ethnic identity to control power. In turn, political entrepreneurs excluded from state spoils activated ethnic solidarities to challenge the regime in place. Thus, ethnic diversity became an instrument for political competition in the pursuit of economic and political advantages. It follows that conflicts are caused not by ethnic diversity per se but by inequality in the distribution of access to national resources and political power across ethnic groups. When the political system discriminates along ethnic lines, then ethnicity becomes a vehicle of conflict.

#### **4.1.2. Patrimonialism, predation and institutional failure**

Under the pre-colonial era, leadership was surrounded by the mythical notion of divine power of the King. The King was above the nation and just under God: "*Imana, Umwami, Uburundi*" (God, the King, and the nation) was the traditional order (Ngaruko: 2003). Everything belonged to the King, including material resources as well as the people. This tradition established the notion that the King not only ruled the country but also owned the country and its resources. A patrimonial system generates rents that accrue to only those who belong to the "clan" of leaders. The smaller the clan the larger the individual share in the rents. Therefore, clan members have the incentives to erect barriers to entry into the club.

During the republic era, leaders perpetuated patrimonialism by actively engineering institutions and mechanisms of exclusion and repression, including the use of force and intimidation against those who were suspected of not adhering to state ideology. The regimes also used ideology and propaganda mainly through the party UPRONA (Unite pour le Progres National), which was instituted into a unique party during the first military regime (1966-76). The unique party played the same role as that of a myth under the monarchy in brainwashing the public and promoting the notion of unchallenged submission to the authority.

Two important features characterized the patrimonial state in Burundi: centralization and penetration. Centralization facilitated control over the economy and the political system while penetration extended control down to the lowest strata of the social structure (Laely: 1997). The administration and party leadership from the lowest level to the top were controlled by "agents of the state" who were accountable to the central authority only. Local officials were often "expatriates" from other communes and provinces. Officials from the south served as administrators of communes in the north while the reverse was

unthinkable. This institutional engineering allowed the central authority to control power at all levels in the country. The system also undermined public accountability on the part of government officials and allowed them to behave like the old King in that they were above the people and just under their "god", that is, the central authority.

The state also hijacked civil society organizations to consolidate state ideology. Youth and women associates and labor unions were branches of the unique party used as propaganda instruments to brainwash the citizenry and enforce the supremacy of state ideology. State penetration extended even to the clergy. The Catholic Church in particular was viewed as a potential threat, especially due to its involvement in formal and informal education, which was seen as a potential vehicle for alternative ideological beliefs. The independence of the church was nevertheless compromised by the presence of influential clergymen from the South who often served as arms of the state. The state often was able to take advantage of the trust enjoyed by clergymen vis-a-vis the people to extract valuable information from or even influence cooperative behavior of potential opposition leaders. For example, the very influential Bishop of the Diocese of Bururi, Bernard Bududira, was an important advisor to military presidents who often used the clergyman's position to gain access to opposition leaders (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2003: 384).

The post-independence regimes established true "predatory bureaucracies" (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2003) aimed at channeling wealth to the benefit of the Tutsi-Hima elite from the south. Various mechanisms allowed the minority southern elite to gain control over the economy. One of these mechanisms is through excessive regulation in the economic system. Excessive regulation allowed leaders to extract rents through bribes and other forms of corruption.

Lack of accountability is a consequence of high centralization and concentration of political and economic power and it is a self-perpetuating process. As Collier

(2000: 197) points out, "once a society becomes corrupt there are powerful forces tending to keep it corrupt." Due to monopolization of state institutions, corruption became the norm in public management, then corruption became "expected", and in the end corruption became a self-perpetuating process. Corruption is vertically and downward contagious, which takes away not only administrative accountability, but also moral guilt.

Excessive regulation serves as a barrier to entry into the private sector for actors who are not politically connected. It is not surprising that a substantial proportion of those who own large companies are former high-ranking government officials or their relatives. Concentration of economic power is therefore a result of concentration of political power.

Another mechanism of redistributive politics is through the management of the public sector. As Ngaruko and Nkurunziza (2000: 386) find that in 1996, the assets of the 37 fully state-controlled firms represented 48% of the country's GDP. For all parastatals combined, the ratio was a staggering 77%. The parastatal sector constituted a channel of distribution of wealth to members of the southern Tutsi minority. Moreover, the policy of expansion of the public sector suffocated the private sector while diverting scarce public funds away from socially productive investments. Since only a select few had access to jobs and command positions in the parastatal sector, such a policy increased inequality along the lines.

From the foregoing analysis, we conclude that institutional failure constitutes an important cause of conflict in Burundi (Ndikumana: 1998). The Burundian state has failed to perform its usual functions of enforcing the rule of law, protecting individual and property rights, enforcing the rules of fair social exchange, administering justice for all, and redistributing national wealth. Institutional failure created a divorce between the privatized state and population while perpetuating a culture of impunity as well as incentives to capture the state for personal

interests. However, although institutions failed, they have proved resilient to change. Consequently, institutional failure has created an environment that not only predisposed the country to conflict but also contributed to the reoccurrence of conflicts.

#### **4.1.3. Greed and grievances**

The "greed and grievance" models of civil wars, which emphasize the motives and costs of organizing and maintaining rebellions, explain conflicts in African countries and around the world (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). The model predicts correctly that Burundi is more prone to conflict than any average country worldwide. In the case of Burundi, dominance, rather than fractionalization is the driving factor for conflict. Although the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa speak the same language, over time they became politically distinguishable communities, especially starting from the 1929 when the colonial administration engineered the domination of the Tutsi in the administration. Taking this view that the differences amongst the three groups are indeed relevant for conflict, as Ngaruko and Nkurunziza (2003) cite the relative proportions of each group (85%, 14% and 1% for the Hutu, the Tutsi and the Twa respectively).

In addition to ethnicity, regionalism has also been an important dimension of fractionalization and antagonism in the political system. Burundian politics in the 1960s were marked by sharp antagonism between the Tutsi monarchists of Muramvya and the Tutsi of Bururi. The post-independence military regimes dominated by the southern Tutsi systematically sought to limit Muramvya's political influence. There are also regionalist tensions within the Hutu ethnic group as non-southern Hutu from the south have benefited from the "neighborhood effects" and have been less marginalized than the Hutu from the rest of the country.

Given these considerations, it is more appropriate to think of ethno-regional fractionalization rather than ethnic fractionalization. Two implications follow. First, fractionalization becomes a dynamic phenomenon rather than a fixed factor, which helps to better explain the pattern and timing of civil wars over time. Second, considering ethno-regional entities increases measured fractionalization and contrary to the theory's prediction, higher fractionalization makes Burundi more not less vulnerable to conflict. To keep the argument simple, let's focus on the recent war. First, one of the reasons why the war broke out in 1993 is because the monolithic army and the southern Tutsi elite were unwilling to accept the shift in power concentration away from the South. President Ndadaye was the first president to be a Hutu, a non-southern, and a civilian.

Second, the war has lasted longer because it has been fought on several fronts, not just opposing the Hutu against the Tutsi. For example, the non-southern Tutsi and Hutu have accused the southern Tutsi and Hutu leadership of shielding the south from the killings while allowing destruction of the rest of the country. Non-southern Tutsi have discovered that not all Tutsi are created equal, and that certainly a monolithic military is not insurance for any ethnic group. As the war progressed, ethnic affinity eroded in both camps. It will be harder in the future for divisionist leaders to simply ride on the back of ethnicity as a way of mobilizing political support.

## **4.2. Distributional conflict**

### **4.2.1. Education and distributional conflict**

The goal of the education system is the development of human capital, which is achieved by pursuing two objectives within the limits of the resource constraint: (1) achieving the highest enrollment ratios or mass literacy and (2) providing the highest quality of education or sophistication. For a monolithic regime, mass literacy is perceived as a threat because it increases the demand for political

participation and economic equity. So, mass literacy yields disutility for the dominant group even though it increases welfare for society as a whole. As a result, monolithic regimes tend to under-invest in mass education and concentrate resources to providing the best education to the privileged few.

There are two possible ways of characterizing the optimization process. First, given the antagonism between the dominant group and the rest of the population, each group's utility is increasing in its own human capital but decreasing in the rival group's human capital. That is, for the dominant group, less education of the population is preferred because more mass education may result in higher pressure for power sharing. For the rest of the population more education for the dominant group implies more marginalization and an increase in the political power of the dominant group. Since the dominant group has control over the allocation of public resources, it can effectively influence education for the rest of the population. In contrast, the rest of the population has little influence on the allocation of resources, which provides incentives to rebel against the dominant group. Hence, discrimination in education is a potential vehicle for conflict.

#### **4.2.2. The military and distributional conflict**

The military, especially its structure and its links to politics, must be at the center of any objective analysis of post-independence conflicts in Burundi from a distributional-conflict perspective. The contribution of the military in generating distributional conflict arises from (1) its structure, (2) what it provides to those who have access to it and (3) what it represents for those who are excluded from it. Furthermore, the role of the military is closely connected with state legitimacy, which also has important implications for resource allocation and political instability.

The structure of the military in Burundi changed dramatically in 1965. Following the aborted coup by members of the Hutu elite, the government orchestrated

**systematic cleansing of the Hutu in the military and the civilian elite (Ntibazonkiza 1993). From that point on, the military became largely monolithic. The Micombero regime (1966-1976) initiated systematic discrimination against non-southern Tutsi and the military became a monopoly under the control of the southern Tutsi-Hima elite.**

For the southern Tutsi-Hima elite, the military provided a source of rent in the form of political power, a source of employment, and an avenue to other material advantages from military coup by Micombero in 1966 until the establishment of the transitional government in 2001. Even under the FROBEDU regime of Ntibantunganya from 1993 to 1996, the army had de facto control of power. The government was kept hostage and paralyzed, which prevented it from implementing any policies that may adversely affect the interest of the military and its civilians allies. Because of the monopolization of the military by the southern Tutsi elite and its role a guarantor of political power, public expenditures have systematically been skewed in favor of security to the disadvantage of socially productive investments such as infrastructure, education and health. The bias in the allocation of public resources in favor of security is closely connected to state legitimacy (Ndikumana 2004). A state that lacks legitimacy invests in security in order to repress demands for political opening. This fiscal policy orientation increases the marginalization of the disenfranchised majority while it promotes rent extraction by the elite in power, which increases the risk of conflict.

#### **4.2.3. The 1965 killings**

The assassination of the Hutu Prime Minister Pierre Ngendandumwe in January 1965 and the refusal by the King to appoint a Hutu as prime minister despite the landslide victory by Hutu deputies in the May 1965 legislative election created political upheaval and poisoned the relations between the Hutu and Tutsi political elite on the one hand and between the King and the civilian elite on the other hand. The events demonstrated that the monarch and the elite Tutsi were not

ready to share power. Furthermore, the Tutsi elite were afraid of a possible repetition of the bloody overthrow of the King by the Hutu in neighboring Rwanda in 1959. The Hutu majority used the events in Rwanda to cultivate fear among the Tutsi of an impending danger of extermination in the event of control of power. The alleged coup plot by the Hutu against the King gave the Tutsi the opportunity to decapitate the Hutu civilian and military leadership.

#### **4.2.4. The 1972 massacres**

The overthrow of the monarchy by army officer Micombero in 1966 intensified accentuated the tensions between the Tutsi from Muramvya (the former royal headquarters) and those from Bururi. In 1971, rumors of a possible reestablishment of the monarchy, the return of Prince Ndizeye and his assassination by the army deepened the tensions further. An alleged coup plot by the Hutu accelerated the descent into chaos. The southern Tutsi elite took advantage of this chaos to complete the ethnic cleansing of the Hutu from the military and the civil service that had started in 1965. The regime also ceased the opportunity to sideline the Tutsi from Muramvya and the rest of the country. The 1972 war was indeed a distributional conflict in that the southern Tutsi elite opted for the "final solution" to consolidate their hold on power by eliminating the Hutu elite.

#### **4.2.5. The 1988 conflict**

In August 1988, the country experienced a civil war in the northern provinces of Ngozi and Kirundo following a long truce of 16 years. What makes the 1988 conflict a distributional conflict is the role played by state penetration and the resistance to it by the Hutu population. In the periods leading to the outbreak of the conflict, the government had been warned of tensions in the northern provinces of Ngozi and Muyinga between local administrators and the population.

One major area of contention was that these "expatriate" local administrators from the south were arrogant and insensitive to the needs of the local community. Moreover, the "wind from the East", that is, the international drive for democratization energized by the fall of the Communist block, also contributed to the intensification of mobilization by clandestine Hutu opposition movements.

It is important to note that from 1972 to 1988, the country had not experienced any violent conflict. While this allowed the military regimes to consolidate power, it also allowed the rebuilding of a sizeable Hutu intelligentsia abroad and at home. As the Hutu intelligentsia expanded, domestic demand for power sharing increased. This explains the increase in the intensity of the activities of opposition groups but also the response from of the Hutu to repression after the outbreak of the civil war in the north. Fearing a repetition of the 1972 massacres, the Hutu intelligentsia decided to challenge the government openly.

In a near-heroic move, a group of Hutu intellectuals wrote a letter to the President (1) to condemn indiscriminate and arbitrary arrests and execution of Hutu intellectuals and (2) to demand a national debate on ethnic discrimination and reform of the political system to achieve egalitarian representation. The open letter marked a turning point in the history of conflict in Burundi: the intelligentsia had decided to no longer watch passively as the government security forces slaughter the people as it had happened in the past. They decided to not only confront the government but also to expose the tragedy to the international community. These reactions by the Hutu intelligentsia largely explain why the repression was less widespread and shorter than in 1972. These reactions of the Hutu intellectuals along with external pressure on the regime were instrumental in the initiation of the process of political opening, starting with the formation of an ethnically balanced "government of unity" in 1989, the opening of a national debate on ethnic divisions, and the ensuing opening of the political process that would eventually culminate into democratic elections in 1993.

#### **4.2.6. The 1991 rebellion**

The rebellion by Hutu rebels in November 1991 may be linked to the general dissatisfaction of Hutu opposition groups with regard to the nature and pace of the political liberalization process initiated in 1989. These groups accused the government of managing the process to preserve the control of power by the southern Tutsi-Hima. The rebellion demonstrated that cosmetic changes such as having more Hutu in top government positions were not enough to satisfy the opposition, which demanded more sharing in the instruments of power, especially the military. The 1991 events demonstrated that the Hutu rebellion had changed tactics, opting to confront the military head on.

#### **4.2.7. The 1993-ongoing war**

The ongoing war that started in 1993 following the assassination of President Ndadaye is by far the most vivid illustration of distributional conflict. Four key factors that illustrate how this war is a distributional conflict. First, President Ndadaye announced his intention to reform the military to make it more representative of the ethnic and regional makeup of the society, as part of his plan to build what he called Burundi Nouveau (New Burundi). Throughout the period of transition toward democracy which started in 1989, the military had systematically exhibited strong opposition to relinquish power. Secondly, the Ndadaye regime quickly proceeded to replace former government officials in a drive to establish control of power but also to fulfill campaign promises. For outgoing government officials and their allies in the private sector, these reforms meant the loss of the means of extracting rents, which explains the wide support that the military coup received among the Tutsi civilian elite.

Third, the massive return of Hutu refugees and their demand for jobs and retribution of their land and other property constituted a major threat for members of the Tutsi ethnic group who had appropriated the property of the Hutu who fled

the country. Reparation and retribution had never crossed the minds of the many Tutsi who had enriched themselves from looting the property of orphans and widows of their Hutu neighbors.

Fourth, the Ndadaye government was also a threat to the Tutsi business sector. As discussed throughout under the patrimonial regimes, connections with the government were essential for success in the business sector. These advantages were to evaporate with the institution of a broad-based government.

The nature of the war on the ground and its duration also demonstrated its character as a distributional conflict rather than just a Hutu-Tutsi conflict. The multiplicity of belligerents demonstrates that political rivalry matters probably as much as – if not more than – ethnic rivalry. Political parties and rebel groups have split up as leaders fail to agree on mechanisms for rent sharing.

### **4.3. Making peace work: Strategies for post-conflict reconstruction**

#### **4.3.1. The political problem**

Bayart (1993) argues that a correct diagnosis of the conflict in Burundi must acknowledge the centrality of the political problem, namely the issue of balance of power between ethnic groups and regions. To achieve lasting peace, the country's leaders must find strategies to overcome the legacies of political imbalances. Emphasis should be on the following three dimensions of political problem: the military, ethno-regional balance, and the constitutional process and independence of the judiciary.

Building lasting peace will require transformation of the military for the purpose of making it an a-political institution. The accord signed in November 2003 between the transnational government of Burundi (TGB) and the CNDD-FDD for a ceasefire and mechanisms for organization of the new national defense was a

history-making event. The agreement envisages the formation of a defense force that is balanced at all levels.

The restructuring process has already commenced but a few issues remain. The first issue is that the accord does not include the Front National de Liberation (FNL, National Liberation Front) as this group has refused to take part into the negotiations. Any progress in the peace process means further marginalization of this group. The problem is that the FNL still has the capacity to disturb peace even though it has no chance of withstanding an open confrontation with the restructured national defense force. For the sake of peace stability it is vital to find ways of convincing if not forcing the FNL to put down its arms and took part in the new democratic process.

The second critical question is that of sustainability of the army. Attempts to accommodating all the political tendencies would result in an unsustainable size of the military. This means that a large proportion of the regular army and the rebel forces need to be demobilized and integrated into civilian life. This especially concerns the estimated fourteen thousand child soldiers in the rebel forces (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2003). Downsizing the army is a politically sensitive enterprise and it can pose a security threat if it is not executed. The country will need significant financial and technical assistance from the international community to manage the reform of the army and to finance the demobilization of former combatants.

The analysis of the causes of the conflicts in this paper implies that the process of peace building needs to take into account both ethnicity and regional balance in the design of new institutions. However, representation should not be reduced to mechanical quotas based on the demographic size of ethnic groups. The objective is to protect the interests of both the majority as well as the minority groups.

The challenge in the post-conflict period will be to establish agencies of restraint that transcend political cycles. These agencies are mainly the Constitution and the legal system. The legal system has always been partisan and served as an integral part of the military regime's repressive apparatus. The Constitution has had little meaning due to the universal veto power of the President. Consolidation of peace will require independence of these agencies of restraint. In particular, the leadership of these agencies should be either elected directly or confirmed by representative bodies.

#### **4.3.2. The economic problem**

Building lasting peace requires solving a certain number of critical economic problems facing the country. Some of these problems are part of the causes of conflict while others are a result of the conflict. But even those economic problems that may seem unrelated to conflict need to be addressed to ameliorate the standards of living of the population and overcome poverty. Poverty may not cause conflict, but a solid economy is essential for political stability and peace consolidation. Poverty produces two effects that are detrimental to peace building. First, poverty erodes the relationship between the people and the state. A state that is economically impotent is unable to perform its other essential non-economic roles, including enforcing the rule of law. Second, poverty increases the temptation for using the state as a source of wealth accumulation. When the returns to investment in politics exceed the returns to labor and capital in the private sector, agents tend to channel energy and resources towards capturing the state, which inevitably creates instability and leads to conflict. Consequently, economic performance is a vital ingredient for building lasting peace.

Even as the country struggles to finance its immense reconstruction needs, its 2003, Burundi spent 65.8 percent of its exports revenues on debt service, up from 39.3 percent in 2000. By comparison the government spent \$3 per capita on health care in 2001; but paid \$5 per capita on servicing debt owed to official

creditors alone. Even as debt accumulated, less funds stayed in the country while large proportion of the resources were transferred abroad. Official development aid and other forms of official assistance dried out since the start of the 1993 conflict. The best way for the international community to help Burundi achieve lasting peace is to write off its debts and to increase official development aid to finance economic recovery. Debt write offs and new aid obviously should be conditional on commitment to democratic governance by the new leadership. In particular, implementation of the Arusha and Pretoria accords should be a key criterion for aid disbursement. Pressure for debt write-offs for post-conflict reconstruction has gained momentum with the United States' pressure for cancellation of Iraqi's debt on the basis of the odious debt doctrine. Obviously the same argument applies to the majority of developing countries, including Burundi. The population of these countries should not bear the burden of debts that were used to finance regimes that oppressed them. The recent decision by the G8 government to write off more debt for HIPC countries is a promising sign. However, more needs to be done to enlarge to pool of relief recipients and to establish mechanisms that prevent new cycles of debt crises.

#### **4.3.3. Education**

In the post-conflict era, education policy has to pursue two objectives that are equally important for peace building: increase the efficiency in resource allocation to maximize human capital formation and promote equity in access to education across ethnic groups and regions. We emphasize two strategies that could help in this transformation of the education system.

The first strategy is to design and implement a financial aid scheme for college education. Since recently, there has been an expansion in private higher education in the country, which has contributed to alleviating pressure on the public university. However, private universities are expensive and the majority of the population cannot afford them. Moreover, nowhere in the world has any

country been able to establish a solid higher education system without a network of first class public universities. With the support of the development assistance community, the government needs to establish a subsidized loan program that allows all academically qualifying students to afford education. The government will need to design mechanisms that allow maximum repayment of student loans to ensure sustainability of the program.

The second policy is to increase the decentralization of secondary education by increasing subsidies to district high schools. Foreign assistance to education should consider the two objectives of reform of the education system as central to decisions regarding allocation and disbursement of development assistance.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **5. Conclusion and Recommendation**

This chapter deals will try and craft recommendations as well as solutions to the problems discussed. It is essential as it discusses the main findings obtained in the study by drawing together the results from the previous chapters. It deals with measures that the Burundian community should take to break the deadlock. This is important for maintaining peace and socio-economic development in Burundi and the African continent at large.

#### **5.1. Conclusion**

The socio-political conflict in Burundi is a vertical dilemma for the government and development practitioners with broader implications for the Greater Horn Region. True development has not been able to take hold because "good" government has been absent from the Burundian experience since its independence in 1964. Bilateral donors such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and development institutions like Africare, Action Aid, World Vision, etc, can only play a "catalyst" role as nations develop practices and policies favorable for governance and development.

While the new Burundian leadership bears the burden of crafting and implementing political and socio-economic reforms, the international community also has a critical role to play for the success these reforms. Given a long history of patrimonialism, certain interest groups may invest in protecting the privileges acquired under the old regimes and sabotage the reforms. The experience of 1993 with the assassination of the democratically elected president demonstrated that this legacy of patrimonialism is a serious constraint to policy reform. The international community can use its leverage through financial aid as well as military intervention to contain such sectarian tendencies on all sides.

The international community should also assist in financial peace building and economic recovery. However politically blind interventions are detrimental to peace building. The development assistance community should scrutinize the distributional impacts of foreign aid. For example, aid to education can play a critical role in helping the country to correct the effects of the legacy of exclusion. In particular, the country would benefit immensely from channeled to funding complete decentralization of high school education and a student loan program for tertiary education. Such an orientation of aid to education would serve to alleviate the pressure on the government budget and contribute to equalization of educational opportunities across ethnic group and regions.

The African Union (AU), through its Mechanism, clearly has an increasingly important role to play in the management of conflict on the African continent. The conflict in places like Burundi has put immense pressure on Africa's leadership to come up with real time solutions. The AU lack of resources, especially financially, denies it the freedom to unilaterally decide on the strategically, tactical and operational aspects of peace operations which it may wish to initiate.

Reliance, on foreign donors means that donors can influence those missions, which the AU can initiate, and those, which it cannot. This reality has an important implication on the AU charter. If the United Nations (UN) were to delegate ore conflict management responsibilities to the African Union, as knight (2001: 49) suggested, it would have to, at the same time, provide it with the necessary resources to carry out its enlarged mandate, without a variety of national strings attached to such support.

Burundi's problem of reaching settlement between the dominant Tutsi and the majority political Hutu grouping still remains a source of serious and ongoing conflict. There is an urgent need to create a regional forum where all role-players in the sub-region can raise issues which have inter and intra-national

implications for regional security. By creating this co-operation, a less partisan and less chauvinistic identity could be created, which could have major long-term benefits for all the parties concerned.

The former mediator of the Arusha Process, Nelson Mandela, clearly emphasized the importance of Burundi's reconstruction at a donor conference in December 2000, when he explained that,

"Our commitment to seeing this conference come about is due to our belief that the political progress needs to be accompanied by social and economic progress. It must be made possible for the people of Burundi to materially distinguish between the destructiveness of conflicts and the benefits of peace"

The process of ending the culture of impunity in Burundi and enabling its judicial system to play its key role in achieving a durable peace within the country will be a slow and delicate process. Two steps, however, are pertinent for immediate implementation: the parties should agree principle about the subject of impunity and justice, and any new atrocities committed by any party should promptly be prosecuted.

There would be no salvation for Burundi until it has exorcised its past, thereby paving the way towards national reconciliation. The common purpose of a developed Burundi is to transform its war theatre, its implements and related mentality into good governance with development tools and resources.

## **5.2. Recommendations**

The term of National Assembly expired in 1999 and the three-year transition period declared by Buyoya came to an end. The international community should therefore support the established transitional government tasked with overseeing and contributing to the process of internal dialogue and with taking part in the external, regional peace process. Both the Hutu and Tutsi transitional governing

period should be given all the support and respect they need so as to transform Burundi and develop it.

An internal dialogue between all the parties to Burundi's conflicts is an essential component of the wider peace process. Dialogue needs to be strengthened, broadened and deepened. It should be underpinned by measures designed to build the confidence of all factions of society in the peace process.

This will take time and require an imaginative approach. Initiatives that might be considered include exchanges between representatives of Burundian society and those of other societies affected by conflict; financial seminars that bring together opposing groups to explore options for peaceful co-habitation; support for reconciliation projects; the dispatch of multi-ethnic delegations to the countryside to explain the process to the communities and seek their views.

The negative effects of the economic blockade have come to outweigh any positive effects it may have had (e.g. it did not stop the conflicts between the rebels and government troops. It only made the poor poorer, the rich, richer). Continuity further with the same policy risks hindering the process of internal dialogue, fuelling extremist elements in Burundi society and contributing to a dangerous destabilization of the situation.

A regional summit that will deal with the lifting of the economic blockade till the sealing of the Arusha negotiations should be convened. This will help in making the regional leaders agree on lifting the sanction.

Sub-committees that will focus on specific issues like counselling economic development, new constitution, etc, should be created. Each sub-committee should be presided by co-mediators. The set of issues agreed during the preliminary talks in Rome and Peace Accord signing should be used as basis on which to structure the agenda. The co-mediators should adhere strictly to the

principle of neutrality, they should not actively advocate one solution or another, and should seek to build up the trust and respect of all participants. The co-mediators should seek to build up the trust and respect of all participants. The co-mediators should be Africans but drawn from the countries of the region.

Once the negotiations have begun, the venue should be taken to another place than Tanzania, because all potential parties no longer see it as a neutral territory. Recent seminars and conferences boasted by UNESCO in Paris and by Synergies in Fibourg have shown that the parties are ready to meet outside Arusha.

The issue of impunity needs to be addressed as matter of urgency. The constant recall of pat killing and exchanges of accusations of atrocities is an obstacle of reconciliation and dialogue. In the absence of a functioning International Criminal Court or an Ad hoc War crimes Tribunal for Burundi, consideration should be given to the establishment of a truth commission based on the South African model or Research Commission tasked with investigating all massacres since independence.

In addition, the international community should be ready to send both financial and technical assistance to help to improve the functioning and strengthen the independence of the judiciary. In the short-term, the emphasis should be on sending judiciary observers and trainers to help demonstrate the separation of judicial and executive powers. In the longer-term, reform the recruitment and education of judges and lawyers of both communities will be necessary to help re-balance the judiciary and build public trust in the system and honesty judiciary from the officials.

Development assistance aid has an important role to play in helping to rebuild Burundi, restart economic activity and lay the basis of future, stable development. To avoid the risk that funding might be diverting in to military or security force

budget, donors should seek to distribute aid at a local level, through, for example selective, direct investment in micro agricultural project, infrastructural projects in the more stable provinces, small enterprises, diversification of production, employment created programs, civil society organisations and independent media projects. Repatriation of Burundian refugees currently sheltering in Tanzania, Zaire, Rwanda, and other neighboring countries would remove an important source of tension in the relationship between Burundi and other countries. A repatriation program has been agreed already by all the countries and UNFCR. This should be implemented as soon as practicable.

Support effort to strengthen and create organization for the different professional, rural, and other sector that are presently poorly organized or not organized at all. Supporting a system of local peace committee structures (based on South African models) to empower communities to play an active role in addressing issues that lead to conflict and became motivated and empowered to create multi-ethnic cooperation in bringing violence to an end.

A coordinated effort at understanding the needs of the country, and more fundamentally, the state's absorptive capacity, is needed to avoid disbursing aid simply for immediate emergency needs. Previous donor strategies of dealing solely with the Burundian state reinforced state control over the economy, and indirectly supported the unbalanced distribution of resources and discriminatory policies that consolidated power in the elites. This broad level of engagement between the NGOs, the donor community and the state must be effectively coordinated to avoid duplication of activities.

While it is understood that primary policies and legislation regarding the post-transition period must be set in place before overall "reconstruction" gets underway, the lack of implementation of the recommendations agreed to in Arusha does not bode well for the immediate future. Indeed, the accords reflect what the parties themselves deemed important for a post-war Burundi.

Therefore, the legal and regulatory vacuum that currently exists with regard to fundamental issues such as land tenure is a major indictment against the transitional government. Moreover increasing levels of banditry, vigilantism, and widespread human rights abuses reflect a society that feels completely disempowered by elite politics. Political peace is therefore insufficient in the absence of concerted investment in the long-term social and economic development of Burundi. In this context, reconstruction must be accompanied by a transformation of the entrenched culture of patrimonialism and discrimination.

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