

**A scenario analysis of NATO's future
(2000- 2010)**

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Afrikaanse opsomming

In die verhandeling is NAVO (Noord Atlantiese Verdrags-organisasie) as 'n voorbeeld geneem om die relevansie van scenario ontwikkeling binne die Internasionale politiek te toets. Om dit te doen is die ontstaansgronde van NAVO bespreek. Dit is gedoen uit 'n histories-chronologiese perspektief waarby relevante terme en teorieë uit Internasionale Politiek gebruik is. In hoofstuk twee is die metodologie wat in die verhandeling gebruik word verduidelik. Hoofstuk drie het NAVO in die Koue Oorlog bespreek, waarna daar in hoofstuk vier die einde van die bipolêre wêreldorde verduidelik is. Hoofstuk vyf het NAVO se reaksie op hierdie situasie verduidelik aan die hand van, die strukture van NAVO en moontlike veranderinge daarin asook verskillende optredes van NAVO sedert 1991. Hoofstuk ses sluit nou aan by hoofstuk twee want die teorie en die praktyk word in die hoofstuk byeengebring. Die voorafgaande hoofstukke het die grondslag voorsien en in hoofstuk ses is konseptuele raamwerke/scenarios geformuleer wat alternatiewe toekomste op die tafel kon plaas vir NAVO in 'n era van verandering. Hoofstuk sewe is die slothoofstuk en die gevolgtrekking wat deur die studie moontlik gemaak is, word daar weergegee.

Dit is bevind dat:

- Scenario-ontwikkeling noodsaaklik is in Internasionale Politieke analise;
- Dat scenarios in die geval van hierdie studie baie konsepte in verband kon plaas en dat sinvolle konseptuele raamwerke geformuleer kon word.
- Die raamwerke is nie uitsluitlik nie, hulle is heuristiese konstrunkte wat verdere ondersoek aanmoedig.

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CHAPTER ONE: CHANGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM

1.1 Introduction

All that remains unchanged is change. The Communist party's power in the USSR began to erode in 1980 due to Gorbachev's reformist policies. These included, "peristroyka", "glasnost" and equally important, policies aimed at the enhancement of powers of the constituent republics of the USSR. The collapse of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe hastened the communist party's decline and by mid 1991 its membership had dwindled considerably. After the USSR legalised opposition in February 1990, freely elected legislatures in some republics imposed restrictions on Communist Party activities. On the 21st of December 1991 the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ceased to exist. In 1991 scholars, strategists, politicians and soldiers had to change the way they thought, spoke and wrote about the world. The institutionalised EAST - WEST conflict had come to an end. Time and reality were putting institutions, policies and policymakers before new and in some cases unforeseen circumstances. NATO was no exemption; the reason for its creation has just seized to exist (Grant, 1992:385).

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, NATO, was established on the 4th of April 1949. The most destructive war in human history, (World War II), had

ended and the Cold War was just beginning. The realist perception that the international order could be defined as anarchic¹ was the dominant perspective in political thought (Calvocoressi, 1987:15 - 16; Viotti & Kauppi, 1993: 49 - 53). In those days, many Western leaders saw the policies of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as the first steps to World War III, especially the blockade of Berlin and the forced alignment of Eastern Europe with the Soviet Union (McWilliams & Piotrowski, 1990:1). With the collapse of the USSR, NATO was confronted with two crises:

- The first crisis was a crisis of political and strategic chaos that emerged as the USSR “unbundled”, some former republics armed with nuclear warheads.
- The second crisis was an organisational crisis. What happens when the reason for your existence implodes?

Security was the most important goal for the victors of World War II. NATO resulted from this need for a mutual security treaty and “...brought into being an alliance of independent countries with a common interest in maintaining peace and *defending their freedom through political solidarity and adequate military defence...*”(NATO, 1995: 17 & Munro & Chant, 1995: 6). This alliance became one of the “poles” of the bipolar (i.e. East - West) world in which mould the international community was sculpted from 1950 to 1991. NATO thus survived as organization from 1950 through

¹ Anarchic, within the realist school of thought, refers to the absence of any authority. Some states are clearly more powerful than others, but there is no recognised authority higher than that of any state. The international system is thus a system where the state or a grouping of states can do anything, the only constraint being their limited power or the limits another state, or grouping of states can impose (Viotti & Kauppi, 1993: 50).

“...a period of remarkable global transformation.”(Schwartz, Leyden and Hyatt, 2000: 2) For these two reasons NATO was chosen to study:

1. NATO was and is extremely important as International Organization
2. NATO survived (and might survive even further) fundamental International uncertainty.

Every publication concerned with the newly changed- (and still changing-) international politics argues towards democracy, globalism, global human rights and concerns for our environment. However, a review of the literature has failed to reveal any studies examining the future relevance and success of NATO. No one has paused to examine why NATO seems to be regarded as a necessity. The central problem on which this study will focus is, the question of what NATO's possible futures may look like given its history and the fact that NATO is still regarded as a necessity even after the Cold War ended, this will be examined using scenario methodology. (Paragraph 1.4.4)

The central theoretical premise of this study is that NATO, as an Intergovernmental Organisation, (IGO); with a specific goal is an example of successful multilevel adaptation. It is likely that this change will continue. Certain relevant facts for the changing NATO, the study of dynamic study objects and the NATO of the future can be extrapolated from this study. This can be done through the use of scenarios. Scenario method is a heuristic device (Van der Heijden 1996: 27) that postulates possible outcomes (futures) for NATO and will, by the nature of the method, be the vehicle through which thoughts about NATO will be focused in four different directions. As such

scenario thinking have already been applied with success to International politics. Nye:1993,180-189.)

1.2 Study goals

The primary goal of this study will be to generate possible futures (scenarios/outcomes) for NATO during the first decade of the new millennium.

To attain this goal, certain questions need to be addressed and these are:

- What methodology will be applied in this study?
- Can scenario methodology be used in analysis?
- What possible futures can be assessed concerning NATO?
- What patterns can be discerned in NATO's actions and
- What does this imply for the future of the alliance?

These questions will lead to the recognition of events, trends and structure that pertains to NATO and from which possible futures can be deduced.

1.3 Research method

The research method employed in this study will be one of a critical analysis of relevant literature synthesis in Nato's electronic information services. A thorough examination of the available databases in South Africa (Social Sciences Index; NAVO; GKPV; NIDS; NEXUS) have indicated that there is a certain lack of academic sources dealing with this topic, especially in terms of a scenario-study. This would be one of the major contributions of this dissertation. Scenario development is a natural extension of this dynamic situation wherein NATO now finds itself and scenarios or possible outcomes concerning NATO will be developed. Scenarios are defined by Venter (1999)

as “a conceptual description, verbal or written, of the future, based on a specific process with the incorporation of cause and effect.” According to Van der Heijden (1996:95) "Scenario planning operates in the area where uncertainty is a major factor... in the situation"...and uncertainty and change go hand in hand.

Theories, terminological perspectives and conceptualisation will be added to clarify and enhance analysis throughout the study. The basis for the inclusion of these academic aspects will be eclectic and will have to take the dynamic nature of the subject into account.

Through a technological advantage, namely electronic access to NATO data, this material will be extensively used in this study.

1.4 Central concepts

This study will focus on certain central concepts. The following is designed to define these concepts and give definitive meaning to these central aspects in the study. It is necessary to do this as soon as possible to negate any possible misunderstanding.


1.4.1 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

NATO is a regional security alliance designed to be used as a framework for co-operation in military, political, economic and social matters. The alliance afforded Western Europe the protection of the US nuclear deterrent and an integrated military structure was established by the signatories to the treaty that brought the alliance into being (Plano & Olton, 1988:320).

1.4.2 Organisational Change

"Organisations and their contexts are dynamic and are constantly undergoing change" (Dessler, 1986:442). Change occurs by changing the structure-, the people- and/or the technology of the organisation. Conflict is inescapable in any process of change. (Venter, 1997:17) discerns three phases in a change process namely, "farewell to the past", "turbulence" and "the new beginning." The turbulent phase is characterised by confusion and uncertainty. The following is a model of how organisations change:

Figure 1: Organizational Change




From figure 1 we can see that:

- Change is a process.
- Change is continual.
- Change brings about adaptation and adaptation brings new change. Thus change is a dynamic process.

1.4.3 Scenarios

"*Scenario planning operates in the area where uncertainty is a major factor...in the situation*" (Van der Heijden, 1996:95). When you have the opposite of a static definable environment, rather what Venter (1999:2) calls "...a moving target," then, scenario generation and use become productive tools. Change in an organisation put the organisation in "flux" (figure 2, below) where many possible outcomes to a process of change could result. (Van der Heijden, 1996:30 and Nye, 1994:83). The "flux phase" in a process of change, marked in green, below, is the area in which scenarios operate. Venter (1999:2) calls this phase "turbulence" and takes conflict and uncertainty that occur during a process of change into account. Turbulence excludes almost all aspects of definability and predictability. It is fundamentally an area of uncertainty. (Scenarios, possible outcomes and possible futures all denote the same meaning. Each has its own connotations, but in this study these terms will be used as synonyms.)

Figure 2: Flux

(Van der Heijden, 1996:82)

Given that organisations are constantly changing and that uncertainty is a major factor in change, scenario development is a useful and even necessary scientific tool. Scenarios deal with the tension between the need to predict and the fact that no one knows the future (Nye, 1994:82). Scenarios are not predictions. Predictions are made when there is a stable and predictable environment out of which predictions can be formulated. Flux and turbulence does not provide this environment.

The accepted definition of scenarios, for the purposes of this study is: "Scenarios can thus be described as conceptual descriptions, verbal or written, of the future, that differs structurally from one another, based on a specific process with the incorporation of cause and effect." Venter (1999:11).

1.4.4 Scenarios in International Politics

It has already been noted that scenario formulation is a useful scientific tool when dealing with certain situations where change or flux is one of the definite factors that need to be held in scientific account. "...No one knows the future." Robert Jervis (1991:39) recounts eight reasons why it is difficult to predict the course of International politics. These reasons are:

- Social scientists have only a limited stock of knowledge to rely on and there are few laws whose validity is not contested.
- Only rarely does a single factor determine the way politics will work out.
- Actors may pay attention to academic theories and this may influence their behaviour in such a way that the theories may be rendered incorrect.
- National behaviour and International policy outcomes are not entirely determined by the external environment. Choice and other unpredictables play a pertinent role.
- The current world situation is unprecedented.
- When elements are tightly inter-connected, as they are in international politics, changes in one part of the system produce ramifications and feedback loops in other elements.
- With complex interaction and constant feedback, prediction is inherently problematic, as the multiple pathways through which the system will respond to a stimulus are difficult to trace after the fact, let alone ahead of time.

- Particular events can send politics down different pathways. Chance and accidents play a large role.

"Yet consciously or not foreign policy makers constantly make predictions. Facts about crucial international issues are rarely conclusive...to help policy makers interpret the available facts, to suggest alternative patterns that available facts might fit, to provide informed assessments of the range and likelihood of possible outcomes..." (Nye,1994:83). What Nye described as "possible outcomes," is worth nothing and given the above description and definitions of scenarios, it becomes clear that "possible outcomes" are what scenarios are all about. Nye uses this method in his book *Understanding International Conflicts* (1993) and his possible outcomes are dealt with in this study in chapter three. The use of scenarios of International relations has become a well-developed field. For the purpose of this dissertation I will only refer to the work of Joseph Nye and Robert Jervis. Both of these scholars point out the tension between the study of International relations, prediction and the unknowable future. In the light of the above-described tensions, this study will make extensive use of scenario methodology to overcome the limitations of prediction. Scenarios are, however, not "soft predictions" but rather conceptual frameworks that differ substantially from each other proposing possible future outcomes.

The method of scenario development start with the recognition of

- **events** - issues in the day to day operation of NATO ;

- **trends and patterns** - that are revealed once several events have been studied and a causal relationship have been discovered; and
- **structure** - this is the underlying factor in both trend and event and comprises macro orientations in a system, organisation or community (Venter, 1999:5). Further explanation of this method follows in Chapter 6.

The relevance of this study is situated in the fact that new insights can be gained about modern political collective security, about NATO as institution and where NATO could be in ten years time, when Nato's reaction to fundamental change is examined.

An analysis of Nato's future is also important for South Africa who has trade relations with most NATO countries, and may well become a member of the UN Security Council. This body of the UN seems to be delegating duties to NATO (Fedarko, 1995:26 - 33).

All study questions thus far stated will be accomplished in the following chapter division. In the following chapter the Scenario methodology will be further explained so that it can be applied in chapter 7. In chapter three the origin of NATO will be described in terms of chronological development and the international relations theory. In chapters 4, 5 and 6 the end of the Cold War, NATO's reaction to this, and new challenges to NATO will be described. In so doing, the background, essential to the question of why NATO was created, will be given. It will also become clear what NATO was, is and could be.

CHAPTER TWO: SCENARIO METHODOLOGY

2.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter an introduction was given to the method used in this study. This was a broad description and touched on the broader aspects of the methodology of this study. The goal of this chapter is to describe the method of scenario application. This has to be done because the ultimate goal of this study is to formulate scenarios for NATO. In order to describe the method of scenario application, scenarios will be defined, the difference between prediction and scenario development will be explained, the choice of scenario development for the purposes of this study will also be set forth. The scenarios will be examined in terms of scenario building blocks, namely: the conceptual iceberg model, the conceptual structural-dynamic and the conceptual scenario matrix. First of all certain definitions must be looked at.

2.2. Defining scenarios

Porter as quoted in Ringland (1998:2), defines a scenario as "...an internally consistent view of what might turn out to be - not a forecast, but one possible future outcome." A more comprehensive definition is however offered by Venter (1999:11) and for the purposes of this study this is the accepted definition. "A scenario can thus be described as a conceptual description, verbal or written, of the future, based on a specific process with the incorporation of cause and effect." One of the main ingredients of scenarios

is causality and the main question in the development of a scenario is: given certain "causes"; what effects could there be? In the case of this study of NATO, scenarios are tools to discover where NATO might be in ten years time.

Scenarios do however have to conform to certain prerequisites to be of value.

These factors are:

- Scenarios must be relevant and they must make an impact on the strategic framework.
- Good scenarios would reflect internal consistency and would be perceived by users to be internally consistent.
- Good scenarios would describe different futures, rather than variations on a theme.
- Good scenarios would describe futures that would be possible for a period of time, rather than highly transient ones.
- Scenarios can be used to keep key uncertainties on the strategic planning and management agenda.
- Good scenarios would be part of the management of change.
- Good scenarios would also be useful in creative problem solving.
- Good scenarios would cover a wide range of possibilities and would pinpoint competitive situations (Venter, 1999:6).

The steps that must be followed to generate a good scenario are the following:

- Define the scenario-spectrum and area of the scenario.
- Identify the role players.

- Identify the key un-notable's.
- Identify the key uncertainties.
- Construct intermediate scenarios.
- Evaluate the intermediate scenarios.
- Reformulate the scenarios.
- Identify new needs.
- Reformulate the scenarios.
- Develop the final scenarios.

2.3 The difference between prediction and scenario development.

Scenarios solve the problems that beset predictions because they do not pretend to be predictions and work in a different way. Prediction is sometimes severely hampered and beset by problems (Jervis, 1991:39). Two of the problems concerning NATO are:

- (1) The international system is still an emerging order and even if a foolproof classification could be made it might only last a short time. The international system would still be dynamic and ever changing (Schwartz, Leyden & Hyatt, 2000:2),
- (2) NATO is in the process of changing and are most definitely in a state of flux (NATO 1995: 29) & (Schwartz, Leyden & Hyatt, 2000:13.)

The methods employed in making data a tool for working into the future or when an organization is in a phase of flux, need to be very flexible and purposefully designed to cope with just this sort of unpredictability. Van der Heijden (1996), Ringland (1998), and Venter (1999), details a method of data

analysis that fit these requirements. *"Scenario planning operates in the area where uncertainty is a major factor ... in the situation. Scenarios provide structure for new data"* (Van der Heijden, 1996:95). When you have the opposite of a definable environment, rather what Venter (1999:2) calls "...a moving target", then, in that situation scenario generation and use becomes a productive analytical tool.

These scholars acknowledge that there are facts that remain fundamentally uncertain and promulgate that scenarios work in this area of uncertainty by tracking that which is certain. In the previous chapter of this study traceable certainties have been discovered. These can be developed further by way of scenarios.

2.4 Why a scenario analysis?

Many dramatic changes have occurred since 1991, the characterisation of the international system has changed. This is mainly due to the fact that the USSR and the Warsaw Pact have ceased to exist. The Bipolar International System is something of the past. (Said et al., 1995:106 - 108; Kegley & Wittkopf, 1995: 105). An age of development has dawned in which many questions are asked that seemed inconceivable a decade ago. For example: What is the nature of the new global order? Can Russia join NATO? Is the world entering into a new type of global capitalism? (Said et al., 1995:106; Zakaria, 1998:2; Yergin, 1998:28). The tanks of the East Block and those of the West block no longer confront each other in the streets of Berlin, or elsewhere. NATO's inceptional motivation has, therefore, apparently

disappeared. The context (historical, ideological, theoretical and analytic) that led to the establishment of NATO is no longer as applicable today as it was fifty years ago. Yet, NATO has remained one of the most important and seemingly successful intergovernmental organisations. Clarke (1944:22) states that, "...the alliance continues to attract support within diplomatic, political and analytic circles." For the reason of dramatic change where NATO is concerned, a scenario analysis is the best way "...to stretch thinking about the future and widen the range of alternatives considered..." (Porter, 1998:VII).


2.5 The conceptual model

To explain the analogy between this model and an Iceberg only two seventh's of an Iceberg is visible above the water line. In any major political shift only a part of what causes the shift is possible to read, say for instance, in the newspaper. That what we do see does not control the shift, that which lies beneath the water level, the structure and the trend provide the major motivational causes. A clear categorisation of data is necessary and is provided by the Iceberg model (figure 3). This categorisation provides the building block for scenarios and places data into:

- A first level of general **events** and issues, that are usually easy to spot;
- A second level of **trends or patterns** that are revealed once several events are studied and revealed to have a causal relationship.
- A third level, or **the structure**, underlines the first two and comprises macro and fundamental orientations in a system, organisation or community or the values of that system, organisation or community

(Venter, 1999:5-7). A graphic representation of the relationships between these factors can be seen below (figure 3) in the iceberg model.

Figure 3: The conceptual model (Iceberg model)



(Venter, 1999:7 & Van der Heijden, 1996:98 & Ackoff, 1999:6-8).

2.5.1 Trends, patterns and scenarios.


The events detailed in chapter 3 describe the international system in the post World War II world. This system became the bipolar international system. In chapter 4 this rapid change was described as bipolarity disintegrated. There were thus fundamental changes in the **structures**, the bottom of the pyramid. NATO reacted to this along the rules set by the sort of organisation that NATO is, and that is a military alliance. Thus certain **trends and patterns** could be discerned and these are grouped into military-, and political integration of the alliance and the perceived threat level to the alliance. These indicators were chosen in the light of the definitions of NATO, alliances and deterrence that was given in chapter two "...as such an alliance is a configuration of power wherein the state seeks security and the opportunity to advance its national

interests by linking its power with that of one or more states with similar interests" (Plano & Olton, 1988:17).

2.5.2 Structural-dynamic model

This conceptual model is the model that explains the structural dynamic model out of which scenarios can be formulated. In the case of the conceptual model the concept of the structural dynamic model will be described. From this conceptual model the scenario matrix can more easily understood.

Figure 4: The conceptual structural model



(See comprehensive model p. 85)

In each scenario, structural factors (for instance the collapse of the bipolar system) as explained in the iceberg model interact with key actors (for instance China) and key issues (for instance NATO's expansion). While this interaction is taking place NATO may be busy

with a dominant group of actions set to achieve certain goals. Together these interacting forces impact on the possible future that NATO is moving towards. The individual scenario matrix explains the individual future while the structural-dynamic model forms the bedrock from which the scenario is formed (Venter, 1999: 2-5). To determine the variables concerned, intensive study is necessary and this will be done in the following chapters.

2.5.3 The scenario matrix

The scenario matrix is the three dimensional axis which creates the space for the placement of a scenario. This matrix cannot be randomly created. It must take the fundamental, definable characteristics that could have an impact on the study object into account. In the case of NATO the following axis can be extrapolated from a definition of NATO:


NATO was created by *political will* that amounted to *mutual- national- security- goal- integration* (i.e.: **(1) political goal integration**), to **(2) integrate military** power for deterrence purposes in the face of a **(3) perceived threat**.

Political goal integration stems from the fact that all the NATO countries integrated their will toward a certain goal. The goal can be defined as mutual security. Towards this goal they pledged military power to be integrated in the NATO military system. This was done in the face of a perceived threat.

These three factors are thus the major trends along which NATO operates and from where the change of the organisation may come, given the clear

changes in structure. These factors have not remained constant and have caused changes along the axis described above. Examples of fluctuation can be given: the most recent being a US diplomat stating, "...the French are not doing their job... "[In Kosovo] (Fisher, 1999:26). Another matter was the not so recent nuclear tests by the French and the sinking of the Rainbow Warrior, a flagship of the Green Peace Organisation (Menon, 1995:19-23) & (Grant, 1991:371). Then there is of course US's stand against Cuba in its bid to isolate that state (Grant, 1991:311).

Figure 5: The Scenario Matrix



In figure 5 the three axis relevant to the scenario are indicated. All the indicators start at a minimum and work outward toward a maximum. Points a, b and c indicate the relative position relevant to a particular scenario. The

area in between, connected by the black dotted line indicate the scenario space which in the case above, describes a high level of threat perception, a low level of military integration and a moderate level of political integration.

2.6 Conclusion

Just like any other scientific endeavour the scenario method has pro's and con's. On the negative side:

- It must be noted in the summary of this chapter that the main point of critique against the scenario method is that it is not prediction and thus not precise.
- Scenarios operate in an area where absolute control is not possible.
- A change in one indicator can imply changes in one or more scenarios.
- Continued change can validate some scenarios while other may seem irrelevant.
- Scenarios are not exercises in precise mathematics.
- Scenarios do not deliver a clear-cut answer, just a framework wherein relevant and important concepts are organised through study and the existence of a causal relationship.

On the positive side:

- Scenarios work in the air of unpredictability, in the "engine room" of change where everything is in flux thus, unsure.
- It is not a loose and unstructured method but rather a way to open a subject to allow a great extent of variables to interact and create a

possible future for the subject in which the scientist aims to discover future possibilities.

- Scenarios create space for policy development.
- It creates the intellectual space “to think outside the box”.
- It creates alternative options
- It breaks down idolised dogma

Scenarios as methods for scientific analysis were explained in this chapter. The discovery of the variables that effect NATO is the function of the next chapters. In so doing the scenario method will be applied and possible outcome will be postulated.

CHAPTER 3: NATO AND THE COLD WAR

3.1 Introduction

NATO is a mutual security treaty Organization designed to provide peace in the North Atlantic area through mutual defence (Plano & Olton, 1988:173). As such, it is described by Bennett (1988:354) as a "regional arrangement capable of mobilisation for collective defence." These two definitions clearly imply the existence of a perceived threat. In 1945, when the North Atlantic Treaty was signed such a threat was indeed perceived by the signatories.

The wartime alliance between the United States (US) Britain and the Soviet Union (USSR) were breaking up. Europe was being divided into two hostile camps; one in Eastern Europe, already dominated by the Soviet Union, the other in Western Europe (Cross, 1996:94). The latter was soon to be rescued from political and economic collapse by the United States when the new American President, Harry S. Truman came to power. He recognised that the wartime allies had been "deceived" by the USSR and Josef Stalin (Matanle, 1989:388). The forward flash point of the new conflict, soon termed the Cold War, between East and West was the divided Germany and its divided capital, Berlin, lying deep in the Soviet zone of occupation.

Given this circumstances the great powers (i.e. the victors of the Second World War) sought security through a series of regional pacts in which the United States (US) took the initiative. (The US remains the leader of NATO

as the USSR remained the leader of the Warsaw Pact.) The Rio-treaty followed and then, on April 4, 1949 NATO was established (Bennet, 1988:355 & Plano and Olton, 1988:173). The goal of this chapter is to describe the causal events that led to the establishment and maintenance of NATO until 1989. These events are historical and theoretical in nature and will be dealt with under these separate headings.

Firstly a purely historical timeline must be given to establish what caused the formation of the alliance. Then a theoretical perspective will be given, showing the theories intertwined in history. By describing the nature of the theory behind NATO and the historical events that led to its formation, the reason for its formation will be clear. Firstly however, the historical motivation for NATO as organisation.

3.2 NATO: A historical perspective

Under the above-mentioned heading, events leading to the formation of NATO will be described. This will be done without any deliberate attempt at clarification. The causality of these events is the important element and will be made clear through concise ordering according to date. The partitioning in a specific period, marks significant events in the chain of causality.

3.2.1 1945 to 1949

On May 8, 1945, victory in Europe was officially declared while Japan surrendered on December 2nd of the same year. This brought the most destructive war in human history to a close (Cross, 1996:93). But in reality

this was the start of "...political division and brinkmanship which lasted into the eighties. The American and Soviet troops may have mingled amid the rejoicing in May 1945, but there has been precious little joy in Eastern Europe since" (Mantale, 1989:388). The Cold War had by this time, already begun. The Cold War, according to Plano and Olton (1988:206) was the extreme state of tension and hostility that developed between the Western powers and the Communist block of Eastern Europe after World War II. The task of establishing a New World order fell to these two power blocks in 1945. During the war the "Big Three": Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill met, not only to discuss plans pertaining to war, but also to the peace that would follow.

Throughout the late 1940s the US assumption was that the Soviet Union was preparing for an attack on Western Europe. This view was reinforced by the Russian (Communist) actions in Czechoslovakia, Romania and Berlin in the years between 1945 and 1949. The thought of an expansionist Soviet Union captured Western thought and when Harry S. Truman became president a policy of "containment" of the Soviet Union was put into place. The Truman Doctrine provided, for example, for extended funding for the governments of Greece and Turkey to combat communism (Clark, 1992:275).

According to "The Truman Doctrine" the US resolved to "...support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures" The view that the Soviet Union had a policy of expansionism was taken for granted after the forced abdication, by

communists, of the Romanian monarch and the establishment of the Peoples Democracy in Czechoslovakia, also a communist regime (Grant, 1982:281).

The first serious conflict of the Cold War however was the blockade of Berlin by the Soviet Union in 1948. All land traffic between the West and the Western sector of Berlin was cut and only Allied resolve and the Truman Doctrine kept the Russians out of West Berlin.

This containment policy had a definite military dimension and in 1949 the United States created NATO and hereby succeeded in boxing the Soviet Union in on its Western (European) flank. One person's containment is another's encirclement and Stalin responded (McWilliams, 1990:44).

3.2.2 1949 – 1960

Stalin demanded heavy sacrifices from the people of the USSR in order to release the resources necessary to defend the homeland. Work was difficult, forced and low personal returns were the norm. The Soviet research and development in modern weapons was pushed along at a pace and soon produced an A-bomb (nuclear weapon), long-range aircraft and different classes of tactical and strategic missiles. By the mid-1950's the USA was, for the first time, vulnerable to massive destruction (Baylis et al., 1987:62). With the creation of this capability and the build-up of conventional and nuclear forces by both sides, the political division of Europe was given "military overtones" that would prove hard to dispel. Further developments enhanced this perception.

In March 1954 a separate state, the German Democratic Republic, was formed. This marked the end of the occupation of Western Germany and the introduction of the new state into NATO. The USSR strenuously opposed the amalgamation. This opposition failed and the USSR created a counter pole for NATO, the Warsaw Pact of which East Germany became a member in 1955 (Calvocoressi, 1988:19). Any possibility of détente was literally shot down in May 1960 when a US spy-plane, a U-2, was shot down by the Russians over their territory. The pilot and instrumentation was captured and this proved that the nature of the pilot's mission was espionage (Calvocoressi, 1988:25). As a result the Cold War grew in intensity and thus, "colder".

3.2.3 1960 – 1989

During the night of the 12th and 13th of August 1960 the Berlin wall was built. This was done to stop the 1000 a day escapes from East Berlin to West Berlin. A few days earlier John F. Kennedy told Nikita Khrushchev that the US remained committed to the use of force to protect the freedom and status of Berlin. Khrushchev, however, was intent on provoking the US still further (Grant, 1992:315). Surface to air missiles were dispatched to Cuba in 1962 followed by MIG 21 aircrafts, nuclear capable bombers and offensive ground-to-ground missiles. This presented the US with a direct threat.

By September 1962 the first of 24 SS-4 medium-range and 16 SS-5 intermediate - range missile launchers, each with one reload had been sent to Cuba. These missiles could cover a variety of important US strategic targets. The SS-4 had a range of 1020 nautical miles and the SS-5 had a range of

2200 nautical miles and as such several bomber and ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missiles) bases as well as several command and control facilities were threatened (Berman & Gunston, 1983:72). When this became known to the Americans, Kennedy decided immediately that his goal had to be the removal of all Russian nuclear weapons from Cuba. After a naval blockade and ultimate brinkmanship, the missiles were eventually removed. The Cold war very nearly got "uncomfortably warm" over this incident (Calvocoressi, 1988:26).

This realistic threat (Total World War) brought about a more realistic approach to politics by the two power blocks and their leaders. In 1969 the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) began. As a result of this, two agreements were signed in 1972 and in 1973. NATO and Warsaw Pact countries started discussions over further arms reductions. This negotiation did not last long and broke down in 1977 (Grant, 1992:343). Diplomatic exchanges followed, yet escalation won through. When West Germany received a quota of Pershing II missiles, the Kremlin broke off all negotiations. In 1983 under President Reagan, the US Congress approved funding for the B1-bomber, Trident- and MX- missile programmes. The unveiling of the Strategic Defence Initiative (Star Wars programme), making possible the destruction of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles followed this (Calvocoressi, 1988:47).

This escalation brought the Soviet economy under severe pressure. It had to reconsider adventures abroad such as Afghanistan and Angola. In 1988 the Soviet Union started withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan (Grant

1992:376). This was also the year in which civil unrest surfaced in the Soviet Union itself. Armenian and Azerbadjanis clashed in Negorno - Karabakh. All was also not well in Eastern Europe. In 1989 Romanians overthrew the communist dictator Nicolae CeauÇescu. Still, bigger change was afoot. See Chapter 4.

3.2.4 Summary

In 1988 NATO was still receiving new military hardware (i.e. the Pershing-Trident- and MX- missile programmes referred to above). The idea was still prevalent that an evil empire, the Soviet Union, lurked and needed to be fought on military grounds on a blow for blow basis. Given the historical background as explained above, it is clear that NATO was formed to combat the USSR and the Warsaw pact.

3.3 NATO: A theoretical perspective

Under this heading the historical events described above, will be clarified by the edition of relevant concepts used in the analysis of international politics. In this regard this researcher concur with Viotti and Kauppi (1993:36), when they explain realistic thinking, that when dealing with matters of security, states act to maximise national (own) interest. It is however not possible to seek only a realist or pluralist explanation for events. Many scholars, though their areas of expertise differ, share core assumptions (Viotti & Kauppi, 1993: 11). For this reason an eclectic approach to theory will be taken in this study.

3.3.1 National Interest and the Security dilemma

According to Coulombis and Wolfe (1986:106) "... the concept of **national interest** remains of central importance in any attempt to describe, explain, predict or prescribe international relations." Plano and Olton (1988:10) describe **national interest** "...as the fundamental objective and ultimate determinant that guides the decision-makers of a state in making foreign policy." The reason for the pre-eminence of national interest is the **security dilemma**, which every state faces. This concept describes the phenomenon, which occurs when a state perceives the actions of another state as threatening. The threatened state will then act in accordance with its own national interest and that is firstly to ensure survival (Kegley & Wittkopf, 1995:372 & North, 1990:158).

In 1945 the US and the Western European nations perceived a threat to their national security in the behaviour of the former USSR and had to act in accordance with their national interest. They had to negate this threat in a way. This was done through a strategy of deterrence.

3.3.2 Deterrence

This strategy can be defined as "...activities undertaken by a state or group of states to discourage other states from pursuing policies unwanted by the deterring state or states" (Plano & Olton, 1988:181). Some of the activities that can be undertaken by the deterring state or states are the general increasing of their military capabilities, developing weapons of mass destruction or concluding alliances. The formation of alliances is also a vehicle for the formation of, or the maintenance of a balance of power system in international politics (Stern, 1995:142). Balance of Power, as concept,

describes in itself the way states deal with their problems of national security by shifting alliances or allegiance, so that stronger blocks or groups of states can be joined or formed in the face of a perceived threat. (Plano & Olton, 1988:3).

The US and the Western European states resorted to all of these strategies; the last, the formation of a strong alliance or power block, resulted in the formation of NATO (Stern, 1995:144). This had an exponential effect on the relative capability of the US. It no longer stood alone. It could draw on the resources of the combined GNP (gross national product), population and territory of the US and the other members of NATO (Toma & Gorman, 1991:233).

3.3.3 Alliances

Alliances are an integral part of international politics (Osgood, 1989:458). They are one of the primary means by which states seek the co-operation of other states in order to enhance their power to protect and advance their interests. As such an alliance is a "...configuration of power wherein the state seeks security and the opportunity to advance its national interests by linking its power with that of one or more states with similar interests" (Plano & Olton, 1988:17). To form an alliance is a formalisation, by written treaties, of agreements that ensure co-operation in security on military affairs and are distinguished from other forms of international co-operation because their members perceive a third party to be a mutual enemy or security problem (Toma & Gorman, 1991:123). A formal reciprocal element that increases the

obligations of the signatories is thus an integral part of any alliance. These reciprocal obligations pertain directly to the response of the signatories to contingencies that call for a possible resort to war (Osgood, 1989:459).

According to the advocates of the balance-of-power system, aggression by third parties can be negated because any such party is likely to be deterred by the formation of an alliance or power block (Toma & Gorman, 1991:223).

A formation of an alliance implies a decision by a state to alter or maintain a local, regional or global power equilibrium. This action is usually followed by similar actions from the other side. In this way a "block versus block" appearance is given and this is exactly what happened when the US formed NATO in 1947 and allowed West Germany to join this alliance. In 1955 the Warsaw Pact was formed (Toma & Gorman, 1991:122) and these two organisations formed the bases for the Western block and the Eastern block and the bipolar model in which shape the world was cast since 1955.

3.3.4 Bipolarity

This was the rigid balance-of-power system in which power was polarised into two rival power centres, one in Washington the other in Moscow (Plano & Olton, 1988:4). This system emerged after World War II. The two rival superpowers dominated the rival military, social, political and economic "camps" or alliances. Neutral states were under constant pressure from both camps to join one or the other.

Bipolarity is characterised by extreme rivalry and rivalry was one of the main characteristics of the Cold War. The Cuban missile crisis is possibly the best example of this rivalry and its dangers.

3.3.5 NATO - one of the rival power centres -

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation provides the structure, which enables the goals of the Alliance to be implemented. It is an intergovernmental organisation. All member countries retain sovereignty. The primary goal of the organisation is the safeguarding of its members by political and military means. Nato's 16 member states (prior to 1999) were: Belgium; Canada; Denmark; France; Germany (since 1955); Greece (since 1952); Iceland; Italy; Luxembourg; the Netherlands; Norway; Portugal; Spain (since 1982); Turkey (since 1952); the United Kingdom and the United States (NATO, 1996:5).

By all accounts the goal of NATO at its inception, to deter Soviet expansionism, has been successful. History is testament to that.

3.3.6 Summary

The primary goal of any state is its national interest of survival. When the US and the Western European nations felt threatened at the end of World War II, they deterred possible Soviet expansionism. This was done at great cost, materially and physically. One of the deterrence strategies employed was the formation of an alliance, NATO. This led to similar actions on the part of

the Soviet Union and a bipolar international system resulted in which NATO became one of the rival poles.

- **1945 - End of World War II - National Interest is perceived to be threatened**
- **1949 - NATO created - deterrence strategy, aggravates security dilemma**
- **1950 - Russia develops nuclear weapon - a deterrence strategy that aggravates the security dilemma in the West**
- **1954 - West Germany joins NATO - security dilemma of the Soviet Union is aggravated**
- **1955 - East Germany joins Warsaw Pact - formation of "creationist" alliance and bipolarity**
- **1960 - US U 2 plane shot down - security dilemma of the Soviet Union aggravated**
- **1962 - Cuban missile crisis - security dilemma of the US aggravated**
- **1969 - SALT starts - the beginning of détente**
- **1972 - SALT agreements signed**
- **1977 - SALT negotiations breakdown**
- **1983 - SDI unveiled- An escalation in arms race that the USSR cannot afford**
- **1988 - Soviet troops withdraw from Afghanistan**

The "action-reaction" in the foreign policy of the USSR and the US is typical of the cycle described by the security dilemma that states face (North, 1990:158). This illustrates historically and theoretically why and how NATO

came into being and why it played such an important part in world affairs until 1988.

3.4 Conclusion

The primary goal of this chapter was to describe the causal event that led to the formation of NATO. This was done on a historical and theoretical basis.

The following conclusions are now possible:

NATO was the result of the fear for *possible* Soviet expansion, given a Western perspective. The formation of NATO was a strategy of deterrence.

It resulted in the bipolar world order that lasted into 1991.

The Alliance and the conflict between the East and West had a definite military dimension.

A main point of critique on the chapter above is the fact that the Russian perspective, or to be more precise, the perspective of the former USSR from 1945 to at least 1989 was not built into the chapter. The reason for this of course is the fact that NATO is the element on which we wish to give an historical perspective and most of the literature being from Western origin gives only a Western perspective. It is thus possible that given a different perspective the history outline above might sound different. In the following chapter a perspective on more recent history as it pertains to NATO will be examined.

CHAPTER 4: THE END OF THE BIPOLAR INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

4.1 Introduction

In April 1988 an agreement providing for the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was reached. This withdrawal was completed in 1989 and in October of that year Soviet leaders acknowledged that the intervention in Afghanistan "...violated the norms of proper behaviour". This marked a major deviation in the foreign policy of the USSR. Under the leadership of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev further and even more dramatic changes were to take place.

The Power Block led by the USSR consisted of an outer circle of "protectorates", countries mainly situated in the Third World, a second circle of Eastern European states, an inner circle consisting off the Warsaw Pact countries and then the Union of Republics known as the USSR (Baynham, 1992: 86). This was the consortium that confronted NATO and as described in the previous chapter formed the eastern pole in the Bipolar System. During the second half of 1989 this Soviet Empire and the ideology that supported it disintegrated (Grant, 1992:381).

The goals of this chapter are to describe the events that led to this disintegration and following this, to describe the international system that

replaced the bipolar system. Finally the marked discrepancies between the "old system", as described in chapter 3, and the "new system" pertaining to NATO must be highlighted.

4.2 The Collapse of Communism

Among the most dramatic changes in Soviet foreign policy was the refusal of the USSR to intervene in Eastern Europe as liberal, pro-capitalist and democratic reform swept through this traditional Soviet sphere of influence in 1989 to 1991 (Encarta, 1997). To understand this shift it is necessary to recount events from 1985 and the election of Gorbachev as Secretary-General of the USSR.

4.2.1 Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev

A superpower summit in Geneva at the end of 1985 followed Gorbachev's election. The cost associated with a second arms race, this time including SDI (strategic defence initiative) technology was more than the beleaguered Soviet economy could manage. This reality forced the Soviet Union to the negotiating table and the result was the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces treaty signed in December 1987 (Baynham, 1992:85). The USSR however still struggled with the economic impact of the misguided economic, military and social policies of the past fifty years. To try and negate the effects of this Gorbachev initiated the policies of "Peristroyka" (reconstruction) and Glasnost (openness of freedom of information). Following this, journalists and students questioned historical perspectives and Stalinism was openly criticised (Bradley, 1989:21).

4.2.2 Eastern European reaction

By this time the "outer circle" of Soviet influence, or Third World Satellite states, had already started to shift their loyalty. The main reason for this being the downsizing of Soviet expenditure. Change was also underway inside Eastern Europe. Once Gorbachev's reformist policies had made it clear that hard-line communist leaders in Satellite States could no longer rely on Soviet support, the whole Eastern European political system collapsed (Grant, 1992:381).

In Hungary the Communist party renamed itself the Hungarian Socialist party, signifying its renunciation of communism and its new nationalist ideology. In Poland elections were held in 1989 in which opposition parties could participate and Solidarity (a pro-capitalist, western orientated political grouping) took over political control. In Eastern Germany Egon Krenz announced that all citizens were free to travel abroad. This was a highly symbolic act and opened the way for German reunification. In Czechoslovakia a movement called the Civic Forum, of whom nearly every citizen was a member forced the resignation of the communist regime and became a free, democratic state. These reforms continued till the traditional East-West division between "two Europes" was no longer desirable (Grant, 1992:381).

4.2.3 Reaction in the USSR

The Communist Party's power in the USSR began to erode in 1985 due to Gorbachev's reformist policies. These included, peristroyka, glasnost and equally important, policies aimed at the enhancement of the powers of the constituent republics of the USSR. The collapse of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe hastened the communist party's decline and by mid 1991 its membership had dwindled considerably. After the USSR legalised opposition in February 1990, free elected legislatures in some republics imposed restrictions on Communist Party activities. On the 21st of December 1991 the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Please refer to annexure 1) (Grant: 1992,385) ceased to exist and was replaced by the Commonwealth of Independent states in which all members retain full independence (Anon, 1992:38654). The pre-1991 chart in annexure 1 shows the boundaries of the USSR before the 1991 division while the chart of Europe, annexure 2, (Corel, 1998) shows new European- or post 1991, boundaries. It is clear how some republics now have their independence and how the USSR has crumbled. Some examples of these newly independent republics would be Kazakstan, Estonia, Uzbekistan and Lithuania. This graphically illustrates that the influence of the Soviet Superpower in the whole of Eastern Europe has shrunk. The monolith in annexure 1 disintegrated into the pebbles of annexure 2. Most of these Eastern European countries were part of the Warsaw Pact and had communist governments. They are now independent and not part of a powerful military alliance (Fullard, 1990:37).

4.2.4 The reaction of the Warsaw Pact

Although the Warsaw Pact was officially renewed in 1985 for another 20 years, the political transformation in Eastern Europe profoundly weakened the organisation. The USSR began withdrawing its troops from other member states and East Germany left the alliance upon German reunification in October 1990. All joint military functions ceased at the end of March 1991 and in July, the remaining members agreed to dissolve the alliance.

4.2.5 Summary

The whole international system that was described as bipolar in nature and had the conflict between two opposing power blocks, NATO and Warsaw, at its roots has disintegrated. Direct conflict and military, social and economic grounds between the Warsaw Pact and NATO has disappeared. The Warsaw Pact has been dissolved and so had the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This begs the question: what kind of international system do we live in now? NATO was created out of fear for Russian expansionism in the bipolar world system as a military alliance. Now bipolarity is something of the past, the enemy, has literally dissolved and military force is deemed undesirable. Is NATO as alliance out of step with this development? Clarke (1994:25) argues that "...if NATO did not already exist it is doubtful that Washington would now invent it." Other scholars do not agree with this. Glaser (1993:50) postulates that "... NATO is best matched to the full spectrum of challenges the West faces in the post-Soviet era." It can be said that this is a point of argument in the contemporary international system. How does this system look?

4.3 The Contemporary International System

Josef Frankel (1988:162) states that all international systems show a certain degree of similarity. This "cross-systemic isomorphism" makes it impossible to classify any system according to exclusive characteristics. The Bipolar World System (1945-1991) could possibly have been the exception to this rule, but that question does not fall within the scope of this dissertation. The object of this section is to describe the international system as it appears today.

Keeping Frankel in mind, Chester Crocker (Kegley & Wittkopf, 1995:3) starts a possible characterisation with the following remark: "Historic changes since 1989 have profoundly destabilised the previously existing system without replacing it with any recognisable or legitimate system. New vacuums are setting off new conflicts. Old problems are being solved, begetting new ones." This view seems to dominate thinking in international politics for the moment.

4.3.1 Falling apart or coming together?

It is clear that a changed international environment now exists. It is however not clear what this new international system looks like, or how it functions. The global community experiences world-wide consumption-based capitalism yet religious fanaticism, ethnic violence, nationalism or the ambition of a would-be dictator can create chaos (Said et al., 1995:278) and (Kegley & Wittkopf, 1995:556). Every writer adopts a different method of description when it comes to the "falling apart yet coming together" phenomenon we are

faced with today. Yet all seem to agree that the major forces at work are those of Nationalism and Transnationalism.

4.3.2 Nationalism vs. Trans-nationalism

"Nationalism and trans-nationalism will be the contending forces in the post Cold War world" (Nye, 1993:184). According to Nye, the world is, in a sense getting smaller through the revolutionary changes experienced as a result of advances made in the areas of technology, communication and transportation. Yet people are reacting to this change with a nationalistic counter wave. Marchall McLuhan (as quoted in Nye, 1993:184) argued towards a "global village" produced by modern communication media. A global political identity, however, remains absent. We can only speculate that instead of a global village we have a planet where several villages are now acutely aware of one another. This awareness was promulgated by an industrial revolution-like, communication expansion. Reaction to the industrial revolution led to "the disruption" of history by major ideologies like communism, capitalism, fascism, national socialism, World War I, World War II and the Cold War. The end of the Cold War, brought about by the communication revolution and the disintegration of the USSR, marks a return to normality where no single ideological cleavage drives large conflicts in international politics (Nye, 1993:1850 and Kegley & Wittkopf, 1995:563). This has a broadening effect on every aspect in the international system. A clear classification as was the case with the Bipolar world system becomes improbable and multiple possibilities must be studied.

4.3.3 The possibilities

The old system has disintegrated. No new stringent international power distribution rules exist. The following are therefore, realistic possibilities of ordering the international community:

- A return to Bipolarity is possible if for instance China becomes a Superpower.
- Multi-polarity - describing to a certain extent the international system as it functions today with a distribution of power and capability amongst more than two states of political groupings.
- Three economic blocks namely Europe, the US and Japan with the power shared amongst these groupings, are also a possible description of the contemporary world system.
- Uni-polar hegemony or as some scholars would have it: A Pax-Americana where the US acts as a global policeman with vast international interest.
- Lastly, multilevel interdependence between all international actors to such an extent that no polarity is either discernible or desirable. (Nye, 1993:190). All these options would impact in a different manner on NATO. These possibilities are dealt with in chapter 6.

These are possible ways in which to classify the contemporary international system. A "perfect" description based on reality is no longer possible.

When we recall Frankel as mentioned above, a new international system shall most probably be a hybrid of these possibilities. This is the standpoint of the author in this study and for the purposes of this dissertation it is not necessary to discuss the eventual international system since this question does not fall within the scope of this study. Viewed in this light, it is already possible to make relevant conclusions concerning the contemporary international system in summation.

4.3.4 Summary

The previous international system that was characterised by bipolarity has disintegrated. The rules of the new international system are less clearly defined. The contradictory and opposing forces of inter-penetrative globality or Trans-nationalism and nationalism oppose one another. It is not yet possible to describe the exact nature of the new system because of these and other variables that may not even be known yet. Even if every variable could be known the contemporary international system would be a hybrid system, composing of several shared criteria. For the purposes of this dissertation and in the light of the above-mentioned, it is best to define the Contemporary International system as a Developing or Emerging International system (Said et al., 1995:108). It is clear that this system differs from the previous one. It is now necessary to illuminate these differences.

4.4 A comparison

This section highlights the main differences between the Bipolar- and Emerging world system pertaining to the main theme of this dissertation.

4.4.1 Technology

One of the greatest differences between the Bipolar System and the Emerging system concerns the way in which states think about war. Modern technology has made the terms of combat as heavily disadvantageous to the leaders of bigger states as they have long been to smaller states (Said et al., 1995:108). The weapons now available make MAD (mutually assured destruction) a distinct possibility, so the choice becomes, either non-violent or non-existent (Kegley & Wittkopf, 1995:556).

4.4.2 A new division

The East-West division has disappeared. There are no longer a formal division amongst two power blocks who manipulates world affairs through regional hegemony and power plays on the floor of the UN Security Council (Said et al., 1995:109). Instead a new division has started to appear. This division is between the global "have's and have not's." This term denotes extreme disparity between the global rich whether they are in South Africa or Monaco and the global poor wherever they maybe (Said et al., 1955:109).

4.4.3 Ethnicity

Ethnic conflict and secessionist revolts are prevalent. Hyper-nationalist beliefs rationalise large-scale violence, as in the former Yugoslavia and the sub-judication of other nationalities (Kegley & Wittkopf 1995:556). During the Bipolar era the then exiting power-blocks kept "their block in system" through their military and economic power and when disruptions occurred information was restricted, as was the case in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Hungary in 1958 (Grant, 1992:299 & 332).

4.4.4 Modern communication media

Global communication media, advanced technology and an emerging global economy have made isolation impossible. According to Kegley and Wittkopf (1995:554) technologies are now the principal driving force behind the ongoing economic, social and political change. During the bipolar era communication was extremely restricted. The Chernobyl incident was for example only made public after a political decision was made to do so. Today CNN or another global news network will probably know of such an incident before the government. It has become highly unlikely to make a quick cross-border raid or test a nuclear device in privacy.

4.4.5 International Leadership

World-leader-states and the factors that bring that status have also changed. Previously military might have brought leadership. Now in the Post-bipolar era successful trading states in the Global Market Place are the world's leaders.

It seems as though the next World War will be fought around economic issues (Kegley & Wiffkopf, 1995:555).

It is clear that the emerging world system is fundamentally different from the bipolar world system. These differences are fundamentally related to amongst other things, the use of military force by states, and the place of military force as a goal for states or a means of goal achievement by states.

4.5 Conclusion

The bipolar world system disintegrated. This is due to the disintegration of the USSR, the Warsaw Pact and the emergence of a global economy. The rules of the contemporary global system are less clearly defined and it can only be characterised as an Emerging world system. The nature of the emerging world system differs in many ways from the previous system. Most importantly however it differs in the way states think about military force and the use thereof. It is also clear that scholars disagree about the usefulness of NATO (Clarke, 1994:25 and Glaser, 1993:50) yet given the fact that NATO already exists NATO's reaction would determine its own relevance. Glaser, 1993:13) The next chapter will deal with NATO's reaction toward this new situation.

CHAPTER 5: NATO's REACTION TO THE POST COLD WAR ENVIRONMENT

5.1 Introduction

During the Cold War NATO and the Warsaw Pact were the best known examples of regional security organisations. According to Wallace (1983:87), the two nuclear armed superpowers, the US and USSR were "...the heavyweights of world politics..." and for the US and the USSR relations with each other held a top priority since World War II. In the course of the Cold War conflict, each superpower became the centre of a wide-ranging network of alliances. In the previous chapter the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and thus, one half of the bipolar world order, was described. The goal of this chapter is to describe NATO's reaction to this fact.

In order to attain this goal it is firstly, necessary to analyse NATO as an organisation. The question of paramount importance in this analysis is whether any institutional changes have taken place since the end of the Cold War in 1991 with the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact. To find an answer to this question a description of the pre-eminent structures within NATO must be given and it must be determined if changes occurred in form or function of these structures. Any new structures, especially structures dealing with the changed international order must also be documented. To accomplish this, publications by NATO and other authors will be scrutinised.

Secondly, from 1991, NATO and thus, its constituent countries had to formulate policy objectives towards a rapidly changing Eastern Europe. A description of these policy objectives will serve as a barometer of change in NATO policy and change in the instrumentation used by NATO to implement policy and carry out its objectives. Thirdly it is necessary to look at some of the most prominent actions NATO undertook since 1991. Thus change in NATO can be discerned as well as trends in their action that will be important in the next chapter.

By the use of these two methods NATO's reaction to the changed international environment can be recounted and the goal of this chapter will be attained.

5.2 A Structural analysis of NATO

Before any analysis is possible it must be clear what building blocks are to be analysed. Wallace and Wallace (1985:49) define an institution as an "...organised set of norms and values that are centred on a basic need of society." NATO is an institution that is centred on the basic need of society to negate the effects of the security dilemma (Chapter 2). As an institution NATO "...consists of a concept (idea, notion, doctrine or interest) and a structure (Timasheff et al., 1976:68). The goal of this chapter, as stated above, is to see whether NATO's "idea" or "structure" changed after 1991. Annexure 3 supplies a diagram of NATO as an organization and is relevant to the following.

As this chapter deals regularly with the concept of structure it is necessary to define the concept clearly. "The structure of an organisation consists of relatively fixed relationships..." and forms a framework, an apparatus ... set to co-operate in prescribed ways. The structure furnishes "...instrumentalities for bringing the idea into the world of facts and action..." (Gibson et al., 1988:250 & Timasheff, et.al. 1976:68). NATO's various organs are thus "instrumentalities" or sub-structures within the larger structure to accomplish the realisation of the "idea" in this case, security.

In this analysis NATO will thus be examined according to its constituent parts and their function. Upon the completion of this, it will be possible to describe new post-Cold War structures and new post-Cold War functions (ideas) in older structures.

5.2.1 Structural background

Although NATO was formed in 1949, militarisation of the alliance only took place in 1950, after the North Korean attack on South Korea. Before this incident the alliance was merely a pact guaranteeing mutual assistance (Williams, 1987:28). After June 1950 NATO was transformed into a military organisation with military headquarters in the form of SHAPE, a Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and extensive American deployments of troops and material in Europe.

From that moment NATO became the most highly organised and most stable military alliance in the world (Bennett, 1988:369).

5.2.2 The main structures within NATO

According to Bennett (1988) the following structures within NATO are the most important.

5.2.2.1 The North Atlantic Council

The supreme organ of NATO is the North Atlantic Council, in which a unanimous vote is required for all decisions. This council convenes at the ministerial level at least twice a year. The ministers of the constituent countries¹ that participate are usually the ministers of foreign affairs or defence. The council also convenes twice a week at a permanent representative level and the constituent countries are represented by ambassadors in these meetings. The Secretary-General of NATO is the Chairman of this Council (Bennett, 1988:370). The Council has effective political authority and powers of discussion. The powers vested in the council remain the same no matter the level at which the meeting takes place. This Council is the only body that derives its authority from the North Atlantic Treaty itself. Under the provisions of the treaty the North Atlantic Council was given the responsibility for setting up subsidiary bodies. Committees and planning groups have since been set up to assume responsibility in specific fields such as defence planning and nuclear planning (NATO, 1995:93). This has resulted in "...an elaborate administrative, committee and military command structure [that] operates under the aegis of the North Atlantic Council (Bennett, 1988:370).

¹The 16 NATO member states (before 1999) are: Belgium; Canada; Denmark; France; Germany since 1955; Greece since 1952; Iceland; Italy; Luxembourg; the Netherlands;

5.2.2.2 The Secretariat

The Secretariat is headed by the Secretary-General and is organised to support all the activities of NATO. In addition to preside over the Council the Secretary-General, via the secretariat, prepares the budget, arranges the agenda, supervises the administration and represents NATO in relations with other governments and organisations (Bennett, 1988:370). The Secretary-General is also the chairperson of the task force on conventional arms control, the NATO air defence committee, the executive working group and a number "...of ad hoc or working groups" (NATO, 1995:139).

5.2.2.3 The Military Committee

The military-command structure within NATO is headed by the Military Committee. This committee is composed of the chiefs of staff, or their representatives, of all NATO members except France. (This country withdrew from the military agreements in 1966.) The defence area (geographically and strategically) is divided into three commands: Allied Command Europe, Allied Command Atlantic and Allied Command Channel (Bennett, 1988:370). This committee is responsible for recommendations to NATO's political authorities on measures that the committee regards necessary for common defence (NATO, 1995:98).

According to publications of NATO from 1995 and 1996 and Bennett (1988) there have been no changes in form or function in these main structures of NATO. New structures were however formed.

5.2.3 New structures within NATO

These new structures are the result of the changed political situation of the post-Cold War era. This is apparent when the functions and dates of inception of these structures are discussed.

5.2.3.1 North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC)

This Council was formed in December 1991 (on the day the Soviet Union dissolved, to oversee the development of dialogue between NATO and countries in Central-, Eastern Europe and the territories of the former Soviet Union (NATO, 1995:103 & NATO, 1996:27). The development of dialogue formed an integral part of NATO's new strategic concept adopted by the Heads of State of NATO's constituent countries in November 1991 (NATO, 1996:27). There are now 39 NACC members. The 16 NATO countries plus: Albania; Armenia; Azerbadijan; Belarus; Bulgaria; Chech Republic; Estonia; Georgia; Hungary; Kazakstan; Kyrgyzstan; Latvia; Lithuania; Moldavia; Poland; Romania; Russia; Slovakia; Slovenia; Tajikstan; Turmenistan; Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Austria; Finland; Malta; Sweden; and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, have observer status in the NACC because of their participation in the Partnership for Peace initiative (NATO, 1996:28).

The NACC is composed of the Foreign ministers or their representatives and convenes at least once a year or according to requirements. The NACC focuses on security related issues where alliance members could offer advice (NATO, 1996:28 & NATO 1995:44). NACC members also participate in NATO's scientific and environmental programmes while information about NATO are disseminated in NACC countries. Military co-operation and joint military exercises have been delegated to the Partnership for Peace initiative.

5.2.3.2 The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)

On May 30, 1997 the Euro-Atlantic-Partnership-Council (EAPC) was inaugurated following the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC). The EAPC is a new co-operative mechanism, which replaces the NACC and builds upon the success of the previous body (NATO, 1997:3). This body now provides the same functions as the NACC but also act as the premier framework for political and security-related consultations between the members which remain the same as the members of the NACC (NATO, 1997:3).

5.2.3.3 Partnership for Peace (PFP)

The goal of the PFP initiative, established in 1994, is to expand and intensify the political and military co-operation in the whole of Europe (NATO, 1996:31). Essentially NATO offered "partnerships in peace" to all the countries in Europe, outside of NATO. By May 1994 eighteen non-NATO countries had joined and in June of that same year Russia agreed to work with the alliance under the terms of the "partnership accord (Kegley &

Wittkopf, 1995:536). From a NATO perspective the PFP programme offers participating states the possibility to strengthen their relations with NATO; NATO will also "consult" with any active participant in the programme if the partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security (NATO, 1996:31). States participating in the NACC, other member countries of the organisation for Security in Europe (OSCE)², a non-NATO body, were invited to join NATO in this partnership. Twenty-seven states have accepted and many detailed and individual Partnership programmes have been concluded (NATO, 1996:31 & NATO 1995:50). The 27 PFP member states are: Albania; Armenia; Austria; Azerbadjan; Belarus; Bulgaria; Czech Republic; Estonia; Finland; Georgia; Hungary; Kazakstan; Kyrgyztan; Latvia; Lithuania; Malta; Moldova; Poland; Romania; Russia; Slovakia; Slovenia; Sweden; The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; Turkmenistan; Ukraine; and Uzbekistan (NATO 1996:32 & NATO, 1995:55).

The primary goal of the PFP translates into the following concrete objectives:

- The facilitation of transparency in national defence planning and budgeting
- Ensuring democratic control over defence forces
- Maintaining the capability and readiness to contribute to operations under the authority of the UN

² The Organisation for Security and Co-operation (OSCE), formerly known as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) initially launched in 1972, is a organisation designed to bring together all the European countries, the US and Canada and to create a forum that will foster mutual trust and communication. It has no institutional ties to NATO (NATO, 1996:41 & NATO, 1995:187).

- Developing co-operative military relations with NATO for the purpose of joint planning, training and exercises in order to strengthen the ability of the PFP participants to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations.
- Developing forces that are better able to operate with those of NATO (NATO, 1996:33).

Active participation in the Partnership of Peace will play an important part in the evolutionary process of including new members in NATO (NATO, 1996:33). PFP can be seen as the first step towards the ultimate goal of enlarging NATO. The "partners" however were not offered the security guarantees that full members of NATO enjoy (Kegley & Wittkopf, 1995:537).

The PFP programme has grown to include non-military aid. In October 1997 a SFP (Science for Peace) was initiated within the larger PFP programme. The objectives of this programme is to support applied science and technology projects that relate to industrial, environmental or security related problems and to help "partner" scientists to increase contracts in the NATO science community, while building a stronger science infrastructure in their home countries (NATO, 1997:1)

5.2.3.4 NATO's role in Peacekeeping

In June 1992 NATO representatives at the ministerial level announced their readiness to support peacekeeping activities, in accordance with NATO's own procedures, under the responsibility of the Conference on Security and co-operation in Europe (CSCE) (NATO, 1996: 41 & NATO, 1995:58). This included making available NATO personnel and resources. At this stage the situation in the former Yugoslavia was rapidly deteriorating and the UN Security Council passed important resolutions aimed at the prevention of further loss of life in the former Yugoslavia. In December 1992 NATO stated its readiness to support peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council (NATO, 1995:59). Since 1992 NATO has taken key decisions that have established NATO as the primary peacekeeper in this region. Land-, air- and sea operations involving NATO forces have taken place (NATO, 1996:41 & Clarke, 1994:23). These and the pre-eminence of NATO presence in the area are being illustrated by the fact that NATO is charged with the responsibility to, among other things, arrest war criminals, protect UN safe areas and enforce the UN, no-fly zone in the former Yugoslavia (Calabresi et al., 1998:36 & Calabresi, 1998:26). As the crisis escalated so did NATO's involvement. The latest peacekeeping mission is the alternative put to the Serbian authorities to stop atrocities in Kosovo or face NATO air strikes (SABC, 1998:1 & Nordland & Watson, 1998:10-13). No new formal and permanent structures were formed within NATO to cope with the crisis. Every contingency was handled within the framework described above.

5.2.3.5 Summary

The only new structures within NATO after 1991 were specifically designated to handle a changed political environment. NATO still functioned within its original organisational framework. The NACC, the Military Council and the secretariat underwent no changes in form, membership or function. The new structures that were formed, the NACC, PFP and various peacekeeping initiatives were slotted in to the committee system of NATO without any change to NATO itself.

5.2.4 Policy objectives of NATO

Foreign policy objectives, according to Plano and Olton (1988) are the ends that foreign policy decision-makers, wish to achieve. Given NATO's objectives certain structures were formed to cope with the changing international order. These structures were discussed above. This section will give the policy background from which these structures evolved. It will also point out the direction NATO wishes to take in the future.

5.2.4.1 NATO's post Cold War policies

According to Kegley and Wittkopf (1995:536) NATO's reaction to the "...virtual disappearance of the threat of a Soviet invasion that it was created to prevent..." was the 1994 NATO summit in Brussels. This summit opened the door for NATO expansion with the Partnership for a Peace programme.

In reality NATO's reaction was more complex and started long before 1994. The NACC agreements were signed the day the USSR dissolved, this implies that NATO was ready for the dissolution of the USSR. NATO started policy initiatives aimed at coping with change as early as 1990 at the Heads of State and Government Summit Meeting in London. This decision was reinforced by decisions taken in Rome in November 1991 (NATO, 1996:7).

Some of the measures taken by NATO at this stage were the strengthening of the CSCE structures in Europe and an internal review of strategy (NATO, 1995:36). This eventually resulted in the NACC and PFP programmes. At this stage intervention came from a different quarter. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on the second of August 1990 leapt to the front of NATO strategic thinking.

As the crisis developed NATO structures played an important part in the facilitation of political consultation and in the eventual war with Iraq (NATO, 1996:36). At this time NATO countries reiterated their commitment to collective defence and a part of NATO's allied mobile force were sent to Turkey. The fear existed at that stage that the crisis in the Gulf would lead to a possible threat to the national security of that country (NATO, 1995:360).

5.2.4.2 A new strategic concept

According to NATO (1995:40) the decisions taken in Rome in 1991 were vindicated by this crisis, the fact that Europe's security has substantially improved, that the threat of massive military confrontation had dissipated and

the fear of a nuclear confrontation seemed remote. The result of this was the adoption of a new strategic concept with strong emphasis on the following principles:

- a strong reliance on dialogue;
- the maintenance of the collective defence capability;
- a reduced dependence on nuclear weapons;
- reductions in the size of NATO military forces;
- improvements in force mobility, flexibility and adaptability to different contingencies;
- the creation of a multi-national Rapid Reaction component;
- the adaptation of defence planning and procedures;
- the streamlining of NATO's military command structure and
- to adapt the military posture of NATO to the changed security environment in Europe (NATO, 1996:8).

5.2.4.3 Fundamental principles

The security policy of the Alliance is therefore based on "...three mutually reinforcing elements namely, co-operation, dialogue and the maintenance of a collective defence capability" (NATO, 1995:41). Yet according to NATO (1995:41) the military dimension of the Alliance remains an essential factor and it continues to reflect a number of fundamental principles:

- the Alliance is purely defensive in purpose;
- an attack on one member of the Alliance is an attack on all;
- NATO's security policy is based on collective defence and

- A mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe will be required for the foreseeable future (NATO, 1995:41).

According to NATO (1995:42) this new strategic concept underlines the need for the Alliance to take into account its global context. New risks such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, acts of terrorism and the disruption of the flow of vital resources must be taken into account.

NATO managed to depart from its Cold War policies of nuclear deterrence and the preparation for massive East-West military confrontation in such a way that new horizons seemed to open for the Alliance. Terrorism, proliferation and global socio-economic stability are now Alliance targets. This implies a much broader approach to security than the signatories of the first NATO treaties foresaw. The means of combat has also changed. According to NATO the primary "soldiers" are now diplomats and the "tanks" are diplomacy and co-operation. These points are gathered from NATO, yet one of the first actions of NATO, was going to war!

5.3 NATO's actions

NATO came, saw and incorporated. On the 12th of March 1999 the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which now have 19 member states. Please refer to annexure 4 of this chapter pertaining to this subject (NATO, 1999¹ & NATO². On the 17th of

¹ NATO, 1999. Nato member countries. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Brussels.[web]<http://www.Nato.int>.

March 1999 the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council met at NATO headquarters to "...continue their regular consultations on the crisis in Kosovo..." (NATO, 1999³) and on the 24th of March 1999 NATO started air operations against "...targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia "...after a negotiated settlement to the Kosovo crisis had "...not been possible..." (Sloana, 1999:?). On the 4th of June 1999 the Secretary-General of NATO, Dr. Javier Sloana, was appointed as the first Secretary-General of the EU Council of Ministers and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Union (Sloana, 1999:?). NATO had thus expanded its membership, included its former archival in negotiations about Alliance policy, went to war with Yugoslavia and steps were taken to integrate European security policies by the appointment of Dr. Sloana. If the realistic view is taken that NATO's actions define NATO, the question of importance now becomes where is NATO heading or what does NATO want to be as can be seen from its actions?

These actions being:

- The war in the Balkan (1999)
- The expansion of NATO
- NATO-Russian relations
- An integrated European Security infrastructure

These actions will be dealt with in the above order and an historical perspective of each will be given. Then, in accordance with international relations theory explanations will be given where possible.

² NATO.1999. What is NATO? North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Brussels: [web]<http://www.Nato.int>.

5.3.1 The war in the Balkan (1999)

Annexure 4 contains a chart of the Balkan region. Kosovo, Serbia and the other states in this region can clearly be seen on the chart. This will give a clear geographic perspective on the War in the Balkan of 1999.

5.3.1.1 Background

The first "Yugoslavia" was an Eastern European country that existed from 1918 to 1991 when it dissolved due to ethnic conflicts. This Republic of Yugoslavia encompassed six smaller republics: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. Serbia, included the two politically autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. In April 1992 Serbia and Montenegro formed the new and now relevant, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This new country has failed to get international recognition until the crisis in Kosovo came to the public eye (Walker1999:54).

5.3.1.2 The crisis in Kosovo

"Massacres cannot be ignored forever..." and according to witnesses, survivors, human rights investigators and diplomats certain evidence of ethnic cleansing could be seen in Kosovo (Walker, 1999:54). (William Walker was the head of the verification mission in Kosovo). Slobodan Milosevic, the political leader of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (i.e. Serbia and

³ North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. 1997.NATO-Russia Permanent joint council meeting. NATO: Brussels

Montenegro), sent Serbian police units and units of the army of Kosovo to quell resistance by the Kosovo liberation army, an organisation fighting for an autonomous Kosovo (Calabresi, 1998:27).

When the number of refugees from Kosovo increased, the UN, NATO and the rest of Europe had to take notice. Not only due to the massacres referred to above being committed by Milosevic's troops but also because of a fear grounded in *real politic*. The countries neighbouring Kosovo are not stable political entities and an extreme influx of refugees could destabilise the whole area and lead to a bigger full-scale Balkan war (Calabresi, 1998:27).

This fear led to greater NATO involvement in the area, diplomatic efforts and outright threats of the use of force: "...if Milosevic doesn't get the message, NATO military means can and may well be used against him" (Robinson as quoted by Calabresi, 1998:27). Milosevic did not heed the warnings.

5.3.1.3 NATO goes to war

The Verification Mission in Kosovo, under the auspices of the Organisation for Security and co-operation in Europe had to keep the two sides, the Serb forces and the KLA, apart (Walker, 1999:54). The head of the mission was declared *persona-non-grata* by Milosevic and ordered to leave Yugoslavia. This made the mission, impossible (Calabresi, 1999:30).

After repeated diplomatic overtures and the issuing of ultimatums NATO started an air-campaign against Yugoslavia (SABC, 1998:104 [text]; Sloana, 1999). This became the biggest air war since 1945.

During the war it was possible to get updates on NATO activity through the internet. This information made available by NATO gives precise detail of the air operations. It is possible to see which targets in Yugoslavia were struck and how often. On May 18 1999, for example, NATO struck at Highway bridges, TV and radio transmitters, 20 artillery pieces, Mortar positions, anti-aircraft artillery, tanks, armoured vehicles and revetted (dug-in) military vehicles. A Mig-21 as well as a Mig-29 was also destroyed. On that day NATO aircraft flew 566 missions (NATO⁵,1999)

This denotes the great scale on which NATO operated in The Yugoslav republics. It is also clear that this was a full-scale war, or at least a full-scale air war.

5.3.1.4 The humanitarian crisis

The war in Yugoslavia had the fear of a destabilised Balkan region leading to the destabilisation of Europe at its heart. To combat destabilisation due to refugees flooding the countries surrounding Kosovo, NATO had to make a strong humanitarian effort.

⁵ NATO. 1999. Briefing at NATO headquarters. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Brussels. [e-mail to:] Venter, J.C.M.

In the Republic of Macedonia NATO troops built refugee camps, a refugee reception centre and an "...emergency-feeding centre..." (NATO⁶, 1999). NATO personnel have also transported or expedited the transport of food and other forms of aid. In Albania NATO deployed a substantial force to help in a similar way (NATO⁷, 1999).

5.3.1.5 The end game

NATO demanded very specific actions from Yugoslavia before a cessation of hostilities would have been possible. According to Jamie Shea, NATO spokesperson "...NATO demand

- an immediate and verifiable end to violence in Kosovo;
- the deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presence, endorsed by the United Nations;
- the establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the UN security council, the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons;
- a political process toward the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for self government for Kosovo; and
- a comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilisation of the crisis region." (NATO⁸, 1999)

This, according to NATO, translates to the following: "...

⁶ NATO. 1999. Briefing at NATO headquarters. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Brussels. [e-mail to:] Venter, J.C.M.

⁷ NATO. 1999. Briefing at NATO headquarters. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Brussels. [e-mail to:] Venter, J.C.M.

⁸ NATO. 1999. Briefing at NATO headquarters. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Brussels [e-mail to:] Venter J.C.M.

- Stop killing
- Withdraw all security forces
- Allow the deployment of an international security presence
- Allow the return of all the refugees and displaced persons
- and work towards a political settlement." (NATO⁹, 1999).

Agreeing to these demands would constitute complete capitulation by Milosevic.

5.3.1.6 Summary

The war in Yugoslavia was the first war for NATO. It became clear how terribly efficient the might of this organisation could be. Nevertheless the alliance could only enforce its will in Yugoslavia due to the end of the Cold War. Secondly, if there had been an equally powerful opposition, the alliance would have been relegated to a strategy of deterrence. The problem of NATO would clearly be quite different if the opposition had a moderately higher military capacity. Thirdly, the lack of commitment towards NATO ground troops testifies to the lack of political will within NATO to accept casualties. In any event NATO's propaganda machine was alive and well during this war and on investigation it became clear that NATO's success rate in the war was highly inflated. "In fact, as some critics suspected at the time, the air campaign against the Serb military was largely ineffective (Barry & Tomas, 2000:11) On September 24, 2000 the Yugoslav people voted Slobodan Milosovic out of power (Albright, 2000: 19). Although NATO might claim this as a victory, no direct cause and effect is discernable, although It

might be logical that the NATO bombing had something to do with this. This action, the hot war in Kosovo explains a lot about the new NATO and gives it an expansionate (as will be seen in the coming section) and warlike (even if inept) stature.

5.4 The expansion of NATO

As is clear from chapter 2, that the USSR was the main reason for the existence of NATO. As the USSR disintegrated, NATO had to "...demonstrate a remarkable ability to adapt to the changing world... and to equip itself with the necessary new tools and tricks to ensure that it remains an effective and relevant Euro-Atlantic security institution..."(Naumann¹⁰, 1997).

5.4.1 Adapt or die

With the need to "adapt" clearly established in NATO thinking, NATO also realised that "...with the end of the Cold War there...[existed]...a unique opportunity to build an improved security architecture in the whole of the Euro-Atlantic area" (NATO¹¹, 1995). Thus by a policy of "...enlargement..." that NATO describes as contributing "...to enhanced stability and security for all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area" (NATO, 1995), NATO adapted and started building an "improved security" structure (Naumann, 1999 & NATO, 1995).

⁹ NATO. 1999. Briefing at NATO headquarters. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Brussels [e-mail to:] Venter J.C.M.

¹⁰ General Klaus Naumann was the chairman of the military committee of NATO.

¹¹ NATO. 1995. Study on Nato enlargement. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Brussels [web]<http://Nato.int>.

This structure can be characterised by stability, co-operation and inclusion according to Dr. Javier Sloana (1997:8) the Secretary-General of NATO.

5.4.2 The NACC and PFP

The vehicles for NATO enlargement are essentially the Partnership for Peace (PFP) and the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC). Please refer to Annex 1. The PFP structure is a series of partnerships between NATO being in 1999: Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and (NATO, 1999), and 25 individual countries being in 1999: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (NATO, 1999). These partnerships are aimed at the development of co-operation in political-, military-, and other defence related fields (NATO¹¹, 1996). The first difference between the PFP and NACC programmes lies in the fact that the PFP is based on a partnership between NATO and each participant individually, while the NACC remains a multilateral forum (NATO, 1996).

The NACC was established in 1991 in order to provide an organised framework for "...*interested parties*.." (NATO, 1996); and NATO countries to take part on an equal basis in discussions on practical issues that ranges in nature from political, economic, and scientific to environmental concerns. Participation in NACC activities is thus voluntary and governed by interest while participation in PFP activities can only take place by NATO invitation (NATO, 1996).

Attaining NATO member status would thus essentially be through participation in NACC activities followed by participation in the PFP and then by invitation only, a NATO membership. Thus far only Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland have achieved this (NATO, 1996:5 & NATO¹², 1996).

5.4.3 Distinctive Partnerships

NATO entered into two "...distinctive partnerships...", one with the Ukraine and the other with Russia (NATO, 1997¹³). These two partnerships namely the, NATO-Russia Founding Act and the NATO-Ukraine Charter is seen by NATO as a necessary building block in NATO enlargement and European security (Sloana, 1997).

¹² North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. 1996. Partnership for peace. NATO: Brussels

¹³ NATO.1997. Charter on a distinctive NATO-Ukraine partnership. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Brussels [web]<http://www.Nato.int>. & NATO,1999.NATO-Russia joints council meeting.North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Brussels [web]<http://www.Nato.int>.

5.4.3.1 The NATO-Russian Founding Act

This act that was signed on the 27th of May 1997 brought into being the NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council at a foreign ministerial level (NATO¹⁴, 1997). The basic principle of this act is a partnership between Russia and NATO that will lead to a closer relationship regarding security. In order for this to be attained a detailed work programme was outlined for the NATO-Russia Permanent joint council that stressed the importance of military co-operation and the updating of Russia's participation under the PFP programme (NATO, 1997).

5.4.3.2 The NATO-Ukraine Charter

The charter, that was signed on May 29, 1997, "...lays the foundation for the development of a strong, enduring relationship between NATO and the Ukraine" (NATO¹⁵, 1997). In order to attain this goal the charter has five sub-sections.

- In section 1 NATO and the Ukraine pledge their intent to broaden their co-operation and to promote stability in Europe;
- section 2 describes the principle on which NATO and the Ukraine will base their relationship, these being: respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all other states;
- Section 3 lists areas for consultation and co-operation between NATO and the Ukraine, these are political and security related issues, support for

¹⁴ NATO, 1999. NATO-Russian joints council meeting. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Brussels
[web]<http://www.Nato.int>.

¹⁵ NATO.1997. Charter on a distinctive NATO-Ukraine partnership. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Brussels[web]<http://www.Nato.int>.

Ukrainian defence reform, civil-military relations, and civil emergency planning.

- Section 4 provides that the North Atlantic Council will meet periodically with representatives of the Ukraine to assess the implementation of the above-mentioned.
- Section 5 welcomes and supports the fact that the Ukraine received, as a non-Nuclear state, security assurances from the five nuclear powers when it acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty (NATO, 1997).

5.4.4 Summary

As part of what NATO sees as adaptation to new circumstances the alliance formulated a policy of enlargement. Unbridled enlargement would of course exacerbate the security dilemma of, for instance, Russia. It could also lead to disparity amongst the armed services of NATO as well as disparity in the contribution by alliance members. In view of this a strategy of constructive engagement and the gradual creation of partnerships with the end goal becoming an alliance partner, was conceived. It is notable that the NATO-Ukraine charter is much "warmer" and more concise than the NATO-Russian Founding Act. In this instance it would seem that some "cold" still remain in the Russia-NATO relationships. It can be concluded, once again, that NATO and Russian relationships are not as cordial as NATO would want us to believe. Nevertheless, NATO grew and has become the strongest non-governmental organisation in Europe.

5.5 NATO-Russian relations

The one European state that could realistically be threatened in accordance with the security dilemma that all states face, is Russia. If this state perceives itself to be threatened by NATO it could exert influence to counter alliance policy and thus be a stumbling block for the NATO strategy of adaptation through enlargement. Therefore NATO is actively trying to convince Russia that NATO's expansion would not harm Russia's interest (Sloan, 1995:222).

5.5.1 The NATO-Russia founding act

According to the American Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright the NATO-Russia founding act means that "...Russia has rejected self-isolationism..." and that Russia "...has recognised that Europe should not be divided into opposing blocks that must be kept apart by buffer zones of excluded states" (Albright as quoted by NATO¹⁶, 1997). This is a one sided American viewpoint, what remains true however is the fact that Russia will find benefits in the open access to information provided by the West (Kozyrev, 1995:7). Continual co-operation between NATO and Russia through the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council enhances Russia's prestige as one of NATO's two "special partners," helps to erase the dividing line of the past and should do much to assure Russia of NATO'S good intentions (NATO, 1997 & Naumann, 1997:4). These intentions are described in the Study on NATO Enlargement

¹⁶ NATO, 1999.NATO.Russia joints council meeting. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Brussels
[web]<http://www.Nato.int>.

(NATO, 1995) that is set in six principles that govern NATO relations with Russia.

5.5.2 The Governing principles

These principles are:

- The recondition that "...friendship..." (NATO, 1997) between NATO and Russia is a key element for security and stability in Europe. As such Russia has an important contribution to make to European stability and security.
- Co-operation between NATO and Russia will be given priority in areas of importance for example nuclear power.
- The co-operation must foster mutual confidence and openness.
- NATO and Russian relations must further a broad and inclusive approach to European security.
- These relations must reflect Russia's significance in European security and be based on reciprocity with "...no surprise decisions by either side which could affect the interests of the other."
- NATO states that the enlargement process "...will threaten no-one..." and contribute to broaden the European security construct by enhancing "...co-operation and stability for all..." (NATO, 1995).

5.5.3 The fruits of our labour

The arrangements noted above governed by the principles mentioned have borne fruit of several varieties. The signing of the NATO-Russia Funding Act

formalised the co-operation alluded to in the principles governing relations between NATO and Russia (Sloana, 1997). This meant that new points of contact between NATO and Russia formed. Russia now has a permanent military representative in Brussels. This allows "...the military to get to know each other in practical day-to-day dealings" (Sloana, 1997).

5.5.4 Summary

NATO's public attitude towards Russia could be described in the words of the Secretary-General of NATO, Dr. Javier Sloana: "It is hard to conceive of a viable European security structure that does not take Russia in account and the potential contribution Russia can make to enhancing stability. We all would like to see in Russia a partner who shares our interest in trade and stability..." To this end NATO has engaged Russia in dialogue and co-operation, especially in the field of security. Furthermore, NATO has tried to deal with Russia's fear of an expanding NATO. How successful these attempts truly are, only the Russians will know. The material on this subject comes from NATO and is thus suspect in the intellectual sense.

5.6 An integrated European Security infrastructure

The pages above are riddled by the theme of "an inclusive and new European Security infrastructure". This does not wholly pertain to an integration of more and more states alone. On the 4th of June 1999, Dr. Javier Sloana, Secretary-General of NATO was designated as the first Secretary-General of the EU Council of ministers and High Representative for the Common foreign

Policy of the Union (NATO¹⁷, 1999). Hereby ties of one sort or the other were placed between NATO and EU security. This is consistent with NATO's standing policy of being part of a "...broad European security architecture throughout the whole of Europe" (NATO, 1995) and the fact that "...European Union members are committed to a common foreign and security policy which shall include all questions related to the security of the union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy..." (NATO, 1995). It is clear that when NATO speak of inclusiveness in security it does not only imply inclusion of more states in NATO but also NATO's inclusion into security policies of a unified Europe.

5.7 Conclusion

The main perspective in this chapter was that NATO's actions define NATO. These actions included the *de facto* enlargement of the alliance through a deliberate policy, which the alliance itself termed "adaptation. NATO secondly declared war on Yugoslavia. This war turned into an air-campaign and exposed an unwillingness of NATO (especially the USA?) to commit ground troops and accept casualties. The new frontier of NATO seemed political rather than military as the alliance strives to convert more countries into allies by way of NACC and PFP programmes. The final touch to NATO's political strategy was put in place by a growing unity between European security agendas and NATO security agendas.

¹⁷ NATO.1999. Briefing at NATO headquarters. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Brussels [e-mail to:] Venter J.C.M.

NATO is thus adapting and doing so at remarkable speed. The end result of this process of adaptation is not yet clear, it is however possible to form certain assumptions.

In this chapter the reaction of NATO to the dramatic changes in the international order was described and the following conclusions can be reached. The dissolution of the USSR did not come as a surprise to NATO. By 1994 preparations were well underway to incorporate former enemies into the alliance. This was done by means of the NACC, the EAPC and the PFP. Underlying these programmes and structure however was a broad definition of security that includes almost every aspect of the modern developing international system. On an even deeper level lies the implicit fact that the NATO signatories still regard the Alliance as necessary for their security. Another possibility however, is suggested by Bennet, (1988:370) and that is that NATO may be looking for activities to justify its continuance. NATO is also skilfully feeding propaganda to the world when it suits them. Most importantly though, certain trends could be discerned that will be helpful in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 6: A SCENARIO MATRIX FOR NATO

6.1 Introduction

The method of scenario development detailed in chapter two is the bedrock of chapter six. The trends of NATO behaviour were found in the previous chapters. Now scenarios need to be formulated from these trends. This is the goal of this chapter. All that was described in the previous chapters must now be filled in according to the method described in chapter two. The Logical place to start is where chapter two left off and that was the Iceberg model. This model comprises three levels: events; trends and structure. Given the facts as stated through chapter three four and five the following can be concluded:

- There were thus fundamental changes in the **structures**, the bottom of the pyramid. (The end of Bipolarity, Chapter 3)
- NATO reacted to this along the rules set by the sort of organisation that NATO is, and that is a military alliance.
- Certain **trends and patterns** could be plotted on the axis of a scenario matrix and these are grouped into military-, and political integration of the alliance and the perceived threat level to the alliance.
- These axes were chosen in the light of the definitions of NATO, alliances and deterrence that was given in chapter two "...as such an alliance is a configuration of power wherein the state seeks security and the opportunity to advance its national interests by linking its power with that of one or more states with similar interests" (Plano & Olton,


1988:17). NATO was created by *political will* that amounted to *mutual-national-security-goal-integration* (i.e.: **(1) political goal integration**), to **(2) integrate military power** for deterrence purposes in the face of a **(3) perceived threat**. These three factors are thus the major trends along which NATO operates and from where the change of the organisation may come, given the clear changes in structure.

- They are also the base indicators or baselines that form the scenario Matrix for NATO. (Paragraph 2.3.3, Chapter 2)
- **The events** leading from these trends and patterns could be seen all over the media and were also detailed, to a certain extent, in chapters 4 and 5.
- The main events of course are: continued expansion of NATO, the war in the Balkan (1999) and NATO relations with Russia.

There may well be others, but these are the most important events. NATO's iceberg model would thus look as follows.

6.2 NATO's Iceberg

Figure 6: NATO's Iceberg




6.3. A structural-dynamic model of NATO scenarios

When the knowledge gathered in this study is cast into the Iceberg model, events, trends and structure can be discerned. The dynamic nature of these factors is not readily apparent and it is important to note that constant interaction between these factors impact on possible outcomes in a very real way. To describe the possible factors that could interact, a Structural-dynamic model of the NATO scenarios needs to be formulated and is illustrated in figure 7. (Following page). The Structural-dynamic model provides the legend for the following NATO scenarios. In each scenario certain structural factors pertaining to the international system, key actors and key issues are mixed to provide different outcomes i.e.: the scenarios. The key structural factors are a possible return to bipolarity, European Unionism or nationalism, ethnicity inside and outside of NATO, technological advancement, brush wars and new ideological rifts in the international system. The key actors are the USA, NATO, China, "Mavericks"- operators in the political arena that come unexpectedly without a rational international goal related policy- North Korea, the UN, and Russia. The key issues are the possibility of a period of new isolationism for the US, weapon and especially nuclear proliferation, a common European security ideology and continued expansion of NATO.

These factors are not an exclusive list but provide the dynamic structure upon which scenario generation is based.

Figure 7: Structural-dynamic model of NATO Scenarios



6.4 Scenario construction

This iceberg analysis underlies scenario generation (Venter, 1999:6). If the trends are taken as non-constant axis whereupon several factors (figure 9) may impact to derive different combinations and given the established data of the previous chapter, scenarios can now be generated.

Figure 4 (Chapter 2), places the axis of the scenario matrix in a three dimensional manner and the place of NATO concerning trends can be plotted. The factors shown in figure 6 can now be plotted on this scenario matrix- and so scenarios can be generated. As it is better to judge between alternatives and because uncertainties are prevalent, four scenarios concerning NATO can be developed using the data thus far developed. The scenarios, to a certain extent, keep track of Joseph Nye's (1993:190) possible power configurations that were also described in a previous chapter. The scenarios are based on certain game rules that apply equally to all four scenarios. These rules are:


- The world seems safe for small wars, as was the case of the Balkan war of 1999.
- NATO is no longer bound by a defined opposing power block.
- Nuclear proliferation has become an issue in geographically diverse regions, like China, North Korea, India and Pakistan.
- Technology and modern communications-media are virtually making the world smaller. Geographic separation no longer equals isolation.

- Economic interdependence is increasing
- The differences between the Northern- and Southern hemisphere are increasing.
- The importance of non-state actors is on the increase.
- Political integration amongst the EU nations is slowly growing.
- Political disintegration amongst the countries, formerly part of the USSR, is on the increase.
- The USSR, though politically and economically weak is still the only country that can destroy the US (Jervis, 1991:41).
- The key knowables that make up the scenarios stem from the previous chapters. The major factors are:

Nato's **military integration** (stemming from its goal as military alliance), **political integration** (stemming from the combined political will of the signatories to create NATO and to remain part of the alliance) and the **perceived threat** level (the reason for the existence of NATO).

The unknowable factors (change inductors) will be discussed as they pertain to each scenario specifically.

Figure 8: Scenario 1: "The First Bamboo War"



In this scenario NATO becomes more important due to developments outside of the alliance. The indicators are high on all the axis. The threat level returns to Cold War proportions, political-military integration also increases in an effort to make NATO more efficient to combat the new threat. NATO will again protect the "free world" but this time, perhaps, from different enemies. Nye (1993:190) describes this option as a possible return to bipolarity.

The following actors, structural factors, unknowable and issues play an important role in this scenario:

- The Actors:

NATO, Pakistan, India, Iraq and Russia

- **Structural Factors:**

Maverick states, or statesmen, may well come to the foreground and launch a nuclear -, or biological armed missile at a NATO country. This action may be rational or wholly non-rational. A form of rational action would be if Russia pushed for more international recognition and “a Greater Russia, through its still large military force.

- **The Issues:**

The main Issue would be a Maverick mentality and / or Weapon proliferation.

- **The key unknowable:**

Who will be the next agitator? The list of possible countries and leaders are long.

New arms races have already cropped up. Pakistan and India have already prompted Superpower reaction. In May 1998 President Clinton applied sanctions, both verbal and economic after India blasted its way into the nuclear club by testing a 30-kiloton nuclear device. This event was closely followed by a Pakistani test and soon after the two countries clashed again, military, in Kashmir

North Korea tested a missile with a range of 2000 kilometres in September 1998. They already have a nuclear capability and with this missile's range they can target the whole of Japan (Macintyre, 1998:49). China is also actively searching for a new international role, enhanced status and has

already partially succeeded upon demonstration of its nuclear capabilities (Ayoob, 1991:375). If China becomes a second superpower with nuclear capability and an anti-Western predisposition; NATO will be back in business. The key unknowable in this scenario is the behaviour of China, North Korea, the outcome of the India-Pakistan conflict or rogue states. According to this scenario then, NATO will have to turn and face further to the east. This state of affairs will be good for NATO as an organisation. It would have found a new and very good, reason for its existence and this after some critics have suggested that NATO should discreetly disband. Defence spending would increase, the Euro-Atlantic axis would be cemented, prospective new alliance members, perhaps even Russia, will want to join, Europe will concentrate on major problems not minor trade squabbles and the days of the Cold War will be with us again.


6.4.1.1 Critique

Mutually assured destruction, economic reality and a world market in which you have to trade and where it will be very counterproductive to engage in the destabilisation of your neighbour will most probably keep conflict local or regional. A precise copy of the Cold War is highly unlikely.

Figure 9: Scenario 2: "A Global Commons"

In this scenario, political and military integration within NATO remain relatively stable. The marked feature is a direct absence of military threat to Europe and the US. As a result of this, military integration and political interaction remain as they were in the late 90's but the perceived threat level falls

dramatically. This is a result of the fact that trade and economic realities quieted the world and trade is now more beneficial than conflict. Brush wars are still a reality and NATO is regarded as highly beneficial to the World Order.



This might not seem so far fetched given technological advances that only first world countries can afford. On the other hand China, North Korea even Iraq might obtain sophisticated weapons of mass destruction but the defensive and offensive capabilities of NATO:

- prohibits their use through apocalyptic counter strike or first strike potential, or;

- NATO countries have become immune to regular and irregular weapons through an advanced missile defence system, stealth technology and electronic espionage; or
- States have become so linked in interests and economy that no one can afford to wage anything but a trade war. For instance the US buys bananas from South American countries; the US does not need the bananas so they have to sell them to Europe. Europe does not want the extra bananas and a scuffle ensues. Yet trade relations are becoming so enmeshed, that a South American banana problem becomes a European problem. This example illustrates the interpenetration of interests that shift the area of conflict away from military means.

The following actors, structural factors, unknowable and issues play an important role in this scenario:

- Actors:

The EU and other Trade organisations, NATO's signatories, The USA, Europe, China, the UN and Russia.

- Structural factors:

Technology, the world economy.

- Key issues:

Profit, Political stability

- Key unknowable(s):


The Key unknowable in this scenario is the behaviour of the NATO signatories, especially the US when confronted with no direct military threat, whatever the reason for this absence of threat might be.

This scenario leads to the eventual downsizing of NATO in the absence of threat and the prevalence of trade-wars (Sullivan 1993:8). Nye (1993:191) calls this state of the international system Multilevel Interdependence. Economy is a transcending structure in this system and this economic structure is totally trans-national. Military capability might still be important but it might be more lucrative to buy protection as Kuwait did during the last Gulf War and Iceland still does.

6.4.2.1 Critique

Technology can only go so far, this fact was proven by several low costs, low tech bombings of US targets. The fact that these bombings did occur underscores the fact that tension is still about, that there are a lot of people with anti-American feelings and the low cost bomb still kills.

Figure 10: Scenario 3: NATO's dissipation



Minimum threat, minimum political integration and minimum military integration result in the dissipation of NATO. This is not to say that other security organizations have not formed, it just means that NATO does not exist any more.

The following actors, structural factors, unknowable and issues play an important role in this scenario:

- Actors:
 - The USA, Other NATO signatories, Russia and France
- Structural factors:
 - Ethnicity, European unionism, new ideological rifts,

- Key issues:

Military isolationism, Proliferation of weapons, New American security perspective and a, New European security perspective

- Key unknowable:

Will the proposed American missile defence system work?

How tired is America of shouldering European security?

How tired is the Europeans of letting America shoulder their security?

There are many reasons why this scenario might not be so far fetched, as it seems.

1. America tried to get Slobodan Milosovic out of Kosovo by way of an intensive air war. Despite the willingness of the Allies to commit ground troops, America said no. This was done in order to favour a “clean” bombing campaign. This campaign turned out to be non effective as far as military targets were concerned (Barry & Tommas, 2000: 11-14).
2. Even During the Gulf war the Allies under the leadership of the USA were less than effective. According to Bhatia and McGrory (1999:?) Saddam Hussein’s quest for a nuclear weapons program remained wholly untouched.
3. Probably upon realising the facts mentioned above the USA now wants to erect a missile shield that will protect the USA from Maverick States such as Iraq or Serbia (Alter, 2000, 18-20). This does not sit well with the rest of NATO’s allies. France has always held a semi-independent line towards NATO, being included yet nearly self-sufficient by maintaining their own nuclear force (Munro & Chant, 1995:84). This put

the signing of START III on the carpet and even the Canadians feel betrayed (Alter, 2000:19).

The main feature is the disappearance of NATO. This might be due to what the USA's allies perceive as self-centred military developments, ineffectual leadership and a total reluctance to put troops on the ground for fear of the "body bag" syndrome that started during the conflict in Vietnam.

6.4.3.1 Critique

In truth, considering the following ten years it is highly unlikely that NATO will disappear. The USA might have a fear of death in straight infantry battles, but the overwhelming monetary support that America can filter through the Alliance is still immense. The PFP and NACC programs are strong and busy working (-according to NATO-) and it seems as though the Eastern European Nation can't leave NATO alone, they want to become members! In these circumstances this scenario is unlikely to unfold within the next ten years. (Jervis, 1991:39)

- US decides that it does not want the position of "Globo-cop" as economic pressure takes its toll and that it would be wiser to spend money, like the money spent on Kosovo, at home.
- Economic rivalry between a stronger more unified Europe and US grows so intense that political and military co-operation is no longer desirable, especially since there seems to be no direct threat.

It is therefore clear that the breakdown according to the Structural dynamic model for NATO scenarios would look as follows:

The following actors, structural factors, unknowable and issues play an important role in this scenario:

- The Actors:
Europe, and the USA.
- The Structural Factors:
European unionism, American Isolation.
- Key Issues
New European security thought, new American security thought, and isolationism.
- Key knowable
America did not do so well in their air wars, namely Iraq and Bosnia, the France are relatively independent when it comes to military planning. The Americans might want a new dispensation when it comes to burden sharing in the Alliance and so might Europe.

6.4.4 .1 Critique

NATO was formed as a direct result of the tension (later termed the Cold War) that existed from 1949 until 1991. When dramatic change in the international order was afoot the Alliance formulated a broader more inclusive concept that defines what the Alliance perceives as a possible threat and started expanding. This does not seem a weak organisation with major internal rifts. The rifts described above are there but it is not enough to change the balance dramatically in the next ten years.

6.5 Conclusion

The goal of this chapter was to generate scenarios for NATO that could realistically be the future of that organization. To accomplish this the Iceberg model was filled in accordance with NATO, the current International order as far as was discernable from macro international shifts (figure 5) and other dynamic interactive structures, issues and actors in the international arena. The result was the structural dynamic model for NATO (figure 6). From this combination factors were taken and four scenarios were formulated. The scenarios represent extremes namely: the growth of NATO through to the dissipation of NATO. As such the scenarios fulfil the design qualification of scenarios by giving the reader a wide scope of possible futures for NATO and also a heuristic device for looking at NATO and the future.

CHAPTER 7: THE WAY FORWARD

The problem that this study was focused around was the formulation of the creation of scenarios or possible futures for NATO in the first decade of the millennium. This was done by the explanation of the scenario method in chapter two. In chapter three the history of NATO was given. Chapters four and five gave a clearer historical perspective of NATO as an organization and the reaction of this organization to radical change. This change was systemic, in other words a whole paradigm for the whole of the world was dismantled and a new paradigm is beginning to unfold. (Bipolarity ended and a system with an open agenda is emerging.) This does not impact on every country in the world as severely as it impacted on the NATO signatories and Eastern Europe. For this reason then was the question about NATO's future of such interest. This alliance is the most powerful military organization in the world, (at least on paper); therefore its future is of great importance. In chapter 6, according to the scenario method two very useful instruments were developed namely the Iceberg analysis of NATO and the Structural dynamic model for NATO. These two figures are heuristic devices. Scholars can work from these, add to them or change them, but they give the scenario method teeth. They categorize, and disseminate between alternatives so that scenarios can be formulised. The four scenarios that were developed namely: "The first bamboo war; A global common; Nato's dissipation and Partnership for Europe cover a relative high number of possible futures.

From all this, the Problem statement can be answered: Scenarios is a most useful and creative tool that can be used in International relations both as a

heuristic device and as a planning framework where major alternative possibilities exist. It looks highly unlikely that NATO will disappear within the next ten years, it might even grow stronger.

The primary study goals can also be answered: Possible futures for NATO were discovered and described and this was done in accordance with the central theoretical statement in this study.

From all this, certain conclusions can be drawn:

- It became clear that NATO deems itself as relevant as ever. NATO is further planning to stay relevant for the foreseeable future. The new strategic concept, that in fact define what NATO perceives as a threat is now so inclusive that NATO is likely to be more active than it was during the Cold War when it was restrained by the Warsaw Pact. The 1999 Balkan war could be seen as proof of this.
- Another strategy for the retention of relevance is the inclusion of more and more states. The two countries mentioned in the study, that have already been incorporated into NATO as members, is only the beginning. More European countries will definitely follow and become members or partners and so will "regional partners". States geographically separated from Europe are strategically located in different parts of the world.

- NATO will however be a changed organisation. It is more than likely that NATO will have a changed structure of burden sharing in more responsibilities for European countries and less reliance on the US, which demonstrated an aversion to the commitment of ground troops and favours high tech stand off weapons that only the US can afford. The year 2000 might also be the start of a new era of US isolationism with the US wanting a lower international profile. In this sense NATO is more likely the future globo-cop, replacing a defunct and recalcitrant US.
- NATO shall more than likely start incorporating other regional partners as mentioned above. This will aid NATO in a high globo-cop profile. South Africa might well be a future candidate for such a partnership.
- NATO will none the less be a European based organisation and it is possible that NATO will become so inclusive that European security and Nato's security policy essentially become the same concept. This will be the result of continuous refinement of the strategic concept and continuous inclusion of more and more states either as members or as partners. This might lead to the incorporation of the whole of Europe and NATO transcending military boundaries and become a political entity.
- The scenarios that were developed in the previous chapter defined indicators that could be used to measure Nato's intentions in the future.

Change along these indicators, namely: military integration, political integration and perceived threat level, gives future perspective.

- The goal of these scenarios was to try and answer the question where NATO might be in ten years from now. No one scenario can be viewed in total isolation. A hybrid truth containing bits of each of the scenarios will more than likely develop. As such the scenarios should be thought of as frameworks for further thinking.

It must be noted that events regarding NATO and the international system in which NATO functions are fluctuating and dynamic. NATO's new policy for security seems a strategy for incorporation rather than deterrence. This ensures that NATO will remain an important international actor for some time to come.

The final answer to the question of how NATO reacted to change is thus that: NATO changed, but not in a fundamental manner. NATO will remain a relevant political force, no longer just a military one and there might be a future partnership between South Africa, a regional power, and NATO, a world power.

Where will NATO be in ten years time? If a radical threat arose, so shall NATO arise. If no threats or low-level threats become the order of the day, NATO will decline in prominence. It might also be possible for NATO to include the whole of Europe in one way or the other and thus transform itself from a military alliance to a political entity.

Three clear recommendations for further study can be made at the end of this study:

- The relationship between NATO and the EU or more specific, NATO and the defence policy of the EU. Will there be further integration? If so, where does that leave the Americans?
- Will NATO reinvest itself to perpetuate itself without reason?
- Will NATO eventually supersede the EU as an organisation based on political rather than military goals?

These themes have been touched on in this study but was not fully examined as they lie on the periphery of the main goal of this study. Any following study might do well to focus on these questions or take them into account.

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
Annexure 1: The pre 1991 USSR

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics



Annexure 2: The post 1991 Europe


Europe



Annexure 3 :NATO at a glance.

(NATO, 1996. NATO at a glance. NATO: Brussels.)

NATO's Civil and Military Structure



Annexure 4: The Balkan region

Balkan Peninsula

