

Exploring India's National Security Strategy as an Instrument of Foreign Policy towards Pakistan between 2000 and 2015

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DECLARATION

I, Marcelino Peter Sereko, declare that the thesis entitled "Exploring India's National Security Strategy as an Instrument of Foreign Policy regarding Pakistan between 2000 and 2015" hereby submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Studies and International Relations has not previously been submitted by me for a degree at this or any other University. I further declare that this is my work in design and execution and that all materials contained herein have been duly acknowledged.

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Signature:

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Date:

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ABSTRACT

The security strategy of any country is critical to the protection of national interests and for addressing threats against that state. The India-Pakistan conflict spans more than 70 years and has indisputably shaped India's National Security Strategy (NSS) to some extent. The aim of the study was to explore the existence and application of India's NSS in relation to Pakistan, identify factors that are key determinants of India's NSS, examine the implementation or activation of the NSS and determine the nature and extent of the involvement of the military and foreign policy elite in formulating and activating India's NSS. The study followed an interpretivist paradigm to understand participants' perspectives and lived experiences of India's NSS. An inductive approach was adopted to collect primary qualitative data from 25 purposively sampled participants from academia and different security agents. Semi-structured interviews were used to collect data following a designed interview guide. Qualitative data was analysed using a thematic analysis. The results showed that India's NSS was shaped by historical events, relationships with neighbouring countries and key national interests. Historical events such as the adoption of the non-alignment policy and the threats posed by Pakistan's military and terrorist attacks have led to India's NSS becoming more aggressive as demonstrated by the amassment of nuclear weapons, yet remaining largely reactionary in nature. The study found that India seeks to protect its territories, particularly Kashmir, while pursuing greater goals of economic and global dominance. Relationships forged by Pakistan with China and the United States have also been instrumental in fueling the India-Pakistan conflict and have been used as a strategy to contain India. The findings of the study also indicate that the military has less influence on the development of the security strategy, yet Pakistan is essentially a military state.

Keywords: India; Pakistan; South Asia, national security; foreign policy; nuclear

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title	Page
Title	i
Declaration	ii
Acknowledgements	iii
Abstract	iv
Table of contents	v
List of tables and diagrams	X
List of abbreviations and acronyms	xi
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION	
1.1. Background of the study	1
1.2. Problem statement	5
1.3. Research objectives	6
1.3.1. General objective	6
1.3.2. Specific objectives	7
1.4. Research Questions	7
1.5. Significance of the study	7
1.6. Literature review	8
1.6.1. Empirical literature review	8
1.6.2 Theoretical framework	8
1.6.2.1. Structural realism	12
1.6.2.2. Structural realism perspective: the Indo-Pakistani conflict	12
1.6.2.3. Social constructivism theory	13
1.6.2.4. Constructivism perspective: the Indo-Pakistani conflict	16
1.7. Research methodology and design	16
1.7.1. Research approach	17
1.7.2. Research design	17
1.7.3. Data collection	18
1.7.3.1. Target population	18
1.7.3.2. Sampling	18
1.8.3.3. Data collection tools	19
1.7.4. Data analysis	20
1.8. Measures to ensure trustworthiness	21
1.8.1. Credibility	21
1.8.2. Transferability	22
1.8.3. Dependability	22

Title	Page
1.8.4. Confirmability	23
1.8.5. Authenticity	23
1.9. Limitations of the study	23
1.10. Ethical considerations	23
1.10.1. Voluntary participation	24
1.10.2. No harm to participants	24
1.10.3. Anonymity and confidentiality	24
1.10.4. Deception of participants	25
1.11. Outline of the thesis	25
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW	27
2.1. Introduction	27
2.2. Culture of non-articulated National Security Strategy (NSS)	27
2.3. Articulation of India's national security strategy	35
2.4. Determinants of India's national security strategy	38
2.5. Pakistan's national security strategy	38
2.6. Theoretical framework	40
2.6.1. Liberalism	40
2.6.2. Deterrence theory	41
2.6.3. Social constructivism theory	42
2.6.4. Structural realism theory	45
2.7. Identity of India and Pakistan	46
2.8. Application of theoretical framework: India and Pakistan	49
2.9. Conclusion	54
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	54
3.1. Introduction	54
3.2. Methods of conducting political research	54
3.3. Research paradigm	55
3.4. Research approach	57
3.5. Research design	58
3.6. Data collection	59
3.6.1. Target population	59
3.6.2. Sampling	59
3.6.3. Sample size	61
3.7. Data collection method	61
3.7.1. Semi-structured interviews	62

Title	Page
3.7.2. Measuring instrument	63
3.8. Data analysis	64
3.9. Measures to ensure trustworthiness	66
3.10. Pilot study	68
3.11. Limitations of the study	69
3.12. Ethical considerations	69
3.13. Conclusion	72
CHAPTER FOUR: INDO-PAKISTANI RELATIONS FROM THE BEGINNING	74
4.1. Introduction	74
4.2. India under colonial rule	74
4.3. Establishment of the two-nation theory	76
4.4. Hindu-Muslim antagonism	77
4.5. Partition of Indian subcontinents	78
4.6. Nuclear weapons	82
4.7. Strategic alliances	82
4.8. Disputed Indo-Pakistani territories	83
4.8.1. Kashmir border dispute	84
4.8.2. Siachen Glacier dispute	84
4.8.3. Sir Creek dispute	86
4.8.4. Indus Waters Treaty dispute	87
4.9. India's perspective on the war	87
4.10. Pakistani attitude and strategies	89
4.11. Post-independence Indo-Pakistani relations	91
4.12. India-Pakistan peace process	92
4.12.1. Kargil war	97
4.13. Conclusion	98
CHAPTER FIVE: PRESENTATION OF DATA, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION	100
5.1. Introduction	100
5.2. Participant demography	102
5.3. Thematic analysis	102
5.3.1. Coding of data	103
5.3.2. Themes and sub-themes	103
5.4. Presentation of data and discussion of results	103

Title		Page
5.4.1.	Implementation of India's NSS	105
5.4.1.1.	India's approach to national security	106
5.4.1.2.	Exposing Pakistan's terrorist links	107
5.4.1.3.	Border security	110
5.4.1.4.	Failure of India's	111
5.4.2.	Key determining factors of India's NSS	114
5.4.2.1.	Historical events	114
5.4.2.2.	National interests	116
5.4.2.3.	Regional and international influence and relations	117
5.4.3.	Role of the military and policy elite	118
5.4.3.1.	Policy elite and the military in India's NSS	118
5.5.	India and Pakistan relations	119
5.6.	Conclusion	121
CHAPTER SIX: SECURITY CHALLENGES BETWEEN 2005 AND 2015		123
6.1.	Introduction	123
6.2.	Unresolved state disputes	124
6.3.	Threats by the neighbours, Pakistan and China	127
6.3.1.	Terrorism	127
6.4.	Threat of Indian dominance	130
6.5.	India and Pakistan state models	131
6.6.	Regional and international influence	133
6.7.	Conclusion	136
CHAPTER SEVEN: PRESENTATION OF DATA, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION		139
7.1.	Introduction	139
7.2.	Study research objectives	140
7.3.	Findings from literature review	141
7.4.	Findings from primary research	144
7.4.1.	Implementing India's security strategy	144
7.4.2.	Key determining factors of India's NSS	145
7.4.3.	Military and political elite	146

Title		Page
7.5.	Recommendations	147
7.6.	Conclusion	148
References		149
Appendix A: Political Map of Colonial India		174
Appendix B: Timelines		175
Appendix C: Interview Guide		176

List of Tables and Diagrams

Title	Page
Figure 2.1: India military expenditure between 1999 and 2019	51
Figure 2.2: Pakistan military expenditure between 1999 and 2019	51
Table 5.1: Demographic distribution of research participants	101
Figure 5.2: Nodes that served as bins during coding of interview transcripts	103
Table 5.3: Definitions of themes	104

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

Bharatiya Janata Party – BJP

Central Bureau of Investigation – CBI

Credible Minimum Deterrence – CMD

Defence Foreign Relations – DFR

Department of International Relations and Cooperation – DIRCO

Gross Domestic Product – GDP

Indus Waters Treaty – IWT

Institute for Security Studies – ISS

Line of Control – LoC

National Security Strategy – NSS

Non -Alignment Movement – NAM

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty – NPT

Revolution in Military Affairs – RMA

South African National Defence Force – SANDF

South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation – SAARC

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute – SIPRI

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics – USSR

United Nations – UN

United Nations Security Council – UNSC

United States – US

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Every country has to establish a national security plan to be able to sufficiently protect its national interests. A national security strategy is described as a framework outlining how a country will provide security measures for the government and citizens (Hagmann and Stocker, 2005). The framework has a present and future role in protecting the national interests of the country and setting up guidelines for addressing threats and opportunities. For this reason, the national security strategy is a “conceptual logic”, which ensures that all the instruments of statecraft, including foreign policy, are orchestrated to maximise the benefits of a nation’s core interests.

In any government, the national interests ought to reflect a general consensus among the political elements in government. It is argued that in a democratic society such as India, the consensus on national interests is affected by a diverse range of public opinion via elections, the media, as well as formal and informal lobbying (Saran, 2012). National interests in the majority of democracies include the maintenance of national unity and sovereignty, greater welfare through increasing wealth and security, and the defence of countrywide principles.

1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

Foreign policy is critical in defining a country’s relations with other countries. Foreign policy can be referred to as a set of actions taken by the state with the intention of influencing the actions of a country in relation to the rest of the world (Bojang, 2018). A foreign policy can be recognised as an essential element of statecraft developed with varying goals and objectives as well as instruments or tools (Gyngell, 2016). Several studies have also highlighted major instruments by which foreign policy objectives can be achieved and these are economic, political, and military and security strategies (Elliott, 2010). Additionally, Holsti (1977) suggests that history, psychology and individual interest can also be utilised to achieve foreign policy objectives. Security and military strategies have been identified from time immemorial as major tools in achieving core (national) interests and state agendas within the international system (Anon, 1995). A study by Byman and Waxman (2002) also indicates that security and military strategies may be classified into two main groups; these are the persuasive and coercive strategies. On the one hand, under a coercive strategy, the country

will use force to neutralise a threat imposed by another country. This strategy can be deployed through military might, political influence and economic strength (Byman and Waxman, 1999). On the other hand, the persuasive strategy takes the form of diplomatic channels aimed at improving relations between the affected states.

The application of security and military strategies as a means of achieving foreign policy objectives varies from state to state, although they are largely similar. India has witnessed foreign invasions since the 17th century. The first Europeans to have an interest in India were the Portuguese, followed by the Dutch, French and then the British. The British occupied India for 250 years. After this tenure, they presided over the partitioning of India to create Pakistan (Rehman & Khan, 2014). The partition was largely based on religion, with India being Hindu-dominated, while Pakistan was predominantly Muslim. In August 1947, after ruling the Indian sub-continent, the British surrendered power and India and Pakistan became two sovereign nations (Atlas of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 2012). However, the partitioning created several problems, which included rehabilitation, property sharing of assets and integration or accession of princely states (Rehman & Khan, 2014). Within five months after the departure of the British, the two nations were on the edge of war over these contentions and disputed territories. Both India and Pakistan claimed to be the rightful owner of the disputed territories (Rehman & Khan, 2014).

The partitioning of India and Pakistan was the result of several social, economic, political and religious (Christian, Muslim and Hindu) forces in the lives of many Indians. Since then, the two countries have looked at each other with a mixture of envy, mistrust, suspicion, fear and jealousy, hence making the relationship acrimonious. When both India and Pakistan attained nuclear capability in 1998, their relationship worsened and the sense of insecurity in the two countries rose. The balance of power has continuously changed between India and Pakistan, with both countries having acquired nuclear weapons to deter possible nuclear attacks in order to achieve their respective diplomatic and political objectives. The relationship between these two countries is currently influenced and managed by both nations' security strategies.

This study will explore India's national security strategy as an instrument of foreign policy towards Pakistan between 2000 and 2015. As part of its security strategy, India is

suspected of embarking on a national security strategy, which is likely to pose a threat to Pakistan's national security strategy.

As India's power is growing, especially in the region, Pakistan is directly implicated as the immediate nuclear adversary. In an uncertain environment, there is fear and when two countries fear each other, neither one can be secured unless one gets the upper hand or eliminates its rival. This scenario is a classic example of a "security dilemma" where one actor is uncertain about the intentions of the other, specifically in the anarchic international environment. The causal relationship between anarchy, the safety problem and conflict as conceived by Tang (2009:59) is as follows:

"Anarchy creates uncertainty; uncertainty creates fear; fear creates power rivalry; power competition triggers a (dormant) security problem; and the activated security dilemma leads to war via a spiral. Typically, evidence of an arms race is deemed to be a clear sign of a security quandary."

The conflicts between India and Pakistan appear to have an impact on both nations' national security strategies. The two states may use their resources as a shield in order to prevent a blitzkrieg from the other. Other countries may have had influence to some degree; however, the duo has been known to be in a seemingly never-ending conflict that has forced them to practise vigilance at all times. Since 1997, India has doubled its defence expenditure, and this has been reported to be growing at an average of 6.3% per annum (SIPRI, 2020). Moreover, India currently seems to be one of the world's largest buyers of conventional weapons, making its military and economic capacity superior to that of Pakistan (Lawdwig, 2015; Sugunakararaju and Akhtar, 2015). This may influence Pakistan's foreign policy, which continues to be a threat to India. However, regardless of its superiority, India is concerned about the possibility that Pakistan might at some point make a desperate move to increase its military power with the aim of protecting itself from potential surprise attacks from New Delhi (Banerjee, 2016). The possibility of this occurring is largely dependent on Pakistan involving its allies who have greater military capacity and economic power. Also, Pakistan appears to have terrorism as part of its security strategy and this implies that India's fears are well founded, as the country has been a victim of terrorist attacks by Pakistan in the past (Subrahmanyam, 2012).

Despite the fact that India is acquiring significant weapon platforms, critics such as Yahsin (2015), Chang (2015), Hao (2015) and Khilnani (2018) have expressed concerns about its ability to use these resources in the service of a long-term strategy, claiming that India is not pursuing a national security strategy toward Pakistan. Furthermore, the existence of an Indian “national security strategy” (outlining political objectives and assuring military, economic, intelligence and educational growth) is now being discussed in national security strategic circles. This discussion focuses on the overall prerequisites and specific policy suggestions for an Indian national security strategy (O'Donnell and Pant, 2015). As a result, it is obvious that India may be going into uncharted terrain, with unforeseeable repercussions.

Historically, India-Pakistan ties have remained antagonistic over a variety of issues, including terrorism, the Afghanistan standoff and Kashmir, a territory over which both countries have gone to war multiple times. Terrorism across the borders has arisen as a major source of conflict between the two countries (Mansingh, 2006). It is evident that the India-Pakistan relationship will not improve qualitatively unless terrorism and geographical and historical borders are addressed and resolved to mutual satisfaction. On the other hand, China and India have moved away from the hostilities of the 1962 conflict and are currently engaged in talks to address the vexing border problem. Over the years, the two nations have implemented a variety of confidence-building measures in order to maintain peace and calm along their borders (Jetly, 2012).

The elected administration of Narendra Modi revealed an additional 11% increase, bringing Pakistan's military budget for 2015–2016 to \$39.8 billion (Bedi et al., 2012:97). Pakistani officials consider its conventional military forces to be the foundation of their strategic deterrent capabilities and, as former president Pervez Musharraf stated, “the conventional balance South Asia is critical to maintaining peace in the region” (Ramana and Mian, 2003). Unsurprisingly, some Pakistani analysts have issued dire warnings about India's developing quantitative and qualitative advantages in the military (Mustafa, 2009).

The flurry of overseas weapon acquisition from countries such as Russia and Israel is specifically designed to strengthen the Indian military's reconnaissance, precision strike and command and control capabilities, which are the cornerstone of the revolution in military affairs (RMA) (Mustafa, 2009). According to Pakistani security experts, the major

consequence of this rising conventional military imbalance will be a loss in Pakistan's traditional power of deterrence and will result in the deterioration of strategic stability in South Asia (Khan, 2005).

1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT

The India-Pakistan relationship will not improve qualitatively unless the military threat and terrorism are handled and resolved to both governments' mutual satisfaction. India has progressively moved towards becoming a middle-income country with growing global interests. Its resources are now bigger than at any previous point in history, and the country maintains close ties with the world's major powers (Robert and Sidhu, 2017). However, India's ascent to prominence has been interpreted as a threat to Pakistan, whose contemporary security environment is influenced by a confluence of political, economic, diplomatic, technical and military factors (Bedi et al., 2012). Pakistan believes that India is in pursuit of the status of a great power through excessive spending on military weapons far beyond its regional security needs. Since the split, no meaningful, sustainable and result-driven dialogue to resolve crises has been evident between the two states (Menon and Kumar, 2010).

Almost 42 years after its first nuclear test, India has spent almost seven times more on its military budget than Pakistan (Einhorn and Sidhu, 2017). India is also perceived to have the oldest, largest and fastest-growing, unsafeguarded nuclear programme of all states that are not party to the Non-proliferation Treaty and the entire developing world. Furthermore, Pakistan does not trust the declared Indian nuclear doctrine, owing to growing inconsistencies with its actual stance on military and technical development (Menon and Kumar, 2010). Although India denies it, continued conflict also confirms a security strategy possibly targeted at Pakistan. India has shown inadequate capacity necessary to dissuade terrorist attacks, and the rise of Hindu nationalism in India has increased conflict towards Pakistan over Kashmir. These issues imply that the conflict between India and Pakistan will continue unless it is resolved under a credible mediator. Through a combination of diplomatic process and guarantees, the United States may play an active role in mediating and deescalating the situation.

Some find it strange that big terrorist events inside India appears to occur whenever Pakistan and India engage in high-level political or diplomatic dialogue to decrease tensions or resolve problems (Global Issues in Context, 2015; Ramana and Mian, 2003). Such occurrences simply allow India to blame Pakistan and are clearly not in Islamabad's best interests, nor do they contribute to the dialogue process, which is Pakistan's major goal. Pakistan is also concerned about the rising Indian security role in Afghanistan, as well as the expansion of military cooperation with Iran, Central Asia and Saudi Arabia, as well as the nuclearisation of the Indian Ocean region (Welman et al., 2005). As a result of these, two views about India have emerged; firstly, that India has no national security strategy targeted at Pakistan and, secondly, that it has no comprehensible and distinguishable way of positioning its economic, military, diplomatic, political, cultural and moral resources toward the goals of security (Mohen et al., 2018). Owing to these characteristics, India as a rising power has become an object of curiosity. Concerns that India does not officially document its strategic doctrines are well-founded. India's response to security threats is largely characterised as reactive and defensive, with diplomacy playing an important role in both countering threats and enhancing the country's capacities (Robert and Sidhu, 2017). It implements its strategies in an ad hoc manner to such an extent that students of Indo-Pakistani relations, such as Singh (2018) and Pant (2009), cannot fathom if India's security strategy is targeted at Pakistan or not. Despite all these uncertainties that exist, no single research has been carried out to provide an insight into India's real intentions towards Pakistan. It is against this background that the researcher seeks to conduct research on exploring India's national security strategy as an instrument of foreign policy and its intentions towards Pakistan.

1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

1.3.1 General objective

The main objective of the study is to explore the existence and application of India's National Security Strategy (NSS) in relation to Pakistan.

1.3.2 Specific objectives

- To identify factors that are key determinants of India's NSS in the context of Pakistan's NSS and processes.
- To examine the implementation or activation of India's NSS in certain cases in the context of Indo-Pakistani relations.
- To determine the nature and extent of the involvement of the military and foreign policy elite in making and activating India's NSS, with the emphasis on the rationale for their choices or roles in the case of military confrontation with Pakistan.

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- What is India's approach for designing its NSS in relation to Pakistan's NSS?
- To what extent has India activated or implemented its security strategy towards Pakistan in the context of seeking to achieve its foreign policy objectives?
- What is the role of military and foreign policy elite in the making and execution of India's NSS?

1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The conflict between India and Pakistan dates back to the partitioning of British India in 1947. Since then, both countries have viewed each other with mistrust, fear and suspicion. India's NSS has been ambiguous about targeting specifically Pakistan. Studies attempting to analyse the evolution and planning process of India's security strategy are limited to military strategy. There is no indication of a strategy development for mitigating the conflict between India and Pakistan (Sinha; 2016; Kanwel, 2012). The implication of India's security strategy towards Pakistan has not been addressed sufficiently. Therefore, this study is important, as it attempts to provide a clear understanding of NSS as a foreign policy tool adopted by the Indian government. It is also aimed at benefiting security advisers in both India and Pakistan

in order to harmonise the relationship of both countries and promote the effective use of military strategies for the benefit of the Asian region. The results of this study will add to the body of scientific knowledge. The recommendations of the study will assist India and Pakistan with effective conflict resolution. This study will contextualise the specific security concerns and threats of national interest as the leading cause of Indo Pakistani military activism. Furthermore, it will unravel perspectives and attitudes of military and non-military actors in the context of explaining certain choices or decisions in the Indo-Pakistani military engagement. Finally, the study will help to describe the values and challenges of approaches often adopted by the military and policy elite and highlight the extent to which they have advanced the realisation of India`s foreign policy objectives through its NSS.

This research will also provide clarity on India`s foreign policy with a unique opportunity to explore its NSS and how it has been applied to the Pakistan perspective. It will contribute towards the body of literature on the topic of national security and also provide an overall assessment of the Indo-Pakistani relationship. In addition, it will provide researchers with the relevance and applicability of related theories in evaluating the national security.

1.6 LITERATURE REVIEW

This section briefly reviews past and present literature on India`s security strategy and provides the foundation upon which to base any new knowledge that will come from this study. This literature review is organised into three sub-sections, namely the definitions of operational concepts, an empirical assessment of discernible trends found in the literature with regard to Indo-Pakistani military and diplomatic engagement and a review of the two most established theories used to explain the determinants of NSS, namely structural realism and social constructivism. A literature search of the available texts, comprising a desktop study of all the relevant books, journals, papers, legislation and other publications, will be undertaken in order to identify the role played by India`s NSS as an instrument of foreign policy towards Pakistan.

1.6.1 Empirical literature review

Scholars are divided into two schools of thought when it comes to the existence of India`s NSS. The first group of theorists subscribe to the notion that India does not have a

strategy that is formalised through a democratic process and, therefore, important debates on the determinants of Indian's security strategy are not initiated. For example, Thakur (1997), a notable South Asian theorist, argues that the main challenge for India in terms of foreign policy is the lack of a coherent NSS and foreign policy debates. He is one of many scholars who believe that India does not have a clear strategic vision. His perspective is supported by Pant (2009) who has analysed the slow rise of India's power after the 1998 detonation of nuclear weapons, but believes that India is deploying various and sometimes contradictory national objectives.

However, the fact that India is slowly gaining power and that the policy is contradictory is not sufficient to ascribe this to a lack of strategic vision. Both studies fail to make use of official strategic planning documents (diplomatic and military) from the government of India to analyse the strategic objectives contained in the annual reports published by the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of International Affairs. Ramayana, Mahabharat and Rajagopalan (2010) argue that ancient India's dividing political line was dharma (order) and adharma (chaos), rather than ideas of national and cultural identities. It relates the lack of an articulated and carefully pursued NSS in contemporary India to the ancient Indian maxim, that rulers were required to be driven by principles that were 'context dependent' and not 'absolute in application'. Jayashree Vivekanandan (2011) finds, in Mughal strategic discourse, especially during Akbar's reign, a synthesis between expansion and accommodation. While pursuing imperial expansion, Akbar adopted such accommodative measures as the mansabdari system, the inculcation of an inclusive spiritual belief system and the dissemination of paternalistic loyalty around himself. The Indian State's 'accommodative national security strategies' to meet external and internal threats are a reflection of Akbar's statecraft (Vivekananda, 2011).

The second camp consists of theorists who argue that India's NSS is identifiable and very robust. The most notable theorist is Mohan (2016), who observes the way India interacts with China and the USA and views their relationship as evidence of India's NSS. Mohan's main assumption about India's NSS is that it must be understood in three concentric circles. The first circle represents "immediate neighbourhood" and this is described as a mix of various strategies that are implemented by India in relation to military power, nuclear responsibility and relationship management in response to tensions that arise for Pakistan and other neighbouring countries (Mohan, 2016). However, Bagia (2011) argues that the

first circle includes some important concerns and challenges of India's NSS and this is largely viewed as a key contributor to India's slow progress in becoming a major powerful state on the global stage. The primary objective of this research is to explore the existence of the NSS from India's perspective in relation to Pakistan. The first circle, as suggested by Mohan (2011), is important for this research, as it deals directly with the relationship between India and Pakistan and goes as far as explaining the military, nuclear and diplomatic relations of the two countries. The second and third circles represent the grand strategy in which India's influence on the international level is implemented through economic policy and growing alliances on the global stage.

It is worth noting that India's vision with regard to its communities and the state perfectly suits the objectives that are presented in the grand strategy. In addition, matters of geographical areas and their dynamics are important in the development of a national strategy. The geographical viewpoint and its relevance to national security, as well as power and national security are mostly dependent on geographic considerations (Singh, 2009). The importance of location, climate and resources is a critical component of strategic thinking and continues to be an essential source of strategic culture (Karnad, 2005). Thus, in this light, the geographical circumstances between India and Pakistan can be the key to understanding why India adopted these particular national strategic policies as compared to other potential policies (Yarga, 2006). Deeply ingrained ideas about Indian topography have had a significant impact on the country's strategic thinking. Geography influences strategic and operational planning, strategies, logistics, operations and relations between civilian populations and the military. Nevertheless, the evaluation of regions is not an aspect of national power, which is typically defined as having political, economic, and military components. Thus, this study will investigate the economic, social and political elements of the disputed regions (such as Kashmir) and the impact they have on the relations between the two countries (Karnad, 2005).

India's strategic engagement with Afghanistan is perceived as an example of soft power diplomacy, where the primary concern is the creation of pluralist democratic political order and socio-economic reconstruction (D'Souza, 2011). The hope is that these will contain terrorism and promote Afghanistan's regional economic integration. Whether such aims can be realised without any form of military engagement, however, remains to be seen. Delhi's relationship with Iran, as Sarang Shidore's (2014) perceptive essay shows, stumbles

between two variables, namely Iran as a source of energy and deterrence to Pakistan and Iran's nuclear ambitions and disapproval of Kashmir policy.

However, India's declining interest in the gas pipeline project and its vote against Tehran in the International Atomic Agency indicates that the country may be succumbing to Washington's pressure to maintain a safe distance from Iran. The proAmericanism of the expanding Indian middle class ensured the current orientation of Delhi's Iran policy (Shidore, 2012). The context of New Delhi's changing perceptions on security, autonomy and development, such as the transformation of India's policy towards Israel from a 'limited relationship' of the 1950s to a 'fuller relationship' of the present time, can be observed (Blarel, 2016). Xavier's (2010) contribution highlights an absence of India's grand strategy and constant reliance on ad hoc responses.

1.6.2 Theoretical framework

The theoretical framework is applied as an instrument to review the existence of an NSS that is designed towards Pakistan. The two theories that will be discussed in this section are structural realism and social constructivism. The two theories fit into the international relations theory, and this is important because of the limitations of structural realism. These limitations include the requirement to form an alliance with other actors and the exclusion of anarchical systems from having power to dictate the state. They make theory struggle to account for the Indo-Pakistani relationship due to a unique structure and ideological position of the two states. Hence, social constructivism is adopted to complement these shortfalls. According to Chukwu et al. (2010), the realists believe that the state is the only rational actor in the international system. Domestically, order exists because there is a government to control the citizens. Externally, there is no super government to control and order the international system, leading to international anarchy. In the same way, the constructivists admit that states are the major actors in the international system. Both theories contend that states are the reference point in their study and analysis of international relations. However, neither theory sees states as the only actor in international relations, but that their existence subsumes all other actors within the international system, in which the responsibility of the state is the provision of security for the state itself, the defence of its sovereignty and the security of the citizens (Chukwu et al., 2010).

1.6.2.1 Structural realism

Realism contends that states are in constant pursuit of power, whether militarily, economically or politically. The pursuit of power includes ensuring the growth of the state's economy and its development to pursue its national strategic goals. This is done to ensure that the state survives and thrives in an anarchic international system (Donnelly, 2000). Donnelly (2000) posits that, in order for a state to protect itself politically, militarily and economically, it may be compelled to form an alliance with other states. The fundamental premise of structural realism is that the state is the primary player in international affairs. Other bodies, such as persons and organisations, exist as stakeholders, but their authority is restricted. The second premise is that the state is a unified actor. National interests, particularly during times of conflict, compel the state to speak and act in unison. The third premise is that policymakers are rational actors in the sense that rational decision-making leads to the pursuit of national interests. Acts that might weaken or expose one's condition would be irrational in this situation. Realism implies that all leaders, regardless of political affiliation, recognise this as they try to manage their state's affairs in order to thrive in a competitive environment. Finally, nations exist in an anarchic framework, that is, there is no one in control globally (Karnard, 2005).

One of the critics of structural realism and its view of states' interaction in the international system is Keohane (1988). Keohane's argument is that in order for actors to achieve cooperation, their behaviour has to change to accommodate and foster cooperation. However, that change is contingent on the change of the behaviour of others, which accepts that there is a level of mistrust among the actors involved (Keohane, 1988). This argument is the reason why Mearsheimer (1994) accuses Keohane and institutionalists of believing that institutions are a 'powerful force of stability' (Mearsheimer, 1994). In an anarchical system, institutions do not have the ability to dictate to a state.

1.6.2.2 Structural realism perspective: the Indo-Pakistani conflict

The rationale for the application of structural realism in this study is that it is ideal for explaining how to assess India's NSS as an instrument of foreign policy towards its enemy and competitor Pakistan. The war between India and Pakistan as seen through the eyes of a realist discounts any plausible endogenous grounds for the dispute. According to

Sugunakararaju and Akhtar (2015) and Challaney (1999), the origin and progression of the conflict is totally external, that is, driven by goals other than geographical goals, and the nations' interests are primarily regarded as mutually antagonistic. Such a realistic assessment of the four wars between India and Pakistan leads to the examination of divergent interests, which have been demonstrated to perpetuate the conflict. Thus, the struggle between India and Pakistan may be viewed as a primary paradigm for interstate competition, having resulted in several wars and persistent instability between the two governments. In terms of state capacities, India has unrivalled economic and military dominance over Pakistan. There are significant discrepancies in every indicator of national power, especially when the percentage of the gross national product (GNP) spent on defence is included.

The Simla (or Shimla) Agreement, the Indus Waters Treaty or any other kind of functional cooperation has little relevance for realists because the absolute degree of state power stays largely unchanged. Cooperation is predicated on the possibility of relative profits for each state. India is the region's dominant power and, therefore, will not sign an agreement that reduces its authority, and Pakistan will not assist until enough advantages are provided. As neither India nor Pakistan can trust the other, Indo-Pakistani relations are marked by conflict and contestation. The bilateral connections are not conducive to peace or friendship in any institutional framework, as evidenced by the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation's (SAARC's) collapse (Michael, 2017). Both will stay trapped in a state of mutual antagonism and concentrate on balancing, alliance building, deterrence and other instruments of power either by threat or the use of force. This leads us to look at another theory to exploit the loopholes of the structural realist theory confirming that there is no general theory in behavioural sciences, but only partial theories. According to Cox (1981), it is determined environmentally. Thus, the social constructivism theory is applied to this study to support the structural realism theory.

1.6.2.3 Social constructivism theory

The importance of culture and setting in social constructivism is emphasised. It is important to comprehend what happens in society and to build knowledge based on that comprehension (Derry, 1999; McMahon, 1997). This viewpoint is strongly related to several

modern ideas, most notably Vygotsky and Bruner's developmental theories and Bandura's social cognitive theory (Shunk, 2000). The idea is predicated on certain assumptions about reality, knowledge and learning. The first premise is that how a state views itself and others in the international system influences how it acts or reacts. The identities that a state assigns itself can have a variety of consequences and thus influence how it deals with circumstances. The second assumption is that a state's perception of other states influences how they interact with one another. When one country is seen as hostile or untrustworthy, others react to that social identity, which may impact on how other countries interact with that country. When one state is seen as a danger, which has happened in the past and is the basis for the realism anarchy viewpoint, security becomes the primary goal. Wendt (2011) defends this idea by arguing that just because connections and interactions are founded on social constructs, it does not mean they are readily altered. Previously, a self-help system was created in which competitiveness is preferred and compassion is penalised. This concept makes it difficult for dissenting states to thrive; thus, no state survives and the cycle repeats itself (Barnett, 2011).

Furthermore, many nations are resistant to change, particularly those that have amassed significant power under a specific system. Anarchy or uncertainty may occur as a result of altering how the system functions (Dmtri, 2011). This indicates that states are resisting change, perhaps to avoid having to retrain how to act or to obtain alternative interests. Wendt (2011) claims that they have all joined the self-help organisation. Theorists who believe that anarchy is defined by governments and that we live in a self-help world have become an institution since they all share the same views and values. They have developed an identity in the midst of turmoil. Their beliefs and customs are founded on the concepts of realism, self-help and anarchy. If this is correct, constructivism plays a role in understanding anarchy. Wendt (2011) is attempting to express the idea that even anarchy is dependent on connections. A self-help institution has been created as a result of the shared link of similar ideas; thus, connections are unavoidable. Because it reinforces connections that produce a world of either self-help or collaboration, anarchy is most definitely what states make of it.

Some of the critics of social constructivism include Mohan et al. (2018), who contend that individuals respond to objects, including other actors, according to the meaning that the items hold for them. Essentially, a state's behaviour will be determined by its relationship

to the item at the centre of its activity. Because they have distinct relationships, a state will act differently towards a friend than it will against an adversary. An adversary is a menace that cannot be trusted in the same way that a friend can.

Pande et al. (2018) argue that it is incorrect to believe that governments in the state of nature confront a 'stag hunt' or 'security dilemma.' Conditions in the form of nature prior to their initial interaction with another state are unable to develop concepts of self and others. Pande et al. (2011) go on to argue that because states lack knowledge of themselves and others, security interests, whether before or after contact, presume too much about the state of nature. They agree that, as a result of anarchy, international political institutions, like economic markets, are established by the self-interested unit's co-action. We also make too many assumptions if we claim that governments in a state of nature are forced to engage in a 'stag hunt' or 'security problem' as a result of anarchy. States cannot act selfishly because they have not yet been exposed to an environment that requires them to do so. Pande et al. (2018) also state that it is incorrect to believe that states in their natural form have "selfish identities and interests" since "they would have no experience upon which to construct such conceptions of self and others."

Karnad (2011) asserts that sovereignty is an institution that cannot exist until nations recognise it amongst themselves. Recognising sovereignty and territorial rights improves security. Each state has the right to develop and execute its own national legislation. As a result, a sovereign state will not violate these standards unless there is a compelling reason to do so. Because sovereignty is dependent on other nations' acknowledgment, smaller states must accept collective recognition for their own security (Karnad, 2011). Endogenous and external forces impacting any one state are equally essential in shaping that state's identity and goals. When studying historical security quandaries, external variables in international relations have become far more significant in shaping the identity and interests of nations in the system than ever before (Shidore, 2014). Globalisation has enabled citizens of any state within the international system to compare their assumptions, values and beliefs to those of citizens from all around the world (Souza, 2011:402). They are free to decide if the values of other global citizens are consistent with their own, and whether a change is necessary. A commonality of interests may be created in this day and age, far more than in the past, and lead to a less neurotic attitude to international affairs. An anarchic world of

self-help may be less hostile than previously imagined if ideas instil a culture and inspire a grassroots movement that leads not only to behavioural change, but also to changes in identity and interests (Saga, 2014:220).

1.6.2.4 Constructivism perspective: the Indo-Pakistani conflict

According to constructivist Alexander Wendt (1999), an anarchic structure is a cultural rather than a material reality. When it comes to Indo-Pakistani ties, creative interpretations have a role. Through a lengthy period of socialisation, state elites have developed norms and beliefs. This approach has established long-lasting cultural norms. According to constructivists, the animosity between India and Pakistan is not determined exogenously. Instead, state policies shape each other's perceptions and beliefs. The issue stems from a "cultural" understanding of statehood's roots.

The Nehruvian and/or Hindu-nationalist conceptions of Pakistan are quite different. The same may be said about Pakistan's understanding of what defines India (Cohen, 2005). Still, Pakistan was founded on the idea that the two-nation theory is correct: Hindu and Muslim people are distinct and cannot coexist in a single entity (Acharya, 2006:162). In contrast, India is, for the most part, an example of secular nationalism, and it engages with a Muslim population that obviously outnumbers Pakistan's.

Change, whether in the shape of internal transformation or even seismic external events, was never given an opportunity to disperse. What exists is a distinctive state identity that has yet to be reconciled with the concept of a shared cultural heritage, and it is primarily the result of antagonism and enmity between India and Pakistan. After 1947, nationalism in both nations strengthened fundamental distinctions while entirely disregarding historic similarities in the domains of religion, culture, language or ethnicity.

1.7 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN

The following section will discuss the methodological approaches that will be used in this research. The research design, methods, ethical considerations, measures to ensure trustworthiness, as well as the limitation of the study will also be discussed.

1.7.1 Research approach

In this research, the qualitative approach will be followed. The purpose of this study is to explore the NSS developed by India and its implication for Pakistan. Therefore, qualitative research is the most appropriate research technique to collect insights and perspectives on India's security strategy. Qualitative methods allow the researcher to examine the phenomenon in depth, as they identify and attempt to understand behaviour, motives and experiences (Blanche et al., 2006). The qualitative research approach focuses on describing and understanding the phenomenon rather than explaining or predicting human behaviour (De Vos, 2011; Babbie, 2012).

The qualitative approach is ideal because it allows the researcher, through interviews, to explore and describe the experiences of the participants within their context (Babbie, 2012).

1.7.2 Research design

According to Kumar (2011), a research design can be defined as a procedural plan, structure and strategy adopted by a researcher to answer research questions objectively, validly, economically and accurately. It is the researcher that decides on the design of the study, sampling strategy, data analysis method and data presentation.

This study will follow an exploratory and descriptive research design. Exploratory research is conducted to gain insight into a situation, phenomenon, community or individual (De Vos et al., 2011). Kumar (2014) reported that exploratory research is employed when the objective of the study is to explore an area where little is known. Since little is known about India's NSS against Pakistani threats, the researcher will use the exploratory research design to explore and gain insight into the phenomenon being studied.

Descriptive research design will also be used in this study. According to De Vos et al. (2011), descriptive research refers to a more intensive examination of the phenomenon and its deeper meanings, thus leading to a detailed description.

1.7.3 Data collection

1.7.3.1 Target population

The entire number of instances that the researcher wishes to investigate is referred to as the target population (Walliman, 2016). All male and female diplomats and defence attachés from Indian and Pakistani embassies between the ages of 25 and 60, as well as former military personnel diplomats from the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) who served in Pakistan or India are included in the target population. The target population also includes senior officers from the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) who have conducted security studies and those who served as defence attachés in the two countries as well as security experts from the Institute of Security Studies (ISS) in South Africa. Communication has been established with respondents who are currently occupying positions at these institutions and they have all expressed their willingness to participate.

1.7.3.2 Sampling

Sampling is the act of choosing a few samples from a population to serve as the foundation for estimating or forecasting the prevalence of an unknown phenomenon, circumstance or result in relation to the larger group. A sample is thus a subset of the population in which the researcher is interested (Kumar, 2011). This study will employ non-probability sampling. This sampling approach is crucial for this study, since the emphasis is on selecting a sample that will provide the relevant information required to analyse and have a thorough grasp of the research topics that must be examined. Non-probability sampling, according to Du Plooy (2016), is used when it is not feasible to determine the complete population or when access to the full population is problematic. In this study, the researcher will use purposive sampling to identify participants who are likely to provide greater insight and in-depth information about the topic. A purposive sample is chosen based on what is known about the population and the study's aim. To choose a sample, the researcher uses his or her judgment or knowledge about a population and the goals of the investigation (Maggie, 2013).

Participants in this study should be familiar with Pakistani and Indian national security. Owing to limited time, money and human resources, a research sample will be drawn from the personnel of Indian and Pakistani embassies who have served as diplomats (2) and defence attachés (4) for a period of more than five years.

Furthermore, former diplomats (8) from DIRCO, experts (4) from ISS (think tank) and senior SANDF officers who served as defence attachés (4) and those who studied national security in India (4) and Pakistan (4) will form part of the sample. All the participants have to have senior positions or be experts and must have occupied their positions for a period of more than five years. Participants will be selected in order to gain insight into their experience, perceptions and knowledge of India's NSS. Embassy and DIRCO personnel are important for this research as they provide insight into the diplomatic relationship between India and Pakistan, whereas defence force officers are important for military-related expertise and knowledge. All this information is essential in understanding how the NSS is designed in India.

The sample size will be 30 participants selected from Indian and Pakistani embassies, DIRCO, SANDF and ISS. The researcher approached the Departments of Defence and Foreign Relations to gain access to the embassies of India and Pakistan, DIRCO diplomats and senior SANDF officers who worked in these two countries in order to obtain approval to select participants.

1.7.3.3 Data collection tools

An interview is a verbal encounter in which one person, the interviewer, seeks to learn about and comprehend the interviewee's experiences and insights. An interview is a strong technique for gathering detailed information about people's beliefs, attitudes and the meanings that guide their lives and actions (Gray, 2014).

The researcher will gather data from the 30 selected individuals by means of indepth semi-structured interviews. The semi-structured interviews will be conducted with the help of an interview guide. An interview guide is a prepared set of open ended questions and subjects that must be covered in a specific order (Bernard, 2013). In-depth semi-structured interviews allow for the probing of viewpoints and ideas. It is preferable that respondents

elaborate on their responses (Gray, 2014). During the invitation process, participants will be informed of the study's aim and objectives, the research procedure and their freedom to withdraw from the interview at any time without penalty. The consultations will take place one at a time at a location that is acceptable and convenient for the participants. To minimise any disturbances, the researcher will ensure that the interview location is secure and quiet. Before the interview, participants will sign a permission form. The interviews will last approximately 30 minutes. All interviews will be videotaped and fully transcribed to ensure precision and accuracy in data collection and to establish an audit trail. Furthermore, secondary sources will be employed for research arguments, such as books, journals, abstracts, dissertations and articles from reputable scholars and writers (Grey and Sadoff, 2007). The researcher will also use scientific debates and international, regional and national policy documents.

1.7.4 Data analysis

The act of providing order, structure and meaning to a large amount of collected data is known as data analysis (De Vos, 2011). "Reading through your data frequently and engaging in activities of breaking the data down (thematizing and classifying) and building it up again in one unique method (elaborative and interpreting)" is what data analysis entails (Blanche et al., 2006:322). The researcher will use Atlas TI and theme analysis to analyse qualitative data. Thematic analysis is ideal for use in qualitative investigations because it compares phenomena to themes collected from data and literature (Mohajan, 2018). The six phases of the data analysis process identified by Braun and Clarks (2006) in Jensen and Laurie (2016) will be applicable.

- **Phase 1: Data editing.** The researcher familiarise himself with the data and identifies and corrects errors as soon as possible.
- **Phase 2: Data classification and coding.** Coding is the process of consolidating data by bracketing (Creswell, 2014). The researcher allocates codes to participant responses. These codes are usually numeric and places them into a limited number of categories or classes that are suitable for addressing the research problem of the study. Classification involves data being categorised into groups with common characteristics.

- **Phase 3: Identifying themes.** The researcher identifies emerging themes and sub-themes from the data.
- **Phase 4: Reviewing themes.** The researcher reviews themes.
- **Phase 5: Defining and naming themes.** The researcher defines and names themes.
- **Phase 6: Producing the report.** The researcher produces the report.

Atlas TI will be utilised for data coding in the theme analysis. According to Lockyer (2004: 318), coding is a "systematic technique to compress large amounts of data into smaller, more easily analysed units through the establishment of categories and concepts generated from the data." Atlas TI software is appropriate for analysing data from this study because it can import interviews, audio and video recordings for analysis.

1.8 MEASURES TO ENSURE TRUSTWORTHINESS

The principle of good qualitative research is based on trustworthiness (Polit and Beck, 2011). Trustworthiness will be determined by four indicators, namely credibility, transferability, dependability, and conformability and authenticity.

1.8.1 Credibility

According to Kumar (2014), credibility entails demonstrating that the findings of qualitative research are credible or plausible from the standpoint of the study participants. The amount of respondent concordance is used to assess credibility, which is identical to validity in quantitative research. The findings are presented to people who took part in the study for confirmation, congruence, validation and acceptance. The greater the outcome of these aspects, the higher the validity of the study.

The following credibility methods relate to the initial interviews to be conducted by the researcher:

- **Building rapport with participants.** The researcher will invest time in building rapport with embassy diplomats for India and Pakistan, former DIRCO diplomats and senior SANDF officers. The researcher will invite prospective participants via telephone to participate in the study and briefly explain the background and objectives of the study. Further information will be communicated by email in which informed consent will also be included. Participation will be confirmed by telephone and concerns regarding the study will be addressed before the interview.
- **Member checking.** After the data collection process, the researcher will make a follow-up appointment with the participants to clarify or ask questions which the researcher might have missed and also present the final thesis of the study with the findings.

1.8.2 Transferability

Transferability refers to the extent to which qualitative research findings may be generalised or applied to different contexts or situations. Transferability is difficult to establish due to the technique used in qualitative research. Transferability can be achieved to some degree if the researcher fully outlines the technique used for others to follow and duplicate (Kumar, 2014). This can be validated using the audit trail and member checks when data is coded and categorised. Therefore, in this study, credibility will be achieved through the excessive use of the audit trail to ensure rigour, data quality and trustworthiness (Anney, 2014). The audit trail comprises the transcribed research interviews, the application of the thematic analysis and the use of the audio recordings. The researcher will also take field notes and observe and explore non-verbal cues during the interviews.

1.8.3 Dependability

Dependability signifies that the same findings would be obtained if the same thing was witnessed repeatedly. The qualitative research supports adaptability and freedom. This may be difficult to prove, unless a thorough record of the process is kept for others to reproduce in order to determine the level of dependability (Kumar, 2014). According to De Vos et al. (2011), the researcher enquires whether the research method is rational, well-documented and audited. To confirm the consistency of the findings, the researcher will enlist the help of an independent coder.

1.8.4 Confirmability

Confirmability relates to how easily the findings may be validated or corroborated by others. Confirmability is related to reliability in quantitative research in that it is only feasible to compare results if both researchers follow the method in the same way (Kumar, 2014). According to De Vos et al. (2011), confirmability captures the conventional idea of objectivity. Confirmability will be enforced through the use of the audit trail by making audio recordings during interviews and transcribing the recordings soon after the interviews. Other methods such as following questions up and probing will be applied.

1.8.5 Authenticity

Authenticity refers to how far researchers have progressed fairly and faithfully show a range of realities. When a report captures the mood and tone of the participants' actual experiences, it becomes authentic. The experience, perceptions, feelings and insights of participants will not be altered, as it will be taken as the real truth of the problem under investigation (Polit and Beck, 2011).

1.9 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The empirical study will be done inside a certain geographical area, namely India and Pakistan. One disadvantage of this study is that existing material focuses on India's overall security strategy rather than Pakistan's response to India's NSS.

Also, the results of the empirical investigation will only draw a picture of the identified grand strategy at a particular point in time, that is, the period in which the study is conducted. It is difficult to know how stable participants' perceptions, attitudes and understanding are or if it may change in future.

The primary researcher has a high-ranking position in the military, which may introduce a certain amount of bias to the study. However, this bias will be minimised by the fact that most of the prospective participants are industry acquaintances of the researcher. They are also in senior positions and, therefore, are unlikely to feel coerced into taking part in the study.

1.10 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

It should be specified that this research work will strictly adhere to the North West University's ethical conditions. Social researchers have clear moral and professional obligations to behave in an ethical manner at all times, even if the participants in the study are uninformed of their rights (Neuman, 2014). According to De Vos et al. (2011), ethics is a collection of moral principles and ethical guidelines that serve as standards and a foundation against which each researcher's behaviour should be evaluated. This study will take the following ethics into account:

1.10.1 Voluntary participation

According to Babbie (2012), social research is frequently, but not always, an intrusion into people's lives; it interferes with the subject's usual activities. Recognising the intrusion, no one should be compelled to participate in the research. According to De Vos et al. (2011), participation should always be voluntary and no one should be compelled to engage in the project. The researcher will describe the aim of the study and give participants the option of accepting or declining participation in the research endeavour. No one will be compelled or enticed to engage in the research study through the use of any sort of reward.

The researcher will also give consent forms to the participants and these will be written in simple language, free of jargon and legalese, to enhance understanding. Consent forms will be signed before the interviews commence.

1.10.2 No harm to participants

Social research should never injure the people being studied, regardless of whether they volunteer for the study or not (Babbie, 2012). De Vos et al. (2011) emphasise that no harm to the participants is a fundamental ethical rule. Therefore, the researcher has the responsibility to ensure that the participants are protected at all times and to minimise any potential harm, either physical or emotional, through the research. The study focuses on lived experiences of participants, thus making the study more sensitive and increasing the risk of emotional harm. The participants will be informed about the potential emotional impact and consequences of the study, so that they can choose to withdraw from participation, should they feel uncomfortable. Furthermore, the researcher will ensure that

the interviews are conducted in a relaxed and calm atmosphere. There is no foreseeable physical harm that can occur to the participants as a direct result of the study.

1.10.3 Anonymity and confidentiality

A response may be considered anonymous when others cannot identify the respondent (Babbie, 2012:523). To achieve anonymity, participants will be identified using numerical values or codes. By maintaining confidentiality, the researcher can identify a given participant's response, but essentially undertakes not to do so publicly (Babbie, 2012:523). To protect the participants' privacy and confidentiality, none of the personal information linking participants to the data will be recorded. Electronic data collected will be stored in a password protected computer and hard copies will be stored in a locked cabinet and later destroyed after a period of five years to ensure that only the researcher and authorised personnel have access to it.

1.10.4 Deception of participants

Deception is defined as intentionally deceiving participants, intentionally distorting facts and withholding information from participants (De Vos et al., 2011). The researcher will explicitly tell the participants about the study's background, purpose and what is expected of them during the research procedure. In no way will the researcher mislead the subjects. The consent forms will include all the necessary information.

1.11 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS

- **Chapter 1: Introduction.** This chapter will provide background to the study, problem statement, research aim, research objectives, research questions and significance of the study.
- **Chapter 2: Literature review and theoretical framework.** This chapter is an extensive literature review related to India's NSS and its implications for Pakistan. There will be a theoretical framework that will be used in this chapter, namely the realism perspective, the Indo-Pakistani conflict, the social constructivism theory and the constructivism perspective.

- **Chapter 3: Research design and methodology.** In this chapter, the research methodology, research approach, research design, data collection, data analysis, methods to ensure trustworthiness and ethical considerations will be discussed.
- **Chapter 4: Indo-Pakistani relations from the beginning.** This chapter will provide an overview of the relationship between India and Pakistan, a comprehensive discussion on the origin of the conflict and how it has evolved throughout the years.
- **Chapter 5: India's NSS in relation to Pakistan's NSS.** This chapter contains a discussion on the findings of the data that will be collected and analysed in chapter 3 on the subject matter of this research project. A rigorous analysis of the NSS of the two countries is provided with an attempt to clearly identify the existence of India's NSS towards Pakistan.
- **Chapter 6: Security challenges between 2000 and 2015.** This chapter focuses on the challenges and key factors that prevent the de-escalating conflict between 2000 and 2015.
- **Chapter 7: Conclusion.** This chapter will provide key findings and offer recommendations for future research.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 INTRODUCTION

India has been confronted with a myriad of internal and external threats for decades that have necessitated a long-term approach to its security strategies. Research on the country's national security has primarily focused on investigating conflicts and challenges emanating from India's tumultuous relationship with Pakistan (Rid, 2012; Ashraf, 2012; Shafique, 2011). Other studies have also highlighted difficulties faced by India, namely high population growth rates partially fuelled by mass migration from Bangladesh and global warming, both of which pose threats to food, water and energy security (Kanwal, 2000; Mehsud, 2017). Information warfare and maritime security are also identified as threats to internal institutions and ocean resources respectively (Kanwal, 2000). All of these threats could significantly undermine India's national security.

To achieve the objectives of this research, emphasis is placed on security threats arising from the Indo-Pakistani conflict and how these are managed through India's National Security Strategy (NSS). This study specifically seeks to assess whether the implementation of the NSS is targeted at India's long-term arch rival, Pakistan. Since India's independence from British rule in 1947 and Pakistan's subsequent separation, the conflict between India and Pakistan has become a threat not only to the two nations but to the stability of South Asia (Sridharan, 2005). In a bid to manage these threats, India embarked on a quest to modernise its defence forces by acquiring different calibre weapons and importing arms culminating in the acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1998 (Pant and Bommakanti, 2019). This occurred in the wake of Pakistan's periodic but consistent attacks on India over the much-contested Kashmir and its flirtations with terrorist groups to perpetrate attacks primarily against India (Malik, 2002; Pradeep, 2019). Not to be outdone, Pakistan also acquired nuclear weapon capabilities later that same year. The conflict with Pakistan has prompted India to develop a response mechanism to security threats in the form of an NSS.

Some scholars have criticised India's national security approach and policymaking since independence as being characterised by failure in integration, ad hoc decision-making and lack of strategic thinking in addressing threats and challenges (Chellaney, 2016; O'Donnell and Pant, 2018; Tanham, 1992). According to these experts, there is scant recorded

evidence of a defined security policy for India (Kapur and Mukherjee, 2018). There are two opposing notions of India's NSS, namely that the security strategy is not comprehensive or clearly articulated and that the strategy is distinguished and robust.

This chapter will explore both views by discussing the existing literature and providing a detailed theoretical framework. This chapter is organised into three sections. The first section will define the culture of non-articulated NSS and determine if India's NSS may be perceived as such according to literature. The second section will comprehensively articulate India's NSS with the support of literature. The third section will review established theories used to explain the determinants of the NSS, including structural realism, social constructivism and liberalism.

International political dynamics and state behaviour determine the dominant theoretical perspectives that prevail at the time (Meshud, 2017). Since the break-up of India and Pakistan, the relationship between the two countries has been consistently hostile. This study will follow the structural realism and social constructivism theoretical frameworks to access India's NSS and its implications for Pakistan. These two frameworks are ideal for Indo-Pakistani relations, as they emphasise the importance of the social aspects, history, culture and identity of the two states in their conflict dynamic. India and Pakistan share a complicated history from the time that India gained its independence from the British in 1947 and the subsequent breaking away of Pakistan from India because of religious differences.

Clarifying the culture of non-articulated and articulated NSS is key to understanding India's security strategy and how it seeks to navigate the conflict with Pakistan.

2.2 CULTURE OF NON-ARTICULATED NSS

Kapur and Mukherjee (2012:1) describe a state strategy as "a framework or plan that tries to attain specific longer-term objectives utilising available resources in a context where other states or non-state actors may have conflicting interests." Many studies (Jacob, 2010; Pradeep, 2019) indicate that India does not have an articulated national security strategy (ANSS). These studies suggest that India appears to have a policy of limited engagement to Pakistan's blatant attacks by failing to adequately address emerging threats, act on defence

reforms and make definite resolutions about the problems at Kashmir (Jacob, 2010; Joshi, 2015).

Theorists subscribing to the notion that India does not have a formalised security strategy and a resulting proper response mechanism and punishment strategy (Pradeep, 2019; Sridharan, 2005) raise important debates on the determinants of India's security strategy. They argue that the main challenge for India in terms of foreign policy is the lack of a coherent NSS, foreign policy debates and the deployment of sometimes contradicting national objectives (Thakur, 1997; Pant, 2009). However, the fact that India is slowly gaining power and that some of its policies contradict each other is not sufficient to completely allude to a lack of strategic vision. Both studies fail to make use of official strategic planning documents (diplomatic and military) from the government of India to analyse the strategic objectives that are contained in annual reports published by the ministries of defence and international affairs.

It is important to note that annual reports, speeches and commentary by civil authorities do not necessarily suggest the absence of a security strategy. Countries without formally published NSS speeches by government leaders in national security are characteristically thought to mutually express that country's NSS (DuMont, 2019).

In India, previous presidents and ministers of parliament have been making pronouncements on NSS since the country's independence. However, this method of collating information about a state's NSS presents some problems. Statements and speeches made by politicians and authorities can potentially generate confusion through misconstruction of their actual meaning (Sinha, 2015). Another problem with political statements is that interpretation errors may lead to difficulties in implementation and accountability (DuMont, 2019). In a report on India's NSS, retired Lieutenant General D.S. Hooda admitted that the lack of a formal NSS for the country had attracted criticism from the strategic community (Hooda, 2019).

As a large democracy and regional power, India's formulation of a formal security strategy will have to include nuclear doctrine that incorporates arms control and missile defence. There is also concern that the lack of a clear NSS can lead to inappropriate defence capabilities being developed (Sinha, 2015). According to Pant and Bommakanti (2019), in response to Pakistan's threats, which are both conventional and sub-conventional in nature,

India has employed military tools by acquiring weapons and importing arms. Owing to India's growing arms weaponry prowess and nuclear capability, its approach towards Pakistan's insurgence has been that of deterrence. (Rid, 2012; Kulkarni and Sihna, 2011). India's nuclear capability, in particular, has credible minimum deterrence (CMD) as one of its main pillars (Kulkarni and Sihna, 2011). CMD is described as a transparent, reasonable, limited and legitimate stance (Karnad, 2008).

The culture of non-articulation of India's NSS was present even during the struggle for independence. Anand (2014) submits that political leaders, during this period, were unlikely to have had discussions on national security in an independent India. This was largely due to the influence of Mahatma Gandhi, a powerful Congress political leader who introduced and advocated for a new drastic strategy founded on "two Hindu concepts: Satyagraha (holding fast to the truth) and ahimsa (non-violence towards all forms of life)" (Hauss, 2002: 362). Some scholars believe that the influence of Gandhi still pervades India's post-independence security policy and its strategic approach to security threats (Thomas, 1986; Bajpai, 2009). According to Anand (2014), after Pakistan invaded Kashmir in 1948, the Indian government responded by stopping the advance of troops and taking the matter to the United Nations (UN). This response is evidence that the Indian National Congress had developed policy focusing more on the development and industrialisation of India rather than putting more emphasis on strengthening the military force. (Hooda, 2019). This posed a threat to India because the military was key to the development of a long-term security strategy.

However, in order to maintain the country's security and adequately protect national interests and sovereignty, the use of military exercises may be necessary. President Nehru failed to ensure military cohesion or encourage coordinative competence in building the defence system. He was concerned that empowering a military official would create an alternative site of authority in the new democracy, leading to instability. The current Indian defence policy system still prioritises maintaining control by political leaders and top government officials over promoting integration and coordinating capacity within the Ministry of Defence (O'Donnell and Pant, 2018). This problem began in 1947 when the founding structure and basic reasoning of the system was first conceived (O'Donnell and Pant, 2018). An Indian analyst, Subrahmanyam, who served in the Ministry of Defence and later as the Director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses was key to prompting

for unprecedented public debate on national security (Mukherjee, 2011). He achieved this by insisting that a report on the perceptions of political and military officials of national security be released to the public. Subrahmanyam also purported that "India's political class is still not in a position to tackle the national security issues with the seriousness they deserve" (Mukherjee, 2011:711).

India's national security policy has frequently been one of reaction to threats and events. Nonetheless, a comprehensive vision was avoided, since it would have weakened the bureaucracy's authority (in the home and military services, in particular). Managing the issue by means of uncoordinated reaction to security threats poses a significant danger to the framework. In any event, Singh (2015) has expressed the viewpoint that the truth must be seen, namely that the country has dealt with its defence and military challenges successfully over the last 50 years.

The culture of a non-articulated security strategy in India may be an indication of limited strategic thinking and culture. The dearth of long-term strategic views and unwillingness of civil authorities to start public debates on the formulation of security strategies, objectives and consensus on important national interests, has been due to cultural thinking of interventionists in the 1970s and 1980s (Kanwal, 2000). During this period, independent India adopted a non-alignment policy that allowed the country not to participate in the domestic affairs of other countries in order to protect its own new democracy, sovereignty and national interests (Harshe, 1990). The Gandhian notion of an NSS that proposed the substitution of Western values with the principles of truth and non-violence and a decentralised polity convincing other societies that India did not pose a threat to them was adopted (Mallavarapu, 2016). Despite taking this stance, in 1962, India sought military assistance from the United States (US) during the border dispute war with China and was greatly criticised for seemingly acting against its non-alignment policy (McMahon, 1994). However, in India's defence, the then president Nehru highlighted that the non-alignment policy was a tool used to serve the country's national interests, particularly against threats (Harshe, 1990). This stand indicates that India's strategic culture is inherently nonconfrontational, sometimes even in the face of threats.

Decades later, India is faced with increasing insurgencies by Pakistan over the Kashmir border dispute. In most cases, the conflict is neutralised by conventional military force, which impacts on Pakistan's security strategy and forces discussions between the two countries (Sinha, 2015). Practical application of interventionist thinking is also evident in India's impasse with Nepal on the trade treaty and its refusal to sign the non-proliferation treaty in 1971 to be part of a united security force in South Asia. These examples can be attributed to India's non-alignment policy, which can also act as a security strategy.

Furthermore, India's security strategy towards Pakistan and China is a major cause of concern due to the conciliatory doctrine in the mid-1990s. The importance of this way of thinking was that India would have to improve relationships with immediate neighbours and commit to assisting them in times of crisis. The aforementioned doctrine necessitated a completely different NSS that had to be applied in a way that was mutually exclusive and brought about more changes than were expected. The problem would arise when there were two different security strategies over time, leading to a mismatch between objectives and interests between the two countries.

It is, therefore, difficult to determine whether India has an NSS that could be aimed at Pakistan, since there are no separate documents that are published by government on strategic policy. The former Indian Defence Secretary affirmed the existence of a strategic policy, but confessed that it had not been written down or publicised. The administration has been opposed to the publication of a separate paper (Hooda, 2019). The fear of being overthrown by the military has been perceived as the reason why civil authority has been reluctant to commit sufficiently to military support. Research has indicated that the culture of a non-articulated NSS in India may be linked to the country's political history. Some scholars posit that ancient India's dividing political line was dharma (order) and adharma (chaos), rather than national and cultural identities (Ramayana, Mahabharat and Rajagopalan, 2010).

There are three perspectives on Indo-Chinese relations, namely optimism (opting for cooperation), pessimism (suggesting geostrategic encompassing of China) and pragmatism (propounding a mixture of cooperation and containment) (Madan, 2016). The rise of India and China as major powers has seen the two states interacting both bilaterally and regionally (Bajpaee, 2015). Their cooperation is due to increasing economic interdependence by

trading with each other and as BRICS members. The BRICS platform has increased regional economic integration such as agreeing to settle inter-BRICS trade using their respective currencies and the establishment of a development and investment bank (Soto and Boadle, 2014). However, there are mounting concerns that China is expanding its presence in the Indian Ocean by upgrading the military base at Djibouti to a complete naval base and expanding an artificial island in the Maldives (Singh, 2020). Concerns about China militarising the Gwadar port in Pakistan, a naval base in Bangladesh, and its increasing maritime deployments in the Indian Ocean further fuels speculation of a possible strategic containment of India (Singh, 2020). Therefore, in view of these events, the pragmatism perspective reflecting both cooperation and containment is ideal for describing the relations between India and China.

Furthermore, India and China are Asian powers. They are physically, demographically, economically and strategically most dominant in comparison to the other countries on the continent (Reddy, 2016). Having once shared a deep cultural and religious history, the relationship between India and China became somewhat fragmented after the 1962 war, which saw India drawing closer to the Soviet Union and China befriending Pakistan (Malik, 2002). Throughout the years, the India-China border dispute has persisted and both countries have established heavy military infrastructure along the border (Reddy, 2016). Expectedly, India is wary of the strategic bilateral relations between China and its long-term nemesis, Pakistan.

Over the decades, India has had a less strained relationship with the US than with China, although it was just as complicated. Although the two countries found themselves at odds with each other, with India pursuing the non-alignment movement (NAM) and the US seeking to counter the Soviet Union, they were not estranged (Hicks et al., 2016). The US has, in the past, given India foreign aid and military assistance during the war with China (Reddy, 2016; Hicks et al., 2016). Security issues are the main factor driving a wedge between India and the US. The US viewed India's stance of non-alignment, its relationship with the Soviet Union and later its acquisition of nuclear weapons as threats (Hicks et al., 2016). As a result, the US issued sanctions against India for the proliferation of nuclear weapons, even though the US would later support India in the US-India civilian nuclear deal (Burns, 2007). India viewed the US Pakistan partnership as equally threatening (Hicks et al., 2016; Ganguly and Howenstein, 2010). The reluctance of the US to cease giving military

assistance to Pakistan will continue to limit the level of trust between the two states. Chaudhuri (2013) explicates the Indo-US relationship in terms of a fine blending of disagreements and 'aberrant' conversations, a format eloquently outlined in his "Forged in Crisis: India and the United States since 1947". In the article, Chaudhuri (2013) illustrates this format in Indo-US relations with reference to the 1950 Korean War, the 2003 Iraq War and the current Afghan stalemate.

The development of the India-US relationship may be the product of various factors: the willingness to ensure that India is capable of fighting terrorism, influencing BRICS economies or deterring China's military power or part of India's grand strategy. Whatever the reasons behind the rise of the India-US relationship are, they all have an impact on the Indo-Pakistani relationship. Pakistan views the former relationship with suspicion or as a conspiracy against it. However, since all these conflicts have taken place, there is no indication that India is embarking on the articulation of an NSS as a means of enhancing power or protecting its citizens. It is clear that Indo Chinese and India-US relationships are largely influenced by the perception of threats posed by alliances with other countries, particularly Pakistan.

India's strategic engagement with Afghanistan is an example of soft power diplomacy (D'Souza, 2011). The primary concern is the creation of a pluralist democratic political order and socio-economic reconstruction in the hope that these will contain terrorism and promote Afghanistan's regional economic integration. Whether such aims can be realised without any form of military engagement, however, remains to be seen. The different views of Delhi and Islamabad imply the possibility that either India or Pakistan could use Afghanistan as a location for conducting a substitute campaign against the other (Hicks et al., 2016). Pakistani security believes that close associations between its intelligence services and the tribes straddling the Afghanistan-Pakistan border guarantee them support in the event that the country needs to respond to an Indian invasion (Hicks et al., 2016). Conversely, India seeks to prevent Pakistan from gaining leverage in Afghanistan and possibly using the country for terrorist activities against India (Ganguly and Howenstein, 2009).

Based on the above review, it is necessary to study India's anonymously accepted NSS in an attempt to bridge the gap that exists in the limited process of framing or designing a security strategy that is possibly aimed at Pakistan's threats to India. This will gauge the

distinctiveness of the NSS of India's foreign policy by concentrating on two aspects, namely the way in which India applies military power to its adversarial relationship with Pakistan and the way in which the security strategy is articulated through diplomatic structures, particularly within the context of Pakistan. It is also important to assess the role of all superpowers with regard to India's national security strategies for Pakistan. This might include the role of regional organisations, such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the United Nations (UN).

Historically, Indian policymakers have failed to formalise the country's defence and national security strategies. Perhaps this hesitation stems from an instinctive desire not to offend the sensitivities of India's opponents and neighbours. In its nineteenth report, the Estimates Committee, comprised of chosen members of Parliament, proposed that the government establish a codified national security doctrine. On 10 May 1995, in reply to the debate in the Indian parliament on the demands for grants of the Ministry of Defence, Prime Minister P. V. Narsimha Rao, who was also the defence minister, stated: "We do not have a document called India's National Defence Policy. But we have got several guidelines which are followed, strictly followed and observed. This policy is not merely rigid in the sense that it has been written down, but these are the guidelines, these are the objectives, these are the matters which are always kept in view while conducting our defence policy" A group of guidelines followed by the Ministry of Defence with regard to national security is, therefore, referred to as a non-articulated NSS. For a strategy to qualify as an articulated NSS, it has to be a formally written document that has been presented and accepted by the members of parliament.

2.3 ARTICULATION OF INDIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Virtually every country in the world has an NSS, which may take on different forms. An articulated NSS can be defined as a formal document that is published and pronounced publicly to give guidance on the management of future risks and challenges by maintaining the nation's security in the long-term against indistinct and distinct threats (DuMont, 2019). According to DuMont (2019), there are basic elements that have to be present in all security strategies. Should they be devoid of these elements, they will be incomplete or incoherent. The basic elements are as follows:

- **Endorsement by the head of state.** In order for an NSS to have the seriousness essential for its implementation, it has to have the full backing of a high-ranking government official who has formal authority to administer and make decisions on national security matters. In this case, it is normally the president of the nation who is involved in the draft development of the document to ensure that it is a true reflection of what the government seeks to achieve through the NSS. The president's endorsement legitimises the document.
- **Accurate reflection of national values.** The security strategy has to be explicitly linked to the values and goals so that it remains relevant. The implementation process of the strategy is simplified when the country's values are taken into account.
- **Clear articulation of national interests.** The strategy has to have a finite list of goals that can be achieved in a specific time frame. National interests are dynamic, depending on domestic priorities and emerging international issues.
- **Declaration of strategic vision.** This declaration is a succinct summary of what government aims to achieve through the NSS.
- **Identification and assessment of future challenges.** An NSS document has to reflect anticipated problems in the future and how these can be mitigated.
- **Risk assessment.** The identification and prioritisation of risks and the probability and severity of their impact on national interests is the key to providing proper direction to the government in the implementation of NSS.
Ways in which to mitigate risks may then be developed, where necessary.
- **Overview of required resources.** The implementation of an NSS requires state resources, which may change in the long term. A government with adequate resources increases the relevancy of the NSS.

- **Effective time frame.** For an NSS to be effective, it has to have a life span of more than a year in order to appropriately guide long-term policy and investment for the country.
- **Measures of effectiveness.** These measures have to be included in the goals of the NSS to promote accountability and the implementation progress.
- **Basic implementation guide.** A plan detailing the steps to be taken to implement an NSS has to be highlighted, although plans are generally highly classified.

Some scholars contend that India's NSS is recognisable and extremely powerful. Notable theorists Sukumur and Shamar (2016) observed the way in which India interacts with China and the US and stated that their relationship is evidence of India's NSS. Their main assumption concerning India's NSS is that it must be understood in three concentric circles. The first circle represents the "immediate neighbourhood". This circle is described as a mix of various strategies that are implemented by India in relation to military power, nuclear responsibility and relationship management in response to tensions that exist with Pakistan and other neighbouring countries. Bagia (2011) argues that the first circle includes some important concerns and challenges of India's NSS, which are largely viewed as a key contributor to India's slow progress in becoming a major powerful state on the world stage. The primary objective of the current research is to explore the existence of an NSS from India's perspective in relation to Pakistan. One of the challenges of Bagia's position is that the inner circle may not necessarily imply security concern, but the employment of hard power. In most cases, it is an attempt to satisfy coterminous states in the form of human security (Amusan, 2018).

2.4 DETERMINANTS OF INDIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

From a socio-economic and historical perspective, it is evident that the Indian National Congress, after leading India to independence, developed a policy that focused more on the development and industrialisation of India than on the strengthening of its military force.

Peace was deemed essential by Indian policymakers to achieve economic development (Harshe, 1990). This strategy posed a threat to India because it undermined the importance of the military force that had to protect the sovereignty of the nation. Historically, India's leaders contributed to the articulation of different theories that were generally based on personal perceptions and borrowing and adapting diverse policies in pursuance of domestic interests in foreign policy and security (Halali, 2001). The end of the Cold War, the fall of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a globalised world prompted a shift in India's foreign policy. It was less idealistic, moralistic and doctrinaire than the one used during Nehru's leadership (Halali, 2001). The thinking concerning challenges and threats to India was that a powerful and unified military force might pose a challenge to the authorities, should there be a government takeover. This perception still seems conceivable today with the persistence of the separation of the Ministry of Defence and the military force and the exclusion of the military from pertinent strategic security decision-making. However, India has been increasingly investing in the advancement of its military capabilities, national security tools and security systems (Halali, 2001).

Pakistan is the biggest external threat that India has encountered since independence. India perceives Pakistan to be a threat in multiple ways, which inevitably shapes its NSS. Pakistan's existence breaches the unity of the subcontinent and its presence on the main land invasion routes into India increases India's vulnerability and threatens its national security (Tanham, 1992). In addition, threats posed by Pakistan's hostile armed forces and its dalliances with extremists and terrorists against India have imposed a heavy defence burden on India (Tanham, 1992). However, India still does not have an overall strategy for dealing with Pakistan.

India's NSS appears to be based on the maintenance of territorial integrity at all costs, a declared policy of no first use of nuclear weapons and a focus on economic development. Researchers seem to agree that India lacks the comprehensive direction or grand strategy of other big democracies to implement its foreign policy (Mukherjee, 2018; Mehta, 2009). A grand strategy is a term referring to the highest level of strategy in statecraft or the leadership of a nation. A grand strategy is characterised as "a political-military means-ends chain and a state's thinking about how it might best generate security for itself" (Posen, 1984: 13). A country's grand strategy is more than just the sum of its foreign policies; it is a crucial logic that combines and unites many policies in order to align with the country's

major goals and appraise the country's ability to accomplish them (Mukherjee, 2018; Goldstein, 2005).

The development of a grand strategy by the Indian government will allow for the implementation of a more comprehensive NSS. India's national security issues are inevitably and intricately linked with Pakistan and this would likely be reflected in its NSS. An understanding of Pakistan's NSS is, therefore, of paramount importance to decipher the country's insurgency tactics against India.

2.5 PAKISTAN'S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

In order to comprehend the objectives of India's NSS, a brief understanding of Pakistan's NSS is vital. According to Kan et al. (2017), Pakistan does not have a comprehensive consensus-based NSS. Pakistan's security priorities together with its foreign policy are found to be dynamic and undergoing various national security priorities. Geo-strategic constraints affect the development and implementation of Pakistan's NSS. Security policy is largely influenced by South Asian regional geostrategic politics detected by major powers in the region, including India. According to Ken et al. (2017), South Asian strategic culture constituted national strategic culture in Pakistan. The current literature on the topic of the existence of Pakistan's national security indicates a need for the country to allocate enough resources from both domestic and international institutions to the development and implementation of a clear foreign policy.

Pakistan's military is the most important institution in terms of the development and implementation of the country's security and foreign policy. According to Hafeez (2011), Pakistan needs to pave a way for a security strategy that is debated, owned and supported by its citizens. The major challenge in Pakistan is imposing policy on citizens and not following the democratic processes that will result in an agreement by interested parties. Pakistanis lack even the most basic bipartisan agreement on a single shared identity, national purpose and set of critical national interests.

Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons poses a major security risk, especially to India and the US because of the possibility that these weapons of mass destruction could fall into

the wrong hands. The presence of various terrorist and extremist groups in Pakistan has only contributed to the country's instability (Thränet and Wagner, 2009). Furthermore, Pakistan's hostile attitude towards India speaks volumes about its security strategy, which is aggressive. Pakistan's nuclear doctrine depends partially on deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment (Alam, 2008). The fact that these two elements have not been adequately explored or articulated against India's nuclear strategy makes Pakistan's strategic policy slightly equivocal.

Both India and Pakistan acquired their first nuclear weapons in 1999, a year after their independence. India presented a novel nuclear doctrine to the Prime Minister, Cabinet and the public (Alam, 2008). This document eventually became India's official nuclear doctrine on 4 January 2003, after the Cabinet Committee on Security Affairs revised its operationalisation competencies. Kapila's (1999) comparative analysis of India and Pakistan's nuclear doctrines revealed that India's strategic perspective incorporates areas beyond the borders of South Asia, whereas Pakistan's perspective seems to be focused on India. The analysis also found that India declared the principle of "no first use" and will only use nuclear weapons in retaliation to nuclear attacks. Pakistan did not give such a guarantee, as it would then lose the advantage of the element of surprise (Kapila, 1999). Pakistan's approach to its security strategy, therefore, implicitly indicates that India is its target.

2.6 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The application of different theories depends on their assumptions and the context of the study. The theoretical framework is applied as an instrument to review the existence of India's NSS against Pakistan. The relationship between India and Pakistan is an example of international relations, which is relevant for the theoretical study of social constructivism, structural realism, liberalism and deterrence. The elements of security challenges, nuclear testing, military power, and continued conflict and foreign policy methods can be applied to the Indo-Pakistani rivalry using these theories. It is, therefore, essential that social constructivism, structural realism, liberalism and deterrence be sufficiently reviewed so that the appropriate theory is applied in this study.

2.6.1 Liberalism

Liberalism has had a tremendous effect on modern day society. It advocates political freedom, democracy, constitutional rights and equality (Burchill et al., 2001). A theory gains dominance when it sufficiently explains the international events of the time. Liberalism became popular for explaining post-World War international politics and post-Cold War international relations (Mehsud, 2017). Liberalism is thought to prevail when society displays characteristics such as humanity, reason, ethics and the promotion of peace and progress (Mehsud, 2017). There are three types of classic liberalism, namely republican liberalism (democratic peace), commercial liberalism and liberal institutionalism. Republican liberalism asserts that democracies are very unlikely to fight one other because conflicts become implausible when people most impacted by war choose their government (Chenoweth, 2013). This theory also asserts that democracies are unlikely to use nuclear weapons and have domestic skirmishes or acts of terrorism.

Commercial liberalism purports that free trade brings peace and prosperity (Mehsud, 2017). Prosperity is achieved by the states by means of the concepts of comparative advantage, competitiveness and specialisation between the states. This results in interlinkages and interdependence because both countries benefit from each other. Peace is ultimately achieved because the two states do not want to jeopardise the relationship.

Liberal institutionalism asserts that international institutions can promote peace through collective security. Collective security refers to having loyalties and strategies with certain states and helping to protect each other's national interests.

Liberals perceive that peace is the ideal state of the world and that war is both unnatural and irrational. Therefore, with the power of human reason and realisation of inner potential, any sign of war can be alleviated (Burchill et al., 2001). Although the liberalism theory was commonly applied in post-war phases where states had reached a level of democracy and peace, it may not be fitting for Indo-Pakistani relations. This relationship has never experienced long-term peace ever since Pakistan broke away from India. The instigator of most of the attacks is Pakistan and sometimes its attacks are launched using terrorist groups. Both countries acquired nuclear weapons in 1998, although they have not

used them against each other. Also, there is hardly any trade between India and Pakistan, which eliminates any opportunity for interdependence and interconnectedness.

2.6.2 Deterrence theory

The classical deterrence theory was created to examine the link between nuclear weapons and state conflict. It was based on the realism school of international affairs (Zagare and Kilgour, 2000). Nuclear deterrence is the threat of deploying nuclear weapons to prevent a possible adversary from striking first (Gerson, 2009). This theory is based on the understanding that when potential attackers are made aware of the enormity of the cost or how extremely low the probability of success of aggressive action is, they will be dissuaded to pursue it. The effectiveness of nuclear deterrence is closely associated with convincing aggressors that any attacks emanating from them will attract great retaliation (Kroon, 2018).

Both India and Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons in 1998 and, because of their long-standing conflict, there is increasing concern about the stability of the deterrence relationship between the two nations. Deterrence is more a strategy for stabilising conflict and possibly preventing war than resolving conflict, although it can be used as a driver for resolution. (Sridharan, 2005). When applying the deterrence theory to the Indo-Pakistani conflict, Sagan and Waltz (2015) identify two schools of thought: firstly, the presence of nuclear weapons in both countries has prevented even greater conflict and, secondly, the possession of nuclear weapons is likely to increase conflict. This theory is fundamentally based on analysing how conflicting states that possess nuclear weapons behave in order to protect their sovereignty and national interests from other perceived hostile states. This theory may not be ideal for application to the Indo-Pakistani conflict because this conflict goes beyond the deterrence theory, as it existed long before the two countries acquired nuclear weapons and continued after acquisition.

2.6.3 Social constructivism theory

Social constructivism emphasises the significance of culture, norms, values and environment for comprehending what happens in society and building knowledge based on this understanding (Derry, 1999; McMahon, 1997). This viewpoint is strongly related to several modern ideas, most notably Vygotsky and Bruner's developmental theories and Bandura's social cognitive theory (Shunk, 2000). The idea is predicated on certain

assumptions about reality, knowledge and learning. The first premise holds that a state's perception of itself and others in the global system influences how it will act or respond. The identities that a state assigns itself may have a variety of consequences and influence how it deals with situations. The second premise is that a state's perception of other states impacts on its relationships with them. When one country is viewed as hostile or untrustworthy, other countries react to that social identity, which may influence how these countries interact with that country.

Ultimately, unfavourable impressions result in destructive behaviours or responses.

When a state is perceived as a danger by another state, security becomes the principal goal of that state. Wendt (2011) defends this idea by arguing that just because connections and interactions are founded on social constructs, it does not mean that they are readily altered. When a previous system established that competition is best and that insurgency will be punished, it makes it difficult for dissident states to thrive. Consequently, no state does, and the cycle repeats itself (Barnett, 2011). Furthermore, many nations, particularly those that have gained significant power under such an arrangement, are resistant to reform. A sort of anarchy or uncertainty may occur when the way in which a prevailing system functions is changed (Dmtri, 2011). This statement is principally true if the change is significant and implemented without consulting or involving those who would be affected. According to Malik and Rather (2015), following India's independence, the government utilised hard force to retain hegemony in South Asia, which was inherited from British security concepts. However, by joining the SAARC in the 1990s and adopting nonreciprocity with its neighbours, India began a move to soft diplomacy. The country also began to emphasise greater trade engagement with neighbouring countries after the liberalisation of its economy to foster better relationships. Thus, the country shifted from unilateralism and hegemony to multilateralism (Malik and Rather, 2015).

States oppose change in order to avoid having to relearn how to act or obtain new interests. Theorists such as Wendt (2011) argue that these states have all become part of a self-help institution and that anarchy is created by the state. War and political insecurity are a product of government and society, as well as their identities and interactions with others. These entities have developed an identity in the midst of turmoil and their beliefs and standards are founded on the perspectives of realism, self-help and anarchy. If this is correct, constructivism plays a role in understanding anarchy. Wendt attempts to express

the idea that even anarchy is dependent on interactions. A self-help institution has been created as a result of a shared bond of similar ideas. Since relationships are an unavoidable part of life, anarchy is unquestionably what states produce, since it validates relations that build either a world of self-help or collaboration.

For example, individuals respond to objects, including other actors, based on the meanings that the items hold for them (Mohan et al., 2018). Essentially, a state's behaviour will be determined by its relationship with the item that is central to its activity. Since they are distinct kinds of relationships, a state will act differently towards a friend than it will towards an adversary. An adversary is a menace that cannot be trusted in the same way that a friend can. Pande et al. (2018) criticise the theory, arguing that it is incorrect to believe that states in the state of nature experience a 'stag hunt' or 'security dilemma'. States in their natural condition prior to their first interaction with other states are unable to form concepts of self and others. According to Pande et al. (2018), because states lack knowledge of self and others and security interests prior to contact, they presume too much about the state of nature. Waltz (2000) agrees with this viewpoint and states that, as a result of anarchy, international political institutions, such as economic markets, are established by the self-interested unit's coercion. The idea that states in the state of nature must confront a 'stag hunt' or a 'security dilemma' as a result of anarchy is far-fetched. States cannot act selfishly because they have not yet been exposed to an environment that requires them to do so. Pande et al. (2018) adds to this argument by stating that it is incorrect to believe that states in their natural state have "selfish identities and interests," since "they would have no experience upon which to construct such definitions of self and others."

Karnad (2011) asserts that sovereignty is an institution that cannot exist until nations recognise it in one another. Recognising sovereignty and territorial rights increases security, and each state has the right to develop and apply its own national laws. As a result, a sovereign state will not breach these standards without first considering other choices. Since sovereignty is dependent on other nations' acknowledgment, smaller states may embrace collective recognition for their own security (Karnad, 2011). Endogenous and external factors impacting on a state are important to determine its identity and national objectives. Exogenous variables in international relations have played a significant role in shaping the identity and interests of nations in the system, while studying historical security quandaries (Shidore, 2014).

2.6.4 Structural realism theory

Realism contends that states are in constant pursuit of military, economic or political power. The pursuit of power includes ensuring the growth of the state's economy and its development to pursue its national strategic goals. This is done to ensure that the state survives and thrives in an anarchic international system (Donnelly, 2000). Donnelly (2000) posits that in order for a state to protect itself politically, militarily and economically, it may be compelled to form alliances with other states. The basic premise of structural realism is that the state is the primary player in international relations. Other bodies, such as persons and organisations, exist as stakeholders, but their authority is restricted and subject to the dictates of the state. The second assumption is that all states are functionally the same units, that is, they behave similarly (Dunne and Schmidt, 2014). National interests, particularly during times of conflict, compel the state to speak and act in unison. The third premise is that policymakers are rational actors in the sense that rational decision-making leads to the pursuit of national interests. Acts that might weaken or expose the state would be irrational in this situation. Realism implies that all leaders, regardless of political affiliation, recognise this as they try to manage their state's affairs in order to thrive in a competitive environment. The fourth premise is that nations exist in an anarchic setting, that is, in the absence of anybody in control globally in the form of a supranational or loose international organisation. (Karnard, 2005).

Keohane (1988) is one of the critics of structural realism and its view of states' interaction in the international system. Keohane (1988) argues that actors' behaviour needs to change to accommodate and foster cooperation. However, that change is contingent on the change in the behaviour of others, which implies that there is a level of mistrust among the actors involved (Keohane, 1988). This is why Mearsheimer (1994) accuses Keohane and institutionalists of believing that institutions are a 'powerful force of stability' (Mearsheimer, 1994). In an anarchical system, institutions do not have the ability to dictate to a state. Indo-Pakistani relations can also be elaborated through the liberalist paradigm.

Most studies have applied the structural realism theoretical framework to analyse the relationship between India and Pakistan. Although the theory is undeniably suitable for the relationship, a better understanding can be gained from criticism highlighting the

methodological shortfalls embedded in the realism theory. At the backdrop of the above theoretical flaws, research purports that constructivism is better at explaining and analysing Indo-Pakistani relations than realism. This is because constructivism emphasises the importance of the identity, culture, history, ideas and social nature of state interaction (Burchill et al., 2001). These factors are important in the Indo-Pakistani relationship because the two countries share a rich cultural and religious history that ultimately shapes their identities. The theory will be ideal for exploring how the Indo-Pakistani relationship has evolved over the decades and determining the current nature of the relationship. The constructivist theory will assist in highlighting the importance of identity to India and how this has shaped the country's NSS.

The two theories fit into the international relations theory, which is important because the limitations of constructivism, such as the requirement to form an alliance with other actors and the exclusion of anarchical systems from having power to dictate to the state, make it difficult for the theory to account for the Indo-Pakistani relationship due to the unique structure and ideological position of the two states. Hence, structural realism is adopted to complement this shortfall. According to Chukwu et al. (2010), realists believe that the state is the only rational actor in the international system. Domestically, order exists because there is a government to control systems and citizens. Externally, there is no super government to control and order the international system leading to international anarchy. Both theories contend that states are the reference point in their study and analysis of international relations. However, neither theory sees states as the only actor in international relations, but that their existence subsumes all other actors within the international system, in which the responsibility of the state is the provision of security for the state itself, the defence of its sovereignty and the security of the citizens (Chukwu, et al., 2010).

Thus, this research applies constructivism and realism theory to explain the existence and implementation of an NSS in India in respect of Pakistan.

2.7 IDENTITY OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN

Identity is essential in the relationship between India and Pakistan. One interpretation is attributed to deep-rooted conflicts between Pakistani "Muslims" and Indian "Hindus". However, this interpretation does not hold because it fails to offer an explanation of the

many years of Muslim and Hindu coexistence and the historical and cultural connection of society before the twentieth century. Furthermore, the argument does not account for the socially constructed quality and identity of both states. The current research addresses this aspect.

The contemporary self-conception of India was formally formed by Jawaharlal Nehru's nationalist administration, which was led by the Congress party prior to and after the country's independence. The prevalent nationalist perspective was established in socially created beliefs about Indian identity, not the liberal-individualist approach. On the one hand, Pakistan may be viewed through the lens of a two-nation theory, which is communal and reactionary in nature. On the other hand, India's selfimage is distinct, involving a big democracy, non-alignment foreign policy and ambitions of becoming a South Asian powerhouse.

As stated previously, Pakistan's self-image was founded on the two-nation theory narrative. According to Shafique (2011), the Muslim League developed the two-nation thesis, which argued that Muslims and Hindus from India formed two irreconcilable groupings, essentially founded on opposing ideals. However, Pakistan's national identity has been established and pushed as an Islamic state opposing Hindu dominance. Furthermore, not being the same as Indian Hindus has been a rudimentary justification for the two-country idea and Pakistan's quest for a separate identity. As a result, narratives have emphasised Pakistan's Islamic-Arabic heritage, while rejecting all that was Indian about Pakistan.

Some argue that the narratives and cultural symbols associated with the two country hypothesis are merely tools in the power struggle amongst elites (and in this way without regulating content). Regardless, while the two-country idea was unquestionably accepted tactically by political business people, such behaviour occurred within a governing system influenced by a mass, broad-based growth, and arose from a genuine fear of Hindu dominance. Furthermore, elements of the Congress-led nationalist movement gradually solidified Hindu imagery and policies, confirming this view. According to India, the two-country idea contributed to Pakistan's socio-economic development as a society. This was not only done via regional state creation, but also, and more importantly, through

representational practices that tried, in many ways, to create something that many refer to as India with substance, history, purpose and direction.

Nonetheless, the identities of both regimes have been dynamic rather than stable and unchanging. During the 1980s, India's secularism began to deteriorate, and the origins of 'self' and 'other' were progressively informed by the Hindutva movement's discourse of Hindu nationalism. This movement criticised the Congress's 'pseudosecularism' for supposedly embracing religious minorities, particularly Muslims, at the expense of Hindus, and sought to rethink India as a mostly Hindu state. Narratives were used to recreate Hindus as homogeneous, with India's identity re-articulated along the lines of one nation, one people and one culture.

Hindutva was also aided by the policies of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) governments, most notably in 1998. Owing to the enabling effects of India's liberal democratic frameworks, Hindu nationalist parties were forced to direct their ambitions in order to remain in power. Along these lines, rather than creating a Hindu *rashtra* or nation, India's self-image has been defined by the pressures and compromises of unions between mainstream and Hindu nationalist ideologies. According to former Prime Minister, Zulifkar Bhutto, Pakistan seeks to dismiss the notion that Hindu India is superior or older than Muslim India through the creation of a Muslim state equivalent to an independent of India (Bhutto, 1979).

Pakistan, too, went through a rethinking process throughout the 1980s, when Islamisation operations, particularly under Zia-ul Haq, attempted to rethink Pakistan's identity based on customary Islam. Madrassas and Jihad reflected the new narrative, and sharp discussions about the country's entrance to the world were used to recast Jinnah and the anti-colonial resistance war as Islamists, hoping to establish an Islamic state. Furthermore, safeguarding Pakistan's Islamic identity and defending present ideology became critical for achieving national unity and stability in Pakistan's selfimage. However, there were some political leaders, such as Benazir Bhutto, who, in her book *Reconciliation*, disagreed with the portrayed identity of Pakistan and the religion of Islam as being largely hostile and intolerant of other people and religions (Bhutto, 2008). She called for a rebirth within Islam and between Islam and other nations, highlighting that Pakistan faced many challenges in the fight for freedom and urging Western countries to accept accountability for their contribution in shaping the country. According to Bhutto (2008), followers of Islam

needed to desist from integrating tribal traditions with the core doctrines of Islam, thus misrepresenting it. She also explains that Islam fundamentally calls for tolerance of and respect for all monotheistic religions, esteems equality and justice, and promotes military action only as a defence mechanism.

It is clear that Islamisation in the current setting in Pakistan has been viewed as a crucially profound element in the country's identity. Therefore, religion differentiates Pakistan and India to such a degree that remaining forcefully Islamic is perceived to ultimately prevent the loss of identity for Pakistan.

2.8 APPLICATION OF THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: INDIA AND PAKISTAN

To properly analyse and interpret the Indo-Pakistani conflict, it is necessary to first grasp the essence of the competition. According to Vesquez (2005), the interaction between these two states is not typical of a dispute. Continued rivalry denotes a long-term strategic conflict between a comparable pair of states. While most interstate disagreements are resolved as quickly as possible, there is a slight possibility that such a relationship will deteriorate into competition, with the competing nations finding themselves in a strenuous conflictual relationship.

These ongoing wars are distinguished by an unusual combination of unknown issues, strategy dependency, mental indicators of hatred, and repeated military warfare. The Indo-Pakistani relationship has seen four wars (three of them over disputed Kashmir), a constant state of tension and hostile attitudes, 'intermediary wars' and has even come dangerously close to nuclear war (in 1990 and 2001–2002). Surprisingly, realists and rational choice methods have a difficult time resolving these ongoing disagreements. According to realists, who place material force at the heart of issues of contention, prolonged wars should only exist between nations with substantially comparable material capabilities (between major powers, for example).

Continuous war should not occur in imbalanced conflicts, such as those between India and Pakistan, where one state (India) has a greater power advantage because of the stronger side's ability to militarily defeat and impose its will on the more vulnerable state. Despite Pakistan's repeated disappointments of military loss or threats to India, the imbalanced India-Pakistan war has lasted more than sixty years, contrary to realist beliefs.


Such conflicts highlight an essential aspect for realist theorists, with some proposing that recurrent military battles are not "continued conflicts" with substantial historical linkages, but rather "random occurrences" that occur by chance. This argument has not only been experimentally refuted, but it also appears inappropriate to inform readers that India and Pakistan have had a number of conflicts by coincidence with no interconnections (Vesquez, 2005). Some realists acknowledge the existence of these seemingly illogical conflicts, but tacitly see them as aberrations or departures from the 'rational' systems-level realist logic, and explain them in terms of 'second-image' reasons such as bureaucratic self-interest.

A realist analysis of the India-Pakistan conflict excludes any putative endogenous causes of the conflict. According to Sugunakararaju and Akhtar (2015) and Challaney (1999), the cause and evolution of the conflict is totally exogenously driven (driven by purposes other than geographical goals), and the state's interests are viewed as mutually hostile. Such a realistic view of the conduct of four wars calls into question the divergent interests that have resulted in the continuance of warfare. Thus, the struggle between India and Pakistan may be viewed as a primary paradigm for interstate competition, having resulted in several wars and persistent instability between the two governments.

In terms of state capacities, India has undeniable economic and military supremacy over Pakistan. There are significant differences in every indicator of national power, particularly when the percentage of GDP spent on defence is included. For decades, India's defence spending has consistently increased (Figure 2.1). The period from 1995 to 2015 saw India's defence budget grow more than 5.5% yearly, drawing on the country's notable economic growth (Mason, 2016; SIPRI, 2015). In 2015, India became the sixth largest spender on defence when the defence budget exceeded \$51 billion, which was about 2.5% of the country's GDP (IISS, 2016).

India's military expenditure has more than doubled in the last two decades to more than US\$70 billion. Despite this marked increase, the country's expenditure as a percentage of GDP has decreased from 3% to 2.4% over the 20-year period (Figure 2.1). This shows that India's economy has grown significantly in order to accommodate the increase in military spending.


Figure 2.1: India military expenditure between 1999 and 2019



Source: SIPRI (2020)

Pakistan's defence budget has also increased at a similar rate to that of India (Figure 2.2). Between 1985 and 2015, Pakistan's defence budget increased consistently from about \$3.8 billion to more than \$9 billion, which is more than 4% of the country's GDP (SIPRI, 2015).

Figure 2.2: Pakistan military expenditure between 1999 and 2019



Source: SIPRI (2020)

The percentage of expenditure on defence has decreased from 5.2% in 1999 to 4% in 2019 (Figure 2.2). Pakistan has a significantly smaller GDP than India, although it spends nearly twice the percentage of its GDP than India. Also, Pakistan's military spending is thought to surpass the released official defence budgets (SIPRI, 2016).

A breakdown of Pakistan's military budget reveals the army's dominance, which accounts for more than half of the total defence spending, and that it has surpassed its

authorised budget since 2009 (Ministry of Finance, 2017). It is understood that the key to maintaining stability and security in a region is the level of democracy. The military is a primary part of Pakistani politics, which could explain the seemingly unlimited budget when it comes to the army. Overspending is also common to most of the other services in defence, that is, the air force, navy and inter-service organisations, although with less consistency (Mason 2016). There are major concerns about the transparency and accountability of Pakistan's defence budget and its potential use of off-budget financing and the nature of the country's relationships with companies linked to the military (Mason, 2016). This ambiguity is thought to possibly lead to corruption or the funding of terrorist activities.

The Simla Agreement, the Indus Waters Treaty or any other kind of functional cooperation has little relevance for realists because the absolute degree of state power remains essentially unchanged. India-Pakistan cooperation is predicated on the notion of relative gains relative to each nation. India, as the dominant nation in the area, will not sign an agreement that reduces its powers, and Pakistan will not collaborate until enough advantages are provided. As neither India nor Pakistan trust the other, Indo Pakistani relations will continue to be marked by conflict and contestation. Their bilateral connections are not conducive to peace or friendliness in any institutional framework, as seen by the SAARC's collapse (Michael, 2017). Both will stay trapped in a condition of mutual antagonism and will concentrate on balancing, alliance building, deterrence and other instruments of power, either by threat or even the use of force.

The fact that India and Pakistan have both obtained nuclear weapons merely changed the two nations' power balancing abilities. The bilateral dispute is also embedded in a larger strategic context, notably alliances. As a result, India and Pakistan will continue to balance each other militarily. These acts have consequences for both nations' capacities, for example, in terms of the linked structural dynamics of an anarchical international order. India aspires to be a significant power that is on a par with the US or China. As a result, India will continue to invest in and improve its military, as well as expand its military budget, for two reasons, namely to keep Pakistan at bay and, eventually, to achieve the rank of a great power. According to the logic of anarchy and continual attempts to improve one's abilities, the Indo Pakistan relationship will remain vulnerable to frequent threats and, if feasible, shifting alliances. In social sciences, the discipline that hinges on human behaviour, one theory can hardly capture one's argument in this type of work leading to a need to look

into another theory to exploit the loopholes of the structural realist theory. Indeed, there is no general theory in behavioural sciences, but, according to Cox (1981), partial theories are determined environmentally. Thus, the social constructivism theory is called upon in this study to support the other theories.

According to constructivist Alexander Wendt (1999), an anarchic structure is a cultural rather than a material reality. Artistic interpretations have a role in Indo Pakistan relations. Through a lengthy period of socialisation, state elites have developed norms and beliefs. This approach has established long-lasting cultural norms. According to constructivists, the animosity between India and Pakistan is not determined exogenously. Instead, state policies shape each other's perceptions and beliefs. The issue stems from a "cultural" understanding of statehood's roots.

A Nehruvian or Hindu-nationalist concept of Pakistan differs greatly from Pakistan's understanding of what comprises India (Cohen, 2005). Still, Pakistan was founded on the idea that the two-nation theory is correct, that is, Hindu and Muslim people are distinct and cannot coexist in a single entity (Acharya, 2006). In contrast, India is, for the most part, an example of secular nationalism that engages with a Muslim majority that obviously outnumbers Pakistan's.

Whether in the shape of internal transformation or perhaps foreign seismic occurrences, change was never allowed to spread. Instead, there is a distinctive state identity that has yet to be reconciled with the concept of shared cultural heritage. It is fundamental to the animosity and hatred that exist between India and Pakistan. Following 1947, nationalism in both nations strengthened those distinctions, while entirely disregarding historical similarities in the domains of religion, culture, languages or ethnicity.

There are several elements of unpredictability in the India-Pakistan conflict that prevent a lasting conclusion. These elements include both parties' unresolved territorial claims in Kashmir, a general incompatibility of political systems and hostile stances in reference to their individual national identities. Kashmir is well-known for its agricultural products, livestock and tourism (Karnard, 2005).

However, Wendt (1999) contends that realism misses the intricate learning required in redefinitions of identity and interest. She correctly points out that realism falls short of describing how the self-help system evolves. It avoids issues such as what leads governments to become self-interested, how the security problem is established and how states respond to it. Because realism sets the self-help system as the primary explanatory role, interactions are considered to be unimportant. They do not contribute to determining the phrasing and answers to these inquiries (Wendt, 1999:92).

2.9 CONCLUSION

Most scholars perceive India as having a non-articulated NSS, which is due to a lack of strategic thinking that minimises the power of the military and its decision making capacity. The Gandhian influence of always pursuing peace and India's history of non-alignment also become a form of security strategy for the country and can, therefore, be used to explain India's stance in responding to the incessant attacks by Pakistan. Since shortly after India's independence from the British, India and Pakistan have been in conflict over Kashmir. This relationship then escalated to the next level when both countries began acquiring more armaments and then nuclear weapons, which is alarming for India because of the presence of terrorists in Pakistan. Research suggests that India needs to have a more focused NSS to deal with Pakistan, as its strategy of limited engagement is proving to be ineffective for deterring Pakistani attacks. The social constructivism and structural realism theoretical frameworks were followed for this study because India and Pakistan share a history, culture and social aspects and their identities are emphasised by these frameworks.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter explains the techniques that were used in the research methodology, which may be defined as a combination of approaches used for data collection and analysis and for demonstrating the systematic design, tools and processes of a study (Melnikovas, 2018). A research technique is a specific, systematic and rigorous strategy to analyse or quantify the proper study outcomes (Mohajan, 2018). This method entails the use of multiple approaches at various phases of the research to improve the likelihood of accurate study findings. The methodologies employed in a study are determined by the nature, scope and aims of the investigation, such as the research paradigm, strategy, and design and sample methods used. This chapter goes into further detail about data analysis, reliability and validity, as well as the study's ethical difficulties and limitations. Political studies can be conducted in a variety of ways.

This chapter describes the methodological approaches used in this study, such as the research paradigm, strategy, design and sample procedures used. This chapter further elaborates on data analysis, reliability and validity, as well as the study's ethical issues and limits. Political studies can be carried out using a variety of approaches.

3.2 METHODS OF CONDUCTING POLITICAL RESEARCH

The technique that a researcher chooses and employs is determined by the goals of the study or the questions that the investigation attempts to answer. This choice is essential, since it defines how data will be gathered as well as the type of data. As a result, a researcher must have a clear grasp of the study project's aims and how they will be met. The majority of political studies research has used descriptive techniques to describe events, developments and progressions toward present circumstances, as well as to explain and

offer explanations why specific situations and events occurred in a particular way (Rid, 2012; Mukherjee, 2010a).

Other studies have explored political approaches, policy and legislature, statements and leadership styles and the impact they had on historical events and current beliefs by analysing the content of documentation (Malik and Ranther, 2015; Chenoweth, 2013; Mukherjee, 2010b; Hendrick, 1999). Most descriptive and exploratory studies are qualitative and hence tend to be subjective in nature. In qualitative studies, the researcher is intimately involved in the description and analysis of events, legislation, documents and strategies by highlighting their opinions and insights based on their knowledge as scholars and experts of the phenomenon. Research using interviews to collect data from different stakeholders has been gaining momentum in political studies as a means of gaining better insights and perspectives on political issues in qualitative studies (Anjum, 2020; Gangle and Smick, 2009). The method in which research is done is determined by the researcher's research philosophy or paradigm.

3.3 RESEARCH PARADIGM

The research paradigm may be characterised as the researcher's assumptions or ideological orientation, or how he or she sees the world (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2019). The research paradigm ultimately influences the methods or techniques used in a study as well as the overall interpretation of the study by directing how research is conducted (Burrell and Morgan, 2016; Johnson and Clark, 2006). There are four major paradigms used in research, namely interpretivism, positivism, critical realism and pragmatism. Owing to the exploratory nature of this study to understand people's perspectives and lived experiences, the interpretivism paradigm was used. The interpretivism paradigm clearly differentiates humans from physical phenomena because of their capacity and ability to attach meaning to events or objects (Saunders et al., 2019). This study involves human subjects and their perceptions, understanding and experiences of India's security strategy and its implications for its neighbour, Pakistan. Since the individual participants in the study are different, their experiences and insights are also likely to vary with regard to the phenomenon being studied. After adopting the interpretivist research paradigm, it is important that the aligning research approach be identified.

3.4 RESEARCH APPROACH

The systematic framework derived from theory is referred to as a research approach that is adopted to conduct social science studies. The research approach of the study ultimately has a bearing on the design of the study. Literature highlights two main approaches to research, namely the inductive and deductive approaches (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009). Owing to this study's descriptive and exploratory character, the inductive approach was followed to understand the data gathered and to develop emerging theories (Saunders et al., 2019). Inductive reasoning develops hypotheses about the phenomena under investigation based on the study's findings (Ketokivi and Mantere, 2010). The strength of the inductive approach to research is that it seeks to explain interactions by understanding how humans interpret their world, that is, the context of the phenomenon, which is also characteristic of a qualitative study (Saunders et al., 2019).

There are three major methods for doing research that can be applied and these consist of quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods. Owing to the exploratory and inductive character of this study, the qualitative approach was used to analyse India's NSS and its implications for Pakistan. The qualitative method relies on the context and use of language to understand a phenomenon, thus making it subjective in nature. According to research, the qualitative research technique is based on explaining and comprehending the 'how' and 'why' of the issue under investigation, rather than clarifying or forecasting human behaviour (Levitt et al., 2017; Babbie, 2012). Because the researcher is closely involved in the data collection, interpretation and analysis stages of the research process, the qualitative technique is generally subjective (Levitt et al., 2017).

The challenge posed by this subjective nature makes the qualitative method prone to researcher's bias. To avoid bias, it has become best practice for the researcher to record and transcribe all interviews verbatim to ensure that only the participants' insights and perspectives are analysed in the study. Another challenge is that qualitative research findings cannot be extrapolated to the larger population, but only to a smaller group with the same study setting (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004).

In spite of the challenges, the qualitative method has the main advantage that it enables the researcher to examine the investigated phenomena thoroughly, as it identifies and attempts to understand behaviour, motives and experiences in a manner that no other method can (Blanche et al., 2006). The most common type of study is qualitative research to collect insights and perspectives on India's security strategy because it is based on the natural environment of the study (Srivastava and Thomson, 2009). The qualitative approach is ideal because it allows the researcher to investigate and explain participants' experiences within their specific environment by means of interviews, (Babbie, 2012). Every study has to follow a specific design for the researcher to determine how data collection and analysis will be conducted in the study.

3.5 RESEARCH DESIGN

A research design may be characterised as a logical plan or approach used to adequately answer research questions in a legitimate, accurate and cost-effective manner (Kumar, 2011). The researcher is in charge of selecting the research design to be utilised in a study, which is mostly dependent on the study's objectives. The nature of this study is both exploratory and descriptive. Exploratory research is used to acquire insight into a situation, phenomenon, community, individual or region about which little is known, whereas descriptive research is a more extensive investigation of the phenomenon that results in a full description (Kumar, 2014; De Vos et al., 2011). Because India lacks a stated NSS, nothing is known about its security policy. As a result, the purpose of this research was to investigate and describe the many methods in which the nation has responded to various threats, notably those posed by neighbouring Pakistan, as part of its security policy.

The most common qualitative research designs include ethnographic, narrative, grounded theory, case studies and phenomenology (Saunders et al. 2019). The phenomenology research methodology was chosen as a suitable approach for exploring participants' lived experiences, perceptions and insights into India's NSS in respect of Pakistan. Phenomenology, in its capacity as a philosophy and methodology, has been used in research to identify, reveal and understand complex issues that may be embedded in participant responses (Goulding, 2005). Some issues related to the phenomenon being studied are only exposed and understood through a process of probing, which phenomenology semi-structured interviews have the ability to do. Phenomenology

investigates the real-life experiences of individuals in a particular subject matter as described by the various participants (Savage-Austin and Honeycutt, 2011). The phenomenological research methodology is suitable for this study, which attempts to investigate participants' real-life experiences and perspectives in order to provide an in-depth knowledge of military commanders and security specialists in India's security policy (Bezuidenhout et al., 2014; Creswell, 2009). Studies following the phenomenological research design can use different data collection methods.

3.6 DATA COLLECTION

3.6.1 Target population

The entire number of people that the researcher investigates is referred to as the target population (Walliman, 2016). A target population can also be defined as the subjects in a specific spatial area or role who have attributes of interest to the research and are likely to add relevant information to the study (Majid, 2018). The study's target population includes personnel (males and females) from the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), defence attachés who served in Pakistan or India, senior South African National Defence Force (SANDF) officers who have done security studies in the two countries and security experts from various organisations. Communication was established with the different institutions and they all expressed their willingness to participate in the study. Sampling was then done.

3.6.2 Sampling

Sampling is a technique for selecting individuals from a population to serve as the foundation for estimating or forecasting the prevalence of an unknown piece of information, circumstance or result in relation to a larger group. As a result, a sample may be defined as a subset of the population of interest to the researcher (Kumar, 2011). Two types of sampling are widely employed in research, namely probability sampling and non-probability sampling. Probability sampling involves subjects being selected through accidental events (random sampling) or where the probability of all subjects being selected is equal (systematic sampling) (Taherdoost, 2016). Nonprobability sampling is based on sample selection being dependent on the researcher's choice of available and accessible subjects

(Setia, 2016). This type of sampling is quite subjective due to the prominence of the researcher's role in the subject selection criteria. Purposive, convenience and quota sampling are examples of non-probability sampling procedures.

The current research employed the non-probability sampling technique. This technique is crucial to this study, since the emphasis is on selecting a sample that provides the information needed to analyse and have a thorough grasp of the research phenomena under consideration. According to Du Plooy (2016), non-probability sampling is employed when it is not feasible to determine the whole population or when access to the entire population is problematic. In this study, the researcher employed purposive sampling to select those participants that are likely to give more insight into and in-depth knowledge of the subject matter. A purposive sample is selected based on what is known about the population and the study's purpose. The researcher uses his judgment or knowledge of a population and the aims of the research to select a sample, thus ensuring that those subjects with the most up-to date and pertinent information are selected (Maggie, 2013). In purposive sampling, participants are selected on the basis of what they know and understand about the study phenomenon, which also ensures effective use of limited time and financial resources.

Therefore, participants selected for this study had to have knowledge of India's NSS in relation to Pakistan through their professional roles, ranks and experience, which were considered during selection. The selected participants were defence attachés who had served in India and Pakistan, national security experts and senior SANDF officers. The criteria for selection were that all the participants had to occupy senior positions or hold senior ranks or be experts in security studies and have more than five years' experience. Participants also had to have been involved with either India or Pakistan directly through their work or studies. They were selected in order to gain insight into their experience, views and understanding of India's NSS. DIRCO personnel were important for the research as they provided insight into the diplomatic relationship between India and Pakistan. Defence force officers were required for their military-related expertise and knowledge. All this information is essential to understand how the NSS is designed in India.

The researcher requested and received permission from South Africa's Departments of Defence and Foreign Relations to interview defence attachés and senior SANDF officers who

had worked and studied in Pakistan and India. The study sample size of the participants was then determined.

3.6.3 Sample size

In general, qualitative studies have smaller sample sizes than quantitative studies. According to research, the ideal sample size for qualitative investigations is between eight and twenty people (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2011; Bezuidenhout et al., 2014). However, other researchers argue that the sample size in qualitative research is determined by data saturation (Guest et al., 2006). According to Faulkner and Trotter (2017), data saturation is when no new information is yielded from the data collection process causing data redundancy. Data saturation occurs when the emergence of new data has reduced to a point where only limited amounts of new information is being collected from data collection (Goulding, 2005). Studies suggest that when a sample is taken from a relatively homogeneous study population, a total of 12 in-depth interviews may be sufficient to reach a point of data saturation.

Initially, a sample size of 30 participants was selected from military officers, defence attachés who had worked and studied in India and Pakistan and security experts as it was anticipated that saturation would be reached at that point due to the heterogeneous nature of the target population. However, data saturation was reached earlier, and only 26 individuals were interviewed. The study's sample was taken from national security experts (9), DIRCO officials who had served as defence attachés (2) and international fellows (4) who had also served as defence attachés in India and Pakistan. Participants were also drawn from senior SANDF officers who had done national security studies in India (4) and Pakistan (7). The researcher had anticipated interviewing Indian and Pakistani diplomats from the two countries' embassies as well, but they were unavailable.

Qualitative research may employ a variety of data collection methods.

3.7 DATA COLLECTION METHOD

Data collection is described as a system for gathering data on a study phenomenon from a specific number of people or occurrences in order to adequately address the research

objectives (Leedy and Ormrod, 2015). Different methods can be used in the collection of data, such as questionnaires, interviews, observations, documents, focus group meetings and experiments (Thomas, 2011). Depending on the objective of the study, existing data and the benefits of each approach, the researcher might choose to employ one or a mix of these data collection methods. Interviews are a popular approach for gathering qualitative data. Structured or semi structured interviews are conducted, with the former employing a pre-designed questionnaire and the latter employing a pre-designed interview guide as data collection methods. To collect data for this study, semi-structured interviews with various individuals were employed.

3.7.1 Semi-structured interviews

The interview is a verbal encounter in which one person, the interviewer, seeks to learn about and comprehend another person, the interviewee. An interview is a strong technique for gathering detailed information about people's beliefs and attitudes, and the meanings that guide their lives and behaviour (Gray, 2014). Structured and unstructured interviews are also possible. Structured interviews are typically utilised in quantitative research and are based on predetermined questions with restricted answer possibilities (Saunders et al., 2009). Interviews that are unstructured or semi-structured are more adaptable. They follow a list questions or topics and let the interviewees share their insights and experiences regarding the phenomenon in their own words. Because these interviews are qualitative in nature due to their contextual character, this study relied on semi-structured interviews to gather information on India's NSS and its implications for Pakistan. The exploratory and inductive character of the research necessitates the use of semi-structured indepth interviews to elicit military officials', diplomats' and security experts' perspectives and real-life experiences of India's NSS and how it relates to Pakistan (McCusker and Gunaydin, 2015). The researcher conducted in-depth semi-structured interviews with the 26 persons selected using an interview guide. In-depth semi structured interviews allow for probing viewpoints and ideas. It is preferable that respondents elaborate on their responses (Gray, 2014).

During the invitation process, participants were informed of the study's aim and objectives, the research methodology and their freedom to withdraw from the interview at

any moment without penalty. Because of the current Covid-19 epidemic and the need to practice social distancing, all interviews were done online via Zoom at a time that was appropriate and convenient for the participants. Prior to the start of the interview, participants signed and returned the consent form. The interviews lasted approximately 30 minutes. The use of semi-structured interviews has the benefit of allowing all topics in the interview guide to be debated on, while giving enough opportunity to discuss other significant problems that may emerge in the course of the interview (Bless et al., 2013). To guarantee precision and accuracy in data collection, all interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. Furthermore, secondary sources were employed for research arguments, which included books, journals, abstracts, dissertations and articles from reputable scholars and authors (Grey and Sadoff, 2007). The researcher also used scientific debates and international, regional and national policy documents as secondary data sources.

In this study, the semi-structured interviews were measured using an interview guide.

3.7.2 Measuring instrument

An interview guide was used to conduct semi-structured interviews. An interview guide is a pre-written list of open-ended questions and topics that must be addressed in a specified order (Bernard, 2013). Because the study was exploratory and descriptive in nature, semi-structured interviews were conducted to obtain detailed opinions, perspectives and lived experiences from diplomats, senior military commanders and security professionals (McCusker and Gunaydin, 2015). The interview research guide was designed with essentially open-ended questions in mind, and it was utilised to conduct semi-structured online Zoom interviews with each participant. A pre-test was carried out to assess the efficiency of the interview guide in answering the study questions. The pre-test was carried out with two people who did not participate in the final research.

A particular data analysis approach was used to analyse the qualitative data obtained during semi-structured interviews and using the interview guide.

3.8 DATA ANALYSIS

The act of providing order, structure, and meaning to a large amount of collected data is known as data analysis (De Vos et al., 2011). Data analysis entails “[r]eading through your data frequently and engaging in activities of breaking the data down (thematizing and classifying) and building it up again in one unique method (elaborative and interpreting)” (Blanche et al., 2006:322). To analyse the qualitative data, the researcher utilised Atlas TI for coding and theme analysis. Because it compares phenomena to themes collected from data and literature, thematic analysis is ideal for use in qualitative investigations (Mohajan, 2018). Thematic analysis was used to examine patterns that emerged from the acquired data. Because all interviews were videotaped and transcribed completely, using theme analysis ensured significant rigor in obtaining basic ideas and perspectives from the participants (McCusker and Gunaydin, 2015). Braun and Clarks (2006) defined the following six steps of the data analysis process:

- **Phase 1: Familiarisation with data.** This is the first phase of data analysis, which entails the researcher becoming acquainted with the data collected. The goal of this step is to detect and fix mistakes or omissions as soon as possible after the data collection procedure. All recorded interviews are transcribed and any written notes meticulously scrutinised to ensure that data collected is precise and reliable. Data editing was thus done to verify the recorded data and any mistakes in the transcriptions were rectified immediately.
- **Phase 2: Data classification and coding.** Coding is the process of consolidating data by bracketing (Creswell, 2014). The researcher assigns numeric symbols or codes to participant replies and organises them into a limited number of groups or classes that solve the study's research topic. Classification is the process of grouping data into categories that have similar features. NVivo was used to code data during the analysis. Coding, according to Lockyer (2004: 318), is a “systematic technique of condensing vast material into smaller analysable units through the development of categories and concepts generated from the data.” Atlas TI software is ideal for analysing the data obtained from this study because it can import interviews and audio and video recordings for

analysis. Coding is important in data analysis as it ensures that essential phrases contained in transcripts or recordings are thoroughly analysed and that nothing is overlooked.

- **Phase 3: Identification of themes.** In this phase, the researcher identifies emerging themes from the collated and coded data categories. The goal of this phase is to refocus the study on the wider themes and organise the various codes into the identified themes (Braun and Clarks, 2006). This process also involves assessing the codes, combining similar ones and developing other themes. The identification of themes has to be limited to the coded data from which sub-themes that are closely linked to the main theme can be developed.
- **Phase 4: Review of themes.** The researcher reviews the discovered topics throughout this step. Theme creation must be congruent with achieving research objectives and providing insight into the study issue. During the process of reviewing themes, a process of refining them is done simultaneously. At this level, some candidate themes may be discarded if they do not have sufficient data, while others are combined (Braun and Clarks, 2006). Also, other identified themes may become sub-themes if they fall under an overarching theme. At this level, the codes appearing in a specific theme have to form a pattern, that is, they have to be closely interlinked.
- **Phase 5: Defining and naming themes.** The researcher defines and names the developed themes and sub-themes that fall under them in the fifth phase of the process. Theme names and definitions have to be concise and accurate and give a clear indication and description of what the theme is about. Each theme and sub-theme is clearly defined and refined for analysis. The coded data under each theme are then arranged coherently and any linkages are highlighted to reveal the relationships between the themes and areas of interest (Braun and Clarks, 2006).

- **Phase 6: Producing the report.** The writing of the report is the final stage of the theme analysis. The researcher discusses and provides a thorough overview of the study's findings under the designated themes. The report has to be given in a logical and concise manner so that the relevance of the study is clearly articulated. The researcher also needs to convince the reader that the study is indeed valid (Braun and Clarks, 2006).

The validity of the data is enhanced by measures that ensure data trustworthiness.

3.9 MEASURES TO ENSURE TRUSTWORTHINESS

The foundation of successful qualitative research is credibility (Polit and Beck, 2011). The validity, reliability and trustworthiness of the obtained data are all dependent on the quality of the data collection process (McCusker and Gunaydin, 2015). Because qualitative research is subjective, there are several elements that might influence the study's reliability and credibility. According to Lincoln and Guba (1985), trustworthiness is a means of attaining internal validity, with the goal of determining that the inquiry was performed in such a way that the subject was accurately and precisely identified and described. Trustworthiness is determined by four indicators, namely credibility, dependability, transferability and conformability, and authenticity.

- **Credibility.** According to Kumar (2014), credibility entails demonstrating that the findings of qualitative research are credible or plausible from the standpoint of the study participants. The amount of respondent concordance is used to assess credibility, which is identical to validity in quantitative research. The findings are presented to people who took part in the study for confirmation, congruence, validation and acceptance. The greater the outcome of these aspects, the higher the validity of the study. The following credibility procedures apply to the initial interviewees with whom the researcher will be in contact:

- ✦ **Establishing a relationship with the participants.** The researcher spent time establishing rapport with security specialists, defence attachés and senior SANDF personnel who had worked and studied in India and Pakistan. The researcher originally asked potential volunteers to join in

the study over the telephone, briefly outlining the study's background and aims. More information was given via email, which included informed permission. Participation was confirmed telephonically and any questions about the study were addressed prior to the interview.

- ✦ **Member checking.** Following the data collection procedure, the researcher scheduled a follow-up session with the participants to explain or ask questions that the researcher may have overlooked and to present the final thesis of the study together with the findings.

To avoid bias, all semi-structured interviews were videotaped and transcribed verbatim, resulting in an audit trail. As a result, credibility was established in this study by the extensive use of the audit trail to verify rigour, data quality and trustworthiness (Anney, 2014).

- **Transferability.** Transferability refers to the extent to which qualitative research findings may be generalised or applied to different contexts or situations. Transferability is difficult to establish due to the technique used

in qualitative research. Transferability can be accomplished to some degree, if the researcher fully outlines the technique used for others to follow and duplicate (Kumar, 2014). The audit trail and rigorous adherence to data collection and analysis procedures when coding and classifying data can be used to confirm this.

- **Dependability.** Dependability refers to whether the same findings would be obtained if the same thing was witnessed repeatedly. Because qualitative research promotes flexibility and freedom, it is inevitably subjective. Consequently, establishing dependability may be challenging, unless the researcher retains an extensive and thorough record of the procedure for others to reproduce in order to determine the amount of dependability (Kumar, 2014). The researcher considers dependability while determining whether the study method is rational, well-documented and audited (De Vos et al., 2011). Strict attention to the data analysis techniques and processes outlined in the methodological guidelines guaranteed that the study objectives were reached and

enhanced the dependability and trustworthiness of the data. The researcher also hired an independent coder to check that the findings reported in the audit trail were consistent. The audit trail consists of transcribed research interviews, theme analyses and the use of audio recordings. During the interviews, the researcher also made file notes and observed and investigated non-verbal cues.

- **Confirmability.** Confirmability pertains to the extent to which the findings can be validated or corroborated by others; in other words, the findings of research must be an accurate reflection of the data gathered. Confirmability is related to reliability in quantitative research in that it is only feasible to compare results if both researchers follow the method in the same way (Kumar, 2014). According to research, confirmability captures the conventional idea of objectivity (De Vos et al., 2011). Confirmability was enforced through the use of the audit trail by making audio recordings during interviews and transcribing the recordings soon after the interviews. Other methods such as following up on questions and probing were also used.

3.10 PILOT STUDY

In preparation for the major investigation, a pilot study is described as a preparatory small study testing the validity and reliability of a research instrument as a measuring tool (Zefeiti and Mohamad, 2015). A pilot study is a procedure that involves pre-testing the research instrument, that is, the interview guide, on a limited number of individuals from the project's target population. Those who participate in the pilot study are later excluded from the main study, since their feedback is crucial to the improvement in the research instrument. The pilot study's goal is to determine whether the measuring instrument adequately answers the study's research questions and to test the transparency of the questions posed to the participants in the research instrument. Questions in the interview guide should be written in plain, straightforward language.

The pilot study was carried out with two volunteers who were familiar with the Indo-Pakistani conflict and security problems. Those two subjects were not included in the study's final conclusions. According to the findings of the pilot study, participants needed clarification

on Question 10: What is the political elite's role in the formulation and implementation of India's national security strategy?

Participants were unsure of what was meant by the term "political elite". Consequently, the term was replaced with "political leadership." Therefore, Question 10 was altered to read: What role does political leadership play in developing and implementing India's national security strategy?

3.11 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The empirical research was conducted within a specific geographical area, namely India and Pakistan, thus limiting the conclusions drawn and their application to other conflict areas. Another limitation of this study is that the available literature draws heavily on India's security strategy in general and less on Pakistan's response to it or Pakistan's security strategy.

Furthermore, the findings of the empirical research will only provide a picture of the selected grand strategy at a certain moment in time, that is, during the study period. It is impossible to predict how stable the perceptions, attitudes and understanding of participants are or whether they will change in future.

The primary researcher has a high-ranking position in the military, which may introduce a certain amount of bias to the study. However, this bias was minimised by the fact that most of the prospective participants are industry acquaintances of the researcher. They also hold senior positions and, therefore, are unlikely to feel coerced into taking part in the study.

The researcher adhered to ethical considerations to reduce bias and protect the participants in the study.

3.12 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The term "ethics" refers to a collection of moral ideals and ethical norms that serve as standards and a foundation for each researcher to assess their actions (De Vos et al., 2011). Throughout the study process, the researcher has a moral commitment and responsibility to protect the rights of the participants (Campbell and Pretti, 2017). Ensuring that

participants are willing to freely disclose information improves the study's validity. As a result, no one was pressured or enticed into participating in this research project by promises of any kind of advantage. Research ethics in social sciences highlight the importance of honesty and respect for all participants to ensure that the research report reflects findings that are valid and accurate. This research study strictly adhered to the North West University's ethical guidelines by observing the following ethical considerations:

- **Voluntary participation.** Social research is frequently perceived as an intrusion into people's life and as disturbing the subject's normal routine (Babbie, 2012). Participation in the study should be entirely voluntary, which means that no one should be compelled or encouraged to take part and that all participants should be notified of their right to withdraw from the study at any moment during the research process, with no negative repercussions, even after signing consent forms (Arifin, 2018). In order to increase voluntary participation, the researcher must first describe the aim of the study and provide participants with the option to accept or refuse participation. Ensuring that participants are willing to freely disclose information improves the study's validity. As a result, no one was pressured or enticed into participating in this research project by promises of any kind of advantage.
- **Informed consent.** The term "informed consent" refers to an individual's ability to freely make an informed commitment to disclose information without pressure or force. Informed consent is a critical component of research ethics. Prospective volunteers must be fully informed about the study's aims, background and potential hazards before they agree to participate (Fleming and Zegwaard, 2018). Participants in this study were given an informed consent form that included information about the study's purpose. Participants were also informed that they could withdraw from the study at any point during the course of the trial, if they so desired (Arifin, 2018). Participants signed informed consent forms before the start of each interview. The informed consent forms were prepared in plain English, free from complicated terminology and legalese, to improve comprehension.

- **Anonymity and confidentiality.** Maintaining anonymity and confidentiality is a critical step in protecting participant data. When others are unable to identify the respondent, the response is termed anonymous (Babbie, 2012). To achieve anonymity in this study, participants were identified using numerical values or codes instead of names. To maintain anonymity, no private information about the participant is disclosed to anyone throughout the study process or in the final report (Arifin, 2018). Confidentiality means that the researcher may identify a specific participant's response, but agrees not to reveal who provided it (Babbie, 2012). To protect participants' privacy and confidentiality, no personal information linking participants to the data was recorded. In addition, electronic data is saved in a password-protected computer and hard copies are kept in a locked cabinet so that only the researcher has access to them. All data will be retained for five years before being destroyed or erased in accordance with North West University's policies.
- **No harm to the participants.** The primary objective of the researcher is to ensure that the participants are protected from any harm that may come from their participation in the study. The research stresses that a basic ethical guideline is to cause no damage to the participants. Therefore, the researcher has the responsibility to ensure that the participants are protected at all times and to minimise any potential physical or emotional harm that may be caused by the research. The study focuses on the lived experiences of participants, thus making the study more sensitive and increasing the risk of potential emotional harm. All participants have to be informed of any probable direct or indirect risk or harm that they could experience, should they participate (Fleming and Zegwaard, 2018). As a result, participants were told about the potential emotional effects and implications of participation in the study, and they were given the option to withdraw if they were uncomfortable. Furthermore, owing to the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, the researcher conducted all interviews online via Zoom to protect the participants from potential exposure to the virus. Therefore, there was no foreseeable physical harm that could be done to the participants as a direct result of the study.

- **Honesty.** The honesty and integrity of data were maintained throughout the study's data collection and analysis methods to guarantee that the results were an accurate portrayal of the participants' viewpoints. Deception is defined as intentionally deceiving participants, deliberately distorting facts and withholding information from participants (De Vos et al., 2011). The researcher clearly informed the participants about the study's background, aim and what was expected of them during the research procedure. In no way did the researcher mislead the volunteers. The consent forms also indicated all the information needed. Information was not distorted, changed or made ambiguous in any way, that is, data was not fabricated to enhance authenticity. The degree to which researchers accurately and truthfully depict a variety of realities is referred to as authenticity. When a report captures the mood and tone of the participants' actual experiences, it becomes authentic. Participants' experiences, perceptions, feelings and insights were not altered, since they would be accepted as the true reality of the topic under investigation (Polit and Beck, 2011).
- **Permission.** By receiving authorisation to conduct interviews from the North West University ethical clearance committee, the principal researcher complied with the ethical criteria. Before the interviews, the researcher requested and was granted permission to interview military officers and defence attachés from Defence Foreign Relations and the SANDF.

3.13 CONCLUSION

The research technique used in a study is determined by the study's aims, the available data and the research questions that the study endeavours to answer. Political studies have primarily been descriptive and explanatory, have documented historical events, legislation and acts and attempted to explain why these events have occurred. This study was classified as exploratory, since little is known about India's NSS. The study was also descriptive because it was aimed at characterising India's present security policy, particularly in respect of Pakistan. This chapter showed the researcher's choice of research technique for this investigation. The interpretivist research paradigm was used in this study to better understand the selected participants views, insights and experiences of India's NSS and its

implications for Pakistan. Owing to the descriptive and exploratory character of the research, the study used an inductive qualitative technique to collect qualitative data using semistructured interviews. A phenomenology research strategy was adopted to conduct semi-structured interviews with participants from various organisations using a designed interview guide. Furthermore, purposive sampling was utilised to choose participants who had more than five years' work experience in international security and were familiar with India's security strategy in respect to Pakistan. Before the data collection procedure began, a pilot study was undertaken to evaluate the research instrument for clarity and relevance.

This chapter describes the data analysis procedure in depth. Thematic analysis was used to analyse the qualitative data gathered from the semi-structured interviews. The researcher initially transcribed the recorded data verbatim. Using NVivo software, transcriptions were thoroughly analysed and coded. The researcher's ethical considerations were also emphasised in this chapter. In addition, the researcher sought and was granted permission to interview defence attachés and top SANDF personnel.

The research findings, data analysis and interpretation of the results will be presented in the next chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

INDO-PAKISTANI RELATIONS FROM THE BEGINNING

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Indo-Pakistani relations are currently undeniably less than cordial because of historical and current events that continue to fuel the conflict between the two states. There are many factors that have contributed to these relations. However, differences in culture and religion were fundamentally at the core of the initial splinter of the great territory of British India during the colonial era. The arms race that occurred in 1998, ending in both India and Pakistan acquiring nuclear weapons, added to the complexities of this tense relationship.

The historical connection between India and Pakistan will be examined further in this chapter. The chapter will begin by focusing on the political interactions, events and ideas in India during colonial rule that contributed to the formation of Pakistan. Following that, the two nations' problematic regions will be evaluated and the many viewpoints on the dispute will be discussed. Furthermore, the various agreements that India and Pakistan have been party to will be analysed. Finally, the post-colonial Indo-Pakistani relationship will be discussed.

4.2 INDIA UNDER COLONIAL RULE

Prior to the British colonisation of India, there was a series of Muslim invasions in South Asia, which introduced Islam into the country. However, the bid to convert India into a primarily Muslim state failed due to the resistance by the majority Hindu Indians (Marshall, 2019). It was later, after the Indian Mutiny and the British victory in the Battle of Plassey that the British government initiated policies that undermined Indian national cohesion and provoked communal division (Tharoor, 2017). After the formal colonisation of India in 1858, the British government became keenly aware of the socio-cultural differences in the state and thus adopted the divide and rule strategy, which exacerbated the hostilities between Hindus and Muslims (Stewart, 1951). For example, the divide and rule policy separated the Hindus and Muslims by using an English education policy that excluded Muslims from learning English.

In February 1947, the British government expressed its intention to transfer power to India by June 1948. By 20 February 1947, the then prime minister Clement Attlee announced that if no agreement was reached by the representative assembly, then the British government would have the prerogative to choose to whom it would hand over power by June 1948 (Rahman, 1996). Lord Mountbatten was named Governor General and entrusted with ensuring the peaceful transition of power to the new administration.

Both the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress were unable to reach an agreement on power sharing because the Muslims believed that they were grossly underrepresented and that their interests would be jeopardised in future. As it became obvious that the two parties would struggle to share power in an inclusive administration, Mountbatten proposed that the British government publish a plan for India's division on 3 June 1947. The Indian Congress leaders were first vehemently opposed to the division, but on 15 June 1947, they decided to accept the partition decision. On 18 July 1947, the Indian Independence Act was passed. It stated that India and Pakistan were to become independent countries on 15 August 1947 (Sherwani, 1999).

The split was to take place in accordance with the Hindu majority regions' communal allegiances (Ganguly et al., 2018). Because religion was the primary separating issue, Muslim provinces were to constitute the new Pakistan (Korbel, 1954). According to the clauses of the Indian Independence Act, there were 565 princely states, constituting 33% of British India. India's multi-cultural, linguistic and religious diversity exacerbated the country's divides, notably with the end of British control and departure in 1947. The sour relationship between the two main political parties in British India, namely the Congress, which represented the Hindu majority, and the All India Muslim League, which represented the Muslim minority, contributed to the reinforcement of the irreconcilable divisions between the two groups (Ashraf, 2015). Disputes between the two political parties became quite intense in the decade of the independence movement, which made it apparent that they could not coexist, hence necessitating a split.

Before the British had physically evacuated India, the partitioning of the country into three was announced. This led to the massive migration of millions of Muslims to the west to the newly formed Pakistan. The Hindus and Sikhs moved inwards towards the new boundaries of India (Marshall, 2019). The sudden exodus of people was not at all

coordinated and resulted in violence and riots breaking out between rival ethnic groups, the deaths of an estimated one million people and the displacement of a further 15 million people from their homes. After this bloodbath, new borders were formed with East Pakistan, India and West Pakistan, which eventually became Bangladesh. Shows the united India before the partitioning Figure 4.1.

4.3 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TWO-NATION THEORY

Foreign policies are dictated by two main factors, namely the geographical location and the politics of the state (Kumar, 2019). Domestic politics involves various aspects, such as religion, that contribute to the governance of a country. British India being divided into two separate states was based on the two-nation doctrine, which held that Muslims and Hindus had fundamentally different religious views and thus required separate homelands (Nanda, 2010). The two-nation idea was proposed to avoid civil conflict between Muslims and Hindus following British departure from India in 1947. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the Muslim leader in India between 1940 and 1947, is known for skilfully impressing the separate state agenda for Muslims (Singh, 2009). Although the colonial experience of the two groups was largely similar, Pakistani Muslims and Indian Hindus have developed different foreign policies.

After the separation of India and Pakistan, the relationship between the two countries grew even more contentious and antagonistic. Since the partitioning was based on religious differences, Pakistan has seen a rise in extreme forms of Islam, which perceives that the religion is under threat from non-Muslims (Behuria and Sareen, 2015). What were mere differences in beliefs have become the source of great enmity, which is clearly reflected in Pakistan's foreign policy in respect of India. The case is, however, rather different for India, since it has remained a country with diverse cultures and religions (Nanda, 2010). Over the years, India has taken great pride in creating a secular and democratic state that has accepted all of the religions represented in the country, including Islam. Indian leadership has shown a deep desire to create a state at peace with all nations by allowing non-alignment to inform its foreign policy in the past in order to focus on developing the economy of the country and becoming a superpower. Religion was the initial reason for the split between India and Pakistan; however, India has managed to evolve into a state whose identity is based on other facets as well.

The colonial experiences of India and Pakistan seem to have had a greater influence on India because of the manner in which the state has integrated democracy and secularism typical in the West as part of its identity. The attacks by Pakistan have, however, led to India also increasing its military budget and weaponry to defend itself and attack Pakistan, if necessary (Mason, 2016).

4.4 HINDU-MUSLIM ANTAGONISM

Religious differences are a significant source of conflict in Asia, more so than in any other region of the globe (Fox, 2002). Religion has an impact on many elements of politics and society, since it is frequently seen as a vital component (James and Ózdamar, 2005). Ethno-religious conflict in the modern-day world has the capacity to impact on international relations through globalisation, terrorism and amassing nuclear weapons. When a state identifies with a single religion, it indicates that the religion has a substantial influence over the state's policies and decision-making (Kumar, 2019). Pakistan has identified itself as a Muslim state and its political leadership uses the rhetoric that non-Muslims and the West are the state's enemies. By taking such a stand, Pakistan is using Islam to influence both domestic and foreign policy. Ethnic conflict has the potential to influence foreign policy through religious differences (James and Ózdamar, 2005). Religion can be used by groups of society to promote specific agendas or achieve political goals.

Scholars posit that India is highly affected by ethno-religious divisions in the region and its relationships with its neighbours. Political turmoil and ethno-religious conflict in neighbouring countries could destabilise the sub-region and India as well. Therefore, the state perceives that it would be ideal to have dispassionate neighbours who are less likely to experience, for example, religious tensions. India and Pakistan's animosity has had a considerable impact on how they see each other and their foreign policy (James and Ózdamar, 2005). Kashmir and Jammu are the widely contested territories preventing the two states from achieving peace. Kashmir is predominantly Muslim in both the Indian and Pakistani controlled territories and yet, in Jammu, Hindus are the main religious group and make up about 66% of the total population (Rahman, 1996). The origin of clashes at Kashmir is quite complex and may be the result of religion mixed with other state factors (Ganguly and Bajpai, 1994). Although these religions have shaped the foreign policies of both

countries, the most prominent source of conflict and identity has been Islam. Islam is used by political forces and extremist groups in Pakistan as the reason for the consistent attacks on India. Their quest is to protect the religion and way of life from external forces. India, on the other hand, considers Islam as a threat against its national security and policies, particularly for Kashmir and Jammu, and has taken a harder approach as the conflict has progressed (James and Özdamar, 2005).

4.5 PARTITION OF INDIAN SUBCONTINENTS

Following the partition of British India, the three resulting countries, Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh (previously East Pakistan), found themselves with little or no access to regions that had formerly been theirs. This also meant that some of the natural resources and borders that had formerly belonged to them now belonged to another other state. According to academics, Pakistan received the short end of the stick during India's division (Mukherjee, 2010, Jalal, 1995). Pakistan inherited the north-west border with Afghanistan, which had previously been a source of contention for British India. The distance between East and West Pakistan weakened the country even more because it was divided by 1 610 kilometers of Indian territory, resulting in East Pakistan's insurrection against West Pakistan rule. East Pakistan eventually became a separate and sovereign state of Bangladesh. In addition, Pakistan only received 17% of the financial reserves from the former colonial government, which hampered its potential for development (Marshall. 2019). All these factors have contributed to the current economic challenges the country is facing.

Pakistan is weaker than India on many fronts, such as its geography, economy, the military and demography (Marshall, 2019). This inferiority is a direct result of the partitioning and may be a serious contributing factor to Pakistan's aggression towards India over the Kashmir territory. The state is further weakened by the demand on the Pakistani military to intervene in domestic strife in the different regions, whilst simultaneously defending the country from external threats. Since its inception, Pakistan has failed to develop a national identity that has managed to unify the divisions in the different cultural regions which have seemingly deepened with the rise of separatism in the country (Behuria and Sareen, 2012). Identifying itself as an Islamic state has not worked as well as initially anticipated by the

political elite of Pakistan, probably because it tries to foster the idea of uniformity under Islam, which actually does not exist, overlooking all cultural differences.

Each state or region in Pakistan has its own language and their populations are more loyal to their regions than to the country. It can, therefore, be assumed that the ideal Muslim state that Pakistan was chasing was to an extent an illusion. The Baluchistan state in particular has a political independence movement that sometimes conducts insurgencies against the Pakistani state. Such revolts have a negative effect on the state's already unstable economic and political landscape because Baluchistan has the greatest land area, which is about 45% of the whole country and is rich in oil and gas (Marshall, 2019). As a result, the political leaders of Pakistan being aware of the importance of such regions attempt with little success to convince the people of a more important national agenda such as dealing with India. Furthermore, the military holds great power and dictates Pakistan's foreign and security policy and will, therefore, never allow insurgents to have their way.

The strength of Pakistan has always been closely linked to its relationships with other states regionally and internationally. Although India is economically and militarily stronger than Pakistan, the two countries have competitive artillery, which includes nuclear weapons. However, India and Pakistan both rely on strategic alliances with other nations to strengthen their respective national security. Although Pakistan secured the most extensive irrigation network recently, it still has not managed to develop a sustainable economic base. The state relies heavily on foreign aid (Behuria and Sareen, 2012). Pakistan's economic growth spurts can be directly correlated with the period of influx of foreign aid into the country (Behuria and Sareen, 2012). For a variety of reasons, the US has been the primary source of financial assistance to Pakistan. First off, Pakistan's geostrategic location in South Asia gave the US military access to Afghanistan, notably after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks (Hicks et al., 2016). Secondly, Pakistan, which has been long suspected of secretly funding and supporting terrorist groups, was given an ultimatum to assist the US in rooting out terrorist elements in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Marshall, 2019, Tankel, 2014). Publicly, the political leadership of Pakistan castigated terrorism, although its attempts to eliminate it were deemed half-hearted. However, this position seemed to pacify the US and it continued to fund the state, although funding has since been reduced by more than half in the last decade. The possibility of Pakistan being two-faced is a real one because it did not necessarily want to become Afghanistan's enemy, yet it needed the aid offered by the US.

The US is also uneasy about Pakistan's close relations with China because China has a testy relationship with the US. China is also a big danger to India because the two nations are at war over the Himalayan mountain range, particularly Tibet. Tibet has the greatest altitude in the world and is desired both states, yet it has fallen under Indian protection since India offered refuge to the Tibetan independence movement (Singh and Dahiya, 2012). This action may have prevented the Chinese from annexing Tibet, but they have continued to push on the Sino-Indian boundary, much to India's chagrin. Nonetheless, the two nations have managed to keep their commercial connections intact.

Pakistan has a glimmer of economic hope due to its border with one of its closest allies, China. The border between the two countries is on the Pakistani controlled part of Kashmir. China has become a great ally to Pakistan due to the presence of a common enemy, India. This alliance is both a national security and economic strategy (Singh and Dahiya, 2012). Gwadar, a coastal city in Baluchistan, is of particular interest to the Chinese, as it provides an alternative route to transport oil through Pakistan (Marshall, 2019). As a result, China has invested billions of dollars in the area in a project known as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which is especially designed to build highways, railway tracks and pipelines connecting the two countries (Marshall, 2019). Concessions on the volatility of Baluchistan have been addressed by having adequate security personnel around the project. Pakistan is primarily dependent on other countries for financial support and less on its own economic activities (Hicks et al., 2016). The military budget takes a huge slice of the country's financial resources, ultimately reducing funding for development. Although this dependence on external support helps Pakistan achieve some of its goals, it does leave the country somewhat indebted to these countries. The sovereignty of such a state may also be undermined because the sources of funding want to interfere in decision-making to serve their own interests.

Bangladesh, the former East Pakistan until 1971, also has economic woes similar to Pakistan, with 40% of people living in poverty (Bangladesh Economic Survey, 2011). Located on the eastern border of India, Bangladesh has been experiencing negative climate change impacts such as cyclones, floods and droughts. These, coupled with poor farming methods and a lack of water-saving techniques, have led to the stunted growth of the agricultural sector and industry (Datta, 2012). Agriculture, of which rice production accounts for 18%, is the major contributor to the economy (Nasiruddin and Hassan, 2009). The land available

for agriculture is slowly diminishing in Bangladesh due to a growing population and the need for more housing and infrastructure. Consequently, the country is facing high unemployment rates that is forcing residents to migrate to India in search of livelihoods, usually illegally (Datta, 2012). Also, Bangladesh has continuously accused India of diverting Ganga water, which has resulted in water shortages in the country.

On the other hand, India, which has a highly diverse population due to the fact that it embraces secular democracy, managed to create a unified identity with which its people can identify (Mukherjee, 2010). Politically, India, having identified itself as a democracy, has aligned itself strongly with other democracies of the world, such as the US. In addition, the state's booming economy has it set to fulfil its ambition to become a world power. From the 1947 partition, India has retained most of the industries, tax generating base and large cities and important ports of entry, thus making it more likely to achieve economic stability in comparison to Pakistan (Marshall, 2019, Mukherjee, 2010). However, India is trying to suppress terrorist attacks and flare-ups of war by Pakistan, which have compelled the state to spend massively on armament and the military at the expense of increasing the people's standard of living.

The partitioning of British India essentially destabilised the South Asian region to an extent and hindered economic growth and peace that would have occurred if the India, Pakistan and Bangladesh had remained a single nation. India and Pakistan are preoccupied with the continuous conflict which has been costly for both states and all three nations. Insurgencies are still a typical feature in all the states resulting from the partition due to ethno-religious divisions and economic hardships.

The new boundary delineation presented additional problems for India and Pakistan, as both nations attempted to claim the Jammu and Kashmir area, proving their entitlement to the territory. As a result, the two countries have been involved in three wars (1948, 1965 and 1971), the Kargil crisis and several skirmishes post independence, especially over the Kashmir area (Ashrat, 2015).

4.6 NUCLEAR WEAPONS

India's acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1998 was both an indication of its foreign policy against the state of Pakistan and its potential to achieve superpower status. Since Pakistan would not be outdone by India in terms of weaponry, it also quickly managed to secure some nuclear weapons of its own in the same year as India and at the cost of its poverty-stricken population (Alam, 2008). States resort to nuclear weapons when they believe that they have run out of options for resolving severe security threats (Krepon, 2015). Having these weapons of mass destruction against a foe with similar or superior capabilities gives a state a degree of deterrence, dissuasion and national reassurance (Krepon, 2015). Nuclear weapons increase a state's sense of national security because a state perceives that it is not an easy target for an attack because of the possibility of retaliation. However, India's security quandary stems not just from strikes by Pakistani military forces, but also from terrorist groups headquartered in both Pakistan and India, such as the Jihad (Tankel, 2014; Hussain, 2007). Nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists would be disastrous for India, as they would likely be used with little restraint. However, since India and Pakistan are neighbours, it is likely that a nuclear attack against each other would cause a catastrophic disaster to both states and the South Asian region. Therefore, both countries having nuclear capabilities makes them and their neighbours rather uneasy.

In its nuclear doctrine, India announced a no-first-use policy, whereas Pakistan abstained from making such strong pronouncements (Mukherjee, 2016; Alam, 2008). However, it is unclear what would prompt Pakistan to launch a nuclear attack on India, although it is clear that the prospect of retaliation by India is deterring such an attack. In addition, India has a much broader perspective and a wider territory than South Asia, as depicted in its nuclear doctrine, yet Pakistan is currently specifically focused on India in its foreign policy (Alam, 2008).

4.7 STRATEGIC ALLIANCES

The third critical component that truncates the India-Pakistan power imbalance is great power alliance politics. During the Cold War, India and Pakistan were viewed as geopolitical equals, particularly by Western officials and the Western media. The US's alliance with

Islamabad bolstered this view. Pakistan has had sporadic alliance assistance from the US since the mid-1950s, and there has been a de facto alliance between Pakistan and China since the 1960s. These alliance connections have provided Islamabad with "borrowed power," allowing it to lessen the power disparity with India. Against the backdrop of the struggle with the Soviet Union, the US deemed Pakistan's geostrategic location appealing. During the early phases of the Cold War, Pakistan provided bases and staging areas for US aircraft to monitor Soviet nuclear and missile programmes.

During the 1960s and 1980s, the US-led coalition assisted Pakistan in acquiring weaponry of higher calibre than India's. In the early 1970s, Pakistan served as a go-between for the US and China in the diplomatic opening between the two countries. During the 1971 Bangladesh War, the US led by President Richard Nixon, sided with Pakistan. Furthermore, during the 1980s, Pakistan served as a frontline state and a conduit for US aid to Afghan Mujahedeen troops against the Soviet Union. This collaboration resulted in enormous US economic and military transfers to Pakistan. Since 11 September 2001, Pakistan has played a critical role in the US's war against Al-Qaeda-led terrorist groups. While the US provided help, the objective was to use Pakistan for more significant geopolitical goals. Pakistan's primary purpose has always been to strengthen its capabilities concerning India and narrow the power gap with its greater neighbour. Pakistan's military and strategic ties with China have also played an essential role in balancing its relations with India. Even while pursuing an engagement strategy with New Delhi, China maintained an all-weather alliance with Pakistan in order to control India. Following the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962, China's assistance to Pakistan began to grow and this occurred at the same time as increased weaponry deliveries from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) to India. During the 1965 war, Pakistan expected China to launch a second front, but this did not happen. In 1971, China, along with the US, backed Pakistan and provided a decisive victory in the fight.

4.8 DISPUTED INDO-PAKISTANI TERRITORIES

The split of British India into three states brought with it enormous challenges, primarily through territorial disputes. Research has documented the importance of Kashmir and other disputed territories in defining Indo-Pakistani relations. The territorial tensions between the two countries began in 1947 during the partitioning of India into Pakistan, India and

Bangladesh and still continue to this today. These territories include Kashmir, the Siachen Glacier and Sir Creek.

4.8.1 Kashmir border dispute

The populace assumed that Hari Singh, the Maharaja of Kashmir at the time, would submit to Pakistan, but the reverse proved to be true. The Maharaja proposed a ceasefire deal to both India and Pakistan as a means of maintaining contact and access to supplies, which Pakistan accepted and India refused. Civil unrest erupted when the Maharaja demanded Muslims to surrender their guns in an effort to disarm them as part of his campaign for an independent Kashmir. This decision was supposed to be informed by the other nations' geographical contiguity and also the preferences of the people living in those states (Ashraf, 2015). In 1947, the population of Jammu and Kashmir consisted of 79% Muslims, while the rest were Hindus, Sikhs and other religions (Tahir, 1995). Owing to the large Muslim community, major rail and road links, tourist traffic and the river network, Jammu and Kashmir were more connected to Pakistan (Ashraf, 2018; Hussain, 1998). Muslims from different parts of Pakistan came to show solidarity with their Kashmir Muslim tribesmen, prompting the Maharaja to request military assistance from the Indian government and leading to the subsequent accession to India.

India and Pakistan have never been able to find a lasting resolution on the Kashmir dispute. In 1972, the Line of Control (LoC) was drawn through the region, demarcating 121 512 square kilometers on the north-western side under Pakistani control and 100 567 square kilometers under Indian control (Kirk and Akhtar, 2019). Scholars posit that the Kashmir issue is essentially a case of national pride and strategy due to the territory's location (Marshall, 2019). Gaining complete control of Kashmir would provide India with a myriad of opportunities, such as direct access to Central Asia and also providing a border with Afghanistan. Indian control of Kashmir would also isolate Pakistan by cutting it off from its great ally, China, by eliminating the Pakistan-China border. India also considers Kashmir as an important component of the India Union (Rid, 2012).

If Pakistan gained complete control of Kashmir, it would strengthen Islamabad's foreign policy choices, deny India access to different prospects and increase Pakistan's water security (Marshall, 2019). Water security is the key to the development of a nation such as Pakistan which is struggling to sustain an economy to eliminate the high levels of poverty. Pakistan

depends on the Indus River that originates in Himalayan Tibet and flows through the Indian territory of Kashmir before reaching Pakistan (Ashrat, 2018). This river network supplies two-thirds of the water demand for cotton farming and other economic activities. As water demands are likely to increase as the climate becomes warmer, there are concerns that the available water supply may begin to dwindle, hence the need for water security.

India and Pakistan have shown no willingness to concede to each other because of the vested interest they have in Kashmir. The first preference of both countries is to have the whole of Kashmir or otherwise fight over it (Rid, 2012). Therefore, the Kashmir dispute continues being the major hindrance to peace negotiations between the two, contributing to the instability of South Asia. In the past, differing Indian and Pakistani perspectives on the question of Kashmir have resulted in a stalemate punctuated by occasional clashes along the border. Another major territory under dispute by the two countries is the Siachen Glacier, which is also linked to Kashmir.

4.8.2 Siachen Glacier dispute

The Siachen Glacier is another source of contention between India and Pakistan. The glaciated region, which covers roughly 3 000 square kilometers and is located in the eastern Karakoram mountain range, is claimed by both governments (Wirsing, 1986). Because the LoC dividing Pakistani and Indian-held regions was never extended to include the glacier, the Siachen issue sprang from the Kashmir dispute. As a result of this uncertainty, Indian armed troops began to erect permanent stations on the glacier to identify or lay claim to the region (Ashrat, 2018). Pakistan, after the initial shock at India's bold move, quickly caught on and deployed its own troops to secure the remaining third of the territory while India controls nearly two-thirds of the glacier.

Forces clashed over the Siachen Glacier and talks were held to find a resolution that both countries would agree to. In 1989, India and Pakistan eventually reached an understanding during dialogues, although this exercise proved to be futile due to the lack of implementation of the agreement to date. Any efforts to move forward with the 1989 agreement have been marred by high levels of distrust by both states. Hence, these efforts have failed (Ashrat, 2018). The significance of this area stems from the fact that the glacier separates Pakistan and China, discouraging them from building military geographical linkages

that may be damaging to India (The Economic Times, 2019). The Siachen Glacier also gives India a vantage point from which to monitor China's activities that have gradually increased in the region (The Economic Times, 2019). To a large extent, the inability to reach a mutual agreement reflects the states' lack of political will to resolve the matter. Territorial disputes inevitably involve the natural resources in those areas of land which are likely to be unevenly distributed. Owning such natural reserves does not only represent unlimited access to the resources, but also increases a country's food and water security. Since the Kashmir issue is closely linked to the Siachen Glacier dispute, the resolution of both disputes can thus be conducted concurrently, although that would require sufficient political will and concessions by both India and Pakistan.

4.8.3 Sir Creek dispute

Sir Creek, a 96-kilometre long canal located in the marshes of Rann of Kutch on the Indus River, has been contested by both India and Pakistan. The primary difficulty is that the creek is located on the boundary of Pakistan's Sindh province and India's Gujarat state (Ashrat, 2018). Although it is not as contentious as Kashmir or the Siachen Glacier, the two states have yet to reach an agreement on their rights to the stream. A meeting held in New Delhi in 2007 brought India and Pakistan closer to an agreement. Still, the ongoing issue of distrust and a lack of political will resulted in the negotiations failing.

The creek is important to India and Pakistan because the demarcation of its boundaries will ultimately determine the distribution of maritime resources if the borderline is stretched to the sea (Khan, 2007). Marine resources include fish and minerals that would be ideal for boosting industry and economic development in the two states (Ashrat, 2018). The creek's location on swampland is also ideal for agriculture and food production because of the presence of high nutrient soils in these areas. The failure of India and Pakistan to reach an agreement on the Sir Creek issue prevents both countries from properly using the creek's natural riches and potential.

State disputes between neighbours are more detrimental to the security, economic development and stability of the states involved and also the region. For Indo-Pakistani relations to improve, the prevailing disputes would have to be resolved so that these

countries can concentrate on exploring strategies to eliminate the scourge of poverty by reducing military and defence budgets.

4.8.4 Indus Waters Treaty dispute

In the nineteenth century, the British built the majority of what is now the world's most extensive contiguous irrigation system in the Indus Basin. However, in 1947, the boundaries between the two states were established without regard for hydrology. When it became clear that India and Pakistan were unable to reach an agreement, the World Bank volunteered to assist in the discussions. After ten years of rigorous talks, the then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Pakistani President Ayub Khan and the World Bank signed the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in 1960. (Briscoe, 2010). The pact is made up of a preamble, 12 articles and eight technical annexures and contains four crucial parts. The first is concerned with the division of the waters. The waters of the three major western rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) were allocated to Pakistan. The waters of the three major eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas and Sutlej) were allocated to India. The second major element of the pact is that the two countries must share data on water flow withdrawal on a regular basis. The third prominent feature is the financing plan for the Indus Basin development for irrigation and other related works (Sharma, 2006).

The fourth component of the pact is the dispute resolution system, which established regulations requiring the Indian and Pakistani IWT commissioners to settle possible difficulties first. If this fails, there are procedures for external arbitration, either by a World Bank-appointed natural expert or an international court of arbitration (Briscoe, 2010). The first conflict regarding IWT emerged in 1970, when India proposed to construct the Salal Dam over the Chenab River. Pakistan objected to the Salal Dam project, particularly the design and storage capacity of the dam. India was flexible about reaching an understanding and decided to coordinate the process.

4.9 INDIA'S PERSPECTIVE ON THE WAR

India clearly understands that Pakistan is an adversary of its state and people due to the constant military and sponsored terrorist group attacks (Ganguly et al., 2018; Tankel, 2014). However, India has other interests and concerns that it is pursuing, from becoming a

world power and alleviating poverty to dealing with its significant population. The constant threat posed to India by Pakistan has definitely influenced India's security strategy by forcing it to protect and defend the sovereignty of its territory from any Pakistani attacks (Hicks et al., 2016; Behuria and Sareen, 2015). The reason for India's defensive stance is a clear reflection of the state's foreign policy since 1947, although its approach has somewhat hardened and is largely in response to attacks from its neighbours (Tankel, 2014).

India is ready to respond to Pakistan's attacks, but has adopted nuclear deterrence. In other words, it will not strike first but will retaliate if attacked. India seems to be surrounded by unfriendly neighbours, which it certainly did not anticipate at independence. Thus, in order to discourage Pakistan, India created a hostile environment for trade between the two states, for example, by recently increasing tax on Pakistani goods to such an extent that they have become too expensive. This economic strategy for fighting Pakistan is hardly a new one. Just after the partition in 1948, India closed off its markets to the young Pakistani nation that has been facing economic problems since its inception (Ashraf, 2015).

However, India understands that it has to tackle the issue of terrorism in order to adequately protect itself from Pakistani attacks. India has been fighting against the Pakistani jihadist threat for decades and has also found that most of the attacks were engineered by terrorists from Indian, both jihadist and Indian Muslims (Behuria and Sareen, 2015). The realisation that not all attacks emanate from Pakistan has made the problem of containing terrorism even more complex. Research contends that Indian Muslims still feel politically alienated and are thus easily activated by Pakistan's terror groups to perpetuate attacks on India (Tankel, 2014). This scenario has created an opportunity for Islamic militants to become more organised in sourcing support and training from external criminal organisations (Swami, 2008). It has, therefore, become difficult for New Delhi to declare war on these terrorist elements, since their own citizens could be involved.

India is known for having a culture of restraint and its approach to national security reflects that culture (Tankel, 2014). Even with evidence linking attacks on the country to foreign organisations or the Pakistani government, it is likely that India may refrain from retaliation lest it implicates its own citizens in the process. Still, foreign support for Indian terror groups has caused a further rift in Indo-Pakistani relations that would be difficult to bridge. Although terror acts are a source of concern in India, they are accorded minimal

importance because they are unlikely to hinder India's climb to superpower status. India is likely to fulfil its objectives with the help of the US, which is more interested in India attaining peaceful progress and enhancing the stability of South Asia.

Despite its many challenges, India has managed to create a more inclusive system that seeks to represent its diverse cultures through its democratic approach (Behuria and Sareen, 2015). The conflict with Pakistan is definitely undesirable for India because it distracts the country from its core vision of growing its economy and rising as a superpower. India is richly endowed with natural resources and has established booming trade relations globally; therefore, it will benefit immensely from reaching peace agreements with both Pakistan and China.

4.10 PAKISTANI ATTITUDE AND STRATEGIES

The conditions that led to the breakup of British India and the formation of Pakistan appear to have become even more significant now that the country is a distinct state. One thing is certain, Pakistan perceives India to be its worst enemy to such an extent that it has etched its identity from this ominous relationship. Since Pakistan is militarily weaker than India, it has adopted a strategy of attacking India at any opportunity and “inflicting a thousand cuts” on it (Marshall, 2019:192). These attacks are often in the form of skirmishes and terrorist attacks. Pakistan also identifies itself primarily through the Muslim religion, which generally perceives non-Muslim and western countries as threats to Islam (Behuria and Sareen, 2015).

Scholars purport that the Islamic agenda and anti-India rhetoric by the Pakistani government are an attempt to promote unity in this otherwise divided nation (Mukherjee, 2010). Firstly, inter- and intra-sectarian Islam conflicts have erupted within the state of Pakistan since 1989, leading to deaths and injuries. Conservative Islamic groups seek to force different sects of the religion to adopt a form of Islam that rejects other versions of the religion. Most of these groups are affiliated with terrorist groups, such as the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The vast majority of those who commit these crimes nearly invariably go unpunished, which exacerbates the degree of lawlessness in the country. Ethnic fractures have also prevented the rise of a united Pakistan after its split from India. Clashes between the different ethnic groups in the states of Pakistan are still prevalent with no resolution in sight (Behuria

and Sareen, 2015). The country is made up of primarily Punjabis (60%), Sindhis (14%), Pashtuns (13.5 %) and Baluchis (4.5%) (Marshall, 2019). Pakistan's constant religious and ethnic conflict has made the country ungovernable, with Islamabad having little control over the other states.

However, not all Muslims in Pakistan buy into the idea of a radical form of Islam or perceive that the West and non-Muslims are enemies. This was the attitude of the former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto, who was educated in the West and took over the leadership of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) when her father was assassinated (Simon and Schuster, 2008). Bhutto endeavoured to redefine the narrative of Islam and the way it was being presented by some political leaders as undemocratic and as a religion that could not coexist with other religions. She openly criticised terrorist leaders such as Osama bin Laden for what she termed was an "attempt to exploit, manipulate and militarize Islam" (Simon and Schuster, 2008: 101). In her book, she also highlighted the role of the US in undermining democracy in Iran in 1953, hence sowing the seeds of distrust among Muslims about the motivations of the West. Bhutto considered herself an advocate for democracy in Pakistan. She hoped to reconcile Muslims with the West, since she believed that extremism had no place in modern society (Bhutto, 2008). Her ideas of Islam were seen as a threat to the prevailing ideas of extremism and led to her assassination in 2007. Bhutto painted a different picture of Islam than the one that is often peddled by extremists and those who seek to use religion to promote their political interests. This picture is, therefore, rarely seen because those who promote democracy in Pakistan are often branded as enemies of Islam and are targeted and attacked.

The failing economic situation in Pakistan is impossible to ignore, but the country is unwilling to change its foreign policy towards India due to its deep hatred and long history of conflict (Behuria and Sareen, 2015). Improving relations between the two nations will definitely improve Pakistan's economy and South Asia's regional security. For this to happen, the political leadership's attitude and approach must alter. Pakistan appears to be obsessed with attacking India to the point that it has become a part of its character. However, it is possible that other elements or goals that are common to Pakistanis and that the nation wants to achieve can be a source of inspiration for the country to carve a new identity for itself. Hopefully, this new identity could transcend the differences that religion and culture

seem cultivate. It is also important to understand how post-independence Indo-Pakistani relations have evolved.

4.11 POST-INDEPENDENCE INDO-PAKISTANI RELATIONS

The relationship between India and Pakistan has been largely hostile with only rare positive interactions that were short-lived. The complexity of Indo-Pakistani relations has been largely influenced by history and different ideologies and religions. It is imperative to understand that these differences have contributed to the development of both states' identities post-independence. Talks and discussions on issues of contention, particularly Kashmir, have been taking place for decades and have seen the leaders of India and Pakistan come and go. Research highlights that Indo-Pakistani relations briefly improved in 1988 when Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi came into power in Pakistan and India respectively (Ashrat, 2015). On the one hand, Benazir Bhutto promoted the idea that Islam was, in fact, democratic, unlike the manner in which those pursuing radicalism depicted it (Simon and Schuster, 2008). On the other hand, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi championed the rhetoric of peace. Indo-Pakistani ties improved for more than a decade under the two leaders (Ashraf, 2015). A series of agreements were entered into to build confidence between the two states and avoid unnecessary conflict through military activities that infringed on each state's territory and airspace and the development of chemical weapons (Ashrat, 2015; Krepon, 1998). India conducted nuclear tests in May 1998, which concerned Pakistan, since it saw these activities as contrary to international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation and that nuclear weapons would most certainly be used against them (Hussain, 2005). In order to gain leverage, Pakistan launched its own nuclear programme. The then prime minister Nawaz Sharif declared that "as a sovereign state, Pakistan has every right to undertake steps for national defence and security" (Rizvi, 2001: 952).

Terrorists assaulted the Indian parliament in 2001 and the Indian government accused Pakistan of funding terrorist organisations (Ashraf, 2015). India also increased force deployments along the LoC and border and Pakistan did the same. This standoff lasted until December 2002, when both nations withdrew their forces and India's Prime Minister extended a hand of goodwill to Pakistan in April 2003. After that, a ceasefire was declared along the LoC in November 2003, triggering the composite conversation process in early 2004.

Through composite dialogue, issues, such as the Kashmir dispute, were identified and discussed. In 2005, Pakistan was struck by an earthquake and, in an effort to save lives, India and Pakistan agreed to open five particular locations along the LoC to allow civilians to relocate to less damaged regions in the Indian-controlled part of Kashmir (Pakistan-India Peace Process, 2006). There was some anticipation in political circles that these positive measures might lead to a peace process, until the Mumbai assault in December 2008. India demanded that Pakistan hand over the individuals that were guilty of the attack, to which Pakistan objected due to a lack of proof, but promised to help with the inquiry (Ahmad and Ebert, 2013). India showed little interest in resuming any peace dialogues and the Indian prime minister ignored invitations from the Pakistani government to visit Pakistan.

There is no denying the adverse elements in the Indo-Pakistani relations that have continued decades after the partitioning of colonial India. Although efforts to improve relations have been made through talks and discussions, they only managed to achieve short-term periods of peace. In most cases, dialogues and talks were marred by suspected terrorists from Pakistan and the whole peace process was derailed (Tankel, 2014). The government of Pakistan has always claimed to have no knowledge of the source of the attacks and that may very well be true. Having been described as being as a state with multiple states, the Pakistani government has little control over its states (Marshall, 2019). This implies that the agenda of the national government may not be aligned with that of its population, thus resulting in contrary action by militants against India. However, from the myriad of economic problems it is currently facing, it is clear that Pakistan cannot afford this continuous conflict. Although India is in a better position, it could benefit from a lower military budget that could rather be used for development and the betterment of its people.

4.12 INDIA-PAKISTAN PEACE PROCESS

Since 1947, territorial issues and conflicting state narratives have been a threat to the India-Pakistan peace process. India and Pakistan fought three wars in the first 25 years of their existence. The Kashmir issue was at the heart of their mutual hostility. Pakistan attempted to fulfil its goal of taking possession of the territory in 1947 by supporting a tribal invasion of Kashmir, which culminated in the 1947–48 Kashmir war. Pakistan attempted to achieve the same goal in 1965 and 1971 with 'Operation Gibraltar', but failed to take Kashmir from India. After these invasions, both India and Pakistan signed agreements, such as the

Tashkent Declaration (1966) and the Simla Agreement (1972), to establish peace in the region. The Indo-Pakistani relationship cannot be completed without highlighting the Simla Agreement, which serves as the foundation of ties between these two countries.

In September 1965, when the second Indo-Pakistani conflict broke out over Kashmir, the UN intervened to end the conflict, but the Security Council was unable to resolve the disagreements. The impasse gave a chance for the Soviet Union to mediate and both India and Pakistan accepted Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin's offer to stop the conflict (Cheema, 2016). As the two groups met in Tashkent in January 1966, Kosygin was successful in brokering a peace accord. From 4 to 10 January 1966, Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President Ayub Khan met. Kosygin kept out of the negotiations for the first two days, intervening only when he perceived the summit approaching a stalemate. He had separate meetings with both leaders and eventually settled their disagreements in an accord inked on 10 January 1966. Both India and Pakistan announced that "all military forces of the two nations shall be withdrawn not later than 25 February 1966, to positions held before 5 August 1965, and both shall follow the ceasefire terms on the ceasefire line."

The Simla Agreement outlines the essential criteria by which Indo-Pakistani interactions have been dealt with in the past, and it will hopefully also determine the parameters in future. The Simla Agreement required both parties to preserve the integrity of the LoC. The agreement was that no party would seek to unilaterally modify it, regardless of mutual disagreements and legal interpretations (Mustafa, 2014). The two countries agreed to respect each other's "territorial integrity and sovereignty" and to resolve disputes peacefully. The two countries also agreed, in line with the Charter of the United Nations (UN), that they would refrain from threatening or using force against one other's territorial integrity or political independence. In addition, New Delhi and Islamabad agreed that the LoC would be transformed into an international boundary in the future. Another key provision of the Simla Agreement was that both India and Pakistan pledged to settle their issues peacefully through bilateral discussions or any other peaceful measures mutually agreed upon by the two parties. While the Simla Agreement may be credited with keeping the two nations at peace for over two decades, that peace was shattered in 1989 by Pakistan's proxy war (Misra, 2007).

Since the signing of the Simla Agreement in 1972, relations between India and Pakistan have progressively worsened. The 1990s saw more negative highlights in Indo-Pakistani ties than the previous three decades. The senior leaders on both sides expressed their desire to continue discussions in the coming years. However, the climate between the two nations only became favourable for such an exercise in March 1997, when Pakistan and India conducted foreign secretary-level talks in New Delhi after a lengthy hiatus. In May 1997, Indian Prime Minister I.K. Gujral visited Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in the Maldives. The two concluded several agreements, including to free detainees in each other's nations, to establish a hotline between the two countries and, most crucially, to form a working group to resolve numerous lingering problems on which the two governments disagreed. The nuclear tests in May 1998 provided a new backdrop for the Indo-Pakistani engagement, which reached a new low (Sehgal, 2011). In the aftermath of the tests, Pakistan attempted to present the South Asian area as a nuclear flashpoint and heightened the Kashmir issue by connecting it to nuclear testing. The intense animosity and hostility between India and Pakistan after the nuclear tests did bring both parties to the understanding that things could not continue in the same manner indefinitely and that a meeting ground needed to be sought. Things began to improve again in September 1998, when Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee visited Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in New York. Foreign secretary-level discussions between India and Pakistan were agreed upon and a direct bus connection between Lahore and Delhi was suggested.

It is critical to consider the influence of nuclear testing on the process of communication between the two countries. In a climate of newly created tensions and suspicions in the aftermath of nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, both countries felt the need to talk to each other at sufficiently high levels to find a common ground and instil mutual confidence (Panda, 2016). The earliest opportunity available was at the SAARC Summit in Colombo, which took place in late July 1998. Both Prime Ministers Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif stated that they wanted to take advantage of the opportunity to meet on the side lines of the summit to have a candid exchange of views on the post-nuclear security situation and, if possible, agree on a framework for official level talks in the near future. The impasse in Indo-Pakistani ties was ultimately overcome at a meeting in New York during the UN General Assembly session in September 1998. It was decided that two foreign secretaries would meet in Islamabad in October 1998 to address Kashmir, peace and security and confidence-building measures,

followed by a series of talks in November 1998 to tackle the other six topics on the agenda. The New York summit also resolved to reinstate a telephone hotline between the two prime ministers and improve commerce and people-to-people communication. Furthermore, the railway link between Kokrapar (Pakistan) and Munnabo (Rajasthan, India) was to be resumed, a direct bus service between Delhi and Lahore was suggested, visa requirements were to be loosened and measures to reduce cross-border violence were to be implemented (Gilani, 1998).

The October rounds of negotiations in Islamabad yielded no significant breakthroughs, but they did provide a boost to the dialogue effort. India and Pakistan repeated their previously stated stances on Kashmir, but decided to reconvene and continue the conversation in the next round of talks between the two foreign secretaries. The Indian side suggested a no-first-use nuclear weapons policy, ensuring dependable communication lines and increased openness between the two countries (Alam, 2008). Both countries agreed to give early warning of missile tests with a range of more than 200 kilometers and to refrain from conducting military exercises within five kilometers of the border (Ashrat, 2016). The Pakistani side mentioned a nonaggression treaty, mutual nuclear and missile restraint, but did not commit to the no first-use policy. The November 1998 New Delhi round of discussions included six issues, namely the Tulbul navigation project, the Siachen Glacier, Sir Creek, commerce, terrorism and drug trafficking, and cultural relations. During the discussions, Pakistan rejected India's request for a ceasefire in Siachen, preferring to address the issue of military withdrawal from the area. India proposed that both parties form a 'bilateral monitoring system'. New Delhi did not agree with Pakistan's proposal of establishing an 'international monitoring mechanism' to supervise the ceasefire in the Siachen area (Kumar, 2000). The November round of talks became bogged down due to the usual accusations and counter-accusations hurled at each other, and the nations were unable to move beyond their stated positions.

There was some progress in the November discussions, as evidenced by several positive events. Both nations formed technical teams to discuss the delivery of excess electricity to India. India was considering several suggestions to minimise double taxation. India agreed to Pakistan's request to establish a system for rapid information flow on trade and investment. Pakistan committed to ensuring that visas were given to Indians within six weeks with no delays. Both countries agreed to establish a mechanism for regular meetings and the

exchange of operational information involving the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and the Federal Investigating Agency of Pakistan to provide expeditious assistance to each other in combating various types of crimes, such as currency counterfeiting and cybercrime (Misra, 1998).

Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee visited Lahore from 20 to 21 February on the first run of the Delhi-Lahore bus service, which was a watershed event in IndoPakistani ties. Both Nawaz Sharif and Vajpayee were more aware that improving ties between the two nations had to be a top priority. The momentum for Vajpayee's visit was created when both governments agreed to hold the cricket test series against right-wing opposition in both nations. In addition, the Jung Group of newspapers arranged that a team of Indian members of parliament (MPs) visit Islamabad for a parliamentarians' meeting, which did its fair share to foster trust between the people of India and Pakistan. The Lahore Summit resulted in the signing of the Lahore Declaration by the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India on 21 February 1999 (Ashraf, 2015). This process resulted in the release of a joint statement by India and Pakistan, evidenced by the signing of a memorandum of understanding by the Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan. Both the Lahore Declaration and the memorandum of understanding alluded to mutual commitment to the ideals of the UN Charter and the implementation of the Simla Agreement (Khan, 2007). At the conclusion of their summit, Prime Ministers Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif pledged a series of actions, including nuclear confidence-building measures, for the 'prevention of conflict' between the two countries. They also agreed that their respective governments reiterated their denunciation of terrorism and commitment to combat it. The two countries agreed to give each other early notice should they conduct ballistic missile flight tests. To reduce the possibility of bizarre nuclear mishaps, the two nations committed to notify each other immediately in the event of any 'accidental, unapproved or inexplicable occurrence' on either side. The level of bilateral discussions was elevated to that of foreign ministers and the composite conversation between the two nations was to be continued by foreign secretaries.

While expectations were high following the meeting, both parties were forced to return to reality, since Nawaz Sharif would not hastily change his stance on Kashmir. The events following Vajpayee's visit revealed the underlying inconsistencies in the

two countries' relations. Nawaz Sharif raised the Kashmir issue when he stated that Vajpayee had agreed with Islamabad on the Kashmiris' right to self-determination, but the Prime Minister's Office of India rejected this assertion. Again, in Dhaka, when Nawaz Sharif attended a conference, he declared that "a settlement of the Kashmir issue is necessary for attaining peace in nuclear-capable South Asia" (Kreopn and Sevak, 1995:95). While the Lahore process was the conclusion of Nawaz Sharif's attempts to elevate Indo-Pakistani ties to new heights, it is well known that the Pakistani army was already uneasy about the events and had been preparing the Kargil adventure in the meantime. In July 1999, it was reported that "highly placed sources indicate that the decision to take over the Kargil positions was made in October last year, and preparations began soon thereafter" (Misra, 2007: 519). In his piece, Afzal Mahmood wondered, "Why did Pakistan refuse to give the Lahore process a fair shot?" Pakistan had not given the process sufficient time or opportunity to demonstrate its usefulness as a dispute resolution tool. The state had first accepted the notion of bilateralism, lauded the Lahore process and taken satisfaction in ushering in a new chapter in Indo-Pakistani relations before embarking on a course of action that would lead to a conflict with India (Harsher, 2003). The enthusiasm generated by the Lahore Summit was completely dampened by Pakistan's actions in Kargil, signaling an unexpected deterioration in Indo-Pakistani ties.

4.12.1 Kargil War

In 1999, the Pakistan Army took the lead in the Kargil sector and launched the country's fourth war against India. Initially, Pakistan pretended that this was a continuation of the ongoing proxy war in other regions of Jammu and Kashmir (Sherwani, 1999). Regular soldiers of Pakistan infiltrated the Kargil territory with ambitious military goals of cutting off National Highway 1A, which connects Zojila to Kargil and Leh, isolating and capturing Turtuk, occupying part of the Indian territory south of the LoC, and reviving militancy in the valley, which had begun to dwindle following the Kashmir and Jammu Assembly and parliamentary elections. The first fog of war took a while to dissipate due to insufficient intelligence and poor monitoring at the local level. When the Indian military juggernaut got going, it did not take long to uncover Pakistani falsehoods, operational and strategic flaws and incorrect

assumptions about the Indian military. Despite a self-imposed national strategy of moderation and limiting the war to Kargil, the Indian armed forces rose to the challenge with a solid commitment and boldness that few imagined was feasible. In May 1999, Operation Vijay was begun with a well-coordinated politico-military plan.

Indian soldiers fared admirably, thanks to their commitment, excellent morale and superb junior leadership. The Indian forces' advance march on the mountain peaks of Kargil, one of the world's most challenging terrains, proved unstoppable, and Pakistani positions fell one after the other. India was able to defeat Pakistani soldiers on the ground and at its leisure. The Kargil conflict came as a considerable surprise to India, who saw it as a betrayal coming so soon after the Lahore Summit (Gupta, 2005). As in the crisis, nuclear clouds appeared to hover over the two states and intensified the tension in the region. Pakistan was believed to conduct a pre-emptive nuclear assault. This concern was heightened when Pakistan's foreign secretary, Shamshad Ahmed, hinted that the war might escalate to a nuclear exchange. Meanwhile, in the first week of July, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, under pressure from the US, vowed to restore the sanctity of the LoC in accordance with the 1972 Simla Agreement and to re-engage in the bilateral conversation that had begun in Lahore a few months before (Singh, 2009).

The Lahore Summit would have been one of the greatest achievements in the history of the peace process between India and Pakistan since 1947. However, the peace process failed due to the large-scale violence brought about by the Kargil war. It is clear that India could never completely trust Pakistan because of the state's underhanded tactics in attacking India. India has, therefore, been forced to take a hard line in its foreign policy against Pakistan by retaliating sufficiently to any forms of attack.

4.13 CONCLUSION

This chapter was a backward glance at the factors and events that shaped prevailing Indo-Pakistani relations. Initially, an analysis of India under colonial rule was conducted so as to give an understanding of how the religious tensions between the Hindu majority and Muslim minority began. The partitioning of British India into

three was also detailed in the chapter, and the resulting disputes between India and Pakistan that have been pitting them against each other for decades. The main territories of conflict were identified, namely the Jammu and Kashmir territory, Siachen Glacier and Sir Creek. All these territories are rich in natural resources, located at the boundaries of the two countries and strategically positioned to provide greater access to opportunities for the country that controls them. In addition, the geopolitics perspective, the Indian philosophy of the ongoing conflict and Pakistan's attitude and strategies were discussed and used to explain particular behaviour. Pakistan and India have a negative perception of each other. Therefore, they believe the worst about each other, which has led to a deep mistrust, making it difficult for agreements to be reached. The absence of a settlement of the Kashmir problem is the fundamental reason for the war that has lasted decades. Most other territorial issues are also connected to it. The Kashmir dispute is the primary cause of sporadic fighting along the LoC and is draining the military budgets of both countries post-independence. Pakistan is experiencing more difficulties in sustaining its economy and maintaining the illusion of unity among its states. India considers Pakistan as its most significant security threat. Therefore, its NSS is primarily informed by its relations with Pakistan. These relations have somewhat worsened over the last decade due to increasing attacks by Pakistan. Suspicion between the two states has deepened, thus decreasing the chance of a possible positive engagement.

CHAPTER FIVE

PRESENTATION OF DATA, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the analyses and discusses the findings concerning India's NSS and its application to Pakistan. The demographic information of the various research participants is provided first in this chapter. Thematic analysis is used to offer a thorough examination of the qualitative data obtained. The data analysis results are then presented in a logical pattern after a coding process using NVivo software. The emerging themes identified from the data are refined and grouped into main and subthemes before data from the semi-structured interviews are presented and discussed under each article. Finally, the study's conclusions are examined further under the theories of social constructivism and structural realism.

5.2 PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHY

Semi-structured interviews were held with three groups of participants, including defence attachés, national security specialists and senior military commanders who had undertaken security courses in India and Pakistan. All the participants had more than 20 years' experience in various national security sectors and had been involved in multiple capacities in the national security plans of India and Pakistan. The participants in the study were from different countries, particularly from the African continent. Twenty-five participants were interviewed, of whom four were from India, two from the Nigerian Armed Forces, one from the Kenyan Air Force and 18 from South Africa. The distribution of the participants' demographic data is shown in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1: Demographic distribution of research participants

Organisation	Designation	Country	Number
North West University, Stellenbosch University	Senior lecturers	South Africa	2
University of Zululand, University of Johannesburg and Accord Training Institution, University of Meerut, India	Professors	India, South Africa	4
Indian Armed Forces	Generals to major generals	India	2
Indian Civil Service	Post Master General	India	1
SANDF	Senior officers (lieutenant colonels to colonels) who studied in India)	South Africa	4
SANDF	Senior officers (majors to generals) who studied in Pakistan	South Africa	7
DIRCO	Defence attachés (colonels) to India and Pakistan	South Africa	2

Kenyan Air Force	Senior officer (colonel) who studied in India	Kenya	1
Nigerian Armed Forces	Defence attachés to India (commodore) and Pakistan (colonel)	Nigeria	2
Embassies	Diplomats		0
Total			25

5.3 THEMATIC ANALYSIS

Thematic analysis was employed to explore emergent patterns from the collected data. Transcribed information was initially edited and checked to guarantee correctness and precision by listening to the audio recordings again and fixing any errors in the transcriptions as soon as they were discovered. Then, using the NVivo program, a coding procedure was followed.

5.3.1 Coding of data

The purpose of this research was to investigate the presence and application of India's NSS in relation to Pakistan. The study drew on a sample of senior officials who had been in their jobs for at least five years and were familiar with India's NSS. The interview transcripts were captured on NVivo 12 (Qsrinternational.com, 2020) and then each interview transcript was methodically assessed and the relevant information coded into categories or nodes. The 26 research participants included in the study were named Participant 1 to Participant 26 in compliance with the ethical considerations for anonymity and privacy outlined in this study. As shown in Figure 5.2, there were 3 nodes and 12 child nodes that emerged from the data.

Figure 5.2: Nodes that served as bins during coding of interview transcripts

Nodes				
Name	Sources	References	Created On	
Implementation or Activation of India's National Security Strategy		23	127	16/10/20 19:03
Better Implementation of India's National Security Strategy		24	118	18/10/20 14:59
Exposing Pakistan's Terrorism Involvement		8	30	18/10/20 14:45
Reasons for Failed Implementation of India's National Security Strategy		13	37	18/10/20 15:53
Strong Border Security		21	63	18/10/20 14:47
Key Determining Factors of India's National Security Strategy		24	101	16/10/20 19:02
Border Disputes		19	41	18/10/20 14:37
Historical		12	29	18/10/20 14:27
Regional and International Influence		20	105	18/10/20 16:21
Survival of the Nation		20	80	18/10/20 16:05
Nature and Context of the Involvement of Military and Foreign Policy Elite		19	40	16/10/20 19:06
Activating India's National Security Strategy		9	13	16/10/20 19:13
Foreign Policy Elite Involvement		12	35	16/10/20 19:10
Making of India's National Security Strategy		18	50	16/10/20 19:12
Military Involvement		17	34	16/10/20 19:09

Source: Results from the NVivo coding showing 15 of these nodes or themes

After the coding process, the resulting nodes or themes that would help answer the research questions were identified and then refined. Refining these themes involved classification by combining similar themes or eliminating those with little or no data. The execution or activation of India's NSS, the major deciding elements of India's NSS and the nature and context of the military and policy elite's engagement in the creation of the security strategy were the three main themes that emerged from the coding process. The primary themes and sub-themes were then identified and data were analysed under each article.

5.3.2 Themes and sub-themes

To represent developing trends in the data, three primary themes and eight subthemes were generated from the data. These themes were each defined and the linkages between them clearly identified as shown in Table 5.3.

Table 5.3: Definitions of themes

Main themes	Sub-themes
1. Implementation of India's NSS This theme illustrates the activation or implementation of India's NSS	1.1 India's approach to national security This theme describes the approach used to implement the NSS in India 1.2 Exposing Pakistan's terrorist links This theme reveals how exposing Pakistan's terrorist links is a way of implementing India's NSS 1.3 Border security This theme outlines the importance of border security as a way of implementing India's NSS 1.4 Failures in India's NSS This theme highlights the failures of India's NSS and its implementation
2. Key determining factors of India's NSS This theme explores the main factors influencing the NSS in India	2.1 Historical events This theme describes historical events which contributed to India's NSS 2.2 Key national interests This theme describes how India seeks to protect its national interests through the NSS

	2.3 Regional and international influence and relations This theme highlights the relations between India and other states in shaping India's NSS
3. Role of the military and policy elite This theme explores the role that the military and policy elite play in India's NSS	3.1 Policy elite and the military in India's NSS This theme identifies the influence of the policy elite and military in the development and activation of the NSS

The qualitative data from the study was presented, analysed and discussed under each theme.

5.4 PRESENTATION OF DATA AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

In this section, data is presented according to the respective themes outlined in Table 5.3 and then discussed in greater detail with the findings from other literature used in comparison.

5.4.1 Implementation of India's NSS

The main theme was the implementation of India's NSS. The sub-themes included India's approach to national security, exposing Pakistan's terrorist links and national interests and failures in India's NSS.

5.4.1.1 India's approach to national security

Participants described India's NSS as being founded on a combination of economic and political elements. These elements include India's non-alignment policy, relationships with neighbouring countries, the protection of India's national sovereignty and territorial integrity and specific security incidences. According to Participant 1, the non-alignment strategy of India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, helped the country and secured a good relationship with both the US and the Soviet Union. India's non-alignment policy, implemented after independence in 1947, was a plan to increase the country's autonomy (Pant and Super, 2015). Although India has continued to maintain the posture of non-alignment in theory, realistically, the country has been gradually shifting towards alliances with western countries, such as the US, that have similar democracies (Pant and Super, 2015). In international politics, alliances, no matter how subtle, are critical in forming strategic relationships that strengthen a country's defence. Participant 1 also stated that nations with which India has had historical and ongoing conflict played a significant role in defining the country's NSS. Kashmir has been a significant source of conflict between India and Pakistan since their partition in 1947, as both nations claimed it (Rid, 2012). Both countries failed to reach an amicable resolution with regard to the Kashmir region and border and increased the presence of the military and overall weaponry along the border (Rid, 2012). Owing to the fact that India's security strategy has not been articulated or publicised, participants could only analyse it using the government's actions and responses to specific security occurrences.

Participants highlighted that the country's security issues were reflected in the increasing military modernisation and rising budget, maritime security and nuclear advancement. Studies purport that, although India's defence budget has been steadily increasing, it has been spending more on human resources since the mid-2000s, that is, pensions and salaries, than on modernising the military (Mason, 2016). Participant 2 noted that, although India had invested a substantial amount of money in its nuclear programme, it subsequently adopted a nuclear non-deterrence no-first-use policy. This defensive stance suggests that India is more concerned about defending its territory and national interests than attacking other nations. Participants emphasised

that both India and Pakistan were spending a lot of money on the military budget at the cost of addressing issues of poverty.

According to Participant 3: "Now Pakistan has received millions of dollars of military equipment and aid over the years from its maiden patrons. Much of it was employed for conflicts with India and response to incidences in Kashmir."

It is estimated that India spends about 4% of its military budget on nuclear weapons, whereas Pakistan spends an estimated 10% of its defence budget on nuclear weapons (Mason, 2016). Yet, Pakistan, a significantly smaller country that has been struggling to maintain sustainable economic growth since its inception, still competes with India in terms of artillery and nuclear capabilities (Behuria and Sareen, 2012). Between 2002 and 2015, 21% of Pakistan's defence budget came from US military aid, but this has since been reduced to less than 11% (Mason, 2016). The level of spending by India and Pakistan is directly proportional to the countries' perception of a security threat (Mason, 2016). The ability to cause substantial damage to India definitely influences India's security strategy against Pakistan. However, Participant 5 was of the opinion that India's nuclear weapons were initially aimed at elevating India to the rank of global nuclear power. India may have seen the necessity for this programme due to China's emergence as a superpower. China has also been modernising its military capabilities and expanding its influence and presence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean area (Singh and Dahiya, 2012). Although China's objectives are unclear, its relationship with India has been tainted by a series of conflicts along the Sino-Indian border, a general lack of trust and China's attempt to gain an advantage in the two countries' commercial connections (Singh and Dahiya, 2012).

5.4.1.2 Exposing Pakistan's terrorist links

Previously, the participants in the study described India's NSS as having been crafted as a result of the country's relationships with its neighbours, particularly Pakistan. Pakistan has launched a number of terrorist attacks against India. However, the Pakistani government claims to have had no hand in them. According to the participants in this study, exposing Pakistan's links with terrorists justifies India's

security stance towards the country. It is also a strategy that is factored into the NSS to discredit Pakistan. The participants stated that India is apprehensive about terrorist organisations operating in India under the pretext of fighting for the people of Pakistan. Participant 6 noted that Pakistan is using terrorism as a form of warfare against India, since the country has been battling terrorism for the past three decades. He mentioned that India had the right to defend its territory from terrorist groups by striking identified and confirmed terrorist camps within Pakistan. In addition, the undermentioned participants noted the following:

- Participant 1: "Okay, we have always seen Pakistan as a hostile nation working against the interest of India by harbouring terrorists, attacking India's interest anywhere in the world. So invariably what we have done is of course to expose Pakistan in various... That is one strategy, exposing Pakistan"
- Participant 6: "Terrorism poses the greatest threat to India because unlike any other country... Terrorism is being used by Pakistan as a kind of asymmetric warfare against India. For more than three decades, India has fought cross-border terrorism with little success."
- Participant 8: "... I think after the Mumbai attacks... in 2008... also with a lot of sympathy from the world, and they use this whole issue of terrorism to justify their approach to Pakistan..."
- Participant 23: "... the issue of terrorism, is what makes India not to improve its diplomatic relations with Pakistan because Pakistan is perceived as a country assisting terrorist that are the biggest threat to India."

The harbouring of terrorists by Pakistan is of great concern to India because such groups are generally elusive and nearly impossible to prosecute. Research posits that Pakistan is a country founded on the commonality of the Islamic religion and little else (Nasr, 1994). The quest to make Pakistan an Islamic state has dominated the country's

political arena. Political incumbents frequently use Islam to achieve political agendas and serve personal interests (Mukherjee, 2010a). This situation ultimately gave birth to Islamism, a volatile version of Islam that perceives western countries, non-Muslims and Muslims not aligned with extremism as perpetual enemies, hence promoting constant conflict with them (Mukherjee, 2010a). The historical split of Pakistan and India and the ongoing Kashmir border dispute has aggravated the negative relations between the two states, thus making India a prime target of Islamic terrorist attacks. Some academics contend that Pakistan's ruling class, particularly the military, is exploiting Islam and the country's strained relationship with India to divert public attention from poor administration and decision-making (Behuria and Sareen, 2012). Pakistan is experiencing a myriad of socio-economic and political problems, yet it is relentlessly focused on its neighbour and rival, India (Behuria and Sareen, 2012). The issue of terrorist attacks in India has further contributed to the degenerating relationship with Pakistan and impacted on the stability of South Asia.

Furthermore, the terror attacks against India have helped to foster the country's relationship with the US. As explained by D'Souza (2011), the development of the India-US relationship may be the product of various factors, such as the willingness to ensure that India is capable of fighting terrorism and influencing BRICS economies and the deterrence of China's military power. Another factor could be that it is part of India's grand strategy. Whatever the reasons are for the development of the India-US relationship, they all have an impact on the Indo-Pakistani relationship. Pakistan views the India-US relationship with suspicion or as a conspiracy against the country. However, since all of these wars have occurred, there has been little sign that India is attempting to articulate a national security policy to increase its power or defend its population. It is evident that the perception of the threat presented by alliances with other nations, notably Pakistan, has a significant impact on Indo-Chinese and India US ties.

India and Pakistan's relationships with regional and international countries are characterised by which country these states support or are aligned with. India's strategic engagement with Afghanistan is an example of soft power diplomacy (D'Souza, 2011). The primary concern is the creation of a pluralist democratic political

order and socio-economic reconstruction in the hope that these will contain terrorism and promote Afghanistan's regional economic integration. However, whether such aims can be realised without any form of military engagement remains to be seen. The different views of Delhi and Islamabad imply the possibility that either India or Pakistan could use Afghanistan as a location for the one to conduct a substitute campaign against the other (Hicks et al., 2016). The Pakistani security believes that close associations between their intelligence services and the tribes straddling the Afghanistan-Pakistan border guarantees the country support in the event that it needs to respond to an Indian invasion (Hicks et al., 2016). Conversely, India seeks to prevent Pakistan from gaining leverage in Afghanistan and possibly using the country for terrorist activities against India (Ganguly and Howenstein, 2009).

5.4.1.3 Border security

This study found that India generally has good relationships with a number of neighbouring countries, such as Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Myanmar. Participants highlighted that India has border disputes with China on the western border and Pakistan on the north-eastern side. A strategy for implementing India's NSS is to ensure that these borders are secure. According to Participant 2, India is experiencing external threats mainly from Pakistan. Consequently, it needs to develop anti-terrorism mechanisms to deter such attacks. He stated that such mechanisms included denying Pakistani insurgents' movement into India across the borders and having the ability to defeat the Pakistani Army, should it move into Indian territory. Participant 8, who worked as a defence attaché in Pakistan, stated that India's NSS was completely dominated by the threat posed by Pakistan. He noted that India had used the Cold Start doctrine as a military strategy. Instead of centralising military resources, units were located at the borders for quick and easy deployment. According to Participant 8, this concept also involved dismantling battle groups into smaller groups, which allowed them to move quickly in the event of an attack by Pakistan. This approach was used to enhance security along the disputed Kashmir border. Furthermore, the undermentioned participants noted the following:

- Participant 2: "They have got to have active anti-terrorism mechanisms in a military context, they have got to have a capability to deter anything from Pakistan, to deny Pakistan any cross-border movement into the territory, and should that happen, to have the ability to defeat them. So, to deny, deter and defeat in terms of their National Security Strategy on Pakistan. It is to deny Pakistan the ability to cross the line of control or to actively engage India."
- Participant 5: "I think is the territorial borders, India has had wars generally with both Pakistan and China in the East, so your National Security Strategy has to undertake tensions and conflicts, even as we speak there are major disruptions between the Chinese and the Indians ... The fact that India has gone to war with both Pakistan and China informs national security strategy."
- Participant 8: "India's focus in terms of the cold start doctrine is not a nuclear one it is a conventional one. It is a conventional one using infantry, using the mechanized units and some air support but instead of centralizing all of the resources in the middle of India they have moved resources towards the border areas especially towards the East of Pakistan such that if there's a need to attack Pakistan it can be done within a period of 72 hours. They further looked at the battle groups and initially they were looking to have three very big battle groups. They broke these battle groups up into around 8 - 9 smaller battlegroups who can move much quicker."

5.4.1.4 Failure of India's NSS

Some participants were of the opinion that the implementation of the prevailing security strategy in India had failed. Participant 2 highlighted that India's socioeconomic challenges, such as the abject poverty and poor living conditions of millions of Indians, limited the budget allocations for military equipment. As a result of the reduced availability of financial resources for the military, gaps in the purchase

of new equipment and the updating of old and obsolete equipment occurred and limited the country's capacity to protect itself against attacks. This participant also mentioned that India incurred a high expenditure to acquire military equipment; therefore, it would rather purchase military equipment locally than depend on foreign manufacturers. These sentiments regarding India's military spending are congruent with the findings of the study by Mason (2016) that assessed India's military expenditure and found that expenditure on military modernisation was relatively low in comparison with expenditure on human resources. According to Mason (2016: 9), this pattern of spending had "negative implications for the country's readiness, procurements and military posture."

India has a population of approximately 300 million people below the poverty line and the rich-poor divide is growing (Stuenkel, 2012). In the last few decades, the country's economic progress has not translated into better living circumstances for India's impoverished populations, which essentially live in rural regions. The dire situation has led to some insurgency groups branding the government as the greatest threat to the Indian people (Stuenkel, 2012). Food and water security is just as essential to safeguard national security as the other aspects of maintaining the national sovereignty of a state, if not more so. India's NSS seems to emphasise the importance of the military to protect the state's national interests through its budget allocation. A political scholar, Rid (2012), purports that the Kashmir border dispute is constantly diverting resources and the policy makers' attention from more pressing issues and reducing the capacity and impact of the Indian Army domestically and regionally.

The participants also considered the reactionary nature of India's NSS due to attacks by its neighbours as a major failure. Participants indicated that the fear that Pakistan would launch a nuclear attack has dissuaded India from acting more decisively against Pakistan. According to these participants, India rather chose to hinder trade between the two countries by imposing extremely high tariffs on goods from Pakistan. The lack of a distinct security strategy in India was said to also contribute to the failure to implement the NSS because the country lacks clear protocols on how to respond to attacks by other countries. In addition, participants

stated that the development of India's security strategies mainly involved political leaders and lacked inputs from the military, which resulted in its failure to fulfil the security mandate by exerting force. Furthermore, the undermentioned participants noted the following:

- Participant 3: "National Security cannot be confined to the use of the state's cohesive power to overcome domestic and external threats. So, India's National Security policy has largely been limited to dealing with specific related security episodes and that too often with its immediate neighbours... For over three decades, India has fought cross-border terrorism with little success. Fear of Pakistani nuclear escalation has typically limited successive Indian administrations' ability to respond to specific acts. So, India's National security landscape is not paralysed..."
- Participant 5: "Pakistan and India do not have sufficient resources for their people... I found that they were imposing 200% on trade goods and other services from Pakistan completely shutting down Pakistan from normally engaging with India as it were. Of course, with more than one billion people in India they have sufficient market internally to be able to trade, but certainly in terms of national security strategy if you impose 200% on your neighbour that is actually in undeclared almost war situation because it does not reflect that you want free trade or congestive trade that everybody gets a win-win."
- Participant 7: "India does not have a well distinct or well-structured national security document. It is the only country that has released a nuclear doctrine without having a clear or convincing security strategy. Just mention an example General, there is no agreement on how to treat or deal with challenges from Pakistan and India."

- Participant 9: "As far as India is concerned, in India, national security making is majorly is primarily a task of political leadership. A task of the ministers, so when India was ruled by polygonal Nehru as its first Prime Minister at that time Nehru's idealism did not allow India to adopt a policy of having a strong military, a strong defense preparedness and India paid the heavy price by losing war with China."

According to the findings, probable explanations for India's failure to implement its NSS include a lack of a defined implementation strategy and a military capacity gap in terms of equipment. Furthermore, the country has faced terrorism threats by neighbouring Pakistan for decades. Scholars such as Pant and Super (2016) believe that India's strategy is reactive and lacks the initiative required to act aggressively and exert sufficient influence to discourage Pakistan from launching occasional strikes. However, the previous Indian defence secretary confirmed the existence of a strategic doctrine, but confessed that it had not been written down or published and that the administration was opposed to the publication of a separate document (Hooda, 2019). Theorists who believe that India lacks a formalised security strategy that results in a suitable reaction mechanism and punishment plan (Pradeep, 2019; Sridharan, 2005) raise crucial issues about the drivers of the Indian security strategy (ISS). They claim that India's principal foreign policy issue is the lack of a cohesive NSS, foreign policy disputes and the deployment of often-contradictory national objectives (Thakur, 1997; Pant, 2009). Over the previous two decades, India's military spending has more than quadrupled to more than US\$70 billion. However, the country's expenditure as a percentage of GDP has fallen from 3% to 2.4% over the last 20 years (SIPRI, 2020).

5.4.2 Key determining factors of India's NSS

5.4.2.1 Historical events

The participants in this study cited historical events that occurred after India gained independence from British colonial authority in 1947 as one of the critical drivers of the creation of India's NSS. According to Participant 1, India's non-alignment policy, implemented shortly after independence, was part of the security strategy that guaranteed that the country would not be affiliated with either the US or the Soviet

Union in the Cold War. He highlighted that this policy changed when India was attacked by the Chinese in 1962 and the Soviets became India's military hardware suppliers. Participant 2 stated that, as a result of its non-alignment strategy, India presently enjoys strong relations with both the US and the Soviet Union and only has problematic relations with Pakistan and China, primarily owing to border issues. Political analysts concur that Nehru's non-alignment policy has served India well because it has asserted the country as an independent state (Stuenkel, 2012). It was of paramount importance for India to eliminate any potential for interference in its affairs soon after its independence from British colonial rule. By adopting a non-alliance stance, India was specifically stating it would not meddle in other nations' issues and expected the same courtesy from other states. According to Stuenkel (2012), India had to adopt a more realistic orientation during the 1960s, as it was forced to form alliances with the former USSR and the US for weapons to fight the Chinese. India still uses its non-alignment policy in instances whenever the government feels that it would protect national interests by not aligning with any country. In the past, the policy has helped India to avoid complications and entanglements emerging from some alliances, although it has hindered the scope of its security strategy (Pant and Super, 2016).

According to Participant 3, Pakistan's split from India in 1947 fostered conflict between the two states, resulting in two major wars in 1965 and 1971, and major attacks by Pakistan over the Kashmir region in 1948, 1999 and 2000. He also stated that state-sponsored terrorism and consistent attacks by Pakistan over the decades had greatly contributed to India's defensive NSS. Furthermore, he was of the opinion that Pakistan's nuclear progress increased India's anxiety and was most likely why the state did not respond to the significant terrorist attacks on its parliament in 2001 and Mumbai in 2008, as it feared that Pakistan would use nuclear weapons against the country. Participant 12 reiterated that India's NSS was fundamentally based on two major threats emanating from the Pakistan and China border disputes. India and Pakistan are at odds about Kashmir and, despite their nuclear weapons and competing military might, they have been unable to reach an agreement (Rid, 2012). Neither country is willing to compromise on the Kashmir issue. India's claim is founded on the accession by Hari Singh, a Dogra ruler, whereas Pakistan's claim is based on the fact that the Kashmir population is primarily Muslim; therefore, it should fall under Pakistan

(Rid, 2012). This philosophy is founded on the reality that Pakistan was separated from India in 1947 on religious grounds and that Muslims and Hindus were divided (Mukherjee, 2010). India has had to defend its territory from its neighbours since independence. As the threats continue to unfold, the country's security strategy evolves in response in order to protect India's national interests.

5.4.2.2 National interests

Countries have different national interests, depending on what they perceive to be most important to them. Participant 10 mentioned that the main element that informs India's NSS is the protection of its national interests. He also stated that, based on previous experiences with Pakistan, the use of force would be required to safeguard India's national interests. Owing to the fact that India's immediate neighbours pose the greatest danger to the country, the disputed boundaries have become regions of critical national concern. Participant 2 emphasised that, unless India and Pakistan settle the Kashmir problem, the war between the two nations will continue. Territorial disputes are a threat to the sovereignty of states because they not only involve large tracts of land, but also resources that may have economic, social and religious significance in this case.

Enhancing border security has also become essential in the implementation of India's NSS to deter terrorist attacks by Pakistan. Pakistan harbours terrorist groups that have been infiltrating India's territory, which poses a threat to India's national security. India uses two styles of counterterrorism actions to secure the country's borders (Kaura, 2017). Firstly, criminal justice counterterrorism, which deals with acts of terrorism in a law-execution context and, secondly, militaristic counterterrorism, which perceives terrorism as a danger to national security and that the military has to opposed (Kaura, 2017). India is faced with increasing insurgencies by Pakistan over the Kashmir border dispute. In most cases, the conflict is neutralised by the conventional military force and this has impacted on Pakistan's security strategy and forced discussions between the two countries (Sinha, 2015). Practical application of interventionist thinking is also evident in India's impasse with Nepal on the trade treaty and its refusal to sign the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) in 1971

to be part of a united security force in South Asia. These examples can be attributed to India's non-alignment policy, which is also deemed to be a security strategy.

5.4.2.3 Regional and international influence and relations

In order to reach its goals of economic growth and national security, India seeks to acquire the potential to influence other states in South Asia and throughout the world by creating strategic partnerships with them. Participant 2 in the study highlighted that India sought to enhance its economic development by increasing cooperation not only with its immediate neighbours in South Asia, but also the Middle East, Asia and Africa. He also stated that India was attempting to gain economic and political power while maintaining national sovereignty and territorial integrity in order to drive the country to actively participate in the United Nations Security Council on a global scale. According to Participant 12, India's foreign policy is inextricably linked to its NSS, as the nation aims to isolate Pakistan diplomatically to dissuade it from invading India. He argued that India had attempted to reduce US support for Pakistan, even though the India-US collaboration has flourished because of the democratic nature of the two countries.

These relationships are further complicated by the negative context of the historical and current relationship between the US and China, both of which have cordial relations with Pakistan. The frosty relationship between India and China can partly be attributed to the border dispute and partly to both countries' ambitions to become superpowers (Stuenkel, 2012). Both countries have increasingly begun claiming territories that belong to the other and strengthening ties with each other's enemies, for example, China and Pakistan, while India is fostering closer ties with Australia, the US and Japan (Stuenkel, 2012).

Participant 13 stated that the US has transactional agreements with India, a key supplier of military equipment, and Pakistan in order to discourage it from harbouring Afghan rebels who are now at war with the US. India's relationships with other nations are important for the success of the country's domestic, regional and international ambitions. India inherently identifies as a democracy, hence its ability to develop

strong ties with the US since 2000, when the US decided to support India's position in the Kargil conflict (Hicks et al., 2016).

The results of the study show that regional and international influence is a key determining factor of India's NSS. India has to consider its economic development while implementing its NSS. According to Naazer (2018), India's policy regarding South Asia has been motivated by power and security considerations from the onset. Since its establishment, the country has pushed for a dominant role in the region. In addition, India's security strategy against Pakistan and China was a major concern in relation to the conciliatory doctrine in the mid-1990s. The importance of this way of thinking was that India would have to improve relationships with immediate neighbours and commit to assisting them in times of crisis. The above-mentioned doctrine necessitated a completely different NSS to be applied in a way that was mutually exclusive and brought about more changes than expected. The problem would arise when there were two different security strategies, leading to a mismatch between the two countries' objectives and interests. It is, therefore, difficult to determine whether India has an NSS that could be aimed at Pakistan, since there are no separate documents that have been published by government on strategic policy.

5.4.3 Role of the military and policy elite

5.4.3.1 Policy elite and the military in India's NSS

The military and the policy elite have different roles in the development and implementation of India's NSS. Participant 6 speculated that India's NSS did indeed exist, although the articulated version was only available to the ruling party. He insisted that the security strategy was not made available, so that the ruling party could manipulate it to serve its interests in any crisis that the country faced. According to Participant 6, having a non-articulated NSS ensured that the military had access to more resources by emphasising the conflicts with Pakistan and China. The lack of an official strategy also allows the political leadership of India to make national security decisions and draft military budgets without accountability. Military developments in India will have ramifications for the South Asia region and internationally. A state's

defence budget is an indication of its military might, and India's defence budget has consistently increased since the mid-1990s in accordance with the country's GDP (Mason, 2016). In 2015, India's defence budget was a massive US\$ 51 billion, which placed the country in sixth place internationally and accounted for approximately 3% of the global defence spending (Mason, 2016; SIPRI, 2016).

Participant 12 was of the opinion that the political elite had a greater influence on India's NSS than the military. He indicated that the political elite and the military worked together, but when there were disagreements, the political position took precedence, particularly in the current government. Participant 13 stated that the military had the responsibility to protect India's sovereignty, which was under threat due to territorial disputes, whereas political leaders had the mandate to support the military in implementing the NSS. However, Participant 1 emphasised that the military was subordinate to the political system and thus did not play any role in policymaking. This finding is typical of a thriving democracy where the military's powers are limited by the political leadership (Mukherjee, 2010b). This situation is different from that of Pakistan where the military is the primary power that dictates the security strategy and foreign policy of the state and the political government has a negligible influence (Behuria and Sareen, 2016). The findings indicate that India's NSS is controlled by foreign policy elites rather than the military. In democratic states, the government that has been voted in by the people usually makes decisions that will enhance the security of the state while it protects its national interests, whereas the military has limited influence on NSS issues, given its expertise and knowledge. The fear of being overthrown by the military is perceived as the reason why civil authority is reluctant to commit sufficiently to increased military power.

5.5 INDIA AND PAKISTAN RELATIONS

The findings of this study show that the Indo-Pakistani relationship aligns with both the social constructivism and the structural realism theories. India and Pakistan share a complex and unpleasant history that has contributed to their current identities. This study found that the historical differences that caused the separation of India and Pakistan still persist today. In 1947, the two countries were separated on religious grounds. The Muslims created Pakistan and the Hindu majority remained in India.

Before India became independent from British colonial rule, the cracks in the relationship between the Hindu majority and the Muslim minority had already become evident, as Muslims felt underrepresented in the government (Mukherjee, 2010a). The outcomes of this study support the social constructivism theory's notion that the way in which a state perceives itself in the international environment influences how it behaves or reacts to changing circumstances. Pakistan considers itself as a Muslim country with ideologies of Islamism or as a country evolving into an Islamist state dominating political narratives and agendas (Mukherjee, 2010b). Its alignment with Islamism, an extreme form of Islam that is often linked to terrorist activities and promotes conflict with non-Muslims, has resulted in Pakistan frequently attacking India since its formation in 1947. Pakistan has consequently evolved into an autocratic state prone to military dictatorships (Mukherjee, 2010a). Pakistan perceives India as an enemy because of the Kashmir territory that has a population that happens to be largely Muslim. Pakistan's policy elite have defined the state in opposition to India and scholars have criticised the nation for failing to carve an identity based on territorial or political beliefs (Buharia and Saneed, 2016). In contrast, India has established itself as a democracy, pursuing economic growth and strategic bilateral partnerships with other nations to secure external assistance in tough times.

Since its independence, India's identity has evolved to an extent as a result of the challenges and threats the state has faced over the decades. Initially, India adopted a non-alignment policy meant to fortify its autonomy and help the country concentrate on building the economy (Pant and Super, 2016). India's political leaders understood that the biggest threat to the new democracy would be conflict with another state and, at that time, the newly formed Pakistan was its biggest threat (Smith, 1994). Non-alignment guaranteed India's security and Nehru believed that it was a prerequisite for peace (Raju, 1979). Non-alignment was, therefore, a security strategy, which simultaneously informed India's foreign policy. The 1962 war with China forced India to seek assistance in shaking the very roots of non-alignment. Therefore, according to the social constructivism theory, the manner in which India identified itself as non-aligned, had implications on its ability to deal with external threats.

India's pursuit of superpower status and the increasing military budgets of both India and Pakistan appropriately align with the structural realism theory, which states that nations are in constant pursuit of economic, military and political power. The theory assumes that states will form alliances with other states that they believe will help them to achieve this quest. Both India and Pakistan have formed alliances that have been instrumental in supplying military weapons and equipment and also providing financial aid to strengthen their military positions in the ongoing conflict (Pant and Super, 2016). India's defence budget has been increasing since the 1990s, making the country one of the top spenders on weaponry in the world. This growth correlates to an extent with the economic growth of the country (Mason, 2016). The percentage of Pakistan's defence budget is higher than that of India's, yet the country has no sustainable economy of its own and depends on aid from the US and China. The military is Pakistan's most powerful organ; therefore, it gets the greatest budgetary allowance at any cost. Although Pakistan is experiencing serious socioeconomic and political challenges, military funding is still highly prioritised (Behuria and Sareen, 2016).

Furthermore, as the structural realist theory implies, India's ambitions to become a more active member of the UN have seen it align and create alliances with other major powers, such as the US and Australia.

5.6 CONCLUSION

This chapter offered an examination of India's NSS in an attempt to clearly define India's NSS against Pakistan. This chapter reported on, analysed and discussed the findings of the research inquiry. Firstly, the demographic data of the numerous research participants were provided, revealing that the participants came from a variety of institutions and nations, all of which are currently or were formerly involved in the Indian or Pakistani narrative in various roles. Secondly, data was coded with NVivo software, resulting in the creation of nodes or themes. These topics were then developed, divided into primary themes and sub-themes, and defined. The qualitative data from the various participants were analysed under each theme.

The participants in the study posited that India had an NSS, but that it had not been made public, possibly as a strategy by the government. The NSS was described as being basically founded on India's two main threats and neighbours, namely Pakistan and China. India's security strategy was also described as reactionary and defensive due to India's roots as a democracy. Factors such as historical events, the protection of national interests and regional and international relationships with other states were identified as the major factors influencing India's NSS. In addition, the policy elite were found to have a more distinguished role than the military in policymaking and developing a security strategy. Participants indicated that the military had limited influence on the NSS, as it was subject to the Indian government.

CHAPTER SIX

SECURITY CHALLENGES BETWEEN 2005 AND 2015

6.1 INTRODUCTION

India and Pakistan are neighbours that are historically intertwined as a result of historical events that have largely been a consequence of differences in religion since their independence in 1947. These historical events have been fundamental to the development of the multi-faceted conflict that ensued between India and Pakistan soon after their independence. The demarcation of Jammu and Kashmir was the initial factor that triggered the Pakistani attack on India and resulted in the first war in 1948. Kashmir is primarily Muslim; therefore, Pakistan believes that it has a legitimate claim to it, since the two countries were separated along religious lines in the first place. However, Kashmir acceding to India became problematic for Pakistan and led to the LoC being drawn, which essentially split the territory in half. Since then, the IndoPakistani conflict has also been fuelled by other territorial and natural resource disputes resulting in three wars, border skirmishes and many terrorist attacks, thus preventing the de-escalation of the conflict. These historical events have shaped the current NSS of India, given that they pose a significant threat to the country.

The challenges and key factors that prevent the de-escalation of the conflict between 2005 and 2015 are provided in this chapter. The de-escalation of the Indo Pakistan conflict has not fully manifested due to certain attitudes and events emanating from both states' identities and their relationships with other regional and international countries. Historical religious differences cannot be discounted as a key factor driving the conflict during this period because current Islamic terrorist threats by Pakistan still have religious connotations. In this chapter, previous events, such as wars and skirmishes between India and Pakistan, and how they have maintained the momentum of the conflict and an atmosphere of distrust, will be highlighted and discussed. The state models of India and Pakistan and how they hinder the de-escalation of conflict will be discussed in depth. Furthermore, the significance of religion in the war and Pakistan's assessment of the threat presented by India's

hegemony in South Asia will be discussed. Finally, both nations' regional and international effects will be evaluated and analysed.

6.2 UNRESOLVED STATE DISPUTES

Since India's independence in 1947, many domestic and external challenges have kept the Indo-Pakistani war from de-escalating. India's external obstacles have primarily come from two of its neighbours, namely Pakistan and China. Various conflicts between India and Pakistan have contributed substantially to their ongoing conflict.

One of the main reasons why the India-Pakistan conflict has continued is because the main dispute between the two states has still not been resolved. The Kashmir territory remains the basis of the conflict. Neither state is willing to compromise its current position (Yaseen, Jathol and Muzaffar, 2016). The two countries were founded in war, since the 1947 subcontinental division did not entirely resolve the demarcation and delineation of the contested Kashmir area. Jammu and Kashmir were autonomous princely republics. Pakistan anticipated that it would annex these republics because they had a predominantly Muslim population. When the ruler of Kashmir acceded to India, Pakistan objected on irredentist grounds that the majority of the population impacted by this choice was Muslim. India was hesitant to give up the section of Kashmir it held, believing that doing so would amount to a second religious split of the subcontinent. India's behaviour is not unusual in young, multi-ethnic governments that are apprehensive of territorial compromises to consolidate their hard-won independence and territorial integrity. India is concerned that surrendering some area to an adversary or allowing it to become independent may lead to the state's disintegration (Wojczewski, 2014).

The Indian political class also believes that surrendering Kashmir will encourage other subnational movements in different regions of the country to come up with similar demands. This assumption holds true because some sub-states in the northeastern parts of India have been advocating for independence, resulting in the country using a multipronged approach to peace talks, negotiations and counter-insurgency tasks teams (Kumar, 2013). The response strategies have, however, not

always been of this nature. Since the independence of the state in 1947, the north-eastern part of the country has been fraught with separatist insurgencies, ethnic clashes and rather forceful responses by the Indian government, leading to a loss of life (Bhaumik, 2007).

In the past, Indian intelligence agencies encouraged clashes between rival rebel groups in a bid to weaken and control them (Bhaumik, 2007). During colonisation, the British government generally did not interfere with the north-east, although this changed after independence when the new government wanted to incorporate the primarily Mongoloid region in a nation-building programme (Bhaumik, 2007). The Indian government identified the Naxalite-Maoist insurgent faction affecting large parts of India as the most serious internal security threat to the country (Stuenkel, 2014). The Indian government's concern is largely because dealing with insurgencies in different parts of the country undermines its ability to promote economic growth, as it is forced to channel resources towards these sources of unrest (Tinkel 2014). Inequality and uneven economic growth have also been highlighted as factors contributing to the continued presence of insurgencies (Justino, 2015). Low economic development and poor service delivery have resulted in protests that have led to injury and death. India is greatly diverse in terms of ethnic and religious groups; these have also been a source of violent clashes (Stuenkel, 2014). A combination of violence by security and rebel forces, ethnic cleansing and massacres have caused a significant displacement of people in the region. To contain these insurgencies, the Indian government enforces laws that infringe on the democracy of the local communities. These laws are, therefore, largely unpopular (Bhaumik, 2007). Also, insurgencies cause instability in India and stretches the armed forces to the limit, particularly because they have to be visibly present along the disputed borders.

Kashmir is of great importance to India and Pakistan because of its geographical location, natural resources and the link to both states' national identity (Marshall, 2019). India and Pakistan seem unwilling to find common ground on the Kashmir issue, which would ensure peace and stability on the South Asian subcontinent. The lack of commonality between the states reflects different ideologies, beliefs and interests, yet Kashmir is special to both because it reflects their identities, hence their fierce refusal to compromise on it. The conflict over Kashmir has degenerated into a

security threat to South Asia and negatively impacted on Indo-Pakistani bilateral relations by perpetuating suspicion and distrust (Singh and Dahiya, 2012; Korbelt, 1966). Although Kashmir is predominantly Muslim, India perceives it to be a significant contributor to the legitimacy and integrity of the state's national pluralist identity and model.

Other disputes, including the Siachen Glacier and Sir Creek disputes, have also not been successfully resolved, thus giving rise to opportunities for conflict. In comparison with the Kashmir and Siachen Glacier disputes, the dispute over Sir Creek has been less prioritised by India and Pakistan. Sir Creek is a 96-kilometre long fluctuating tidal estuary situated along the Rann of Kutch marshes on the border of the Indian state of Gujarat and the Pakistani province of Sind (Misra, 2001). In 1965, Pakistan began claiming half of the Rann as its territory. India immediately disputed the claim, arguing that the border was along the northern edge of the Rann. The two countries then approached the international tribunal about arbitration, which resulted in India receiving 90% of its claim to the Rann and Pakistan 10% (Misra, 2001). However, a disagreement about Sir Creek emerged when Pakistan claimed that the dividing line was on the creek's eastern bank, making the entire territory part of Pakistan. The stream is significant, since its border defines the sea's maritime boundary. According to Pakistan, the creek's border must first be precisely established to ascertain the location on land from which the marine edge may be determined. India is primarily interested in the maritime boundary, as the creek's dividing line will decide the distribution of the marine border (Indo-Pakistani Western Boundary Case Tribunal, 1968). In 1989, Islamabad hosted the first round of discussions to resolve the Sir Creek issue (Hindu, 1998). Throughout the 1990s, there were series of talks during which India proposed a mid-channel principle, essentially dividing the creek in half and then using the equidistant demarcation to delimitate the maritime boundary. However, Pakistan rejected the proposal. In November 1998, India rejected Pakistan's bid to seek international intervention. India insisted that the issue be dealt with bilaterally (Hindu, 1998). Hence the issue currently still remains in limbo.

Some scholars have dubbed the Siachen Glacier dispute a by-product of the Kashmir dispute, as it is a direct result of the LoC (dividing the Indian and Pakistani controlled territories of Kashmir and Jammu) not having been extended to cover the Siachen Glacier area (Ahmad, 2006). India and Pakistan both claim that the glacier falls within their individual territory of Jammu and Kashmir. This dispute is an extension of the Kashmir dispute and has also resulted in injury and loss of life. The casualties on the glacier are largely due to the cold, harsh climatic conditions and terrain. The feud started in 1984 when Indian troops took control of part of the glacier and its approaches located in the eastern Karakoram mountain range. The glacier is 76 km in length with an intermittent width ranging from 2 km to 8 km (Ahmad, 2006). Pakistan has suggested that the Siachen Glacier issue be dealt with separately from the Kashmir dispute, but India insists that the two cannot be separated, which has led to a deadlock in negotiations (Wirsing, 1988). The Siachen Glacier dispute remains a factor contributing to the India-Pakistan conflict, which is ultimately a threat to India. India's national security is also under threat from its closest neighbours, namely Pakistan and China.

6.3 THREATS BY THE NEIGHBOURS, PAKISTAN AND CHINA

National security is an issue that concerns all sovereign nations. The issue becomes even more pronounced when the threats to national security are the neighbours of a state. Pakistan and China pose different but very real threats to India because of their vicinity to it. These neighbours have existing border disputes with India that have, in the past, culminated in war and skirmishes. Pakistan poses a bigger threat due to terrorist groups that have been attacking India since the early 1980s.

6.3.1 Terrorism

Pakistani Islamic groups' terrorism attacks on India have without a doubt escalated the prevailing conflict and hampered dispute resolution efforts. There are various definitions of the term 'terrorism', depending on how scholars, organisations and government agencies define them. Terrorism can be simply defined as an act of physically attacking a state or country, usually by groups from another country, resulting in loss of life, property and infrastructure. However, terrorism can also be

domestic when local groups are activated, sponsored or trained by international groups or governments to perpetuate acts of violence against their domestic governments and people (Tankel, 2014). The label 'terrorist' has definite negative connotations and governments are often reluctant to label insurgents as terrorists due to the history of colonialism, apartheid and political instability that eventually leads to rebellion against ruling governments (Bruce, 2013). Also, in the past, the UN and some international governments have supported some local groups believed to be fighting for freedom (Bruce, 2013). The complexities involved in the identification of terrorists have led to difficulties in developing a universal definition of the term 'terrorism'. However, in 2001, the UN listed acts of terrorism as "resulting or likely to result in major economic loss, when the purpose of the conduct by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population or compel a government or international organisation to do or abstain from doing an act." Scholars, such as Walter Laqueur, have also defined terrorism as the "illegitimate use of force to achieve a political objective by targeting innocent people" (Laqueur, 1977). Terrorism has also been described as systematic acts of violence producing extensive emotions of fear and anxiety and conveying threats as a form of communication and control (Reinares, 2005).

Prior to the terrorist attacks in India between 2005 and 2015, both states were optimistic that the outcome of the peace dialogue would be positive. This dialogue was, however, marred by the Mumbai attacks in 2008, which further damaged IndoPakistani relations in a new way. As a result, Islamic terrorism has become the leading external threat to India. Terrorism in India has become even more complex and difficult to tackle because of the emergence of terrorist groups that are Muslim Indian, thus making it harder to identify them. These locally activated groups are commonly funded and trained by various Pakistani groups to carry out attacks on India (Tankel, 2014). About 6 000 people were killed between 2005 and 2012 during terrorist attacks resulting in the state being the most affected by terrorism in the world (Wojcizewski, 2014). Some attacks have been concentrated in the Kashmir region, although the most devastating ones have occurred in India's financial hub, Mumbai, and the capital, New Delhi.

Terrorist attacks on India have been relentless since the 1990s with most of them being bombings and shootings, resulting in human casualties. The Delhi bombings in 2005 claimed 70 lives in a series of three separate blasts. In July 2006, a total of 209 people were killed and more than 700 were injured in an attack on seven trains during peak hour in Mumbai (The Economic Times, 2020). Furthermore, the Samjhauta Express bombings in 2007 claimed 70 lives and the Hyderabad bombings in the same year killed 42 people. The year 2008 was particularly difficult for India, as the country experienced more attacks than in any other year in its history. Since then, an average of three to four terror attacks are recorded in India every year. Also, the Indian Embassy in Afghanistan was attacked and more heinous attacks in Mumbai occurred in November of the same year killing 166 people (Rath 2014). India accused Pakistan of being responsible for the attacks, yet the Pakistani government distanced itself and also condemned the terrorist attacks.

Scholars posit that Muslim terrorists seek to get Kashmir completely under Pakistan control while disrupting the Indian secular state model by promoting anti-Muslim rhetoric in India (Wojczewski, 2014). This anti-Muslim rhetoric increases radicalisation between the Muslims and Hindus and creates an atmosphere that is ideal for the recruitment of Indian Muslims into extreme Islamism (Tankel, 2014). This problem has led to India facing both internal and external security challenges, despite achieving substantial political stability. Pakistan perceives India's secularism as a threat to Islam. Similarly, India believes Pakistan "is a direct threat to its secular and pluralist identity" (Wojczewski, 2014: 326). Although India has made strides in embracing many religions in its state model, infiltration by Pakistani terrorist groups undermines these efforts at uniting different ethnic groups, resulting in growing divisions.

The Pakistani government has consistently denied any association with terrorist groups, although there have been reports of support and tolerance of some Taliban groups led by Mullar Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadar in South Waziristan (Irshad, 2011). Other scholars posit that some of these terrorist groups are used as tools against India by the Pakistani government because of the difficulty associated with locating and prosecuting them (Kapur and Ganguly, 2012). Terrorist attacks have strengthened India's distrust of Pakistan, since they are commonly used to disrupt peace dialogues. There is also the notion that Indian policymakers are now emphasising these attacks

to draw attention from the prevailing situation within the country (Ganguly and Thompson, 2011). Be that as it may, terrorist attacks almost always result in fatalities; therefore, they have to be taken seriously.

6.4 THREAT OF INDIAN DOMINANCE

There are factors that have fuelled the India-Pakistan conflict and prevented its de-escalation in the past. India is the most dominant state in South Asia in terms of population size and sheer land area. India's population is 10 times larger than that of Pakistan and its army is approximately four times bigger (Marshall, 2019). Also, India boasts 80% of the subcontinent's economy, which makes it a powerful nation, particularly in comparison with its smaller neighbours (Wojczewski, 2014). Therefore, it is conceivable that India's smaller neighbours fear that they could lose their sovereignty and be dominated by the state, as they do not have the capacity to win a war against India. This fear of being dominated by India may also be a driver of Pakistan's resistance to conceding to India in resolving the current disputes. Furthermore, India has bestowed on itself a hegemonic role in the region through the proclamation of a regional doctrine (Yaseen et al., 2016). This doctrine clearly asserts India's right to interfere in the domestic politics and foreign policies of surrounding states and also warns external powers against interfering in regional politics as a strategy to protect smaller democracies, while enhancing security and cohesion in the region. Although hegemony may be perceived negatively in international relations and as a threat to less developed countries in a region, economic and military capabilities give a state a level of power and responsibility (Bhasin, 2008). Generally, global powers and South Asian states have indirectly given India the responsibility to protect the region, while fostering cooperation among the nations (Bhasin, 2008). Furthermore, by enhancing the national security of the surrounding smaller states, India's own national security is also boosted (Malone, 2011).

Therefore, India posits that the doctrine is founded on the need to protect and preserve the sovereignty, not only of the state but also of all the countries in the South Asian region (Pant, 2011). This notion seems to have originated from historical invasions of the Indian subcontinent during which the British used the ethnic and religious diversities of the people to sow division and effectively colonise them

(Wojczewski, 2014). Pakistan is obviously reluctant to accept this hegemony claim from India, further hindering dialogues and cooperation that could have de-escalated the conflict and fostered greater peace and stability in the region. Owing to the issues raised above, the next sub-section interrogates the duo's state models for clear organic linkages between the two states under discussion.

6.5 INDIA AND PAKISTAN STATE MODELS

India and Pakistan have different state models that cause them to clash constantly. Ordinarily, having diverse models does not insinuate that states become enemies. This only occurs when one state tries to impose its identity on another. Pakistan's national identity is founded on the two-nation theory that purports that Hindus and Muslims are unable to live together peacefully in the same homeland in a Hindu-dominated state (Nanda, 2010). Pakistan, therefore, rejects India's secularism and pluralist model, insisting that all Muslims on the subcontinent essentially belong to Pakistan (Pande, 2011). This reasoning is the main argument in the claim on Kashmir. Scholars suggest that Pakistan is so concerned about India's secular model because of its inclusion of Muslims under the freedom of religion section of its constitution. Kashmir thus poses a threat to Pakistan's own fragmented national identity (Cohen, 2013; Fair, 2011).

Pakistan's emphasis on religion during the state's inception ultimately influenced the governing of the state. The political leaders of Pakistan use the threat against Islam rhetoric to gain the people's support. The military uses the same excuse to be heavily involved in the running of the state. The political elite have tried to portray Pakistan as a united Muslim nation as its main source of identity; however, this has failed due to the presence of ethnic conflicts within some states in the country (Marshall, 2019). The Shia and Sunni Muslims in Pakistan had found a way to coexist in Pakistan until the 1970s, despite having a history of centuries of conflict in the region (Behuria, 2004). Having bonded on the idea of exclusivity in Islam that was likely induced by the euphoria of independence, the two sects had declared the Ahmadiyya as non-Muslims. The Ahmadiyya is a small sect of Muslims estimated to constitute between 0.22% and 2.2% of the Pakistani population. However, the Sunni Shia union began disintegrating in the late 1970s, since the passion for exclusivity

emphasised the differences between the two sects, with the minority Shia sect becoming the new target of exclusivity (Behuria, 2004). The Sunni Muslims also quickly embraced extreme forms of Islam, termed Islamic Sharia, under the leadership of Muhammed Zia-ul-Haq who was the president of Pakistan from 1977 to 1988 (Zaman, 1998). As a result, the sectarian forces found their way into the national political landscape of Pakistan, making the divide between the Sunni and Shia more apparent. During the 1980s, the Shia began to be increasingly alienated and there were clashes with the Sunni over religious activities which led the deaths of thousands of Shia people. Shia militants were also believed to be behind the assassinations of many Sunni leaders, including Zia-ul-Haq (Behuria, 2004). Since then, the ethnic clashes have continued and thousands of lives have been lost on both sides.

It is, therefore, clear that some states in Pakistan have not embraced the extreme Islamic rhetoric. As a result, the nation has seen an increase in insurgencies against the government (Marshall, 2019). Owing to the fragility of Pakistan's identity and its flawed state-building process, the conflict with India has become a source of its identity (Wojczewski, 2014). Pakistan has been in conflict with India since it was founded and this conflict has continued for more than 70 years. Hence, it has become a part of the nation's identity, which has contributed to the failure to find sustainable solutions to the conflict.

Furthermore, since the establishment of Pakistan, there have been intermittent periods of democratic and militant rule (Cohen, 2013). However, this identity has been challenged by the rise of ethnic, religious and political factions within the state. This situation has caused contradicting identity concepts about the state of Pakistan, adding to the fragility of the state's identity even more (Kapur and Ganguly, 2012). Between 2005 and 2008, there were two interstate wars. Consequently, the internal political instability has to an extent distracted Islamabad from its conflict with India, particularly where attacks took on the form of border skirmishes and were less brutal than before (Wojczewski, 2014). The internal conflict within Pakistan also tends to be used by the army to justify its presence in the political arena of the country.

However, Pakistan has become increasingly aware that Islamic extremism is a double-edged sword and that it has contributed to the socio-economic downturn of the country as relations with India worsened (Kapur and Ganguly, 2012; Cohen, 2013). Although the Pakistani government may support terrorist groups that attack India, it does not have control over them. Therefore, terrorism is now also an issue in Pakistan. The former Pakistan Army chief, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, admitted during his Independence Day speech in 2012 that the war against terrorism had to be fought so that the country would not be plunged into civil war (Firstpost, 2012). Even with this admission, the army only conducts counterinsurgency operations within its states, suggesting that the political elite still consider these Islamist groups as strategic weapons against India (Fair, 2011). The use of Islamic groups has always discreetly been part of Pakistan's foreign policy, although they were not under the state's direct control. Growing Islamism and the dominance of the army have crippled the bilateral dialogue between India and Pakistan because the army believes that India will only compromise on Kashmir as a result of pressure from Islamic militants (Wojczewski, 2014). The Pakistani military has a visible influence on the political leadership of the state and has consistently interfered with the foreign policy and the composite bilateral dialogue. After the Mumbai attacks in 2008, the army disrupted President Zardari's efforts to conduct an investigation into the attack as requested by the Indian government, thus elevating India's level of distrust (Wojczewski, 2014). The de-escalation of the India-Pakistan conflict has also been influenced by other nations, regionally and globally.

6.6 REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE

The external influence of interregional and extra interregional states in the Indo Pakistan conflict has also prevented the de-escalation of the prevailing conflict. India and Pakistan's relations with China have markedly impacted on the India-Pakistan conflict. China and India are economic rivalries that have risen simultaneously in the quest to become superpowers and they have a pending border dispute that has not yet been resolved. This border dispute led to the India-China war in which India was defeated. Time and again border skirmishes flare up as the border demarcation comes into question along the Himalayas. China's military advancement and economic growth have exceeded those of

India and pose a security threat to India's international ambitions (Burilkov and Geise, 2013). Although India may be inferior in respect of its military prowess in comparison with China, it still poses a threat to China due to its nuclear capabilities and powerful alliances with the US and Japan. China poses a threat to India, which is used as a justification for India embarking on its nuclear weapons programme in the first place (Cohen, 2001). China has since forged an alliance with Pakistan in a bid to contain India and its regional and global aspirations. This alliance saw China giving military aid to Pakistan, particularly in respect of its nuclear programme (Wojczewski, 2014). Strengthening Pakistan's military capability is meant to actively assist Pakistan or match India's capabilities in the event of conflict or a war breaking out. The China-Pakistan alliance is strong because India recognises that it cannot wage war on two fronts. However, India's economic development cannot be ignored, and the country's nuclear capabilities have transformed China's stance on the country.

Another alliance that has prevented the de-escalation of the India-Pakistan conflict is the US-Pakistan alliance. The political and military aid that Pakistan receives from the US is primarily used against India, which maintains the conflict between the two countries. Pakistan has used the greater part of the US funding and support to attack an economically stronger India, leaving its own economy in a state of implosion (Marshall, 2019, Tankel, 2014). Following the attacks on 11 September 2001, Pakistan became critical in the US's war against Al-Qaeda-led terrorist organisations in Afghanistan (Hicks et al., 2016). While the US provides aid with the purpose of utilising Pakistan to achieve broader geopolitical goals, Pakistan's primary goal has always been to enhance its capabilities and minimise the power imbalance with its larger neighbour, India. However, Pakistan is a military state with an unstable political and economic environment and may not win the trust of the US. Conversely, despite the US having invested great resources and weaponry in the country and having improved Pakistan's stand against India, Pakistanis are more anti-US than ever before (Fair, 2012). The US War on Terror has, in essence, worsened the US-Pakistan relationship, as it is seen as a marriage of convenience between two countries teetering on the brink of being foes (Fair, 2012). The breakdown of US-Pakistani relations is perhaps not surprising, since Pakistan, being a militant Muslim nation, has always stood against the ideology of US democracy and secularism.

India and the US have a number of similarities, such as being democratic and economically stable and fighting against terrorism. Although India has great concerns about Islamic terrorism, it has not closely aligned itself with the US War on Terror, as it does not necessarily agree with the methods the US uses to fight terrorism (Ollapally, 2005). Although the US is aware that its resources are being used against India, it is more concerned about getting Pakistan to cooperate in exposing the terrorist groups in Afghanistan that had attacked the US. Therefore, the US War on Terror has put a strain on US-India relations and the supply of arms added to the hostilities in India-Pakistan relations.

The US-India alliance is cemented by a common contentious relationship with China. Indo-Chinese relations have become increasingly hostile since the 1962 war, frequent skirmishes at the disputed border and China's economic and military support for Pakistan. India and China are also economic rivals. Although they have pending disputes and little trust, they have managed to maintain a trading relationship, since China is India's largest bilateral partner (Wagner and Tripathi, 2018). Both countries are also members of BRICS and often take a similar stand towards developed countries on international trade and global change (Wagner and Tripathi, 2018). India's approach reflects the different strategies that it has used to gain recognition through BRICS at the international level and to resume the rapprochement between India and the US to balance China regionally (Stephen, 2016).

Through BRICS, India has found a platform to pursue the reform of multilateral institutions subjecting developing countries to unfavourable lending rules and to minimise the dominance of Western nations, particularly in trade (Stephen, 2016). BRICS has been partially successful in achieving its objectives and this may be attributed to some extent to the prevailing hostile India-China relations and rivalry. The economic and military rivalry of these states has accelerated over the decades and both nations have increased their military budgets significantly. Also, China has secured geo-strategic relationships with not only Pakistan but also India's other neighbours, Nepal, Bangladesh and Maldives (Rehman, 2009). India has also sought to strengthen its military ties with the US, Russia, Japan and other South Asian countries. Furthermore, India and China are at the forefront of a contemporary "Scramble for Africa" and are supplying goods and services, investing in mining and

business and engaging with the continent more dramatically (Kimenyi and Lewis, 2011). This focus on Africa has mainly been identified as a strategy for increasing their economic prospects and political interests instead of actually improving the continent's economy.

The presence of India and China in BRICS was ideally supposed to foster more cordial relations and even a resolution to the border dispute. Brazil, Russia and South Africa were to act as mediators. Such an outcome would highly benefit both states by boosting trade relations and stability in the region. The future India-China relationship largely depends on the capacity of these states to resolve their disputes in a more amicable manner. The resolution of the border dispute, in particular, is a key factor in this relationship. China has a significant influence in South Asia and may have a positive impact on India-Pakistan relations if it acts as an arbitrator. With India and China working together and not against each other, they could achieve the superpower status they so wish to attain much quicker and ultimately have peace and stability in the region. Consequently, BRICS would become a formidable force that international institutions would have to heed.

6.7 CONCLUSION

Pakistan is unlikely to change its approach to the governance of the country or its attitude towards India. The army will most likely remain in control of the foreign policy of the country and not yield on the issues of terrorism and Kashmir. Pakistan is increasingly reflecting a failed state with its host of economic and political problems, internal conflict and mounting terrorism issues (Behuria and Saheed, 2015). Terror attacks will probably continue as the state becomes more desperate to survive. In essence, most of these attacks may eventually not be sanctioned by the Pakistani government as they completely lose control of the terrorist groups. This scenario is a clear indication that India's approach to national security needs to change, otherwise it will continue being a victim of terrorist forces. In spite of being an economically stable state and having a large military budget, most of the funding is being used for human resources. Less funding is spent on the modernisation of weapons (Mason, 2016). As a result, India's security forces are inadequately trained and ill-equipped to deal with consistent and well-trained Islamic militants (Rath, 2010). Ultimately, this

situation suggests that India's security agencies lack the capacity to deter terrorist attacks on the nation, hence the continuation of the India-Pakistan conflict.

Another factor that has prevented the de-escalation of the India-Pakistan conflict is India's NSS. Although it is unarticulated, India's NSS has to be clear on how the country must effectively defend itself against constant Pakistan attacks. The fact that this conflict has lasted so long is primarily the result of India failing to take a tougher stance against Pakistan, thus, in a way, allowing these attacks to continue. India's dependence on Pakistan to investigate terror attacks against it is inconceivable and reflects India's weakness in intelligence gathering. At this rate, the notion of peace between the two nations is doubtful, unless India rises as the superpower it aspires to be or Pakistan eventually implodes as a result of its economic and political challenges.

This chapter dealt with the challenges and factors that have prevented the de-escalation of the India-Pakistan conflict which began at the partitioning of British India in 1947. India and Pakistan have a series of unresolved disputes that have maintained the flow of attacks by Pakistan and the conflict between the two states over the decades. Kashmir is the main area of contention fueling the conflict because both India and Pakistan believe that the territory is rightfully theirs and justify this stance using religion and their state models. Until the Kashmir dispute is resolved amicably, it is unlikely that the India-Pakistan conflict will be de-escalated. Kashmir is part of the national interests of both India and Pakistan. Therefore, the two countries are likely to clash due to the strategic location of the territory and its socio-economic implications. Over the decades, the two countries have also failed to resolve other disputes, such as the Siachen Glacier and Sir Creek disputes, which can easily trigger conflict. Perceived threats by India's neighbours have also been a factor perpetuating conflict. India has been the target of a great number of terrorist attacks by Pakistani terrorist groups or Pakistan-sponsored groups in India. These attacks have not only led to massive human fatalities, but have also stalled peace talks and dialogues, causing suspicion and distrust to fester yet again.

The hegemony of India in South Asia was also discussed in the chapter. Pakistan believes that India seeks to dominate its smaller neighbouring countries because of its greater economic and military capabilities. Thus it considers India to be a threat

against its sovereignty. Furthermore, the two states have divergent state models that increase the perception of the other as a threat. Pakistan believes that India's secularism and attempt to embrace Muslims in Kashmir undermine its identity as a purely Muslim country. India also regards Pakistan's state model of non-inclusivity as a threat that defeats the purpose of secularism if the state cannot include the Muslims from Kashmir. This chapter also dealt with the way in which relations with other countries in the region and internationally have prevented the de-escalation of the India-Pakistan conflict. Pakistan's relationships with China and the US have given it the capacity to continue attacking India using their military and financial aid. These alliances have been a key factor in continuing the India-Pakistan conflict by giving Pakistan the ammunition required to attack, thus reinforcing India's perception of Pakistan as a threat to its national security.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 INTRODUCTION

All sovereign countries need a foreign policy and security strategy that clearly outline the steps to be taken in the event of different forms of attack. India and Pakistan have been adversaries since the partitioning of British India in 1947. Since the partition was primarily due to religious differences, religion has continuously played a significant role in subsequent India-Pakistan conflicts. In many instances, Pakistan has been the primary instigator of conflict due to a host of issues, as discussed in Chapter 4. India has responded to the attacks by Pakistan by using a mixture of coercive and persuasive strategies in its foreign policy, which have not been effective in deterring these attacks. Historical events, policies and actions have influenced how India's NSS has been analysed in this study to gain a clearer understanding of the country's security strategy and how it is applied to Pakistan.

A total of 25 semi-structured interviews were conducted with participants from different backgrounds, such as the military, subject matter experts and scholars who have been involved with India and Pakistan through their political studies and work. In this chapter, the research objectives will initially be highlighted and then followed by the key findings of the literature review. Findings derived from the participants' insights and perceptions using semi-structured interviews will be elaborated upon. The chapter will conclude with recommendations.

The literature has primarily focused on foreign and internal challenges to India's national security, with Pakistan seen as the most significant external danger to the country. The complexity of the India-Pakistan conflict can be traced back to the two countries' split in 1947, in line with the two-state theory. This conflict resulted in both countries embarking on an arms race and significantly increasing their military budgets. The arms race eventually culminated in the procurement of nuclear weapons by India in 1998, followed by Pakistan that very same year. Nuclear weapons act as a form of deterrence for India, which has adopted a no-first-use policy, while Pakistan has not. In Chapter 4, the major issues contributing to the India-Pakistan conflict were highlighted as being largely territorial.

Disputes over Kashmir, the Siachen Glacier, Sir Creek and the Indus Waters Treaty are the main issues that continue to fuel the conflict.

India clearly identifies Pakistan as an enemy. However, the country's NSS in against Pakistan reflects restraint and is also reactionary and defensive in nature. India's approach has been attributed to its foreign policies that are non-aggressive in nature, such as the NAM and the no-first-use nuclear policy. Also, owing to India's identity as a secular and pluralist state, it tends to be more accommodating of other religions and ethnicities as discussed in the previous chapter. Pakistan perceives India as a threat to Islam due to its pluralist identity and its stance on the Kashmir issue. Although there have been efforts to resolve the prevailing disputes between India and Pakistan by means of dialogues, these have been marred by the high level of distrust between the countries and exacerbated by terrorist attacks by Pakistani groups.

The India-Pakistan conflict has also been complicated by the two states' relations with other countries, specifically the US and China. Pakistan's attacks on India have been made possible by the US and China's financial and military support. Since India and China are economic and military rivals and also have an unresolved border dispute, the Pakistan-China relationship is meant to contain India by reducing its influence in South Asia. Naturally, India is weary of Pakistan's relations with China and has thus cultivated closer relations with China's enemies, such as the US and Japan.

Chapter 5 dealt with India's internal threats to national security, such as high population rates, ethnic clashes and domestic terrorism. It was also noted that Pakistan was experiencing ethnic uprisings against the state leading to divisions in the country and other states becoming virtually ungovernable. The findings of the semistructured interviews are discussed in greater detail below.

7.2 STUDY RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The main objective of the study was to explore the existence and application of India's NSS in relation to Pakistan. This study also had the following specific objectives:

- To identify key determinant factors of India's NSS in the context of Pakistan's NSS and processes.
- To examine the implementation or activation of India's NSS in certain cases in the context of Indo-Pakistani relations.
- To determine the nature and extent of the involvement of the military and foreign policy elite in drawing up and activating India's NSS with the emphasis on the rationale for their choices or their roles in the case of military confrontation with Pakistan.

7.3 FINDINGS FROM LITERATURE REVIEW

India has been criticised for an NSS that fails to integrate the various aspects of security, lacks a clearly documented strategy and is void of long-term planning and strategic thinking for addressing threats, challenges and conflict (Chellaney, 2016; Kapur and Mukherjee, 2018; O'Donnell and Pant, 2018). The literature reviewed in this study distinguished the presence of an articulated or non-articulated NSS in India.

Scholars suggest that India may not have an articulated NSS, particularly in its engagement with Pakistan, but rather policies informing responses to threats and attacks by Pakistan (Joshi, 2015; Pradeep, 2019). Having a non-articulated NSS has been largely cited as the main reason for the state's failure to adequately deal with or curb the continuous terror attacks on the country resulting from poor responses and no punishment strategies against Pakistan (Sridharan, 2005; Pant, 2009). India is militarily superior, economically stable and has some attributes of a rising superpower, but having a non-articulated NSS reflects the lack of a sound foreign policy. Although the state has invested significantly in its military capabilities by increasing the budget, importing arms and acquiring nuclear weapons, these have mainly been used for defence and deterrence (Rid, 2012; Kulkarni and Sihna, 2011). In response, Pakistan also acquired its own nuclear weapons which matched India's military capabilities in that respect. However, unlike India, Pakistan does not have a clear policy dictating the circumstances in which it would launch a nuclear attack on its adversaries.

It has been posited that the culture of an unarticulated NSS has developed since pre-independence from the influence of Hindu leaders, such as Mahatma Gandhi, who mainly pursued non-violent and peaceful protests in the fight against British colonialism. This concept was also firmly based on the Hindu religion, which promotes non-violence and, therefore, resonated with the Hindu majority in India pre- and post independence (Hauss, 2002). After independence, India adopted the NAM policy discussed in detail in Chapter 5. The NAM policy was an international relations strategy to avoid conflict with other states in order to develop the young Indian nation (Pant and Super, 2015; Singh, 2017). The Hindu religion is part of India's identity and is, therefore, reflected in mostly non-violent responses to violence. Subsequently, nonalignment has also become part of India's identity and has permeated its NSS (Ibrahim, 2008; Pant and Super, 2015). The NAM was initially a success in India, although, in a sense, it has become a weakness in the conflict with Pakistan (Ibrahim, 2008; Singh, 2017). Since the partitioning of India and Pakistan was based on religion, the characteristics of their religions are an inherent part of their actions, behaviour and approach to national security.

Despite having adopted non-alignment, the practicality of such a policy was first tested in the 1962 war against China when India was forced to seek military aid from the US because of China's superior military weapons (Reddy, 2016; Hicks et al., 2016). Since then, India has deviated from the policy in the face of threats by China and Pakistan. These deviations have, however, not lessened Indian policymakers' affinity with non-alignment (Pant and Super, 2015). India-Pakistan relations are basically distrustful and their relations with other countries in the region and internationally have also contributed to the situation. The US-Pakistan alliance – which was formed after the 11 September 2001 terror attacks against the US to enable the US to track down the Islamist terrorist group Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan – provided Pakistan with the resources and ammunition to continue attacking India. This alliance is making India uneasy because, although Pakistan's economy is seriously ailing, the aid provided by the US ensures the continuation of the India-Pakistan conflict (Hicks et al., 2016; Ganguly and Howenstein, 2010). Similarly, China has developed close relations with Pakistan and provides expertise and military equipment in order to contain India.

Beijing's policy is to divert New Delhi's attention from the contested territory, as discussed in this thesis.

Currently, the majority of the threats against India emanate from Pakistan in the form of terror attacks. A review of the literature on Pakistan's NSS reflects that the state has fashioned its strategy primarily against India. Pakistan perceives India as a major threat to its identity as a Muslim state, particularly because of the Kashmir dispute (Hasan, 2005). The fact that India happens to be militarily and economically superior to Pakistan makes it all the more intimidating for Pakistan and causes it to resort to sponsoring terrorist groups. These groups have become the leading source of attacks on India in the last two decades (Tankel, 2014). However, this approach has not been without difficulties because the Pakistani government does not have control over these terrorist groups, which, in some instances, have attacked civilians and tried to promote extreme forms of Islam (Thränet and Wagner, 2009).

The division between the Muslims and Hindus existed before the formal colonisation by the British government in 1858. The British used the differences to promote hostilities between the religions, which made it easier to subdue them by using the divide and rule strategy. Later, British India would be divided on the basis of religion because the Muslims felt that they could not coexist with the Hindus in the same state, since they were a minority and largely felt underrepresented in parliament. During the partition at independence, the 535 princely states were given the option to accede to either India or Pakistan. Since Jammu and Kashmir were primarily Muslim and geographically located close to other Muslim states, it was expected that they would accede to Pakistan (Marshall, 2019). Initially, the Maharaja of Kashmir offered a standstill pact to both countries, which Pakistan rejected and India accepted. The situation changed dramatically when the Maharaja decided to accede to India because he was trying to contain the uprising of the Muslims in the state. Since then, India and Pakistan have been at odds over the territory and its natural resources. The LoC dividing the area into two was formed with the greater portion of the territory falling under India.

However, the LoC did not extend to the Siachen Glacier that has an area of approximately 3 000 square kilometers. This glacier became another point of contention between India and Pakistan in the scramble to control parts of it (Ashrat, 2018). The two nations also have unresolved disputes over Sir Creek and the IWT, which contribute to the conflict. India and Pakistan also fought three wars and had countless border skirmishes (Ashrat, 2015). As a result, an arms race ensued, culminating in the acquisition of nuclear weapons by India in 1998 and Pakistan later that year. India then developed a nuclear doctrine and adopted a no-first-use policy that prevents the country from attacking other countries, except in retaliation to a nuclear attack. In contrast, Pakistan has not submitted any specifics regarding the use of its weapons, thus it remains largely unaccountable. However, the threat of a nuclear attack in retaliation or for any other reason has become a form of deterrence for both states. Most of the attacks in the India-Pakistan conflict over the past two decades have been perpetrated by terrorists sponsored by Pakistan. The military budgets of both India and Pakistan have increased proportional to the escalation of the conflict (Mason, 2016).

7.4 FINDINGS FROM PRIMARY RESEARCH

7.4.1 Implementing India's security strategy

In this study, India's NSS was described as being based on economic and political elements, such as India's NAM policy, relations with other states, the protection of its national interests and historical security events. Although the NAM policy in India is not currently in force as it was just after independence, it still permeates the country's foreign policy and security strategy. India's relations with its neighbours, Pakistan and China, pose a threat and have had an impact on the state's NSS.

The India-Pakistan conflict began in 1947 and unresolved disputes, historical events and terror attacks have continuously escalated and maintained the conflict. Owing to the fact that India's NSS is unarticulated, it has to be analysed in accordance with the way in which the government acts and responds to specific security threats.

Participants in the study identified weapons advancement from the mid-2000s and the increase in the military budget as indicators of India's investment in the army as a

security strategy. However, acquiring nuclear capabilities and then adopting a no-first use policy highlights the defensive nature of India's NSS. India is aware of the fact that a nuclear attack would be detrimental to the state. Therefore, nuclear weapons is a form of deterrence against Pakistan and China.

The fact that the Pakistani government has terrorist links definitely influences India's security strategy. Terrorist groups sponsored by Pakistan are used as a form of warfare against India because of Pakistan's consistent hostility. Ensuring that India's borders are secure was identified as a strategy for implementing the state's NSS. The two disputed borders with Pakistan and China have forced India to increase its military presence along the borders to protect its territory and prevent possible infiltration by terrorist groups. An analysis of the historical events between India and Pakistan gives an indication of India's NSS. Although the state does not have a publicly articulated security strategy, the manner in which it has responded to attacks by Pakistan has been consistent and defensive.

7.4.2 Key determining factors of India's NSS

The current study identified a number of key factors that have determined India's NSS, for example, historical events, such as the NAM policy and the protection of its national interests. The wars fought against Pakistan over Kashmir also contributed to India's security strategy because the country had to ensure that it could defend itself against attacks. The war against China in 1968 also had an influence on India's NSS because India had to seek help from the US after adopting the NAM policy, as discussed in Chapter 5. In addition, terrorist attacks against India by Pakistani sponsored groups have increased the distrust between the two states and made India less willing to engage in peace dialogues.

Furthermore, India, by means of its security strategy, seeks to protect its national interests, such as becoming a superpower, growing the economy and defending the country's borders and identity as a democratic state (Stuenkel, 2014). India's disputed borders with Pakistan and China have become national interests together with Kashmir. Therefore, India cannot compromise on these issues that clearly have economic, social and religious significance. Furthermore, India has aspirations to

achieve superpower status. Thus it will have to increase its capacity to influence other nations in the South Asian region and across the globe. The sphere of influence is a claim by a state to predominant control over a foreign state, territory or region (Deudney, 2019). This control may take different forms, which may be cultural, economic, military or political in nature and vary in the level of exclusivity. The sphere of influence may be in the form of hegemony, which India, due to its sheer size and economic and military capabilities has achieved to a limited extent over the countries in South Asia. India also seeks to have this type of influence through economic growth and the promotion of peace and democracy in order to secure a seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Both India and Pakistan have transactional relations with the US, which complicate their dynamics even further. In order to realise its ambitions, India has to improve its relations with Pakistan and China and maintain a level of hegemony in South Asia.

7.4.3 Military and political elite

India's military and political elite have different but complementary roles in developing and implementing the state's NSS. The political elite are more involved in the development and decision-making aspects of the security strategy, whereas the military implements the security strategy. In essence, the political elite have a greater influence on the NSS, which prompted some of the participants in the study to purport that an articulated NSS probably exists, although it would only be available to the political elite of India's ruling party. By keeping the strategy out of the public domain, it may allow the political elite to manipulate or change it to its benefit or to appropriate more funding for the military at the expense of other causes without being accountable. Conversely, Pakistan is a military state and influences decision-making and security strategies more than the political elite. However, the lines between the political elite and the military are not always clearly defined; hence, the influence of these groups on security strategies may be blurred. For example, military leaders, such as the defence minister, are more likely to be political appointees, thus creating a scenario where the political elite are also part of the military.

7.5 RECOMMENDATIONS

The India-Pakistan conflict has led to a waste of financial resources and economic opportunities, the loss of lives and livelihoods and the destruction of property, as wars and instability have reigned in both nations and South Asia. Firstly, India needs to take more aggressive and decisive steps to eliminate terrorism by investing in intelligence that will aid the state in tracking and prosecuting those who perpetrate acts of terror. The state should even be willing to prosecute its own Muslim citizens working with Pakistani groups in order to dissuade them from participating in terrorism. Secondly, despite its resources, India has failed to effectively defend itself against Pakistan's constant direct and indirect attacks. India needs to develop and publicise a well-articulated NSS that will clearly state how the nation will respond to attacks by local or foreign groups. This will serve as a warning to Pakistan that each attack will have dire consequences. Thirdly, Pakistan has many internal political and economic challenges and thus cannot afford to continue this conflict with India. Therefore, Pakistan needs to seek more peaceful methods of conflict resolution and be more sincere in order to rebuild the trust between India and Pakistan. One of the ways in which Pakistan can prove its sincerity, is to take clear and decisive actions against terrorist groups by stopping all sponsorship and making the state hostile to terrorist groups. The funds diverted from funding terrorist groups can thus be used to rebuild the Pakistani economy.

As the trust between India and Pakistan increases, the trade between the two will increase, which is likely to boost the Pakistani economy further. Through economic integration, India and Pakistan will become co-dependent on each other and encourage them to resolve conflicts to protect their economic interests and promote political stability. In addition, the insurgencies of different ethnic groups in both countries are largely due to economic inequality. Therefore, economic integration will increase economic stability and lead to political stability. Finally, both India and Pakistan need to stabilise their local political ethnic conflicts, which will make them less vulnerable to terrorist attacks and infiltration. Only then will India successfully fulfil its ambition of being a global superpower.

7.6 CONCLUSION

In line with the social constructivism and structural realism theories, Indo Pakistan relations are intertwined with historical events, geography, religion and national interests. These elements have contributed to both states' identities and the development of their security strategies. On the one hand, Pakistan identifies as a Muslim state and has made it its sole purpose to protect its religion and project Islamic ideologies that the religion is under threat. The Kashmir dispute reinforces that belief. On the other hand, India identifies as a secular state that embodies religious diversity and democracy. In line with the constructivism theory, India is more tolerant of other religions and cultures in comparison with Pakistan, which explains the latter's vicious approach and response to threats. India became known for its non-alignment and pursuit of peace. Therefore, its defensive and reactive approach to threats is due to its identity as an advocate of peace. Although Kashmir is primarily Muslim, it has become part of India's identity because it buttresses the idea of religious diversity. It is ironic that Kashmir has somehow become so deeply embedded in the identities of both India and Pakistan that they are unwilling to compromise on it.

Pakistan's use of terrorism as a tool against India is typically found in states that promote Islamism. Hence it is becoming part of the state's identity. Conflict is, therefore, also part of Pakistan's identity and the country will act violently, should it be under threat. It is because of India's identity that it has failed to protect itself effectively by responding decisively to external threats, particularly those by Pakistan. India's identity is reflected in its NSS, which is defensive and reactionary in nature. Pakistan cannot or is unlikely to stop using terrorism to attack India because the latter is militarily and economically superior. Engaging in war would be unfavourable for Pakistan. Terrorist attacks could be considered to be a form of guerrilla warfare, which is normally the instrument used by the weak against larger opponents or governments. Islamist groups commonly use guerrilla tactics to order a series of attacks on civilians so as to annoy the government or security agency. Pakistan also perceives the hegemony established by India in South Asia as a further threat. The India-Pakistan conflict shows no signs of abating and is likely to continue, unless both countries alter parts of their identities to some degree.

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APPENDIX A: Political Map of Colonial India



APPENDIX B: Timelines

Task	Duration	Start	Finish
Proposal approval	182 days	22 Jun. 2019	28 Dec. 2019
Book reading and analysis	62 days	15 Jan. 2020	15 Mar. 2020
Article reading and analysis	62 days	15 Mar. 2020	15 May 2020
Article review	61 days	15 May 2020	15 Aug. 2020
Critical analysis	62 days	15 Aug. 2020	15 Dec. 2020
Interview preparation	62 days	15 Jan. 2021	15 Mar. 2021
ICT Conference			
Chapter 1	64 days	15 Mar. 2021	16 May 2021
Chapter 2	62 days	16 May 2021	16 Aug. 2021
Chapter 3	62 days	16 Oct. 2021	16 Dec. 2021

APPENDIX C: Interview Guide

Title: Exploring India's National Security Strategy as an Instrument of Foreign Policy towards Pakistan between 2000 and 2015

Section 1 – Biographical information

This section of the interview guide refers to the background or biographical information that will allow us to compare groups of participants.

Once again, you are assured that your response will remain anonymous. Your cooperation is appreciated. The interview will take between 30 and 45 minutes.

1. Gender ☐ M ☐ F
2. Ethnicity ☐ Black ☐ White ☐ Coloured ☐ Indian ☐ Other
3. Designation
4. Number of years in current post
5. Role/responsibilities in current organisation

Section 2

6. How would you describe India's National Security Strategy?
7. How has the National Security Strategy been developed in India as an aspect of foreign policy?

8. In your opinion, what are the elements that make up India's National Security Strategy in the context of Pakistan's security strategies?
9. To what extent has India implemented its security strategy towards Pakistan in the context of seeking to achieve its foreign policy objectives?
10. What is the role of the military and policy elite in drafting and executing India's national security strategy?
11. How can India's security strategy as a foreign policy be designed and implemented more efficiently to eliminate conflict with Pakistan?

This is the end of the interview.

Thank you for participating in the study. Your time is highly appreciated.