

**The troubled
Afrikaner-tribe
of
South Africa**

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Gabriel Louw

HISTORY/POLITICAL SCIENCE

2020



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A political-historical perspective: 1652 - 2020

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The Troubled Afrikaner-tribe of South Africa
A political-historical perspective: 1652 - 2020

Gabriel Louw

DEDICATION

To those true Afrikaners who were never members of the National Party and the Broederbond and who have never underwritten the ideologies of and participated in these groups' thinking and doings, especially between 1948 and 1994.

Your genuine human, personal, economic, social and political efforts and manifold sufferings, humiliation and fighting over many years against super-nationalistic Afrikanerism and its in-depth discrimination, were at the end worthwhile and well-compensated by the spectacular collapsed of the National Party and its Grand Apartheid.

However long the night, the dawn will break (African Proverb).

AUTHOR'S NOTE

THIS book is the outcome of a series of seven academic papers published in the South African accredited journal *Ensovoort* from September to November 2017. Much has been published worldwide on apartheid and the negative role of the Afrikaner-tribe in the engineering and execution of this policy in South Africa over many years. Afrikaners have been labelled internationally as extreme White racists and supremacists, even by the countries from where their ancestors hailed. In South Africa they are experiencing more and more hostility from the current Black government in reaction to the apartheid past. The impact of liberation movements and the demands of current human rights activists and propagandists for redress of the political, social and economic discrimination and exploitation of the past leave Afrikaners in a position where they are still the culprits, always available to accuse and to blame. South African politics has become a very one-sided environment in which the Afrikaners, presently isolated and uprooted, have very little opportunity to object to or to reflect on their history as a tribe and on apartheid itself. For one thing, the Black-on-Black genocides in South Africa two centuries ago remain hidden, not only from the international eye, but also from South Africans. It has become a history delayed, a history denied.

In current public discourse, the negative determinants and role players that caused, steered and strengthened the sentiments and resulting policy of racial discrimination are ignored when anti-apartheid extremists condemn Afrikaners. Their focus has become a sweeping anti-Afrikaner sentiment, entrenched worldwide in the general public and global opinion makers.

Thus far the topics of "Afrikaner" and "apartheid" have seldom been objectively examined in South Africa itself due to the unwritten rules of political correctness that have been dictating South African public discourse since the White-to- Black regime transition in 1994. After the collapse of White rule in 1994, certain dogmatic views on Afrikaners and apartheid were formulated and propagated in a completely one-sided manner. Opposition to and critics of the current political thinking and doing are not tolerated very well by the post-1994 South African regime.

The word apartheid has become an international understood term to identify and describe racism as a crime against humanity, while the Afrikaners specifically have in this context been identified as the exclusive international culprits guilty of this misbehaviour. Activists and propagandists ignore the facts that prove early Europeans to be the true creators and champions of apartheid, racism, human rights abuse and genocide worldwide. Is today's hostility and ill treatment of thousands upon thousands of Islamic refugees and migrants from the war-torn Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria by the various European peoples not a cruel reawakening of the truth of this historical fact?

The aim of the book is not to justify or deny Afrikaner involvement in apartheid and all its wrongs. Most Afrikaners undoubtedly took part in racial discrimination and benefited shamelessly from the political and socio- economical system over a long period of time. Ugo Betti (1953) makes a comment about the often-unpunished serious wrongdoings within families, and this remark is applicable to the Afrikaner tribe as well: "I think the family is the place where the most ridiculous and least respectable things in the world go on". "Ridiculous" and "least respectable" are not harsh enough words to describe the wrongs of apartheid, and the Afrikaner tribe cannot escape their part in it.

However, most Afrikaners accept their guilt for apartheid and do not try to avoid their responsibility. The primary aim of the book is to go deeper in an effort to bring to the foreground the various determinants and

role players that influenced the creation, establishment and drive behind apartheid. These influences were present from 1652 with the Cape Settlement and they are still present in 2017. They include the Afrikaners' origins; historical experiences; the internalization of racial, cultural and social values; and the agents who drove practices of racial discrimination. As such, the book aims to put the general ethnic, racial, social and psychological intentions and inclinations of the South African peoples in perspective. The current and future dilemmas in relation to the continued existence of the Afrikaners, either as individuals or as a tribe, are also in-depth addressed.

One central question stands out at this stage: Is the Afrikaner not a latecomer to the global White community's practice of apartheid, White supremacy and the political abuse of Blacks? Do Afrikaners deserve to be the scapegoats on which to blame all modern racism? Is it not time that the citizens of the world learn more about the Afrikaners?

When you meet a man, you judge him by his clothes; when you leave, you judge him by his heart (Russian Proverb). Could this also be the case if the world meets and gets to know the Afrikaner better? Hopefully this book will introduce the true Afrikaner to the objective reader, freed from his many masks and many labels.

The book consists of seven chapters that address the following topics: 1) Who is the Afrikaner?; 2) The historical determinants and role players in the establishment and maintenance of racial discrimination in the mindsets of Afrikaners; 3) Present and past determinants and role players in the establishment and continuation of perceptions of injustices in the minds of Afrikaners; 4) The Afrikaners' failure to understand, accept and internalize the indigenous realities of South Africa; 5) The vicious cycle of revenge and counter-revenge around apartheid; 6) The preparedness of Afrikaners to deal with the realities and challenges of the new South Africa; 7) 2020 is the time for thinking, planning, and action. The overarching goal of the study is to determine the position of the Afrikaner in the year 2120. The Afrikaners' possible dissolution as a "volk" in a century's time is central to the research.

When writing this book, I took the inimically experience of the young American Zionist Peter Beinart, the author of *The Crisis of Zionism* (Picador © 2013), which was critical of the older generation of authoritarian Jewish Israelis, to heart, when he writes (p. 197):

'Are you Peter Beinart?' called out the woman who spotted me on the street. She was in her sixties or seventies, thin, with an Israeli accent. 'Yes,' I replied, and walked over to shake her hand. She paused, before reluctantly extending hers, she declared, 'I'm very angry at you. You don't understand all the harm you do.'

I'm very angry at you. Do people speak that way to writers they disagree with about tax cuts? The hostility was personal, intimate. It's something I experienced again and again after the initial publication of this book. People told me they felt sorry for my mother that she raised such an anti-Israel son. Several warned that my children, realizing my true nature, would one day turn against me. On indignant e-mailer suggested that she begin a correspondence with my wife. On Twitter, a woman said she would never make me chicken soup.

After the publishing of this book I hope the Afrikaner tannies will still make me some afval and biltong.

I trust that the book will be of interest and of use to those persons who are involved in constructive community sociology, behavioural psychology and African tribal politics, and those who are focused on the history and behaviours of the Afrikaners of South Africa. It also offers some insight into the dogmas of the nationalist Afrikaners with their apartheid-doctrine of racial discrimination, opposed over many years by a segment of liberal Afrikaners, freed from racial contamination. It also offers the opportunity for self-introspection by Afrikaners, especially the older generation.

Note: Although there is routinely made use of masculine pronouns for ease of reading in the book this in no way implies a sexist attitude. The same is applicable on the use of certain names identifying specific ethnic/cultural/racial groups from the South African history. This use is necessary in this research to can focus specific on the country's complex social, ethnical and political problems and the development of apartheid around class, ethnic and racial differentiation. In the South Africa's post-1994 policy of political correctness these names are seen as words of degradation and is been sensitively avoided in public speaking and writing.

Gabriel Louw, Author, Potchefstroom, September 2020.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

GABRIEL LOUW, a psychologist, historian, educator, researcher and writer, is a professor-emeritus of the Potchefstroom University of Christian Higher Education (PUCHE) and the North-West University (NWU), South Africa, where he lectured and did research at the Department of Psychology (1980-1995) of PUCHE and at the Faculty of Education (2009-2013) of the Mahikeng-campus, NWU. After his retirement at the NWU, he was appointed by the University in its Focus Area Social Transformation at the Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom-campus: in 2016 as research fellow, in 2019 as an extraordinary researcher and since 2020 as an extraordinary professor.

He was also the head of two South African private tertiary institutions and worked as senior consultant in the South African private tertiary sector (1996-2008). He designed and developed multitude graduate and postgraduate programs for private tertiary institutions.

He started his career in the South African Civil Service as a teacher (1968-1969), an archivist (1970-1972) and a psychologist (1973-1979).

He is the sole/co-author of over hundred accredited articles, books and other academic publications and of more than two hundred selected research reports on higher education. He served as supervisor/promoter and examiner for more than forty senior post-graduate studies. (His international research identification is: ID orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8093).

His main research interests are healthcare and tertiary educational development and management, general, healthcare and political history, as well as the individual's constitutional and political rights.

He obtained degrees at the Universities of Stellenbosch, South Africa, Potchefstroom and the North-West, South Africa. He obtained in 1976 the MA (Psychology) from UNISA and holds respectively a DPhil (1984) and a PhD (1991), both in Psychology, from PUCHE, as well as a PhD (2018) in Governance and Political Transformation from NWU.

Professor Louw was born in 1946 in the village Vanwyksvlei in the Great Karoo, Northern Cape, South Africa.

Also books by Gabriel Louw

- Personality Psychology (Co-author with AT Möller) (1987)
- Perspectives on Personality (Co-author with AT Möller) (1993)
- Traditional Mental Health Care in a new SA (1993)
- The formulation and practice of the ethics of Psychology in SA (1993)
- Legislation concerning Professional Psychology in SA: 1946-1992 (1993)
- Contributions of specific institutions to the establishment of psychology in SA: 1912-1982 (1993)
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- The Crisis of the Afrikaners: Is dissolution a century away? (2018)
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- An appraisal of the executive political leaders and their regimes of South Africa: 1652 – 1872 (2020)
- Sangomas in South Africa's modern-day Healthcare (2020)

ABBREVIATIONS

AA	Affirmative Action
AB	Afrikaner Broederbond
ANC	African National Congress
AWB	Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging/Afrikaner Resistance Movement
BEE	Black Economic Empowerment
CP	Conservative Party
CSAP	Cape South African Party
DA	Democratic Alliance
DNA	Deoxyribonucleic Acid
DRC	Dutch Reformed Church
EE	Employment Equity
FF	Plus Freedom Front Plus/Vryheid Front Plus
MK	Umkhonto weSizwe
NP	National Party
NPA	National Prosecution Authority
NSDI	National Dialogue
PNP	Purified Nationalist Party
RC	Reformed Church
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
RET	Radical Economic Transformation
RSA	Republic of South Africa
RST	Radical Social Transformation
SAA	South Africa Airways
SABC	South African Broadcasting Corporation
SABW	Second Anglo Boer War
SAP	South Africa Party
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UK	United Kingdom
UNPO	Organisation for Unrepresented Nations and Groups
URC	United Reformed Church
USA	United States of America
VOC	Vereenigde Oostindische Compangie
WW2	World War II
ZABBV	Zuid-Afrikaansche Boere Bescherminingsvereniging

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CHAPTER 1

WHO IS THE AFRIKANER?

1.1 Introduction

“The world on September 11, 1901, was not a bad place for a healthy white man with a decent education and some money in the bank when the class to which he belonged had enjoyed ‘at a low cost and with the least trouble, conveniences, comforts, and amenities beyond the compass of the richest and most powerful monarchs of other ages’”, writes Niall Ferguson.^{1, p.3} What was most important, added Ferguson^{1, p.4}, was that this White man of 1901 saw “this state of affairs as normal, certain, and permanent, except in the direction of further improvement, and any deviation from it as aberrant, scandalous, and avoidable”.

This world of 1901 was the oyster of the White man, but for the critical observer, like the economist John Maynard Keynes, it was not without toxic impurities that could devour the White man and the false and superficial utopia over time. Indeed, two cruel and devastating World Wars, various other regional wars, two world-wide financial depressions, internationally ethnic and racial reprisals by the suppressed non-Whites, worldwide radical regime changes and many other calamities ensued from 1901 to 1950. This unexpectedly, unasked and unavoidably changed the White man’s belief in his unshakable “permanent and normal privileged lifestyle,” concludes Ferguson.^{1, p.4}

For nationalist Afrikaners, especially those living between 1948 and the late 1980s, South Africa was not a bad place to live in either; an oyster of Apartheid-privileged lifestyle that Afrikaners undoubtedly believed was normal and permanent and that could only be improved with time. However, the post-1994 democratic dispensation arrived virtually overnight: unexpected, unasked, unwelcome and unthinkable, and most of all, unavoidable for Afrikaners if they wanted a future existence in South Africa and on the African continent. This socio-economical, political and humanitarian correction of the economical, psychological, political and social wrongs created by the nationalist Afrikaners with their racial discrimination against non-Whites, brought tremendous aberrant and unforeseen negative changes to their good lifestyles, psychological functioning, religious, social-economical and political powers, individual and human rights, even citizen privileges. It also terminated the nationalist Afrikaner’s self-belief with one stroke of the pen. This self-belief was inculcated

in Afrikaners since 1652 and it held that the Afrikaners have an “inherited ability” as Europeans to rule forever the indigenous peoples of South Africa.^{1,2,3}

The favourable socio-economical political set-up described above was statutorily erased in 1994 as the political tide turned on the Afrikaner. As the fortune of Ferguson’s¹ White man of 1901 changed dramatically during the first 50 years of the century, so did the Afrikaner’s fortune change dramatically, but in just 23 years. The Afrikaner is now inextricably linked to the birth pains of political, economical, social and personal modernization in the new South Africa. The Afrikaner brought this on himself during the 1970s without realising the consequences. The future life of the Afrikaner seems to be a totally different one from the one that he and his ancestors experienced or envisioned. When 1994 arrived, the Afrikaner was not only isolated from his fellow South Africans, there was no one left in the world to help him with this fate.^{1,4-10}

In light of the above historical overview, the general question is thus prominent: *Who is the Afrikaner?*

Answering this question has become unavoidable. In 2017 this question needs immediate attention to ensure the Afrikaner’s present-day and future psychological, political, social, financial, emotional and physical well-being.

The lack of an in-depth self-investigation and analysis of who he is has undoubtedly led to a situation where the nationalist Afrikaner and every individual inside the so-called greater Afrikaner grouping carries many unsolved psychological and political traumas and other dispositions with him over many years. This troubles the Afrikaner’s adjustment to the new, greater multi-racial society of South Africa. Many parts of Afrikaner history can possibly be traced back to the Afrikaner’s insufficient knowledge and lack of insight into his history. This includes the political malfunctioning of proto-Afrikaners in the Boer republics after 1902; the transformation of various proto-Afrikaner groups into Afrikaners and later to *nationalist Afrikaners* and *super Afrikaners* in the Union and in the Republic of South Africa. The history of the Afrikaner has contributed greatly to the robustness and roughness that Afrikaners display in their daily behaviour and their thinking on racism and ethnicity. It is time for the Afrikaner to confront the good and the bad in their history, but this necessitates an honest and a comprehensive valuation of Afrikaner history and who the Afrikaner is. Only then can the identity of the present-day Afrikaner be understood and the group’s possible future been mapped. Only through such a

true and objective re-evaluation of history can the Afrikaner's real identity and place in the new and future South Africa be revealed; his dark fate as a result of the ill-treatment of non-Whites be made bearable; and the tragic meaning of his possible dissolution become understandable.¹¹⁻¹⁶

Once the Afrikaner knows his own history and who he is, he will much more easily evaluate the role of cognitive thinking and life experiences in the past racial and ethnic domination and discrimination, and he would be able to decide how to handle the present-day environment in an effort to outlive dissolution.

The aim of this chapter is to research and to reflect on *who the Afrikaner are*: the Afrikaners' European heritage, their identification as 'Afrikaner', their present-day population numbers, the assumed uniqueness of the Afrikaans language and Afrikaner culture, as well as their position inside the Afrikaanses group and their assumed 'European and White blood-purity'. Research was done by means of a literature review to reflect on the Afrikaners and to the put thought, views and opinions on the Afrikaners in perspective.¹⁷⁻¹⁹

1.2 Role of ethnicity in discrimination

Most of the social domination and discrimination that has ravaged societies over the centuries was primary activated by *ethnicity* and *race*. Ethnicity is the combination of the language, habits, customs, and rituals practiced in the house, the school and the religious life of a person or group. Ethnic differences do not necessary include racial differences. Indeed, one single determinant, like language, is sometimes enough to distinguish two ethnic groups within the same racial group. Such a small difference can start discrimination, violence and even genocide. Race, hereto, is seen as inherited physical characteristics, transmitted from parents to children in their DNA. Racism is a doctrine of innate or biological superiority, which, in its classical form, leads to discrimination that deprives members of victimized groups of equal protection under the laws and of a proper lifestyle. Race per se is one of the most devastating determinants in racial discrimination and genocide worldwide, especially from the middle-1800s to the middle-1900s. Although race and ethnicity are mostly seen and discussed as two separate entities, they are seldom active separately. Usually they form a sole determinant in genocide together, or even in the common discriminations of daily life.^{1,20-22}

In contrast to above outcomes in the thinking and the behaviour of men on race and ethnic differences, the science of modern genetics reveals that human beings

are remarkably alike and that all humans belong to one species in terms of DNA (Deoxyribonucleic Acid). The origin of this one species can be traced back to Africa between 100 000 and 200 000 years ago. This species only started to spread to the new continents as late as 60 000 years ago. Also, it must be noted that the differences used to denote racial identities in South Africa, like for instance an Afrikaner or a Zulu, are superficial. The distinctions were and are still the basis of racial and ethnic discrimination. The darker pigmentation in the melanocytes of peoples whose ancestors lived close to the equator, and the physiognomy which makes eyes narrower and noses shorter at the eastern end of the great Eurasian landmass, as well as hair types, are of secondary importance. Geographical dispersion led to humans forming groups that became physically quite distinct over time, but below the skin, peoples are quite similar. Furthermore, despite outward differences; great distances between groups and mutual incomprehension, these so-called “unique races” of the earth have intermingled.¹

Notwithstanding the above biological similarity many people, including the Afrikaner specifically, have thought and acted as if the so-called physically distinctive races were separate species, especially during the 20th century. Specific individuals and groups who are different were classified as somehow ‘subhuman’.^{1,21-23}

It seems in this context as if humans, notwithstanding our intelligence and cognitive insight, and thus a logical awareness that genetic racial differences may indeed be insignificant; have to a certain extent, been driven by an inherent psych-biological disposition that is designed to attach importance to racial differences. These differences have led to intense discrimination and even the murder of people based on their race and class.¹

The inclination to discriminate against other racial groups and against people of the same race simply on cultural, religious and political grounds is not unique to the Afrikaner, even though it is a behaviour that is sometimes be seen by psychologists as a psycho-pathology.^{3,24-26}

Various situations, like the Nazi genocide of the Jews and the ongoing modern-day human tragedies in Israel and Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and less prominent racial and ethnic conflicts in modern-day USA and Europe, illustrate this world-wide inclination.^{1,4,27-30}

Research shows that most of the Y-chromosomes found in Jewish males are the same as those found in other Middle Eastern men, meaning that notwithstanding their bitter hate and pathological murdering of each other, Israelis and Palestinians are genetically very close. Their inter-racial discrimination orientation is therefore rather based on an ethnic life style: religious differences, socio-economical classes and social behaviours. These differences play the dominant role, rather than pure racial content.¹

As another example, it seems as racial and ethnic prejudices (based on physical and cultural differences) are practiced in combination in the USA to create and maintain White-on-Black discrimination. Although an American study shows that between 20% and 25% of the DNA of most African Americans can be traced back to Europe, they are still treated as “European-different” by the so-called White Americans based on the physical differences. In addition, a lower social class and income classification is associated with Blacks in the USA, supporting and strengthening further racial discrimination.^{1,31,32}

This illustrates the fact that visible physical features, like skin colour, hair type and facial features are undoubtedly still powerfully drivers in discrimination, regardless of the actual genetic closeness of the groups in question. Such external features can be much stronger role players than cultural determinants.

When racial and ethnic discrimination functions in combination, the outcome can have serious consequences for the victim. This negative outcome seems to be in line with the Afrikaners’ discriminatory attitude towards people of different colour and class.³³⁻³⁵

In South Africa, the White Afrikaner discriminated against Blacks and mixed races for centuries by means of ethnic and racial domination of the political, economic, social and cultural spheres. Domination was structured, managed and executed primarily by means of class. Vilakazi^{36, p.43} aptly describes the machine-like precision with which the Afrikaner elite managed Apartheid discrimination when he writes:

The structure of racial domination is kept up by pillars of political, economic, social and cultural institutions, above all, bureaucracies, controlled and run by men and women from specific social classes. We should also keep in mind the crucial fact that, in our age of elections for State offices, particular parties and politicians find support and favour from, and arise out of, particular social classes; these parties and

politicians may therefore champion the causes and pander to the prejudices of particular social classes, no matter what the racial group may be.

In day-to-day, practical terms, Whites, therefore, do not all dominate Blacks a like. Some exercise the domination directly and harshly; others exercise it still indirectly, but more ‘pleasantly’ and ‘kindly’; some exercise it indirectly, but still harshly; while still others exercise it indirectly, with sophistication and even ‘friendship’ for Blacks. All this depends on the class background of the Whites concerned, and the institutions within which they make their living within the huge edifice of racial domination.

In this context, Vilakazi^{36, p. 44} furthermore writes:

Blacks also do not experience racial domination in exactly similar ways, for there are growing class differentiations within the Black population. For the vast majority, however, domination is still direct, harsh and sharp-edged: this is true for farm workers, peasants and the working classes in industries, cities and White homes.

In addition to the clear class distinction between Whites and non-Whites, the Apartheid regime grouped all Blacks together as one ethnic group to fit the political domination and institutionalised discrimination.

The Afrikaner unfortunately wears the same “stained cloak” of serious racial and ethnic discriminations as the German, Jew, Palestinian, Briton, the American and many other nationalities and races worldwide, guilty or not guilty. This “dark past” of the Afrikaner must therefore be addressed in a study on the future of the Afrikaner as an individual, group or tribe. This includes addressing who he is, how he was formed and where he comes from. This is a historical issue with an immense impact on today’s Afrikaners and their psychological experience of the new South Africa. The issue has thus far deliberately been avoided by the Afrikaner himself. However, avoiding the past out of a sense of shame is unnecessary. The Afrikaner’s history is no more shocking and tragically than that of the Zulu or the Xhosa tribes or the Scots or Ukrainians, and it must be thoroughly understood to understand the present day and future inclinations and intentions of this group of people.

An understanding of the Afrikaners' history will hopefully shed light on why they practiced racial discrimination to such an extreme and for so long. The unavoidable questions are: Were these discriminatory beliefs driven by a need to keep their assumed pure European bloodline, which makes them "better" than non-Whites, pure at all times? Was it driven by a psycho-pathological mindset on race and White supremacy? Was it shaped by unhappy life experiences during their development that became learned and internalised ideas that drove their thinking and actions? Was it driven by inborn psychopathic inclinations in their psyche, making them selfish and conscienceless so that they put their interests first at the cost of others' interests and lives?

1.3 The concepts Afrikaner people and nation, Afrikaans as language, Afrikaanses, the name Afrikaner, Afrikaners in numbers, Afrikaner culture and the Afrikaners' White blood purity

It is of utmost importance to understand the above concepts related to Afrikaner history to determine and to describe the role of race and ethnicity in the discriminatory inclinations of the Afrikaner. The following questions are prominent in this regard:

- Do Afrikaners as Whites from the Afrikaner ethnic group and the Blacks in South Africa truly differ so much that these differences could have led to the Afrikaner's negative attitudes towards other races and to the resulting discrimination?
- Are the seemingly unique features of the Afrikaner, like their status as a people, their exclusive Afrikaans language, the name "Afrikaner", their significance in terms of numbers, the Afrikaner culture and their "pure" White bloodline true reflections of who Afrikaners are?

These features are described and evaluated in the following sub-divisions.

1.3.1 The Afrikaner people and nation

Over the years, a vast body of literature on the proto-Afrikaners and later the nationalist Afrikaners has come to reflect them as members of the exclusive Afrikaner people. This group identity was fore grounded after 1948 with the Malan-Strydom-Verwoerd doctrine of the Afrikaners as a unique European-race that developed over many years in the Cape and who is permanently established in Africa. This idea of the Afrikaner resulted from the political and social domination of civil society by the National Party (NP), the Afrikaner

Broederbond (AB) and various Dutch Calvinist Protestant churches, especially the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC). These forces undoubtedly influenced people to internalise this Afrikaner mindset and lifestyle.^{3,37-39}

For many reasons this trend could not be successfully challenged before the early 1990s. There was great political force behind this mindset. Many dissident Afrikaners, English-speaking Whites and of course all the Blacks endured it in silence. The power behind this indoctrination started to lose steam after 1994 with the constant decline of the Afrikaner numbers and their political disempowerment. The Black majority also embraced the new politically free and democratic environment and started to look at the Afrikaners critically. They regarded the Afrikaner as a group that lacks any direct association with or support from Europe. They are merely a minority group of South Africa. This threw suspicion on the status of the Afrikaner as a people. During the Apartheid regime, most Blacks groups were restricted to certain territories and areas and classified in terms of tribes. In the new South Africa, all the tribes were collected to form the total population of South Africa and a new South African nation. In a certain sense, this diminished the status of the Afrikaner as *the* South African people to one of many tribes that together constitute a nation.^{7,36,40}

With reference to the concept Afrikaner nation, the Anglo Boer War veteran and later South African nationalist politician, JBM Hertzog, reflected that the founding of the Union of South Africa in 1910 seemingly created a new White nation in the minds of White liberals. This new nation was a South African nation, styled according to the thinking and doctrines of the British Empire. This nation was set to replace ideas of an Afrikaner identity and nation as it existed before 1910. Hertzog rejected any such ideas and nipped them in the bud. He acknowledged only the Afrikaner nation when he stated that the Afrikaner developed in South Africa, complete with the language of Afrikaans, as a new nation that had incorporated Dutch, French and German cultural and biological elements. Hertzog hailed the existence of an Afrikaner nation as early as the 1910s.³

At the same time, Hertzog admitted that to be called a nation, a strong nationalism is needed. This necessitated a comprehensive unity that required more than the existence of a shared religious, own language, culture, shared life values and racial nationalism. According to Hertzog, the Afrikaans people still lacked in this area by the 1910s. Indeed, the Afrikaner nation, later presented as a fact by the South African nationalist Afrikaner prime-ministers DF Malan and

JG Strydom, also failed with regard to these requirements. The mono-ethnic NP and their leader Verwoerd's efforts to establish a territory for Afrikaners and other Whites by means of Apartheid failed the test of time after the decline in the power base of the Afrikaners.³⁷

What was seen at the time and is still constantly propagated today as an Afrikaner nation, was nothing more than an emotional and political rhetoric to motivate a subgroup of nationalist Afrikaners to support the Apartheid ideologies of leaders such as Malan, Strydom and Verwoerd (three persons seen by the opposition of Apartheid as Nazi-orientated). This subgroup stands separate from the total Afrikaner population. Many members of this group of nationalist Afrikaners who belonged to the NP, AB and the DRC (and whom Giliomee⁴¹, p. 11 describes as *NP-Broederbonder-Afrikaners*) remains caught in this way of thinking and doing. They stuck to this notion of the Afrikaner nation after the founding of the Verwoerd republic in 1961 and its collapse and they stick to it even today. The NP-AB-DRC-classification of people who upheld the concepts Afrikaner nation and Afrikaner identity, is distinct from the so-called "SAP-Afrikaners", followers of the Smuts group, with their less comprehensive Afrikaner identification and nation status^{3,39,41,42}. This conclusion is in line with various other historical and political researchers.^{7,37,43}

Giliomee⁷ reflects that Afrikaner nationalism has dominated South Africa for so long that it has come to look like a fixed feature in the history. In this context of contradictions, he states that in the 1890s there was no conscious Afrikaner nationalism or movement. In fact, there was no recognisable Afrikaner or Afrikaner nation, no agreement about the term Afrikaner, while the Afrikaans language was a despised "kitchen" or "Hottentot" language. Giliomee⁷, p. 7 writes:

Contemporary observers in the 1870s and 1880s identified a distinct ethnic segment within the White population of southern Africa. They were people from Dutch, German or French descent, with a considerable sprinkling of Black ancestors who had merged into a group in the course of the eighteenth century. With few exceptions, members married inside the group, belonged to the one of the three Reformed Churches, spoke Dutch or Afrikaans at home, and had a largely shared history".

It is important to note that the issues around nation status and nationalism are much more complicated and comprehensive than the propagandists of an

Afrikaner nation or an Afrikaner identity seem to understand. While the Afrikaners pride themselves in the fact that they originate from age-old nations like the Dutch, Germans and French, it seems that these nations themselves are not that old. Giliomee⁷ shows in this regard that studies of ethnic movements in Eastern Europe and the Third World indicate that the ethnic and national identity that forms a nation is not natural, but artificial inventions driven by political, economic and social alliances of distinct classes to empower them to face the everyday and long-term challenges of life. As such, many nations are not as old as generally believed and accepted. Sometimes a situation requires a group to have more than a vague idea about the race of groups, their culture and history. They are forced to invent a national identity and to become a political nation for the sake of empowerment. This development path, as with that of many European nations and thus the Afrikaners' European fore-bearers, repeated itself with the development of the Afrikaner identity and nation concept, although it seems to be less successful than the creations of their fore-bearers.

The Afrikaner only became prominent in South African history as a so-called nation because of their early political and military power and dominance of other groups in the Cape, not because they were by any means sacred. The South African Coloureds show the same dynamics and uniqueness as the Afrikaners, but they were stigmatised and side-lined from the start simply because they are not "pure Europeans" and because they lacked social, economic, political and military power from 1652 onwards to position themselves as a significant racial group. The same is goes for the Griquas. This group formed before permanent settlement at the Cape from contact between Portuguese sailors visiting the Cape and Khois women. Later, after 1652, this new ethnic group was strengthened by further miscegenation between White colonists at the Cape and Khois women. Adam Kok (born circa 1710) grouped them together as a people in the 18th century. Initially known as "Basters" (Bastards), their name was changed to Griqua in 1813 under influence of a London missionary because of the stigma surrounding the word "bastard" in Europe. They became, just like the pro-Afrikaners, established as a "nation", although much fewer in numbers than the Cape Coloureds. They settled on Kok's farm *Klaarwater*, later to be known as Griekwastad in the region known as Griekwaland-Wes. The same political, economic and military disempowerment that the Coloureds experienced from early on became their fate. They were side-lined from the social, economic and political mainstream and were denied a prominent role as a "nation" equal to the Afrikaners.^{41,44,45}

Within the ranks of the NP leadership, it was only in 1981 that a minister in a NP cabinet, Dr PGJ Koornhof, showed the courage to admit that the Afrikaners are only one population group among 14 other groups in South Africa.⁴² This opinion was later supported by president PW Botha in 1986 when he said that the peoples of South Africa form one nation. This served as a clear indication of how the various minority and majority groups inside the borders of the country were encircling Afrikaners, and the Afrikaner was only one of the groups in the country. Although this statement was part of the opportunistic neo-Apartheid (liberal) thinking that entered the mindset of the leadership of the NP during the 1980s, it was a clear admission that there is and has never been an Afrikaner nation.⁴⁰ Koornhof and Botha's viewpoints, although a century later, do not differ from what Paul Kruger said in 1883^{46, p. 356}: "Evenzo zal ik steeds mijn hartelike ondersteuning schenken aan elke poging ener nauwere verbinding tussen de staten en kolonieën van Zuid-Afrika ter kweking van een Zuid-Afrikaanse natie...". In Kruger's view, there was no Afrikaner nation in the 1880s or in view future at the time.

It is doubtful that one could say that the Afrikaner was a true nation in the 1910s or in 2017. The opportunistic and misleading political rhetoric common from the 1940s to the early 1980s, is seldom heard in public or reflected in literature these days.

1.3.2 Afrikaans as language

The Afrikaans language has been and is still one of the prominent reasons why Afrikaners aim to maintain exclusively Afrikaans public universities, schools and business entities and to identify villages, townships and cities that date from before 1994 with Afrikaner names. Discrimination against Afrikaans in social life and the formally phasing out of the language at public institutions has led to various court cases and other formal protests. Indeed, its conservation, together with the Afrikaner identity and name, is one of the main reasons why some aspire to an independent Afrikaner state in South Africa. For the majority of Afrikaners, Afrikaans is undoubtedly a personal heirloom, a unique ethno-language, covered in their believed ethnic and racial heretage.⁴⁷⁻⁵⁹

The present official and unofficial attitude of the ANC government towards Afrikaans is most negative, discriminatory and driven by the single intention to demolish Afrikaans as a commonly used public language, basically because it is still seen as the language of the oppressor. These discriminative actions are reflected more and more in the judicial system, at universities and schools and

public services of South Africa. This is also seen as a focused and planned effort to diminish the Afrikaners legal, political, economic, personal and civil rights and positions. Afrikaners have reactions to these official and unofficial conducts. The reactions are becoming more and more aggressive and negative towards the government, with fierce court cases, public publications and comments, and various other agitations.⁶⁰⁻⁶⁹

Is this idea that the Afrikaans language belongs solely to the present-day Afrikaners correct?

It is important to study the history of and the development of the language Afrikaans to find an answer to this question.

Afrikaans, currently the third most widely spoken home language in South Africa, evolved from the Dutch vernacular of South Holland. It was initially spoken as a Dutch dialect (with some varieties) by the proto-Afrikaner settlers on the Cape frontier during the eighteenth century. These people were socially and culturally isolated and less educated than the Cape Dutch living in Cape Town and its immediate environment. In this isolation and in the muddle of various races and classes living and working together – Europeans, Hottentot, the Khoi-San, Negro and Indian-Malaysian slaves – and the dialect already different from the original Dutch, it became a way of daily communication between the groups. From there the early reference to it as the “*taal*” (language), but something of doubtful quality and inferior status. It can with right be said that various racial groups – the French, German, British, Portuguese, the European free burghers, as well as slaves from Southeast Asia like Malaysia, Madagascar and native Africans, Khoikhoi and people of mixed descent – all contributed to this emerging language (initially described as “Kitchen” or “Hottentot” Afrikaans) by adding some of their own vocabulary and cultural practices.^{7,71-73}

From the late 17th century onwards, the Dutch spoken at the Cape started to develop differences from the original Dutch with respect to morphology, pronunciation, accent, and to a certain extent, also in syntax and vocabulary. The language spoken in the Cape start to assimilate influences from the already established new dialect often described with names such as “Cape Dutch”, “African Dutch”, “Kitchen (Kombuis) Dutch”, “Hottentot Dutch” and “Taal” (meaning: language). This proto-Afrikaans only started to develop into a separate language by the 19th century.^{7,74}

Afrikaans initially developed slowly. The first print of proto-Afrikaans only appeared during the early 19th century. Much of the work to develop Afrikaans into a separate language was initially done by the “Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners”.^{7,39}

Pure Dutch remained the official language at the Cape for a long time. This formal use of Dutch continued even after the establishment of the Union of South Africa. In fact, much objection was raised against efforts to legalise Afrikaans as a new language until the 1900s, mostly from Afrikaners themselves. One reason for the official pleas to recognise Afrikaans was the fact that it was already the language used at universities, courts and schools from as early as 1915. It was only in 1925 that Afrikaans was given equal status to Dutch by an act passed by parliament. It became one of the two official languages (with English the second) of the Union of South Africa. As a legal entity, Afrikaans is not yet a century old in 2017. In the new South Africa, Afrikaans has lost its early primary status and is recognised today as one of the eleven official languages and as an African language. Notwithstanding this “African uniqueness” and its remaining independent status as a language, the South African Dutch dialect, known today as Afrikaans and the Dutch spoken in The Netherlands are still very similar, so much that it is mutually intelligible. This makes it less of an exclusive and independent language than what Afrikaners many times argue.^{39,48,58,68,74}

Second, regarding the initial creators and speakers of Afrikaans at the Cape, there is, as already indicated, no doubt that the early Dutch-speaking White settlers were the main creators of Afrikaans and that they initially guided its development. As also already indicated, other ethnic and racial groups, especially those who were living in the countryside, also contributed to the formation of Afrikaans with vocabulary from their mother tongues. These inputs were limited to contributions to the Dutch dialect. However, newcomers to the colony such as German and French settlers, Cape slaves and non-White groups, usually reverted to the use of Dutch and the later to the various dialects of Dutch and proto-Afrikaans. They used proto-Afrikaans in their communication with their owners, other slaves and non-Whites. In this way, the language was maintained and expanded by the non-Whites as well. Indeed, the inclusive labelling of the “Taal” as “Kombuis” and “Hottentot” Afrikaans aptly illustrates the impact and involvement of household workers (slaves) and other free workers and other indigenous peoples in the forming of the language. It is not the “elite” of the Cape Dutch (Whites) who should be honoured as the sole

fathers of Afrikaans. The prefixes “kombuis” and “Hottentot” indicates an early stigma associated with the language because it was widely used by the lower socio-economical classes and lower level working classes in their working places as the kitchen (which included mostly non-Whites and slaves) in their mutual communication away from the more complicated Dutch language that was used by the educated Whites at the Cape.^{39,48,49,75-77}

The influence of slaves and non-Whites on Afrikaans was greatly affected by the fact that by 1754 there were only 6 000 Whites in the Cape, but they already far outnumbered by the imported slaves. This means that in comparison with the proto-Afrikaners (Whites), an equal, if not larger proportion of these non-Whites was already speaking “Kombuis” and “Hottentot” Afrikaans by the late-1700s. In 1806, the proto-Afrikaners numbered 26 720 or 36% of the colony’s population, meaning that there were already 74 222 other people (mostly non-Afrikaners or non-Whites) at the Cape, of whom most spoke a kind of proto-Afrikaans or a Dutch dialect. “Kombuis” or “Hottentot” Afrikaans” was most probably forced on workers, but it was nurtured by the non-Whites as their only medium of communication with the proto-Afrikaners.^{7,39,78}

Afrikaans is indeed a multicultural and multiracial language, developed and established to a certain extent by the various races of South Africa, starting in 1652. Ownership of the language rests with all South Africa people. Its survival as an official language is strongly steered and guarded by the so-called Bruin (Brown) Afrikaners or Coloureds. This group is starting to claim more and more ownership of the language and its various dialects. It seems as if they regard the use of Afrikaans as their main communication medium in schools, universities, at work, and in their personal and social lives as absolutely essential and not a matter open for discussion or negotiation for the future. The fact that this group represents more than 3.6 million people and that they are constantly growing in numbers, makes them a factor that the ANC should take into account in its discrimination against Afrikaans. The ANC think of the Brown population as grouped with the Blacks who they freed from oppression, from the Afrikaner. It seems that this group, together with Black Afrikaans speakers (making up a group of more or less 6 million persons in total) will be the rescuers of the language, and not the Afrikaner.^{41,48,49,75,77,79-81}

1.3.3 Afrikaanses

The term “Afrikaanses” is a new group name that sprouted by the late 2000s. It is used by some nationalist Afrikaners in their efforts to include other racial and

ethnic Afrikaans speakers into the Afrikaner-grouping, like the Cape Coloureds, solely to strengthen the Afrikaners' fading political empowerment and to obtain numbers in an effort to avoid the dissolution awaiting the Afrikaner in a century's time. Nationalist Afrikaners are now also making an effort to involve other Afrikaans speakers of non-White status to assure the existence of the name Afrikaner, its identity as a group and the conservation of the Afrikaans language in the near future by their offering to "redefine" the name and entity "Afrikaner". It is a very vague and an undefined offer on the one hand, and a very opportunistic offer on the other. It is too little too late, and totally inappropriate and irrelevant within the political context of modern-day South Africa. "Afrikaanses" have been existing for a long time apart from the Afrikaners and they are not as a group in need of mercy and incorporation to be saved or to be helped as a group. This effort to redefine the name Afrikaner and to make it more comprehensive so that it includes other ethnicities and races, seems to be nothing more than a masked wish to depart from the name "Afrikaner" to get away from the exclusivity of the nationalist Afrikaners who were mostly members and supporters of the NP, AB and DRC. This implies that the proponents of the redefinition of the name "Afrikaner" do not really themselves understand the concept and entity that is the Afrikaner tribe, its position in relation to the other South African tribes and its future in the new South Africa. In 2017, nationalist Afrikaners find themselves in doubt about the Afrikaner's identity and the Afrikaans language, asking: "whereto from now for us?". The Afrikaanses, on the other hand, can answer with confidence "we are here and ready for the future".^{13,50,59,82}

As already indicated, the name "Afrikaanse" is not a new front name or a new front entity or group that has been fabricated to suit the Afrikaner's frame of reference or to give him an escape route. To the contrary, this group (even tribe) has been in existence from 1652 (as evidenced in their contribution to the development of the Dutch dialect "Kombuis" and "Hottentot" Afrikaans), although mostly as an unspecified background role player up to the late 1990s and the end of Apartheid. They are now, in terms of the present-day political, social and economical empowerment, free and strong enough to move out of the shadow of the nationalist Afrikaners and their Apartheid dominance. Indeed, the Afrikaanses are more than ready to incorporate and to steer the growing number of aimless Afrikaners as individuals, but stripped from their stigmatised past. There is no need for the Afrikaanses to join the Afrikaners, as some nationalist Afrikaners shamelessly try to do. As said, it is just the opposite: The Afrikaanses

have become the present-day parents and safe house for the Afrikaners in a future South Africa.^{48-50,59,77,83}

There have been various developing stages after the early Cape Settlement and the later Cape Colony. The identity of the “Afrikaner” grew from “Dutch” to “Cape Dutch” to “proto-Afrikaner” to “Afrikaner”. This Afrikaner identity is now in an end stage. A new entity is now starting to awake, the “Afrikaanse” of today and tomorrow.^{75,76,83}

1.3.3.1 Who are the Afrikaanses?

All South Africans who speak Afrikaans at home can be defined as “Afrikaanses”. Ethnic features, like religious beliefs and practices, schooling and political orientation and racial features are not role players in inclusion at all. These characteristics take second place. Members are identified by only one thing: they are “Bruin” or Coloured Afrikaanses, Afrikaner Afrikaanses, Black Afrikaanses, etc. There are surely great similarities between some “Afrikaanses”, like adhering to Christianity, but this feature is also contradicted by the inclusion of some Islam “Afrikaanses”. The groups includes different political orientations or membership of different political groupings and it includes members from the Black, White, Coloured and Indian communities and various other mixed races.^{49,75,80,83-86}

The “Afrikaanses” is an open non-racial and non-ethnic social group defined as a group by only a single linguistic factor, Afrikaans as mother tongue. As with all developing cultural groups, uniformity in political, religious and other behaviours can follow in time, but it will surely be free from the comprehensive and extreme Afrikaner dogma, developed and nurtured by the nationalist Afrikaners for over a century and more.

The first foundations for public approval for the classification “Afrikaanses” was laid by the AB in 1998 when this nationalist Afrikaner group tried in vain to grow their dwindling numbers by declaring that all those who show a broad inclination towards the nationalistic Afrikaner values and lifestyle should be accepted as Afrikaners.⁸²

When one looks at the number of non-Afrikaners who qualify as Afrikaanses based on the criterion of using Afrikaans in their daily lives, the numbers are strong. It is important to note in this regard that in 2011, many of the 13.5% of the total South African population who spoke Afrikaans at home were Blacks,

Coloureds and Indians and not Whites. The ratio of non-Afrikaners to Afrikaanses who speak Afrikaans at home is 60:40. To be more precise, of the approximately 7.5 million South Africans whose mother tongue is Afrikaans, only more or less 2.7 million were White, compared to the 3.6 million Coloureds and 1.2 million other non-White Afrikaans speakers at home. The Coloured population shows a constant growth as the majority Afrikaans speakers. In total it is estimated that 20 million South Africans speak Afrikaans every day in some form during their communication at work or in their social life, a number that completely overshadows the present-day Afrikaners' input.^{74,75,80,86-88}

There is also evidence that the number of non-Whites whose mother tongue is Afrikaans is increasing: in 2001 they were 5.98 million, compared to 6.9 million in 2011, representing a rise of nearly one million in ten years. The Northern Cape (53.8%) and the Western Cape (49.7%) have the highest percentages of Afrikaans speakers of all the South African provinces. These numbers include a strong non-Whites element, already making regional establishments or enclaves of Afrikaanses possible.^{74,75,80,86}

It is clear that the "Afrikaanses" has become an important non-racial- and non-ethnic cluster that can play a dynamic role in the new South Africa. The group is borderless in terms of culture, ethnicity and race, seasoned and schooled in assimilation and miscegenation over more than three centuries. They have lived both inside and outside the restrictions and stigmas of Apartheid, their unbounded interrelationships offer them the opportunity to eradicate the racial and ethnic discrimination so inherent to the nationalist Afrikaners and which led them to the immense disrespect for Afrikaans as the language of the oppressor. The Afrikaanses, it seems, have the ability to secure a better future citizen's place for themselves and their descendants in new South Africa. This differs from the insecure Afrikaners. Only one determinant plays a role in their minds, to differentiate them from the rest of the South African population with their adaptable and politics-free Afrikaans language.^{13,59,89,90}

The question left at this stage is: *can every Afrikaner become an Afrikaanse?* To a certain extent, the Afrikaner's transformation to new political affiliations from die-hard NP-Broederbonders already started after 1994 after the collapsed of the NP. Many repositioned to the DA and smaller Afrikaner-orientated parties, a small group even joined the ANC. But, for most of these Afrikaners the political focus was on finding a political organisation that they believe can serve their needs as the NP did. The Afrikaanses, on the other hand, stand cultural and

politically apart from the interests of the nationalist Afrikaner identity. There are two big obstacles that the nationalist Afrikaner has to overcome to become an “Afrikaanse”. First, he would have change as an individual to a person without the collective baggage of the nationalist Afrikaner culture that he supported for many years and was born into. Secondly, he would have to denounce in all honesty all the racial and ethnic attitudes so inherently part of the nationalist Afrikaner regime before 1994. This change seems to be a small step for a suppressed slave or an individual used to discrimination for his whole life, but a giant and difficult step for a rigid nationalist Afrikaner.

1.3.4 The name Afrikaner

The naming and positioning of the “Afrikaner” within the South African society and in the international context as a specific entity followed the same path that his main ancestors, the Dutch, Germans and the French, embarked on centuries ago. Groups identify themselves by fronting a specific identifying name, a clear racial and ethnic orientation and entity, the existence of a unique of language ability and preference, a well-defined and comprehensive economical system, a geographic region and specific cultural habits, customs and traditions. This includes unique folklore, religious and political beliefs, education and principles. This complex is jealously guarded, and any negative influences or intruders that can endanger its continuation, are fearlessly attacked, either verbally or physically in the form of wars. In addition, its growth and spread other non-related groups and subordinates are scrumptiously promoted and sometimes shamelessly forced to subordinate them and sometimes incorporate them into the group. In South Africa this was done through Apartheid and its strict discriminative laws imposed by the nationalist Afrikaners.^{21,22,27,36,38,39,42,91}

In South Africa the early White political dispensation starting in 1652 and especially the later Afrikaner political dispensation starting in 1902, strictly adhered to the above methods. Here, the name “Afrikaner”, as if truly stretching from 1652, the perceived uniqueness of the language “Afrikaans” as something developed by and belonging solely to the Afrikaner from the beginning, and the exclusiveness of the Afrikaner’s race orientation, labelled as “pure” White, European and Caucasian, became prominent determinants and drivers in the Afrikaner’s racial and ethnic thinking and planning. But did these assumed successes and achievements of the Afrikaner really meet the criteria of fact and truth?^{3,26,38,39,92}

It seems that the name “Afrikaner” is clouded by controversy and contradictions. It is clear that the Whites at the Cape saw themselves as a part of Europe and as citizens of their various European homelands during the early colonial period, even up to the late 1800s, instead of a new race or ethnic population or citizen at the Cape. The fact is that the name “Afrikaner” did not denote a group identity for many years after 1652. The early Cape ancestors of the today’s Afrikaners were simply described as “Christians”, “colonists”, “emigrants”, “inhabitants” or “ingezeetenens”, “free citizens” or “vrijburgers” and “burghers” for a long time. Even the name “Boer” is a late-comer on the scene.^{26,39,92-94}

The Cape Colony resident, Hendrik Biebouw’s reference to himself as an “Afrikaander” (“Africander”) in 1707 can not be seen as irrefutable evidence that the “Afrikaner” was already a specific name of an identifiable White group at the Cape. To the contrary, Biebouw’s “Afrikaander” identity or classification seems more applicable to the numerous half-castes, Coloureds and other mixed groups at the Cape at that time. These mixed groups often had the same White and non-White ancestors as today’s Afrikaners, but even at that point they had already begun to develop biologically and culturally away from the Whites as an early branch of the existing Cape Coloured people.^{95,96}

Above finding is in line with that of Giliomee^{7,p.8} when he states:

In the eighteenth century the term Africander (Afrikaner) was used primarily for the offspring of slaves born in Africa, usually out of liaisons with ex-slaves, Khoisan or Whites. This usage continued until little more than a century ago [*more or less 1890*]. An official list of Cape Town prostitutes, taken in 1868, was headed by ‘Africanders’, referring to people of mixed descent. By 1880 the designation Afrikaner was also claimed by some Africans in the Eastern Cape. After a branch of the Afrikaner Bond was established in Cradock an African organisation, the Imbubwe, was formed. Its members claimed that their organisation was the true Afrikaner Bond while the White organisation was merely the Boeren Bond. ▼

A community of approximately 100 families, descendants of the freed slaves who accompanied the Voortrekkers to Transvaal in the middle 1800s and settled in 1886 at Onverwacht near the town Cullinan after receiving land from Paul Kruger. They also identify themselves as “Afrikaners” and proudly called themselves “Boer” to this day. They speak Afrikaans as first language and

follow Afrikaner traditions, making the exclusive name “Afrikaner” more complex, undefined and multi-racial. This non-White group identification, together with the claims of the Eastern Cape Blacks that they are Afrikaners, foregrounds Biebow’s remark in 1707 on being an “Afrikaner/Afrikaander/Africander” and that of the Cape prostitutes of mixed descent who called themselves “Afrikaner/Africander” as early as 1890. It was clearly a more non-White than White group in the beginning.^{97,98}

History resulted in three kinds of divisions among the early Dutch-Afrikaner grouping: *urban/rural*, *regional* and *a class division*, each with clear cultural overtones. The urban/rural division was particularly salient – those considered the better-educated and more civilised *Cape Dutch* of the Western Cape or interior towns versus those considered to be ignorant, illiterate and backward *Boers* living on farms beyond the Western Cape. Regional differences brought a division between the *Western Cape Afrikaners* and the later *Transvaal Boer Afrikaners*, especially based on their economical differences. The class differences contained a further difference within the rural Dutch-Afrikaner Boer society with the *wealthy land-holding farmers* versus the marginalised, *poor farmers*, many of them *bywoners* without any land. Many of these poor Dutch-Afrikaners were abused by the rich Boer (Dutch)-Afrikaners and they were not financially and physically supported by the governments of the Boer republics. They were forced out of work on farms where cheaper Black tenants provided the rich Boers with cheaper labour, leading to further unemployment, illiteracy and poverty. During the Anglo Boer War these Boer *bywoners* formed the bulk of the ‘joiners’ who sided with the British, not only splitting a uniform Afrikaner nation and Afrikaner identity even further, but also delaying the establishment of the culture for many years to come.⁷

It is therefore clear that by the early 1800s two distinct White groups had developed under the umbrella of the proto-Afrikaner in the Cape Colony, namely the “Cape Dutch” and the “Boers”. These two broad groups in time not only became culturally and economically different from each other, but to a certain extent stood at opposite ends of the continuum of political and socio-religious thinking and doing. The *Cape Dutch group*, living in and around Cape Town, was generally comprised of a better educated and socially developed society, compared to the *Boers* who were living in isolation in the country-side with a total lack of educational and cultural facilities. Most of the Cape Dutch (who only adopted and promoted the name “Afrikaner” after the 1900s) of the Cape Colony were pro-British and initially sided with the DRC against the Great

Trek of approximate 10 000 Boers [the “Voortrekkers” (First Movers or Pioneers)] who migrated to what became Natal, the Transvaal, Orange Free State and Northern Cape in 1830 to 1840. These cultural and other differences between the Cape Dutch and the Boers and their separate development as two different proto-Afrikaner peoples are reflected in the Cape Dutch hostility towards the Boers. Some of the Cape Dutch even fought on the side of the British against the Boers. This intimate Cape Dutch-Briton association found expression the many marriages and social and business relations between the Cape Dutch and the British in the early Cape. Many of today’s well-known Afrikaner families supplied the British with food stock for their fighting soldiers in Transvaal and the Free State and were strong British-orientated Cape politicians in line with Cecil John Rhodes’ thinking.^{3,26,38,39,92,99}

The name “Boer” was initially used to refer to the occupation of the “Trek Boers” (travelling farmers) on the Eastern Cape frontier of the Colony around the early 1700s. This group gradually moved northwards to form the “Grens Boers” (border farmers). They later became the vast majority of the “Voortrekkers”. In this way “Boer” became a name for most of the proto-Afrikaners who permanently lived north of the Cape’s eastern border and later north of the Orange River. This group was openly anti-British and anti-colonialist and they had clear ethnic and racial discriminatory tendencies based on their religion. Their lifestyle grew out of their pioneer circumstances and their exposure to a pre-modern environment. These “Boers” were mostly involved in agriculture, living in isolation and lacking basic facilities like schools and career training facilities, hospitals, religious institutions, civil services and the government structures that the Cape Dutch enjoyed and promoted. The Boers’ homes, travelling facilities and amenities seemed to be of a much lower quality and standard as that of the Cape Dutch. Their more rugged lifestyle was necessitated by the undeveloped and rough regions where they farmed. It contrasted their ancestors from Europe and the Cape Dutch in Cape Town and the Cape Colony’s way of living. Eventually this lifestyle spread gradually over the whole eastern border area. This more elementary culture was transferred to the first generation of Boers [now also named “burgers” (burghers)] of the Transvaal and the Free State by the “Voortrekkers”.^{38,39,82,93,94,100,101}

The two groups of proto-Afrikaners, namely the Cape Dutch and the Boers, also differed in their use of the proto-Afrikaans dialect up to the late 1800s all over the Cape. The cultural and socio-economic differences became rooted in the

name Boer, and this group started using the name Boer instead of Cape Dutch to identify them as a specific group. These differences later became political and socio-cultural characteristics with the founding of the two anti-British and outright racially discriminative Boer Republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. The differences that highlighted the *Boer and Burgher identification* as distinct from Cape Dutch were further strengthening by the two Anglo Boer Wars that followed. It left many of the Boers hostile and embittered towards the British and the Cape Dutch.^{39,82,101}

The literature preceding the establishment of the Union of South Africa referred to the Transvaal and Free State Afrikaans-speaking citizens as “Boers” and not “Afrikaners.” People like general Smuts, who was initially from the Cape Colony, referred to himself as an “Afrikaner,” but this was at a much later stage during and after the establishment of the Union where new political opportunism played a role. His earlier references to himself, just after the Second Anglo Boer War was to an “old Cape colonialist” (“Kaapkolonialer”) and an old Capetonian (“Kapenaar”), simply meaning a citizen of the Cape Colony.⁹²

It is important to note that three Afrikaner organisations were formed from the 1870s onwards to promote proto-Afrikaans and the Dutch Afrikaners’ interests in terms of an informal nationalism, which undoubtedly included the name “Afrikaner.” The first was the Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners, followed by the establishment of the Zuid-Afrikaansche Boere Beschermingsvereniging (ZABBV) by Jan Hofmeyr in 1878 (representing capitalist farmers and businessmen, the pro-British *capitalist Afrikaner nationalism*). This was followed by the establishment of the Afrikaner Broederbond in 1879 by the reverend SJ du Toit (for a while it was called the Cape South African Party (CSAP), but it changed back to Afrikaner Broederbond), representing a *radical Afrikaner nationalism* away from British domination. These three organisations all aimed to take care of the poor Afrikaans-speaking people’s interests in the Cape.^{3,7,26}

This split into nationalism and a pro-British attitude strengthened a deep Afrikaner class divide and the divide into various opposing and competing sub-groups based on precise economic, social, educational and cultural lines in the Dutch-Afrikaner community. This kind of divide (a negative characteristic of the Afrikaners’ lifestyle and thinking) created conflict in Afrikaner ranks. They split their interests, which interfered with the development of a uniform Afrikaner nationalism. This conflict was further intensified when Hofmeyr

captured control of the AB, steering it towards liberal politics and interests, away from the less educated and poor Afrikaners' immediate politics and interests.^{7,102}

In the Orange Free State and Transvaal early Afrikaner nationalism was mainly fuelled by the Boer community's input. It was driven by their hostility and hate of British imperialism and the British aggression against them during the Anglo Boer War (1899-1902). It stood in direct opposition to the pro-British nationalism of the Cape Dutch. A uniformed Afrikaner identity and nationalism was impossible in the Cape in the 1880s and after the outcome of the Anglo Boer War in Transvaal and Orange Free State after 1902. This made unity with the Cape Dutch immediately after 1910 impossible, slowing the development of the Afrikaner as a unified group. This development only continued with the political actions of DF Malan and the NP after 1913 and after 1910 with the intervention of Louis Botha and Jan Smuts to bring about Afrikaner-English reconciliation and reconciliation between the Southern Afrikaners with the Northern Afrikaners. This slowly brought about the unification of subgroups of Afrikaners towards the founding of an Afrikaner entity.⁷

It took the early Afrikaner architects of Afrikaner nationalism (later hijacked by the NP-AB-DRC Afrikaner nationalists) over a century, starting in 1880s, to establish the term Afrikaner and the Afrikaner "nation", a dogma based on the "idea of an indigenous people occupying a common territory, having a common language, vigorous culture and proud history, identified by a common name and sharing consciousness of kind", writes Giliomee.^{7, p. 13} Central to this is the deliberate transformation of proto-Afrikaans from a "kitchen" or "Hottentot" language to a language in its own right. It ultimately became a modern language with a proper body of literature, spoken by a specific group, namely the Afrikaner.⁷

Giliomee^{7, p. 12} writes:

They projected it as White man's language which set the Afrikaners off from White English-speakers and Brown Afrikaans-speakers. The ethnic project also included the rewriting of history along nationalist lines. Prominent in this were the accounts of Afrikaner heroism and suffering, in particular the Great Trek and the Anglo-Boer War, and the efforts of the Afrikaners to maintain themselves as a distinct people among 'savage' and 'heathen' nations. A new nationalist ideology was also constructed. Derived ideas of more abstract nature were grafted upon long-standing

beliefs about the need to maintain White supremacy and reject racial intercourse. Prominent among the derived ideas was Calvinism which was strongly propagated by Malan and his followers in the South and the *Doppers* (members of the Reformed Church) of Potchefstroom in the North. This Calvinism, or rather neo-Calvinism, argued that God had ordained separate nations, each with a unique destiny, which charged the Afrikaners to maintain themselves in separate cultural, religious and political institutions”.

The main intention, said Giliomee⁷, was to give meaning to the rather amorphous concept of “Afrikaner,” yet a degree of ambivalence remained around the name for a long time, and it is still there today. The dictionary description of “Afrikaner” in the in 1910s was still that it is a person ‘born of White parents in South Africa,’ far removed from the political claim of some Cape Dutch as their exclusive name.⁷

The evidence shows that the name “Afrikaner” was possibly used in a rather non-descriptive way by the middle to late 1800s in the Cape Colony, especially around Cape Town, but not as an exclusive, identifiable and uniform name as it is used by today’s Afrikaners. The name “Afrikaner” to describe a uniform group only took hold after the Second Anglo Boer War when the “Boers” (also commonly identified and referred to as “Transvaal Burgers” or “Transvaal Boers” and “Vrystaat Burgers” or “Vrystaat Boers” respectively) of the two old Republics were left financially devastated and destitute as a result of their War efforts and many were forced to move to the cities for work and a living. In this new and alien environment, they were forced as individuals to adapt to a totally new social and political lifestyle and thinking. This political and economic new dawn, activated by the liberal Cape Dutch and the British authorities governing Southern Africa, affected the mindset of the Burghers of the old Transvaal and Free State. The masked Anglicisation efforts of the authorities promoted the new identity and name “Afrikaner,” which was at the time used to start the political reconciliation between the Cape Colony and the two old Republics. This name was also in line with the blanket name “Southern African” to activate the new South African citizenship created by the Union. In supporting this new “Afrikaner” identity and name, many of the old political leaders of the Transvaal and Free State who joined the new post-1902 South African political dispensation, started to echo more and more Afrikaner nationalism, and from there the use of the name “Afrikaner” for political opportunism.^{3,26,39,92,95,96,103}

In addition, the political climate surrounding the formation of the Union of South Africa did not leave space for the incorporation of the name “Boer” into the new political context and process. This was especially sensitive for the Cape-based Cape Dutch Afrikaners. Leaders promoted the general term “Afrikaner” that was until then mostly associated with the Cape Dutch Afrikaner.^{3,26,39,82,103-105}

It is clear that the name “Afrikaner” to describe the Afrikaners as a specific ethno-cultural group – so frequently used today in public and political literature – slowly emerged all over South Africa only after 1902 with the collapse of the two Boer republics. In 1902 the English author, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, also referred to the Boers who moved eastwards from the Cape Colony in the middle 1800s as “Africanders.” It is unknown if this reference was affected by the new “status” of the Boers after 1902, or if it was a name already in use in the Cape, although not widely in the late 1800s. In retrospect, it seems to have been the new, uniformed and politically promoted name in use from 1902 onwards that influenced Doyle to refer to the trekkers in this way in his writing. It was a referral to these trekkers as early proto-Afrikaners. Even references to the name Afrikaner in public by prominent leaders like General Hertzog after 1902, do not confirmed the existence of an official and uniform group of “Afrikaners” before 1900. People like Hertzog and others offer no confirmation that the name “Afrikaner” was commonly used in the five political and governmental regions of South Africa before 1902 and thus automatically transferred to the Union. It must instead be seen also as a retro-perspective used by Hertzog and other old Boer leaders to describe the new South African scenario. Also, the new common use of the name Afrikaner and the popular descriptions of the history of the Afrikaner nation, offered political power to politicians after 1910 as they could mobilise political support and unity for their own future careers.^{3,7,26}

A good example of this kind of political rhetoric is specifically revealed by Hertzog himself in 1911 when he defined the concepts of “Afrikaner” and “Afrikaner nation” as follows^{3, p. 301}: “In die laaste tyd het mense hulle baie druk gemaak oor die benaming Afrikaner. Hulle het self so ver gegaan om ‘n ander term te soek om daarvoor in die plek te stel. Natuurlik te vergeefs. Dit word gedoen uitsluitelik omrede van jaloesie. Die Hollandssprekendes was die eerste Afrikaner. Hy kon dit nie help nie. Reeds 150 jaar voor die oordrag van die Kaap aan die Britse Regering was hy hier gehuisves vir goed...Die so geminagtigte Afrikaner het die baanbreker geword van die Suid-Afrikaanse beskawing” [*More recently people has a lot to say about the name Afrikaner.*

They went so far to seek another term to replace it. Of course in vain. This is done solely because of jealousy. The Dutch speakers were the first Afrikaner. He could not help it. Already 150 years before the transfer of the Cape to the British Government he was housed here for good...The so disrespected Afrikaner became the pioneer of the South African civilization].

Hertzog often contradicted himself when speaking about the identification of the Afrikaner. Even by 1921 Hertzog still used names like “Dutch/Afrikaans” versus “English-speaking Afrikaners” and “white and black Afrikaner”. Politicians like Hertzog used the more inclusive variant when it suited their political purpose, rather than to be guided by true historical facts. John Vorster also used this kind of political rhetoric in the 1960s with the same short-sighted claim that the NP created the entity Afrikaner and the Afrikaans language.⁷

As can be seen, most of the political and emotional rhetoric used by Hertzog and later Vorster, failed to offer sound evidence to confirm their claims about the Afrikaner. At most, these terms serve as superficial retro-perspectives on the historical development of the Afrikaner.

Even now after a century, there is some evidence of resistance to the name “Afrikaner” and its broad ethnic and racial classification and stigma. This resistance comes from a small minority of White Boers. Some descendants of the “Boers” in certain geographical parts of South Africa still see themselves as a unique cultural minority that is separate from the larger “Afrikaner”-group, its culture and the name. They do not want to be associated with Afrikaner nationalism. Sub-group and regional names (Afrikaans related), like “kolonianer” “Boesmanlander”, “Bokveller”, “Bolander”, “Namakwalander”, “Kapenaar”, “Transvaler”, “Vrystater”, “Dopper-Afrikaner” and “Karoo-boer”, etc., are still used by remnants of these minorities to introduce and to identify themselves. In most of these cases, their status as South Africans takes second place, while they ignore the Afrikaner identity. Even the epithets of “joiner”, “hendsopper”, “traitor” and “National Scout” stuck in the minds of certain Afrikaner groups as more important identifications than the broad name “Afrikaner”. The strong “Boer” mentality still, after many years, lingers just below the surface. This is reflected in the use of the term by non-Whites as a name to identify abusive and racially prejudiced Afrikaans-speaking Whites.^{11,50,75,80,82,87,93,94,100,105-108}

The inclination to differentiate between different sub-groups of Afrikaners and to split into factions can gain momentum in the future as the forced and to a certain extent artificial unity of the Afrikaners during the 1900s, starts to disintegrate. The empowerment of the Afrikaanses can disintegrate it further, if not totally over time.^{3,7,26,39,78,101,109,110}

1.3.5 Afrikaners in numbers

Identifying the “true” Afrikaners as a specific group by looking at numbers is a very complex and controversial issue. The traditional classification of Afrikaners as all Whites who speak Afrikaans at home is also controversial and could have led to an over-estimation of their numbers for many years, offering them power as a political pressure group. The inclusion of Coloureds who go through as Whites in statistical research can be a confounding factor. Afrikaners who live outside South Africa permanently but still reflect as South African citizens can also lead to an enormous over-estimation. If the traditional classification is used, the numbers of the Afrikaners have declined dramatically since 1960 compared to the total population of South Africa. In 1960 they made up 10%, compared to only 5.7% of the total population in 2001, reflecting a 0.1% annual decline over 40 years. In 2011, this percentage dropped to 5.2%, reflecting a 0.05% annual decline over 10 years. This placed them below the Coloureds, whose numbers were 4 615 401 in 2011. The total number of Afrikaners living in South Africa in 2001 was estimated at 2 576 184, compared to 2 710 461 in 2011 (an estimated total of between 3.3 to 3.5 million when the Afrikaners living outside the borders are included). It is estimated that between 1994 and 2004, between 1 and 1.5 million Afrikaners left South Africa permanently. This emigration number was conservatively estimated for 2006 to 2011 at 112 046 and for 2011 to 2015 at 95 158.^{95,96,111-115}

It seems that it is specifically the number of Afrikaners in the age group 15 to 34 years that is declining: in 2009 their number was 1 245 000, compared to 1 193 000 in 2014 (a decline of 52 000). For 2009 to 2014, the decline in the number of Afrikaners in the age group 15 to 24 years was 5.2% and for the age group 25 to 34 it was 3%.^{75,80,87,95,96,111,115}

The White segment of the population, of which the Afrikaners formed approximately 58% in 2011, declined with 4.2% between 2009 and 2014, while the Black population increased with 7.3%. The statistics for 2011 to 2016 confirmed the declining trend in the White segment numbers: the age group 0 to 4 years declined from 268 267 to 253 035; the age group 20 to 24 declined from

313 616 to 303 257; the age group 25 to 29 declined from 336 355 to 287 792; the age group 30 to 34 declined from 318 329 to 279 475; and the age group 35 to 39 declined from 342 316 to 278 789. The White segment's decline in total for the period 2011 to 2016 was from 4 586 838 to 4 516 691 (a decline of 70 147 or -1.5% in five years).^{75,80,87,95,96,111,115}

What is shocking about the 2017 findings of Statistics South Africa (SSA) is the dramatic aging of the White population over the past 20 years. This is the result of the emigration of younger people, the decline in White births and the fact that people are living longer. Where the ratio of people 16 years and older to children younger than 16 years is 20 above 16 years per 100 children for Blacks, it has become 130 above 16 years per 100 children for Whites. If this trend continues, only a small pocket of Whites will be left in South Africa in years to come. Brand-Jonker¹¹⁷ estimates the total South African White population at only 3% (compared to the present 8%) in 60 years. Cronje is even more pessimistic and he thinks that the White population can decline to between 1% and 3% in less than 40 years. This negative population profile of Whites is fully applicable to the Afrikaners.^{109,117,118}

The Afrikaner doctrine of the NP-AB-DRC leadership that they have a “chosen role as a nation in Africa by God” and as “the bearers of the European culture in South Africa,” made them blind to the dramatic changes in their status in Africa, “with or without God’s will”. This hard reality has now arrived in 2017.^{37,119,120}

Afrikaners have never taken a hard look at themselves in the mirror. They have a shocking lack of insight into the country’s present and future political and racial environment. They therefore pay no individual attention to their dwindling numbers and diminishing political and military power base, which could be devastating in long run for their existence. This lack of basic insight to read population warnings is illustrated well by Ginsberg^{121, p. 21} when he writes: “Back in 1989 there was one black child born every 28 seconds and one white child born every 12 minutes”. Nearly 30 years ago Afrikaners knew what was awaiting them, but they failed to act constructively.

It is clear that it is not only the Afrikaner numbers that are declining, but the broader White segment as well. This implies a decline in political empowerment, not only for the Afrikaners, but for all Whites.^{75,80,87,95,96,111,115}

1.3.6 Afrikaner culture

The Afrikaners' unique ethno-cultural identity has always been intricately linked to the name "Afrikaner" and their numbers as a tribe. Of the main components of the Afrikaner culture are the Afrikaans language, religion, cultural heritage, education, family life, employment, sports and recreation, and folklore. This unique Afrikaner culture was nurtured and maintained in isolation by means of a system of separate development in which the non-White cultures, especially that of the Blacks, were seen as inferior to that of the Afrikaner. It was even sometimes regarded as non-Christian.^{37-39,119}

This early unique Afrikaner culture and the strict isolation from the rest of South African cultures in an effort to conserve it, circled out to all spheres of South African social life. This resulted in separate sport and recreation activities, residential areas and health, school and training facilities; as well as legal prohibitions on miscegenation. The foundation was Christian nationalism. The basic intention was not only to preserve the Afrikaner identity, but to maintain the fundamentals of Afrikaner culture and to limit it to the Afrikaner-milieu alone. In terms of the doctrine of Afrikaner nationalism, the principle was to promote and to reserve Afrikaner culture at all cost; and to cleanse it from foreign, especially Black cultural influences. Foundational to this doctrine was the belief that the Afrikaner and White civilisations would disappear if it became contaminated by the Black culture. This disappearance of the White and Afrikaner civilisation would automatically result in the disappearance of the Afrikaner as a person.^{26,37,39,119}

Religion was always a strong role player in the Afrikaners' behaviour and their political thinking and indoctrination, which took the form of a Christian nationalism. Socialism and communism were feared, not because of their implications for the economy, but due to the threat to the Afrikaners' religion and to their privileges and favoured lifestyles. The Afrikaners' religious beliefs and traditions were founded on the Protestant practices of the Reformed Church of Holland in the 17th century and were later influenced by English-speaking ministers of the UK. Of all these early role players, it seems that the French Huguenots' racial-religious influence on the political mindsets of the proto-Afrikaner was immense and has been under-estimated in evaluations of the Afrikaners' later racism. These French settlers, arriving at the Cape in 1688 at a time when the White population lacked a strong unified political mindset, strongly underwrote the Swiss church reformer John Calvin's ideas that the church should influence the government and that races should remain pure and

separate. This new racial-religious doctrine was quickly incorporated into to Cape's religious system, which was up until that time influenced by the Goske agreement of 1671. French Calvinism quickly became part of the proto-Afrikaner and the doctrine of the Cape Reformed Church, leading to a unique kind of Calvinistic Protestantism among the proto-Afrikaners and later Afrikaners. By 1985, as many as 92% of Afrikaners were still members of the various Afrikaner Reformed Churches, showing the lasting influence of Calvinist Protestantism on Afrikaners after 300 years.^{37,38,95,96}

The Cape French Huguenots, known for their extreme religious-political views on race, can therefore be regarded as one of the main causes of the later racial discrimination in South Africa. In fact, the Huguenots' racial attitude was one of the reasons for their persecution and expulsion from France that brought them to the Cape.^{95,96}

The above early blueprint of religious-racial thinking in time led to a specific social-cultural lifestyle among the proto-Afrikaners of the Cape Settlement, Cape Colony and the Boer Republics and later especially the Afrikaners of the Union and the Republic of South Africa. Central to this particular lifestyle and inclination were European, Western and Christian values, standards and life views; community cohesion; a familiar and recognisable environment; a specific way of life; a sense of origin and identity; the psychological satisfaction of an in-group community life; standards of public order, behaviour and respectability; traditions and prescriptions; financial well-being and political-empowerment; and so-called "white culture," mythical or not. This blueprint became a driver and guideline for their daily doings, decision making, beliefs, customs, traditions and education, even outside the racial and class context. It became so recognisable that literature refers to it as the "unique culture" of the Afrikaners.^{7,37,38,119}

Although this "European Afrikaner culture" of the Afrikaner lacked reference to any European society, Afrikaners believed that they are the bearers of a superior, "African-free" European system that required the imposition of pervasive controls and management of Blacks.^{37,119}

This cultural-religion-political inclination affected all of the Afrikaner's life to such an extent that major Christian religious holidays like Christmas, Good Friday, Ascension Day were reserved next to political holidays like Founder's Day, Republic Day, Kruger Day, Day of the Vow. These days became "holy

days” that all Afrikaners strictly adhered to and respected. Belonging to one of the Afrikaner Dutch Reformed churches was a priority and essential for social mobility. Sunday became a day of rest, reserved for attending church services, with shops, movie theatres and the practice of organised sport being forbidden. This Calvinist Protestantism was intertwined with certain church activities like baptism, catechism and Bible instruction, and specific marriage and burial traditions and customs that reminds one of 17th century Protestant practices.^{95,96}

Afrikaners children were educated within a framework of a strict and punitive Protestant religio-political worldview. Children were required to think, develop and behave within the confines of this conservative mindset. Even a strict clothing protocol was prescribed at Afrikaner schools and churches. In line with their Calvinist Protestantism, children were required to receive a good school training from the age of six to 18 years, and where possible, to attend tertiary institutions.^{95,96}

The Afrikaners’ Calvinist Protestantism rites of passage were inculcated into their folklore, public and personal relationships, family life, dress, traditions, lifestyle rules and prescriptions, sport and recreational activities and employment traditions and styles. Boer music (“Boeremusiek”), folk dance (“Volkspele”), social dancing (“sokkie”) and “Boeresport” (a range of games like tug of war, three-legged races, jukskei and other games) became traditions unique to the Afrikaner.^{37,95,96}

There have been changes to the Afrikaner’s culture, some recent and swift after 1994, while others have been happening gradually over many years. First, there has been a gradual religious mindshift with regard to Black people in the Afrikaner, but it ultimately resulted in immense changes to and the Afrikaner culture, basically obliterating it. This left many deviating from political and moral prescriptions, making them more pragmatic and materialistic. Although the DRC kept Afrikaners from church integration, the Calvinist Protestantism of the proto-Afrikaner was also taught to the Cape slaves and the Cape Coloureds. The various missionary institutes also transferred Christianity to the Blacks. The effect of the early Christianisation efforts on the lifestyles of non-Whites is well illustrated in research. Christianity in time spread to the rest of the South African population, to such an extent that 87.9% of the Blacks and 90% of the total South African population adhere to Christianity today. This outcome was one of the reasons why the doctrine of separate development from the early 1700s onwards (institutionalised as Apartheid in the 20th century) with its belief that

the Blacks were non-Christians or heathens in terms of Grand Apartheid, gradually became obsolete. The religious and cultural uniformity among Afrikaners weakened immensely after the fall of Apartheid. The solidarity and group unity on race and the “Black question”, faded. The improvement of religious ties and increased socialisation between Whites and Blacks bettered personal and work relations between some sectors of the Afrikaners and Blacks. Renewed post-1994 socialisation between Whites and Blacks further weakened the stereotypes held among Afrikaners that Blacks are primitive and that there are true racial differences that make Blacks culturally and psychologically inferior as humans and that keeps them from developing according to the standards of Western civilisation.^{78,119,122-125}

The impact of the new South Africa also influenced the religious and cultural context of the present-day Afrikaner, changing it dramatically since 1994. Afrikaners have moved far away from the Huguenot doctrine of their grandfathers and their fathers. This is reflected in a decline in their adherence to Christianity, where as much as 82% Afrikaners belonged to the Dutch Reformed Churches in 1982, this membership has declined to only 1 450 861 out of a 2 576 184 possible Afrikaner members by 2001, representing 56%. In 2013 it was also reported that just more than 30% of Afrikaners still read the Bible at home, while as much as 62% Afrikaners said in 2015 that they no longer attend church on a weekly base.^{95,96}

This “unofficial” split between the “old” and “present-day” doctrines, habits, customs and traditions of the DRC churches is clearly reflected by their members’ public rejection of firmly established church rituals, practices and even management. The position of women as ministers, gays in church life, etc. and various other controversial issues became burning issues, leading to direct confrontation between members and church leaders. Many members have come to reject the pre-1994 doctrines of the NP and AB. The Afrikaners, especially the younger generation, do not hesitate to take the church to court if they feel that the church has failed them and their new liberal religious perspectives. Subjects like atheism, communist Christianity and homosexuality are now openly discussed and even practiced or underwritten by Afrikaners without the pre-1994 fear of being completely rejected by the Afrikaner community. Religious radicalism and blind trust in the right-wing church culture has drastically declined. This new religious thinking among Afrikaners resulted in a large egression from the traditional Afrikaner churches to charismatic churches.

These changes have resulted in the DRC threatening to split into two and it is no longer the church of choice among all Afrikaners.^{52-54,125-139}

The only thing Afrikaner churches can still offer their often-conservative members is a White Christianity that is still guarded from a Brown and Black Christianity. Since 2000, many of the Afrikaners, especially the younger generation, have turned away from extreme religious practices and fundamentalism, lessening the dominance of the Calvinist component over their culture, social and political life.^{101,129,139}

The diminishing role of the DRC in public life is indicative of a slow death in progress, as happened with the NP and AB. As with the NP during its dying years, the DRC fails to offer moral leadership to its members on their future in the new South Africa and to modernise its religious system.^{129,140}

Of course the end of Apartheid contributed to the transformation in the Afrikaner's religious mindset. This change has been supported by changes to the education system since 1994. This includes the exclusion of religious beliefs from schools, phasing out exclusively White public schools and higher education institutions with Afrikaans as medium of instruction. The newly established academic, work-related and social relationships between the younger Whites and Blacks, both generations born outside of the Apartheid contamination of hate and conflict, has hastened this change.^{58,141,142}

Clearly, the sentiment around the traditional Afrikaner church, its powers and influences, has started to crumble fast, freeing the Afrikaner more and more from religious and cultural isolation, making them independent from a formal church association. This outcome, driven by new democratic and free thinking, has also started to shape the Afrikaner's unique culture. Afrikaners' personal and social views on education, childrearing, marriage and racism, including Afrikaner nationalism, have undergone a metamorphosis to something that is quite the opposite of the views that characterised the culture of twenty to thirty years ago. The maintenance of old traditions, views, opinions and values have weakened and seems to be in a process of diminishing. Political and social changes and reforms are gruelling processes, sparing not even that which has been regarded as sacred for many centuries. The Afrikaners culture bears evidence of this gruelling process of the last 20 years, steering more and more into an unblemished South African culture.^{7,37,119}

1.3.7 Afrikaners' White blood purity

A direct and primary co-determinant that activated and drove the Afrikaner to racial domination and discrimination was his fear that open racial societies would promote miscegenation, leading to a contamination of their Caucasian blood by non-White blood. Sexual contact between different races therefore had to be avoided, during Apartheid by means of legal prohibitions. It is the same fear that led the Nazis to the “Jewry question” and the Holocaust as an end result.^{1,26,39}

Added to this, there was the widely accepted and propagated view that the “Afrikaner” is a unique and “pure” White, European and Caucasian race that had its biological and cultural origins in 1652 at the Cape Settlement. This was far from the truth and an incorrect idea. The proof in literature of a more than 6% non-White component in the bloodline of the earlier White Cape settlers in the immediate period after 1652 through miscegenation, was tactfully avoided by researchers and the nationalist Afrikaner himself from 1902 onwards. This denial became even stronger from the 1940s onwards with the development of Afrikaner nationalism.^{3,7,39}

The estimated 6% blood from other races in the Afrikaner’s bloodline is, in fact, far too low. Some research puts it at 7.2%, while other research reflects a 10.7% Indian influence on the Afrikaners’ matrilineal gene pool from Malaysian and other slave women (up to the early 1800s, 80% of the slaves came from India. It was only from 1730 onwards that the import of slaves from Madagascar was intensified).^{73,143}

There is also an erroneous view that this early intermingling was limited to few and certain White families, and that these 6% to 10.7% mixed Afrikaner descendants were pushed from White society to form the new Coloured population at the Cape. This *vertical biological* development of a closed and outcast group of mixed people, mostly excluded from the White nucleus that formed modern Afrikaners, is surely true as evidenced by the South African Coloureds and other mixed people of today. The politician and former premier of the Cape Province, Peter Marais, describes this “schizophrenic” split between people of the same bloodline well^{49, p. 7}: “Ons (wit en bruin mense) is een volk. Een pa, maar twee ma’s” [*We (white and brown people) are one nation. One dad, but two moms*]. The superficiality of this split is confirmed by historical evidence of an immense *horizontal biological impact* of “Coloured blood” on Afrikaners’ genes, contradicting the 6% to 10.7% of mixed Afrikaner

descendants and of an exclusive separate vertical development of the Coloureds as a separate ethnic group.

The cited numbers (6% to 10.7%) selectively masked the true historical fact of a free social and sexual *horizontal biological association* between the races in the Cape, especially immediately after the introduction of the free burghers in 1657 up to 1671. The fact is, many of the children born to European fathers between 1650 and the late 1600s had slave mothers. Indeed, three out of four children born to slave mothers during 1650 to 1670 had White fathers (meaning that the direct, first line infusion of “non-White blood” into the White parent stock can even as high as 75%). The fact is that between 1657 1671, these early male “Afrikaner” ancestors took Black, Hottentot and Malay women. They were accepted into the White community, either as concubines or wives. They, together with some White women, became the parent stock of the Whites and the Afrikaners. These non-White women’s children, especially the females, were mostly assimilated into society *directly* and *horizontally* to make up for the shortage of women, without any discrimination or stigmatisation.^{7,38,73}

This multiracial component that was incorporated into the White bloodline, a fact that is mostly hushed, had a profound effect on the gene pool of the later Afrikaners, seeing that no remarkable effort was made immediately after 1691 to bring more White colonist families or White women. Between 1657 and 1806, the total number of White women who arrived was 454 compared to 1 590 White male colonists. This comes to one female for every four males. In 1688 the White population consisted of 573 persons: 254 men, 88 women and 231 children, in other words one woman for every three men. The above White population (including the contingent of women from other races incorporated into the White family tree) of the late 1600s became the *matrilineal Afrikaner parent stock and gene pool*. These women who came to the early Cape married early and had large families. There was a high incidence of *inter-family marriages* as result of the shortage of females. These earlier proto-Afrikaner-families, *founded on various racial and ethnic bloodlines*, formed the *trunk (nucleus) of the Afrikaner family tree* that branched out to today’s Afrikaners.³⁹

The 6% to 10.7% influence of other races on the earlier White colonists spread out horizontally since 1652. Within two generations, these genes formed part of all or most of the matrilineal White families at the Cape. This 6% to 10.7% is therefore misleading. The Afrikaner bloodline is far more inclusive of other races, and this intermingling affected most of the Whites at the Cape by 1754,

when the census of Cape governor Ryk Tulbagh showed that White free burghers totalled only about 6 000. They were already outnumbered by more than 6 000 slaves (this was already apparent by 1710). Statistically speaking, the infusion of “blood” from other races to the early matrilineal White society at the Cape could result in a 100% “contamination” of the Afrikaner blood of “old” Afrikaner families by bloodlines from other races. This occurred due to repeated intermarriages between proto-Afrikaner families between 1652 and 1806. This paints a picture that is totally different from the 6% to 10.7% reflected in literature.^{38,39,73,143}

Literature sites the early horizontal European blood infusion to the matrilineal Afrikaner parent stock as 66.67% Dutch, 16.67% French, 14.29% German and 2.37% Scandinavian, Belgian, Scottish and Irish “bloodlines” at the Cape in the late 1600s and the early 1700s. These estimations change a little bit when the period is taken between 1657 and 1867. The numbers change as follows: 35.5% Dutch, 13.9% French, 34.4% German, 2.6% British, 2.8% Other European, 3.6% Unknown and 7.2% non-European. These numbers bluntly and blindly ignore the fact that the French impact of between 13.9% and 16.67% from 1688 constitutes another non-White horizontal blood contamination of the gene pool of the matrilineal Afrikaner parent stock at the Cape. This is due to the earlier Afro-Arab blood contamination of Europeans like the French, Portuguese and Spanish as a result of the early Moorish occupation of Europe and the miscegenation between the Europeans and the Afro-Arabs for many years. This French blood contamination was further transferred to the English through widespread intermarriages between the English and the French after the Battle of Hastings in 1066 and the French reign of England until 1366, to such an extent that 25% of the English forefathers are French. This multiracial bloodline was transferred to the proto-Afrikaners from the 1800s through intermarriages with the British at the Cape. The same is true of the blood contamination of proto-Afrikaners through their intermarriages with Portuguese and Spaniards at the Cape.^{72,73,91,144,145}

The slow growth of the Cape White population since 1754 and the shortage of European newcomers, especially women, to contribute to pureness of their European bloodline, is confirmed by the fact that in 1806 (52 years after the Tulbagh census) the Cape’s White population was still very small, only 26 720. This reflected an average annual growth of only 502 White people. This confirms the branching out (downwards) of the multiracial genetic component

through the matrilineal White parent stock due to constant and unavoidable inter-family marriages.^{95,96,143}

This horizontal inter-family bloodline among Afrikaners that goes hand-in-hand with a multiracial component is further confirmed by various family illnesses prevalent in Coloured and Afrikaner families over many years and generations. Huntington's disease is such an example. The South African mixed-race population contracted this illness from their Dutch and British ancestry, which they share with the Afrikaners. These symptomatic illnesses were undoubtedly further aggravated by the later horizontal intermarriages within Afrikaner families, especially in the late 1800s and early 1900s.^{73,146,147}

By the late 1800's there were more or less 46 000 Whites at the Cape. They were so interconnected through intermarriage that they were a *great interrelated family* rather than a new polyglot community. In the later stages of the intermarriage effect, non-White mothers formed a nucleus. Since there was a shortage of women up to the early 1800s, this led to further inter-family marriages between first and second nephews and nieces. In this way, a multiracial bloodline spread horizontally too many, if not most, of the branches of the Afrikaner family tree. This phenomenon was indeed much higher than the conservative and traditionally accepted 6% to 10.7% reflected in the general genealogical literature on the Afrikaner. It is not a case that only 6% to 10.7% of the Afrikaners are from other races; a case can rather be made that more than 6% to 10.7% of the initial gene pool of the Afrikaner is multiracial. This means that far more than 6% to 10.7% of today's Afrikaners are not purely White.^{72,73,144}

The shortage of women at the Cape resulted in the mixed or Coloured females from the first miscegenation becoming concubines and wives to male newcomers. It was only by the middle 1800s that the gender ratio of 1:4 females to males improved. This highlights the comprehensive pathway of "blood contamination" that follows when the trunk of a family tree is horizontally penetrated by various bloodlines at an early stage and spreads out downwards over centuries to affect many, if not all, of the descendants. The later "whiteness" of these "contaminated" Whites did not come from the "blood purity" of the Whites at the Cape or their later abstinence from miscegenation with other races. It was simply the direct result of the "whitening" of their mixed race offspring with further miscegenation with Whites until they became indistinguishable from the White settlers themselves. However, genetically they are more or less the same as their mixed nephews and nieces.^{73,146}

The argument that an initially “contaminated” White bloodline has been purified through generations of only procreating within the White gene pool, especially by means of the unofficial and official Apartheid policies that excluded other races from the Afrikaner’s society and family life to prevent mixing, carries little weight. Though racial segregation was practiced from the 1850s to the 1990s, this period of abstinence from racial miscegenation was too short to “purify” a large contingent of Afrikaners of mixed-race blood from their non-White ancestors, dating especially from 1652 to 1670 and immediate thereafter. Indeed, their skins became more whitten but their gene pool is not white to the same extent. No wonder that this inclusion of “black blood” now inspire proponents of the “Afrikaners-are-Africans”-view to declare the Afrikaner as “Black”.^{70-72,144,146}

The present-day Afrikaner can pride himself in being “purely White” in terms of various definitions used worldwide. However, the term “White person” has since 1924 been defined in the State of Virginia, USA as “such a person has no trace whatsoever of any blood other than Caucasian or one-sixteenth or less of the blood of the American Indian and no other non-Caucasia blood.” If this definition is used, many Afrikaners would not have passed the pure White test. Using the Nazi annulment definition where a single Jew in the family tree meant that a person was a Jew, the outcome would have been catastrophic. The chances of an Afrikaner to survive a Holocaust would have been zero. In South Africa, the Afrikaner has come to understand the dilemma of his mixed bloodline very well. In some cases, there is a sudden manifestation of a Coloured or Black child from White parents. The “White classification” of 1948 was amended in 1966 so that the child of two White parents were classified as “White”, notwithstanding the contrary physical appearances to be Black or mixed of their offspring.^{1,148,149}

The South African human rights activist, Rhoda Kadalie, herself a descendant from White, Malaysian and Coloured fore-fathers, previously married to a White South African and the mother of children born out of this so called “mixed” marriage, rejected the Afrikaner’s insistence on his White blood purity when she said with pride about her family^{150, p.11}: “Ons is ‘n regte basterfamilie” [*We are are a true half-breed family*]. This can surely also be said by many Afrikaners with the same pride as Kadalie, if they have courage enough and are honest with themselves about their heritage.

It is important to note that the South African Blacks also carry the genes of various races through their miscegenation with other races in South Africa. South African Black tribes are physically the end product of a racial mingling of the Negroes of Africa and the Hamite people. South African Blacks can today be classified into four clear and separate Black groups in terms of language and culture. This is notwithstanding the ANC and the Marxist intentions and efforts to declare all South Africans “grey people” and the Blacks a uniform Black group for the sake of political rights. The four groups are the Nguni group, the Sotho-Tswana group, the Venda group and the Shangana-Tsonga group. These four main Black groups can further be divided into ten Black ethnic groups, each with their own culture, life values, language, and customs and characteristics that are conserved. They also inbred with Whites, Coloureds, Asians as well as other smaller groups like the Khoi-Khoi and Hottentot. This multi-racial inbreeding between Afrikaners, Coloureds and Blacks is still active and ongoing today as reflected by many mixed marriages and the birth of “mixed-race” children.^{42,50,113,142,150,151}

One example of this racial intermingling is the marriage of the Democratic Alliance (DA) leader, Mmusi Maimane, to a White woman.¹⁵ This continuation of racial miscegenation that started in 1652 and the resulting new generation of intermixed Blacks and Whites is excellently described by Tambo Dali, a prominent Black South African married to a White South African, when he says^{142, p. 23}: “In my family there are three colours: black, white and my four golden brown children.”

History has the inclination to repeat itself, also regarding natural racial mingling and miscegenation. South Africa is an excellent example where even the Immorality Act of the Apartheid regime could not stop it. Racial intermingling between Blacks and Whites is going to increase in the future, not decrease.

Ultimately, the colour of a person’s skin can contribute very little to the physical classification of a person into a specific South African race group. To call South African Blacks “pure Blacks” is also an error, just as the Afrikaners are not “pure Whites”: South Africans are to a great extent ethnically and racially much more “Creole” than they themselves know or want to know.^{42,78,113-115}

1.4 Conclusion

The view of the Afrikaner as a nation was clearly inapplicable and erroneous. The same can be said about the political and emotionally laden classifications of people as part of the “White nation”, the “Zulu nation”, or the “Xhosa nation”.

Today, “nation” refers to the South African nation, including all the various races, tribes and peoples inside the borders of the country under one legal definition and classification. The Afrikaners can at most be seen as a South African tribe, more specifically a group among which specific racial features and various cultural similarities are identifiable, based on a predominately mixed European origin.

To arguing that Afrikaans is an old language is wrong. Although it does have roots in the remote past, it is not yet a century old in 2017 as an official language. In addition, to argue that it was exclusively developed by the Afrikaner or that it is a sole Afrikaner possession is also wrong. Afrikaans developed into an independent language from European Dutch as its initial basis. This process was driven by South Africa’s “old” populations, starting in 1652. It was definitely not a language spoken exclusively by the proto-Afrikaners away from the other racial and ethnic groups. To the contrary, it was a mutual language, unsophisticated for a long time, spoken, written and used by the country’s various racial and ethnic groups in their communication with each other. Indeed, one of the first works in written Afrikaans was “Bayaan-ud-djyn”, an Islamic tract written in Arabic script by Abu Bakr in 1845.^{74,76,83,152-154}

There are still various Afrikaans dialects that could be regarded as “Kombuis” Afrikaans. Examples include the varieties spoken in certain parts of the country by the various Afrikaans subgroups, like “Afri-kaaps” of the Cape Flats, “Cape Afrikaans” of Western Cape and the “Orange River Afrikaans” in the Northern-Cape. These dialects can with good reason be seen as public protests against the gold standard of Afrikaans that some academic purists with Afrikaner-nationalist sentiments see as the correct and only Afrikaans, belonging exclusively to the nationalist Afrikaners.^{73,89,107}

This means the Afrikaans language (as the Afrikaner himself as a person and a specific racial identity with a particular culture entity) is still in a process of development and it will certainly change considerably as time goes on, especially with the input of the Afrikaanses. The language will not only survive, like the Icelandic and Welsh languages did, it will grow through its use in primary communications between the Afrikaanses as their numbers grow.^{52-54,67,76,77,152,155-158}

It is not wrong to say that Afrikaans also belongs to the “Afrikaanses”, a group that is much more comprehensive in numbers than the Afrikaner grouping, but

free from the exclusive contaminated race and ethnicity connection of the Afrikaners. The presence of the Afrikaanses in the South African greater society indeed nullifies the nationalist Afrikaner argument that the Afrikaners are the sole creators or keepers and guardians of the Afrikaans language: there are many more role players. The future of Afrikaans, it seems, is much safer in the hands of the politically uncontaminated “Afrikaanses” than in those of the Afrikaner.⁷

The name “Afrikaner” in certain circles refers to an exclusive Afrikaner identity that entails political rights and that is regarded as centuries old and endangered by other races and even outsiders from his own White racial group if he allows miscegenation. This identity served as a justification for his discriminatory behaviour against persons from other races. The though construct surrounding this identity was clearly erroneous.

The research shows that the Afrikaners are indeed a very small group in the greater South African population. They are decreasing in number every year, and seeing the controversy around the name “Afrikaner” as an established identity that conserves Afrikaner unity and exclusiveness, the Afrikaner is already *en route* to dissolution of the group’s coherence as a natural course of events. If the declining numbers (5.2% to 10%) of the Afrikaners from 1960 to 2011 (50 years) are taken as guideline for future predictions, and the emigration numbers of 1994 to 2017 continue, the Afrikaner as a group would be dissolved by 2117.^{75,80,87}

The belief that the present-day Afrikaner’s Christian religion is unique is also an untruth. The same can be said about the Afrikaner’s culture of today: it has very little in common with the Afrikaner culture of his father and his grandfather. Present Afrikaner culture is much more culturally integrated with the other ethnic groups, like the Coloureds and to some extent even the Blacks. These various cultural changes, some slight while others are significant, are notable in Afrikaner family life, work ethic, the customs and traditions they underwrite and practice, as well as his educational and social preferences. The Afrikaner in general has become an individual, not very different from any other South African.

The idea that the Afrikaner is “lily” white is inaccurate. The strict prohibition of miscegenation between Afrikaners and Blacks because of the Afrikaner’s White blood purity was therefore pointless. The process of intermingling was activated in 1652 and is indeed on-going. The Afrikaner’s discrimination on the basis of

“pure blood” reflects a lack of knowledge about his own racial origin. The Afrikaner seems to lack insight and wise reasoning in this regard.

There is no doubt that the masterminds behind Apartheid during the peak of Apartheid were the members of the Afrikaner Broederbond. It consisted of a nucleus of approximately 20 000 nationalist Afrikaners, referred to as the *Super Afrikaners*. Their powerful cultural, economical, political and military tentacles reached all nationalist Afrikaners, especially the Afrikaners belonging to the NP and the DRC. It form an immense circle and powerful group of approximately three million members, what Giliomee called the *NP-Broederbonder-Afrikaners*.^{41, p. 11}

When considering the above information, it is clear that Apartheid was in essence designed by the NP, the AB and the DRC, especially during the period under Verwoerd, in an attempt to secure a correspondence between nation status and territory for Afrikaners. The only principle was refusal to share political power in South Africa. This was done by imposing a political order with creative procrastination and manipulation, much more incisive than just pure racial segregation. It was a period of grand Apartheid with brutal and numerous well thought through legislative, economic, political and administrative policies. It ignored and disregarded the interests and aspirations of the subjugated citizens of South Africa in a blind belief that the Afrikaners, at that stage the most developed of all the South African groups, deserved the lion’s share of all the country’s benefits and rights and that this situation will be permanent. Although there were a number of policy reforms and adaptations by the NP since the late 1970s to uplift Blacks, was it exclusively aimed at keeping the Afrikaner regime in power and to reserve Afrikaner and White rights and benefits.^{7,37,159}

Many Afrikaners were not nationalist Afrikaners and experienced discrimination and domination to some extent, like the Blacks. However, they still benefited directly and indirectly from Apartheid and, notwithstanding their distaste for Apartheid, they mostly remained silent on Apartheid’s wrongdoings. Collectively, these side-lined Afrikaners cannot escape responsibility for Apartheid, whatever their arguments and excuses are. They are, with the Super-Afrikaners and nationalist Afrikaners, culprits. Although it is argued that Afrikaners born after 1994 are been freed from this burden they too cannot plead not guilty. They are still benefitting from what their forefathers gained over many years during Apartheid. This outcome makes all of these individuals part of the entity “Afrikaners” to which this article refers.^{7,36,37,41}

The chapter begs of Afrikaners in-depth introspection. Afrikaners should answer the question whether they had already reached self-actualisation and an optimal personal happiness in the new South Africa. Has the Afrikaner left his worries and fears behind to commit to a good life here, or is he considering other options for happiness in the future.

It is an open question whether the proto-Afrikaner of 1910 on the founding of the Union, would have supported racism, especially the Afrikaner nationalism of the NP-AB-DRC-alliance (Grand Apartheid) from 1948 onwards, had they been thoroughly educated on who they are and where they truly come from. Would the mess the Afrikaners find themselves in today have been their real choice? If Afrikaners knew the facts, would they not perhaps have acted differently? Instead of selecting to obstruct Black voting from 1910 to 1948, would they not have had selected not to obstruct one-man-one-vote. Would they not have parted with the “Boer” and “Cape Dutch” identities in 1910 to choose the ANC as his preferred party by the 1960s? Would they not perhaps have become Afrikaanse and Black South Africans because they are Black?^{3,11,26,92,96}

Was the Afrikaner’s immense psychological fear in 1994 to be rejected as a “traitor”, “joiner” and “hendsopper” (“hand-upper) if he became an ANC supporter or made another radical political change-over stronger than the fear that their culture will dissolve within a century? Are these two fears, now in combination, paralysing today the Afrikaners so that they cannot make sound decisions about their present and future role in the RSA?^{3,11,26,92,96}

Was the cause of Apartheid perhaps the Afrikaner’s dark disposition and inclination to racial and ethnic discrimination? If so, it has resulted in many negative political and life consequences that the Afrikaner must face as they face the personal confusion in the new South Africa.

Two crucial questions emerge from the above:

- Was the Afrikaner’s racial and ethnic discrimination learned from and embedded as part of their mindset by the bad examples of racist governance and other social, religious, cultural and political institutions and groups into which they were born and grew up? *or*

■ Do Afrikaners regard their racial behaviours as justified acts of revenge for personal, political, social and economic injustices perpetrated against them by other races and ethnic groups?

Evaluating your own history and wrongdoings of the past is not easy. “We find ourselves living in an indignant world, one intolerant of complexity when viewing our history and eager for simple characterisations of good and bad”, writes the writer Kalim Rajab^{160, p. 18}. He concludes^{160, p. 18}: “...we ultimately need room for greater magnanimity and to allow greater space for graciousness in our understanding of the past”. These words are very much applicable to the Afrikaners when they have to look at themselves: they are caught up in indoctrination that taught that they are a superior race that does only the ethically correct and good, versus the inferior Black subordinates whose doings were infected with unethical and bad behaviour and an inferior disposition. The nationalist Afrikaner regime’s doctrine of Afrikaner supremacy was supported by the idea of a “completeness and perfection” as part of a superior mindset and lifestyle. This started in in 1652 at the Cape of Good Hope. It was internalised by many ordinary Afrikaners: *Afrikaners are only good versus Blacks are always bad*. Most Afrikaners are too frightened to acknowledge the bad in their past, avoiding consciously and unconsciously their incompleteness, imperfection and failures, which so greatly characterise all humans. This study informed the Afrikaners of their true past, who they are: they are just ordinary humans, indigenous people of the same bloodline as their previous subordinates, characterised by the same incompleteness, imperfections and failures.

The advice of Palkhivala¹⁵⁹ is valuable for Afrikaners in their effort to unshackle and cleanse themselves from the dark secrets of their past and to move successfully into the new South Africa with its manifold indigenous realities. He writes^{159, p. 77}: “Every country must learn to live with its past history and to cherish it instead of trying to rewrite it. Chaos would be the only result of trying to undertake ‘correction of history’, or to undo the past, or to seek to remedy past wrongs”. The Afrikaners tried all these wrong venues in the past and failed. They have hopefully at last learned from the past.

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CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL DETERMINANTS AND ROLE PLAYERS IN THE ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE MINDSETS OF AFRIKANERS

2.1 Introduction

Separation on the basis of ethnicity and race in South Africa during apartheid to benefit the Whites and to suppress the Black majority was not only a very controversial move, but also a devastating political dispensation driven by Whites up to 1994. It was not a voluntary process, but one that Whites one-sidedly forced on Blacks, Asians, Coloureds, and other races from 1671 onwards. The pertinent question is: *What motivated the Afrikaner to practice statutory racial and ethnic discrimination up to 1994?* Was it an erroneous belief in White supremacy; a selfish appropriation of prosperity at the cost of others; a doctrine implemented by leaders with masked intentions to abuse their mandate to obtain benefits for themselves at costs of the other Afrikaners and Black population? Was it an outcome that resulted from the Afrikaner's negative personal and collective experiences over many years, resulting in revenge, and compensatory behaviour? Or did they learn and internalize deviant behaviour from bad examples during their historical development?¹⁻⁵

Present-day research on racial discrimination is mainly focused on the negative consequences for the victims of apartheid. The emphasis is on the situations and environments that developed from apartheid, like the implications of the financial burdens and poverty it created for and the psychological hurt and scars left on the victims. Many of efforts are aimed at finding ways to correct the wrong-doing with strategies like affirmative action to create equal work opportunities and to restore the civil and personal rights of the victims of apartheid. The focus on political correctness that developed after 1994 has hampered balanced research on the structure and dynamics of apartheid. This trend led to a very one-sided, emotional, and superficial focus on apartheid victims and their fate in the new South Africa. The outcome is that apartheid has not been researched as an entity in itself. Research with a focus on the *victims* and the *culprits* of apartheid, the *Afrikaners* specifically, is rare in South Africa. There has been very little reflection on possible historical determinants and role players that inspired apartheid, caused it to be internalized, and drove, and maintained it in the mindset of Afrikaners. Critics of apartheid have generally

ignored the context surrounding the origin and practice of apartheid in research since 1994 in their efforts to blame Afrikaners as solely responsible for all South Africa's present-day political, social, and economic ills. Worldwide, Afrikaners are successfully portrayed as selfish White racists without any pity, mercy, or empathy for other racial groups or their interests. The true reasons for the development of apartheid and the way in which Afrikaners were born into this controversy are blindly ignored by political opportunists and human rights critics. As Afrikaner numbers and their political impact diminish, they are dropping below the radar for "Apartheid crimes" and revenge for the past. Balanced research on the possible historical determinants and role players in the establishment, maintenance, and practice of racial and ethnic discrimination in the mindsets of Afrikaners is of critical importance. Only once these factors have been foregrounded can apartheid be understood in its full complexity and a sound judgement be made.¹⁻⁸

Spence⁸, p. 13 writes that the phrase 'white civilisation' is often dismissed contemptuously as euphemism for 'white supremacy', but he states that is the oversimplifying of a complex set of attitudes and beliefs unique to the Afrikaners: The Afrikaners were rightly the *first nationalists in Africa* as Harold Macmillan already remarked in 1960. This nationalism included a complexity that can not easily be defined. Should the Afrikaners bow already in the 1960s to pressures, it would be more than a system of privilege that will crumble, more than deep-rooted prejudices that would be suffered, a nation would lose its identity (as reflected well in 2017). Spence argued so far back as in the 1960s that the Afrikaners' ideological inflexibility in the face of internal and external criticisms of their racial policy had given Afrikaner-politics a rigidity far removed from the tradition of compromise and adaptation to changing circumstances which animates political activity in Western societies.⁸ He writes⁸, p. 19:

Apartheid is no subject for mockery or facile comment. It is very grim, very important, very difficult. Of the men in South Africa who support it some are uninformed and deeply prejudiced; still others are angry or frightened: many feel helpless or bewildered; selfishness and indifference are common. These attitudes are easily discernible amongst both English and Afrikaans-speaking sections of the population. There is, however, a gross and dangerous error in not recognizing that the best of the advocates of apartheid are men of personal worthiness, with genuinely conscientious and moral spirits. This concession is not in conflict with the opposite

admission that there exists in the present government an ugly and sinister self-righteousness which seems prepared to sacrifice the liberty and comity of a democratic society in order to attain the harsh ends of an imperious racial nationalism. Yet it is still wrong to believe that a body of ungenerous and selfish motives is all that sustains the doctrine of *apartheid*.

The racial discrimination perpetrated by Afrikaners against other races because the blood of these races is contaminated by Black blood, is clearly unjustifiable when using the genetic heritage of Afrikaners as a measuring stick. What is more, White Afrikaners cannot claim to be the sole owners of the name “Afrikaner” and the Afrikaans language. Their use of racial discrimination to fight off challenges to their name and language is without any basis. The fact is that the Afrikaner is bio-physically part of the multiracial South African community. Afrikaner discrimination against other races could not always have been driven by sound thinking and reasoning. This lack of insight is inexplicable. Various agents, determinants, and role players, sometimes outside the constitution of the Afrikaner, could have activated these deviating behaviours and could have played masked and unspoken roles in its development.

Various negative and conflicting Afrikaner experiences over generations made them conform and adapt to specific behaviours to survive in a system where they felt threatened. Certain experiences can result in psychological predispositions in the human mind about the behaviour and intentions of other persons. Such predispositions could have dominated and steered the Afrikaner’s actions and reactions over a long time. Their ideas may have included assumed and real cognitions on negative Black racial inclinations and actions. In the Afrikaner, this ended specifically in discriminatory and opportunistic behaviour towards other races. The racially discriminatory examples set by government authorities and other Afrikaner institutions and groups, set the stage for discrimination as an approved and acceptable, even prescribed, lifestyle for the Afrikaner.²⁻⁵

In this regard it is important to note that negative experiences with the current Black majority government can still stimulate or strengthen established racial attitudes or reignite racist behaviours. This is the *action-reaction syndrome*.⁸⁻¹²

Belief systems that had been inculcated over generations and which had become firmly established in individuals and groups remain part of these individuals and groups long after the initial stimuli have disappeared. It has a momentum of its own. This also goes for certain negative past experiences losses versus positive experiences gains. This learned predisposition, awakened, and maintained by conditioning, overrides even the soundest cognitive thinking.^{11,13}

The Afrikaner propensity for racial and ethnic discrimination and their disregard for sound thinking and reasoning seem to be anchored in their own history as individuals and ad a tribe in South Africa on the one hand, and the history of the South African peoples on the other. The relationships between these peoples as historical entities, sometimes intertwined, and sometimes oppositional, show many similarities with that of the privileged and racially subjective Whites of the Old and New Europe. Peoples in the Old and New Europe are also inclined to ethnic violence and genocide. There is also the masked racial domination of the Whites of the United States of America up to the 1960s and the current racial conflict and discrimination in Europe in reaction to migrants from Syria, Iraq, and Libya. On the other hand, history reflects a Black propensity for serious racial and ethnic violence and genocide in Africa, especially in early South Africa, comparable to the events that marked the worldwide de-placement and elimination of racial and ethnic minorities from the late 1800s up to the present.^{4,14-18}

It is important to note that not all Afrikaners agreed with the National Party's (NP) racial policy or were ever members of the NP and nationalist Afrikaner organizations like the Afrikaner Bond (AB) and the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC). They were not all racists in their lifestyles, even though they had been exposed to bad examples. There is often a clear political and cultural difference between *nationalist Afrikaners* and *ordinary Afrikaners*. There is evidence of this in the strong support many Afrikaners had for the South African Party (SAP) of general JC Smuts up to the late 1950s, and their membership of the later Progressive Party and its successor, the Democratic Alliance. Many Afrikaners belong to cultural organizations like the Freemasons, an international British-orientated organization that is quite the opposite of the AB, which solely underwrites Afrikaner nationalism. This division is also reflected by the Afrikaans membership of English churches, which early on opposed apartheid and the political ideologies of the nationalist Afrikaners. The political division among Afrikaners on racism was so prominent that descriptions for this

phenomenon emerged as Afrikaner liberals were referred to as “Afrikaner Sappe” while nationalists were referred to as “Afrikaner Natte.”^{3,4,17-21, 23}

This highlights the enormous differences in the political, racial and cultural thinking of the earlier racially driven *Northern Afrikaners* (the Transvaal’s and Free State *Boers* and *Burghers*) and the earlier liberal *Southern Afrikaners* (Cape Dutch). This division became more overt after the 1980s, especially as Afrikaners started publishing anti-apartheid content or started making anti-apartheid statements. Many started joining political parties that opposed the NP and the AB.¹⁹⁻²¹

Notwithstanding these differences among different Afrikaner groups, most Afrikaners are stereotyped as racists. After 1994 the incoming ANC regime and prominent Blacks have been discriminating against Afrikaners for their own political profits. The initial strong opposition against the NP Broederbonder-Afrikaners’ thinking from the side of liberal (dissident) Afrikaners, the English, and Portuguese-speaking White South African minorities, religious dominations outside the domain of the Dutch Reform Church families, like the Charismatic and Roman Catholic churches and the Islamic and Buddhist religions, dramatically declined from the 1970s onwards. This made the regime of the NP-Broederbonder-Afrikaners politically untouchable and uncontrollable. On the other hand, these opposing liberal Afrikaners never stepped away from the benefits of apartheid under the NP regime. In practice, many Afrikaners outside the NP-DRC-AB regime were involved in the practice and maintenance of apartheid. The system generated many benefits, directly, or indirectly. They embraced these benefits while at the same time publically criticizing and opposing apartheid. It was only in the 1980s that true political liberalism emerged again and that liberal Afrikaner resistance to apartheid resurfaced more openly. However, this new level of opposition did not mean that liberal Afrikaners, despite their more open hostile orientation against apartheid and the NP-Broederbonder-Afrikaners, stopped participating in apartheid, or stopped benefitting broadly from the system. It was still with them, but only well masked.^{2,3,5-7}

There is an enormous difference between *objecting Apartheid and opposing Apartheid because you don’t like it* and *automatically being a beneficiary of Apartheid because you are White*, an insight even the “liberal” Afrikaners seem to miss or are not honest enough to recognize publically. These long-term exclusive benefits and enrichment that apartheid brought for most Afrikaners,

notwithstanding their political orientation, is reflected in the current call of Black politicians for the “second revolution” of the 1994 dispensation. This would entail radical economic transformation (RET) through White capital capture. Apartheid is seen, in the eyes of Blacks, as a collective guilt shared by every Afrikaner, young, and old, past, and present.^{19-21, 25-29}

What motivated proto-Afrikaners and Afrikaners to accept, underwrite, and practice racial discrimination?

The aim of the chapter is to analyse and describe the historical determinants and role players in the establishment and maintenance of racial discrimination in the minds of Afrikaners.³⁰⁻³²

2.2 The Afrikaner’s propensity for racial and ethnic discrimination

In-depth reflection on the Afrikaner’s interactions and experiences with other races in South Africa is paramount for insight and understanding of the Afrikaner’s racially discriminatory psycho-social, historical, and political set-up. At the moment, the devastating impacts of certain historical events are completely ignored. Many Black leaders, politicians, and opinion makers, when confronted with it, even reject it as untrue, in step with the post 1994 policy of political correctness. The impact of these negative events and their internalization in the minds of the proto-Afrikaner and later Afrikaner is intentionally side-lined by proponents of Black empowerment in the new South Africa. These events influenced the design and maintenance of discrimination, and this is the case even today. The spirit of political correctness that grew out of an honest attempt to bring reconciliation after 1994, does not allow the people of South Africa to confront untruths and myths with truths and facts.^{4,33}

In order to put the roles that Jan van Riebeeck, the proto-Afrikaners (often described with names like *Cape Dutch*, *Voortrekkers*, *Grens-Boers*, *Boers*, and *Burghers*, etc) and the Afrikaner of today played in the racial and ethnic colonial wrong-doings in South Africa into clear perspective – away from the current emotional and political rhetoric – it is necessary to also put possible Black colonial wrong-doings in South Africa into perspective. Only through such an attempt can the Afrikaner’s role in racial and ethnic discrimination be understood and evaluated in context, although still limited. Such an approach offers the opportunity to use the *Herodotus rules on proper government* as a yardstick to measure if the many current discriminative racial, ethnic and political accusations against the Afrikaner as an individual and as a group are

full truths, and if the overwhelming national and international prejudices against the Afrikaner are fully justified. Are the labels *racism*, *political power abuse*, and *genocide* not applicable to all the peoples of South Africa to a certain extent?^{2,3,5,25,34-39}

Intertwined conflicts, suffering and exploitation formed central determinants in the development, appropriation, strengthening and execution of the Afrikaner's racial and ethnic discrimination. The following learned behaviours, all with a political, psychological, racial, and social under-build and clearly unique to the Afrikaner's past and present context, need further discussion:

- Negative ethnic and racial influences of early Cape authorities
- Black-on-Black violence and genocide in South Africa
- White-on-White violence and genocide in South Africa
- Negative modern-day European and Western influences
- Afrikaner institutions of racial and ethnic discrimination

2.2.1 Negative ethnic and racial influences by early Cape authorities

Some of the external influences to which the Afrikaners were exposed were clearly not good social and political standards and principles. Some of these influences were accepted, but influences were also sometimes forced on the Afrikaners by the various early Cape and South African authorities. These influences became their leadership examples and were internalized in their mindset. This internalization of examples and values contributed to the Afrikaner's improper and inhuman actions later on with respect to other racial groups. The early Cape authorities' views and laws on the human and personal rights of other racial groups led to the internalization of racial discrimination as correct and normal. This propensity for racial discrimination was further enhanced by the compensations that racial discrimination and exploitation had for the proto-Afrikaner right from the start of the Cape settlement. The inclination to discriminate against other races was further strengthened by the slave ownership by Whites at the Cape. Slavery nullified the personal rights and dignity of other racial groups. *The abnormal became the normal.*^{3-5, 23}

Various determinants and role players in the Afrikaner's negative learned behaviour can be identified:

2.2.1.1 The Goske instruction of 1671 and the other internalizations of racial discrimination in the thinking of the early Cape Settlers and Colonists

The years immediately following the Dutch settlement led by Van Riebeeck and the arrival of various other Europeans at the Cape of Good Hope were marked by intimate social association and miscegenation between the different races, including the slaves (Indian-Malaysians and Blacks from Madagascar). In 1658 slaves started to arrive from Malaysia and other places, and indigenous people like the Hottentots and sometimes the Boesmans (KhoiSan) entered slavery as well. With the introduction of the system of free burghers at the Cape in 1657 the social- and workforce changed from strictly controlled VOC officials and employees (and the accompanying European lifestyles) to private entrepreneurs like free fishermen, bakers, hunters, masons, wagon builders, woodcutters, gardeners, etc., characterized by a much less rigid behaviour code. These newcomers not only made their own living, but also started to live a lifestyle away from the VOC's moral restrictions. Restrictions included prohibitions on social association and intermixing with other races. The shortage of female citizens stimulated social interaction and miscegenation between White free burghers and other racial groups. The authorities did not intend for the further growth of the settlement's population, which numbered 144 persons by 1659. This plan was fast undone by the miscegenation between the races because of the shortage of incoming women from Europe and the subsequent increase in mixed offspring. Racial mingling progressed so fast that 75% of all the children born to slave women between 1650 and 1670 had White fathers.^{18,40-42}

This interracial interaction, however, was quickly restricted by the narrow-minded Calvinistic bureaucracy of the autocratic local ruler of the Cape, the Dutch East India Company (better known as the "Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie" or VOC). An official instruction in 1671 from the executive manager of the VOC, Commissioner Isbrand Goske, prohibited sexual intercourse between Whites and slaves, while the Political Council of the VOC also forbade extramarital sexual intercourse between White men and young slave women in 1678. This was followed by a prohibition on marriages and extramarital sexual relations between Whites and freed slaves in 1685. The focus of racial discrimination was initially on foreign peoples (slaves of Indian-Malaysian origin and Blacks from Madagascar) and other indigenous people like the Hottentots. It seems as if indigenous Blacks, like the Xhosas, were not initially included in the South African racial discrimination that started in 1671. Indigenous Black assimilation only started by 1730 with the first contact

between the proto-Afrikaners and the Xhosas on the borders of the colony.^{17,18,40,41}

The racial discrimination described above, exclusively based on skin colour and officially recorded in 1671 with the *Goske instruction*, can be regarded as the *first apartheid law of South Africa*. Goske was the *first White proponent of organized racial discrimination*, eventually against all people of colour. However, this discrimination seemed to adhere to a view where *ethnicity is seen in terms of class*, meaning that the poor, and therefore to a certain extent the underdeveloped non-Whites at the Cape, were regarded as having a lower socio-economical standing and as “untouchables.” The slaves especially were stripped from their human rights and dignity and their financial and personal independence. They were impoverished. Also, the initial problems with the behaviour of the first slaves in 1658 and the Hottentots in terms of work and social habits and aggressiveness already manifested from 1652. This contributed further to levels of social differentiation and discrimination between certain sectors of the White community and other racial groups in general (specifically guided and practiced officially by the Cape authority). It is in this context that the VOC implemented a strict policy of separation between Whites and the other races like the slaves, Hottentots and Blacks from 1671. Later the Xhosas, with whom the Whites started to make contact in 1730, were included. This was extended to all Blacks and to all other races in South Africa from the 1850s onwards, especially in the republics of Transvaal and the Free State. The year 1671 can therefore be considered the *beginning of socio-controlled racial manipulation and engineering in South Africa*, specifically with the aim of Whites limiting and managing the personal and group rights of all other racial groups in some way.^{17,18}

This means that discrimination based on skin colour was legally established in South Africa in 1671 by the VOC. It was managed from the Netherlands, and not initially by the White incumbents. Notwithstanding this early legal discrimination, illegal clandestine relationships and illegitimate relations between the different races still continued in South Africa, even up to 1994 when the Immorality Act that legally prohibited sexual relations and miscegenation between White and non-Whites was struck off the law books.^{5,18}

The majority of the early Cape Whites, mostly of whom became the proto-Afrikaners, were not only introduced to statutory racial discrimination and domination by the authorities from 1652 onwards, but also became acclimatized

to racial discrimination due to the formal human and political wrong-doings of the authorities towards other races. Formal discrimination became internalized in the thinking of the proto-Afrikaners as “normal and correct” and this was strengthened by the many benefits the system brought them. The immediate result was that they started to practice discrimination themselves on a continuous and extreme basis.^{4,17,18}

2.2.1.2 Discrimination policies of the Dutch and British authorities

Discrimination against other races was not only impressed on the Whites at the Cape by the racial policies of the VOC, but also later by the Dutch and British rulers. The tendency of the British authorities to position Blacks and Whites against each other was another contributor to the later negative racial inclinations of the proto-Afrikaners. It strengthened of their established discriminatory inclinations. Prominent here were the liberal British authorities at the Cape's equalization of Blacks and Whites in 1828 with Ordinance 50, as well as the negative political and financial impact that the emancipation of the slaves in 1834 had on the proto-Afrikaner, the liberal Cape Constitution of 1835 with its non-distinction between races, together with the negative political and social influences of the liberal English missionaries on the political and personal rights of the proto-Afrikaner. Afrikaners saw these liberal British outcomes as endangering their immediate livelihoods and positions as citizens. The other races were not only directly responsible for this situation, but also became future competitors in a new liberal-political society that not did not favour Afrikaners.^{17,18,43}

These official liberal political outcomes undoubtedly further increased and hardened the already established racism of the proto-Afrikaner. This official British race-linearism, together with the British denial of the proto-Afrikaner's political rights and the Afrikaner's own developing proto-Afrikaner nationalism led to the Great Trek and the establishment of the two independent republics, the Free State and Transvaal. The republics were both racially defined (although free from slavery) from the beginning and were outright anti-British establishments.^{3,17,18,44}

The liberal British politics of the 1830s at the Cape also affected the proto-Afrikaner churches' racial inclinations and practices negatively. From the 1850s, the three main Afrikaans churches [the DRC and the two other Reformed Churches (RCs) established in the two Boer republics] also developed a racist slant and reflected a dramatically hardened racial and ethnic discrimination. This growing discriminative and hard core racial attitude of the church managements

was successful transferred to the members of the three Reformed churches in the Cape, Free State, and Transvaal after 1902, especially through cooperation with the NP and the AB.^{17,18}

2.2.1.3 The racially discriminatory policy of the Union of South Africa

The rigid racial discrimination that started to emerge in the 1850s was not eradicated with the annexation of the republics of Transvaal and Free State and the formation of the Union of South Africa. Just like the Civil War between the North and the South in America failed to erase immediate racial discrimination (even up to today), the Anglo Boer War also failed to erase racial discrimination in the new Union of South Africa after 1910. The new government structure brought a new, more rigorous, even ruthless, racially defined lifestyle to benefit exclusively the Whites of South Africa.^{3,4,15,18,23,44,45}

The racial and ethnic, cultural, political, and social attitudes of the Boers that started to develop and to manifest before and after the Great Trek, not only led to the development of various proto-Afrikaner subgroups in the Cape Colony, but also in the republics of Transvaal and the Free State. Each group had their own learned and institutionalized racial foundations. The existence of such segmentation in cultural and racial thinking was ignored, or at best not noticed by the British government and most of the Cape Dutch of the Union of South Africa as they compiled the Constitution of the Union. There were at least six proto-Afrikaner subgroups, although not always clearly separated: The Transvaal Afrikaners (Transvaal Boers), the Orange Free State Afrikaners (Orange Free State Boers), the Natal Afrikaners, the South-western Cape Afrikaners, Eastern Cape Afrikaners and Northern Cape Afrikaners (Northern Cape Boers). The differences were noticeable in lifestyles and the groups were sometimes very different from each other in political and socio-cultural orientation and thinking. Racial discrimination was very similar between the various subgroups. They showed a general (a fact that seems to be true to a certain extent even today) inclination to steer away from liberal and unity thinking. Unity was impossible in the Union and even the later Republic of South Africa. Racial discrimination seems to be the only unifying factor.^{3,5,19,21,44}

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This tendency to discriminate against certain racial groups was also evident among the White political leaders during the formation of the Union of South Africa. Smuts' memorandum of proposals for the formation of a Union reflected no trace of concern for the fate of the Black man in South Africa. In reaction to

the “Black question”, the Cape politician Merriman for instance wrote to J C Smuts^{3, p. 18}: “... I do not like Natives at all and I wish we had no Black man in South Africa. But there they are, our lot is cast with them by an overruling Providence and the only question is how to shape our course so as to maintain the supremacy of our race and at the same time do our duty.” Smuts answered in a very similar tone^{3, p. 19}: “...I sympathise profoundly with the Native races of South Africa whose land it was long before we came here to force a policy of dispossession on them... But I don’t believe in politics for them. Perhaps at the bottom I do not believe in politics at all as a means for the attainment of the highest ends, but certainly so far as the Natives are concerned politics will to my mind only have an unsettling influence.”

General Hertzog showed a liberal insight with respect the Coloureds in 1925, persons directly related to the Afrikaners^{44, p. 194}: “They came into being and today still live in the midst of the Whites, they know no other form of civilisation than that of the White man; however much they may on occasions fail in this connection their ideal of life is that of the White man and not that of the native and they employ the language of the White man as their mother tongue. Their can thus in their case be no question of segregation.” Hertzog clearly differentiated between the general coloured people of the country versus the Cape Coloureds, which he favoured. This emphasizes his racist attitude towards Blacks and his ethnic differentiation between “different” kinds of Coloureds. At the same time he makes it clear that the social mingling of the Cape Coloureds with the Whites is not desired.⁴⁴

Hertzog showed further preference for a liberal programme of separate development with the division of territories between Whites and Blacks in South Africa. He wanted to give Blacks their own political rights, but clearly wanted to keep political rights from Blacks in White territories based on his “test of civilisation.” The politician Pirow in this regard writes about Hertzog’s viewpoint^{44, p. 195}: “He often said that the time would come when a black skin was no longer such a test. He felt that at such a stage direct political rights could no longer be withheld from the black man. If, however such rights had to be given in the white man’s country the time would come when the latter would be swamped politically and thereafter it would be only a question of time until white civilisation would disappear completely.”

Hertzog’s ideas became the blue print for the NP’s later rigid and discriminative apartheid (and the homelands/Bantustans). Apartheid kept the Blacks out of the

political domain of the Whites completely, but they were received with open arms into the Whites' economical sphere to benefit the Whites only. He introduced these ideas as an influential leader at a time when Afrikaners were insecure and he projected it as correct and applicable political, social, and personal behaviour.^{3,5,44}

The to and fro on the political rights of other races in South Africa, especially the Blacks, together with naive political thinking of the 1910s to the 1930s, served as early manifestations of what became a permanent feature of White thinking on the "Black question." This thinking was internalized among Afrikaners and it was what nationalist Afrikaner leaders thought *was right and just* for the Blacks. It is the counter-reaction to this political manipulation and the erroneous thinking that is Afrikaner nationalism that has been rattling the Afrikaners back to reality from 1994. They are now learning what the concept *humanity* means. Friedman wrote about these early double standards in political thinking and the activation, establishment and promotion of hard core racial discrimination in the 1930s by Afrikaner nationalist leaders in the mindsets of Afrikaners^{3, p. 19}: "Liberal principles, it seems, could be successfully invoked in the case of the Boers, but they somehow lost their efficacy where the Natives were concerned. In principle liberalism is a fine doctrine, but in practice it is for Whites only."

Smut's conclusion best described the fates of Blacks and other races and the racist indoctrination of the Afrikaner masses up to 1994 when he says^{3, p. 19}:" When I consider the political future of the Natives in South Africa I must say that I look into shadows and darkness; and then I feel inclined to shift the intolerable burden of solving the sphinx problem to the ampler shoulders and stronger brains of the future." That this "darkness" was indeed a nightmare in an "exceptional" darkness for the Afrikaner and the Whites in Africa, is illustrated by the fact that in 1950 that there was only 4 million Whites in the whole of Africa out of a total population of 170 million.¹⁶ This denial of the political realities and dangers became a confident bluff with which the NP-Broederbond-leadership approached the South African racial predicament. They concealed long-term political disaster for the common Afrikaner through "a policy of living the present politics and awaiting the political future."⁴

The above context forms the unstable political heritage of other races, especially Blacks. This combined with a rigid, racist doctrine internalized in the thinking of the nationalist Afrikaners that Dr. DF Malan, Adv. JG Strydom and Dr. HF

Verwoerd of the NP inherited since 1948. These three NP leaders (seen today by many as Nazi sympathizers) were just too willing and too eager to expand racial and ethnic discrimination and domination so that it became extensive and legalized. They were, with great pride, the “Fathers of Grand Apartheid.”^{3,4,47,48}

The political and socio-cultural conflicts and flawed thinking that made racial discrimination the dominant feature of certain of the nationalist Afrikaner subgroups (especially the Transvaal and the Free State nationalist Afrikaners, the *Northern Afrikaners*), was obvious from day one of the Union.^{3,5,44}

Although it is sometimes alleged that it was the “Cape Dutch” Afrikaner who dominated the Afrikaner’s political future from 1910 and who forced the name “Afrikaner” onto the Transvaal and Free State Boers, the opposite happened with political thinking, sentiment, and governance. The early appropriation of hard core thinking on discrimination and the racist influences of the nationalist Boers from the Transvaal and Free State influenced the Union. All the prime ministers of the Union and the presidents of the old South Africa since DF Malan (himself living in the North after his studies) came from the Northern part of the Union. Racist Afrikaner attitudes greatly influence the political, social and cultural thinking of some of these Northern subgroups even today. In the past this has led to deep divides, even violence, mistrust and dysfunction between the various groups of Afrikaners. This split was one of the main reasons for the de-internalization and unlearning of the doctrine of racism. This led to the failure of the nationalist Afrikaner attempts to morally and politically justify apartheid and to establish an exclusive independent Boer state in South Africa since the 1960s.^{3-5,19,21,46,49}

The result in 1910 was that the more liberal political rights available in the Cape Colony were not extended northwards after the founding of the Union. To the contrary: the extreme racial discrimination that was internalized in the minds of proto-Afrikaners and later nationalist Afrikaners moved south-wards from 1902 onwards. It quickly spread all over South Africa, overwhelming the liberal human rights from the Cape. This negative outcome and the constant indoctrination with ideas of White supremacy led to growing numbers of nationalist Afrikaners and later the NP-Broederbond Afrikaners all over South Africa since 1910. There is evidence of as much as ten grand apartheid laws that were promulgated before 1948 to control and to limit the personal lives and political rights of the other races.^{3,5, 23,47,48}

2.2.1.4 Grand Apartheid from 1948 to 1994

The leadership and members of the NP, a group of staunch White supremacists, inherited an established racist political system in 1948. As indicated, it originated from the Dutch authorities in 1671 and was already 277 years old when the NP took office in 1948. The racially discriminatory system of 1671 was constantly developed and intensified after the late 1890s by several White racial-political dispensations (the Cape and Natal colonies, the republics of Transvaal and Free State and the later Union of South Africa) before the NP took office.

Since 1948 this engrained racism against Blacks was further developed and steered by the NP and its nationalist Afrikaners into a comprehensive ethnic-racial system. The NP's discrimination also showed traces of ethnic discrimination, imported especially by BJM Hertzog against the English-speaking Whites. It took hold as early as 1912 and escalated from 1930 to 1939 due to Afrikaner nationalist anti-Jewish actions, propaganda and legislations guided by NP-Broederbond-Afrikaner leaders such as DF Malan, JG Strydom and HF Verwoerd. They wanted to stop the immigration of Jews to South Africa out of sympathy for the Nazis. As in Greater Europe, lower classes of nationalist Afrikaners had a jealousy and fear of the successes of the immigrant Jews in business and professional life. Nationalist Afrikaner politics since the early 1930s to 1946 reflected the kind of racial and ethnic ideology of Adolf Hitler and the Nazis. After 1946, the ghost of Hitler and his racist ideology remained, only disguised as something more refined. The well-planned policy of discrimination and the constant inculcation of the ideas on which it was founded led to the successful establishment of an ethnic and racial despotism in South Africa within half a century. The NP, supported by the AB and Afrikaner churches, ostracized dissident Afrikaners and shamed them for deviating political anti-Afrikaner behaviour and compensated approved pro-Afrikaner behaviour. This political and racial milieu was not challenged or questioned by the grassroots nationalist Afrikaner at any time. It was instilled into the new generation of nationalist Afrikaners as appropriate and correct behaviour.³

5,18,23,44,48,50

Within this undemocratic political set-up with its indoctrination, most of broader population of nationalist Afrikaners grew up and partook freely in a lifestyle guided by the bombastic and arrogant leaders of the NP-AB leadership. These leaders took away the average Afrikaner's independent thought and decision making. They were caught in a frame of reference where discrimination against

non-Whites and negative ethnic behaviours towards other non-Afrikaners were morally justified, underwritten fully in the opinions, advice, views, and integrity of the leaders of the NP-AB. Independent thought was of secondary importance. For the most nationalist Afrikaners, apartheid became a permanent way of life dredged with benefits that could only improve with time.^{4,23,51}

2.2.2 Black-on-Black violence and genocide in South Africa

Notwithstanding the constant reference to the Afrikaner as an “alien, murderous colonist” in South Africa by Black politicians, is it undeniable that the current Black population are also foreign to South Africa and is indeed in the same boat as the Afrikaners, “alien murderous colonists.” The Black migration downwards over Africa was accompanied by extreme Black-on-Black violence and genocide, stretching over more than 30 years (1810–1840). It was nothing less than one group forcing a Black ethnic, racist and undemocratic political system on other Blacks. It was equally, if not more extreme than the Afrikaner’s apartheid regime later on.¹⁴

Just before the official occupation by Van Riebeeck in 1652, the ancestors of the current Black population moved to South Africa from Central Africa and became settlers here. These Southern regions, which were traditionally Khoi and San territory, were illegally possessed by incoming Black groups. Today objective historians see these migrations from Central Africa and the subsequent establishment of a permanent stronghold in a new homeland by these Black settlers, as the *first true colonization* (and thus the *first Black colonization*) of *South Africa*.^{14,17}

After this first Black colonization, ownership and peace did not last long for many of the Black colonists (conquerors) in South Africa. There was infighting over land, livestock, water resources and group political rights. This quickly resulted in conflict, and led to wars in the newly occupied areas. Driving each other off territories soon became the order of the day. This series of expulsions from territory and evictions are regarded as the *second Black colonization* (or Black-re-colonization or re-conquering) of South Africa. The period 1810 to 1840 (known as the *Mfecane* in the coastal areas and the *Difaqane* in the inland) especially led to widespread Black-on-Black chaos and bloodshed in the North of South Africa. This process took place more or less simultaneously with the Afrikaner Trek Boers and Voortrekkers' move northwards from the Cape Colony.¹⁴

King Shaka, the king of the powerful newly formed Zulu kingdom and his murderous behaviour around 1819 is prominent in this tragic political, social and economic chaos. He was the main instigator of Black colonial wrongdoings and Black colonialism between 1810 and 1840.¹⁴

The eradication and re-colonization of other Black tribes (and the remnants of these broken and fleeing tribes wherever they settled away from the Zulus and other occupying tribes), led to the depopulation of large parts of South Africa. Intense food shortage followed and more than 28 independent Black tribes were completely wiped out. The total death toll of the above *Mfecane* and the *Difaqane* has never been satisfactorily determined, but it is estimated to be between one and two million. Many displaced Black tribes like the Batlokwa, amaHlubi, amaNgwane, Mfengu, Makololo and many others turned into colonial villains themselves. While fleeing from Shaka and the murderous rage of other tribes, they would themselves occupy other tribal territory and resources. Black tribes like the Tembus and Xhosa enslaved tribes such as the Bhaca, stripping them of personal rights and their tribe's jurisdiction.¹⁴

Mzilikazi, the king of the Matabele in Transvaal between 1826 and 1836, also played a prominent and murderous role in this genocide. He ordered widespread killings and devastation to remove all opposition to his new Ndebele order.¹⁴

Even the Griqua tribes and other Coloured groups committed inhuman wrongdoings in the former Northern Cape and Free State to oust Sotho and Tswana neighbouring tribes to seize their land. The latter, in turn, searching for new territory, again perpetrated inhuman violations of other Blacks.¹⁴

During this *second Black colonization* only the Khoi and the San were not guilty of significant wrongdoings like xenophobia and genocide. In fact, they were the only victims to ever fall victim to cannibalism under Black tribes like the Bafokeng.¹⁴

In other words, regarding Van Riebeeck's (and thus the Whites) arrival as the start of colonialism and racial and ethnic discrimination in South Africa is a fallacy. It is more correct to say that South Africa's racial and ethnic troubles actually started with the migration of Black tribes into South Africa from Central Africa and the *first Black colonization*, together with their *re-colonisation between 1810 and 1840* of each other's territory. These *first and second colonisations* also represent South Africa's *first genocide*.¹⁴

Today, Black South Africans seem to refuse to accept personal blame and responsibility for their ancestors' colonial atrocities and wrongdoings; behaviours that included genocide and invoked the *Herodotus Rules of Revenge* by the other suppressed Black tribes, a revenge in waiting up to today.⁵² The only difference between this early racial and ethnic discrimination of Black-on-Black and that of the nationalist Afrikaner's White-on-Black, is that when the Black-on-Black political aggression stopped during the 1840s, the ethnic and racial aggression of the nationalist Afrikaners had only just begun, ending in 1994. In 1994 the *third Black colonisation of South Africa* began to awaken.¹⁴

All Blacks and Whites are therefore collectively guilty and responsible for past atrocities as settlers in South Africa, not only the Afrikaner. Most importantly, the Afrikaner is not naive about what had happened during this 1810 to 1840 Black-on-Black violence and genocide in the Greater South Africa. They are aware of the potential that such extreme violence and genocide can happen to them in a collapsed political system. Nationalist Afrikaners used the potential danger of unpredictable and all-encompassing Black hostility and aggression, the so-called "Black Danger," as a way to rule Afrikaners with fear. This fear has become internalized in Afrikaners. They stereotype Blacks as a lower social, ethnic and racial class, beset with aggression, making apartheid necessary for survival in South Africa.⁵³⁻⁵⁵

On the one hand, knowledge of the early extreme Black aggression and the negative experiences of the Boer settlers from the 1730s onwards with other races, as well as the proto-Afrikaners' direct physical encounters with the Blacks in their early days in Natal, Transvaal, and Free State, aggravated their negative view of Blacks. It strengthened racist views and attitudes, and clearly not without reason. The contact that the Natal, Transvaal and Free State Boer settlers and burghers had from the middle-1830s created further a negative view of Blacks as murderous people and their leaders as incapable, untrustworthy and ruthless rulers.^{14,17}

On the other hand, it seems that Black-on-Black ethnic violence, reaching a climax between 1810 and 1840 and to a great extent occurring far away from the Whites, played a role in the current Black tribalism and the origins of the constant conflict between Whites and Blacks. Whites were initially unaware of the Black-on-Black violence in the interior. Some of these early tribes and their leaders, like the Zulus, Xhosas and Tswana, are still dominant role players

against the Afrikaners in the ANC regime more than 170 years later. The 1810 to 1840 Black genocide is ignored and shielded from the public eye in the present context of the ANC's post-1994 policy on guarding Black politics, empowerment and unity. Some of these events and their early impact on the Afrikaners on the later racial dispositions are unknown to a great contingent of the current Afrikaners. Currently, the sole, unchallenged focus is on blaming all Afrikaners and bashing apartheid as the only and culprit responsible for South Africa's present manifold problems. Blacks require a constant guilty plea and petition for forgiveness from the Afrikaner for their apartheid mistakes as part of this permanent blame game, even from Afrikaner school children. Requests for forgiveness for their own Black-on-Black genocide and murder actions against the Afrikaner Boers on the Eastern Border and in Natal, Transvaal, and the Free State is totally absent. Blacks are currently portrayed as "uncontaminated angels."^{14,33,45,57-61}

The Black-on-Black ethnic violence described above and the lingering ethnocentricity has made Afrikaners cautious about the behaviours and inclinations of Blacks. It is still regarded as a stern warning for the future. The present rise in xenophobia in South Africa is a cruel reminder. For many Afrikaners the golden rule for South Africa and Africa and its people is that *they are not European or North-American, they are unpredictable entities in terms of political, racial and ethnic behaviours: changes in these domains are seldom obtained in Africa through pacification*. This view strengthens the inherently negative mental dispositions that guide the racial discrimination of the Afrikaners against Blacks. One implication of the earlier Black-on-Black violence is that these groups all harbour the potential for new and future ethnic discrimination, revenge and flare-ups between Black groups, as the Afrikaners fade from the scene as the sole scapegoat (and the former peacekeeper between Blacks). There is the possibility that the focus may in future move to one Black tribe seeking total dominance of other Black tribes as in the period 1810 to 1840, carrying the disempowered and destroying Afrikaners with their stream of destruction.^{14,39,45,57,62,63}

The political power games and face-offs between the Zulus and Xhosas since 1994 are obviously disconcerting. Hate that springs from the past and revenge for Zulu, Xhosa or other tribes' serious wrongs may well emerge among the Black tribes of the country. With it come a need and an urge to settle vendettas of 200 years ago and more. Up to the 1990s, these dynamics were suppressed by the Afrikaner's apartheid. Evidence of lingering ethnic and racial feelings of

revenge and murder are evident from events like those in Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Syria, Iraqi and Algeria. These are all countries with unresolved past racial and ethnic disputes like in South Africa. These old disputes can be activated very suddenly. In such an eruption the Afrikaners as Whites and as members of a minority group of “colonists” (and therefore subject to xenophobia), will surely unwillingly become victims to this battle and be gobbled up.^{14,34,39,45,51,64}

Not only old, but also new racial and ethnic Black conflicts are a responsibility. Consider the rising xenophobia. There are new role players from among the various existing South African Black tribes. Constant public talk of war and murder aimed at Whites and cases of unrest and damage to property like in Coligny and Lichtenburg in 2017 result in massive financial losses for Whites and a constant fear for attacks on their lives. The Afrikaners as a lone White tribe may be in the firing line as a new victim and a subject for revenge. The story of Bloedriver (Blood river) is also etched in the memory of the nationalist Afrikaners.^{27,37,39,55,64-67}

It is clear that the Afrikaner’s experiences with South African Blacks over the course of the country’s history were at times terrible and disastrous, leaving emotional scares. These experiences fed the racial attitude they learned in the Cape and caused it to be transferred from groups like the Coloureds to the Blacks. Negative stereotypes and fear of the unpredictable behaviour of some South African Black tribes fed into their learned racial attitudes and discriminatory lifestyle in the form of statutory apartheid up to 1994. Emotional reactions and infringements against Whites by some Blacks rekindle these feelings.^{3,5,14,18,23,44,50,55,65}

2.2.3 Early White-on-White violence and genocide in South Africa

Violence in terms of racial, ethnic and war crimes in South Africa is not limited to the above Black-on-Black behaviour, but is part of the wrongdoings of White races from 1652 up to 1902. Learned bad behaviour has been internalized by Afrikaners, not only due to the example and their exposure to deviant and discriminative White behaviour against other Whites, but also due to the ethnic discrimination they experienced at the hand of the British.^{3,17,18,23,48}

The war crimes of the British military and politicians against the Boers and their immediate families during the Second Anglo Boer War (1899-1902) are excellent examples of White-on-White violence and genocide. The mighty

British Empire invaded the small republics of Transvaal and the Orange Free State purely for sake of the enrichment of the British people and for future British political manipulation and power-play in Southern Africa. However, these events are seldom acknowledged as such. The impoverishment of the Boers of the Transvaal and Orange Free State republics after the Anglo Boer War, their loss of independence and their voice in the international world, the well-oiled propaganda system of the British Empire and the Afrikaners' desire for reconciliation with their new masters, all contributed to the true events and genocide of Afrikaner women and their children by the British government and military management remaining to the outside world. The consequence is that it has never been a topic for public discussion as war crimes against humanity or for comprehensive war compensation for emotional suffering. It was much easier for the British press and government to portray the Afrikaners as racists and obstructers to peace. The Afrikaners were the true and only victims of the Second Anglo Boer War. This false portrayal denied the Afrikaners their humanity, economical development and "genuine" British interests; they were war losers who in the eyes of the British deserved the war outcome. Lord Alfred Milner's outright dislike for the Afrikaners, the treatment he sanctioned between 1899 and 1906 and his lack of acknowledgement of their suffering after the war from 1899 to 1902 war, bares evidence of this.^{3,17,18,23,48}

The true impact of the British war effort was much greater than what history reflects. It taught that political and social abuse of one human by another is acceptable and correct in the eyes of the world. These actions go without any punishment of the aggressor (if that party is the winner). The genocide of the proto-Afrikaners by the British between 1899 to 1902, and the continuation of British aggression after 1902, entrench racial and ethnic prejudice in the Afrikaners' collective psyche as good and acceptable by world standards. They saw it as the way to survival as a group in a complex racial society. The Afrikaners were already trapped in a racially discriminatory mindset that developed over hundreds of years. The effect of the war between 1899 to 1902 was catastrophic: it laid the foundation for grand apartheid with the other experiences that fill the history of the Afrikaner.^{4,48}

Today the war methods of Lord Kitchener, the British commander, and Lord Milner in South Africa would be seen as harsh and extreme war crimes. They acted with the full approval of the British government. They did not attack them on the battlefield, but instead drove their already overburdened wives and children from their farms, burning their homesteads and killing their livestock.

Many were taken to concentration camps where the conditions were atrocious, leading to the death of one in three inmates as result of poor sanitation, disease, and lack of food. According to modern standards, this was nothing less than crimes against humanity and the genocide of the Transvaal and Free State Boers and their families. A total of 34 116 Afrikaner lives were lost between 1899 and 1902 in Transvaal and the Free State. About 3 990 burghers died on the battlefield and a further 1 081 died during commando from illnesses or in accidents, bringing the total to 5 071 burghers. Of the remaining 29 045, 1 118 burghers died as prisoners of war, while 27 927 Boers died in concentration camps. Only 1 676 of these were men older than 16 years, 4 177 were women older than 16 years and the remaining 22 074 were children under 16 years who died as a result of malnourishment and illness. The impact of these deaths becomes clearer when analysed in terms of the 100-comparison: 12 died in battle, 6 died in indirect action, 16 women died in concentration camps and 65 children died in concentration camps. This collective trauma of the Northern Afrikaners as a result of the British genocide not only limited their immediate personal and group functioning after the war, but also steered future ethnic and racial relations in the direction of a focus on survival, with Afrikaner interests as a first priority.^{3,4,18,44}

Milner himself admitted to the British government in London in 1901 that the war effort was a black stain and that he saw it as a mistake. If Milner himself saw it as a tragedy, more was the experience of it by the Boers as the suffering victims and lone survivors. This retrospective British apology meant nothing to the Afrikaners: it only shaped their existing ethnic and racial hatred into a political orientation.^{3,18}

The intense abuse of the Boers and their families stirred immense negativism in their collective psyche on the financial, emotional, psychological and religious consequences by the actions of other groups. It created a blueprint for how they would react in the future if their existence in South Africa is endangered. The constant abuse by specific culprits became prominent in their thinking. They had two enemies and dangers that had caused negative learned dispositions over many years: the Blacks and the British. Not only was their general hate against the British intensified after the war, but the denial of their political and personal rights evoked mass efforts to obtain independence within South Africa. The most immediate obstructions to this independence were the British and the growing “Black question.” The most vulnerable and closest of the two were the Blacks: the “Black question” became the main point of focus from the Union

onwards. From 1910, the leadership of the nationalist Afrikaners shamelessly promoted the doctrine of White supremacy and the Blacks' human inferiority. They were regarded as a racial danger for the Afrikaners' future. This doctrine not only fitted well with the already established propensity of proto-Afrikaner for racial discrimination, but strengthened it enormously. The pathway to formal apartheid in 1948 and grand apartheid in the 1960s was successfully laid in the 1910s.^{3-5,17,18,44,48}

2.2.4 Negative modern European and Western influences

Racial and ethnic discrimination and domination (apartheid) up to 1994 were not unique to South Africa, but a worldwide phenomenon. Although there was initially great support from authorities and governments for early settlers in North and South America, Madagascar and Senegal to intermingle with the indigenous people there, a worldwide revulsion in it started to develop after the 1600s. British settlers in North America found themselves facing laws designed to discourage miscegenation in the 1600s. Interracial marriages were punishable offences in the Virginia colony as early as 1630 and was formally prohibited by legislation in Maryland in 1661 and in Virginia in 1662.¹⁵

In the century after the founding of the USA as many as 38 states banned interracial marriages. By 1915 a total of 28 states of the USA still had such statutes, while ten states went as far as to prohibit racial miscegenation. Even definitions of "whiteness" and "blackness" became more prominent, precise, and discriminative. Some states simply declared interracial unions null and void, while other conferred penalties of up to 10 years imprisonment for such offences. Although slavery was abolished after the American Civil War, the Southern states still successfully introduced a system of segregation that prohibited intermarriage and intercourse between Whites and Blacks.¹⁵

In the 1940s the African Americans who fought as part of the USA forces in World War II (WW2), representing 11% of the total USA forces, were segregated from their White counterparts into separate units. In the 1940s segregation was still practiced in the Southern States of the USA. It was only in the 1960s, after bitter fights between Whites and Blacks that formal "American apartheid" fell away, although it seems to still be present informally in the USA as evident from protests, unrests and riots activated by the "Black lives matter" movement. Deep-seated racial and ethnic hate in the American society became quite apparent in the recent Trump presidential election.^{15,68,69,71-74}

Ethnicity has also played a dominant role in differentiation and discrimination between different White immigrants in the USA. Intermarriage between Irish and Americans, Italians and Americans, Protestants and Catholics, and Jews and Christians have only become more acceptable in recent years.⁵¹

South Africa was a close business partner of the USA for a long time. Up to the 1980s, the political relations between the two states were excellent. South Africa received much support, although hidden, for its racist politics. The influence of American support and the many similarities in the racial attitudes of White Americans and nationalist Afrikaners strengthened and guided the Afrikaner's racial discrimination at a time when the world started to condemn and to fight it.^{3,4,15,17,44,68,69,71}

The USA has a history of supporting governments with poor human and political records and radical leaders as long as they benefit. The African continent is dotted with such examples. South Africa was not an exception, specifically because of its ruling pro-Western White regime, its military empowerment and stand against the communist military actions of Russia and China in Africa, and certain strategic minerals. American cooperation and support for the NP regime strengthened and influenced the apartheid ideology. It was only during the office of President Ronald Reagan that the relationship started to sour and apartheid was identified as inhuman and unacceptable.^{47,68,69}

The British and other European colonial powers also practiced racial discrimination in their territories all over the globe. In 1808, Eurasians were excluded from the East Indian Company Forces, while in 1835 intermarriage was formally banned in British India. From 1857, interracial sex was frowned upon when a general process of segregation was introduced there. In 1919, the Crewe Circular expressively banned officials throughout the British Empire from even taking native mistresses. Today, Black activists are protesting in the UK under the banner of "Black lives matter" about racial discrimination and wrongdoings.¹⁵

Whites in South Africa were exposed to British influences and their ideas on race for many years, notwithstanding British liberalism on racial relations and status. South Africa's partnership with the British Empire, followed by membership of the Commonwealth after 1910, brought them direct and indirect support for racism and confirmed the racist ideas of the Afrikaners up to the 1940s, especially due to the British hypocritical policy on racism. The British

gave the nationalist Afrikaners free reign to introduce racist political ideologies after 1910 in the Union and helped to establish racially discriminatory policies and belief systems.^{3,18,44}

There is no doubt about the fact that racism and ethnocentricity were directly or indirectly instilled in proto-Afrikaners by the British during their various occupations of South Africa. After 1910 this was strengthened by their hypocritical management of racial issues to please the various White factions' political ambitions and needs and to reach reconciliation between these factions. They also wanted reconciliation between the proto-Afrikaners and the British Empire with the founding of the Union. This free-reign British on South African politics freed the British government from any further South African political headaches. This political outcome gave the incoming nationalist Afrikaner leaders strong support for the practice of apartheid and a free hand to establish a new, more rigid and suppressive racial policy than ever. The ideas underlying this policy was transferred very effectively to the insecure proto-Afrikaners as a way to gain their freedom and to handle the growing "Black question" in a new political dispensation.^{3,4,47,68,69}

For a long time (up to the 1980s), British Conservative Party governments and American administrations fully and publicly supported the NP and the racist policies of the nationalist Afrikaners. Various other European as well as African and Asian countries like the Netherlands, France, Israel, Switzerland, Zaire and Belgium, which were themselves cradles of racism from an early time at home or in their colonies, supported and influenced the racial orientation of the Afrikaners up to the 1980s and the government of President PW Botha.^{4,47,68,69}

International support for and approval of apartheid over many years led to Afrikaners regarding apartheid as *good*, *acceptable*, and *correct*. The racial policy became more and more extreme from 1948, until it became virtually untouchable by both insiders and outsiders by the 1970s. In the end external role players like the Dutch, British and Americans who all in some way introduced, instilled, supported and compensated South Africa for apartheid for many years, turned on the Afrikaners, leaving them confused in new South Africa with a set of unacceptable and conflicting international and local racial attitudes, values and beliefs.

2.2.5 Afrikaner institutions of racial and ethnic discrimination

Political parties like the NP and civil bodies like the AB and the Afrikaner churches were initially established and steered by nationalist proto-Afrikaners and later on by nationalist Afrikaners with the main aim of promoting the interests of Afrikaners over a broad spectrum, from the cultural to the political spheres. This was done very successfully through racial and ethnic discrimination.^{5,44}

2.2.5.1 The National Party and the Afrikaner Broederbond

The NP and AB quickly became independent safe havens for and guardians of the nationalist Afrikaners and their comprehensive political and cultural interests. Their interlinked functioning and accompanying political and military empowerment as part of the Afrikaner government during the period 1948 to 1994 made them mighty and unchallengeable political machines in the form of opinion-forming and politically radical executive bodies. This position offered them the opportunity of forcing the racial-political opinions of a small group of *super-nationalist Afrikaners* on their fellow Afrikaners, other Whites and the Black majority. The corrupt and nepotistic end result was that more or less 20 000 AB members, supplemented by as many members of its “Junior ABs” (the groups “Ruiterswagte” and “Rapportryers”), enjoyed many work, financial, and other benefits and privileges that the non-member Afrikaners were denied. In addition, there was open discrimination against dissident Afrikaners. They were basically in the same situation as the oppressed Blacks.^{18,48,75,76}

Dissident Afrikaners and other non-conformers were labelled “communists” by means of well-planned propaganda and stigmatization. These Afrikaners have good reason to say that they have only ever experienced discrimination. They most often grew up in the liberal Southern part of the country, studied at various Afrikaner universities and worked in the Northern or Southern parts of South Africa. They were first outcasts under the NP-AB alliance from 1948 to 1994, and then under the ANC and its partners from 1994. This inclination to discriminate against this group of Whites certainly contributed to a slow turning away of English-speaking Whites and liberal Afrikaners and other races from the Afrikaner nationalist establishment after 1948. For these dissidents the NP and ABs political views and vision resembled Nazism too much. The doctrine of the nationalist Afrikaner leaders and their programme of indoctrination were so effective and overpowering that the arguments and opinions of these political opponents of the NP-AB never made any impact on ordinary nationalist Afrikaners. Much of the resistance was scandalously silent. The tragic fate of

dissidents like Abraham Fischer and Beyers Naude are well known. The NP regime had secret agents and co-operators of political opponents like Ruth First, Jeanette Schoon and Dulcie September murdered. This behaviour was approved and sanctioned by ordinary nationalist Afrikaners.^{6,18,48,53,54,75-77}

The NP-AB alliance of political mischief was already very active during the 1930s in efforts to indoctrinate the common Afrikaner, especially the poor. This alliance and its negative impact on social society with regard to instilling political contamination in nationalist Afrikaner members with time was aptly described when general JBM Hertzog declared in 1935 that the *secret AB is nothing less than the NP operating secretly underground and the public NP is nothing less than the secret AB operating in public*. These were wise and prophetic words about what was to come with regard to racism and racial disharmony, steered by the NP-AB. It is still raging South Africa today. The extent that the AB became intricately intertwined with nationalist Afrikaner thinking and the nationalist Afrikaner's doctrine of racism, could be foretold by looking at reverend SJ du Toit intent to establish the AB in 1879 with the main aim of incorporating all the Afrikaans-speaking Whites in Southern Africa into one state. It is therefore no surprise that the AB later entered active politics to form the Cape SAP. The top management of the NP-AB alliance quickly became the sole thinkers and decision-makers for the common nationalist Afrikaner – and thus the inspiration behind the view that racism is appropriate and correct. The Afrikaner youth especially became their main target.^{4,5,18,44,47,48,54,78,79}

This godfather syndrome among Afrikaners of dependence on spiritual-political-cultural leaders and mentors resulted in the growing political and personal disorientation within the NP as a group after the 1970s, a process that started with the deaths of their dominant leaders DF Malan, JG Strydom and HF Verwoerd. It ended in the total collapse of the NP following the chaos brought about by Vorster, Botha, De Klerk and Van Schalkwyk. The mighty “Afrikaner company” of the 1960s faded fast to become the insecure “Afrikaner incorporated” in the 1980s. By 1994 they started splitting into small, less rigid and less extreme Afrikaner cultural, political and financial bodies. However, this disintegration does not mean that the beliefs and values on race and the intentions to act on it, phased out. These views were instilled, learned and strengthened constantly over many years. To the contrary, these inclinations have become fixed, and many Afrikaners are still guided by these views today.^{4,5,18,44,47,48,54,78,79}

Since the late 1990s, nationalist Afrikaners have been leaderless and politically disorientated. Many have gradually become reactive about their well-being and they pursue survival individually. They seem to seek more and more individual economical and social empowerment, outside the growing corrupted NP and AB-family tree and its extreme racial policy. The engrained beliefs are being abandoned more and more in view of the lack of compensations to support it. Once an unstoppable and mighty political, cultural, economical and emotional bullying giant under the NP and AB, the nationalist Afrikaners are now orphaned and frail, with the NP vanishing and the AB busy scaling down. In 20 years Afrikaner nationalism has gone from a hyper to an irreparable hypo-state.

The nationalist Afrikaners' daily frustration with and objections to the doings of new South Africa are now confined to court cases, appeals to the Constitutional Court and complaints in the few struggling Afrikaans newspapers still publishing. These are all stumped and dishearten actions that were previously unknown to Afrikaners in their heyday of power. It seems as if these growing numbers of unhappy and deserted Afrikaners are putting their last hope, trust and money into various *Afrikaner organisations* and other mainstream institutions as their true saviours to repair their lost political, economical, social and civil rights. They have even founded their own universities to accommodate 100 000 and more Afrikaner students. In all honesty, these organizations do not have real political power, know-how and the finances to restore the Afrikaner's dignity and rights. They do not even have the stamina to live the Afrikaners' growing problems with them.^{8,80-92}

It seems as if the most modern Afrikaners (less than 3 million, of whom many are already politically and culturally differently minded than their parents of 40–60 years ago) are driven in their daily lives and future planning by their own life needs, decisions and planning. About 2 million plus Afrikaners are outright ignoring the various exclusive “Afrikaner bodies” like the Freedom Front Plus Party (FF Plus with approximately 166 000 supporters) and Solidarity (with approximately 350 000 members). These two Afrikaner bodies, however humble and honest their intentions may be, have been struggling to attract more than between 5% and 13% of the total Afrikaner population respectively. The VF Plus's support went 600 000 votes in 1994 to only 166 000 in 2014, reflecting a decline of nearly 70% in 20 years. The AWB (Afrikaner Weerstand Beweging), the prominent nationalist Afrikaner right-wing organization that promised to free the Afrikaner physically, just collapsed.^{80,81,92-95}

Apart from the above organizations various other less significant organizations and initiatives surface from time to time to represent the interests of today's "lost" Afrikaners, like the AfriForum, the Institute of Race Relations, the FW de Klerk foundation's Centre for Constitutional Rights, the National Dialogue (Nasionale Stigting-dialogoog Inisiatief or NSDI), the Organization for Unrepresented Nations and Groups (UNPO) and the Africa-European Indaba. There are also efforts of religious groups to almost mesmerize the directionless Afrikaners. They overrule rational thinking with emotional and unsound religious ideologies and this finds favour with some Afrikaners in their political confusion and uncertainty. However much these organizations, initiatives, leaders and prophets would like to present themselves as saviours, the lifespan of these groups is at most ten years, very superficial, directionless, nor viable or sustainable in the new South Africa. Secondly, it seems as if these "saviours" are intentionally (seeing that some of the leaders themselves raise the alarm that the Afrikaners are in a process of becoming distinct) not informing their oblivious followers that in 30 to 60 year there will only be between 300 000 and 1 million Afrikaners left in South Africa. This makes the "pure" Afrikaners as a dynamic and profitable entity that can generate income through membership and donations for all these initiatives, insignificant. Their rescue efforts are already in vain. A change of heart that would inspire positive Afrikaners to accept the new South Africa unconditionally, to completely discard apartheid and racial discrimination, to accept and internalize the South African indigenous realities, is the only solution to becoming "adjusted" South Africans. Such sentiments are absent from these initiatives' intentions and modus operandi. All these "saviour" initiatives do is to give false hope of a new Afrikaner South Africa. They strengthen outdated apartheid ideas and racial discrimination in the minds of the confused and directionless Afrikaners with talk about the "injustices" done to them the denial of their Afrikaner "rights and privileges," making their adjustment to a non-racial society basically impossible.^{80,85,89,94-101}

For the upkeep and supporting of right-wing dogmas and socio-political misled and doctrines of the NP-AB-alliance, well-planned internalized in the mindsets of Afrikaners over more or less 50 years and cleverly adapted and steered since 1994 for new South Africa, are there clearly not much place left in the political and cognitive reasoning of most of the Afrikaners of today: the new independent Afrikaners have drawn a line between themselves and the slow outgoing nationalist Afrikaners. The de-internalization of wrong believes on racism and

the dissociation from false “saviours” has become essential for the Afrikaners survival.^{80,85,89,93-101}

Above can be an indication of an already unsaid written-off by a large group of Afrikaners of the internalized cognitions on racial policies of the NP and AB which the majority nationalist Afrikaners had blindly endorsed and promoted for many years, as well as a gradually positive adjustment of their racial cognitions to fit them successfully as individuals into the political lifestyles of the new South Africa. The question becomes prominent if this majority Afrikaners are not regretting that they had foolishly and unquestioned believed in the manipulated- and untrue-stories of the NP and AB about the “Black-Danger” (Swart-Gevaar”) and the “Communist-Danger” (Kommunis-Gevaar”), and if it would not be better if they had instead put their loyalties and votes on the side of the ANC in 1994.

To reach the ideal outcome of non-racism is not so easy, as fixed mindsets are not very much changeable. This fact is well reflected today by many Afrikaners still today under-writing negative racial attitudes and –behaviour against non-Afrikaners, although mostly not openly reflected.

2.2.5.2 The Dutch Reformed Church (DRC)

All that is left in some strength of the Afrikaner’s previous bullying institutions, still to guide, to support, and to a certain extent, to doctrine him with Afrikaner-ideologies in his present-day of political disorientation and insecurity, are the three main Afrikaner churches, with the DRC as the dominant role-player.

The historical-roles of the DRC in the establishment and the upkeep of racial discrimination are prominent and well-known. Even today is it, in the absence of the NP and AB, still the most strong conditioner and booster of the Afrikaner’s racial attitudes, although most of the nationalist Afrikaners had moved from hyper- into hypo-nationalism.

Racial discrimination was apparent in the Cape Church from an early time, as reflected by certain church-customs like the separate baptizing of slave-children and other rituals excluding non-Whites, although not prominent. It must also remember that the church-reverends were initially in the service of the VOC. Also the church was under the control of the VOC. In the time of De Mist’s reforming of the Cape Church in the 1806s, the existing church-apartheid was not approved as his church-order described that public religious services could

only be practiced on Sundays in the church and that the doors must be open to allowed all persons, Christian, or heathen, White, or Coloured, slave or freeman, entrance to the service.¹⁸

Clear racial discrimination by the church started in 1817 when the Holland's (Netherland) Church, the most prominent church-entity at that time at the Cape, declared officially itself against mixed marriages of Whites and Blacks (names referring to this early church at that time are Nederduits Hervormd, Nederduits Gereformeed, Gereformeed, and Hervorm).¹⁸

The DRC obstinacy with apartheid itself is deep- and well masked in a church-political foundation where racial diversity and racial purity are prominent church-doctrines from the 1850s. Here, in particular, it is a *White-Christianity* versus a *Brown-Christianity* and a *Black-Christianity*, as well as seemingly a *White-Afrikaner* versus a *Brown-Afrikaner* in church-life.^{17,18}

This race-based doctrine, based on “human goodness” and “human badness” between races, is unique to the character and history of the DRC, how hard the hierarchy of the church is trying to make-believe outsiders that it is untrue or by denying it outright. To understand this dogma in all its complexities and consequences in the DRC's current functioning and intermixing with the Afrikaner's upkeep as a tribe and of Afrikaner-racism, the DRC century-old history of the doctrine of racism as cognitions into the mindsets of Afrikaners must be fully known and understood. A short trip into its past is thus needed.

This history shows that the DRC's formal racial diversity began in 1857 when its Cape Synod introduced segregated congregations. That was a policy that was consistent with the already racially discriminatory church-policies of the DRC itself and the two other RCs that were founded and very active in the Transvaal and Free State Republics.^{3,5,44}

This decision of the DRC in 1857 is seen by many today *as one of the main instigators of the later 1948-1994 NP-Apartheid*. What is clear is that it fuelled a unique church-political life and way of thinking under most of the DRC-members and was internalized gradually in the members' mindsets across the country. This is a church-culture that has becomes gradually embedded in a contaminating alliance and interaction between the hierarchy of the DRC and the nationalist Afrikaner-politicians, as well as the leaderships of the NP and

that of the AB. In particular, after 1948 this interaction became acute and was internalized in-depth in the thinking and behaviours of its members.^{3,5,44}

Immediately after 1948, the DRC gave its unconditional support and approval to the NP's newly established policy of apartheid and started to forcefully build the DRC's political authority within this church-political Alliance. For this purpose, the hierarchy of the DRC unashamedly used official church-literature to advocate and to justify apartheid (which they claimed not to be discrimination but “godlike-diversity”). Several influential and leading DRC -ministers, -academics and -writers intensively produced early written propaganda to promote and to establish apartheid in general in the church-life, to justify Scriptural apartheid in the DRC and thus for the DRC-members to accept it unquestioned in their mindsets and religious, social, and personal lives apartheid *as absolute correct*.^{3,5,44}

For this they reformulated and misrepresented texts from the Bible. This post-1948 DRC propaganda-campaign among DRC-members were so successful embedded in their members' religious, political, and cognitive mindsets that in 1950, at a joint-congress in Bloemfontein of the three Afrikaner churches and the Dutch Reformed Mission Church [the *Brown- or Coloured-DRC* at that time, now known as the United Reformed Church (URC)], the four Sister-Churches decided overwhelmingly in favour of total racial-separation in their church-life. This declared DRC apartheid's policy was reaffirmed at several successive General Synods of the DRC and was official introduced to and internalized into the mindsets of its members as religious correct. This officially authorized socio-economic and political racial discrimination by various Afrikaner institutions was quickly embraced, internalized and promoted in their daily lifestyles by many opportunistic nationalist Afrikaner-DRC-members because apartheid-legislation led to the expropriation of the land and properties of non-Whites in created White Areas. Financial it benefited them enormously by the cheap obtain of ownership of these properties, while it also favoured them in their new exclusive scope of work rights above non-Whites. Additionally, it also seems to serve as an external force to protect themselves and their fellow Afrikaner DRC-members against the temptation of miscegenation with non-Whites.^{3,5,44}

The DRC's racial diversity and policies evoked criticism by some of his liberal theologians, such as the outright rejection by the *Cottesloe Declaration* in 1960 and the *Open Letter* by 123 DRC-theologians that church and political racial

discrimination were unscriptural, but impact was minimal, and was promptly suppressed by the hierarchy of the DRC. Also the expulsions of dissident DRC -ministers and -thinkers were strictly adhered too to demolish criticism and thus the possible de-internalization of established faulty racial cognitions and dispositions in the minds of DRC-members. Even the DRC's General Synod decision of 1974 that the Church of Christ (and hence the DRC) had to be opened to all races, peoples, and nations, were entirely ignored by the nationalist-Broederbonder-Afrikaner- hierarchy of the DRC and the managerial boards of the various DRC-congregations.^{3,5,44}

The DRC-NP-affiliation became more and more contaminated by racism. Their in-forcing of racial discrimination – theological, juridical, economic, and social – into the South Africa religious and social life, were intensively internalized since 1948 until the fall of the NP in 1994. This church-political- interaction was very powerfully and had extremely influenced the DRC as an equal partner to the NP. To such extent that it's stated principle of Afrikaner Christian-nationalism has changed quickly in practice to Afrikaner Nationalism-Christianity with hyper-Afrikaner nationalism in the first place. In this system racial discrimination, despite its devastating negative psychological and financial consequences for the *Brown- Afrikaners* and the Blacks, was extreme practiced by its already well racial doctrine DRC-members. This comprehensive church-state affiliation between the DRC and the NP (together with its intimate political and social management partner, the AB), in all areas of the South African society from 1948 to 1994, is confirmed by the entry of several DRC-theologians into active NP-politics. One of them, Dr DF Malan, even became prime minister of the Union and had thoroughly ensured that legalized apartheid was introduced in 1948. The exclusive and super-powerful AB's direct influence and control in DRC's decision-making are also strongly confirmed by the great support and membership of DRC -ministers and DRC-members of it.^{3,5,44}

Racial discrimination was and is still indisputable intensively indoctrinated and internalized into the mindsets of DRC-members for almost one and a half century, starting in 1857. These established value- and belief systems of Nationalism-Christianity were not dispelled by the DRC in 1994 with the incoming of new South Africa. Today it is still conveyed subtly to DRC-members and inculcated by its hierarchy, just well enough disguised to can operate within the provisions of the South African Constitution and the Human Rights Commission.

Since 1994, the DRC -members' (especially the elderly) negative racial values were unfortunately, by a multitude of destructive events in the country, strengthened rather than mitigated: examples of these events are the lost of their "Afrikaner-state," the post-1994 political, social, and economic chaos that was created by the ANC-government, White poverty, unprecedented violence, crime, corruption, and murder. The worst was most certainly the miserable way their long-time partner and patron, the NP, left them lurching, and alone. The AB also starts to fade as an emotional and political guider. These events left them totally disillusioned and politically more radical, with just one notable *Afrikaner-fortress* left that still seek to protect their church-, personal -and cultural-rights, namely the DRC in its current, rigid racial form.^{3-5,44,48}

The fact that DRC-members (especially its youth) left the church in droves the last decade for the less racial rigid charismatic churches (an outflow that will increase dramatically in the next decade), together with a lack of inflow of active, young members, as well as the rise in death of its elderly members, predicts that the DRC, as a significant church-group and a driver to internalize and to strengthen in future racial discrimination in the mindsets of its members, will disappear in the near future. This will mean a further decrease in political empowerment and support for the already belittled Afrikaner in his racial prejudice. But to think at this stage that racial discrimination will disappear from the DRC is wishful thinking – their elder members were for too long indoctrinated about the racial differences between Whites and non-Whites and the right of Afrikaners to discriminate against non-Whites. This negative cognitive contamination will stay with the DRC till it disbands or all its elderly members has passed away.

2.3 Emotional malfunctioning and pathological thinking and behavior

Psychological and emotional malfunctioning of individuals forms most times the bases of serious social, even criminal, behaviour. A psychopathic foundation, making the individual insensitive, exploiting, and cold-bloodedly to others, is many times detected in these cases. In practice the presence of official psychopathic malfunctioning in the greater society as a whole in terms of the traditional mental classifications, is minimal. On the other side is it from studies on the behaviour of people from old times till modern-day clear that the mass behaviour of the greater society can reflect behaviour bordering to or can be associated as psychopathic. The stories from the Old Testament of the Holy Bible describing in-depth the Jews outright and totally murdering of innocent non-Jews communities that they conquered in their entrance into Israel from

Egypt, instigated, and instructed mostly by their religious leaders in the name of the “God of the Jewry”. The Nazis leadership’s successfully mesmerizing of Germans to commit the genocide of Jews as well as other non-Germans confirms this internalising of doctrine further. Basic to the outcomes of these behaviours stand mass discrimination; In the Jewish and Germanic cases more ethnic orientated against people of the same race as the Afrikaners’ discrimination against people of another race. To be coerced into such mal-behaviour requires a tendency and latent disposition in the mindset of culprits to be acceptable for these doctrines of misbehave and to commit it. To argue subjective that these culprits also as nations were permanent evil or psychologically genetically malfunctioning, is wrong, and inapplicable. The fact that the Jews during their stay in Egypt were not involved in this type of behaviour against the Egyptians, and the Germans before the arriving of Hitler and his Nazis also were free from genocide against Jews, contradicted these kinds of assumption and generalization on mal-behaviour. Other activating and contaminating powers are also involved to activate and upkeep mal-behaviour in the mindsets of ordinary people and nations as a whole.^{11,15,102-105}

It is clear that a manifold of negative external influences, examples, circumstances, and environments, happening over a short period or coming over centuries, can be used by cunning, manipulated and mentally malfunctioning leaders as drivers and powers to establish deviated doctrine and ideologies in the mindsets of large groups and to activate and internalize mal-behaviour like the practice of discrimination. In the case of the Jews as well as the Germans these external causes were seemingly manifold, making common people acceptable of leaders to “lead and defend on their behalf their rights, property, cultural and religious lifestyles and nationhood” against any non-Jew or non-German by discrimination, even murder. On the one side had specific mal-behaviours, in up keeping this discrimination, became internationalized via constant and supported learning as a mental disposition in the mindsets of Jews and Germans as normal and acceptable behaviour; not only as a planned and well-thought through method of survival in the start-up of it, but at the end to obtain and safeguard extraordinary rights, richness, and land for the discriminating Jews and Germans at the cost and suffering of non-Jews and non-Germans. On the other side can mal-behaviour not be activated in the individual’s mind without his cognitive reasoning and permission, understanding, acceptance, and a free-willingness to participate in it. This indicates the presence of a latent cognition in his mindset, waiting and ready to be activated by external stimuli, ending in various forms of

abnormal behaviour. It seems as if the Jews and Germans (and the Afrikaners in their apartheid-dogma) fall prey to this faulty cognition.^{11,15,102-105}

In the case of the creation and practice of the Afrikaner's Apartheid there seems, as with the Jews, and the Germans, also to be clear and specific historical causes which had led over centuries to the learning and internalizing of discrimination against non-Whites particular in the Afrikaners mindset as a mental disposition that is correct, acceptable, and normal. This learning and internalizing dimension does not acquits the Afrikaners as individuals or as a group from mental malfunctioning in their racial discrimination (as this article is also not try to do), but the aim of the study was primary focused to give insight to what extent negative external influences can contribute to mal-behaviour inside or outside mental malfunctioning. (In this concern it must be noted the fact that the majority of ordinary nationalist Afrikaners gave through the ballot-box freely and unquestioning an absolute mandate to their leader-corps to can act on their behalf and on their own discretion to drive and manage apartheid, knowing well that this had included the cold-blooded murder of political opponents and dissidents and never tried through elections to make a turn-around, make them party to these crimes and bring their cognitive judgement and thus general mental health under suspicion).^{11,75,76,102,103,106-109}

The "Afrikaner-problem of Apartheid" is to complex to simplify it solely in terms of a "mental mal-functioning syndrome" founded on an internal congenital-inborn or racial cause only. Many other, unrelated negative external determinants and role players are also primarily involved and must be study and be enlightened to can offer a total view on apartheid. For this reason, this study traces, describes and analyses specific the impact of various negative external causes on the mindsets of Afrikaners activating them to commit and upheld extreme racial discrimination over many years.^{11,75,76,102,103,106-109}

Social- and class-discrimination at the Cape began to take root after 1671 due to several unfavourable predisposing factors associated with the non-Whites. This differentiation and discrimination were indeed initially economically and culturally and not ethnic and racial factors. These determinants – like social and economical differences and unique lifestyles that created unfair discrimination as well as other political discriminative rulings by the European authorities – were mostly totally outside the non-Whites own wrong-doings, wishes, and choice. Discrimination was forced down with negative consequences specific on the non-Whites of the Cape, exclusively because they were as a group

defenceless and extreme vulnerable to the over-powering Whites discriminative actions. Inclusive ethnic, economically, and social differences, also reflected by some Whites at the early Cape and thus totally unrelated to race-exclusiveness, was with time faulty identified with specific races, namely the non-Whites. The basis for and the formal start-up of racial discrimination between Whites and non-Whites were laid, with the non-Whites as the unwilling and harmed victim. These distorted-thinking and belief-set-up about non-Whites, solely on the basis of colour, eventually becomes internalized in the mindsets of the early Dutch and other European settlers (and the later proto-Afrikaners and today's Afrikaners). This race inclination and the later accompanying hyper-nationalism in the mindset of the Afrikaner were later both promoted, strengthened, and rewarded, especially by various nationalist Afrikaner institutions, like the NP, the AB, and the three main Afrikaner churches.^{5,18,23,44,48}

Black-on-Black violence and genocide of the past had penetrated the mindset of the Afrikaner to become negative and fixed cognitions about the Blacks as unsuitable equal citizens in a peaceful country, strengthening the Afrikaner's racial discrimination. For the present-day Afrikaner the earlier-day Black-behaviours and governmental-scenarios, together with the present-day political instability and openly hostility by certain Black-sectors against Whites on the other side, are clear warnings of happenings that can again awaits him in new South Africa and which can play dominant and clear roles in his dissolution. The fact is that live conditions for the Afrikaner can be good and even improve further in South Africa, but it can also change, sometimes gradually or very fast, from good to bad and from bad to worse. These negative observations only serve to strengthen the already negative dispositions of the Afrikaner's mindset on racial discrimination.^{14,17,18,45}

The history of proto-Afrikaners and the later Afrikaners shows that the Afrikaners were not strangers to incidents of genocide. Afrikaners know the tragic consequences of genocide and racial discrimination and exploitation very well. They learned about the Black-on-Black violence and genocide in South Africa from 1810 to 1840 through folk stories and later experienced genocide at the hands of the British between 1899 and 1902. They observed the Greater European genocide of 1938 to 1948 from a distance. As in many cases of abuse and maltreatment, the personal, emotional, psychological, political and financial ill treatment of Afrikaners desensitized them psychologically and emotional so that they had no regard for the well-being of any political, racial or ethnic competitor. The result, as with Hitler's German nationalism later on, was the

activation of the hyper-Afrikaner nationalism and outright racial discrimination that culminated in the grand apartheid of 1948–1994.^{2,5,18,44,50}

Afrikaner institutions like the NP, AB and DRC genuinely did initially serve Afrikaner interests, like with the “Problem of Poor Whites” (Armblanke Vraagstuk). However, these institutions had ability to keep the nationalist Afrikaners united by means of manipulation, indoctrination and corrupt and nepotistic benefits for loyalists. After a contingent of “Super Afrikaners” essentially hijacked these organizations, they started to use these bodies solely to serve and to promote their own personal, economical and racial-political orientations and ambitions. The NP-AB-DRC alliance started to instil in nationalist Afrikaners the idea that there is a need “to fight the Black danger” and that Afrikaners have “God-given rights” over and above other races, effectively inspiring thoughts of “untouchable White supremacy.” The Afrikaners who belonged to the AB, numbering more or less 20 000 “super-Afrikaners,” successfully misused and misled more or less 3 million ordinary Afrikaners for their selfish aim to strengthen the doctrine of apartheid among nationalist Afrikaners, solely for the AB members’ own political, social, economical and juridical benefits.^{4,5,18,23,44,47,48}

The changes in the South African political scene from the 1980s onwards quickly spelled the end of the doctrine of racial discrimination and White supremacy of the NP and the AB. It ultimately resulted in the end of the NP and the attenuation of the AB. But to assume that the NP and the ABs promotion, maintenance and strengthening of the nationalist Afrikaner’s racial discrimination stopped completely in 1994 is wrong. Their influences are still there: their inputs are just indirect and hidden. However, the AB and the DRC are losing their credibility with the younger generation of Afrikaners, making them ineffective role players in any continuation of a mindset of racial discrimination in the Afrikaners.^{4,5,18,23,44,47,48}

Behavioural psychology shows that traditions, habits, customs, values and beliefs that have been established over generations (in the case of DRC members over nearly two centuries and six generations and in the case of the AB and NP more than one century and three generations) become part of the group members' characters and personalities. These elements are unchangeable as long as the group survives as a unit. It also shows that such cultural, religious and political thinking gain a momentum of their own and persist long after the initial

creator and purpose disappeared [like for instance the former NP and the AB and the DRC, each with its own apartheid doctrines and objectives].^{11,102,103}

2.4 Conclusion

The proto-Afrikaners and the Afrikaners learned that certain actions and behaviours are crucial for survival as individuals and as a group. They learned this from their own hardships, unhappiness and political experiences, and from broader negative South African events. They also had governments who set a bad example. As a result, they embraced negative behaviours despite the injustice it does to other persons outside the Afrikaner group. Over the years they came to see these behaviours as essential to their survival (especially during the era of the nationalist Afrikaners after 1948). Discrimination and ethnic domination of persons from mixed races, Blacks, and even Whites from other ethnic groups, however inhuman and morally wrong, became a learned survival strategy. As result of the successes, satisfaction and compensation it brought, it became entrenched as the most applicable and correct approach to other groups. The outcome for the Afrikaner has been and is to a certain extent still that there is only a single golden rule for their political, economical, social and personal lives: “you are ruling” versus “you are being ruled” and “if you are the minority you must be the ruler as long as possible, notwithstanding the consequences.” For the nationalist Afrikaners meant that to safe-guard their future, they must stay in power at all times, even if this entails domination and discrimination against the other races in South Africa. They saw the full-blown discrimination of grand apartheid as the only choice and ultimate solution for the nationalist Afrikaners. It became a normal lifestyle for the Afrikaners.

The practice of discrimination as means of survival, fully justified in the eyes of the Afrikaners and rationalized as correct, is an entrenched flaw in Afrikaner thinking. It grew out of the indoctrination by the NP-AB-DRC leadership. It did not matter how selfish and morally wrong it was, possibly even bordering on psycho-pathology. It was continuously driven and strengthened by the unstable political, economical and social milieu of South Africa and the Afrikaner’s constant experience of and exposure to this in their struggle to survive. On the formal termination of apartheid in 1994, the Afrikaner tragically became a victim of himself of his own history.^{2-5,18,44,75,76,110,111}

Negative thought patterns like racial discrimination, forged by years of exposure, examples and compensation, will not easily be erased from the thinking of most Afrikaners, especially if they are not rational. The lost

privileges, rights, benefits and empowerments are seldom reclaimable. Most Afrikaners find themselves in an unbearable dilemma today.^{2-5,18,44,75,76,110,111}

“Man creates his own future, but not under conditions of his choice, nor with the consequences he intends,” writes Giddens.¹¹² To many Afrikaners, apartheid was their first choice, but the current backlash of Black hostilities and revenge against Afrikaners were consequences they did not foresee. They naively thought that it could not happen because Blacks lack the ability to rule. They never thought that the Blacks would act precisely as the Afrikaners themselves acted in the heyday of apartheid. They seem to be unknown with the Italian Proverb: *If you scatter thorns, don't go barefoot*. This reminds one also of Karl Marx's words of warning: *History repeats itself*.

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CHAPTER 3

PRESENT AND PAST DETERMINANTS AND ROLE PLAYERS IN THE ESTABLISHMENT AND CONTINUATION OF PERCEPTIONS OF INJUSTICE IN THE MINDSETS OF AFRIKANERS

3.1 Introduction

Schlemmer relates the following incident that aptly captures the problem addressed in this article¹, p. 7: “At a press conference held in Dakar, Senegal during the July 1987 visit by a number of South Africans to meet the ANC (African National Congress) representatives, a senior ANC member took exception to a remark by a South African academic that ‘apartheid’ had developed over centuries of South African history. Whether this was true or not, the ANC member retorted, one should not let the apartheid government ‘off the hook’ ”.

The Schlemmer¹ quotation illustrates two things, namely who the culprits were that created apartheid and the fact that there was a history that resulted in apartheid. First, no-one in South Africa, not even the ‘culprits’ who created apartheid, the Afrikaners, deny that the Whites in South Africa for many years dominated and discriminated against the Blacks: politically, economically, socially and culturally. Apartheid at its height was sustained by a certain class of Afrikaners and the connections they had among them. Its structure was upheld by political, economical, social and cultural institutions and bureaucracies that were controlled and run by Afrikaner men and women from this social class. Even during apartheid, not all Afrikaners dominated and discriminated against Blacks to the same extent, although they were all complicit. Vilakazi explains this poignantly when he says², p. 43: “Some Afrikaners exercise domination directly and harshly; other exercise it still directly, but more ‘pleasantly’ and ‘kindly’; some exercise it indirectly, but still harshly; while still others exercise it indirectly, with sophistication and even ‘friendship’ for Blacks. All this depends on the class backgrounds of the Whites concerned, and the institutions within which they make their living within the huge edifice of racial domination. The distinctions later give rise to differences in political orientations – to conservatives, liberals, radicals, etc.”

It is clear from the above that apartheid was practice by all “social classes” in the Afrikaner grouping, with the emphasis on the leadership and the ordinary

citizens who identified as nationalist Afrikaners as represented by their membership of the National Party (NP), the Afrikaner Broederbond (AB) and the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC).³⁻⁸

The last part of the 1987 comment of the ANC senior member, as quoted by Schlemmer, namely that^{1, p. 7}: “one should not let the apartheid government ‘off the hook’”, is completely justified. This remark should have added “one should not let the apartheid government, and all the ordinary nationalist Afrikaners and members of the NP-AB-DRC off the hook.” All the various social groups within the larger Afrikaner grouping are guilty of the practice of apartheid, as Vilakazi² also argues. They all benefited, either directly or indirectly, and they were all *role players* in this system, however much some try to hide behind an array of excuses. This collective responsibility is a fact and is accepted by the majority of Afrikaners today. It is within this broad context of collective responsibility that Blacks today tend to label all Afrikaners as participants in apartheid and as the people at whom they direct their revenge for apartheid since 1994 (successfully one might add). This outcome of “collective guilt” shared by all Afrikaners has been used since 1994 to drive the ANC regime’s unspoken policy of revenge on Afrikaners for apartheid specifically and for all the ANC’s own governmental failures in general. This revenge has an immense impact on the way Afrikaners think about the Blacks’ political behaviour, views and intentions. It only serves to strengthen their entrenched feelings about injustices done to them through racial and ethnic discrimination and domination in the past. There are now new added experiences of injustices done to them by the Blacks.^{1,2,9,10}

The dynamic described above re-activates a set of behaviours that was instilled and entrenched in proto-Afrikaners and Afrikaners over many years, namely discrimination against Blacks based on colour. [Chapter 2 of this series discusses how this negative racial behaviour was instilled in Afrikaners and strengthening as “appropriate” and “correct” due to *negative examples and experiences*]. The immediate question at this stage is: *what motivates and drives this sort of behaviour?* In this context it seems that the cause of this learned and internalized behaviour is the *perception of injustices done to him*. This idea can stay passive and can be ignored, but it leads to counter-actions to revenge or defence in the form of various forms and levels of discriminative racial behaviour. The intention of this study is to research and describe the *determinants and role players in the establishment and continuation of a perception of injustice in the mindset of the Afrikaner*.

The second important point to note in Schlemmer's¹ quote is the reference to the *history of Apartheid*. Was the South African academic correct to remark at the Dakar meeting of 1987 that "'apartheid' had developed over centuries of South African history,"^{1, p. 7} or is this a myth without any facts to prove it? In the post-1994 political rhetoric, very little attention is given to this controversy and to the possible negative impact of long-term exposure to undesirable behaviour and experiences on the development of the Afrikaner's propensity to discriminate. Schlemmer makes the following comment^{1, p. 8}: "Archetypal apartheid was developed to its epitome in the period under Verwoerd. It represented a brutal, massive but almost heroic attempt on the part of the then ethnically solidary National Party of the time to secure a correspondence between nation and territory for whites by imposing an order much more incisive than race segregation." Such statements have led to a denial of an earlier history. Schlemmer's¹ focuses exclusively on 1960 to 1994. Discussions like this completely ignore the immense negative impact of the history before apartheid on the racist behaviours of the, sometimes unwilling, proto-Afrikaner and later Afrikaner as participants in the system. This point of view is used selectively by some subjective researchers and poorly informed politicians to justify the new South Africa's over-emphasis on political correctness. It has led to superficial arguments and myths that apartheid is a recent phenomenon created only by nationalist Afrikaners. It also brings to the foreground allegations that the Afrikaners' racial attitudes are pathological and set, ignoring the effect of external influences on behaviour learning and the reinforcement of problematic behaviour. Research that denies a history that culminated in apartheid fits well with the post-1994 political and emotional rhetoric, especially since any consideration or discussion of history by Black politicians seem to be fixated on the period of Grand Apartheid (1960–1994) for obvious political gain. This "conscious" amnesia is understandable and is also reflected in the "selective" amnesia of Black politicians about their catastrophic and barbarous "Black apartheid" and "Black genocide" between 1810 and 1840 in South Africa.^{1,2,10,11}

The fact is that White racial domination and discrimination against Blacks have a long history, dating from the early Cape Colonists up to the proto-Afrikaners and culminating in the modern-day Afrikaner's history. Historically, social-*cum*-racial class differentiation already took shape in 1671 at the Cape Settlement. Whites were favoured and the other races were subjected to discrimination. This differentiation and resulting discrimination continued throughout the centuries, creating a generally unfavourable position for all darker races in the broader

society. It started in 1671 and sometimes had the same devastating consequences for non-Whites, if not more, than grand apartheid. However, apartheid can comfortably be criticized in the modern idiom of human rights violations and it is very easily pinpointed as the root of all evil in South Africa. The proto-Afrikaners were and the Afrikaners are still part of this ongoing history of apartheid that started in 1671. A focused study is needed to understand the ordinary Afrikaner's ideas on race and the reasons why they supported, subscribed to, and practiced apartheid for so many years. Such a study should steer clear of the current political and emotional rhetoric. Such a study will also open the door for insight into and an evaluation of the *Afrikaner's perception that many kinds of injustices have been and are being committed against him (and this leads to their inclination to racial discrimination)*.³⁻⁸

Although this article does not delve into the history of apartheid, specific and direct historical causes are noted. (The history was already fully described in Chapter 2 of the series: *Historical determinants and role players in the establishment and maintenance of racial discrimination in the mindsets of Afrikaners*. Its subdivision 2.2.1 *Negative ethnic and racial influences by early Cape authorities*, is relevant to this article). From this history it is clear that apartheid has a long historical development in which the proto-Afrikaner, and even to a certain extent also the Afrikaner, were not initially volunteers, but victims themselves. They too were subjected to a bad and inappropriate socio-political system that was forced on them involuntary. The proto-Afrikaner and Afrikaner were not only exposed to bad racial examples that became entrenched in Afrikaners over time, but that they also experienced immensely negative consequences as a direct outcome of infringements perpetrated against them. These negative experiences became entrenched as an obsession with the injustices they suffered. Not only did these ideas lead to racist behaviours, but they also reinforced established racism and behaviours of revenge. Part 2 concludes that Afrikaners hold the specific belief that injustices were not only done to them in the past, but are being done to them today. It is therefore important to know *how* this perception of injustices took root in the mindset of Afrikaners.^{3-8, 12}

The intention of this article is to study and analyse the present and past negative determinants and role players in the establishment and reinforcement of a perception of injustices in the mindsets of Afrikaners.¹³⁻¹⁵

3.2 General perspective

Many Afrikaners argue that their living standard is deteriorating in the new South Africa due to job discrimination and unemployment resulting from Affirmative Action (AA), Employment Equity (EE) and Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). Afrikaners are experiencing more general poverty. There are frequent murders, especially of farmers. This comes in addition to various other social, economical and political discriminations. Political rhetoric, public objections and court cases to protect Afrikaner interests are common. This discriminative Black behaviour has two decisive effects on the Afrikaners' racial attitudes and inclinations: the reinforcement of established racism and the development of new negative racial attitudes. Fundamental to both these developments is the belief that an injustice is being done to them at present, as was the case in the past. They are experiencing hostile and hurtful behaviour that they believe is undeserved and inappropriate. The perception of injustice is in turn founded on a belief that revenge is an appropriate action.¹⁶⁻²⁴

What is shocking about the post-1994 Afrikaner thought pattern is the lack of insight into the enormous social, economical, political and personal backlash for the Afrikaner in the new South Africa. The anti-Afrikaner attitudes of the ANC regime is nothing else than *Black apartheid*. It is to be expected when considering history. This reaction by Blacks must be understood in terms of the cruel legacy of White apartheid. Blacks had to endure an extremely negative political environment and lifestyle, not for decades, but for centuries. It was an inhumane setup that Schlemmer¹, p. 8 describes as a "brutal, massive order much more incisive than race segregation." The pseudo-peace and the seemingly normal continuation of life immediately after 1994 faded fast with the NP and AB losing power and the increasingly aggressive ANC government. A significant sector of Blacks feels that the dispensation that started in 1994 did not punish the Afrikaners adequately for their mistakes. Initially the retreating leadership of the NP and AB promised a new and happy South Africa forever. This was an effort to appease the Afrikaners for the moment. Enormous changes awaited the Afrikaners, unbeknownst to them. For many years the NP-AB-DRC leaders concealed the fact that Afrikaners will face an unfriendly environment where they are stripped of their previous White apartheid empowerments and benefits. Some Afrikaners miss the fact that they are now dependent on themselves and on forming small groups. The formal guiding patrons have all disappeared. They are in this "alone" and they are in a hostile environment where they are subjected to "Black Discrimination," more and more, making

any appeal on their rights very difficult. The new and serious injustices against them seem to be gathering momentum.

The Afrikaners at present simply do not have the political power to stand up to the more dominant ANC at any level to ensure their future. The general attitude of the Black society is becoming more hostile. First, the current Afrikaner population of less than 3 million and the negative annual growth of approximately -0.1% from 1960 to 2011 shows that they are indeed a much less influential racial, ethnic and political pressure group than they would admit, especially compared to a Black population of more than 55 million and an approximate annual growth of +1.5% for 2009 to 2014. The decline in the is becoming more rapid, so much so that experts, supported by statistics, predict that the Afrikaners can disappear from the South African scene in 30 to 60 years. The disproportionate racial distribution and accompanying lack of political power largely explain the growing disrespect and discriminatory attitude of the ANC and their followers towards the Afrikaners since 1994. This is an attitude that can intensify in the future, bringing more injustice to the door of the Afrikaners.^{23,25-29}

Second, it would be incorrect to see the attitude and behaviour of the ANC and the Blacks in general towards the Afrikaners as based only on the Afrikaners' diminished political position as a White minority, which makes them an easy target. It goes much deeper: an age-old hatred has been activated after extreme suffering due to racial discrimination and apartheid. Blacks and other racial groups in South Africa suffered psychologically, politically and economically at the hand of proto-Afrikaners and Afrikaners. The negative reactions to and behaviours towards the Afrikaners from the side of the ANC and the other racial groups in South Africa originate from the *Herodotus Rules* that guide good governance. Afrikaners as rulers blindly and arrogantly ignored these rules in the heyday of apartheid.^{6,19,30,31}

An understanding of these rules will aid in an understanding of today's "Black Apartheid," as practiced by the ANC through policies such as AA, EE and BEE [knowing in the USA as Minority Procurement, which in South African implies *Majority* Procurement or *Majority* Affirmative Action] and through other racial discriminations against the Afrikaners. It will also provide Afrikaners with some insight into how counter-productive and fatal it is to see these Black discriminative actions against them as justifying counter racial discrimination and actions to balance out the injustices.

Modern Afrikaners only became victims of “Black apartheid” after 1994. They are exposed to experiences that make them feel as if injustices are being committed against them. In actual fact, they got off scot-free after the Black discrimination between 1948 and 1994. However, it is important to note that the proto-Afrikaners from the early 1700s up to 1902 and the Afrikaners from 1902 up to 1948 experienced numerous forms of domination and discrimination against them. This instilled a mentality of being subject to injustice. These current and past experiences of injustices are and were strong determinants in inspiring new and reinforcing old negative racial attitudes amongst Afrikaners, leading to further racial discrimination in the new South Africa.³⁻⁸

3.2.1 The Herodotus Rules for good governance and respect

More than 2 500 years ago, the ancient historian Herodotus formulated six rules for good governance. In his view, these rules guarantee a revenge-free country of peace for current and future generations. These six rules provide an excellent explanation of the attitudes of the ANC towards the Afrikaners since 1994.^{30,31}

Herodotus reasoned that any ruler should adhere to six rules to stay in power, to lead a long and happy life as a ruler and to prevent reprisals and retaliation against him and his descendants and followers from aggrieved subordinates or conquered groups and their descendants. The six rules that a ruler should underwrites, practices and respect are³¹:

1. Always act with fairness and wisdom towards one’s subjects;
2. Empower each individual politically, legally, socially, and economically;
3. Do not favour or put certain individuals or one self above others;
4. Act with self-control at all times;
5. Do not be self-enriching at the expense of one’s subjects, and
6. Given the power of a ruler, avoid and be free of power mismanagement and emotional and physical exploitation, abuse and misuse of one’s subjects.

In practice, these six rules come down to the following: 1). *history repeats itself*; and 2). *that the contraventions of these rules create hatred that spells tragedy for culprits, even after many centuries had passed.*³¹

The Herodotus Rules acknowledges that the innocent are sometimes punished for the failures and shortcomings of their ancestors (much in line with the Mafia of Sicily’s habit to take revenge on families even after many generations have

passed, whether the new generation is guilty or not). A poignant example is the genocide of the Jews in Europe during WW2 because their ancestors were falsely identified as financial and political exploiters by the local citizens of the countries to which they had migrated. In reality, these locals merely failed to be competitive, trained and skilled so that they could be successful in their businesses and professional lives.^{31,33}

The various Afrikaner regimes since 1910, especially those between 1948 and 1994, transgressed all six the Herodotus rules. The current inaccessibility and hostility of the ANC and the Blacks are predictable political, psychological and pathological responses within the framework of the Herodotus philosophy of 1) *misrule by the ruler* and 2) *undeserved punishment for the innocent victim*, 3) *injustice done to the victim* and 4) *revenge by the victim for the misruling of the ruler and injustice done*.³¹ The Afrikaner has in the minds of the Blacks been sentenced to long-term political and personal, social and economical “imprisonment” in South Africa for contravening the Herodotus rules, whether the individual Afrikaner is guilty or not. This is the result of the proto-Afrikaner and Afrikaner’s political, socio-economical and inhumane misconduct as a ruler over many years.³¹

The Afrikaner should blame themselves and the failed Afrikaner leadership that they elected to act on their behalf for this penalty. The tragedy is that this “sentence” is a logical and expected historically outcome the Afrikaner seems not to understand, to have expected, or to know how to counter. The retaliation according to the Herodotus rules affects all modern Afrikaners and its youth, even though many of them were not part of the practice of apartheid. Many Blacks feel that they may take revenge for apartheid, regardless of the guilt or innocence of the current generation. This, in terms of the Herodotus rules, starts a new cycle where Afrikaners experience their society as unjust, triggering further negative attitudes towards Blacks.³⁻⁸

3.3 Current injustices committed against Afrikaners

3.3.1 The long-term punitive intentions of the ANC and the continuation of injustices

The ANC’s revenge clearly entails more than just a short-term punishment of the Afrikaners for apartheid in terms of the Herodotus Rules. It is aimed at the total expulsion, psychologically and physically, of the Afrikaner (although hidden and mostly denied publically) from the country as an ethnic racial group or at totally isolating them from the educational, economic and cultural

mainstream. (This is a properly orchestrated exercise and reminds one of the Afrikaner's own expulsion of Blacks from central South Africa to various *Bantu* homelands under the Malan/Strydom/Verwoerd regimes. These actions show the negative effect of the Herodotus Rules in justified revenge).^{3-8,31}

Several factors favour the ANC in its adventure of a long-term punishment for the Afrikaner. These negative factors include the negative population growth of the Afrikaner, the Afrikaner's fear of residential and farm murders, increasing White poverty and job discrimination, fear of radical economical transformation and White capital and land capture, the closing down of Afrikaner institutions like schools and universities, disrespect for Afrikaans as a national language, political confusion and a loss of sovereignty that is casting many Afrikaners out of the governing system. This ongoing racial and ethnic victimization and discrimination against the Afrikaners, especially as a "colonial" minority group, influence many to eventually leave their birth and/or adopted homeland. This is evident from the fact that nearly 1.2 million (30%) Afrikaners left South Africa in the last 20 years since 1995, while a further 35% (1.35 million) also wish to emigrate in the near future.²⁵⁻²⁷

The punitive intentions of the ANC regime was and is exacerbated by the fact that most Afrikaners decided to radically oppose the ANC after 1994, openly showing their distrust, hostility and aggression against Black rule and a Black majority government. This negativism was not only exhibited towards the ANC as a political party, but frequently towards the Black majority in general. In retrospect this decision seems to have been a fatal error in terms of planning their future, as was the introduction of apartheid. It seems as if the proto-Afrikaners and the Afrikaners are inclined to saddle the "wrong political horses" over and over. This fatal decision in 1994 terminated all possible sympathy and support for the Afrikaners by the Black majority and any hope of a future intimate partnership with and support of the ANC or one of the other Black political parties. The fear of and reaction against Blacks and Black rule, entrenched in Afrikaners over many centuries, and the actions to counter-act any endangerment of their interests, only strengthened the resolve of the ANC and the Blacks. They are themselves driven by the injustices done to them by the Afrikaners. They want to apply the Rules of Herodotus to the Afrikaners.^{30,31}

The ancient historical work of John Moschos³⁴ (*The Spiritual Meadow*) and the modern historical works of William Dalrymple³⁰ (*A Journey in the Shadow of Byzantium*), Ryszard Kapuściński³¹ (*Travel with Herodotus*) and that of Niall

Ferguson³³(*The World at War*), illustrate how these counter-discriminations as revenge for injustices and wrong-doings (and much in line with the current revenges of the ANC on the Afrikaners) take the form of expulsions and deadly annihilations globally from ancient times to modern times.

Good examples of such expulsions and annihilations are those of the Christian Armenians and Suniani in Islamic Turkey and the Christian Greeks in Islamic Egypt between 1900 and today. It is also echoed in the destruction of 210 Armenian monasteries, 700 convents and churches and 1 639 parish churches from 1914 in Eastern Turkey (total: 2 549 buildings). Sixty years later, in 1974, only 449 (18%) of the buildings were still in use by active members. The Suniani tribe in Eastern Turkey decreased from nearly 200 000 in the 1900s, to 70 000 in 1920, 4 000 in 1990 and only 900 in 1998. The expulsion also happened to the Greeks in Egypt. In the 1900s they were 200 000, in 1988 they were 5 000 and in 1998, only 500.^{30,31}

The eradication of the Armenian identity started in Turkey with the replacement of the names of their towns and streets with Turkish names. This was followed by the destruction of Armenian cemeteries, even tombstones, and the conversion of their churches into mosques. The Armenians who did not move house, were forced to adopt Turkish and Islam names for survival.^{30,31}

The Afrikaners have also experienced 1994 similar punitive actions against them. They are losing traditional work opportunities in the civil services, at tertiary institutions and business enterprises. The policies of AA, BEE and EE are intensified almost on a daily basis, while their educational institutions are being “Africanised”. The boundaries of their personal, political, economical and social environments are deliberately transgressed. They are threatened with the capture of capital and land without compensation. There is a growing rhetoric to take arms against Whites who resist the radical transformation, the names of traditional Afrikaner villages, towns and cities have been replaced with Black names. The same is happening with the names of streets and public buildings with Afrikaner names. They are also targeted in terms of criminality in their daily lives.^{21,22,35,36}

The above injustices to Afrikaners are growing, putting them in conflict with the ANC and the Black population more and more. However, their political and military empowerment is zero, making it impossible for them to do anything constructive. These threats (and powerlessness of Afrikaners) create a vicious

circle of constant experiences of abuses and maltreatments in many different areas of their lives. Afrikaners experience these actions as injustices. An important development that Afrikaners seem to deny is the reality that the intensity and number of assumed injustices will increase fast from 2017. The other point that Afrikaners seem to miss is that these injustices they are experiencing at the hand of the ANC are equal to the injustices that they measured out indiscriminately to Blacks over many years. This leaves the question if they can claim that these injustices are wrong and whether they are not “justified” revenge in terms of the Herodotus Rules. Is the Afrikaner not just over-sensitive and selfish about upholding their assumed Afrikaner rights and their false belief in their racial supremacy, thing that do not really fit into a modern democracy?^{21,22,35,36}

Ignoring the possible merits of revenge as a point of discussion, it is clear that these assumed maltreatments by the ANC government and politicians have an immensely negative impact on Afrikaners, specifically on their perception of the integrity and trustworthiness of Blacks as a race and the feeling that it is impossible to live side by side in a civilized manner in South Africa. The direct outcome is that the Afrikaners entrenched ideas of racial discrimination and injustices are strengthened, instead of fading away. The foundation is being laid for new negative racial cognitions and new injustices in the mindsets of Afrikaners.^{10,21,22,35,36}

3.3.2 The future dilemmas of the Afrikaner in South Africa in terms of citizenship

In South Africa, apart from the shocking farm murders, extreme radical and massive ethnic and racial aggressions and unrests have thankfully been avoided thus far. If the increasing xenophobic behaviour against foreign fellow-Africans, the recent unrests at Coligny and Lichtenburg against Afrikaners’ property and lives, the increasingly radical speeches of the ANC regime and other Black political leaders and political parties and the open disregard for the Constitution and the judicial authority and system are taken into account, the Afrikaners can expect radical aggression in the near future. The official calls by the ANC and other Black role players for radical economical transformation and the capture of White capital, land and property especially sound warning bells. The consequences can be massive injustices to the Afrikaners in the near future, leading to an escalation in negative racial attitudes and reactive behaviour by the Afrikaners to counter the growing injustices against them. This can even end in physical conflict, an outcome that will spell genocide for the disempowered

Afrikaners. What is clear at this stage is that the Afrikaners are certainly not exempt from more emotional and physical aggression in the future, a fact that they must seriously consider.^{16,18,22,36-41}

The growing need for basic resources and the intense competition for it to counter dire poverty among South African Blacks is being ignored by politicians. It is a possible stimulus for conflict with and the maltreatment of the Afrikaners and could result in further negative experiences that they can see as injustices to them. Up to 1994 the Blacks, as competitors of the Afrikaners, were comprehensively nullified on all levels by the rules of the apartheid. The immense poverty of Blacks and their dire life circumstances was psychopathologically ignored by the Afrikaner regime. With specific racially discriminative planning, it was even intentionally aggravated. After 1994, the Afrikaners, stripped of their many privileges and economical manipulation, became equal competitors with the impoverish masses of Blacks. In the new South Africa the ANC's AA, EE and BEE did not at all help the approximately 70% of the total Black population out of their tragic poverty. This situation is making the competition for sources and support systems extraordinary intense, especially when the race factor comes into play.^{16,18,22,36-41}

The dire state of need in which many Blacks in South Africa still live can possibly lead to further disempowerment of Afrikaners in an effort to eliminate the competition. The continuous poverty of the mass of Black can at the same time lead to physical aggression and genocide of the Afrikaners. This kind of scapegoat behaviour had tragic consequences for the Jews in Europe in the 1930s and the Belgium population in the Congo in the 1960s, basically because of the large-scale poverty of the indigenous people and their inability to escape from it immediately. On the other hand, the mob oratories and instigations by German and Belgium Black politicians and leaders respectively to act against Jews and Congolese Whites to rectify alleged injustices of the past through the capture of Jewish and White capital and property undoubtedly drove the impoverished Germans and Africans of Belgium to murder and genocide. A critical perspective shows that the impoverished position of South African Blacks do not differ much from the Germans of the 1930s or the Belgium Blacks of 1960 in the Congo.^{33,42,43}

The current estimated 350 000 to 400 000 poor Whites in South Africa and up to 150 000 Afrikaners struggling for survival (when evaluated in terms of the present value of the South Africa rand and the immense constant increases in the

prices of foodstuffs and living costs in 2016, this can even be an underestimation), is of secondary importance in conflict activation. It is no comparison to the masses of non-Whites living below the poverty line. The extreme poverty of non-White groups in South Africa can stimulate direct conflict between Blacks and Whites to such a degree that it can result genocide. In this regard it is estimated (which is an underestimation) that as many as 29 236 632 Blacks (73.0%), 2 175 417 Coloureds (48.1%) and 150 409 (11.8%) Indians live in poverty. The official statistics, which reflects that only 26.6% of the population is unemployed, is misleading when one considers that only 42.8% of the total population is employed in some way and that the youth unemployment is 53.7%, of whom most are Blacks (this means that 57.2% of the total South African population are not in employment and as much as only 46.3% of the youths are employed). To expect that only 6 million middle class Blacks and their new-found wealth would counter future revolt and anarchy is wishful thinking. Any strategist who specializes in political and social conflict, revolution and genocide would confirm that these statics describe a huge time bomb waiting to explode. It is a recipe for human disaster that would overshadow all the current moans of injustice against the Afrikaners.^{3,4,42,44-48}

A prominent question at this stage for the less than 3 million Afrikaners who are struggling at present to get political, social, economical and ethnic recognition and to maintain their unique culture and ways of living, is what will happen 100 years from now in 2117 to a very insignificant minority group of Afrikaners under an authoritarian ANC or other Black regime or an otherwise overwhelming, totally impoverished Black majority in South Africa?

If the expulsions of the Greeks and Suniani from their adopted homelands over 100 years are taken as guidelines, there will only between 10 000 and 20 000 "pure" Afrikaners left in South Africa in 2117, as opposed to an estimated 100 plus million Black people with their own political, economic and cultural attitudes and lifestyles. If the constant population decline among Afrikaners is used as another guideline, the chance is good that there will be between 300 000 and 1 million Afrikaners left in 2047 and fewer than 10 000 "pure" Afrikaners in South Africa in 2117.^{30,49}

Afrikaners should realize that the injustices – true or false, justified or unjustified – done by the ANC government and its Black partners, will increase and become more complex and directed. To revenge or to rectify these injustices through direct military, public or private actions, will be impossible for the

declining Afrikaners. The end result can be terrorist actions, a path followed by minority groups worldwide, like in Northern Ireland, Syria and Turkey, sometimes with tragic outcomes.

3.4 Past injustices to the Afrikaner

To see the 1994 dispensation and its current negative outcomes as the second “Slagtersnek” in Afrikaner history and as a doomsday in their lives, is wrong. The proto-Afrikaners and the later Afrikaners went through at least two other “Slagternek” incidents before, challenging their future as a population in South Africa. Over many years they have become very familiar with the abuse of power by hostile authorities and what it means to stay upright in such a constant struggle where injustices become absolutely overwhelming. They know the enormous psychological and financial efforts and dedication needed to outlive such an ordeal.^{6, 8-10, 19}

3.4.1 Fifty years of British Rule: 1806 to 1854

Although all the stages of the proto-Afrikaner development were characterized by conflicts and constant onslaughts on his existence since 1652, it seems to be the British Rule of 1806 to 1854 that first brought him in open revolt, culminating in the Great Trek to escape many unsolved injustices. One clear fact that stands out here was the British intent to apply British enculturation to the proto-Afrikaners to suppress their political and personal identity. In 1811 there was the “Black Circuit” (Swarte Ommegang), a period during which court cases were opened against 50 farmers and their families based on various allegations of serious crimes, including murder. The allegations were brought by the Hottentotte and other non-Whites. Although the cases were mostly found to be false, the intentions of the British authority and of the missionaries creating these allegations, brought bitterness into the minds of the proto-Afrikaners. The existing racism and ethnocentrism in the Afrikaners were not only strengthened, but broadened to include the British and the other racial groups. The Afrikaners experienced vivid emotions of injustice and transgression. It was also the start of public resistance by small sectors of proto-Afrikaners, like the Frederik Bezuidenhout revolt and conflict, which not only led to death, but also to the hanging of four Boers at Slagtersnek, Graaff-Reinet in 1815 (the name “Slagtersnek” means the *Butcher’s Mountain Pass*, possibly referring to it in Afrikaans as the place where four “nationalist Afrikaners” were murdered by the the British).^{6, 8-10, 19, 32, 50}

This extraordinary abuse of judicial and political power by the British authorities created negative memories that made reconciliation with the British

impossible as early as 1815. The British wanted to issue a warning and make an example so that the proto-Afrikaners would behave in the British system, without allowing them to have a say or to make an impact on the political system of the Cape. It created strong fears of injustices in their belief system, especially around their personal identity and safety. It cemented in the mindsets of Afrikaners the growing perception of wide-spread, intense and focused injustices done to them: injustices that they were not empowered to rectify with direct action against the British, but that they rectified indirectly with the Great Trek. The Voortrekkers carried this negative attitude of hate and the perception of injustices directed at the British and the non-Whites, who were directly responsible for their unhappy and unstable lives at the Cape, into Natal, Transvaal, and the Free State. The Slagtersnek incident stands out even today as the first sign of the later crimes against humanity to be committed in the Second Anglo-Boer War by the British Empire in Transvaal and the Free State against the Boers and their families. These were injustices that brought great division between the Northern and the Southern Afrikaners.^{6, 8-10, 19,32,50}

The many other autocratic and anti-Boer actions of the British authority at the Cape between 1806 and 1836 were aimed at subduing the proto-Afrikaners. They especially wanted to phase out all Dutch influences. They wanted to Anglicized the proto-Afrikaners, starting in 1813 with the civil services, the introduction English into the Afrikaner churches in 1826 by forcing them to accept Scottish Presbyterian ministers, forcing them to accept English-speaking teachers and the establishment of free English Schools in 1822. In 1825, English became the court language, while in 1827 a legal charter was published to replace the Dutch legal system that was in use since 1652 at the Cape. A further act to minimize the Afrikaner cultural and their numbers was the 1820 migration of British Settlers to South Africa.^{7,10, 19,32}

In 1816 the British started with a process to emancipate the slaves, first by formally registering them and then by regulating workdays by 1823. This was followed by the appointment of a Slave Protector and an assistant to oversee that the proto-Afrikaners behaved towards their slaves. In 1836 slavery was ended. The outcome of the emancipation of the slaves financially ruined many farmers, especially those in the country side. The proto-Afrikaners was at this time already split into subgroups like the Grensboers and the Trekboers, showing clear ethno-cultural and racial differences with the more British-orientated and liberal Cape Dutch. For the rural proto-Afrikaners the consequences were immense: not only was the rural proto-Afrikaners financially ruined by the little

compensation for their freed slaves by the British, but they were also suddenly a White minority in a region populated by a majority of non-Whites outside their control and equal in status. Their opportunities to prosper in this environment and to establish their identity was blocked. Most of all, their clear differentiation of Christian versus heathen, as well as White versus Coloured, were suddenly shattered. Large numbers of unemployed and landless freed slaves started roaming the country side, make rural areas dangerous. ^{7,9,10, 19,32}

This outcome further complicated the government's failed attempts at managing the "Black- and Hottentot-questions" and to guarantee the future safety to the proto-Afrikaners on their farms. The proto-Afrikaner's opinions, personal, political and economical interests, safety and future existence as citizens were also totally ignored. The proto-Afrikaner became a stranger in a new British colony, making the fear of a next Slagtersnek and of their dissolution as a population, acute. Life in the country side became very difficult, making the proto-Afrikaners more desperate by the day. The racial confrontations that highlighted the immense cultural and lifestyle differences between the races also laid the foundation for the Grensboers' and Trekboers' perception of deliberate injustices against them. This resulted in apartheid later on. The proto-Afrikaners felt that the injustices against them were mounting, and they had no voice or power as long as they were under British authority. ^{7,9,10,19,32}

To uphold their identity, culture, language and freedom in the face of the constant growing hostility and insensitive liberal race policy of the British authority, whose sole intention was to subdue the Afrikaners and the growing "black danger", the proto-Afrikaners needed an escape route. In the end they were left with only one solution: the Great Trek northwards to vast unpopulated areas without an oppressive British government. In this context it is understandable why the new republics of Natal, Transvaal and Free State were established with three clear characteristics: total self-rule and a total distaste for the British Empire and racial integration. The basis for all these outcomes was the Afrikaners' perception of enormous injustices done to them; injustices that took the backseat for a while in the republics. ^{6-10,32}

3.4.2 British government policy in the Transvaal and Free State between 1902 and 1906

The immediate post-1902 period after the Anglo Boer War brought immense hardships for the Boers of the disbanded Republics of Transvaal and the Free State. Suddenly they were forced to be British citizens inside a domain of the

British Empire and thus under the Union Jack and a king, namely Eduard VII. This was precisely what they had fled so eagerly from the Cape Colony in the 1830s, but in the end all in vain.^{6-10, 32}

However, a hell of injustices was still waiting for the Boers in the new British Transvaal and Free State. The worst happened after the reconfiguration of the old republics as British Colonies: the heartless and the intolerant Lord Alfred Milner, who was the instigator of the whole war and the main cause of the Boers' suffering, downfall and disgrace, became the chief leader in charge of rebuilding the old republics. It was clear from day one that only British interests would be served, especially when considering the repatriation and the compensation for the Boers and his negative public views on the Boers. British mine owners were promoted and supported, while the numbers of the Black workers at Johannesburg mines were accelerated, ignoring the impoverished Boers' views on race and keeping them from work opportunities. Milner had one main focus and interest, namely the total Anglicization of the Boers and the influx of British immigrants to outnumber the Boers and Afrikaners in South Africa as fast as possible.^{6-10, 32}

Milner's intent to Anglicize the Afrikaners is evident from his correspondents to the British government on 8 November 1901 where he reflects that there were 368 000 English Whites in South Africa compared to 496 000 Afrikaans Whites. His intention was to boost British numbers to 615 000 against 544 000 Afrikaners in five years to obtain a ratio of three British against two Afrikaners to assure a permanent British majority in South Africa. He wanted to do this through immigration from Britain and the placement of British soldiers and others who had fought in the war into the Civil Service, industries and on farms. The situation for the Boers in Transvaal under Milner became such chaos and so unbearable that JC Smuts referred to the period 1902 to 1906 as "the darkest time in the history of Transvaal, much worse than the bloodshed of the War itself".^{6,32}

It is undoubtedly true that the Boers and their families of the old Republics of Transvaal and Free State were totally devastated after the war, not only financial but also psychologically. Husbands had to start their lives without their wives, mourning their children lost in the concentration camps. Even General Smuts said himself in 1902 that "South Africa was demolished and that he had seen no light for the future." It was clear to him that very few Afrikaners still believed in law and justice after their ordeal at the hands of the British. Even the Lord

Milner, the brain behind the British war effort, confessed when visiting Western Transvaal after the war that the country had “become a total wreck, a heart-broken sight to see.” The treatment that the Boers received from the British after the war on various terrains only served to strengthen their psychological political dislike for the British Empire and for non-Whites. It was an all-out policy of injustice against them, one that drove the Afrikaners’ racial attitudes in an extreme direction, basically up to 1994. For the Boers this became a direct motivation for more and new kinds of racial discriminations as ways to safeguard their future political and social rights in a hostile South Africa.^{6-10, 32}

The disgraced and demolished Afrikaners were by no means uplifted after 1906. They only overcame this third Slagtersnek because of a unique and dynamic Afrikaner leadership with vision and integrity. These leaders took up the plight of the Afrikaners and steered them back to self-respect by means of psychological and financial upliftment. Prominent leaders were Louis Botha, Koos de la Rey, Barry Hertzog, Christiaan de Wet, Jan Smuts, Christiaan Beyers, Schalk Burger, Abraham Fisher and others. However, the early injustices of 1902 to 1906 remained in the psyche of Afrikaners, driving their racial inclinations, attitudes and behaviour for many years to come, ending in grand apartheid.^{6,10, 32}

3.4.3 The 1994 dispensation of unity

While their second Slagtersnek was avoided by the trek out of the Cape Colony and the founding of independent republics and the Boers of Transvaal and the Free State fought and mastered their third 1902-Slagtersnek guided by a wise Afrikaner leadership, the 1994 dispensation was brought on by a total lack of a sound Afrikaner leadership, a degrading morale and a political process that started in the 1970s and reached a climax in the late 1980s. Where they had manifested vision, wise thinking, integrity, planning, and honesty in overcoming successfully their second and third Slagtersneks, most of the nationalist Afrikaners entrusted their political and personal future from the 1950s to 1994 to persons not always worthy of being called Afrikaners or Afrikaner leaders at all; persons totally incapable of leading a tribe through a new Slagtersnek, as the Afrikaner’s history after 1994 confirmed very well. No provision was made to accommodate and to steer the manifold new injustices against Afrikaners, as the present bitterness, insecurity and lack of direction of the Afrikaner’s shows.

The question is: can the Afrikaner again fight off his fourth Slagtersnek, notwithstanding the failed 1994 and present leadership? In this regard it must be

noted that world politics, South African politics and human rights have changed dramatically in the last 20 years. Technology, science, lifestyles, habits, beliefs, socio-economics, future-thinking, traditions, group values, family life and demographic limitations have also changed dramatically; not only freeing the individual from group conformity, but also making it less necessary for people to be accommodated in close groups and to be guided by “sacred” leaders to survive in the future. Thankfully, most individual Afrikaners have started to make these changes of modernization; the collapse of the NP, the diminished role of the AB and the vague role of the DRC in the Afrikaner’s life confirms the process of Afrikaners departing from these three dominant, useless and most of all, aimless and racially contaminated groups. This new self-orientation and individuality increases the chances that the individual Afrikaner would be able to fight off his fourth Slagtersnek in new South Africa successfully. However, history tends to repeat not only the good of the past, but also the bad. Traumatic experiences are not easily erased from the human memory. Wrongdoings and injustices are entrenched over many years of suffering, exploitation, abuse and misuse. It is not only the Blacks who can rightly claim that they suffered discrimination and injustices at the hands of the Afrikaners via *Afrikaner apartheid*, the Afrikaners can also rightly claim that they suffer discrimination and injustices from the side of the Blacks via *Black apartheid* and in the past at the hand of the Dutch via *Dutch colonial apartheid* and by the British via *British imperial apartheid*. The experiences that Afrikaners had over the course of 300 years and the ideas this perpetuated blindly drove apartheid from 1948 to 1994. Racial injustices, etched into the memories of Afrikaners as well as Blacks, will still drive racism for many generations to come in South Africa. Any doubt? There is the Herodotus Rules to back this postulation.

3.5 Conclusion

It is clear that the proto-Afrikaner and later the Afrikaner were both exposed to serious life traumas, sometimes experienced over a short and extremely dramatic period, while other times gradually over the long-term. This has caused negative thought patterns to become established in the Afrikaner. For the Afrikaner these traumatic experiences stretched specifically from 1899 to 1902 through the Second Anglo Boer War and to a certain extent also from 1902 to 1948 again under British Imperialism, while for the proto-Afrikaner from 1671 to 1806 under authoritarian Dutch rule and from 1806 to 1902 under authoritarian British rule. It seems, in terms of a negative psychological impact, as if the discrimination in the period 1806 to 1902 is responsible for the most damage to the Afrikaner’s long-term psychological health. It became the breeding-ground

for later extreme racial discrimination. The constant, long-term negative experiences of ethnic and racial discrimination and the lack of political power to defend them selves in this imbalanced set-up clearly created a perception of being the victim of perpetual injustice in the psyche of the Afrikaner. Their reaction to this situation was to find an effective action to counter these daily and growing injustices and for their enemies' intentions to annihilate them. There was only one way out, and that was to selfishly place themselves first in their daily behaviour, promoting their own interests and rights at all times, ignoring the consequences that such behaviour can have for other persons outside their group; specifically, people from other racial groups and non-Afrikaner Whites. The apartheid to which he was exposed by the early Cape authorities was internalized as "good and acceptable" behaviour, but it also became the "correct" direct strategy to obtain and maintain their rights, integrity and most of all their identity. The Afrikaner's apartheid was born, and the injustices that were done to them became the motivating power and the justification for the pursuit and maintenance of modern-day apartheid. There is no doubt that any injustice done to Afrikaners up to today is still steering their racial attitudes and behaviours.

The historical and political facts of the proto-Afrikaners and later Afrikaners, read together with the historical indicators focusing on the safekeeping of tribes and nations over many centuries, make it clear the modern Afrikaner is in a crisis: politically, economically, sociologically, personally and psychologically. The powers of hostility against them are immense, overwhelming and overpowering. There is also, it seems, the unbreakable Herodotus curse on them. It seems as if the Afrikaner tribe is heading for dissolution within a century. The primary need at the moment for the Afrikaners, seen specifically from a psychological and political perspective, is to make their dissolution as painless and trauma-free as possible. For such an outcome, specific personal changes and strategies are needed, which are at present outside the Afrikaners frame of reference.

Be that as it may, one can ask if the Afrikaners could not perhaps, as the proto-Afrikaners successfully did three times before, overcome their 1994 Slagtersnek? Why not? Their emancipation from the NP-AB-DRC alliance and their new-found individuality offers them an escape route to overcome this 1994 trauma. This ideal can only be reached if they can lay to rest their obsession with the injustices done and being done to them. They have to clean their collective

psyche of contaminated race attitudes and start anew as independent, freed South Africans.

Reaching the above outcome is not so easy and it would need extraordinary cleansing. As Palkhivala cautions⁵¹, p. 40: “Unfortunately, enmity and hatred persist among nations even after the root cause has been relegated to the limbo of forgotten past”. Speaking of the Schleswig-Holstein question of the 19th century and the forgotten reasons for the war and hatred still left around it, Lord Palmerston observed, “Only three people had ever understood it. One was dead. The other was in a lunatic asylum. I am the third and I have forgotten it.”

Although it seems best for individual Afrikaners not to know the real future brought on by their past, they may have no other choice in 2017 than to take a peek into the glass ball of hope in a last effort to prevent their obsession with the many injustices done to them to gobble up their future. Only in this way can Afrikaners hope to postpone their eminent demise as individuals and as a group. But do they, after so many years of exposure to negative political doctrines and the unlearning of independent thinking, still know how to take a peek?

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CHAPTER 4

AFRIKANERS' FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND, ACCEPT AND APPROPRIATE THE INDIGENOUS REALITIES OF SOUTH AFRICA

4.1 Introduction

The racial separation of Whites and other races in South Africa in the form of *apartheid* as a legal and a social system exclusively for benefit the White minority and to suppress the Black majority, was a devastating White political dispensation that lasted up to 1994. It was a process of discrimination, forced physically and legally by the Whites on the Blacks, Asians, other non-Whites and Coloureds, that gradually started from 1671.¹⁻⁶

This dispensation was statutorily erased in 1994 and the political tide turned on the Afrikaner. The Afrikaners' fortune changed dramatically in just 23 years and in 2017 their future looks completely different from what their ancestors planned for them in South Africa. This outcome seems to be fully in line with the undesirable and unwelcoming changes that the Europeans, especially the British, were subjected to since the 1900s during the decolonization of their African colonies. The only difference between the British and the Afrikaner situation is that the *European* Afrikaners came to the table about sixty years later.^{7,8}

This unexpected turn in the Afrikaners' seemingly "unchangeable future" must be understood in terms of their proto-Afrikaner heritage that started off in the early Cape. This proto-Afrikaner heritage, which developed with time into Afrikanerism, includes a complexity of specific thought patterns and beliefs, cultural values, lifestyles and intentions, histories and life experiences that have been internalized over many years. This forms a complex that makes observing, recognizing and incorporating any other realities outside this internalized Afrikaner framework very difficult, if not totally impossible. Although the Afrikaner and his ancestors have been in Africa for more than 350 years and have acclimatized to a South African existence to some extent, it would be false to say that they ever became true South Africans with African thinking, planning and living. However, they are not truly European with European thinking, planning and living either. This is an ethnic differentiation and uniqueness that already started to manifest in the 1700s at the Cape. This *in-between status* (Afro-Euro status or Euro-Afro status) is a unique feature of the Afrikaner's

identity, political thinking and actions. Anti-apartheid and anti-colonial activists completely miss this, especially the post-1994 ANC politicians who are constantly targeting the Afrikaners for apartheid.^{2,3,4,6,9-12}

Although the identity of the Afrikaner has been defined to a certain extent, although many times with conflicting, misleading and negative descriptions for instance as a *European colonist*, very few researchers have noted the existence of *Afrikanerism* as a specific cultural, political and racial movement and grouping in South Africa. It undoubtedly developed out of Europeanism, colonialism and to lesser extent Africanism, but, in terms of its unique discriminative intentions and inclinations, it is not colonialism, nor Europeanism or Africanism. Apartheid was not colonialism or a European-driven entity either. It is erroneous to classify these Afrikaner actions as European just because they descend from European ancestors. Although Hitler's apartheid and Jewish apartheid reflect similarities in terms of racial supremacy and discrimination, the Germans and Jewish personal and psychological development and structures that led to these "apartheids" are different from that of the majority of Germans and Jews. These "apartheids" developed, as in the case of the Afrikaner's apartheid, as a result of exposure to negative treatments by and experience of other indigenous and ethnic groups over time. It is not a European hereditary taint, transferred from generation to generation, as many researchers claim. In practice, there are different social classes of Blacks in South Africa today, varying from rural to urban and from poor to rich, who clearly do not intermingle. The middle and upper class Blacks have moved to the traditional White suburbs, send their children to the old "White" schools and private schools, buy good homes and cars, maintain an "Western and modern" lifestyle, etc., away from the poor in the informal settlements and their 'sub-standard' lifestyles. This class differentiation, representing discrimination per excellence and an unofficial Black-on-Black apartheid, reflect exactly the same inclination to discriminate of the Afrikaners. Any of the Black tribes of South Africa could, if the circumstances favoured them and they were military, political and economic empowered, have developed a similar South African apartheid as a result of wrongdoings by other indigenous races or ethnic groups or because of selfish and opportunistic personal inclinations. Such apartheid do not represents a Black hereditary taint, but the unique (sometimes deviant) behaviour of a specific group of Blacks.^{2,3,4,6,9-12}

Afrikanerism's differentiation between Afrikaners and Africans forms a "cultural- and racial-schizophrenia" in which proto-Afrikaners and Afrikaners

have lived since 1652. It determined the Afrikaners attitude and view on the Blacks, as well as their preferred actions, life style and views, etc. This early secession of the proto-Afrikaners from the Black life system and the total absorption of Blackness, was further aggravated by the proto-Afrikaners' unchangeable belief in a system of constant order and predictable outcomes to which most Westerns (and not specific only Europeans like the British, French, Dutch) were exposed over centuries in South Africa. It was clearly a case of direct experience with what works and what does not work, what cultural approaches, expertise, life-uses and traditions, etc., assure the viability and sustainable of the individual's life and the continuation of a group. This included the maintenance of a certain life standards, life style, traditions, customs and habits that they believed were not debatable. This behaviour was not European determined or driven, but the result of group experiences and views developed by exposure to a country's environment and its people. Many of these initial experience-derived characteristics, internalized in the mindsets of the proto-Afrikaner and Afrikaner, were of secondary importance for Blacks as it did not fit into their preferences. This difference laid the basis for indigenous racial conflict and estrangement between indigenous South Africans. (Many of the "uncivilised" characteristics assumed to belong to Blacks are direct results of many years of living in the disorder of racial discrimination and the denial of human rights).^{2,4,6,9-12}

The Afrikaners' failure to accept the indigenous realities of South Africa and their rigid implementation of their Afrikaneristic lifestyles, standards and values on the Blacks from a very early stage in the country's history, must also be valued in terms of the impact that the narrow-minded views of Europeanism and colonialism had on the total South African population. A short historical overview of South African (British) colonialism, colonists and Afrikanerism is first offered.

4.2 Colonialism and Afrikanerism

Since 1994, the terms "colonialism" and "colonist" had become two of the catch phrase to identify Afrikaners with apartheid. Underlining this abuse is the simplified argument that the Afrikaners are Europeans who do not belong here. The Helen Zille sage around South African colonialism recently showed how little understanding some of the Black anti-Afrikaners have of their own past as well as that of the Whites, including that of the Afrikaners. Any person like Zille who dares to challenge the propaganda of the subjective post-1994 spirit of political correctness directed at the concepts *colonialism*, *Afrikaner*, *racism* and

apartheid, is quickly ousted from political life, notwithstanding his or her skin colour. Researchers also hesitate to address the matter out of fear of victimizing and many forms of retaliation. Black anti-colonial and anti-apartheid activists have received an open book to jabber untruths in speeches and publications on the multiple wrongs of “British colonialism” and “all colonists,” ignoring the unaccountable benefits it brought to all South Africans: Afrikaners, Blacks and Whites.^{2,13-16}

4.2.1 British colonialism

Although the British colonial policy at the Cape seized in 1815 for academic purposes, its practice was reignited with the colonization of the republics of Natal, Transvaal and Free State up to 1902 under the pretence of safeguarding the various Black tribes against proto-Afrikaner racism (A philanthropic British claim that came to very little when they allowed the racist Constitution of the Union of South Africa in 1910)^{3,17,18}

What is clear is that the proto-Afrikaners were subjugated to the same imperial rule of British and English cultural arrogance as the Blacks. The proto-Afrikaners ‘subjugation started much earlier and was much deeper and extreme’. Not only did it drive many proto-Afrikaners out of the Cape Colony in the 1830s, but it also led to the death of thousands of innocent proto-Afrikaner citizens of the republics of Transvaal and Free State during the Anglo Boer War (1899–1902). It created the same perception of injustices and hate in the mindsets of the Northern proto-Afrikaners as colonialism (and later also Afrikanernism with apartheid) did in the mindsets of Blacks. It created such a hate for the British in the early 1900s that when the British spoke of South Africa’s “racial problem,” it was not a Black one, but an exclusive Boer one. Ethnic and racial tension between Afrikaners and the English Whites who came to South Africa as part of British colonialism, only eased from the 1960s onwards when the “Black problem” became a mutual concern for both groups: the English speakers needed Afrikaner protection against the feared Black empowerment and the Afrikaners needed the English votes to stay in power.^{2,3,11}

The erroneous thought that classifies the Afrikaner as a “colonist” practicing “colonialism” is contradicted by many outcomes. First, true colonialism in South Africa, as practiced by the British formally stopped in the 1840s. “Decolonisation” in present South Africa is an outdated concept about a historical event that ended more than a century ago. The present blames and claims around it are based on uninformed anti-apartheid activists who lacking

knowledge of South Africa's history. To 'decolonize' Afrikaners or Blacks would in practice mean to erase internalized and established European and British knowledge, culture, lifestyles, politics, economics, etc., going back more than two centuries. Surely some of the contributions of colonialism that have become part of South Africans have helped them to become successful countrymen and global citizens. Without early colonialism, most South Africans would be political and cultural "zombies."^{7,9,19}

One fact is clear from the South African history: present-day South Africa is not a colonial society as is being argued. It was awarded effective self-government in 1910 with the Union of South Africa, obtained sovereign status in 1933 (equal to that of Australia, Canada and New Zealand). Affiliation with Britain ended with the founding of the South African Republic outside the Commonwealth. South Africa affiliated in 1994, but without subordinate status.^{7,17,18}

In other words, there are two prominent historical facts that are being blindly ignored by current anti-apartheid activists and politicians when they argue on colonialism and the Afrikaners' status as colonist: a) the change in the constitutional status of South Africa in 1910; b) the activation of statutory political rule by a specific group of indigenous people over the other indigenous groups in South Africa since 1910. Afrikaners (the rulers until 1994) are indigenous to South Africa as the Blacks are indigenous to South Africa (both groups' forefathers migrated four centuries or more ago to the country and settled here without any other fatherland to go back to or that can support them in any way. They were not responsible to any colonial power and were not compensated for being here).²⁰

Second, there are no footprints of colonialism in apartheid. The intent with Afrikanerist apartheid from the 1910s was to safeguard the personal and economical safety of Afrikaners as a specific indigenous racial group. This intention was based on obtaining exclusive political, economical and military power through the practice of extreme racial discrimination under apartheid. Afrikanerism and apartheid lacked a foreign colonial power's inheritance or input, thinking, planning, manpower and manipulation or responsibility. The internal indigenous inclinations and intentions that make up Afrikanerism, which was driven, managed and maintained as grand apartheid, are different from the external colonial inclinations and intentions.⁷

4.2.2 Indigenous Afrikaners and Afrikanerism

The momentum and absolute power of Afrikanerism from the 1910s up to its collapse in 1994 in terms of its statutory empowerment, together with the tremendous input needed to neutralize apartheid, as well as the differences between British colonialism and Afrikanerism as practiced by the indigenous Afrikaners in South Africa, –were aptly described in Berger and Godsell in 1988⁷, p. 268:

These details of constitutional status are important because of what they indicate about the nature of power in South African society. Power is held by a segment of the indigenous population. The task facing those who seek fundamental change in the present government does not lie in persuading a colonial authority that the costs of continued occupation outweigh the benefits, but rather in helping in one section of a population wrest power, by force or persuasion, from each other. This is a much more difficult exercise.

In the process of dislodging a colonial overlord, economic, military and political costs had to exceed their benefits. In military terms, decolonization has mainly involved campaigns of endurance on the part of the indigenous guerrilla forces, and exhaustion on the part of the colonial power. The military stakes were seldom high.

In contrast to this colonial pattern, conflict in South Africa pits one section of population against the other.

Defining the identity of the Afrikaners and their behaviour and thinking around apartheid as that of *Western European settlers*, or as *a fragment* or *a segment of Western Europeans practicing colonialism*, is inappropriate and faulty. Also, propagating that the social identity of Afrikaners, especially from 1948 when apartheid began its more devastating journey into the South African society, is imbued with a colonially invested consciousness of being associated with a ‘superior’ civilisation, which in turn tinted Afrikaner views of indigenous people by pervasive paternalism and social distance because of their assumed personal inferiority and other shortcomings, is “stretched” and unsubstantiated thinking. These arguments are not adequate to solve a complex problem like apartheid or Afrikanerism.⁹

Labelling the Afrikaners as “settler-colonist classes” or as a group of Europeans living in Africa with the main intention to oppose Blacks is misleading. The view that all Whites are united by their European origin, perceptions of origin, cultural features and political interests is a planned effort to deny the Afrikaners their identity as *an independent, indigenous group of South Africa*. Up to 1994 they thought for themselves and reacted independently to situations, totally away from their early European descent or European political, cultural and racial influences. They are a group that has not had any political, emotional and cultural roots in Europe as a homeland for more than three centuries and that has intermixed with other South African groups to some extent. What is true is that Afrikanerism, in its efforts to deal with unique indigenous challenges and the Afrikaners’ feeling of being endangered, activated not only extreme discrimination against Blacks, but also the social and racial ousting of Blacks from their intimate circle. This led to Afrikaners lacking sound information and expertise about the “subordinate” indigenous Blacks. They were driven blindly by various levels of racial prejudice in their apartheid actions, ultimately lacking any real understanding, acceptance and incorporation of South African realities.^{2,9,20,21}

Secondly; the current labelling of Afrikaners as settlers, etc., also fails to describe the unique racial attitudes of Afrikaners as their practiced apartheid and the role of Afrikanerism in racism. The normal reaction of a subgroup and sub-society is declared as a result of the Afrikaner’s European descent. There are social classes and reactions to realities like the differences between first and third world cultures, established group rights, moral and religious beliefs, etc., all over the world. This assumption also fails to consider the multi-fold European origin of Afrikaners – their descence from European groups and nations who differ from each other and reflect dissimilar ethnic and racial inclinations, social class approaches and behaviours, etc. The cultural, social and political distancing and estrangement of the proto-Afrikaners from their original European homelands over centuries is also ignored. Their history has left them with a strong mixed bloodline from the first day of the arrival of the Dutch at the Cape. They were an indigenous racial group in South Africa by the late 1700s and early 1800s.^{2,9,20,21}

Third, their later racial reactions as an indigenous South African group must be seen from the context of the contact they had with the other indigenous South African racial groups, varying from Blacks to Asians, at the Cape and in the Boer republics. Their fear as a specific minority indigenous group has nothing to

do with Europeanism or colonialism. They are a group bound together over many years by political discrimination and British colonialism. They learned cultural customs and adopted certain views. They were politically, culturally and economically steamrollered by other indigenous groups. Their distaste for unsophistication, disorder and lower life standards, also have nothing to do with European system. The racial discrimination practiced by the Afrikaners was activated and driven by their own South African indigenous lifestyle, developed over centuries in terms of indigenous lines in South Africa. It was this “sophisticated” indigenous lifestyle that formed the Afrikaners’ racial (and ethnic) discrimination and, as result of their political authoritarianism and selfishness, ended in apartheid.^{2,9,20}

Many Afrikaners say that race and colour do not matter to them anymore. They are willing to live in South Africa with all the other races, they just want to live according to their own standard and they want the other groups to live to this as well. However, other indigenous groups are not interested in living in a way that would please the Afrikaners. The criteria are such that other groups would fail to meet them anyway. The continuation of discrimination in the form of Afrikanerism is obvious here. Afrikaners want to claim a certain brotherhood with other indigenous groups, but this standard that they prescribe is one of the factors that led to early class distinctions that later became race distinctions. Afrikanerism’s practice of racism was much more extreme than the racism practiced under colonialism and of a much longer duration. They tried to maintain “blood purity” by means of rules prohibiting racial mixing, even simple social association. They wanted to isolate their group to protect it from assimilation by means of unwritten and unreasonable “standards”. Blacks were regarded as *volksvreemd* (foreign), and this view propelled their self-enrichment and political empowerment for Afrikaners only, their ideas of racial supremacy and acts of suppression, including the benefits in turn for loyalty at the cost of non-Whites.^{2,9,20}

4.2.3 Indigenous Afrikaner versus indigenous Black

Due to the Afrikaner’s racial differentiation, they never learned to move out of their early learned culture, lifestyle and belief system towards a true South African inter-racial sphere. They don’t have the ability to conceptualize South African indigenous realities, like the constructive role of constant chaos, disappointment, repeated failures, unhappiness, unpredictability and constant hope that forms the life cycle of many Blacks as positive drivers in life. The Afrikaner never mastered the ability to understand the indigenous religious,

economical, social and tribal life of Black, which, in contrast to the Afrikaner's individuality, are driven and practiced around the family and tribe. The many differences in the Black marriage and religious practices are strange to the Afrikaner. These failures to observe, to understand, to incorporate and to acclimatize in his development, exposure and learning, kept the Afrikaner from understanding South Africa's indigenous realities, needs and demands. This precludes the ability to participate successfully in the Black community or to make a transition to becoming a permanent member of the Black society. Priding oneself on good relations with various Buthelezi's and Mangope's is insignificant, even condemning. Basically is the isolation and out-casting of him from the Black culture a direct result of his incorrect thinking and expectation that successful Afrikaner trouble-shooting in daily life will also always follows permanent in the greater South African society, including for the Blacks. Accompanying this separatist Afrikaner thinking is their selfish inclination to autocratically and indiscreetly forced needs, rights, experiences and wishes on the Blacks. They also have the tendency to see Black indigenous behaviours as barbaric. They seem to miss the fact that Blacks themselves experience Afrikanerist behaviour as barbaric. In the end there were two strangers living in two different cultural and mental worlds in the same South Africa.^{2-4,6,11,12}

The proto-Afrikaners' oversimplified view of indigenous Blacks' political, social, economical and personal thinking and needs was one of the primary reasons for striking Blacks off the voter's role of the Union in 1910 and later in 1961 from the first Republic.

As discussed at length in the two previous chapters of the book, the proto-Afrikaner and Afrikaner were exposed to a variety of traumatic experiences and examples of improper racial and ethnic behaviours over a long time.^{2-4,6,11,12,22,23}

This history and racial differentiation paved the way for ideas of a *White supremacy and civilisation* versus *Black barbarism* in proto-Afrikaners thinking. This racial and cultural differentiation formed one of the main reasons for the Great Trek and became entrenched in the mindsets of the Northern Afrikaners of South Africa (Transvaal and Orange Free State). The history that culminated in the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 and the role of the debate on Blacks as citizen and their right and ability to be part of the Union reflects this North-versus-South thinking about the Blacks as "different kinds of human beings" and as "African strangers". The racial attitudes of the White delegates to the meetings of the Convention to form the Union of South Africa in 1908

confirm the existence of the idea that there is a double world of Blacks and Whites. It established the schizoid racial relations between Whites and Blacks that the modern Afrikaner was later exposed to and grew up in and that hampers their understanding, acceptance and appropriation of South Africa's indigenous realities.^{1-6,11,12,24}

The Afrikaner internalization of life experiences as *good* versus *bad* is the main point of focus of this study. Much of the Afrikaner thinking is based on a *bipolar racial classification*. In terms of this classification, they evaluate certain situations as problematic and they address these, and they evaluate other situations as less important. They have a vision for the future and they plan accordingly, but only for their own benefit. . Prominent in this context is the Afrikaner's failure to understand, accept and appropriate South African indigenous realities correctly.

The aim of the chapter is to reflect on the failure of the Afrikaner to understand, accept and appropriate the indigenous realities of South Africa.²⁵⁻²⁷

4.3 Disrespect and degradation of Blacks at the 1908 Cape Convention (Union of South Africa)

It is crucial to understand the racial disrespect and degrading behaviours of many South African Whites, especially the Afrikaners, towards the South African Blacks before apartheid. This also explains how Afrikaners deliberately isolated the Blacks as indigenous partners in a true South African indigenous society, ultimately leaving the Afrikaners in isolation, a total stranger to the South African realities. The best evidence of this is the events in 1908 at the National Convention to prepare a constitution for the Union of South Africa. The various speeches and other inputs of the White delegates on accommodating and inscribing the rights of the all citizens, White and Blacks, of the Cape and the three colonies into the constitution, provides insight in this matter. The events also reveal the thinking of the Afrikaners and the English-speaking Whites of that time. It also reflects the racial situation into which the proto-Afrikaners were guided by their leaders, shaping to a great extent their future views of disrespect and degradation of the Blacks' political and general views, cultures, ambitions, dreams and expectations of the South African society.³

In retrospect, the views of 1908 on Blacks did not differ very much from those of the nationalist Afrikaners of 1948 to 1960 and onwards into grand apartheid. It is therefore of great importance to start with this 1908 racial profile and

description to determine the Afrikaners' attitudes, reasons and motivation to discriminate instead of becoming incorporated in South Africa's indigenous realities.^{2,3,11,24}

- Regarding the status of Blacks in the world of 1908, it would have been naive to see them as perfectly developed and functioning citizens in terms of “Western” and “Afrikaner” standards, which were the *only criteria for human rights* for many Whites of that time. To the contrary. They were not “civilised angels” who were blindly discriminated against just because they are Black. There were large cultural gaps between the average Black and the average White in the 1900s, making social resistance and conflict unavoidable;

In referring to the 1900s, one must remember that South Africa, its people and civil society was totally different from that of the South Africa of 2017. It would also be false to claim that racial discrimination, hatred, prejudice and hostility were limited to Afrikaners. The same negative characteristics existed (and still do today) in the mindsets and behaviours of some Blacks against Afrikaners (the Black hostile view and that the Afrikaner is an uninvited European colonist and interloper into South Africa was already there from the 1800s).^{2,4,6,11,12,14}

■ The intention of this book is *to focus exclusively* (a focus that some over-sensitive Afrikaners may see as prejudice, which is of course not true) *on the Afrikaners and their political and social wrongdoings in South Africa. The book examines how they saw and treated the country and its people and why they fail to accept, understand and appropriate South Africa's indigenous realities. The book also looks at why they failed as indigenous South Africans to join Blacks in the greater South African society unconditionally.* This approach permeates the wider research. The mistakes of the Blacks and their racist attitudes or hostility are irrelevant here and should be studied separately.

4.3.1 The 1853 Cape Constitution and liberal politicians

Racial relations were not negative and hostile before 1908. From the British side there was a positive view on Blacks (although they called them *Natives* at that time) as reflected in the 1853 Constitution of the Cape Colony. Sir George Cathcart reveals this clearly in a dispatch to the Governor of the Cape^{3, pp.22-23}: “It is the earnest desire of Her Majesty's government that all her subjects at the

Cape without distinction of class or colour should be united by one bond of loyalty and we believe that the exercise of political rights enjoyed by all alike will prove one of the best methods of attaining this object.” In the Cape under this Constitution “franchise was open to all men, White, Coloured or Native, who could comply with a civilisation test and every person qualified to vote was eligible for election to the House of Assembly”.³

The testimony of Colonel Stanford, a Cape delegate and former head of the Native Affairs Department in the Cape Colony and an ex-member of the Native Affairs Commission, someone who spent his life among Blacks and thus with in-depth knowledge of the Blacks, said to the other members of the Convention³, p. 53: “They must realise the fact that the Natives were men and must treat them as men and slowly they would prove themselves good and worthy citizens ready and able to bear their full share of the burden of citizenship”. His belief was that they would take the same position and show the same progress in South Africa as they had done in the Cape Colony. The franchise in his view was the crux of the whole *Native* question in South Africa. He regarded freedom and citizenship for Blacks as a priority in South Africa after 1910.

The prominent politician WP Schreiner, a former Prime Minister of the Cape, saw the political intentions of many of the delegates to the Convention, especially those from the Northern parts, as suspicious. He felt that they were racist when it came to the rights of Blacks and described the new Constitution they wanted for South Africa not as an Act of Union but rather as an Act of Separation between the minority and the majority of the people of South Africa.³ He denounced the intended exclusion of other races from the union parliament³. In this regard he argued³, p. 25: “*Humani nil a me alienum puto*. To embody in the South African constitution a vertical line or barrier separating its people upon the ground of colour into a privileged class or caste and an unprivileged, inferior proletariat is, as I see the problem, as imprudent as it would be to build a grand building upon unsound and sinking foundations...”

The Cape politician JX Merriman, going through as a liberal on the Black issue in public view, showed his true racial attitudes (and colours!) in a letter to JC Smuts when he wrote³, p.18: “... I do not like the Natives at all and I wish we had no Black man in South Africa. But there they are, our lot is cast with them by an overruling Providence and the only question is how to shape our course so as to maintain the supremacy of our race and at the same time do our duty”.

Merriman's extreme racist view was in line with that of the Northern delegates and laid the foundation for the union's racial policy and later apartheid.

4.3.2 The Northern Colonies and their 1908-degradation of Blacks

Compared to the Cape Colony, the two Northern colonies had a rigid colour bar in their constitutions that excluded any person who was not European from franchise and from public office. The Transvaal and the Orange River Constitutions were based on the proto-Afrikaners' views. They came from a tradition of slavery from the 1650s at the Cape, went through a constant struggle with Blacks on the Eastern border and in the colonies and had a schooling in the harsh, rigid doctrine that promised security for the minority Whites in South Africa. This doctrine held that they had to subdue the Blacks and keep them permanently and constantly subdued. These Northern Afrikaners claimed based on their earlier conquering of the Blacks in Transvaal and Orange Free State, the right to rule and to keep Blacks in a state of complete subjection.³ This perception of the Northern Boers is illustrated well by Friedman³, p. 24: "They would admit of no relationship between White and Black save that of master and servant. The caste system they established was supported by Biblical sanction, than which they recognised no higher authority. White supremacy was part of the Divine order of things. Equality of status for White and Black was not only a revolutionary conception – it was sheer blasphemy".

During the preparatory discussions to the formation of the union, this Northern Afrikaner contempt for Blacks as humans quickly came to the foreground. They stated it in their arguments and they won in the end, notwithstanding strong opposition from some delegates. This early socio-cultural isolation between Afrikaners and Blacks in the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony became the guiding racial policy for South Africa as a whole after the establishment of the Union, with the Blacks seen as inferior humans. Prominent Afrikaner and English-speaking White leaders showed disrespect for Black intelligence, integrity and sincerity in their degrading speeches. Hidden behind this racial discrimination was the desire to secure exclusive *White economical supremacy* through *White political supremacy* as fast and comprehensively as possible. [Today under the ANC regime these actions are described by anxious White critics as (*White*) *radical economical transformation* through *state capture* under the Zuma regime]. The foundations of the Afrikaans version of radical economical transformation and state capture were laid on the establishment of the Union, waiting to be exploited by the authoritarian Hitler-oriented Malan-Strydom-Verwoerd alliance. Twenty years later it started steering into an

extreme economical and political apartheid. For this alliance, the impoverished and downtrodden Afrikaners (with a strong tendency towards authoritarianism themselves) were easy prey who could be manipulated with the Nazi-dogma of White supremacy as a vehicle to obtain and maintain political and economical power.^{2,3,6,9,11,12}

General Botha was commissioned by Transvaal to attend the Convention. His negative racial attitude is aptly described by Friedman³ when he writes^{3, p. 49}: “His conception of a united nation did not embrace the Natives and other non-Whites; when he spoke of the population of South Africa as being too small he obviously did not include them in the account. As a true descendant of the Voortrekkers he could not acknowledge that the Natives had any legitimate claim to a share in the new dispensation. Nor could Botha accept the doctrine that by enhancing the status of the Black man he would make a contribution to the progress and prosperity of the Union”.

General de Wet’s reaction was even more negative when he said^{3, p. 60}: “Providence had drawn the line between Black and White and we must make that clear to the Natives and not instil into their minds false ideas of equality”. To his mind, the greatest kindness and the greatest justice the Convention could do to the Blacks were to inform them that they are unequal to Whites.³

Two other speeches, one at the preparatory meeting of the Convention and one at the Convention itself, reflect the psychological and physical estrangement and detachment already present between Afrikaners and Blacks in 1908, notwithstanding nearly 200 years of contact. Mr Abraham Fischer spoke on behalf of the Orange River Colony and challenged the opinion of another delegate. Friedman reports as follows on his reaction^{3, p.55}: “...He could ask those who knew [the Native peoples] whether they could say the Natives were fit for power? Are they fit to take part in the making of laws for South Africa? ...A test of civilisation was spoken: what is the test of civilisation? It is not education. Not an industrial qualification. Not the improvement of property. Was it to be a liquor test?”

The negative view of Sir Frederick Moor of Natal on the Blacks was the following^{3, p. 54}:

... White and Black races in South Africa could never be amalgamated. The history of the world proved that the Black man was incapable of

civilisation and the evidences were to be found throughout South Africa today. Almost every race in the world could point to its stages of civilisation but what traces of Black civilisation could South Africa produce though the Native people had been brought into contact with civilisation for ages? Sir Percy Fitz-Patrick has spoken of a test of civilisation. What was a civilized man? Was it not a man who proved himself adaptable to a civilized community? The Native were incapable of civilisation because they were incapable of sustained effort.

General JC Smuts, representing Transvaal and a person of supposed liberal thinking, had a less negative reaction, but he was very aloof about Black political rights in the future union. Smuts reflected³, p. 19: "...I don't believe in politics for them. Perhaps at the bottom I do not believe in politics at all as a means for the attainment of the highest ends, but certainly so far as the Natives are concerned politics will to my mind only have an unsettling influence". In studying Smuts' famous Memorandum to the 1908 Convention, preparing the Constitution for the Union, there is no trace of safeguarding the future rights of or a concern for the fate of Blacks in post-1910 South Africa.^{3,24}

In retrospect, most of the 1908-delegates to the founding of the union regarded the ordinary South African Black as *persona non grata*; more precisely, they were *persona non human*. These *non-human* Blacks stayed for a very long time.

These negative attitudes on the Blacks in 1908 and the racial attitudes reflected by prominent leaders not only laid the foundation for the future racial policy of South Africa, but confirmed the belief that Blacks are inferior and can not be allowed into the intimate circle of Whites. Whatever was going on at the homes of Blacks, their daily struggles to survive financially, and the substandard quality of healthcare they received, were not only of little concern to the ordinary Afrikaners, it was taboo for them to want to know, understand or see it for themselves. These problems were not regarded as the Afrikaners' concerns, notwithstanding the fact that the Afrikaner racial policy was responsible for much of the Blacks' suffering. The 1908-views on race relations, cemented into the Constitution of the Union of 1910, paved the way for keeping White and Black away from each other as far as possible, not only socially but also statutorily. The Constitution of the Union of South Africa made Blacks into strangers to Afrikaners aside from cordial, subordinate workplace contact. The opportunity for the Afrikaners to understand, accept and appropriate the

indigenous realities of South Africa was curtailed by their own negative racial attitudes and inclinations in 1910.^{2-4,6,11,12,24}

This racial split that prohibited assimilation between White and Black, thus blocking the opportunity for a better understanding among Whites and Blacks, was edified by various kinds of racial legislations. This legislation was accompanied by supremacy and an authoritarian Afrikaner thinking on Blacks as humans and with regard to their civil rights. An example is Hertzog's legislation of 1936 that accomplished not only the removal of the Black voters from the common roll, but *established distinctions of race or colour as legitimate grounds for the denial of political rights and an all-out discrimination*. This deprived the Blacks and Coloured people of their political rights (the racial discrimination became the basis for the later apartheid dispensation).³

White and Black became more and more estranged from each other: two opposing *aliens* living in the same country. The passing of more extreme legislation, culminating in grand apartheid, destroyed any opportunity for Whites to learn more about Blacks and South Africa's realities.^{2-4,6,11,12}

This side-lining of the "Black problem" in 1908 became a chronic problem, left unaddressed for many years to come. It was never successfully addressed until the dawn of the ANC regime. The union was to benefit exclusively the Whites, not the Blacks; the matter of citizen status for Blacks was treated by the union-makers as a matter of subsidiary importance. In the minds of the racially discriminative White policy makers, Black voting and civil rights would have meant the end of White supremacy and the doom of White civilisation. Political power had to stay in the hands of Whites to maintain White supremacy and to enforce a full-blown policy of segregation. This segregation, which within short time developed into full racial discrimination, was intentionally obtained through the formation of the union. Apartheid was introduced to Afrikaners as morally, and statutorily right and acceptable. This was an outcome that was welcomed by many greedy nationalist Afrikaners who were now assured of their income through job reservation and profited from property expropriation, etc. But the most successful outcome of apartheid was the deliberately isolation of ordinary Afrikaners from the Blacks' indigenous culture, their lifestyles, politics, ambitions, dreams, humanity and, most of all, the Blacks' immense suffering as a result of the nationalist Afrikaner leadership's policy of systematic discrimination against Blacks and the open degradation and disrespect for them as humans. By 1908 the table was fully laid for discrimination against Blacks and a lifelong estrangement that the 1994 dispensation have not been able to

address. The events of 1908 also became the barrier for the Afrikaner to obtain insight into South Africa's realities.^{2-4,6,11,12}

The harshness of apartheid is echoed by the nationalist Afrikaners' disdain for Jews during the 1930s. Like the Nazis hid the Jews from the German civilians, the fate of Blacks and their existence was kept hidden from the Afrikaners' daily view. In this way they saw to it that Afrikaners would not develop any sensitivity for their fate (based on the principle "out of sight, out of mind"). Up to the 1930s, Jews were regarded as "brothers" of the Afrikaners, yet they were shunned when it suited the Afrikaners. This makes clear the cold-bloodedness of the discrimination against the Blacks during apartheid and the damage done to any future "brotherhood" between Blacks and Whites after apartheid.³

The next section shortly chronicles the Afrikaner reaction to immigrants and the "Jew problem" to show how groups that used to have amicable relationships can suddenly turn on each other. Such outcomes make any unification in a country impossible. This piece of history also shows how the fears and prejudices of the proto-Afrikaners and Afrikaners were hijacked by crafty political leaders from the early 1900s. These leaders had dubious personal and political views. They masterfully steered these unfortunate and insecure Afrikaners in the direction of extreme racial discrimination and the expulsion of other ethnic and racial groups from their lifestyles and living spaces. The endorsement, acceptance and establishment of authoritarianism and moral double standards as part of the political lifestyle of these insecure Afrikaners fitted well with the racial discrimination promoted by ultra-nationalist Afrikaner leaders. It is evident from the political behaviour of the puritan nationalist Afrikaner leaders (the rulers of South Africa from 1948 to 1994) and those in their inner circles from the 1930s onwards.^{2,3}

4.3.3 The puritan nationalist Afrikaners' discrimination against Jews

The sentiment around Hitler and his Nazis became very prominent in 1935 with DF Malan (a future prime minister) and his *Purified Nationalist Party (PNP)* [launched in 1934 and later becoming the core of the National party (NP) which came to power in 1948]. This sentiment is well-demonstrated by Malan, Hertzog, Strydom and Verwoerd's justification of Hitler's annexation of Czechoslovakia and Poland and his growing aggressions to Germany's neighbours. These four were leaders in the Purified National Party.^{2,3} The purified nationalism of Malan was very much in line with the political thinking and philosophies of Hitler. Friedman writes about the PNP and Malan^{3, p. 125}: "Its

aim was domination. It sought a state of affairs which would ensure the undisputed ascendancy of the *ware* Afrikaner in every sphere of the national life and reduce all unnational elements – British, Jews and detribalised Afrikaners who followed Smuts – to the status of second-class citizens. The Republic, the goal of all his aspirations, would be founded on the principle of ‘*Een land, een volk, een taal*’.

The severity of Malan’s purified nationalist intolerance of democracy is noticeable from the fact that he scolded JBM Hertzog, who was seen as the father of Afrikaner nationalism, as a renegade and a traitor to the cause, and an enemy of the *volk*[nation]. Malan’s purified nationalist Afrikaners assimilated Hitler’s *Herren-volk* doctrine, so much so that a party member, JG Strydom³ (a future prime minister), said that if the Afrikaners do not accept and practice the “Herren-volk idea” of the Nazis, the Whites would fail to be the political masters of South Africa and to rule the Blacks.^{3,12}

Hitler’s prominent use of anti-Semitism as one of the main strategies (the other strategy was to use the dire poverty of the Germans after the First World War) to muster authoritarian political power had a direct impact on the purified nationalist Afrikaners. Malan, when he was Minister of the Interior, was himself a man who initially publicly praised the South African Jews for their contribution to various areas to the country and as an important group of the population who had fully identified themselves with the White society and its people. Now, beset by purified nationalism and suddenly under the Nazi doctrine of anti-Semitism, Malan denounced the Jews as an unassimilable group. Even the belief that the Jews are the Chosen People of the Bible was skilfully extinguished in the mindsets of the Boers under the influence of the purified Afrikaners. The Synod of the Dutch Reformed Church annulled the Divine decree that the Jews were God’s Chosen People after a study on the historic credentials of the Jews (In doing this the DRC assured Afrikaners that any manifestation anti-Semitism would not and could not incur Divine displeasure). DRC members were careful to observe the Biblical injunction to “love their neighbours”, but the church aligned this commandment with anti-Semitism and the Afrikaners’ new Christian duty became to ensure that their neighbours are Gentiles and not Jews.^{2,3}

In this regard it must be noted that South Africa was at that time a safe place to settle for German Jews fleeing Nazi persecution and genocide. However, Malan and his collaborators’ anti-Semitism and pro-Nazism immediately saw the Jews

becoming a target for the purified nationalist Afrikaners. The PNP wanted to stop them from entrance into South Africa. Action was started by the Purified Afrikaners to prohibit Jewish immigration. Malan himself declared that the country did not want more Jews because they were an ‘unassimilable element.’ The anti-Jewish hostility of the purified nationalist Afrikaners reached a climax when a German chartered ship, the Stuttgart, arrived in Cape Town filled with German Jews and urgently looking for asylum. The agitation by the purified Afrikaners forced Hertzog’s government to act and the Aliens Bill ended the entrance of Jewish refugees. Even the liberal Smuts did not block this draconian act.³

What is of immediate importance is that this unprecedented official ethnic discrimination, fully in the public domain and promoted with “Afrikaner pride” by prominent nationalist Afrikaners, was internalized during the 1930s by ordinary nationalist Afrikaners as good, applicable and correct behaviour. For Blacks, this increase discriminatory thinking among the majority of Afrikaners and the inclusion of discrimination in the political system was a sign of doom. *An entire sub-society of nationalist Afrikaners* formed. The question must have been clear to Blacks at that time: *if the Afrikaner could not assimilate other Whites like the Jews, how could they ever freely assimilate Blacks?*

This without a doubt increased the Blacks’ distrust in the Afrikaners and they increased the distance they kept. The estrangement between the two racial groups was exacerbated, leaving the Afrikaners in isolation, with a growing misunderstanding of Blacks and South African indigenous realities (and the Blacks of Afrikaner realities).

The racial incitement against the Jews revealed the authoritarian and self-centred political and psychological thought patterns of the purified nationalist Afrikaner leaders. Not only did they steer and manipulate the Afrikaners into their weird and abnormal thinking on humanity, but they also sought votes and political empowerment, cunningly and deliberately creating false ideals for the insecure Afrikaners and promising that their injustices would be rectified and their political, social and financial needs would be satisfied. The leaders’ own intentions, ideals and attitudes on extreme racial discrimination and White supremacy were hidden from ordinary Afrikaners.³

As with the Germans’ immense poverty that offered Hitler the opportunity to direct his ideology of revenge at the “culprits” and to focus on the correction of

the imbalance in richness between the Germans and the “culprits,” the Jews, the purified Nationalist-Afrikaner leaders identified the Blacks as the “culprits”. Blacks, as cheap labour was seen as competition for the poor and unskilled Afrikaners. The White English had comparatively higher incomes than the Afrikaners. The purified Afrikaner leaders exploited this state of affairs to strengthen their self-centred political racist dogma, personal agendas and to gain support among the Afrikaner electorate. They basically relied on White supremacy and kept non-Whites isolated and on a distance as strangers whose influence must at all time be blocked. Support for the purified Afrikaners (as with the Nazis in the beginning in Germany) was initially small, but it quickly gathered momentum until they won the general election in 1948 (when the Purified Afrikaner Party came to power in 1948 they won with a majority of eight seats, while obtaining only 37% of the polled votes. Nineteen years later, in 1977, on the NP’s pick, the NP captured 134 of the 164 seats, drawing 64.5% of the polled votes with an estimated 85% voter support from the Afrikaners).^{2,3}

When comparing the authoritarian personality of Adolf Hitler with many of the leaders of the purified Afrikaners and later nationalist Afrikaners, the similarities are astonishing. The same goes for a comparison of their political planning and institutions. The same political and emotional rhetoric, well-planned false racist propaganda, dogma and doctrine, authoritarian thinking, planning and management by the leadership, exclusive small beneficiary support groups around the top management, like the SS versus the AB, the Gestapo versus the Civil Cooperation Bureau, the immense poverty of certain sectors of the German and Afrikaner populations to exploit, extremely charismatic leaders that could secure a mass following of up to 85% of the population, constant pleas for nationalism and nation building, group interests above that of the individual and unselfish service to and sacrifices for the nation, the emphasis on injustices done to the Germans and Afrikaners, extreme suppression of political enemies, reckless political behaviour by the leaderships of both when their power started to wane, etc., distinguish both groups. Also, the failure brought on the Germans by the racism/ethnicity and political corruption of Hitler and the failure brought on the Afrikaners by the ultra-racism and political corruption of their leaders, show great similarities. The only two differences between modern Germany and modern South Africa is that Germany re-captured its position as a world leader after Hitler and the Nazis, but the Afrikaners failed to be a group of any significance after the fall of the NP-AB-alliance leaders and the NP, and they seem to be on their way to dissolution in a century’s time. Secondly, where

it took the world to bring down Hitler, the NP was brought down easily by South African Black empowerment without a real war.^{2,3,28-30}

Regarding the characteristic authoritarianism of the Afrikaner leaders like Malan, Strydom, Verwoerd and Vorster, it will be foolish to argue that it was unique to them. This is far from the truth: the behaviours of the Trekboers on the Eastern border of the Cape in the 18th, the Boers/Burghers of the republics of Transvaal and the Orange Free State and their previous governments under leaders like Paul Kruger, Smuts, Botha and De Wet as well as the various delegates to the 1908 Convention, bares evidence of this. Also, the behaviour of the management structures of the Afrikaner churches like the DRC was and is still today founded in authoritarianism. Authoritarianism seems to be embedded in the worldviews of most ordinary Afrikaners, which made it very easy for their autocratic leaders to beset their political minds and to steer them towards the thinking and belief system of their leaders and into extreme apartheid from 1960. Hitler's impact on leaders like Malan, Verwoerd and Vorster did not a lead to the creation of a new political behaviour or ideology based on authoritarianism, but rekindled old behaviours and thinking. The practices that result from this thinking were driven unashamedly and with certitude by a prominent (notorious) world leader in world politics, setting an example for subordinate leaders. It is an open question if one could describe the strong tendency of many Afrikaners to underwrite and to practice authoritarianism in their daily life as abnormal psychological behaviour that reflects psychopathology. However, one could say that authoritarianism did contribute to the Afrikaner's abnormal racial discrimination and apartheid. The role of authoritarianism in the Afrikaner's resistance to Black empowerment and his isolation from South Africa's realities can not be doubted or denied either.^{2,4,6,11,12,24}

It essential to understand the autocrat Adolf Hitler and his dogma if one wants to understand the authoritarian behaviour, intentions and thinking of the NP-AB-DRC leaders, apartheid and the extreme racial segregation with all its consequences, the isolation of the Afrikaners from knowledge of South Africa's indigenous realities.

In an effort to understand the corrupting influence of Hitler on the nationalist Afrikaner leaders during the 1930s (a mindset that still seems to exist today), the article provides short descriptions of the anti-Semitic and general Nazi-

authoritarian behaviour of DF Malan, HF Verwoerd and JB Vorster. There is also a short reference to the post-Vorster period of NP leaders.

4.3.3.1 DF Malan

Malan's extreme authoritarian mindset and his shameless manipulation of the ordinary Afrikaners (characteristics that became well-known with the NP leadership up to the party's disbanding) are described well by Friedman³, p. 126: "He [Malan] denied that there was a Nazi persecution of the Jews, a rather ironic statement for, in effect, he denied that Hitler had put into practice the sort of discrimination he, Malan, was planning to enforce against the Jews in South Africa. Thus he exonerated Hitler, whilst convicting himself of anti-Semitism".

Looking back on the blocking of German Jewish refugees from South Africa by Malan and his collaborators, Malan made himself directly part of the killing and genocide of German and other European Jews by making it impossible for them to flee the Nazis. Judged by his post-1930s behaviour, his part to these murders by the Germans did not seem to worry him. This is a good indicator of how "unworried" he was when he ruthlessly conducted his policy of apartheid from 1948 onwards.

Malan, although not part of the war clan of Hertzog, Botha, De Wet, and Smuts, started to have a political impact on the Afrikaners during the early 1900s. He became a strong opinion and policy maker on Afrikaner interests after he became editor of *Die Burger* in 1916 and the leader of the Cape NP in 1920. His intention was to give specific meaning to the then rather undefined concept of the Afrikaner, the immediate mobilization and empowerment of Afrikaners in the South African politics (and to successfully mask the various divisions) to establish a nationalist Afrikaner identity and – entity that is separate from White English speakers and Coloured Afrikaans speakers. He was, in the words of Giliomee², p.12, "part of the rewriting of history along nationalist Afrikaner lines: the gestalt of the Afrikaners as a distinct group living among groups of 'savage' and 'heathen' nations, the construction of a new nationalist Afrikaner ideology founded specifically on the long-standing beliefs of White supremacy with the subordinate position of non-Whites and the condemning of racial mingling". Primary to these new ideas was neo-Calvinism (Malan was previously a minister of the Word in the DRC), which Malan propagated in the south alongside the Doppers of Potchefstroom in the North.

This “neo-Calvinism,” strongly underwritten and propagated by Malan² p.12: “argue[d] that God had ordained separate nations, each with a unique destiny, which charged the Afrikaners to maintain themselves in separate cultural, religious and political institutions”. Malan’s later acceptance of the Nazi ideology (and extreme racial discrimination) was clearly present in his mindset in the early 1900s and was waiting to be set free in the mindsets of Afrikaners when applicable.

Malan’s disrespect for the rights of the individual is evident from the NP’s consistent violation of the fundamental rights and freedoms of South Africans after 1948. One means to do this was the Suppression of Communism Act which placed the NP regime above the law. Malan could eliminate individuals and political opposition from politics, ban persons from public life, etc., by means of executive order. This shows how the ghost of Nazism became a living Dracula in South Africa after 1948. This act was amply applied to Black political leaders.³

4.3.3.2 HF Verwoerd

A good example of the significant Nazi-orientation and – manifestation among the leaders of the purified nationalist Afrikaners is the extreme racial and ethnic discriminative mindset of HF Verwoerd (A born Dutchman and later leader of the NP and premier and president of the South African Republic) in the 1930s. When the German ship, the Stuttgart, arrived at the Cape filled with German Jewish refugees, Verwoerd – at that time a professor at Stellenbosch University – addressed a mass demonstration and threatened to lead a march on parliament to vent the people’s anger and resentment against this unwanted and undesirable influx of Jewish refugees.³

This attitude and these actions against White immigrants who were fleeing from the murdering madness of Hitler (and himself an immigrant) provide a good idea of Verwoerd’s early Nazism. These ethnic and racial attitudes and Nazi ideas and behaviour never left Verwoerd. The tragic outcome of his twisted political mindset for Black South Africans is evidenced by his later grand apartheid.^{2,8,11,23}

The highly charismatic Verwoerd, as Malan before him, captivated nationalist Afrikaners and he became the most unchallenged leader of the NP. His advice, viewpoints and opinions were untouchable and were followed without questions. The same went for his political dogma around apartheid. For a many opportunistic and shortsighted nationalist Afrikaners, his extreme racial politics

worked excellently, at least in the short term, although totally at the cost of the Blacks. Ultimately his vision, promises and manipulations not only failed the NP, but also all the Afrikaners. The backlash by the Blacks after 1994 erased to a great extent many of his racist wrongdoings, but the psychological and physical estrangements he brought between Black and White seems to have become permanent, making the Afrikaners today outcasts with a limited knowledge of South Africa's indigenous realities.^{2,3,11}

4.3.3.3 JB Vorster

Vorster, a president of the old South Africa, was an agitator for Nazism in his younger days and was interned by the Smuts regime to curb his undermining political activities in the country during the war.

His Terrorism Act highlighted his Nazi-draconian and authoritarian mindset. In terms of this act the South African police could at any time arrest anyone without stating reasons and they could suspend *Habeas Corpus* for 180 days. The act conferred unlimited authority on the arresting official. Detainees could be held in solitary confinement without visitors or reading and writing material. The arrestee could on the termination of the 180 days be rearrested for another period of 180 days if the police deemed it necessary.³

Vorster's political behaviour was very similar to that of the SS and the Gestapo, only two decades later and outside the borders of Nazi Germany. Although he tried to establish ties with various African leaders, his government also failed to introduce the Afrikaners to any African realities.

4.3.3.4 The post-Vorster leaders of the NP

Looking back at the examples set by Malan, Verwoerd and Vorster, there can be no doubt how, where and from whom the ordinary nationalist Afrikaners learned White supremacy, the practice of racial discrimination and the tendency to dissociate themselves from Blacks from the 1920s onwards. Regarding Malan, Strydom and Verwoerd's political teachings and doctrines, there can be no doubt where they found in some way the inspiration for their political dogma: Hitler and the Nazis.

To declare the post-Vorster-period of NP-leaders' and –members' thinking and behaviour free from the authoritarian and racial political policy as practiced by the Malan-to-Vorster-leaderships is wrong: the political ideology preached and practiced under Vorster, had continued. P W Botha shows throughout his

political life his authoritarian NP-orientated racial-inclinations. Indeed, as a disciple of D F Malan he learned and internalised a lot of the NP-AB-doctrine. Although F W de Klerk, a minister in Botha's cabinet, activated the dismantling of apartheid, he underwrites till 1990 as a member of the NP – and before his seemingly Damascus Enlightenment and political conversion - fully apartheid in all its negative consequences for Blacks. This political inclination was home-and family-bred. His father, Jan de Klerk, a nominated senator, was a minister in the Strydom- and Verwoerd-cabinets and a stalwart apartheid-preacher and – practitioner himself. More, de Klerk Senior was the brother-in-law of J G Strydom, the prime-minister of South Africa after D F Malan. How much it can be debated, F W de Klerk, notwithstanding his receiving of the Nobel-prize for Peace and his political self-crucifixion in the eyes of many South Africans and the international public to dismantle apartheid, undoubtedly benefited over a broad terrain and in long term from the pre-1994 NP-reign. He is direct and indirect as much collectively guilty to apartheid's mal-behaviours as Malan, Srydom, Vorster, his father Jan de Klerk and Botha are: No-one can escape his past, also not De Klerk Junior. About the political and humanitarian guilt to apartheid's wrongdoing of the last leader of the NP, Marthinus van Schalkwyk, there is little to say in this political condemnation and pinpointing of NP-culpability: he was a political non-account in Afrikaner-politics and a short lived leader.

4.3.3.5 Plentiful autocrats like Adolf Hitler

Various researchers^{3,22,31} offers an excellent description of Hitler and the NP-AB leadership's mental functioning. They shared elements such as their ability to easily motivate masses of ordinary citizens to follow their leadership and doctrines blindly and unquestioningly. In the case of the Afrikaner leaders, there was the successful implementation of the doctrine of apartheid for many years; their establishment of segregation so that the Blacks, notwithstanding centuries of living in the same country, remained complete strangers for the Afrikaners; their successful radical economical transformation of the Afrikaners at the cost of Blacks and their successful state capturing after 1948.^{3,22,31} Boon's description on autocrats and the mental functioning of Hitler is of such importance in helping to understand the modern Afrikaners' politically deviant behaviour during apartheid that I quote it at length ^{31, p. 69}:

Autocrats will not be keen to draw on the analogy between themselves and such a heinous individual as Hitler. However, Hitler was a dictator and an autocrat. To the German people he was presented as a saviour,

someone to look up to and to follow out of the terrible depression of the 1930s. People wanted to follow him – he was charismatic, charming and convincing. But that was his public image. Behind the scenes he was ruthless. He cared nothing for the German people or their wishes. He only fed them with what they wanted for as long as it satisfied his personal needs and objectives. He created the Gestapo to eradicate any resistance to his ideology.

At a senior level Hitler behaved very differently. He was utterly and openly dictatorial. There was genuine conflict among his senior leaders, to the point where some of his general staff attempted to kill him in 1944.

As an autocrat, charismatic as he was, he used song, charm and rousing speeches to instil unbelievable pride in the German people. Because he made them feel good about themselves and gave them hope, they loved him. But all of this was designed to foster loyalty to him alone so that he could better achieve his ambitions. Hitler lied to the people all the time. When ambition is coupled with dishonesty, one finds the evil of autocracy.

Hitler did not share his real goals with the people. He did not stand on a podium and talk of murder and genocide. Instead, he talked of love and care for the ordinary German people. This is the kind of thing that makes autocracy so dangerous. The autocrat is unassailable and need not even share his visions. People are therefore never empowered, and rely entirely on the autocrat. 'Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.'

4.4 Afrikaners' negative life experiences and lost opportunities to better South Africa

It must be conceded in all honesty that the proto-Afrikaner and later the Afrikaner were exposed to many negative and unfavourable life experiences and examples from 1652 onwards. This created the tendency to feel that injustices have been committed towards them and attitudes of hatred towards others. They were conditioned to form negative racial attitudes and to shy away from contact with the Blacks.

Since the 1900s there were several opportunities to incorporate Black South Africans into the White governmental system successfully. They could also have been included in the Afrikaners' personal and social lives, but Afrikaners

ignored South African indigenous realities and the fate awaiting them as indigenous Whites in South Africa. They were politically and emotionally blinded by their purified nationalist Afrikaner leaders' doctrine (which became stronger from the 1930s). They also clung to unsustainable selfish political rights and privileges.

The first opportunity was the founding of a federation instead of a union in 1910. Although the idea of a confederation of states like that of the United States of America (USA) instead of a union was initially favoured, this plan was short-sightedly abandoned after political manipulation. The negative consequences of this decision not to accept a federation for the Whites, especially the Afrikaners, were enormous. First, the concentration of Afrikaners in particular provinces, like the Orange Free State, could have empowered them. Second, the further division of the provinces in terms of tribes and their particular territories could have led to a variety of racially orientated federal states inside the confederation by awarding equal federal areas to the Afrikaner, the Coloureds, the Zulu, the Venda, etc. This outcome would have prevented the racial friction that resulted from the union. This would also have eliminated the competition with the Blacks for resources since federal states would have guaranteed the equality of the citizens. This competition was a strong driver in the implementation of racial discrimination. The Afrikaner would also have had the opportunity to grow out of their racial fears in a less racially laden environment where the communication and interaction between races would have been less influenced by the doctrines authoritarian racist leaders. The structure of a federation would from have made it difficult for the authoritarian Afrikaner leaders to proclaim their dogmas on race.^{3,6,12,32,33}

In the 1930s there was another opportunity to make a positive turn-around on racial discrimination with full voter's rights and a confederation of tribal states. Again, the selfish interests of nationalist Afrikaner leaders and their political parties to stay in power with a developing but an unstable Afrikaner nationalism, made reconciliation with the Blacks impossible. This was just a repeat of the continuing denial of South African indigenous realities; realities that had to be solved as fast as possible.^{2,3,6}

The arguments in the 1950s that there is enough room in South Africa for all its' people and for the peaceful inclusion of the Blacks in the political system were ignored. The Afrikaners took the road of no return regarding reconciliation with the Blacks. Their last opportunity to understand and get to know the Blacks was

lost. In this vacuum the Blacks unofficially took up the position as master of South African politics, ignoring the Afrikaners.

When the NP and its NP-AB leadership promulgated the laws that made up grand apartheid in the hope that it would assure Afrikaner supremacy through state capture and management of the “Black-problem”, the “doors of reason” of even politically moderate Blacks closed on the Afrikaner. His fate as an obstruction to sound interracial relations and an uninvited and “an unwelcome White colonist” in South Africa was sealed. At present, there are few opportunities in South Africa for the Afrikaner to accept the indigenous realities and to make good with the Blacks. The Blacks regard the Afrikaner as the stranger who they don’t want to know.^{3,6,12,33}

4.5 The Afrikaner’s failure to “read” the future and to accept indigenous realities

4.5.1 The early indigenous realities and visions of JC Smuts and JBM Hertzog

One of the main failures of the Afrikaners was that they could not “read” their future in South Africa correctly. This statement does not refer to the *Siener van Rensburg fantasies* that so commonly beset the minds of some Afrikaners, but rather to hard facts of the South African economical, social, racial and political realities. JC Smuts spelled out the reality of Blacks and Whites and the Afrikaner’s future possession of the (their) South African territory [the Union of South Africa and later the Republic of South Africa (RSA)] as a whole when he said in 1908 on the eve of Convention to found the union, that the Blacks *were here before the Whites*. The implication of this comment is that Whites have illegally occupied their territory. This means that repossession is eminent; a South African reality for Smuts that will still happen in the future, notwithstanding the ideologies of purified Afrikaner leaders like Malan and Verwoerd of an everlasting Afrikaner South Africa.^{3,34,35}

This South African indigenous reality was central in the mindset of Smuts, but definitely not in the mindset of the ordinary nationalist Afrikaners, whose thinking on the Blacks were guided and driven by exclusive Afrikaner realities (or better: unrealities). Their views were steered by ideas such as permanent White supremacy and Black subordination and inferiority developed over centuries. The return of the South Africa territory as a whole to the Blacks in 1994 would be an understandable and an unavoidable fact for the ordinary

nationalist Afrikaner if his thinking about the future was based on a sound understanding of the South African indigenous reality.

The 1994 dispensation was a logical and predictable outcome based on a South African reality. When JBM Hertzog said in the 1920s that the Blacks will one day become “equally civilised” to the White civilisation and that the Blacks would then swamp the Whites in South Africa, he was referring to a reality. This explosion of the Black civilisation to “equality,” suppressed for decades by apartheid (but in real life unknowingly promoted by the Afrikaner with his separate development and the progress of the impoverished Blacks on various terrains), indeed happened in 1994 when the Black civilisation seemingly “overtook” the Afrikaner civilisation. This specific African reality observed by Hertzog, but denied by the ordinary nationalist Afrikaner (and masterly concealed by the NP-AB leaders), not led only to the repossession of all of South Africa by the Blacks, but it also permanently annulled the Afrikaner’s “baasskap” (or in more finessed words: *guardianship* and *trusteeship* as the ordinary nationalist Afrikaners liked to call it) over the Blacks in South Africa. The Afrikaners did not in the 1920s foresee this nullifying of their “baasskap.” They thought they would have indemnity from any Black reaction and revenge in the future.³

Hertzog furthermore warned when this “equality” of the two civilisations manifested, the White civilisation in South Africa would start to disappear. It is exactly what started to happen from 1994 with the Afrikaners, with all the Whites as a unit, in South Africa. However, in 2017 it seems as if this South African reality is still not embedded in the mindset of many ordinary nationalist Afrikaners. There is still the belief that they might regain political power through some manoeuvre and will be restored as the everlasting Afrikaner, standing out in the world’s history.^{3,9,10,36}

Smuts and Hertzog clearly outlined the path (and South African reality) that the Afrikaners should have taken to the future from 1902 up to 1994 to avoid their fixed destination. It also shows that the empire building and false Afrikaner nationalism imprinted in Afrikaners by their nationalist Afrikaner leaders under the umbrella of patriotism to guide Afrikaners into apartheid thinking, failed. The primary aim was to change their doomed route and to keep nationalist Afrikaners lifelong in power. Today such ideas are laughed at as a political joke because it is so unrealistic (In Africa all the European states that tried to do the same thing in their colonies had dolefully failed and left the continent long ago).

The Afrikaner, it seems, will continue on this journey and it will result in the dissolution of the Afrikaner tribe by 2117. This is a South African reality that the ordinary nationalist Afrikaner have not yet figured out.^{3,9,12,37,38}

Smuts³ insight in the future in the early 1900s (although he himself ultimately did nothing constructive to solve the Afrikaners' lack of insight into South Africa's realities) is echoed by his honest view that the Black-White issue will only be solved in the far future when he said at that time that it is an "intolerable burden" that only "the ampler shoulders and the stronger brains" of the future can solve³. The later NP regime lacked this insight and this contributed to their downfall in 1994. The problem has not been solved yet. Blacks have succeeded in liberating themselves from the oppression, but the race problem has now only shifted. Instead of the "Black problem" it is now the "Afrikaner problem".^{2-4,12,20,24,32,39}

The Blacks quickly realized that such a foolish system can not contain them. The 1994 dispensation and the transfer of Afrikaners' political power to the Blacks took place without a single shot being fired; a South African reality which the ordinary nationalist Afrikaner did not consider or think of ever before the 1990s, basically because they thought that it was just impossible that it could ever happen. Even a revolution was seemingly outside their frame of reference.^{9,20,21,38}

Giliomee anxiously warned in 1988 about military counter-actions by the Afrikaners against Blacks in the event of a change of regime^{2, p. 4}: "Should its own political dominance be threatened Afrikanerdom may well unleash a 'scorched earth' policy. It will destroy the modern infrastructure, demolish industry and explode the edifice of civilised rule and orderly government – and take as many Blacks down with it as possible". However, the mighty Afrikaners their systems and institutions simply started after 1994 to collapse. This also proved Zille wrong in her over-estimation of the military and political power and the influences of the right-wing nationalist Afrikaners as an uniform group who would run down Blacks when she warned in the late 1980s^{23, p. 4}: "One thing at least seems clear: the right wing is a serious obstacle in the way of South Africa's transition to a society beyond apartheid. The Right is no paper tiger". Today the Afrikaners are nothing more than a nuisance for the ANC.

4.5.2 The Afrikaners' unwillingness to confront South African indigenous realities

It is open question whether Afrikaners ever developed a true Afrikaner nationalism and whether they ever reached the final stage of a real tribe (especially the Afrikaner segments of Transvaal and the Free State after their psychological ordeal during and after the Second Anglo Boer War). Have they ever overcome the negative impact of the great diversity in the Afrikaners' political thinking, education and culture that existed from 1902 between the various Afrikaner groups? Did the nationalist Afrikaners ever try to see the larger South African reality and to understand themselves within that context? It seems as if the Afrikaners over time also adopted a certain selfish materialism. The Afrikaners became so preoccupied with their own suffering and financial struggles and their later power, that they lost contact with South Africa's realities and with the existence of the other large civilisations inside South Africa besides the limited Afrikaner realities that were based on a false "Afrikaner empire" and "Afrikaner nation."^{2-4,12,20,32,39}

The nationalist Afrikaner leadership ultimately failed to transform the various groups of Afrikaners (and their own unique realities) into a true nation to reach true Afrikaner nationalism, basically because these role players failed to position themselves inside the greater South African reality that in the 1990s set the rules for Black government in 1994. The ordinary nationalist Afrikaner, it seems, became more and more driven by empty public political rhetoric based on exclusive Afrikaner realities, like that of Hertzog in 1911 and other prominent NP leaders such as Malan in the 1930s. All rhetoric was cleansed from South African realities to make sense to the Afrikaners. The Afrikaners never regarded it as important to think about their future within the greater South Africa. They assumed the permanence of Afrikaner rule. This short-sightedness has lasted for so long that even modern Afrikaners struggle to consider their place within South Africa.^{2-4,6,11,32,33}

4.5.3 The indigenous realities of Black numbers and ultimate Black rule

The Afrikaners' failure to think about their future was not just an innocent mistake. Leaders adhered to a policy of deliberately ignoring and concealing facts from the general public. They especially did not communicate the fact that the Black population would ultimately swallow the Afrikaners. In the early 1900s the ratios of Whites to Blacks in South Africa was 1 to 3 and people like Hertzog already warned then that the Blacks would outnumber the Whites and that Whites should address this But the 1913, 1923 and 1936 legislation on the

“Black question” only addressed it superficially, as if it was not a South African reality that had to be addressed immediately and critically. The laws were aimed at ensuring the continuation of White supremacy, nothing more. It never occurred to the Afrikaners that this was not rational or realistic. They did not notice the increase in the Black population and showed immigrants the door because they feared sharing their resources and allowing people in who may not vote for them. They were more concerned with giving White women the right to vote that with increasing the White population or actually solving the underlying problems.^{3,33,39-44}

The Afrikaners were too short-sighted to see that the numbers of the Black population was getting out of control when viewed in relation to White numbers. Indicators of this trend emerged early. In 1804 the Cape Colony’s population was: 25 757 Whites, 29 545 slaves and 20 006 Hottentots. This implied 25 757 Whites against 49 551 non-Whites (ratio: 1 to 2). In Cape Town itself the non-Whites were the majority with 6 273 Whites against 9 129 slaves and 452 Hottentots (6 273 against 9 581 or a ratio of 2: 3). The 1904 statistics reflect 1 116 805 Whites, 3 491 056 Blacks, 445 228 Coloureds and 122 734 Indians (ratio: nearly 1 to 4). The 1911 census showed 1 276 000 Whites against 4 000 000 Blacks, 525 000 Coloureds and 152 000 Indians. In totals this means 1 276 000 Whites against 4 677 000 non-Whites (ratio: nearly 1 to 4). In other words, the ration doubled from 1804 to 1911.^{33,41-44}

The census of 1936 shows a growth in the Afrikaner population compared to the English-speaking Whites (1 121 000: 783 000). Afrikaners were 56% of the total White population, and the ratio Afrikaners versus English-speaking South Africans were as follows: age groups 7 to 21 years, 64.6% versus 35.4%, under 7 years, 68.2% versus 31.8%. This comparison of Afrikaners with White English-speaking South Africans steered attention away from the population statistics of the greater South African society and the Black statistics specifically. When comparing White statistics with Black statistics, the 1936 census reflected 2 000 000 Whites, 6 500 000 Blacks, 750 000 Coloureds and 219 000 Indians [(meaning 2 000 000 Whites against 7 469 000 non-Whites (ratio: nearly 1 to 4)].^{33,41-44}

Although the ratio stayed the same from 1911 to 1936 (25 years), the numbers of the Blacks increased from 4 million in 1911 to 6.5 million in 1936 (growth 2.5 million) and the Whites from 1 276 000 to 2 000 000 (increase of only 724 000). The 1960 statistics show 3 088 492 Whites, 10 928 264 Blacks,

1 509 258 Coloureds and 477 125 Indians (ratio: 1 to 4). Fifty-one years later, in 2011, the numbers were as follows: 4 586 838 Whites, 41 000 938 Blacks, 4 615 401 Coloureds and 1 286 930 Indians (ratio Whites to non-Whites: 1 to 10). From 2011 the Coloureds passed the Whites as the second largest race group. The hopelessness of the Afrikaner's case in terms of numbers in the new South Africa is evident from the 2015 statistics of the Afrikaner and Whites in the new South Africa. In 2015 the Whites were estimated to be 4 534 000 against 44 228 000 Blacks, 4 832 000 Coloureds and 1 362 000 Indians. The ratio of Whites to non-Whites is more or less 1 to 11.^{33,41-44}

The final nail in the coffin for those nationalist Afrikaners who still cling to their empire is their fast decrease in numbers. The White population (which includes the Afrikaners) has become an old population, lacking young people to assure growth. Where in 2016 the ratio for Black persons under 16 years to persons over 60 years was 100:20, this ratio for Whites was 100:130. This imbalance will increase over the next five years as more young Whites are leaving South Africa permanently and the high concentration of the elderly is growing. Statistics indicate that the Afrikaners may decrease to between 1% and 3% of the total population in 30 to 40 years from now, leaving a remnant of less than 1 million Afrikaners against an estimated 70 million Blacks in South Africa. As a very small minority group, their influence and empowerment will be zero. The Afrikaners are primarily responsible for this situation themselves because of the decrease in birth rate as well as the high rate of emmigration of younger Afrikaners.⁴⁴⁻⁴⁸

The estimated growth of the South African Black population for the period up to 2110 is lower than the rest for Africa but it is still estimated that the growth may be between two to five times the 2015 numbers. This would mean that the total Blacks population for 2110 may be 100 million. The Whites have shown a constant decline in numbers for many years, which can make them an absolutely insignificant group in 2110 in South Africa with a possible ratio of 1 to 30 or more to the Blacks.^{33,40-43, 48}

4.6 Cultural assimilation versus biological assimilation

The Afrikaners were indeed in denial during in the early 1900s about the reality that the Blacks were waiting in silence to gobble them up from 2011. In this regard they also failed to hear the sound warning of historians, anthropologists and socialists to be realistic, that when two opposite peoples meet in the same living area, the weaker one is always over-powered by the stronger one. The

weaker group with either have no influence on the new society, or will be absorbed by the stronger culture to such an extent that the weaker culture has no effect on the stronger one's culture. The other option is that a new society develops after a process of adaptation and intermingling between the various elements of the initial groups. The groups ultimately disappear in a new social unity. The process of integration activates one or more of these outcomes, mostly very slowly and insignificantly, but comprehensively in the end.^{33,39}

For South Africa, with its complex multiracial society and Blacks increasing in numbers from the early 1900s, the long-term intent and reality of this process has only one way to go, as Prof RFA Hoernlé predicted³⁹, p. 9: “*firstly cultural assimilation, followed by economical assimilation, social assimilation coupled to political assimilation, ending in biological assimilation*”. Stress and conflict are part of this transformation, especially in the stages of socio-political and biological assimilation. These are stresses and conflicts that the Afrikaners have already been experienced since the 1990s.

The view of Hoernlé³⁹ was echoed by the Tomlinson commission in 1955³⁹, showing that there was only one of two choices left for the Afrikaner in his South African reality: *integration* or *segregation* (This finding was much in line with the 1908 Convention to prepare for the Constitution of the union). At that time the Tomlinson outcome already clearly indicated that *integration* was the best option for the country's people in the long term (as the 1908 Convention also indicated). However, the nationalist Afrikaner never regarded integration and assimilation as an option. They wanted a European solution. This ultimately led to the demise of the NP in 1994. The NP and AB's top management under the racist leaderships of Malan, Strydom and Verwoerd, ignored the sound Tomlinson advice³⁹ that the Afrikaners should adapt to the South African requirement of a gradual integration to survive in the long term as citizens in South Africa. Instead these leaders continued to believe (or at least reflected it as such to their followers) that their “Afrikaner solution” would bring the necessary solution to the “Black problem.” They successfully concealed the inevitable outcome from their followers with manipulation and political misinformation. Any indications of Afrikaner's future being endangered as reflected by the Tomlinson outcomes and the Hoernlé guidelines were deposed in public speeches by the nationalist Afrikaners leaders and in NP guidelines as unimportant senselessness. The point of departure was the belief of the NP and AB leaders that the Blacks' assumed economical, racial and cultural inferiorities, and their alleged African supernatural religion and pre-modern

levels of civilisation, are insignificant drivers to make them permanent and dominant role players in the Afrikaner's South African political and social life. Basically the nationalist Afrikaner in 1908 saw the Blacks as non-entities in an Afrikaner/White society: a *persona non-human*.³⁹

The results of American and Australian studies that warned about the possible effect of upcoming majorities on the futures of minorities were disregarded as inapplicable in South Africa. The nationalist Afrikaner leadership felt that although the Blacks are the majority in South Africa, their lower cultural level neutralized their power through numbers and that the Blacks were not a reality that could ever disturb the Afrikaner equilibrium. The Afrikaners refused to see the gradual Black empowerment from the 1950s onwards.³⁹

In 1955 the South African greater society was, in terms of the Hoernlé model, already reaching the stage of *social assimilation*. The 1980s brought the second-last stage, namely *political assimilation* and the equalization of the Black and White civilisations.^{6,12,39} The 1994 dispensation confirmed this reality. On the other hand, the 1994 outcome have not yet alerted the individual Afrikaner to South Africa's realities; specifically, the reality that Afrikaners are at present entering the final stage in the South African political equalization, namely *biological assimilation* into the Black population and therefore dissolution.

The Afrikaner cannot escape this process of dissolution and the harsh South African realities that the year 2017 has brought. However, Afrikaners seem to be oblivious to this South African reality.

4.7 Nationalist Afrikaner leaders' deceit on Black indigenous realities

The nationalist Afrikaner leaders knew in the 1930s that there would ultimately be black rule in South Africa. The convention in 1908 to form the union showed that the Black problem was already South Africa's *biggest problem* and needed urgent attention.³ In the 1910s and the 1930s there were only two choices with regard to the "Black question":

- 1) to prolong White supremacy and the short-lived comfort of the Afrikaners for as long as possible before it is followed by the total and fast collapse of the Afrikaner empire and its possible dissolution; *or*
- 2) an immediate incorporation of the Blacks in the socio-politics of the country, together with a gradual transfer political rights, leading to an

early curtailing of the Afrikaner's life of comfort, but the possibly of socio-political survival and the avoidance of dissolution.

Apartheid was not an accidental phenomenon, it was artificially created to protect the interest of the Afrikaner, despite the fact that Black rule was a given from the start. The Afrikaner nationalist leaders DF Malan and HF Verwoerd at times acknowledged "Black danger" as a chronic problem, but they did nothing (besides using it as a lever to gain votes). JC Smuts and JBM Hertzog did not do anything positive and failed the test of immediate constructive and pro-active actions to remedy discrimination and racism in terms of human rights and the Christianity that they as Afrikaners and nationalist Afrikaners publically prided themselves in. This failure to react was basically a fear of the consequences at the ballot box (which happened to Smuts in 1948). Short-sightedness, opportunism and selfishness were sometimes stronger motivators in the political thinking of many of the prominent Afrikaner leaders than wise reasoning and decisions.^{2,3,9,11,20}

Afrikaners failed to be productive and industrious and in their search for financial empowerment, they allowed the economical considerations to outweigh their socio-cultural and political independence and self-rule. Hoernlé and Tomlinson show this South African reality, which completely escaped the Afrikaners. The Afrikaner ultimately surrendered their territory in 1994. This breakdown of power, activated by Black economics, already started in 1658 with the introduction of slavery at the Cape by the proto-Afrikaners, followed gradually by the entrance of the Black labour into White territories to suit the Whites. Indicators in 1913, 1923 and 1936 regarding Black landownership and citizen rights, as well as the 1955 Tomlinson Commission's findings that the "Black question" is an unavoidable disaster awaiting the Afrikaner in the future, were blindly and bluntly ignored. This was basically a direct outcome of the nationalist Afrikaners' refusal to acknowledge the *South African reality of Black rule for South Africa* from as far back as the Great Trek, the Union of South Africa and the establishment of the republic.^{2,33,39,49} The Arabian proverb: "arrogance diminishes wisdom", declares this failure the best.

4.8 The unavoidable realities of 2017

4.8.1 "Forever happy South Africa"

The Afrikaner should consider a few realities. They should be aware of their deteriorating political, social, personal and economical position, the daily build-up of political rhetoric and hostility from the side of Black politicians and

leaders against the Afrikaners and the slow collapse of the country since 1994. They should not forget about the tragic experiences of the Jews from 1938 to 1948 in an assumed “Happy Greater Europe,” leaving nearly 60% of their total population dead. There are correlations in the European and South African realities that the Afrikaner can not and must not ignore when considering a “Forever happy South Africa” that many opportunists’ belief awaits.⁸

The South African period of Black-on-Black genocide from 1810 to 1840 during which more than 1 million Blacks were murdered and 28 Black tribes annulled and the Afrikaners’ own experience of genocide by the British from 1899 to 1902 in Transvaal and the Free State, must serve as a warning that they can find themselves inside such a renewed genocide or even be the focus. Africa has a tragic track record for genocide. Excellent examples are the present murderous outcomes in Sudan, Mali, Libya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Algeria, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Basically is there not a single African state has not experienced some form of internal conflict based on ethnicity or race in the past, since 1960 or at present. Afrikaners should be reminded of the murdering of Whites in the old Belgium Congo in July 1960 after its independence. There is also the inhumane treatment and murder of White farmers and Blacks from the same ethnic groups as the murderers the last decade or two in neighbouring Zimbabwe under the regime of Robert Mugabe.^{20,31,33,50-56}

It is important to remember that many African countries tend to default on good government. The outstanding academic, Prof Francis Wilson, describes this African reality on governmental failure well. According to him it is mostly due to poor leadership and management that are chronic characteristics of the new South Africa. He writes⁵⁷, p. 14: “If we look at the 12 most southern countries of Africa and as where each was in 1960 and where each hoped to be 50 years later, we find that many which were hopeful have failed dismally, while two that had the worst prospects, Botswana and Mauritius, have done remarkably well. This is due to several factors but common to all countries is one fact: the quality of leadership. It is this which will determine where we will be 50 years from now”. The constant failure of the ANC regime and its leaders with regard to good and clean governing since 1994 is a strict warning that the next 20 to 50 years can be much worse than the past 20 years for South Africa, and thus also for the Afrikaners. This outcome is a South African reality that must penetrate the narrow-minded mindset of the Afrikaner in their efforts to avoid dissolution in an African setup.^{20,57}

It is also important to remember that history repeats itself. The worst time to live under a regime is when it is starting to crumble, especially when this process takes place slowly. In 2017 the ANC, based on his governing from 1994, seems to be such a regime in making. This makes even their planned or forced assimilation of the Afrikaners into the Black society more impossible by the day. It seems as if new South Africa has reached the point of make or break already. Again, it seems as if most Afrikaners have still not detected this South African reality of chaos.⁵⁸⁻⁶²

In reference to above, a successful terrorist organization that changes to a democratic political party and ends up as the people's government of a country is seldom successful in governance. Extremists, especially with racial, religious, or Marxist inclinations in their politics, belief system, lifestyles and view of human rights, have proven this fact over and over. Stalin's mass murder in Russia and the Assad family's cold-blooded regime in Syria are of the world's best examples. Also the military interference and intervening by the US in political so called "unstable" countries like Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria and their murdering of hundred thousands of innocent Islamic believers in these countries under the false cover of American/Western democracy, can also awaits Afrikaners in South Africa when the ANC-regime collapse under political unrest and anarchy. Remember: the ANC was an organization of terrorists (now called "freedom fighters") who now have to be the honourable citizens in the new South Africa, a virtue to which they not always fulfilled too. Especially the arriving recently of the "Zumpta-era" spells possible disaster.^{8.63-66}

Staying on too long in South Africa, especially when the number of the Afrikaner population has decreased below 1 million, can be risky. The opportunities to leave will then also be far less and just too expensive for an impoverished Afrikaner, especially the older generation. Afrikaners have to do constructive and strategic thinking and planning based on the South African realities to safeguard them for survival and for the early detection of genocidal thinking directed at them. Many European nations in the 1940s saw the Jews as a "Jews question," a problem that is unsolvable even by full assimilation or miscegenation. It could in their view only be solved by the complete dissolution of the Jews as a nation. The Greek, Armenian and Ukrainian "problems" in the 1940s were also addressed with the same savageness.^{8.63}

These tragic Armenian, Greek, Jewish and Ukrainian fates can suddenly await the Afrikaner as the last White tribe of "colonists" in Africa. It is time for the

Afrikaner to learn to understand and to master the reality of Blacks, South Africa and Africa and to make place with it. This will better his chances to survive in South Africa.^{8,63}

4.8.2 The Afrikaners' everlasting curse

The “Afrikaners’ curse”, as cemented into their existence by the Herodotus curse⁶⁷ also constantly hangs over the Afrikaner’s head. Not assimilation or miscegenation worked in biblical times or in modern times to prevent revenge and genocide. Genocide is complicated, unpredictable and unexpected. It starts suddenly and is focused. Even if they live in total isolation in various Orania enclaves, the Afrikaner will not be free from genocide. The Afrikaner must note this. To say^{68, p. par. 20/61}: “Apartheid is gone and Afrikaners are, in the world’s eyes, no longer the bad guys and we must not get stuck in that area. We cannot live with a guilt complex or as hostages of the past...” as propagated by a sector of Afrikaners, is naive and inappropriate. It is a misguided idea that reflects a lack of understanding of the present reality.

Above reflection is a selective disremembering about one’s own past of political wrongdoings and of a country’s inherent political- and racial-instability that were already present before the start-up of the Cape Settlement in 1652. Most of all, it is an evidence of a lack of political knowledge of the Herodotus Rules on injustices, prejudices, hate and revenges, and thus an inability to understand the processes around genocide by over-eager (and sometimes false) propagandists of the “Sacred Afrikaner Race” who still belief the Afrikaners have a calling to spread Christianity and civilisation as well as to preserve the nationhood God ordained for them. Again this reflects the Afrikaners inability to read and to understand the realities of South Africa.^{23,67,69,70}

4.8.3 The White problem

After 1994, the “Black problem”, “Coloured problem” and “Indian problem” disappeared. The Whites, including the Afrikaners, have become the “White problem” in the eyes of the ANC regime (this surely reminds the Afrikaner of the “Jewish problem” of the 1930s and their own wrongdoing in those events). The “Afrikaner problem” is presently addressed by means of the ANC’s well-managed policy of anti-White rhetoric and actions embedded in and guided by various pieces of legislation, like AA, EE, and BEE.

In order to survive these growing anti-White actions, the Afrikaners have to take a critical look at the various South African realities like their own radical

economical transformation and state capture in the distant past. They have to make peace with certain events that do not always favour the Afrikaners. Many Afrikaners are still unaware that they are the main “problem” at the moment, a problem that occupies the minds of many Blacks. Contrary to the nationalist Afrikaners who had constantly and deliberately ignored the Black problem, the Blacks are clearly not ignoring the White problem. It seems as if they are going to address it properly, possibly not always positively.^{15,60,62}

However, to think that the Afrikaners history is replete with their racial discrimination against Blacks is wrong: there is also a significant tradition of non-racialism towards Blacks in the leadership of various South African organizations that opposed apartheid. To argue that a specific skin colour determines specific political thinking and that only an oppressive White minority or only an oppressive Black majority can govern the country means that a non-racial democracy is impossible. Such thinking dooms the Afrikaners. However, the fact that some (although a small number) Afrikaners could successfully bridge the racial gap in supporting Blacks against the majority of nationalist Afrikaners, means that other Afrikaners can also do it in the future. This would not only make a non-racial democracy possible, but also cleanse the history from the self-fulfilling hypothesis of apartheid as an exclusive Afrikaner racial intention and disposition. The basis here is that these dissident Afrikaners *acted as individuals* and were received into the Black community and politics as *individuals*. For those the Afrikaners dislodging from their authoritarian group and leaders and becoming individuals who think for themselves, this cross-over seems to be natural, neutralizing the elements of race and class in New South Africa. This can change the “Afrikaner problem” in the mindsets of Blacks from negative to positive. It can be the beginning of a “new Afrikaner” inside a “new nationalist South African movement” who has drawn a line between himself and the traditional Afrikaner of the apartheid era.^{7,10,31}

Berger and Godsell are perhaps not over-optimistic when they write about a future South Africa in which the Afrikaners are also role players^{7, p. 298}: “Neither paradise nor Armageddon awaits South Africa. Instead, a slow and often painful march towards modernity is on the agenda. A non-racial democracy and prosperous society is possible. South Africans simply have to make it happen”. The “new Afrikaners” can be part of these South Africans.

4.8.4 Was colonialism and Afrikanerism a godsend?

British colonialism served the Blacks and the Afrikaners well, notwithstanding negative emotional rhetoric on the matter. Goodness in a stormy political setup is seldom rewarded by thanks from the sufferer. Good intentions and help are seldom acknowledged by the receivers. Political ambitions and aggression close the wronged mind to remember events that can influence it to do good, but instead focuses on evil done to mankind. Colonialism undoubtedly brought much suffering to the indigenous people of South Africa, but it also benefited the country's people. British colonialism brought with it early stage school education, healthcare and infrastructure like roads, dams, political networks, buildings, administrations, as well as exposure to new knowledge and expertise, open doors to new worlds and cultures. British missions played a strong leading role, especially in political support of Black activists and the creation of a strong leadership to challenge the Afrikaner's racial politics and discrimination. Without the early colonial support, Blacks would have never reached the 1994 political transfer. Helen Zille was correct about the benefits of colonialism to all South Africans, Blacks and Whites, including herself. All political systems have pros and cons; to retract a system's inputs after a century or more is basically impossible. To see only the utmost negative and the wrong, as opportunistic anti-colonial activists and Black politicians do with British colonialism at present, is evidence of the political immaturity and purblind that characterize the behaviour of many inside the ANC.^{16,49,71-74}

Afrikanernism also served the Blacks of South Africa. It put them on the road to self-development, the regaining of their previous identity and self-respect. It offered schools and tertiary education, leadership development, while it drained the central government's coffers to sustain corrupt homelands and wronged the ordinary Afrikaners financially to benefit Blacks. It offered the incoming ANC a sound and comprehensive infrastructure on schools, healthcare, etc., to build on when they took over in 1994.^{23,73,74}

Looking back to 1994 and the impact of the ANC regime on South African up to 2017, it is a massive failure: basically all the previously well-established systems are in pieces. In retrospective, it seems as if colonialism and Afrikanerism were godsend to many Blacks in the early times, helping them to reach heights that they failed to reach in the past or even today after 1994.

The Afrikaners can be criticized for failing to understand, accept and appropriate South African realities. However, their egocentric thinking on what was good

for Blacks and the implementation of these things in the lives of Blacks during apartheid brought enormously benefits for many Blacks. Many of these successes of Afrikanerism seem to be of a more lasting quality than many of the ANC regime's post-1994 liberated actions, even that of British colonialism.

Black activists seem to forget that they are themselves in a colonial political and financial structure as old as the British occupation of the Cape of 1795. The majority of Blacks are allowing the country to be governed present-day by a self-serving minority in the name of the masses.⁷⁶

4.9 Conclusion

To say that the present-day Afrikaners are in the worst crisis in their history is a falsity. The devastating Second Anglo Boer War brought a belief of totally loss in the 1910s to the majority Northern Afrikaners. They doubted the continuation of the Afrikaners as a specific indigenous cultural group in South Africa. This crisis was of such intensity that JC Smuts called it the darkest time in the old Boer republics history ever.^{2,3} The 1980s political turmoil in South Africa and the in-fighting between the left- and right-wing Afrikaner factions about the political road further, was viewed as something that can destroy Afrikanerdom.^{11,23} The journalist and writer, later politician, Helen Zille, writes about this^{23, p. 63}: “Afrikaners (and South African whites in general) are facing the greatest moment of crisis in their history”.

It is now more than a century after the Second Anglo Boer War and nearly 40 years after the 1980s Afrikaner right wing's despair and the Afrikaners are still here, riding out crisis after crisis since 1994. To say that the Afrikaners are before their *biggest challenge*, that is perhaps correct and true. What is now of importance is what the Afrikaners are going to do *with* and make *of* this challenge in the immediate future.^{2,3,23}

The toxic impurities of selfish thinking and opportunism that can penetrate the minds of the White man and which in the end can destroy him – the evil political toxin that the economist John Maynard Keynes^{8, p.5} had so dearly warned the White man against more than a century ago – also infested the ordinary nationalist Afrikaner's mind. This makes his political rehabilitation and establishment as a future role player in new South Africa, notwithstanding his indigenouness, very difficult. But most importantly, clinging to and believing in outdated Afrikaner realities and lacking political growth and maturity cripple the Afrikaner, just like Ferguson's White man of 1901 in Europe.⁸ It was

therefore logical that the Afrikaner would fail as a ruler and in the act of becoming a well-respected member of the greater South African indigenous society.^{2-4,6,8,11,12,33}

The Afrikaners' insufficient knowledge of South Africa's indigenous realities left him without any armour to address the demands and requirements of South Africa if they want to stay on here. It is thus time for the Afrikaner to confront these many demands and realities, but to do that an honest and comprehensive self-valuation of his cognitive, cultural, economical, political and racial context is first urgently needed. This means in practice a re-evaluation of Afrikanerism's frame of reference, thinking and functioning. A total departure from Afrikanerism is preferable. It is only in this way that they can hope to obtain a place in the new and future South Africa.^{2,4,20,21,32}

The efforts by various nationalist Afrikaner leaders since the 1880s to secure solidarity and security for the proto-Afrikaners and Afrikaners as² p. 12: "indigenous people occupying a common territory, having a common language, vigorous culture and proud history, identified by a common name and sharing consciousness of kind," supported by their propaganda that the Afrikaners can realize their full human potential only "through identification with and service of the *volk*" and not through "individual self-assertion," failed miserably when this unrealistic dogma of Afrikanerism meets the hard political realities of the 21st century. However heart-breaking it is, the Afrikaner group's identity is fast being gobbled up by the stronger Black group's identity. At this stage it seems only to be the Afrikaner's individual self-assertion that can hold him up in new South Africa.^{2,17}

Thankfully individual Afrikaners have come long away from the lack of insight of leaders on South African realities. One example is HF Verwoerd's comment in 1960 in the Cape Parliament⁷⁸ p. 11: "Ons het 'n land beset wat kaal is...Ons beskou onself as deel van die Westerse wêreld...Ons is die skakel. Ons is Wit maar ons is in Afrika." [*We occupy a land that is bare...We regard ourselves as part of the Western world...We are the link. We are White but we are in Africa*].

It can be catastrophic for the Afrikaners if they allow themselves to be led by such foolish leaders again. There is no "Forever happy South Africa" awaiting the Afrikaners. For this privilege they have to become true "South Africans" and "Africans," but thankfully Afrikaners are "not Whites from somewhere outside Africa," as HF Verwoerd erroneously asserted. To the contrary: Afrikaners are

indigenous South Africans and Africans from the late 1600s, if not earlier. Historically, the Afrikaners became *indigenous* when their European umbilical cord was cut in 1707 as the rebellious Hendrik Biebouw or Bibault shouted^{79, p. 75}: “Ik ben een Afrikaander!” during his conflict with the Dutch East Indian Company at the Cape (He seems to be of mixed descent, a so-called “bastard” -- but was the Afrikaner not then already a “bastard?”).

The poet, artist and writer Breyten Breytenbach writes^{79, p. 75}: “Bibault’s defiant cry (I am an Afrikaner!) of secession from Dutch law and company sovereignty must have been a leap towards defining another identity. He says: I am beyond your possession. But he also says: You cannot tax me or govern over me since I’m no longer a Dutchman or a Frenchman; I’m of *this* continent”. But still, notwithstanding their established South African indigenosity, to be accepted as true South Africans and Africans in the new South Africa, Afrikaners have to de-Afrikanerise and have to make an effort to adopt a non-Afrikanerism.^{2-4,11,24,69,70,79}

The settlement of the Afrikaner’s ancestors in 1652 at the Cape of Good Hope was geographically located on a massive African racial faultline. It is a giant demographic sinkhole that, when it opens unexpected more than 350 years later, hungrily started swallowing into its dark depths the psycho-political unprepared and bewildered Afrikaners of South Africa as one of the last two indigenous Whites tribes of Africa (with the Tuaregs being the other “White African” tribe). But this unpreparedness and bewilderment are the Afrikaners own fault. It was caused primarily by their unwillingness to understand, accept and appropriate the indigenous realities of South Africa into their Afrikanerism.^{1-3,20,21,79}

It remains to be seen if the Afrikaner can take on the challenge and make the leap from a “bewildered Afrikaner” to a “very happy African.” To succeed, the Afrikaner has to take to heart the words of the human rights activist and academic, Mamphela Ramphele, when she says^{80, p. 20}: “Embracing shared values would enable us to reconnect as fellow citizens and build trust and productivity as economic actors”.

4.10 References

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CHAPTER 5

THE VICIOUS CYCLE OF REVENGE AND COUNTER-REVENGE AROUND APARTHEID

5.1 Introduction

Apartheid, a political system created exclusively to benefit the Whites, was statutorily erased in 1994 and the political tide turned on the Afrikaners in general. A specific negative outcome is the continuing cry, since 1994, by some Black victims and Black politicians for various forms of revenge and compensation from Afrikaners. The focus is on Afrikaners in general for their participation in and benefits from apartheid and on a certain group of Afrikaners specifically for committing apartheid crimes.¹⁻⁷

Why is there this negative preoccupation with the past?

The cycle of reaction and counter-reaction involving the Afrikaners and the Blacks and the continuous White-on-Black discrimination followed by Black-on-White discrimination, is a phenomenon not often addressed or referred to by researchers or the present-day Black regime. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) missed out on the opportunity to address it thoroughly because of its one sided and subjective aim to cleanse only Afrikaners from their apartheid's sins. The complexity of South African politics and the structures of racism, discrimination, colonialism and Black empowerment asks for more than the emotional catharses of forgiveness for political and personal deviant behaviour by individuals and groups that characterized the TRC-proceedings. The end result of the TRC left many Black persons with personal, emotional, psychological and financial difficulties rooted in apartheid, unsatisfied and aggrieved. The same goes for those Afrikaners outside the main stream of nationalist Afrikaners who were affected by the NP-AB-DRC alliance's policies and discriminative actions.⁴⁻⁷

The deadly cycle of injustices, prejudices, hate and revenge that is a reality in every society and practised every day by all individuals and groups in some way, was not addressed by the TRC. The TRC did not address the devastating impact that this vicious cycle can have on people's lives and their participation in society and did not acknowledge that this cycle is extremely difficult to break.^{1, 5-8}

There are various examples of behaviours by Afrikaners towards Blacks during apartheid that are regarded as atrocities that justify revenge and retribution by the Blacks against Afrikaners. There is a constant repetition of this information and reinforcement of the history by anti-Afrikaners in an effort to maintain revenge in the minds of certain elements in the Black population. In the last four years, there seems to be a renewed emphasis on apartheid wrongdoings and the role of Afrikaners in it from the side of the ANC top management. Jacob Zuma uses this rhetoric at public political meetings in his effort to survive his beleaguered leadership and to mobilise the masses of lower, poorer ANC supporters so that he would be able to outlive the effort to oust him. At times incorrect historical facts about the Afrikaners and apartheid are offered up as the truth. This creates a certain sentiment among the Blacks and it has obtained momentum of its own with time, specifically when it is supported and propagated by prominent leaders inside the ANC. Myths and lies have become facts and truths without any data to substantiate it, especially when emotional and political rhetoric become intertwined and started to overshadow logical reasoning.⁹⁻¹⁷

A whole range of generalizations form part of these allegations, for instance the allegation that Afrikaner men frequently sexually exploited Black women, the exaggerated accounts of Whites stealing land from Blacks and that there was a silent “genocide” of the South African Blacks by the Afrikaners. These kinds of allegations not only reflect a lack of knowledge of the country’s history, especially with regard to genocide, but also contribute to racial conflict and intensify the distance between Black and White.^{18,19}

The tendency at the moment is that whatever political problems the ANC have failed to solve since 1994, even if they are not related to apartheid, are projected on Afrikaners and ‘the legacy of apartheid’ to draw the attention away from the incompetence of the current government. Blacks are constantly reminded of the dangers of White empowerment. The intention of the ANC strategists is clearly to keep the Afrikaner and apartheid a communal enemy for as long as possible to assure Black unity between the many Black tribes. The main reason for mass poverty of the Blacks, a problem that has only been growing since 1994 as a result of poor ANC government, is simply linked to apartheid and the Afrikaners’ financial exploitation of Blacks. The current buzz over White monopoly capital that must be transferred back to Blacks is a good example. These ideas on the reasons for poverty have been firmly established among rural

ANC supporters. As an impoverished and uneducated group, they are often not able to see the complexity of the truth. It has also found fertile ground among middle and higher classes when coupled with focused anti-Afrikaner rhetoric. The “White danger” and “White problem” associated with apartheid is kept alive to inspire revenge and retribution thinking.^{11,12,14-17, 20}

Cries for revenge for the injustices surrounding apartheid are still prominent among some Blacks, even after 23 years of the independence from statutory apartheid. Many Blacks still mourn loved ones who were mistreated or killed by the apartheid managers and their accomplices. Many struggle to escape the impoverishment they suffered at the hand of White regimes, especially by the nationalist Afrikaners after 1948. These negative feelings, emotions and thinking are not limited to the poor, lower socio-economic Black classes who form the majority of Blacks, but is also reflected more and more in present-day by the Black upper classes as well. Most feel that there has not been real legal, civil and financial transformation and correction after 1994 to rectify wrongdoings of Whites on Blacks during apartheid. This negative and unbounded psychological energy manifests in various problematic and conflict behaviours in today’s South Africa.^{4,5,20-22}

Dr Albertina Luthuli (daughter of the late Chief Albert Luthuli) says that the present flood of racial polarizations could be expected, because she believes the past cannot just be forgotten to suit the needs of the Whites who want to survive in South Africa. The TRC failed in its attempt to bring the past to the present.⁷ For many Black persons who had been wronged by the apartheid system, there seems to be no future in South Africa if the past is not first addressed.^{4,5,7} These persons still seem to think about rectification of the past as a process of revolution, a forced and physical correction of the past. They are caught in the Castro thinking of the 1960s²³, p. 12: “...a revolution is a struggle between the future and the past...” They want to exorcise the past in a way that will constitute full-blown revenge for apartheid instead of reconciliation.

The aim of this chapter is to research the vicious circle of revenge and counter-revenge around apartheid.²⁴⁻²⁶

5.2 The desire for revenge after 23 years of freedom

After 1994 South African needed a true process of cleansing to rid it from the negative remnants of apartheid. Such a process does not only entail the shaking of hands, the washing of feet, the crying on shoulders or tearful public

confessions, but constructive action in the form of criminal prosecutions of apartheid leaders, their immediate accomplices and where applicable, also of some of the nationalist Afrikaner supporters of the National Party (NP), the Afrikaner Broederbond (AB) and the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC). Bringing only persons like Eugene de Kock to book and making him the chief culprit or to pin political murders on the members of the Civil Cooperation Bureau, was a brilliant move by nationalist Afrikaners of the NP-AB-alliance to save their own skins by sidestepping true penance. However, this did not fool the Black masses. It only contaminated an already explosive racial situation and started to spill over to the racial relations of new South Africa. Many of the present Black discriminations and fixation on apartheid and Afrikaners are rooted in on the idea of apartheid as extended colonization and not as Afrikanerism, something unique to the nationalist Afrikaners.^{6,7,27-29}

The nationalist Afrikaner leadership of the NP-AB-DRC alliance just continued with their lives after 1994, undisturbed, padded by excellent apartheid pensions and other apartheid benefits, citizen rights and comfortable livings, and even in some cases new honours. The Blacks who they directly and in-directly harmed financially and psychologically, are still struggling. In addition to failing to embark on comprehensive criminal prosecutions to send the apartheid culprits to jail, there were also no efforts by the state to repossess the properties and assets of these culprits to compensate those they have injured emotionally or financially.^{4,6,7, 28, 29}

Current South African literature, especially newspaper reports, clearly shows that many Blacks are still waiting for justice. They are bemoaning the incompleteness of the transition that led to the 1994 dispensation and the Constitution of 1996. Some individual Blacks and people within the ANC have embarked on forms of revenge and equalization, sometimes openly and sometimes hidden. Direct discrimination and hostility like the high number of farm murders and other murders on Whites, work discrimination in the form of BEE, etc., are just a few examples of revenge. The current rhetoric of some Black politicians seems to indicate that there is much more in store for the Afrikaners in the immediate future, like the grabbing of White property, land and assets, a more radical BEE and a decrease in governmental protection of the lives of Whites in a politically criminalized South Africa.^{15,30-32}

These cries about the injustices of apartheid and the lack compensation, together with the failure of the post-1994 ANC regime to act legally and properly against

the many White culprits, is described succinctly by one affected Black person when she writes^{6, p. 5}: “As jy bereid is om in dieselfde ruimte as Niel Barnard, F W de Klerk, Pik Botha en hul soort te wees, te praat en te drink, voeg Eugene de Kock ook by jou lysie. Hy was hul voetsoldaat. Hy het die spreek-woordelike pak vir hul gevat. Apartheid was ‘prime evil’; De Kock bloot sy lojale dienaar. Jy kan nie moreel verontwaardig oor De Kock voel en nie ook oor De Klerk of die verwoesting wat apartheid vir swart Suid-Afrikaners meegebring het nie.” [*If you’re willing to be in the same room as Niel Barnard, F W de Klerk, Pik Botha and their kind, to talk, to drink, add Eugene de Kock to your list. He was their foot soldier. He took the proverbial spanking for them. Apartheid was ‘prime evil’; De Kock just his loyal servant. You can not feel morally indignant to De Kock and not also about De Klerk or the devastation that apartheid has brought to black South Africans*].

She pinpoints very clear the immediate steps that have to be taken on these culprits when she concludes^{6, p. 5}: “Ek vra weer: Wie was dit wat Suid-Afrika regtig opgedonder het? ’n Wrede polisieman, of diegene wat die opdragte gegee het?” [*I ask again: Who was it really who hell-up South Africa? A cruel policeman or those who gave the instructions?*].

This urgent need to correct the failures of the TRC and to act against the free-walking apartheid culprits, is also reflected by Pearl Boshomane when she says^{5, p.18}: “Good for Adriaan Vlok for publicity trying to cleanse himself of the shame of his actions – but you know what would be even better? If criminals were to rot in jail for their atrocities [that] would be a great start towards reconciliation. I’m sure many victims of apartheid would prefer that instead of tears and a hug.”

However, as said, criminal proceedings are not enough for many of the apartheid victims. Many of these victims want financial compensation from those who were directly involved in criminal actions, while others wish for compensation from the Afrikaner community and business sector as a whole as they have benefitted from favoured business deals, the many other interests and the jobs etc. that apartheid offered them. Prominent are certain Afrikaner and nationalist Afrikaner business leaders and magnates who benefitted greatly from the apartheid system. They were favoured for business deals, contracts and other benefits. The current battle regarding Radical Economical Transformation (RET), seen by many Blacks as the second leg (economical revolution) in continuation of the first leg of the 1994 dispensation (political revolution), are

excellent indicators of the Black call for “pay-back” of White capital obtained from apartheid-incongruities.^{4,7,9,33,34}

For the critical and observing outsider, the 1994 political dispensation only represents the incorporation of 20 000 elite NP-AB members and 20 000 elite Blacks from various exclusive Black political institutions and organizations like the ANC, the POQO, the MK, etc., into a new, unofficial political and business union. It had one central aim: to enrich the new Black members and to help its White members keep their riches. That state capture by the post-1994 ANC already started as far back as 1994 and is evidenced by the many new Black millionaires in the top structures of the ANC and the ANC family. In the meantime, the political elite of nationalist Afrikaners continued their lifestyles while the majority Blacks and many innocent Whites outside the NP-AB alliance were left in the cold with growing poverty and an uncertain future. It is shocking how many Blacks have stayed very poor since 1994. While Zuma’s state capture and notion of RET is borne of vice, it helps to reinforce and strengthened feelings of injustice, hate and revenge for apartheid among a great contingent of the poor Blacks. Sly politicians make use of these sentiments to gain power. Ever since 1652, governance in South Africa has been afflicted by a devouring monster of action and reaction, and it seems as if this cycle will destroy future regimes, be they good or bad regimes.^{4,28,35,36}

The political and human rights activist and academic, Mamphela Ramphele^{28, p-20}, in evaluation of the failure of the South African state model since 1652, describes this unfortunate outcome after 1994, manipulated and steered by the dominant nationalist Afrikaner elite and supported by the ANC elite excellently:

Their brief was to protect the foundations of the capital accumulation and obstruct any redistributive policy framework designed to address the extreme poverty and inequality affecting the majority of people.

Key business people worked patiently to shift the mindsets of the then less-experienced ANC leaders to get them to adopt market-friendly liberal economic policy frameworks.

Non-Afrikaner business organizations and corporations also played key roles in ensuring the protection of an economic system dominated by White-led corporations.

The Reconstruction and Development Programme – favoured by trade unions and progressive social society groups to redress socioeconomic inequities – were marginalized.

The demise of the RDP in early years of the ANC government ensured that White economic power, capital and privileges were left intact.

The elite compromise underpinning our 1994 political settlement pressured the ANC, in the interest of political power, to sacrifice redistribution and concomitant socioeconomic upliftment of the majority of citizens, while the NP exchanged political power for continuing White economic power.

The cruel irony remains that the very people who rose from modest economic status only a generation or two earlier to become business moguls would devote so much energy to undermining policies to eradicate poverty – policies similar to those that ensured the spectacular success of the Afrikaners.

We are paying a heavy price for our failure to build the inclusive prosperous democracy the political settlement enshrined in our constitution.

5.3 The two sides of revenge and compensation

When a process of reconciliation of two enemies starts, the wrongdoings on both sides have to be acknowledged. The roles that feelings of injustice, prejudice, hate, revenge and counter-revenge play in an unjust system like apartheid should also be considered. *These conflicting elements must fully be addressed, understood and completely solved before reconciliation can occur.* The two enemies have to understand the drivers (stimuli, reasons and motives) for injustices and possible revenge as an outcome. Both participants in the process of reconciliation should understand the following: a) the Herodotus Rules of good governance and the consequences if these rules are transgressed by the ruler and his regime; b) that there are two opposing parties to the conflict and that both parties are guilty to injustices done to each other, that hate for each other and revenge and counter-revenge are normal outcomes of these injustices if not successfully reconciled.^{4,6,7,28, 37}

Two failures from the TRC in terms of above guideline became clear from day one:

- a) There was only a *single culprit* (Afrikaners/Whites) versus a *single victim* (Blacks, ignoring tribal interests and orientation), with only the culprit obliged to ask and to obtain forgiveness. There should have been double entities: *culprit* (Afrikaners)/*victim* (Afrikaners) versus *culprit* (Blacks)/*victim* (Blacks), to address the wrongdoings and injustices that occurred in both directions.
- b) The Herodotus Rules (six), to govern successfully and to be respected permanently and its implications for the *creation* as well as the *solving* of injustices, hate, revenge and counter-revenge between the two harmed parties, was not offered as a guideline for the steering of the reconciliation of the two broad parties around apartheid. This is an absolute pre-requisite for long term success with reconciliation.
- The six Herodotus Rules³⁷ show that any ruler should practice and respect the following rules to stay in power, to lead a long, happy life as a ruler and to prevent subsequent reprisals and retaliation directed at him and his descendants and followers by aggrieved subordinates or previously conquered groups and their descendants:
 1. Always act with fairness and wisdom towards subjects;
 2. Empower each individual politically, legally, socially, economically;
 3. Do not favour or put certain individuals or him self forward;
 4. Act with self-control at all times;
 5. Do not be self-enriching at the expense of the subjects and
 6. Do not abuse power or emotionally or physically exploiting, abuse or misuse subjects.
- Practicing these six rules in short means: 1) *history repeats itself* and 2) *that the contravention of these rules creates hatred that spells tragedy for culprits; even after many centuries had passed.*³⁷
- It must be noted that the Herodotus Rules includes the fact that the innocent may be punished for the sins of the guilty (much in line with the Mafia of Sicily's attitude in blood revenge on families generations after the initial injustice, guilty or not).³⁷

5.4 Stretched justice and wrongdoing

A further negative outcome of the failed TRC attempt to bring a long-lasting post-1994 reconciliation between Afrikaners and Blacks, seldom acknowledged or even understood by many facilitators and the general public, is the effect of “stretched justice” on the conception of right and wrong (especially the lower social classes who believe that they suffered immensely under the apartheid regime). This idea has influenced the increase in crime in South Africa after 1994. The line of argumentation is that those hit worst by apartheid are required to turn the other cheek and carry on while the Whites guilty of apartheid crimes are going free. This perception has warped the public idea of what is good and just, and with good reason. If the Whites of the apartheid regime and some Blacks in high positions in the current regime can commit all forms of crimes without prosecution, what stops victims of apartheid from perpetrating the same kinds of crimes (seeing that it is accepted, sanctioned and lived by the top brass as “good and correct”). The exemption of the elite from any consequences for earlier anti-social behaviour strips the individual Black from the lower rank from any statutory empowerment to fight for what he sees as his legitimate rights and the opportunity to truly benefit from the post-1994 dispensation as promised by Nelson Mandela in his election promises. It seems as if “stretched” criminal behaviour has become a lifestyle for many poor, untrained and jobless Blacks over the years, strengthened daily by the current opportunistic Zuma politics.^{4,5,12,28,38-41}

The foundations for the failure of the TRC (and the ANC regime later on) were laid in 1994, as Luthili⁷ and Ramphele²⁸ both indicate. Ramphele writes^{28, p. 20}:

The anger, despair and loss of trust between citizens who have been denied the socioeconomic fruit of freedom is exploding all around us. Violence at interpersonal, domestic and public levels scream out the sense of betrayal they experience.

Corruption and a complete disregard for the ethics and accountability set out in our public service legal framework are signs of alienation between leaders, public servants and the citizens they are meant to serve. The public service, with notable exemptions, has become a tool for looting from the highest office to the lowest worker.

State-owned enterprises are being hollowed out with impunity. Self-enrichment and patronage systems to secure perpetuation of the “ruling party” in government characterize much of our country today.

Boshomane^{5, p. 18} also emphasises the immense powerlessness the poor and lower class Blacks endure as a result of the 1994 dispensation, the TRC and the ANC’s new class system for Blacks after 1994, together with a growing deep-seated bitterness^{5, p. 18}: “Only in South Africa are people expected to break bread with their torturers, murderers and oppressors, all in the name of unity, a legacy of the TRC and Mandela’s government.”

The “knives drawn” in 1994 by Blacks to use on Whites “are still out, waiting to cut,” although it seems as if many of the wronged Blacks of yesterday do not know who to cut now-a-days: the ordinary Afrikaners, –financially often in the same bad position as the wronged Blacks; the White moguls still enriching themselves daily; or their own ANC leaders who betrayed and double-crossed them from day-one. It is in this context that revenge for apartheid wrongdoings, RET and state capture is prospering and are cleverly steered by dubious, racially prejudiced politicians for their own masked agendas, mostly with negative consequences for the ordinary Afrikaner and the ordinary Black.

5.5 Salvaging efforts by the National Prosecution Authority (NPA)

Perhaps on second thought it is wrong to lay all the blame on the TRC for failing to solve the wishes, needs and demands of many Blacks regarding the apartheid-injustices done to them. It is wrong to think of the TRC as failed. Although the TRC was mandated to start criminal processes against apartheid offenders, its main aim was to bring *reconciliation* between Afrikaners and Blacks on apartheid crimes, a task that they mastered to a certain extent. Criminal prosecutions and civil actions against the culprits of apartheid were the primary tasks of the NPA and of course the ANC regime themselves. These two bodies failed the victims of apartheid, not the TRC.⁵

The NPA has at last started (but very slowly) to think in the direction of the prosecution of the apartheid wrongdoers in 2016 to comply with the wishes of many aggrieved Blacks for justice.⁵

The nationalist Afrikaner elite have already raised an outcry about these intended prosecutions. They view themselves as post-1994 victims of the

Blacks. These protest reactions were limited seem to come from the guilty ones.⁵

It is important to note that the White youth born after 1994 have outgrown the subjective attitudes on apartheid so entrenched in their parents. Most of these post-1994 Afrikaners feel that they are being unjustly punished for their parents' and other Afrikaners' wrongdoings in the past. For them the prosecution of the Afrikaner culprits of apartheid is an opportunity to get rid of their unmasked and unwelcome nationalist Afrikaner racist baggage. On the other had they do not remember the nationalist Afrikaner leaders and their weird ideas as positive influences. This would include living ex-politicians like FW de Klerk, Marthinus van Schalkwyk, Roelf Meyer and Pik Botha and deceased leaders like DF Malan, JG Strydom, HF Verwoerd, PW Botha, Jimmy Kruger and Magnus Malan, as well as the NP and the AB as the two leading Afrikaner institutions. As such, prosecution is null and void for them, because they do not identify with these figures.^{4-7, 28}

A large contingent of Afrikaners who were side-lined and them selves harmed by the NP-AB alliance's extreme Afrikaner nationalism and who did not really have part in the apartheid atrocities would also like to see these nationalist Afrikaners with their political criminality be brought to book. This will at last give them the opportunity to heal their feelings of injustices done to them by NP-AB alliance and to free them from their own longing for revenge. The breakdown of the last remnants of the nationalist Afrikaner elite and their structures will help to set them free as *Afrikaanses* and as independent "nationalist" South Africans in new South Africa.

The NPA's intent to prosecute individuals for apartheid crimes are too late and will surely involve only a few prosecutions. Most of the NP and AB culprits are deceased or have left the country. The damage done to the relationships between the ordinary Afrikaners and the Blacks by the nationalist Afrikaners' discrimination is too great and the duration too long to remedy it quickly and completely with the punishment of the NP-AB elite. Any present reprisals and prosecutions for apartheid crimes also carry the risk of new racial conflicts and even mass bloodshed; this time not by the Afrikaners against Blacks, but by aggrieved Blacks whose grudges against the Afrikaners have not been resolved. Many of these wronged Black persons, still living in a very unstable emotional, economical and political South Africa, may see such a prosecution as official

approval to attack the Afrikaners. Violence is a primary possible outcome because of a lack of security services to stomp any revenge.

5.6 The TRC's failure to solve injustices and to prevent revenge

It is true that the South African justice system – and the TRC to a certain extent – failed the Blacks in terms of addressing their feelings of being marred by injustices. If the system was not politically influenced and manipulated from 1994 onwards, many of the leaders of the old NP-AB government, some still living safely behind high walls, still doing business or active in post-1994 politics, would surely be in jail.^{5,7,21}

There were various reasons for the failure of the TRC to attend immediately and fully to all the injustices done to Blacks by the Afrikaners at the reconciliation meetings. If they could do so successfully, it would have settled grudges about injustices and feelings of revenge. This failure was not so much an inability of the TRC. The process was manipulated by the ANC regime themselves as part of their plans to rule new South Africa.^{28,29}

It is important to remember that the nationalist Afrikaners under NP-AB leadership were still well armed in 1994. Any provocative action, like a large-scale prosecution of the political and security leaders of the nationalist Afrikaners that could be seen as a threat to the Afrikaner's immediate safety and rights, would have triggered a military intervention that could have thwarted the transfer of power to the Blacks. The late Nelson Mandela and his counsellors knew this well and took the wise route of not prosecuting.⁴²⁻⁴⁵

Secondly, Mandela knew very well as a freedom-fighter who had turned a peacemaker and as a wise man, the dire consequences of the Herodotus Rules that “crime and punishment, injustice and revenge” only create new crimes and thus new and counter-revenge.³⁷ Also, the no process of prosecution and sentencing for any crime is subjective and completely just.^{37,46-49} In the case of war, racial and political crimes, these prosecutions and sentences are mostly emotionally driven and many times far from true justice (in most cases is it the winner, how criminal and corrupt they may be, who takes all, while the loser, sometimes of a far higher moral integrity than the winner and who are often the real victims, who loses all). The outcomes of comprehensive criminal prosecutions and sentencing of apartheid leaders by possibly biased ANC judges and their sympathizers could only spell mass conflict and immediate new problems for the young and insecure ANC regime in 1994 and immediately

thereafter. A “Nuremberg” trail for apartheid offenders would only have triggered unnecessary and unmasked counter-punishment and counter-revenge on Blacks by many Afrikaners innocently punished in terms of the Herodotus Rules’ punishments and reactions.^{38,41}

5.7 Apartheid’s wrongdoings against the Blacks in South Africa are not unique

An important fact that many Black propagandists and victims of apartheid forget in their agitation for revenge, punishment, reimbursements and reparations for wrongdoings by Afrikaners or by Blacks who they see as collaborators with the Afrikaners during apartheid, is that this kind of deviating behaviour had already occurred uncountable times worldwide. It even occurred at least two other times in South Africa in the past. It went mostly unpunished, especially for the winner (who is mostly also the culprit). This historical and political naivety is not only reflected by the ordinary disadvantaged and impoverished Blacks at grassroots level, but also by prominent Black political leaders and community leaders. There is a constant stream of speeches and publications on the correction of the apartheid-wrongs and the future correction of the NP-AB alliance directed Constitution of 1996, which is seen as blocking RET as part of adjusting of the damages of apartheid.^{5,7,18,28,50-51}

What is of immediate importance is that efforts to punish or reimburse or repair have seldom been successful.^{5,7,18,50}

The next section examines cases where there have been human, financial and political wrongdoings that did not result in revenge.

5.7.1 Worldwide political wrongdoings that did not result in revenge, punishment, reimbursement and reparations

When accusing the Afrikaner of apartheid atrocities and claiming their right to revenge, it is clear that the Black proponents of revenge have no sense of world history. There have been extreme wrongdoings that have gone unpunished, for instance the Persian empire, the Macedonian empire, the Islamic empire, the Mongol empire, the Chinese empire, and the Aztec and the Inca empires in the Americas.⁵³

Their ignorance is also reflected by their lack of understanding of the history of the British Empire, as well as the land captures by the French, Americans, Dutch, Belgians and Spaniards, etc., and the accompanying human and civil

wrongdoings by these foreigners without any revenge or compensation in return. Then of course there are the present-day murderous actions of the USA, France, UK, The Netherlands and other European countries in the independent states of Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. In all these cases immense damages were (and are still) done to property, while millions of indigenous people were and are uprooted and thousands of innocents are killed. International law is ignored and the aggression-oriented Western powers see the loss of innocent human lives as unavoidable and excusable. Revenge and compensation for these extreme war crimes and crimes against humanity are absent notwithstanding the degree of injustice that has been done.⁵³⁻⁵⁵

The killing of thousands of innocent German civilians by the executive order of Sir Winston Churchill with his indiscrete air bombings of German citizens during the Second World War, the Americans killing of innocent Japanese citizens with two atomic bombs during WW2 and the indiscrete killing by USA air bombing of Vietnamese citizens in the 1960s, went unpunished or without reimbursement up to today. Recently we have seen the killing of more than 5 800 innocent civilians in a four-month's period during the bombing of ISIS in Mosul, Afghanistan, by USA-led forces. It was justified as "natural outcomes of war" and not as war crimes. Then there is of course the Western-backed Israel's constant terrorizing of and comprehensive discrimination against and indiscrete killings of the Palestinians, actions that also fail to attract any form of compensation or reimbursement to the Palestinian victims.^{18,53,56,57}

The legal and customary right to revenge, reimbursement and reparation for political misconduct by specific races and ethnic groups towards others is mostly non-existent, especially when the culprit is the winner-conqueror-ruler. There are no consequences for the leaders of the world powers (especially in the West) who executed these crimes, like Winston Churchill, Gerald Busch, David Cameron, Tony Blair, Bill and Hillary Clinton or Barack Obama and Donald Trump. They were not brought to the book for war crimes and crimes against humanity, notwithstanding the fact that these behaviours are seen as murder in terms of international law.^{50,53,55-57}[British politician Lloyd George offers a description of Churchill that aptly describes this cold-bloodedness in the characters of world leaders whose inhuman behaviour to other human beings went unpunished⁵⁸. p. 13: "He would make a drum of out of the skin of his own mother in order to sound his praises." The same can be said of many prominent leaders and governments of many other leading countries that have made themselves guilty of crimes against humanity that went unpunished].

5.7.2 The 1899–1902 wrongdoings against the Northern Afrikaners

Mass murder and abuse also happened to the Afrikaners during the Second Anglo Boer War (SABW) of 1899 to 1902 as reflected by the deaths of 29 045 Transvaal and Free State citizens in concentration camps at the hand of the British. Today this would be regarded as nothing less than crimes against humanity, even planned genocide. Of these 29 045 deaths, 4 177 were women and 22 074 children; all killed over a period of three years. Besides this loss of loved ones, many lost their farms, homes, their savings, etc. It took the proto-Afrikaners from the early Boer republics years to overcome their psychological and financial breakdown after the Anglo Boer War.^{2,3,43,59}

What is of utmost importance is that the Boers never took direct revenge on the many British instigators of these deaths, like Lord Alfred Milner and his partners, Cecile John Rhodes, Dr LS Jameson, Lord Kitchener or even King Eduard VII after the war. Such *blood revenge* would be a priority and an absolute need in certain societies. Never was there a single assassination attempt on the prominent British in South Africa, like Milner, after 1902 for their war crimes and crimes against humanity, or on the British immigrants (ex-soldiers) who were established and benefitted from Milner's policies.^{2,43}

This reflects well on the integrity of the Afrikaners. Even in a time of utmost injustice, they behaved humanely and forgave their enemies. Mostly they just continued with their lives without looking back over their shoulders to plan revenge, compensation and reimbursement for injustices done to them during the SABW. Yes, they hated the British and this remained with most nationalist Afrikaners for their entire lives, but they never took revenge in any form.^{2,3,43,59}

5.7.3 Black-on-Black injustices in South Africa

Regarding the allegations and belief that only the Afrikaners have made themselves guilty of acts related to colonialism, slavery, imperialism, racism and ethnocentrism in South Africa, our history shows that these wrongs are not unique to the Afrikaners. The South African history of the Black population shows clearly that it is also immensely clouded by genocide, colonialism, slavery, imperialism, racism and ethnocentrism. Leaders like Shaka Zulu, the founder of the Zulu people, and Mzilikazi, the founder of the Matabele (Ndebele) people, practiced at the same time empire building, colonialism, ethnocentrism, racism, slavery and genocide in cold blood and without mercy on other Blacks. The Black history of South Africa confirms the murder of more

than one million Blacks and the eradication of at least 28 tribes between 1810 and 1840 in South Africa.^{4,18,60,61}

Negative Black behaviour, very much in the class of apartheid, was reflected more recently again in the form of xenophobia by South African Blacks against foreign Blacks with very little reaction by the authorities to safeguard the foreigners. Compensation was not even on the periphery. Also the massacre at Marikana, Rustenburg by the ANC regime's security forces of Black people confirms the presence of cruelty and wrongdoing between Blacks. There has been very little revenge in the form of criminal actions against the government or financial compensation.^{62,63-65}

The Zulus never compensated the other tribes they terrorized for stealing their women, children or livestock, or for the burning of their Kraals and taking their land, etc., during the unstable period of 1810 to 1840. The same failure is reflected by Mzilikatzi and his murdering tribesmen or their descendants. Nor was the Khoi-San, the earliest settlers and by international law the true owners of early South Africa, compensated by the present-day Blacks for their forefathers' discrimination and murderous behaviour towards them when occupying and colonizing their land.⁴

There was never a post-1994 TRC to call the leadership of the ANC and the other Black terror organizations to book for the atrocities and tortures committed against dissident members, for instance Umkhonto weSizwe (MK) in ANC camps like Quatro outside South Africa during apartheid. (Yes, there was the so called Motsuenyane-Commission, but at the end it had no public standing in bringing justice or trustworthiness by its farce of identifying only six culprits for minor offences for these immense atrocities).^{4,65} The true fact is that many of the Blacks responsible for these criminal deeds against other Blacks at places like Quatro became the top brass of the 1994 ANC regime. Is this condoning of present-day "in-house" political murder between Blacks fair against the Afrikaners: is it not exactly the same behaviour, if not more extreme, than what is associated with apartheid? Or is it just possible one of many examples of selective amnesia about their own discriminative and mal-behaviour or that of their beloved and adored ANC-leaders by some of today's Black activists and politicians who are constantly and shamelessly calling for revenge on White-Apartheid?^{4,5,7,65}

Zuma's state capture shows how selectively and successfully the race card has been played after 1994. It shows the double standard of racial and ethnic revenge and how this is selectively applied in South Africa. This state capture relies on a strong Zulu support base and political cadres (very much in line with the apartheid's corrupted NP-AB-DRC alliance). This situation selectively enriches certain Black and Foreign Asian persons and groups, as well as family members. The basis here is an immense political and financial discrimination against millions of other poor Blacks (nothing less than a system that can be called "Black-on-Black apartheid" and very much in line with the NP-AB government and its grand apartheid), making Black poverty and Black political disempowerment as strong and large in number than apartheid in the South African history. This current exploitation and discrimination continues, notwithstanding its similarities with the Afrikaners and their apartheid, and it goes free of the strong contingent of criticism that the present-day Blacks so noisily agitate against Afrikaners and apartheid.^{5,6,28,66}

The race card is cleverly played here. First, most of the activists and critics of Afrikaner-apartheid are part of the present Black regime that is already executing various forms of racial discrimination and punishment against Whites (self-criticism is unacceptable!). Secondly, their hostility against Afrikaners is founded on and driven by the knowledge that the Afrikaners, as the last White race in Africa, lack any support from the outside world or a motherland. They are vulnerable and an easy target for uncontrolled Black attacks, demands and enforcement of compensation without any backlash (political winners sometimes change to bullies very quickly).^{7,9,12,28,31,32,67}

What is clear here is that the arguments of some Blacks regarding revenge, reimbursement and compensation for political wrongdoings by the Afrikaners, are not emotionally balanced, lack sound reasoning and are subjective and one-sidedly applied. Often this is unjust to the Afrikaners and offered by opportunistic and short-sighted Blacks. There is a great preoccupation with opportunistic and subjective ideas of self-enrichment through the unlawful transfer of others' belongings under the auspices of "justified reimbursement." It seems as if these people lack the insight to see what impact this unconstructive and self-destroying thinking of "justified revenge" can have on their own future in the country.^{7,9,12,28,31,31,67}

5.8 The impossibility of reparation

Research shows that even if there are some grounds for justified revenge, the implementation of a system to calculate and to collect reimbursement and reparation is a very complicated exercise and basically an impossible task to complete successfully (Nelson Mandela and the ANC regime realized this and avoided the path of criminal prosecution). Although war reparation costs were calculated and collected in some cases in the past, like the fines and land losses that were imposed on Germany after WW1 and WW2, these kinds of war punishments only inspired new feelings of retribution. Compensation in itself often leads to the activation of hate, conflict and Herodotus's revenge, as Hitler's revenge for the WW1-punishment of Germany shows.^{18,37}

There are four clear reasons why it is basically impossible to calculate accurate values for the collection of repayment for reparation^{18,53,60,68}:

- a) Social justice based on figuring out whose ancestors did what to whom, is just a case of impossibility;
- b) Formulating an acceptable and justified rule of law to calculate and to collect the compensations is impossible;
- c) All these different races and ethnicities involved in crimes against humanity have become so intermixed and socially intertwined with time that it is impossible to select and to separate the victim from the culprit. In South Africa, as in the Americas and Europe, people of different races have to a certain extent mixed.¹⁸ The well-known socialite and cultural leader Dali Tambo, himself married to a White and experienced in the area of racial conflict solutions, defined this racial intertwining aptly when he said^{68, p.13}: “In my family there are three colours: black, white and my four golden brown children.”
- d) In terms of these calls for compensation (which is closely related to sub-point c above), the question emerges about the legal position and rights of aliens, foreigners and colonists (labels that are often applicable to the Afrikaners in post-1994 South Africa) who have been staying in their adopted countries for centuries and who have in some way intermixed with the indigenous people. What must happen to these “strangers” after they have done their time or paid their reparation for their wrongdoings to the “indigenous” people? Must the

Afro-American be deported back to Africa or the English Scotsman goes back to England or must Julius Malema goes back to Venda as a further punishment? Must they remain “strangers” and be discriminated against for the rest of their lives? If such a division can be made purely on facial characteristics, ignoring what is going on beneath the skin of the Afrikaner, whereto can these “foreign” Afrikaners being exiled to after 350 years of living in South Africa? These questions make the Afrikaners unsure about their future in the new South Africa, especially in light of the growing political rhetoric.^{18,53,60}

In line with the above racial outcome there is a prominent and worrying question: Has the Afrikaner become the “Afrikaner question” or “Afrikaner problem,” like the Jewish one in the 1930s in Europe and Nazi Germany: a *problem* to be solved by genocide? This question is more than justified in terms of the escalating murders of White farmers since 1994 and the outright failure of the ANC regime to combat it.^{2,53}

The people who call for revenge, often guided by communist ideas, forget the stern warning of their master, Karl Marx: *History repeats itself*. This, together with the warning of Herodotus: *Evil done is revenged with more evil*, reflects a recipe for disaster. Both Black and White are caught in a vicious circle of repeating the actions of the forefathers. What is unclear at this stage is *who* is going to do *what* to *whom* in 50 years. Remember, history repeats itself with the same evil over and over, so the chances are good that the *what* will be negative.^{4,37,43,69}

Dali offers a wise guideline for behaviour to the many Blacks so constantly calling for revenge on and reparation by the Afrikaners in South Africa^{68, p. 13}: “Rather than angry, I feel sad. Sad for the racist who goes through life in self-imposed isolation from the wondrous variety of human culture and colour, who lives in self-imposed ignorance of other people’s rich cultural traditions and the beauty of their diverse and distinct forms of human expression. Over time racism has been the source of so many woes, of so much hell on earth and deep dishonour.”

5.9 The ANC's modern penalties for Apartheid

5.9.1 End of criminal penalties

It is clear that it would be impossible to embark on criminal prosecution of Afrikaners for their apartheid wrongdoings today. Only a few of the extremists are still alive. The more than twenty years since 1994 also a great burden on the memories of the few living direct victims of apartheid crimes, making the trustworthiness of their evidence questionable in an open court.^{4,28,31}

The ANC politicians sensed this dilemma in 1994 and they embarked on various other revenge actions, like AA and BEE. The redistribution of capital through the promotion of Black employment seems have been insufficient, especially in light of the total failure of the financial policies of development of the ANC regime to reform and better South Africa for its Black people. The lack of capital for development in the absence of a sound economy is forcing the Black regime to look for new ways to gain capital from Whites as “apartheid injustice compensations”. This trend serves as a concrete example of revenge for apartheid. Financial gain seems to be the most satisfactory compensation for those who want retribution. This process has already been activated in the form of *RET* and the *state capture* that started in 1994 by the ANC regime under Mandela. It is now reaching its climax under Zuma.^{28,66,70-73}

Various kinds of inequalities between Whites and Blacks, like salaries, household incomes, education, land, house and property ownership, company ownership, individual and family wealth, etc., have been put forward as reasons for “apartheid injustice compensation.” Another more “dark and diabolic” intention, –although hidden, seems to be to drive Afrikaners out of South Africa through the various implementations of Black apartheid in the form of work discrimination, political hostility, isolation and disempowerment, planned financial impoverishment and especially farm murders of Whites. The ANC-elite’s strong emphasis since September 2017 on readdressing and rectifying further the pre-1994 apartheid-situation under their focus of Radical Social Transformation (RST), is a red light of warning. Specific the arrogance of the public remark by the ANC-spokesperson Zizi Kodwa on the person of the well-known and respected international businessman, Johann Rupert, as an “ungrateful parasite” after Rupert’s justified remark that the intention of the ANC to seizure so called “gains” of Afrikaners and Whites, “allegedly unlawfully obtained during apartheid”, as nothing less than “thieving”, spells evil for all classes of Afrikaners in future in South Africa.^{66,69,72,73}

5.10 New age of revenge

The various forms of Black revenge against Afrikaners for their pre-1994 racial discrimination and apartheid crimes against the Black population are present and they hold serious consequences for the Afrikaners in the new South Africa. Its negative and devastating impact goes unnoticed to the outside world, and where noticed, it attracts very little attention or sympathy. This negative scenario is shortly evaluated.

One of the arguments of the ANC regime and Black activists and politicians regarding the *differences between the financial income of Whites and Blacks*, is that it is a direct result of apartheid's discriminations and benefits, which they alleged had outright and favoured White appointments, salaries, properties and financial support to Afrikaner individuals and Afrikaner business groups. This must now be rectified. Specific examples are the profiles of persons like Johan Rupert, Christo Wiese, Douw Steyn, the Oppenheimer family. However, the wealth of Blacks, like Tokyo Sexwale and Cyril Ramaphosa, the Zuma clan or the Gupta family never appear anywhere in ANC propaganda or writings of Black activists. There is the same hostility against ABSA Bank, Afrikaner media groups like Media24 and Nasionale Pers, and other Afrikaner organizations such as Sanlam, Rembrandt, etc. The ANC's own enterprises with a strong RET orientation, are off the radar. What these Black "judges" of White wealth further fail to do, is to mention that most of these White business entities have already gone through the process of Black empowerment with strong contingents of Black shareholders and Blacks in top management. The capturing these institutions by way of nationalization spells disaster, as has already happened with various parastatals such as SABC, SAA, Telkom, as well as the public school system and healthcare. Some prominent South African universities went down the drain under the guardianship of the ANC since 1994.^{66,69,72,81-83}

It is surprising to see how little the present government's political and financial policy makers know about basic economical rules *to follow and not to follow* to make a country financially viable and sustainable (although this serious financial shortcoming is contradicted by the Gupta's financial progress inside the governmental powerhouse). Intentions to nationalize Afrikaner interests is one example of bad financial governance.^{12,84-87,89,90}

5.10.1 Income

First it is important to note how one-sidedly politicians like Jacob Zuma, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Julius Malema formulate their reflections on the state of poverty of Blacks with apartheid as a direct role player. Jacob Zuma and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma reflect that the Blacks only possess only 20% of the South African economy, compared to the 80% that Whites own. They ask why this is still the case with Blacks having 100% of the political power. Secondly, the primary reason for this discrepancy in terms of their viewpoints and opinions is that it is an apartheid outcome, one that needs immediate correction, especially through RET. At the same time various political pro-ANC commentators who support RET emphasise the absolute need for land ownership by poor Blacks.^{12,28,52,81,84-87,89,91}

To further support the arguments for the need for RET and the redistribution of White Capital, official data are skilfully and constant offered in the press to remind readers of the urgency to get compensation for apartheid. The dire situation of unemployment among Blacks is one example. Of all South Africans older than 15 years, less than 40% are employed in some form. Off the 55 million total population of which 35 million can accept employment, only 15 million are in employment, leaving 20 million unemployed. More specifically this means that for every ten persons who have work, 25 persons are unemployed. The negative impact is much higher when one remembers that the total population of 55 million needs some basic income to be able to live, and only 15 million work. This global comparison indicates a ratio of employment versus unemployment of 2:7). Regarding the racial attitude, the ratio for Whites is ten in work against 13 unemployed. The ratio for Blacks employed versus unemployed is 10:28. The official unemployment number for Whites is 7% versus 30% for the Blacks. There has been an insignificant increase of only 127 000 persons into employment from 2010 to 2015 in the age group 7 to 17 years, totalling a 11.2 million persons in work placement for this age group. In 2015 2.4 million children, not really qualified and mature enough to work, were being forced to work as a result of their family's poverty. This dooming data is further strengthened by official household studies that reflect the average annual income of Whites as R444 446.00 versus that of the Indians as R271 621.00, Coloureds as R172 983.00 and the Blacks as R92 983.00. The ratio of this annual income for Whites versus all South Africans is 2:6, while for Whites versus Blacks it is 2:9. The above data clearly favours Whites.^{12,81,92,93} Khumalo finds the above data so overwhelmingly pessimistic that he writes^{93, p.10}: "...poor blacks barely surviving, while rich whites are prospering...."

However, when Black emotions and self-pity are discarded, another picture emerges. The ANC regime has failed gloriously to uplift its people.^{12,81,92,93}

The first question is: Who were the rulers of the new South Africa over the last 23 years? The answer is simple: *The ANC regime and their top brass of unable, unskilled and crooked men who promised to deliver on the mandate to serve their fellow men.* The ANC regime failed from day one with Nelson Mandela's under-performance as a statesman to uplift or better the living conditions and lifestyles of the Blacks. The negative standard of leadership was followed by Thabo Mbeki and his arms deal, the Schaiks and Yengeni's; a failed cycle that was perfected by Jacob Zuma and his Zuptas.^{14,28,94}

The open question in this context is: why did the ANC party and the leadership accept guardianship of South Africa in 1994 if they knew beforehand that they lacked the ability to govern successfully. Did they already their sights set on state capture and the enrichment of only certain Black political elites? The answer goes much deeper and is founded in the compromise between the NP-AB alliance and ANC (freely agreed to by the ANC in exchange for financial benefits for its elite as the new government after 1994) which transferred the political power in 1994 to the ANC while the economic and empowerment structures around it stayed in the ownership of the NP-AB. This outcome basically castrated the ANC regime of effective political power. This 1994 outcome was not a surprise for the ANC – they knew it beforehand and were willing parties. Ramphela writes^{28, p. 20}: “The ANC anticipated this state of affairs in its 1992 “Ready to Govern” report: “We are prevented from developing a national vision in terms of which we would see our country through the eyes of all its citizens and not just one group or the other.” What they do not like to admit is that it was they have failed from 1994 to see the South African life ‘through the eyes of all its citizens’ due to their own scheming. The ANC (as the NP-AB did before with its blindness for Blacks) as the new leader has failed “to see all the citizens of the country”. It is struck with blindness as far as the Whites go. Misplaced emphases on apartheid, its wrongs and the Afrikaners as the sole role players has become the daily rhetoric on the South African history among political activists who promote retribution for apartheid because they can see only Black.^{11,14,28,29}

The second basic question is: who has been keeping the ANC in power for 23 years since 1994, notwithstanding their growing failure as a government to do

good to all Blacks? The answer: *Black people as individual voters of South Africa themselves, the people who suffer extreme poverty.* These ordinary Blacks have had various opportunities to vote the ANC out in favour of a variety of Black political parties, but they have stuck to their fate as if masochists, enjoying the suffering brought on by their ANC masters. It is foolish for these impoverished ordinary Blacks to cry foul about injustices committed before or after 1994. They only have themselves to blame for their current poverty and suffering. Political immaturity has led to a spirit of greed and naivety about the estrangement of Whites and the value of ANC intervention. The culture of dishonesty and laziness created by the ANC since 1994 among their Black followers, notwithstanding enormous financial support to develop and better themselves, play a strong role in their present poverty. It is no longer a remnant of apartheid.^{12,14,86,95,96}

Since 1994 a financial input of R500 billion has failed to bring real positive change to the financial status of Blacks. Unemployment steadily escalated. The lack of training, poor school education and failure to create jobs are the roots of the failure of ANC. Yet the ANC would constantly call this a remnant of apartheid.^{14,16,92,97-99,}

5.10.2 RET

The ANC sells citizens the idea that state of Black poverty is a remnant of apartheid, and this has resulted in the aggressive call for RET. Julius Malema and his EFF has become masters at calling for land transfer from Whites to Blacks without compensation in an effort to take back land from “colonists.” More recently Zuma himself, supported by his new finance minister Gigaba and his adviser professor Malikané, started to test South Africans’ reaction to total RET on White interests as a model (in the press referred to as the *Malikanegate*) to equalize the injustices of apartheid. Although the White media and political and business leaders have shown strong resistance, even threatening with legal actions, the approval for RET seems strong among a faction inside the ruling ANC as well as in the general Black public. For Zuma and his trusted cadres and foreign business partners RET is not so much a way to rectify the apartheid injustices, but also a very important vehicle to obtain future support from the masses of impoverished Black voters to sustain the “Zuma double government’s reign of comprehensive state capturing of South Africa” (and for Zuma to stay out of jail for as many as 783 corruption charges against him). The necessity of keeping Zuma in power makes RET an urgent tactic. The vagueness of the definition of “radical” is worrying: first because it seems to refer to a

widespread nationalization of White ownership and shareholding in mines, industries, pension funds, private companies, banking and financial enterprises, private property and land, etc. Second, remarks by spokespersons inside the Zuma circle regarding possible physical action (a forcible and violent nationalization) against Whites who dare try to oppose White RET are very disconcerting. The seriousness of this focus is evident from references to this as the *Second Revolution*.^{32,67,100-102}

On the other hand, Afrikaners and other Whites must not overreact. This rhetoric is old news in South Africa: this kind of governance, also implemented by the NP-AB regime, can be traced back to 1710 at the Cape. Secondly, the Afrikaners knew in the early 1990s that this type of political and economical government, typical of the South African state, will surely also be the way the ANC planned to behave if it comes to power.²⁸ Vilakazi writes^{45,p. 60}:

Whether or not we, as individuals, like it, there will be tremendous pressure from the poor Black masses to use the state, ‘the concentrated power of society,’ to offset the control of the economy by Whites, and to uplift economically the poor masses, who will, then, see themselves as ‘bosses’ of the new society; there will be tremendous pressure to make the state a ‘welfare state’ for Blacks, too, instead of for Whites only, as is presently the case; and continuous, tremendous pressure to have the new state intervene directly in the ‘free play of the market’ – and this momentum will lead to pressure upon the state to make deep inroads into capitalist private property, thus crossing the boundaries of a bourgeois revolution, into the terrain of a socialist revolution”.

History has revealed that any social class, lacking capital of its own, involved in conflict with an economically powerful class, internal or external, tends to use state capital, once it has captured political power, to initiate economic growth; there is a tendency to make the state a direct entrepreneur in the economic sphere. The state becomes a means for the uplifting of the economically disadvantaged classes. Interestingly enough, the very history of the impact of enfranchised poor Whites, the White petty-bourgeoisie, and the White working class in South Africa itself confirms this assertion.

The current RET has always been a logical outcome awaiting the Afrikaner. The NP-AB alliance kept this reality from their supporters. Remarks in the Afrikaans

media referring to the academic adviser appointed by the ANC regime to activate RET and capital capture as the “mal prof” (crazy prof) or his intentions as “Malikanegate,” is not only inappropriate and slanderous, but is clearly an effort to cover up the Afrikaners’ own history on economics and politics. They are themselves running the gauntlet of the Afrikanerism of the past.^{28,103-106}

The ANC’s lack of ability to manage the South African economy, nationalization notwithstanding, spells doom for the Whites, but even more so for the large group of poor Blacks. The ANC’s botching of the SABC, SAA, Telkom, public education and healthcare, public universities, municipalities, as well as the transfer of established White farms to Blacks with only 10% to 20% of farms still functioning, are excellent examples of the ANC-elite’s inability and lack of skills to manage a country. The lack of integrity and honesty with regard to financial and political matters in the government, widespread corruption, nepotism and fraud, as well as the planned execution of state capture by the top brass of the ANC regime, spells ominous for RET and Whites in South Africa. The end will be a disaster the likes of Mozambique and Zimbabwe, leaving South Africa without a sound infrastructure. This will create an opportunity for incoming African despotic and corrupt regimes as Marx’s *history repeats itself*. The hard fact is that the ANC simply lacks the brilliant think tank of the NP-AB that planned, managed and steered the South African economics successfully for many decades. This distrust of the ANC regime among South Africans is reflected in a 2016 study on the citizens of African countries. While the percentages indicating trust were respectively 73% for Namibia, 71% for Tanzania and 50% for Mozambique, the count was only 40% for South Africa.^{32,107-111}

Zuma and those in his circle lacks a sound understanding of the negative impact of nationalization of White assets. As such forcible redistribution will have disastrous effects. They are trying to kill the goose that lies the golden egg.¹⁰⁸ The Fourie analysis¹⁰⁸ shows that if the total wealth of the approximately 38 500 millionaires of South Africa (which includes a significant number of Blacks) is paid out in cash to each South African citizen, the amount received by each citizen will be a single payment of R38 282.00. If this amount is wisely invested for 10% interest, the monthly income would only be R319.00 per month. Not much of an income if the Black household’s average monthly income of R7 750.00 is insufficient to take them out of poverty. About the ANC’s dream to redistribute all, Fourie¹⁰⁸ shows also that if the 36 000 commercial farms are each turned over to ten Black families it will only create work for 6% of the

South African jobless. This subsistence farming model will not generate enough for a single family to live on, not even speaking of producing food for the country. These 36 000 commercial farms currently contribute 95% of South Africa's food output.

The ANC's leaders have been playing the race card from the beginning and they have become masters at hiding their own agendas. Their bullying behaviour in the form of all kinds of discriminative attitudes against the Afrikaners did not stop with at BEE, AA, etc., but has slowly intensified in the last two years. Much of their hatred for the Afrikaners and their perceptions of injustices done to them by the Afrikaners through apartheid, were never been addressed by the TRC. It is now spilling over and developing into revenge in the form of various forms of compensations, masterminded to impoverish and control the Afrikaners further.

5.10.3 Farm murders and attacks

Physical revenge is promoted by the constant public White-bashing by prominent Blacks, especially by persons like Malema with remarks such as "We will not *now* kill the Whites."^{17,112} The killing of Whites, especially Afrikaner farmers have become a common phenomenon in South Africa since 1994, with very little effort on the side of the ANC regime to prevent it or to offer compensation. The farm murders are of such little concern to the ANC that it was only after great effort that a discussion on the issue was allowed in the parliament.

Two outcomes of these farm attacks and murders are clear: Blacks are taking revenge on farmers for apartheid. Second, there is a direct effort to drive Afrikaner farmers from their farms as was done by the Mai-Mai in Kenia and Swapo in Namibia. If there is any doubt about the truth of this statement, the official data on the matter erases it. In 2016, 70 White farmers were murdered in 345 farm attacks. In practice this means one farm murder every four days and one farm attack every day. If the averages of 2016 for South Africa are compared with the 2016 data on world's averages, South Africa seems to be a very dangerous country. The world average is 7:100 000 versus South Africa's average of 33:100 000. This dangerous South African characteristic is also confirmed by the murder of members of the South African Police Service in 2017, namely 54:100 000. The murders of South African farmers in 2016 came to a shocking 133:100 000. The SAPS data for the period 1991 to 2016 reflect the death of 14 589 farm dwellers (with a ratio 60% Whites: 40% Blacks). It is

clear that White farmers have slowly, as in Zimbabwe, been driven from the farms since 1994. These murders to drive Whites off their farms are very successful (and fulfil to the revenge for apartheid) as evidenced by the fact that in 1994 there were 65 000 commercial farmers against 35 000 in 2017.^{109,113}

5.10.4 The insignificance of the race factor

The leaders of the ANC fail to see that the race factor in South Africa is slowly starting to diminish in the mindset of many ordinary Blacks. The alleged race factor, whereby Blacks and Whites are played off against each other and the Afrikaners are treated as “unwelcome colonists” is contradicted by research. Prominent points of conflict that some of the ANC politicians and activists so eagerly like to point out as reasons for reparation and revenge are not that prominent at all. Research shows that *poverty* and *joblessness*, which has increased dramatically since 1994, are far more concerning than the race factor, with 73% of poor being Blacks. Research by the Institute of Racial Relations in 2016 reflected that 40% of citizens are worried about unemployment, 34% about poor service delivery, 18% about poor home accommodation and 15% about education, compared to only 3% being worried about the race factor. This shows that 71% Blacks and 74% Whites have no concerns about race. This absence of the race factor as a concern among ordinary Blacks is further confirmed by the Caro Institute in the USA’s finding that the reasons why South Africa is the 5th most depressed and unhappiest country in the world are unemployment, inflation and high interest rates, not racial conflict or hate.^{32,114,115}

Many Blacks feel quite positive about Whites. Many of the negative reflections on Whites must be read in terms of one-sided and manipulated propaganda by a small number of politicians and political activists with their own hidden agendas, as well as Black opportunists with the intention to enrich themselves by grabbing the riches of Whites through a well-orchestrated RET. More and more Blacks are looking past the emotional rhetoric of leaders like Jacob Zuma, Cyril Ramaphosa and Julius Malema that singles out and emotionally attacking Whites for own political gains, especially colonialism. It seems to be the rising middle and higher Black classes who are financially becoming more established, who are inclined to good relations with Whites.^{12,31,32,98,110,116}

5.10.5 The Afrikaners’ own role in RET

All the above being said, no-one can argue that the Afrikaners and their forefathers did not also benefit from their own form of state capture and RET. These practices started in 1671 and was refined and masterminded by the

nationalist Afrikaners from 1948. There was the same returns for powerful elites in public offices to reward loyal leaders and members, abuse of political power to promote prosperity and wealth for a few at the cost of the many. It was normal practice under the NP-AB alliance. The NP-AB alliance was experienced in RET and state capture and more than ready and willing to teach the leaders of the ANC all the ropes when they joined government in 1994. It is therefore no surprise that the ANC leaders became so good at state capture and RET so quickly.^{28,29,43,45}

Ramphele writes^{28, p. 20}:

The NP government refined state capture into statecraft. The Broederbond, its think tank and brains trust, was a powerful political machine to ensure the capture, command and control of South Africa for the benefit of the Afrikaner *volk*.

The successful eradication and the building of a strong middle and upper class secured the perpetuation of NP dominance until 1994. This economic success was bought at the expense of silent acquiescence to human rights abuses against the majority indigenous population.

But there are some differences: the ANC concentrated on the elite freedom fighters, with little financial bettering of the broader Black populace. They failed to uplift the Black masses through education and training, better lifestyles through higher incomes and affordable healthcare, failed to offer Blacks personal safety, etc. The nationalist Afrikaner leadership successfully extended these benefits to most nationalist Afrikaners at least (and to some extent also to some favoured Blacks). The nationalist Afrikaners did not allow the extreme corruption, fraud and nepotism, or free entrance of crooked foreigners to the state coffer. Leaders like JB Vorster (with the Muldergate Scandal) and PW Botha were swiftly and properly dealt with when they overstepped the line. Their departures took place without them ever being accused of one of the 783 charges of corruption that characterized Zuma.^{28,29,43,117}

However much apartheid and Afrikanerism are detestable, not one of the leaders of the NP came close to ever having such charges against them as Zuma does at the moment.^{102,118-130}

No one in South Africa is exempt from guilt. At most one can say that all the various rulers from 1652 to 2017 each ruled under specific world and local circumstances, traditions, beliefs and needs. Each regime was exposed to unique circumstances, demands and dangers, making them in some ways incomparable. Although this outcome does not make provision for exemption of wrongdoing, it does make certain behaviours understandable, though not forgivable. There is, however, very little understanding for Afrikaners and apartheid.

5.10.6 The ANC's own colonial ghost of 2017

The ANC will keep the legacy of apartheid alive in the minds of the supporters as long as possible to ensure a common enemy. One approach is *colonialism* and the Afrikaners' status as *colonists*, with an enormous negative impact on racial reconciliation and harmony. It encourages revenge and counter-revenge and makes the impact of the TRC nil and void. This kind of opportunistic political view, nothing less than hypocrisy to obtain votes and radical political status, is reflected by Cyril Ramaphosa, at present vice-president and a candidate for president when he says^{130, p. 2}: "Imperialisme (het) in Afrika gefloreer, want kolonialiste 'het ons sommige van die ergste leuens laat glo'. Deur brute krag, deur ons hulpbronne te plunder en deur ons verstand en liggaam gevange te hou, (is) Afrikane van hul menslikheid en waardigheid ontnem," and as "verbeeldinglose primitiewe barbare te vrede met 'n bestaansoorlewing afgemaak." [*Imperialism flourished in Africa, because colonialists made us believe some of the worst lies. Through gross power, by plundering our resources and capturing our mind and body, Africans were deprived of their humanity and dignity, and were Africans brushed aside as unimaginably primitive barbarians, in peace with a living survival*].

Ramaphosa knows very well that he would make political gains with this opinion. Secondly, what lies is he referring to? It seems to be one of those "roaring statements" without substantiation that characterizes the ANC leadership's emotional rhetoric; rhetoric free from any accountability. Thirdly, is he deliberately ignoring (selective amnesia?) his own part as mine-owner in the killing of Blacks at Marikana? He describes it as a "colonist developed mine" and initially owned by "colonists," who "plundered South Africa's resources." Fourth – and the most damaging to his own position as a sincere Black fighter against colonialists and apartheid – is his role as a mine-owner making use of Black labour to enrich himself and his golden silence about how and from whom he obtained his mine ownership. Is this not also true colonialism and exploitation? Why is he not distancing himself from "awful" colonialism by in

the first place not to get involved with an enterprise that can be associated with colonial activities. Why did he not transfer his mine shares and mine income to the exploited Black mine workers to make up for their poverty and their suffering at the hand of the colonists? Why are there no criticism from Black activists against apartheid on Ramaphosa's mine interests and his self-enrichment from an old colonial enterprise? There are different rules for Blacks and Whites. This reflects, as with the planned RET, a double standard. Ramaphosa's political rhetoric on Whites and the talk of colonialism is hampering positive racial relations. This troubles Afrikaners in South Africa.

The anti-colonialist propagandists forget that they themselves are part of a colonial financial structure that dates back to long before apartheid. The ANC has failed to address the exploitations that claim are inherent to this system, especially for the unfortunate colonists' victims, the "verbeeldinglose primitiewe barbare te vrede met 'n bestaansoorlewing," to whom Ramaphosa¹³⁰, P. 2 refers. In reality only the foreign mentors of the South African regimes between 1948 to 1994 and from 1994 to the present day changed: for the NP the mentors were Western Europe and the USA and for the ANC the mentors are China and Russia. Today, as in 1795, the country is still being governed by a self-serving minority in the name of the masses with a parliament castrated from executive powers to do best for the masses. The failed ANC, the Gupta factor, cadre employment, state capture, extreme corruption and nepotism all reflect this "Black colonialism" and exploitation of other Blacks.^{102,118-131}

South Africa's outdated colonial state and its aged economical principles and visions must be replaced with a solid bond between capitalists, landowners and the masses of poverty-stricken people who possess political power through their votes. A constructive change seems unacceptable for the leadership of the ANC. They fear losing their political and financial power. Such a change would mean letting go of the apartheid wrongs. This change will benefit the lower socio-economical level by educating them on sound and balanced thinking on the wrongdoings of the past and the absolute need for co-existing with capitalists, Whites with know-how and the majority of Blacks to make the country work. Such a change will eliminate the degrading influences of substandard politicians and short-sighted activists who are currently ruling South Africa.¹⁰²

The "stretched government" described above is not new for many Afrikaners. They grew up and lived in the refined RET and state capture of the NP-AB alliance. What is of immediate importance is how they as a racial minority can

minimise the devastating attacks on them that reflect them falsely as *settlers, colonialists and exploiters* of Blacks and that call for revenge. It is not enough for them to know that internal ethnic differences will perhaps take to focus away from them. The reality is that revenge in various forms is awaiting them.

5.10.7 Afrikaners' cutting of their umbilical cord with the volk

The year 1994 was indeed a watershed year for the Afrikaners of South Africa. Their intimate and only trusted mentors, the leaderships of the NP, AB and DRC, suddenly started to crash. This not only took away their support system within a closed and selective group, but they also suddenly and unexpectedly saw the true colours of the nationalist Afrikaner leadership they so deeply adored and trusted for many years. Suddenly they met a selfish, self-centred and opportunistic group who over many years under the guise of a sacred *volk*, fatherland, Afrikaans as an exclusive language, own Afrikaner institutions, etc., successfully moulded them from ordinary Afrikaners into a supremacist nationalist Afrikaners unit in which racial discrimination and own benefit at the cost of Blacks were central priorities. Afrikaner supremacy, exclusive group interests and unselfish services to the propagated "Afrikaner nation" glued nationalist Afrikaners together. They recruited members through various governmental and other related institutions' compensations, managed and executed by the NP-AB alliance's refined state capture and radical economic transformation. These financial benefits were spiralling down to devoted and loyal members in the middle to lower ranks. In exchange for these immense benefits and support, members had to let go of their individual self-assertion for absolute group belonging with the central pre-requirements: *service and loyalty to the Volk* inside the comprehensive nationalist Afrikaner group.^{28,43,44,59}

Membership to the "volk" made each individual member responsible not only for his intimate group's misbehaviour, but also for the misbehaviour of the greater group (*volk*), up to the NP-AB leadership. When the NP collapsed, the leaders found protection in their cooperation with the incoming Black regime, but the ordinary citizens were left out in the cold. They became the ones who have to pay for apartheid. This abandonment of the ordinary Afrikaners did not happen immediately in 1994 because the De Klerk regime initially tried to protect Afrikaner supremacy. Since 1998 the individual Afrikaner has found himself on his own, open to full punishment for apartheid and its misconducts. Efforts to reposition with ultra-right Afrikaner groups or more liberal political groups were unsatisfactory. The emigration of the younger Afrikaners followed

(more than 1 million), while the rest started to rethink their future in South Africa.^{2,28,43,59}

It is clear that the ordinary Afrikaners suddenly had to learn to live as an individual inside a new South Africa, cutting ties with the *volk*. *It became a case of every person for himself*. Group loyalty and dogma and the protection of the group interest all but disappeared. It has become clear to poor individual Afrikaners that they will not benefit in any way from the wealth of Afrikaner magnates like the Ruperts, Wieses, Steyns, etc. The ties between the wealthy Afrikaner and the ordinary Afrikaner have been cut.

These Afrikaner magnates saved themselves. (These magnates, as independent Afrikaners, are more than able to take care of themselves and to defend themselves very successfully against financial, personal and political attacks as the international public relation's firm, Bell Pottinger, dearly has learned and is paying for after it took on Rupert and other Afrikaners indiscreetly. The present self-discrediting of the audit and advisory giant KPMG South Africa must also be seen in the same context. The same outcomes can follow for many ANC-elites in their indiscreet attacks on the so called "rich" Afrikaners).

In reference to the planned Zuma-RET and ANC regime's intent to diminishing White assets in general, there is very little linkage with the ordinary and becoming poorer Afrikaners' direct financial interests and RET, but this fact seems to escape the mindsets of many ANC's.

The question has been asked why the ultra-rich are not targeted for RET (Black and White). Data show that 66 000 South Africans are part of the richest 1% in the world, with 40 400 of the world's 13.6 million ultra-rich and between 38 500 and 45 000 billionaires in South Africa. The three richest South Africans possess more than 50% of the total South Africa riches. The average Afrikaner has become poorer since 1994, making them less of a target for the ANC through RET. It must be remembered that 22% of the total Afrikaner population are 60 years and older: to capture their capital through RET will only impoverish these older persons further and make them a direct financial burden for the state.^{108,132-134}

The individual Afrikaner has settled into a new South African lifestyle that is completely different from that of his father. It is now time they stop feeling guilty. But to gain a clean conscience, he has to shed, if he has not already done so, his membership of the various nationalist Afrikaner groupings and the

remnants of the NP-AB-DRC leadership drenched in apartheid. It is time for the Afrikaner to reposition himself as an individual, stripped from all the emotional and political rhetoric he is bombarded with daily from extreme racial Black politicians and leaders. It is time to refuse unconditionally the many blames for whatever went wrong in the country's near and far past, especially around the Blacks and their lives. South African Blacks are themselves responsible for a great deal of their mess through their blind and unquestioning worshipping of the ANC for 23 years. The TRC could have facilitated complete forgiveness among Black and White and White and Black long ago. True reconciliation would have prevented the political opportunism.

The Black calls for revenge and reparation, although it comes from a minority, must be a warning for Afrikaners of how blindly they can be targeted if South Africa's civil, governing and legal systems suddenly collapse. These tragic outcomes were seen in Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia and is now again present in Syria, Iraqi and Libya where reparations are not enough for the political activists. They use history to justify serious violence and murder and genocide.^{18,53,135}

The ANC is clearly hostile towards the Afrikaner, and individual ANC members will have to change their perceptions for this to change. In the last two years the DA have started to dissociate from Afrikaners. It is clear that the DA is shedding its liberal orientation to gain Black votes, which are much more available than the diminishing White votes. A more radical view of Black interests and land-grabbing, RET, RST and partnerships with Malema and others will follow, making Afrikaners reluctant to join the DA. The rest of the South African Black parties have the same Afrikaner-distancing, while the remaining Afrikaner parties are still sleeping under the snow of old apartheid racism and old NP-AB leadership opportunism. To find a safe political home is becoming difficult for the individual Afrikaner, while thoughts of revenge against them are not receding.^{9,11,17,32,117,136-140}

In his new political environment, the individual Afrikaner must accept that his manifold previous empowerments and privileges by the favouring of apartheid have been nullified in 1994. They can no longer try to force these privileges: We are now all *base en knegte* at the same time in the same body. This change is one of the most important for the individual Afrikaner to make if he wants to be accepted unconditionally as an individual by the Black society. This is the prerequisite: to understand, accept and appropriate the indigenous realities of South

Africa to neutralize the vicious cycle of revenge and counter-revenge.^{16,22,83,94,136,137}

5.11 Conclusion

The prominent question at this stage is why some of the Blacks are so keen on revenge for apartheid wrongs. Is the immense emotional and vocal rhetoric aimed at the Afrikaners by some Blacks solely driven by the fact that the Afrikaner is White? In terms of the *Oppression Theory* all Whites grew rich and powerful by beating up everybody else and taking their stuff. They are all culprits and obliged to pay reparations and to suffer revenge, it doesn't matter if he is guilty or not?¹⁸

Is the Afrikaner simply a victim of the *multiculturalists* who seek to fill Whites worldwide with an overpowering sense of guilt and blame for all that went wrong with non-Whites, and thus to let them accept responsibility for all the suffering of non-Whites and the poor?¹⁸

Is the Afrikaner simply the victim of South African Black-on-White racial hate, hidden under the hypocrisy of false reconciliation and Christianity?

Or is the Afrikaner too rigid to change from Afrikaner Nationalism and Afrikanerism to a true South African individual, geared to mix in with the greater South Africa?

The revenge and counter-revenge around apartheid are complicated and difficult to explain and understand, if at all possible. However, all four above questions can be answered with a yes.

There is great similarity between Afrikaner-Apartheid-wrongdoings and Nazi-wrongdoings (excluding the murdering intentions of the Nazis).^{149,150} The criminal war-behaviour of Germany during World War II can no-one doubt, but, writes George Friedman, a Jew, who himself with his family, had immense suffered under the Nazis, on this sensitive issue^{149, pp. 105-106}: "The Germans were forgiven under the concept of no collective guilt, the principle that Germany as a whole could not be held responsible for the crimes of the Nazis, but that only individuals who had committed the crimes could be. Nevertheless, they remained stunned and ashamed by what they had done". Many Afrikaners, especially the post-1994 borne one's, are undoubtedly also ashamed by the political, psychological and socio-economical mal-behaviours and crimes of

their NP-AB-leaders as well as their church-foremen during apartheid, but they can not be held responsible (as today's Zulus can't be held responsible for King Shaka Zulu's atrocities against the other Black-tribes two centuries ago). This responsibility-endorsing of the total Afrikaner-tribe is been done more and more faultily by many ANC-elites and politicians. *Afrikaner-leaders as individuals are alone guilty.* (There are still a lot of these Afrikaner culprits living and political active in South Africa. Some of them with a conscious, like ex-minister Adriaan Vlok, tried sincere to make peace with their "bad" past; other, still catch-up in their psychopathology and self-justification, show no remorse and seem like cranky Hitler - beset on his ideology of racial supremacy and the Jews as "bad" - to think still that their Apartheid-behaviours and views on Blacks as "problems" were totally correct).^{149,150} The Mandela-regime as well as the TRC had the opportunities from 1994 to call these mal-behaving and many times political-criminal Afrikaner-leaders to book but failed by own free-will and own agendas to do something on it. Present-day revenge for apartheid is too late and only reflects political-immaturity and barbaric cognitive functioning. To be totally unchained from apartheid's shame, victimisation and revenge, many of the present-day quite innocently but blame-loaded Afrikaners, will only really be free when their old-guard of troublemaking NP-AB-DRC leaders has passed away. That can take time.

There are always two sides to a coin, but in battles and wars the winners are always seen as the innocents and the only victims who need justified compensation and revenge. The winners do not often take responsibility for their mistakes. The Afrikaner has been paraded as the sole wrongdoers ever since 1994. Their mistakes have been screened to the world, while the stained history of the Blacks remain hidden.^{7,43,141-144}

Discrimination, whether driven by race, ethnicity or just common jealousy, has existed from the start of humanity. Fighting it and coping with it was one of the main reasons for the development of the world's many religions. Still, notwithstanding all these doctrines and millions of prayers to heal racism and ethnic prejudices, it persists. Today all forms of discrimination are still with us everywhere during every moment, and it will be there forever, because it has been incurable thus far. Discrimination is not unique to the Afrikaners; it is also an inherent part of the Black mindset. Derrick Bell^{18, p. 119} describes racism in mankind very effectively when he says that it is "an integral, permanent and indestructible component of society."

In light of its permanency it is of utmost importance that governments treat allegations and assumptions of racism, ethnicity and discrimination with wisdom. One-sided discriminations created by subjective TRC's with their false findings and reconciliations must be avoided at all cost. It only led to racial discrimination like AA, BEE, EE, RET, RST and various poor judicial verdicts against Whites in the past to make examples of them. In the hands of robust governmental leaders, opinion-makers and officials, these outcomes can have a devastating effect on minority groups.

Degrading behaviours towards the Afrikaner since 1994 makes his stay in South Africa unnecessarily stressful and hastens the dissolution of the group. It only awakens the Herodotus Rules for revenge and complicates racial affairs further. It is a process that can gobble up the ANC itself at the end.³⁷

The current emphasis on the Afrikaners from the side of a minority of Black politicians does not have to be a death sentence. But, these hardliners can, depending who obtains the political power in the near future of South Africa, have a devastating effect on the vicious cycle of revenge and counter-revenge around apartheid. Thankfully the majority of Black South Africans have made peace with their past and have obtained true reconciliation in 1994 and are trying to steer the country to success. It is time that the still aggrieved group of Blacks and Whites in South Africa sit down, sort out their racial troubles, injustices and hate, and face the present and future realities, *not the past*. For such reconciliation they do not need another TRC, they only need openness, honesty and true goodwill.^{101,145-148}

The journalist and radio-presenter, Andile Khumalo, writes about the meaning of the quote "insanity" in the daily life of South Africans as follows^{151, p. 11}:

Narcotics Anonymous and Alcoholics Anonymous use the phrase to highlight the need for drug or alcohol abusers to consciously break habits to become fully rehabilitated. The logic is that while it is normal to try specific interventions to solve serious problems such as addition, it borders on stupidity to repeatedly trial an intervention that has not yielded results.

We've had two decades of this "lovey-dovey" approach. It clearly hasn't worked.

It is time that we take the first step towards rehabilitation of our enslaved minds. We must accept we have a problem. Our problem is that we are insane.

Are all South Africans really insane, starting up in 1652 till today? If Khumalo is correct with his diagnosis, he is the first to describe successfully the reason for South Africans' unquenchable strive, as individuals or as groups, to obtain economical, political, social, ethnic and racial supremacy over each other for more than three centuries. He rooted clearly why insecurity and conflict are constantly reflected in South Africans daily existence. But most of all, he possibly declares at last the reason for the country's Black-White syndrome of domination and discrimination. Insane or not, Khumalo offers good advice to them: *it is time that all South Africans accept their problem and start their own rehabilitation for political and racial sanity.*¹⁵¹

Black and White South Africans need each other in many, many ways, now and in the future. They can cooperate, even though a totally new South African culture and political dimension and domain are needed. For such a positive outcome they need to follow the wise words of the well-known South African publisher, Jonathan Ball, when he said^{152, p. 13}: "If we open a quarrel between the past and the present, we shall find that we have lost the future." Do Black and White South Africans have the will to write a new history that will reflect happy cooperation? If the Afrikaner wants to avoid dissolution in a century from now, it is very important that they strive to reach this aim.

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CHAPTER 6

THE PREPAREDNESS OF AFRIKANERS TO DEAL WITH THE TREATS AND CHALLENGES OF THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA

6.1 Introduction

Boon writes^{1 p. 62}: Then, in 1974, at the stroke of a pen, the Portuguese relinquish control of the colonies of Angola and Mozambique. For years, the Portuguese army, the one into which you were conscripted as a young man, had been fighting Frelimo in the bush. In just a few days, Frelimo is going to take over the government! Images of Mau Mau in Kenya, the slaughter of civilians, even nuns in the Congo, let alone what you saw as a soldier, rush to mind. You look at your wife and two daughters, and your beautiful home, and know what you have to do: get out. You have no foreign currency, no passports, and it is too late to try and get them. So you pack all the valuables you can into your car. You squeeze in granny and the rest of the family and, along with what looks like the entire white Portuguese population of Mozambique, make your way to the South African border at Komatipoort. Overnight, you are a refugee.

Where do you all go? Bez Valley (Johannesburg, RSA)! And why to Bez Valley? Because suddenly you need the tribe. You need the extended Portuguese family to survive. For here, in this strange country, your Portuguese escudos (Mozambique pre-independence currency) mean nothing; you are unable to even speak the language. It doesn't matter that in Lourenço Marques you were landowner and a successful businessman. Here you have nothing. In order to survive, first the extended family and then the tribe draws together. Your uncle speaks a little English and helps you find a job. In crises you group together and find ways of helping each other because you all experience the same treat. Ethnicity is high.

With time, the community is educated in the local culture. You learn to speak English and you progress quickly in business terms. Over the years, you once again become a well-to-do, successful

businessman. Your children are at good local schools, but when they finish high school you decide to move. You no longer live in Bez Valley, although you still have friends there. Now you live in Sandton, Randburg or Mondeor”.

With above description Boon^{1, p.62} sensitively, but thoroughly profiles what can happen when established political systems suddenly collapse and disintegrate. The Portuguese who had become indigenous to Mozambique, were not only left destitute, but also became permanently detached from their trusted leadership and the motherland they served loyally and unquestioningly for many years. This was primarily the direct outcome of political entities that not only suddenly lost all power, but consequently also failed to offer their previously core group of supporters and followers any protection or support whatsoever. This political group were in a certain sense cold-blooded in that they did not take the trouble to negotiate any kind of guarantee with Frelimo for the safety of Portuguese citizens. All the traditional guarantees, written or unwritten, said or unsaid, that had safeguarded the Mozambican Portuguese’s unique lifestyle and their personal safety fell away. Suddenly these Mozambican Portuguese were alone and they were forced to make dramatic life-changes, totally foreign to them. The Portuguese master they served with loyalty and even their lives for many years, became more concern with the interests of Frelimo than their interests.

6.2 The De Klerk pen-stroke

History repeats itself, especially in terms of what happens to groups of people. In South Africa, Uhuru also lifted its head to slowly demolish the nationalist Afrikaners’ empire. In 1994, also with the stroke of a pen, the Afrikaners relinquished control of South Africa. Rather, the De Klerk regime did it on their behalf. He was mandated by a half-baked referendum. The country as a whole went to the African National Congress (ANC), which the Afrikaners fought for years in the bush, on the borders and in the country. For years the NP-AB leadership impressed on people that this group is an enemy, murderers, communists, terrorists and unacceptable citizens. Suddenly they received the blessing of the same NP-AB leaders to become the masters of the Afrikaners, precisely as Frelimo became the masters of the Portuguese in Mozambique with the blessing of the Portuguese authorities twenty years earlier.^{1,2}

The following comparison between the Afrikaners and the Mozambican Portuguese serves to facilitate an understanding of the position of the Afrikaners since 1994 and their reaction to the threat that is the ANC government.

Both of these groups descend from European groups and over time had become indigenous African groups. Both groups had lost contact with their motherlands, but were at all times seen and treated as superiors (based on White supremacy) by the local indigenous people. Both were supported by oppressive security forces that protected their personal safety and their rule over the Blacks populations. Both had access to wealth, opportunities and favours not always available to Blacks. The Portuguese had an established extended family network outside Mozambique (supported further by unrelated Portuguese in South Africa based on ethnicity). The Mozambican Portuguese's Roman Catholic religious groups were far more communally oriented in offering support to its members than the selfish capitalistic Protestant religious groups of the Afrikaners that were the bedrock of the NP-AB political alliance. Both groups practiced racial discrimination: the Afrikaners in an extreme form (varying from planned brutal suppression, impoverishment and manipulating of Blacks up to the Immorality Act), while the Portuguese engaged in a form of racial miscegenation. The Portuguese not only lost their Mozambican citizen's rights, but all their material belongings immediately after Uhuru. They had to restart and rehabilitate their personal, social and economic lives. Their lives became endangered on the very first day of entering Mozambican independence. The Portuguese were suddenly refugees, forced to find a new homeland. They had to learn a new language and accept a new culture. The Mozambican Uhuru at once cut off the Portuguese from their Mozambican hinterland.¹

The Afrikaners were not forced out of South Africa after 1994. Nor were they forced to accept a new culture. They did not lose their South African citizenship or their material possessions. Their lives were not endangered. But still, the South African Uhuru brought immense changes for the Afrikaners and these changes are still intensifying in 2017. Although the real consequences of Black rule for the Afrikaners only emerged five years and longer after 1994, it seems to be in some ways more negative than in the Mozambique of 1974. It is starting to endanger the lives and material possessions of the Afrikaners. Afrikaners have not had extended family systems in other countries since before the Second Anglo Boer War, nor have they had the sympathy of other countries. It was effectively replaced by a NP-AB Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) network that supported and rewarded those who were loyal to the NP-AB-DRC cause. The benefits, favours, rights and privileges, written, unwritten, said or unsaid, that were generated by the apartheid dispensation were central to this network.^{1,3}

6.3 Neo-Calvinism and Afrikaner nationalism of 1910 as a political-religious system

This political-religious system, started in Potchefstroom by the “Doppers” in the North and by DF Malan in the South in the 1910s under the umbrella of Neo-Calvinism and extreme Afrikaner nationalism (strongly influenced after the 1930s by the racism of the Nazis), later had roots in every sphere of the Afrikaner life – social, economic, personal, religious, cultural. The main targets were the vulnerable poor, lower and middle class Afrikaner voters. They won government in 1948, after which the dogma of White supremacy and racial discrimination were established and practiced to the extreme. The ordinary nationalist Afrikaner citizen benefitted financial, politically and socially. In exchange for these comprehensive benefits and safeguards, nationalist Afrikaner citizens and followers of the NP-AB-DRC alliance were required to accept the NP-AB-DRC leadership’s dogma of White supremacy unquestioningly. It was the task of the Afrikaners to Christianize and “save” the Blacks. All this required the promotion of Afrikaner unity and solidarity over and against individualism, the value ascribed to White racial purity and the obstruction and rejection of all cultural and racial foreignness, etc. The ordinary nationalist Afrikaner citizens in the process surrendered their citizen’s rights to the NP-AB-DRC top management, who came to speak, think and act on behalf of the ordinary nationalist Afrikaners. From the late 1940s, the entire Afrikaner social structure was based on this mandate. The NP-AB-DRC benefits and safeguards (written, unwritten, said and unsaid, justified or unjustified, legal or illegal), safeguarding the Afrikaners from physical, political, social, economical and personal onslaughts from the Blacks, were kept alive by the ordinary voters themselves via general and local elections. This idea of the leaders as “saviours” became entrenched in ordinary Afrikaners: all decisions, planning, solutions, future planning and thinking on Afrikaner interests became centralized as a mandate to be executed exclusively by the NP-AB-DRC top management, with the ordinary Afrikaners in a subordinate position.^{3,4}

It never crossed the minds of the general Afrikaner populace that the NP-AB-DRC leadership could falter or double-cross them (especially after 46 years of benefitting and being favoured), so they accepted in good will the De Klerk regime’s unwritten guarantees of an ongoing Afrikaner utopia after 1994. It was in this context of long-lasting security and political benefit that the ordinary Afrikaners blindly accepted the resolutions of the Referendum and sanctioned the ANC via their NP-AB-DRC leadership as the new regime in 1994.

The aim of this chapter is to determine if the guarantees that NP-AB-DRC put forward of the continuation of a strong future White South Africa, promised in so many election manifestos of the NP over the years, kicked in after 1994 and if they still exist today. The further aim is to examine how the ordinary Afrikaners handled post-1994 South Africa treats and challenges. The new role players and organizations that promote Afrikaner interests are also evaluated. Central to this research focus is the doctrine of Afrikaner and White supremacy that dominated from 1948–1994 and the right of Afrikaners to dominate Blacks in all areas of life. It is important that the processes and the various role players in the establishment of this doctrine are understood.⁵⁻⁷

6.4 The “Black danger” and NP-AB leadership’s unwritten guarantees of political rights for ordinary Afrikaners

It became clear that the NP-regime was already a government in crisis with regard to the *Black problem* by the late 1980s. It was the most serious South African statutory problem for the various White regimes since 1910. The Black problem, centring on the incorporation of Black South Africans into the country’s political environment and awarding full voting rights equal to those of the Whites, created enormous conflict in the White society since the founding of the Union of South Africa. This problem, dubbed the *Black danger* in the 1920s by the rising nationalist Afrikaners to gain voters’ support for their dream of an independent Afrikaner republic outside British domination, became the political vehicle through which DF Malan slowly began to rally the poor lower and middle classes of Afrikaners behind his dogma of Afrikaner nationalism since 1913. Afrikaner status, Afrikaans as an exclusive own Afrikaner language, Afrikaner radical economic transformation, Afrikaner state capture, the racial purity of the Afrikaner, race separation, the limitation of Black politics, Afrikaner social and economical empowerment, Afrikaner nation identification, Afrikaner group identity above individuality etc., became the dominant propaganda of the Malan era.^{3,4,8}

For the Afrikaners, especially the bruised and vulnerable Northern Afrikaners still battling with their psychological and financial scars after the Second Anglo Boer War, this Afrikaner messiah and his message were like manna from heaven. Extreme apartheid was born, driven daily by a growing authoritarian Afrikaner leadership who gradually broke down individual thinking, planning and decision making of the ordinary Afrikaner in exchange for the establishment of an exclusive Whiteman’s utopia. The ordinary Afrikaners’ dependence on their NP-AB-DRC leaders to meet all their needs as citizens in time became

internalized in most of the post-1910 Afrikaners and the following three generations up to 1994. It not only led to grand apartheid to manage the ever-growing and ever-present “Black danger,” but also contributed to the rigid and ruthless reinforcement of apartheid for nearly five decades to follow.^{3,4,8}

Schlemmer⁸ discusses the interrelation between the “Black danger” and archetypical apartheid and the process around its maintenance, including favouring the Afrikaners. He writes that it was developed to its epitome in the Verwoerdian period. Schlemmer describes apartheid as follows^{8, pp. 8-9}:

It represented a brutal, massive but almost heroic attempt on the part of the then ethnically solidary NP of the time to secure a correspondence between nation and territory for Whites by imposing an order much more incisive than race segregation. It was the period of the grand experiment: dividing South Africa into homelands, called national states, by using a full barrage of legislative, economic and administrative strategies. It might have succeeded at that stage of Black politicization and international sympathy had it not been for other major elements in the tradition of government: paternalism; a disregard of the interests and aspirations of the subjugated peoples and the all-pervasive conviction that the most developed nation deserved the lion’s share of resources.

It must be noted that the NP introduced a number of policy reforms and adaptations (from September 1978) that departed from the rigid “traditional” apartheid policy. Radical territorial separation and separation in the political and social lives of the races and the idea of an exclusive and autonomous nation for Whites in the central area (87%) of South Africa was to a great extent abandoned. In these “reforms,” the concept of the White nation made place for the concept of the autonomy of White communities within a multi-racial nation.⁸ This “new liberal” thinking was reflected by senior NP-leaders like Pik Botha^{8, p.25} (foreign affairs minister) who argued on 7 February 1986 that as long as suitable constitutional means of protecting minority rights [referring to Afrikaner rights] could be identified, the impact of racial categories should be removed. This “liberal” remark is in line with two earlier remarks by cabinet minister Chris Heunis. On 8 May 1985 he said^{8, p.38}: “Many things have occurred in the past for which some of us must now ask forgiveness,” and, “A White power monopoly has become intolerable...”. PW Botha (President) added to this rhetoric on 21 April 1986 by saying^{8, p.38}: “We made a mistake,” while earlier on 27 March 1986 FW De Klerk said^{8, p.38}: “Any system aimed at keeping some of

its participants in a subordinate position through clever or devious means is doomed to failure. It must be visible and honestly just and equitable towards everybody” [undoubtedly Blacks]. There was an enormous decline in the numbers of Afrikaner farmers (most adhering to the extreme racist thinking of DF Malan) and they were growing poorer. As such the farmers became unsupportive of the NP and became less important as voters (they declined from 116 000 in 1950 to more or less 65 000 in 1986). By 1985-1986 the NP turned their attention to urban (industrial/business) Afrikaner votes. There was for the first time an open negativity from the side of the NP-AB leaders towards certain sectors of their voter corps and doubt about the continuation of the NP-AB alliance as the guardian and extended family of some Afrikaners.⁸ A NP member of Parliament made this clear in 1985 when he said^{8, p. 23}: “We have been afraid of White farmers far too long – we must be prepared to lose votes.”

Was the above tactful rhetoric of 1985–1986 on the side of the NP leaders the masked introduction of Black rule? Were they giving notice of the end of the existing mandate of the NP-AB leadership (from as early as 1913) that so gradually eroded the individual thinking, planning and decision making of the Afrikaner? Was the Mozambican–Portuguese syndrome of 1974 arriving in South Africa? The answer is a decisive “yes” in terms of above rhetoric. FW De Klerk’s dramatic turn-around in political thinking confirms it.⁸ On 5 February 1986 he said publically that^{8, p. 38}: “voluntary group association would lead to chaos and confusion,” reflecting clearly his hidden racism and his support for the traditional NP-AB race policy from the days of DF Malan. Only a month later, he expresses a contradicting view when on 27 March 1986 he says^{8, p. 38}: “Any system aimed at keeping some of its participants [undoubtedly Blacks] in a subordinate position through clever or devious means is doomed to failure. It must be visible and honestly just and equitable towards everybody [undoubtedly Blacks].” These leaders were not only warning Afrikaners that the mandate of the NP-AB leaders had come to an end, but also that they can no longer guarantee the political, social, personal, as well as the economical and civil rights to which the Afrikaners were accustomed too.

Although it is argued that the 6 May 1987 general election gave the NP a mandate to work towards the central representation of Blacks outside the politically and economically marginalised homelands, it was clear that the interests of Whites had to be guaranteed by the NP-AB leaders for them to stay in power. The inroads of the Conservative Party (CP), founded on 20 March 1982, into Afrikaner politics in the May 1987 general election slowed

down the “new liberal thinking” of the NP-leaders on South African politics. The CP warned about the NP-AB-DRC leadership surrendering the rights of the Afrikaners in the name justice and equality to Blacks. In this election 610 516 voters (29.62%) voted anti-NP (conservative right), representing a 25% swing away from the NP’s 1981 electoral support. The CP obtained 22 seats to become the official opposition on its first attempt and only five years after establishment. This outcome gave the NP a taste of what could be expected if dramatic pro-Black reforms and “liberal” political changes followed. (It reminded of the unexpected fall of the Hertzog regime in the general election of 1943 to JC Smuts. Smuts reduced the nationalist Afrikaners to only 43 seats against his 110 seats in a house of 160).³⁹ PW Botha put the brakes on, reassuring the Afrikaners of the NP’s good intentions.⁹

In 12 June 1986 the State of Emergency called in 1985 was widened to include the whole country, whereas the 1985-proclamation was only applicable to one third of South Africa’s 133 magisterial districts. This caused a reconsideration of the “emergence” of “liberal” political thinking within the NP. Politicians reassured Afrikaners of the NP-AB guarantees for their protection in the future. Many ordinary citizens saw the implications of the 1986 state of emergency as a “restarting” of apartheid by the NP-AB leadership by means of suppression tactics.⁸

The doubts and distrust in the NP-AB leadership which had started to emerge in 1985 to 1986, was quickly laid to rest with various anti-Black actions. The NP-AB reconfirmed their commitment to safeguard in future the political, social, personal, economical and civil rights of the Afrikaners.^{8,9}

Notwithstanding all the talk during 1985–1986 within the NP’s top management of some form of “incorporation” of Blacks into South African politics, the NP rhetoric still contained the old unifying emphasis on the concept of a European standard and way of life, mythical or otherwise, which must be upheld at all times, reports Schlemmer.^{8, p.27} The NP was still concerned about an entire subset of Whites whose rights, as was done since 1948, had to be safeguarded and guaranteed by the NP-AB leaders in its mandate to Afrikaners if they wanted to stay in power. The NP member of Parliament, Albert Nothnagel, describes these interests of Afrikaners inside the NP-AB leadership’s mandate as follows^{8, p. 27}: “...a combination of lifestyle, a sense of origin and identity, the psychological satisfaction of an in-group community life, standards of public order, behaviour

and respectability and sufficient control over the allocation of resources and the maintenance of security to ensure the continuation of these benefits”.

Another senior NP member of Parliament summed up the major interests of nationalist Afrikaners in 1985-1986 as being^{8, p.27}: “...security and standards – there is a great fear (among whites) that a third world situation will arise in their areas.” A senior NP-MP reflected that some in the inner circles of the NP wanted the old rigid apartheid guidelines to be included in future guarantees on Afrikaner rights^{8, p. 27}: “National Party thinking gave the central concern a more ethnic flavour but also stressed the composite character of its ideology by listing Western values, Christian values, life views, community cohesion, material security, a familiar and recognisable environment, a strong economy, property rights, an objective legal system and the protection of established institutions in general. These everyday or popular interests would be taken for granted in any typical Western society. In South Africa, however, they are clearly much more consciously experienced as constituting a first world sub-society within a third world continent”.

Extreme apartheid, driven daily by an authoritarian nationalist Afrikaner leadership, remained undisturbed up to the 1990 Referendum and the 1994 transfer of political power to the ANC. PW Botha supported it in his address to Parliament after winning the 6th May 1987 general election.⁸ Schlemmer refers to the following keywords in Botha’s speech^{8pp.13-14}: “...It is not possible in a multicultural country like the Republic of South Africa to talk about the protection of individual rights unless one talk about the protection of minority rights at the same time...it is (also) impossible to talk about the protection of minority rights unless one talks about the protection of minority groups at the same time and the prevention of the domination unless groups enjoy statutory recognition and the relationship among them is regulated constitutionally. Constitutional development cannot take place in isolation, but has to be preceded and accompanied by economic and social processes to create the conditions in which renewal may be continued on the basis of security...our challenge lies in narrowing the gap between the first world and the third world without lowering standards in South Africa...At the same time the government will ensure that safety and security will the highest priority because without them development and progress are not possible...”.

It is clear from the above that the NP-AB leadership tried to guarantee the Afrikaners’ political and other rights in the future during the late 1980s. It was

included in their political planning, whether by legation or by brute force. This outcome placed the Afrikaners in a much more favourable position than the Mozambican Portuguese, who had to leave Mozambique empty-handed and without any guarantee of their Mozambican political position and status in the future.

The doctrine of racism and its constant impression on nationalist Afrikaners by the NP-AB-DRC alliance's leadership led to a successful Afrikaner ethnic and racial despotism within half a century in South Africa. The NP-AB-DRC used methods such as ostracising and punishing dissident Afrikaners for political deviating and anti-Afrikaner behaviour and compensating people for approved pro-Afrikaner behaviours. This situation was never challenged or questioned by grassroots nationalist Afrikaners and was inculcated in the new generations of nationalist Afrikaners. Greed played a part in the start and continuation of conformity to racism.^{4,10-12}

Most Afrikaners grew up in this undemocratic political context. They obliged themselves to a lifestyle manipulated by the arrogant leaders of the NP-AB-DRC alliance. By means of parliamentary mandating, they indirectly took away the ordinary Afrikaners' basic right to decide for themselves on their behaviour, thinking and planning. These are common rights in a democracy.¹³ Ordinary Afrikaners were trapped within a doctrine where discrimination against non-Whites and negative attitudes against other ethnic groups were regarded as appropriate, correct and morally justified. They adhered to the opinions, advice, viewpoints and integrity of the leaders of the NP-AB-DRC alliance unquestioningly, even if their own logical thinking contradicted it.^{4,13,14}

For most nationalist Afrikaners, the political rights, privileges, benefits and favours they gained by supporting and practicing apartheid became similar to what Ferguson^{14, p.3} writes of the rich, imperial and arrogant British in the 1900s: "...a state of affairs as normal, certain, and permanent, except in the direction of further improvement, and any deviation from it as aberrant, scandalous, and avoidable". However, there is always an expensive price attached to such behaviour in the future, especially where greed is the motivator. For the greedy British it came in two devastating World Wars and the loss of their Empire; for the nationalist Afrikaners it arrived in 1994, stripping them of apartheid's rights, privileges, benefits and favours.^{4,13,14}

6.5 The intertwining of the NP and the AB in creating and guaranteeing Afrikaner rights

It is important to reflect in short on the Afrikaner leadership who gradually subdued the independent thinking, planning and decision making of the ordinary Afrikaner in exchange for favour in an exclusive “Whiteman’s Utopia.”

The NP and AB in time developed into independent and comprehensive safe havens for and guardians of nationalist Afrikaners’ political and cultural interests. The NP-AB leadership’s political and military power as part of the Afrikaner government for the period 1948 up to 1994, made them, in terms of opinion-forming on and implementation of political, racial and cultural matters, unchallengeable and mighty political machines. This position offered them the opportunity to force their racist political opinions and plans, formed over many years of discussion, evaluation and testing, to promote only Afrikaner interests. This was driven by a small group of *super-nationalist Afrikaners*. This NP-AB power gradually led to corruptive and nepotistic result where more or less 20 000 members of the AB, supported further by as many of its “Junior ABs”, called the “Ruiterwagte” and “Rapportryers”, enjoyed many work and financial opportunities and various other rights and privileges that other Afrikaners outside the circle of the AB and NP, were denied. There was even a clear discrimination between members with dual membership of the NP and AB and members with only NP membership. There was open and total discrimination against any dissident Afrikaner. These Afrikaners were in the same position as the suppressed Blacks politically, socially and economically.^{2,11,15,16}

Afrikaner dissidents and non-conformists were often labelled as communists. This followed on widespread propaganda and stigmatization of anyone who challenged the broader racist and supremacist belief system on politics and culture. There is sound reason for “liberal” Afrikaners of that time to say that they have only known discrimination their whole lives. They grew up mostly in the politically liberal southern part of the country, studied at various Afrikaner universities and worked in the northern or southern parts of South Africa. They experienced it first under the NP-AB alliance from 1948 to 1994 in terms of White-on-White discrimination and then from 1994 under the ANC-regime and its partners in terms of Black-on-White discrimination. This tendency to discriminate contributed too many English-speaking Whites, liberal Afrikaners and of course other races to slowly turn away from the Afrikaner nationalist establishment after 1948. From the 1930s onwards there was a strong Nazi influence in the NP-AB’s general vision and political views and doctrines. Their

indoctrination and manipulation was so effective that the arguments and opinions of political opponents of the NP-AB alliance never really made any impact on the general Afrikaner population. Many Black and White opponents were scandalously silenced with jail sentences, exile and murder by the NP regime's secret agents. Suppression and even murder became approved and sanctioned behaviours for the nationalist Afrikaner followers as a result of the political doctrines and false information fed to them by the NP-regime's leadership.^{2,8,11,15-19}

The NP-AB alliance was already established by the 1930s and together they indoctrinated common Afrikaners, especially the various poor segments of the lower and middle classes. This alliance's profoundly negative impact on the broader social society and the internalization of their political contamination among the highly receptive and uninformed ordinary nationalist Afrikaners evident from the growth in member numbers of the NP from 1948 to the late 1970s. The top management of the NP-AB alliance quickly became the sole thinkers, decision makers and spokespersons for the common nationalist Afrikaner. They instilled in the Afrikaner that racism was appropriate and correct. The Afrikaner youth became their main target.^{2,4,10-12,17,20-22}

In March 1992 the ordinary Afrikaners, still guided and driven daily by an authoritarian Afrikaner-leadership which had minimised their self-thinking,-planning and-decision-making in exchanged for their exclusive living rights and protection in a Whiteman's Utopia created by Verwoerd in 1961 with his First Republic of South Africa, agreed to F W De Klerk's plea to vote in a referendum endorsing *only* the negotiation process on the possibility of a new type of Black-White mutual-government.^{2,4,22}

On "total Black-rule" was F W De Klerk dumb in the referendum: indeed he promised a second referendum on the matter of change of ruler-ship or handing over to Black-rule, but it seems his *volte face-experience* (changing from right-wing to left-wing in the NP), starting suddenly on 2 February 1990, made him seemingly short in memory about his future political responsibilities and promises as far it concerns the future interests of Afrikaners. F W De Klerk's *volte face-* or Damascus-experience of 1990 is still today "undeclared behaviour". What is clear is that De Klerk contributed extensively to the haste-up of the dissimulation of the Afrikaners.^{2,4,22}

It must be note further that the De Klerk-regime was facing more and more a right-wing backlash inside the NP: In the February 1992 election they saw a

serious decline in votes at the traditional NP-AB-Dopper Parliament-seat of Potchefstroom. This was a clear decline starting in 1990 under leadership of the political-inexperienced F W De Klerk's and after the reconstructed NP becoming a multi-racial party. It was a demoralized NP that was ruling and for the NP-caucus it was clear that the Conservative Party (CP) can be the new White-rulers in the future. Indeed, it became also clear that very few of NP-members would be re-voted to Parliament in a post-Apartheid RSA. November 1993 statistics showed an estimated NP support of between a mere 15% to 18% in general, while with Whites it declined to less than 34% and Blacks basically zero. From Afrikaners side it was thus already obvious for many NP-members in 1993 that the NP under F W De Klerk and his right-hand man, Roelf Meyer, were not a match for the ANC's negotiation-team and that the NP would not come to power again in the future, either in a Black- or White political system. The NP-leadership's capitulation to the ANC, even before the 1992-Referendum, became fact, as the then minister Dawie De Villiers bemoaned it to the De Klerk-cabinet. De Klerk and his cadres failed already at that time to guarantee the NP-members and other White-voters who had voted for them naively in the Referendum, in future the coverage of power, protection and patronage previously offered by the NP to them: an outcome proofed to be totally correct in 2017. The NP was a lame duck from 1990 under the leadership of F W De Klerk as far as first-order Afrikaner-interests concern. The first so called democratic elections of 27 April 1993 was well-masked by the De Klerk-regime in the handing over of power to Black-ruling. Looking back today on this development, it was nothing less than a well-planned bloodless *coup d' état*, executed successfully by a small band of dissipated Afrikaner nationalist on the unsuspected Afrikanerdom, changing their political milieu for ever. Indeed, it was the officially start-up of straightforward majority Black-rule and the end of the "traditional" rights, privileges, favours, etc., exclusively enjoyed (justified or unjustified) by the Whites during Apartheid up to 1994.^{2,4,22}

In 1992 the general Afrikaner population, still guided by an authoritarian Afrikaner leadership, agreed to vote in a referendum on Black rule. The outcome was a "yes." The naive Afrikaners trusted the various unwritten promises of the NP-AB-DRC leadership that nothing radical will follow after 1994 because of checks and balances in the government of national unity. (In large F W De Klerk owed his 1992-Referendum "victory" to his so called "guarantees" in the constitutional proposals for which he sought a mandate. This should have had included permanent power sharing in a federal system in which power was to be devolved to the maximum possible extent to regions, a free market economy and

guarantees for the status of Afrikaans, etc.). Initially the Afrikaners' reality and rights seemed untouched. All initially went well in the "reconciliation government" until the NP was basically ousted by the Mandela-government (an expected normal development in political evolution and revolution) and De Klerk chose an escape route. The trust of the Afrikaners quickly changed into distrust with the unmasking of the De Klerk-regime's true political colours. With the entry of Marthinus van Schalkwyk as the new leader of the NP, its total collapse arrived quickly. Suddenly the Afrikaners had not only been double-crossed and betrayed by their trusted NP-AB leadership, but they were also left without any of the many guarantees or back-ups assured by the NP-AB leadership to steer their political future. With the collapse of the NP as a political and military power and a safe haven for the ordinary Afrikaner nationalists, Afrikaners were "homeless." Many Afrikaners see themselves as a group without a "destiny;" strangers in their previous own territory, stripped from their immense political power and favour, while they seem more and more unwelcome in the ANC-regime.^{2,4,22}

What the unprepared and naive broader population of Afrikaners failed to understand, even as late as in the 2000s, is that the De Klerk-regime was not in a position to guarantee them any of the rights that they enjoyed in such abundance under grand apartheid. These guarantees were worthless political promises, emotional rhetoric, utterances used by opportunistic politicians to promote only their own interests and to manipulate. Many senior NP-negotiators realized this well, but stay silent on the fact that the NP could not secure a constitutional blueprint that contained all of its proposals build on the Referendum-promises in virtually unchanged form. It can be read already in the 1990 to 1994 failed management of F W De Klerk and his regime to control at that stage already violence and to assure good government themselves, forget in a Black-regime.²² Spence^{22, p. 40} writes: "Coupled with political violence has been sharply increasing criminal violence, including numerous cases of the brutal slaying of elderly whites on isolated farms. This, too, has rubbed off on de Klerk by strengthening the perception that his administration has been unable to protect communities and has 'lost control'". De Klerk's "lost of control", starting in 1990 and that had stayed with him through the rest of his official political career, is undoubtedly still with the Afrikaners in 2017.

It is doubtful if the De Klerk-regime really would have wanted to guarantee these rights, even if they could. After 1994 the NP-AB leaders had a new master to serve and to please and new gains to make for themselves again. Afrikaners

misunderstood what De Klerk meant on 27 March 1986 when he said^{8, p.38}: “Any system aimed at keeping some of its participants in a subordinate position through clever or devious means is doomed to failure. It must be visible and honestly just and equitable towards everybody”. After 1994 he extended his so-called ‘justice’ and ‘equitability’ to everybody in South Africa – *remember*: there was a new master to serve and to please! Also they missed out on his *volte face* or “Damascus experience” of 2 February 1990, seemingly changing his spiritual visions on politics dramatically.

Afrikaners did not even realize how well planned the NP-AB rejection was. These leaders quickly sought ways to ensure that they would not be prosecuted for apartheid crimes and to make new gains for themselves. Mamphela Ramphele describes these hidden intentions and mechanisms of self-enrichment and personal gain that characterized the NP-ANC talks on a new political dispensation instead of a spirit of keeping promises of political rights for ordinary Afrikaners after 1994 when she writes^{23, p. 20}:

It is significant that those who led the charge on the NP side in the negotiation of our political settlement were Afrikaners elite redeployed from business and academia.

Their brief was to protect the foundations of capital accumulation and obstruct any redistributive policy framework designed to address the extreme poverty and inequality affecting the majority of people.

Key business people worked patiently to shift the mindsets of the less-experienced ANC leaders to get them to adopt market-friendly liberal economic policy frameworks.

The elite comprise underpinning our 1994 political settlement pressured the ANC, in the interest of political power, to sacrifice redistribution and concomitant socio-economic upliftment of the citizens, while the NP exchanged political power for continuing White economic power.

Politicians’ hidden agendas and conscienceless abuse and betrayal of their people are possibly best described by Palkhivala when he says^{24, p. 81}: “...it is beyond hope that the correct guidance can ever come from politicians. They are self-centred and have their minds glued on their own personal prospects and those of their party; and shamelessly look upon people as vote banks and not as

human beings entitled to disinterested guidance from their so-called political leaders”.

With the political bankruptcy of the NP and its loss of power, the AB, once the NP’s think tank and brain trust and used over the years as a powerful political machine to ensure the capture, command and control of South Africa for the exclusive benefit of the Afrikaners, came also the lost its political and military power.²³ Only a remnant is left today, just enough for a museum piece. (If the ANC-regime should ever consider an Afrikaner institute and its members for prosecution for crimes against humanity, the AB would be the most appropriate one).

It is clear that the ordinary Afrikaner’s position is ultimately in some aspects the same as that of the Mozambican Portuguese who were forced to flee in 1974. Both were suddenly, after the coming of Uhuru, on their own after being betrayed by their long-trusted leaders who they served with utmost loyalty, support and submissiveness. Both found themselves in an extremely hostile political setup. Both were forced to find their own solutions to function. Both were to a great extent to blame them selves because of their own greed, self-positioning, arrogance and White supremacy that closed their eyes to the indigenous realities of Southern Africa.

6.6 The phantom of the DRC is still lurking in some Afrikaners’ mindsets

Today all that is left of the Afrikaner’s previous bullying institutions to guide, support and indoctrinate him with inappropriate Afrikaner ideologies and dogmas in his present personal and political disorientation and insecurity are the three main Afrikaner churches. Here the DRC is still the dominant role player.

The historical role of the DRC in the establishment and continuation of racial discrimination is apparent from the outset. Today, after the collapse of the NP and the paralysing of the AB, it is the strongest conditioner and booster of the Afrikaner’s racial attitudes, although most of the nationalist Afrikaners have publically moved from hyper- to hypo-nationalism.

The DRC’s involvement with apartheid is hidden in a church-political foundation where racial differentiation and racial purity were prominent church doctrines from the 1850s. History shows that the DRC’s formal racial diversity began in 1857 when its Cape Synod introduced segregated congregations. It was a policy that was consistent with the already racially discriminatory church

policies of the DRC itself and the two other reformed churches that were founded and very active in the Transvaal and Free State republics.^{3,10,12}

The 1857-decision was undoubtedly one of the main precursors to the grand apartheid of 1948 to 1994. It introduced a unique church-political life and way of thinking among most of the DRC members. In time it became entrenched in its members across the country. The DRC's church culture had become embedded in a contaminating alliance and interaction between the hierarchies of the DRC and nationalist Afrikaner politicians, as well as the leaderships of the NP and that of the AB. After 1948, this interaction became part of the thinking and behaviours of DRC members.^{3,10,12}

After the 1948 NP take-over of the South African government, the DRC gave its unconditional support and approval to the NP's new policy of apartheid and started to build the DRC's political authority within this NP-DRC alliance. The DRC used official church literature to advocate and to justify apartheid, which they claimed to be "godlike diversity," while several influential and leading DRC ministers, academics and writers produced written propaganda to promote and to establish apartheid in general in the church life and to justify apartheid from Scripture in the DRC. Texts from the Bible were reformulated and misrepresented. The sole intention was to instil apartheid in DRC members and in their religious, social and personal lives as something that was Biblically correct.^{3,10,12}

By 1950 the DRC propaganda had been so successful that a joint congress of the three Afrikaner churches and the Dutch Reformed Mission Church [the Coloured DRC at that time, today the United Reformed Church (URC)] in Bloemfontein decided overwhelmingly in favour of total racial separation in their church life. The DRC apartheid's policy was reaffirmed at several successive General Synods. Socio-economic and political racial discriminations were quickly embraced, internalized and promoted by many opportunistic nationalist Afrikaner DRC members. Apartheid legislation for example led to the expropriation of the land and properties of non-Whites to create White Areas. Afrikaners were enormously benefitted as they could obtain ownership of these properties cheaply. Job reservation also benefited them. Additionally, apartheid seemed to serve as an external force to "protect" DRC members from the temptation to intermix with non-Whites. A Christian dogma of wisdom had made place for a pathological dogma of financial-political greed in many DRC members' lives.^{3,10,12}

Although the DRC's racial policies evoked criticism from some of its liberal theologians, the impact was minimal and these elements were promptly suppressed by the hierarchy of the DRC. The expulsions of dissident DRC ministers and thinkers demolished criticism against the DRC's racism. The DRC's General Synod decision of 1974 that the Church of Christ (and hence the DRC) had to be opened to all races, peoples and nations, were entirely ignored by the NP-AB hierarchy of the DRC and the managerial boards of the various DRC congregations.^{3,10,12}

The DRC-NP affiliation in time became even more contaminated by extreme racism, which was absolutely entrenched until the fall of the NP in 1994. The NP-AB alliance influenced the DRC as an equal partner. Its stated principle of Afrikaner Christian nationalism changed quickly to Afrikaner Nationalist Christianity with hyper-Afrikaner nationalism in the first place. In this system, racial discrimination, despite its devastating negative psychological and financial consequences for non-Whites, was practiced by its indoctrinated DRC members, which included a strong contingent of NP-politicians and AB-members.^{3,10,12}

Racism is still part of the DRC and present among its members. The established value and belief systems of nationalist Christianity were not dispelled by the DRC in 1994 with the advent of the new South Africa. Today it is still conveyed subtly to DRC-members and inculcated by its hierarchy, just disguised enough to operate within the provisions of the South African Constitution and the Human Rights Commission.

Since 1994 many of the DRC-members' (especially the elderly) negative racial values were unfortunately strengthened by a multitude of destructive events in the country rather than mitigated: examples of these events are the loss of their "Afrikaner state," the post-1994 political, social and economic chaos that was created by the ANC government, White poverty, unprecedented violence, crime, corruption and murder. The worst was most certainly the miserable way their long-time partner and patron, the NP, left them lurching and alone. The AB has also started to fade as an emotional and political guide. These events left them disillusioned and politically more radical, with just one notable Afrikaner fortress left that still seeks to protect their church-life, personal and cultural rights, namely the DRC in its current, rigid racial form.^{2-4,10,12}

The fact that DRC-members (especially its youth) have been leaving the church in droves the last decade for the less racially rigid charismatic churches (a phenomenon that will increase dramatically in the next decade), together with the lack of inflow of active, young members, as well as the rise in deaths of its elderly members, predicts that the DRC, as a significant driver to internalize and to strengthen racism among its members, will disappear in the near future. However, to think at this stage that racial discrimination will disappear from the DRC is wishful thinking – their elderly members have been indoctrinated for too long on the racial differences between Whites and non-Whites and the right of Afrikaners to discriminate against non-Whites. This contamination will stay with the DRC until it disbands or all its elderly members have passed away.

6.7 Past and present actions and movements to safeguard the Afrikaner's future

It is clear that no provision was made by the NP-AB-DRC alliance to accommodate and to steer the ordinary Afrikaners after 1994 in their adaptation to a new South Africa. The changes in their political, social, economic and personal functioning in the post-1994 South Africa were not only unexpected, but often phenomenal. Many negative emotional outcomes have followed. Afrikaner experiences of injustices, bitterness, insecurity and indirectness should surely be addressed urgently. This seems to have attracted the attention of a few “saviours and savers” of the Afrikaners.

Can Afrikaners stand on their own legs after their NP-leadership and the NP-AB guardianship failed them in 1994 like the proto-Afrikaners successfully did in the 1700s? South African politics and human rights have dramatically changed in the last 20 years, making the racial discrimination and racial misbehaviour that the older generation of Afrikaners grew up with criminal offences. Lifestyles, habits, beliefs, socio-economics, thinking about the future, traditions, group values, family life and demographic limitations have all changes dramatically in South Africa. The individual has detached from group conformity so that it is unnecessary for people to be accommodated in close groups or to be guided by “exclusive” leaders and groups to survive in the future. Also, most ordinary Afrikaners have as individuals started to make these changes of modernization. The condemnation of the NP, the side-lining of the AB and the vague role of the DRC in many Afrikaners' lives, confirm the process of Afrikaners' departure from these three previously dominant racism contaminated groups. This new self-orientation and individuality makes the chances excellent for the individual Afrikaner to take on the many challenges of

New South Africa. Many Afrikaners, especially the young, have successfully crossed over from the exclusivist Afrikaner identity and entity to which many Afrikaners were exposed, to an inclusive South African identity and entity, driven primarily by indigenous realities. On the other hand, it seems as if as many ordinary Afrikaners are still caught in the culture of the old South Africa, drifting around without direction or aims and beset with conflict. Many others show a tendency of rationalizing the present in terms of the past, seriously clouding their insight on conflict and adaptation. Many of these persons seem to have fallen prey to opportunistic “helpers of the Afrikaner case.”

The question is what has happened in general to ordinary Afrikaners in their daily functioning as citizens in South Africa from 1994 up to 2017? How have they managed to deal with the threats and challenges of an unfriendly political environment? The question is also who are the persons and institutions who/which are taking care of them or offer them support services in the absence of the NP and AB?

Before and after 1994 there have been various attempts by new role players “to safeguard the Afrikaners from dissolution.” These role players had varying success. They also offered “guarantees” and visions on how the “dire political, social, economical and cultural situation of Afrikaners” can and will be rectified by these so-called pro-Afrikaner organizations and by a small group of self-appointed new leaders of the Afrikaners. Some of these so-called “saviours” and “rescuers” or “Afrikaner-White helmets” gained the support of a portion of ordinary nationalist Afrikaners who are still anchored in apartheid thinking and the nostalgia of living in grand apartheid (and of course fantasies of re-establishing it in the near future).

Whatever ideas opportunists impress on present-day insecure Afrikaners, the reality is that the Afrikaners can just one day suddenly disappear: dissolute by their own doing, due to natural processes or a hostile environment. These circumstances ask of Afrikaners to look to the future constructively. We can only hope they will think, plan and act more constructively and successfully than their ancestors did thus far. Every Afrikaner must know and understand the indigenous realities of South Africa in order to decide objectively on his or her own fate and future, as well as that of their immediate descendants. Any support and guidance offered either to the Afrikaners as individuals or as a group, must be critically evaluated, otherwise they will be exploited again as the NP-AB leaders did for many years. It is all the more tragic if a people become dissolute

of their own doing. Following wrong advice, guidance, trends and solutions spell dissolution by own doing; Afrikaners must note it well.^{2-4,10,11,14,22,25}

The important question at this stage is: What did the Afrikaner himself do to better or to safeguard his position before 1992 and in the post-1994 political dispensation of South Africa? Various options were in available in the past. They are still available, but they will now achieve less than they could have 20 years or more ago.

One option is (or should have been in the 1960s) the Chamberlain-Churchill approach, also known as the “Chamberlain-Churchill reaction of self-assertion”^{3,14}. The *Chamberlain* element’s intention is to appease the enemy at all time (stemming from the policy of Chamberlain to appease Hitler at all times and not to be aggressive to his neighbouring countries). These actions lack constructive resistance to dangers to the tribe’s existence (the NP-regime’s opportunistic approach since the late-1980s and onwards to Black power was to appease them, while at the same time surrendering power slowly). The *Churchill* element (representing Churchill’s belief that there was no limits to Hitler’s aggression and that he must be fought and neutralized) means that one takes on the enemy in various forms, representing full resistance and battle without fear of annihilation (an approach strongly inculcated in the armed forces during the offices of Verwoerd and Vorster).^{3,4}

Another approach propagated by some Afrikaner political strategists was and is still to trust the future in terms previous historical outcomes for the Afrikaners and the “sacred” role of the Afrikaner in the South African history (an approach very near the Chamberlain approach of appeasement, but more passive and characterized by a lack of any involvement). This fatalism in the Afrikaner thinking and belief system becomes quite apparent in times of loss and failure as a group or after being abandoned by leaders, as reflected in old Israel. As a result of total disempowerment and their dire situation, the group stops all resistance to the enemy. Even constructive actions stop. Self-isolation and self-pity are prominent. Biblical examples of the Jewish people being rescued from unavoidable dissolution motivate the Afrikaners to believe that a “new life” is waiting and that they will be saved. This thinking seems to find fertile ground among politically, economically and socially suppressed people when they did not implement the Chamberlain-Churchill approach in time.¹⁴

Often a belief in the mystical and trust in the supernatural visions of prophets, intertwined with a historical/Biblical context, is used to manipulate people in search for a positive future. In the case of the Afrikaners, a prominent role player in these future visions of Afrikaner salvation is the “prophet” Siener van Rensburg. He prophesied that “Afrikaners will come to power again in South Africa.” In this context, the prophecy of an independent Boer state becomes prominent. This belief seems to be strongly established among the Northern Afrikaners.^{26,27}

There are also the various, but mostly false utopias that “Afrikaner-friendly organizations” and self-appointed leaders present to ordinary Afrikaners. These organizations seldom offer free membership and support. They use the motto “we are here for the Afrikaners,” to make money in the short run, knowing very well that their efforts “to better the Afrikaner’s position” locally or globally, is of little significance. The promises, if they are fulfilled, are often not sustainable in the long run.

The above three reactions are discussed more detail in the following sections. These sections discuss the potential to assist Afrikaners to adapt to new threats and challenges in the new South Africa, as well as possibilities to avert their dissolution in a century’s time. On the other hand, the discussion reflects often doubtful business enterprises and dubious characters that can harm Afrikaners interests, especially the poorer and less educated lower classes who are desperate for help, guidelines and new leaders to promote their interests and safeguard them from political dangers.

6.7.1 Chamberlain-Churchill approach

The Chamberlain-Churchill approach, designed in 1939 as a guideline to fight the continuous and constant rise in the aggression of Hitler and his Third Reich, seems to be a good guideline for evaluating what the Afrikaners could have done in the past and what they can still do to protect their interests, although less would be possible at present.^{14,28}

Niall Ferguson describes the Afrikaner’s choice between fight or flight and the consequences that awaited Afrikaners after 1994 (and as far back as 1910) if they acted in certain ways well when he writes^{14, p. 318}: “Even a dog has a choice when confronted by a more aggressive dog: to fight or to flee.” Based on the Chamberlain-Churchill approach, the Afrikaners had four options in the 1990s^{14, p. 319}:

- **Acquiescence.** The primary approach of the Afrikaner since 1994 was “hoping for the best”, trusting that the Blacks’ gestures of good will towards the Whites are sincere. They let the Blacks “have their way for a while in South Africa” before taking some repair actions. It seems the Afrikaners gave the ANC unwritten permission with their Yes-vote in the 1993 referendum to mismanage the country, to practice corruption, nepotism, fraud, and to take financial mismanagement and misadministration of the country to an unprecedented high. The present threats to their pensions, capital, property, as well as AA, EE and BEE (nothing other than legalized racial discrimination), are a few of many dilemmas suddenly facing the Afrikaner (but to which they willingly agreed).

Resistance to these discriminations, especially outside the prescribed legal channels, can only spell disaster and war. A war is beyond the means of Afrikaners at this stage. The Afrikaners have no political or military power to obtain justice; they only have legal action in terms of the Constitution and the Constitutional Court.

This tendency to “hope for the best” corresponds with the (failed) guarantees offered by the De Klerk regime when they mesmerized the Afrikaners into voting yes in exchange for a guarantee that the goodwill of the ANC-elite is sincere and will be honoured in the long run. The (failed) government of national unity should have affirmed this sincere goodwill of the Blacks. The Afrikaners forgot about “for a while before they will be taken repair actions.” Seeing as they lost their power by their own free will in 1994, they have no means to take repair actions besides the Constitutional Court, which can only bring limited “reparation.”

- **Retaliation.** In the context of retaliating are time and resources important. A retaliation party has to act with speed and overwhelming power. This can include physical actions like military retaliation for wrongdoing against the victim (as in the case of the British and Europeans in reaction to Nazi aggression). The Afrikaners did have this kind of reaction up to the 1990s towards the ANC and the other Black revolutionary organizations. However, since the Afrikaners lost all political and military power in 1994, any direct organized military action is excluded as an option. At the moment, retaliation represents only the implementing of

“formal objections and legal steps” as reactions to offensive ANC actions. The only option is passive actions such as approaching the Constitutional Court, and where available and allowed, official parliamentary actions. Thus far these reactions have had limited positive outcomes with respect to Afrikaner interests. Since 1994 Afrikaners have been second-class citizens, and there is very little they can do about it.

- **Deterrence.** During WW2, the British entered into an armed struggle with friendly countries to form a strong united military front to take on the Nazis and to bring them down. In the case of the Afrikaners, there was (White) cooperation with the Portuguese in Mozambique and Angola and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) before the 1990s to take up arms against (Black) aggressive revolutionary organizations. After the end of Portuguese rule in Africa and the ousting of the Smith-regime in Rhodesia, the Afrikaner was alone. After 1994, the scenario changed from military to political combat. After the collapse of the NP and the diminishing of the right-wing faction of Afrikaners, the only alternatives left for the disempowered Afrikaners were to join strong existing and upcoming political opposition groups, like the DA, or to found their own strong cultural, social, economical and political structures. The aim: to build up “an own ability to strike legally and politically at the opponent.” So far political bodies like the DA have had limited political success in addressing the failures of the ANC in parliament, municipalities, governmental departments, parastatals, etc. The founding of bodies like Afriforum and Solidariteit has in individual cases been successful with effort to safeguard and promote Afrikaner interests, although on a very limited scale. Corrections of ANC wrongdoings via other official and non-governmental bodies were and are mostly limited as a result of the strong representing of the ANC in the parliament and other executive and legal structures. It is clear that the Afrikaners are not only side-lined, but are in a process of losing more ground in the present governmental setup. There have been no successful deterrence efforts since 1994, nor is there any possibility of this being a real option.
- **Pre-emption.** The nationalist Afrikaner regime was very well armed and good at eliminating threats with pre-emptive military strikes. They kept political problems like the “Black danger” at bay with these forces. Since 1994 this option has not been available to Afrikaners. At the moment Afrikaners lack any military or political executive power to end the ANC-

regime and Black authority. Another form of pre-emptive behaviour is needed, namely new political empowerment. In this regard the Afrikaners lack the numbers to challenge the ANC in elections or to do “political pre-emptive strikes” on the ANC powerhouse. The Afrikaners’ greatest chance at pre-emptive action is through the DA, where they are in a subordinate position inside a semi-Black organization. All indications are that the DA will become more Black-orientated with time, although they undoubtedly have more sympathy for Afrikaner interests than the ANC in the short term. Afrikaners therefore have no powerful tool to strike with pre-emptive action.

In terms of the Chamberlain-Churchill approach to rectifying political instability, Afrikaners have basically lost all means. Their own problematic economic situation, declining political empowerment and often their own short-sightedness, have caused them to in effect become a political failure. They have become aliens in the new South Africa, a group without any pre-emptive power, often burying his head in the sand like an ostrich.

In terms of the “Chamberlain/Churchill reactions of self-assertion” required to neutralize treats of nation dissimulation, it seems that Afrikaners had become helpless to take any preventive actions in terms of self-preservation and self-defence against or assault on their political enemies to assure their future. The Chamberlain-Churchill approach can basically only be implemented and activated from an existing position of strength. In the Afrikaner’s case, such action was needed long before 1994 when the Afrikaners were still in a position of power to force down decisions favouring them, like an Afrikaner homeland. In the Afrikaners’ emotional and financial dependence (and blind trust) of their NP-AB leadership since the 1960s, thoughts of such self-remedial actions were just unthinkable and unneeded *because history could never go wrong for the Afrikaners*. Their dependence made them an easy prey in the 1990s for the De Klerk-regime, which was beset with the Chamberlain-inclination of acquiescence to appease and please the ANC and to surrender without any resistance. In the 1993 referendum, Afrikaners were easy prey to be caught by the De Klerk-regime and the ANC.^{2,4,14,28}

After the De Klerk-regime disbanded the Afrikaners’ armed forces, there was no chance for any turn-around or a full Churchill-approach to fight the threat to their political rights. The Afrikaners are in a sense to blame for this, since they had ample time to get rid of De Klerk or to reject his surrender to the ANC. Self-

assertion is still available, but within the hostile setup it is much more limited. In the Afrikaner's case it seems as if the dog is fleeing, and with good reasons. For the first time, it seems as if the odds are just too great to overcome, or at least for some of the Afrikaners.^{2,4,14,28}

6.7.2 History and its joker's surprises

History, thankfully, have also had unexpected, even strange outcomes. The fortunes and misfortunes of nations have in some instances changed even after they had fled or failed, totally contradicting the rules of trustworthy predictions (and even sound thinking!). The impact of extreme world disasters, like earthquakes, pests, new wars, immense famine, new mass migrations, just to mention a few, have in the past had quick and profound impacts on the power of mighty empires or have caused undervalued, small nations' fate to take a turn for the better. To a certain extent, the Afrikaners experienced this kind of luck after the devastating Second Anglo Boer War. The possibility is there that today's Afrikaners can be lucky again, even though they are such a small indigenous racial group. However, the chances are slim.^{3,14,24,28}

History shows that the unexpected joker surprises sometimes result from the incorporation of a subordinate group (loser/victim) into the social and political life of the ruler (suppressor/winner). Often this takes place at the beginning of the new regime's take over, other times later on as the new regime (winner) becomes established and as they lose their insecurity or resentment of the subordinate or their need for revenge. Two primary factors drive this joker surprise: first, a positive change in the suppressor/ruler in that he no longer see the subordinate as a danger to his reign; and secondly, the subordinates/losers reflecting excellent abilities that the ruler urgently needs to make a country successful.

Positive changes in governments of places that previously experienced racial and ethnic conflict that ultimately lead to sound non-discriminative management and rule and the inclusion of the "loser" sometimes contradicts the established and traditional findings on the outcomes of genocide or racial conflict as happened in Europe with the cold blooded killing of ethnic minorities with the millions of murders of "colonial" Jews and other groups under Hitler and Stalin. In Southern Africa, Namibia is an example of such a successful transition to a race-free democracy, starting immediately after independence. South Africa, after initially being a reconciliation success, failed to include the Afrikaners as a political group in the government and started to force not only the Afrikaners

out of political empowerment, but to inspire further Black discrimination against them. The expulsion of the Afrikaners was not because they were incompetent politicians or substandard citizens, but purely as a direct outcome of the ANC-regime's hate for the Afrikaners' apartheid (and possible masked racism). This negative view of Afrikaners is gaining ground as the present-day political rhetoric and actions of the ANC elite shows.^{14,25,29}

There are undoubtedly many factors that favour the Afrikaner as a group that may help them come back into South African history as a prominent role player in a future governmental life. Despite their descent, they are closer to Africa than to Europe after 350 years. They have become indigenous.^{4,12} Afrikaners have gradually been cemented into an African indigenous heritage (although clouded by apartheid). The Afrikaner has great talent, experience and political intelligence, making him capable at many levels. Research on the pattern of ousting the losers from politics shows specific that jealousy and inferiority on the side of the winner are often the causes. The ANC elite show signs of this syndrome with their ousting of Afrikaners from the South African political life, as well as their hostile labels of "colonists," "exploiters", "thieves." It seems many of the negative reactions are directly linked to the Afrikaner's personal talents that make him capable, like leadership, integrity, being hardworking, honesty, strategic thinking and independence. It was through the Afrikaner's self-styled and to a great extent selfish guardianship and separate development initiative during his political reign (much of its positive impact is being ignored, denied and detested today) that the Black civilisation was helped to overtake the White civilisation in 1994, making the Blacks the new guardians of the South African society. This is a normal development that Hertzog already indicated in the 1920s. He warned the Afrikaner to take note and to be prepared if they develop and promote the Black civilisation unselfishly and wrong planned.^{3,4,12,30,31}

Afrikaners and their forefathers have made and are still making tremendous contributions to the country, although now outside the ANC's main stream of politics. They have the potential to do it again inside the political context in the future if they are offered the opportunity by a wise Black regime. The majority of Afrikaners deserve respect and acknowledgement, something the ANC regime and its leadership have thus far, for obvious opportunistic and self-centred reasons, refused to give. The Afrikaner does have a bond with South Africa. It was with great honesty that Nelson Mandela said that the Afrikaner *is*

*through blood and tears, the same as all the other indigenous nations, part of South Africa.*³²

One possibility for the Afrikaner to gain a place to participate in the country is the predicted fall of the ANC. Some political research indicates that there would be a new ruler in 2024, while others indicate the possible end of the ANC government by 2019. This can bring surprising changes to the South African political landscape.^{22,33-36}

Even though the DA will in all probability be a majority Black party in the near future, they will surely be much more lenient and friendly in its attitude and treatment of the individual indigenous Afrikaner as a political companion. In this political context it must be emphasised that the new South Africa still holds many opportunities for Afrikaners, especially if the Black ruler of the day is positive about them. There can still be a surprise under the present ANC-regime. History sometimes surprises everyone.³⁶⁻³⁸

6.7.3 History and the biblical destiny of the Afrikaner

There is an interrelationship between the Afrikaners' history and the Afrikaners' biblical belief system, sometimes with a vicious undertone. Some Afrikaners believe that they are in some way "a chosen people," placed in South Africa to Christianise the Blacks and to spread European culture here. Those who adhere to this belief think that since this is their "God-given destiny," He will take care of them in the long run. This thinking dates back to the late 1790s and was further cultivated by the proto-Afrikaners and Afrikaner churches like the DRC. It was propagated and strengthened from 1948 by the leadership of the NP, AB and the DRC as part of their nation-building efforts and attempts to gain political power. Closely intertwined with this dogma is also the belief in the God-given visions of Siener van Rensburg. Many Afrikaners considered him a prophet. Van Rensburg, a Transvaal burgher who fought against the British, alleged to have made some "successful" predictions about the outcomes of battles during the Second Anglo Boer War and about the fact that the Boers would lose the war. Some believe that he also predicted the "suffering" of the Afrikaners under the present-day ANC regime. Fascination with his views increased in the last ten years of Afrikaner rule.^{26,27}

The relevance of his prophecies for today lies in the fact that he allegedly prophesied that there would be a Black regime that would rule South Africa for a while, but as soon the Afrikaners make peace with God and rid themselves of

non-Afrikaner thinking, influences and intermingling, God will put them in charge of South Africa again. Afrikaners are required in terms of his dogma to stay calm and trust God at all times. Van Rensburg's visions of the future South Africa and the Afrikaners' prominent role in it carry strong support among some Afrikaners, especially the elderly from the North of the country and a new contingent of Afrikaners who feel side-lined and helpless in the present political context.^{26, 27}

These prophecies are illogical, selective of peoples and nations and seldom realizes. At this time, they are misleading, creating not only false hope, but also racial conflict. The White population is dwindling when compared to the Black population (at present they make up 8% of the population, while in 20 years' time this percentage will be between 4% and 6%, and in 60 years, 1% at most). If a war or disaster is the reason for Van Rensburg's coming change, it will affect both Blacks and Whites equally. If a White government comes into power again, racial discrimination would start all over again. According to the Herodotus Rules, the Afrikaner would take the place of the victim in time and the positions will reverse again. The Van Rensburg predictions, if they ever realize, are a recipe for disaster and large-scale genocide and murder of a powerless Afrikaner people in a future South Africa. This is an outcome that will hopefully never realize. Thankfully, the success of such an outcome is only one in 30 million and limited to and promoted by a small fraction of Afrikaners.^{26, 27, 39}

6.7.4 The donkey's carrot and Afrikaners' false utopias

Since 1994 some Afrikaners have held to the belief that history will only be merciful on the Afrikaner if they themselves are constructive and participate in their own fate. Three factors play a role in this.

6.7.4.1 Outdated emotionally driven group conformity and group management

There seems to be a concerted effort by some individuals to keep Afrikaners together as a group and to strengthen them with some measure of political impact in the country. They are trying to motivate Afrikaners to stay (more than 1.2 million Afrikaners have left South Africa since 1994, and this process is gaining ground among the youth). The efforts to create Afrikaner solidarity is partly based on the belief that they are still a group and that they should identify leaders who can lead them to an Afrikaner utopia. However, these efforts are in vain, since many Afrikaners are distrustful of "Afrikaner leaders." They are

wary of anything apartheid-flavoured and they are comfortable enough in post-1994 to steer clear of any talk of an Afrikaner utopia.⁴¹⁻⁴⁷

6.7.4.2 The elderly, the poor and outdated Afrikaner nationalism

Data show that the migration for great groups of people (even from European origin) to Europe and other Western countries are becoming unfeasible, as the current resistance and hostility to Islamic refugees all over Europe shows. Any further large exodus of Afrikaners will be impossible. Even if there was opportunity, the ageing of Afrikaners makes them less acceptable in other European countries (at the moment the 60 years and older age group makes up 22% of the total White population, while the age group over 16 years makes up another 60%). The average age of Afrikaners is increasing fast, leaving the possibility of a total Afrikaner population of less than one million in 30 years). Obviously the older and poorer Afrikaners would be a burden on another country, so they are unwelcome. These elders are best off keeping their capital in the country and living their lives here. Data also confirm that there are still many opportunities for educated and eager Afrikaner youths to make money and to start a life in the new South Africa, but then outside the nationalist Afrikaner political and cultural doctrine and domain. Many Afrikaners are doing extraordinary well after 1994 financially speaking; so much so that their income increased much more from 1994 to 2014 than in the 18 years after 1910. From a short-term financial perspective South Africa is a future utopia for the older and the poorer Afrikaners. A point of great concern is the hidden efforts of self-made opportunistic Afrikaner leaders to mobilize these ordinary Afrikaners as an opposing force to Black rule. The financial abilities of these persons, like pension funds and other investments, also draw the attention of opportunistic Afrikaners and their enterprises. The rekindling of a strong nationalist Afrikaner movement has thus far been of minimal success, even among the elderly. This group has become concerned with their day-to-day existence, a far cry from the tribal concerns of years ago. The only link to their nationalist past that they are upholding is their Afrikaner churches, especially the DRC, which itself has suffered a decline in numbers.⁴¹⁻⁴⁷

6.7.4.3 Present-day saviours and rescuers of the Afrikaners

The third group that offers visions of an Afrikaner utopia is the old right-wing groups, often inclusive of opportunistic Afrikaner businessmen. Sometimes the intentions are nothing less than self-enrichment. Their rhetoric aims to make Afrikaners feel endangered by speaking of topics like the danger in which Afrikaner educational institutions (schools and universities) are, farm murders,

political discrimination, the capture of farms and of White capital, radical economic transformation, etc. Many of these allegations have some semblance of truth, but are stretched to fuel emotion. The “Black danger” warning is prominent, while the conservation of the Afrikaner’s self-rule is a primary topic (with the focus on an Afrikaner state or region, consisting of exclusive Afrikaner communities with their own educational institutions, etc.). Many of these private enterprises, promoting themselves as able to assist the Afrikaners with regaining their “old rights and privileges,” are run by former Afrikaner leaders, portraying themselves as sincere businesses and servants of the Afrikaner cause. At the moment many of these saviours and rescuers of the Afrikaners (*Afrikaner white helmets?*) are central role players in that they offer bursaries and support education and legal defence for Afrikaners’ constitutional rights. There are thankfully also a contingent of persons and enterprises of integrity active in these areas. This group have become the central role players in the political, cultural, economical and personal “rehabilitation” of ordinary Afrikaners. They are the “pilots” who can steer Afrikaners back to their former glory. Their well-oiled marketing strategies and their impact on a certain component of ordinary Afrikaners through services and products should be reflected on. This is done in the next section.

In terms of the activities, agendas, intentions and rhetoric reflected by some of these pro-Afrikaner activist groups, it is crucial that Afrikaners make sure who these people and their enterprises are. Afrikaners must learn to separate the wheat and chaff. Modern Afrikaners cannot allow their minds to be polluted by any opportunistic fellow Afrikaners who bought into the ANC dogma of nepotism and corruption, or by self-centred and greedy Afrikaners and institutions who want to mislead the Afrikaners with false propaganda and short-sighted information about the Afrikaners’ future. Even the Afrikaner media still tries to persuade Afrikaners of a good future in South Africa on the one hand and of the hostile actions that threaten Afrikaners on the other. Many of these editorials and articles lack knowledge and wisdom with respect to the “Afrikaner question.” Some also lacks knowledge of economical planning and the functioning of the country, world, genocide, etc. Most of all, they seem to be out of touch with the thinking of modern Afrikaners, young and old. Their advice and guidelines on the future for Afrikaners (as individuals and as groups) – inside or outside the country - lack the needed depth and soundness to inspire wise decisions and seems to be driven by emotional rhetoric. The Afrikaners must start to think beyond this mass propaganda and false ideas of “an everlasting happy new South Africa” or “durable support to solve the Afrikaners

mistreatment by the ANC.” Nor must they blindly accept and support schemes to better themselves while in reality they are enriching only these individuals and groups at their own peril.^{48-60, 64}

6.7.4.3.1 Incoming of exclusive private school and tertiary education

Education is of great importance for the Afrikaners. This has been the case from the 1930s when Afrikaners suffered devastating poverty due to prolonged droughts and poor markets. The Afrikaners were mainly farmers, so this affected a large portion of the group. In 1936, 41.2% Afrikaners were in agricultural occupations, compared to 27.5% in White collar occupations (with 31.3% in blue collar and other manual occupations). These numbers have changed dramatically over the next 41 years. In 1977, only 8.1% Afrikaners were still in agricultural occupations (a decline of 23.2%), with 65.2% in White collar occupations (an increase of 37.7%). The percentage for blue collar and other manual occupations in 1977 was 26.7% (a decline of 4.6%).⁴

With the arrival of the ANC on the scene in 1994 and the many problems around school and tertiary education that followed, education again became a main point of concern for many Afrikaners. While they argue that the quality of education has dropped, concerns also included racially mixed institutions, being allowed Christian schools and Afrikaans as language of instruction. Many Afrikaners are unwilling to send their children to open schools where there is racial mixing, class divisions are breaking-down and non-racism has become the priority. They share the concerns that PW Botha aired when opening Parliament on 6 May 1987: the “protection of individual rights”, the “protection of minority rights”, the “protection of minority groups” and the “gap between the first world (Afrikaner) and the third world (Blacks) and the lowering of standards”. These “protections” valued by Botha for many Afrikaners became legitimate claims based on guarantees by the NP-regime before its fall. They in effect want exclusive Afrikaner residential areas, lifestyle and rights, as in the pre-1994 South Africa, far removed from the indigenous realities of South Africa.⁸

Education has become a hot issue in White-Black relations. Some Afrikaners want “better”, alternative education to fit the “exclusive standards” of education required by some of them. Private education has become an attractive alternative for Afrikaners who can afford it. It has become a gold mine for educators and businessmen who care to entertain these notions, which are often accompanied by racist attitudes. For many Afrikaners private education is a miracle, for others it seems to be a nightmare. The true consequences of private education could

only be determined two to three decades from now, but at present there is much to worry about.

Many South African private organizations pride themselves in being able to save the Afrikaners with the help of linked organizations. One group of businesses, which primarily focus on Afrikaners as clients, is reflecting 350 000 members (and one million indirect members when the family members of their members are included!). Regarding tertiary education, their advertising literature mentions that they have assisted more than 5 000 students at a cost of R73 million; that their student fund is R100 million strong and that they plan to expand their scholarship fund to R160 million by 2020; that they are currently training 1 000 artisans and plan to train 1 500 artisans annually in the near future; that they have invested R50 million each in two separate training institutes; that they intend to invest R735 million in security structures, municipal services and schools by 2020 and that they aim to establish an Afrikaner hostel at one of the public universities. At the same time, they are speaking of the establishment of a private “university” for Afrikaners comparable to Yale! As can be seen from their marketing strategy, most of their actions or products are “planned,” or “will be established,” meaning simply that they are not in existence. Promises are not facts and truths, and Afrikaners must take note of this.^{49,51,54,55,57,60-63}

First, the above group’s 350 000 members is misleading for the purposes of true education empowerment. Most of their members belong to their labour union, insurance division, etc. A very low percentage of these members can be useful in their education network to create a significant Afrikaner tertiary institution, exclusively for Afrikaners. Their insignificant present student numbers, when compared with that of the public universities’ numbers, confirms this. As said, to present *intentions* and *future planning* as realities, is misleading and cannot be taken as a viable and sustainable guarantee. Second, their 350 000 members (hopefully ordinary Afrikaners?) represent less than 13% of the total Afrikaner population (2.7 million) presently living in South Africa, making even their 350 000 memberships insignificant. Eighty-seven per cent (87%) of Afrikaners do not make use of any of their general services, with many more ignoring their academic activities. Third, regarding the status of their “university,” they failed to inform the public that as a “private tertiary institute” they are not allowed to use the title “university” in South Africa, although they can offer degree programmes, but only if they meet the prescribed standards and are registered with and controlled by the various statutory bodies. Fourth, their vague reference to the possible training of healthcare professionals in the future is

nothing less than fantasy. This kind of training, which includes expensive equipment, training facilities, staff and overseeing, is unaffordable without immense infrastructure and enormous government subsidies (something that private tertiary institutions do not receive and will not receive in the near future).^{49,51,54,55,57,59-63}

Another business group, already active in private school education and functioning as a public company on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), also advertises that they are going to open various “universities” in the near future as a public company, also to be registered on the JSE. It is assumed that they will, besides Afrikaners, also cater for other races as students to make it viable and sustainable. Their intention is to offer various degree programmes to 40 000 students initially, but to enlarge the student numbers to 100 000.⁶⁵ As previously said, to present *intentions* and *future planning* as realities, is misleading and cannot be taken as a viable and sustainable guarantee.

All these promises, however good the intentions, can do more harm than good given the uncertainty of Afrikaners. It also holds enormous financial risks for shareholders in the long run where these enterprises are register on the JSE to generate funding for their businesses’ development. For Afrikaners who put their savings into such an enterprise in support of the “Afrikaner cause,” the outcome can be catastrophic in the long run. A well-known educational institution that went public in the 1990s after the South African authorities allowed the opening of private institutions to offer degrees and other tertiary qualifications came on the market at R40 a share. When it was delisted as a company in the 2000s, it shares were bought out by the parent company in a rescue-effort for 40 cents a share, reflecting a 100th of a share’s initial value. Such negative outcomes can and will happen again as the South African financial environment worsens and public education is rehabilitated by a new regime, again offering excellent public education at affordable costs to South Africans. Also, when the promises of private enterprises of large enrolments fail to realize and they don’t show the profit to make these “universities” viable and sustainable businesses, the financial academic outcomes can be devastating for shareholders, as well as students enrolled in good faith.^{49,51,54-57,59-61,66}

Regarding the private tertiary institutions for the sake of Afrikaans and Afrikaners, the dwindling and impoverishing Afrikaners are not able financially to support such a dream in the long run. The limited work opportunities and inclusiveness of the government’s AA, EE and BEE employment policy with

respect to all appointments and employments, even Afrikaner private enterprises, makes the chances that these “home trained” Afrikaners will be employed very slim. The leaders of these enterprises failed to tell the Afrikaner public that the Afrikaners are an ageing population who do not need further study and training. They also fail to tell the Afrikaner public that the Afrikaners are in a process of dissolution: it is estimated that in 30 years, there will be less than one million Afrikaners in South Africa (mostly old people), while in 60 years their number will be less than 300 000. In the year 2117, there will be less than 20 000 “pure” Afrikaners left in South Africa. The financial viability and sustainability of these exclusive “Afrikaner universities” are basically zero.⁴¹⁻⁴⁷

There is no sound basis for comparison of the quality and world ranking of these private and public tertiary institutions. The qualifications offered by these private institutions are not accepted with the same approval as those of the public universities by employers in general. This outcome also has a negative impact on the overseas employment of graduates and on further study. Very few of the graduates from private South African tertiary institutions continue their studies at public South African universities. The argument that the quality of public universities is falling due to the student unrest of the past two years is not accurate. The unrest proved to be temporary and most of the public universities compete well internationally. Besides, education at the public universities is still much less expensive than at the private universities.

Running a single medium-size faculty at a public university costs more or less R50 million a year, while a medium-size university with three campuses that include 26 faculties, costs about R1.3 billion per annum. It is also public knowledge that not a single one of the 26 South African public universities are successful business enterprises that can function without state subsidy, which makes up anywhere between 10% to 90% (average 50%) of the 26 universities’ total annual income. Those who sell a university to the public as a business model that can offer private education to Afrikaners are abusing the naïveté of the public.^{52-56,59,67-72}

What is more, the Constitution of South Africa forbids discrimination on entrance to any universities, private or public, on the basis of race. This means that the planned exclusive “private Afrikaner universities” may not allow only “pure Afrikaners” (meaning Caucasians who speak Afrikaans at home). It will be compelled to allow all students speaking Afrikaans (not necessarily at home). This group numbers more than 13.5 million against the 2.7 million Afrikaners.

This can render the “only Afrikaner” exclusiveness null and void. This knowledge is kept from the public and shareholder by the Afrikaner saviours with their private Afrikaner tertiary institutions registered on the JSE.^{52-56,59,67-72}

Regarding private schooling, this element of education has also found approval with the Afrikaners, although it seems that the educational environment is less racially orientated, with some private businesses offering this kind of service. Still, some Afrikaners show great interest in this type of schooling, especially those offering a so-called Christian education where the Black numbers are small. This trend therefore warrants some investigation as well.

In South Africa private schools make up only 4% of all the South African schools and are therefore insignificant role players in education. Although there was a significant growth in this sector in the last 10 years, the bulk of pupils are still concentrated in public schools, which accommodate more than 12 million pupils in 23 700 schools countrywide. Private schools seem popular as a result of the temporary instability in the public school education, which often lack quality education and management. Afrikaners from the middle class (a group that is growing as rich Afrikaners earn less income) and its higher income earners are making use of these institutions. From a financial perspective, these schools are generally expensive, with fees varying between R15 000 and R21 000 per month. These fees make it unaffordable for most South Africans, although some of the schools situated in the rural areas still offer enrolment at lower fees.⁷³

These schools can be attractive for the Afrikaners, especially those parents who believe private schools offer a better education and an environment that is more conducive to learning, additional resources, better policies and practices and who are of course satisfied with their hidden racial discrimination. The prominent question is: are these schools a stable factor in the future of the Afrikaners’ education and are they the saviours of Afrikaner education? Are Afrikaner children really benefitting from it? As a guideline one can use the statistics of one of these groups for 2017. This group has increased pupil numbers by a compound growth rate of 31% since 2012, with revenue and earnings increasing at a rate of 48% and 83% respectively over the same period. Looking back to 2009 when it joined a large business as partner, its numbers increased from 2 000 pupils to 35 000 in 2015, but it now seems as if enrolment has started to reach saturation. As many as 127 of their present schools are only operating at a 52% capacity.⁷³ Evidence suggests that further expansion plans

are just too ambitious. Gumede writes^{73, p. 8}: "...it's not one of those things the market is going to get excited over because there are hurdles to achieving such target". This negativity about the future of private schools is confirmed by other sources. This draws the attention to one of these groups declaration that tit plan to establish and run 500 schools in South Africa by 2030. The attainment of this target is doubtful (in terms of financial viability and sustainability given the fact that private capital must fund it), especially in light of the poor financial environment into which the country is moving. There is a relatively small middle class, the country's credit ratings have been downgraded, poor economic outlook, low business and personal confidence in the government, sub-zero growth are prominent. One of these education groups constantly have to back up development, not from net profits delivered by the schools or from the pockets of the owners themselves, but from annual rights (This group has had six rights offers in six years, yet still do not pay dividends to shareholders as a result of "reinvesting" of profits).⁷³

The fact that some of the private education service deliverers are not using their own money to run these enterprises but make use of enormous public money (via the JSE, etc.) to drive their businesses, leaves a question mark on stable profits from the existing schools as a direct source of income. Why do these schools not generate enough capital to drive on their own growth in terms of pupils and more schools? Profit and dividend payment to shareholders based on the delivery of affordable education does not seems to be viable and sustainable.⁷³ Promises of future performance cannot and should not be seen as guarantees. It is a marketing strategy to attract attention, nothing more. The Afrikaners who support these ventures with their hard-earned capital to secure their children an "Afrikaner education" at the secondary or tertiary levels must take note of this.

It is clear from the above it will be difficult for many Afrikaners to make use of private schools in future because the fees of these schools will increase, while the income of the parents is on the decrease. An eagerly parent who wants to make a contribution to the continuation of private schools by investing money into the holding companies, should take note of the constant lack of significant net profit generated by some of these schools themselves and the constant use of rights to do development. Constant development (reinvestment) leads to "over-development" and the "over-sourcing" of finance via the JSE from the public that stretches beyond the true value of some education enterprises. This can lead to a vicious cycle of "money-sourcing," for reasons other than pure education

delivery. Private school education is, like private tertiary education, not always the utopia offered too many ordinary Afrikaners, from promises of exclusive “White” education, to promises of financial gain.

The initiatives for the creation of own-funded private “universities”, schools and related educational businesses are noble ideas and must not be seen at any time as “illegal”, “irregular” or “fraud”. It is individuals and business-groups democratic right to do and practice it and to believe in the virtue of it, as long as they stay inside the law. What is clear is that a line must be drawn between business opportunism which is focussed on every individual, notwithstanding race, religion or status or political orientation in South Africa to make money from by business enterprises versus business initiatives solely focussed in helping the Afrikaners in their unique political, ethnic, racial and cultural dilemma. Here especially are the political confused Afrikaners under radar. With a shrinking Afrikaner population and decreased buying power, exclusion from profitable and sustainable enterprises and professions by a growing policy of AA, EE and BEE, these actions to “save” of Afrikaners are just too little too late. The same is happening here than what happened with the Jews in Germany, Hungary and Poland in the 1940s, namely the selectively disownment of their properties, being kept out of professions, closure of their schools and universities, withdrawal of business rights, limiting their civil and personal lives. Nothing can stop the ANC from making an end to private school and tertiary training in the near future. The worst can still come. The Afrikaners must be informed and not be misled by moneymaking schemes and business opportunists who abuse their emotional and personal unhappiness in present-day South Africa. Public education is still the most viable and preferable for the ordinary Afrikaner. Most important of all, it helps the Afrikaner to enter the South African open society and to accept the indigenous realities of the country. His individuality is here centred, not outdated political, racial and cultural groupings and doctrines or isolation in Afrikaner learning-enclaves. Exclusive private institutions cannot reach this goal.^{56,68,72,73}

6.7.4.3.2 Private enterprises who take on public and legal battles on behalf of Afrikaners

Frustrated Afrikaners are at the moment limited to court cases, appeals to the Constitutional Court and moaning in the few struggling Afrikaans newspapers still publishing. Many of these unhappy and deserted Afrikaners are putting their last hopes, trust and money, often in vain, into various “organisations for Afrikaners” to repair their lost political, economical, social and civil rights. In

all honesty, these organizations do not have the real political power, know-how and finances to restore the Afrikaners' dignity and rights in full, or even have the stamina themselves to outlive the Afrikaners' daily growing problems.^{56,57,74-}

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A profile analysis of the two largest of the private enterprises involved in the "Afrikaner cause" reflect that they have approximately 170 000 supporters and approximately 350 000 members respectively. These two, to a certain extent, self-styled "Afrikaner saving bodies," how humble and honest their intentions may be, have struggled to attract more than between 5% and 13% of the total Afrikaner population since 1994. One of these bodies' Afrikaner support has gone down from 600 000 votes in 1994 to only 166 000 in 2014, reflecting a decline of nearly 70% in 20 years. The prominent nationalist Afrikaner right-wing organizations that promised the freeing of the Afrikaner from Black rule after 1994, have all but disappeared.^{60,74,85}

Besides the two organizations referred to above, various other smaller organizations and initiatives representing the interests of today's "lost" Afrikaners surface from time to time. Some of these organizations target the Afrikaners' religiosity. However much these organizations, initiatives, leaders and "prophets" like to present themselves as saviours, their own life-span as service deliverers are at most ten years. They are superficial, directionless, not viable or sustainable in the new South Africa. Second, some of these "saviours" are intentionally (seeing that some of the leaders themselves make alarm that the Afrikaners are in a process of dissolution) not informing their uninformed followers that there will be only between 300 000 and 1 million Afrikaners left in South Africa in 30 to 60 years (in a century it can be less than 20 000 "pure" Afrikaners). This makes the "pure" Afrikaners as a dynamic and profitable entity to generate income through membership and donations for all these initiatives, insignificant. Their rescue efforts are already doomed. Efforts to mobilize Afrikaner positively to accept the new South Africa unconditionally, to discard apartheid and racial discrimination fully are absent from these various initiatives. All that many of these "saviour" initiatives do is to give false hope of a "new Afrikaner South Africa." They often just strengthen outdated apartheid and racial discriminations and negative political attitudes in the minds of confused and directionless Afrikaners, making their future adaptation to a non-racial society basically impossible.^{20,60,70,74,83,85,87-91}

The actions and declarations of these various organizations that have emerged since 1994 with their sympathy for the “Afrikaner cause” through court actions and other public rescue-actions on behalf of the ordinary Afrikaners are also reflected in public publications. It must be clear that these organizations in general are not non-profit organizations, but are often trade unions that are constantly marketing themselves as the front-line fighters for a specific cause: *Afrikaner rights and the Afrikaner’s future*. Their main aims are to assure member enrolments, member fees and thus a constant income for the union’s staff salaries and benefits. Public statements that these organizations currently have more than 30 affirmative action cases against the state pending, that they win nearly 90% of their court cases, that they handle 400 000 work-related enquiries annually, that they are involved in 1 200 legal disputes and court actions at any given time and that they are even making presentations to the United Nation on behalf of the Afrikaner, bare evidence of their excellent marketing policies. All these efforts cost money and ask immense input from the organizations, but ultimately serve to attract more support, more members and more income. They have offices to maintain, as well as the salaries, pensions and medical funds of the “hard-working and sincere” directors, managers and staff involved in these solutions to Afrikaner “injustices.” They offer limited welfare and free services, and in the end all these services are funded by the Afrikaner themselves through membership fees and their donations for the “urgent Afrikaner cause.” Very few Afrikaner organizations offer any free services to the public. They never mention the declining Afrikaner numbers and how little they can do about that. Much of their rhetoric also reflects a strong anti-Black view, troubling racial relations unnecessary. In some cases it seems as if they deliberately seek conflict, and this causes Afrikaners in general to look like they are uncooperative. These actions not only increases hostility, but contributes to moving Afrikaners further away from inclusion in the South African politics.^{49,51,54,55,57, 59-61, 66, 72}

These organizations call on memories of the “Help Each Other”-initiative of 1915 which led to the later founding of various Afrikaner financial institutions. However, the comparison is misleading and constitutes manipulation to recruit more Afrikaners and their hard-earned savings into often doomed financial enterprises. The Afrikaners’ successes of the past can never be repeated by the present-day Afrikaners, simply because they lack apartheid’s favour, NP state capture and Afrikaner radical economical transformation by the NP, as well as the nationalistic Afrikaner doctrine and unity that drove Afrikaners in their previous crises and planning.^{50,52-54,5658,66,77}

The above future utopias offered to the naive and sometime desperate Afrikaners, spells only disaster. These efforts are short-termed and cannot grow into anything substantial. It only furthers and strengthens the Afrikaner's negative racial attitudes, obstructs transformation, creates false ideas about his individual constitutional and other personal rights and slows down his successful absorption into the new South Africa. The useless continuation of court cases against the state (some of the organizations have gone so far as establishing a prosecution authority) to protect "individual Afrikaners' constitutional rights," etc., is nothing more than public gimmicks to recruit more members and generate more income for these Afrikaner institutions. Since these efforts increase hostility, they do not always serve the Afrikaners who want to stay in South Africa. Afrikaners, either as individuals or as a group, must remember that they can no longer hide behind outdated Afrikaner institutions that promise unsustainable futures. It is foolish to give these "saviours" and "rescuers" a mandate to manage Afrikaner interests. The Afrikaners did this with the NP, AB and the DRC in the past, and it caused the present chaos. There is no place for isolation in modern society, not for the individual, the group or the country. This is applicable to the individual Afrikaner too. Chances are that many of these noisy organizations will go down at the same speed and with as little of a bang as the NP did.^{50, 56, 57, 59, 60, 70}

To-day's Afrikaners do not need again the exclusive Afrikaner education, economic and cultural *volk*- institutions from their past. Neither do they need the input of outdated and self-righteous leaders from the old NP-AB alliance to guide and uplift them. They have their quota of them in the past. Most Afrikaners are now in individual growth, geopolitically in *transit*, or, as the writer Breyten Breytenbach describes them: "people in the middle world"; people able to think more and more for them selves, independent from the misleading doctrine of Afrikaner nationalism. Indeed, the Afrikaner is seeking a new identity, totally unknown at this stage.^{50,56,57,59,60,70,92-95}

6.7.5 The rekindling of the Boer homeland thinking

Many of the organizations alluded to above do not answer the question of what kind of future they see for the Afrikaner in South Africa. Do they see this future inside or outside South Africa? What will happen to the small group of Afrikaners left 60 years from now? Where will they live or where will they go?

The idea of a Boer homeland is still alive among some Afrikaners. They see the cultural and racial diversity of South Africa as a good reason to restart

homelands. The focus is the unification of certain similar groups who are concentrated in specific regions or areas. The argument is that the creation of homelands in areas with mono-cultural economical structures, racial and ethnic composition, and development histories, has occurred world-wide and can also happen in the future South Africa. Modern-day Italy, Belgium, the UK and The Netherlands are offered by these Afrikaner propagandists as good examples of self-rule. It is also argued that Brexit, where Britain preferred to regain its independence from the European Union, as well as the fight for independence from the British by the Scots, shows the legal possibility of cancelling unifications when a specific group's interest, like democracy, unique identity and finance are endangered. Afrikaanses in the Western Cape, supported by Afrikaners, are playing with the idea of breaking away in the Western Cape.^{40,92-94}

Frans Cronje⁹², director of the South African Institute of Race Relations, has referred to the possible division of the new South Africa into various independent states, mainly on the basis of economical sustainability and viability, although ethnicity and race differences can also be role players at the end. Cronje is of the opinion that over the last 100 years, not a single South African government could successfully have governed the "Union of South Africans" in a prosperous and peacefully way. He argues further that the present forcing of different races and ethnicities into one South African state is indeed a huge failure. The Zulus, as a specific Black tribe, would be the first to gain independence as the ANC has failed to stay in power in that region and the Zulu-component in the government is losing their power and are being pushed into sub-ordinance by the Xhosas and others. There is also at present a racial cleansing of non-Zulus underway in Zulu regions making a "pure" racial Zulu state even more of a reality. An Afrikaner homeland is also part of this thinking, inspiring the idea of an utopia in waiting for Afrikaners in the new South Africa.^{33,34,36,92}

Clearly, some Afrikaner did not learn anything from the AWB efforts in the 1990s to establish an independent Boer state. The average Afrikaner is becoming poorer and poorer and their dreams are being shattered, while their realities are becoming harsher and their opportunities are becoming fewer and fewer each day. The Constitution is on occasion dragged into this "Afrikaner fight for justice" without much sound argument. The Constitution is not meant for abuse by the citizens of South Africa. This includes the Afrikaner's search for justice for the alleged wrongs done to him after 1994.^{50,51,54-57, 59,-61,66}

There seems to be only one constructive route, and that is as individuals inside an Afrikaanse grouping inside greater South Africa, free from the anti-transformational sentiment of the right wing and “laager” Afrikaners who are being misled and exited by all kinds of prophets and visionaries. It would be wise for Afrikaners to pay their medical fund, pension contributions and taxes every month, but not a sent to any organization or individuals that offer to act on their behalf or to fight for their rights. They are wasting their money and time. Most of all, in doing so they surrender to opportunists!

6.7.6 The post-1994 cultural, social and political unchaining of many Afrikaners

After 1948 and under the influence of the NP-government many of the ordinary nationalist Afrikaners thought of themselves as the anointed nation who was sent to Africa by God to Christianise the Blacks. Prominent were the NP-AB dogma of White supremacy and the internalized belief that Afrikaners would always have the power to rule South Africa. They never thought that it could all collapse. When the NP-AB alliance suddenly collapsed in 1994, many ordinary Afrikaners were still too naive to understand that they, with the approval of the NP-AB-ANC leadership, will slowly be sacrificed within ten years: the proverbial lamb to be slaughtered on the ANC’s altar of revenge. Since the early 2000s the ordinary Afrikaners were not only naive on what to expect in a new South Africa and unprepared for the immense political, social, economic and personal changes awaiting, but were also totally confused about what their position in the new dispensation is and about the appropriate behaviours for new environment.⁸

It is not surprising that many Afrikaners feel so desolated. Many experience the feeling that they have ceased being an Afrikaner and the Afrikaner as an entity with a language has been lost.⁹⁵

The Afrikaner is still alive, but it is true that they have lost all power. Black rule has become final. What is also clear is that the new ruler will apply more and more strong-arm tactics to impoverish, isolate and where possible, nullify the Afrikaner as a citizen.^{1,95}

The hard fact is that Afrikaners are still citizens and that the ruler should take note of this. It is therefore of utmost importance for Afrikaners to find solutions to secure their existence and to avert the danger of dissolution. There is evidence

that Afrikaners have already started to think outside their indoctrinated Afrikaner nationalism and are starting to try out solutions to adapt to their political dilemmas in the new South Africa.⁹⁵

Afrikaner dependence on spiritual-political-cultural leaders and mentors is evident from the political and personal disorientation of NP-members as a group after the 1970s on the deaths of their dominant leaders DF Malan, JG Strydom and HF Verwoerd. After 1994 they started to split into small, less rigid and less extreme Afrikaner cultural, political and financial bodies. However, the Afrikaner group's disintegration does not mean that the internalized beliefs, values and intentions on racial differences have disappeared too. These views have become fixed and independent dispositions in the mindsets of the nationalist Afrikaners, guiding many of them still today.^{2,4,10-12,17,21,22}

Since the late-1990s many nationalist Afrikaners, basically leaderless and politically disorientated, have become individual and reactive about their well-being. They seek individual economical and social empowerment, outside the growing corrupted NP and AB family tree and its extreme racial policy. Established internalized beliefs, customs and traditions are increasingly being abandoned without the traditional compensations of the past to reinforce it. Once an unstoppable and mighty political, cultural, economic and emotional bullying giant under the guardianship of the NP and AB, the nationalist Afrikaners are now orphaned and totally frail. In 23 years Afrikaner nationalism has gone from a hyper-state into a hypo-state.

Most of the current 2.7 million Afrikaners, of whom many already hold different political and cultural views than their parents, are driven in their daily lives and future planning by their own individual needs. More or less 2.3 million ordinary Afrikaners are ignoring the various exclusive "saviours" and "rescuers" and the various bodies that want to take up the Afrikaner cause.

Most Afrikaners clearly see no place for the racist right wing politics of old. The new independent Afrikaners have undoubtedly drawn a line between themselves and the hard-line nationalist Afrikaners. The de-internalization of wrong beliefs on racism and the dissociation from false "saviours" has become essential for the Afrikaners' survival.

Many Afrikaners have written off their racist pasts and are doing their level best to adjust to the new South Africa on an individual basis. Many of these

Afrikaners regret their trust in the different apartheid governments and their adherence to those doctrines. This being the case, would it not have been better if they put their loyalties and votes on the side of the ANC in 1994?

To reach the ideal outcome of non-racism is not so easy, as fixed mindsets are not easily pliable. This fact is reflected today by some Afrikaners' who still underwrite negative racial attitudes and behaviours against Blacks, although mostly not openly.

6.8 Conclusion

Boon^{1, p. 11} enthusiastically wrote 21 years ago about a free South Africa: "South Africa has been forced in conflict but also in human triumph. It is a place of multiple cultures – each with their dramatic and proud histories and powerful heritages. But culture is not static nor is it an isolated thing. It is dynamic and constantly influenced by other groups' thoughts, philosophies and behaviours". And this South Africa came in 1994, making dramatic changes to its multiple cultures and to the mindsets of its various peoples.

The Afrikaners were put before the reality of dynamic and constant changes in their culture by the 1994 dispensation. They resisted being assimilated into the country's multiple cultures or assimilating South Africa's multiple cultures into theirs for 350 years. The 1994 dispensation forced them out of their cocoon of assumed White supremacy and Afrikaner uniqueness and their ignorance of the indigenous realities of South Africa. They have lost their fear for the other South African groups' thoughts, philosophies and behaviours. Undoubtedly many of their political conflicts have changed to human triumphs. Their previously rigid refusals to understand, accept and appropriate the indigenous realities of South Africa have started to wane. Being betrayed by the NP-AB leadership after the ANC came to power, have forced them out of group conformity and they have started thinking independently. Most of the ordinary Afrikaners do not need "saviours" and "rescuers" to steer their future: not the NP-AB-DRC leadership of the past or the new post-1994 corps of "Afrikaner white helmets"; leaders and enterprises with their "we are here to serve exclusively Afrikaners." They can only harm Afrikaners' future with their intentions and efforts to create a "double government" for South Africa (with their efforts to institute and to reserve "apartheid" for the "benefit" of some racial Afrikaners again). Ordinary Afrikaners can thankfully at last think, plan and decide for themselves, and some are doing it excellently.

Some Afrikaners prepared themselves long ago to deal with the threats and challenges of the new South Africa. Other unfortunately did not.

An in-depth understanding of their present and future situation is urgently needed so that they can get out of their present political, social, economical and emotional insecurities.

The pertinent question at this stage is: Are routes really available to assure success? Can ordinary Afrikaners make the year 2017 the year of thinking, decisions and actions? They can only do this if they know the opportunities, challenges, risks, threats and dangers awaiting them in the future. Part 7 (Article 7) of the series offers such a reflection on options and opportunities.

Whether they plan to make a future in South Africa or not, is it of great importance that the ordinary Afrikaner takes to heart in the wisdom of J C Smuts, the eminent South African statesman and scholar, when he said that South Africa was a place in which neither the best nor the worst has happened⁹⁶. For the Afrikaner, moving into the new South Africa, these words can be the wisest he ever heard. The negativisms they experienced since 1994 in South Africa could have been worse; it was not the worst and will not become worse. The apartheid euphoria until 1994 was false. His future experiences in South Africa can be positive. What does the Afrikaner want more than a true South Africa? The Mozambican-Portuguese settled successfully in the new South Africa. Why can the indigenous Afrikaner not do the same? South Africa is his only homeland.

6.9 References

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CHAPTER 7

2017 IS THE TIME FOR THINKING, PLANNING, AND DEEDS

7.1 Introduction

“One might argue that there is almost a symbiotic interdependence between Black and White in South Africa, which makes for minority security. On the other hand, the relatively large size of the White majority gives it a substantial capacity for the fomenting dissidence, which could lead a predominantly Black government either to handle it with care so as to avoid provocation; or to use strong-arm tactics to neutralise this potential. Much would depend, of course, on how the process of sharing power had occurred and the extent to which Whites (or a majority of them) felt themselves included in the new government”, writes Welsh¹ in 1988.

This political view on the possible future outcomes of a Black regime’s comprehensive attitude and actions against the Whites, including Afrikaners, was not only accurately portrayed by Professor David Welsh, but become a reality 29 years later.¹

Now, looking back after 23 years of Black rule in South Africa, it is clear that both of the outcomes were realized by the ANC-regime. Although, during the initial period after 1994 when the National Party (NP) led by FW de Klerk stayed on in the government of reconciliation, Afrikaners were treated with care to avoid provocation. But after the NP left the ANC-NP alliance, this intention of the ANC regime started to change gradually into a hostile one. This mild hostility against Whites was initially reflected by BEE, EE, etc., well masked under the pretext of equalizing opportunities between Blacks and Whites and promoting the mass of disadvantaged Blacks. No doubt exists that some sectors inside the Afrikaner population began to show dissidence to Black rule, although this was mostly limited to public protests and legal action, mostly via the various private enterprises which had assigned themselves as “caretakers” of Afrikaner interests.¹⁻¹⁶

With the Zupta shenanigans and state capture gaining prominence and Jacob Zuma’s efforts to mask his dictatorial, duplicitous regime of self-enrichment, the focus was once again shifted to the Afrikaner. Ignoring the poor Black masses and the civil rights of individual Blacks, Zuma and his ilk diverted the heat to

Whites as past and present oppressors of the Blacks. Afrikaners' self-enrichment through their alleged exploitation of Blacks and the consequent "unlawful possession" of Black capital and land – which had been "stolen" from the rightful Black owners by White colonialists – was the popular refrain. The South African public were reminded of the *racial division* between Black and White with apartheid, colonialism, Afrikanerism, and the like wedged into the collective consciousness. Zuma and his intimate cadres utilised this momentum to promote Radical Economic Transformation (RET), which focused on nationalizing White capital (banks, property, land, pension funds, etc) and would tip the economic scales in favour of the previously disenfranchised. Disregarding Afrikaners' civil and political rights in the work environment, crime-fighting, the murder of White farmers, parliamentary debating, and political decision-making, are further excellent examples of the start-up of strong-arm tactics to neutralize the Whites as a political grouping as well as an indigenous South African population [The more recently emphasis also on Radical Social Transformation (RST) to equal social status between Blacks and Whites is a further example of these tactics].¹⁻¹⁶

Mthombathi^{17, p.17} writes that the truth behind RET and "White monopoly capital" is that it is just a cloak to cover up Zuma and the Guptas' nefarious deeds of enduring damage by their cynical exploitation of racism and repeated regurgitation of the apartheid past. The two terms are thus not as innocent as they sound. He writes^{17, p. 17}: "It's got nothing to do with any desire to help or uplift the black masses, especially not on the part of a family [Guptas] who have shown no love for black people. These words have a sinister motive. They are deliberately designed to pull the wool over our eyes, to set us up against each other, to incite racial hatred. And so we fight among ourselves as they get on with the business of looting the country. We have fallen for it. Their plan is working. They have poisoned the well". It is excellent example of "divide and rule" used worldwide by sly rulers to stay in power and to distract attention from their own wrongdoing.

Clearly the Afrikaner has become, through Zuma, the sole "enemy of the people" again as in the 1960s with the ANC's policy of revolution and an effective method to distract especially the poor Black classes' from the truth. This tried-and-tested trick has always been successful at obtaining votes from the poor masses: by frightening them with the return of White apartheid, the repositioning of the "racist" Afrikaners as a political power, and the theft of new-found Black richness.^{1,3,4,7,11,12,15,16,18-21} This RET policy does not differ from

the established corrective economic policies that have been pursued since 1994. Fuelling the fire of Black-White conflict can ultimately – socially and economically – destabilize South Africa. It is in this subjective but overwhelming anti-White hostility that Afrikaners are trying to make the best of their indigenous identity and to live in the new South Africa.¹⁷

While Welsh¹, p. 101 postulated in 1988 that “it is perhaps not ‘inevitable’ that in fifty years’ time [2038] White control over South Africa will have disappeared...”, it took the ANC regime only 23 years to reach that goal successfully through the intensifying of well-planned strong-arm tactics. These kinds of tactics by Zuma and his supporters will strongly increase in their efforts to draw the attention away from their growing political wrongdoings as more and more Black dissenters from the middle and higher classes turn their backs on the “Zupta-ANC”.

The abovementioned propaganda and political rhetoric is exactly how the ZANU-PF regime of Robert Mugabe “won” Zimbabwe from the Whites. ANC Secretary General Gwede Mantashe himself recently provided an apt description of the dangerous implications, especially for Afrikaners, of Jacob Zuma’s populist RET policy of grabbing White-monopoly capital and land when he says²², p. 4:

As ‘n revolusionêre beweging agteruitgaan en goedkoop populariteit soek, raak dit avontuurlik en populisties. Zanu-PF was ‘n revolusionêre party, maar om goedkoop steun te kry, het Zanu-PF grond gegryp en uitgedeel en só kosproduksievernietig. Dit was dalk gewild, maar Zimbabwe is nou ‘n voedselinvoerder. Dit is waarheen ons ook neig. Die beweging [ANC] sal nie gered word deur kitsoplossings nie, maar deur diep besinning. Die debat oor radikale transformasie en witmonopoliekapitaal word deur Gupta-gesinde ANC-lede gestook om ‘n voorsprong te kry met die oog op die party se nasionale konferensie in Desember [*If a revolutionary movement deteriorating and looking for cheap popularity, it becomes adventures and populist. Zanu-PF was a revolutionary party, but in order to get cheap support, Zanu-PF grabbed and handed out land, destroying food production. It might be popular, but Zimbabwe is now a food importer. This is where we also tend. The movement [ANC] will not be saved by fast solutions, but by deep reflection. The debate on radical transformation and white monopoly capital is being fired by the Gupta-*

based ANC members to get a head start in view of the party's national conference in December].

If the secretary general of the ANC feels obligated to warn against his own party's failing future political integrity and behaviour (which is already a reality), there can be no doubt of the seriousness of these anti-White tactics and the possibly devastating consequences awaiting Afrikaners. The plight of the Whites in Zimbabwe is well recorded and well published.

Although the South African Constitution, the Constitutional Court and other courts of law have thusfar managed to shield the Afrikaner from the ANC's extreme strong-arm tactics, these bodies might be rendered powerless in the long run if a total ANC-takeover (67%) results in changes to the independence of the courts and the security services. Dramatic action against the Afrikaner could follow, which may even lead to genocide. The present-day cry by ultra-hot-headed ANCs and other radical Blacks for a "second revolution" via RET and RST seems more and more imminent. This revolution's intention is far from innocent, despite claims by the present-day ANC leadership that its only aim is to obtain "economic" freedom by ending the "first revolution" of 1994 by means of RET and RST to bring "political freedom" to Blacks.^{1,7,11,12,15,16,20,22,23}

The aggressive and militant movement known as Black First Land First (BLF), have already started putting their demands in writing and publically vocalising threats and intimidating any opponents of this "second revolution" with their anti-White motto, "to defend black people, the Guptas, from racist, land-thieving white monopoly capitalist scum," as the journalist Peter Bruce²⁴, p. 20 summarised it. This already reflects that the presence of a "...culture of intolerance and bullying and disregard for the basic principles of free speech in our society in the new smash and grab milieu is such that lives are being put at risk".²⁵, p. 20 This spells disaster for Afrikaners. There is overwhelming evidence of a comprehensive readjustment around Afrikaners and their position as citizens of South Africa, and one cannot help fearing for the worst.^{1,7,11,12,15,16,20,22,24-26}

Vilakazi warning of this extreme political, social, economic, and personal upheaval in the future of Afrikaners if they did not take the time to safeguard them against Black revenge and annulment, was already well profiled and spelled out nearly 30 years ago^{when} he writes¹⁵, p. 40.

The essence of revolution is the direct, active intervention of the oppressed masses of society in public affairs, in an effort to speed up and bring about *long overdue changes in the fundamental structures of society*. These changes are above all in the possession and control of power, first political, and, following on its heels, economic power. Revolution consists of the shifting of this power from the hands of one class to the hands of the hitherto oppressed classes. The issue in any revolution is the possession and control of the power of the State, and possession and control of property; in other words, political power, and economic power.

But what Vilakazi also failed¹⁵ to say then, but which Gwede Mantashe²² now warns us of, is that any revolution is not a bed of roses: not only for the loser, but also for the winner at the end, spelling total chaos at the end.²⁸ (Remember the vicious cycle of the Herodotus Curse on wrongdoing that history repeats itself and that contravening the rules of justice creates → *injustice* → *hate* → *revenge* → *contra-revenge*, with sometimes a fast, sudden, surprising, and deadly counter revenge).^{22,27,28}

The present day as well as potential future abuse and crushing of Afrikaners by the ANC regime and other radical Blacks are clearly pinpointed in the above remark of 30 years ago by Vilakazi's^{15,p. 40}: "...*long overdue changes in the fundamental structures of society...*". This was a dire warning of an unavoidable South African indigenous reality of disaster to come in their near future, which the ordinary Afrikaners missed to read on the lips of F W de Klerk when he mesmerized the 1993 referendum and the post-1994 utopian South Africa into their mindsets.^{14,29,30}

The basic aim of this final and conclusion chapter is to inform the Afrikaner of his present and future role as a citizen of the new South Africa. This contemplation should motivate the Afrikaner to do self- introspection. Afrikaners should answer the question: *Have we reached self-actualisation and an optimal personal happiness in the new South Africa? Have we left our worries and fears behind so that we can participate in a good life here?* If Afrikaners fail to offer a positive answer on the question, then it is time that they reread this article to see how they can address their upcoming Afrikaner dissolution the best, and how they can obtain and assure at present and in future psychological and political wellbeing for themselves. The various options and routes are there, but only they alone can make a choice. Remember: *at this stage*

Afrikaner dissolution is a fact, not a myth. 2017 is the time for thinking, planning, and deeds.⁶⁰⁻⁶²

Prominent to the background provided are the questions: *Is it justified that Afrikaners at this stage of the New South Africa are still exposed to discriminative behaviours and maltreatment by the ANC regime?* and, *what can Afrikaners do to secure a future for themselves and their descendants in or outside of South Africa?*

In this context it is important to know if the ANC regime understands the concept of indigenusness of the various tribes of South Africa outside a Black-only ethnicity, as well as if they have any knowledge of the prescribed principles and rules to be followed in nation-building? Does the ANC regime really take notice of the Afrikaners' sincere and willing efforts to become successful members of the new South Africa? There is no doubt that if the ANC regime can answer these three questions positively and practice them accordingly there will be no need for Afrikaners to reconsider their present and future positions in South Africa. So far, all hope seems to be in vain.

In the following four subdivisions the ANC's understanding of and respect for South African peoples' indigenusness, nation-building, as well as the ordinary Afrikaner's sincerity and willingness to accept South African indigenous realities and to move on to greater South Africa, will be described.

7.2 South African indigenous realities missed by the ANC

For some Blacks, especially those in ANC politics, it was just too difficult after 1994 to accept that the White minority had legitimate interests in view of what, historically, had been the 'illegitimate' exercise of minority power over "them" as Blacks. This bitterness about their treatment as human beings during apartheid (and during colonialism, in the same breath) and outright rejection of the "illegitimate" NP-regime by the Blacks, has led to today's hostile actions against Afrikaners. Also, the Afrikaner's substantial dissidence to Black rule, specifically with the ANC as former revolutionary organization, aggravated the situation. The end result was the ANC regime's disregard and disrespect of the rights of Afrikaners, despite the safeguarding of minority groups by the Constitution. The ANC regime's obvious efforts to undo the privileged political and socio-economic position the Afrikaner previously held [and considered guaranteed after 1994 by virtue of the NP and the 1993 referendum agreement] reinforced this view.^{1,3,4,15,31-35}

What these Blacks and the ANC have forgotten is that internalized customs, habits, and traditions do not just disappear when a new regime takes over. Rights, privileges, benefits and favours, written or unwritten, official or unofficial, also do not suddenly disappear (the present behaviour of the ANC as an ex-terrorist, ex-revolutionary organization plainly reflects these internalized dispositions). South Africa as a country developed over more than three hundred years of war and peace, good and bad. At the moment the differences between the classes, between Black and White, as well as Black and Black, are just too significant to erase overnight. The same can be said of the chasm between the “haves” and the “have-nots”. Unfortunately, targeting Whites out of racial hatred and jealousy and forcing them out of their homeland and seizing their capital and property will not solve the problem. At the end it is the country and its Black people that suffer the most. After independence, Samora Machel of Mozambique attempted (but failed) to rectify inequalities in one fell swoop by focussing exclusively on Whites as the wringers. Despite Machel’s reputed warning to Mugabe not to repeat this mistake, Mugabe blindly implemented radical racial reform measures by kicking Whites off their farms and out of Zimbabwe, but failed as Machel did and today continues to mutilate the tattered remains of his once-thriving country. The ANC has been trying to do the same in South Africa since 1994, but instead is creating more long-term problems than solving present short-term problems. It is against devastating costs to the country that Mantashe and a few wise ANC stalwarts and veterans are – seemingly in vain – warning the Zupta-led ANC elite.^{1,22,25,37,38}

In a “peaceful transfer” from one political regime to another, like that of the NP to the ANC (*a peaceful development of revolution* which very seldom takes place in history), the peace of such a transfer is sometimes very short-lived. Basically, because the initial solutions to problems were often insufficient, leaving many of the role-players from both sides unfulfilled and frustrated in terms of compensation or punishment for wrongdoings (as evidenced by the hunger for revenge by victims of apartheid). To steer a regime change peacefully through its growing pains requires extraordinary leadership, characterized by foresight, courage, a sense of morality and conciliation, and the ability to act fast in times of crisis. The ANC leadership after Nelson Mandela lacks all of these. This has led to a misrepresentation in the minds of some Afrikaners that ill discipline, corruption, lethargy, unproductiveness, inefficiency, and incompetence are characteristics of Black culture in general. These traits of the current leadership and the departments under them are the

primary motivation behind the commonplace reference to the new South Africa as a “banana republic”.³²This is a very sad generalisation as the greater part of most Black societies do not harbour particular ill will towards their fellow South Africans, including Afrikaners. They are merely getting on with life as best they can, and suffer under the same inefficiency and incompetence of the ruling party; they are not governed by hatred or an urge for revenge.^{13-15, 39-45}

This “African culture” which has characterized life in post-1994 South Africa is actually a “deviant ANC culture” originating from its origin as a terrorist and revolutionary organization. It is far removed from the true African culture of South Africa and shaped by outdated political thought and the actions of anti-Afrikaner Black politicians and activists with their own agendas (maintained and driven by the MKs of the late 1960s and 1970s). At present, it is aggravated by the Zuptas and their supporters. Many ANC leaders and members are nothing more than spectators, lacking wisdom or insight, who gained front seats to the political game in the post-1994 democratic elections. And then there are the many “takers” who will do anything just to satisfy their personal greed and ambitions. The reality is that these opportunistic people are in charge of the ANC and are steering its policies and actions. Any positivity on the Afrikaner’s side is blindly ignored; the same can be said about their civil rights. It seems that Afrikaners are increasingly falling prey to this system.^{12,32,33,39,46-52}

7.3 Requirements for South African Nationhood

A lot of the present-day hostility of the ANC-regime is a direct outcome of the political immaturity of the South African Constitution and South Africa’s history as a nation, although the judges of the Constitutional and Appeal Courts act with wisdom, sincerity, and sound legal principles. South Africa as a member of BRICS can learn a lot from India’s colonial past and the successful manner in which this new nation (but old civilisation) is handling its different cultures, peoples, and tribes since obtaining independence in 1947. Whereas India was never a unified political entity, the Proclamation of Queen Victoria in 1853 unified into one country, one nation; when independence came on August 14, 1947, a democracy was created that has remained unified. What makes this achievement so great is that it brought nearly a 1 000 million people (of various cultures, tribes and levels of education, some in extreme poverty, other extreme rich) together as one political entity under conditions of freedom. “Never before in history, and nowhere else in the world today, has one-sixth of the human race existed as a single free nation. This unity of people is more than the combined population of Africa and South America”.^{53, p. 3}

This achievement goes much further – all 12 of the great living religions in the world are flourishing in India, 16 major languages written in different alphabets and derived from different roots, while Indians express themselves in 250 dialects. Although English (the language of colonialism) is not included in the major languages listed in the Constitution, it remained the only language for the whole country. Furthermore, English is the only language in which South India is prepared to communicate with North India. British jurisprudence is the matrix of India's non-personal laws.^{53, p. 3}

India's independence is based on a sound Constitution which is respected by all the role-players. Even in states of the Indian Republic where the Communist Party governs, human rights are fully respected because of the Bill of Rights being firmly ingrained in the Indian Constitution (the substance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations on December 10, 1948, is embodied as Fundamental Rights in the Indian Constitution). What drives this democracy, freedom, and unity in India, fighting of communal hatred, linguistic fanaticism, terrorism, professional hooliganism, caste, and clan fanaticism, corruption, and creed, is India's *national integration, and integrity*. The eminent Indian writer, lawyer and academic, Nani Palkhivala⁵³, defined this *totality* very well (the ANC leadership and anti-Afrikaner Blacks would do well with a daily dose) when writing^{53 p. 11}:

The most crying need of India today is to undergo catharsis, a course of emotional cleansing. We must not allow the moral bedrock of our society to turn to lava.

National integration is born in the hearts of the citizens. When it dies there, no army, no government, no constitution, can save it. States of mind precede states. Inter-faith harmony and consciousness of the essential unity of all religions is the very heart of our national integration.

The soul of India aspires to integration and assimilation. Down the ages, Indian culture – a tremendous force of power and beauty – has been made richer and deeper as a result of absorbing what is best in outside influences and integrating those various influences to grace and enrich its own identity.

Regarding Palkhivala's reference^{53, p. 11} to "absorbing what is best in outside influences and then integrating those influences" (which brings us back to the ANC leadership's distaste and hatred of British colonialism and Afrikanerism and their rejection of good influences as bad simply because it does not fit their revolutionary dogma), he writes specific about the "accidental" impact of British colonialism of 200 years on India as follows^{53, p. 15}:

There seems to be a mystical bond which holds us together in real understanding and goodwill. There is something special, in fact providential, in the relationship between Britain and India. The crucial test is this: if the last two hundred years in India's history were to be relived, how many thinking Indians would prefer to have them without British rule? I venture to say no one, who is not ignorant, or partial, would wish the past to be redrawn effacing all traces of the raj.

There was much that was ugly and exploitative in those years. But, on the balance, the good far outweighed the evil. The British took enormous wealth out of India, but they left behind legacies which no money could buy.

Where the Indians accepted the British as part of their future life after Indian rule, incorporated the positive of British colonialism and imperialism into their daily lives and created a brotherhood with the British that still exists today, the ANC elite did just the opposite with Afrikaners. Five years into Black rule they started to oust Afrikaners from all terrains of South African life on the basis of their association with "imperial and colonial rule". Afrikaans as a language came under siege, work limitations followed, political isolation became prominent, White murders intensified and White bashing became a daily rhetoric, while the capture of White capital now seems to enter its final stage. It must, however, be said that, although India is a young nation (74 years), it is a country with an ancient history (5 000 years). New South Africa is not only a very young nation (23 years), but it lacks a comprehensive history: there are existing White and Afrikaner histories but a true Black history is missing. History and nationhood still come, but notwithstanding this, it is worrying that after 23 years of the existence of the new South Africa, the ANC – driven by greed and revenge – seems to be focussing on national disintegration, fighting its own past, and instigating Black-White conflict and hate, instead of following a course of action to bring about positive growth in nation-

building.^{3,4,8,17,24,32,34,39,47,50,53,54} Palkhivala⁵³ warns well of personal and political mischievousness that destroys nation-building.

Palkhivala's remark that^{53, p.15}: "...no one, who is *not ignorant or partial...*" points to the ANC's political and personal immaturity as the reason for their failure, as ruling party, to think strategically and constructively about the country's future. Or is their thinking so overrun by their negative emotional state after apartheid that it has neutralized all sound cognitive functioning? It took the Afrikaner nearly 400 years to develop from European, Black, Indian, and other indigenous people to the proto-Afrikaner and to the Afrikaner, with the latter still an identity in the *process of becoming another*. Possible are the present-day peoples of South Africa, including Afrikaners, in a great haste to become true South Africans. To obtain this status, it is necessary for them to live through the present political, social, economical, and personal upheavals for at least another 300 years before the ordinary South Africans can say, as the Indians after 5 000 years of growth: WE ARE A NATION. The ANC as a political party, its tailstock leaders and the hot-headed guild of anti-Afrikaners, are seemingly only a temporary nuisance in this long process of nation-building in which the Afrikaner has unfortunately become an innocent victim.^{8,14,53,55,56}

Apartheid, driven by Afrikanerism from 1910, was – like British colonialism in India – ugly and exploitative until 1994. But, on the balance – as with colonialism in India and most African countries – the good of apartheid far outweighed the evil. Afrikaners enriched themselves at the cost of Blacks and degraded them, but they brought and left behind legacies for Black South Africa which no money could buy. As in India with British colonialism, apartheid and British colonialism was needed to bring South Africa and all its populations to its present stage of Black rule. Many Black South Africans reject the legacies of apartheid, although the positive evidence is all over the country and in Black present-day lifestyles.^{32,53} The arguments against the Europeans/colonists in South Africa, Africa, and worldwide – that they grew rich and powerful by robbing their colonies, – do not hold true because *there was not much to take*, writes D'Souza^{57, p. 60} in response to the often heard retort: "The Europeans stole the raw material to build their civilization, they stole rubber from Malaya, and cocoa from West Africa, and tea from India". D'Souza points out that before British colonialism^{57, p. 60}: "...there were no rubber trees in Malaya, nor cocoa trees in West Africa, nor tea in India. The British brought the rubber tree to Malaya from South America; they brought tea to India from China. And they taught the Africans to grow cocoa, a crop the native people had previously never heard of". There was a total lack of infrastructure and to make the countries

effective, the British built roads, shipping docks, railway tracks, irrigation systems, government buildings, introduced education and healthcare, and introduced them to new words and new ideas unknown to their ancestral culture, like “liberty”, “sovereignty”, “rights”, etc., concepts that still affect their present-day thoughts and actions.⁵⁷ “Despite the corrupt and self-serving motives of their practitioners, the institutions of colonialism and slavery proved to be the mechanism that brought millions of non-White people into the orbit of Western freedom”, D’Souza^{57, p. 60} continues. The doctrine of oppression ignores these facts and goes on to fuel anti-Western resentment around the world and in nations of the West. D’Souza concludes^{57, p.67}: “I think we can now conclude that the doctrine is false, and the animus that is based on it is misplaced”. In fact, the ANC elite have adopted many of the actions condemned as evil habits of Afrikanerism and apartheid. Apartheid and Afrikanerism are, together with Afrikaners, a permanent part of Black history and South African history.^{32,53}

Black insecurity about an own identity, masked behind their false bravado and arrogance of “self-made” and “independence” as well as their focused aggression towards Afrikaners, confirms the cemented impact of the positivity of apartheid and Afrikanerism in their psyche. This “inferiority complex” as the result of under-development in a complex and dynamic world easily gets a grip on people. (This also happened to the poorer proto-Afrikaners and later Afrikaners under British colonialism and was strongly reflected in their behaviour in the Union). Blacks reference to themselves as^{32, p.2}: “verbeeldinglose primitiewe barbare”, supported by: “... kolonialiste ‘het ons sommige van die ergste leuens laat glo.’ Deur brute krag, deur ons hulpbronne te plunder en deur ons verstand en liggaam gevange te hou, (is) Afrikane van hul menslikheid en waardigheid ontnem”, are excellent examples of this illusion and underestimation, not only of themselves as full citizens, but also of the roles of Afrikaners in their lives during apartheid. Rationalization and projection are lifestyle-mechanisms often used for the wrong reasons, to relay attention from own much deeper personal-shortcomings, dysfunctions, and needs. Afrikaners are part of the South African nation-building process and have a valuable contribution to make.

If the ANC leadership and its members doubt the wise words of Palkhivala⁵³ on nation-building and the importance of every piece of history because it is related from an Indian context, they may turn to the writings of South African entrepreneur and White African, Mike Boon³⁹ in *The African Way: The power of interactive leadership*. Maybe Boon’s simple guidelines on the South African

peoples and their leaders will appeal to the palate of the ANC leadership (and change their present failure to succeed as leaders). Boon writes^{39, p. 15}:

Africa is a place of many peoples, many tribes, and many beliefs. It is a place of terrible horror and great compassion; one of foolishness and great wisdom. But there is a vision of Africa, based on the nobility, and tragedy of the past. This is a land of strong cultures that survive and grow together with the ever-increasing education of proud people, secure in the knowledge that they are the future mentors of the world. The world is beginning to realize that happiness is a state of being and not something we work towards or buy. It is a vision of harmony, prosperity, and success; of productive, powerful work teams; of true democracy; of cooperation and interdependence; and of trust and pride in humanity and in each other.

We are different people with different cultures. We have our own ways, our own languages, customs, philosophies, and beliefs. We have our own history and our own heroes. More importantly, we have our African humanity and our noble cultures. Woe to the world if we all pursue a singular, grey, and boring sameness. Our differences and traditions make us interesting and proud.

The ANC regime of today, as the NP-AB (Afrikaner-Broederbond) alliance of the past, is misjudging the South African diversity of cultures and peoples and their stubborn will to survive under immense hardship. It seems that the ANC of today are destined to suffer the same humiliating failure the NP and ordinary nationalist Afrikaners suffered after 46 years of rule (1948 –1994); although it may be after the relatively short time of 25 years in government (1994 – 2019). Both failures were as a result of unwise, racist, authoritarian, and greedy leaderships. Not only did the leaders of both dispensations abuse their positions for their own gains, but they lacked insight into the needs of individual citizens on grassroots level.

7.4 The Afrikaner is an identity in becoming another

The opportunistic and authorial leaders of the nationalist Afrikaners doctrine into their mindset the belief of themselves as the anointed Afrikaner nation, sent to Africa by God to convert the Blacks and make them better people. A group granted “everlasting supremacy” over Blacks and the right to be “forever the rulers” of South Africa, as established by Verwoerd and his First Republic.

Under the sly leadership of the NP and the AB, ordinary Afrikaners were somehow pacified into believing that the political rule of the Afrikaner in South Africa – with its immense military and political might – was infallible. When the unholy alliance between the NP and the AB suddenly collapsed in 1994, ordinary Afrikaners were still too naive to understand that they, with the approval of a newly combined leadership, were going to be gradually sacrificed within ten years: the proverbial lamb to the slaughter on the ANC’s altar of revenge from 2017 and onwards. From the beginning of 1994, ordinary Afrikaners were naive about what to expect in the new South Africa. They were unprepared for the immense political, social, economic, and personal changes awaiting them. They were totally confused about what their positions in the new dispensation were and the appropriate behaviour required in this new environment.^{8,14,29,41,55,56,58,59}

It is not a surprise that this confusion and loss of identity suffered by the ordinary Afrikaner after 1994 culminated in *total desolation*, and in the words of Breytenbach^{55, p. 83}:

Actually I’d ceased being an Afrikaner. My sense of that entity, and even the language, was but nostalgia encapsulated in an irrevocable lost past. Maybe I’d made up that past, coloring it in the glowing tones of innocence, contextualizing its dark and bleeding violence to make it seem part of the woof of being human”, and, “‘I?’ What ‘I?’” The language, if I still used it, had become private and personal. Some words were left, moving like maggots through the dead meat of redundant arguments. But now I am no longer identified in any way. What am I saying? It is already dead. I was talking to dead people. I am talking of a passed away “self”.

Thankfully, the Afrikaner is not yet “ceased,” neither is he dead in the new South Africa, but the smell of death is present in his existence and he must know it. What is indeed true, is that the basic issue of an all-over political empowerment of a specific group in South Africa, namely who is going to rule South Africa from now on^{1, p.108}: “‘them’ or ‘us?’” has been successfully phased out of the mindsets of most Afrikaners after 1994. The final acceptance is clear: *the Blacks are ruling and that is absolute and final in 2017*. What is also clear is that the new rulers are going to apply more and more pressure to impoverish, isolate, and – where possible – nullify the Afrikaner as citizen.

It does not matter today whether the^{55, p. 78}: “...Afrikaner is only an identity in becoming another,” or if he is “rightfully still a legitimate member of an independent indigenous South African tribe been stripped of his previous ruler’s status”. The hard fact is that he still exists as a South African reality and the new rulers should mark that he is a human being with legitimate civil rights as a citizen. It is thus of utmost importance for Afrikaners to find solutions to secure their existence to avoid the danger of dissolution in the future. However, there is evidence that Afrikaners have already begun to think outside their doctrine of Afrikaner nationalism and are starting to try out solutions to adapt to their political dilemmas in the new South Africa.

7.5 Afrikaner Sincerity and Willingness to Political Change

To change political and cultural mindsets to fit into the South African indigenous realities – the *cake of customs* as the historian J M Roberts^{14, p. 986} describes it – formed sometimes by almost unrecognized assumptions and attitudes over long stretches of time – is no easy feat. But it can be done, as in 1994 when Afrikaners were forced to accept a Black regime and the ANC as ruling party. Although this change was initially seen as a *conditional transfer* by the outsider, it turned out to be *unconditional*, leading to today’s serious consequences for the continued existence of Afrikaners in this country. At the time, very few Afrikaners saw the “end ... coming”, also because they were never warned of such a possibility by their leaders.

Afrikaner leaders showed their sincerity and willingness by releasing Nelson Mandela from jail, and repealing the various apartheid laws in 1991. In 1994, the South African government was technically handed over to an immature, inexperienced, and unprepared ANC regime driven by revolutionary ideas. It already seemed at the time that the same political willingness and sincerity was lacking on the Black side. The ANC and other Black political parties showed an inability to control some of their more radical followers from the beginning and signs of anti-White sentiment were clear from day one of Mandela’s era. These were some of the signs of the stormy path that lay ahead for post-1994 South Africa. It is this stormy path that Afrikaners are now travelling, exposed to the ANC’s deviant politics. Most of Afrikaners still harbour the spirit of sincerity and willingness to make South Africa a better place for themselves as well as the Blacks. All it requires is an equally sincere and willing ANC regime.¹⁴

7.6 Possible escape and survival routes for the Afrikaners to survive the next century as individuals, a subgroup or a tribe

Both Boon³⁹ and Palkhivala⁵³ illustrated that rigid customs can be changed, although it could take time; also, that South Africa is not a country with “grey people”, but a rainbow nation of many cultures and peoples requiring wise and effective leaders to respect and steer them into the future as a true nation. If Afrikaners could willingly and freely resign their political rule and become subordinate to an ANC government after 46 years of political power, the ANC regime should also show at least the same sincerity towards nation-building. It was under the pretence of democracy for all South Africans, something they argued Afrikaners had failed to institute, that they came into power. If they had stayed true to their political promises and guarantees of 1994, it would have been unnecessary for Afrikaners to seek safeguards and rescue in the new South Africa.

Thus far, sadly, the ANC leadership has failed to make a significant positive contribution to better South Africa for its citizens, black or white. There were no reasons or grounds for the ANC to have allowed the hotheads and extremists in its leadership to change the accepted policy of 1994 – to handle Afrikaners with care – to the present-day strong-arm tactics, which seems to have gained momentum in the last two years. The only logical explanation is that the ANC is still locked in its revolution stage of the 1960s, driven by a “cake of customs” which is cemented in outdated and inappropriate assumptions, attitudes, traditions, and beliefs. It seems that they still do not understand, 23 years after demilitarization as freedom fighters, the differences between democratic or authoritarian governing, or how to promote the greater society without discriminating on the basis of race or creed, self-enrichment versus uplifting the poor, and the simple difference between naked hatred from the past versus present-day forgiveness for injustices done. With this the unfortunate status quo, Afrikaners in 2017 are left with no other choice than to prepare themselves for surviving the growing onslaught against them.

There are four main options available for the present-day Afrikaner to survive another century as individual, subgroup, or tribe. They are:

- An armed struggle to obtain an independent or autonomous Afrikaner state inside the greater South African region;
- Extensive migration to Europe and other white-dominated friendly countries;

- Self-isolation and withdrawal as a tribe in a semi-dependent Afrikaner homeland in the new South Africa;
- Full social integration and miscegenation with the rest of the South African population.

All of these alternatives have been tried and tested, with various outcomes, across the world and throughout history. Of particular interest here are events that occurred in the 1900s, up to the 1950s, in Central, Eastern, and Western Europe as well as in Asia and in the Middle East. These outcomes are well-documented and could guide the Afrikaner in terms of a decision. What must be taken into consideration is that every situation is unique: what could fail in one case could prove successful in another. The Afrikaner's future lies in this context.^{14,63}

7.6.1 An armed struggle to obtain an independent or autonomous Afrikaner state inside the greater South African region

The Afrikaner's history is littered with efforts to obtain independent territories; there was the short-lived earlier Republics of Swellendam and Graaff-Reinet in the Cape Colony, the doomed Natal, Free State, and Transvaal Republics, the failed 1914 Afrikaner Rebellion, the Union of South Africa from 1902 until 1961 and the nationalist Afrikaner Republic of South Africa from 1961 to 1994; all of them came to an end. Those up to the early 1900s were military crushed. South Africa of 1961 to 1994 seems to be the last Afrikaner sovereignty in its history.^{59,64,65}

The Afrikaner's drive to create a *mini empire of multinationals* (Union of South Africa with various provinces), followed by his *mini empire of multination-states* (South African Republic with various semi-independent Black homelands under a central White homeland), had all failed for various obvious reasons, like the Afrikaner political and financial incompetence after 1990, an underestimation of the ANC's political and thinking power, and a Black majority as upcoming political role-players, etc.^{8,68}

The 1994 political dispensation in South Africa was a reorientation, specifically in terms of redressing the imbalance between Whites and non-Whites that had existed for nearly 350 years, since the official establishment of White rule in the Cape of Good Hope. It is common for such reorientation to be accompanied by severe conflict and loss of lives, as evidenced in various multination states, like Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Turkey. Fortunately, South Africa was spared this

bloodshed in 1994 due to a sudden and a full collapse of the NP government and their surrender of the leadership without military resistance (or as it is seen today by some as a well-planned bloodless coup d' état orchestrated by insiders of the nationalist Afrikaners' leadership). This collapse was swiftly followed by a successful capture of the government in five years by the ANC. The occupation of an initial mini empire of multinationals in South Africa between 1910 and 1961, a political system once again changed to a mini empire with multiple states by the NP between 1961 and 1994, shifted into the hands of the ANC without a shot being fired by the Afrikaner tribe to attempt to reclaim leadership of South Africa.^{63,67}

This annulment of Afrikaner-power afforded the ANC regime the opportunity to undo a number of decisions implemented by the "Afrikaner executive empire" by dissolving and collapsing the various independent "Bantu-homelands" back into the new South Africa. Through this return to a "mini-empire of multinationals" for South Africa, the ANC obtained total military and security power, nipping any possible large-scale revolt by nationalist Afrikaners in the bud. This new ANC state also had a strong inclination to decolonize from day one, with the primary aim of preventing further Afrikaner political aspirations of independence or autonomy.^{8,15}

The establishment of a totally independent homeland, like the Jews did in Palestine to create a New Israel, is out in South Africa. The price of this present-day Jewish state was extreme bloodshed, war, and embitterment in the minds of the Arabs. The daily existence and functioning of Israel today still requires massive military overruling and suppressing of the Arabs in the occupied areas, with outcomes of conflict so atrocious it is considered crimes against humanity, and even genocide. Running Israel is an expensive and complicated exercise, and its maintenance is possible only by the backing of Western powers (especially the USA) in money and arms; this is not viable in the Afrikaner context. And then there is the extraordinary Jewish unity and belief system that equally motivates Israelis and Jews; a nation-component that is sorely missing with Afrikaners after 1994.⁶⁸⁻⁷¹

Also, there would be no place for the Afrikaner's political aspirations (even less for revolt) in an Afrikaner homeland (a nation-state, or even just an ethnic society) inside the ANC and Black majority's mini-empire of multi-nations of the new South Africa, is. Thus any notion of a future "Afrikaner autonomy" or even of "Afrikaner self-reliance" is wishful thinking and is as nonsensical as

offering the modern-day Khoi-San an independent state in the new South Africa. This propaganda is only maintained by a small Nationalist-Afrikaner portion of society with very little support from ordinary Afrikaners.^{63,72}

Even if the Afrikaner had tried in 1994 to hang on to full political and military power, he would have failed the ruler test: his resources and security for maintaining power were overstretched and the NP was basically bankrupt in 1994: peaceful capitulation was unavoidable. The fact that its population had decreased over the years from more than 4 million to less than 3 million in 2016, emphasizes this dilemma of a declined empowerment. This “cruel” reality has at last been recognized by some of the hard-line nationalist Afrikaners in South Africa, who acknowledged that an own independent state was no longer viable, but that an Afrikaner (ethnic) society inside the new South Africa might still be possible. However, this option is also nothing but a pipe dream.⁷³⁻⁷⁹

In the end, multi-ethnic mini-empires of multi-nations, together with multi-empires of multi-states that overruled their citizens like the Union government, and later the NP government, had only a shadowy concept of what they were doing and what the outcome of their empowerment or planning would one day be. They mostly collapsed in a short amount of time. Their shelf-life is indeed limited, as confirmed by the various Empire states of the 20th century: the duration of the Bolsheviks’ Social Union lasted from 1922 to 1991 (69 years); Bismarck’s German Reich 1871 to 1918 (47 years); Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich 1938 to 1944 (12 years); Japan’s Colonial Empire 1905 to 1945 (40 years). The People’s Republic of China was established in 1949 and is still functioning in 2017, but is only 58 years old. For these five states, the average is 45 years.^{14,63}

It is thus not a surprise that the NP and its nationalist Afrikaner style mini-empire of multi-nations (or the unofficial managed “NP Union”) only lasted from 1948 to 1961 (13 years), and its mini-empire for multi-states (Republic) only from 1961 to 1994 (33 years), while the Union of South Africa (exclusively British-oriented) under strong British influence lasted from 1910 to 1948 (38 years). This reflects an average of 24 years for the three regimes.^{56,58,64}

The ambition of Afrikaners up to 1994 (with a population of less than 3 million) to rule a majority of Blacks (approximately 40 million) displayed the same flawed thinking as that of 66 million Germans in the 1940s to rule over more than 300 million other Europeans in an area stretching from the Channel Islands to the Caucasus, or 70 million Japanese to rule over 400 million other Asians in

Greater East Asia from Manchuria to Mandalay. This kind of rule is and was impossible to maintain indefinitely.⁶³

In terms of a military takeover it should also be borne in mind that Afrikaners don't have a capable defence force at their disposal. The well-oiled army of the 1990s made up of well-trained White soldiers was phased out. The training of new White soldiers had stopped in the 1990s and the 18-year-olds of 1994 are now middle-aged men of 40 years and over. Undoubtedly not the preferred combat troops to win a war!

Strive among different groups of Afrikaners since 1902 also makes the possibility of a unified front less. Afrikaners, old and young, are currently grappling with their individual futures to find and map such futures in their thoughts. The Afrikaner's powerful hyper-Nationalism of 1994 had been replaced by an undefined Hypo-Nationalism 20 years later; a nationalism that is still further dwindling.⁸⁰⁻⁸³

History also shows that support for hard-core terrorist-oriented Afrikaner and other politically obstructive groups like the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) and the Boeremag (BM), is zero amongst present-day Afrikaners. These revolutionary influences faded out in the early 2000s. It also seems as if the Afrikaner has just lost interest in ruling South Africa after centuries of struggling to do so. The lessons Afrikaners have learned about the devastating effects of revolts and uprisings by minorities to themselves clearly stopped any notions of planning organized armed action against the ANC government.⁶⁸⁻⁷¹ They know very well that such action would give the government sound justification to annul them in a racial war without any hope of rescue from Europe or the USA. The treacherous Dingaan and his Hloma Amabutho are still not forgotten by many Afrikaners.⁵⁹ Also, the ANC partners in BRICS will not allow military intervention from the West if such outside assistance were available. The African Union's support of the ANC in resisting any Afrikaner uprising or outside military support for them would also make any such initiative very unwise indeed.

A well-organized armed struggle is out forever. Even their deep belief (and trust) in the prophet Siener van Rensburg's vague predictions that the ANC and the Black rulers are going to collapse, putting Afrikaners back in power, is only a small memory of the past in the present-day Afrikaner's bewildered mindset.^{84,85}

Armed responses to secure his survival as a nation, is clearly the last option for the Afrikaner. Other, more constructive, and less risky options must thus be considered.

7.6.2 Extensive migration to Europe and other white-dominated friendly countries

Since 1994, migration has become a popular option for Afrikaners; apparently to retain their identity, language, freedom, and rights; as much as 1.2 million people have already left, with a further 1.5 thinking or planning to do so the next decade or two. The most popular destinations at present are Australia and New Zealand.⁷³⁻⁷⁹

Migration is a worldwide manifestation in times of political unrest, racial, and ethnic discrimination as well as economical hardship. Aspects that drove people to migration in the past have been limited or lack of employment, high criminality, poor governance, and lack of national identity and threats/acts of genocide by the local population. Aggravating circumstances worldwide were that these types of pervasive grievances had grown on a daily basis and had gone unaddressed by the authorities in charge. There was also a constant rise in expectations of a better and a secure lifestyle and living conditions worldwide, especially promoted by the opportunities that globalization had brought since the 1900s. There is also no disloyalty in migration; that is how the ancestors of the Whites and the Blacks of South Africa arrived here. The fact that between 1850 and 1914 nearly 34 million, and between 1901, and 1910 nearly 12 million Europeans emigrated, confirms this as an acceptable and normal process of economical, personal, and social survival.⁶³

Most of such worldwide migration was *geographical*, basically because of economic, social, and ethnic discrimination and not so much a *social* transplant into a same-nation setup. It happened for instance during the Irish famine, which the English authorities in London totally ignored in an effort to annul the “Irish Problem”. This led to a massive migration to the United States of America. Also, no less than 6 million Germans moved to South America in the 1900s, fleeing from negative political and economical circumstances at home.⁶³

This kind of migration also happened in Britain between 1891 and 1900 when no fewer than 726 000 citizens emigrated from the UK, with a 72% of them

moving to the foreign USA (geographical migration) in contrast to a mere 28% to other British regions (social/nation-migration).⁶³

In the 1900s as many as 5 million Germans emigrated to the American mid-West; at the time, there were already 13 million Germans living beyond the Bismarck-Reich Eastern frontier, a further 9 million Germans in Austria, and another 4 million Germans in Eastern Europe in places like Hungary, Romania, and Russia. There were also substantial numbers of Germans in Poland, Galicia, Bukovina, Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Transylvania, and in Russian territory, seeking better life-conditions.⁶³

But, these German migrants did not always find a better life and secure German nationhood in Greater Europe. As their economic position improved and they became prosperous, ethnic hostility born from masked economical jealousy led to intense discrimination from nationals in their adopted countries, deportation, and even mass murder of migrant Germans during World War Two (WW2). This was one of Hitler's reasons for not only occupying some of these countries for the German people, but to wipe out their indigenous populations to make living space.^{14,63}

It was not only the Germans who migrated to other countries – fleeing political, economical, racial, or discriminative circumstances in their own homeland – that fell prey to new discrimination and murder in their adopted homelands; it also happened to Blacks in South Africa in the early 1800s and Jews, Greeks, Hungarians, and Turks in the 1900s.⁶³

It was especially the Jews who fall prey: of the 10.6 million Jews living in Europe up to Russian territory in the 1930s, 6 million were murdered in their new adopted homelands before 1948. In South Africa, between one and two million people from the tribes that had moved here from Central Africa were murdered by other tribes, like the Zulus and the Matabele, also settlers from Central Africa, between 1810 and 1840.^{39,63}

It is evident that migration to a new homeland is not always a guarantee of a better life; in the long term (even in 50 years and more after migration), the outcome can be the tragic opposite. However, for the impoverished and landless Jews moving to the New Israel and the Zulus and Matabele moving to South Africa from Central Africa, migration was worthwhile.³⁹

Where could Afrikaners go as a group? This was the same question the Jews were asking themselves in the 1940s in Europe when the tide turned against them. Most of the European and Western countries already had quotas on Jews in place: from South Africa, the UK, all the way to the USA, where other discriminative legislation against them barred them from entering. There was a new Israeli homeland in Palestine, but only for those who could afford the travelling costs. The British authorities further limited the entrance of Jewish settlers so as not to offend the Palestinians.^{56,63,64}

For the Afrikaner, as the last White colonist in Africa to be pushed out, it seems that not only political but also economic asylum is urgently needed if the negative politics of the ANC continues.

Europe seems a viable choice for the Afrikaner, but for the average Afrikaner the language barriers of Germany, France, etc, could pose severe obstacles. Also, the costs of migrating to and living in Europe are just too steep for the average Afrikaner (initially, poverty also stunted the migration of Jews to Israel). The Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, and the UK seem to be the only applicable destinations for a large-scale transplant, but these countries are clearly not financially or politically geared for such a large influx of Afrikaners.^{67,86,87}

The present chaos in Europe, created by the massive inflow of Islamic migrants from the Middle East and North Africa, would act as additional deterrent against mass migration of Afrikaners to Europe. Firstly, these countries are already bursting at the seams with the additional demand on existing employment and living space; secondly, the racial and ethnic differences between Europeans and Muslim migrants have already given rise to conflict. This situation leaves very little space for a large influx of Afrikaners to any country in Greater Europe. In light of deteriorating global political scenarios in Greater Europe, the Middle East, and Russia and its surrounding countries, migration northwards could cause more trauma than relief.^{86,87}

Although it is a very attractive new homeland, the United States of America (USA) has not been immune to financial, racial, and political upheavals, which renders it far from ideal for a massive migration. Poverty in South Africa is colour-blind, which means that the number of Whites affected by this scourge is also increasing, which automatically bars them from emigrating anywhere, including the US.⁸⁸⁻⁹¹

To put the Afrikaners' future for instance in the USA (and in all European countries) in perspective, it must be remembered that pre- as well as post-1994 South Africa was and is still a small power (and its people also) in the international society. The most obvious fact about small powers is that their interests and lots are governed by the policy of the great powers. In the pre-1994 South African governing it was mostly by Europe, Britain and the USA, while in post-1994 the chief-masters are China and Russia. Inside this belittled setup the Afrikaners were in the past and are at present never regard as important by international powers. This includes migration, especially on a large scale.⁹¹ In 1965 (more than 50 years ago) Spence writes about the doomed view of the USA of the Afrikaners^{91, p. 24}: "...in the American view 'the cultural and spiritual interests of a paltry 2¹/₂million whites...or even their vital interests and survival...count for very little. In the pattern of post-war world politics, the truth [is that] the survival and the rights of the small Afrikaner people have no place'". Today, with still only a population of nearly 2.5 million, but financially and politically in a far more diminished position as in 1965, large scale migration opportunities for the Afrikaners to the USA and a warm welcome there, seems zero. The present US racial developments around the "Federal Statues Must Fall" and so called "New Black-liberation" give a further good indication that the "White"-Afrikaners, still saddled with apartheid, are not welcome. (This zero stand on future mass migration of Afrikaners to Europe seems the same, as the present refugees from "small" countries, like Syria, Iraqi and Libya, to Europe and the USA, confirm it well).

The Afrikaner should also remember that a new country poses challenges in terms of lifestyles, customs, habits, and traditions: there will be no Afrikaans at work, and if it is not deliberately spoken at home, the language of the adopted country will become the new home language. Afrikaners who migrated to Argentina and the USA after the Anglo-Boer War were fully assimilated and intermixed with the locals within two generations. They surrendered their Afrikaner identity and today their descendants are Argentineans and Americans, not Afrikaners.⁵⁹

South Africans seem to prefer Australia and New Zealand as peaceful and secure countries to expatriate to. But are these countries really the best calls? It is important to note the Chinese factor of growing imperialism and world domination, especially with their focus on Australia and New Zealand.

7.6.2.1 Australia, New Zealand and the Chinese Dragon

The ambition of some countries to achieve global empire status is still relevant today as it was before WW2. China's development as a world power with should not be ignored, especially not with the period after 2030 in mind; China is not only looking to expand its economy, but the living space of its population. The Western World's present concern over China's gradual dominance of world trade is missing the point; Chinese citizens are the main export product. By gradually populating politically and economically unstable and vulnerable countries with Chinese people, China is winning the war without firing a single shot. Australia and New Zealand are centrally situated, economically valuable, relatively isolated from Europe and the USA, incapable of defending themselves against a world power like China. From the Chinese perspective, these countries are obvious targets for takeover in the next 20 to 40 years. (Chinas' annually population growth is equal to the total population of Australia. It's thus understandable that Australia's and New Zealand's inherent potentials in space and richness make them very attractive future destinies of expansion for the over-populated China).⁶³

It would be myopic for the Afrikaner to downplay these possibilities in considering a permanent relocation to Australia and New Zealand. In Japan's Global Policy of the 1940s, aspirations to occupy Australia and New Zealand were clearly articulated. The main aim was to establish a Japanese Empire up to Japanese Asia, with the Yamato Race as nucleus, consisting of 2 million permanent Japanese settlers in Australia and New Zealand.⁶³

Regarding China's possible military entrance to Australia and New Zealand as enclaves for Chinese settlers, the numbers can be phenomenal calculated in terms of the Japanese planning of 1940. Of a total Japanese population of 70 million (in 1940), 2 million Japanese settlers equate to 46 million Chinese settlers in terms of the modern-day Chinese population of 1 600 million. With China's notorious human rights record, this spells trauma for the democracies of Australia and New Zealand. Who could forget Deng Xiaoping of China or Pol Pot of Cambodia and their murderous gangs who killed thousands upon thousands of other Chinese? Also the cold-blooded annexation of Tibet by China and the diminishing of the indigenous Tibetans in the 1960s is a clear warning for Australia and New Zealand in waiting. Surely these are fates could very well be awaiting Afrikaner migrants in Australia and New Zealand. ^{63,86,92}

Above possible negative future outcomes internationally for Afrikaner migrants are well-reflected on by Friedman^{86, p. 79} when he writes: “The First World War was essentially European [with more than 16 million deaths]. The Second World War was truly global, with the Pacific as well as the Atlantic basin involved. But most important, the war was more intense. No one can be certain of exactly how many died in Europe in World War II, but a reasonable number is 51 million soldiers and civilians, from genocide, bombing, and the normal cost of war. In 1939, Europeans numbered about 550 million, including neutral countries. A staggering 10 percent of all Europeans perished during the six years from 1939 to 1945”. But Friedman⁸⁶ shows the global war-death-outcome for the period 1914 to 1945 was much more devastating, leaving approximately 71 million Europeans dead in general warfare and when adding the 20 million killed under Stalin, the number rises to 91 million. “Add in the Russian and Spanish civil wars, and sundry other conflicts hardly worth mentioning, such as Turkey’s war with Greece and Armenia, and the number of 100 million is conservative”, states Friedman^{86, p. 81} further. Theoretically did approximately 3 million people died globally per annum in war-related outcomes for the period 1914 to 1945; this is 300 000 more than the total present-day Afrikaner-population. The warfare of the period 1946 up too today, with the seemingly fast incoming Third World War III, are going to take not less than 500 million lives and can devastating permanently much more life space, freedom and richness than ever.^{86, p. 81}

Migration seems a very attractive solution for wealthy Afrikaners and the younger generation of Afrikaners away from of their seemingly present financial-, political, racial- and ethnic-problems in South Africa, but there are many unpredictable, unexpected and negative outcomes that can await them in any promising new homeland. Migration as a choice needs thus a well-thought-through.

7.6.3 Self-isolation and withdrawal as a tribe in a semi-dependent Afrikaner homeland in the new South Africa

The Afrikaner is used to self-isolation, starting in the early days of the European settlers at the Cape of Good Hope, far away from their motherland without family, friends, or the comforts of Europe. This isolated state was exacerbated by negative political and personal treatment by the authorities at the Cape, forcing them to live in the undeveloped and the isolated country-side.^{58,59,64,93}

Their later involvement in the Great Trek, founding themselves in the thinly populated Free State and Transvaal further cemented the lifestyle of self-isolation. It was only after the founding of the Union of South Africa and the

impoverishment of the Transvaal and Free State burghers (Afrikaners), that they were forced to earn a living away from the farm and amongst other people. The Afrikaner slowly moved into urban areas and became exposed again to the foreign world of his European ancestors. But isolation still exists: the events leading up to and the dawn of apartheid led to many countries, including the Europeans, distancing themselves even today from the South African great-grandchildren of the original European settlers.^{56,59,64,93,94}

The Afrikaner's longing for an own, exclusive homeland was a constant companion for centuries. The NP government under the FW de Klerk did not see this as practical solution; factors like economic interdependence between the different races, the lack of a suitable region to allocate legally to Afrikaners, and an absence of national unity among Afrikaners were some of the arguments against such a move. Most of these arguments were true. Afrikaners relinquished the notion, also because in 1994 the ANC had made it clear that it objected to any Afrikaner homelands. This set in motion moves to nullify any separate Afrikaner identity, action, or organization even vaguely reminiscent of apartheid or Afrikanerism, including schools, universities, businesses, political organizations, etc.^{72,95-112}

There was strong call by Afrikaner nationalists of the 1930s for an independent republic with clear borders and unique Afrikaner character in South Africa, but as a result of infighting between themselves and their short-term political opportunism in terms of obtaining power at the time, the whole effort faded away until 1960. By that time it was too late for such an Afrikaner homeland, especially in view of the economic interdependence of all South Africans and their scattering to all corners of the country.^{56,58,64}

This immense failure by nationalist Afrikaner leaders to establish a nationalist Afrikaner republic on their homeland model was because they lacked understanding and acceptance of global changes in thought regarding African and Black Nationalism and Uhuru, as well as the development and protection of human rights by populations and individuals in general. Also, there were insufficient numbers of Afrikaners on the African continent and their geographic isolation from Europe and the USA to support their rights as a White group, disempowered them as a role-player. Afrikaners also underestimated the strength of the ANC in 1994 and put too much faith in a future conciliation between Afrikaners and the ANC. It not only left Afrikaners ill-prepared for the consequences of 1994, but cost them political credibility and respect. This result

of poor planning and strategic thinking left them paralyzed, as was the case with the two conquered Boer republics after the Second Anglo-Boer War.^{67,94}

Efforts today by Afrikaner leaders to locate Afrikaners within a greater African context by arguing that Afrikaners are also “Africans” and “South Africans”, but with a *unique Afrikaner identity*, is considered foolish by the Black majority. It is seen as a disregard for the indigenous realities of South Africa. The ANC considers any attempts of Afrikaners to isolate themselves as a parallel government, to polarize the races and call into being a “Boer volkstaat”, as hostile and outside the indigenous unity of a nation.^{18,30,72,113,114}

The failure of Orania is a good illustration of why an Afrikaner homeland is not a viable solution. This enclave could not attract the massive amount of Afrikaners as expected, neither does it have the infrastructure to make it a viable or sustainable state for 100 000 Afrikaners, let alone 3 million! The same can be said of the other dubious enclaves that had sprung up over time.^{73,101,107,110,112,115-117}

A similar kind of separate state in the 1920s for Russian-Jews, the **Jewish Autonomous Region of Birobidzhan** in Siberia, failed for a number of reasons, mostly the same associated with the failure of Orania as a true homeland. It serves as a good example as warning of the failure in waiting of an Afrikaner homeland. It must be noted.

7.6.3.1 The failed Jewish Autonomous Region of Birobidzhan in Siberia

The pogroms, the chaos of the Civil War in Russia and the breakup of the Pale, made Russian Jews a thorn in the side of Russia. In the 1920s it became so chronic that a quick solution was needed. For the Russian authorities in Moscow it offered the opportunity to force communism on its Jewish subordinates through its *model of nominal autonomy* and to deal a blow to Zionism in Russia. On the other hand, the Russian authorities believed that a Jewish homeland would attract Jewish capital from the West and at the same time relegate jobless and unskilled Jews of European Russia as farmers in a conventional Soviet cast.¹¹⁸

Both the Ukraine and the Crimea were mooted as Jewish homelands, but the initiatives were dropped as result of resistance by the local people. As a solution, the area of Birobidzhan in the Siberia wilderness along the borders of China was allocated as a Jewish homeland in 1928. It was a derelict land of mosquito-plagued marshes, wild forests, and mud tracks. Government support for

establishing the Jewish enclave was minimal; often nothing was prepared for them and implements, livestock, and houses were absent. The area was run on Leninist principles from start and not religious ones, and the first settlers held their prayer meetings in secret. The promises of a rich and waiting land drew only a trickle of Jewish settlers. Religious and integrated Jews distrusted it and it was seen as just another ghetto. From 1928 to 1938 only 43 000 Jews, including outsiders from America, Europe, Argentina, and even Palestine, immigrated. Many of the immigrants were urban artisans with no experience of planting crops or draining soil. More than half of the initial immigrants returned home or moved back into their old occupations in Siberian cities. Notwithstanding all the obstacles in the beginning, the rest of Jews went on to establish the city of Birobidzhan and in 1934 their province became the *Jewish Autonomous Region of Birobidzhan*. The income of the area moved from agriculture to industry. Textile factories sprung up, furniture cartels, Jewish newspapers, and schools followed. At this stage the Jewish population had already declined drastically and the Russians were the majority, with the Jews making up only 23%. In the 1936 Stalin purges, which affected the whole Soviet Union, the leaders of Birobidzhan and its committees were also liquidated. Despite the negative events of 1936, the post-war years brought a revival with the arrival of another 10 000 Jews from the Ukraine. This positive turn was dashed by the persecutions in 1948, and the majority of the Jews left the region for good. One by one the Jewish leaders disappeared, accused of obscure conspiracies. All Jewish institutes, schools, theatres and newspapers were closed down.¹¹⁸

The only Jews coming in after 1948 were convicted exiles and only Stalin's death prevented the region from becoming a zone of mass deportation and even mass murder. A tentative synagogue was burned down in 1956 and the region was left without a rabbi permanently. Migration out of the area escalated from there onwards, especially to the USA. In 1990 less than 10 000 Jews were still living in Birobidzhan (representing 6% of the total inhabitants) and Yiddish had disappeared from the streets. Very few true Jews remain today apart from the few who became Russians, while the last poor Jews are being assisted by Israel to move there. Today the businesses are monopolized by the Chinese and Jewish faces are missing from the streets. Even the older street facades show no trace of the early Jewish immigrants. All that remains of the Jewish state of Birobidzhan is a *bizarre dream*.¹¹⁸

The above reflects well what is taking place in the new, integrated South Africa with the Afrikaner population: the loss of their schools, universities, street and

city names, jobs, etc. and their out-numbering in traditional (although not by law) Afrikaner areas. Further can RET and RST change dramatically in future the Afrikaners' position in South Africa for the worst. But these are all realities that are comprehensive in their destroying which the Afrikaner homeland-dreamers must take serious note of –the discrimination and crushing of the Jews took place *outside* in motherland Russia as well as *inside* their Russian homeland Birobidzhan. There was no difference at the end, making Birobidzhan as a bizarre dream. It reflects well that to survive as a separate state, even as a subordinate homeland is difficult, even impossible. An Afrikaner homeland in greater South Africa means just another failed Birobidzhan.

7.6.3.2 Its time for republic-minded Afrikaners to face the failures of Orania, Kleinfontein and Birobidzhan as true homelands

One of the main requirements for the establishment and upkeep of a new state is the availability of motivated young people to develop and to promote it. The young Afrikaners are currently grappling with their own identity in a multi-racial and cultural milieu. At the moment Afrikaners can perhaps only rely on middle age and older people to steer its agendas and interests.^{83,119} There is today much more cooperation between the urban White youth and urban Black youth than between the urban White youth and the rural White youth. This outcome not only undermines the Afrikaner brotherhood doctrine and *volk's* ideology, but also nullifies strong youth support for the exclusive White homeland dream. Today many Afrikaners, in their disorientation and desperation, knowing the Afrikaner homeland idea is something of the past, are instead trying to absorb the “Afrikaanses” (Coloured or Brown Afrikaners and other Afrikaans speakers, including Blacks) as members into their group as part of greater South Africa's variety of many groups. This kind of overall disintegration of Afrikaners as a tribe and their open acknowledge of this fact, is on the increase.^{119,120}

Viewing the aims and intentions of Afrikaner enclaves like Orania and Kleinfontein as the same as that of modern-day Israel is foolish, short-sighted and irresponsible. They are totally different and opposing entities. Israel is supported by world powers like the USA and financially by many rich Jews from all over the world. Also the European/White support element is prominent. There is consensus among the Israelis about their future and being a Jew. The villagers of Orania and Kleinfontein are not like that.

Very few Jews believed initially that they would be better off by establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. In the 1930s about 82 000 Polish Jews immigrated to

Palestine. The majority of Jews in Poland and other European countries were initially more interested in what could be achieved in their motherlands. It was only after Hitler, Stalin, the Polish and other European peoples started to murder Jews and the genocide of as many as 6 million Jews followed, mostly Ashkenazim Jews, that the Jews were forced to change their minds in favour of emigration to an independent Israel. However, in the case of the Jews, there *was a secure territory awaiting them.*^{115,116,121-124}

However, Afrikaners do not have an identified piece of land that they can emigrate to, neither are they welcome to establish such a state inside the new South African territory and under the ANC authority. There is no global support for such an endeavour either. Orania and Kleinfontein are far from secure. In addition to the above, an Afrikaner state would be too small to be a trade partner of Europe and the USA. China and many African countries will be reluctant to trade with the Afrikaners as their sympathies lie with the Blacks and the ANC. As such a state would not form part of South Africa as a financial hub they will struggle to generate income. The infrastructure of South Africa is crucial. Ultimately, such a state would be forced to join South Africa again under Black rule.

The overall position of the Afrikaner is also significantly different from the genocide of the Jews in the 1940s and their need to escape from Europe to a homeland. There is no genocide of Afrikaners. The financial and living circumstances of Afrikaners in the new South Africa are still favourable and far better than in the 1830s in the Cape Colony or in the Union after the 1930s, even in the 1960s under Afrikaner rule. Yes, there are immense political problems for Afrikaners as a tribe, but South Africa has not yet declined beyond redemption and can only be described as a partially failed state, although there is some red lights.¹²¹⁻¹²³

H F Verwoerd's political power play in 1960 to establish again an "Afrikaner/Boer" republic after the two failures of the 1900s and his obtaining then of a strong mandate for this impossible NP dream from the Afrikaner electorate on the "Black-danger" issue, when he said^{91, p. 34}: "Your choice is more sharply defined than at any previous election, namely between a White republic, with non-white neighbours, and a multi-racial fatherland with, first a multi-racial and, later, a Black government", is today only a vague memory in the minds of the elderly nationalist Afrikaners. Afrikaner power plays and -visions on future "Boers states" can still be reflected in talks, but the physical establishment again

of a “White republic” is only a dream in the illogical mindset of some Afrikaners. This is a South African indigenous reality that all Afrikaners must make peace with.

7.6.4 Full social assimilation and racial miscegenation with the other races of South Africa

Assimilation and miscegenation between different races and ethnic groups is a global phenomenon. The Afrikaner’s own mixed heredity from early horizontal miscegenation between other races and the White matrilineal family stock, confirms this.

Intensive and large-scale assimilation and miscegenation between Afrikaners and Blacks and other races to root out ethnic and racial discrimination in South Africa, is one practical approach to the problem. The questions are:

- Has such assimilation and miscegenation really worked elsewhere in the world? and
- Can the Afrikaners change their resistance to large-scale assimilation and miscegenation with Black South Africans?

The first question is answered by analysing the outcomes on assimilation and miscegenation between different races and ethnic groups in Greater Europe for the period 1900 to 1950 as a guideline for the Afrikaner. Strong focus is on the experiences and treatment of the Jews who were assimilated and married non-Jews in adopted countries.

7.6.4.1 Examples of assimilation and miscegenation worldwide

The Jews, driven from their homeland in Palestine as early as 300 AC, spread over the Greater Europe to countries like Germany, Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, France, The Netherlands, Switzerland, Prussia, Russia, Romania, Poland, Estonia, Czechoslovakia and Austria. In 1901, 70% (7.42million) of the world’s total Jewish population of 10.6 million were Ashkenazim in Eastern and Central Europe. Of this 7.42 million Jews, as much as 30% (2.23 million) were living in Russian territory.^{14,63}

The process of assimilation of the Jews with the Germans and other nationals was well advanced by the start of the 1900s, leading to the establishment of mixed communities and settlements. In Germany, the various legal obstacles to marriages between Jews and non-Jews were removed in 1875, aligning them

with the legislation of Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, The Netherlands, Switzerland and the USA. It was still illegal in Russia. This assimilation led to miscegenation with the local peoples. In 1876 5% of the Prussian Jews were already married to non-Jews. These marriages rose to 8.5% in the 1890s. In Germany the 7.8% of mixed marriages in 1870s rose to 20.4% in 1914.^{14,63}

Racial integration, assimilation and miscegenation of Jews with the citizens of their adopted homelands were thus quite well advanced in Central and Eastern Europe by the 1920s. The rates of intermarriage across ethnic barriers for Jews rose to new heights from 1920. In the late 1920s, nearly one in every three marriages involving a German Jew was to a Gentile, while the rate rose as high as two out of three in some German cities. This trend was more or less similar in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Russia.^{63,86}

This assimilation was so normal in the Jewish community that the Jews did not hesitate to be active in the political landscape of their adopted homelands, especially in the revolutionary politics of the 1900s. Jews like Trotsky and others were part of the various left-wing parties and revolutionary organizations that spearheaded the 1905 revolution in Russia. Their numbers accounted for 11% of the Bolshevik delegates and 23% of the Menshevik delegates at the fifth Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Party in 1907. Together with other parties attending the Congress, as much as 29% of the delegates were Jews.⁶³

This assimilation and miscegenation are also evident from by the acceptance of the Jews into the financial systems of their adopted homelands and the extraordinary economical contribution of the Jewish population to the economies of their homelands. By the 1900s some Jews living under Russian and other rulers had already had great financial success: in 1897 Jews accounted for 73% of all merchants and manufacturers in Poland. In Kiev specifically they accounted for 44% of the city's merchants and handled more than 66% of the city's commerce while making up only 13% of the city's population.⁶³

Despite this positive state of affairs, it was precisely in Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Russia, all regions with established mixed settlements, some of the worst ethnic violence and mass murders of Jews (and of other foreigners who had intermixed with the locals) occurred during WW2 in the 1940s.^{63,86,118}

In Auschwitz the Nazis killed 1.8 million Jews and the further 4.4 million were murdered at places like Majdanek, Belzec, Chelmno, Sobibor and Treblinka. Assimilation and miscegenation did not save mixed villages and settlements from genocide, sometimes death came by the hands of their own half-brothers and -sisters.^{14,63,118}

The German occupation of Poland resulted in the seizing of Jewish property, the closure of their schools, expulsion of Jewish professionals like medical doctors and professors, the closing of Jewish organizations, followed by a well-managed genocide. The result was that of the more than 9 million Jews living in Greater Europe in 1938, only 3 million still remained by the end of 1948.^{63,86}

This genocide by the Germans was not limited to the Jews, but was applied to the citizens of Poland during the German occupation – a country where the Germans and the Polish intermixed freely for many years. As many as 6 million people died in Poland under Hitler's occupation. Here, it was especially the Polish intelligentsia and leadership, like priests, lawyers, businessmen, teachers, doctors, mostly people with strong intermixed relations with the locals who were murdered.^{14,63}

In Czechoslovakia, where there was assimilation and miscegenation between Jews, Germans and the Polish in the 1920s, the state capture of Jewish and German property with wide-spread economical reform and land reform by the government (better known as the “selective expropriation and redistribution of German and Jewish property”), as well as the nationalization of their industries and the closing of their schools, followed.⁶³

The same processes of racial and ethnic discrimination followed against Ukrainians in Poland, Hungary and Romania, also well-established regions of mixed settlements. Romanian authorities drove German-speaking teachers and lecturers at universities out of the country. Even in Italy did discrimination, especially against German and Jewish organizations, follow.⁶³

The Turkish treatment of Armenians also proves that genocide can occur in well-functioning mixed settlements with high rates of intermarriage between races and ethnic groups and mixed descendants. It is often regarded as the first modern genocide, dated 1915-1918, as it led to the extermination of 1.8 million Armenians. (The methods of the Turks were later used in the mass executions of

the Jews in the 1930s to 1940s by the Nazis at Auschwitz and other murder camps).^{14,63,86,125}

The persecution of Greeks in Turkey in 1923, also in well-functioning mixed settlements with intermarriages between ethnic groups and mixed descendants, also led to mass murdering and more than 1.2 million Greeks being forced from their ancestral homes.^{14,63,125}

The staggering scale of murder of other races, ethnic groups and even dissident Russians by Stalin in his Siberian murder camps – all people who lived in harmony with strong assimilation and miscegenation over long periods – become evident when considering that there were at least 25 million Soviet deaths during WW2. Of these 25 million, only 7.8 million were military deaths, the other 13.7 million deaths were victims of the German occupation. About 7.4 million were executed. The rest was Stalin's work.^{14,63,118}

Although the Germans played the dominant role in the genocide of the Jews, the atrocities during WW2 were not limited to Germany alone, but genocide was committed in many other European countries. It was a general phenomenon, mainly committed by the “superior, developed, intellectually and cultured Caucasian.” Genocide was not led by “a few local ruffians” in these European countries. It was executed on Jews by their neighbours of good standing and personal friends; all people with whom the Jews had lived together within stable mixed settlements. They were often people with the same mixed blood as the Jews.^{14,63,118}

As much as roughly half of the male population in certain towns in Russia, Poland, Ukraine, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Italy, Norway, Denmark, The Netherlands, Belgium, and France were involved in murdering people based on ethnicity.^{63,118}

The above clearly shows that assimilation, even intermixed marriages, is not enough to safeguard a specific racial or an ethnic group's future in a mixed settlement or in an assumed stable, cultural and educated new homeland against crimes of humanity and genocide. Afrikaner numbers are significantly less than the Jewish numbers before the start up of the genocide, making them much more identifiable and targetable.

Genocide is also not always committed by the uneducated and pre-modern human, but also by well-educated people. The Germans' behaviour towards the

Jews (and others) confirms this. Up to 1933 Germany had by far the best universities in the world, more than a quarter of all Nobel prizes awarded in sciences between 1901 and 1940 were awarded to Germans, compared to only 11% to the USA. It had one of most advanced educational system in the world and a political system that brought to power Adolf Hitler primarily by democratic means. Still, they failed the test of humanity.^{63,86}

7.6.4.2 Afrikaners' acceptance and willingness to assimilation and miscegenation with Blacks

Regarding the second question on the Afrikaner's resistance to assimilation, it important to mention that assimilation between Whites and Blacks occurred by the 1830s, if not earlier. Some miscegenation surely took place at the Cape between settlers and Black slave women from Madagascar. Assimilation and miscegenation with the Malayans and Coloured People already started in 1652.^{8,30,41,57,58,59,64,87}

Many Afrikaners still think of the differences between the different races as enormous, even though 90% of the country's population share Christianity. Differences centre on class, customs, habits, traditions. These differences between Afrikaners and Blacks slowly start to diminish. The post-1994 political dispensation very successfully helped to erase it.^{4,126-129}

A true hegemony of a United Rainbow Nation for the RSA, how tactfully we are ignoring and side-stepping a discussion of this daring issue is absent. Intensive racial assimilation or miscegenation by the Afrikaner with non-Whites, notwithstanding the Afrikaner's own "contaminated blood-line" by his non-White parent stock, was just not reachable before 1994 and will not, it seems, depending on certain positive political outcomes, be obtained easily for many decades to come. Especially the present-day older Afrikaners are not acceptable for it; their indoctrination by the NP, AB and DRC was just too long and too successful to make their mindsets changeable and acceptable. The South African History, starting in 1652, confirms this rigidity.^{42,86,127-129}

On the other side is racial discrimination against the Whites by Blacks also prominent in the RSA and is been up-kept and is strength by certain prominent Blacks. Indeed, it is restarted every time before an election or when the ANC-regime fails the test of a responsible and trustworthy government. The end-result is the blocking of better relations between Afrikaners and Blacks.^{42,86,127-129}

The present-day financial insecurity which the Afrikaners are experiencing in new South Africa is seen many times exclusively as a direct result of Black aggression and their alleged dislike and hatred for Afrikaners. It is argued that it

activates counter-revenge from Afrikaners, resulting in the obstructing since 1994 of their assimilation and miscegenation with Blacks. This is not always a correct observation. Afrikaners experienced similar, if not more extreme, financial insecurity after the Second Anglo Boer War and during their Anglisation immediately after 1910 in the Union. Poverty characterised the Afrikaners existence for a long time in the Union. The *Poor White Problem in South Africa: Report by the Carnegie Commission in 1929/30* shows roughly 300 000 (16%) Afrikaners out of a total White South African population of 1.8 million were classified as “very poor”.¹³⁰ These outcomes were totally unrelated to Blacks actions (Indeed, the Black population suffered at that time three to four times more under “very poverty”). Blacks are surely not the primary reason for the financial insecurity of Afrikaner before or after 1994 and thus far not contributed to the Afrikaners reluctance to assimilate and miscegenate with Blacks. This reluctance seems to be much deeper seated in the psyche of the Afrikaners.¹³⁰

The present-day political, social and personal insecurities which the Afrikaners are experiencing in new South Africa is also attributed many times to be the outcome of Black dislike and hatred for Afrikaners which are steered as planned hostile actions against Afrikaners. This alleged behaviour by Blacks, as with the Afrikaners financial insecurity, is argued to activate counter hostility in the mindsets of Afrikaners, leading to their withdrawing from direct informal Black contact and cooperation. The end-result is argued, is the absence of assimilation and miscegenation with Blacks. Again, this is not always the full truth. In the past, as with the Afrikaners’ financial suffering, there were many non-Black determinants also as primary role-players contributing to the political, social and personal insecurities of Afrikaners, coming over many years up to 1994, like the internalised disposition of racial discrimination and White supremacy in the mindsets of Afrikaners. On the other side it must be acknowledged that Black hatred and dislike for Afrikaners can play a role in some cases. Hostilities are undoubtedly driven and executed sometimes by ANC political delinquents. But this seemingly racial overture not seated in a general dislike or hatred for Afrikaners: it is a direct outcome of the ANC’s present-day internal power struggles and its slow dismantling as a liberation movement cum political party. This phenomenon of conflict is not new for Afrikaners and is indeed part of their own history. The Afrikaners’ internal politics in the 1930s and 1940s, especially when H F Verwoerd arrived on the scene and contaminated even the internal relations of pro-Nazi Afrikaners, reflected the same extreme instable characteristics inside the leadership of the Afrikaners for as a certain time before calming down. This 1940s internal hostile energy as reflected by Afrikaners,

spilled over not only to the Afrikaners in general, but also unasked to the other ethnic groups (Jews) as well as the Blacks, doing serious harm to racial relations. The Second World War strengthened the nationalist Afrikaners internal conflicts (precisely as conflict and hostility are now manifested inside the ANC by its instability as movement for all Blacks). As with the internal conflicts now inside the ANC, the Afrikaners hostile conflicts were not driven by political ideological differences but purely by Afrikaner leaders' personal ambitions, corruptions and strive for self-empowerment, turning on each other. This was especially extra-activated in the 1940s by the founding of extreme pro-Nazi Afrikaner groups like the Grey Shirts, the New Order, the Ossewabrandwag (OB) and the Stormjaers (A phenomenon in line with the actions of many in-house groups fighting, even murdering each other, in the present-day ANC). Verwoerd's conflict with the pro-Nazi groups (notwithstanding his juridical declared status by Judge P A Mullin of the Supreme Court in 1941 as a propagandist for Nazism and thus partner to the same pro-Nazi thinking as the radical Stormjaers and other pro-Nazis groups) even led to two attempts to kidnap him (with the possibility to kill him) in 1941 and 1944 by his radical comrades.¹³⁰ As said, these in-house Afrikaner conflicts in the 1940s generated hostile energy, comprehensive enough, to negatively effected at that time on a broad base racial relations. The ANC's present hostile energy towards them is not a new or devastating experience for many of the older nationalist Afrikaners; it is much less serious than the Afrikaner press tries to portray it and is temporary.

The ANC, after 23 years of reign, shows serious signs of collapsing. This collapse and insecurity are not only presently prominent reflected in their extreme internal political behaviour by in fights around leadership and members, but is to a great extent also responsible for the temporary over spilling of this extraordinary hostile energy to the Afrikaners, making their social assimilation and racial miscegenation with Blacks undoubtedly very difficult. However, after the 2019 General Election, the selecting of new ANC leaders in harmony with each other and possible constructive new Black political directions on government, the situation can normalised, neutralising this hostile energy, as had happened with the Afrikaners in 1940s. To assume thus that the present-day political, social and personal insecurity which the Afrikaners are experiencing in new South Africa is a new experience for them or is a direct Black dislike and hate for Afrikaners and is of a permanent kind, is not always correct. This insecurity is much related to the nationalists Afrikaners loss of their bullying rights of Blacks before 1994. The Black public has very much goodwill towards

Afrikaners and most of the hostility against Afrikaners is activated by a small group of extremists inside the ANC who lost very fast their position as soon as the ANC's internal politics stabilised and common sense triumph. In such a case the opportunity for better relations between the ANC's elite and the Afrikaners will surely follow. Depending on the 2019 General Election's outcomes can the general political, personal and financial circumstances of Afrikaners dramatically bettered from 2020, helping to activate the long overdue social assimilation and racial miscegenation between Blacks and Afrikaners.¹³⁰

Assimilation as well as miscegenation took place at the Cape between White settlers and Black slave women from Madagascar, Malaysians and Coloured People and are ongoing till today, although sometimes on a reserved level. The 1994 dispensation and the freeing of Blacks and Afrikaners from the apartheid's shackles gives immense support to much deeper assimilation between the South African races while miscegenation seems also to gain field. With the Afrikaner's growth in independence from his previous nationalist *volks* capturing and "pure White blood" ideology, as well as his today's more willingness to accept South African indigenous realities, it can be expected that his assimilation and miscegenation with Blacks will undoubtedly increase. How much it can be denied by the NP-AB inner circle today, were assimilation and miscegenation not two of the main intentions of their 1994 bloodless *coup d' état*?
8,30,4144,,57,58,59,64,87,126-129

In Brazil, the majority of the population was Black and still in slavery at the time of independence (To a certain extent very much in line with the suppression of the apartheid system). As citizens socialized, racial classification diminished fast. Intermarriage was not frowned upon Today the result is a Brazilian population that may well be the most successfully integrated ethnic mix in the world.^{14,126-129}

The same path of success as in Brazil can follow in South Africa. It is possible that full assimilation and miscegenation of Afrikaners with Blacks may occur in 100 years or less. But in this assimilation and miscegenation there are many risks for the Afrikaners if the country decays politically and financially. Fast and dramatic changes in ethnic and racial tolerance, as happened with the Jews in Europe in the 1940s, can bring immense suffering to the Afrikaner's mixed-race descendants, notwithstanding that they are natives of South Africa.

7.7 Conclusion

For the political scientist interested in the Afrikaner as a human being, especially his thinking and entrenched ideas on apartheid, is it important to look at both their past and present. The eminent historian, JM Roberts, says^{14, p.xi}: “Historical inertia is easily under-rated. This is not just a matter of what we see. Ruins and beefeaters are picturesque, but for the most part less important than much mental and institutional history lost to sight in the welter of day-to-day events”. One of the aims of this book was to offer an overview of that part of Afrikaner history that is hidden from plain sight.

This study reveals that many Afrikaners have shown much goodwill and have sincerely attempted to accept Black rule since 1994. These Afrikaners show great willingness to become part of the greater indigenous South Africa, leaving behind racial discrimination. Although most Black citizens have been willing to forgive the Afrikaners for apartheid, the ANC elite clearly intends to implement a policy of discrimination against Afrikaners. This has started to intensify in the last few years, possibly with grave consequences for Afrikaners as citizens.

Efforts at reconciliation in 1994 failed all South Africans, reawakening racial conflict with Afrikaners as the focal point. At the moment, Afrikaners being targeted for revenge. Central to this is the Afrikaner’s unforgiveable history: “The past hangs around longer and is more difficult to keep peacefully buried, even by strenuous efforts, than we believe”, warns Roberts^{14,p.1109} with respect to this hidden danger. Afrikaners are not free from a negative memory of their experiences with Blacks, pre-1994 and post-1994. A re-emerging of a negative Afrikaner-memory spells disaster for Afrikaners as well as Blacks, especially in the activating of revenge and counter-revenge.

The Afrikaner has insufficient knowledge of his own past. The doctrine of Afrikaner nationalism left very little space for the recognition of the many faults in their past. It is time for the Afrikaner to confront the good as well as the bad in their history, not only to understand their past and present behaviour, but also as guideline for the future. Good can come from knowing the bad of the past, but this requires an honest and comprehensive analysis and valuation of history. Only a true and objective evaluation of their history can reveal their identity and place in the future South Africa.^{8,27,94}

The “Afrikaner question” is a complex issue that rests on fact as much as on myth, hidden determinants and dark dispositions. Anti-Afrikaners offer many

over-simplifications of these determinants and dispositions. It is a “problem” as complex as that of the Jewish Palestinian. No one scholar, historian, sociologist, theologian or politician can give a simple and final summary or solution. Opinions on the Afrikaner matter must be treated with a good measure of scepticism. The ANC elite is tragically relying on spreading misinformation on Afrikaners, while treating them the same as the Palestinians are being treated and the Jews were treated.^{63,68-71}

Statistics show that in 30 to 60 years there may only be between 100 000 and one million “pure” Afrikaners left in South Africa and in 2117 possible less than 20 000. The small number of 20 000 will not be the result of genocide or even migration, but of the normal process of natural extinction.

Will the descendants of today’s Afrikaners really care about being Afrikaners two to three generations from now? Would they perhaps preferred to be happy Australian-, Chinese-Creole-, half-caste-, hybrid, mulatto-, or simply *South African bastards*? Are the constant political efforts and fights for rights and existence and the worries and fears about Afrikaners and their future in South Africa really justified and worthwhile? Will the Afrikaners of 2117 know what a “*koeksister*” or “*volkspele*” are or will they hear about it for the first time when they read of it in an old article of the year 2017? To this outcome there seems to be an overall doubt, meaning the answer is an undisputed *NO*. Very few of the Afrikaner’s descendants are going to care about their Afrikaner heredity.

Afrikaners must urgently consider how they want to address their present personal and political threats, dangers and challenges under the ANC regime and as citizens of South Africa. Several options are available. Constructive and wise individually thought and action are pertinent. Some Afrikaners will find the selection of an option easy, for other it will be difficult, while some will never decide in their lifetimes. Every Afrikaner’s needs and visions are unique: each individual has to journey into the future. Time is running out. As reflected from this study the year 2017 is the time for thinking, planning, and deeds for Afrikaners, but their actions must be extraordinary and correct. There have been too many mistakes in their past to expect leniency or a chance if they fail again. Palkhivala^{53, p.129} warns: “In the affairs of nations, as in the affairs of men, there is a providential margin of error; you may take wrong turns at the crossroads, misuse time, take gold for dross and dross for gold, and yet somehow stumble along to your destination. But the margin and period of permissible error need to be carefully watched. You overstep them at your peril”.

The human rights author Raoul Martinez^{131, p.381} emphasises that South African Blacks and Afrikaners must remember that social and personal changes are not: “... something that we get done ‘out there’ simply by changing laws and procedures. Whatever rights are granted whatever procedures are in place, social systems are brought to life by the people who participate in them. The attempt to increase control over our lives and produce outcomes we value is inextricable from the attempt to deepen our understanding and develop our character. Ultimately, this is a moral challenge. We are the timber from which the future will be constructed – the stronger the timber, the more solid the construction.” Martinez^{131, pp. 381-382} brings Blacks and Afrikaners before an easily challenge in this context: “Every human being inevitably suffers hardship, loses loved ones and, some day, passes away. Life is rare, delicate and short. Given all this, why would we not join together to do what we can, for the brief time we have air in our lungs and strength in our bodies, to transform this world into a place of joy and wonder for all those passing through – a place where all can flourish, contribute and create? After all, it is only through the creation of what we deeply value that we find the fullest expression of our freedom. And what could be more valuable than that?”

Every Afrikaner should decide on their own an immediate path as an individual. Each must decide on lifestyle changes and strategies, but to postpone a final decision can be fatal. No one else can take this decision. The author of this article can only point out the various options and risks, nothing more.

The only consolation for Afrikaners in their present visitation is that if dissolution sweeps away the last Afrikaner, the Herodotus curse on the Afrikaner will also be broken. It will then be time for their conquerors and executors to inherit the curse and to be ravaged. Only time will tell if the ill fate of dissolution awaits the Afrikaner.

The year 2017 is the time for options, deeds and more deeds by the Afrikaners about their future. But they must remember *that the virtue of deeds lies in completing them (Arabian Proverb)*.

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Gabriel Louw, Author, Potchefstroom, September 2020.

NOTES

1. Is the dissolution of the Afrikaner-tribe only a century away?

Part 1: Who is the Afrikaner? *ENSOVOORT, 2017(37); 9(1):1-46.*

2. Is the dissolution of the Afrikaner tribe only a century away?

Part 2: Historical determinants and role players in the establishment and maintenance of racial discrimination in the mindsets of Afrikaners. *ENSOVOORT, 2017(37); 9(2):1-44.*

3. Is the dissolution of the Afrikaner tribe only a century away?

Part 3: Present and past determinants and role players in the establishment and continuation of perceptions of injustice in the mindsets of Afrikaners. *ENSOVOORT, 2017(37); 10(1):1-29.*

4. Is the dissolution of the Afrikaner tribe a century away?

Part 4: Afrikaners' failure to understand, accept, and appreciate the indigenous realities of South Africa. *ENSOVOORT, 2017(37); 10(2):1-50.*

5. Is the dissolution of the Afrikaner tribe a century away?

Part 5: The vicious cycle of revenge and counter-revenge around apartheid. *ENSOVOORT, 2017(37); 11(1):1-46.*

6. Is the dissolution of the Afrikaner tribe a century away? Part 6: The preparedness of Afrikaners to deal with the threats and challenges of the new South Africa. *ENSOVOORT, 2017(37); 11(2):1-51.*

7. Is the dissolution of the Afrikaner tribe a century away?

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For the Nationalist-Afrikaners, especially those living in the time of 1948 to the late 1980s, was South Africa not a bad place to live in; an oyster also occupied with an Apartheid-privileged lifestyle that they undoubtedly also believed was “normal and permanent and that can only be improved with time”. Then the *Political Dispensation of 1994* arrived overnight: clearly unexpected, unasked, unwelcomed and unthinkable, and most of all, also unavoidable for most Afrikaners in their future existence in South Africa and the African continent. This socio-economical, political and humanity correction of the economical, psychological, political and social wrongs created by the Nationalist-Afrikaners, exclusive racial discrimination against non-Whites, brought tremendous aberrant and unforeseen negative changes to their exclusive good lifestyles, psychological functioning, religious, social-economical and political powers, individual and human rights, even citizen-privileges. It terminated also with one stroke of the pen the Nationalist-Afrikaner’s self-belief, conditioned since 1652 into his ancestors’ mind sets and also with time into his, of the Afrikaners “inherited ability” as Europeans to rule forever the Indigenous Peoples of South Africa.

This favourable socio-economical political set-up, as said, was statutory erased in 1994 and the political tide turned on the Afrikaner. As the fortune of Ferguson’s (2007) White man of 1901 had sometimes changed dramatically negatively in 50 years, so had the Afrikaner’s fortune also changed dramatically but just in 23 years. He is undoable part now of the birth-pains of a revolution of political, economical, social and personal modernization of the New RSA, something he has started himself in the 1970s without realizing the consequences for himself. The future life of the Afrikaner seems to be a totally different one from the one that he and his ancestors had so far lived or had planned. When 1994 arrived, the Afrikaner was not only alone and isolated from his co-South Africans, but there was also no one left in South Africa or the world to help him in his lot.

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