

**“SYSTEMIC CORRUPTION”:
CONFLICTING RELATIONSHIPS REGARDING DEVELOPMENT,
DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN DIGNITY IN ZAIRE - AN ANALYSIS
AND EVALUATION.**

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***"When in a society the shameless triumph,
when the abuser is admired;
when principles end and only opportunism prevails;
when the insolent rule and the people tolerate it;
when everything becomes corrupt but the majority is quiet
because their slice is awaiting...
when so many `whens' unite,...
it is time to review our activities, re-evaluate those around us,
and return to ourselves."***

(Klitgaard, 1991:115.)

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to God revealed in Jesus Christ, whose Word enjoins all His people to hate and depart from all forms of evil.

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Needless to say, the views and opinions expressed in this study are those of the author and are not necessarily shared by the above-mentioned persons or bodies.

Jean-Nestor Bokumbe Mpetsi
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OPSOMMING

Hierdie studie het betrekking op die bereiking van drie hedendaagse interverweefde prioriteite in Afrika: ontwikkeling, demokrasie en menswaardigheid.

Hoewel daar reeds 'n geruime tyd 'n aantal konvensionele argumente is wat in 'n fundamentele sin en op eksklusiewe wyse aanvoer dat eksterne faktore en kragte primêr inhiberend en benadelend is en ook 'n beslissende rol speel ter dwarsboming van die bereiking van die genoemde trilogie doelwitte in Afrika en in ander Ontwikkelende Lande, kom hierdie studie met 'n nuwe benadering na vore wat gebaseer is op selfkritiek en fokus dit op die herevaluering van interne oorsake vir die voor die hand liggende gebrek aan ontwikkeling, demokrasie en menswaardigheid in lande wat hierna streef.

Die verskynsel van sistemiese korrupsie, nl. geïstitutionaliseerde, gevestigde en gesanksioneerde sistemiese korrupsie, (soos dit in Mobutu se Zaïre voorgekom het), vorm een van vele interne faktore wat op 'n ernstige wyse 'n groot land (potensieel die rykste in Afrika) gebring het by bankrotskap, wanbestuur en massa-verarming.

Deur gebruik te maak van 'n algemene analitiese en teoretiese raamwerk met betrekking tot die negatiewe impak en die disfunksionaliteit van korrupsie op die bereiking van die genoemde trilogie oogmerke in die Ontwikkelende Wêreld, en met behulp van 'n analise van die toedrag van sake in die spesifieke geval van Zaïre, word eerstens en primêr in die studie aangetoon dat wanneer Ontwikkelende Lande se politieke sisteme gekenmerk word deur die institusionalisering van korrupsie met betrekking tot regerings- en burokratiese pogings ter bereiking van ontwikkeling, demokrasie en menswaardigheid, dit negatief geaffekteer word.

Teen die agtergrond van die evaluering van die vraagstuk ter sprake en deur gebruik te maak van 'n drievoudige stel normatiewe waardestelsels (inheemse Afrika-waardes, die Westerse waardestelsel m.b.t. openbare (publieke) verantwoordbaarheid en die Christelike waardes m.b.t. verantwoordelik regering) - waarvan elkeen 'n diensbaarheidsmoraliteit voorstel, is tweedens bevind dat sistemiese korrupsie voorkom waar die politieke leierskap en die burokratiese elites en kaders vervreemd is van basiese waardes met betrekking tot goeie regering ("governance").

Met die oog op die toekoms is 'n aantal alternatiewe voorstelle gemaak - wat nie daarop aanspraak maak dit die moontlikhede uiput nie - ter uitwissing van wat beskryf kan word as wydverspreide geïstitutionaliseerde korrupsie in Zaïre en in soortgelyke state.

ABSTRACT

This study bears on the achievement of three contemporary interlinked priorities in Africa: development, democracy and human dignity.

Though a number of arguments keep on blaming, in a fundamental and exclusive way, external factors and forces being the major inhibiting and detrimental factors that play a definite role in compromising the attainment of the above-mentioned trilogy of objectives in Africa as well as in other Developing Countries, the present study brings about a new approach based on "self-criticism" and it focusses on a "re-evaluation" of internal factors that constitute the actual and factual causes for the obvious lack of development, democracy and human dignity in countries in quest of these.

Bearing this in mind, the phenomenon of systemic corruption, i.e. institutionalized, established and sanctioned corruption (as it obtained in Mobutu's Zaire) constitutes one among many internal factors that seriously hinders this achievement by reducing a great country which is potentially the wealthiest country in Africa, into a land of bankruptcy, misrule and mass-pauperization.

Following a general analytical and theoretical framework relating to the negative impact and the dysfunctionality of corruption *vis-à-vis* the achievement of the trilogy of objectives in the Developing World, and the analysis of this state of affairs in the particular case of Zaire - it is shown in this study that, first and foremost, when developing countries' political systems are characterized by the institutionalization of corruption, governmental and bureaucratic efforts to achieve development, viable democratization and human dignity within the society are negatively affected.

Secondly, against the background of the evaluation of the issue at stake and by utilizing the treble set of value-systems (normative values) pertaining to what can be regarded as good government (indigenous African values, the Western value system of public accountability and the christian values on responsible governance) - all of which recommend servant morality - the research's finding is that systemic corruption appears where the political leadership and bureaucratic elites and cadres have been alienated from basic values pertaining to good governance.

A number of alternatives and proposals for the future have been put forward by the author - though these do not claim to be exhaustive in so far as the eradication of what can be described as widespread institutionalized corruption in Zaire and in other Zaire-like countries is concerned.

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"SYSTEMIC CORRUPTION": CONFLICTING RELATIONSHIPS REGARDING DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN DIGNITY IN ZAIRE - AN ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION.

CHAPTER 1.

INTRODUCTION

Overview

The essence of the argument that follows deals with the achievement of three contemporary interlinked priorities in Africa, i.e. democracy, development and human dignity. Despite various arguments listing external African factors and elements as causes for the obvious lack of democracy, development and human dignity in Zaire, institutionalized corruption (as it subsists in Mobutu's Zaire) is one of many internal factors that seriously obstructs the achievement of these goals. Thus, the time has come for a reevaluation of internal factors, like institutionalized corruption as factors influencing the lack of democracy, development and human dignity. Secondly, a much closer analysis of the negative relationship between institutionalized corruption and its effect on the failure to obtain the stated objectives should be made. An evaluation of this relationship appears to be necessary as very little is known about the fundamental issues at stake. The argument will be that an evaluation of corruption implicitly focuses on values and, therefore, use will be made of three sets of norms relating to what can be regarded as "good government", i.e. indigenous African values, the Western value system of public accountability and Christian values pertaining to responsible governance. The focus will be placed on Zaire although corruption will also be analyzed from a broader Third World perspective to create a more general theoretical framework for the study.

It must be kept in mind that at the time of the conception and finalization of the manuscript of this study, Mobutu's control of Zaire and the concomitant practices of systemic corruption were still in place - with no visible or expected fundamental changes in sight. As it is and was the explicit objective of the author to analyze and evaluate systemic corruption in Zaire, the name Zaire will be retained in this study and the country used to illustrate the effects of systemic corruption on the achievement of development, democracy and human dignity. The reader should, therefore, not be confused by the use of the present tense in the study when reference is made to Mobutu's Zaire.

It is also worth suggesting from the outset that systemic corruption cannot be handled easily. There is no guarantee that if the most serious offenders are dismissed, or if everyone who is guilty is replaced, corruption will not persist. The old patterns will continue with new players, because people may change but the system persists (Caiden & Caiden, 1977:307).

1. Motivation

In today's developing world in general and in Africa in particular, many politicians, development experts, and international organizations dealing with development projects in developing countries, regard the following three objectives, i.e. those of socio-economic development, democracy and human dignity as interlinked priorities. Such bodies include the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (1994) in Germany; Transparency International in Germany; the Center For International Private Enterprise (1995) in the USA, the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation (1992) in Sweden, and Africa Leadership Forum in Nigeria - to name but a few.

Africa is presently experiencing an unprecedented wave of democratization (United States Information Agency, October 1991) as well as intended economic reform - aimed at paving the way for economic growth, democracy and, of course, the fostering of the general well-being of African nations (Center For International Private Enterprise, 1995:2-4).

In harmony with such developments, article 1(a) of the new Constitution (1996) of the Republic of South Africa stipulates: "The Republic of South Africa is one sovereign democratic state founded on a commitment to achieve equality, to promote and protect human dignity, and to advance fundamental human rights and freedoms".

However, as is generally known, there are still many obstacles to the promotion and achievement of these interlinked objectives - of which corruption is a major one. Zaire, in particular, is recognized as a typical case of what is known as "systemic corruption", i.e. widespread institutionalized (officially authorised and established) corruption (Makolo, 1986:184-185; Caiden & Caiden, 1977:306-307). It is exactly institutionalised corruption which has compromised the attainment of the objectives of development, democracy and human dignity in this country (Ngondo a Pisthandenge, 1993:481; Askin & Collins, 1993:72; Young & Turner, 1985:247; Gould, 1980:122).

In fact, corruption has been identified and is regarded as one of the foremost problems in the developing world *per se* (Klitgaard, 1988:94; 1991:116) and it has recently received much attention from international aid organizations (e.g. the World Bank, the IMF, USAID, UN Development Programs and many others), inter alia in the form of preconditions and prerequisites demanded for making available loans related to development projects. Various seminars and programmes (like the international summit held in Copenhagen, Denmark, in March 1995) have been launched and are still being launched on the effect of corruption on the achievement of development, democracy and human dignity. Many scholars and some institutions have also identified corruption's role in inhibiting and even destroying the achievement of these objectives in various countries (Ayittey, 1995:22-24; Kinoti, 1994:36-38; Ngondo a Pitshandenge, 1993:481; Gould & Amaro-Reyes, 1983:34-35; Gould, 1979:106; 1980:122; Caiden & Caiden, 1977:307; Nye, 1967:424, the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 1992:18-21). Thus, the contemporary desperate position in Africa as a continent, especially with reference to democracy, development and human dignity, can

largely be attributed to corruption - and in the case of Zaire, to "systemic corruption".

Diagnoses made by African scholars and Africanists alike of deficiencies and problems in Africa as well as in other developing countries, have accentuated various **external factors** and "isms" like the legacies of colonialism, imperialism, Americanization, and the Westernization of the international economic system (Adeyemo, 1995:4; Kinoti, 1994:14, 24-27, 29,35, 42-46). Although these, on the face of it, appear to be sound arguments which harbour some truths, it seems unrealistic to continue **regarding** colonialism or any "ism" as a scapegoat, given that:

- more than three decades of sovereignty and independence have passed with no or rather little improvement regarding development, democracy and the advancement of human dignity;
- many capital investments and development efforts have failed dismally because of fraud, mismanagement and kleptocratic practices on the part of those in authority, and, due to a gross abuse of public trust and funds, revenues have been squandered on corrupt projects and practices for the sake of self-gain by leadership cadres and the bureaucracy;
- at present the West's "sudden" discovery of the need for good governance and respect for human rights in Africa has resulted in Western nations and institutions becoming fairly vocal advocates of democracy, development and human rights in the developing world (Kinoti, 1994:29-30). President Mandela (1995) for one has corroborated this state of affairs in a letter addressed to the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the German Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in which he stated that "... the sterling initiative of the FES to promote a sense of solidarity among nations over many decades and its particular concern for the well-being of African nations, as well as its specific support for the democratisation process in South Africa, is highly valued. This bears testimony to your foundation's concern for social and economic justice..."; and
- as Josef Brodsky, the Russian-born poet and Nobel Prize-winner, once wrote: "A free man, when he fails, blames nobody." (United States Information Agency, 1991:31.)

It is clear that arguments blaming, in a fundamental and exclusive way external factors and forces as being the major factors inhibiting development, democracy and the realization of human dignity are hardly, in any scientific sense, tenable. Neither are they able to stand against counter arguments which suggest factors which may have played a definite role in compromising the attainment of these ideals in Africa, and especially in Zaire. In terms of the argument presented, it is clear that a much closer scientific analysis is needed to establish more precisely the relationship between institutionalized corruption and factors compromising the attainment of the mentioned objectives - especially in Zaire, known as a typical example of "systemic corruption" in Africa and the developing countries. This implies that the time has come for a new approach and analysis based on **self-criticism** instead of external factors. Such an approach and analysis will unavoidably have to focus on issues such as how public affairs are conducted and how leadership and authority are being exercised by political leaders and

bureaucratic élites/cadres that have become estranged from **norms and principles** dictating "**good governance**". It is worth indicating that scholars like Gould (1980:122), Young & Turner (1985:247), Askin & Collins (1993:72) have described systemic corruption in Zaire as a depressing issue which has compromised the achievement of development, democracy and human dignity by reducing a great country, potentially the wealthiest one in Africa, into a land of misrule, bankruptcy, dearth, squalor and mass-immiserization - while being ruled and managed by her own leaders.

2. Problem statement

The problem is that the attainment of the interlinked priorities of development, democracy and human dignity in Zaire is impossible in a context of widespread institutionalized corruption in which political leaders as well as bureaucratic elites have become estranged from the normative values pertaining to good governance.

The following **research questions** are posed:

1. Conceptually and theoretically, what is corruption (and derivatives thereof) within the context of the Third World ?
2. What are the general characteristics of the relationship that exists between corruption and the attainment of democracy, development and human dignity respectively in these countries ?
3. What common value denominators exist in African value systems, the Western public accountability model of governance and the Christian value system pertaining to "good" governance ?
4. How and in which respects can the phenomenon of corruption be linked to values and value estrangement ?
5. What did and does corruption and specifically systemic corruption in Zaire entail and how does it negatively affect programmatic actions to achieve democracy, development and human dignity ?
6. What are the characteristics of the conflicting relationship between systemic corruption and democratization, development and human dignity in Zaire ?
7. How and in which ways can the behaviour of politicians and bureaucratic cadres in Zaire be seen as both cause and effect of their own value estrangement ? (see 2,3,4,5).
8. What analytic value does the notion of "systemic corruption" have in terms of explaining the normative estrangement of the political leadership and the bureaucratic élite ?

9. What can be done to curb "systemic corruption" in Zaire-like countries and what guidelines can be established for developing countries in dealing with the endemic impact of systemic corruption on the above-mentioned interlinked objectives ?

3. Goals

The **objectives** of this study are:

1. to attempt a conceptualization of what can be regarded as the strategic terms of the study;
2. to construct a theoretical and analytical framework for examining the negative impact and toxic effects of corruption on the trilogy of objectives by exploring three African countries, i.e. Ghana, Uganda and Equatorial Guinea;
3. to analyze the dysfunctionality of corruption from the broader perspective of the developing world by commenting on some non-African developing countries as well as some other African experiences besides those of Ghana, Uganda and Equatorial Guinea and see how corruption can regularly be linked to the impossibility of achieving development, democracy and human dignity;
4. to analyze three different sets of normative values pertaining to good governance so as to establish a common denominator regarding relevant norms with which to evaluate this phenomenon;
5. to analyze systemic corruption in Zaire by demonstrating some characteristics thereof and to establish how this negatively affects the government's ability to promote development, democracy and human dignity in Zairean society;
6. to analyze and examine the particular case of Zaire against the background of the general theoretical framework of the negative impact and dysfunctionality of corruption in the developing world by indicating that, in Zaire, an incompatible, conflicting and negative relationship exists between "systemic corruption" on the one hand and development, democracy and human dignity on the other hand - which makes the attainment of this trilogy of objectives impossible;
7. to explain and establish (against the background of the established normative value-systems pertaining to good governance) that the phenomenon of systemic corruption in Zaire can be interpreted from the perspective of normative estrangement of the political leadership and bureaucratic élites, and
8. to put forward some proposals and recommendations - which may provide guidelines for Developing Countries regarding the endemic impact of systemic corruption on development, democracy and human dignity.

4. Leading theoretical argument

In this study it will be argued that:

1. In those developing countries' where the political system is characterized by the institutionalization of corruption, governmental and bureaucratic efforts to achieve development, viable democratization and human dignity within the society, are negatively affected.
2. "Systemic corruption" appears where the political leadership and bureaucratic élites have been alienated from basic values pertaining to good governance.

5. Methodology and literature

First and foremost, the study will be a description, analysis and normative interpretation of the negative relationship between "systemic corruption", on the one hand, and the advancement of development, democracy and human dignity, on the other hand.

The comparative, chronological, deductive and inductive methods will be utilised to construct a general theoretical framework of corruption in some Developing Countries, and in Zaire specifically, while the method of transcendental criticism will be applied when entering the field of normative judgment regarding the estrangement of political leaders and bureaucratic élites from values dictating good governance in Zaire.

The evaluation of the problem at stake will be done by implementing three sets of ethical and normative value-approaches. The first of these which is the Western (democratic) public accountability model advocates the concern for general well-being and public interest in terms of good governance and democratic theory (Pennock, 1979:205; Schwella, 1991:5-6). It can be suggested that this model accords with the "public organizational rationality" approach (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982:18) which also upholds some conception of public interest or the common good (Huntington, 1986). The second value-system, i.e. the indigenous African values pertaining to good governance and public interest will also be used in the evaluation of the phenomenon (i.e. systemic corruption). The third value-approach which is the Christian norms and values on responsible governance will be dealt with in the evaluation of the issue at stake. At the very least, these value-systems all run counter to all approaches and practices that oppose the common good or public interest: i.e. abusive, non-transparent and personal rule; self-seeking leadership; and corruption and estrangement from values pertaining to good governance.

This study, which will be a literature study, will be based upon a large corpus of recent and relevant published literature, in French and in English. The author's proficiency in French and English and personal knowledge of Zaire, will be of great advantage in exploring this material. However, the author is aware of the fact that only limited sources have been consulted with regard to the corruption in

the colonial era (chapter 5) as a result of the difficulties inherent in liaising with libraries in Zaire, especially during the period of political instability in the country which marked the finalization of the manuscript.

It should also be made clear that, in so far as bibliographical style is concerned, the author made use of the adapted Harvard reference style, i.e. the 1995 edition of the Potchefstroom University Senate Commission's Guide for Bibliographical references. Having said that, since some publications at the author's disposal were sent to him in the shape of extracts which did not furnish the total number of pages of a given publication/ book, the author has chosen not to follow the University Senate Commission Guide's (1997 edition) style as it is outlined in sections 24.2.7.1 and 24.2.7.2. The mentioned material refers to European publications that could not be traced.

The topic of this study will be dealt with from a political science perspective, bearing in mind that the issue of corruption is inter-disciplinary in its nature.

6. Structure

After the introduction, chapter 2 will deal with the conceptualization of strategic terms like development, democracy, human dignity (this last term will be dealt with in terms of development, i.e. as intertwined with progress towards what can be regarded as a "better life" for human beings), systemic corruption, governance, good governance, alienation, *etcetera*.

Chapter 3 will attempt to provide a theoretical and analytical framework with which to examine corruption by analyzing its "toxic effects" on the three objectives in the Developing Countries of Africa with a special focus on Nkrumah's Ghana, Amin's Uganda and Nguema's Equatorial Guinea. It will also examine the dysfunctionality of corruption vis-à-vis the achievement of the aforementioned objectives from the broader perspective of the Developing World.

In chapter 4, attention will be devoted to the normative value-systems pertaining to what can be regarded as just and good government. Three sets of normative values (indigenous African-Bantu proverbs, the (democratic) public accountability system and the Christian value-system) will be analyzed and common denominators will be deduced. This will also be used as a yardstick against which a value judgement can be based regarding "good government" as well as the evaluation of the phenomenon of systemic corruption.

In chapter 5, a chronological description, analysis and exposition of the characteristics of corruption as it developed in Zaire will be presented.

Against the background of the theoretical framework established in chapter 3, it will be argued in chapter 6 that an antithetical, conflicting and thus incompatible relationship developed in Zaire between "systemic corruption" (legitimized by political leaders and bureaucratic élites) and governmental and bureaucratic programmatic efforts to achieve the three interlinked priorities.

Chapter 7 will contain a critical, theoretical and normative evaluation of the Zairean scourge against the background of the mentioned sets of normative values relating to good governance.

Lastly, a number of proposals will be advanced, suggesting some alternatives and constructive actions for the future, which may provide guidelines for other Developing Countries in quest of socio-economic development, democracy and the restoration of human dignity - which are, I believe, key factors for political integrity, stability and credibility.

It should be indicated in advance that corruption - within the framework of this study - will be dealt with as it appears in "official" or "public" institutions and public officials (political leaders, bureaucrats, *etcetera* at local, provincial and national levels) and not so much as it may have appeared in private institutions or private people.

CHAPTER 2

CONCEPTUALIZATION OF STRATEGIC TERMS

2.1. Introduction

The goal pertaining to this chapter is:

- To attempt a conceptualization of what can be regarded as strategic terms of this study.

2.1.1. What is corruption ?

Corruption is an ubiquitous phenomenon. Writers from various disciplines including law, public administration, politics and economics confirm that it is more prevalent in developing nations than in Western-type countries (Bakker, 1991:55; Bayley, 1989:935) and the literature on it contains several useful definitions. Yet, it must be kept in mind that there is not and never has been anything like an overall agreement on the definition of the term. It (corruption) has had various connotations in different historical periods (Della Porta, 1995:310). Ekpo (1979:1) is of the opinion that the task of definition has been made more difficult by the fact that there are a number of perspectives from which corruption may be viewed - each with its own questions to ask and each with its own methods of answering those questions. One should have a clear conception of what the definition excludes as well as of what it includes since what is corruption in one situation may be viewed as a laudatory act in another. Bayley illustrates this state of affairs by saying: "For example, in both Africa and India the man who uses his official position to obtain jobs for his relatives is not considered immoral: in traditional terms, he is only doing what every loyal member of an extended family is expected to do. He would be censured if he did not act in this way." (Bayley, 1989:937.)

With this in mind, it can be suggested that any attempt to analyze the concept of corruption in the context of the developing world must, first and foremost, be able to resolve the problem of "western versus non-western standards". Is it fair to build upon the "western" denotative meaning of corruption when analyzing non-western systems ?

For the sake of simplicity, though the writer is aware that contrary view may be held by others on the issue, the alternative offered by Bayley (1989:936-939; 1970:523-524), who favours preserving only one standard of official morality, namely the morality carrying the Western label, will be adopted within the framework of this study. The reason for this is that the intelligentsia, and especially top-level civil servants, bureaucratic cadres and political office-bearers in most developing countries are familiar with the Western definition of "corruption", and they are aware that Western standards of governmental conduct condemn it (corruption) and that this has to be kept in mind when dealing with Western financial institutions and International Aid Organizations

(The International Monetary Fund, World Bank and USAID to name but a few). To a large extent, therefore, this argument will be understood by the nation-building élites and advocates of democratic accountability in most developing countries.

After making this clarification, it becomes possible to attempt a definitional approach to the concept of "corruption".

In the *Oxford English Dictionary* (OED) (1989:974) only one of nine commonly accepted definitions for the term seems applicable in a political context: "Perversion or destruction of integrity in the discharge of public duties by bribery or favour; or the existence of corrupt practices, especially in a state, public corporation, etc..."

Webster's Third New International Dictionary (unabridged) defines corruption as "inducement [as of a public official] by means of improper considerations [as bribery] to commit a violation of duty."

Heidenheimer (1989; 1970:4-6) has identified and grouped three categories of definitions of corruption: (1) public-office-centered definitions; (2) market-centred definitions; and (3) public interest-centred definitions.

- **Public-office-centred definitions** (Heidenheimer, 1989; Ekpo, 1979:1) of corruption relate essentially to the concept of the public office and to deviations from the norms binding its incumbents and are well illustrated in the work of three authors, David H. Bayley, M. McMullan, and J.S. Nye, who have concerned themselves with the problems of development in various continents. Bayley's definition of the concept is as follows: "Corruption, while being tied particularly to the act of bribery, is a **general term covering misuse of authority** (own emphasis) as a result of considerations of personal gain, which need not be monetary." (Bayley, 1970:522; 1989.) This may, therefore include nepotism, kleptocracy, despotism, maladministration, arbitrary actions of a government, *etcetera*.

More directly related to this is the point made in an Indian government report on corruption: "In its widest connotation corruption includes **improper and selfish exercise of power** (own emphasis) and influence attached to a public office or to the special position one occupies in public life." (*The Santhanam Committee Report*, 1964:5).

M. McMullan (1970:319) argues that "a public official is corrupt if he accepts money's worth for doing something that he is under duty to do anyway, that he is under duty not to do, or to exercise a legitimate discretion for improper reasons."

Nye (1967:419) offers a widely-cited definition of corruption: "... behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence. This includes such behaviour as bribery (use of a reward to pervert the judgment of a person in

a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reason of an ascriptive relationship rather than merit); and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for private-regarding uses)."

- **Market-centred definitions** (Heidenheimer, 1989; Ekpo, 1979:1-2).

Definitions in terms of the market theory have been developed particularly by authors dealing with earlier Western and contemporary non-Western societies, in which the norms governing public office-holders are not clearly articulated or are nonexistent.

Nathaniel Leff (1970:510) stresses that "corruption is an extra-legal institution used by individuals or groups to gain influence over the actions of bureaucracy."

Van Klaveren (1970:38) states that "a corrupt civil servant regards his public office as a business, the income of which he will seek to maximize. The office then becomes a "maximizing unit". The size of his income depends... upon the market situation and his talents for finding the point of maximal gain on the public's demand curve."

Robert Tilman (1970:62-64) holds that "corruption involves a shift from a mandatory pricing model to a free-market model. The centralized allocative mechanism which is the ideal of modern bureaucracy may break down in the face of serious disequilibrium between supply and demand. Clients may decide that it is worthwhile to risk the known sanctions and pay the highest costs in order to be assured of receiving the desired benefits. When this happens, bureaucracy ceases to be patterned after the mandatory market and takes on characteristics of the free market."

- **Public-interest-centred definitions** (Heidenheimer, 1989; Ekpo, 1979:2-3).

Some writers feel that the first set of definitions is too narrowly conceived and the second set too broadly conceived. They tend to maintain that the embattled concept of "public interest" is not only useful but necessary to illustrate the essence of concepts like corruption.

Carl Friedrich (as quoted by Ekpo, 1979:2-3), for example, contends that "the pattern of corruption can be said to exist whenever a power-holder who is charged with doing certain things, i.e. a responsible functionary or office-holder, is by monetary or other rewards not legally provided for, induced to take actions which favour whoever provides the rewards and thereby does damage to the public and its interests."

Arnold A. Rogow and H.D. Lasswell (1970:38, 54; see also Ekpo, 1979:2-3) maintain that "a corrupt act violates responsibility towards at least one system of public or civic order and is in fact incompatible with (destructive of) any such system. A system of public or civic order exalts common interest over special interest; violations of the common interest for special advantage are corrupt."

To conclude: an analysis of the mentioned definitions and descriptions of public corruption indicates, at least on the surface of it, a variety of opinions although the concomitant ubiquitous character of public corruption is obvious. It is, however, clear that all the mentioned definitions have the following in common or at least stress the following aspects in general when dealing with public corruption.

In the first instance, any judgement on corruption hinges on methodological problems that have to be recognised. This refers to the fact that corruption is value bound. These values are not universal as values differ according to cultures and traditions (although the principle remains that any relationship between the public and government is based upon a set of values). Yet, for the sake of this study, the Western rational model of the relationship between the public and authority will be used for the reasons already given.

Essentially, all definitions refer to a specific (public) mandated and ordered relationship pertaining to the public or civilians for whom certain duties should be carried out as part of an official task. The relationship is based upon a set of values, rules and norms that should be adhered to. The assumption is that any public service and servant is performing an official task for the benefit or the general good of "the public". Thus, in a democracy, public officials, including politicians, rule and work in terms of and by the grace of the public. All authors refer, implicitly or explicitly, to this state of affairs. In all instances, corruption is seen as counter to the legitimate interest of the public.

Corruption, however defined by different authors, refers at least to three dimensions: **what** it is; the **means** by which it is achieved and for **what purpose** or purposes corruption is committed.

It should be indicated that the purpose which corruption usually has in mind, is to enrich officials (political and administrative) from the purse of the public. The purpose is to tap another "source of income" for the benefit of the self - the few. It may include material and immaterial gains but usually material gains are at stake. However, because material gains are more detectable, one may be deceived as to how often corruption pertains to achieving influence, status, positions, appointments, *etcetera*. This, in its turn, very often opens the door to gaining material benefits at the expense of the public.

The ways in which corruption is defined or described refer to acts like the destruction of official integrity in discharging public duties; the violation of public duties; deviation from norms relating to public duties; misuse of (public) authority; improper and selfish exercise of power; improper motives at stake in exercising legitimate duties (duties of public trust), and the "privatization of the public office" for the sake of the few or the self (the self, the own group, the clique, the oligarchy, the family, *etcetera*), which becomes nothing other than a form of robbery of the public; arbitrary actions and decisions for wrong purposes ; maladministration; the "wrong" exercise of power, *etcetera*.

One of the ways of defining or describing corruption is to refer to specific terminology in describing categories of corruption, with words like kleptocracy, nepotism, despotism, arbitrary action of government and maladministration. These categories of corruption are useful for analytical purposes in case studies.

In the light of the foregoing (keeping in mind that corruption may mean many things to many people) corruption can be regarded as:

- an abuse of public trust;
- involving the misuse of public authority and /or public status and a violation of public responsibility in sacrificing the public interest for the interest of the self - the few, and
- including a deviation from norms relating to the discharging of public duties characterized by the improper, arbitrary and selfish exercise of power and authority, all of which constitute an affront to the promotion of the public interest (or the common good) in a given society or public institution.

2.1.2. Bureaucratic corruption

Whereas some characteristics of corruption (as it has been analyzed above) are also related to "bureaucratic corruption", it does not seem necessary to linger over either this term or its derivative, "systemic corruption". In this study a more simplified conceptualization or rather definition will be adopted. In accordance with the definition used by Makolo (1986:184), the definition of bureaucratic corruption to be used in this study is :

"the intentional wrongdoing or neglect of a recognized duty, and an unwanted exercise of power with the motive of gaining some advantage more or less directly personal. This includes bending the law, discarding morality, employing deception and justifying criminality..., dishonesty, venality, nepotism, appointment in jobs and contracts to unqualified persons, awarding decisions and services in exchange for bribes and kickbacks, and government favours, all of which involve fraud, waste and abuse in government."
(own emphasis).

2.1.3. Systemic corruption

One talks of "systemic corruption" when bureaucratic corruption has been institutionalized (Makolo, 1986:184-185; Caiden & Caiden, 1977:306-307). In this situation, wrongdoing is the norm; it is so regularized that the administrative system tolerates wrongdoing and actually penalizes propriety and integrity. Such systemic corruption persists where high standards of public rectitude and personal integrity have been eroded , and where notions of public responsibility and trusteeship have been thrust aside for exploitation of office for private gains (Makolo, 1986:185).

Caiden & Caiden (1977:306-307) define "systemic corruption" as follows:

"A situation where wrongdoing has become the norm, and the standard accepted behaviour necessary to accomplish

organizational goals according to notions of public responsibility and trust has become the exception, not the rule. In this situation, corruption has become so regularized and institutionalized that organizational supports back wrongdoing and actually penalize those who live up to the old norms." (own emphasis).

Caiden & Caiden (1977:306-307) state that in systemic corruption:

1. "the organization professes an external code of ethics which is contradicted by internal practices;
2. internal practices encourage, abet, and hide violations of external codes;
3. non-violators are penalized by foregoing the rewards of violation and offending violators;
4. violators are protected, and when exposed, treated leniently; their accusers are victimized for exposing organizational hypocrisy, and are treated harshly;
5. non-violators suffocate in the venal atmosphere; they find no internal relief and much external disbelief;
6. prospective whistle-blowers are intimidated and terrorized into silence;
7. courageous whistle-blowers have to be protected from organizational retaliation;
8. violators become so accustomed to their practices and the protection given them that, on exposure, they evidence surprise and claim innocence and unfair discrimination against them;
9. collective guilt finds expression in rationalization of the internal practices and without strong external support there is no serious intention of ending them; and
10. those formally charged with revealing corruption rarely act and, when forced by external pressure to do so, excuse any incidents as isolated, rare occurrences."

To conclude, the term "systemic corruption" will be regarded in this study as widespread institutionalized and sanctioned (officially authorised and established) corruption which goes against the norms and principles dictating good governance. It is also important to stress, in accordance with Caiden & Caiden (1977:307), that systemic corruption is obviously dysfunctional within society. This will be discussed in more detail later.

2.1.4. Development

Development is a concept with different implications depending upon the point of view of the user. Granted that the term **development** may mean different things to different people (Todaro, 1994:14), Kofi (1993:100) is right in maintaining that there is no consensus on what constitutes development. However, it is important to try to have some working definitions or core perspectives on its meaning and these can be attained by exploring some agreed-on measurement criteria according to both traditional and new views on development.

2.1.4.1. The Traditional View of Development

In strictly economic terms, **development** has traditionally meant the capacity of a national economy, whose initial economic condition has been more or less static for a long time, to generate and sustain an annual increase in its **gross national product (GNP)** at rates of perhaps 5% to 7% or more (Todaro, 1994:14). This is what can be termed the "growth approach" largely based on conventional growth theories (notably the Harrod-Domar growth theory) that were formulated before the Second World War, and therefore based on the historical growth paths of developed countries (Coetzee & Ligthelm, 1989:351-352). In the two decades following the Second World War, the main emphasis in development thinking was on economic growth. Therefore, the social, political, and cultural dimensions of development were grossly neglected and almost no attention was paid to the interplay of economic and social (and other non-economic) forces. Development was primarily conceived as a modernisation process and a "catching up" exercise, that is catching up with the developed countries. It was believed by economists that economic growth could best be promoted by the injection of capital into the economies of less developed countries. The definition offered by the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) fits this view: "the economic advancement of a region or people especially one currently underdeveloped."

A common alternative economic index of development has been the use of rates of growth of **income per capita** or per capita GNP to take into account the ability of a nation to expand its output at a rate faster than the growth rate of its population. It is worth noting that economic development in the past has also typically been seen in terms of the planned alteration of the structure of production and employment so that agriculture's share of both declines and that of the manufacturing and service industries increase. Development strategies have, therefore, usually focused on rapid industrialization, often at the expense of agriculture and rural development.

All things considered, it appears that, prior to the 1970s, development was nearly always seen as an economic phenomenon in which rapid gains in overall and per capita GNP growth would either "trickle down" to the masses in the form of jobs and other economic opportunities or create the necessary conditions for the wider distribution of the economic and social benefits of growth. Consequently, problems of poverty, unemployment and income distribution were of secondary importance to "getting the growth job done" (Todaro, 1994:14-15).

2.1.4.2. The New View of Development

The experience of the 1950s and 1960s, when many Third World nations realized their economic growth targets but the living standards of the masses remained for the most part unchanged, signalled that something had gone very wrong with the narrow traditional definition of development. From that time, an increasing number of economists and policymakers, clamoured for the so-called "dethronement of GNP" (Todaro, 1994:15) and the elevation of direct attacks on widespread absolute poverty, increasingly inequitable income distribution, and rising unemployment. During the 1970s, economic development came to be

redefined in terms of the reduction or elimination of poverty, inequality, and unemployment within the context of a growing economy. "Redistribution from growth" became a common slogan.

It is with this view in mind that Dudley Seers (as quoted by Todaro, 1994:15) posed basic questions about the meaning of development when he asserted:

"The questions to ask about a country's development are: what has been happening to poverty? What has been happening to unemployment? What has been happening to inequality? If all three of these have declined from high levels then beyond doubt this has been a period of development for the country concerned. If one or two of these central problems have been growing worse, especially if all three have, it would be strange to call the result 'development' even if per capita income doubled."

From this assertion it follows that a number of developing countries that experienced a relatively high rate of growth in per capita income during the 1960s and 1970s but showed little or no improvement or even an actual decline in employment, equality, and the real incomes of the bottom 40% of their populations, were not "developing" in terms of the newer poverty, equality and employment criteria (New Economic View); but in terms of the earlier/traditional "growth" definition, they were. This new view stands for a broader, a more integrated and multidimensional conception of development in which an equilibrium can be obtained between what is called by Destanne de Bernis (1991:86;see also Kofi, 1993:100) "**Capital development**" (own emphasis) referring to capital accumulation or the increase in capital and "**Development of peoples**" (own emphasis) meaning an increase in the satisfaction of each social group's needs or a rise in the living standards of all social groups.

Development must, therefore, be conceived of - as has been suggested by Michael P. Todaro (1994:16) - "**as a multidimensional process involving major changes in social structures, popular attitudes, and national institutions, as well as the acceleration of economic growth, the reduction of inequality, and the eradication of poverty.**" (own emphasis).

Development, in its essence, must represent the whole gamut of change by which an entire social system, tuned to the diverse basic needs and desires of individuals and social groups within that system, moves away from a condition of life widely perceived as unsatisfactory toward a situation or condition of life regarded as materially and spiritually "better".

In a 1983 study, Kotzé (1983:13-14) had the same conception in mind when he used the term **empirical definitions of development** (own emphasis) to refer to the results of development, that is economic growth, improvement in educational and health services, better nutrition, and other social indicators. Development indicators found in Kotzé's empirical definitions can be divided into the following categories:

- **Economic indicators** such as income, expenditure, consumer patterns, savings, investment, production, foreign trade, imports and exports.
- **Social indicators** such as health, nutrition patterns, education, employment, conditions of service, housing, social security, welfare services, recreation, freedom, clothing, transport, communications and professional structures.
- **Institutional indicators** such as political attitudes and behaviour, economic relations, organisational change, production patterns (for example, industrialization), social structures, and patterns of distribution.
- **Development values** such as quality of life, equality, participation, and satisfaction of needs.

It is important to note that even the World Bank, which during the 1980s championed economic growth as the goal of development, joined the chorus of analysts taking these new views (for example Korten & Klauss, 1984; Kofi, 1993:100; Harrison, 1993:173; Destanne de Bernis, 1991:86; Kinoti, 1994:54-55; and others) by taking a broader perspective when, in its 1991 World Development Report, it was stated:

"The challenge of development is to improve the quality of life. (own emphasis). Especially in the world's poor countries, a better quality of life generally calls for higher incomes - but it involves much more. It encompasses as ends in themselves better education, higher standards of health and nutrition, less poverty, a cleaner environment, more equality of opportunity, greater individual freedom, and a richer cultural life." (World Bank, 1991.)

This discussion on the new view of development would be incomplete without mentioning and examining some core values as well as objectives of development that are threefold respectively (Todaro, 1994:16-19):

1. **Three core values of development**

Like Goulet and others, Todaro (1994:17-18) has identified at least three basic components or core values that serve as a conceptual basis and practical guideline for understanding the inner meaning of development. They are: **sustenance, self-esteem, and freedom.** Let us, therefore, examine each in turn.

• **Sustenance**

It goes without saying that all people have certain basic needs without which life would be impossible. These life-sustaining basic human needs include food, shelter, health, and protection. When any of these is absent or in critically short supply, a condition of "absolute underdevelopment" exists. A basic function of all economic activity, therefore, is to provide as many people as possible with the means of overcoming the helplessness and misery arising from a lack of food, shelter, health, and protection. To this extent, it should be suggested that economic development is a necessary condition for **the improvement in the quality of life that is development.**

Thus, without sustained and continuous economic progress at the individual as well as the societal level, the realization of human potential would hardly be possible.

- **Self-esteem**

A second component of the good life is self-esteem, meaning a sense of worth and self-respect, of not being used as a tool by others for their own ends. This could also include the concept of "human dignity" which will be dealt with later. All peoples and societies seek some basic form of self-esteem, although they may call it authenticity, identity, dignity, respect, honour, or recognition. The nature and form of this self-esteem may vary from society to society and from culture to culture. Yet, with the proliferation of the "modernizing values" of developed nations, one realizes that many societies in Third World countries that have had a profound sense of their own worth suffer from serious cultural confusion when they have come into contact with economically and technologically advanced societies. This is because national prosperity has become an almost universal measure of worth. Due to the significance attached to material values in developed nations, worthiness and esteem are nowadays increasingly conferred only on countries that possess economic wealth and technological power. That is why at present the Third World seeks development in order to gain the esteem which is denied to societies living in a state of disgraceful "underdevelopment". Development is legitimized as a goal because it is an important, perhaps even an indispensable, way of gaining esteem (Todaro, 1994:18).

- **Freedom from servitude**

A third and final value that can be suggested as contributing to the meaning of development is the concept of human freedom. Freedom here is to be understood in the sense of emancipation from alienating material conditions of life and from social servitude to nature, ignorance, other people, misery, institutions, and certain dogmatic beliefs. Freedom involves an expanded range of choices for societies and their members together with a minimization of external constraints in the pursuit of some social goal we call development. It is important to stress the relationship between economic growth and freedom from servitude, as economic growth can increase the range of human choice. In other words, wealth can enable people to gain greater control over nature and the physical environment (e.g. through the production of food, clothing, and shelter) than they would have had if they had remained poor. It also gives them the freedom to choose greater leisure, to have more goods and services, or to deny the importance of these material wants and live a life of spiritual contemplation. The concept of human freedom should also encompass various components of political freedom including, but not limited to, personal security, the rule of law, freedom of expression, political participation, and equality of opportunity (Todaro, 1994:18.)

2. The three objectives of development

After presenting the core values of development, attention should be given to what can be regarded as treble objectives regarding the achievement of a "better life", meaning "development". They can be briefly stated as follows:

- **To increase the availability and widen the distribution of basic life-sustaining factors** such as food, shelter, health, and protection;
- **To raise levels of living** including, in addition to higher incomes, the provision of more jobs, better education, and greater attention to cultural and humanistic values, all of which will serve not only to enhance material well-being but also to generate greater individual and national self-esteem;
- **To expand the range of economic and social choices** available to individuals and nations by freeing them from servitude and dependence not only in relation to other people and nation-states but also to the forces of ignorance and human misery.

2.1.4.3. Conclusion

From the above discussion, it follows that the concept of development means different things to different people. Two different views of development have been identified and examined, namely the **traditional view** which equates development with **national economic growth**, and the **new view** which takes a broader perspective and involves a **multidimensional process** which incorporates major changes in social structures, popular attitudes, and national institutions, as well as the acceleration of economic growth, the reduction of inequality, the promotion of human freedom, and the eradication of poverty. Such development is aimed at **the improvement of the quality of life** or rather **all human lives**, that is the improvement of human well-being (see also, Todaro, 1994:16, 670; Harrison, 1993:173; Kofi, 1993:100; Kinoti, 1994:54-55; The World Bank, 1991).

According to the new view on development, there are three equally important aspects of development:

1. raising people's living standards - their incomes and levels of food consumption, medical services, education, etcetera, through relevant economic growth processes;
2. creating conditions conducive to the growth of people's self-esteem through the establishment of social, political, and economic systems and institutions that promote human dignity and respect; and
3. increasing people's freedom by enlarging the range of their choice variables, such as by increasing varieties of consumer goods and services.

In this study, the new perspective on development will be used and, in agreement with Kinoti (1994:54-55), **development is to be understood as an improvement in the quality of life of the people such that every human being has his/ her basic needs (food, clothing, shelter, health, education) met adequately, his/her dignity and self-esteem respected, his/her freedom honoured (ideological, philosophical, religious freedom) and his/her potential given full scope for realization.** Such development is only possible if it has a strong moral basis.

2.1.5. Democracy

The term "democracy" is often used in many contradictory contexts. There are various interpretations thereof, and there are also several democratic models to the extent that history has not yet finished experiencing types of democracy (Irung, 1993:527; see also Vanhanen, 1990:11 and Finer, 1970:62-63). Democracy is a promiscuous and puzzling word in the world of public affairs (Ball, 1983:42). Almost everyone uses it, and everyone would like to claim to be practising it. Liberals use it; Conservatives use it; Fascists use it; Neo-Nazists use it; Imperialists use it; Marxists use it and even most contemporary authoritarian rulers use it. It has become fashionable for every and any state to style itself in this way (Finer, 1970:62-63). Examples of this include the former Soviet Union and communist states of Eastern Europe, the Chinese People's Republic, North Korea and North Vietnam, to name but a few, all of which call themselves democracies as did Nasser's Egypt; Stroessner's Paraguay; Mobutu's Zaire; Hitler's Germany; Mussolini's Italy; Salazar's Portugal; and as Fidel Castro's Cuba; Bongo's Gabon; Sukarno's Indonesia; Sadam Hussein's Iraq and Buyoya's Burundi still do.

Having said that, the definitional approach to the concept of democracy need only be a simplified one in this study. Attention is thus to be given to (1) the exposition of the Western normative democratic theory whose pattern will inspire this study; (2) the exploration of various interpretations and definitions in this very context, and (3) to make clear what characteristics of democratic systems the term is used to describe in this study.

2.1.5.1. Democratic theory

In general, normative democratic theory stresses that final control over the governing and administrative functions of the state should be vested with the citizens of the state (Schwella, 1991; Ranney, 1971; Lively 1975; Dahl 1982).

Lively (1975:9) also holds that two other related aspects are of paramount importance as far as democracy is concerned. These are the principles of majority rule and government by the people. According to Lively (1975:30), the following requirements should apply to what can be described as "true government by the people":

- All citizens have to be involved in governmental functions: the making of legislation, policy-making, law enforcement and administration.
- All citizens should be involved in some way in legislative and policy decisions.
- All rulers have to be accountable to the governed and have to be able to justify their actions before the governed who have the supreme sanction to dispose of the rulers in a constitutional way.
- The rulers have to accept their accountability to the representatives of the people.

It should be noted that the literature on normative democratic theory has always linked it to democratic or public accountability, a notion which implies that the citizens should have final control over the government and its administrative apparatus and these entities should be democratically accountable for their actions to the citizens (Schwella, 1991:6).

Moreover, Finer (1970:63) refers to democratic accountability by arguing that democracy, in its primary meaning, is government which is derived from public opinion and is accountable to it. In this respect, "democratic accountability implies that it is not sufficient for a government to justify its existence because at some time in the past it was representative of popular opinion; but most importantly, democratic accountability entails that a government must continuously test its representativeness, that is to say whether its claim that it is "derived from public opinion" is still valid." (Finer, 1970:63.). The idea of democratic accountability will be dealt with later.

William Fox (1993:6) - in the light of Pennock (1979:251-253) - states that the following basic democratic principles are essential:

Firstly, the division of authority (i.e. separation of powers) within a system of coordination and control (i.e. political, economic and social checks and balances (Finer, 1970:71-72)); secondly, reference may be made to representation by political groupings; and thirdly, constitutionalism is a principle aimed at curbing all arbitrary action of a government, that is, government action should be founded on a judicial basis and should enjoy the support of the majority of society.

With all this in mind, attention is to be devoted to the exploration of various interpretations of democracy in the Western World.

2.1.5.2. Interpretation of democracy in the Western World

In the Western World, **democracy** has always been connected with the **rule of the people** (Vanhanen, 1990:6), and the literal meaning of democracy - **government by the people** - is probably also the most basic and most widely used definition of it (Lijphart, 1984:1).

Aristotle (1952; see also Ball, 1983:37) made one of the earliest attempts to classify governments in terms of tyranny (the rule of/by one person, serving the interest of one person/man), oligarchy (rule of/by the few, serving the interest of the few) and democracy (rule of/by the many, serving the interest of the many/poor). Aristotle's point was that democracy is not only the government of

the many, but also the government of the poor. He also defined the term democracy as a constitution in which the free-born and the poor control the government - being at the same time a majority. According to a 1961 translation of the Politics of Aristotle, "the most pure democracy is that which is so called principally from that equality which prevails in it: for this is what the law in that state directs; that the poor shall be in no greater subjection than the rich; nor that the supreme power shall be lodged with either of these, but that both shall share it." (Aristotle, 1961:115.)

Herodotus used the word in its old and strict sense, to denote a government in which the will of the majority of qualified citizens rules (Vanhanen, 1990:7). As stated, this definition emphasizes "majority rule" as the core element of democracy.

In his Modern Democracies, Bryce (1921:25-26) uses the term democracy to describe a political system where the will of the whole people prevails in all important matters. The principles of "popular sovereignty" and legitimacy can be seen as the essence of this definition.

By democracy Greenstein & Polsby (1975:121) mean a system within which decisions are not taken autocratically on behalf of society, but on mandates received from society. The idea of "public accountability and responsibility" underlies in this definition.

Fox (1993:6-7) in agreement with Ranney (1975:306) identifies three characteristics of which, in their view, it is generally agreed a democratic government should have. These are firstly, **political equality**, as opposed to regimes, which may be termed oligarchies; secondly, **governmental response to the popular will**; and thirdly, **majority rule rather than minority rule**. Democracy in this respect is seen as a form of government organized in accordance with the basic concepts of popular sovereignty, political equality, popular consultation, and majority rule.

Karl R. Popper (1977:124, 160-161) asserts that democracy cannot be fully characterized as the rule of the majority because a majority might rule in a tyrannical way. In a democracy, the powers of the rulers must be limited. This resembles Aristotle's remark, that "the supreme power is possessed neither by the rich nor the poor alone; it is shared by them. "This definition seems to be based on a "consensual model" of democracy as well as on the principle of the rule of law.

Dahl (1982) presents only a minimal definition of democracy, according to which democracy concerns processes by which ordinary citizens exert a relatively high degree of control over leaders. Finally, he reserves the term "democracy" for a political system of which one of the characteristics is the quality of being completely or almost completely responsive to all its citizens. Needless to say this definition is based upon the norm or principle of (democratic) public accountability.

In his *Political Man*, Lipset (1960:45) defines democracy as a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials, and a social mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for political office. The key components of this interpretation of democracy are: "popular participation" and "regular elections".

Sartori (1987:206; 1969) for one defines democracy by making clear what it is not. Democracy is non-autocracy. It is the opposite of autocracy: Democracy is a system in which no one can choose himself, no one can invest himself with power to rule and, therefore, no one can arrogate to himself unconditional and unlimited power. This view stresses legitimacy, accountability, the rule of law, popular consultation, openness and transparency as key elements of democratic governance.

Plamenatz (1978:69-70; 184-188) is of the opinion that responsibility is the key idea of democracy; that is, a political system is democratic if it operates in such a way as to ensure that makers of the law and policy are responsible to the people, that is, citizens are free to criticize their rulers and to come together to make demands on them and to win support for the policies they favour and the beliefs they hold, and where the supreme makers of law and policy are elected to their offices at free and periodic elections. The key elements underlying this definition are the following: public responsibility and accountability, the rule of law and regular elections.

Pennock (1979:3-15) contends that a democracy is rule by the people where "the people" includes all adult citizens and "rule" means that public policies are determined either directly by vote of the electorate or indirectly by officials freely elected at reasonably frequent intervals and by a process in which all votes count equally and in which a plurality is determinative. This view emphasizes "popular sovereignty and/or popular participation", political equality, competition, regular, free and fair elections.

By democracy Diamond, Lipset and Linz (1988:XVI) refer to a political system that meets three essential conditions: meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organized groups, a highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, and a level of civil and political liberties sufficient to insure the integrity of political competition and participation.

Democracy is seen by Morlino (1986:54) as a set of institutions and rules that allow competition and participation for all citizens considered as equals. The definition stresses "political competition and equality" and "popular participation" as core elements of democracy.

As defined and portrayed by Jean Baechler (1985:14-21), democracy is characterized by the fact that all power is always rooted in the citizens. The essence of this view of democracy is nothing but "popular sovereignty" which implies the idea of public accountability.

It is also important to know that, as reviewed above, Western definitions and interpretations of the term democracy differ drastically from Marxist-Leninist perspectives, even though by democracy Marxists also mean the rule of the people. To Marxist-Leninist scholars and advocates, democracy implies the rule of the majority over the minority (but their definitions of these terms are different), and only one majority is acceptable: the majority formed by the working class and represented by the Communist Party. In other words, after coming to power, the working class establishes the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is the broadest and truest form of democracy for all working people (Vanhanen, 1990:10-11). The Chinese interpretation of Socialist Democracy is similar.

2.1.5.3. Main characteristics and attributes of democracy within the framework of this study

In the light of the foregoing interpretations of and perspectives on democracy in whichever way it is defined and explicated, the following will be taken as the key elements and attributes of the term for the purposes of this study:

- **Popular sovereignty:**

Power is to be rooted in the people, which entails governmental response to the will of the people. In other words, government should act only according to a public mandate on certain policies and be mobilized for preferred policies.

- **Rule of law:**

This ensures that power and authority cannot be exercised arbitrarily and autocratically (in an unaccountable manner) that is unconditional and unlimited power, self appointment and self invested power are not permitted. Also, it ensures that rights cannot be flouted at will without mitigation or redress.

- **Popular participation and consultation:**

This is a process that leads to the creation of a strong civil society with a keen awareness of rights and responsibilities (Museveni, 1994:66) that is, a way of enabling people to participate and get involved in the decision making process. This state of affairs needs a political landscape that fosters free criticism as well as access to free and correct information.

- **Public Accountability:**

This implies the democratic control by citizens over all arms and levels of government and administration (including individual government members), and it is of prime importance that governmental and administrative bodies must act in the best interest of their citizens (that is, they are there to serve the people, all the people) and should be held publicly and democratically accountable by the public for what they do on the public and citizenry's behalf.

- **Transparency, openness and integrity:**

Democratic governance must be transparent so that the people know what is going on at all times (Museveni, 1994:66). People must be able to censor the actions of governmental and administrative bodies at all levels and to make sure

that the "right people", men and women of integrity, are in charge of public affairs. This requires that civil and political liberties are guaranteed and executed in effecting control over leaders and policies.

- **Political equality and competition:**

Different interest groups, considered as equals, are legally entitled to compete for political power.

- **Regular, free and fair elections:**

This must be part and parcel of the system so as to ensure that people do, at regular intervals, choose the leaders they wish to lead them, which means that governance is given to freely-chosen representatives of all the people. People, in an inclusive and participatory way, have to mobilize for this state of affairs as groups or individuals without harassment.

With all this in mind, it can be argued that the interpretations offered by Vanhanen as well as Abraham Lincoln's famous formulation of the concept of democracy will be of prime consideration in this study as (implicitly or explicitly), the above-mentioned democratic elements and characteristics can be identified therein.

Democracy, in accordance with Vanhanen (1990:11), can be conceived as a political system in which ideologically and socially different groups are legally entitled to compete for political power (i.e. political equality and competition) and in which institutional power holders are elected by the people (i.e. popular sovereignty, popular participation via elections) and are responsible to the people (i.e. [democratic] public accountability, public responsibility and transparency).

In addition, and most importantly, democracy is to be defined not only as government by the people but also, in Abraham Lincoln's famous words, **as government for the people** (own emphasis) - that is, government in accordance with the people's preferences; government that promotes the general public welfare (not primarily the welfare of rulers, bureaucrats and cadres) and government which is fully transparent and genuinely answerable (accountable and responsible) to the people (see Lijphart, 1984:1; Anon, 1993a:587; Kinoti, 1994:78-79) and whose office-bearers refrain from using their power to manipulate, coerce or corrupt (see: rule of law and transparency).

2.1.5.4. Conclusion

Literature on democracy contains various interpretations and/or definitions of it. There are also several models or types of democracy. Western normative democratic theory stresses that the final control over the governing and administrative actions of the state should be vested in the citizens (the people) of the state. In other words, the rulers or power holders have to be accountable to the governed and have to be able to justify their actions before the governed who constitute the basis of the rulers' power. This is on a par with the notion of democratic (public) accountability. For the sake of this study, and against the

background of the foregoing discussion on various interpretations of democracy in the Western World, the following are to be taken as key characteristics and attributes of a democratic governance and/or system, namely: **popular sovereignty, rule of law, popular participation and consultation, public accountability, transparency and integrity, political equality and competition via regular, free and fair elections.**

2.1.6. Human dignity

The term "human dignity" has been synonymously equated - in various societies - with concepts like authenticity, human self-respect or self-esteem, identity, honour, or recognition (Todaro, 1994:17, 701). Like other normative concepts such as democracy, development, corruption, etcetera, there is no general agreement regarding the definition of the concept "human dignity" for it may mean many things to many people. Having said that, it can be recognized that it is not an easy task to analyze the concept of human dignity - bearing in mind that:

- The Oxford English Dictionary (1989) refers to the term "dignity" as inter alia (1) "the state of being worthy of honour or respect"; (2) "worthiness, excellence"; (3) "a high or honourable rank"; (4) "high regard or estimation"; - all of which imply "manner of being treated with due respect". It can vary in terms of different cultures, although one may find universal dimensions thereof.
- The term human dignity can be related to material developmental aspects as well as to non-material values, like justice, honesty, respect *etcetera*.
- There is also the issue of relative perceptions regarding the concept of human dignity that cannot absolutely be correlated to a good economy or material wealth and goods: for example somebody in a rural area may still enjoy his/her dignity and self-esteem although his/her country's economic development is not good.

Despite the issues highlighted and raised above as well as its various disciplinary connotations in scientific terms - and taking into account the globalisation of the present world's economic system and development standards - the term human dignity within the framework of this study will be analyzed in terms of and intertwined with the process of development. In this respect, human dignity can be referred to as one of the core values or components of the progress toward the realization of what can be seen as "better human life", that is development. In this vein, it can also be defined as a sense or feeling of worthiness that a person or society enjoys when its social, moral, judicial, political and economic systems and institutions promote conditions and values that are conducive to the due respect of human life and the realization of full human potential as well as the improvement in the quality of human beings' lives, as opposed to the lives of other beings (animals for instance). It is to be argued that the term human dignity keeps pace with the notion of development, and is

negatively seen as the opposite of various categories of dehumanizing acts and conditions (Kinoti, 1994:10; Paul VI, 1967:20; John Paul II, 1995).

In his Social Encyclicals entitled *Populorum Progressio*, Pope Paul VI (1967:20) used the term human dignity to refer to the opposite of poverty (especially those people who live below an acceptable minimum standard) and all dehumanizing conditions. In this document, he instructed his faithful to increase productivity and to assist others in their development. He asserted:

"Individual nations must raise the level of the quantity and the quality of production to give the life of their citizens truly human dignity, and give assistance to the common development of the human race." (Paul VI, 1967:20.)

It should be noted that one of his successors, Pope John Paul II (1995) expresses similar views in his recent *Ecclesia in Africa*, a Post Synodal Apostolic Exhortation which was published in Yaoundé (Cameroon) on the 14th of September 1995.

Dealing with this issue from a Christian-African perspective, Kinoti (1994:10) admits the promotion of human dignity as being the reason why Christians must work for peace and prosperity in Africa. He argues that our faith teaches that every human being is created in the very image of God and shares with his Creator unique dignity and worth. Certain conditions, such as abject poverty, uncontrolled diseases, torture, gross social injustice, and chronic hunger and famine, ignorance, dependency, political savagery, unemployment, an inferiority complex, general backwardness and others, dehumanize people, damage human personality and self-esteem, and are an affront to human dignity and development. These appalling conditions affect not only individuals but also communities and races.

2.1.6.1. Conclusion

From the foregoing it appears that it is not an easy task to analyze and define the concept of human dignity whose perspectives may vary in terms of various cultures, though one may find universal dimensions thereof.

The term human dignity can be related to material developmental aspects as well as to non-material values. Thus, there are different perceptions relating to the concept of human dignity that cannot be correlated absolutely to material goods. Despite this state of affairs and for the sake of this study, the term has been analyzed in terms of and intertwined with the process of development so as to mean a sense or feeling of worthiness that a person or society enjoys when its social, moral, judicial, political and economic systems and institutions promote conditions and values that are conducive to the due respect of human life as well as the improvement in the quality of human beings' lives - as opposed to the lives of other beings (such as animals).

2.1.7. Governance

The term governance is not new. It has been around in both political and academic discourse for a long time and refers in a generic sense to the task of running a government or any other appropriate entity, for example, an organization (Hyden, 1992:5; Halfani et al. 1994? :2).

While not a new term, it has, within the context of international development, become more widely used in the past few years by researchers, government planners and other public administrators, politicians and international donors.

Given the rising importance of this concept, it is useful to trace the origin of this idea, how it has been used in the past, and, to make clear what definition should be adopted in this study.

Political scientists have been using the term governance for a number of years (Rothchild and Foley, 1983; Hyden 1988; 1989; 1992; Hyden & Bratton, 1992:7). Richard Joseph of the Carter Centre of Emory University launched a "Governance in Africa Program" in 1989 and brought together thirty scholars for an inaugural meeting to consider the notion of governance, debate its definition and discuss the importance of governance issues to the African continent (Carter Centre, 1989b). In the report of this conference, governance is referred to as a broader, more inclusive notion than government - which conventionally refers to the formal institutional structure and location of authoritative decision making in the modern state - and "the general manner in which a people is governed. It (governance) can apply to the formal structures of government as well as to the myriad institutions and groups which compose civil society in any nation." (Carter Centre, 1989a:1.)

Michael Lofchie, a political scientist participating in this meeting, also identified an important characteristic of governance which moved beyond the traditional definitions of government as situating political authority within the formal institutions of the state (Carter Centre, 1989a). His view on governance is a broader one because it allows the inclusion of groups and individuals in civil society that are increasingly instrumental in the governance relationship between the state and civil society.

The term governance has also gained particular significance within the World Bank, especially in a 1989 World Bank report on African development, which identifies the crisis on the continent as one of governance (Hyden, 1992:5; Leftwich, 1993:610). The Bank, through its two officials, defined governance as "... the exercise of political power to manage a nation's affairs." (Landell-Mills & Serageldin, 1991.) Later on, in 1993, the World Bank's use of the term governance became - as never before - a call for "better government" including such concerns as an independent judiciary, economic liberalism, political pluralism and administrative accountability (World Bank, 1993; see also Halfani et al. 1994?:3-4). It is with this in mind that authors like Moore (1993) refer to governance as the "quality of government".

Adrian Leftwich (1993:611) contends that the concept of governance is, of course, wider than that of government. Governance refers to a looser and wider distribution of both internal and external political and economic power; it denotes the structures of political and, crucially, economic relationships and rules by which the productive and distributive life of a society is governed. In short, it refers to a system of political and socio-economic relations, or, more loosely, a regime.

For the purposes of this study, and in accordance with Halfani *et al.* (1994?:4-5), it is important to present a clearer definition of governance, and identify certain key aspects of this notion. Governance, as distinct from government, refers to a "good" relationship between civil society and the state, between rulers and the ruled, the government and the governed in order to put in place an open society where the management of public affairs is operated in a democratic, representative, accountable, responsible and transparent fashion.

Bearing this in mind, studies on governance will focus on a system of government, concentrating on effective and accountable institutions, democratic principles, electoral processes, and representative and responsible structures of government, in order to ensure an open and legitimate relationship between civil society and the state. Central to this relationship is the idea of credibility, for both politicians and governing institutions. The paths to improvements in credibility and legitimation of government are *via* accountability, transparency, responsiveness, real participation and public consultation (Halfani *et al.* 1994?:5).

2.1.8. Good Governance

Governance can have negative or positive connotations. It is important here to examine and discuss what **good governance** might be by exploring the origins of the concern with "good governance" and the meanings given to this term in the modern World.

As has been earlier, the first contemporary public appearance of the notion of good governance came in a 1989 World Bank report on Africa, which was of the opinion that, underlying the litany of Africa's development problems is a crisis of governance (Leftwich, 1993:610; Hyden, 1992:5; Moore, 1993). More specifically, the Bank referred to these phenomena as the extensive personalization of power, the denial of fundamental human rights, widespread corruption, and the prevalence of unelected and unaccountable governments (Hyden, 1992:5), all of which imply bad governance.

In this light, good governance includes some or all of the following features: **an efficient public service; an independent judicial system and legal framework to enforce contracts; the accountable administration of public funds; an independent public auditor, responsible to a representative legislature; respect for the law and human rights at all levels of government; a pluralistic institutional structure; and a free press.**

It should be noted that this adds up to a comprehensive statement of the minimum institutional, legal and political conditions of liberal democracy (though the Bank never stated this explicitly). It also resembles a new orthodoxy dominating official Western aid policy and development thinking according to which "democratic good governance" refers to a political regime based on the model of a liberal-democratic polity, which protects human and civil rights, combined with a competent, non-corrupt and accountable public administration (Leftwich, 1993:605).

The above reading of the World Bank's initial managerial approach has been confirmed by its recent and definitive statement on **governance and development** (own emphasis). This publication, the product of two years of work by Bank staff, treats good governance as synonymous with sound development management (Leftwich, 1993:610).

Between 1989 and 1991 there followed a flow of pronouncements on governance, democracy and the relationship of either or both to development. These pronouncements issued from all major Western governments and were especially forceful from the British, French, German, US and Nordic governments. They were also supported by the main international development institutions, and a variety of cooperative, intergovernmental and regional organisations, such as the Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the European Community and the Commonwealth.

In this vein, Leftwich (1993:611-612) identifies three main components, or levels on which the concept of "good governance" (he uses the term "democratic good governance") can be conceived: systemic, political and administrative.

From a broad systemic point of view, he asserts that governance refers to a **system** of political and socio-economic relations or, more loosely, a regime; and "in current usage there is no doubt that good governance means a democratic capitalist regime, presided over by a minimal state which is also part of the wider governance of the New World Order." (Leftwich, 1993:611-612.)

In its more limited but explicitly political sense, good governance implies a state enjoying both legitimacy and authority, derived from a democratic mandate and built on the traditional liberal notion of a clear separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers. And, whether presidential or parliamentary, federal or unitary, it would normally involve a pluralist polity with some kind of freely elected representative legislature, subject to regular elections, with the capacity at the very least to influence and check executive power and protect human rights. This is the position which most Western governments adopt.

Finally, from a narrower administrative point of view, good governance means an efficient, open, accountable and audited public service which has the bureaucratic competence to help design and implement appropriate policies and manage whatever public sector there is. It also entails an independent judicial

system to uphold the law and resolve disputes arising in a largely free market economy. This is the position of the World Bank.

It is clear that (democratic) good governance is also linked to the idea of (democratic) accountability. It is important here to examine at least three aspects of accountability that are basic to good governance (Halfani et al. 1994?:5-6): **political accountability, legal accountability and bureaucratic accountability.**

The system is **politically accountable** when a constitution subjects the political leadership to credible electoral processes and limited periods in office. **Legal accountability** is the prerequisite for both political and bureaucratic accountability, and requires an objective and reliable judicial system as well as trustworthy law enforcement agencies and an efficient court administration. **Bureaucratic accountability** requires the effective performance of public agencies and officials in their relations with the public. Of central importance for effective bureaucratic accountability is transparency in operations, whereby all public accounts and audit reports are available for public scrutiny. Moreover, involvement of the public in decision-making through engagement with non-governmental organizations, interest groups and individual citizens, is also basic to accountability, and, through it, good governance. It has also been suggested that efficient financial management is a critical dimension of bureaucratic accountability, including sound financial accounting systems, procurement, revenue collection systems, and auditing practices (Landell-Mills & Serageldin, 1991).

2.1.8.1. Conclusion

From the above analysis, it appears that the concept of (democratic) "good governance" goes hand in hand with normative democratic accountability based on the model of a liberal-democratic polity. It cannot be stressed enough that the present study follows the patterns of the Western democratic theory and the principles guiding good governance according to which a value-judgment can be made on corruption in public affairs. Although the foregoing definitional approaches to the concept of good governance are all useful, it is worthwhile to advance a clear definition of this notion. A more integrated definition can be provided in this regard.

By good governance, I refer to a political system that does not promote "personal rule" or "personal politics" (see also Jackson & Rosberg, 1982:18-19) - **in which norms and values regarding democratic accountability are politically, legally and bureaucratically instituted or protected and are being put into practice; where authority and power are exercised in a more responsible, representative, accountable and transparent way** that is, in the hands of "good leaders" consisting of men and women of integrity who place the public/general welfare (the public interest or the common good) above their own (self-interest), who are upright, wise, lawful (enjoying legitimacy and legality),

competent, efficient, honest and free from corruption, abusive rule and selfish exercise of power (see also Kinoti, 1994:79,81).

It can also be argued, in the last analysis and in accordance with Leftwich (1993:612), that good governance requires a particular kind of politics, especially democratic politics, to both institute and sustain it. And, in the context of the Third World, good governance is perceived to be better for development than its opposite, bad governance.

2.1.9. Alienation

It should be kept in mind that the following delineation of the concept of alienation (estrangement) will be of paramount importance in evaluating and demonstrating marks of alienation on the part of the political leadership and bureaucratic cadres as far as their fundamental functions and duties in Zaire are concerned.

The concept will be examined according to its etymology; how it is used philosophically; its use in the past as well as its use in contemporary social sciences.

The word alienation derives from Latin where its roots can be identified (*The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology*, 1966). Two words appear in this regard: (1) **alienare**, meaning to yield, to give up, dispose of, to sell and (2) **alienus**, meaning "alien", somebody else, other people.

Philosophically speaking, alienation implies a dispossession of a typical (characteristic) state that is peculiar to a person to the detriment of another one (*Petit Larousse Illustrée*, 1986:29). This state of affairs refers to what can be termed ontological dispossession.

Alienation, or estrangement is a concept of considerable antiquity. Its metaphysical origins have been veiled in the course of time by the progressive secularization of the Western thought (Lichtheim, 1972:264). Historians of philosophy trace the concept back to the writings of Plotinus, whose doctrine of emanation assumed a procession from an ultimate undefinable source or principle to a multiplicity of finite beings: the Undivided One unfolds into its various manifestations by a downwards process linking the supersensible Being with a hierarchy of lower spheres and with the world of nature and material existence, matter being the lowest stage of the universe and the antithesis to the One (Lichtheim, 1972:264).

Recognition of the concept in Western thought has been elusive. Although entries on "alienation" did not appear in major reference books of the social sciences until as late as 1935, the concept had existed implicitly in classical sociological works of the 19th and early 20th centuries by Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim, Ferdinand Tönnies, Max Weber, and Georg Simmel (*The New Encyclopedia Britannica*, 1987:270).

From the point of view of contemporary sociology, Marx - especially the Marx of 1845-1847 who was no longer a philosopher and not yet an economist - appears as the crucial figure in the process whereby alienation was transformed from an ontological into a sociological concept (Lichtheim, 1972:265). In the process of reaching this position, Marx made use of the Hegelian categories of "externalization" and "estrangement". He transformed Hegel's rudimentary analysis of the labour process into something new. Man, that is, generic man as a "species being" (Gattungswesen), was seen to have his essential being in labour. But this essence was at the same time seen as being taken away from him, i.e. "alienated", by a world which was seen a **verkehrte Welt** (one standing on its head), a world in which the "worker" became poorer the more wealth he produced; and in which the increasing value of the world of things proceeds in direct proportion the devaluation of the world of men: that is the objectification of labour. This appears as a loss of the object and bondage of it, appropriation as estrangement, as alienation (Lichtheim, 1972:265-266).

In social sciences, alienation refers to the state of feeling estranged from one's milieu, work, products of work, or self (*The New Encyclopedia Britannica*, 1987:270-271). Despite its popularity in the analysis of contemporary life, the idea of alienation remains an ambiguous concept with elusive meanings.

More modern definitions of alienation focus on the following features:

1. **Powerlessness:** the feeling that one's destiny is not under one's own control but is determined by external agents, fate, luck, or institutional arrangements;
2. **Meaninglessness:** referring either to the lack of comprehensibility or consistent meaning in any domain of action (such as world affairs or interpersonal relations) or to a generalized sense of purposelessness in life;
3. **Normlessness:** the lack of commitment to shared social prescriptions for behaviour (hence widespread deviance, distrust, unrestrained individual competition and the like);
4. **Cultural estrangement:** the sense or state of being removed from established values in society (as, for example, in the intellectual or student rebellions against conventional institutions);
5. **Social isolation:** the sense of loneliness or exclusion from social relations (for example, among minority group members); and
6. **Self-estrangement:** perhaps the most difficult to define and in a sense the master theme, the understanding that in one way or another the individual is out of touch with himself.

2.2. Conclusion

The foregoing analysis has tried to explore the etymological, philosophical and historical outlines of the concept of alienation within the context of Western thought. It follows that alienation (estrangement) is a concept of considerable antiquity. Its use in the historical thought of the Western world goes back to

Plotinus who tackled it from a metaphysical point of view. Although its recognition in Western thought has been elusive, it can be said that the concept had existed implicitly in classical sociological works of the 19th and early 20th centuries like those by Marx, Durkheim, Weber and others. Marx was the one who transformed it (alienation) from an ontological into a sociological concept by making use of the Hegelian categories of "externalization" and "estrangement" in his analysis of the labour process. Marx's point of view on "alienation" (estrangement) boils down to what he describes as "the objectification of labour".

The notion of alienation in the context of contemporary social sciences remains an ambiguous concept with elusive meanings.

Nonetheless contemporary definitions of alienation have focussed in terms of (1) powerlessness, (2) meaninglessness, (3) normlessness, (4) cultural estrangement, (5) social isolation and (6) self-estrangement.

For the purpose of this study, factors (3) and (4) will be taken into account. The term alienation seen in terms of "**normlessness**" will be applied when evaluating and judging the Zairean political leadership and bureaucratic élites' behaviour in terms of **widespread deviation** from norms and principles dictating democratic good governance and, on the other hand, it will also be judged and evaluated in terms of **cultural estrangement** with regard to indigenous traditional African-Bantu values as well as Christian values.

CHAPTER 3

ANALYTICAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE NEGATIVE IMPACT AND THE DYSFUNCTIONALITY OF CORRUPTION VIS-à-VIS DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN DIGNITY : GHANA, UGANDA, EQUATORIAL GUINEA; THE DEVELOPING WORLD.

Introduction

The present chapter has as main objectives the following:

1. to construct a theoretical framework regarding the negative impact and toxic effects of corruption on the trilogy of objectives by exploring three cases in Africa: Ghana, Uganda and Equatorial Guinea;
2. to analyse the dysfunctionality of corruption in the broader perspective of the Developing World by considering some non-African developing countries as well as some African experiences besides those of Ghana, Uganda and Equatorial Guinea and see how corruption can regularly be linked to the impossibility of achieving development, democracy and human dignity (which will enable the author to explain Zairean trends in terms of wider general theories of corruption in chapter 6).

3.1. Three examples of corruption in Africa

3.1.1. Ghanaian corruption under Nkrumah's regime

3.1.1.1. Introduction

In his very useful essay on The consequences of corruption: the Ghanaian experience, Herbert H. Werlin (1979:247-258) of the University of Maryland (USA) has suggested that political corruption, defined as the diversion of public resources to nonpublic purposes, might be a greater cause for concern in emerging nations than in the United States or some other so-called developed country. In this vein, the author notes that corruption, though a universal phenomenon, is a more serious matter in a poor country than in a country like the United States of America where illegally gained money goes back into internal production while in a country like Ghana, the profits from corruption tend to be invested or banked abroad or spent on wasteful imports (Werlin, 1979:250). In other words, corruption is unlikely to have "tonic" effects in a developing country. Bearing this in mind, the Ghanaian experience can now be examined.

3.1.1.2. Corruption: the Ghanaian experience

Under Nkrumah, more than 40 state corporations were set up, involving an investment of over 40 million British pounds. Most of these proved to be a great drain on the country's economy - particularly the State Mining Corporation, Ghana Airways, and the State Farm Corporation (Levine, 1975:101-102; Werlin, 1979). In the 1963-64 financial year, over one-third of the invested capital was lost, and in 1966, a loss of over US\$100 million was incurred by 22 State

Corporations (NC89,4million). While many state enterprises were unrealistic, such as a steel mill for which there was neither adequate domestic raw material nor trained personnel, they also suffered from corruption (Werlin, 1979:249).

It has been reported - even by noted commentators on Ghana's economy between 1957 and 1965 - that the Nkrumah period was characterised by what can be regarded as "ineffective or irrational implementation", "unselective and untested importation of large-scale mechanized techniques", "inadequate public sector management", "misuse of public funds and incompetence in high places", and the like (Levine, 1975). For example, the operations of the State Farms Corporation for the 27-month period ended December 31, 1965, cost US\$21 million (including \$10 million for wages and salaries) while the value of corporate production in that period was only \$4 million; this left a deficit of US\$17 million. Frequently, investment policies in some sectors were not based on sound economic considerations; and the most costly mistakes were made at the highest levels. Instead of meeting public needs, most factories were acquired rather haphazardly by politicians, ministers, and the president (Nkrumah). These kinds of factories were not only expensive, they were sometimes obsolete or unusable; and above all, they were wasteful (Levine, 1975:102).

In the case of the State Furniture and Joinery Corporation, the relationship of corruption to the development of debt of nearly US\$350,000 between the end of 1961 and the beginning of 1968 has been clearly revealed (Werlin, 1979). During these years, furniture was bought from private contractors contrary to the Corporation's official objectives and without following official tendering procedures. Raw materials and machinery were also bought in an irresponsible way and at the same time they were sold on credit to certain favoured private furniture manufacturers or were practically given away free of charge without proper advice, approval, or record-keeping. Similarly, customers, particularly politicians from the **Convention People's Party** (Nkrumah's party), were given credits and discounts for furniture for no assignable cause or reason and without authority. Many refused to pay what they did owe, and there were also irregularities in the payment of staff salaries, the keeping of accounts, and the handling of corporation funds. In these and other ways, the assets of the Corporation were drained away.

When Nkrumah became more insecure, he started becoming more concerned with the tribal origins of civil servants and high Party functionaries. He therefore increasingly surrounded himself with Nzimas (his own tribe, thus indulging in a kind of nepotism). Even the leaders following Nkrumah have continued his practice of putting fellow tribesmen into strategic positions of power and of authority in order to settle old scores and/or buttress their own positions in the institutions of the state. In this situation, the struggle for political power thereby becomes a struggle for tribal advantage (Werlin, 1979:250).

Moreover, what needs to be emphasized about the Nkrumah regime is that corruption really emerged from the absence of power as he had no effective way of controlling the atrocious behaviour of his ministers, regional commissioners, and district commissioners. He was not even in a position to inspire them to

disinterested deeds in the service of their country, because he was himself involved in selfish deeds. This was the weakness of the Nkrumah regime, which facilitated or rather fostered corruption (Ekpo, 1979:394). It can be argued that what Nkrumah failed to acknowledge was the extent to which he not only encouraged the corruption of his subordinates but also relied upon it (Ekpo, 1979). In this vein, Nkrumah somehow developed the notion that everybody had his price, and that he could use those whom he bought to further his own ambitions or to flatter and nurture his ego, often at great public expense. Those who were most corruptible were thought to be most co-operative; while those who resisted these temptations were considered dangerous and, as such, punished. This state of affairs resembled one of the characteristics of **systemic corruption** as identified earlier in this study. The striking example in this regard is none other than Kwabena Owusu, who was in 1961 acting manager of the Ghanaian Distilleries Corporation and who objected to the inflated prices of raw materials being charged by a London firm that was then paying kickbacks to the National Development Corporation. He and his family were arrested and humiliated, and he was eventually dismissed from his post (Ekpo, 1979).

Since corruption became so much a part of the Ghanaian way of life, it became necessary and a way of survival for ordinary citizens. The existence of widespread political corruption has been established beyond doubt, and it goes without saying that corrupt practices hampered the good functioning of a number of public enterprises and sabotaged many investment opportunities.

It remains a mystery as to precisely how much money went to Swiss banks for self-enrichment during Nkrumah's rule; yet there are conjectures that give figures in this regard, ranging from US\$3 million to US\$30 million (Levine, 1975:103). The figure may be far higher. It can also be argued that Nkrumah's increasing paranoia had the effect of stifling innovation with the following consequences: the learning and correcting capacity of the government and administration of Ghana was submerged in a welter of irrational, contradictory, erratic, highly emotional perspectives concerning events at home and abroad; the widespread corruption and the inaptitude of local government and field agencies brought about an excessive centralization of authority in the ministries in Accra; the ministries, therefore tended to neglect their primary responsibility for determining objectives, priorities, and strategies for the nation as a whole, and for assessing, marshalling, and allocating resources, and, yet they could never be certain of having their instructions followed at the local level (Werlin, 1979:254).

Due to this widespread political corruption, Nkrumah left Ghana with a serious balance-of-payments problem. By 1966, Ghana had a public external debt of over US\$800 million (Werlin, 1979:248). This implies that there was no foreign exchange to buy spare parts and raw materials required by the economy. While inflation was rampant, causing the price-level to rise by 30 per cent in 1964-65, unemployment was also serious (Werlin, 1979:248-258; Levine, 1975:104-105). There was practically no growth at all by 1965 in terms of Ghana's GNP; the Ghanaian economy was obviously retrogressing; the gap between the haves and have-nots in fact increased during the Nkrumah era, with a lots of urban unemployed, marginal farmers, peasants, and the ethnically out of favour

becoming worse rather than better off (Levine, 1975:104). It has also been revealed that between 1960 and 1966, personal per capita consumption declined by some 15 per cent, and the real wage income of the minimum wage earner declined by some 45 per cent during the same period (Werlin, 1979:248-258). Moreover, there were usually more concerns about basic economic issues, such as poor pay in the face of rising costs of living which was caused by the "official corruption" (Levine, 1975:104-106).

Democratic standards were not maintained: the country (Nkrumah's Ghana) had never enjoyed a free and independent press; during much of the Nkrumah period there was virtually no independent press. Press agencies like **The Spokesman** and others did raise their voices in dissent, and they were often subjected to official persecution (Levine, 1975). Opposition parties were unable to exercise much restraining influence; their members in parliament frequently denounced the excesses of government during Nkrumah regime, but with negligible effect. "Free and fair elections" were held too infrequently to exercise much restraint on official corruption.

In all these circumstances, it goes without saying that the needs and demands of the population simply could not be met; even if the purpose of independence, according to Nkrumah, was to **create a better life for all (own emphasis)** - in accordance with the philosophy of African Socialism (Werlin, 1979:248-249, 254-255). It can also be argued in agreement with Werlin (1979:254-255) that because of the existence of corruption in Nkrumah's Ghana, the legitimacy of the regime was undermined; maximization of public welfare promised by African Socialism could never be achieved, and this, ipso facto, mocked Nkrumah's advocacy of socialism and undermined Nkrumah's personal integrity as well as the public loyalty to the political system.

3.1.1.3. Conclusion

Political corruption in Nkrumah's Ghana was characterized by the diversion of public resources to non-public purposes (i.e. for the benefit of the President, ministers and other bureaucratic cadres). There was a certain degree of bureaucratic corruption and nepotism where Nkrumah put his fellow-tribesmen (the Nzimas) into strategic positions of power and authority. Nepotism was fostered by "strengthening" a circle of friends in order to buy loyalty and "legitimacy" on ethnic basis. This state of affairs was aimed at creating a "fortress" of personal safety and an image of legitimacy. Official political corruption existed, in which Nkrumah himself was involved, and he could not control the atrocious and rapacious behaviour of his subordinates (ministers, regional and district Commissioners and others). In fact, he encouraged and supported it. Corruption was widespread and became part of the Ghanaian way of life, necessary for survival. There was also a degree of systemic corruption in the sense that criminality and dishonesty were justified, and the central leadership sanctioned (legitimated) corruption in official organs. Those people who were most corruptible were thought to be more co-operative, while people like Kwabena Owusu who resisted it were considered as dangerous and were

harshly punished. Millions of US dollars were siphoned off and placed in Swiss Banks for personal gain and self-enrichment.

The existence of such widespread political corruption impacted negatively on the Ghanaian economy: unemployment was serious; "per capita consumption" and the Real Wage Income Earner declined; social development and public welfare policies simply could not be achieved. This state of affairs contributed, to a certain extent, to the devaluation of money, lack of provisions, inflated prices, the collapse of former basic facilities, etcetera. In a situation where political and bureaucratic leaders kept on satisfying their tastes for extravagant lifestyles - as a result of continuous corruption over a period of time - all forms of productive enterprise were stunted, and all pockets of growth were potentially eradicated. Development disappeared from all horizons of political planning and government until "government" came to an end and mere political force remained.

The ever-broadening circle of political corruption engendered social inequalities and accentuated those that already existed by increasing divisions between classes in Ghanaian society and widening the gap between the haves and the have-nots. This situation also led to an endemic spread of corruption as a forced means of mere survival, especially on the part of the public and poor masses who were reduced to the conditions of corruption, dishonesty, mendicancy, small per capita income, paltry and precarious wages (no living wages) - all of which constitute an affront to human dignity (see previous discussion).

Democratic standards were stifled and were not promoted or protected. There was no free and independent press which could denounce corrupt practices without fear of harassment on the part of the regime's authorities. Many press agencies were subjected to official persecution after denouncing irregularities and malpractices regarding governmental actions and policies. The norms of accountability, transparency, public participation and the right to reliable information were eliminated; public bureaucratic rules, values and norms for good government (see discussion thereof) disappeared. No single set of enforced values and norms for the relationship between government and the public was promoted. All this undermined the legitimacy of Nkrumah's regime as well as the loyalty of the public toward the political system.

Thus, there was a negative impact on the attainment of the trilogy of objectives (development, democracy and human dignity).

3.1.2. Corruption in Idi Amin's Uganda

3.1.2.1. Introduction

It is worth pointing out that corruption, seen and described as "misuse of authority" and the "improper, arbitrary and selfish exercise of power" (which may include despotism, kleptocracy, nepotism, irrationality, and all arbitrary actions of a government), has a toxic and destructive impact on the process of obtaining a "government for the people" as well as "a better life for all" in developing societies. It is with this in mind that the tyrannical, homicidal and non-accountable

regime of Idi Amin (as well as that of Nguema in the case of Equatorial Guinea) will now be discussed.

3.1.2.2. Corruption: the Ugandan experience

Idi Amin seized power on 25 January 1971, after a coup d'état that toppled Obote's regime while Obote was attending a Commonwealth conference in Singapore (Hansen & Twaddle, 1988:1; Low, 1988:45).

Amin's regime in Uganda soon revealed itself to be much worse than Obote's, indeed one of post-colonial Africa's very worst (Hansen & Twaddle, 1988); and, between 1971 and 1979 Uganda was subjected to one of the most capricious, terror-ridden, and inhumane governments yet to emerge in Sub-Saharan Africa - perhaps one of the most tyrannical regimes to emerge anywhere in the underdeveloped world after the end of World War II (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982:259). Uganda under Amin has been even called a "slaughterhouse" (Ullman, 1978:529; Jackson & Rosberg, 1982; Low, 1988:36). In this situation - as in all tyrannies - there was a shared interest in the perpetuation of the tyranny binding the ruler and his clients.

From the perspective of the misuse of authority and the improper (arbitrary) exercise of power, it can be argued that in Amin's Uganda, the conduct of regime agents was scarcely distinguishable from that of ordinary criminals, revealing the essential banditry of tyranny. For example, property - including cars, land and so forth - was seized with impunity by those who possessed on-the-spot power. In addition, it has been reported that attractive women were kidnapped and their husbands or escorts simply disregarded; if the men resisted or complained, they were beaten or even murdered. It is even claimed that Amin himself committed or authorized murder to possess the women of other men (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982:258). In Idi Amin's era, there were extensive human rights violations on all sides amounting to genocide, over 100,000 confirmed deaths occurred (the figure may be far higher. According to the editorial comment of Le Standard, a Kinshasa-based news paper, on 21 May 1996 300,000 deaths may have been attributed to Idi Amin (USAID, 1992:11; Low, 1988:48; Hansen & Twaddle, 1988:45-46).

In this context, large amounts of property were seized by the regime and redistributed to leading supporters. The most prominent example was the seizure of the property of the expelled Asian community (Anon, 1996; USAID, 1992; Low, 1988:46; Jackson & Rosberg, 1982). Jackson and Rosberg (1982:259) assert that Amin himself freely shared in the booty.

When considering the bureaucratic corruption and the kleptocratic practices characterizing Amin's regime, it can be maintained that the most striking illustration of the plundering of wealth by Amin's regime was the use of increasingly scarce foreign exchange (some of it held originally in private banks accounts by Ugandan Asians) not only to purchase weapons for enforcing the tyranny, but also to reward the privileged (especially the military hierarchy) with expensive imported goods. For example, a Boeing 707 or C-130 transport aircraft

arrived nearly weekly at Stanstead Airport in England to be loaded not only with essentials in short supply in Uganda, but also with luxury goods (whiskey, clothes, furniture) for Amin and his agents' personal use (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982:259).

The result of this massive misappropriation of private and national property was the creation of a comparatively privileged military élite, living in the best houses in the capital's most salubrious suburbs, and driving impressive and expensive brand new cars (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982: 258-259). Meanwhile the Ugandan economy was deteriorating badly, that is to say, the economy was in near ruin. In these circumstances, for some 85 per cent of the population, survival meant a return to subsistence agriculture and there was extensive malnutrition and stunted human growth (USAID, 1992). In this vein, the London Times (June 24, 1977) made this comment: "Uganda has largely returned to a peasant subsistence economy."

In addition, fifty thousand trained Asians were expelled by Amin. The number of refugee emigrants of all races was high and these come mostly from the managerial and entrepreneurial class. Most technical experts in cabinet either fled the country or were killed - although the exact number is a matter of conjecture (Anon, 1996; USAID, 1992; Low, 1988:46-48). This state of affairs adversely affected the managerial and administrative capability of the Ugandan government. "Government" in the ordinary sense of the term was rendered largely nonexistent; in many ways government could not operate with much effect - or at all; most industrial and transportation facilities and equipment were heavily damaged or destroyed (USAID, 1992; Jackson & Rosberg, 1982:258-262). In the spheres of financial policymaking and currency management the government lost much of its ability to function; the Central Bank of Uganda was greatly restricted in its ability to provide foreign exchange to pay for imports - owing in large part to the theft and diversion of funds by Amin's regime (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982:262).

Furthermore, in 1977, the Ugandan currency was reported to have lost about 80 per cent of its former value; the financial and currency crisis had had the effect of depriving the business economy and system of trade in Uganda of the goods they needed to sell. In the very same year, the Minister of Planning and Economic Development revealed that there had been a negative rate of growth since 1972; much that had been built up since independence was in serious economic jeopardy, and much else was lost (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982:263). This implies that "Churchill's Pearl of Africa" (Uganda) had lost its former reputation for being relatively prosperous with an extensive rail and road transportation network, a stable currency, diversified exports, a nascent industrial sector, and a well-trained cadre of people including graduates of Makerere, arguably then the best university in Africa (USAID, 1992; Anon, 1996).

Clearly, rules and agreements that permit a modern cash exchange economy to operate were seriously eroded in Amin's Uganda.

Amin's Uganda was also characterized by the decline of law. Inevitably and inextricably associated with this state of affairs was the degradation of civic

morals (Low, 1988; Jackson & Rosberg, 1982; Obbo, 1988:210). Words such as "kondoism" (armed robbery, or stealing by breaking the padlock, "kakondo") and "mangendo" (whose meaning covers various nefarious activities from bribery to black marketeering) were prominent in everyday vocabulary. There developed a psychology of insecurity and a corresponding social calculus whereby connections, influence, bribes, and the like were used to protect oneself, one's family, and one's property against the regime or its agents (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982:263).

Finally, the damage and misdeeds of corruption under Amin's regime can be illustrated by quoting Kinoti, when he writes:

"I visited the West Nile District of Uganda, Idi Amin's home district, and I was hit by the widespread poverty and devastation for much of which Amin's regime was responsible. For instance, the medical research laboratory in which I was supposed to work had been looted of everything - roofs, doors, benches, sinks, and equipment, which had been sold in the neighbouring country of Zaire. The best Hotel in the town (Arua) had no beds or water. I had to sleep on the floor and to fetch water for my own use from some distance. As I went about my job I was distressed by the extent and depth of poverty in the district. Most of the people were hungry, thin, and practically naked. Makerere University in Kampala, where I once had been a student and later a teacher, had sadly decayed from being a World-class University to something unrecognizable. Poverty, decay of institutions and infrastructure, and political repression were evident in every district I visited.

The beautiful and prosperous Uganda (I add, "Churchill's **"Pearl of Africa"**) I had known in the 1950s and 1960s was no more." (Kinoti, 1994:II.)

3.1.2.3. Conclusion

Corruption in the case of Idi Amin's Uganda included "misuse of authority" and the improper, arbitrary and selfish exercise of power reflected by terror, widespread infringements of human rights, genocide and homicide, tyrannical and kleptocratic practices (such as theft and diversion of public funds by the regime, banditry, kidnapping other men's wives); plundering of public resources for the regime and its agents and massive misappropriation of private and national property, and so forth.

This state of affairs had toxic or negative effects on the Ugandan economy as well as the managerial and administrative capability of the government. Most industrial facilities and transportation networks were heavily damaged or destroyed; poverty and devastation were common as a result of an irresponsible and unaccountable management of public funds and assets by political leaders and top officials; the rural economy reverted to subsistence; there was extensive malnutrition and stunted human growth; life, for the majority of ordinary citizens meant "survival"; poverty, decay of institutions and all sorts of social evils prevailed. In these circumstances, it goes without saying that no or little

improvement could be noticed in the quality of life of the Ugandan people. In other words, development could not be viable, sustained and attained. It could not even be initiated.

The banditry and arbitrariness of tyranny could hardly foster and promote the dignity of and respect for human life. This state of affairs was reflected and expressed by more brutal acts, terror, harassment, homicide and widespread violations of human rights, etcetera.

Political repression was evident, and in this context accountability, transparency, public participation, rule of law, legitimacy and other democratic standards relating to good governance were simply beyond imagining.

In sum, the corrupt, unaccountable, repressive and "personal" rule of Idi Amin had negative effects vis-à-vis the promotion and attainment of development, democracy and human dignity in Ugandan society at large.

3.1.3. Corruption in Nguema's Equatorial Guinea

3.1.3.1. Introduction

If Uganda under Amin has been called a "slaughter-house", Equatorial Guinea under Macías Nguema has been described as "suffocating" and a country "living on the margin of international society" and Fernando Póo (the Island where Malabo, the capital city, is located) has been referred to in the African press as **Devil Island** (own emphasis) (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982:264, 247). Here also corruption will be dealt with from the perspective of abusive rule and the improper, arbitrary, unaccountable and selfish exercise of power and authority.

3.1.3.2. Corruption: the Equatorial Guinean experience

In the first elections under the independence constitution, held in September 1968, Francisco Macías Nguema, a Fang and former civil servant, was elected president.

As far as abusive rule and selfish and arbitrary exercise of power are concerned, it was reported that upon assuming power, the Macías Government showed real nepotism by installing 7,000 of its Fang supporters in government positions in the capital city of Malabo. In this respect, the new government was not to be a Guinean government so much as a Fang government (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982:246). Under his regime in Equatorial Guinea (1968-79), Macías's political actions became increasingly arbitrary and severe, with ever-widening circles of Guineans affected by his inhumanity. In this period Equatorial Guinea was the scene of a virtually continuous political purge - initially of politicians and political leaders, but subsequently of anyone suspected, with or without reason, of opposing Macías and his regime (Legum & Drysdale, 1976-77). In these circumstances, it was estimated that more than one-third of the entire population had fled and were living as refugees in neighbouring countries. Macías has been described as a "paranoic", cruel, and megalomaniac personality who imposed a reign of arbitrary terror in which no one individual or group was safe (Jakson &

Rosberg, 1982:246-247). Provincial governors, police and army officials, diplomats, bankers, doctors, teachers, and priests were killed, persecuted, or simply disappeared. It is in this context that "Amnesty International" and the "Anti-Slavery Society" described the Macías regime as among the most brutal and unpredictable in the World.

The marks of corruption and kleptocratic practices under Macías Nguema's abusive and tyrannical rule were revealed in September 1979, when the tyrant was deposed and brought to a trial that was attended not only by Guineans, but also by representatives of the few remaining embassies in the country and an observer from the International Commission of Jurists in Geneva. Nguema was charged with genocide, murder, the violation of human rights, treason, and above all, the misappropriation of public funds (which is most important for the purposes of this study). In this regard, the observer from the International Commission of Jurists reported that the trial had been conducted properly and fairly, and had brought to light abundant evidence of Macías's crimes, which included not only his participation in numerous murders, but also his virtual theft of the national treasury - the tribunal mentioned payments to Macías of nearly US\$5 million during a two-month period in 1978 (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982:249).

In consequence there was a widespread breakdown in general social and economic norms. The economy, in particular, deteriorated badly. Kleptocratic and corrupt practices of Macías's regime brought about seriously disruptive consequences for the provision of social and technical services, as far as medicine and education were concerned (Legum & Drysdale, 1976-77). By the mid-1970s it was reported that the technical personnel required to operate and maintain the telephone service, the radio broadcasting facilities, and the nation television station were not available in sufficient numbers; and there were reports of infrastructural breakdowns due to an absence of qualified personnel (many of whom had run away or been killed), neglect, and a lack of spare parts. Moreover it was reported that civil servants were, in general, not regularly paid - unlike the tyrant's agents, who were handsomely rewarded for their services (Legum & Drysdale, 1976-77; Jackson & Rosberg, 1982:250).

Ultimately, it should be noted that when following the 1979 coup d'état, Western journalists were able to visit Equatorial Guinea, they found a dispirited people and a seriously dismal and dislocated society whose institutions were badly damaged and barely functioning; the country had ceased to possess an "economy" or government "administration" in the ordinary meaning of these words; there were severe food shortages. Many of the Island's shops were closed, and civil servants had gone unpaid for months. In a word, everything had to be started from scratch, that is, rebuilt (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982:251).

3.1.3.3. Conclusion

It follows from the foregoing discussion that corruption in Macías Nguema's Equatorial Guinea took the form of an abusive, arbitrary, unaccountable and selfish exercise of power as was the case in Amin's Uganda. It was characterized by nepotism (thousands of Macías's tribesmen, the Fang were installed in

government positions), genocide and tyrannical practices, violation of human rights, political corruption and kleptocratic practices including the defalcation and misappropriation of public funds and theft of the national treasury. All these impeded the progress toward a "better life for all" and brought about a widespread breakdown in general social and economic norms due to a dislocated society, food shortages, social inequalities, unpaid civil servants, shortcomings in rendering social and technical services.

In addition, ordinary citizens had been subjected to degrading and appalling material and physical conditions like food shortages, the decay of infrastructure and facilities, the deterioration of social services, etcetera. It goes without saying that human life had not been treated with due respect; one could hardly enjoy a sense of worthiness and dignity in a context of the inhumanity, brutality, criminality and violation of basic human rights perpetrated by the abusive, repressive, unaccountable and corrupt regime of Macías Nguema.

Democratic standards and values could hardly be conceived or promoted under a "reign of arbitrary terror" characterized by "continuous political purges". Here again the prevalence of corruption understood as "misuse of authority and power" impairs the attainment of the trilogy of objectives (development, democracy and human dignity) and has detrimental consequences and effects on these three elements.

3.1.4. Conclusion: Corruption in Ghana, Uganda, Equatorial Guinea

In the light of the above analyses and discussions relating to all three examples of corruption in the developing world of Africa, it follows that:

- Political corruption under Nkrumah's Ghana was characterized by diversion of public resources and funds to non-public purposes, bureaucratic corruption, nepotism, kleptocratic practices as well as systemic corruption including the justification and legitimation of corruption, criminality and dishonesty in official organs by central leadership. This state of affairs had a negative impact on the promotion and attainment of the trilogy of objectives (development, democracy and human dignity) as has been highlighted above.
- Corruption, seen as "abusive rule and misuse of authority" and characterized by improper, arbitrary, unaccountable and selfish exercise of power, was the epitome of Idi Amin's regime. There was also a high degree and prevalence of kleptocratic practices and plundering of public resources and funds by the regime and its agents and supporters. This state of affairs had toxic effects on the promotion and attainment of development, democracy and human dignity in Ugandan society.
- In the similar reign of arbitrariness, terror, brutality and "personal rule" and the misappropriation of public funds and resources, the promotion and attainment of development, democracy and human dignity were negatively affected in Nguema's Equatorial Guinea.

- It appears that the prevalence of corruption (as highlighted in the three cases above) has a negative and detrimental impact as well as toxic effects on the promotion and attainment of the trilogy of objectives.

But, the question is: can all these endemic, detrimental and negative effects of corruption in Africa be found in the broader context of the developing world (including some non-African developing countries as well as in other African countries besides Ghana, Uganda and Equatorial Guinea)? In other words, can the disruptive consequences of corruption regarding the processes of development, democracy and human dignity be examined in the general theoretical framework of the developing world ?

3.2. Dys functionality of corruption in the Developing World with reference to Development, Democracy and Human dignity

3.2.1. Introduction

As has been indicated and argued earlier - in accordance with Caiden & Caiden (1977:307-308) - corruption is obviously dysfunctional to society as whole, and mostly so in its systemic form. In the following section of this chapter, the dysfunctionality of corruption will be analyzed in the broader perspective of the developing world with a view to linking the phenomenon of corruption to the impossibility of achieving development, democracy and human dignity.

3.2.2. Corruption in the developing world: dysfunctionality and hindrances to the achievement of development, democracy and human dignity

As one examines corruption in the general context of developing societies, it is clear that corruption is harmful or detrimental to social, economic, political and organizational development (Klitgaard, 1991:117, 121; 1988:42-46; Nye, 1967:421-423 and others).

Joseph Nye (1967:417), a Harvard University political scientist, who has studied corruption in less developed countries contends, in accordance with C.J. Friedrich, Ronald Wraith and Edgar Simpkins, that corruption is endemic in all governments. He has described the scarlet thread of bribery and corruption running throughout the fabric of public life in new states as a weed suffocating better plants and has said that corruption and nepotism rot good intentions and retard progressive policies (Nye, 1967:417).

Nye (1967:421-423) mentions some costs attributed to corrupt practices, listing them as follows: **corruption is economically wasteful, politically destabilizing, and destructive of governmental capacity** (own emphasis). Let us examine each aspect in turn.

1. **Waste of Resources:** Corruption hinders economic development or directs it in socially less desirable directions:

- 1.1. Capital outflow: Capital accumulated by corruption that winds up in Swiss Banks is a net loss for developing countries. The costs can be considerable (as in the case of Haiti under the Duvaliers, Baby-Doc and Papa-Doc, and many examples in Africa).
- 1.2. Investment distortions: Investment may be channelled into sectors such as construction not because of economic profitability, but because they are more amenable to the hiding of corrupt fees through cost-plus contracts and the use of suppliers' credits. This was the case in Venezuela under Perez Jimenez and it occurred in Mobutu's Zaire as will be discussed later.
- 1.3. Waste of skills: If the top political élite of a country consumes its time and energy in trying to get rich overnight by corrupt means - as was the case in Burma under U Nu - and as is presently so in many Black African states - it is not likely that any development plan will be fulfilled.
- 1.4. Aid foregone: Another possible wastage pertains to the opportunity costs of aid foregone or withdrawn by outside donors because of disgust with corruption in a developing country. This could be a serious cost in the sense that developing countries are highly dependent on external sources of capital.
2. **Political instability**: Corruption destroys the legitimacy of political structures, and by so doing, can contribute to instability and possible national disintegration.
3. **Reduction of Governmental capacity**: Even if it may not be the sole or major cause, corruption can contribute to the loss of governmental capacity in developing countries in the following ways:
 - 3.1. Reduction of administrative capacity: Corruption may alienate modern-oriented civil servants and cause them to leave a country or withdraw or reduce their efforts. In addition to the obvious costs, this may involve considerable opportunity costs in the form of restriction of government programs because of fears that a new program might be ineffective in practice.
 - 3.2. Loss of legitimacy: It is often alleged that corruption squanders one of the most important assets a new or developing country has - the legitimacy of its government.

To Caiden & Caiden (1977:307-308) the institutionalization of corruption is obviously dysfunctional to society. They advance certain assumptions in this regard, inter alia:

- Systemic corruption perpetuates closed politics and restricts access, preventing the reflection of social change in political institutions.

- Systemic corruption suppresses opposition, contributing to increasing resentment; thus corruption, far from being an alternative to violence, is often accompanied by more violence.
- Systemic corruption perpetuates and widens class, economic, and social divisions, preventing social cohesion.
- Systemic corruption prevents policy change, particularly where this works against immediate market considerations.
- Systemic corruption blocks administrative reform, and makes deleterious administrative practices profitable, for example induced delays.
- Systemic corruption diverts public resources and contributes to a situation of private affluence and public squalor which is especially serious where affluence is confined to the few (it is fair and correct to say that Zaire, as will be discussed later, is the epitome of this state of affairs).
- Systemic corruption contributes to societal *anomie* in shoring up or transmuting traditional values into appropriate areas.

In a word, "systemic corruption" can be regarded as "the institutionalized subversion" of the public interest (Caiden & Caiden, 1977:308).

In a literature review of the World Bank's Management and Development Series, a number of authors have recognized that corruption has deleterious, often devastating, effects on administrative performance and economic and political development (Gould & Amaro-Reyes, 1983:34-35).

Pointing out the endemic effects of corruption on governments' effectiveness in developing countries, Klitgaard (1988:39) maintains that corruption has efficiency costs in terms of the waste and misallocation that often accompany it. For example, because of corrupt procurement policies, governments in the developing countries pay from 20 to 100 per cent more than the price they would pay under noncorrupt conditions. It can also be argued, in accordance with Klitgaard (1988:40-46), that corruption may lead to other inefficiencies:

- If bribes lead to unsafe buildings, unqualified government employees, or police negligence, "public bads" may be produced. Because of corruption, top government officials skew public policies to benefit themselves and a small number of cronies. It should be noted that the result of "public bads" has been disastrous in India with regard to "top soil": India's most precious resource (Klitgaard, 1988:40).
- A second category of consequences of corruption pertains to the redistribution of resources. Most studies have shown that the rich and the privileged benefit from corrupt schemes at the expense of the poor, the rural, and the disadvantaged. This will be dealt with later with regard to Zaire.

- Possibilities for corruption create nefarious incentives throughout society. Economists have analyzed the unproductive incentives found in a "rent-seeking society" where citizens and officials strive to achieve "monopoly rents" often through bribes. In short, when corruption becomes a decided possibility, the incentives of both officials and citizens are twisted toward socially unproductive activities.
- Corruption leads to political alienation and instability (Klitgaard, 1988:44), which is harmful and detrimental to the effectiveness of a government in terms of the advancement of socio-economic development, democracy and protection of human dignity and respect. In this respect, corruption is conducive to a climate of popular uprisings as well as popular disaffection with illicit activities in the public sector.

In a fairly recent study on governments corruption in the Latin American context, Klitgaard (1991:117) remarked that the costs of corruption as a system are enormous. A general cost in this regard is the lack of transparency. That is, the apparatus of the state inflates itself; it becomes heavy and arbitrary; it suctions off what it can; and almost everything becomes particularized, there are dominions of this or that economic group associated with this or that political group; competition is brought to a halt; and a Creole-style feudalism seems to be crowned and promoted.

Although one may recognize, of course, the seriousness of corruption in countries like the United States, Japan, and Europe, corruption has been considered to be more painful in the context of Latin America where it constitutes a vital gear (*engranaje*) of the economy; and this is so because Latin American countries combine an enormous state apparatus with an endemic poverty, which is the best broth for the cultivation of corruption (Klitgaard, 1991:117).

Moreover, Bolivia's experience under the regime of general García Meza from 1980 to 1981 shows that corruption can involve the misuse of important policy instruments such as tariffs and credit, irrigation systems and housing policies, the enforcement of laws and rules regarding public safety, the observance of contracts, and the repayment of loans - or simple procedures (Klitgaard, 1991:121). Corruption may become systematic so that it infects the daily business of government like collecting taxes, passing items through customs, allocating public contracts to build or supply, or carrying out police work. As far as Bolivia is concerned, most Bolivians will have to attest - as careful studies in other countries have repeatedly shown it - that corruption is socially pernicious. **When corrupt behaviour becomes widespread, it stunts economic growth, undermines political legitimacy, and demoralizes both public officials and ordinary citizens** (own emphasis) (Klitgaard, 1991:121).

In his study, *The effects of corruption in a developing nation*, David H. Bayley (1970:526-528; 1989) presents some "harmful effects of corrupt acts", but for the sake of simplification only the following are enumerated here:

1. Corruption exacts a cost by inhibiting over-all economic development.

2. If corruption takes the form of a kickback, it serves to diminish the total amount expended for public purposes.
3. Corruption in government, perceived by the people, lowers respect for constituted authority in that it undercuts and weakens popular faith in government to deal evenhandedly.
4. Politicians and civil servants constitute an élite whose function is to give purpose to national efforts. Corruption among an élite not only debases standards popularly perceived, it forces people to undertake underhanded approaches out of self-defense, that is, to resort to corrupt practices just to get one's due.
5. A corrupt official or politician is a self-centred individual. How can it be expected that such a person will put country before self, and to jeopardize his prospects for the sake of prosperity for the whole country in the remote future? It can also be suggested that uncommon political courage can hardly be maintained in an atmosphere of tolerance of corruption.

Gunnar Myrdal is more than explicit when dealing with the situation in South Asia. He contends that corrupt practices are highly detrimental, and the prevalence of corruption provides strong inhibitions and obstacles to development; counteracts the strivings for national consolidation; decreases respect for and allegiance to the government, and endangers political stability (Myrdal, 1970:540-541).

From another point of view, corruption is one of the forces that help to preserve the "soft state" with its low degree of social discipline. Not only are politicians and administrators affected by the prevalence of corruption, but businessmen and, in fact, the whole population are also. Corruption introduces an element of irrationality in plan fulfilment by influencing the actual course of development in a way that is contrary to the plan or, by limiting the horizon of the plan. In a word, **where corruption is widespread, inertia and inefficiency, as well as irrationality, impede the process of decision-making and plan fulfilment** (own emphasis) (Myrdal, 1970:540-541).

Ekpo (1979:xiv) brings into focus Sub-Saharan African countries, and holds that the aggravated corruption - which we are currently witnessing in African countries - is destructive, and it does not require an ethical judgment to observe this state of affairs. Even if some corruption is valued by both citizens and rulers in Africa, the greater its magnitude the less efficiently a political system fulfils its other functions, since theoretically speaking, all acts of corruption are a threat to the political system (Ekpo, 1979:xiv).

Jean-François Médard (1982:2, 24; 1997:414-416) chimes in with the above opinion by asserting that the level of corruption in Africa is so high that it makes the administrative machine quite inefficient. He argues there is a considerably body of evidence for this in African countries where even if corruption has not yet reached the level of Zaire or that of Nigeria, it is nevertheless rampant to such an extent that it warps the functioning of the public administration. Corruption has even brought about the fall of certain regimes in Africa; but those regimes who

have succeeded there have done (or are still doing) the something (Médard, 1982:24).

Attempting to find major causes for the wretchedness and backwardness of Africa's political and socio-economic realities, Kinoti (1994:23-24; 36-39) makes it clear that African governments are largely responsible for the situation, as they encourage bureaucratic bottlenecks, corruption and other evils. In almost all African countries economic power is concentrated in the hands of the ruler. He uses it to buy or reward loyalty either financially or by appointment to lucrative positions in public institutions, regardless of the appointee's competence, and to deny economic opportunities to those he considers to be disloyal. In this situation, he simply converts public property and public institutions to his own use in a quest for political survival. Those in the system have many opportunities to enrich themselves and their relatives and tribesmen at the expense of the economy (Kinoti, 1994:24) and the country at large.

This can be described as "bad government" or rather "poor political leadership", which is guaranteed to keep a poor country poor and turn a progressive nation into a retrogressive one (Kinoti, 1994:36). This will be discussed later with reference to "le Grand Zaïre".

Moreover, it can be maintained, in accordance with Kinoti (1994:37) that our political leaders (in Africa) in their quest for personal wealth have dashed our hopes. For so many years of selfish and abusive rule they have helped to impoverish the African people and to perpetuate our underdevelopment. Independent Africa has experienced more violence, violations of human rights, corruption, injustice and oppression than did colonial Africa (this is not to say that there were not corruption, incompetence and many other evils during the colonial era). This accords with the point of view expressed by Van der Walt (1995:2) of the Potchefstroom University in his recent publication *Leaders with a vision*:

"Our leaders did not fulfil their beautiful promises for a better life than the one during colonial times. More than thirty years after independence, we today have:

- poverty instead of prosperity
- sickness instead of health
- imprisonment instead of freedom
- indignity instead of dignity
- hatred instead of unity, respect, love
- war instead of peace
- refugees instead of citizens
- technological retardation instead of development
- moral degeneration instead of morality
- **corruption, bribery, nepotism instead of honesty**
- **self-seeking instead of service to the community** (own emphasis);
- hell instead of the utopia promised, etcetera, etcetera.

We, living on the continent, are familiar with all these ills."

Obviously, there is the problem of misuse of public institutions and embezzlement of public funds by those in authority (Kinoti, 1994:38). In many

African countries government is quite plainly in the hands of crooks. These people collaborate with multinational corporations and foreign governments to siphon millions of dollars out of their countries each year. One way they do this is through development projects that are simply not viable for a poor country. Such projects are funded through loans from foreign banks and are carried out by foreign companies. The budget includes **provision for bribes to politicians and officials** (own emphasis) and huge salaries for the mandatory foreign staff. The country has to repay the loan and interest whether the project succeeds or fails. Also, those in authority embezzle funds directly from government ministries, the treasury and parastatal corporations. Thus, the funds that should go into the provision of essential services and the capital that should be husbanded and invested in development are lost (Kinoti, 1994).

Admittedly, African political leaders and bureaucrats must, therefore, be held responsible for the gross mismanagement of African economies that causes so much poverty and wretchedness in our societies (Kinoti, 1994:39).

This has been also recognized by the 35 high-level participants from 13 African countries who gathered at the May 12-17, 1990 Mweya Conference in Uganda under the auspices of the **Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation** (Uppsala, Sweden). They stated the following:

"above all, it means ending the situation where those in power use their position to enrich themselves at the expense of the people. Many African governments have been criticised for spending a disproportionate amount of their budget on military and security matters at a time when the development of agriculture and industry is so badly needed. There is today a net outflow of capital from Africa. Yet another serious constraint is the deteriorating state of the continent's physical infrastructure. Roads, railroads and other communication structures that served Africa well in the 1960s and the 1970s have been allowed to decline because of poor management and lack of funds to sustain them. **The abuse of government power in the post-independence period is the root cause of the state being "set apart"** (own emphasis). The ethical dimension of holding offices has been ignored. The consequences of these weaknesses is **a state without legitimacy, whose largesse benefits only a few** (own emphasis). This lack of legitimacy of state power has now reached such serious proportions that it is being increasingly questioned across the continent." (Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 1992:18-20.)

It is important to note that the destructive and endemic side of widespread corruption may be seen even beyond the context of the developing world's history. Dealing with the situation in America, Benson (1978:187, 191-209) indicates the destructive side of corrupt machine politics, its creation of cynicism in politics, its destructive effect on city finances, its deleterious effect on government departments, its effect as a gateway for organized crime and help to other crimes, its support for police brutality, and (most importantly) **its frightful**

impact on poorer citizens (own emphasis). Numerous examples of this are to be found in the history of American corruption (Benson, 1978:209).

Bearing this in mind, it is no wonder that at least one top official from the developing world is offended by the social scientists' suggestion that corruption is conducive to socio-economic advancement in Africa and Asia. I quote:

"I think it is monstrous for these well-intentioned and misguided scholars to suggest corruption as a practical efficient instrument for rapid development in Asia and Africa. Once upon a time, Westerners tried to subjugate Asia by selling opium. The current defense of kleptocracy is a new kind of opium by some Western intellectuals, devised to perpetuate Asian backwardness and degradation. I think the only people pleased with the contribution of these scholars are the Asian kleptocrats." (Klitgaard, 1991:119; 1988:29.)

Policy-makers like Dr. Keh Swee, the then deputy prime minister of Singapore, are puzzled about this charge and contend that corruption as well as ineffective organs of public administration, are likely to have an immediate impact and an endemic one on the economic growth of Third World countries (Klitgaard, 1988:29).

In the same vein, Rose-Ackerman (1978:9) argues that normative statements regarding corruption require a point of view, a standard of "goodness", and a model of how corruption works in particular instances. Those economists who look favourably upon corruption generally have a limited point of view, a narrow definition of "goodness" and an oversimplified model of the corrupt marketplace.

Benson (1978:209) holds that the social science professors who scorn "naive morality" are usually quite "moral" themselves. He is of the opinion that the failure of these social scientists to point out the bad consequences of corruption is simply a result of ignorance. Several of them are theorists, unlikely to be aware of all the practical consequences of corruption, and most of their written literature tends to ignore administrative, social or economic consequences of corruption. He adds that as the knowledge of these administrative results grows, the theorists (social scientists) will probably add to their praise of the corrupt machine some indication of its bad consequences (Benson, 1978).

3.3. Conclusion

From the analysis and discussion above, it becomes clear that the prevalence of corruption in the developing world is dysfunctional, endemic, detrimental and destructive to governmental functioning in terms of promoting and achieving socio-economic development, democracy and human dignity.

Corruption in the context of the developing world harms and undermines socio-economic progress towards the achievement of a "better life" for all; kills the development spirit; provides strong inhibitions and obstacles to development; perpetuates African, Latin-American and Asian backwardness and degradation;

brings about brutality; and has a negative and endemic impact on the economic growth of Third World countries.

By enriching those in the system and their relatives and tribesmen at the expense of the national economy and the country at large, widespread corruption impoverishes the people in Third World countries and keeps a poor country poor and turn a progressive nation into a retrogressive one.

By leading to the gross mismanagement of African and Third World economies, corruption also causes much poverty and wretchedness in developing areas as well as the loss of funds and that should be invested in development. Corruption perpetuates underdevelopment, dependency, oppression, injustice and the violation of human rights and many other social evils that are not conducive to the protection of human dignity (due respect for human life). Corruption makes the administrative machine quite inefficient by bringing about inertia and irrationality and impeding the process of decision-making and plan-fulfilment. Not only are politicians and administrators affected by it (corruption), but the whole population is also.

Corruption endangers political stability; undermines political legitimacy and makes the apparatus of the state inflate itself by becoming heavy, arbitrary, particularized and unaccountable. Thus corruption disrupts, destroys and smothers the norms of transparency, popular participation and public accountability in the management and running of public affairs - which are the attributes of what can be described as "good" democratic governance. In a word, the prevalence of corruption in developing countries brings about strong governmental ineffectiveness; frays societal fibre and constitutes a hindrance to achieving the trilogy of objectives: development, democracy and human dignity.

In the foregoing chapter an effort has been made, first and foremost, to construct a theoretical and analytical framework for the negative impact of corruption on the trilogy of objectives. The analyses and discussions relating to the cases of Nkrumah's Ghana, Idi Amin's Uganda and Macías Nguema's Equatorial Guinea respectively show and have established this state of affairs.

In the second place, the dysfunctionality of corruption has been analyzed and examined in the broader perspective of the developing world. In this context, it has also been shown how corruption is linked to the impossibility of achieving development, democracy and human dignity.

It is worth noting that the particular case of Zaire will be analyzed and evaluated against the background of this general theoretical and analytical framework.

CHAPTER 4

A NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR "GOOD" PUBLIC GOVERNANCE

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze three different sets of normative value-systems, the Western (democratic) public accountability system, traditional African-Bantu worldviews and the Christian value system relating to "good" and just government in order to establish common normative denominators by which a value judgement can be made on governmental and bureaucratic corruption.

Before coming to the point, let us examine what norms and proverbs are all about in society.

- **What are norms ?**

In the New Encyclopaedia Britannica (1987:765) norms, also called social norms, are defined as rules or standards of behaviour shared by members of a social group.

In their New Dictionary of Political Analysis, Roberts and Alistair (1991:87) regard a norm as a rule of conduct or shared value which regulates or is used to judge the social behaviour of group members.

It is important to note that some norms are explicit, such as laws and regulations, and are enforced by legitimate formal sanctions; some, still relatively explicit, such as customs, morals and manners, are enforced by more informal sanctions. The social units sharing particular norms may be small (for example a clique of friends) or may include all adult members of a society. Norms are more specific than values or ideals (New Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1987): honesty is a general value, but the rules defining what is honest behaviour in a particular situation, are norms.

According to the functionalist school of sociology, norms reflect a consensus, a common value system developed through socialization, the process by which an individual learns the culture of his or her group (New Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1987). Social norms regulating/dictating the social behaviour of group members in a particular situation can be expressed through, inter alia, proverbs and sayings.

In conclusion, norms or social norms will be referred to in this study as rules of conduct or standards of behaviour shared as values by members of social units and these rules (codes) of conduct (behaviour) will be considered to regulate, dictate or judge the social behaviour of group members. This definition is of prime importance in making value judgements of the corrupt behaviour on the part of political leaders and bureaucratic élites in Zaire.

- **What is a proverb ?**

The Oxford English Dictionary (1989) defines a proverb as a short pithy saying in common and recognized use; often metaphorical or alliterative in form, which is held to express some truth ascertained by experience or observation and familiar to all.

The New Encyclopaedia Britannica (1987) views it as a succinct and pithy saying in general use, expressing commonly held ideas and beliefs (values). In this respect, proverbs can also be seen as "a vehicle" for social norms and the transmission of tribal wisdom and rules of conduct.

In the light of the above definitions, a proverb can be referred to as a succinct saying, expressing commonly held ideas and values which can be used as a way of conveying social norms.

The analysis of the collected indigenous African-Bantu proverbs given below will thus help to explain what kind of social behaviour is expected from those in authority or leadership in African societies.

With this in mind, it is time now to examine the treble set of normative value systems governing this study: the Western norm of public accountability model of governance, the African-Bantu proverbs on good leadership and the Christian conception of good governance.

4.1. The Western norm of (democratic) public accountability

As has been argued, the concept of good governance is essentially linked to the idea of (democratic) public accountability which is based on the liberal-democratic polity model. In the same vein, authors like Schwella (1991:5) contend that, theoretically, the idea of public accountability (Schwella uses the term "democratic accountability") is closely linked to the theory of democratic norms. In this respect, it must be admitted that the notion of (democratic) public accountability is only sustainable in conjunction with the idea of democratic control by the citizens over the government and its administration. This implies that democracy is a prerequisite for democratic control which, in turn, is a prerequisite for (democratic) public accountability. Therefore, it can be argued that (democratic) public accountability is, by definition, neither applicable nor possible in nondemocratic states (Schwella, 1991:6). In other words, the norm of public accountability which is dealt with in this section, is the norm applicable in democratic states with a system of representative, responsible, transparent and accountable government, where elections are held or should be held, at regular, fixed intervals (Hattingh, 1988:43).

4.1.1. Traditions relating to public accountability

The fact that man is a social being has for many centuries had a decisive influence on his development and that of his environment. During the course of

many years, man's increasing need for protection, for the joint utilisation of natural resources and some other activities resulted in the establishment and development of specific forms of association. These developments eventually led to the establishment of what can be seen as probably the most important form of association, government (Hattingh, 1988:1).

Even though the annals of history do not always enable us to determine the precise sequence of events in past centuries, one may assume, in the light of Rousseau, Locke and other philosophers of the eighteenth century, that there was a general consensus (agreement) or a general will on the part of the community to subject itself to a controlling authority, and those in authority were empowered to govern the community in accordance with the general will expressed by the community (Hattingh, 1988:1). During the course of centuries, relations between government and governed developed to the extent that it eventually became necessary for such relations to be placed on some or other permanent footing. This state of affairs gave rise to Constitutionalism (a phenomenon developed mainly in modern democracies, whereby a community is governed in according to a prescribed set of rules, leaving the ultimate power in the hands of the community so as to ensure that it will be in a position to control its elected representatives) along with a system of representative government, whereby the community elected representatives to govern on its behalf. Yet, the major requirement under this system was still to ensure that the elected authority could in all respects be called to account for the manner in which it exercised the function of government (Hattingh, 1988:2-3, 43; Stewart et al. 1992:4).

Traditionally those exercising public power in society have been held to account through a line of accountability to elected persons, who are, in turn, accountable to the citizens in periodic elections. That line of accountability can be direct, as in the case of local government officers or civil servants, or can be indirect through responsibility to appointed boards, themselves accountable through ministers to parliament (Stewart et al. 1992:4).

The responsibility for giving an account has traditionally rested upon parliament and local councils, which in debates can require accounts of action taken, but has also involved a series of procedures for giving written accounts of actions intended or taken. The giving of an account presupposes a right of citizens to be informed of the actions of those who govern on their behalf, granted that, powers (it can be argued) do not belong to those who exercise them, but belong to citizens on whose behalf they are exercised (Stewart et al. 1992:4). With this in mind, some views on the norm of (democratic) public accountability can now be given.

4.1.2. The meaning of (democratic) public accountability

According to Normanton (1972:311-312), public accountability calls for openly declared facts about government and open debate of these facts by the citizens and their elected representatives. It is grounded, inter alia, in the doctrine of popular sovereignty over governmental actions. He (Normanton) contends that public accountability is a rich and open source of knowledge about how

government services function in actual practice and hence of ideas about how they ought to function. It casts a spotlight on institutions that are shy of the public's gaze but that have a steady and cumulative effect on the lives of citizens. To Normanton (1972:312), real public accountability requires infinitely more than mere hierarchic accountability to all citizens.

Thompson (1983:236) is in accordance with the above views of public accountability (he uses the term democratic responsibility) when he states that it refers to a process of deliberation and a process of accountability. As a process of deliberation, it requires that public office-bearers be expected to give reasons for and debate the merit of their decisions publicly or in front of the elected representatives of citizens. While as a process of accountability, it (public accountability) requires that those involved in making public decisions shall be identified in order to reward them for positive actions and punish them for detrimental ones. These processes should continuously involve the active participation of citizens.

Schwella (1991:11) is of the opinion that public accountability (he uses the term "democratic accountability") is a prerequisite for democratic government and administration. To him, (democratic) public accountability requires democratic control by the citizens over government and administration, and most importantly, governmental and administrative bodies **must act in the interest of their citizens** (own emphasis) and should be held publicly and democratically accountable by the public for their actions (Schwella, 1991:11). Moreover, (democratic) public accountability can be institutionalised through institutions like, a legislature, a judiciary, an executive and administration, the press and others.

Each of these can now be examined in turn:

Within the **legislature**, (democratic) public accountability can be enhanced through public debate and open criticism; institutional aids such as select committees, the office of an ombudsman and state auditors.

The judiciary, with the courts of law as its instruments, could play a vital role in the maintenance of democratic accountability depending upon the constitutional position of the courts.

(Democratic) public accountability can also be enhanced through **executive** structures such as hierarchical control within the bureaucracy culminating in ministerial responsibility to parliament, the effect of professional officials in the bureaucracy and the appointment of commissions of inquiry.

The press plays a linking role between all the institutions for the maintaining public accountability and the public at large. The press conveys the essential facts about government and administration to the public which acts as the final controlling authority over governmental bodies (Schwella, 1991:11).

Alluding to the question of public accountability, Jasper Walsh (1994:6), a South African Democratic Party spokesperson on local government made it clear that

government, at all levels, is there **to serve the people** (own emphasis); it must be efficient, transparent, honest and accountable to the electorate. Such mechanisms as petitions, referendums and the ombudsman must be considered, and a close relationship between local authorities and the community must be established through strong and active civic organisations and ratepayers' associations.

To Walsh (1994:6-7) serving one's community is central to the idea of public accountability, and it is a regrettable fact that those who seek public office often do so for reasons other than to serve and better their community. This view has already been expressed by the Duke of Omnium in a letter addressed to his son, Lord Silverbridge, on his election as a member of the British Parliament in 1880:

"I have known gentlemen who have felt that in becoming members of Parliament they had achieved an object for themselves instead of thinking that they had to put themselves in the way of achieving something for others. A member of Parliament should feel himself to be the servant of his country - and like every other servant, he should serve. If this be distasteful to a man he need not to go into Parliament. If the harness gall him he need not wear it. You are there as a guardian of your fellow countrymen in that they may be safe, that they may be prosperous, that they may be well governed and lightly burdened - above all that they may be free. If you cannot feel this to be your duty, you should not be there at all." (as quoted by Walsh, 1994:7.)

The above views can be summarized by stating that (democratic) public accountability places great emphasis on the requirement that governmental and administrative bodies act to the benefit of citizens and that they should be held publicly and democratically accountable by the public for their actions (Schwella, 1991:6).

4.1.3. Conclusion

As has been stated, the idea of (democratic) public accountability can be traced back to the emergence of a system of representative government along with the absolute requirement that the elected authority should in all respects be responsible and answerable to society for the manner in which it exercises the function of government. Being a prerequisite for democratic government and administration, and linked to the idea of democratic control by the citizens over the government and its administration, public accountability is, by definition, neither applicable nor possible in nondemocratic states. Public accountability requires that government and administrative bodies must act in the interests of the public (government and administrative actions and programmes should be taken and implemented with the public interest in mind) and should be held publicly and democratically accountable by the public for their actions. Institutions such as the legislature, the judiciary, the executive and administration, the press and others can play a vital role regarding the maintenance of (democratic) public accountability.

4.2. Traditional African-Bantu worldviews and values pertaining to good government

4.2.1. Introduction

The intention in this section is to attempt an interpretation of some African-Bantu worldviews and values concerning "good government". This is to be achieved by making use of some proverbs. Each category of proverbs is to be stated, then translated, and, finally, an effort will be made to deduce values basic to each proverb especially in relation to norms dictating good government - bearing in mind that proverbs are regarded as "vehicles" of social norms and transmitters of social codes, which also includes norms pertaining to public governance.

4.2.2. Proverbs from West Africa

4.2.2.1. Yoruba Proverbs: Nigeria/ Benin (Owomoyela, 1988:51-53; 84-229; see also Knappert, 1989:76)

a. ***Akì ì já lórí òpè ká tún joba nísàlè***
"One does not fall from the top of a palm tree and become a king on the ground."

- That is to say: if one were to lose one's exalted position through disgrace, one could not expect to be accorded further honors, certainly not greater honors. The proverb says that a person who has disgraced himself cannot expect to be treated with reverence.

The value behind this proverb is that a person in authority cannot enjoy legitimacy and loyalty by showing "bad behaviour" in the exercise of his/her functions. It should be noted that good behaviour, uprightness and integrity have been described in this study as being - inter alia - the requirements expected from good leadership (see good governance).

b. ***A kì í je alàdùn méjì pò***
"One does not enjoy two pleasures at once"

- The proverb is often used to require people, also those in authority, not to hoard too many things for themselves and thus deprive others of their fair share.

The basic belief underlying this proverb is the supposed equity of nature by which no one enjoys an excess of endowments while others suffer deficiency. This proverb may be used to stigmatize all sorts of greedy and rapacious behaviour in the exercise of power or positions of public trust. This implies integrity and honesty, which are among the core values of good governance in this study.

- c. ***A kì í je méjì lábà Alàdé; ení je iyán kò gbodòje isu***
"One does not eat two at Alàdé's farm hut; whoever eats pounded-yams may not eat boiled yams."
- The proverb warns people, including those in authority, not to be greedy, and not to seek to have everything when people wanting a share of what is available abound. It thus expresses the same idea as proverb (b).
- d. ***A kì ì rí omo oba ká má rí àmì oba lára rẹ̀.***
"One never sees the child of a king without seeing the mark of the king on his or her person."
- The proverb can be used to advise people who have privileged positions in society to behave in ways appropriate to their status - presumably integrity, responsibility, lawfulness and other characteristics relating to good leadership.
- e. ***Ilé kì í jó kí baálé ilé tàkakà***
"When a house is on fire the landlord does not lie around longingly."
- The landlord, being the head of the household, should not only be concerned about saving his home, but should also be concerned about the many people who are dependent on him to provide them with a roof and to safeguard their lives and property.

The value underlying this proverb is the **responsibility** of a leader for his or her people. The proverb is used to urge people in responsible positions to live up to their responsibilities, both to themselves and to others who depend on them. Responsibility has been described in this study as one of the values pertaining to good governance.

4.2.2.2. Hausa Proverbs: Nigeria and Niger (Knappert, 1989:75-76)

- a. ***The head cannot go without the body.***
- The proverb implies that a chief cannot rule without his people's co-operation and consent - that is, against the popular will. It stigmatizes all sorts of personal, selfish and unaccountable rule which may lead to corruption and bad governance.
- b. ***When the moon is half, the stars are bright***
- Weak leadership (which can be characterized by incompetence, greed, lawlessness, tyrannical practices and the like) jeopardizes its legitimacy (or authority) vis-à-vis subordinates. Instead of supporting a corrupt and poor leadership, this proverb calls upon people in authority to act with competence, transparency, integrity and openness

in order to become role-models in society and enjoy legitimacy from the people.

4.2.3. Proverbs from Central Africa

4.2.3.1. Bantu Proverbs

4.2.3.1.1. Tetela Proverbs: Kasai /Zaire (Knappert, 1989:75-76)

a *A good chief is like the forest: everyone can go there and get something.*

- The belief underlying this proverb is **responsibility, care and servanthood** which are supposed to characterize a good leader. A good leader is the one who serves and provides for the well-being of people, all the people; that is the one who takes care of /and meets the needs of his people. This accords with one of the aspects of good governance and democratic accountability: government at all levels is there to serve the people (Walsh, 1994:6-7).

b *The dog whom you did not feed will not hear your call.*

- This proverb is the logical consequence of the above. The leader that is unable to provide and meet the needs of his people can hardly compel obedience from the people whom he or she governs. In other words, the legitimacy of a leader depends on the way he/she serves and provides for the needs of the people.

4.2.3.1.2. Luba-Lulua Proverbs: Kasai (Zaire) (Muyaya, 1995)

a. *Mukalenga wa Bantu, Bantu wa Mukalenga*

"A chief is for the people, and the people are for the chief."

- A chief can only rule over people, not over trees or a sandy desert while a society without a chief is a lawless society, lacking order. Therefore, the chief should rule over people that are supposed to be obedient to him. On the other hand, it is the duty of the chief to ensure that law and order (justice) are maintained in the society for which he is responsible.

Legitimacy, reciprocal responsibility, control and accountability are the core values and norms behind this proverb.

- b** ***Lukengu wa Bakuba wa kakenga mutu wa lupioko***
"The Emperor of the Bakuba had all the wealth, but he once was lacking a thread of raffia."

- Although the king had everything at his disposal viz. gold, silver, an army, power, laws, he was in need of somebody (inferior to him) to get the thread of raffia; he still needed the least one in society. This suggests that one should never despise anyone when you are in power; even a young fellow can be of some value, and give you good advice. The proverb stigmatizes personal rule, and requires openness and popular consultation in terms of leadership and the decision-making process.

- c.** ***Mfumu katu wa somba pa bilowa bia tshimuku, bualu ne alua kupua mikenji moyo.***

"A chief must not get involved in drunkenness lest he forget the law."

- The kings or the princes must not get drunk or take (strong) liquor; since by doing so they may ignore the law, and forget about the rights of the poor, the have-nots and the needy. A ruler constitutes the last hope or help for whoever is in search of justice.

The value assumed about being a chief/king is that a king is expected to be a role-model: a model of justice and equity, of wisdom and all virtues. Therefore, he must behave accordingly in order to fulfil his function and obligations towards his people.

4.2.3.1.3. Mongo Proverbs: Equateur /Zaire (Ngoi Boliya, 1995)

- a** ***Bakotangake Eanga, we oyatangake Yimbeleke***
"The society regards you as a respectable person, while you are making yourself a worthless person."

- When you are a chief or in authority, you must behave accordingly in order to gain respect and admiration from your subordinates. Otherwise you will deserve no respect at all. It can be deduced from the above that if authority and power are exercised in a good manner with integrity, wisdom, justice, equity, responsibility and many other virtues, then legitimacy and loyalty can be gained from the people. The opposite simply jeopardizes this state of affairs.

- b** ***Bakwetaka nsomi, óyâka o nsomi.***
"If/when the society regards you as a senior/elder, then behave accordingly."

- This expresses the same idea as proverb (a): the elder (a person of high esteem) ought to be a role-model for the subordinates.

4.2.3.1.4. Swahili Proverbs: Eastern Zaire/Africa (Knappert, 1987:75)

a *When the tree falls, the branches too, fall.*
(The tree is the chief, the branches his subjects)

- When a chief misbehaves, his subjects do wrong as well. Granted that a chief ought to serve as a role-model, his misconduct and misbehaviour entail the corruption of his subjects (see the effect of the quality of government and leadership on the whole society).

b *All authority is borrowed from God.*

- This proverb views leadership and authority in terms of stewardship and this may be used against an unaccountable and abusive ruler.

4.2.3.1.5. Baluba Proverbs: Katanga (Zaire)

(Burton, 1958:49;51;75;132;174;254-255; 258-259).

a *Kyakayula. Kotanketanke udi ne kisandji. Shi udy a bulopwe i na bantu.*

"You step out so smartly in your new clothes, but it takes more than that to win a chieftainship."

- Chieftainship does not lie in "external" dressing, but in something deeper.

b *Ke mukulu, i nzazangi. Kumwenepo byasomba lonji.*

"He is not worthy to be regarded as an elder, since he conducts himself in an unseemly way, with bitterness and unkindness."

- This is applied to the abusive behaviour of people in positions of public trust.

c *Kudya waila madimbo. Upwa kadi watela lukambo.*

"He who wants to eat more than his fair share will reap bad feelings."

- This proverb may be used with reference to all kinds of rapacious behaviour (greediness, egoism/selfishness, kleptocracy and the like) in running public affairs and in holding positions of public trust. It is also applicable to people in general.

d *Nemba wa mbaji. Bakunene shyala na nkasa. Tutu washyala wantyinankanya. N'amba n'nene wantapa nseso. Le nseso yadi yabusonga'ni yakuntapa ami.*

"They left us younger ones in your care, but you ill-treat and oppress us. Was this adze put into your hands for handicraft or for murder?"

- Is your authority for benevolence or for harm?

The proverb condemns any kind of oppressive, tyrannical behaviour in the exercise of authority (that is bad governance). Authority is expected to serve, not to harm the people.

- e** ***Wa Bantu i Molopwe. Wamwino i Mumunwa.***
"The generous one is a chief. The selfish one is a slave."

This proverb condemns selfishness as well as greediness in all respects - especially as far as leadership is concerned. It is expected that the chief or the authority be responsible to, serve and meet the needs of all. By doing so, he or she may enjoy legitimacy and the loyalty of the people.

4.2.4. Proverbs from Southern Africa

4.2.4.1. Bemba Proverbs: Zambia (Milimo, 1972:113)

- a** ***Wanya tateke calo***
"Threats and insults never rule a country"

- A tyrant cannot make a good ruler.

The proverb condemns tyranny and oppressive rule and encourages legitimacy, accountability and openness as far as leadership is concerned.

- b** ***Ukuteke mbwa mano***
"To take care of a dog needs wisdom"

- If you want to rule people well, do it with wisdom and intelligence and not with force. Good leadership implies competence, maturity and skills. Tyranny and oppression jeopardize all these things. If it needs wisdom to care for a dog, more is required from those who care for people.

- c** ***Mwamina-bantu tanaka, mwamina ng'uni alanaka***
"Who takes care of the people should never tire; who chases birds away tires."

- The person given responsibility over others must always try to fulfill his obligations towards the people for whom he is responsible. He should never say, "I am tired". The proverb requires from the authority figure a continuous responsibility of care and servanthood towards the people. He cannot follow his own pleasures and still govern.

4.2.4.2 Tonga, Tumbuka and Chewa Proverbs: Zambia/ Malawi
(Milimo, 1972:3-6)

a ***Sibbuzya takolwi bowa (Tonga)***

"The one who asks is the one who does not get poisoned by mushrooms."

- If you ask and seek the advice of others you will never go wrong. Ask and they will tell whether the mushroom is edible or not. Leadership needs openness and consultation in order to make good decisions (policy). Failing in this may lead to repression, oppression, unpopularity and arbitrary behaviour (**as is the case with "personal and autocratic rule"**).

b ***Mahara gha yekha wakapasika kawale munyumba (Tumbuka)***

"With his own brains he built a granary in the house."

- Never do things (especially as far as chieftainship/leadership is concerned) without people's advice. To do so is to risk doing ridiculous things, such as building a granary in the living-room.

The proverb expresses the same idea as in (a).

c ***Ndadziwa kale adamanga nyumba yopanda khomo (Cheva)***

"Who said "I know everything" built a house without a door."

- If one sticks to one's opinions very stubbornly - especially if one is a leader or a person in authority - one ends up doing ridiculous things. The same idea is expressed in (a) and (b).

4.2.4.3. Dama Proverbs: Namibia (Knappert, 1989:75)

a ***A good chief is like a food basket. He keeps the people together.***

- The proverb views a good chief as a unifying force; a servant of the people; the one who serves as societal glue.

b ***A chief is like a well: as soon as it collapses the people will be thirsty.***

- The proverb views a chief as the source of the general welfare, the one who can promote the well-being of all. If a chief fails to play this critical role the well-being of the society will be jeopardized.

c ***The tree cannot live without its branches.***

(The tree is the chief, the branches his subjects)

- Chieftainship depends on the people's consent and loyalty. The proverb emphasizes the principle of legitimacy as one of the key

norms for sustainable leadership. Authority is meaningless without the consent and allegiance of the people. You cannot have a chief without people.

d *A good chief is like a strong tree with many branches. People like to sit in its shade.*

- The proverb regards a good chief as a symbol of care, justice, peace, comfort, service, protection, security, integrity, rightfulness and the like. People always expect something good from him.

4.2.4.4. Tsonga-Shangana Proverbs: South Africa
(Junod, 1981:8-19; 100-107)

a *Hosi i vanhu*
"A chief is his people."

- No authority can exist without the consent of the people.

This proverb repeats the idea contained in Baluba Katanga proverb (a) as well as in Dama-proverb (c).

Authority without legitimacy is meaningless. You cannot be a chief without people/subjects. If they leave you because of your manner of governing, you are not chief anymore. Thus, a chief (chieftainship) exists by the support of his or her people, their will and acceptance.

b *Ahosi a yi na Xaka. Kumbe: Vuhosi a byi na Xaka.*
"The chief has no relative or authority knows no kin."

- When you have committed an offence, do not trust that the chief will acquit you because you are related to him. In other words, a chief must not favour relatives in court. This proverb is relevant to the ideas of transparency, equity, justice and lawfulness that are expected from the authority. The proverb is also against dishonest acts such as nepotism, clientelism, partiality and the like.

c *Loho hosi yi khwita, malandza ma khwita hinkwawo.*
"When the chief limps, all his subjects limp too."

- When a chief is bad, all his subjects do wrong too. The same idea is expressed in Swahili proverb (a). The chief ought to be a role-model for the people. Should he be corrupt, his subordinates will be the same.

d *Muvoyami ku voyama wa le mahlweni, wa le ndzhaku o landzela*
"If a chief or a leader does not walk straight, those who follow him will do the same."

- If a leader is not honest or a person of integrity, those who follow him will not be honest either. This repeats the idea given in the previous proverb.

e *Xi wundle, xi ta ku wundla.*
"Take care of it, it will take care of you."

- Take care of your people, they will take care of you.

The proverb underlines mutual responsibility between the authority and the people. Authority is there to serve the people; when it does so people will owe allegiance and loyalty to the established authority.

h *Vanhu vukosi. Kumbe: Vanhu mavele*
"People are wealth or people are mealies."

- Show kindness to or serve the people whom you govern; they are your real wealth; they are the basis of your power. The proverb recognizes, in a specific way, the norm of **government of the people, by the people and for the people**. Without the consent and support of people one cannot govern or rule. Authority needs to serve the people that constitute the basis of its power.

4.2.5 Conclusion

In the light of the foregoing, it can be deduced that African leadership (chieftainship, headmanship, head of families, kingship, etc.) - from an African-Bantu worldview - is far from being **personal** or oriented to the self. To exercise authority in the African-Bantu context needs a kind of reciprocity, consultation and interdependence between the person given authority and the people that constitute the basis of power. This can only be understood against the background of what can be described as the very African-Bantu values that inspire and characterize social interactions. Important among this is the notion of **intersubjectivity** whereby one's self-realization can only be conceivable or feasible if one interacts with others. This can be linked to what is known as the concept/culture of "mit-sein" to borrow Martin Heidegger's terminology.

In this vein, good leadership or chieftainship is regarded and interpreted as "people-based". The ideal is a "being-with" leadership which is there to serve, to provide for the needs of the people, all the people.

The person in authority in this context has a considerable number of duties, and it is of paramount importance that he must serve the interests of his subjects (see also Gildenhuys, et al. 1991:143) and promote the general and public welfare. Other duties include: maintaining law and order; protecting the rights of his subjects by determining whether justice is being done to the injured and the

oppressed, and punishing offenders (see also Schapera, 1962:178). Through this, the people will owe allegiance and loyalty to the established authority.

It also appears that concepts like despotism, tyranny, greediness, personal, oppressive and abusive rule and nepotism - to name a few - do not fit within the scope of the African-Bantu conception of good governance. The existence of the tribal council system (that is found in many African-Bantu traditional political structures) limits the chief or authority in the actual application of his power, and the political and consultative system is organised in such away that effective government is possible only through harmonious co-operation between the chief and his advisers, the tribal council, and the general tribal meeting (see also Gildenhuys, et al. 1991:144). That is why some proverbs state that authority is there as a result of the consent or rather goodwill of the people (tribe, kingdom). In spite of the fact that the eventual control of almost all the affairs of the tribe (kingdom) is vested in the chief-in-council, it seldom happens that a chief or authority figure degenerates into an autocratic despotic leader. Any attempt by a chief or authority figure to act without the support of his advisers and tribal members, is not only unconstitutional, but will not succeed (see also Schapera, 1962:184).

It can also be argued that a person in authority (king or chief) is not above the law. If he acts in contravention of the accepted tribal standards regarding right and wrong, he will be severely reprimanded by his advisers, tribal council members and members of the tribe. Should he harm one of his subordinates, in some tribes, he may even be tried and disciplined by his tribe. Should he persevere with malpractices, the tribe will leave him or civil war may break out in an attempt to overthrow his reign and appoint someone else in his place. He may even be assassinated (see also Schapera, 1962:184).

Authority figures ought to be role-models in the society. What is expected from a good leader is inter alia: good behaviour consisting of honesty and integrity, uprightness, self-control, openness, thoughtfulness, altruism, lack of greed, tyranny or oppression, impartiality towards one's kin; and working for the public interest. All of these imply public servanthood and sacrifice.

4.3. The Christian conception of good government

4.3.1. Introduction

The Christian conception of good government and leadership can only be examined and grasped against the background of what can be described as **the ethic of service** (own emphasis) (Buckerfield de la Roche & Schluter, 1991:13-14) and the basic Biblical principle governing leadership, namely **servanthood** (own emphasis) (Van der Walt, 1995:12-13, 17).

4.3.2. The Biblical perspective

The Biblical perspective on authority, leadership and office wishes to be a "service-oriented one" (Van der Walt, 1995:12). The Bible is full of instances

which prove that leadership is not about status, position and domination; Christian leaders are called to serve their fellow-men and to abide by God's law - God Himself being the highest norm and source of authority. It is Jesus Christ himself who laid down a new standard for the ordering of social relationships among his followers - the ethic of service (Buckerfield de la Roche & Schulter, 1991:14). This can be examined in his statements in Luke and Mark's gospels:

"An argument broke out among the disciples as to which one of them should be thought of as the greatest. Jesus said to them, 'the kings of the pagans' have power over their people, and the rulers claim the title 'Friends of the People'. Not so with you. Instead, the greatest one among you must be like the youngest, and the leader must be like the servant. Who is greater, the one who sits down to eat or the one who serves him? The one who sits down, of course. But I am among you as one who serves." (Luke 22:24-27; see also Mark 10:42-45.)

It should be noted that for Jesus, this was no statement of theory. He demonstrated its application by washing his disciples' feet during his last meal with them before his death (John 13). And ultimately Jesus demonstrated the implications of a life of service in his own death which Christians believe was not an act of heroism to save his friends from Roman reprisals, but a means by which he took the consequences of their moral failures upon himself and was thus able to achieve for them reconciliation with God. It is the supreme example of service because it involved the supreme sacrifice of separation from God (Buckerfield de la Roche & Schulter, 1991:14).

Over and over again in the early church, the apostles appeal to the new Christians to live a life of service to God and to one another by appealing to the life and death of Jesus as inspiration and example. The Christian is no longer to live for his or her own pleasure and enjoyment, but for the well-being and in the service of other people (Buckerfield de la Roche & Schulter, 1991).

Although the "ethic of service" was specified originally by Christ for his disciples rather than as a norm for all in society, it has had an immense impact in Western societies outside the churches (Buckerfield de la Roche & Schulter, 1991). This is probably for two reasons:

1. There has been a spillover effect from the church to wider society (those who follow the service ethic in their personal lives as Christians are bound to try and carry it over into their careers, including public administration). Where Christian influence has been strong, as in Britain in the nineteenth century, the impact has been widespread.
2. The ethic of service is a high ideal with which people of all backgrounds and faiths can identify, and to which they can aspire. It can be argued that probably both factors played a role in why the health system introduced to Britain after the Second World War was not called a "National Health Business", but a "National Health Service" (Buckerfield de la Roche & Schulter, 1991:14). It should also be noted that even the motto of the

Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution, the then One Party-State of the Second Republic of Zaire, used to be as follows: "M.P.R. equals to serve, not to serve oneself".

Having this in mind, public offices are not simply there for the sake of the office-bearer's own interests, but for the sake of those entrusted to him. Public office is therefore synonymous with service (Van der Walt, 1995:12).

In the same vein, *Romans* 13:4 and 6 state that government is a **servant of God for the best interests of the citizens** (own emphasis). It is from this perspective that Osei-Mensah (as quoted by Van der Walt, 1995:12) re-emphasises **servanthood** - with reference to many Biblical figures and scriptures - as the basic Biblical principle regarding leadership, which entails humble service to God and our fellow human beings. The same line is taken by Adeyemo in his book "The making of a servant of God" (1993) in which he shows in some detail how one figure from the Bible, Daniel, was a real servant of God and the people (see also Van der Walt, 1995). King Solomon's way of governing can be viewed in a similar light.

It is worth pointing out that the attitude of rulers who do not want to act as shepherds, servants and stewards of God among his people is stigmatized in the Bible. More than 2502 years ago, the prophet Ezekiel was instructed by the Lord:

"Son of man, denounce (prophesy against) the rulers (shepherds) of Israel. Prophesy and tell them what I, the sovereign Lord, say to them: You are doomed, you shepherds of Israel ! You take care of yourselves, but never tend the sheep. You drink the milk, wear clothes made from wool, but you never tend the sheep. You have not taken care of the weak ones, healed those that are sick, bandaged those that are hurt, or looked for those that are lost. Instead, you have treated them cruelly. My shepherds were taking care of themselves and not the sheep. Therefore, O shepherds, hear the word of the Lord: This is what the Sovereign Lord says: I am against the shepherds and will hold them accountable for my flock. I will remove them from tending the flock so that the shepherds can no longer feed themselves. I will rescue my flock from their mouths, and it will no longer be food for them." (Ezekiel, 34:1-10.)

This very same idea appears in the *New Testament* when one hears Christ, the glorious Lord and the King of kings, passing judgement on unjust rulers who misuse and abuse widows and orphans, as well as (I add) the weak, the poor, the homeless and the voiceless.

It is also with respectful reference to the scriptures that Van der Walt (1995:92) recommends an alternative model of leadership for Africa, namely **responsible servant-leadership** (own emphasis).

4.3.3. Conclusion

From the foregoing it follows that the Christian conception and norms of good government and leadership can only be interpreted against the background of the biblical principles of **servanthood** and **the ethic of service** laid down by Jesus himself.

In the Christian faith and particularly the calvinist forms of it, the origin/ basis of all authority lies in God and not in the people. But God did not command authorities, leaders and governments to rule according to their own whims. The norms and the laws of God for government are fundamentally based on justice. Basic to this are the supportive principles of obedience to Him the Creator and His law and that of service to others as He served us through Jesus Christ to the ultimate sacrifice of/on the cross. In this respect, governments, authorities and leaders have to uphold a just law; they are not "mini-gods" and have to abide by the mentioned norms - even though the *Bible* does not prescribe any specific governmental model.

Having said that, there is a clear distinction between ruling an exclusively Christian community (ruling the flock of Christ) and ruling a secular public - in terms of the Christian norms. However,

it is to be indicated that the above stated Biblical and Christian norms (especially those of servanthood and the ethic of service) for governance are applicable in a secular state too and can also be used by non-Christians.

The *Bible* provides guidelines only and enjoins governments and authorities towards a humble service to God and fellow human beings, advising them to look not only to their own self interests, but also to the interests of others (*Philippians*, 2:3-4) and having the same attitude as that of Christ Jesus, the Lord of lords and King of kings, Who, being in very nature God, did not consider equality with God something to be grasped, but made himself nothing, taking the very nature of a servant (*Philippians*, 2:5-7).

From the Christian perspective, governments and authorities are seen as servants of God dedicated to the best interest of citizens and the public at large. Consequently public office or authority being synonymous with service should not simply be there for the office-bearer's own interest (s), but for the benefit of those entrusted to him or her. Good government and leadership in this context ought to mean responsible servant-leaders.

4.4. Conclusion

In the foregoing, an analysis of similar aspects of the treble set of value-systems pertaining to good governance has been given in order to establish common denominators (regardless of different cultural, ideological or religious backgrounds and motives) by which a value judgement can be made on corruption and malpractices regarding political and bureaucratic behaviour. It can be stressed that this conclusion focuses on a general common denominator

which, on its part, rests upon a broad range of supporting values and practices as has been demonstrated.

In recapitulation, the Western norm of (democratic) public accountability emphasizes that government at all levels is there to serve the people (the public), and governmental and administrative bodies must act for the benefit (interests) of the citizens and the public at large, and that they should be held publicly and democratically accountable by the public for their actions; public actions and programmes should be undertaken and implemented with the public interest in mind. This norm runs against the current of non-democratic and unaccountable states and regimes.

Being people-based and oriented, good government and leadership in the traditional African-Bantu worldview (context) is there to serve, to supply and meet the needs of the people (the public). Authority in this regard must serve the interests of its subjects and promote the general welfare. Malpractices such as despotism, tyranny; greediness, nepotism, dishonesty, oppressive and abusive rule cannot fit in with the traditional African-Bantu conception of good government and leadership. Authority is also accountable to the people through the tribal council system and general tribal meetings. Authority is not above the law, and it must work in the public interest, which implies servanthood and sacrifice.

The Christian conception of good government is based upon the Biblical principle of servanthood (relating to leadership and authority) and the ethic of service laid down and put into practice by Jesus Christ himself. The Biblical perspective on authority is a service-oriented one. Leadership is not a matter of dominion, tyranny, oppression, position or status; rather, it is a humble service to God and one's fellow human-beings. Public office, is therefore, synonymous with service. Government is there as a servant of God acting in the best interests of the citizens and the public at large. Good government and leadership in this context implies responsible servant-leaders.

It can be deduced from the foregoing that the respective sets of value-systems regard good government and leadership as servanthood, a responsible service aimed at the best interests of all the people, and not the ruler's own interests.

Being service and public interest-oriented, all the three sets of normative value-systems stand against what can be described as malpractices and the misuse of authority and of positions of public trust as displayed in tyranny, greediness, dishonesty, non-transparency, nepotism, despotism, oppressive, personal, unaccountable and abusive rule and the like.

To sum up, good governance requires responsible, transparent, honest, upright and servant leaders that are free from corruption and all malpractices.

CHAPTER 5

A CHRONOLOGICAL OUTLINE AND AN ANALYSIS OF CORRUPTION IN ZAIRE

5.1. Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to present a concise chronological description, analysis and exposition of some characteristics of corruption as it developed in Zaire. Specific attention will be given to the era of the "Second Republic" (known as the maturing stage of corruption in Zaire). Facts relative to corrupt and kleptocratic practices will be provided in order to establish - in the subsequent chapter (chapter 6) - how this state of affairs negatively affects the government's ability to promote development, democracy and human dignity in Zairean society.

As has been said, only a limited number of sources have been consulted with regard to the chronological outline of corruption in the colonial era as a result of the great difficulties inherent in liaising with libraries in Zaire, especially in the context of the turmoil and unrest in the country. Consequently the author has been forced to rely heavily on Askin and Collins (1993) throughout the subsequent section.

5.2. Forerunner stages

5.2.1. The Colonial era

The colonial era was characterized by a massive foreign presence, the dominant position of foreigners in the country as well as the systematic exploitation of local resources, both human and natural, by these foreigners (Gould, 1980:10). It can be argued that there are two distinct sequences that emerge as far as the evolution of this colonial history is concerned, namely "the Congo Free State" and "the Belgian Congo" periods.

5.2.1.1. The Congo Free State

Born at the Berlin Conference in 1885, the Congo Free State lasted until 1908. It was created by King Leopold II of the Belgians as his personal property. Thus, Askin & Collins (1993:73) have this to say:

"Leopold II, not Mobutu, was the first ruler to use profits from exports of this land's vast natural resources to build a personal fortune and finance investments elsewhere."

This period was characterised by savage exploitation, based on mercantilism, with no attempt to better the country's economic and social potential except through the communications infrastructure which was developed only because

roads and riverways were essential for this exploitation. Ilunga (1973:197) portrays this period as a very rough and primitive colonial system in which the political market could almost be reduced to the economic market, the Free State being directly involved in the exploitation of raw materials, especially ivory and red rubber. It is important to emphasize that this exploitative enterprise was carried out for the virtually exclusive profit of King Leopold II.

The secrets of Leopold's system were first unravelled by a shipping clerk turned muck-raking journalist, Edmund Morel (Askin & Collins, 1993:73). The Congo, as he discovered (and others later confirmed) was the only European colony to run at a profit almost from its inception. Millions of Congolese were murdered or died from disease and overwork under the murderous forced labour regime which Leopold used to extract rubber, ivory and other precious commodities. Leopold, anticipating Mobutu by a century, used an intricate system of double book-keeping and false trade statistics to conceal the profits from his vast private domain (Askin & Collins, 1993). Moreover, Leopold's public accounting of trade transactions was designed to facilitate tax evasion and, therefore, consistently under-counted the profits. For example, in the 15 year period examined by Morel, the King - who publicly claimed a cumulative loss of US\$5 million on his Congo enterprises - actually earned US\$ 25 million in profits. Leopold's friends and allies shared the profits through "concession" companies which received virtually unlimited rights over vast tracts of Congo land. One such company earned USA\$ 3.6 million in six years on an initial investment of less than US\$ 50,000; others enjoyed a return on investment as high as 50-100% annually (Askin & Collins, 1993:73).

It should be mentioned also that the King spent US\$6 million upgrading his palace at Laeken; at least US\$3.5 million on other Belgian real estate; millions more for Belgian and French properties purchased secretly through his doctor or his architects; and uncounted additional sums for a dazzling array of investments in Asia, Latin America and the Near East (Askin & Collins, 1993:73-74). He made the Congo, one of the World's first "off shore" money laundering centres. He used the Congo-incorporated shell companies to quietly pursue business opportunities around the World: railway construction deals in China; fishing rights off Morocco; mines in Greece and the Philippines; and rubber concessions in Bolivia (Askin & Collins, 1993:73-74). It is quite interesting to note that, as Mobutu was to do decades later, Leopold poured his African earnings into foreign investments and real estate, including a French Riviera estate at Cap Ferrat, barely ten miles from the modern dictator (Mobutu)'s favourite estates (Askin & Collins, 1993:73).

Bearing this in mind, economic historians like Minter (1986:30) have adequately described Leopold's Congo economic system as a **Raubwirtschaft** or robbery economy.

Ultimately, the violence Leopold used to extract his wealth, provoked one of the first international human rights crusades, which finally persuaded the Belgian Parliament to take the colony out of Leopold's control in 1908 (Askin & Collins, 1993:74), so that it became **the Belgian Congo**.

5.2.1.2. The Belgian Congo

The second phase in the penetration of the capitalist mode of production into colonial Zaire began in 1908 with the advent of the **Belgian Congo**. This period was characterized by a so-called "holy" alliance, commonly called the "colonial trinity", a term which suggests the community of interests and complementarity of action among the **administration**, the **Catholic Church** and **capital**.

In this situation, everything was organized to guarantee that the necessary primitive accumulation of capital would take place. Being party to the "colonial trinity", the colonial bureaucracy played an important role in acquiring the ability to impose its political power capable of enduring the maintenance of a legal system and a repressive apparatus guaranteeing the functioning of primitive accumulation of the profit of the metropole (Gould, 1980:17).

Gould (1980:17) contends that one of the most notable patterns of corruption during the colonial period was that of non-civil servants corrupted by the civil service, for instance the creation of a class of Blacks, bourgeois "évolués", and the policy of co-opting customary chiefs and making them intermediaries promoting Belgian interests to the masses. In this respect, the colony used the customary chief as an intermediary, giving him in return recognition and protection. Instead of serving his people - as recommended by traditional African-Bantu normative values on good chieftainship/government, the traditional chief, co-opted now as part of Belgian colonial authority, had to sell out his people by lending his legitimacy to colonial plans to exploit the people all the more (Gould, 1980:18).

All this was to open the door to the misuse of authority, undue influence and corruption.

5.2.1.3. Conclusion

During the colonial period, mostly in the King Leopold II's Free State-era and later in "the Colonial Trinity's era", it goes without saying that there was a degree of corruption, which can be described as the birth of bureaucratic corruption in Zairean history as well as the roots of modern kleptocratic practices in the country.

King Leopold II's era was characterised by a selfish, "personal" and unaccountable rule as well as a kind of "kleptocracy", government by theft (robbery) whereby the monarch used profits from exports of the Congo's vast natural resources to build a personal fortune and finance investments elsewhere. Kleptocratic practices were characterised by savage exploitation or rather an exploitative enterprise which was carried out for the virtually exclusive profit of Leopold II. The era of Leopold II's economic system has been regarded as the "robbery economy".

Corruption in the Belgian Congo or "the Colonial Trinity's" era was a new phenomenon, unlike anything previously known in Zaire (Congo). It was corruption with a crude capitalist essence. There was also a form of corruption of the bureaucratic type which exposed civil servants to corruption by owners of capital and involved the corruption of non-civil servants (like the black-bourgeois and the customary chiefs/traditional chiefs) by colonial civil servants. It may be said that this type of corruption was not always one in which money played a dominant role. Its birth and growth, however, were facilitated by the injection of the money economy. Corruption, in the era of the Belgian Congo was not systemic. Bureaucratic corruption was present because it was inherent in the system, although its role at the time was marginal. Thus, the basis was laid for bureaucratic corruption to come into its own and to play a more significant role in subsequent periods.

5.2.2. The First Republic (1960-65)

Being regarded as the period of the "development of corruption", the 1960-65 period constitutes a special conjecture in Zairean political history (Gould, 1980:20-23). The following lines will examine this state of affairs.

From June 30, 1960 to November 24, 1965, there were six governments in the Congo (the former name of Zaire). The government of the prime minister, Emery-Patrice Lumumba, lasted barely two months. It was followed by the "Collège des Commissaires Généraux", the Ileo government, the Adoula's (lasting from 1961 to 1964), the Tshombe's, and finally the abortive Kimba government. At the same time there were various parallel governments like Gizenga's government in Stanleyville (the present city of Kisangani), Tshombe's secessionist government in Katanga from 1960-1963, and Kalonji's secessionist government in South Kasai (1960-1961). In addition, numerous insurrectional movements were active in the same period, as well as countless instances of ethnic strife. In all these events, tens of thousands of lives were lost, homes were destroyed, and families were uprooted. For certain, "Congo chaos was a tragic reality." (Gould, 1980:23.)

From the point of view of corruption, it can be argued that among the kinds of corruption - almost too numerous to mention - in **First Republic of Zaire** were the practically routine cases of votes bought and sold in Parliament and electoral fraud. But the most significant and best organized forms of corruption were developed in the Department of Finance and in the Central Bank regarding fraudulent grants of import licenses; in the Department of Justice and Territorial Administration with respect to indemnities for victims of civil strife; and in the Civil Service Department for any operation involving hiring, firing, and being placed on the payroll. All such governmental services were subjected to corruption as a matter of course (Gould, 1980:30).

In these circumstances, the public administration and the army were transformed into privileged places for struggle between political tendencies and interest groups. The generally hyper-politicized and desolate climate favoured the development of corruption. From its embryonic form under the "Colonial Trinity-

era", corruption soon took on an important role in all aspects of public life (Gould, 1980:29).

Therefore, every group participating in transactions in which corruption was involved, had good reason to promote corruption, to maintain it, and even to develop it. Gould (1980:29) identifies two major kinds of corruption that were developed by and through the state apparatus and were helped along by its relative disorder and disorganization, viz. the purchase of political loyalties, in a word, clientelism; and the transformation of small, disunited groups of bureaucratic and business elites into a true capitalist bourgeoisie.

Ultimately, it should be noted that of all the concepts generally used to describe Zairean political institutions during the first five years after independence, the most enduring, significant, and operational is "patrimonialism" (Gould, 1980:23), a term first used by Max Weber and applied to Zaire by Jean-Claude Williams. The term refers, first of all, to the fact that governmental offices originate in the household administration of the ruler. It also refers to a system of rule in which the appropriation of political office is the elite's major source of prestige and reward. In this context, the standard operating procedure called for any head of an administrative agency or body to manage it virtually as if it were his own property, to use the agency to expand his political influence, enlarge his ethnic clientèle, buy and sell services, provide or obtain favors, get rich, and consolidate his class position.

All these elements were validated in the case of the Congo (own emphasis) (Gould, 1980:28).

5.2.2.1. Conclusion

The 1960-65 period was an important one from the point of view of corruption. The following characteristics of corruption could be found during this period:

- parliamentary and electoral fraud (buying of votes);
- bureaucratic and administrative corruption in the Department of finance and in the Central Bank, in the Department of Justice and Territorial Administration and in the Department of the Civil Service respectively (fraud involving grants regarding import licenses, fraud regarding indemnities, fraud and favouritism regarding operations involving hiring and firing, etcetera);
- a kind of clientelism was present (the purchase of political loyalties);
- patrimonialism (the appropriation/ privatization of political office by the ruler and/or the elite) prevailed. In this context, any head of an administrative agency or body managed public office as if it were his own property. This state of affairs brought about ethnic clientelism, unaccountable ways of running public services, favouritism, self-enrichment and affluence and the consolidation of one's class position; and

- all governmental services were subjected to corruption, and that corruption took on an important role in all aspects of public life.

From the foregoing, it can be argued that the First Republican period (1960-1965) served as a prolongation of the colonial period, and as a precursor to the vast dimensions which corruption was to take on under what can be described as the "New regime-Zaire", Mobutu's Zaire.

5.3. The Second Republican period (1965-90s): The maturing stage of corruption

Known as the **New Regime** or rather **Mobutu's Regime**, the Second Republican period covers the interval from the 24 November 1965 coup d'état to the unprecedented events of 17 May 1997 when the Army of Laurent Désiré Kabila's Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo marched on Kinshasa and took over. Although the so-called "liberalization" and "multi-partism" processes (that have been taking place in the country since 24 April 1990) seem to be regarded by many as the Third Republican period or the Mobutu democratization-era, yet, in the author's opinion, this was nothing but a "façade-democracy" (Finer, 1970:441).

From the perspective of corruption, it can be argued that the Second Republic-Zaire has reached the point where authors such as Caiden & Caiden, and Makolo couldn't find a better illustration of their afore-mentioned definitions relating to the concept of systemic corruption. Many other sources like to associate this period with what can be termed **institutionalised, officially sanctioned corruption** (Fritscher, 1993; Anon, 1993c; Anon, 1994)..

It is the period where new forms of behaviour, new rules of the game emerged, involving a dramatic decline in public ethics; the innovative, new techniques involved institutionalised, systemic corruption (Gould, 1980:35).

According to Gould (1980:36), the existence, tolerance and encouragement of systemic corruption are not mere functional appendages; they are built into the structure and have come to constitute the sine qua non of the Zairean bourgeoisie and their system. In this context, the chain of tolerance of corruption is such that everybody is corrupt and corrupting (Fritscher, 1993; Anon, 1993c); and potentially honest individuals are caged, willy-nilly, into a bureaucratic system which one knowledgeable observer has characterized as institutionalizing "hydra-headed dishonesty" (Gould, 1980:xiv). In a similar vein, the 2 May 1980 Pope John Paul II homily in Kinshasa (reflecting the September 1978 Zaire Catholic Bishops statement) states:

"The malady of Zaire reveals a profound crisis, leading to a situation in which the individual has no choice left but to seek a solution in active corruption in order to defend his rights." (as quoted by Gould, 1980:xiv.)

Jackson and Rosberg (1982:178; 1986:268) suggest that corruption in Zaire has been termed a "structural fact"; it is part of the very constitution of the state, and to change it would entail changing the present makeup of the State and the way in which power is exercised and devolved.

Observers have virtually had to invent new phrases to describe corruption in Second Republic-Zaire. Zaire, in this respect, has been referred to in the press and in scholarly journals alike as "an extortionist culture" in which bribery is practised among diverse strata of society and often assumes the form of "economic mugging" (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982:179; 1986:268). Frédéric Fritscher of Le Monde (a Paris based newspaper) reporting from Kinshasa, on 21 July 1993 said that corruption has become institutionalized and maintained everywhere. In these circumstances, soldiers and policemen and generally all those possessing weapons have turned to milking the capital's residents, and the uniform and the Kalashnikov have replaced the cheque book (Fritscher, 1993).

With regard to the misuse of public funds and national assets (kleptocratic practices), it has been estimated that as much as 60 per cent of the annual national budget has been misappropriated by the governing elite, that is the corrupt group in power (Blumenthal, 1983:12; De Staercke, 1991:4-7), and this is perhaps not surprising in a country where the precise dividing line between private and public sectors (or between the public treasury and the ruling oligarchy's personal assets) has never been very clearly drawn (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982:178; see also Anon, 1994 The Citizen 14 March 1994; Askin & Collins, 1993:78; Blumenthal, 1983:12). For example, the Presidency or President Mobutu's bureau makes no distinction between state expenditure and personal expenditure and control of the financial transactions of the Presidency is virtually impossible (Blumenthal, 1983:12; Nguza, 1983:17). It can also be maintained that none of the managers of the IMF or the World Bank is ignorant of the fact that any attempt to control the Zairean national budget more strictly is blocked by a major obstacle: the Presidency or Mobutu's bureau (Blumenthal, 1983:12). The "Presidency" section in the national budget is the personal and exclusive "province" of Mobutu himself. The minister of Finance has absolutely no say in the matter (Nguza, 1983:17). It (the presidency section of the national budget) has several sub-divisions, where the various people responsible administer funds theoretically allocated to state expenditure. In actual fact, most of it is embezzled, going largely to pay off the security services and the so-called Division Spéciale Présidentielle (DSP) (Mobutu's special army division). There are a number of "Presidency" accounts in a variety of foreign banks (for example, the Belgolaise (Brussels) the Banque Belgo-Luxembourgeoise, the Banque Bruxelles-Lambert (Brussels) the Krediet-bank (Brussels), Parisbas bank (Paris), Parisbas bank (Geneva), Deutsche bank (Frankfurt), Midland bank (London), Credit Commercial de France, Bankers Trust Co. (New York) to name a few) - and only Mr. Mobutu can (could) draw on these accounts (Nguza, 1983:17; 1982:127; Blumenthal, 1983:14; see also De Staercke, 1991:6).

It is worth pointing out that the extravagance, rapaciousness and opulence of Mobutu and the ruling class of his dependents are exceptional. For instance, Mobutu himself is reputed to be one of the World's richest men with an enormous

personal fortune that has been accumulated by directing a large segment of the annual national budget into "presidency services", where funds not only are amassed for self-enrichment, but also are used for creating personal dependency among associates and clients. It is also alleged by Howard Hill (1993/94:193) that Mobutu, having a fondness for Swiss banks, and being in total control of Zaire's treasury, has amassed a US\$4 billion fortune. In this regard, Mobutu has built for himself and the Zairean elite that owes loyalty to him, a life of opulence and corruption, generated by an excessive desire to acquire as many material possessions as possible. These include palatial residences not only in France, Belgium, Switzerland, South Africa... but also in all Zairean provinces, including his palace at Gbadolite, his palatial yacht which cruises up and down the Zaire River, a magnificent building at N'sele, 64 Km from Kinshasa (Anon, 1993c; Nguza, 1982:128-130; Jackson & Rosberg, 1982:179). He frequently uses the national airline, "Air-Zaire" as a personal service. Not only is Mobutu the president of a country (Zaire), but he is also the Managing Director of the farming and food industry - as well as the mining industry - which generates abundant profits (Nguza, 1982:130).

It can be argued that the rapaciousness of the Zairean ruler is imitated, on a declining but nevertheless exceptional scale, down the civil and military hierarchy of the Zairean autocrat. Among the rapacious are soldiers, who are reported to enjoy a virtual **license to steal** (own emphasis) (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982:179; see also Fritscher, 1993).

Moreover, striking illustrations and tangible facts relating to the architects, beneficiaries and allies of modern kleptocracy in Zaire can be obtained as one glances at the recent and useful study by Askin & Collins (1993:72-85), "External Collusion with kleptocracy: can Zaire recapture its stolen wealth ?".

The authors start by arguing that on seizing power in 1965, the then general Joseph Désiré Mobutu (known as **Marshall Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Waza Banga**) eloquently explained the tragic circumstances which necessitated radical change. He accurately pointed out that the Congo, Zaire, which should be among the richest countries in the world, suffered rising malnutrition, deepening poverty and everworsening bouts of untreated disease (Askin & Collins, 1993:74). In his 12 December 1965 speech, Mobutu decried the mismanagement by government functionaries who served only the "people and companies who pay them bribes". He promised he would live simply on his soldier's salary and lead the army in restoring "stability and legality and, within five years, return power to a democratically elected civilian government." (as quoted by Young & Turner, 1985:242-243.)

Alas! Mobutu himself was already the epitome of the abuses he denounced. Already by 1962, according to a UN audit, Mobutu had diverted enough money from foreign military aid programmes to make himself a millionaire (Askin & Collins, 1993:74).

To Askin & Collins (1993:75), the system Mobutu has constructed is partly a throwback to the Leopold era of rapacious extraction, and partly a product of his

shrewd utilisation of new self-enrichment opportunities created by modern political and economic conditions. They try to identify five pillars upon which Mobutu's self-enrichment system rests, namely direct bribes from foreign governments and security agencies; payments and takings from foreign investors; diversions from the Zairean government budget; embezzlement of export earnings; and diversions of foreign aid and foreign loans (Askin & Collins, 1993:75-80).

1. Direct foreign government bribes

Foreign bribes were Mobutu's first route to riches. Former US National Security Council official, Roger Morris, has estimated that Mobutu received close to US\$150 million from the US in the first decade or so of his rule. While John Stockwell, a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) official who served in Zaire in the 1960s and coordinated the Agency's Zaire-based covert war against neighbouring Angola in the 1970s, reported that the Agency repeatedly made multi-million dollar payments to fund specific Zaire-based military ventures, only to discover that Mobutu pocketed it (the money) immediately (Askin & Collins, 1993:75). Nguza (1983:18), Mobutu's former premier, confirmed that Mobutu offered a large number of diamonds to foreign individuals, especially to Madame Giscard d'Estaing, Emperor Bokassa, Bongo and a number of wives of heads of state who visited Zaire. Even the former Director of President Mobutu's Office, Mr. Bisengimana and one of the directors of MIBA (Mines De Bakwanga) also confirm that they were required to furnish caskets of diamonds to Mobutu and his associates (Nguza, 1983:18; see also Dungia, 1992:60-61). Other reports have documented flows of hundreds of millions of dollars in government contracts to businesses controlled by the family of the then French president, Giscard D'Estaing and to politically influential Americans. Among these reports is one taken from Erwin Blumenthal (1982; 1983:11-14), an International Monetary Fund expert, who monitored Zairean Central Bank transactions for the IMF in the late 1970s. In addition, it is alleged that in the United States in recent years, Mobutu has granted multi-million dollar contracts to American businesses whose owners have lobbied on his behalf in Washington (Askin & Collins, 1993:76).

2. Dealings with foreign investors

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Mobutu used the seizure of foreign-owned businesses and fixed assets to speedily build his own personal wealth, and to create a "loyal" Zairean economic elite. His various cycles of nationalization policies (for example "Zairianisation" and "radicalisation"), in reality, merely served to reallocate wealth to Mobutu and his clients. For example, much of Zaire's indigenous business elite, including the man reputed to be the nation's wealthiest entrepreneur, Bemba Saolona, as well as Mr. Litho, Mobutu's uncle, got their start from Zaireanized properties obtained through Mobutu's patronage (Askin & Collins, 1993:76-77; Blumenthal, 1983:14; De Staercke, 1992:6-7).

In the 1970s and 1980s, Mobutu used his political power to obtain shares in the Zairean branches of giant multinational corporations like ITT-BELL, FIAT, GOLF, PAN-AM, RENAULT, PEUGEOT, VOLKSWAGEN and many others (Young &

Turner, 1985:179). The Commission on Misacquired Wealth of the Zairean National Conference in 1992 (hereafter referred to as "Commission des Biens Mal Acquis") was of the opinion that Mobutu pocketed US\$ 50 million in commissions paid by a mysterious German firm known as OTRAG during two years in which it leased effective sovereignty over 46,000 square meters of Zaire's Shaba/Katanga province, for a missile testing scheme (Commission des Biens Mal Acquis, 1992:74-76; see also Askin & Collins, 1993:77). In addition, the most famous case of Mobutu-corporate collaboration, involved Zaire's biggest infrastructural project, the 1760 Km Inga-Shaba power line. This "white-elephant", "uselessly expensive" project, as it was termed by the Commission, did nothing for Zaire except to add at least US\$ 1 billion to the nation's foreign debt. The Commission indicated that evidence suggests that Mobutu may have pocketed 7% of the project's value in secret kickbacks and commissions, but the Commission was unable to complete its investigations due to official resistance (Commission des Biens Mal Acquis, 1992:77-78).

3. Diversion of state funds

It can be argued that the Zairean state treasury itself has provided Mobutu with his most reliable and consistent source of funds. Confidential studies by the World Bank and the IMF contain a wealth of information on this subject. As a matter of conjecture, Mobutu's appropriation of state funds for personal use can be divided into three categories:

3.1. "Legal" use of state funds via "presidential" spending:

This category refers to Mobutu's presidential allowance, the annual "dotation présidentielle", a fund officially allocated for Mobutu's unrestricted use. Starting in the late 1960s, presidential appropriations officially consumed 15-20% of the government's operating budget and 30-50% of its capital budget. But the "dotation présidentielle" is only one among many direct state payments to funds personally controlled by the President (Askin & Collins, 1993:77-78).

3.2. Illegal spending:

Askin & Collins (1993:78) refer to confidential World Bank reports that reveal and allege that Mobutu has routinely ignored official budgetary appropriations, and consistently overspent his already generous presidential budget. In the late 1970s, Blumenthal (1983:12) found that "control of financial transactions of the Presidency is virtually impossible, largely because the President's bureau makes no distinction between state expenditure and personal expenditure." This was indicated earlier. In 1986, for example, the Presidency and related institutions drew US\$ 172 million from the treasury, three times their official appropriation (Askin & Collins, 1993:78).

3.3. Mystery spending:

Hundreds of millions of dollars have disappeared annually from the state treasury without even an indication of how, when or why the funds were taken and/or spent. A 1989 World Bank study showed that 18% of the year's state expenditure was spent for unexplained other goods and services; while in 1986, these unexplained outlays absorbed US\$269 million. In Zairean state financial records, much of this money appears to have been spent on luxury purchases or superfluous military hardware (Askin & Collins, 1993:78; see also De Staercke, 1991:6-7).

4. Stolen mineral export earnings

Embezzlement of export proceeds may be regarded as the most lucrative "pillar" of Mobutu's system, and the state mineral marketing apparatus has been a "paragon of corruption" since its founding in 1974 - according to a well-researched study by the state mining company, Gécamines (Askin & Collins, 1993:78-79).

Over the past few years, repeated studies by the World Bank and other international institutions have revealed diversions of US\$150 million to US\$400 million a year from the nation's copper and cobalt revenues, representing up to 30% of annual exports (Askin & Collins, 1993; see also Nguza, 1983:18). In addition, Mobutu-linked diamond smuggling replaced the diversion of copper and cobalt proceeds as Mobutu's main source of foreign earnings (see also De Staercke, 1991:4-7). In 1992 alone, diamond smuggling operations with ties to Mobutu or his associates may have netted as much as US\$300 million (Askin & Collins, 1993:79).

5. Foreign aid and foreign loans

Western governments and multi-lateral institutions have known at least since the mid-1970s that money lent to the Mobutu regime was likely to disappear without explanation. In some cases, proceeds on loans were directly stolen, in others, they were squandered on projects which enriched no one except Mobutu or a few politically favoured foreign investors (Askin & Collins, 1993:78-79).

In 1991/1992, Zaire's accumulated foreign debt totalled US\$10.7 billion (Hill, 1993/94:192; Askin & Collins, 1993:79). Foreign lenders have known for 20 years that there was no rational reason to expect repayment of loans to the Mobutu government. After spending a year inside the Zairean Central Bank in the late 1970s, Erwin Blumenthal of the IMF definitively warned international lenders that they could never expect repayment of funds lent to Mobutu's Zaire. He concluded that the corruptive system in Zaire, with all its manifestations, will destroy all endeavours towards the recovery and rehabilitation of Zaire's economy (Blumenthal, 1983:14; see also Askin & Collins, 1993:79).

It is also reported that, in 1988, African Development Bank officials with close links to Mobutu - despite warnings from technical experts that this loan was susceptible to embezzlement or diversion - pushed through a US\$100 million ADB petroleum import support loan. Finally, according to a finding of Zaire's Commission des Biens Mal Acquis, a son-in-law of Mobutu embezzled US\$10 million from the loan proceeds (Commission des Biens Mal Acquis, 1992; Askin & Collins, 1993:80).

It should be noted that, even though he was the one who fostered and promoted these illegalities and malpractices, and was the leading architect of kleptocratic practices and systemic corruption in Zaire, it was not unusual to see Mobutu himself making declarations in this regard, from the beginning of his rule.

In December 1965, in his first major speech following the coup, Mobutu declared that:

"Before such examples - of politicians stuffing their pockets - the public administration, national as well as provincial, has given in to inertia, ineffectiveness, and still more serious, to corruption. At every level, many of those who in our country had a bit of public power let themselves be corrupted. Their professional activity no longer was inspired by national or provincial interest, but uniquely by their own interest." (Young & Turner, 1985:242-243.)

Again, Mobutu declared in November 1997 in his "Mal Zaïrois" speech:

"Everything is for sale; government services are subject to an "invisible tax". Such services may not be distributed to the first comer with sufficient funds; nepotism is an interactive factor. Affinities of family, ethnicity, or region may supplement or replace monetary payments to induce the grant of a government favour." (Young & Turner, 1985:245.)

According to Young & Turner (1985:400), the decline and decay of the Zairean political system is attributed, inter alia, to what can be described as **the systematization of corruption** (own emphasis). From the petty venality entailed in survival among the lower echelons to kleptocracy at the summit, corruption is presumed in transactions with the state - enrolling a child in school, visiting a public clinic, passing a police roadblock and so forth (Young & Turner, 1985:245).

In this vein, a number of examples may illustrate the extent and range of the penetration of corruption into the Zairean polity, mostly the administrative and governmental systems. But for the sake of conciseness, this study will limit itself to enumerating a number of illegalities in two categories in the governmental and bureaucratic functioning, namely **corruption in the routine course of government**, and **corruption in the exercise of government programs**. More details in this regard can be obtained from the useful and authoritative study done by David Gould (1980:124-149), who has been referred to as "a patient observer of corruption in Zaire." (Young & Turner, 1985:245.)

1. Corruption in the routine course of government

This category includes:

- "Trafic de correspondance":
Bribes paid to have compromising documents removed from files.
- "Trafic de sceaux et de papier-en-tête":
Fraudulent use of official stationery.
- "Trafic d'audience":
Payment for office visits.
- "Trafic de recommandations":
Payment for letters of recommendation.
- "Trafic d'embauche" (et mise en place):
Kickbacks for hiring and false/wrong ways of employment.
- "Opération-Survie":
Permanent kickbacks (no-fault bribes).
- "Trafic d'ordre de mission":
Phony travel documents and travel-related peccadilloes.
- "Détournement d'avantage sociaux":
Misuse of official housing.
- "Le cumul":
Two salaries.
- "La mécanisation et le reliquat":
Payroll fraud, a struggle to get appointed to an official position in Zaire through the computerized payroll list, an engine of diversion of public funds.
- "Le détournement":
Embezzlement.

2. Corruption in the exercise of substantive government programs:

This category includes:

- "Fausse factures":
False bills.

- "Fraude fiscale":
Income tax fraud.
- "Dépassement de la marge bénéficiaire":
Excise tax fraud.
- "Fraude dans l'importation":
• Import tax fraud.
- "Attribution des quotas":
• Business quotas fraud.
- "Fraude dans l'exportation":
• Export tax fraud.
- "Trafic des timbres fiscaux":
• Tax stamp fraud.
- "Trafic à la justice":
• Court tampering.
- "Trafic des timbres et de services postaux":
• Postal fraud.
- "Les barrages militaires":
Military and police shakedowns.

In this context of rampant and widespread corruption, it is no wonder that justice declined. It is with this in mind that Tshilemalema (1986:126) writes:

"Zaire is a country where obtaining justice has become a matter of luck. Very often criminals go free whereas innocent people are incarcerated or forced to pay fines for crimes that they have not committed. The popular slogan: 'Okofunda ngai wapi?', meaning where will you try me? is not an exaggeration but a faithful expression of a fact of life: the absence of justice."

This is admittedly a *contradictio in terminis* in a country whose motto claims: Justice, Paix et Travail (Justice, Peace and Labour).

Schatzberg (1988:112) corroborates the foregoing assertion in this way: "From time to time one would also hear muted complaints from merchants concerning corruption at the *parquet* (office of the Attorney General /Public Prosecutor): Zairean justice is a function of the material capacity of the person before the court, and judgments are rendered not on the ultimate conviction formed from the objective elements of a dossier, but uniquely on the basis of the conclusions of the party who offers the most."

Nguza, a former premier and Foreign Affairs minister under Mobutu's regime had enough courage to make the following statement:

"The judicial apparatus is quasi inexistent. It is Mobutu who makes the law; he cynically organizes trials and decides in advance the sentences to pronounce defendants. Judges are coerced into forgetting national and international law to conform scrupulously, on pain of severe sanctions, to the directives of Mobutu and his single party, the MPR (Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution). Corruption in this sector has reached its height." (as quoted by Schatzberg, 1988:99.)

Even disregarding the judicial sector, Gould (1980:72) is of the opinion that, if one assumes that two-thirds of all Zairean civil servants are fictitious, and if one makes the further assumption that they are equally spread over all employment categories, then one can appreciate **how systemic and institutionalized the practice is** (own emphasis) and how much of a drain on the budget this particular kind of corruption represents. For example, if one considers that the overall budgetary deficit for the government of Zaire was Zaires 316.2 million in 1975 and Zaires 573 million in 1978, it is apparent that nearly half of the deficit may be accounted for by payments to fictitious employees alone (Gould, 1980:72).

In addition, it may be realized that, when considering some of the Zairean modern kleptocratic pillars previously examined, the range of corruption in Zaire can be identified on an international scale. It is quite interesting to note in accord with Kapstein (1980:10) that South Africa is a major contributor to Zaire's status quo, and also that South Africa cooperates in Zaire's corruption. Much of Zaire's sales of illegal commodities are handled outside normal commercial channels and leave the country on South African chartered aircraft (Kapstein, 1980:10; see also Nguza, 1983:18). Moreover, when looking at the suburbs of Johannesburg (including Braamfontein, Sandton, Wendy-Wood, Gallo Manor, Randburg, Rosebank, Midrand and Parktown to name of few) and those of Cape Town, one is amazed by the presence of ostentatious real estate and other properties bought and owned by architects of the Zairean modern kleptocracy. Alas, among them is Gabriel Kyungu (deposed governor of the Katanga/Shaba province). This leader and advocate of self-determination and socio-economic prosperity in the province stood for the well-being of all the natives of Katanga. He was involved in illegal and hidden deals of Zairean cobalt (produced in Katanga) involving South Africa. He also owns a magnificent house in the Randburg area as a result of that.

But it must be put clear that South Africa is not the only country to become embroiled in Zaire's corruption (Kapstein, 1980:10). It is of course one among many including France, Belgium, Switzerland, the USA and others.

5.3.1. Conclusion and characterization of corruption in the Second Republic- Zaire

From all these factors and indicators, it may be deduced that in the so-called "New Regime Zaire", corruption has become a system. It is a system by which the powerful exploit the less powerful, who in turn exploit the powerless. Corruption in this situation has become rampant and widespread, affecting all segments of society. It is a system which has become a central element of the Zairean condition; a situation that can be described as "institutionalizing hydra-headed dishonesty". Almost all characteristics of corruption are **common currency** and prevail in this system, including bureaucratic corruption, nepotism, patrimonialism, all kinds of fraud and bribery, plunder of public funds and assets by the corrupt group in power and authority, ethnic clientelism, embezzlement, kleptocratic practices, justification, promotion and legalization of wrong-doing, irregularities and malpractices and so forth.

It is a system in which everybody is corrupt and corrupting, and whose leading architect remains Mobutu and his domestic clients and associates as well as his external sponsors. This state of affairs entails the accumulation of national wealth at one pole (Mobutu's), and the utilisation and management of public funds and national assets in an unaccountable manner (with no distinction between official and personal expenses) that promotes Mobutu and his associates and clients' self-enrichment to the detriment of the public welfare.

In this regard, it can be argued that Mobutu's takeover paved the way for the construction of a structured system of plunder: "a kleptocracy" or "government of and by theft" (Askin & Collins, 1993:73; Safire's New Political Dictionary, 1993).

5.4. Conclusion

To recapitulate, it follows that during the colonial period (the Congo Free State and Belgian Congo eras), there was a degree of corruption, and the roots of modern kleptocratic practices in Zaire can be traced back to this period.

King Leopold II's era was characterized by a selfish and unaccountable rule, a "kleptocracy", in which he used profits from exports of the Congo's vast natural resources to build a personal fortune and finance investments elsewhere. The Leopold II's economic system was termed "the robbery-economy".

Corruption in the Belgian Congo, i.e. in "the era of Colonial Trinity" was corruption with a capitalist essence. It was also a corruption of the bureaucratic type, exposing civil servants to corruption by owners of capital and involving the corruption of non-civil servants by colonial civil servants. Corruption in the Belgian Congo was not necessarily money-oriented, and it was not systemic.

The 1960-65 period was an important one from the point of view of corruption, and it served as prolongation of the colonial period, as well as a precursor to the vast dimensions which corruption took on under the "New-Regime Zaire".

In the so-called "New-Regime Zaire" or under Mobutu's rule, corruption has become a system in which the powerful exploit the less powerful, who in turn exploit the powerless. Corruption is rampant, endemic and widespread, affecting all segments of society. It has become a central element (of survival) in Zaire, which has been described as "institutionalizing hydra-headed dishonesty". Almost all characteristics of corruption prevail in the system. It is a system in which everybody is corrupt and corrupting (as a means to survival). It is also a system of plunder of public funds and assets whose leading architect is Mobutu together with his domestic clients and associates as well as his external sponsors. It is a system that has brought about the accumulation of national wealth at one pole (Mobutu's), and which has entailed the misuse of public funds and national assets by Mobutu and his associates for their own benefit and to the detriment of the public at large. In this regard, Mobutu's rule has constructed a structured system of plunder that can be termed a kleptocracy, meaning government of theft or robbery.

In terms of the main theme of this study, the next question is: what does this entail for governmental programmes which promote the achievement of socio-economic development, democracy and the restoration of human dignity in Zaire?

CHAPTER 6

ZAIRE: THE CONFLICTING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SYSTEMIC CORRUPTION AND THE TRILOGY OF OBJECTIVES - DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN DIGNITY

6.1. Introduction

It has been hypothesized from the outset that, in those developing countries' political systems that are characterised by the **institutionalization of corruption**, governmental efforts to achieve development, viable democratization and human dignity within the society are negatively affected. In chapter 3, the analysis has shown that the prevalence of corruption in the developing world is endemic and destructive to governmental functioning. It harms socio-economic progress toward obtaining a "better life" for all and it undermines transparency and accountability in the running of public affairs. In a word, it is linked with the impossibility of achieving development, democracy and human dignity.

Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to analyse and examine the particular case of Zaire against the background of the general theoretical framework which has established the negative impact and the dysfunctionality of corruption in the developing world indicating that, in Zaire, an incompatible, conflicting and negative relationship exists between "systemic corruption" on the one hand and development, democracy and human dignity on the other hand. This relationship makes the attainment of this trilogy of objectives impossible.

6.2. Systemic corruption versus Development

It is necessary to bear in mind the general theoretical framework relating to the detrimental and dysfunctional effects of corruption in the developing world and take into account that:

1. Corruption per se has been identified by many (including statesmen, politicians, scholars, development experts and international organisations) as an obstacle and hindrance to development (Soglo, 1994:18; Obasanjo, 1994:25; Museveni, 1994:65-68; Buyoya, 1994:85-88; Frisch, 1994:57-62; Soley, 1994:63-67).
2. Corruption, generally seen as both cause and consequence of underdevelopment and poverty (Frisch, 1994:60), is dialectically related to and finds itself in a vicious circle with underdevelopment and poverty (Frisch, 1994:60; Gould, 1980:7-8). It can be argued that development, understood as a multidimensional process (involving major changes and improvement in terms of social structures, national institutions, national economic growth, reduction of inequalities and the eradication of poverty and the promotion of human freedom, all of which imply a "full-life" approach to development) aimed at the improvement of the quality of life can hardly take place or be said to exist in the context of a developing

country like Zaire that is characterized by widespread institutionalized corruption in which political leaders, mostly the head of state and his associates (as has been analyzed and highlighted in the Second Republic-Zaire) as well as bureaucratic cadres have a licence to steal and divert the country's funds and resources for self-promotion and neglecting the fundamental needs of the general public.

It is important to note that various studies have shown that in a spiral of increasing corruption, such a society is unlikely to be an economically efficient or politically efficient one. Corruption, in general, is harmful to economic, political and organizational development (Klitgaard, 1988:42-46).

6.2.1. The negative and conflicting relationship between systemic corruption and development in Zaire

The relationship between institutionalized corruption and development in Zaire is now to be examined against the background of the above theoretical assumptions (see also chapter 3) as well as in the light of the views of authors and analysts of the Zairean political and administrative systems.

MacGaffey (1986:141-142) observes that in the current political situation in Zaire a clique of some 50 persons close to Mobutu, many of them his relatives, have virtually unlimited opportunities to accumulate wealth. Together with other top level administrative, political and military officials and advisors, they form what can be termed a "political aristocracy" which has pillaged the country's economy to line its own pockets. Consequently, this has drastically weakened the performance of the administration of the state. This weakness is evident in the shortage of state revenues which is attributable to the massive embezzlement of state funds; the inability to enforce regulations and border controls by corrupt officials and the ineffectiveness of state marketing boards. The weakness of the state is also evident in the inadequacy of government personnel, who frequently treat official positions as mere opportunities for personal enrichment in line with public office and public interest-centred definitions of corruption.

It cannot be stressed enough that the extraordinary fortunes accumulated by Mobutu and some of the inner ring of his collaborators (Mr. Ngbanda, Generals Baramoto, Nzimbi and others, Mr. Tshimbombo Mukuna, Mr. Bakali, Mr. Banza Mukalay, Mr. Seti Yale, the Lithos, Prof. Vundwawe, Mr. Munkamba, Mr. Tshongo, Mr. Mongbondo, etcetera) are internally notorious, and do not escape the notice of the average citizens (Young & Turner, 1985:400), bearing in mind that this kleptocratic device operates to the detriment of the betterment of the quality of life of the bulk of the Zairean population (Blumenthal, 1983:13; see also Nguza, 1982:134). Due to the prevalence of this kleptocratic behaviour and state bribery (abuse or misuse of public funds or property for purposes of creating control relationships and clientelism), it is no wonder that Zaire's long-standing economic crisis and the poverty of the population, despite the country's enormous natural wealth, still remain notorious (MacGaffey, 1992:243).

Nzongola, for example, flatly asserts that Zaire is a neo-colonial state - one that serves the interests of Mobutu, his class, and foreign corporations (Callaghy, 1984:55). According to the same author, Zaire is also a neo-colonial state whose ruling class, because of corruption and self-enrichment among its leadership, helps to block economic growth and development as well as the normal functioning of the state apparatus by depriving the state of those essential means and capabilities with which it may improve the living conditions of the population as a whole. As a result, despite its vast potential wealth, the Zairean state is unable to satisfy even the vital minimum needs of its people (Callaghy, 1984:56). Because of the prevalence of bribery and the diversion of public resources, as has been described in *Second Republic-Zaire*, Zaire's rulers (the corrupt group in power) continue to enrich themselves in the face of popular misery. There is virtually no improvement in the quality of life of ordinary men, women and children (Nzongola, 1986:3, 15; Kaseba, 1982:123-124). Wages are so low compared to prices that virtually no one is paid a living wage; the social infrastructure of schools and clinics has deteriorated to a degree where an entire generation has grown up with only the most rudimentary education and health care.

A corrupt, non-transparent, rapacious and ineffective administration has caused an appalling situation where the country is plagued by transport and communication difficulties: the country's once-extensive road network has largely returned to the bush. What remains is dwarfed by the sheer immensity of this vast country and the woefully inadequate infrastructure of communications and power is choking potential growth. In addition, it can be argued that corruption in terms of development and investment projects (white elephants) whose principal beneficiaries in Zaire are the contractor and the head of state or the minister in charge is a kind of corruption that really cripples Zaire's economy as it increases its huge foreign indebtedness. Many of these are of dubious use and function far below their full capacity. Examples include the Maluku Steel Mill, the Inga-Shaba power transmission line, the National Cement Company, the CCIZ office block in Kinshasa and the Limete Interchange routes in Kinshasa to name a few. This corrupt and ineffective administration has brought about scarcities of all kinds in the country, and in this type of system, little optimism seems possible; or to quote Biaya & Omasombo (1993:122), "such a situation means there is little hope of development in the short run."

It can also be maintained that the Zairean political aristocracy, because of its greedy and corrupt devices, manifests a weak sense of public purpose and collective or societal good; and it has demonstrated a notably feeble commitment to increasing the standard of living of the masses over whom it rules. In consequence, "development programs" usually get only what is left over after the political aristocracy has achieved its class projects, resulting in a general pauperization of the bulk of the state's subjects (Callaghy, 1984:188; see also Kaseba, 1982:123-124). In this vein, one former high state official, speaking of Mobutu, noted that when one is the head or the leader of a dictatorship like his, one has to allow some corruption inside and abroad to keep people loyal, and for that one needs money. He also pointed out that the big victim of this

institutionalized and sanctioned corruption remains, without a doubt, the Zairean people (Callaghy, 1984:190).

To paraphrase Gould (1980:xiii), massive unproductivity and the striking "privatization" of the state apparatus are among the most significant features of the Zairean public bureaucracy. It goes without saying that the ruling class in Zaire has effectively "privatized" the public bureaucracy and converted it into an instrument for self-enrichment (see previous discussion of the Second Republic-Zaire). In the context of such institutionalized corruption, the official ethic of the clique in control of the state and its bureaucracy is clearly expressed and conveyed by the watchword, *Yiba na mayele*, which means: steal cleverly. Alas, the leading architect of this perverted and depraved morality in Zaire can be nobody else but Marshal Mobutu himself. In his 20 May 1976 Kinshasa speech, not only did he admit that administrative corruption was the rule; he actually encouraged it in these words: "if you want to steal, steal a little cleverly, in a nice way. Only if you steal so much as to become rich overnight, will you be caught." (Gould, 1980:xii.)

This state of affairs gives weight to Young & Turner's (1985:400) argument, that "without any public morality - decency of public morality - in the exercise of state power, the state can hardly sustain the legitimacy necessary for routine functioning."

This situation has brought about what can be described as the **politics of nonconcern** in relation to public well-being and the rights of ordinary citizens, while the affluence and well-being of the ruling class has increased. This rapacious, covetous and corrupt official ethic of the clique in control of the state and its bureaucracy has permeated all segments and sectors of public policy. The consequences of this have been devastating in Zaire and have included: the abandonment of roads, bridges, schools and hospitals to deterioration due to the diversion of funds and embezzlement on the part of the respective ministers in charge or any top office-holders; the absence of any serious efforts to structure life in the squatter zones in which larger numbers of city dwellers live; the absence of any provision for the unemployed, the elderly and other dependents; the paralysis of the banking system (top officials are there to siphon thousands of millions of US dollars so as to built new havens abroad); deterioration of the informational and communication network; the degradation in living standards that affects even university professors in the country and diplomats abroad, who do not get paid more than a pittance.

In fact, the politics of tolerance with regard to corruption and the misuse of public goods, funds and services by the kleptocrats and their clients who form a political aristocracy in Zaire, has exacerbated poverty in Zaire by depriving and cutting off the ordinary people from socio-economic resources and rendering people incapable of meeting what can be seen as basic needs, and making life a daily struggle to them. It can also be stressed that very little money has ever been made available for empowerment of people by teaching them to help themselves, keeping in mind that development refers to people and their capacities. In these circumstances, very little remains in the state treasury for legitimate government

activity, and very little of that goes to human services (Askin & Collins, 1993:83; see also the section devoted to systemic corruption and kleptocratic practices under the Second Republic-Zaire). In this respect, it is no wonder that Zaire, in a World Bank (1992:238) survey, ranked last among developing nations in the percentage of its government budget allocated to education, health, housing and other social services. The price or rather the result of this type of corrupt and rapacious management of public affairs is that there is a big gap between the haves and the have-nots; the powerful exploit the powerless and the weak; poverty still keeps on growing; potentially the wealthiest Central-African country, having at its disposal a huge potential for development, ranks amongst the poorest countries on the planet (having US\$100 as the Annual Per Capita Income, that is lower than the estimated limit of poverty by the World Bank [US\$370 per capita income]) (Anon, 1995); and that bankruptcy is the most suitable word to describe the Zairean polity during the Mobutu's era mostly because of state bribery and widespread corruption that are **common currency** in Mobutu's Zaire.

6.2.2. Conclusion

From the foregoing analysis the following can be concluded and deduced:

The Zairean political system, characterized by widespread and established corruption, is unable to deliver services effectively and to achieve its programmatic goal to better the quality of human lives in Zaire. That is why, governmental programmatic actions like the so-called "Objectif 80", "Plan-Mobutu", "Septennat du Social", "Plan-Quinquennal" and many other programmes in the annals of Mobutu's Zaire have all been doomed.

As has been establish so far, because of the politics of plunder vis-à-vis public resources and funds fostered by the political aristocracy and its clients, Mobutu's Zaire provides incontestable evidence that the basic conditions for accomplishing national development are by no means being met.

Because of kleptocratic practices, the state bureaucracy incarnates nonproductivity and indeed counterproductivity. That is to say, the state in Zaire is bankrupt. Instead of attaining some measures of national independence, dependence and a huge foreign indebtedness (due to the accumulation of white elephants and useless "development" projects whose principal beneficiaries are not the people but the political aristocracy and its associates) are the watchwords. Instead of providing for the basic needs of the Zairean people, the state bureaucracy, because of an institutionalized type of corruption, has reduced potentially the richest country in Africa's heart to a condition of abject poverty and mendicity so extreme that mere survival has become the average citizen's daily struggle in the face of repression and scarcity.

As Marx (1936:709) states in his Capital:

"Accumulation of wealth at one pole is at the same time accumulation of misery, agony of toil, slavery, ignorance, brutality, mental degradation at the opposite pole." (own emphasis)

In fact, the situation in Zaire does not contradict the above statement. On the contrary, it denies corruption any possible contribution to development; hence the antithetical and negative relationship between the two is established. It also highlights corruption as being a path toward what can be termed "mass-impooverishment". It can also be admitted that bureaucratic corruption has become - to use Gould's words - the instrument par excellence of Zairean underdevelopment, valiantly performing the function of the stewardship of penury and it is apparent that systemic corruption is a most important operational device for Zairean underdevelopment.

Of course, in the light of the foregoing analysis as well as the facts given in the section dealing with kleptocratic practices in the Second Republic-Zaire, the Zairean state apparatus in its present form and functioning constitutes - to use Young and Turner's words - an exceedingly heavy burden upon society, a hindrance towards socio-economic development, and a major impediment to mass well-being as a result of an institutionalized corruption.

6.3. Systemic corruption versus Democracy

Democracy, as has been pointed out earlier, should be regarded not only as rule of the people by the people, but also and most importantly in Abraham Lincoln's famous formulation, as government for (own emphasis) the people, government in accordance with the people's preferences; government that promotes the welfare of the people, meaning the public at large (not the welfare of rulers, bureaucrats and cadres only) and which is fully transparent and genuinely accountable to the general public.

It should also be noted that the idea of (democratic) public accountability - along with transparency - is one of the attributes and norms pertaining to normative democratic theory and (democratic) good governance, which stresses not only that all rulers have to be accountable to the governed but also, and most importantly, government and administrative bodies must act in the best interest of their citizens and the public at large by being efficient and transparent. A government cannot claim to be democratic unless it is fully accountable to its people (the public) and conducts its business in a transparent fashion.

Corruption is an effective way of obliterating transparency because it thrives in non-transparency (see the five pillars upon which Mobutu's self-enrichment system rests [chapter 5, section 5.3.]), whilst accountability is anathema to corruption (Muthoga, 1994:96). It is for these reasons that corruption has been described as the enemy of democracy, affecting the exercise of it (democracy) in a number of ways. This is especially so in Mobutu's Zaire where the head of state and his "political aristocracy" (top level political, administrative and military officials and advisors) have a licence to steal and misappropriate public funds and assets at will; and have "privatized" the state apparatus as well as the public bureaucracy, reducing them into mere instruments for self-interest and self-enrichment. Hundreds of millions of US dollars have disappeared annually from the state treasury - into the pockets of Mobutu and his internal and external

associates - without even an indication of how, when or why the funds were taken and/ or spent. In this vein, Le Potentiel, a Kinshasa-based newspaper, contends that the fiscal escapism, tax evasion, under Mobutu is nothing but a headache for the Zairean state which loses three billion three hundred million US\$ annually (Bimb, 1997:5). It can also be argued that since the beginning of 1990s the Zairean national budget does not worth even the one tenth of funds embezzled by managing directors of a number of state corporations (Bimb, 1997:5).

The privatization of the state apparatus and the public bureaucracy by the Zairean Head of state and its "political aristocracy" has also jeopardized the rule of law (one of the attributes of democratic governance) in Zairean society. The judicial apparatus has also been "privatized" and is almost nonexistent. Mobutu, his so-called political aristocracy and his kinship are "above-the law" and constitute what can be described as "No Go Areas" vis-à-vis the law of the land (Zaire). Those top political, bureaucratic and military officials who siphon hundreds of million of dollars from the state treasury have nothing to fear (even the courts of law) as long as they are politically or biologically related to President Mobutu (see also De Staercke, 1991:4-7). They know that they can hardly be brought to book and that, after stealing, they can even get promoted. The rule of law is quasi nonexistent in the corrupt Zairean system where it is Mobutu who makes the law and judges and all other law enforcement agents are forced and coerced into forgetting or ignoring national and international law so as to conform scrupulously with the directives and whims of Mobutu, his kinship, his political clients, his military advisors, etcetera.

In these circumstances, there has always been political repression of the press and the opposition (political opposition). These have been silenced when denouncing, exposing and condemning malpractices and kleptocratic deeds on the part of Mobutu, his kin, his so-called "political aristocracy" and his external associates (multinational companies, international enterprises and some foreign individuals, like most of the Lebanese people involved in the smuggling of diamonds and other ores in the country with the complicity of a number of generals and top-ranking army officials and political office bearers like General Baramoto, General Nzimbi, General Bolozi, General Eluki, General Ilunga, Colonel Nyumbi, Mr. Ngbanda, prof. Vunduawe Te Pe Mako, Mr. Thsimbombo Mukuna, Mr. Banza Mukalayi and many others).

It can also be argued that corruption undermines the growth of a sound economic base which is the hallmark of a democratic democratic culture and, in its various forms, corruption results in the malfunctioning of the economic system which, in turn, results in such things as increased national debt, failed development projects and increased poverty of the people (see also Muthoga, 1994:96). Needless to say all these facts have been identified as far as the corrupt system of Mobutu's Zaire is concerned.

As has been highlighted in the case of Zaire, corruption is per se in a dialectical interaction with the phenomenon of underdevelopment or "mass-pauperization". In this regard, corruption is harmful to the promotion of the general public's well-

being which is one of the key-factors for the viability, sustenance and effectiveness of democratic rule and governance.

Speaking about the interaction that should be promoted between democracy and socio-economic development in the context of the developing world during the Cinquième Sommet de la Francophonie, held in Port-Louis, Mauritius (whose topic was Democracy, Human Rights and Development), President François Mitterrand of France made this observation:

"I see the progress of democracy;
I do not see that of development;
Whilst development is the key of
democracy." (Anon, 1993a:587.)

Having said that, it can be taken that Mitterrand implied that democracy has to be concerned with development or rather the promotion of the general welfare of the people, that is nothing but an improvement in the quality of life of human beings in such a way that every human being has his/her basic needs (food, clothing, shelter, health, education, etcetera) met adequately, his/her dignity and self-esteem respected, their freedom honoured, and their potentiality given full scope for realization (Kinoti, 1994:54-55; and others). In this vein, President Sam Nujoma (1996) of Namibia was of the same opinion when addressing the South African Parliament in May 1996:

"Democracy is meaningless in a context of poverty, hunger, dearth."

Pennock (1979:206-208), for example, thinks highly of a close relationship between socio-economic development and democracy, believing that an equilibrium between political and socio-economic indicators is one among many prerequisites or requisites conducive to the maintenance and establishment of a successfully functioning democracy. It can be argued that a political culture of corruption, which is rather systemic corruption in Zaire, constitutes a hindrance toward such a democracy.

In this respect, it should also be argued that a regime like the one in Mobutu's Zaire that claims to be democratic without bearing fruits in development (because of widespread established corruption) aiming at the well-being of all is unworthy to bear the label of "democratic". For it can hardly be accepted that a government which is not ruling in the best interests of the people holds democratic standards. This is stressed by the proverb, "the tree is known by its fruits" (*Petit Larousse Illustré*, 1986). What is a regime that causes a lengthy decline in the economic sector of the country and the living standard of its people through kleptocratic practices combined with institutionalized corruption as in Mobutu's Zaire ?

In its present form characterized by the accumulation of the country's wealth at one pole (that of Mobutu, his family circle and his clients and associates) which creates misery and degradation at the other pole, to borrow Karl Marx's words, the Zairean state incarnates the opposite of both democracy and development which, it cannot be stressed enough, are so intertwined. A so-called democracy,

which is unable to show a meaningful improvement in terms of socio-economic realities as is the case in Mobutu's Zaire not only can hardly claim to bear democratic standards, but simply needs to be much more concerned about its barrenness and to strive to look at the causes of this and bring about a remedy.

Corruption in its various forms harms democracy in many other ways. It (corruption) leads to political alienation and instability (Klitgaard, 1988:44-46); the 1990 crisis as well as the present crisis in Mobutu's Zaire just prove that (Biaya & Omasombo, 1993:122). It is because of the existence of unaccountable and non-transparent institutions like the government, the parliament and the judiciary being used or privatized by Mobutu and his political party, the *Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution* (M.P.R.) that Zaire has known more than seven governments since 24 April 1990, along with the parallel government of Etienne Thsisekedi, a noted opposition leader in Zaire. Since 1990, democratic elections have never taken place; those in government or authority (cabinet ministers, members of parliament, top political and administrative office-bearers, high ranking military officials, *etcetera*) fear the establishment of a transparent, accountable and democratic institutional order that can compromise their rapacious designs and practices. It can be argued that the legitimacy of Mobutu's regime is under attack. The MPR in principle, and its founding President in practice have appointed themselves the source of power and legitimacy (Kankwenda *et al.* 1993:96). In so doing they put their personal interest first, keeping in mind that whoever legitimizes himself by the same token negates the people as the source of power and legitimacy. This negation is the fundamental reason why there is no way the MPR's social programme could ever be an effort to create an economically prosperous, equitable and democratic society for the benefit of the people, all the people of Zaire (Kankwenda *et al.* 1993:96).

In this vein, it is worth recalling the thought of Joseph Ileo, a former premier, Christian Social and Democratic Party leader and late deputy-chairman of the so-called "Haut-Conseil de la République" (the transitional parliament in present day-Zaire, i.e. from 1991 to 17 May 1997), which were made public during his speech delivered on 30 April 1993:

"As long as the common good and the full development of every one and that of the whole person in the country are not at the heart of political actors' preoccupations and concerns, the crisis (I add, the crisis relating to the establishment of a democratic and institutional order and governance) is going to last and will take place in Zaire." (Anon, 1993b:460.)

It is needless to emphasize once more the interaction between corruption, democracy and development, and that institutionalized and sanctioned corruption is endemic and harmful to the other two.

6.3.1. Conclusion

From the foregoing analysis, it appears that democracy, going hand in hand with the norms and attributes pertaining to good governance (transparency, public accountability, the rule of law, the promotion of the people's interest and welfare

through accountable and legitimized institutions) and socio-economic development, can hardly be said to exist in the context of widespread institutionalized corruption as in Zaire where those in authority (the corrupt group in power) run the "business of the state" or rather "public affairs" not with public interest in mind, but rather with self-interest and self-enrichment in mind, stifling transparency in the management of public affairs, depriving the ordinary people and the public at large (that should constitute the base of power and legitimacy in a democratic governance) of socio-economic resources and the opportunity to better their lives, fostering the existence of non-transparent, corrupt, unaccountable and illegitimate institutions which in turn serve the rapacious interest of the few (the head of state and all the myriad of his clients and associates, both internally and externally) to the detriment of the vast majority of the population. This state of affairs has brought about political instability, lack of trust and loyalty in the people with regard to the public institutions (from April 1990 to 17 May 1997). The legitimacy and the credibility of Mobutu's regime are under attack and there is a total absence of what can be regarded as republican, institutional and democratic order and governance. The privatization of the state apparatus, the public bureaucracy, the judiciary, the parliament and all other public organs by Mobutu, his kin, his political, bureaucratic and military aristocracy and oligarchy jeopardizes and prevents the norm of the rule of law in this corrupt and unaccountable political system.

All this (though it is unusual to use new quotes in a conclusion like this one) gives weight to Rose-Ackerman's (1978:10) argument: "...the case of corruption often presupposes a strikingly undemocratic standard for government action."

6.4. Systemic corruption versus Human Dignity

It has been argued so far that both bureaucratic corruption and systemic corruption constitute the instrument *par excellence* and most important operational mechanism for Zaire's underdevelopment, poverty, dearth and all sorts of social and economic backwardness which, it cannot be stressed enough from the perspective of this study, constitute an affront to the promotion of human dignity.

In this connection, corruption has denied any possible and meaningful contribution to development. Development is so interlinked and intertwined with the notion of human dignity and is understood in this study as the "improvement or betterment in the quality of human life or humanity's well-being" (Kinoti, 1994:54-56; Kofi, 1993:100 and others) which goes hand in hand with the notion of "human dignity". Regardless of its various disciplinary connotations in scientific inquiry, "human dignity" has been conceived heretofore (by virtue of the interdependency and globalization of the present world economy and development standards) as a core value in the process of development and is to be understood as a sense or feeling of worthiness that a person or society (or a community) enjoys when its social, moral, judicial, political and economic systems and institutions promote conditions that are conducive to the due respect for and treatment of human life, the realization of human potential as well as the

improvement or betterment of the quality of "modern" human beings' life (as opposed to the life of other beings).

Corruption, in its various forms, is dysfunctional to society as a whole and constitutes a hindrance to development. Its effects on society as well as the life of ordinary people are devastating and dehumanizing (for example poverty, lack of resources, hunger and famine, dearth, mendicity, political savagery, unemployment, gross social injustice, refugees and illegal immigrants and underdevelopment, to name just a few). It is for this reason that corruption, in its systemic form, is likely to damage and/or to be an affront to human dignity and development.

The Zairean polity in its Mobutist incarnation (operating under a corrupt and rapacious leadership and administration) is the epitome of this state of affairs.

In fact, corruption in Mobutu's Zaire can be regarded as a direct route towards mass-impoverishment or mass-pauperization. It can also be argued that, to a large extent, dehumanizing conditions that are presently being experienced in Zaire can be attributed to, *inter alia*, the gross maladministration and misuse of public funds by those in authority who fail to conduct the business of the state in an honest, accountable and transparent fashion - at the expense of the prosperity of the country at large. The result is abject poverty, chronic diseases, gross social injustices and violations of human rights (working conditions are dehumanizing, workers are ill-treated and ill-paid while most of those managing directors of public enterprises like, *La Société Nationale d'Electricité (SNL)*, *Direction Nationale des Contributions*, *La Gécamines*, *La Regideso*, *La Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer du Zaïre*, *OFIDA*, *Office Nationale des Transports*, *Office Zaïrois de Control (OZAC)* - to name a few - siphon hundreds of thousand of US dollars into their own pockets), famine and food shortages, the impossibly low wages at all levels of the country's work-force, and despair in many facets of society, all of which constitute an affront to human dignity and development.

Askin & Collins (1993:72) put it straightforwardly, saying that for 28 (I add, for 32 years), Mobutu Sese Seko has carefully and thoughtfully refined his system for transforming the public resources of Zaire into private wealth, while using bribery, coercion and violence to thwart all movements for change. The consequences of his system, commonly known as "kleptocracy" or government by theft, are well known: immiseration of the people; destruction of the nation's infrastructure; enrichment of Mobutu and his collaborators, *etcetera*. In these circumstances, far from rebuilding the economy, Mobutu's willingness to sell the Zairean nation will plunge his land into a cycle of ever-worsening hunger, disease and malnutrition - instead of preparing his nation for a golden age of stability, legality and democracy for the benefit of all (Askin & Collins, 1993:74-75).

Ilunga (1984:13; see also Biaya & Omasombo, 1993:97-98) presents a more sceptical and despairing picture by saying this: "Hey, this is Zaire, no use trying to make sense of anything". One has to ask why? For years now, Ilunga argues, the ordinary people have lived in a "zone of death", their social life has been

reduced to nought, they been dominated by the cash nexus and its attendant constraints, and made weightless feathers in a political hurricane."

Writing about the degradation of the human and social conditions in Zaire as a result of widespread institutionalized corruption, Biaya and Omasombo (1993:97) remark that a cursory look at the people and their environment in Zaire makes it clear that most live under conditions of poverty so harsh as to drive them into seemingly absurd behaviour patterns. The survival hustle pushes people into adopting instant solutions for the alternative is social annihilation or actual death.

In this vein, the dehumanizing conditions affecting the people of Zaire owing to three decades of the plunder of public funds and assets for personal gain by those architects of the one party-state (MPR) (see also Anon, 1995) can be portrayed through a most popular jest concerning Zaire, which sums up the whole situation: One fine day all the data on Zaire's economy, politics, culture and history were fed into a computer. The computer processed the data and spat out the printout: "This country no longer exists". Reason: "continued survival impossible for its citizens." The anecdote captures popular attitudes that have been around for at least decades. It also confirms the findings of numerous socio-economic studies: Zairean society is in a state of free fall and collapse, and the ordinary people are devastated by abject poverty (Biaya & Omasombo, 1993:97).

Keeping this in mind, many surveys on Mobutu's Zaire and its social, economic and political realities almost always point to a dead end (Biaya & Omasombo, 1993:98). It can also be argued that today, life among the common people in Zaire has an anarchic flavour. As corruption and trickery are so routine and accepted by everyone as standard facts of life, the consequences are disastrous to society: the social system as a whole seems to work on informal lines, and life is lived like a game of chance (except that the dice are heavily loaded in favour of the ruling regime); wage-earners, the unemployed and peasants are at the bottom of the social pyramid and, in the last analysis, are the victims of the country's distorted economy and the pervasive corruption of the political and bureaucratic apparatus (Biaya & Omasombo, 1993:121).

In its unrestrained pursuit of self-enrichment, the government simply fails to remunerate its civil servants, school teachers, medical practitioners, nurses and university professors (to name but a few) on a regular basis - even though they earn what can be described as a precarious income and a "paltry salary". In consequence, children of these workers and professionals find themselves in a situation where the future signals no opportunity on the horizon. Worse still, Zaire constitutes a country where more than 60 per cent of the youth are on the street, failing to afford school fees (Vuembaluzamba, 1996:3). Nowadays, the Zairean youth have become the "sweepings" and scum of international society: they are hunted down in the neighbouring countries of Congo, Angola and Zambia and others; they are deported in degrading and dehumanizing conditions from most European countries (France, Belgium, Germany, The Netherlands, United Kingdom, Austria, Russia, Switzerland, etcetera) and most recently right here in South Africa, below Pretoria's Union Building, with Mandela's knowledge. They

are called names throughout the world. Admittedly, Zairean nationals, rather the Zairean youth, have fallen low (see also Vuembaluzamba, 1996:3) as a result of a corrupt and covetous leadership and administration.

As for the intellectual elite, it seems to have settled for a role inferior to its potential. The social crisis in Zaire has shattered the educational system too, and trying to survive among the ruins, Zairean intellectuals have dropped from higher aspirations and become hostages to daily survival needs (Biaya & Omasombo, 1993:123; see also Anon, 1995).

In a situation where a hungry university professor cannot afford to eat adequately (as a result of either lack of remuneration or a low income due to a rapacious and greedy administration), even access to a library and the opportunity of undertaking scientific research become impossible. Under these circumstances one has no alternative but to conform to the law of survival.

It is no wonder that educational standards have fallen steadily, and many educational institutions face shortages of laboratories and basic textbooks - as the minister in charge and those top officials always convert the money allocated to such services into personal gain. Meanwhile large numbers of pupils and students are trying to get an education in deplorable and dehumanizing conditions.

As for other basic social needs, it appears that ever-rising costs of building materials make improvement in the housing situation impossible. In their attempt to deal with the situation, people at the base of society either silently put up with land lords'whims or try to find a way out by building substandard units that fall utterly short of basic hygienic standards. Rural conditions are no better. Village huts are also constructed with no regard for health standards (see also Anon, 1995; Kakwenda et al. 1993:96).

The destructive effects of corruption and state bribery on human conditions in Zaire can now be examined by considering certain sectors like, transportation, housing, medical care and education - to name but a few.

6.4.1. Transportation

In the modern world, it goes without saying that transport constitutes one of the key elements in improving people's quality of life. Transport can be regarded as the vehicle of a viable and sustainable socio-economic development which goes hand in hand with the betterment of human life and the conditions thereof (as it provides a means of access to one's workplace, schools, university, hospitals, businesses, leisure activities, home, friends, church and so forth).

Admittedly, the public transport system in Zaire is, of course, a headache (Biaya & Omasombo, 1993:122; Anon, 1995). Parastatal rail and river boat services have steadily declined since independence: they are slow; reliability and security are poor and unit costs are high compared to other countries (twice those in Zambia or Kenya); the supply of fuel is irregular or inadequate; the entire country

looks like a large dumping-ground or a country which has been destroyed as a result of 30 years of war; asphalt roads inherited from the colonial era no longer exist; swamps and sewage are not drained (which encourages mosquitos, and diseases like malaria, cholera and others); many roads are in appalling conditions and, in rural areas, have often deteriorated so as to be unusable (MacGaffey, 1992:247). The parastatal "*Office des Routes*", which sarcastically can be called "*Office Déroutant*", meaning "baffling office" - even though it benefits from a road tax fuel - still does not have the resources to maintain secondary regional roads and has little knowledge of them. Its funds are insufficient and sporadic. It has been reported that salaries and working conditions for its personnel are poor and degrading: for instance, a director earns a salary that cannot afford to support himself and his family for five days; ordinary workers can hardly afford to eat (including their families) twice a day nor can they afford to send their children to school; they have no access to medical care, leisure activities, banks and the like. In Kinshasa, for example, the official passenger transport services are quite insufficient. Workers are subjected to a daily survival battle and cannot afford to pay a bus fare which is approximately equal to their wage.

6.4.2. Housing

A striking feature of the urban landscape of Kinshasa is the vast amount of half-finished construction, particularly in the "zones of extension" outside the planned areas of the city (MacGaffey, 1992:248-249). Even in these so-called planned areas, such as Barumbu, Kinshasa-Zone, Lingwala, Lemba, to name but a few, human life is far from being enjoyable in a housing system which falls completely short of basic hygienic standards, that is, which has been designed with no regard for health standards. A rapacious and irresponsible administration (City Council of Kinshasa) keeps on misusing public revenue and simply cannot deliver services accurately (here, the author is bringing into focus the specific situation of the Mobutu era). Built-up areas are surrounded by craters full of pus, where a huge number of mosquitos, typhic bacillus and all sorts of bacteria dwell and proliferate.

6.4.3. Medical care and Education

In addition to economic ills, public and social services are almost defunct in Zaire as a result of maladministration as well as an established type of corruption and state bribery (MacGaffey, 1992:253): funds that are allocated to such services are converted to personal use by greedy top office-holders.

In fact, the decline in public health services and in public education has been so bad that, in many respects, it can be said that these services no longer exist. As early as 1986, it was reported (MacGaffey, 1992:252-253) that health and education each got less than 3 percent of government budget, while 23 percent went to the military (whose recent spending is approximately from US\$150 million to 200 million US Dollars per annum, and the beneficiaries of this amount are those who are close to Mobutu) (Anon, 1995). (It is needless to stress that these figures are given against the background of the Mobutu era). Moreover, over

50% of the national budget went to political institutions that were supporters of the *status quo*; and from 1989 to 1994, less than 8% of the national budget was spent on health and education combined (MacGaffey, 1992:252 -253; see also Anon, 1995).

It is important to note that the elite send their children to be educated in Europe - most of the time with a view to settling there for good - and travel there themselves for medical care (Mobutu himself has been treated in Switzerland and France). For the rest of the population, those who are sick usually find that doctors, nurses, and other medical personnel, who have been unpaid for months and earn a paltry and worthless salary, must be paid a personal fee before they will deliver care. Hospitals will not admit even emergency cases without advance payment. It is not unusual to see many people dying in the "emergency rooms" failing to afford such a fee. Health centres lack medicine and equipment of the most rudimentary sort (MacGaffey, 1992:253; see also Anon, 1995; Kaseba, 1982:124). In this situation, the vast majority of the population is not protected against all sorts of diseases and epidemics (see also Kaseba, 1982:124).

The mirror of the Zairean tragedy remains Mbuji-Mayi, the diamond-city of Zaire. The diamond industry in Mbuji-Mayi produces plus minus 15 million US dollars weekly by way of transactions and through this, Zaire ranks among the biggest world producers of diamonds, producing roughly 20 million carats per annum. But, because of mismanagement of the state owned company, *Mines de Bakwanga* (MIBA) which benefits only the head of state and those close to him, especially Mr. Munkamba Kadiata Nzemba, the managing director of Miba), Mbuji-Mayi wallows in an appalling environment: without drinking water, without electricity, almost without asphalt roads, without a good school or a single health centre nor a single public phone.

In this connection, in the capital city, Kinshasa, whose population can be estimated at approximately three million people, life expectancy oscillates between 40 and 45 years, and more than one thousand people die on a daily basis to such an extent that hospital mortuaries are overcrowded; there are also epidemic diseases of all kinds: tuberculosis; diarrhoea from which each and every child suffers at least six times *per annum* and plasmodium falciparum (malaria) to name just a few.

It should be noted that schoolteachers, civil servants, soldiers and administrators must often wait for months for their grossly inadequate pay, with the result that students must bribe administrators for admittance to schools and universities, and pay off teachers with money or sexual favours to pass exams. In these circumstances, it is no wonder that university professors are reduced to mendicancy (often vis-à-vis well-to-do students) so as to make a living. Schoolteachers are subjected to conditions of poverty and misery (hunger, lack of clothes, lack of shelter, indigence, beggary, hopelessness, *etcetera*) and find themselves in a situation where their dignity and social standing have been harmed as never before. This is obvious for anyone who is accustomed to the situation prevailing in Mobutu's Zaire. University libraries have no books and journals; many buildings are derelict, and dormitories closed; laboratory facilities are lacking,

and students learn from lecture notes. Schools lack books, teaching supplies, and even blackboard chalk (those in charge of the Ministry of National Education almost always misuse the state funds allocated to such services by buying impressive cars; taking care of many wives, owning a house abroad, *etcetera*). It is a routine occurrence to see a university professor, in the evening or at night, making himself an unexpected taxi-driver in order to survive in the ocean of scarcities of all kinds caused by the rapacious and corrupt management of public affairs by those in authority.

6.4.4. Conclusion

In the light of the foregoing discussion, the notion of human dignity conveys among other things the sense or feeling of worthiness that a person or society (or a community) enjoys when its social, moral, judicial, political and economic systems and institutions promote conditions and values that are conducive to due respect for human life, the realization of full human potential as well as the betterment (improvement) in the quality of "modern" human beings' life (as opposed to the life of other beings). In this sense, it (human dignity) goes hand in hand with the process of development. Corruption, in its various forms, and especially systemic corruption - being *per se* a hindrance to development - has devastating, disastrous and dehumanizing effects on the life of ordinary people causing poverty, powerlessness, lack of resources, hunger, dearth, mendicity, low wages, diseases, squalor, gross social injustice, refugees, illegal immigrants, idle and depressed youth to name just a few, and constituting an affront to the fostering of human dignity and development as has just been proven in the case of Zaire.

6.5. Conclusion

It follows from the foregoing that the objective pertaining to this chapter has been achieved by establishing, in the context of Zaire, the dysfunctionality of corruption vis-à-vis the trilogy of objectives as well as the incompatible, conflicting and negative relationship that exists between systemic corruption, on the one hand, and development, democracy and human dignity, on the other hand.

State bribery, the plunder of public funds and other kleptocratic practices and widespread institutionalized corruption (see chapter 5, section 5.3.) have been identified as placing an exceedingly heavy burden upon society and being a major impediment to mass well-being and development in Zaire.

The existence of non-transparent, corrupt, unaccountable and illegitimate institutions that serve the rapacious interests of the few (the head of state and his myriad of internal and external clients and associates) obliterates democratic attributes and norms of transparency and accountability regarding the management of public affairs in Zaire, depriving the ordinary people and the public at large (who should provide the base of power and legitimacy in a democratic governance) from socio-economic resources and the betterment of their lives. The rule of law is also nonexistent in this corrupt system whereby the head of state, his kin and his so-called "political aristocracy" constitute "No Go

Areas" vis-à-vis the law of the land. This state of affairs jeopardizes the legitimacy and the credibility of the regime which entails the absence of truly institutional and democratic governance in Zaire.

The disastrous, dysfunctional, degrading and dehumanizing effects of systemic corruption on the life of ordinary people and the public at large in Zairean society are numerous and constitute an affront to human dignity and development. They include, abject poverty, dearth, squalor, hunger, appalling housing and medical care systems, gross social injustices, depressed and idle youth, scorned and despised refugees and illegal immigrants throughout the globe, mendicity, scarcities of all kinds, *etcetera*.

CHAPTER 7.

SYSTEMIC CORRUPTION: A NORMATIVE EVALUATION

7.1. Introduction

This chapter, containing a critical, theoretical and normative evaluation of the Zairean scourge, has as its purpose the need to explain and establish, against the background of the treble set of normative value-systems pertaining to good governance, that the phenomenon of systemic corruption in Zaire can be interpreted from the perspective of normative estrangement by the political leadership and bureaucratic élites and cadres.

It should be stressed that, while being referred to as "normlessness", the concept of alienation is to be dealt with here in evaluating and judging Zaire's political leadership and the bureaucratic élite's behaviour in terms of widespread deviation (estrangement) from norms and values dictating democratic good governance as a result of what can be described as "privatization" and "personalization" of the state apparatus and all public organs as well as the "unrestrained search" for self-enrichment and self-interest by those in authority. This state of affairs occurs even though the "governing" political party, the Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (this refers to Mobutu and his political aristocracy's era) claims : "To serve and not to serve oneself".

As "cultural estrangement", alienation is also going to be dealt with in relation to the estrangement on the part of Zaire's greedy and selfish political leadership and bureaucratic élites from traditional indigenous African-Bantu values as well as Christian norms and values of good and just government.

It should be kept in mind that in the pre-colonial and in the pre-Mobutu eras in Zaire, definite norms pertaining to government on all levels were applied. In indigenous societies definite established values governed the morality of government, and, under colonial rule (Belgian), democratic Western norms were also introduced. Having this in mind, it will be indicated, in this chapter, that Mobutu and his political, bureaucratic, military, administrative and financial aristocracy and/or oligarchy have deviated from the above-mentioned norms and value-systems. Thus, deviation and estrangement from norms and values of good governance have occurred.

7.2. Towards a normative evaluation of the Zairean scourge

7.2.1. The alienation of Zaire's political leadership, bureaucratic élites and cadres

7.2.1.1. Alienation of political leadership

As has been said earlier (see chapter 2, section 2.1.9) and despite its elusive meanings, for the purpose of this study, the term alienation is to be referred to as both, normlessness (the lack of commitment to shared social prescriptions for behaviour - hence widespread deviance) and cultural estrangement (the sense of removal from established values in society).

Having this in mind, by looking at Zaire's political leadership and bureaucratic cadres' behaviour which is characterized by an unrestrained search for self-enrichment to the detriment of the promotion of the public's general welfare - as has been stressed so far - it can be argued that this state of affairs constitutes a widespread deviation from universally shared norms and values dictating good democratic governance, namely responsibility, transparency and accountability which not only require democratic control by the citizens over government and administration, but most importantly imply that all levels of government and administration are there to serve the all the people, meaning the general public (not the rulers only) and they must act in the best interests of the citizenry (not in the interests of those in authority only).

It can also be argued that this state of affairs is nothing but an estrangement from the treble set of value-systems (Western public accountability, indigenous traditional African-Bantu values and Christian values) that regards good government and leadership as servanthood, that is, a responsible service aimed at the promotion of the best interests of the people, all the people.

It also appears that the estrangement of Zaire's political leadership is explained by its misunderstanding and misuse of power and authority. Instead of being in a role of servanthood and stewardship - in terms of promoting and maintaining justice, equity, common good and public welfare - political office holders, in this situation, evince a "having-oriented" and "self-centred" attitude and power is exercised to the detriment of what can be regarded as "being-with" and "servanthood" and "public interest-oriented leadership. The facts that have been displayed and examined in section 5.3. of chapter 5 as well as those in the whole of chapter 6 which concerns the accumulation of the country's wealth and resources at the one and sole pole of the head of state and his myriad clients and associates through kleptocratic practices, resulting in the pauperization of a large part of population (Blumenthal, 1983:11-14; Nguza, 1983:17-18; 1982:128-134) prove this sufficiently.

Thus, political leadership in Zaire is ill-oriented and this squares with what Nietzsche regards as "an ontological disease" (as quoted by Brun, 1979:4-6;

107), which is viewed as the loss of an original and genuine health. Having been revealed as "having and self-seeking oriented", Zaire's political leadership as well as bureaucratic cadres are alienated from what can be regarded, within the framework of this study, as basic normative values and principles pertaining to "democratic good governance" - as has been highlighted earlier (see section 9 of chapter 2 and the whole of chapter 5). Nietzsche was correct in asserting that the human disease, to which I add the Zairean political leadership's malady, develops itself by an irretrievable loss in search of "all-beyonds" (as quoted by Brun, 1979:4-6) or in terms of an unrestrained search by all means for "self-enrichment" and "one's affluence" as is seen in the Zairean situation. In this context, it can be argued that the "being" is likely to be conquered or imprisoned by the "having". This is what can be termed "situational alienation" against the background of what can be described as "inter-subjectivity" between the ruling-body and the governed masses. It should be borne in mind that (democratic) governance has been referred to, in this study, as the "good" relationship and interaction between rulers and the ruled, the state and society, the government and the governed in order to put in place an open society where the management of public affairs can be done in a democratic, inclusive, representative, accountable, responsible and transparent manner.

It is also important to note that such leadership (Zaire's leadership) finds itself estranged from traditional African-Bantu values as well as the Christian "ethic of service" regarding the management of public affairs (see chapter 4). For the traditional African-Bantu's conception of leadership or holding a position of public trust, as has been said earlier, can be integrated with the Western norm of "public accountability" and the Christian norm and/or value of "ethic of service" and is removed from what can be described as personal and abusive rule with no concern for the common good or the common interest. The African conception of holding a position of public trust is far from praising or advocating a kleptocratic, rapacious and corrupt rule which serves only the interests of the ruler and his supporters or kin to the detriment of the interest of the people over whom he rules. Rather the opposite is true in this respect. Therefore, the traditional African-Bantu conception of leadership wishes to be a "mit-sein-oriented" one, so to say - to borrow Martin Heidegger's terminology. Instead of promoting the culture of mit-sein and homo homini frater in its exercise of power and authority, Zaire's political leadership constitutes, the political culture of homo homini lupus in the country. It is the very same political leadership that fosters the "privatization" and "personalization" of public offices for self-gain and self-interest in the country which leads to state bribery, loss of public funds, self-appropriation of public assets and the denial of the general public well-being.

An opinion put forward by Obotela Rashidi (1994:46) gives weight to that:

"...the Second Republic-Zaire has equipped itself with no worthy and upright leaders or administrators, but with toady and fawner clients whose sole concern was to make sure that those dearly acquired posts and positions are kept undamaged. On the other hand, the analysis of

the situation of the country has revealed the depth of the crisis and mismanagement of the public affairs."

As early as 1981, participants in the "Colloque National sur l'Authenticité" came to the following diagnosis as far as the Zairean crisis is concerned: politicians are not models to be followed by the masses; the control system is ineffective and inefficient and leads to a mere observation of criminal offences that remain unpunished; there is a big gap between the interests of the ruling-body and the governed; although ill-fated, the toady opportunism has brought some people to the exercise of power; the notion of sanction is often reduced to the only negative aspect thereof, keeping some guilty citizens in impunity (Obotela Rashidi, 1994:32).

The Zairean Catholic Bishops Conference regards this state of affairs as "l'assassinat de l'état" (the assassination of the state). The Catholic prelates hold the Zairean ruling class responsible for the stalemate in Zaire (this refers to Mobutu's Zaire) and suggest that, in its present form, Mobutu's Zaire will die away, assassinated by its own leaders (Anon, 1993b:461) as a result of the corruption of the group in power (Blumenthal, 1983:12). Zaire is seen to suffer misrule and ill-oriented leadership which is there not to serve the public but mostly to serve itself, not to promote the best interests of the general public but to serve its own interests by self-enrichment to the detriment of the public welfare.

In this connection, Archbishop Laurent Monsengwo Pasinya (1993:397) the then chairman or president of the transitional parliament of Zaire, known as the "Haut Conseil de la République", pleaded with the Zairean political class in general and those in power in particular to stop assassinating the Zairean state as well as its own people. Because of this estrangement (alienation) of leadership in Zaire, the state is no longer governed, and the institutions of the Republic are in a state of paralysis; the social situation is disastrous and the country's economy is in a state of collapse; civil servants are desperately awaiting wages that are unable to meet the essential needs of life; Zairean diplomats abroad remain unpaid for months and are subjected to beggary, which is unworthy of the Zairean people; the mechanisms of the banking system are out of order. But, facing such a crisis, Zairean political authorities rather take delight in the "terrorisme d'Etat" as well as in organizing a kind of "black market" which serves only the interests of a financial oligarchy (Monsengwo Pasinya, 1993:397; see also Blumenthal, 1983:12-13; Nguza, 1983:17-18) - to the detriment of the public at large.

In these circumstances, there is even a belief that a large number of the Zairean political actors would like to see such a confusing situation lasting so that they may benefit from it by acquiring dishonest wealth, simply because the regular good functioning of state institutions and the rigorous management of public funds and assets will make their rapacious designs more difficult to achieve. All these greedy, selfish and irresponsible attitudes on the part of the ruling body are dysfunctional to society, and simply take people hostage and prevent them from freeing themselves which results in

indifference vis-à-vis the misery of the people on the part of those in authority (Monsengwo Pasinya, 1993:397-398). In this situation, the state of law or the rule of law is, in fact, assassinated and the relationship (interaction) between "authority-people", "state-society", "rulers-ruled", "the government-the governed" which constitutes the very basis of a "republican democratic order" is seriously affected and damaged; what is more, power has no trustworthy purpose any longer: it becomes meaningless and inhumane (Monsengwo Pasinya, 1993:398).

Ngondo a Pitshandenge (1993:481-482) sees such alienation from a continental perspective, and in terms of what can be described as the "privatization of African states". It can be argued that, having access to independence during the sixties, African countries found themselves in the presence of political regimes resulting from "coups d'état", one party-state systems and revolutions. By then, true monarchs based on the divine right emerged under the labels: "Pères Fondateurs" (Founding-Fathers) or "Guides des Nations", i.e. Leaders of Nations, and so forth. They were (and are still) able to own the management of the respective African states. Everywhere, the so-called "Guides des Nations", have concentrated all authority, administrative, judicial, military and fiscal in themselves or their relatives, parents or ethnic and tribal relations. They have brought about oligarchies that consist of these categories of persons so as to control the administration, politics, army, trade and commerce. Together, they have succeed in taking all the people hostage" - to corroborate Ngondo a Pitshandenge's (1993:481) words - and monopolizing the state as an end per se, and not in prescribing a social policy or a way that can be conducive to development. As early as 1980, the same opinion was courageously expressed by 13 Zairean politicians (members of parliament) who, in December 1980, addressed an open letter to Mobutu:

"Citizen and Founding-President, you alone have the power to name, revoke, and encourage the members of Zaire's ruling class, and because of this you should endorse the acts of your proteges which you have recognised as the exploiters (own emphasis) of our people. To our knowledge there is no country in the world where there is such a scandalous concentration of political and economic power (own emphasis)." (As quoted by Blumenthal, 1983:12.)

Needless to say this state of affairs runs counter to the respective treble normative value-systems of good governance highlighted heretofore.

In Zaire, as a result of this ill-based or ill-oriented leadership, countless social and political forms of alienation, scarcities of all sorts and an ocean of miseries have been generated. In a word, dehumanization and backwardness of human life predominate "Le Grand Zaïre".

7.2.1.2. Alienation of bureaucratic élites and cadres

As far as the bureaucratic system and the public administration are concerned the estrangement from norms and values dictating good governance (good management of public affairs) of bureaucratic élites and cadres in Zaire can be described as follows:

Having been politicized and privatized beyond measure, public administration has been made incapable of achieving its objectives. The same applies to the State's Portfolio, reduced to the status of an office which is to become the or a source of prestige, reward and income for the regime's clients and courtiers. The corrupt, dishonest, unaccountable and covetous management of state corporations and public institutions in Zaire by those managing directors (PDG- Présidents Délégués Généraux in French) biologically or politically related to Mobutu proves this. Certain members of Mobutu's family or his advisers often make use of the Central Bank funds just as they please (Nguza, 1983:18). It goes without saying that this state of affairs runs counter to the norm of public accountability that requires that governmental and administrative bodies must act in the best interests of the general public and that government (at all levels) is there to serve all the people not self-interest or that of the few.

As is the case in public administration, political and administrative corruption takes place often. For instance, nepotism, tribalism and clientelism have been shown on the part of those individuals who knowingly serve and stand surety for high office bearers. Today in Zaire, more than in the past (see Nguza, 1983:17-18), many state corporations and institutions (e.g. the Central Bank of Zaire, GECAMINES, MIBA, OZAC, Direction Nationale des Contributions, OZACAF, SOCIETE NATIONALE D'ELECTRICITE-SNL, REGIDESO, OFFICE DES ROUTES, SOZACOM, to name just a few) are converted into mere tills where ministers in charge and other relevant officials willingly draw funds for self-enrichment with or without the knowledge of the established political and governmental hierarchy which is a removal or estrangement from the ethic of service and the norms of transparency, accountability, honesty and efficiency in terms of the exercise of power and authority.

It can also be argued that Zaire, like most African countries that are sick and tired of their respective bureaucratic cadres and élites, is tragically short of managerial staff for public life and affairs (Anon, 1993b:459; Kapanga, 1996b). This gives weight to Ngondo a Pitshandenge's (1993:482) argument: "the strength of weapons has proven the vanity of mind as far as the management of a country is concerned, to such an extent that the African intellectuals hardly imposed their views on the functioning of their respective countries."

Skilled strategists, African dictators (for example Mobutu, Eyadema, Bongo, Arap Moi, Shani Abacha and others) have revealed themselves, in this regard, more clever than intellectuals and bureaucratic élites in their respective countries. Having been dehumanized in terms of standards of

living, some African intellectuals in general, and Zairean bureaucratic cadres in particular, are busy dreaming or expecting an opportunity to enter one day into the "sanctuary" where, through a favour from the so-called "Guide de la Nation", one can get by; that is to say, from "hell" to "heaven" - without any transition. Alas! all this cannot work unless one pays a price by burying one's personality and one's ability to criticize government's action and performance.

This state of affairs is what can be described as a painful "inner-being-exile", in which many intellectuals and bureaucratic cadres find themselves forced to live and where they experience a painful inner exile as a result of fear (Anon, 1993b:460). Applied to the Zairean situation, this can be illustrated by disillusioned statements given by all the university professors in government (this refers to Zaire's governments during Mobutu's era). Some of them have been Chiefs of Staff in the Office of the President or high ranking officials that have done nothing to save the country from deterioration and decay: 'Hey, one cannot survive by merely being in opposition'; 'one cannot operate in the opposition without having financial means'; 'seek Ye the kingdom of self-enrichment and the rest will follow'; 'Hey, there is nothing like morality or ethics in politics', they say more often than not. This shows how Zairean intellectuals and bureaucratic élites and cadres are prisoners of conscience and show a lack of commitment to prescribed norms and values of good democratic governance (because of the uncontrolled search for self-enrichment). As has been highlighted so far, these people keep well abreast of this. It is for this reason that Ngondo a Pitshandenge (1993:482) has noticed a kind of baffling instability on the part of African, and especially Zairean political, intellectual and bureaucratic élites and cadres which, like the political leadership, contribute to the "privatization" of public office and organs and are there not to serve and promote the public interest, but to serve themselves (self-interest). It can also be argued that most of them are corrupt not necessarily because they do not possess, but because they would like to possess more (Sarassoro, 1980:80-81).

7.3. Conclusion

From the foregoing, it follows that political leadership and bureaucratic and intellectual élites in Zaire - as well as some areas in Sub-Saharan Africa - bear marks of alienation or a lack of commitment to, estrangement from and removal from the prescribed sets of norms and values pertaining to how leadership, power, authority and public duties should be exercised and conducted. This is explained by the unrestrained search for self-interest of these social groups to the detriment of the promotion of public interest and welfare. This has also been shown by the privatization or monopoly of the state apparatus; the ownership of public office (public duties); the concentration of authority (judicial, legislative, executive, administrative, military, fiscal, etcetera) in one person (the head of state) or the few (his kin, his clients and courtiers) and self-seeking type of leadership - all of which run counter to the spirit of the treble set of norms and values (i.e. the Western norm of public accountability, the traditional African-Bantu values and the Christian norm of "ethic of service") relating to good governance.

This state of affairs has brought about widespread and endemic corruption, misrule and maladministration, all of which has led to socio-economic alienation and evils such as dearth, squalor, disease, poverty, hunger and famine. In a word, mass-pauperization and dehumanization of human life constitute watchwords and epitomize of the condition of Mobutu's Zaire.

CHAPTER 8

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE: ALTERNATIVES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1. Introduction

As has been recognized heretofore, the extent and range of the dysfunctional and detrimental effects of "systemic corruption" on Zairean society as well as on the Zairean government's efforts to achieve socio-economic advancement, viable and sustainable democracy and the safeguarding of the dignity of human life, constitutes something very serious, which needs to be attended to. To observe and analyze the evils relating to the scourge termed "systemic corruption" in Zaire by trying to denounce and condemn them only would imply some kind of incompleteness or "empty-space" within the framework of this study.

Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to put forward some alternatives by way of proposals and recommendations for Zaire (without claiming these to be exhaustive) - which may provide guidelines for other developing countries that have embarked on or are embarking on a crusade against all forms of corruption in the management of public affairs and are in quest of socio-economic development, democracy for the benefit of all, and the restoration and safeguarding of the dignity of human life.

However, it should be made clear that the author's intention here is far from offering programmatic (policy) "solutions". The aim is rather to stress and assess certain relevant dimensions relating to the Zairean scourge - bearing in mind that:

- Systemic corruption cannot be handled easily.
- There is no guarantee that if the most serious offenders are dismissed, or if everyone who is guilty is replaced, corruption will not persist.
- The old patterns may continue with new players, because people may change but the system persists (see also Caiden & Caiden, 1977:307).

8.2. Alternatives and recommendations

Like a gangrene or virus, systemic corruption has corroded Zairean social fibre and may well destroy it completely as was recognized by the Zairean Catholic Bishopic a few years ago in the following statement:

"The Zairean state lies, so to speak, on the ground, being in its death throes and lacking ordinary means of its action and functioning. It is high time to stop destroying and assassinating our nation." (Conference Episcopale du Zaïre, 1993:462.)

Before getting to the point, some questions need to be asked: What is wrong with Zaire ? how much longer will this situation drag on ?, and what can be done ?

In so far as the first question is concerned, an answer can be taken from the famous Nigerian writer Chinua Achebe who wrote more than a decade ago about Nigeria - although it also applies to Zaire and the whole continent of Africa, including some developing countries:

"The trouble with Nigeria is simply and squarely a failure of leadership. There is nothing basically wrong with the Nigerian land or climate or water or air or anything else. The Nigerian problem is the unwillingness or inability of its leaders to rise to the responsibility, to the challenge of personal example which are the hallmarks of the true leadership." (Achebe, 1983:1.)

In this respect, it must be recognized that one crucial factor in the decay of the Zairean state is, among other things, the quality of the men in charge. Political as well as administrative institutions in Zaire are run by crooks who have no commitment to serving the country and no integrity making them worthy to be entrusted with the public welfare, or the leadership qualities to persuade and mobilise others to follow them (see also Lee Hsien Loong, 1996:27).

It can be argued that to many Zaireans, change is absolutely impossible since what the people know is the daily round of poverty, and looking at the messy outcome of the dream of liberation, some actually suppose it wouldn't be a bad idea to go back to colonialism (Biaya & Omasombo, 1993:122-123); while some others advocate revolutionary rhetoric by adopting the so-called "Palestinian formula and sketch" which, according to them, will bring about real changes in the country.

To the last question, "What can be done?", it must be made clear that, first and foremost, it is in Zaire's best interest to put off any revolutionary rhetoric or formula meant as solutions. Such solutions end up causing other alienations in society, for instance bloodshed, genocide, massacre, murder, diseases, misery, refugees, disgrace, desolation, etcetera. The cases of Angola, Somalia, Southern Sudan, Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra-Leone, Rwanda, Burundi, and more currently the situation in Eastern Zaire - to name a few - are striking examples of this.

Having said that, there is no intention, as far as this study is concerned, of continuing to support the status quo - keeping in mind that the process towards total transformation of the Zairean polity is something irreversible and that, nothing (be it the barrel of gun or a gunner, or a blood-thirsty tyranny or anything else) will be in a position to prevent such a process from moving forward. For Zairean society at large longs for a new order (a democratic, just and responsible one), which can bring about socio-economic advancement, viable and sustainable democracy, social justice and the protection of the dignity of human life. These objectives can only be attained through dialogue, national consensus,

mutual respect and tolerance between major role-players within Zaire's political spectrum.

By recognizing the crisis and failure of leadership as one crucial factor in the decay of the Zairean state, we are also of the opinion that for endemic and institutionalized corruption to cease being a hinderance to the achievement of the above-mentioned objectives - although there is nothing like a magic formula in this respect - it is necessary to reform the Zairean state completely. Politically speaking, Zaire needs democracy that is conducive to more rigour and transparency in so far as the management of public affairs is concerned. This can only be feasible if, and only if, the right men or good leaders are put in charge of Zaire's institutions. By good leaders, I mean men and women of integrity, enjoying legitimacy and showing themselves to be upright, wise, competent, accountable, committed to serving the country and having the vision to promote the general and public welfare while being role-models to others and free from corruption and kleptocratic practices. Moreover, administrative principles based on good governance need to be put in place so that Zaire can get stop being a clannish or tribal state and to become a more open society where the management of public affairs is transparent. This requires the promotion of freedom of expression on the part of the citizens so that they can condemn discrepancies without fear.

The ethical dimension is also of paramount importance in this regard. In fact, the ethic of "integrity" and "service" should be developed, particularly at the level of leadership. Zairean leaders have no right to manage the state with the aim of living in other heavens abroad (Europe, South Africa, U.S.A., etcetera) as is the fashion nowadays. In this regard, they should manage the available resources with rigour, and, above all, they themselves must submit themselves to transparency. Instead of "selling their hearts and souls" by being insensitive vis-à-vis the misery of their fellow-human beings, the Zairean political leadership and its bureaucratic élites and cadres should reconsider their ontological condition (as "mit-sein") and take their human calling and destiny very seriously - bearing in mind that the sense of respect and concern for the dignity of human life can only be fostered by those who feel that they are human beings themselves.

Instead of being "self-seeking-oriented", an alternative leadership model is to be suggested and fostered in Zaire and the whole African continent, that is, a more "responsible servant-oriented leadership". Van der Walt (1995:92) is quite correct in maintaining this: "What we today need on our continent is not in the first place father-leaders (I may add, in the form of the Zairean so-called "Père de la Nation"), teacher-leaders (I may add, in the stature of the Zairean so-called "Guide de la Nation" or "Président-Fondateur"), neither aristocratic leaders (I may add, in the form of the Zairean so-called "L'Aigle de Kawele" and "Mulopwe") and least of all warrior-leaders (I may add, the type of the so-called Zairean "Commandant Suprême des Forces Armées" and "Nkoy or Elombe Mobali"). We need responsible servant-leaders".

Kinoti (1994:31), a Kenyan Christian scholar expresses the same opinion in different terms, contending that Africa desperately needs new types of leaders,

different types of leaders, men and women of integrity (who are free from corruption and kleptocratic practices), have ability, and education and having a genuine concern for and commitment to the well-being of all their fellow citizens, which applies to the Zairean situation.

We are of the opinion that a greedy, covetous, rapacious and kleptocratic regime or administration which encourages the accumulation of the country's wealth at one pole, and simply chooses to ignore the rumblings of a hungry "social belly" - as has been experienced in Mobutu's Zaire - can hardly do so without digging its own grave (Biaya & Omasombo, 1993:124). Having that in mind, the crucial duty of the new leadership, meaning responsible servant-leaders, entering positions of public trust with clean hands, is to take a stand against all sorts of corruption and malpractices and to promote a more equitable distribution of resources through the rehabilitation of managerial skills and the promotion of economic productivity for the benefit of all. This must be done in collaboration with all responsible instances, mostly those dealing with the management of the national finances and economy, as well as members of the judiciary and international financial institutions and donors. People in charge of the management of national, financial and economic institutions are to show their loyalty and patriotism to the Zairean nation by improving general conditions of productivity and efficiency, and establishing a strong and effective system of control through which corrupt behaviour and all kinds of illegalities and malpractices must be exposed to the public and punished impartially. For the Zairean malady is also attributed to the "impunity" with which it is possible for evil-doers to act. This is where the judiciary can play such a critical and major role, given that of the three organs of the state, it (the judiciary) is the tallest and strongest (Babalola, 1994:100). It is the judiciary alone that can pronounce the acts and deeds of the legislature and executive unconstitutional, illegal, void and of no effect.

Yet, unfortunately, and most regrettably the judiciary in Zaire (this refers to the Mobutu era) faces a legacy of lack of courage among its members, which has paved the way for and aided for decades - as has been the case in most African countries where the military or despots have been in power - such rulers, particularly the military and the despots, including rapacious authorities and all kinds of kleptocrats to desecrate the constitution and perpetuate injustice, destroy the economy, pillage the country's wealth and stack away state money in foreign banks and, what is more, they have succeeded in establishing themselves as a "No-Go-Area" vis-à-vis the country's law enforcement agents.

Having that in mind, it must be admitted that in times like this, when despots rear their heads and rapacious and kleptocratic leaders establish themselves as a "No-Go-Area" with regard to law enforcement agents of the country and become the personification of the state, the judiciary needs men and women, strong ones, with strong minds and great hearts, men and women of true faith and honour (Babalola, 1994:101) so that all known corrupt political leaders and public office bearers, past and present, can be brought to book at the right time, and after thorough investigation by an independent panel of reputable persons. The aim of this is far from being any kind of vindictive action to square scores with anyone, but to demystify the power of money and to make the point very clear that even

the highest public office bearer in the land (be it the head of state, prime minister, cabinet minister, dignitary, defense minister, high ranking person in the military service, member of parliament, business tycoon, church-leader, clergyman or layman, or relative or next of kin of any leader, man or woman) can be brought to account for his or her wrongs while in office.

As a matter of fact, the words of J.G. Hollad are relevant to the Judiciary and all law enforcement agents, including all arms of government at this time in Zaire:

"God give us men ! A time like this demands strong minds, great hearts, true faith, and ready hands; Men whom the lust of office does not kill; Men whom the spoils of office cannot buy; Men who possess opinions and a Will; Men who have honour; Men who will not lie; Men who cannot stand the demagogue and damn his treacherous flatteries without winking; "Tall" men, sun-crowned, who live above the fog in public duty and in private thinking." (As quoted by Babalola, 1994:101.)

Institutions such as the police and law enforcement agents must be there, independent and well-funded, so as to check corrupt practices and investigate, prosecute and, where appropriate, punish offenders of all social ranks. But, experience has shown that in countries where an unaccountable and unelected government exists (as is the case in Mobutu's Zaire), the institutions of the Police and the Judiciary are often compromised. Efforts must, therefore, be made to work towards the enthronement of full and genuine democracy in Zaire - as well as in the whole African continent. In this vein, it is to be admitted that the struggle against corruption in Zaire and in most countries in Africa can only be advanced and become more effective and efficient if the struggle for democracy, good governance and the rule of law and human rights can be won. Government at all levels must be by the consent of people, it must be accountable and responsible to the people and institutions set up in this regard.

Unless and until such time as the Zairean polity is equipped with democratic government and institutions (at the central, provincial and local levels) afortiori the rule of law, the citizenry can hardly cease to experience the following evils: detention, dearth, misery, deprivation of liberty, brutality, agony of toil, arbitrariness, social inequality, illiteracy, all forms of corruption, incompetent, all-embracing and unaccountable governments, famine, diversion of public funds into private hands, stealing in the name of commissions, inflated contracts, tax evasion, state bribery, robbery, endless lootings, "bureaugamy" (a Zairean neologism, referring to a public office-bearer having more than his own lawful spouse, but instead two or more concubines, each one being referred to as "bureau" in French), rapacious administration, refugees, brain drain, oppression, infraction of the laws of the land, countless killings in the name of the security of the state and so forth.

Unless and until such a time when upright leaders will be in charge of the Zaire state and themselves take the lead in the fight against corruption at both the legal and ethical levels, will be very difficult to curb and eradicate corruption in Zaire. For it is at the top that really big thieves and kleptocrats that cripple national

development are to be found and to deal with corruption at this level moral persuasion is not enough - to borrow president Museveni's (1994:66) words. There should be laws that govern corruption in the country, and sanctions against corruption must be put in place where such sanctions do not exist. This state of affairs can be only be feasible if men and women of integrity are in authority.

At a time like this, the Zairean government has an inevitable duty to work jointly with multinational or rather international organizations in order to intensify the initiation and implementation of projects to attack poverty and to upgrade living standards for all segments of society (eg. bureaucrats, public officials, civil servants, professionals, physicians, nurses, teachers at all levels of education, city-dwellers, countrymen, etcetera) as a way of discouraging corrupt practices. In this vein, the government has to revise and re-think its policy towards wage-earners. There should be an introduction of a realistic salary system in the country through which people can earn a living wage, because a poor salary is unlikely to help curb corruption. In other words low wages will only lead to more corruption.

For more sustainable development to take place, first and foremost, the people (especially those people at the grass-roots level) must be empowered so as to start with development themselves. To do this, the Zairean government must make the money available in order to invest in people and such development should be people-centered. Secondly, the Zairean government must be "development-oriented" in its national and international relations and policies.

It is also the duty of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), in their capacity as agents of development, to play a fundamental role in the mobilisation against corruption by eradicating poverty at the grass-roots level and creating conditions that are conducive to a better life for rural dwellers. The NGOs should promote the economic activities of the rural people as well as economic self-reliance at the grass-root level, which is a way to reduce political corruption. Reasons for this involvement of the NGOs are twofold: (1) when the grass-roots are economically self-reliant, the temptation to sell their conscience and values for money during political elections will be reduced; (2) it has to be borne in mind that poverty constitutes a major impediment to democratic development and good governance. Whilst it is true that man does not live by bread alone, it is also true that man cannot live without bread. In fact, the natural desire for bread influences man's behaviour in virtually all spheres of life (Alao, 1994:88).

Western countries and the international community know very well what is going on in Zaire under the dictatorial and corrupt rule of Mobutu that keeps on starving the Zairean people, oppressing the majority of the population and denying them all kinds of freedom and rights. Western countries, through the press and international organizations, are all kept abreast of the disastrous situation and misery the people of Zaire have been facing for three decades as a result of dictatorship and corruption. Having said that, Western countries have to play a critical role - through international political and economic structures - in getting rid of an unpopular and undemocratic regime, like the one in Mobutu's Zaire or other

Mobutu-like regimes accross the continent. They have to put meaningful pressure on them (unpopular regimes) so that the Zairean people's fight or struggle for democratic governance, socio-economic advancement, the rule of law and human rights can be won. For it will be in the best interests of the whole international community if democratic institutions are put in place and the management of the state apparatus is done in a responsible, accountable and transparent fashion.

The Parliament, like other institutions in Zaire, must consist of men and women of integrity, with clean hands, working hard towards the establishment of a democratic order and governance. It (Parliament) must have the potential to control corruption in various forms; it must also have the power in the constitution to impeach the government for improper conduct of its activities, including corruption and violation of human rights; and, finally, it has to set up in the House some panels of discussion and debates with governmental officials regarding corrupt practices. But this state of affairs can hardly take place in the so-called "Haut Conseil de la République - Parlement de Transition" (HCR-PT), a semblance of parliament that, in its form and picture, has been taken hostage by Mobutu and his political aristocracy and operates according to their (Mobutu and his political aristocracy) whims. Unless this situation changes completely, it will have to be replaced by a more democratic, representative, inclusive and responsible forum.

The debates that can take place in this kind of forum to expose corrupt practices must be broadcasted through the media. This is where the media occupies a special role in any society that aspires to be democratic and accountable, a role which is to be discharged and performed honestly, fearlessly and in an objective fashion. The news media in a democracy has, inter alia, the function of serving as a watchdog over government and other powerful institutions in the society by exposing the truth behind the claims of governments and by holding public officials and all those in authority accountable for their actions (see also United States Information Agency, 1991:28).

The media therefore must expose corruption where it occurs and whoever may be involved, and it must not become captive to political point-scoring. All this requires standards of professionalism set by journalists themselves, and not by the imposition of control by parliament, lest it becomes a "teleguided" media. The public owned media, like "Télé-Zaïre" or "Office Zaïrois de Radio Diffusion et de Télévision" has to be open for the dissemination of all points of view, particularly for the exposure and condemnation of corruption in all its forms.

It cannot be stressed enough that corruption is dysfunctional to society at large, and the effects of corruption on human misery are worse than war crimes - not only is corruption perceived to be as much a crime against humanity as genocide, terrorism and narcotic trafficking (see also Aderinwale, 1994a:4), but also corruption is believed to constitute a headache vis-à-vis governmental programmatic action in achieving socio-economic advancement, democracy that benefits the citizenry or the public at large and the protection of the dignity of human life for all of which the Zairean nation longs. Therefore, there should be

no safe havens for corrupt leaders and kleptocratic bureaucrats just as there are none for terrorists and narcotics traffickers or drug-lords in most parts of the world. Once more, Western countries and many others in international society (e.g. France, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, the United States of America, Britain, Japan, Mainland China, Morocco, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Togo, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Tchad, Nigeria, South Africa, Namibia to name but a few) have to join efforts in making and implementing significant policies in this regard.

It must be borne in mind that in a position of public trust, and according to the values peculiar to the modern state with democratic governance, one can hardly become famous or be given credit merely for being a crook and siphoning millions of dollars out of one's country in order to own housing and real estate abroad (whether in Belgium, France, Switzerland, Sandton-City, Randburg, Brooklyn, Waterkloof Ridge, Pretoria-East, the Cape Peninsula or other residential areas in South Africa), thus spoiling and putting the national public interest in jeopardy. To the author's mind, only the contrary is true. It can be acknowledged that the barometer of the greatness of a country is the state of its socio-economic realities, through which one may evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of a government. Corrupt and kleptocratic practices on the part of leaders and elites undermine and hinder such a state of affairs.

In this respect, there is one problem that has to be attended to, namely "foreign aid or assistance". It must be realised that we in Africa in general and in Zaire in particular have not yet understood the real meaning and purpose of that. Quite often, this has been taken for "alms" or "free gifts", (Kinoti, 1994:45-46). Foreign aid is like a bank loan which will only assist us if we use it productively and efficiently, otherwise we will end up in debt or even going bankrupt as is the case in Zaire, and has happened to most African countries. We must also understand foreign humanitarian aid and grants correctly, whether they come through governmental or non-governmental agencies. But, alas, it is not unusual to see, in Zaire especially, that such loans have been used for futile and irrelevant purposes such as self-enrichment, marrying another wife; owning more private houses and real estate around the globe; buying and driving more expensive and impressive cars; or going around with more concubines or girl-friends.

Let all the people of Zaire realize and bear in mind that the "Zairean cancer and scourge" has also a collective responsibility. The remedy pertaining to this can hardly be expected from outside. The responsibility to get things changed in Zaire lies primarily with the people (all the people) of Zaire themselves. One should be careful, however, not to put all the blame only on the shoulders of those past and present political, economic and bureaucratic leaders. It must be understood that even good leaders can achieve very little if the citizens of a country are unco-operative, not willing to work hard and be responsible (Van der Walt, 1995:3). Therefore, it is up to every citizen of the country to clean up his or her conscience, to reconsider his or her patriotism or loyalty towards the nation, to be part and parcel of the joint campaign and crusade for moral rebirth of Zairean society, and to work hard and all together - in spite of everything - towards a national effort to curb all sorts of corruption and misdeeds inhibiting

socio-economic advancement, genuine democratic order and protection of the dignity of human life in Zaire. For, to campaign against corruption effectively and effectually in Zaire will require the joint and committed involvement of all Zaireans - men, women, children, the youth, adults, city-dwellers, country-men, leaders and the followers.

The Churches - mostly Christian churches and the people of God, the God revealed in Jesus Christ, consisting of roughly 80 to 90 per cent of the Zairean population - are to play a critical role in this regard. This will bear witness to Jesus Christ's Gospel of full salvation as faithfully as possible in the context of a nation that is going through a vast "desert" of misery and death as a result of widespread institutionalized and sanctioned corruption characterizing the deeds of its leaders. It is the compelling duty of the Christian churches in Zaire to reflect, in words and deeds, their role as "the salt of the earth (Matthew 5:13), so that all forms of evil, including political, administrative and bureaucratic corruption, can be abhorred and rebuked through the power of the Holy Ghost - the Church being per se the light of the world (Matthew 5:14) and "the sacrament of salvation" for the "world".

Yet and unfortunately, one thing must be recognized: there is no alternative but to connive with Kinoti (1994:90-91) in admitting that the Church (the Christian Church) in Africa - and especially in Zaire - is far from being what she ought to be. The first challenge is that the Church must become genuinely the Church of Jesus Christ, the Church He desires and which He died for; that is, a "radiant church, without stain or wrinkle or any other blemish, but holy and blameless." (Ephesians 5:25-26.)

But, like the Christian Church in other parts of the world, the Church in Africa, and especially in Zaire, is usually much better at preaching than at being and doing what she preaches. There are glaring contradictions between what the church says and what she actually does. As Christians, we always preach integrity but practise corruption. We preach fair play but practise nepotism and tribalism. We proclaim that God created all people equal but treat some as if they were more human than others. We claim a new nature as a result of the transforming work of the Holy Spirit in our hearts but we cannot be trusted with money or sex. We condemn all forms of idols but, we still regard the so-called "super-powers" (mostly the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany, Japan, Russia, etcetera) or the so-called G7 countries as mini-gods, worthy to be praised and worshipped and we are simply enslaved by a myriad of idols taken from all these areas in the form of political, philosophical and economic ideologies. The Bible enjoins us to hate every form of evil but we not only tolerate but easily accommodate all manner of evil in the church and in our society - corruption, repression, embezzlement, tribalism, ethnicity, etcetera. Equally guilty are the members of the clergy (churchmen or ecclesiastics) and church members who, in exchange for recognition, for tribal solidarity, or for material gain, give full support and respectability to oppressive, illegitimate and corrupt leaders. Undoubtedly this state of affairs can only be conceded by those honest people presently living in Zaire. This irresponsible behaviour has been identified on the part of many misguided prelates, including "cardinals",

archbishops, bishops and ecclesiastics such as pastors, priests, and all the so-called "Représentant Légaux" - to use the Zairean terminology.

Nonetheless, we believe in the Church of Christ Jesus, the Risen and Living Lord. May the grace of Jesus Christ our Lord, the love of God the Father and the fellowship of the Holy Ghost (2 Corinthians 13:14) be reflected in all the Zairean nation - in terms of words and deeds.

The author is of the opinion that an alternative model of leadership as has been suggested so far can hardly arise spontaneously. This needs to be created through careful character formation and training of young people. The church, it has been said, has the potential to make a crucial contribution in the crusade against corruption and misdeeds in the management of the Zairean state. It is important to teach the people of God, mostly the youth, those sound social and political morals and values against the background of biblical ideals. The Church must work jointly with all arms of government and other sections of civil society - which can also accommodate non-Christians - to mobilise the youth in this challenging task, the exposure and eradication of corrupt practices in the public terrain. Through this, the people of God, as a holy nation, can act effectively and effectually to replace human degradation with human dignity, poverty and hunger with prosperity, disease with health, oppression with freedom, social inequality and injustice with social justice and equity, conflict with peace, corruption and self-interest with integrity, public interest and common good, refugees with citizens, misrule with good and just governance, tears and shame with joy and happiness, Baal-Zebub and all kinds of idols of our time with the living Word of God revealed in Jesus Christ. For moral rebirth constitutes an essential requisite for harmony, reconciliation and the reconstruction of Zairean society. This is what the respective people and communities in Zaire and across the African continent (Christians and non-Christians alike) long for.

It must be indicated that even in the so-called secular Western democratic states and in indigenous (traditional) governmental systems, the essential norm of servanthood is present, and has been institutionalized in various ways. Although these values may be rationalized and motivated from different perspectives and beliefs, and though a preference has been given to the above Christian motivation thereof, the point remains that Zaire (like other societies across the African continent) needs a new morality, a moral rebirth based on responsibility and servanthood which are key requisites for the rehabilitation of Zairean society which involves Christians and non-Christians.

Lastly, let us make ours this prayer, learnt from a Zairean child on the occasion of the New Year 1994:

"Thank you, Lord ! Inexhaustible spring of goodness !
Through your love, we have been created;
Great people and small people alike;
Your children are coming before you;
Please, hear our prayers... ;
Look, Lord, at what our fathers have done with
the "Paradise" you have given them;
Man has become a wolf vis-à-vis his fellow-men;
Lord !!!
Put just a bit of humaneness in their heart(s);
A bit of water in their wine;
And in their depraved world;
A small place for You, for Mankind;
Lord,
Help us to build a new world."
(Mirindi da Symba, 1994:4-6.)

We need a better world to dwell in it, a more just world, a more fraternal world which is free from corruption and all forms of evil, in which everyone realizes and understands that egotism, selfishness and greediness run counter to salvation and happiness, and that the rapacious accumulation of wealth at one pole of the society is both suicidal and delusive.

8.3. Conclusion

It can be established from this chapter that the crisis and failure of leadership is one crucial factor in the decay of the Zairean state in its 'Mobutist' form. To deal with the eradication of what can be described as widespread institutionalized corruption as accurately as possible in this specific context would require reforming the Zairean state's apparatus completely, by promoting a genuine democratic and transparent governance, which will be viable and sustainable only if new and good leaders are in charge of Zaire's government and institutions. It cannot be stressed enough that for institutionalized corruption to be dealt with in an effective and effectual manner, the joint and committed involvement of all Zaireans - men, women, children, the youth, adults, all arms of government, civil society, the leaders and the followers - is a compelling and key way to solve the problem.

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY

This last section of the study on the endemic impact of what can be described as "systemic corruption" vis-à-vis the achievement of development, democracy and human dignity in Zaire is now to recapitulate all the main arguments and the objectives that have been achieved.

From the foregoing, it follows that in chapter 1, being introductory in its nature, an effort has been made to point out and give an account of the main arguments relating to the relevance and topicality of this study.

In chapter 2, the conceptualization's framework regarding corruption and its derivatives, as well as certain strategic terms of this study has been constructed.

In chapter 3, a general theoretical and analytical framework of corruption has been made and explored in two ways.

- First of all, the "toxic" and negative effects of corruption on the three objectives (development, democracy and human dignity) in the developing countries of Africa have been analyzed against the background of three cases in Africa (Nkrumah's Ghana, Amin's Uganda and Nguema's Equatorial Guinea). It has been shown and established that the prevalence of corruption in all three cases had toxic effects or an endemic, detrimental and negative impact on the promotion and attainment of the trilogy of objectives.
- Moreover, the dysfunctionality of corruption vis-à-vis the achievement of the afore-said trilogy of objectives has been examined from the broader perspective of the developing world by looking at some non-African developing countries as well as some other African experiences besides those of Ghana, Uganda and Equatorial Guinea. In this context, it has also been shown and pointed out how corruption, in all its forms, is linked to the impossibility of achieving development, democracy and human dignity in developing countries.

In chapter 4, an effort was made to analyze three different sets of normative value-systems (the Western norm of public accountability, traditional African proverbs and the Christian value and principle of the "ethic of service") relating to "good" and just government. Some aspects of the treble set of value-systems on good governance were given in order to establish common denominators by which a value judgement could be made on corruption and malpractices regarding political and bureaucratic behaviour in Zaire. It is important to note that attention has been given to general common denominators which, on their part, rest upon a broad range of supporting values and practices as has been demonstrated. In this respect, being service and public interest-oriented, it has been argued that all three sets of normative value-systems run counter to what can be described as malpractices and the misuse of authority and of positions of

public trust resulting in tyranny, greediness, dishonesty, nepotism, despotism, oppressive, personal, unaccountable and abusive rule and the like.

In chapter 5, a brief chronological background description, analysis and exposition concerning some characteristics of corruption as it developed in Zaire (from the colonial era to Mobutu's era) have been presented and explored. Special attention has been devoted to the so-called "Second-Republic"'s era known as the maturing stage of corruption in Zaire.

In chapter 6, systemic corruption in the specific case of Zaire has been analyzed and examined against the background of the general theoretical and analytical framework of the negative impact and the dysfunctionality of corruption in the Developing World. It has been argued, shown and established as far as possible that, in Zaire, an incompatible, conflicting and negative relationship exists between "systemic corruption on the one hand, and development, democracy and human dignity on the other hand which makes the attainment of these objectives impossible. It has been argued that state bribery, the plundering of public funds and other kleptocratic practices by the corrupt group in power and the existence of non-transparent, corrupt, unaccountable and illegitimate institutions place an exceedingly heavy burden upon society and are a major impediment to mass-well-being and/or development, genuine democratic order and governance, and the fostering of the dignity of human life in Zaire.

In chapter 7, it has been explained and established against the background of the treble set of normative value-systems pertaining to good governance that political leadership and bureaucratic and intellectual elites in Zaire bear marks of alienation, or lack of commitment to, estrangement and removal from the prescribed sets of norms and values on how leadership, power, authority and public duties are to be exercised and performed. This state of affairs has been explained by an unrestrained search for self-enrichment by those in authority to the detriment of the promotion of public interest and welfare. It should also be borne in mind that the privatization of the state bureaucratic apparatus is one of the factors of this estrangement. They do this not necessarily because they do not possess, but because they would like to possess more at the expense of the public at large. Not only does this state of affairs run counter to the spirit of the afore-said treble set of norms and values on good governance, but it brings about widespread and endemic corruption, misrule, maladministration of public affairs, socio-economic alienation and evils in Zairean society.

In chapter 8, a number of alternatives and recommendations have been advanced (though these in no way claim to be exhaustive) so as to deal with the challenging task of eradicating and curbing every form of corruption as far as the management of the Zairean state's apparatus is concerned. It has been recognized that the crisis and the failure of leadership is one of the crucial factors promoting the decay of the Zairean state in its 'Mobutist' form. The total reform of the Zairean state, the promotion of a genuine democratic order and governance by putting new and good leaders in charge of Zairean institutions as well as the joint and committed involvement of all Zaireans in the crusade against corruption and malpractices in the management of public affairs have been regarded as key

contributions to the solution which may also serve as guidelines for those developing countries embarking on the campaign to curb corruption, that is one of the key ingredients of development, democracy and the safeguarding of human dignity.

Finally, it goes without saying that the leading theoretical argument (hypothesis) of this study has been established and proven in two dimensions:

1. It has been hypothesized those developing countries' political systems which are characterized by the institutionalization of corruption, governmental and bureaucratic efforts to achieve development, viable democratization and human dignity within the society, are negatively affected. This state of affairs has been examined and proven against the background of chapters 3 (the general theoretical framework of the negative impact and the dysfunctionality of corruption vis-à-vis the trilogy of objectives in Africa and in the Developing World) and 6 (the conflicting relationship between systemic corruption and the trilogy of objectives in Zaire).
2. It has also been argued that "systemic corruption" appears where the political leadership and bureaucratic élites have been alienated from basic values pertaining to good governance. This has been examined and proven against the background of chapters 4 and 7.

May the Lord and Master of all that which is in the creational order, the Lord from Whom we hold the "cultural mandate" help us, in Zaire, in Africa and in the Developing World, to build a new and more humane world, a just world which is free from corruption and misdeeds in the management of public affairs, in His grace and according to His justice and love !

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