

**SUBJECT - OBJECT
ALIENATION
AND METHOD**

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SUBJECT-OBJECT ALIENATION AND METHOD

By

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B.A. B.A.(Hon), TH.B.

Mini-dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree *MAGISTER ARTIUM* in *PHILOSOPHY*, of the *Potchefstroomse Universiteit vir Christelike Hoer Onderwys*.

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POTCHEFSTROOM

1999

DEDICATION

“*Chiendai mundodzidza, mugouya motichengeta*” (Go and learn so that you can come and take care of us). These were the last words of encouragement and commissioning from my late father, **Mr. Tafireyi Sahisa Wuriga**, to whom this limited dissertation is dedicated.

699/1719

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, in humble submission, I want to give thanks to **Adonai Eloheynu the Creator of all things**, for giving me the opportunity to participate in the world of scholarship in its scientific endeavour.

Secondly, I wish to express my sincere gratitude to:

- **Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education**, through its **Foreign Student Bursary** office for granting me the bursary for my studies. Without which, this academic project could not have materialized;
- My wife **Eveline Wuriga**, my daughter **Rumbidzaiishe Hikensile Wuriga**, and my son **Benjamin Munyaradzi Wuriga** for their support;
- My mother **Mrs. Ndaizevei Wuriga**, who taught me the first things of wisdom of life – that is to fear the Lord Almighty, and my sisters – for supporting me;
- All my relatives and friends who were of great support and encouragement in the process of writing this project, especially, **Mr. Emmanuel Mbennah** (Tanzania) whose editing skills were employed to summarize its proposal;
- All my colleagues in the Philosophy department, especially **Mr. Jaco P. Kruger** who helped in translating the summary from English to Afrikaans, and all the library officials at the Ferdinand Postma Library who were so friendly in assisting me to get necessary material from the beginning to the end of this research project;

I give my special gratitudes to my Supervisor, **Professor J. J. Venter** for his unreserved support and usage of his immense

philosophical insight, skilful experience in the discipline and his perseverance in taking all the pain in guiding me through this journey of seeking the treasures of wisdom.

Author.

SUMMARY

SUBJECT-OBJECT ALIENATION AND METHOD

The purpose of this research project is to expose, analyze, and criticise the origin, presuppositions, and influence of the subject-object alienation problem in method in a bid to establish proper presuppositions for research methodology that can retain an integral ontology. This is done through the means of textual (literature) study, problem-historical approach, and transcendental criticism. From the study of relevant literature, it is revealed that Descartes, in his "I think, therefore I exist" (*Cogito ergo sum*), declared the origin of the subject-object alienation problem. It was also revealed through literature study that there were several methodological attempts to solve this problem by some of the philosophers or schools of philosophy like Kant (Transcendental Philosophy), Husserl (Phenomenology), Heidegger (Hermeneutic Phenomenology), Dewey (Pragmatism), and the Participatory Research method (Subject-subject, and object-object approach). These methods were not capable of reaching their goal to resolve the legacy of a split ontology in the theory of knowledge that was left behind by Descartes.

All these methodological attempts, with the exception of Participatory Research method, did not recognize the object functions of the respondent. Some of these methods reduced the object to the level of mere ideas of the consciousness. This left us with questions such as 'Can there be any method that can solve the subject-object alienation problem? Can research be conducted without causing a split ontology? In a bid to establish an answer to these questions the author opted for reformational philosophy. Its basic ontological presuppositions for research methodology includes (1) the creaturelihood of creation, (2) unity of creation, (3) diversity of creation, and (4) human calling. On the basis of these presuppositions reformational philosophy rejects the self-origin of creation, and holds that

creation is a created reality that has its unity and diversity through one origin – the Creator. That is to say, it is a created reality, which was perverted by evil, which needs redemptive redirection in order to re-discover its structure and potentiality. The Creator does this through the calling of man.

Man was given the gift of science to help creation to rediscover itself. This becomes a critical dialogue between man (who was given the rationality to take the initiative in the process of creation in self-rediscovery) and the rest of creation. In the process of self-rediscovery of creation, man as the initiator, must recognize the object function of the respondent in concrete terms.

OPSOMMING

SUBJEK-OBJEK VERVREEMDING EN METODE

Die doel van hierdie navorsingsprojek is om die oorsprong, voorveronderstellings en invloed van die probleem van die subjek-objek vervreemding in metode oop te dek, te analiseer, en te bekritiseer in 'n poging om behoorlik voorveronderstellings vir navorsingsmetodologie daar te stel; voorveronderstellings wat 'n integraie ontologie weerspieel. Dit word bereik deur middel van literatuurstudie, 'n probleemhistoriese benadering, en transendentale krietik. Uit die bestudering van relevante literatuur blyk dit dat Descartes met sy "Ek dink daarom is ek" (*Cogito ergo sum*) as die oorsprong van die probleem van die subjek-objek vervreemding geneem kan word. Dit blyk verder uit die literatuur dat daar verskele metodologiese, pogings was om hierdie probleem op te los. Hier kan gedink word aan filosowe of skole van filosofie soos Kant (Transendentale filosofie), Husserl (Fenomenologie), Heidegger (Hermeneutiese fenomenologie), Dewey (Pragmatisme), en die metode van Deelnemende Navorsing (Subjek-subjek en objek-objek benadering). Hierdie metodes was nie in staat om Descartes se nalatenskap van 'n gedeelte ontologie in die kenteorie op te los nie.

Met die uitsonderdering van Deelnemende Navorsing herken deeneen van bogenoemde metodologiese pogings die objeksfunksies van die respondent nie. Sommige van hierdie metodes reduceer die objek tot die vlak van blote idees in die bewussyn. Dit laat die vraag ontstaan of daar enige metode kan wees wat in staat is om die probleem van die vervreemding tussen subjek en objek op te los? Kan navorsing onderneem word sonder dat 'n gedeelte ontologie daardeur veroorsaak word? In 'n soeke na antwoorde op hierdie vrae, het die outeur 'n keuse gemaak vir die reformatoriese filosofie. Die basiese ontologiese voorveronderstellings daarvan ten opsigte van navorsing sluit in: (1) die skeppingsmagheid van die skepping,

(2) die eenheid van die skepping, (3) die verskeidenheid van skepping, and (4) menslike roeping. Op grond van hierdie voorveronderstellings verwerp die reformatoriese filosofie die self-oorsprong van die skepping, en voer dit aan die skepping 'n geskape werklikheid is wat verwring is deur die kwaad, en wat 'n bevrydende rigtingsverandering nodig het, sodat dit sy struktuur en potensialiteit kan her-ontdek. Die Skepper doen dit deur roeping van die mens.

Aan die mens is die gawe van die wetenskap gegee om die skepping te help om sigself te herontdek. Dit word dan 'n kritiese dialoog tussen die mens (aan wie die rasionaliteit gegee is om die inisiatief te neem in die proses van skepping in self-herontdekking) en die res van die skepping. In die proses van die self-herontdekking van die skepping moet die mens, as die inisieerder, die objeksfunksie van die respondent in konkrete terme (n)erken.

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PART I:
LACUNAE OF
THE SUBJECT-OBJECT ALIENATION
PROBLEM

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Statement of Problem

The question, “How do we know?” presupposes an epistemological methodology to enhance the acquisition of knowledge, and “How do you do it” presupposes a research methodology. Methodology, since Descartes, suffered the subject-object dualism in conceptualization and practical procedure. Social and scientific research methodologies have always found themselves confined to the bounds of this dualism since the declaration of Descartes (1636:26-27 [JV])¹ *cogito ergo sum*. This resulted in many epistemological and research difficulties, such as the domination of the subject (so-called thinking thing) over the object (so-called non-thinking thing). The importance of the field of study in the determining of the method was thus almost ignored. It is because Descartes simply

¹ The letters in the square brackets indicate the name(s) of the translator. This is done because there are more than one translation per non-English author that may be consulted in this work. The date indicated will be of the original copy the translator used for his translation, but the page number(s) indicated is (or are) of the English translation copy, of which in this case it is John Veitch.

decided on subjective, rational grounds that the only acceptable method is the deductive one found in geometry.

Harrison-Barbet (1990:310), discussing Descartes' theory of the mind, and especially his arguments for the rule of reason, indicates Descartes tried to show that the mind is an individual substance possessing its own properties and entirely distinct from the body. Hence Harrison-Barbet's (1990:310) conclusion:

... It would not be too much of an exaggeration to say that most subsequent theories of the mind can be seen as attempts to deal with the difficulties raised by this essentially dualistic position of Descartes.

It was not only the difficulties related to the theories of the mind that Descartes' dualism affected, but the mind-set in the Western research methodology and social life at large.

As a result of that various philosophers after Descartes attempted to solve this Cartesian epistemological problem, because it had an impact on research methodology. Among them, just to name a few, are Kant, Husserl, Heidegger, and Dewey. I shall discuss these in detail in chapter 2. Some schools of methodology also sought to address the problem, and these

include the Participatory Research school (which I shall also discuss in detail in chapter 2).

Kant, for example, developed his transcendental or critical philosophy, which came to be known as the “Copernican Revolution”. He argued against the concept of the thinking thing (of Descartes) versus the object as the source of human knowledge. But since he believed that all the structural coherences which are found *a priori*, he remained stuck in the Cartesian dualism, and the object-in-itself (*Ding an sich*) remains unknown.

Husserl’s (1960:24) phenomenological method widened the gap between the subject and object more than Descartes because of his abstraction idea. He abstracted the essence of the intentional object and so took a distance from the real, by rejecting any presupposition of its existence. That means phenomenology as a method failed to solve the subject-object alienation problem.

Heidegger (1996:141 [150]) rejects Husserl’s presuppositionless method of phenomenology in any inquiry, especially the one based on the Cartesian dualism. He wanted to destroy the separation between the subject and object, but in the process, he fell into the temptation of extremism. Everything became

ontology of the subject. Method, for him, is finally a non-rational way back to where the subject is.

Dewey's pragmatism rejects the subject-object dichotomy as the basis for inquiry. To do this he introduces pragmatism, whose starting-point is the indeterminate situation. The situation becomes so absolute that his method also suffered the extremism of situationism. Thus his method boils down to taking the road which works best in the peculiar situation, and is an attempt to hold onto power, in ever changing situations. The final thing is that the subjective aims dominate over the means, and the requirements of the object may still be ignored.

Participatory Research (hereinafter referred to as the PR) methodology approaches the subject-object alienation problem differently. Research is viewed as a communal activity in the process of knowledge production because knowledge is a product. In order to avoid the subject-object cleft, the proponents of PR calls for the democratizing of investigation and knowledge production (Mulenga, 1994:7,8). This meant the researcher and the "researched" become one but with distinct roles to play. In so doing the subject-object cleft dissolves in the subject-subject relationship. This leads to the extreme of pansubjectivism. It also focuses on the social side of knowledge

production, so that, from the natural sciences, only those sections which show a direct social meaning, are important.

From the brief background above, it is apparent that no consensus has been reached among philosophers nor do the contemporary schools of philosophy provide a viable answer to the issues regarding Subject-Object alienation. There is still, therefore, the need to develop an optional approach to methodology, whereby a number of perspectives can be used. In this case, I wish to approach the subject-object alienation problem from a reformational philosophical perspective. I will first address methodological attempts to overcome the subject-object alienation problem, then follows the issue of ontological presuppositions, that gives foundation to the question of method.

After making such an overview on some methods which were developed to combat the subject-object problem, I conclude that none of the above managed to solve this problem completely. Therefore, this research seeks to address the problem that manifests itself in the following questions:

- (1) Can any method overcome the subject-object alienation?
- (2) How could it be done: without causing split ontology?

- (3) How could Husserl's excessive abstraction that rejects the existence of the created reality be avoided?
- (4) How could Heidegger's absolute ontologizing of method be avoided?
- (5) Should the researcher or the situation control the conception and practice of a research method?
- (6) How should the oscillation between being a subject and an object be resolved?

1.2 Purpose

The purpose of this research shall be to expose and analyze the origin and influence of the subject-object alienation problem, and some methodological attempts that were made to overcome it. It seeks a reasonable starting point for research methodology, and to establish proper presuppositions for methodology, as a way to give answers to the above questions.

1.3 Central Theoretical Statement

It will be argued, firstly, that the points of view under discussion, remained in the subject-object split, mostly on the side of subjectivism. Secondly, it will be proposed that creation should be seen as a unity, therefore, knowing it should be done

within that realm of the presupposition that method should be based on a united ontology. From this it follows that due recognition must be given to the relevant object functions in the field of study as co-determinants of the method used. Method, therefore, should be seen as a way of creation in self-discovery so as to maintain the unity of creation.

1.4 Method

The following methods shall be employed:

1.5.1 A *textual (or literature) study* of major works on methodology of the thinkers mentioned above, in order to analyze the development of the problem and its influence in the world of scholarship.

1.5.2 A *problem-historical approach*, in which the texts studied are lined up chronologically in order to indicate shifts in approach to the theme of this thesis.

1.5.3 *Transcendental criticism*, to search for and uncover the roots (or key ideas) of each approach in the basic ontological presuppositions.

1.5 Division of Chapters

Chapters 1 to 3, fall under Part I of the dissertation which covers the lacunae of the Subject-Object alienation problem. In Chapter 1, the reader is introduced to the dissertation, that includes, the introduction, statement of problem, purpose, central theoretical argument, and methodology. Chapter 2 is devoted to an analysis of Descartes' philosophy, as a way of establishing the origin of the Subject-Object dichotomy. Chapter 3 aims at uncovering some methodological attempts done by some philosophers to overcome the subject-object alienation problem.

Chapters 4 to 5 fall under Part II, which covers the Reformational Philosophy Option. In chapter 4 the reader is brought to the author's reaction to the problem and the author's proposed option of the Reformational Philosophy. Chapter 5 is the author's conclusion.

CHAPTER 2

THE ORIGIN OF THE SUBJECT-OBJECT DICHOTOMY

The question that we can confront Descartes with is, ‘How can we acquire knowledge without causing a split ontology?’ This question is posed in order to investigate how and why Descartes came out with a controversial method that led to a split ontology. Descartes insisted upon the necessity of a method that can govern the search for knowledge, especially intellectual certainty. In his search for a way to discover this truth, Descartes decided to harness the powers of reason and a set of rules. These rules were derived from mathematics, particularly geometry.

2.1 The Geometrical Method

Firstly concerning his geometrical method, Descartes (1628:4[H&R]) judges that “of all the sciences known yet, Arithmetic and Geometry alone are free from any taint of falsity or uncertainty”. This is because Descartes (1628:5[H&R]) holds that they are the easiest and clearest of all, they have an object such as we require, and in them it is not possible for someone to err, except by inadvertence. He calls us to note that there are two ways we can gain knowledge of facts: by experience and by

deduction (Descartes, 1628:4[H&R]), of which deduction is central to geometry. Later on we will see that Descartes does not work with experience because he does not trust his senses.

For Descartes, philosophy is developed as a pure geometry that owes all its certainty to the internal linkage of its reasons without making any reference to external reality (Grosholz, 1991:4). Therefore, Descartes' method is geometrical in nature, because he ascertains truth on the basis of innate ideas and a set of special principles. He held that our minds naturally possess two powers, by which we are able, entirely without fear of illusion, to arrive at knowledge of things: intuition² and its complementary, deduction (or reduction).

Grosholz (1991), in his book, *Cartesian Method and the Problem of Reduction*, analyzes Descartes' geometrical method. Grosholz (1991:2) argues that Descartes is an intuitionist, whose method is "not logicist, sceptical or scientific", but "performs the metaphysical function of making explicit how an object of

² Descartes (1628:7) understands *intuition* not as the fluctuating testimony of senses, nor misleading judgment that proceeds from the blundering constructions of imagination, but as the undoubting conception of an unclouded and attentive mind, which gives us so readily and distinctly that we are wholly freed from doubt about that which we understand. It springs from the light of reason alone; it is more certain than deduction itself, in that it is simpler.

knowledge must come to be known by a knower". Furthermore, Grosholz (1991:2) views Descartes' particular version of intuitionism as reductionism in that he reduces the true to the evident. This is because, Grosholz (1991:2, 6) comments:

Cartesian method organizes items of knowledge within a domain, and domains within the sphere of knowledge as a whole, according to an order of reasons, which begins with self-evidently indubitable, clear and distinct ideas, atoms of evidence, and proceeds by a chain of reasoning intended to be both truth-preserving and ampliative. Each item in the linear unfolding of knowledge from simple, clear and distinct ideas that provide the starting-points must be understandable solely on the basis of the ideas that precede it. ... Descartes supposes that human knowledge can be organized as a rigorous chain of items of knowledge arranged according to the order of reasons, so that those laid down first must be known without the aid of those that follow, and those that follow must be so arranged that they are shown to be true solely by those that precede.

What it shows us here is that Descartes wants to make the whole methodological enterprise a universal "mathematics". This was because he was convinced that mathematical (especially geometrical) certainty is the result of a special way of thinking. So he was striving hard to discover this way of thinking so that he would have a method for discovering true knowledge of

whatever was within reach of his mental powers. In order to discover this way, Descartes chose the method of geometry and arithmetic as indicated above.

One would want to know why Descartes chose mathematics. Is mathematics the method? Mathematics itself is not the method, but Descartes believed that he had discovered something fundamental about our mental operation via mathematics. That is, through intuition and deduction, the human mind is able to apprehend directly and clearly certain basic truths (Descartes, 1637: 92 [H&R]). So the criterion which Descartes uses to judge certainty or any given claim of truth is whether, “when contemplated by an undistracted and unprejudiced mental vision, it is clear and distinct ...” (Grosholz, 1991:136). Furthermore, Grosholz (1991:136) correctly assesses that in *Meditations*, Part III, Descartes

... converts this epistemic necessity from a merely subjective to the objective by inferring from the idea of God, God’s existence and perfection, so that He can serve as the guarantor of clear and distinct ideas.

Descartes (1637:92[H&R]) argues that through the help of geometrical reasoning, we are able to discover what we do not know with clarity and distinctness by progressing in an orderly

way from what we do know. This shows that Descartes' epistemology is apriorist for it does not make an appeal to human experience, but to the mental capacity. In other words Descartes does not work with the empirical world (or nature), but with innate ideas and an approved set of geometrical rules which provide a clear and orderly procedure for the operation of the mind. This clear and orderly procedure of the operation of the mind is seen in Descartes' rules of methodical doubt, based on the four rules he laid down.

Underlying this clear and orderly procedure of reasoning, are the four precepts which Descartes (1637:92[JV]) believed were perfectly sufficient, provided he took a firm and unwavering resolution that never in a single instance to fail observing them. These he (Descartes, 1637:92[JV]) laid down as follows:

The *first* was never to accept anything for true which I did not clearly know to be such: ... to compromise nothing more in my judgment than was presented to my mind so clearly and distinctly as to exclude all ground of doubt. The *second*, to divide each of the difficulties under examination into as many parts as possible, and as might be necessary for its adequate solution. The *third*, to conduct my thoughts in such order that by commencing with objects the simplest and easiest to know, I might ascend by little and little, and, as it were, step by step, to the knowledge of the more complex; ... And the *last*, in every case to make

enumerations so complete, and reviews so general, that I might be assured that nothing was omitted.

Descartes (1641:80 [JV]), in *Meditations on the First Philosophy*, strongly holds that all the truth that he possesses before his methodical doubt, was received either from, or through the senses (i.e. senses of seeing, hearing, touching, etc.). However, once he started his methodical doubt, he dismissed any knowledge from or through senses because we are subject to dreams and hallucinations (Marias, 1967:213), consequently these senses often deceive or mislead us. He does not also trust the human thought process for it is untrustworthy because we formulate paralogicism (or illogical reasoning) and frequently fall into error (Descartes, 1641:112;116ff[JV]). Now that he has laid down the rules, he wants to discover certainty by perfectly following those rules which are geometrical in nature. The rules show us how he is going to move from the empirical world to the ultimacy of reason.

2.2 Methodical Doubt

Although Descartes (1637:14-16 [JV]) holds that mathematics and logic are sciences with a secure basis, these two cannot help us to get to reality. Descartes resolved that the best way is to engage himself in search of a point that was firm and

immovable, that is, certain and indubitable. In a bid to solve this epistemological problem (of getting an immovable and an indubitable Archimedean point for acquiring knowledge), Descartes (1641:85 [JV]) chose the method of systematic doubt which he operated under the four rules quoted above. Following the first rule, Descartes doubted everything including himself and the whole world (as indicated below). Descartes (1641:85 [JV]) starts with the only thing that was left in his possession, that was his doubt of everything, which he expressed as follows:

I suppose, accordingly, that all the things which I see are false (fictitious); I believe that none of those objects which my fallacious memory represents ever existed; I suppose that I possess no senses; I believe that body, figure, extension, motion, and places are merely fictions of my mind. What is there, then, that can be esteemed true? Perhaps this only, that there is absolutely nothing certain.³

Furthermore, in *Principles of Philosophy*, Principle IV and V, Descartes (1644:220 [H&R]) gives reasons why we may doubt

³ Haldane and Ross (1911:149) translate the passage as follows, "I suppose, then, that all the things that I see are false; I persuade myself that nothing has ever existed of all that my fallacious memory represents to me. I consider that I possess no senses; I imagine that body, figure, extension, movement and place are but the fictions of my mind. What, then, can be esteemed as true? Perhaps nothing at all, unless that there is nothing in the world that is certain".

of sensible things, and the things we once accepted as certain, such as mathematical principles:

... because we desire to apply ourselves only to the search after truth, we shall in the first place doubt if, of all sensible things, or things which we have imagined, there are any that really exist: in the first place because we know that our senses have before deceived us, and that prudence directs us not to trust too much in what has even once deceived us: in the second place because in sleep we continually seem to feel or imagine innumerable things which have no existence. ... We shall also doubt of all the other things which have formerly seemed to us quite certain, even of the demonstrations of mathematics and of its principles which we formerly thought quite self-evident.

Descartes came out of his rationalistic trance with the declaration, "I think, therefore I exist" (*Cogito ergo sum*) as his indubitable starting point or the ultimate principle for the theory of his epistemology. Hence his (Descartes, 1637:26-27[JV]) conclusive assertion as found in his *Discourse on Method*:

But immediately upon this I observed that, whilst I thus wished to think that all was false, it was absolutely necessary that I, who thus thought, should be somewhat; and as I observed that this truth, *I think hence I am*, was so certain and of such evidence, that no ground of doubt, however extravagant, could be alleged by the sceptics capable of shaking, I concluded that I might,

without scruple, accept it as the first principle of the philosophy of which I was in search In the next place, I attentively examined what I was, ... I thence concluded that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature consists only in thinking, and which, that it may exist, has need of no place, nor is dependent on any material thing; so that "I," that is to say the mind by which I am what I am, is wholly distinct from the body, and is easily more known than the latter, and is such that although the latter were not, it would still continue to be all that it is.... And as I observed that in the words *I think, hence I am*, there is nothing at all which gives me assurance of their truth beyond this, that I see very clearly that in order to think it is necessary to exist. I concluded that I might take, as a general rule, the principle, that all the things which we very clearly and distinctly conceive are true, only observing, however, that there is some difficulty in rightly determining the objects which we distinctly conceive.

The above quotation concerning Descartes's *cogito* clearly indicates the shift he makes. Descartes shifts from renouncing the world (because of our subject dreams and hallucinations, the deceitfulness of our senses, our errors in judgment which he thought make it impossible to find the least truth in it), to the realization of his own existence. This realization does not remain in the empirical world but it progressively ascends to rational capacity. All things may be false but only one thing cannot be false, that is his existence as a thinking being. For

without existence, there is no thinking. This is because thinking points to the indispensable presupposition of substantial existence.⁴ The first truth of his existence, the *cogito ergo sum* is the first indubitable truth which Descartes could not doubt even if he might have wished to. It was clear and distinct in his mind that he was existing. This existence is a substantial *cogito* (ego, or I).

⁴ For Aristotle, the central concern of metaphysics is the study of substance, the essential nature of a thing. In connection with that, substance means that which is not asserted of a subject but of which everything else is asserted (Aristotle, *Metaphysics*:III,18). Therefore, substance is what we know as concretely basic about something, the substratum, after which we can say other things. Aristotle holds that everything that exists is some concrete individual thing and every thing is the concrete unity of matter and form (Aristotle, *Metaphysics*: XXV:40); therefore Mariás (1967:70) rightly concludes that in Aristotle substance is interpreted as a composite of matter and form, at the same time substance is viewed as a centre of change and as a logical subject (O'Connor, 1967:38).

Lacey (1986:235) correctly interprets Descartes that he “took substance to be *substrate* of, or what underlies, accidents or properties, but did not emphasize its distinction from them so much that it became unknowable”. Hence his (Descartes) definition in O'Connor (1967:38): “Everything in which there resides immediately, as subject, or by means of which there exists anything that we perceive, i.e. any property, quality, or attribute of which we have a real idea is called a Substance; ...For by means of our natural light we know that a real attribute cannot be an attribute of nothing”. For Descartes (in *Meditations*, 1637:103-105;233[JV]), there is a distinction between the finite substance and the infinite substance, of which the finite substances is the created reality and the infinite substance is God whom Descartes’s mind cannot comprehend. But all in all, substance for Descartes is permanent, so that

The Cartesian *cogito* is an existing being (a substance), a thinking thing that doubts, understands (or conceives), affirms, denies, wills, refuses, imagines, and perceives (Descartes, 1641:88-89[JV]). Thus existence became the starting point of Descartes's philosophy.

2.3 The Mind Versus the World

Descartes (1637:27[JV]) holds that the *cogito* is separated from the body. This is a grave mistake that Descartes made, of conceiving "the human subjectivity as a closed consciousness" (Kockelman, 1994:67). It is here that we see the Cartesian dualism, which is the genesis of the disengagement of the mind (or reason) from the extension so as to establish its hegemony in the realm of epistemology. The implication here is that reason (or the mind) takes the subjective role, and the material things are the objects of the *cogito*. In a critical disapproval of this split ontology, Taylor (1989:145) portrays Cartesian dualism by saying:

Coming to a full realization of one's being as immaterial involves perceiving distinctly the ontological cleft between the two, and this involves grasping the material world as mere extension. The

the material world formed but a single substance, since only it, not things in it, was permanent (Lacey, 1986:235).

material world here includes the body, and coming to see the real distinction requires that we disengage from our usual embodied perspective.... We have to objectify the world, including our own bodies, and that means to come to see them mechanistically and functionally, in the same way that an uninvolved external observer would.

From the same declaration we see the reduction of reality to mere “mystic” existence, because reality is no longer spoken of in terms of concretion but ideas. This is because the substantially existent being, becomes simply thinking, reason. Thus, the thinking thing is an immaterial subject with material objects.

Strozier (1988:191) says that Descartes's *cogito* is by definition self-reflexive, because the observer-philosopher must think the being thought that is prior to his thinking. Consequently, the problem of the *cogito* is the crisis of identity, the split of the self into the subject and the object (Strozier, 1988:191). What Strozier holds is the generally held understanding of the Cartesian method. But a closer look at this Cartesian problem appears to show a double split: (1) the thinking thing (or subject) reflexively look at (or think about) the being thought (object), (2) the thinking thing (or subject) facing (or thinking about) the material world.

Descartes may not have seen the first one as a split. In fact he may have thought of it as a subject-object-identity (thought to thinking about itself). Therefore if all knowledge can be deduced from this, the second split does not matter. So he believed his method of doubt, “seeing”, and deduction would overcome the second split.

2.4 Evaluative Conclusion

Kockelmans (1993:64) points out that in the problem of knowledge, traditional philosophy since Descartes, has tended to separate the subject and the object. Furthermore, Kockelmans (1993:64) argues that whoever adopts such a point of view must sooner or later, in some way or another, hit upon Descartes' epistemological problem of finding the Archimedian point. This is because whoever conceives of man as independent of the world necessarily throws man back upon himself. Underlying Descartes' attempt to solve the epistemological problem facing him is the rationalistic presupposition of a split-ontology. This split-ontological presupposition became the origin of the problem of subject-object alienation. Stambaugh (1975:80) comments:

The split between subject and object means that there is a separation, a dichotomy between the knower and what he knows. In the formulation of Descartes, the subject is a thinking thing which is not extended (or material) and the object is an extended (or material) thing which does not think. These two things have nothing in common and the problem of their relationship to each other becomes very acute.

Pressing on the same note, Mensch (1991:465) says:

Since Descartes' time the problem of the subject-object relation has bedevilled philosophy's attempts to understand the world. The framework it has left us with has been one in which we picture the subject as something "here," the object as another thing there and their relations as describable according to the laws of causality.

Our encounter with the Cartesian split ontology tells us that creation is divided into two: the thinking substance (man) and the extended substance (the world). The world is a mere extension; these two spheres of the created reality do not have any contact with each other and are completely dissimilar (Marias, 1967:221). Consequently, it gives rise to the problem of communication between the two, whereby the mind (or man) becomes the subject and the body (or the world) becomes the object: hence the supremacy of the thinking subject. Out of this

dualism, one can see a further ontological presupposition: the “external” object, in terms of the second split, is always and only spatial (and implicitly mechanical). In such a situation, one would conclude that this is a reduction. That is to say, all object functions, other than the spatial, are mental. Space itself is reduced to geometrical *a priori*. This compels one to conclude that Descartes’ analytical method, which is characterized by progression, is geometrical in nature as has been shown above.

In reducing the non-ego to extension and mechanism, Descartes neglected its functioning as object of thought, art, moral love, economic action, law-abiding behaviour in human interaction with the environment. He further ignored the question of how to reach out to other minds – thinking that all the certainty needed is found in the thinking ego.

In so doing, Descartes (1637:15[JV]) developed the methodic doubt in order to find an absolutely certain starting point for building our knowledge as we have seen above. Consequently, this meant that, according to Descartes (1637:15[JV]), we have to live according to probability until all knowledge has been reconstructed according to this method. Due to this kind of conception, one would want to know whether Descartes, through his subjective rational deductive method and the

certainty placed in logical intuition, would really be able to understand activities of practical life. Activities of practical life, like trade, demands interaction and dialogue in real life, whereas for Descartes real life and certainty should be understood in terms of innate ideas.

This notion of innate ideas is contradicted by Locke (1680:535-536) who claims that the mind is a *tabula rasa*, a blank tablet or white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas. For he argued that all ideas come from experience which is either sensations or reflection (Locke, 1680:538[Book II]). Sensations are derived from our sensory perceptions of the external world (Locke, 1690:539[Book II]), and reflection provides ideas by the mind “reflecting on its own operations within itself” (Locke, 1690:539[Book II]). In his disapproving discussion on the universal innate moral principles, Locke (1690:535[Book I]) criticizes the notion of innate ideas for ethical life – that is there cannot be innate, self-evident truths that are the same and valid for all minds. In other words, there is no room for universal consent on innate moral principles. If such a thing were there, then people would not debate or argue about the morality of abortion, because it would be something innate.

Furthermore, we must be warned of the dangers of Descartes' rationalism. There is extreme emphasis upon the rational capacity of the human mind, which he now considers the irreplaceable source of truth, both about man and about the created reality. We have seen that he assumed that what we could think clearly with our minds did in fact exist in the world outside our minds, and experience would cause the innate truths in us to be self-evident. Thus anything we can conceive clearly and distinctly is true. The trust in reason and its *a priori*'s alone is not warranted, since the human mind is limited and subject to perversion. There is heavy reliance upon reason in Descartes, to which we must object. Everything becomes reason in the Cartesian philosophy.

It is worthwhile to remind Descartes that he still needs the body even if he were to reach the ultimate level of thinking. Primarily, human existence is humanly understood not in a form of a ghost, but in embodied form. In order to discover and understand the thinking subject, we need a body, or the material world, to be real. Man cannot be seen as a mere mechanical *extensa*, and he is neither a dichotomy (mind or reason) and body (or extension) nor a trichotomy (soul, body, and spirit), but a unity. Descartes' dualism, with his singular preference for deductive rationality prevents him from using his full human experience in

understanding the world, even for practical life. It even prevents him from appreciating the body as something fully human (for him it is a mere extension or machine) with its beauty, its communicative capabilities, its biological frailties, its continuity with the rest of creation for man to be real.

What does Descartes say about the unity of creation and its logical structure? An approach that departs from the principle of creation as given, sees mankind as part of creation and all of creation as a coherent whole. Therefore mankind and the rest of creation are open towards each other, for creation is the dwelling of mankind and sustains mankind. Humankind finds its security in this Divine-given coherence. But Descartes finds his security in innate ideas, so he cannot even appreciate the coherence and mutual openness of mankind and the whole of creation. Descartes stresses only the deficiencies of bodily knowing and the trustworthiness of reason, while forgetting that the senses and the limbs have some trustworthiness, and also the external world, while reason can also be misleading.

The Cartesian framework strongly influenced social and scientific research. In many places the researcher has been and is still being designated as the subject, with the connotations that he is the one who gives meaning and has the final say on the

object(s). This, today, is unacceptable because if research is to be carried out on a certain person or a group of people, the so-called object of research is reduced to a non-thinking thing. Such a kind of designation has led to misconceptions and misrepresentations of some human cultures and even led to ethical insensitivity when dealing with non-human creatures. In that kind of situation, especially in social research, there is lack of proper interaction between the researcher and the people among whom he or she is doing research.

For us to engage ourselves in scientific endeavour without splitting ontology, one is compelled to really seek for an alternative. Prior to all the alternatives I may give, it is good to look at the other alternative attempts which were done by other philosophers. I will look at a few of these I think they are of matter to this problem.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGICAL ATTEMPTS TO OVERCOME THE SUBJECT-OBJECT ALIENATION

Various philosophers and schools of philosophy after Descartes attempted to solve this Cartesian epistemological problem because it made an impact on research methodology in various fields of natural and social sciences. These are, just to name a few, Kant, Husserl, Heidegger, Dewey, and the Participatory Research Method.

3.1 Kant's Transcendental Philosophy

3.1.1 Transcendental/Critical Method

In its development, Kant's philosophy appears as an attempt to reconcile the views of *scientism*⁵ (whose important representatives are Galileo, Hobbes, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Newton, Locke, and Berkeley) and *practicalism*⁶

⁵ *Scientism* according to Kok (1996:127), refers to the period between 1600 to 1830, where *ratio* was believed to be of scientific nature. In this period, the role of scientific, and theoretical knowledge, came to be very much overestimated.

⁶ *Practicalism*, in early rationalism, referred to the realization that there was such a thing as practical knowledge – thus there was some valuable

(whose important figures are the three great Enlightenment philosophers Hume, Voltaire, and Rousseau) (Kok, 1996:135). This blend resulted in him becoming the father of *idealism*⁷. He developed his transcendental (or critical) method around a response to the views of the above philosophers, more especially the Cartesian dualism and the Humean skeptical empiricism.

Marías (1967:285-286) says that the principal source of Kant's philosophical method on the one hand, is to be found in the Cartesian philosophy and resultantly in rationalism, and on the other hand is to be found in Hume's criticisms which awakened him from his dogmatic slumbers.⁸ This awakening is confirmed by Kant's (1985:5) open confession when he said:

knowledge not of a theoretical nature (Kok, 1996:127). During The Enlightenment, according to Kok (1996:127), practicalism was made to mean the practical a priori, the practical reason.

⁷ *Idealism* is the view that mind is the ultimate reality in the world (Stumpf, 1993:530). According to Kok (1996:127) idealism came as reconciliatory movement which attempted to bring together the rivalry movements, scientialism and practicalism. Kant's *transcendental idealism* (sometimes referred to as critical idealism) – “a term he applied to his theory of the external world ... refers to his view that the objects of our experience, in the sense of things existing in space and enduring through time, are nothing but appearances, and have no independent existence outside our thoughts” (Flew, 1979:160). Kant (1787:59) uses the adjective, ‘transcendental’ because the mode of knowledge is to be possible *a priori*.

⁸ Kant holds that there are three possible standpoints in philosophy - **the dogmatic, the skeptical, and the critical**, of which his predecessors fall under the first two. A dogmatist is one who proceeds under the

I openly confess that my remembering of David Hume was the very thing which many years ago first interrupted my dogmatic slumber and gave my investigations in the field of speculative philosophy a quite new direction.

In Descartes, the *res cogitans* and the *res extensa* share some commonality: being (Marias, 1967:286). It is this being which Descartes saw as creating the unity between the soul (or mind) and the world, and as the one that makes knowledge possible. For Kant, the concept of being is understood as being transcendental. Something transcendental according to Kant (1787:43[VP]), refers “to all knowledge which is not so much

assumption that human reason can comprehend ultimate reality. Before proceeding to construct a metaphysics he does not enquire whether it is possible. **Dogmatism** expresses itself through three factors: *rationalism, realism, and transcendence*.

Descartes and Leibniz fall under this dogmatic category because (1) they hold that it is possible to determine from pure reason *a priori* principles the ultimate nature of God, the soul, and the material universe (rationalism); (2) they assert that by human reasoning, the full nature of objective reality can be determined (realism); (3) and through pure reason they go out beyond the sensible and determine the supersensuous (the attitude of transcendence) (Smith, 1923:13).

Skepticism may be defined through three terms: *empiricism* (reduction of knowledge to sense-experiences), *subjectivism* (knowledge is infected by subjective conditions - sensations), *immanence* (knowledge is confined to the sphere of sense-experience). **Criticism** is constituted with three factors: *rationalism, subjectivism, immanence* (Smith, 1923:14).

occupied with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects, so far as this mode of knowledge is possible *a priori*. A system of such concepts would be called *Transcendental Philosophy*". That is to say something transcendental is something that does not correspond to the objects of our experience. Therefore, according to Kant, any idea is *transcendental* because it corresponds to no object in our experience, for such an idea is produced not by intuition but by pure reason alone. Such are the ideas of the self, of the cosmos, and of God (Stumpf, 1993:310). So being is something transcendental: it became an important basis for Kant's method when he came to talk about *phenomena* (things as they appear (or as we experience them) to us, or things subject to space and time) and especially the *noumena* (things-in-themselves).

Hume (in Kaufmann and Baird, 1994:683-689) rejected all abstruse speculations and superstitions of contemporary thought and held that there are no such things as *innate ideas*, on the basis of the maxim: all knowledge comes through sensory experience. The rejection of innate ideas was a reaction to Descartes's (1912:98;250) discussion on ideas whereby he argues that some of the ideas are innate.

In response to some of his predecessors, Kant (1787:15[VP]) came with a central maxim of his critical method which he famously code-named “Copernican revolution”:⁹ no knowledge without a knower. The maxim was based on his new hypothesis that it is the object that conforms to the operations of the mind, and not the other way around, as conceived by Kant’s predecessors. This is because prior to Kant, most philosophers held that the mind, in knowing, is conformed to objects; that is the ideas of the mind are shaped by the world outside the mind (Kaufmann and Baird, 1994:762). In other words, the impressions we get from the objects through our senses guide

⁹ *Nicholas Copernicus* (1473-1543) was a Polish canon (or astronomer). He studied mathematics, astronomy and medicine, and in the last year of his life published his work: *De Revolutionibus Orbium Caelestium* (The Revolutions of the Celestial Orbit). In this book he made a revolutionary declaration that the sun is the centre of our celestial system and that the earth and the other planets revolve around it (Marías, 1967:202). This was an opposed view to the traditional cosmological one that the earth as being located in the central region of a universe, and the sun was moving around the earth. Some commentators criticize Kant’s analogy of the Copernicus revolution with his Critical Philosophy.

According to Smith (1923:22) the Copernican revolution is naturally conceived “in terms of its main ultimate consequence, the reduction of the earth from its proud position of central pre-eminence”, but that does not bear the least analogy to the intended consequences of the Critical philosophy. For Kant’s purpose is to neutralize the naturalistic implications of the Copernican astronomy by reversing the order of dependence of mind on things. According to Stumpf (1993:307) Kant neither meant to say that the mind creates objects, nor did he mean that the mind possesses innate ideas. Thus Kant’s Copernican revolution meant that the mind brings something to the objects it experiences.

our minds to understand the world. This was the case with most of the philosophers but it was not the case with Descartes. Hume maintained that all that we experience is a series of impressions. For with Hume, Kant agreed that our knowledge begins with experience, but unlike Hume, Kant saw the mind as an active agent doing something with the objects it experiences (Stumpf, 1993:307). In his preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant (1787:13-14[NKS]) says,

When Galilei caused balls, the weights of which he had himself previously determined, to roll down an inclined plane; when Torricelli made the air carry a weight which he had calculated beforehand to be equal to that of a definite volume of water; or in more recent times, when Stahl changed metals into oxides, and oxides back into metal, by withdrawing something and then restoring it, a light broke upon all students of nature. They learned that reason has insight only into that which it produces after a plan of its own, and that it must not allow itself to be kept, as it were, in nature's leading-strings, but must itself show the way with principles of judgment based upon fixed laws, constraining nature to give answer to questions of reason's own determining.

In other words, the mind has something to do with reality. Kant (1787:83-90[VP]) demonstrates this by showing that the mind is structured in categories which enables it to impose its way of knowing upon its objects; in so doing, the mind (i.e. reason)

actively organizes our experiences after a plan of its own. That is to say, natural laws are imposed onto nature in the process of knowing. It is a technician and subjectivist construction of nature which takes place here. Reason makes what it knows according to fixed laws (innate) – it compels nature to fit into its (i.e. reason's) plan. It is reason – the *cogito* behind the categories – that imposes order on the chaotic impressions received (Kok, 1996:135). In so doing, man thinks he is putting some sense in reality and brings order to the world. That is why nature is in such a bad shape – rather than respecting in its own integrity, we have been remaking it according to our aims (without knowing or expecting the bad consequences).

If the human mind has something to do with the impressions it receives from the objects, how does it make some of these objects? In reaction to this, Kant formulates, what one may call his statement of problem in a question form: “How is synthetic *a priori* knowledge possible?” (Politis, 1993:xl). The question presupposes a method. Kant wrote his *Critique of Pure Reason* (1787) as an answer to the question (Politis, 1993:xl), and in the same treatise he develops the transcendental/critical method which, according to Beck (1981:57), was “the first method designed specifically for philosophy”.

So with this transcendental (or critical) method Kant wanted to investigate the conditions that determine the possibility of our knowing (Kok, 1996:135). In the process, Kant addresses the issue of the subject (mind) and its objects. Relevant to this research is to look at Kant's methodological attempt to close the cleft between the subject and the object.

3.1.2 Kant Versus Descartes

Although Kant differs with Descartes, he shares with him the idea that the mind already contains some ideas which do not need empirical verification. In Descartes the mind contains the innate ideas, while in Kant the mind contains the idea of categories. Be it as it may, Kant (1783:74[333f][JWE])¹⁰ rejects the Cartesian view of an ultimate substantial subject and he argues that:

People have long since observed that in all substances the subject proper, that which remains after all the accidents (as predicates) are abstracted, hence the substantial itself, remains unknown, and various complaints have been made concerning these limits to our

¹⁰ The *square brackets*, which are inside the round brackets, are used to indicate the page numbers found in the vertical margins of some of the translated works of Kant and Heidegger, which are used in this research work.

insights.... Pure reason requires us to seek for every predicate of a thing its own subject, and for this subject, which is itself necessarily nothing but a predicate, its subject, and so on indefinitely (or as far as we can reach). But it follows that we must not hold anything at which we can arrive to be an ultimate subject, and that substance itself never can be thought by our understanding, however deep we may penetrate, even if all nature were unveiled to us.

Caygill (1995:378) points out that with Descartes, the ultimate subject was designated with the self-conscious "I" disclosed by the *cogito ergo sum* (I think therefore I am), and this was subsequently regarded as the ground or basis of acquiring knowledge.

A close look at what Kant is saying above and what Descartes holds one would really want to ask this question: Does Kant agree with Descartes that there is a substantial subject? After a careful look at his discussions pertaining to the issue, one finds that while Kant admitted that the subject as I, has a formal, logical function as a condition of experience, he argued vigorously against the claim that it is designated an existing substance (Kant, 1787:237-252). He is willing to concede that the self-conscious I is the ultimate subject of knowing and acting, but he is not willing to grant this subject any substantial

existence: the I as absolute subject is a logical function, and not an 'existing' being. Furthermore, for Kant this subject is only a mere prefix or a completely empty representation, not a conception, "but merely a consciousness which accompanies all conceptions" (Kant, 1787:239[NKS]). This leaves one with a question: What exactly is the difference between a 'substantial subject' and a 'logical subject'? Following closely Kant's arguments this difference may be explained as follows: a substantial subject refers to a specific, concrete, and existent figure, while a logical subject refers to a prefixial function or role it plays in conceptual and grammatical construction. In other words, Kant's analysis of the subject concerns the very essence of the subject. We find this idea being expressed by Husserl as we shall see in point 3.2, in the form of a transcendental Ego.

In his elaboration of Kant's position on the issue of the subject, Caygill (1995:377f) says that:

Kant was extremely sensitive to the danger of converting the logical subject and its predicates into the substance and accidents of ontology. The logical subject of knowledge is the I which remains after all the accidents (as predicates) are abstracted but the process of abstraction itself cannot vouch for the existence of the I. To expect it do so is to commit the fallacy of paralogism, as

in the first paralogism which moves falsely the premises that the absolute subject of our judgements is substance, and that I, as a thinking being, am the absolute subject of all my possible judgements to the conclusion that “Therefore I, as thinking being (soul) am substance”.

That is to say it is impossible to view the subject in terms of substantiality as found in Descartes, but it has to be understood simply in terms of transcendental. Therefore, Kant rejects the Cartesian argument of a substantial subject as invalid, in favour of a transcendental subject, which Husserl calls the transcendental Ego, as already indicated above.

Now unlike Descartes, Kant’s viewing of the subject as being transcendental, does not mean that he rejects the existence of concrete reality (or doubt it as the ultimate reality) as it appears to us. However Kant (1787:61[NKS]) points out that:

... there are two stems of human knowledge, namely sensibility and understanding, which perhaps spring from a common, but to us unknown, root. Through the former objects are given to us; through the latter they are thought.

And these two sources demonstrate the applicability of Kant’s critical method hypothesis that “knowledge is, therefore a cooperative affair between the knower and the thing known”

(Stumpf, 1993:308). Furthermore, according to Stumpf (1993:309), Kant insists that the human knowledge is limited in its scope, of which the limitation consists of two forms, namely: (1) “knowledge is limited to the world of experience”; and (2) knowledge is limited by the way in which “our faculties of perception and thinking organize the raw data of experience”.

Based on these ideas, one is compelled to ask Kant two most important questions. (1) How does Kant arrive at his epoch-making conclusion? (2) How does he solve the subject-object cleft? Kant responds to these questions by bringing to use his transcendental/critical method in his analysis of the human consciousness.

3.1.3 Analysis of the Human Consciousness

For Kant to reach his goal, he needed to spell out the forms of space and time¹¹, and the *a priori*¹² categories (or structure) of

¹¹ According to Tarnas (1996:343) *space and time* are a priori forms of human sensibility; they condition whatever is apprehended through the senses. Functionally space and time lay the basis of all sensory experience; they condition and structure any empirical observation.

¹² The term *a priori* means before or independent of experience. hence, a priori knowledge is what we know without experiencing it (Stumpf, 1993:528) (Its opposite is *a posteriori*, which means after experience, or knowledge whose validity is based on experience (Marias, 1967:283)). Categories, as used by Kant refers to the *a priori* concepts or principles

the mind, so as to lay his foundation. That calls for us to give an exposition of Kant's analysis of the human consciousness. In his book *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics that will be Able to Come as Science*, Kant (1783:27 [283]) begins by noting that:

... it is only the form of sensuous intuition by which we can intuit things *a priori*, but by which we can know objects only as they appear to us (to our senses), not as they are in themselves; ... Now, the intuitions which pure mathematics lays at the foundation of all its cognitions and judgments which appear at once apodeictic and necessary are space and time. ... for if we omit from the empirical intuitions of bodies and their alterations (motion) everything empirical, i.e. belonging to sensation, space and time still remains, and therefore pure intuitions that lie *a priori* at the basis of the empirical.

According to Marias (1967:288) knowledge can be either *a priori*, or *a posteriori*; the latter cannot be universal or necessary, therefore, science requires the former. In other words, Kant (1787:37-39) is trying to argue that science requires *a priori* knowledge (that is, knowledge that is not limited by the contingencies of experience in the here and now), of which its

the human mind brings to knowing to structure and condition the experiential data received from the impressions given by the objects. These include, space and time; cause and effect; categories of understanding such as quantity, quality, relation, and modality (Kant, 1985:46 [302-303]).

constituents are mathematics, physics, and traditional metaphysics. Traditional metaphysics claims to know its three objects – man, the world and God as indicated above. These objects are beyond our experience because they are infinite syntheses (Marias, 1967:288). From the three kinds of scientific knowledge *a priori*, mathematics, physics, and metaphysics, Kant chooses mathematical principles because they necessarily involve a context of space and time which they share with objects of sense (Kant, 1783:31 [287]). Linked to this background, Kant puts much emphasis on experience; this tells us of the influence of the Humean empiricism.

The next step that Kant takes in his discussion on the subject and object is to try to uncover the way the human consciousness is organized in every person. Firstly, Kant (1787:180[MJ]) puts the objects into two groups. These are: (1) the *phenomena*, which refer to things as they appear, (i.e. objects of possible experience or objects as we experience them); (2) and the *noumena*, which refers to things-in-themselves, (and these things in themselves are purely intelligible, or nonsensual and transcendent reality which are inaccessible (*Ding an sich*)). This distinction meant also the distinction of the principles or structure of the mind, thus between the perception (sense) and thought (understanding). Bird (1962:53) points out that:

... appearances are the objects of perception, and so belong to sensibility, while the understanding is responsible for the concept of a thing in itself, or noumenon.

Kant, (1783:73 [332-333]) holds that objects-in-themselves cannot be known because they are not bound in space and time. As well they cannot be known because they are not in us. The idea that they are not spatial and temporal, and also they are not in us means that they are not affected by our subjectivity. Therefore we cannot conceive something that is not reshaped into our senses. For all objects we know and investigate are sensed objects.

Now how do we come to know the object? Kant (1787:41[NKS]) argues that

There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience In the order of time, therefore, we have no knowledge antecedent to experience, and with experience all our knowledge begins.

In other words, Kant (1783:32 [289-290]) argues that we can only know the object as far as it is given to us through its impressions, but we cannot know what it may be in itself. They

are outside us, but we know them by the impressions which their influence make on our senses. These impressions are chaotic raw materials. They do not have any shape. It is here, in the experience by our senses that the first level of shaping takes place. It is our mind that shapes the raw materials into the forms of space (spatial character – next to each other) and time (temporal character – after each other). It is in space that the shape, magnitude, and relation to one another of (an) object(s) are determined or determinable (Kant, 1787:67[NKS]). Kant (1787:68; 74[NKS]) explains that space and time are necessary *a priori* representations which underlies all outer intuitions. Space and time are the forms of vision (or intuition) in our sensibility. They are the ones that stand between the object and the sensibility of the subject. Marias (1967:290) rightly concludes that “space and time separate us from the reality of the things-in-themselves”.

After the raw materials are reshaped into representations (or organized materials) in form of space and time, our sensibility presents to our understanding only phenomena, that is, things which it has already deformed or operated on (Marias, 1967:290). Kant (1787:105[NKS]) describes understanding as a non-sensible faculty of knowledge, and it cannot be a faculty of intuition. However, besides intuition there is no other mode of

knowledge except by means of concepts (Kant, 1787:105[NKS]). In our understanding there are forms, or categories. These categories of the understanding, according to Dooyeweerd (1969:43[II])¹³, “are applied as logical determinations without aid of any sensory experience”. These are categories or forms of quantity, quality, relation, and modality. In these categories, we are no longer separated from reality in itself, because it is in us as representations. What we see here is that the autonomous reason constructs laws by imposing the categories on the received raw materials (of nature). According to Kalsbeek’s (1975:60) comment, “The forms and the categories of the human mind, together with the forms of intuition, constitute our whole known world”. In other words, the origin and existence of the cosmos is reason.

Our knowledge of objects (phenomena), according to Kant (1783:47 [NKS]):

... consists of intuitions, which belong to the sensibility, and judgments, which is entirely a work of the understanding.

That is to say, intuition takes place in so far as objects are given to us in form of raw materials through sensibility. Then after

¹³ The *number* in the square brackets indicates the volume number; in this case, it is volume II.

these *raw materials* are transformed into *representations* they are brought through into the understanding (which is the faculty of thought) (Kant, 1787:102[VP]). The understanding uses categories to organize phenomena – the result is *concepts* (Kant, 1787:65[NKS]).

Kant (1787:106[NKS]) reduces all the acts of understanding by sending all the concepts to the faculty of judgment (which also has the capability of judgment) where the result is *ideas*. The faculty of judgment is able to reduce the concepts into ideas by means of transcendental deduction (Kant, 1787:122[NKS]). In the faculty of judgment there are three transcendental ideas of pure reason which act as regulative concepts, viz: ideas of the *self*, of the *cosmos*, and of *God* (Kant, 1787:323[NKS]). These ideas are transcendental because they do not correspond to any object in our experience, and they are not produced by intuition but by pure reason alone. Since these three transcendental ideas do not correspond to any object in our experience, therefore, we cannot have scientific knowledge of God, the world, and or even the substantial self. This is because, according to Kant (1787:324[NKS]) pure reason does not relate directly to objects, but to the concepts that are sent to it by understanding in regard to the objects. Here we encounter Kant's arid rationalistic idealism, whereby all things are thrown into the world of ideas.

The question that Kant is yet to answer is: How does he get rid of the cleft between the subject and the object? Kant, does not answer this question; instead, he is busy in polemics with Descartes in a bid to reject the substantiality of the subject, which we find acceptable. However, what we see here is Kant's critical idealism. Everything remains within the subject's reason. The subject imposes order on the chaotic raw materials received through sensibility into the *a priori* space and time. The real reality is the reality of ideas. For Kant the divine-given reality is not the real world until it is reduced to *a priori* ideas. This resulted in Kant's understanding of human knowledge of science or scientific knowledge to be acceptable only when it is viewed in *a priori* terms.

Like scientific knowledge, moral knowledge is based upon *a priori* judgments. Using his transcendental/critical method, in the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant investigated the conditions that determine the possibility of our knowledge, while in the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788) he explores the conditions for our moral action. In these two critiques, Kant tries to show how these mental processes are linked – thus how the mind moves from a formal understanding of reasoning in general to moral reasoning in particular. This is because the universal law

of reason is the universal law of morality (Hughes, 1983:41), which is *a priori* knowledge – everything is controlled by the exercise of reason. That is why Kant postulated his famous ‘categorical imperatives’.

In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant (1788:47[TKA]) gives an exposition of his law of universal moral duty:

Pure reason is practical of itself alone, and gives (to man) a universal law which we call the *Moral Law*. ... Now this principle of morality, just on account of the universality of the legislation which makes it the formal supreme determining principle of the will, without regard to be a law for all rational beings, in so far as they are capable of acting according to principles, and consequently also according to practical *a priori* principles ... It is, therefore, not limited to men only, but applies to all finite beings that possess reason and will ... In the former case, however, the law has the form of an imperative, because in them, as rational beings, we can suppose pure will. In their case therefore, the moral law is an *imperative*, which commands *categorically*, because the law is unconditioned; the relation of such a will to this law is *dependence* under the name of *obligation*, which implies a *constraint* to an action, though only by reason and its objective law; and this action is called *duty*

Furthermore, in his work, *Fundamentals for the Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant (1785:848[K&B]) concludes that

From what has been said, it is clear that all moral conceptions have their seat and origin completely *a priori* in the reason,

Now, it is important to analytically look at the influence of Kant's transcendental/critical method to moral knowledge. Central to Kant's method is reason, hence his view of scientific and moral knowledge is that it is *a priori* as indicated above. In moral judgments, reason, coupled with pure will enable men to formulate laws of conduct for themselves. Thus man can judge the right or wrong of his actions. This is because, according to Kant (1788:49),

The *autonomy* of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws, and of all duties which conform to them; on the other hand, *heteronomy* of the elective will not only cannot be the basis of any obligation, but is, on the contrary, opposed to the principle thereof, and to the morality of the will.

This independence of the will presupposes the freedom of the self-legislation of the pure, and therefore practical reason. Based on pure reason, all imperatives command either *hypothetically*, (which represents the practical necessity of a possible action as means to something else that is willed), or *categorically* (which represents an action as necessary of itself without reference to

another end) (Kant, 1785:850[K&B]), hence Kant's choice of the categorical imperative. He said it (the categorical imperative) may be designated the way of *morality*.

What we get from Kant's declaration and moral arguments is that the driving force, if not the guiding principle behind Kant's (1785:840[K&B]) moral philosophy is pure reason – it reinforces the idea of duty to maintain one's life. Duty is here defined as “the necessity of acting from respect for the law” (Kant, 1785:841[K&B]). Hence Kant's moral philosophy can be referred to as deontological ethics (i.e. duty-centred ethics) as well as autonomous ethics. Threading through his moral arguments is the line of thought that the moral law is within us (in our reason) and moral actions are carried out for our sake not because of any external law. That is to say, the principles of moral behaviour (or knowledge) are derived by the practical reason *a priori*. What it means now is that Kant reduces all the knowledge he acquired to human constructs and neglected the knowability of the world.

On the basis of understanding such a position (Kant's), one is compelled to ask some questions as follows: (1) Does Kant's position not entail that natural things cannot function as moral objects? That is to say, do we not owe some loyalty to

threatened species of animals even though they cannot act as fellow moral subjects? (2) Should Kant not give us an analysis of the concrete subject-subject relations on the level of morality? Why is it that we differ concretely on moral issues if the categorical imperative is universal – i.e. why do some moral subjects not come to understand that their rational moral duty?

3.1.4 Evaluative Conclusion

In evaluating Kant, one can see his positive side, that Kant is right to reject the complete deduction of human existence that saw the rejection of human experience as seen in the Cartesian metaphysics. He tries to balance the two, rationalism and empiricism. Caygill (1995:378) concludes that Kant accepts the *cogito* or ‘I think’ as the proposition of an absolute I or subject, but resists the *ergo sum* or paralogistic inference that this subject is a substantial being.

Even though Kant resists the temptation of a substantial subject, Grene (1966:143) rightly concludes that Kant remained a Cartesian dualist because of the maintenance of the subject-object polarization. He even helps Descartes by giving firm demarcations of the cleft. Although he never intended the transcendental subject to be a substantial subject, Kant fuelled

the desire for it to be so when he accepted the concrete existence of the object. In an attempt to secure an infinite and logical subject as the absolute condition of knowledge and action, Kant's transcendental/critical method suffered the reality of the finite, historical, and substantial subject suggested by the object. This left the rationalistic epistemological methodology with an insoluble problem. As a result, West (1996:170) rightly argues that:

If knowledge is based on a finite or contingent subject, then the conditions of knowledge are neither timeless nor universal, and anything like absolute truth is unattainable.

The danger that Kant made was to make pure reason his Archimedian point for his method. The consequence was that Kant became an agnostic about knowing reality in itself, although he had a belief in God. He could not figure out the gift of knowability that is given to created reality. He left the real object out and concentrated on the impressions it sent to his sensibility. This widened the gap between the subject and the object.

Therefore, Kant's critical method could not help to dissolve the problem of subject-object alienation, it actually widened it. The subject is completely detached from the created reality – the real

object. In that way, Kant maintains the gap between the subject and the object, because reality is completely separated from us in space and time. Consequently, Kant did not solve the problem.

3.2 Husserl's Phenomenology

The two most important philosophers who influenced Husserl, in his development of his phenomenological method were Descartes and Brentano. One may ask: How was Descartes of any importance to Husserl? In *The Paris Lectures*, Husserl (1967:3) writes:

No philosopher of the past has affected the sense of phenomenology as decisively as Rene Descartes, France's greatest thinker. Phenomenology must honour him as its genuine patriarch. It must be said explicitly that the study of Descartes' *Meditations* has influenced directly the formation of the developing phenomenology and given it its present form, to such an extent that phenomenology might almost be called a new, twentieth century, Cartesianism.

Consequently Husserl (1967:2) holds that the Cartesian method of doubt provides a starting point for his phenomenological method. This is because the Cartesian doubt gives the *cogitatio*,

which provides Husserl's phenomenological method with the tool of abstraction. Not only did he take the *cogito* as his starting point for philosophy, but Husserl (1913:223) also adopted as his “methodological principle” explicitly the Cartesian criterion of clear and distinct ideas:

... we must abide by the “principle of all principles”, that complete clearness is the measure of all truth, and that statements that give faithful expression to their data need fear nothing from the finest arguments.

Though the Cartesian doubt gave him a starting point, Husserl criticised Descartes's presuppositions, and the shortcomings of his methodical starting point.

Firstly, in his *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl (1960:24) points out these two presuppositions as:

- (1) Unclarified and unquestioned presuppositions or prejudices of scholasticism which underlies Descartes' *Meditations*.
- (2) The prejudice of *ego cogito* that rose from Descartes' admiration of mathematical natural science. Hence its assertions, as summarized by Walker (1985:570) that (a) all conceptions must be doubted until proved; and (b) that

any sufficient proof must have the certainty of mathematical demonstration.

In view of the former assertion (i.e.(a)), Walker (1985:324) argues that its distinguishing mark was its adoption of a common method of inquiry: discovering and defending philosophical and theological truth by means of Aristotelian logic or dialectic. As a result of that, it led to the development of the Cartesian idea of method. Concerning the latter assertion (i.e. (b)) it was because the mathematical demonstrations, delighted Descartes with the certitude and evidence of their reasoning (Descartes, 1965:7).

Husserl (1960:7) argues that Descartes himself presupposed an ideal of a science, approximated by geometry and mathematical natural science; this science shall be established as radically genuine, ultimately an all-embracing science. Then Descartes sought for the most evidential and indubitable thing which was the *ego cogito*. Husserl rejects Descartes' absolutization of the *ego cogito*, and criticises him for not fully analyzing the notion of the *cogito* and so failed to exploit some of its essential aspects (Cunningham, 1976:1). As his critical evaluation of Descartes, Husserl (1960:24) writes:

...it was an unfortunate thing that Descartes's prejudices were at work when Descartes introduced the apparently insignificant but actually fateful change whereby the ego becomes a *substantia cogitans*, a separate human *mens sive animus*, the point of departure for inferences according to the principle of causality - in short, the change by virtue of which Descartes became the father of transcendental realism, an absurd position ...

Furthermore, concerning the issue of the presuppositions, in his *Logical Investigations*, Husserl (1913:265 [Volume I]) designates them as metaphysical, natural scientific, and psychological presuppositions. He thinks that these presuppositions vitiated the inquiry. Deducing from Husserl's critique of Descartes, Cunningham (1976:3) concludes that there were at least three kinds of presuppositions which Husserl wanted to eliminate, namely:

...the metaphysical, the methodological, and the teleological. The specific metaphysical presupposition ... which Husserl sought to drop was the existence of substance, particularly the *res cogitans*. The second sort of Cartesian presupposition was the methodological ... specifically, the use of the deductive method of the sciences as the model for the rational thought and as the sure guide to truth. ... Lastly, ... the teleological presuppositions ... he wished to avoid aiming the inquiry at the justification of any specific metaphysics or science.

Commenting on Husserl's phenomenology, Stumpf (1993:495) says that Husserl tried to build a philosophy without any presuppositions looking only to things and facts themselves, as these are given in actual experience and intuition. That is why he rejected Descartes's presuppositions.

Secondly, concerning the short-comings in Descartes' methodical starting point, the *cogito*, Husserl launched a radical investigation in order to exterminate any unjustified elements Descartes had included in virtue of his presuppositions, and also unveil the essential elements which Descartes under-utilized, or failed to take note of. This radical investigation under the indispensable influence of his former teacher Brentano, unearthed the intentional character of the *cogito*. Farber (1943:11) writes that Husserl was indebted to Brentano for his interest in the concept of intentionality and the investigation of inner perception. Broadly, the term intention (from *intentio*) means a relationship to an object or objectivity of any kind in purely cognitive experience (Farber, 1943:11f); thus being directed to the object, as a phenomenon in consciousness.

Husserl (1964:12) argues that *ego cogito* must be expanded by one term: *cogitatum*. This idea of the *cogitatum* is an echo of Brentano's philosophical assertion, as pointed out by Farber

(1943:11), that every cognition refers to an existing thing. That meant that, whereas Descartes emphasized the two terms in his famous *ego cogito*, Husserl (1964:14) believed that a more accurate description of experience is expressed in the three terms, *ego cogito cogitatum*. That is to say, instead of saying "I think", as found in Descartes, it should be "I think something" as Husserl holds. That is to say, all consciousness is directional, as consciousness of something. This meant that, for Husserl, the self-evidence of the *cogito* carried with it an intentional object for consciousness, a *cogitatum* (Cunningham, 1976:5). But what is consciousness? Consciousness is (1) primarily an intentional experience, that is to say it is a psychical act which refers to an object, (2) the aggregate of all experience: the unity of the consciousness, and (3) the realization of an object (Marías, 1967:408f).

Now that Husserl has got two of his main tools: the Cartesian *ego cogito*, and the concept of intentionality, how does he solve the problem of the subject-object alienation? To do so, Husserl structured his method as follows:

- (1) phenomenological reduction
- (2) transcendental reduction
- (3) eidetic reduction

(3) intentionality and constitution

In his attempt to deal with the problem of subject-object alienation, Husserl goes step by step, which Nakhnikian (1964:xxii) claims that each of which will be a refinement of Descartes's method of doubt.

3.2.1 Phenomenological Reduction

The first step which Husserl takes is phenomenological reduction. In defining phenomenological reduction, Husserl (1964:4) says that it is the exclusion of "all that is transcendently posited", in order to "come face to face with the essence of the possibility of reaching clarity."

Furthermore Husserl (1964:4) explains that:

This means: everything transcendent (that which is not given to me immediately) is to be assigned the index zero, i.e. its existence, its validity is not to be assumed as such, except at most as the phenomenon of a claim to validity.

In his introduction to Husserl's book, *The Idea of Phenomenology*, Nakhnikian (1964:xvii) defines phenomenological reduction as:

... suspending all beliefs characteristic of the natural attitude of common sense and science, that is, everything that is not "apodictic".

In other words, as Shutz (1966:27) puts it, "it is suspending belief in the existence of the outer world." Thus it is a deliberate refrain intentionally and systematically from all judgements that has to do, directly or indirectly with the concrete existence of the outer world. Cunningham (1976:7) describes Husserl's notion of phenomenological reduction as an activity with two overriding characteristics:

...first, it is the reducing of a real transcendent object to a real immanent object by bracketing out all considerations of its spatial existence, that is, the reduction of transcendent reality to phenomenal reality; secondly, it is the restricting of what is acceptable as true to what is immediately self-evident.

For Husserl (1964:3), the immediately self-evident are the (*reell*) immanent which "are self-given as constituted in evidence." Like Descartes, Husserl tends to reduce the true to the evident.

With the two characteristics, phenomenological reduction involves abstraction of the concrete existence, seeking to eliminate the metaphysical and ontological presuppositions (Husserl, 1964:7) embedded in the Cartesian philosophy. That means the rejection of the existence of created reality. This is because Husserl's intention is to have a method which is unprejudiced and presuppositionless.

Husserl characterizes his phenomenological reduction, in terms of the Greek word *epoché* (which is the transliteration). Husserl (1913:109) uses the word *epoché* to mean abstention or refraining from judgement. But in many cases where Husserlian phenomenology is being discussed, *epoché* is referred to as meaning bracketing. This has compelled me to try and do a short word study of the word.

A word study from a few Greek lexicons shows that the word *epoché* is from the verb *epoche* as shown in the list below:

(1) Liddell and Scott (1861:513):

epoché, (epoché) 1....a check, cessation, ...2. a suspension of judgment, technical term of the skeptical philosophers..., 3. a stoppage, pause, of light during an eclipse; ... the epoch of the

star, i.e. the point at which it seems to halt after reaching its highest; ...the close of an historical time, an epoch(?).

(2) Sophocles (1887:496; 519):

epoché 1. To hold ...to be the representative of any one... 2. To suspend judgment, ...to see, to hold.

epoché, hes, 1. check, cessation of hostilities..., 2. Suspension of judgment, in the Pyrrhonic philosophy...

(3) Lampe (1961:515):

epoché ...1. hold out, 2. hold... keep, maintain; ...5.hold in check, ...refrain...in silence.

Central to all the lexicons is the word check and hold. Both Liddell and Scott's and Sophocles' lexicons have "suspension of judgment". Lampe also has "refrain". In some places Husserl (1913:109) has used these words. The only problem lies with his coinage of the concept of bracketing as coming from the word *epoché*. It is not clear how Husserl came up with the idea of bracketing. This is because *epoché* does not have a clear and direct link with bracketing as we have seen from the above word study. It is possible that in his discussion on performing phenomenological reduction Shutz (1966:27) may be right when

he pointed out that Husserl borrowed from mathematical technique when he called his procedure “putting the world in brackets”.

It does not matter how Husserl came up with bracketing, but the question is, ‘What kind of judgment did Husserl suspend, and what was it that he was bracketing?’ The suspension of judgment which Husserl was performing, was in reaction to Descartes. While Descartes doubted everything in existence with the exception of his thinking self, Husserl refused to assert whether the world did or did not exist, and he abstained from believing experience. Thus the whole line of experienced life, including the world, the objects, other people, cultural situations, are ‘put out of play’, eliminated, and “bracketed”. To bracket all these things, according to Stumpf (1993:497) means “only to look upon them without judging whether they are realities or appearances” (as we found in Kant above), “and to abstain from rendering any opinion, judgments, or valuations about the world”. After the elimination, and bracketing of everything empirical, what remains is “pure or transcendental consciousness” (Farber, 1943:527), “in which and through which the objective world in its entirety exists” (Stumpf, 1993:497).

Now what remains is the question, how does one perform the phenomenological reduction? In the *Ideas*, Husserl (1913:130) gives the following explanation:

We shut off the whole of physics and the whole domain of theoretical thought. We remain within the framework of plain intuition and syntheses that belong to it including perception. It is then evident that intuition and the intuited, perception and the thing perceived, though essentially related to each other, are in principle and of necessity not really (*reell*) and essentially one and united.

The concept of intuition mentioned above by Husserl refers back to the Cartesian intuition which meant an intellectual activity or vision of such clarity and distinctness that it leaves no doubt in the mind (Descartes, 1912:15,16). Commenting about the performing of phenomenological reduction, Shutz (1966:28) explains that one has to suspend also “the belief in his mundane existence as a human being within the world.” What it shows us here is that the process of reduction transcends the world in every respect. Everything can be reduced so that it can be assumed to perception.

But what was the aim of the phenomenological reduction? The phenomenological reduction, if one can make a proper

deduction, is the concretion of Husserl's attempt to eliminate metaphysical and methodological presuppositions in the Cartesian philosophical practices. The act of bracketing is parallel to the Cartesian systematic doubt, because all of them profess the aim of reaching universality and the indubitable point of certainty through methodical doubt. For Husserl it happens through phenomenological and eidetic reductions. Like Descartes, Husserl had a mathematical background. Having this knowledge at the back of the mind, it compels one to consider that there is a possibility that *epoché* may be another expression of Descartes's methodical doubt. This is because from the above-made reference to the lexicons of Liddell and Scott, and others it is clear that *epoché* comes from the skeptics. They suspended judgment since they remained unsure. But Husserl (like Descartes) is looking for certainty in consciousness, by testing all presuppositions through doubt.

In doing this, Husserl still maintains the ontological cleft that Descartes created in his method. Thus he has to suspend judgment that there is anything outside the mind. To do so, Husserl has to redefine "immanence" by means of "constitution", because the intentional object has, somehow, to be "constituted" in the intentional relationship. But prior to that Husserl wants to establish the subjective pole of the whole

process through transcendental reduction, which will give meaning to the objective pole of phenomenology.

3.2.2 Transcendental Reduction

Husserl suggests that he considers transcendental reduction as a second reduction to phenomenological reduction. In some place, Husserl (as quoted in Cunningham, 1976:8) indicates the following:

Accordingly, as against the first application of the *epoché*, a second is required, or rather a conscious reshaping of the *epoché* through a reduction to the absolute ego as the ultimately unique center of function in all constitution.

So, what one can conclude is that the transcendental reduction is the second reduction. Sometimes Husserl (1960:29) calls it the transcendental-phenomenological reduction.

After having placed in suspension the existential status of the objective pole of consciousness by means of phenomenological reduction, Husserl seeks to elucidate the issue of the subjective pole of conscious acts, as well, by introducing the transcendental reduction. It was Husserl's attempt to shun any hint of a substantial ego (as found in Descartes), designating the

ego as the subjective pole of *cogitationes*. But his attempt to shun the substantiality of the ego seems to be marred by the qualities he gives to the ego. This is because of his description of the ego in his book, *The Paris Lectures* (Husserl, 1967:26) where he tries to argue that the transcendental *cogito*'s (ego) only concretion is in its acts and objects:

The ego is thus not merely an empty pole, but the permanent and enduring subject of persisting convictions and habits through whose alterations the unity of the personal ego and its personal character is first constituted. From this we must dissociate the ego in its full concretion, because the ego is concrete only in the flowing multiplicity of intentional existence and with the objects that are meant and constituted for it therein. The ego may thus also be viewed as a concrete monad.

Be it as it may, by means of the transcendental reduction, Husserl uncovers what he terms the transcendental ego (Cunningham, 1976:35). The function of this transcendental ego is to bestow unity and meaning on all acts and objects of consciousness. For the same ego was termed transcendental to mean meaning-giver, because, according to Husserl's (1960:26) assertion:

... this world, with all its objects, I said, derives its whole sense and its existential status, which it has for me, from myself, from

me as the transcendental Ego, the Ego who comes to the fore only with the transcendental-phenomenological *epoché*.

What we encounter here is the absolutizing of the transcendental Ego (the subject). It seems, like Kant, Husserl might have been looking for the universal precondition of knowing – the need for that which is common to all ego's for the sake of universality. This is because the ego is seen as the sole genesis of meaning and existential status of the object. Thus, the object exists meaningfully at the mercy of the subject. One finds no doubt that this kind of seeing a thing had great influence in research, that the subject became the dominant source of meaning. The researcher simply studies the researched without any response as if it was not given the gift of knowability.

3.2.3 Eidetic Reduction

The concept of *eidos* or essence refers back to the *eidos* of Plato which means his abstract Forms or Ideas (Flew, 1979:103) or of Aristotle (1961:173-186) which means the forms or essence of things. Here we encounter Husserl, like in many places giving the concept a functional meaning. The concept is transformed to a phenomenological method of reducing reality.

By reducing the object, the *cogitatum*, to its absolutely essential elements, consciousness introduces itself into the sphere of *ideal* objects, thus the sphere of the *a-temporal* and *non-spatial* (Cunningham, 1976:10). Consciousness can only do this by means of eidetic reduction. The performance of eidetic reduction has solely to do with the objects of consciousness (*cogitata*) and the acts of consciousness (*cogitationes*). Thus, eidetic reduction does not deal with sensuous seeing rather than with “seeing” of generalities. This is because when objects are reduced to essence in the mind, they are no more dealt with as individual items, but as essence of any object that the transcendental Ego (subject) will be in a position to use in constructing its objects.

Now the question one may ask is, how do we perform eidetic reduction? Husserl (1964:6) responds by saying that “in agreement with a tenet of Descartes’s concerning clear and distinct perceptions”; through phantasizing ourselves into a perceiving, severing all ties with actuality, and entering in the realm of abstraction, we will reach perception of “universal type”, the “pure *eidōs*” (Husserl, 1960:70). In so doing the *cogitatio* (act) and the *cogitatum* (object) of consciousness are brought up to the level of universal type, *pure eidōs*. That is to say, the transcendental ego no longer refers to a specific factual,

concrete, temporal, and spatial ego, but to any essential possible transcendental ego.

Eidetic reduction struggles to get to the essence of things. Thus it attempts to pierce through to the essence of things, and perceive them in general terms. This attempt to pierce through to the essence of things is called a reduction because one has to strip all the facticity of a thing to reach the essence. Reduction has a negative sense, that is stripping inessential qualities (like physicality and experientiability of things), disregarding facticity in time moving in the direction of the essence of things.

Thus, we abstract the essence of the object into consciousness of the universal; in so doing Husserl considers the gap between the subject and the object is destroyed. This means that alienation exists when we hold onto existing reality. But in actual understanding, Husserl widened the gap between the subject and the object. He was dealing with the essence of the object and not the object itself. The danger we are facing here is that the object loses its own real concrete consideration and remains at the mercy of the subject who will give it meaning and sense. In that way it is possible to give a wrong meaning about the object, because the meaning will be based on ideational constructions.

3.2.4 Intentionality and Constitution

Before discussing constitution, it is important to discuss intentionality, because it lays the foundation of Husserl's phenomenological method in terms of the subject in relation to the object. As indicated in Chapter 2, Descartes laid bare the indubitable "*ego cogito*" as the origin of all our knowledge, and thus defined the stream of thought as the field of all further philosophical investigation. But, according to Schutz (1966:26), he was hesitant to use it and to pursue the indispensable consequences.

While Husserl was busy trying to perfect Descartes's method, two problems arose, viz.:

- (1) the through and through interconnectedness of the stream of thought in inner time;
- (2) the radical distinction between the act of thinking and the object of thought (Schutz, 1966:26).

The second problem finds its solution in the intentional character of all thinking. As discussed above, Husserl argues that Descartes did not finish the Archimedian point statement: '*ego cogito*'. This is because for Husserl, there is no such thing

as thought, fear, fantasy, remembrance as such: every thought is thought of, every fear is fear of, every remembrance is remembrance of the object that is being thought, feared, remembered. Therefore the complete statement should be *ego cogito cogitatum*.

According to Husserl (1970:552-554 [Volume II]), Brentano (from whom he adopted the intentionality concept),

... used the notion of intentionality for distinguishing psychical phenomena from physical, psychical phenomena belonging to the realm of psychology, physical phenomena to the realm of the natural sciences.

In his adoption of the notion of intentionality, Husserl employed it differently. He did not continue the distinction; according to Cunningham (1976:38), he merges both physical and psychic phenomena into the group known as “intentional objects”, suspending consideration of their existence in any natural-scientific or psychological sense. For an object to be “intentional”, Husserl (1970:557-558 [Volume II]) describes it as follows:

The object is an intentional object: this means there is an act having a determinate intention, and determinate in a way which

makes it an intention towards this object.... This reference to the object belongs peculiarly and intrinsically to an act-experience, and the experiences manifesting it are by definition intentional experiences or acts.

That is to say, the intentional status of an object means that the object is meant or intended by an act of consciousness. This status does not emanate from any of its qualities, but rather from its relationship to an intending act of consciousness which gives the object shape and meaning.

The function of the transcendental Ego as the bestower of meaning on all the transcendencies in its universe, is one aspect of Husserl's view of consciousness as intentionality (Cunningham, 1976:38). Following Brentano, Husserl holds that the essence of consciousness is intentionality. By this proposition, according to Koestenbaum (1967:xxvii) Husserl meant that the "object of my consciousness is something meant, constructed, projected, constituted, in short intended by me".

According to Koestenbaum (1967:xxvii-xxviii), intentionality points to

the fact that consciousness is directional, that is, it is given in experience as an outward moving vector. The source of the

movement, the here-zone, is termed the ego, whereas the focus towards which the movement addressed itself, the there-zone, is the object. The division of the vector into ego, movement, and object is purely abstraction, because another fundamental meaning of intentionality is the essential unity of consciousness. To be, is to be the object to a subject and the subject for an object at the same time.... Intentionality is the structure of consciousness *per se*.

That is to say, central to the relationship between the subject and the object is the structure of intentionality. Without intentionality, the whole method of Husserlian phenomenology will not accomplish its purpose.

Husserl's emphasis of the intentional direction of consciousness to its objects, especially its role of shaping its objects, leads him quite naturally to one of the crucial ideas in his phenomenology: *Constitution*. We cannot get an exact place where Husserl clearly defined the concept of constitution. Spiegelberg (1960:146) mentions the same problem concerning the meaning of the term 'constitution', by saying that in Husserl's usage of the term there is a significant ambiguity about the way in which he employs it in concrete context. Furthermore, Spiegelberg (1960:146) points out two ways in which the term "constitution" is used by Husserl: (1) it appears reflexively as if it is the

phenomena themselves which take care of their own constitution; (2) it is used as transitive expression, implying that it is our intentional consciousness which actively achieves the constitution. Although there is such an ambiguity on the meaning of the term 'constitution', one can deduce its meaning and function from the way Husserl explains and uses it in his phenomenological method. Also, it is important to examine descriptions from other writers who discussed the notion so as to enlighten us on what it means. These are the likes of Bruzina, Farber and many others. As for Bruzina (1970:65) who describes it as follows:

Constitution, then, in a word, is the action of meaning-giving consciousness, of noetic¹⁴ intentionality, by which an object

¹⁴ Intentional analysis (or analysis of consciousness) has two ways: noetic and noematic.

(1) The noetic way comes from the term *noesis*. This is the intentional and strictly non-material component of an experience (Pivcevic, 1970:68). It is related to *nous* (reason) and this relationship gets a deeper philosophical significance to Husserl (1913:249) because he sees noesis as specifications of nous. Furthermore, for Husserl (1913:448) *noesis* is a formative synthesis in its animating function that shapes material elements into intentional experiences, and it is also a meaning dispensing component.

(2) The noematic way comes from the term *noema*. For Husserl (1913:274), the noematic is the content of the *noetic*. In his discussion about the *noema*, Pivcevic (1970:68) says that "the *noema* is the ideal, content-correlate of noesis, referred to as the 'noematic content' or 'noematic meaning'. Each perception as its own *noema*: it is the perceived as such.... In a recollection, the *noema* is the remembered as

becomes a phenomenon in some particular noematic sense, i.e. appears in some particular aspect or coherent set of aspects.

For Farber (1989:233-234), constitution is phenomenological shaping of a thing – thus an object by the transcendental ego, which

... really names the constructive programme of descriptive analysis, which is called for once “purification” by “reduction” is completed.

Therefore what we get from Bruzina and Farber is the idea of meaning-giving and shape-giving by the Ego to the intended

such; ... in expectation, the *noema* is the expected as such. ...This ‘as such’ points already to a reduction to essences”. Contributing to the discussion, Magill (1990:502) argues that “*noema* is that which is perceived, is dependent upon *noesis*, the perceiving; but *noema* has the kind of being peculiar to essences ”. Magill (1990:504) further argues that the *noesis* is real and fundamental, while the *noema* is dependent and strictly speaking, unreal (not concrete). Magill 1990:502) further gives an example of his propositions: the perceiving of the tree is actual and constitutive of the tree perceived. But conversely, though it does not have reality, *noema* has being, which is composed entirely of essences, which are eternally what they are and stand in necessary or *a priori* relations with each other.

In his book, *Doing Phenomenology*, Spiegelberg (1975:5) discusses Husserl’s pure or transcendental phenomenology, where he indicates that *noesis* refers to the intentional acts of consciousness and *noema* is its objective referent. Thus noetic intentionality is the movement (or act) of the transcendental Ego (subject) to the given *noema* (or essence of the object).

object. This reminds us of Kant's human consciousness in which the chaotic raw material of the object are reshaped in space and time.

Following the discussion in his phenomenological method, constitution is another step whereby Husserl is to discern the way in which objects of cognition are constructed in cognition (Nakhnikian, 1964:xviii). That is why Husserl (1929:56) holds that, constitution embraces the full breadth of the topic, *cogito - cognition*. Thus the transcendental Ego constitutes the *cogitatum*. That is to say the subject gives meaning to the object.

When an object is said to be given, it means that it is to be constituted. That is to say, when eidetic structures of an object are brought to consciousness, through intuition, meaning and shaping is brought to definiteness and givenness. In other words, the transcendental Ego gives meaning and shape to eidetic structures in concrete terms. Bruzina (1970:47) puts it this way:

the eidos, the pure essence, can be intuitively exemplified in empirically given instances, in those of perception, remembering, etc., but quite as well also in just plain imaginatively provided examples.

Therefore, constitution is the accomplishment of the phenomenological method that brings to realization certain meanings to the object.

Following the development of Husserl's phenomenology, one wonders whether he is something of a scientialist like Descartes, but also more of idealist like Kant. This is because what we see in Husserl's method is excessive abstraction. Excessive in the sense that concreteness is overwhelmed by ideation. Things are only real when they are in essence and universal. It is true that it is not always that we understand things in concretion, but also in their universal status. Husserl, as an academic, might have been looking for universality but the problem that remains is whether we can understand the laws apart from the concrete reality in which they function.

One would want to ask why and how did Husserl end up in the position where he is prejudiced and have some presupposition? There are some historical and methodological reasons to this situation. Going back to the beginning of this discussion on Husserl, it was indicated that his intention was to be unprejudiced and presuppositionless. Although he had such an intention, he found himself adopting some ideas from Descartes (especially the *cogito*) and Kant (especial a *priori ideas*). The

first reason for that is Husserl underwent the orientation in Kant's philosophy, which was always prominent in Germany (Farber, 1943:7). Hence we see the analogy between the notions of space and time in Kant, and Husserl's phenomenological *epoché*. While Kant is talking of the human consciousness, Husserl is talking about transcendental consciousness – of which these two concepts refer to the world of ideation, which we saw Husserl plunging in. For instance, the ideal objects in Husserl are only viewed *a priori* because they are described only as essence (ideal not empirical) of the experiences of a consciousness “which is itself not empirical but pure and thus also *a priori*” (Marias, 1967:411).

A very important question that one is compelled to ask is, “Is it possible to do any scientific inquiry without any presupposition? Husserl had some knowledge of something, so he had to presuppose an object, and he must be the knower, hence he presupposed a transcendental Ego. The more Husserl tried to deny the person who knows, the more he absolutised the ego, making it to constitute universality while ignoring the world out there.

Therefore in terms of such an abstraction, Husserl's methodology contributed a lot but did not solve the problem of

the cleft between the subject and object in relation to methodology.

3.3 Heidegger's Hermeneutic Phenomenology

From the time of Heidegger on, the critique of the subject-object split becomes very strong. Attempts to overcome it abound (even though they not may have been successful). It seems to coincide with the transition from rationalism to irrationalism - which indicates that previously an implicit trust in reason to construct (or at least to reflect) reality was the major cause of the subject-object split. This in turn, had a religious implication - whereas in the Middle Ages certainty was concentrated in God (who keeps creation together), in modern times certainty was concentrated in reason. But Irrationalism does not seek for certainty any more although the human being still seems to be the point of departure. So in Heidegger we encounter a severe attack on the subject-object split, and an attempt to eradicate it through the employment of his hermeneutic phenomenology.

In his attempt to eradicate the Cartesian subject-object epistemological dualism, Heidegger called for a reversal of Descartes's *cogito ergo sum*. Thus instead of "I think, therefore I exist", Heidegger argued for "I exist, therefore I think"

(Heidegger, 1927:21 [24][JS]). This means that, for Heidegger, in any methodological approach, existence is to be declared as the foundational thing, and this is the only foundation he defended as we shall see in the course of the discussion.

For Heidegger to eradicate the Cartesian dualism, he adopted Husserl's method of phenomenology, redefined it and gave it a new role in his hermeneutics, hence the name "hermeneutic phenomenology" (or "interpretative phenomenology"). In redefining it Heidegger first goes to its Greek roots of *phainomenon* or *phainesthai*, and *logos*. *Phainomenon* means that which shows itself in itself (Heidegger, 1927:51 [28][M&R]); and *logos* means letting something be seen in its *togetherness* with something - letting it be seen *as* something (Heidegger, 1927:56 [33][M&R]). The combination of *phainesthai* and *logos*, therefore means letting things become manifest as what they are, without forcing our own categories on them. This links with Husserl's (1950:9) ideal of the things themselves. It means a reversal of direction from that which one is accustomed to: it is not we who point to things; rather things show themselves to us (Palmer, 1969:128). This links up with Husserl's phenomenological *epoché*, which is a process of disclosing intentionality. Here we find also in Heidegger phenomenology as a process or means of letting the

phenomenon reveal itself. There is some difference here: in Husserl the direction is from the subject to the object, while in Heidegger the direction is from the object to the subject.

According to Dreyfus (1992:31-32), Heidegger distinguishes three conceptions of phenomenology:

- (1) The *formal conception of phenomenology* to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself (Heidegger, 1978:58 [34][M&R]). Dreyfus (1992:31) says that this conception is broad enough to embrace both Husserl's and Heidegger's understanding of phenomenology.
- (2) The *ordinary conception of phenomenology* points to the idea that to have a science of phenomena means to grasp its objects in such a way that everything about them which is up for discussion must be treated by exhibiting it directly and demonstrating it directly (Heidegger, 1927: 59 [35][M&R]). Thus phenomenology is concrete demonstration (Heidegger, 1927:358 [311][M&R]).
- (3) The third *phenomenological conception* refers to the questions, (a) What is it that phenomenology is to let us

see? Heidegger (1927:59 [35][M&R]) answers that if phenomenology is letting something show itself, what phenomenology deals with must be something that is not already obvious: "It is something that proximally and for the most part does not show itself at all: it is something that lies *hidden*, in contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does show itself; but at the same time it is something that belongs to what thus shows itself, and it belongs to it so essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground." (b) How does the phenomenon show itself? Dreyfus (1992:32) says that in Husserl's phenomenology one should study only what can be made fully evident, but in Heidegger phenomenology, when correctly understood, turns out to be hermeneutic, thus interpretative. That is to say the phenomenon shows itself through the process of phenomenological description which, as a method is *interpretative*.

The central theme of Heidegger's philosophy is the foundation of human existence. Without human existence, for Heidegger, philosophy is impossible. He makes a perfect blend out of existentialism and Husserl's phenomenology which he adopted and modified. The two philosophical trends make the best combination in Heidegger's philosophy that gives a basis for his

method of hermeneutic phenomenology. Now how does Heidegger employ this method to deal with the subject-object alienation? Before embarking on his hermeneutic phenomenology, I want to show how much Heidegger differs with traditional metaphysics: hence his rejection of traditional western metaphysics.

3.3.1 Rejection of Traditional Western Metaphysics

In Heidegger understanding is viewed as temporal, intentional, historical; thinking is defined in terms of responsiveness rather than manipulation of ideas; and the object of interpretation shifts from a generalized description of *Dasein's* everyday contact with being to metaphysics and poetry (Palmer, 1969:140-141).

In order to pave the way for the development of a new way of thinking and interpretation, Heidegger begun by rejecting some of the traditional western philosophical systems. He does it by asking the fundamental and ontological question: "Why are there essents (or things) rather than nothing?" (Heidegger 1935:1). By this question Heidegger (1935:5) seeks to arrive at a final or "primal ground" which is "found in a leap through which man thrusts away all the previous security, whether real or imagined, of his life ... for without this leap, there is no

asking". The leap in question opens up its own source, the original source. So the fundamental question, "Why are there essents rather than nothing?" breaks open the ground for all authentic questions and is thus at the origin (*Ursprung*) of all other questions. One can leap into an authentic relation with the ground only through a fundamental poetic and intellectual experience of being discovered not through words and language, but in words and language themselves (Ducharme, 1981:217). Here we encounter Heidegger trying to avoid the canons of logic since he was moving in the direction of irrationalism. The idea of the leap shows some link with Kierkegaard's leap of faith. For Heidegger (1935:17), to question is to will to know, hence the fundamental question.

According to Guignon (1983:57) Heidegger's early writings on logic reveal his commitment to the anti-metaphysical trends that characterized the nineteenth century backlash to naturalism. Though he rejected traditional Western logic and metaphysics, Heidegger, on the other hand accepted logic that leads us to the metaphysics of subjectivity. Heidegger's own major hermeneutical endeavour is directed at the history of Western metaphysics in which he finds a one-sided attachment to the subject-object distinction (Connolly & Keutner, 1988:20).

What Heidegger was trying to achieve, by rejecting the traditional Western Metaphysics (which he argues that it never changed since the time of Aristotle) was that he wanted to have a good ground, which he claimed to have found in hermeneutics. That is to say, hermeneutics came to mean the entire effort to let Being be manifest, to achieve a more original assumption of Being in order to lay the groundwork of metaphysics (Richardson, 1963:631). This brought a new way of thinking and understanding of language. Heidegger, as argued by Palmer (1969:142), could only achieve this by criticising

- (1) the abstract presentational thinking; by reviewing how Western thinking came to define thinking;
- (2) being and truth in presentational terms;
- (3) truth as correspondence came to predominate over the more dynamic conception of unconcealment (Plato's cave allegory) so that truth became correct seeing; and
- (4) thinking as becoming a matter of placing an idea before the mind's eye, that is it became the proper manipulation of ideas.

As everything is ordered in relation to the conception of ideas and ideation, most importantly the concept of reason which we saw in Descartes and Kant, being is sensed in the form of a static

presence of an idea. Truth as disclosure, or being-discovered in its earlier conception was lost (Heidegger, 1927:196-211 [213-230][JS]). Then truth becomes something seen as correctness of perception and assertion (Palmer, 1969:143). This tradition became a rock on which the West built its metaphysics and theology. In reaction to this tradition, Heidegger sees everything taking a new direction. Theologically, this tradition explains the evident conflict (in Augustine's confessions) between lived experience (living in God rather than knowing God) and enjoying God (which is a static and presentational conception of being and experiencing God that can be traced back to Neoplatonism: God is seen as outside flux of factual-historical life and is merely 'on-hand' to be contemplated and enjoyed) (Palmer, 1969:143). Furthermore, Palmer (1969:144) argues that, metaphysically, the Cartesian standpoint, combined with such a general approach, put the human subject as the ultimate reference point for the status of all that is seen: truth is the subject's rational certainty of the conformity between the knowing subject and known object. Heidegger (1927:43 [46-47][JS]) calls this decisive turn 'subjectism', because the status of the world is firmly anchored in human subjectivity which becomes subject-centred, and consciousness also becomes central to philosophy.

Because of this subjectism, the sciences take preeminence as they serve man's will to master, which as a result saw man being locked in his own projected world. Ultimately even God is redefined as the infinite, unconditioned, and absolute and the world is de-divinized; man's relation to God is approached as merely his own religious experience (Palmer, 1969:145). That is to say, God becomes a projection of man, and man's relation to God becomes a religious experience or a human feeling of dependence.

The will to power (as in Nietzsche) that is grounded in subjectism knows no ultimate value, only the thirst for more power, hence the frenzy for technological mastery. Thought becomes technological, moulded to the requirements of concepts and ideas that will give control over objects and experience (Palmer, 1969:145). This, as a result, has affected hermeneutics to such an extent that it is simply serving the interests of the metaphysics of subjectism. Thus when the interpretative problem is approached within the context of technological thinking, interpretation provides the means of conceptual mastery of the object. Heidegger saw this problem emerging from the traditional Western metaphysics. It happens as well that when thinking is defined as the manipulation of ideas and concepts, it is no longer creative but manipulative and inventive.

(Palmer, 1969:146). Interpretation ceases to deal with an unknown matter which has to be brought to light, but rather deals with the clarification and evaluation of already known things. Language is simply conceived of a system of signs applied to an already known set of objects (Palmer, 1969:146).

Looking at what has been analysed above, one sees that Heidegger pinpointed quite a number of valid problems that underlie in the traditional Western metaphysics which are so influential in hermeneutics as a method.

3.3.2 Fundamental Ontology

As a move against the traditional Western metaphysics, Heidegger, under the sloganistic and iconoclastic term of “destruction”, came up with the hermeneutic phenomenology as his method to get rid of the subject-object alienation problem. He starts off by exposing the first and only foundation of his method, namely, fundamental ontology. This is a preparatory analysis of human existence that takes its starting point from what is given first and foremost. Heidegger (1927:33 [13][M&R]) argues that fundamental ontology from which other ontologies can take their rise, must be sought in the existential analytic of *Dasein*. In other words, the ontological

understanding of human existence is the foundation for all ontology even that of non-human existentials. Thus he begins his hermeneutic phenomenology by establishing the analysis of *Dasein*: fundamental ontology. According to Richardson (1963:46), the task of fundamental ontology is to discern the Being of There-Being, i.e. *Dasein*. Thus the goal of fundamental ontology is to lay bare the meaning of Being¹⁵ in the widest sense so that one cannot fail to grasp its true significance (Ducharme, 1981:209).

As already mentioned above, Heidegger adopted from Husserl the method of phenomenology and tasked it to make clear, or precisely to permit, something to appear of itself; the *phainomenon*, which shows itself as it is. This method, for Heidegger, can only work within his presupposition of human existence.

¹⁵ West (1996:97) mentions that, governing Western metaphysics is the underlying conviction that there must be some being or beings, which are fundamental or truly real in both an explanatory and a justificatory or normative sense. That means that all other levels or kinds of being are causally dependent on them and all norms and values have their ground or justification in them. Tracing the history of western metaphysics, one finds out that there were several attempts to identify such fundamental being or beings. Thus from Plato's "Forms" and Aristotle's "unmoved mover" to the God of medieval theology and Hegelian 'spirit'. Based on this background, Descartes could not escape the idea of (a substantial) existence, hence Heidegger's idea of the fundamental ontology.

This points to Heidegger's (1927:33 [37][JS]) claim that ontology is possible only as phenomenology and reciprocally that phenomenology is effectively ontology. Therefore, ontology must become phenomenology. Ontology must turn to the process of understanding and interpretation through which things appear; it must lay open the mood and direction of human existence; it must render visible the invisible structure of being-in-the-world (Palmer, 1969:129). This means that ontology must, as phenomenology of being, become a hermeneutic of existence whose primary act of interpretation is to bring a thing from concealment, thus laying it bare.

Heidegger (1927:32[37][JS]) further argues that the meaning of phenomenological description as a method lies in interpretation (*Auslegung*, laying bare (Palmer, 1969:129)). This is because phenomenology of *Dasein* is hermeneutic in the original sense of the word, which designated the business of interpreting. Palmer (1969:130) comments that hermeneutics as methodology of interpretation for the humanities is a derivative form resting and growing out of the primary ontological function of interpreting. It is a regional ontology which must be based on the more fundamental ontology.

3.3.2.1 *Dasein*

The word *Dasein*, in German means "being-there"; thus, for Heidegger, man is best described as his unique mode of being rather than defined as an object (Stumpf, 1993:505). Heidegger used the word *Dasein*, rather than *man* to refer to human beings. This is because the term *Dasein*, according to Ducharme (1981:209),

... is meant to express Heidegger's view of man, which understands existence prior to the separation of subject and object. Man as *Dasein* is not an individual subject that objectively exists in the material world; rather he is a "Being-there" whose essence is found in existential possibilities and not in scientific actualities.

Having defined man as *Dasein*, Heidegger also sets out the condition in which *Dasein* is rooted. Thus the basic condition or state of *Dasein* is his being-in-the-world, an expression that combines man's ontological essence (Being) and his existential condition (in-the-world), which is held to be the necessary prior condition of man, who can understand himself as a "subject" only if he is already a "Being-in-the-World" (Heidegger, 1927:59-62 [63-66][JS]). Being-in-the-world is the underlying fundamental relationship of human existence with the other existentials and it is the basic structure of human consciousness (Spiegelberg, 1960:328). As a result, the subject-object

bifurcation is preempted and being-in-the-world gives clues into the existential relations that *Dasein* has at hand. In fact Heidegger is trying to show us that human beings cannot practically exist outside the rest of the world, they are part of the whole creation.

Heidegger (1927:42 [45][JS]) insists that we cannot conceive of *Dasein* apart from "world" because such a condition is prior to any psychology, anthropology, and biology; i.e. prior to any separation of self from world in the objective or cognitive sense. World is "given" along with *Dasein* prior to any act of conceptualization and the compound expression "stands for a unitary phenomenon" (Ducharme, 1981:210). Thus *Dasein* is thrown-down among beings and immersed in them and as a result, *Dasein's* unique prerogative lies lost in the forgottenness; this is its every-day condition, hence every-day-ness (Richardson, 1963:48). This everydayness is the starting-point of Heidegger's hermeneutical work.

Richardson (1963:48) explains that

... by everydayness, Heidegger wishes to designate that condition in which Being-There first of all and for the most part finds itself in its day-in-day-out contact with beings. "First of all" indicates the manner in which Being-There is initially disclosed to itself by

reason of its coexistence with others, in the comings and goings, the constant superficial exchanges which constitute daily intercourse. "For the most part" indicates the manner in which There-being usually, though not always shows itself for every man. It consummates in ordinariness.

What it means here is that man is a creature surrounded by other creatures. In other words, Heidegger wants us to think of our ordinary daily experiences, i.e. our average everydayness as the first step in discovering how we become familiar with the world around us. Therefore it is the task of fundamental ontology to help lay bare the ontological structure of the Being of *Dasein*.

3.3.2.2 Threefold Structure of *Dasein*

There are three equiprimordial conditions that makes the structure of *Dasein*, namely, understanding, states-of-mind (or mood), and discourse. The three are found to be existentially equiprimordial, that is, one condition cannot be descriptively accounted for, or reduced in terms of the others. Hence these three are *a priori*, analytic existentials that lay bare the universal structure of human existence (Ducharme, 1980:211).

(1) Understanding

Understanding, for Heidegger, is the power to grasp one's own possibilities for being, within the context of the life-world in which one exists (Palmer, 1969:131). It is conceived, not as something to be possessed but rather as a mode or constituent element of being-in-the-world (Palmer, 1969:131). Heidegger (1927:184 [144][M&R]) defines understanding as

... the existential Being of Dasein's own potentiality-for-Being; and it is so in such a way that this Being discloses in itself what its Being is capable of. As a disclosure, understanding always pertains to the whole basic state of Being-in-the-world, and as a potentiality-for-being, any being-in is a potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world.

Understanding is ontologically fundamental and prior to every act of existing (Palmer, 1969:131). Understanding always presses forward into possibilities because it has in itself the existential structure which is called projection (Heidegger, 1927:184 [145][M&R]). Because of this projective character (*Entwurfscharakter*) of understanding, it always relates to the future (Palmer, 1969:131). The "future" aspect points to the projecting of understanding having its own possibility - that of developing itself. This development of understanding is called

interpretation (Heidegger, 1927:221[MV]). In interpretation, understanding does not become something different, but it becomes itself (Heidegger, 1927:221[MV]). Thus understanding is related to interpretation. It is the basis for all interpretation; it is co-original with one's existing and is present in every act of interpretation, because understanding always operates within a set of already interpreted relationships, a relational whole (*Bewandtnis-ganzheit*) (Palmer, 1969:131). The implication of the idea of the relational whole points to the familiar principle that understanding always operates within a "hermeneutical circle" (Palmer, 1969:132).

For Heidegger (1927:223[MV]), understanding has a threefold structure, viz.: fore-having, fore-sight and fore-conception.

- (1) Fore-having (*Vorhabe*) means something we have in advance. The background already circumscribes the domain in question and thus already determines possible ways of questioning (Dreyfus (1992: 199). Thus to ask the question about the meaning of being presupposes a fore-having, namely our preontological understanding of being. Bleicher (1980:102) says that the explication of what remains implicit, the appropriation of understanding in interpretation is always done under the guidance of a point

of view, which fixes that with regard to which what is understood is to be interpreted.

- (2) Fore-sight (*Vorsicht*) means that in every case understanding is grounded in something we see in advance (Bleicher, 1980:102). Anything understood which is held in our fore-having and towards which we set our sights foresightedly becomes conceptualizable through the interpretation (Heidegger, 1927:223[MV]).

- (3) Fore-conception (*Vorgriff*) means grasping something in advance. Dreyfus (1992:199) says that the interpreter in this case already has expectations as to what he will find out. Thus the interpretation has already decided for a definite way of conceiving [the entity to be interpreted] either with finality or with reservations; it is grounded in something we grasp in advance - in a fore-conception (Heidegger, 1927:191 [150][M&R]).

One may conclude that it seems like Heidegger is telling us that the above discussed pre-structuredness of understanding should not be viewed as the structure of consciousness, because understanding goes beyond the Cartesian scheme of subject-object split, for it operates within the world. Therefore to view

understanding in terms of a subject-object scheme is to fall back in the misgivings of the old traditional Western metaphysics. A closer look at the discussion tells us that fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception are all part of consciousness in advance – in other words the subject already has them in its process of becoming self-conscious and conscious of the world. More so, they are process concepts which the subject uses in constructing himself.

Heidegger (1927:191 [150][M&R]) argues that when something is interpreted as something, the interpretation will be founded essentially upon fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception. This is because an interpretation is never a presuppositionless apprehending of something presented to us (Heidegger, 1927:191 [150][M&R]). By saying so Heidegger strongly rejects the idea of objective interpretation or presuppositionless interpretation. This is true – knowing is never presuppositionless, but all the presuppositions concern the constructive work of the subject.

Understanding is also related to meaningfulness. This is because, according to Heidegger (1927:142[151][JS]), meaning is the basis on which fore-having, foresight, and fore-conception operates in terms of which something becomes intelligible as

something. Thus the point is, as Palmer (1969:134) puts it, that meaningfulness is something deeper than the logical system of language; it is founded on something prior to language and embedded in the world – the relational whole. Meaningfulness is not something man gives to an object; it is what an object gives to man through supplying the ontological possibility of words and language (Palmer, 1969:134). That is to say, meaning is the "upon-which" of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible; it gets its structure from a fore-having, fore-sight, and a fore-conception (Bleicher, 1980:102). Understanding and meaningfulness together are the basis for language and interpretation (Palmer, 1969:135).

The major (or key) point that results from this is that Heidegger brings to our attention that understanding is ontological (Palmer, 1969:132), because understanding is the existential Being of *Dasein's* own potentiality-for-Being.

Based on the idea of understanding, Heidegger discusses the hermeneutical significance of propositions or assertions. In his analysis of assertions, Heidegger shows that assertions function in three ways, viz.:

- (1) Pointing out. Assertion means 'pointing out' and not mere representation; and in this Heidegger adheres to the primary meaning of *logos* as *apophansis* - letting an entity be seen from itself (Heidegger, 1927:196 [154][M&R]). The assertion, "The hammer is too heavy", does not refer to the concept of the hammer, but the entity itself, as it is used.

- (2) Predication (or showing). The subject is given a definite character by the predicate. Thus what is put forward is the hammer itself not the predicate.

- (3) Communication. Assertion means communication (*Mitteilung*), speaking forth. Thiselton (1980:167) says that this aspect draws attention to the existential context in which assertions operate. That is to say assertions are shared and they achieve their purpose in the setting of human life.

Heidegger (1927:200 [157][M&R]) argues that the statement such as, "the hammer is too heavy" is not merely a theoretical statement; it may serve to say, "Hand me the other hammer." Furthermore, Heidegger (1927:200 [157][M&R]) says that interpretation is carried out not in a theoretical statement but in

an action of circumspective concern - laying aside the unsuitable tool, or exchanging it 'without wasting words'. From the fact that words are absent, it may not be concluded that interpretation is absent. In this understanding, Heidegger views assertions as derivative mode of interpretation.

All understanding is temporal, intentional, historical. For Dilthey, the interpretation of the literary work of art, is set in the context of the historicity of man's self-understanding (Palmer, 1969:122). In so doing, Dilthey laid foundations for Heidegger's thinking on the temporality of self-understanding. In his own elaborations, Heidegger went beyond Dilthey, in defining understanding as ontological.

(2) State-of-mind

States-of-mind disclose a partial meaning of our existence through moods. Some of the moods are fear, anxiety, joy, and boredom. Moods can lighten up our Being-in-the-world in a way that is neither objective nor subjective but comes before the separation of subject and object (Ducharme, 1981:212). Ducharme (1981:212) says that moods are particularly important in the sense that they necessarily disclose truths about the actual world of *Dasein*.

Moods reveal thrownness. Ontologically, the first essential characteristic of states-of-mind is that they disclose *Dasein* in its thrownness (Heidegger, 1927:175 [136][M&R]). The expression "thrownness" is meant to suggest the facticity of its being delivered over; thus it is thrown in such a way that, as Being-in-the-world, it is the "there" (Heidegger, 1927:174 [135][M&R]). Facticity means that the human being is always already in a world - a world into which beyond its willing, it has been cast (*geworfen*) (Grene, 1967:159). That is to say, one is cast into a world not of his own making although it is one's own duty to appropriate and assimilate, freely, yet within inescapable limits of contingency. Therefore, it can be concluded that the states-of-mind through the moods reveal the thrownness of *Dasein*.

(3) Discourse

Heidegger's (1927:203 [160][M&R]) clarification of assertion as communication (speaking forth) leads to his other idea: the fact that language now becomes our theme for the first time will indicate that this phenomenon has its roots in the existential constitution of *Dasein's* disclosedness. Thus the existential-ontological foundation of language is discourse or talk (Heidegger, 1927:203 [160][M&R]). Heidegger believes that the

mode of the actual (state-of-mind) and the mode of the possible (understanding) lead directly to "discourse" which is equiprimordial with both, but is their unifying ground (Ducharme, 1981:214). Thus discourse is existentially equiprimordial with state-of-mind and understanding (Heidegger, 1927:203 [161][M&R]). It is the articulation of the intelligibility, that underlies both interpretation and assertion (Heidegger, 1927:204 [161][M&R]).

Discourse is expressed in language, which is a totality of words - a totality in which discourse has a 'worldly' Being of its own; and as an entity within-the-world, this totality thus becomes something which we may come across as ready-to-hand. This means that discourse is existentially language because that entity whose disclosedness it articulates has, as its kind of Being, Being-in-the-world - a Being which has been thrown and submitted to the 'world' (Heidegger, 1927:204 [161][M&R]). Furthermore, discourse communicates. In commenting on this Ducharme (1981:214) says that for Heidegger, the key point here is that all language is grounded not in words themselves nor in abstract constructions about logic, but, as Thiselton (1980:168) puts it, in the sharing of communication between human persons.

Furthermore, the locus of truth is shifted from propositions to the existential source of such propositions, of which the ground is discourse or talk (Ducharme, 1981:214). Talking is a sharing which is more than the meaning given by the verbalization of the word language. This is because a reader (or interpreter) contributes his own talk when he reads a well-written dialogue; and the reader does not become a viewer but a participator in understanding of what is written (Ducharme, 1981:214).

3.3.3 Thinking

Heidegger's critique of Western metaphysics also involved the ontological question with regard to human thinking, bridging the boundary between being and non-being. Following his arguments on thinking in *Being and Time* and *Discourse on Thinking*, Heidegger calls us to abandon calculative thinking, a thinking that breaks reality into subject-object, and to embrace primordial or essential thinking, a thinking that is viewed to be prior to objectification. Heidegger (1959:46) refers to this kind of thinking as thinking of the second sort which exists, and is particularly known as meditative thinking. What one does not know is how far did Heidegger want to go with this – in practice. One may ask: “Is Heidegger giving a method for philosophy, or for the human sciences, or did he also want the

natural sciences to stop calculative thinking?” Heidegger knew that in the natural sciences scientific research could not do without objectification of reality, that is why he said that at one and at the same time technical devices (objectification of things) are allowed to enter one’s daily life (Heidegger, 1959:54).

Heidegger regarded meditative thinking as the higher kind of activity than is involved in the exercise of any subjective human power (Anderson, 1959:25). Metaphorically, meditative thinking is viewed as the activity of walking along a path which leads to Being (Anderson, 1959:25). This meditative thinking is called *releasement* (*Gelassenheit*) (Heidegger, 1959:54). According to Ducharme (1981:219), Heidegger borrowed and modified the meaning of the word *Gelassenheit* from the German mystic Meister Eckhart¹⁶. This contributed considerably to his mystical ontology.

¹⁶ Eckhart used the term for the casting off of sinful self-seeking, but for Heidegger one casts off subject-ness and object-ness (Ducharme, 1981:219). According to Ducharme (1981:219-220), Eckhart used releasement for two moments: (1) negative one – a separation from things, a willing not to will; (2) positive one – when Eckhart speaks of “let God be God”, in Heidegger it is a simple openness to Being that “lets Being be”.

When Eckhart speaks of letting God be God through *Gelassenheit* and living without asking “why,” and so too for Heidegger, *Dasein* must be without “why” because Being is a groundless ground, therefore, let Being be, free of reason’s categories, principles, and concepts (Ducharme, 1981:220). If one asks why, he is seeking for a “technological” or “calculative” answer.

As we have seen above, Heidegger, after the rejection of Western traditional metaphysics, establishes the relationship between man and the rest of reality. After that, then Heidegger declares that man stands in a hermeneutical relationship (*ein hermeneutischer Bezug*) where he is a message-bringer, the enunciator of being, who is the being that bridges the gap between concealment and disclosure of being. In speaking, man interprets being (Palmer, 1969:149). Through meditative thinking man opens up to the mystery of reality. Thinking becomes a path to reach Being.

Heidegger defines true thinking as disclosing what was hidden, not the manipulation of what has already been disclosed. It follows that a thinking dialogue with things or existentials brings further disclosure. Heidegger thus takes reality seriously, but he does not give the way in which it should be done to solve the problem of a technological society where the subject overpowers the object which remains a thing unknowable in itself. In any case, hermeneutics must unceasingly return to this secondary act of interpretation to a loving repetition of the original disclosure remaining on the border between what is concealed and revealed (Palmer, 1969:149). What it means is

that releasement is movement toward things and openness to the mystery; the two belong together (Heidegger, 1959:54-55).

Within the realm of thinking, Heidegger (1935:27) shifts the question from "Why are there essents rather than nothing?" to "How does it stand with being?" It is this questioning that leads us into the open. If questioning does not go deep into the (negative) ground of the being, it is not true questioning but manipulation, calculation or explanation (Palmer, 1969:150). But true questioning draws being into showing itself, and bridges the ontological difference between being and the being of beings (Heidegger, 1935:29-30). This hermeneutical process of questioning relates to the essence of man's being-in-the-world, by reaching into the unmanifest being and draws it out into a concrete, historical occurrence, of which, therefore, through questioning being becomes history (Palmer, 1969:150).

According to Heidegger (1935:29), in the early times the occurrence of being was the product of man's inquiry and grasping but later it occurred as a gift of truth from the side of being to man who is a 'shepherd of being' whose guardianship entails 'thinking' and 'poetizing' (Palmer, 1969:151). An unanswered question is how does being give this gift of truth. Thinking is sometimes defined as a response, an answer, to the

calling voice of being. In response to this calling, man reaches into the negativity of being, the undisclosed, the mystery (Palmer, 1969:151). Therefore, for us to be able to render such a response, man must abandon calculative thinking which offers him only technical relation to the world and embrace meditative thinking (Heidegger, 1959:51-55). If man continues to cling to calculative thinking, he will be a defenceless and perplexed victim at the mercy of the irresistible superior technology (Heidegger, 1959:53). On the contrast, meditative thinking frees man from viewing things and the world objectively (or seeing them as objects).

3.3.4 Language

Heidegger addresses the issue of language: thus the linguisticity of being. He puts language in a new context, where it becomes the articulation of existential understanding, not simply a tool of communication (Heidegger 1927:151-156 [161-166][JS]). The starting point here is that just as the occurrence of being presupposes apprehension, so there can be no being without language, and no language without being (Palmer, 1969:153). This is because “language is the house of being” and “in its home man dwells” (Heidegger, 1947:480). As he pursues his argument, Heidegger stresses that the task of

thinking is to bring over again to spoken form the arrival of being (in language). Heidegger (1935:82) argues that “if our essence did not include the power of language, all beings would be closed to us, that which we ourselves are no less than the being that we are not”. That means that without language man could not be, in any way we can think of; for to be a man is to speak (Heidegger, 1935:82). This is because language is the house of Being (DeVries, 1984:504).

For Heidegger (1927:150 [160][JS]), the foundation of language is in speaking, and especially in saying (*das sagen*), because to say is to show. Thus essence of language is its hermeneutical function of bringing a thing (especially a poetic text) to show itself. Language is not an expression of man but an appearance of being. But what is being? In traditional western metaphysics, being was understood to be transcendental, “that which is most universal of all” (Aristotle, *Metaphysics*:Book III,4). For Heidegger (1927:2-8[3-9][JS]), the concept of being is obscure and it is indefinable, but it can be explained as the totality of beings because it is self-evident in man’s everydayness. Thus being is an *enigma* (or a paradox – something puzzling).

Thinking does not express man, it lets being happen as language event (Palmer, 1969:155). Interpretation in this case means to

step back from analyzing and explanation, so as to find an outlet where the being of the text will show itself. In this way interpretation becomes a helping of the language event itself to happen (Palmer, 1969:155). Therefore it is evident that Heidegger's philosophy is centrally hermeneutical. This means that man is there to use language to lay bare through interpretation the meaning of the rest of reality, not as a subject but as part of reality.

In his hermeneutic phenomenology Heidegger responds to Descartes's, Kant's, and then Husserl's approach to the subject-object alienation. Firstly, Heidegger (1927:84 [89][JS]) responds to Descartes's ontology where *ego cogito* (I think) as *res cogitans* (thinking thing) is separated from the *res corporea* (corporeal thing). This distinction, consequently became the source of the opposing distinction between the spirit and nature which is ontically formulated in many variations of content (Heidegger, 1927:84 [89][JS]), and further it influenced the epistemology and research methodology in the form of subject-object separation. Like Kant (though Heidegger differs with and accuses him of repeating Descartes), Heidegger finds the central problem to be the ontological status of the subject. This is because, in Descartes' dualist metaphysics of mind and matter (world), Descartes, as West (1996:98) puts it:

...conceives the world as a mechanistic realm of extended material objects, which is mysteriously connected to a spiritual domain of mind or consciousness.

In this kind of conception the Cartesian dualistic metaphysics put the emphasis on man as a combination of mind (spirit) and body (matter). It follows that man was set forth as a knowing subject facing the world as a known or knowable object (Stumpf, 1993:505) (as discussed above under 3.1). For Heidegger, to conceive of man in this kind of relation to the world, is to give a distorted view of both man and the world.

Be it as it may, Heidegger became more concerned with substantiality that Descartes, in Heidegger's interpretation, tried to evade. Hence Heidegger's (1927:84 [89][JS]) question to Descartes:

In what kind of understanding of being did he determine the being of beings?

For Heidegger (1927:84 [89-90][JS]), the being of being is termed *substantia*; which sometimes refers to the being of beings as substance, or substantiality. The *res corporea*, in its ontological determination requires the explication of substance.

Thus the real being of the corporeal substance which we call the “world”, is constituted by extension in terms of length, width, and depth (Heidegger, 1927:84 [90][JS]). Heidegger (1927:87, 92 [94,100][JS]) concludes that:

Descartes not only evades the ontological question of substantiality, he emphasizes explicitly that substance as such, that is, its substantiality, is in and for itself inaccessible from the very beginning. ...Descartes narrowed down the question of the world to the thingliness of nature as that innerworldly being which is initially accessible.

In other words Heidegger is rejecting Descartes’s reduction of the created reality through his methodical doubting because it evades substantiality. One is compelled to ask Heidegger why he is so concerned with substantiality. This is because for him, to reject or to evade substantiality, or to give a wrong ontological definition of the world, is to reject existence, which is Heidegger’s number one philosophical presupposition. Also Heidegger rejects the partitioning of the reality into man against the world.

For Heidegger (1927:55[59][JS]), being-in-the-world creates a conducive situation for the coherence of man (seen as the subject in Descartes and Kant) and the world (the object in

Descartes and Kant). For Heidegger (1927:56[60][JS]), the subject and object relation should be seen as the same with *Dasein* and the world. In fact, Heidegger (1927:55[59][JS]) argues that being-in-the-world “is the relation between one being (world) and another (the soul) ...” What he is trying to show us is that he does not accept the presupposition of the subject-object relation in his epistemology, rather he prefers the relation between the world and the soul. The process of knowing takes place within the realm of being-in-the-world. In such a process, Heidegger (1927:55[59][JS]) holds that the subject-object relation must be presupposed because it gives clues into the rich existential relations of *Dasein* has at hand. But in its own facticity, Heidegger (1927:55[59][JS]) disapproves of it, arguing that it is fatal because it sets man against the rest of the world, whereby the world becomes the victim of man’s calculative thinking which is merciless. Man and the rest of the existentials are a *unitary* phenomenon before any act of conceptualization (Heidegger, 1927:49[53][JS]). So Heidegger considers Descartes to have missed the right ontological conception of man and the definition of the world.

In response to Kant, Heidegger (1927:189 [204][JS]) says that at first sight, it seems as if Kant abandoned Descartes’s position of a transcendental isolated subject. But to accept that, Heidegger

(1927:189 [204][JS]) argues, is to accept an illusion because of the mere fact that

Kant requires any proof at all for the existence of things outside of me already shows that he takes the subject, the "in me," as the starting point...

That is to say, Kant still maintains the Cartesian dualistic metaphysics, with the mind being separated from matter.

In response to Husserl's phenomenological method, Heidegger (1927:141 [150][JS]), discussing interpretation in his hermeneutic phenomenology (with human existence as its starting point), rejects the Husserlian presuppositionless methodological approach in any inquiry, and most strongly rejected a split ontology. This is because Husserl's concept of intentionality presupposes the subject-object alienation. Husserl is also caught up in the hub of the subject-object split problem which Heidegger severely attacks.

Stambaugh (1975:80) says that in his analysis of human existence, what Heidegger criticizes about the subject-object split is not its legitimacy on a certain level of thinking, but rather its ultimacy. By taking human existence as his starting point, Heidegger did not wish to start with the subject and subjectivity,

because man is the only being who is aware of himself, of the world (Stambaugh, 1975:80).

After following the structure of his hermeneutic phenomenology, the question that remains is: how does Heidegger solve the subject-object separation problem? Firstly, Heidegger breaks with the Cartesian tradition and Husserl by replacing the epistemological questions concerning the relation of the knower and the known, with ontological questions with regard to what sort of beings we are and how our being is bound up with the intelligibility of the world. Hence Heidegger's (1927:21[24][JS]) call for the reversal of Descartes's famous starting point:

With the *cogito sum* Descartes claims to prepare a new and secure foundation for philosophy. But what he leaves underdetermined in this "radical" beginning is the manner of being of the *res cogitans*, more precisely, *the meaning of being of the "sum"*. Working out the tacit ontological foundations of the *cogito sum* will constitute the second stage of the deconstructing of, and the path back into, the history of ontology.

Heidegger (1927:21[24][JS]) tacitly moved from the formalized Husserlian conception of phenomenology into a concrete sense of phenomenology. Thus he rethought and redefined the concept

of phenomenology, hence he referred to his phenomenological method as hermeneutic (Heidegger 1927:24-34 [28-39][JS]). The movement from phenomenology to ontology led Heidegger (1927:34 [38][JS]) to declare that ontology and phenomenology are simply the same essential characteristics of philosophy. Because of that, Heidegger (1927:34 [38][JS]) views philosophy as universal phenomenological ontology which takes its departure from the hermeneutic of *Dasein*, which, as an analysis of existence, has fastened the end of the guideline of all philosophical inquiry at the point from which it arises and to which it returns.

Secondly, Heidegger declares the basic state of man, namely his being-in-the-world, thus *Dasein*. Man is part of the world of things, though he is the only thing that is aware of itself. The world in which he is a part of, is not a collection of things or natural objects set against man as though man is one kind of thing and the contents of the world another. By declaring *Dasein* as the starting point of his method, Heidegger wanted to close the gap between the subject and the object. This is because the traditional logic had dictated the separation of the subject and object, such that it led to very dangerous implications in social research methodology. Stambaugh (1975:81) mentions that it is

... Heidegger's contention that regarding things as natural objects has characterized the ontology of traditional logic. The ontology of natural objects regards everything as static entities separated from each other and from the knowing subject in a way in which it is impossible to get them back together again. Ontology has been thing-ontology, an ontology of static things.

That is why Heidegger has always been unsympathetically critical with the traditional Western metaphysics, accusing it of being static and restricted to the language of the subject-object distinction (Connolly & Keutner, 1988:20) as mentioned by Stambaugh.

So the being-in-the-world of *Dasein* means de-distancing. Heidegger (1927:97[105][JS]) argues that by de-distancing he does not refer to remoteness (nearness) or even being at a distance. However, he (Heidegger, 1927:97[105][JS]) says that:

We use the expression de-distancing in an active and transitive sense. It means a constitution of being of *Dasein* of which de-distancing something, putting it away, is only a definite factual mode. De-distancing means making distance disappear, making the being at a distance of something disappear, bringing it near. *Dasein* is essentially de-distancing. As the being that it is, it lets beings be encountered in nearness.

This means that the primary relationship of *Dasein* with the world is one of practical, and personal involvement that eliminates the distance between man and the world. The reason is that our original encounter with the world is not as detached observers but as involved participants (Heidegger, 1927:65[69][JS]), because the world is fundamentally constituted as a practical totality (West, 1996:101). Heidegger (1927:41[43-44][JS]) indicates that the world is characteristic of *Dasein* and the way we encounter it in everyday experience (hence his concept of everydayness) is by participation not observation. That means being-in-the-world is primordially and constantly whole; therefore, *Dasein* as being-there, is inseparable from the world, and so it is essentially Being-in-the-world.

Once man is already a Being-in-the-world, he can understand himself as a "subject" because he is the only part of reality that is aware of itself. Things are no longer understood as objects of the thinking subject, but they are understood in terms of something ready-to-hand (available for its purpose) and present-to-hand (simply an object). In such a situation, there will be no distance between man and the rest of the creation.

But just like his predecessors, in the process of solving the subject-object separation problem, Heidegger also fell into the temptation of extremism. Thus Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology led to an indiscriminate ontologizing of everything, from philosophy itself to his method of inquiry. For there must be a distinction between methodology and ontological presuppositions on which it is founded. So in Heidegger, everything becomes ontology. This becomes a problem rather than a method to solve a problem, for it became a fertile ground for monism and mystic metaphysics.

3.4 John Dewey's Pragmatism

Dewey comes from an irrationalistic background, that of pragmatism. Pragmatism was given its initial theoretical formulation by Charles S. Peirce, received its popular circulation through the writings of William James, and it was methodically (or methodologically) implemented by John Dewey (Stumpf, 1993:383). It is a closely related sister-movement to vitalism, and existentialism (Kok, 1996:149-155), of which central to them all is the human situation. Hence Dewey's starting point in his pragmatic method is the indeterminate (or confused) situation in human life, and it ends up with transformed or restored situation.

Firstly, I am going to give an outline of Dewey's inquiry (or method), which will be followed by an evaluation. Dewey (1938:104/5) defines inquiry as

the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole.

The stress in the definition of Dewey, according to Hart (1965:27) lands on the terms, "controlled, directed, transformation, and convert". The importance of the term "controlled" tells us that there are other transformations that take place in the environment without being controlled, whereas in the inquiry, there are instrumentalities which are at the disposal of the inquirer to have the problematic situation in hand (Hart, 1965:27). The necessity of transformation and conversion in the definition exposes the operational character of Dewey's theory of inquiry, which commences as soon as the situation becomes problematic, and it goes on until the inquiring attitude has been existentially satisfied (Hart, 1965:27). What we see here is the will to subject the problematic situation by the inquirer. There is some kind of subduing mastery in the attitude of the inquirer. The terms "subduing mastery" implies a plan which expresses

the subjective aims of the inquirer. Unless the situation changes from indeterminate to determinate, inquiry will never be stopped even if it means causing pain.

3.4.1 Dewey's Theory of Inquiry

Dewey's theory of inquiry, (or methodology) involves the following elements:

- (1) The Indeterminate Situation
- (2) Institution of a problem
- (3) The Determination of a Problem-Solution: Hypothesis
- (4) Reasoning
- (5) Experiment
- (6) Conclusion of Inquiry

3.4.1.1 The Indeterminate Situation

The problematic situation is the point of departure to Dewey's pragmatic method. Dewey (1938:105) describes it as "the antecedent conditions of inquiry". It is pre-reflective in the sense that it exists prior to inquiry and reflection (Thayer, 1969:50). What matters most concerning the indeterminate situation as Thayer (1969:50) puts it, is that its constituents have become

discordant such that it evokes inquiry. Dewey (1938:105) further describes this problematic situation as being actually unsettled, disturbed, uncertain, and potentially questionable. Thus the whole situation is full of conflicting tendencies which leads us to be doubtful. Dewey (1938:105) argues that

We are doubtful because the situation is inherently doubtful. Personal states of doubt that are not evoked by and are not relative to some existential situation are pathological; when they are extreme they constitute the mania of doubting.

So in order to restore this situation to a normal situation, there is need for an organic-environmental interaction. This troubled, confused, imbalanced situation, cannot be restored by simply using mental processes. This is because, according to Dewey's (1938:106) argument,

... Nature is an environment only as it is involved in interaction with an organism, self, or whatever name be used. Every such interaction is a temporal process, not a momentary cross-sectional occurrence. The situation in which it occurs is indeterminate, therefore, with respect to its *issue*. If it is *confused*, then it is meant that its outcome cannot be anticipated. It is called *obscure* when its course of movement permits of final consequences that cannot be clearly made out. It is called *conflicting* when it tends to evoke discordant responses.

The act of responding to an indeterminate situation, sets in motion the movement towards its restoration, which is search and exploration. This movement happens in the occurrence of the responses in the organic-environmental interaction. Dewey (1938:107) concludes that

Organic interaction becomes inquiry when existential consequences are anticipated; when environing conditions are examined with reference to their potentialities; and when responsive activities are selected and ordered with reference to actualization of some of the potentialities, rather than others, in a final existential situation. Resolution of the indeterminate situation is active and operational.

That is to say, environing conditions are examined to find out what they can contribute and so that they can be selected and ordered with a view to actualizing what they potentially reveal and offer in terms of materials for the resolution and settlement of the problematic situation.

3.4.1.2 Institution of a Problem

The name, problematic situation, according to Dewey (1938:107) refers to an indeterminate situation when such a

situation comes under inquiry. This indeterminate situation comes into existence as a result of existential causes, which are pre-cognitive (Dewey, 1938:107). Before any involvement into inquiry, the situation will be explored in order to make sure it is problematic, thus looking at all the facts that constitute the concrete existence of the situation. If proved to be problematic, and well put, then it is half-solved (Dewey, 1938:108). In other words, if the indeterminate “situation is taken, adjudged, to be problematic”, then, as Thayer (1969:52) puts it, it

... sets the stage and marks the general area in which inquiry is to work; it is the beginning of the transformation of problematic into determinate situation.

Therefore, the institution of a problem is very important, because it suggests the direction which the inquiry is going to take.

3.4.1.3 The Determination of a Problem-Solution: Hypotheses

Now how does Dewey conduct an inquiry that can lead to a solution of the genuine problem? Once a statement of a problematic situation is formulated, the inquirer may suggest

possible solutions to it. But there are steps to be taken before reaching the stage of making these suggestions.

Dewey (1938:109) points out that the first step is to search out the *constituents* of a problematic situation, thus their existence. After that, the inquirer should settle these constituents in *observation*. Then these observed conditions of the problematic situation, taken together, form the facts of the case (Dewey, 1938:109). They become the terms of the problem because in any attempt to reach a relevant solution it requires the inquirer to be take them into account. So the determined factual conditions secured during the process of observation lead to the springing up of ideas as simple suggestions for a possible relevant solution to the problematic situation. That means, according to Dewey (1938:110),

Every idea originates as a suggestion, but not every suggestion is an idea. The suggestion becomes an idea when it is examined with reference to its functional fitness; its capacity as a means of resolving the given situation.

The possible solution presents itself, consequently as an idea. Dewey (1938:108) defines ideas as

anticipated consequences (forecasts) of what will happen when certain operations are executed under and with respect to observed conditions. ... An idea is first of all an anticipation of something that may happen; it marks a possibility.

In his comment on Dewey's pattern of inquiry, Thayer (1969:52) says that suggestions and hypotheses are

anticipations and forecasts of what, under certain conditions present, will happen if a plan (or suggestion) is acted out.

What we find out here is that according to what has been quoted above from Dewey and Thayer, hypotheses and ideas refer to the same thing, thus, hypotheses are ideas (and vice versa) (Dewey, 1938:113; Thayer, 1969:52).

Furthermore, Dewey (1938:132) views hypotheses (or ideas) as theories and as the conceptual and rational contents of scientific inquiry: they are instruments of a wide, indefinite scope of operational application, and actual application. Their truth and validity can only be proven by experimentation. Unless experiments are carried out, they remain in the world of anticipation.

3.4.1.4 Reasoning

The Deweyan pragmatic method, roughly put developed a criterion of meaning stating that the meaning of a statement is the sum of its verifiable consequences; thus things are understood by the way they behave or within the bounds of their operational meaning. Since ideas are plans of action, proposals for possible solutions for the problematic situation, therefore the plan of action (i.e. the manner), will be their meaning (Thayer, 1969:54).

The activity of critically evaluating suggestions to see if they are functionally fit to be selected and ordered to form the whole package of plans for action, takes the form of reasoning. Therefore, reasoning, according to Dewey (1938:110) may be defined as an examination of these plans; an examination of meaning

as a result of which we are able to appraise better than we were at the outset, the pertinency and weight of the meaning now entertained with respect to its functional capacity.

Therefore, to reach this point of viewing ideas as plans, reasoning is used as that instrument to help the inquirer to sift wheat from chaff. That is to say, thinking in the form of

reasoning is instrumentally employed to critically examine and select suggestions that are fit for ideas that will determine the course of action to restore the troubled situation. This brings us to the conclusion of instrumentalism (Dewey's theory) that "reflective thought is always involved in transforming a practical situation" (Stumpf, 1993:397).

3.4.1.5 Experiment

Earlier on we learnt that an hypothesis (or idea) is a plan of action, and an experiment is the overt activity; it is the plan acted out (Thayer, 1969:61). Dewey (1938:112) argues that

An hypothesis, once suggested and entertained, is developed in relation to other conceptual structures until it receives a form in which it can instigate and direct an experiment that will disclose precisely those conditions which have the maximum possible force in determining whether the hypothesis should be accepted or rejected. Or it may be that the experiment will indicate what modifications are required in the hypothesis so that it may be applicable, i.e., suited to interpret and organize the facts of the case. In many familiar situations, the meaning that is most relevant has been settled because of the eventuations of experiments in prior cases so that it is applicable almost immediately upon its occurrence.

So an experiment whose conclusion brings about the settling or solving of the problem (the problematic situation) is declared successful. Also the plan of action which guides the experiment will be displayed as the satisfactory answer to the disturbed situation. If it happens that the experiment fails to succeed, inquiry will continue: "it may retrace and re-examine its own procedures and develop other hypotheses to be tried out" (Thayer, 1969:61). Therefore it is through the experiment that a hypothesis should be accepted or rejected.

3.4.1.6 Conclusion of Inquiry

Conclusion refers to the close of the inquiry of the problematic situation which has become settled. Once the indeterminate situation is transformed to a determinate one, the inquiry is closed, and judgment is made by the inquirer concerning the outcome of the inquiry. Then a statement (a formulation) or warranted assertion of the plan and action that brought success in inquiry is made.

After such an account of Dewey's method, a question remains: Does John Dewey subscribe to the Cartesian dualism? John Dewey's pragmatism also rejects the subject-object dichotomy as his starting point. In his response to Stuart, who accused him

of having the subject-object separation as his point of departure, Dewey (1988:67) argues that this appears to be Stuart's view because he further distinguishes knowledge of physical objects as involving subjection of the self, as the knower. Furthermore, Dewey (1988:68) polemically argues that Stuart was busy propounding his (Stuart's) view when he (Stuart) referred to the situation presenting itself to the knower as being doubtful or precarious, as if Dewey held the situation to be outside the knower.

What Dewey is trying to do here is that he is defending himself from and rejecting what some people like Stuart are saying about his pragmatic method. Hocking (1988:422) believes that theory does not require the Cartesian dualism, but Descartes was on a true scent or had a clue when he made it as clear as he did. Although he did so, Dewey and Whitehead agree in laying the blame on Descartes for much of the modern metaphysical confusion, for he split asunder what experience had joined together (Hocking, 1988:422).

But how does Dewey solve the problem of subject-object alienation? In his move to solve the subject-object cleft, Dewey points out that the initial stage is the existence of an indeterminate situation (Dewey, 1938:107) caused by existential

causes. The reference to existence of the situation and its existential causes, tells us of the close link between existentialism and pragmatism. The indeterminate situation, in its whole existence, characteristically it is disturbed, troubled, ambiguous, confused, full of conflicting tendencies, obscure, and inherently doubtful (Dewey, 1938:105). The inherent doubtfulness of the situation also causes us to be doubtful (Dewey, 1938:105). The idea of “doubt” seems to link with the methodical doubt of Descartes. Anyway the question one would want to ask Dewey is, “Who determines that the situation is indeterminate?” The question presupposes the role of the knowing subject (the inquirer). From the explanation of Dewey, it is the inquirer (the subject) who uses his own judgment and criteria to determine the indeterminacy of the situation.

Now when does this situation become problematic, and how does the Dewey’s pragmatic method reverse the indeterminacy? Firstly, Dewey (1988:70) answers the question on the existence of a problematic situation as follows:

... a situation is problematic prior to any “grasping” or “apprehension” whatever, the first act of knowing being to locate a problem by selective or analytic discrimination of some of the observable constituents of the total situation.

The qualitative term “total” in the above quotation, which is used interchangeably with “whole” sends connotations of monism, according to Hart (1965:41). Hart (1965:41) argues that the theory of progress that underlies Dewey’s philosophy is definitely monistic and the same holds for Dewey’s doctrine of the situation. If Dewey describes the situation as total, he refers to it as being a whole. That is why Dewey (1938:202) describes the totality of the situation as follows:

To be a whole is to be complete, finished; to be of seamless quality throughout. If parts are mentioned... nothing separable... is denoted.

In his critical analysis of Dewey’s *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, Hart further discusses the doctrine of the situation in an attempt to prove that it is monistic. He (Hart, (1965:41-2) argues that a situation (according to Dewey) is a whole, and its unity and oneness are primary, determinative of its aspects, of which its composition does not consist of originally separate parts. The unity of the situation, is considered as the whole.

Concerning the reversing of the indeterminacy of the situation, Dewey is not clear about it though he mentions the organic interaction based on instrumental thinking; one would conclude that by saying so Dewey implies the human aspect in the

inquiry. Interaction does not accommodate the polarity between the subject and object as found in the Cartesian dualism, but gives distinction between the process of knowing and the known (Tibbets, 1971:265). So what we see here is Dewey's rejection of a knower standing behind the knowing activity. If Dewey is rejecting the traditional epistemological dualism, to whom does the indeterminate situation reveal itself?

In his discussion on Dewey's account of experience and the subject-object relation, Tibbetts (1971:281) states that:

What he claims is simply that the subject-object relation as traditionally conceived both by rationalism and empiricism presupposes a dualism between knower and known that can only be bridged by a host of artificial devices, such as impressions, sensations, and sense data. Such a dualism can for Dewey be avoided only by putting the experiencer directly into the midst of the objects of his experience and not interpret him at the outset as a "knower" or "cognizer."

The implication here is that Dewey does not deny the distinction between the subject and the object within the context of experience. This is confirmed in Thayer's examination of Dewey's book: *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* where experience is explained as a context that includes both the knower and the

known (Thayer, 1969:26). So to reverse the indeterminacy of a situation, the experiencer, must be part of the whole build up of the situation. By means of instrumental thinking that can lead him/her to the development of the hypothesis and other methodical devices, the indeterminate situation will be reversed to a determinate situation.

Such an approach like this makes one to wonder if Dewey is not allowing the theory of evolution to blur human knowledge into the interaction of organisms with the environment. Are all creatures capable of reversing the indeterminate situation to a determinate one? Can animals have plans, hypothesis, and calculated actions? Once one talks of hypothesis, plans, and actions, the subject is obviously human beings. Experimentation is not an activity of the subject-matter (object) but an activity of the subject to transform or to restore the problematic situation. Therefore, Dewey, an irrationalist of the pragmatic movement, implicitly holds onto the subject-object alienation in his method.

3.4.2 Evaluative Conclusion

Even though in Pragmatism the human organism is projected as an organism in-interaction with its environment, the human organism is also projected as a being with certain aims to be

realized. It is not the indeterminacy of the situation which is problematic – it is the fact that the situation puts limitations on the realization of human aims. This means that the human organism will try to realize its aims in spite of the limitations of the situation. Stated otherwise: the pragmatist sees the difficulty of the realization of his aims as part of the whole situation, and therefore does not fully realize that he/she is imposing personal aims onto the environment. The situation is not indeterminate for a start – rather there is a problem of the clash of aims with the environment which Dewey's monism does not allow him to see.

This brings us to the conclusion that Dewey never agreed with the idea of a method that is based on a split-ontology. He emphasized an ontological unity, which was a move in the right direction, save the fact that he ended up being monistic. Also in his contending against those who held these views, Dewey also tried to develop a way of solving this problem of subject-object alienation in his pragmatic method. But what we encounter is domination of experience and situation, in which the cleft between the knower and the known still implicitly continues.

Situationism dominates Dewey's method. In such a position, the subject and object sink in the problematic situation where the

situation dictates the method. That will mean if there is no a problematic situation then there is no need for an inquiry or any method of inquiry.

3.5 Participatory Research Method

There are two major camps of the Participatory Research¹⁷ method (hereinafter referred to as PR) namely, those who subscribe to the *historical materialist* position, and the idealist and social democratic political position (Mulenga, 1994:9).

Underlying the former are Marxist presuppositions whose standpoint is class struggle and revolutionary social change as the basis for development (Mulenga, 1994:10). It follows that knowledge is viewed as a social product; if the means of its production is in the hands of few people, the marginalized will be dominated and exploited. Arguing from the historical materialist school of thought, Rahman (1994:56) who belongs to the Participatory Action Research (PA-R)¹⁸ says that:

¹⁷The term “participatory research” was coined in the seventies and it means an emancipatory approach to knowledge production and utilization. Its main aim is to actively involve the oppressed and disenfranchised people in the collective investigation of reality in order to transform their reality (Mulenga, 1994:7).

¹⁸The early 1970's saw the emergence of another version of participatory research called Participatory Action Research (Mulenga, 1994:12). It gave birth to three conceptual models, viz.: (1) PA-R as an

... domination of masses by elites is rooted not only in the polarization of control over the means of material production but also over the means of knowledge production, including control over the social power to determine what is useful knowledge.

Therefore there must be a collective investigation of problems that affect them. In that way the production and control of knowledge becomes democratized (Mulenga, 1994:10).

In contrast to the former, underlying the latter are the phenomenological and pragmatic presuppositions whose standpoint is that pragmatic reforms are the most that can be achieved by participatory research (Mulenga, 1994: 10). In this school of thought, Mulenga (1994:11) says that PR

is perceived as a method and investigation whose main role is to enhance the cooperation and “participation” by the “community”.

interdisciplinary methodology that leads people to self-reliance by combining formal and informal knowledge, so as to utilize the blend product or that new knowledge to transform their own contemporary situation; (2) PA-R is viewed as enabling the self-conscious to progressively transform their environments on their own, with the community under the distinction of roles, some as catalytic, and some as supportive systems without domination; and (3) PA-R is viewed as transformative research which is defined in Mulenga (1994:16) as research that is ethical, emancipatory, empowering, and holistic in both its implementation and use of results.

Now, how does the PR solve the subject-object alienation problem? In PR circles, the cleft between the researcher (subject) and the community or reality (object) is seen as having dangerous connotations such as political domination. It is because PR has detected the motive of mastery and control inherent in the subject-object split. They do not want the intellectual control of the researcher over human beings participating as field of research – they do not want persons to be “objectified”. The question then remains (which as humanists they leave aside) whether it is admissible to exert mastery over nature in the Modern sense. So it is by all means their ideal to overcome the subject-object separation in the process of research.

As a first step in the bridging of the subject-object separation, PR sets out a multi-faceted point of departure that one may deduce from Mulenga (1994:13-14) and Borda (1994:57) namely:

- (1) the enlightenment and awakening of common peoples as the primary task;
- (2) lived experience of the people, and through the actual experience of something, may help us to

intuitively understand its essence and understand it as reality;

- (3) authentic commitment which refers to genuine collaboration;
- (4) empowerment of people through conscientization so as to enhance a collective self-inquiry and reflection for people to build their self-knowledge;

Beside the above enlisted tasks, central to the PR and PA-R is the key notion of dialogue. Through dialogue, Mulenga (1994:14) argues:

the subject-object relationship of traditional sciences gives way to a subject-subject relationship. ... The academic knowledge of formally educated people works in a dialectical tension with the popular knowledge of the people to reproduce a more profound understanding of the situation.

Mulenga's view of moving from a subject-object polarity to subject-subject approach is echoed by Borda. Borda (1994:132) also holds that dialogue diminishes the differences between research subject and object. Furthermore, Borda (1994:133) holds that dialogical understanding between the active subject and object, will result in the sharing of their experiences within the same historical process while they all act as subjects.

In agreement with the idea of getting rid of the subject-object split Rahman (1994:56) argues that the generation of knowledge does not need the method of detached observation of the positivist school. Even though Rahman is of the view of closing the subject-object gap, he warns that the concept of establishing a subject-subject relation between the researcher and the people requires deeper articulation (1994:59). He believes that it is not easy to do so because of the traditional methodological tendencies.

Through dialogue, consensus will be reached which will be employed as the method of verification. The scientific character of knowledge rests on its social verifiability which relies on the reached consensus. That means truth will be determined by the community of people with a common interest based on consensus as method. Consensus will give the context for researching roles and activities. That will mean, the researching expert, who is part of the community in terms of interest, will play his role of formalizing the research project, while the community is the support base and supplier of information. Formalization of the research project includes defining, concretizing and formulating a problem, setting the purpose of the project, data collection and analysis, defining and organizing

of collective action (Mulenga, 1994:17-19). Mulenga (1994:18) points out that PR

uses both qualitative and quantitative methods but eschew certain methods that dictate the separation of the subject from the object of research.

It uses such methods as, just to name a few, group discussion, public meetings, research teams, popular theater, and community seminars (Mulenga, 1994:20-22). To accomplish all this, the community of common interest requires dialogue, which is so crucial in all stages throughout the process.

The merging of the researcher and the community into one is viewed as victory of the subject-subject relation over the subject-object cleft. In that way, the proponents of PR believe that knowledge will be available for every member of the concerned community. Research becomes a communal issue rather than an individual-oriented activity by democratizing the investigation and production of knowledge. This is really a good thing to do, and it is beneficial to all.

On an evaluative point, looking at PR, one sees five things that are of concern:

(1) If we look at research in natural sciences (e.g. agriculture), we find out that, according to PR, it can only be done with a community focus – i.e. the principle of subject-centredness remain there, but has shifted to a communal subject.

(2) From the look of it, PR is not a method, but a strategy, which uses standard methods. It is not given to us, hence there are no clear indications as to how to purify standard methods of their backgrounds.

(3) PR combines the skills of the researcher with that of the community. But it does not tell us how to avoid domination of the community by the skills of the researcher.

(4) PR turns everybody into a researcher. It succeeds in this by not analyzing inquiry itself – so it never really comes to the question of the types of inquiry. Not all inquiry is “scientific”. That is why Mulenga specifically refers to a dialectical tension between the researcher and the community. The researcher works with scientific skills; the community may even “investigate” by consulting a certain “expertise”. How will the two be reconciled since their knowledge is sourced from two different points?

(5) PR, because it does not distinguish between scientific research and other forms of inquiry, involves the researcher in particular forms of activism. That is to say, instead of producing generalisable results with a wider application, the researcher becomes an activist mouthpiece for the communities' problems. This includes the danger of experimenting with people even before the results of the investigation have been tested by the academic community.

A closer look at PR tells us that it hinders individual expertise and helping an individual in discovering his/her potentiality in research. If everything is done under the auspices of the community, then members with personal initiatives in the interests of the community are not going to succeed. This can even hinder academic or scholarly endeavours. Therefore, PR cannot claim the ability to rid the subject-object gap simply by bringing the research in the members of the community for the researcher and the researched to be in the subject-subject relation.

3.6 CONCLUSION

Therefore, I am of the view that at the moment, among those methods discussed above, there is no one that can solve the

subject-object alienation problem in methodology. That means there must be a new look for a strategy that can give a better way of doing things without dictating a split-ontology. It requires a better view of the created reality than of simply a new method – hence the option of Reformational Philosophy.

PART II:
THE OPTION OF REFORMATIONAL
PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGY AS A WAY FOR CREATION IN SELF-DISCOVERY

4.1 Need for Method

In his book, *Against Method*, Feyerabend (1975) rejects anything that includes method, and argues in favour of epistemological anarchism. Feyerabend (1975:23) argues:

The idea of a method that contains firm, unchanging, and absolutely binding principles for conducting the business of science meets considerable difficulty when confronted with the results of historical research. We find then, that there is not a single rule, ... firmly grounded in epistemology, that is not violated at some time or other.

These violations are viewed by Feyerabend (1975:23) not as “accidental events”, but as “necessary for progress”. In his lengthy discussion, Feyerabend (1975:181-122) argues in agreement with and against Lakatos’ methodological rules laid out in his (Lakatos’) papers: *History of Science and its Rational Reconstructions* (1967), and *Falsification and the Methodology*

of *Scientific Research Programmes* (1970). Feyerabend (1975:182-183) indicates two areas where there are points of agreement and disagreement with Lakatos. Firstly Lakatos (1967:102-138) suggests that methodology must grant a breathing space to the ideas one wishes to consider. This idea is acceptable to Feyerabend (1975:183). In the second place, Lakatos (1970:116-132) suggests that methodological rules are not beyond criticism, but they can be reinterpreted, improved, replaced by better rules. Feyerabend (1975:183) argues against this second suggestion of Lakatos. This is simply because, as an anarchist, he does not believe in any methodological rule that should govern the acquisition of knowledge. Feyerabend (1975:295-296) describes methodological rules as

... *unrealistic*, for it takes too simple a view of the talents of man and of the circumstances which encourage, or cause, their developments. ... *pernicious*, for the attempt to enforce the rules is bound to increase our professional qualifications at the expense of our humanity. ... the idea is *detrimental to science*, for it neglects the complex physical and historical conditions which influence scientific change.

Since all methodologies have the above-mentioned limitations, the only “rule” that survives for Feyerabend (1975:296) is “anything goes”. Feyerabend’s unselective rejection of

methodology is unreservedly unacceptable. Epistemological anarchism, which Feyerabend propagates, is the best recipe for an immoral approach to any scientific endeavour. Therefore, it is here totally rejected.

After encountering such a view, one comes up with a question: Can any intentional, conscious, and meant-to-be-productive research be done without a methodological decision, either in theoretical or empirical sciences? The whole process of discovery, in so far as it stands, is concerned with a continuous task of finding out the structure and direction of creation after the disruption of sin. If this is to take place there must be a decision to choose the way (due to the modal diversity of creation) in which the process is to be carried out. These decisions will of course rely in their turn upon the goal that we choose from among a number of possible goals and the nature of the problem to be solved. It follows that the process of discovery should be characterized by such methodological decisions that do not imply or result in an ontological cleavage, anarchism, and moral irresponsibility.

As will be discussed below (see paragraph 4.3), that in the process of self-discovery of the created reality, mostly in our days, characterized by scientific and technological researches,

there is need for a particular methodological strategy to be able to reach one's intended goal. One is compelled to ask a question like, "What is a method?" Method can be described as a properly planned (demands human thought), systematic and (sometimes) complicated procedure, or a course of action, or the way in which an action is performed, (or the way of doing things) with a goal being pursued (Van der Merwe, 1983:332). In this procedure, human activity is presupposed with or on created reality (or specifically on certain available material), using appropriate tools or instruments (Van der Merwe, 1983: 333).

Stoker (1970:190) also defines method as an acquired responsible way of human action, with which a pre-determined purpose (terminal point) is achieved by the manipulation of the knowable (which is the starting point). Stoker brings in the most important aspect of method – responsibility, which indicates a normative approach. In his analysis of Stoker's definition, Venter (1998:103) points out that the question of norms is important in method "since method is a means to achieve an end". By this he means that if we avoid the question of the relationship between means and norms or criteria, we might end up facing a situation where the ends may justify the means. But what are these norms?

Some of these norms are given by Stoker (1970:191-194) and modified by Venter (1998:105-108) as follows:

1. *The formal norms of unison, means, diversity and complementary correlation:*

- *The norm of unison* of method refers to the correlation of the observed knowable and aims of knowing.
- *The norm of means.* Method should always be treated and used as merely means to reach the end, but not as an end in itself.
- *The norm of diversity.* Due to the diversity of creation, the principal *diversity* of method must be fully admitted and respected because we choose a method (based on our full knowledge of the world – life-view) suitable for a particular purpose of knowing a particular part of reality.
- *The norm of complementary correlation* (on account of the coherence of the irreducible diversity of the knowable, and different aims of knowing) demands that no method should be employed in isolation of other methods – a method should always be taken and used in the view of its complementary relation to other methods.

2. *The intrinsic norms of **relevance**, and **efficiency**:*

- *The norm of relevance* calls for a method to be suited to the field of study as well as to the specific purpose of knowing. Venter (1998:106), argues that “we must reject methodological totalitarianism – only one method for all disciplines”. On the basis of the coherence of reality (which expresses itself in similarities between different things) “we may borrow methods, or develop new methods analogically to methods used in other areas of reality, on the condition that they be adjusted to become more relevant to the field for which they are used” (Venter, 1998:106).
 - *The norm of efficiency.* The norm of efficiency (or effectivity as in Venter (1998:107)) demands results and methodological economy. This means that any method should yield results and also that “the end or purpose of method be achieved with a minimum use of time and/or effort ...” (Stoker, 1970:107).
3. *The transcendental norm of **logical consistency**.* This norm includes the linguistic question and the question of truth. Concerning the linguistic question, the plan of our method must be logically structured in such a way that we must be able to know and distinguish between what is logically earlier and later (Venter, 1994:107). The plan of a method must be

consistent internally and externally. That is, we must eliminate logical tensions and clashes. Internally the linguistic naming (formulation of scientific terminologies) and linguistic formulation (the forming of propositions with their scientific syntax) concerning the investigated knowable and the end purpose in the research process and its results should be unambiguous, distinct, precise and economical (Stoker, 1970:193). Externally, the language we use ought to express our ideas or concepts in such a way that our method must be consistent with our problem statement and our hypothesis.

4. *The norm of moral responsibility*: Any research project is subject to the demands of the moral law that holds for the moral aspect in the investigated knowable. Thus the initiator is subject to the norms of veracity (truthfulness, accuracy), honesty, integrity, reliability, perseverance, justice, and impartiality (Stoker, 1970:193). We must also avoid using scientific methods which undermine the sense of responsibility and which are ontologically divisive. This norm can only work if we reject the Kantian ethical norm that the moral laws are within us – autonomous, and embrace the view that ethical laws are from the Creator. In that way we are able to see the Creator as the only “Absolute, ... the

Arche (origin) of creation, the first and final Ground of all things, of whom and through whom and to whom are all things” (Stoker, 1970:194). That means, the norm of moral responsibility is founded on the presuppositions of the creaturelihood of creation and the calling of man (to form a culture) which are going to be discussed in 4.2 below.

5. *The norm of contextualization.* According to Venter (1998:108), the norm of contextualization warns us to use our methods in terms of their original context, and to recontextualise them whenever we want use them in a new context. The intention here, Venter (1998:108) argues, is to show the “non-neutrality of the method, so that we can take special precautions in the new context to overcome the limitations of the original context”.

So, in order to have a critical dialogue with the rest of the created reality, man must develop a way of doing things – method. That means from the onset, there is need for a method. This method must be established on presuppositions that sees the investigated reality (object) in its comprehensive and coherent existence vertically (in relation to its Creator) and horizontally (in relation to rest of creation). That is method must

recognize and respect the object in its empirical originality and existence.

4.2 Ontological Presuppositions

Methodology implies ontology, and in turn, ontology implies philosophical anthropology. That is to say, underlying methodology are ontological presuppositions. But what are presuppositions? Hoffercker and Beale (1986:193) give a viciously circular definition of presuppositions as “ideas that a person pre-supposes in all his or her thinking”. *The Concise Oxford Dictionary* (1990:944) defines the term presupposition as “a thing assumed beforehand as the basis of argument”. Flew (1979:286) also defines the term presupposition as “an assumption that involves either a necessary or a contingent truth”. From these definitions one can conclude that presupposition(s) is an idea or are a set of ideas (or beliefs) that are granted (or accepted) without any argument or proof of their truthfulness.

Hoffercker and Beale (1986:193) argues that

... they do not only provide a point of departure for thought, but also determine the method by which knowledge is attained and the goal toward which knowledge is directed.

Though these two authors (Hoffecker and Beale, 1986:193) gave us a flimsy definition of a presupposition, they rightly argue and conclude that

All views of reality, therefore, begin with certain ideas or truth-claims that exercise an enormous, though often unrecognized, influence over what and how we know. ... since they are that starting point of knowledge, presuppositions are simultaneously part of what we know and yet not susceptible to proof. ... they are the foundations upon which the rest of knowledge stands.

Botha, in Mouton (1984:108), discusses the relationship between philosophy and methodology, rightly argues that

... responsible scholarship therefore requires training in philosophical foundations of methodology ..., but it also calls for the provision of adequate tools with which to discern the ontological ground-plan which accompanies ... research methodology

The call for the discerning of ontological ground forms tells us that there is no method that can only work with the human rational aspect without presupposing an ontological ground plan. This is because without ontology, it is impossible to develop a successful research methodology. Every method

implies an involvement in the created reality. Therefore, Descartes' subject-object dualism cannot be seen as simply an intellectual exercise without practical implications.

The Cartesian split ontology gave a detrimental ground-plan to the development of method, even in many scientific methodologies. In every method discussed above, what we have seen is that there were some signs of the influence of the Cartesian split ontology. Later methodological developments attempted to either perfect it (in the case of the Husserlian phenomenology), or to destroy it (in the case of some of the continental methodologies). All these methods could not really solve the subject-object separation problem because they could not deal with the ontological ground motives of the Cartesian dualism. In my attempt to address the subject-object alienation, I am going to put forward some ontological presuppositions that can help us to take directions that can give us a better view of methodology as creation in self-discovery.

4.2.1 The Creaturelihood of Creation

There are so many options in methodology, of which the most well-known ones have been articulated above. We have seen their strengths and weaknesses. The reformational approach,

contrary to Husserl's presuppositionless phenomenological method, acknowledges its presuppositions especially the primary one, namely the creaturelihood of creation. This points to the existence and revelation of the Creator. This Creator exists as a transcendent and personal God who reveals himself in his written ontic law. The existence of God is a presupposition that I hold does not require proof because I regard that God's existence as the ultimate predication of all being. That is to say, God is the prerequisite not only for the existence of all other things but also for their meaning.

God is the prerequisite not only for the existence of the whole creation and its meaning, but also the sole source and meaning-giver of truth, because He is sovereign. When God is referred to as sovereign, it includes "the notion that only God can be trusted to make God known to us, to truly reveal God as God, and as we can and must take God" (Hart, 1984:335). That is why God's creatorship of creation is indispensable in its endeavour to discover itself.

The existence of creation presupposes a Creator. This self-sufficient, self-revealing, personal, and sovereign God, is the one who created the world and everything that is in it. Walsh and Chaplin (1983:10) rightly claim that

everything in reality is creaturely, having its origin, meaning and calling in existing as a servant of God the Creator.

That means the researcher and the researched are creaturely and they owe their origin, and meaning to the Creator. The whole of reality (or *cosmos*) (which includes the researcher and the researched) is under the law (or *nomos*); hence the cosmonomic idea¹⁹.

By subscribing to the view of the creaturelihood of creation, we reject the idea of a self-originating or evolving world, because the world and its order are not, as Hart (1984:361) argues, self-made, *sui generis*. But the origin of creation and its order lies outside both the created reality and its order. It is God who created the created reality and gave it its order. The existence of creation is the response to God's creative word. Even if the opponents to this view might say this is irrational, "there is no way they can prove or justify the assertion that the world is its own origin" (Hart, 1984:361). For the world owes the origin of its existence to the wisdom of God.

¹⁹ According to Dooyeweerd (1969:74), "the cosmonomic idea directs and leads philosophical thought, and gives it the hypothesis without which, it would be helplessly dispersed in the modal diversity of meaning".

Furthermore, Hart (1984:361) argues that such an assertion is

another belief to which one comes without rational justification, conclusive evidence, or compelling grounds. ... It is however an assertion we might arrive at through a firm commitment to the ultimacy of empirical reality.

That means, as Hart (1984:361) rightly concludes, that all that is to be known or can be known, must be either the created reality, the order of the created reality, or the origin of the world.

Since God is the Creator of the cosmic reality, that means creation is a divinely ordered reality, including human life and its normativity. There is no way, in our scientific endeavour, “we can reason God out of concrete created reality” (Troost, 1994:10). By his wisdom and creative word, God craftly designed, structured, and gave order to creation. The whole of creation is orderly structured in such a manner that it is inter-related, and no part of creation can survive on its own. The order of creation is structured in such a way that every aspect is interwoven with the other. Therefore, the creaturelihood of creation implies the unity, and diversity of the created reality (of which man is part), and the calling of man. This is because the whole of creation comes from God in all its diversity.

The existence of creation, the fall (which refers to the perversion of creation by the evil forces through man), and redemption (which refers to the redirection of creation) – are cosmic in reference (Walsh and Chaplin, 1983:10). Walsh and Chaplin (1983:10) argues that everything in reality is creaturely and has its origin and meaning, and calling in existing for service to the Creator.

Furthermore, Walsh and Chaplain (1983:10) argue that everything in the created reality is perverted and misdirected by sin (which is a consequence of man's declaration of independence from his Creator). In the same vein, Dooyeweerd (1969:549[II]) also argues that the "fall into sin has obfuscated our experiential horizon". No part of the created reality remains immune from the annihilating effects of sin. The Creator established a possibility that everything in creaturely reality falls within the reach of the redirection process through redemption.

The creation-fall-redemption principle confirms the creaturelihood of the created reality, unity of creation, and diversity in creation. It helps us to understand the human inclination to corruption and destruction, especially in the practice of irresponsible scholarship in science and technology. That means humanity needs redirection in order to realize that

method should not lead to ontological cleavage but to ontological unity that is inseparably co-related to diversity. This unity should not be seen as monism. Therefore, perverted creation should be redeemed for it to be redirected towards its Creator in order for it to rediscover itself.

4.2.2 The Unity of Creation

In order to eliminate or overcome dualism, as Hart (1984:315) rightly argues, we must “assume the fundamental unity of the world in its origin and subjection to an order of the same origin”. In that way we will be able to understand that within creation, all things relate to each other, and all things are what they are in relation to other things (Hart, 1984:349). Thus, one cannot talk of the unity of creation without also talking of commitment, community, and responsibility.

Creation exists as a community. Both human and other members of creation have a communal relation that is indispensable to research. Research is done within the community of creation, so any method that finds itself separating creation into subjects and objects is illegitimately dividing a community that has one origin. It is within this community of creation that human commitment

(or human calling, of which part of it is scientific endeavour) is fulfilled.

In Reformational Philosophy, the unity of creation is upheld, but the dividing of creation into subject and object polarity is rejected. This is because Reformational Philosophy distinguishes the subjective from the objective; it does not divide them (separate them) – it rather sees them as a correlative coherence. So in the fulfilment of our commitment, we should be able to experience creation as one (Hart, 1984:317).

We experience creation as one because creation is coherent. It follows that we already have a given relationship between subject and object, and subject and subject. This given relationship provides everyday interaction, which results in everyday knowledge, connected with our life-view (how we experience the world). We experience the world objectively in through object-functions as will be indicated below in 4.2.3.

Responsibility can only be realized in a communal situation. Such a situation should be seen in terms of a created reality that is united not in dualistic terms. This does not mean that the author of this treatise supports ontological monism; monism of any kind is here unreservedly rejected. Therefore, in the

development of any methodology, unity of creation should be considered as one of the indispensable underlying presuppositions. This is because the unity of creation presupposes the rejection of any method that leads to the division of reality into subject and object.

4.2.3 Diversity in Creation

Unity and diversity are correlates, which are irreducible and indispensable to one another in creation. It follows that diversity does not simply mean any indiscriminate multiplicity; it means unity of unity, thus in unity all diversity come to one (Hart, 1984:246). In support of diversity, Hart (1984:315) is right to argue that “diversity is as fundamental as unity”. Diversity is the mark of the Creator’s handwork as seen in creation. One cannot talk of unity without the existence of diversity. It is the coming together of diverse things that brings unity to fact.

We cannot talk of diversity without looking at the distinction between man and the rest of creation, and also the distinctions among the members of the same realm, especially distinctions in the realm of human beings. These are distinctions that can be realized through some of the simplest determinants and their basic relations.

Firstly, the *modal determinants*. The modal determinant refers how we can determine the distinction between various ways (modes) of being creaturely (Kok, 1996:190). These modal determinants or fundamental ways of being are also called *modalities*, modal aspects²⁰. In his glossary of terms Kalsbeek (1975:350) explains this modal distinction within the Latin term *modus quo*, which means “manner in which”; thus “modality is a manner or way in which a thing exists or functions, and not a thing itself.” According to Kalsbeek (1975:40-41), and Kok (1996:193-194) there are fifteen modalities in number, namely:

Modality	Meaning Kernel
1. Arithmetic (Numerical)	Calculations of kinds, or discrete quantity, the domain of magnitude; i.e. that of more and less
2. Spatial	This refers to the amount of space or continuous extension.
3. Kinematic	Motion or movement.
4. Physical	Peculiar properties of things: energy, energy levels, molecular structure, etc.
5. Biotic (Organic)	Vitality (Life). This deals with functions and vital processes of living

²⁰ The aggregate of modalities preceding a given aspect in the modal order is called a substratum because they are the foundation on which that given aspect rests (Kalsbeek, 1975:354). The numeric, spatial, kinematic, and physical aggregate to form the substratum of the biotic. The aggregate of modalities following a given aspect in the modal aspect constitutes the superstratum (Kalsbeek, 1975:354). Thus the physical and the moral forms the superstratum of the juridical.

	organisms or their parts and organs.
6. Sensitive	Feeling and perception
7. Analytic (Logical)	Distinction. Human ability to distinguish differences in their context and the ability to distinguish other things.
8. Historical (Cultural)	Formative mastery and power that includes tradition and technique.
9. Lingual	Symbolic meaning. Everything that is spoken and unspoken language.
10. Social	Social intercourse (cohesion). I.e. community and human collective interaction
11. Economic	Value-weighing thrift and frugality in managing scarce resources.
12. Aesthetic	It is the aspect of play, imaginativity, and nuance. The beauty of the lift-off which inspires all sorts of new works of art.
13. Judicial	The judicial modality covers the domain of public justice and retribution.
14. Moral (Ethical)	The moral aspect (or modality) of the created reality has to do with trust, fidelity, love and faithfulness in temporal relationships (friendship, marriage, family, business, etc).
15. Pistic	Pistical modality has to do with certidunal (or confessional) belief and faith life.

Fig. 1

Secondly, the *this-that determinant* (the individuality of things). According to Kok (1996:197),

This determinant - the *this-that* difference - is analytically irreducible. ... it is different from, and cannot be reduced to, the modal difference.

This determinant, according to Kalsbeek (1975:353), in his discussion on sphere sovereignty²¹, stands as “the ontological principle on which the sociological principle is based since each of the societal spheres mentioned is qualified by a different irreducible modality”. Although these modalities are distinct and irreducible, they are also intimately connected with each other in an inseparable coherence²² (Kalsbeek, 1975:353). According to Hart (1984:250),

coherent relationships are ones that display reciprocity, mutuality, dependence, organization, necessity, and similar characteristics.

²¹ Sphere sovereignty is a translation of Kuyper’s phrase *soevereiniteit in eigen kring* by which he meant that the various distinct spheres of human authority, such as family, church, school, business enterprise, and state. These spheres “have their own responsibility and decision-making power, which may not be usurped by those in authority in another sphere ...” (Kalsbeek, 1975:353). Dooyeweerd employs the same phrase, but he extends its usage to mean irreducibility of modalities.

²² This idea explains the notion of sphere universality, which Kalsbeek (1975:353) describes as “the counterpart of modal sphere sovereignty; just as sphere sovereignty stresses the unique distinctiveness and irreducibility of the modal aspects, so sphere universality emphasizes that every one depends for its meaning on all the others, especially as evidenced by the analogies in the modal structure of each”.

This inseparable coherence makes it possible for the *this-that* determinant and the modal determinants (the how of things) to form a mutual irreducibility and a combined occurrence (Kok, 1996:199). So the *this-that* determinant helps us to make a distinction between individual things. That means, creatures exist as individuals but governed by laws of how they exist. They are different but they are not separate.

This difference or diversity is shown by their modal existence, which is *limitedly* known to human knowledge. Thus each stone, or any element, is subject to the law for the arithmetic (numeric), spatial, kinematic, and physical modes (Kok, 1996:199). In the case of each plant, besides the four modes of being found in a stone, it is subject to the divine law for the organic mode (Kok, 1996:199). For the animal, beside the five that are in plants, also function as a subject in the sensitive mode (Kok, 1996:200). As for a human being, he functions as subject in, besides the six which animals function in, the analytic, historical (cultural), lingual, social, economic, aesthetic, juridical, moral, pistical.

This can be graphically represented as follows:

Modality	Man	Animal	Plant	Element
1. Numeric	*	*	*	*
2. Spatial	*	*	*	*
3. Kinematic	*	*	*	*
4. Physical	*	*	*	*

5. Organic	*	*	*	—
6. Sensitive	*	*	—	—
7. Analytic	*	—	—	—
8. Historical	*	—	—	—
9. Lingual	*	—	—	—
10. Social	*	—	—	—
11. Economic	*	—	—	—
12. Aesthetic	*	—	—	—
13. Juridical	*	—	—	—
14. Moral	*	—	—	—
15. Pistical	*	—	—	—

Fig. 2 (Adopted (but modified) from Kok (1996:215). The star in each cell under the four main categories of creation (man, animal, plant, and element) represents the modalities in which such things function as subjects, and the double dash represents the modalities in which such things do not function as subjects.

All modalities presuppose a diversity of functions of each creature. A function refers to all that a creature “can do, be, or have”, which includes states, actions, qualities, attitudes, and properties (Hart, 1984:153). Although they cannot be reduced to one another, these functions are inseparably interrelated by means of analogy (Hart, 1984:153). For example, growth is normally regarded as an organic function, but economic sciences employ this functional analogy (“economic growth”) metaphorically to explain the state of the country’s economy. Thus the economy is referred to as being in the state of growing. What we can see here is that things function in two ways, namely, as subjects and as objects to the laws of structural order.

The subject must not be understood in Cartesian terms, where it is the thinking thing opposed to the object that is a non-thinking thing. Also the subjective function, according to Kalsbeek (1975:119), should not be understood as in the Kantian philosophy, whereby the subject is a

... pure, rational, thinking Ego or I is the transcendental subject, raised above everything else in empirical reality and sharply distinguished from so-called empirical psychic subjectivity.

The Kantian epistemological subject became the law-giver of nature, because Kant's concept of law was immanently based on autonomous thinking (Kalsbeek, 1975:120). That meant, because of its transcendency above all things, the Kantian subject was able to impose its will upon the object (created reality). It imposes order on the chaotic raw material which Kant holds that we receive from the object, as mentioned in point 3.1.

Also the Reformational view of the subject must not be understood in Husserlian way where the subject is the transcendental Ego that constructs its objects and gives them meaning. In contrast, according to Kalsbeek (1975:120) in the *Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea*, the term subject means to be "placed under". Thus the subject is placed under the laws of

creation-order, established by the Creator. In other words, the subject should not be seen as an independent thing, *sui generis*, but something under the control of the laws of its origin, the Creator. This is to say that the evolutionary view of creation is here rejected. So, in its subjective function, a creature must fulfil its calling to be subjective to the laws that govern its existence.

The object should not also be understood as in Descartes where it is a non-thinking thing, or in Kant, as Kalsbeek (1975:120) puts it, where it is a thing in itself (*Ding an sich*), "existing apart from human experience, ...unknown to us, ...unknowable in principle, ...and we can only know its appearance in consciousness". In Husserl, the object, thus the empirical world, is seen as the result of the transcendental Ego who reconstructs them and gives them meaning. This kind of understanding that is found in Descartes, Kant, Husserl and others, is here rejected because it does not accept the world as real. In their modal existence, things have subject functions, but when they are being analyzed, then they are analyzable objects. In that way they are meeting their object functions as analyzable objects of an analyzing subject. What this implies to method is that, the object should not be viewed as something that is not knowable to and distanced from human knowledge.

Now the question one may pose is, 'What is an object in Reformational Philosophy?' The object should be known as "something qualified by an object-function, and thus correlated to a subject-function (Kalsbeek, 1975:351). Pressing on the same note of the subject-object relation in naïve experience, Dooyeweerd (1969:42) arguably discusses that

... in this relation, objective functions and qualities are unreflectingly ascribed to things and to so-called natural events within modal aspects in which it is not possible for them to appear as subjects. ... Further, this subject-object relation in the attitude of naïve experience and thought is grasped as a structural relation of reality itself. That is to say, the objective functions belong to things themselves in relationship to possible subjective functions which the things do not possess in the aspects of reality involved.

Furthermore, Dooyeweerd (1969:42) gives an example of a rose that it does not feel or think or engage in aesthetic valuation as a subject. However, we ascribe to it objective qualities of sensory colour and odour (sensitive aspect), objective logical characteristics (analytic aspect), objective cultural qualities (historical aspect) and objective beauty (aesthetic aspect). Dooyeweerd (1969:43) concludes that the result of "the subject-object relation in naïve experience is that we experience reality

in the total and integral coherence of all its aspects, as this given within the temporal horizon of human experience”.

Looking at the diagrammatic representation above (Fig. 2), an element can have all subject functions and object functions in the numeric, spatial, kinematic, and physical modal aspects, but cannot have all the subject functions in the fifteen modal aspects. It is only humankind that can have all the subject functions in the fifteen modal aspects. When an element is available for study, it is responding or fulfilling its object functions, and when the study is over, it maintains its potential to respond in subject function or object function. It does not become a permanent unknowable object as in Kant.

The diversity of creation also leads to a number of questions, of which the most prominent ones are: Is man an extension of the animal? What is the position of man in the created reality? In response to these two questions, firstly, as mentioned earlier on, the concept of creation as *sui generis* is rejected. This is because Dewey reduced man to just another organism and therefore did not see that man has unique features, such as reason or rationality, which creates the methodological problem of man in “clash” or “tension” in a situation. Spykman (1992:210) rightly argues against the uncritical acceptance of the evolutionary view

of man (which influenced Dewey's philosophy) especially in the west.

Strauss (1993:43) argues that "man is not simply an extension of the animal kingdom", because

... our human natural features, such as the bodily configuration of man, our unique biotical developmental status, and the relatively unspecialized organs, are, together with the erect gait and spiritual expression of the face, all in service of our normatively qualified truly human responsibility to obey the universal conditions of God's creational order. Though, in present sinful dispensation, we shall always be tempted to disobey these normative conditions....

Man can never be an extension of the animal kingdom because the human functioning is not completely determined by instincts. This is because man's bodily existence is directed and guided by the normatively qualified aspects (Strauss, 1993:24). Why man's bodily existence? It is due to the reason that human existence is obviously continuous with the rest of the empirical world; thus they must be physical in order to be real (Hart, 1984:267).

Now, what about the position of man in the created reality? Hasker (1983:16) puts the question in a different way, "What is

man's place in what is real?" Furthermore, Hasker (1983:16) asserts:

Out of all the different sorts of beings in heaven and earth, there is no doubt that we have a very special interest in the creatures we ourselves are, namely, human beings.

That concern should be seen as the fulfillment of part of the whole creation in a reflective wonder pointing to the need for self-discovery. In point 4.2.2 where the discussion on the unity of creation was done, it was mentioned that we can not talk of the unity of creation without the mention of commitment, responsibility, and community. Each existent in the community of creation is subjected to the conditions that govern its peculiar existence. From this follows that, although these empirical existents "must all respond to the conditions that hold for their existence, a person is called to respond *responsibly*" (Hart, 1984:267), rationally, and spiritually. This is because the place of man in the created reality portrays him as the open point that expresses and explains the relationship between the Creator and his creation.

Also there is diversity between members of the same realm. This diversity may be caused by the members' adaptation to their environment. This results in the distinction between members of

the same realm. For instance, the distinction between a person in Africa and a person in Asia. In terms of biological structure they look alike, but how they react to things differ due to various religious, cultural, and many other factors.

Therefore, creation exists in a unity of diversified things. All these things are subject to the divine laws of existence, and with various functions in the world of the created reality. That means in the development of any method, this diversity must not be viewed as encouraging or meaning division in the created reality.

4.2.4 Human Calling

The notion that man responds *responsibly* to the conditions that govern his existence presupposes his calling. Central to human calling are two vital factors: certitudinal commitment and cultural mandate. The certitudinal commitment points to the relationship between man and his Creator, and his service to God. Man was called by the Creator to rule over (or to subdue) the other realms of creation, and to cultivate (or to till) the land (Genesis 1-3).

The human rule over creation should not mean domination, but dominion. By dominion, is here meant ruling with responsibility intended to bring preservation, conservation, and communication between the Creator and the whole of the created reality. The relationship between the Creator and creation, as mention earlier on finds an open recipient in humankind (Hart, 1984:357). By domination, is here meant ruling with suppressive and oppressive subjection whose end result is exploitation, corruption and destruction. It may here be concluded that the human calling includes the development and preservation of our creational environment.

The call to subdue the earth links us with cultivation and culture²³; of which both “refer essentially to our human interactions with the world” (Walsh and Middleton, 1984:54). Thus “culture is the result of cultivation”, because human interaction with or cultivation of our creational environment always constitute culture (Walsh and Middleton, 1984:54). So the call to rule over the ground is the cultural mandate.

Scientific endeavours carried by human beings are activities they do so as to fulfill the demands of their calling. Thus comes

²³ The concept of culture embraces a great deal. It covers all the aspects of human society. Thus it includes language, history, religion, skills,

the question of method. As humankind engages itself in the process of self-discovery through scientific researches, a specific way of doing things is presupposed: that is method.

4.3 The Process of Self-Discovery

The process of self-discovery can best be described as a process by which creation through the realm of humankind focuses its reflective wonder and critical inquiry on itself in order to rediscover its structure and direction. The diversity in creation tells us that one way or the other, creation will have to come, or already has come (as shown by the history of the development of science and technology) to a point of self-questioning as a result of such a reflective wonder. This reflective wonder includes, among many of them, launching questions on the origins of creation, the conditions that govern various empirical existents, the physical structure of each individual empirical existent, disclosure of cosmic potentialities, and the destiny of the total created reality. It is called the process of self-discovery because after the fall, creation lost its direction, the knowledge of itself, and its potentials.

Calvin (1559:37) argues that

ethics, philosophy, science, technology, education, family, art, scholarship, just to name a few.

... it is certain that man never achieves a clear knowledge of himself unless he has first looked upon God's face, and then descends from contemplating him to scrutinize himself.

Battles (1960:37) writes a footnote on this Calvinian view by calling it "*sui notitiam*" (meaning self-knowledge). Furthermore, Battles (1960:37) comes to the conclusion that our knowledge of ourselves includes "both all mankind and all creation (of which man is a microcosm)". It gives one the basis to conclude that scientific thought and practice is religious in character; hence Dooyeweerd understood science to be a God-given means for disclosing the potentialities of the cosmos (Knudsen, 1979:209). Therefore, as a good gift from God it should be used *responsibly* to his glory (Knudsen, 1979:209). This is why creation needs redirection so that it can rediscover itself, in terms of potentialities: cultural, scientific, religious, creative, just to name a few.

The process of self-discovery, to satisfy its aspirations, it demands research. Where research is required, the way to do it is indispensable, hence the call for a methodological option that does not split ontology. Any method employed should first lay down its ontological presuppositions, to show how it works in the empirical world. But who should establish these

presuppositions if there is no initiator of the research? There must be an initiator who decides as to which method to use, or who suggests the method to be used (in the case with a human respondent), and there must be a respondent. “Initiator” here is meant to take the place of the so-called subject, and “respondent” here is meant to take the place of the object. It is preferable to use the term ‘respondent’ because the term ‘object’ carries with it the connotation something constructed by the human mind to be acted upon without reacting to the process.

The term ‘initiator’ refers to the idea that any part of creation that is subject to the laws of creational order that govern their ability to see and reflectively wonder about things, or the other parts of creation. Ouweneel, who is going to be referred to, prefers using the terms, ‘logical subject’ for subject, and ‘logical object’ for object. Reasons for that are not clearly given, probably it is because he takes the subject-functions and the object-functions seriously as it appears in his writing.

4.3.1 Distinction Between the Initiator and the Respondent

In trying to strike a distinction between participants in the process of self-discovery, one may ask the following questions to proponents of the subject-object separation. When is a subject

a subject, and when does it stop being a subject? When is an object an object, and when does it stop to be an object? These two questions seek to find out whether the subject-object cleavage is a permanent ontological division or it exists only when some knowledge about something is under investigation.

From the discussion we heard in chapters 2, and 3, we discovered that Descartes, Kant, and Husserl, showed us that the subject-object alienation is a permanent ontological separation which cannot be brought together if any scientific knowledge is to be acquired. This is because, in Kant (1787:257-275), the subject is the law-giver, and the object in itself exists apart from our experience, is unknown to us and is unknowable in principle. We can only know of its appearance in our consciousness. That means that human knowledge is entirely the creation of the subject. This idea of the subject as the sole origin of meaning as found in Descartes, Kant, Husserl, and others, is disputed and dismissed by McNay (1994: 4-5) as being, in fact, “an illusion generated by the deep-level rules of formation that govern all thought and speech”.

One of the important problems with the subjectivism of Descartes and Kant, is that they have reduced the objective world to only one or two object functions. For Kant, the only

object function that remains is that of sensibility – things only present themselves to the senses as chaotic raw materials. This was total abandonment of reality by Kant.

The question, “Can any method overcome the subject-object alienation?” posed in point 1.2.1 above, should be counteracted by question such as, “Can there be any acquisition of knowledge without the subject-object alienation?” In respond to this question, it should be mentioned that in the first place, it is held in the reformational philosophy that the process of self-discovery (or knowing-process) is under the divine law (Ouweneel, 1993:191). That means the initiator, the respondent, and all the logical laws of thought are all placed under the divine law as has been expressed in various sections above. So we necessarily make a theoretical distinction between the initiator and the respondent on the basis of the diversity of creation (Cf. 4.2.3 above), while we reject an *ontic* separation between them (Ouweneel, 1993:191) on the basis of the unity of creation (Cf. 4.2.2 above).

According to Taljaard (1976:73), all concrete created realities are sub-jects to the Creator’s thing-law, and thus they are subjects. So the word “subject” in its ontological sense refers to created reality which includes things, animals, plants, man, and

all forms of communal life (Taljaard, 1976:74). In the things, there are qualities that the Creator created with laws valid for them but determined by the thing-laws guaranteeing their uniqueness in specific creatures (Taljaard, 1976:73). To indicate this world of qualities, Taljaard (1976:73) uses the word “object”. This follows that we can distinguish but not separate the world of things (subject) and the world of qualities (objects) – over both of them, the law (which is multiple in character – shown in the modal dimension) of the Creator is proclaimed. The objectivity of concrete created reality is complementary to its subjectivity. This objectivity is in each created thing, but it is distinguishable from subjectivity. It presupposes the subjectivity of a thing. Thus everything on earth possesses the basic feature of subjectivity and objectivity (Taljaard, 1976:75).

Both the initiator and the respondent are subject (or under control) to certain structural laws belonging to God’s creational order (Ouweneel, 1993:192). For instance, a man (initiator) and the sheep he studies (the respondent) function as (ontic) subjects in the arithmetic (numeric), the spatial, the kinematic, the energetic, and the biotic modalities. According to Ouweneel (1993:192), the respondent (the logical object) functions as the *ontic* object in the subjective life of man (as an initiator), which also includes thinking and knowing. The respondent is

analysable and knowable. This created analysability and knowability of the respondent is possessed in many respondent (object) functions of the created things. That means that this knowability given to the existents by the Creator, involves that in their function as respondents, they are “ontologically directed layed-out for, and coherent with” (Ouweneel, 1993:192) the function of the initiator in the process of creation in self-discovery.

Even in those modalities where the respondent functions only objectively, the logical subject and the logical object are bound by the same law. Thus the logical object cannot transgress the law of contradiction – it cannot be at variance with itself, as Mao tse Tung (1957:23-78) tries to convince us in his essay, *On Contradictions*. When a contradiction occurs, it is because humankind imposes its power onto creation in such a way that norms are transgressed (see paragraph 4.1 above).

Another way of approaching it is provided by Henderson. The analysability and knowability of respondent is only possible through the logos. The cosmos (which includes a given respondent), according to Henderson (1994:104), “which is not logical or conceptual in character, has been made accessible to us in a special way (i.e. in terms of theoretical abstraction)

through the logos". The logos is cosmic in character in the sense that it exists in cosmic order, and it precedes all knowledge (Henderson, 1994:104). The logos is a sphere of the cosmos which makes the cosmos accessible to thought, and thought depends upon the logos because it provides material for responsible conceptual manipulation (Henderson, 1994:104).

The laying-out for, and coherent with the function of the initiator by the respondent takes place, according to Taljaard (1976:255) when man as initiator (knower)

focuses himself intellectually by way of perception, memory, and expectation upon the cognizable in the present, past and future.

This link between the initiator (subject) and respondent (object) is constituted by the laws or norms which determine the respondent as well as the laws of logic – analysis.

Therefore, Ouweneel (1993:192) rightly concludes that there is no room whatsoever for any split between, "or mutual hypostatization of, subject and object". This is simply because the respondent functions within the same modal aspects of reality and the same law-order as the initiator. What one can conclude here is that, the view that man (the subject) is a thinking thing, and the rest of creation (the object) is a non-

thinking thing as we saw in Descartes, is rejected. The object is something real, i.e. it is knowable.

Therefore, in the process of self-discovery, there should be a distinction between the initiator and the respondent because each participant in the process is unique in terms of the functions bestowed. For research is never possible unless there is an initiator in any scientific endeavour. That same initiator must make a decision to choose a method which he should work with, in order to achieve a pursued goal.

4.3.2 The Process of Self-Discovery as Critical Dialogue

The process of self-discovery is viewed as critical dialogue between the initiator and the respondent, because of its radical rejection of reductionism. In some quarters of the scientific world, critical dialogue includes even the most disputed ways of causing pain to some parts of creation. It ranges from critical questions, critical discussions, scientific manipulation, to laboratory confinements (for the purpose of scientific investigations).

The process of creation in self-discovery is also viewed as critical dialogue because it can use the gift of science, which in

turn uses some sophisticated apparatus and scientific research methods. In scholarship endeavours, based on the presupposition of the diversity of creation, we take a distance from the total reality to look at one aspect of reality – *Gegenstand*²⁴ theory (abstraction) – to allow critical dialogue to take place. Abstraction, which is a hypothetical way of approaching reality, presupposes everyday distinctions and life-view, such as the belief in law-like behaviour and the belief in coherence. Coherences play an important role in the process of creation in self-discovery. According to Henderson (1994:109)

coherence is the basis of the logic, the system with which each science is concerned. ... Logic depends upon the coherence of things in order to function. Coherence is a condition of the possibility of scholarly thought of each kind within each area, and cannot ultimately be grasped logically.

This implies that not only the isolated aspect is studied in itself but its relationships are also analysed. In his reflective wonder and analysis, the initiator (or logical subject) begins with the act of intuition (or viewing), whereby he intuits one field and brings

²⁴ According to Kalsbeek (1975:348), the term “*gegenstand*” is a German term which Dooyeweerd uses as a technical term for a modality when abstracted from the coherence of time and opposed to the analytical function in the theoretical attitude of thought, thereby establishing the *Gegenstand* relation. “*Gegenstand*” is therefore the technically precise

it to conscious awareness (Henderson, 1994:107). This is not an act of creation by consciousness, but an act of recognizing the respondent (or logical object) (Henderson, 1994:107).

It must also be borne in mind that objectivity is also part of meaning, which Dooyeweerd (1969:4[I]) defines as “the being of all that has been created and the nature even of selfhood”. Furthermore, Dooyeweerd (1969:5[II]) argues that “philosophic thinking is analysis and synthesis of meaning”. It must also be presupposed that meaning attribution (or meaning-giving, or meaning dispensing, or meaning assigning) is from the Creator (Henderson, 1994:105). Human knowledge includes an attribution of meaning to an “object,” which makes it a *noema* (a meaning-possessing “object”) (Henderson, 1994:106). This does not mean that the meaning of the object is ultimately dependent upon consciousness. To attribute meaning to something, is to become conscious of and reflect upon meaning; which is not yet knowledge but a condition of all knowledge (Henderson, 1994:106). According to Dooyeweerd (in Henderson, 1994:107),

The meaning-possessing entity coheres completely with meaning attribution (*zingeving*) as an individual activity of reflective

word for the object of science, while “object” itself is reserved for the objects of naïve experience (i.e. ordinary or everyday experience).

consciousness. The meaning attribution and the meaning possessing entity stand within consciousness in an inseparable union of being (*wezensverband*).

What it means is that union of the consciousness (initiator) through abstraction, with the entity (respondent) closes the gap between them. In this union, the alienation between the initiator and the respondent is done away with.

While it is expected to be dialogical, the process of self-discovery should not also be irresponsibly manipulative. The rejection of irresponsible manipulation here points to the idea that reformational philosophy acknowledges the empirical (or concrete) existence of the respondent as given in order to fulfil the subject function of the initiator. This leads to the issue of deontics that is raised and addressed by Stoker (1970) in his paper, *Outlines of a Deontology of Scientific Method*. The question here is, what *ought* the initiator (in this case, man) to do? As mentioned in 4.2.2, and 4.2.3, the initiator, who is in most if not in all cases, man, is responsible and should be accountable for his actions. This links with Stoker's definition as summarized above in 4.1 in which he indicates a normative approach.

In his critical dialogue with creation, man has the gift of science at his disposal. Stoker (1970:184) gives four functions that characterizes this gift of science:

- (1) It seeks a deliberate acquisition of knowledge by an intentional investigation of the “what?”, the “how?”, the “why?”, and the “wherefore?” of the knowable.
- (2) It seeks to answer these questions with the intention to comprehend, explain, understand and evaluate the knowable. It does so by seeking the relations of the knowable diversity by a theoretical formulation of these relations – hence science as an intentionally and purposefully systematized knowledge.
- (3) It seeks to verify its assumptions, observations, research, reasoning and results – it is critical in nature. (The idea of verification has been discredited since, but it still remains true that scholars double-check their results).
- (4) The search for knowledge as such, systematization and verification, require technical methods.

The above-listed functions which characterize science show that central to them is also a manipulative approach, which Stoker mentions in his definition of method. This approach breeds ambition to conquer creation, rather than compassion to preserve and conserve it. It is the ambition to impose order on the other parts of creation that blunts man's conscience to the point of choosing the separation of creation (subject-object separation) in order to know it so as to overpower it. Hence the popular traditional slogan, 'Knowledge is power!' The manipulative approach to critical dialogue with the created reality has its theoretical assumptions in the Cartesian view of man (the subject). In the Cartesian view of man, man as the subject is the thinking thing, and the rest of creation is viewed as a non-thinking thing, and simply an extension. Rather, man must use the gift of science responsibly, with compassion for the created reality, knowing that he is an inseparable part of it. He should choose compassion in the place of ambition.

The gift of science cannot be responsibly operative unless there is a method chosen by the initiator, and suggested by the respondent, if the area of research is the human realm. For critical dialogue cannot take place without a method to work with. This method must consider the importance of the normative approach to research as shown in point 4.1 above.

Thus method should also be viewed as the means that concern the initiator's responsible activities of rediscovering the structure and direction of creation.

The method that is chosen should bring the initiator to a critical dialogue with the respondent. This critical dialogue should be compassionately interrogative in its investigative application, but at the same time it must be based on the intention of preservation and conservation of created reality. The initiator ought to choose a method for creation to rediscover itself without splitting it into the schema of a subject and an object, for this schema has serious implications as indicated above.

What it means here is that, the problem does not simply lie with the distinction between the initiator and the respondent but in not recognizing that the objective functioning of the field of investigation has implications for methodology. For example, when a materialist reduces a work of sculpture to a soap stone, he denies that the sculpturing functions objectively in the aesthetic modality. He also denies that this calls for, other than physical methods, if we want to understand the aesthetic meaning of the sculpturing. In addition to that, when it concerns human studies, the subjective functioning of the field of study must be recognized. It must not be reduced to mere concepts or

ideas, or constructions of the human consciousness. When we study human beings under a certain aspect (like the economical, or juridical), we should not only observe them or make assumptions about them, but we should learn from Participatory Research that we can ask their co-operation. So a method must be chosen which does not lead to the cause of ontological split.

Critical dialogue demands that the initiator, in this case referring to man (and the human respondent) should be responsible for the destiny of the universe. The reason is that he is part and parcel of this destiny of the universe. This destiny of the universe demands them to know and maintain creation as it was intended in its creaturelihood. If not known and maintained, creation is going to suffer all kinds of evil, rather than enjoying all the given good intended by the Creator. Through man as the initiator of the process of creation in self-discovery, good or/and evil, find their point of entry into the world and destroy its intended destiny. Hence Hart's (1984:291) argument:

This is both the point of entry for evil into all affairs of the world and the point of entry for the derailment of good intentions. The distinction between good and evil is the distinction between that which happens in the world in keeping with the ordered destiny and that which develops in resistance to that destiny. As a result

evil is no arbitrary designation of things. Things are evil because they resist what is good, they destroy, break down, cause sorrow.

Why is this the point of entry for evil? It is so because sin disrupted the good intentions that were put in human scientific endeavours and replaced them with immoral and destructive tendencies. These immoral tendencies found in human scientific endeavour propagate for an antinomian²⁵ or an emotive²⁶ kind of research ethic. This means that some sense of morality must find a permanent place to control how research is being carried out (permanency here does not mean that kind of a static rule, but a divinely founded norm). This sense of morality can only get a place if research does not cause the ontological cleavage.

4.4 Conclusion

Methodology as a way for creation's process of self-discovery should have ontological presuppositions that recognize the unity of creation. Such a starting-point guarantees that object functions of an existent not be reduced to a mere idea. This

²⁵ Antinomianism is an absolutistic notion that denies all universal and general moral laws (Geisler, 1989:25-26). It holds that there are no ethical rules or norms (Geisler, 1989:311).

²⁶ This comes from emotivism, which is also an absolutistic notion that holds that "ethical statements are an expression of our feeling but are not really objectively binding" (Geisler, 1989:312).

starting-point should not be perverted by the dualism of subject-object separation that causes a split ontology. It is through these ontological presuppositions that we are able to evaluate a method.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The process of creation in self-discovery is a constant and an ongoing process of finding out what the structure of creation is like and what the intended direction of creation should be. This implies that there must be a starting-point based on pre-suppositions, then comes the choice of method or methods to achieve what one wishes to do. Such a method is compelled to use a hypotheses (which is a typical characteristic of any scientific endeavour hence all knowledge is hypothetical). Any hypotheses or mental image is attached to reality. This means that to neglect any relationship between the philosophical framework of a method and reality leads to metaphysical mysticism as seen in Descartes, Kant, and Husserl, who reduced everything to a world of (innate) ideas.

What was found from this research project was that methodological attempts to solve the subject-object alienation by Descartes, Kant, Husserl, Heidegger, Dewey, and the Participatory Research did not reach their goal. In Descartes the mind was endowed with an existence of its own separated from reality. Kant overrated and absolutized reason which he

mutilated with *a priori*'s and changed it into *ratio* with more or less almighty power to create and impose order on creation. This was rather some kind of the abandonment of reality, because the object-in-itself remained unknown. Husserl, whose intention was to establish an unprejudiced and a presuppositionless method, reduced the subject to a transcendental Ego and the object to an *a priori* object. This is because it is described only as essence (ideal not empirical) of the experiences of a consciousness which is itself not empirical but pure and thus *a priori*. Heidegger, through his hermeneutic phenomenology, landed into an indiscriminate ontologizing of everything – philosophy itself and method of inquiry became ontology. It was discovered above that Dewey tried to argue against the subject-object alienation, but the inquirer is found imposing his investigative rules upon reality as he/she determine the indeterminacy of the situation which is reality. The separation of the subject and the object remains the same. Participatory Research, which continues to adhere to the ideals of the eighteenth century, made everybody into a researcher (subject-subject) but was not able to close the gap between the subject and the object. All in all, these attempts were not able to solve this problem.

We cannot reduce the respondent (or object) to mere ideas, because in doing so we are widening the gap between the initiator and the respondent. Man as the initiator, if not the only one, is bound to the respondent because it functions objectively in a given manner. We cannot construct the respondent, but we must recognize it. We must not neglect nature as a move to empower ourselves. We must have respect for nature, rather than irresponsibly disrupting and exploiting it. We should see nature as part of creation.

Research methodology should struggle to maintain the unity and diversity of creation so as to establish a morally acceptable ontology. This is because the creaturelihood of the created reality points to its dependence to the Creator. Any progressive decision in the choice of a methodology should not turn a blind eye in considering the ontological presuppositions brought forward in point 4.2 above.

If the search for an approach that helps to solve the Cartesian dualistic confusion (i.e. subject-object alienation), the reformational philosophical approach should be considered as one of the options not to be left out. It is because, as argued above, it has shown that it is possible to acquire knowledge without causing split ontology. This may happen if the ground-

plans of one's method points to the cardinal points: the creaturelihood of creation, unity of creation, diversity in creation, and human calling.

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