A good governance framework for state institutions: The case of the Government of Zimbabwe

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DECLARATION

I, Bright Muronda, declare that this thesis: *A good governance framework for state institutions: The Case of the Government of Zimbabwe* is my work that has not been submitted for assessment before any learning institution in South Africa and beyond. The thesis is being submitted to fulfil the North-West University's requirements for a Doctoral degree in Public Management and Governance. The sources used to compile this thesis were duly acknowledged using in-text referencing and a bibliography.

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gathered from these individuals highlighted public sector institutions' functions, strengths, weaknesses and strategic goals.

I also appreciate the contributions of various non-state role players such as academics, NGOs, CSOs and other organisations and institutions who provided insights into the weaknesses of public sector institutions and how state institutions can be leveraged to create value for the citizens. These insights were vital in proposing a good governance framework.

ABSTRACT

The overarching purpose of the state is to provide a stable, secure, accountable, representative and economically viable environment, commonly referred to as good governance, where citizens can thrive and meet their goals. The government, consisting of bureaucrats and elected officials, use the state's architecture and machinery to achieve good governance. A modern government consists of complex institutions, goals, policies and lines of authority deployed to provide citizens with public goods and services, and a healthy and stable environment crucial for their well-being. Delivering these services and good standards of living depends on efficient and effective public institutions that economically manage limited public resources to meet an increasing list of infinite needs. This study explores how the state's resources can be optimally utilised to meet citizens' needs.

Challenges associated with good governance can be addressed by ensuring that government institutions adhere to certain globally-accepted standards, values, norms and principles. This reasoning motivated the researcher to explore public sector interventions within the ecosystem of good governance praxis. A situational analysis indicated that the public sector is plagued by perennial issues such as poor performance, the general lack of political and administrative oversight, widespread state corruption and financial mismanagement. The Zimbabwean public sector has also witnessed decades of strategic decline due to internal political dynamics and forces associated with international trade, globalisation and foreign relations. The pariah state badge, international condemnation and near-global isolation imposed on the country further starved the public sector of the required capacity, competency and resources, resulting in the relative inability of government institutions to fulfil their constitutional mandate and statutory obligations. Good governance standards, values, norms and principles offer a valuable conceptual and theoretical framework for the design of suitable solutions and interventions to increase the performance of the state's machinery and reimagine the value proposition of the country's public sector. Good governance praxis may leverage human capital, efficient public sector resources management and citizens' participation in public affairs to create value for the citizens and strengthen public oversight of the functioning of public institutions.

The study adopted a qualitative research design imbedded in an interpretivist paradigm to investigate the research problem. Qualitative research is suitable in social science research, where the researcher has to collect deep insights into a specific social phenomenon. A case study design was also employed together with semi-structured interviews, a questionnaire and document analysis. These were used as primary data collection methods. These methodological choices provided flexibility and insights into the functions, operations, strategic goals, performance and management of selected public institutions in Zimbabwe. Semi-structured interviews enabled the researcher to engage decision-makers, bureaucrats and senior public officials responsible for implementing public policies and overseeing the management of resources. In addition, a representative purposive sample was drawn from civil society organisations, academics, non-governmental organisations, directors, CEOs and executive secretaries in various state and non-state institutions mainly responsible for monitoring and oversight.

The study's findings revealed the underlying challenges facing public sector institutions, hampering adherence to good governance praxis. The main challenges include inadequate funding, insufficient human capital, compromised institutional independence, poor accountability and transparency, weak political oversight, and a lack of cooperation between public institutions and non-state actors. The findings reflect the state of governance in Zimbabwe. The researcher develops a good governance framework to address public sector challenges. The good governance framework is targeted mainly for application at the national level. It demonstrates how leveraging efficient and effective management of resources, financial management, accountability and value-for-money in public sector institutions can increase their overall performance and reinvigorate their value propositions. The study also outlined a research agenda for future scholarly inquiry into public officials' competencies, capacities and skills to implement the good governance framework. This agenda is rooted in the realisation that strategic and operational level public sector interventions are only as successful as the public officials' ability to implement them.

KEY WORDS

Good governance, good governance framework, performance, public sector, state institutions, non-state actors, Zimbabwe.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

3Es	Efficiency, Economy, Effectiveness
AG	Auditor General
AGSA	Auditor General South Africa
ANC	African National Congress
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
BBBEE	Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment
C&AG	Comptroller and Auditor General
CAO	The Chief Accounting Officer
CEO	The Chief Executive Officer
CGF	Corporate Governance Framework
CGG	Corporate Governance Guidelines
COO	Chief Operations Officer
CPI	Corruption Perceptions Index
CPIA	Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
CPR	Country Performance Rating
CRM	Country Review Mission
CRR	Country Review Report
CSAR	Country Self-Assessment Report
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
DMB	Dairy Marketing Board
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
EU	The European Union
EUROSAI	European Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GGA	Good Governance Africa
GMB	The Grain Marketing Board
GoZ	The Government of Zimbabwe
IAG	Index of African Governance
ICASA	Independent Communications Authority of South Africa
ICT	Information and Communication Technologies
IMF	The International Monetary Fund

INTOSA	International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions
IRBM	Integrated Results-Based Management
NAO	National Audit Office
NCOP	National Council of Provinces
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisations
NPA	National Prosecuting Authority
NPM	New Public Management
NPOA	National Programme of Action
NRZ	The National Railways of Zimbabwe
OAG	The Office of the Auditor-General
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPC	Office of the President and Cabinet
PA	Public Administration
PAC	Public Accounts Committee
PAT	Principal-Agent Theory
PAZ	Privatisation Authority of Zimbabwe
PCAOB	Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
PCT	Public Choice Theory
PELT	Public Enforcement of the Law Theory
PFMA	Public Finance Management Act
PGT	Public Goods Theory
POSDCORB	Planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting and budgeting
PP	Public Protector
PRASA	Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa
PRT	Power Resources Theory
PS	Political Science
PVT	Public Value Theory
QoG	The Quality of Government
RBZ	Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
RISDP	The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
RR	Research Respondents
SAA	South African Airways

SABC	South African Broadcasting Corporation
SAHRC	South African Human Rights Commission
SAI	Supreme Audit Institutions
SAT	State Autonomy Theory
SCOPA	Standing Committee on Public Accounts
SCT	Social Contract Theory
SOEs	State-Owned Enterprises
TCT	Transaction Cost Theory
TQM	Total Quality Management
UK	The United Kingdom
VFM	Value for Money
WGI	World Governance Indicators
ZACC	The Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission
ZHRC	Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission
ZIMCODE	The National Code of Corporate Governance
ZIMPREST	Zimbabwe Program for Economic and Social Transformation
ZSE	The Zimbabwe Stock Exchange
ZUPCO	Zimbabwe United Passenger Company

CHAPTER ONE

ORIENTATION AND AN OUTLINE OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

1.1 ORIENTATION

The study develops a good governance framework for selected state institutions because public institutions are critical in promoting sound governance. The two types of state institutions being investigated are state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and independent institutions and commissions, such as the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC), the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) and the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission. Sections 254 and 309 of the Constitution direct the government to establish the ZACC and the OAG, respectively. Zimbabwe established SOEs, such as the National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ), the Zimbabwe United Passenger Company (ZUPCO), the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) and the Zimbabwe Power Company (ZPC) to promote socio-economic development by providing public goods and services. They are leveraged by the government to promote social stability and sound governance (Muzapu *et al.*, 2016:91). For example, the ZACC and the OAG combat corruption and misuse of public resources. Networking between public and non-state institutions promotes socio-economic development, social stability and sound governance (Hinderman, Kodila-Tedeka & Christiansen, 2015:98). Hence, institutions are crucial in modern governance.

Progressive states have legal systems and robust public institutions contributing to socio-economic development (Nganje, 2015:18; Osman, Alexiou & Tsaliki, 2011:143; Lewin, 2011:85). Such states have public institutions ensuring that the government adheres to norms and standards required for a functional society. Nganje (2015) cites Botswana as an African country with strong institutions leading to sound governance and socio-economic development (Brown, 2014:50-52; Lewin, 2011:82).

The importance of effective public institutions in national development and economic growth cannot be disputed because studies suggest that the difference in economic growth among countries is attributable to the quality of public institutions (Nirola & Sahu, 2019:3-3). Countries with sound public institutions experience steady economic growth and social stability. Hence, researchers suggest a correlation between sound public institutions and economic development (Kanani & Larizza, 2021: online). Sub-Saharan countries have slow socio-economic underdevelopment due to weak public institutions (Nganje, 2015:5). For this reason, researchers posit that robust public institutions are vital for economic growth and sustainable development (Brown, 2014:47). Empirical evidence suggests that countries with efficient institutions (such as impartial courts, legislature, auditor-general, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), free press, human rights commissions) have a positive development trajectory because they promote sound governance (United Nations, 2016:142). Therefore, transparent, efficient, accountable, competent and well-functioning public institutions promote good governance (UN, 2016:149; Fourie, 2015:110).

It is challenging to pin down definitions of governance and good governance because they are usually used in various contexts (Pillay, 2016:23; Maserumule, 2014:963; Sebola, 2014:995). “Governance” emanated from an ancient Greek verb *kybernein,* demonstrating steering or manoeuvring a vessel; Plato metaphorically used it to illustrate managing society, and the French used *gouvernance* to refer to royal officers (Zargar & Sheikh, 2018:60; Katsamunska, 2016:133; Campbell & Carayannis, 2013:3). Modern governance has evolved and metamorphosed into a tool for participation, negotiation, collaboration and consensus between authorities and citizens (Campbell & Carayannis, 2013:3-4). It entails steering the economy and society towards reaching “collective goals” (Katsamunska, 2016:133). This viewpoint is consistent with negotiations between all stakeholders involved in governance affairs that underpin this study.

Governance became an instrument for socio-economic development in Africa in the 1970s when multinational organisations leveraged it as a precondition for aid (Fourie, 2015:110; Mubangizi & Tshishongo, 2013:302). Governance seeks social consensus by coordinating multi-stakeholder interface between role players in society (Maurseth, 2008:6). It transcends the traditional limits of public administration by including other

social institutions involved in developing, implementing and reviewing policies (Fourie, 2015:110-111). Hence, it incorporates NGOs into the state's architecture to develop public policies. Institutions are critical in national governance because they involve complex processes and relationships between public and social institutions (Katsamunska, 2016:133). Public institutions are essential because they interface with non-state role players in promoting a sustainable political and economic climate required by national growth and development (Fourie, 2015:110).

Governance occurs in two paradigms, firstly as a *process* and secondly as a *structure*. Governance as a structure consists of institutions and organisations governed by rules and regulations, whereas governance as a process refers to the management of these institutions. This study pursues an in-depth structural or institutional dimension of governance consisting of institutions, values and policies managing multi-level socio-economic and political processes (Mubangizi & Tshishonga, 2013:302). This is rooted in the belief that ineffective institutions result in poor governance in developing counties (Khan, 2012:56). Hence, good governance can be achieved by strengthening public institutions and enabling them to contribute to national economic development (Khan, 2012:56). Lewin (2011:85) underscores democratisation and developmental role of state institutions by stating that Botswana evolved from being poor to a middle-income country owing to robust public institutions. This demonstrates the importance of effective public institutions in promoting economic development (Katsamunska, 2016:134). Therefore, the goodness of a governance system is achieved through institutions at the national, regional or local government level. This enables role players like NGOs and state institutions to address complex socio-economic challenges through dialogue and negotiation. For this reason, public institutions should be effective, fair, accountable and transparent; however, some developing countries cannot meet these obligations, resulting in a lack of public trust.

The notion of the "goodness" of governance was propounded by the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and United Nations (UN) as one that promotes sustainable development economic development, poverty and corruption eradication and accountability (Zargar & Sheikh, 2018:60; Pillay, 2016:23-24; Matshabaphala, 2014:1009; Wagener, 2011:173). The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESPACP) stated that the eight characteristics

of good governance are participation, the rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, accountability, consensus-oriented, and equity and inclusiveness (Zargar & Sheikh, 2018:61). Good governance is defined as leveraging legitimate authority to use public resources and implement common socio-economic goals (Ali, 2015:65). It entails citizen participation, transparent policy-making, the rule of law, accountability, efficient resource management and equitable distribution of resources (Devi, 2015:79; Maserumule, 2014:972). Therefore, scholars concur that good governance principles encourage efficient and responsible management of public resources and state authority, resulting in stable and prosperous communities that promote citizens' rights. In contrast, bad governance refers to an inefficient and unrepresentative government which fails to meet citizens' needs and does not comply with the standard principles of good government (Sebola, 2014:996; Lewin, 2011:82). This type of governance degenerates towards a dysfunctional state (Greffrath & Van der Waldt, 2016:341; Matshabaphala, 2014:1009).

Section 9 of the Constitution deals with good governance in Zimbabwe. The Constitution (2013) directs the State to adopt and implement policies and legislation to ensure efficiency, competence, accountability, transparency, personal integrity and financial probity in all government institutions and agencies at every level (section 9 (1)). Section 9 (2) directs the State to ensure that all government institutions and agencies have adequate resources and facilities to carry out their functions conscientiously, fairly, honestly and efficiently. Research indicates that the Government of Zimbabwe aspires to capacitate institutions to promote economic growth, the rule of law and respect citizens' human rights (Pillay, 2016:24; Fourie, 2015:110; Lewin, 2011:82). Therefore, these institutions should enhance transparent and accountable governance in the public sector. Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate the legal and regulatory architecture of good governance in these public institutions, whereas data reported in Chapter 5 underscore how the institutions promote sound governance.

The realisation of the impact of good governance on economic development by policymakers, scholars, aid recipients and aid donors necessitated the need to develop tools for measuring governance (Thomas, 2010:31). The principles of good governance, such as the rule of law, transparency, efficiency and responsiveness are

essential performance indicators of sound governance; to this end, various regional and global instruments discussed in Chapter 3 of this study were developed to achieve this goal (Gisselquist, 2014:516; Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2011:24). This led to the development of indicators to assess specific elements of good governance, such as the rule of law, the prevalence of corruption and the public sector's performance (USCIB, 2015:3; Maurseth, 2008:9). Hence, the indicators are used to objectively compare and measure the quality and standards of governance in different countries (Langbein & Knack, 2010:350). Maurseth (2008:9) posits that it is possible to measure governance based on four primary spheres of transactions at different societal levels. Maurseth (2008:9) argues that the transactions happen formally or informally in all communities, societies, business and political transactions and across nations. Figure 1.1 illustrates Maurseth's four spheres of transactions.

Figure 1.1: Maurseth's four spheres of transactions



Source: Adapted from Maurseth (2008:10)

Maurseth (2008:10) suggests that the four spheres of transactions are the basis of human interaction. In light of this supposition, the following section discusses instruments for assessing good governance. A more in-depth exposition of these instruments is provided in Chapter 3.

The Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) was developed at Harvard University to objectively measure the performance of African governments (Dassah, 2015:715). It assesses development outcomes, such as poverty, inequality and growth, by benchmarking them using specific indicators (Gisselquist, 2014:513). The IIAG is a comprehensive and quantitative instrument for assessing the effectiveness and outputs of governance systems of countries in the sub-Saharan region of Africa (Dassah, 2015:715). The IIAG was analysed in this study to assess the performance and efficiency of the government of Zimbabwe. An in-depth analysis of the Mo Ibrahim Index is provided in Section 3.4.2.

Other instruments of assessing governance include the Country's Policy and Institutional Assessment (CIPA), the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and the World Governance Indicators (WGIs) (USCIB, 2015:3; Gisselquist, 2014:513; Langbein & Knack, 2010:350; Thomas, 2010:31). The World Bank developed the WGI to measure the six dimensions of governance using data from multiple sources (USCIB, 2015:3; Thomas, 2010:31). The WGIs rank the performance of a specific government and compare it with peers in its region or globally (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2011:220). Several instruments for measuring the goodness of governance are analysed in this study; they include the Sustainable Governance Indicators and the Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) (Van Der Waldt, 2012:87).

The government's performance metrics are based on hundreds of variables gathered from qualitative and quantitative data (Kaufmann *et al.,* 2011:220-222). For example, assessing the dimensions of the WGIs requires the researcher to collect and process data about public management and governance elements such as voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, the rule of law, regulatory policies and corruption control (Gisselquist, 2014:514; Wagener, 2011:175; Langbein & Knack, 2010:351). Chapter 6 of this study demonstrates that these indicators and field data are crucial in assessing sound governance and designing a good governance framework for state institutions.

1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT

The study develops a solution for an existing problem. The lack of a good governance framework causes poor performance in the Zimbabwean public sector (Muzapu *et al.*, 2016:89). Public institutions are weak and cannot fulfil their constitutional obligations (Sikwila, Chavunduka & Ndoda, 2015:3; Rusvingo, 2014b:39). Ordinarily, public institutions should function efficiently to meet citizens' needs and contribute to socio-economic development. At their peak, SOEs contributed 40% of the nation's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Muzapu *et al.*, 2016:89; Zhou, 2012:175). Currently, SOEs (such as NRZ, ZBC, CAAZ, CSC, GMB and ZUPCO) are "financially crippled" and failing to meet basic organisational obligations, such as remunerating employees (Muzapu *et al.*, 2016:89; Chavunduka & Sikwila, 2015:652). This is worsened by the lack of political will and commitment to address these challenges, resulting in further deterioration of the institutions (Mhlanga, 2017; Muleya, 2016; Rusvingo, 2014b:39). This results in low performance in public sector institutions due to inefficiency resulting in poor public services. In their current state, public institutions do not live up to Section 9(2) of the Constitution, which envisages "effective and efficient" public sector institutions that foster socio-economic development and citizens' well-being. Furthermore, poor public sector performance is inconsistent with the national developmental discourse outlined in Section 13 of the Constitution, which advocates upholding human rights.

Human rights violations are rife in Zimbabwe, particularly before national elections, when human rights violations, intimidation, murder, rape, abduction, and torture are rampant (Mavhinga, 2017: online; Dzimiri *et al.*, 2014:232). Most of these violations are never investigated, and responsible public institutions such as law enforcement agencies are ineffective in dealing with these matters. Empirical data indicates that government security agencies are allegedly responsible for the violations (Quarterly Political and Human Rights Violations Report, 2016:7,8; Zimbabwe Human Rights Report, 2009:7). In 2009, a civil activist, Jestina Mukoko, was abducted and tortured by unknown figures believed to be state security agencies. In 2014, Patson Dzamara (a political activist) was abducted by unknown figures driving an unmarked vehicle; to date, his whereabouts are unknown (Human Rights Watch, 2016:1). These two cases

are by no means isolated cases. Nonetheless, they underscore the state of human rights abuse, disregard for the rule of law, and public institutions' inability to execute their functions. They also highlight the rampant corruption inherent in government.

Furthermore, corruption is endemic in Zimbabwe. Public confidence in the ZACC and the capacity of law enforcement agencies to combat corruption and promote the rule of law is low. The ZACC is an independent commission established to investigate corruption (Mugadza, 2017:330). The Constitution 2013 gives it authority to investigate corruption and cooperate with the National Prosecuting Authority to ensure that corrupt officials are prosecuted because it does not have prosecuting powers. Mugadza (2017:331) states that due to a lack of political will and influence, the ZACC faces operational challenges, such as cooperation from other government institutions like the police and the judiciary. This results in weak investigations and prosecutions of corrupt public officials. This weakness is also manifested in the lack of financial accountability.

The Office of the Auditor General audits the government's finances and reports to Parliament to ensure public financial accountability. However, "audit recommendations are not seriously taken by Treasury, Accounting Officers and government ministers", resulting in poor financial management, wastefulness and abuse of resources in the public sector (Zhou & Zinyama, 2012:218). This weakens the state's ability to provide public goods and services to the citizens. Hence, the Auditor-General is rendered ineffective because it cannot promote financial accountability and transparency in the public sector. As a result, the state cannot create value for the citizens, resulting in low economic growth and social instability (Zinyama, 2013:269). This suggests poor performance and a lack of accountability in the public sector. Scholars cited above indicated the importance of effective public institutions in promoting good governance. For this reason, this study develops a good governance framework for the GoZ to increase the performance and effectiveness of public sector organisations, oversight institutions and independent commissions.

1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

Research objectives articulate the overall aims and projected outcomes of the study. Accordingly, this section deals with the objectives of the study.

1.3.1 Primary research objective

The primary research objective is the main purpose of the study. The study's primary objective is to develop a good governance framework for state institutions in Zimbabwe to promote an effective and efficient public sector.

1.3.2 Secondary research objectives

Secondary research objectives are supplementary objectives complementing the primary research objective. The study's secondary research objectives are as follows:

- To explore the theories, principles, dimensions, and approaches of good governance in the public sector.
- To investigate the theoretical foundations of developing a good governance framework with specific reference to existing frameworks, models and good governance measuring instruments.
- To investigate the role of state institutions in promoting good governance.
- To provide an in-depth analysis of instruments for measuring sound governance and the legal and regulatory frameworks for good governance in the public sector.
- To assess regional and international best practices regarding the role and contributions of state institutions in promoting good governance praxis in the public sector.
- To empirically determine the main challenges and problems in the execution of good governance principles by selected state institutions in Zimbabwe.
- To design a good governance framework for state institutions in Zimbabwe to improve the performance of public sector organisations and strengthen oversight institutions.

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

In line with the research objectives stated above, the study's research questions are as follows:

- What are the theories, principles, dimensions and approaches of good governance in the public sector?
- What are the theoretical foundations of developing a good governance framework with specific reference to existing frameworks, models and good governance measuring instruments?
- What is the role of state institutions in promoting good governance?
- What are the instruments for measuring sound governance and the legal and regulatory frameworks of good governance in the public sector?
- What are the regional and international best practices of state institutions that promote good governance praxis in the public sector?
- What are the main challenges and problems selected state institutions encounter in the execution of good governance principles?
- What should be included in a good governance framework to contribute towards effective and efficient public sector and oversight institutions in Zimbabwe?

1.5 CENTRAL THEORETICAL STATEMENTS

In line with the background of the study discussed in Section 1.2, this section lists the study's central theoretical statements and the underlying assumptions serving as theoretical foundations for the study.

Relevant theories and paradigms were analysed in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 to provide a theoretical foundation. The study's theoretical framework consists of the Public Value Theory, New Public Management (NPM), New Public Governance (NPG) and the New Public Service (NPS) paradigms. Public Value theory was propounded by Mark Moore, encouraging bureaucrats to contribute towards social development by managing public resources to create value for citizens. This approach views citizens as customers and beneficiaries of public services (Kavanagh, 2014:57). The NPM

emerged in OECD countries in the 1980s to deal with the ineffectiveness and inefficiencies of public sector organisations and their failure to create value for the citizens. This approach leveraged private sector practices to increase performance in state agencies (Islam, 2015:141; Fatemi & Behmanesh, 2012:42). The NPM approach is analysed to explore how public sector institutions can create value by providing essential goods and services. The NPG is an emerging paradigm of adopting contemporary management practices in public institutions (Runya, Qigui & Wei, 2015:11). It is pluralistic because it incorporates non-state institutions and social capital in policy development and implementation (Runya *et al.*, 2015:12). The New Public Service paradigm explores the functions of public service workers and the role of bureaucrats in a country's system of governance; it seeks to promote public sector accountability, efficiency, equity, and responsiveness to citizens' needs (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2015:664). In light of this background, the following statements are central arguments posited in this study.

Public sector institutions foster sound governance by delivering essential services, implementing and coordinating government policies and ensuring stable and progressive societies (UN, 2016:143).

The idea of good governance emerged in the early 1990s, and it was popularised by multilateral organisations that required specific economic, social and political standards for countries requiring aid. Good governance evolved into a benchmark for assessing governments' performance regarding the rule of law, public sector performance, transparency and promoting citizens' human rights (Triguswinri, 2021:129-132).

"Good governance is expected to streamline the role of the government and public organisations and the rule of law, accountability, transparency, an efficient and responsive bureaucracy, a participative policy process, and free media" (Zafarullah & Huque, 2001:1380). Hence, good governance requires countries to implement sound policies and strategies to combat corruption, increase citizens' participation in public affairs and promote transparency in the management of public resources (Salihu, 2022:101-104).

Good governance is democratic, participatory, transparent, responsive, equitable, and consensus-oriented. The good governance discourse encourages state institutions to protect human rights, ensure a free press and citizens' access to information and allow the presence of a vibrant civil society. Furthermore, it promotes accountable and ethical management of public resources (Matshabaphala, 2014:1009-1010).

Although good governance became prominent in the 1980s, it "has long been part of the early philosophical discourses on the normative imperatives of politics" because it can be identified in the narratives of classical philosophers, such as Aristotle and Plato (Maserumule, 2014:964).

1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN

An in-depth description of the research approach, design, techniques and the researcher's philosophical worldview employed in this study is provided in Section 5.2.

The three research philosophical standpoints are quantitative, qualitative and mixed-methods research methodologies. A research methodology encapsulates the researcher's approach, theory or philosophy towards solving an identified problem; it explains the techniques and strategies used to select the sample, collect and interrogate data and interpret the findings (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2016:4; Tracy, 2013:260), whereas, the research design is a logical plan of conducting a study; it synergises the research objectives, type of data and data analysis techniques to ensure that the study's findings solve the research problem (Yin, 2011:75-76).

A qualitative research philosophy was used because it enabled the researcher to gather and interpret non-numeric subjective data in a specific natural setting (Saunders *et al.*, 2016:168). It enables researchers to immerse themselves in the study, collect in-depth data and use subjective reflections to interrogate a research problem (Tracy, 2013:3). This was a suitable approach because the researcher was interested in understanding respondents' perceptions of various dimensions of good governance, such as accountability, the rule of law and public sector efficiency. Therefore, the qualitative research methodology enabled the researcher to collect

qualitative data about the performance of public institutions through semi-structured interviews, document analysis and a questionnaire. In addition, qualitative thematic data analysis enabled the researcher to analyse and interpret subjective data presented in words, speeches, texts and experiences. This is consistent with the research problem because it enabled the researcher to analyse bureaucrats, citizens and non-state players' perceptions of the government's performance.

The study used an inductive and exploratory research design following an interpretivist paradigm and a case study approach. This research architecture is a logical plan enabling the researcher to investigate a complex social research problem, collect and process in-depth qualitative data from a specific case in a natural setting and identify trends and patterns to develop a solution (Heale & Twycross, 2018:7; Saunders *et al.*, 2016:136; Nishishiba, Jones & Kraner, 2014:49; Kumar, 2011:95-96). The research design is suitable because it enabled the researcher to collect, analyse and interpret qualitative data. Section 5.2.1 further explores the study's research design.

1.6.1 Literature survey

Reviewing literature provided insights into the theories and typologies of good governance; hence, it assisted the researcher in identifying gaps in the current body of knowledge (Welman, Kruger & Mitchell, 2011:38). As a result, studying the literature enabled the researcher to identify the theories of good governance, public sector management and the evolution of Public Administration. The theoretical exposition focused on specific theories, philosophies, and approaches to good governance. A solid theoretical foundation was crucial to developing a good governance framework. The researcher also conducted document analysis to review the Auditor-General's reports and SOEs' performance, financial and other internal reports. This provides insights into the operations and corporate governance of state-owned businesses. The following platforms were used to source information for conducting the literature review:

- Catalogue of books: Ferdinand Postma Library
- SA ePublications

- Google Scholar
- Boloka: NWU Institutional Repository (NWU-IR)
- Catalogue of theses and dissertation of South African Universities (NEXUS)
- EBSCO Academic Search Elite.

1.6.2 Case study design

A case research design allowed the researcher to investigate social settings, empirically generate new theories and ideas, and thoroughly explore good governance issues in the public sector. Case studies are used in social science research because they enable researchers to focus on single cases and investigate them in their everyday contexts (Yin, 2011:17). Cases can represent individuals, groups, institutions or other phenomena that can be accurately delimited (Saunders *et al.*, 2016:184). In this study, the case referred to the entire public sector in Zimbabwe: the government's bureaucracy and institutions managing the state's authority and resources. Case studies are ideal in qualitative research because they enable a researcher to conduct field studies and gather empirical data from respondents (Yin, 2011:307). Hence, it enabled the researcher to engage and collect empirical data from the respondents outlined in Section 5.2.2 in uncontrolled environments. This non-experimental approach allowed the researcher to collect unfiltered and in-depth data with rich insights into how specific public institutions operate and their challenges. This is crucial because the researcher was able to concentrate on a specific case (Saunders *et al.*, 2016:184).

1.6.3 Empirical investigation

Empirical data is essential because it enables the researcher to address the research problem and proffer solutions and recommendations. The empirical investigation outlines the methods used to collect empirical data. Saunders *et al.* (2016:4) suggest these methods are linked to a specific research methodology. As discussed above, this study used a qualitative research methodology to solve the research problem; hence, the data collection methods consistent with this approach are discussed below.

1.6.3.1 Semi-structured interviews

Semi-structured interviews collect subjective data from interviewees or explore respondents' experiences of a specific research problem (McIntosh & Morse, 2015:1). The designed interview guide comprised standardised questions prepared after reviewing the literature and analysing instruments for assessing sound governance. The questions explored issues such as accountability, transparency, the rule of law, public sector performance and value-for-money auditing. This method provided the researcher with some flexibility in collecting data. Despite having a standardised set of questions, the researcher chose the ones which applied to specific interviewees. For example, finance directors were exempt from questions about human capital management. Therefore, semi-structured interviews were flexible because they allowed the researcher to deviate from the interview guide by skipping or asking additional questions depending on the interviewees' responses. Furthermore, this enables the researcher to probe and quiz respondents about specific issues (Saunders *et al.*, 2016:391).

Apart from being flexible, they enable in-depth discussion and allow participants to elaborate and substantiate their responses (Alsaawi, 2014:151). This enabled the researcher to conduct open and fruitful interviews with bureaucrats, administrators and senior executives of public institutions and collect rich data. For this reason, semi-structured interviews were a valuable and suitable data collection method because they enabled the researcher to collect comprehensive data. The interviews also allowed the researcher to skip some questions that fell beyond the interviewee's scope or that they struggled to answer. This saved the researcher and the interviewees much time because the researcher was flexible enough to skip some questions. Hence, the researcher could engage with respondents and collect rich data through semi-structured interviews.

1.6.3.2 Open-ended questionnaires

An open-ended questionnaire comprises standardised open-ended questions about a specific issue; it enables respondents to give open responses and can be shared as a hard or an electronic document (Leavy, 2017:101; Lune & Berg, 2017:200). In cases

where it was not ideal for conducting interviews with the respondents, the researcher designed and distributed an open-ended questionnaire. This instrument was appropriate because it accommodated respondents without access to video conferencing facilities and face-to-face or telephonic interviews. Furthermore, the questionnaire was used in cases where the researcher required limited, straightforward information. This technique was mainly used with general employees of civil society organisations and NGOs. Hence, it was flexible and saved the researcher and respondents' time.

1.6.3.3 Document analysis

The documentary analysis enables qualitative researchers to collect data by analysing texts and written materials (Leavy, 2017:146). Leavy (2017:146) suggests it is a form of content analysis because it interrogates written materials. Government and ministerial departments, libraries, central statistical offices and newspapers are sources of documents (Mogalakwe, 2006:223). Document analysis entailed an in-depth study of institutional and government documents with information about performance, accountability, governance and transparency. This enabled the researcher to analyse government gazettes, statutory instruments, regulations, company documents, press releases, annual reports, promotional information, financial and performance statements, parliamentary reports, audit reports and other documents with information pertinent to the study. The researcher used document analysis because it enabled the study to thoroughly analyse written documents, memos and performance data, mainly for state-owned enterprises and the OAG.

1.6.4 Target population and sampling

The targeted population refers to a group of subjects upon whom conclusions will be drawn (Leavy, 2017:264). It encapsulates all the possible elements the researcher can investigate (Bless, Higson-Smith & Sithole, 2013:162). The study targeted a population of six state institutions, namely ZACC, ZHRC, the Auditor-General, NRZ, GMB and ZUPCO, and academics, civil society organisations (CSOs), pressure groups, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and charity organisations. This cross-section of respondents was included to collect comprehensive data about the

functions and performance of public institutions. Three state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (ZUPCO, NRZ and GMB) were included because they provide essential public goods and services. The researcher opined that a comprehensive good governance framework should include public sector organisations contributing to citizens' well-being. The ZACC, ZHRC and the Office of Auditor-General were included in the study's population because they oversee and regulate how the government exercises the state's authority (discussed in sections 1.1 and 1.2). Academics, NGOs and CSOs were included because they have extensive knowledge of citizens' aspirations, human rights, public management and public sector performance. Purposive sampling identified specific individuals within these institutions and organisations.

1.6.4.1 Sampling

It is rarely feasible to investigate the entire population in research; hence, sampling is used to choose a feasible group of individuals. This saves the study money, time and other resources whilst preserving the data's reliability (Saunders *et al.*, 2016:274). A sample is a small portion of the target population. It is representative when it has an original population's characteristics (Bless *et al.*, 2013:165). The study used non-probability sampling techniques, such as purposive and snowball sampling, because they enabled the researcher to identify respondents with insights required to solve the study's problem; these sampling techniques were consistent with a qualitative research methodology. A full description of the sample and the sampling methods is provided in Section 5.2.2.

1.6.5 Data analysis

Data analysis is crucial; it enables the researcher to process and analyse data collected from the respondents because unprocessed data does not answer the research questions. Hence, it gives empirical data meaning. Data analysis techniques should be consistent with the research methodology. As a result, thematic (qualitative) data analysis was used to analyse respondents' data. This enabled the researcher to identify trends and themes from the field data. An in-depth description of how data was analysed is outlined in Section 5.5.2 to Section 5.6.7.

1.6.6 Data triangulation

Triangulation was borrowed from geometry, where angles of two known points are used to determine unknown angles. Data triangulation enables the researcher to reduce bias by collecting data from various sources; it balances and tests the authenticity of data (Heale & Forbes, 2016:98). At the heart of triangulation was the researcher's desire to collect balanced and unbiased data. As a result, data was collected from different sources, such as state and non-state role players, including NGOs, international organisations and academics. This provided a multi-faceted description of the government's performance. Furthermore, the empirical data collected from the respondents were compared to the propositions of scholars in the existing body of knowledge, institutional documents and the legislative framework. This limited bias and enhanced the data's credibility and reliability (Saunders *et al.*, 2016:730).

1.7 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Ethical considerations ensure that research is conducted ethically without violating the rights and privileges of the respondents. The North-West University requires students to demonstrate the soundness of their research methodology, the data sought, and the techniques used to collect it from respondents before clearing to conduct fieldwork. This protects the institution's integrity and ensures the researcher can engage with respondents without exposing them to harm and indignity. Social science research does not usually cause physical harm to respondents; nonetheless, it is crucial to address other ethical issues, such as anonymity, confidentiality, informed consent and beneficence. The main ethical issues in research are not exposing respondents to harm, protecting their dignity, privacy and confidentiality, professional data handling, voluntary participation, accurate reporting and informed consent (Lune & Berg, 2017:46-48; Wessels & Visagie, 2017:156; Matshabaphala, 2017:296; Saunders *et al.*, 2016:243-245).

The researcher sought ethical clearance from the NWU Ethics Committee and permission from authorities of organisations listed in Section 5.2.2. The researcher

ensured respondents were aware of their rights and privileges and that all the ethical issues were respected before engaging them. Once consent had been granted and respondents were notified that proceedings were recorded, the researcher commenced the interviews or other data collection exercises. These measures ensured that the respondents were aware of the ethical issues applicable to the study.

1.8 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The significance of the study explores the potential benefits of conducting the study; it also identifies individuals and organisations who benefit from the study's findings and recommendations. Various studies (Muzapu *et al.*, 2016; Sikwila *et al.*, 2015; Chavunduka and Sikwila, 2015; Rusvingo, 2014a) focused on the weaknesses of public sector institutions. However, they were descriptive because they did not develop interventions to address the challenges identified. This study is significant because it develops a good governance framework for state institutions as an intervention to address specific challenges, such as poor performance and the lack of accountability and transparency. Hence, the Government of Zimbabwe, particularly bureaucrats and public managers, will benefit from this study because it highlights the existing challenges and recommends solutions. The findings are significant to the Public Management and Governance discipline because they outline measures to increase efficiency and performance in public institutions.

1.9 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Limitations are inherent weaknesses in a study (Lutabingwa & Nethonzhe, 2006:700). The study's limitations include the researcher's or the respondents' biases. The qualitative research methodology adopted in this study allows the researcher's subjective opinions to influence the study's findings. For example, non-probability sampling depends on the researcher's judgement. This exposes the study to the researcher's bias. In addition, respondents' bias can impact the study's findings. The researcher interviewed government officials and senior executives who might have been inclined to give selective data that gives a positive impression of the government's performance. Furthermore, the qualitative research methodology does

not enable the researcher to accurately measure and verify the respondents' views or the methods used to data. This can also limit the validity and reliability of the study's findings.

1.10 CHAPTER LAYOUT

The thesis consists of six chapters. The chapter layout of the study is presented below:

Chapter One: Introduction and Orientation

Chapter 1 introduces the study; it provides its background and the context of good governance in a modern state. In addition, it outlines the problem statement and describes the research methodology.

Chapter Two: The theoretical exposition of Government, governance and good governance

This chapter explores the existing body of knowledge in the discipline of Public Administration and describes the theories, principles, dimensions and approaches of good governance.

Chapter Three: An overview of the instruments of good governance and the statutory and regulatory framework

This chapter is two-fold. It examines instruments for assessing sound governance and discusses the public sector's statutory and regulatory framework of good governance.

Chapter Four: The role of state institutions in promoting good governance

This chapter investigates the role of state institutions and explores regional and international best practices of state institutions promoting sound governance.

Chapter Five: Good governance in state institutions: Empirical findings

This chapter explains the research techniques used to select the study's sample and collect empirical data. Furthermore, it establishes the challenges facing public institutions.

Chapter Six: A good governance framework for state institutions in Zimbabwe
This chapter outlines the study's contributions by presenting the good governance framework. The framework was developed using empirical data, insights from the literature review, and governance instruments and indicators.

1.11 CONCLUSION

Chapter 1 provided the context and background of the research problem by outlining the research objectives, research questions and conducting a preliminary literature review. The research methodology demonstrated how respondents who participated in the study were selected and the rationale for selecting them. Furthermore, it identified, described and justified various methods and techniques to collect, analyse and interpret respondents' data. The chapter also discussed how the researcher ensured that data collection was done ethically, underscoring the study's significance and limitations. The next chapter provides a theoretical exposition of governance and good governance by discussing various theories, paradigms and perspectives.

CHAPTER TWO

A THEORETICAL EXPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT, GOVERNANCE AND GOOD GOVERNANCE

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter introduced the study by providing, among other things, the background and context of the study, the research problem, the research objectives and questions, and the research methodology. The study aims to develop a good governance framework for the Government of Zimbabwe; hence, this chapter reviews the existing literature because developing a good governance framework requires an in-depth understanding of the nature, scope and principles of good governance and related concepts, including theories of the state and theories dealing with public service institutions. This chapter aims to attain the study's first objective identified in the previous chapter. The study's theoretical framework evaluates the New Public Management (NPM) paradigm and several theories of state development, public sector management, governance and the management of state resources. The theoretical framework is critical because it provides the researcher with contemporary knowledge to analyse the empirical findings.

2.2 AN EXPOSITION OF GOVERNANCE AND GOOD GOVERNANCE

“Governance” forms the centrepiece of this study. Before examining the theories and paradigms of the study, this section renders a detailed exposition of “governance” and “good governance”. Hence, a theoretical exposition of governance and good governance is included because it explores two concepts essential in developing the good governance framework. As demonstrated in Chapter One, the locus of this study (Zimbabwe) is associated with notions of “bad” governance and maladministration. Therefore, this chapter provides the theoretical underpinning of good governance because such information is instrumental in developing a good governance

framework. Logically speaking, before determining whether governance is “good” or “bad”, it is incumbent to demonstrate an in-depth understanding of “governance”. The previous chapter dealt with the history of governance; it demonstrated that governance could be traced back to ancient civilisations when human beings first attempted to co-exist in societies governed by common laws and norms (Ali, 2015:65). Despite its renewed popularity, governance is by no means a new concept (Almqvist *et al.*, 2013:479). Its resurgence can be linked to the ongoing shift from a centralised government to a cooperative and inclusive type of governing involving collaboration between government and social role-players. From the outset, it should be noted that “governance” incorporates numerous meanings, prescriptions and connotations depending on the social aspects under investigation (Almqvist *et al.,* 2013:479; Van Doeveren, 2011:303).

Consequently, governance often connotes complex processes and structures in public and private sector settings. Several scholars draw attention to the ambiguity and vagueness of governance (Ali, 2015:65), and some suggest that governance is relative to a particular historical or social context (Pillay, 2016:23). For this reason, the term “governance” is casually deployed to mean different things in distinct settings, resulting in several subfields and genres such as media governance, good governance and corporate governance.

One of the critical elements of governance is promoting collaboration and cooperation between stakeholders in society. It seeks to distribute decision-making power formerly retained by the state. This is consistent with the liberal ideology explored later in this chapter, which seeks to limit the state’s influence on business and society by advocating for a lean and decentralised governance system. Salihu (2022:102) alludes that governance encapsulates the social architecture and systems of making and implementing decisions. It should not be mistaken for the government because it comprises social players outside the formal state governance structures (Rhodes, 2017:158). This implies that governance is broader than the public sector and the state’s machinery used by the government to implement public policies (Rhodes, 2017:158).

For this reason, governance is regarded as a multi-disciplinary phenomenon transcending the private-public sector binary. In the public sector, governance is the exercise of authority in managing national resources (Salihu, 2022:102) based on the government's "ability to make and enforce rules and to deliver services" (Fukuyama, 2013:3-4) through cooperation with private and public stakeholders. It consists of structures and mechanisms that interlink and coordinate the activities of distinct stakeholders working towards a common goal (Almqvist *et al.,* 2013:480). This simplistic conception of governance is broad and highlights that governance involves steering and coordinating activities of distinct actors such as civil society organisations (CSOs), corporates, NGOs, labour unions and political organisations (Almqvist *et al.,* 2013:479). This is important because it incorporates stakeholders previously excluded from public policy affairs. Hence, the mainstay of governance is that it includes various stakeholders in matters of public concern, such as grassroots development, social security, public services and government social policies.

To conceptualise governance, Mayne, de Jong and Fernandez-Monge (2019:33) and Lui and Palmer (2021:158) introduce two governance orientations, namely, the structure-oriented and the actor-oriented perspectives. The structure-oriented perspective consists of structures and social systems that can forge collaborations or interact with other structures in the environment. This can result in some form of direct interaction with external players. This perspective of governance focuses on social systems found in the environment. It illustrates the merits of cooperation and collaboration between social systems to achieve mutual goals (Mayne *et al*., 2019:34). On the other hand, the actor-oriented perspective consists of open social systems with cooperation between players with distinct roles (Wang & Ran, 2021:1891). The actor-oriented perspective regards governance as exercising administrative, political and economic authority in managing state affairs. The actors make decisions, formulate strategies and pursue particular governance goals because they fulfil specific roles and duties within a governance ecosystem (Lui & Palmer, 2021:158). This viewpoint posits that governance incorporates processes, systems, institutions and mechanisms created for citizens, citizen representatives and other social groups to express their interests, interact and resolve differences. In this scenario, the state coordinates and regulates various stakeholder interactions.

In the context of this study, governance principles should encourage governments, such as the Government of Zimbabwe, to collaborate with NGOs, civil society organisations and other stakeholders in developing a national agenda such as socio-economic development, public service delivery and social services.

The background of governance discussed above is a crucial building block of good governance.

Good governance conforms to the standards and norms of governing a modern society. In other words, it is the opposite of “bad” governance. However, viewing good governance merely as the opposite of bad governance does not sustain a viable academic argument. Hence, the following sections explore the core elements of good governance from multiple perspectives.

In its most rudimentary form, good governance refers to legitimate public institutions and organisations established to meet citizens’ basic needs. As a tool for economic development (cf. Gumede & Dipholo, 2014:45), it promotes accountability and incorporates citizens’ interests in public policies (Dassah, 2015:716:4). Good governance is multidimensional and context-dependent; this means it varies geographically (Pillay, 2016:23; Van Doeveren, 2011:301). The good governance principles were developed in Western countries to improve public sector performance in developing countries. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank used it as criteria for providing development aid (Stojanovic, Ateljevic, & Stevic, 2016:569). This is noteworthy since many developing countries rely on aid for their citizens’ socio-economic needs. Hence, good governance is critical for socio-economic development. It can be leveraged as a political tool to promote democracy, transparency, participation, and human rights in the developing world (Pillay, 2016:24; Stojanovic *et al*., 2016:570).

Triguswinri (2021:129) explores the ideological underpinnings of good governance rooted in expanding neo-liberalism in developing countries through neo-liberal economic policies. Neo-liberals preferred democratic governments that developed public institutions, fostered economic growth and valued the rule of law and political legitimacy. The neo-liberal good governance agenda was a reform strategy pushing

NPM values and liberal democratic principles popularised by the Washington Consensus in the 1980s (Van Doeveren, 2011:303). The Washington Consensus advocated for market liberalisation, strict public finance controls and privatising public sector organisations in developing countries (Stojanovic *et al.*, 2016:558). Hence, it sought to address the shortcomings of the economic structural adjustment programmes by encouraging economic development policies in developing countries (Magocha & Mutekwe, 2021:2-5). These ideas were introduced when Eastern and Western blocs competed for global influence. Hence, the Washington Consensus used the idea of good governance to spread neoliberal market values to erode the communist sphere of influence (Stojanovic *et al.*, 2016:558).

Gumede and Dipholo (2014:45) suggest that principles of good governance can be divided into economic and political principles. Economic principles promote sustainable economic growth through economic and fiscal reforms in public and private sectors. Hence, in line with the NPM ideas, donors encouraged developing countries to institute public sector reforms to open up markets for businesses to provide public goods and services (Magocha & Mutekwe, 2021:2-5). Therefore, good governance encouraged public sector reforms because Western governments believed the public sectors in developing countries were ineffective and economically unsustainable due to corruption and poor public finance management. Hence, the good governance doctrine and public sector reforms sought to increase socio-economic development. For example, from 1991-1995, Zimbabwe was encouraged by the IMF and the World Bank to adopt the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) to *inter alia* increase economic growth, liberalise the economy, reduce government expenditure and address rising poverty (Magocha & Mutekwe, 2021:1-2). ESAP was a neo-liberal strategy to increase economic growth by limiting government control of the markets and encouraging the private sector to produce public goods and services. This was done in tandem with spreading ideas of good governance.

The political principles ensure that the government is sensitive to the citizens' interests (Gumede & Dipholo, 2014:45). Regarding this issue, good governance is synonymous with political legitimacy, free and fair elections, representing citizens in public policy affairs, openness, transparency, responsiveness and accountability. In this regard, it

is an instrument for respecting human rights, free and fair elections and sustaining democratic governments (Salihu, 2022:103). Good governance spreads democratic values by promoting collaboration between the state and citizens in public policymaking because when they participate in policymaking, the policies reflect their needs (Keping, 2017:7). Hence, good governance creates synergies between societal stakeholders by linking state and other government institutions with CSOs, NGOs, interests and pressure groups, church organisations and academics. This ensures collaboration with citizens in developing and implementing policies (Keping, 2017:5).

Good governance is fragile in developing countries due to weak institutions and poor economic conditions (Gisselquist, 2012:1,18). Weak institutions deter good governance and socio-economic development because they are responsible for implementing government policies and producing public services. Chigudu (2020:2) adds that weak state institutions hamper good governance and democratic accountability in Africa. Due to the lack of democratic standards, transparency, accountability and the rule of law, Zimbabwe is regarded as a country with bad governance and fragile public institutions (Mude & Chigora, 2013:27). Mude and Chigora (2013:31) suggest that the country's problems stem from the lack of an independent media and the judiciary, a lack of the rule of law, corruption, cronyism, low economic development and poor governance. In light of this background, the following section explores the relationship between good governance and public administration.

2.3 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND GOOD GOVERNANCE

Bureaucrats and public sector employees promote good governance by exercising the government's authority, utilising public resources and ensuring that the public sector provides citizens with public goods and services. This depends on the existence of a public sector system designed to fulfil the citizens' needs by transforming public resources into consumable goods and services. Hence, various public policies, regulations, processes and legislation contribute towards this goal; public administrators operate within an ecosystem of these processes. To this end, public administration is regarded as the policy implementation functions carried out in public

institutions (e.g. departments, agencies, parastatals and entities) to provide public goods and services and sustain a stable and prosperous society. This requires quality governance and public sector efficacy (Dipholo & Gumede, 2014:43). The relationship between public administration and good governance is based on the idea that the state should provide citizens with basic goods and services (Pillay, 2016:18). This is critical because the state's ability to provide public services efficiently and sustainably determines the nation's stability and economic growth (Abala, 2017:593). Hence, the public administration profession performs functions and duties to ensure quality governance, strong democracy and a free-market economy conducive to public service delivery (Thornhill & Van Djik, 2010:105). Therefore, public administrators should be skilled professionals in state departments and institutions to render high-quality public services. Their skills, competencies and abilities influence the public sector's ability to promote principles of good governance, such as the rule of law, integrity and impartiality (Pillay, 2016:19; Phago, 2013:114). The competencies of public administrators impact the state's ability to transform policies into tangible goods and services (Abala, 2017:593). Hence, public managers, officials, and other public service employees should obtain skills, competencies and knowledge to meet this expectation. For this reason, Public Administration scholarship should capacitate professionals with the skills required in the public sector (Phago, 2013:115). Section 6.5 demonstrates how Public Administration pedagogy contributes to implementing public policies.

The following section explores the paradigmatic development of Public Administration as a field of study.

2.4 PARADIGMATIC DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AS STUDY DOMAIN

Scholars (Pillay, 2016; Henry, 2010) underscore the interrelationship between Public Administration, statehood and good governance, confirming that Public Administration contributes knowledge in the good governance domain through evidence-based, policy-related research and theory development and assessing the government's performance. This ever-growing knowledge repository conceptualises and examines

public sector governance at various levels of the government. Public Administration (PA) as a field of study is highly dynamic and sensitive to socio-economic and political changes because it is not immune to macro-environmental forces. Hence, PA has evolved through evolutionary stages called paradigms since the late 19th century (Pillay, 2016:19; Basheka, 2012:34). There is a discernible dissonance in how scholars evaluate PA's evolution. Ikeanyibe *et al.* (2017) and Henry (2010) suggest that it underwent six stages, whilst Mukonza (2014) and Basheka (2012) posit eight, five and seven stages, respectively. This study adopts a five-stage paradigmatic approach.

The paradigmatic evolution of PA highlights its dynamism and flexibility to adapt to ideological trends. The first paradigm in Public Administration's evolution is the *Politics-Administration dichotomy (1887-1926)* which sought to separate political and administrative functions of government (Ikeanyibe *et al.*, 2017:3). "Dichotomy" is a theoretical construct separating politics from administration, establishing an intellectual field of public administration focused on implementing policies developed through discrete political processes (Maserumule, 2013:483; Uwizeyimana, 2013:2). It was influenced by Woodrow Wilson's essay *The study of Public Administration* advocating for separating the two disciplines (Bojang, 2021:228). He believed public administration is a scientific and action-oriented field concerned with the public sector's organisational functions (Maserumule, 2013:484). Wilson's ideas encouraged the creation of Public Administration as an independent field of study (Uwizeyimana & Maphunye, 2014:90-92; Maserumule, 2013:481).

The dichotomy generated many debates. Despite criticism, Woodrow's ideas shaped contemporary PA (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2015:2, 16; Theletsane, 2013:183). He believed separating the two would improve the public sector's efficiency and productivity because administrators would not focus on policy-making (Maserumule, 2013:481). Separating administration from politics enables public sector officials to find effective ways of creating value from available resources by planning, managing resources, budgeting and reviewing performance (Basheka, 2012:36).

The second stage is *The Principles of Public Administration (1927-1937)*. Following Woodrow's dichotomy ideas, this era identified constructs making Public

Administration a scientific field in its own right through the scientific management movement. This movement gathered and tested information about scientifically managing public organisations (Uwizeyimana & Maphunye, 2014:92; Basheka, 2012:41). Scholars and theorists provided ideas that shaped the incorporation of scientific management philosophies in managing public organisations. Willoughby's essays on *Principles of Public Administration* heralded an era of scientific management in the public sector (Fourie, 2016:33). Other contributors include Marry Follet (*Creative experience, 1924)*, Gullick and Urwick (*Science of Administration, 1937)*, Henri Fayol (*Industrial and General Management, 1930)*, James and Mooney, Frederick Taylors (*Scientific Management*) and Alan Reilay (*Principles of organisation, 1939)* (Bojang, 2021:229). Frederick Taylor's scientific management theory was groundbreaking because it optimised tasks to increase labour output per capita (Su, 2017:102-104; Uwizeyimana & Maphunye, 2014:92).

Taylor's experiments and ideas of planning, organising, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting and budgeting (POSDCORB) were adopted in the public sector by Gullick and Urwick, although they were designed for industrial contexts (Uwizeyimana & Maphunye, 2014:92). This institutionalised efficiency and economy in public organisations (Basheka, 2012:43). Therefore, the Principles of Public Administration introduced empiricism in PA scholarship through scientific studies to increase public sector efficiency. This changed how public organisations manage human capital, performance and organisational output.

The era of *The Challenge (1938-1950)* faced criticism because the post-war period contested the logic of separating administration from politics (Fourie, 2016:33; Basheka, 2012:44). Essays by M, Marx and J Gaus downplayed the feasibility of separating administration from politics (Bojang, 2021:229). The mechanistic methods of increasing production were criticised because they sacrificed employee motivation and wellness, resulting in advocacy for knowledge in organisational behaviour and employee wellness by scholars such as Herbert Simon, who used psychological and sociological constructs to improve employee wellness (Basheka, 2012:44). Herbert Simon (1916-2001), Abraham Maslow (1908-1970) and Chester Barnard (1886-1961) underscored the importance of employee wellness and motivation in meeting public sector goals (Kurian, 2013: 24,180,252). Hence, this era introduced ideas about the

impact of high productivity on organisational behaviour, employee motivation, wellness and health. It also encouraged PA to borrow ideas from other disciplines, making it a transdisciplinary field.

During the *Identity Crisis (1948-1970)*, PA regressed because the idea of separating public administration from politics was challenged. Attempts were made to reject the politics-administration dichotomy due to the complex post-war political and administrative environment, which exposed the weakness of the POSDCORB doctrine and the practical challenges of separating political and administrative functions in the public sector (Bojang, 2021:229). Reestablishing the discipline's identity was believed to safeguard its future and integrity (Mukonza, 2014:504). Attempts were made to relocate PA back to the Political Science (PS) domain because it was considered its cradle (Henry, 2010:32). This triggered the politics-administration interface rooted in reconciling the two and rejecting Woodrow's ideas (Bojang, 2021:229). The *Identity Crisis* is significant because it challenges the dichotomy. The researcher believes that although they are distinct fields, they have similarities that cannot be ignored. However, the dichotomy ensures efficiency in policy-making and implementation.

Feelings of "second-class citizenship" led Public Administrators to move away from PS and seek an alternative paradigm (Henry, 2010:34). This heralded the fourth paradigm of *Public Administration as Public Management (1956-1970)* (Mukonzi, 2014:505). Scholars believed alienating PA from PS enabled it to borrow ideas from other disciplines by not trying to fit into the rigid PS domain. Scholars suggested that administration cannot be housed in a single discipline because it needs ideas from other disciplines, such as economics, sociology, psychology, business studies and political science (Mukonzi, 2014:505; Thelestane, 2013:176). The fourth paradigm underscored that PA is transdisciplinary because it borrows other fields' principles, values and theories (Mukonzi, 2014:505). Bojang (2021:230) suggests that this blurred the distinction between public and private organisations and risked it being a subfield of management sciences like Business Management because it adopted market-oriented practices. This set the scene for adopting market-oriented practices under the NPM.

Public Management to Governance paradigm incorporated governance into PA literature in the 1980s (Ikeanyibe, Ori & Okoye, 2017:6). It introduced transparency, citizen participation and accountability in managing public resources due to ideas of globalisation and devolving the state's authority (Basheka, 2018:58). Contemporary governments are increasingly flattening and collapsing the top-down hierarchical structure to accommodate the participation of non-state players in policy-making, resulting in lean and democratic controlling governments (Henry, 2010:40-41). This coincides with the ideas in Section 2.2, conceptualising governance as a government system not limited to formal public sector organisations (Mukonzi, 2010:506). Adopting this phenomenon traditionally applied in the private sector to manage resources alters the scope of practising and studying Public Administration.

Some scholars posit that PA is morphing into a new paradigm: New Public Service focusing more on delivering citizens value through public services (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2015). The following section evaluates how the NPM promotes efficiency and increased productivity in the public sector.

2.5 THE MEANING AND EVOLUTION OF NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT

This study adopted the NPM approach to evaluate performance and efficiency in the public sector because the NPM can be used as a benchmark for analysing the government's performance (Gangte, 2012:50). The NPM ideas were conceived to increase governments' performance and output in the 1980s by experimenting with public sector reforms and new strategies for providing public services (Hammerschmid *et al.*, 2018:2; Kalimullah, Alam & Nour, 2012:18; Eakin *et al.*, 2011:339). This was preceded by an era of public sector inefficiency, poor services and wastefulness (Gumede & Dipholo, 2014:43 In the UK, the welfare state model increased public debt, encouraging Margaret Thatcher to spearhead a free-market ideology that minimised the government's role in providing public goods and services (Ingrams *et al.*, 2020:261). Arguably, this was the beginning of NPM reforms, which spread to other countries (Kajimbwa, 2013:64). Thatcherism embodies radical macro-economic policies, privatising and deregulating the public sector, resulting in low public

expenses, increased performance and re-calibrating the government's role in socio-economic affairs (Rubakula, 2014:87). Against the backdrop of public sector reforms, academics paid attention to NPM and conceptualised it as a normative ideology (Shepherd, 2017:1669; Yorid & Zeb, 2015:428; Gumede & Dipholo, 2014:46; Eakin *et al.*, 2011:340). Christopher Hood called this "new public management" (Zungura, 2014:247; Fatemi & Behmanesh, 2012:42).

The NPM is not a theory; instead, it comprises discrete ideas of lean government, decentralisation, efficiency and service excellence in the public sector (Naidoo, 2015:26; Fatemi & Behmanesh, 2012:42). It achieves this through increased performance, dissolving public monopolies, free competition, organisational management, high outputs, strict controls, performance management and unbundling public sector conglomerates. Hence, it is a mixture of ideas rooted in effectiveness, competition, efficiency and re-inventing public sector management (Swirska, 2014:150; Eakin *et al.*, 2011:340).

The NPM introduced consumer-centric ideas and reduced autocracy in the public sectors of African countries (Vyas-Doorgapersad, 2011:238). Zimbabwe experimented with NPM public sector reforms (the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), 1991-1996; the Zimbabwe Program for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST), 1996-2000; Integrated Results Based Management (IRBM), 2005-2011) due to fiscal and economic challenges (Chigudu, 2014:43; Marufu, 2014:25; Zungura, 2014:246; Matunhu & Matunhu, 2011:64). Socio-economic challenges triggered reforms in most sub-Saharan African countries because most post-colonial governments were unable to sustain or build robust economies to cater for the expanded needs and aspirations of citizens (Rubakula, 2014:87). As a result, structural adjustment programmes were imposed on African countries by erstwhile colonial states; this means they were not home-grown and were viewed as a neo-colonial agenda, resulting in lacklustre implementation (Zungura, 2014:246, 252).

NPM introduced market-oriented ideas such as *managerialism* and a *business-like approach* to providing public services. Managerialism allows some individuals to run organisations (Shepherd, 2017:1668). Managerialism was introduced in the public sector to increase customer-centric service delivery and accountability (Gumede &

Dipholo, 2014:43; Swirska, 2014:150). Managerialism gave public managers the power to run institutions efficiently by increasing production and service quality; it is undemocratic and reduces political accountability to citizens (Swirska, 2014:149-150). Conversely, Eakin *et al.* (2011:340) suggest that the division of labour gives managers authority to oversee policy implementation; this does not usurp policy-makers's authority to make policies. Hence, citizens, through political representatives, set policy goals for bureaucrats to implement (Gumede & Dipholo, 2014:46).

NPM reforms leveraged a business approach to increase cost-effectiveness, low production costs and financial sustainability. This involves running public sector organisations profitably based on competition, consumer satisfaction, entrepreneurship and budgeting (Gumede & Dipholo, 2014:14, 43; Kalimullah *et al.*, 2012:2; Eakin *et al.*, 2011:340). Imitating private sector ideas increased the quality of public services and gave citizens a voice in determining the quality of services (Eakin *et al.*, 2011:340). Therefore, the NPM reforms reinvented the public sector by introducing new techniques for meeting citizens' needs (Yorid & Zeb, 2015:428; Gumede & Dipholo, 2014:46).

2.5.1 The theoretical underpinnings of NPM

The NPM paradigm is rooted in the principal-agent (PAT), transaction costs and public choice theories (Islam, 2015:143; Gumede & Dipholo, 2014:43). The principal-agent theory deals with accountability by evaluating the relationship between principals (shareholders) and agents (managers) (Kalimullah *et al.,* 2012:9). Principals leverage a contract of employment and other incentives to encourage agents to protect shareholders' interests (Islam, 2015:143). The NPM ideology suggests that bureaucrats are agents responsible for meeting the agents' (citizens') needs; public managers are accountable to citizens' needs. The PAT suggests that citizens cannot hold agents accountable due to a lack of information and challenges in monitoring them (Gumede & Dipholo, 2014:47).

Transaction Cost Theory (TCT) ensures the cost-effectiveness of projects and public sector programmes by encouraging public sector organisations to contract out services to private businesses (Rindfleisch, 2019:85-86). Contracting is cost-effective

because it reduces operational costs and stimulates competition (Islam, 2015:143). It is ideal because government operations are costly due to red tape and administrative costs involved in public sector procurement and production. Contracting is cost-effective because private businesses have large economies of scale and experience and produce high-quality goods and services at a lower cost than the public sector. This saves public funds (Rindfleisch, 2019:85; Islam, 2015:143). However, contracting out requires robust performance monitoring because it creates rent-seeking opportunities; hence, public managers should thoroughly manage procurement, tendering and contracting to combat corruption and abuse of public resources (Rindfleisch, 2019:94).

Public Choice Theory (PCT) is a behavioural model dealing with consumer decision-making. It suggests that individuals are self-serving and rational; hence, they are driven by their needs and preferences (Schuster, 2018:2251). The PCT suggests that a free-market economy rooted in competition and consumer choice produces goods and services consistent with citizens' needs (Gumede & Dipholo, 2014:43; Kalimullah *et al.,* 2012:9). The PCT suggests that consumers should be able to choose the best services in the market because giving consumers choice will encourage producers to provide good quality service at reasonable costs to grow or retain a big market share (Schuster, 2018:2251).

2.6 CORE COMPONENTS OF NPM AS GOVERNANCE PARADIGM

As stated above, NPM seeks to reinvent and reorganise the public sector. The core components of NPM illustrate how the reforms transformed governments' function by introducing market ideologies to increase efficiency and effectiveness. Some of the core components were used to assess the performance of public sector institutions in this study. The following sections analyse the core components of NPM.

2.6.1 Customer orientation

Customer orientation means customers have discretion; hence, organisations should understand and address their needs (Mahmoud & Othman, 2021:77). Customer

orientation in public service gives consumers of public services considerable influence in determining the nature and quality of public services by putting them at the centre of decision-making (Ingrams, Piotrowski & Berliner, 2020:259). This creates opportunities for citizens to be active political players and decision-makers as opposed to being passive consumers of public services (Reiter & Klenk, 2019:25). Hence, NPM reforms reinvented the government's value proposition by putting citizens' needs at the core of the public sector's mandate because they have a voice (Gumede & Dipholo, 2014:43). This was designed to increase the quality of public services to meet citizens' preferences. Furthermore, it required developing effective public sector value chains that provide good quality public services while absorbing production costs (Rakic & Rakic, 2014:50).

2.6.2 Organisational restructuring

Organisational restructuring restructures public sector organisations and SOEs by decentralising, creating flexible and effective systems, enabling devolved decision-making and responding to macro-environmental opportunities and threats (Naidoo, 2015:16; Gumede & Dipholo, 2014:44; Jones, 2010:1-2). This produces a "delayered" public sector comprising democratic decision-making and delegated authority line managers (Jones, 2010:3). Restructuring sheds redundant labour and contracting out some public functions to private businesses (Jones, 2010:9). In Section 6.8, the researcher recommends further research in privatising some public sector organisations, particularly those failing to generate profits. This will reduce the burden on public funds and increase the quality of public goods and services.

2.6.3 Public accountability

Public accountability ensures that public officials' conduct is consistent with citizens' expectations of efficiently using public resources (Adejuwon, 2014:104; Zungura, 2014:250). This is crucial because bureaucrats manage vast public financial resources; hence, accountability ensures that public resources are not misused or stolen (Adejuwon, 2014:104; Ejere, 2012:956). Accountability is essential in democracies because it enables public leaders to demonstrate how resources are used (Fatemi & Behmanesh, 2012:46). The NPM promotes "public accountability and

institutional development" by ensuring that citizens get value for their money (Kalimullah *et al.,* 2012:3). Section 1.2 underlined the public accountability challenges facing the public sector; the researcher in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 suggested strengthening accountability measures in the public sector to increase transparency and ensure that public resources are not misused. The proposed good governance framework demonstrates this viewpoint.

2.6.4 Citizen participation

Citizen participation in public affairs brings them closer to policy and decision-making, enabling them to determine the quality of public goods and services. It strengthens democracy by ensuring that citizens shape policymaking because they are the consumers of public services (Muronda, 2017:1-3). Hence, NPM transformed how citizens interact with the government by actively involving them in public affairs. Ideas such as customer orientation and managerialism require citizens to actively participate in determining the quality of services (Farjad *et al.*, 2015:247). NPM reforms in some African countries achieved this objective because citizens in South Africa and Botswana are more involved in public affairs (Vyas-Doorgapersad, 2011:241). Empirical data indicated that active citizen participation in Zimbabwe is a challenge.

2.6.5 Using ICTs

Information and communication technologies (ICTs) enhance the quality of public services and allow citizens to engage with the government (Mahmoud & Othman, 2021:78; Molokwane, 2019:58). Public sector institutions in developed countries such as the UK and New Zealand were slow to adopt ICTs, resulting in missed opportunities for improving internal efficiency and stakeholder interaction (Molokwane, 2019:58; Reiter & Klenk, 2019:17). As a result, the NPM reforms introduced e-government to transform public sector management by allowing better communication methods because citizens could easily send and receive information (Reiter & Klenk, 2019:17-20). This provides immense opportunities for improving public services, particularly in developing countries where citizens can use modern technologies to bridge poor services. For example, they can send complaints, pay bills or report faults via web portals, social media handles, e-mail and WhatsApp; this enables quick information

dissemination and rapid responses. Hence, using ICT increases efficiency, market orientation and decentralisation in public organisations by enabling consumer-centred governance and service delivery (Sandor, 2012:160-161). The GoZ established a National ICT Policy to increase access to ICT technologies. A national ICT strategy was initiated by Nelson Chamisa in 2010 to spearhead e-governance; this increased citizens' access to cell phone technologies and their capacity to send and receive information (Marufu, 2014:26).

2.6.6 Total Quality Management

The Total Quality Management (TQM) approach harnesses organisational resources to satisfy customers' needs through quality services (Mohammed, Tibek & Endot, 2013:326). TQM is a holistic strategy focusing on all aspects of the organisation. It seeks to integrate systems, functions, plans, resources, strategies and human competencies to meet customers' needs through high-quality goods and services. Most organisations have adopted this approach globally to increase production and create value for stakeholders (Mohammed, Tibek & Endot, 2013:327-329). TQM regards the organisation as an entity with complimentary ecosystems focused on common goals, and it was adopted in public sector organisations to increase performance, service quality and customer satisfaction (Nour, 2018:1).

2.6.7 Privatisation and competition

Privatisation and competition level the playing field by enabling citizens and business entities to develop ideas and participate in improving public services; this allows for experimenting with the best ideas through tendering and outsourcing (Zungura, 2014:248; Kalimullah *et al.,* 2012:10). Privatisation limits the government's role in providing public services by allowing businesses to provide citizens with electricity, public transport and water reticulation (Nhema, 2015:247; Nyamita *et al.*, 2015:31; Kalimullah *et al.,* 2012:16). This increases public sector efficiency because businesses have more capacity to deliver services cost-effectively (Wang, Mu & Lui, 2017:3; Eakin *et al.*, 2011:340).

Zimbabwe implemented this idea by outsourcing public services such as healthcare to private businesses with better capacity and efficient value chains (Vyas-Doorgapersad, 2011:240). The Privatisation Authority of Zimbabwe (PAZ) was established to oversee the privatisation of SOEs in line with ESAP targets. This resulted in the privatisation of the Dairy Marketing Board (DMB) (now called Dairibord Zimbabwe Limited) and the Cotton Marketing Board (now called Cotton Company of Zimbabwe), among many others. Ideally, competition and privatisation create value for citizens by increasing the quality of services. However, researchers posit that it did not achieve this in Zimbabwe due to corruption and the effects of low economic growth (Chigudu, 2014:48; Zungura, 2014:251).

2.6.8 Performance management

Performance management increases performance and ensures that organisational goals are met by implementing management strategies, aligning institutional goals with employee output performance and improving efficiency (Andrews, 2014:3; Fatile, 2014:79). Information and data management are essential in managing performance and ensuring public sector transparency; this also enables organisations to set, compare and measure performance (Mojapelo & Ngoepe, 2017:35). Performance management is used to manage and oversee how internal resources such as staff and financial capital create value for stakeholders (Andrews, 2014:3). Traditionally, public sector performance measurement focused on inputs and paid less attention to the impact of organisational structures on productivity. Chigudu (2014:47) observes that the Zimbabwean public sector resisted initial performance management interventions under the NPM reforms because officials could not differentiate between performance management and performance appraisal. This resulted in poor implementation of performance management in public institutions; as a result, contemporary public service architecture has poor performance management systems (Zungura, 2014:251).

2.6.9 Budgetary reforms

Revenue collection and expenditure enable governments to function and fulfil their mandates (Nyamita, Dorasamy & Garbharan, 2015:25). A budget outlines the

government's intentions and revenue sources; it broadly sets out its policy commitments and citizens' needs that would be prioritised in a specific financial year by mobilising and allocating public financial resources (Egbide, Sola & Francis, 2014:2). Budgeting improves public sector efficiency and service delivery by funding government projects and directing expenditures to citizens' needs (Jena, 2016:106; Egbide *et al.*, 2014:2). NPM reforms transformed budgeting by ensuring that it is done according to specific public sector goals and intentions. Matching budgets with public policy objectives improves policy implementation and public service delivery by mobilising and allocating resources to specific citizens' needs (Nyamita *et al.*, 2015:25). This is also known as outcome-based budgeting, and it is evaluated based on the quality of projects and programmes the budget funds. This is an effective public finance management instrument because it encourages public institutions to utilise funds on specific projects. This helps bureaucrats to execute policies that serve citizens' preferences (Nyamita *et al.*, 2015:25).

2.7 CRITICISM LEVELLED AGAINST NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT

NPM reforms are a subject of intense scholarly debate. The following sections underscore some of the arguments against implementing NPM reforms in the context of a developing country like Zimbabwe.

NPM reforms have been criticised for being incompatible with developing countries' political and economic realities; this criticism posits that the reforms' assumptions are unfounded in African countries (Islam, 2012:149). Therefore, the reform successes generated in countries like the UK and New Zealand are not guaranteed in Africa. Mongkol (2011:37-9) highlights the drawbacks of the NPM reforms in developing countries by citing the lack of requisite expertise and supporting infrastructure. For example, bureaucratic and centralised decision-making and planning discourage decentralisation and devolution of government authority; without proper administrative and accountability systems, decentralisation will result in inefficiency, corruption and nepotism in the public sector. As a result, this will impede the government's capacity to provide quality goods and services.

The NPM reforms are criticised for relying on private-sector management practices to solve public-sector challenges. Proponents of this criticism opine that private and public sector institutions operate in different political and regulatory contexts. While businesses pursue narrow shareholders' interests, public institutions have citizens' needs to fulfil; hence, both operate at different parameters primarily because private organisations have little public oversight and accountability (Yorid & Zeb, 2015:433; Mongkol, 2011:36-7). Hence, public managers have limited autonomy and discretion because they operate in an ecosystem that restricts bureaucrats' authority (Islam, 2012:149). Hence, relying on market-oriented management approaches is not ideal in the public sector because the approaches do not consider the restrictive regulatory environment in the public sector.

NPM has also been criticised for exposing public sector organisations to corruption by devolving authority and accountability from the central government through decentralisation and privatisation. Bureaucratic accountability and transparency systems are ill-equipped to cope with decentralised or privatised government functions. According to Fatemi and Behmanesh (2012:45), "new public management may lead to increased corruption between policymakers and senior managers in public institutions involved in privatisation and outsourcing. Bureaucracies are naturally centralised; hence, devolving authority to lower-level organisations at regional and local levels without strengthening accountability mechanisms leads to the abuse of public resources (Eakin *et al.*, 2011:340).

Islam (2015:149) states that unbundling or privatising public institutions streamlines the separation of the public sector's political, administrative and service provision functions; this creates rent-seeking tendencies. Privatisation can be a gateway to corruption; hence, devolution, privatisation and decentralisation should be complemented with sound transparency, accountability and financial management interventions to ensure that the NPM reforms increase efficiency and create value for the citizens. The prevalence of corruption in quasi-state enterprises in Zimbabwe demonstrates this issue. The "salary gate", misuse and plunder of resources indicate the limit of ensuring transparency and accountability after contracting out and devolving public sector functions to business entities (see Section 3.7.2).

Mongkol (2011:36) argues that NPM reforms inadvertently promote centralisation in public organisations by asserting that they entail a “paradox of centralisation through decentralisation”. This means decentralised public institutions are undemocratic; hence, despite having been given some authority to execute public functions, they comprise managers wielding most decision-making powers. Mongkol (2011:36) believes that by devolving power to a few public managers, the reforms concentrate decision-making autonomy on a few people within the state’s bureaucracy. In other words, public managers tend to usurp all the decision-making authority in decentralised organisations. This leads to concentrated authority, rendering the organisation autocratic. Mongkol’s (2011) argument suggests the wholesome democratisation of public institutions, but given the hierarchical composition of government enterprises, this is a significant challenge.

The NPM reforms are criticised for being inconsistent with traditional public management values and systems, culminating in what Mongkol (2011:37) suggests are consistencies in the NPM ideas. For example, regarding accountability and managerialism. Managerialism gives public managers some discretion in running and administering public organisations. Innovation and entrepreneurship require them to use their intuition and ingenuity to pursue efficient ways of achieving organisational targets. This involves experimentation and thinking outside the box. Public sector accountability systems are not designed to accommodate this approach. Mongkol (2011:37) suggests that managerialism and the discretion it extends to managers is incompatible with high accountability standards required in the public sector because it gives individuals in managerial positions significant discretion that can be misused. These are costly tendencies because they do not always produce the expected results. Furthermore, the NPM’s focus on efficiency to reduce wastefulness gives public managers considerable discretion, allowing them to manage organisational resources as they see fit (Mongkol, 2011:37). This can be abused without effective accountability systems. For example, some departments might require more than their share of resources in the short term to boost long-term production. This can be considered wasteful because public organisations should receive their equitable share of resources. This demonstrates why some scholars believe that NPM ideas are inconsistent.

NPM reforms are further criticised for their implications on democracy and public accountability (Kalimulla *et al.*, 2012; Adejuwon, 2014). Adejuwon (2014:107) and Kalimulla *et al.* (2012:16) state that the reforms are "against the precepts of democracy" because they promote managerialism, competition and privatisation at the expense of democratising the public sector. For example, lean government is undemocratic because it gives bureaucrats control over public institutions. Kalimullah *et al.* (2012:17) believe that democracy needs structures and institutions such as the rule of law, the legal regulation of markets, the maintenance of equity and institutions controlled by legal and judicial systems to survive. These systems and structures are the backbones of the state bureaucracy. Kalimulla *et al.* (2012) opine that the reforms limit the authority and influence of the traditional bureaucratic system grounded in citizen representation. Adejuwon (2014:107) believes that contracting out and privatisation impact democracy by giving private businesses influence in public affairs.

Critics suggest that NPM reforms do not propose sufficient accountability measures to monitor the performance of contractors and tenderers. Additionally, when managers are put at the centre of public affairs, politicians become less accountable (Kalimullah *et al.,* 2012:17). Outsourcing, contracting and privatising public services steer public accountability away from the citizens because private businesses are traditionally accountable to shareholders or owners of a franchise and not the public. Therefore, this impacts accountability because public oversight institutions are not actively involved in ensuring transparency and accountability in providing public services.

2.8 META-THEORETICAL AND THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF GOOD GOVERNANCE

Theories are used in academic research to describe, explain or predict a phenomenon in various contexts (cf. Van der Waldt, 2017:185). The following theories explore ideas behind state evolution and formation, constitutional states, the quality of government, state recognition, public spending and public goods.

2.8.1 Social Contract Theory

Social Contract Theory (SCT) suggests that citizen's moral and socio-political responsibilities depend on them agreeing to form social relations underpinning their society (Weber, 2014:3; Fabre, 2013:4940;). Regarding the state's obligations, the SCT posits that the state of Zimbabwe entered into a social agreement with the society to govern them and meet their social needs. Hence, the state (represented by the sitting government) has a political and moral obligation to govern according to specific standards. Social contract theorists posit that the state's legitimacy to exercise legal, judicial and executive authority is drawn from a social agreement or covenant that requires social partners to relinquish alienable rights to the state in return for protection and public services (Weber, 2014:3; Fabre, 2013:4940; Laskar, 2013:1; Nbete, 2012:267). The SCT is a "monolithic theory" derived from aggregating viewpoints of several scholars (Nbete, 2012:268). The protagonists of the SCT include John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, Baruch Spinoza, Samuel Pufendorf and John Rawls (Shaapera, 2015; Fabre, 2013; Nbete, 2012:267).

Thomas Hobbes' demonstrated the importance of a social contract by highlighting that before one existed, the "state of nature" was anarchic, and people's behaviour was shaped by survival and self-preservation instincts, resulting in a risky, short and violent existence (Nbete, 2012:270; Mouritz, 2010:125). All people were equal, and no public institutions had legislative or executive power to govern society. 'Equality' did not entail fairness, justice and equal access to public resources (Fabre, 2013:4940-4941). As a result, people were not incentivised to cooperate and form an organised society because survival was harsh, selfish, brutal and competitive. It was a zero-sum game; individuals harmed or eliminated each other to protect themselves or compete for resources (Nbete, 2012:270). Hobbes posited that the "state of nature" reflected a grim life of perpetual fear and savagery lived by people before civilised societies mooted the idea of a social contract, which created formal government institutions and authorities to regulate individuals' behaviour and promote stable and safe communities (Mouritz, 2010:124). The social and group dynamics for growth, development and human advancement were absent due to a lack of trust, cooperation and sharing ideas. This demonstrates the importance of a social contract grounded in mutual goals and trust (Nbete, 2012:270). The drawbacks of this existence encouraged people to

surrender their rights to a higher authority and establish a social contract to form civilised societies based on cooperation, regulations and sovereign authority (Weber, 2014:4; Fabre, 2013:4940-4941; Nbete, 2012:270).

John Locke rejected the idea of a brutal “state of nature”; he believed it was cordial because people voluntarily consented to form societies governed by elected rulers and social obligations (Nbete, 2012:270). Locke perceives the social contract as the foundation of a sovereign government with the authority to legitimately rule over citizens because the government’s authority is derived from citizens’ approval. This is the bedrock of democratic governance rooted in citizen representation and participation (Nbete, 2012:270; 271).

Rousseau suggested that a social contract is a hypothetical idea (Laskar, 2013:5). He rejects the idea of a brute “state of nature” because he believed that people lived happily and resources were abundant (Laskar, 2013:5; Nbete, 2012:271). He believed that population growth was the bedrock of modern societies because it transformed how people lived and aspired. Social groups, communities, division of labour, innovation, public values, norms, goals, greed, slavery, private property, human rights and inequality evolved from population growth and resource scarcity. Laskar (2013:5) states that Rousseau’s notion of a social contract, state and law is grounded in the people’s “general will”. In this study, the social contract theory is significant because it illustrates the source of the government’s authority. Democratic processes, elections, public accountability, public goods and services and state oversight are manifestations of the social contract.

2.8.2 Evolutionary Theory

The evolutionary theory is a framework for outlining an endogenous and incremental change process; it is humanity's gradual change and development over a long period (Ma, 2016:224; Lewis & Steinmo, 2011:111; Lustick, 2011: 205). It is based on Charles Darwin’s idea of species’ mutation, environmental adaptation, and the effects of natural selection (Lewis & Steinmo, 2011:113). The biological principle of human evolution can explain the phenomenon of institutional change; although the philosophy of human evolution is mainly applied in natural sciences, political scientists apply it in

public affairs to account for institutional changes. This means political systems gradually change. Lustick (2011:180) proposes that citizens' activism seeks to change or preserve the status quo, making change a constant in modern governance (Lewis & Steinmo, 2012:314). In public management, this is significant because it provides a conceptual framework for understanding how public institutions can serve citizens' changing preferences.

Evolutionary theory provides a framework for understanding complex and multi-dimensional political change (Ma, 2016:224; Lewis & Steinmo, 2011:111). The theory allows this study to comprehend the dynamics and the change agenda in the public sector. More importantly, the theory underscores the feasibility of change in the Zimbabwean public sector. In the analysis of NPM, this study highlighted periods of change and reorganisation in the public sector through privatisation and economic reforms. In a nutshell, the evolutionary theory illustrates that public institutions are not static and that change can be instituted to increase efficiency and performance in the public sector.

2.8.3 Quality of Government Theory

Quality refers to a product which is fit for its intended purpose or robust. In governance, it denotes a government system capable of delivering value to citizens through efficient public sector institutions, the rule of law, democracy, economic development and better living standards for citizens (Charron & Lapuente, 2018:3). The Quality of Government (QoG) approach assesses the impartiality of public institution and their ability to exercise the state's authority and cost-effectively use public resources to provide citizens with public services required for their socio-economic well-being (Rothstein, 2013:16). The QoG suggests that high-quality institutions, structures and human capital result in an effective and efficient government (Charron & Lapuente, 2018:3). The QoG emerged in the 1990s to institutionalise values of integrity, efficiency, economy and effectiveness in the public sector; it propounded that adhering to high-quality standards in public sector institutions promotes national socio-economic growth (Flachaire, Garcia-Penalosa & Konte, 2014:212; Rothstein, 2013:17). Rothstein (2013:16) suggests that the quality of political and administrative institutions determines a country's socioeconomic growth prospects.

The QoG theory was included in this study because it deals with most aspects of good governance, such as enhancing the capacity of the state's administrative infrastructure to promote development by managing and deploying resources in critical public policy areas. This channels resources to citizens' pressing needs and ensures that the state's bureaucracy is fit for public resources administration and management. This speaks to establishing efficient and effective government institutions (Rothstein, 2013:16; Charron & Lapuente, 2010:443). Hence, the QoG approach is essential in the context of a developing country like Zimbabwe, where public enterprises are significant economic players producing a wide range of goods and services because their performance has implications for national economic growth (Dijkstra, 2013:3). Therefore, the QoG is a framework for strengthening public financial management and overseeing public institutions' performance (Charron & Lapuente, 2018:5; Dassah, 2015:715).

2.8.4 Public Value Theory

Chapters 4 and 6 underscored the need for public institutions to create value in serving the citizens. The Public Value Theory (PVT) illustrates how public sector institutions can improve citizens' living standards by managing public resources. In Section 6.7.3, value-for-money auditing is recommended to increase the state's capacity to extract maximum value for the citizens from public resources. The PVT provides insights into how the public sector can deploy human capital and public resources to create valuable products that meet citizens' needs. The theory assumes that citizens derive value from public goods and services fulfilling their needs, and the government should satisfy them to improve citizens' livelihoods (Sami, Jusoh, Qureshi, 2016). The PVT is central in public policy and public management because it promotes efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability in public resource management (Sami *et al.*, 2016:262; McGregor, 2014:854; Talbot, 2011:27). The PVT complements the NPM reforms by addressing legacy challenges such as the marketisation of public services because it is an ideology for advancing social values and aspirations by incorporating political interests and citizens' views in policymaking and public service delivering (McGregor, 2014:854). Therefore, the PVT is a citizen-centric approach encouraging public sector institutions to put citizens' needs above everything else.

Public managers operate within a political landscape or marketplace, meaning their discretion resides within the limits of political interests dominating the public sector. Hence, public managers should keep abreast of citizens' needs. This line of thought justifies centring policy implementation on issues adding value to taxpayers who fund and consume public services. Therefore, the PVT highlights the importance of creating public value and underscores public managers' role in ensuring that public institutions are conditioned to fulfil this mandate. This makes public managers value-seekers who steer public resources and find efficient ways to satisfy citizens' needs or address their challenges. The "strategic triangle" in Figure 2.1 illustrates the public sector's value chain.

Figure 2.1: Strategic triangle of public value



Source: Adapted from Kavanagh (2014) and Moore (1995)

2.8.5 Public Goods Theory

Paul Samuelson proposed the Public Goods Theory (PGT) to deal with producing commodities and services collectively enjoyed by citizens (Gao, Zhu & Mao, 2022:2; Kallhoff, 2021:391; Anomaly, 2015:111). Public goods are commodities, goods and services consumed by all citizens, such as public broadcasts, parks, national security, public infrastructure and knowledge; their production is funded by taxes and surcharges levied by local governments or other government institutions (Kallhoff, 2021:390-1). Public goods are jointly consumed without generating additional costs

because collective consumption does not diminish them (Gao *et al.,* 2022:3). Hence, apart from justifying the idea of providing public goods and services, the PGT evaluates the rationale and costs of producing these goods. Economists raise concerns about free riders and the return on investment in producing public commodities, while public administrators are more concerned with their quality and value creation regarding citizens' needs.

The key characteristics of public goods are non-rivalry, non-exclusivity and joint consumption. This means citizens share public goods without competition; for example, Citizen A's consumption does not preclude Citizen B from consuming the same goods (Bieber & de Jongh, 2023:2; Kallhoff, 2021:391; Gao *et al.,* 2022:3). Joint consumption is pivotal because citizens' taxes collectively fund public goods (Gao *et al.,* 2022:12). This is a controversial supposition, particularly among developmental economics, because it does not address the free rider problem, where non-tax-payers enjoy the same benefits as those paying taxes. They argue that public goods incentivise free riding because some citizens can enjoy them without contributing. Bieber (2023:1-2) blurs what constitutes public goods. Bieber & de Jongh (2023:1-3) suggest that public goods can be privatised to exclude other citizens from enjoying them. For instance, although fire protection is a traditional public good, it can be privatized by introducing extra services such as smoke alarms and real-time alerts.

Similarly, police protection can be privatised by introducing rapid response services, rendering it a private commodity. This line of reasoning suggests that improvements in public goods can transform them into exclusive private commodities. Natural disasters can also restrict citizens' access to traditional public goods. Bieber & de Jongh (2023:2) highlight how marginalised citizens could not use public goods such as parks and other recreational areas during the COVID-19 pandemic. This demonstrates the shortcomings of universal access to public goods. Hence, public institutions should review the conventional thinking around providing citizens with public goods, particularly those in marginalised communities, because, in some cases, invisible barriers hinder them from enjoying them. This review enables public institutions to continuously evaluate their value proposition regarding public goods because citizens are deprived of basic services and privileges when they cannot serve their purpose.

From a good governance perspective, the public goods theory is insightful because it illustrates that the government reserves the duty to produce and distribute specific commodities and goods. Regarding public sector performance and efficiency, government institutions should be robust and fit for this purpose; otherwise, public sector production will be less cost-effective whilst producing poor quality goods and services. For this reason, the public goods theory is connected with the quality of government, social contract and public value theories because they chronicle the governments' responsibility in providing public goods and services.

2.8.6 Public Enforcement of Law Theory

The theory of public enforcement of the law (PELT) illustrates how the state's law enforcement apparatus identifies and punishes those who violate laws; it demonstrates the costs and benefits of law enforcement (Lemos & Minzner, 2014:854). Although Section 2.8.5 suggested that law enforcement is a public good produced by the public sector and collectively consumed by citizens at no additional cost, the PELT regards it as a lucrative business because it generates monetary benefits (Mungan, 2012:156). The state funds the cost of detecting, apprehending and housing law violators; it also collects revenue through fines, settlement and penalties (Lemos & Minzer, 2014:854). Hence, the PELT evaluates the costs and benefits of public law enforcement (Chopard & Obidzinski, 2021:2). Regarding the costs, some researchers suggest that law enforcement should be managed by public institutions and funded by taxes; (Lemos & Minzner, 2014:854; Garoupa & Klerman, 2010:76) believe private business can use economies of scale and other advantages to provide better services.

The direct benefits of law enforcement to individuals are also used to justify market-oriented law enforcement: i.e., judges, police officers and prosecutors do not get performance allowance or benefits when law violators are penalised with big settlements. Therefore, if private businesses provide public law enforcement services, remuneration strategies such as performance bonuses could increase the quality of policing services. However, the services will also be subjected to market forces and available only to paying consumers like any other commodity in the market; hence, they will be exclusionary.

Economists use the deterrence hypothesis and the basic theory to evaluate the costs of deterring crime; the deterrence hypothesis proposes that individuals' propensity to commit crime depends on the risks and benefits of committing a crime (Cooter & Gilbert, 2022:262). The basic theory proposes a social system where citizens benefit from not committing crimes (Chopard & Obidzinski, 2021:1-3). In other words, high penalties, incentives and sanctions can reduce criminal activities. The PELT adds value to this study by underlining the costs and benefits of law enforcement and crime prevention. Applying economic reasoning enables public managers to select cost-effective methods to ensure law and order in the public sector and society.

2.8.7 Power Resources Theory

Power refers to using incentives or penalties to control human behaviour; the power resources theory (PRT) belongs to the family of neo-Marxist theories (Bhuiyan, 2017:183). It explores how social inequalities encourage citizens to form interest groups to challenge social policies (Manza & Brooks, 2012:97). The PRT is a toned-down version of the 1970s' Marxist perspective (Rothstein, Samanni & Teorell, 2012:4). Power resource theorists believe employers and businesses use their power resources to influence government policies that oppress employees and other social groups (Brady, Blome & Kleider*,* 2016:120-122; Rothstein *et al.,* 2012:3). The theory is a tool for galvanising political power to broaden the welfare state; this can be achieved by appealing to the interests of poor and working-class people. It suggests that if the groups mentioned above gain power, they will implement egalitarian, leftist and welfare state policies to improve the living and working conditions of their primary constituency: the poor class (Brady *et al.*, 2016:120-122).

The theory underscored that right-leaning policies favour capitalists' interests, resulting in unequal distribution of wealth, income and power. This can be addressed by mobilising affected social groups to form trade unions and political parties to counter the influence of the elites (Brady *et al.*, 2016:119; Rothstein *et al.,* 2012:4). It highlights the feasibility of combining the power of workers, the poor and the working class to form trade unions or political parties aimed at influencing public policies or gaining political power (Brady *et al.,* 2016:119-120; Rothstein *et al.,* 2012:3). PRT further underscores that citizens in groupings can use collective power to foster public

policy change. This often manifests in unions, interest groups and political parties that draw power and influence from working and poor people's grievances (Manza & Brooks, 2012:97).

2.8.8 Theory of a (Neo)Liberal state

Neoliberalism is a set of political and economic ideologies and philosophies that evolved from classical liberal ideas of liberty and individual freedoms (Flew, 2014:5; Rousseau & Walker, 2012:21). Classical liberalism began in 17th-century Europe to free subjects from absolute monarchs (Flew, 2014:5). It regards state intervention in social and economic affairs as a coercive attribute limiting citizens' civil and economic liberties. The hallmarks of liberalism are civil liberties, political participation, personal freedom, free markets, lean government, equal opportunities and private property rights. This ideology posits that citizens can prosper and improve their circumstances by enterprising in a free-market system uncontrolled by the state. Hence, the state's role is to provide an enabling environment allowing individuals to reach their full potential.

A liberal state subscribes to the liberal ideas outlined above and seeks to provide an enabling environment for citizens to prosper (Flew, 2014:5; Rousseau & Walker, 2012:21). The capitalistic system prevailing in the United States of America is often regarded as an example of a neoliberal state. Flew (2014:5) states that a neoliberal state comprises political systems and institutions established to support neoliberal political and economic ideas. These institutions often advocate for strict financial controls and the end to the welfare state that funds social and economic programs to provide a safety net to poor and marginalised people. This includes severe budget cuts on welfare programmes and rejecting Keynesian ideas of increased state spending to avoid a recession and stimulate economic growth (Birch, 2015:572; Flew, 2014:5). Neoliberals favour a political economy shaped by the market instead of state intervention; hence, ideas such as deregulated financial markets, free markets and loosening the state control on the political economy by removing trade barriers and price controls and austerity measures dominate the neoliberal landscape (Birch, 2015:572; Rousseau & Walker, 2012:21).

2.8.9 Marxist Theory of the State

Marxism comprises ideas and notions of a left-leaning state proposed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (Van Der Waldt, 2017:192; Chongfu, 2014:126; Obo, 2014:527; Resnick & Wolff, 2013:153). Marxism regards classes as social strata held together by common interests, wishes or grievances. Social classes are in conflict over power, resources and influence (Obo, 2014:527; Resnick & Wolff, 2013:153). Marxism posits that society comprises the proletariat (poor working class) and the bourgeoisie (wealthy class); it is rooted in class struggles and regards the ideal state as a neutral broker responsible for centralising and managing the means of production to deter the bourgeoisie from owning everything and controlling the proletariat. This generally creates an egalitarian economic democracy where citizens equally participate in the economy without prejudice (Segrillo, 2012:8). Marxism stimulated socialist revolutions and calibrated developing countries' political movements that sought to eradicate the unfair political economies dominated by a few capitalists and industrialists (Resnick & Wolff, 2013:153; Segrillo, 2012:8).

The Marxist theory regards the state as an exploitative "class dictatorship" conditioned by dictatorial tendencies of the bourgeoisie class to rule the proletariat (Chongfu, 2014:127). Hence, it posits that the state is not a neutral arbitrator; it is an instrument of the wealthy people to exploit the poor (Obo, 2014:531). The state is regarded as a classist prism used by the wealthy to control the proletariat (Chongfu, 2014:27). Lenin believed the state uses systematic force to safeguard the interests of the bourgeoisie and suppress the proletariat (Chongfu, 2014:27). Therefore, proponents of Marxism sought to transform the state and use its authority to address low wages, hard labour, poor working conditions, child labour, exploitation, the commodification of the working class and other social grievances (Resnick & Wolff, 2013:153). Karl Marx and Engels believed that state formation is tied to the evolution of civilisation because humans were stateless at some point in history, but states emerged as they evolved (Chongfu, 2014:126). States were created when a certain level of economic development was reached. They also insisted that "the state as a political power is not inevitable" (Obo, 2014:531). This implies that the state's perpetuity is not guaranteed; states are products of human creation.

For this reason, Marxists submit that citizens should have the authority to transform the trajectory of the state when it fails to fulfil the citizens' needs. Therefore, the Marxist theory of the state explores "the origin, nature, development, succession and decay of the state and the innovative and transitional nature of the proletarian state". In other words, it seeks to transform the state by improving the working class' chances of economic emancipation through wealth management and distribution (Chongfu, 2014:124). The theory posits that public institutions should leverage the state's authority to redress the injustices of the bourgeoisie and actively lower economic barriers facing the proletariat.

2.8.10 Force, Coercion and Conquest Theories

The force, conquest and coercion theories are analysed simultaneously because they underscore that states are formed through war, violence and domination. Using force is an act of coercion. In state creation, force and coercion are tools to conquer and subjugate territories. The force theory postulates that states are created through conquering and coercing weak communities/states. This school of thought regards a state as a subjugative institution created to oppress the poor (Obo, 2014:530; Shaapera, 2012:18). Some scholars believe that it can be regarded as a means of state formation despite its negative connotations because this approach is consistent with the use of war, brute force and violence in state formation (Park & Han, 2018:662). Nevertheless, Ojo (2015:66) argues against this approach because even though force and conflict can be used to form states and enable a powerful entity to exercise authority over a region or country, it is not sustainable. History has proven that national integration, development, political legitimacy and peace are seldom by-products of states formed through force and aggression. Contemporary examples such as Yugoslavia demonstrate the limits of using force to form states (Ojo, 2015:72-74).

Similarly, the conquest theory is an approach to state formation based on conquering other states. Ojo (2015:72) and Shaapera (2012:18) state that conquests and coercion were used in the past to create states. In some cases, this approach was successful. For example, the invasion and subsequent conquest of North American territories by native Europeans led to the creation of some states. Other examples include the unification of Italy and Germany in Europe and the consolidation of African states by

powerful individuals and groups (Ojo, 2015:70-72). These examples demonstrate that legitimate states can be formed through conquests.

Therefore, numerous historical occurrences support force, cohesion and conquest theories. Prehistoric states such as Mesopotamia, Greece, Egypt and India were formed in ancient times using war, domination and subjugation. In more recent times, Japan, China, the Soviet Union, Peru, Colombia and central Africa are examples of regions where force was instrumental in state formation. The domination and subsequent colonialization of territories in Africa, Latin and North America and parts of Asia testify to the use of force, coercion and conquest in forming modern states. However, Ojo (2015:72-74) regards force as an instrument of violent domination used by powerful individuals or groups to assert dominance over regions, countries and citizens. It often involves repressing citizens' rights and civil liberties. A forceful state will use its power within and outside its borders to sustain its existence.

2.8.11 Divine Right Theory

People in the Middle Ages believed the state had a divine right to govern the inhabitants (Negoita, 2022:12). Ancient Hebrews believed that their government was a creation of the Lord (Shaapera, 2012:12). This doctrine attributes state formation to divine creation because it is regarded as ordained by God, making earthly rulers God's agents or descendants (Obo, 2014:530; Shaapera, 2012:12). The divine right theory suggests that rulers are God's lieutenants; hence, their actions, decisions and policies should not be questioned because they manifest God's will (Negoita, 2022:12-16). States that exercise this form of governance or public administration blur the lines between the state and church because since their rulers are considered divine, their authority transcends the traditional limits of legislative and executive power. This type of government dominated ancient Roman and Greek societies. Negoita (2022:12) and Shaapera (2012:12) suggest that the divine right theory is theocratic because it exerts God's rule through earthly rulers and kings. For example, the ancient Israelites believed their kings were ordained. Contemporary theories of state formation have disproved this approach. Locke, Rousseau and Hobbes provided alternative perspectives on state formation and modern government.

2.8.12 Declaratory and Constitutive Theory

Declaratory and Constitutive theory deal with state recognition (Vidmar, 2012:361). A state's recognition by other states is essential because of its political and legal implications on a country's development agenda. In a globalised world rooted in multilateralism and economic cooperation, global partners' recognition of a state can be a key determinant of economic development. Hence, states use diplomacy, bilateral agreements and economic cooperation to promote fruitful relations with their regional and global partners. However, some states, especially those of communist and socialist inclination, such as Venezuela, North Korea and Russia, routinely forego diplomacy and multilateral cooperation, which underpin global acceptance and recognition.

The declaratory theory suggests that state recognition under international law is objective and does not rely on other states' discretion (Erman, 2013:38). In other words, state recognition is a national sovereignty issue because a nation can be a state in its own right without external recognition (Gider, 2020:29). Proponents of this idea argue that the conditions for an entity to be recognised as a state include a defined territory, permanent population, government and the capacity to enter relations with other states (Panganiban, 2015:82). The theory supposes that an entity (state) cannot subjectively choose to become a state; instead, it depends on specific geographical characteristics and conditions. Hence, the declaratory theory considers a state's existence as an objective rather than a legal issue; this means that legal propositions do not preclude objective elements of a state, such as geographical jurisdiction and popular representation (Erman, 2013:38-40). It further suggests that declarations, treaties and multilateral agreements strengthen a state it enters into with other states (Gider, 2020:29). Erman (2013:38) suggests that this theory fills the gap in state recognition and formation theories because it addresses the shortcomings of denying an entity 'statehood' when it fulfils the primary conditions of a state.

International law scholars generally accept the declaratory theory because it is based on an objective criterion of declaring states. However, it faced significant shortcomings after the dissolution of former Yugoslavian states when some regions assumed statehood without meeting the basic requirements (Gider, 2020:29). This is significant

because the theory posits that fulfilling international conventions and conditions makes a state recognised as a member of the international community. To this end, the declaratory theory underpins that state recognition is not dependent on external recognition by other states because an entity can unilaterally become a state once it meets the objective criteria prescribed by international conventions and standards.

The constitutive theory postulates that state recognition depends on other states' recognition and discretion. Therefore, an entity is considered illegitimate if other states do not recognise it (Gider, 2020:29). The theory submits that other states voluntarily recognise an entity as a state (Erman, 2013:37). An entity's statehood is a function of recognition by other states under international law (Gider, 2020:29). According to this school of thought, recognising a state's legitimacy depends on established states' actions and perceptions (Vidmar, 2012:361). This approach has been criticised for being unrealistic, illogical and impractical because it gives global states disproportionate control over which countries can be considered legitimate states (Vidmar, 2012:361). This is a positivist legal approach because its proponents insist on the primacy of external recognition as the prerequisite for states to enjoy the benefits of being recognised under international laws and multilateral agreements (Gider, 2020:29).

The theory suggests that emerging states must conform to international law conditions to be recognised by other states. As a result, some scholars relegate the constitutive theory to an obsolete and positivist doctrinal level of interpreting international law based on subjective consensus instead of objective conditions and criteria (Erman, 2013:37; Gider, 2020:29-33).

2.8.13 State Autonomy Theory

The state autonomy theory's (SAT) core theme is that the state's institutions and autonomy belong to the citizens as a collective; hence, private individuals, groups or organisations should not exercise their influence/power to influence how the state deploys and manages public resources and authority. It explores the independence and autonomy of modern states based on independence, self-governance and sovereignty (Ahmed, 2017:129). The theory also illustrates that a state's autonomy

should not be subject to illegitimate influence from internal or external individuals or groups. The SAT underscores that autonomous states can develop and implement public policies without external influence; hence, it emphasises the legitimacy and integrity of the state's structures and institutions because a modern state cannot function effectively without being recognised by its citizens and other states.

The state autonomy approach discourages the state's apparatus from implementing policies favourable to influential individuals or organisations at the expense of citizens' interests (Ahmed, 2017:131). It demonstrates that the state's institutions can be hijacked by influential entities or private capital to forfeit citizens-centred policies and direct public resources towards private needs (Gardner, 2013:14). Hence, the state's apparatus and oversight institutions should insulate it from being steered by private individuals and organisations because this limits its capacity to meet the citizens' needs (Ahmed, 2017:135). Allegations made during the Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture in South Africa demonstrate how private interests can influence public resources management (Dassah, 2018:5; Wolf, 2017:3-5).

The theories examined above explore various issues about the state, the public sector and delivering public services and goods to meet citizens' needs. This investigation underscored the responsibilities of public institutions and the rationale for public service delivery and establishing specific government institutions to fulfil a particular mandate. This data was vital in analysing respondents' empirical data and developing a good governance framework. Table 2.1 summarises the theories explored in this chapter.

Table 2.1: Synopsis of the contribution of theories for an exposition of good governance

Theory	Main protagonists	Contributions/perspectives to good governance
Social contract	Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), John Locke (1632-1704), Jean-Jacques	· Binding concession between government and society · State authority is sanctioned by society · Governance is achieved through a social pact

	Rousseau (1712-1778)	
Divine right	Robert Filmer (1588-1653), Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet (1627–1704)	· States are divinely created · States have a right to rule unquestionably · Political absolutism · Rulers are agents of God
Declaratory	William Blackstone (1723-1780)	· A state needs to meet certain conditions to be considered a state · A state has a defined territory, permanent population, government and relations with other states · State recognition is objective
Constitutive	Lassa F. L. Oppenheim (1858 – 1919)	The statehood of a state is dependent on its recognition by other states State recognition is subjective
Force	Jenks-Bernhard, Heinrich von Trietschke (1834-1896)	· States are born out of force · Strong states prosper by subjugating weak ones · Society is made up of enslavers and enslaved people
Coercion		· Governments use force to achieve set objectives · Citizens are coerced into submission · States institutions are implements of coercion
Conquest	Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), Jean Bodin (1530–1596), Franz Oppenheimer (1864-1943)	· States are created by conquering other states · Only the strongest states survive · Weak states are subjugated and serve the wishes of stronger ones
Marxist	Friedrich Engels (1820 –1895), Karl Marx (1818-1883)	· Society is made up of the rich and poor class · The rich use their resources to exploit the poor · The only resource owned by people with low incomes is labour · Class struggles are inevitable · The poor will always seek to overthrow the rich to share society's resources equitably. · Capitalism thrives on class exploitation.

(Neo) Liberal state	James Madison (1751-1836), Montesquieu (1689-1755), Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), John Locke (1632-1704)	· Limited state intervention in citizens' personal lives · Individuals reserve the right to make personal decisions and preferences without undue influence from the state.
State autonomy	Korpi (1989), Skocpol (1985), Carruthers (1994), Polidano (2001)	· Independence and autonomy of the state · Ability to develop policies autonomously, free from outside influence
Power resources	Walter Korpi, Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1947), John Stephens	· Political/social movements generate power from the masses · Resources are used to influence behaviour · Wealth is unequally distributed in capitalism · There is power in numbers
Public enforcement of law	Montesquieu (1748), Beccaria (1767), Bentham (1789)	· The state enjoys the right to enforce laws · Law enforcement is not without costs · Sanctions and penalties deter crime
Public goods	Paul Samuelson (1954)	· Public goods are a shared responsibility · Every citizen is entitled to public goods · The public jointly funds public goods
Public value	Mark, H. Moore	· The government's performance should add value to citizens' livelihoods · Public services are valuable when they meet the needs of the public · Public enterprises are established to serve the needs of the public
Quality of government		· The government should provide quality public services and institutions · Government should impartially serve the needs of society
Evolutionary	Charles Darwin (1809-1882), Alfred Russel Wallace (1823-1913), Jean-	· Modern communities and organised societies are products of human evolution · Change is inevitable

	Baptiste Lamarck (1744–1829)	

Source: Researcher's own composition

The information generated from these theories (i.e. the contributions and perspectives) were valuable guidelines for designing a good governance framework for state institutions.

2.9 CONCLUSION

Chapter Two provided a detailed analysis of the various theories selected for this study. The primary aim of this chapter was to explore the theories, principles, dimensions, and approaches of good governance in the public sector. This established a relationship between good governance, efficiency, and effectiveness in the public sector. Various theories discussed in this chapter underscored that the efficacy of the public sector determines its capacity to provide good quality public goods and services. The chapter provided the evolution of Public Administration by chronicling key developments and milestones that shaped the discipline. This demonstrated the impact of intellectual reasoning and practical dimensions in shaping the discipline. The NPM paradigm was treated as a set of public sector management techniques that shaped public administration and management in developing countries in the post-cold war era when appeasing governments to buffer the spread of communism no longer shaped the US and most western governments' foreign policies. This heralded a stark shift in how Western governments provided development aid to developing countries. Economic structural adjustment programmes discussed in Sections 2.2 and 2.5 emphasised efficiency and strict financial management in developing countries' public sectors.

The evolutionary, divine right, coercion and conquest theories illustrated the roots of some modern states. The study leaned on economists' theories such as the public value, public goods and public enforcement of the law to demonstrate why the public sector produces and distributes some public services despite private businesses

having better economies of scale to produce them cost-effectively. These theories emphasised the importance of efficiency and effectiveness in the public sector.

The next chapter investigates global, regional and local instruments for measuring sound governance.

CHAPTER 3

AN ANALYSIS OF THE INSTRUMENTS FOR MEASURING SOUND GOVERNANCE

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter reviewed the theories underpinning the study. The theories reviewed provided a conceptual understanding of a modern state's origins, responsibilities, challenges, and expectations. The theoretical framework also accounted for developments in the academic discipline of Public Administration. Going forward, the theoretical framework is essential because it provides an academic justification for developing a good governance framework that addresses the shortcomings and weaknesses of the current governance ecosystem in Zimbabwe. More importantly, the theoretical framework ringfences or demarcates the application of the researcher's proposed good governance framework. In other words, the theories reviewed in the previous chapter identify the locus of the proposed good governance framework.

The current chapter provides an exposition and analysis of the frameworks and instruments measuring governance at global, continental, regional and national levels. The chapter demonstrates that the nature and scope of governance indicators vary depending on the instrument's design. For example, some instruments assess institutional capacity and policies, whereas others assess government performance, human rights and the rule of law. This is partly because of the breadth of "governance". An analysis of these instruments also includes those that measure sound corporate governance. Corporate governance is a key construct of the study because it ensures that public sector corporate institutions (State-Owned Enterprises and parastatals) are managed in line with the principles of good governance. This chapter lays the groundwork for developing the proposed good governance framework for the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) by investigating good governance and corporate governance instruments in Zimbabwe.

3.2 CONTEXTUALISING THE MEASUREMENT OF GOOD GOVERNANCE

Measuring governance or the performance of a government enables governments to assess their capacity to meet citizens' needs and determine whether the system of governance in place is 'good' or 'bad'. This is essential in the context of Zimbabwe because the available governance instruments enable policy-makers to assess the government's performance. However, measuring governance is not without challenges because it is marred by controversy and critique of the abstractness of the concept of governance (Malito, 2015:3; Dassah & Tshishonga, 2011:12). "Governance" is an abstract and complex phenomenon that is difficult to measure empirically (Dassah, 2015:715; Dassah, 2013:730). For instance, some scholars argue whether instruments of measuring governance should assess the inputs or outputs of a governance system (McFerson, 2009:253). A case in point is the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), which focus on assessing governance inputs, such as policies and institutional capacity. On the other hand, the Mo Ibrahim Index assesses outputs, such as public goods and services, that impact citizens' daily lives (roads, schools, refuse collection and housing) (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2017:9).

Similarly, instruments that collect citizens' perceptions primarily focus on the goods and services rendered by the government. These are the outputs of a system of government. Naturally, most instruments focus on the outputs of the governance system simply because they are tangible and easy to assess. Several instruments, some of which are analysed in this chapter, quantify and assess governance. The dimensions of good governance should be quantified to allow for statistical analysis. This is typically done by quantifying governance dimensions such as the rule of law, human rights and economic development. Quantifying governance makes it easy for practitioners and researchers to measure governance in a particular country by assessing it against objective benchmarks and metrics.

Conversely, as demonstrated in this chapter, many instruments rely on the subjective opinions of citizens and other stakeholders. This means assessing governance is

complicated and does not always use objective data. For this reason, the current chapter analyses several instruments of measuring governance and determines the performance of the GoZ. This is essential because it will determine the type of information the researcher will seek during data collection.

3.3 GLOBAL INSTRUMENTS OF MEASURING GOVERNANCE

There are global, continental and regional instruments for measuring the goodness of governance. This section focuses on global instruments for measuring the goodness of governance.

3.3.1 World Governance Indicators

Developing a good governance framework requires understanding the government's performance, and the WGIs enable the researcher to achieve this objective by assessing key areas of the GoZ's performance. Hence, the WGIs enable the researcher to determine weaknesses in the existing governance ecosystem.

The WGIs were developed in the 1990s by the World Bank Institute to measure six indicators (listed in Table 3.1) of a country's performance (Salawu, Yusuff, Salman, Ogunniyi & Rufa, 2018:59; Gisselquist, 2014:516). The indicators are also used to compare the performance of different countries (Han, Khan & Zhuang, 2014:4). The WGIs determine performance by measuring the subjective views of survey respondents, NGOs, think tanks, international agencies and private corporations. The World Bank uses the "unobserved components model" to compute performance data from various sources when measuring a government's performance (Lin *et al.*, 2014:250). Each indicator is assessed based on "a value centred around zero and ranging from –2.5 to 2.5". WGIs rank countries using percentiles and aggregate instead of weighted scores to measure performance (Salawu *et al.*, 2018:59; Han *et al.*, 2014:4). Countries with bigger values on the positive spectrum of the scale (+2.5) have better governance outcomes than those with negative scores (-2.5).

Table 3.1: World Governance Indicators

Indicator	General definition
Voice and accountability	Assess freedom of speech, press, association and citizens' participation in democratic elections.
Political stability	Assess the likelihood of destabilising the government unconstitutionally.
Government effectiveness	Assesses the quality of public services, policy formulation and civil services' ability and independence from politicians' influence
The rule of law	Measures the government's ability to provide regulations and policies to promote the private sector's development.
Regulatory quality	Assesses the quality of the police and courts in upholding the rule of law.
Control of corruption	Assesses if public authority is misused for private benefits.

Sources: Salawu *et al.* (2018:59), Han *et al.* (2014:4), and Lin *et al.* (2014:250).

Like most instruments, WGIs are not immune from criticism by stakeholders who question their objectivity and usefulness (Kaufmann *et al.*, 2011:221). Regardless, they are vital for measuring a government's performance and comparing it to its peers. This is essential in the case of Zimbabwe because the current WGI trends show that the government's performance has been on a downward trajectory in the past two decades. Zimbabwe's performance is poor compared to other regional countries, such as South Africa and Botswana (Desai, 2022).

3.3.2 Corruption Perceptions Index

The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), a brainchild of Transparency International (TI), measures corruption globally by ranking countries according to the prevalence of corruption perceptions within their jurisdictions (Sharma & Sharma, 2015:27). The CPI provides "data on extensive perceptions of corruption within countries" (Lambsdorff, 2003:71). Despite criticism, it is a reliable instrument (Ghosh & Siddique, 2015:12) because it uses data from multiple sources (Sharma & Sharma, 2015:35). The CPI measures perceptions of corruption on a scale of 1 (most corrupt) to 10 (not corrupt)

(Christos *et al.*, 2018:525; Sharma & Sharma, 2015:27). In 2012, the index scale was changed to 0 (most corrupt) - 100 (not corrupt) (Christos *et al.,* 2018:525). CPI scores are calculated using the Monte Carlo technique. This technique collects data from 10 000 samples (Sharma & Sharma, 2015:27). Business people, risk analysts, Freedom House, the Economist Intelligence Unit and the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy, African Development Bank, Bertelsmann Foundation, Political Risks Services, CPIA, World Economic Forum, World Justice Report, and Global Insight are primary data sources (Christos *et al.*, 2018:525; Ghosh & Siddique, 2015:12).

Zimbabwe has low economic development and CPI scores. Over the years, it slipped on the CPI scale. It was ranked number 157, scoring 22, 22, 21, 21, 21 and 20 in 2017, 2016, 2015, 2014, 2013, and 2012, respectively (Transparency International, 2018; cf. Christos *et al.*, 2018:525 for the amended index scale). This is from a historical score of 2.4, ranking 134 out of 176 countries in 2010 (Sharma & Sharma, 2015:34). It was also ranked 44 and scored 4.4 on the CPI scale in 1998. These figures indicate negative perceptions regarding the prevalence of corruption in Zimbabwe. This data is consistent with the literature reviewed in Chapter 1 of this study, which indicates that developing countries suffer from a high prevalence of corruption mainly due to weak state institutions, such as the judiciary and law enforcement agents. Chapter 2 of this study highlighted that corruption, particularly in the public sector, deters national development because public resources are misappropriated for personal use.

A thesis developing a good governance framework should focus on public sector corruption because it is detrimental to social and economic development (Saha & Ali, 2017:83; Saha & Gounder, 2013:70). Analysing the CPI adds immense value to this study because it is the only instrument of assessing corruption being analysed. The CPI differs from the other instruments because it focuses on a singular governance issue: corruption. The global applicability of the CPI is an added advantage because it can be used to compare countries from different regions. Hence, it does not suffer from the Afrocentric biases of continental instruments, such as the SGIs, IAG, Afrobarometer and APRM.

3.3.3 Country Policy and Institutional Assessment

The World Bank developed the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) to assess the policies and institutions of third-world countries earmarked for aid (Nguema-Affane, 2016:5; Reigner, 2016:1;). Despite criticism, the CPIA is a valid instrument because it uses standardised questionnaires to collect data from multiple stakeholders (Reigner, 2016:10-11). Property rights, the rule of law, accountable government, human rights, free media and fighting corruption are indicators of good governance (World Bank, 2010:16). Table 3.2 shows the four clusters assessed by the CPIA. Data from the questionnaire is analysed to produce a Country Performance Rating (CPR) and a CPIA score. The CPIA scores range from 1 (lowest) to 6 (highest) (CPIA Africa, 2018:5; Nguema-Affane, 2016:5; World Bank, 2010:3). Sub-Saharan countries collectively score low on the CPIA instrument. In 2017, the average score in the sub-Sahara was 3.1 (CPIA Africa, 2018:4).

Table 3.2: The CPIA criteria

A. Economic management 1. Macroeconomic Management 2. Fiscal Policy 3. Debt Policy	 10. Social Protection and Labour 11. Policies and Institutions for Environmental Sustainability
B. Structural Policies 4. Trade 5. Financial Sector 6. Business Regulatory Environment	**D. Public Sector Management and Institutions** 12. Property Rights and Rule-based Governance 13. Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management 14. Efficiency of Revenue Mobilisation 15. Quality of Public Administration
C. Policies for Social Inclusion 7. Gender Equality 8. Equity of Public Resource Use 9. Building Human Resources	16. Transparency, Accountability, and Corruption in the Public Sector.

Source: Reigner (2012:14)

Assessing policy and institutional performance is crucial for Zimbabwe because it relies on aid. Since the 2000s, Zimbabwe has experienced political strife, human rights violations and economic ruin, resulting in donor organisations and lending institutions

pulling out their assistance. Zimbabwe continues to perform poorly on the CPIA index. In 2016 it scored 2.7 (CPIA Africa, 2017:48) due to weak policies, unsustainable debt and a low gross domestic product (IMF, 2017:1-2; Nguema-Affane, 2016:14, 18).

Despite the study not focusing on Zimbabwe's aid prospects, data from the CPIA is significant because it underlines the country's governance system's shortcomings and weaknesses. In other words, the CPIA provides insights into the lack of institutional and policy capacity of the GoZ to receive aid. This indicates that its systems are not fit for purpose. Institutional capacity is key because sound governance and prospects for development are compromised when there are no robust institutions. Policies represent the government's intentions. Hence, sound policies are a key ingredient in a country's apparatus of good governance. The CPIA is also valuable for this study because it is a multisectoral instrument assessing many aspects of modern governance. Hence, it provides extensive data and an understanding of the GoZ's performance. The CPIA assesses the government's primary accountability and socio-economic development tools. These governance elements give an accurate picture of the GoZ's performance.

The major drawback of the CPIA is that it was developed to rationalise the allocation of aid. As a result, it overlooks vital governance issues, such as citizen satisfaction, human rights and the rule of law. Nonetheless, it will proffer valuable data in developing the proposed good governance framework.

3.3.4 Sustainable Governance Indicators

The Sustainable Governance Indicators (SGIs), a product of the Bertelsmann Foundation, assess the sustainability of public policies in 41 industrialised and economically advanced countries in the European Union (EU) and the OECD (Malito, 2015; Schraad-Tischler & Seelkopf, 2015). SGIs are an analysis toolkit that addresses shortcomings in public policy issues, such as immigration, globalisation, ageing societies, climate change, national insecurity and natural resource depletion (Schraad-Tischler & Seelkopf, 2015:2). The point of departure of SGIs is that developed countries are slow to reform their policies in response to the dynamic macro-environment. Therefore, the SGIs are medium to long-term policy management tools

developed to respond to macro-environmental dynamics (Schraad-Tischler & Seelkopf, 2015:2). They use 150 multi-layered variables to measure national policies using both objective and subjective data (Malito, 2015:16). The index's scale ranges from 1 (minimum) to 10 (maximum). This allows for comparison across countries (Malito, 2015:19).

The SGIs focus on people and institutions who shape public policies, such as CSOs, transnational organisations, politicians, citizens and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in OECD states (Schraad-Tischler & Seelkopf, 2015:2). SGIs are built to assess democracy, governance and policy performance (Malito, 2015:7, 18).

- *The policy performance index* measures and compares policies between countries through a ranking system to stimulate policy reform. This index assesses member states' economic, social and environmental policies using 16 metrics (Schraad-Tischler & Seelkopf, 2015:3-7).
- *The democracy index* assesses the quality of democracy, the rule of law, citizen participation, governments' legitimacy and the social inclusion of minorities (Malito, 2015:7; Schraad-Tischler & Seelkopf, 2015:8-9).
- *The governance index* assesses cooperation between state and NGOs in making sustainable public policies (Schraad-Tischler & Seelkopf, 2015:10-12).

The EU and OECD countries do not fall under the ambit of this research; however, analysing the sustainability of their policies and democratic systems is significant for establishing policy benchmarks that developing countries can adopt. The assumption is that developed countries' governance ecosystems have been tried and tested; hence, valuable lessons can be drawn from them. Furthermore, SGIs provide a different perspective from the other instruments evaluated in this study because they are strategic. Governments should develop policies to address long-term social needs and development in an era of climate change, migration and natural resource depletion. Most challenges facing developing countries today, such as dwindling resources, population explosion, and insufficient public services and infrastructure, resulted from missed opportunities in the past to foresee society's strategic needs. Although the SGIs have limited scope, they caution developing countries to consider their public policies' strategic impact and shortcomings.

Table 3.3 provides a synopsis of the global instruments for assessing several elements of sound governance.

Table 3 3: A synopsis of global instruments

Instrument	Protagonist	Scope	Elements assessed	Merits	Demerits
WGI	The World Bank	Global	Political stability, corruption, the rule of law, government effectiveness accountability	Assesses many elements of governance; broadly defines "governance"; data collected from several stakeholders; measure the government's performance.	Collects subjective data and findings cannot be scientifically verified
CPI	Transparency International	Global	Perceptions of corruption	It uses data from multiple sources, largely reliable, large, diverse samples, and covers many countries.	It is impossible to assess the accurate difference in corruption levels between countries; uses subjective data, perceptions can be misleading.
CPIA	The World Bank	Global	Institutional capacity, public policies, socio-economic development	Comprehensively assesses the government's performance; uses official data sources.	Primarily used to allocate aid; hence, it ignores crucial elements of governance; biased towards developing countries
				An analysis toolkit to ensure policy consistency; addresses society's	Uses subjective data; too many variables can produce

SGI	Bertelsmann Foundation	EU and OECD	The sustainability of public policies	emerging challenges; strategically oriented; uses objective data from many variables; a large pool of stakeholders	unreliable data; deliberate focus on the future at the expense of current challenges;

Source: Researcher's own composition

3.4 CONTINENTAL, PAN-AFRICAN MEASURES OF GOOD GOVERNANCE

Pan-African instruments of governance that assess governance in African countries are analysed below.

3.4.1 Afrobarometer

The Afrobarometer was established in 1999. It measures and compares the soundness of governance by collecting and analysing cross-country data about the economy, governance and democracy from attitude surveys in 36 African countries (Bratton & Gyimah-Boadi, 2016:1-2). It uses subjective data, surveys and public opinions to strengthen "institutional capacities" and inform public policy formulation and implementation (Bratton and Gyimah-Boadi, 2016:1; Mwombela, 2014:2). The Afrobarometer's operations receive funding from Sweden, the UK and the US; it uses a standardised methodology and data collection survey to systematically collect data from samples of 1200 or 2400 per country from public surveys and face-to-face interviews (Bratton & Gyimah-Boadi, 2016:1 Mwombela, 2014:2-3). A Probability Proportionate to Population Size is used to select representative samples that reflect the demographic set-up of each country, resulting in a ±2% margin of error at a 95% confidence level (Chritoplos *et al.,* 2018:9). Afrobarometer has so far conducted seven bi-annual public surveys in Zimbabwe (Bratton & Gyimah-Boadi, 2016:15; Mwombela, 2014:2). The recent survey shows that citizens' perceptions about the GoZ's performance are negative. The outcomes of the surveys also highlight gross citizens' mistrust of the government (Kugarakupi & Ndoma, 2022).

Afrobarometer surveys have several limitations. The major drawback is that they collect data from a single source: citizens. This curtails the validity of the survey outcomes owing to the bias and limitations inherent in singular-source data. Thus, although public interviews are a rich data source, relying only on them poses major reliability concerns. The surveys do not generate data from secondary or expert sources to balance citizens' views and perceptions. The instrument resembles the APRM because it uses opinions and surveys to generate data. In addition, conducting surveys only in 36 African countries provides a small pool for comparison when compared to other regional and global instruments. Furthermore, samples of 2400 or 1200 citizens limit the representativeness and generalizability of survey outcomes. Limiting survey questions to economic conditions, governance and democracy and excluding key issues such as institutional capacity, policy-making and government efficiency results in one-sided data about a government's performance.

Despite inherent limitations, the surveys are vital to the study because they reflect citizens' opinions. As the ultimate beneficiaries of public services, citizens' perceptions are a dependable indicator of the government's performance. In this case, the data is essential in triangulating documentary and empirical data. So far, public survey data supports the assertion that the GoZ's performance is poor, as shown by other instruments analysed above. This data is vital in developing a proposed good governance framework.

3.4.2 Mo Ibrahim Index of Governance

The Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance (AIG) was developed in 2006 by Rotberg and Gisselquist to measure sound governance in Africa using several social indicators and outcomes of public policies (Dassah, 2015:723; Dassaah, 2013:736). It is an empirical, knowledge-based index developed to combine policy research and policy marking (Dassah & Tshishonga, 2011:12). It uses 36 independent sources to generate objective data. At its core, the AIG institutionalises good governance in Africa by assessing the quality of public goods and services (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2017:9; Dassah, 2015:723). Researchers believe it is a diagnostic instrument that enables citizens, CSOs and governments to assess government performance and compare it with other African countries (Dassah, 2013:736). Despite the complexities of

computing dimensions of governance into a singular metric, measuring the goodness of a government's performance is crucial in Africa because bad governance retards economic growth (Dassah & Tshishonga, 2011:12).

Figure 3.1: The basic and the sub-basic categories of the Mo Ibrahim Index



Source: Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2017)

To assess a government's performance, the IAG analyses safety and the rule of law, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity and human development. When computing an overall index, the main categories portrayed in Figure 3.1 are divided into 14 subcategories (SC) and 57 sub-subcategories (Dassah, 2013:738). In each category, SC and SSC indicators are data analysis parameters. Figure 3.1 summarises the categories of the IAG. Data from basic categories are combined to produce an aggregate score per country. This data compares countries' performance (Dassah, 2015:716; Dassah, 2013:737). Therefore, the IAG does not merely rank countries according to performance. Its basic and broad categories comprise distinct evaluations and analyses of government performance to ensure that the index measures as many governance dimensions as possible.

The IAG is unique in many respects (Dassah, 2013:737). It adopts a broad definition of "governance" to include service delivery and the government processes, structures and apparatus used to fulfil this function. It assesses performance by analysing the quality of public goods and services. It quantifies governance by statistically computing discrete governance indicators to produce composite scores. Hence, it is an empirical and objective instrument which uses several indicators to compute a composite score for each country. The IAG is regarded as a scientific and highly reliable tool.

For this reason, the IAG departs from instruments such as the CPI and ARPM, which solely rely on subjective perceptions and opinions. Furthermore, the AIG measures governance in many countries. Most instruments analysed above, apart from WGIs, have a limited scope of application. For these reasons, the AIG is pivotal to this study because it objectively assesses the soundness of a country's governance systems. For instance, researchers who evaluated the GoZ's performance noted that it is low compared to its regional and continental peers (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2017:12; Dassah & Tshishonga, 2011:17-24).

3.4.3 African Peer Review Mechanism

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) was introduced in 2002 by the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) to assess the attainment of sustainable development goals, public reforms and the institutionalisation of good governance in African countries by overseeing the adoption and implementation of sound policies and regional economic integration (Iroulo, 2017:2; Dassah, 2013:735). Hammed and Kabo (2013:14) state that the NEPAD fosters socio-economic development and good governance in African countries. The APRM aims to reform and build African states by promoting good governance, sustainable development and economic growth (Iroulo, 2017:1). It emulates the OECD's peer review techniques (Dassah, 2013:735). Although it was designed as a continental instrument, it does not cover all because some countries have not acceded to it.

The APRM uses academic peer review, International Monetary Fund (IMF) Article IV consultations and OECD country review guidelines to assess sound governance. Peer review examines the policy performance of African states based on social and

economic development indicators (Dassah, 2013:735). IMF Article IV consultations assess fiscal discipline by monitoring exchange rates to ensure that countries do not manipulate their currencies. Visiting IMF staff members conduct consultations each year. The OECD country review monitors and evaluates member states' policies to ensure compliance with conventional norms (Hammed & Kabo, 2013:21).

APRM reviews the performance of African states in corporate governance, democracy, political and economic governance and socio-economic development using standardised objectives and codes (Hammed & Kabo, 2013:18). Peer review is a five-stage process conducted by member states and peer reviewers (Hammed & Kabo, 2013:21). The first stage gathers data using the APRM questionnaire and collates it to produce a Country Self-Assessment Report (CSAR) and a National Programme of Action (NPOA) for the APR Continental Secretariat. The Secretariat analyses and combines the data to produce a Country Issues Report (CIR), highlighting the country's shortcomings, strengths and weaknesses under review. In the second stage, the Country Review Mission (CRM) consults with politicians, resident representatives of international organisations, government officials, business players, civil society organisations and academics (Iroulo, 2017:2). In the third stage, the CRM produces and shares the Country Review Report (CRR). The review process is complete when the APR Continental Secretariat submits the CRR to the APR forum, which subsequently shares it with the Pan-African Parliament and the AU summit.

The APRM stands out because it is voluntary and measures good governance through consultations and peer review. Despite being intended for all African states, only a handful have acceded to it (Makgalancheche, 2006:69). This is in contrast to the IAG and Afrobarometer, which cover all African states and the CPI, CPIA and WGI that are global. This substantially limits the effectiveness of the instrument in promoting good governance. In addition, the lack of binding commitments results in few countries implementing the findings of the review process. This makes "the APRM a paper tiger" (Dassah, 2013:735). Another drawback is that the APRM has a limited scope of what governance entails. As a result, it focuses on socio-economic and political values agreed upon by member states APRM (Makgalancheche, 2006:69). Despite its weaknesses, the ARPM offers valuable insights to this study.

3.4.4. Good Governance Africa (GGA)

The GGA is a think tank headquartered in Rosebank Johannesburg with regional centres in Nigeria, Ghana and Zimbabwe, which conducts research on good governance in African states (Davis, 2019). The GGA chiefly focuses on good governance and related issues, such as corruption, economic development, local governance, public administration and general quality of governance in selected African countries. For example, in the South African local government sphere, the GGA publishes the Government Performance Index (GPI) to assess the performance of South African local municipalities. The GPI is a GGA instrument for ranking local municipalities according to their performance (Good Governance Africa, 2017:1). The GPI assesses performance based on economic development, administration and service delivery by generating data from the Auditor General's reports, National Treasury, municipality information, Statistics South Africa, and non-governmental stakeholders, such as individuals and business people using citizens' and business surveys, respectively to collect data (Davis, 2019; Good Governance Africa, 2017:1).

The GGA's contribution towards assessing sound governance in Zimbabwe cannot be overlooked. Yearly, the think-tank publishes reports and journals regarding several governance issues in Zimbabwe. The publications enable the institution to monitor the performance of the GoZ against regional and international benchmarks. In addition, they also highlight deviances from governance norms. The GGA researchers interact with state and non-state stakeholders, giving them a holistic understanding of the government's performance. Their reports provide a cache of knowledge about the performance of the GoZ in real time. For example, in the past two years, the GGA reports on Zimbabwe highlighted the following issues: constitutionalism, capturer of state institutions, electoral governance, corruption, accountability, citizen participation, media freedom, human rights violations, an independent judiciary, politicisation of state institutions and the rule of law. This information is crucial for this study, mainly because it will inform the type of information sought from government bureaucrats and stakeholders in non-governmental organisations by the researcher during empirical data collection. Table 3.4 provides a synopsis of the governance instruments discussed above.

Table 3.4: Synopsis of pan-African governance instruments

Instrument	Protagonist(s)	Scope	Elements assessed	Merits	Demerits
Afrobarometer	Michael Bratton, Robert Mattes, Gyimah Boadi.	36 African countries	Economy, governance and democracy	Collects data from direct beneficiaries of government services; assesses key elements of governance; assesses the government's performance.	Relies on subjective data, citizens' perceptions can be misleading; data is prone to respondents' bias.
The GGA	The GGA	Ghana, RSA, Nigeria, Zimbabwe	Elections, the rule of law, democracy, safety, human rights, public policies, corruption, local governance.	Relies on empirical data; researches a broad range of governance matters; uses data from verified sources.	Its data is for research purposes; hence, it might not be suitable for measuring government performance; it covers a few countries.
AIG	Robert Rotberg & Rachel Gisselquist	All African countries	The rule of law, participation; human rights, safety, sustainable economic opportunity; human development	Uses objective data; assesses government performance; shapes policy-making; multiple data sources; uses statistical tools to assess performance; official data sources.	Aggregating data may curtail crucial data nuances.
				Uses objective and subjective	A limited number of

APRM	NEPAD	37 African countries	Sustainable development goals; public reforms; good governance	assessment; data from independent external bodies; a broad definition of governance; consults many stakeholders.	countries reviewed; voluntary; primarily relies on peer reviews.

Source: Researcher's own composition

3.5 REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS: GOOD GOVERNANCE IN THE SADC

Ajambo (2015:4) underscores the complexities of measuring governance in the Southern African Development Community (SADC). While good governance features in the SADC's agenda, there are no "standards and instruments" to assess them **(**Van Der Vleuten & Husle, 2013:5); the bloc does not have a regional governance instrument. Against this backdrop, this study submits that the SADC does not have an instrument for measuring sound governance. The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), 2003, is the SADC's good governance policy (Van Der Vleuten & Husle, 2013:31). Sections 1.2.2, 2.4.2, 4.10.5, 4.12.1 and 5.2.2 of the policy demonstrate the importance of good governance in the region by highlighting its role in socio-economic development. It assumes that good governance increases investments, cooperation and accountability (Van der Vleuten & Husle, 2013:31; SADC, 2003:4, 5, 55-56, 67, 69, 76). This is understood against the backdrop of challenges of weak governance systems in African countries (Phirinyane, 2002:115).

Although countries like Botswana are improving in the SADC region, Zimbabwe and Malawi have poor governance (World Bank 2018:1). Hence, the SADC promotes good governance to increase external investment (SADC, 2017:2; Van der Vleuten & Husle, 2013:5, 40; Phirinyane, 2002:118). This school of thought is grounded in the assumption that good governance spurs national socio-economic development. For this reason, good governance is a panacea for investment.

Alence and Mattes (2016:2-17) developed a governance instrument which assesses mineral governance in the SADC region through state capacity, state accountability, regulation and monitoring and enforcement on a scale ranging from zero (0) to one (1). State accountability is measured using auditing, recovery of assets and financial reporting indicators. All four dimensions, including their sub-indices, are aggregated into one score ranging from 0-1. These offshoots of governance are crucial in demonstrating the feasibility of assessing good governance in the SADC. However, measuring sound governance in the SADC is difficult until all the governance components are aggregated into a framework.

3.6 COUNTRY-SPECIFIC GOOD GOVERNANCE MEASUREMENT INSTRUMENTS

It is vital to use standardised instruments and metrics to assess the performance of a system of governance. This enables stakeholders to gauge the government's performance against globally-recognised good governance principles and expected outcomes of modern governance (Van der Waldt, 2012:83). Therefore, it is incumbent upon the GoZ and other stakeholders to ensure that the government's performance is assessed based on global standards. Due to the importance of measuring good governance, some jurisdictions continuously developed governance indexes to measure their performance. For example, Good Governance of Sidoarjo was developed by the city of Sidoarjo in Indonesia to assess the city's performance (Mursyidah & Abadi, 2018:294). Mursyidah and Abadi (2018:294) believe that measuring good governance results in better living standards for citizens and a responsive government because it enables government functions to gauge and improve their performance.

The GoZ's performance can be assessed using global assessment tools or locally developed instruments. This promotes the entrenchment of good governance in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe's existing social and political systems pose significant challenges to entrenching good governance values. Evidence for this assertion is found in the lack of the rule of law, opaque electoral systems and weak economic

growth (Alexander, 2015). Zimbabwe does not currently have an instrument or framework for measuring good governance. Due to the fragility of the governance ecosystem, the country faces a mammoth task regarding establishing a good governance framework. Alexander (2015) argues that the socio-economic and political challenges in the country deter long-term commitment to good governance from key stakeholders, such as citizens, civil society, political actors and multilateral organisations. The government's performance data is collected from the abovementioned global and regional instruments.

3.7 MEASURING THE GOODNESS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

Corporate governance promotes sound ethical practices from the board, management and other stakeholders of business and charity organisations (Sifile & Dangwa, 2018:66; Maune, 2017:7). The concept of corporate governance is grounded in the principal-agency theory where the board and management are stewards (agents) who implement the interests of the principals (shareholders and owners of businesses) (Zuva & Zuva, 2018:16; Mashavave, 2017:212). In the Zimbabwean public sector, this relationship plays out in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), where the board and management of these entities implement the interests of the citizens, who are the ultimate shareholders. In most cases, a political appointee is regarded as the principal that represents citizens' wishes.

Therefore, corporate governance is vital in SOEs because it ensures the board and management implement citizens' and the state's interests in public sector corporations. The Zimbabwean government should ensure that its corporations adhere to good corporate practices to enhance productivity and efficiency and contribute towards national development (Maune, 2017:6; Dube & Murahwe, 2015:760). Corporate governance is a pivotal issue in national development because it enhances the performance of public-sector corporations (Maune, 2015:167). Hence, African governments should promote sound corporate governance as a critical consideration for global investors coming to Africa (Chimbari, 2017:213; Mashavave, 2017:211).

Measuring corporate governance provides an "overview of strengths and weaknesses" of an organisation's governance (Matic & Papac, 2014:784). Researchers underscore the importance of using models and frameworks to assess organisational efficiency using objective metrics (Djokic & Duh, 2015:375). Apart from using metrics, it can be assessed by evaluating outputs and performance. Scorecards can measure corporate governance by comparing an organisation's governance score with pre-set benchmarks and indices which assess performance (IFC, 2014:3; Matic & Papac, 2014:789). However, it is not easy to measure qualitative elements, such as behaviour and decision-making (Sahay, 2016:301).

3.7.1 Country-specific instruments of corporate governance

This section examines corporate governance frameworks in the USA and South Africa. The USA was selected because it is one of the market economies that passed legislation to foster accountability and corporate governance. South Africa has a long history with corporate; hence, it was included to provide insights into how state companies can be managed.

3.7.1.1 Sarbanes Oxley (United States)

The Sarbanes Oxley Act is formally known as the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act. It was promulgated in 2002 to address scandals such as those at Sunbeam, Xerox, Tyco, and WorldCom (Verleun, Georgakopoulos, Sotiropoulos & Vasileiou, 2011:49). The Act promotes sound corporate governance and accountability in public companies by guaranteeing auditors' independence and creating the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) (Verleun *et al.*, 2011:50). The PCAOB oversees and regulates the conduct of auditors by ensuring that they enforce rules and regulations against fraud and unethical practices by corporate officers. The Sarbanes Oxley Act mandates the PCAOB to regulate the relationship between auditors and individual companies by directing boards to rotate auditors and make it easy for whistle-blowers to come forward. It spurred incentives for corporations to invest in internal controls to strengthen corporate governance.

The Sarbanes Oxley Act is significant to this research because it demonstrates how legal frameworks can be deployed to strengthen corporate governance in SOEs. The Act is an example of a legislative instrument that can be recommended to address the corporate governance challenges facing public sector corporations. The Act also highlights the nature of corporate governance in the United States. This can be adopted as an international best practice to rescue struggling SOEs because the Act illustrates how the American Congress moved to curb the lack of accountability and professionalism in profit-oriented organisations; hence, the Zimbabwean parliament can emulate this intervention to promote accountability and professionalism in public enterprises. Therefore, addressing unsound corporate governance can be used in this study as a premise for averting financial mismanagement, lack of accountability and transparency and inefficiency in the public sector.

3.7.1.2 King Report (South Africa)

While corporate governance is nascent in Zimbabwe, South Africa has had more experience dealing with corporate governance, as evidenced by the sequence of King Reports. "King Reports" are sequels of corporate governance codes (King Report I, 1994; King Report II, 2002; King Report III, 2009; King Report IV, 2016) prescribed for companies operating in South Africa (IODSA, 2016). The King Report was first released in 1994 by the King Committee to align South African corporate with the market-oriented system; it identifies accountability, transparency, fairness and social responsibility as corporate governance principles (Mashavave, 2017:212). Its objectives are to:

- promote corporate governance for ethical quality performance;
- ensure that the King IV Report is implemented in private and public sectors;
- promote transparency in reporting to stakeholders, and
- incorporate corporate governance in organisations' culture (IODSA, 2016:22).

The King Report lauds the role of corporate governance organisational competitiveness. The King IV Report significantly departs from previous reports by emphasising the applicability of corporate governance in all organisations, whether

from the public or private sector. Drafters of the report sought to create a code usable in different sectors (IODSA, 2016:6). Thus, it is a corporate governance code applicable to companies in all sectors, private or public, profit or non-profit. The King Report IV regards good corporate governance as a universal code of ethics which can be adopted by government organisations such as municipalities and other entities in the public sector. This view of corporate governance resonates with the objectives of public sector management, where public administration aims to provide quality public services using efficient and accountable procedures (Mudau, 2022:156; Sonderskov & Ronning, 2021:5).

In this regard, the King IV Report encourages organisations to adopt an "outcomes-based approach for a corporate governance code" through accountability and exemplary stakeholder conduct (IODSA, 2016:7). It is divided into seven parts, of which part three (Application and Disclosure) and part five (Code on Corporate Governance) are relevant to this study. It should be noted that the King IV Report promotes principles and practices consistent with a constitutional developmental state espoused by South African laws, such as the Companies Act and the Public Finance Management Act. The King IV Report primarily focuses on governing bodies that make decisions (IODSA, 2016:35). The King IV Report assumes that ethical leadership and accountability promote good corporate governance (see Part 5 King IV, IODSA, 2016:43-73).

The King Report is widely applied in South Africa. Although it is not officially considered a tool for corporate governance in Zimbabwe, it is included in this study to illustrate South Africa's corporate governance standards and guidelines. In this respect, the King Report is a corporate governance benchmark that SOEs can adopt in the SADC region. Although it was not designed to assess sound corporate governance, it is significant because it comprises a set of prescriptive measures to improve sound governance. As highlighted below, the King Report is similar to the National Code for Corporate Governance and the Corporate Governance Framework for State Enterprises and Parastatals because it is a prescriptive framework and a corporate governance benchmark.

3.7.2 Corporate governance shortcomings in Zimbabwe

The public sector corporate culture in Zimbabwe is characterised by underperformance, corruption and poor accountability (Mashavave, 2017:211). The Institute of Directors of Zimbabwe recommends that companies should apply the Combined Code (UK) and the King Report (RSA) guidelines to improve performance and governance (Sifile *et al.*, 2014:79). In light of the public sector management challenges, the government promulgated several corporate governance codes and frameworks for SOEs. This status quo deters socio-economic development because SOEs should provide goods and services that create value for citizens (Muzapu *et al.*, 2016:89). Poor corporate governance in the public sector results from the lack of a structured public sector corporate governance system for stimulating performance management and productivity (Zuva & Zuva, 2018:17; Mashavave, 2017:211).).

3.7.2.1 The National Code of Corporate Governance

The National Code of Corporate Governance (Zimcode) was introduced in 2014 to promote sound corporate governance practices in public sector enterprises and quasi-public institutions that provide public goods and services after a spate of scandals in this sector (Sifile and Dangwa, 2018:66; Chimbari, 2017:213). The Zimcode is a generic corporate governance code designed for all sectors and industries; hence, it has the same guidelines as the King Report (Maune, 2017:447). The Zimcode adopts the "apply or explain" approach where organisations are expected to apply its recommendations or explain reasons for failing to (NCCG, 2014:9). The Code encourages public sector organisations to implement the Corporate Governance Framework guidelines outlined in section 3.7.2.2.

3.7.2.2 Corporate Governance Framework

The GoZ introduced the Corporate Governance Framework for State Enterprises and Parastatals (CGF) in 2010 to promote good corporate ethics, values and practices and solve corporate governance challenges in SOEs (Mashavave, 2017:212). It is a product of extensive consultations between local and international stakeholders (Mashavave, 2017:212; Moyo, 2016:128). The CFG has some elements of the King

Code 3 of Governance for South Africa, the Malawi Code, OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of SOEs and the United States of America's Act on Corporate and Auditing Accountability and Responsibility. The CGF demonstrates the importance of sound corporate practices and accountability in fostering public sector efficiency and socio-economic development. It is a framework which emphasises financial management and accountability. It advises stewards in public sector organisations to be guided by certain sections of the Public Financial Management Act (PFMA).

Assessing the corporate governance frameworks and tools for the Zimbabwean public sector enables this study to discover the strengths, weaknesses and shortcomings of the legal and regulatory framework of public sector cooperate governance. Significant overlaps and contradictions exist between corporate governance frameworks developed by the GoZ for local companies. This means that, unlike in South Africa, where the King Report is universally applied, several corporate governance codes and frameworks are designed for companies in Zimbabwe. This leads to significant confusion as to which codes companies should use. For example, the Zimcode and the CGF recommend the same things, yet other tools exist. Having one corporate governance framework that is constantly updated is advantageous because the policy-makers build on past recommendations and standard practices. The King Reports in South Africa demonstrate this. Even though the King Report has been updated multiple times, it still carries some of the fundamentals of corporate governance. Recent updates are merely a reflection of conventional changes and not paradigmatic shifts. This enables South African companies to improve their corporate governance without gradually discarding the fundamental tenets of the first King Report published in 1994.

3.7.3 The statutory framework of corporate governance in Zimbabwe

This section examines Zimbabwe's statutory (legal) and regulatory framework of good governance.

3.7.3.1 The Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013

The Constitution is key in regulating the use of state resources (Madue, 2007:306). The Constitution of Zimbabwe makes provisions for good corporate governance. In section 3, good governance is listed as one of the founding principles of the Constitution, whereas sections 195 and 198 promote sound corporate governance in the public sector. The Constitution submits that good corporate governance ensures that public sector organisations operate effectively to meet their public service obligations. The Constitution makes provisions for the national assembly to introduce legal instruments for disciplining corporate officials who violate corporate governance codes or standards. Many sections of the Constitution (9(1), 56(2), 73, 165 (1) and (2), 194-198, 255(1), 264, 265(1), 270(1), 298(1) and 308 (2-4)) promote sound corporate governance in the public sector (Moyo, 2016:111).

In a constitutional democracy, the Constitution is the supreme statute that determines the state's conduct and responsibilities. In the case of Zimbabwe, the Constitution supports the promotion of good governance in Zimbabwean society and corporate governance in the public and private sectors. This is a significant point of departure for promoting good governance because the legislature must enact laws that promote sound governance in the country. The constitutional stance on sound governance is a significant step towards ensuring sound governance in Zimbabwe.

3.7.3.2 Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) (chapter 22:19) of 2010

The objective of the Public Finance Management Act is to control, protect and manage public financial resources. Financial management is vital in the public sector because it ensures that financial resources are utilised efficiently and in a manner that creates value for the citizens (Madue, 2007:307). The Act also provides mechanisms for recovering misused public resources from unscrupulous individuals based on the Auditor-General's recommendations. Hence, it makes public officials personally responsible for their conduct and handling of public financial resources. The Act gives the Auditor-General the authority to investigate misuse of public funds and report to the legislature. Section 50 of the Act is consistent with the Constitution because it

regards sound corporate governance practices as a springboard for accountability and performance in the public sector.

In a nutshell, the PFMA views sound corporate governance as an instrument for promoting fiscal accountability and efficiency in the public sector. The importance of public financial management in promoting sound corporate governance cannot be overemphasised because how public finances are managed directly affects public sector accountability and performance (Dube & Murahwe, 2015:760). Hence, the Act is an essential apparatus in corporate governance.

3.7.3.3 Acts for establishing public sector organisations

Corporate governance encapsulates "processes and structures used to direct and manage the business and affairs of an institution to ensure its safety and soundness and enhance shareholder value" (Pfumorodze & Nzunzo, 2010:52). Legislative instruments are part of the structures which ensure that the public sector maintains sound corporate governance practices. Hence, the Zimbabwean legislature is responsible for enacting laws to promote public-sector corporate governance. The legislature enacted several laws in this regard.

The Railways Act (13:09) of 1973 (as amended) provides for the establishment of the National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ) board and ascribes the powers, functions and duties of the general manager (sections 17-22), which include upholding sound corporate governance practices. The Grain Marketing Act (chapter 18:14) of 1966 (as amended), sections 3 to 12, sets out for the establishment of the Grain Marketing Board (GMB). The Act deals with matters of financial accountability and auditing (sections 19-25), daily operations (sections 29-43) and powers, functions and duties of the GMB (sections 26-28). In line with the Constitution, the Act promotes good corporate governance at GMB. The Companies Act of 1952 regulates the conduct of boards and how companies do business with external parties. Despite not dealing specifically with corporate governance, some provisions of the Act (sections 169-189, 340-345) deal with accountability and other matters relating to corporate governance.

The Constitution, the Public Finance Management Act, and Acts providing for establishing SOEs are significant legal mechanisms of corporate governance because they benchmark the conduct of public sector business entities' boards, management and shareholders. By ensuring strict financial management and accountability, the PFMA ensures that the financial resources of SOEs are directed towards providing citizens with essential public services economically. However, the Acts providing for the establishment of SOEs are old and do not consider modern developments in improving corporate governance. While the entire legal and regulatory framework of public entities is dense and falls outside the focus of this study, some laws and regulatory instruments are relevant to corporate governance.

By design, the performance of stewards in public sector organisations is evaluated based on existing legal frameworks. This means that whilst corporate governance frameworks and codes (for example, those discussed in previous sections) are essential in shaping sound corporate practices based mainly on best practices from other countries, boards and principals in Zimbabwean SOEs are still legally bound and guided by legal provisions. This is a significant realisation, particularly in developing a proposed good governance framework, because some corporate governance shortcomings are grounded in antiquated legislation.

3.8 SECTOR-SPECIFIC GOOD GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORKS

The two sector-specific corporate governance tools discussed in this section are for banking and financial services organisations.

3.8.1 Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Corporate Governance Guidelines

Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) Corporate Governance Guidelines (CGG) were introduced in 2004 by the Reserve Bank for institutions operating in the banking and financial services sector following the collapse of several banks (Dube & Murahwe, 2015:760; Pfumorodze & Nzonzo, 2010:51). The CGG regulates the conduct of financial institutions. Before the guidelines were introduced, there was little regulation in the sector. The Guidelines promote good corporate governance by introducing

regulations promoting accountability and professionalism, such as regulating the rights, duties and responsibilities of shareholders and the board and stipulating that six of the ten directors of a banking institution should not be non-executive members of any other banking institution (Dube & Murahwe, 2015:760). Additionally, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chief Accounting Officer (CAO) should be approved by the RBZ. The guidelines separate ownership and the management of banks by prescribing that an individual with at least 10% share ownership cannot be part of the bank's management (Pfumorodze & Nzunzo, 2010:60).

The current study does not focus on financial institutions in Zimbabwe; however, the CGG was included because it demonstrates that some sectors in Zimbabwe have dedicated corporate governance frameworks. The CGG illustrates that principals' (the line ministry of SOEs) intervention can be deployed to ensure that SOEs adhere to corporate governance practices. This is essential for the study because it demonstrates the feasibility of sectoral corporate governance frameworks for public-sector enterprises.

3.8.2 Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Listing Requirements

The ZSE introduced the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) Listing Requirements for listed companies. The ZSE was established in 1896 as a platform for mining companies to raise equity to finance their operations. ZSE is a corporate body regulated by the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Act of 1996 and supervised by the Ministry of Finance. The purpose of the Listing Requirements is to benchmark the corporate conduct of listed companies. Section 7.F. 5 of the ZSE Listing Requirements requires companies to prove that they applied and complied with the Code of Corporate Practice and Conduct in the Cadbury or the King Report. The disclosure lets investors and shareholders assess a company's corporate governance record. Section 8.52 of the Listing Requirements requires listed companies to reflect on compliance with corporate governance codes in their financial statements (ZSE, 2002).

In a nutshell, the Listing Requirements contribute towards sound corporate governance in Zimbabwe by ensuring that listed companies and their associates

uphold standard corporate practices. The Listing Requirements are unique because they seek to regulate the corporate conduct of listed companies and their associates by setting the minimum corporate governance requirements. Therefore, the requirements are efficient mechanisms for promoting good corporate governance in the local business sector.

3.9 CONCLUSION

The chapter demonstrated the importance of assessing governance in Zimbabwe because studies demonstrate a correlation between good governance and socioeconomic development. From a public policy-making perspective, assessing good governance is essential because it enables the state to gauge its performance and the efficiency of delivering public goods. This also enables it to reflect on core governance issues such as human rights, citizen participation and accountability. In addition, this chapter dealt with instruments and frameworks for assessing good governance. These instruments were carefully chosen to focus on various aspects of good governance, such as eradicating corruption, government performance, service delivery, human rights and socio-economic development. Therefore, the researcher discovered that instruments for measuring sound governance vary based on the assessment of good governance. The three levels (categories) of assessing governance discussed in this chapter are global, continental and regional instruments. Global instruments include the CPI, WGI, and CPIA. Continental tools of assessing sound governance are tools adapted for use in Africa. The IAG is comprehensive because it covers many countries and broadly defines good governance. Other tools include APRM and Afrobarometer. Although they are designated continental instruments, they do not focus on the entire continent. The chapter highlighted that, despite numerous references to good governance in the bloc's strategic policies, the SADC does not have an instrument for assessing sound governance.

This chapter is a significant study component because it analyses objective and subjective instruments for assessing good governance in Zimbabwe. The information generated from this chapter demonstrates poor governance in the country. Data from several global and regional institutions support this. This information is vital in

developing the proposed good governance framework because it shows that the good governance goals espoused in the Zimbabwean Constitution have not been accomplished. From the researcher's point of view, this supports the hypothesis that there is a poor institutional capacity to sustain good governance in Zimbabwe. Hence, the next chapter collects empirical data from bureaucrats in public sector institutions and companies and non-state role players from non-governmental organisations involved in promoting good governance in Zimbabwe.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ROLE OF STATE INSTITUTIONS IN PROMOTING GOOD GOVERNANCE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter explored local, regional and international instruments for assessing good governance. The underlying objective of the chapter was to fulfil the second research objective of the study. The current chapter fulfils the third research objective by examining the role of state institutions in promoting good governance and sound corporate values in the public sector. This chapter lays the groundwork for reporting findings generated from field data. These will be dealt with in the next chapter. This thesis is grounded in the supposition that various state institutions are instrumental in ensuring good governance. This chapter outlines how and why governments establish public sector institutions to ensure that the government is transparent, accountable, effective, efficient and sustainable. To this end, the purpose of this chapter is twofold; it analyses the role of state institutions, independent commissions and state-owned enterprises in promoting sound governance and compares them with state institutions from the United Kingdom and South Africa. In addition, the chapter explores international best practices that can be adopted in Zimbabwe to address challenges and shortcomings associated with public sector institutions.

This chapter outlines the origins, establishment, legal and regulatory framework, composition, mandate and functions and duties of the Auditor-General, Human Rights Commission (Zimbabwe), the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission and selected state-owned enterprises in Zimbabwe and compares them with their counterparts in the UK and South Africa. The researcher will subsequently explore the international best practices of sound corporate governance based on lessons and experiences from selected UK and South African public institutions. These include oversight institutions

such as the Public Protector, Human Rights Commission (SA), Comptroller Auditor General, and selected South African state-owned companies.

4.2 INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT INSTITUTIONS IN ZIMBABWE AND SELECTED COUNTRIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Chapter two of this study examined theoretical perspectives of traditional Public Administration, New Public Management, governance and good governance. It illustrated that modern governance should be collaborative, inclusive, accountable, transparent and efficient (Devi (2015:79; Almqvist *et al.*, 2013:480). Chapter three examined instruments of assessing good governance and sound corporate values in public sector institutions. The instruments examined elements of governance such as transparency, efficiency, accountability and the rule of law. Theories, frameworks and the information reviewed in the previous chapters will be incomplete without assessing how state institutions and state-owned enterprises contribute to good governance and sound corporate governance. This is so because public institutions are the *loci* of sound governance in a modern state. This highlights issues such as efficiency, effectiveness, the rule of law, transparency and accountability in a contemporary state. These issues will be examined under the state governance philosophy of *trias politica*. *Trias politica* is a state governance ideology that seeks to separate the legal, administrative and political authority within a state. It is famously known as the principle of internal “checks and balances” within a state (Mathebula & Munzhedzi, 2017:7). The notion of checks and balances denotes that a transparent and accountable government is a product of allocating specific powers and responsibilities to distinct institutions of the state (Mojapelo, 2013:37). Separation of powers ensures that the authority of a single arm of the state does not supersede or impede the authority of other arms of the state (Sultana, 2012:55). This doctrine allows arms of the state to monitor and regulate each other. In Zimbabwe, the Constitution reiterates that separation of powers is the bedrock of good governance.

The Constitution ensures transparent and accountable governance guided by the rule of law, protection of human rights, and fulfilment of citizens' needs. State institutions such as the Auditor–General, Human Rights Commission, and the Anti–Corruption

Commission oversee, monitor and regulate the state's authority. In this study, the *trias politica* philosophy will be applied to analyse how various state institutions ensure that the state efficiently fulfils its mandate. From a good governance perspective, this takes the form of public accountability, public sector efficiency, effective service delivery and the protection of human rights.

The current chapter is significant in fulfilling the overall objective of developing a good governance framework for the GoZ because it explores public institutions' existing legal and institutional status. The sequel of the current exploration is the collection of field data vital in developing a good governance framework.

4.2.1 Oversight responsibilities of the Office of the Auditor-General

Globally, Auditor-Generals are public audit institutions responsible for promoting sound financial management and accountability in the public sector (Talbot & Wiggan, 2010:58). Studies and research in good governance pay attention to the functions of a state auditor because sound public financial management and accountability are key pillars of good governance (Hatchard (2018:51). According to Khotami (2017:31), accountability is a basic tenet of good governance. It enables public leaders to account for decisions and actions to utilise and manage public resources. This is essential because it allows citizens to assess whether state resources are being used to fulfil their needs (Rai, 2015:5). For this reason, it is conventional for governments to establish the Office of the Auditor-General to monitor financial management in the public sector (Hatchard, 2018:51). This is crucial because the state has a dual and concurrent duty to generate revenue from collecting taxes and spend the money to fulfil various public needs (Rai, 2015:5). The literature reviewed in the previous chapter highlighted the extent of abuse and misappropriation of financial resources in the public sector, particularly in Sub-Saharan countries. The Auditor-General unearths these cases and brings them to the attention of lawmakers.

Without independent intervention, there will be a conflict of interests within the state because a body or entity cannot collect and spend public funds without external oversight. To this end, establishing a state auditor is consistent with the *trias politica* philosophy underscored above because it enables an independent institution to

scrutinise the state's accounts. Independent state audit institutions are vital because they ensure the state is accountable for managing and utilising public financial resources. In practice, an independent and impartial public audit institution safeguards the interests of the public by overseeing the activities and financial decisions of public leaders and office bearers and reporting to the legislature. This arrangement was designed to promote public accountability. As the custodian of popular interests, Parliament has the authority and means to follow up on issues raised by the Auditor-General.

4.2.1.1 The Auditor-General (Zimbabwe)

The Auditor-General (AG) (Zimbabwe) is an independent state audit institution whose establishment is provided for by s309 and s311 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (Matamande, 2016:1). The AG, formerly known as the Comptroller and Auditor-General (C&AG), was first established in 1915 when an Independent Auditor was appointed to audit revenues and expenditures of the Rhodesian colony. The Independent Auditor was formalised in 1924 through the Audit and Exchequer Act (19/24) of 1924 (Zhou & Zinyama, 2012:225). The AG's office consists of 218 auditors and 40 support staff members. It is made up of four divisions, with each division being led by a Deputy Auditor-General. The AG oversees the activities of the four divisions (Auditor-General Zimbabwe, 2021). AG has to ensure that public resources are managed efficiently, effectively and economically (Zinyama, 2013:272).

For this reason, the AG audits government institutions (including provincial, district and local authorities) and makes recommendations to Parliament (s309(2), Constitution). This enables the AG to safeguard public resources, promote value for public money, and ensure that public sector financial controls are adequate and consistent with the provisions of the Constitution and related public financial management legislation (s5, Audit Office Act, 22:18 of 2010). The duties of the AG can be summarised as follows:

- to examine, inquire into, and audit accounts of public institutions on behalf of Parliament;
- to safeguard public financial resources at the behest of the state; and

- prepare and submit reports and do any other duties conferred by the Act.

In light of the above outline, it is apt to state that the AG in Zimbabwe is a gatekeeper of transparency and accountability (Hatchard, 2018:51,77; Matamande, 2016:1). The AG should be independent and impartial to effectively discharge its mandate (Makwetu, 2019:3-4; Hatchard, 2018:51; Raj, 2015:7). This is vital given that public financial accountability deals with the conduct of public officials and office-bearers who possess significant power and influence. Therefore, as an independent institution, the AG should be immune and protected from undue influence and pressure from public officials. The Constitution and the Audit Office Act direct the AG to present reports and findings to Parliament. This promotes transparency and accountability because it provides an avenue for Parliament to exercise oversight in the financial conduct of public institutions by scrutinising the financial transactions of government agencies (Zhou, 2012:157). This is a significant aspect of good governance because it ensures that public resources are expended as per the government's public policies and social needs (Khotami, 2017:31; Raj, 2015:5). In this regard, the AG, as a representative of the citizenry, scrutinises government accounts as an intervention to promote accountability.

The connection between accountability and good governance was underscored in the previous chapters and section 4.2.1 of this thesis. Chapter 3 outlined the significance of public accountability as an indicator of good governance. Based on the work of Matamande (2016), Hatchard (2016), Zhou (2012) and other contemporary researchers, it will suffice to underscore the vital role of an independent and effective AG in promoting good governance in Zimbabwe. To provide a basis for comparative analysis between the AG in Zimbabwe and those in South Africa and the UK and to draw lessons and experiences, the following two sections outline the composition, functions, duties, and purpose of the Auditor General in those countries. Subsequently, the researcher will analyse the international best practices that the AG can adopt.

4.2.1.2 The Auditor-General (South Africa)

The Constitution of South Africa lays the groundwork for accountable and efficient management of public resources. In s188, it provides for the establishment of the Auditor-General (South Africa) (AGSA), a “supreme audit institution” (Nzewi & Musokeru, 2014:36) that safeguards the efficient and accountable management of public financial resources (Matlala & Uwizeyimana, 2020:1; Matamande, 2016:5). The AGSA was established on the 31st of March 1910. It became functional on the 12th of May 1911 when the Exchequer and Audit Act, 21 of 1911, was passed. The subsequent enactment of the Amendment Act, 123 of 1992 guaranteed the AG’s independence and autonomy to operate without interference from the government (Nzewi & Musokeru, 2014:38). The AG as an organisation consists of the Auditor-General, the Deputy Auditor-General, the National Leader: Audit Services and the National Leader: Internal Operations and Audit Support. The National Leader: Audit Services manages corporate executives in nine provincial divisions of the country, and the National Leader: Internal Operations and Audit Support oversees internal functions such as human resources, finance and quality control (AGSA, 2021).

The AGSA reports public financial management matters to Parliament (s188(1), Constitution; Public Audit Amendment Act 5 of 2018). It is a tool the Parliament uses to monitor and scrutinise financial transactions in government institutions. This mandate is fulfilled by auditing accounts of public institutions, agencies and municipalities and investigating wastefulness and misuse of public funds (Nzewi & Musokeru, 2014:36; Thornhill, 2011b:81). Auditing public accounts is an essential element of good governance in South Africa because it promotes accountability and transparency (Fakie cited in Matlala & Uwizeyimana, 2020:3). The system of government in South Africa provides the Parliament with the means and instruments to hold officials in the public sector accountable (Munzhedzi, 2016:2). The role of the AGSA is to provide Parliament with information on how public institutions are managing their finances. An example of this is information contained in Table 1 below.

The Oversight and Accountability Model adopted by Parliament uses Committee Hearings such as the Standing Committees on Public Accounts (SCOPA) and Commissions of Enquiry to hold public officials accountable for financial misconduct

and wastefulness (Malapane, 2016:136). Public accountability is based on the findings and reports of the AGSA. This highlights the vital role of the AG in enhancing good governance through public accountability (Matlala & Uwizeyimana, 2020:3).

Public audits also build and inspire confidence among CSOs, the donor community, and multilateral institutions (Korje, 2016:21). This is vital under the governance philosophy discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, which requires state and non-state players to work together to solve social challenges. The pillars of good governance, such as the economic utilisation of resources, the rule of law, sustainability and public responsiveness, depend on the transparent and effective utilisation of public resources (Matshabaphala, 2014:1009). For this reason, public audits are vital for promoting good governance and the financial integrity of public institutions (Fray, 2020; Imiera, 2020; Krsteski, 2017; Khanyane & Sausi, 2015). In the absence of a longitudinal statistical analysis of the AG's findings, it is not easy to assess the impact of the AGSA in enhancing public sector accountability. However, Table 4.1 below summarises audit outcomes from 2016 to 2020.

Table 4.1: Auditor-General findings

SOEs Audit areas	2019-2020	2018-2019	2017-2018
Unqualified with no findings	65	60	56
Unqualified with findings	94	107	116
Qualified with findings	45	47	58
Adverse with findings	3	4	4
Disclaimed with findings	17	9	23
Outstanding audits	35	36	5
Quality of published financial statements	70%	54%	75%
Quality of published performance reports	89%	63%	64%
Compliance with legislation	30%	8%	88%
Irregular expenditure	R 68 billion	R 1.125 billion	R 1.9 billion
Financial health		42%	69%

Source: Researcher's design adapted from the PFMA Consolidated General Report on National and Provincial Audit Outcomes (2021; 2020; 2019; 2018)

Table 4.1 indicates the AG's successes and its ability to consistently audit public sector accounts annually and report findings for public consideration. However, the reports indicate that the management of public resources in SOEs and other government institutions did not marginally improve during the period under review. It regressed noticeably. For example, the table shows that the public finances lost through irregular expenditure grew exponentially in 2019/2020. This indicates that the government should develop proactive interventions for curbing financial mismanagement and unaccountability in the public sector. State audit institutions are crucial in managing public financial resources. However, it is not easy to quantitatively assess their impact because several intervening variables can be responsible for specific audit outcomes (Otetea *et al.,* 2015:621). These include improved or regressed financial management, record keeping and accounting and stiff penalties for mismanaging public finances. Nevertheless, a study conducted by Pollitt, Xavier, Lonsdale, Mul, Summa and Waerness (1999) indicate that the performance of state auditing institutions in the UK,

Finland and Sweden influenced changes in the financial decisions and conduct of public officials in the public sector.

4.2.1.3 The Comptroller and Auditor General (United Kingdom)

The Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG) (UK) heads the National Auditing Office (NAO). According to the National Audit Office (2021), the NAO, in its current form, has existed since 1983. However, the state function of auditing government expenditures has a more extended history. The earliest reference to the Auditor Exchequer was made in 1314. In 1559, the Crown established the Auditors of the Imprest; the Commissioners for Auditing the Public Accounts succeeded it in 1780. In 1866, Parliament formalised the audit institution through the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act of 1866. This is regarded as the establishment of the C&AG (National Audit Office, 2021).

The C&AG comprises 800 staff members (National Audit Office, 2021). It is an independent “supreme audit institution (SAI)” responsible for evaluating the economy, effectiveness and efficiency (3E’s) of government operations (Ostrusinova & Pastuszkova, 2012:171). The C&AG ensures that the performance of public institutions is in line with economic principles of affordability, reasonable expenditure and sustainability. Therefore, the C&AG has to ensure that the UK government manages public resources economically by prioritising the pressing needs of citizens. This means that government has to find efficient and effective ways of fulfilling public needs. The critical aspect of the economic utilisation of public resources is avoiding wastefulness.

The Westminster model embeds the state’s audit institution in the system of parliamentary accountability. Under this model, parliament authorises public spending by state departments and institutions whilst the C&AG audits government accounts to ensure that public resources are used to fulfil the goals of the government (Talbot & Wiggan, 2010:58). The model imposes the duty of auditing public accounts on a single official or institution, namely; the C&AG. The auditor’s primary mandate is to ensure that public funds are utilised efficiently, economically and effectively (the “3Es”) (Hafiz, 2020; Zinyama, 2013:273). Therefore, reporting findings to Parliament retains the

legislature's prerogative and authority to enforce public accountability. This is significant in light of the UK's parliamentary democracy, where elected Parliamentarians directly represent the aspirations of their constituencies (Zhou & Zinyama, 2021:224).

The C&AG is remunerated from a Consolidated Fund (Morin & Hazgui, 2016:568), separate from the salary bureau of civil servants and public officials. This provides NAO personnel with the much-needed independence and job security not directly controlled by public officials they audit. This technique ensured that the C&AG does not fall under the Ministry of Finance. The Consolidated Fund is the primary public account in the budgetary system of the United Kingdom. The Parliament should authorise payments and other transactions from this account. Legislation regulating this fund requires the government to forward requests to Parliament beforehand (Morin & Hazgui, 2016:568). Regarding the C&AG, the Consolidated Fund is significant because it gives the Parliament (not government or public officials) authority over the remuneration and conditions of employment for the NAO personnel. This insulates the C&AG from unprocedural termination and censures from public officials.

The NAO is a member of the European Organisation of Supreme Audits Institutions (EUROSAI) and the International Organisation of Supreme Audits Institutions (INTOSAI). These international audit institutions govern and regulate state auditors' functions (Otetea, Tita & Ungureanu, 2015:622-623). What sets the C&AG (UK) apart from other state auditors globally is that they are mandated not only to audit but ensure that there is "value-for-money" (VFM) in the public sector. Hence, value for money is a metric for assessing whether government expenditure is economic, efficient and effective. This means that apart from following public financial management protocols, public leaders and office bearers should create value for citizens by spending public resources in line with citizens' needs (Morin & Hazgui, 2016:568).

VFM ensures that public funds are not wasted on projects that do not create value for citizens. This aspect of accountability resonates with sustainability and public sector efficiency. These are key pillars of good governance; they stipulate that the utilisation of state resources should reflect the needs and aspirations of citizens (Devi, 2015:79). Similarly, to the AG in Zimbabwe and South Africa, the C&AG promotes good

governance in the public sector by ensuring that public officials and office bearers manage state resources as per public financial management protocols. This promotes accountability, transparency and value for money in the public sector. This is consistent with the tenets of good governance outlined in Chapters 1 and 2 of this study. The key takeaway is that the C&AG strengthens good governance in the UK through transparent, economic and efficient management of public funds (Matamande, 2016:5; Zinyama, 2013:273). The literature reviewed above shows the similarities and differences between state audit institutions in Zimbabwe, South Africa, and the UK. These are accentuated in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2: The differences and similarities between the AG in Zimbabwe, South Africa and the C&AG

Criteria	A-G in Zimbabwe	A-G in South Africa	C&AG in the UK
Legal framework	Audit Office Act, 12 of 2010; Audit and Exchequer Act (19/24) of 1924; Constitution, 2013	Exchequer and Audit Act, 1911; Public Audit Amendment Act of 2018; Constitution, 1996.	Exchequer and Audit Departments Act of 1866; National Audit Act of 1983
Mandate and purpose	Ensures efficiency, effectiveness and economy in public resources management	Promotes financial accountability in the public sector	Ensuring value for public money (VFM)
Functions and duties	Auditing government revenues and expenditures	Audits government institutions at the national, provincial and local government level	Auditing government accounts, authorising public spending
Composition	Auditor-General, 4 Deputy AGs, 218 auditors, 40 staffers	A-G, Deputy AGs, National Leader: Internal Operations and Audits, National Leader: Audit Services, staffers	C&AG is head of NAO (800 staffers). NAO has ties to international institutions (EUROSAI & INTOSAI)
Scope of audit	Government institutions and departments, including provincial, district and local authorities	Government institutions and departments at the national, provincial and local government level	Public sector institutions, government departments, local governments

Status of institution	Statutory independent body	Independent institution	Independent institution
Nature of reporting	Annual reports to Parliament, recommendations to a parliamentary committee on public accounts	Reports to Parliament and makes recommendations to SCOPA	Reports to Parliament through the Committee of Public Accounts; produces VFM reports during the year

Source: Researcher's own composition

4.2.1.4 International best practices for a state audit institution

Table 4.2 highlights the differences and similarities between the AG in Zimbabwe and South Africa and the C&AG in the UK. This section draws best practices and lessons from the AGSA C&AG (UK) that can be emulated by the AG (Zimbabwe). These are treated as international best practices. These are value-for-money auditing in the public sector and remunerating the AG from a consolidated fund. This study posits that adopting these practices will enhance the AG's efficacy and independence in Zimbabwe.

4.2.1.4.1 Value for money auditing

VFM is an auditing philosophy assessing whether the government uses public resources efficiently to meet citizens' needs. This school of thought is associated with the economic concept of cost-benefit analysis. In public accounting, this concept is used by governments to attain the desired service delivery outcomes at minimum costs (Barr & Christie, 2015:1). VFM auditing is rooted in the New Public Management ideology. Its genesis is associated with a drive towards efficient and economic use of finite public resources to meet the growing needs of citizens. Hence, the objective of VFM is to sparingly use scarce public resources to meet dynamic citizens' needs. VFM audits (also known as performance audits) aim to improve the performance of public sector organisations by assessing the efficiency, effectiveness, and economy of government expenditures (Alwardat, Benamraoui & Rieple, 2015:208). These audits are consistent with sound governance principles because they are grounded in efficiency and sustainability. In a study of sub-Saharan governments, Ghirmai

(2011:3396) underscored that good governance encourages governments to manage state resources sparingly, transparently, and efficiently to meet citizens' social and economic needs.

The UK public sector auditor emphasises VFM auditing in government accounts (Barr & Christie, 2015:1). A discussion about how the C&AG audits government accounts to ascertain if public resources were utilised efficiently, effectively and economically was provided in 4.2.1.3. Preventing wastefulness, extravagance, or fruitless expenditure is the hallmark of VFM auditing (Zinyama, 2013:273). The extent of waste in the public sector in Zimbabwe shows that apart from financial management irregularities, there is no value for money in public spending. This is a significant shortcoming in terms of public financial management. As a result, the state audit function should leverage value-for-money audits to ensure that public spending is consistent with citizens' needs and the government's public policies. In this case, the UK provides a good best practice that the AG can adopt. How government accounts are audited in the UK demonstrates that VFM is an international best practice enabling the government to monitor public accounts.

This characterisation of VFM auditing shows that it is a valuable tool for the AG in Zimbabwe because it will enable the state, through Parliament, to assess if public resources were spent consistently with citizens' needs. Alwardat *et al.* (2015:211) suggest that value-for-money audits differ from generic audits because VFM audits go beyond determining if basic accounting and financial management procedures were followed in government spending by assessing the value created for citizens. In this regard, they focus on whether government organisations created value for citizens. This is an effective way of rooting out wastefulness, fruitless expenditure and unsustainable government spending because it aligns citizens' needs and wishes with the government's expenses. This type of auditing is crucial in the public sector because it reports its progress towards providing essential public services. Therefore, a public auditing function devoid of VFM will not effectively contribute to public sector accountability because most financial abuse cases in the public sector are wasteful and commit public resources to frivolous programmes. For this reason, this study posits that the AG will be more effective in promoting transparency and accountability if the institution conducts value-for-money audits in the public sector.

4.2.1.4.2 Independence of the AG

A setback of the AG (Zimbabwe) is that it does not have sufficient independence in terms of administration, conditions of service and staff remuneration. Matamande (2016:1) argues that this deviating from global best practices of government auditing has rendered the AG inefficient. In the UK, The National Audit Act of 1983 made the C&AG accountable to the House of Commons, not the Treasury. This ensures that the C&AG is not under the department responsible for handling government finances. This would create a conflict of interest and develop avenues for dereliction of duty by the C&AG.

The Act further stipulates that the Kingdom's Crown should appoint the C&AG and that he/she can be removed via a joint sanction from the House of Lords and the House of Commons (Zinyama, 2013:273). This arrangement ensures that the C&AG is independent and only accountable to the legislature. Therefore, such a setup allows the C&AG to discharge duties objectively and independently. The NAO, of which the C&AG is the head, is only accountable to Parliament because it is independent of the government. The employees of the NAO and C&AG are not regarded as civil servants, and their salaries are paid from the UK's Consolidated Fund. In contrast, civil servants' salaries are paid from their departmental votes. Paying the C&AG from the Consolidated Fund ensures that the executive does not sway or intimidate them. The reason behind this arrangement is to have an audit institution that is not beholden to the executive or public leaders (Zinyama, 2013:273). This is crucial since executive members are responsible for spending and managing public resources. Hence, they are usually at the centre of public sector audits.

The above submission means that the AG in Zimbabwe can benefit from financial and administrative independence. Gustavon (2015:7) cautions against undermining the importance of an independent state auditor. Auditing in the public sector is grounded in the principal-agent theory. Public sector audits ensure that Parliament – as the citizens' proxy (principal) – has control over the executive arm of the state (agents). There should be a separation between the auditor and the agents (Matamande, 2016:1) for this system to be effective. The current legal framework of the AG gives the executive (President), in consultation with the Public Service Commission, the

authority to hire the AG (Zhou & Zinyama, 2012:232). This deviates from the international norm of giving Parliament the hiring authority. Zhou (2012:157) observes that the independence of the AG is further compromised by putting it under the Ministry of Finance. The AG does not have "an independent budgetary vote" immune from executive control. De Vos (2013:167) describes how the executive can use government budgets and cut public spending to deprive state institutions of resources critical for operation. Therefore, the executive can use budget cuts to control an unfavourable AG. Zhou (2012:157) further states that the AG submits reports and findings to Parliament via the Treasury. This arrangement reduces the AG to being under the Treasury.

Some researchers report that the independence and efficiency of the AG in Zimbabwe are severely compromised (Matamande, 2016:1; Zinyama, 2013). This significantly impacts the quality of its findings. The best practices discussed above indicate that the independence of the AG can be strengthened by separating it from government control and by remunerating the AG and its staff from a Consolidated Fund that Parliament administers. This institutional arrangement ensures that the AG is autonomous and immune from direct executive control. This is vital because the executive implements public policies using state resources. This is where most of the mismanagement, misuse and wastefulness of public resources occur. Thus, naturally, the executive is usually the object of public accounts. Therefore, having the AG accountable or closely affiliated with the executive exposes them to intimidation, dependence and inefficiency.

4.2.2 The oversight role of human rights commissions

Core elements of good governance explored in chapters 1 and 2 of this study promote the realisation of fundamental human rights and freedoms espoused in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Brown, 2016:106). According to the OHCHR (2021), “good governance and human rights are mutually reinforcing” because standards of human rights “provide a set of values to guide the work of governments and other political and social actors”. Fundamentally, human rights and freedoms are associated with good governance because citizens’ human rights cannot be protected by a government that does not adhere to good governance principles and *vice versa*. This

conceptualisation of governance puts human rights organisations at the forefront of promoting good governance.

The philosophical standpoint adopted by this study is influenced and supported by the works of Reif (2001) in "*Building Democratic Institutions: The Role of National Human Rights Institutions in Good Governance and Human Rights Protection"*. Reif (2001) suggests that protecting citizens' rights and the quest for good governance are interconnected. The argument is grounded in the belief that human rights institutions coincidentally promote good governance to ensure that citizens enjoy basic rights and civil liberties. This school of thought becomes plausible in light of the significant association between human rights and economic development. In this regard, good governance principles such as accountability, transparency, effectiveness and efficiency consistently promote citizens' socio-economic rights.

The key takeaway is that a responsible, participatory, effective and accountable government will likely observe and promote citizens' basic and socio-economic rights. A longitudinal study of 139 countries spanning over three decades indicated a strong association between economic growth and development and the protection of human rights. The study stated that autocratic governments with poor human rights records have low economic growth (Cole, 2016:375). Similarly, quantitative data collected over the past few decades indicate a strong correlation between the protection of human rights and economic development (Lucena, 2013:146).

This study subscribes to the notion of a nexus between protecting human rights, economic development and good governance. This notion maintains that citizens' social, economic and political rights and principles of good governance, such as economic utilisation of public resources efficiently and effectively, citizen participation, accountability, transparency, building consensus and equity overlap (Kumar 2003:284-284).

With the above-mentioned scholarly views in mind, this study posits that an analysis of good governance cannot exclude the role of institutions or bodies that promote, safeguard or raise awareness about human rights. The researcher is aware that this contentious academic standpoint will likely generate contrary views, particularly in light

of countries such as China, which underwent massive economic development against the backdrop of a poor human rights record. Nonetheless, barring the Chinese case, findings from several studies support the school of thought mentioned above. Hence, in the context of a developing country, human rights are essential because for the added reason that they are a condition attached to debt cancellation, the ability to borrow from multilateral institutions and foreign investment. Zimbabwe is a perfect example because it forewent international support, debt cancellation and multilateral aid from the Western world because of its poor human rights record (Grebe, 2010:8-13).

Following a demonstration of state institutions' role in human rights, the following sections analyse the functions and purpose of the human rights commissions in Zimbabwe and South Africa.

4.2.2.1 Human Rights Commission (Zimbabwe)

S242 of the Constitution provides for the establishment of a human rights commission. The ZHRC was established in 2009. It first became functional in March 2010 when the Chairperson and Commissioners of the ZHRC were formally appointed (Chiduza, 2015:151). The ZHRC comprises ten commissioners, a management team of 8 people, general personnel based in Bulawayo and Harare and local and international partners such as the European Union representatives in Zimbabwe, Swedish and German Embassies and the Raoul Wallenberg Institute (Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission, 2021). S243 of the Constitution states that the functions of the Commission include the following:

- “Promoting awareness of human rights.
- Promoting the protection, respect, and attainment of human rights and freedoms.
- Receiving human rights complaints and launching investigations.
- Monitoring, assessing, and ensuring the observance of human rights and freedoms.
- Protecting the public from misuse of state authority.

- Direct law enforcement agents to investigate cases of human rights abuse.
- Recommending to Parliament effective measures of promoting human rights and freedoms".

Furthermore, the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission Act, 2 of 2012 states that its functions include the following:

- "conducting, investigating and receiving complaints;
- visiting and inspecting prisons, detention centres and institutions housing people with mental health conditions and intellectually challenged people to observe the living conditions of inmates;
- providing redress and justice for human rights violations; and
- making recommendations to the government regarding human rights issues in Zimbabwe".

As examined above, human rights and the quest for good governance are mutually reinforcing. The Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC) and the courts are the two main institutions responsible for enforcing human rights in Zimbabwe (Kondo, 2017:165, 176). In light of this notion, the ZHRC plays a part in promoting good governance because it ensures that the government respects citizens' human rights and complies with conventional principles of the rule of law, fairness, and justice (Chitimira & Mokone, 2016:3). Chiduza (2015:152) makes a strong case for creating an enabling environment where a human rights commission can carry out its mandate without hindrance from the state by suggesting that merely establishing a human rights watchdog is insufficient, particularly in a tumultuous and politically charged environment. Therefore, the GoZ should ensure that the ZHRC is independent, accessible, accountable and has a clear mandate that is not bound by the private interests of the appointing authority or other state or non-state players (Kondo, 2017:179; Chiduza, 2015:152-174); this means that the independence of the ZHRC is vital.

In a nutshell, the ZHRC guards against abuse of authority by state or state officials, raising awareness on human rights matters (Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission,

2021; Kondo, 2017:192; Chiduza, 2015:152). It promotes the rule of law and accountability in Zimbabwe by ensuring that the government does not violate Constitutional provisions, international treaties, statutes, and obligations related to human rights (Kondo, 2017:176). This is a critical function in Zimbabwe, where allegations of human rights violations are rampant (Chitimira & Mokone, 2017; Chitimira & Mokone, 2016). The existence of the ZHRC in Zimbabwe's governance system further supports the *trias politica* ideology discussed earlier in this chapter because the ZHRC has a distinct regulatory role. It oversees the deployment of state resources and state autonomy on its citizens. From a constitutional standpoint, this provides citizens with an avenue for protection against abuse of authority by public officials. As a signatory to several international human rights treaties, the GoZ must engage and cooperate with the ZHRC.

Given the considerable authority yielded by the state, the ZHRC is a crucial public institution. Although it does not possess prosecutorial authority, the ZHRC contributes towards human rights protection by advising the National Prosecuting Authority to take judicial action when citizens' rights are violated (Chitimira & Mokone, 2016:3). Lack of prosecutorial authority does not diminish the impact of the ZHRC because the constitution allows it to make recommendations that other agencies of the state should follow up on (Kondo, 2017:178).

It can be concluded that the ZHRC serves an essential purpose in promoting good governance, particularly in a developing country such as Zimbabwe, where the state's authority is routinely used to violate citizens' rights. It provides citizens with a platform for redress and representation against the unjust use of state power. As an independent state institution, the ZHRC has the resources and capacity to shield citizens from uncontested use of state authority. It counterbalances state authority, particularly from the executive. This is an essential aspect of "checks and balances" because it oversees how the government uses the state's authority. The major drawback of the ZHRC is that it does not have a clear mandate to focus on socio-economic rights.

4.2.2.2 The Human Rights Commission (South Africa)

The South Africa Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) is one of the Chapter 9 institutions responsible for overseeing and supporting a constitutional democratic dispensation in South Africa (Mojapelo & Ngoepe, 2017:28). The SAHRC was brought into existence by provisions of the interim 1993 South African constitution. It became operational on the 2nd of October 1995. The Commission ensures that state and non-state entities do not violate the citizens' rights outlined in the Bill of Rights in the Constitution (Mojapelo & Ngoepe, 2017:28). The SAHRC gets its mandate from s183 of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996 and the South Africa Human Rights Commission Act, 40 of 2013. The Commission's management comprises a Chief Executive Officer, a chairperson, a deputy chairperson and six commissioners (SAHRC, 2016; Thipanyane, 2016:126).

The SAHRC monitors, assesses and promotes human and socio-economic rights, such as access to basic services and economic opportunities (Kondo, 2017:178). It achieves this by conducting investigations into the socioeconomic conditions of communities and collating the information in the Economic and Social Reports. The reports provide the government with information about the state of socio-economic rights in the country (Kondo, 2017:178). The South Africa Human Rights Commission Act, 40 of 2013 outlines its functions, duties and composition. They include to –

- monitor compliance and implementation of international human rights treaties and charters, which South Africa is a signatory of;
- review state's human rights policies and make recommendations, if necessary;
- educate and raise public awareness of human rights issues;
- cooperate with institutions with similar objectives to SAHRC;
- undertake studies to enhance the performance of the Commission;
- make recommendations to state organs where human rights interventions are required; and
- prepare and submit human rights reports to Parliament.

Thipanyane (2016:126) maintains that the SAHRC is essential in stabilising the post-colonial South African state. The author suggests that after the first democratic

elections that transferred political authority to the ANC's government, the country was at risk of sliding back into aggression due to the new government's inexperience and desire to maintain power. This would have encouraged the government to use the pre-independence repressive security apparatus to suppress dissent like some post-colonial African governments (Greffrath, 2017:14). This would have resulted in massive human rights violations. Thus, Thipanyane (2016) opines that post-1994, it was necessary to establish an independent human rights institution to monitor and curb the abuse of state power. He further argues that Chapter 9 institutions collectively assist the state in its quest for good governance.

In summary, the functions and duties carried out by the SAHRC significantly contribute towards good governance in South Africa (Thipanyane, 2016:131). According to Kondo (2017:178), the overall purpose of the SAHRC is to promote citizens' human and socio-economic rights of designated groups (e.g. blacks, coloureds, women). In light of this statement, this study maintains that the SAHRC is a crucial state institution. It contributes towards good governance by ensuring that the state's authority is used according to global standards of democracy, the rule of law, service delivery, transparency and responsiveness (see OHCHR, 2021; Mojapelo & Ngoepe, 2017:41,45,47; Kumar, 2003:283; Rief, 2000). Table 4.3 highlights the similarities and differences between the ZHRC and the SAHRC.

Table 4 3: Similarities and differences between the ZHRC and the SAHRC

Criteria	Human Rights Commission (Zimbabwe)	Human Rights Commission (South Africa)
Legal and regulatory framework	Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission Act, 2 of 2012; Constitution	South Africa Human Rights Commission Act, 40 of 2013; Constitution
Mandate and purpose	Promote HRs and freedoms in Zimbabwe	Promotes citizens' human and socio-economic rights
Functions and duties	HRs awareness, protecting HR and freedoms, making recommendations to Parliament about HR matters, directing law enforcement agents to investigate HR abuses	Monitor compliance with conventional HR charters, makes recommendations to the state, cooperate with other institutions to promote HR, review HR policies, receive HR complaints, investigate HR violations

Composition	10 commissioners, 8 managers, general employees, local and international partners	CEO, Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson, six commissioners and general employees
Scope of functions	State and public institutions, civil servants and bureaucrats, public leaders	State bodies and institutions, public servants, and all spheres of government
Purview	Human rights, freedoms	Human rights, freedoms, socio-economic rights
Status of institution	Independent commission	Independent commission
Nature of reporting	Submits annual reports and recommendations about HR matters to Parliament, obligated to cooperate with local, regional and international HR bodies	Submits reports to Parliament

Source: Researcher's own composition

4.2.2.3 International best practices for human rights institutions

The examination of the SAHRC demonstrated the importance of socio-economic rights. Zimbabwe's economic and political circumstances require a focus on protecting citizens' rights. Thus, the investigation below motivates the school of thought which advocates safeguarding socio-economic rights in Zimbabwe.

4.2.2.3.1 Socio-economic rights

The underlying purpose of Table 4.3 is to draw attention to the shortcomings of the ZHRC whilst highlighting SAHRC's good practices that can be emulated by the former. This view is influenced by the realisation that the ZHRC is a relatively young institution (the 2013 Constitution ushered it) that can benefit from practices and techniques used by the SAHRC. Table 3 shows that over and above protecting human rights, the SAHRC has an additional mandate of protecting citizens' socio-economic rights.

Socio-economic rights improve citizens' quality of life and well-being. They include the right to education, water, food, healthcare, housing and social security (Heywood,

2021:1-4). In some jurisdictions, socioeconomic rights are regarded as part of the basic human rights espoused by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. Fundamental rights are considered top-tier human rights compared to socio-economic rights because the former promotes the right to vote, life, movement, freedom of speech, and fair trial (MacNaughton & McGill, 2012:365-366). These rights have considerable political appeal because Western governments usually champion them, and they have been key determinants of providing aid and government-to-government assistance, particularly towards developing countries.

Socio-economic rights do not attract attention in jurisdictions such as the United States of America (USA) because courts ruled that enforcing socio-economic rights encroaches on the legislature's functions and duties and the state's executive arm (MacNaughton & McGill, 2012:367). Therefore, American courts find it unconstitutional to instruct the executive and legislature to allocate public funds. Despite being at the forefront of including socio-economic rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, successive American presidents have abstained from using their authority to implement this ideal at home (MacNaughton & McGill, 2012:367). Given America's history of socioeconomic inequality, this judicial standpoint is puzzling. Nonetheless, empirical research demonstrates the folly of separating the two types of rights because all rights impact citizens' well-being, safety, security and health (Heywood, 2021:1).

The literature reviewed in this study shows that South Africa takes a different approach to dichotomising citizens' rights. Heyns and Brand (1998:19) assert that the SAHRC and courts are the two major public institutions responsible for enforcing socio-economic rights in South Africa. This, coupled with provisions in s24-29 of the Constitution, gives the SAHRC a mandate to oversee how the state uses available public resources to advance citizens' socio-economic rights. SAHRC provides Parliament with annual reports on the state's progress in providing for citizens' socio-economic needs. S184 of the Constitution gives the SAHRC a clear mandate to oversee the state's efforts to safeguard and promote citizens' socio-economic rights in housing, education, healthcare, food and social security. This has resulted in South Africa developing one of the best social security programmes in southern Africa, which has helped the country to significantly reduce extreme poverty and inequality (Goldblatt, 2014:22). This is noteworthy in South Africa, particularly given the

historically separate development policies that left many citizens marginalised and without socio-economic opportunities to improve their living standards.

The ZHRC only oversees the protection of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms. Under the current setup, the ZHRC concentrates on civil and political (fundamental) rights. Kondo (2017:177) points out that the primary difference between the SAHRC and the ZHRC is that the former has a unique mandate of promoting socio-economic rights. Social security is virtually non-existent in Zimbabwe because citizens do not have sufficient social assistance; hence, they are left to wallow in poverty under trying economic conditions without the state's help. This is exacerbated by the absence of efficient avenues to seek redress or implore the state to act on citizens' socio-economic needs (Nhapi & Mathende, 2016:71). Goldblatt (2014:26) insists that the SAHRC is instrumental in strengthening South Africa's social security framework because it enforces citizens' socio-economic rights. This shows that a human rights body can be more progressive in providing social security in Zimbabwe if the GoZ extends such a mandate.

Unlike the previous one, the new Constitution of Zimbabwe makes provisions for protecting socio-economic rights. Although the current Constitution does not expressly mention the term "socio-economic rights", it states that the state must take reasonable steps to ensure the wellness of citizens by protecting citizens' rights to education, healthcare, food and water (Constitution, s75-77). Given this background, the state should establish an independent institution overseeing these provisions' implementation. This mandate should be extended to the Human Rights Commission, as in South Africa. A study conducted by Chitimira (2017:179) discovered that despite the constitutional provisions, the GoZ performs poorly in providing for citizens' social and economic needs. Under the current setup, citizens can only use courts to seek a reprieve. Given the costs involved, this is not a viable option for underprivileged citizens who do not have the necessary financial or legal means to approach the courts. Therefore, this study suggests that the ZHRC could ensure that the state deploys its resources towards citizens' social and economic needs if it develops the legal and institutional framework to support this additional mandate.

4.2.3 The role of anti-corruption commissions in good governance

Corruption impedes good governance. To this end, an anti-corruption drive is one of the key pillars of good governance (OHCHR, 2021). Corruption is associated with a lethargic, inefficient, wasteful and underperforming public sector. According to the United Nations, cited in Gisselquist (2012:6), corruption is one of the main threats to good governance and national development. It channels public financial resources to persons who use them for private gains. The link between fighting corruption in the public sector and good governance stems from the need to ensure that government functions are transparent, accountable and effective (Naher *et al.*, 2020:3). Key elements of good governance, such as government efficiency, economy and accountability can only be achieved in an environment where corruption is curtailed (Gisselquist, 2012:2). Stojanovic *et al.* (2016:568; 570-573) point out that multilateral institutions regard corruption as a major drawback in the quest for good governance. The good governance model envisaged by these institutions cannot manifest alongside rent-seeking tendencies, weak state institutions, unaccountable government and corruption. Studies indicate corruption, particularly in Africa, festers without strong state institutions (Mustapa *et al.*, 2020). Hence, most African countries struggle to combat corruption (Mustapa *et al.*, 2020:5337; Pauw *et al.*, 2015:306-307). For this reason, it is vital for developing world governments to establish institutions that curb corruption and promote good governance (Chigudu, 2015:103).

For purposes of this study, corruption is regarded as the misappropriation of public resources that deprives the state of valuable resources for implementing the government's public policies. The major drawbacks of corruption in national development cannot be overestimated, particularly in developing countries where resources for national development are scarce. In light of this characterisation of corruption, it is essential to analyse the role of the state apparatus in combating corruption.

The following subsections provide an in-depth analysis of state institutions established to deal with corruption in Zimbabwe and South Africa. The underlying objective of the sections is to examine the institutions' functions, roles, duties, composition and

purpose. A comparative analysis between the institutions will also highlight similarities and differences in how the countries deal with corruption.

4.2.3.1 Anti-Corruption Commission (Zimbabwe)

Zimbabwe has an endemic problem of corruption exacerbated by ongoing economic challenges (Mugadza, 2017:330; Cloete, 2013:151). Most corruption cases are attributed to political players who tend to be insulated from prosecution by their political influence (Kronester & Buchner, 2017:28; Chigudu, 2015:103). A corrupt and unaccountable government is the antithesis of good governance because it is inefficient, opaque and has little capacity to satisfy the needs of its citizens (Cloete, 2013:150). This justifies the establishment of state institutions that combat corruption. S254 (1)(a) – 2(c) of the Constitution provides for the establishment of the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC). ZACC was established in 2009 as a replacement for the old Anti-Corruption Commission, which has existed since 2005. A chairperson manages the ZACC, eight commissioners and general employees who are part of the administrative staff and the commission's Secretariat (Mugadza, 2017:353). The Constitution stipulates that there must be at least one qualified legal practitioner, a public accountant with seven years of experience, and a crime investigator among the commissioners. This ensures that the commission has competent human capital with the qualities, merit and expertise required to fulfil the objectives of ZACC. ZACC contributes towards an efficient, transparent and responsible government by curbing corruption and wastefulness in the public sector. For this reason, it is a vital state institution whose agenda is instrumental in promoting good governance, transparency and efficient use of state resources. The Anti-Corruption Act, 3 of 2016 states that the mandate of ZACC includes the following:

- “investigating cases of fraud and corruption;
- raising public awareness about the dangers and consequences of corruption; and
- making recommendations regarding measures that can be implemented to eliminate corruption in the public and private sectors”.

The Act states that the functions of the ZACC include the following:

- “monitoring procurement practices and procedures in public and private institutions;
- educating citizens and organisations about the dangers of corruption to society;
- investigating individuals that are believed to be involved in corrupt activities;
- investigating allegations of corruption brought to the Commission’s attention by the public; and
- participating in developing policies and measures for combating corruption”.

According to Mugadza (2017:330), the legal framework of ZACC is robust because it guarantees its independence and autonomy. This ensures that the performance of the ZACC is free from political or executive interference. However, Chigudu (2015:103) counters this assertion by highlighting that the ZACC is inefficient and its inefficiencies result from legal irregularities. The author believes that the legal prescriptions contained in the Constitution are at loggerheads with the vision of ZACC. For example, the lack of prosecutorial authority means that the ZACC relies on the police and National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) to apprehend and charge persons involved in corrupt activities. Although this is consistent with the *trias politica* ideology of separating state authority, it is problematic in Zimbabwe, where law enforcement agents and the NPA are conflicted because they have poorly handled corruption cases (Kronester & Buchner, 2017:31). Despite the high number of reported cases of corruption, very few have been prosecuted.

To counter this assertion, Mugadza (2017:330-332) suggests that the incapacities of the ZACC are institutional rather than legal. The author suggests that whilst the constitution guarantees the commission's independence by stating that its operations should be independently funded and its employees should not be arbitrarily dismissed, the situation on the ground is different. Commissioners have been dismissed without due process, and the ZACC is poorly funded. Presently, it is administratively under the Office of the President. Given that corruption is associated with political authority and influence in Zimbabwe, this creates a conflict of interest.

It can be argued that ZACC is incapacitated by the current institutional arrangement, exposing it to the influence of public officials and office-bearers. This significantly impedes its ability to fulfil its mandate. On the other hand, extending prosecutorial and law enforcement authority to ZACC is unconstitutional because it has neither the legal capacity nor the human capital to fulfil the obligation. In any case, this will encroach on other state institutions' functions.

In summary, the challenges faced by ZACC are a clear demonstration of the need to build transparent and efficient public sector institutions in Zimbabwe and strengthen the doctrine of separating the authority of various state functions. The governance model examined in Chapter 1 of this study indicated that state and non-state players need to be jointly involved in governing the country. From a public sector perspective, the state requires efficient and effective institutions that cooperate and work together to enable the state to deliver its public service mandate. This means state institutions like the NPA and law enforcement agents should cooperate and work with ZACC to combat corruption.

4.2.3.2 The Public Protector (South Africa)

The Public Protector (PP) is “an effective and trusted constitutional institution that remedies administrative injustices and promotes good governance in state affairs” (Public Protect, 2021). The Public Protector monitors state agencies, promotes good governance, and contributes to preserving South Africa’s constitutional democracy (Mathekga, 2017:245). Good governance strengthens South Africa’s democracy by ushering in a governance ecosystem that champions stakeholder involvement, transparency, inclusivity, efficacy and accountability (Phera, 2019:282). This conceptualisation of good governance necessitates establishing an institution that monitors, oversees, regulates and evaluates the state’s compliance with the ethos of good governance (Mubangizi, 2012:308).

The Office of PP is governed by the Public Protector Act, 113 of 1998. It was established in 1995 (Mubangizi, 2012:308). A Deputy Public Protector and a Chief Administrative Officer head the Public Protector (PP). These individuals are complemented by staffers and general employees such as managers and

investigators who carry out the daily functions and activities of the institution. The PP has representative (satellite) offices in nine provinces (Public Protector South Africa, 2021). The functions of the PP include:

- “investigating cases of misconduct in state affairs or the three spheres of government; and
- reporting misconduct and taking appropriate remedial action” (s182, Constitution).

Additional functions of the PP are outlined in the Public Protector Act. These include the following:

- “investigating, reporting and taking remedial action regarding improper handling of public funds, improper enrichment and improper use of public resources; and
- presenting annual reports to Parliament and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP)” (Mubangizi, 2012:309).

Furthermore, in the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, 12 of 2004, the PP is also responsible for investigating improper use of authority, dishonesty, capriciousness and other inappropriate conduct (Thornhill, 2011b:82).

Over the years, the PP has demonstrated its importance in promoting clean, accountable, progressive governance. During her tenure as the PP, Professor Thuli Madonsela investigated several cases of financial misconduct and abuse of power in the public sector (Mathekga, 2017:249; Thornhill, 2011b:83). Her contribution towards good governance in the public sector is imminent. The ongoing state capture enquiry is a by-product of the former PP’s resilience and excellence. This demonstrates state oversight institutions' role in promoting transparent, efficient and accountable governance management of public resources in the public sector (Phera, 2019:282).

Table 4.4 below outlines the similarities and differences between the ZACC and the PP. The researcher uses information from this comparative analysis to identify international best practices that the ZACC can adopt to improve its performance.

Table 4.4: Similarities and differences between the ZACC and the Public Protector

Criteria	Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission	Public Protector
Legal and regulatory framework	Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 3 of 2016; Constitution, 2013.	Public Protector Amendment Act, 22 of 2003; Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, 12 of 2004.
Mandate and purpose	Investigates corruption, raise public awareness of the perils of corruption, recommends measures for eliminating corruption in public and private sectors	Investigates allegations of misconduct by public officials and institute remedial actions
Functions and duties	Monitor procurement procedures in public and private organisations. It educates citizens about the perils of corruption, investigates individuals and organisations believed to be corrupt, contributes to formulating policies to eliminate corruption in the public and private sector and makes recommendations to the state.	Investigates public affairs, reports misconduct and taking remedial action, investigates cases of improper enrichment and abuse of state resources
Composition	Chairperson, Secretariat, eight commissioners, administrative staff	PP, Deputy PP, CAO, staffers, managers, investigators and administrative employees
Scope of functions	Public sector, private sector	Public sector institutions, public officials, public office bearers
Status of institution	Independent commission	Independent state institution
Nature of reporting	Submits annual reports detailing its activities to the responsible Minister, submits supplementary reports when requested by the Minister	Reports to the National Assembly at least once per year, the report is also availed to the NCOP

Source: Researcher's own composition

4.2.3.3 International best practices for anti-corruption institutions

The PP enjoys relative independence from the executive in performing its duties and functions. The role of the PP in the Nkandla saga and the establishment of the ongoing commission of enquiry into state capture illustrates how the PP is independent. Therefore, the international best practice the ZACC can adopt is independence from the executive. This study posits that ZACC's independence will significantly improve its performance.

4.2.3.3.1 Independence of ZACC

Table 4 shows the congruencies and differences between the ZACC and the Public Protector. This study suggests that the ZACC can emulate practices from the PP that have produced desired outcomes or enhanced its efficiency. The PP is a well-known state institution in South Africa and the region, mainly due to the tenacity and exemplary performance of the former PP, Thuli Madonsela. As outlined above, Thuli Madonsela's perceived impressive performance resulted in investigations, judicial interventions and commissions of enquiry into the management of state resources by the executive in South Africa. This alone indicates the influence of the PP in public affairs.

On the other hand, the ZACC is relatively low-key and subdued. The public views the institution with distrust because, since its inception, it has hardly justified its existence. There is considerable discord between mounting corruption and abuse of state resources in the public domain and ZACC's failure to investigate these cases.

In this regard, the international best practices that can be adopted by ZACC centre on funding and ensuring the independence of the ZACC. The Public Protector is one of Chapter 9 or oversight institutions responsible for strengthening South Africa's constitutional democracy. The Constitution of South Africa guarantees its independence. De Vos (2013:163) suggests that institutional autonomy enables oversight institutions to contribute towards good governance in South Africa by holding the executive arm of the state accountable. An important aspect of institutional

independence is access to sufficient financial resources required to perform effectively and administrative and political independence.

Financial independence is essential because financial resources are essential for the effective operation of any state institution. In addition, inadequate funds pose a danger to the impartiality of the Public Protector because funds can be used as an instrument of controlling or denting this oversight institution (Konstant, 2016:7). The Public Protector does not have its independent budget like the C&AG UK which is funded through a Consolidated Fund. Instead, funding for the Public Protector is provided through the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (Konstant, 2016:12). A ruling by the Constitutional Court in *Independent Electoral Commission v Langeberg Municipality* indicated that financial independence does not mean that a Chapter 9 institution is solely responsible for its budget. Instead, it means that Parliament, instead of the executive, is jointly responsible for allocating funds to a state institution (De Vos, 2013:166). As discussed below, this is not the case for the ZACC, that the Office of the President funds. As a result, Parliament as a collective body has no control over the operations and budget of the ZACC. This leaves ZACC vulnerable to the president, the appointing authority.

Magadza (2017:353) underscores that, on paper, the legal framework supporting the ZACC is reasonably robust and consistent with the legal support rendered to statutory bodies that fight corruption. However, institutional challenges can impact ZACC's ability to execute its mandate beyond the legal stipulations and prescriptions. These challenges curtail the commission's independence and efficiency (Rahman, 2021). Section 234 of the Constitution states that ZACC employees shall not be drawn from the civil service. This means that ZACC is an independent body responsible for recruiting its employees. This provision provides ZACC employees with job security. This is important since the ZACC can investigate public officials who might use their positions to victimise ZACC employees. However, the lack of independent funding still exposes ZACC employees to victimisation and political influence. ZACC lacks adequate funding (Matebwe, 2019:32). Muponde and Musafare (2019) state that ZACC has never received a full budget since its establishment. This has severely affected its efficiency and ability to attract competent staff, fund operations, and decentralise operations to all the country's provinces.

According to s322 of the Constitution, Parliament should provide ZACC with an annual public budget reserved explicitly for its operations and the salaries of its employees. Mugadza (2017:357) states that this provision has never been implemented. In fact, as of now, ZACC falls under the Office of the President and Cabinet (OPC). This executive institution has significant political influence that can easily be exerted on ZACC officials. The net effect is that ZACC has never been efficient; hence, it consistently fails to achieve its goals. Zinyama (2021:143) underscores that corruption in Zimbabwe is political. Since the collapse of the private sector and formal economy, public officials and politicians have taken advantage of their authority and influence to siphon state resources.

For this reason, it is strange and expedient for ZACC to be placed under the control of the OPC since the president and his inner circle are allegedly involved in corrupt activities. Whether they are guilty or not, the current arrangement emasculates the ZACC especially given that the president appoints ZACC commissioners. This contrasts with the status quo in South Africa because oversight institutions are afforded administrative and political independence. The South African Constitution contains provisions that make Chapter 9 nine institutions, such as the Public Protector, accountable to Parliament rather than the executive. Since South Africa is a representative democracy and the Parliament consists of 14 political parties, this arrangement ensures that oversight institutions are cushioned from executive interference (De Vos, 2013:167). Therefore, this study suggests that the GoZ should adopt the institutional and funding arrangements implemented in South Africa. These practices will enhance the independence and performance of the ZACC. This suggestion is proffered in light of ZACC's poor performance despite high hopes and expectations from citizens and members of civil society.

4.3 THE ROLE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN GOOD GOVERNANCE IN ZIMBABWE AND SELECTED COUNTRIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

One of the prominent challenges in the public sector is failing to adhere to sound corporate governance standards (Chigudu, 2020:1). In response to this, the GoZ

promotes corporate governance using legislation, regulations and corporate governance instruments examined in Chapter 3. The chapter also highlighted that the public sector comprises state-owned companies and enterprises that produce products and services earmarked for public consumption. Public sector corporate governance is vital in this regard because it contributes towards building sustainable and robust economies that are responsive to the growing needs of citizens (Chimbari, 2017:213). This is particularly true of 21st-century societies where finite natural resources should satisfy mounting human needs. This school of thought holds that the GoZ– through state agencies, institutions, bureaucracies and departments – should create value for citizens by providing essential goods and services such as clean water, roads, healthcare, public transport, safe and secure neighbourhoods (Sangware, 2014:15).

This study is premised on the idea that corporate governance is essential in the public sector because it enhances efficiency, economy and professionalism in producing public goods and services.

4.3.1 Selected state-owned enterprises in Zimbabwe

This section examines the National Railways of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe United Passenger Company, and the Grain Marketing Board in promoting good corporate governance in the public sector. Despite being established to provide citizens with basic goods and services (Ncube & Maunganidze, 2014:132), SOEs in Zimbabwe are characterised by poor corporate governance systems, wastefulness and lack of accountability (Chigudu (2020:1; Muzapu *et al.,* 2016:90). Whilst other governments use SOEs as tools for service delivery and buffers against market failure, in Zimbabwe, they are incapacitated by underperformance, poor governance and endemic corruption (Chilunjika & Mutizwa, 2019:42). Key SOEs such as the National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ) and Air Zimbabwe have become liabilities to the state because they do not create public value or generate profits as envisaged by the Constitution; instead, they rely on government bailouts for their sustenance. This is reminiscent of South African SOEs such as South African Airways and government bailouts that sustain South African Broadcasting Corporation to fund their operations. The high

levels of poor performance and inefficiency in Zimbabwe SOEs are ascribed to poor corporate governance (Muzapu *et al.,* 2016:89).

This indicates that SOEs in Zimbabwe are characterised by poor corporate governance, resulting in poor performance, inefficiency, and failure to create value for public goods and services consumers. This *status quo* is inconsistent with sound corporate governance principles espoused by the Constitution. This is one of the reasons that prompted this study to develop a good governance framework for the public sector. In the following sections, the researcher analyses the functions, duties, composition and purpose of selected SOEs in Zimbabwe and South Africa.

4.3.1.1 National Railways of Zimbabwe

The National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ) is a rail passenger and freight transporting company owned by the state through the Ministry of Transport Infrastructural Development (Sibindi, 2014:347). The Railways Act (Chapter 13:09) regulates the company as amended in 2009 (NRZ, 2017). The genesis of (NRZ) can be traced back to 1949 when the Government of Southern Rhodesia became the sole owner of the Rhodesia Railway Limited. It was renamed Rhodesia Railways and later National Railways of Zimbabwe when the country attained independence in 1980 (Chiguvi & Magwada, 2016:1; Mbhowa, 2008:26). The key mandate of NRZ is to provide freight and passenger rail transport to individuals and businesses in Zimbabwe and its neighbouring countries (Sibindi, 2014:347). At the company's helm is the Minister of Transport Infrastructural Development, who is also accountable for the Board of Directors, General Manager and five directors who oversee various company portfolios. The company also comprises organisational and management functionaries such as senior managers, line managers, auditors and general employees (NRZ, 2017).

According to Chiguvi and Magwada (2016:1), the poor performance of NRZ has far-reaching implications for the freight industry in the Southern African region. Given Zimbabwe’s central location, NRZ used to be responsible for handling cargo from coastal countries such as Mozambique and South Africa to inland destinations such as Zambia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Malawi. The latter shipped vast

amounts of raw materials earmarked for international export. Zambia transported copper from the Copperbelt region to ports in Beira and Durban. DRC moved its immense mineral wealth to Durban for export to Europe, China and North America (Mbhowa, 2008:32). Over the years, due to poor management, the performance of NRZ is deficient because it is no longer able to fulfil its mandate (Chilunjika & Mutizwa, 2019:42). At its peak in 1997, the company ferried 19 million tonnes of freight annually. In 2011 the figure had fallen to 1.7 million (Chiguvi & Magwada, 2016:1). NRZ's poor performance hurts Zimbabwe's economic growth because many primary and secondary industries depend on it for transportation.

Contemporary researchers conclude that poor corporate governance is responsible for NRZ's current dysfunctional state of affairs (Sibindi, 2014:347; Mbhowa, 2008:31-33). The company has high employee turnover, debt and an unimpressive balance sheet (Chiguvi & Magwada, 2016:1; Chavunduka & Sikwila, 2015:652). The inefficiencies of NRZ have forced freighters and passengers to opt for road transport; however, given the country's poor state of roads and the cost involved, it is hardly a viable solution. Studies conducted by Chiguvi and Magwada (2016) and Muzapu *et al.* (2016) indicated that NRZ is among the worst poorly managed SOEs in the country. This is supported by findings from the Auditor-General that indicate cases of gross financial misconduct, corruption and poor financial management at NRZ (Muzapu *et al.,* 2016).

4.3.1.2 Zimbabwe United Passenger Company

The Zimbabwe United Passenger Company (ZUPCO) was established in 1985 when the government bought a significant stake in the United Transport Group (Maunder & Mbara, 1995:60). The composition of the company consists of the Chief Executive Officer and a Board of Directors (appointed by the Minister of Local Government, Public Works and Urban Development) and managers and employees working at depots across the country (Chawira, 2014:4; Auditor-General, 2013:287). The GoZ is now the sole shareholder of the company. The primary purpose of ZUPCO is to provide affordable and reliable transport services to commuters in Zimbabwe, particularly in urban areas (Maunder & Mbara, 1995:60). Faced with a high demand

for affordable and reliable transport; the GoZ sought to provide efficient services by acquiring a 51% stake in ZUPCO.

The main objective of the acquisition was to capacitate the struggling company and improve its ability to deliver quality services to the public. Initially, the government achieved this objective because ZUPCO increased its fleet and served many routes (Mbara, 2006:123). According to Chawira (2014:3), the ZUPCO enables the government to fulfil its social objectives of providing the public with efficient and affordable transport services. At its peak in 1992, with approximately 1200 buses, the company provided public transport to commuters, most of whom commuted from high-density suburbs to work in factories, businesses and government agencies located in big cities and towns (Nyatondo, 2013:11). ZUPCO also provided transport to school children and long-distance travellers. To fulfil the government's social objectives, ZUPCO charges below-market-price fares for its services. As a result of this strategic anomaly, the company cannot generate profits. Hence, it relies on government funding to run its operations (Chilunjika & Mutizwa, 2019:44). Muzapu *et al.* (2016) analysed

ZUPCO's corporate governance systems and concluded that poor corporate governance and lacklustre oversight from the government resulted in the current low levels of chronic underperformance. This is inconsistent with the principles of corporate governance outlined in the Zimbabwean constitution. The constitution envisaged that state-owned companies would be at the forefront of creating value for the state through revenue generation and providing citizens with quality goods and services.

Research indicates that efficient public transport is vital for socio-economic development in Zimbabwe because most workers reside far from the cities, factories, industries, and other places of work. Despite solid successes in the 1990s, ZUPCO struggles to fulfil its objectives due to poor performance and lousy management (Nyatondo, 2013; Mbara, 2006). These are the results of an incompetent board, predatory employees and an acute collapse of good corporate governance (Ncube & Maunganidze, 2014:132). As a result of this malaise, the company's performance deteriorates, and commuters are left stranded without reliable transport.

4.3.1.3 The Grain Marketing Board

GMB (formerly known as the Maize Control Board) was established as a consequence of the Maize Control Act of 1931 that was subsequently repealed by the Grain Marketing Act of 1991 (Chapter18:14) (Chidemo, 2013:5). The company was established during the Great Depression of the late 1920s to shield local producers and consumers from speculative maize prices on the global market (Masters, 1993:230). GMB's mandate is to ensure food security and the constant availability of staple crops (wheat, millet, maize, sorghum) (Moyo, 2010:17). Furthermore, its purpose is to create a market for buyers and sellers of grain crops in Zimbabwe while ensuring enough local consumption. Therefore, the GMB sources grain from local and international producers to maintain an optimum grain supply in the market (Chidemo, 2013:5). Muchero (1987:398) states that the functions and duties of GMB are to -

- "ensure orderly marketing of agricultural products;
- buying and selling agricultural products delivered to it;
- provide storage, handling and processing facilities for agricultural products;
- maintain optimum stocks of agricultural products; and
- handle imports and exports of agricultural products when necessary".

The GMB is run by a Board of Directors appointed by the Minister of Agriculture. The Board of Directors appoints the General Manager responsible for the company's daily operations. GMB has 84 depots throughout all the country's districts (Chidemo, 2013:6).

The GMB enables the government to intervene in the marketing of agricultural products by giving it leverage in selling them. This allows the government to control the price and distribution of agricultural products. GMB is a government-owned company whose operations are financed and subsidised by the government. Therefore, the state shoulders its losses and collects its profits (Masters, 1993:227). It is one of the state companies riddled with corruption, embezzlement and misuse of resources (Ncube & Maunganidze, 2014:137). Most of the company's infrastructure is in a state of decay. The government's cadre deployment policy has led to unqualified

personnel being part of the board and senior management of the company. This led to poor performance, plunder and corruption. As a result, GMB cannot fulfil its mandate (Ncube & Maunganidze, 2014:132, 137). Some of its challenges stem from poor stakeholder policies. For example, the government encourages GMB to sell its products at subsidised prices to offset the market's adverse shortages (Ncube & Maunganidze, 2014:137).

4.3.2 SOEs and sound corporate governance in South Africa

A strong commitment towards corporate governance took hold in South Africa in the 1990s in response to the new democratic dispensation and shifting global trends in corporate management (Padayachee, 2013:260). Public sector corporate governance is a yardstick for the country's corporate values because private and foreign companies tend to emulate the standards of SOEs (Thabane & Van Deventer, 2018:3). According to Mashamaite and Raseala (2019:124), sound corporate governance contributes towards transparency and accountability in the public sector in South Africa. The country has up to 715 SOEs operating in several economic sectors (transport, energy generation, communication, defence, health) to provide goods and services to the public and to generate revenue for the state (Mashamaite & Raseala, 2019:124; OECD, 2018:28). SOEs are state instruments of fostering economic development, poverty alleviation and employment creation. This aligns with the government's developmental state agenda (Matsiliza, 2017:36). For this reason, SOEs need to embrace sound corporate governance standards to strengthen their capacity to deliver public goods and services.

South Africa's corporate governance framework consists of the Companies Act, 71 of 2008, OECD corporate governance guidelines and the King IV Report on Corporate Governance. In addition, the government's transformative policies, such as affirmative action (AA), transformation and Broad-Based Black Economic Employment (BBBEE), have minimum corporate governance prescriptions for businesses (Matsiliza, 2017:36). Despite the composite corporate governance framework, researchers note that the performance of SOEs is impeded by corruption, poor leadership, failure to meet institutional objectives, political interference, maladministration, lack of transparency and weak systems of accountability (Matsiliza, 2017:36, 41). This is

symptomatic of poor corporate governance at the sectoral level (Mashamaite & Raseala, 2019:124). Sound corporate governance remains a challenge in state-run companies such as Eskom, South African Airways (SAA) and South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) (Thomas, 2012:449). Given their role in national development, this significantly impedes national economic growth and service delivery (Qhobosheane, 2018).

In the following sections, the researcher examines the composition, purpose and functions of selected SOEs in South Africa. The purpose of the analysis is to provide a basis for comparing SOEs in South Africa and Zimbabwe. This will also enable the researcher to elicit the best international practices that public sector entities in Zimbabwe can adopt.

4.3.2.1 Eskom

Before the establishment of Eskom (formerly known as the Electricity Supply Commission or ESCOM), power was discretely generated by several municipalities and private companies (Steyn, 1994:4). ESCOM was established in 1922 through the passage of the Electricity Act of 1922, which directed the state to establish a state-owned power generating company (Eberhard & Mtepa, 2003:79-80). The purpose of ESCOM was to supply "cheap and abundant" electricity for domestic and industrial use by building new power stations and forming partnerships with existing producers. The company was not required to generate profits. However, the government policy discouraged the company from operating at a loss (Steyn, 1994:6). ESCOM was renamed Eskom in 1987 after enacting the {Act of 1987. In 2001 the Eskom Act of 1987 was repealed. In its stead, Parliament enacted the Eskom Conversion Act 13 of 2001. With its subsequent amendments, the Act converted Eskom into a public holding (Eskom Holdings Limited) liable to pay shareholders' dividends and government taxes (Eberhard & Mtepa, 2003:80-82).

The governance structure of Eskom consists of a Board of Directors, with nine members, and an executive management team. The company has clear corporate and legislative responsibilities, particularly power generation, efficiency, and creating value for its ultimate shareholder, the government. The company's leadership is accountable

to the state through several ministerial portfolios such as the Department of Public Enterprises, Department of Mineral Resources and Energy and National Treasury (Eskom Holdings, 2019:20-22). The company's corporate governance framework consists of the following:

- Relevant legislation (Treasury regulations, PFMA, Eskom Conversion Act)
- Codes of good governance (Protocol on Corporate Governance in the Public Sector, King III principles and recommendations)
- The company's memorandum of incorporation
- Eskom's corporate plan
- Materiality framework
- Delegation of authority framework
- The shareholder's compact outlining performance indicators and company targets that are consistent with the strategic intent
- Statement of strategic intent and other relevant policies and procedures (Thabane & Van Deventer, 2018:12; Eskom, 2014).

Corporate governance has always been a matter of concern for Eskom, despite the prescriptive corporate governance framework. Since the last decade, Eskom has been facing severe corporate governance shortcomings. These are consistently detailed in the media, Eskom's integrated reports, parliamentary hearings and the ongoing state capture commission of enquiry. At the centre of the company's corporate governance shortcomings are allegations of corruption, maladministration and misconduct, particularly in procuring goods and services and reporting company performance (Eskom, 2018). Eskom is currently facing a severe financial crisis that hampers its growth and viability (Williams, Thondlana & Kua, 2020:2). Despite achieving good profits before 2007, the company's debt rose from R77 billion in 2006 to about R 604 bn in 2019 (Phalatse, 2020:21). The company's challenges started worsening in 2007 when it lost the capacity to generate enough electricity. Since then, Eskom has relied on financial assistance from Treasury to fund operations (Matsiliza, 2017:41). Eskom's corporate governance failures include poor risk management, lack of accountability and transparency. Hence, the company does not have a comprehensive risk management plan, hence its inability to forecast and prepare for a future surge in

electricity demand (Williams *et al.*, 2020:2). According to Thabane and Van Deventer (2018:22), restoring standard corporate governance practices such as ethical leadership and management, applying King III guidelines and separating the board's functions, management and the Minister will reinvigorate the company and improve its performance.

Eskom has a vital economic and social responsibility. Economically, it produces 95% of electrical energy, contributing significantly to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It employs many people; thus, it alleviates unemployment and directly develops society through its corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs (Vorster & Marais, 2014:31; Eberhard & Mtepa, 2003:83). Thus, it contributes to the growth and stability of the economy by generating electricity, consuming products from other industries such as coal, vehicles, transport services, information and communication technologies and skilled and unskilled labour (Thabane & Van Deventer, 2018:1-2). The contribution of Eskom towards economic development in South Africa is consistent with the economic role of SOEs investigated in this study (Chilunjika & Mutizwa, 2019:42; Muzapu *et al.*, 2016:89). This was demonstrated in the discussion above that revealed that SOEs are tasked with stimulating economic growth by effectively providing certain goods and services.

The literature reviewed above indicates that Eskom has severe corporate governance shortfalls. This is demonstrated by the company's perennial failure to stem the tide of maladministration, corruption, mismanagement and poor performance. An analysis of Eskom is vital in this study because it illustrates how an SOE can have a poor corporate governance record despite a clear corporate governance framework ecosystem to guide and regulate the company's conduct.

4.3.2.2 South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC)

South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) was established on 1 August 1936 when Parliament enacted the Broadcasting Act 22 of 1936 (Silke, 1989:74). SABC is responsible for providing public radio and television broadcasts to the people of South Africa (Matsiliza, 2017:40). The mandate and purpose of SABC are informed by the Broadcasting Act 4 of 1999 (herein referred to as the Broadcasting Act) and the

Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) regulations. In a nutshell, SABC has to "encourage the development of South African expression by providing, in the official languages, a wide range of" programmes that reflect local values, attitudes and creativity; educates and entertains, provides a platform for a plurality of news and views and advances national interests (Dibetso & Smith, 2012:2). The establishment of SABC is provided for by the Broadcasting Act, which designated SABC to become a public broadcaster. Hence, SABC is a public company under the Companies Act 71 of 2008. Before enacting the Broadcasting Act of 1999, it was regulated by the old Broadcasting Act of 1976, a statutory body. Designating SABC as a public company means it must fulfil corporate governance requirements in sections 24 – 34 (transparency, accountability and integrity of companies) and 57 – 78 of the Companies Act. At the apex of SABC's organisational structure is the Department of Communications, represented by the respective Minister and the SABC Board. The company's management also comprises Group CEO, company secretary, Group Internal Auditor, Chief Operating Officer and the Chief Financial Officer, senior managers and general employees (SABC, 2019:11).

Corporate governance at SABC is characterised by a lack of accountability, poor performance, financial mismanagement and board apathy (Matsiliza, 2017:39; Thomas, 2012:456). From 2013 – 2015, the company received qualified Auditor – General reports due to a R411 million loss (Matsiliza, 2017:40). This indicates that the principles of corporate governance espoused in the King IV Report are not adhered to (KPMG, 2016). Similarly, this indicates that SABC does not adhere to the corporate governance ethos envisaged in the Protocol on Corporate Governance in the Public Sector. These include the following:

- maximising shareholder value;
- accountability;
- oversight; and
- accountability (Department of Public Enterprises, 2000).

Khanyane and Sausi (2015:35) believe that political interference is responsible for poor corporate governance at SABC. Citing the Public Protector's Report, 2014,

Khanyane and Sausi (2015:35) argue that maladministration, unethical conduct, irregular appointments and "systematic corporate governance failures" are responsible for poor performance and financial mismanagement at SABC. Matsiliza (2017:39) and Khanyane and Sausi (2015:35) illustrate the extent of political interference by stating that the former Chief Operating Officer (COO), Mr Motsoeneng, was shielded by the Minister of Communication despite evidence showing that he was not qualified for the position. The appointment of Mr Motsoeneng shows how political interference and abuse of power contributed to maladministration and poor performance (Madonsela, 2018:35). Political interference at SABC is a product of an ownership structure where the government is the principal shareholder. This shareholding arrangement gives political figureheads, such as the Minister, power to interfere in SABC operations (Thabane & Van Deventer, 2018:1). Khanyane and Sausi (2015:35) suggest that having a minister as the ultimate decision-maker makes the board redundant. Traditionally, the board is responsible for running a business organisation on behalf of shareholders. However, in the case of SABC, the Minister can veto board decisions.

The state of affairs at SABC contrasts with the minimum standards of corporate governance envisaged in the Protocol on Corporate Governance in the Public Sector and the King Report. The Protocol states that executive authorities such as the national Minister should represent the government's interests of optimum performance, accountability and ethical leadership by setting clear objectives, oversight and exercising parliamentary accountability. When the Minister fails to execute his or her duties, the state company is left without a clear strategic direction. This creates opportunities for rent-seeking behaviours and maladministration. Presently, SABC is struggling to perform effectively (SABC, 2020:26). From a corporate governance perspective, the company needs to adhere to the King Report corporate guidelines to ensure that the board plays a governance role. The manager manages the day-to-day operations without undue influence.

4.3.2.3 Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA)

PRASA is a state-owned company responsible for providing short and long-distance commuters with reliable, affordable and quality train and bus services (George,

Mokoena & Rust, 2018:497). It was established in 2009 (on the backdrop of the Legal Succession Act of South African Transport Services Amendment Act, 38 of 2008 and provisions of the National Land Transport Transition Act, 22 of 2000) after a consolidation of operations and assets of South African Rail Commuter Services (SARCC), Autopax, Shosholoza Meyl and Metrorail (PRASA, 2020:4). PRASA has the mandate to provide affordable and reliable mass transportation services to the public (PRASA, 2021:5). This ensures that commuters have access to affordable and dependable transport. The company has a legislative mandate to implement the objectives of the National Department of Transport. For example, it should generate profits from its assets whilst providing rail commuter services in South Africa (PRASA, 2020:4; George *et al.*, 2018:497). At the helm of PRASA's governance structure is the Minister of Transport, the PRASA Board of Control Group Audit, the Company Secretary and the Group Chief Executive Officer. These individuals are complemented by senior executives, managers and employees of PRASA's subsidiaries and divisions (PRASA, 2020:8; George *et al.,* 2018:497).

Goosen (2016:706) highlights efficient public transport's importance in promoting economic development. Developed countries such as the USA and Japan have efficient mass transport systems that allow rapid movement of commuters. This brings goods and services closer to consumers, enabling companies to benefit from a highly mobile labour force. The resulting efficiencies are suitable for businesses and consumers because products, services and work opportunities become accessible to a bigger market (Kozlak, 2017:21). In South Africa, improving public transport systems contributes towards economic growth, especially given the long distances that commuters travel to reach the country's economic hubs (Goosen, 2016:715; Tsikai, 2016:727). Therefore, it is incumbent upon the government to ensure the efficiency of PRASA at an operational and organisational level.

Recent studies, however, indicate that PRASA's performance is below expectations (see National Planning Commission, 2020; Mashamaite & Raseala, 2019; Khanyane & Sausi, 2015) because it is unable to provide efficient public services due to mismanagement and ageing infrastructure. This results in poor and unreliable services (Du Toit, Jooste, Conradie, 2019:235). Makokoane (2020:7) indicates that PRASA's

failure to meet consumer needs results from poor corporate governance, poor performance, financial mismanagement and corruption.

The government committed to restructuring or privatising some state companies to improve efficiency and performance. This policy was adopted to revitalise inert public enterprises. As mentioned above, PRASA is a product of an agglomeration of several state companies operating in the transport sector. The Department of Public Enterprises (2002) regards transportation as a critical driver of economic growth in South Africa. Therefore, the corporate governance failures at PRASA are significant in light of the company's position in the economy. Public rail transport is vital for the country's economic development because most workers require efficient and affordable transportation.

Table 4.5: Similarities and differences between selected SOEs in Zimbabwe and South Africa

Criteria	SOEs in Zimbabwe	SOEs in South Africa
Legal and regulatory framework	NRZ: Railways Amendment Act. GMB: Grain Marketing Act.	PRASA: Legal Succession Act of South African Transport Services Amendment Act; National Land Transport Transition Act. SABC: Broadcasting Act, 1999 Eskom: Eskom Conversion Act, 2001; Eskom Act, 1987
Mandate and purpose	ZUPCO: Provide affordable and reliable transport services. NRZ: Provide affordable freight and rail transport to individuals and businesses. GMB: Ensure food security	PRASA: Provides affordable and reliable mass public transport services. SABC: Provides the public with access to information Eskom: Generate electricity.
Functions and duties	ZUPCO: Provides reliable transport services to commuters at affordable fares. NRZ: Provides passenger rail transport, ferries freight. GMB: Marketing and storing agricultural products, buying and	PRASA: Provides short and long-distance train and bus services. SABC: Providing radio and TV broadcasts. Eskom: Supplies electricity for domestic and industrial use.

	selling, importing and exporting staple grains	
Composition	ZUPCO: Minister of Local Government, Public Works and Urban Development, CEO, Board of Directors, managers, employees. NRZ: Minister of Transport Infrastructural Development, Board of Directors, Administrative staff, senior managers and employees. GMB: Board of Directors appointed by the Minister, General Manager and other staff.	PRASA: Responsible Minister, 9-member Board of Control, Group CEO, CEOs of Autopax, senior executive managers. SABC: Responsible Minister, Board, CEO, COO, CFO, Internal Auditor. Eskom: Responsible Minister, 9-member Board of directors, executive management.
Scope of operations	ZUPCO: Public Road transport. NRZ: Passenger rail and freight transport. GMB: Food security	PRASA: Passenger rail and bus transport. SABC: Public TV and radio broadcaster Eskom: Public utility
Status of institution	ZUPCO: Entirely state-owned. NRZ: Entirely state-owned. GMB: Entirely state-owned.	PRASA: SOE. SABC: SOE Eskom: SOE
Industry	ZUPCO: Public transport. NRZ: Public transport. GMB: Agriculture and food processing industry.	PRASA: Public rail and road transport. SABC: Information and broadcasting Eskom: Energy

Source: Researcher's own composition

4.3.2.4 International best practices for SOEs

Corporate governance aims to mitigate risks associated with misdeeds and misconduct of corporate officials. Sifuna, cited in Ekakitie (2018:32), suggests that corporate governance encapsulates a web of legislation, regulations, and approaches

designed to control, monitor, and direct a corporation's conduct. This characterisation of corporate governance will be used in this study to underscore international best practices that SOEs can adopt in Zimbabwe. The study will use a hybrid of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004), the Cadbury Report (1992) and lessons from SOEs in South Africa to generate international best practices of corporate governance that can be emulated in Zimbabwe. The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and the Cadbury Report will be used because they are globally recognised as tried and tested corporate governance benchmarks. Many jurisdictions worldwide have adopted or improved these principles for local use.

Global corporate governance best practices are companies' techniques and practices to deliver shareholder and consumer value. These exemplary corporate governance practices can be recommended to private or public companies facing corporate governance challenges. They are believed to improve corporate governance because they have consistently produced superior results when applied (Ekakitie, 2018:32). The OECD has a prominent role in promoting sound corporate governance globally because it developed corporate governance principles used in public and private sectors across the world. As a result, the OECD principles of Corporate Governance are regarded as a global benchmark for corporate governance (Shahwan, 2020:418).

Due to the poor corporate governance in Zimbabwean SOEs, international best practices of corporate governance from the Cadbury Report and the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance will be recommended as guidelines for Zimbabwean SOEs to enhance efficiency. These practices are examined below.

4.3.2.4.1 Remuneration committee

The literature reviewed in this chapter revealed the corporate governance shortcomings associated with remuneration in the Zimbabwean public sector. Greedy officials use remuneration to award themselves hefty pecks at the expense of the performance of public sector organisations. According to Fuzi and Halim (2016:463), the Cadbury Report recommends establishing a remuneration committee comprising non-executive directors. One of the committee's purposes is to develop a criterion for performance-based remuneration for directors. The Cadbury Report identifies

executives' remuneration as a corporate governance issue. It recommends that a company's annual report disclose directors' remuneration packages, including their stock options and pension contributions. The Cadbury Report also provides mechanisms to measure directors' performance to align their remuneration with performance (Fuzi & Halim, 2016:463).

According to Park (2021:5), performance-related pay (PRP) is grounded in the principal-agency theory. The theory suggests that agents (executives) will act in the interests of principals (shareholders) if their financial rewards and principals' interests are mutually inclusive. This means that directors and other company executives are encouraged to perform by aligning specific performance targets with remuneration. Similarly, the expectancy theory of organisational behaviour suggests that expected rewards motivate performance (Lloyd & Mertens, 2018:29). Zalewska (2014:5) believes that PRP will incentivise high performance in the public sector. By drawing from the agency, the author posits that the fundamental problems with the principal-agency situation are that agencies will have no incentive to commit their talent and competencies to principals' interests in the absence of common interests. Therefore, providing PRP as an incentive aligns with the interests of agents and principals.

The Corporate Governance Framework for State Enterprises and Parastatals in Zimbabwe (2010), examined in Chapter 3 of this study, underscores the "payment of performance-related remuneration and bonuses" for the leadership of SOEs. However, it is unclear how PRP will be determined and which structures within SOEs are responsible for assessing performance and aligning it to remuneration. The literature reviewed in this study did not provide evidence indicating that SOEs adhere to this principle. The salary gate that rocked SOEs in 2013-2014 shows that remuneration in public sector organisations does not adhere to the PRP principle. The scandal revealed that SOE CEOs and board members earned mega salaries, hefty bonuses, and frivolous allowances when most SOEs struggled to operate and pay employees. In one instance, verified reports indicated a board member was earning a monthly salary of US$ 230 000 despite the company's precarious financial situation (Rusvingo, 2014a:20). Considering this challenge, the global best practice derived from the Cadbury Report is establishing a remuneration committee responsible for determining and overseeing the remuneration of managers, directors and board

members of SOEs. The committee will peg salaries, bonuses and allowances against an empirical performance metric. This will encourage top managers, directors and SOE boards to increase their performance in anticipation of optimum remuneration.

4.3.2.4.2 Accountability, transparency and disclosure

The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and the Cadbury Report underscore the importance of accountability, transparency and disclosure in managing company affairs. These principles enhance trust from shareholders and stakeholders of a company. In this study, the principles are used as a global corporate governance best practice. The literature reviewed in this study's current and previous chapters underscores a dearth of accountability in SOEs in Zimbabwe. Unfortunately, the situation is not different in South Africa and other African countries. An analysis of SABC and Eskom revealed that some SOEs in South Africa are not accountable. Earlier research conducted in sub-Saharan Africa revealed that lack of accountability in the public sector is responsible for the public sector's inefficiency and underperformance (Van der Westhuizen, 2005:143). Recent studies show that the situation has not significantly changed (Subrahmanyam *et al.*, 2014:431).

Accountability is a fundamental code of best practices upon which the system of sound corporate governance of the Cadbury Report is based. To emphasise the importance of accountability, Cadbury (1992:1) envisages a "framework of effective accountability" that will enable boards to discharge their duties and enhance the competitiveness of their companies. Indeed, accountability is a vital aspect of the agency theory because it ensures that the decisions and activities of agents are consistent with principals' expectations. In SOEs where profitability is not always the goal, boards must manage state companies sustainably and create value for citizens. This is usually in the form of quality public goods and services. According to Harvey, Price, Maclean and Campbell (2018:152), the Cadbury report's continuous reference to accountability frameworks indicates that companies should have internal systems of ensuring financial and public accountability. This includes inbuilt systems promoting transparency, internal audits and disclosure.

The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance emphasise transparency and disclosure. According to the OECD (2004:22), the corporate governance framework of a company should promote punctual and accurate disclosure of the company's performance, finances, governance and ownership. This information is essential because stakeholders can use it to determine its well-being. After all, it outlines a company's objectives, associated risks, financial performance and liabilities. Transparency and disclosure can also be associated with accountability because it provides stakeholders with information that can account for expenditures, investments, and liabilities. Fung (2014:72) remark that transparency and disclosure are vital in contemporary corporate organisations because they can be used as a springboard for informed decisions by stakeholders, shareholders and potential investors regarding capital performance and allocation.

There are significant drawbacks regarding transparency, accountability and disclosure in the Zimbabwean public sector. Unlike in South Africa, SOEs in Zimbabwe neither disclose nor regularly publish performance and financial statements. The literature on SOEs in South Africa shows that all the SOEs reviewed publish annual reports, financial statements and interim results. This makes it easy for stakeholders to evaluate and analyse SOEs' objectives, financial performance, and liabilities. Without these crucial documents, assessing a company's well-being is impossible. Incidentally, company disclosures promote transparency and accountability by revealing transactions, profits, losses, and strategic direction. Considering this state of affairs, this study regards accountability, transparency, and disclosures as international best practices of corporate governance that SOEs can apply to enhance efficiency and performance in the public sector.

4.4 CONCLUSION

The previous chapter dealt with global, continental and country-specific instruments for measuring governance's goodness. The assessment of sound governance instruments fulfilled this study's second research objective. The current chapter fulfils the third research objective. The purpose of this chapter was two-fold. It assessed the role of state institutions (the Auditor-General), SOEs (National Railways of Zimbabwe,

Grain Marketing Board, Zimbabwe United Passenger Company) and independent commissions (Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission, Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission) in promoting sound governance in the public sector and, it also conducts a comparative analysis of Zimbabwean public sector institutions with their counterparts in the United Kingdom and South Africa. Conducting a comparative analysis enabled the researcher to identify international best practices that can be adopted by public sector institutions in Zimbabwe.

It is evident that, as most jurisdictions modelled on democratic governance, Zimbabwe established state oversight institutions, commissions and SOEs to fulfil the government's public policies in a democratic, transparent, economic, sustainable and accountable manner. The *trias politica* philosophy was used as an ideological instrument to separate the functions and obligations of various independent powers inherent in the Zimbabwean state. The literature reviewed in this chapter indicated that one of the pivotal shortcomings of the Auditor-General in Zimbabwe is its dependence on the executive for budgetary and institutional support. This is coupled with the absence of a clear mandate on value-for-money auditing of government accounts. Lessons from the Comptroller and Auditor-General (UK) and the Auditor-General (SA) indicate that the effectiveness and performance of the state's audit function can be enhanced by guaranteeing its independence and by auditing public accounts to create public value.

This chapter underscored the institutional drawbacks of the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission. The literature reviewed indicated that despite a clear and progressive legal and constitutional mandate, the current institutional arrangements of this Commission significantly impede its performance. Whilst the Constitution specifies the independence of ZACC, it is currently housed in the President's Office. This makes it difficult for ZACC to investigate rampant corruption cases in the executive due to conflict of interest. Lessons from the Public Protector in South Africa indicated that placing this institution under Parliament's control enhances its efficiency and independence. In this regard, the international best practice recommended for the ZACC is to ensure it moves away from executive control.

The ZHRC has an essential role in protecting citizens' rights. The literature reviewed in this chapter indicated that the Constitution directs the ZHRC to promote and safeguard Zimbabweans' civil rights and freedoms. However, it is silent about socio-economic rights. In light of the high poverty rates and economic deprivation mainly at the hands of the state, the study identified the lack of focus on socio-economic rights as a legal and constitutional misnomer for the ZHRC. This assertion was made in light of the socio-economic mandate of the South African Human Rights Commission. To this end, the international best practices generated from the SAHRC were that it is pertinent for a state human rights body to safeguard the socio-economic rights of citizens. Literature also underscored Zimbabwean SOEs' corporate governance shortcomings, particularly executive remuneration management, transparency, accountability and corporate disclosures. Unfortunately, the South African SOEs analysed in this chapter face similar challenges. The researcher utilised the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and the Cadbury Report to generate international best practices. These two guidelines revealed that establishing a remuneration committee for the management and boards of SOEs will ensure that executives in public sector organisations are paid according to their performance. This will deal with the current challenge in Zimbabwe, where executives embezzle financial resources under the guise of remuneration. The corporate governance principles also contain guidelines for enhancing transparency, accountability and corporate disclosure.

The next chapter determines the challenges and problems in the execution of good governance principles by selected state institutions in Zimbabwe.

CHAPTER FIVE

GOOD GOVERNANCE APPLICATIONS IN STATE INSTITUTIONS IN ZIMBABWE: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1 outlined the study's objectives, informing the theories, paradigms, framework and legislative instruments explored in Chapters 2 and 3. The previous chapter analysed the role of state institutions in promoting good governance. The researcher outlined the establishment, role, purpose, composition and legal and regulatory framework of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission, the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission and the Office of the Auditor-General. The previous chapter also assessed the functioning and mandate of state-owned enterprises. After identifying weaknesses and shortcomings in the administration, operations and value proposition of the public sector institutions, notably those providing public goods and services, the researcher conducted a comparative analysis with state entities in South Africa to draw lessons and international best practices. The overall objective of the previous chapter was to identify the role of state institutions and explore ways to improve their performance and efficiency. The chapter laid the groundwork for collecting empirical data to solve the research problem.

The current chapter empirically investigates good governance applications in state institutions in Zimbabwe. This serves to verify the potential gaps between current governance praxis and international good governance best practices, principles and approaches. It thus enables data and source triangulation to gauge potential discrepancies with theoretical perspectives, as exposed in chapters 2 to 4. The chapter outlines the research methodology, data collection methods, data analysis and key findings emanating from the responses of sampled participants. It also highlights fieldwork challenges and how ethical issues were addressed during data collection. Data generated during this empirical investigation will inform the development of a good governance framework for the GoZ as the study's main contribution.

5.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Social science research creates new knowledge to advance contemporary society (Leavy, 2017:5-6). Research in Public Administration should be rooted in rigorous and dependable techniques to produce valid and reliable findings (Leavy, 2017:5-6; Thani & Wessels, 2011:75). Therefore, this study adopted appropriate and purposeful research methods. In Public Administration research, the research methodology choice is informed by the applicable theory, objectives of the study and the problem under investigation (Van der Waldt, 2017:187). This study adopted a qualitative research methodology because it seeks to collect empirical data from respondents' views, opinions, experiences and preferences.

There are three primary research methods: qualitative, mixed-methods and quantitative. Leavy (2017:87) suggests that quantitative research techniques (methodologies) permit the collection and analysis of quantitative data for statistical analysis. Hence, quantitative methods create new knowledge by quantifying and processing data to make predictions or compare relationships between variables without giving the researcher too much flexibility (Saunders *et al.*, 2016:136). Conversely, qualitative research collects and analyses non-statistical data to obtain deep insights into an identified research problem (Lune & Berg, 2017:23). Qualitative research involves techniques, instruments and procedures, such as non-probability sampling, focus groups or interviews, induction and content or thematic analysis, enabling the researcher to have an in-depth understanding of social situations by processing views, opinions, feelings and experiences (Hammarberg, Kirkman & De Lacey, 2016:498-499). Mixed research methods combine the strengths of qualitative and quantitative research (Leavy, 2017:167).

This study adopted qualitative research methods because interviews, document analysis, open-ended questionnaires and thematic data analysis will be used to collect and analyse subjective (qualitative) data regarding sound governance in Zimbabwe. This approach is ideal because it enables the researcher to collect and assess participants' perspectives and triangulate with the literature reviewed in the previous chapters to develop a good governance framework.

5.2.1 Research design

The research design delineates the methodical plans and processes developed to procedurally and objectively solve the research problem (Kumar, 2011:95-96). It can be regarded as a game plan outlining the timeline, data sources and data collection techniques of research (Nishishiba, Jones & Kraner, 2014:49). This study adopts an inductive and exploratory case study research design, which follows an interpretivist research paradigm. Interpretivism is a philosophical worldview which enables the researcher to appreciate the complexity of human experiences and social reality. Interpretivists posit that reality is multi-layered, complex and socially constructed; therefore, researchers should understand and interpret people's realities to solve social challenges (Saunders *et al.*, 2016:136). Interpretivist Public Administration researchers are conditioned to accommodate varying perspectives in empirical data because they accept that social reality is shaped by people's experiences and subjective reasoning (Fard, 2012:64-67). This is essential in Public Administration because it enables researchers to explore and understand the subjective world of public policy development and implementation challenges. This subjective worldview requires the researcher to dwell on participants' perceptions, experiences and interpretations to develop new insights or solve a research problem. Interpretivism is appropriate because it enabled the researcher to use participants' experiences and interpretations to identify weaknesses in the governance infrastructure ecosystem of Zimbabwe and proffer interventions. An exploratory research approach explores a phenomenon to gain deep insights (Saunders *et al.*, 2016:174). This approach was consistent with a qualitative research methodology and interpretivism because it enabled the researcher to collect and analyse subjective data.

An inductive case study approach is also consistent with the qualitative methodology described above because it allows the researcher to collect and analyse field data for a specific case, entity or people in natural settings (Heale & Twycross, 2018:7). In this case, the GoZ is considered a single case. Even though a government can be considered an abstract phenomenon, the fact that the GoZ constitutes discrete institutions, departments and entities qualifies it as a researchable case. Induction allows data collection to investigate a research problem and identify patterns and themes to develop an intervention. This approach enabled the research to collect data

about governance issues in Zimbabwe, identify themes and develop a good governance framework to fix existing weaknesses and shortcomings. Although it may be presumptuous for a researcher to assume that a particular governance system has problems, sections 2, 2.6.3, 3.5, 3.6, 4.2.1.1, 4.2.2.1 and 4.2.3.1 indicate that the current system of government in Zimbabwe requires review.

5.2.2 Population and sampling

The target population is essential because it highlights subjects with characteristics the researcher requires to solve the research problem (Leavy, 2017:264). In Public Administration research, subjects comprise recipients of public services, bureaucrats working in government institutions or cities, regions, the state and other stakeholders involved in governance matters (Northrop & Arsneault, 2008:214-5). The total population of this study was difficult to determine because it included an inaccurate number (i.e. unavailability or accurate and reliable statistics) of subjects within or outside the state apparatus. Hence, the researcher cannot accurately state its size. Nonetheless, the target population includes the following:

- Public officials on all managerial levels and in all government spheres and tiers
- Managers and administrators in state-owned enterprises
- Members of non-governmental organisations
- Academics and researchers
- Members of civil society organisations

Sampling involves selecting a portion of the population to investigate (Leavy, 2017:75-6; Northrop & Arsneault, 2008:214). Suitable samples are selected in research because it is impossible to investigate the entire population. Qualitative research uses small samples because the sampling frame cannot be determined, and the researcher does not wish to generalise findings (Nishishiba *et al.*, 2014:293). The study used a two-tier sampling system consisting of two non-probability sampling techniques: purposive and snowball sampling. Purposive sampling was the primary method of selecting individuals and organisations that provided data. Snowball sampling was a

secondary sampling technique; it allowed respondents to recommend people with relevant information that the researcher was unaware of.

Non-probability sampling was ideal because it selected respondents using the researcher's subjective judgement; hence, subjects with specific characteristics were selected (Northrop & Arsneault, 2008:225). Other sampling methods, such as random sampling, would have yielded a sample comprising undesirable respondents who could not provide the data the researcher required. Purposive sampling ensured that the sample had respondents with insights about transparency, accountability and public sector efficiency. Figure 5.1 illustrates the sample of this study.

Table 5.1: The sample of the study

Participant and respondent groups	**Numbers per sample**	**Identification code**
State-owned enterprises	8	RR02; RR01; RR05; RR03; RR06; RR04; RR07; RR08.
Independent commissions and oversight institutions	7	RR12; RR13; RR14; RR15; RR16; RR17; RR18.
Non-state entities	4	RR19; RR24; RR20; RR21.
Academics and researchers	5	RR22; RR23; RR11, RR09; RR10.
Total	**24**	

5.2.3 Data collection techniques

Data collection is essential in empirical Public Administration research because it enables researchers to assess and evaluate the government's performance by collecting citizens' opinions and experiences regarding the quality of public goods and services (Northrop & Arsneault, 2008:214-5). Researchers use several instruments to collect data from participants. Since this study seeks non-statical, qualitative data collection tools were used: semi-structured face-to-face interviews and open-ended questionnaires.

5.2.3.1 Semi-structured face-to-face interviews

Face-to-face interviews are a data collection technique that allows the researcher to meet respondents and ask questions (Nishishiba *et al.*, 2014:99). This data collection method was suitable because it enabled the researcher to ask probing questions, engage at length with respondents and clarify specific issues. Face-to-face semi-structured interviews were conducted with bureaucrats who implement government policies or oversee the functions of specific government institutions and technocrats and administrators working in state-owned enterprises. In addition, semi-structured interviews were conducted with academics and members of civil society organisations. When face-to-face engagements were untenable, Zoom meetings were used to conduct interviews online. On average, each interview lasted 45 – 60 minutes and was conducted at the respondent's workplace.

An interview guide or schedule was designed based on the theoretical exposition and literature review conducted in Chapters 2 to 4. The guide was piloted (pre-tested) with two sampled participants from each target group to test their comprehension of the questions and to validate the data collection method.

The interview guide consisted of three sections. The first section outlined the research's purpose, the respondents' obligations, and ethical issues such as voluntary participation, privacy and confidentiality, and informed consent to ensure that the research complied with the ethical requirements stipulated by the North-West University Ethics Committee. The interview guide protected their privacy and confidentiality by deliberately omitting questions eliciting identifying information such as respondents' names, residential addresses and other personal credentials. The second section (A) collected participants' biographical data, notably age, position and designation, length of service and educational qualifications. Section B collected data about several aspects of good governance depending on the participant's designation. For example, personnel from the Office of the Auditor-General were asked questions about fiscal accountability and value for money, whilst those drawn from the ZHRC were asked questions about protecting human rights. An interview guide should comprise an introduction and primary and follow-up questions (Nishishiba *et al.*, 2014:101).

5.2.3.2 Questionnaire

A questionnaire can be regarded as a data collection instrument containing standardised questions written on a sheet of paper or distributed to respondents electronically (Leavy, 2017:101; Lune & Berg, 2017:200). The questionnaire was used to collect data from civil society and non-governmental organisations about the extent of cooperation between state and non-state institutions. The questionnaire had a section introducing respondents to the study and highlighting ethical issues and how they will be addressed. Section A collected biographical data. The researcher deliberately abstained from generating identifying information such as respondents' names, residential addresses and other personal credentials to enhance their privacy and confidentiality. Section B assessed non-governmental organisations' missions and their cooperation with state institutions.

Questionnaires were used instead of in-depth techniques such as interviews because the data sought from these respondents is straightforward and not nuanced. In addition, this was likely to be a big pool of respondents; hence, a questionnaire could collect the data quickly and economically. Furthermore, in hindsight, the respondents were elusive; hence, it was better to follow up on the questionnaire than to schedule interviews or focus groups. Despite these advantages, the inherent disadvantage of a questionnaire is that it is static and does not permit two-way engagement in real-time. To counteract this shortcoming, the researcher conducted several Zoom interviews with selected gatekeepers to address some loopholes discovered in the respondents' responses.

5.2.4 Thematic data analysis

In its raw form, data collected from the participants and respondents do not address the research problem; hence, it should be processed, analysed and presented in a digestible format. Data analysis achieves this objective. Analysing qualitative data requires a researcher to process thematic or textual data. This is consistent with an exploratory and qualitative study that generates respondents' opinions, experiences and viewpoints that cannot be statistically processed (Nishishiba *et al.*, 2014:286, 293). Thematic data analysis uses manual or computerised coding to look for patterns,

trends and themes and extracts meaning from a data cache. It is considered a scientific technique because it uses systematic and logical procedures; however, the researcher can easily manipulate these to suit the research due to the technique's flexibility (Saunders *et al.*, 2016:579).

Thematic data analysis was used to process and manage data generated through semi-structured interviews and open-ended questionnaires. The researcher transcribed the audio recordings of interviews. Data from respondents were put into distinct themes and categories. Although the institutions and entities being investigated have different functions, the researcher was able to group data for their mandate, management and governance structure and the challenges they encounter. Hence, thematic data analysis was appropriate because it enabled the researcher to analyse data from different public sector organisations by putting it into common themes. Table 5.2 illustrates the themes drawn from the respondents' data. These themes are analysed in detail in 5.5 and 5.6.

Table 5.2: Themes generated from empirical data

Section	Independent Commissions and the Office of the Auditor-General	Section	State-owned enterprises
5.5.1	The state and good governance	5.6.1	Respondents' views on public sector corporate governance
5.5.2	Respondents' views on good governance	5.6.2	Purpose and mandate of SOEs
5.5.3	Purpose and mandate of state institutions	5.6.3	Governance and structure of SOES
5.5.4	The funding model of state institutions	5.6.4	SOEs Boards
5.5.5	The independence of state institutions	5.6.5	SOEs Boards and corporate governance

5.5.6	Exercising oversight over the State	5.6.6	Public sector financial management systems
5.5.7	Challenges facing state institutions	5.6.7	Challenges faced by SOEs

5.3 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Research ethics are vital because they safeguard the researcher's integrity and the safety, well-being and integrity of people who participate in research. Wessels and Visagie (2017:156) acknowledge the importance of ethical considerations in Public Administration research. Like most social and humanities disciplines, Public Administration researchers need "ethical intelligence" because the discipline faces multiple ethical challenges, such as fairness, beneficence and honesty (Matshabaphala, 2017:296). Research ethics are norms and value systems conditioning the researcher's behaviour to protect people participating in the research. The primary ethical issues include avoidance of harm, informed consent, voluntary participation, plagiarism and professional data handling, privacy and confidentiality (Saunders *et al.*, 2016:243-245; Matshabaphala, 2017:296; Wessels & Visagie, 2017:156).

North-West University requires researchers to apply for ethical clearance before embarking on fieldwork. This procedure assesses the ethical compliance of the proposed study. Before fieldwork, the NWU Ethics Committee granted the researcher ethical clearance (Certificate number: NWU-00764-18-A7). The researcher then requested permission to conduct research from gatekeepers in institutions under investigation. Once prospective respondents were identified, the researcher sent them an informed consent letter seeking permission and outlining the study's objectives, ethical guidelines and their right to withdraw from the study at any given point. These issues were emphasised to ensure that prospective respondents understand the rights and responsibilities of participation in the study.

5.4 DATA COLLECTION PROCESS

The data collection process outlines the processes and challenges encountered by the researcher in the field. In this case, it includes the experiences of collecting data, a pilot study and the challenges encountered by the researcher.

5.4.1 Collecting data

The empirical findings presented in this chapter were generated from the fieldwork conducted by the researcher between November 2021 and November 2022. The data collection instruments used in this process included semi-structured interviews and open-ended questionnaires. In most cases, the interviews were conducted face-to-face, but in instances where this was impossible, Zoom was used to meet virtually. In cases where respondents were unavailable for both, they were provided the interview schedule to complete independently. The researcher generally shunned this method because it deprived the researcher of an opportunity to delve deeper and follow up on what the respondents would have said. In most cases, the respondents were provided with the interview schedule to enable them to familiarise themselves with the scope of the interview.

Hard copies of open-ended questionnaires were distributed to the respondents, which proved problematic because the return was meagre. Zoom interviews were scheduled to counter this challenge.

5.4.2 Challenges

When developing the study's research problem, researchers tend to assume they will have undeterred access to gatekeepers and key informants in state institutions and non-governmental organisations. However, the reality on the ground is daunting and demoralising. The challenges encountered in the study include unresponsive and uncooperative respondents, inaccessible gatekeepers and the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic.

The effects of the pandemic were two-fold. The social distancing restrictions resulted in controlled cross-border movements, which affected the researcher's ability to travel to Zimbabwe freely because South Africa and Zimbabwe had distinct and sometimes conflicting cross-border requirements. Once in Zimbabwe, access to some institutions' precincts was restricted; hence, the researcher could not access gatekeepers or negotiate to conduct fieldwork. This resulted in unforeseen delays. Once the researcher was cleared to research, some key informants were unavailable due to sickness and Covid-19 restrictions. This also made it challenging to collect data.

Some of the officials earmarked for engagement were inaccessible or unresponsive. As a result, the researcher had to look for other officials to fill up their places. This prolonged the data collection process because the researcher had to reschedule appointments and commitments constantly. Some institutions were uncooperative or disregarded their commitments. In addition, some public officials were unavailable due to pressing work commitments.

In Chapter 1, the researcher outlined that Commissioners of state oversight institutions would be interviewed for the study due to their deep insights into the functions and operations of independent commissions. However, some gatekeepers felt these institutions were sensitive; hence, access to Commissioners was privileged and monitored. As a result, the researcher could not interview these individuals. The researcher was thus unable to engage with all the respondents envisaged when the study was set in motion (Table 1.3 in section 1.6.4.1 outlines the projected sample size that the researcher expected to investigate).

Despite these institutional and pandemic-related challenges, some gatekeepers and respondents went out of their way to assist the researcher. Their assistance made a significant difference.

5.4.3 Pilot study

After everything was set, the researcher conducted a pilot study with two respondents to assess if they understood the interview questions and to test the suitability of the interview guide. A pilot study is an initial step in research designed to assess the

suitability and appropriateness of the research instrument. It is done on a small scale; hence, it usually includes a handful of subjects (In, 2017:601). The pilot study was designed to include five respondents; unfortunately, only two were available. Nonetheless, it was insightful because it revealed some weaknesses in the interview questions, which resulted in amendments to the interview guide.

5.4 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

The sections outline the profile of the respondents and provide an analysis of the empirical data collected from the respondents.

5.4.1 The profile of the respondents

Section A of the data collection instruments collected respondents' biographical information, including the respondents' gender, age range, number of years in the current position and number of years within the organisation. For easy analysis, months were rounded off to the nearest year. This information is summarised in this section. Figure 5.1 shows the respondents' gender profile. It shows that the bulk of the respondents were males. This, however, does not affect the quality of the respondents' insights because they are all professionals with in-depth insights into their organisations. Table 5.3 indicates the respondents' years of experience in the organisation and current positions, showing that they are experienced, and their data can be relied on owing to their vast knowledge and experience. Figure 5.2 shows the respondents' educational qualifications. The respondents are highly qualified, which renders their insights credible.

Figure 5.1: Respondents' gender profile



Table 5.3: Respondents' years of experience

Range of years	-5yrs	6 – 10 yrs	11– 15yrs	16yrs
Years in current position	10	6	6	2
Years within the organisation	5	4	8	7

Figure 5.2: Respondents' educational qualifications



5.5 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS FROM THE OAG, THE ZACC AND THE ZHRC

This section analyses empirical data collected from state institutions, an oversight institution (OAG), an independent commission promoting democracy (ZHRC), and a Commission established to combat corruption (ZACC), herein referred to as state institutions.

5.5.1 Situating the State within the ecosystem of good governance

At its most basic level, this study maintains that the various perspectives of good governance seek to develop an architecture through which the State, through the government of the day, fulfils the obligation of providing public goods and services to the citizens. This was reflected at various stages of data collection by RR08, RR11, RR09, RR02, RR06, RR03, RR22, RR23 and RR09, who highlighted the State's obligation to provide public services and goods. Given that none exists, this idea necessitates developing a good governance framework for the GoZ. For this reason, this study's analysis of good governance is based on the proposition that the Zimbabwean government should develop systems and institutions to achieve good governance. Theories discussed in sections 2.9.1, 2.9.4 and 2.95 establish this State's mandate and shapes the relationship between the citizens and the State in modern societies.

Social contract theory posits that the State gets the mandate to govern citizens by entering into a social contract with them. According to the social contract theory, citizens should obey the rules and authority of the State; for example, taxes and the courts (this is elaborated by the Public Enforcement of the theory discussed in Lemos and Minzer (2014:854), Mungan (2012:156) and Garoupa and Klerman (2010:76)). In exchange, the State meets citizens' needs, expectations and aspirations as dictated by the contract (Weber, 2014:3; Fabre, 2013:4940; Laskar, 2013:1, 5; Nbete, 2012:271). A fitting example of the social contract is demonstrated in China, where citizens forfeited their right to vote in exchange for unprecedented socio-economic growth and human development. However, China falls short in terms of this study's

characterisation of good governance because it denies citizens the right to vote (cf. Campbell & Carayannis, 2013:3-4).

The public goods theory suggests that citizens, by living under the State's jurisdiction, automatically enjoy public goods such as roads, street lighting, recreational facilities and a safe environment funded by their taxes (Gao et al., 2022:2; Kallhoff, 2021:391; Anomaly, 2015:111). In section 2.8.4, an evaluation of the public value theory highlighted that the State should use its human capital and other tangible and intangible resources to create value for the citizens by delivering public goods and services to meet their needs. Hence, these theories demonstrate the State's obligation to provide goods and services for citizens' consumption. In a nutshell, the theories explain why modern states have obligations to citizens who inhabit geographic areas that fall under their jurisdiction. In the case of the GoZ, the Founding Values and Principles in Chapter 1 of the Constitution put a legal obligation on the State to carry out its duties and fulfil citizens' aspirations.

Data RR03, RR06, RR07, RR11, RR01 and RR09 indicate that the State has established institutions and instruments to deliver value to citizens. In line with this development, the researcher is particularly interested in how State and non-state can be deployed to monitor the government's performance to ensure it delivers its mandate without abusing its authority or misappropriating public resources. Regarding these issues, respondents in academia, non-governmental organisations and the state bureaucracy indicated that state oversight institutions, independent commissions and non-governmental organisations have a collective role in promoting sound governance by assuring transparency, accountability and public sector efficiency. To this end, the section below explores selected state institutions' functioning and how their operations contribute to sound governance.

5.5.2 Exploring bureaucrats' perspectives on good governance

In sections 1.1 and 1.2, the researcher underscored that the study's primary objective is to develop a good governance framework to improve governance in Zimbabwe. This research goal was motivated by the observable poor performance of the GoZ on most regional and international instruments of assessing good governance, as

demonstrated in sections 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7.1 For this reason, good governance is the central concept being researched in the study. Hence, gauging the respondents' understanding and appreciation of good governance is imperative. This is exceedingly important in the case of bureaucrats whose duty is to implement public policies and exercise the state authority responsibly to meet citizens' needs and the government's political obligations. This theme achieved this objective.

Respondents expressed varying views about good governance. By and large, their responses indicated that they understood what it entails. RR12 stated that good governance refers to a governance system that ensures that the government provides public services through its institutions and departments. The main features of a good governance dispensation are accountability, participation and transparency. This conceptualisation of good governance was supported by RR16, who opined that good governance refers to how a legitimate government manages state resources to deliver public services and protect citizens' basic rights, the rule of law and a government administration free from corruption. Hence, it is an apparatus through which public policies are implemented to reflect citizens' needs. RR15 suggested that good governance is a mechanism used to measure the performance of a government. RR15's viewpoint is consistent with this study's conceptualisation of good governance, unpacked in Chapter 3. This viewpoint regards good governance as a measurable concept that can be assessed with objective and subjective instruments (see sections 3.3, 3.4, 3.6 and 3.7). The bureaucrats' responses are consistent with the views expressed by the UN (2016:149), Fourie (2015:110) and Ali (2015:65), who maintain that good governance is a system of promoting sound management of public resources through transparent, accountable, efficient and representative government institutions. In particular, most definitions of good governance are consistent with RR12's views because they denote that governments should be accountable and transparent.

The respondents’ views indicate that within the sample selected for the study, there is a robust understanding of what good governance entails. This is a good foundation because, from oversight and monitoring of the government's functions' perspective, it means that bureaucrats tasked with promoting good governance have a firm grasp of what should be done.

5.5.2.1 Academics' and NGOs' views of good governance

The governance model adopted in the study incorporates the contributions and the role of the non-state role players in shaping sound good governance practices in the public sector. Sections 1.1 and 2.2. indicate that modern State governance is collaborative because it incorporates the support and contribution of non-state and social role players. This collaborative approach creates avenues for NGOs, academics and CSOs to be a party to national governance through research, activism, critique and lobbying (Pillay, 2016:23; Ali, 2015:65; Almqvist *et al.,* 2013:479; Van Doeveren, 2011:303). Hence, in addition to considering bureaucrats' views, the researcher also considered those of staffers from non-state stakeholders such as non-governmental organisations, academics and civil society groups.

RR19, RR23 and RR20 stated that good governance refers to a system of government that does not violate the human rights of the citizens. It ensures that the State does not abuse its power and deprive citizens of their constitutional rights. This conceptualisation of good governance focuses on how State authority should not be abused, but instead, the State should use the authority to protect citizens and promote their human rights. The premise of this school of thought was addressed in Chapter 4 when the link between good governance and preserving citizens' human rights was established. For instance, according to Brown (2016:106), the principal elements of good governance assure citizens' human rights and freedoms. The OHCHR (2021) suggests a nexus between promoting good governance and ensuring that citizens enjoy their human rights because both concepts have a set of values that shape the implementation of the government's policies. RR23 stressed that good governance could be perceived as how the government's authority, resources and systems are galvanised to achieve specific goals such as constitutionality, the rule of law and accountability.

According to RR21:

> *"Good governance is a transparent system that satisfies citizens' needs by ensuring that corruption and abuse of power for individual gain by government officials do not impair government functions".*

RR24 opined that in the non-governmental organisations' fraternity,

> *"…we understand good governance to be government free from corruption and excessive use authority and theft of State resources by government officials".*

Similarly, RR20 opined that good governance is a construct used chiefly by developed countries to encourage developing countries to fulfil their obligations to their citizens without resorting to corruption, violating human rights and silencing citizens and preventing them from participating in public affairs. These views reflect the characterisation of good governance discussed in section 1.1, where academic views argue that good governance is a mechanism for gauging the suitability of developing countries to receive aid and foreign investment. It assesses the government's capacity to use public resources to meet citizens' needs. Hence, good governance can be viewed from an institutional or policy perspective. This viewpoint was discussed in section 3.3.3, where the researcher outlined how the CPIA index assesses the robustness of policies and institutions in developing countries earmarked for aid (Nguema-Affane, 2016:5; Reigner, 2016:1). This shows that for a developing country such as Zimbabwe, good governance is a national and an international issue because if the country's governance is regarded in a bad light, international development partners can shun it.

By and large, the respondents' perspectives reflect the views and opinions of researchers highlighted in the literature reviewed in sections 1.1, 1.2, 2.2, 2.3, 3.2 and 4.2.2. For instance, several citations underscored that good governance is concerned with establishing state institutions and a bureaucracy engineered to meet the citizens' needs by sustainably deploying public resources. This means it fosters national development through accountable, legitimate and responsive government systems (Gumede and Dipholo, 2014:45). It is noteworthy that most of the respondents did not regard good governance as an instrument of strengthening public institutions such as law enforcement agents, the judiciary, public audit institutions and state oversight bodies. This argument was made in Chapter 1 when the researcher demonstrated that poor governance in Zimbabwe results from weak public institutions. This line of reasoning is supported by Gisselquist (2012:1,18) whos argue that less developed countries are characterised by weak institutions that fail to instil values of

accountability and transparency, resulting in corruption and the collapse of the rule of law.

Figure 5.3 collated some respondents' views, showing a fair understanding of good governance.

Figure 5.3: Respondents' perceptions of good governance



Source: Researcher's own composition

5.5.3 The purpose and mandate of state institutions

The *trias politica* principle, as outlined in section 4.2, fosters the separation of legal, administrative and political authority within a state. This theme established the overall purpose and mandate of independent commissions and state oversight institutions. The institutions in question are the Office of the Auditor-General (OAG), the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC) and the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC). The *trias politica* principle informed the decision to investigate these institutions because they are vital in fostering the separation of State power. Mathebula and Munzhedzi (2017:7), Mojapelo (2013:37) and Sultana (2012:55) point out that the modern State should have inbuilt systems of balancing and checking how

it exercises its authority because failing to create such instruments breeds governments that are antagonistic to citizens' needs. Hence, it is essential for modern states to develop effective checks and balances. For this reason, the State should create institutions that assure citizens of responsive governance bound by the limits of the law. The mandate and purpose of state oversight institutions in a modern state are derived from this ideology of separating powers and establishing institutions to monitor, balance and check the exercise of state power. In the case of Zimbabwe, the Constitution and legislative interventions extend this mandate to independent commissions and state oversight institutions. The respondents' views were consistent with the constitutional provisions governing the establishment and functions of state oversight institutions and independent commissions supporting democracy. Most respondents highlighted the purpose and objectives of their institutions. This dovetailed with their functions and responsibilities. However, some of their responses were inconsistent with the information discussed in the literature. Regarding this issue, academics were quick to point out that while the mandate and purpose of these institutions are straightforward, they struggle to live up to the good governance spirit exuded in the Constitution. This is one of the reasons poor governance is prevalent in Zimbabwe because the proverbial “checks and balances” (Mathebula & Munzhedzi, 2017:7) cannot fulfil their mandate.

5.5.3.1 The purpose and mandate of the Office of the Auditor-General

RR23 opined that a public audit institution is crucial in assuring transparency and accountability because it is the starting point for assessing public resources management. For example, interventions of bringing public officials to account or recovering misappropriated assets stem from the reports tabled to the Parliament by the Auditor-General. As demonstrated in section 4.2.1.1, the Auditor-General ensures efficient, effective and economic use of the State's resources by auditing government institutions such as local authorities and state-owned entities and making legislative recommendations. These activities enable it to foster transparency and accountability, ensure value for money, safeguard public resources and strengthen public sector financial controls in line with the provisions of the Constitution and related public financial management laws (s309(2) of the Constitution; Zinyama, 2013:272; s5, Audit Office Act, 22:18 of 2010). The Auditor-General's (AG) reports shape how various tools

for ensuring accountability and responsible use of public resources will be deployed. This demonstrates how other forms of checks and balances within the State depend on the performance of the public audit office. In South Africa, the SCOPA holds public officials for mismanagement of funds based on the AGSA's report (Matlala & Uwizeyimana, 2020:3; Malapane, 2016:136).

Similarly, RR17 and RR18 stated that the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) in Zimbabwe summons public officials to answer cases of financial misconduct. For this reason, the Auditor-General is one of the most vital institutions for managing the State's authority, particularly regarding spending public financial resources, because it unearths cases of financial misappropriation and mismanagement. Regarding OAG's purpose, respondents such as RR18, RR23 and RR16 concurred that the OAG is the sole auditor of government accounts. It fulfils this duty by analysing financial management in government-affiliated institutions. However, RR17 pointed out that "sole auditor" should not be understood literally because the OAG outsources services from the private sector. The primary objective of the OAG is to ensure that financial resources deployed in the public sector are accounted for. RR18 stated that the OAG is an SAI (supreme audit institution) responsible for public audits. It achieves this mandate by auditing and publishing reports of the government's expenditures annually for the legislature. The legislature has the means and authority to make public officials accountable for their decisions and activities regarding using or misusing public financial resources, but this system heavily relies on the AG's insights. In this regard, RR18 highlighted that the PAC is an institution within the legislature that analyses the AG's reports and seeks an audience with public officials believed to be responsible for violating public financial management statutes.

RR16 stated that the Office of the Auditor-General audits the accounts of government institutions such as local municipalities, state-owned enterprises, government ministries and other departments. Furthermore, RR16 stated that:

> *“Basically, in a nutshell, it is to assure accountability if I were to summarise briefly. We aim to bring government entities to account. The other government departments, ministries and agencies are spending the government's financial resources. As the OAG, our mandate is to*

assess if government expenditures are used according to the law or principles of the Public Finance Management Act. So, one thing we do is to buttress accountability among government ministries, departments, agencies and entities".

Similarly, according to RR17, the purpose of the state audit institution is to audit the government's entities and support reports to the Parliament. He added that:

"*We are mainly concerned about the accountability of public funds disbursed to various state companies and ministries. We assess if they are using public funds as expected by the government"*.

All the respondents agreed that the OAG's primary function is to audit government accounts. RR18's response was noteworthy because it highlighted that structures within the legislature are responsible for grilling public officials about their questionable financial decisions. The researcher had the privilege of visiting the premises of the PAC and interacting with the administrative staff members. The PAC is a multi-party parliamentary body tasked with scrutinising the AG's reports and questioning public officials about inconsistencies. However, given the perennial challenge of financial mismanagement and recurring cases of misconduct among state institutions, the efficacy of the PAC comes into question.

Respondents' responses are consistent with the literature reviewed in section 4.2.1.1. Hatchard (2018:51,77) states that the OAG gatekeeps transparency and accountability, Zhou (2012:157) and Raj (2015:7) believe it is an independent institution created to scrutinise how finances are managed and Khothami (2017:31) states that it ensures that financial resources belonging to the State are used according to citizens' pressing needs and public policies developed by the government. These scholarly contributions are congruent with the perspectives proffered by respondents. From a legal standpoint, the Audit Office Act mandates the OAG should examine and audit public accounts and safeguard the state's financial resources at the behest of Parliament by ensuring that government expenditures are consistent with the law. Hence, this is a delegated role that is fulfilled at the request of

Parliament. This complements the *trias politica* principle mentioned above, ensuring that state authority is shared among its different arms.

5.5.3.2 The purpose and mandate of the ZACC

The exposition in section 4.2.3.1 indicates that Zimbabwe has an endemic corruption scourge, and the ZACC was established to address this challenge. This section aims to collate respondents' views and compare them with the constitutional and legal provisions and viewpoints of scholars examined in Chapter 4. The respondents demonstrated a robust understanding of the importance of combatting corruption by outlining the purpose and mandate of the ZACC. A competent government institution dedicated to combating corruption is a relatively new development in Zimbabwe. The ZACC was established in 2005 through the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Act of 2004. The Constitution gave it additional responsibilities in line with the country's renewed corruption challenges. Section 4.2.3 of this study created a link between an anti-corruption body and promoting good governance by indicating that the government and civil society organisations are concerned about corruption because it breeds inefficient, fruitless and underperforming government systems.

The role of the ZACC fits into the thesis of this study because Zargar and Sheikh (2018:60) and Salihu (2022:102) insist that good governance entails a corrupt-free public administration which manages public resources sustainably according to government policies and citizens' needs. This makes anti-corruption agencies obligated to develop interventions to prevent and uproot corruption within the civil service, the executive and the legislature. This is essential because these elements of the State command state resources; without adequate oversight, they can abuse these resources for personal gains. Hence, the ZACC is vital in promoting good governance because it eradicates corruption within the administration of State authority.

The United Nations in Gisselquist (2012:6) identified corruption as threatening sound governance. For this reason, combating corruption is necessary, particularly in developing countries where most people live in poverty due to government inefficiency, which disproportionately affects poor people who rely on public goods and services the most. RR21 and RR19 believe that combatting corruption enables the

government to extract optimum value from its resources. This gives it a better chance of addressing the increasing citizens' needs. In Zimbabwe, the government requires all the resources it can get to resuscitate its functions and increase the State's capacity to cater for citizens' needs. Naher *et al.* (2020:3) postulate that combatting corruption is vital within the framework of good governance because it promotes accountable, efficient and transparent governance. Therefore, from a public administration perspective, the ZACC is pivotal because it enables the state apparatus to deliver value sustainably to the citizens.

Corruption is rampant in Zimbabwe (Cloete, 2013:151); in light of this, RR14 stated that the ZACC was established "to combat corruption in the public sector"; hence, its purpose is to eliminate corruption. RR14 believes combatting corruption is vital because it costs the State money and leads to poor government services. RR15 indicated that its purpose is to receive complaints about corruption in the government bureaucracy and investigate them to enable the judiciary to prosecute. RR14 added that the ZACC was established to:

> *"Investigate corruption, inform and educate the public about the perils of corruption and recommend techniques of eliminating corruption in the country".*

The Anti-Corruption Act and the Constitution mirror these views. Both envisage an anti-corruption body that actively eliminates corruption by investigating instances where corruption is believed to have happened and educating citizens about the effects of corruption in society. Mugadza (2017:330) believes the ZACC has a robust legislative framework to support its operation. This includes guaranteed autonomy and the authority to conduct investigations and educational campaigns without deterrence.

According to RR19, the ZACC is an institution for preventing corruption established through a constitutional provision. RR21 stated that from an academic point of view, ZACC is a structure within the government established to eradicate corruption and maintain clean governance by investigating allegations of public officials' misuse or theft of public resources. The existence of an anti-corruption body shows the government's commitment to the maximum use of taxpayers' funds to improve

people's living standards. Fighting corruption also gives the governing party-political capital, especially in developing countries where governance systems are considered corrupt and self-serving. Hence, politicians and political parties leverage an anti-corruption message to gain political capital.

Respondents drawn from non-governmental organisations concurred with the school of thought which associates the public sector with corruption. The respondents stated that most instruments of measuring corruption agree with this view because, in the past two decades, Zimbabwe has been performing poorly on corruption indexes. RR24 stated that the ZACC mandate prevents corruption and investigates suspicious conduct in managing public resources. The respondents' responses reflect what was gleaned in 4.2.3.1. However, it should be noted that non-state players interviewed in this study believe that despite the straightforward mandate of the ZACC, more needs to be done to capacitate it and ensure that it is up to the task of combatting corruption because corruption is rampant in the public sector and it requires the ZACC to eliminate it aggressively.

Corruption in Zimbabwe is so rife that basic public services such as obtaining a driver's license or car number plates require citizens to bribe officials. This brazenness indicates that corruption has been ingrained in the public service, and nothing short of extreme measures will eliminate it. However, RR13 stated that without actionable complaints and official reports about corruption, the ZACC does not pursue cases based on hearsay. This is a missed opportunity for the ZACC to demonstrate its willingness to eliminate corruption, particularly since people generally question its effectiveness.

5.5.3.3 The purpose and mandate of the ZHRC

The researcher sought to establish the congruence between respondents' perspectives, the legal stipulations and the views and opinions of researchers analysed in the previous chapters and section 4.2.2.1. Respondents stated that the Constitution and the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission Act of 2012 inform the purpose, mandate and functions of the ZHRC. The literature reviewed in section 4.2.2.1 indicated that Zimbabwe is regarded as a pariah globally due to its poor human

rights record. The State is accused of perpetrating most human violations and disregarding protecting citizens' rights (Mavhinga, 2017: online; Dzimiri *et al.*, 2014:232).

The nexus between protecting human rights and citizens' freedom, good governance, government administration and economic development is derived from Reif (2001). Reif (2001) hypothesises that the government's ability to deliver public goods sustainably and services cannot be separated from its obligation to protect citizens' rights. Efficient management of public resources and delivering citizens' needs cannot be achieved in a climate characterised by a disdain for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Hence, public management and governance scholars and practitioners underscore the importance of a public administration system with in-built mechanisms for protecting citizens' human rights. To this end, this study investigated the state apparatus designed to protect citizens' human rights. Protecting citizens' human rights is essential in conceptualising the *trias politica* doctrine because it informs the creation of a public institution accessible to citizens which actively monitors how the State exercises its authority. This is a pivotal internal control mechanism because it enables the State to have an in-house structure designed to curtail the exercise of illegitimate authority.

Regarding the purpose and function of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission, most respondents displayed sufficient knowledge about the mandate of the Commission by pointing out that it promotes and protects citizens' rights. RR13 highlighted that the ZHRC is an institution that came into existence through a provision in the Constitution. Overall, it protects and promotes citizens' rights. RR13 further stated that:

> *"The ZHRC is a Chapter 12 Commission supporting democracy, and it is established in terms of section 242 of the Constitution Amendment 20, read together with the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission Act [Chapter 10:30] as amended by Act 3 of 2016. The ZHRC is mandated to protect, promote and enforce human rights and fundamental freedoms at all levels of society. It also had a duty to protect the public against abuse of power and maladministration by the State and public*

institutions and officers of those institutions. It has a dual mandate that includes the Public Protector Mandate in paragraph 16 (2) of Part 4 of the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution. To implement its mandate and work, the ZHRC established three Programmes: the Complaints Handling and Investigations Department, the Monitoring and Inspections Department and the Education Promotion and Research Department. It establishes a fourth programme department, the Administrative Justice Department, responsible for the Public Protector Mandate. Currently, the Public Protector Mandate is housed within the Complaints Handling and Investigations Department".

RR13 and RR20 stress that the ZHRC was established to protect citizens' rights; hence, it should be accessible to communities nationwide. However, RR12 mentioned that the Commission has not been able to spread its operations across the country. To date, it has a few satellite stations outside the capital city. Efforts are underway to establish provincial ZHRC offices in all the country's provinces to enhance accessibility.

RR12 believes that:

"The ZHRC is a multi-purpose institution with the duty to raise awareness about human rights and freedoms; it also promotes programmes that ensure citizens' rights are attained without prejudice, and it monitors how the State ensures that citizens attain human rights and freedoms. In addition, the ZHRC receives and investigates human rights violation complaints and protects citizens from excessive state authority by organs of the government or public officials".

In addition, RR12 stated that:

"The ZHRC plays the role of a human rights watchdog, an educator, and an enforcer of human rights and fundamental freedoms. It publicises human rights and contributes to efforts to combat all forms of discrimination, particularly racial discrimination, by increasing public

awareness, especially through information and education and using all press organs. It also acts as an advisor to the government on issues related to human rights. It plays a crucial role in promoting and monitoring the effective implementation of international human rights standards at the national level".

RR20 indicated that the ZHRC was established as a state entity that educates citizens and government officials about the importance of human rights. It also implements measures to protect the people's human rights from abuse, especially by government officials such as police officers, soldiers and other public officials. Given the history of human rights violations in Zimbabwe, the ZHRC is crucial because it has the authority and means to protect citizens' rights.

By and large, the respondents' views depicted in Figure 5.4 match the functions of the ZHRC outlined in the ZHRC Act. This demonstrates an understanding of the mandate of the Commission by the respondents involved in the study.

Figure 5.4: The mandate of state institutions



Source: Researcher's own composition

5.5.4 Composition and organisational structure

Sections 4.2.1.1, 4.2.2.1 and 4.2.3.1 dealt with the composition and governance structure of institutions investigated in this study. This theme establishes their

composition and organisational structure to determine consistency with the Constitution and applicable legislation.

5.5.4.1 The ZACC

RR14 and RR15 stated that the ZACC is one of the independent commissions established under Chapter 13 of the Constitution to combat crime, corruption and abuse of the government's resources. RR13 mentioned that it falls administratively under the Office of the President and Cabinet, although it is accountable to the legislature. The governance structure of the Commission includes a chairperson, the deputy chairperson and six commissioners. Altogether they make up the Commission's commissioners. The daily operations of the Commission are managed by the Secretariat, comprised of senior management members, including the executive secretary and five general managers.

Section 254 of the Constitution outlines how the management and governance structure of the ZACC should be composed. It states that the President should appoint a chairperson and eight other members. Furthermore, members of the Commission should be selected on the grounds of merit, experience and integrity. This contradicts respondents' feedback because the ZACC executive organ comprises seven members.

5.5.4.2 The ZHRC

Section 242 of the Constitution directs the government to establish the ZHRC. It provides for the appointment of a chairperson and eight other members. Respondents underscored that the ZHRC is composed of management and commissioners. The management, also called the Secretariat, typically manages the daily functions and operations of the Commission.

RR13 stated that:

> *"The management and governance structure of the ZHRC entails two main organs: the Secretariat and the commissioners. The nine*

Commissioners are appointed under section 237 of the Constitution through the Parliamentary Committee on Standing Orders and Rules. The Chairperson and the Deputy Chairperson are full-time, and the other seven members are appointed part-time. There are two vacant Commissioner posts, given that the two Commissioners' terms ended during the year. The Secretariat is headed by the Executive Secretary and supported by seven members of the management. These other seven members are the Deputy Executive Secretary – Programmes, Deputy Executive Secretary – Administration, Director – Finance, Director – Human Resources, Director – Complaints Handling and Investigations, Director – Monitoring and Inspections and Director – Education, Promotion and Research. Then the rest of the Secretariat are members of staff. Each department has a Human Rights Officer responsible for carrying out the work outlined above under the guidance of the Director responsible. Other support staffers include the Office orderlies, IT Assistants, Human Resources Assistants, Personal Executive Assistants, Procurement Officers, Internal Auditor, and Records Officers, among others".

RR12 stated that the Secretariat manages the Commission's day-to-day operations, and the commissioners oversee policy development, organisational goals and strategic objectives.

5.5.4.3 The Office of the Auditor-General

The AG is part of the public finance management architecture. Section 310 outlines the processes of appointing an AG. However, the Constitution is silent about the composition of the OAG. Respondents such as RR16 and RR18 stated that the OAG consists of four divisions: three are headed by a deputy director. The fourth division, which comprises administrative functions such as public relations, human resources, information and technology, finance, administration and procurement, is headed by the finance and human resources director. All four divisions are accountable to the Auditor-General. Divisions 1 and 2 have four directorates, and Division 3 has three. Division 1 is responsible for value-for-money audits; division 3 audits local

municipalities and state-owned enterprises; division 2 trains the OAG's staff and develops their skills to match macroenvironmental trends and organisational requirements. RR16 believes this organisational structure was designed to divide responsibilities and enhance efficiency.

5.5.5 The funding model of state institutions

This theme established how the institutions being investigated are funded. Funding is essential in the public sector because it is the backbone of its efficiency. Financial resources are used to hire competent employees and procure essential resources for day-to-day operations. Hence, investigating the institutions' funding models can give researchers insights into their performance. The researcher asked the respondents to disclose the funding source for state oversight institutions and independent commissions supporting democracy, and their responses are collated below.

5.5.5.1 The OAG

Most respondents concurred that the OAG's primary funding source is the State. RR18 opined that, like any other government institution, the OAG relies on the central government, through the Ministry of Finance, to fund its mandate. RR16 suggested that adequate funding is essential for the functioning of institutions because it enables them to acquire resources, personnel and other necessities required to enhance performance. In the public sector, the issue of funding is crucial because public institutions cannot raise funds from sources outside the State's Treasury. In other jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom, a Consolidated Fund is created to finance the remuneration of members of independent state institutions (Morin & Hazgui, 2016:568). The Consolidated Fund separates the salaries of officials of independent institutions from other civil servants to enhance their independence and job security by ensuring that they are not paid directly by a department of government that they may be called to investigate (Morin & Hazgui, 2016:568). In Zimbabwe, RR14 hinted that the Consolidated Fund funded the ZACC, not the individuals within it.

RR22 stated that all the state oversight institutions and independent commissions supporting democracy and other institutions affiliated with the State are funded from

the public purse. This was reiterated by RR23, who stressed that from a funding perspective, the State is obligated to fund these institutions in the same manner as it does with other State institutions. He also noted that even though the ZHRC directly receives funding from the Treasury, the Constitution stipulates that allowances, salaries and other forms of remuneration for members of the Commission are generated from the Consolidated Revenue Fund. This means that the fund is reserved for individuals' compensation. This provision was included in the Constitution to ensure that the State does not threaten the Commission's impartiality.

Regarding the source of the OAG's funding, RR17 stated:

> *"I am not sure about the current set-up, but traditionally we get funding from the Treasury. In addition, we generate money from audit fees. We do not charge audit fees to government ministries, but we charge SOEs and local municipalities. The bulk of our funding is generated from the treasury"*.

Since the OAG is designated the role of auditing all government accounts, audit fees from SOEs and local municipalities are a good funding source; however, this is insufficient to sustain the OAG's operations. For this reason, relying on the Treasury is sustainable and prudent, given that the OAG does not have a reliable funding source outside of the State. RR16 opined that although the OAG receives token funding from other sources, its primary funding source is the Treasury (Minister of Finance). RR16 also argued that creating a separate funding structure for the OAG is not worthwhile because the funds will still come from the Treasury. He added that it might sound like the OAG will have an independent funding source, but it cannot be realistically independent of the State's influence if it administers the Consolidated Fund. RR18 believed that funding affects the performance of the institutions. The respondent stated that in the past when financial support was not as it was today, the OAG struggled to meet its objectives. This dented its performance.

When the researcher asked the respondent whether the funding they received was adequate for their operations, RR17 said:

“Not necessarily, although there are efforts by the AG and the PAC to address this. Currently, in Zimbabwe, the cake is so small and financial resources are difficult to come by. We cannot do some things due to the lack of funding”.

RR16 stated that:

“There is room for improvement regarding our funding; however, the situation is better than before, but we certainly would welcome additional funding because it will enable us to conduct our duties more efficiently”.

5.5.5.2 The ZHRC

Sufficient funding is essential for the ZHRC because it, among many other things, enables it to run programmes that educate State agents, such as the police and soldiers, about human rights. The state agents are more likely to abuse citizens' human rights because they wield the State's power. RR13 stated that they receive most of their funding from the Treasury. In some cases, their programmes are funded by donors and other international organisations that promote human rights in Zimbabwe. RR12 supported this view by highlighting that they are a state institution, and the Constitution states that the fiscus should fund their functions. Hence, the government's Treasury is the primary and regular funding source for the ZHRC's operations. RR12 further stressed that unlike other business-oriented organisations owned by the State, such as SOEs, the independent commission does not have the means of collecting revenue because their services do not generate profits. Hence, it can only receive funding from the State. The researcher probed if the ZHRC has a specialised funding system designed only for it. The respondent indicated that there was not.

5.5.5.3 The ZACC

According to RR14:

"The Consolidated Revenue Fund funds the ZACC's operations. The Treasury has to finance our operations to ensure we perform our duties effectively. From my experience, anti-corruption agencies globally are funded through the CRF because they are constitutional bodies. However, when we talk about their independence, this is evaluated based on their operations and decision-making; hence, operational independence. A public institution cannot be financially independent of the government".

Muponde and Musafare (2019:) and Matembwe (2019:32) insist that the ZACC's operational challenges stem from its arrangements with the State. These researchers suggest that the ZACC has never been adequately funded, and the current funding model makes the Commission vulnerable to pressure and influence by the executive. This argument opposes the assertions of RR14 because it suggests that members of the Executive arm of the State can influence the Commission through funding.

The Constitution provides for specific individuals working in strategic state institutions to be remunerated from the CRF. This instrument enhances their independence and job security. However, the Constitution implies that this provision only relates to individuals' salaries and allowances, not entire institutions. Upon being asked if this funding arrangement does not compromise the independence and performance of the ZACC, RR14 argued that the State should ultimately fund any state institution, and this does not imply that the institution will not execute its duties effectively. The respondent believes State administrative support in terms of funding does not sway the policies and objectives of the ZACC.

One of the international best practices identified in Chapter 4 pertains to how independent state institutions are funded. De Vos (2013:163) insists that state institutions should enjoy a great deal of autonomy to exercise unfettered oversight over the State and contribute towards sound governance in the public sector. De Vos (2013:163) argues that institutional autonomy cannot be guaranteed without financial independence because financial independence shelters the institutions from administrative and political interference. Given that these institutions investigate influential individuals, their performance can be dented by funding arrangements

systems that make them financially dependent. Konstant (2016:12) states that the South African model funds the Public Protector through the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development. This arrangement, as it was argued in the ruling of *Independent Electoral Commission v Langeberg Municipality,* indicates that financial independence does not mean independent state bodies unilaterally manage their budget affairs; instead, it means that their funding is in the hands of Parliament instead of the executive arm of the State. This ensures that a collective body is responsible for funding state institutions, making it difficult for individuals to make unilateral decisions about how these institutions are funded (De Vos, 2013:166).

5.5.6 The independence of state institutions

This theme explored the autonomy of the ZACC, the ZHRC and the Office of the Auditor-General. The literature reviewed in section 4.2.3.3.1 indicates that the performance of state institutions is enhanced if they are autonomous. The independence of state institutions was described in Chapter 4 as one of the international best practices that render them impartial, effective and free to operate without fear and prejudice (De Vos, 2013:166). Most researchers consider the independence of state oversight institutions as sacrosanct because it liberates them from the control and influence of the Executive arm of the State, which, if its authority is unchecked, can fire or suspend officials investigating their affairs (Matebwe, 2019; Rahman, 2021). The respondents had the following to say about the independence of their institutions.

5.5.6.1 The OAG

Asked about the independence of the OAG, RR17 stated that:

> *"The OAG is an independent entity; we only deal with the Ministry of Finance like any other government entity that requires funding from the public purse because they control the government's finances. Hence, we relate with them to the extent that they are the Treasury. Regarding audits and our functions, we are independent of the Ministry of Finance".*

Given that the OAG is financially dependent on the Treasury, scholars, particularly those reviewed in Chapter 3 of this study, believe this dents the institution's independence. In light of this assertion, RR16 argued that:

> *"Receiving funding from the Treasury does not affect our independence because in as much we are financially dependent on the Treasury's funding, in terms of operations and execution of functions, we are not. In fact, as an institution, we are committed to asserting our independence".*

Asked about the effects of relying on funding from the Treasury on the institution's operations, RR18 said:

> *"When you talk about the independence of an auditing institution, there are two aspects; functional and financial independence. For us, we are functionally independent, as guaranteed by the Constitution. Regarding financial independence, we are not a hundred per cent independent. In other countries, they treat SAIs like the judiciary because they are wholly independent. Zimbabwe uses the Westminster system because we are neither part of the judiciary nor the legislature. In fact, we are almost like a part of the executive. We operate as the executive arm of the State, but we report to the parliament because we are an oversight institution. In any case, the Treasury is our source of funds. We could be deemed financially independent if Treasury did not dictate our access to finance. For example, the Treasury can give us less funding than expected".*

The feedback indicates that despite relying on the State for funding, the OAG can maintain its independence and execute its functions impartially.

5.5.6.2 The ZACC

Given its function of combatting corruption, the ZACC is one of the institutions most sensitive to interference and undue pressure in its operations. As outlined above, most scholars argue that the current funding model used to finance the ZACC compromises its independence, curtailing its performance.

RR15 expressed the view that the Commission is a vital institution in the transparency and accountability architecture of the government. The Constitution affirms and guarantees the independence of its operations. Hence, it needs autonomy to carry out its mandate. Although RR14 hinted that the ZACC is administratively under the Office of the President and Cabinet (OPC), he argued that the OPC does not influence the institution's policies and strategic direction. Asked if putting the ZACC administratively under the OPC does not create bias given that it is an Executive arm of the State with immense political power and it might fall under the purview of the ZACC's investigations, the respondent said:

> *"OPC is the number one ministry which deals with policy implementation and coordination. It has a chief secretary and deputy chief secretary to mimic the arrangement in any other ministry. Obviously, professionalism and values such as transparency outweigh individuals' notions of conflict of interests among our officials".*

The respondent stressed that this relationship does not impede the ZACC's operations. In addition, RR14 underscored that:

> *"When we talk about policy issues, we receive policy guidance. This does not affect our operational independence because we make resolutions, but we rely on the OPC in terms of policy guidance. Our reports are tabled to Parliament through the Ministry of Justice. In other words, fighting corruption is a collaborative effort"*.

Rahman (2021) and Matembwe (2019:32) are not convinced that the ZACC will deliver results under the current model. They favour a system used in South Africa of directly putting the affairs of the Public Protector under the Parliament's scrutiny and accountability. Given the multi-party nature of Parliament, this set-up enhances institutional independence and makes it answerable to a body broadly representative of the citizens' interests.

5.5.6.3 The ZHRC

Regarding the independence of the ZHRC, RR13 stated that:

> *"We have not yet experienced any challenges regarding operating independently. We are an independent institution in charge of our plans, strategies, functions and how to execute them. The only challenge to our independence is strategic because we are not wholly in charge of our human resources management functions; we are forced to rely on other government departments".*

5.5.6.3.1 Political interference in state institutions' operations

The other issue related to the independence of state institutions is political influence or undue pressure from illegitimate individuals, groups or institutions. Sections 235(3) and 314(c) direct independent commissions and the Office of the Auditor-General to be independent and impartial in executing their duties. To explore this issue, the researcher asked respondents if they face political or undue influence. RR18 said:

> *"I would not know, from my low-level position and experience, I have not personally faced it, but you will find that some officials tend to drop names of prominent political leaders to intimidate our officers. I cannot say that it is political interference. It is people shielding their incompetency by invoking the names of politicians to deter the operations of the OAG. As I said, ours is an independent institution, and no one deters us from performing our functions. The AG's reports generate a lot of noise in the country; if there had been interference, we would have been deterred from conducting audits. Since we freely audit and publish findings, there is no political pressure. However, we try not to sensationalise our findings by being factual and objective".*

Similarly, other respondents drawn from the OAG, the ZACC and the ZHRC expressed no knowledge of political interference in their operations.

5.5.7 Exercising oversight over the State

One of the reasons behind choosing to investigate the ZHRC, the ZACC and the OAG is that they are among a variety of public institutions that have an oversight function on the State. For this reason, these are crucial institutions that can strengthen good governance and ensure that the State fulfils its obligations in compliance with the Constitution or conventional norms stipulated by international treaties and conventions. To this end, this theme explores how the institutions exercise oversight functions or strengthen democracy and good governance in Zimbabwe by exploring the interventions, strategies and mechanisms they deploy to ensure that the State legitimately exercises its authority and sustainably uses public resources to create value for the citizens.

5.5.7.1 The ZHRC

In section 5.3.3, respondents indicated that the overall purpose of the ZHRC is protecting citizens' human rights and fundamental freedoms. Under this theme, the researcher explored how this purpose is achieved. Respondents highlighted the three primary strategies the Commission uses to execute its mandate. RR13 underscored that the ZHRC implements various strategies to fulfil its constitutional mandate of promoting and protecting citizens' rights. This invariably includes cooperating with other government agencies and non-governmental organisations. RR12 said:

> *"The ZHRC establishes and strengthens collaboration with a wide range of cooperating partners, stakeholder organisations and groups to instil awareness of the universal human rights values and principles into the very fabric of society. For example, the legislature, the Executive and the judiciary and key actors in the justice delivery sector; hence, we partner with them. Other stakeholders include independent commissions, members of civil society, donor agencies, development partners, regional inter-governmental organisations and international treaty bodies that we cooperate with. This enables us to deliver our mandate. We conduct public awareness campaigns through outreaches, radio programmes and awareness in grassroots communities to share our*

vision with the public. We also implement our mandate through training public service workers, particularly members of the Prisons and Correctional Services, the police, the army, government departments and ministries. Furthermore, we conduct investigations of alleged human rights violations, and violators are brought to account".

RR13's feedback demonstrates that the ZHRC engages multiple stakeholders interested in human rights issues to promote citizens' rights. RR12 mentioned that the ZHRC collaborates with many regional and international partners to strengthen its capacity. The engagements often involve training sessions and knowledge-sharing programmes to enable the ZHRC to learn from other countries' experiences. In support of RR13, RR12 added that the ZHRC adopts a three-pronged approach to accomplish its objectives. This involves complaints handling and investigations, monitoring and inspections and education, promotion and research. RR12 further stated that:

"The complaints handling and investigations department receives complaints about human rights abuses from citizens and takes appropriate action. It also protects citizens against abuse of power and maladministration by State and public institutions and officials of such institutions. In addition, it investigates the conduct of authority or people suspected of violating citizens' human rights and fundamental freedoms as per Chapter 4 of the Declaration of Rights. The department also takes necessary action to assist victims of human rights violations and maladministration".

RR12 added that:

"The Monitoring and Inspections Department assesses how citizens' human rights and fundamental freedoms are being protected, and it also monitors and inspects detention places such as refugee camps, children's homes, old peoples' homes, prisons, institutions of persons with mental or intellectual handicaps to ensure that inmates' rights are not abused. The education, promotion and research department develops and conducts programmes to promote human rights

knowledge and awareness through education and training, information dissemination and human rights awareness. The department runs libraries and information centres and publishes informative and educational materials for stakeholders such as general citizens, academic institutions, schools and government officials. It also researches human rights issues".

The respondents' insights indicate that the ZHRC aims to protect citizens' rights by educating stakeholders, conducting investigations, monitoring detention and other mass-people housing facilities and conducting research. The international best practice of human rights organisations derived from the South African model is promoting socio-economic rights. The South Africa Human Rights Commission actively promotes citizens' socio-economic rights because they are deemed fundamental (Heywood, 2021:3-5). Researchers who comment on the effectiveness of the ZHRC point out that the Commission will do more for the citizens if it promotes their socio-economic rights (Kondo, 2017:177). The ZHRC could adopt this approach to promote citizens' socio-economic rights. This is vital in Zimbabwe because the government has a legacy of violating citizens' economic rights. For example, in the winter of 2005, the government razed people's houses, mainly in urban centres, without giving them alternative accommodation. In addition, incessant farming evictions and land seizures continue to deprive farmers of their source of livelihood. These are examples of citizens' socio-economic rights violations that the ZHRC did not act on. The examples demonstrate the ZHRC's dereliction of its responsibility to safeguard citizens' human rights from being violated by the State.

5.5.7.2 The OAG

Respondents drawn from the OAG, NGOs and academia pointed out that the primary role of the OAG is to audit the government's accounts. Section 4.2.1 suggests that, globally, it is a norm for governments to establish supreme public auditing institutions to promote accountability, transparency and sound financial management in the manner government financial resources are expended. Good governance advocates and researchers pay particular attention to public sector financial management because it impacts the government's ability to meet its obligations to the citizens

(Hatchard, 2018:51). In sections 4.2.1.2 and 4.2.1.3, the researcher demonstrated that countries such as the UK and South Africa conform to the global norm of setting up an institution to audit government accounts. These two countries' experiences were instrumental in establishing international bests practices that can be adopted in Zimbabwe. Considering this background, respondents' perspectives on the role of the OAG's contribution towards overseeing the management of the State's financial resources are collated below.

RR23 suggested that the OAG does not directly oversee how the State's financial resources are managed; instead, it provides parliament, particularly the PAC tools and information required to scrutinise public sector financial management and ensure accountability. Nonetheless, the OAG is a vital cog in ensuring sound financial management because it enables the legislature to instil values of transparency, economic use of public funds and accountability by raising awareness about the misuse of public funds through the Auditor General's reports. According to RR17, the primary function of the OAG is to audit the government's accounts. This is achieved by auditing accounts of government-affiliated institutions annually and producing reports for the Parliament's consideration. The primary tools the OAG uses are financial audits and value for money (VFM) audits. RR18 stated that:

> *"Financial auditing is mainly done by us (sic) in government departments to express an opinion on whether financial statements show a true and fair reflection of financial accountability, whereas, for VFM, we are appraising the 3Es (economy, efficiency and effectiveness), we do not express an opinion, but we give a conclusion on whether the activities were done economically, effectively and efficiently. With VFM, it does not have a structural deadline. The reports are produced and tabled in Parliament as and when they are concluded. Whereas for the financial audits, we have a statutory deadline of 30 June. VFM auditing embraces diverse, academic and professionally qualified people, but financial auditing mainly involves those with financial qualifications. With financial audits, we appraise financial statements only, whereas VFM audits can appraise any activity or programme in government".*

Section 4.2.1.4.1 demonstrated that VFM auditing seeks to extract maximum value from the government's operations. RR23 opined that VFM auditing is vital in assessing the extent of value created by certain financial decisions. He noted that the ultimate goal of government projects is to improve citizens' living standards by implementing projects or policies to address their material needs. Hence, VFM auditing assesses if public finances were expended consistently with citizens' needs. While value can be challenging to assess, allowing other interested stakeholders, such as professionals and academics, to proffer their opinions enables the OAG to reach objective conclusions about the value of money in government spending. The process of conducting VFM audits differs across jurisdictions. In Zimbabwe, RR18 outlines that:

> *"We carry out performance audits to assess if public funds were used to create value for citizens. Sometimes when we carry out VFM audits, we might not evaluate 3Es concurrently. We might evaluate the economy mainly when we are doing procurement audits. We will evaluate whether procurements were done by considering the prices and the quality of the product or services being procured. If there was VFM, those resources or services procured would be utilised to serve Zimbabwe's citizens. In some cases, they are highly-priced, and in those cases, the goods will not produce value for citizens. Regarding efficiency, we mainly evaluate the available resources because we know the resources are scarce".*

> *"We assess if the available resources are being put to maximum use. In brief, that is the whole concept of assessing efficiency. Regarding effectiveness, we assess whether the goals or objectives various government arms have set were achieved. In conclusion, sometimes we only conclude on one or two elements, but from my experience, these elements move together. Sometimes it is very difficult to be efficient when you are not effective. Sometimes, you cannot be efficient when the available resources procured are not up to standard. So, in conclusion, we evaluate and then conclude on 3Es. But our audits focus on whether those principles are articulated or achieved in the public sector".*

RR17 stated that the OAG promotes accountability in the spending of government funds by analysing how the funds were spent. RR17 argues that the OAG is the principal auditor of government accounts, but private auditors are sometimes delegated some public audit functions. This makes the OAG a vital tool in ensuring accountability and enabling the Parliament to understand how funds disbursed to government-affiliated institutions were spent. RR17 believes the oversight role of the OAG is embedded in its function. Accordingly, the respondent said:

> *"The Audit Office Act states that the AG may audit or cause to audit government. Hence, the AG may assign duties but not the responsibility. In all instances, the AG remains accountable for audits, whether private or public audits carried out. When audits are reported in parliament, audits will not be attributed to private auditors who may have been delegated to perform some audit functions. Hence, the AG is wholly responsive for audits".*

The respondents believe that the OAG is vital in public sector financial accountability architecture because it develops reports on which public funds' financial transparency and value are assessed. This school of thought is generally consistent with the perspectives shared by scholars reviewed in section 4.2.1, who indicated that the principle of separating the State's power is fulfilled by having an independent public audit institution that scrutinises the government's expenditures. This is consistent with the *trias politica* and "checks and balances" ideology because it enables the State to manage its authority by establishing internal oversight institutions managed by independent bureaucrats (Mathebula & Munzhedzi, 2017:7; Mojapelo, 2013:37). Section 4.2.1.1 demonstrates that the government of Zimbabwe lived up to this practice by establishing an independent public audit institution (Makwetu, 2019:3-4; Hatchard, 2018:51; Matamande, 2016:1; Raj, 2015:7). However, the ideology of separating the State power will be betrayed if public financial accountability is not achieved. In this regard, some respondents highlighted that financial accountability was not fully achieved in the public sector because some officials do not implement the AG's recommendations.

5.5.7.3 The ZACC

The ZACC has been broadly criticised for failing to meaningfully exercise oversight over some State functions by combatting corruption and the abuse of public resources. This contrasts the eminent role of anti-corruption bodies in combatting corruption (Chigudu, 2015:103). A fitting example is Thuli Madonsela, the former South African public protector who became famous for investigating the Nkandla scandal and producing the State Capture report in 2016 (Phera, 2019:282; Mathekga, 2017:249; Thornhill, 2011b:83). To this end, the study sought to establish how the operations of the ZACC contribute toward oversight of the State's functions. Respondents indicated that the ZACC could contribute towards state oversight by investigating corruption and cooperating with law enforcement agents and the judiciary to combat corruption. RR14 and RR15 stated that the ZACC uses interventions such as educational and awareness campaigns, MOUs with other state agencies, research and investigating cases where corruption is believed to have occurred. RR14 opined that they foster a multi-stakeholder approach in combatting corruption. This involves engaging with various state and non-state players such as journalists, NGOs, local leaders, business people, political parties, activists and academics to develop interventions for eradicating corruption. This enables the ZACC to benefit from other stakeholders' insights about eradicating corruption. This is an essential intervention because corruption and abuse of state resources often occur in the shadows. A multi-stakeholder engagement approach enables all social players who might be privy to acts of corruption to be an asset in combating it.

RR15 stated that corruption is rife in the Zimbabwean public sector; hence, the ZACC has to implement several measures to combat it. According to RR14,

> *"We have a four-pronged approach to combat corruption through public education (raising awareness and supplying citizens anti-corruption messages highlighting the evils and effects of corruption); prevention (putting systems, where we conduct a systems and processes review in the public sector and also the issue of spot-checks and compliance checks); investigation and prosecution (cases are referred to the NPA) and assets recovery. Regarding assets recovery, this is a parallel*

intervention where investigations and other criminal procedures have been conducted, and prosecution is successful. We then institute civil procedures of following the money and recovering assets acquired through corruption. This is vital because criminal procedures alone do not redress the effects of corruption. For example, if an individual serves a 10-year jail sentence for stealing 5 million, without asset recovery interventions, after serving the term, they can freely spend the looted money".

Respondents stressed that cooperation with other state agents, such as the police and judiciary, enhances the capacity of the ZACC to combat corruption. Regarding this matter, RR14 stated that:

"Law enforcement agents are critical stakeholders in terms of cooperation. This is guided by an MOU signed between the ZACC and the ZRP. The MOU dwells on issues of joint investigations, training and research. In other words, the MOU specifies the areas of cooperation. Hence, we have a solid and complementary relationship guided by an existing Memorandum of Understanding".

However, RR15 pointed out that the ZACC does not only rely on police investigations because it conducts its independent investigations. Asked whether the ZACC has strategies to monitor improper procurement practices and tender processes in the public sector, RR15 said:

"The prevention pillar of the ZACC relates to combatting corruption. Operationally, we conduct systems reviews and compliance checks. For example, we consider the procurement procedures, processes, guiding frameworks and the minutes of government entities such as the Prison Services to ascertain if they comply with the stipulated procurement regulations. This is a vital intervention for monitoring procurement and tender processes in government institutions because our people interact with government stakeholders and interrogate the paper trail left by procurement processes. It is also a participatory intervention which

enables our officers to interact with institutions under review at a particular time. In cases where whistle-blowers alert us about procurement regulations being flouted, we institute spot checks and compliance measures to assess the entities in question, depending on the situation. However, the major aim of the ZACC is to prevent corruption".

It should be noted that non-state players believe establishing the ZACC was a significant and welcome move in combatting corruption. Historical cases of massive corruption in the public domain were not attended to because the State did not have a specialised anti-corruption institution. Hence, there were high expectations for the ZACC to make a difference. Respondents believe these high expectations have been largely betrayed because the ZACC is regarded as weak. RR19 and RR24 bemoaned that the ZACC could drastically reduce corruption, but it does not utilise its potential. RR22 insists that the ZACC adopt a more proactive and aggressive approach to combat corruption because citizens do not feel its impact so far.

The respondents indicate that more must be done to eradicate corruption in Zimbabwe. This stance was shared by scholarly viewpoints discussed in sections 4.2.3.1 and 4.2.3.3. For instance, Kronester and Buchner (2017:28) and Chigudu (2015:103) argue that corruption festers in Zimbabwe because it is done by politically connected individuals immune to prosecution due to their political capital. Hence, institutions such as the ZACC should be at the forefront of addressing such issues to gain credibility and demonstrate that they are fit for purpose. Figure 5.5 condenses respondents' views regarding the oversight functions of state institutions. Most of their views are consistent with the literature reviewed in this study.

Figure 5.5: The oversight functions of state institutions

Source: Researcher's own composition

5.5.8 Challenges faced by state institutions

This theme explores the challenges faced by state institutions investigated in the study. It is fundamental for the protagonist of a good governance framework to thoroughly understand the challenges confronting state institutions. The literature reviewed in Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4 revealed that state institutions in Zimbabwe face various challenges that cripple their capacity to fulfil their mandate. Similarly, insights from respondents also revealed that several factors hinder the institutions' ability to achieve their legal and constitutional obligations. In sections 2, 2.6.3, 3.5, 3.6, 4.2.1.1, 4.2.2.1 and 4.2.3.1, researchers (Mugadza, 2017:330; Mhlanga, 2017; Muleya, 2016; Muzapu *et al.*, 2016:89; Chavunduka & Sikwila, 2015:652; Sikwila, Chavunduka & Ndoda, 2015:3; Rusvingo, 2014b:39; Zungura 2014:250; Zhou & Zinyama, 2012:218; Zhou, 2012:175) state that the challenges facing Zimbabwean state institutions range from poor performance, inadequate funding, poor accountability, the lack of political support by public leaders, inefficiency to institutional weakness. These challenges embody a weak, inefficient and unresponsive public sector ill-equipped to meet citizens' expectations. Respondents stressed that the prominent challenges include inadequate funding, insufficient human resources and a weak legislative mandate.

These institutions' challenges can be categorised into legal, financial, human resources and other resources challenges.

5.5.8.1 Legal challenges

RR15, RR13, RR17, RR23 and RR16 contributed some legal perspectives to enhance the performance of the ZACC, the OAG and the ZHRC.

Regarding the ZACC, RR15 highlighted that one of the challenges facing the ZACC is that it does not have the authority to prosecute individuals involved in corruption. RR15 believes that legal interventions such as amending some sections of the ZACC Act can strengthen the ZACC's mandate by granting it prosecutorial authority to deal with corruption. The respondent believes that this intervention could speed up the process of arresting people involved in corruption. It should be noted that the GoZ created specialised courts for dealing specifically with corruption cases. However, most corruption cases fizzle out in practice, and those accused are hardly subjected to judicial processes.

RR13 observed that the ZHRC has a legal challenge because some crucial laws have not been aligned with the new Constitution. This makes it difficult for the Commission to navigate the legal terrain. The respondent stated that:

> *"Delays in aligning the ZHRC Act to the Constitution affects the independence of the Commission, which is guaranteed by section 235 of the Constitution and required by the principles relating to the Status of National Human Rights Institutions (the Paris Principles)".*

The researcher asked respondents drawn from the OAG if amending the Audit Office Act to give the OAG sanctioning powers to compel public entities to implement the AG's recommendations or submit financial statements could enhance financial accountability in the public sector. RR16 stated that:

"In my opinion, yes, because once an institution is given sanctioning powers, those responsible will fear repercussions for not doing the right thing".

However, it is noteworthy that RR17 and RR23 were adamant that amending the Audit Office Act and giving the OAG sanctioning powers would not be an appropriate or wise solution. RR17 argued that:

"The division of state authority of the Westminster system, other arms of the State, such as the Treasury and the parliament, are obligated to implement the AG's recommendations. On our part, we highlight to these bodies if current and previous recommendations were implemented. The power to compel is unnecessary because we feel other arms of the State can adequately ensure compliance with public policy objectives".

5.5.8.2 HR challenges

RR17 highlighted that regarding human resources, their main challenge is high labour turnover. Although this challenge has dissipated compared to yesteryears, the OAG loses many qualified personnel to the private sector or greener pastures in countries such as the UK, where people are given more competitive salaries. RR18 stated that:

"The main challenge is staff turnover".

RR16 pointed out that one of the challenges they face is our clients' late submission of relevant receipts and essential documents. When this happens, it is difficult for us to scramble our human resources to audit such institutions, given our strict deadlines.

5.5.8.3 Resources constraints

RR18 opined that some of their operations are resource-intensive and the OAG cannot always meet their needs. The respondent stated that:

"As I mentioned before, this is an expensive type of audit; sometimes, the resources may not be available to conduct audits".

According to RR17:

"In general, the challenges are inadequate resources, be it financial or HR, which result in us lagging behind. We also do not have access to modern accounting software used in other countries that could improve our services. We have not yet adopted digital auditing techniques; most functions are still analogue-oriented. We also face the challenge of the late submission of financial statements and evidence of financial expenditure on time".

Activities to combat corruption, such as investigation, educational campaigns and research, cost the ZACC significantly. Hence, it requires more financial resources to meet its objectives. In addition, the ZACC operates in an environment where some stakeholders doubt its abilities and commitment to combat corruption. These attitudinal challenges deprive it of cooperation from stakeholders essential in providing information and other insights. RR14 stated that:

"The macro-economic environmental issues such as weak local currency, attitudinal challenges because some people think fighting corruption is entirely the function of the ZACC. In practice, we spearhead the fight and believe in coordinated efforts with other stakeholders".

Similarly, respondents drawn from the OAG reported that more financial resources are needed to improve its performance.

RR18 said:

"Value for money audit is a type of audit that needs substantial resources because evaluating and appraising financial activities need substantial financial and human resources".

In the same vein, the ZHRC faces resource constraints. Accordingly, RR13 pointed out that the primary challenges facing the ZHRC are inadequate financial resources and the lack of independence. The respondent stated that:

> *"The financial resources allocated by the Treasury are inadequate because the budget is eroded by inflation and erratic disbursement of the allocated finances, resulting in crippling operations as the Commission fails to procure assets such as pool vehicles, ICT gadgets, and fuel for fieldwork and visits. However, it is pertinent to acknowledge that the ZHRC has consistently received a constant budget despite the Commission's growing operational and human capital needs. The Commission is yet to decentralise; hence the reach of its programmes work continues to be limited. The limited human resources capacity of the Commission to cover a wider geographic area across the country remains a limitation in the work of the Commission.*
>
> *With the COVID-19 pandemic, the Commission faced additional challenges such as safe transport to carry out our duties, information and communication technologies, including laptops and data to enable our members to work from home and personal protective equipment to protect them from contracting the Covid-19 virus during field trips. In addition, we are understaffed due to the government freeze on public sector posts, resulting in an increased workload on the few sitting officers and affecting the quality of work. The ZHRC Act identifies the Commission as an employer, yet it does not have a say in its employees' service conditions. The Government has embarked on the harmonisation and standardisation of public sector conditions of service. Unfortunately, this development has not been formally communicated, and the negotiation process does not include any representative from the ZHRC".*

5.5.8.4 Other constraints

RR16 stated that the major challenge facing the OAG is the poor implementation of recommendations. The researcher observed that most institutions audited by the OAG received the same recommendations consecutively over the past few years. This demonstrates that public officials in those institutions disregard and do not implement the AG's recommendations. This is a common challenge because the ZHRC faces the same problem. RR13 stated that:

> *"Disregarding the Commission recommendations by respondents affects human rights protection and promotes a culture of impunity"*.

This significantly derails the operations of the ZHRC.

Figure 5.6 summarises some of the respondents' views.

Figure 5.6: The challenges facing state institutions

Source: Researcher's own composition

5.6 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS FROM THE GMB, THE NRZ AND THE ZUPCO

This section analyses empirical data from the following state-owned enterprises (SOEs):

- The Grain Marketing Board;
- The Zimbabwe United Passenger Company; and
- The National Railways of Zimbabwe.

5.6.1 Exploring technocrats' understanding of public sector corporate governance

Corporate governance is one of the bedrocks of this study analysed at length in sections 3.7.1, 3.7.2, 3.7.3 and 4.3 because it promotes ethical leadership and efficient deployment of an organisation's resources to execute its mission and accomplish long-term goals (Zuva & Zuva, 2018:17; Maune, 2015:167). Corporate governance is considered a benchmark with a multiplier effect on the performance and efficiency of public sector organisations; hence, exploring this theme establishes the respondents' understanding of the phenomenon. The researcher posed the following question: What is your understanding of corporate governance in the context of state-owned enterprises (SOEs)?

Responses were varied, with some research respondents (RR) displaying an in-depth appreciation of the phenomenon whilst others had a rudimentary grasp of it. However, most of the respondents demonstrated that they know about corporate governance, and they were able to highlight its significance in their organisation's operations. The respondents' views are summarised below. RR01 stated that:

> *"My understanding of corporate governance is broad, but in short, I can say that it refers to the rules and standards that govern modern business-oriented companies. Corporate governance is especially important in public service companies because it shapes how we*

manage our affairs and ensure that we maintain standards and meet our goals".

Views from RR02, RR09 and RR10 indicate that corporate governance is the rule book of public entities with minimum standards, processes, systems and regulations through which they are controlled. Therefore, it is a system through which roles, responsibilities and obligations of controlling and directing a company are conceived. For example, principals appoint board members in state-owned enterprises through some corporate governance regulations. Similarly, RR01 added that in the Zimbabwean public sector sphere, corporate governance is guided by several local and international codes. This demonstrates that corporate governance is an assortment of guidelines, conventional practices and rules deployed to ensure that organisations adhere to stipulated governance expectations and codes.

RR03 stated that:

"Corporate governance is essentially the rules that govern the conduct of corporate bodies. It promotes virtues such as transparency, responsibility and effectiveness".

RR04 and RR11 more or less agreed with the abovementioned view by stating that corporate governance consists of mechanisms ensuring that SOEs are well-managed in line with established corporate ethical standards.

The respondents' views generally correspond with the data set of scholarly views on corporate governance highlighted in 3.7.1, 3.7.2, 3.7.3 and 4.3. For example, Sifile and Dangwa (2018:66) and Zuva and Zuva (2018:16) maintain that corporate governance ensures ethical control and management of public organisations. It is rooted in allocating distinct roles and responsibilities to principals, shareholders and agents to efficiently and effectively manage organisational operations. The corporate governance discourse posits that distributing responsibilities enables organisations to operate effectively and attain strategic objectives (Sifile & Dangwa, 2018:67). RR01 and RR02 shared these viewpoints. The idea that corporate governance is an ecosystem of controlling organisations through accountability, internal controls and

ethical decision-making (Zuva & Zuva, 2018:17-18) is consistent with RR03's submission. This school of thought posits that corporate governance can improve the viability of the Zimbabwean public sector, which is plagued by poor decision-making, corruption, lacklustre accountability and underperformance (Zuva & Zuva, 2018:17; Mashavave, 2017:211; Muzapu *et al.*, 2016:89). These views are summarized in Figure 5.7 below.

Figure 5.7: Respondents' views on corporate governance



Source: Researcher's own composition

5.6.2 The purpose and mandate of SOEs

Questions dwelling on the theme of the purpose and mandate of SOEs sought to explore their overall function in the public sector. The literature reviewed underlined that the GoZ regards SOEs as vehicles for public goods and services. This is against the belief that Global South countries should abstain from owning corporations providing public goods and services. This belief dominated public sector reforms introduced by the Washington Consensus to promote privatisation and marketisation of the public sector to increase efficiency in producing public goods and services (Gumede & Dipholo, 2014:45; Van Doeveren, 2011:303). NPM-inspired reforms

discouraged the State from owning underperforming public enterprises that incubated cronyism, corruption and wastefulness (Ncube & Maunganidze, 2014:137). Whilst the success of these reforms remains debatable, evidently, some developing countries, including South Africa and Zimbabwe, held on to SOEs they regarded strategic and vital for spearheading public policies and socio-economic development agendas (Mashamaite & Raseala, 2019:124; Chilunjika & Mutizwa, 2019:42; Chimbari, 2017:213). Hence, in the post-colonial era, while the existence of SOEs seems controversial, governments need them to satisfy citizens' needs. The literature and the respondents' views indicate that they produce public goods and services such as telecommunication, transport, food security and basic amenities (Chimbari, 2017:213). For example, RR05 suggested that the GMB is the country's granary because it ensures food security by buying agricultural products from farmers and storing or selling them to industries that use them as raw materials for food, such as maize meal and flour. Accordingly, RR03, RR02 and RR05 believe that the GMB ensures food security in the country by buying and distributing grain products such as maize, wheat, soya, millet, sorghum, and beans.

RR03 highlighted that the GMB imports grain products from other countries to supplement national stocks during droughts. In addition, RR05 stated that it manages storage facilities for locally produced and imported agricultural products such as maize and small grains. The responses indicate that the GMB ensures food security by giving farmers a platform to market their products. It also sells grains to businesses that use them as raw materials. These views are consistent with section 4.3.1.3, which underscores that the GMB buys, sells, markets and stores agricultural products to ensure food security (Chidemo, 2013:5; Muchero, 1987:398), in line with the Grain Marketing Act.

Respondents indicated that the ZUPCO provides reliable public transport to short and long-distance commuters. RR04 stated that:

> *"The mandate of the ZUPCO is to provide a safe and reliable public transport system for the citizens".*

RR01 emphasized that it is a public transport provision company, and it ensures that commuters have access to reliable and affordable commuting services that meet their transport needs. RR01 added that:

> *"We are successful in this regard because the transport costs have stabilised, and people can budget in advance, unlike in the previous years when it was unpredictable, and transport services were scarce".*

These views resonate with section 4.3.1.2, which underscores that the GoZ took ownership of the ZUPCO to provide citizens with affordable commuting services (Nyatondo, 2013:11).

RR08 and RR07 stated that the NRZ provides rail transport to passengers and goods destined for local and regional destinations. These submissions are consistent with section 4.3.1.1, which states that the NRZ provide passenger and freight transporting services. The NRZ has depots, stations and sidings across the country, enabling it to fulfil this mandate. The company has entered into local and international partnerships to increase its efficiency and provide good quality services to citizens and businesses that rely on its operations.

The respondents' views indicate that SOEs in Zimbabwe were constituted to provide public goods and services to citizens. This notion is consistent with the Social Contract theory and the Public Value and Public Goods theories, discussed in sections 2.91., 2.9.4 and 2.9.5, respectively, that obligates the State to provide certain goods and services to fulfil citizens' tangible and intangible needs. This is further supported by the legal framework for establishing public entities (see sections 4.3.1.1, 4.3.1.2 and 4.3.1.3), which mandates them to provide products and services to meet citizens' needs.

From a governance perspective, the GMB is noteworthy because it enables the government to intervene and control the industry and market of agricultural products (Masters, 1993:227). For instance, the Grain Marketing Act of 1991 directs the GMB to ensure food security and the availability of staple crops that most citizens consume. It ensures that buyers and sellers of grains have a platform to procure and sell their

products whilst maintaining sufficient stocks for national consumption (Chidemo, 2013:5; Jones, 1987:378). Similarly, the Railways Act (Chapter 13:09) fostered the establishment of a rail company to provide rail transport services. The government took over the United Transport Group to provide transport services (Maunder & Mbara, 1995:60).

The responses indicate that respondents understand that the State actively participates in the market through public corporations to provide goods and services. These responses are highlighted in Figure 5.8 This underscores the consistency between respondents' views and the literature analysed in this study. These viewpoints contradict the neo-liberal agenda of offloading State companies to private ownership to increase their efficiency, reduce public spending and trim the size of the GoZ (Chilunjika & Mutizwa, 2019:44; Muzapu *et al.*, 2016; Ncube & Maunganidze, 2014:137).

Figure 5 8: The mandate and purpose of SOEs



Source: Researcher's own composition

5.6.3 Governance and management structure OF SOEs

The researcher asked respondents to outline SOEs' management and governance structure. This is essential because it establishes the lines of authority, influence and control in SOEs. RR04 said:

> *"At the top of the governance structure is the minister of Local Government because the original entity's mandate was to provide urban transport. We also have a board that currently only has four members. We call it a management committee instead of a board. It comprises a chairperson, (acting) CEO and two external members. Internally, there are two divisional managers".*

Similarly, RR01 and RR03 stated that the government governs and controls SOEs through the minister and the board. The minister ensures that the government's public policy agenda is infused into the SOEs' plans by appointing and holding the board accountable. The minister can fire or suspend the entire board or individual members for poor performance. The board implements the mandate received from the minister; however, it is not involved in its day-to-day running because that is the responsibility of HODs and managers. These individuals are accountable to the board, and they implement its decisions. SOEs have their vision, mission and strategic objectives, but the government's policies and expectations influence their performance and goals.

The respondents' perspectives in Figure 5.9 below are consistent with the literature reviewed in sections 4.3.1.1 – 4.3.1.3. In particular, Figure 5.9 shows the governance and management structure of SOEs in Zimbabwe. It demonstrates that Zimbabwean SOEs have the same governance as their South African counterparts. This means that the State exercises control over SOEs through boards and Ministers. For this reason, decision-making in SOEs is not entirely independent of the State. This should be considered when analysing SOEs' decision-making and strategic planning.

Figure 5.9: Governance and management structure of SOEs



Source: Researcher's design

5.6.4 The profile of agents (boards) controlling selected SOEs

This theme analysed the role of boards in managing and administrating SOEs. Owners of business organisations (principals) delegate agents to implement their vision. The principal agency theory demonstrates this phenomenon by describing how duties and responsibilities are delegated in large organisations. The theory posits that shareholders exert influence and direction on organisations through agents who ensure they have the resources to accomplish shareholders' objectives (Zuva & Zuva, 2018:16; Mashavave, 2017:212). Although economists use the theory to demonstrate conflicts arising from divergent interests of principals and agents, in this study, the theory highlights the source of the boards' mandate to control, direct and manage SOEs. Public sector organisational control differs from the private sector because SOEs have obligations to the citizens. Hence, questions about the functions of SOE boards established the State's influence in constituting boards and controlling their operations. To this end, the researcher posed the following questions:

What is the SOE's governance and management structure? What is the composition of the board? How many board members does the SOE have? When board members are considered, is industry experience a part of the consideration? Does the board

have an audit committee? Does it have a human resources management committee? If so, what are the functions of the committees? The respondents' responses are summarised below.

5.6.4.1 Composition of SOE boards

Respondents outlined the composition of boards and how they are constituted. The information was insightful because it shows SOEs' governance and management structure. This is essential in understanding decision-making, strategic planning and accountability in SOEs. RR02, RR03 and RR05 stated that the board of the GMB has ten members.

According to RR02:

> *"The board comprises four females and six males. Almost all the board members are from the black African racial group, and only one male member is white".*

RR01 highlighted that ZUPCO's board comprises six board members. However, RR04 objected by stating that ZUPCO's governing body comprises four members. RR04 further objected to it being characterised as a board by stating that a management committee was temporarily set up to manage the company's affairs whilst a proper board was being constituted. RR04 also stated that the current CEO is occupying the position in an acting capacity. Hence, a formal board for the company is yet to be appointed.

RR01 stated that:

> *"The ZUPCO's board's composition includes five males and one female. All the members are black Africans from various professional backgrounds such as finance and human resources management".*

According to RR07 and RR08, the NRZ board consists of eight board members; seven blacks and one Indian. Five of the board members are males, and three are female.

The board comprises a chairperson and general board members. Insights shared by the respondents are consistent with the legal framework of SOEs discussed in section 4.3.1., which directs them to constitute boards. RR03 and RR04 indicated that boards are at the peak of the decision-making architecture within the organisation. However, externally, they are accountable to a Minister.

5.6.4.2 Industry experience

The researcher explored considerations by the government in selecting board members of SOEs. The previous section highlighted the importance of SOEs' boards in the organisation's decision-making ecosystem; hence, examining attributes of the individuals' competency and aptitudes is essential. Chigudu (2021:34-35) states that the board monitors performance and strategy implementation on behalf of shareholders. In the public sector, organisational performance is assessed based on sustainably in producing public goods and services (Abala, 2017:593; O'Flynn, 2007:361). Chigudu (2021:34) believes this performance depends on the competencies of board members, making it vital to assess their competencies. Legislative instruments (see the Constitution of Zimbabwe, the Public Finance Management Act, Companies Act of 1952, Railways Act (13:09) of 1973 and sections 3 – 12 of the Grain Marketing Act (chapter 18:14) of 1966) underscore the importance of competent boards. To this end, the researcher asked the respondents if industry experience is considered when board members are appointed.

RR01 stated that:

> *"That is a difficult question for me to answer. People with a transporting background have, or once had, transporting businesses. It is difficult to appoint such individuals because there will be a conflict of interest. While the enterprise would immensely benefit from a board member with a proven track record in the transport industry, if that individual is still active in the industry, their impartiality and objectivity can be brought into question. Due to this, we do not normally have board members who are or were once active in the transporting or logistics industry"*.

According to RR04, boards are not necessarily constituted of individuals with experience in the industry. Nonetheless, considerations such as abilities, competencies, leadership skills, ethical leadership and public sector knowledge are considered. Therefore, individuals' competencies are considered because appointees are pivotal in implementing strategic policies in public sector organisations. RR07 stated that individuals' competencies and commitment to the organisation's vision are primarily considered. This enables appointees to add value to organisations' operations.

RR02 stated that:

> *"Indeed, industry experience and knowledge are considered when appointing board members. Such experiences help the board members understand the challenges facing the GMB and how they can be solved".*

According to RR03, the Corporate Governance Unit (CGU) selects people who become eligible for board appointments in SOEs. The CGU has specific requirements to select competent individuals. Interested individuals register with the CGU to be considered for appointments. RR03's viewpoints mirror RR05, who stated that an objective selection criterion is used to appoint suitable board members in SOEs.

5.6.4.3 Board committees

To ascertain the contribution of boards to corporate governance, including organisational performance, transparency and accountability, the researcher asked respondents if boards have committees for specialised functions such as human resources (HR) and financial management.

RR04 said:

> *"The board consists of committees established to focus on various aspects of organisational management and governance; hence, it has an HR committee"*.

RR05 stated that the board's HR committee oversees HR policies to ensure the organisation has the human capital to fulfil its mandate. According to RR08, the board has various committees, including an audit committee. The committees enable some board members to focus on particular areas of the organisation. This increases the board's efficiency and its contribution to organisational performance.

RR01 highlighted that the board has an audit committee overseeing internal audits. RR01 said:

> *"The board has an audit committee among its ranks. The role of the audit committee is to supervise and monitor internal controls. It focuses on the work of the audit department headed by the audit manager. Therefore, it ensures that the organisation's internal controls are robust".*

Similarly, RR07 underscored that the Audit Risk and Compliance Committee oversees the functions of the internal auditors by scrutinising their reports. It also ensures that the organisation is not exposed to risks and complies with standards and regulations regarding disclosures and accounting.

The respondents' views deal with the competencies of the SOE board. For example, the audit committee oversees financial and audit reports and internal controls. This promotes accountability, transparency and effectiveness. The HR committee monitors HR issues and recommends strategic human resources plans.

The scientific management and the NPM principles emphasise the importance of HR management and efficient utilisation of financial resources. Scientific management principles of planning, organising, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting, and budgeting (POSDCORB) underline the importance of competent leaders in increasing performance (Uwizeyimana and Maphunye, 2014:92; Basheka, 2012:43). This highlights the importance of competent leadership (boards) in the performance of SOEs.

5.6.5 SOEs' boards and sound corporate governance

This theme establishes if boards of SOEs promote corporate governance. From a Public Administration standpoint, sound corporate governance in the public sector is essential because sections 194 – 198 of the Constitution regard it as one of the "basic values and principles governing public administration". Hence, as decision-makers and strategic planners, SOEs boards should promote sound corporate governance.

5.6.5.1 The role of boards in promoting corporate governance

The researcher asked respondents to outline the role of SOEs boards in promoting corporate governance. Their responses are listed below.

RR01 stated that:

> *"The board oversees and promotes good corporate governance practices as stipulated by various public sector regulations that guide the board's functions. For example, it has to conduct strategic planning and ensure that the company's financial management, ethical leadership and efficient resource utilisation are enhanced".*

The researcher probed by asking: who is responsible for strategic planning within the organisation? RR01 responded by stating that strategic planning is a function of senior management and the board. RR01 further indicated that the board also monitors the performance and the general well-being of various organisational units by assessing quarterly and bi-annual reports. These reports give a general picture of the state of the SOEs, and it is the basis for summoning division heads and managers to account for their actions and decisions. This promotes corporate governance through transparency and accountability. According to RR07, committees such as the Audit Risk and Compliance Committee assess risks and ensure that the organisation's financial management practices, such as accounting, reporting, auditing and disclosures, are consistent with industry regulations. This is a cornerstone of sound corporate governance and ethical leadership.

RR02 opined that the board is the governing authority within the organisation; therefore, it employs various techniques to ensure that corporate governance practices are entrenched. For example, it ensures that the organisation adheres to corporate governance frameworks and regulations developed for SOEs by assessing performance reports and taking corrective actions. According to RR04, the functions of various committees within the board promote corporate governance. For example, the Ethics and Governance Committee ensures that the SOE's conduct conforms to codes of governance established for the public sector. Other committees, such as the risk and remuneration committees, exemplify how the board promotes practices and conduct consistent with corporate governance principles. RR08 believes the board yields immense authority that it can exercise to steer and control the organisation. Hence, when the board feels the organisation is heading the wrong way, it has the authority and duty to steer it in the right direction. This can be achieved by hiring or firing the CEO or other high-ranking company officials.

Section 195(1) of the Constitution directs SOEs to adhere to sound corporate governance principles. Hence, SOE boards are essential vehicles that can be deployed to achieve this goal because they have the authority and responsibility to steer and control the organisation (Zuva & Zuva, 2018:16). RR02 and RR07 indicated that the board assesses performance reports, summon meetings and reprimand management for poor performance. Hence, they can use their authority to instil good corporate governance values. Section 4.3 firmly affirms the role of boards in promoting corporate governance. For example, the Railways Act (13:09) mandates the board to uphold corporate governance practices, and the Companies Act of 1952 regulates how board members interact with internal and external stakeholders.

Despite statutory provisions, the performance of boards in promoting sound corporate governance has been questioned. While respondents' views imply that the boards are instrumental in promoting corporate governance, the literature reviewed paints a different picture. Chigudu (2021:38) and Chigudu (2020:7-9) argue that corporate failures in SOEs are attributable to incompetent and poorly constituted boards. This means boards are failing to fulfil their mandate. It is also an indictment on principals that appoint poorly qualified or incapable boards.

Subsidiary questions established how SOE boards promote accountability, financial management and transparency. The researcher posed the following two questions:

- How does the board ensure compliance with the Public Finance Management Act and the Public Entities Corporate Governance Act?
- What is the role of the board in ensuring transparency and accountability?

These themes are addressed below.

5.6.5.2 The role of SOE boards in ensuring compliance with the Public Finance Management Act and the Public Entities Corporate Governance Act

The PFMA regulates how government-controlled organisations' revenues, expenses and assets are managed. The Act promotes efficient management of public financial resources. The Public Entities Corporate Governance Act promotes corporate governance in SOEs. It provides the legal background for establishing the Corporate Governance Unit in the Office of the President and Cabinet. The Act ensures that SOEs are managed through sound corporate governance practices. In a nutshell, the Act entrenches sound corporate governance in SOEs. Its equivalent in South Africa is the Protocol on Corporate governance in the Public Sector, which promotes corporate and financial governance in SOEs (DPE, 2002:11). Compliance with the PFMA and the PECGA ensures that SOEs adhere to standard corporate governance principles. Recommendations in local and international corporate governance codes, such as the ZIMCODE, the King Report and the Cadbury Report, can supplement these basic and mandatory guidelines. For this reason, this sub-theme establishes how SOE boards ensure compliance with these Acts.

Data from the respondents indicate that SOE boards use various mechanisms to comply with the legislation. The CGU developed a checklist to rate the performance of public enterprises. RR02, RR03 and RR01 indicated that most SOEs rely on the checklist to assess their performance.

RR02 pointed out that:

> *"There is a checklist developed by the internal audit unit which focuses on compliance with financial management issues. The checklist evaluates financial management within the GMB against norms and standards set out in the legislation. Financial management compliance issues are reported to the audit committee that presents findings to the board. To comply with the Corporate Governance Act, we follow the stipulated guidelines when appointing and compensating senior management members and developing strategic plans".*

RR03 stated that the enterprise has a good record of complying with relevant legislation; our annual performance outcomes over the past few years prove this. RR03 added that each year, public enterprises are rated for their performance based on a standardised checklist, and their organisation is one of the best performing in the country. The respondent believes this is a good sign of compliance.

RR01 opined that:

> *"Being a state company, we are supposed to comply with certain regulations. We also operate like any other business registered in the country. We are registered under the Companies Act and have a Certificate of Incorporation. Hence, we are a fully registered company which is supposed to comply with legislation regarding our operations. The board plays a critical role through various committees that receive and evaluate quarterly reports. Of late, the government invited heads of department in state companies to sign performance contracts based on stipulated targets".*

Unfortunately, the researcher could not access the checklist (it is unavailable online) used to rate the performance of SOEs to compare it with the PFMA and the PECGA. Responses from the respondents indicate that most public enterprises focus on the checklist, not the legislation. Based on the respondents' feedback, the researcher cannot ascertain if the board is actively involved in ensuring compliance with the legislation.

5.6.5.3 The role of boards in promoting transparency and accountability

This sub-theme probes how SOE boards promote transparency and accountability. Transparency and accountability are pillars of corporate governance, ethical leadership and effective management of resources (Matamande, 2016:1). As a result, the State developed mechanisms such as public audits, performance-based contracts and public sector oversight to ensure that SOEs are accountable and transparent (Makwetu, 2019:3-4; Hatchard, 2018:51,77).

According to agency and stewardship theories upon which corporate governance in this study is being explored, boards should be transparent and accountable to ensure organisational growth (Mashavave, 2017:212). The respondents demonstrated that the boards use committees and financial reports to promote transparency and accountability.

For instance, RR02 stated that:

> *"The board is given the strategic task of growing the organisation. As far as financial management is concerned, as part of their strategic thrust, they have to look at the company's financial outlook through the finance committee".*

RR02 also stated that:

> *"The board ensures accountability and transparency through the finance committee. We have quarterly meetings where we present financial reports for the quarter, and through the finance committee, programmes and projects go to the board for adoption. This process ensures that the company remains transparent and accountable to its stakeholders".*

This enables the board to scrutinize how the organisation's finances are accounted for and managed. This allows the board to align the organisation's spending, strategic objectives, and immediate plans. Given that the board can take corrective action,

these interventions enable the board to promote transparency and accountability in SOEs.

RR01 pointed out that:

> *"Like other public enterprises that depend on the government, we are very open and transparent about utilising our financial resources. Our operations are not always profitable. We have three revenue streams; cross border travel, intercity, hiring out our services and urban transport, which is not profitable because our buses are not always full, particularly during off-peak hours. Urban transport is a provisional service due to its unprofitability. Thus, we regularly depend on the government for our operations because the money we generate is not enough. When we receive funds, at the end of each month, we do an acquittal which details our expenditures, income and expenses. In terms of transparency, we have internal and external audits. We submit quarterly management reports to our parent ministry to promote transparency".*

Similarly, RR01 hints that the organisation relies on financial and performance reports to promote transparency and accountability. According to RR07 and RR08, public audits conducted by the Auditor-General are an instrument for promoting accountability. This view was shared by RR16, RR17, RR23 and RR18, who underscored the pivotal role of the AG in public sector transparency and accountability. This is consistent with how section 4.2.1.1 addressed transparency and accountability in the public sector. Therefore, whilst public audits are a macro intervention, internal reports and committees are used within SOEs to foster transparency and accountability.

5.6.6 Public sector financial management techniques

This theme explored techniques used in SOEs to manage financial resources. Finance management is crucial because it enables the State to efficiently manage public finances to create value for the citizens (Madue, 2007:307). The researcher sought to establish SOEs' systems, tools and processes to manage financial resources in line

with the PFMA. Section 3.7.3.2 indicates that the PFMA promotes the financial health of government institutions through efficient financial management, plugging wastefulness and mismanagement, and helping public entities design ways to extract maximum value from resources to meet citizens' needs. The Act strengthens financial management in the public sector through public audits and budgeting. The respondents indicated that SOEs' primary financial management systems are internal and external audits, guidelines, and manuals. Other techniques generated from the literature reviewed in the study are 3Es (effective, efficient and economic use of resources), internal checks and controls, and corporate disclosure.

5.6.6.1 Public audits

RR07, RR03 and RR01 stated that audits enhance sound financial management among SOEs. RR16, RR18, RR08 and RR17 stated that there are two levels of audits in the public sector: internal and external. The organisation's internal auditors conduct internal audits in the finance department, whereas the OAG, as an external auditor, also audits the organisation's accounts.

RR01 and RR02 indicated that financial management is crucial in SOEs because they collect, receive and expend large sums of money to procure raw materials and other resources. Annual audits conducted by the Auditor-General are a reactive financial management instrument because they assess expenditures. Despite being reactive, the AG's reports show the legislature how taxpayers' funds were used. According to RR03, the legislature has the tools to reprimand and recover assets lost due to mismanagement. In gross mismanagement and theft cases, law enforcement agencies and the judiciary are advised to intervene and prosecute officials accused of wrongdoings. Without effective management systems, SOEs will suffer from financial mismanagement and wastefulness; hence, enterprises must develop fool proof systems to deter mismanagement, wasteful and fruitless expenses in their financial dealings.

5.6.6.2 3Es

This theme was explored to establish if efficient, effective and economic use of funds and other resources helps SOEs manage their financial resources. Respondents stated that SOEs deploy various internal controls to ensure their financial resources are managed economically and effectively. The 3Es were introduced in sections 1, 3.1, 5, 2.6, 2.7, 3.3.1, 3.4.3, 3.7.3.1, 4.2.1.1 and 4.2.1.2 as pillars of sound governance, transparency, accountability and good public resources management. Fourie (2015:110) states that efficiency and effectiveness enable the State to use scarce resources to meet citizens' needs. This addresses the fundamental economic problem of satisfying citizens' unlimited needs with limited resources (Barnett, 2018:59-62). Similarly, Muzapu *et al.* (2016:89) and Zhou (2012:175) argue that SOEs cannot accomplish their objectives if they do not operate efficiently, effectively and economically. Hence, the SOEs under investigation should run their operations efficiently, effectively and economically to create value for the stakeholders. One way to achieve this is by preventing wastefulness. Section 4.2.1.3 underscores how public audit institutions consider efficiency, effectiveness and economy (3Es) in determining accountability. Globally, supreme audit institutions use 3Es to measure financial management in the public sector (Ostrusinova & Pastuszkova, 2012:171). This was reiterated by RR16 and RR18, who stated that the OAG conducts VFM audits which consider the 3Es.

Respondents, including RR22, RR23, RR07, RR04, RR16, RR17, RR01, RR03, RR08 and RR02, indicated that efficiency, effectiveness and economic management of resources within SOEs are achieved through competitive bidding, strict adherence to procurement guidelines, cashflow management, financial management guidelines and regulations, budgeting, collective decision-making, strategic planning. For example, RR02 maintained that they are committed to ensuring that resources are managed economically and without waste. To this end, RR02 said:

> *"It starts from procurement. Our procurement practices are competitive. The GMB is not allowed to procure unless we go for tender. Hence, in that respect, we get the best prices due to competitive bidding. Hence, when we commit resources, we do so to the most viable bidder".*

This process ensures that the best suppliers are selected for goods and services. In addition, RR01, RR02 and RR08 stated that their organisations prevent irregular, wasteful and fruitless expenses by managing cashflows and recording all financial activities. In addition, the organisations ensure that expenses are approved and aligned with budgets.

RR02 further said that they use the following interventions:

> *"We have weekly cashflows presented and prepared by the finance department. These records come to my table through the finance manager, and obviously, there are checks and balances to ensure the appropriate use of company resources"*.

RR01 suggested that strict adherence to procurement guidelines promotes efficient, effective, and economical use of financial resources. In addition, RR01 said:

> *"We follow guidelines set by the government. Regarding financial resource utilisation, we are guided by the regulations from the PRAZ (procurement authority of Zimbabwe). We follow their guidelines when procuring resources. There are thresholds that we have to adhere to. If we procure goods for less than US 5000, we request at least three quotations from eligible fully registered suppliers registered with PRAZ for that category of services, for example, software, tires, fuel, and computer hardware, among many others). For services costing above US$ 5000, we apply to PRAZ to advertise a tender for the service. Given the size of our fleet, we procure most services through tendering processes. The tendering process is as follows: we advertise and get bids that the evaluation committee assesses. If all bidders meet PRAZ requirements (VAT, fully registered and compliant with legislation), they will be considered".*

Asked how they prevent irregular, wasteful and fruitless expenses, RR01 stated that:

“In the last quarter of the year, we formulate a budget and ask section heads to submit their requirements for the following financial year. During purchases for the following year in question, after the finance department and board have approved the budget, that guides us in expenditure. If departments want to buy certain things, they must provide solid reasons and the finance department makes considerations”.

RR01 indicated that wastefulness is prevented by involving multiple stakeholders in decision-making, procurement and tendering. RR04 also reiterated this. Since they deal with transport services, they incorporate the opinions of technicians and other line workers when deciding what goods and services to procure. Regarding this issue, RR01 said:

“When procuring new buses, machinery and other resources required to sustain our operations, we are guided by strategic plans, budget allocations and guidance from the executive. We are also guided by input from the engineering department, especially in cases where the current fleet is no longer fit for purpose. Hence, it is a two-fold decision-making exercise where lower-level personnel and senior management give input. This set-up ensures that senior management does not make uninformed decisions without consulting relevant stakeholders who may have intimate knowledge about the organisation's needs”.

This response is consistent with RR04, who, when asked if the organisation involves internal stakeholders such as employees in strategic and operational decision-making, pointed out that:

“We uphold democratic labour practices in the organisation because we value every voice and opinion. Our employees participate in decision-making processes, particularly on issues which affect their performance. Regarding labour laws in this country, democratic principles are enshrined in legislation. The law creates structures where employee representatives focus on mutual issues of the organisation that affect employees and the employer. The structures democratise the workplace

by giving employees a voice. At the national level, we also have a workers' committee, which meets quarterly per year with regional operational managers and HODs (HR, finance, operations). At the divisional level, issues that affect the division are discussed; if we fail to resolve them, they are escalated to the National Workers' Council. Hence, I think we have an inclusive system of organisational governance".

This implies that transparency and accountability can be enhanced by democratising decision-making and seeking opinions from floor workers working in specialised functional areas when deciding what resources to procure. This prevents the board and senior management from unilaterally making procurement decisions that do not align with the organisation's needs. Therefore, democratising the workplace promotes transparency and accountability by preventing unilateral decisions and involving multiple stakeholders in strategic planning and decision-making.

5.6.6.3 Internal checks and controls

This sub-theme established how checks and control systems in SOEs enhance sound financial management. The researcher asked respondents if SOEs have internal checks and controls for managing financial resources. The respondents indicated that checks and controls are implemented to safeguard expenditures and ensure transparency. The goal of these interventions is to enhance sound financial management. For example, RR01 stated that since 2022, individuals occupying senior managerial positions in public enterprises must sign performance-based contracts (PBCs). PBCs are objective assessment tools to gauge and spur performance and accountability in the public sector. This is a State-intervention to increase performance. RR04 said:

"We have performance contracts which we are still implementing. The contracts outline what we expect from our employees. However, these are only at the management level".

RR01 believes that internal control mechanisms are adequate if all stakeholders implement them. The respondent stated that:

> *"If everyone (floor employees, supervisors and managers of the enterprise) follows the guidelines of our manuals, we will not have problems. As I said, even though there is a risk of conductors swindling the company, it is secure if the cash reaches us. Hence, we only need to maximise the supervision of our conductors out there".*

In section 4.2.3, Mustapa *et al.* (2020: 5337) argued that SOEs attract rent-seekers seeking to milk the State for personal gain. Procurement and tendering are some of the areas affected by this malaise. SOEs need objective and transparent tendering procedures to root out chancers and rent-seekers. RR01, RR02 and RR07 indicated that their organisations have procedures to manage tenders and procurements. For instance, RR01 stated that:

> *"The tender evaluation committee looks into issues of conflicts of interest because procurement is one of the areas where finances are mismanaged and abused in this sector. We tend to buy many products and services from suppliers. That is why some people might be tempted to cash in and shortchange us. Members of the organisation can also use their position to further their business interests. That is why we evaluate bidders to prevent any conflicts of interest".*

RR02 stated that:

> "*We have some internal control measures of financial management. For example, we have had unqualified audit opinions in the past four years. That points to strong internal control systems"*.

The researcher asked RR02 to elaborate further, and he said:

> *"Every department within the organisation works with manuals that the executive approves. These manuals provide detailed instructions and*

directives about handling some internal functions and the reporting structures within the organisation. In addition, there are policies which are approved by the board. Collectively, they guide and dictate what needs to be done regarding internal controls. Furthermore, we are audited annually, and the annual report is produced. We must produce financial statements two months after the financial year ends and send them to the auditor. Hence, in that respect, we are up to date with our audits".

RR01 stated that:

"We have an accounting manual that we follow in terms of finance. Those are guidelines for the operations of the finance department. For example, the guidelines state that ticket books should be issued to buses before they are dispatched. When the bus returns to the depot, there are guidelines for collecting and accounting for cash that should be followed. We also have authorised people who communicate with the bank and manage bank deposits. Every purchase and transaction must be a paper trail, such as requisition forms authorised based on merit. After authorisation, authorisation is taken to the Procurement Management Unit (PMU), which does the necessary paperwork and determines if the threshold requires a tender. After a tender has been awarded, it is sent to PRAZ for further verification. It also goes to the Procurement Oversight Committee to determine if it is above board. The tender is only successful if it goes through all the processes".

RR01 further stated that:

"Even though the PRAZ guides our procurement function, the country's challenges with an unstable currency and inflation can lead to suppliers overcharging us. Most of our purchases come through this office [the finance department]. This requires us, the finance personnel, to know how goods and services cost in US dollars and to do due diligence to avoid approving purchases of inflated products. The interesting thing

about procurement is that most of the established companies are not registered as suppliers of our company; hence, we do much business with SMEs. Some SMEs might be tempted to inflate prices to increase their returns. So, I can say that the checks and controls for these procurement processes involve the finance management department carefully assessing the costs of goods and services submitted by our suppliers. This is an ongoing exercise because of the volatility of the costs of the services in Zimbabwe caused by an unstable local currency".

Sections 2.2, 2.5, 2.6.3, 2.6.7, 2.7, 29.3, 4.2.3, 4.2.3.1, 4.3.1.1, 4.3.1.3, 4.3.2.3 and Mustapa *et al.* (2020: 5337), Mugadza (2017:330), Cloete (2013:151) and Gisselquist (2012:6) indicate that rent-seeking tendencies, corruption and wastefulness are rampant in the public sector. Respondents highlighted that manuals, tender regulations, documenting financial transactions, and evaluating tenders are some interventions used to ensure sound financial management. While macro instruments of ensuring financial management, such as public audits, parliamentary oversight and asset recovery, provide the State with means to instil sound financial management practices, they will be ineffective without robust internal mechanisms to ensure that organisational processes and systems are geared to sustain efficient financial management. To this end, it was vital to explore public enterprises' internal checks and controls and establish how the systems are implemented to create an environment of robust financial management.

5.6.6.4 Disclosure

This subtheme explored if SOEs disclose vital information about their performance, liabilities and growth to the public. Section 4.3.2.4.2 dealt with corporate disclosures and identified them as an international best practice used to instil values of transparency and accountability in profit-oriented entities. This study posits that SOEs in Zimbabwe should also adopt this practice. Corporate disclosures disclose information about an organisation's governance structure, ownership, investments and liabilities (Fung (2014:72). Disclosing this information ensures that pertinent information is accessible to stakeholders. For example, knowing about an organisation's ownership enables stakeholders to predict its direction and value

proposition. In the public sector, the State fully or partially owns the enterprises. RR01, RR03, RR04, RR08 and RR06 indicated that SOEs' governance and ownership structure involves the State (represented by a government minister), a board and senior management. Although suppliers view public enterprises as lucrative businesses partners because the State is their guarantor, their performance remains low due to several reasons discussed in this study, such as cronyism, corruption and maladministration (Chigudu 2021:38). This usually wanes interest in their performance information. Nonetheless, public enterprises should commit to corporate disclosures. According to the Accountability, Transparency and Disclosure Manual for Public Entities, SOEs face the challenge of vague and inaccessible performance information and complex reporting lines.

Disclosures enable investors to assess a company's potential to grow shareholders' equity. This study posits that this information is essential because it enables interested parties and shareholders to assess the company's performance and growth prospects. In line with the NPM principles of marketising the public sector, these best practices can be adopted in public entities to improve transparency and accountability (OECD, 2004:22).

Empirical data collected from the respondents indicated that the Government of Zimbabwe survey revealed that most public enterprises suffer from poor corporate disclosures and transparency. The Public Entities Corporate Governance Act and the National Code of Corporate Governance (Zimcode) mandate accounting officers and boards of public enterprises to ensure that they disclose all the information about their operations to the line minister and the public. RR02 mentioned that SOEs are implementing some interventions to disclose information about their performance, assets and liabilities as per local corporate governance codes and requirements. RR03 stated that they comply with the legal stipulation of disclosure and transparency. As a result, they provide shareholders with the necessary information.

The researcher asked the respondents if they provided all stakeholders with performance information, including the citizens. RR01, RR03, RR07 and RR08 stated that they know shareholders and the general public should have access to its performance information. To fulfil this requirement, SOEs publish and share the

performance information with the principals. According to RR01, they hold annual general meetings, and stakeholders, such as the Auditor-General, officials from the Treasury and the line ministry are invited. All the information regarding the enterprise's financials, performance, ownership and governance is disclosed during these meetings. Since the Auditor-General presents annual reports to the National Assembly and the public, stakeholders can access all the information about the public sector companies in that report. RR02 said they comply with existing regulations and systems to ensure corporate information reaches its intended stakeholders. Similarly, RR03 said they share all the necessary information with the principals annually. RR02 also stated that:

> *"The enterprise is audited annually and produces annual reports. In addition, we produce financial statements at the end of each financial year and share them with the Auditor-General. As a result, our enterprise is up to date with its audits and reports, and this information is freely available to interested stakeholders".*

It is essential to consider the platforms used to disclose corporate information. Section 4.3.2.4.2 demonstrated that an international best practice that can be derived from SOEs in South Africa is regular disclosure of performance information online. This is ideal because stakeholders, including citizens, can conveniently access the companies' performance, liabilities and investments data. The researcher observed that the SOEs under investigation do not disclose their information online, making it challenging for stakeholders to access it. The researcher enquired about the platforms they used for disclosures, and RR02 indicated that they provide stakeholders with annual reports, statements and other information about the SOE's performance. Asked if the information is available online, the respondent stated that this information is only available manually.

RR02 further stated that:

> *"It is done manually using paper-based reports that are distributed to stakeholders"*.

RR01 stated that:

> *"I do not think you can get our financials online. However, I think it is a requirement for state companies to publish their financials. I do not think it is a requirement because we always submit our financials to the Office of the Auditor-General".*

Respondents' views indicate that, to a certain extent, SOEs are committed to corporate disclosures, although poorly monitored. Corporate disclosure is vital in publicly traded private companies because it provides shareholders and interested parties with the company's performance information. For this reason, disclosure is also an effective instrument for promoting transparency and accountability because it discloses vital information about an organisation's operations (Fung, 2014:72). Financial scandals investigated in section 3.7.1.1 unearth how some enterprises forge performance information. World Comm's accountants and senior executive officials falsified financial and income statements to reflect profits and underestimate liabilities and losses to keep the Wall Street investors confident and increase the company's stock price (Verleun *et al.*, 2011:50). This demonstrates the importance of accurate corporate disclosures. Due to this, the United States of America's government enacted the Sarbanes Oxley Act to address corporate governance and transparency. Section 76 of the Public Entities Corporate Governance Act deters the board from engaging in selective disclosures. Selective disclosures give stakeholders inaccurate and misleading information about an enterprise's performance.

Corporate disclosures are essential because they inform the public and shareholders' investment decisions. Public enterprises are state-owned, so corporate disclosures provide citizens with performance information. This enables taxpayers to assess how SOEs are using public resources. Hence, they foster transparency and accountability.

5.6.7 Challenges faced by state-owned enterprises

This theme established the challenges faced by SOEs. Some of the challenges were underlined in sections 2 and 3.7.2. This section matches the information analysed in chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4 with respondents' opinions. This information is essential in

developing a good governance framework for the GoZ. The respondents' views indicate that the challenges faced by SOEs are divisible into four categories: financial management, human capital management, corporate governance and other auxiliary challenges hindering performance. The respondents' views and opinions are presented below:

RR04 stated that:

> *"Our main challenge is retaining employees, particularly technical staff and other employees, due to low wages and seeking greener pastures. Due to high unemployment, we attract overqualified people. Disciplinary processes and dismissals also cause employee turnover".*

RR08 stated that the SOE could not deliver its mandate due to capacity constraints such as HR challenges, inadequate funding, obsolete infrastructure and the lack of resources to maintain existing assets. Regarding HR management, RR08 mentioned that their workers are not adequately remunerated. This leads to poor performance, low productivity per employee, incessant absenteeism and high labour turnover. This is a significant challenge; because competent HR is essential in accomplishing organisational goals. These views mirror the opinions of Chiguvi and Magwada (2016:1) and Chavunduka and Sikwila (2015:652), who stated that the NRZ is, among many other things, incapacitated by high employee turnover. RR04 stated that:

> "*We currently do not have a full board; we only have a management committee of four people. This means we lack a permanent board with people with essential expertise in areas such as HR, finance or organisational management. For instance, although I make presentations to the board, I am not a member; hence, I do not actively contribute to its decision-making and planning processes. As a result, some crucial issues will be ignored because we do not have a permanent board, and the existing committee might not have all the required expertise, although they are supposed to make decisions about technical issues such as procurement, operations, finance, real estate and marketing".*

RR02 pointed out that one of the challenges they face is an unreliable and erratic electricity supply. He stated that:

> "*We computerised our accounting systems; however, we face the challenge of erratic electricity supply resulting in our ability to capture data in real-time. However, we are now installing solar systems in all depots to ensure uninterrupted electricity supply".*

As mentioned above, the GMB is responsible for ensuring that the country has sufficient stockpiles of food, particularly staple grain products that most citizens consume. It accomplishes this objective by buying and storing farm products such as maize, beans, groundnuts and millet from farmers nationwide. Due to delayed disbursement of funds from the Treasury, the GMB often fails to pay farmers in time. Given the high inflationary environment in Zimbabwe, this is a disservice to farmers because delay means their returns will be eroded by inflation. The downstream effect is that farming will be unviable, reducing farmers' capacity to deliver agricultural products to the GMB in the future. Asked about this challenge, RR02 stated that:

> *"The government fully funds us; hence, we compete with other institutions for public funds. This results in us failing to pay service providers, creditors and farmers on time".*

RR02 stated that this affects their viability resulting in them continuously relying on the Treasury for funding. Similarly, RR07 and RR08 stated that the SOE suffers from inadequate funding to manage its operations. RR08 stated that they are experiencing "a lack of recapitalisation and general support from the government". This significantly cripples the SOEs' operations and deters them from achieving their mandate. In the same vein, RR07 stated that:

> *"One key challenge is the declining capacity caused by obsolete infrastructure that is also heavily vandalized. We have accumulated a huge maintenance backlog, and the locomotives, wagons and coaches*

have outlived their economically useful life and need replacement. The IT system is obsolete, and systems are disintegrated".

As a result, the organisation cannot replace or refurbish this infrastructure due to financial constraints. This has led to an acute deterioration of their services and capacity to collect revenue. RR07 hinted that:

"The financial books are burdened with legacy loans making it difficult to attract fresh capital".

Hence, the SOE faces the challenge of poor recapitalisation and a sturdy funding stream. Given that it requires substantial funding to procure machinery and modern technologies, failure to receive sufficient funds has crippled the enterprise's operations. This is consistent with the views of Chilunjika and Mutizwa (2019:42), Chiguvi and Magwada (2016:1), Chavunduka & Sikwila (2015:652), Sibindi (2014:347), Mbhowa (2008:31-33) summed up in section 4.3.1.1, which indicate that the SOE is dysfunctional due to poor corporate governance, unimpressive balance sheet, debts and poor funding.

From a public governance perspective, this is a microcosm of the public sector's challenge because SOEs are not viable; hence, they rely on the State for funding. As a result, SOEs continuously seek bailouts because they cannot survive independently. This deprives the State of precious resources to attend to other socio-economic issues. Economic structural adjustment programmes and public sector reforms championed by the Bretton Woods institutions through the NPM reforms sought to address this challenge (Van Doeveren, 2011:303). Proponents of the reforms argued that lean governments with few business obligations are efficient and effective. This is informed by the belief that the State cannot run SOEs efficiently due to its social obligations that do not always generate profits. In countries like Zimbabwe, Venezuela and Angola, state institutions are vehicles for fulfilling social and welfare policies. For example, in the 2021-2022 agricultural season, the GoZ introduced a programme to revitalise farming and increase national yields. The GMB was a key stakeholder. Thus, one of the challenges facing public enterprises is that they are often saddled with the burden of fulfilling government policies. This demonstrates why some governments

are unwilling to privatise SOEs because they are vehicles for social policies. This school of thought resonates with RR02 because the respondent believes it is fulfilling its mandate despite the challenges facing the SOE. Similarly, RR03 stated that the SOE's performance is good based on the State's assessment. This is against the backdrop of grain imports to supplement grain shortages in the country.

Some respondents indicated that challenges facing public entities are financial and emanate from the country's inflationary economic environment. RR01 stated that:

> *"Like anyone in Zimbabwe, we are also affected by the system whereby we have two financial rates. The decreasing value of the local currency erodes our budgets. We must budget based on the number of items we want instead of the finance needed. The other challenge is the rising cost of services and salaries that affect our financial plans".*

These financial challenges affect SOEs' operations because their budgets cannot meet their needs due to the dwindling value of the local currency. In addition, RR01 hinted that public enterprises feel the effects of the black-market economy because they rely on suppliers and business partners to procure essential goods and services. Therefore, these supplies are increasingly becoming costly for enterprises with limited funding. Information gathered in this study, particularly in sections 4.3.1.1 – 4.3.1.3, is awash with challenges facing SOEs'. By and large, respondents' views mirror this information. Notably, the respondents did not mention the challenges of poor corporate governance, corruption, incompetent boards, embezzlement, abuse of resources, looting and poor oversight. Figure 5.10 summarises the challenges facing SOEs.

Figure 5.10: Challenges faced by state-owned enterprises

Source: Researcher's own composition

5.7 TOWARDS A GOOD GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK

The primary goal of this study is to develop a good governance framework for the GoZ. Havenga, Poggenpoel and Myburgh (2014:149-154) state that developing a model or framework involves steps such as the research problem and objectives, theory and empirical data. The model should address the problem identified by the researcher. The next chapter will address the good governance framework's contents, scope and purpose. This section underlines the rationale and building blocks of the good governance framework. A good governance framework will be developed to address the challenges highlighted by the respondents in this chapter. Therefore, the rationale for developing a good governance framework is rooted in the challenges facing SOEs, independent commissions and state oversight institutions in Zimbabwe. Hence, the main building block of the framework is the research problem outlined in section 1.2. Figure 5.11 shows the building blocks that will be considered to develop a good governance framework.

Figure 5.11: The building blocks of a good governance framework



Source: Researcher's own composition

5.8 CONCLUSION

The primary objective of this chapter was to present the empirical data gathered from the respondents who consented to participate in the study. The chapter was divided into several sections.

The first section revisited section 6.6 of this study by describing and explaining the research methods used to identify respondents, approach them, seek their permission, and collect and analyse qualitative data. It is essential to thoroughly describe the research methodology because it can be used to determine the quality of the study findings. The key takeaway from the research methodology section is that the study adopted a case study approach and qualitative research methodology because the research problem required qualitative data about governance in Zimbabwe. The second section dealt with the profiles of the people who participated in the study. The information reported in the section indicates that most of the respondents were males

of black African descent. This is consistent with the demographic trends of Zimbabwe's civil service labour force, particularly at managerial levels.

The section about insights from officials in SOEs indicated several issues. It established respondents' understanding of corporate governance, the mandate, financial management and SOE boards. In addition, respondents' views about the challenges facing SOEs were also collected. There were several consistencies and inconsistencies between respondents' views and what was reviewed in Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4 of this study. Respondents' data indicated how SOEs operate, procure resources, manage finances and promote corporate governance. The challenges facing SOEs were explored, and they showed that most SOEs' performance is impeded by poor funding.

The researcher collected views from bureaucrats from the Office of the Auditor-General, the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission and the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission to evaluate how they monitor the exercise of State authority and public resources. The respondents' views indicate that collectively these institutions enhance accountability, transparency, the rule of law and the eradication of corruption. Their insights also indicated that the operations of state institutions are informed by laws enacted to enhance democracy, accountability and transparency. Like SOEs, state institutions' challenges include high labour turnover, inadequate funding and the lack of essential resources. Some institutions, such as the OAG, face the challenge of their recommendations being ignored. This results in poor financial management and wastefulness in the public sector.

The next chapter deals with the good governance framework and summary and conclusions of the study.

CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: A PROPOSED GOOD GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK FOR THE GOZ

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The preceding chapter outlined the respondents' views and opinions regarding specific aspects of good governance, such as public accountability, public sector efficiency and eradicating corruption. This exercise was informed by the global, regional and local frameworks of sound governance and the legal apparatus for Zimbabwean public institutions analysed in the previous chapters. The objective of the previous chapter was to provide empirical data that could be triangulated with the literature generated from the existing body of knowledge in Public Administration and Management, Economics and other related disciplines informing the research problem. This exercise enabled the researcher to identify trends and patterns in the research respondents' views. In addition, the respondents were also asked to comment on the draft good governance framework. Their inputs were instrumental in reviewing and improving the draft framework developed by the researcher before conducting a field study.

Considering this background, this chapter presents the good governance framework for the GoZ. The chapter outlines the rationale for developing frameworks in Public Administration research, steps taken to develop the good governance framework, and recommendations for its application. Furthermore, this chapter outlines the operationalization of the research objectives and answers to the research questions posed in Chapter 1. Suggestions for further research in the good governance arena conclude the chapter.

6.2 REFLECTING ON THE STUDY'S OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS

In Chapter One, based on the research problem, the researcher crafted the research objectives and questions to develop a good governance framework. These research objectives (RO) are listed below:

RO1: To describe the theories, principles, dimensions, and approaches of good governance in the public sector.
RO2: To investigate the theoretical foundations of developing a good governance framework with specific reference to existing models.
RO3: To investigate the role of state institutions in promoting good governance.
RO4: To provide an in-depth analysis of instruments for measuring sound governance and the legal and regulatory frameworks for good governance in the public sector.
RO5: To assess the regional and international best practices of state institutions promoting good governance in the public sector.
RO6: To empirically determine the challenges and problems in the execution of good governance principles by selected state institutions in Zimbabwe.
RO7: To design a good governance framework for state institutions in Zimbabwe to improve the performance of public sector organisations and strengthen oversight institutions.

The researcher developed research questions (RQ) to address the abovementioned objectives. This enabled the study to accomplish specific objectives, such as reviewing the existing literature and collecting and analysing empirical data. The research questions of the study are as follows:

RQ1: What are the theories, principles, dimensions and approaches of good governance in the public sector?
RQ2: What are the theoretical foundations of developing a good governance framework with specific reference to existing models?
RQ3: What is the role of state institutions in promoting good governance?

RQ4: What are the instruments for measuring sound governance and the legal and regulatory frameworks of good governance in the public sector?
RQ5: What are the regional and international practices of state institutions which promote good governance in the public sector?
RQ6: What challenges and problems are encountered by state institutions in the execution of good governance principles?
RQ7: How will the good governance framework designed by this study contribute towards effective and efficient public sector and oversight institutions in Zimbabwe?

Table 6.1 aligns the research objectives and questions to specific chapters covered in this study.

Table 6.1: Aligning the research objectives and questions to specific chapters

Research objectives	Research questions	Chapter
RO1: To describe the theories, principles, dimensions, and approaches of good governance in the public sector. **RO2:** To investigate the theoretical foundations of developing a good governance framework with specific reference to existing models.	**RQ1:** What are the theories, principles, dimensions and approaches of good governance in the public sector? **RQ2:** What are the theoretical foundations of developing a good governance framework with specific reference to existing models?	Chapter Two
RO4: To provide an in-depth analysis of instruments for measuring sound governance and the legal and regulatory frameworks for good governance in the public sector.	**RQ4:** What are the instruments for measuring sound governance and the legal and regulatory frameworks of good governance in the public sector?	Chapter Three
RO5: To assess the regional and international best practices of state institutions promoting good governance praxis in the public sector. **RO6:** To empirically determine the challenges and problems in the	**RQ5:** What are the regional and international best practices of state institutions which promote good governance praxis in the public sector?	Chapter Four

execution of good governance principles by selected state institutions in Zimbabwe.	**RQ6:** What challenges and problems are encountered by state institutions in the execution of good governance principles?	
RO3: To investigate the role of state institutions in promoting good governance.	**RQ3:** What is the role of state institutions in promoting good governance?	Chapter Five
RO7: To design a good governance framework for state institutions in Zimbabwe to improve the performance of public sector organisations and strengthen oversight institutions.	**RQ7:** How will the good governance framework designed by this study contribute towards effective and efficient public sector and oversight institutions in Zimbabwe?	Chapter Six

6.3 SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS

This section provides a synopsis of all the chapters covered in the study.

The first chapter of a study is crucial because it provides a roadmap for the research. **Chapter One** introduced the study by outlining the background and orientation of the research study, the research problem, questions and objectives, and a glimpse into the study's research methodology. It hinted that the researcher intended to develop a good governance framework for the government of Zimbabwe to improve public institutions' performance, effectiveness and conduct. The researcher demonstrated that a good governance framework could improve the performance of public institutions because the philosophical standpoint of good governance is rooted in the rule of law, accountability, transparency, citizen participation, effectiveness and efficiency, protecting citizens' human rights, responsiveness to citizens' needs and sound financial management.

The preliminary literature review highlighted the GoZ's poor performance on most good governance benchmarks. Recent studies indicate that the government's performance is low compared to its regional peers. Six public institutions were selected for investigation. The literature suggested that the institutions perform poorly, resulting

in inadequate public services and public sector accountability. This contrasts public administration theories which underline the importance of efficient and effective institutions because the government has an innate responsibility to oversee an efficient administration of the state's authority and the management of public resources (the theories discussed in Chapter Two demonstrated why the state is responsible for meeting citizens' needs). Hence, Chapter One laid out the roots of the research problem and the researcher's desire to develop an intervention to solve the problem. Overall, the chapter provided a foundation for subsequent chapters covered in the study.

Reviewing the literature is crucial because it familiarises the researcher with the research problem and helps to explore research gaps. Accordingly, **Chapter Two** provided the theoretical framework of the study. The exposition of governance and good governance explored the roots of the two concepts. The researcher drew a link between modern collective governance: a social contract between state, citizens and non-state players in the country's governance infrastructure and promoting sound governance. This provided the basis for including non-state players' views and perceptions in developing the good governance framework. Beyond this, Chapter Two also linked the professional practice of public administration to good governance to justify applying good governance principles, such as economy, effectiveness, efficiency, accountability, transparency and responsiveness in the public sector. As a result, laws and regulations have been passed to affirm this standpoint (for example, public financial management and anti-corruption laws are consistent with the standards of sound public governance).

Tracing the pragmatic development of the Public Administration domain demonstrated how the discipline evolved from 1887, when it weaned itself from Political Science to the current dispensation, which emphasises collective governance in the state's bureaucracy. This necessitated a review of the New Public Management and New Public Service paradigms, underpinning the analysis of corporate governance in state-owned enterprises in subsequent chapters. Chapter Two also discussed theories on state evolution and public resource management, which provided insights into the functions and responsibilities of the government.

Chapter Three examined the systems of measuring sound governance by unpacking the existing instruments deployed at national, regional, continental and global levels, such as the Mo Ibrahim Index of Governance, World Governance Index, Corruption Perceptions Index and the African Peer Review Mechanism. This was crucial to developing a good governance framework because it enables gauging the performance of the GoZ on various indexes. Most importantly, this demonstrated that a government's performance can be measured. This negates views by some scholars who reduced governance to an abstract beyond measurement. Most instruments use a multi-stakeholder approach to assessing governance. In other words, assessing the soundness of governance is not a preserve of formal state institutions since citizens, NGOs, business people, and the donor community contribute views and perceptions of governance. This is noteworthy because it denotes that the state's bureaucracy cannot solely assess itself. Hence, social partners and citizens have a voice in assessing the quality of government services. This produces reliable performance data on the government's performance.

Chapter Four explored international best practices by conducting a comparative analysis of public sector norms in state institutions in the United Kingdom and South Africa. The rationale for analysing international best practices was to generate practical and implementable lessons for Zimbabwean public institutions. For example, the Comptroller and Auditor General in the United Kingdom and the South African Auditor General provided valuable insights into practices and standards, such as value-for-money auditing and institutional independence, that can be adopted by the Office of the Auditor General in Zimbabwe to improve its performance. A glimpse at international best practices is crucial in a study of this nature because it provides real-case examples of how other jurisdictions are addressing problems being investigated in this study. This knowledge reservoir gives the researcher ideas about solving the current research problem because research does not occur in a vacuum; hence, adapting lessons and interventions from other countries enables the researcher to develop sound interventions. At this stage, the researcher relied on information gathered from documentary analysis and the review of the literature to identify weaknesses and performance shortcomings embedded in the Zimbabwean public sector. This was crucial because it produced information consistent with empirical data. Analysing international best practices was crucial in developing research

instruments, interview guides for bureaucrats and technocrats and questionnaires for non-state role players. It also provided a starting point for making recommendations for challenges in the Zimbabwean public sector and for further research.

The purpose of **Chapter Five** was two-fold: it outlined the study's research methodology, paradigm and approach, and it also presented the empirical findings generated from the interviewees and the respondents who completed the questionnaires. A qualitative research approach supported by an interpretivist paradigm and a case study design was used to collect and process empirical data from the sample identified in Chapter One. This approach enabled the researcher to generate deep insights into sound governance in Zimbabwe using qualitative data collection techniques. The researcher undertook an empirical study where senior bureaucrats, administrators, heads of departments, directors and general employees were engaged in various matters about sound governance. Most engagements occurred at the respondents' workplaces, but others were done via Zoom, telephone, electronic mail and open-ended questionnaires. Data collected from the respondents were compared to the information generated through the literature review. The respondents provided information about the functions, operations and challenges facing public institutions in Zimbabwe. The findings are crucial because they indicate what is happening in the public sector and provide a basis for developing a good governance framework and making recommendations.

Chapter Six concludes the study by providing a summary and conclusions and demonstrating how the research objectives and questions were addressed. It also reports the principal findings. Furthermore, the chapter underlines the importance of Public Administration and Management research in developing suitable performance improvement interventions for the public sector. The fundamentals of developing a good governance framework to address the government's low performance are scrutinised and the researcher illustrates how the good governance framework can be applied in public institutions. Finally, recommendations for further research in the good governance domain are made.

6.4 PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

The principal outcomes of the study are listed below:

- In line with the constitutional and legal provisions, the Government of Zimbabwe established various state institutions, state-owned businesses, oversight institutions and independent commissions supporting democracy. For example, state-owned businesses were given legal mandates to provide specific services and goods to the citizens. Most interviewees drawn from these organisations believe they are fulfilling their mandates. However, respondents drawn from academia and other non-state players indicated they are inefficient and operate below capacity. The information generated through reviewing existing literature indicated that state-owned businesses operate below capacity due to corruption, poor corporate governance and mismanagement.
- Respondents drawn from non-governmental organisations indicated that the government needs to do more to promote good governance. The respondents cited corruption and human rights as areas where the government is underperforming. Some respondents bemoaned the promulgation of laws that close democratic spaces and make it difficult for non-state role players to contribute to national development. The respondents indicated a significant erosion of citizens' human rights and the government’s excessive use of state authority.
- Corruption and abuse of public resources are rife in the public sector. The tools developed by the anti-corruption body fall short of addressing this challenge because they are reactive and fraught with shortcomings especially given the magnitude of corruption. This has led to citizens lacking trust and confidence in the institution's capacity to deal with corruption. Non-state role players such as the media, advocacy groups, NGOs and civil society organisations are vital stakeholders that should be harnessed in eradicating corruption. The ZACC is aloof in its fight against corruption because it is primarily regarded as weak and uncommitted to its mandate.
- The ZACC has a clear mandate drawn from the constitution and the ZACC Act. These two instruments guarantee its independence and autonomy. This is

significant given that dependence can cripple the ZACC's capacity to perform its duties. This setup ensures that the ZACC is accountable to the National Assembly. However, it administratively falls under the Office of the President and Cabinet (OPC). This is an executive arm of the state. Researchers believe this arrangement muzzles the ZACC and cripples its capacity to fulfil its mandate.

- Prosecuting corruption cases through the National Prosecuting Authority is cumbersome owing to a considerable backlog. Some respondents suggested that extending prosecutorial authority to the ZACC will increase its performance. It should be noted that other respondents strongly believe that such a development will upset the separation of state power because the doctrine of a modern democratic state designates such authority to the judiciary.
- The OAG does not have compelling powers to encourage public officials and government organisations to implement the AG's recommendations. This has resulted in recurring audit findings with few consequences for the wrongdoers. Some respondents suggested giving the OAG compelling powers to ensure the AG's recommendations are implemented to improve public accountability and financial management. However, some respondents suggested that this would allow the OAG to encroach on the legislature's responsibilities, which ensures that bureaucrats account for their financial management decisions and actions. Inserting the OAG into this ecosystem will result in a duplication of roles and upset the separation of state power and responsibilities.
- Zimbabwean state-owned businesses rely primarily on legislated corporate governance codes and guidelines, such as the Public Entities Corporate Governance Act, National Code of Corporate Governance and the Corporate Governance Framework, to ensure sound governance among state-owned enterprises. International corporate governance frameworks such as the Cadbury Report and the King Report (South Africa) are applied to supplement local codes and guidelines.
- The OAG is the sole auditor of government accounts. However, it routinely delegates some duties to private-sector audit practices. This is done to outsource supplementary human resources or to provide business

opportunities to private sector companies especially given that the slow economic environment in the country dried up most business opportunities for auditors in the private sector.

- The OAG conducts irregular (unscheduled) value-for-money (VFM) audits to assess the economy, effectiveness and efficient use of public resources. However, unlike financial audits that should be done by the 30th of June each year, VFM audits do not have a strict timeline; they are conducted when the OAG deems them necessary. In most cases, the OAG relies on media reports, citizens' disgruntlement, and instances of excessive public expenditure to institute VFM audits.
- SOEs' performance is below expectations. In light of their legal mandate of providing essential goods and services to the citizens, their poor performance has grave consequences for citizens' well-being and socio-economic development. Researchers point out that corruption, poor oversight and mismanagement hinder SOEs from sustainably providing goods and services. In addition, SOEs are burdened with fulfilling the government's social policies, most of which are financially crippling.
- There seems to be minimal cooperation and engagement between state and non-state role-players. The governance system espoused in Chapters 1 and 2 of this study envisages close cooperation between the state bureaucracy and non-state stakeholders to champion citizens' needs and improve the performance of public functions. However, data from state institutions and non-state players suggested insufficient stakeholder cooperation. This deprives state functions of an opportunity to harness competencies and social capital from civil society organisations, social groups and non-governmental organisations.

6.5 THE RATIONALE FOR DEVELOPING FRAMEWORKS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH

Public Administration and Management (PAM) research is solution-oriented; hence, it uses models and frameworks to address challenges and provide solutions for increasing performance, managing resources and improving efficiency (Maritz,

2019:104-115; Masiloane & Dintwe, 2014:187; Bannister, 2000:37). PAM research outcomes are poised to improve the management of resources in state or quasi-state institutions (Van der Waldt, 2013:38). In light of this background, this study proposes practical solutions and recommendations to the governance challenges facing the GoZ. The researcher can fulfil this objective because PAM research provides the means for scholarly inquiry and a scientific methodology to create new insights and develop interventions to address governance challenges.

Scholars often question the contribution of PAM research and scholarship in addressing normative, methodological and practical challenges facing government administrations. This prompted questions about the depth (i.e. meta-theoretical and philosophical) of the discipline's qualifications and the extent to which they adequately prepare students to become senior public officials who manage public affairs according to normative values, democratic ethos and sound governance principles (Raadschelders, 2020:180). As a result, PAM research and pedagogy are characterised as an applied social science focusing on deliberate problem-oriented approaches and methodology. To this end, PA scholars conduct research to develop theories and solve concrete public sector problems. Hence, PA research provides practitioners the means and tools to solve practical challenges. In other words, despite engaging with various interdisciplinary theories, norms and assumptions, its fundamental objective is solving practical challenges confronting bureaucrats, citizens and the state's superstructure. Hence, PAM should impact the execution of the government's public policies (Raadschelders, 2020:176; Saisi, 2020:1). This suggests that it cannot be divorced from the prevailing political and socio-economic realities and PAM research should use new knowledge and insights to solve existing challenges (Raadschelders, 2020:176). As a result, research in universities, especially at the postgraduate level, is mainly designed to solve challenges governments face in exercising state authority and satisfying citizens' needs. In this regard, Phago (2012:142) outlines the following six properties of PAM research in South Africa by suggesting that it should –

- “engage in critical thinking and reasoning by interrogating existing theories and frameworks;

- produce new knowledge by addressing academic questions and solving public sector challenges; making the discipline more relevant;
- provide pedagogical tools to mentor and guide budding PAM scholars;
- ensure scholars are abreast with developments in the discipline;
- promote specialised research and scholarship; and
- ensure that PA scholars are respected by their peers and the community".

These properties indicate that PAM scholarship should add value to public sector management and academic research. One way of doing this is by creating new knowledge to solve public sector challenges. Hence, in Chapter 1, good governance challenges impacting the GoZ's ability to deliver value to the citizens and manage public resources were investigated.

This study was conceived to create new knowledge by developing a good governance framework to increase performance and responsiveness to citizens' needs. This line of reasoning is consistent with Maritz (2019:100), who states that PAM researchers develop interventions (solutions) to increase the performance of government institutions and capacitate public officials with skills and knowledge consistent with contemporary governance challenges. In recent years, North-West University (NWU) has been at the forefront of creating new knowledge in PAM by encouraging students to develop interventions (frameworks, approaches, strategies and models) to address various public sector challenges (cf. Ahiante, 2021; Chigova, 2020; Mahlala, 2019; Muronda, 2017; Haurovi, 2016). Against this backdrop, this study reviewed the existing corpus of knowledge, statutory and constitutional provisions and prevailing public sector governance shortcomings to create new knowledge to address problems facing the GoZ and its citizens. Maritz (2019:104-115) and Masiloane and Dintwe (2014:187) state that conceptual frameworks should be applied to increase public sector efficiency. Maritz (2019:100) developed a framework to promote good governance, strategic planning, sound corporate governance, public sector efficiency and efficient public resources management because research (Masiloane & Dintwe, 2014) argue that statutory tools and regulations alone cannot increase public sector performance. While reflecting on the shortcomings of the Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy (South Africa) in eradicating corruption in the public sector, Masiloane and Dintwe

(2014:194) argue that their strategic framework may address the weaknesses of existing public sector approaches because it considers new empirical data, research outcomes and the government's performance data. As a result, various instruments, strategies, action plans and frameworks are developed for public sector institutions to enable specific state functions to fulfil their objectives using new insights.

Maritz (2019:100) emphasises the importance of building frameworks to spur good governance because they incorporate local realities and international best practices, resulting in balanced strategies to improve performance and deliver value to the citizens. Therefore, as a result of this study, the proposed good governance framework is considered a worthwhile intervention because it incorporates current data from the existing body of knowledge, multinational institutions, social research, respondents' views and non-governmental organisations. Due to this rich information reservoir, the proposed framework can be regarded as a review of the existing government frameworks and statutory tools for enhancing performance, accountability and the rule of law in the public sector. This provides an academic rationale for developing the framework.

6.6 ACADEMIC CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY

The primary study's contribution is the proposed framework outlined in section 6.6.3. In line with the framework, the contributions are grounded in theories, public administration and management literature, and empirical data collected from the field.

6.6.1 Developing a good governance framework

Literature often uses the terms ‘model’ and ‘framework’ interchangeably. Models typically depict graphics, pictures, diagrams or numeric notations to showcase ideas (Chinn & Kramer in Tema, Poggenpoel & Myburgh, 2018:2). A model is generally shaped by basic assumptions, inductive reasoning, empirical data, theoretical foundations and the research problem (Diedericks, Myburgh & Poggenpoel, 2020:2; Tema *et al.*, 2018:4; Villarruel, 2014:349; Havenga *et al.*, 2014:149). From an academic perspective, frameworks are generally broader than a model and may

illustrate the relationship and interaction between two or more models. Frameworks are crucial because they add value to the implementation of ideas and philosophies in specific professional setups by creating new knowledge and insights that guide and improve the conduct of managers and workers in those professions (Glassman, 2016:336; Lukose, 2011:27). As such, the term ‘framework’ was selected for purposes of this research since it encompasses a depiction of tiered models as well as the inclusion of related dimensions comprising a good governance framework. Researchers (Huang, 2022:11; Villarruel, 2017:349; Glassman, 2016:337; Havenga *et al.*, 2014:149; Phillips, 2011:308) point out that framework construction comprises the following elements:

- review of the existing body of knowledge
- scrutinising applicable theories and approaches
- reflecting on existing frameworks and/or models
- analysing empirical data derived from engaging with research participants, key informants and other gatekeepers who provide pertinent insights into the research problem or the phenomenon being investigated or measured.

This study's literature review and empirical data provided insights into developing a good governance framework. Respondents were presented with a draft framework and requested to comment on its applicability and suggest areas where it could be improved.

6.6.2 Underlying axioms of the framework

Axioms can be regarded as basic assumptions, assertions or untested postulations believed to be accurate. Axioms are vital in developing a sound framework for academic research because they are the foundation upon which the development of new knowledge is premised (Johnson, Adkins & Chauvin, 2020:140). Maritz (2019:105) maintains that basic assumptions are deployed in PAM research to develop practical interventions, such as models and frameworks for public institutions. This study's framework's axioms are drawn from four sources: the literature reviewed in chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4, empirical data reported in the previous chapter, the

constitution and various legislative instruments and the norms and basic assumptions about modern nation-states, particularly in the developing world. The underlying axioms of this framework are outlined in Table 6.2.

Table 6.2: Underlying axioms of the proposed good governance framework

Number	Axiom
1	The government is committed to improving its performance by extracting maximum value from natural, material and human resources domiciled within its borders.
2	The government can develop people-oriented policies to improve citizens' living standards.
3	The state architecture comprises various institutions, processes, systems and infrastructure which can be harnessed to implement people-centric policies.
4	The bureaucracy has competent and rational bureaucrats committed to creating optimum value for the citizens.
5	The legislature is people-centred and willing to repeal obsolete and retrogressive laws.
6	The state machinery, and by extension, the government of Zimbabwe, has regressed in the past two decades resulting in poor performance and mismanagement of public resources.
7	Deep structures within the state's architecture impede public sector transformation and the adoption of interventions to increase performance. Hayes (2018:17) defines deep structures as decisions and choices embedded in the organisation which determine how it reacts to environmental changes.
8	New interventions are required to revive the state's architecture and condition public institutions to deliver value to citizens.

Source: Researcher’s own composition

The underlying axioms justify developing and implementing a good governance framework for the GoZ. Hence, the assumptions will enable the researcher to develop

a good governance framework without the burden of verifying all the details and data generated from the field.

6.6.3 The proposed good governance framework

Based on the empirical data and the research problem, a good governance framework was developed to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector and the capacity of oversight institutions. The framework considers the inputs (governance philosophy, public policies, political systems, legal architecture, economic system, existing challenges and stakeholders' perspectives), systems and processes needed to sustain a good governance paradigm. It borrows insights from tools and instruments for assessing various aspects of sound governance. These implements were crucial because they underlined the critical governance issues assessed to measure the government's performance. Additionally, Zimbabwe's poor performance on most metrics reinforced the need to develop a new intervention.

The proposed good governance framework presented in Figure 6.1, as the primary contribution of this study, comprises two tiers: GoZ governance architecture (ecosystem) and public sector management techniques for increasing efficiency and effectiveness.

Figure 6.1: A good governance framework for the Government of Zimbabwe

Tier One: GoZ governance architecture



Tier Two: Public sector management elements and techniques for increasing efficiency and effectiveness



VFM: Value-for-money auditing
HCM: Human capital management
SER: Social and economic rights
FM: Financial management

Source: Researcher's construction

At the core, the framework is a blueprint for decision-makers and bureaucrats with the autonomy to steer public resources and implement public policies. Therefore, the framework is rooted in addressing prevailing public sector challenges. It illustrates the researcher's insights into addressing these challenges using state and non-state resources. This is consistent with the governance ideology discussed in the study, where the state takes advantage of non-state resources and social capital to strengthen its systems and address citizens' concerns. Section 6.6.6 discusses the audience and the zone of application, and section 6.6.6.1 identifies the role players of the proposed framework.

6.6.4 An exposition of the framework

The good governance framework for the GoZ is in a two-tier format. The tiers indicate two distinct domains of utilising the proposed framework and it underlines critical issues to consider in promoting good governance and increasing the public sector's performance and value proposition.

The first tier provides a background of a modern government ecosystem by underlining the state ideologies, governance philosophies, political principles and public sector management paradigms adopted by the government of Zimbabwe. This information was generated from the literature review. However, respondents who participated in the study corroborated some of it. The first tier gave the researcher a blueprint of the government's background and ideological stance. This information enabled the researcher to identify governance architecture gaps and recommend interventions to address them. This tier conceives the governance architecture of a modern government as an open system consisting of inputs (core governance elements), processes (public sector management) and outputs (sound governance and public sector efficiency). These are housed within the public sector's operating environment rooted in the legal, social, political, economic and technological status quo. The open systems approach enables the researcher to interrogate the interrelations between various properties of a specific system. Diedericks (2013:44-45) used this approach to analyse the government's goals, processes and political systems. The current framework emphasises the role of public institutions, non-state role players, the legal and regulatory framework, public policies and the government's strategic plans in

creating an efficient governance system to satisfy citizens' needs. This tier indicates that institutions such as state-owned enterprises, the Office of the Auditor-General and an anti-corruption body are vital ingredients of public sector management.

The second tier comprises public sector management elements and techniques to be applied in governance functions, such as human capital management, accountability and financial management, essential in implementing good governance. It enables public institutions to create more value for citizens. This tier involves organisational interventions such as innovation and learning culture to increase the performance and outputs of public institutions. This is the locus (site) of transforming policies and ideas into tangible and measurable outcomes. Instruments analysed in Chapter Three of this study, such as the Sustainable Governance Indicators and the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment, come to mind because they assess the robustness of the public sector's capacity to implement public policies. Section 6.6.6 justifies why the researcher recommends deploying the proposed good governance framework at the national level, where the systems, institutions and policies dealt with at this level can be interrogated.

6.6.5 Spheres where public sector interventions are deployed

Governments comprise a complex web of individuals, spheres, institutions, lines of authority, functions, duties, processes, systems and decisions that make up the architecture through which policies are implemented (Nzimakwe & Ntshakala, 2015:824; Thornhill, 2011a:45). Subnational governments have legislative and executive power (Van Wyk, 2012:289-292). In Zimbabwe, the constitution suggests that the government consists of three spheres to enable the state to deliver its mandate (Sekgala, 2017:105; Musekiwa & Mandiyanike, 2013:49; De Visser & Mapuva, 2013:159). For this reason, this section identifies the possible loci for applying the good governance framework. The following subsections evaluate the suitability of deploying the framework in the loci depicted in figure 6.1.

6.6.5.1 National government

The national government is commonly called the central government because, in a unitary state, it wields most of the state's authority to make policies and strategic decisions and oversee the government's exercise of state authority (Moyo & Ncube, 2014:294). This includes key authorities and associated institutions in the national government sphere, namely the legislature, judiciary and the executive. These key state authorities support national government authority over other tiers of government. For this study, the national government sphere is suitably placed to implement the good governance framework because most state authority, policy-making and political directives reside within this sphere. The national government should thus develop a suitable transformative model (tier 1) to steer a state towards good and effective governance.

6.6.5.2 Provincial government

The provincial government sphere includes regional governments governed by provincial councils. Section (270) (1)(f) provides provincial government authority to exercise legislative powers and other functions in their areas of jurisdiction. Musekiwa and Mandiyanike (2013:56) argue that the constitutional provisions are not sufficient to ensure independent provincial government institutions because it does not specify their functions and duties. Deploying an intervention at the provincial level is not ideal because they generally lack political and administrative control over most institutions implementing public policies promoting good governance.

6.6.5.3 Local government

Local government institutions have legislative and revenue-collection powers allowing them to provide public services (Musekiwa & Mandiyanike, 2013:49). Section 276(1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe guarantees their autonomy. However, this autonomy is routinely negated and contravened by the national government, citing political expediency as the reason (Sekgala, 2017:109; Musekiwa & Mandiyanike, 2013:54; De Visser & Mapuva, 2013:159). The Constitution does not specify particular local issues where municipalities can exercise autonomy. This ambiguity can therefore be

exploited to deny them the autonomy to exercise municipal powers (Sekgala, 2017:109; De Visser & Mapuva, 2013:168). Devolving authority to local municipalities gives them the leeway to manage decision-making, planning and execution of government policies (Thornhill, 2011a:56; Van Wyk, 2012:295). This means local municipalities can implement some interventions to increase their performance and value proposition to local communities. From this perspective, some dimensions of the framework, particularly those on increasing performance, can be deployed in this sphere.

6.6.5.4 Public institutions

Public institutions implement policies and deliver value to citizens. To achieve this, they must operate effectively and according to specific standards, values and procedures (Moolman & Van der Waldt, 2022:8). Public institutions consist of state-owned or quasi-state-owned businesses and other agencies established to fulfil the state's functions. These institutions are vehicles of public service delivery and policy implementation (Musvota & Mukonza, 2021:475). Organisational frameworks and national laws guide their operations. Implementing the good governance framework within public institutions is ideal if the intervention sufficiently provides organisational arrangements and functional procedures for increasing performance and productivity.

Figure 6.2: Loci where public sector interventions can be deployed



Source: Researcher's construction

6.6.6 Locus of the good governance framework

In light of the description of various loci of applying the proposed good governance framework, this study maintains that it is ideal for applying the framework at a macro or national level where key decision-makers and implementers of government policies are situated. Public policies and government directives flow from the national government to provincial and local spheres of government. Another reason is that state institutions, oversight institutions and independent commissions supporting democracy do not have grassroots representation. RR12 indicated that they are in the process of devolving their operations to other towns and regions. Hence, a framework designed to be applied at subnational levels is impractical. Hence, the framework is a macro-level intervention since it focuses on policy implementation and structural aspects of government institutions. However, structural issues cannot be addressed in a vacuum. This means that at every level of government, there are organisations and institutions through which the government operates. Empirical data reported in the previous chapter demonstrated this. The institutions under investigation are situated at the central government level. This is consistent with Musvota and Rukonzi (2021:475), who indicate that public institutions are vehicles for implementing public

policies. Figure 6.2 indicates the tasks and duties carried out in the national sphere of government and within public institutions. This shows that recommendations in section 6.7 emanating from the proposed good governance framework can be applied at these loci.

Figure 6.3: Tasks and duties in the national sphere of government and within public institutions



Source: Researcher's construction

6.6.6.1 Role-players in applying the good governance framework

Successful application of the good governance framework depends on identifying specific role-players and stakeholders whose functions and duties can be aligned with the assumptions and objectives of the framework. Figure 6.3 depicts the role-players who can be co-opted into applying the good governance framework in public institutions.

Figure 6.4: Role-players who can be co-opted into applying the framework



Source: Researcher's construction

6.7 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK

In light of the findings of this study, the following recommendations are made for applying the good governance framework.

6.7.1 Non-state stakeholder involvement in government affairs

Critical non-state stakeholders include citizens, community representatives, the church, civil society and non-governmental organisations. Stakeholders' involvement in government affairs is vital in promoting good governance because it ensures that policymakers, bureaucrats and public administrators are continuously aware of citizens' needs and new interventions for meeting them. This shapes public policies and government expenditures. Sections 1.1, 2.2, 2.4, 2.6.1 and 2.6.4 indicate the importance of stakeholder involvement in promoting sound governance and responsiveness to citizens' needs. Researchers underline the importance of citizens'

participation in policy-making, public accountability and transparency (Basheka, 2018:58; Keping, 2017:5-7; Ikeanyibe *et al.*, 2017:6).

In contrast, Zimbabwe's shrinking spaces of citizen participation deprive citizens of meaningful participation in public affairs, leading to an aloof government that is at loggerheads with citizens' expectations (Mude and Chigora, 2013:27). Empirical data generated from RR24, RR12, RR15, RR13, RR20, RR14 and RR22 indicates some cooperation, collaboration and engagement between state role players, such as government departments and public institutions and non-state role players, including non-governmental organisations, media organisations, civil society organisations, interest groups, international organisations, regional governments and church organisations.

However, given the political polarisation and the government's dismissiveness of political groups and non-governmental organisations that oppose it, significant population sectors are excluded from meaningfully participating in the country's governance affairs. This contrasts the good governance principles of stakeholder involvement and citizen participation because some sections in society are regarded as illegitimate despite representing the needs of many citizens. Hence, honest stakeholder participation will enable the government to gain knowledge and insights from social partners. This concerns public accountability and transparency because citizens are important constituencies that can become whistle-blowers of corruption and abuse of public resources. Co-opting them will give them incentives to assist the government in uprooting corruption and abuse of state authority.

6.7.2 Emphasis on citizens' socio-economic rights

Sections 1.1 and 1.2 highlight the significance of protecting citizens' human rights in promoting good governance, and section 1.2 underscores Zimbabwe's poor human rights record. Recently, the citizens experienced an erosion of their socio-economic rights primarily due to the government's socio-economic and political policies and a failing economy. The land reform programme and Operation *Murambatsvina* (getting rid of the filth) of the early 2000s sequestrated individuals' assets and destroyed residential properties without reprieves or compensation from the state. This eroded

citizens' socio-economic rights and undermined their ability to sustain decent livelihoods (Mhlanga & Ndhlovu, 2021:83-84; Benyera & Nyere, 2015:6522). In addition, the government-initiated replacement of the United States dollar as a legal tender of transactions with the undervalued local currency deprived citizens of their savings stored in US dollars. This affected citizens' bank savings, insurance policies and other investments. These examples demonstrate how the government's policies can erode socio-economic rights and impoverish citizens.

Without a clear commitment and pressure to protect citizens' socio-economic rights, the government will not have incentives to develop policies that shield citizens from economic ruin. This shines the light on the shortcomings of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission in protecting citizens' human rights, particularly their socio-economic rights. Section 4.2.2.3.1 described socio-economic rights and analysed the role of the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) in ensuring that the state does not ignore these rights. Valuable insights were generated from this exercise. The SAHRC's experiences were regarded as international best practices to benchmark the performance of other human rights commissions, particularly on the African continent because it has a history of safeguarding citizens' socio-economic rights.

In cases where public policies expose citizens' rights, reprieves and other interventions should be implemented to curtail citizens' exposure to wanton economic ruin. For example, the South African government cannot evict or displace people from where they stay without giving them alternatives. This demonstrates how public policies can be implemented without exposing citizens to risk. *Government RSA v Grootboom [2000]* demonstrates the role of the SAHRC in monitoring the government's conduct in ensuring that citizens' economic rights are protected. The SAHRC was tasked with monitoring the implementation of the Constitutional Court's ruling after the government infringed on citizens' rights (Wesson, 2004:284-286). Hence, the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission can draw lessons from the SAHRC by ensuring that the state does not violate citizens' socio-economic rights. This recommendation is rooted in the principle of separating state powers. The ZHRC is expected to oversee the government's exercise of state power, especially when it threatens citizens' rights. The recommendation ensures that the ZHRC monitors the

government's powers when its policies contravene citizens' socio-economic rights. This often includes judicial interventions.

6.7.3 Broadening value-for-money audits

Section 4.2.1.4.1 demonstrated that value for money (VFM) audits are based on the "cost-benefit" principle of extracting maximum value from managing public funds because governments only have limited resources to fulfil citizens' unlimited needs. Hence, VFM ensures that public resources are deployed where needed and managed sparingly to meet a growing list of public needs (Barr & Christie, 2015:1; Alwardat *et al.*, 2015:208). In the UK, the government emphasises conducting VFM audits to ensure public resources are utilised according to citizens' most pressing needs. Sections 4.2.3 and 5.5.7.3 underscored that most corruption cases in the public sector centre around government procurement, projects and tenders. Naturally, value-for-money audits should focus on these elements to minimise the misuse of public resources. RR18, RR16 and RR17 indicated that the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) conducts value-for-money audits to ascertain the economy, effectiveness and efficiency of the government's spending to ensure that public funds are utilised for their intended purposes. RR18 indicated that the audits are conducted only when the OAG deems fit.

It is recommended that the OAG develop an audit model that automatically conducts VFM for tenders and projects involving substantial public funds to ensure that big government projects are audited for economic, effective and efficient use of resources. This proactive approach can restore sound financial management by detecting wastefulness and the misappropriation of resources. The VFM audits published on the OAG's webpage indicate that most recent VFM audits did not focus on government spending. The crumbling infrastructure and poor public services indicate that the government's spending is not creating value for the citizens. Hence, auditing should focus more on VFM to encourage the government and contractors to prioritise generating value from public financial resources in line with the provisions of the Audit Act and the Public Finance Management Act. This will improve public accountability.

6.7.4 Enhancing the independence of public enterprises and other state institutions

The independence of state institutions is sacrosanct because it enables public officials and administrators to fulfil their mandate without undue influence, unwarranted interference and fear of backlash from institutions or individuals with legitimate or illegitimate authority. Sections 4.2.1.4.2 and 4.2.3.3.1 illustrated how the independence of state institutions can be achieved and maintained. Public organisations often suffer from political interference because they fall under the management of political appointees and office bearers. For instance, RR16 and RR17 indicated that the OAG cannot be entirely separate from the Treasury because it receives policy directives and funding from the national purse. However, this dependence is administrative and does not impinge on the OAG's duties if it does not unduly influence its operations. Most respondents indicated that political office bearers are more or less involved in state institutions' administration and strategic decision-making. Most of it is benign and expected; for example, the boards of SOEs are appointed by the minister, and the ZHRC works closely with the Ministry of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs. However, some dependence can impinge state institutions' capacity to execute their functions.

The researcher quizzed RR14 and RR12 about the independence of the ZACC and the ZHRC. RR14 insisted that despite being administratively under the Office of the President and Cabinet (OPC), the ZACC is independent of interference or deterrents to conduct its duties. The OPC consists of the executive arm of the government (the president, vice president and cabinet ministers). This arrangement can be misconstrued as a ploy by the executive to circumvent the legislature and unduly control a vital oversight institution mandated to investigate the executive and other arms of government. Since corruption and abuse of state power in the public sector often involve political appointees, this development is counterintuitive and erodes confidence in the ZACC's commitment to eradicating corruption. This is worsened by the vast number of corruption cases involving politicians and members of the executive arm of the state that are not investigated. Hence, the independence of the ZACC will inspire citizens' confidence in the ZACC's commitment to fighting corruption. Therefore, the international best practices for state organisations reviewed in this

study underline the importance of institutional independence. The South African Public Protector demonstrates how an independent state oversight institution can effectively combat the abuse of public resources.

From a strategic planning perspective, it is recommended that SOEs be unburdened from the government's short-term policies exposing them to financial ruin. Whilst line ministers should provide SOEs with policy direction, strategic planning and implementation should be left to competent boards and senior management of SOEs. Failure to do so will result in ministers dictating SOE's strategic plans. For example, the National Railways Zimbabwe (NRZ) and the Zimbabwe United Passenger Company (ZUPCO) are in weak financial positions; notwithstanding this, they were mandated to provide urban public transport when the government banned private minibuses from operating. The same can be said for other SOEs seen as vehicles for implementing populist policies. Therefore, SOEs' effectiveness and contribution to national development are hindered by punctuated policies that create little returns for them.

6.7.5 Improving human capital management

It is recommended that more attention should be paid to improving human capital management in the public sector. Human resources are the backbone of public institutions because they implement public policies and ensure that the performance of public sector institutions is consistent with the government's policy vision and strategic development agenda. As a result, managing, developing and maintaining human capital is essential because they are essential public sector assets. The Principles of the New Public Service Model examined in section 2.8.1 illustrates the value of good public sector human capital management by underlining that high productivity should not be achieved at the expense of employees' well-being. The model posits that public sector organisations should invest in human capital skills development and well-being because motivated and satisfied employees are more productive and committed to organisational goals.

The theories examined in Chapter 2 demonstrated that the performance and efficiency of the state's bureaucracy hinge on having skilled and committed employees. Various

respondents pointed out that state institutions and state-owned enterprises struggle to retain human capital primarily due to poor working conditions and uncompetitive salaries. RR04 stated that some employees swindle the company's revenue to supplement low wages, and RR13, RR17 and RR16 hinted that labour turnover is attributable to employees seeking greener pastures and better wages. RR17 noted that despite a significant improvement in employees' wages, low staff morale could be attributed to the high living costs and insufficient wages received by employees. These examples demonstrate poor human capital management in the public sector. The hyperinflationary environment in Zimbabwe continuously erodes employees' wages, making it challenging to meet their basic needs and family obligations. This results in poor staff morale, high labour turnover and extreme job dissatisfaction.

Involving public sector employees in decision-making and continuously matching their remuneration with the consumer price index (CPI) helps to cushion them from high inflation affecting the Zimbabwean economy. This will stem labour turnover and increase job satisfaction and commitment to public sector objectives. Offering employees opportunities to upskill themselves and participate in organisational decision-making harnesses their skills and expertise and enables them to increase the growth and performance of public sector organisations. RR04 highlighted that the board in the current state does not have a representative from HR; this deters the board from making strategies consistent with employees' needs and interests. Hence, involving employees in decision-making that affects them is crucial. Furthermore, public institutions should invest in sophisticated skills and modern techniques for delivering services and exercising oversight over the administration of the state's authority and management of public resources. This complements the existing human capital capacity. For example, the ZACC should develop the skills and capacities of its employees to enable them to detect corruption of a digital nature because intercontinental crimes and embezzlement now use digital platforms. To cope with this sophisticated abuse of public resources, institutions need highly skilled employees to match contemporary challenges. Hence, developing public sector employees' skills will increase the capacity of state institutions to respond to threats presented by the digital terrain.

6.7.6 Strengthening accountability and penalty measures for financial mismanagement

It is recommended that accountability measures and penalties for mismanaging public resources be strengthened. A document analysis of the recent AG's reports for SOEs elicited recurrent audit opinions and recommendations, indicating that SOEs do not implement the AG's recommendations. Respondents indicated that the OAG faces the challenge of clients (public institutions audited by the OAG) disregarding recommendations. This leads to recurrent issues each year. The existing legal framework for public accountability and government audits does not allow the AG to force clients to implement recommendations. Instead, legislative committees, such as the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), can summon them to account for their decisions or mishandling of public resources. However, given that most recommendations are hardly implemented, it brings the effectiveness of the PAC into question.

Unfortunately, the Public Accounts Committee chairperson declined an invitation for a face-to-face interview with the researcher. The researcher intended to establish the effectiveness of public accountability measures for individuals and institutions that misuse public resources. Landmark cases in South Africa about the Nkandla debacle, such as the *EFF v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others* and the *DA v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others,* provide insights into how oversight institutions can promote accountability and recover assets from officials who misuse public resources. Asset recovery and prohibitive penalties should prevent the abuse of public resources.

6.7.7 Funding

Funding is essential for the performance of public institutions because it dictates how they operate, recruit human resources, and retain and develop a skilled workforce. Funding also enables them to source equipment and resources needed to function correctly. The Constitution of Zimbabwe provides for the establishment of a consolidated revenue fund. The respondents indicated that the government implemented this provision. However, how the fund is administered is unclear. In any

case, funding public institutions is administered by the Treasury. Institutions like the OAG have some autonomy in managing their finances; other institutions investigated in this study do not. Therefore, public institutions should be given more autonomy in managing their funds. This will enable them to assert operational independence from the Treasury and the executive arm of government. This will potentially increase public officials' job security and confidence in executing their duties.

6.7.8 Performance management

The government, through a multi-stakeholder convention involving academics, private sector professionals, bureaucrats, NGOs and social and global development partners, should develop an objective framework for measuring performance at all levels of the public sector. A multi-stakeholder approach will enable the government to benefit from local and internal resources and competencies regarding managing performance and deriving maximum value from public resources. Implementing this intervention can increase productivity and improve the provision of public services. Contemporary research indicates that poor and non-existent performance management interventions are responsible for poor public sector performance in selected European and African countries; hence, commissioning performance management interventions can increase productivity and the quality of service delivery in the public sector (Masenya, Mokoele & Makalela, 2018-106-110). Developing an objective performance management intervention will enable the GoZ to monitor productivity and performance in public sector institutions, particularly those responsible for providing public services and monitoring the exercise of state authority. Incidentally, this is an effective tool for increasing accountability and the efficient use of public resources.

6.7.9 Privatisation

The researcher also recommends privatising some state functions, particularly those providing services and goods that private businesses can carry out (for example, public transport, grain marketing, air travel and postal services) to reduce their financial burden on the state. Inviting private businesses to take over some public sector enterprises allows an injection of new skills, ideas, resources and strategies in

managing the enterprises. This increases efficiency and productivity because private players with profit motives can promote organisational growth to generate returns from invested capital. Lessons from Ronald Reagan and Margareth Thatcher's privatisation drives indicate that it can increase the quality of public services and improve productivity and financial management in previously struggling state-owned enterprises (Malema & Kaelo, 2013:88-88; Edwards, 2017:99). This will free up significant amounts of public finances to enable the state to focus on other social programmes being starved of funding.

6.8 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Whilst good governance is a macro-level phenomenon consisting of how government institutions adhere to specific values and norms, implementing its principles is institutional because it depends on organisational efficiency, human competencies and organisational management. In other words, government initiatives' success is contingent on public sector employees' capacities and commitment. The researcher recommends further research on the human and organisational competencies required to promote good governance in the context of a developing country. Research in employee motivation, satisfaction, performance management and organisational goal achievement can be aligned with interventions to promote good governance in Zimbabwe.

One NPM ideology proposes privatising some state functions to increase efficiency and unburden the state from running public entities without the requisite competencies and capacity. This is commonly known as Thatcherism following its widespread adoption by the United Kingdom in the 1980s when the Conservatives controlled the government under Margaret Thatcher. Arguably this proposition increased the efficiency of the former state-owned businesses and led to the closure or merger of underperforming entities. Altogether, it reduced the burden on taxpayers to fund underperforming businesses. The strategy adopted by the GoZ to unbundle these state-owned entities did not increase their efficiency or value proposition; hence, privatising them might. The researcher recommends further research into privatising inefficient and underperforming state-owned businesses.

Organisational management and leadership are essential to implementing interventions in public sector management. This study did not focus on these organisational aspects. Hence, it is recommended that further research be conducted into how organisational leadership can be leveraged to promote sound corporate governance and enhance public sector performance.

6.9 CONCLUSION

Good governance is a topical issue in public administration and the management of state resources because donor organisations, development practitioners, politicians, development bankers, economics and global north countries believe it can rescue sub-Saharan countries from corruption, abuse of authority, unresponsive governments and the lack of sustainable development. This motivated the researcher to study how public institutions and state-owned businesses can be leveraged to promote good governance. This was accomplished by developing a good governance framework. Hence, Chapter Six set out to fulfil the study's primary objective by proposing a good governance framework for the GoZ in line with the research problem outlined in Section 1.3. The chapter also recapped the research objectives and questions and outlined the chapters covered in the study. In addition, the researcher aligned the research objectives and questions with specific chapters. This ensured that the objectives set out in Chapter One were achieved and that all the chapters were accounted for.

Developing a framework in academic research is overwhelming; hence, the researcher used academic resources to propose a good governance framework. Empirical data was essential because it was the backbone of this study's findings and recommendations. Journal articles, previous theses, and dissertations were also handy because they were springboards for ideas and insights into developing a framework. Sections 6.5 – 6.6.4 outlined the reasoning behind the researcher's framework. Sections 6.6.6 – 6.6.6.1 were particularly essential because they outlined how the framework can be applied in public sector institutions.

The framework perceives a country's governance architecture as an open system comprising inputs, processes and outputs. Applying the good governance framework and implementing its principles are vital to increasing public sector performance and improving the state's service provision capacity. This contribution resonates with the theories explored in Chapter Two, the governance instruments analysed in Chapter Three, as well as the study's research problem.

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ANNEXURE A

NWU®
NORTH-WEST UNIVERSITY
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YUNIBESITI YA BOKONE-BOPHIRIMA

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Research Ethics Regulatory Committee
Tel: 018 299-4849
Email: nkosinathi.machine@nwu.ac.za

22 October 2018

ETHICS APPROVAL LETTER OF STUDY

Based on approval by the **Arts Research Ethics Committee (AREC)** on 22/10/2018, the Arts Research Ethics Committee hereby **approves** your study as indicated below. This implies that the North-West University Research Ethics Regulatory Committee (NWU-RERC) grants its permission that, provided the special conditions specified below are met and pending any other authorisation that may be necessary, the study may be initiated, using the ethics number below.

Study title: A good governance framework for state institutions: The case of the Government of Zimbabwe
Study Leader/Supervisor (Principal Investigator)/Researcher: Prof G van der Waldt
Student: Mr B. Muronda

Ethics number: N W U - 0 0 7 6 4 - 1 8 - A 7
Institution Study Number Year Status
Status: S = Submission; R = Re-Submission; P = Provisional Authorisation; A = Authorisation

Application Type: Single Study
Commencement date: 01/11/2018
Expiry date: 30/11/2022
Risk Category: Low

Approval of the study is initially provided for a year, after which continuation of the study is dependent on receipt and review of the annual (or as otherwise stipulated) monitoring report and the concomitant issuing of a letter of continuation.

Special in process conditions of the research for approval (if applicable):

- Translation of the informed consent document to the languages applicable to the study participants should be submitted to the AREC (if applicable).
- Any research at governmental or private institutions, permission must still be obtained from relevant authorities and provided to the AREC. Ethics approval is required BEFORE approval can be obtained from these authorities.

General conditions:

While this ethics approval is subject to all declarations, undertakings and agreements incorporated and signed in the application form, the following general terms and conditions will apply:

- *The study leader/supervisor (principle investigator)/researcher must report in the prescribed format to the AREC:*
  - *annually (or as otherwise requested) on the monitoring of the study, whereby a letter of continuation will be provided, and upon completion of the study; and*
  - *without any delay in case of any adverse event or incident (or any matter that interrupts sound ethical principles) during the course of the study.*
- *The approval applies strictly to the proposal as stipulated in the application form. Should any amendments to the proposal be deemed necessary during the course of the study, the study leader/researcher must apply for approval of these amendments at the AREC, prior to implementation. Should there be any deviations from the study proposal without the necessary approval of such amendments, the ethics approval is immediately and automatically forfeited.*
- *Annually a number of studies may be randomly selected for an external audit.*
- *The date of approval indicates the first date that the study may be started.*
- *In the interest of ethical responsibility, the NWU-RERC and AREC reserves the right to:*

ANNEXURE B

School of Social and Governance Studies
Faculty of Humanities
P. Bag X6001
Potchefstroom 2520, RSA
Cell: +27629659143; E-mail: brightmuronda@gmail.com

INFORMED CONSENT LETTER

Title of the thesis: A good governance framework for state institutions: The case of the Government of Zimbabwe

You are cordially invited to participate in this study by the researcher Bright Muronda to fulfil the requirements of a Doctor of Philosophy (Public Management and Governance) degree at the North-West University in Potchefstroom. This exercise collects data about the challenges facing state institutions in executing good governance principles. This will enable the researcher to develop a good governance framework for public institutions.

Please note that consenting to participate in the study implies the following:

1. Your participation in the interview is voluntary, and you are free to withdraw from the study at any particular time without being reprimanded;
2. Your rights to privacy, confidentiality and dignity are guaranteed; hence, you are not obliged to provide identifying information;
3. A voice recorder/cell phone will be used to capture your responses;
4. Interview transcripts will be stored in the researcher's password-protected computer;
5. The information generated from the interview will only be used for academic purposes and will be published in a thesis as well as academic journals;
6. Your participation is immensely appreciated since it will contribute to developing a good governance framework for the Government of Zimbabwe.

After reading and understanding this letter, I _____ give informed consent to participate in the study.

_____ _____

Interviewee's signature Date

ANNEXURE C

School of Social and Governance Studies
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P. Bag X6001
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GENERIC INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES

Title of the thesis: A good governance framework for state institutions: The case of the Government of Zimbabwe.

You are invited to participate in this study conducted to fulfil the requirements of a Doctor of Philosophy (Public Management and Governance) degree at the North-West University in South Africa. The semi-structured interview generates data about SOEs' challenges in executing sound corporate governance principles. This will be done to explore how a good governance framework can contribute towards an efficient and effective public sector.

Please be advised that participation is voluntary; rights to privacy and confidentiality will not be violated. You are not required to disclose personal and identifying information. Data generated from the interview will be ethically and professionally handled, and the findings will be published in the final thesis and academic journals. Transcripts of the thesis will be availed to stakeholders upon request. Your participation and cooperation are sincerely valued and appreciated.

SECTION A: BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

(*Completed by the researcher after requesting the information from the interviewees*)

Occupation: _____

Period of employment in the current post: _____

Period of employment at the enterprise: _____

Gender	Male				Female	
Age	18-35		36-49		50 and above	
Educational Qualifications	Honours Degree		Master's Degree		Doctorate Degree	

SECTION B: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

1. What is the overall mandate and purpose of the SOE (herein, the enterprise)?
2. What is your understanding of corporate governance in the public sector?

3. Provide an outline of the enterprise's management and governance structure.
4. What is the Minister's role in the enterprise's management and governance?
5. What is the board's role in the enterprise's management and governance?
6. How does the board ensure sound corporate governance?
7. How many board members does the GMB have?
8. What is the composition (in terms of diversity – gender, race, age, industry experience etc.) of the board?
9. Which instruments/frameworks guide the enterprise's corporate governance?
10. Does the enterprise recognise and implement recommendations from the King Report, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and the Cadbury Report in its corporate governance practices?
11. To what extent does the enterprise implement the corporate governance recommendations from local and international corporate governance codes?
12. Which platforms does the enterprise use to disclose its financial and performance statements?
13. What are the challenges faced by the enterprise regarding corporate governance?

SECTION C: FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

14. Does the board have audit and remuneration committees? If yes, what are their duties?
15. Who is responsible for auditing the enterprise's accounts (i.e. internal or external auditors)?
16. What is the board's role in the enterprise's financial management?
17. How does the board ensure the enterprise complies with public sector financial management regulations?
18. How does the board ensure that the enterprise complies with the provisions of the Public Entities Corporate Governance Act and the Public Finance Management Act?
19. Discuss how the enterprise ensures transparency and accountability in managing its resources.
20. What mechanisms are there to ensure that the enterprise has healthy financial accounts?
21. How does the enterprise that its financial resources are utilised in an effective, effective, economical and transparent manner?
22. How does the enterprise prevent irregular, wasteful and fruitless expenditure?
23. What are the enterprise's internal controls to prevent financial mismanagement?
24. Which platforms does the enterprise use to disclose its financial and performance statements?
25. The Accountability, Transparency, and Disclosure Manual for public entities states that parastatals have a challenge of vague, inaccessible performance information and complex

reporting lines. How does the enterprise ensure that the following information is accessible?

i. Performance information, annual statements,
ii. Financial and operating results.

26. What are the strengths/weaknesses of the enterprise's financial management systems?
27. What challenges does the enterprise face concerning financial management?

SECTION D: HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

28. Does the board have a remuneration/compensation committee? If so, what are its functions?
29. How does the enterprise ensure sufficient human resources to meet its objectives?
30. How does the enterprise ensure its employees possess the skills and competencies to meet its objectives?
31. Do the enterprise's employees participate in the organisation's decision-making and strategic planning processes?
32. How do leaders and managers ensure that the performance of the GMB's employees is aligned with the enterprise's objectives?
33. What are the challenges the enterprise faces regarding human resources management?

ANNEXURE D

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GENERIC INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR INDEPENDENT COMMISSIONS AND OVERSIGHT INSTITUTIONS

Title of the thesis: A good governance framework for state institutions: The case of the Government of Zimbabwe.

You are invited to participate in this study conducted to fulfil the requirements of a Doctor of Philosophy (Public Management and Governance) degree at the North-West University. This exercise generates data about state institutions' challenges in executing good governance principles. This will be done to explore how a good governance framework can contribute towards an effective and efficient public sector.

Please be advised that participation is voluntary; rights to privacy and confidentiality will not be violated. You are not required to disclose personal and identifying information. The data will be ethically and professionally handled, and the findings will be published in the final thesis and academic journals. Transcripts of the thesis will be made available to all the stakeholders upon request. Your participation and cooperation are sincerely valued and appreciated.

SECTION A: BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

(*Completed by the researcher after requesting the information from the interviewees*)

Occupation: _____

Period of employment in current post: _____

Period of employment at the organisation: _____

Gender	Male				Female	
Age	18-35		36-49		50 and above	
Educational Qualifications	Honours Degree		Master's Degree		Doctorate Degree	

SECTION B: FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

1. What is the overall purpose and mandate of the OAG?

2. Is the OAG the sole auditor of government accounts?
3. How does the OAG promote fiscal transparency and accountability in the public sector?
4. Does the OAG have enough human resources to carry out its mandate?
5. How does the remuneration of the OAG employees compare with the wages and salaries of their counterparts in the private sector?
6. Can the OAG audit all public institutions as stated by the Audit Office Act?
7. How does the OAG generate funding for its operations?
8. What is the nature of the relationship between the OAG and the Treasury?
9. Have you been able to deliver annual audit reports on time?
10. Do you face challenges regarding delayed submissions and failure to produce expenditure statements for public institutions?
11. Do you face any political interference in your operations?
12. Political appointments and a great deal of politicisation characterise public sector institutions. Does this affect compliance with treasury regulations and the AG's recommendations?
13. Would the OAG be more effective if public financial management laws gave it powers to compel public officials to implement its recommendations?
14. Does the current public financial management legislative framework give the OAG enough legal room to carry out its mandate?
15. Do you think that giving the OAG sanctioning powers will improve accountability and transparency in the public sector?
16. Do you recommend that the ZACC investigate public sector financial mismanagement?
17. What are the strengths/weaknesses of the current public audit system?
18. What are the challenges the OAG faces in auditing public accounts?
19. What are the challenges the OAG faces in ensuring fiscal transparency and accountability?
20. What can be done to overcome these challenges?
21. Is the OAG is achieving the mandate stated in the Constitution and the Audit Office Act?

SECTION C: VALUE FOR MONEY AUDITING IN THE ZIMBABWEAN PUBLIC SECTOR

22. What is value for money (VFM) in the public sector context?
23. Does the OAG consider VFM when auditing government accounts?
24. What is the difference, if any, between financial auditing and VFM auditing?

25. Does the OAG use metrics, frameworks or indicators to measure value in the public sector?
26. When conducting VFM audits, does the OAG align public sector organisations' vision, mission or legal and constitutional objectives with their performance outcomes? In other words, on what basis does the OAG determine value in the public sector?
27. Does the current auditing architecture consider VFM?
28. What are the (dis)advantages of VFM auditing?
29. Does the OAG have sufficient human competencies for VFM auditing?
30. Given an opportunity to change the system of auditing government accounts, what aspects of the current system would you consider i) changing, ii) strengthening, iii) introducing?
31. What challenges do you face concerning VFM auditing?
32. How can these challenges be solved?

SECTION D: ANTI-CORRUPTION IN THE ZIMBABWEAN PUBLIC SECTOR

33. What is the overall purpose and mandate of the ZACC?
34. How prevalent is corruption in the Zimbabwean public sector?
35. How does the ZACC prevent corruption in the Zimbabwean public sector?
36. What strategies does the ZACC use to monitor improper procurement practices and tender processes in the public sector?
37. Some media houses and civil society organisations allege that the ZACC is slow to investigate corruption involving politically connected individuals. What is your comment on this matter?
38. Public services such as obtaining a driver's license, passport and police roadblocks have become havens of bribery and corruption. Is ZACC investigating such cases?
39. Does the ZACC cooperate/engage with no-state organisations such as CSOs, NGOs, church organisations and CBOs to fight against corruption? Please give some examples.
40. Hopewell Chingono alleged corruption involving Covid-19 PPE tenders, Henrietta Rushwaya and other public institutions. Did the ZACC investigate these allegations?
41. Over the years, the Office of the Auditor General has unearthed financial irregularities in the public sector; some cases border on corruption. To what extent has the ZACC investigated financial misconduct in the public sector?
42. To date, what are the successes/failures of the ZACC?
43. Does the ZACC have sufficient HR?
44. Please identify the most significant challenges faced by the ZACC.

45. How can the functions and duties of the ZACC be improved under the current regulatory, political and legislative framework?
46. If a new framework of good governance is being developed for the GoZ, what aspects of eradicating corruption and abuse of public resources do you expect it to address?
47. Is the ZACC fulfilling its constitutional mandate?

SECTION D: GOOD GOVERNANCE (HUMAN RIGHTS) PRAXIS

48. Kindly explain the key duties and functions of the ZHRC.
49. Please provide a brief outline of the composition and the organisational structure of the ZHRC.
50. Does the ZHRC publish its reports for public review?
51. Can you describe the role of the ZHRC in promoting citizens' human rights?
52. What are the typical strategies used to combat human rights abuse?
53. To what extent does the ZHRC cooperate/engage with no-state entities such as CSOs, NGOs, church organisations and CBOs?
54. What is the nature of the typical recommendations to Parliament regarding developing effective measures for protecting citizens' rights?
55. Identify the five most significant challenges the ZHRC faces regarding institutional funding and independence.
56. How do operational issues such as human resources management, financial management, and resource utilisation impact the Commission's operations?
57. To what extent does the ZHRC contribute towards good governance in Zimbabwe? Kindly elaborate.
58. Please elaborate on how a proposed good governance framework for state institutions can contribute to the efficiency of the ZHRC's operations.
59. What elements of good governance do you expect the proposed framework to focus on to enable the ZHRC to fulfil its mandate?
60. Please elaborate on the merits of developing a new good governance framework for state institutions.

ANNEXURE E

All communication should be addressed to:
The Auditor-General
P. O. Box CY 143, Causeway, Harare
Telephone 263-242-793611/3/4
Telegrams: AUDITOR
E-mail: oag@auditgen.gov.zw
Website: www.@auditorgeneral.gov.zw

OAG ZIMBABWE

OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR-GENERAL
5th Floor, Burroughs House,
48 George Silundika Avenue,
Harare

Ref: **Aud 4.3.2.**

March 14, 2022

Mr. Bright Muronda
School of Social and Governance Studies
Faculty of Humanities
P. Bag X6001
Potchefstroom 2520, RSA

Dear Mr. Bright Muronda

RE: REQUEST TO CONDUCT INTERVIEWS WITH THE STAFF OF THE OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL ON GOOD GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK FOR STATE INSTITUTIONS: THE CASE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE.

I acknowledge receipt of your request seeking approval to conduct an academic research study.

Please be advised that my Office has granted you permission to conduct your research on condition that the information gathered during this exercise will be handled professionally and strictly for academic purposes only.

I wish you success in your studies.

Regards

M.M. VINGIRAI
For: AUDITOR-GENERAL

ANNEXURE F

NATIONAL RAILWAYS OF ZIMBABWE

OFFICE OF THE

CHIEF HUMAN RESOURCES AND ADMINISTRATION MANAGER
P. O. BOX 602
BULAWAYO

TELEPHONE: (029) 2363277
TELEX 33173 NRZ ZW
IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE: 64:5035:07

24 March 2021

Bright Muronda
BULAWAYO

Dear Sir/ Madam

REQUEST TO CONDUCT A RESEARCH PROJECT WITH A TOPIC ENTITLED "A GOOD GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK FOR STATE INSTITUTIONS": CASE NRZ

1. I am in receipt of your undated letter in connection with the above subject and I have to advise that permission has been granted for you to conduct a Research Project whose topic is "**A good governance framework for state institutions": . The case of National Railways of Zimbabwe on the following conditions:-**

   1.1. That you use the information gathered purely and strictly for purposes associated with your academic requirements as a student studying towards a Doctor of Philosophy (Public Management and Governance) degree at the North West University in Potchefstroom, South Africa.

   1.2. That you will give a copy of your Research Project to the NRZ.

   1.3. That the research project will not be published without written consent of the NRZ.

2. Please sign a copy of the attached letter as acceptance of these conditions and return it to my office after which you may approach the Chief Strategy and Planning Manager (Bulawayo) who will assist you with your investigations. Please present this letter to him as proof of this authority.

Yours faithfully

S MLAMBO
CHIEF HUMAN RESOURCES AND ADMINISTRATION MANAGER

RAILWAYS BOARD

Advocate M T Dinha (Chairman); Maior Gen W Dube (Deputy Chairman); Mr E Patel; Mr K Mafukidze; Ms D S Mavalwane; Mrs M Dingani; Ms R Zinyanduko (General Manager)

ANNEXURE G

GMB
GRAIN MARKETING BOARD
ASSURING FOOD SECURITY

179-187 S. Machel Avenue, Eastlea, HARARE
Box CY77, Causeway, HARARE
E-mail: publicrelations@gmbdura.co.zw
Website: www.gmbdura.co.zw
Hotline: 263-4-701898
Tel: 263-4-701870-95
Fax: 263-4-251294

1 MARCH 2022

ATTENTION: BRIGHT MURONDA
Department Public Management and Governance
North-West University
Potchefstroom 2520, RSA
South Africa

Dear Sir,

APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION TO CARRY OUT A RESEARCH

Reference is made to your application letter requesting to carry out a research on the topic entitled, **"A good governance framework for state institutions: The case of the Government of Zimbabwe"**

Please be advised that your application has been successful on condition that the information gathered will be strictly used for academic purposes and kept confidential. Furthermore, you are required to submit your report to this office once you are through with the dissertation.

Yours faithfully,

N.MAKONI
HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGER
FOR AND ON BEHALF OF GRAIN MARKETING BOARD

Cc: *Chief Executive*
Corporate Secretary
Enterprise Risk Manager
Personal File

Signature: ..... **Date** 1 MARCH 2022.

Ms J. Ndoro (Chairperson), Dr H. Mushonga (Vice Chairman), Mrs R.K. Hove, Mr N. Swanepoel, Mr L.D.J. Belinsky, Mr T. Mukahlera, Mr C. Bwenje and R. Mutenha*(Executive)

)

ANNEXURE H

HEAD OFFICE & NORTHERN DIVISION
109 BELVEDERE Road P. O Box 3298, Harare
Tel No (263-4) 751293 / 733865

SOUTHERN DIVISION
Stand No 2200 A. Khami Road P.O Box1779. Bulawayo
Tel No (263-9) 67291 77871

ZIMBABWE UNITED
PASSENGER COMPANY LTD.

01 April 2022

North West University
School of Social Governance Studies
Faculty of Humanities
P. Bag X6001, Potchefstroom 2520
RSA

Attention: Mr Bright Muronda

RE: AUTHORITY TO CARRY OUT A RESEARCH PROJECT AT ZIMBABWE UNITED PASSENGER COMPANY (ZUPCO)

The above subject matter refers.

ZUPCO is pleased to advise you that your request for authority to carry out a research project in partial fulfilment of your Doctor of Philosophy (Public Management and Governance) degree with North West University has been approved.

We request you to provide us with a report on your findings for our information and also action if need be.

Please sign below indicating your acceptance of the above condition.

Yours sincerely,
ZIMBABWE UNITED PASSENGER COMPANY

ZIMBABWE UNITED PASSENGER COMPANY LIMITED
2022 -04- 6 1
Director, Finance and Administration
109 Belvedere Road, Harare
P. O. Box 3298, Harare

E.T. Madangwa (Mr)
ACTING CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

I. Bright Muronda. .....accept / ~~do not accept~~ the above condition.

Signature:..... Date: 14 - 04 - 2022

ANNEXURE I

FACULTY OF HUMANITIES, SOCIAL SCIENCES AND EDUCATION

21 July 2023

TO WHO IT MAY CONCERN

Sir/Madam

This serves to confirm that I have proof-read Mr B Muronda's Doctoral thesis titles "A good governance framework for state institutions: The case of the Government of Zimbabwe".

The proof-reading entailed editing some parts of the document; for example, to avoid wordiness, redundancy, sub-dividing sentences, and so on, to enhance the readability of the document.

However, I have not tampered with the content of the document, except where this constituted repetition or made the document confusing.

Sincerely

.....

Mr. F. Mahori
Lecturer: Department of English, Media Studies and Linguistics

University of Venda

UNIVERSITY OF VENDA
PRIVATE BAG X5050, THOHOYANDOU, 0950λ LIMPOPO PROVINCEλ SOUTH AFRICA
TELEPHONE (015) 962 8299
E-mail: Freddy.mahori@univen.ac.za
"A quality driven, financial sustainable, rural-based comprehensive University"