

**THE AFRICAN UNION'S PEACE MISSION INITIATIVE IN
SOMALIA: FOCUS ON THE COLLABORATION OF THE
STAKEHOLDERS**

BY

OLUFUNMILAYO ABIMBOLA DARAMOLA

Student Number: 23935413

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Supervisor: Prof. Oladejo Olowu

Co-Supervisor: Prof. Lere Amusan

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


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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATION

ACABQ	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ)
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
APF	African Peace Facility
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ARB	Africa Research Bulletin
ASWJ	AhlusSunnahwalJamaah
ASSEMBLY	IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government
C-IED	Counter Improvised Explosive Devices
CONOPs	Concept of Operations
CSDP	European Common Security and Defence Policy
DFS	Department of Field Support
EC	European Commission
EDF	European Development Fund
EU	European Union
EUNAVFOR	European Union Naval Force
EU PSC	European Union Political and Security Committee
ESDP	European Union Security and Defence Policy
EUTM	European Union Training Mission for Somalia
FC	Force Commander
FIBUA	Fighting in Built-up Areas
FPU	Formed Police Unit
HAN	Horn of Africa News
ICU	Islamic Courts Union of Somalia
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IEDs	Improvised Explosive Devices
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority Development
IGADSOM	Inter-Governmental Authority Development Mission in Somalia
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
IMG	International Monitoring Group
IPF	IGAD Partners Forum
ISS	Institute of Security Studies, Pretoria

JAES	Joint Africa-EU Strategy
KDF	Kenya Defence Forces
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCA	National Constituent Assembly of Somalia
NSF	National Security Forces of Somalia
NSSP	National Security and Stabilisation Plan
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Services
PCC	Police Contributing Countries for AMISOM
PSC	Peace Security Council
PSD	Peace Security Department
PSO	Peace Support Operations
PSOD	Peace Support Operations Department
REC	Regional Economic Community
RM	Regional Mechanism
SAIIA	South African Institute of International Affairs
SNF	Somalia National Forces
SNM	Somali National Movement
SMN	Shabelle Media Network
SPF	Somalia Police Forces
SPM	Somali Patriotic Movement
SPMU	Strategic Planning Management Unit
SRCC	Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU for Somalia
SSDF	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
SSF	Somalia Security Forces
SWM	Somalia War Monitor
TAM	Task Assessment Mission
TCC	Troop Contributing Countries for AMISOM
TFG	Transitional Federal Government of Somalia
TFIs	Transitional Federal Institutions of Somalia
TFP	Transitional Federal Parliament of Somalia
TNG	Transitional National Government of Somalia
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly

UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNMAS	United Nations Mines Action Service
UNOAU	United Nations Office for African Union
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPKO	United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
UNPOS	United Nations Political Office for Somalia
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General
UNSOA	United Nations Support Office for AMISOM
UNTF	United Nations Trust Fund
UPDF	Uganda's People Defence Forces
USA	United States of America
USAU	United States Mission to the African Union
USC	United Somali Congress
WFP	World Food Programme

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ABSTRACT

In 2007, the AU peace mission in Somalia was inaugurated after several years of non-deployment of any peace mission, serving as a neutral force to stabilise and improve the security situation in the country. African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was mandated to provide support for Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) in a bid to stabilise the country; provide an avenue for dialogue and reconciliation; facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance; and establish a functional government. As an AU-led peace mission with the approval of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in alignment with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, the mission is entitled to receive assistance from the UN and other regional organisations such as the European Union (EU). However, AMISOM was incapacitated in the first three years of operation - despite the alignment in the UN Charter - due to the lack of adequate political, financial and logistical support. The terrorist groups took over the major territories in Somalia and piracy became the order of the day until the international community showed more commitment to the Somalia political process with the intention to avert the impact of the internationalisation of the crisis. Currently, Somalia political Roadmap is successfully implemented with the nomination of parliamentarians which was followed by the election of Somalia's President on 10 September 2012, with minimal security problems. In consideration of the time taken in establishing a functional democratic government in Somalia and the level of AMISOM's efficiency in Somalia, the proper evaluation of AMISOM's operation is incomplete without evaluating the trend and level of the stakeholders: IGAD, AU, EU, UN collaborations; that is, is it a collaborative or positional process? The roles and contributions of the stakeholders are examined to determine if the stakeholders' collaboration is based on a collaborative or positional process.

In this study, the trend and extent of the stakeholders' contributions to AMISOM, and the subsequent impacts on AMISOM's operations in securing and stabilising Somalia for an environment conducive enough to establish a functional democratic government is examined. In examining the trends and extent of the stakeholders' contributions, the factors that determine the stakeholders' contributions are investigated and discussed. These factors influenced the level of the collaboration which makes the collaboration process either collaborative or positional.

In the findings, it was discovered that the interests of each stakeholder, which were either political or economic, makes their contributions positional. However, the more positive their positional interest in Somalia's stability and AMISOM's operations becomes, the more their contributions increased and thus the collective collaboration process improved. Again, the

challenges of the collaboration process were examined and discussed. Consequently, recommended solutions are proffered to avert a reoccurrence in subsequent AU peace mission initiatives.

In conclusion, the stakeholders' collaboration process is a determinant factor that determines the level of efficiency of AMISOM's operation in Somalia. Therefore, this research study has made recommendations that will assist the AU and the UN policy makers to review the current policies in order to improve stakeholders' collaboration in the AU peace mission initiatives.

Keywords

Stakeholders, Piracy, Terrorist group, Peace mission, Stability, Collaboration process, Democratic government, Internationalisation and Roadmap.

CHAPTER ONE

1. INTRODUCTION

After the United Nations (UN) withdrew its peace mission to Somalia in 1995 and in consideration of the impact of the crisis in that country on Africa's image in the international community, an African Union (AU) peace mission was deployed to Somalia in 2007. Other international stakeholders, who were not ready to deploy their troops, opted to contribute to the peace mission through other forms of support.

In view of the focus of this research study and to ensure the focus of this study is properly examined, the study is divided into six chapters. This introductory chapter, which is the first chapter of the study, discusses the historical background of the Somalia crisis. This gives an overview of the situation in Somalia prior to the deployment of the AU peace mission, and the necessity for stakeholders' collaboration in the restoration of peace and security in the country. Also in this chapter, the statement of the problem, significance, objectives, aims, scope, research questions, and the methodology that the researcher used in the course of the research study are outlined. The limitations that the researcher also faced in the course of the research are discussed and definitions of terms are highlighted at the end of this chapter. This chapter provides the basis for the discussions in the remaining five chapters of the study.

1.1 *Historical Background of the Somalia Crisis*

The genesis of the failed state situation in Somalia between 1991 and 2012 can be traced back to the colonial rule and the scramble for Africa during the European imperialist era, whereby the homogenous nation of the Somali people was divided among the three European powers: Britain, France and Italy. Great Somaliland was divided into five regions, namely: British Somaliland (north-west), French Somaliland (Republic of Djibouti) and Italian Somaliland (north-east and southern Somalia), while the two other minor regions were allocated to Ethiopia and Kenya, which were both under British colonial rule (Abdi, 2006: 84).

In 1960, Italian and British Somaliland were the only parts of Greater Somaliland that amalgamated to form the current nation of Somalia. This newly-formed Somali nation had an external relations policy that pushed for unification with the remaining three regions of Great Somaliland. However, owing to differences in their colonial heritages, there were internal

disputes between the northern and southern regions. This crisis further resulted in regional and domestic uprising in Somalia and also with neighbouring nations that have people of Somali origin. These countries are Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. The diverse colonial heritage within Somalia culminated in an impasse in trying to link the two colonies to the same economic, political, educational and legal system. Furthermore, the adoption of the Italian system of governance resulted in clan-based politics that laid the foundation for the internal political crisis that rocked Somalia. Since Somali traditional politics was organised around clan structures and the Italian system of government, it allowed voters to elect the leaders of political parties and members of the legislative arms. Thus, the adopted Italian system of government produced numerous clan or sub-clan-based parties having clan-interest based policies (Abdi, 2006: 84-86; Cornwell, 2010: 8).

Because of the clan disintegration which emanated from the different colonial heritages and the years of authoritarian regimes from the democratic and military governments, the country had experienced a "perfect storm" for twenty-one years, between 1991 and 2012. The civilian government during the tenure of President Aden Abdullah Osman adopted repressive internal policies, which allowed the President to manipulate the law to bar his opponents from contesting the presidency. As a result, he won the 1967 presidential election. This manipulation of the law and the barring of the opponents thus intensified the clan's disintegration which led to the assassination of the next President elected, Abdirashid Ali Sharmake on 18 October 1969 while he was touring the northern region of Somalia. This consequently led to the overthrow of the civilian government by General Siad Barre's military coup. Following in the footsteps of past civilian governments, Siad Barre's military regime further intensified the clan's disintegration through suppression of political activities and other non-state actors such as the civil society and the media. His regime also gained an upper hand through the abolition of the separation of powers and centralisation of all government instruments. These actions led to the transformation of Somalia into a 'fascist state' (Abdi, 2006:84-86; Cornwell, 2010: 8).

The intra-clan and sub-clan differences finally degenerated into an uprising of different insurgent movements from northern Somalia. The Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) (mainly from the Marjeten's clan) emerged in 1978; and the Somali National Movement (SNM) in 1982, dominated by the Issaq clan from the north-west, which followed in the footsteps of SSDF. The two insurgent groups were engaged in guerrilla warfare against the government, but the Government launched counter-attacks on both clans. The southern Somalis were not left out of the struggle against Siad Barre's regime. In 1989, the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), dominated by the Ogaden clan, emerged. This

was followed by the United Somali Congress (USC) - led by the Hawiye clan, in 1990. Both movements were able to overthrow the government of Siad Barre in 1991 with the support of Ethiopia (Abdi, 2006:84-86).

The atrocities of Siad Barre's regime and those of the insurgents that were launched against civilians because of their clan affiliations, and the inability of Siad Barre's regime to reconcile his government with the Somalis at home and abroad led the Somalia crisis into a full-blown civil war among the various clans and their warlords. Towards the end of Siad Barre's regime in 1990, a group of civilian and high-ranking military leaders (later known as the 'manifesto group') signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU), which openly questioned Barre's leadership and proposed a blue print plan that could have saved the country from total disintegration but it was rejected by the warlords and the government. In the warlords' view, the members of the manifesto group were opportunists who wanted to use the crisis to achieve their goals to take over the government, and so the parties failed to reach a consensus for Siad Barre's replacement. Nevertheless, in 1991, northern Somalia, (former British Somaliland, now known as Somaliland), declared its independence and separated itself from the rest of Somalia and its crisis. Nonetheless, this country has not yet been recognised by the UN (Abdi, 2006:84-86). In 2000, after about ten years of instability and lack of consensus among the warlords, the Djibouti-led Arta agreement was able to inaugurate a Transitional National Government (TNG), with Abdulkassi Salat Hassan as the Head of State in Somalia. All the efforts of the TNG to resolve the crisis were undermined by the Ethiopian government, which was also strategically pushing for its own puppet government in Somalia. In 2004, a new government, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), was instituted by the Ethiopian-led peace agreement in Kenya (Abdi, 2006: 84-86; Cornwell, 2010: 8). There were several reshuffles in the TFG, which has governed the affairs of the country since 2004, but its mandate ended in August/September 2012 when parliamentarians were nominated by the Somali elders and the subsequent election of a president.

The international community deeply moved by the impact of the conflict and famine on Somali civilians, mobilised UN peace missions to the country between 1992 and 1995. Under the auspices of the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I), from April 1992 – March 1993; followed by the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) from December 1992 – March 1993; and the UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) from March 1993 – March 1995, there were efforts to resolve the conflict and provide humanitarian assistance. The progress and the achievement of the UN peace mission operations were short-lived because the implementation of UNOSOM II's mandate on the disarmament of the warring groups led to the killing of 18 American soldiers in October 1993. This event led to the withdrawal of US

troops from the UN peace mission and the remnant of a weakened UNISOM II finally pulled out of Somalia in 1995. After about ten years of no deployment of peace missions to intervene in the Somalia crisis, East Africa's Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) initiated a plan for an IGAD peace mission in Somalia (IGADSOM), but the plan was abolished by the disingenuous politics among the member states and their financial incapability to support the plan. Notwithstanding the disappointment faced earlier, the United States of America (USA) backed Ethiopian troops to move in to support the weak TFG in 2006, to gain its legitimacy and to retrieve power from the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The Somali's uproar against the Ethiopian troops necessitated the need for a neutral peace mission to take over from the troops (Abdi, 2006: 84-86; Cornwell, 2010: 8; UNISOM I; UNISOM II).

African leaders of the 21st century understood the need for proactive action in ensuring peace in Africa, considering the negative impacts wars have had on the continent's prospective growth and development despite its enormous resources. Most of these conflicts were the outcome of the passivity of the Organisation of African Union (OAU), the predecessor of AU, through its policy of non-intervention in intra-state crises. In addition, the UN which has the primary mandate to deploy peace missions, has been reluctant to mobilise its troops for African peacekeeping, following its failure in the mid-1990s. The AU therefore inaugurated an organ called the Peace and Security Council (PSC): which was ratified by the required majority of the AU member States. The council's aim was to handle the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa. The AU-PSC's inauguration was supported and approved by the UN Security Council (UNSC), and it came into operation on 26 December 2003 (AU website).

In 2007, the AU inaugurated the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), a peacekeeping mission with the mandate to take over from the Ethiopian troops, to protect the TFG and to facilitate in the provision of humanitarian assistance on the one hand and on the other hand to provide a functional government in Somalia. However, the final withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops in 2009 and the takeover by the weak AMISOM troops aided the insurgents led by the Al-Shabaab (the military and youthful arm of the defunct Islamic Courts Union (ICU)) to regain control of the southern area of Somalia, which the TFG had earlier conquered with the assistance of the Ethiopian troops. Also, the link between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda added a new dimension to the crisis (AMISOM; Cilliers, *et al*, 2012).

The political, financial and logistical supports, which Somalia should have received from the AU and the international community were hindered because of the international community's

withdrawal following the killing of the 18 American soldiers in 1993, coupled with the Kenyan and Ugandan bomb blasts in July 2010 for which Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility. These incidents discouraged most African leaders from deploying their troops to Somalia for fear of their troops meeting the same fate. Consequently, these factors affected AMISOM's mandate. Nevertheless, some analysts recognised the improvements in AMISOM's performance and attributed them to the support from the foreign stakeholders (Lunn & Thompson, 2012: 4; Marangio, 2012: 9). In 2012, the dream of twenty-one years has been successfully implemented; that is, the nomination of parliamentarians, the election of a President, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud on 10 September 2012 and subsequent nomination of a Prime Minister and ministers to form a cabinet. Despite that, questions still arise as to whether the current peace process is based on a collaborative process or a mere positional process by stronger powers that are keen on resolving the conflict to their own advantage.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The AU peace mission in Somalia was inaugurated in 2007 with the mandate to provide support for the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI) in a bid to stabilise the country; provide an avenue for dialogue and reconciliation; facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance; and establish a functional government. AMISOM's mandate was incapacitated due to the lack of political, financial and logistical support from the AU member states. The operation of AMISOM was labelled as being inefficient, until the international community showed more commitment in the Somalia peace process. Currently, the Somalia Roadmap is successfully implemented by the nomination of parliamentarians and the subsequent election of Somalia President on 10 September 2012, with minimal security problems. In consideration of the time taken in resolving the conflict, the contributions of the stakeholders is a major factor that should be thoroughly examined; that is, is it a collaborative or positional process? Although AMISOM's mandate has been extended until the end of February 2014, the failures and the successes of AMISOM's mandate are linked to the stakeholders' contributions and support. Therefore, the previous scholarly evaluation of AMISOM's mandate cannot be considered complete without evaluating the collaboration of the stakeholders.

Based on these broad problems, this research study seeks to investigate the collaboration process of the stakeholders; IGAD, AU, European Union (EU) and UN. This study finds out their roles, authenticity and rationale for the collaboration, the challenges of the collaboration and the impact of the collaboration on AMISOM's operation. This assisted in providing appropriate conclusions and recommendations on the collaboration process adopted for

AMISOM's operation; which are useful for AMISOM's mandate; African peace missions and for further related research studies.

1.3 *Significance of the Study*

The AU-led peacekeeping mission in Somalia has functioned in a war-torn country which has been without a functional government for five years, and despite criticisms of its effectiveness, the UN has not made any move to deploy its own peacekeeping mission to completely takeover or to form a hybrid mission now nor in the near future. Although it is an AU-led peace mission, nonetheless the AU is not solely responsible for the planning, financing and the deployment of AMISOM. External stakeholders such as the UN and the EU are also involved. Moreover, many scholars have suggested that there is a need for collaboration between stakeholders in ensuring an effective AU peace mission. Therefore, this study is significant because it seeks to provide a clearer understanding of the collaboration between the AU and other stakeholders with AMISOM in its operations, whether it is collaborative or positional. In addition, this study seeks to be liberal in its findings on AMISOM's efficiency, and to have an open situational report of AMISOM's impact in the Somalia crisis (its successes and failures); unlike the previous scholarly works which have mainly pointed out the inefficiency of AMISOM's mandate. The findings will draw commendable conclusions regarding the collaboration process for the AU peace mission in Somalia. This study will add value to the literature on the AU-led peacekeeping missions and discussion of the role of the AU, sub-regional organisations and international organisations on the outcomes of the AU peace mission operations. The results of this study will further show that the AU-led peacekeeping operations requires consistent research work that seeks to assess the progress made and make recommendations on the mitigation and strategies that can be adopted by the AU to avert similar future crises in Africa.

1.4 *Aim of the Study*

The aim of the study is to examine the role of the African Union's peace mission initiatives in Somalia; to investigate the stakeholders' collaboration process and how effective it is to the achievements of AMISOM's mandate in Somalia.

1.5 Objectives of the Study

The main objectives of the study are to:

1. Investigate the role of the stakeholders; IGAD, AU, European Union (EU) and UN in AMISOM's operations;
2. Determine whether AMISOM and its stakeholders follow a collaborative process or a positional process;
3. Investigate the obstacles to the collaboration process;
4. Analyse the impact of the collaboration on AMISOM's mandate;
5. Make conclusions and recommendations based on the collaboration process of the African Union's peace mission initiative in Somalia.

1.6 Scope of the Study

The scope of the research study is on AMISOM's operations between 2007 – September 2012, with the focus on the mandate to provide a secure place for the establishment of a functional government. The study examines AMISOM's sub-regional, regional and global stakeholders' collaboration under the auspices of the IGAD, the AU, the EU and the UN.

The period between 2007 and 2012, commemorates the contribution of AMISOM to the nomination and the election of parliamentarians and the President of Somalia respectively. This is a landmark in AMISOM's operations because its primary mandate is the provision of a secured environment for the establishment of a functional government in Somalia. In the area of stakeholders' collaboration, the focus is on the IGAD, the AU, the EU and the UN because these organisations are the major stakeholders in AMISOM's operation, which represents the regional and global collaboration in the achievement of AMISOM's mandate.

Besides, the scope of this research is limited to the AMISOM military, which is the component that has the main mandate for the maintenance of peace and security in Somalia. The Somalia coverage area is also limited to Mogadishu, southern and central Somalia, where the AMISOM's troops are deployed. Somaliland and Puntland are not covered because these two regions are relatively peaceful with functional governments.

1.7 Research Questions

The research study provides answers to the following questions.

1. What are the roles of the stakeholders; IGAD, AU, European Union (EU) and UN in AMISOM's operations?
2. Do AMISOM and its stakeholders; follow a collaborative process or a positional process?
3. What have been the obstacles to AMISOM and its stakeholders' collaboration process?
4. What are the impacts of the stakeholders' collaboration or positional process on AMISOM's mandate?
5. What is the conclusion and recommendations to be inferred from the African Union's peace mission initiative in Somalia?

1.8 Research Design and Methodology

This research adopts a descriptive or analytical method. A descriptive or analytical research method allows the researcher to collect information without changing the phenomenon being studied, to describe and analyse the relationship between the phenomena as it exists. It enables the researcher to give an insight into the situation that needs to be manipulated for future experiment. Within the context of the descriptive or analytical study, the research analyses the AMISOM's stakeholders' collaboration process and its impacts on its mandate. The findings generate knowledge that will assist in the planning and inauguration of future AU peacekeeping missions. Therefore, to have proper analysis of the research study, the research adopts the qualitative research design for effective analyses. Qualitative research is essentially exploratory and involves methods of data collection that are non-quantitative. This method of research design assists in providing explorative analysis of the collaboration between AMISOM and its stakeholders, without predetermining the paths of the research study followed.

1.8.1 Population

The proposed population for the research study are some key informants such as; Somalis, Somalia crisis experts, academicians from research centres and universities, and middle-

level officers in the regional and international organisations who are versed in the field of AU peacekeeping mission, especially in Somalia.

1.8.2 Selection of Participants

This researcher used the key informants' technique to select the participants to be interviewed based on their involvement or knowledge in the AU peacekeeping mission, especially in Somalia. Nonetheless, their availability for the interview determined the number of participants that were interviewed. The key informants' technique is useful in gathering first-hand information from the personalities that occupy positions of responsibility and influence to the phenomenon being studied.

1.8.3 Data Collection

Descriptive research method allows the researcher to collect necessary information using surveys or interviews through interaction with the participant.

Given the nature of this research work, the data for the analysis are obtained from both primary and secondary sources using interviews and existing records.

Primary sources: The researcher conducted semi-structured interviews with a few key informants of the organisations involved in the AU peacekeeping mission in Somalia through personal interview; and using a Skype meeting or telephone interview. The semi-structured interview enabled the respondents to respond to questions that require specific answers and to freely respond to issues on the collaboration process that existed between the AU and the major stakeholders, and its impact on AMISOM's mandate, which may not be covered in the information retrieved from archival or secondary sources. The researcher also used observation studies by using existing archived documents from reliable sources such as the stakeholders' websites. Both the interview and existing records are the sources of primary data collection for reliable information on the phenomenon being studied.

Secondary sources: The researcher sourced secondary information from the journals, articles, magazines, media coverage and web information related to AMISOM and the stakeholders. For accuracy and reliability of the information, emphasis is on the published and accredited publications.

The comparison of the documented information and that obtained from respondents assisted the researcher in propounding useful recommendations at the end of the research study.

1.8.4 Data Analysis

The data analysis models used for the information from the primary sources and secondary sources are content and descriptive analysis. Information that is retrieved from the primary and secondary sources is sorted based on its content in correlation with the research objectives and questions. The descriptive analysis is used to inter-relate the information that is retrieved from the primary and secondary sources to analytically explain the phenomenon being studied. The compilation of the analyses proffered answers to the research questions and was useful in propounding the conclusion and recommendations for the research.

1.9 Limitations to the Study

The research is limited to the available resources and the number of participants that can be located in South Africa and other participants outside South Africa that can be interviewed through the internet Skype meetings and telephone. The reason for this is that the researcher could not travel to Somalia, Kenya or Ethiopia where AMISOM, AU, EU and UN offices for Somalia are located.

Some of the intended interviewees could not be interviewed either through Skype or telephone because of their very busy schedule, hence a questionnaire was sent to them to be filled. Moreover, one of the interviewees requested that his name should not be mentioned because of his job. All efforts to secure an interview with the contact in AMISOM headquarters in Mogadishu was unsuccessful because of his very busy schedule though he made efforts to send unpublished AMISOM documents on the contributions of EU, UN and the AU.

The numbers of the interviewees and participants were limited to four. Therefore, to cover for the limited participants, the research used more information retrieved from the press releases, reports and communiqués of the stakeholders.

Further, there was also a limitation in the efforts to interview Somalis especially the government officials and journalists. All that were contacted failed to respond to requests for an interview. As a result, the research study is limited to secondary information retrieved from newspapers reports and articles.

Since the scope of the research focused on AMISOM's mandate on the security of Somalia, the research is limited to the AMISOM military component which has the major mandate to ensure the stability of Somalia, considering the security situation involving the terrorist group of Al-Shabaab. The researcher could not cover the remaining two components of AMISOM which are the civilian and the police components.

1.10 Definition of Terms

Collaborative process: This is the process whereby people or organisations work together to realise shared goals. It is the interconnectivity of the stakeholders' roles towards achieving common goals (Benning, *et al*, 2010: 14).

Insurgent group: This is a rebel group that revolts against established government and authority. The insurgent groups in Somalia are the terrorist groups that revolt against the recognised established government (The American Heritage, 2009).

Multidimensional peacekeeping: It is a contemporary form of peacekeeping designed to ensure the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements and assist in peace-building using civil functions, economic reconstruction, institutional reform and election monitoring (UN, 2003).

Peace support operations: It is multi-functional operations, involving military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies. They are designed to achieve a long-term political settlement or other specified conditions which includes peacekeeping and peace enforcement as well as conflict prevention, peace-making, peace building and humanitarian relief. They are designed to enforce compliance with the operation's mandate and to create a secure environment in which civilian agencies can rebuild the infrastructure necessary to create a self-sustaining peace (NATO, 2001).

Political Roadmap: It is the outline of the key deliverables to be accomplished in Somalia before August 2012 comprising the timeliness for the completion of each task; institutions responsible; the resources required; and the mechanisms to ensure compliance by the TFIs.

Stakeholders: This is the group that has interest in a project and whose support is necessary for the existence of an organisation (Business Dictionary, 2013).

Terrorists: It is a group that uses violence and threats, or acts of terrorism to achieve political or religious or ideological aims (Dictionary of Military, 2005).

Terrorism: The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a person or an organised group against people or property with the intention of intimidating or coercing societies or governments, often for ideological or political or religious reasons (The American Heritage, 2009).

1.11 *Outline of the Study*

Chapter one provides the introductory section of the research study. The historical background to the Somalia crisis was discussed to give an understanding of the security situation prior to the deployment of AMISOM in 2007. The overview of the study and the methodologies used to conduct the research are also explained in this chapter. The major terms used in the study are also explained and the limitations of the study are highlighted.

Chapter two explains the theoretical framework of the study and it also reviews the related scholarly works that have been written on peace missions in Africa by the UN, REC and the AU.

Chapter three gives an overview of AMISOM; the mission mandate, structure and the three components of AMISOM; the AMISOM troop's strength; and the contributing countries. This provides a background understanding of the composition and capacity of the mission in relation to the roles of the mission discussed in chapter six.

Chapter four identifies the roles of the stakeholders; IGAD, EU, UN and AU in AMISOM's operations; the stakeholders' collaboration process is examined to identify the model of the collaboration and multilateralism forum for the stakeholders to co-ordinate their contributions within the AU framework. In this chapter, the factors that determine the stakeholders contribution to AMISOM is examined, and the challenges of the collaboration are discussed.

Chapter five discusses the impact of the collaboration on the AMISOM mandate with the focus on the security situation in Somalia since AMISOM deployment in 2007 and 2012. The achievements of AMISOM are identified and the challenges encountered in the mission operation are discussed. This chapter gives an open situational report on the AMISOM's operation unlike earlier scholars who have criticised AMISOM's operation and focused on the ineffectiveness of the mission.

Chapter six discusses the findings in the interconnectivity of the stakeholders' contributions and AMISOM's operations, and also provides recommendations for the AU policy makers on the co-ordination of the stakeholders, and suggests study areas where further research can be conducted. Finally, in this chapter, the researcher gives the conclusion on the interaction of the stakeholders' collaboration and AMISOM's operations.

1.12 *Ethical Considerations*

The study is guided by the research ethical rules. The researcher informed the prospective participants of this research study that their participation is voluntary and their identities will not be revealed, if requested. All the information and materials that are provided by the respondents are kept confidential. The researcher ensures that the views of the prospective participants are not wrongly presented and their integrity is protected.

CHAPTER TWO

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

This chapter examines and discusses the theories that explain the collaboration of stakeholders in relation to the African ownership of peace operations in Africa. The first theory examines the liberalism of the involvement of non-state actors in the stability of conflict areas in order to understand the collaboration between the peace mission and stakeholders. The second theory perceives collaboration between the peace mission and the stakeholders from the angle of collective security that entails the pooling of resources to bring stability and security in the conflict areas. The third theory examines the African peace missions from the perspective of the African ownership or, in other words, the African solution to Africa's problem. This gives Africans the opportunity to play an active role in providing a solution to Africa's security issues with the assistance of other stakeholders beyond Africa's boundary.

In the second part of this chapter, the scholarly works on peace missions under the auspices of the UN, Africa, and sub-regional organisations in Africa are examined. It reveals the perspectives of scholars in the aspect of peace missions; especially the African-led peace missions and examines the gap that this research study has provided additional information to fill.

2.1 *Theoretical Framework*

The research study is analysed within the framework of the Liberalism or Pluralism theory, African Conflict theory and Collective Security theory.

The liberalists have a wider perspective of international relations beyond the state-centric view of the realists and adopt world politics in the context of globalisation. They have consideration for a multiplicity of actors in the world politics; state and non-state actors, international and non-governmental organisations that transcend national borders for the achievement of peaceful regional development which is crucial for economic interactions. In their view, States wracked by internal conflict and humanitarian disasters are threats to

international peace and security and should be subject to interventions on behalf of the international community in areas such as peace-building, establishment of democratic institutions and an open economy for a better world (Rogers, 2007: 25–30).

The theory of collective security was a major concept in the establishment of the UN in 1945 to preserve world peace and security. Collective security gives law-abiding states the privilege to pool resources together to assert force on any aggressive state that fails to obey the international law. The concept of collective security resulted in the emergence of the UN peacekeeping mission, to manage conflicts which fall within the context of interstate warfare as stated in UN Charter, Chapter VII (Viotti & Kauppi, 2009: 205–214). However, with the shift in the mode of conflict, especially after the cold war, from interstate to intrastate conflict, collective security has been modified to collective responsibility to protect civilians in the conflict zone. The modification is also reflected in the UN Charter, with the inclusion of Chapter VIII, to provide for regional bodies to spearhead peacekeeping operations in their respective regions. Within the context of collective security and the collective responsibility to protect, maintenance of peace is the collective responsibility of the regional and international bodies. Moreover, with the globalisation of the international community through technology advancement, conflict has a connected effect in all parts of the world, directly or indirectly, on the states or non-state actors. Thus, despite the establishment of the regional peacekeeping mission, the theory of collective security in the maintenance of world peace is very relevant to the effectiveness of contemporary peace mission operations (Raman, 1983: 371–374; Viotti & Kauppi, 2009: 205–214).

There are three schools of thoughts under the African conflict theory. The first school of thought solicits for an in-depth understanding of African conflict through its customs, religion and history. This school of thought stipulates that the application of the African conflict resolution mechanisms to an African crisis is more appropriate and more effective than other mechanisms. The second school, however, requests a multifaceted approach i.e. usage of African solutions and Western solutions depending on the nature of the conflict; an African solution for an African conflict and a Westernorientated solution for a problem that is influenced by Africa's external factors. The last school of thought has a wider opinion on providing a solution to Africa's conflicts. They disagree with the use of a specific method, but solicit for globally acceptable theories, which may be applicable to the conflicts (Pelcovitts, 1983: 287; Yoh, 2008: 27–29).

For the purpose of this research study, liberalism theory, African conflict theory and collective security theory are significant in the analysis of AMISOM and its stakeholders' collaborative process.

According to the African conflict theorist, it is essential to employ the traditionally African initiated solution in an African conflict for effective conflict resolution. In the context of the three schools of thoughts, it can either be solely the African solution or collaboration with Western or other universally acceptable solutions. In relation to the African conflict theory, AMISOM is an achievement for Africa, because of the involvement of the African peacekeepers with the cultural knowledge of the terrain. Moreover, the deployment of AMISOM reflects the model of African peace initiatives in partnership with other stakeholders in proffering African-led solution to the Somalia crisis and to ensuring global peace and security.

The involvement of IGAD, AU, European Union (EU) and UN, in AMISOM's operation supports the liberals' view on the use of international and transnational organisations to intervene in the internal conflict of states, (which is a threat to the international community), using the method of peace-building and the establishment of a democratic government. While the limitations of AMISOM's operations in the area of logistics and finance necessitated the assistance and collaboration of the international community (stakeholders) in the conflict zone for successful peace mission operations using collective pooling of resources.

Internationalisation of Somalia conflict in the area of terrorism and piracy whereby aggressive non-state actors are involved reflects the essentiality of collective security and liberalism theories. The collective security theory posits that there is a need for nations (stakeholders) to use their apparatus to pool resources for the purpose of averting war from the aggressive state, or within the state against its civilians. The liberalist theory recognises the fact that the state is not the only key factor in international politics, rather, there are other non-state actors and international organisations which are important instruments of the states used to ensure peaceful regional integration. The interrelatedness of the collective security and liberalist theories has assisted the researcher to posit that the aggressive non-state actors that oppress civilians, as the case of Al-Shabaab's oppression against the Somali civilians has necessitated the need for states and non-state actors to pool their resources to fight against the aggressive non-state terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab in Somalia in order to ensure global peace and security.

In the context of the three theoretical frameworks, namely; African conflict theory, collective security theory and liberalism theory, AMISOM is the instrument of the AU and an African solution mechanism established to provide peace and security in Somalia, while the stakeholder organisations (the AU, the EU and the UN) are the liberalist's transnational and international organisations that pooled their resources using collective security mechanism to support AMISOM's mandate in Somalia. These theoretical frameworks form the basis for the researcher's analyses on the collaboration between AMISOM and its stakeholders. The research study also provides clearer understanding of the stakeholders' collaboration and the impact on AMISOM's mandate. The research study will unveil AMISOM's collaboration model which can be adopted by the AU in subsequent African peace mission initiatives.

These findings will further assist AU policy makers to improve on the management of the stakeholders collaboration towards the achievement of Africa's cooperate goal on the continent's peace and security. It will also be of immense value during the formulation and establishment of subsequent AU-led peace missions for effective mission operations. The findings will confirm the interconnectivity in global peace and security. It will place emphasis on the need for non-African stakeholders to be more proactive in their support for African peace mission initiatives, which is essential for global peace, security and stability. Also, it will ascertain that African peace mission initiatives are indispensable in Africa. It will confirm that African peace mission initiatives are not only beneficial to the continent alone but also as Africa's contributions towards global peace and security. Moreover, the findings will simultaneously be useful for the UN policy leaders to discover the need to review UN policies in order to delegate more authority to the AU on peace and security issues. The findings will buttress the need to institutionalise the UN support for any African-led peace initiative. This action will prevent delays that currently occur due to long durations of deliberations and decision making. The findings will buttress the interconnectivity of collective security, liberalism theory and African conflict theory in the African-led peace mission initiative in Somalia.

2.2 Literature Review

In this section, the works of some scholars in relation to their different perspectives on the peacekeeping mission are reviewed. Although the research study is focusing on the stakeholders' collaboration and its impact on the AU-led peacekeeping mission in Somalia, it is necessary to review different scholarly works on peacekeeping missions in Africa. Therefore, the researcher has reviewed some scholarly works on UN peacekeeping, Africa sub-regional peace missions and the AU-led peacekeeping missions to find the gap or

divergent views that this research study strives to fill, and add to the knowledge on AMISOM's operation and peace mission in general.

According to Raman (1983: 371), Rikhye (1983: 5) and Wiseman (1983: xi), the experiences of the two devastating world wars made the international community see the need for "collective security" through "common responsibility" for the maintenance of world peace and security. Therefore, the procedures designed for the preservation of world order through peacekeeping was incorporated into the Charter of the UN, Chapter VII. It was meant to prevent another serious armed conflict that would threaten the world's status quo and ensure desired change is achieved only through peaceful means, but if it fails, authorises the UNSC to enforce peace when it is necessary (Raman, 1983: 371; Rikhye, 1983: 5; Wiseman, 1983: xi). Rikhye (1983) however states that, the implementation of the organisation's charter on the procedure for peaceful conflict resolution and the last resort for peace enforcement was not employed until during the cold war era. Raman, Rikhye and Wiseman in their analysis, give an insight into the establishment of the UN peacekeeping operation and not to any regional peacekeeping operation. For their scholarly work was written years before the establishment of the regional peacekeeping missions in Africa. Therefore, this research work on the AU peacekeeping mission initiative in Somalia fills a gap in the study of the peacekeeping mission.

Wiseman (1983: 19-64), in his historical overview of the development of the UN peacekeeping mission between 1946 and 1981, asserts that the practice of peacekeeping is affected by political developments in the world such as East-West relations, the cold war era, and the decolonisation of the third world countries. He opines that despite the impact of the cold war on the practice of peacekeeping and the various changes in the international system, peacekeeping has gained legitimacy and strength as a utilitarian and competent instrument in the limited arsenal of UN capability in the management of conflicts. Wiseman's (1983) assertion about the impact of political development is confirmed on the UN peacekeeping website. It states that the UN peacekeeping operations are influenced by the nature and the trend of conflicts that erupted in the cold war and post-Cold War era. UN peacekeeping affirms the increment in the world conflicts on its website, "as a conflict develops, worsens, or approaches resolution, the UN is frequently involved in a number of consultations to determine the best response by the international community" (History of Peacekeeping, UN Peacekeeping Website). Wiseman's contention that peacekeeping is affected by the political development in the world confirms the current phenomenon in the peacekeeping mission such as the establishment of the regional peacekeeping missions in Africa. However, the scholar could not foresee Africa having its own peacekeeping mission

such as the AU peacekeeping mission in Somalia. For a better understanding of the impact of political development on the peacekeeping mission, this research is contributing to the study of peacekeeping, by giving a clearer understanding on the collaboration of the stakeholders in relation to the AU peacekeeping mission in Somalia.

Pelcovits (1983: 256-297), in his analysis on UN peacekeeping focusing on the African experience, reveals the OAU-UN relationship in the resolution of African conflicts during the cold war. He points out the two cardinal rules that governed the OAU-UN relationship, namely; "rule of prior reference to regional agencies before going to the UN" and "the principle of non-intervention", or in OAU terminology, "non-interference in the internal affairs of states." He acknowledges that African leaders preferred to handle all conflicts within the African peace mediation framework; in spite of OAU's institutional limitation to manage the conflicts, the regional body insisted on the first cardinal rule of "try-the-OAU-first" and resorted to involve the UN only in an issue that could be of advantage to Africa when it is internationalised. Pelcovits (1983: 261) classifies the UN relationship with the OAU as having a complementary and supportive role. The UN complementary roles were in the reconciliation of political differences, monitoring and certifying the validity of elections and legitimising the states leadership successions, while the UN held a supportive role when the OAU was directly involved in the crisis.

Pelcovits admits that the decision of the OAU's Heads of States at the Freetown summit in 1980 to seek for UN assistance if the OAU could not finance the first proposed African-Chad's peacekeeping mission on its own, placed the UN in a supportive role and the decision lessened the OAU's traditional principle about non-African involvement in all African conflicts. He states that, though there was little opposition to the principle of the OAU-UN collaboration, the nature of the partnership was controversial. Especially, because of the African experience during the UN intervention in the Congo crisis, that polarised the continent and intensified the cold war tensions significantly, because the UN failed to adhere to its original purpose to protect the area from great power confrontations. Pelcovits (1983: 279; 287), points out the different opinions of the African leaders. Most of them wanted assistance to be limited to financial and logistic assistance with an all-African force under the OAU's control, as there was suspicion that the involvement of non-African peacekeepers was an invitation for European intrusion. Some countries, led by Cameroon and Senegal, supported a mixed force under the UN command, because of their concern for efficiency, and anxiety that an OAU force would become entangled in the "crosscurrents of ethnic antagonisms" which pervaded the conflict in Chad. Moreover, the international relief and refugee aid that would be needed if the fighting erupted could be reliably managed.

However, on Chad's side, the regime and its patron Libya were totally opposed to "internationalising" the conflict and the involvement of non-African powers in an African dispute.

With the different views on the OAU-UN peacekeeping collaboration, Pelcovits (1983: 279) emphatically admits that the collaboration would not be easy and the debate on the type of peacekeeping assistance that would be politically acceptable to Africans cannot be concluded easily (Pelcovits, 1983: 287). He mentions that the meeting between the OAU Secretary General Kodjo and the UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim revealed the divergent views on the acceptable terms of collaboration from both ends. Africans preferred a hybrid arrangement of an all-African force controlled by the OAU but with the UN's financial and operational support, while the UN Secretary General was proposing a UN controlled peacekeeping mission with geographic balance in the composition of the force (Pelcovits, 1983: 279). He proposes that the UN-OAU joint planning should forecast areas of the crisis and their susceptibility to the conflict resolution, prepare guidelines for the complementary UN and OAU actions, correct the organisational shortcomings and define the command structure, particularly in relation to the political authority. He also solicits that the OAU planners should conduct systematic evaluation of the recent UN peacekeeping experiences to offer lessons on the needs and susceptibilities of managing peacekeeping missions (Pelcovits, 1983: 290).

The analysis of Pelcovits on the African experience in the UN peacekeeping is related to this study in the area of peacekeeping collaboration. While Pelcovits' analysis is projected with the focus on the OAU during the cold war and also with a different political ideology, this study focuses on the reality of the peacekeeping collaboration under the auspices of a refined African regional body – AU - with improved institutional capacity and with operational peacekeeping missions. Nonetheless, Pelcovits's analysis is relevant because, till date, the AU encounters problems in its peacekeeping operations, which necessitates collaboration between the AU and the international community. Unlike Pelcovits' analysis that focused on the prospective UN-OAU peacekeeping collaboration, this study focuses on the authenticity of the stakeholders' collaboration in the AU peace mission in Somalia.

In his article on the comparative analysis of the five AU peacekeeping operations in Africa, Williams (2011: 29-50) asserts that the peacekeeping missions are faced with challenges such as; the political will, finance, logistics and an unclear and ambiguous mandate. He criticises the efficiency of the peacekeeping operations except the AU peace missions in Burundi and Comoros, which, in his opinion, have successful mandates. Because of the

challenges facing peacekeeping in Africa, he asserts that a single organisation cannot handle the challenges of conflict management facing the continent. In his opinion, it is necessary to have coordinated relationships among the stakeholders, especially the trilateral collaboration between the UN, the AU and the EU. Williams' analysis is relevant for giving an insight into the operation of AU's peacekeeping but it should be noted that his analysis in the case of AMISOM is outdated because other events have overtaken his analysis. Though his opinion on the inability of a single organisation to handle the crisis in Somalia supports the background to this research study, it does not elaborate on the trilateral relationship between the major stakeholders. He only suggests that there should be coordinated relationships between the stakeholders. In view of this, this research study is relevant in contributing to scholarly works on AMISOM and African peace missions in general as it provides more elaborate and focused analysis on the relationship between the stakeholders (the AU, the EU, the UN) and its impacts on AMISOM's mandate,

Gumedze (2007: 3-10) analyses the involvement of the private security industries in Africa's peacekeeping missions. He mentions that as long as there will be involvement of peacekeeping missions in Africa's protracted conflicts, there will be the need for the private security industry to enhance the peacekeeping missions efforts. Meanwhile, he states that it is uncertain if their involvement has contributed to the success of peacekeeping missions because of the secrecy in their operations. He further suggests that since their involvement is becoming significant, the AU and the UN should regulate their operations in peacekeeping missions because of the threat this poses to security. The involvement for gain of private security organisations in the conflict on behalf of their clients may complicate the peace process. Gumedze's analysis of the involvement of private security industries is essential to the understanding of current phenomena in the peacekeeping. However, the researcher wants to address a different issue in the African peace mission; this research study is on the collaboration between AMISOM and its stakeholders.

In their comparison of the role of the UN and AU peace operations, Appiah-Mensah and Eklou-Assogbavi (2012: 11-16) address the issue of the protection of civilians. They mention that the contemporary wars in Africa are mostly intrastate with the civilians as the victims and the target of the warring parties. This constitutes abuse of human rights and necessitates the need for protection of civilians, an important factor for the success of peacekeeping missions. They argue that, given the fact that the UN and the AU face the same challenges in the protection of civilians, they should collaborate through the strategic civilian protection partnership to achieve their goal in civilians' protection, which is one of the essential criteria for the success of peacekeeping missions. Since the scholars' analysis is

on the role of the UN and the AU peace operations in the protection of civilians, and they solicit collaboration between the two organisations for successful peacekeeping, their emphasis on the collaboration supports the focus of this research study. Nonetheless, the scholars focus only on collaboration for civilian protection while this study is essentially concerned with the authenticity of collaboration between AMISOM major stakeholders (the AU, the EU and the UN) for the establishment of a functional government in Somalia. The focus of this research study makes it distinct from the analysis of Appiah-Mensah and Eklou-Assogbavi.

Francis (2010: 94-96), Hutchful (1999), Ibegbu (2006), Obi (2011: 51-67) and Omoiugi (n.d), in their various analyses on the ECOWAS sub-regional peacekeeping operations; solicit a collaborative process in the sub-regional peace mission. They argue that the positional stand from West Africa's weak states and sub-regional leader (Nigeria) hinder the success of the missions and lay financial, human and political burden on the sub-regional leader's internal politics. This consequently led to Nigeria's decision to pull its troops out of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) after the Sierra-Leone conflict resolution. According to the scholars, the absence of Nigeria's leadership role in ECOMOG had a significant impact on the subsequent ECOMOG peace missions in Guinea Bissau and Ivory Coast. However, while the scholars motivate for the sub-regional collaboration, they argue that the collaborative process should not be limited to the sub-region but it should involve both regional and international organisations. N, Francis (2010) and Obi (2011) solicit for a clearly defined collaboration among the ECOMOG and the UN troops, so that the ECOMOG troops will not face the rigour of combat alone while their UN counterparts will only be involved in the planning.

In the analysis of the ECOWAS sub-regional peacekeeping, the scholars, [Francis (2010: 94-96), Hutchful (1999), Ibegbu (2006), Obi (2011:51-67), Omoiugi (n.d)], focus on the role, achievement and challenges of sub-regional peace. In support of the focus of this research work, while it is commendable that most of the scholars assert that there is a need for collaboration between the sub-regional countries for an effective mission, they also recognise the role of sub-regional leaders, where one or two can be found, and assistance of the international community. However, the scholars' analyses are largely on sub-regional peacekeeping in Africa but not on the Africa-led peacekeeping missions; or on the authenticity of the collaboration or the focus on the AU peace mission in Somalia. In order to fill this gap, this research work gives a clear understanding of the collaboration between the stakeholders in the African-led peacekeeping mission in Somalia.

Murithi (2011: 68-89), in his analysis of the IGAD peacemaking initiatives, ascribes the success in the resolution of the Sudan conflict to the dedication and impartiality of the lead mediating country while the contrast was the case with Somalia. In addition, he asserts that the geostrategic interests of global and regional players had an impact on the IGAD mediatory role in the Sudanese and Somali crisis, which resulted in different outcomes. He therefore solicits that the partnership of the stakeholders must be carefully coordinated so that all the parties could pursue the same goals; if not, the role of the mediator will be undermined and there will be confusion among all the parties which will consequently lead to loss of life and property (Murithi, 2012). Murithi's recognition of the contribution of the stakeholders, though not detailed enough and the necessity to co-ordinate IGAD's partnerships to avoid complicated goals are applicable to this research study. Nevertheless, his analysis centres on the IGAD peace mediation aspect of the peace process and does not involve AMISOM peacekeeping partnership.

Keith (2007: 149-164), in his analysis, examines the intervention strategies deployed by the AU and the UN in the Darfur crisis from the humanitarian point of view. In his analysis of the strategies employed by both the AU and the UN, he reveals their weakness in trying to ensure peace in the Darfur region. In the case of the AU, he points out that the peacekeeping and diplomatic strategies used could not achieve the desired results because of the financial constraints and weak political will of the AU leaders despite the consent of the Sudanese government to the AU peacekeeping mission. Also, the UN with more resources; politically, economically and militarily, lacked the political will to enforce peace because of China's sabotage. The Chinese government, (Sudan's business partner), was reluctant to support the UNSC proposed economic sanctions against Sudan. The Chinese government used its UNSC's veto power to prevent the economic sanctions and the deployment of the stronger humanitarian military forces against the Sudanese government. This action assisted the Sudanese government to achieve its resistance against UN involvement in the peacekeeping mission to Sudan. According to Keith, the Sudanese government agreed to the deployment of the AU peace mission, knowing the incapability of the AU peace mission to hinder its incessant crime against Darfur region. On the other hand, the Sudanese government rejected UN involvement in the peacekeeping mission because of the latter robust mandate and fear of the arrest of its top military personnel indicted in the crime; for example, the head of Janjaweed.

Keith's analysis should be commended for exposing not only the weakness of the AU in enforcing peace; but also of the UN. He discloses the power politics of the superpowers in the Darfur crisis, the significant role that China (Sudanese's major business partner, and a

member of the UNSC) played in sabotaging the UNSC's power to break the stronghold of the Sudanese government and end the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. While, this study revealed the power politics of the major stakeholders in the Somalia crisis in relation to the achievement of the AU peacekeeping mission in Somalia, it is different from Keith's analysis because of the different case studies and the background of the conflict zones.

In his assessment of the AU readiness to participate in African peacekeeping operations with the case study of Burundi and Sudan, Kobbie (2009) affirms that the effectiveness of the organisation was restrained by its political, institutional and conceptual levels. Despite the constraints, he opines that with the incessant violent armed conflicts across Africa, the contribution of the AU to African peacekeeping operations is inevitable. He suggests that there is a need for global collaboration in peace mission operations between the AU and the other international actors, because the AU is not fully equipped to conduct peacekeeping operation unilaterally.

According to him, in spite of the idea of the "African solution to African problem", there is a need for international support. The AU/UN joint forces facilitate prompt conflict resolution and peace-building. Nevertheless, for effective joint force operation, he requests more organised joint planning, more resources and harmonised operations. It should be acknowledged that while most scholars are pessimistic about the AU led peacekeeping operations, Kobbie is optimistic on the inevitable role of AU peacekeeping missions and suggests an effective collaboration between the AU and the international community, for a successful peacekeeping mission. However, Kobbie's analysis did not address the peacekeeping mission in Somalia, which represents the focus of this research study. While, Kobbie solicits collaboration on the deployment of a hybrid peace mission, this research focuses on the collaboration that exists between the AU and the major stakeholders in the AU-led peace mission in Somalia and how AMISOM's operations can be a pacesetter for other AU-led peace mission.

Kasaija (2011: 1-10), in his analysis of the AU role in the Libyan crisis, promotes the adoption of the strategy of the "African solution to African problem". Politically, he criticises the AU leaders' failure to reach consensus on the modality to handle the Libyan crisis swiftly, thus leading to the UNSC's intervention and marginalisation of the regional body. Financially, the AU's dependence on donations from developed countries incapacitated its independent interventions in the African conflict resolutions, thus challenging the hope of African solutions to African problem. The lack of political consensus among African leaders in relation to the resolution of the Libyan crisis and recognition of the rebel force undermined the African

resolution on the non-recognition of a non-democratically elected government. In his opinion, these factors challenged the hope of Africa to have African solutions to African problems.

Regardless of Kasaija's view, Africa's initiative to handle the continent's problems is in progress, though it may fail in some circumstances and be successful in others until it becomes stabilised. Therefore, there is hope for its success with the support of all the actors in the crisis. His criticism against the AU's role in Libya can however be justified, although he fails to take into consideration that the international community's intervention in the Libya crisis was an exceptional case. It was influenced by the global economic politics and therefore, the probability of the UN direct intervention in subsequent African conflicts is very rare, especially following the UN's failure in the mid-1990s. In addition, his criticisms about the African leaders are based only on the Libyan crisis, and he fails to take into consideration the roles of the AU leaders in other conflict zones like Somalia, where the international community has failed to intervene directly. In order to give a different perspective on the role of the AU in peacekeeping operations and the involvement of the international community, this research study undertakes an academic inquiry into the AU peacekeeping operation in Somalia with a view to bringing into the open the authenticity or otherwise of the collaboration of the stakeholders in achieving the mission's mandate.

Dave-Odigie (2011: 63-70), in her article, opines that African grown initiatives, if chartered in the resolution of Somalia crisis will end the crisis in Somalia. According to her, the application of solely western-oriented solutions without consideration for the African cultural context in the Somalia conflict has hindered conflict resolution. She contends that because the international community, with its inherent divergent views and interests, launched most of the initiatives outside Somalia, there were so many failed attempts to reach consensus among the warring groups on the resolution of the crisis. She believes that the location of the peace negotiation's meetings in luxury hotels outside Somalia did not give any serious sign to the warlords that there was urgency for conflict resolution. She argues that the Somalia crisis could only be resolved by Somalis themselves, through the "engagement of traditional and indigenous peace and reconciliation mechanisms that is devoid of international domination". She cites that the creation of an acceptable constitution and the appointment of a reliable government in Somaliland reveal that the input of the council of elders in the region was significant. She recognises the role of the elders in pressurising the warring parties to reach consensus for a lasting peace. She contends that the "purely indigenous" model of conflict resolution tried and tested in Puntland and Somaliland should be employed in the resolution of conflict in other parts of Somalia (Dave-Odigie, 2011: 65). Additionally, she believes that if the significant role of women in the initiation of peace among the warring

clans in the Somali traditional conflict resolution is recognised, they should be included in the contemporary conflict resolution efforts in Somalia. According to her, this will be in line with the UNSC adopted resolution 1325 of 31 October 2000. The resolution recognises the important role of women in conflict prevention, resolution, peace-building, full participation in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution (Dave-Odigie, 2011: 65).

The researcher supports the view that the African traditional conflict resolution method is required in the resolution of the Somalia crisis, she however disagrees with Dave-Odigie that a solely African solution would be adequate to resolve the crisis. The scholar's criticisms against AMISOM are based on the bomb blast that happened in December 2009 during a graduation ceremony, at a location very close to the AMISOM base in Mogadishu. According to her, this exposed the inefficiency of AMISOM to ensure peace in Somalia, due significantly to the inadequate personnel, finances and logistics (Dave-Odigie, 2011: 67). If solely African traditional conflict resolution is efficient, she fails to explain the reason it was not able to resolve the crisis and establish a democratic government prior to the deployment of the AU mission. Dave-Odigie points out that most of the conflicts in Africa originated from the colonial legacies and that the ammunition used in African warfare is manufactured outside the shores of Africa. Despite the acknowledgement of the input of the West in the crisis, her criticism against the western-orientated solution, and upholding a purely African solution (Dave-Odigie, 2011: 65), negates the African conflict theory's second school of thought, that African solutions should be applied in resolving problems originating from Africa and Western solutions to problems from the West. Moreover, from all indications, Africans cannot resolve the problem of smuggling ammunition to Africa alone, particularly, the complex Somali crisis. There is a need for collaboration between the AU and the major stakeholders, EU and UN to resolve the crisis. Therefore, for a clearer understanding of the current trend in the AU peacekeeping mission in Somalia and the role of the stakeholders, this research study is relevant.

Murithi (2007: 70 – 81) has an overview of the AU peacekeeping operations until 2007, within the context of peace-building operation. In his opinion, the AU has not conducted any extensive peace-building operations in the continent despite the significance of peace-building. Despite that, he acknowledges the success of the AU peace-building intervention in Burundi, while also criticising the inability of the AU peace mission in Sudan to implement comprehensive peace-building due to the weak mandate and financial incapability. In his review of the decision of the AU and UN to collaborate on joint action to form a hybrid peace

mission, he is pessimistic about the form of the collaboration that would be implemented. Whether the collaboration of the AU-UN partnership will be a new paradigm, or a reformation of the old partnership, which he refers to as hybrid paternalism, in which the AU troops and personnel will do the basic and dangerous work on the ground under the supervision of UN advisors. He acknowledges that the UN has more experience and resources than the AU, which will consequently influence the partnership model. He states that it is too early to judge the hybrid partnership but advises that the AU should be vigilant and ensure that the relationship does not descend into hybrid paternalism.

However, in his analysis of AMISOM, a thorough assessment could not be established because it was only inaugurated in 2007. Nonetheless, he mentions the mandate of AMISOM, and highlights that the pattern of logistical support will be after that of AMIB. He points out that the AUC will mobilise the logistical support for the troop contributing countries (TCCs) through the co-ordination of the funding from the AU member states and the foreign partners, for the re-imbursement of the costs the TCCs incurred in the course of deployment of their troops. He mentions the efforts of AMISOM to secure Mogadishu and Baidoa, to create a security condition for the complete withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops and to support dialogue and reconciliation. Moreover, he mentions the financial support that the EU and the UK pledged, and their assistance to the TCCs and logistical support for the AU military cell in Addis Ababa. In addition, he states that AU requested for NATO support for air transportation for AMISOM troops. In his conclusion, he commends the AU decision on the conflict and peace initiatives in Cote d'Ivoire, Burundi and Darfur. However, he states that it is too early to pass definitive judgement on the AU. He acknowledges that the AU has substantial experience, but it failed in its capacity to monitor and implement its own decisions. In addition, he opines that the AU experience in Burundi, Darfur and Somalia, shows that the AU needs to improve its ability to deliver peace and security in Africa. The African leaders should take decisive and necessary action to tackle the challenges of ensuring peace. At the time of the analysis, Murithi was concerned with the AU-UN hybrid mission in Sudan, but he could not give a definitive analysis on the stakeholders' collaboration. Again, in his analysis on the AU peacekeeping mission in Somalia, he could not give an adequate analysis of AMISOM's stakeholders' role. Nevertheless, he mentions the input of the stakeholders but not in detail, however, the correlation between stakeholders' input and AMISOM's efficiency was not stated. Therefore, to have a clearer understanding of the AU peace mission in Somalia mandate and the stakeholders' contribution, the study shall contribute extensively to the AU peacekeeping mission research works.

Anyidoho (1997), reviews conflict and peacekeeping in Africa and propounds some lessons for future use. He states that the lessons from the peacekeeping operations in Africa are derived from the way conflicts have been handled, the conditions leading to the establishment of peacekeeping missions, and the way such missions have been finally executed. He summarises the causes of conflict in Africa as; ethnicity, land reforms, religious fundamentalism, negative colonial legacies and inequitable distribution of political and economic power. He propounds lessons which will be useful for peacekeeping operations; power sharing, heeding the warning signals, use of the African conflict resolution model together with other methods, clear mandates, a background study of the conflict zone prior to deployment of troops, consent of warring parties, members to contribute their financial obligations, logistics assistance and strong political will, understanding of the role of the media and their involvement, training for peacekeepers and civilians, periodic conferences, seminars and workshops to bring the UN agencies, NGO's and peacekeeping troops together for the common good.

Conclusively, he requests collaborative efforts from the UN, regional and sub-regional organisations for the careful analysis and refinement of the lessons stated above and others that emerged from other peacekeeping forums, to prevent and manage conflicts in Africa. He advises that the OAU and African leaders must show greater commitment and exhibit stronger will in their efforts to end the conflicts on the continent. Emphatically, he states "without this will, Africa cannot develop socially and economically". Despite the significance of the Anyidoho analysis, it does not extensively address the collaboration that exists between the UN and the AU in the operation of the peacekeeping mission. The AU had not been inaugurated at the time of his analysis and there have been changes since his analysis. Therefore, this study focused with noticeable details on the AU peacekeeping mission in Somalia and the authenticity of the collaboration, and fills a gap. It also adds fresh insight to the knowledge of the AU peacekeeping mission which will be useful for further research study.

Cilliers, *et al* (2010: 11-14), in their article on the AU decision for increased troops in Somalia, believe that the AU's decision to reinforce AMISOM by 2,000 troops raised questions as to why the AU suddenly made the appeal four years after the regional and international actors neglected Somalia. In addition, they argue that the effectiveness, sustainability and desired outcomes should be questioned because experiences have shown that the international interventions spur radicalisation of the situation beyond control. However, the scholars identify the Kampala suicide bombing on 11 July 2010, or which Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility, as a major factor that could have instigated the AU to make

the decision. In their perspective, the volatile, dire and unpredictable situation in Mogadishu; lack of attention to the key principles of peacekeeping such as means and resources, political support, weak mandate, deployment of only African troops for the combat while the international community donates money, threatened the success of AMISOM deployment and mandate's implementation. They point out that whatever model of peacekeeping is deployed in Somalia should be sustainable. In support of this, the scholars anticipate that if there could be deployment of the AU/UN hybrid operation patterned after Sudan's Darfur peace mission, it could improve AMISOM's capabilities. It will also avert inconsistent support from the foreign partners, who may want to blame AMISOM for its inefficiency, and use the opportunity to take control of AMISOM's strategy through financial donations. They claim that because AMISOM has not inspired stakeholders' confidence due to its weak mandate, the mission could be overwhelmed by the demand to account for its numerous assistance and aid commitments. In addition, they opined that the support of the stakeholders such as the UN, USA, regional and other international bodies, seems to 'internationalise' the conflict by attracting foreign element to the side of Al-Shabaab and other insurgents. They state that the AU should learn from the experiences of the UN and the international community in the 1990s.

In their view, all the previous missions deployed to Somalia had the mandate for their respective troop increased, but in the case of AMISOM, the insufficient increase did not give opportunity to review the weak and insufficient mandate. They argue that the AU, as the supporting organisation of AMISOM, does not have the management or logistical capacity for the operation. Citing the case of the Ethiopian military intervention, the scholars point out that the intervention failed despite the increase of its troops to deal with ICU because the Somalis did not accept the TFG, and the Ethiopian forces on the other hand, are viewed as foreign invaders. So also, the Somalis view the support of the US to the AU and the TFG forces with suspicion, with the belief that it could lead to terrorism and worsen the situation for the neighbouring countries.

In their opinion, the solution to the Somalia crisis should be 'real African leadership and ownership – which is different from African topdressing at the bidding of others'. They proposed that the USA must be kept out before there can be peace in Somalia. In their view, the USA attracts international radicals. Concurrently, while the role of the US is recognised as very important, they advise that its support should be provided through mechanisms such as the UN Trust Fund. They argue that the decision of AU on the increase of troops would not determine instability in Somalia, because of the decision of the US and its allies, that the AU protects only TFG, the crisis will not become resolved. They propose a political process

including all the key stakeholders, inclusive of Al-Shabaab and Hizbul-Islam. The peace process should not be enforced from outside, but it should be internally groomed to address the interest of Somalia and not of the external stakeholders. In their opinion, until the internal arrangement is put in place, AMISOM can only provide safe haven or a green zone for the people to seek refuge and for the TFG to show that its government is more conducive than Al-Shabaab's brutal and oppressive regime.

According to them, the international community must recognise that the TFG is not in the best position to offer the basis for reconciliation. The AU should bring on board the other Somali states for a comprehensive political process. The AU and the international community should handle the impact of the critical regional rivalry between Ethiopian and Eritrea on the Somali conflicts. Neighbouring states with Somali populations should be prevailed on to dissociate their internal security issue from the Somalia crisis and encouraged to find a political solution to their intrastate crisis. Countries such as Yemen and Eritrea should be mandated not to instigate the crisis. They opine that if these political arrangements are implemented, AMISOM peacekeeping should be transferred to the UN and should not be configured as a hybrid because the UN has more institutional expertise and has better resources for the complex peace mission required for a conflict zone such as Somalia.

The political arrangement proposed by these scholars, if properly implemented, will assist to resolve the crisis in Somalia. However, their criticism against the decision of the AU to increase the number of troops for effective peacekeeping and their proposal for the transfer of AMISOM to the UN means the scholars do not foresee a better future for the AU peacekeeping initiative in Africa. Contrary to the scholars' view that the increases in the AU peacekeeping troops will not have any impact on the security of Somalia, events have shown that AMISOM's surge has been able to re-capture more zones from Al-Shabaab. The researcher believes that the AU peacekeeping initiative is a concept that should be encouraged by Africans and the research work should be directed towards finding improvements to this adorned African initiative until it is groomed into a reliable institution that can effectively handle African conflicts. Therefore, the researcher is focusing on the AU peace mission in Somalia from the concept of the stakeholders' collaboration and its impact on the mission's mandate in order to provide clearer understanding of the peacekeeping mission and the current impact of AMISOM in the stability of Somalia.

A summation of the scholarly works on the peacekeeping missions that were reviewed, reveals that the scholars' analysis emanates from the historical, national perspective,

operational role and challenges of the peacekeeping missions. All the scholars admit that the achievements of peace missions' mandate are achievable by the collaboration of the stakeholders. However, the researchers do not focus on the authenticity and rationale for the collaboration or positional process. Moreover, all the scholarly works on AU peacekeeping in Somalia were written prior to 2012 and they criticised its effectiveness. It must be noted that there have been significant improvements in AMISOM's mandate from early 2012. The improvements are noticeable with the provision of an environment relatively conducive for the establishment of functional and democratic government in August/September 2012 and expansion of the mission beyond Mogadishu towards the end of 2012. Therefore, this study seeks to fill this gap to provide a clearer understanding about the stakeholders' collaboration in the AU-led peace mission in Somalia. The findings will assist the policy makers involved in the establishment of the African peace missions to carefully co-ordinate the collaboration of the prospective stakeholders for the purpose of achieving the African peace mission's mandate. In addition, the research hopes to engender the interest of scholars with the view to widening the various perspectives on the analysis of peace mission activities on the continent and for further research study.

CHAPTER THREE

3. OVERVIEW OF THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SOMALIA

Introduction

This chapter gives readers the insight into AMISOM's history, mandate and troop strength. The first part discusses the background and the mandate given to the mission in Somalia.

3.1 Background of AMISOM

AMISOM is a multidimensional and regional peacekeeping mission established by the AU with the approval of the UN. It is a replacement for the proposed IGADSOM, which was approved by the AU in September 2006 and approved by the UNSC, with the mandate for protection and training mission in Somalia. The proposed IGADSOM did not materialise because of the internal crisis within the states in the sub-region; it was rejected by the ICU because they felt it was a US backed mission to curb the Islamists interest to establish Islamist state in Somalia unlike a secular country it was prior to 1991; and the lack of support expected from the international community (AMISOM, 2013a).

In order to avert a security gap and further crisis in Somalia, on 19 January 2007, during its 69th meeting, the AU-PSC authorised the deployment of the AMISOM and on 20 February 2007, the UNSC authorised the AU to deploy the peacekeeping mission with a mandate of six months, by adopting resolution 1744(2007)⁴. The mandate of the peace mission has consequently been extended by the AU and UN several times through their communiqués and resolutions. The latest extended date is stipulated for 7 March 2014, adopted in the UN resolution 2073 (2012)¹. The aim for AMISOM was to support a national reconciliation congress and it requested a report within 60 days on a possible UN peacekeeping mission (AMISOM, 2013a).

In line with the authorisation, AU deployed the first batch of AMISOM troop to Mogadishu in 6 March 2007, which comprises mainly troops from Uganda and these were later joined by those from Burundi in December 2007, Djibouti in December 2011, Kenya in June 2012 and most recently Sierra-Leone in January 2013.

3.2 AMISOM's Mandate

At the inauguration of AMISOM in 2007, the mission was mandated to conduct Peace Support Operations (PSO) in Somalia to stabilise the situation and provide an environment conducive for the conduct of humanitarian activities and an immediate takeover by the UN. The mission was given the mandate to take all appropriate measures to carry out support for dialogue and reconciliation by assisting with free movement, safe passage and protection of all those involved in the national reconciliation congress involving all stakeholders, including political leaders, clan leaders, religious leaders and representatives of civil society. With the review of the mission rules of engagement and concept of operation (CONOPs) adopted by the UN resolution 1964 (2010), the mission was tasked to support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia working with all stakeholders; provide protection to the TFIs and the key infrastructures to enable them to carry out their functions; assist in the implementation of the National Security and Stabilisation Plan (NSSP); provide technical assistance and other support to the disarmament and stabilisation efforts, monitor the security situation in areas of operation, facilitate humanitarian operations, including repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), and protect AMISOM personnel, installations and equipment, including self-defence (AMISOM, 2013b).

With the signing of the Djibouti agreement on 18 August 2008, the AU-PSC requested AMISOM to take the necessary steps to support the implementation of the agreement. The success of the mission was henceforth measured through the following indicators; improvement of the security situation in Somalia; an environment conducive for TFI to function directly from Mogadishu; progressive establishment of TFIs in all regions; progress in the handover to the advance contingent of a UN-led peacekeeping mission; commencement of a programme of disarmament of armed groups; stabilisation of the hostile environment in Somalia (EC, 2012b: 5).

Towards the full implementation of the roadmap to end the tenure of the TFI and establishment of a democratic government in Somalia by August to September 2012, the AU, with the approval of the UN, adopted the new strategic concept for AMISOM on 22 February 2012, through the UNSC resolution 2036 (2012). This modified the mission's mandate by expanding the area of operations into four sectors covering southern and central Somalia, including the reimbursement of contingent-owned equipment (COE) (standard enablers and multipliers within the land component), and by including an aviation component to 12 helicopters in the logistical support package. The authorised strength of the uniformed

personnel was increased from 12,270 to 17,731 including two formed police units (FPUs) (UNSC, 2012b; UNGA, 2009e: 6).

3.3 *AMISOM's Deployment Mandate*

The mandate of AMISOM was originally intended for six months between February and July 2007 and thereafter the UN would take over. However, the UN unwillingness to take over as planned because of the UN's claim that Somalia was still unstable and with no peace agreement to be kept, led to the various extensions of the mission's deployment mandate.

The mission's deployment mandate was extended for six months from 18 July 2007 – 17 January 2008 in the communiqué of the 80th AU-PSC meeting and approved by the UNSC resolution 1772 paragraph 9 on 20 August 2007. At the expiration of the six months, another six months extended mandate was given to the mission with effect from 17 January 2008 by the AU-PSC at its 105th meeting and UNSC resolution 1801 (2008)¹. An additional six months' mandate was given to the mission with effect from 17 July 2008 as stated in the communiqué of the 139th AU-PSC meeting and was approved in the UNSC resolution 1831 (2008)¹. As released in the communiqué of 163rd AU-PSC meeting, AMISOM's mandate was extended for two months with effect from 16 January 2009. At the expiration of the AU-PSC two months mandate, there was an additional three months extension from the AU-PSC during its 177th AU-PSC meeting with effect from 17 March 2009, which was covered by the UNSC authorised six months extension with its resolution 1831 (2008)¹. The AU-PSC's seven months extension from 17 June 2009, released in the communiqué of its 194th meeting, was approved by the UNSC 1863 (2009)². The six months extension and the extra one month was covered by the UNSC 1831 (2008)¹.

At the expiration of the various deployment mandate extensions between July 2007 to January 2010, the AU-PSC during its 214th meeting called for the extension of AMISOM's mandate for twelve months with effect from 17 January 2010 and it was approved by the UNSC resolution 1910 (2010)¹ of 28 January 2010, which extended the mission's mandate till 31 January 2011. UNSC 1964 (2010)¹ on 22 December 2010 approved the extension of the deployment mandate to 30 September 2011, with the approval for the increase of the troops from 8,000 to 12,000 troops in paragraph 2, the AU-PSC reviewed the extension of the mission deployment mandate for twelve months with effect from 17 Jan 2011 to 16 January 2012 in its 258th meeting. The UNSC resolution 2010 (2011)¹ of 30 September 2011 unanimously approved AMISOM deployment to 31 October 2012. AMISOM's mandate was renewed for another twelve months with effect from 16 January 2012 during the 306th

AU-PSC meeting held on 5 January 2012. On the part of the UN, the mandate of AMISOM was extended for a very short term from 1 – 7 November 2012, in the resolution 2072 (2012) of 31 October 2012. The most recent mandate extension was UN resolution 2073 (2012)¹ adopted on 7 November 2012, which extended the mission's deployment mandate until 7 March 2013.

The extensions by the AU-PSC of the AMISOM mandate to operate in Somalia have been swiftly followed with the UNSC approval. To ensure the harmonisation of the mandate extension periods, the UNSC ensures that the approval of the extended mandate is covered in its resolutions. This reveals that the final authorisation of peace missions mandates rests with the UNSC. The collaboration between the AU and the UN in the area of authorisation of the AMISOM mandate supports the spirit of collective security in ensuring peace in Somalia. The extended mandate has given AMISOM the authority to operate in Somalia within the AU and UN political framework.

3.4 *AMISOM's Concept of Operations*

The AMISOM initial area of operational responsibility in 2007 was divided into three sectors: Sector 1, Kismayo; Sector 2, Mogadishu; and Sector 3, Galcayo. As stated in the AMISOM CONOPs, the mission would firstly be deployed to control and stabilise the security situation in Mogadishu in Sector 2 with approved troop strength of 8,000 before extending its operation into the other sectors indicated as Sector 1 and Sector 3 (AUC, 2008).

The initial CONOPs planned to have 8,000 troops to cover Mogadishu. However, with consideration of the security situation in Somalia, AU-PSC, during its 245th meeting, endorsed the revised CONOPs with the mission's troop strength of 20,000, with the plan to have 12,000 troops to strengthen the security situation in Mogadishu, while the remaining 8,000 troops would cover the neighbouring areas. The UN resolution 1964 (2010) gave partial approval of the revised CONOPs with only 12,000 troops which prevented the AU's intended expansion of the mission's operation area (AUC, 2008).

Towards the end of the transition period in December 2011, the proposal for the expanded AMISOM's operation was reviewed. The new strategic concept was endorsed by the AU-PSC on 5 January 2012, and approved by UN resolution 2036(2012) adopted on 22 February 2012. The adoption of the new strategic concept marked the second phase of the mission's mandate. AMISOM's area of operations was expanded into four sectors covering southern and central Somalia. Sector 1 comprised the region of Banadir, Lower and Middle

Shabelle, while Sector 2 was Gedo, Lower and Middle Juba regions. Sector 3 comprised of the Bay and Bakool regions and Sector 4 covered Hiraaan region (AUC, 2008).

3.5 *Phases of AMISOM's Operations*

The AMISOM's operation is planned to be deployed under four phases to ensure effective mobilisation and implementation of the mission's mandate.

Phase I, referred to as the "Initial Deployment Phase", is planned to have the initial deployment of 9 infantry battalions and later reinforced troop's strength for Sector 2 to be based in Mogadishu. This phase is under the executive leadership of the Head of the military component, the AMISOM Force Commander (FC AMISOM), who ensures the mounting of the AMISOM headquarters and also provides for a secure and safe environment in and around Mogadishu, thereby providing for the conditions to execute Phase 2 and allow the SRCC to relocate to Somalia. Also, with a view to providing quick relief to the civilian population, police and other civil components are to be launched in Sector 2 during Phase 1. After successful completion of Phase 1, the mission is expected to move to Phase II.

Phase II, known as the "Expansion of Deployment Phase", is expected to be the expansion of the mission beyond Mogadishu, by the deployment of predominantly military units to other sectors such as Baidoa, Marka, Kismaayo and Galkayo simultaneously with recycled troops.

Phase III is the "Consolidation Phase". The intention with this phase is to carry out a comprehensive execution of the mandate and key tasks as decided by the AU-PSC.

Phase IV is the "Redeployment/Exit Phase", this is planned to coincide with the expected handover to the UN (AUC, 2008; UNSC, 2008b: 19; AU, 2011e: 13).

3.6 *AMISOM's Structure*

AMISOM as a multidimensional peace mission is structured to ensure effective implementation of the peace mission operations. The mission is headed by the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU for Somalia (SRCC) and assisted by the Deputy Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU for Somalia. The mission has three components, which comprise the military, police and civilian. All the three tiers of the peace mission work hand-in-hand to achieve the mission's mandate. The military component

is headed by the FC and assisted by the Deputy FC. The police component is headed by the Police Commissioner and assisted by the Deputy Police Commissioner. The civilian component is supervised by the Deputy SRCC, who oversees the political affairs, civil affairs, humanitarian affairs and public information, among other issues. The Chief Administrative Officer heads the support component of the mission, which includes administration, personnel, finance and budgeting, logistics and procurement, among other things.

The civilian component of the mission has the primary responsibility to assist the Somali government in re-establishing functioning state institutions and services delivery to the Somali civilians in order to fulfil the mission's humanitarian and political mandate (AMISOM, 2013c). The police component thus has the mandate to train, mentor, monitor and advise the Somali Police Force (SPF) with the objective to transform the force into a credible and effective organisation that adheres strictly to international standards (AMISOM, 2013e).

The military component, which is the focus of this research study, is the biggest of the three AMISOM components. The military component has the primary responsibility and core mandate given to AMISOM. The core mandates are to conduct peace operations in Somalia; to stabilise the situation; create the necessary conditions for the conduct of humanitarian activities; and an eventual handover of the mission to the UN. It also provides protection to the Somalia Federal Institutions as they carry out their functions and helps secure Somalia key infrastructure inclusive of some of its airports and seaports (AMISOM, 2013d).

With the adoption of the new strategic concept for AMISOM's operations on 22 February 2012, in the UNSC resolution 2036 (2012), the administrative functions of the AMISOM headquarter are divided among the regional stakeholders. For neutrality and appointment of staff from any of the contributing countries, the personnel function (J1) is handled by the AU. Other functions in the mission headquarters are distributed equally among the troop-contributing countries. The military intelligence (J2) and logistics (J2) is handled by Kenya, and military operations (J3) and engineering corps (J8) is led by Uganda. Communications (J6) and planning (J5) is controlled by Burundi. Sierra Leone troops handle the training (J7), while Djibouti leads the civil-military cooperation, after the deployment of its troops (ARB, 2012: 19205B).

3.7 AMISOM's Troop Contributing Countries

The AMISOM's operation has been made possible with the assistance of the TCCs that deployed their troops. The TCCs for AMISOM's military operation in Somalia are; Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti and Kenya, as well as the Sierra-Leonean troops who joined later in 2013. However, since this research scope ends in 2012, the Sierra-Leone troop's contribution is not relevant to the study.

3.7.1 Uganda

Uganda, which is one of the East African countries to propose the deployment of IGADSOM, was the first to deploy troops under AMISOM into Somalia in March 2007. Since the inception of AMISOM, Uganda has provided all the four AMISOM FCs and the contingent remains the largest contingent in AMISOM. As of September 2012, the contingent is made up of 6,223 troops based in Sector 1 which comprises the Banadir (Mogadishu), and Middle and Lower Shabelle regions. Since the first deployment in March 2007, Uganda has deployed 10 battle groups into the mission area. Battle Group 11 is expected to deploy at the end of January and will be joining their Burundian counterparts in Baidoa (AMISOM, 2013i).

3.7.2 Burundi

The Burundi contingent is the second largest within AMISOM and the second to deploy troops into Somalia. Its first soldiers arrived in Mogadishu in December 2007. As of the spring of 2010, the number of its troops was 2,600 while by 2013, the number had increased to 5,432 troops. The contingent is based in Baidoa, and primarily responsible for the operations in Sector 3 which covers the Bay and Bakool regions but also maintains troops in Sector 1, where they work closely with the Ugandan forces. Since its first deployment in December 2007, Burundi has sent 6 battle groups to Somalia and it has provided three Deputy FCs till 2013 (AMISOM, 2013f).

3.7.3 Djibouti

In December 2011, Djibouti became the third East African country to contribute to AMISOM. The country deployed a contingent of 960 troops to Somalia and they are based in Beledweyne which serves as Sector 4's headquarters covering the Hiiran region. In 2012, as part of its support to the Somali civilians, the contingent came to the aid of Beledweyne's

civilians, helping to organise evacuations after heavy rains caused massive flooding in the region (AMISOM, 2013g).

3.7.4 Kenya

Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) moved into southern Somalia on 16 October 2011 with the initial aim protecting its security by pursuing the insurgent group Al Shabaab after a series of kidnappings of tourists along the Kenya-Somalia border. The Kenyan government agreed to integrate its forces under AMISOM, as of November 2011 at the request of IGAD and AU for the integration of the Kenya troops under AMISOM; to improve AMISOM troop's strength and for the improvement of Somalia security. Following this was the official integration of the KDF into AMISOM on 22 February 2012, with the signing of the MoU between the Kenyan government and the AU Commission (AUC). These came after the UNSC passed resolution 2036 that allowed the neighbouring countries to be part of the AMISOM's TCCs (AMISOM, 2013h).

With the adoption of the CONOPs in 2012, the Kenyan forces of 4,652 troops have the control of Sector 2. They were joined by the 850 troops from Sierra Leone in February-March 2013 after which, Kenya reduced its contribution by one battalion.

3.8 *AMISOM's Military Troop Strength*

The AMISOM's troop strength reviewed in this section gives an insight into the military operation of the mission in Somalia.

The military troop strength approved for AMISOM was 8,000 troops but it was not achieved immediately. In March 2007, only 1,700 Ugandan troops were deployed for AMISOM's operations while awaiting the deployment of the remaining troops promised by the AU members (UNSC, 2007d: 7). By March 2008, the AMISOM troops were 2,613 soldiers, achievable with the Burundian's 850 troops deployed between December 2007 and 20 January 2008 (UNSC, 2008b: 5). By the end of 2008, the mission's troop strength was 3,400 troops (EC, 2011: 20). As of 30 June 2009, AMISOM's troop strength in Mogadishu was 4,300 troops, with three battalions from Uganda and two battalions from Burundi, with a balance of four battalions yet to be deployed (UNSC, 2009e: 4). In August 2009, deployment of the sixth battalion, comprising 850 troops from Burundi was completed. As of 10 September 2009, AMISOM's troop strength was about 5,217 or 65 percent of the mandated strength, comprising three battalions each from Uganda and Burundi (UNSC, 2009f: 10). In

mid-March 2010, Uganda deployed the fourth battalion which expanded AMISOM's strength to 6,120 troops. Burundi also deployed a 40-strong support team to AMISOM, with additional four military staff officers from Ghana, Cameroon, Senegal and Zambia deployed to AMISOM headquarters in Mogadishu (UNSC, 2010b: 10). With additional battalions, one each from Uganda and Burundi, AMISOM was able to reach the mandated strength of 8,000 troops by December 2010 (UNSC, 2011a: 11).

With the approval of the new authorised strength of 12,000 troops by the UN in 2010, Burundi and Uganda reaffirmed their commitment to deploy the additional 4,000 troops. In the first week of March 2011, Burundi deployed an additional 1,000 troops that brought AMISOM's strength to 9,000 troops (UNSC, 2011a: 12; AU, 2011c: 3). As of August 2011, AMISOM remained at approximately 9,300 troops (UNSC, 2011b: 10). By early December 2011, AMISOM's troop strength was approximately 9,800. In addition to this, 14 staff officers under the East African Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism were deployed on 4 October 2011 to reinforce AMISOM force headquarters (UNSC, 2011d: 5; EC, 2011: 20). The integration of the KDF of approximately 4,700 troops as part of the AMISOM, and deployment of an additional 2,500 troops from Burundi and Uganda together with the approximately 9,500 troops on ground increased the mission strength to closely 17,731 troops (UNSC, 2012a: 6; UNSC, 2012e: 7). By November 2012, AMISOM reached its full authorised strength of 17,731 troops with the deployment of the Djiboutan contingent, while Kenyan troops filled the Sierra-Leone contingent placement pending the latter's deployment (UNSC, 2013: 7).

The overview of AMISOM has given an insight into the mission's mandate, structure, troop strength and phases of the mission operation. AMISOM is a multidimensional peace mission, but the bulk of the mission operations and achievements rest on the military component, which has the major task to ensure security and stability of Somalia. The achievement and success of the military component gives the platform for the other two components to perform. Hence, the bulk of the contributions of the stakeholders for the success of the mission depend on the support given to the military component to achieve its mandate. Since the research focus is AMISOM's role in the provision of a secured environment for the political process in Somalia, the emphasis is placed on the military component. The study focuses on the military components and the roles of the stakeholders (IGAD, EU, UN and AU) in AMISOM's military operations in Somalia.

CHAPTER FOUR

4. ROLES OF THE STAKEHOLDERS AND COLLABORATION PROCESS

Introduction

This chapter examines the roles of stakeholders and the collaboration process followed in providing support to the AMISOM with a focus on the military component. As stated in the conclusion of chapter two, the support given to the military component determines the platform for the overall success of the mission. The first part of this chapter discusses the roles and contributions of the stakeholders (IGAD, EU, UN and AU) towards the achievement of AMISOM's operation. The second part examines the collaboration process, that is, the collaboration model for the provision of the resources required for AMISOM's operation. In this section, the researcher highlights the legal framework for the collaboration of the stakeholders. The third section of this chapter, discusses factors that determine the stakeholders' contributions to AMISOM's operation while the last section, considers the challenges encountered by the stakeholders during the course of the collaboration.

In accordance with the data collection section of chapter one, the information used in this chapter is derived mainly from primary and secondary sources. The primary information is retrieved from the responses of the participants that the researcher was able to interview and other primary sources as the communiqués, resolutions, reports and press releases of the stakeholders that are being examined. The secondary information is retrieved from the published scholarly work of certain researchers that had direct contact with the participants in the research study.

This chapter provides the answers to the first three research questions and objectives of the research study, which are: roles of the stakeholders in AMISOM's operations; determination of whether AMISOM and the stakeholders follow a collaborative process or a positional process; and lastly the obstacles to the collaboration process.

4.1 Roles of the Stakeholders

The direct benefit from the peaceful resolution of the Somalia crisis is benefit from the peaceful resolution is for the AU and its member states, especially the IGAD sub-regional organisation. There are other stakeholders that are also interested in the role of AMISOM as well as peace and stability in Somalia. These stakeholders have collaborated with the AU and IGAD in developing the African peace support operation in Somalia. The major stakeholders are the AU member states, the EU and the UN, all of whom have contributed to the operation of AMISOM since its authorisation and deployment in 2007 (EC, 2012b: 7).

4.1.1 Roles of IGAD in AMISOM's Operations

The foundation of the deployment of AMISOM was laid by the initiative of IGAD to deploy the peace mission IGADSOM to Somalia in an effort to secure the peace of the country (ISS Senior Researcher, 2013). The vision of IGAD was transformed to the establishment of AMISION following the failure of IGAD to deploy its initiated IGADSOM in 2006 because of internal crises which were political and financial in nature (ISS Senior Researcher, 2013). Nonetheless, the organisation has been a major stakeholder in the deployed AMISOM. As a recognised REC with direct geographical proximity to Somalia, IGAD member states are the key troop contributors to AMISOM's operation (SALIA Director, 2013). IGAD has also contributed in the political and technical advisory roles to the AU and UN on the situational report on the crisis in Somalia and necessary action required in supporting the AMISOM's operation.

4.1.1.1 Troop Contributing Role

The lead troop contributing countries are from the IGAD member states, especially Uganda and subsequently Djibouti and Kenya. Initially, the frontline states next to Somalia were prevented from contributing troops to AMISOM to ensure proper neutrality of the peace mission. Thus, Kenya and Ethiopia could not deploy their troops with AMISOM. However, with the passing of the UN resolution 2036 in 2012, the Kenyan troops were amalgamated with the AMISOM troops. This was after their initial military advancement to Somalia in response to the Al-Shabaab intrusion on Kenyan borders. The UN resolution 2036(2012) gave the frontline states such as Kenya permission to be officially integrated as a TCC for AMISOM. Despite Ethiopia's inability to amalgamate with the AMISOM troops due to the Djibouti agreement, the Ethiopian troops are actively involved in the fight against insurgent groups in Somalia. The Ethiopian troops' contribution is possible because of the bilateral

agreement with the TFG and their role is also recognised in the new strategic concept for AMISOM's operations (UNSC, 2012b). However, IGAD does not only participate in AMISOM as the major TCCs, its member states have also been actively involved in political and technical advisory roles for the mission.

4.1.1.2 Political Role

The direct impact of the Somalia crisis on the IGAD sub-region spurred the organisation to be politically active in expressing their support for AMISOM. The two leadership arms of the IGAD region directly involved in the Somalia crisis are; the Assembly of IGAD Heads of State and Government (Assembly) and the IGAD Council of Ministers. The two leadership arms released several communiqués to express their political decisions and observations on AMISOM's operations. The major area of concern that the region expresses in its communiqués are as follows: the inadequate support for AMISOM, the situational report on the Somalia crisis as well as the detailed description of the support required for AMISOM to carry out effective operations (IGAD, 2009c).

In 2009, the region reviewed the security situation in Somalia with the minimal impact of AMISOM because of the limited troop strength. The region therefore requested that the UNSC review its resolution 1725(2006)4 of 6 December 2006' to enable the frontline states deploy troops to Somalia, if it was required (IGAD, 2009c). In 2010, the region criticised the UN for its refusal to fully approve the revised AMISOM CONOPs. The region confronted the UN saying that any reluctance to act according to the request of the AU-PSC has the potential of undermining the efforts and the prospects of achieving lasting peace and reconciliation in Somalia (IGAD, 2010d).

Furthermore, the region expressed its displeasure with the UNSC resolution 1964 (2010) of 22 December 2010, which partially approved the revised CONOPs, allowing a troop strength of only 12,000. To ensure the AU's request was granted, the region called on the AU-PSC to hold a special summit before the end of March 2011 on resource mobilisation for Somalia and to address issues not catered for by the UNSC (IGAD, 2011a). Also, to eliminate supply lines to the insurgent groups, the region released a communiqué to the UN to support AMISOM's counterinsurgency operation, with the provision of mission enablers; adoption of a resolution to enforce the blockade of Kismayo, Barava, Merka and Elmaan; and the imposition of air exclusion on zones such as Balidogle, N.50 and Cisaaley (IGAD, 2011b).

The Assembly requested Kenya to consider the prospects of integrating its forces with AMISOM in order to consolidate the counterinsurgency efforts of the region (IGAD, 2011c). Additionally, the region welcomed the renewed international momentum on Somalia as demonstrated in the deliberations of the UNSC session of 11 January 2012, and called on the UNSC to expeditiously review and enhance the mandate of AMISOM in line with the new strategic concept. To ensure that the UN authorised the new strategic concept that the AU drafted in 2012, the IGAD Assembly mandated its Chairman to get involved with the African members of the UNSC and IGAD country's Permanent Representatives to the UN. In pursuance of pressurising the UNSC to adopt a resolution that guarantees the appropriate troop level, adequate resources and logistical support to change the situation of Somalia for good (IGAD, 2012). As the region directly affected by the security situation in Somalia, the political pressure from IGAD on the AU, EU, UN as well as other stakeholders assisted in the improvement and increase in the stakeholders' contributions towards the success of AMISOM's operation in Somalia.

To ensure proper channelling of IGAD's requests and concerns the following procedure was followed. The press releases of the IGAD Council of Ministers are reviewed and adopted during the IGAD Assembly of the Heads of State and Government meetings. The reviewed and adopted communiqués are passed to the AU-PSC, who subsequently review and adopt the communiqué before passing it to the UN through the AUC Chairman. Despite this, the communiqué is directly conveyed to the UNSC and the UNGA for crucial matters requiring urgent resolution (IGAD, 2009c).

4.1.1.3 Technical Advisory Role

IGAD's political support for the effectiveness of AMISOM's operation also applies to the operational advisory support. The directives of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government for the convening of the meeting of IGAD's Chiefs of Staff for Defence to assess the security situation in Somalia and advice on the support required for an effective AMISOM's operation during the assembly's 16th, 18th, 19th and 20th extra-ordinary sessions resulted in the technical advisory support of the IGAD region to the AMISOM's operation. The technical report of the IGAD Chief of Defence and Ministers for Defence held on 5 and 12 November 2011 provided an insight into the security situation in Somalia and formed the basis for the deliberation of the meeting of the AMISOM TCCs, potential TCCs and stakeholders held on 14 November 2011.

The outcome of the meeting held on 14 November 2011 led to the draft of new strategic concept, which was also reviewed by IGAD's Chiefs of Staff for Defence on 2 December 2011 and 4 January 2012. The technical advice of IGAD's Chiefs of Staff for Defence and Ministers of Defence assisted in the formulation and adoption of the new strategic concept for AMISOM, which the AU-PSC endorsed during its 306th meeting on 5 January 2012 and was adopted by the UNSC resolution 2036 (2012) of 22 February 2012 (AU, 2011m: 4-5). The communiqués of IGAD bodies have spurred the improvement in AMISOM for consolidation of their decisions. In the process, the press releases of the IGAD Council of Ministers are reviewed and adopted during the IGAD Assembly of the Heads of State and Government meetings.

4.1.2 Roles of EU in AMISOM's operations

The EU is one of the regional organisations that extended its hand of fellowship to the AU's regional organisation. The EU historically considers Africa as part of its broader neighbourhood; a view which can be traced to the colonial era and that has been the bedrock of their relationship. Africa and Europe are bound together by history, culture and geography (SALIA Director, 2013). Their areas of collaboration include: economic development, conflict prevention, crisis management and peace-building. The EU has, through its funds and instruments such as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), European Development Fund (EDF) and the Africa Peace Facility (APF), sought to support African regional and continental actors in the area of maintaining peace and stability. The AU, as the pre-eminent pan-continental organisation, has benefited from this close support from the EU including capacity building, training, troop remuneration and political support (SALIA Director, 2013). Clearly, the EU has contributed immensely to the AMISOM's operations in the area of training for both AMISOM and TFG personnel, of more magnitude though is the financial contribution towards the payment of troops' salaries.

4.1.2.1 Financial Contribution

The EU is one of the main contributors to the AMISOM's operation. This is done through the African Peace Fund (APF), a major instrument of the EU directed to supporting peace and security in Africa, but also, through the bilateral contributions of its member states. The financial contribution comes in the form of troop allowances, salaries for police officers and civilian staff, and operational costs to support mission activities (EU-APF Manager, 2013). The EU funding for AMISOM is the major financial contribution for the achievement of the mission's mandate (EU-APF Manager, 2013; ISS Researcher, 2013; SALIA Director, 2013).

The EU established the APF in 2004 following the request of African leaders to initiate financial support towards the African-led PSOs and the capacity activities. The APF is funded through the European Development Fund (EDF) under the overall legal framework of the Cotonou Agreement for a 20 year period signed in 2000 to foster coherence and predictability in the EU's support regarding peace and security agenda in Africa. This agreement is between the EU and 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP countries). In December 2007, EU and AU collaboration was placed on a more comprehensive footing by the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) adopted in 2007 at Lisbon. The adoption of JAES reflects the EU member states' commitment to support African peace and security (EU-APF Manager, 2013; EC, 2012d: 8, 11). In this agreement, the use of the APF is restricted to financial costs incurred by the TCCs. These costs include the cost of carrying troops, soldiers' living expenses as well as development capabilities. Conversely, the fund did not cover military and arms expenditures (including military, EU military technical assistance, and specific individual and collective equipment for the African Security Forces - ASF).

These additional expenditures are funded through other bilateral financial contributions from the EU member states depending on their colonial and trade affiliations. The agreement on the funding of the AU-led peace mission through APF also applied to AMISOM with its inauguration in 2007 (EC, 2012d: 8, 11). The EU proved itself as the major financial contributor for the mission. For a period of five years, the EU supported AMISOM financially, except in 2008. This in the perspective of the researcher could be linked to the global economic meltdown that affected almost all nations in 2008, especially the developed countries.

The table below gives the details of the EU-APF financial contributions towards AMISOM's operations in Somalia between April 2007 and November 2012.

Figure 1: EU-APF Financial Contributions to AMISOM

African Peace Facility support to AMISOM Overview table					
PSO Contribution Agreement	Period of Implementation	EUR Contracted (Date)	Sub-Total EUR	EUR Paid (Date)	Sub-Total EUR
AMISOM I	1 Mar 2007 – 30 Nov 2008)	15 m (March 2007)	15 m	11.8 m (April 2007)	11.8m
Death and Disability	10 Oct 2007 -31 Mar 2009	0.5 m (Oct 2007)	0.5 m	0.5 m (July 2008)	0.5 m
AMISOM II	1 Dec 2008 - 31 July 2009	20 m (Dec 2008)	20 m	8 m (Jan 2009) 5.4 m (Dec 2009) m (July 2011)	14.5 m
AMISOM III	1 Aug 2009 – 30 June 2010	60 m (Dec 2009)	60 m	30 m (Dec 2009) 20 m (Apr 2010) 0.9 m (Jun 2011)	50.9 m
AMISOM IV	1 July 2010 – 31 Jan 2011	47 m (Sept 2010)	47 m	25 m (Oct 2010) 17 m (Dec 2010)	42 m
AMISOM V	1 Feb 2011 – 31 Aug 2011	65.9 m (Mar 2011)	65.9 m	60 m (Apr – Jun 2011)	60 m
AMISOM VI	1 Sep 2011 - 31 Jan 2012	50 m (Dec 2011)	50 m	45 m (Dec 2011)	45 m
AMISOM VII	1 Feb 2012 – 31 July 2012	67 m (Mar 2012) 4 m (July 2012)	71 m	53.6 m (Mar 2012) 13.85m (Nov 2012)	67.45 m
AMISOM VIII	1 Aug 2012 – 31 Jan 2013	82 m (Oct 2012)	82 m	65.6 m (Nov 2012)	65.6 m
TOTAL			415.9 m		357.75 m

Compiled by the researcher: EC, 2011: 25 -26; EC, 2012d: 28 – 30; EU-APF's official was interviewed. The APF fund for 2007 was funded under the 9th EDF, while funding between 2008 – 2012 was under the 10th EDF 2008 -2010/2011 – 2013 three years plan.

4.1.2.2 Technical Support for APF Fund Management

In an effort to ensure a high standard of administrative and financial management of APF contributions, EU technical assistants provided monitoring of the operation in both Nairobi (Kenya) and Addis Ababa (Ethiopia). For long-term technical support and sustainability of the APF contribution to AMISOM, in March 2012, the EU recruited and deployed technical experts to the AU Peace and Security Finance Division in Addis Ababa and the AMISOM headquarters in Nairobi/Mogadishu. The technical support is funded under APF long term agreement of the “Operationalisation of the APSA component of the APF” (EC, 2012b: 2; EC, 2012d: 24 – 25)

4.1.2.3 Protection of AMISOM shipment

There are two EU military missions contributing to the East African regional security within the framework of the European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The EU EUNAVFOR Operation Atlanta is the first of the EU Naval Force Operations which has the mandate to improve maritime security by fighting piracy in the Indian Ocean. In addition to its primary mandate to deter, prevent and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery on the Somalia coast, it provides dedicated protection for AMISOM shipments to Somalia and escorts ships transporting assistance of the World Food Programme (WFP). The combination of the fight against piracy in the coastline of Somalia and the security advancement of AMISOM's troops on land has thus assisted in minimising the security threat in Somalia (UNSC, 2010b: 11).

4.1.2.4 Operational Support

On the AU operational side, the EU, under the auspices of ESDP, seconded to AMISOM in Addis Ababa, four experts on civil engineering, human resources, budgeting and communications, who were earlier based in the EC delegation to Ethiopia to AU's Strategic Planning and Management Unit (SPMU). Together with seven UN experts, two NATO officers and a US liaison officer, they continue to make up the bulk of the SPMU and provide crucial strategic and technical advice for the AU Peace and Security Department (PSD) and also, to the AMISOM commanders in the planning, deployment and conduct of AMISOM (Franke, 2009: 260; EC, 2012b: 260; Helly, 2009: 149; AU, 2007d: 3).

4.1.2.5 Training of the Somali National Force

The decision of the EU to establish EUTM Somalia is also another contribution of the EU towards AMISOM's operations in Somalia. Following the meeting of the Ministers for Defence of AMISOM TCCs and the partners held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 17 February 2010 under the auspices of the AU-PSD, where the challenge of the AMISOM mandate to train NSF was discussed, the EU proposed to establish a training school to assist in the training of the NSF and it was welcomed by the participants of the parties at the meeting (AMISOM Review, 2010: 8).

Likewise, the EUTM Somalia was established on 7 April 2010, at the Bihangi camp in Uganda because of the volatile security in Somalia. The commencement of the EUTM training for Somalia recruits relieved AMISOM of its mandate to train and equip the Somali National Force (SNF) which was later changed to National Security Force (NSF). This is one of the tasks given to AMISOM through the adoption of the NSSP and within the framework of the Djibouti peace agreement. With this arrangement, the EU trains the Somali recruits for six months while AMISOM integrates the newly trained Somali troops into the NSF, through two or three months of comprehensive training at the Jazeera facility in Mogadishu (Oksamytna, 2011: 100, 102; EC, 2012b: 2–3). This arrangement enables AMISOM to concentrate on its counterinsurgency efforts. Moreover, the EUTM-trained Somali recruits assist to improve the Somalia security sector with the increase in the number of well-trained Somali forces that are engaged in the counter-insurgency mission with AMISOM (EC, 2007; Mugisha, 2011: 32). Notably, the mission was established in Africa because of the EU's endorsement of the African ownership in providing solutions to African problems (Oksamytna, 2011: 100).

The roles and contributions of the EU assisted in the sustenance of AMISOM in Somalia. The financial contributions are reliable but the delay in the release of the fund is challenging to the mission and its operations. The protection of AMISOM shipments helps in getting the needed logistics support across to the mission with minimal security hitches. The technical support for APF fund management and deployment of EU staff to the SPMU and AMISOM finance department improve the technical aspect of the mission and improve the financial contributions which were quite minimal prior to the deployment of the EU staff. The establishment of the EUTM Somalia for the training of the Somali forces improved the security sectors with more Somali forces spearheading the military advancement against the insurgents and assisting the AMISOM forces.

4.1.3 Roles of the UN in AMISOM's Operations

According to the UN Charter, Chapter VII, the sole responsibility in ensuring global peace lies within the UN, specifically under the legal framework of UNSC resolutions. However, the nature and the trend of conflicts that have erupted in the Cold War and post-Cold War era, especially in third world countries, and the failure of UN peacekeeping to restore peace in these countries, especially in Somalia and Rwanda, shifted global peacekeeping towards the emergence and establishment of regional peacekeeping. Especially Africa, which has the highest number of conflict zones in the world. Therefore, for the integration of regional peacekeeping procedures, the UNSC adopted Charter VIII, to enable the regional organisations to deploy peace mission operations to its conflict area with the authorisation of the UNSC. Notwithstanding the authority given for the establishment of a regional peacekeeping mission, the final authorisation of the operation of these missions remains with the UNSC.

Similarly, as part of its primary mandate to ensure international peace and security, the UN has contributed as a major stakeholder to the operation of AMISOM in the area of political and logistics support (SAIIA Director, 2013; ISS Senior Researcher, 2013). The inauguration of AMISOM was ratified by the UNSC resolution 1744 and since its deployment. UN contributions have been in the areas of approving the extension of the mission's deployment mandate and providing financial and technical support. The role of the UN in the deployment and operation of AMISOM can be identified as;

4.1.3.1 Political Role

The political role of the UN towards the peacekeeping mission lies mainly with UNSC. The UNSC has the authority to mandate every deployed peacekeeping mission. Political support of the UNSC towards peace missions reflects in their resolutions. In the case of AMISOM, the UNSC resolutions on AMISOM formed the political support and legal framework for the operation of the mission in Somalia. In 2007, UNSC acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter authorised IGAD and the AU to establish a 'protection and training mission in Somalia'. The UNSC resolution 1744, which was passed on 20 February 2007 welcomed the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia and reiterated the UNSC's support for TFIs. It also authorised the AU to establish a mission in Somalia. This paved the way for the deployment of AMISOM in accordance with UN resolution 1744 (2007), with Uganda and Burundi being the only countries that honoured the pledge to send troops to Somalia. Further, the UNSC authorised AMISOM to take all necessary measures to provide security

for key infrastructure and to contribute to the creation of the necessary security for the provision of humanitarian assistance as may be requested, and within its capabilities and its existing mandate. Following the inability of the UN to deploy its peacekeeping mission at the expiration of the six month mandate given to AMISOM, the UNSC adopted resolutions to renew and extend the mandate of AMISOM, which legalised the mission's existence in Somalia.

4.1.3.2 Authorisation and Release of UN funds and equipment for AMISOM

Admittedly, the UNSC is responsible for providing the political and legal framework for the mandate of AMISOM's operations while the UN General Assembly (UNGA) is responsible for the approval of the funds to be released from the UN assessed fund for the UN logistics support package for AMISOM and equipment to be released from the UN facilities. Even more, the UNGA ensures that the support given to AMISOM is within the political framework of UNSC resolutions that directed the UNSG to provide the support. The UNGA reviews the report of the UNSG on financial support for AMISOM and the report of the UNGA Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ). In addition to this, it scrutinizes the budget and gives the final approval on the budget of AMISOM's logistics support based on the reported recommendations of the UNGA ACABQ. Besides this, it also appropriates the financial contributions to be released from the UN assessed fund to the Special Fund for AMISOM and requests the UNSG to take appropriate measures to ensure the effective implementation of the resolutions (UNGA, 2009b: 1; UNGA, 2010d: 1–2). Apart from the approval of funds from the UN assessed fund, in August 2010, the UNGA requested the UNSG to release the use of the facilities and equipment at the UN Logistics base at Brindisi, Italy for AMISOM, in order to minimise the costs of procurement for the UNSOA logistical support package (UNGA, 2009b: 1; UNGA, 2010d: 1–2).



Figure 2: UN Assessed Fund for AMISOM

Period ^a	UNSG Budget Report (\$)	ACABQ Recommended Fund (\$)	UNGA Approved Fund (\$)
May 2007 – June 2008	2,149,000	2,149,000	2,149,000
July 2008 – June 2009	78,757,900	78,757,900	75,641,900
July 2009 – June 2010	224,380,000	214,580,000	213,580,000
July 2010 – June 2011	240,992,200	218,410,370	210,089,100
July 2011 – June 2012	303,951,900	298,927,000	291,092,700
July 2012 – June 2013	438,267,300	437,945,600	436,905,000
Total	1,288,498,300	1,250,769,870	1,229,457,700

Extracted from the UNSG and ACABQ financial reports as well as the UNGA resolutions on financial support for AMISOM

The table above states the funds released for AMISOM from the UN Assessed Fund. The disparity in the fund budgeted and the recommended budget with the approved fund is determined by the cross-cutting policy of the UN as well as the advice of the UN Audit Department.

4.1.3.3 Financial Contributions

Inauguration of the UNTF for the security institutions in Somalia during the Brussels Conference in 2009 provided the platform for the freewill financial contribution from the UN member state towards the AMISOM's operation. As of July 2009, the financial contribution for the UNTF was \$15 million and by October 2009, the fund had increased to \$25 million. The \$25 million received represented 80 percent of the total pledge towards the UNTF (UNSC, 2009g: 4). As of May 2010, the AMISOM Trust Fund had received \$28.7 million (UNSC, 2010b: 7). A year later, the UNTF had received approximately \$38.3 million in support of AMISOM. It received \$2 million from Saudi Arabia, \$1.8 million from Denmark for military (non-lethal) purposes, as well as \$3.8 million from the UK for military and medical purposes. The UK confirmed its intention to make further contribution of \$2.5 million without caveat (UNSC, 2011a: 17).

Between April and August 2011, the UK contributed \$2.5 million to the UNTF in support of AMISOM that allowed the full re-imbursement of the COE of the TCCs until March 2011. This brought the total contribution from 2009 to \$40.8 million, with approximately 60 percent

of the fund being without caveat. The fund was used to support the military component of AMISOM, while the funds for the civilian and police components could not be utilised due to the fact that they were not relocated and deployed on the grounds of security conditions in Mogadishu (UNSC, 2011b: 16). As of 30 November 2011, UNTF for AMISOM had received a contribution of \$500,000 from India without caveat, and a pledge of 60,000 pounds for AMISOM troop welfare. The UNTF had a caveated balance of \$6.1 million for non-military purposes (UNSC, 2011d: 15). In the UNSG reporting period between December and May 2012, UNTF AMISOM received three un-caveated contributions, of \$4,374,799 from Denmark, \$260,247 from Sweden and 16 million pounds from the UK. The funds were used for the reimbursement of COE and other forms of support to the AMISOM troops (UNSC, 2012d: 15).

Within the UNSG reporting period of 1 May to 15 August 2012, the UNTF AMISOM received 1 million Canadian dollars to support the role of AMISOM in creating the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, and \$3.5 million from Australia for equipment identified as critical to AMISOM's operations. In the course of 2012, UNSOA committed approximately \$33 million, mainly for arrears in reimbursement payment for COE from the TCCs prior to the adoption of UNSC resolution 2036 (2012) and the procurements of trucks, material-handling equipment and equipment for the engineering plant. There was the balance of uncommitted fund of \$6 million because of the placement of caveat on it (UNSC, 2012e: 16). UNTF AMISOM received GBP 85,000 (approx. US \$ 135,940) from UK to support the welfare of the AMISOM troops and their outreach activities during the period between 16 August 2011 - 15 January 2013. With this financial contribution, UNSOA was able to commit approximately US \$ 31.7 million, mainly for ground transport equipment, Radio Bar Kulan and public service broadcasting, medical supplies for AMISOM troops, civilians and police. The uncommitted balance fund was US \$2.6 million, earmarked for outreach activities (UNSC, 2013: 13).

Categorically, the UNTF contributions are used mainly for the reimbursement of the COE and operational costs of the mission's civilian and police components.

4.1.3.4 Establishment of UN Mission Offices for AMISOM Support

As part of its political role in the achievement of AMISOM's mandate, and response to the AU-PSC request for UN logistical support to strengthen AMISOM's operation, the UNSC in its resolution 1863 (2009) approved the establishment of UNSOA, UN Office for AU (UNOAU) and UNTF to provide logistics, technical and financial support for AMISOM.

4.1.3.4.1 UN Support Office for AMISOM

The UNSC resolution 1863(10) on 16 January 2009, requested the UNSG to provide a UN logistical support package to AMISOM to enable it conduct peacekeeping operations in Somalia. To provide legal framework for the collaboration, a MoU was signed between the UN and the AU on 12 July 2009 for the provision of support to AMISOM, which includes, but is not limited to: rations, fuel, transport, general supply, aviation, engineering, communications and information technology, control of the movement of equipment and supplies and medical, strategic telecommunications capability, public information support and training (OIOS, 2011: par2; UNSC, 2011b: 10).

In accordance with the UNSC resolution 1863 (2009)10, the UNSOA was established as a field support operation led by the UN Department of Field Support (DFS). It was given the mandate to provide logistics capacity support package to AMISOM critical to achieving its operational effectiveness and in preparation for possible UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO).

The logistics package is the same with mission supports provided by UNPKO of the same size and with the aim to assist AMISOM in its mandate. The mandate of UNSOA was renewed in the UNSC resolution 1964 (2010)7 to cater for the increased troop strength of 12,000, while the most recent renewal was adopted in the UNSC resolution 2036 (2012) for the approved 17,731 troops. The UNSOA logistics package is funded from the UN assessed contributions while the UNTF AMISOM, established during the Somalia donor conference in Brussels on 23 April 2009, financed the funding of COE and areas of AMISOM's operations not covered by the UN assessed fund (UNGA, 2009e: 17; UNSC, 2010c: 11).

The UNSOA is located in both Nairobi and Mogadishu to ensure close collaboration with the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU for Somalia and AMISOM FC who uses Nairobi as the primary point of liaison outside Somalia with key stakeholders. Moreover, the UNSOA have a small staffing complement to support military liaison requirements, as well as a small liaison capacity with the AU directly in Addis Ababa (UNGA, 2009b: 3).

4.1.3.4.2 UN Office for AU

UNSC resolution 1863 (2009) requested the UNSG to provide technical and expert advice to the AU in the planning and deployment of AMISOM through the existing UN planning team in

Addis Ababa. The mandate of UNOAU was adopted with the UNSC resolution 1872 (2009)¹⁹ and renewed with resolution 1964 (2010)⁵. A team of 19 professional officers and 4 national staff were deployed to AU headquarters in Addis Ababa to collaborate with the AU in the planning and force generation to deploy AMISOM to its mandated strength but also, to guide its operations on the ground (UNGA, 2010e: 9). The mandate of the UN planning team in Addis Ababa was transferred to the UNOAU on 1 July 2010 (UNGA, 2009b: 6; UNSC, 2010c; UNGA, 2010e: 12). The mandates of the former UN Liaison Office to the AU, the AU Peacekeeping Support Team, and the UN planning team for the AMISOM were integrated into the mandate of the UNOAU (UNGA, 2010e: 3).

4.1.3.4.3 UN Trust Fund for AMISOM

In 2009, the UNTF was established following the directives of the UNSC resolution 1863 (2009)⁸. The UNTF was mandated to provide financial support for AMISOM and assist in the re-establishment, training and retention of Somalia Security Forces (SSF) to fulfil their role as stipulated in the Djibouti Agreement. The trust fund provides for improved co-ordinated and transparent management of the voluntary contributions for the enhancement of the SSF and AMISOM. The trust fund is managed by UNPOS with oversight from the Department of Political Affairs and co-operation with the UN Country Team. The UNTF for AMISOM is used to reimburse COE costs and AMISOM's operational areas not financed from assessed contributions (UNSC, 2010c: 11).

4.1.3.5 Contributions of the UN established missions in support of AMISOM

The UN missions established to support AMISOM have contributed to improve the mission's conditions of operations. The contributions of the UN offices in support of AMISOM are discussed below.

4.1.3.5.1 Life Support

Since its establishment in 2009, UNSOA has provided logistics support for AMISOM. The life support supplies for AMISOM such as food, fuel and medical services earlier provided by a UN member state and its vendor before the establishment of UNSOA, was transferred to the UNSOA at the commencement of its operation in mid-August 2009 (UNSC, 2009g: 5). The AMISOM troops in Mogadishu commenced the consumption of the fresh food provided by the UN in late August 2009. The contractor provided the food in Mombassa, Kenya, and UNSOA arranged for the regular shipment of the consignments to Mogadishu where it is

stored in a centralised refrigerated facility before being issued to the contingent kitchens once or twice daily (UNSC, 2009g: 5; UNGA, 2009e: 6). The direct provision of the life support supplies improved the welfare of the AMISOM personnel

4.1.3.5.2 Provision of Facilities and Equipment

Apart from the provision of the life support, UNSOA provides engineering equipment and construction of key facilities, health and sanitation, medical evacuation and treatment services as well as medical equipment for AMISOM medical facilities. Communications and information technology, information support services, aviation services for evacuations and troop rotations, vehicles and other equipment including capacity-building are also provided (UNGA, 2010e: 9). Also, it has provided communications and radio broadcast equipment, pharmaceuticals, airport fire-fighting capacities, prefabricated buildings, generators, armoured vehicles and a range of engineering equipment to assist AMISOM in improving its security and living conditions (UNSC, 2009g: 5).

4.1.3.5.3 Training of Personnel

As part of the logistical support for AMISOM, UNSOA organises training for AMISOM's personnel. The senior officials are trained in International Humanitarian Law (IHL); basic and advanced technical training as well as different types of in-theatre training are periodically conducted for AMISOM's staff to equip them for effective operation. Moreover, the AMISOM troops are trained to operate and maintain the UN-owned equipment, and on accountability and stock-control procedures, mostly before the delivery of the UN consignments in Entebbe or Mombasa (UNSC, 2009g: 5; AMISOM Official, 2013).

Furthermore, UNSOA conducts training for selected troops in communication, medical response, movement control, property management and engineering, to form the Force Enabling Unit. While other AMISOM personnel receive specialised training in fire-fighting, use of equipment, UN rations management, communications and logistics co-ordination (UNSC, 2009f: 12). Moreover, in accordance with the explosive management policy established in October 2009 under the auspices of the UNSOA, UN Mines Action Service (UNMAS) provides training, facilities, equipment and co-ordination support to develop the AMISOM explosive ordinance disposal equipment and use of mine-protected vehicles, which is critical to the mission's operation in consideration of the explosive attacks from the insurgents (UNSC, 2010b: 11).

4.1.3.5.4 Strategic Communication Support

UNSOA provides enhanced strategic communication support to AMISOM, and relatively secured communications. UN provides a strategic communications network that links the AMISOM force headquarters in Mogadishu with the AMISOM mission headquarters and the UNSOA in Nairobi. For the first time, the mission connects through a secured network, better than the Somali-based commercial providers that the mission has depended on since its deployment (UNSC, 2009g: 5). For the mission's efforts to effectively respond to the issue of civilian casualties, Radio Bar Kulan is used, which is a UN/AMISOM radio station that commenced operation in March 2010. It broadcasts around the clock in Mogadishu and the UN information support team is permanently co-located with AMISOM in Mogadishu. The UNOAU assists AMISOM in recruiting civilian staff for the AMISOM, strengthening its public information offices and updating the AMISOM communications strategy and the strategy on the protection of civilians (UNSC, 2010b: 10-11). To ensure proper co-ordination of the stakeholders on the implementation of the operational benchmarks and related activities, the AUC, with the support of UNOAU, established a bi-weekly video conference with AMISOM in Mogadishu and UNSOA in Nairobi (UNSC, 2012c). The UNOAU planners also assisted AMISOM to launch its monthly newsletter and develop designs for an expanded website, to highlight the mission's activities in Mogadishu and raise awareness of its mandate among potential TCCs, donors and Somalis in diaspora (UNSC, 2009e: 7-8).

4.1.3.5.5 Operational and Technical Support

The UNOAU support office for AMISOM provides technical advice and operational support for the AU-PSD in the planning and management of AMISOM. Particularly in the areas of military and police planning, force generation, aviation, medical services, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, human resources, security, landmine action and explosive ordnance disposal service, training and equipment, public information, information and communications technology and other mission support areas. The team also assists the AUC in developing or updating a number of core technical documents, including military and police concepts of operations, rules of engagement, mission implementation plans, strategic directives and other standard operating procedures. The team also supported an extensive technical assessment of AMISOM conducted in April 2010. In addition, the team is actively engaged with existing and potential troop-contributing countries and donors and its participation in a number of pre-deployment visits and inspections resulted in the provision of additional troops, staff officers and equipment for AMISOM. The team was engaged in the extensive technical assessment of AMISOM in April 2010 and also intensified its support for

the planning process for the next phases of AMISOM deployment (UNSC, 2010c: 12; UNGA, 2010e: 9). Also, the team was actively involved as member of the Joint AU-UN TAM that reviewed AMISOM CONOPs between November and December 2011, for the drafting of the AMISOM new strategic concept which was endorsed by the AU-PSC on 5 January 2012 and approved by the UNSC on 22 February 2012 (AU, 2011m: 4–5).

4.1.3.5.6 Construction of Facilities

UNSOA improves the working and living conditions of AMISOM personnel and the UN support personnel through the construction of infrastructures and as the mission's operational base increases. For instance, the AMISOM headquarters, a level II medical facility and the erection of prefabricated structures for offices, accommodation, ablutions and sanitation systems in compliance with minimum operating security standards (UNSC, 2009g: 5; UNSC, 2011b: 11).

4.1.3.5.7 Transportation and Medical Evacuation

The UNSOA delivers essential materials by sea, and airlifts immediate operational requirements, delivers additional defensive materials and finally, critical supplies. UNSOA also provides repatriation, medical evacuation and transfer flights from Mogadishu to Kenya, Djibouti, Burundi, Uganda and South Africa. Indeed, it has airlifted injured AMISOM personnel and flown mortal remains to Burundi and Uganda. In agreement with its mandate, UNSOA intensified the tempo of its logistical support during the AMISOM-supported military offensives that commenced in February 2011 (UNSC, 2011a: 12). For casualty evacuation from the frontline and when the need arises, UNSOA provides transport helicopter for AMISOM. Aside of casualty evacuation, the helicopter is also useful in the transportation of AMISOM personnel as required by the authorities (AMISOM Official, 2013).

4.1.4 *Roles of the AU in AMISOM's operations*

Since the deployment of AMISOM in 2007, AU has been the converging point and mouth piece for AMISOM and a channel through which the external actors access AMISOM (ISS Senior Researcher, 2013). The AU is primarily responsible for the establishment, management and eventual liquidation process from AMISOM to a possible UN mission (AU Official, 2013). The contribution of the AU towards AMISOM is tailored under the auspices of AU-PSC, AUC and directly under the AU Peace and Security Division (PSD).

As stated in the Protocol for the establishment of the AU-PSC, the AU organ is defined as “a standing decision-making organ for prevention, management and resolution of conflicts”. The AU-PSC has the responsibility for the deployment of peace support operation and quick intervention of the PSO to assist in cases of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. In relation to the protocol of the AU-PSC, the AUC is the key organ with the central role that ensures the management of the AU decisions in relation to AMISOM. As part of the AUC roles, the Commission collaborates and harmonises the programmes and policies of the AU with that of IGAD to ensure that the mainstream of all programme activities is within the AU framework. The PSOD is responsible for the planning, launching sustainability and liquidation of the AMISOM’s operations in accordance with the AU directives. The PSOD also assists in managing and directing the AMISOM (AU Official, 2013; AU, 2013b).

The AU contribution to the AMISOM’s operation can be identified as follows:

4.1.4.1 Political Roles

The authorisation of AMISOM deployment during the AU-PSC in its 69th meeting held on 19 January 2007 symbolises the political role of the AU for the AMISOM’s operation. The decision of the AU-PSC on AMISOM gives the mission and AUC the political framework for its operations and management. Since the initial authorisation of the six months mandate for AMISOM, AU-PSC has released communiqués for the extension of AMISOM mandate in Somalia pending the decision of the UNSC to take over the operation of the mission (AU, 2007a: 3–4).

4.1.4.1.1 Adoption of Concept of Operations

As part of the AU-PSC political support to improve AMISOM’s mandate and CONOPs, the AU-PSC adopted the revised CONOPs for AMISOM during its 245th meeting on October 2010 to increase the AMISOM troop’s strength to 20,000. The revised CONOPs adopted by the AU were not fully operational because of the UN resolution 1964 (2010) that partially approved the request with the approval of only 12,000 troops (AU, 2010c: 13; AU, 2011c: 3). To ensure that its political support for the AMISOM revised CONOPs is realised, the AU-PSC directed the AUC to conduct proper consultation with the UN team in Addis Ababa and IGAD Chiefs of Defence Staff. This action was taken to ensure the reviewed AMISOM mandate and new strategic concepts are acceptable to all stakeholders involved. The new strategic concept is the general framework within which a number of key instruments, such

as the new CONOPs, new rules of engagement, and a logistics concept are incorporated (AU, 2011g; AU, 2011M: 4).

During the 306th meeting of the AU-PSC held on 5 January 2012, the Council noted the final recommendation of the Joint TAM, based on broad consultation with the Ministers of Defence of the TCCs and other interested countries held on 4 January 2012, regarding the strategic concept for future AMISOM's operations [CDS-Min Def/TCCs/AMISOM.Rec(1)] as well as the statements of the AUC Commissioner for Peace and Security, representatives of the TFG, Uganda as AMISOM TCC, the Special Representative of the UNSG for Somalia, Denmark as the co-Chair of the AU Partner Group, Italy as co-Chair of the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) and the EU. The AU-PSC endorsed the strategic concept for future AMISOM's operations. It serves as a planning tool for enhancing the strength of AMISOM and to enhance the military gains made in Somalia (AU, 2012a: 1).

The AU-PSC's political support for AMISOM assisted in the final authorisation of the new CONOPs by the UNSC on 5 February 2012.

The revised CONOPs categorised AMISOM's operation into three phases. Phase 1 (approximately 3 to 4 months,) was intended to be devoted to the reinforcement of AMISOM troops to 12,000, supported by the FPU to meet the security situation in Mogadishu and its environs, and create further space for political dialogue and reconciliation. Phase 2 (of 5 to 12 months,) was meant for the expansion of AMISOM's operations beyond Mogadishu into south and central Somalia with 8,000 additional troops; and the last phase (of 12 to 24 months,) was planned to create conditions for the re-integration of AMISOM to UN peacekeeping operations for the long-term reconstruction and stabilisation of Somalia. The newly revised CONOPs further emphasised that AMISOM's operations required more than the 12,000 troops approved in the UN resolution 1964 (2010)². It further emphasised that AMISOM is a multidimensional peace mission with the involvement of other two components, that is, the civilian and police (AU, 2011e: 12–13).

4.1.4.1.2 Soliciting for Support

Regarding the AU's political support for AMISOM, it has solicited for the support of the African states and the international community towards the achievement of AMISOM's mandate (AU, 2008h: 2; AU, 2008k: 3; AU, 2009a: 2). Majorly, the AU solicited for support in the areas of finance, logistics and personnel.

4.1.4.2 Management Role

While the AU-PSC has provided the AU's political and legal framework of AMISOM's operations, the management and the implementation of AU-PSC decision in relation to the mission is handled by the AUC. The AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) has the direct functions that developed policies and procedures relevant to the planning, launching, directing, and sustaining of AMISOM. The AU-PSOD acts as the AUC primary contact point with IGAD, TCCs, PCCs and the AU partners; and liaising with partners in raising support for AMISOM (AU, 2013c).

The AU-PSD and the Programming, Budgeting, Finance and Accounting Department are responsible for the financial management of the APF. Moreover, they are responsible for the payment of troop allowances and pre-deployment costs to the TCCs, while the AMISOM mission headquarters in Nairobi is responsible for the management of the day-to-day activities and expenditures of the mission. The EU technical assistants are seconded to AMISOM headquarters in Nairobi and AUC in Addis Ababa to support administrative and financial management of AMISOM (EC, 2012b: 6 – 7).

4.1.4.2.1 Co-ordination of Stakeholders Meeting

The AU-PSD organises technical-level workshops to mobilise resources and commitment of the stakeholders towards the achievement of the AMISOM's operation. It also organises meetings of the current and potential TCCs Ministers of Defence and Chiefs of Staff for Defence with the EU, UN, IGAD and other interested partners, to review AMISOM's operations and highlight essential additional support that the mission requires. These meetings are organised by the AUC to promote African ownership of the mission and to ensure that the support is within the AU's framework.

In commemoration of 2010 as the AU Year of Peace and Security, AUC organised the meeting of the Ministers of Defence for AMISOM TCCs and the partners including the UN, EU and IGAD representatives in Addis Ababa on 17 February 2010. The participants were briefed on the developments in Somalia with an emphasis on the political and security situations. They discussed the status of the capacity building, training programme, equipment and sustainability of the NSF and the related challenges it posed to AMISOM. The priority of the meeting was on the role of AMISOM in the training and re-integration programmes for the NSF. In agreement, the participants called on the international community to adequately support the sustenance and retention of the NSF by providing the


necessary logistical and other resources required to make the Jazeera training camp fully operational. Moreover, the participants welcomed the EU's proposal to establish its training centre for the training of the NSF to ease the burden on AMISOM (AMISOM Review, 2010: 8).

AMISOM under the auspices of the AUC held a technical-level meeting on 7 and 8 March 2011 in Nairobi to mobilise for resources to meet the mission's equipment and enabler requirements in accordance with the additional 4000 troops authorised in the UN resolution 1964 (2010). The meeting identified AMISOM requirements and received pledges and firm commitments from various donors including a UK contribution of £4m for reimbursement of COE to be disbursed in two phases and a pledge by the USA to provide major equipment for the additional 4,000 troops. Uganda agreed to provide some maritime capability, an air component and combat engineering elements. Also, Burundi and Uganda each pledged an additional 2,000 troops (AU, 2011c: 3).

The meeting of Ministers of Defence of the TCCs, with the attendance of Ethiopia, as IGAD Chairman was held on 17 March 2011, in Addis Ababa to review the progress that was achieved in the mobilisation of resources for AMISOM and the pending gap to be filled. The Ministers of Defence communicated the need to increase the troop allowance to the UN rate of \$1,028 per soldier and timely payment of death and disability compensation (AU, 2011c: 3).

On 17 and 18 August 2011, AUC organised a technical workshop to solicit an enhanced support for AMISOM in relation to the security challenge in Somalia. At the workshop, the participants recommended: acceleration of the deployment of the additional 4,000 troops to enable AMISOM to reach its authorised strength of 12,000 troops; enhancement of the support package provided by the UN; deployment of AMISOM-FPUs to bolster the maintenance of law and order in Mogadishu; creation of a guard of adequate size as part of AMISOM and under its command, facilitating deployment of civilian staff and provision of protection for the AU and UN staff in Mogadishu; as well as an elaboration of therevised CONOPs (UNSC, 2011b: 10; AU, 2011e: 12–13).

The AUC organised the meeting of the TCCs Ministers of Defence and other interested countries on 14 November 2011. The meeting was organised in consideration of the realities of the expanded AMISOM-TFG controlled areas in Mogadishu, southern and central Somalia in the last quarter of 2011, including securing support for the implementation of the second phase of AMISOM's mandate. In attendance at the meeting in Addis Ababa were the UN



Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, UN Special Representative for Somalia, Head of UNOAU and other stakeholders. The participants were briefed on the security situation in Somalia through the proposal submitted by the Chiefs of Staff for Defence of Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, who had earlier held a series of technical consultations on 5 and 12 November 2011 respectively. The participants deliberated on the advancement of the military operation in Somalia, positive impacts of Kenyan military operations against Al-Shabaab which deprived the group of human and financial resources. They also deliberated on the need to fully secure Mogadishu and further the promotion of peace and reconciliation in Somalia for smooth implementation of the Political Roadmap to end the transition period. It was agreed at the meeting that there should be joint planning activities of the stakeholders to develop options for combining all the military operations in Somalia into a coordinated and coherent effort against Al-Shabaab. Consequently, this would enhance support to AMISOM through the provision of needed force enablers and multipliers, for the mission's operational effectiveness. Support NSF forces to enable them to assume primary responsibility for the security of Somalia as well as extend the authority of the TFG beyond the capital, but also to mobilise required financial resources for the effective implementation of the road map (AU, 2011g: UNSC, 2011d: 6; AU, 2011m: 4).

To ensure proper consultation of the stakeholders, the AUC convened a meeting of the technical experts from AU, AMISOM, UN, AMISOM TCCs and other interested countries to form the Joint AU-UN TAM. The Joint TAM meetings to develop a draft of the new strategic concept for AMISOM were held on 24 – 25 November 2011. Another meeting held between 16- 17 December 2011, discussed options for the consolidation, expansion and coordination of the AMISOM, TFG and KDF forces in Somalia (AU, 2011m: 5). The AUC organised a meeting of the Ministers of Defence of the TCCs and other interested countries on 2 December 2011 (AU, 2011m: 5) and 4 January 2012 in Addis Ababa to review and to make useful recommendations on the strategic concept for future AMISOM's operations developed by the Joint AU-UN TAM for the implementation of the second phase of AMISOM, in accordance with the AU-PSC directives during its 302nd meeting on 2 December 2011 [CDS-Min Def/TCCs/AMISOM.REC(I)] (AU, 2011h: 2; AU, 2012a: 1).

4.1.4.2.2 Review of AMISOM's Mandate and Concept of Operations

The Joint AU-UN TAM comprising the members of the UNOAU and AU PSOD under the auspices of the AUC was given the task to review the mandate of AMISOM and develop the strategic concept for AMISOM. The Joint AU-UN TAM in collaboration with the Chiefs of Staff for Defence and Ministers of Defence of the TCCs, PCCs and the partners organised

the meetings to review the security situation in Somalia and the assistance needed for the AMISOM's operation that should be adopted in the concept of operation.

The communiqué of the meeting was part of the report submitted by the AUC to the AU-PSC for approval. In 2010, the revised CONOPs increased the troop strength from 8,000 to 20,000, with requisite air and maritime capabilities, an enhanced police component of 1,680, comprising 560 police experts on mission and 8 FPU's of 140 each, and an enhanced civilian component (AU, 2010c:30). The revised CONOPs for AMISOM was re-submitted with the incorporation of an additional guard force of a battalion of 850 with the UN authorised 12,000 troops, to provide protection for the AU, the UN and the TFIs in Mogadishu. It was endorsed by the AU-PSC during its 293rd meeting on 13 September 2011, following the technical consultative workshop organised by the AUC in Addis Ababa on 17 – 18 August 2011 (AU, 2011e: 2–3).

In accordance with the directive of the 298th, 302nd and 305th AU-PSC meeting, and various consultative meetings held with the TCCs, EU, UN, and a field visit to Somalia between 9 and 17 December 2011, the Joint AU/UN TAM submitted the new strategic concept with the incorporation of the revised CONOPs for AMISOM adopted during the AU-PSC 293rd meeting of the 13 September 2011. The new strategic concept recommended increasing the troop's strength from 12,000 to 17,731 troops with adequate enablers and force multipliers, a guard force, 260 individual police officers and 2 FPU's, comprising 140 personnel each. The Joint AU-UN TAM convened the meetings of the stakeholders to review the CONOPs for AMISOM. The exercise led to the endorsement of the new strategic concept for AMISOM during the 306th communiqué of the AU-PSC on 5 January 2012 and the UN approval with its resolution 2036(2012) of 22 February 2012 (AU, 2011i: 1; UNSC, 2012b).

The adoption of the strategic concept for AMISOM on 22 February 2011 ushered in the second phase of the AMISOM's operations. The mission area of operations was expanded to central and southern Somalia.

4.1.4.3 Contribution of Troops

The AU member states, especially the TCCs consisting of the IGAD member states (Uganda, Kenya and Djibouti,) with the non-IGAD member state of Burundi contributed troops for AMISOM between 2007 and 2012, to ensure a sustained peace mission and rotations of troops (AU Official, 2013). These contributions of the stakeholders have had a

significant impact on AMISOM's operations. Nonetheless, there are factors that determine the extent of the stakeholders' contributions to the peace and security of Somalia.

4.2 Stakeholders' Collaboration Process

The foundation of the collaboration between the stakeholders of the AMISOM's operation (the AU, IGAD, EU and the UN) is centred on the AU and it is based on the mutual recognition of various important issues. As an AU-led peace mission, the political authority for the achievement of the mission is within the auspices of the AU. Although the UN has the sole responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the two bodies are aware that a single organisation cannot handle the challenges of Africa's peace and security. The peace and security challenges in Africa, especially in Somalia have been the core agenda of the UNSC. In spite of the AU's important political authority for addressing Africa's peace and security challenges, it is a known fact that the AU lacks the necessary material and financial capabilities to single-handedly resolve the crisis in Somalia. Therefore the AU decided to collaborate with various stakeholders, notably the IGAD, EU and the UN, towards the smooth operation of AMISOM (Boutells& Williams, 2013: 4).

To ensure Africa's ownership of the AMISOM's operation, the contributions of the stakeholders is anchored on AU requests released in the communiqués of either the AU-PSC or the Assembly communicated by the Chairman of the AUC to the UNSC and UNGA for approval (AU, 2010c: 6). Hence, the stakeholders' contributions to AMISOM are made directly to the AU or to the TCCs of AMISOM on a bilateral basis.

4.2.1 Collaboration Model

The collaboration model for the AMISOM's operations can be termed as the division of labour among the stakeholders or complementary support, dependent on coincidence of the stakeholders' political agenda. The AU and its regional body, IGAD, provide the troops while the UN supports mainly in the logistics and operational aspects through the UNSOA and financially through the UNTF and UN assessed fund. On the other hand, the EU pays the troops allowances while other partners provide in-kind support in the form of training and equipment in a bilateral relationship with the TCCs and PCCs (Boutells& Williams, 2013: 12).

AU collaborates closely with the UN to ensure coherence and complement efforts of stakeholders' contributions particularly through the UNSOA and the UNTF organisations, established to support the AMISOM's operations in accordance with UNSC resolution 1863

(2009) (EC, 2012b: 4). The collaboration of the stakeholders is intertwined in a pattern whereby the UN's final approval determines the contributions of the stakeholders. UNSC's endorsement of the AU-PSC communiqués gives the AU the approval to solicit for necessary support. EU's fund commitment for AMISOM's troop allowance is based on UN's approval, while the EU agreement to fund the troop allowances determined the number of troops that IGAD and the AU TCCs deployed for the mission within the agreed period. Nevertheless, collaboration of the stakeholders is also anchored on the MoU that forms the legal framework which determines the structure of the collaboration.

4.2.1.1 AU and UN Collaboration Framework

The collaboration between the AU and the UN and its sub-regional organisations has been increasingly employed within the legal framework of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter to meet the goal of peace and stability on the African continent. The collaboration is based on the recognition that successful collective action relies on an effective and strategic partnership between the UNSC and the AU-PSC (AU, 2012b: 11). This facilitates coherent decision-making and clear division of responsibility based on respective comparative advantages (AU, 2012b: 11; Boutells& Williams, 2013:1). The UNSC's approval for the AU-PSC's authorised mandate for AMISOM gives the AU the legitimate right to access funds from the EU APF and source funds from other donors (Deblomet *et al*, 2008: 20).

The collaboration between the AU and UN on Africa's security issues, especially on the Somalia crisis, led to the establishment of the annual periodic meetings members of UNSC and AU-PSC have held interchangeably in New York and Addis Ababa since 2007 to discuss the various countries' specific issues. In these joint meetings African non-permanent members of the UNSC are placed in important positions, especially, if they are simultaneously members of the AU-PSC (AU, 2012b: 11; Boutells& Williams, 2013: 4). UN collaboration with the AU in relation to the effectiveness of the AMISOM's operation is mainly in the area of logistics and financial supports. It became operational with the approval of the UNSC resolution 1863 (2009) that formed the general legal framework of the support package while UNSC resolution 2036(2012), enhanced the support package for the newly approved strategic concept.

However, for the operational implementation of the UN support package for the AMISOM's operations, a MoU was signed between UN and AU on 12 July 2009 which formed the legal framework of that aspect of the collaboration. The MoU defined the overarching responsibilities and obligations of the two parties in support of AMISOM (UNSC, 2009f: 12).

In July 2010, the two bodies also decided to conduct a collaborative joint assessment of selective peace missions including AMISOM (AU, 2012b: 11). The collaboration of the UNSC and AU-PSC is the highest political collaboration of the two bodies in relation to peace and security in Africa. Their decisions formed the legal framework of the activities of AU-led peace missions inclusive of AMISOM.

4.2.1.2 AU and IGAD Collaboration Framework

The collaboration between the AU and IGAD is within the legal framework of Article 16.1(a) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the AU-PSC (2002). According to the protocol, the AU-PSC has the role to “harmonise and coordinate the activities of the Regional Mechanisms (RM) in the field of peace, security and stability to ensure that these activities are consistent with the objectives and principles of the Union” (AU, 2002: 23). In 2008, the MoU was signed between the AU and the eight RECs of which IGAD was a signatory. The MoU also emphasised the “recognition of the respect for the primary responsibility of the Union in the maintenance and promotion of the peace, security and stability in Africa” in section 4ii of the Article (AU, 2008g: 4), and called for the AU to co-ordinate the efforts of these parties to harmonise their views when dealing with the UN in section 21.1 of the Article (AU, 2008g: 10).

However, Article 4iv of the MoU called for adherence to the principles of subsidiary, complementarity and comparative advantage. This section of the article gives the RECs the opportunity for bilateral relationship with the foreign partners. Therefore, IGAD has been able to relate directly with other stakeholders in the Somalia peace process as the EU and the UN to support its role as a major troop contributor in the sub-region towards the AMISOM's operations. It also assisted the IGAD to solicit financial and logistics assistance through various bilateral collaborations (AU, 2008g: 4).

IGAD's collaboration with the AU is mainly as the major troop contributing region in Africa. The highest number of troops is contributed by Uganda. For five years of the AMISOM's operation in Somalia, only Uganda and Burundi contributed troops. Apart from contributing troops for the AMISOM's operations, the IGAD leadership solicits support of other African countries in the areas of troop contribution and financial contribution through the press statements and communiqués released during the bi-annual IGAD ministerial meetings and annual IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government extra-ordinary meetings.

The harmonisation of IGAD's efforts toward Somalia peace and security, their communiqués and press statements are communicated to the AU-PSC for approval and implementation through the AUC. To provide a legal framework between AU and the TCCs countries, the AUC signed a MoU with each TCC to signify the commencement of the contract and agreement on the details of the troop deployment. This is different from the MoU under the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the AU-PSC (2002), (UNSC, 2012d: 7; AU, 2012e).

4.2.1.3 EU and AU's Collaboration Framework

The collaboration between EU and AU on the AMISOM's operation is anchored on the Joint Africa-EU strategy adopted in Lisbon in 2007 and it was confirmed at the third Africa-EU Summit in 2010. The JAES sets out both sides intention to proceed beyond donor/recipient models towards working together on jointly identified, mutual and complementary interests. The EU support under the JAES works towards the African-led and owned approaches strengthening the primary responsibility of the African governments on all issues inclusive of peace and security (EC, 2012d: 8, 11). The adoption of the Africa-EU strategic partnership marked a new phase in the relationship between the two continents, with the principles of equality, partnership and ownership. In the field of peace and security, three main priorities were identified: that is, exchanging dialogue on challenges to peace and security, full operationalisation of the APSA and predictable funding for African-led PSO (Helly, 2009: 149).

Further, the collaboration between the AU and the EU in relation to the funding of the AMISOM's operations is a joint management based on the signature of the contribution agreement as set out in the Aide-Memoire services of the Contribution Agreement between the AUC and EU Council signed on 27 August 2009, and the revised Aide-Memoire agreement signed on 1 June 2011., There have been various dialogues between the EU and AU in relation to the peace and security in Africa, of which the Somalia crisis is a focal point emphasising the importance of the continuous successful management of AMISOM to sustain the joint management modality of the financial contribution (EC, 2012b: 6–7) for the effectiveness of the collaboration.

Moreover, one of the fora for the bilateral collaboration is the AU-PSC and EU-PSC annual joint consultative meeting held alternately in Brussels and Addis Ababa since 2008. The meeting focuses on the crisis in Africa and examines specific country cases detailed and reviews action implemented in different conflict contexts by both sides. The collaboration is built around themes, especially on the crucial and critical issues from shared and argued

positions. Both PSCs recognised that the consultation is the pillar of their collaboration, because it allowed them to reflect on their collaboration and the required collaborative action needed to achieve peace (Pirozzi, 2009: 20; Link, 2009b: 8; EC, 2012d: 9–10).

4.2.1.4 Multilateral Collaboration Forum

For the multilateral co-ordination of the stakeholders' forum, the AU-PSC established the AMISOM Partners Group to provide an avenue for the stakeholders to deliberate on the contribution to AMISOM during the monthly meeting held in Addis Ababa (EC, 2012b: 4; AU Official, 2013; EU-APF Manager, 2013). The AU-PSC open forum also provides the avenue for the stakeholders to deliberate on AMISOM and the required assistance for the mission's effectiveness (AU Official, 2013). AUC organises technical workshops and meetings of the Ministers of Defence and Chiefs of Staff for Defence of the TCCs, potential TCCs and the stakeholders, whereby AMISOM's operations are reviewed for the identification of the areas of support needed for the mission's effectiveness (AU, 2011b: 3).

The stakeholders' collaboration process is instituted mainly on the bilateral framework between the AU and other stakeholders such as IGAD, EU and UN. The bilateral framework is based on a legal framework of various bilateral agreements. The multilateral collaboration is not founded on any legal framework, which makes it a challenge for the AU to effectively manage various stakeholders involved in the AMISOM's operations. The multilateral collaboration is only a platform for deliberation whereby the decisions reached may not be binding on any of the stakeholders.

4.3 *Factors that Determine the Stakeholders' Contributions*

The longevity of the Somalia crisis as a failed state situation revealed that the AU alone cannot handle the situation and there is a need for the involvement of external actors. For instance, the interconnectivity between civil wars and their impact such as the refugee problem, terrorism, and piracy has spurred the need for the international community to become involved as external actors. The negative impacts of the internal conflict reflect the intra-connectivity between internal conflict and the disruption of peace and economic activities in the neighbouring countries (Raffaelli, 2007: 127; Shimizu & Sandler, 2010: 1479-1484). However, the Al-Shabaab threat, especially its alliance with Al Qaeda increased the local and international efforts in resolving the crisis in Somalia.

4.3.1 Restoration of Somalia State and Institutions

The restoration of the state of Somalia and its institutions was perceived by the international community as the foundation for peace and security because the longer law and order is absent from Somalia, the greater the chances for international terrorists to use it as a safe haven that will create threats to regional and international peace and security (UNSC, 2007g: 4). Moreover, in consideration of the longevity of the security crisis and absence of a functional government, it became a reality that neither the Somalis alone, nor the IGAD nor the AU can resolve Somalia unique problem of a failed state. This necessitated the collaboration of the local and the regional organisations for the resolution of the crisis. To provide a secure environment for the restoration of the Somalia state government and institutions (Shimzu & Sandler, 2010: 1479-1484). Thus, the underlining factors for the collaboration of the stakeholders in resolving Somalia crisis centred on the restoration of state institutions, the solution to the conflict and other associated problems (AU, 2010c: 1).

4.3.2 Somalia's Development

The interdependency between security and sustainable development informed the involvement of UN, IGAD, AU and especially EU to ensure peace in Somalia. The EU-APF's financial support to AMISOM is an integral part of the EU's comprehensive and long-term approach to support security and development efforts in Somalia. AMISOM's crucial role in peace and security in Somalia determines the APF's crucial role in ensuring the provision of funds for the sustainability of the mission to create a secured environment for development (EC, 2012d: 8, 20).

4.3.3 Protection of Global Trade Flow

The protection of the flow of global trade is identified as one of the reasons for the involvement of the stakeholders, especially the EU, in the restoration of peace and security in Somalia through counter-piracy. Basil Germond and Michael Smith point out that a large share of the EU's oil imports are likely to transit the Gulf of Aden because "six million barrels a day, which is more than 12 per cent of global oil transport" travel through the Gulf. This is particularly important when the EU's reliance on Russia for energy supplies is considered; the power Russia could gain over Europe if oil is no longer transported from the Middle East through the Gulf of Aden could potentially be reason enough to involve the EU in counter-piracy (Germond & Smith, 2009: 580).

4.3.4 *African Ownership*

The previous lessons learnt in the international commitment towards restoration of peace in Rwanda and Somalia was agonising for the continent. Therefore, to avert the reoccurrence of these failures, African leaders decided to take the lead role and greater ownership in the security of Africa inclusive of Somalia. Nevertheless, the African leaders recognise the importance of partnership, but they believe that Africa should not always rely on the international community to address the threats to African peace and security (IISS, 2011: 397). Therefore, the principle of an African solution to an African problem and African ownership have been factors that underlined AU and IGAD's commitments in ensuring security and peace in Somalia (SAIIA Director, 2013; ISS Senior Researcher, 2013; EU-APF Manager, 2013). Within the framework of African ownership, the AU and IGAD member states are involved in the Somalia crisis as a response to the African humanitarian crisis and good brotherliness and not the dividends of troop contribution (ISS Senior Researcher, 2013). The benefits of TCCs are only an end result of the deployment of troops. This benefit is associated with the sacrificial support, considering the level of insecurity in Somalia where many of the troops have been killed (ISS Senior Researcher, 2013). The principle of African ownership underlines EU's financial support to AMISOM from the APF instrument. To this end, there will be a formal request from Africa to the EU before the initiatives can be funded through the APF instrument (EC, 2012d: 9).

4.3.5 *Economic Factors*

The economic benefits that could be derived from Somalia and other countries in the region are other critical factors for the stakeholders' contribution (SAIIA Director, 2013; AU Official, 2013). Without a peaceful environment, the economy of Somalia cannot be fully utilised and it will not be conducive for foreign investors to invest in Somalia and other countries in the region. One of the economic benefits that could be derived from the peace and stability of Somalia is the hydrocarbon deposits. For this reason, the foreign stakeholders are involved to provide a safe environment for oil extraction. According to the AU official, there are speculations that some of the new stakeholders, especially from the Middle East, are involved to forge stronger economic ties with Somalia (AU Official, 2013). The security and stability of Somalia which could only be provided by AMISOM if fully supported will provide an avenue for peacebuilding and reconstruction of Somalia. This will probably provide an economic dividend for the investors from the stakeholders' states. Therefore, these investors are using all the instruments such as their regional bodies to support the peace process in Somalia.

Another aspect of the economic factors is that the crisis in Somalia disrupts the economic activities of the neighbouring countries and their partners. The tourism sector of neighbouring countries such as Kenya was greatly affected by the impact of the terrorism that sprouted from Somalia. Tourists were afraid to travel to Kenya for fear of being kidnapped or killed. Therefore, to prevent more adverse impacts of the Somalia crisis on the economy of the neighbouring countries and partners, they are involved in Somalia to ensure the stability and peace of the country (Shimizu & Sandler, 2010: 1479-1484). In an independent opinion poll conducted in Mogadishu between 2010 and early 2012, half of Mogadishu's residents believe strongly that foreign nations have intervened in the Somalia crisis out of self-interest (Ochami & Opiyo, 2012).

4.3.6 Image Management

In order to improve their image in African conflict resolution and development, the international, regional and sub-regional organisations have contributed to the peace process in Somalia, especially, the AMISOM peace operation. The stakeholders collaborate to sustain a perceived African-led model of PSO, an exemplary model for the implementation of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, and the promotion of coordination and cooperation between the UN and AU (AU Official, 2013). The African continent has contributed in a leading role toward the Somalia peace process through sub-regional organisation, IGAD and the regional organisation, AU and through the deployment of troops for AMISOM's operation. The active role in the regional peacekeeping in Africa has improved the image of the AU in the international community. IGAD, a region known for crisis, famine and instability has also been able to improve its image in Africa and the world as a region that can actively contribute and participate in peace and conflict resolution in its region.

The EU is actively involved in the AMISOM's operation to show its commitment to peace in Africa, not only as an economy bilateral partner but as a contributor to African peace and development (EU-APF Manager, 2013). The ability of the EU to resolve the Somalia crisis through peaceful means and within the framework of effective dialogue with the Islamic world will improve EU's positive image as a neutral and unbiased party in other regions where the EU needs to play the active role of a strong player (Raffaelli, 2007: 127). The involvement of the EU in anti-piracy in Somalia is also an opportunity to take the lead on a global issue that has the potential to establish the EU as a realistic provider of security globally (Germond & Smith, 2009: 582). Moreover, the EU is committed to AMISOM as the substance of its agreement with the AU in the JAES-Cotonou agreement signed in 2007

has support for African peace and security as one of the pillars. Thus, to preserve the EU's image as a truce keeper, the organisation and its member states are committed to the AMISOM's operation (EU-APF Manager, 2013). Arguably the commitment may be politically based, whereby the publicly exhibited support is lesser than the actual support committed (AU Official, 2013).

The UN is also involved in a supportive role to AMISOM and has shown its commitment to international peace and security especially in Somalia. It has also shown its commitment in combating the scourge of terrorism and piracy which affects the international community as a whole (ISS Senior Researcher, 2013).

Image management is one of the key factors for the involvement of the organisations such as IGAD, AU, EU and UN in the deployment, financing, logistics support and training for AMISOM to assist in its operation in Somalia.

4.3.7 Collective Security

The factor of collective security is another reason for the contributions of the stakeholders. The principle of collective security through "common responsibility" and pooling together of resources for the maintenance of world peace and security as stated in the UN Charter VII has always been an underlining factor for the stakeholders' involvement in conflict resolution (UNSC, 2009a: 4). On the other hand, it is the reality of the security impact on the affected countries. The Honourable Mohammed Yusuf Haji, Kenya's Minister of State for Defence, during the signing of the MoU between the AUC and Kenya as a troop and resource-contributing country to AMISOM on 2 June 2012, mentioned that the stabilisation of Somalia is critical to the collective security of Eastern Africa, the rest of the continent and to international peace and security (AU, 2012e).

4.3.8 Terrorism

Terrorism is one of the major factors that influence the AU and IGAD as well as other stakeholders such as the EU and the UN to improve their contributions towards the stabilisation and security of Somalia. The scourge of terrorism in Somalia led by Al-Shabaab, the youth military wing of the defunct ICU, with the support from foreign fighters and the declaration of its affiliation with Al-Qaeda on 10 February 2012 caused critical concern for the international community (IMG, 2012: 11; AU, 2011k: 2). The Assembly of the IGAD Heads of State and Government identified the conflict in Somalia as a conflict between the

people of Somalia and an international terrorist group and not merely a conflict among Somalis (IGAD, 2010b). In the press release of the IGAD Council of Ministers on 9 January 2012, the Ministers declared that the brunt of the escalation of terrorism is borne directly by countries in the East African region. As a result; the leadership of the region is determined to curb terrorism.

Thus, the international community is using all the available resources: human (troops), political and financial, to ensure peace and security for the restoration of central government in Somalia and displacement of the Al Shabaab militants. The increase in the financial commitment of the UN and EU to the AMISOM's operation is linked to the terrorism issue because almost all stakeholders' member states pursue the foreign policy of counterinsurgency (AU Official, 2013).

4.3.9 Piracy

The high rate of piracy in the Horn of Africa, mostly by Somali pirates forced the international community to focus on restoring peace and security to Somalia. For the activities of the Somali-based pirates threaten not only the peace, security and stability of Somalia, but also regional and international security as well. The piracy distorts the trade movements between Europe, Asia and Africa. In 2010, Somali pirates successfully hijacked 35 ships in nine months, compared to 34 hijackings that occurred in the same period in 2009. The economic benefits to the pirates and lack of institutional and democratic government in Somalia hindered the efforts of the international community to curb the scourge of piracy. Therefore to address the root of the piracy problem, the international community is involved in the stabilisation of peace and security in Somalia. According to the US Deputy Secretary Steinberg at the AU Summit High-Level meeting on Somalia in 31 January 2011 at the UN Conference Centre at ECA, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, "piracy emanating from Somalia threatens international shipping, commerce, and regional development, and the ransom money flowing into Somalia and its neighbours is further destabilising the region" (USAU, 2011; IMG, 2012: 7).

4.3.10 Refugee and Immigration Problem

Refugee and immigration problem is also one of the factors that contributed to the involvement of the stakeholders. The risks and problems of refugees and immigration have been a major concern to the sub-region, particularly Kenya, and the EU, especially Italy. The high influx of refugees in Kenya affects social and internal security in the country. In the

same vein, high numbers of asylum seekers have strained the economy of affected nations within the EU. Therefore, to prevent further problems that the Somalia crisis has directly and indirectly inflicted on the affected countries, their contributions to the Somalia peace process and security became a necessity. This is reflected in their commitment to the AMISOM's operation in Somalia (Raffaelli, 2007: 125,127; Shimizu & Sandler, 2010: 1479-1484; UNSC, 2011b: 5). Somalis in diaspora are not only a threat to the countries they migrated to, rather, they also created networks that support the hindrance of conflict resolution within Somalia (UNSC, 2007g: 4). Therefore the determination to curb the impact of refugees and immigration, especially in the neighbouring country of Kenya, Ethiopia and European nations is another major undertone for the involvement of the stakeholders, particularly, IGAD and EU.

4.3.11 Geographical Proximity and the Internationalisation of the Crisis

The concrete contributions from the IGAD countries and the EU are associated with their geographical proximity to Somalia. Hence, the fear of the regionalisation and internationalisation of the crisis especially through terrorists who may be EU citizens necessitated the use of all available apparatus to curb the poor security situation. This is one of the pillars for the EU partnership with the AU under the framework of the Strategic Partnership signed at the Lisbon Summit in December 2007 (Raffaelli, 2007: 125, 127; IISS, 2011: 397). The geo-strategic security consideration is one of the major factors for the involvement of the stakeholders (AU Official, 2013); As the issue of regional and international factors: such as piracy, the use of Somalia as a stage for a proxy war among neighbours, proliferation of arms and the presence of international terrorist cells- created significant regional and international threats to peace and security (UNSC, 2007g: 4).

IGAD is involved in the AMISOM's operation because of the fact that the IGAD states have geographical proximity to Somalia and are in the front-line of any potential negative or positive impacts flowing from the conflict management initiatives (SAIIA Director, 2013). The twin bomb blast in Kampala and the various terrorist attacks along the Kenya-Somalia border and recently the terrorist attack at Westgate Centre, Nairobi, are part of the reasons for IGAD's major concern and its contribution to the stability of Somalia.

4.3.12 Dividends of Troop Contributions

The dividends for countries that contribute troops, such as the reimbursement of COEs and payment for the troops are also one of the factors for the TCCs and PCCs countries (AU

Official, 2013). These dividends are also associated with the benefits associated with the conflict management initiatives as posited by the SAIIA Director when he was interviewed.

The factors that determine the stakeholders contributions are categorised as international peace and security, African ownership, and economic factors which are determined by the political interest of the stakeholders' member states (ISS Senior Researcher, 2013; AU Official, 2013; EU-APF Manager, 2013; SAIIA Director, 2013).

4.4 Challenges of the Collaboration Process

The political and economic interests of the stakeholders which determine their involvement in the AMISOM's operations also constitute challenges towards the achievement of the mission's operation. The challenges of the collaboration process are discussed below.

4.4.1 Limited Troop Strength

Despite the approval of the AU-PSC and UNSC for the deployment of AMISOM in 2007 with 8,000 troops, Uganda was the first country to deploy its troops with a strength of 1,700 on ground till December 2007 when they were joined by the Burundi troops (UNSC, 2007c: 7). The other member states of the AU failed to deploy troops as pledged (UNSC, 2007c: 5). The Ugandan troops were based mainly at the Mogadishu airport where they conducted security tasks in and around the airport. The inability of the AU to raise the required forces hindered the expansion of the areas controlled by the mission and completion of the first phase of the anticipated four phases of the planned deployment necessary for the withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops from Mogadishu (UNSC, 2007c: 7). The potential TCCs were concerned with the lack of political framework and agreement in Somalia between the TFG and the insurgent groups, on which the deployment would be based. Nevertheless, a progressive improvement in the political situation towards the end of the transition provided more certainty for added support from the potential TCCs (EC, 2012b: 6).

4.4.2 Non-Attractive TCCs Support Arrangement

Another major challenge to the collaboration of the stakeholders was that the support arrangements were not attractive to the potential future TCCs. The AU could not guarantee reimbursement to the TCCs with only less than ten percent of the overall budget received. This discouraged countries from providing the expected additional troops for the mission and

made them turn to the well-funded missions such as the UN-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). As stated in the report of the AUC Chairperson to the UNSG delivered by the UNSG to the UNSC on March 2008-although the AU appreciated the bilateral support that the UN mobilised for the TCCs of Uganda and Burundi, it noted that the pledge of troops from Nigeria and Ghana would not materialise at the required time until there was a robust, secure support package for the TCCs (UNSC, 2008b: 19). Moreover, the stakeholders' reluctance to increase their commitment and the plans for international stabilisation force prevented the necessary levels of the mission support for the mission's operation, thus limiting the troops to a limited coverage area in Mogadishu before the establishment of UN'SOA in 2009 (Franke, 2009: 260).

4.4.3 Weak Financial Management

One of the challenges to the stakeholders' collaboration in support of AMISOM's operations was the weakness in the AU financial management which was specific to the mission. It was a general concern of the EU with regards to the way funds were handled by the AU (Pirozzi, 2009: 29-30; EC, 2012d: 25). The AU however, has taken substantial steps to improve AMISOM's financial management through a series of priority actions adopted between 2009 and 2012. These include the review and redistribution of responsibilities in the budget preparation and execution process, recruitment of a Head of Finance and Accounting within AMISOM and the tightening of AMISOM's internal control procedures. The improved strategies have had a positive impact on the quality of AMISOM's financial management, and substantial encouraging improvements have been noted (EC, 2012b: 6; EC, 2012d: 25). However, the EUC press release on its decision on the approval of funds AMISOM VIII, still expresses its concern 'the management system set up by the AUC for the management of EU funds. According to them, it is yet to fully comply with all the conditions set out in Article 29 of the Financial Regulation applicable to the 10th EDF' (EC, 2012c). The press release revealed that AUC's financial management is a major challenge to the financial contributions of the stakeholders such as the EU.

4.4.4 Duration of Fund Approval and Release

The lengthy period involved in the decisionmaking procedures for the release of APF funds for AMISOM is also a major challenge to the financial support. The long procedures do not adapt to the urgent needs of the AU and IGAD peace support operation in Somalia (Poulton *et al*, 2010: 27). All APF contracts require an EC financing decision, which normally requires a full clearance and approval process with 30 signatures. As shown in figure 1 page

47, the period of the EU financial commitment and payment date reveal a major challenge in the area of release of funds. According to one of the research participants, the publicity gained by the EU commitment to AMISOM is only for political reasons, to show its commitment while the realities of the commitment undergo serious scrutiny and delay.

4.4.5 Inadequate Co-ordination

The involvement of numerous stakeholders apart from the EU, UN and IGAD has made it difficult for proper coordination. There is no well-planned institutional framework within which the roles of all the stakeholders are co-ordinated (ISS Senior Researcher, 2013; EU-APF Manager, 2013). The complexity of the locations of the stakeholders is another factor that hinders proper coordination; AMISOM is located in two countries; Mogadishu in Somalia and Nairobi in Kenya, AU in Addis Ababa, UN in New York and EU in Brussels with different contributions (EU-APF Manager, 2013). This creates the issue of different lines of reporting for the AU to the stakeholders for accountability (AU Official, 2013; ISS Senior Researcher, 2013).

4.4.6 Political Interest

Political interest of the stakeholders is a crucial factor that determines their position on the contributions made towards AMISOM's operations. The UN's commitment to AMISOM is determined by the interest of its member states, especially the member states of the UNSC where the UN's interest in the political process in Somalia determines their contributions towards AMISOM's operations to ensure stability for the political process (ISS Senior Researcher, 2013). The EU member states also consider if the AU's request to be funded is politically appropriate before the funds are released for AMISOM (EU-APF Manager, 2013). The political interest of IGAD's members towards the stability of Somalia geared their total commitment as visible in the military strength of AMISOM. The AU member states' political will is geared mainly towards soliciting for international support while the contribution of funds and troops for AMISOM has not been encouraging. The level of the stakeholders' political interest sometimes makes them less sensitive to the contextual needs of the AMISOM's operations (AU Official, 2013).

4.4.7 AU's Financial Commitment

The lack of financial commitment from the AU member states placed the bulk of the funding for AMISOM's operations on the EU and the international community. It reduced the funds

that should have been available for the mission and undermined the extent of the support the international community could have contributed. In addition, since the bulk of the funds for the financing of the AMISOM are contributed by the EU and the UN, the AU lacks the authority to decide on the priority of implementation (Link, 2009b).

4.4.8 AU Commission's Limited Staff

Another major challenge encountered in the collaboration of the stakeholders towards the deployment and operation of AMISOM was the limited availability of staff in the AU headquarters for the planning, deployment and management of the mission's operation in Somalia. The limitations with the bulk of duties required and different lines of reporting to different stakeholders hindered the effective institutionalisation of the support and the co-ordination of stakeholders (UNSC, 2007c: 7; Pirozzi, 2009: 25). One of the interviewees also recognised that the AU faced some institutional challenges that needed to be tackled by restructuring.

4.4.9 Somalia Security Situation

The volatile security situation in Mogadishu and continued attacks against AMISOM and UN 0 not only affected AMISOM military operation because the potential TCCs were reluctant to deploy their troops considering the tense security situation, but it also affected commitment of the UNSOA to provide adequate logistics support already mandated to AMISOM. The UNSOA could not operate directly in Mogadishu until mid-2010 because of the security situation in Somalia. The UNSOA's duties in Mogadishu were contracted to contractors which hindered the effectiveness of the service because the UNSOA staffs were not on-site. Clear examples of security challenges faced were the attacks on four maritime vessels that transported UNSOA consignments to AMISOM in 2009. Three of the vessels were attacked by the insurgents' mortars in Mogadishu harbour while the fourth was unsuccessfully attacked by pirates (UNSC, 2009g: 6).

4.4.10 Financial Constraint

The limited financial support was a critical challenge to effective deployment of the AMISOM troops and subsequent impact on their operation in Somalia. A year after the authorisation and deployment of the first AMISOM troops, the total contribution was \$32 million as opposed to the annual budget of \$622 million for the troop of 8,000 (AU, 2008b: 9; Franke, 2009: 261). By 2009, there was an improvement in the pledges made as well as

logistical and financial support received from a number of countries to the UNTF. Unfortunately, the resources were far below AMISOM's requirements for the full deployment and sustenance of its operations (UNSC, 2009b: 5), of \$817,500,000 per year for the UN standard of 8,000 troops (AU, 2008d: 7). Lack of financial commitment from the international community was influenced by the internal financial constraints that many of the UN member states faced (UNSC, 2010c: 8), and this could be linked to the global financial and economic crisis that affected the international community between 2007 and 2012 but which was more critical in 2008. A major constraint which affected other areas of support required by the mission was the lack of sufficient funds

4.4.11 Caveats on Funds for Military Component

The placement of caveats on the financial contributions received for the UNTF despite the generous contributions prevented expenditure towards the military component of AMISOM. As a result, there were minimal funds that could be used to finance the COE reimbursement. The available funds were frequently exhausted and the UN found it difficult to reimburse AMISOM troop contributors (UNSC, 2010c: 11). As of December 2011, the TCCs were owed 9 months of COE reimbursement, which caused equipment shortfalls, lack of enablers and force multipliers required in the difficult security environment (UNSC, 2011d: 7).

4.4.12 Multiplicity of Actors

Although the EUTM's objective can be rated as successful, challenges were encountered with the EU's training of the SPF. . The number of various actors involved in the selection process caused delay in the number of trainees received. The delay was attributed to the security situation in Somalia and the novelty of the co-operation arrangement between EU and its partners, rather than absolute disadvantage (Oksamytna, 2011: 100). The multiple stakeholders meant AMISOM had support from various angles, but on the other hand, it was difficult to effectively co-ordinate them, because of AU institutional incapacity.

4.4.13 Parallel Support for an AU-led Peace Mission

The parallel support for AMIS at the early stage of AMISOM deployment in 2007 caused a lack of commitment from the international community in its support to the AMISOM's operation. In spite of several communiqués from the IGAD and the AU for provision of adequate logistics and financial support from the UN, the UNSOA and UNTF were not established until 2009. Although the approval of the UNSOA was preceded by the field

assessment missions to ascertain the modality and the extent of support required, the long period taken reflected the positional collaboration of the stakeholders. Moreover, the UN was reluctant to grant the AU's full request in relation to strengthening the troops from 8,000 to 20,000. The UNSC initially approved 12,000 in 2010 and 17,731 in 2012. However, the volatile political and security situation, especially the scourge of terrorism and the increase in the pirate hijackings from 2007 changed the attitude of the international community to invest in peace and security in Somalia, which resulted in support for the AMISOM's operation (Franke, 2009: 261; EC, 2009: 7).

These challenges encountered in the collaboration of the contributing stakeholders towards the AMISOM's operation had an adverse effect on the effectiveness of the mission. The challenges were linked to the limited political interest of the foreign stakeholders and the lack of institutional capacity on the part of the AU. Indeed, the period where these challenges were dominant was reflected in the mission's ineffectiveness. The period between 2007 and 2009 was very critical and challenging for the troops because of these challenges; although the troops were committed to the stability and security of Somalia, they were restrained because of these challenges.

CHAPTER FIVE

5 IMPACT OF THE COLLABORATION PROCESS ON AMISOM'S MANDATE

Introduction

Having examined the roles of the stakeholders, the collaboration process, and challenges of the collaboration, it is essential to identify and discuss the impact of the collaboration on the AMISOM mandate. In order to properly discuss the impact of the collaboration on AMISOM's mandate, the challenges and achievement of the AMISOM's operation must be examined. Thus, this chapter discusses the impact of the collaboration process on the AMISOM mandate and also provides the answer to the last objective and research question of the research study.

5.1 Challenges of the AMISOM's Operations

As previously identified in the fourth chapter, AMISOM has faced various challenges in executing its mandate in Somalia. The challenges encountered by the mission in the course of implementing its mandate are examined below. Immediately after its deployment, the mission was faced with its major challenges which spanned 3 years, viz. 2007-2009. Although there were other challenges after these three years of operation, the challenges during these periods were quite extensive and almost led to the termination of the mission, save for the determination of the TCCs countries who ensured the emergence of a new dispensation of peace, security and functional government in Somalia.

5.1.1 Limited Manpower

The major challenge AMISOM encountered in its operation was the limited number of troops deployed for the mission operation. The limited number of troops had an adverse effect in all other areas of the mission's mandate (Mugisha, 2011: 27). The first batch of troops deployed for the mission was 1,700 Ugandan troops. They were in Mogadishu until December 2007 and March 2008, when the Burundian troops were deployed. By the first year anniversary of the mission's deployment, the troop strength was only 2,613, compared to the 8,000 which had been authorised. The troops slowly increased to 3,450 as of November 2008 and 4,300 troops by June 2009. By August 2009, the mission gradually increased to 5,217 troops,

6,120 as of March 2010. As of October 2010, the troops were 7,200. The troop strength reached its authorised 8,000 as of December 2010. The inability of the mission to reach its authorised number 8,000 troops for almost 3 years hindered the operation of the mission.

5.1.2 Lack of Adequate Equipment and Skills

AMISOM's operations not only experienced challenges in the area of troop strength, the mission was also deployed without major critical and maritime supports until 2012 when a new enhanced strategic concept was adopted. AMISOM ground commanders conducted operations without the support of any combat aircraft, radar system or maritime capability. The absence of aircraft prevented the ground force from having the air support they should have had as they advanced to the insurgent areas. The lack of radar systems prevented AMISOM's troops from accurately targeting the insurgents' mortar launching location. Absence of maritime capability to patrol Somali waterways prevented AMISOM's troops from interrupting Al Shabaab lines of re-supply from the strategic port of Kismayo in the south (UNSC, 2009e: 4; Mugisha, 2011: 31).

AMISOM's troops were not only underequipped, the troops also lacked adequate pre-deployment training in counterinsurgency operations in built-up areas, countering improvised explosive devices (C-IED) and fighting in built-up areas (FIBUA) until 2010 when UNSOA commenced the training in collaboration with UNMAS. The adaptation of the majority of AMISOM troops (who were already versed in counterinsurgency operations in rural areas and over open terrain,) to a new terrain of fighting armed insurgent groups in built-up areas of Mogadishu with a large civilian population was a major challenge for the mission's operation (UNSC, 2010b: 11; Mugisha, 2011: 31).

5.1.3 Restricted Control Area

The mission was prevented from expanding its control area beyond the Mogadishu airport, seaport and the Villa Somalia due to a delay in deployment caused by the unwillingness of troop deployment by potential TCCs to the volatile security situation. The unwillingness on the part of the TCCs was linked to the lack of political framework among the warring groups and reimbursement of COE. On the other hand, Al-Shabaab enjoyed an increase in foreign fighters who were skilled and experienced in sophisticated warfare. This aforementioned factors thus resulted in a major challenge for the mission between 2007 and early 2010.

Meanwhile, the security situation in Mogadishu and south central Somalia became more tense: from civil war to localised insurgency. During this period, Al Shabaab, Hizbul

Islam and other protagonists controlled the central and southern regions, as well as large parts of Mogadishu, except for the few square kilometres of the presidential compound and the key infrastructures.

In the first three years of AMISOM deployment with the troop strength between 1,700 to about 3,500, the mission could only control the key infrastructures such as Aden Ade International Airport, the Villa Somalia, seaport and the military academy (Mugisha, 2011: 28). The mission was seen as 'mission impossible' considering the security situation and non-commitment of AU members and the international community to provide the necessary human, financial and logistics support (ISS Senior Researcher, 2013).

AMISOM's incapability in troop strength and equipment was exposed after the withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops from Mogadishu between 13 and 15 January, 2009. It was unable to take over all the areas vacated by the Ethiopian troops thereby giving the insurgent groups led by Al-Shabaab free control of those areas without any major fight. Further, the withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops put more pressure on the limited and under-equipped AMISOM troops as the only protector for TFG. AMISOM, now overstretched by its low troop strength and lack of equipment, continued to provide security only for the key infrastructure such as the airport, seaport and the presidential palace without any capacity to expand its area of operation (UNSC, 2009b: 3–4). By the way, AMISOM military operations were based in Mogadishu until 2010. At any rate, AMISOM gained more areas from 2011 onwards in southern and central Somalia with the assistance of major military operations launched by the TFG and its allied forces; Ahlusunnah WalJamaah (ASWJ), Ethiopian troops, and finally, the KDF which joined in October 2011.

5.1.4 Limited Government Control Area

UN's delay in the approval of the revised CONOPs for AMISOM until 2011 hindered AMISOM and TFG from expanding its control beyond Mogadishu. The absence of the TFG control outside Mogadishu made it easy for Al-Shabaab and ICU who continuously mounted their insurgency, attacking and seizing towns and villages, installing friendly local authorities and then withdrawing. By the end of 2009, Al-Shabaab had the control of key towns outside southern central Somalia and the majority of the districts in Mogadishu. This gave the insurgent groups more controlled areas and sources of income to equip themselves without any major resistance (UNSC, 2008b: 8; AU, 2008b: 9).

5.1.5 Lack of Capacity to Train Somali National Security Forces

Another challenge for AMISOM was the lack of capacity to implement the NSSP. The limited troop strength approved by the UN could not fully achieve its mandate to provide security and stability in Somalia, in consideration of the volatile security; much less fulfil the mandate to train the NSF as expected. The training of the NSF became a challenge to AMISOM's troops and thus limited the capacity of the TFG forces to lead the fight against the insurgent groups. Instead of AMISOM's troops supporting the TFG troops in an ideal situation, the reverse was the case; AMISOM took the lead role with supporting the government troops as opposed to supporting the TFG troops.. Although it made efforts to train the TFG NSF as a fulfilment of its mandate for NSSP, the disorganisation and poor resources available for TFG to provide reasonable and regular allowance for the NSF undermined AMISOM's efforts. The NSF's morale was affected by the low and irregular allowances and caused a significant challenge to the operation of AMISOM between 2007 and 2010. However, there has been significant improvement since 2011 (Mugisha, 2011: 31).

5.1.6 Volatile Security Situation

The major challenge for AMISOM's operations has been centred on the volatile security situation in Somalia. The acts of terrorism were carried out by the insurgent groups such as Hizbul Islam and Al-Shabaab who in December 2010. Backed by their link with foreign fighters especially Al-Qaeda, they created a very hostile environment for AMISOM and the TFG. Al-Shabaab opposed the involvement of foreign troops in restoring stability to Somalia and upheld strict adherence to the Islamic law "Sharia". Since the deployment of AMISOM in 2007, the mission encountered volatile security in Somalia which has been protracted by the Al-Shabaab group with its local and foreign allies with experience and skills in sophisticated warfare using mortars and improvised explosives in attacks. Also, the insurgents made use of a network of tunnels and trenches and this posed another challenge to the operation of AMISOM in Mogadishu. Throughout 2007, the security situation in Mogadishu, south and central Somalia was so tense, which prevented the limited number of under-equipped AMISOM troops to make any impact to secure Mogadishu (IGAD, 2009b: 2; Mugisha, 2011: 30).

Because of the limited troops in AMISOM and NSF, it was difficult to control the influx of arms that entered Somalia for the insurgent groups. According to the report of the UNSG on Somalia, the influx of arms into Somalia in 2007 was greater than at any time since the early

1990s, which exacerbated the volatile security in the country (UNSC, 2007e: 3). The influx of arms without any restrictions assisted the insurgent groups to be fully equipped for major warfare against AMISOM and the TFG forces (UNSC, 2007g: 4 – 5; IGAD, 2009a: 2).

As of March 2008, the insurgent groups persistently launched terrorist attacks in Mogadishu, Kismayo, Jawhar, Beledweyne, Baidoa and Galkayo, targeting the Ethiopian troops, TFG forces, police stations and government authorities (AU, 2008b: 5; UNSC, 2008b: 4). There were frequent major clashes between Al-Shabaab together with the other insurgents against the Ethiopian-backed TFG in and around Baidoa, and along the Mogadishu-Afgooye-Baidoa highway. The control of Al-Shabaab over towns of Beledweyne and Wajid allowed banditry and criminality; this in turn led to the relocation of all international staff from the town while humanitarian workers were exposed to risks of assassination, abduction, harassment, improvised explosive devices, roadside bombs and piracy (UNSC, 2008b: 8; AU, 2008d: 4).

Within three months of the withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops in January 2009, AMISOM experienced eight significant attacks. The deadliest of the attacks happened on 22 February 2009, which killed 11 Burundian peacekeepers and injured many others. This gave Al-Shabaab the opportunity to score military victories, seizing control of key towns and ports in both central and southern Somalia while AMISOM was restricted to its headquarters with minimal input to Somalia security (UNSC, 2009b: 3–4; AU, 2009b: 2). Al-Shabaab took control of the seaport town of Merka in December 2008 and attacked the compounds of humanitarian agencies, including the WFP office. As of December 2008, Al-Shabaab faced serious opposition from the local clans in other regions. In Galgaduud region for instance, the ASWJ engaged Al-Shabaab in intense combat in January 2009, with a death toll of 35 people and 60 injured people in Dhusamareeb. This led to the withdrawal of Al-Shabaab from the Galgaduud region. In Baidoa, Al-Shabaab took control by negotiation with the local clan elders, following the widespread looting that happened on 25 January 2009 after the withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops (UNSC, 2009b: 3 – 4).

In the second quarter of 2009, the security situation remained tense but the TFG forces and AMISOM troops were able to repel the 7 May, 2009 attack on the Villa Somalia a few days later. It marked the first TFG force counter-attack in several months in which insurgents were dislodged from a number of strategic locations within Mogadishu. Another attack from Al-Shabaab on 19 June 2009 in key locations such as K Junction and Beledweyne, led to the death of Omar Hashi Aden, the Minister of National Security, who was killed in a large-scale suicide car bomb in Beledweyne, which also killed 30 other people. The involvement of foreign fighters from Pakistan and Afghanistan was evident during the insurgent attacks

(UNSC, 2009e: 4; Mugisha, 2011: 28). Following the unsuccessful attacks against TFG and AMISOM in May and June 2009, the insurgents led by Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam reinforced themselves with support from outside Mogadishu, and foreign fighters (UNSC, 2009f: 4 – 5). The reinforced group launched full scale attacks on key strategic positions which raged for several days with the peak on 12 July 2009 when the insurgents came within 300 metres of the Presidential palace (Villa Somalia) and attempted to take over key locations, including the old seaport, which would have allowed them access and control of Mogadishu port but the TFG forces with the support of AMISOM forced the insurgents to retreat and successfully repelled the attacks with minimal resistance. This demonstrated the ability of AMISOM to achieve its mandate to protect the TFG and key infrastructure (UNSC, 2009f: 4 – 5).

Despite this, , the TFG, with the support of AMISOM were as of the end of 2009, yet to take control of most neighbourhoods in Mogadishu and Banadir district which were under the control of the insurgent groups. Therefore, there was daily fighting with the estimated fatalities of 20 to 50 per week with most of the victims being combatants, while civilians were killed in the cross-fire and in long-range artillery and mortar attacks. On 27 August 2009, there was an unsuccessful pirate attack on the UNSOA supply vessels contracted for the AMISOM goods. In addition, on 16 August and 11 September 2009, the insurgents' mortars attacked the contracted UNSOA supply vessels for AMISOM which resulted in the deaths of 5 and 17 civilians respectively. AMISOM troops and the TFG were continuously targeted by the insurgents. There was an attack targeted against AMISOM on 17 September 2009 at the mission controlled area at the Mogadishu airport whereby two stolen UN vehicles were detonated at the mission's Force headquarters and a building used by a contracted supply company, killing at least 21 people; 17 AMISOM soldiers, of which 12 were Burundians, inclusive of the AMISOM Deputy FCs, and 5 Ugandans. A minimum of 40 people were injured during the attack, including several TFG officials and contractors. (UNSC, 2009f: 4 – 5).

During the third-quarter of 2009, the TFG forces with its allies were able to temporarily dislodge Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam in southern and central Somalia. The insurgent groups were dislodged from the towns of Beledweyne, Bulobaarde (Hiraan region) as well as some insurgent strongholds in the Gedo region. All these towns were later recovered by the insurgents (UNSC, 2009f: 4–5). In order to assist the TFG forces and for the security of Ethiopia, Ethiopian troops crossed the border into Hiraan region and briefly entered Beledweyne to dislodge the insurgents. Due to the clashes between Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam with the TFG forces and Ethiopia troops, security situation in the towns of Beledweyne

and Bulobaarde (Hiraan region) and some insurgent strongholds in the Gedo region in southern and central Somalia became more volatile and hostile (UNSC, 2009f: 4–5).

In early 2010, the security situation in Lower Juba, Lower Shabelle and the central region remained tense and volatile as a result of the fighting between Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam with the ASWJ and TFG forces (UNSC, 2010b: 3). As of September 2010, the security situation remained volatile especially in southern and central Somalia, where there were sporadic clashes between Al-Shabaab and ASWJ in the central regions. The town of Kismayo and its seaport, continued to be under the control of Al-Shabaab. The group control in Juba Valley and Kenyan border was sporadically attacked by the local clan militia associated with TFG and the rival RasKamboni group. In Mogadishu, the firing of mortars and direct attacks against Villa Somalia and the seaports increased, while the sporadic mortar fire into the Mogadishu airport continued. Improved security measures and the training in counter-improvised-explosive assisted in the decline of AMISOM casualties. Nonetheless, the frequency of attacks with improvised explosive devices in the highly populated area increased the civilian casualties (UNSC, 2010c: 3–4; AU, 2010d: 6; Mugisha, 2011: 31).

On 19 February 2011, the launch of a major military operation against Al-Shabaab in Mogadishu by AMISOM and TFG forces against the insurgent groups started. The area of operation was in south and central Somalia. Although there was a great gain for AMISOM and the TFG forces with its allies, the military operation resulted in casualties on both sides. Civilians were also part of the casualties caught in the cross-fire. ASWJ and TFG with other allies were involved in a successful offensive attack against Al-Shabaab in southern and central Somalia with the focus on the Ethiopia-Kenya-Somalia border. The violence was intensified in Gedo, Bay and Bakool regions with armed conflict highly prevalent in Bula-Hawa and less so in Beledweyne and Dola. In Mogadishu, AMISOM and TFG also launched a renewed military advancement to force Al-Shabaab out of major strategic locations such as Bakara market – the largest commercial hub in Mogadishu and a source of revenue for the insurgent group. AMISOM and the TFG forces also destroyed a network of tunnels and trenches that Al-Shabaab used in Mogadishu. In spite of the losses of Al-Shabaab through the military advancement, the insurgent group continued to receive arms and ammunition through southern Somali ports and acquired financial resources from extortion, illegal exports and taxation. On 21 February, Al-Shabaab launched a suicide car bomb attack on the TFG police training facility at HamarJabab district, killing 11 people including policemen and civilians while 40 others were injured (UNSC, 2011a: 3; Mugisha, 2011: 28).

The territorial gains secured by AMISOM and the TFG in 2011, especially with the withdrawal of Al-Shabaab from Mogadishu on 6 August 2011 (AU, 2011f: 4), considerably reduced the risk of IDF improvised device explosives and mortar attacks against the airport and its immediate environs. But, there was still a very high risk within Mogadishu, especially outside the Mogadishu airport area because of the mortar and artillery shelling; roadside, vehicle borne, and suicide bomber improvised explosive devices; armed clashes; and hand grenade and stand-off attacks (UNSC, 2011a: 9). As of August 2011, in the southern and central region, specifically in the Gedo and Juba areas, the TFG allies continued the fight against Al-Shabaab but the insurgent group was able to maintain its presence in the region and was believed to have been responsible for the improvised explosive attacks in Mandera, Kenya, in early June and late July 2011 respectively. The clan and political disputes in this region hindered the progress in the advancement against Al-Shabaab and prevented advances into Bay and Bakool while ASWJ in collaboration with other militias that opposed Al-Shabaab made limited gains in Galguduud and Hiraan (UNSC, 2011b: 4). With the heavy loss of territory to AMISOM and TFG forces by early November 2011, Al-Shabaab maintained daily terrorist attacks including the vehicle-borne improvised explosive device that killed more than 170 people on 4 October 2011. This placed all areas of Mogadishu at risk because of the improved technology reflected in the insurgent attacks (UNSC, 2011d: 5).

In the first quarter of 2012, the security situation remained volatile because of the continuous military operations on the outskirts of Mogadishu and parts of southern and central Somalia. The improved security in the Mogadishu area provided an environment relatively peaceful and conducive for political activities and the visitation by international dignitaries (UNSC, 2012d: 4–5). Al-Shabaab continued to threaten security in the Mogadishu area, but most of the attacks were prevented by the reinforced AMISOM and TFG forces. The collaboration between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaida, announced on 9 February 2012, heightened the group's terrorist threat to destabilise the political Roadmap to end the transition. However, the alleged collaboration with Al-Qaida caused a division between the leadership of Al-Shabaab who opposed it. This led to an unsuccessful three hand grenades attack on the UN sites. The Presidential palace – Villa Somalia – was also subjected to constant attacks. On 14 March 2012, there was a suicide bombing and firing of mortar rounds on 19, 20, and 26 March 2012 that claimed several lives at the Presidential Palace. Another Al-Shabaab suicide bomb detonated at the National Theatre of Mogadishu on 4 April 2012 which claimed 10 lives, including several officials of the TFG. In southern Somalia, continuous insurgent hit-and-run attacks hindered the military advances despite the numerous air strikes in Juba Dhexe and Juba Hoose, as of April 2012 (UNSC, 2012d: 7).

During the last few months of the transition, the security situation in Mogadishu was relatively peaceful but remained unpredictable. AMISOM and the NSF maintained their hold on the city, despite Al-Shabaab's frequent targeted killing and hand grenade attacks that increased in the outlying districts. The use of improvised explosive devices were minimised but there were periodic attacks, such as the one carried out on 12 September 2012 at the Jazeera Hotel while the President was present and at the Village Restaurant on 20 September 2012. These reflected Al-Shabaab's persistent threat to the stabilisation of Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab deployed the method of guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics in the recovered areas; weekly attacks in Baidoa (Bay) and Kismayo, and almost daily in the Afgooye and Merka areas. On 27 August 2012, Al-Shabaab killed a UN employee in Marka, issued threats against, and harassed other aid workers in Southern Somalia. The local support for Al-Shabaab in Shabelle Dhexe caused relatively few attacks in the region. The frequency of attacks in Beledweyne (Hiraan) decreased, but they still occurred weekly, with continued reports of harassment of civilians and aid agencies in southern Hiraan. Al-Shabaab kept a low profile in Galguduud. The intermittent clashes between the clan militias in Beledweyne and among factions of ASWJ in Galguduud disrupted aid activities (UNSC, 2013: 3).

5.1.7 Civilian and Military Casualties

The delay in the provision of the logistics support and training for the deployed AMISOM troops resulted in their use of IDF within the densely populated civilian zones. Since AMISOM adopted UN guidelines on civilian protection, efforts have been made to minimise the use of counter-battery to prevent civilian casualties. According to General Mugisha, former AMISOM FC, Al Shabaab's use of IDF within civilians' zones to provoke AMISOM counter-insurgency response resulted in the civilian casualties. The insurgent casualties are extracted from the fire-fight with AMISOM and taken to a civilian area where fighters set tyres alight to obscure observation while they fire at AMISOM with IDF in order to provoke a response. The insurgents also fired at their own casualties and shifted the blame to AMISOM, claiming that AMISOM was responsible for the civilian casualties (UNSC, 2010c: 3–4; Mugisha, 2011: 31; EC, 2012b: 5). While AMISOM made efforts to reduce civilian casualties, the involvement of other allied forces of the NSF in the combat against Al-Shabaab, through the use of improvised explosive devices in the highly populated areas increased the civilian casualties (AMISOM, 2012b).

The AMISOM troops are not left out of the casualty toll. The troops were constantly targeted by the Al-Shabaab group, during which several AMISOM military personnel were killed.

Despite the declaration of numbers of AMISOM troops killed in the report of the AUC Chairperson and UNSG, it was the view of a Somali-based newspaper that AMISOM and AU officials failed to declare the actual numbers of troops killed. This prevented accurate records of the military casualties. The high number of military casualties was because the troops were engaged in military operations against Al-Shabaab without adequate air support, adequate body armour and armoured vehicles that are vulnerable to attack by the IED (SWM, 2011). The inadequate training and limited military equipment to support AMISOM caused the civilian and military casualties that were recorded during AMISOM's operations.

5.1.8 Troops Misconduct

AMISOM troops were accused of misconduct in the course of their operations in Somalia. Barely a month after the deployment of the Ugandan troops into AMISOM, it was accused of aiding, abetting and committing war crimes in Somalia, together with the Somalis and Ethiopian troops (Nyakairu, 2007). Some of the Somali elite accused AMISOM of committing genocide against civilians, and held grievances against the international community for supporting the genocide (Hashi, 2011). In 2008, some elements of the UPDF-AMISOM troops were accused of selling ammunition to the Somali gun-runners who consequently sell it to the insurgents especially, Al-Shabaab (Garowe, 2008). In another report, the accusation of killing civilians levied against the mission encouraged Al-Shabaab to call for holy war against the mission (SMN, 2009). There are also reports of rape allegations against the AMISOM troops. These allegations are however contrary to the ethics of a peace mission.

Although this does not have a direct impact on the collaboration of the stakeholders in AMISOM's operations, nonetheless, the period of perpetration of the allegations, especially the selling of guns, coincided with the period of 2007 and 2009 when there was minimum support from the external stakeholders (EU and UN) in terms of finance and logistics support. The limited support and the contributions of the stakeholders constitute the major challenges that the mission experienced in the course of its operation in Somalia.

5.2 Achievements of AMISOM's Operations

Having faced challenges in achieving the mission's mandate mainly from 2007 and 2009, the mission recorded some achievements even in the midst of the challenges and more achievements were recorded for the mission mainly from 2010 to 2012. The contributions and collaboration of the stakeholders towards AMISOM's effective operations, manifested in the achievements of the mission mandate are discussed below.

5.2.1 Establishment of Government in Mogadishu

One of the significant successes of AMISOM's military operation is the establishment of a government presence in Mogadishu since 2008. On 20 January 2008, the TFG relocated to Mogadishu, barely a year after its deployment. The TFG took the bold move to show its commitment to stabilising the country with the support of AMISOM. By 2011, the government presence in Mogadishu was gradually extended to southern and central Somalia. The government presence evolved from interim government to the elected democratic government. It was also a very significant development in the political situation in Somalia (UNSC, 2008b: 3). The fact that the Somali government could operate in Mogadishu since 2008 has been a recorded success for the AMISOM's operations, even if it was a weak government because prior to the deployment of the mission, the Somali government could not successfully operate in Mogadishu (ISS Senior Researcher, 2013). The opportunity for the Somali government to operate directly in Mogadishu is an enormous achievement for AMISOM (EU-APF Manager, 2013; AU Official, 2013; SALLA Director, 2013).

Major military advancement in Mogadishu, south and central Somalia that commenced in February 2011 against Al-Shabaab increased the territory under the control of the Somali government in and beyond Mogadishu. The Ethiopia-Kenya-Somalia border was secured from Al-Shabaab with ASWJ and TFG with other allies on 19 February 2011 and successfully gained ground against Al-Shabaab despite repeated counter-attacks that resulted in casualties on both sides (UNSC, 2011a: 3). Al-Shabaab withdrew from Mogadishu on 6 August 2011 from the locations it had held for nearly two years, following the months of intense military operations by the TFG supported by AMISOM troops (UNSC, 2011b: 3; AU, 2011f: 4). In early November 2011, the presence of the AMISOM and TFG forces was felt across all the 16 districts in Mogadishu but it was overstretched and so many of the districts remained insecure.

The achievement of stabilising security in Mogadishu supported the Djibouti peace agreement and expanded the government controlled areas. Thus, this achievement improved public opinion on the government and AMISOM troops (ISS Senior Researcher, 2013; EU-APF Manager, 2013). The enormous progress made by AMISOM in the restoration of state authority, especially within Mogadishu, and the rapid expansion of its influence to other sectors has created some political space for a democratic transition and stabilisation efforts in Somalia, but the final conclusion on AMISOM's contribution to a successful foundation laid for peace in Somalia can be drawn when the mission's mandate ends with the transfer of authority to a traditional peacekeeping operation (AU Official, 2013).

5.2.2 Establishment of Democratic Government in Somalia

The most critical success of AMISOM's operation is the provision of an environment relatively conducive in Mogadishu, and its extension to the southern and central Somalia. This made it possible for the successful end of transition and the installation of a functional government in Somalia, after years of civil wars and unrest. Between August – September 2012, there was an end to the eight years of the transition period and interim government. AMISOM and the TFG forces were able to provide protection for the international delegates, TFG officials and the Somali delegates who participated in the final stages of the Roadmap signed in September 2011. On 1 August 2012, the provisional constitution was adopted by the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) selected by the 135 Traditional Leaders. The new Federal Parliament was inaugurated on 20 August 2012, while the Speaker was elected on 28 August 2012. Finally, on 10 September 2012, the new democratic President was elected by the parliament, thus beginning a new political dispensation for Somalia (AU, 2012f; EC, 2012b: 1). The election of the democratic government in Mogadishu by the Somalis gave the government credibility and support from the Somalis and the international community. AMISOM, formerly thought to be an impossible mission proved otherwise (ISS Senior Researcher, 2013).

5.2.3 Protection of Key Infrastructures

In accordance with the mission's mandate to protect the TFIs, support dialogue and national reconciliation and humanitarian assistance, AMISOM troops have been in control of the strategic locations in Mogadishu. As of 2008, the Villa Somalia, Aden Ade International airport, and the seaport were under the control of AMISOM troops. By 2009 locations such as KM4, the old university and the military academy were under the mission's area of operation. The increase in troop strength helped to secure more key infrastructures in Mogadishu, south and central Somalia. The protection of the key infrastructures enabled the TFG to function in Mogadishu (UNSC, 2009e: 4; AU, 2009d: 8).

5.2.4 Protection of Government Officials and Delegates

The mission provided escorts and protection for the members of the TFG and TFIs which gave them the opportunity to perform their functions as administrators for Somalia. Although there was an initial shortfall of the troop strength until 2010, the mission ensured that the task was implemented. The mission also ensured that protection was provided for the increased number of international and AU delegates that visited Somalia for political

dialogue from 2010. The surge in the number of delegates by 2010 was made possible by the improvement in security. Protection of the government and delegates provided the avenue for political dialogue in Somalia that led to the establishment of the functional government, that eventually happened in August/September 2012 (UNSC, 2009e: 4; AMISOM Bulletin, 2010b: 2; Mugisha, 2011: 29; EU-APF Manager, 2013; AU Official, 2013).

5.2.5 Training of Somali National Security Forces

In an effort to revitalise the NSF, as adopted in the Djibouti Agreement's NSSP plan, the establishment of EUTM Somalia on 7 April 2010 assisted in the training of Somali recruits. Approximately, 3,029 NSF recruits were trained by the EU trainers at the EUTM base in UPDF training centre in Bihanga, Uganda. The recruits were later reintegrated to the NSF by AMISOM at the Al-Jazeera training facility in Somalia (AU, 2010d: 12; EUTM, 2012: 18). As of August 2011, the NSF military personnel in Mogadishu were 10,298 troops (UNSC, 2011b: 12). At the end of November 2011, the NSF was 10,300 according to the payroll data, including the second batch of EUTM trained recruits that completed their training in September 2011 (UNSC, 2011d: 7; AU, 2011c: 4).

In addition, AMISOM provided support in the area of technical expertise and financial contribution, for the process of re-establishing the NSF (UNSC, 2009e: 4).

5.2.6 Improved Somali National Security Forces

By 2011, the positive impact of the EUTM trained TFG-NSF forces was felt. AMISOM and the TFG forces with their affiliated militias provided the crucial and successful advancement against Al-Shabaab. Unlike the beginning of AMISOM's operations, where the mission led the military operation, the tempo gradually changed by 2011. The NSF started leading while AMISOM provided support in the military operation. However, the military operations were successful at a reasonable cost of both military and civilian casualties. Although there was the fear that the NSF recruits could defect to the insurgent group, there was minimal defection of about 10 percent, according to AMISOM. This was made possible because prompt payment for the troops made defection less likely. (Oksamytna, 2011:103; Mugisha, 2011: 32).

5.2.7 *Acquisition of Insurgent Territories*

By March 2010, AMISOM's troop strength of approximately 6,120 together with the TFG forces gradually shifted their military frontline, from sole protection of key infrastructure and moved further north into the Al-Shabaab controlled neighbourhoods. AMISOM's troops fought their way to new outposts at Dabaka Junction, the Parliamentary building, and former Coca-Cola factory in Hodan district among other areas. By early September 2010, AMISOM held eight new positions in areas of Mogadishu, which had previously fallen under the control of the insurgent groups after the Ethiopian troops, left Mogadishu in 2009. Towards the end of 2010, the number of AMISOM outposts almost doubled with more than two dozen combat outposts in the Mogadishu areas.(Mugisha, 2011:32).

The TFG force and its allies, ASWJ, launched a major offensive in Mogadishu as well as the southern and central areas of Somalia. This attack started on 19 February 2011 and successfully gained ground along the Ethiopia-Kenya-Somalia border despite repeated counter-attacks that resulted in casualties on both sides. Also in February 2011, the TFG troops, including the first batch of 1,000 EU trained forces, with the support of 8,000 AMISOM troops, also launched a major offensive against Al Shabaab in Mogadishu, which coincided with the military operations in southern central Somalia, of Gedo, Bakool and Lower Juba on the Kenyan border. The joint AMISOM and TFG forces successfully reclaimed most of the territory that had previously been under the control of the insurgent group in Mogadishu, such as the Baraka Market (the largest commercial hub in Mogadishu), Al-Shabaab's main logistical and operational base located at the former Ministry of Defence building at Gashandigga, the former milk factory, Damanyo military camp and African village, which gave the joint troops of AMISOM and TFG, full control of Hodan district. AMISOM also completely secured Bondere district from where the insurgents could launch shell attacks on the Villa Somalia – the seat of government. On 3 April 2011, it was reported that Al-Shabaab moved most of its forces from the Kenyan-Somali border to strengthen the defence of Kismayo port. The reports of heavy casualties and intensified recruitment efforts on Al-Shabaab's part indicated that the group's capabilities had reduced. In north-east Mogadishu, four districts were still under the effective control of Al-Shabaab as of June 2011 and four other districts had approximately 9,000 AMISOM and TFG troops but they did not yet have full control. The south-western half of the city was fully controlled by AMISOM and TFG troops. The territorial gains secured by AMISOM and the TFG considerably reduced the risk of IDF improvised device explosives and mortar attacks against the airport and its immediate environs (Mugisha, 2011: 28; AU, 2011c: 4; UNSC, 2011a: 3). They were able to uncover and destroy Al Shabaab's network of tunnel and trenches used by the insurgents for hit and

run attacks against AMISOM and the TFG troops, and made continuous advancement in territorial gains despite repeated counterattacks (Mugisha, 2011: 32).

In response to intense pressure and internal crisis within the group, Al-Shabaab withdrew from locations it had held for nearly two years in Mogadishu on 6 August 2011, following the months of intense military operations by the TFG supported by 9,300 AMISOM troops. This gave the troops control over 90 percent of Mogadishu and greatly improved the previous gains made in May 2011 and the significant control of over 8 out of the 16 districts made in early June 2011 (UNSC, 2011b: 3–4; AU, 2011f: 4). In early November 2011, AMISOM's troop strength of 9,800 and TFG's of 10,300 made their presence felt across all the 16 districts in Mogadishu but were overstretched so that many of the districts remained insecure. In the southern and central regions, the KDF of approximately 4,700 troop commenced military operations on 15 October 2011. It assisted the TFG to expand their presence in Gedo and Juba Hoose regions, while in the Galguduud and Hiiran regions, Ethiopian forces assisted ASWJ to fight Al-Shabaab (AU, 2011f: 4; UNSC, 2011d: 5). Towards the end of December 2011, the military advancement against Al-Shabaab proceeded successfully. In Mogadishu, AMISOM and TFG forces continued to consolidate their control over all districts of the city and began operations in the outskirts of Mogadishu (UNSC, 2012a: 2).

Meanwhile, Al-Shabaab lost a significantly large number of its controlled areas in the southern and central regions, to the forces of AMISOM, Kenya, Ethiopia and their local Somali allies from mid-2011. Again, Al Shabaab's intensification in its recruitment effort signified that the group's strength was undermined by AMISOM and its allies. The loss of territory and the UNSC ban on exported charcoal from Somalia, a major source of revenue for Al-Shabaab, deprived the group of lucrative border taxation points and income. For stable source of income, Al-Shabaab moved away from the Kenyan-Somali borders on 3 April 2011 to strengthen their defence of the port of Kismayo due to the continuous attack of AMISOM's allied troops. The serious pressure on Al-Shabaab caused a rift within the leadership of the group. The group migrated northwards towards Puntland, Somaliland and Yemen. It was also reported that foreign fighters migrated out of Somalia (IMG, 2012: 11). The withdrawal of Al-Shabaab from some of the southern Somali towns, improved the security situation and the expansion of the Somali's government's presence in liberated areas. The civilians enjoyed access to humanitarian assistance from the UN and its humanitarian partners with the defensive security assistance of AMISOM allies, ASWJ (UNSC, 2011a: 1). In the southern region, the combined operations of the Kenyan military and the Ethiopian troops in collaboration with the TFG forces allies also advanced in their

military operation. The town of Beledweyne was recovered from the insurgents on 31 December 2011 (UNSC, 2012a: 2). The advancement of the joint offensive towards Kismayo in mid-2012 threatened Al-Shabaab's single most important source of revenue as well as its principal training bases (IMG, 2012: 11). On 6 August 2011, Al-Shabaab lost its captured territories in Mogadishu. Thus, relative peace was restored to the capital since the collapse of central government in 1991 (AMISOM, 2012a).

In central Somalia, Al-Shabaab was forced out of its key strongholds in Bay Region including Baidoa on 18 February 2012. This was made possible by the heavy combat elements of the Ethiopian troops that were stationed around the border towns of Luuq and Dola. The Ethiopian troops also captured Xuddur and Ceelbuur in collaboration with the allies of the TFG forces. In southern Somalia, continuous insurgent hit-and-run attacks hindered the military advances despite the numerous air strikes in Juba Dhexe and Juba Hoose (UNSC, 2012d: 7).

In the last few months of the transition, security situation in Mogadishu was relatively peaceful but remained unpredictable. Approximately 12,300 AMISOM troops (without KDF-AMISOM troops) and the NSF maintained their hold on the city despite Al-Shabaab's frequent targeted killing and hand grenade attacks that increased in the outlying districts. The use of improvised explosive devices was minimised but there were still periodic attacks. In southern Somalia, AMISOM – the newly integrated KDF forces and the NSF made significant territorial gains with the capture of Marka in Shabelle Hoose and Kismayo in Juba Hoose in September 2012. These losses for Al-Shabaab caused a reduction in the group's sources of income and increased pressure on it to look for more support. Moreover, in central Somalia, AMISOM and government forces took over Jowhar, the capital of Shabelle Dhexe in early December 2012 (UNSC, 2013: 3).

The launch of offensive military operations that commenced in February 2011 till the end of 2012 gave AMISOM and the TFG control of Mogadishu. In addition, the mission's areas were expanded to southern and central Somalia. The military gains for the joint AMISOM and TFG forces, signified losses for the Al-Shabaab group. The military advancement for the two-year period was tremendous as compared to AMISOM's operation in the first three years. This improvement in the mission's operation was associated with the improvement in the contributions of the stakeholders, in the areas of financial, logistics, operational and troops.

5.2.8 Secured Areas for Civilians

AMISOM's area of operations since 2007 has served as a haven for the civilians. Expanded mission area, means availability of more secured areas available for the civilians to live. Apart from the provision of improved security that the civilians enjoyed, they also had access to the mission's free services such as water and medical services, despite the limited resources available to the troops themselves. This gave the civilians relative peace to conduct their businesses and personal affairs. With the expanded AMISOM controlled areas from late 2009 till 2012 and the enhanced support package from UNSOA from late 2009, AMISOM's military component increased its humanitarian services to the civilians. The mission provided over 120,000 litres of safe drinking water per day to Somalis living close to AMISOM's camps. The two AMISOM-run hospitals provided free medical care to more than 12,000 people every month. The controlled area in the city became a safe-haven for the Somalis who had migrated from the drought-ridden areas. By 2011, after increased military operations and humanitarian services, many Somalis in Diasporas returned to Mogadishu for the rebuilding of the city. There were many improvements in the social amenities for the civilians. For the first time in over two decades, Mogadishu could boast of playgrounds; a bank; clean running water which was provided by AMISOM; and twenty-four hour electricity for those that could afford it. In addition, there was relative peace for free movement of school children and the emergence of private enterprises. With the commencement of rebuilding Mogadishu, the construction industry became a means of livelihood for the unemployed. All humanitarian assistance offered by AMISOM together with the security in its controlled area assisted them to gain the support and confidence of the civilians. It also helped in the counterinsurgency mission of AMISOM, which could otherwise not be achieved solely through military means (Schulman & Rader; 2012: 31; Mugisha, 2011: 30; AMISOM Review, 2010: 5; AMISOM, 2012a). In an UN sponsored opinion poll conducted by an independent organisation in early 2012, 92 percent of Mogadishu's residents agreed that AU and UN are friendly as compared to the 72 and 75 percent who had the same opinion in the poll conducted in January and November 2010 respectively (Ochami & Opiyo, 2012).

5.2.9 Relocation of Headquarters to Mogadishu

By May 2011, there was an increase in the number of UN staff stationed in Somalia despite the fragile security situation in Mogadishu. The city which was rated as a very volatile environment in the report of the UN TAM in 2007 and not conducive for the presence of the UN personnel gradually became a safe haven where the UN personnel could operate. The AMISOM protected area at the Aden Adde International Airport and the seaport served as

the secured environment for the UN common compound, UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) compound, and the WFP facility at the port served as accommodation and offices for the UN staff (UNSC, 2011a: 52). The relatively conducive environment which was secured by AMISOM's military component, assisted the relocation of AMISOM's civilian component to Mogadishu in May 2011 to ensure the proper political collaboration with the TFG and UN for the smooth political dialogue for the end of the transition scheduled for August 2011 (AU, 2011f: 9).

With the expanded territory under the control of AMISOM and the TFG forces from the last quarter of 2011, the UN Special Representative relocated his office to Mogadishu on 24 January 2012 with a supportive team of 10 staff with political, security, human rights, public information and administrative functions, thus enabling UNPOS to form a main forward headquarters in Mogadishu while a rear base was retained in Nairobi until the security and logistics condition became conducive for the relocation of the entire office to Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia (UNSC, 2012a: 9). By the end of 2012, the presence of UN international staff in Mogadishu increased to 110, with a daily average presence of 84 international staff, of which around 70 percent were permanently assigned to the capital.

The achievements of AMISOM discussed above were made possible with the improvement in the support and contributions of the stakeholders. Although the troops have been wholeheartedly-committed to peace and stability in Somalia, their efforts were minimised within their capability. However, with the expansion and increase in the support given, the mission has been able to prove to the international community that Africa is committed to peace and security in Somalia and in Africa as a whole. The African intervention in a conflict area such as Somalia restored stability and peace to the citizens of the country.

The expanded mission area of operation, establishment of democratic government and the relocation of UN and AMISOM headquarters to Mogadishu ushered AMISOM into the second phase of its operation in Somalia and an opportunity for the UN to gradually reintegrate the mission to an UN-led peace mission. Reintegration of AMISOM to an UN-led peace mission will mark the successful completion of the mission's operation in Somalia.

CHAPTER SIX

6. CONCLUSION

Introduction

As the concluding chapter in this research work, the findings of the researcher in relation to the objectives and the research questions are herein discussed. The findings of this research are derived from the contributions of the four participants for the research study. However, because of the limited number of participants, the researcher relied on and used more of the information retrieved from primary sources such as the communiqués, resolutions, press statements and reports retrieved from internet databases of the stakeholders. This has given the researcher more insight and credible information on the research study.

Additionally, the researcher retrieved information from some key researchers whose research works are derived from their close contact with the participants of the research focus. From the information that has been discussed in previous chapters, the researcher has been able to derive the findings, conclusions and recommendations discussed in this chapter. The study thus contributes to knowledge in the field of peace missions in Africa within the spheres of stakeholders' collaboration in the AU peace mission in Somalia.

6.1 *Findings*

In this section, the last objective of this research study is discussed. The findings are derived from the first four objectives of the research study, which are discussed in chapter three to chapter five of this research study. It is based on the responses of the interviewees to the questionnaire, which is constructed to provide answers to the research questions and objectives with the information from existing records of the stakeholders and secondary sources. These were sorted based on content in relation to the research objectives and questions to descriptively analyse AMISOM and the collaboration of its stakeholders.

The first objective of the research study aims to identify the roles of the stakeholders in AMISOM's operations. The four research participants whose views were received all agreed about the primary roles of the stakeholders. For example, IGAD's input in terms of troop

contribution; EU as the major financial contributor for AMISOM especially in the payment of troops' allowances; AU providing the managerial and political role which served as the political framework for the activities of AMISOM; and the UN's role in the area of financial and logistics support. However, all the participants revealed that there are also individual states that have contributed to AMISOM's operations, such as USA and China. They also mentioned that there are bilateral relationships and contributions of the stakeholders such as US, China, EU to the IGAD region and directly with the TCCs.

While the participants identified the primary roles of the stakeholders mentioned above, the researcher, in the course of studying and analysing the information retrieved directly from other primary and secondary sources, has been able to identify other contributions of the stakeholders. It was discovered that IGAD not only provided troops for AMISOM's operation but also provided political and technical advice to the AU and the UN. It ensured that required assistance for the mission was approved, especially by the UN. In the case of the EU, the researcher found out that the EU not only contributed financially to the mission, but also supported the mission's operation in the areas of training the Somali NSF. These allowed AMISOM to concentrate on its counterinsurgency operations. The EU also provided staff for AMISOM SPMU, financial management support and protection of AMISOM's supply vessel. The UN's role in AMISOM's operation was not limited to the provision of financial and logistics support, but included provision of political support that legitimised AMISOM's operation. Lastly, AU also contributed troops to the military component of AMISOM through the deployment of Burundian forces.

Furthermore, IGAD's strong commitment to the stability of Somalia was the major underlining factor that sustained AMISOM in Somalia. AMISOM could have been pulled out of Somalia, a year after its deployment due to the volatile security in 2007 coupled with limited support from other AU member states, the EU and the UN. However, IGAD's commitment assisted in the sustenance of the mission. Despite the challenge of TCCs COE reimbursement arrangement that discouraged other potential TCCs such as Nigeria, IGAD member states were ready to deploy more troops for the mission. Some of the interviewees are of the opinion that the IGAD TCCs support was based on the benefit of the troop allowance and reimbursement of COEs, but one of the interviewees strongly argued against this opinion. In his view, IGAD member states were involved primarily because of African brotherliness, while the economic or financial gains were secondary. Moreover, he stated that most of the African states were reluctant to deploy their troops because of the volatile security situation. His view is supported by the UNSG and AUC Chairperson reports. According to them, the troop allowances were initially very low compared to the intensity of

the security situation and TCCs were not reimbursed regularly. The TCCs were owed for nine months in 2010 because of a lack of funding for military operations as a result of caveats placed on the funds contributed to UNTF. The most recent terrorist attack in Kenya's Westgate centre on 21 - 25 September 2013 occurred because Kenya had deployed troops to Somalia. This is the opinion of the participant who views the commitment of IGAD member states as being based more on brotherliness and regional security than on any economic reason.

As shown in Figure 1 page 47, the EU's financial contribution was very encouraging but there was no financial contribution to AMISOM throughout 2008. The financial commitments in 2007 and 2009 were not released within the time frame of the contribution agreement. From 2010, there was a significant improvement in the funds committed and the timing of the release of funds. The most encouraging support was in 2012, when the committed funds increased and they were released quickly, especially in November 2012 after the establishment of the Somali democratic government in September 2012. The increase in the EU's funding for AMISOM, especially from 2010, could be associated with the increase in the number of troops and the signing of the Aide Memoire services between EU and AU on 27 August 2009 and revised on 1 June 2011. These served as the Contribution Agreement to strengthen the AUC's financial management of the APF funded action.

The reverse was the case for the UN as shown in Figure 2 page 52 as their initial support before the establishment of UNSOA in 2009 was not encouraging. Although UNPOS provided the logistics and the UNGA approved fund for the mission's operation, the support provided was not commensurate with the support proposed for the UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia in the UNSG report. The UN was pressurised through various political fora such as IGAD Council of Ministers and Heads of State and Government press statements, AU Assembly and PSC communiqués, African non-permanent members of the UNSC and other avenues until the enhanced logistics and financial support was approved with the establishment of UNSOA and UNTF. Since the establishment of these two organisations, especially UNSOA, the working and living conditions of those involved in AMISOM's operations was greatly improved, and the troops were encouraged to put in their best effort towards the success of the mission's operations.

In conclusion, the contributions of the stakeholders go beyond the primary roles of the stakeholders. The additional roles are incorporated to improve the mandate of AMISOM.

The findings to the second objective and research question of the study provide an answer as to whether AMISOM and the stakeholders followed a collaborative process or a positional process. In the course of the interviews, one of the research participants gave the opinion that there was no collaboration process that stipulated what each stakeholder should provide because there was no signing of an MoU among the stakeholders but the contributions of the African external actors was in the form of assistance, where they could not be held liable if the support was not provided. Another participant from the EU-APF stated that the collaboration process was based on the Joint Africa-EU Strategy agreement signed in 2007 for the support of the EU towards African peace and security through financial contributions. He mentioned that the agreement was fully supported by the EU member states.

The researcher in the course of this study discovered that there were collaborative processes through which the stakeholders have contributed to AMISOM. Each of the stakeholders had its primary role for the success of the mission, which has been identified in the response to the first objective. One of the participants argued that the legality of a collaboration process is determined by the signing of a MoU and the stakeholders' collaboration, especially the support from the EU, is more of a complementary support, and not a division of labour as stipulated in UN Chapter VIII. The researcher also confirms this argument, that the collaboration process as stated in the UN Charter, Chapter VIII placed the contributions from the EU in a supportive role, while the contributions from the UN were a distribution of responsibilities. However, the researcher posits that the EU's contributions were a division of labour due to the bilateral agreement of JAES of 2007. In addition, the MoU between the AU and the RECs as well as the RMs placed the contributions and collaboration of IGAD in the pattern of division of labour. The various documented agreements between AU and each of the stakeholders; (the UN, the EU and IGAD) asserts the researcher's position that the collaboration of the stakeholders is a division of labour towards global peace and security. The bilateral collaboration process, therefore systematically divided the roles and contributions of the stakeholders into primarily; troop contribution from IGAD, financial contribution from EU, political, logistics and financial support from the UN while the AU provided the political framework, management and troop contributions. Moreover, AMISOM's stakeholders' collaboration makes it a model of collaboration that should be maintained for effective peace missions in Africa.

In consideration of the structure of the collaboration framework, the EU-APF Manager identified the desk-to-desk interaction between the AU official in Addis Ababa and the EU official in Brussels. According to the AU official, the collaboration fora for the stakeholders

are through the open sessions of the AU-PSC on Somalia, quarterly reports by the AU Chairperson to the UNSC on Somalia (which was mandated by various UNSC resolutions) and the AMISOM Partners Group established through the AU-PSC. The researcher also found out from the reports, press releases and communiqués of the stakeholders, about the high-level bilateral collaboration between the UNSC and AU-PSC, as well as the AU-PSC and the EU-PSC. The high-level collaboration provides the political framework on which the activities of their Secretariats are built for the collaboration of the stakeholders in relation to peace and security in Africa, as well as in Somalia.

The findings for the concluding part of the second objective, to find out if the collaboration between AMISOM and its stakeholders followed a collaborative or positional process confirms that collaboration moved from positional- to collaborative -process. The stakeholders' contributions were influenced by their political and economic interests in Somalia. The scourge of piracy and terrorism were the major factors for the involvement of Africa's external stakeholders such as the EU and the UN, while for the African stakeholders, AU members and especially IGAD member states, the issue of security and African ownership are the underlining factors for their involvement. These factors subsequently lead to the extent of their contributions towards AMISOM's operations. One of the participants interviewed confirmed that the contributions of the stakeholders outside Africa, (EU and UN,) were based on the AU's request. This was to support the African ownership of the AMISOM's operations and to coordinate the contributions under the AU's frameworks. Nevertheless, the approval of these requests was determined by the political interest of the stakeholders.

The EU-APF manager mentioned that the EU considered the political appropriateness of the AU's request before it was approved. This point was also confirmed by the AU official. The ISS Senior Researcher mentioned that the extent of the UN's political interest in AMISOM's operation was based on the political interests of its member states. If the member states had not vested their political interest, the UN would not have shown any political interest too. The foreign policy of a member state determines its contribution, and member states of the stakeholders do not go beyond their foreign policy. The other two research participants also agreed that the political and economic interest of the stakeholders is the underlying factor for their involvement. This means that the stakeholders' collaboration is positional because it is determined by the political interests of the member states. However, the extent of the positional contributions of the stakeholders determines the extent of the collaboration. The more the stakeholders' positional contributions increase, the more their collaboration and contributions increases. The drastic improvement in the stakeholders determination,,

especially that of the UN and the EU, to ensure there is peace and security in Somalia, especially to provide an environment conducive for the political process and the establishment of a functional government, increased their commitment to AMISOM and thus improved the mission's operation.

In conclusion, the stakeholders collaboration towards AMISOM is positional but the more positive their position or interest is, the more collaborative their contribution to the mission increases.

The findings for the third objective of the research study, to identify the challenges of the stakeholders' collaborations process shows that lack of proper coordination of the stakeholders was the major challenge to the collaboration identified by three of the research participants, while the other one agreed that the AU faced management challenges that needed to be addressed. One of the participants was of the opinion that some of the stakeholders preferred to be coordinated under the auspices of the UN but the UN was not ready to coordinate. Another participant stated that some of the stakeholders were also less sensitive to the contextual needs of the mission. Two of the participants were of the opinion that the deployment of AMISOM outside the framework of APSA created an institutional gap for the mission, which could have been better managed if the mission had been deployed within the APSA structure, even if only on an experimental basis. Another factor that two of the participants identified as a problem of the collaboration process was the burden of different reporting lines for the limited AU staff. There were other challenges that the researcher also discovered, such as the delay in the approval of AU requests, and divergence of the AU and the UN's policy on the role of the peace mission as a peace enforcer. While the AU peace mission could enforce peace, the UN policy on peace missions prevents its missions to enforce peace. The divergent policies resulted in the placement of caveats on funding for military equipment by some of the donors and reluctance to provide the necessary support for AMISOM's military operations against the insurgent groups such as Al-Shabaab. These challenges were obstacles to the model of AMISOM's stakeholders' collaboration process. The review of these challenges will improve the AMISOM model and assist in effective implementation of AU peace mission initiatives in Africa.

Findings of the fourth objective of the research to find out the impact of the collaboration on AMISOM were that all the participants for the research study agreed that the collaboration of the stakeholders, that is, the contributions of the stakeholders, had an impact on AMISOM's operation. The level of their commitment determined the level of AMISOM's operations. The

findings from other primary sources and the secondary sources also revealed that the collaboration of the stakeholders determined the trend of the mission's capability in ensuring the stability and security of Somalia.

The collaboration process, which is the interconnectivity of the stakeholders' contributions, revealed that any laxity on the part of any of the stakeholders affects the flow of the contributions and finally affects the peace mission's operation. Since the logistic and financial contributions from the EU and the UN was the major support for the mission, the delay in releasing their contributions affected the contributions of manpower from the IGAD and the AU, even if they were willing to contribute. Moreover, on the political framework, the proactive decisions and recommendations of the AU-PSC could not be implemented without the UNSC's approval; neither could the AU seek support from the UN member states. One of the criteria for the EU to release funds for AMISOM depended on a prior approval from UNSC of the activities such as the increase of troop strength. Thus, UNSC's approval determined the timeliness and promptness of the implementation of the AU decision for the effectiveness of the mission's operations.

The impact of the collaboration on AMISOM's mandate to ensure stability and security is reflected in the challenges and the achievements of the mission. Because of the limited collaboration in the contributions of the stakeholders, especially between 2007 and 2010, AMISOM was incapacitated with limited troops, training, and resources that affected the mission's mandate to provide security and stability in Somalia. The improvement and increase in commitments from the stakeholders, increased gradually from 2010. This is evident with the UN's approval of 4,000 additional troops in December 2010; improved logistics and training support that commenced with the establishment of UNSOA in July 2009; improvement in Somali NSF which was possible with the assistance of the EU's established EUTM for Somalia in 2010; and improved operational support with the inauguration of UNOAU in 2010. All these contributed to the success of the mission. Moreover, the increased commitments were evident with the arrival of the initial 8,000 troops in December 2010. There were additional troops from Uganda and Burundi; more troops deployed from Djibouti in December 2011; and re-integration of the Kenyan forces in June 2012. The UN's approval of the new strategic concept of operation for AMISOM in 22 February 2012, further enhanced support from the UN assessed fund and increased troop strength to 17,731 expanded the area of the mission's operations. There was also an increase in the fund from the APF and the UN assessed fund.

All these improved supports were possible with the establishment of a forum for the stakeholders to deliberate. The joint consultative meetings of: AU-PSC and EU Political and Security Committee (EU-PSC) joint consultative forum since 2009, UNSC and AU-PSC joint consultative meetings from 2007 but with more commitment from 2010, the AU and the TCCs meetings with the stakeholders, to deliberate on the mission's operation and support required for its effectiveness aided the actualisation of the support rendered and collaboration achieved.

The effective collaboration between AU and IGAD assisted AMISOM tremendously. AU and IGAD used their political roles to pressurise the UN to provide the support required for AMISOM based on Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, they called on UNSC to establish a Trust Fund and to provide logistic support, reviewed UNSC's resolution 1725 (2006)⁴, to allow the frontline states to deploy troops to Somalia if required; reviewed AMISOM's concepts of operation and rules of engagement. Also, IGAD's recommendations, implemented by the AU, assisted the mission's operation by establishing a forum for the TCCs Ministers of Defence and Chiefs of Staff for Defence and the stakeholders to effectively review AMISOM's operations and seek more support in the areas where the mission was lacking, such as the training school for the NSF, increased salary for AMISOM's troops to UN salary scale, and the removal of caveats on financial support were addressed.

All these factors had a positive impact on the capability of AMISOM to improve on its mandate to ensure stability and security in Somalia, beyond the protection of the TFG and the key infrastructures, to the displacement of Al-Shabaab from Mogadishu in August 2012, and the expansion of the mission area of operation to south and central Somalia. The expanded mission area enabled the mission to transit from its first phase of providing security in Mogadishu to the second phase of expanding mission areas to south and central Somalia. The expanded mission's area of operation signified an expanded government controlled area and secured area for the civilians. This provided opportunity for more humanitarian assistance to the civilians. The most important impact of the collaboration was the security provided for the TFG, local and international delegates that were involved in the political dialogue and the implementation of the political roadmap that ended the transitional government in August/September 2012.

These achievements have been possible with the collaboration of the stakeholders. As pointed out by one of the participants for the research study, "there would not have been progress in the military operation, if not for the need to speed up political process and the political process would not have been possible if AMISOM has not provided the space for the

political actors to act. The commitment of the international community, including the EU and the UN to the political process for the establishment of state institutions in Somalia assisted in the improvement in the security through more support and contributions towards AMISOM's operation.

In spite of the challenges faced by the scarcity of Somalis to interview for the research study, the researcher retrieved secondary information from the Somali-based online newspapers and other foreign newspapers that had reported on AMISOM in Somalia. The findings give mixed reports and depended on the reporter's perspective. Some Somalis are of the opinion that AMISOM has assisted to create relative stability and security, which evaded the nation after the intrusion of the Ethiopian troops that came to assist the TFG government. While other Somalis have a perspective of the mission as an extension of the Ethiopian troops and label the mission as 'foreign invaders'. The opinion that AMISOM is a 'foreign invaders' emanated mainly from the Islamist insurgent group, Al-Shabaab. The insurgent group has also championed the cause of blaming AMISOM for the death of the civilians during military operations involving Al-Shabaab and AMISOM troops. There are also allegations of misconduct levelled against the troops such as the selling of guns and raping of women. The allegation of rape is a common scenario which was still reported in August 2013.

However, the Somalis have enjoyed the humanitarian services of AMISOM's troops and had access to humanitarian support from the international humanitarian organisations in the mission's secured areas. In an opinion poll conducted by an independent company, 18 percent of Mogadishu residents in 2010 believed AMISOM came to harm them but by 2012, the percentage had fallen to 1 percent. As of 2012, 77 percent of the 1,151 residents described the TFG and AMISOM as very effective in stabilising and reconciling Somalia as compared to the 61 and 65 percent from the two previous polls conducted in January and November 2010 respectively. Also, more than half of the Mogadishu residents in the opinion poll believed that foreign nations were in Somalia to pursue their own interests.

In conclusion, the challenges and the achievements of AMISOM in its mandate for the stability and security of Somalia have been influenced by the collaboration of the stakeholders. The level of the stakeholders' contributions increased the level of the mission's operations.

The discussions on AMISOM's operations and the collaboration of the stakeholders in providing the required support for the effectiveness of the mission have given insight to this study. The findings give insight to the reality of the collaboration of the stakeholders and the

impact it had on AMISOM's mandate. The findings support some of the views of the scholarly works reviewed, while some give different perspectives from the view of the scholars on AMISOM's operation.

As a qualitative research, there are other findings that the researcher discovered in the course of the research. In relation to the critiques of AMISOM, that the AU lacked the capacity to deploy a mission, the researcher found that the AU was fully aware of its limitations in the deployment of a peace mission for a very volatile security situation such as that in Somalia. To fill the vacuum of its incapacity, the AU requested assistance from the UN in terms of logistics and operational supports but the support was not fully operational until the UNSC approved the establishment of UNSOA in 2009. Moreover, the AU, supported by IGAD, requested in their communiqués that the UN should take over AMISOM, which is yet to happen. As mentioned by all the participants, AMISOM is a short-term peace mission that will be re-integrated into a UN peacekeeping mission because of greater resources that will be available under the UN-led mission, unlike the limited funds and resources available to the AU. Nonetheless, the reality of the UN peacekeeping principle, which is primarily to keep peace, unlike the AU peace support operation that could enforce peace where there is no peace, makes it inevitable for the deployment of an AU-led peace support operation to a crisis in Africa, where there is a need to enforce peace. In such cases, the UN will not be ready to deploy its peace mission unless there is a political undertone as in the case of Libya.

The criticism that the AU's call for a troop increase would bring only minimal improvement in Somalia's security has also been proven wrong. The findings revealed that the higher the troop strength, the more advanced the military operations against the insurgents becomes. The relative success AMISOM recorded in Somalia has been connected with increased support from the stakeholders and most especially an increase in the troop's strength. Al-Shabaab lost most of its key territories to the AMISOM troops, especially the KDF forces in southern Somalia. This weakened the insurgent group's strength and economic resources considerably, especially the loss of Kismayo in September 2012. In agreement with the critics that an increase in troop numbers could result in an internalisation of the crisis, there was a terrorist attack in Kenya, aimed at discouraging the Kenyan government from deploying more troops and encouraging the withdrawal of their troops from southern Somalia. Coincidentally, the Al-Shabaab terrorist attack in the Westgate Centre in Kenya, between 21 and 25 September 2013, marked the one-year anniversary of the loss of Kismayo to the AMISOM-KDF forces in September 2012. The terrorist attacks on the TCC nations such as Uganda in 2010 and Kenya in September 2013 signifies the weakness of Al-

Shabaab in Somalia because of the AMISOM's military advancement. Therefore, all forms of terrorist tactics would be employed by the group to discourage more troops from being deployed by the potential TCCs. However, this challenge has not discouraged the IGAD countries but has rather motivated them to increase their support for AMISOM until the scourge of terrorism in Somalia and the region ends.

In response to another criticism that traditional methods of conflict resolution is the sole solution to the Somalia crisis, the interviewees confirmed that the presence of AMISOM in Somalia provides the security through which the political process, inclusive of the traditional conflict resolution, has been able to operate. Without AMISOM, relative peace and successful establishment of a functional government in Somalia would not have been possible. However, this was achieved by the collaboration of the different methods of conflict resolution: peace mission; traditional conflict resolution; political dialogue; other support from the international community.

Finally, the collaboration process of the stakeholders' contributions had an impact on the mission's effectiveness. The interconnectivity in the trend of support from the EU and the UN with the contributions from the IGAD and the AU in the effectiveness of AMISOM's operation revealed that these stakeholders collaboration in support of AMISOM's operation is inevitable. The AU and IGAD have the combatant human resources that neither the UN nor the EU were ready to deploy to Somalia in 2007 while the UN and EU have the financial, technical and logistics strength that AU and IGAD lack. The AU's political strength to pull these resources together, in spite of its weak institutional capability, improved the collaboration that translated to the successes that have been recorded in AMISOM's operations.

In summary, the bilateral agreements between the AU and the other stakeholders systematically divided the primary roles and contributions of the stakeholders into what can be termed as shared responsibility. IGAD was the major troop contributing region; EU was the major financial contributor for AMISOM especially in the payment of troop allowances; AU provided the managerial role and political role which served as the political framework for the activities of AMISOM; and the UN contributed to the AMISOM's operation in the area of financial and logistics support.

The trend of the stakeholders' contribution reveals that the stakeholders' collaboration is positional because it is determined by the political and economic interest of the member states. However, the extent of the positional contributions of the stakeholders determines the

extent of the collaboration. The more the stakeholders' positional contributions increase, the greater their collaboration and contributions.

However, the major challenge encountered in the collaboration process was the lack of proper coordination of the stakeholders due to the institutional incapacity on the part of the AU, because of limited staff and numerous lines of reporting. In addition, the divergent policies of the AU and the UN on a peace mission as a peace enforcer hindered the necessary support required for AMISOM's military operation against the insurgent groups.

Moreover, the collaboration process, which is the interconnectivity of the stakeholders' contribution, revealed that any laxity on the part of any of the stakeholders affected the flow of the contributions and finally affected the peace mission's operation. Any delay in the logistic and financial contributions from the EU and the UN affected the contributions of manpower from the IGAD and the AU, even if they were willing to contribute. In addition, on the political framework, the proactive decisions and recommendations of the AU-PSC without UNSC approval could not be implemented; neither could the AU seek support from the UN member states. One of the criteria for the EU to release funds for AMISOM was the prior UNSC approval of the activities such as the increase in troop strength. Thus, UNSC approval determined the promptness of the implementation of the AU's decision for the effectiveness of the mission operations.

The level of the stakeholders' contribution to AMISOM also affects and reflects in the level of the mission's effectiveness. The period between 2007 and 2010 was very challenging for the mission, while from mid-2010; the mission recorded progressive improvement in the implementation of its mandate towards peace, security and stability of Somalia because of the improved contributions from the stakeholders. The reluctance of the EU and UN to proactively support AMISOM's operation in the first three years of its operation resulted in the weakness of the mission's operation that gave the insurgent groups, especially Al-Shabaab, the opportunity to extend their activities across Somalia.

Finally, the significance of the stakeholders' collaboration towards AMISOM's operations in Somalia has proven to be significant. In spite, of the challenges encountered, the findings have proven that collective security and involvement of non-state actors is significant for the maintenance of global peace and security. The non-state and state actors are essential for the pooling of resources to avert oppression of civilians, not only in aggrieved states but also from aggrieved non-state actors such as Al-Shabaab in Somalia. Despite the challenges and security threats that the deployment of AMISOM troops posed to the TCCs countries, the

maintenance and deployment of more troops to Somalia continued because of the determination of IGAD and AU to ensure peace is restored in Somalia for the peace and stability of the region and the world as a whole; this has revealed the benefits of an African-initiated conflict resolution mechanism in Africa.

6.2 Recommendations

Based on the findings of this research study, there are identified areas that show a need for improvement in AMISOM's operation and any subsequent AU-led peace mission operations in Africa.

AU's political interest in the deployment of an AU peace mission in any conflict zone is commendable. In consideration of the persistent institutional incapability and limited funds, AU should employ more permanent staff in the AUC Secretariat that will be well trained to handle the management of PSO with minimal support from the UN and EU. The involvement of the UN and EU staff is inevitable, because the UN and the EU have more confidence in the planning stage if their staffs are involved and they have experts that could assist AU to improve its efficiency.

There is a need for the AU member states to be more committed to the peace fund mobilisation within Africa. Although this fund may not be sufficient for the full deployment of an AU-led peace mission, nonetheless, it will aid availability of tangible funds from the AU and show more commitment from the AU towards peace missions in Africa.

As the issue of fund management is critical in the effectiveness of collaboration between the stakeholders, especially the EU and UN with the AU, the AU needs to improve its accountability in financial management. It could be more effective and efficient with the development of a centralised fund management programme accessible to all the stakeholders who contribute to the fund. This will reduce the number of different reporting lines for the limited AU PSOD staff and improve Africa's image in open financial management. Moreover, the RECs should be accountable to the AU for the funds received from its bilateral donor support, to ensure they are basically used for the correct purpose.

Regardless of the criticisms of the AU's institutional weakness in the operation of its peace missions, there are some very hostile environments where the UN will not want to deploy its troops until the environment is more conducive-hence, the burden of peace mission

management lies on the AU. For this reason, the international community especially the UN should be ready to give full support to an AU-led peace mission for it to be effective. AU deployment of troops is based on African brotherliness but the sole responsibility remains with the UN, and the latter should be reluctant in giving necessary support. Moreover, it is necessary for the UN to review its policy and institutionalise its support for regional-led peace initiatives, especially in Africa, to ensure proactive support that will not be hindered by its decision-making time frame.

AMISOM's mandate as peace enforcer has assisted the mission to achieve the success recorded in Somalia. This confirms that there are certain types of conflicts that occur in the world which requires peace enforcers rather than peacekeepers. Therefore, it is high time the UN policy makers reviewed its policy that will assist regional peace missions which could serve as peace enforcers, to receive the support needed for utmost efficiency.

In spite of the distinctiveness of the conflict areas, there is a common scenario that could not be ruled out in the stakeholders' collaboration, in ensuring peace and stability in any conflict areas in Africa. Therefore, the AU should identify these major stakeholders and involve them in the planning of an AU-led peace mission prior to deployment but ensure it is within the AU's political framework and in the interests of Africa's security. It is inevitable for the sub-regional organisations to be involved because of their geographical proximity to the conflict area; the EU will always be involved because of the neo-colonial and economic affiliation to Africa, and finally the UN, as the higher organisation with the sole responsibility of ensuring world peace and stability. The AU should use its political authority in Africa to ensure that there is a proper institutional framework based on a legal framework with these major stakeholders for any AU-led peace mission before it is deployed. This will ensure the commitment of the stakeholders to the peace mission.

Moreover, there are some other stakeholders who are becoming strong partners with AU, and contributing to the African peace and security agenda. It is necessary for the AU to ensure their support is strictly within the AU's interest. Some of these stakeholders are China, and the League of Arab Nations.

In consideration of the cost of peace missions, the AU should improve on its conflict management for the prevention of war in Africa. Prevention of war is less costly and more effective than peacekeeping and peace-building. Therefore, the AU should encourage good governance and the rule of law in African states and avoid the mistake of the OAU. AU

member states should be ready to delegate adequate authority to the AUC to prosecute any government that fails to promote democracy, peace and security in its country.

The multiple states that have emerged from the old Somalia should be of critical concern to the international community. The AU and the UN should take measures to consolidate the different autonomous states to prevent another crisis that could escalate into conflict and war in the fragile Horn of Africa territory. The historical background of the Somalia crisis revealed that the amalgamation of two Somali states with different colonial heritages laid the foundation of crisis in Somalia over the last twenty or so years. Therefore, to avoid the same mistake made in 1960, the AU and the UN should conduct a referendum in Somaliland (the former British protectorate) to determine if the citizens would prefer an autonomous state or to merge with Somalia. The results of the referendum should guide whatever political decision is to be taken. Somaliland has proved its functional capacity as a state in the last twenty-one years and its separate colonial heritage has been a major factor that has assisted self-proclaimed autonomous states to function perfectly. Any efforts to coerce amalgamation with Somalia could result in another crisis in the region.

The scourge of terrorism is becoming a very serious issue for Africa and the international community. The era of the cold war has passed; the new era of Islamist extremism and terrorism is the problem that requires more collaboration within the international community using all available apparatus; political, economic and military intervention. It is necessary for the AU and UN to ensure that state institutions are supported. If there is a need for a new political dispensation, the change must be made through democratic procedures. This will prevent the toppling of governments that could provide avenues for Islamic extremists to use the chaos and failed state situation to create an environment conducive for their own activities.

AMISOM's stakeholders' collaboration model is worthy of emulation in subsequent AU-led peace missions. Nonetheless, for more effective collaboration, the AU should ensure that subsequent AU peace missions are deployed within the framework of APSA which has been structured with the advanced institutional collaboration between the major stakeholders such as the REC, EU, AU and UN.

With the establishment of a functional government in Somalia and the expansion of the mission area, AMISOM should be more proactive in providing humanitarian support. AMISOM should improve on the tracking of violation of civilian protection, to improve the mission's image with the Somalis and the international community. The mission should

improve its operations more in the area of peace-building through Quick Impact Projects (QiPs) and other post-conflict reconstruction activities such as addressing civilian protection issues and maritime security.

With the accusations of misconduct levelled against AMISOM, significantly the raping of women, it is necessary for AU to collaborate with the UN to establish an investigating team to thoroughly investigate these accusations and prosecute the culprits accordingly. One of the interviewees who preferred to be anonymous also mentioned this allegation levelled against AMISOM. This means there is some truth in the accusation. Therefore, to ensure that AMISOM does not lose its significance in Somalia and create an avenue that Al-Shabaab could use as a religious platform to create an uprising, the AU should ensure that this issue is properly managed. The UN peacekeeping mission experienced the Blackhawk incident in 1993, and a repeat of a similar incident could destroy the efforts of the AU, with the support of the international community, in restoring peace and stability in Somalia.

6.3 *Suggestions for Further Research*

During the course of this research, the researcher came across other areas of interest that are yet to be researched. For this reason, the researcher will suggest further research study in the following areas; AMISOM civilian, police components.

AMISOM is a multidimensional peace mission, with each of the components having its roles and contributions to the peace and security in Somalia. This research focused on the military component of AMISOM. The researcher suggests further research study on the roles of the civilian and police components as a lesson for future AU-led peace missions. The AMISOM police component is the first AU-led police component of a multidimensional peace mission, therefore, its contributions to peacekeeping needs to be examined to find out the contributions the component has made to AMISOM's operations and serve as a lesson for future police components of AU-led peace missions.

Also, a research study can be conducted with regards to the political process, the role of the civilian component in collaboration with other stakeholders, such as Somali leaders, IGAD, UNPOS and the EU- to find out the impact of the political process on the security of Somalia.

The Institutional framework of AU-PSD is also an area in which further research is required. The systematic structures of AU-PSD should be examined to identify the major issues that

affected the AU institutional capacity, the coordination of the stakeholders, and the improvement required in this area.

Furthermore, the roles of the AU member states who are both members of the AU-PSC and UNSC should be examined because the influence of these countries on UNSC deliberations and sessions determined the extent and duration for the approval of the AU-PSC communiqués and recommendations.

Researching on these identified areas will broaden the knowledge base on African peace and security architecture and hopefully assist African leaders in the formation of policy for effective peace and security in Africa.

6.4 Conclusion

The contribution of AMISOM's military operations to the stabilisation of Somalia through the provision of security for an environment relatively conducive is commendable. The relatively peaceful environment provided the platform on which the political process that led to the establishment of a functional and democratic government in September 2012 was laid. Somalia would have remained a failed state if not for the proactive determination of IGAD and AU to deploy the peace mission. However, the level of the mission's effectiveness has been dependent on the level and extent of the support received from the stakeholders, especially the major stakeholders IGAD, EU, UN and AU, that this research focused on. The effectiveness of AMISOM is directly linked with the level of the stakeholders' contributions. The interconnectivity of the stakeholders' contributions determines the collaboration process and its impacts on AMISOM's operations.

The level and extent of the support contributed to AMISOM has been subject to their political interest, which has economic undertones, either directly in Somalia or in the region. The political interest of each stakeholder makes their contributions and their collaborative support positional but the inability of each stakeholder to singlehandedly resolve the crisis in Somalia, has led to their collaboration with other major stakeholders, whereby each of the stakeholders has intertwined their individual contributions to support the AU-led peace mission within the framework of the AU. Nevertheless, there are challenges in the process of the collaboration, but the determination of the stakeholders to ensure that the Somalia crisis was resolved and democratic government is established assisted the collaboration process to be more productive.

In spite of the challenges and criticisms, AMISOM troops are commended for their determination and sacrificial roles in ensuring that the primary mandate of protecting the TFG and key infrastructure is adhered to. If the troops had not been consistent and determined in supporting the interim government, the situation would not have been what it is today. Moreover, the mission's mandate has identified possible limitations that could be encountered and therefore tasked the mission to act within its capabilities to implement its mandate. These tasks could be summarised as the protection of the TFG and delegates; protection of key infrastructures; training of Somali forces and provision of a secure environment for humanitarian assistance. Within the capability of the mission, these tasks have been implemented.

EU's collaboration with the AU towards the realisation of AMISOM's mandate is commendable; it was the highest financial contributor to AMISOM's military mission in the area of troop allowance; it assisted in the training of NSF that increased the military strength to fight the scourge of terrorism; it deployed personnel as part of the AMISOM SPMU to support AMISOM's planning and deployment. These contributions assisted AMISOM tremendously in achieving its mandate in Somalia. The crucial issue which could have marred the collaboration was the management of funds. To prevent this from being a major issue, it was addressed with the deployment of technical expertise to assist AMISOM and AU with financial support to AMISOM. While the above contributions can be commended, the EU has made pledges to each AMISOM's operation based on the AU's requests. The actual funds paid are lower than the amount committed while the period of the payment is longer than the agreed time frame for the mission's implementation.

This research has revealed that the role of AMISOM in Somalia supported the 'African solution to an African problem' theory. However, the impact of the stakeholders' collaboration revealed that the collective security theory is essential to the pooling together of resources for the achievement of global peace. The roles and contributions of the various stakeholders organisations such as the EU (APF, ESDP, EUTM); UN (UNSOA, UNMAS, UNTF); IGAD; and AU to the AMISOM military operation revealed that the peace process is beyond the state-centric view and upholds the liberalist view that there are non-state actors such as transnational and international organisations which are state instruments to ensure peaceful regional integration.

To conclude with, an AU-led peace mission is indispensable in Africa. Clearly, AMISOM stakeholders' collaboration is a model worthy of emulation in subsequent AU peace mission initiatives in Africa. For a more successful mission model, AU should be more proactive and

provide adequate institutional capacity to ensure that the collaboration of stakeholders is effectively managed within the AU framework. On its part, the, UN should ensure its roles in supporting AU-led peace mission are increased. The deployment of AU-led peace missions should remain on an ad-hoc basis and the UN should be ready to take over once there is relative peace. It is time for the international community to view the AU initiative on deployment of peace missions as having a benefit for global peace and security; hence all the assistance required should be rendered.

ANNEXURES

Appendix 1

Questionnaire for Interview

The purpose of this interview is to seek your assistance in gathering data on the collaboration between AMISOM and its stakeholders; the Intergovernmental Authority Development (IGAD), the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) and its impacts on the mission's mandate in Somalia.

Please be assured that your identity will be treated confidentially and your opinion will be used only for the academic purpose.

Question 1: Please introduce yourself.

Question 2: Please identify your profession.

Military

Analyst

Senior Analyst

Public Relations

Director

Others: Kindly specify.....

Question 3: Is your organisation involved in the operation of AMISOM's operation, either as a technical or operational partner?

Yes

No

Question 4: What role(s) does (do) the organisations (IGAD, EU, AU, UN) play to ensure that AMISOM achieve its mandate?

Question 5: What are the factors that determine the organisations' (IGAD, EU, AU, and UN) involvement in the AMISOM's operation? Please specify and explain.

Question 6: What has been the trend of these organisations (IGAD, EU, AU, UN) roles in the achievement of AMISOM mandate?

Increasing

Decreasing

Please clarify the reason for the option chosen above. Provide reliable data to support your answer.

Question 7: Is the trend of the stakeholders (IGAD, EU, AU, and UN) contribution to AMISOM's operation based on the requirements for the success of mission's mandate?

Question 8: Is there any overlap in the contributions of the stakeholders? If yes, what are the areas of the overlapping contributions?

Question 9: Are there any efforts to address the overlapping contributions?

Question 10: Is there any forum where the stakeholders meet to evaluate their roles in the AMISOM's operation and its impact on the AMISOM's mandate?

Yes

If yes, Please specify

No

Question 11: What is (are) the structural framework(s) for the stakeholders' collaboration?

Question 12: In your opinion, is the stakeholders' collaboration properly co-ordinated?

Yes

No

Please explain the reason for the option chosen above.

Question 13: What are the factors that you can identify as the challenges of the stakeholders' collaboration?

Question 14: How effectively can the stakeholders' collaboration be co-ordinated for the achievement of AMISOM mandate? Please explain.

Question 15: In your perspective, has AMISOM been able to contribute to the peace process in Somalia?

Yes

No

Please explain, considering the situational report of Somalia between 2007 and 2012

Question 16: Critically assessing the operation of AMISOM in Somalia. Do you think the stakeholders' contributions have any role to play?

Yes

No

Please explain.

Question 17: In your view, what can you say about the collaboration process of the stakeholders in the achievement of AMISOM mandate? Please explain.

Question 18: In your opinion, in what area(s) should AMISOM improve its mandate and what role(s) should the stakeholders (IGAD, AU, EU and UN) play to achieve it? Please explain.

Question 19: In your view, can the subsequent AU led mission be patterned after AMISOM, especially in the area of its stakeholders' collaboration? Please explain.

Question 20: In your opinion, what is the future of the AU peacekeeping mission?

The researcher wishes to thank you for your input and acknowledge your assistance towards the achievement of this research.

Appendix 2

List of the Research Participants

Below is a list of the research participants whose views are used in this research study. Interviews were conducted for two of the participants while views of the other two were retrieved by filling questionnaires meant for the interview. The interviews were conducted by telephone because one participant is based in Brussels while the second participant, based in Pretoria, South Africa, preferred a Skype meeting interview because of his busy schedule and frequent mobility. For the remaining two participants, the interview could not be conducted because of their busy schedule. Nonetheless, the researcher was able to have non-scheduled telephone conversations with them. The participants from the AU requested to be anonymous, based on ethical considerations, so the name is not mentioned. The views of all the research participants are their own personal views and do not represent their organisations views.

1. Mr Albrecht Braun, Programme Manager at African Peace Facility, European Commission based in Brussels. The telephone interview was conducted on 30 April 2013.
2. Dr Andrew Attah-Assamoah, Senior Researcher at Institute of Security Studies (ISS) based in Pretoria. Skype meeting interview conducted on 22 May 2013.
3. Anonymous, an AU Official based in Addis Ababa. Questionnaire filled and response sent on 30 June 2013.
4. Dr Ola Bello, Programme Head, Governance of Africa's Resources Programme at the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA). Questionnaire filled and sent on 30 June 2013.

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