

AN INVESTIGATION INTO SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN
POLICY TOWARDS CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE
SOUTH AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC)
REGION. CASE STUDY; SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERVENTION
IN LESOTHO.

By



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
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A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF
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DECLARATION

I Kgosiemang Seikhuni Stephen, student number 10253327 declare that the mini dissertation entitled;

AN INVESTIGATION INTO SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC) REGION. CASE STUDY; SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERVENTION IN LESOTHO.

For the degree of Master of Arts (M.A) in Peace Studies and International Relations at the North West University hereby submitted has not previously been submitted by me for a degree at this or any other university, that it is my own work and I further declare that the sources acknowledged are also valid.


.....
Signature


.....
Date

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to convey my sincere gratitude and appreciations to Mr. Kale Ewusi from the Department of Politics and International Relations for providing me with the skills, techniques, guidance and moral support which led to my success in completing this research paper.

DEDICATION

I dedicated this study to my family, Granny who is my wife, Katlego my daughter and Kopano my son. I also extend my dedication to my parents and my parents in law who provided me with moral support throughout my study.

ABSTRACT

The tragic events within the South African Development Community (SADC) countries e.g. Civil war and conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), evoked a rethinking on the pivotal role assigned to the United Nations (UN) and the international community in African conflict resolution. Subsequently, there emerged clarion calls for African solutions to African conflict, with foreign intervention only playing a complementary role. This unfolding of events put a democratic South Africa in a good stead to take this initiative in the SADC region.

In this study, the nature of South Africa's involvement in conflict resolution within SADC region is outlined. The main objective is to outline reasons which have moulded South African intervention in Lesotho, and its impacts on her perceptions about prospects for future African initiatives in the twenty first century. South Africa adopted a remarkably ambivalent foreign policy towards the region and indeed the rest of the continent. It is however, in the light of that development that a democratic South Africa became a dominant member state within SADC to enable her the capabilities of bringing African solutions (SADC in particular) to African conflicts.

It is on this note that South Africa has intervened successfully towards resolving the Lesotho conflicts. South African foreign policy objective of enhancing international peace and security by maintaining efforts towards a lasting resolution of conflicts, stability and security situation in Lesotho achieved, and the general elections were ultimately held.

It is however, acknowledged that South African government has made a firm commitment to developing its role as a voice for the global South. In supporting this statement, South Africa should seriously develop a reputation, culture and capacity as a patron of peace promotion which means continuing with investing political will and resources in mediation and human resources, and also engage in a concerted campaign to improve the peace-keeping ability and security mechanisms of the SADC through a commitment of technical and human resources.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

1. ANC – African National Congress
2. NP – National Party
3. SADC – South African Development Community
4. UN – United Nations
5. GNU – Government of National Unity
6. RDP – Reconstruction and Development Programme
7. AU - African Union
8. NEPAD – New Partnership for Africa’s Development
9. LCD – Lesotho Congress for Democracy
10. SANDF – South African National Defense Force
11. BDF – Botswana Defense Force
12. LDF – Lesotho Defense Force
13. IRPS – International Relations, Peace and Security
14. DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo
15. BCP – Basotho Congress Party
16. BNP – Basotholand National Party
17. NCA – National Constitutional Assembly
18. OAU – Organisation of African Unity
19. RPTC – Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre
20. SIPO – Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ
21. RLDF – Royal Lesotho Defense Force
22. RLMP – Royal Lesotho Mounted Police
23. ISDSC – Inter-State Defense and Security Committee
24. CTF – Combined Task Force
25. CBD – Central Business District
26. CMOC – Civil Military Operation Centre
27. NGO – Non Governmental Organisation
28. IPA – Interim Political Authority
29. SAMHS – South African Medical Health Service
30. SOFA – Status Of Forces Agreement

31. EEC – European Economic Community
32. MFP – Marematlou Freedom Party
33. IPA – Interim Political Authority
34. IEC – Independent Electoral Commission
35. UNCTAD – United Nations Conference on Trade And Development
36. NAM – Non – Alighted Movement
37. WTO – World Trade Organisation
38. IMF – International Monetary Fund
39. HIPC – Highly Indebted Poor Country
40. OPDS – Organ on Politics Defence and Security
41. SADCC – South African Development Conference

<u>Table of Contents</u>	<u>Page (s)</u>
Declaration	i
Acknowledgement	ii
Dedication	iii
Abstract	iv
List of Acronyms	v-vi

Chapter One

Introduction	1
1.1 Background	1-10
1.2 Statement of the problem	10-11
1.3 Aim of the study	12
1.4 Objectives of the study	12
1.5 Literature review	12-17
1.6 Theoretical perspective	18-19
1.7 Hypothesis	19
1.8 Methodology	19
1.8.1 Subjects	19-20
1.8.2 Methods of data collection	20
1.8.3 Procedure	20-21
1.8.4 Data analysis	21
1.9 Ethical consideration	21

Chapter Two

The reasons for engagement of South Africa in conflict resolutions in the SADC region.

2.1 Introduction	22
2.2 Historical and political reasons for South African engagement	23-29
2.3 The South African government exposure to international community.	29-36

Chapter Three

The reasons for South African Intervention in Lesotho.

3.1 Introduction	37
3.2 The political reasons for South African intervention	37-50
3.3 The economic reasons for South African intervention.	50-52

Chapter Four

The implications of South Africa's foreign policy towards conflict resolutions in the SADC region.

4.1 Introduction	53
4.2 The political implication	53-57
4.3 The economic implication	58-61

Chapter Five

Recommendations and conclusions	62-63
References:-	64-67

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND

The development of South Africa's foreign policy can be divided into two phases. The first phase spans the years of National Party rule (1948 – 1994) and the second phase of the African National Congress (ANC) led government operations since April 1994. The second phase covers the transition period of 1990 – 1994 as it formed the foundation of post 1994 foreign policy. The first phase will not be dealt with in its entirety, but the emphasis will be on the more salient features of National Party foreign policy.

According to Olivier (1997) South African's foreign Policy up to 1977 could be classified as consisting of a number of separate foreign policies and lines of conduct.

The main characteristics of South Africa's foreign policy.

- Non isolationist, anti-sanctions and pro-western foreign policy aimed at enhanced co-operation with non-communist states and international organizations with emphasis on international trade and commerce because it was a strong instrument to fight isolation and to strengthen the position of South Africa.
- Peaceful coexistence and regional cooperation based on geographical realities, the need to foster friendly relations with neighboring states, and South Africa's being part of the African continent.
- External justification to enhance South Africa's image abroad and the maintenance of internal Sovereignty by refraining from interference in the internal affairs of other states based on article 2 (7) of the United Nations (UN) Charter.

The most important foreign policy problems that faced South Africa during that period were:

- Issues of South West Africa, which later become the independent state of Namibia and Rhodesia, which later become independent state of Zimbabwe.
- Security concerns and the means to safeguard South Africa from external attacks.

- Relations with the United Nations (UN), which were characterized by tension and hostility.

The South African foreign policy by then could be described as reactionary and tentative, because of the influences of internal policies of apartheid, (Olivier, 1997). The ensuing period in South Africa's foreign policy, from 1978 to 1989, was dominated by the leadership of prime minister and later state president P.W. Botha. Foreign policy in that period was based on the perception of a total onslaught against South Africa, as well as the total National Strategy of South Africa, aimed at defeating the total onslaught against South Africa (www.iss.co.za/ 11.03.04).

The foreign policy of South Africa during that period was shaped by an increased hostility against South Africa. South Africa's response was an increased reliance on "strong arms tactics" against any perceived enemy or threat. The result was an escalation in the use of violence as a means of addressing problems in the regional context (the infamous destabilization policy). This came to an end in 1989 when F.W. de Klerk succeeded P.W. Botha as state president (Mills, 1994).

The events that took place in South Africa since February 1990 saw remarkable changes, not only in South Africa itself but also in the foreign policy of South Africa. Apart from the changes such as the acceptance of South Africa back into the community of states, necessitated a review and adaptation of a new foreign policy. The country was now in need of a foreign policy suited to a new world, not only as a result of internal changes, but also as a result of global changes brought about by the end of the cold war. The new foreign policy had to provide for increasing regionalization in world politics and the increasing importance of multilateralism in world affairs. This foreign policy was also the foreign policy of South Africa during its transition from apartheid to democracy after April 1994. That transitional foreign policy was based on two pillars:

- The quest for a political solution to the internal problems of South Africa that would satisfy the international community and ensure their support.
- The revitalization of the South African economy (www.iss.co.za/ 03.11.04).

The foreign policy was at that stage influenced by factors such as the need to interact with the rest of the world, economic and development needs, and the limitations inherent in South Africa's position as small middle ranking country. New priorities emerged in terms of South Africa's foreign policy. The first priority was relations with Africa, and especially Southern Africa. The second priority was the expansion and consolidation of East, Far East, South East Asia and Eastern Europe. The third priority was to expand South Africa's relations with the UN and other intergovernmental multilateral organizations. It was also important to enhance the image of South Africa as it emerged from the isolation of the past.

The period 1989 to April 1994 saw the review and redirection of South Africa's foreign policy to underpin the process of internal political reform and the emergence of South Africa into world politics as a "normal" member of the international community. This latter phase in the development of South Africa foreign policy formed the foundation of the foreign policy of the first democratically elected government of South Africa (Sole, 1994). The development of South Africa's foreign policy after April 1994 can be described as the foreign policy of the Government of National Unity (GNU) and as that of the African National Congress after the withdrawal of the National Party (NP) from the GNU. That has created the situation where the foreign policy of South Africa was of necessity influenced by the perceptions and objectives of the ANC, despite the continued participation of the Inkatha Freedom Party in the GNU.

The analysis of the nature and development of the foreign policy of South Africa after 1994 turns on three aspects:

- Declaration of intent, especially as communicated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- The influence of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) on foreign policy.
- Important developments in foreign policy since April 1994.

The declared foreign policy of South Africa, as explained by the Foreign Affairs minister Alfred Nzo to parliament in May 1994, was aimed at a commitment to:

Human rights, specifically the political, economic, social and environmental circumstances conducive to these:

- The promotion of freedom and democracy throughout the world.
- The principle of justice and international law in the conduct of relations between nations.
- International peace and international agreed mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts.
- The interests of Africa in global Affairs.
- The expanded regional and international economic cooperation in an interdependent world (Henwood, 1995).

In August 1994, the following Guidelines regarding South Africa's foreign policy were given by the Foreign Affairs Minister.

- That the conduct of South Africa's international relations should be transparent and take place in close consultation with parliament.
- That national interest of South Africa will always dictate its policies.
- That South Africa must expand its participation in regional, continental and global multilateral organizations.
- That the Security and the life of South Africans, justice and the international rule of law, peace, economic stability and regional cooperation were some of the fundamental principle underlying the foreign policy of South Africa.
- That South Africa could not become involved in all initiatives and issues in international politics, because of lack of adequate resources.

The priorities that were already decided on, as far as foreign policy was concerned, were the following:

- Peaceful coexistence and the promotion of economic development in South Africa.
- Constructive interaction with Africa, specifically to address challenges of the next decade and to find solutions to conflict.
- Interaction in multilateral organizations.
- Improved relations with the G7 nations, as well as with South Africa's major leading partners:- and
- The continuation of traditional friendship and the promotion of new partnership.

These were some important problems that had to be provided for in the foreign policy of South Africa.

Those included:

- The bloc formation in international policies and the possible exclusion or denied of South African participation in specific "blocs".
- The risk of protectionism, the undermining of international trade systems, the impact of refugees and wars immigration and the threat that these issues posed for job creation.
- The proliferation of arms and weapons of mass destruction.
- Disease, drought and the occurrence of other national disasters and the impact of these issues on economic and social development (Henwood, 1995).

The analysis of the principles and objectives of the foreign policy of the GNU leads to the conclusion that it reflects the foreign policy of any "Normal state". It was also noticeable that those principles were contained in the basic foreign policy aims of most states, and that it implied an emphasis on the national and security interests of the state as fundamental policy principles.

The focus of regional cooperation and peaceful coexistence were a normal part of the foreign policy of any state. A second conclusion regarding the development of South Africa's foreign policy since April 1994 was the emphasis on democracy, justice, and human rights, which brought a new dimension to the declared foreign policy. This posed important challenges for South Africa as it could lead to conflict between perceived interests and the right decision, and had implications for the allocation of reasons for essential foreign policy goals (National Interests) as opposed to morality justifiable objectives that might, in the long run, negatively influence the material position of the state (Sole, 1994).

The analysis of some of the decisions regarding the formulation and implementation of the foreign policy of South Africa was necessary in order to understand the problems of foreign policy formulation and implementation in South Africa. The policy issues that, the need to be explained include the comparison of declared policy principles and objectives, with the policy decisions that have been taken, some of them were quite controversial in the eyes of some stakeholders.

The process for foreign policy formulation has also undergone important changes. One of the important change was reviewing the key performance areas which were almost similar to the guidelines and priorities that were outlined in May 1994 by former Foreign Affairs Minister, Mr. Alfred Nzo.

The key performance areas were outlined as follows:

- To work to the realization of the African Renaissance through the promotion of the objectives of the African Union (AU) and Nepad (New Partnership for Africa's Development).
- To promote and enhance international peace and security by maintaining efforts towards a lasting resolution of conflict in Africa as well as post conflict reconstruction and development.

- To reduce potential conflict through the effective implementation of warning systems, the African Peer Review mechanism and through the deepening of democracy.
- To promote sustainable development and an equitable global system.
- To build a positive image of South Africa and market South Africa internationally.
- To provide efficient and effective support services.
- To maintain and further develop a world class, integrated and professional state protocol services to relevant stakeholders (www.dfa.gov.za/ 03.11.04).

The role of South Africa in both the region and the continent has changed considerably since 1994. It should be remembered that not too long ago South Africa was a source of regional insecurity and instability through notorious destabilization policies pursued by the apartheid regime. At that time, the country's foreign policy was influenced by increased hostility against South Africa. South Africa in a new dispensation has adopted a different approach towards the region and the continent. The spirit of cooperation replaced the hostility that once prevailed. South Africa is engaged in various peace initiatives around the continent (www.Aisa.org.za/ 03.11.04). Much emphasis on peace initiatives by South Africa will be on the kingdom of Lesotho or Basutoland, as it was known through most of the 19th and 20th centuries.

Following the Lesotho elections in May 1998, in which the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) claimed an overwhelming victory, serious questions were raised about the legitimacy of the vote and a campaign was undertaken by opposition parties to force a new election. The protest, which reached its heights in August when workers and students held a nightly vigil at the palace calling on King Letsie III to dissolve parliament and form an interim government. On August 14, 1998, fourteen of the South African Development Community (SADC) appointed representatives from South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Botswana to investigate the charge of election fraud. (www.wsws.org/ 03.11.04).

An interim report issued by that committee on August 26, 1998 confirmed irregularities and recommended that the elections be declared null and void. The LCD rejected these findings as unacceptable. Then the South African Deputy President, Mr. Thabo Mbeki, who chaired the meeting, refused to make the report public, insisting that it must first be shown to the South African President Mr. Nelson Mandela, Robert Mugabe and other leaders of SADC region.

South Africa press reports that a secret meeting was held on September 13, 1998, involving Nelson Mandela, Robert Mugabe and other members of SADC, with Lesotho Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili present, to doctor the Langa report and minimize its findings. On September 17, 1998, all opposition parties met in Maseru to discuss the report which by that time did not show outside fraud, pointing instead to a few irregularities. As tensions mounted, with the opposition continuing to call for new elections, Prime Minister Mosisili requested the intervention of the South African National Defense Force to prevent a coup (www.wsws.org/ 03.11.04).

On 22 September 1998, the early morning silence of Lesotho was shattered by sounds of Operation Boleas, when 600 South African soldiers moved into Lesotho. That was the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) operation in an effort to deal with the deteriorating Security situation in the mountain Kingdom of Lesotho (Molefe, 1998). Although it was said to be a combined military task force, consisting of South African National Defense Force (SANDF) and the Botswana Defense Force (BDF), it was not until after nightfall on 22 September that approximately 200 Botswana Defense Force arrived in Maseru.

The operation primarily resulted from dissatisfaction of the opposition parties who demanded that king Letsie III use his power to dismantle the parliament, since they believed that it had been fraudulently elected. In light of this, members of the Lesotho Defense Force (LDF) seized arms and ammunition and expelled or imprisoned their commanding officers. Government vehicles were hijacked, the broadcasting station was closed, and the prime minister and other minister were virtually held hostage.

The Lesotho police had lost control of the situation, as far as the SANDF was concerned; there were fears that a military coup was being planned (www.trinstitute.org/ 03.11.04).

Heitman, 1998, state that the mission of the combined task was “to intervene militarily in Lesotho to prevent any further anarchy and to create an environment for the restoration of law and order”. The battle concept was described as, “the deployment of forces in order to locate and identify destabilizers of resources, to disarm and contain them and to strike where applicable with the necessary force to disarm and contain them and to strike where applicable with the necessary force to eliminate threat”. The desired result was:

- To create a stable environment in Lesotho.
- To restore Law and order to enable negotiations to take place between the political parties in Lesotho.

The South African government insisted that the military intervention in Lesotho did not constitute an invasion (Buthelezi, 1998). The decision was based on and justified by the fact that SADC was directly approached by the Prime Minister of Lesotho, Pakalitha Mosisili, who requested the intervention, that the intervention was based on agreements reached in SADC; that all attempts at peacefully resolving the dispute had failed; and that South Africa had intervened to protect certain South African interests such as the Katse Dam Water Scheme, which supply water to South Africa. It was furthermore stated that the Lesotho government was democratically elected (despite certain irregularities during the election process) and it was increasingly required of South Africa to play a role in regional peacekeeping efforts. In addition, it was stated that the decision had notified ambitious elements in the military forces in the region that no member state would the political aspirations of any military faction be tolerated and that South Africa’s commitment to this policy was also a commitment to the development in the region (www.mil.za/ 03/11/2004).

From a South African viewpoint, it was not just a simple and insignificant operation in a small neighboring state. It was a dramatic event and a milestone for the need to keep peace. It was for first time that the post apartheid government ever deployed its army on foreign soil in a conflict situation. By doing so, it has changed its relationship with Lesotho and the region. Another important point was the fact that the operation was conducted in the full glare of the media (Sutton, 1998). The results of the operation was described in a journalistic term as “a loss of innocence” as it announced the arrival of a very different South Africa; moreover a heated debate had been heard eliciting a variety of viewpoints from reporters, analysts and government spokesperson about the appropriateness of SADC’s intervention in Lesotho.

In conclusion, one would say, in view of the preceding, it would be of great value if the relevant groupings, in Africa could develop a set of broad principles for responsibilities to preserve regional security. It is advisable that they should especially determined means to respond appropriately and speedily to threats to peace, in co-operation with the United Nations and other stakeholders. It is imperative to develop such principles to avoid a haphazard, reactive response and decisions implemented hurriedly in reaction to unforeseen crisis, especially as African countries and organizations are accepting an increasing burden of responsibility for conflict prevention and resolution on the continent.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The statement of the problem for this study is reflected in the following questions:

1.2.1 Why is South Africa engaged in conflict resolution in the SADC region?

1.2.2 Why did South Africa intervene in Lesotho?

1.2.3 What are the implications of South Africa’s foreign policy towards conflict resolution in the SADC region?

The study is important in the sense that it evaluates South Africa's Foreign policy position and involvement in conflict resolution in the SADC region. It provides and overview about the role that has been played South Africa in conflict situations. South Africa's aim was to contribute to the rebuilding of Africa as per its foreign policy objectives of promoting and enhancing international peace and security, and it is important to evaluate whether this objective is being met as intended, especially in conflict occurring on its doorstep.

The South African department of Foreign Affairs under its cluster of International Relations, Peace and Security (IRPS) has the following strategic priorities:

- Promoting the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).
- Consolidating, improving and expanding bilateral relations.
- Transforming the states.
- Building a better Africa and better world.
- Speeding up delivery of basic needs and developing human resources.

These key priorities of the South Africa's foreign policy under Peace and Security had an influential role towards conflict resolution in the SADC region. Amongst these key priorities under Peace and Security, South Africa protect and assure the sovereignty and territorial integrity of nation states in the region, it also promote the development of an effective security regime for the region and oppose the proliferation and illicit trade in arms, it also work towards attainment of a peaceful, stable and secure region by promoting peace and stability, as well as by containing and working towards eliminating state corruption in the continent. It also work towards eradication of conflicts in the region by promoting peaceful resolution of all conflicts in the region and by laying the framework for durable and sustainable peace and developed and affective, sustainable systems and harmonized approach to averting and managing disasters (www.dfa.gov.za).

1.3 Aim of the Study

To investigate South Africa's Foreign policy towards the conflict resolution in the SADC region.

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The study examines the following specific aspects:

1.4.1 The reasons for engagement of South Africa in the SADC region.

1.4.2 The reasons for intervention of South Africa in Lesotho crises.

1.4.3 The implications of South Africa's foreign policy towards conflict resolution in the SADC region.

1.5 Literature Review

Literature review is important for the researcher to identify related literatures to the research problem handled by other researchers and to identify existing gaps in the literature. It also sharpens the researcher's theoretical developments and debates in the area of research, and also to acquaint him/ her with problems that he/ she might come across. The researcher attempted to ensure that he did not simply duplicated the efforts of others, but contributed something original and meaningful to the body of knowledge by discovering something different about South Africa's Foreign policy position towards the conflict resolution in the SADC region. The researcher also attempted to identify the strength and weakness in previous studies, thereby alerting him/ her to possible difficulties in the study.

Le Pere et al (1999) argued that South Africa has a unique and special role in the Southern African region and on the African continent, and that its emergent "South" identity compels South Africa to act as a voice for developing countries in multilateral forums.

Their article (4.3 December 1999, South Africa foreign policy challenges in the new millennium) further states that the orientation of the South African government's post 1999 foreign policy has been described as vacillating between "Realist and Moral" internationalism. Indeed, in the early post apartheid period, there was a palpable tension between prioritizing its perceived commercial trade and political interests and its role as a moral crusader in the promotion of global human rights and democracy. However following the second post-apartheid election in 1999 which saw Mr. Thabo Mbeki securing overwhelming political control in the hands of the ANC, with himself and a close circle of colleagues at the center of policy making, this ambiguity and hesitancy was replaced by a strong sense of identity.

The trio further outlines on the efficient foreign policy making that the foreign policy making under the democratically elected ANC government is dramatically different from the process under Apartheid. Gone are the days of excessive secrecy, the promotion of narrow sectional interests, the overbreaking and cynical influence of the military, and the Myopic Worldview. Despite a difficult transitional period, the current approach to foreign policy making is refreshingly open and participative. Complementing this approach is an apparent broad societal consensus on the three broad objectives of foreign policy, namely: the promotion of "Wealth Creation" and "Security" for South Africans, prioritizing Southern Africa and the continent and leading the global South on issues of democracy and Sustainable, People-Centered development (www.igd.org.za 03/11/2004).

According to Dube (2003), hostility best describes the atmosphere that existed between South Africa and its neighbors prior to 1999. South Africa found itself in an awkward position as far as its neighboring countries are concerned, as the apartheid regime managed to create more enemies than friend in the Southern African region. Given the hostile atmosphere and tense relationship between South Africa and its neighbors, it is no wonder that security concerns dominated the agenda of South African policy objectives. Policy makers devoted much time to exploring military options and to protect the country from antagonistic states that resented the fact that they had to depend on South Africa for a number of essential services (Dube, 2003).

South Africa used its military superiority to pursue its foreign policy objectives, which aimed at, amongst other things, creating instability in the region and preserving white minority rule. Denis Van Niekerk notes that, “While South Africa’s people experienced discrimination and repression at home, the people of other countries fell victims to destabilization. Policies, which left many people dead, displaced even worse, and inflicted damage estimated at \$65 billion on the economies of neighboring countries”. The destabilization policies of the apartheid regime contributed to an atmosphere of insecurity in South Africa (www.Aisa.org.za/ 03.11.04).

Horst Brammer (1999) states that the events of the recent past, which reflect political upheaval and instability in Southern Africa, are clear indicators of the urgent need to establish a regional mechanism that deals effectively with political issues in the region. That was particularly in the realm of regional dialogue and conflict resolution. He further outlined that when Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) was established in 1992, member’s states accepted the SADC Treaty and Declaration, which forms the legal and political foundation of the community. The treaty made several references to political co-operation between members. It also identifies the principle to which member states commit themselves. Those principles were peace and security, human rights, democracy and the rule of law and the peaceful settlement of disputes (www.igd.org.za 03/11/2004).

Brammer also elaborated on the issue of conflict resolution in the SADC region. He outlined that the fundamental differences in conflict resolution were extremely detrimental to the objectives of attaining integration in SADC. Not only has Southern Africa been subjected to political instability and the security of the region’s citizens seriously threatened by those developments, but also the international community becomes increasingly disillusioned with the political ability of the region to cope with its problems. This could impact extremely negatively on vital aspects of socio-economic development in the region. The investor confidence will be eroded and projects aimed at capacity developments in Southern Africa could be jeopardized. He further stressed that for these reasons; a structure addressing regional security must be developed and put in place with great urgency.

The intervention of South Africa into Lesotho was viewed in different ways by some authors and journalists. The monthly journal of the Socialist Party under its issue 33, November 1998, condemning the Lesotho invasion by South Africa. The article "Socialism Today" states that South Africa's invasion of Lesotho on 22 September 1998 was an act of aggression worthy of the old apartheid regime. The invasion left at least 66 people dead, nine of them South African soldiers. That action by South Africa has generated a legacy of bitterness among the Masses of Basotho, and shocked most South Africans. Until the invasion, protest had been relatively peaceful. But within hours of the arrival of South African troops, the capital Maseru was in flames, with an estimated R2 billion worth of damage through arson and looting by desperate and powerless Basotho (Legassick, 1998).

According to Nettling (1999) the media also condemned the intervention of South Africa into Lesotho. He states that the intervention operation in Lesotho by South Africa's school of hard knocks, especially in light of the higher than expected rate of casualties. The newspaper headlines referred to Operation Boleas as "the incursion went wrong", "Fearful milestone for South Africa and the SANDF blunder". Moreover, as arson and looting in Maseru and resulting in deaths, the effect of the operation was described as "a city ruined by bungled intervention" and Lesotho tarnishes SA's Peacemakers Image.

It became clear that the media played a crucial role in interpreting news and events in respect of Operation Boleas. The government also responded to the media for blindness "to the values and sacrifices behind the Lesotho intervention" as a result of an "unprofessional such to fashionable and superficial judgment". From a military point of view, it would seem that, unlike many other previous multinational operations on African soil, the SANDF was not hampered by uncertainty over the political and strategic objective of the operation. It was quite clear that the intervention was intended to establish control over South Africa and Lesotho border, to protect South African assets, and to stabilize Maseru in order to create a safe environment in which Lesotho's problems could be negotiated. Accordingly, the military planners of Operation Boleas were able to define a mission, a battle concept and a desired result of the operation (www.mil.za/ 03.11/04).

At the same time, there appears to be substantial evidence that the decision to send troops to Lesotho marked a sea change by the South African government, which after failing to persuade the quarrelling parties to sit down and talk to each other; suddenly called upon the SANDF to intervene in the mountain kingdom. The intervention left the SANDF without proper contingency plan, especially in light of vagueness and uncertainty concerning the ambit of South African foreign policy framework for peace enforcement. Moreover, SANDF units were not ready, as time was too short for proper planning preparing development skills and rehearsals by the units involved. In addition, stock-level planning for operation reserves was not properly done, resulting in a strain on supplies (www.trinstitute.org/ 03.11.04).

One of the greatest difficulties pertaining to Operation Boleas was clearly its political justification from a regional perspective. Much confusion surrounded modalities for Security co-operation under the auspices of SADC. In August 1998, SADC became the focus of international attention when Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia decided to take part in the intervention of operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

It can be rightly argued that any justification for a military intervention on the grounds that it is in the interest of peace and must prove for the assumption that such justification cannot be contrary to the purpose and principles of the intervention as embodied in the charter of the world body. To this end, Article 24 of the charter confers upon the UN Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Article 52 of the charter deals with “regional arrangements” and states that nothing in the charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. Yet intervention operation should not be contemplated without UN authorization, as Article 53 of the UN charter clearly states “No enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council (Charter of the United Nations, 1995).

What seems to be important is to address potential conflicts or coups before they can take place or escalate beyond control. The Commanding Officer of Operation Boleas, Colonel Robbie Hartsliel, suggested that, "this kind of intervention in Lesotho be accepted as a new kind of peace operation in Africa, because such operation may prevent a massive loss of lives and enormous economic damage. According to Hartsliel, everything possible should be done to prevent civil war, and this can be achieved only if intervention takes place before armed conflict can occur (Stofberg, 1998).

At the same time, it should be remembered that peacekeeping is essentially a UN responsibility that it should be endorsed by the world body, and conducted in accordance with the internationalist ethos of the UN charter. This would imply that any justification for military intervention on the grounds that it is in the interest for peace must proceed from the assumption that it is not contradictory to the UN charter. To this end, it would be wise that intervention operations should be led by regional organization or even single nation, under political authorization of the UN. However, this would imply that the formulation of UN mandates should not inhibit swift intervention in internal matters and that regional or sub-regional organization should clearly provide for guidelines or regards military response to internal conflicts within the framework of sound objectives.

Besides, no organization may ever prop up any questionable government and the legitimacy of a particular leader may never be in the eye of the holder. In addition, no military intervention should ever go beyond the ambit of international law, since the international community or regional groupings are obviously in position to engage or interfere in any country's domestic affairs in unqualified situation. What is also significant is the fact that the UN now seems prepared to form partnership with willing regional organizations and alliances in Africa as far as operations for maintaining peace and security are concerned. This relates to the notion of a shared responsibility between the UN and continental stakeholders for the effective management of conflict in Africa.

1.6 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

A sustainable peace across Africa required the establishment of Security Community in Africa, that is, a Community that transcends international boundaries in which the resolution of conflicts by anything other than peaceful means is unthinkable. This is more than an interstate order that formally outlaws aggression and other forms of conflict and amounts to a complex inter relationship between all branches of government, civil society, and citizens themselves (www.iss.org.za/ 29.11.04).

The commitment of South African foreign policy to the principle of justice and international law in the conduct of relations between Nations is closely linked to the theory of idealism which states that the international law and morality are key influences on international events, rather than power alone. Idealism further states that the international law refers to the principles and rules of conduct that nations regard as binding. The idealists believe of good habits (such as telling the truth in diplomatic dealings with other Nations), education, and the existence of international Organisation such as the United Nations (UN) and South African Development Community (SADC), to facilitate good relations between nations will result in Peaceful and cooperative international relationships, is closely linked to South African foreign policy principle of promotion of freedom and Democracy throughout the world (Encarta, 2001).

The intervention by South Africa into Lesotho on the 22 September 1998, under the auspices of SADC has been accelerated by Liberalism. This theory puts on the interdependence of the world's countries and the mutual benefits they can gain through cooperating with each other. Liberals believe that by cooperating together, all nations could win. Liberalism see war not as a natural tendency but as a tragic mistake that can be prevented or at least minimized by international agreements. The SADC approach to Lesotho can be viewed as a right move towards a Security Community. Karl Deutsch defines Security Community as a group of Nations, which has become "intergrated".

He further stipulate that in the Security Community, being a product of social intergration, emphasis is on tranquil change and the ability to move with the actual times but projecting a desire to “positive peace” in an environment where the actual or potential application of force as a means of resolving conflicts is not a distinct possibility, but at the same time acknowledging the existence of conflicts of interests. Two theorists, Asberg and Wallensteen complements Deutsch’s definition, characterizing a Security Community as an agreement by states, which share values, including democracy. This is what has been done by a joint approach by South Africa and Botswana to Lesotho, intervenening with the ultimate objective of achieving democracy.

The two theorists furthermore not that the survival of the state and Sovereignty constitutes the core value of a Security Community and the state regarded as the provider of Security. It is nevertheless pertinent to observe that the relationship among states in a Security Community is seen as “reasonably equal and symmetrical” (www.iss.org.za/ 29.11.04). It may be argued that the Southern African sub-region has such states, insufficiently developed as they may be in terms of all these factors. It is after all the “community” nature of the Security Community Paradigm that recognises the value in numbers and consequently the need to seek structural stability to enhance it. The evolvment of structures such as Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) may have been due to this realization.

1.7 Hypothesis

1.7.1 South African involvement in conflict resolution in the SADC region led to South African intervention in Lesotho.

1.8 Methodology

1.8.1 Subjects

Data would be collected from key people involved in or knowledgeable about the conflict situation in Lesotho.

These include:

- The South African Department Foreign Affairs key Personnel.
- The Lesotho embassy in South Africa.
- The Non Governmental Organizations like Centers for Conflict Resolution in South Africa.

1.8.2 **Methods of data collection**

The semi-structured interviews with key Personnel from the Department of Foreign Affairs will be held. This type of interview has been chosen because it has the technique which helps to clarify concepts and problems, and they allow for the establishment of a list of possible answers or solutions which, in turn, facilitates that construction of multiple choice questions, the elimination of super flow questions and the reformation of ambiguous ones.

This method will also allow for the discovery of new aspects of the problem by investigating in detail some explanations given by the respondents. The wealth and quality of the data gathered are strongly depended on the skills of the interviews, the confidence they are able to awaken in respondents, the type of questions which are asked, and the encouraging comments which are made at the correct moment (Casley, 1995).

1.8.3 **Procedure**

A letter of introduction to various stakeholders would be obtained from the Department of Political Studies and International Relations, North West University, Mafikeng Campus. This letter will serve to enable the researcher to gain access to the relevant sources of information and interviewing some respondents.

Beside a letter of introduction, a pre-arrangement of making contact with respondents telephonically would also form part of the procedure. A sample of twenty people will be chosen to gather data. Gathering data on a sample of twenty respondents will be less time consuming and less costly since the costs of research are proportional to the number of hours spent on data collection.

The two types of sampling i.e. Probability or Random Sampling and Non Probability Sampling will be used in this case. The probability samples are of much higher quality, whilst the Non-Probability Sampling has pragmatic advantage. Therefore, a probability sampling of simple random sampling will be used because it is a sampling procedure, which provides equal opportunity of selection for each element in a population. Even though a Simple Random Sampling is seldom used because it is cumbersome for a large population, it will be a useful tool when used as part of other Random Sampling techniques, such stratified and clusters sampling methods.

1.8.4 Data Analysis

Most of the data from the field was qualitative. The data was obtained from the examination of secondary data as well as from interviews with key people and other respondents who had a broad insight about the Lesotho conflict as well as South Africa's foreign policy. The data is analysed on the basis of content.

1.9 Ethical Consideration

The researcher would ensure confidentiality of information and anonymity of the names of respondents. Participation in the study of the respondents will be voluntary, and the respondents will be duly informed about that. The researcher undertakes to provide the findings to the relevant stakeholders like the Center for Conflict Resolutions in South Africa, and other Non Governmental Organizations which deals with conflict resolutions within SADC region.

CHAPTER TWO

THE REASONS FOR ENGAGEMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA IN CONFLICT RESOLUTIONS IN THE SADC REGION.

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The emergent pattern of conflict in the African region has had devastating consequences on the civilian population and the social costs of these conflicts are horrific. It is self-evident that the challenge facing governments is not the elimination of conflict, but rather how to effectively address conflict when it arises. Whilst noting that there is no “one size fits all” intervention on conflict mediation/resolution, we have learned that alternatively conflict can be managed positively through mediation, negotiation, joint problem-solving and consensus building.

Due to the changing nature of conflict which is now mostly within states, more and more attention is being paid to the sub-continental institutions or sub-regions within Africa to assume greater responsibility for conflict resolutions and prevention than ever before. The Southern African Development Community (SADC)’s 1992 Treaty states clearly that the consolidation, defense and maintenance of democracy, peace and security and stability is one of the main objectives of the regional organization. Yet the past decade has not been kind to the region which has remained wracked by inter and intra state conflicts that included the civil wars in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), election related violent protests in Lesotho, Zanzibar and Zambia as well as the electoral disputes and land invasions in Zimbabwe.

However, it is worth noting that, the reasons for South Africa’s engagement in conflict resolution in the SADC are categorised into political and historical reasons, Socio-Economic reasons, cultural reasons and demographic reasons. These categories of reasons will be dealt with in details in the following sub-topics.

2.2 The historical and political reasons for South African engagement.

The early years of independence were not particularly happy. Lesotho was no less poor than it had been previously, nor any less dependent on South Africa. In the political arena the government was engaged in running battles with both the Basotho Congress Party (BCP) and the king and his supporters. In the past, the antagonism between Jonathan and the king could be traced back to bitter dynastic rivalries that had surfaced in the 19th century. The Basotholand National Party (BNP) government came to depend increasingly on South African administrative, financial and commercial assistance. Collaboration with South Africa suited the BNP, but further alienated the indigenous middle classes and intelligentsia.

Nevertheless, though the BNP was able to cement its hold on power through collaborationists' policies, these failed to translate into improved living conditions for the majority of Basotho, who in any case harboured an innate anti-Afrikaner sentiment that drew on folk memories of conquest and the loss of land. Disappointed voters once again switched sides and in the 1970 elections the BCP won 35 seats to the BNP's 23. Jonathan refused to accept defeat, however, and, encouraged by a South African government disturbed by Mokhehle's "radicalism", suspended the constitution and declared a state emergency. King Moshoeshe III was initially placed under house arrest but later allowed to go into exile in the Netherlands. These developments merely served further to narrow the domestic political support base of the BNP, and entrenched the regime's relationship of dependence vis-à-vis the South African government (www.iss.co.za 03/11/2004).

Though the king was allowed to return to Lesotho in 1971, Jonathan ruled the country without any recourse to representative institutions. In 1973 Jonathan established an interim legislature and began work on a new constitution, a move that split the BCP again, as some members were won over to Jonathan's side. Mokwehle's supporters staged an abortive coup in 1974 and then fled into exile, to begin an underground war against the Jonathan government. It was at this stage that Jonathan and his Lieutenants began to reconsider their options.

In 1974 the Lisbon coup and the subsequent liberation of Angola and Mozambique constituted the first significant breaches in the settler fortress of South Africa. Collaboration with South Africa had also yielded fewer material benefits than expected for Lesotho's elite and their constituents, making the unpopularity of the policy and the continental ostracism that followed that much more difficult to endure. Gradually Lesotho's leaders began to ponder the advantages of shifting to a radical stance in the region, which would certainly attract the sympathy and financial support of the outside world. It might also go some way towards undermining the support base of the exiled BCP.

By 1976 Jonathan's reorientation was virtually complete. Following Soweto uprising of 1976, the Lesotho government issued a number of public warnings to Pretoria about its repressive policies, and began to open ties with the African National Congress (ANC). Lesotho refused to recognize the independence of Transkei (a homeland in South Africa) and joined the frontline states grouping. By 1979, the BCP had split once more, one faction negotiating its return to Lesotho, while another under Mokwehle was prepared to accept Pretoria's help to form a military wing, the Lesotho Liberation Army, which launched a number of Nuisance raids into Lesotho from South Africa soil over the next few years.

There was a brief lull in 1980 following a temporary rapprochement between Maseru and Pretoria, but an upsurge in unrest in South Africa and suspicions that Lesotho was harbouring ANC bases saw a resumption of destabilization, culminating in a bloody raid on Maseru in 1982. These events forced Jonathan even deeper into the radical camp, and he established diplomatic relation with a number of Socialist countries (www.iss.co.za/03.11.04). In 1983 Pretoria began to exert pressure by restricting the flow of traffic into Lesotho. This was followed by further military incursions from South Africa in 1984. Further economic and diplomatic pressure followed and Pretoria began to co-ordinate the activities of the exiled opponents of the Jonathan regime. Lesotho's general election of September 1985 deteriorated into force when all five opposition parties withdrew to allow the BNP a clean sweep without a single vote being cast.

By early 1986, Pretoria had tightened its blockade of the mountain kingdom and the fear of economic strangulation and the army's growing apprehension about the growing power of the BNP's militant youth wing served as the triggers for the Lesotho Defense Force (LDF) to intervene in the political arena on 20 January 1986, only a few days after its commander had returned from consultation in Pretoria (www.iss.co.za/ 03.11.04). Heading Lesotho's new ruling military council was Major-General Lekhanya, who now found himself propelled into leadership by colleagues more directly involved in the coup. These other senior officers included close relatives of the king, who was now invested with executive and legislative powers, though these were to be exercised in consultation with the military Council, which retained an effective veto.

The new arrangement suited the royalists and the traditional chiefs, who effectively had been sidelined during Jonathan's rule, and had resented the BNP's relegation of king Moshoeshoe II to the status of a national symbol. The new regime also enjoyed the support of BNP conservatives, including the experienced former Minister Evoristus Sekhonyana, a business associate of Lekhanya. Pretoria soon ended the border blockade and shortly indicated a willingness to suspend its association with the BCP, which subsequently reached an agreement with Lekhanya permitting its leader, Ntsu Mokwehle, to return to Lesotho in 1989. The new military regime was inept, however, being driven by internal tensions and personal ambitions, corrupt and incapable of managing national affairs. It staggered on through a number of notable disasters, including a memorable papal visit in 1988 when, in full view of international television, it was compelled to rely heavily on South African assistance.

The blatant faults of the new regime, Lekhanya's ruthless treatment of the BNP's radical wing, a number of whose leaders died in mysterious circumstances, and his public dependence upon South Africa quickly brought his government into bad odour, exacerbated by sordid personal scandals. In February 1990 the ambitions of the royalist faction within the Military Council provoked an open power struggle. Lekhanya quickly neutralized the challenge mounted by two of the king's cousins, whom he also charged with involvement in the murder of BNP ex-ministers.

When king Moshoeshoe refused to acquiesce in the removal of his kinsmen from office, Lekhanya simply stripped him of his powers, purged the cabinet of royalists and took full control. In March 1990 the king went into exile in Britain (www.iss.co.za / 03.11.04). Partly, no doubt, to improve the tattered image of his regime, in late February 1990 Lekhanya indicated a desire to return Lesotho to democracy by May 1992. By that time events in South Africa had made it clear that the RLDF could no longer hold the line against the regional manifestations of the global democratic tide. In May 1990 Lekhanya established a National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) to deliberate upon a new dispensation to be based on the independence constitution.

Developments in South Africa since 1990 had stimulated greater openness in public debate within Lesotho and had also signaled the removal of Pretoria's implicit support for a conservative military regime in Maseru. When the Lesotho government resorted to brutal repressive measures to counter a wave of industrial strikes and public unrest in 1991, it was left isolated in the face of international condemnation. Indispensable foreign donors and influential governments stepped up their pressure on the regime for the introduction of accountable government.

Major general Elias Rameama took over as head of the state after Lekhanya was ousted from power following his forced resignation by soldiers who were angry at being offered no more than a 22% pay increase, and also failing to dismiss two of his civilian ministers, Tom Thabane and Everistus Sekhonyana, who were implicated in scandals involving vast amounts of government money. Lekhanya fled to South Africa, with Thabane and Sekhonyana, after being dethroned from power.

Rameama lifted the ban on party political activity in late 1991, and tried to organize the elections for the coming year. On the recommendation of the Commonwealth appointed Electoral Officer, however, the elections were postponed to November 1992 because of administrative and delimitation problems, and again in January 1993. They were eventually held on 27 March 1993, though the delay fed public suspicion that the army was using technical excuses to prolong or avert the transition.

On 1 April 1993, the Military Council had a final emergency session amid rumours that another coup was in the offing; a General Rameama subsequently visited the barracks to calm the soldiers. Later that day king Letsie III (the son of king Moshoeshe II) was then sworn in as head of state under the new constitution. The leader of BCP, Dr. Ntsu Mokwehle, was then sworn in as Prime Minister. Mokwehle's role was characterized by fears of the army and the government's failure to assure its hold over the state's security apparatus, and Sekhonyana's inflammatory utterances scattered reports about a mutiny within the Lesotho Defense Force (LDF). The government reaction was to keep the mutiny secret, and then approach the South African government with request that it send in forces to disarm the LDF. On this occasion Pretoria declined to interfere so drastically in Lesotho's affairs (www.iss.co.za/ 03.11.04).

Tension between Mokwehle and LDF Major General A.M. Mosakeng goes on heat when General Mosakeng handed over an unsigned letter demanding on behalf of the (Royal Lesotho Defense Force) RLDF a 100% pay increase. Mokwehle replied publicly that he was shocked by that demand, since the soldiers received the same consideration as other public servants, whose salaries were reviewed periodically. However, the soldiers were not united in that mission.

Mokwehle's response to the RLDF was to send a letter to the South African government pleading Pretoria to send peacekeeping forces. Essentially to disarm the RLDF. He consulted neither the Defense Commission nor the king before issuing his appeal for help. On being informed by the South African ambassador in Maseru that the situation was indeed dangerous, then South Africa Foreign Affairs Minister "Pik" Botha arrived the following day to talk to the latter as "leaders of the opposition" was deemed offensive by Mokwehle, and caused a delay in the opening of these urgent talks. Having spoken to both political camps, Botha warned that while his government had no intention of becoming embroiled militarily in Lesotho's problems, it would not hesitate to close the borders should a coup occur. This threat appears to have secured promises of a truce from the two army factions, which now occupied the hill-tops around the capital (www.iss.co.za/03.11.04).

Botha's intervention notwithstanding, trouble resumed on 18 January 1994, when a former member of the Military Council and his son were wounded in an ambush. At this stage it appeared the then Lesotho's Foreign Minister, Molapo Qhobela, met the two warring factions in the company of General Mosakeng in an effort to word off the threat of military confrontation, but on the 23rd the fighting intensified once more, with master and machine-gun fire exchanged between Maseru's hills.

The following day Botha again ruled out the possibility that South Africa would intervene militarily indicated that he had notified the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the United Nations (UN) and Commonwealth of the gravity of the situation. Among other things this provided an indication that Pretoria saw the Lesotho crisis as an opportunity to exploit its new-found semi respectability in the diplomatic arena, by involving National Party ruled South Africa with the Frontline Status in a peace initiative.

Meanwhile Mokwehle's government found itself arrayed by criticism from all sides. The prime minister's apparent refusal to consult with other domestic political actors and the weaknesses revealed by his panicky appeal for foreign assistance further damage his warning credibility as a leader. Indeed, the Information Ministry revealed that while the government was talking to the international community about a solution, it had no contact with either military faction. Conflicting reports continued to emanate from official sources blaming the trouble variously upon a wage dispute and on more sinister political ambitions.

On the night of the 24/25 January 1994, Elijah Legwaila, Secretary to the president of Botswana, visited Maseru at the OAU request and negotiated a truce to end the fighting. The Lesotho crises also dominated the deliberations of South African Development Community (SADC) summit in Gaborone on 26 January 1994, but only after it had provided the justification for a historic meeting between the then South Africa's president, F.W. de Klerk, his Zimbabwean and Botswana counterparts and Nelson Mandela.

Lesotho's Deputy prime minister Qhobela. President Mugabe of Zimbabwe, subsequently announced that the five leaders had agreed to the establishment of a task force, to be provided by Zimbabwe, Botswana and South Africa, to assist in the resolution of Lesotho's current difficulties. The task force was discussed by officials of the three participating countries at a meeting in Pretoria on the 27th January 1994 (www.iss.co.za/03.11.04).

2.3 THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT EXPOSURE TO INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

In 1994, the "new South Africa" entered the international political arena prepared to assume more responsibility and play a more active role in world affairs. The focus of South African foreign policy were: Southern Africa, Africa as a continent, as well as Europe and other continents. Relations with other states, in particular with its partners in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) were acknowledged by South Africa to be high on its political agenda. Special priorities were given to economic affairs and the settlement of political conflicts.

Parallel to free agreement with the European Union, which is now being applied provisionally, South Africa conducted relevant negotiations with its thirteen SADC partners and has since ratified the SADC trade protocol. In recent years, the SADC member states transferred the SADC's steering functions to the organizations headquarters in Gaborone, Botswana, thus launching an intergration process which is, however, for less ambitious than the one embarked upon within the African Union (AU). With its "organ on politics, defense and security", SADC has given itself a security policy instrument reaching beyond economic intergration to deal with, among other things, conflict prevention and management. South Africa holds the deputy chairmanship in that body, which compels her to be fully engaged in the resolution of conflicts in the SADC region.

Gwexe (2000) outlined that the other dimension which saw South Africa being engaged in regional conflict prevention was some of the tragic events which happened in SADC and other great lakes regions. He cited the tragic events in Liberia (1990), Somalia in 1992 and Rwanda in 1994 had evoked a rethinking of a pivotal role assigned to the United Nations (UN) and the international community in African conflict resolution. Subsequently there emerged a clarion calls for African solutions to African conflicts, with foreign intervention only playing a complementary role (African journal of conflict resolutions, Vol. 1, No. 1 2000).

That unfolding of events put a democratic South Africa in a good stead to take initiative in Sub-Saharan Africa. Those events in Somalia and Rwanda showed that many of the recommendations of the UN agenda for peace were, in fact, implausible. In the light of this developments, a democratic South Africa as a dominant member state within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) seemed to be in good head pend in the forefront of renewed moves towards bringing African solutions to African conflicts.

Another dimension of South Africa to be engaged in the conflict resolution within SADC region was the approval of the white paper on South African participation in peace missions by the South Africa cabinet, on 21 October, 1998. That document was the answer to the need for a comprehensive and intergrated policy on conflict management and peacekeeping in South Africa (Global Dialogue Volume 4.1, 1999). The most fundamental aspect of the white paper was a belief that conflict management (of which peacekeeping forms but one part) should not happen in isolation of addressing that cause of the conflicts. South Africa's domestic policy principles also informed the policy on participation in peace enforcement. Those principles were equality, dignity, safety and the creation of wealth.

The white paper includes more specific principles for participation in peace missions such as clear international mandates, clear entry and exit criteria, sufficient means and clear domestic mandates that are in line with the constitution of South Africa. The paper further outlines the domestic procedures to be followed when participation is considered (Global Dialogue Volume 4.1, 1999).

The speedy and systematic implementation of the white paper happened in number of ways. The first one was the prioritization of active participation in initiatives that enhance Africa's capacity to take greater responsibility in resolving its conflict. For example, South Africa to host Exercise Blue Crane, which was the second SADC peacekeeping exercise of that nature. Exercise Blue Crane was most intergrated and multifaceted exercise over to be held in Africa. Participants from South Africa and SADC governments practiced all skills needed for modern peace missions. These ranged from more conventional military tasks such as crowd control and logistic support civillian and humanitarian skills such as refugee assistance, dealing with media and managing the office of a special representative of the UN Secretary-General (www.igd.org.za/ 03.11.04).

While much of the input from the white paper was the work of the Non Government Organizations (NGO's), the white paper eventually casted peace missions within a wider, peacebuilding framework, emphasizing that military participation in peace mission was the only one tool that was available for the engagement of Africa. The document reflected a genuine desire by South Africa to come to grips with the challenges of accepting partial responsibility for stability in Africa and elsewhere. The challenge that was to be met was how to communicate resource and implement the good intentions of the white paper. Practically, the final step was the establishment of a peace missions database for government officials and the compilation of interdepartmental standard operating procedures (South African defense on white paper, 1999).

While the white paper was remarkably a perceptive document, South Africa's apparent commitment to peace missions has yet to be translated into government action of even the most moderate nature such as a positive response to United Nations (UN) requests for even a few civillian police and military observers or even accession to the UN standby arrangement. It is not surprising, therefore, that more than one informed commentators have argued that the government has been using the drawn-out policy processes as an excuse not to be involved in peace missions, particularly in Africa.

In all fairness, perception have changed quite markedly after the hard lesson that South Africa learned in Lesotho and the obligations that the country's active diplomatic engagement in the Democratic Republic of Congo was created (www.iss.co.za/ 29.11.04). The defense sectors also emanates as one of the contributory factor towards the engagement of South Africa in the conflict resolution in SADC region. These sectors reflects aspects as the need for people to be protected from interstate and intrastate conflicts and aggression, and the need to harmonise policies. The draft document on acknowledgement of "regional coordination and co-operation on matters related to security and defense and the establishment of appropriate mechanisms to this end" and the need to take this further to "the development of a collective security capacity and concluded a mutual defense pact to respond to external military threats" showed the sub-region's evolution of a security community from the Nascent through the ascendant to the mature phase (Vale, 2002).

The document's strategy of developing a sub-regional capacity through member states standby arrangements, and the enhancement of the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) based in Zimbabwe, indicated recognition of the value of a sub-regional approach and the weaknesses of a state-driven project. Utilization of some of the state's forces in the sub-regional standby arrangement, irrespective of the size or quality of their forces, reduces the problems that would arise from feelings of exclusion that might ignite the sensitivity of state sovereignty. Since the standby arrangement project would imply forces that may not necessarily have had identical training and operational experience working together, standardization was an important requirement.

The inclusion of Gaborone Draft of the promotion of inter-operability of military equipment and joint multinational exercises aiming to develop coordination and cooperation among the forces. A consequence this would be a reduction of fear and an increase in trust, which is another characteristic of the ascendant phase of a security community (www.iss.co.za/ 29.11.04).

However, the financing of the RPTC, including the possible use of foreign partners, poses some political difficulties. One difficulty arises from allowing states to contribute according to their capacity. Since this would imply that South Africa, and other economically advanced and militarily superior states, would play a dominant role in the activities of the RPTC (as indeed they would in the overall sub-region structures), it would not be unrealistic to deduce that this reopen the old fear and hostility which characterized the pre 1994 era (Kariuki, 2003).

A mutual defense pact was another issue which forced South Africa to be engaged in conflict resolution matters within SADC region. That pact was closely associated with a non-aggression treaty and was regarded as a collective defense strategy which was viewed as, firstly, having the ability to stop member states from promoting hostile activities from each other's territories, and secondly, encouraging coming to each other's support in an eventuality. The SADC mutual defense pact supported that issue, thereby giving the view that the pact may be nothing short of a strategy for states to protect one another; specifically, for state elites to keep one another in power. However, read in conjunction with article 7 on Non-interference in one another's internal affairs, the pact also stipulate that the SADC Summit would act differently should it consider it necessary to intervene (SADC Communiqué, 17-18 August 1999).

The very existence of the Mutual Defense Pact suggested that the regional grouping genuinely desired to work as one on matters of defense and Security. Article on defence co-operation and collective defence as well as on the settlement of disputes showed the determination to create a suitable environment for peaceful coexistence. While the Pact provides for training, joint technological enhancement and the exchange of military intelligence, and in this way creates a close working environment and trust among the members of the different defence forces, it also provides for timely help to needy state parties. States confirming to these article hold compatible value and similar interests; both essential factors for a Security Community. Article 13 (which covers the Settlement of disputes among member states) assured that members states would no longer target each other militarily, which was a critical indicator of a Security Community (www.iss.org.za / 29.11.4).

However, the Pact was not without elements that inhibited the development of a Security Community for a start, although there would be a swift response to an armed attack on a member state, Article 6 (2) insisted on the SADC Summit's Sanctions (which could only lead to delay when attending to an emergency situation) and consequently may become a source of differences among member states. The provision required that the African Union (AU) and Security Council of the United Nations (UN) be Notified soon after such an attack, instead of the earlier requirement that no such intervention took place without the UN's approval, is significant. That implied that there would be no undue delay in reacting to emergencies (www.uneca.org.za/ 03.11.04).

Notwithstanding some of the articles viewed as retrogressive to the attainment of a Security Community, the SADC Pact continually stressed some factors that pointed towards a peaceful collaborative arrangement. The Pact continued to make states and people its dominant units. It also took into cognizance collective defence and the preservation of Peace and Stability as well as other provisions on defence co-operation. Together with other aspects, which includes bilateral consultation and the settlement of disputes through democratic institutions such as the SADC Tribunal, the Pact reflected on unmistakable intention by its members to establish a Security Community (SADC Communiqué; 12-14 August, 2001).

The political sector also played a vital role towards South Africa's engagement in conflict resolution matters of the SADC region. This sector indicates that the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) bias towards a Security Community. For instance, the Plan's acceptance of democratic elections and Consultations designed to improve democratic culture and the acknowledgement of "good political co-operation" sits well with early phases of Security Community development. What may be contested was the degree to which elections in the sub-region have been democratic. Holding regular elections in the sub-region, holding former Political leaders accountable, and participation by sub-regional institutions in these processes were all indicative of efforts to improve governance.

Further solidifying that position was the Gaborone Draft's assertion that the sub-region has established institutions designed to "deepen cooperation and mutual trust among member states, one such institution (being) the inter-state politics and Diplomacy Committee". That relates to the first and second tiers of the emergence of Security Communities (SIPO, 2003). Central to the political section of the Gaborone Draft was the heightening of current common values and culture, which was expected to lead to the transcending of boundaries. Acknowledging these values entails an acknowledgement that the people in the SADC region share a common past, present and future.

While the document reflects common identity, it nevertheless (and in line with the tenets of the Security Community Paradigm) acknowledges the state and regional project: "The process of building the Nation-State place in tandem with the process of building the SADC community". Strategies and activities in the SIPO document reflected factors that project Unity across state boundaries, such as establishing common electoral standards and enhancing the regional capacity to meet disasters.

Even more significant in the Gaborone Draft was the apparent determination by the sub-region to "Develop a common foreign policy approach on issues of mutual concern and advance such policies collectively in international fora" (Isaksen, 2002). The Draft coverage of the public Security Sectors shows a situation of "increased cooperation and collaboration between various services responsible for law enforcement and public Security". Co-operation in immigration, customs, and policing is said to be comprehensive but nevertheless challenged by a number of issues such as "transnational criminal activities and organized criminal syndicates, the negative effects of globalization such as the growing vulnerability of national borders and Scarcity of resources". The Gaborone Draft envisaged that the public Security Sectors will establish common approaches their work.

The strategies of “developing a database for law enforcement agencies, harmonizing and consolidating immigration procedures and control mechanisms to facilitate the movement of people amongst member states” are indicative of a plan to develop a collaborative arrangement for the sub-region (SADC Communiqué, 1996). The SIPO eventually provided a “road map” to the attainment of a shared future in the Southern African region. Insofar as the development of a Security Community is concerned, the attainment of a mutual defence Pact is the ultimate achievement, which would equate to the mature level in the formulation of a Security Community (Selebi, 1999).

CHAPTER THREE

3. THE REASONS FOR SOUTH AFRICAN INTERVENTION IN LESOTHO

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Over a period of years the South African government supported various Lesotho government in an attempt to maintain stability and develop the country economically, as well as in various other ways.

Examples of these are the following:-

- The extensive role that South Africa is playing in developing the Lesotho Highlands Water Project.
- Developing the border infrastructure in the Vicinity of Fouriesburg, Ficksburg and Ladybrand.
- Agricultural assistance and Socio-economic assistance, especially during heavy snowfalls.
- Supporting the development of military infrastructure and building of Lesotho's military capacity by means of training programmes, the institutionalization of modern military processes, etc.

3.2 THE POLITICAL REASONS FOR SOUTH AFRICAN INTERVENTION

The uprising and unrest seem to be an intergral part of the political landscape of Lesotho. Illegal border crossings, endemic, smuggling of contraband and cattle rustling across the RSA/ Lesotho border obliges the South African government to maintain deployments along the 550 kilometer border, all at the South African taxpayer's expense (Mills, 2001). There have been times that the South African Military Forces could have intervened in Lesotho but did not do so because it was not a South African policy to intervened in the internal affairs of a neighbouring country. Also, South Africa had no mandate to intervene and would not act outside the dictates of the law.

One has to see all the combined events preceding the intervention in combination to realize how serious the situation had actually become. The military takeover, violent unrest, absolute lawlessness and a helpless Lesotho government had created an untenable situation inside the country. The palace grounds had been occupied by an intransigent mob. Demonstrators urged on by their leaders, held Maseru to ransom. The lives of ministers were threatened, government vehicles hijacked, the civil services were also disrupted and the police cowed into submission. The minister's vehicles were stoned by rampaging demonstrators. The broadcasting station was closed down and senior Royal Lesotho Defence Force (RLDF) Officers were forced to take refuge in South Africa (www.mil.co.za/ 13.12.04).

The situation worsened even further, when workers stopped from going to work. The rampaging demonstrators congregated at various offices, denying workers entry and threatening to occupy Government offices. Public Statements were made to the effect that parliament and Government were being closed. The ministers were not able to enter their offices. There were takeovers and theft of government vehicles (Gambri, 2001). The country was in a state of absolute absence of law and enforcement capability. The public of Lesotho were held hostage by unruly and looting elements. The Royal Lesotho Mounted Police (RLMP) was not in control of law and order because of intimidation from the masses of Lesotho. The government was unable to govern and as a result there were genuine fears that a military coup was imminent. In a nutshell, anarchy reigned and Lesotho was plunging into chaos. There was no possibility of unaided return to normality (ww.mil.co.za/ 13.12.04).

During the uprising, the legitimately elected authorities of Lesotho had clearly completely control of the situation and the RLDF, was in fact, in command of Lesotho. It can simply not be disputed that a virtual takeover of a democratically elected government had taken place. It was highly doubtful that the proper Lesotho authorities could ever have restored order and proper government on their own without cooperation of those who had taken charge of Lesotho. Even before the formal request for help was made, it was doubtful if the SADC had any choice but to intervene. It would have been immoral not to respond, given the prevailing situation by then.

The Prime Minister and Head of Government of Lesotho, Pakalitha Mosisili, appealed in writing to the SADC for military assistance. The SADC then requested Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe, all countries of the acknowledged, legitimate SADC, to provide the assistance required. These were four of the SADC countries which had come to an agreement to defend one another in case of undemocratic attempts at takeover (www.mil.co.za/ 13.12.04). The Prime Minister of Lesotho had thus appealed to the SADC as a legitimate body for military assistance to restore the authority of his government. As it happened, South Africa and Botswana responded to the request. At a meeting of the ministers of Defence of South Africa and Botswana in Gaborone on 15 September 1998, these two countries were ordered to plan military intervention in Lesotho under the auspices of the SADC and in accordance with the SADC agreement to prevent military coups.

On 16 September 1998, the South African President's Office instructed the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) to conduct contingency planning. In order to attempt further negotiations with the dissidents, South Africa agreed to postpone the military intervention from 18 September 1998 to 22 September 1998. Efforts were again made to resolve the crisis by peaceful means, but these were unsuccessful (Kiguwa, 1999). On September 22, 1998, the early morning silence of Lesotho was shattered by Sounds of Operation Boleas when 600 South African Soldiers moved into Lesotho. Thus the SADC's operation in an effort to deal with the deteriorating security situation in the mountain kingdom of Lesotho.

Although it was said to be a combined military task force, consisting of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and the Botswana Defence Force (BDF), it was until after night fall on 23 September 1998, that approximately 200 Botswana Defence Force arrived in Maseru. The SANDF concentrated on defeating military bases and other strategic installations. These included the Katse and Mohale dams, part of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (www.trinstitute.org.za/ 13.12.04).

Surprised at the strength of the Lesotho Soldiers resistance, and commander of the operation, Colonel Robbie Hartslief, ordered his troops to shoot to kill. On 28 September, 1998 South Africa was forced to send 450 reinforcements soldiers while Botswana boosted its force by more 120 soldiers. Maseru, the country's main Commercial Centre, has been destroyed and the economy were also devastated. Damage in the main town were estimated at US\$ 10 Million (www.greenleft.org.za/ 03.11.04). The military operation conducted in Lesotho were closely linked to the sole mission of restoring stability in Lesotho. However, although, underestimating the level of hostility, the SANDF knew that it would nevertheless face a hostile RLDF.

Therefore a safe environment first had to be created by securing and controlling the Maseru Bridge Border Post, the RLDF military bases, the radio broadcasting station, embassies, the South African High Commission, the Royal Palace, airports, government buildings, power and water supply facilities. Securing the Maseru central business district and stabilizing the rest of the country was another priority. The military dissidents were simply to be disarmed, and no violent actions were planned against the people. No military objective fell outside the mandate to restore stability in Lesotho. As an extension of this mission, the final and most important objective once stability had been achieved was to enable the Royal Lesotho Mounted Police to restore and maintain law and order in conjunction with the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) of the SADC.

All this was of course, done with the full blessing of the SADC. As soon as that was done, then SANDF and BDF withdrawn peacefully from Lesotho (Matheba, 1999). Unfortunately, the time available for planning and preparation to execute all the possible tasks of such an operation had been insufficient, causing an outcry in the national and international media, with the SANDF bearing the brunt of criticism accusing it of unprofessional, reckless action.

In spite of the fact that the SANDF knew that it was going to face hostile opposition, it tried to keep violence to the absolute minimum, by taking the following measures:-

- In general, the combined SADC task force behaved like a peacekeeping rather than an intervention force, leading to it being under strength for the military task at hand, the soldiers were tasked to occupy key installations and disarm the mutineers with a firm requirement to use minimum force. This meant that the target could not be softened up with artillery bombardment and aerial attacks. Fire was drawn at the Royal Palace and mutineers, approached with soft intentions, fiercely resisted the Combined Task Force (C.T.F) at the Katse dam and the Ratjemose and Makoanyane military bases. The strong armed resistance led to quite a few SANDF members either being killed or wounded because the initial response was inadequate to counter the resistance that had to be dealt with (Matheba, 1999).
- Furthermore, most of the SANDF's weapons were kept in less than a defensive mode for as long as possible. The C.T.F initially used blank ammunition in weapons other than the personal weapons of soldiers to minimize casualties. It was never the intentions to fight the RLDF.
- For as long as it was possible, the C.T.F tried various forms of negotiations before using force to reach its goals. In order to restore normality and for the RLDF to reorganize itself, appeals were made to its members to report to, and to surrender their weapons, at designated points. Hope was expressed that the mutineers in the outlying bases could also be contacted. That was part of the initial peaceful approach, but it didn't materialized. It was also hoped that the use of blank ammunition would convince the mutineers at the bases to surrender. This tactic succeeded at the Ratjemose base, but when it failed at Makoanyane base, live ammunition had to be used. On all occasions, the troops of the C.T.F were always fired on first (Nyanda, 2001).

- There was always concern for the saving of human lives. This was even done at the expense of military effectiveness. The Makoanyane base was captured from a downhill position rather than from a superior position above the base to prevent high number of civilian casualties and damage to civilian property that would inevitably have resulted from an attack in the preferred direction.
- As soon as the C.T.F realised the strength of the resistance, they had to revert to live ammunition, but the approach still remained relatively non-violent for initially, small Calibre ammunition was used to limit casualties. Later, during specific incidents, heavy Calibre ammunition had to be used selectively although still with the aim of quelling resistance rather than eradicating it. At the Makoanyane Military Base, the RLDF was prepared and ready for intervention from the C.T.F and fierce resistance was met here too. Heavy weapons were used against the C.T.F, which forced an armed response. At the Royal Palace, Government Buildings and Maseru Central Business District (CBD) the C.T.F forces were initially met by resistance in the form of small arms fire (Solomon and Ngubane, 2002).
- After having reached its targets, the C.T.F was simply to contain and disarm all mutineers at the RLDF bases to seize all ammunition stored at the bases.
- It was decided that the C.T.F would maintain a presence in all areas that had been secured in the interests of preventing further violence and restoring order. It maintained a high profile in the Central business district of Maseru to prevent ongoing looting and disorder. This was in the interests of the citizens and business operations in Lesotho. An element of the C.T.F also had to be deployed at the Royal Palace to ensure the safety of the king.
- The seized arms were to be transported to the RSA for inventory purposes and interim safekeeping. Some have already been returned to the RLDF. A decision as to the disposal or final destination of the weapons and ammunition were negotiated with the appropriate Lesotho authorities (www.mil.co.za/ 13.12.04).

It is given and stands to reason that Operation Boleas undoubtedly brought a stabilizing effect towards the Lesotho crisis. This manifested itself within two days of the operation, when the military goals were reached. The military successes were never seen as an ultimate goal. Rather they were seen as a contributory factor to the returning of order and calm to Lesotho. To maintain stability, certain military tasks were to be maintained. Everyday the C.T.F brought new discoveries of weapons and massive ammunition caches which had nothing to do with the legitimate requirements of the small RLDF. More than 11000 firearms were found in various arsenals.

Anarchy was suppressed and the basis for constitutional order was created. The democratic process started to function once again. All these actions ultimately contributed to the continuation, rather than the mere establishment of stability in Lesotho (Nyanda, 2001). The operation or intervention ultimately enabled the Lesotho authority structures to regain their functions. Emphasis had to be put forth, that the SADC and its C.T.F in general, as well as the SANDF in particular, had at no stage wished to subsume the responsibilities of the legitimate Lesotho authorities. The goal of intervention was to assist the legitimate authorities to return to normality by re-assuming and carrying out their own functions.

One of the final objectives of the Operation was to enable the Royal Lesotho Mounted Police to restore and maintain law and order in conjunction with the Policing component of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee of the SADC. The C.T.F succeeded in achieving this objective. When the intimidation factor had been removed, the Royal Lesotho Mounted Police were in relatively good shape and would play a prominent role in the restoration and maintenance of law and order (Pityana, 2001). Whilst the operation was on, the C.T.F had the civilian interest at heart. The commanders of the CTF worked constantly towards restoring general security in the interests of protecting the lives of the people of Lesotho. For instance, one of the goals of the operation was to protect the industrial area of Maseru because it contained chemical and fuel plants.

The consequences of such a plant catching fire or exploding could have been disastrous. The contributions to deepening stability and re-activating the political process was one advantage which the intervention resulted in. The SANDF realized that the stability that had been achieved was not deep enough for it to be able to withdraw. To do, it would be a betrayal not only of the Lesotho government but also of the Security forces and the civilian population of the country. From the beginning, there was an attempt by the SANDF with the context of the CTF to work together with all parties involved to shift the focus away from military action to negotiation, the building of consensus, the restoration of law and order and extended, lasting stability. Only that foundation would enable the Lesotho government to promote economic growth and proceed with governing the country (Solomon et al, 2002).

As a move towards rebuilding Lesotho, the Joint Operation Centre which comprised of elements from the Lesotho Government, the RLDF, the Royal Lesotho Mounted Police and representatives from other state departments, as well as from South Africa and Botswana, was established. That Centre was established with the aim of reinstating Municipal Services and normality. The task of the Joint Operation Centre was to get government and civil administration working again in Lesotho and that was achieved. A further task of the Joint Operation Centre was to make contribution towards rebuilding the economy of Lesotho. For instance, the CTF commander had meetings with members of the business forum to discuss their interests and needs which were further addressed at the Joint Operation Centre. An ongoing concern of the SADC and the South African Government was to help rebuild the economy of Lesotho.

Another structure of the Civil-Military Operation Centre (CMOC) was created to coordinate civil and military affairs between the SADC forces in Lesotho and the Lesotho authorities. That structure was an integral part of the campaign named CHARON which embodies a campaign HQ with civil/ military cooperation as a staff function, a Combined Task Force Headquarters and three sectors in Lesotho. The overall aim of the CMOC was to assist and coordinate the normalization of the Security situation in Lesotho. Its function was to oversee the Security-related issues in Lesotho and to liaise with government departments, the business community, Non Governmental Organizations

(NGOs) and other related structures on Security matters and humanitarian relief. Its priorities were the following:-

- To sustain a stable environment in Lesotho. That involved the continued confiscation of weapons and ammunition and the maintenance of stability along the borders between Lesotho and RSA.
- The protection of key points such as the Royal Palace, the airports, government buildings, power and water supply installations, the industrial area and the Central Business District of Maseru and other main towns.

The CMOC was a genuine wide civil/ military involvement and participation was deducted from its composition, i.e.

- The RSA High Commissioner (Chairperson)
- Representative of the High Commission RSA (Vice Chairperson).
- Chief of the Royal Lesotho Defence Force.
- Commissioner of the Royal Lesotho Mounted Police.
- Director General of Lesotho National Security Services.
- Representative of the Botswana Defence Force.
- Representative of South African Defence Force.
- An SANDF Humanitarian Advisor (www.mil.co.za/ 13.12.04).

The CMOC had managed to convince some members of the business community to come back and had been able to instill some confidence in the senior leadership of the RLDF. NGOs and other government related structures, including the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank, have been activate to become involved in relief work. CMOC has had successful meetings with the principal chiefs and the Council of Churches. They discussed problems and at the end CMOC was assured of their unwavering support for the realization of a worthy cause. Both the World Bank and the UN wished to work together to ensure good governance in Lesotho. However, their assistance was dependent on law and order being maintained and on some positive results in the restructuring and retraining of the RLDF (ww.mil.co.za).

The CMOC had also been able to win the confidence of almost all the political parties in Lesotho. There had been a degree of accountability infused in the RLDF with regard to proper weapon controls and the introduction of daily personal returns. Some of the divisions in the Security powerhouse between the army and the police have been narrowed. This centre has also been able to direct military activities and to link these with the overall Security Situation in the country, so that everyone should pull in the same direction.

There had been accusation however that CMOC was not providing adequate leadership and still not dynamic enough in its general goal of restoring general security in Lesotho. As that was a cornerstone of stability in any country, there remain much work to be done. It was clear that in order for Lesotho to rebuild itself, many goals have to be reached. A deep, lasting military and political stability, as was as the maintenance of law and order, in all of which the SANDF has a vital role to play through bodies like CMOC, are vital for restoring the democratic process and economic growth in Lesotho. CMOC had and will probably keep on contributing to maintaining and enhancing security in Lesotho in various ways as well as a contributing to the restoration of general confidence in the country as a vital input to restoring its economic (www.iss.co.za/ 13.12.04).

The intervention also led to the establishment of an Interim Political Authority (IPA). That IPA was put in place to incorporate two members from each of the political parties that took part in the previous election of May 1998. These IPA was, however, experiencing certain problems. It didn't appeared to be making any tangible progress towards organizing the next elections. Not only was it fraught with administrative and logistic problems, but it was also used as a leverage Mechanism to promote party political agendas. The Basotholand National Party (BNP) under the leadership of General Motsing Lekhanya was campaigning for the dissolving of the Interim Political Authority and its replacement with the Independent Electoral Committee. The resurgence in demand for a Government of National Unity continued, with the Basotholand National Party heading it.

South African intervention was based on humanitarian support in Lesotho. After the end of the Operation in Lesotho, South Africa Showed commitment to treat professionally all the injured, including those from the RLDF who needed such assistance. Measures were also taken to counter the effect that the military intervention had had on the ordinary people of Lesotho. Apprehended RLDF dissidents were eventually handed to the Lesotho Civil Authorities. While in military custody, they received rations and medical treatment where necessary. Members of the RLDF who had been injured in the fighting were treated in hospitals in South Africa. The CTF lent active support to Lesotho's existing allying doctor service. The South African Medical Health Services (SAMHS) also participated actively in that regard. This South African Medical Health Services formed part of the Disaster Management Committee in Ladybrand.

Medical Personnel from the Orange Free State Medical Command manned a clinic in Ladybrand for three weeks. Primary health care was rendered to more than 5000 people. Medical orderliness also gave lectures on primary health care (www.mil.co.za/ 13.12.04). A Humanitarian / Health Forum was formed under the leadership of the Lesotho Department of National Health to identify organizations to render assistance, especially in remote areas. After the Operation, some 250 refugees of whom approximately 50 were children, were at one stage housed in South Africa. This number peaked at about 1500 shortly after the intervention. Hospitals within Lesotho were functioning and provision had been made to transport food supplies over the border. Assistance was also given with regard to the repatriation of displaced persons and the provision of tents and blankets. All displaced persons were returned to Lesotho during October 1998.

A sense of togetherness and reconciliatory mood was created after the Operation, whereby goodwill amongst different soldiers was fostered. That was shown by various Security Forces in Lesotho holding a sports day on 25 November 1998. The teams from the SANDF, BDF, RLDF and Royal Lesotho Mounted Police participated. The objective of the sports day was to enhance good working relationships as well as mutual understanding and trust among the members to the respective forces (www.mil.co.za/ 13.12.04).

More than two thousand civilians attended the sports day as spectators. A positive spirit was evident among the spectators and no undesirable incidents took place. The continued participation in and enjoyment of informal soccer matches was a further indication of the goodwill being fostered by means of sport. It was then clear, that the military intervention by the SADC was a victory for democracy and transparency. It has never in the history of the military had an operation been conducted under civil control and been so clearly transparent.

Unfortunately that transparent approach worked against the SANDF. The information which was not in accordance with the provision of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) seemed to have been passed to the media. The glaring images of the chaos in Maseru, the Fierce fighting and the casualties being evacuated detracted from simple facts such as the comparative ease with which the military goals were reached, the balance of advantages the operation had for Lesotho and the contribution it made to stability inside the country. The honesty and objectivity of the transparent approach worked against its perceptions triumphed over realities and facts (Van Schalkwyk, 2002).

South Africa, due to its proximity to Lesotho and the size of the SANDF, had contributed greater force number to the operation from Botswana. Additionally, South African forces were at first on the scene and, as such, gained a high level of visibility through television coverage of events, particularly on the streets of Maseru. That led to the impression that the forces acting in Lesotho were exclusively South African. The BDF force had been less visible because it had been committed to the South of the country where its vehicles were more suited to the terrain than the heavier South African ones.

The then South African deputy Minister of Defence, Mr. Ronnie Karris, has acceded that, at government level, there was a lack of a concerted, pro-active Media strategy, particularly during the period preceding the intervention. However, undeservedly, the SANDF paid dearly for that in the form of destructive, misleading media coverage (www.mil.co.za/ 13/12/04).

As the stable and peaceful situation in Lesotho prevailed, SADC started to withdraw in stages from Lesotho. There were some alternatives which were put forth as the withdrawal of SADC soldiers started, but some were rejected by the civilians of Lesotho. The first alternative that was considered was a blockade around Lesotho that would put the Mutineers in charge. That alternative was not in the best interests of the people of Lesotho and that option was rejected.

Initially, troop numbers in Lesotho were increased to ensure the stabilization of the country. However, as normality returned and the military threat subsided, the all round stable and peaceful situation in Lesotho had led to troops of the SANDF element of the SADC forces being sealed down several times. The remaining troops were doing tasks including guard duties, food and vehicle patrols and tactical level operational communication actions. The BDF elements were deployed mostly in the Southern Sector and the SANDF elements in the Northern Sector (www.mil.co.za/ 13.12.04).

Next to the fact that the South African government had always been working under SADC umbrella in Lesotho, it could be frankly stated that it was never the intention of the South African government and its armed forces to occupy Lesotho. That was simply not true. South Africa's participation in the intervention was nothing less than its shouldering of its part of the SADC's commitment to long-term stability and democracy in the region. The decision on the final withdrawal was made by the SADC and not unilaterally by the South African Government.

The question of whether South Africa should withdraw completely was given a serious consideration. A great degree of stability was achieved, but it was felt that South Africa would be abandoning Lesotho if it did not remain until the political process has gained further momentum. For South Africa not to take certain vital actions would be important but amount to leaving Lesotho in a lurch. It was foreseen that further involvement could include assistance with regard to training and restructuring of the Lesotho Security forces to enable them to resume their responsibilities, with a greater degree of confidence. South Africa agreed to participate in retraining and restructuring the RLDF.

The SADC had to provide a revised mandate and that would have been proactive by nature, as opposed to the reactive policy to date. There were still fears, however, that the wrangling between the internal political factions could be a setback to the re-establishment of real political order. The crux of the political end-state was to create political stability in Lesotho. With regard to demobilization, the SADC military strategic intention was to support the political end-state as far as possible. The people of Lesotho didn't seem to have decided who they want to have as their political leaders. There was suspicion that for SANDF to leave, they could have created a political power vacuum inside the country. The SANDF's pulling out of or staying on in Lesotho was a political decision which the military had carried out to the best of its ability.

3.3 THE ECONOMIC REASONS FOR SOUTH AFRICAN INTERVENTION

During the times of colonial rule by Britain, Basutoland (as it was originally known) was transformed from a relatively self-sufficient agrarian region, (a net exporter of maize, wool, and sorghum) into a labor reserve of South Africa. By the 1930's, over one half of adult male worked on ranches and in mines in South Africa, where they earned only subsistence wages. The situation was no better at home, where the redrawing of colonial boundaries had made many Basutoland's Pastures and farmlands part of South Africa.

What little arable land existed could scarcely meet the demands of a growing population. Most farmers in Basutoland were too poor to adopt more efficient farming techniques, and consequently could produce little more than what they needed for subsistence, at best. Many land poor households came to rely on migrant laborers to purchase foodstuffs imported from South Africa (Andrew, 2002). Since Lesotho independence on 04 October 1966, Lesotho has remained poor and highly depended on foreign donors as well as on South Africa. Despite historically troubled relations between the two countries, Lesotho was a major source of labor for South Africa's mining industry and agriculture well into the 1990's. In the mid 1980's it was estimated that over 100,000 men (one half of Lesotho's adult male labor force) worked as migrant laborers in South Africa.

Their remittances accounted for roughly fifty percent of Lesotho's 30,355 sq km (11, 720 sq km) are suitable for farming (Herwan, 2002). The structural economic dependence of Lesotho to South Africa continued or even increased, with as much as half of the gross National product coming from the earnings of migrant workers and some Seventy percent of government revenue coming from the South African administered Southern African Customs Union. These revenue partially compensated for Lesotho's massive deficit of trade in goods. Late in 1986, there were reports that a final treaty for \$ 1.5 billion Highlands's water scheme would be signed, despite problems that developed the same year. The project was to supply water from Lesotho rivers to South Africa, eventually producing an income of over \$90 Million a year. That project was to be financed by South Africa and in part by the European Economic Community (EEC) and the World Bank.

In 1987, the first-phase planning and design began for the long delayed \$ 1.8 billion Highlands water scheme, which was intended to supply South Africa with over \$ 90 Million worth of water a year from Lesotho. The first loan approved was a \$9.7 Million World Bank credit for a hydroelectric station, which was to become Lesotho's principal power source. Several contracts were signed to British, French, Canadian and South African companies for the engineering design phase. That construction phase was not to begin before 1989.

The project had been repeatedly postponed during complicated negotiations among Lesotho, South Africa, and International agencies. African countries were concerned that the scheme would intensify Lesotho's already overwhelming dependence on South African, which surrounds the small country. And South Africa had used the talks to pressurize Lesotho into Cracking down on South African refugees. In January 1987, Lesotho Military Council Chairman Major General Justin Lekhanya, whom celebrating the first anniversary of the coup in which he took power, claimed credit for resolving the problems that had delayed the water project treaty (Encarta, 2002). Feasibility studies continued for the separate oxbow hydroelectric project, an internal plan that could enhance Lesotho's energy independence from South Africa.

In another effort to strengthen the economic position, Lesotho negotiated with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a \$19.5 Million structural adjustment loan, which would be its first loan from that agency. In the 1990's Lesotho pinned its hopes for economic growth on the costly and controversial Lesotho Highlands water project. The constitution began in 1991 and completed as planned, a network of dams and tunnels had linked the Orange river in Southern Lesotho to reservoirs 217 km north in South Africa, providing water for the city of Johannesburg, and surrounding industrial areas. The World Bank and other international agencies have provided loans for that project, which was expected to cost over \$ 3 billion (three times Lesotho's gross domestic product or GDP).

Despite its apparent benefits, the Highlands Water Project has many detractors in Southern Africa and abroad. The project massive dams flood thousands of acres of the Orange River Valley, submerging much of the region's limited supply of farmlands and disrupting numerous ecosystems. As many as half of the several hundred poor farming families already displaced by the project have not been successfully relocated nor compensated for their land. Because of the constitution of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, South Africa had to intervene in their crises to safeguard that particular project. The project is a source of water for most of development in South Africa. The intervention also consolidated South Africa's geographical position over Lesotho. For Lesotho to be surrounded by South Africa, it was very easy for South Africa to intervene and achieve their mission successfully (Encarta, 2002).

CHAPTER FOUR

THE IMPLICATIONS OF SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE SADC REGION.

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The conditions that gave rise to the civil wars of the past decades, and those that resulted from them, called for a more holistic approach to intervention that went beyond military and Security priorities to address issues of governance, legitimacy, political and social inclusiveness, and economic equity. It has been widely argued that international assistance from western societies will have to extend way beyond the initial intervention if such issues are to be resolved and the host society made resilient to new rounds of violent conflicts. On the other hand, events in Somalia and Rwanda during the early 1990's, and the more crises in the Great Lakes region, illustrated that there was urgent and continuing need for developing effective methods for rapid and effective intervention in African conflicts.

4.2 THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

South Africa has intervened in the Lesotho conflict of 22 September 1998, guided by her Foreign Policy principles of believing that just and lasting solutions to the problems of human kind can only come through the promotion of democracy worldwide, believing in, and being preoccupied with, human rights which extends beyond the political, embracing the economic, social and environmental and of most importance, a belief that international peace is the goal to which all nations should strive (www.wsws.org.za/ 03.11.04).

Even though the SANDF of South Africa have entered Lesotho under the auspices of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) tension between the political parties in Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), Basotho National Party (BNP), Basotholand Congress Party (BCP) and the Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP); mounted over the election fraud.

Lesotho find herself under fire because of differences amongst members of the political parties. The sections of the army were mutinying and threatening the ruling regime. The intervention was done for the sole purpose of maintaining peace and democracy in Lesotho, as the country had experienced military rule until 1993. The military intervention therefore demonstrated that the ruling African National Congress (ANC), supported the interests of the South African banks and big business. The army used their guns and tanks to shore up a corrupt regime, protect the Royal Palace of Monarch king Letsie III and defend other strategic buildings.

As a result of the intervention, an extensive damage was done in the capital Maseru and 70 people died and 4000 had been displaced. While the capital was being looted, army troops joined in, filling their vehicles with various goods to take back to South Africa. Hundreds of mothers marched in Maseru following the invasion condemning soldiers who raped young women and use excessive force on civillians (www.wsws.org.za/ 03.11.04). The intervention also resulted primarily from the dissatisfaction of the opposition parties which demanded that king Letsie III use his powers to dismantle the parliament since they believed that it had been fraudulently elected. In light of this, members of the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) seized arms and ammunition and expelled or imprisoned their commanding officers. The government vehicles were hijacked, the broadcasting station was closed and the Prime Minister and other ministers were virtually held hostage. The Lesotho police had lost control of the situation and, as far as the SANDF was concerned, there were fears that a military coup was being planned (www.trinstitute.org.za/ 13.12.04).

The mission of the combined task force i.e SANDF and Botswana Defence Force (BDF) was to intervene militarily in Lesotho to prevent any further anarchy to create a stable environment for the restoration of law and order. The battle concept was described as “the deployment of forces in order to locate and identify destabilizers and destabilizer resources, to disarm and contain them and to strike where applicable with the necessary force to eliminate threat”. The South African mediation between various political camps succeeded in achieving the government’s consent to the formation of an Interim Political Authority (IPA) to prepare the ground for new elections, planned for 2000.

The bickering in and around this body, however, suggested that few of the lessons that led up to the tragedy of 1998 had been learned by the political class. The constitutional principles emerging from the IPA’s deliberations were extremely vague, and the burning issue of how to introduce a system of proportional representation remained unaddressed for many months (www.trinstitute.org.za/ 13.12.04). In December, 1999, the IPA stipulated that the configuration of parliament should be changed to increase the number of seats to 130, the additional 50 being elected according to the principle of proportional representation. The elections were to be held by June 2000, as agreed with the Commonwealth, United Nations (UN) and SADC.

An Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) was established by the IPA to run the 2002 parliamentary elections set for 25 May 2002. The initial voter registration period which was from 13 August to 9th September 2001 was extended for an additional three weeks until 30 September 2001, due to the low level of registered voters. After the voter registration process was concluded the IEC announced that 832 000 voters were registered for the 2002 elections. According to the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa reported problems with this process included: Delay in delivery of registration material to registration centre; confusion over the location of several registration centres; the depletion of registration materials and the disobliging behaviour of a number of registration staff (www.iss.co.za/ 03.11.04).

The parliamentary elections that were held in Lesotho on 25 May 2002, restored democracy to the Mountain kingdom in 1993, after seven years of military rule. Those elections which were contested by 19 political parties, were concluded without much controversy surrounding the new electoral system that includes elements of the old first-past-the-post system and proportional representation. That electoral system in which 80 seats were contested using the first-past-the-post system and the remaining 40 seats allocated using the proportional representation system in the 120 member parliament, had not been tried before in this country, and was therefore a cause for concern in the eyes of many observers.

However, these fears surrounding the new electoral model were put to rest by a statement released by the International Election Observation Delegation that endorsed the election as “free, fair, peaceful, lawful and transparent”. The outcome of the election resulted in a landslide victory for the ruling Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD). The results announced on Tuesday 28 May 2002 showed that the ruling Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) won 76 of the 77 constituencies announced with large majorities. The only constituency election won by an opposition party was that of Segonoka in the Northern Berea district, which was won by the leader of the opposition Lesotho People’s Congress (LPC) Kelobone Maope. However, the 40 additional seats allocated to other parties under the new proportional system in an expanded parliament will temper the ruling party’s majority. Proportional representation was introduced to the electoral systems as a means of making parliament a more inclusive political institution (www.iss.co.za/ 03.11.04).

On a less positive note, the leader of the Basotho National Congress (BNP), retired Major-General Justin Lekhanya, challenged the free and fair endorsement given to the elections by the electoral observers. The BNP subsequently hired independent auditors to establish “distinct patterns” in voter behaviour that suggested the results had been manipulated. Lekhanya who came into power in 1986 after a coup and ruled until he was deposed in 1991, did not reject the poll, but called for an independent audit. One of his fears that many observers of Lesotho politics had prior to the election, surrounded the influence that Lekhanya has.

Over the security establishment in Lesotho, especially the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF). There was a mounting fear that Lekhanya would use his extensive influence and connections to convince the military to stage a coup in his support, should he fail to gain power through the ballot box.

However, the possibility of that occurring at that stage was very slim because, in an attempt to prevent any further disturbances by the military, the SADC and an Indian army unit had trained soldiers from the LDF with the hope that they can turn Lesotho's troubled military into a more professional force.

The BNP was not alone in its objection to the results of the election; other political parties aggrieved over the results of the general elections also instituted legal proceedings against that country's Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). One such party was the Sefate Democratic Union (SDU) that served court papers on the director of elections, Khothatso Ralitsie, as he supervised the announcing of elections results at the election centre in Maseru on Tuesday 28 May 2002. According to the court papers, the chairman of the IEC Leshele Thoahlame has been called upon to undertake a recount of the ballot papers throughout the country. However, the objections to the results, that were increasing in number and intensity later declined as most political parties began to accept the outcome of the elections as representing the will of the people.

Luckily these political disturbances did not lead to any political disturbances in Lesotho, which has a history that is checkered by incidents of political violence following elections (www.iss.co.za/ 03.11.04). Even though the process of elections has gone relatively well, the threat of future political instability in that country could only be removed if a concerted effort could have been made by both internal and external political culture. Given the political climate over the past years or so, this task could be almost impossible to achieve in the short term, because the sum-up to the election has been marked by continued fending within as well as between the leading parties. Personal exchanges of a virulent and public nature have been the stock-in-trade of leading members of the Lesotho political class since the resumption of democratic competition.

That trend showed no signs of abating. Until the cycle was broken, a return to the past undemocratic dispensation that prevailed in Lesotho was not impossible. Such a turn of events will reverse the progress towards good governance and democracy that have been achieved to date, and this will surely augur badly for the Basotho and future African regional initiatives such as NEPAD. However, one hopes against hope, that a period of effective government will follow this political contest.

4.3 THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS.

Since coming to power, the new South African government has emphasized its commitment to and solidarity with other developing countries, many of whom experience similar problems of marginalization and increased poverty in the global system. It has accepted the challenge (in the first five years of South Africa's transition) to use its "Moral capital" in trying to build bridges of understanding between North and South, Notably as the chair of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), but also as the chair of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and South African Development Community (SADC).

The South African government has been active in developing positive trade agendas for African, SADC, and least developed countries respectively in the sum-up to the Seattle Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The government, and especially the ministers of Finance, Mr. Trevor Manuel has spoken out against the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in perpetuating the debt crises and the organization's undemocratic structure and practices. It has even on occasion lashed out at the "anonymous" market filled with currency speculators, especially after the Asian meltdown in 1997. These sentiments presumably informed its decision to take part in the initiative that saw the establishment of a "group of 22" emerging economies to look at ways in which to restructure the international financial architecture (www.igd.org.za/03.11.04).

But despite these and many other international efforts, the African continent is currently more marginalized within the world economy than at any time in the past 50 years. Inequality within and among countries worldwide has been rising since the early 1980s, with the assets of the world's top three billionaires exceeding the combined Gross Domestic Products (GDP).

More than two billion people who live in human poverty, almost all in the developing world, are no longer waiting for their governments, who are often more concerned with their own political survival than their obligation towards their citizens, to continue talking to one another in collective forums, unable to sort out their divisions over issues such as nuclear disarmament, protection of human rights, arms sales, and the territorial integrity. It has now ever been accepted by international financial institutions that many poor indebted countries will never be able to take off economically without canceling their debts, even beyond the levels proposed in the latest World Bank Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative.

Five SADC members are highly indebted poor countries, and Lesotho was one of those countries. These motivated South Africa to push for the long overdue and often proposed "debtors forum", which gave debtors countries a collective voice in negotiating with their creditors in the Paris and London clubs, who they currently deal with individually. That proposal dating back to many of NAM Summits, South Africa could not miss the window of opportunity, partly created by pressure from people's movements, to bring together countries of the South to collectively strategise to resolve that crisis, instead of continuing to respond individually to the initiatives of well-organised creditors (www.igd.org.za/ 03.11.04).

Equally a window of opportunities existed for countries of the South to start directing the rules-based world trade regime towards their own needs and interests. At no point in history of developing countries been so prepared for trade talks than during the third ministerial WTO Conference in Seattle.

They have formulated their needs, stipulated their conditions about the inequalities in many of the existing agreements, and many have taken strong positions against putting any new issues on the agenda until their problems with existing agreement have been resolved. This does not detract from the fact that industrial countries and their transnational companies still make the rules, although this power imbalance in the WTO should only strengthen the resolve of developing countries to work together in coalitions, albeit only around issues of similar concern, to ensure that they can defend their needs and interests. Such coalition also does not need to exclude like-minded countries from the North.

In that way they can pool resources and capacity, not only to make full use of their existing rights under the system, but also change it were necessary. The failure of WTO Seattle Ministerial conference to reach an outcome reflects the increasing strength of such coalition in the multilateral system (www.igd.org.za/ 03.11.04). The South African government has on many occasions emphasized the need for an international rules-based system to protect individual countries from the negative of short term and especially speculative capital flows. This was after currency speculators attacked the Rand and the South African stock market took a major plunge in the wake of the 1997 Asian meltdown. The South African economy and people are still recovering from the subsequent massive interest rate hike.

Not only is there a need for a more stimulating national debate on that issue, which goes beyond merely endorsing increasing global calls for the imposition of a tax on speculative flows to slow down their entry and exit from vulnerable economies. The South African Government was in a position to initiate forums and discussions amongst developing countries especially Lesotho to join the growing international chorus, led by industrial countries, that concrete proposals for international financial restructuring. The question of equitable representation in the United Nations (UN) members on the Security Council has already been raised to 20 years ago in the General Assembly. However, it was only in 1992 that concrete work started in the UN working group on how to restructure the Security Council, a product of the power relations in its current form reflects neither the political, nor the economic power balance in the UN system.

It was therefore faced with a crisis of legitimacy, paradoxically at a time when it has become even more active during the 1990's. Typically, African position has already been developed without public debates or consultation with people in countries such as Angola, Sudan, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Eritrea, to mention but a few, who suffer daily from violent conflict situations, which necessitate UN assistance or intervention.

That position advocated that two African states should become permanent members of the Security Council, on a rotating basis. Once again as former chair of the NAM, which has a long history of involvement with issue, the South African government initiated a National Consultation to discuss a restructuring of the UN Security Council and the desirability and usefulness of becoming a permanent member in a body where none of the current permanent members would conceivably relinquish or extend their veto power (www.igd.org.za/ 11.08.04).

CHAPTER FIVE

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The challenges facing the Southern African Sub – region are indeed enormous. The SADC summits, protocols and the Mutual Defence Pact are indicative of State in the SADC region having more than just a momentary relationship with one another. It is obvious that problems among the State in the SADC exists, but not to the extent that they affect their neighboring State. The very existence of the Political Security dynamism can be seen in the determination to work as an entity at the Political level and in close cooperation at the security level.

This does not only place such pessimism on the periphery, but points towards the development of a viable collaborative security arrangement. A worthy conclusion is the acknowledgement of a ‘large gap between SADC’s stated regional development, integration goals and economic policies in the region’. It is also apparent that the developments in SADC are pointing towards the efforts to develop a Security Community that would work towards resolving the conflicts in the region. The establishment of SADC parliamentary forums with the objective of promoting multiparty democracy, good governance and political stability, as well as respecting the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms showed unity which will enable SADC to reach its ultimate goals.

The South African intervention in Lesotho on 22 September 1998 was arguably a success as the military objective of the SADC mandate was accomplished. The intervention which was termed ‘Operation Boleas’ succeeded in stabilizing the Security Situation in Lesotho, which enabled the political parties to resume negotiations on the issue of governance. Furthermore, the intervention safe guarded South Africa’s interests and Secure Strategic installations from being taken over or destroyed.

Critics of the intervention may therefore be silenced with the argument that 'the end justifies the means', but this would not be possible in a mission that fails or is perceived to fail or which results in more serious loss of life than that incurred by the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in Lesotho.

Since the South African government has long been involved in a variety of initiatives, which are meant to strengthen and promote regional cooperation through its foreign policy principles of promoting freedom and democracy throughout the world, promoting international peace and internationally agreed mechanisms for the resolution of conflict and the expanded regional and international economic cooperation in an independent world. It is however recommended that the South African department of Foreign Affairs strengthen and be seen to take seriously its regional commitment.

This can be accomplished by:

- Appointing and developing the appropriate expertise in SADC sub directorate and hosting regular Foreign Service Institute and departmental roundtable discussions on developments in Southern Africa. In these ways it will be able to improve its own in – house analytical capability.
- Contributing to the efficient and effective functioning of SADC and proposed Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) Secretariats by Seconding or sponsoring specialist and donating whatever equipment is needed.
- Supporting and facilitating research on deep – seated causes of instability in Southern Africa.

This will enhance the domestic NGO sector's ability to contribute to policy debates.

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