

Roles of Nigeria in African Union's Peace and Security Operations in Sudan

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Abstract

Across Africa, Nigeria has played major role in peacekeeping partly because Africa remained the cornerstone of her foreign policy stance. This Afrocentric stance was tested in Nigeria's involvement in the lingering crisis in Sudan. Indeed, the crisis has had severe impact on both Sudan and other neighboring African states in terms of huge devastating effects on human and food security and other fallouts associated with the conflict. The need to forestall peace in Sudan stimulated the decision of Nigeria's government to send her troops to Sudan. While the initiative to

intervene in the Sudan crisis by Nigeria has generated commendation and attention, especially in the way Nigeria is keeping to her core foreign policy principles, it also raises doubt about the sustainability and success of the peacekeeping operation in Sudan. Drawing on qualitative systematic review and collective security theory, this study examined the roles of Nigeria in African Union's Peace and security operations in Sudan. The findings showed that Nigeria has greatly exhibited its Afrocentric foreign policy stance by providing a disproportionate number of troops to support the African Union's attempts to bring peace and stability back to Sudan. It was also discovered that Nigeria's peacekeeping operation in Sudan was flawed with challenges ranging from troops' human casualties, financial limitations, and inadequate equipment. It concludes that Nigeria's intervention in Sudan helped to douse tensions and facilitated the delivery of relief supplies to certain areas of the country, improved security for civilians and internally displaced people, and influenced peace negotiations between rebel groups and the Sudanese government.

Keywords: *Nigeria, African Union, Peace, Security, Operation, Sudan.*

Introduction

Since gaining independence, Nigeria has always conducted its foreign policy through engagement in international peace and security operations (Warner, 2017; Ndidigwe, 2023). Nigeria is a country that firmly believes in the sanctity of peace and considers any threat to it to be a threat not only to its own security but also to peace throughout the continent (Uhomobhi, 2012). Therefore, a war-torn and distressed Africa poses a threat to global peace and security (Nuamah, 2003). Thus, this clarifies why Africa is given precedence in Nigeria's foreign policy. The innermost circle, which is focused on Nigeria's immediate neighbors, symbolizes the country's security, independence, and prosperity, as Gambari (1989) correctly pointed out in his idea of four "concentric circles" of national interest. Nigeria's relations with its neighbors in West Africa are the subject of the second circle; peace, development, and stability in continental Africa are the subject of the third circle; and Nigeria's relations with organizations, institutions, and states outside of Africa are the subject of the fourth (Gambari, 1989). "While it is true that the country had demonstrated her peacekeeping role in the 1970s and 1980s through the UN and OAU, the decade of the 1990s has witnessed a

significant expansion in the area of Nigeria's participation in peace and security operations," asserts Saliu (2005:110). In this sense, Nigeria has made a significant contribution to the peace process in Sudan, especially through the AU's platform and other international organizations. The nation has attempted to put into practice its foreign policy goal of maintaining international peace (Folarin, 2014; Amao & Uzodike, 2015).

It is consequently argued that Nigeria might someday become a camp for refugees due to a catastrophe in one of its neighboring countries. So, efforts to find long-term solutions to Sudan's protracted civil war have received significant support from Nigeria's successive authorities (Ebegbulem, 2012; Akinboye, 2013). Nigeria has supported peace talks on the Sudanese civil war on multiple times as an engaged participant. Furthermore, Nigeria has always taken the lead in both military and diplomatic efforts to uphold and restore peace in a number of other nations, including the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and many more.

Nonetheless, despite Nigeria's noteworthy history of peacekeeping deployments and related diplomatic efforts, the nation has yet to fully embrace the reality of the emerging global politics (Akinboye, 2013). These realities include how the domestic economy is run, how important mass mobilization is to support peacekeeping operations, and how reluctant major world powers are to get engaged in African security crises (Alexander, 2007; Ashiru, 2013). According to Ashiru (2013), some Nigerians are pushing for the removal of Afrocentrism from Nigeria's foreign policy, hence the dispute amongst or among the population is still unsolved. The claim is that Nigeria cannot sustain peace internationally if its weak economic structure prevents it from doing so at home. Under such circumstances, Nigeria would need to find a diplomatic means of persuading other African nations to endorse her aspirations for global leadership. Despite the complaints, Nigeria must participate in African crisis management. Given that some of these African nations share borders with Nigeria, strategically, Africa's problems may eventually become Nigeria's problems. Furthermore, Nigeria should continue to be dedicated to conflict management in Africa in light of the circumstances in Sudan's Darfur region (Ade-Ibijola, 2013). Certainly, research has been done on Nigeria's involvement in Darfur; however, studies like those by Ebegbulem (2012), Ngwube (2013), and Umezurike et al. (2017) have only looked at Nigeria's involvement in Sudan; the success or failure of Nigeria's intervention has received little consideration in these studies. It is

envisaged that this kind of research would inform the Nigerian government about the necessity of continuously assessing or evaluating its participation in other African states. Depending on how well the operation goes, this could provide insight on whether or not to continue or stop the peacekeeping intervention's efforts.

Thus, how Nigeria's peacekeeping operation has fared in terms of success or otherwise is the critical goal of this study. It specifically determined how Nigeria has effectively utilized the AU's platform in the promotion of peace in Sudan and talked about the main obstacles that Nigeria has when conducting such operations. The importance or rationale for this study resides in its capacity to supply sufficient data or broaden understanding on probable lessons Nigeria can take away and strategies for navigating likely challenges in her operation in Sudan and other African countries. Undoubtedly, the study's conclusions will broaden the conversation about the dynamics of Nigeria's security and peace efforts in Sudan. The results also suggest ways that Nigeria might strengthen her foreign policy tenets in order to support calculated attempts to enhance security and peace in Sudan. The methodology and theoretical foundation portion come after the instruction segment. The African Union's involvement with Nigeria and its peace and security mission in Sudan are the next topics of discussion: was it successful? The section on the discussion of findings and conclusion was preceded by Nigeria's challenges in promoting security and peace in Sudan.

Methodology

Using semi-structured interviews with carefully chosen specialists in security and international relations, seasoned soldiers on peacekeeping assignments, and officials in diplomatic offices, African Union, and Nigerian embassy in Sudan, a qualitative study design was used. Their positions as experts and stakeholders on security and peacekeeping operations served as the foundation for the selection of participants. This is to allow a proper sieve of sentiments from a robust scholarly idea, peacekeeping operations, practice, and involvement in promoting security and peace in Africa because to the classes that the participants attended. It also allows further inquiry about the subject following answers to the stored questions during semi-structured interviews. A content discussion was used to examine the data.

Theoretical Framework

The research embraces the collective security doctrine, which Cardinal Richelieu first proposed in 1629 and which the 1648 Peace of Westphalia largely implemented. In order to guarantee peace in the global system, this theory replaces the military alliance system that was in effect up until World War II (Butfoy, 2008). The call for collective security intervention towards peace and security was made based on the idea that an attack on one state could degenerate to other states (Jordaan, 2017). A system of preserving peace and security through international consensus and coordinated action is known as collective security (Barry 1996:82). According to Asogwa (1999), collective security is the implementation of shared accountability and the pooling of resources from multiple governments in an endeavor to preserve world peace. The concept of collective security permits all countries to unite and confront a perceived aggressor that jeopardizes the security of any state (s).

An idea that stems from the idealist perception of the international system as a community of states capable of working together to solve challenges they face in common. The utopians envision an anarchic, non-centralized system devoid of central enforcement mechanisms to be replaced by an international system built on collective security (Galadima, 2006). While the concept of collective security was first introduced in the League of Nations and later expanded to regional organizations by Article 52(1) of the UN Charter, the UN required regional and subregional organizations, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Arab League, AU, and ECOWAS, to include the doctrine in their charters in an attempt to popularize it (Imobighe 2003). To improve the organization's efficiency and efficacy in tackling the issues facing the region, the AU's charter was subsequently reinforced. It is the moral, political, and legal duty of all member nations to act against the aggressor and bring about peace when aggression takes place. The common belief that "peace is indivisible" and that "any aggression, anywhere, affects every state's security interests" forms the basis for this.

The doctrine advocates intervention against international aggression or internal strife, usually by a coalition of sovereign states or by a single state, with or without the UN's and other regional organizations' explicit or tacit consent. Numerous strategies, such as economic sanctions, deployment of preventive force, coercive military operations, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and crisis management, are possible for this intervention. Therefore, in order to ensure collective security, all states

must act in unison and take coordinated action against any aggressor (Galadima, 2006). Using multinational troop contingents to uphold security and sustain peace, the United Nations has served as an institutional framework for collective security since its founding in 1945. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement mechanisms have been employed by regional organizations such as AU-AMIS to effectively handle disputes. Nowadays, there are numerous structures for collective security in place. With the creation of numerous organizations around the globe, including the African Union, ECOWAS, NATO, and the intergovernmental authority for development (IGAD), the concept of collective security has gained traction since the founding of the League of Nations and the subsequent creation of the UN in 1945.

Based on the idea that states have a common interest in security issues with broad global ramifications, collective security theory was developed. According to Etekpe (2012), the defense of other nations' territorial integrity and the resolution of interstate conflicts by means of an international body with direct representation from each member state are the foundations of this collective interest. These are the three guiding principles advocated by the doctrine of collective security. Second, rather of resorting to armed war, states should choose diplomatic methods to resolve interstate conflicts. Thirdly, when it comes to matters that have an impact across international borders, states ought to abide by the decisions made by international bodies. Appadorai (1974) provided adequate support for these principles when he stated that "collective security is assured if every state realizes the truth of these three principles and acts upon them; the knowledge that an act of war against all is sufficient inhibition to any possible aggression in violation of international law." The rule of law, not force, will prevail, and national security will be a part of collective security." Collective security, to put it briefly, is a sacrosanct tenet of international law that views unprovoked conflict between states as hateful and inhumane against the entire international community. This principle's main goal is to avert conflict and maintain international peace (Etekpe 2012).

Nigeria's Role in the African Union

It is essential to consider Nigeria's involvement in AU peacekeeping in the broader context of her foreign policy, which is characterized by an overarching Afrocentric orientation and commitment to Africa (Fafore, 2020; Akinterinwa, 2005). Nigeria's dedication to the growth, peace, and

unity of the continent drives her participation in the AU. From the country's 1960 independence, Nigeria's political leaders have played a significant role in promoting African interests abroad. The policy is based on the idea that Nigeria ought to act as a Big Brother to other African nations, as emphasized by Pax Nigerian (Ngwube, 2013; Ebegbulem, 2012). Additionally, the nation feels that African unification ought to happen gradually. This stance contrasts with the radical strategy supported by former Libyan leader Muammar Ghaddafi, who desired the quick integration of African states under a single authority. Accordingly, Nigeria took an active part in the summits, conferences, and other gatherings that resulted in the establishment of the AU (Akinterinwa, 2005; 100). Then-foreign minister of Nigeria, Ambassador Sule Lamido, outlined the country's stance during the OAU ministerial conference in Tripoli on May 30 and June 1, 2000.

Based on the political experiences of our nation-states and the reality of our continent, Nigeria supports the creation of a robust African Union that does not have to resemble the United States of America (Ebegbulem, 2011; Fafore, 2020; Williams, 2016). Yet, it must be of a nature, substance, and structure that honors the beloved ideal of the OAU's founders and fulfills the hopes and aspirations of the peoples of our continent (Hamman & Omojuwa, 2013). Articles 3 and 4 of the AU Constitutive Act, which describe the organization's goals and guiding principles, respectively, have been endorsed by Nigeria ever since the AU was founded. Based on features specific to the nation, Nigeria views itself as Africa's Big Brother (Hamman & Omojuwa, 2013). The following is how Professor Gabriel Olusanya, a former director general of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, best explains this: Nigerian leaders are born. Nigeria possesses intrinsic qualities that make it deserving of the moniker "giant of Africa." Over 160 million individuals call Nigeria home. Nigeria, like America, is therefore unable to exist outside of its geographic borders due to factors such as population, economics, and size. Nigeria must act as her brother's keeper because nature has put her in this predicament.

Nigeria has made significant financial contributions to the AU, demonstrating its clear commitment to the institution. Some of the financial issues that beset the OAU were passed down to the AU. For example, the member nations of the AU and OAU were the same, including those that were unable to pay their obligatory, assessed OAU dues. Due to the organization's expansion of its budgetary requirements, which are now around five times more than the OAU budget, the AU's

financial difficulties have become increasingly apparent. With contributions to the AU operating budget totaling over 75%, Nigeria is still one of the five principal financiers (also known as the Big Five) of the organization. The other four are Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and South Africa. Nigeria, being a significant financier, possesses complete voting rights inside the AU and has the ability to promote its citizens for important roles in international organizations that need AU backing. As a result, in 2008 and 2012, respectively, each of the Big Five gave US\$14.4 million and US\$16.7 million toward the organization's operating budget (Eke, 2015; Osimen et al., 201; Umezurike et al., 2017).

Nigeria has continuously taken the lead in maintaining peace and security throughout Africa. For instance, the Peace and Security Council (PSC), an instrument of the AU tasked with addressing peace and security in Africa, began full operations on March 16, 2004, subsequent to the approval of the convention pertaining to the PSC in December 2003. Olusegun Obasanjo, the president of Nigeria, presided over the council as its first chairman (Akinterinwa, 2005; 100).

Nigeria's peace and security operation in Sudan: success or failure?

The United Nations emphasized the importance of peace and security in its first operational charter article, emphasizing the importance of these elements to human civilization which says that:

To sustain global peace and security, and in order to do so, to take effective collective action for the prevention and elimination of threats to peace, as well as for the suppression of acts of aggression or other peace violations. Lastly, to resolve international disputes or circumstances that could give rise to a breach of peace through peaceful means, in accordance with the principles of justice and international law (UN, 1945).

Additionally emphasizing the value of peace and security at the regional level is the African Union. "Promote peace, security, and stability on the continent" is the stated purpose of the Union, according to Article 3 (f) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, 2000. The need of peace and security for achieving state objectives is also emphasized at the national level by the national constitution. The security and wellbeing of the people "shall be the primary purpose of government," according to section 14(b) of the Nigerian constitution (as modified in 1999) papers. Zakari (2016) pertinently states that in keeping with this:

With the deployment of strong military forces, a police force, and civilian experience in her peace operation, Nigeria under AMIS and UNAMID made a major impact. Relief supplies were made easier to get to previously unreachable areas of Darfur thanks to Nigeria. In addition, Nigeria made it easier for civilians to be protected by strengthening ties between the military and the government. Due to the security conditions in western Darfur, Nigeria, acting under the AU's auspices, evacuated a number of people to locations where relief workers and IDPS could be assured of peace and security.

Similarly, Col. Ishaku (2015)¹ opines that;

Because the Nigerian government supplied the fighting soldiers (machinery) while other nations supplied the equipment, Nigeria had the most troops during the AMIS. Additionally, leaders of the Nigerian military oversaw the majority of the parts in Sudan. Since Sudan is a desert, Nigeria has also given the IDP camp tents. Relief supplies have also been given, and civilians who have been in combat zones have been brought to the camp. Sudan would have been dispersed if Nigeria's government had not been instrumental in facilitating the death of John Gara, the President of Southern Sudan. Following his passing, his spouse and kids were flown to the United States to ease tensions as the people in the southern Sudan thought it was a Janjaweed group conspiracy.

Scholars such as Ngwube (2013), Saka (2006), and Osimen et al. (2015) have advocated for this position, pointing out that Nigeria's top priorities are the peace in Sudan and the country's reconciliation. Nigeria wasted little time in beginning and reviving the peace process in Sudan, even while the international world continued to argue on the nature of the crisis there. Nigeria has consistently been a proactive participant in the efforts to bring about peace in Sudan. Saka goes on to say that Nigeria's then-president Olusegun Obasanjo sent military contingents to Sudan in keeping with Nigeria's attitude of good neighborliness as one of the actions done to show the country's commitment to ending the situation. In Sudan, where the government-backed Janjaweed militia has massacred over 300,000 non-Arabs, the wise advocated for an African response to the escalating humanitarian disaster (Saka, 2006). Nweke (2010) stated as follows:

Nigeria pledged to send at least two battalions, as part of the 2,000-strong African Union peacekeeping force that member states might send to the region. This was the basis for Nigeria's military commitment, according to the request Nigeria made to the National Assembly. Nigeria gradually raised the number of soldiers as President Olusegun Obasanjo requested, starting with a company of 120 soldiers when the situation called for it.

This was part of the letter that Obasanjo sent to the Senate, it reads thus:

This is one last opportunity for us to demonstrate leadership and offer hope to millions of our Sudanese brothers and sisters, given our prominent position on the continent, the gravity of the situation in Darfur, and our historical contribution to peacemaking, peacebuilding, and reconciliation processes in Africa (Cited in Nweke 2010;40).

Nweke expressed a similar opinion, pointing out that given the evident desire to see peace returned to Darfur, it was an impressive suggestion that the two battalions of troops that Nigeria was expected to send to Darfur would make up three quarters of the 2,000-person AU peacekeeping force that was stationed in the Sudan. Meanwhile, 48 hours following the impasse at the Abuja Peace Talks, Dr. Mustafa Osman, the foreign minister of Sudan, led a government delegation to Aso-Rock to confirm plans for the deployment of Nigerian troops in Darfur and to get ready for the next round of peace talks in Nigeria's capital (Nweke, 2010; 41). Imongan (2015) is in agreement with Abutu when he says that Nigeria's efforts and dedication to its peacekeeping operations in conflict-affected countries have been praised by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) (Imongan, 2015; 40). This Day Newspaper, October 24, 2013) reports that Nigeria is among the top five countries that contribute the most troops; Table 1 illustrates this.

Table 1: Nigerian Peacekeeper Contributions, from United Nations Peace Operations Year in Review

Year	Police	Military Experts	Observers/Military	Troops	Total	Position in UN Top 10
2006	365	80		1963	2408	9
2007	630	90		1974	2694	7
2008	917	88		4903	5908	4
2009	806	86		4915	5807	4
2010	877	76		4888	5841	4
2011	726	75		4948	5749	4

Source : Adapted from the publication of ThisDay newspaper, 2013

One of the top five nations in the world that supplies uniformed troops to UN peacekeeping missions is Nigeria. According to Adesola (2016)4, Nigeria did not take part in the AU/UN hybrid mission in Sudan, but rather through a somewhat different but similar perspective. In his opinion:

The majority of the peacekeepers, including the troops, police force, diplomats, and civilian experts, are Nigerian, so while Nigeria did not solely contribute to the restoration of peace in Sudan through AMIS/UNAMID, the Nigerian government can also be recognized for its role in the country's ability to maintain stability. That being said, as the mission is still ongoing and Nigerian forces are in Sudan keeping the peace, total peace has not yet been reached in the nation. In light of the fact that South Sudan separated from the Republic of Sudan in 2011 despite her best efforts, the endeavor was, once more, not entirely successful.

He added, "Nigeria has made a significant contribution to the peace process in Sudan by minimizing humanitarian disasters, violations of human rights, and crisis tension." Nigeria also performed the role of middleman between rebel organizations and the government. Once more, the use of Nigerian forces in AMIS/UNAMID is quite beneficial. According to Hung (2016)9, who takes the aforementioned stance:

Nigeria's persistent efforts in Sudan have allowed her to convene roundtable discussions and negotiations between the Sudanese government and rebel groups, culminating in the signing of a peace deal.

Studies that have also argued in a similar spirit as Isiaq (2012), Saka and Omede (2012), and Osimen et al. (2015) support the opinions of Adesola⁴ and Hung⁹. To be precise, Isiaq made the point that Nigeria has consistently taken the lead in facilitating the signing of comprehensive peace agreements between the rebel factions and the Sudanese authorities. Nigeria has been actively seeking peace in its own nation ever since the 1980s civil conflict broke out in Sudan. In an effort to speed up the end of the protracted conflict, it organized a number of peace conferences in Lagos, Abuja, and Kano in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The seeds of the peace discussions have now sprouted into the signing of a peace pact between the Sudanese government and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) (Isiaq, 2012:74). Likewise, Choat¹² observes that:

With the deployment of troops under AMIS with the mission to monitor and provide security for civilians, particularly internally displaced people, Nigeria has successfully restored peace to Darfur. This achievement cannot be understated. The African Union (AU), chaired by Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, organized and led peace negotiations between the warring parties as part of her efforts to mediate a political settlement. In Sudan's Darfur region, Nigeria is steadfastly dedicated to the peace effort. The commitment of Nigeria to the peace process in Sudan cannot be disregarded, despite the fact that the violence in the nation has persisted to resist all attempts to bring about a durable peace.

Based on her efforts to comprehend the essence of the war after hearing both sides' positions, Nigeria has hosted a number of peace negotiations between Sudanese government rebel groups in Abuja and other major Nigerian cities at different times. George's claim may be the main explanation for why, even while the international community was still arguing over the nature of the conflict, Nigeria moved quickly to give the search for peace in Darfur more momentum. Nonetheless, there are still a lot of difficulties despite Nigeria's military engagement and peacekeeping efforts in Sudan being largely successful. Additionally, it supports the assertion made by Abubakar (2014:186) that long-term peace and stability in Sudan remain threatened by funding for reconstruction and economic recovery. In Nigeria, poverty, unemployment, internal disputes, and insecurity are among the country's growing socioeconomic issues. There is a question about Nigeria's ability to maintain its relationship with Sudan because the US, China, and other

western powers are perceived as being more interested in restoring imperialism than in making real attempts to maintain stability in the nation. This is the case due to the fact that the west's exploitation of the peace process under the cover of the UN only serves to highlight the purposeful attempt to thwart the AU's first efforts in the nation destroyed by war.

Arguing further, Adamu (2016)¹⁸ contends that:

By sending armed troops and hosting a number of peace negotiations between the rebel movements and the Sudanese government, Nigeria showed her commitment to settling the problem in that country. In light of South Sudan's recent independence, she is still diligently working with UNAMID to guarantee complete peace and stability in the nation.

Still, it is important to remember that Nigeria has participated in more than 40 international peacekeeping operations as a military and police force since the Congo in 1960 (Dauda, Ahmad, & Keling, 2017). In several of these missions, it has also provided senior civilian leadership. The demand for peacekeepers is rising globally, placing a strain on available resources (Oni & Taiwo, 2016). Nigerian professionals are in greater demand due to their eagerness to service and generally good record throughout time (Ebegbulem, 2012; Hamman & Omojuwa, 2016). In Agwai's words:

Following Nigeria's independence in 1960, the country's foreign policy has consistently been shaped by its commitment to world peace. Africa has remained the focal point of her foreign policy, and nowhere is that more apparent than here. In all regional and continental attempts at conflict management, Nigeria has demonstrated outstanding leadership and is currently the most prominent peacekeeping country in Africa (2010, p. 2).

Diplomats frequently point to the prestige gained from these initiatives as evidence that a nation is qualified for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, strengthening its credentials as a leader. Furthermore, according to Fayeye¹⁵,

There is no question that this is proof of Nigeria's diligent efforts under UNAMID to enhance Darfur's security and humanitarian conditions. In an attempt to monitor the ceasefire deal and further the peace

process, Nigeria is still actively engaging rebel groups. With 24/7 military patrols and community policing in the communities and camps housing internally displaced people, the nation (Nigeria) under UNAMID works to prevent armed groups from undermining the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement as well as attacks and threats against civilians.

ICG (2005) made reference to the statement of Fayeye¹⁵ when it said that the deployed troop's duties included protecting civilians, assisting with humanitarian relief, and keeping an eye on the humanitarian ceasefire agreement including the Government of Sudan, SLA, and JEM.

Challenges faced by Nigeria in peace and security promotion in Sudan

Nigeria has endeavored to actively intervene and execute its mandated duties under AMIS to safeguard the safety of civilians; however, the internal and external limitations encountered during the operations have been such that Nigeria's efforts have not been sufficient to prevent attacks against defenseless civilians. As Nigeria's own forces came under increasingly lethal attacks, the mission's deterrence effect was significantly reduced given those challenges and other elements working against Nigeria's success under AMIS. The non-application of the Darfur Peace Agreement's (DPA) security requirement and AMIS's inability to force parties to abide by the ceasefire agreement, given the worsening security conditions throughout Sudan, is a sign that the intervention spearheaded by the African Union has failed, Saka and Omede (2012) claim that the United Nations was once again urged to assist in Sudan by sending a more capable peacekeeping force due to the country's deteriorating circumstances. Accordingly, Col. Muhammad¹³ pointed out that:

Despite challenging weather that was extremely different from Nigeria, we completed our seven-month tour of duty in Darfur within the parameters of our mandate.

Col. Ishaku¹, another respondent who took part in the peacekeeping effort in Darfur, lists some of the difficulties they encountered as follows:

As there is no solid food that can last for a longer amount of time, we in Sudan eat only two meals—tea and rice—every morning, afternoon, and night for nearly a year. Consequently, the fact that these two diets digest swiftly lowers our spirits. Our features were mirroring the rice seed as we became ill from overindulging in rice and tea. The soldiers had been traveling to Sudan at one point to find their local delicacies. The climate presented further difficulties. Our radio phone runs on a little battery, so if we run out of juice while returning from a patrol, we could be utterly lost. We are also not accustomed to the desert climate, so occasionally we go on patrol and get lost due to sand bars.

Ahmed¹⁹ underlined the impact of weather conditions on the deployed forces in keeping with what was previously mentioned. He said Sudan's air quality is appalling, far worse than Nigeria's, which nearly made people less optimistic. Moreover, the Sudanese government did not grant the peacekeeping force complete autonomy since one of the rebel factions—the Janjaweed, in particular—was supported by the government and engaged in hostilities with other rebel organizations. According to Biya²⁰, who takes a radically different stance:

The effort was impeded by a lack of funding to purchase military hardware. food and other supplies are insufficient for the IDP camp, particularly for those in Nyala, the largest camp in Sudan.

The greatest description of Biya's perspective may be found in Galadima's (2006) explicit statement that AU PKOs have manpower, logistical, and financial limitations. There aren't enough skilled and prepared soldiers to mobilize quickly and form a reliable PKO force. Moreover, the AU is dependent on outside partners for this crucial help since it lacks the capacity to project power quickly and effectively due to a lack of airlift and rapid air response capabilities.

A few respondents identified the operation in Sudan as being threatened by a shortage of troops. In particular, Zakari¹⁶ and Iyanda⁷ pointed out that its authority to guarantee residents' security is limited. As said by Zakari¹⁶

The number of peacekeepers is insufficient to complete its mission, and the hazardous circumstances in Darfur have made most of the countries who had committed to sending soldiers hesitate. Not less than ninety military vehicles were taken over at gunpoint, and numerous peacekeepers were slain or detained as hostages by rebel

factions. But as a result of the raid by rebel groups in Sudan, almost 50 AU soldiers died and 12 people were slain.

In a similar vein, Iyanda⁷ puts his opinion that;

With few resources and a restricted mandate to safeguard people, Nigeria operating under the umbrella of AMIS was ill-prepared. Furthermore, a barrier to long-term peace in Sudan is the rebel faction's unwillingness to abide by the peace accord that was first struck.

These opinions support Birikorang's (2009), Saka and Omede's (2012), and Ngwube's (2013) claims that a significant barrier to the successful implementation of PKOs is member states' lack of political will. Moreover, leaders from both African and non-African backgrounds are reluctant to jeopardize the lives of soldiers in little understood nations where there might not be any perceived threats to their strategic national interests. Because of this, governments are responding to the needs for African peacekeeping in an ad hoc fashion, mirroring the same shortcomings and shortcomings that defined the OAU.

Reconciling the seeming tensions between state sovereignty and the necessity of intervening in intra-state conflicts is another political dilemma for AU PKOs, particularly in Sudan. Though the AU's bold move to intervene in Sudan and Darfur through AMIS was noteworthy, the PKOs in Sudan have shown that the AU has not yet been able to overcome the political weakness inherent in the OAU due to its fixation on the principle of sovereignty and consequent indifference to the dire humanitarian and human rights situation in the nation. African leaders in government are still shielded by the AU, despite doubts about their legitimacy. Mahfouz² similarly declared that:

One of the biggest problems the peacekeepers in Sudan are facing is the division of the rebels into various factions, which makes it hard for them to communicate with all of the groups. Around 20 rebel groups with varying interests, demands, and aims killed UNAMID peace keepers in the region, where they were stationed to monitor a truce. Peace keepers in the region are frequently targeted by warring factions.

Saka and Omede (2012) also highlighted the Mahfouz² perspective, arguing that it has led to a lack of trust between the parties involved in the conflict, resulting in frequent violations of ceasefire agreements and an increase in attacks against civilians as well as between them. For

instance, the attainment of long-lasting peace in Darfur has grown more elusive due to the insurgents' subsequent disintegration following the 2006 Abuja Darfur Peace Agreement. The opinions of many respondents support the numerous difficulties Nigerian troops experience in the AU/UN hybrid mission in Sudan, citing among other things their incapacity to maintain relative quiet in the country since rebel groups find it difficult to accept peace. Adesola⁴; the domestic crises in Nigeria, including the insurgency, farmer-herdsmen, and Niger Delta militia, which forced the nation to remove a large number of its troops from Sudan, Kingsley; Abutu¹⁷; inadequate funding, Dabaran¹¹; and a lack of knowledge of the geography of Sudan, Kingsley. In a similar view, Fayeye¹⁵ states that:

One of the obstacles to a diplomatic settlement of the Sudanese problem is the disarmament of the government-sponsored Janjaweed. To properly cover all of Sudan, the operation lacks the necessary funding and equipment. A great deal of African nations struggle to provide troops and weapons because of internal issues (election crises, for example) that they face. The resources needed to provide and retain them are lacking in those with the workforce. Because of these restrictions on the force's goal, the African Union's operations became ineffective. In addition, the organization's financial and logistical issues contributed to the problem.

Birikorang (2009) supports the perspective of Fayeye¹⁵, pointing out that in addition to the \$1 billion contribution from the US, Canada, EU, and Japan to support the AU budget and camps run by the AU force in Darfur, UNAMID faced multiple criticisms for its failure to provide sufficient funding and structural support in the region. As stated by Imongan (2015), additional funding is still needed for the Mission because the AU peacekeepers need to purchase paint in order to change their green AU berets to UN blue berets. As several academics have noted, Saka and Omede (2012) have noted that the success of AU/UN operations in Darfur has also been hampered by a lack of political will. As one of the reasons the UN was deemed inadequate in its peacekeeping efforts in Rwanda, for instance, a lack of political will was one of the obstacles facing it. Accordingly, Omotosho (2016)¹⁰ highlights that;

Prominent among the challenges faced the mission are; inadequate fund available to AMIS; lack of the expertise and personnel needed in Darfur. The troop is critically low to protect civilian in the country. The

mission also faced the problem of inadequate logistics and equipment needed to carry out the mandate assigned to them. These challenges informed the perception that AMIS is incapable of enforcing its mandate effectively and that gave room for the emergence of UNAMID to ensure complete peace and stability in Sudan.

The opinions of Saka and Omede (2012) and Birikorang (2009), who pointed out that the peacekeepers lacked sufficient supplies of gear and logistics, are in line with Omotosho's. The operation was more open to rebel attacks as a result of these deficiencies. Furthermore, because not all of the necessary equipment—particularly helicopters—was present on the ground, the peacekeepers lacked appropriate gear. This made it impossible for UNAMID peacekeepers to carry out their duties and protect civilians, which made the situation such that humanitarian aid could not be successfully delivered to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the war-affected areas. Vehicles were forced to travel perilous routes, making them vulnerable to attacks from militia groups.

Discussion of Findings

Nweke (2010), Ngwube (2013), and Imongan (2015) are only a few of the academics who have emphasized the shortcomings of the Nigerian administration, which have always cast doubt on Nigeria's participation in Sudan. Based on numerous pieces of evidence, including the deployment of soldiers and the signing of the peace treaty, this analysis concluded that Nigeria had really performed credibly by all measures. Nigeria is not the only country that face issues despite their inherent nature. The terrible situation facing the Sudanese people can be best characterized as the worst in its socio-political history, according to findings. Literature (Nweke, 2010; Ngwube, 2013; Osimen et al., 2015; and Imongan, 2015) contains evidence pointing to this.

Evidence has unequivocally demonstrated that Nigeria, operating under AMIS/UNAMID, has made significant contributions to improving the security and humanitarian situation in Sudan. Nevertheless, the operation is still in progress, ensuring that all parties to the conflict uphold their end of the bargain because total peace has not yet been reached. However, Nigeria deserves credit for its efforts in defusing the tension Sudanese felt about the conflict and forcing the rebel organizations and the Sudanese government to reach a peace agreement. Without a question, the goal of restoring peace in Sudan faces enormous obstacles.

A primary obstacle to a peaceful settlement of the Darfuri conflict was the weather, which differs greatly from Nigerian conditions (Ebegbulem, 2012; Dokubo & Joseph, 2011). One further issue was the government-sponsored Janjaweed's activities and the requirement to disarm and demobilize them. The lack of proper tools for the African Union Mission to handle the difficulties in Sudan was another significant obstacle to the conflict's conclusion (Chigozie & Ituma, 2015). The mission lacks the necessary resources and equipment to adequately cover all of Sudan. It is challenging for many African nations to provide troops or equipment because of internal issues (terrorism, insurgencies, and election crises) (Ebegbulem, 2012; Eke, 2015; Omaamaka & Groupson-Pau, 2015). The resources needed to provide and retain them are lacking in those with the workforce. The signing of the agreement by the rebels and the Sudanese government took several months before the AU force, while tiny, was sent into action. Additionally, the enforcement mechanism is so weak that even the narrow mandate for monitoring the ceasefire agreement has not been successful (Ebegbulem, 2012).

Nigeria has managed to carry out its duty in Sudan, according to the study, despite the difficulties it faced. This was thought to be consistent with Nigeria's foreign policy goal of maintaining peace and stability in the area. This demonstrates Nigeria's significant time, labor, and material contributions to the Sudanese peace effort. From this, it is simple to draw the conclusion that Nigeria is the state on the continent that is most fervently dedicated to the peace effort through thick and thin. Based on the information provided above, this is rather evident. Because many Nigerians advocate for the removal of Afrocentrism from Nigeria's foreign policy, the dispute between and among Nigerian nationals has not been settled. One could argue that Nigeria can't preserve peace in her own country or among her population due to its weak and unsustainable economic structure, so what need is there to maintain peace abroad? Nevertheless, given the circumstances in Sudan, Nigeria must play a role in managing African crises. Since that some of these African nations share borders with Nigeria, strategically, Africa's problems may eventually become Nigeria's problems. Nigeria's engagement in Sudan's crisis was driven by its national security principles and Afrocentrism, the study concluded, based on the comments received and some studied material. And despite the tremendous obstacles encountered, her intervention brought about a state of calm, and the tactics employed were successful in lessening both the crisis and humanitarian disasters in Sudan.

Conclusion

The peacekeeping mission that Nigeria undertook in Sudan was undoubtedly a risky endeavor. All the same, the obstacles are known and need to be overcome if her peacekeeping efforts are to be successful. To become more active in Africa and the wider globe, Nigeria needs support from the AU and UN. Nigeria's duty to maintain peace and security has been accomplished, the report states, despite these significant obstacles. This was thought to be in keeping with Nigeria's foreign policy objective. Nigeria's contribution to re-establishing harmony and stability in Sudan is so crucial, and it cannot be understated. Nigeria's engagement in Sudan's crisis calmed the situation, and the techniques used were effective in reducing both the crisis and humanitarian disasters, according to the study's analysis of the literature and the replies received. Nigeria's engagement in the Sudanese crisis and the nation's ongoing efforts to maintain peace and security in the nation have thus been significantly influenced by foreign policy goals and considerations of national interest, according to the study's analysis of the data gathered.

The study has provided policy guidance to the Nigerian government to periodically evaluate the success or failure of their peacekeeping missions, which has consequences for Nigeria's future peacekeeping force in Africa. This is probably going to assist Nigeria in preventing any waste of money or resources under the guise of peacekeeping efforts. The study's conclusions also provided the Nigerian military with policy guidance on how to conduct transparent and accountable peacekeeping missions.

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