

**AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND
NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN DRC**

BY


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**A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF MA IN POLITICS AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AT THE NORTH WEST UNIVERSITY (MAFIKENG
CAMPUS)**



SUPERVISOR: PROF V. OJAKOROTU

DATE: NOVEMBER 2012

DECLARATION


I, Guy Michel Feret-Ehouango declare that, the dissertation titled: An analysis of the role of multinationals corporations and neighboring countries in the elusive search for peace in DRC, has not been submitted by me at this or any other university; that it is my own work in conception and design and all materials contained herein have been duly acknowledged.

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Date: _____

20-09-2013

DEDICATION

This study is dedicated to Mr. and Mrs. Feret, my lovely wife Siphwe, Cynthia, Stella, Chrisna, Stelli, Rama, Owami, Zano and Anzo.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

First of all I would like to thank the Almighty for giving me courage and strength to complete this dissertation successfully. The successful completion of this study is a combination of many efforts. A number of people have contributed greatly to this study. I would, however, like to mention those I have frequently asked for help in the process of working on this study.

My gratitude goes to my supervisor Professor V. Ojako, who helped and guided me through to the end of this study.

I appreciate the early encouragement to complete this study from my dad and mom: Mr. FeretOndon and Mrs. Feretjosee, not forgetting my wife who stood by my side during difficult times Mrs. SipiweEhouango.

I need to thank my former Lecturers, Doctor Vera and Mr. OntiretseKeebine for their critical comments.

To all people mentioned above your contribution to the completion of this study is highly appreciated.

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ABSTRACT

The study has been conducted in order to gain an understanding on the causes of the complexities of sustainable peace in the D.R.C. What is the role of the main actors in the DRC peace process? Secondly factors leading to the elusive search for peace in DRC. Finally we will look at the DRC history from 1960 to 2002 from the socio-economic and political aspect to the government by thieves and dictatorial leadership. Series of violent conflict started with the rise into power from Laurent Kabila till the succession of his son Joseph Kabila.

They are various causes that led to the conflicts in the DRC, which were caused by unlawful succession of its leaders, lack of political will of its leaders to serve the people of Congo, ethnicity and another big problem it is the size of the country causing a problem to central government in exercising its autonomy fully. Finally the DRC mineral riches have been attracting external forces that came and exploited illegally the resources of the country. This further fueled the conflict.

The persistence of the war brought about threat to political, economical and social stability to the Congolese government.

This study focuses on factors leading to the elusive search for peace in DRC.

The study further found that solid minerals have been linked to recent African conflicts. The center of our argument here will be, to analyze the impact of natural resources on the DRC conflict and to analyze the role of MNC's in the DRC conflict: peace broken or encouraging or sustaining the conflict.

1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

The natural environment has often played a key role in conflicts throughout the world and Africa is no different. The 19th century scramble for the continent saw immense bloodshed as European countries battled over Africa's natural wealth. Decolonization in the 20th century seemed to embody a promise of freedom for Africa politically, socially and economically. More than half a century later this vision has not yet been realized and conflict is a constant feature. In many of the protracted conflicts in Africa, the control of natural resources and land is a major underlying issue.

The Congo war, one of the biggest in the history of Africa, saw numerous actors such as American Mineral fields (AMF) involved in the exploitation of the country's vast and rich resources. To this day violence in the Kivu region, in the eastern DRC, is largely fueled by the drive to control these resources. Disputes relating to land, environmental and, more recently, climate change issues further add to the DRC's woes. Since independence in 1960, the DRC has been torn apart by intrastate conflicts on five occasions. The first was after independence, when two mineral rich provinces of the Congo-Katanga and South Kasai declared themselves sovereign. Army general Mobutu seized power in 1965, hailing the start of a 15-year rule, marked by extensive and endemic corruption, economic ruin, rebellions and intermittent wars. Mobutu crushed political dissent, and human rights abuses were widespread. He also amassed a vast personal fortune in the process. Nevertheless his regime was backed, until the late 1980's, by western nations as a bulwark against communist elements in central Africa. In 1996-1997, an armed rebellion, led by Laurent Kabila and supported by Rwanda and Uganda, managed to topple Mobutu in May 1997.

In 1997 a rebellion started from the eastern part of the country, when the citizenship question of the so-called Banyamulenge population (originally from Rwanda) constituted a difficult political problem, exacerbated by the flow of Rwandan Hutu refugees to the area after the 1994 genocide. With strong support from Uganda and Rwanda, the rebellion brought Laurent Desire Kabila to power in the renamed DRC (Collins, 1998).

In August 1998, a new rebellion started. It was again motivated by Uganda's and Rwanda's security concerns and the discontent of the Banyamulenge towards the new regime. Eight African countries and about 20 private armies have been involved in the fighting since August 1998. The eastern areas of the Congo are controlled by the rebels, which is disintegrating as a political group. The government with its allies controls the western and the southern parts of the country. From the beginning of the conflict, Southern African Development Community (SADC), Organization of African Unity (OAU), the non-aligned movement, the UN as well as the several African and Western initiatives called for peace and offered mediation. The efforts led to the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement on the 10 July 1999 by the six countries involved in the conflict and a few months later by the rebel movements. However, the implementation of the agreement has encountered difficulties and there have been frequent reports of ceasefire violation (Liisa, 1999).

According to Gilpin (1992:231), since the end of World War II no aspect of international political economy has generated more controversy than the global expansion of multinational corporations. After World War II, the International system has been characterized by the emergence and rise of non-state actors whose power and influence jeopardize the sovereignty of states. Non-state actors are formed of local and international non-governmental organizations, liberation movements, multinational corporations (MNCs) religious bodies and individuals. Many MNCs have resources greater than most countries (Gilpin, 1992:231).

The global expansion of MNC's started from the end of World War II but more especially in the 1990's with the expansion taking place in the third world. That started with the low cost of factors of production; availability of raw material and, most importantly natural resources; the quest for new market opportunities; generous tax concessions; and the prospect of big returns on investments with the intention of maximizing the overall profit in the third countries. The expansion of MNCs in third world countries, including conflict-prone countries became phenomenal (Chandler and Mazlish, 2005:135).

Some MNC's like Afrimax was active in conflict zones through access to natural resources, with strategic plans for bigger markets with the objective of growing and maximizing their economic

interest. Some analysts have said that the recent history of several countries have shown to be lucrative business for MNCs in the sense that, during conflict, the participation of MNC's has played an important role in fomenting and sustaining conflict in exchange of exploitation of their mineral resources (Kanagaretnam& Brown, 2006:2) .

This analysis has raised the question of analyzing the relation between MNC's and the dialectics of conflict. This has led to academic interest to analyze the role of MNC's in resource rich countries "affected" by war and conflict like Algeria, Angola, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and the Sudan (Berman, 2000:35). While some academics like Stephen Kabel focus on the role of MNC's in initiating and sustaining conflict others will be focusing on corporate programs that promote peace building in conflict zones of mineral rich countries.

The main purpose of this dissertation will be to analyze the role of multinational corporations and neighboring countries in the search for peace in the DRC.

The scramble for the DRC's vast mineral resources has been a major factor in the perpetuation of the conflict that started in 1996. The DRC conflict was by its nature very complex in that a variety of shadow networks, state mafias, private armies, businessmen and different state elites inside and outside of Africa were involved (Taylor, 2003:45). This has given the conflict the quality of a civil war and an international war (Ross, 2004:53). This complexity is very much associated with the involvement of many actors who had their own interests and agendas, including global business bodies. These profiteering networks informed references to the conflict as "Africa first World War" according to Taylor (2003:45) and "Africa's continental war" according to Weiss (2000). On the other part the scramble for the DRC mineral wealth involves the neighboring states, government officials, rebels and militia leaders, MNC's and other profiteering networks.

Suffice it to say that besides proven and unsubstantiated reports of MNCs' complicity in DR Congo's conflict, no attempt has been made to analyze systematically the context specific roles of corporate actors in the conflict. According to Patey (2006:11), simplistic notions of profit maximization bring the questions of the relation between MNCs and conflict. These questions include the following:

- What are the underlying motivations and causalities that conditioned MNC's, Rwanda, Burundi strategic behaviors in the DRC?
- In what context and specific environment international actors operate in the DRC conflict?
- And how did the conflict influence the behavior of international actors?
- By making a triangular reference to natural resources, profit and peace in the title of this study, what role did Rwanda, Uganda and foreign interventions play in the DRC conflict?
- What peace initiatives did international actors undertake in the DRC conflict?

All these questions constitute the major points of focus of the proposed study. In doing so the study will build a deep understanding of the roles of MNC's in an environment that is not favorable for the opportunities for enrichment, in trying to bring suggested responses to these questions. This study will examine the behaviour firstly of MNCs in the DRC extractive/mineral sector and the role played by Rwanda, Burundi and other international actors in the DRC elusive search for peace.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The main purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the role of MNCs and neighboring countries (Rwanda, Burundi) in the elusive search for peace in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) conflict in order to understand the dynamics of their presence in the DRC. In this sense it will help us to understand if their presence in the conflict is of a peaceful nature or of supporting the conflict.

The proposed research seeks to address the following questions:

- (i) What are the factors that triggered the negative behavior of MNCs in zone conflict?
- (ii) What role does MNC's play in connections with Rwanda, Burundi play in the DRC conflict?
- (iii) To what extent has corporate behaviour and international actors sustained the conflict or facilitated peace in DRC?

- (iv) What are the successes and failures of the international actors in the DRC conflict?

1.3 RATIONALE

The rationale of the study is to examine and evaluate critically the role of MNC's, Rwanda, Burundi and other international actors in the DRC conflict. In so doing, this study seeks to replace the conventional conflict analysis paradigm (which focuses essentially on warring parties) and the formal governmental peace process paradigm (that emphasizes the role of state actors) with a more encompassing framework that encapsulates the motivations, strategic interests and roles of important and powerful non-state actors in conflict and peace building processes.

1.4 AIM OF THE STUDY

The main aim of this study is to examine and evaluate the role of MNC's, Rwanda, Burundi and other international actors in the DRC and what contribution the elusive search for peace. In doing so, this study seeks to give a new meaning to the conventional conflict analysis in looking into the role of MNC's, neighboring countries and other international actors in the elusive search for peace in the DRC and also to analyze their motivations, strategies interests in the conflict.

1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

- (i) The objectives of this study are to understand the strategic behaviours of MNC's, and other international actors into the DRC conflict.
- (ii) To analyze the role(s) of Rwanda, Burundi and other international actors in the DRC conflict.
- (iii) To evaluate critically the successes and failures of international actors in the DRC conflict.

1.6 RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS

Behaviour of MNC's and neighboring countries involved in the DRC conflicts was due to the political and economic instability in the country especially lack of central government and its inability to regulate the activities of MNC'S. Therefore the strategic behaviour of MNC's and neighbouring states like Rwanda and Burundi in the DRC is basically on political and economic interest to the detriment of the Congolese people.

1.7 LITERATURE REVIEW

According to Rieth and Zimmer (2004:10), only a limited number of studies have focused on explaining MNCs' behavior in general and very few have looked specifically at their role in conflict zones. Although the literature on conflict is expanding, the role of big business in conflict (including the peace building process) has, until recently, been largely ignored. However, the reality of corporate complicity in zones of conflict highlights the economic dimension of war. As noted in the background to this research, burgeoning analyses of corporate-conflict dynamics examine the potentially ambivalent roles that the MNC's play in conflict as catalysts for its perpetuation or as peace builders.

Patey (2006:3) in a study that examined the operation of eight Sudanese MNC's, notes that the behavior of each corporation is influenced by a combination of domestic and international factors. There are "critical differences" that shape the individual behavior of MNC's such that it is difficult to make generalizations solely on the basis of the profit seeking logic. These "critical differences" explain why some MNC's choose to stay while others exit conflict zones. These include: company-specific factors (such as size, type of business activity, ample financial power and widespread international operations); the host country environment (including the geography of conflict/proximity of military activity, community relations, and state interest); and the international environment (encapsulating variables such as the relation between MNCs host and home government, and pressure from international market). Together, these factors, which apply differently to each MNC, underscore and combine in various ways to determine corporate behavior in zones of conflict.

According to Berman (2000:28-32), there are five variables in the analysis of the strategies of MNC's in conflict areas: geography of conflict; severity of conflict; government and opposition; sector of industry; and investment structure. Berman(2000:32-36)says that MNCs tend to exit a conflict zone if the geographic impact of fighting is large such as in Colombia where nearly forty percent of the country is under rebel control ; so long as conflict is contained and relatively stable MNC's will remain. Furthermore, MNC's typically tolerate isolated incidents of violence if us it is in their favor. That the nature of an MNC's industry impacts on strategies in a conflict zone is illustrated, for example, by the resilience of MNC's in the extractive sector in conflict areas. An investment structure that yields substantial returns for MNC's and that retains funds offshore typically make MNC's more tolerant of conflict.

MNC's are linked to conflicts, especially " resource wars" "through the extraction of natural resources such as oil, natural gas, timber, diamonds and other precious metals" and through "upsetting environmental and social balances in the local communities in which they operate and by financing unaccountable, often repressive host governments" or parties to a conflict. In addition, MNC's, collusion with rebels or militias and their involvement in the illicit trade of natural resources ("conflict diamonds", for example) epitomize this aspect of the corporate-conflict dynamic which speaks to the complicity of MNCs in perpetuating conflict (Patey, 2006:3). According to Kanagaretnam and Brown (2006:3), "focusing on profit to the exclusion of other considerations has resulted in MNCs getting involved either directly or indirectly in fomenting and sustaining tensions or civil wars in several countries." Also, the deployment of a country's military personnel to protect MNCs' facilities invariably exacerbates conflict as this often pits the government and MNCs against resource-bearing communities.

However, as Bennett (2002:394) aptly notes, corporate conflict analyses have begun to highlight the "other dynamic", namely the responsibility MNC's share in promoting peace and avoiding conflict". He postulates again that MNCs facilitate peace building through support for humanitarian relief and responsible management of company's security arrangements for the protection of human rights against violations. This happens in the post conflict era, through corporate initiatives such as rebuilding infrastructure and investing in key productive sectors.

According to Nelson (2000:47), MNCs facilitate peace building through their core business activities, social investment programs, and engagement in policy dialogue and civic institution building.

Haufler and Lilly (2003:5) identify three strategies through which MNCs play a positive role in a conflict situation which are compliance, doing no harm and peace building. The MNCs might function as forces for good in a conflict environment by complying with the national and the international regulations even if the state is unable or unwilling to enforce these standards. They may choose to “do no harm” by initiating and implementing policies that minimize any damages that may result from their own operation or that of their business partner. In this context, it can be said that the positive roles MNCs play in conflict zones draw from their commitment to corporate social responsibility (CSR) and long term corporate benefit derivable from a stable operational environment.

The impact of a company on conflict has been under researched and largely ignored (Banfield, Haufler & Lilly, and 2003:5). There has been considerable scholarly inquiry into the phenomenal expansion, role and powerful influences of MNCs in the global economy. Scholars of International relations have also given extensive attention to MNCs operation and their impact in the developing countries. For example, scholars have explored the relationship between MNCs and ecological problem such as oil spillage and gas flaring.

Relations between MNCs operations and human rights violation e.g. Royal Dutch Shell in Nigeria’s Niger Delta and the relation between security seeking activities of MNCs and militarization or small arms proliferation have been researched, but not the problem addressed in this study. It should be acknowledged that scholarly works even though limited have addressed the causes and dynamics of the conflict in the DRC, the involvement of foreign forces, and the tortuous of the peace process. However, there has been no clear analysis of the role of private sector or multinationals in the country’s conflict and peace process. In fact, there are many scholars who have written about the role of the MNCs in the DRC’s conflict and peace process. This is in contradistinction to recent novel attempts by scholars to explore the

strategic behavior of MNCs in relation to the conflict in Sudan and in Colombia for an example (Reith & Zimmer, 2004:2).

The increasing realization that important and powerful non state actors such as MNCs and local profiteering networks wield enormous power that could shape the dynamics of conflict in pursuit of their strategic interest has not been reflected in the scholarly analysis of the DRC's conflict. Therefore, there is a need for the proposed study that seeks to address this part which is missing in addressing the DRC's conflict. On the basis of the lack of systematic empirical analysis of MNCs strategic behavior in the DRC with reference to the conflict cycle and the peace process, it is expected that this study will break new ground in conflict analysis by examining the role of MNCs in zones of conflict and this will make a significant contribution to the literature of the political economy of war.

1.8 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The significance of the study is to provide us with a descriptive analysis of the role of MNC's, Rwanda, Burundi and other international actors in the DRC conflict.

People who are set to benefit from the study are: academics, decision makers, and policy makers. The research will benefit all stakeholders in that it will be a paradigm for peace making in the DRC in order to prevent future problems caused by human security.

1.9 RESEARCH METHDOLOGY

Methodology is a set of procedures applied in conducting a study and it is imperative since it describes the methods used. These include research instruments and the population being studied. The theoretical framework on the other hand, is important in every research since it defines the theoretical underpinning of a specific study. The purpose of the theoretical framework is to identify and label important variables that are relevant to the research problem. This enables the researcher to connect the dependent variables with the independent variables and if possible elaborate any moderate variables.

The research approach adopted for this study is the qualitative research approach. The qualitative research method is the most suitable as it paves the way for an in-depth study of data. The qualitative approach will generate a comprehensive study of the role of MNC'S, Rwanda, Burundi and other international actors in the DRC conflict. Therefore the study best suits the case study research designs. It is an in-depth study of a particular situation, narrowing down a very broad field of research into one easily researchable topic.

The case study gives indications and allows further elaboration and hypothesis creation on a subject (Shuttleworth, 2008:34). Out of many rich mineral rich countries in Africa, the DRC is one of the richest in terms of natural resources in Africa, if not in the world. And for some reasons, resources have not brought peace to the Congolese government in particular and to the central and eastern part of the African continent and SADC region in general.

This method was appropriate for this study in that it helped the researcher to concentrate on implications of the role MNC's, Rwanda in the illusiveness of peace in the DRC. In that light it is an important method which excels in revealing and understanding of the complex issue of MNCs behavior in zones of conflict. Case study research excels at bringing us to an understanding of a complex issue or object and can extend experience or add strength to what is already known through previous research. It emphasizes detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of events and their relationship. Social scientists, in particular, have made wide use of this qualitative research method to examine contemporary real-life situations and provide the basis for the application of ideas and extension of method.

According to Yin (1984:23) this method is an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident and in which multiple sources of evidence are used. This captures the prevalence of MNCs, Rwanda, Burundi activities in the DRC as well as efforts to remedy the crisis in the DRC conflict.

This study draws extensively on relevant empirical studies based mainly on a literature review. This was augmented by internet sources and relevant United Nations documents, and NGOs based in the DRC.

1.10 Data collection methods

The study limited the techniques of data collection to documentation review, which is a critical qualitative method of data collection. So as to insure that the study does not lose sight of the original purpose, it will also entailed an analysis of previous MNCs activities in zones of conflict and deductive reasoning from facts of evidence as well as assessment of qualitative data and therefore the type of data collection method adopted in this research will largely be qualitative. Data was collected from primary and secondary sources (UN reports, presentations, documents). Primary sources data will provide first-hand information for the problem understudy. It will consist of interviews due to the fact that Interviews are common approach used in social sciences to get information from well-placed individuals in relevant institutions and in society.

Key personnel involve in MNCs activity issues in the DRC who will be interviewed will be: Research officer at the High Commission of the DRC in Pretoria Mr. Kazumba Martin, the representative of Congolese refugees in high commission of refugee (HCR) in Johannesburg office, MrKabemba political exile representing (MCCD) opposition party in charge of economic affairs and minerals.

Primary data will also be derived from a number of sources including relevant document from websites, public statements, speeches, conference papers. The listed sources offered credible first hand insights on MNCs,Rwanda, Burundi and other internationals actor's activities in the DRC.

Secondary data will include a wide range of journals, published articles, books, newspapers articles (Mail and Guardian), internet / electronic sources and magazines (the Africa.org and New Africa).

The above sources contain invaluable information relevant to the study and relating to the role of MNC's,Rwandaand Burundi in the illusiveness of the DRC peace. Reference will also be made to a broad selection of academic texts.

1.11 Data analysis methods

There are several techniques normally used in analyzing the multiple sources of data which a case study research like this engenders. Considering that data will be collected from interview and mainly from documentation review, information will be categorized and tabulated to address the initial propositions and purpose of the study and cross checks of facts and discrepancies in account will be conducted. Content analysis is the most suitable as it looks at documents, texts, speeches and presentations then sees what themes emerge.

The data collected will be analyzed using this method. Throughout the research process, another research analysis method used will include discussing the information with other students who have conducted similar studies in order to gain the advantage provided when a variety of perspectives and insights are applied to the same data. In order to strengthen the conclusion and findings, a system of triangulation will be applied for the purpose of validating the data; this method of triangulation uses multiple methods to ensure that a single phenomenon is examined thoroughly from different perspectives.

Against this backdrop, the triangulation method is appropriate in the context of the complexities associated with the subject matter of this study: the potentially powerful impact that MNCs have in conflict as promoting peace in mineral rich countries. The use of the triangulation method will also inform the method of data collection as discussed above.

1.12 Ethical consideration

A major ethical consideration of this research is that the researcher will ensure that all authors from previous research used in this researcher will be referenced accordingly and the authenticity of their writings will be kept intact.

1.13 Limitations of the study

The perceived limitation to this study is that DRC is still in crisis such and will not encourage any researcher to visit to obtain primarily source information for the study. Therefore the researcher will make use of the available secondary data to make the study achieve its purpose.

1.14 Scope of the study

The scope of the study is to examine the role of MNC's, Rwanda, Burundi and others international actors in the illusiveness of the DRC peace process.

STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION

Chapter one which is the introductory part of the work contains:

Background of the study, statement of the Problem, rationale, aim of the study, objective of the study, hypothesis, preliminary literature, significance of the study, research methodology, method of data collection, data analysis, ethical consideration, limitation of the study, scope of the study and structure of the dissertation.

Chapter two focuses on literature review and theoretical framework.

Chapter three focuses will analyzes factors leading to the elusive search for peace in the DRC.

Chapter four summarizes, recommend and conclude.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter comprises of the literature review and theoretical framework. The purpose of the literature review is to present a critical and an in-depth evaluation of previous researchers works on the subject matter. It also ensures that the works of others are not duplicated instead it goes further in identifying gaps in literature which may be explored in further studies (Denscombe, 2007:23). A theoretical framework, on the other hand is important in every research since it defines the theoretical underpinnings of a specific study. Its purpose is to identify and label the important variables that are relevant to the research problem. This has enabled the researcher to connect the dependent variables with the independent variables and if possible elaborate any moderating variables.

In January 1960, the Belgian government abruptly announced that they were granting the Congo independence within six months. The modern Congolese state came into being on 30 June 1960. Despite its development as an economy geared to serve Belgian colonists in the Congo, the former administration had given no thought to the requirements of an independent Congolese state. The instability that plagued the new state from the eve of independence was a direct consequence of colonial policies and a lack of preparedness for independence. Like other post-colonial countries, the Congo was expected to build modern state institutions from scratch, but that did not happen. From the beginning, foreign governments dispensed bribes to key political figures in the newly formed state which in many instances contributed to its fragmentation into secession movements around key economic regions (Katanga, Kasai and the Kivu provinces). Zartman makes the interesting observation that 'the genesis of the independent state in Congo was a result of state collapse "(Zartman, 1995:9). The Congo, in comparison with the other countries in this condition is unique in that its transition to independence occurred because the colonial state had failed. It is worth mentioning here that

as soon as the national movements started to challenge the Belgian interests in the Congo, the United States began to show interest in the country.

For the first five years of its independence, the Congo remained a country without a single, effective political authority to govern it, a situation exacerbated by a lack of trained personnel to run the country. At independence there were less than a dozen Congolese university graduates. Under Belgian rule, some 10,000 Belgians handled all the important administrative and public responsibilities. Even with this number, the colonial administration had difficulty in administrating and maintaining order because of the vastness of the country. In addition the newly independent state was under threat from tribal and ethnic conflict, and was built on laws which were not adapted to Congolese realities (Nest, 2002:10).

The Belgians were very much aware of the fact that with no qualified personnel the new government would collapse. They were expecting to continue running the country in the name of the new rulers. It is not surprising that a Belgian commander should have declared that "after independence equals before independence". This is why the outspoken first prime minister to be democratically elected was assassinated, in January 1961; six months after independence had been achieved. Lumumba, unlike the colonial power, 'sought to elevate national interests over the divisive interests of ethnicity, religion or class' (Nest, 2002:16).

After five years of political instability, Colonel Joseph Desire Mobutu took power in coup on the 24 November 1965, with the help of the USA. America, deeply involved in an ideological confrontation with the Soviet Union, was not prepared to see the Congo disintegrate. Despite a strong call from politicians for a federal state, Mobutu, like the Belgians before him, maintained a strong centralized state and an oppressive administration. The West supported Mobutu in keeping together a weak state because it served their economic and ideological interests. America was convinced that the Congo's geographic position, size and resources could be used to stem the advance of the Soviet Union in central and southern Africa. One factor that has had a long term effect on state capacity in Africa, especially in the Congo, has been the vulnerability of the policy to outside influence and interventions. The consolidation of Mobutu's regime as a 'bouclier'(shield) against communist penetration. Shortly after coming to power, as part of an

'Africanisation' programme, Mobutu changed the name of the country to Zaire (Joseph, 1997:12).

The Mobutu regime was a government by thieves, bent on promoting the interests of a narrow group to the detriment of the general welfare. Mobutu had all the characteristics of what Fanon called 'the chairman of the board of a society of impatient profiteers'. Almost forty per cent of Congo/Zaire national revenues accrued to Mobutu and his cronies, while the average Zairian made \$190 a year. During the Cold War, especially in the mid-1970s, as Africa became more important as an arena of international rivalry, the US sustained Mobutu's regime for its own purposes. However, instead of being strengthened, Zaire continued to weaken. The erosion of the Zairian state as Richard Joseph argues, "resulted from the combined effects of external manipulation over an extended period and internal misrule and mismanagement '(Minter, 1986:13).

The two Congo civil wars (1996-1997 and 1998-2003), were largely the outcome of more than three decades of rampant mismanagement, corruption and authoritarianism that were the hallmark of the Mobutu Seseko era. This system was commonly described as a "kleptocracy". Joseph Desire Mobutu's ascendancy to power in 1965 initially appeared to have brought stability to what was basically a chaotic post-independent period. But his rule gradually turned the former Zaire into an implicitly failed state (Kabemba, 2000:18).

The 2006 elections were the culmination of a three-year transition period that started in 2003, following the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, a process in which all the political forces of the DRC were represented. The elections revealed a cleavage between the eastern and the western provinces of the country. The eastern provinces voted massively for Joseph Kabila while those in the west were clearly won by the Movement de Liberation du Congo (MLC) of Jean-Pierre Bemba, former rebel leader and one of the four vice-presidents in the complex transitional government arrangement (HANS. 2010:27).

According to Hoeboken (2010:45) another factor of electoral strength in the west was the Parti Lumumbiste Unifié (PALU) party of octogenarian Antoine Gizenga, a historical political figure with a strong political base in Kinshasa and the Bandundu Province. In the second

presidential run-off, Gizenga and PALU allied themselves to Joseph Kabila. This alignment undoubtedly provided Kabila with the critical political base in that part of the country. In return Gizenga was succeeded in 2008 by Adolphe Muzito and PALU was compensated with the position of Prime Minister and a number of other key ministries that included finance. While in the general the elections were peaceful in most places, violent incidents broke out in Kinshasa between government forces and armed elements loyal to Bemba.

The lull that followed the elections was short-lived. In March 2007 heavy fighting erupted in Kinshasa between Bemba's rag-tag bands of bodyguards at the "Garde Republique" (the presidential security). In this confrontation the government quickly lost control of the situation until the intervention of their Angolan allies, which restored their edge. It was however not the last case where government had to confront its opponents. For instance, the government subsequently acted militarily to quell flare-ups in Bas-Congo Province against the Bundudia Kongo religious sect and the ever-bolder Congres National pour la Defense du Peuple (CNDP) rebels of the renegade Congolese Tutsi general, Laurent Nkunda in the North Kivu Province (Hoebcke 2010:12).

Ethnicity in the DRC poses a threat to the reconstruction of the state. In the DRC, ethnic identity politics have been a part of intra state and interstate conflicts since independence. President Mobutu was a master at setting one leader, tribe or ethnic group against another in order to get what he wanted. This game contributed to serious ethnic tensions and conflict in the country between the Katangese and the Kasaians on the one side, and the indigenous Congolese of the east and Congolese of Rwandan origin, commonly called the Banyamulenge. Despite the ethnic tensions that have emerged, it is the inter-state ethnic conflict fostered by political elites, and not hatred between people, that poses a problem for state survival (Kabemba, 2000:11).

The ethnic divisions in the states of the eastern part of the country pose the greatest threat to state recovery. The Kivu province was the powder keg where ethnic massacres first exploded in 1990s. It was also the place where the regional wars of 1996, which drove Mobutu from power, and of 1998, which attempted to overthrow Laurent Kabila, began. Two inter related

factors contribute to ethnic conflict in this part of the country. The first is the aftermath of the invasion of the DRC by Rwanda and Uganda. The Second is the problem of citizenship for the Banyamulenge who are Congolese of Rwandan origin.

There exists a link between these two factors, because one motivation for Rwanda to invade the DRC, beside economic interests and the search for interhamwe (rebel Hutu militia from Rwanda), was also the wish to protect the Banyamulenge and to ensure their political survival inside the Congo. Colonial legislation was not clear on the issue of the status of this people and at independence, the legal arrangements dealt only with the election related problems. The Belgian administration failed to address the citizenship question in what had become an extremely diverse population. Unless the Banyamulenge are recognized as citizens, the prospects for peace will remain doubtful, especially in the east of the country. Although the decision on the future of this group falls within the competence of the DRC, it will have a profound effect on Rwanda and its relations with the DRC (Lemarchand, 2000:4).

Congo has a problem in terms of the quality of its leadership, both in civil society and in its political parties. These are all ethnically based, too often show a narrow self-interest, and are preoccupied with short term concerns that obscure any regard for democracy, the public good or national interests. Congolese politicians seek power through whatever means they deem expedient. In general, personalities tend to dominate a party, which makes cooperation among them difficult. The danger is in the effort to secure their own political survival, would be leaders who have no political base might prefer to sacrifice the interests of the Congolese people by retreating from democracy and trying to restore the previous status quo (Leslie, 1993:8).

Congo does not have well organized and structured membership organizations such as labor movements, professional associations and student movements which are necessary for democracy to flourish. The church remains an important role player and its leadership is needed, but it suffered as a result of Mobutu's manipulations. By the 1980s, the church had become reluctant to criticize the government and some felt that it has been infected by the system of corruption, accepting that it must pay bribes to conduct its business.

According to John Katanga (2010:18).The DRC is emerging from a bloody war that claimed the lives of nearly 4 million people, the majority of them in the eastern part the country. In the absence of a strong state, the raging civil wars allowed the rebels, neighboring countries (Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda), and international players to plunder the country's unparalleled endowment of the valuable minerals, wildlife, and timber. In its investigation, the United Nations (2001) found that the violence in the DRC was largely supported by the funds the players gained by looting and exploiting natural resources, mostly minerals in areas under their control; confiscation and extraction of resources made the war, the expert panel reported ,“a very lucrative business”. (p.6). Despite this great natural resource wealth, the people of the DRC suffer great poverty; more than 75 percent live on less than a dollar a day and lack access to drinking water and the infant mortality rate is one the highest in the world.

Throughout its history, different natural resources in the DRC have been deemed “strategic” by the international markets. Congolese institutions have been unable to protect the country's resources due to corruption, weak governance, and low capacity. Thus, natural resources are vulnerable to exploitation and violent competition when they are found in abundance in a particular location.

Some conflicts cannot be fully explained or properly addressed if environmental factors especially those related to access and control of some strategic natural resources, are not integrated in this overall causal analysis. Failure to integrate these crucial dimensions leads to incomplete conflict resolution; patterns of violence are then more likely to return after peace accords have been implemented.

The current fragile peace, 2006 presidential and parliamentary elections, and the subsequent 2007 local elections have paved the way for a new governance system in this war-torn country. But peace will not be sustainable without reconstructing the systems that govern the country's natural resources. Efforts by the World Bank and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to establish codes of conduct for forest management and mining are steps in the right direction but much work remains to be done(US Agency, 2005).

The DRC not only possesses vast water resources but is extremely rich in mineral resources. This makes it not only the envy of neighboring states but also a country of strategic importance to powers such as the US, equivalent to that of the Persian Gulf Region. The DRC is capable of producing eighty percent of the world's industrial diamonds, possesses eighty per cent of the world's known reserves of coltan in its eastern provinces, and is also a source of cassiterite, tin, copper, cobalt and gold. The DRC is a leader in the potential use of cassiterite, tin, copper, cobalt and gold. The Congo river, second largest in the world in terms of volume of flow (30 000 to 60 000 cubic meters per second) by itself has a potential generating capacity of more than 6 billion kilowatt hours annually which represent two thirds of the entire global production. With this massive potential the Congo River basin is destined to become the leading industrial region of Africa, the principal centre of Africa's heavy industry (Lemarchand, 2000:21).

Internally the extraction and distribution of resources has been a source of tension. In the DRC copper and diamonds mined in the Katanga and Kasai provinces have contribute largely to government revenues. As in the colonial period, the copperbelt in Katanga continued to be the jewel in Mobutu's state's crown. Revenue from Gecamines furnished the government with a large part of the finance required for the administration of the country. However, the distribution of the earnings from diamonds and copper has been a source of tension between the central government and the people of both Kasai and Katanga since independence. It was in these two provinces that Mobutu had least support. Resource extraction revenue affected the relationship between the state and the society in the DRC. The disproportional redistribution of earnings, with the lion's share going to the capital, where it was quickly distributed among Mobutu's clique, created serious discontent in those who lived in the mineral rich areas but did not benefit (Joseph, 1997:13).

The war economy that has prevailed in the DRC over the last five years points to the weakness of the Congolese state. It has reached a point where it cannot protect itself or determine its own future. There is no doubt that conflicts are more likely to break out where governments are dysfunctional. While Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Angola might have had bad genuine

security concerns and Zimbabwe and Namibia initially had a straightforward desire to help protect the sovereignty of the DRC, the motives for sending forces to the DRC changed over time until the exploitation of the DRC's resources became the predominant intention. Each force was seeking, as Rene Lemarchand (2000:23) correctly puts it, 'to draw maximum advantage from the near collapse of the Congo state and this with the direct or tacit complicity of local actors'. Apart from the military, there have been numerous groups, private companies and individuals, who have been involved in the exploitation of the DRC's natural wealth. It is this easy usurpation of state functions and unchecked exploitation of its raw materials that demonstrates the level of state collapse in the DRC, the DRC is a 'carcass being chewed at by its elite and its neighbors' (Nest, 2002:16).

From the time of Leopold II king of Belgium to the present, the problem of the Congo has remained the same. It has not been divided by ethnicity or disputes over boundaries but by the imbalance in the redistribution of the country's resources between the national interest and those of external parties, in favor of the latter. Illegal exploitation remains one of the main sources of funding for groups involved in perpetuating the conflict. There is no doubt that flows of arms, mining income and the continuation of the conflict are inextricably linked. This cycle remains the biggest threat to state building in the DRC (Nabudere, 2003:11).

When a state collapses the structures of authority, law and order within it disintegrate. Security is no longer guaranteed, there is no rule of law, and public services decline or cease to exist. As TshikalaBiaya suggests (2002:6), in 'weak states where sovereignty and territoriality are difficult to uphold, the pressure increases from internal and external actors who take the opportunity to advance their particular positions. "The lack of a strong national army, the permeability of its borders; the ineffectiveness of the administration and other chaotic organization of public affairs by successive governments and regimes have emphasized the weakness of the Congolese state in the face of internal and external pressure and ambitions".

It was the fragility of the Mobutu state that persuaded Rwanda and Uganda, joined by Angola and Zimbabwe, to challenge the regime in Kinshasa and install Laurent Kabila as the new president in May 1997. But these interventions gave external forces power to dictate the

operation of government activities and the exploitation of country's natural wealth. Evidence exists that all the foreign forces deployed in the DRC plundered the country's assets. The UN report on the subject noted that the conflict in the DRC has become mainly about access to, control of and trading in, five key mineral resources Coltan , diamonds, copper, cobalt and gold. The wealth of the country as Greg Mills (2010:14) puts it, is appealing and hard to resist in the context of the lawlessness and wickedness of central authority.

2.1 DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS

Elusive search for peace is one of the elements of this study. It is worth briefly considering elusive peace as a concept that provides a frame of reference. Peace in its broadest sense embraces the absence of violent conflict. Sustainable peace in its broadest sense is peace which is capable of being maintained through economic development, renewable resources (Chambers, 2005:34).

It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education, health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfill his or her potential. The concept of sustainable security is bound with social stability and economic opportunities. Thus it involves safety from threats such as hunger, disease and oppression (Axworth, 1999:43). Talking about elusive peace is denying the fact peace may be possible or totally uncertain or absent.

2.2 FACTORS LEADING TO THE COMPLEXITIES OF SUSTAINABLE PEACE

According to Chambers (2005) peace is freedom from or absence of war, a treaty ending war, freedom or absence of noise, disturbance or disorder; quietness or calm. Intra-conflict is conflict happening within oneself or between people inside a common Territory (Collins, 2004:16). Inter-conflict it's a conflict happening between one or more nations in an international level (Collins, 2004:23). Sustainable peace is peace which is capable of being maintained or prolonged (Collins, 2004:34).

2.3 A CHAOTIC INDEPENDENCE

In January 1960, Belgium abruptly announced that they were granting the Congo independence within six months. The modern Congolese state came into being on 30 June 1960. Despite its development as an economy geared to serve Belgian colonists in the Congo, the former administration had given no thought to the requirements of an independent Congolese state. The instability that plagued the new state from the eve of independence was a direct consequence of colonial policies and a lack of preparedness for independence. Like other post-colonial countries, the Congo was expected to build modern state institutions from scratch, but that did not happen. From the beginning, foreign governments dispensed bribes to key political figures in the newly formed state which in many instances contributed to its fragmentation into secession movements around key economic regions (Katanga, Kasai and the Kivu provinces). Zartman makes the interesting observation that 'the genesis of the independent state in Congo was a result of state collapse (Zartman, 1995:67). The Congo, in comparison with the other countries in this volume is unique in that its transition to independence occurred because the colonial state had failed. (It is worth mentioning here that as soon as the national movements started to challenge the Belgian interests in the Congo, the United States began to show interest in the country).

For the first five years of its independence, the Congo remained a country without a single, effective political authority to govern it, a situation exacerbated by lack of trained personnel to run the country. At independence there were less than a dozen Congolese university graduates. Under Belgium rule, some 10,000 Belgians handled all the important administrative and public responsibilities. Even with this number, the colonial administration had difficulty in administrating and maintaining order because of the vastness of the country. In addition the newly independent state was under threat from tribal and ethnic conflict, and was built on laws which were not adapted to Congolese realities (Nest, 2002:45).

The Belgians were very much aware of the fact that, with no qualified personnel the new government would collapse. They were expecting to continue running the country in the name of the new rulers. It is not surprising that a Belgian commander should have declared that "after independence equals before independence". This is why the outspoken first prime

minister to be democratically elected was assassinated, in January 1961; six months after independence had been achieved. Lumumba, unlike the colonial power, 'sought to elevate national interests over the divisive interests of ethnicity, religion or class'.

After five years of political instability, Colonel Joseph Desire Mobutu took power in coup on the 24 November 1965, with the help of the US. America, deeply involved in an ideological confrontation with the Soviet Union, was not prepared to see Congo disintegrate. Despite a strong call from politicians for a federal state, Mobutu, like the Belgians before him maintained a strong centralized state and an oppressive administration. The West supported Mobutu in keeping together a weak state because it served their economic and ideological interests. America was convinced that the Congo's geographic position, size and resources could be used to stem the advance of the Soviet Union in central and southern Africa. One factor that has had a long term effect on state capacity in Africa, especially in the Congo, has been the vulnerability of the policy to outside influence and interventions. The consolidation of Mobutu's regime as a 'bouclier' against communist penetration. Shortly after coming to power, as part of an 'Africanisation' programme, Mobutu changed the name of the country to Zaire (Joseph, 1997:31).

The Mobutu regime was a government by thieves, bent on promoting the interests of a narrow group to the detriment of the general welfare. Mobutu had all the characteristics of what Fanon called 'the chairman of the board of a society of impatient profiteers'. Almost forty per cent of Congo/Zaire national revenues accrued to Mobutu and his cronies, while the average Zairian made \$190 a year. During the Cold War, especially in the mid-1970s, as Africa became more important as an arena of international rivalry, the US sustained Mobutu's regime for its own purposes. However, instead of being strengthened, Zaire continued to weaken. The erosion of the Zairian state as Richard Joseph argues, 'resulted from the combined effects of external manipulation over an extended period and internal misrule and mismanagement (Minter, 1986:85).

2.4 ETHNICITY

The question here is: does ethnicity in the DRC pose a threat to the reconstruction of the state? In the DRC, ethnic identity politics have been a part of intra state and interstate conflicts since independence. President Mobutu was a master at opposing one leader, tribe or ethnic group against another in order to get what he wanted. This game contributed to serious ethnic tensions and conflict in the country between the Katangese and the Kasaians on the one side and the indigenous Congolese of the east and Congolese of Rwandan origin, commonly called the Banyamulenge. Despite the ethnic tensions that have emerged, it is the inter-state ethnic conflict fostered by political elites, and not hatred between people, that poses a problem for state survival (Kabemba, 2000:23).

The ethnic divisions in the states of the eastern part of the country pose the greatest threat to state recovery. The Kivu province was the powder keg where ethnic massacres first exploded in 1990s. It was also the place where the regional wars of 1996, which drove Mobutu from power, and of 1998, which attempted to overthrow Laurent Kabila, began. Two inter related factors contribute to ethnic conflict in this part of the country. The first is the aftermath of the invasion of the DRC by Rwanda and Uganda. Second is the problem of citizenship for the Banyamulenge who are Congolese of Rwandan origin.

There exists a link between these two factors, because one motivation for Rwanda to invade the DRC, beside economic interests and the search for interhamwe (rebel Hutu militia from Rwanda), was also the wish to protect the Banyamulenge and to ensure their political survival inside the Congo. Colonial legislation was not clear on the issue of the status of this people and at independence, the legal arrangements dealt only with the election related problems. The Belgian administration failed to address the citizenship question in what had become an extremely diverse population. Unless the Banyamulenge are recognized as citizens, the prospects for peace will remain doubtful, especially in the east of the country. Although the decision on the future of this group falls within the competence of the DRC, it will have a profound effect on Rwanda and its relations with the DRC (Lemarchand, 2000:35).

2.5 LEADERSHIP

Congo has a problem in terms of the quality of its leadership, both in civil society and in its political parties. There are all ethnically based, too often show a narrow self-interest, and are preoccupied with short term concerns that obscure any regard for democracy, the public good or national interests. Congolese politicians seek power through whatever means they deem expedient. In general, personalities tend to dominate a party, which makes cooperation among them difficult. The danger is in the effort to secure their own political survival, would be leaders who have no political base might prefer to sacrifice the interests of the Congolese people by retreating from democracy and trying to restore the previous status quo (Leslie, 1993:67).

Congo does not have well organized and structured membership organizations such as labor movements, professional associations and student movements which are necessary for democracy to flourish. The church remains an important role player and its leadership is needed, but it suffered as a result of Mobutu's manipulations. By the 1980s, the church had become reluctant to criticize the government and some felt that it has been infected by the system of corruption, accepting that it must pay bribes to conduct its business. While the church has not fully recovered from this, it has a central role to play in mobilizing citizens in the transitional period.

2.6 RESOURCES

Throughout its history, different natural resources in the DRC have been deemed "strategic" by the international markets. Secondly, Congolese institutions have been unable to protect the country's resources due to corruption, weak governance, and low capacity. Thus, natural resources are vulnerable to exploitation and violent competition when they are found in abundance in a particular location.

Some conflicts cannot be fully explained or properly addressed if environmental factors especially those related to access and control of some strategic natural resources, are not integrated in this overall causal analysis. Failure to integrate these crucial dimensions leads to incomplete conflict resolution; patterns of violence are then more likely to return after peace accords have been implemented.

The current fragile peace, 2006 presidential and parliamentary elections, and the subsequent 2007 local elections have paved the way for a new governance system in this war-torn country. But peace will not be sustainable without reconstructing the systems that govern the country's natural resources. Efforts by the World Bank and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to establish codes of conduct for forest management and mining are steps in the right direction but much work remain the be done(US Agency, 2005:25).

The DRC not only possesses vast water resources but is extremely rich in mineral resources. This makes it not only the envy of neighboring states but also a country of strategic importance to powers such as the US, equivalent to that of the Persian Gulf Region. The DRC is capable of producing eighty percent of the world's industrial diamonds, possesses eighty per cent of the world's known reserves of coltan in its eastern provinces, and is also a source of cassiterite, tin, copper, cobalt and gold.

The DRC is a leader in the potential use of cassiterite, tin, copper, cobalt and gold. The Congo river, second largest in the world in terms of volume of flow (30 000 to 60 000 cubic meters per second) by itself has a potential generating capacity of more than 6billion kilowatt hours annually which represent two thirds of entire global production. With this massive potential the Congo River basin is destined to become the leading industrial region of Africa, the principal centre of Africa's heavy industry (Lemarchand, 2000:18).

Internally the extraction and distribution of resources has been a source of tension. In the DRC .copper and diamonds mined in the Katanga and Kasai provinces have contributed largely to government revenues. As In the colonial period, the copper belt in Katanga continued to be the jewel in Mobutu's state's crown. Revenue from Gecamines furnished the government with a large part of the finance required for the administration of the country. However, the distribution of the earnings from diamonds and copper has been a source of tension between the central government and the people of both Kasai and Katanga since independence. It was in these two provinces that Mobutu had least support. Resource extraction revenue affected the relationship between the state and the society in the DRC. The disproportional redistribution of earnings, with the lion's share going to the capital, where it was quickly

distributed among Mobutu's clique, created serious discontent in those who lived in the mineral rich areas but did not benefit (Joseph, 1997:65).

The war economy that has prevailed in the DRC over the last five years points to the weakness of the Congolese state. It has reached a point where it cannot protect itself or determine its own future. There is no doubt that conflicts are more likely to break out where governments are dysfunctional. While Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Angola might have had genuine security concerns and Zimbabwe and Namibia initially had a straightforward desire to help protect the sovereignty of the DRC, the motives for sending forces to the DRC changed over time until the exploitation of the DRC's resources became the preeminent intention. Each force was seeking, as Rene Lemarchand (2000:34) correctly puts it, 'to draw maximum advantage from the near collapse of the Congo state and this with the direct or tacit complicity of local actors'. Apart from the military, there have been numerous groups, private companies and individuals, who have been involved in the exploitation of the DRC's natural wealth. It is this easy usurpation of state functions and unchecked exploitation of its raw materials that demonstrates the level of state collapse in the DRC, hotelet describes the DRC as a 'carcass being chewed at by its elite and its neighbors' (Nest, 2002:18).

From the time of Leopold II to the present, the problem of the Congo has remained the same. It has not been divided by ethnicity or disputes over boundaries but by the imbalance in the redistribution of the country's resources between the national interest and those of external parties, in favor of the latter. Illegal exploitation remains one of the main sources of funding for groups involved in perpetuating the conflict. There is no doubt that flows of arms, mining income and the continuation of the conflict are inextricably linked. This cycle remains the biggest threat to state building in the DRC (Nabudere, 2003:19).

When a state collapses the structures of authority, law and order within it disintegrate. Security is no longer guaranteed, there is not rule of law, and public services decline ore cease to exist. As TshikalaBiaya suggests (2002:18), in 'weak states where sovereignty and territoriality are difficult to uphold, the pressure increases from internal and external actors who take the opportunity to advance their particular positions. The lack of a strong national

army, the permeability of its borders the ineffectiveness of the administration and the other chaotic organization of public affairs by successive governments and regimes have emphasized the weakness of the Congolese state in the face of internal and external pressure and ambitions.

It was the fragility of the Mobutu state that persuaded Rwanda and Uganda, joined by Angola and Zimbabwe, to challenge the regime in Kinshasa and install Laurent Kabila as the new president in May 1997. But these interventions gave external forces power to dictate the operation of government activities and the exploitation of country's natural wealth. Evidence exists that all the foreign forces deployed in the DRC plundered the country's assets. The UN report on the subject noted that the conflict in the DRC has become mainly about access to, control of and trading in, five key mineral resources ,Col tan ,diamonds, copper, Cobalt and gold. The wealth of the country as, Greg Mills (2010:28), puts it, is appealing and hard to resist in the context of the lawless and wickedness of central authority.

2.7 REGIONAL INVOLVEMENT

The DRC shares borders with nine countries. Its neighbors are Congo Brazzaville in the west and North West, the Central African Republic in the north east, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania in the east and Zambia and Angola in the south. These countries can be divided into three geographical zones: the Great Lakes states (Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Zambia); the states of the Congo River Basin (Angola, Congo Brazzaville and Central African Republic); and finally Sudan and Uganda. All significant political events in any of these countries have a direct impact on the stability of the DRC; conversely, an unrest or conflict in the DRC is immediately felt in these neighboring states. The focus here will be limited to countries which have had a direct impact on the politics of the DRC in the last two decades: Rwanda, Burundi, Angola and Uganda (Kabemba, 1999:35).

Since 1970 Mobutu had wanted to establish Zaire (on account of its size, mineral wealth and strategic location) as the leading African country and himself as a major African statesman. In Rwanda and Burundi, Mobutu was considered a father figure. But the situation changed with

the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. When the Tutsi minority party, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) launched an insurgency in 1990, in a bid to regain power in Rwanda, French forces and Mobutu's Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ) helped the Hutu dominated government of President Habyarimana to stop the advance of the RPF. When, in 1994, the RPF took over Kigali, relations between Kinshasa and Kigali were strained over the issue of the DRC having armed the Rwandan government forces (Matlosa, 2003:56).

According to Kabemba (2001:28), directly or indirectly, President Mobutu also supported militarism in Burundi. The armed opposition to President Buyoya's military regime, particularly the FDD/CDD (Forces de defence de la democratie/Conseil national pour la de'fense de la democratie), had their headquarters in Zaire. This does not mean that Mobutu actively opposed the regime of President Buyoya. Due to developments linked to the effects of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the coups d'etat in Burundi and the increased ethnic conflict fermented by Mobutu's geopolitics, the Burundi regime found itself on the side of the Banyamulenge insurrection against Mobutu in 1996.

The relationship between Mobutu and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni was very cold as a result of the competition for leadership in the region. However, the Ugandan intervention in the DRC to oust Mobutu had more to do with Uganda's own security concerns. Museveni's support for Kagame was initially limited to destroying refugee camps used by interhamwe and the ex-FAR to destabilize Rwanda. The decision then to support Kagame and the advance of his forces up to Kinshasa was informed by Museveni's own experience in Uganda.

The Ugandan approach was very much influenced by the experience of direct Tanzanian involvement in the war that removed Idi Amin in 1979. The situations were comparable. President Mobutu had acquiesced in the transformation of border camps for Rwandan refugees into armed training centers for the proponents of 'Hutu Power', while Idi Amin had invaded the Karega region of Tanzania. When Tanzanian forces pushed him out, the question of what should follow arose. Should the next step be for them to push onward to Kampala, thus overthrowing the dictatorship? Or should they leave matters to Ugandan groups opposed to

Amin, giving them as much material and political assistance as the situation called for recover, would you not be inviting a second and more lethal strike from him? (MILLS,2002:75).

In Angola, Mobutu played the roles of both the instigator of conflict that paralyzed the country for more than twenty five years and the mediator between the opposing parties. He was used by the US as conduct for arms to Jonas Savimbi and his liberation movement National Union For the complete Independence of Angola (UNITA). In 1992 he presided over an African diplomatic effort to broker a ceasefire between UNITA and Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Observers however dismissed his efforts as insincere. Mobutu was pursuing his own objective of making himself important in the eyes of the Americans, whose attitude towards him was changing with the end of the Cold War. There is no doubt that Mobutu used himself and the Congolese territory as pivotal factors for US control of Angola (Davidson, 1992:18).

2.8 INVOLVEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS

The DRC's relationship with the West is simplified here to a discussion of three key countries; Belgium, the US and France. With Belgium the relationship has always been that between colonization and the colonized. Very close ties have always been that between the two countries, and the DRC is heavily dependent on Belgian foreign aid. In spite of the apparent closeness between the two countries, there have been periodic outbursts of friction. At the end of Mobutu's reign relations were at the lowest level. The elder Kabila did not do much to restore relations between the two countries, but under Joseph Kabila the relationship is better than it has been for more than twenty years (Hottele, 2001:28).

The US DRC relationship followed from what the US perceived was the pivotal location of Zaire in central Africa. As mentioned earlier, America's interest in the DRC coincided with the lessening of Belgian influence in the late 1950s. A special relationship was forged during the Cold War. Both the US and the Soviet Union sought to cultivate sympathetic politicians among the Congolese because each hoped to bring this huge, resource rich country into its sphere of influence. During the crisis experienced in the DRC in the early 1960's presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson sought to maintain the territorial integrity and pro-Western orientation

of the former Belgian colony. After his takeover in 1965, Mobutu's consistently pro-Western stand served to underscore Zaire's strategic importance, particularly as the US believed there was renewed Zaire's strategic importance, particularly as the US believed there was renewed Soviet interest in Africa in the 1960s and 1970s (Kabemba ,1999:30). It was hoped that under Mobutu's leadership, the DRC might be the focal point for US foreign policy objectives in sub Saharan Africa. In much the same way as Brazil was in Latin America. The consensus in the American foreign policy of the US focused on assuring total security, not of the Congo but of the person of Mobutu through military, political and economic support. It was President Mobutu ability to procure aid from the international community that was critical to the maintenance of this increasingly dysfunctional political entity (Hoschild, 1999:89).

With the end of the Cold War, the US abandoned Mobutu. In the face of growing rebellion the US appreciated that Mobutu's undemocratic regime was adding to the instability of the region. The ambivalence and the lack of policy on the issue of Mobutu's removal became a policy in itself when the US chose to remain quiet in the face of the invasion of the country by Rwanda and Uganda.

The DRC's relationship with France has developed more recently. France was the only Western power that continued to support Mobutu in the face of a fast advancing rebellion. To the French, Mobutu still appeared the essential force required to solve the regional conflicts. In other words, the cause of the problem was perceived as the solution to the problem. But France's relationship with the DRC is also cultural. The DRC is the most highly populated francophone country after France, which means that France would not like to see the DRC fall within Anglophone influence. However, over time, cultural imperatives were transformed into French political and economic interests in the country (Hans, 2010:45).

In recent times Belgium and French efforts have been influential in generating international assistance for Joseph Kabila's government. To an extent, they have supported the Inter Congolese Dialogue, which altered the balance of power in the negotiations in favor of Joseph Kabila. The European Union (EU) Commission formally resumed direct cooperation with the DRC on 5 February 2002 after ten years of suspension.

Western diplomacy in Central Africa and the DRC in particular has been to a large degree a dynamic process, which has been changing since the end of the Cold War. But one element has remained the same. For the West, any government in the DRC must maintain the kind of friendly and constructive relations with Western powers that serves their interests, which may not necessarily be identical with those of the Congolese people. Lumumba and Laurent Kabila, who attempted to oppose Western interest, were killed (Matlosa, 2003:54).

2.9 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

International economic relations/International political economy scholars have come with many theories explaining the activities of multinational enterprises. A majority of those theories address the extension of capital and foreign direct investment by MNCs as opposed to the social environment of multinational business and therefore ignore the impacts of corporate behavior on society. Having said that, it can be deduced from the objective of this research that the corporation cannot be treated in isolation from the society. In fact, business interplays with the society at different level or stages. In addition another theory which will be used in this study to explain the behavior of state going to war against another is realism. In the case of Rwanda and Burundi, the interest in the involvement in the DRC conflict is based on the illegal exploitations of the Congo mineral wealth.

CHAPTER THREE

DELINEATION OF VARIABLES

This chapter deals with delineation of variables which impact on complexities of sustainable peace and security in DRC.

3.1 MINERAL RESOURCES CONTRIBUTING TO THE ELUSIVE SEARCH FOR PEACE

Mineral inputs led to violence and human losses in the DRC. A vicious cycle of mineral extraction drives completion, promotes exploitation, degrades the environment, diminishes resources, and drives more competition. The more demand grows, the higher and faster the cycle, and the larger the number of victims (Katunga, 2010:34).

In the latter half of the 19th century, following the discovery of rubber, 10 million Congolese were subjected to murder, mutilation, torture, deportations, and forced labor by rubber hunters operating on behalf of Belgium's King Leopold II, who then owned DRC (Hochschild, 1999). After the DRC became a Belgian colony in 1908, the colonial overlords continued to exploit natural resources including copper, gold, cassiterite, wildlife, and timber. In particular, the massive exploitation of minerals sustained Belgium imperial ambitions, strengthened the colonial system, and provided a model for the subsequent autocratic regime of Mobutu SeseSeko. Belgium's desire to protect its stake in the Congo prompted the assassination of nationalist Patrice Lumumba and its support for Mobutu and secessionist Moïse Tshombe of the southern Katanga Province, home to immense reserves of cobalt, copper, manganese, zinc, and uranium.

According to John Katunga (2010:45), DRC minerals have played numerous strategic in world politics. For example, uranium from the DRC was shipped to the United States for the Manhattan Project, and thus partly fueled the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. State owned Gecamines, the source of the uranium, sustained Mobutu's kleptomaniac regime. Today, the DRC is still awash in valuable, strategic resources. Copper, cobalt, diamond, columbo-tantalite (coltan), and the gold mines flourish in the eastern and southern regions. The Congo Basin forest, most of which is in the DRC, is the second-largest area of dense tropical

rainforest in the world, containing one quarter of the world's remaining tropical forests, as well as spectacular array of biodiversity 10.000 species of plants, 1000 species of birds, and 400 species of mammals, many of which exist nowhere else on Earth (USAID, 2005). However, the DRC's forests are threatened by plunder and mismanagement: logging for timber and fuel wood, clearing forests for agriculture, poaching wildlife for bush meat or the endangered species trade, and mining are degrading the forest at the rate of 2 million acres every year.

John Katunga says that "Technological developments and the demands of international markets continue to determine the patterns of resource exploitation and conflict. The spike in the price of coltan, which is used in consumer electronics such as a cell phone, kicked off a mining rush in 2000 that influenced hefty environment damage and supported the various armies fighting in the civil war".

3.2 INVOLVEMENT OF RWANDA, BURUNDI, UGANDA AND ANGOLA CONTRIBUTING IN THE ELUSIVE SEARCH FOR PEACE

The war in the Congo is linking together African civil war that had very little to do with each other before. Thus the war is sometimes referred to as "Africa's First World War". The parties of the civil wars in Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Angola are also parties in the war in the DRC. From Uganda the most notable one is the ADF, fighting against the Ugandan government. It is based by Sudan and includes soldiers from the former Zairian and former Rwandan armies. The former Rwandan army and Interahamwe, that was Responsible for the Rwandan genocide in 1994, came to eastern Congo, Kivu, together with the Rwandan refugees and have been attacking the current Rwandan RPF government since then. One apparent explanation of the Rwandan and Ugandan involvement is their interest to create a kind of buffer zone to safeguard their borders. While the progress in the Burundian peace process represents perhaps the single sign of hope in the region, also the security of Burundi is threatened by the insurgent activities across its border to the DRC. (Lemarchand 1997)

3.3 DOMESTIC DIMENSION OF THE CONFLICT IN THE ELUSIVE SEARCH FOR PEACE: KIVU

On the domestic dimension of the conflict, there is president Laurent Desire Kabila's government of Congo and its internal opposition. This opposition is very heterogeneous as the splits

between its components illustrate. In the Kivu region, there are the disappointed Banyamulenga, whose expectations concerning citizenship rights have not been fulfilled in spite of the significance for the rebellion in 1996-97. There is the ex Mobutists who have been excluded from government power by Kabila. And finally there are many critiques of Kabila's nepotistic rule, who had been looking forward to the long awaited democratization. Initially this movement was more or less united under the RCD. During the campaign, the RCD has suffered from serious internal rifts and has consequently split into two competing factions. Ernest Wamba-dia-Wamba, the original political leader of the RCD was thrown out of the government in the Spring 1999. Emile Ilunga replaced him (Harri, 1999:24).

His faction, known as RCD-Goma continued under Rwandan protection. Wamba-dia-Wamba quickly established RCDM-ML (also known as RCE-Kigali) under Uganda's protection. The Other main rebel group, the Uganda-backed MLC, led by Jean-Pierre Bemba is gradually becoming more of an equal partner with the RCD (Liisa, 1999:56).

3.4 LUSAKA CEASE FIRE AGREEMENT

The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was signed on 10 July 1999 by all state parties to the DRC conflict, namely the DRC, Namibia, Angola, Zimbabwe, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. The government of Zambia, SADC, the OAU and the United Nations (UN) all signed the agreement as witness. The then two main rebel movements – the RCD and the Mouvement de Liberation du Congo (Movement for the Liberation of Congo) (MLC) only endorsed the agreement on 1 and 31 August respectively, after initially having refused to sign. Negotiated within the framework of the SADC, the agreement consisted, in its main part, of a preamble and three articles dealing respectively with the ceasefire, security concerns and the principles of the agreement. Three annexures were also included, focusing on the modalities for the implementation of the agreement, its framework and its key words respectively (Sadiki, 2006:12).

The preamble strongly emphasizes the principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC, making due references to the UN and OAU charters. In its closing paragraphs, though,

provisions are made for the necessity of organizing an all-inclusive national dialogue, aimed at enabling national reconciliation and establishing a new political dispensation in the country.

With regard to the ceasefire (Article 1.), all parties to the conflict committed to cease, 24 hours after signing the agreement, all hostilities, military movements and reinforcements as well as hostile actions, including hostile propaganda against one another. Article 2 stressed that all involved parties should commit themselves to addressing immediately that security concerns of the DRC and her neighboring countries. With regard to principles, Article 3 dealt with issues relating to the request for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC, the withdrawal of foreign troops, the organization of political talks among Congolese parties, the formation of a new national army and the disarming of militias and armed groups, amongst other issues (Carayannis, 2002:34).

Annexure A contained a total of 13 articles and was fully devoted to the modalities for the implementation of the agreement. Central to implementation was the establishment of a Joint Military Committee (JMC), which was tasked to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire as well as the withdrawal of foreign troops and disarming of militias, armed groups and civilian Congolese. Composed of representatives from each party to the agreement under a neutral chairman appointed by the OAU, the JMC was answerable to a Political Committee, composed of ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense or any other representative duly appointed by each party.

According to Carayannis (2006), the JMC was, thus, to act as a peacekeeping body awaiting the deployment of UN and OAU contingents. The armed forces of the warring parties were also, in the meantime, expected to disengage from territories where they were in direct contact with each other, and redeploy to defensive positions to allow for a buffer zone. A national dialogue to serve as a framework for a political resolution of the conflict was to be implemented 45 days, culminating in the establishment of new institutions for the country. The agreement called for the deployment of a Chapter VII UN peace keeping mission, expected to conduct peace enforcement activities that is, tracking down and disarming armed groups in the DRC, screening

mass killers, perpetrators of crimes against humanity and war criminals, as well as handing over Rwandan genocide suspects to the international Criminal Court for Rwanda.

However, within the context of a complex conflict involving parties with divergent interests and world views, persistent challenges and shortcomings to the agreement and its implementation emerged.

3.5 SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS IN THE ELUSIVE SEARCH FOR PEACE: THE LUSAKA CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT

At the time of its signing, the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement represented a significant breakthrough in the resolution of the DRC conflict. For the first time, all the parties had met and agreed on establishing processes that would lead to the peaceful resolution of their differences and possible political reconstruction of the Great Lakes region. However, a number of challenges arose as a result of the nature of the agreement and the process of its establishment.

Firstly, the very complex nature of the Lusaka Agreement quickly revealed itself as a stumbling block to its operationalization. According to Weiss (2006:43), have termed it “a very complicated plan for peace “, even Joseph Kabila criticized the complexity of the Lusaka Agreement. In his speech at the SADC Heads of State and Government summit in Blantyre, Malawi, in January 2002, he admitted that the Lusaka Agreement contained obstacles to its own implantation, as it placed more emphasis on the internal aspects of the conflict while legitimizing Rwanda’s and Uganda’s continuous presence in and exploitation of the DRC by centering the process on their security needs. This was also implied by Mangu (2003:29) as he argued that “the titling of the Agreement as ‘DRC Ceasefire Agreement’ was misleading since it was designed to achieve far more than the official designation suggested”.

Secondly, though recognizing the presence of hostile foreign armies on DRC soil, the agreement did not compel these armies to an unconditional withdrawal. Instead, it placed them on the same level as the invited DRC government allies, and linked their withdrawal. “By authorizing the Rwandan and Ugandan armies to stay on Congolese soil to administer part of the Congolese territory, it regrettably condoned the Rwandan and Ugandan aggression and ‘legalized’ their

violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC, and their interference in the Congolese affairs. Therefore, in his inaugural speech on 26 January 2001, Joseph Kabila committed to supporting the Lusaka Agreement on condition that the “aggressing armies from Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda withdrew unconditionally and without delay” from his country.

Thirdly, the Lusaka Agreement suffered from a lack of commitment on the part of its signatories, as well as the absence of an authority entrusted with its enforcement. “The Lusaka Agreement provided little peace, as it could not prevent the outbreak of further violent conflict. The negotiations seemed to be regarded as a platform for security international recognition rather than representing a commitment to peace by the signatories. The ceasefire also failed owing to the absence of an international guarantor who could compel compliance. In early 2001, for example, Uganda withdrew unilaterally from agreement following the release of the UN Report on Resource Exploitation in the DRC, in which Ugandan officials were named as perpetrators’. At a 2000 SADC meeting, Laurent Kabila indicated that he could no longer accept Masire as a facilitator, accusing him of bearing a South African bias. Kabila believed that South Africa had a close relationship of both Rwanda and Uganda countries that supported the rebels. According to Mangu (2003:39), Kabila then suspended the accords and called for direct negotiations with Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi and rejected the UN peacekeepers.

The reluctance on the part of the parties to abide by provisions of the agreement was not a surprise. According to Swart and Solomon, “the Lusaka agreement was imposed, even forced the signatories metaphorically at gunpoint, rather than being offered as a symbolic ‘olive branch’. Notwithstanding the pressure, all parties did also have incentives to sign the agreement.

“For the Kabila government, the agreement should secure its legitimacy and re-establish state authority over DRC territory. For Zimbabwe, the agreement emphasized the DRC’s sovereignty, legitimizing their intervention. Angola’s inclusion of UNITA on the list of groups to be disarmed gave the Angolan government the opportunity to shop for diplomatic support against UNITA and secure a commitment to closing down UNITA supply routes through Congo. For Rwanda, the agreement recognizing for the first time the security threat posed by the interhamwe and

ex-FAR and called for a regional response. For Uganda, the agreement weakened Kabila by calling for a National Dialogue, rebuilt regional solidarity under Ugandan political and economic leadership. By making the Congolese rebels signatories, the agreements brought them international recognition and weaken Kabila (Swart. 2004:67).

Burundi and Namibia were, at the time of signing the Lusaka Agreement, already minimizing their engagement in the DRC conflict. The external pressures and self-focused incentives that brought the warring parties in the DRC conflict to sign the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, devoid of genuine commitments, simply resulted in a situation of 'no war, no peace' in the country. The DRC remained divided by rebel-held zones and government-controlled territories. People's movements across the two zones were severely curtailed. The national dialogue, originally expected to take place only 45 days after the signing of the agreement, fell into a 'delay strategy'.

Other challenges to the implementation of the Lusaka Agreement included short and unrealistic time frames and the complex nature of the peacekeeping mission expected to be deployed. Expecting the crisis in the DRC and the security situation in the Great Lakes region to normalize within a year was overambitious. The complexity inherent in deploying a hybrid OAU/UN mission expected to operate in a peacekeeping and peace enforcement capacity, was also underestimated.

According to the international group (1999:56), the Lusaka Agreement enabled a holistic discussion of the DRC conflict, bringing together all involved parties. Despite its shortcomings, it established the framework that would be later utilized in the inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD), which was crucial to the formation of a consensual and all inclusive transitional dispensation, making possible the first multiparty elections in the country in 41 years.

The signing of the Lusaka Agreement also contributed to containing the leadership struggle within the main rebel group, the RCD. When the agreement was initially signed on 10 July 1999, the RCD has split into two rival groups, namely Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie – Goma or the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Kisangani (RCD-K) which later become the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Kisangani/Movement of Liberation (RCD-K/ML). The agreement

recognized all sides and parties to the process and all initial members were granted the status of founders of the RCD, entitling them to sign the agreement individually and participate in all future negotiations, including the national dialogue.

Though cases of fighting were registered after 10 July 1999, the Lusaka Agreement after 10 July 1999, the Lusaka agreement did work as a psychological for the belligerents by 'de constructing' the notion of armed and military confrontation to ensure victory. It created the space and opportunity to realize other options. Parties on both sides government and rebel movements realized the importance of upholding the positive progress made during the Lusaka process. This is believed to have played a role in preventing them from continuously engaging in self-defeating strategies that would not have only endangered their acquired positions, but also could have jeopardized the legitimacy of their claims by sparking the disagreement of the international community and SADC, which remained committed to the process (SADC, 1997:67).

The Lusaka Agreement upheld inclusivity in the DRC peace process. It clearly recognized multiple parties, including the political opposition and civil society, as stakeholders in the process. Such groups' participation in the ICD and subsequent transition has been important in diffusing tensions that would have proven otherwise very difficult in a context where only former combatants were included.

3.6 THABO MBEKI AND NEPAD INTERVENTION IN THE DRC CONFLICT

According to Calland (2003), South Africa's timely entry into the DRC conflict in 2001 reflected a major paradigm – and foreign policy – shift in Pretoria. It linked to the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), an initiative of the African Union in which President Mbeki remains one of the major players. Within the NEPAD framework, conflict resolution is an important prerequisite for democratization and bringing about sustainable economic growth. However, as SA stepped in to keep the process alive, the facilitator, Sir Ketumile Masire, appointed five eminent non-Congolese to chair the five ICD committees. The five appointees were: Moustapha Niasse, the UN secretary-general's special envoy to the DRC; General Abdusalaam Abubakar (former Nigerian President), military

committee; Ahmed Ould Abdallah (former Mauritanian foreign minister), electoral Committee; Ms Helen Johnson (Liberal), humanitarian and development committee; and finally, Albert Tevoedjea (former planning minister in Benin), reconciliation committee.

A majority of Congolese perceived the appointments of non-Congolese as an expression of the facilitator's lack of trust in the Congolese. Each of the committee chairs immediately received a grant of US\$60,000 (a total of \$300,000) from the facilitator. The appointment of non-Congolese chairs and the allocation of money to them, against the background of the constraints in Addis Ababa, did not go down well with the Congolese. They expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of consultation; the absence of eminent Congolese from the Diaspora as committee chairs; and the level and speed of resource allocation that had been already been effected. As delegates gathered at the Sun City resort in South Africa for the final act, this dissatisfaction created further tension between the Congolese and the facilitator. The result was that the strained relation between the late Laurent Kabila and Sir Masire before January 2001, also spread to the Congolese delegates (Sturman, 2002:42).

In South Africa, the organizers faced problems similar to those alluded to above. They were: Non-attendance by factional leaders until forced to appear by forces other than the ICD organizers; confusion over representation, with 60-odd delegates each trying to pursue a differing point of view; the limited time available in relation to resources, initially 45 but eventually 52; the absence of a clear agenda; the continuing war and the plundering of resources to finance the war; and the absence of political will amongst the key actors.

Given the urgency of establishing a transitional government of national unity before June 2003, civil society and unarmed opposition changed their behavior and began seeking alliances with the armed groups. By doing this, these groups abandoned not only the special provisions accorded them in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement but, much more importantly, their historical contribution towards the peace process since 1991.

One such example amongst many was the case of the Union pour la Democratie et le Progress Social (UDPS), traditionally based in Kinshasa and led by Etienne Tshesekedi, that now found itself seeking an alliance with RCDGoma. Almost as if in retaliation, the MLC also found

common cause with the Kinshasa government. Clearly, the resilience and patience of civil-society organization was wearing thin. Many delegates shared the view that they had to catch up the train and jump on as it pulled out the station or be permanently left behind (African Security Review, 2003:19).

However, this has played into the hands of the armed combatants who shaping the agenda to their best advantage. This development, of fighting one's way into future government posts during the transitional period outside framework of the ICD, has continued in the east. The recent eruption of conflict between the hitherto traditional adversaries, the Lendu and Hema, is evident.

3.7 SOUTH AFRICA MILITARY DEPLOYMENT TO THE DRC

The global and inclusive Agreement on Transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo refers to the resolution adopted on 10 April 2002 on recommendations of the Commission for Defense and Security. According to the resolution, the chief of staff of the Defense Force and the two deputies cannot come from the same political faction. Similarly, the chief of staff of the ground forces, air force and navy cannot come from the same political faction. These posts will be distributed between the groups and factions with combat forces who are signatories to the Lusaka Accord (Kendal, 1998:45).

Representatives of the different groups met on the weekend of 27 March 2003 in Pretoria to discuss the allocation of posts in the DRC's new defense force. An agreement was prepared by the mediation team but was rejected by the DRC government and MLC. Parties decided to postpone the formation of the military until after the signing of the Final Act on Inter Congolese Dialogue (ICD) on the 2 April 2002. This could unfortunately not be resolved and put the implementation of the ICD in danger. The UN asked Mr Niasse and retired Canadian general, General Baril, to help the South African mediation team resolve the issue. On 6 July 2003, the issue was resolved and the following allocations were made: This is, however, only the beginning of the process of integration. The UN mission in the DRC, MONUC is prepared to assist the DRC to restructure the national armed forces by providing political and military advice (Colette, 2001:78).

MONUC will not take on the responsibility of training of the national armed forces. Belgium has already indicated that it would be willing to be lead nation. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has already started a program for the generation of a national defense force. Through the different steps enumerated here below, they will give assistance to the complex process of creating a national defense force (DF).The steps are:

Identifying the total capacity of the different components and entities; determining the overall structure of the future DRC DF based on a threat analysis;Elaborating a detail structure for the DRC DF; preparing the selection and integration of military personnel in the new structure; Instructing and training of the unit commanding personnel; and incorporating military personnel and the launch of the structures. It is foreseen that a special body within the general stall will be created, with working groups for each step of the process (Herald, 2001:64).

3.8 THE 2006 DRC ELECTION AND POWER SHARING

After numerous postponements, landmark parliamentary elections were held on 30 July 2006 in parallel with presidential elections to replace the transitional power-sharing institutions set up in 2003. They were the first multiparty elections to be held in more than forty years.

Mr. Joseph Kabila Kabange became President after his father, Mr. Laurent Kabila, was assassinated in January 2001. Under his presidency, numerous economic reforms were implemented in cooperation with the international Monetary Fund (IMF), including liberation of petroleum prices and the exchange rate and the adoption of new fiscal and monetary policies. Inflation dropped from more than 500 per cent to seven per cent, and the GDP growth rate surpassed five percent in 2005(Maclean, 2003:23).

In the 2006 elections, 9.709 candidates contested 500 National Assembly seats and 33 presidential candidates stood for elections. President Kabila led a coalition comprising 30 parties called the Alliance for the Presidential Majority (AMP). The coalitions pledged to rebuild the country and promote national reconciliation. His main rival, Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, the outgoing Vice-President in charge of the economy and finance, led the Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC), as part of the Union for the Nation (UN) alliance. He called on voters's support for his plan to reform government institutions and improve governance.

Another Vice President, Mr. Azarias Manywa Ruberwa, led the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) that also pledged to establish good governance. The Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS), led by veteran opposition figure Mr. Etienne Tshisekedi, had announced in April 2006 that it would boycott the polls, claiming a lack of transparency. During the electoral campaign, violence continued in the eastern provinces bordering Rwanda and Uganda. Some sporadic violent incident was also reported involving opposition supporters and the Congolese police (Rothberg, 2006:56).

Approximately 25.4 million people were registered to vote. More than 1,300 international observers, including 300 from the European Union Electoral Observer Mission in the DRC (EU EOM), monitored the polls. A total of 17,000 troops from the United Nations Observer Mission (Monuc) and 2,000 European Union forces were deployed to ensure peaceful voting.

The EU EOM praised the high level of participation among citizens as well as the electoral commission's efforts to overcome the huge logistical challenges to the elections. It however noted weaknesses in the civic education programmes for voters.

Presidential election results were announced on 21 August 2006. President Kabila came in first with 44,81 per cent of the votes, followed by Mr. Jean-Bemba with 20,03 per cent. Five people were reportedly killed in the Kinshasa prior to the announcement following exchanges of gunfire between supporters of both sides.

On 8 September, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) published official preliminary results for the parliamentary elections. The People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (PPRD), a main party of the AMP alliance, came in first with 111 seats. The AMP reportedly won around 200 seats. The main opposition MLC, led by Mr. Bemba, won 64 seats. Together with its allies, his camp reportedly secured around 100 seats. The RCD won 15 seats (Tevera, 2000:56)

The newly-elected National Assembly held its first session on 22 September, under the presidency of its most senior member, Mr. Joseph Mbenza Thubi. In the run-off presidential election on 29 October, President Kabila won 58 percent of the votes. Mr. Bemba's challenge

to the election results was rejected by the Supreme Court on 28 November, and he subsequently accepted defeat. On 6 December, Mr. Kabila was sworn in as President, becoming the first freely-elected president in more than four decades.

Mr. Vital Kamerhe, the Secretary General of the PPRD, was elected as Speaker of the National Assembly on 28 December. He was sworn in on 9 January 2007. Indirect elections for the 108-member Senate were held on 21 January. The newly elected Senate was convened on 3 February. The composition of the Government was announced on 5 February, headed by a Prime Minister, Mr. Antoine Gizenga, and comprising six senior ministers, 34 ministers and 20 deputy ministers.

The re-establishment of both chambers of Parliament and the formation of a new Government marked the end of the political transition process initiated in 2002. A new speaker of the Senate is expected to be elected in April 2007 after the adoption of new rules of procedure (Mans, 2007:89).

3.9 THE ROLE OF MNC'S IN THE ELUSIVE SEARCH FOR PEACE: Economic Motivation for the DRC Conflict

The demise of the Cold War certainly ended ideologically driven superpower military confrontation. Subsequently proxy wars fought in the furtherance of east-west rivalry have also terminated. These dynamics of international security have, however, not meant an end to bloody conflicts. Africa in particular has experienced a significant increase in conflict since the collapse of the Soviet Union. As a result, scholars of peace and security, in the absence of Cold War dynamics, have become preoccupied with providing answers for the longevity and proliferation of conflicts. An approach that has been gaining momentum in recent years attempts to provide economic reasons for the continuation of warfare. Put differently, the proliferation of wars after the Cold War has "encouraged or freed up economists to consider more intimate relations between such conflicts and other variables within their models" (Cramer, 1999:2). Subsequently, economic motivations in generating and sustaining predominantly intra-state conflicts have become central to a growing discourse on 'war economies'.

In addition to literature that has propelled the discourse on 'war economies', the united nation's focus in recent years on the economic dimensions of Africa's protracted conflicts reflected the growing realization that the relationship between war and economics can no longer be ignored from analyses of conflict (UN Panels, 2001). The UN panels that investigated violations of Security Council sanctions against UNITA rebels in Angola and the civil war in Sierra Leone contributed greatly to exposing the role that diamonds played in fuelling these conflicts, and thereby influenced the 'conflict diamonds' campaign. More recently were reports by the UN panel of experts that investigated the exploitation of resources and other forms of wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). All three reports produced compelling evidence that linked the continuation of the conflict with the exploitation of the country's resources (UN report, 2001).

3.10 MINERAL RESOURCES CONTRIBUTING TO THE ELUSIVE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN THE DRC

Mineral resource led to violence and human losses in the DRC. A vicious cycle of mineral extraction drives competition, promotes exploitation, degrades the environment, diminishes resources, and drives more competition. The more demand grows, the higher and faster the cycle, and the larger the number of victims (Katunga, 2010:6).

In the latter half of the 19th century, following the discovery of rubber, 10 million Congolese were subjected to murder, mutilation, torture, deportations, and forced labor by rubber hunters operating on behalf of Belgium's King Leopold II, who then owned DRC (Hochschild, 1999). After the DRC became a Belgian colony in 1908, the colonial overlords continued to exploit natural resources including cooper, gold, cassiterite, wildlife, and timber. In particular, the massive exploitation of minerals sustained Belgian imperial ambitions, strengthened the colonial system, and provided a model for the subsequent autocratic regime of Mobutu SeseSeko. Belgium's desire to protect its stake in the Congo prompted the assassination of nationalist Patrice Lumumba and its support for Mobutu and secessionist MoiseTshombe of the southern Katanga Province, home to immense reserves of cobalt, copper, manganese, zinc, and uranium.

According to John Katunga (2010:8), DRC minerals have played numerous strategic roles in world politics. For example, uranium from the DRC was shipped to the United States for the Manhattan Project, and thus partly fueled the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. State owned Gecamines, the source of the uranium, sustained Mobutu's kleptomaniac regime. Today, the DRC is still awash in valuable, strategic resources. Copper, cobalt, diamond, columbo-tantalite (coltan), and gold mines flourish in the eastern and southern regions. The Congo Basin forest, most of which is in the DRC, is the second-largest area of dense tropical rainforest in the world, containing one quarter of the world's remaining tropical forests, as well as spectacular array of biodiversity with 10,000 species of plants, 1,000 species of birds, and 400 species of mammals, many of which exist nowhere else on Earth (USAID, 2005). However, the DRC's forests are threatened by plunder and mismanagement: logging for timber and fuel wood, clearing forests for agriculture, poaching wildlife for bush meat or the endangered species trade, and mining, are degrading the forest at the rate of 2 million acres every year.

According to John Katunga (2010:15) "Technological developments and the demands of international markets continue to determine the patterns of resource exploitation and conflict. The spike in the price of coltan, which is used in consumer electronics such as a cell phone, kicked off a mining rush in 2000 that influenced hefty environmental damage and supported the various armies fighting in the civil war".

The war in the Congo is linking together Africans in civil war that had very little to do with each other before. Thus the war is sometimes referred to as "Africa's First World War". The parties of the civil wars in Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Angola are also parties in the war in the DRC. From Uganda the most notable one is the ADF, fighting against the Ugandan government. It is based by Sudan and includes soldiers from the former Zairian and former Rwandan armies.

The former Rwandan army and Interahamwe, that was responsible for the Rwandan genocide in 1994, came to eastern Congo, Kivu, together with the Rwandan refugees and have been attacking the current Rwandan RPF government since then. One apparent explanation of the Rwandan and Ugandan involvement is their interest to create a kind of buffer zone to safeguard

their borders. While the progress in the Burundian peace process represents perhaps the single sign of hope in the region, also the security of Burundi is also threatened by the insurgent activities across its border to the DRC. (Lemarchand, 1997:23).

On the domestic dimension of the conflict, there is President Laurent Kabila's government of Congo and its internal opposition. This opposition is very heterogeneous as the splits between its components illustrate. In the Kivu region, there is the disappointed Banyamulenge, whose expectations concerning citizenship rights have not been fulfilled in spite of the significance for the rebellion in 1996-97. There are the ex-Mobutists who have been excluded from government power by Kabila. And finally there are many critics of Kabila's nepotistic rule, who had been looking forward to the long awaited democratization. Initially this movement was more or less united under the RCD. During the campaign, the RCD has suffered from serious internal rifts and has consequently split into two competing factions. Ernest Wamba-dia-Wamba, the original political leader of the RCD was thrown out of the government in the spring 1999. Emile Ilunga replaced him (Harri, 1999:19). His faction, known as RCD-Goma continued under Rwandan protection. Wamba-dia-Wamba quickly established RCDM-ML (also known as RCE-Kigali) under Uganda's protection. The other main rebel group, the Uganda-backed MLC, led by Jean-Pierre Bemba is gradually becoming more of an equal partner with the RCD (Liisa, 1999:45).

3.10 LINKING WAR WITH ECONOMICS

During the Cold War the link between economics and war was restricted to determining the cost of the aggression waged and monetary estimates of the destruction incurred. However, within the past decade "economics has come to 'rule' the social sciences to the extent that it is now legitimate to discuss all social endeavors solely in terms of the economics of self-interest". Accordingly scholars of peace and conflict have begun grappling with more 'intimate' links between war and economics. The Clausewitzian doctrine that war is but politics by another means has been extended to argue that war is but economics by other methods (David Moore, 2001:61). As a result, 'war economies' or 'resource wars' have gained significant prominence on the international security agenda.

According to Michael Klare (2001:23) the international security agenda in the post-Cold War era has experienced a “strategic shift in its geography”. Klare argued that whereas the Cold War – era divisions were created and alliances formed along ideological lines, economic competition and access to vital economic assets now drives international relations. However the pursuit of a causal link between conflict and the exploitation of natural resources has produced a misleading conceptualization of ‘war economies’. Firstly, in its common usage the term war economy has come to depict a recent phenomenon of conflict or warfare. Secondly, attempts to define a ‘war economy’ have focused exclusively on the internal or domestic actors of a conflict to the exclusion of the external forces and its foreign architects.

The need to provide answers for the perpetuation of armed conflicts in the absence of Cold War dynamics has stimulated a simplistic link between war and economics to imply a new type of warfare characteristics of the conflicts raging in the developing world, in general and in Africa in particular. But the “presence of economic motives and commercial agendas in wars is not so much a new phenomenon as a familiar theme in history of warfare” (Bedar& Malone 2003:1). Indeed “the argument that current violent conflicts in Africa are driven by an unprecedented degree of greed and profit as compared to other time periods or wars, remains largely untested” and unfounded . This then supposes a hidden and deliberate intent within the ‘war economy’ discourse of fiendish belligerents, especially in Africa, since western governments and “public relations experts of the world’s transnational corporations would blanch at the possibility of linking the concepts of ‘war’ and ‘economy’ in their society. They therefore link it to the ‘other’ in the borderlands of their empire (Cilliers, 2000:2).

The suggestion is that strong and developed economies that were created through the brutal and violent systems of slavery and colonialism must also be termed ‘war economies’. The South African apartheid economy, for example, must not be excluded from such a conceptualization, given the legislated violence and low intensity warfare that was used to build the economic heartland of Africa. However, broadening the conceptualization of ‘war economies’ appreciate the level of violence inflicted on the enslaved and colonized to produce capitalism’s birth and

evolution for the benefit of the North's development, can lead to an overloading of the term (Moore, 2000:32).

Richard Jackson argued that contemporary conflicts or 'war economies' are also related to the maintenance and growth of the developed economies of the North. In his words, "many current conflicts are deliberately created war economies" in which neo-colonial and post-Cold War methods devoid of any ideological baggage are used by the North to maintain their "systems of profit, power and protection" (JACKSON, 2001:2). In the case of the DRC, the anti-Kabila war, as argued by David Moore and Dani Nabudere in chapters two and three of their book that the need by western governments to maintain their monopolization of space technology, defense systems and the production of "mobile phones and computers, common tools for the modern European lifestyles". According to Klare (2001), because an interruption in the supply of natural resources would portend severe economic consequences, the major importing countries now consider the protection of this flow a significant national concern. Accordingly, security officials have begun to pay much greater attention to problems arising from intensified competition over access to critical materials. But in characterizing the economies of the developed North as 'war economies' because of having benefited, and continue to do so, from 'resource wars', almost all national economies become 'war economies', both in the North and the south. As a result there is no clear distinction between the exploiter and exploited.

Accordingly, in his introductory discussion of Africa's conflicts, Moore provides a theoretical examination of the contention that arises from "reducing the study of war to a single determinant, economics". But while Moore tries to reset the notion of 'economics' to its proper niche, the 'market', he is at the same time compelled to substantiate the claim that there are indeed material roots to the conflicts tearing through Africa. As a result Moore argues that the phrase 'political economy' captures the multitudinous aspects of such conflicts much better than does the narrowness of the term 'economics'. Nevertheless, the term 'war economy', in its common usage, "has been used to conceptualize the sustainability of an intractable conflict

through the expropriation and exploitation of a country's resources by the warring parties" (Naidoo, 2000:1).

Implicit in the understanding of 'war economies' is the preponderance of weak or collapsed states as being a fundamental characteristic of such conflict. Attempts to conceptualize or define 'war economies' have equally stressed that such conflicts are essentially civil wars fuelled primarily by economic interests of local actors. As correct as this may be, "such wars are never entirely internal in character" (Berdal&Marlone, 2001:2) Moore has accurately argued that those narrow definitions of 'war economies have "placed the immediate parties to the war in charge of their own destinies, refusing to privilege the manipulations of imperialist states and multi-national corporations (MNCs)" (Moore 2000:6). The emphasis on such wars as being solely civil in nature diverts attention from the external forces and dynamics to such conflicts. In other words the systematic dimensions of these wars, created by the involvement of foreign governments, multinational corporations and even individuals, are often lost in the label 'civil war'. Indeed, "the crystallization of war economies within 'weak' states can only be understood within a broader global context".

Moore's introductory analysis, therefore, argues that the 'war economy' discourse focuses almost exclusively on the domestic or local warlord without any inquiry into the 'connivance' of MNCs or western governments that sustains these charlatans, a collaboration that warrants the label of international warlords. Consequently, 'Africa's warlords,' that have been studied extensively by such scholars as William Reno, "look strikingly similar to many of the buccaneers and brigands who helped start capitalism in its homelands. But those aspects of capital's history are removed as it maintains its current aura of respectability". It is this systemic explanation for the DRC conflict that Moore's publication explores in detail.

The argument that economic motivations are the primary causes and origins of contemporary civil conflicts have been described no more tellingly than by Paul Collier, the Director of the Development Research Group at the World Bank. Initiating the 'greed versus grievance' debate, Collier has argued that greed is the principal cause of contemporary conflicts and that warring factions have an economic interest in both initiating and sustaining wars (P Collier, 2000:15).

For Collier, civil wars are a result of rebel groups competing with national governments for the control of natural resources and primary commodities, rather than any political, ideological, ethnic or religious grievances. Simply put, those who take up arms in the pursuit of justice or democracy are nothing but charlatans in pursuit of self-enrichment.

Although some of Africa's conflicts certainly depict this reality, "Economic" agendas account less for the origins than the longevity or persistence of violent conflict" (Hubert, 2000:5). According to Don Herbert, a distinction needs to be drawn from the onset between the search for resources in order to continue fighting and the accumulation of resources for its own sake. He therefore argues that Self-supporting armies are one thing: a self-sustaining economic rationale for war is quite another. Obviously in practice these distinctions are seldom neat or clearly identifiable, and the motivation for fighting can easily change over the course of the conflict greed can become a more prominent motivating factor. Since all warring factions need resources in order to continue to fight, and in the absence of foreign patrons they must be secured independently, it is surely a relatively small step to use existing methods for new ends (Hurbert, 2000:8).

Collier's thesis contains, therefore, certain limitations and shortcomings. The most glaring of these is that his findings are based on 'civil wars' and confined to the operations of local rebel movements without examining the commercial activities of national militaries in inter-state conflicts. Collier has, therefore, ignored the "increasing utilization of national militaries as tools for private financial gain by the political elite"(Dietrich, 2000:9). Collier's goes further in explaining that the political economy of the DRC was strategically used to control and exploit the Congo's natural resources. More critically, Collier presents his findings as being devoid of external variables. In other words, Collier does not consider the actors that constitute the demand -side for the commodities that rebels appropriate. For Moore, this 'greed' school of interpreting Africa's wars focuses on the 'honey-pot' effect of mineral resources to the bee-like instincts of African warlords without suggesting that the same honey-pot attracts foreign governments and their respective multinational corporations (Moore, 2000:46). Although the greed argument offers a strong basis for understanding the economic interests of local rebel

governments, its negation of the external economic forces and national militaries in the equation, limits its value for critical analysis and policy formulation of the DRC conflict.

Moore's chapter finally confronts the challenge of examining the global, regional and local dynamics of the DRC war. He incorporates his critical examination of the linkage of war and economics in his attempt to reassess the roots and consequences of the conflict. Thus the rest of his chapter is devoted to explaining how the war affected the economics of everyday life in most parts of the DRC, as well as the 'intrigues' of the rebel movements, their leadership and the foreign governments and multinational corporations that were behind them.

3.11 MNC'S IN ZONES OF CONFLICT (Economic motivations for Mobutu's removal)

The war that began in the DRC in August 1998 was a consequence of the nature of Mobutu Seseko's removal. Externally planned and executed, Mobutu's overthrow was undertaken primarily to ensure the internal security of the DRC's neighbors, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Angola and to secure the mineral interests of western governments and their mining companies. The smallest reason for the overthrow of the Mobutu regime was because of the need for a democratic government in the Congo. However, analyses of Mobutu's removal, especially those produced in the early stages of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo-Zaire (AFDL) rebellion, portrayed the military take-over as an event conducted solely for internal and regional interests(Nabudere:2003:6)

In other words the overthrow of Mobutu in 1997 was justified for two main reasons. Firstly, from a regional perspective Mobutu was regarded as the main supporter of opponents of his neighboring governments. The most detrimental was his support for remnants of the former Rwanda Hutu government of Juvenal Habyrman and its military, the ex-FAR, and the Hutu extremist militia known as the Interahamwe, many of whom were responsible for carrying out the 1994 genocide. In addition, Mobutu's long standing relationship with the UNITA rebels and his support for the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) justified the involvement of Angola and Uganda, respectively, in his overthrow. Secondly, Mobutu's blockage of the democratization

process that emanated from the 1992 National Sovereign Conference (NSC) resulted in the leadership of local non-armed opposition championing his removal even more vehemently.

Although these were well-founded reasons for his removal, it was international economic interests that provided the wherewithal for Mobutu's ousting. This dimension for his removal is, however, often excluded from analyses of the DRC war. Nabudere(2003:62) argues that to understand the origins and sources of the DRC war, one must unpack the real forces that continue to exploit the natural resources of the Congo. According to Nabudere these forces are the New Anglo-American Conglomerates that are continuing to maintain the balance of power together with their African agents through a series of alliances and networks, in their favor and against the interests of the native people of the DRC. Nabudere also locates these forces within the context of the global economy and the effects it has had in generating internal regional, ethnic and racial hatred in the DRC and Africa's Great Lakes region.

By the mid-1990s, Mobutu's erstwhile western allies, in particular the United States (US) ,finally rejected his kleptocratic reign in the country he named Zaire. The embarrassment that Mobutu was creating for the US could no longer be tolerated. Moreover, although western mining companies had almost unimpeded access to the former Zaire's riches, Mobutu's nationalization and mismanagement of the mineral economy made the business climate increasingly unpredictable. According to Nabudere (2003:70) "although clearly a puppet of western interests, Mobutu had, over the years, developed certain arrogance in dealing with the west. He consistently refused to privatize the mineral economy, preferring to leave the bulk of it in the state hands, which in effect meant leaving it under his own personal control and that of his close cronies ". As early as the mid-1980s the US,through the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), began demanding that Mobutu dismantle the state mining companies and open them for liberalization. This, for Nabudere, was the new period where economic liberalization and privatization was the new creed, against the old-style nationalistic policies. The toppling of Mobutu, in his words was, therefore, "part and parcel of installing a new generation of leaders who accepted the new creed of globalization" (Nabudere, 2003:79).

Pierre Baracyetse has argued that it is the transformation of the world mining industry over the last decade that has fuelled the mining transnational corporations demand for the privatization of state enterprises (Baracyetse, 1999:24). Compared to the 1970s, a period characterized by the nationalization of industrial sectors, especially those linked to the exploitation of natural resources, the 1990s witnessed a reverse movement, one that entailed the privatization of a country's resources. Accompanying this phenomenon is the fact that "mining resources in other countries of the world have already been heavily exploited, not to say exhausted, and those which are being exploited, are associated with tremendous costs. As a result, the great financiers of this world and hunters of mineral resources, have their eyes targeted on Central Africa where discovered mineral deposits are still virgin or ill exploited".(Baracyetse,1999:24)

Indeed the DRC is a 'geological scandal'. As far back as World War II, the US obtained uranium from the Congo for the Manhattan (Atomic Bomb) Project. Some of the uranium ore of that time was extremely rich in the metal, certain lumps containing extraordinarily high concentrations of 75 per cent, but more normal ore concentrations are 0.2 per cent e.g. Russia, or in Namibia where the ore extracted contains just 0.03 per cent concentration (B.Bosongo,1998:12). In the eastern DRC, presently under the control of the rebels, deposits of copper, cobalt, silver, cadmium, gold and above all, coltan are of exceptionally rich concentrations.

A study carried out by the National Centre of Geological and Mine Research (CRGM) in 1994, found the soil in the Ituri region (eastern DRC) to be so rich in gold that with modern extraction methods it is possible to get pure gold at a ratio of 6-7 kg/ton (Basongo, 1998:15). According to specialists, the OKIMO concession which is situated around the city of Mongbalu on the border with Uganda contains estimated reserves of between 2,000 and 3,000 tons of gold, worth between 20 and 30 billion US dollars. In certain places the concentrations reach the astronomical figure of 18 kg of pure gold per ton, as compared to an overall global average of 11 grams of gold per ton (Bosongo, 1998:20). Specialists estimate that when the rich copper and cobalt mines of Katanga(in the south-east) are later depleted, the eastern provinces will be

the motor of the economy, and constitute that which is already being designated 'the useful Congo' by western MNCs and governments.

To ensure their investments and unwavering access to the most lucrative mineral deposits, Baracyetse argues that these financiers need a customized economic and financial policy, that of privatization and the co-operation of political actors or 'rebels', "which are associated with them and sometimes even created by them" (Baracyetse, 1999:22). The geopolitical stakes of the international mining companies in the DRC, therefore, constituted the critical basis for the overthrow of Mobutu. So as the regional quest to remove Mobutu ripened, based on security concerns and ambitions for a Tutsi empire, mining conglomerates found the appropriate alliance with Presidents Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and Paul Kagame of Rwanda to lead a military campaign to oust the Congolese despot. The alliance also, very critically, entailed the involvement of multinational companies that were directly linked to high ranking politicians from western countries. The two main new Anglo-American mining conglomerates that stood at the heart of this alliance were American Mineral Fields Inc. (AMFI) and Barrick Gold Corporation.

AMFI is based in Hope, Arkansas, and chaired by Mike McMurrrough, said to be a personal friend of former US President Bill Clinton. As Nabudere (2000:23) notes that AMFI directly financed the AFDL's military campaign to remove Mobutu by, for example, putting at the disposal of Laurent Kabila its hired corporate jet. In return AMFI secured the copper-zinc mine at Kapushi in Katanga (Shaba) province regarded as one of the prime copper-zinc mines in the world, even before the AFDL captured Kinshasa. However, the relationship between AFDL rebels and AMFI extended beyond copper and zinc to involve space technology. David Moore (2003:23) points out that one of the biggest hopes when Laurent Kabila marched from borders of Rwanda to Kinshasa was a US \$ 60 billion contract to construct the orbital platform as a replacement of the Russian MIR station. Although sixty countries, with many more enterprises and industries participated in the bid, the contract was awarded to AMFI. The special alloys in the composition of numerous pieces of this space device require enormous quantities of rare and precious metals, such as cobalt, niobium, tungsten and coltan, all of which are present

under Congolese soil. Cited by Nabudere, is an Executive Intelligence Review (EIR) report which revealed that the Barrick Gold Corporation, headed by former US President George H.W. Bush and former Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, was also formed just before the outbreak of the AFDL rebellion (Steinberg,1997:3). Nabudere argues that the invasion of eastern Congo by combined forces of Rwanda and Uganda behind the AFDL rebels, prepared for a takeover of Congo's gold rich eastern territory by Barrick Gold Corp.

Furthering the economic interests of their mining conglomerates in Mobutu's removal has been the involvement of western governments. A report by the New African argued that "interests of the US, Britain and their European allies were being served by the Ugandan and Rwandan occupation of the Congo (Ankomah, 2001:12).

The same report revealed that a US military base in the Bugesera district of Rwanda was used to train the Rwandans to fight in Congo. An earlier report by the British daily, The Independent, argued that " Rwanda's military operations in the Congo, being far above its means, was secretly funded by the CIA" (New African, March 2001). According to Wayne Madsen (2001), the US ran the war in the DRC from 1996. Madsen argued that the AFDL rebels and their Rwandan allies, in their march to topple Mobutu, reached Kinshasa in May 1997 largely due to the technical assistance provided by the US's Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The US provided Laurent Kabila's rebels and Rwandan troops with 'high-definition spy satellite' photographs that permitted them to plot courses into Kinshasa that avoided encounters with Mobutu's forces (New African, 2001).

Hence, Laurent Kabila, the spokesperson turned leader of the AFDL, became the president of the DRC through an externally contrived plan that backed the regional states to replace a devalued Mobutu. Consequently, the Kabila regime was expected to be amenable to the economic, political and security interests of western governments and regional states. This agenda involved availing the country's enormous mineral riches for exploitation by mainly Belgian, Canadian and US-based mining conglomerates, while at the same time allowing Rwanda and Uganda to take charge in Kinshasa (Naidoo, 2001:2).

3.12MNC'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE REGIME CHANGE THAT WENT WRONG

Despite pretensions that all was well within the AFDL that toppled Mobutu, it soon became clear that tensions were brewing between Kabila and his patrons. Once at the helm of the new DRC, the Rwandans and the Ugandans began to play more of a sovereign role. Laurent Kabila was increasingly sidelined from important decisions affecting especially the eastern provinces. At the same time, Nabudere (2000:45) maintains an anti-foreigner nationalist sentiment began to emerge among the Congolese people. The feeling was the strongest against the Rwandese forces and the so-called Banyamulenge community who were responsible for killing Congolese who were seen to be former Mobutists.

Feeling he was being held hostage, Kabila tried to establish space for himself. Nabudere has argued that when Kabila refused to award the Banyamulenge, Congolese citizenship because of the anti-Rwandese and anti-Banyamulenge sentiments and publicly denounced the plunder of diamonds, gold and timber by both Rwandese and Ugandan forces, Uganda and Rwanda began to complain about his 'unpredictability'. They accused him of helping the Intarahamwe and not doing enough to honor his part of the 'deal' in declaring parts of the DRC territory as being part of Rwanda.

As Kabila began to feel that his security was at risk he was forced to rely more and more on the Congolese, especially his own ethnic group, the Baluba, to ensure his personal security. In July 1998, Kabila's Baluba security guard botched an attempt by the Rwandese to have him assassinated. At the same time a rebellion by the Banyamulenge against his government was taking place in the South Kivu province (Madsen, 2001:2). When Kabila purged his government and military of the Rwandans and the Ugandans for trying to kill him, the stage was set for a fully-fledged second 'rebellion' by the Banyamulenge Tutsis to have him ousted.

It was, however, clear that in order to wage this second 'rebellion', both Uganda and Rwanda needed a Congolese 'cover' or 'face'. Nabudere argues that the use of the Banyamulenge 'rebellion' alone as justification for the new offensive was seen to be problematic as a propaganda ploy. What they required was a 'broad alliance' of all Congolese groups that wanted to fight for 'democracy' against Kabila's 'dictatorship'. Having moved quickly to occupy

Goma, Bukavu and Uvira, they declared a rebellion in the name of the Banyamulenge and other disgruntled Congolese groups on 2 August 1998. What they wanted was a well-structured organization that could take over the propaganda work while the Banyamulenge, Rwandese and Ugandans fought on their behalf. This is what led to the creation of the 'rebel movement' called the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD). The reason given for the new 'rebellion' was that Kabila was a dictator just like Mobutu, and that he was supporting the Intarahamwe and the ex-FAR, that was responsible for the Rwandan genocide (Madsen, 2001:4).

Kabila's death knell was, in fact, sounded when he reneged on deals made with the MNCs that were behind his installation as president of the DRC. Moore notes in his chapter that Kabila's cancellation of mining concessions made with multinational companies while he was making his way to Kinshasa was enough for their host states to give the green light to Uganda and Rwanda to turn against him. In particular, when Kabila reneged on mining contracts awarded to AMFT and Barrick Gold Corporation, which were contracted even before he could assume the presidency of the DRC, he committed an unacceptable offence. Therefore, as Madsen has observed, one of the major goals of the Rwandan backed RCD rebels, was the restoration of mining concessions for western mining companies (Albright, 2000).

The RCD and its regional backers chose to pursue a full -scale war against the Kabila government attempting to topple his regime in the same way they had toppled Mobutu. Their calculation was that Kabila could be overthrown in a matter of weeks. This influenced their strategy of airlifting whole battalions of Rwandese and Ugandan troops to take over Matadi port and the Inga dam in the south west of the country. It was alleged that aircraft from the US undertook the airlifting of these troops. The effort failed as Zimbabwean, Angolan and Namibian troops intervened and prevented Kabila's overthrow. Subsequently, what started out as the removal of Mobutu, one of Africa's longest standing despots, progressed very quickly into what becomes a protracted, all out of African imbroglio, dubbed "Africa World War 1" (Albright, 2000).

In prescribing the type of political leadership and state structure required to end the externally induced conflict in the DRC, Roger Kibasomba argues that the Rwandan and Ugandan invasion

could not have occurred if the Congolese people, society and institutions were 'securitized'. In other words, for Kibasomba, the RCE rebellion, even though it was created and sponsored from outside, would have been unthinkable if the majority of Congolese citizens had benefited from the distribution and allocation of national wealth and political power. Kibasomba argues that kleptocratic, nepotistic and predatory behaviors in the Congolese leadership systems since independence stem from the systematic erosion of institutional foundations that are supposed to drive democracy and good governance in the DRC. Such leadership produced the failure of the political economic, social and military structures of the DRC state which in effect led to the insecurity affecting the Congolese people. Indeed both Mobutu and Laurent Kabila enjoyed excessive presidential powers. However Kibasomba warns that the armed opposition that arose to 'check and reduce' Kabila's presidential powers must be carefully examined. The rebellion led by the RCD, he argues, was clearly unpopular, clouded with hidden agenda, counter-productive, opportunistic and prone to self-destruction.

3.13 FROM KABILA SENIOR TO KABILA JUNIOR

As the war to remove Laurent Kabila from power dragged on, the military situation pointed increasingly toward a stalemate. The result was the carving up of the DR into three zones of military control. The western and southern part of the country came under the control of the Kinshasa government and its Southern African Development Community (SADC) allies. The Rwandan government and its RCD allies occupied the eastern part of the country while the northern region was taken over by the Ugandan government and its Movement for Congolese Liberation (MLC) allies (Naidoo, 2001:2).

Although the war was directed at Laurent Kabila's removal, his assassination on 16 January 2001 was ironically carried out by his inner-circle. His intransigent and erratic behavior that eventually turned his friends against him was firmly rooted in his 1960's pseudo-revolutionary style of governing. The swift monarchical style appointment of Joseph Kabila, some of Laurent Kabila as the DRC's new president was not without controversy and protest. Joseph Kabila's assumption of power at the age of 29 aroused widespread concerns about his political maturity and capacity to address the challenges he faced as head of a fragmented state which was embroiled in a war of unprecedented proportion and complexity.

Economic realism that informs international relations in a post-Cold War era was never appreciated nor understood by Laurent Kabila. Unlike, for example, the Angolan government that deals with its former enemy, the US, over its oil resources, Laurent Kabila failed to grasp the economic prudence that underpins the need for a constructive, albeit cautious, engagement with external forces that contributed greatly to Congo's woes. In the aftermath of his father's death, Joseph Kabila and his new government undertook a radical turnaround of relations with the relevant international economic actors (Naidoo, 2001:3).

Unlike his father's erratic blockage of Western mining conglomerates under the guise of checking imperialism, Joseph Kabila's first step was to renew Kinshasa's economic relationship with heavyweight MNCs that were set on obtaining the country's mineral wealth. It is therefore no coincidence that Joseph Kabila's international acceptance was attained only after he made the necessary assurances to the Corporate Council for Africa, the World Bank (WB) and the US oil cartel on his trip to Washington just a week after his father was gunned down. Needless to say Kabila Junior promised these foreign constituencies free and fair elections, and more importantly, a liberalized economy and a new investment code to improve the climate for foreign business.

It came as no surprise, therefore, when AMFI announced in late April 2001 that the new DRC government had approved its US\$300 million deal for the Kolwezi copper-cobalt tailings project, potentially the largest direct investment in post-Mobutu Congo. Moreover, it was of a great relief for companies to learn that they no longer required a presidential approval for mining titles, a responsibility that had been transferred to the mining minister. But Joseph Kabila's economic reforms did not end there. Mobutu's legislation of the US dollar and the devaluation of the country's over-valued franc surely pleased mining companies and traders that who eager to resume their business in the Congo (Naidoo, 2001:7).

As a reward for the new DRC government's economic turnaround, Western government was expected to urge their allies, Rwanda and Uganda to withdraw from the occupied zones. This was, however, conditional on Joseph Kabila's termination of support for the Rwandan militia operating from eastern Congo. A change of heart toward Rwanda and Uganda was certainly

felt when the UN released a report charging them with the illegal exploitation of the DRC's natural resources. In the forefront of this reconfiguration of policy by Western governments toward the Kinshasa authorities, stood lobbyists like US-based Cohen and Woods International (CWI).

CWI was employed by Laurent Kabila to repair Congo's image in the US. The plan proved unsuccessful simply because Kabila refused to open up the economy, renew mining contracts and co-operate with the international economic actors. CWI may have convinced the Bush administration that with the 'right leadership now in Kinshasa, the US can look forward to predictable relations with the DRC government, and thereby require less of the rebels to further its interests in Congo (Naidoo, 2001:15).

3.14 MNC'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE BALKANISATION AND PLUNDER OF THE DRC

Indeed, Laurent Kabila's autocratic rule legitimized the existence of the rebel movements. However, he was killed and replaced by a more internationally accepted government, only after rebellion against Laurent Kabila could not nullify the rebels' existence even after the new DRC government was meeting such interests. Consequently, the rebels retained their recognition as legitimate opposition forces having equal status with the DRC government. This concretized the de facto partitioning or 'Balkanization' of the DRC, which, however, did not dismay the foreign governments that had vested interests in the Congo (Madsen, 2001:2).

According to Madsen, the appointment of Walter Kansteiner as the US assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs provides some insight about the intentions that the US had for the Great Lakes region. Kansteiner in a paper on what was eastern-Zaire, written for the Forum for International Policy in October 1996, called for the division of DRC and the Great Lakes region between the primary ethnic groups, creating homogenous ethnic lands that would necessitate redrawing the boundaries. Madsen maintains that Kansteiner argued for the creation of separate Tutsi and Hutu states in central Africa. The creation of a Tutsi state in eastern Congo, Madsen notes, was "exactly what Rwanda, Uganda and their American military advisers had in

mind when the plan to remove Mobutu was implemented in 1996 the same year Kansteiner penned his plans for the region" (Madsen, 2001:3). In Madsen's words:

"Four years later, Kansteiner was still convinced that the future of the DRC was 'balkanization' into separate states. In an August 23, 2000 Pittsburgh Post-Gazette article, Kansteiner stated that the 'break-up of Congo into various fiefdoms has been for US and other western mineral companies. And I believe Kansteiner's previous work at the Department of Defense where he served on a Task Force on Strategic Minerals, and one must certainly consider coltan as falling into that category may influence his past and current thinking on the territorial integrity of the DRC. After all, 80 per cent of the world's known reserves of coltan are found in the eastern DRC. It is potentially as important to the US military as the Persian Gulf region. (MADSEN, 2001:18).

Kibasomba argues that ethnicity and the uneven distribution of resources in the DRC necessitates a unitary system operating with strong federal principles. The DRC, he stresses, needs presidential executive leadership that delegates many duties to the elected local and provincial authorities who have the capacity to promote development initiatives, and private and public sector partnerships. To remedy the chief weaknesses of a unitary system and to promote democracy, the presence of strong local governments and the existence of an effective opposition cannot be overemphasized. However, Collette Braeckman maintains that the "exploitation of mineral wealth from the Congo by neighboring states, with support from their non-African allies, is clearly incompatible with the idea of rebuilding an effective central government" (Braeckman, 1999:3). She correctly points out that this agenda fits in very well with the argument, frequently advanced in the US, that the Congo is ungovernable, too big and too diverse. Braeckman notes that according to this argument the DRC should break up, opening the way for a very loose federation of provinces or a constellation of micro states which would have special relationships with the adjacent countries (Rwanda and Uganda) rather than a central government (Braeckman, 1999:6)

But is the DRC really too big to be governed? The DRC is Africa's third largest country. Yet the two countries that are bigger, the Sudan and Algeria, have not attracted similar arguments in

spite of a protracted war in the Sudan that has basically dissected the country. Nevertheless, as the DRC remained de facto partitioned, mining companies benefited from the three separate zones of military control. The mineral exploiters and companies operating from Rwanda and Uganda concentrated on pillaging gold, diamonds and increasingly coltan from the eastern Congo, in particular the Kivu province. According to a report by the New Congo Net, evidence underscored how important the occupied zone is to businesses working out of Kigali the capital of Rwanda (NCN, 1999).

The report argued that minerals were moved from the Rwandan occupation zone in the DRC to companies in the West through relationships based in Kigali and elsewhere, including the USA, to support very high technology programs that are in some cases, ahead of the state-of-the-art. It named the Banque du Commerce du Développement et de l'Industrie in Rwanda, the Banque National de Paris (BNP), B&L Trading International Ltd. Dublin, and Kenrow Inc. of Maryland, USA, as being involved in a deal to develop coltan and other key minerals obtained from the Rwandan occupied zone in DRC. In addition the report noted that H.C. Starck of Goslar, Germany, examined minerals essential to some of the most advanced technologies of our time. (The final report of the UN panel of experts investigating the exploitation of the DRC's resources identified H.C. Stark as part of the elite network in the Rwandan-controlled area (NCN, 1999).

Uganda's intervention in the Congo had been timourously linked to the economic rewards reaped from its occupation of Congolese territory. Foreign gold mining companies, in particular Barrick Gold Corporation registered in Uganda, are involved primarily in prospecting and very little with mining itself. However, Uganda's gold exports have been soaring. Reports of official figures revealed that sales reached US \$110 million in 1998, compared to only US \$35 million in 1997. A Ugandan government document revealed that only two percent of all the country's gold exports were from domestic sources. Statistics from Congo's Central Bank shows that the DRC annually exports 300 kg of gold. However, according to the same statistics, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda are exporting 3, 4 and 10 tons of gold, respectively, per year. All this gold,

the Central Bank claims originates from the DRC and leaves the country clandestinely (NCN, 1999).

The link between the exploitation of resources and the war became so acute that the consequences, especially regarding the more than 2.5 million deaths of innocent Congolese, could no longer be ignored by the international community. Subsequently the UN established a panel of experts to investigate the links between the continuation of the conflict and the exploitation of the country's resources by the warring parties.

In their first report, the UN panel identified two phases in the illegal exploitation of the country's resources. The first was mass-scale looting while the second was the systematic and systemic exploitation of the DRC's rich natural resources by the warring factions. The report characterized mass-scale looting as stockpiles of mineral, coffee, wood, livestock and money being illegally exploited in the territories 'conquered' by the armies of Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. These resources were taken and either transferred to those countries or exported to international markets. Systematic exploitation, the report argued, "flourished because of the pre-existing structures developed during the conquest by the AFDL", while the systematic exploitation referred to Rwanda and Uganda using these existing systems of control created during the AFDL rebellion to channel extracted resources (NCN,1999).

A glaring limitation of this UN report was its restricted examination of the forces that constituted the systemic dimension to the exploitation. In other words while the UN panel identified that the illegally exploited resources were being exported to international markets, they confined their explanation of the systematic dimension to the regional and neighboring countries without drawing any connection to foreign based MNCs that are central to 'international markets'. Put differently, the UN panel failed to identify the source of the demand for these resources and the buyers to whom the Rwandans and Ugandans were selling these resources.

In the absence of determining the external actors and beneficiaries of the illegal resources exploitation, and an addendum to the first UN panel report, recommended the imposition of a moratorium on the purchase and import of certain precious commodities from the DRC. This

recommendation was, however, 'shot down' by the representative of the US to the Security Council, who argued that the moratorium would be unenforceable and advised that it would be more effective to control exports of natural resources by means of existing internal mechanisms. Importantly, for the 'greed versus grievance' debate, the addendum argued that a wide array of interests has ensured that the war in the DRC remains a self-financing and self-sustaining affair. In other words, while parties to the three-year conflict in the country may have been originally motivated by security concerns, they remained in the DRC largely for economic gain (IRIN, 2001).

During this time the Belgian-based International Peace Information Service (IPIS) released a report titled: Supporting the War Economy in the DRC: European Companies and the Coltan Trade in January 2002. The report revealed the names of European companies trading in coltan originating from the DRC which directly contributed to the financing of the war. Some of the companies it listed as having commercial dealings in eastern Congo and Rwanda were Cogecom and Sogem (a subsidiary of Netherlands and the Swiss off-shore company Finmining). The report argued that these companies were among those that provided the demand and even instigated the mining of such strategic minerals. Consequently, some of these companies, the report argued, have played an important part in the continuation of the war by co-operating directly with the rebels and the Rwandan and Ugandan allies.

The final report of the UN panel attempted to expose the international and foreign beneficiaries of the DRC's illegally exploited resources. Published on 16 October 2002, it named the United States, Germany, Belgium, Kazakhstan and even South Africa as leading buyers of these resources. Crucially for an understanding of the possible solution for this 'new scramble for the Congo', the final UN report argued that although the regional conflict had diminished in intensity, the overlapping micro-conflicts that it has provoked continued, for example, the conflict in the Ituri region. The report further stated that 'criminal groups linked to the armies of Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe and the Government of the DRC have benefited from such micro-conflicts. Critical for the peace process, however, these "groups will not disband voluntarily even as the foreign military forces continue their withdrawals. They have built up a

self-financing war economy centered on mineral exploitation" (UN, 2001).

3.15 THE ROLE OF MNC'S IN FUELLING THE CONFLICT

For almost 20 years, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been experiencing deadly civil wars, where the death toll has claimed over 5.4 million people. Lasting conflict flared up again and again. Many reports from the zone of conflict illustrated widespread looting, rape and killing of civilian targets. The international community has struggled to come up with an adequate response to the case, such as giving aid, providing peace keeping forces, disarming militants, and even criticizing the role of multi-national company fueling conflict in the area (Greal, 2008:6).

The role of multinational companies in fueling this violence is a key issue, due to the immense natural resources in this nation. Moreover, various foreign powers, as well as internal, have sought to gain an advantage from the conflict existing in this area. Even Rwanda and Uganda as neighboring country also involved in deepening and tightening the conflict. Both countries were believed to have secret agendas regarding economic interest, especially in terms of resources, diamonds, minerals and other vast rich resources. Therefore, due to the rich resources of DRC, the conflict and the rebels had long been successful in setting up financial administrative bodies in their controlled areas, especially with regards to trading with multinational companies, while DRC had also been able to finance that side of the conflict (AnubSyah, 2008:5).

Therefore, the writer of this essay would also like to describe and to know the discourse the global ethics of MNC's conduct in the light of human development, human rights and human security in the areas in which they operated. Then how the international community responded to the misbehaviour of MNC, and what was done to address misbehave.

3.16 INTEREST OF MNC's IN THE CONFLICT

Many local and regional groups could not operate in conflict and war without access to international mineral markets. The multinational corporations have significant roles and are extremely important in conflict trade in the DRC. They are deeply involved in war of economic interest. They supply goods and services and provide market outlets to warring government

authorities, rebels and warlords who, without these companies, would have neither the foreign capital to finance a war nor the profit incentive to sustain one.

Multinational companies (MNC's) have been involved in providing arms and money by paying taxes and licensing fees to rebellions in the DRC, International business has, through its contracts, deals, and provisions, served to finance and sustain these actors involved in the Central African conflict. International companies have also viewed rebel-held territory as de facto sovereign states and used local leaders as conduits for illicit trade. This practice not only violates the right of DRC sovereignty under international law, but has also served to bolster the rebel's control in certain areas (DEARING, 2008:8).

There are many companies from different countries that operate in DR Congo. For example, American Mineral Fields (AMF) and Afrimax have gained immense benefits from the conflict in DRC. Since Laurent Kabila's coup in 1996, American Mineral Fields (AMF), for instance, has started operating in the DRC. The AMF that had link to President Clinton business that had been supporting Kabila to get power, got a billion dollar concession from Kabila to mine copper, cobalt, and zinc. Therefore, American Mineral Fields directly benefited from America's military and intelligence support for Kabila. It was very clear that in return for America's support for Kabila, North American-based mining companies has access to open up Congo's vast mineral riches (Dearing, 2008:12).

Furthermore, Afrimex, the U.K. based company, continues to obtain trading minerals that exacerbates the conflict in the DRC. In this case, Afrimax only considered economic interest, although it has breached guidelines of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In South Kivu, Afrimex could control 40 percent of all tin exports, and then it became the second largest tin exporter in 2004 and 2005. Afrimex was charged directly with contributing to funding armed rebel groups which committed human rights abuses, such as extortion, killing, torture, and forced mass displacement. Because Afrimex has paid taxes annually to the RCDG a \$15.000 licensing fee and a percentage of its total value of exports since 1998 (Anglo gold Ashanti report, 2004).

The example of the two multinational companies from US and UK involvement in conflict describes weakness of a standard international ethics in regulating multinational companies. MNC's have contributed to violence and atrocities in the DRC, but they have never received any sanction. In 2001, the UN has listed 85 companies that had not achieved and in fact had violated "international standards of good corporate behavior, especially guidelines for the ethical behavior of multinationals established by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The report categorized the involvement in violations into two categories, such as provision of direct support to militias including training and equipment, and funding of the war through the acquisition of mineral wealth from areas controlled by rebels. Corporations from around the world have sought to profit from exploiting the DRC's natural resources on the cheap particularly coltan, a mineral used to produce cell phones, laptops and video game consoles (Talbot UN report, 2002)

Furthermore, in 2003, when human rights activist groups reported and charged that many multinational corporations from rich countries have been benefiting from the war and have consolidated "elite networks "of key political, military, and business elites to plunder the Congo's natural resources, a number of companies and western governments pressured the United Nations panel to omit details of shady business dealings in a report which came out in October 2003 (The British newspaper report,2002). Then after a long debate between panel experts in the UN, the UN finally released the report at the end of October 2003. They listed approximately 125 companies and individuals that had been named in a previous report by the panel for having contributed directly or indirectly to the conflict in the DRC (UN Security Council report, 2008).

In December 2008, the UN also revealed another report on the new situation of conflict in the DRC. This report describes the continuing flow of coltan and other minerals flow out of the country. Then money flows in which is used to support the conflict by providing armaments for rebellion groups involved in warfare, such as Forces Democratiques de liberation du Rwanda (FDLR) and the Coalition of Congolese Patriotic Resistance (PARECO). Both have been charged and accused of using children as soldiers, raping and killing civilians.

The MNC's which operates in conflict areas which benefit from business out often hide behind a constructed excuse of ignorance. They argue that they are not aware of the origin of the minerals that they get. Therefore, the excuse of ignorance is very disgusting. Even the latest UN report proves that MNC are carefully trying to avoid assessment and investigations that would unveil the truth. Moreover, they refuse to uphold due diligence from their suppliers. It means that that they fail to meet basic standards of business ethics. They achieve their economic interest, but they have no consciousness or awareness of human interest and human ethics. MNC's are not paving away to enforce basic standard to ensure that they are not purchasing conflict minerals, indeed they still continue to exploit Congo's mineral wealth (C.Dearing,2008:12).

The worst conflict condition in the DRC is also attributable and linked to countries who indirectly contribute to illegal exploitation by failing to do due diligence regarding origins of their imports. Belgium, China, France, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, Lebanon, the Netherlands, Russia, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States all receive a substantial amount of minerals from the DRC (Dearing, 2008:15).

CHAPTER FOUR

FINDINGS CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

4.1 RESEACH FINDINGS

The findings of the study reveal that DRC is a dysfunctional state par excellence. It is really a stereotype of an African state, rich in mineral resources but poor in governance. There is no doubt that rebuilding a functioning state on the ashes of King Leopold II's Congo, Mobutu's Zaire, and the destruction caused by the Congo war will be a difficult task. But it is not an impossible one. History offers worse cases of unstable states affected by epidemic civil wars and social disorders in Europe which were successfully rebuilt. There is no good reason why the Congolese cannot do the same.

However, there is no guarantee that a society undergoing transition from war will become a fully-fledged democracy. A starting point for rebuilding the state has already been achieved in the successful conclusion of the Lusaka Accords. The formation of a transitional government that is to some extent acceptable in the eyes of the majority of citizens is the first prerequisite. But it would be naïve to assume that the simple fact that Congo has a negotiated transitional government in place means that the problems of the DRC have been solved, because the point of the issue has never been exclusively that of peace.

The challenge for the new Congolese leadership is how to turn this opportunity into a success story. The DRC of Mobutu was, although badly governed, relatively peaceful. The root of the DRC problems has always been the absence of an effective state that is capable of meeting the minimum social needs of its people. The level of disintegration of political power, the extent of the country's exposure to external interference, linked to the wish to exploit the country's resources, and a total absence of principled leadership are factors which made governance difficult in the past and continue to pose the greatest threat to the reconstruction of the state.

There are those who maintain that the DRC is too large a country to govern and the in the absence of a central power capable of managing it, it is not in the interests of stability to try and keep it together. It is argued that although the Congolese have demonstrated a strong

commitment to maintaining the political cohesion of the country, a long term political vacuum caused by the failure of the central government to control the entire territory would perpetuate the cycle of violence and conflict.

There is no doubt that the legacy of economic predation use of resource to fund military interests and illegal trade in the country's natural asset in which many of those who are in government today were or are still involved, will continue to hinder any attempts to establish a functional state which control the entire territory. At present there are certain parts of the country that the central government cannot control because it has insufficient resources (both administrative and military) to do. This school of thought argues that it will require enormous injections of financial aid to establish an effective administration in the DRC and give it the organizational capacity to manage the entire territory.

While it is much easier to conceive strategies, including foreign funding, to rebuild smaller state such as Sierra Leone and Liberia, Western countries are simply not prepared to fund the reconstruction of bigger states such as the DRC. Assumptions that what the Congolese need is to end the war, commit themselves to a democratic process and the West will fund the country's reconstruction are not in touch with the new thinking in the Western world. This is even though the current situation in DRC is related to the legacy of colonization and the support Mobutu received from the West and former colonial powers, the problems of the DRC are Africa's alone to be solved by Africans themselves. If Congolese cannot find the necessary resources, then they might as well consider breaking the country up into more manageable territories.

This argument has serious flaws. Firstly, there is a correlation between the size of the country, the illegal exploitation of resources and the dysfunctional of the state. Whenever state vacate social space, alternative actions can gain legitimacy by occupying it and performing the abandoned core functions of the state. In most cases these spaces are maintained by organized violence funded by the exploitation of the country's assets. Although it is true that post-colonial Congo has proved impossible to manage so far, it does not necessarily mean that the Congolese are incapable of running an effective state. After the five years of instability that followed

independence, the DRC achieved stable government under Mobutu, whose government was represented and recognized across the entire territory.

During this period, it seems the DRC was faced with a problem of governance that was related not to the country's size but to inadequate capacity, which made it impossible for the central government to expand the provision for most states, big and small, on the continent. In contrast, King Leopold II and the Belgian government maintained control of the entire territory during the colonial period. They were able to maintain security and construct a network of well-built albeit untarred roads connecting all parts of the vast country, which could be reached without trouble by motor car. The only time the size of the country itself is likely to pose a threat to the stability of the state is the new dispensation is not built on sound democratic principles acceptable to all (Nzongola, 2002)

It is still not clear, although the belligerents, the non-armed opposition and civil society are all part of the government of transition that they will be able to create a climate within which their efforts towards democracy can be sustained. This convergence on the basic elements and needs of democratic government for the DRC might be challenged by militants, radicals, or reactionaries in defense of their own interests.

What would help to build a functional state in DRC is an approach to politics that transcends the limits of the style of governance that has so far been largely informal, personal and highly centralized. Careful decisions need to be made on constitutional and institutional arrangements to ensure that there is meaningful political representation, a consolidation of peace, and a general belief in the legitimacy of the political process. Constructive lessons are already emerging from the African continent. It is increasingly clear that the most desirable constitutional and institutional arrangements need to include a power sharing formula, the decentralization of state structures, a parliamentary system and an electoral system that ensures representation, inclusiveness and reconciliation.

This can only happen through a strong and visionary leadership, which is able to rise above regional and ethnic allegiances. The DRC is in need of a leadership that is capable of reclaiming the ownership of the state and freeing it from external influences and manipulation. Rebuilding

the state can begin only when an organized and determined group of indigenous political actors creates a form of government that does not replicate the failings of the old one. Political culture is one of the most influences that shape a country's political system because it creates norms and beliefs about how people should behave which influence social behavior. The Congolese since 1885 have been at the mercy of a succession of cruel and authoritarian regimes. It is now required that the Congolese should adapt to the demands of democracy, and they will have to do it fast if the country is to become a functional state.

Secondly, countries like the DRC and Angola could finance their own reconstruction, making them free of external aid. The problem of the DRC is not a lack of resources but their utilization and management. Mobutu's government by thieves was the source of most of the country's socio economic problems. Even with external aid that Mobutu received from the west, he did not manage to construct an efficient state. Rather, aid served only to undermine the Congolese nation state further. The rebuilding of the state in Congo will have to start by reinstating the capacity of the state to collect tax, a problem in many African states. Debts to international institutions have become the only source of capital for state functions, plunging the state into perpetual dependency without assisting development. But this is not a rejection of the necessity for external funding and support (which in any case would not come as a donation). While the state rebuilds its capacity to collect tax, there will definitely be a need for external investment, to help restart production in the industrial and manufacturing sectors, to get the parastatals back on the rails, and to restore the infrastructure (Collins, 2002)

The extension of state capacity over the entire territory will not happen automatically, even with a Marshall plan. Just as the decay of the Congolese state did not happen overnight, reconstruction will also happen in stages. Perhaps the most important lesson learned in other transitional situations, such as in South Africa and Mozambique, is that the well-being of the economy is pivotal for the success of whatever follows a negotiated transition. Even more important is the recognition that the economy is not something that can be put on ice until the transition is over; its soundness is dependent on how the transition occurs. It is perhaps here that intervention from the international community is mostly needed.

Thirdly, any attempt to divide the DRC into manageable states would not solve the problem of the weakness of the state. There are small territories on the continent which are failed states or are too weak to perform their duties. There is equally no guarantee that the new states would not inherit the endemic weaknesses of the original state. Further, how could the whole be divided without creating imbalances between the subdivisions that might become a source of fresh conflict? Any attempt to divide the DRC would have serious repercussions, and might even destabilize the region further (Kabemba, 2000).

Other way exist of resolving problems related to the country's size and the exposure of its resources to the illegal exploitation, which perpetuate conflict, undermine state capacity and disrupt attempts to reconstruct it. Firstly, there is an urgent need to create a relatively strong and professional army capable of exercising power over the entire territory. A well coordinate integration of the different armies which are now controlling different parts of the country could achieve this. The war of the 1997 exposed the military weakness of the Congolese state. Mobutu' army, which had never seriously tested on the battlefield, failed to defend the integrity of the Congo due to its lack of professionalism, preparedness and training. The 1998 war succeeded in creating distinct pieces of territory under the control of rebel groups and their foreign allies, Rwanda and Uganda. The state then lost its monopoly of power over its territory.

Secondly, there is a need for an administration that is capable of monitoring an ensuring state presence in all parts of the territory. This means a more decentralized administration. But, while it makes sense to devolve political power to the provinces, this should not undermine the unity of the state by allowing the emergence of centrifugal forces. As the case of Nigeria clearly demonstrate, regional and ethnic leaders can use their authority to advance their personal political and, by implication, economic interests. Yet in the DRC, a decentralized state within a unitary state might be the way forward. The Congolese have repeatedly expressed their commitment to the entity called the DRC. Introducing a debate on federalism in the DRC should not focus on separation, but about finding ways of strengthening state capacities so that they are represented over the entire territory. Most of the internal problems in the DRC were caused by an excessive centralization of power in Kinshasa that left provinces with no

decision making powers at all. There is no way that a government sitting in Kinshasa can provide services to the entire population, even within the most democratic environment. Any federal system would have to be structured in a manner that corrects imbalances based on ethnic and resource allocation (Amaoka, 1999).

Thirdly, regional integration should be speeded up. The exploitation of the DRC's resources by foreign forces, multinationals and individuals is carried out in collaboration with Congolese citizens. Neighboring states are the keys to the success of these operations. The conflict in the DRC has highlighted the need to view the political economy of the conflict in its regional context. The illegal trade in the DRC's resources using neighboring states as transit routes could be resolved through the adoption of a common security mechanism. This would include proposals for economic cooperation between the countries of the region and for tighter border controls. A regional organization could alleviate the political security and economic fears of the most vulnerable states in the Great Lakes and reduce the opportunistic exploitation of resources; especially those located on the long DRC border.

4.2 CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that relations between the DRC and its neighbors have to an appreciable extent replaced connections with the superpowers as critical determinations of state security. The adoption of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad) could not have come at a better time for the DRC. Today the critical prerequisite for both economic development and political stability on the continent is centered on democratic governance. At the continental level, the newly established African Union (AU) has committed member states to democratic governance which will be monitored from time to time through the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The APRM is intended to create an external source of pressure on weak states. Peace and security is one prerequisite for sustainable development in Africa. Neighboring states will be under serious pressure to stop destabilizing the DRC. But the APRM will not work unless it is reinforced by pressure 'from below', reflecting a demand from Congolese citizens for improved governance. A strong, vibrant and organic civil society to oversee that the above concerns are addressed is urgently needed in the DRC.

The complexity of the DRC conflict rendered its resolution even more difficult. The SADC sponsored Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement signed in July 1999 charted the initial path towards stability in the DRC. But the hope its signing brought about was short-lived, as the parties continued to explore the possibilities of enhancing their original positions and interests through violent incidents and skirmishes. This outcome can be understood in the context of a truncated commitment to peace, on the part of the parties, that was driven largely by external pressure and immediate individual gains rather than any genuine renunciation of violence. The agreement, therefore, fell dormant only weeks after its signing.

However, in the aftermath of the assassination of Laurent Kabila in January 2001 and his replacement by his son, Joseph Kabila, the process was set back on track. The agreement subsequently stood as the pillar that made possible the ICD, the setting up of the transitional political dispensation and, later on, the organization of the first multiparty elections in the country since 1965.

4.3 RECOMMENDATIONS.

This study makes the following recommendations to different stakeholders:

4.4 To the Congolese government

We urge engagement in Congo led by SADC initiatives and support for peace and security to encourage parties involved in conflict locally to put aside their selfish motives and participate in a more constructive way of avoiding violent conflict which has cost thousands of lives and created millions of refugees which have become the burdens of neighboring countries.

Mbeki's pressure to resolve outstanding issues during Congo's negotiations, it is likely that the Congolese peace process would have developed quite differently. Several factors made the implementation of the peace process agreement difficult and will continue to affect post-elections politics negatively. These challenges can be traced to the political economy of conflict, patterns of authority in the Congo, and the regional dimension of this conflict. The importance of understanding the economic stake in the Great Lake conflict cannot be overemphasized. Even after the Pretoria agreement was signed, there were powerful people and interests within and outside Congo that benefited from continued conflict and insecurity.

For some war was preferable to peace, particularly if their prosperity and interest were threatened by the prospect of democratic elections. As Filip Reyntjens explained in the case of the DRC: 'local, national and regional state and non-state actors indeed act rationally, engaged as they are in cost-benefit analyses, whose outcome often shows that war, instability and state decay are more attractive than peace, stability and state reconstruction.'

Reflecting pervasive war economics and patterns of authority, the violence in the DRC was often not conducted on behalf of clearly defined political groupings with explicit grievance and objectives. Instead, rebel movements, political parties and groupings split and merged according to strategic interests and the opportunistic calculations of individual leaders. While there were legitimate grievances in both countries, these were not clearly represented by a cohesive opposition or rebel leadership. As a result, instead of negotiations leading to the all-encompassing new political dispensation that South Africa and others had envisaged, the talks in Congo were more akin to office trading and bargaining between unrepresentative leaders, warlords, and ambitious politicians. Power sharing became a tool to placate opportunistic and sometimes dangerous leaders, rather than a tool to ensure wider participations.

External economic interests and networks further aggravated the process and ensured the continuation of previous patterns of enrichment at the expense of the majority of the population.

4.5 Prompt government investigations

Governments must give much greater priority to the examination of the role of companies in the DRC. Governments, adhering to international standards acting through the CIME and individual NCPs, must establish a clear time-table for carrying out the investigation of specific instances with a view to issuing public recommendations on compliance. This will require revisiting many cases declared by the panel as resolved. As the full RAID report demonstrates, there is sufficient information in the public domain for NCPs to act without waiting for a submission from an interested party. NCPs should be given additional resources to carry out this task.

4.6 International Criminal Court

Governments and the UN should co-operate fully with investigations which are being launched by the ICC into, inter alia, the complicity of business in war crimes in the DRC.

4.7 Domestic prosecutions

National governments must investigate and prosecute companies where their conduct is shown to contravene domestic legislation. In particular, Government should urgently investigate whether there have been any breaches of domestic anti-bribery laws and money laundering by companies based in the DRC.

4.8 Call for a permanent UN monitoring

A permanent UN body, with clear and transparent procedures, should be established to monitor the role of business in conflict situations.

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