African migrant exclusion in South Africa and its implications for the African Renaissance

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DECLARATION

African migrant exclusion in South Africa and its implications for the African Renaissance is the title of a dissertation that I, Ndaba Lebohang Nelson, declare is my original work and has not been submitted to any institution by me or any other scholar to receive a degree. I am convinced that this paper is not a duplicate of somebody else's work and that all sources used or cited are indicated and acknowledged with detailed references.

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ABSTRACT

Whenever the African continent is mentioned, negative connotations such as underdevelopment, poverty, inequality, war, and migration issues are frequently evoked. Migration and issues associated with it also occupy centre stage in public debates about Africa. The aforementioned problems obstruct African growth, which gave rise to the notion of going from "tragedy to Renaissance." This study is centred on the exclusion of African migrants in South Africa and how such exclusion undermines the African Renaissance, a "development plan for Africa" that seeks to unite African nations for stability, peace, and security as well as for improved living conditions across the entire continent. The researcher theorised that the tragedy of the African Renaissance depicts the exclusion, suffering, and xenophobia faced by African migrants in South Africa based on observations on literary arts, particularly tragedy in drama, which is about human suffering or death.

In the main, this study aims to ascertain whether or not South African citizens and state institutions exclude African immigrants, and find out *what the key causes and dimensions of the exclusion of African immigrants in South Africa are.* The study achieves this by combining qualitative and quantitative research approaches or using a mixed/hybrid method of social science research. Since this is a desktop study, data relevant to the study were analysed using both content analysis and critical discourse analysis. The critical finding of the study indicates that the exclusion of African immigrants in South Africa is a result of the state and non-state agents' failure to build a social infrastructure enabling the peaceful establishment of a two-tier society made up of both citizens and non-citizens. As a result, this study recommends educating the general public about anti-migrant violence and suggests that the commitment and practice of the African Renaissance are important to pave the way for the development, social cohesion, protection and inclusion of all migrants in South Africa, the rest of the continent and the world.

Keywords: African Renaissance, exclusion, migrant, migration, South Africa and xenophobia (*Afrophobia*).

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACMS	African Centre for Migration & Society
AChHPR	African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
AfCFTA	African Continental Free Trade Area
ARI	African Renaissance Institute
AU	African Union
DAC	Department of Arts and Culture
DBSA	Developmental Bank of Southern Africa
DFID	Department for International Development
DHA	Department of Home Affairs
EFF	Economic Freedom Fighters
HSRC	Human Sciences Research Council
IMC	Inter-Ministerial Committee
ILO	International Labour Organization
IOM	International Organization of Migration
KZNCC	KwaZulu Natal Christian Council

MiWORC	Migrating for Work Research Consortium
MPFA	Migration Policy Framework for Africa
NAP	National Action Plan
NDP	National Development Plan
NDT	National Department of Tourism
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NWU	North-West University
PAIA	Promotion of Access Information Act
PANSALB	Pan South African Language Board
POPIA	Protection of Personal Information Act
RSA	Republic of South Africa
SACAR	South African Chapter of the African Renaissance
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SAHO	South African History Online
SAHRC	South African Human Rights Commission

Stats SA	Statistics South Africa
UN	United Nations
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WHO	World Health Organization

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

This chapter serves as the study's introduction and describes the tragedy and predicament of the African Renaissance as it relates to the exclusion of African immigrants in South Africa. The chapter covers the background and orientation of the study and touches on the problem statement concerning migration that confronts the dilemma of African migrant exclusion and xenophobia. The chapter provides a summary of the research methodology, objectives, and ethical considerations for the study.

1.1 Introduction and background of the study

To Wa Thiong'o (2009: 70) Renaissance is a "period of rebirth, a monumental historical shift and the emergence of a new vision of being or modernity, which manifests in the quantity and quality of intellectual and artistic output in the life of a people, nation, or region". Connected to Renaissance in the African context is Afro-modernity, which promotes the idea that Africans, particularly in Africa, have the capacity to excel in economic, political, intellectual, and artistic fields and are equally competitive with other parts of the world (Mbeki, 1997).

Whenever the African continent is mentioned, negative connotations such as underdevelopment, poverty, inequality, war, and migration are frequently evoked (Mbeki, 1998; Manchester, 2002). Migration and issues associated with it also occupy centre stage in public debates about Africa. The aforementioned problems obstruct African growth, which gave rise to the notion of going from "tragedy to Renaissance." This study is centred on the exclusion of African migrants in South Africa and how such exclusion undermines the African Renaissance, a "development plan for Africa" that seeks to unite African nations for stability, peace, and security as well as for improved living conditions across the entire continent (Louw, 2000). The observation on literary arts, particularly tragedy in drama, which is about human suffering or death (Taplin & Billings, 2010), led the researcher to the supposition that the tragedy of the African Renaissance equally reflects in the exclusion, suffering and xenophobia experienced by African migrants in South Africa.

The term African Renaissance alludes to the continent of Africa's revival, rejuvenation, or ascent (Banda & Saayman, 2015). It is a "development plan for Africa that promotes the uniting of African nations for stability and improved living circumstances across the whole continent" (Mbeki, 1997; Landsberg & Kornegay, 1998: 28; Louw, 2000). The basic tenet of the African Renaissance is that the continent's "social, economic, and political difficulties may be solved by continental initiatives, and only backed up and supported by external assistance when and as appropriate" (Landsberg, 2002: 88). A "full-fledged Renaissance is yet to flower in Africa" (Wa Thiong'o, 2009: 72), indicating that it is a 'wanted ideal' rather than something that has already occurred or is now happening.

Due to existing socio-political divisions and failed African States, the African Renaissance has not yet been fully realized. While it was Thabo Mbeki's presidential project, the African Renaissance never became a policy. When Mbeki was the deputy president and president of South Africa, ministers, deputy ministers and other state officials were not active participants in the advancement of the African Renaissance. Upon being removed from office, Mbeki's successors did not pay requisite attention to the African Renaissance in terms of articulating or advancing it.

However, one can assert that the African Renaissance is taking place. Throughout several African industries, the idea of an African Renaissance has sparked an interest. In music, fashion, and literature and recently in medicine where African traditional medicine is making inroads and gaining recognition by governments as an alternative to western medicine. In the field of education, support for African traditional knowledge systems is growing, and the South African government has passed legislation in this regard. The phenomenon of decolonization sweeps institutions of higher education because of cultural boldness among youths.

African historian and politician Cheikh Anta Diop first proposed the concept of the African Renaissance as a means of promoting self-determination as well as the continuity of African culture (Gumede, 2014). While "Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria preferred the term Pan-Africanism in the 1960s, with the same broad vision of the acknowledgement of the common history and destiny of Africa's people against colonialism, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana further understood and endorsed the notion

of African Renaissance” (Netshitenzhe, 2013: 21). African Renaissance is more like an "African rehabilitation program," according to Mbeki (1997).

If it materializes, the African Renaissance will bring about competitiveness in the global political and economic spheres, prosperity, independence in terms of foreign aid and economic growth, cultural identity, social cohesion and (African) unity, respect, protection and promotion of human rights, social justice as well as peace and stability (Gumede, 2014; Banda & Saayman, 2015).

African liberation or decolonization project is the first African Renaissance. African unity is seen as a pillar of the new African Renaissance by notable thinkers like Noel Moukala and former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo, who played a critical role in the movement (Netshitenzhe, 2013). The implication is that without African unity, there cannot be an African Renaissance, and since there must be free mobility, the exclusion must end. Therefore, given its reputation as a “constitutional democracy, a diverse economy, and a proponent of peaceful conflict resolution, South Africa was expected to lead the new African Renaissance" (Umezurike & Ogunnubi, 2016: 264; Maloka, 2001: 1; Grix & Lee, 2013: 172).

According to Asante (2014) as well as Umezurike and Ogunnubi (2016), while competing on the international stage and guiding a new African Renaissance, South Africa still battles with the "dilemma of modernity", which affects how it manages irregular migration and removes obstacles to immigrant integration in policy decision-making (Thompson, 2016). According to Western ideals of urbanization and technological advancement, modernity denotes the state of socioeconomic growth, being contemporary or civilized (Eisenstadt, 2010).

As part of its global colonialist agenda, colonialism also tried to provide civilization to impoverished countries (Thakur *et al*., 2017). The phenomenon of temporality, which grants the state of being within or having some link with the time of admission, gives expression to the barbarian beliefs and obstacles to immigrant integration (Thompson, 2016). The barbarian belief conceived by South African citizens is that African immigrants will end up outnumbering them if they do not return home and keep on migrating to South Africa and inviting those they left at home. As per the problem

statement, the concept of temporality predominates in South Africa, where there are worries about more foreigners becoming permanent residents.

Afro-modernity implies progress, freedom of human movement and cordial habitation throughout post-colonial Africa (Ugwuanyi, 2011). Thus, in this study, the exclusion of African immigrants in African countries like Angola expelling Congolese migrants constitutes a setback to the African hopes of renewal politically, socially, and economically (UN News, 2018). African interests and ambitions for unity and peace as a "community beyond territorial demarcations and ethnic inclinations" are represented by Afro-modernity (Hanchard, 1999: 248; Zimmerman *et al*., 2009). African subjugation and the contemporary, Eurocentric values of closed borders Western in nature are rejected by Afro-modernity, which of course still requires any migrant to comply, meet and observe all the rules and regulations governing migration in destination countries. Wa Thiong'o (2009: 89) submits that “in a world where Africa is treated equally, it should be seen through the economic and political resurgence of the continent's power."

Wa Thiong'o (2009: 80) asserts that “South Africa has been involved in promoting the notion of the new African Renaissance with regional hegemons like Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Nigeria”. Hence, South Africa delineates the scope of the research. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) was co-written by former presidents Mbeki, Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria, Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria. NEPAD was seen as a plan to ensure that Africa's regeneration would materialize.

According to Stats SA (2022) the population of South Africa is estimated to be 60,6 million, and with 11 official languages recognized by the constitution, and the political aspirations of the ‘rainbow nation’, South Africa is a multicultural society (Harris, 2000: 33; Gary, 1997: 3). “Gauteng, Limpopo, Mpumalanga, North West, Northern Cape, Western Cape, Free State, Kwazulu-Natal, and Eastern Cape are the nine provinces that make up this country” (Mwakikagile, 2008: 75). The Southern African Development Community (SADC), which promotes the migration of Africans across borders, includes South Africa.

The 16-member state group (SADC) is a regional economic organization whose goals are to advance regional integration, sustainable development, and democratic values (SADC, 2005). According to a Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) report, Africans have been crossing the boundaries of SADC member nations since the 1700s in quest of better economic opportunities and a peaceful society to live in (HSRC, 2008).

Gauteng has the most migrants as compared to the total foreign population spread among the country's nine provinces. Gauteng is another province where the most horrifying assaults on foreign nationals take place (Umezurike, 2015; Adiba, 2016). A surge of xenophobic violence against African migrants occurred in 2007/8 in the Gauteng community of Alexandra and then spread across the country. Taking into account the dispersion of foreign migrants across different provinces in South Africa, it is clear that the majority of these migrants are from Africa.

South Africa ranks high among SADC member states in terms of the number of migrants it receives, according to the United Nations (UN, 2015). The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs noted that intra-African migration increased from 13 million in 2000 to 19 million in 2015, with South Africa being the most sought-after location. For improved employment prospects (labour migration) and to live in more peaceful countries, the majority of Africans choose to go to the Southern part of the continent (UNDESA, 2017).

Global statistics prove that the international migrant population has continued to climb in recent years, growing from 220 million in 2010 to 258 million in 2017 (UN, 2017). Although the number of African migrants living in South Africa has decreased in recent years to 1.6 million (Chiumia, 2016), they are still more likely to face exclusion and xenophobic violence because of worries that foreigners will eventually take over the country. Since South African citizens still make up the majority of the population in each province, city, and town, this is illogical.

1.2 Problem statement

South African State institutions and citizens exclude African migrants in socio-economic contexts, which undermines the idea of the African Renaissance. Below is

the detail of the socio-economic contexts of African migrant exclusion and the implication on African Renaissance in South Africa:

Migrant exclusion is a practice that affects African immigrants negatively as proven by the experience of xenophobia. In the main, these experiences characterise a phenomenon of Africans being outsiders in their own continent (Landau & Segatti, 2009), whose reversal would have occurred through the African Renaissance. The government and citizens in South Africa are the main actors in the exclusion of African immigrants. The neglected analysis of African migrant exclusion linked with the African Renaissance in African countries, especially South Africa is another reason for undertaking this study. Most of the connection between the African Renaissance and the exclusion of African immigrants is found in newspaper commentaries, and not usually in research studies (Msila, 2017; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2019).

Economic exclusion occurs in the form of labour market discrimination and employment segregation policies driven by the state. This makes it difficult for foreign nationals to secure better, decent jobs in the country and therefore end up opting for low-paid jobs to survive (Misago *et al*., 2009). Further, this dimension of exclusion predominantly facilitated by the state also reflects on limited or no access to economic resources and rights, including tight business ownership regulations against non-citizens. The South African society (non-state agents of exclusion) that immigrants settle in is hostile to African immigrants' economic performance and participation. This prevails during xenophobic attacks, whereby locals loot and burn business assets owned by foreigners.

The State's response to the xenophobic attacks is insufficient and the lack of social protection insinuates that foreign business people and workers will remain economically inactive, which further augments economic exclusion. In the education space, such exclusion persists under the system used by most South African higher learning institutions pertaining to fee payments, which promotes economic exclusion in the sense that international students have to settle 50% of their tuition fees during the registration period, whereas South African citizens may register with just the minimum fee payment. Immigrants' social well-being and space are negatively impacted by the economic challenges they face.

Social exclusion of African immigrants manifests through poor integration into the host societies (Phillips, 2008). In this context, exclusion implies that immigrants are unable to live a life they value and hence achieve complete freedom (Phillips, 2008). In South Africa, immigrants' social exclusion results from the state's and non-state actors' failure to provide the social infrastructure necessary for a two-tier society, consisting of both citizens and non-citizens to be established. African immigrants, who are typically the minority in South African society, "frequently find themselves in unsafe, susceptible places like slums and impoverished housing estates, where crime and violence are common". Additionally, this kind of exclusion results in poor housing, education, health, and service access rights (HSRC, 2004). Socio-economic difficulties encountered by African immigrants in South Africa imply that their political activity and being are weak.

Immigrants in South Africa face extreme political exclusion, which is also common across the globe. The most common method and practice of this exclusion is to "exclude certain individuals and groups without citizenship from participating in political activities" (Hedstrom & Smith, 2013: 5). In a democratic South African state, immigrants are not granted basic political rights including the ability to vote, run for office, organize, and establish a political party. Political exclusion is through constitutional amendments and other legal methods that give it legitimacy. Political exclusion is related to citizenship in South Africa because every essential political activity and process requires a certificate of citizenship. This simply means those without such are not eligible and therefore excluded from taking part in the political events and activities in the land. One can therefore ask the following:

How can a legal and political system manage the daily lives of immigrants while denying and depriving them of the opportunity to participate in the development and formulation of its laws?

Not recognizing and extending political rights to a large percentage of individuals who reside legally in a country somewhat tends to encourage inequality and discrimination and calls into question the legitimacy of democracy, which seems to be constrictive in this regard. The expansion of political rights to non-citizens who are legally residing in South Africa or any other country will strengthen political integration, open the door for

new notions of democracy focused on inclusivity, gradually improve standards, and ensure that everyone's voice is heard.

The State does not guarantee immigrants the same opportunities, and services that citizens enjoy (Whitaker, 2005: 112). The “South African Human Rights Commission emphasizes that everyone living within the borders of South Africa is protected by the supreme law, the Constitution from abuse, exploitation of labour, neglect, and degrading treatment” (SAHRC, 2017). Contrary, immigrants face ill-treatment, exploitative labour practices, abuse, and degradation with no social protection from the State even after settling in South Africa. To sum it all up, despite South Africa being a democracy, immigrants, particularly those of African descent, still experience xenophobia.

African migrant exclusion undermines the African Renaissance principle of unity, social cohesion, respect for human rights, peace and stability. When operationalized, “exclusion leads to murder, damage to property, grievous injury or bodily harm, and human displacement” (Bekker, 2015: 231; KZNCC, 2016). Xenophobia, which is commonly conceptualized as an “intense fear or dislike of foreign people, their customs, and culture” is one example of exclusion (IOM, 2010; Mantsinhe, 2011: 309). The impression that “European foreigners are ‘tourists or investors’ who contribute positively to South Africa, whereas African immigrants are not so significant and have nothing constructive to offer, feeds verbal and physical abuse as well as anti-African foreigner sentiments” (Matsinhe, 2011: 295).

This type of xenophobia, which translates to ‘*Afrophobia or Afro-pessimism’* simply points to the "fear or hate of the cultures and people of Africa, as well as the African diaspora" (van Kessel, 2002; Daily Vox, 2017). Additionally, there exists a belief among black South Africans, especially the youth that they are superior when compared to other African immigrants (Isike & Isike, 2012: 96; IOM, 2010). This idea of superiority can be traced back and attributed to the legacy of colonialism and apartheid in South Africa, which allowed White supremacy that Black South Africans were subjected to (Dussel, 1993). As a result, the same mentality is shifted and is now held by Black South Africans towards African immigrants. Migrant exclusion has emerged as a “territorial practice of oppression and destitution, making invisible anything foreign” (Vázquez, 2011). In this case, black (African) people oppress,

misrecognize, and systematically reduce other black (African) people to non or sub-human status.

The South African policy framework on migration strips it of the great “expectations of spearheading a new African Renaissance and the ideal of diversity” (Chinomona & Maziriri, 2015: 26). Policy and general decision-making by the South African government regarding migration and xenophobia affects the aspiration of Afro-modernity, which is a sought unifier of the continent. Addressing the issues of xenophobia and migration (illegal) is quite challenging as South Africa, or any other country for that matter, welcomes both authorized and unauthorized immigrants (Crush, 2002: 4). As such, there is a dominant perception that “migration is responsible for increasing the number of foreigners becoming ‘permanent’, thus straining the economy and social welfare” (Stremlau, 1999: 43; Crush, 2002: 90). The rise in xenophobic vigilante activities against foreigners can be attributed to “beliefs that immigrants of African descent disrupt social order, plan and commit crimes, offer cheap labour and take jobs meant for South African citizens“ (Bekker, 2015: 229; Solomon & Kosaka, 2013: 8; Sosibo, 2015; SAHO, 2017).

Figure 1 contextualizes and indicates the xenophobic violence confronted by African migrants in South Africa per province. Xenophobia, criminality, and violent entrepreneurship according to Charman and Piper (2012) were all fused to torment African migrants from the year 2000 until 2017 (see similar and more recent data in chapter 4).



Figure 1: Xenophobic attacks in South Africa**,** adapted map from yourfreetemplates.com

1.3 Theoretical Framework

Based on the belief that African Renaissance practice and commitment can lessen the exclusion of African immigrants in South Africa, the researcher harmonizes the social misfit theory in this study. The social misfit theory, advanced by Wright et al. (1986), contends that people are prone to exclusion or rejection when they differ from others. In the case of South Africa, the race and nationality of immigrants might be considered identity indicators and features that contribute to such exclusion. Furthermore, better employment opportunities, social protection, and basic education are all objects of exclusion in South Africa. South Africa is used as a case study for intensive inquiry, thus it is necessary to collect multidimensional data on the economic, social, and political elements of exclusion. See the exclusion framework below:

Table 1: Framework of exclusion (own construction inspired by Misago *et al*., 2009).

<table>
<tr><th>Dimension of exclusion</th><th>Level of exclusion</th><th>Criteria of exclusion</th><th>Agent of exclusion</th><th>Object of exclusion</th></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="5">Economic</td><td rowspan="4">Individual</td><td>Ethnicity</td><td rowspan="4">State</td><td rowspan="2">Social protection</td></tr>
<tr><td>Gender</td></tr>
<tr><td>Race</td><td rowspan="2">Better employment</td></tr>
<tr><td>Disability</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">group</td><td>Geography</td><td rowspan="2">Non-State</td><td rowspan="2">Basic education</td></tr>
<tr><td>Citizenship</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="5">Political</td><td rowspan="4">individual</td><td>Ethnicity</td><td rowspan="4">State</td><td rowspan="2">Social protection</td></tr>
<tr><td>Gender</td></tr>
<tr><td>Race</td><td rowspan="3">Basic education</td></tr>
<tr><td>Disability</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">group</td><td>Geography</td><td rowspan="2">Non-State</td></tr>
<tr><td>Citizenship</td><td>Better employment</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="5">Social</td><td rowspan="4">individual</td><td>Gender</td><td rowspan="4">State</td><td rowspan="2">Social protection</td></tr>
<tr><td>Race</td></tr>
<tr><td>Religion</td><td rowspan="3">Basic education</td></tr>
<tr><td>Disability</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">group</td><td>Geography</td><td rowspan="2">Non-State</td></tr>
<tr><td>Citizenship</td><td>Better employment</td></tr>
</table>

Walker and Walker (1997: 9) indicate that “exclusion is a dynamic process of being shut out, fully or partially, from any of the social, economic, political, or cultural systems that determine the social integration of a person in a society.” These categories summarise a diversity of exclusion challenges for African migrants in South Africa. Disadvantage and marginalization experienced by individuals or population groups relative to specific norms of social, economic, or political behaviour may be attributed to exclusion in all or some cases (Percy-Smith, 2000). According to Jones and Smyth (1999), the idea of exclusion enhances our awareness of poverty and creates a conceptual bridge between citizenship and access to opportunity.

Political figures in well-known cities, like Herman Mashaba, the former mayor of the City of Johannesburg, linked inner-city blight and low municipal revenue collections to unauthorized foreigners and further called for their deportation (Adam & Moodley, 2013). Illegal immigrants according to the former Executive Mayor of the city of Gold reached a crisis level and therefore needed to be deported (Joubert, 2017; Shange 2018). According to research conducted by the African Centre for Migration & Society (ACMS) at the University of the Witwatersrand, immigrants live in constant fear of attack, marginalization and deportation (ACMS, 2015).

The National Development Plan (NDP, 2012) of South Africa urges the police, corporate sector, and civil society to afford African immigrants equal protection as citizens. Notwithstanding calls and advocacy for the inclusion of immigrants, “the government/state has adopted measures to ensure a temporary stay by immigrants in South Africa” (Misago *et al*., 2009: 29). Mass arrests and deportations have seen over 600 000 illegal immigrants sent back home between the years 1994 and 2000 (Crush, 2002: 7).

To determine the impact of African migrant exclusion on the African Renaissance, the study relies on African Renaissance principles/assumptions from Vale and Maseko (1998), which supplements data analysis. These assumptions will be indicators of the African Renaissance for this study. They are a) South Africa’s re-unification with the rest of the continent and the commitment to it, b) the African way to deal with African problems, c) cultural boldness, d) youth and women empowerment, e) following the

modernist tradition in democratisation and economic development, f) a globalist approach to South Africa's destiny in modernising Africa/South Africa's African Renaissance. In the broader sense, it would look at Africa's destiny in a global arena, g) the Africanist approach to constructing African identity.

The prospects of the African Renaissance are adversely affected by the exclusion of African migrants in South Africa. More like a political movement, the African Renaissance seeks to unify Africa (like Pan-Africanism) and achieve national self-determination (Makgoba, 1999). Due to similar racial history, cultural norms, traditional institutions, and historical experiences, Africans have a subjective sense of kinship or affinity (Munyai, 2020). Like Pan-Africanism, it has its origins in the revelation of shared blackness in the face of colonial oppression (Kokole, 1998). The three sub-trajectories of the African Renaissance include the initial resistance to colonial control, post-pacification or subsequent uprisings against certain administrative policies, including nativistic or messianic groups, and contemporary nationalist movements that support self-government (Philani, 2000).

The researcher holds that there is a connection between the triumph of the African Renaissance and the exclusion of African immigrants in South Africa. In other words, individuals and governmental organizations that genuinely support and commit to the African Renaissance can help in reaching the goal of African immigrant inclusion. This study will prove that socio-political thoughts about African migrants precede social behaviour and institutional treatment of exclusion, which is what causes the tragedy of the African Renaissance. Conversely, African Renaissance practice and dedication can lessen the exclusion of African immigrants.

The coexistence of collaboration and conflict is deeply ingrained in the idea of the African Renaissance, which is said to rest on "the five cornerstones of regional cooperation, emancipation, revaluation of African cultures, sustainable economic development, and democratization" (van Amerom & Buscher, 2005:11).

1.4 Research questions

- What are the reasons for and dimensions of the exclusion of African immigrants in South Africa?

- How is the African Renaissance disrupted by the exclusion of African immigrants?
- What is South Africa's position in international and regional migration policies?
- Is the inclusion of African immigrants essential for the fulfilment of the idea of the African Renaissance?
- What are the prospects for migrant inclusion in a renewed African Renaissance mindset, and South Africa's role in it?

1.5 Research objectives

This study advances the African Renaissance as an instrument to lessen the exclusion of African migrants in South Africa to address the study's main questions above. The reader will therefore value this research's quality based on its capacity to:

- Explain the causes and dimensions of the exclusion of African immigrants in South Africa;
- Analyse the implication of migrant exclusion on the African Renaissance;
- Describe South Africa's position in international and regional migration issues and policies;
- Present the relevance and importance of the inclusion of African immigrants in fulfilling the ideals of the African Renaissance; and
- Comment on the prospects for migrant inclusion and South Africa's relevance in the new African Renaissance project.

1.6 Literature review

Exclusion, according to the Department for International Development denotes a systematic marginalization of people based on ethnicity, race, religion, sexual orientation, gender, disability, and nationality (DFID, 2005). It also revolves around "economic, social, and political dimensions of deprivation" (Loury, 2003: 226; Kuhlman, 1991: 77; Bhalla & Lapeyre, 1997: 87)". The other component of exclusion is concerned with the objects of exclusion, such social protection, basic education, and better employment. According to the relevant literature, the African Renaissance is driven by democracy, social cohesion, economic progress, and growth (Oginni & Moitui, 2016).

Herein lies the linkages between migrant inclusion and the African Renaissance. The consciousness of and commitment to the African Renaissance is a sine qua non (necessity) for the development, integration, and inclusion of all Africans; paradoxically. African Renaissance can also be viewed as the result of all Africans' growth, racial integration, and inclusion in every corner of the continent (Diop, 1996). Therefore, this study lends support to that conception of the African Renaissance.

Against this backdrop, the insinuation is that no African should be subjected to exclusion, discrimination and abuse in any African nation (Duponchel, 2013). This ideal in connection with migration in Africa and the exclusion of African migrants, therefore, implies that “African Renaissance should work in the lives of ordinary Africans as they seek to come to grips with a globalizing world” (Vale & Maseko, 1998: 282). African migrant exclusion signifies a non-viable Renaissance, which mutilates the continent and its people (Vale & Maseko, 1998). The marginalization of African immigrants in South Africa who are unable to experience the freedom required for personal growth reflects the tragedy of the African Renaissance (Abdi, 2011; Duponchel, 2013; Calogero *et al*., 2014; Maposa, 2016).

African nations and their leaders ignore instances of migrant exclusion across the continent, except when it occurs in South Africa. President Cyril Ramaphosa was compelled by the outcry from the African people and leaders to organize a delegation to travel throughout Africa to express remorse and repent for the xenophobic attacks that took place in South Africa in September 2019. Most South Africans did not feel the need to apologize because to them, foreigners had committed clear acts of illegality. However, the incident demonstrated that South Africa has a unique and special role to play in determining the value and benefits of migration on the continent, as it is a regional hub of migration.

Nwonwu (2010: 151) claimed that “a deep-rooted paradox of the African Renaissance cornerstones lies in the distraction of African cultures, free movement, integration, and Afro-modernity.” Hanchard (1999: 245) talks about "Afro-modernity and temporality" in African diaspora politics. According to Yahia (2016), Afro-modernism is a mirror of Africa and is crucial to development. In this sense, Afro-modernity is an extension of the African Renaissance that calls for the abolition of colonialism and exploitation of Africa as well as for its independence within the global community. Afro-modernity is

also the formulation and upliftment of African descent with commonalities, such as coloniality, suppression, segregation, and temporality imposed by the colonial powers.

Few academics link the phenomena of migration, and the African Renaissance to exclusion in the context of Africa, notably in South Africa. Ruedin (2018) laments that the majority of research on migrant exclusion tends to concentrate more on borders outside of Africa. A lot of research on the African Renaissance focuses on identity and ethnicity and further adopts a model of 'defensive assertion of identity' (Castells, 1997). The Castells model does not address the exclusion of migrants but is rather an expression of identity against colonial oppression and prejudice. Exclusion, particularly of African migrants that is prevalent in South Africa, paves the way for the emergence of African Renaissance-rooted politics of inclusion, social cohesion, and integration. As a result, it is important to conduct extensive research to understand how these two phenomena are related.

The exclusion of migrants in Europe and America has received increased attention in studies performed by the United Nations (UN) and other organizations (UN, 2016). Adiba (2016) and Ruedin (2018) are only a couple of the recent scholars who have made the connection between migration and exclusion which African Renaissance researchers neglect or fail to discover. Adiba (2016) still offers a thorough analysis of migration and exclusion in the context of South Africa in the article '*Immigrant Exclusion and Insecurity in Africa*. Although there are many different interpretations of exclusion in political literature, theorists do not use it to address the issue of migration.

In her study of "Constructing a Category of Women, Goldenberg (2007: 140) discussed exclusion in a feminist theory". According to Goldenberg (2007:141), mainstream philosophy fails to see women's ways of being, thinking, and doing as being equally valuable as those of men and fails to contemplate women's interests, identities, and challenges. From the review and analysis of the relevant data regarding the experiences of African immigrants in South Africa, the same is applicable, whereby most African immigrants' "ways of being, thinking, and doing is not treated as equally valuable" as that of South Africans and consequently their interests, identities, and challenges are often overlooked. Asal et al (2016) evaluated the link between political exclusion and ethnic armed conflict, while Kuo et al (2016) examined the connection between social exclusion and political identity.

The researcher discovered that xenophobia and violence are more frequently discussed in the literature on migration-related topics in South Africa. Exclusion of migrants is a pressing issue on a global scale, however, African scholars have not responded well to it. Silver (1994) demarcates that exclusion is a process of declining participation, access, and solidarity in society. In a much wider perspective, Touraine (1991) shapes it more as a reflection of the accumulation of various deprivations (resources, social relationships, and means of participation), evictions (from work, from school, from the city) and further aggravated by social and/or ethnic segregation.

The myth that "African immigrants steal jobs and women" is usually used by the native citizens to justify the exclusion and maltreatment of African migrants in South Africa (Landau, 2013; Schippers, 2015: 7; Niyimbanira & Madzivhandila, 2016:170). Such narratives motivate social exclusion practices that discriminate against Black African migrants in South Africa (Matsinhe, 2011). For instance, stereotypes connect Zimbabwean men with theft and women with prostitution, Malawians with cheap labour, and Nigerian immigrants with drugs, and human trafficking (IOM, 2010). This myth was debunked by Chinomona and Maziriri (2015: 28) asserting that the myth emanates from "pure jealousy, irrationality and scapegoating."

Mbiyozo (2018) holds that migration issues are not prioritized in global affairs, and as a global phenomenon that is as old as human life on earth, migration deserves prioritization. As a result of migration becoming a global phenomenon, the United Nations (UN) developed a draft global compact, the first government-negotiated global framework on international migration, to encourage safer and orderly migration, (Mbiyozo, 2018). According to Hiropoulos (2017), the African Centre for Migration & Society (ACMS) was instrumental in the investigation of South Africa's migration issues after the establishment of Xenowatch in 2016. Xenowatch is a platform used by the public to keep track of xenophobic threats and acts of violence around the country, according to ACMS (2016).

Balbo and Marconi (2006: 706) contend that "international migration breeds exclusion because integration depends heavily on command of the local language." This is precisely the case In South Africa, where African immigrants are largely excluded from society due to their inability to understand the host's languages. To bring about Renaissance, which will subsequently open doors for inclusion and integration, Wa

Thiong'o (2009) emphasizes the need for a radical transformation that includes the usage of African languages.

The inclusion and integration of immigrants need to be prioritized across the globe as the number of international immigrants is on the rise. According to estimates, the international number of immigrants increased from 150 million in 2000 to about 214 million in 2010 globally (IOM, 2012). Europe, North America, and Western Asia have the highest immigrant populations of 72 million, 55 million, and 33 million respectively (UN, 2016). On the other side of the world, there has also been an increasingly dynamic movement of people across borders of the Southern African region, mostly with South Africa as a destination (Ratha & Shaw, 2007). According to the South African community survey, the foreign-born migrant population has declined from 2.1 million in 2011 to 1.6 million in the year 2016 (Chiumia, 2016).

Beyond the many reasons for increased South Africa, "the democratization of South Africa in 1994 is a fundamental draw of African migrants" (Nwonwu, 2010: 151). Despite the varied migration reasons, the majority of African immigrants, like any other immigrants moving to South Africa or any place around the world have the same hope, which is to settle peacefully and make ends meet while attempting to assimilate effectively with the host communities, and fortunately, African Renaissance encourages such optimism.

According to the *social misfit theory* put forward by Wright et al. (1986), individuals tend to be rejected or excluded when they differ from others. Such exclusion is due to one or more identity indicators and traits, and immigrants' race and nationality can be deemed such traits. Additionally, exclusion of this nature is reflected in government and corporate actions to explicitly advertise jobs and other opportunities specifically for South African nationals only. The same is seen In South African higher education institutions or even some from across the world, where stricter conditions are imposed on foreign students than on locals when it comes to paying their tuition fees.

Thabo Mbeki, a former president of South Africa, advocated for "African solutions for African problems by promoting the African Renaissance idea" (van Amerom & Buscher, 2005: 2; Maloka, 2001: 4). The emphasis on the idea of the African Renaissance was inspired by the vision of a unified Africa, van Amerom and Buscher

(2005) refer to the work and literature on the background of African Renaissance by Landsberg and Hlophe (1999). When it convened a conference in 1998 that was dedicated to the African Renaissance, the office of the president of the Republic of South Africa demonstrated its strong interest and commitment to the movement (Vale & Maseko, 1998).

The year 1999 saw the establishment of the African Renaissance Institute (ARI) in South Africa. After that, the South African Chapter of the African Renaissance (SACAR), which is designated to be in the vanguard of a social movement for the "revitalization" of Africa, was established. South Africa's involvement in spearheading the African Renaissance has been noted in helping other African nations realize their objectives regarding social, economic, environmental, recreational, and social bodies (Ndlovu, 2010).

While the exclusion and abuse of African immigrants persist, disagreements about how to achieve an African Renaissance or a united Africa arise. Without regional and continental unity, there can be no African Renaissance (Geingob, 2007: 1). African Renaissance hopes to bring about continental and global concord in which everyone has the chance to realize his full potential in a setting characterized by peace, security, and respect for human dignity (Geingob, 2007).

1.7 Research design

The goal of the research design is to give the study an adequate structure. This section discusses the decision taken regarding the research methodology and specifies how the necessary data was gathered for the study. A mixed approach of social science research, which integrates both qualitative and quantitative techniques to collect and analyse data relating to the research problem (Maree, 2016), is the foundation of the study's methodology This approach provides a thorough examination of the impact of African immigrants' exclusion on the tenets of the African Renaissance as seen in South Africa. To "provide answers and clarifications for research topics that pertain to multidimensional settings," mixed research methodologies are appropriate (Patton, 2014: 186).

To be exact, quantitative metrics capture migration rates, dates, and numbers of xenophobic incidents, while qualitative methodologies provide an in-depth

examination of migration determinants and experiences of inclusion or exclusion in receiving nations. For this reason, the researcher developed a framework of exclusion (see Table 1) to direct and guide the analysis of evidence from relevant literature for the testing of hypotheses and the construction of theories.

1.8 Data collection and analysis techniques

The researcher collected secondary data (written material and published surveys) because according to Maree (2018) they are easily accessible and give a huge amount of required information to complete a study. The notion of migrant exclusion, African Renaissance, migration, and policies on migration and xenophobia in South Africa and internationally were all subjects of a careful analysis by the researcher. Journals and scholarly publications from online repositories including Springer Link, Wiley Online Library, and Science Direct were accessed since they contain the relevant information. Other internet sources used in the study include annual reports from the Migrating for Work Research Consortium (MiWORC), the African Renaissance Institute (ARI), the African Centre for Migration & Society (ACMS), government legislation, and online newspaper articles. Data sets from the United Nations Global Migration Database, International Migration Database, Net Migration, and the Migration data of Stats SA also formed part of the analysis.

To effectively construct a new study, Williams (2011: 76) states that "data analysis allows researchers the opportunity to follow the trends and patterns and identify the gaps from earlier results." Both content analysis and critical discourse analysis were utilized in this study for that reason because they have the ability to examine deeper into the literature and categorize it thoroughly (Heaton, 2004; Willman, 2011). The two analysis techniques were employed to systematically examine the incidence of xenophobic attacks, the locations where they occur, the arrests and repatriations of African immigrants, as well as the exclusion from fundamental services like education and employment.

To explain and aid in the analysis of migration policies enacted globally to raise, maintain, and lessen migration and contribute to the exclusion of migrants, content analysis was utilized in the form of codes or "themes." The classification of data in terms of the social, economic, and political dimensions of exclusion, including the

categories as stated in Table 1 and indicators of the African Renaissance, helped to minimize overlaps between data categories.

To improve the analysis of the data relevant to this study, critical discourse analysis was applied. Van Dijk (2006) asserts that the pursuit of understanding urgent social concerns is the primary motivation and area of interest for critical discourse analysis. Like in this study, the societal issues of exclusion and xenophobia were examined, A "qualitative analytical method known as critical discourse analysis (CDA) is usually used to describe, interpret, and explain how discourses create, uphold, and justify social inequities (Mullet, 2018). Critical discourse analysis is based on the idea that language use is intentional, whether discursive decisions are made consciously or unconsciously.

Data was gathered, categorized, and then condensed according to codes and themes by the researcher. The researcher then evaluated data themes and categories against the framework of exclusion and African Renaissance indicators for hypothesis testing and theory construction (See the section about theorising exclusion, to avoid repetition, the details are not included here). The researcher advances a case for inclusive migration policy in South Africa by making inferences and establishing connections between several themes. To draw conclusions from the facts and offer suggestions for migration policy and decision-making, the researcher examined data including pertinent ideas to the topic, such as those addressing xenophobia, exclusion, migration of Africans, and the African Renaissance.

Pierce (2008) devised a hierarchy of data analysis, which allows for high-level abstraction and the development of new concepts or theories, and the researcher used it to improve the assessment of key concepts in this study. This hierarchy fits within the mixed method approach, in which the researcher interprets and analyses data to provide context for the topic, according to Bowen (2009). The hierarchy of analysis (see Figure 2 below) enables the researcher to take into account the collection and assembly of data relating to the research problem and categorize and code the data. Thereafter, make an inference from the already available secondary data to test the framework of exclusion and develop a theory based on the analysis.



Figure 2: A hierarchy of analysis (inspired by Pierce, 2008)

1.9 Significance of the study

Firstly, the publicizing and dissemination of this research study will take place with the goal of promoting inclusion and a welcoming atmosphere in South Africa. It will make it easier for South Africans as a whole to reflect on the exclusion of migrants through open discussions. The study is significant in that it will help advance efforts to diminish and end migrant exclusion and fight xenophobia in South Africa and around the world. The study also aims to play a significant role in enhancing migration governance, which includes information gathering and sharing, monitoring, support, and protection for all immigrants, regardless of nationality, race, gender, or citizenship, and encouraging cooperation between governments of origin and destination.

After this research is complete, the researcher hopes to collaborate with NGOs to promote the 'Meeting Africa' exchange program for Africans, organize an academic conference, and launch a campaign for civic education on the African Renaissance. The researcher aims to contact the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) and National Department of Tourism (NDT) to act as custodians of the Meeting Africa project to contribute to discussions about xenophobic attacks that have notably targeted African immigrants in South Africa and promote tourism in South Africa which has been tainted by acts of violence against foreign nationals. The study will encourage the researcher

to participate in forums involving the government, civil society, and the black South African community wherever possible to present the findings of the study to advance national identity distinctions that have a substantial impact on relations with African immigrants.

1.10 Research ethics

The researcher did not necessarily need to conduct interviews since this is a desktop study. Therefore, “desktop research implies that no one will suffer physical, financial, or psychological harm as a result of the data collection process” (Pierce, 2008: 10). The researcher interacts with material that is available to the public, therefore there is no requirement for data protection in closed cabins or password-protected workstations. When secondary sources reveal personal information about the respondents on the secondary materials studied, the researcher will adhere to the Promotion of Access Information Act (PAIA) and the Protection of Personal Information Act (POPIA) as necessary. Since no rigorous ethical clearance process is required, there is little to no risk associated with the research.

Regarding plagiarism, the researcher acknowledged any work that other writers had done in helping to draft the report by providing a reference. Additionally, following the academic principles of fairness, responsibility, and honesty upheld by North-West University, the researcher made sure that secondary data was real and credible. The lowest level of researcher bias is a result of self-criticism and self-questioning during the data collecting, analysis, and reporting processes, which is in line with the critical realist aspect of this study design.

Provisional chapter summary

Chapter 1 - African migrant exclusion in South Africa and implications on the African Renaissance

The chapter raises the issue of African migrant exclusion. The chapter serves as the study's background and introduction and clarifies important concepts to provide context.

Chapter 2 – Literature Review: African Renaissance, migration, exclusion (xenophobia) of African immigrants.

This section defines key concepts in detail and highlights the connection between all the key phenomena of study.

Chapter 3 – Context: South Africa's position, response and policies on migration, and xenophobia.

The chapter emphasizes the nexus between the African Renaissance and the migration of Africans to South Africa, as well as the importance of including migrants to fully realize the idea of the African Renaissance. The chapter includes a discussion of both the country's historical and post-apartheid migration policies.

Chapter 4 – Research design, methodology, and findings on migration issues such as the exclusion and mistreatment (xenophobia) of African migrants in South Africa.

The chapter explores the exclusion and xenophobia that African immigrants encounter upon arriving in South Africa, its implications for the African Renaissance and the potential for developing stranger-friendly settings (*xenophilia*).

Chapter 5 – Recommendations and conclusion: Prospects for migrant inclusion and South Africa's relevance in the new African Renaissance project.

Based on the findings, this chapter presents recommendations for migrant integration and inclusion, peace and solidarity. It also makes suggestions for further research.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

Conceptual Framework - African Renaissance, migration, migrant, xenophobia *(Afrophobia)* and exclusion

The discussion and exploration of various conceptualizations such as African Renaissance, migration, exclusion and xenophobia (*Afrophobia*) are the focus of this chapter. In addition, South Africa will be used as a case study to analyse the location of the African Renaissance in a democratic South Africa and throughout Africa. The phenomenon of migration and xenophobia will be discussed in a global and regional context with an aim to explore the link between the African Renaissance and migrant exclusion (xenophobia).

2.1 Unpacking Renaissance

The concept of "Renaissance" is not new; it has long been associated with the European heritage's foray into new territory, which has served as the foundation for the modern Western world's general civilization (Kombo, 1998: 3). The concept "Renaissance" was coined in the 14th century and has since been employed by a variety of academics and thinkers in a variety of contexts. According to the historical dictionary cited by Nauert, Renaissance defines "rebirth and renewal" in its specific context. As "resurgence/rebirth" was a part of the Renaissance, it also meant and had the power to reveal the act of returning to restore and revive wonderful achievements. (Johnson, 2000).

Renaissance philosophers were deeply influenced by classical antiquity values, particularly as articulated in newly rediscovered masterpieces of literature, history, and philosophy (Wa Thiong'o, 1986). At its height in northern Europe, the term Renaissance was inextricably linked to reformation (Levi, 2002). Renaissance has shown such a strong momentum over the years that it has continued with new ideas and inventions, playing a vital role in almost every aspect of the world's most exceptional art and 'is used to mark significant turning points in religion, philosophy, science, politics, and other fields' (Magubane, 1999: 23).

The 15th to 17th centuries roughly make up the Renaissance era in history. The term "renaissance" means "re-birth," and it was during this period that Europe abandoned the dogmatic beliefs of the Middle Ages and gave birth to the first elements of the modern world as we know it. The re-discovery of the civilizations of ancient Greece and Rome stimulated interest in classical study, challenging medieval beliefs and views. Therefore, as the populace grew wealthier, trade, travel, and the dissemination of new ideas all increased. Additionally, the increase in income sparked interest in education, aided the growth of the arts, and encouraged scientific advancements and innovations. The printing press, which made it possible for books to be printed rather than written by hand and allowed for the distribution of knowledge to a much wider audience than ever before, was perhaps the most significant of these.

2.2 A Footprint of the African Renaissance

Although it could be argued that the African Renaissance ideal is influenced by the European civilisation, when looking at its earliest thinkers, it is clear that there are similarities and differences. The European civilisation was a venture into the art in spaces of religion, philosophy, science and politics. But the African renaissance was to reclaim the former glory of the continent which was evidenced by civilisations like Great Zimbabwe, Mapungubwe Sudan and the Ashanti Kingdom. Seme in juxtaposing the two civilisations opined that “the regeneration of Africa means that a new and unique civilisation is soon to be added to the world”.

With this observation, Seme was acknowledging the fact that there are other civilisations, but Africa will add to these civilisations, “the most essential departure of this new civilisation is that it shall be thoroughly spiritual and humanistic-indeed a regeneration moral and eternal”. One notable fact is that Seme gave this speech 6 years after the inaugural conference of the Pan African Congress, which boldly claimed “To the Nations of the World”, that “to be sure, the darker races are today the least advanced in culture according to European standards.

This has not, however, always been the case in the past, and certainly the world’s history, both ancient and modern, has given many instances of no despicable ability and capacity among the blackest races of men.” The tone and thinking between the delegates of the Pan African Congress and Seme are the same. They speak of African civilisation that has been overshadowed by European civilisation. Among others, due to the wars of conquest and resistance, the civilisation missions of the European Church and the greater colonisation of Africa by European states. This is the context of the African Renaissance ideal in the African continent.”

The concept of the African Renaissance, its origins, and its resurgence, according to Davidson (1955), has a considerably earlier pedigree, dating back to the founders of late nineteenth-century Pan-Africanist philosophy. Pixley ka Isaka Seme, one of the founding members of the African National Congress (ANC), originally established the concept of the African Renaissance as a philosophical and intellectual umbrella in South Africa in 1905 (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2019). Pixley called for "*Africa's regeneration*" in an article in 1906, an idea that may be considered a forerunner to the call for an African Renaissance (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2019). African Renaissance is an evolution of

Pan-Africanism in the African environment. The appeal for "Africa for the Africans" encouraged this movement (Mamdani, 1999; Banda & Saayman, 2015: 138).

Like Pixley ka Isaka Seme and Marcus Garvey, Azikiwe wrote a piece titled Renascent Africa, first published in 1937, in which he not only conveyed a notion of a new Africa but also his philosophy of black pride and self-reliance (Azikiwe, 1937). Subsequently, *Towards the African Renaissance: Essays in Culture and Development, 1946–1960*, by Cheikh Anta Diop (formally published in 1996), popularized the concept of the African Renaissance and emphasized the importance of grounding African development in African history and culture, as well as mobilizing Africans on the continent and in the diaspora to take charge of their futures. In concrete terms, the early stages of the African Renaissance saw civil rights movements in the United States, political decolonization of the Caribbean and Latin American countries, and political decolonization of Africa and the rise of continental Pan-Africanism, which influenced the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) were all part of the early phase of the African Renaissance drive (now the African Union [AU]) (Sogolo, 1993).

In its idealistic sense, the African Renaissance envisioned a significant transformation in the shape of African consciousness on which to base African unity, rebirth, and growth as was proclaimed by Cheikh Anta Diop (Diop, 1996). Cheru (2002) claims that during the colonial period, a Senegalese thinker named Diop used the term in conversations about Africa's struggle for independence. African Renaissance, according to Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah and Nigeria's Nnamdi Azikiwe, was about acknowledging Africans' common experience and fate in the struggle against colonialism and slavery, as well as for unity, freedom, and self-determination (Netshitenzhe, 2013). Nnamdi Azikwe, a Nigerian nationalist, expanded on the concept in 1937, calling for a "new Africa" based on five pillars: "spiritual balance, social regeneration, economic determination, mental liberation, and national self-determination" (Azikwe, 1937: 107).

Vilakazi (1999) states that every Renaissance begins with the reawakening of an idea, which in Africa entails decolonizing the intellect. The wave of popular renewal pronouncements according to Kessel (2002) coincided with Africa's liberation decade in the 1960s. In Africa, the renaissance notion evolved to define and combine Africa's

reaction and response to African challenges, dreams, and ambitions as a new phenomenon known as the "African Renaissance" (Kessel, 2002: 47). According to Prah (1998) and Makgoba (1999), Africans must establish and maintain their forward march without looking back. Zeleza (2009) feels that the African Renaissance has been proposed as a theoretical framework for tackling the question of African heritage, the multi-faceted challenges facing Africa, and the challenges of globalization in recent years by the African intelligentsia.

African Renaissance is a political movement aimed at uniting Africa (more like *Pan-Africanism*) and achieving national self-determination (Makgoba, 1999). It is Africans' subjective sense of kinship or affinity based on shared cultural norms, traditional institutions, racial heritage, and a shared historical experience (Munyai, 2020). Primary resistance to colonial rule, post-pacification or secondary revolts against specific administrative actions, including nativistic or messianic movements, and modern nationalist movements that advocate for self-government are the three trajectories subsidiary to the African Renaissance (Philani, 2000).

The current waves of African nationalism differ in their origins and impact from the early 1960s national independence movements (Simkins, 2017; Kohnert, 2009), and are impacted by globalization and rising inequality. Kohnert (2009: 112) reveals that, unlike the "first wave of nationalism, the present wave of nationalism tends to exclude rather than include populations; focuses on alienation and xenophobia, and its political instrumentalization is more like a curse". As a result, the African Renaissance has revived at an era when globalization has been used as a "soft tool" to promote a capitalist slave economy (neo-colonialism). This is compounded by the rising activity of unwanted non-state actors in Nigeria, Libya, Egypt, and Somalia, as well as the reoccurrence of xenophobia in South Africa (Behr & Jokela, 2015).

Africa Renaissance as an action plan for Africa aims to rewrite Africa's history from supporters or followers to a major geopolitical force in world relations, as well as to eliminate colonialism's disparaging and malevolent traces through economic and political unity and emancipation (Oginni & Moitui, 2016: 41). Asante (2014) said that a new Africa was forming amid political upheaval, economic dislocations, and social desperation, all of which were ignored by casual onlookers and the continent's

constant critics. This meant that African countries needed to band together for rebirth and to end the continent's marginalization in global affairs.

According to Zeleza (2009), the African Renaissance is more of a determined effort to regain Africa's history and humanity, which Europe ruthlessly snatched through slavery, colonialism, and neo-colonialism, as well as a will to sustainable development and viable African modernities. On one hand, Teffo (1997) maintains that the aim, breadth, and operation of the African Renaissance should be Afrocentric. On the other hand, Mbeki (1997; van Vuuren, 2000; Zeleza, 2009) submitted that Afro-optimism and Afro-pessimism, as well as both positive and negative political and economic shifts in postcolonial African history, drive African visions and discourses.

In philosophy, the African Renaissance is defined as an ideology that encourages and promotes Africa's regeneration through forward-thinking, innovative, and sensitive thinking (Landsberg, 2002). As a result, an ideology has emerged that seeks to reconstruct Africa, which has been shaped by colonial holocausts and manifested itself in autocratic governments, human rights violations, political instability, extreme poverty, and insecurity, to represent and achieve the *"Africa we want*" as per Agenda 2063 of the AU (AU, 2015; Oginni & Moitui, 2016: 44). According to Makgoba (1999), the African ideal of rebirth was first articulated in independence and autonomy in the 1960s, followed by democratization in the 1990s and continued progress advances.

African Renaissance agenda, according to Zeleza (2009), included promoting democratization and political accountability, peace and stability, and viable economic development and growth, as well as resolving the scourges of indebtedness and strengthening African nations and the continent's autonomy in their relations with superpowers. Furthermore, Zeleza (2009) pronounces that the African Renaissance should be viewed and spoken as a project, discourse, and process, and above all, as a task that entails examining and evaluating African performance, inclusion, opportunities, and postcolonial development paradigms in particular.

Given the aforementioned postcolonial African development phenomenon, there is a greater need to re-evaluate the building and branding of the African Renaissance in terms of human rights, inclusion, and integration of African immigrants into African communities, particularly in South Africa as the research's focal point.

Many African countries have experienced a revival in the political debate following their independence, which is significant because political independence has not translated into economic, industrial, or cultural independence. Pan Africanists, as delineated by Mavimbela (1998), believed that the continent had failed to realize its full potential and impact on the world as a result, the African Renaissance movement aimed to reposition Africa so that it could compete on an equal footing with other continents at the global level. The then Prime Minister of Namibia, now president, Hage Geingob, gave direction on how to fulfil the African Renaissance objectives during the ninth African Renaissance conference in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, in 2007. At the conference, he stated that without regional and continental cooperation, there could be no African rebirth (Geingob, 2007).

African Renaissance thought leaders hope to attain continental and global concord, in which "every person has the opportunity to realize his full potential in an atmosphere of peace, security, and respect for human rights" (Geingob, 2007). "African Renaissance simply means economic and political recovery or progress, anti-colonialism, pro-African-migration, cultural rebirth and the establishment of a new being, unity, and modernity in Africa and among Africans in practice and ideas." The only way for Africa to participate fairly and be competitive globally is for it to assert itself independently of the West and its conceptions by renouncing present Western constructs and redefining itself in constructs that are a pure reflection of relevant African indigenous notions of reality, and realize the potential and importance of migration on Africa development (de Haan, 1999).

The idea of an African renaissance has become a counter-hegemonic discourse in African social thought. Since the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when a rising modern Europe set its imperialistic eyes and tentacles on Africa, African intellectuals and activists have wrestled with the questions of Africa's purity and parity with Europe, of its autonomy and agency in a world marked by the destabilising and often destructive forces of imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, and globalisation. That yearning is fundamentally a search for a workable future, for new beginnings, for a pause in Africa's cruel history, and a change course. It is a battle cry to reclaim the continent's history and humanity, a will for sustainable development and self-sustaining modernity.

Great pan-Africanists of the nineteenth century, such as Edward Blyden, believed fervently that Africa would rise and reclaim its rightful place in the world. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the idea was periodically articulated by nationalists in various parts of the continent. Pixley ka Isaka Seme, one of the founders of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, prophesied in his 1905 essay 'The Regeneration of Africa' that would mean a new and unique civilisation is soon to be added to the world'.

“The rebirth of the African continent is fundamentally different from the European experience. Firstly, in 1490, the continent was an equal partner with various regions of the world in terms of trade, international relations and civilisation. Various empires in the continent equalled the empires in Europe, such as the Mapungubwe, the Great Zimbabwe, the Great Sudan and Carthage.

The Renaissance in the closing of the 20th century and opening of the 21st century was marked by the transformation of the OAU to the AU, and the development of blueprints continuing from the 1980s Lagos Plan of Action, the 1992 Abuja Treaty, into the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (2002) and Agenda 2063 of 2013. The AU is more empowered to intervene in intra-state conflicts compared to the OAU, which has protocols such as the Lome Declaration which prohibits unconstitutional changes of governments and the protocol on management of democratic elections. The consequence of this is the observation that the economist changed from referring to Africa as a “Dark continent to “Africa rising”.

2.3 Migration

Migration has become a reality in today's interconnected world, affecting practically every corner of the planet (Mbiyozo, 2018). The geographic movement of individuals across a designated boundary for the aim of establishing a new permanent or semi-permanent abode is broadly defined as migration (Bilsborrow *et al*., 1997; Fussell *et al*., 2014). Migration is defined by the International Organization of Migration as "the movement of a person or a group of people across an international border or inside a State (IOM, 2011)." It is any sort of human movement, regardless of length, composition, or causes; it includes refugee migration, displaced persons, economic migrants, and people travelling for other reasons, such as family reunification" (IOM,

2011). In an increasingly mobile world, however, defining migration as any type of human movement, regardless of length, is problematic.

Lee (1966) offers a definition of migration that takes into account both the temporal and spatial dimensions. Migration, according to him, is a change in permanent or semi-permanent residence that involves an origin, a destination, and any intervening impediments. Using this definition, however, a person moving from one apartment to another, even within a city is migrating, which is not consistent with the conventional use of the term. As a result, many definitions of migration clearly say that migration is the temporary crossing of a political or administrative boundary (Castles, 2000).

With the development of contemporary governments and boundaries, Castles (2000) and King (2012) affirm that defining migration has become far more politicized and complex. People may now move easier, cheaper, and faster in search of better prospects, work, and education, thanks to modern transportation (Oglethorpe *et al*., 2007). The literature on important ideas in this study shows that migration is a global phenomenon that is as old as human existence on earth (Isike & Isike, 2012). Mbiyozo (2018) also stated that migration has risen to the forefront of the global debate.

Migration is a continual phenomenon that has sparked political discussion around the world. Between 1960 and 2019, according to Dao et al., (2021: 418) "the global stock of international migrants grew from 92 to 270 million, nearly keeping pace with the world's population growth". Up until 2010, the global percentage of migrants hovered at 3% (Ozden *et al*., 2011), then began to climb until reaching 3.5% in 2019. In high-income countries, on the other hand, Dao et al., (2021) state that the foreign-born population grew faster than the overall population, increasing the average share of foreigners from 4.5% to 12% (+7.5% points). This shift is largely explained by the influx of immigrants from less developed countries, which is a remarkable phenomenon. Rushubirwa et al., (2015) point out that the underlying causes of this tendency are well understood, with population growth disparities between rich and poor countries, economic inequality, increased globalization, and political instability playing a critical role.

Migration as a worldwide phenomenon is subject to a variety of interpretations and is a highly debated topic, profoundly entwined in rational policy aims. Castelli (2018: 1) defines migration as "a central, permanent, and ongoing component of existence, in

which macro, meso and micro factors interact to determine the final individual or collective decision to migrate." This implies that humans are constantly on the go. Although migration, an especially international movement, has been an important feature for many years, it has recently been accelerated and aided by factors such as globalization, urbanization, political, economic, and climate change, among others (Skeldon 2012; Bremner & Hunter, 2014; UNHCR, 2013).

Migrating entails dangers and uncertainties, although many migrants gain in the long run. In terms of career prospects, money, safety, and overall well-being, they are generally better off than those in their home countries (Rushubirwa *et al*.,2015). Unfortunately in South Africa and other parts of the world migrants' safety and well-being are threatened by exclusion and xenophobia. Fortunately, Castles et al., (2014) underscore that the benefits of migration are not limited to those who relocate, as international migration has changed the lives of millions of people who have not even migrated and their entire societies, largely for the better.

Migration, according to Achiumwe and Landau (2015), is an old and ongoing phenomenon. Migration, being an interdisciplinary topic, has drawn researchers from a variety of fields, including geography, sociology, demography, economics, politics, and other related fields. Because of their distinct methodologies, scholars have attempted to investigate and define the topic of migration from numerous perspectives. The relevance of mobility in time and space was emphasized by geographers, the social repercussions of mobility were emphasized by sociologists, and the economic side of migration was emphasized by economists. Migration is defined as "the movement of people (individuals or groups of people) from one cultural area to another, which may be permanent or transitory," according to Ramphele (2016).

Sinha (2005) and Haller et al., (2018) consider migration to be one of the most important aspects of population change. In a similar vein, Oglethorpe et al (2007) emphasize the importance and significance of migration in that it causes quick and unanticipated changes in population size and density that go considerably beyond those caused by fertility and mortality. Fauvelle-Aymar (2015) is of the view that migration is driven by a variety of economic, political, and social causes in both ancient and modern settings. Migrants may flee their native country owing to widespread human rights violations or other threats to their safety and security. Many people are

obliged to look for work elsewhere due to the lack of decent work in their countries of origin, while others move to join already-established foreign family members outside their country (Fussell *et al*., 2014).

Migration is a diverse occurrence with significant variation among countries, and it has been a vital aspect of labour markets and lives for at least the previous century across much of the African continent (Adams & John, 2003). International, regional, and internal movements have all been part of it. It has crossed class and skill lines and can be found in a variety of demographic settings. At the same time, conflict, poverty, and the lack of a sustainable way of life push people from their homeland in quest of a better future for themselves and their families (Skeldon 2012; IOM, 2014).

In the context of the African Renaissance, advocating for “the rebirth of the continent” migration, mainly intra-Africa migration is encouraged because of the role it plays in the development and revival of Africa. This is evident from the fact that regional Pan-African institutions such as the African Union (AU) and the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) have already assumed the initiative and taken the lead on setting the agenda for enabling safe, orderly, and regular African migration, in line with the implementation of the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration (GCM), which was widely endorsed in July 2018 (Pailey, 2019).

The adoption in 2018 of the Continental Free Trade Area Agreement (AfCFTA) by 49 out of 55 Member States and the Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence, and Right of Establishment by 32 of the AU's Member States signalled Africa's renewed commitment to facilitating intra-Africa migration, trade, and investment (Pailey, 2019). Even though many Member States have not yet finished ratifying and implementing the AfCFTA and the Protocol on Free Movement, they continue to be crucial tools for finance and campaigning.

African policymakers have also taken the lead in assisting the AU by ensuring funding to implement migration agreements and platforms instituted from 2015 onwards, specifically the AU-ILO-IOM-ECA Joint Labour Migration Program for Development and Integration (2015), Migration Policy Framework for Africa and 12-Year Action Plan (2017), Protocol on Free Movement (2018), AfCFTA (2018), and Single African Air Transport Market (2018).

In support of intra-African migration encouraged by the African Renaissance, African policymakers should domesticate AU migration policies by developing appropriate migration strategies, which could include: the protection of migrants abroad (including labour and human rights, evacuation, resettlement and reintegration in times of crisis, etc.); the return and reintegration of migrants fleeing crises in regional and non-regional destinations; the establishment of offices of diaspora affairs in ministries of foreign affairs; the establishment of knowledge transfer programs that would facilitate the return of African nationals with skills suited to fill gaps in the labour market.

2.3.1 International and internal migration

International migration is known as the movement of people across borders to live permanently or temporarily in a country other than their birth or citizenship country (Schoorl, 1995; Mayda, 2010; Vezzoli *et al*., 2014). International migrants relocate from one country to another regularly, and shorter stays in another country should not be classed as permanent international migration, according to the United Nations (UN, 2009).

Male migrants made up 52% of the entire migrant population worldwide, while female migrants made up 48%. According to the UN's worldwide migration report, 74% of all foreign migrants (20–64 years) were of working age (UN, 2019). India, followed by Mexico and China, remained the most populous nation of origin for foreign migrants living abroad with 17.5 million, 11.8 million and 10.7 million respectively. The United States, on the other hand, is the most popular destination country, with 50.7 million international migrants. According to the UN (2019), between 2013 and 2017, the number of migrant workers in high-income nations declined slightly (from 112.3 million to 111.2 million), while increasing in other areas. The growth was greatest in upper-middle-income countries (from 17.5 million to 30.5 million).

According to the United Nations (2019), the number of international migrants worldwide climbed to 272 million in 2019, up from 174 million in 2000 (3.5% of the world's population). This means that 96.5 percent of the population lives in the country where they were born. However, the estimated number and share of international migrants already exceed predictions for 2050, which were over 230 million (2.6%) (UN, 2019). With this in mind, one can extrapolate that it is extremely difficult to accurately forecast the quantity and rate of international migration due to its close association

with acute events, such as severe instability, economic crisis or conflict as well as long-term trends, such as demographic change, economic development, communications technology advances and transportation access (Hendow *et al*., 2016).

International migration is a powerful manifestation of people's desire to improve their circumstances in a world where incomes, opportunities, safety, and lifestyles are all severely uneven (UNDP, 2009). Some people are compelled to migrate to avoid violence (wars), but the majority prefer to do so to close the gap between their opportunities and those of people in other, usually wealthier, places (Crush & Ramachandran, 2009; Castelli, 2018). Almost everyone is motivated by a desire for a better life in every migrant's unique story, for the most part, this desire is fulfilled.

According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), international migration is a matter of state sovereignty, as governments have the power to decide whether and under what conditions non-citizens may enter their territories (ILO, 2015). Furthermore, there is a belief that international migration should be kept to a bare minimum, limited solely to what is necessary to sustain economic advantage in an increasingly competitive global economy. As long as it is supervised, free movement of labour for investors, entrepreneurs, and certain kinds of skilled workers is largely allowed.

International migration of highly skilled and trained professionals poses a severe problem to developing countries. Subscribing to the theory of "brain drain", Yordanos et al., (2019) highlight that a significant loss of highly educated citizens abroad has a direct impact on the accumulation of human capital or knowledge. Such costs are bigger than the simple loss of investment in training immigrants in the first place, and the immediate outcome is a slowing of emerging countries' economic progress. In the same breath, the COVID-19 pandemic and the closure of borders as containment measures have dramatically impacted the social, economic and political situation in many regions, leading to a decrease in regular mobility pathways, streams of income and remittances (IOM, 2020).

Despite what some observers said or projected, the year 2020 did not usher in an age of immobility because people were still able to move even though it was limited. The COVID-19 pandemic disturbed some of the more traditional dynamics and

conventions of global migration, as well as reduced overall levels of pre–COVID–19 cross-border movement, it did not put an end to international migration (IOM, 2021; OECD, 2020).

Now moving to a narrowed form of migration, internal migration, as opposed to international migration, which comprises migratory transfers across country borders, refers to a migratory move when both the origin and destination locations are within the same country (Facchini *et al*., 2013). This trend is often tied to urbanization, which is seen as the driving cause behind people relocating to cities in search of better economic opportunities. According to Skeldon (2012), internal migration accounts for roughly 40% of urbanization in the developing regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, as noted in King (2012).

Domestic migration is significantly higher in terms of numbers than international migration, with the bulk of migrants relocating within their own country rather than between nations (Skeldon, 2012; Landau & Segatti, 2009). The number of internal migrants worldwide was estimated to be around 740 million individuals in 2009, according to research by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP, 2009). This amount was nearly four times that of international migrants at the time, even though it covers both regular and irregular migrants.

2.3.2 Regular and irregular migration

In practice, the distinctions between regular and irregular migrants are rarely evident. The vast majority of migrants enter their host nation regularly and only become "irregular" later due to administrative overstay (Ghosh, 1998; IOM, 2011). This could be due to factors other than the migrant's fault, such as unclear or overly bureaucratic migration procedures, discrimination, or practical impediments including high visa renewal costs, language barriers, and a lack of access to legal assistance (UNHCR, 1997, Castles, 2000). Those who cross borders without adequate documents and in an illegal manner, on the other hand, should be held accountable if there is no acceptable reason for doing so (i.e. asylum-seeking).

The transfer of a person from his or her customary place of residence to a new place of residence, in accordance with the laws and regulations governing exit from the country of origin, travel, transit, and admission into the destination or host country, is

commonly referred to as regular migration. This type of migration takes place through well-known and approved pathways, such as having legal travel documents like a passport, visa and permits for specific travel purposes and using legal state-controlled borders (IOM, 2011).

Irregular migration is defined as the "movement of persons that occurs outside of the laws, regulations, or international agreements that control admission into or exit from the state of origin, transit, or destination" (IOM, 2011). Despite the lack of a broadly acknowledged definition of irregular migration, the phrase is commonly used to describe people who travel outside of established migration channels. Meaning, entry, stay or work in a country without the requisite authority or documentation required under immigration regulations, from the standpoint of destination countries (Kraler & Reichel, 2011). In circumstances where a person crosses an international border without a valid passport or travel document or fails to meet the administrative conditions for leaving the country, irregularity is observed from the sending country's perspective (Vespe *et al*., 2017). There is a popular perception that irregular immigration, or migration that occurs outside of the Republic's regulatory framework, is a concern.

According to Adepoju (2007; Castelli, 2018), migrants can be considered to have taken an irregular migration route if they enter the country irregularly, for example, with false documentation or without crossing at an official border crossing point, or if they reside in the country irregularly, in violation of the terms of an entry visa/residence permit, or if they are employed in the country irregularly. IOM reported that between 17,000 and 20,000 male irregular migrants from East Africa and the Horn of Africa are smuggled into South Africa each year, with the vast majority being Somali and Ethiopian citizens (IOM, 2014).

The fact that people migrate irregularly does not absolve governments of their responsibility to safeguard their rights and provide them with certain forms of international protection, such as access to international protection for asylum seekers fleeing persecution, conflicts, or generalized violence. Furthermore, refugees, victims of trafficking, and unaccompanied migrant children are examples of migrants who may have no other option but to employ irregular migration channels.

"Irregular migration is difficult to track as it occurs outside the regulatory norms of countries and usually to avoid detection. Changes in the migration status of an individual, into or out of irregularity, are also hard to track. As a result, current knowledge of irregular migration levels and dynamics is limited, particularly on a global scale" (IOM, 2021).

2.3.3 Forced migration

Forced migration is defined as a migratory movement involving some form of coercion, such as threats to life and livelihood, whether caused by natural or man-made factors (e.g. movements of refugees and internally displaced persons as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development projects) (IOM, 2011). It is critical to note that for the small percentage of migrants who are compelled to move and end up doing so irregularly, such immigration can be justified, as in the case of irregularly arriving migrants seeking protection against persecution.

2.4 Reasons for migrating *(Push and Pull factors)*

The first thing that comes to mind when trying to comprehend migration is: Why do people move? Migration is rarely a straightforward shift of people or a movement from one location to the next; rather, it is a decision impacted by a variety of circumstances in both the areas where people live (areas of origin) and the areas where they desire to migrate (areas of destination) (areas of destination). The dynamics of migration are always changing in response to changes in the global environment (Vespe *et al*., 2017). New migratory flows emerge in reaction to economic, social, and political systems in both the sending and receiving nations, which are referred to as migration's push and pull forces. Conflict is a well-known pull and push element in terms of the pull and push factors, as well as poverty, and lack of sustainable livelihoods which stimulate individuals and groups to flee their homes in search of a better future for themselves and their families abroad (UNDP, 2009; IOM, 2014).

Castelli (2018) claims that economic and demographic factors are the most influential in driving global migration. Economic drivers include the potential for increased employment in the areas of destination, and demographic drivers include the size and density of the population in the areas of out-migration, as well as the prevalence of

diseases (Groth *et al*., 2020). Conflict, security, prejudice, and persecution, as well as government styles and institutionalized relocation programs, are all political drivers of migration. These drivers according to Oglethorpe et al (2007), can cause large-scale and rapid population shifts as witnessed in Europe in 2015 when millions of people fled the Middle East and North Africa largely due to these political drivers.

Besides political drivers, land productivity, natural resource security, climate change and natural disasters, as well as conservation initiatives are all environmental causes of migration (Borderon *et al*., 2019). Despite the increasing abundance of evidence on how and where populations migrate due to the impacts of environmental change, there is still little research, both quantitatively and qualitatively that links such migration to anthropogenic climate change (Cattaneo *et al*., 2019). In an African context, Thalheimer et al. (2021) denote that the confidence in attributable links regarding the climate change-human mobility nexus is low with evidence from climate science being in many cases underrepresented.

These factors may operate as primary migration drivers while also impacting other migration drivers. With the advent of transportation and information technology, social motivations such as family obligations and bonds have become increasingly frequent drivers of migration (Thalheimer *et al*., 2021). Migration drivers rarely function alone to influence migration decisions; rather, they work together to varying degrees to influence migration decisions.

2.5 Migration in the African Context

Migration has a long history in Africa, and Adepoju (2004) states that it dates back to the 4th century in Mali. Apart from the broader global picture, African migration, particularly in Southern Africa, has been particularly significant. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the current environment has resulted in increased migration movements from the region, as individuals are drawn to other countries and regions in quest of better opportunities (Adepoju, 2007). Africa has substantial migration dynamics as a result of a combination of conflicts, income disparity, and poverty, as well as environmental reasons such as droughts (IOM, 2011). Political, demographic, economic, social, and environmental factors are among the five macro-level forces that determine the volume, direction, and frequency of human migration in this region and globally, according to Groth et al., (2020).

Some African migrants from Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana and Namibia engage in seasonal agricultural operations that require them to travel borders; this type of migration might develop a long-term pattern of employment (Castelli, 2018). Others migrate for a limited time in response to changes in economic conditions, to obtain experience or training, or to save money for future investment. Individuals or entire families may choose to relocate to another African country to live a better life. Most Africans have a history of migrating to Europe with the belief that it offers greater opportunities than the countries of origin and the continent at large, scholars such as Isike and Isike (2012) coined the term "self-actualization" to describe this phenomenon.

Trading across borders is frequent in Africa, and depending on the length of stay, it may not be considered migration. Travel between Africa and Europe for cross-border trading is also common. Senegalese traders in Italy, for example, return to Senegal regularly to replenish their inventory (Castles *et al.,* 2014). South-to-North migration, unlike intra-African migration, is well documented, according to Waiganjo (2017), due to the "availability of funding and agents who facilitate it" Scholars such as Adepoju (2000) have remarked that the literature on international migration suggests that migration in Africa is becoming increasingly feminine since a lot of women are now travelling across borders on their own in quest of better livelihoods (Jamela, 2013; Crush *et al*., 2015).

In West Africa, the primary international migratory movements are from Burkina Faso to Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana, and from Mali and Guinea to Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal, to supply labour for commercial agriculture (Adepoju, 2000). Temporary seasonal migration is sometimes encouraged as a rite of passage for young men in Ethiopia, whereas long-term migration is considered a last resort by most poor families Groth et al., (2020). Regional differences in agriculture production seasonality encourage migration in Ghana. Mauritius and South Africa have high enough salaries that immigrants are often drawn to countries with even greater wages.

Landau and Segatti (2009) suggest that Southern African states can be classified as migrant-sending (Mozambique, Malawi, and Lesotho) or migrant-receiving (South Africa and Namibia). Botswana and Swaziland, for example, fall into both groups. Others, such as Tanzania and Zambia, have seen huge refugee influxes in recent

years but do not send or receive large numbers of labour migrants. In Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, governments' attitudes toward migration are generally either neutral or hostile (Gordon, 2016). Seven countries, Kenya, Gabon, Côte d'Ivoire, Botswana, Namibia, Djibouti, and Gambia, were reported as indicating in 2000 that immigration levels were too high, while another eleven claimed that they had plans in place to restrict immigration, according to a UNDESA evaluation (UNDESA, 2002). Meanwhile, Gabon, Sudan, Burkina Faso, and Guinea-Bissau have all indicated that immigration is too high and that their policy is to minimize migration.

2.6 Migrant *(African migrant)*

Since there is no universal definition for migration, determining who is a migrant differs per country, depending on political and socioeconomic interests, as well as migration rules and restrictions (King, 2012). According to the International Organization for Migration's prescripts and reports, a migrant is "a person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a state away from his or her habitual place of residence, regardless of (a) the person's legal status; (b) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (c) the causes for the movement; or (d) the length of the stay" (IOM, 2014).

A migrant is simply defined as "a person who moves into a country other than that of his or her nationality or usual residence so that the country of destination effectively becomes his or her new country of usual residence" from the perspective of a receiving country (UNDESA, 2009: 10; IOM, 2011). Dao et al., (2021) point out that the receiving nations' immigration policies and rules, as well as the degree to which those laws are enforced, have a significant impact on the number of immigrants to any nation and their places of origin.

African migrant, therefore, refers to “anyone from Africa who travels from their home nation to anywhere else on the planet” (Karen, 2007). On the one hand, every African migrant who crosses an international border, whether from the Northern, Eastern, Western, or Southern African region, to live in a new territory outside their country is an African migrant (Achiumwe & Landau, 2015). African (American) migrants, on the other hand, are black Americans who are on the move. In this case, the term 'African' is used as a prefix to refer to black individuals in the United States of America who are derived from families who originated in Africa. The term "African migrant" thus refers

to the origin, or rather, the geographical status, of persons migrating from African countries (Simkins, 2017).

The African Union goes on to define African migrants, specifically those who live outside of the continent's borders, as the 'African Diaspora,' which simply means "outside of Africa." Furthermore, the diaspora refers to "people of African descent living outside of Africa, regardless of citizenship or nationality, who want to contribute to the continent's development" (AU, 2020). Its founding act proclaims that it will "welcome and encourage the African Diaspora to fully participate as an integral component of Africa". Even though migrants play an integral role in development, it is known that wherever they land, they are most likely to encounter ill-treatment and xenophobia.

2.7 Xenophobia

On issues involving migration around the world, xenophobia has been a relatively popular topic on the public and governmental agenda. Violent incidents against migrants began to influence the international migrant population, resulting in the emergence of the xenophobia phenomenon. In simple terms, Charman and Piper (2012) describe xenophobia as ‘the hate of the other (foreign)’. Xenophobia can be found all across the world, according to Crush and Ramachandran (2009). Xenophobia is quite a contentious term in social, political, and academic disputes, despite its frequent use. Crush and Ramachandran (2009) looked at how the word 'xenophobia' was obtained from the Greek words '*Xenos*' and '*Phobos*,' which means 'strange' or 'foreign' and 'fear,' respectively.

The phenomenon stems from unjustifiable and unnecessary hatred that can grow among a country's population, resulting in emotions of distrust and aggressive responses to newcomers (Adam & Moodley, 2013; Bekker, 2015). It mostly reflects fury, envy, and patronizing attitudes toward foreign nationals, as well as aggressive behaviour (Chinomona & Maziriri, 2015; Crush *et al*., 2017). Some academics, such as Nyamnjoh (2006:41) and Abdi (2011: 700) define xenophobia as a “strong and unfounded fear and hate of foreigners or strangers," while others only recognize it when it manifests itself as overt hostility toward strangers (Harris, 2002). Xenophobia, according to Duponchel (2013) and Gordon (2016), is prejudice against foreigners or outsiders.

The South African Human Rights Commission defines xenophobia as "a strong hate of outsiders among the residents of a host country" (SAHRC, 1999). Moreover, Abdi (2011) acknowledges that the word was previously used to relate to the fear of foreigners, but that in recent years, it has been associated with "ethnocentrism," or the idea that one group or culture is inferior to others, as in the case of South Africa. An anthropological definition of xenophobia proposed by Mogekwu (2005: 7) is "fear and hate of foreigners as a result of poor intercultural communication in which members of one national culture do not understand, appreciate, or accommodate individuals of another national culture among them." According to the aforementioned criteria, xenophobia is deeply rooted in attitudes and behaviours of discrimination against non-citizens, which leads to human insecurity (abuse and killing of human life) and social exclusion.

Another theorization denotes the phenomenon as "attitudes, beliefs, and actions that reject, exclude, and sometimes demean people based on the perception that they are alien or alien to the community, society, or national identity" (Bruce, 2017:48). Furthermore, Bruce (2017) emphasizes that xenophobia is frequently associated with the belief in a hierarchical world order in which one's nation-state is superior to others. It is a multi-dimensional and multi-causal phenomenon tightly intertwined with conceptions of nationalism and ethnocentrism and frequently linked to periods of economic and political unrest (Hiropoulos, 2017). In essence, fear and violence against migrants stem from a perception that non-citizens pose a threat to the host communities' social standing, identity, and individual rights.

Xenophobia ranges from insults, humiliation, extortion, detentions, deportations, and at its worst, rape, violence, and murder (Matsinhe, 2011). Violence is defined by the World Health Organization (WHO) as "the deliberate use of physical or power violence, threatened or real, against oneself or a group or community that causes injury, death, or psychological damage, or is very likely to lead to undesirable development or development. deprivation" (WHO, 2002). Three types of violence are distinguished, including self-directed, interpersonal, and collective violence. Collective violence is described as violence perpetrated by larger groups of individuals, which according to WHO (2002) can take many forms, including social, political, and economic

aggression. Against this backdrop, one may claim that African immigrants have been victims of both individual and collective violence.

2.8. Xenophobia, an element of exclusion in a global context

Xenophobia did not begin in South Africa or Africa, it has a long history in other regions such as Asia, Australia, Europe and North America, i.e. in the United Kingdom, Japan, etc (Mayfield, 2010; Chiumia, 2016). The discourse has largely rotated around the 'character, drivers, impacts, and policy responses to xenophobia in recent years, resulting in a large body of literature, the majority of which focuses on negative attitudes and discriminatory treatment towards migrants in Europe and North America (Gorinas & Pytliková, 2018; Peterie & Neal, 2020).

There were reported cases of xenophobic incidents toward Russians and Hungarians in Italy (Rome), of which the victims of such cases were known not to be citizens and came from surrounding countries (Gorinas & Pytliková, 2018) Xenophobic sentiments toward migrants have been expressed in Australia, although it is a cosmopolitan country. Foreigners have always been seen as criminals or asylum seekers. The situation deteriorated when the government and opposition parties exploited migrants by demonizing them (Mayfield, 2010; Rensmann & Miller, 2017).

France, once a White and Catholic country, was developed due to the presence of migrants (Muslims and other races in particular). On the flip side, xenophobia in France became so popular that residents began to blame foreigners for increased unemployment and instability (Mikulich, 2009). As a result of the labelling of foreigners as criminals, the French government tightened security (immigration rules). Fear that foreigners from other continents, such as Africa and Asia will contaminate their cultures (Roemer *et al*., 2007). The French and British have established harsher immigration restrictions that limit the number of foreigners from these countries (Roemer *et al*., 2007).

Herrera and Kraus (2016) used a multi-ethnic dataset of around 11,000 respondents gathered in Russia between 2003 and 2004 to investigate ethnicity and national identity in the post-Soviet space and assess the basis of xenophobia in Russia. The factors of xenophobia toward four different groups were studied: Roma, Chechens, Azerbaijanis, and Muslims. National identification was not found to be a factor in

xenophobia, according to the study. Although there was some evidence to back the social dominance theory, the link between economic vulnerability and xenophobia was unexpected; higher wealth was linked to increased hatred toward some groups, while economic threat explained xenophobia only toward Chechens (Herrera & Kraus, 2016).

Xenophobia presents itself in the United States of America (USA) as a hate crime (Mayfield, 2010). According to some studies conducted, xenophobia first appeared in the United States in the eighteenth century. It was reported in 1885 that White Americans were attacking Chinese people. Another xenophobic attack on the Chinese was documented in 1890 when White agricultural labourers attacked their Chinese counterparts. Americans' attitudes toward Mexicans, Italians, and Asians demonstrate that they are not welcome in the country (Clemens *et al*., 2018). In 1914, xenophobic attacks against Mexicans came to an end. Only foreigners from Germany, England, French-speaking Canadians, and Jews were permitted to enter the United States during this period (Chiumia, 2016).

The myth of the United States as a nation of European immigrants has its roots in American xenophobia, which is founded on the belief that "our country" is defined and must be defended by its mainly White European history (Mikulich, 2009). This circumstance covers America's fundamental sin of racism by concealing the truth that the country was established, promoted and maintained in part on the backs of Africans who were stripped of their native culture and who arrived unwittingly through the slave trade in the Atlantic (Clemens *et al.,* 2018).

In India, as in South Africa, the number of Bangladeshi foreign nationals has been predominantly regarded by government officials as a national crisis (Crush & Ramachandran, 2009). The fact that xenophobic attacks against Bangladesh differ according to religious origin is a unique feature of xenophobia in India. In South Africa and India, xenophobic violence against foreigners is similar in that it is founded on "politics of exclusion" and is linked to post-independence and nation-building (Camminga, 2018).

2.9 Xenophobia, an expression of migrant exclusion in Africa

Olukoju (2008) in his article *Black on Black: xenophobic attacks and interstate relations in Post-Independence Africa*, traced the history of xenophobia in Africa dating back to pre-colonial times. Marriage arrangements, which limited people to marrying people from clans other than their own, gave rise to the concept of social exclusion, which came out to be a dominating feature of xenophobia. The belief that the other clans were inferior was usually the motivation for this practice. The majority of clans were socially built to see any other clan as a threat to their survival.

Globalization may be responsible for xenophobic attitudes since in the face of globalization, different nationals from different countries move from one country to another in pursuit of greener pastures, only to be subjected to xenophobic attacks at the end of the day (Harrison, 2005; Nyamnjoh, 2006).

Xenophobia is also a reality in Africa, with most scholars agreeing that the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 serves as proof (Fourchard & Segatti, 2015; UN, 2019). There have been reports of anti-immigrant sentiment in Nigeria and Ghana, which resulted in xenophobia (Campbell, 2003). In 1969, xenophobia in Ghana worsened to the point where the Ghanaian government was forced to remove 1.5 million migrants, mostly Nigerians. Years later, the Nigerian government also removed over a million migrants from the country in 1983, primarily Ghanaians (Campbell, 2003: 75). Both countries' xenophobic attitudes were exacerbated by their economic woes. In 1969 and 1983, citizens of the two countries, Ghana and Nigeria, accused each other of being responsible for their respective situations (Soyombo, 2008).

In Botswana, migrants (except South Africans) were referred to as "*makwerekwere*" by residents who spontaneously embraced xenophobic views from South Africa (Campbell, 2003; Kopinski & Polus, 2012). This derogatory term, which is also popular in South Africa, refers to foreign language speakers from economically depressed countries seeking better pastures. Xenophobic attitudes against foreigners in the two countries differ slightly in that Indians are loathed, attacked, and viewed as threats and a burden in Botswana, despite their massive economic investments (Campbell, 2003).

On a more positive note, Campbell and Crush (2015) point out that most African leaders have condemned xenophobia as part of the process of tackling challenges

that jeopardize national, regional, and global peace. However, when reviewing the substantial literature on xenophobia in Africa, it is clear that scholars and researchers are more concerned about how politicians and community leaders incite violence against migrants (Peterie & Neil, 2020).

In recent years, Africa has seen an increase in anti-immigrant and nativist clashes. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Zambia, and the Ivory Coast are only a few examples (AU, 2020). As a result of this rise, academics have written a growing body of work on the emergence of xenophobia on the African continent. The inclusivity and spirit of unity that characterized most African countries' early years of independence have been abandoned, instead, the exclusion of social groups within the same society appears to define the new nationalism, with a focus on the new political divide between endemic and origin (Adibe, 2017). The new national question appears to be "who has citizenship but shouldn't have it, and who should have it but doesn't" (Tsheola *et al*., 2015). Citizenship is increasingly being used to exclude and deny immigrants access to social services, welfare, employment, property, and other privileges.

Xenophobia is defined as "a strong feeling of dislike or fear toward people from other countries," (Oxford Dictionary, cited in Mngomezulu & Dube, 2019: 68). Mngomezulu and Dube (2019: 70) further add that this "strong emotion of repulsion or fear" is not solely based on race or class, but also directed to "people from other countries," all of whom are included in his definition. Mngomezulu and Dube (2019: 73) on one hand, state that "*xenophobia is the fear of others*, on the other Waiganjo (2017; Tarisayi & Manik (2021: 187) speak of the fear of a specific other, the other black, which is known as *Afrophobia* ".

In support of this claim, Waiganjo (2017) points out that in South Africa, the "particular other" was almost invariably, if not always, black foreigners as seen during the previous incidents of xenophobic violence like that of 2008 and 2015 experienced mainly by black foreigners. In response to recent attacks on African migrants, Nigerian politician Ezekwesili called it Afrophobia rather than xenophobia. As she said:

“I have not seen Italians or other Europeans, nor have I seen any Chinese or Indian hurt or maim, kill or lose property. I have seen addresses of people, especially from my country, Nigeria”.

2.10 From Xenophobia to Afrophobia *(A South African Dilemma of Exclusion***)**

International migrants arriving in South Africa, particularly those of black African origin, have encountered tremendous prejudice. Xenophobia remains one of the undesirable and prevalent aspects of post-apartheid South Africa (Daily Vox, 2017; Tarisayi & Manik, 2021). It is not just racist, but also Africanized, as xenophobia in South Africa targets black African foreigners disproportionately (Nyamnjoh, 2006). A narrative or reasoning behind xenophobia, marginalization, and mistreatment of black African immigrants in South Africa is based on the conviction that they steal jobs and women meant for South African citizens and also commit crimes (Matsinhe, 2011). This fuels the practice of social exclusion in South Africa, which mostly targets black African immigrants.

For instance, stereotypes associate Nigerians who came to South Africa with drug trafficking and prostitution, while Zimbabweans are linked with robbery (IOM, 2010), and Malawians with cheap labour. Due to the struggle for scarce resources in South Africa, black South Africans are often dissatisfied with the competition for jobs and business opportunities with African immigrants (Matsinhe 2011). Chinomona and Maziriri (2015) debunked this assertion based on irrationality and pure jealousy, stating that such claims lack evidence.

Afrophobia is open to a wide range of interpretations, some authors, such as Olukojo (2008), Matsinhe (2011), Mngomezulu and Dube (2019) and Ullah et al., (2020), use the term '*Afrophobia*' to refer to racist xenophobia directed at black African migrants, which they consider to be a more accurate phrase to describe xenophobia in South Africa. Roemer et al, (2007), as well as Campbell and Crush (2015), speak of a hierarchy of race belonging that is founded on a hierarchy of races and stereotypes of distinct racial groups. In South Africa, the disparaging epithet "*makwerekwere*" is frequently used to refer to black African foreigners (Mantsinhe, 2011). The term, invented by black South Africans, has negative connotations and represents the sound of other Africans speaking incomprehensible languages (Nyamnjoh, 2006). The

"*makwerekwere*" (African migrants) are viewed as a serious threat to personal and communal safety, as well as a threat to the country of South Africa.

Since African migrants are seen as a threat in South Africa, they are then subjected to xenophobia in an attempt to keep them out of the country. This expressed itself in the abuse of African migrants of the same skin colour as the local population (Hopstock & de Jager, 2011; Rushubirwa *et al*., 2015). In general, both public discourse and scholarly research hold that what is commonly referred to be xenophobia is aimed against Africans in the country, rather than outsiders in general (Matsinhe, 2011). Anti-African sentiments and violence against immigrants are frequent among South Africa's underprivileged urban populations, and they are linked to other aspects of the divided society, such as a sense of interracial competition and alienation amid great inequities (Gordon, 2016).

According to a study conducted by Masikane et al (2020), South Africa has a history of violence, and the apartheid's legacy played a critical role in terms of contribution. Participants of the abovementioned study (Masikane *et al*., 2020) believe that apartheid taught many South Africans to attain their goals through violence. During the battle against apartheid, South Africa witnessed acts of violence intended towards the apartheid system. Many people were killed as a result of political violence between different political groups in the country (Masikane *et al*., 2020:8). This past instilled in the country's residents a culture of violence and hatred. Because xenophobia is a violent act, it should not be surprising that it exists, especially the form of xenophobia that occurred in 2008.

Although violence against African immigrants by their native hosts, South Africans, is not new, politicians like Ezekwesili's linkage of recent attacks with "*black versus black*" or better still "*Afrophobia*" has spurred debate over the term's use in defining such instances (Olukoju, 2008). Ullah et al., (2020) add to the xenophobia discussion in South Africa by stating that "while migration is frequent in South Africa (among all racial groups), it is fairly simple to describe to black South Africans attitudes toward African migrants as '*Afrophobic*'. There are different attitudes towards different groups of migrants (Black and White). Even when looking at black South Africans as a group, it suggests that in most cases Whites are the most tolerated migrants.

Studies have revealed that South Africans (black) prefer migrants from Europe and North America as opposed to those from Africa (Crush *et al*., 2017; Gordon, 2015). Crush et al. (2017) found that attitudes toward migrants from Southern Africa have improved in their analysis of the 2006 and 2010 South African Migration Program (SAMP) surveys, with the percentage of respondents with positive impressions of migrants from this region increasing from 21% in 2006 to 25% in 2010. However, after that survey in 2010, xenophobic violence has been resurgent against African immigrants in 2015, 2019 and as recent as 2022, which shows that African immigrants are still facing exclusion which manifests as Afrophobia in South Africa.

2.11 Exclusion

Exclusion, as a term used in social sciences, dates back to classical sociology. It refers to Max Weber's (1958) account of how certain groups choose to maintain a privileged position in society by monopolizing symbolic or material resources or opportunities (Weber, explained by Gerth and Mills (1958). This implies that others are treated as second-class citizens or are excluded entirely (Schierup *et al*., 2015). In its manifestation, exclusion means that an individual or a population group is disadvantaged in relation to certain norms of social, economic, or political activity and institutional processes and the results or consequences of these processes in individuals, groups, or communities hinder progress (Percy-Smith, 2000).

Exclusion, according to Schierup et al., (2015) is a multi-dimensional process characterized by uneven power connections that interact across four key dimensions: economic, political, social, and cultural, and at many levels such as individual, household, group, community, country, and global levels. It leads to a cycle of ‘inclusion and exclusion marked by unequal access to resources, capabilities, and rights, resulting in inequities" (Popay *et al*., 2008).

Given the history of racism and segregation policies, one may argue that South Africa (both state and non-state actors) engaged in identity-based exclusion of the indigenous people (black South Africans), which peaked during the apartheid era. African families were torn across the rural-urban divide due to segregationist regulations and a vindictive migrant labour system (Vosloo, 2020). Workers in cities were given precarious jobs, as well as housing and amenities that were thought to serve a transient population. Pre-1994, and to some extent, even post-apartheid, black

South Africans faced exclusion due to a lack of basic human rights and any social contract with the state (Vosloo, 2020).

The generalized scope of exclusion is explained by Walker and Walker (1997) as "an integrative formulation that relates to the dynamic process, in whole or in part, of all social, economic, political, or cultural institutions that influence a person's integration in a society." Individual actions and decisions, as well as institutional systems, continue to perpetuate exclusion (exclusion agents). As a result, exclusion can be viewed as a rejection (or non-realization) of citizens' civil, political, and social rights (Walker & Walker, 1997).

International migration, according to Balbo and Marconi (2006), leads to exclusion because integration is heavily reliant on "command of the local language," as is the case in South Africa, where African immigrants are largely excluded from society due to their inability to understand the host's languages. On a different note, Wa Thiong'o (2009) stresses the importance of radical change, which includes the usage of African languages as part of the Renaissance. Multilingualism is critical in South Africa; for example, the average South African citizen speaks more than one language (Coetzee Van Roy, 2016). This means that non-South Africans can choose the language that is most convenient for them to acquire to communicate with ordinary people.

Foreigners from Botswana are welcomed favourably in the North-West Province, according to Reitzes and Simpkins (1998). This is due in great part to a shared language, culture, and history that exists on both sides of the border. Cultural, ethnic, and linguistic similarities appear to be more relevant than nationality in local relations.

Exclusion, according to Jones and Smyth (1999), deepens one's understanding of poverty and establishes a conceptual relationship between access to opportunities and citizenship. Exclusion also relates to insufficient rights relating to access to housing, education, health, and other basic services. It affects individuals and groups who are discriminated against or disadvantaged in some way, particularly in urban and rural areas, and it highlights the social infrastructure's flaws as well as the threat of a two-class society forming on its own. In a nutshell, exclusion is the (in)voluntary segregation of individuals and groups from society's political, economic, and social processes, preventing them from fully participating in society.

2.11.1. Social Exclusion

Bhalla and Lapeyre (1997; DFID, 2005; Hungwe & Gelderblom, 2014) define social exclusion as a practice that prevails in developed, developing and under-developed countries in which a minority of people are excluded from the main social system, activities, rights, and privileges, and are unlikely to benefit from state welfare or formal social security at any point in their lives. Furthermore, people who are excluded are unlikely to be granted the freedom or avenues to raise concerns with the government (de Haan, 1999; Schierup *et al*., 2015). The concept of social exclusion is still alive and well in the world of international development, albeit most commonly in the context of promoting inclusion in mainstream development goals.

Failure to promote inclusion implies that many people may be subjected to and suffer from social exclusion based on their identity (de Haan, 1999). African immigrants in South Africa face such exclusion because of their national identities. According to Phillip (2008), social exclusion occurs on both an individual and a group level. This might take the shape of stigma, humiliation, or ostracism on an individual level, but it can also take on more sinister aspects in groups. This type of exclusion indicates that immigrants are unable to live a life they value, and hence are unable to achieve substantive freedom (Phillips, 2008).

African immigrants, who make up a small percentage of South African communities, usually get excluded and sometimes find themselves in insecure, vulnerable locations such as slums and run-down housing estates, where crime and violence are common. Due to exclusion, migrants are not granted sufficient social protection they need (Jones & Smyth, 1999). Host migrant tensions modelled by perceptions of religious, ethnic and cultural ‘otherness’ sharpen social exclusion and divisions and potentially contribute to conflict (DAC, 2012).

2.11.2 Political Exclusion

Political exclusion, according to Hedstrom and Smith (2013) is defined as the exclusion of a certain group of the population from participating in matters about the state, i.e. political events (e.g. elections), resulting in an unfavourable and hostile barrier between the majority and the minority who are deprived of fundamental civil rights in society. This form of exclusion jeopardizes liberal democracy's key political

goals. Political exclusion, to Moyo and Zanker (2020) means being denied the opportunity or rather the freedom to engage effectively in the decision-making process as well as public policies that address the needs and aspirations of various groups in society.

Political exclusion is usually legitimized by law, in South Africa, it is through the supreme law, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, and justifying legal methods (SAHRC, 2017). This exclusion is inextricably linked to citizenship because every essential political activity and process requires a certificate of citizenship, which simply means that those without one are ineligible and thus excluded from participating in the country's political events and activities (Jamela, 2013).

Immigrants in South Africa, like the rest of the world, face widespread political exclusion, which is characterized by deprivation and restrictions of individual or migrant groups' access to political systems and processes, such as freedom of association, assembly, and voting, as well as the right to form a political party (Hedstrom & Smith, 2013). Migrants are minor political players who do not form a core political constituency. As a result, according to Gibson and Gouws (2000), citizenship (identity) has adopted an exclusive rather than inclusive function in circumstances where foreign nationals are being excluded. This, to some extent, can threaten the socio-political stability and unity that post-independence states are known for.

The right to vote, or suffrage, is often reserved for country citizens only in the majority of countries across the globe. However, in some countries, residents who are not citizens are allowed to vote. These rights are frequently regulated or limited in some way, with the specifics of the limitations varying from country to country. The United States is one country, where some subnational entities have given immigrants the power to vote. The idea of subnational citizenship has been used as a justification to grant this right to those normally excluded from it. Other countries have granted voting rights to immigrants who hold citizenship of a country that is a fellow member of a supranational organization (e.g. members of the European Union).

Earnest (2003) examined the practice of granting foreigners the right to vote and concluded that while it is surprisingly widespread, the specifics vary greatly from country to country. Furthermore, Earnest (2003) compared the voting rights of immigrants in various democracies and found that subnational governments (rather

than central governments) in developed states like Canada from 1975 to the present, Switzerland from 1960 to the present, and the United States from 1968 to the present have successfully granted immigrants the right to vote. This suggests that a developing country, like South Africa, one of the democratic governments in Africa, is equally capable of granting immigrants the right to vote, while adequately regulating and limiting the right, and also leading an initiative that will be adopted by other democracies in Africa. Jamela (2013) as well as Asal et al., (2016) propose that to combat political exclusion, it is imperative to return to the idea of citizenship as a universal right.

2.11.3 Economic Exclusion

Economic exclusion is a multifaceted process in which certain people are unable to completely and fairly engage in the economic activities of the country or place in which they reside (Burchardt, 2000). It occurs when people are at a serious economic disadvantage, meaning they are unable to better their financial situation (Burchardt, 2000). Economic exclusion also refers to the removal of employees from three basic markets: labour, credit, and insurance (completely or partially). When applied to labour markets, the exclusion concept shows the genuine and growing gaps between qualified citizens and immigrants. The actions of both private and public institutions and structural forces perpetuate economic disadvantage and privilege. Economic exclusion differs from income or wealth inequalities, which can result from and are symptoms of exclusion. Usually, communities of colour, immigrants and refugees, as well as women experience this form of exclusion (Greene *et al*., 2016).

The question of whether international migration has a harmful or good impact on the national economy is one of the most persistent anti-immigrant themes in South Africa and around the world (Hungwe & Gelderblom, 2014). In South Africa, urban areas have become major centres of economic activity for both South Africans and immigrants as urbanization rates have risen. Rural-urban migrants, for example, may not always have the same economic rights as citizens and are frequently employed in precarious, low-paying employment. Moreover, retrenchments and a decrease in the number of migrant mineworkers have resulted from South Africa's exclusive economic and labour policies, which also heightened the socioeconomic difficulties of migrant-sending countries (Kuhlman, 1991; Ngomane, 2010)

Economically, the formal and informal sectors of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in South Africa are critical characteristics of the financial lifestyles of marginalized and inclined groups, consisting of immigrants (Africans) who are a part of the SME area. This specific area, however, continues to witness and maintain the exclusion and discrimination of those operating in the space, African immigrants in particular due to the shortage of regulations that adjust the legitimacy of the participation of immigrants in this sector (ILO, 2015; Benjamin, 2008).

Generally, people are excluded, according to Wright et al. (1986), if they differ from others in one or more qualities, and the origin of migration may be one of such traits. This practice mirrors for instance when the government advertises economic opportunities (jobs) that are specifically targeted at South African citizens. This is also true in South African universities, where foreigners or international students are subject to different terms and circumstances when it comes to paying their tuition fees than South African citizens (Jackson *et al*., 2006).

The state does not provide immigrants with the same opportunities and services as citizens (Whitaker, 2005). Protection from mistreatment, exploitative work practices, and abuse falls under the remit of the country's supreme law, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, and is one of the basic rights that everyone, regardless of citizenship, should enjoy within the country's borders (SAHRC, 2017). Contrary to popular belief, African immigrants are frequently excluded, and their rights are frequently infringed, as they are subjected to mistreatment, exploitative work practices, abuse, and humiliation, even after lawfully settling in South Africa.

Greene et al., (2016) highpoint that exclusion does not only lead to the spread of inequality, but also results in disparities in access to resources, employment, education, and government services. In South Africa, one of the main causes of exclusion from the job market is a lack of education, particularly illiteracy. Exclusion from the job market can also be due to direct discrimination based on race, nationality, gender, age, or socioeconomic class. As a result, it can be claimed that African immigrants who migrate to South Africa in this case already have low chances of securing a proper decent job in the market, as nationality/ citizenship plays a critical role in terms of selection and recruitment.

The fight for democracy in South Africa also meant promoting native citizens' inclusion into the country's social, economic, and political systems (Geingob, 2007). Fortunately, the tables turned, the government changed, and the indigenous people faced little or no exclusion. On the contrary, in post-apartheid South Africa, the same exclusion that was enacted by the State and non-state actors against black South Africans began to be shifted towards African immigrants. This expressed itself through the poor integration of African immigrants into host societies (Phillips, 2008). The failure of state and non-state actors in South Africa to build a social infrastructure that allows for the establishment of a two-tier society consisting of both citizens and non-citizens has resulted in the exclusion of African immigrants from the social system.

In the literature reviewed, contentions transpire in terms of how to attain the goal of the African Renaissance or a united Africa while African immigrants continue to be subjected to social, political and economic exclusion within the African continent. “In Southern Africa, debates over the extension of political and social rights to immigrants have a long history of contention and strife” (Whitaker, 2005).

With democratization as part of the commitment to promote inclusion, the democratic government in South Africa took steps to rectify historical inequities and target historically marginalized people. Identity-based policies, such as affirmative action and black empowerment programs, were implemented as a result of these initiatives, to combat and eliminate exclusion and establish equality and equity. The National Action Plan (NAP) was also adopted to combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related Intolerance (NAP, 2016). With all of this history, one would think that South Africa and its people (both State and non-state actors) would therefore be better equipped and in a better position to deal with the exclusion of any form.

Conclusion

This chapter explored, explained and clarified various conceptualizations of the key terms of the study, including African Renaissance with a wide range of interpretations from diverse African thought leaders who share the view that the ideology heavily revolves around Africa's rebirth and revival. This chapter also presented the definition and background of the theory and practice of migration from an international and domestic perspective, while looking at regular and irregular migration and its drivers.

Additionally, this section described and examined the economic, social, and political exclusion of African immigrants, as well as how it manifests through xenophobia and advances to Afrophobia, a problem common in South Africa.

CHAPTER THREE: CONTEXTUALIZATION

South Africa's position (regional and international), response and policies on migration, xenophobia and African Renaissance

In this chapter, South Africa's position, response and policies on migration, and xenophobia will be delineated and dissected. The chapter considers the role of government in dealing with migration issues in South Africa and also discusses the relationship and influence that the African Renaissance has had on the migration of African immigrants in South Africa. The chapter further touches on the significance of migrant inclusion in fostering and advancing the idea of the African Renaissance. Furthermore, it locates South Africa's position in the project of African Renaissance and migration policy (decision) making. This section comprises a brief discourse on the country's historical migration policies, as well as those adopted in the post-apartheid era (political development and system). It conveys the theoretical statement related to the poor practice of the African Renaissance, which contradicts and disrupts the idea of Afro-modernity.

3.1 Migration in South Africa

According to McDonald (2000: 89), migration has long been a topic of public discussion in/about Africa. As part of Africa, South Africa has a long history of cross-border human migration, extending back to the pre-colonial era (Crush, 1999: 10; CoRMSA, 2009; Farley, 2019). The Bantu migration, which occurred before the arrival of White settlers in 1652, reflects the beginning of South Africa's immigration history (Klotz, 2013: 1869). Scholars agree that a pair of events in the 19th century marked a turning point, the late 1860s discovery of diamonds in Kimberley and the roughly 1886 striking of gold in the Witwatersrand basin, near Johannesburg (Crush, 1984: 113; Facchini *et al*., 2013: 13). These discoveries sparked significant migration into South Africa, notably to Johannesburg, and the immigrants included a mix of Southern

Africans as well as fortune seekers from Australia, Europe, the United States, and other countries (Crush, 1984: 116).

The change of regime and the advent of apartheid augmented migration challenges in South Africa. There were significant discrepancies in the movement of people of different races, and that had to do with the country's apartheid policies and regulations (Crush, 1999: 7). While the majority of immigrants came from other parts of the continent to work in mining and other industries, they did not have the right to stay permanently (Crush *et al*., 1991). White immigrants, initially from Europe and North America, and later from newly independent African countries such as Zimbabwe and Mozambique, were granted permanent residency in South Africa. Crush et al., (1991) emphasize that Black African immigrants were only allowed to stay as long as they worked and kept valid contracts; after these contracts were completed, they were returned to their home countries.

Landau and Segatti (2008) are of the view that European migration led to the establishment of an authoritarian dictatorship (apartheid) and a racially biased government in South Africa. In actuality, the diversity of the individuals that make up South Africa's "*rainbow nation*" was established by foreign migration (Gary, 1997; Fauvelle, 2015; Vosloo, 2020: 15). With a rising foreign immigrant population in the country, (Moyo, 2021) holds that South Africa serves as a regional hub for immigrants on the African continent. Because of its middle-income status, democratic institutions and comparatively industrialized economy, South Africa has the most immigrants on the African continent.

The African continental and Southern African regional strategic importance of South Africa is characterised by the fact that on the immigration challenges or problems the world is facing, it is the African country negatively affected by the “global immigration crisis” more than any other African country. In the words of Ademola Araoye, a former Nigerian diplomat:

> *In Africa, South Africa has been singularly hit by this worldwide phenomenon. This was inevitably a near and popular destination for the poor and wearied of Africa and Asia. Barely two decades into its majority rule, in the context of its internal challenges and the struggle as with most states hit by this global challenge, South Africa has paid the price of sluggish messaging and faced*

the familiar hypocrisy of a world that has traditionally designed one measure for Africa and another for itself. But it is Africa that has been caught in the beams of the hypocritical international searchlight" (Araoye, 2015:12).

In his article providing honest, sincere and objective understanding of the key reasons behind the flow of African immigrants into South Africa, he maintains, firstly, that there are; continental perceptions of a sense of entitlement to an open black-ruled post-apartheid South Africa given its special place in the tortuous story of African emancipation, its sterling economy and the universality of its ideological motor that drove its liberation struggle" (Araoye, 2015:9).

According to Landau and Segatti (2009), the post-apartheid era saw a significant influx of both permanent and temporary African migrants. This was owing to the positive social, economic, and political changes that democracy brought (McDonald, 2000: 86). As a result, neighbouring countries such as "Lesotho, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Mozambique, and Swaziland" served as labour pools on one hand, while on the other South Africa appeared to be a haven for people wanting a better life for themselves and their families (Neocosmos, 2010). During most of the 19th and 20th centuries as well as apartheid rule, labour migration from nearby Southern African countries normalized the coexistence of Black Africans and inhabitants of other African countries in South Africa (Umezurike & Ogunnubi, 2016).

However, with global immigration on the rise, the dynamics started to change and thus migration-associated problems are believed to be negatively affecting South Africa more than any other African country. The problem of illegal migrants in South Africa is on the rise, and the dilemma is that South Africa is caught between resolving the challenge of accommodating its sprawling number of illegal immigrants and rolling out strict migration management policies and programs, at the same time being sensitive to the demands of African solidarity in managing the avalanche of fleeing economic migrants from badly managed African countries (Araoye, 2015:9).

Another reason is that it has to "bear the brunt" of a global immigration crisis as "the major economic destination with the largest aggregation of centripetal economic factors." Araoye (2015:9) further argues that young uneducated black South Africans have felt strongly disadvantaged in the competition in the retail trade and petty

services that have been taken over by fellow Africans from the continent as well as from South Asia. In addition, the political governance of ‘many’ African societies is structurally inimical to the advancement of their development and the material conditions and rights of its members. Added to this problem is what Araoye refers to as “an egregious abuse of African and global solidarity” by African political leaders who argue that South Africa and the world should take care of the security of the nationals of their countries while they themselves are not using public institutions and resources to protect them as the first function of any serious government. They are responsible for a significant number of their nationals to emigrate (Araoye, 2015:10).

First (1982) expressed in his article, "*The gold of migrant worker*", that families and individuals from South Africa who were exiled lived alongside other Africans in host countries on the continent and overseas. Likewise, Clemens et al (2018), noted that internal and even international labour migrants converged in South African urban areas that offered economic and other life opportunities, where they competed for diverse resources and South Africa's political freedom, which it gained in 1994, resulted in an upsurge in migration, particularly of people from all across the African continent (Vosloo, 2020).

As a result, the county's cities, particularly those in Gauteng and KwaZulu Natal provinces, had a tremendous population increase in the first two decades of the twenty-first century (Stats SA, 2017). Between 2000 and 2004, there was a significant increase in the number of immigrants, with Africans accounting for approximately half of all immigrants in South Africa (Crush *et al*., 2015). According to Moyo (2021), South Africa's democratization sparked a surge in both illegal and legal immigration to the country.

In addition, Crush et al (2015) and Moyo (2021) assert that since 1990 the number of international migrants and refugees entering South Africa has increased. Even though accurate data on international migrants in South Africa is difficult to come by, one can argue that the number of migrants has increased dramatically. When illegal migrants are factored in, this figure skyrockets. Realistic migration projections based on the triangulation of data from many sources confirm that there has been an increase. This rise includes both documented and undocumented migrants, as well as refugees and asylum seekers, and represents a small percentage of the entire population of South

Africa (Moyo, 2021). The exact number of immigrants in South Africa is currently unknown, but there are many estimates of the number of legal and illegal immigrants (Chinomona & Maziriri, 2015).

Because of its middle-income position, strong democratic institutions, and comparatively industrialized economy, South Africa is home to or rather a favoured destination for many African immigrants (Moyo & Zanker, 2020). Anecdotal evidence has also suggested a persistent outflow of Black South African professionals, particularly in the medical and engineering fields, who leave to explore job prospects in richer countries. These immigrants are increasingly being joined by Black professionals from other African countries who had previously migrated to South Africa but have since left due to factors such as shrinking economic opportunities and rising xenophobic sentiment, which has at times translated into violent attacks on Black foreigners (Moyo, 2021). This migration has sparked concerns about a 'brain drain' from the country and the continent at large in recent years.

According to the 2011 census, three-quarters of South Africa's immigrants are from elsewhere on the African continent, and 68% of these Africans came from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region (Stats SA, 2011). According to United Nations data from 2020, Zimbabwe was the most common nation of origin of all immigrants. South Africa also attracts a large number of European immigrants (UN, 2020), see Table 2 below:

Table 2. Immigrants in South Africa, 2020 (from the SADC region)

Country of Origin	Number
Zimbabwe	690 200
Mozambique	350 500
Lesotho	192 000
Malawi	94 100
Democratic Republic of Congo	63 900
Somalia	58 500

Botswana	50 500
Angola	47 900
Eswatini	45 400
United Kingdom	67 400
Total	2, 860 500

Source: United Nations Population Division, "International Migrant Stock 2020: Destination and Origin," 2020.

For the year 2021, the official estimates of South Africa's immigrant population are estimated to be around 2.9 million, which is roughly 5% of the country's overall population of 60 million people, according to Moyo (2021). Due to the large number of illegal migrants, particularly from neighbouring countries, this estimate is considered an underestimation. According to Stats SA, the Covid-19 pandemic has had a less direct influence on South Africa's population statistics, particularly when it comes to migration because lockdown regulations have effectively prevented most South Africans from leaving the country except in specific circumstances (Stats SA, 2021).

South Africa also has a continual outflow of citizens, especially from the White community, who migrate to nations like the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States (Moyo, 2021). After apartheid ended, many White South Africans grew disillusioned with the new majority-Black administration, and emigration accelerated almost three decades afterwards. In 1996, white citizens accounted for 11% of the population of South Africa, 9% in 2011, and only 8% by mid-2021. Emigration of White populations and reduced fertility rates among White groups have been blamed for the continued decline.

Internal mobility over the lockdown period has generally been temporary, Stats SA observed, indicating a considerable decline in foreign movement, which is symptomatic of the COVID-19 travel restrictions globally. South Africa was predicted to have a net foreign migration of 852,992 individuals in the 2016-2020 period, down from 916,346 persons in the 2011-2016 period, according to Stats SA, with net immigration expected to be high among Africans and Asians (Stas SA, 2021).

The majority of international migrants settle in Gauteng (47.5%), the country's wealthiest province, which includes Johannesburg's commercial centre, Pretoria's capital, and Ekurhuleni's manufacturing epicentre. Gauteng is South Africa's economic hub, drawing both international and domestic migrants from rural provinces like Limpopo, KwaZulu-Natal, and the Eastern Cape (Stats SA, 2018). On the other hand, the Western Cape attracted the second-highest number of immigrants from 2016 to 2021 (Stats SA, 2021).

The SADC region accounted for 68 percent of all international migrants, which is about 75 percent when calculated with all African immigrants (Census, 2011). This aligns intending to make it easier for people to travel throughout the region. However, when African migrants arrive in South Africa contend with reproach. Apart from the various push and pull factors that have contributed to a rise in African migration to South Africa, the country's democratization in 1994 has been a major attraction for African immigrants (Nwonwu, 2010: 151). Regardless of the reasons for migration, African immigrants' optimism is the same, they want to settle down and find a way to make a living while seeking to blend in with the host community, and the African Renaissance encourages and promotes such optimism.

More importantly on the continental aisle is the undeniable lack of political will in many African states to stem emigration through an un-bating and export of mass-produced poor and wearied who are primed to go in search of greener pastures further abroad or in the immediate abroad. Horrendous governance paradigms persist that continue to lead to the defection of a disenchanted middle class to the down-and-out constituencies of the wretched across the continent. Current challenges of human haemorrhage and undesirable cargo from Africa to the world and in particular to South Africa constitute an egregious abuse of African and global solidarity. The state is at the heart of this global crisis (Araoye, 2015:10).

Movements within and across South Africa's borders have an impact not only on the country's and provinces' demographic structures, but also on the economic, political, and social composition of a community, province and the country as a whole (Moyo & Zanker, 2020). For South Africa's sustained growth and development, it's critical to understand and plan for the present and projected migration patterns with appropriate policies.

3.2 Dissecting migration policies (international and regional level)

To have a meaningful conversation about international and regional migration, we must think nationally (across sectors and spheres of government), regionally, and globally, while keeping in mind that policies adopted affect every community and individual in receiving and sending countries, including citizens and migrants visiting or residing in other countries. If a nation is isolated or fails to comply with international laws, conventions, treaties, and accords, it will not be able to survive or thrive in the globalized economy (UN, 2019).

Knowing migration policies is just as important as knowing and understanding significant migratory trends. On a global scale, countries formulate and implement migration policies to meet their international human rights commitments, maintain their political sovereignty, and advance their national development goals and ideals (OHCHR, 2012; McKenzie, 2017: 18). The United Nations (UN) Member States committed to enabling "orderly, safe, and responsible migration and mobility of people, particularly via the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies" as part of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 2030, Target 10.7. (UN, 2019).

In recent years, the world has seen developments in the management and governance of migration. Two global compacts on the international manifestations of migration and displacement, the “Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration, and the Global Compact on Refugees”, were finalized by UN Member States, presenting a historic transformation and development of migration policies at the global level (IOM, 2021). These compacts represent the culmination of decades of effort by States, international organizations, civil society organizations, and other actors (such as corporate sector organizations) to improve international migration governance (Tarisayi & Manik, 2021).

Various migratory realities have been discussed and explored in the years leading up to States committing to construct the compacts to gain a better understanding of the benefits of migration as well as the challenges it may present through numerous conversations, seminars, consultations, and events at the international, regional, national, and local levels (Tarisayi & Manik, 2021). State migration laws regulate nation-state membership, effectively serving as a checkpoint for territorial sovereignty enforcement (Adams & John, 2003; Vespe *et al*., 2017). As a result, migration policies

are typically tied to national identity since they distinguish citizens from non-citizens. Furthermore, Nwunwo (2010) asserts that migration policies serve to identify the individual as someone who is not a citizen of the country, making identification and control easier. In so doing, they have increased exclusionary power.

A variety of international policies have been incorporated into international treaties and human rights instruments in order to provide a common framework for controlling migrants' rights and responsibilities, among other things (OECD, 2020). However, the execution of these policies is dependent on government approval and the government's ability (or, in some cases, political will) to pass such legislation. ‘Return, restrictive and recruitment policies’ are only a few examples of migration policies (OECD, 2020). Restrictive policies threaten individual international migrant rights and also have the potential to suppress positive feedback effects (Clemens, *et al*., 2018). Although return migration policies may benefit migrant source countries in the long run, few officials in receiving countries have yet to justify temporary admission limits on this basis (Clemens*, et al*., 2018).

Regional and intergovernmental agreements are required for migration regulation. Migration management and regulation in a specific area may be a matter of international, regional, or intergovernmental action, depending on the type of migrant flows (IOM, 2021). For example, some researchers argue that skilled migration should be handled entirely through intergovernmental agreements while adhering to global and regional norms because the benefits of such migration are primarily national, while others believe that regional skills pools should be addressed at a regional level (Thompson, 2016; Khan & Lee, 2018; IOM, 2021). Low-skilled and informal migration, on the other hand, may be best addressed within regional frameworks because it might be viewed as a regional 'good.'

The majority of governments (61%) in the world have a policy of maintaining current migration levels (UNDESA, 2016). Around 13% of other governments have policies in place to restrict recorded migration into their country, while 12% have strategies in place to increase it, and 14% have neither an express strategy nor do anything to influence migration trends (UNDESA, 2016). Europe, followed by Asia, has the most countries planning to increase migration levels, whereas African countries, on the other hand, are attempting to reduce present migration numbers.

Anderson-Nathe and Gharabaghi (2017) assert that countries in the north and west of the world have enacted more restrictive and isolationist policies to control migration, study, and monitor people. Hate crimes and xenophobia have increased as a result of these tendencies. The rise in hate crimes in the aftermath of the Brexit and Trump elections, for example, has exacerbated polarization and altered social norms. It is argued that as extremist people and organisations have become more tolerated, they have felt more empowered to act on nationalist and xenophobic attitudes (Anderson-Nathe & Gharabaghi, 2017).

In the case of asylum seekers and mixed migration, the concept of global public policy comes to the fore (Peterie & Neil, 2020). In such circumstances, international actors such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) must collaborate with regional and national authorities to manage border crossings (Amnesty International, 2019). Furthermore, whether regional entities or intergovernmental agreements take precedence depends in part on whether the regional policy goal is intra-regional free movement, in which case regions must be active, or regulated labour mobility, in which case regions can be more passive (Amnesty International, 2019).

On a continental level, the African Union (AU) has established a "strategic framework for a migration strategy" and a "migration special program" inside its Social Affairs Directorate on a continental level (AU, 2020). The program's goals include addressing the causes of internal and international migration, as well as the "challenges posed by migration," but it also encourages countries to collaborate to "take full advantage of the opportunity provided by the phenomenon" (AU, 2020). In addition, the framework aims to assist AU Member States in their efforts to encourage the free movement of people (AU, "Resolution Regulation on the Establishment of a Strategic Framework for a Migration Policy in Africa").

The African Union also formulated the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which was signed by 44 of the 55 AU member nations in Kigali, Rwanda on the 21st of March 2018 (AU, 2020; Apiko *et al*., 2020). The historic day also saw the launch of two other continental initiatives: the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and the Single African Air Transport Market (SAATM), both of which are complementary to the implementation of the AfCFTA. In essence, Member States are required to eliminate

tariffs on 90% of items under this accord, allowing the free movement of commodities, goods, and services across the continent. It also seeks to remove barriers to Africans' capacity to travel, work, and live inside their continent by amending restrictive legislation and lobbying for visa-free travel so that all Africans can freely move around the continent (AU, 2020).

The AfCFTA went into effect on May 30, 2019, marking the penultimate step before it became operational. Except for Eritrea, all African countries have signed the AfCFTA, which has been ratified by more than 30 countries. The AfCFTA's operational phase began on July 7, 2019, with the establishment of the five operational instruments that regulate the AfCFTA. In August 2020, the African Union Commission opened the AfCFTA secretariat in Accra, Ghana. The launch of trading was postponed from 1 July 2020 to 1 January 2021 due to the global catastrophe caused by the COVID-19 epidemic (Apiko *et al*., 2020).

Concerning other policies or initiatives adopted by African countries in relation to the movement of people, it is worth noting that governments in Sub-Saharan Africa are generally either neutral or hostile to migration. Countries' attitudes about migration have varied throughout time. According to a review by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, about seven countries, including Kenya, Gabon, Côte d'Ivoire, Botswana, Namibia, Djibouti, and Gambia, reported that migration levels were too high in 2000, while another eleven reported that they had policies in place to reduce migration (UNDESA, 2002; IOM, 20219. Gabon, Sudan, Burkina Faso, and Guinea-Bissau have all recently stated that migration is excessive and that their goal is to reduce it (IOM, 2019). Only one country, Cape Verde, thought its level of migration was too low in the UNDESA poll, and even then, there was no explicit government policy to promote it.

Despite the existence of an African migration policy, it is mostly unimplemented in the SADC region. The African Union recognizes the critical role migration plays in the development of the continent and the need for Member States and Africa's Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to formulate migration policies that manage migration and harness it for Africa's development, according to the Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA) (Achiumwe & Landau, 2015). Despite the fact that the MPFA is not

legally obligatory, the absence of a regional migration policy in SADC shows that Member States are yet to adopt the primary MFPA requirements.

While the goal of the SADC is to make migration easier, the regional reality is a mix of informal, mostly irregular migration into South Africa and managed regular migration of skilled (mining, education, etc.) and low-skilled (agricultural) workers between South Africa and several neighbouring countries (Ramphele, 2016; Whitaker, 2017). Many memorandums of understanding (MOUs) and bilateral agreements are out of date and go unnoticed. South African migration policy has evolved, indicating a shift toward increased bilateralism and the reinforcement of a targeted skilled migration approach, while leaving low-skilled illegal migrants with limited legalization options (Facchini, 2013; Fauvelle-Aymar, 2015; Vosloo, 2020). South Africa, as the region's most developed economy, attracts a diverse group of people, including skilled and unskilled workers, long-term migrants, and short-term visitors from other countries in the region and its migration and border policies are very important to neighbouring countries.

3.2.1 South African Migration Policies

Migration has always been linked to people's social, economic, and political life in South Africa, and it is influenced by the environment in all three of these areas. International migrants as well as South Africans and their families who want to relocate from their birthplace are often lured to certain regions that are deemed to offer better opportunities (Adiba, 2016).

An analysis of South African migration policy requires the use of two lenses, one for pre-1994 and the other for post-1994, with democracy playing a key role in the positions taken by the apartheid and democratic governments regarding migration. Klotz (2013: 1895) holds that during the apartheid era, migration policy was a field reserved for Whites alone. International migrants, therefore, needed to be able to blend in with the White population, which was ensured by migration policies that included racial criteria (Crush, 2000b; Hopstock & de Jager, 2011: 122).

The 1913 Immigration Act and laws made it illegal for Black Africans to enter South Africa unless they were temporary guest labourers subject to influx control regulations after they arrived (Hopstock & de Jager, 2011). As a result, the State established a "two-gates" policy, separating Black and White migrants and encouraging White

migration over Black migration (Peberdy, 2001). According to Castles (2000), this two-tiered migratory approach was certainly more of a weapon of exclusion. The guiding principle in all of these categories was that migration "should not result in significant social and cultural change in the receiving society" (Castles, 2000).

According to Crush (1999; Landau, & Segatti, 2008; Vosloo, 2020), the pre-1994 government aided White migrant labour, particularly in the mines, by permitting British nationals and other White immigrant workers with mining experience to enter the country. Not only were these migrants given permanent residence and voting rights in the cities, but they were also given supervisory and skilled professions and roles (Crush, 1999). White immigration was encouraged in general to increase the number of White people in South Africa and to provide skilled work. For instance, Vosloo (2020), reveals that British immigration was pushed as a political weapon and perceived as a threat to Afrikaner supremacy and identity in the run-up to the 1948 elections.

Before the advent of democracy, the Aliens Control Act of 1991 was one of the last laws approved during apartheid, and it clashed with the new democratic authority that took office when apartheid ended (Crush, 1999). The law imposed harsh penalties for illegal migration and assisting illegal migrants, as well as broad search and arrest powers for migration authorities. The Aliens Control Act, despite its apartheid origins, remained in effect for several years after democracy was established, it regulated migration to the country until 2002 to be precise and was responsible for hundreds of thousands of illegal migrant arrests and deportations (Landau, & Segatti, 2008).

Although the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) had established an agreement with the apartheid government to give special permits to asylum seekers and refugees under the Aliens Control Act, there was no refugee legislation in effect in 1994 (CoRMSA, 2008; Khan & Lee, 2018). The Aliens Control Act was replaced by the Immigration Act of 2002, which maintained a strategy of preventing irregular migration while encouraging skilled labour migration. Following amendments in 2007 and 2011 to reflect changes in South Africa's migration policy, it nonetheless retains aspects of the apartheid era's focus on allowing certain types of immigrants in while restricting others (Khan & Lee, 2018).

The Immigration Act no 13 of 2002, in certain ways, reflects a proper South African strategy for international migration. However, Khan and Lee (2018) believe that for a long time, the policy did not effectively offer projected strategic benefits for the country's development due to poor management of status determination, residence, and citizenship status, necessitating a revision of the international migration policy in 2017. Most low-skilled employees from elsewhere in the SADC region, who have very little prospect of lawfully migrating to South Africa, appear to be ignored by the Immigration Act. Hence, Clemens et al (2018) assert that South Africa's strategy led to job losses and a reduction in the number of migrant mineworkers, worsening the socioeconomic crisis in exporting countries.

South Africa is also a signatory to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, its 1967 Protocol, and the 1969 African Union Refugee Convention (Camminga, 2018). The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Cahir), the Luanda Guidelines on Arrest, Police Custody, and Pre-Trial Detention in Africa, and other international obligations arising from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights require South Africa to respect and promote the human rights of all people within its borders, regardless of national origin (ACHPR, 1981; Amnesty International, 2019).

South Africa has spent considerable time developing a coherent migration system, which includes effective border controls, migrant selection criteria, visa issuance and re-issuance, as well as responsive administrative mechanisms for managing involuntary immigration of asylum seekers and refugees. With the majority of Africans travelling within the continent and preferring to settle in South Africa, Isike and Isike (2012) argue that developing a coherent migration policy and system that adequately responded to the country's rapidly changing migration landscape became even more difficult for the government. South Africa's new administration was inspired by the country's democratic transition in the mid-1990s to reorient its migration policy to reflect the country's regional and worldwide political status (Isike & Isike, 2012)

According to Crush and Ramachandran (2009), the Immigration Act of 2002 presented post-apartheid policy instruments and migration norms that allow for the sanctioned movement of immigrants into South Africa. This Act regulates skilled migration, student migration, tourist migration, and other types of permanent and temporary migrants, as well as detention and deportation procedures (Crush, 2008). This bill

maintains the Aliens Control Act's strong security and sovereignty-centred agenda by including the core themes of security, border control, and the use of law enforcement to restrict migration.

The current international migration strategy is based on the White Paper on International Migration, which was implemented in 1999 (DHA, 2017). The White Paper also indicates that South Africa has yet to reach an agreement on how to manage international migration for development at the policy, legislative, and strategic levels (DHA, 2017). As a result, an ineffective discussion between those who advocate for stronger immigration regulations and those who advocate for looser limits has shaped national thinking and attitudes toward international migration. On the administrative side, there's a lot that still needs to be done, and the Department of Home Affairs in its role of enforcing migration policies should regulate immigration efficiently and securely.

3.3 Xenophobia: a reflection of exclusion and disruption of African Renaissance in South Africa

The discourse regarding xenophobia in South Africa has piqued the interest of political leaders, academics, policymakers, citizens, and civil society organizations in the country, across the continent, and abroad (Neocosmos, 2010). Some scholars argue that this malevolent practice, which is common in South African urban-rural communities can be attributed to a struggle for scarce resources, highlighting that black South Africans are frequently dissatisfied with the competition with African migrants for jobs and business opportunities (Mngomezulu & Dube, 2019; Matsinhe, 2011).

According to Crush and Ramachandran (2009), South Africans' discontent and violent behaviour toward African migrants is a direct result of the exclusion and marginalization of anything that does not qualify as or originates from South Africa. Even though some scholars attribute xenophobic behaviour by South Africans to issues such as foreigner-related crime, such as drug trafficking, robbery, the establishment of brothels, and failure to follow local laws (SAHO, 2017), it remains a massive disruption of a 'development plan for Africa,' which advocates for 'unity, peace, and security,' as reinforced by African Renaissance.

For instance, the recent ‘’Operation Dudula’’ well-known in Gauteng, especially around Soweto has been accusing illegal foreigners of criminal networks and taking jobs meant for locals and went as far as chasing and removing foreign national street vendors in Soweto and Johannesburg CBD (Mfundo, 2022). In January 2022, Mfundo, (2022) expressed that “Operation Dudula” demonstrations turned ugly as the protesters claiming to clean the country clashed with police who fired rubber bullets to disperse the crowd. “Operation Dudula” claims that it aims to restore and clean the streets with immediate effect because South African citizens had enough of the false promises made by the government, the corruption and the illegal immigrants that are causing problems in South Africa (Feketha, 2022).

Therefore, campaigning for the removal of foreign immigrants in South Africa is their mission. The Foundation for Human Rights (FHR) has slammed “Operation Dudula” which has recently been conducting “clean-up” operations targeting illegal foreign nationals in Soweto and other parts of Johannesburg, also expanding to Limpopo in which they evicted foreign nationals from their rented homes and informal trading stalls (Feketha, 2022).

Even in the democratic era, the country has seen some gruesome xenophobic attacks that have occurred in practically every part of the country, with attacks occurring in all nine provinces, see the table below:

Table 3: Incidents of xenophobic violence in South Africa by province: 1994 – 2021

Province	Total number of incidents
Gauteng	343
Western Cape	139
KwaZulu Natal	105
Eastern Cape	61
Limpopo	44

Mpumalanga	33
Free State	28
North West	26
Northern Cape	8
Unallocated	9
Total	796

Source: Xenowatch Factsheet 2 (by Misago & Mlilo, 2021)

Xenophobia has become a recurrent phenomenon in South Africa, and it has made many migrants, especially those from other African countries, feel unwelcome in the country. The xenophobic violence witnessed in recent years has highlighted the need to protect immigrants' and refugees' rights to enhance social cohesion and promote a sense of belonging among immigrants (Ndaba *et al*., 2019). Public animosity toward immigrants in South Africa has motivated anti-immigrant riots, violence and prejudice, setting back African hopes of citizenship and well-being, and the dream of the African Renaissance where the main objectives, unity and integration are constantly being undermined (Ndaba *et al*., 2019).

The table above clearly indicates that xenophobia is a national crisis, as it occurs in all of South Africa's nine provinces. The continuous sporadic eruptions of xenophobic attacks in the country also suggest that foreign nationals, especially African immigrants in this context, are excluded from the social protection that the States provide to those who live in South Africa. Gauteng, Western Cape and KwaZulu Natal are the three provinces that have seen the highest number of xenophobic incidents in the country from 1994 until 2021 (Misago & Mlilo, 2021).

Gordon (2019) articulates that the police have been accused of being complicit and ignoring crimes committed against foreign nationals and tend to victimise foreign complainants. According to the framework of exclusion developed for this study, police actions, in this case, imply that the State (law enforcement) is the agent of exclusion,

and the object of exclusion is social protection. In addition, Gordon (2019) states that the police's continual harassment of immigrant business owners in the guise of detecting counterfeit items could be seen as another form of xenophobia endured by African immigrants at the hands of authorities. Gordon (2019) stresses that operations that confiscate counterfeit goods have often targeted areas dominated by African immigrant businesses.

Once there is an outburst of a xenophobic attack in a certain community/township, the violence usually spreads across provinces. Xenophobic attacks have been vastly reported in Kwa-Zulu Natal and Gauteng over the years, but they have expanded across all nine provinces, with many going unreported countrywide. Gauteng, Western Cape, and Kwa-Zulu Natal have been identified as the hotspot provinces, with 343, 139, and 104 incidents reported, respectively (Misago & Mlilo, 2021).

On the other side of the country, the Eastern Cape, Mpumalanga, and Limpopo have all had fewer than a hundred occurrences of xenophobic violence since the country's democratic history began, with 61, 44 and 33 xenophobic violent incidents reported in the three provinces, respectively (Misago & Mlilo, 2021). A few incidents have been reported in the North West and Free State, with only 26 and 28 incidents reported for the two provinces, respectively. According to Xenowatch, a public tool that tracks xenophobic threats and violence in South Africa, as depicted by Misago and Mlilo (2021), the Northern Cape has had the fewest xenophobic attacks in the country, with only 8 cases reported between 1994 and 2021.

Gordon (2017) conducted public opinion research and found that the vast majority of adults in South Africa believe that international migrants have a negative impact on the country. Concerns about the negative impacts of immigration are frequently unfounded. Consider the widespread belief that foreign nationals are a big contributor to crime. Kollamparambil's (2019) recent empirical investigation finds no evidence to support this supposition and implies that other factors (such as income inequality, poverty and unemployment) better explain crime patterns in South Africa.

Kollamparambil (2019) notes that, in addition to immigrants, internal migrants should also be considered when investigating crime, particularly in South Africa, where internal migration remains an important phenomenon. The argument about the

negative impact of foreign nationals in the country usually informs citizens' views and socio-economic discontent, which is subsequently directed at foreign nationals as a play of the politics of belonging in the lack of official crime figures disaggregated by residence and citizenship status (Charman & Piper, 2012; Chinomona & Maziriri, 2015; Masikane *et al*., 2020).

South Africa's anti-immigrant violence reveals several alarming themes and patterns. Xenophobic violence appears to be concentrated in areas with a history of social and spatial imbalance (Chinomona & Maziriri, 2015). These regions are marked by informality, with a level of competitiveness between citizens and foreign nationals who have established there and made a living for themselves, and they provide fertile ground for beliefs that violence is fuelled by a battle for few resources and the need to survive (Masikane *et al*., 2020). Access to certain essential services is limited, which puts locals in a constrained situation, especially when they observe foreign people who appear to be benefiting from services and enjoying better lives than they do.

Xenophobia in the rainbow nation (South Africa) has little to do with the ‘fear of a foreigner’ as ‘xenophobia’ literally means. It is more of a prejudice, negative attitude, hate, and intolerance problem in the Southern African country (Adam & Moodley, 2013; Duponchel, 2013). Xenophobia is a strong sign that African migrants from Sub-Saharan African countries, as well as black foreigners from all across the continent, continue to struggle to integrate into South African communities (Yordanos *et al*., 2019; Tarisayi, & Manik, 2021).

Research on xenophobia shows that most South Africans prefer immigrants from Europe and North America to those from across the African continent. Yordanos et al., (2019) interpreted the above-mentioned literature and noted that the disadvantage of such literature is that it tends to depict black South Africans as a homogeneous group, leading to the adoption of the word Afrophobia to characterize the hatred and intolerance of people from other African countries by their black South African hosts.

In confronting such notions and practices, the African Renaissance rejects the Eurocentric mentality of South Africans, which aims to maintain the subjugation of African immigrants, by addressing such ideas and practices. The colonial divide between oppressor and oppressed have now been converted into a post-colonial

colour code that separates black outsiders (African migrants) from black insiders (South Africans).

The abovementioned Afrophobia and the abuse of African immigrants in South Africa and other African countries is a direct deterrent to the advancement of the African Renaissance. Furthermore, it depicts exclusion and represents the African Renaissance tragedy, in which the fundamental components, namely unity and peace, are shattered. In essence, the concepts of great Pan-Africanists like Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere, who both pushed for African interests and goals of solidarity "united African community" transcending boundaries and ethnic divides, are embodied by the African Renaissance (Zimmerman *et al*., 2009).

The fact that xenophobic violence is mostly directed toward African immigrants, the bulk of whom are from Sub-Saharan Africa, is discouraging and possibly embarrassing to those who advocated for the African Renaissance (Long *et al*, 2015). Inclusivity and integration, which Kwame Nkrumah emphasized as important components of the African Renaissance and the 'beginning of independence,' now appear to be abandoned, and the exclusion of social groups (African migrants) within the same society (South Africa) appears to define the new nationalism, focusing on the new political cleavage of indigenousness and origin (Neocosmos, 2010; Simkins, 2017). "Who has citizenship but should not have it, and who should have it but does not?" appears to be the new national question (Anderson-Nathe & Gharabaghi, 2017).

Neocosmos (2010) is of the view that citizenship is regarded as a critical criterion that confers access to social services and welfare, work, land, and other benefits, but it is increasingly denied to African migrants. The leader of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) Julius Malema, is one political leader who has been very vocal about combating xenophobia in South Africa. Malema has on several occasions pleaded with EFF supporters and South Africans, in general, to “stop killing brothers and sisters from Africa” (Ndenze, 2019).

South Africa is grappling with the "dilemma of modernity" (Asante, 2014; Umezurike & Ogunnubi, 2016) in championing the African Renaissance, which is shown in poor management of irregular migration, dealing with xenophobia, and removing hurdles to migrant integration (Thompson, 2016). The Afro-modernity goal of the African

Renaissance supports intra-African trade and cross-border travel as individuals participate in cultural activities (Mbeki, 1997). The current approach to xenophobia in the United States is complex, and it works to maintain exclusion to some extent. It comprises official policy documents, administrative processes, and political leaders' statements that emphasize exclusion and lacks consistency and coherence in their responses to migration and relations between African migrants and South African citizens.

The tragedy of the African Renaissance, which is mirrored in xenophobia and the exclusion of African migrants, stems from the researcher's reflections on literary arts, specific tragedy in drama, which is about human suffering or death (Taplin & Billings, 2010), and Garreth Hardin's tragedy of the commons (Taplin & Billings, 2010). (Hardin, 1968). Individual actions that cumulatively deplete the common resource are referred to as the tragedy of the commons. The violent attacks and prejudice against African migrants that have occurred in South Africa over the years may constitute an epidemic of displaced anger in communities that is supported by exclusionary macro-politics (Fourchard & Segatti, 2015, Long *et al*, 2015). Instead of tackling the source of such rage, it is channelled through xenophobia towards other, equally disadvantaged African migrants, and as a result, disrupts the African Renaissance.

3.4 Social misfit theory

This study contributes to a comprehensive understanding of the role that immigrant background or status plays in the exclusion of African immigrants. According to the *social misfit theory* first introduced by Wright et al. (1986), individuals and groups are usually rejected or rather excluded when they differ from others according to one or several characteristics, and more often than not immigrants' nationality, race and citizenship can be such characteristics (Jackson *et al*., 2006; Vervoort *et al.,* 2010). Vulnerability to exclusion is greater in contexts where one's ethnic group comprises a situational minority (Graham 2006), which occurs regularly in ethnically segregated communities, like that of South Africa.

A further argument in synchronising the social misfit theory into this study is that African immigrants somewhat deviate from the majority ethnic groups of the host communities and are different in some discernible way, such as behaviours or appearance and language, and are often targeted for victimization. African immigrants

or ethnic minorities often deviate in such ways and thus may be perceived as not fitting in.

3.5 Policy framework on xenophobia in South Africa: government's efforts to resolve migrant exclusion

South Africa has taken a long time to develop a comprehensive policy response to xenophobia, a social problem with multiple local and international repercussions for the country (Gordon, 2016: 445). The evolving legal and policy framework recognizes xenophobia as a substantial social problem in South Africa that must be addressed alongside racism and discrimination. When considering the negative implications of this social problem, it is clear that it is yet another kind of violence that society must address through effective preventive and responsive programs that reach a large number of South Africans and immigrants (Gordon, 2019).

To begin with, the Bill of Rights, which is Chapter 2 of South Africa's supreme law, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, guarantees that everyone living in the country is protected against human rights violations, maltreatment, exploitative labour practices, neglect, or degradation (SAHRC, 2017). Contrary to popular belief, immigrants, particularly those of African descent, continue to face mistreatment, exploitative labour practices, abuse, and degradation, with little or no social protection from the state's law enforcement institutions.

What is even more critical is the failure of the South African government to deal decisively with the infringement of the rights found in the Bill of Rights, and other national, regional and international laws protecting the rights of immigrants, refugees and humans in general (Ndaba *et al*., 2019). The predicament that still prevails in a democratic South Africa is that African immigrants suffer xenophobia, as evidenced by the fact that violence against foreign nationals has increased since 1994, notably in provinces such as Gauteng, Western Cape, Free State, and KwaZulu-Natal (Misago & Mlilo, 2021).

The country squandered the opportunity to participate in the United Nations World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerances in Durban in 2001, and did not immediately follow up with policy developments based on the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action (DDPA)

(Gordon, 2016: 454). From the late 2000s, the South African government began to prioritize the battle against xenophobia by developing laws, policies, and programs in collaboration with civil society that address the country's migration-related challenges while also promoting nation-building. Some of the issues that the South African national government is facing indicate flaws in its policy and institutional framework, which are exacerbated by residents' increasing intolerance of immigrants (Crush & Ramachandran, 2009).

Following a series of violent attacks on African immigrants in 2015, the South African government began formal policy discussions on xenophobia. In March 2019, a plan was introduced and later approved by the cabinet, as the National Action Plan to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance (hereafter referred to as the "NAP") (NAP, 2016). This plan is an important tool to “prevent and combat racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic and other discriminatory conduct and forms of prejudice that have been experienced in South Africa”. It also serves as the nation's guide to eradicating intolerance in South African society, having been developed through a multi-year comprehensive consultation process including numerous stakeholders. The NAP demonstrates the State's explicit commitment to combating xenophobia.

The NAP outlines a series of specific initiatives to combat xenophobia, such as migrant integration, restructuring migration management, improving law enforcement, civic dialogue, and media participation (Gordon, 2019: 276). By 2024, these initiatives are expected to be accomplished (NAP, 2016). Overall, the NAP is merely a technical framework, and more detailed anti-xenophobia programs will be required. The NAP is unclear on how South Africans might express reasonable concerns about practices such as administrative and labour procedures related to immigration that may undermine social cohesion without resorting to drastic and damaging measures.

Notwithstanding a strong commitment to solving this social issue, policymakers are frequently faced with a scarcity of high-quality evidence on how to influence public perceptions about foreign nationals. Gordon (2016: 459) voiced that Inter-Ministerial Committees (IMCs) are frequently forced to operate with fragmented and, at times, contradicting sources of information, which has harmed government anti-xenophobia efforts.

Undeniably, the absence of reliable data was identified as one of the main difficulties by the drafters of the NAP on xenophobia concerns (Gordon, 2019: 275). Previous studies into anti-immigrant hate crimes such as the Special Reference Group on Migration and Community Integration chaired by Judge Navi Pillay identified this as a roadblock (Gordon 2015: 376). Given the State's limited resources, high-quality data is essential for efficiently targeting anti-xenophobia measures. The National Action Plan itself recognizes the need for more study and monitoring. Gordon (2016: 460) noted that IMCs, such as the IMC on Migration, the IMC on Social Cohesion, and the IMC on Population Policy, are tasked with detecting early warning signs of xenophobic hate crimes.

South Africa has seen an alarming increase in hate crimes such as xenophobia, homophobia, racism, and sexism-related crimes. These crimes differ from those classified as crimes under existing South African law in that they are motivated, in part or entirely, by the hate of the victim's identity. Concurrent with adopting the NAP, the government through the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (DOJ & CD) developed the Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Bill (DOJ & CD, 2018). The Bill fills a legal void in the area of dealing with hate crimes.

According to the Bill, a hate crime is committed when "a person is motivated by the other person's prejudice or intolerance towards the victim of the crime in question because of one or more perceived characteristics of the victim or his or her family member or the victim's association with or support for, a group of persons who share the said characteristics, ethnic or social origin, nationality, migrant or refugee status, or the victim's association with, or support for, a group of persons" (DOJ & CD, 2018).

In compliance with international law responsibilities, the Bill aspires to give effect to the country's commitments under the Constitution and international human rights treaties concerning racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and similar intolerance (DOJ & CD, 2018). It also establishes the offences of hate crime and hate speech, as well as the prosecution of those who commit these crimes. As per the DOJ & CD, (2018) the Bill also includes provisions for appropriate punishments to be enforced on those who commit hate crimes and hate speech, as well as prevention for such offences.

3.6 Implementing African Renaissance to promote migrant inclusion and address xenophobia

According to the preliminary literature review, the African Renaissance is centred on democracy, social cohesion and integration, economic development, and growth (Munyai, 2020.). That is why in the early stages of this study, it was said that the African Renaissance is a vision of being. Drawing from Duponchel (2013), the implication is that no African should experience exclusion and mistreatment (xenophobia) in any African country. Thus, on one side, the consciousness of and commitment to the African Renaissance is a necessity for the development, integration, and inclusion of all Africans. On the other side, the African Renaissance is also the outcome of the development, integration, and inclusion of all Africans (Diop, 1996).

In the African setting, and notably in South Africa, few researchers associate the phenomenon of migration with the African Renaissance and exclusion. Ruedin (2018) also bemoans the fact that much of the research on migrant exclusion focuses on boundaries outside of Africa. A lot of studies on the African Renaissance focus on identity and ethnicity, and adopt a model of "defensive" identity assertion (Mavimbela, 1998: 12; Oginni & Moitui, 2016: 41). Exclusion, particularly of African migrants, which is prevalent in South Africa, lays the foundation for the establishment of African Renaissance inspired politics of inclusion and social cohesion. As a result, further research is needed to investigate the link between the two occurrences of migrant exclusion and the African Renaissance.

Based on the conviction that the practice and commitment to the African Renaissance can ameliorate the exclusion of African immigrants in South Africa, the researcher harmonizes the theory of the African Renaissance. This exclusion does not only occur in Africa; it also occurs in other States and continents. For example, in North America, the exclusion of Mexicans and Arabs predominates in the United States, whereas in Europe, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Russia encourage the exclusion of Africans and Arabs (Clemens *et al*., 2018: 1473)

The exclusion of African migrants was recently witnessed in Ukraine in February 2022, whereby Africans working or studying in the country were discriminated against and excluded from getting transportation or any assistance when attempting to flee the

country to seek refuge owing to the Russian-Ukraine conflict (Noah, 2022). Furthermore, Noah (2022) criticized biased reporting and journalism for implying that the predominantly White people of Ukraine deserve more sympathy than Africans and people living in places with mostly non-White populations. According to Mlaba (2022), Africans attempting to flee Ukraine have been abandoned at border crossings and have faced discrimination in their attempt to board public transportation.

In Australia, Arabs frequently face exclusion, and in Asia, particularly in China, Africans are mostly excluded (Khan, 2007). Therefore, there exists a causal relationship between the exclusion of African immigrants in South Africa and the success of the African Renaissance. Increased levels of exclusion lead to the tragedy of the African Renaissance, while practice and commitment to the African Renaissance can mitigate the exclusion of African immigrants, according to this research. It is therefore important to go back to the basics and fully implement and practice the African Renaissance to promote migrant inclusion and address xenophobia.

Conclusion

This chapter analysed South Africa's position, response and policies on migration, and xenophobia and its role in spearheading the African Renaissance. The chapter's analysis of migration policies focused on various levels, from an international and regional (African) perspective to a local context (South Africa). The chapter further explored and dissected the role of government in addressing migration issues manifesting in the exclusion and violence against African immigrants in South Africa. Moreover, this part of the research reviewed the link between the African Renaissance and the migration of African immigrants. Additionally in this chapter, the national crisis of xenophobia and exclusion of immigrants was appraised and recognised as a disruption of the African Renaissance, while on the other hand, the inclusion of immigrants was asserted as significant to foster and advance the idea of the African Renaissance.

CHAPTER FOUR – RESEARCH DESIGN, METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

4.1 Research design

To collect and analyse data, the research design of this study took the form of desktop research, therefore conducting interviews was not necessary. This specific research methodology did not as maintained by Pierce (2008) present any harm or threat to anyone's physical, economic, social, political and psychological being or status as a result of the data collection process. Because the researcher interacted with publicly available material (data), there was no requirement for data protection in closed cabins or password-protected workstations. Where classified data was required, the researcher adhered to the Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA) as well as the Protection of Personal Information Act (POPIA). As a result, there was no need for a rigorous ethical approval process as the research posed little to no danger.

The research design relied on a mixed/hybrid method of social science research, which is a combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods (Maree, 2016). Therefore, data was collected and analysed using both qualitative and quantitative techniques. This mixed method fits well into the study because of its strong ability to '"generate answers to research questions that relate to multidimensional settings and problems" (Patton, 2014: 186), like that of the marginalization/exclusion and xenophobia towards African migrants in South Africa as discussed in this study.

To be more specific, quantitative measures were used to present migration flows, xenophobic incidents (dates and the number of cases) and several policies that influence migration by use of tables, calculations and graphs, whereas qualitative approaches guide in-depth analysis of migration reasons, the government's position, policies and response to migration and the social problems that are associated with it and the citizens' proposed solutions to resolve xenophobia. The qualitative style entrenched in the mixed method played a crucial role in terms of analysing and understanding citizens' behaviour/attitudes towards African migrants, and the nature of exclusion experienced by African immigrants. For this purpose, (see Table 2), the researcher developed a framework of exclusion to guide the analysis.

4.2 Data collection and analysis techniques

A desktop study like this one simply means that a wide range of secondary data was collected and reviewed for analysis. Secondary sources (written material or published surveys) were examined by the researcher mainly because they are "easily accessible and provide a tremendous amount of vital information to furnish and finish a study" (Maree, 2018:91). The researcher conducted a detailed analysis of a wide range of data that speaks to migrant exclusion, African Renaissance, migration, xenophobia, and policies in South Africa and other areas relevant to the study.

Data was not directly collected from participants or institutions but from secondary sources (including data sets) publicly available or resources provided by the various target institutions. The qualitative component focused on a review of various relevant documents to explore in-depth their respective intended purpose and focus, which is essential to understanding the key issues that relate to this study such as migration, exclusion (xenophobia and Afrophobia), African immigrants and Renaissance.

Journals and academic publications from online repositories such as Springer Link, Wiley online library, as well as newsletters and research papers and reports from Stats SA, Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), the United Nations (UN), International Organisation of Migration (IOM), and Xenowatch from the African Centre for Migration & Society (ACMS) are some of the secondary sources of information consulted to make a thorough analysis and also inform findings and recommendations of the study.

This study followed a view by Williams (2011) that the freedom to follow and monitor trends and patterns and then uncover the gaps from past research results for better development of the new study is granted by thorough data analysis. Since this is a desktop study, content analysis and critical discourse analysis were both utilized to analyse data relevant to the study. Heaton (2004) and Willman (2011) hold that content analysis helps with determining the nature of a social problem, in this instance, content analysis on one hand helped the researcher understand and make sense of the social problem of migrant exclusion that manifests through xenophobic violence, arrests, and repatriations of African immigrants, as well as poor or no access to better opportunities and basic quality services.

Critical discourse analysis, on the other hand, goes beyond linguistic and psychological approaches by analysing data from a critical perspective. This type of analysis “looks at the narrative, or 'social story,' at play in the investigation” (Hammersley, 2003: 758), in this case, the social story is that of the exclusion, mistreatment, discrimination, and violence perpetrated against immigrants of African descent who have settled in South Africa. Critical discourse analysis also examines the dominant and subordinate discourses on offer in society, which in this study is reflected mainly by two opposing views in South African communities: a) some individuals and groups are anti-migrant and advocate for the removal, deportation, and disintegration of African migrants in society; and b) in contrast, some individuals and groups are pro-migrant and advocate for the integration, promotion and respect of migrants’ human rights, and encourage peace between the host communities and African migrants.

The critical analysis also explores conceptions of resistance and adoption of discourses among various social actors, as seen in Table 1: framework of exclusion, State and non-state actors are the agents of exclusion being studied to see which are more resistive to the idea of migrant inclusion and which are more open and adapting. In the exploration of both notions, Hammersley (2003: 758) believes that “critical discourse analysis does not only capture something important about the social world but also plays a key role in demonstrating how social phenomena are discursively constituted; it shows how things come to be as they are, that they could be different and that they can be changed with action”.

Conducting content analysis of international data on migration and migration policies, as well as exclusion, and integration of immigrants for this study led the researcher to secondary data, such as reports and studies from the Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division of the United Nations, which provide the international community with timely and accessible population data and analysis of population trends and migration patterns and policies for different countries and regions in the world. Since 1974, the Population Division has been tracking migration patterns and policies, notably those relating to international migration.

In 2015, the Population Division of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs undertook various studies on migration. The first study was to analyse

government migration policies across different regions in the world to determine if the implemented policies have an impact on the number of migrants that different regions have (UNDESA, 2016). The data was analysed with simple criteria indicating if countries/regions have official migration policies or not and whether such policies raise, maintain, or lower the number of migrants in the selected regions. The study was based on 196 countries across the globe, and the selected regions were Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, Northern America as well as Oceania, see the table below:

Table 4: Different government policies that influence the level of documented migration by region, 2015

Percentage (%) of government policies on migration				
Region	Raise	Maintain	Lower	No official policy
World	12	61	13	14
Africa	4	43	13	40
Asia	10	65	23	2
Europe	32	55	9	5
Latin America & the Caribbean	6	76	9	9
Northern America	0	100	0	0
Oceania	6	94	0	0

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2016).

Methodologically, “content analysis is used as a research tool to determine the presence of certain words, themes, or concepts within some given qualitative data” (Elo *et al*., 2014: 3). This means that the researcher can therefore quantify and analyse the presence, meanings and relationships of certain words, themes, or concepts. The researcher evaluated the language used within the different government policies that

influence the level of migration to search for predisposition or favouritism towards migrants. Afterwards, the researcher then made inferences about the themes/words within the policies. To analyse the policies using content analysis, the policies must be coded (as seen in the above table), or broken down, into manageable code categories for analysis (i.e. “codes”). Once the policies are coded, the codes can then be further categorized into “code categories” to summarize data even further.

Migration policies from different regions around the world were analysed to find out various governments’ positions. As seen in the table above the position and aim of government policies were categorized into four words/themes. Therefore for this study, content analysis was used to explore, analyse and break down the four words/themes into codes. The codes used to analyse migration policies herein are raise, maintain, lower and no official (policy).

Following a quantitative approach, to establish how many government policies aim to raise, maintain, and lower migration flows and even governments with no official policies at all from the 196 countries evaluated, a formula was developed (see below). Since the total number of countries is given (196), together with percentages of codes per region, the following calculation method was developed and used to determine the number of government policies:

$$N = \frac{\sum}{100} \times P$$

Where N represents the number of government policies per region

$\sum$ is the given sum of countries (196)

P is the percentage of policies per region (given)

Raise

The first code of analysis in this context of migration policies is '*raise*,' which denotes various countries' desire to raise migration levels. This refers to governments' policies aimed at increasing migration flows by having relatively open borders, encouraging and welcoming foreign visitors, and allowing them to settle in their communities. Now

making use of the calculation method developed above, the following can be interpreted about the number of government policies implemented to raise migration in the ***world***:

$$N = \frac{\sum}{100} \times P$$

$$N = \frac{196}{100} \times 12$$

N = 24 government policies

Therefore, 12% means only 24 government policies of all countries studied across the world encourage the rise of migration flows (UNDESA, 2016). Through the analysis of data drawn from the table above, Europe has the highest number of government policies (32%), to get the actual total number of policies in **Europe** the same method developed above was used as follows:

$$N = \frac{\sum}{100} \times P$$

$$N = \frac{196}{100} \times 32$$

N = 63 government policies

The 32% of government policies that seek to raise migration levels in Europe translate to a total of 63 government policies. Asia with 10% is the region with the second highest government policies aiming to raise migration (UNDESA, 2016). As per the calculation, 10% translates to the following number of policies in **Asia**:

$$N = \frac{\sum}{100} \times P$$

$$N = \frac{196}{100} \times 10$$

N = 20 government policies

Only 20 government policies in Asia aim to increase their migration levels. A few policies in Oceania and Latin America are striving to increase migration, with both regions accounting for 6% of government policies aimed at raising migration, therefore

the 6% for **Oceania** and **Latin America** implies the following number of policies as per the calculation: $N = \frac{\sum}{100} \times P$

$$N = \frac{196}{100} \times 6$$

$$N = 12 \text{ government policies}$$

Each of the two regions, Oceania and Latin America have 6 government policies which aim to raise migration levels. Africa has the lowest percentage, with only 4% of government policies focused on raising migration, which is made up of the following number of policies in **Africa**: $N = \frac{\sum}{100} \times P$

$$N = \frac{196}{100} \times 4$$

$$N = 8 \text{ government policies}$$

The calculation, therefore, indicates that only 8 government policies in the African continent aim to raise the migration level.

Maintain

In this study, the code 'maintain' refers to government migration policies that aim to maintain current migration levels. In other words, countries that do not wish to affect the increase or reduction of migrant flows. Out of a total of 196 countries studied throughout the world, 61% of governments have policies that aim to sustain current migration levels (UNDESA, 2016). To put into context, and construe the exact number of policies that intend to maintain migration in the **world,** the calculation formula devised was used as follows: $N = \frac{\sum}{100} \times P$

$$N = \frac{196}{100} \times 61$$

$$N = 120 \text{ government policies}$$

As per the calculation above, it was deduced that about 120 government policies from different regions across the world are firm in maintaining migration rates in the countries examined. All Northern American countries/governments (100%) examined

have policies that aim to maintain migration levels. Oceania and Latin America & the Caribbean were found to be the second and third regions with the highest number of policies, with 94% and 76% taking the same stance in terms of maintaining the number of migrants, respectively, according to the UNDESA (2016) report, the number of policies for both regions was calculated below:

Oceania

$$N = \frac{\sum}{100} \times P$$

$$N = \frac{196}{100} \times 94$$

$$N = 184 \text{ government policies}$$

Latin America & the Caribbean

$$N = \frac{\sum}{100} \times P$$

$$N = \frac{196}{100} \times 76$$

$$N = 149 \text{ government policies}$$

According to the UNDESA (2016) report, both Europe and Asia have several government policies in place for main migration levels. In Asia, 65% of government policies were enacted to maintain migration, whereas, in Europe, only 55% of government policies do so, see the calculations below:

Asia

$$N = \frac{\sum}{100} \times P$$

$$N = \frac{196}{100} \times 65$$

$$N = 127 \text{ government policies}$$

Europe

$$N = \frac{\sum}{100} \times P$$

$$N = \frac{196}{100} \times 55$$

$$N = 108 \text{ government policies}$$

Africa is rated very low in this category of policies that maintain migration flows, with only 43% of examined countries having migration policies to maintain migration levels, the actual number of policies was calculated as follows:

Africa

$$N = \frac{\sum}{100} \times P$$

$$N = \frac{196}{100} \times 43$$

N = 84 government policies

Lower

Another code utilized in this study to analyse migration policies is 'lower,' which looks into government policies that were taken to lower migration levels. Only 13% of the policies from the 196 countries studied from distinct regions across the world intend to reduce the level of reported migration into their countries (UNDESA, 2016). To determine how many government policies constitute 13% of the **world**, the developed formula was used as shown below:

World

$$N = \frac{\sum}{100} \times P$$

$$N = \frac{196}{100} \times 13$$

N = 25 government policies

From the calculation, there are about 25 government policies across the world that aim to lower migration rates in different countries of the six regions studied. **Asia** has the most government policies focused on lowering current migration levels, with 23% of policies in the region facilitating and ensuring the lessening of migration flows, the actual number of government policies that seek to lower migration flows is as follows:

$$N = \frac{\sum}{100} \times P$$

$$N = \frac{196}{100} \times 23$$

N = 45 government policies

With the use of the very same formula devised, Asia has a total of 45 government policies implemented to lower migration flows in different countries in the region. In **Africa,** 13% of government policies were ratified to lower the rates of migration. As per the formula, the percentage accounts for the following number of policies:

$$N = \frac{\sum}{100} \times P$$

$$N = \frac{196}{100} \times 13$$

$$N = 25 \text{ government policies}$$

Europe as well as **Latin America & the Caribbean**, both sit at 9% which interprets 17 government policies implemented to lower migration in countries around the regions:

$$N = \frac{\sum}{100} \times P$$

$$N = \frac{196}{100} \times 9$$

$$N = 18 \text{ government policies}$$

Countries in North America and Oceania do not have policies to curb migrant flows, with both regions sitting at 0% (UNDESA, 2016).

No official (policy)

The last code of content analysis for this research is "no official (policy)." This code denotes regions/countries whose governments have no official policy to affect migration levels in their respective countries. The number of countries analysed was 196, much like the other three codes. Around 14% of government policies in the world have no official policy to influence migration. The world percentage is made up of 27 countries out of a total of 196 countries studied in all regions. Africa has a high ranking in this category, with 40% of its countries having no official government policy aimed at impacting migration levels.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, 9% of the total countries have no official government policies in place to influence migratory trends. The percentage of European and Asian countries with no official government policy to change the number of immigrants in their countries is 5% and 2%, respectively. Countries in North America

and Oceania have 0% official government policy, implying that they have no clear official policy to raise, maintain, or even lower migration.

Since many third-world countries have taken positions and enacted policies that aim to sustain rather than increase migration levels, policies addressing migrant repatriation to home countries have gained more attention (Vespe *et al*., 2017; IOM, 2021). This demonstrates the significance of return migration in international migration flows on a global scale, both from the perspectives of host and home nations. This topic is intertwined with current debates over the possible good role of migrants in the development of their home countries, as well as the growing number of temporary migration programs implemented in destination countries, particularly in more developed regions (OECD, 2020).

In an attempt to examine the potentially positive role that migrants play in the development of destination countries, a study was conducted to analyze whether countries have policies to encourage the integration and inclusion of immigrants by kind of policy measure and region (UNDESA, 2016). The UNDESA study was conducted in 153 countries throughout the world and the selected regions were still as from the abovementioned study, Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, Northern America as well as Oceania, see figure 3.

For most destination countries, proper integration of international migrants remains a serious concern and a major challenge (Yordanos *et al*., 2019). Many developed countries, on the other hand, have taken steps to make it easier for immigrants to integrate into host societies, and facilitate that through language training and information campaigns that teach immigrants about the host country's life and culture, as well as legal provisions that guarantee non-discrimination and other explicit measures (UNDESA, 2016).

Integration policies are critical for achieving inclusive and sustainable economic growth in destination countries, as well as contributing to migrants' well-being (Achiumwe & Landau, 2015). Of the 153 countries analysed around different regions in the world, the majority, 90 countries (or 59%) of the total governments policies have implemented policies or programs aimed at integrating non-nationals into their societies, while the remaining 63 (41%) have not implemented any policy for the

integration of migrants (UNDESA, 2016). This implies that a lot of work is done at a global level to ensure the integration of international migrants in host countries.

To get a clear image of the study that was conducted to analyse the integration and inclusion of immigrants at an international level through government policies and programs, see Figure 3 and the content analysis below:

Figure 3: Percentage of governments with a policy to promote the integration & inclusion of immigrants by type of policy measure and region, 2015



Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2016).
Note: Based on 153 countries.

In this section informed by the data in figure 3 above, the content analysis focused on the theme of integration to draw inferences from the evidence provided.

In Africa, 40% of countries have enacted at least one policy measure to aid immigrants' integration, while in Northern America, 100% have. The most common type of intervention among the specific integration measures studied is anti-discrimination

protection, which is used by 52% of governments. Language skills training for immigrants and the transfer of professional credentials are two other popular measures implemented by 37% and 36% of the 153 nations studied, respectively.

The efforts of African and Oceanic governments to create and implement policies that facilitate the integration of immigrants through language skills training and the transfer of professional qualifications in their countries are rated very poor, with both areas scoring 17%. Furthermore, African states receive a bad rating when it comes to protecting migrants from discrimination. Only 40% of African countries have policies and programs in place to help immigrants integrate into their society (UNDESA, 2016).

North American and European governments, on the other hand, outperform the rest of the regions in terms of policies and initiatives that promote immigrant integration and inclusion. The majority of their integration policy measures contain regulations that protect immigrants from discrimination; 74% of European countries have such policies, while North America has 100%, meaning that all countries in the area have policies that protect immigrants from discrimination which usually manifests through xenophobic violence in countries like South Africa

The integration of immigrants is not always easy, especially in nations where non-nationals, face labour exploitation, exclusion and xenophobic violence (Yordanos *et al*., 2019). In South Africa, xenophobic violence, particularly towards African immigrants, is a serious concern and a social problem (Hiropoulos, 2017; Gordon, 2019; Masikane et al., 2020). Violence against foreign nationals in South Africa has worsened since 1994, particularly in provinces such as Gauteng, Western Cape, Free State and KwaZulu-Natal (Gumede, 2015). It occurs in public spaces, in the purview of the security forces and within the glare of the media. Without effective intervention by security forces, such violence can easily deteriorate into full-blown violence and anarchy in a country that is officially not at war.

Since 1994, there have been occurrences of xenophobic violence in South Africa every year. Migrant hostility persists, resulting in murder, mass displacement, injuries, threats, violence, looting, and the destruction of property and livelihoods (Gordon, 2015; Masikane *et al*., 2020). There have been a lot of xenophobic violence cases in South Africa, the cases from the year 1994 until 2021 are presented in Figure 4 below:

Figure 4: Incidents of xenophobic violence in a democratic South Africa by year: 1994 –2021



Source: Xenowatch Factsheet 2 (by Misago & Mlilo, 2021)

Content analysis of xenophobic violence in South Africa by year: 1994 –2021

South Africa experienced a high number of xenophobic attacks every year between 2008 and 2020. These as demonstrated by Misago and Mlilo (2021), peaked in 2008 and have since varied, with a rise also being witnessed in 2019. For more than a decade (1994-2005), South Africa had an extremely low rate of xenophobic violence, with only a few occurrences per year on average. This simply implies that during those years, there was still a high level of order and security, and the attitudes and behaviour of the host populations toward migrants were not as hostile.

Since 2006, the environment has been increasingly hostile to immigrants, causing tensions between African immigrants and South African citizens (Gordon, 2019). This resulted in the highest number of xenophobic violence incidents ever seen in South Africa, or anywhere else in the world, in a single year (2008). In 2008, there were 147 xenophobic attacks reported in South Africa, the highest to ever be recorded in the history of the country. A year later, in 2009 things improved, with less than three-quarters of the cases reported the previous year (2008) occurring in South African communities as a whole (Misago & Mlilo, 2021). After the 2008 attacks, Bekker (2015)

suggested that marginalised young South Africans, especially men perpetrated the xenophobic attacks.

Anti-immigrant violence began to develop and escalate in severity four years after South Africa's worst xenophobic year, 2008, as few serious efforts were made to critically address the problem and its root causes. According to Charman and Piper (2012), some foreign-owned businesses and houses had been robbed and destroyed by the time the anti-foreigner violence ended. Following the 2008 attacks, South Africa found itself in the international limelight due to a wave of xenophobic violence, the country's worst sustained violence since the end of apartheid.

The outbreak of xenophobic violence began to rise again in 2012, when 69 xenophobic attacks were reported, followed by 64 cases in 2013. In recent years, there has been an increasing trend in attacks that has seen not only violence and murders of fellow Africans but also masses participating in more public attacks, looting and damaging stores and businesses of immigrants (Bruce, 2017; Crush & Ramachandran, 2017). Jones (2020) claims that through failing to protect the rule of law, many disadvantaged communities have become conditioned to violent behaviour.

Xenophobic violence has been related to a diversity of causes, including jealousy on the side of locals regarding job prospects, foreigners consenting to lower salaries, and foreign economic triumphs, (Mantsinhe, 2011; Jones, 2020). Criminal activities such as drug trafficking, among many others, are frequently connected with foreigners in host communities. There is a frequent assumption that various groups of foreigners are linked to specific criminal acts that occur in specific locations, like hijacking buildings in Hillbrow, Johannesburg, and drugs and prostitution in Sunnyside, Pretoria. In 2015, the outbreak of xenophobic violence resurfaced, with 62 incidents reported. The main issue about xenophobic attacks on African immigrants is that "not enough is done to study and understand the cause of these attacks" (Solomon & Kosaka, 2013: 12).

After the 2008 attacks, 2019 saw the second-largest number of xenophobic incidents, with about 79 xenophobic incidents reported across South Africa. President Cyril Ramaphosa's address at the ANC's electoral manifesto for the 2019 South African general election, in which he pledged to tighten down on undocumented foreigners

participating in criminal activities, has been accused of fuelling xenophobic violence (Tarisayi *et al*., 2021). Despite the government's launch of the National Action Plan to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance (NAP) in 2019, Misago and Mlilo (2021) revealed that incidents of xenophobic violence and discrimination against non-nationals continued in South Africa in 2020 and 2021, with 51 and 14 cases reported for the respective years.

The most recent xenophobic cases reported were the ones that were said to be driven by “Operation Dudula” in early 2022. Operation Dudula is very popular in the Gauteng province, particularly in communities around Soweto. The operation alleges that the law enforcement agencies are corrupt and not dealing decisively with illegal foreigners who are responsible for crime in the country, therefore those who are part of the operation have decided to take matters into their own hands in terms of removing illegal migrants in communities around Johannesburg and Soweto (Mfundo, 2022).

In an effort to bring about solutions and open the floor for dialogue and meaningful engagements regarding combating xenophobia. The Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) conducts the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), an annual survey that in part aims to explain the interaction between the country's citizens and foreigners, their attitudes, beliefs, and behaviour patterns on various issues, like that of immigrants and violence against them (HSRC, 2018). One part of the survey asks South African citizens for their opinions about foreign nationals living in the country and seeks to find out their attitudes and behaviour.

To fully comprehend this issue of xenophobic violence occurring in South African communities, it is important to thoroughly analyse public opinion. Against this backdrop, the HSRC began using SASAS to draw people's opinions about foreign migrants. This is done using a representative sample of 7,000 people aged 16 and older living in households that are geographically dispersed across the nation's nine provinces produced by each SASAS cycle. 500 Population Census enumeration areas (EAs) serve as the primary sampling units for each SASAS cycle of interviewing. These EAs are then stratified by province, geographic sub-type, and majority population group. SASAS asked questions on anti-immigrant attitudes since 2008. Following xenophobic violence in May 2008, the SASAS study introduced a set of

questions on migration into the survey. These included questions on attitudes towards the threat proposed by migration and individual contact with migrants.

For this study, the results of this particular survey (SASAS), specifically those regarding the proposed solution for xenophobic violence in South Africa were reviewed and analysed. The results are presented in a graph, see figure 5 below:

Figure 5: Solutions proposed to solve xenophobic violence in South Africa



Source: SASAS Data (by HSRC, 2018)

To analyse the secondary data from the SASAS responses about what could be done to stop attacks against foreigners living in the country, a qualitative research technique, specifically critical discourse analysis (CDA) was used. Critical discourse analysis looks at the “dominant discourse/narrative" that prevails in the research (Hammersley, 2003: 758). This qualitative analytical strategy of CDA was used to critically analyse and explain how discourses construct, maintain, and justify social problems. The foundation of CDA is the idea that language use is intentional, whether discursive decisions are made consciously or unconsciously.

With the use of critical discourse analysis on the results from figure 5 above, it is clear that the country is quite divided on this important issue, with citizens proposing a wide

range of solutions to resolve and combat xenophobic violence (HSRC, 2018), CDA applied herein indicates that the expulsion of immigrants is the dominant narrative in the research regarding the proposed solution for xenophobic violence. This is evident from the data as 22% of the respondents' answers (discourse) about the preferred solution is expelling immigrants from the country. The expulsion of immigrants means deportation, taking all the non-South Africans and sending them back to their country of origin.

Further critical analysis of the data shows that a certain portion of the population's discourse, 13.1% put forward solutions that relate to law enforcement playing a role in resolving xenophobic violence in South Africa, which is the second dominant narrative. In this narrative, law enforcement agencies, like the police, immigration officers and the military if needs be, are required to take responsibility and combat xenophobic violence and ensure the safety and security of immigrants and even South Africans during immigrant-native conflicts. Some respondents' preferred solutions to xenophobic violence appear to revolve around border management, this third dominant narrative was supported by 11.2% of the respondents. Border management means the facilitation of authorized flows of immigrants across a country's border to detect and prevent irregular migration of non-citizens into the country.

Critically analysing the discourse of other respondents shows that 10.8% proposed solutions such as education and awareness, which highlights the importance of education in such social problems. In addition, one of the dominant discourses (answers) depicted through critical analysis is resource management, which was also proposed as a solution by at least 9.9% of the respondents. This solution includes for instance job creation and giving opportunities to immigrants as well as the broader South African population to limit the competition in the job and business space, which will in turn resolve the xenophobic violence that emerges as a result of such competition. Furthermore, another dominant narrative examined through the lenses of critical discourse analysis is foreign behaviour as a solution recommended by 8.2% of the respondents.

Other anti-xenophobia strategies and solutions put forward by respondents include attitude change (4.9%), meaning foreigners should conduct themselves civilly and

acceptably, and respect the law and the people of communities they settle in. Community dialogue (5%) is also a proposed solution, whereby the host community and foreign nationals are encouraged to have meaningful engagements while opening up a space to learn about each other's cultures, origins, systems and interests. Lastly, two small groups of respondents indicated more or less the same narrative regarding the solutions for xenophobia in South Africa. On one hand, the first group of respondents pointed out uncertainty (5.8%) concerning the solutions for xenophobic violence, which means the respondents are not sure whether there is a sustainable solution for the problem or not. On the other hand, the second group (3.5%) indicated that nothing can be done to resolve the problem of xenophobic violence in the country.

The general public is divided on how xenophobic violence can be resolved in South Africa, with many favouring solutions that could be described as prejudicial, such as the expulsion of immigrants Critical discourse analysis emphasises the need for interdisciplinary work to gain a proper understanding of how discourses and language function in contributing towards resolving social ills (Bowen, 2009). Critical discourse analysis is generally concerned with issues of power and justice and the ways that race, class, gender, religion, education, and so forth construct, reproduce or transform social systems (Hammersley, 2003). CDA was therefore used because it fits well into the study due to its ability to fundamentally and critically analyse a social problem, like that of the exclusion of African immigrants and xenophobia in South Africa and look deep into the solutions and recommendations given to deal with such a problem.

Key Findings

- The majority of governments (61%) in the world have policies that aim to maintain the rate of migration within their national borders.
- In destination countries, the emphasis has mostly been on strengthening the capacity for border control, a strategy to control international migration more effectively and to maintain the number of immigrants.
- In Africa, many countries do not have ratified official migration policies to encourage the rise of migration flows.
- Migrant exclusion is a global phenomenon that is generally informed by the belief that migrants are a burden to state resources.

- From the framework of exclusion developed for this study, it is clear that exclusion in South Africa is a result of the failure of the state and non-state agents to construct a social infrastructure allowing for a two-tier society, consisting of both citizens and non-citizens to be established peacefully.
- The exclusion that African immigrants receive from South Africans can thus be explained as 'reversed exclusion' one which was experienced by native South Africans from the apartheid regime and is now being exerted on foreign nationals by South Africans.
- Migration and xenophobia are global phenomena experienced by every region and country in the world.
- The majority of immigrants in South Africa come from neighbouring countries of the SADC region.
- Most of the migration problems in South Africa boil down to poor management of the migration system, which for a country that provides numerous pull factors should be addressed with urgency.
- Assessing and addressing migration problems in South Africa and other countries is particularly challenging due to the prevalence of high irregular migration. Therefore, harnessing the benefits of migration while managing the problems and risks is difficult.
- Comparatively, the scale of internal migration between provinces and municipalities is by far greater than international migration in South Africa, which poses challenges for government planning and social cohesion.
- South Africa still battles with xenophobia even during a post-apartheid era and under a constitutional democracy with the supreme law (Constitution) that embraces diversity. The problem of xenophobia in South Africa usually manifests through and advances to Afrophobia.
- It is easier for the government, and South Africans, especially the marginalized to shift blame onto migrants for the social problems that the country has. Foreign working nationals in South Africa are seen as a threat and are often targeted and exposed to xenophobic discrimination in various environments and settings.
- In terms of migrant inclusion and integration, North America and Europe are leading and doing a great job of ensuring that immigrants are included and well-

integrated into their countries through proper language skills training and protection against discrimination.

- Africa is performing poorly when it comes to implementing government policies to encourage and ensure migrant inclusion and integration, many countries in the continent do not even have official policies for this purpose.
- At a local level, the South African government does not have a clear, holistic policy for the integration of migrants into South African societies. The challenge for South Africa is to formulate a policy that takes advantage of the positive aspects of globalization, including migration, which will support the country's efforts at reconstruction, development and nation-building.

CHAPTER FIVE – RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Recommendations

The issue of African immigrants' exclusion is complicated, necessitating a multifaceted and multisectoral approach to solve. The issues brought up by both immigrants and the local community must be addressed. Finding a way to return to our shared humanity of seeing each other as people rather than the violent South African or the criminal foreigner is essential to resolving migration issues. The following suggestions are given in light of the study's findings above to lessen and end migrant exclusion and combat xenophobia in South Africa and around the world.

To improve migration governance, which includes information gathering and sharing, monitoring, support, and protection for all immigrants, regardless of nationality, governments of origin and destination should cooperate. Migration policies should be considered at the regional, bi-regional, and multilateral levels in order to establish common protection standards and enhance policy coherence in migration management because migration policies are by definition global.

When tackling and managing migration and related concerns, governments should also change their emphasis and focus on a security-focused strategy and move more towards a development-focused strategy. Respecting migrants' human rights is crucial for addressing issues like exclusion and xenophobia as well as limited access to opportunities and services. Therefore, governments and host communities should always support this principle.

Workshops and orientation programs about the law, culture and state of affairs of destination countries should be conducted before migrants can settle into host communities. Because immigrants are most likely to practice their own cultures once they are settled, these should be prioritized and utilized as instructional tools or programs to educate and inform migrants about South African laws and traditions, or those of any other country of destination. As a result, understanding the customs and regulations of the host communities will help migrants get ready and let them decide how and where their own cultures can blend with those of the natives.

Lesson learning is essential since various countries can gain from one another's expertise on how to manage migration well. Lessons can be drawn from the global regional governance structures already in place, some of which have specialized regional forums that deal specifically with migration issues. For instance, the European Union provides for the gradual opening of borders and the free movement of labour, allowing workers from 'less developed' economies access to some higher-income countries' labour markets for years to allow for labour markets' adaptation.

In South Africa, where violence against immigrants is a major issue, the government should work to improve everyone's basic living conditions, rights, and freedoms. Due to a lack of access to essential services, millions of South Africans continue to live in poverty and easily scapegoat immigrants for the countries’ socioeconomic issues, overburdening the state and stealing opportunities intended for locals.

Furthermore, the South African government must acknowledge the various capabilities and resource demands of the many institutions and officials responsible for controlling migration in the country, and find ways to improve to reduce irregular migration.

Educate the general public about the causes of local-immigrant conflicts and hate crimes against immigrants. As a result, more people will be aware of the laws in place, the authority's role and their role and response towards immigrants and have better knowledge of the National Action Plan (NAP). Consequently, less victim blaming will occur, both of which can help create a climate where xenophobic hate crimes are not allowed. Additionally, researchers, academics, advocacy groups, and civil society organizations need to fully take charge and all contribute towards dispelling misconceptions about immigrants in South Africa and enlightening citizens on the social and economic advantages of immigrant integration.

Since the lack of adequately funded immigrant assistance programs was mentioned as a serious concern in the most recent White Paper on International Migration, the UNHCR, civil society, and key stakeholders should collaborate through appropriate governance mechanisms to produce a strategic plan that is both explicit and resourced and implement an integration policy for migrants into South African society.

To boost efforts for immigrant integration, the Border Management Authority Bill of 2016 should be supported by the Department of Home Affairs and the Border Management Authority should be provided with funding to complete its mandate.

The attitudes and actions of the citizens and non-citizens should be regularly observed. It is necessary to monitor anti-immigrant attitudes and behaviours throughout time to evaluate and enhance the effectiveness of intervention efforts.

A judicial commission of investigation should be established by the government to investigate the causes of xenophobia so that those responsible, including prominent political and administrative figures, can be held accountable.

South African citizens and legal immigrants should both have readily available structures or offices/portals where they can report and voice legitimate concerns about illegal migration and issues that result from it, such as crime, cheap labour, and any labour-related administrative or procedural practices that may undermine social cohesion, without resorting to drastic and harmful measures.

Vigilantism or community/mob justice should be discouraged and prohibited where immigrants are perceived and suspected to be involved in criminal activities so that

the State's law enforcement authorities and judicial system can take over and prosecute. Thorough collection, review and analysis of data regarding the relationship between immigrants and crime are necessary and important.

Commitment and practice of the African Renaissance are important to pave the way for the development, social cohesion and inclusion of all migrants in South Africa, the rest of the continent and the world.

Conclusion

In today's increasingly interconnected world, migration has emerged as a reality that affects every region of the planet, and it will continue to occur and increase indefinitely. It primarily focuses on improving the social, economic, and physical security of persons who are relocating both within and outside of their place of birth as well as their individual, household, and communal status. In addition to examining people's social behaviour and institutional treatment of African immigrants, the research study, which was centred on the African Renaissance, also sought to evaluate the issue of migrant exclusion that occurs in a democratic South Africa due to xenophobia.

It is quite obvious that African Renaissance thought leaders find it disheartening and possibly embarrassing that the violent behaviour and attitude of South Africans are exclusively directed at African (black) immigrants. This problem calls for the recognition, commitment and practice of the African Renaissance to address the prevalent exclusion of African immigrants in South Africa, and anywhere on the continent. African Renaissance can therefore play an important role in this regard as an initiative aimed at achieving unity and connected to Agenda 2063, specifically, the second aspiration, which advocates for *an integrated continent, politically united and based on the ideals of Pan-Africanism.* Furthermore, the ideals of the African Renaissance are very crucial for the promotion of the free movement of people as well as peace and security. The African Union's Agenda 2063, which aspires to bring peace, security, and unity to the continent, served as the study's main source of inspiration.

Given the significance of the study and its implications for South Africa, it is important to point out that "it is becoming increasingly important to implement initiatives that address anti-immigrant sentiments, behaviour, and perceptions, which are likely to rise

amidst increased competition for jobs and scarce resources" as the country recovers from the economic challenges made worse by the COVID-19 pandemic. On a more positive and encouraging note, the pandemic has highlighted the significant role that migrants may play as essential workers in many sectors, including healthcare and agriculture. The Global Migration Data Analysis Centre of the International Organization for Migration reported that a sizable share of critical and crisis-affected industries are populated by migrants. For instance, in seven of the twenty countries that had the highest number of COVID-19 cases, foreign-born workers made up more than 13% of total service and sales employees (IOM, 2021).

Against this backdrop of growing interconnection, attempts to limit or even discourage international migration through legislation are probably destined to fail. Instead, the core of migration policies should be social integration and the protection of migrants, regardless of race, nationality or citizenship. Migration needs to be managed as a substantial component of development. Additionally, there is a critical need to monitor how South Africans view immigrants and how immigrants view South Africa and its citizens and then set up social cohesion programs that can aid in their integration into local communities. Deportation, harsh police action, and mob justice or vigilantism are all just short-term resolutions that are reactionary (Ndaba *et al*., 2019).

To address the marginalization of African immigrants and foster a more facilitated integration, inclusive, and welcoming environment for all in South Africa, this study can assist in identifying practical and relevant initiatives. The study can also add to conversations about xenophobic violence in South Africa, which has predominantly targeted African immigrants. Moreover, the study aims to play a part in bringing together government, civic society, and the black South African community to promote national identity differences that have a significant impact on African immigrants' interactions.

This research is essential in assisting the government and civil society in creating and putting into action successful public relations campaigns and other initiatives that can, among other things, impact and modify attitudes, behaviour, and perceptions regarding foreign nationals. It also makes an effort to close the data gap, which frequently serves as a barrier to efficient and targeted efforts meant to counter anti-immigrant sentiments and advance inclusiveness, which is in line with the National

Action Plan to Combat Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance. Closing on a positive note and with the hope to shift the perception of readers and that of the general public about this problem of the exclusion of African immigrants, it is therefore important to note the following:

''If a society's respect for the basic humanity of its people can best be measured by its treatment of the most vulnerable in its midst, then the treatment of immigrants offers a disturbing testament of the great distance South Africa must still travel to build a national culture of human rights'' (SAHRC, 1999).

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